NATION-BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: THE ROLE OF NGOS FUNDED BY THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

by

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A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Global Affairs

Written under the direction of Dr. Frank Fischer and approved by Prof Gabriella Kuetting Prof Allison Howell Prof Eduardo Moncada

Newark, New Jersey May, 2015
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Observations of recent developments in a globalizing world emphasize the importance of nation building as both a policy and a topic of academic discussion. Most recent nation-building projects are the effort of developed democracies to promote democracy and democratic values around the globe. One prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy is the strong civil society. The core of civil societies is the NGO sector. Therefore, the role of NGOs promoting democracy and democratic values is of paramount importance. Nevertheless, the role of NGOs in several nation-building projects is understudied, and demands substantial academic scrutiny. Examples of nation building in transitional and post conflict societies such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and elsewhere show little success. Literature suggests several reasons for the lack of NGOs’ success. This study focuses on the role of NGOs that promote democratic values as part of a strategy used to break the ethno-national political gridlock that cripples democratic changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further, this study aims to incorporate globalization as a new dynamic in nation-building studies. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina is a post-conflict, post-communist, and transitional society, it make an excellent case study that can be applied to different geopolitical and socio-cultural contexts of nation-building. These findings, applied, could make nation-building more functional and less costly.

Keywords: nation-building, globalization, regime change, democracy promotion, transnational NGOs, civil society, global civil society, neo-liberalism
Acknowledgment

First, I would like to thank my wife and my family for all support they have provided me throughout this endeavor. Many times my wife was the only light at the end of this long and shadowy tunnel. In addition, my two children born during the writing of the thesis were additional motivation and encouragement to finish this Odysseys journey. Second, I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my committee chair, Professor Frank Fischer who was always there when I need an advice and guidance in this complicated study. In addition, I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to my committee members, Division of Global Affairs, and Political Science Department at Rutgers University-Newark for all support and guidance. I would like to thank Ms. Ann Martin from DGA for all unselfish support she has provided. Lastly, I appreciate FEBA for scholarship that made the completion of this graduate degree possible.

Semper sint in flores.

Meho Buljubasic
May 24, 2015 Newark, NJ
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

The primary topic of the current study is nation-building with the specific focus on the democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The literature on nation-building is vast, and it is expanding fast. Nevertheless, there are certain gaps in the literature that require substantial academic scrutiny. The role of NGOs that promote democratic values in post-conflict, and transitional societies is particularly understudied. Therefore, this study will try to contribute to this body of literature by exploring the role of NGOs in nation-building and democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, this study aims to reveal the situational contexts, and challenges of democracy promotion in BiH faced by the nongovernmental organizations.

In addition, the current study aims to incorporate the study of globalization as a new dynamic in nation-building studies. This study will consider the impact of globalization on the recent democracy surges around the world.

The general framework for this study is borrowed from Giddens’ (2000, 2001) view on globalization and society. Giddens (2000, 2001) argues that globalization as a new dynamic is the cause of the struggle between modern and traditional institutions. In a very narrow sense, such a struggle is marked by the resistance of traditional institutions to the changes imposed by modern institutions. When applied to the societal level,
particularly the context of democratization in BiH, the ethno-nationalist parties, political leaders, and political institutions represent the traditional stream. On the other side, NGOs working on the promotion of democratic values are considered as a modern stream in the struggle. Therefore, this study assumes that democratization or nation building in BiH is a contested field where the competing modern and traditional competing streams clash. A more detailed discussion on this is provided later in the theoretical framework section of the study.

The general argument of this study is that recently the impact of globalization prompted several regime changes around the globe. The ultimate goal in these regime changes was democracy, which is perceived as the most desirable system of governance. Democratization that rebuilds the society (nation-building) requires “agents of change” that will “transplant” the democratic values seen in the developed western democracies to transitional societies. Within the present context of democratization around the world, in most cases these agents of change are nongovernmental organizations working on different levels (the local, regional, national, multinational, international, transnational, and global scales). However, this study argues that when NGOs are working to promote democratic values they face resistance from the traditional stream that varies according to the geographical context.

In some cases it is the tradition of a certain group of people, a nation, or other constituencies that share the same tradition that comes into conflict with the ideas embedded within democratic values promoted by NGOs. In other cases, it is the struggle of democracy against oppressive and corrupt regimes that use different strategies to resist changes that might ultimately oust them from power. Lastly, some other modern vs.
traditional dimensions might be present in NGOs’ advocacy of some transnational issues. However, the debate in the current study is limited to democratization in BiH. This study argues that the democratization process in BiH is a contested field where traditional and modern streams/trends compete.

**The reemergence of a nation-building as a topic in global affairs**

The end of the twentieth century was marked by events that changed global affairs. While 9/11 is currently a reference for terrorist attacks in the United States, this date also signifies the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, and the beginning of the fall of the Soviets as well.

Once suppressed by communism, new identities unleashed after the Soviets’ fall started the battle for international recognition and independence. These struggles in many cases resulted in the outburst of ethno-nationalism in former communist countries. The failure to respond to ethno-nationalism caused emerging national and ethnic identities to start the struggle for their nation states, and increased the area of their control and influence. This led to the struggle for territories and in some cases ethnic clashes on the eve of the 21st century. In some cases ethnic conflicts led to the break up of federations to federal units that started to seek their own independence, and in other cases countries tried to rejoin the territories of the countries populated by their ethno-nationals. Regardless of the outcome, the new nations, nation states, and transitional societies in general required nation-building that would rebuild their society. In most cases, democracy was the model chosen for rebuilding the society.
The second 9/11 made an even stronger impact on global affairs. Al ‘Qaeda’s attacks represented an attack on the U.S., a leading democracy and the strongest economic and military power in the world. This led the U.S. and its allies into two costly wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Despite the fact that the U.S. had a deliberate goal to annihilate the global terrorist network Al ‘Qaeda, and presumptively eradicate Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction capacity, it also had a neo-conservative ideological goal in the background (Schmidt & Williams, 2008) to promote democracy in the world.

The promotion of democracy in the Middle East region was seen as the priority. It is important to note that the same region comprises around 66% (OPEC, 2013) of the world’s crude oil production. Consequently, it is questionable whether the promotion of democracy in Middle East reflects an ideological or rational approach to foreign policy by the U.S., or perhaps it reflects both.

Once the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regimes were overthrown, the nation-building of these two nations became a top U.S. priority. The general policy was to use nation-building in order to establish democratic regimes. This way, democratization would bring stability to the region, protect the interests of West, and provide an early exit strategy for the U.S. and her allies from this costly military excursion.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the following attacks in Madrid, Istanbul, and London proved that failing states are fertile grounds for terrorism (Piazza, 2008). Since they represent a global security threat, failing states represent potential threats to the national security of developed Western democracies and their allies. Therefore, the rescue of failing states through the nation-building agenda of democratization became a
priority for developed democracies. In addition, the promotion of democracy has another important outcome for global security: peace. It follows the argument made by developed democracies that democracies do not go to war (Doyle, 1986; Clinton, 1994).

Lastly, the recent immense breakthroughs in communication, information technologies, and the rapid development of the Internet and its widespread availability enabled the expeditious share of information, media, and ideas across the globe. Together with the faster circulation of information and ideas -- particularly with young adults--the struggle for democracy gave birth to a myriad of colorful revolutions. The recent uprisings in the Arab world popularly known as the Arab Spring are a struggle against the totalitarian regimes, and the demand for changes that will be based on democratic principles. Not only did the advancement in communication technology make it easier to transfer information from one place to another, but also it prevented oppressive regimes from hiding the atrocities, chronic regime corruption, massive killings, severe human rights violations, and other measures used by these regimes to oppress their citizens. In other words, the media “…limited the hegemonic control over the information flow” (Hofheinz, 2005). This led to the fall of authoritarian rule in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Ukraine, and caused several uprisings for freedom across the Arab World and elsewhere. These tendencies were marked by the struggle between democracy versus oppressive and authoritarian regimes (O’donnell & Schmitter, 2013). As a result, some regimes have fallen under the pressure of “the people’s will” and were forced to change, whereas some regimes are still fiercely and desperately trying to resist changes, causing havoc (i.e. the most recent Syrian civil conflict). Regardless of the consequences, the wave of protests and the uprisings in the Arab World and elsewhere are demanding
regime changes that will seize the power from dictatorial and corrupted regimes. The tendency towards regime change once again emphasizes the importance of the nation building in the modern world.

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the context of democracy promotion in BiH and elsewhere

The NED is a typical case of an organization working on democracy promotion worldwide (it is running democracy-related projects in more than 90 countries). In general, NED is a bipartisan private organization sponsored mainly by the US Congress. It is a platform for funding NGOs involved in the democracy promotion in many parts of the world (NED, 2014).

The idea behind NED is that the promotion of democracy cannot be done only by government; rather, it is more suitable and effective for the private sector to promote democracy. In addition, working with non-governmental entities only gives NED more flexibility to make networks, partnerships and organizational cooperation with foreign bodies (NED, 2014).

The values promoted by NED represent the universal values promoted by international law and inalienable rights to any human (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Helsinki Final Act and etc.) (NED, 2014). The values promoted by NED are guided by six purposes that define the NEDs mission. These purposes are as follows:

- to encourage free and democratic institutions throughout the world through private-sector initiatives, including activities which promote the individual
rights and freedoms (including internationally recognized human rights) which are essential to the functioning of democratic institutions;

- to facilitate exchanges between United States private-sector groups (especially the two major American political parties, labor, and business) and democratic groups abroad;
- to promote United States nongovernmental participation (especially through the two major American political parties, labor, business, and other private-sector groups) in democratic training programs and democratic institution-building abroad;
- to strengthen democratic electoral processes abroad through timely measures in cooperation with indigenous democratic forces;
- to support the participation of the two major American political parties, labor, business and other United States private-sector groups in fostering cooperation with those abroad dedicated to the cultural values, institutions and organizations of democratic pluralism; and
- to encourage the establishment and growth of democratic development in a manner consistent both with the broad concerns of United States national interests and with the specific requirements of the democratic groups in other countries which are aided by programs funded by the Endowment. (NED, 2014).

Further, the following principles are used in order to implement the aforementioned purposes:

- that democracy involves the right of the people freely to determine their own destiny;
- that the exercise of this right requires a system that guarantees freedom of expression, belief and association, free and competitive elections, respect for the inalienable rights of individuals and minorities, free communications media, and the rule of law;
- that a democratic system may take a variety of forms suited to local needs and traditions, and therefore need not follow the U.S. or any other particular model;
- that the existence of autonomous economic, political, social and cultural institutions is the foundation of the democratic process and the best guarantor of individual rights and freedoms;
- that private institutions in free societies can contribute to the development of democracy through assistance to counterparts abroad;
- that such assistance must be responsive to local needs and seek to encourage - but not to control - indigenous efforts to build free and independent institutions; and
- that the partnership between those who enjoy the benefits of democracy and those who aspire to a democratic future must be based upon mutual respect,
shared values, and a common commitment to work together to extend the frontiers of democracy for present and future generations (NED, 2014).

The foundation supports activities in the following areas: pluralism; democratic governance and political process; education, culture and communications; research; and international cooperation (NED, 2014). In BiH, NED provides grants for several projects run by local and international NGOs. According to data obtained from annual reports prepared by NED (NED, 2014) the average amount of funding allocated for projects in BiH is 1.3 million USD, where in average 22 projects are funded per year. The average grants’ amount is 37,000 USD when the outlier is omitted.

Interestingly, the outlier, or the NGO that received a substantial amount of funding by NED is the U.S.-based National Endowment for Democracy (NDI). Just in 2013, NDI has received $350,000 USD or 32% of funding provided by NED for the consolidation of democracy in BiH.

The preferred type of activity funded by NED for BiH projects appears to be the promotion of democratic governance and political process. For the same activity in 2013, NDI received a grant for the project “Promoting Issue-Based Political Dialogue”. The goal of the program is strengthening political institutions by fostering “constructive political debate across party lines and strengthen parties’ capacities to engage in inclusive, responsive communications with citizens on important policies” (NED, 2014).

Practically, NED represents a significant factor in the process of democratization in BiH. NED provides both funds and other resources for democracy promotion in BiH. However, there are some opposing views in regards to NED activism in BiH. Liberal
NGOs working on democracy promotion support NED activism in BiH because NED provides both resources and expertise on democracy promotion. However, ethno-national political parties accuse NED of patronage over local NGOs by imposing their preferred democratic values and norms. Further, they criticize their activities in promoting a neo-liberal market economy, claiming that foreign investment would lead towards the enslavement of the labor force in BiH. In addition, political parties go beyond these accusations by accusing NED of running the campaign to impeach the government in RS.

Regardless of stance on the aforementioned issue, whether NED is having a positive or negative influence on BiH society, there is a need for a scientific inquiry in which the perception of BiH citizens in regards to the NED mission and activities is evaluated. Such an inquiry should consider other NGOs working on the promotion of democracy in BiH. The rationale for such research is that the major stakeholders in the Bosnian democratization story are BiH citizens, and their opinion is essential for democracy development in BiH.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In a very simple form, the complex political phenomenon this study aims to explore is formalized into the following primary research question: “What is the role of NGOs promoting democratic values as a strategy of nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina?” This rather simple question is divided into subordinate research questions or research sub-questions that reemerge in academic debates, political discussions, daily media, and in daily conversations between BiH citizens. Further, these questions are related to the role of NGOs in nation-building in BiH. The critical research questions derived represent the current gaps in the literature regarding the role of NGOs in nation-building in BiH that this study aims to fill.

The first two research questions (sub-questions) are related to the developmental strategies of the US, EU, and the IC to promote the liberal democratic values of the West in the different socio-cultural, and historical context present in BiH. This issue raises two critical questions. First, what type of democratic values are NGOs promoting in BiH? Second, are the democratic values promoted by the NGOs abstract to BiH citizens?

The third research question regards the legitimacy and accountability of international NGOs involved in nation building in BiH. The critical question related to this issue is: Is it true that over time the NGOs displaced their initial goals to promote liberal democratic values and became agents for someone else?
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. **Nation-building**

There is much discussion in academia regarding the use of “nation-building” as a concept in social sciences (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Hippler & Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2005). Accordingly, “nation-building’ as a conceptual framework is being interchangeably used by the scholars. In some cases the term is being used to cover designate strengthening the national identity of the state through its interior organization (Norman, 2006; Tolz, 1998). In other cases it is used to describe practice of “state-building” that comprises the external and internal efforts of the international community and other actors to develop a stable and functional state (J. F. Dobbins, 2003; J. Dobbins, 2007; Fukuyama, 2004). Finally, the concept “nation-building” is used for different external and internal interventions of different local and international actors (Sahin, 2007). Authors (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007) argue that there is a need for a conceptual consensus regarding the “nation-building” concept. In this study, “nation-building” as a concept is used to describe the set of initiatives, activities, and strategies developed by the international community, international organizations, transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs), liberal NGOs (LNGOs), other actors working on the promotion of a democracy, and democratic values within the transitional context in BiH.

2. **Liberal NGOs (LNGOs)**

In the current study, “liberal NGOs (LNGOs)” is used to describe the nongovernmental organizations that promote liberal values through democracy promotion
activities. The basic role of these organizations is to promote pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition LNGOs represent the modern fraction in the modern vs. traditional concept that is a general framework for the current study. Having said that, LNGOs in the BiH context of nation-building are working on the promotion of democratic values that will promote the participation and activism of all Bosnian constituent nations. In other words, LNGOs support and promote inclusiveness, where participation in activities as well as employment in NGOs does not depend on ethnicity. The LNGOs can be local, regional, and international. In addition, often they form networks that operate on local, regional and international level. In BiH they are most likely to be sponsored by foreign donors. In many cases they receive grants from foreign donors through the subcontracting local NGO in BiH.

3. Ethno-national NGOs (ENGOs)

Ethno-national NGOs or ethno-nationals are nongovernmental organizations in BiH that promote values that benefit certain ethno-national groups. ENGOs are exclusive NGOs, where belongingness to the NGOs is depending upon ethnicity. The majority of ethno-national NGOs in BiH work on preserving and promoting nationalism and nationalist policies in the political discourse in BiH. In many cases, ENGOs emerged as a response of ethno-national political parties to the growing number, and activism of LNGOs. Further, they resist changes promoted by LNGOs in an effort to augment the advantage they acquire through ethno-national rhetoric.
4. Traditionalism vs. Modernity

The traditionalism vs. modernity struggle in the case of Bosnian democratization requires a more detailed description of concepts used in the current study. Ideas of traditionalism vs. modernity in Bosnian nation-building or democracy promotion echo from the works of Giddens (2000, 2001) on modernity. The author suggests that in the current age there is a struggle between traditional and modern institutions. When concepts described by Giddens are applied to the Bosnian context, it can be said that the modern elements in the traditionalism vs. modernity struggle are nongovernmental organizations and international actors who promote democratic values in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This study focuses on NGOs sponsored by NED to promote democracy and democratic values in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, Giddens’ concept of modernity (2000, 2001) will be described through the prism of these NGOs. Data obtained suggests that there are three democratic values promoted by the NGOs in BiH: accountability, transparency, and advocacy. The NGOs’ goal of prioritizing these values is to make BiH citizens aware of the chronic socio-economic problems created by current political elites. Moreover, once the awareness of BiH citizens is raised while voting in democratic elections, they are expected to vote for the politicians and political party that will work to solve its socio-economic problems, as well as make BiH a functional state. Nevertheless, the NGOs as modern institutions who are trying to promote democratic values in BiH face strong opposition from traditional institutions in BiH. The concept of
traditional in this study refers to the institutions in BiH that try to resist change. Traditional institutions refer to those that are the product of ethnocentric nationalism.

The issue of ethno-nationality in BiH is also one of BiH citizens’ identity. The complex issue of BiH citizens’ identity contributes further to the problem. The national identities of people living in BiH are hard to distinguish, and do not represent classic cases of nationalism. Rather, the socio-cultural, religious, historical contexts, and unique personality traits (Tomasic, 1948) of people living in this territory contributed to the development of identities that are complex and dynamic.

Ethno-nationalism was a tendency of different groups in BiH struggling for a national identity at the end of the 18th century, and throughout the 20th century. Whether it is a classic form of ethnocentric nationalism is debatable, since the development of a strong national identity was always suppressed by the dominant powers controlling the territory at a given time. Whether it was the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, or socialist Yugoslavia, they all left a strong mark on the identities of people living within Bosnia’s borders. Further, they contributed to the heterogeneity of the BiH identity (Malcolm, 1994).

In addition, the geopolitical and geostrategic location of BiH further contributes to the complexity of national BiH identity. BiH is a place where three major religions and civilizations meet (Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam). It is difficult to distinguish the differences between national and religious identity. This made it possible for the more homogeneous Croatian and Serbian nationalities to be exported onto the heterogeneous Bosnian identity, leaving the latter in a complex and fragile form. Consequently, a majority of the BiH population identified itself with Croatian and
Serbian ethno-national identities, and a Bosniak nationality. In the Croatian and Serbian ethno-nationalities, religion plays an important factor since belonging to a religion (Orthodox Christianity or Catholicism) determines the ethno-national identity as well. In contrast to the flourishing ethno-national identities of Croats and Serbs in BiH, the Bosniak (Bosniak) national identity struggled for its own existence and evolved throughout history from a Bosnian ethnic identity to one where religious affiliation determines national identity. Historically, in the diplomatic scriptures of Bosnian King Tvrtko II Kotromanic (15th century) the term “Bosniak,” originally Bošnjak (Bosniak), corresponded to the people living within the Bosnian Kingdom. However, since the fall of the Bosnian Kingdom to the Ottomans, and more intensively after the fall of Ottoman rule in BiH, there was a constant weakening of the Bosnian national identity due to Austro-Hungarian policies and the ethno-national tendencies of neighboring Serbia and Croatia throughout the 20th century. Conclusively with the Bosnian War (1992-1995), the Bosnian nation was shattered into three distinct identities: Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosniaks. Respectively, this splintering of the Bosnian ethos led towards national identities that strictly correspond to religious identity and vice versa (Bosnian Croats are Bosnian Catholics; Bosnian Serbs are Bosnian Orthodox, and Bosniaks are Bosnian Muslims).

Finally, the identity issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina is both understudied and biased. Currently, it prevents academic consensus on the identity issue in BiH. Meanwhile, there are still people in BiH that cannot identify themselves with any of the three currently available constituent ethno-nationalities.
In addition to the identity issue, Tomasic’s (1948) study of personality traits of the peoples of Southeastern Europe (with specific focus on the people of the ex-Yugoslavia) suggests two different personality traits. First are the highlanders, people living in the mountainous region (most of the Bosnian territory is in this region). Their personalities are influenced by the harsh conditions they live in. Their character is marked by a harsh competitiveness that relies more on the individual than the collective. The second is the lowlanders, or people living in valleys. Their character is influenced by the necessity of the collective required to cultivate vast amounts of fertile lands. Since they didn’t experience scarce resources, they have a friendlier attitude and tendency of living in a collective.

Due to its isolationist character and harsh personality traits, the highlander character is more easily manipulated into conflicts against groups that are different. In BiH, where national identities coincide with religious affiliation and highlander character, it is more likely to expect an inter-ethnic rivalry. However, in the case of that rivalry, it is not tradition per se that pushes people into the conflict, but rather manipulation by the political groups that seek to increase their political power by creating an ideological struggle and tensions among ethno-national identities. In other words, the term “identerism” coined by Ferguson (2008) perfectly fits into the context of inter-ethnic struggle in BiH. Applying the identerism in the case of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) the political elites mobilized groups of people using identity into wars that would serve their interests. A majority of ethno-national leaders during the War in BiH (1992-1995) ended up in ICTY for war crimes and genocide.
Finally, the concept of traditionalist in the Bosnian context of democratization can be seen as a tension among ethno-national identities in BiH. This ethno-national tension in BiH is the product of the complex ethno-national identities in BiH; the bloody history among different identities in BiH throughout the 19th and 20th centuries; propaganda by neighboring countries and superpowers at given times; and personality traits of people living in BiH. However, ethno-national political leaders used ethno-national tension as an instrument to obtain political power. The strategy of traditionalists in BiH is to take political discourse from a realist to an ideological domain, using ethno-national arguments of the constituent nationalities. In this way, they remain in power despite clear evidence of chronic regime corruption, political manipulation, and other pertinent socio-economic and political issues in the country. The only opponents of such a policy are NGOs working to promote democracy and the IC. Therefore, the ethno-nationals in R.S. accused the list of NGOs sponsored by the U.S. of intending to destroy R.S. in the fashion of the Arab Spring.

Further, the ethno-nationals are empowered by the Daytonian provisions that are based on a consociational power sharing system. This system distributes power in BiH along ethno-national lines. This situation has created political gridlock that prevents the development of pluralist democracy in BiH. This political gridlock is anticipated by ethno-national political elites, since it guarantees that they stay in power. For example, the Presidency of BiH is strictly reserved for ethno-national presidential candidates. That is, the rotating BiH Presidency is reserved for a Bosniak, Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Serb. The modern stream in the current study or NGOs are underdog runners in the current race. The modern stream hopes to make changes while raising the awareness of BiH
citizens of current problems in BiH. They struggle to take the political discourse from the ideological (ethno-nationalism) to the realist domain (chronic corruption, unemployment, crime rates and other problems). They seek to develop a political culture of BiH citizens more likely to vote for political parties that offer issue-based policy making, and not ethno-national rhetoric.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A.) Nation-building, NGOs and Globalization

The literature on nation-building is in many cases related either to the study of elites, or the studies’ focus was skewed to local ownership and external actors (Chesterman, Ignatieff, & Thakur, 2005). The literature on the role of NGOs in nation-building, is relatively vast (Ateljevic, 2008; Chacho, 2008; Fagan, 2005; Goodhand & Lewer, 1999; HE & MURPHY, 2007; Mahmood, 2002; MATANGA, 2010; McMahon, 2006; Monshipouri, 2003; Patrick, 2001; Radziszewski & Akcinaroglu, 2004). The literature on NGOs in nation-building considering the impact globalization has on democracy promotion within a transitional context is relatively sparse. Therefore, the significance of this study lies in the endeavor to combine or integrate the fields of nation-building in a transitional context; the NGOs’ role in the promotion of democracy within a transitional contexts; and the impact globalization has on the process.

The ideas about globalization in this study will echo the works of Giddens (Giddens, 2000; Giddens, 2001) on globalization, and political changes. Giddens (2000) suggests that we live in a specific age that is much different than our predecessors did. The impact of globalization on our lives through recent breakthroughs in communication technology, and transport has led to the “sublimation of time and space” (Giddens,
2000). This led to the emergence of new challenges and dynamics in the public, social, political, and economic lives of states, and consequently, individuals living within states.

In his work, Giddens (2000) refers to the struggle between modern and traditional institutions—in other words, struggle between the traditional and modern in almost any aspect of life of individuals or society. The concept of modernity by Giddens is wrapped up in a precise term—the cosmopolitan worldview. The cosmopolitan view, according to the author, refers to individuals and institutions in society. It is a new form of identity sometimes called “global citizenry” or “global civil society.” The shifting identity pattern described by Giddens (2000) represents the “evolution psyche” of both individuals and institutions in society necessary for both to adapt to the challenges of the 21st century. On the other side, the “traditional”, can be described as the resistance to changes brought by globalization. Giddens (2000) argues that the very nature of social institutions has been changed. He uses the term “empty shell,” referring to the institutions that maintain their existence but have lost their original function. Giddens (2000) as an example provides the institution of marriage as an argument for his proposition. The author suggests that despite the fact that marriage as an institution still exists, its structure and functions have significantly changed.

Giddens (2000) argues that state institutions were not spared the new dynamics either. The very nature of states shifted, and continues to shift over time. Giddens (2000) argues that the sublimation of time and space leads toward the global integration of the world. Accordingly, the flagship of globalization is global economic integration. Global economic integration has two elements in its core, global capital and global trade. Further, both of the aforementioned elements have a neo-liberal ideology with democracy
Consequently, states are left with two possible choices, either adapt to the new dynamics, or become the subject of scrutiny inflicted by both, domestic and international actors.

The process of adaptation requires a transition in which the roles of the state and society are reinterpreted into different socio-cultural, political, and economic contexts. Although Giddens (2000; 2001) was referring to the issue in terms applicable for individuals and society in general, at the same time his concept can be applied in global affairs as well. The reason this study utilizes the concept of global affairs and not international affairs is the fact that in the phenomenon being studied, many different actors, not only states or a nation-states, are involved in the process. Therefore, approaching the issue from international relations paradigm—and there were attempts made to do so as the literature suggests—would misdirect the study, and place the debate on Potemkin’s village. Focusing on the global affairs perspective, encompassing the impact globalization has in the process, is more prudent.

In addition to the Gidden’s aforementioned concepts, this study also draws to Fukuyama’s (2006) work on contemporary nation-building. His work (2006) will be used to bridge the existing gap between the role of globalization and the NGOs. Further, these two concepts will be amalgamated into one coherent concept, popularly known as nation-building. According to Fukuyama (2006), a state, in order to adapt to the new dynamics brought by globalization, needs to transfer the functions traditionally being provided by it, and franchise them to new agents. Thus, as an argument, Fukuyama (2006) focuses on two core aspects of the state. He refers to them as the scope and the strength of the state. These two concepts represent, as the author refers to them, the “stateness” of the state.
The existence of the state can be seen through the scope and the strength of the state. The scope represents the scope of services provided by state, and strength refers to the power of the state to enforce and provide services in different areas of the “scope”. In the recent times, it appears that the robust structure of the state is not compatible with socio-economic, and cultural challenges. Therefore, the author suggests that states are more often subjects of criticism of their ability to provide public services of both good quality and acceptable cost. Therefore, a state as a guarantor of those services is forced to delegate some of its responsibilities to the agents that do the government’s job, but are nongovernmental in essence. Apparently, it can be drawn out from the context, the new agents Fukuyama refers to are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

One of the gaps present within the literature is the lack of systematic and scientific research on the role of nongovernmental agencies in regards to nation-building. Even more focus needs to be placed on the role of transnational nongovernmental organizations involved in the promotion of democracy and democratic values within transitional, transformational, and post conflict societies. Newly developing democracies are subject to a complex process of nation-building. This process requires a “transplant” of democratic values seen in developed democracies, to the different socio-cultural, economic, and historical contexts of developing democracies (Barany & Moser, 2009). Values preferred by the transnational NGOs in the context of democracy promotion are universal—Fukuyama (2006) has a guarded thought on this due to the failing nation-building efforts in the Middle East at the time. Nevertheless, agencies working on democracy promotion, indeed, focus on universal values, or at least universally desired
values of liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2006) such as human rights, democratic governance, government transparency, humanitarian services and others.

Despite the fact that the values promoted by NGOs are diverse, they resemble a specific ubiquitous format. In other words, TNGOs are involved in many different aspects and cases of nation-building around the globe, but the type of values NGOs promote is analogous in nature. Consequently, TNGOs promote an analogous type of democracy, and that way it makes a path towards analogous society as well. Eventually, it gives rise to a society that shares similar values and norms, or a society that is “cosmopolitan” (Giddens, 2000) in nature. Finally, by placing globalization into the context of cosmopolitan society, it can be said that TNGOs’ promotion of democracy leads towards global civil society.

The idea behind the TNGOs’ activism is that civil society will be in a position to counterbalance the regimes that are oppressive and resisting societal changes. In this struggle against oppressive regimes, TNGOs represent “the modern stream” (Giddens, 2001), whereas oppressive regimes resisting the changes are “the traditional” (Giddens, 2001). The idea of modern society is a society that is sensitive to ongoing political, economic, social, environmental and other issues. This modern society can be seen as the “self-reflexive society” described in Bech, Giddens, and Lash’s study (1994).

Frequently, NGOs are criticized for the promotion of neo-liberalism, and for promoting a “global north agenda.” The negative criticism focuses on transplanting the democratic set of values into a different socio-cultural and historic context. Fukuyama and Bloom (1989) proposed that liberal democracy is final stage of political thought, or the most desirable political system by citizens, is criticized by authors on different
theoretical and analytical grounds (Burns, 1994). Further criticism is evident (Chandler, 2006; Chandler, 2004; Chandler, 2005; Chua, 2004; Schraeder, 2002; Seligson & Finkel, 2009) opposing the idea that democracies can be successfully exported or imposed into different socio-cultural, historical and economical contexts. Accordingly, criticism of democratic transplanting argues that democracy requires certain historical, cultural, and societal values embedded in developed Western democracies, and that a mere transplant of democratic values and norms into remote transitional societies is challenging, risky, and destined to fail. Further, imposing values and norms can have a negative effect of undermining authentic political and social movements (Sejfija, 2009).

Barnett and Zuercher’s (2008) study asserts that the collaboration of the local elite and external actors contributes to the development of oppressive systems, and a vague promotion of democracy. Further, Paczynska (2006) suggests that global trade has produced marginalized groups and worsened situations of the same kind. Therefore, these groups are seeking a way to address their issues to the relevant institutions by participating in political life. Paczynska (2006) suggests that the advancement in communication technology and the increasing number of the transnational NGOs has made it possible for marginalized groups to participate in the political life of the state. Nevertheless, the author argues that the shifts in NGO intervention and resource allocation might have negative effects on the society.

Another adamant criticism of the role of NGOs in nation-building regards the legitimacy and accountability of NGOs promoting democracy. Critics raise a question about NGOs’ dependence on foreign donors. In the case of developed Western democracies, the state franchises certain traditional functions to the third sector (NGOs).
The developed Western democracies are able to do so because they are able to relocate budgetary resources in the form of government grants. This allows NGOs to perform the franchised functions. In contrast, developing democracies are not in a position to provide adequate funding to the NGO sector. Since the post-conflict societies and general societies in transition are having difficulties with funding NGOs due to weak economies, civil society in developing democracies is highly dependent upon foreign donors. This is consistent with Kamat’s (2003) study that criticizes donors for their patronage of the NGOs. It is indicated that NGOs have a strong donor seeking behavior, and frequently fit their missions according to the established parameters set by the donors.

Eberly (2008) has a more positive approach to NGOs. He asserts that through the promotion of global democratic norms and rights, global governance is being promoted as well. This, along with government and business, helps form the third leg of the three-legged stool of governance (government, business, and the third sector). The fact that tens of trillions of dollars (Eberly, 2008) are available for philanthropic purposes on a global scale suggests that the NGOs pie is large enough for different kinds of global affairs actors. Interestingly, most of the potential NGO resources currently lay in the hands of authoritarian regimes in developing countries. For example, because of the Arab Spring, the Egyptian regime was overthrown. Just after the overthrow of Egyptian ex-President Hosni Mubarak, it was discovered that his family held a fortune of $70 billion (Inman, 2011).
B.) The Bosnian Context of Nation-building and Democracy Promotion

The primary focus of this study is the role of NGOs in nation-building or democratization in BiH. There are several reasons for this study to be focused on BiH. BiH is a post-conflict, post-communist, transition country with a diverse history and demographics, as well as a critical geopolitical position.

Throughout her history, BiH represents a place where different cultures, religions, and ethnicities used to live together in a very diverse environment. The geo-politics of the region –being in the heart of Europe—frequently lured the superpowers throughout the history to invade and occupy Bosnia in order to project their powers in the Balkan region. Throughout the frequent occupations by foreign leaders, the identities of the Bosnian people were suppressed. Not only that, but their identities were also subject to frequent alterations by the neighboring countries of Bosnia (Croatia and Serbia). Hence, Bosnia was frequently subject to the occupation by different superpowers (the Holy Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Austro-Hungarian Empire). Occupations of Bosnia contributed to the heterogeneity of Bosnian society. Whether being part of the Ottoman Empire, or Austro-Hungarian Empire, The Kingdom of Serbo-Croatia and Slovenia, or Socialist Yugoslavia, the identities of the people living within the territory of Bosnia were suppressed by the dominant identity formed by each unique ideology.

In no other case has this identity issue brought the kind of havoc that the outbreak of ethno-centric nationalism, or ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia in the 1990s did. In 1990 with the fall of the Soviets and communism and unsuccessful transition from communism to democracy, ethno-nationalism was promoted within the multiethnic
Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that Federalist Yugoslavia was not a part of the USSR, the outbreak of extreme nationalism triggered the secessions of federal states in Yugoslavia to seek independence. The right of self-determination was used first by Slovenia (1991) to secede from Yugoslavia. Despite small clashes with the Yugoslavian Army (JNA)—which was dominated by Serbs—the war in Slovenia ended fast. The next on the line was Croatia, where the majority of the population in Croatia are ethnic Croats, with a Croatian Serb minority. Soon after the declaration of independence in 1991, clashes between Croatsians and Croatian Serbs backed by the corrupted JNA intensified with an increase in casualties. The conflict lasted till 1995 when the joint forces of the Croatian National Defense and Bosnian Army succeeded in redeeming territories in Croatia claimed by the Croatian Serbs. Despite the fact that the war in Croatia lasted longer than in Bosnia, no ex-Yugoslavian federal state paid a higher toll than did Bosnia in fighting for its independence.

The path to independence of BiH was unlike that of the other federal units of socialist ex-Yugoslavia. Bosnia itself is not homogeneously populated, and is comprised of three major constituent nations. In 1992 BiH declared independence based on a referendum where a majority of BiH society voted for independence for Socialist Yugoslavia. Soon after the declaration of independence Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum and shortly thereafter, the bloody war started and lasted from April to 1

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1 According to the last census done in 1991 in BiH the majority of Bosnian society consists of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) 43.47%, Bosnian Serbs 31.21%, Bosnian Croats 17.38 %, and Yugoslavs 5.54 %.
December 1992 when President of the United States Bill Clinton and his administration managed to put this gory conflict to an end.

The representatives of the three constituent nations signed the Washington Accord and eventually the Dayton Peace Accord and brought the war to an end. However, there was no winner in the war. The Dayton Peace Agreement was a great diplomatic achievement of President Clinton’s administration. However, it became the major obstacle for the reforms and institutional changes required for the successful development of democracy in BiH.

The current political situation in BiH is very complex and fragile. The Dayton Peace Agreement granted power to the ethno-national political elites of constituent nations in BiH. In this way ethno-nationals are able to maintain control of the key institutions in BiH, weakening the central government. Further, Bosnia is currently under the international protectorate. The mandate for international engagement is given to International Community (IC) under the office of High Representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently, BiH has a federal state system consisting of two entities, the Republic of Srpska, and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one quasi-autonomous region, the Brcko District. Both entities have their own constitutions, and part of the federal constitution of BiH is the Annex IV of Dayton Peace Agreement. Bosnia is run by a collective state presidency (rotating among three constituent nations every eight months). The Republic of Srpska frequently advocates a referendum where the citizens of the smaller Bosnian entity would decide for the Republic of Srpska to secede from BiH. It can be said that the political agenda of ethno-nationals in Republic of Srpska is to obstruct institutional changes and veto any possible constitutional changes
that would provide more power to central institutions and diminish the strength of entity institutions.

The strategy used by the IC for peace implementation, and later in nation-building, adopted the consociational model of power sharing (Touquet & Veermerch, 2008; Dziewulska, 2007). In Toquet & Vermeerch’s (2008) study, the authors try to explore alternatives to the traditional way of nation-building. They criticize the current traditional approach of the I.C. in BiH. They argue that the power sharing approach applied by the Dayton provisions is responsible for the lack of institutional changes and constitutional reforms in BiH. Further, the competing ethno-national political parties used the Dayton provisions to create a political gridlock that enables them to stay in power despite severe socio-economic and political problems. Despite the fact that ethno-nationals are holding their counterparts responsible for the country’s dire situation and presenting the ethno-national agenda as a priority, the BiH citizens do not share the same thoughts.

Accordingly, the UNDP sponsored Oxford Research Institutes’ (ORI) “The Silent Majority Speaks” (ORI, 2008) survey is an important quantitative assessment regarding the pertinent political issues in BiH. Survey participants are Bosnian citizens. Their general opinion is that the state is highly unsatisfactory. This view is fostered by corruption and high unemployment. There is mistrust in political institutions and political actors. Further, high unemployment, political corruption, mistrust in political institutions, and the general opinion of the stagnant situation in BiH (political gridlock), cause the young population to have pessimism for their future, lower their expectations of the state,
and make them disengage from political life. Surprisingly, public opinion is not affected by religious or ethno-national identity (ORI, 2008).

The general belief of the public is that membership in the EU would solve the problems. There is a great demand for institutional changes; nevertheless, opinion regarding the institutional changes varies greatly. There are several opinions regarding the state and institutional changes. Suggesting three entities (a Bosnian Serb entity, Bosniak entity, and Bosnian Croat entity) is vague and without support. The pro Yugoslavian system is not supported either. The most preferred system would be a centralized system with strong regions (probably economic regions) (ORI, 2008).

It can be concluded from the report that the opinions of the silent majority and of the international community (IC) on short-term goals differ (Belloni, 2001; Belloni, 2007). The current short-term goals of the IC are de-mining, prosecuting war criminals, police reforms, and defense issues. The silent majority strongly supports the improvement of living conditions and fostering anti-corruption measures.

The results of the ORI’s (2008) survey suggest three sets of policies that will improve nation-building efforts in BiH. Despite not being focused on the role of NGOs in the process of democratization in BiH, the ORI’s (2008) survey indicates the policies that might be anticipated and supported by the society. Reasonably, these policies should reflect upon the work of NGOs in order for them to achieve their mission of promotion the democracy. Accordingly, the policy suggested correlates with the time framework. Suggested policies can be categorized as long term, medium term and short-term (ORI, 2008).
The long-term policies of nation-building imply two strategies that the nation should take. First is joining the EU, and the second includes regime/institutional/constitutional changes (ORI, 2008). Joining the EU is not only set as a long term strategy, but is perceived by many as the only exit from the current chaotic and critical political situation in BiH. Interestingly, Tomašić (1948) not only predicted the outbreak of bloody conflicts in the Balkans region, but also suggested a strategy of dealing with the conflicting groups. The reasons for conflict in the first place are related to psychological or personality traits of Eastern Europeans. In this context, he was mostly referring to the Balkans region, where Bosnia is located as well. Tomašić (1948) suggests that these personality traits can be categorized in two groups. The highlanders (brdjani), or people living in the highlands, are exposed to very volatile and harsh living conditions. The second group is lowlanders (zadružani). Lowlanders, inhabitants of the fertile lowlands, experience fewer problems in acquiring a livelihood compared to the highlanders. Since they need to agriculturally process vast areas of lowlands it requires the agricultural community to work together. Therefore, lowlanders developed a strong sense of community. The rougher environmental and ecological conditions affected the character of highlanders, who constantly struggle to survive. They have diminished trust in each other; have very aggressive attitudes; and are apathetic towards community life—except the family. This endless struggle of highlanders affects the society. Tomašić (1948) suggested that the stability of the region, referring mostly to Yugoslavia and the Balkans, depends upon the integration of the region into a larger community—probably hypothesizing about a community like the EU. In this large society, the highlander’s personality traits would be tamed or absorbed (Tomašić, 1948) The long-term policy
supported by BiH citizens in the survey (ORI, 2008) suggests the same strategy. BiH citizens welcome joining the EU, and the active involvement of the EU in this strategy is expected (ORI, 2008). It is widely perceived that joining the EU would end the further escalation of conflicts in the regions, and secure lasting peace and prosperity for the people living within.

The second long term policy, institutional changes, is in fact the original thought of nation-building in BiH. According to this strategy, as it is mentioned earlier in this study, the political elites in the country would promote institutional changes that would enable the rapid transformation and transition of the country. First, the institutional changes should be preceded by constitutional changes. Constitutional changes should promote a political discourse about changes to the provisions created by the Dayton Agreement. These are the provisions related to the entities in BiH, as well as the central government. In the first place, constitutional changes would promote the central federal government, with strong economic regions as aforementioned. Such an action envisages the participation of political elites, and a state referendum in which BiH citizens would decide on the shape of their country.

The second set of policies are medium and short-term. The ORI (2008) results suggest that short and medium policy suggestions focus at economic progress; a comprehensive package for the youth; reconciliation and social integration; and communication, trust, fighting corruption, and civic engagement (ORI, 2008). These sets of policies reflect the issues directly affecting BiH citizens. The high unemployment, high levels of corruption, segregation and apartheid in schools (ECRI, 2011) and similar issues jeopardize the stability of the brittle Bosnian state. The promotion of new jobs and
employment opportunities should be the priority, since unemployment for 2013 was 31.6% (Agencija za Statistiku BiH, 2014). SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) are a policy type that suggests a new strategy in dealing with economic challenges. SMEs might be a feasible solution for the country’s economic development that will further reduce the high level of unemployment. According to the survey (ORI, 2008) citizens in BiH demand support for local agricultural producers and also a return of the diaspora.

The next set of midterm and short-term policies is related to youth. The survey results suggest that there should be more investments in education and in youth-related themes in media (ORI, 2008).

Reconciliation and social integration is another set of midterm and short-term policy goals. They include formation of a commission to promote reconciliation in the fragmentized BiH society.

The next set of policies focuses on communication, trust, fighting corruption, and civic engagement. The ORI (2008) survey summary suggests that there is unrealistic negativity among the Bosnian population. Therefore, in order to change this negativity both print and TV media could be used to develop more positive perceptions.

Regarding corruption, it can be said that the transformation and transition of BiH is a fertile ground for corruption. ORI’s (2008) survey suggests that BiH citizens perceive that corruption levels are very high. Corruption seriously undermines all nation-building and democratization efforts at all levels, and further perpetuates the Daytonian gridlock, as well as instability. It was present during the war, after the war, and currently. The privatization that took part in BiH after the war exemplifies the seriousness of the corruption problem. Fast development of the economy was assumed to be a key factor in
the post-socialist transition of BiH. Thus, the transition from socialism to liberal
economic principles, as well as the consolidation of democracy were based on the
assumption that if the economic development of the state were to have significant impact
on the daily life of BiH citizens, it would decrease the chance of conflict. Unfortunately,
in BiH the premature privatization that took place after the Dayton Agreement (1995)
merely provided solid ground for corruption. Similarly, the transition from socialism to
capitalism was seen as the flow of capital from the state to private entrepreneurs (Donais,
2002). In this way, the state accustomed to a socialist economy would further lose its
grasp on the economy by the shift of capital. Nevertheless, in the Bosnian case it was a
wrong strategy. Observes assumed that potential capitalists would have appropriate
financial resources to enable them to purchase private property. However, the BiH
citizens just after the war could only achieve their bare existence due to the hardships.
Thus the power to acquire capital, through different corruption games, was in the hands
of people who were responsible for the conflict (Bosnian War 1992-1995), and those
who were at the peak of the mafia in BiH (Donais, 2002). This made the transition and
transformation of BiH a more delicate task, since in this way due to different
privatization games the ethno-nationals acquired the resources and power.

The relationship between the IC and emerging NGO sector in BiH is important.
The initial strategies of the IC to promote democratic changes through ethno-national
political ideas proved counterproductive. Therefore, the IC needed to adapt to a new
strategy, promoting democracy through civil society. This new strategy led towards an
exponential increase of the numbers of registered NGOs.
Nevertheless, at the very beginning of the IC mandate there was a troublesome relationship between the IC and NGO sector. The struggles between the NGOs and IC are evident in a study conducted by Grodeland (2010). The author sought to explore the attitudes of the IC towards NGOs and vice versa in the context of nation-building in the Western Balkans. In addition, she explains the complexities of developing civil society in the region. She indicates that there should be a reevaluation of transplanted legal structures to determine whether it is possible to transfer the institutions and political culture from one context to another. In addition, author Belloni (2001, 2007) (Belloni, 2001; Belloni, 2007) (Belloni, 2001; Belloni, 2007) (Belloni, 2001; Belloni, 2007) argues that peace building and reconciliation through civil society sounds good in theory, but in practice is discouraging. The main reasons for this according to the author are political complexity in BiH and imposition of values by the IC over the process.

Grodeland’s (2006) study explores the public perceptions of non-governmental organizations in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. It suggests that despite the fact that participants in in-depth interviews found it difficult to provide a definition of NGOs, they have still managed to identify several features regarding NGOs. In addition, the public in Bosnia showed a positive attitude towards the NGOs, which results from their belief that NGOs are there to help people (Grodeland, 2006). The most interesting finding, however, was that the more educated the participants were, the more favorable attitude they had towards NGOs. Grodeland’s (2006) study suggests that there should be more information available and provided to the public about the NGOs’ activities and missions.
Authors Martin & Miller (2003) suggest that there is a growing cooperation between NGOs and Bosnia. At the beginning, the NGOs in Bosnia were portrayed as prostitutes (due to their resource seeking behavior), while now they have been accepted as a significant factor in the democratization, stabilization, and reconciliation process. They also suggest that there is a tendency of both the IC and NGOs to cooperate in times when resources and funding are scarce. Fagan’s (2005) study portrays the initial efforts of IC to make civil society in Bosnia less dependent on foreign donors. Nevertheless, the author claims that dependency on foreign donors is still high.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1. Research Methods

The role of the study is to explore the role and context related to the NGOs’ role in nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, within the current setting, the research design needs to use methods that focus on contemporary events, that do not require the control of behavioral events.

The primary research question of this study is:

“What is the role of NGOs in promoting democratic values as a strategy of nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina?”

Since there is a lack of academic endeavors on the topic, the purpose of the current study will be explorative. Therefore the goal of this study concurs with Yin’s (2008) suggestion regarding an explorative purpose: “…its goal is not to conclude a study but to develop ideas for further study.” (Yin, 2008, Kindle Locations 2877-2878) since this is a study of “contemporary event but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated.” (Yin, 2009, Kindle Location 496) The best research design would be the case study research design.

Yin (2008) elaborates on the difference between “context” and “phenomenon” in case study research, suggesting that the phenomenon is not necessarily isolated from the context as in the case of experiments. Moreover, the case study focuses on phenomena
that are embedded within the context (Yin, 2008). That is the unique characteristic that favors the use of the case study research design over other types of research designs in this study. Hence, a study of democracy promotion requires a unique analytical strategy that will enable the reader to understand the context in which the phenomenon is happening. Further, the exploratory nature of study necessitates understanding the context in order for high-quality explanation building. Understanding both, the context and the phenomenon, in this study is crucial in understanding the purpose and importance of this study.

The context and phenomenon being studied in this study are widely defined in general terms by the primary research questions “What is the role of NGOs promoting the democracy as a strategy of nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina?” The central question helps us to set up the parameters for the study. Yin (2008) illustrates that

When studying an individual it is impossible to focus on everything in his life, since the set of variables regarding the individual is infinite. Rather, the author suggests, the research question helps us to focus on a particular context. In this case setting up the borders, or parameters, will help us stay focused on particular phenomena that will make the course of this scholarship practical, or feasible. (Yin, 2008).

Since, the phenomenon of this study is democracy promotion by NGOs, where the same stands for the nation-building process in BiH. Nevertheless, focusing on the universal set of topics on nation-building in BiH is both unfeasible, and unnecessary. Therefore, it is a necessary to narrow the focus of the study. The phenomenon to be studied can be conceptualized as a “democratic transplant process” in which transnational NGOs and their local NGO counterparts, or extended hands (Belloni, 2007) are working on different projects and activities that are part of democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that process the modern vs. traditional trends are expected to be in form
of struggle that significantly affects the NGOs in their democracy promotion goals. However, the current number of NGOs involved in the process of democracy promotion in BiH ranges from 11,000 to 12,000, according to different sources. Therefore, examining this large number of NGOs is impossible. However, focusing on the most typical cases makes this scholarship possible. Therefore, this study will focus on the nongovernmental organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are working on the promotion of democracy, with a special focus on the selection of NGOs sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The reason to focus on the organizations that are sponsored by NED is the fact that NED is a typical NGO that works on more than 1,000 projects related to democracy promotion in over 90 countries worldwide (NED, 2014). This impressive characteristic of NED makes the NGOs sponsored by the NED almost a perfect set of cases for the current case study. In the current study, the focus is placed on the local and the transnational NGOs working on democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The following questions will help illuminate both context and phenomenon in the study.

1. First, what type of democratic values are NGOs promoting in BiH? This is an empirical question within the Bosnian context of democracy promotion. The phenomenon throughout the questions is democracy promotion by NED-sponsored NGOs. In regards to the first research question, the unit of analysis or the “cases” pertinent to this study are the nongovernmental organizations sponsored by NED that are involved in the democratic transplant. The data related for this question will be collected from the artifacts, documents, and observations of both transnational and local NGOs
selected as cases for this study. In addition, the most important source of data for this research question will be obtained from interviews with NGO officials, and participants of NGO activities that were both part of the democracy promotion, and whose referred projects are sponsored by NED.

2. Are the democratic values promoted by the NGOs abstract to BiH citizens?” The second research question is also within the Bosnian context of nation-building or democratization, with the same phenomenon. The specific focus of this question is on the values being promoted by the NGOs. The unit of analysis here is participants in the NGO’s programs, activities, and projects that were part of democracy promotion in BiH. In addition, these programs, and projects are run by the NED-sponsored NGOs. The data used for this research question will be obtained from semi-structured interviews with both NGO officials and participants in NGO activities.

However, the phenomenon observed or “the abstractness” in this question refers to two concepts: first, the abstractness that expresses little familiarity of BiH citizens with the values promoted. The second notion of abstractness considers it as remoteness of promoted values to the underlying problems BiH society faces. For example, one NGO might promote “free speech” as a part of its mission, while the primary problem of their target population might be obtaining a livelihood for their families due to the harsh economic situation in BiH. This will result in citizens feeling that the value promoted by the NGO is unrelated to them and therefore they will not participate in such activities. The critical issue comes when the group of NGOs is being associated with promotion of values that are perceived as unimportant by BiH citizens, and therefore citizens do not participate in such NGOs. However, although that value promoted by an NGO is not
directly associated with the direct problems BiH citizens face, the same value might be associated with the underlying problems. Accordingly, in the case of the aforementioned problem where “free speech” as a value is perceived as remote by BiH citizens, on the contrary it is the value that aims towards citizens’ awareness and development of political dialogue, and issue based policy making in which citizens develop a culture that can address this issue to policy makers. Thus policy makers will know that they need to deal with these problems, or otherwise they will lose votes.

3. **Is it true that over the time the NGOs displaced their initial goals of promoting liberal democratic values and became agents for someone else?** The third research question is an empirical question where the phenomenon is democratic transplant in the transitional, post-conflict, and post-communist context of nation-building or democracy promotion in BiH. The units of analysis are transnational and national (local) nongovernmental organizations that are involved in democratization in BiH, and are sponsored by NED. The complicated nature of inquiry required for this research question requires that the data be obtained from several sources. Therefore, primary data will be taken from the interviews with NGO officials, who are working on democracy promotion, and who are sponsored by NED. The second source of data that will be used for this study will be field observation. The field observation data will be codified and standardized into a common case study research database, where Nvivo software will be used in disassembly and assembly of information.

Yin distinguishes among single case (holistic) designs, single-case (embedded) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, multiple-case (embedded) designs. (2008).
In the current study, we have the same context and phenomenon across four research questions. However, we have two different types of unit-of-analysis. In the first and second research questions, the unit-of-analysis is NGOs promoting democratic values in BiH, and who are sponsored by NED. In the third research question, the unit-of-analysis is BiH citizens that participated in the activities of NED sponsored NGOs. The BiH citizens will participate in semi-structured interviews from which the collection of data related to their perceptions of the democratic values promoted by NGOs will be obtained. Although two units-of-analysis are presented in this study, the context and the phenomenon are the same.

Considering the complexity of the current study, the best model for the current case study is the multiple-case design with embedded multiple units of analysis. The multiple-case refers to the use of individual case studies with same multiple units of analysis (participants to the NGOs activities; and NGOs sponsored by NED) across the individual studies. The individual case studies (six of whom are related to NGOs, and five to the participants to the NGOs’ activities) are independent from each other, thus the cross-case research developed will be developed by following the analytical patterns derived from the synchronous phenomena-context across the study. The cross case analysis will represent the finding of the data that will provide general analytical insights in regards to the democracy promotion in BiH by NGOs. In addition, cross-case analysis will be used for the debate considering the focus of the study; the struggle between the modern vs. traditional competing trends in BiH.
Since the research question, unit-of-analysis, context and phenomenon, and the type of case study research design are defined, the research design used in this study is an **explorative multiple-case embedded case study research design.**

1. The Units-of-Analysis (Cases)

The cases selected for the current study need to reflect the Bosnian context of nation-building as well as its relation to the phenomenon of democracy promotion by NED sponsored NGOs in BiH. In the current study NED refers to both the local and the global contexts of democracy promotion. Therefore, NED represents the aforementioned “**typical**” (Yin, 2008) example to be used in the study. The NED is seen through the nongovernmental organizations in BiH that it sponsors for democracy related projects. The cases selected encompass both entities of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accordingly, NGOs selected as cases are from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from the Republic of Srpska. They are organizations involved in media, think-tank activities, educational activities, advocacy, and the like. These organizations are the Center for Policy and Governance (CPU) located in Sarajevo, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN) located in Sarajevo, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Center for Development of Media and Analysis (CRMA), Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; National Institute for Democracy (NDI) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, located in Sarajevo, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Youth Communication Center (OKC), located in Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska. The interviews were organized and conducted with the
representatives of the aforementioned NGOs, and with participants in the activities provided by these organizations.

Yin (2008) argues that 4-6 studies in a multiple-case study research design represent a sufficient number for literal replication (not to be confused with statistical replication). Essentially, the literal replication represents the instance where the same analytical pattern is being observed across the cases that are independent from each other. Therefore, this study focuses on 6 cases of NGOs sponsored by NED and involved in the “democratic transplant” in BiH. For each case study a representative of the nongovernmental organization is interviewed. The case of OKC is different, since five citizens who participated in the activity organized by OKC are also interviewed. Their input is of utmost importance for understanding their opinion on issues regarding the democratic transplant, and their personal attitude towards the role of NGOs in democracy promotion. Further, interviews with them provided important insights into whether the democratic values promoted by NGOs are abstract to them or not.

2. The Cases Selected for Case Studies

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) sponsors several projects in BiH. The goal of these projects is to promote democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NED in BiH sponsors transnational NGOs, the “extended hands” of transnational NGOs, and local NGOs whose projects go along priorities or parameters set by NED for issuing grants.
Since this is a multiple-case case study, selecting the cases for the study is of utmost importance. When selecting cases, special attention should be provided to the selection of the most typical cases of the phenomenon to be studied. In the case of the current study typical cases of NED sponsored NGOs were selected.

The timeframe selected for the projects is 4 years encompassing projects NGOs realized for 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. The reason behind taking the four-year timeframe is due to the prevailing criticism that the projects done by NGOs in BiH are mostly short term. Therefore, they have not been able to develop a long-term strategy that deals with the underlying issues described in their grant applications. The cases selected for the current study include both, short-term projects (run for a couple of months or a year), and long-term projects-- NGOs that received grants NED to run the same project over several years.

The six selected NGOs are: Center for Policy and Governance (CPU), Center for Investigative Network (CIN), eFM Students Radio (eFM), Center for Investigative Reporting Network Bosnia and Herzegovina (CRMA-ACCOUNT), National Democratic Institute in BiH (NDI BiH), and Youth Communication Center (OKC) Banja-Luka. The following NGOs are located in Sarajevo: CPU, CIN, eFM, BIRN, and NDI. The interview locations for NGOs located in Sarajevo are conducted in their offices in Sarajevo. Thus, the OKC provided a chance for the observer to conduct the interviews while they were running an activity that was a part of the project funded by NED. It provided a unique opportunity for the researcher to obtain data related to the project by direct observations, as well as a chance for the researcher to conduct interviews with the participants. Thus, at the time of the interview participants were involved in the OKC’s
project, but they are also came from different parts of BiH, and were also involved with
different NGOs in BiH that are partners with OKC.

In total, there are five OKC project participants (who are working/volunteering
for other NGOs in BiH) interviewed in the current study. They participate in activities or
projects that are part of democracy promotion efforts of NED sponsored NGO. First,
interviews with the NGO representatives will be provided, and later the interviews with
the participants will be provided.

3. The Interviews

The interviews use a semi-structured interview format. The interview format or
interview protocol for the current study is available in the Appendix section of the current
study. Thus, in a case study research design it is a common that the question asked in an
interview provides an answer that leads to a new profound question (Yin, 2008).
Therefore, interview questions will be used in order to maintain a focus on the topic
being studied within the Bosnian context, but on the other hand answers might provide
grounds for a further scientific inquiry during interview as well.

Since there are two categories of interviewees, consequently there are also two
sets of questions. The first category consisted of NGO officials and activists. Interviews
follow the research protocol designed for the first category of interviewees The length of
interviews is scheduled for 45 minutes and the interview is divided into sections. Each
section contains questions referring to one of three topics related to NGOs activism.
a) Interviews with the NGO Officials

The first topic (TOPIC 1) refers to the challenges nongovernmental organizations that promote democracy face in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This question leads to information that can be used for a better understanding of the Bosnian context, and also the state-of-mind the respondent has in regards to the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a brief introduction, and the explanation of what the study is about the interviewee is asked to share his/her opinion about the challenges NGOs face while promoting democracy in BiH. This question refers to both the challenges the NGOs in general face and the challenges his/her particular organization faces. It provides a chance for the interviewee to contribute by his/her own experience.

The second question is related to effectiveness of NGOs. It has two parts. The first part is related to input the interviewee provides while reflecting his/ her own experience on the ground, and inferring about the effectiveness of his/her organizations and other NGOs involved in the process of democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second part of the second question in section “Topic1” is regarding the support his/her organization receives from citizens, government, and other relevant actors in the context of democracy promotion. The purpose of this question is to see whether BiH citizens provide support to NGO activism in the field of democracy promotion. Thus, the answer provided will be compared to the one received from citizens who participated in the democracy promotion activities sponsored by the NED. This provides us a platform to distinguish the issue of NGOs “remoteness” and “abstractness” posed in the third research sub-question.
The second section or “Topic 2” is explicitly related to the research questions posed in the study. The third question in the interview, part of Topic 2, is related to the democratic values the given organization is promoting. The categorization of the values might be complex with several different values promoted. Nevertheless, they should fall into one of the categories listed in the NED’s mission (i.e. accountability, transparency, advocacy, civic education, etc.).

The fifth question refers to the way democracy is being promoted in BiH. It focuses on the way democratic values, as understood in developed Western democracies, are being transferred (transplanted) into the different socio-economic, historical and cultural context of BiH. The interviewee provides their professional opinion about the issue based on their experience and the experience of colleagues from other NGOs involved in democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The respondents elaborate on whether it is, indeed, possible to transfer the democratic values of the West to the different context in BiH.

The next sets of questions are categorized under the section “TOPIC 3: Goals, criticism”. This section focuses on the issue of legitimacy and accountability of the NGO sector in BiH. The sixth question, the first in the Topic 3 category, refers to the legitimacy of the NGO sector. The question seeks the opinion of interviewees on whether over time NGOs displaced their initial goals to promote democratic values, and became agents for someone else. The interviewee will give their opinion based on their experience related to this phenomenon.

The seventh question in an interview is regarding foreign donors. This is the vulnerable point of many NGOs in BiH. The fact that NGOs in BiH are mostly sponsored
by foreign grants (Sejfija, 2006) raises questions about both the authenticity and the legitimacy of their action. The common belief is that the dependency on foreign donations exerts pressure on the NGOs, putting them in a position to shift the focus of their mission—this question also connects to question number six—in order to receive grants for their activities. In this way, instead of dealing with the problems on the ground, they are forced to promote values that might be abstract to BiH citizens. Further, the dependency on foreign resources may create distrust in the NGOs’ activities and projects due to lack of legitimacy.

The eighth question is the last in the interview, and it is in the section “Final Thoughts”. In this section interviewees have a chance to provide more thoughts on the issues of democracy promotion by NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those previously addressed in the interview protocol.

b) Interviews with the NGOs’ participants

The next group of interviewees or informants is BiH citizens who participated in the projects and activities that were part of democracy promotion by NED sponsored NGOs. The BiH citizens that are to be interviewed would be those who participated in activities organized within this time framework. The questions asked during the course of the interview (See Figure 1.6) are designed to provide information necessary to elaborate on corresponding research questions.

The first question in the interview protocol designated for participants in the NGO activities asks interviewees to share their opinions about the involvement of NGOs that
works on the promotion of democracy in BiH. This question will provide important information about the way citizens comprehend the NGOs, and activities run by them. Further, it will provide their perspective about democracy promotion by NGOs. The opinion of citizens is extremely important in this case. A positive answer indicates support of NGOs activism in the field of democracy promotion. Correspondingly, a negative answer will indicate the reasons why there is a lack of participation of BiH citizens in NGOs’ activities.

The second question in “Topic 1: NGO” is about the activity subjects participated in. The reason this question is included in the protocol is to obtain some information about the activities, and to see whether the subject/informant had a clear idea about the activity in which he/she participated, or is currently participating in.

The next section in the interview protocol for participants is “Topic 2: Values”. This section is dedicated to the research question that focuses on values promoted by NGOs. In the fourth question, subjects are asked to define the democratic values promoted in the activity, and to share their thoughts about that particular democratic value. It is used as a proxy or control question in regards to the participant’s comprehension of values being promoted. This question refers to the issue of “abstractness” mentioned earlier.

The fifth question is dedicated to the level of importance the participants place on the democratic values being promoted within the project in which they participated.

The third section or topic in the interview protocol designed for participants is reserved for suggestions. In this topic, the interviewee is asked for his/her opinion how
participation in the NGOs democracy promotion activities can be increased, and improved.

The responses to question number six in this section are a proxy to identify the activities that might be desirable to participants. Comparing them to the values already promoted might provide important suggestions that can be used by NGOs to increase participation of BiH citizens into their programs.

The last question of the interview protocol is reserved for final thoughts, where interviewees might provide additional thoughts on democracy promotion by NGOs sponsored by NED in BiH.

4. The Analytical Strategy

The interview data provided several analytical categories in the current study. The analytical categories that are scattered around certain themes are classified as analytical patterns. Furthermore, the constellation of themes is used in this study to describe different concepts related to democracy promotion by NGOs in BiH.

The analytical strategy will follow the principles used in case study research design. Accordingly, the data will first be obtained from different sources that are related to the context and phenomena be covered. The primary information sources are the interviews with the NGO’s officials, and participants to the NGO studies. Once the data is obtained the disassembly of data will be done in Chapter 4: Analysis. In this chapter the analytical categories will be obtained from different sources (primarily interviews), and they will be coded using NVIVO software. The complete list of analytical patterns
observed throughout the study is available as an APPENDIX III in APPENDICES of the current study. The brief description of analytical categories observed is provided, together with the number of sources for each analytical category. For example if an analytical category is observed in both, the interview and in the archival information the sources cell of the observed analytical pattern will be summed as “2”. Further, the references represents the number the analytical category is being observed across different sources of the data (i.e. if the number in the “References” cell is “3” it means that the coded analytical pattern is observed three times.

The reassembly of data is done in “Chapter 5 Findings”. In this chapter the reassembly of data is done in the way that the analytical categories are grouped under analytical patterns that the analytical categories refer to. The next step is where the similar analytical patterns are forming the themes. The constellation of themes leads towards the concepts that are being the general findings of the study.

In “Chapter 6: Conclusions” the linking of the available reassembled data to research questions, and the focus of the study will be made. Since the current study provided some additional findings, these findings will be linked to the proposition and scope of the current study in the “General Discussion” Part of the study. In Chapter 6 the suggestions are provided as well.

Despite having a certain format for the case study, the analytical categories observed do not necessarily correspond directly to the research questions posed in the study. However, mostly the analytical categories reflect upon the issues posed in the research questions. For example, throughout the interviews the issue of availability of funding for NGOs working on the democracy promotion regularly appeared. In addition,
some respondents said that the scarcity of funding is forcing NGOs to shift their mission and goals in order to receive grants. Therefore, the first analytic category would be “The scarcity of funding” and the second analytical category is the “NGOs shifting mission and goals due to scarcity.” These two categories refer to Research Question (sub-question) #3: Is it true that over the time the NGOs displaced their initial goals of promoting liberal democratic values and became agents for someone else?

The Nvivo qualitative research software is used for the disassembling (sorting data according to the analytical categories observed) and reassembling data (creating cross case analysis based upon the concepts, themes, and analytical patterns).

5. The Research Reports Format

The most important part of the case study research design is the case study research report. Depending on the design of the case study research design, the report can be related to single-case case study research or multiple-case case study research design. Different format for reporting for each type is available. Thus, Yin (2008) suggests that there are at least four available formats for written case study reports: a single narrative; multiple-case version of a classic single case; multiple case or a single case study that has no traditional narratives; and the multiple case study with no traditional narratives for each case. This report is comprised of a cross-case analysis (Yin, 2008).

The best format for the current study is multiple-case version of classic case study with traditional narratives for each case. It refers to the individual cases as an independent cases. Therefore, each case will be dedicated an independent case-study
research. In total, there will be eleven independent cases study that will provide the analytical categories that will be used in the “Findings” chapter. The findings of the current study will be in the form of cross-sectional analysis or narrative. Thus, focusing on the cross-case section’s findings will provide a chance to focus more on the analytical categories pertinent to the research questions. Further, input made by the researcher, or the self-reflexivity of the researcher, will be used as an advantage for comprehension of the Bosnian context, as well as understanding some symbolic events or subjects that might be unfamiliar to readers. The data limited to the individual case study will be comprised of interviews, direct observations, documents, and artifacts related to the individual cases.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

A. Different Contexts in Regards Democracy Promotion in BiH

This study is about democracy promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the focus on the role of NGOs that are sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Therefore, obtaining the relevant empirical data, conducting the necessary field observations, and interviews required travel to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The field observations and interviews were conducted in July 2014. The field study lasted about a month. Although the field research lasted for about a month, the data collection period for this study spans four years. The data obtained during those four years includes archival records, documentation, and data mining on different portals and web addresses of local and international NGOs, political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and most popular web portals in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the topics relevant to the current study. There are several events that happened in 2014 that are of enormous importance for this study. They will be explained in the section below. The purpose of this section is to provide the reader the temporal characteristics of BiH at the time field research was conducted.
1. Temporal Context

There are certain benefits from conducting the current study in 2014, as significant events took place that year. A chronological explanation of these events will best serve the purpose of this study.

In February 2014 protests in the city of Tuzla, the industrial capital of BiH, began by workers dissatisfied by the corruption seen in the privatization and management of once big companies in Tuzla City. Rather peaceful protests, bewildered by police brutality, and perhaps ambiguous individuals sparked society-wide upheavals.\(^1\) These upheavals lasted until April 2014. They didn’t make any significant changes in the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the estimated total damage done during the riots and demonstrations is around thirty million US dollars, which will be reimbursed by the taxpayer money. Despite producing insignificant impact to the current situation in BiH, the February protests were an unexpected response of the BiH citizens towards the ongoing situation in the country.

The next event that made a mark in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2014 was floods in May. On May 13, 2014 heavy rainfall resulted in floods of biblical proportion. These

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\(^1\) There are different explanations for the protests in BiH in February 2014. They range from the spontaneous reaction of citizens towards corruption and misuse of power by government officials that brought the country to the verge of collapse. Further, there are speculations that the protests were ignited by NGOs working on democracy promotion. However there is no evidence for such a claim. Lastly, there are conspiracy theories suggesting that the protests most likely started as a spontaneous reaction of citizens as a protest against the government. However, these conspiracies claim that later these protests were used by suspicious individuals (criminal underground in BiH) who used violence in the protests, and created havoc in which several archival buildings were set to fire. As a consequence of fire damage, bodies of evidence about corruption cases in BiH were lost. However, there is insufficient evidence for any claim, and the protests needs to be put under academic scrutiny for a more valid analysis.
floods affected Bosnia-Herzegovina and other countries in the region, particularly Republic of Serbia. The amount of the three-day rain was equal to a typical three-months of rainfall (World Relief, 2014). The flooded area in Bosnia-Herzegovina was more than 30%. At the initial stages it is estimated that around 1,900,000 people were affected by floods (ACAPS, 2014). According to the UN report, there were about twenty-three to thirty-three fatalities. Floods created around 3,000 landslides. As a result of floods and landslides around 40,000 people were displaced. Zlatko Lagumdzija, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the damage created by the floods was no less than that created by the Bosnian War (Gearin, 2014). The damage and despair created by the floods encouraged solidarity among BiH citizens regardless of ethno-national group or religion. Citizens organized themselves swiftly to prevent the worst possible scenario, and they significantly contributed to restoration and relief efforts. NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina played a great role in relief and restoration. Most of the NGOs mobilized their staff and sent them to the hardest-hit areas. They provided help to Bosnian citizens in all aspects of the crisis. Accordingly, they were involved in rescue missions, providing humanitarian aid and services, cleaning flooded areas, and more. The NGO activism created a double effect. It acquired the respect and recognition of the NGO sector and respect among Bosnian citizens. Second, it created a fertile ground for better cooperation between political elites and NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as better cooperation with NGOs in general. The solidarity among all stakeholders during the floods in Bosnia-Herzegovina prevented a potential cataclysm from happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, floods reoccurred again in August with further
substantial damage had a heavy impact on the lives of the greater population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Fortunately, the next event that will be discussed is a positive one. It sheds light on the current political and socio-economic issues in the country. The national soccer selection of Bosnia-Herzegovina qualified for the largest spectacle of soccer in the world; the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. Although this event should be considered as apolitical, still it created a euphoria among Bosnian citizens that created a certain optimism about the future of BiH as an independent country. In the very beginnings of the National Football Association of BiH, there were myriad indications of corruption in the federation. Ethno-nationalistic politics influenced the sport, where ethno-nationals demanded the sort of proportionality in the selection of national footballers. Further, bribery and similar events that had a very negative influence on the results of the national selection in soccer, and on the nation as well. Providentially, in order to resolve the political and logistical problems that mounted in the federation, legendary soccer player and coach Ivica Osim—one of the most respected persons in BiH, and the region—took the helm of the board called the “Commission for Stabilization.” This commission had a goal to put things in right order in the soccer federation by ignoring ethno-political considerations, preventing corruption, and providing the best possible conditions for the national soccer selection and represent the country the best it could. Apparently, taking politics out of the federation had astounding results, and with a near-heroic sacrifice of participation by national soccer players; Bosnia-Herzegovina’s national anthem was played in the World Cup in Brazil. It was an opening group match against Argentina on

2 In Europe and in some other places the word football refers to soccer.
May 15, 2014 in the legendary Maracana Stadium in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This event had a significant psychological effect citizens of in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was first time they saw their country in one global contest.

The next important event in 2014 was the general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina that took place in October. Accordingly, BiH citizens elected the members of Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina\(^3\), and legislatures in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska (Sahadžić, 2009). The robust political structure created a contested field for 7,877 candidates who will be in a fight for 518 elected positions (Rukavina, 2014). The preliminary results of elections predict the ultimate victory of ethno-nationals, and total collapse of the SDP, the only party on a state level that promotes liberal democratic principles, pluralism, tolerance, and avoids ethno-national rhetoric.

2. The Global Context

In global affairs 2014 is a year marked with extraordinary events. The Ukrainian Revolution in 2014 resulted in the ouster of the pro-Russian President of Ukraine Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych. The Ukraine Revolution was followed by pro-Russian unrest in eastern and southern Ukraine. The unrest resulted in the Crimea province holding a referendum about its status. The referendum in Crimea resulted in the decision of a majority of Crimean citizens to separate from Ukraine, and become a legitimate part of

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\(^3\) The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina is consisted of three presidential members that represent three ethnic constituencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is a rotation of presidential members every eight months.
Russian Federation. The events that unfolded in Ukraine were followed by ethnic clashes threatening a conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is supported by her NATO Allies. The conflict is still ongoing in several regions in Ukraine, but the most fierce conflict is in Donetsk, where the pro-Russian rebels are fighting for independence from Ukraine and possible annexation of the region to the Russian Federation. The current Ukraine crisis is the major threat for the peace and security of the world. The nationalistic drive of the Crimean population and the region’s secession and annexation to Russia may trigger similar behavior elsewhere in the world, threating global peace and security. Further, the sanctions imposed by the West alienated Russia, and created tension between the West, and Russia.

The Civil War in Syria (2011-present) cast a shadow over the emerging terrorist threat in the Middle East region. The war draws the focus to President Assad’s regime, and on the rebellion of Sunni groups. Despite warnings coming from different intelligence sources claiming that a new terrorist threat is emerging, there were no substantial responses to the warnings by the U.S. and other international actors in the region. In January 2014 the groups fighting against Assad’s regime in Syria swiftly declared the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and in June 2014 they declared a caliphate, grasping control over vast territories of Iraq and Syria. ISIL soon became recognized as one of the most violent extremist groups. It became involved in a series of executions and ethnic cleansing while clashing with the different sects in Iraq and Syria. It is also known for the brutal beheadings of captured Western citizens. The atrocities of ISIL against the other ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq and Syria forced the U.S., and her NATO allies, as well as other allies in the region to swiftly respond to the growing
ISIL threat. The response started with airstrikes of ISIL strategic military assets (September, 2014). Thus, the long-term nation-building efforts of the U.S. and her allies proved to be inadequate against extremism. In other words, democracy failed in Iraq, and ISIL threatens to spread through the region, significantly affecting global security.
B. Individual Case Studies:

The Individual Case Studies: NGOs supported by the NED who work on democracy promotion in BiH

1. The individual Case Study: Center for Policy and Governance (CPU)

The Center for Policy and Governance (Centar za politike i upravljanje) is a think tank founded in 2009. The CPU mission is to conduct high-quality research and based on this research, develop policies to foster better understanding between government and citizens, and provide solutions for the current socio-economic challenges in BiH (CPU, 2014).

They focus on three sets of policies. First, European integration policies are policies that promote fast adoption and realization of the responsibilities taken by Bosnian authorities from the EU. The adoption of such policies is the fastest route for BiH to full membership in the EU. In addition, the CPU holds the belief that fulfilling the requirements set up by the EU to Bosnian authorities is the fastest way to develop the country (CPU, 2014).

Second, governance and public administration, is set of policies used to promote better serving quality of public administration on state, regional and local level. Special attention is given to the advancement of a human resources (abbr. HR) sector in public administration. However, primary focus of CPU is not to increase the capacities of public

4 Retrieved from www.cpu.org.ba/o-nama/
officials, rather the focus is analysis of this problem in public administration, and creation of suggestion that can solve this problem (CPU, 2014).

Third, policies related to the economy and the development of the private sector is a set of policies where the CPU focuses on the analysis of economic and private sector development. In addition, the CPU focuses on developing policies that will promote economic development. Briefly, the economic situation in BiH is grim. Despite initial satisfactory economic growth after the war, the current economic situation is crippled with chronic unemployment (60%), and lack of foreign investments. This dire situation can be attributed to government economic policies and corruption.

The CPU criticizes government economic policies that were based on short-term goals, while failing to develop long-term economic policies that would provide steady development of the economy. In the CPU mission statement improvement of the economy and development of the private sector will be achieved by promoting better leadership; higher quality of both legislative and enforcement agencies; and by stimulating the contribution of the private sector in creating economic policies. (CPU, 2014).

In the last four years, NED has sponsored four projects developed by the CPU. Annually, one CPU project was sponsored by NED with an average amount of $43,500. There is an incremental increase in grants annually. All four grants fit into two categories sponsored by NED: accountability or advocacy.

The year 2010 was also the year of general elections in BiH, The CPU was funded by NED to work on the project that would promote policymakers’ accountability and the
efficacy of government institutions in BiH (NED, 2014). This project is long term and funded for several years by NED. The project description is as follows:

To promote the accountability of policymakers and efficiency of government institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the October 2010 general elections. Through regular monitoring and review of the public policymaking and implementation processes, the Center will provide better insight into government activities and enable citizens to hold policymakers accountable for the use of public funds. The Center will also conduct extensive media outreach activities to promote the results of its findings. (NED, 2014)

Additionally, Policy Monitoring Index is the part of the long-term project started in 2010 (CPU, 2014). According to the CPU’s website, the project focused on policy evaluation on different levels of government in BiH. The responsibility of the CPU in this project was to follow implementation of governmental policies. The timeframe for the project was April-October 2010 (CPU, 2014).

In 2011 NED provided $41,000 to the CPU for continuing the projects on accountability started in 2010. Thus, the focus of this funding was to develop four policy papers on the topic of public policymaking and implementation of policies related to BiH en route to membership in the EU. Further the CPU would focus on outreach activities. In this way the CPU would try to promote the implementation of its policies. The project description available on NED’s website is as follows:

To promote public debate on policies affecting Bosnia-Herzegovina's democratic transition and EU integration. Through an analysis and a review of public policymaking and implementation processes, the Center will initiate an open debate about and solicit expert input on specific policies of major importance for the country's EU accession. The Center will produce four policy papers and conduct a series of outreach activities to advocate for the implementation of its recommendations. (NED, 2014)
The CPU received the grant in 2013 for its project “Promoting Accountable Policymaking and Policy Implementation” (NED, 2014). The project description is as follows:

To promote public debate on key policies affecting Bosnia-Herzegovina’s development and democratic transition. Through analysis of public policymaking and implementation processes, the CPU will not only initiate a public debate about specific policies of major importance for the country’s transition, but will also help to hold decision-makers accountable for their implementation. The CPU will produce six policy papers and three policy briefs, and conduct a series of outreach activities to encourage greater public participation in monitoring the work of government institutions. (NED, 2014)

a. The Interview with the CPU

The CPU was the first organization to be interviewed. The interview was scheduled with a high level official from the NGO at their headquarters in Sarajevo. The person interviewed, or the informant\(^5\), was very young, well educated, professionally attired, extremely hospitable, and professional. The first question the researcher asked the informant to share his personal opinions about the challenges NGOs face while working on projects related to democracy promotion. The informant responded:

The thing that we as an NGO have noticed is that the actors, or politicians are not ready to open themselves, or to adapt themselves to the things that the NGO sector has to offer to them. They don’t want to accept the knowledge that NGOs offer to them. In the same time, the media is under the veil of politicians. Therefore, the media is not covering NGOs activities well . . . this is the essence of the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina (personal communication, July, 2014).

When asked how effective NGOs can be in their efforts to promote democracy and democratic values, as well as how much support his organization receives from the

\(^5\) In this study “the informant” term will be used for the interviewees that participated in the interviews with the NGOs’ representatives, and the participants in the NGOs’ activities.
public and other pertinent stakeholders, the informant answered that NGOs can be
effective in democracy promotion but certain issues are affecting their ability to perform
better. The informant asserted that the problem might be in BiH citizens’ perceptions of
the NGO sector. The informant describes the situation as follows:

Bosnian society is pretty conservative regarding the promotion of
democracy and democratic values by NGOs in BiH. Consequently, every NGO
has problems that are related to the fact that the NGO sector doesn’t score high
according to the public. There is a big issue here that just after the war, the large
number of NGOs did considerable damage to the NGO sector. Accordingly, large
sums of money rotated in the sector and just simply perished. Today, people
perceive NGOs as a sector where, some strange people are working; their work
absolutely has no purpose; and they are being compensated with large sums of
money. So that is further making the job of NGOs more difficult (personal
communication, July, 2014).

The informant’s response reflects the general framework of the study. It is the
conservative view that citizens have in regards to the NGOs that indicate on the patterns
of modern vs. traditional struggle. Nonetheless, BiH citizens’ view of NGOs is affected
by the performance and the behavior of those NGOs.

The informant also discussed the use of social media and Internet forums against
the NGO sector, in which NGOs are accused of conspiracy. Such accusations can be seen
in the current leading political party in RS. Accordingly, the “Savez Nezavisnish
Socijaldemokrata-SNSD” (trans. The Coalition of Independent Social Democrats) on
their website published a controversial book (Karganovic et al., 2014) in which the
author accuses some NGOs to be the extension of foreign governments aiming at the
destruction of RS (Bjelajac, 2014). Several organizations sponsored by NED are being
listed as “fake NGOs” in Karganovic’s 2014 book. In regards to these types of
accusations, this informant asserted that:
There are forums, portals, and the Internet that clearly identify and describe the NGOs that are being sponsored by this or that international institution. In this case these organizations are being called foreign agents. That is not only the case in RS; it is also the case in the Federation (FBiH), and all three sides (ethnic groups) as well. In addition, it is easy to deceive people in BiH since, whatever people here see on TV, they accept as truth by default. The critical thinking in BiH is not much developed. This problem greatly affects the NGO sector (personal communication, July 2014).

When asked about the democratic values promoted by the CPU, the informant stated that:

You see, our organization, literally, and in essence, the only right we want to secure for citizens is the right to work. Principally, our organization deals with economic issues, and European integration related to economic and tax-related policies. The thing that we are most interested in is the right to work. Henceforth, as a part of a project that we are currently working on, we have chosen five economic topics that we want to set up as the most important questions in the pre-election process. As an organization, we want to influence the public topics that should be dealt with: energy, employment, business indexes, the way BiH treats her entrepreneurs, and potential foreign investors from any part of the world, as well as the export-import coverage. These are the topics related to production.

All questions are connected to it, and we are trying to forward these questions to the public as the most important for the society, whereas all other topics like constitutional reforms, and similar issues are marginal. The deficit of job opportunities in BIH is the greatest problem, and this problem spills over into other issues. Politicians skillfully cover this issue, which I call a “lack of will” to do something about these issues. On the contrary, they are dealing with marginal issues like ethno-national tensions, declaration of enemies of the state and the like. Thus, we think this is an institutional priority.

When speaking in general, I think that BiH needs to be open to new ideas. One of the biggest challenges for the democracy promotion is the educational system. Myriad organizations deal with this issue, but still the educational system in BiH is very conservative/traditional. It is very similar to the old system where kids were not participants in the educational process. Rather they were mere listeners. Bosnia-Herzegovina should work as a country on reform of all levels of educational system. The source of many problems related to unemployment is the uncoordinated private sector, and universities. We have too many graduates from occupations that we actually don’t need: political scientists, lawyers, etc. On the contrary, it is often the case that we need engineers, and there is a deficit of them, we don’t create enough engineers.

One of the major challenges is that the majority of students who develop their talents and scholarship to a certain level develop it in order to leave abroad. They go to a university entrance examination in order to develop their skills so they can leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. This issue again reflects the fact that
politicians do not work on the production of new jobs. So youth cannot see a way to secure their future and stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next question was on the issue of NGO programs’ abstractness. The informant was asked whether or not NGO programs reflect the underlying problems in BIH? The informant partially answered this question before, asserting that citizens in BiH have the general opinion that people that work for NGOs actually do nothing. The informant implies:

The NGO sector in BiH serves its purpose. Sometimes it appears that the majority of NGOs focus on marginal issues. Therefore, BiH citizen do not notice the NGO work. There are NGOs that do an extremely good job, but they have great problems funding their activities. These organizations manage to survive on the enthusiasm of people. In contrast, there are those organizations that have extremely good funding available, yet they do an extremely poor job. In essence, this imbalance in the quality of NGOs’ work is what greatly determines the public and media support of the NGO sector (personal communication, July, 2014).

When asked about the “democracy transplant”— whether it is possible to transplant the democratic values and norms seen in developed Western democracies to a transitional context in BiH—the informant asserted:

Philosophic discussion that occupied the attention of a majority of BiH citizens—especially, those working in the NGO sector— for years. He suggests that personally he assumes that, literally nothing is possible to transplant from one environment to the other. He suggests, what is seen as a value in American society, or German society doesn’t necessary mean that it will be of the same value for BiH society. Nevertheless, the informant suggests that democratic principles that represent the foundation of Western societies should be used as a foundation for democratic values in Bosnia-Herzegovina, values such as freedom of movement, religious rights, right to free speech, and tolerance are the values that NGOs in BiH should work on (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next question was the controversial one. It somehow reflects the criticism addressed by Karganovic (2014) that NGOs are some sort of foreign agents. The informant is asked to share his opinion on this issue, and responded with a smile:
I believe that this is a funny question. I am not saying that some organizations are not a cover for intelligence agencies. Yet, at the same time some companies in the private sector are covers for intelligence agencies. Every sector can be used for that purpose. Nevertheless, I think that the real NGO sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not vulnerable to this phenomenon (personal communication, July, 2014).

In the next section of the interview protocol, the informant was asked for his opinion on foreign donors. Further, what is the impact of dependence on foreign donors on NGOs’ effectiveness in promoting democracy and democratic values in BiH?

The informant answered:

I think that it has a large impact on NGOs, since, it is not a rare case in BiH that some NGOs do projects that are not related to their mission and interests. They do it only for one reason: that is to collect grants, and they are purely donor driven. I assume that the problem is when a foreign donor provides an agenda, and says, “This is my agenda, who will do the project?” There are organizations that will take the project no matter the costs. This is very damaging for the NGO sector and for the development of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina (personal communication, July, 2014).

When asked about additional opinions about democracy promotion through projects run by NED-sponsored NGOs, the informant complimented the methods used by NED. The informant asserted:

I believe that for our institution, the presence of NED in BiH is very important. The NED support was very important since we were formed. I am personally convinced that we have done a lot of good thing, because we had NED funding. We believe that our current project also sponsored by NED will have a significant impact. In the very beginning of next month, just prior to elections, we will embark on our advocacy mission, and we hope to have very good results (personal communication, July, 2014).

b. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The interviewee from the CPU provided an important contribution to the study. Not only did it reveal the existence of the so-called “Black List” (Bjelajac, 2014), it also
provided some important aspects of democracy promotion in BiH. One can see that the current project run by the CPU reflects their goals and mission. It can be concluded that due to institutional experience and educated staff, this project is likely to provide the expected results.

The data obtained from this study reflects several analytical categories. In general terms they are referring to negative criticism about the direct “democratic transplant”, whereas the adjusted transplantation receives positive criticism. The role of young people and education is emphasized. Informant suggests there should be a focus on education, and on youth. The priority of the CPU is economic policies. “Biased media” and “societal challenges” are two phenomena that should be examined in more detail.

According to the data from this informant, the media is under the influence of politicians and citizens of BiH are greatly influenced by the media. One leads to the other. It appears that the negative perception of NGOs by BiH citizens—as defined in the interviewee’s response—is a result of the strategy of ethno-national political elites to control media and use it to criticize NGOs for different reasons. Apparently, the most severe and evident case of accusation was the publication of a controversial book (Karganovic, 2014) by SNSD on its website. The author of the book accuses some NGOs sponsored by foreign donors of some sort of conspiracy against the RS. This was criticized by the NGO sector in general as an attempt to “lynch” the organizations listed in the book. The organizations listed include NED-sponsored NGOs.

The informant believes the NGOs in BiH in general are not agents for others. Nevertheless, the informant suggested the issue of donor seeking behavior by NGOs. This behavior can be explained as such when NGOs are applying for projects that do not
refer to their area of expertise and they do not have enough institutional capacity to carry them out. This behavior greatly affects the perception of BiH citizens towards the NGO sector, since in most cases these projects do not make any significant impact on BiH citizens.

The informant elaborated on the issue of foreign donors’ dependence, asserting that it significantly affects or limits the effectiveness of NGOs. Foreign donors are required so projects can be run in the first place.

The informant praised the NED approach. Not only does the NED provide grants to competitive NGOs that possess a level of expertise necessary to run the project, but also they don’t force the NGOs with programs that have a specific agenda according to the parameters established by NED.

It is interesting that some of the projects done by the CPU are NED-sponsored year by year. If the projects prove beneficial, NED sponsors the projects for the long run. This is notable, given that most of the NGO projects in BiH were short-term projects. The problems that society faces in BiH, like reconciliation, raising the awareness of citizens, and similar issues require the long-term approach. In most cases, foreign donors provide short term funding, and this prevents NGOs from establishing a long-term agenda. Nevertheless, NED provides this chance to NGOs in BiH. In the case of the CPU they have given a grant for the continuation of the CPU’s successful project over a period of four years.

The only thing that can be addressed in this report as criticism is the fact that the CPU does not work directly with BiH citizens. Moreover, they are a think-tank that produces certain knowledge and analyses. Then these analyses are disseminated to
different stakeholders in the Bosnian political scene. Nevertheless, the quality of projects they run is high, and incrementally they are increasing the number of projects they run.
2. The Individual Case Study: Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN)

The CIN is a highly respected center for investigative reporting in BiH. It was established in 2004 with a USAID grant, and with technical and other expertise related assistance from the New York University School of Journalism and the Journalism Development Group. Today, the CIN operates fully independently, conducting research, analysis, and publishing articles about issues in BiH society. (CIN, 2014a).

The CIN is located in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The center can be seen also as a media platform, whose reports are used as a valuable and reliable source of information by different Internet forums and individuals. All information available on the CIN’s webpage, and all related material is available free to partner organizations (CIN, 2014a).

The primary mission of the CIN is to provide “fair and unbiased” (CIN, 2014a) information. Their primary goals are described on their website as follows:

Our work focuses on organized crime and corruption and the negative effect they have on the lives of ordinary citizens. We put out investigative projects and stories on topics that include education, health, sports, employment, politics, illegal trading in tobacco and drugs, illegal drugs and documents, and financial fraud (CIN, 2014a).

The impressive thing about the CIN is the level of cooperation they have with local, and international organizations. The statement available on their website confirms the high level of cooperation with different organizations, some of which are highly respected and renowned media centers:

The center cooperates with a number of distinguished media outlets worldwide and its stories have appeared in print form in the Guardian, Time, Der Spiegel, Washington Post, and on radio and TV stations including ZDF, BBC, and Deutsche Welle. CIN work is regularly published by the most prominent media
outlets of Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro. In addition, they are distributed through Radio Free Europe / TV Liberty. The CIN has done much work with one of the leading associations of investigative journalists in the world – the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. (CIN, 2014a).

The CIN’s staff is composed of 18 local members (CIN, 2014a), incorporating all three ethnicities, and gender balance. In addition, two international editors serve as members of the advisory board at the CIN. According to the information on the CIN’s website, the internationals are there to make sure that the CIN complies with international standards, and for training purposes (CIN, 2014a).

The center received numerous domestic, regional, and international awards for investigative reporting. The international donors are CIN’s primary funders. Nevertheless, the center intends to work on sustainable projects that would cover part of its expenses (CIN, 2014a).

From 2008 NED has sponsored several projects. These projects were related to accountability. In 2010, NED sponsored a CIN watchdog project that worked on financial transparency and accountability. The project description is as follows:

To promote transparency and accountability, with a particular focus on raising awareness about the actual cost and consequences of corruption in public institutions. During an important election year, CIN reporters will investigate specific cases of corruption in the sectors which most directly affect the lives of ordinary citizens, quantify their effects, and calculate the actual cost to taxpayers. The information uncovered will be used to produce at least six investigative articles for popular national newspapers, magazines, and websites. (NED, 2014)

The amount of the grant was $48,500. In 2011, NED re-sponsored a similar watchdog project to that of 2010, with only small changes and a grant amount of $51,000. The description of the sponsored project is as follows:

To conduct a watchdog project promoting transparency and accountability in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a particular focus on using public financing to obtain political influence over media outlets and civil society organizations. The Center
for Investigative Reporting will analyze the public financing mechanisms, examine the transparency of funding decisions, and investigate funding patterns. The information uncovered will be used to produce at least eight investigative articles for national newspapers, magazines, and websites. (NED, 2014)

The year 2012 was an election year. Therefore, the project from 2011 was continued but with the specific goal of raising awareness about corruption in the areas that have major impact on the lives of BiH citizens (NED, 2014). The grant amount was $49,000, with a primary focus on accountability and transparency. The project description is as follows:

To promote transparency and accountability, with a particular focus on raising awareness about the actual cost and consequences of corruption in public institutions. During an important election year, CIN reporters will investigate specific cases of corruption in the sectors which most directly affect the lives of ordinary citizens, quantify their effects, and calculate the actual cost to taxpayers. The information uncovered will be used to produce at least six investigative articles for popular national newspapers, magazines, and websites. (NED, 2014)

Lastly, the CIN received a grant in 2013 for the project in 2014 in amount of $49,000. The project is related to raising the awareness of corruption. The description of the project is as follows:

To raise awareness about the actual cost and consequences of corruption in public institutions. CIN reporters will investigate misuse of public spending, with a particular focus on the lack of transparency and oversight regarding the allocation of the country's budgetary reserves. CIN will analyze mechanisms for approving and disbursing these public funds, and investigate relationships between officials and recipients of public funds. The resulting information will be used to produce at least six investigative articles for leading popular national newspapers, magazines, and websites.” (NED, 2014).

In summary, the NED has provided around $200,000 to the CIN over four years for projects related to accountability and transparency in BiH. The projected result of the projects would be 30 investigative articles about the corruption, accountability, where the
targeted goal would be the raising of awareness of BiH citizens about how corruption severely affects their lives.

**a. The Interview with the CIN**

When asked about the challenges NGOs in BiH face while promoting democracy and democratic values, the informant asserted:

The primary challenge is the fact that in BiH there is a change of the complete system. Accordingly, there was socialism until the 90’s, after that the bloody war happened. At the same time the war marked the transition from a single-party to multiple-party political system. Just after the war, the informant suggests, the BiH society started to reform of entire system: the judicial, executive, and legislative branch and so on. She suggests that was the time when NGOs came on the scene. The informant suggests that the NGOs came as a brand new form of an assembly. In essence they came as a new sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time privatization of state owned capital to private ownership resulted in new private businesses. The informant suggests that this was all happening while regular citizens of BiH were struggling to survive; they were trying to deal with that chaos they were exposed to, while trying to acquire their basic needs. The informant suggests that at that time the implementation of democracy as a new political system in BIH occurred (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant asserts that the major challenge that both BiH as a country and the NGO sector face in BiH is how to explain to BiH citizens what democracy means. It goes along with the research question related to the abstractness of democracy promotion in BiH. That implies understanding key concepts of democracy by Bosnian citizens such as how to participate in the democratic process; who makes the decisions in a democracy, and who is responsible for those decisions; and who is responsible to whom.

The informant believes there is plenty of work that needs to be done to enlighten the citizens in regards to democracy in BiH. Since, the large number of politicians in BiH
believes that they can behave in the way they did during the previous political system, socialism. In the socialist system, they were in charge. Unfortunately, even nowadays, BiH citizens do not understand that by voting for a certain political party or politician they are at the same time responsible for what the elected government does. The informant believes that the basic role of the NGO sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina is to draw Bosnian citizens closer and educate them about participating in the democratic process. In a sense, they should know how to participate in democratic processes, but at the same time citizens should be aware of the meaning of those democratic processes. The informant believes that this type of effort is the missing link in the story of democratization in BiH.

When asked about the effectiveness of NGOs in regards to democracy promotion, the informant asserted that it is related mostly to NGOs. In other words, it depends how the NGO was formed. Hence, most NGO organizations were formed under the scrutiny of the international community. Therefore, the NGO sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina is very different than the NGO sectors in neighboring countries are.

The informant suggests that the vast number of international NGOs in BiH certain goals. Once they achieved these goals they started to leave the BiH scene. As their programs were shutting down, certain “spin-offs” to local organizations happened. The informant asserts that the consequence of such behavior resulted with the shut down of some NGOs, while some new NGOs were formed in the process.

Further, the informant indicates another important outcome of BiH democratization. The NGO sector in BiH emerged as a new form of entrepreneurship. Thus, BiH citizens believe there are substantial financial resources available for NGOs,
and that NGO activism became a well paid job. The Informant suggests that this popular belief produced negative perception of NGOs, and greatly affected NGOs’ ability to receive the popular support from citizens required for effective NGO democracy promotion in BiH.

The informant believes that the number of NGOs is another problem. The media presents such stories about NGOs. In these stories some of the NGOs were involved in certain cases of fraud. Further, some NGOs are being labeled as politically oriented who exist only to serve special purposes. This creates a negative image of the NGO sector as a whole. The respondent asserts that there is a trace of truth in this negative criticism. Nevertheless, some NGOs are doing an extremely good job, are very successful, and continue to develop new programs and projects. In this way the influence of successful NGOs is increasing, as well as their popularity and support they receive from citizens. The informant’s response suggests that the level of support of the citizens depends upon the effectiveness of NGOs.

In regards to politicians and their support for NGOs working on democracy promotion in BiH, the informant extrapolated on the complexity of the political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The informant claims that that it’s very rare and unlikely that the government cooperates with the NGO sector in a democratic process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The informant suggests there are improvements in cooperation between the NGO sector and government, but also implies that progress is very slow.

The next section in the interview was the one dedicated to democracy transplant and democratic values The CIN sees as a priority the promotion of democracy and democratic values. In regards to democratic transplant, the informant said that if we use
the term as it is used in medical jargon, then it is obvious that the transplant can be accepted only if there is an absolute match between the transplant and the organism that is receiving a transplant. The informant believes that it is the same case in the case of democratic transition. Nevertheless, the informant holds a strong belief that a sort of copy-paste style of democratic transplant from one system to another is not possible. The informant suggests that the Bosnian context is even more problematic due to the large number of problems the BiH context. The informant referred to the problems rooting back to the recent war in 1992, asserting that “We have a lot of problems that are consequences of the war. We tried to patch those problems up, but we didn’t succeed. Consequently, these problems are continuously reemerging and hitting us back” (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant states since it is not quite possible to have a literal transplant of democracy, the tailor-made approach should be used. The informant extrapolates that this approach considers the influence of ubiquitous democratic values seen in developed Western societies on the democratic process in BIH. Further, the informant suggests that this strategy considers the gradual introduction of these values to BiH society, so they can be implemented or absorbed smoothly. This approach anticipates better comprehension of values introduced, and less resistance of BiH society towards promoted values.

Regarding values, the informant states that the most important value they promote is facing and dealing with corruption, investigating the connections of political structures in BiH with corruption, and investigating the different sorts of fraud committed by government officials. In summary, the CIN primarily focuses on accountability and transparency. The informant indicates that promoting accountability is an extremely
difficult task, satirically implying that “Even the translation of ‘accountability’ in the Bosnian Language is difficult; now you can only imagine how difficult it is to promote the same value within the society” (personal communication, July, 2014).

Regarding transparency, the informant asserted that:

Transparency is not something that was valued throughout our history. Therefore, the most difficult task is to explain to the BiH citizens why such a value is important, and how that value should be manifested, as well as why the transparency is one of the most important values in society. I believe that with the transparency of government we will resolve some of the problems that are impeding our efforts. The primary focus should be corruption, and the vast amounts of money that disseminate into private pockets in different directions that led our state to the brink of bankruptcy (personal communication, July, 2014).

In addition to transparency and accountability, the informant asserted that another important value is respect for human rights. The informant believes that accountability and human rights are also under the umbrella of transparency.

The next question was whether the promoted values refer to the underlying issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The informant noted the importance of educational activities conducted by the NGO sector. Informant believes that the NGO sector must make the citizens aware what is important for them. Informant states that:

It is very sensible task, since you have to introduce something without imposing it. In other words, you have to explain it, but not affect the thought process. For example, again we can use transparency as an example. It is very normal for citizens that speaking about the transparency of government is abstract to them. The main reason for this are the regular citizens who struggles to acquire some basic services provided by government. They struggle to receive some basic healthcare, education for their kids, right to receive compensation for the work
they did, and therefore dealing with the transparency of the government is a very difficult task for them.

Nevertheless, when we look at the core of these problems we see that transparency in healthcare will indeed make things easier for citizens. Because, they will be provided accurate information about what is or what is not covered with the healthcare, what are their rights in healthcare, and how they can obtain their rights, and also who will pay for the healthcare services provided to them (personal communication, July, 2014).

In order to provide the illustration of the CIN’s work, and challenges both the CIN and other NGOs face while working on the promotion of democracy in BiH the CIN’s approach to issues related to healthcare problems in BIH will be discussed. Accordingly, the CIN’s (2004) report “Health care in BiH is sick” talks about the calamitous situation in Bosnian healthcare. Several issues were being listed that severely affect the healthcare system in BiH. The issues are both of legal and logistics nature. Combined together, everyday these issues put the lives of BiH citizens in danger (CIN, 2004).

In regards to transparency in the healthcare system in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are several studies published by the CIN that call for more awareness of the issue of various issues and schemes for embezzlement in the BiH health care system. The CIN’s (2014) article is titled “Customs that have become crimes.” (CIN, 2014b). This article relates the topic to the theoretical approach used in this study, and the struggle between the traditional and the modern in the context of democracy promotion in BiH.

The article covers omnipresent issues in the healthcare systems in BiH and the region, such as the chronic form of healthcare bribery present in BiH and Serbia. The bribery consists of the patient paying extra money to acquire services that are normally provided for free by the state. This problem has two forms: first, when doctors ask for money for services that should be free, and second, the custom of BiH citizens of rewarding their doctors for services provided to them. This is a form of gratitude, in
which BiH citizens feel an obligation to tip the doctors. Regardless, doctors already receive their salaries for this service. Further, the problem becomes even more complicated when these two illegitimate forms of obtaining money or goods from patients by doctors become merged into a new form of fraud. In this new form, it is hard to distinguish whether the extraction of resources (bribery) or an act of gratitude occurred. Nevertheless, no matter the form, the doctors or medical employees are committing a fraudulent act that damages health care.

It is extremely difficult for NGOs in BiH to raise the awareness of citizens and medical staff about the severity of this issue, and how important transparency in the health care sector is. For BiH citizens it is disgraceful not to tip the doctors, whereas on the other side doctors became accustomed to such gratitude, which leads towards chronic cases of bribery and extraction. The CIN (2014) article provides an illustration:

Dr. Mladen Stojnić, from Prijedor, allegedly asked for 200 KM\(^6\) from a patient, explaining it was needed to pay for surgical thread, according to Vukašin Kondić, a Prijedor prosecutor. Police said a patient made a complaint and they used marked KM notes as evidence that Stojnić had accepted the money. Stojnić, who was indicted and will go to trial, denied the charges, and said he was set up by police for what was only miscommunication between himself and the patient.” (CIN, 2014b).

The doctor’s response was as follows:

In an interview, an angry Dr. Stojnić pointed out that, although he is innocent, he will be on trial in Prijedor for allegedly taking 200 KM for colon cancer surgery, when he has heard that doctors are asking for 2,500 KM for the same procedure in Banja Luka(CIN, 2014b).

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\(^6\) KM or BAM is the monetary unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It approximates to 1.95 Euros. According to the indexes in the time this study was conducted the KM or BAM was approximately equal to .68 USD.
The comment of another doctor in defense of his fellow colleague was even more astounding, “Millions of marks are missing, or are stolen and nobody asks about them Lazarević said. ‘And a doctor is on trial because of 200 KM.’ “ (CIN, 2014b).

For NGOs to change the customs of BiH citizens will be extremely difficult. Nevertheless, it appears that through education and gradual exposure of BiH citizens to the consequences of bribery in the healthcare, both the behavior of BiH citizens and doctors might become more similar to that in the West, seen as purely professional and ethical, so that ethical and professional standards prevent doctors and medical staff from obtaining goods or resources from patients. This will surely be a long process for NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, instances of corruption that are seen as custom or tradition in BiH require more study.

In some cases interviewee responses can lead to better questions in case study research design (Yin, 2008). The previous answer regarding the healthcare system in BiH led to a new question: whether the problem of democracy promotion in BiH, at least in regards to the issue of tips/bribery, is a case of conceptual incoherence. Conceptual incoherence means using the same conceptual framework and term for a certain phenomenon, yet it has different conceptual values observed in different contexts. For example, in BiH consistently tipping the doctor is seen as a custom and general courtesy, whereas in Western democracies it could be considered as a bribe.

Regarding transparency as a social value, the informant asserts that I need to refer back to the previous system, socialism. Socialism did not promote transparency as a value. Whatever was in the domain of politics, it wasn’t available to citizens. This was the approach used by the socialist system. Therefore, there was a political system in socialism together with its elements like ministries, and other government structures that did their job. On the other side, citizens were aware that they were not supposed to interfere into these internal affairs, there are people who are chosen to do so. I am doing my part, and I am
not diverging from this system. That was socialism as a political system. I am not criticizing it, nor do I think it was good, but the consequence of that political system can be seen in the issues regarding transparency. It is very difficult to have citizens who grew up in that system feel sure that it is okay to ask questions. That it is okay to diverge, it is ok to ask whatever they have a right to ask about (personal communication, July, 2014).

As an example, the informant shared an experience about the \textit{Free Access to Information Act in 2001}. The informant said that this was a relatively smoothly legislated law. In the very beginning, politicians did not understand this law. The moment when they started to receive questions, and when NGOs started to use the law frequently as a tool, there was a repressive reaction by politicians. Since that time, politicians have been trying to derogate the law. The informant explained,

\begin{quote}
At the time the law was legislated in Sarajevo there was a delegation from one NGO from Slovakia that dealt with the same problem. They provided an illustration how the law was implemented back there. They provided the phone numbers of the mayors in the major cities in Slovakia. They asked citizens to call the mayor of the town at any time and ask questions about anything related to the governance of those cities, from the budget for planting flowers in the public parks to questions regarding the resources allocated for trashcans in the city, and similar subjects. There was a strong resistance by a mayor. Because, for God’s sake, how can he can receive a call from someone at midnight, and be asked about such banal questions, like: what was the budget for planting flowers in public parks? It was not only strange for the mayor to receive that type of questions and calls, but also it was strange for citizens to ask the mayor those questions in the first place. It was strange to them that someone could make a phone call to the mayor of the town because he is someone from politics. It required a long time to acquaint the citizens that a mayor is directly accountable and responsible to citizens, and that mayor has an obligation to either know the answer to the question asked by citizens, or to research in order to find the answer.

However, when the same method was presented here, the reaction was the same. Thus, even today nothing significantly changed. The attitude that questions like that can’t be asked still persists. Because, for God’s sake, a mayor shouldn’t answer questions asked by regular citizens, despite the fact that, these citizens are the ones who elected the mayor for that position in the first place. It is unacceptable for a citizen to ask how much money was spent for to paint a certain government building in the city. Nevertheless, that is exactly the information citizens need to know to be active citizens and it is essential to the participatory democratic process. That is basically a cultural difference, because it is relatively normal for citizens in the West to ask that type of question, and they are ready to
ask them. To the contrary, our society is still not ready for that type of participation, and basically that is the primary reason we are in such a dire situation in the first place (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant explained that there was a certain impact the aforementioned method had, but it wasn’t sufficient to make a significant change. The same methods should be promoted every year so the wider population becomes engaged. Nevertheless, informant asserted that this was the case for urban areas. When speaking of rural areas situation is much different since “The educated level of urban population is much higher than the one in rural areas. In addition to this, in urban areas there are a large number of people who lived in the West, and then brought some of the values seen there back to BiH. It is much different situation than in rural areas where for example politicians are treated as ‘gods’ and not like people who are being elected by citizens” (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant believes that NGOs’ priority should be education, and conversance of BiH with NGOs’ efforts. There is a general opinion that BiH citizens are not well acquainted with the NGO sector. The informant asserts that “NGOs are somehow separated form the daily life of citizens. They have problems communicating with citizens. The root of all problems is the lack of education of both sides about the activities of both “ (personal communication, July 2014).

The informant stated that the CIN as a media house (media center) has a very specific role and mission. The CIN has a priority to improve conversance of NGOs with BiH citizens. The process of conversance requires NGOs to adjust themselves to the level of citizens; to simplify the approach they use. In this way, regardless of educational level, every regular citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina could understand what NGOs in BiH are
actually doing. The informant believes this is how NGOs can acquire the popular support of BiH citizens, and this should be the priority of every nongovernmental organization working on the promotion of democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The next question in the interview was about criticism that some NGOs are changing their initial goals and working as agents for someone else, with some hidden agenda. The informant responded affirmatively to this claim. The informant indicated that after the elections in 2010 a large number of NGO representatives started their political careers. These people were severely criticized by political parties for this behavior. In addition, the informant suggests that it is completely acceptable for someone who worked in the NGO sector to see himself/herself as a political activist and engage in work with a political party. Nevertheless, the problem is that once they leave, the NGO shuts down and its mission is finished. The informant asserts that another reason why NGOs are shifting their initial focus is the decreasing availability of funding. The informant suggests that this is reason why, instead of achieving expertise in one area, NGOs may shift their focus to issues that are not in accordance with their initial mission. In other words, they simply run for the money and other resources.

Regarding the criticism that NGOs may be working for someone else, the informant asserted that it is absolutely correct. This person indicated that the democratic transplant, was frequently what international organizations did, and now the local organizations are doing it under the financial support of foreign donors. These organizations are trying to transplant processes, procedures, and situations from abroad to BiH. Nevertheless, these organizations do not pay attention to the adaptation of these values to the Bosnian context.
The informant suggests another omnipresent NGO problem: most projects in BiH are short-term. Informants suggest that since projects lack long-term commitments, NGOs tend to look for quick strategies to resolve issues. On the contrary, these projects require a long-term commitment. This informant indicated that many projects lasted for two years; there was some sort of progress observed. Then, suddenly an NGO working on the project decides to do something else, they retreat from the project, and it remains unfinished. This resulted in BiH citizens’ dissatisfaction with the NGOs. Further, the informant suggests, it serves as a strong argument used by politicians against NGOs in BiH. The politicians claim that in essence, NGOs are doing nothing, that they are working for money, and that they have no commitment. The informant agrees that in rare instances it may be true that some NGOs lack integrity. Therefore, the NGO sector needs to pay more attention to the issue of NGOs shifting focus. Nevertheless, the informant asserts that due to the current struggle of NGOs for resources, they are frequently in a race to obtain financial resources. Therefore, the most common instance is the opposite of the desired one. Instead of paying attention to the structure and quality of the programs, NGOs are running from project to project to acquire grants.

When asked about how the dependency on foreign donors affects NGOs, informants assert that the dependency exists since there are no other viable sources of funding for NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of the CIN, the informant confirms that foreign donors sponsor their activities. Nevertheless, the informant believes that this was also necessary for the CIN so they could conduct their activities as they needed to do. The informant asserts that they can’t criticize the government and at the same time expect the government to fund their activities. Therefore, funding that comes from
governments comes with certain demands. The CIN can’t accept these demands, and therefore need to turn their faces towards the donors that achieved a higher level of democracy.

The informant noted that the CIN is not a volunteer organization or association of citizens that works for a certain ideal. Rather, it is a professional organization that works in a certain field and is sponsored by foreign donors. The Informant raised the question of whether the CIN would do the same job if there were no funding available, and answered the question this way:

Yes, journalists would work the way they work currently. Thus, they wouldn’t have enough space to work like they currently do since they would need to earn money for their living. Therefore, we can say that here we have a special sector inside the NGO sector in BiH. This sector is composed of professional organizations, that work on professional projects (projects that require a professional approach (personal communication, July, 2014).

Lastly, the informant said that there are instances when the dependency of the NGO sector on foreign donors is seen as negative. However, in most cases, it is positive that NGOs are dependent on foreign donors, since it contributes to the development of an NGO sector as it is in the West.

Regarding ethno-nationalists’ strategy to cripple the democratization process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the informant asserted that ethno-nationalists elites play important role in the political life of BiH, and they could do much more. However, they prefer to use ethno-nationalistic rhetoric to remain in power. According to informant, politicians understand that every other change will result in the loss of their power. Therefore, it can be expected that politicians in BiH will promote ethnic divisions. Once they confine BiH citizens into small groups, where they are not able to see the larger trends, it is easier for
politicians to manipulate them. Further, the informant notes that the state is the best employer in BiH:

> The BiH citizens are not stupid, and they comprehend the current situation in Bosnia very well. Thus, they prefer to keep the current situation as it is. There are not many possibilities for employment, and working for the government remains the most desirable job. It is a lifetime job, you can’t get fired, and has great benefits. From these three aspects (continuity, security, and benefits) Bosnian citizens would say: ‘I secure myself maybe not a wealthy life but a kind of solid life. I will not loose my job; I will not work too much—since in administration there is not much happening. Therefore, why should I cut off the same branch on the tree on which I am sitting by voting for some opposition, or some other option?’ In general, the system is perfectly designed to preserve the current condition, since it secures those in power, while those whom the powerful secure maintain themselves. This is a perfect case of manipulation. If someone comes with different ideas, he/she will be labeled as a foreign agent (personal communication, July, 2014).

In regard to the “black list” published on the SNSD’s website, and some other ethno-nationalists strategies used against the NGO sector, the informant said that:

> The act that happened in RS was simply a call for a lynching. That call for a lynching was not sanctioned. That means that the person that created that list published a list of organizations seen as unacceptable, and destabilizing RS. In other words, it gives the right to the neighbor of the person that works in a listed organization to commit some sort of act that will bring damage to the person, like to hit him, to set his apartment on fire, or to punish him by any means since the person that causes the damage can say: ‘Hey, you are the one that works against constitutionality, and against our people!’ This is basically a call for a lynching, and generally, such an instance in the Wes, would be prosecuted as a criminal act (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant expressed a hope that soon the ethno-nationalists will not be in the position anymore to use ethno-national rhetoric to obtain power. Rather, once resources in BiH are exhausted they will need to cooperate with neighboring countries in the European context where competition is the decisive factor, not ethno-national rhetoric.
When asked about the additional thoughts and opinion, the informant responded that the NGO sector is necessary for democracy in BiH. This sector might be slow and invisible. Thus, the NGO sector should be observed through a different perspective and judged by the question “What would the situation in BiH be like if there was no NGO sector at all? The informant suggests that one portion of changes taking place in BiH context of democratization is happening due to NGO activism. The informant argues that the NGO sector requires some sort of guidelines and not values imposed from above.

The informant claims that NED is doing an excellent job in BiH. It is providing guidelines, and is also one of the few international organizations that understands the Bosnian context. The informant suggests that NED doesn’t impose its own values as some other international organizations do. Rather, NED has adopted certain rules, and the game should be played by those rules. The informant believes that strengthening civil society in BiH is the best way for to consolidate democracy; therefore any assistance in that process provided to the NGO sector is welcomed.

b. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The interview with the CIN provided important insights about the challenges NGOs face in BiH, as well as the impact they have on the process. The data obtained from websites, project reports, and articles is consistent with the answers provided by the informant. Several analytical categories are observed in the CIN’s study: biased media, the importance of raising awareness among BiH citizens, the ambiguous activities of some NGOs, the complexity of the state structure or abstractness of the state system are
the remnants of the old political system, political culture, urban vs. rural environments, ethno-nationals’ strategy against democratization and the NGO sector, and good collaboration with other NGOs.

In summary, the CIN has provided significant efforts in raising the awareness of BiH citizens regarding transparency, accountability, and corruption. From the information available on its website—reports, news articles, and studies—one can conclude that the CIN is doing an extremely good job. It has produced a lot of materials on the issues it deals with. Since it is a media house or media center, it doesn’t necessarily have direct contact with BiH citizens. Rather, it disseminates information to the wider public through mass media. NED sponsors the same project for several years, which helps the CIN to stay focused on particular topics, and achieve a level of excellence in them. Lastly, it appears that the CIN has enormous importance in fighting corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3. Individual Case Study: eFM Student Radio

The eFM Student Radio is a media center that was registered in 1996 in Sarajevo. The University of Sarajevo provided the venue for the radio in 1997 and with the assistance of UN funding ($20,000), renovated and equipped the center. In March 1997 eFM was issued a permission and a radio frequency necessary for its work by a regulatory commission. In April 1, 1997 they began their 24/7 programming. (eFM, 2014).

The first project was done in 1997 in cooperation with the British Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and UN radio. The program emitted was “Days of British Culture”. In 1997 eFM worked on the production of jingles for the prevention of AIDS, drug use, and alcoholism, ecology, traffic culture, and etiquette. In 1997, eFM did a live broadcast of the first Sarajevo Jazz Festival in partnership with COMUS London. (eFM, 2014).

Judging from eFM's website, the radio’s favorite campaign was in 1998 when they promoted accessibility infrastructure for disabled persons. The final campaign was supported by around a thousand students who came to support it (eFM, 2014).

The same year eFM was funded by USAID for a pre-election program called “For a better tomorrow”. At the same time eFM continued to work with student organizations. (eFM, 2014). In 1999, the center continued to work with different organizations and institutions on the production of programs. They developed a joint program with BBC 2 for women called “Venera” (trans. Venus).

eFM continued to work on programs related to youth, democratization, human rights, and academic and educational topics. They did these projects in cooperation with
USAID, UN, OESS, OHR, EC, nongovernmental organizations, and different consular and diplomatic offices in BiH.

The project done in 2001 by eFM is important from the perspective of regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe among different nongovernmental agencies, according to the information obtained from the eFM online archive:

In 2001 eFM worked on the project called “Mostogradnja” (trans. Shipbuilding). This project was composed of 20 radio stations from ex-Yugoslavia, and eFM joins the Southeastern European Radio Stations Network known as CROSS, which was the biggest info cultural network in the Balkans. The network lasted for nine years and it had eleven radio stations and independent institutions from eleven cities. A radio show with the same name was broadcast in Sunday on radio stations in Ljubljana (Radio Student), Belgrade (B92), Sarajevo (eFM), Skopje (Kanal 103), Novi Sad (Radio In), Zagreb (Radio SC), Mostar (Radio Mostar), Maribor (Radio Mars), Sombor (Radio Sombor), Zrenjanin (Radio Zrenjanin), Basel (Radio X). As a part of this project there were 1,500 versions and interviews produced. CROSS radio came into the existence as the response to broken cultural relationships among the federal republics of ex-Yugoslavia. The goal was to establish a new cultural dialog among newly formed states, with the focus on youth subculture. This was the first contact of the kind among Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (eFM, 2014).

The “Trokut 66” (trans. TRIANGLE 66) project is important for the current study. As a part of this project eFM held 50 public meetings providing youth a chance to speak with different public figures. The project was funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Several VIPs participated in the project including the President of BiH, High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and prominent film and media celebrities (eFM, 2014).

The eFM ran different projects related to a variety of topics. However, eFM primarily focuses on youth in BiH. An interesting venue adjacent to the offices of the eFM radio station is the “Centar za Kulturnu I Medijsku Dekontaminaciju” (trans. Center for Cultural and Media Decontamination). The center evolved from eFM in 2012.
The goal of the center as described on its website is to be the platform where the future academic community will have a place to meet and improve the cultural and media development of the student population in Sarajevo (eFM, 2012).

NED sponsored the eFM in 2012. The eFM’s mission was to promote civic activism through media. It falls under the civic education category of NEDs’ goals. The project description is as follows:

To promote the activities of nongovernmental organizations and foster greater citizen participation in and support for civil society efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Sarajevo-based station will produce 36 episodes of its popular radio series "Parents’ Attention," which profiles local NGOs and their efforts to tackle specific problems in their respective communities, highlights discussions on key issues by civic leaders, and provides current news about the country’s civic sector.” (NED, 2013)

a. The Interview with eFM

The interview with eFM was conducted in the eFM office located on the Sarajevo University campus. It allowed the researcher to see in person the eFM office, and the Center for Cultural and Media Decontamination. eFM has several offices from which they broadcast their program 24/7. In addition, they frequently organize field trips where they provide services to community. At the time of the interview the eFM team was preparing for a field trip to one small town in BiH that was devastated by floods in May 2014. The mission was to shed some light on the lives of children who were suffering by providing them a chance to watch animated movies.

The first question in the interview was about the informant’s opinion about the role of NGOs in democratization and democracy promotion in BiH. The informant responded by noting a controversial fact in BiH
Today in BiH, despite the atrocities and horror that occurred during the Bosnian War, the same is not even called a war anymore. Moreover, the BiH government agreed to change its name, and renamed it, so BiH children today in school are taught that the war was a set of ‘unfortunate events’, but not a war, not aggression (personal communication, July, 2014).

Further, describing the challenges NGOs face, the informant suggested that despite everything that happened in regards to victims of war and the war torn economy, today in BiH there is one thing that no one talks about, yet it is crucial for the development and reconstruction of the state. It is the destroyed and shattered society. Therefore, the informant suggests that there is no society in BiH, or it does not exist in the form it should. While elaborating on the destroyed society, the informant argues that today, BiH’s society – political system, civil society, academia, etc.—, is one big lie. He illustrates it by using the example of academia, claiming that academics become academic not by merit but by using connections. The informant suggests that in the BiH there is no normal society, academia, etc. The informant asserts that today every village in the country has a university, referring to the recent increase in number of universities (that are frequently involved in some sort of the illegal activity). The informant argues that the self-designated intellectuals that are hot public figures achieve that status through media exposure, not by merit. He suggests that the media is linked to politicians and forms a perfect circle of corruption. Therefore, whatever happens here, he argues, is a big lie.

The informant suggests that the very first challenge for BiH society was fifteen years ago. Bosnia-Herzegovina was suppose to openly indicate that BiH as a country had
a certain number of refugees, a certain amount of economic destruction, as well as economic potential, and develop a strategy for development. In that way, the informant argues, the society could use the information to develop the potential available in the country and make BiH a normal functioning country, with a normal society. According to the informant, that would put the BiH on the same track as Europe and the world. The informant argues that such a thing never happened in BiH, yet the society behaves like that deception is completely normal. Further, the informant asserts that it is, indeed, normal for one group of people.

This group of people, the informant suggests, consists of under 100 families. These families are elites that control whatever happens in the country. The informant concludes that these are the basics challenges NGOs face while promoting democracy. Yet the informant suggests that if the aforementioned testimony is not true, then the problem could be seen as the fact that foreign donors come with huge resources to BiH to work on the democracy promotion. He suggests that this is noticed by the NGOs, and they will do whatever is the focus of foreign donors. Therefore, the informant argues that the biggest challenge for NGOs there is how package project proposals in the way that foreign donors will like. The informant concludes that the challenges of democratization in BiH usually reflect this issue. The informant asserts:

Finally, the goal of the NGO sector, and foreign donors here is for NGOs to justify the use of resources, and for the foreign donors to justify the used resources to their tax payers, so at the end everyone will be satisfied. That is seen as a satisfactory formula. Nevertheless, whether something was successfully done or not done is not a relevant question. I must say that there are exceptions, but here I am referring to the majority of NGOs. In addition to this, neither does the international donor pay attention to where the resources are being used (personal communication, July, 2014).
These were provocative answers, yet popular views among the citizens of BiH: that the activism of NGOs in BiH and of foreign donors is just to obtain lucrative salaries and a fancy lifestyle. When asked about how effective NGOs can be in the process of democratization, the informant asserted that in theory a lot of things could be done; yet in real life, one can see that the NGOs are not performing well. He provided an example of the city of Srebrenica, infamous for the Srebrenica Genocide (1995), noting the unchanged situation in the city. Accordingly, the amount of resources provided to Srebrenica should result in the city being more developed than Sarajevo. On the contrary, Srebrenica is in even worse condition than before the war. Therefore, the informant suggests that in theory so many things could be done for the city, yet in reality nothing changed, and perhaps it became even worse.

In the next question the informant was asked whether his organization enjoys the support of the public, government, or other parties (i.e. the information on eFM’s webpage shows that eFM has a respectable level of cooperation with the diplomatic offices of various governments, as well as cooperation with media giants like the BBC). The informant indicated that they don’t enjoy much support from the government. Moreover, the informant asserted, in the eighteen years since eFM was founded, all governments worked to shut the radio station down. The informant asserts that was why currently the radio is in a bad situation, referring to the possibility that they will be evicted from the current venue, as well as the fact that eFM’s workers haven’t received salaries for months.

The informant suggests that the reason for such behavior by the government may be because eFM was an organizer of the plenums during the 2014 riots. The informant
argues that the effort of eFM then didn’t benefit the radio since currently they are threatened with eviction. Regardless of the situation, the informant claims that they will not give up on their ideals and goals, stating that

To be honest, we don’t know where we will move once we are evicted. Despite the situation, it doesn’t prevent us from working for our ideals. If I tell you that my last salary was 400 KM (approx. $270.00), and that last salary I received in January (the interview was conducted in July), would you believe me? Despite that, we are preparing to go on tour in flooded areas, and to conduct video workshops with kids there by letting them watch the animated movies (personal communication, July, 2014).

The philanthropic drive of eFM as well as their dedication towards their goals is evident. There is no evidence that eFM shifts its mission in order to get the grants and resources. Moreover, the data from documentation, direct observations, and interviews suggest that eFM works for the benefit of BiH citizens, even if the benefit requires substantial sacrifices by eFM’s stuff.

The informant suggests that they enjoy citizen support because of their familiarity with the station and activities it provides, since generations of BiH citizens grew up listening eFM’s programs, and participating in their projects. Nevertheless, the popular support they enjoy from citizens is not tangible.

The next section was about democratic values. When asked about what value does the informant’s organization sees as a priority in the process of democratization, the informant answered

When we are speaking about a transplant, in order for you to transplant something into the current system in BiH, you should have a system first. Unfortunately, we have nothing. The system is distortedly designed in Dayton, and it has never been
changed, so you can’t make a democratic transplant (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant refers to the Dayton Agreement as the prime issue in regards to democracy promotion in BiH. In other words, the institutional arrangement created by the Dayton Agreement is crippling democracy in BiH. The informant has a critical attitude towards democracy promotion elsewhere. In connection to this he argues that:

On the other hand, we need to be critical about democracy in the world. When we look globally, especially from the democratization perspective, it is difficult to find democracy to be brilliant. I consider, that if you have a system where you know what is truth and what is a lie; what is justice, and what is injustice; and if you have in that system justice, prosecution and etc. then you have a democratic system (personal communication, July, 2014).

In other words, the informant is not concern with the formative and normative aspects of democracy, the institutional and constitutional arrangements. Rather, he anticipates the democratic system through the prism of its reflections to society. He suggests that

There is a wrong assumption that we know what a democracy is. Maybe it will sound stupid, but in the previous political system (referring to Socialist Yugoslavia) we had a democracy. Since democracy is the will of many, we in that system already had a form of democracy. Though, there was a minority that suffered in one way or another (personal communication, July, 2014).

Evidently, the retrospective fit of democracy anticipated by the informant is a typical view of BiH citizens. Many have a nostalgic view of the Yugoslavian political experiment as superior over the values and promises brought by NGOs working on the democracy promotion in BiH. Accordingly, disagreement with the current democratization and strategies adopted by the IC and other stakeholders is evident in the informant’s argument where he states that
Today we have a problem in the current democracy that was unfortunately brought to us by the International Community. It is not the will of the many, but the will of the few. It is the minority that decides in this country. Again, we are speaking about those 100 families. They are a minority when you consider that there are 3.5 million BiH citizens according to the last census. Therefore, the International Community brought us a totally wrong democracy, in which we have a will of 100 families ruling over 3.5 million. Consequently we live in a catastrophic situation. Since, the democracy thesis is reversed. If it is a transplant, then the body is rapidly dying in a historical context, and for our lives it is a very slow process where we suffer a lot (personal communication, July, 2014).

The suggestion of the informant in regards to the reverse democratic thesis is controversial, yet one may observe that a majority of the population shares the same opinion. Absurdly, the majority of current political elites were also officials in high positions in the socialist regime that is looked to by BiH citizens. Therefore, the questions that arise are a great puzzle in the story of democracy in BiH. Are the described elites the core of the problem by intentionally crippling democracy in order to achieve control over BiH citizens--the same control they enjoyed in the totalitarian Yugoslavia? Further, would the citizens give up the rights and liberties they currently enjoy in the complex, corrupt, and fragile democratic system in BiH, in order to enjoy the security and rule-of-law they enjoyed in ex-Yugoslavia? In essence, these questions pose a conundrum. When thoroughly considered they suggest that the democratic process in BiH—referring to the transition from communist to democratic society (1990-present)—is not the result of BiH citizens’ aspirations for greater freedom, and liberties that couldn’t be provided within the framework of Socialist Yugoslavia. Instead, the transition from a socialist to democratic system in BiH was rather a deliberate act that was imposed over the people by the political elites at the time. Interestingly, most of the political elites
of the Yugoslavian Spring (1990) ended up in ICTY\textsuperscript{7} for either being a witness or a suspect in atrocities during the War in Bosnia (1992-1995). Tragicomically, the leaders against whom the mounting evidence indicates to be involved in war crimes were parties that signed the Dayton Agreement. There is a high possibility that the Dayton Peace Accord, whose draft was a consensus between leaders that were both; representatives of the constituent nations in BiH and the main promoters of ethno-nationalism, was crafted in an ethno-national fashion (consociational framework), that will cripple the democratic process in BiH for decades.

It is difficult to evaluate whether the political gridlock that secures the power of ethno-nationals is a deliberate act or a side effect of the Dayton Agreement. The priority of the U.S. administration at the time was simply to end the gory war, and the best possible solution was to rely on traditional consociational power sharing without significant oversight of its possible outcomes. Thus, it resulted in the Daytonian gridlock that prevents the society required for the consolidation of democracy in BiH and the diminution of the political power acquired by the ethno-nationals through the Dayton provisions. In conclusion, allegorically speaking, the Dayton Agreement that was supposed to end the war and promote democratic changes instead was being used by the ethno-nationalists as a Trojan horse to stifle democracy in BiH. Consequently, it resulted in democracy to be perceived by BiH citizens as a Potemkin’s Village, and developed a serious nostalgia for the old socialist system. Perhaps this was why citizens provided general support in the elections (2012) to social-democrats (mainly in FBiH) who had a brief grasp on immense political power before dissolving due to internal conflicts in the

\textsuperscript{7} International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
party. Apparently, this puts the NGOs working on democracy promotion in a difficult position, where they need to sell the product to BiH citizens who show a low demand for it.

BiH citizens’ presumably low demand for democracy is consistent with the criticism of democracy that suggests that the democratic values promoted by NGOs do not address the underlying problems in society. In relation to this, the informant was asked how much the promoted democratic values address the underlying problems in BiH. The informant indicated that the values of democratization were already present in the socialist BiH. The informant argues that:

We can see that the values we accepted, are values that we already had in our society. We erased them and we accepted that the IC will set up the necessary values. In other words, IC will come to BiH to teach B (referring to Bosniak) and S (referring to Serbian) new values. Accordingly, they will come to BiH and teach B and S that they can sit at the same table, and that they can work together (referring to reconciliation efforts by IC), despite the fact that, B and S were doing that same thing for centuries; where they sat and worked together. Thus, we are playing stupid when they approach us with those ideas, and we are saying to them, well we never had such an idea that B and S can sit together regardless what they believe in, or where they live. Therefore, we forgot that B and S were living together and we accept that as a fact (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant suggests that there is a level of professing by BiH society in regards to the values the IC and others promote. This professing is used by the society to acquire resources the IC provides for strengthening democracy in BiH.

When asked to comment on the claim that some NGOs changed their initial goals of promoting democracy and became agents for someone else, the informant responded as follows:

Well, they didn’t just change their goals, the goals are being changed almost on a daily basis. You have a large number of foreign donors here that come from abroad that do jobs for their salaries and their interests that they need to justify to their governments and their tax payers. On the other side, we

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8 (M) and (B) were edited version of real names provided by informant in order to keep the identity of the informant protected.
understood you could take a serious amount of money—in the current economic situation—while doing nothing. Therefore, we can be sure that the goals will be changed on a daily basis. It is like I am working for an NGO, and you are foreign donor. I meet and ask you: “Hey, did you bring some money? Yes you did? For what?” Then you tell me that you have brought the money for the production of i.e. beach umbrellas, and you tell me: “Well, you know, you are working in radio, and I need someone who makes beach umbrellas, so…” Then I respond: “Yes, indeed, I work at a radio station, but you should see the beach umbrellas I make.”

It is important for me to deceive you, and I will get the money. Unfortunately, an infinite number of deceptions exist, such as: “How much money have you allocated for that project?” You answer: “One million dollars.” Then I suggest to you: “Ok! If you give $900,000 to me to run a project, you can take for yourself $100,000”. Finally it is like, I am making the best beach umbrellas, you have justified your expenditures to your taxpayers, and I have justified it here in BiH, and at the end everyone is happy and satisfied. Most often this is the case.

Nevertheless, there are those ‘normal’ organizations, but there are both rare true NGOs, and true foreign donors. While we reject the values that we have, we are letting anyone come from abroad and teach us some values, and we accept everything that is being taught to us. On the contrary, I have a very cold relationship with foreign donors. Because, there is no money that can buy me. Therefore, we have the problem that even 18 years after we were founded, we are not on anyone’s budget. I don’t want to accept the foreigner to tell me what is important and what is not. Like in the case when they approached and asked me to promote interfaith or mixed marriages. My response was: “What has that to do with anything?” I mean, why should they care to whom a member of one religious group would marry? Why do you care? Why are you changing our values? This is just one of those stupid examples where you are being put in one of the endless situations where foreign donors are asking you to do stupid things. Therefore, I assert that you can’t just transplant the values as they are because they are not true and honest values. Coming to the question do they change their initial goals?

Well, it is perfectly normal for that type of NGO to do such a thing on a daily basis just to get your money (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next section in an interview was about foreign donors, and how much they affect NGOs democracy promotion efforts. The informant said

First, I have to make a distinction between RS and FBiH. In RS, Milorad Dodik in order to strengthen and improve the RS for some sort of session or stupidity like that he set up things in the right way so that they can serve the RS. RS put most of the NGOs on a budget, not in a sense of promoting democracy and work in the field but in order to control them. Since most people here are poor, and most jobs are government jobs, and NGOs, it is extremely good when you receive a monthly grant from government, and you can sustain your needs with it. Thus, since I got the grant I will do whatever is in your interest.
Dodik arranged that well. In youth related policies it was legally regulated. I think the majority of NGOs in RS are like that, maybe only 10% of NGOs are not sponsored by the official budget, where Dodik has absolute control. A good example for this is the way he took the control over the media in RS five or six years ago. Accordingly that was not a dictatorship, that was a quite democratic and fair strategy.

As an illustration, just imagine if our budget is 200,000 KM, and think of it if someone gives me 100,000 KM and say, that in order to receive this money I must guarantee that I will not fire anyone in 9 months. It is clear that you will appreciate such an act, since you have been provided a semi-annual budget. It is perfectly normal that you will appreciate it and that you will not criticize him. Rather, you would praise him, because you will say: “Well I have 100,000 KM, if I find another 100,000 KM I am good for this year.” Nevertheless, what will happen next year, or what will happen in the next twenty years, we don’t care. Unfortunately, that is our biggest problem; by thinking on a daily basis how to obtain resources we don’t pay attention to the future of our kids (personal communication, July, 2014).

When asked about the fact that most projects are short-term, with short-term goals, the informant answered

These are not goals, it is all short term. It is like let me grab 50 KM from your pocket, and I don’t care if we meet tomorrow on the street. That is our context. You have Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBIH) where this issue is not resolved. You have extreme examples where everything is set up completely wrong. You have Sarajevo University that is the biggest and the oldest university in BiH, and this university is not on a state budget. Sarajevo University receives monthly grants on the canton level. They are on the same canton level as the Beekeeper Associations in Sarajevo. It means that they are not an item on the budget of the Sarajevo Canton. They are just receiving a monthly ration. Now when you consider that Sarajevo University is on this level, what level do you think NGOs are on?” (personal communication, July, 2014)

The informant has a positive opinion of the NED, and praises the way it supports NGOs in BiH. The informant asserts that NED is one of the few foreign organizations they work with, since the informant has a very adamant view of foreign donations. The informant asserted that

They don’t just make up things. NED is one of few that puts no conditions and sets up their own agenda in regards to grants. It was a strange occasion when I first met Mrs. Ivana Cvetkovic-Bajrovic. I have participated on some sort of panel or conference organized by the EC, where I participated as a guest. The
topic was something like “How to prevent hate speech?” They spent the whole day discussing irrelevant things, and trying to reinvent the wheel. At the end they called me to make a small speech on the subject. It was like they have concluded what are the priorities and what must be done to prevent hate speech, only my conclusion is required and the panel would be closed.

Since I am very controversial, I have told them that all things being discussed and the topic itself is stupid and idiotic. I have no problem with hate speech, and in regard to my institution I have resolved the issue. That statement stunned them all, and they were wondering how I prevented the spread of hate speech. I answered that it was a relatively easy task. Simply, why would I, as a media institution, broadcast hate speech by someone? Then they argued: “But as media, you are responsible to do that!” My answer was rather simple, and with an example. I told them to take an example of Dodik. Why would I broadcast information from one entity, where the official is claiming that there was no genocide in Srebrenica; why would I care about his opinion? Since ICTY vindicated that there was a genocide, and the whole world and normal people accepted it. That’s it, and the story is over, there was genocide and there is no need to discuss it anymore. Whether Dodik thinks that it was sulfur or rain is irrelevant. On the contrary, what is interesting to me is that Dodik, as a President of RS, has responsibilities. I can talk with him about unemployment in RS. Ask him questions like: What did your buddy do as a president to decrease unemployment on the state level, and did you make progress in certain areas? Therefore, the personal opinion of the president is absolutely irrelevant for me. After I provided such a speech, all of a sudden there was sort of a mess, where I abolished the conclusions they previously made. After that they said it is cocktail time, and didn’t let me finish my speech.

Unfortunately, the conference itself was made to precede the foreign donations to come to BiH so NGOs can fight hate speech. They will come to Bosnia and give us money so we will prevent and fight hate speech. After my input that night, I was never again called for such a session again. It appears I am not the right person for that type of conference.

That was the time when Ivana and I officially met. She asked me whether I have some sort of project. I told her that, first I don’t know how to write projects; I don’t know the key words. We do the things in the way we do. In other words we are struggling. Then NED provided us a monthly grant. However, NED never called us to tell us how to do things, and what are we supposed to do. Hence, NED decided that the stuff we are doing, and the way we are doing things are in harmony with NED policies, and therefore they supported us. This happened last year. This year we applied but we didn’t get the grant due to the political issues with congress and staff.

According to me, NED is the best example of how things should be done in BiH. Hence, by using different sources and information about us, NED decided that what we are doing is in their interest and they sponsored us. Not a single call or email was sent to me to have input in projects and tell me what shall and shall not be done. There was a certain control of finances, but no control over projects in the form of censorship. No one gave me lectures on democracy, indicating the
values they have and values that we need to promote. They just accepted that we know best what is good for our community, and go on, do your projects. I am telling you, we had complete freedom, without condition, and they are one of the few who didn’t make conditional grants, special requests, lecturing by reinventing the wheel. Therefore, I bow to NED, even if they don’t decide to work with us anymore. Congratulations to NED, that’s the way things should be done. They want to help us, but they accept the fact that we know what is best for our community. For example they didn’t come here to directly transplant U.S. democracy, like they come and are teaching B and S that they can sit and work together. On the contrary, NED says: “Well, B and S are already doing it. Thus, let us see whether we? You? Who? can further spread that to society as well, to raise such a value to a new level, and to start something. Therefore we decided to help you.” This is simply the way NED approached us (personal communication, July, 2014).

b. The Individual Case Study Research Report

This study provides important insights into the context of democracy promotion by NGOs in BiH. In a rather controversial interview, this informant provided some new contrasting versions of the NGO sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the way foreign donors affect democratization and in general the work of NGOs. The informant identified several fake behaviors and strategies adopted by NGOs, BiH citizens, and foreign donors. Evidently, eFM is a very professional organization with many successfully completed projects. Nevertheless, they are struggling financially due to their adamant attitude against most foreign donations. They have an extremely good reputation that can be seen through the partnerships with media conglomerates like the BBC. Nevertheless, they are very humble, and approachable to citizens. Materials available on eFM’s webpage suggests that they have made many good quality documentaries, articles, and reports. They pay special attention to vulnerable populations. Several analytical categories are distinguished from an interview with eFM, and their materials. In the case of eFM,
informant suggested the control over media by political parties. The shifting focus of NGOs is another analytical category observed. The informant believes it is very common for NGOs in BiH to shift their mission in order to acquire grants. The ethno-nationals’ strategy is another analytical category, indicating the strategies used by ethno-nationals to control the media and NGOs. The 100 families term was used in this study, and it can be considered as a separate analytical category. The “100 families” term refers to the families that are currently the most influential. They obtain their power through corruption, bribery, and nepotism. They are closely and directly related to ethno-national and other political parties. They were the winners of the democratization process by obtaining significant power through privatization in BiH.

The next significant analytical category is the one coded as “Lies” and it refers to the strategy by foreign donors, and by a majority of NGOs in BiH to cover up their real purposes and just pursue resources. Citizens see NGOs as shifting their focus in order to obtain resources and applying for projects for which they lack the institutional capacity and experience. In the case of donors, in order to justify the use of resources, they use the old story that certain values can’t be found in the BiH society, which they need to introduce, although these values and social dynamics already existed and are present today.

In addition, from the informants’ response it can be concluded that in some cases NGOs that are doing an extremely good job and that have philanthropic purposes frequently don’t have the necessary institutional practices and expertise to apply for grants. Therefore, in many cases they don’t apply. In the case of eFM there was a positive evaluation of the originality of NED’s approach to funding NGOs in BiH. Lastly, it can
be said that eFM, together with the adjacent Center for Cultural and Media Decontamination, have a non-conforming and authentic approach. In other words, eFM doesn’t shift its goals in order to acquire grants and resources. They represent a valuable source of information on democratic values to students of Sarajevo University, to the listeners of eFM, and BiH society as well.
4. The Individual Case Study: Center for Media Development and Analysis (CRMA)

The Center for Media Development and Analysis (CRMA) is an NGO located in Sarajevo that works on projects related to accountability, transparency, and freedom of speech.

The CRMA’s mission is:

Providing active, professional, responsible, and high quality support for freedom of speech, and providing access to true information, objective analyses, and real recommendations to decision makers and the wider community.

Promoting positive and democratic interethnic and societal dialogue, reintegration of the society, and working on the membership of BiH into Euro-Atlantic integrations. Promotion of analytical and investigative reporting that is independent, objective, and of the highest professional standards; development of media, and promotion of freedom of expression (Tanic, Jugo, & Becic, 2013).

In general, the work of CRMA can be seen through two projects, ACCOUNT and ZURNAL. ACCOUNT is an acronym for Anti-Corruption Civic Organizations’ Unified Network. It is an NGO network that works on prevention and detection of corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ZURNAL is an online magazine and the first not-for-profit media in BiH. It started its work in 2009. (Tanic et al., 2013).

The ACCOUNT project can be seen as a join project by NGOs in BiH to develop a strong network that will work on fighting corruption in BiH. The network consists of members from different civil society organizations, institutions, unions, media, academic institutions, chambers of commerce, and individuals. The editorial board consists of representatives of donor organizations and institutions (ACCOUNT, 2014).

The CRMA is a flagship in the ACCOUNT project. The mission of ACCOUNT is:
With its advocacy and actions ACCOUNT will create pressure on every level of BiH government to hasten anti-corruption reforms that are necessary for the processes of Euro-Atlantic integrations of BiH. ACCOUNT and all of its member NGOs will contribute to systematic and sustainable processes of fighting corruption, and award those who publicly and unreservedly fight against corruption in BiH.” (ACCOUNT, 2014).

ACCOUNT focuses on five distinct sectors: health care, education, economy, judiciary, and public administration (ACCOUNT, 2014). The strategy of ACCOUNT is to use small watchdog teams across BiH that work on revealing and reporting cases of corruption. The watchdog teams will be formed in designated cities in BiH. They will advocate for fighting corruption in designated cities in BiH (ACCOUNT, 2014).

Further, ACCOUNT provides important trainings related to fighting corruption. In 2013 the network provided training to more than 200 individuals. More than 600 people participated in debates and discussion panels (ACCOUNT, 2014).

An important lobbying mission ACCOUNT its partners worked on was successfully lobbying for a law that will protect those who report instances of corruption (legislated) and a law related to public tendering (in-legislation) that will prevent further instances of public acquisition corruption (ACCOUNT, 2014).

The distinctive aspect of ACCOUNT and other organizations and networks working on preventing corruption is the level of cooperation they have with different NGO organizations and networks, state and governmental agencies, the Ministry of Security of BiH, and media. Up to now members of ACCOUNT produced more than 1200 publications (ACCOUNT, 2014). (Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations.2009)

For the purpose of illustration a brief description of a study published by ACCOUNT will be provided. The study’s title is “The Ten Largest Privatization Frauds
Privatization of once-state-owned property to private entities or entrepreneurs is an important factor in the democratization process in BiH. It is a complex conundrum that needs to be investigated from different perspectives. Briefly, privatization as a process was conducted when BiH lacked internal mechanisms that would control potential corruption in the privatization process. Parties involved in the privatization process were able to use inadequate monitoring of privatization to acquire state owned firms for drastically depreciated values. The ambiguous and fraudulent processes of ten firms in BiH resulted in almost 3 billion KM damage, and left 7,000 people jobless (ACCOUNT, 2013). One example of fraudulent privatization is the case of Zeljezara Zenica. The firm was the largest producer of iron and steel in the country. Arcelor Mittal bought it in 1998. Once a profitable firm, it suffered enormous losses and debts (approx. $23,000,000). According to the study,

“The value of Zeljezara Zenica from 1999-2005 was decreased by 515 millions of KM. 300 out of 700 workers are considered as redundant.” (ACCOUNT, 2013)

In addition, ACCOUNT’s study presented nine other cases of fraudulent privatization in BiH. The ACCOUNT project surely brought the debate about corruption in BiH to a new level, where many corruption cases are being reported.

NED has given a grant to CRMA for several years. In 2010 they received $37,750 for a project related to transparency and accountability. The project’s goal is as follows:
To conduct a watchdog project promoting transparency and accountability of elected officials prior to the October 2010 general elections. The Center’s journalists and experts will produce news analysis on and investigate specific cases of corruption, conflict of interest, and misuse of public office. NED funds will be used to produce approximately 40 online articles for the e-magazine www.zurnal.info (NED, 2014).

In 2011 CRMA was granted $42,700 to continue with the watchdog project. The project’s goal was

To conduct a watchdog project promoting transparency and accountability of government institutions and elected officials at levels of government in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Center's journalists will produce news analysis on and investigate specific cases of corruption, conflict of interest, and misuse of public office. Approximately 30 online articles and five special reports for the e-magazine Zurnal (www.zurnal.info) will be produced for the e-magazine Zurnal (NED, 2014).

In 2012 CRMA received a $39,870 grant by NED for an accountability-related project. The goal of the project is as follows:

To promote the accountability of elected officials ahead of the October 2012 local elections, as well as to encourage public support for NGO work. The Center will partner with local NGOs to identify key problems facing citizens in 21 municipalities, and spotlight the work of elected officials responsible for addressing them. Approximately 150 online articles and 120 reports on local government spending will be produced for the e-magazine Zurnal (NED, 2014).

a. The Interview with CRMA

The interview was conducted in the CRMA’s office that is located in the city center of Sarajevo. The informant was a top level official at the organization. The informant was highly educated, experienced, professional, and motivated. The informant openly answered questions being asked.
The first question in the interview was in regards to challenges NGOs face in BiH when promoting democracy. The informant was asked to share personal opinions on the topic. The informant suggested that the main problem of NGOs in BiH is financial resources. Hence, the scarcity of recourses frequently forces the NGOs to work on projects that are not in accordance with their mission, vision, and regular activities. Further, the informant suggests that the scarcity of financial resources is the reason why some NGOs behave like a “svastara” (lit. trans. Scribble book).

The svastara term denotes the donor-seeking behavior of some NGOs, where they shift their goals and projects in order to fit into grant parameters set by donors. The informant argues that these NGOs do everything, but the results do not approximate to the invested resources from the foreign donors. In other words these NGOs pretend to possess the capacity and expertise to do the job in order to receive grants. However, when it comes for them to carry out the projected they received grant for they would fail to reach expected goals.

The informant suggests that the next challenge is the media in BiH, arguing that media in BiH are either under the control of political parties or interests groups that are also somehow connected to political organizations. Further, the informant suggests that there is a high level of censorship--selective overseeing of information--and this is generally why NGOs are not in position to present their activities and results to public.

Further, the informant suggests that the next challenge NGOs working on the promotion of democracy face is the low capacity of NGOs. In other words, some NGOs are understaffed and unprepared to carry out the projects they apply for. Therefore, in many cases the NGOs do not finish the project they started, or do not meet expectations.
In addition, the informant suggests that some NGOs, particularly larger ones that have a greater capacity to carry out the projects, developed a business out of NGO activism. Therefore, the NGO sector in BiH became the well-paid job. According to the informant one working in the NGOs in BiH can have a good life without any responsibilities.

Further, the informant argues that another challenge for NGOs working on democracy promotion in BiH is the attitude of foreign donors. In many cases, foreign donors do not provide a reliable project evaluation of NGOs who are sponsored by them. The informant concludes that when an NGO does a poor job, it is easier for foreign donors to say the project was successful, and avoid being scrutinized for poor recruitment of the NGOs.

Lastly, the informant notes another problem NGOs face in BiH. The informant observes collective pressure (in the last six months), of political institutions on the NGO sector in BiH. The informant claims that after the “euthanasia” of media by government – where government acquired 90% of media—the next obstacle to absolute rule in BiH is the NGO sector. The informant suggests that the government presents NGOs in BiH as money driven organizations. In some cases NGOs are described as foreign agents as well. Further, the informant asserts people that work in NGOS are characterized by the government as lacking integrity. In other words, the NGO activists are doing their job for the money. Thus, such an act by the government, according to the informant, is an attempt to make the image of the NGOs worse than of those that are governing the country. Further, the NGO sector, according to the informant, is accused of making up problems and fabricating enemies. The informant suggests that there is a trace of success
in these attempts by government to disgrace the NGO sector. The informant asserts that the government’s purpose is to destroy the NGO sector by using the media they control to destroy the integrity and trust NGOs enjoy from BiH citizens. The informant suggests that if that happens, it will be extremely difficult to present a good information to the public.

The informant summarizes that these are the challenges that NGOs face in BiH. They are the same reasons that make NGOs in BiH influence over social changes in BiH weak. The informant suggests that the influence is weak, but it cannot be said that it is completely absent. Rather, the informant describes the influence as insufficient. The informant suggests that in order to understand the extent of influence NGOs have in BiH, one should consider what would happen if there was no NGOs at all in BiH. The informant argues that in this case, the politicians would have absolute control in the country, since they already have the media in BiH under their control.

Regarding the question of how effective NGOs can be in democracy promotion, the informant provided the example of the CRMA. The informant suggests the organization enjoys solid support from BiH citizens. The reason for this support is its successfully run projects. Further, the informant describes the current project of the CRMA, which is related to fighting corruption in BiH (ACCOUNT). The informant indicates that over the two years since its establishment, ACCOUNT’s network achieved exemplary results in raising the awareness of BiH citizens about corruption. The effectiveness of the CRMA, according to the informant, was in “successfully raising to BiH society the seriousness of its corruption problem” (personal communication, July, 2014), while indicating that other issues like ethno-nationalism, ethnic hate, ethnic
divisions, and others are secondary problems. The informant suggests that CRMA aims to inform BiH citizens that corrupter politicians use the ethno-political issues in order to cover up the corruption they are responsible for.

The next topic was about the democratic values. The informant was asked about what value NGO informant works for sees as a priority. The informant stated that fighting corruption and misuse of power, preventing any type of discrimination, and development of media are seen as a priority by CRMA. The informant suggests that these values can’t be excluded from each other.

Regarding whether the values promoted by NGOs who work on democracy promotion are related to the underlying problems in BiH, the informant asserted that in recent times, they represent the underlying problems more than they used to. The informant suggests that nowadays it is clearer what certain NGOs are doing and what they specialize in. The informant suggested it is extremely important for NGOs to raise social awareness regarding pertinent issues since the absence of awareness will lead to total anarchy. Further, the informant believes that the values promoted by the NGOs are in fact values that the society already has, but the current system in BiH is not compatible with those values. Thus, the informant uses the normative approach to the issue, giving an example of the value prioritized by CRMA; fighting corruption. The informant suggests that

I have mentioned earlier, I believe we have those values. It is a fact that the current system is not compatible with those values. I will take the values that my organizations work on as an example. One will say that corruption in our society is traditional and normal. Indeed, it is normal when you don’t have any legal prevention for corruption. Then the corruption itself is the norm. Whatever is not prohibited, it can be considered as allowed. When the time comes that sufficient measures are legislated, and number cases of corruption are prosecuted, you prevent the further development of corruption and then you will have no
corruption. Then there will be no tradition that will be able to surpass those regulations and beliefs. It can be reflected to other things as well (personal communication, July, 2014).

Further the informant suggests that:

Whatever value from the West is promoted in BiH, if the norms related to the value are taken from Western society then the value will be in the form it is in the West. Thus, the informant argues that the implementation for the law will last longer, but at the end it will surely have results. However, the informant implies, the political parties in BiH are doing whatever it takes to prevent that. The informant believes that is the reason BiH is so far from the EU context. Hence, EU means the European standards and normative framework (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant suggests “when the BiH society develops stronger normative framework, where everything is clear and regulated by law, then politicians will not be able to do things they currently do” (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant discussed another controversial topic regarding the values within the BiH society. The informant suggests:

Currently, 90% of regular BiH citizens are living an honest, respectable, civilized, and normal way of life, despite the fact that, the same life style, or way of life is not being regulated by law as such. Conclusively, it means that BiH citizens are better than the system in which they are living. The informant suggests that this should be the topic of study for people coming from abroad, and this is what they should be thinking of. How can simple people manage to become honest and hardworking people, and somehow responsible in the things they do compared to those two or five percent of the population that destroys this country? Those destroying the country made a legal context in BiH where they could be dishonest, irresponsible, and criminal. Nevertheless, they don’t have the support of BiH citizens. BiH citizens are demanding changes that will resolve those issues. I believe that we have those values here, and that we just need to adjust some things (personal communication, July, 2014).

Further, the informant criticizes international actors for their interference and lack of understanding of the BiH context, and gives an example related to public procurement legislation. The informant asserts that the CRMA demanded that a law about public procurement be in a broad normative and determinative form so it wouldn’t allow
corruption in public procurements. Nevertheless, the informant suggests, the EU told them there is no need for such a rigorous normative framework, and the proposed form of the law by the government is sufficient. Thus, the informant believes that the EU representatives assumed that BiH has strong internal control mechanisms necessary to prevent corruption, as there are in developed European countries. Nonetheless, BiH has no such mechanisms, and therefore the legislation was insufficient to prevent corruption in public procurements. However, when the EU noticed that corruption levels were unchanged although anti-corruption legislation was adopted, they were puzzled. The informant suggests this is the result of the EU’s interference in BiH without sufficient comprehension of its complexities. Further, according to the informant, due to the unsuccessful results of the anti-corruption legislation, the EU considers BiH citizens to be some kind of savages that are hard to control. Nevertheless, according to the informant, the primary reason for the failed legislation is that the law didn’t possess the necessary normative and formative structure required for the institutionally underdeveloped BiH.

The informant compared the different social and normative values in BiH and abroad, using the example of reporting domestic violence. The informant suggests

The problem is when I report my neighbor for such an act, he will soon come back from prison, and not lose a thing. The first person he will go after is me. He will wait for me in the entrance of our apartment building and beat me up. In Germany, it is not the case, since, the one being reported will spend at least five years at prison, regardless of his Therefore, that is the difference., I am for that strategy where we will first build a system, and then we will be able to implement values (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next question addressed the criticism of NGO activities followed by the popular claim that they are shifting their missions, and the conspiracy claim that they are frequently working for someone else. The informant answered the question by providing
CRMA as an example. The informant suggests that they apply for projects that are similar to the mission and vision that they work for: fighting corruption, developing media, etc. Nevertheless, the informant suggests that they were never in a situation where someone else imposed what they should do and how to do it. CRMA might deliver solutions because they are attractive and fit donors’ values. Nevertheless, the informant argues, the solutions provided by the CRMA were always in accordance with societal needs and the CRMA’s mission. Further, the informant suggests that the majority of NGOs in BiH are using the same approach to have their projects funded. Nevertheless, the informant implies there is always a possibility that some sort of imposing or directing by donors exists.

However, the informant argues that there is an issue of great concern for the informant and his organization. The informant believes that someone is deliberately impeding development of a strong civil society in BiH. Since foreign donors shift funding unpredictably from one sector to the other, this shift forces NGOs to jump from one project to the other, frequently changing their fields of expertise. According to the informant, this results in the dissipation of resources, knowledge, and energy, ultimately decreasing the capacity of NGOs to carry out projects. In this way, the informant suggests, foreign donors are diminishing the energy required to make change. As an illustration, the informant points to the way media in BiH came under the umbrella of political parties. The informant asserts that

The best example for this is media. In the period just after the war, media was well funded by foreign donors. In that way the stability and independence of media was achieved. Some new independent media were established as well. However, in one moment it is like someone just said that there is no more funding for media, and the funding was cut off. The only available foreign resources for media are maybe two grants of $100,000 annually. Therefore, suddenly the media
was bought by political elites for cheap money. People working in media need a livelihood so they can maintain their regular lives. Many media centers shut down, while others are struggling. Either someone did poor decision-making, or understood the BiH context and deliberatively imposed values and control. In contrast, it is impossible that someone would give me money and tell me to do something that will be of use to the US, or EU interests (personal communication, July, 2014).

When talking about foreign donors, the informant asserted that foreign donor dependency is evident, but the real cause of dependency is that the financing of NGOs is not regulated by law, as it is case with EU member states and in the U.S. The informant suggests that some transitional countries like Serbia resolved it, as well as Croatia, which became a full member of the EU. The informant suggests state funding of NGOs in BiH is available to the extent that NGOs serve the purposes of political elites. In some other cases the money allocated for NGOs is transferred to political parties’ accounts. In regards to funding and foreign donor dependency the informant asserts:

Once again I will take media as an example. We have media in BiH whose work primarily is funded from donations. We never take commercials, we are not commercial by any means, but we depended on donations. Since we said there is no money for media, we are basically financing our projects by doing other projects, and we don’t want to close our media project, since we use it as a support in what we are doing, and we are keeping the public aware of pertinent topics. Therefore, we depend on donations, and also we try to adapt and become more independent while staying within our parameters (personal communication, July, 2014).

In regards to NED, the informant suggests that NED is important in the democratization of BiH because it finds projects that are not being funded. CRMA received grants from NED for two years, but recently when CRMA applied for grants they didn’t receive it. The informant suggests that this is probably due to the perception of NED that CRMA receives enough funding to run its projects. However, the informant suggests, financing for the current CRMA projects is not adequate.
b. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The case study of the Center for Development of Media and Policy (CRMA) provides a broad understanding about the role of NGOs in the democratization process in BiH. Moreover, it provides important new insights into the issues of corruption, control over media, the role of foreign donors, and behavior of NGOs in BiH. The following analytical categories could be derived from the interview conducted with CRMA’s top official. They will be listed below in the form of codes assigned to them with the brief description of the analytical patterns being described.

*Democratic values.* Referring to the values promoted by NGOs and by CRMA.

*Cultural differences.* Referring to the cultural differences between BiH and Western developed democracies. The example provided of anti-corruption law, and comparative example of social responsibility indicate the differences caused by cultural and contextual differences.

*Ethno-nationalism vs. Neoliberalism.* This refers to an instance where ethno-nationals resist the values promoted by liberal NGOs. The informant provided examples: control over media by ethno-nationalists, and asserting pressure on NGOs by media. The second example is anti-corruption law: they are doing whatever necessary to slow the process.

*Control over media.* This analytical category indicates that media is either under control or biased, making the NGOs’ work more difficult. Frequently, controlled media is defaming NGOs. The informant suggests that 90% of the media are under such control.
Democratic values existing in society. This analytical category indicates the existence of democratic values in BiH’s previous political system. CRMA’s case study suggests the impact those values had. The informant asserts that these values still exist but their value is depreciated.

Systematic prevention of the development of the NGO sector in BiH. This analytical category indicates the ambiguous effort by unidentified actors to impede the process of reforming and promoting civil society in BiH. The informant assumes that at certain times donations are provided to NGOs, then suddenly these donations are cut off, leaving the NGOs in a difficult position. The informant provides the media as an example. This example illustrates how media was at the beginning sponsored by foreign donations, than suddenly donations are cut off, and media was forced to go under politicians’ umbrella.

The CRMA’s individual case study provides important insights about democracy promotion in BiH by NGOs. It can be concluded from the interview that the situation in BiH in regards to democracy is very complex. On one side there are NGOs that are donor hunters that frequently shift their mission in order to acquire grants. On the other side, the ethno-nationalists’ control over the media, and their strategy of defaming the NGO sector is further making the NGOs’ job more difficult.

Despite the fact that current NGOs are not making sufficient impact, they still have a certain level of influence in BiH. As the informant suggests, to understand the importance of the NGO sector in BiH one should just ask what would happen if there was no NGO sector in BiH at all, leaving the ethno-nationals in absolute control.

Furthermore, the comparison of resources spent by ethno-nationals versus NGOs
is important. The informant suggest that in BiH resources available to ethno-nationals’ projects are ten times more than those provided by foreign donors to NGOs. In general CRMA’s current project, the “ACCOUNT” network, is of paramount importance in fighting corruption. Other areas of NGOs activism should achieve cooperation similar to that of the ACCOUNT project.
5. Individual Case Study: National Democratic Institute (NDI) BiH

The National Democratic Institute or NDI plays an important role in democracy promotion around the world. The organization itself can be summarized as follows:

The NDI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization that has supported democratic institutions and practices in every region of the world for more than three decades. Since its founding in 1983, the NDI and its local partners have worked to establish and strengthen political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government. (NDI, 2014c).

The National Democratic Institute is present in several countries where together with its partner organizations they work to:

Promote openness and accountability in government by building political and civic organizations, safeguarding elections, and promoting citizen participation, the Institute brings together individuals and groups to share ideas, knowledge, experiences and expertise that can be adapted to the needs of individual countries. (NDI, 2014a).

The NDI focuses on specific areas such as citizen participation, elections, debates, political inclusion of marginalized groups, democracy and technology, political parties, women’s political participation, and democratic governance (NDI, 2014a). The NDI runs different projects in more than 110 countries on all five continents. Furthermore, the NDI’s work is divided according to specific regions where it works on democracy promotion. These regions are Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eurasia, and Central and Eastern Europe (NDI, 2014b). Since Bosnia-Herzegovina is located in Southeastern Europe it is considered for NDI purposes part of the Central and Eastern Europe region.

The NDI started with activities in BiH in 1997, just after the war ended. With the support of NED and USAID it provided significant support to political reforms in BiH,
including election reform, whistle blowing, anticorruption issues, education, social services, health care, agriculture, and political debates.

Although the NDI has several programs in BiH with different priorities and participants, its focus at the beginning was three areas: support to political parties, parliamentary support, and support to women and youth. Current projects focus on two areas of interest: development of local politics, and regional programs (NDI, 2014).

An example of a project run by the NDI is the “Training for the development of local policies in city of Brcko”. This program is part of the development of local policy area. The program was held in April 2012 in the city of Brcko (part of the semi-autonomous region the Brcko District). The program’s goal was to provide training to members of local political parties and train them on topics like: research on public opinion, increasing party visibility and popularity, and how to develop a strategic plan and policies within the local context. (NDI, 2014).

In summary, the NDI in BiH focused on different projects related to the promotion of issue-based political dialogue, support to political parties and civil society, and advancing policy development by political parties in BiH. (NED, 2014).

Since 2009, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has sponsored the NDI each year with grants that most often equaled more than 33% of all grants by the NED to NGOs in BiH. Since 2009 (2014 is not included) NED has sponsored the NDI five times. In this period, NED allocated more than $2.5 million to the NDI.

In 2009, NED provided a grant of $690,000. The goal of the project is “to strengthen political parties’ and civil society organizations” (NED, 2009). The project description is as follows:
To strengthen political parties’ and civil society organizations’ connections with each other and with citizens by focusing efforts on national public policy issues. Aligning these interests will generate more responsive policymaking and foster greater citizen participation. As a result, both political and civic institutions will be better able to incorporate citizens’ issues into their decision-making, and strengthen the political process at the local and national levels.” (NED, 2009).

In 2010, NED provided the NDI a grant of $545,000. The goal of the project was “to foster issue-based political discussion and debate ahead of Bosnia’s October 2010 general elections.” (NED, 2010). The description of the project is as follows:

The NDI’s nonpartisan program will help to strengthen reform-oriented political parties’ ability to offer alternatives to the prevalent ethno-nationalist discourse by assisting them in communicating and promoting concrete policy positions on issues relevant to citizens across the country. The NDI will conduct public opinion research and provide technical assistance to its partner parties, as well as work with civil society organizations to promote issue-based voting. (NED, 2010).

In 2011 NED provided a grant to the NDI of $525,000. The goal of the project was: “To advance open policy development at the municipal level among political parties in Bosnia.” (NED, 2011). The description of the project is as follows:

The NDI’s nonpartisan program will help to strengthen reform-oriented political parties’ ability to offer alternatives to the prevalent ethno-nationalist discourse by assisting them in communicating and promoting concrete policy positions on issues relevant to citizens across the country. NDI will conduct public opinion research and provide technical assistance to its partner parties, as well as work with civil society organizations to promote issue-based voting. (NED, 2011).

In 2012, the NED provided a grant to the NDI of $425,000 for a project whose goal was “to support political parties to strengthen their connection to citizens through public policy dialogue at the local level.” (NED, 2012). The description of the project is as follows:

The NDI will assist twelve party branches, representing six parties, in drafting inclusive and responsive policy documents, engaging citizens on these policies through public meetings, developing corresponding campaign platforms, and
supporting these policies within municipal councils. The parties will utilize the NDI's municipal public opinion research and incorporate citizen input into their policies. (NED, 2012).

Lastly, in 2013 NED provided a grant to the NDI of $350,000. The goal of the project was “Promoting issue-based political dialogue.” (NED, 2014). The project description is as follows:

The NDI will assist twelve party branches, representing six parties, in drafting inclusive and responsive policy documents, engaging citizens on these policies through public meetings, developing corresponding campaign platforms, and supporting these policies within municipal councils. The parties will utilize the NDI's municipal public opinion research and incorporate citizen input into their policies. (NED, 2014).

### a. The Interview with NDI BiH

The interview with NDI BiH was held in the NDI’s office in Sarajevo. The person interviewed was a high level official at the organization. The informant was highly professional, well educated, and experienced with the NGO sector in BiH. The organization is located in the city center at an attractive location. The interview protocol was electronically provided to the informant before the interview. The informant was provided informed consent, and the interviewer assured that the informant understood the elements of the consent and rights provided to the informant. Further, the informant was briefed on the study, and asked whether additional explanation was required.

The first question regarded the challenges NGOs face when promoting democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The informant was asked to share the informant’s professional opinion and comments on this. The informant responded by dividing the NDI’s work in BiH into three different periods. The initial period was just after the war, where the goal
of the NDI was peace and reconciliation. The primary goal of the NDI was to create trust and reconstruct inter-ethnic relationships. The informant concluded that the NDI succeeded in bringing the political stakeholders to the table, where they wouldn’t aim weapons at each other. In the next period, the goal of the NDI was to develop a sort of political system by the creation of political parties with an inner structure related to citizens, that ran political campaigns. The challenge in this stage was to assure the parties that the system that works in the U.S. would work in BiH as well. Due to pessimism about the success of such an effort, the NDI needed to expose the political parties to the experience by letting them go through the process together with the NDI.

The third period is marked with unique challenges. According to the informant, the basic problem in the third period is slow integration of BiH into Euro-Atlantic relations. According to the informant, slow integration is also followed with the slowdown of political reforms. The reforms are marked by a segment of deadlock, and by the status quo maintained by the politicians on power. The informant suggests that frequently politicians are corrupt, and prevent people from focusing on the underlying issues in societies. Rather, the politicians draw the focus of the BiH citizens to ethno-nationalism and similar irrelevant issues.

The informant also suggests that the international community is guilty of making the NGO sector donor driven, and developing dependency on foreign donations. The informant believes that this dependency is a major obstacle for the development of civil society in BiH, especially for advocacy organizations. Foreign donors in some cases have special requirements that further erode the effectiveness of the NGOs.
The informant indicated that in the current economic situation in BiH it is very difficult to get a job. Therefore, when applying for projects NGOs focus on getting salaries for its activists and not to fulfill some higher goals. The informant indicated that it is extremely difficult to create a civil society, suggesting that current civil society in BiH is still in its infancy. The informant claims that on one side civil society is limited with donors. On the other side, political parties successfully control the development of civil society, since they strictly fund only those organizations that are somehow connected to them.

When discussing political parties, the informant suggests that unfortunately, they are established on an ethno-national basis. The informant asserts that it is the sad truth about the BiH context that political parties are thwarting the development of the civil society, whereas civil society should be the be corrective component of the government, as it is elsewhere. The informant noted another very serious problem: a monopoly over the NGO sector by a small number of big NGOs. The informant claims that these NGOs successfully sold themselves to the international community. In this way they receive most of the foreign donations. This puts them in a position to disperse that money to subcontractors as they like. Consequently, a large number of smaller organizations do not have a chance to gain resources and run successful projects. In addition, some of the projects run by smaller NGOs are successful and extremely important. Despite the success, their work is unnoticed by society. The informant suggests that this is a big problem for smaller NGOs, where the smaller NGOs frequently expressed their regret that most decisions regarding their projects depend on the view of big nongovernmental organizations. Lastly, the informant argues that despite the fact that
the NDI is a large organization, it doesn’t subcontract grant monies to smaller NGOs. Whatever the NDI does in BiH it does directly, and therefore the NDI is not in a position to control other organizations, to control what’s happening on the field, or what activities other organizations do. The NDI is responsible only for grants they receive, and projects they run.

The informant argues that it is difficult to evaluate whether the presence of large transnationals like Transparency International, the NDI, NED and similar organizations is bad for local NGOs in BiH. According to the informant, on one side it might have an aggregate effect on local organizations, but on the other hand, local NGOs have issues with limited capacity and independence that they still don’t possess.

The informant suggests that the NDI has a very specific mission in BiH. It is an NGO that works with governmental funds. The informant reported that USAID sponsors most of activities of the NDI. Therefore, the NDI needs to pay attention to the official U.S. governmental approach towards BiH, and it needs to focus on particular issues. The NDI therefore differs from other NGOs in BiH. While other NGOs do the job within the nongovernmental sector, the NDI deals with the U.S. government sector, and it is also very specific. The informant asserts that despite the U.S. government’s sponsorship, the NDI still manages to do the job that most organizations wouldn’t be able to do. This can be seen through the activities of the NDI that include a wide spectrum of political organizations. They range from rightist to leftist, and from ruling party to opposition. In this way the NDI provides its contribution to the democratization efforts in BiH.

The next question was regarding the effectiveness of NGOs in democracy promotion in BiH. The informant responded in following way:
They can be very, very effective. They are not that effective currently. It may be a continuation of the story where NGOs need to exert pressure on parties on one side, while on the other side they need to work on increasing the awareness of BiH citizens. BiH citizens are very inactive, and if NGOs present themselves or are considered as a representative of people in BiH it is a mistake. Civic passivity is extremely high in BiH. Some studies in the region indicate that 80-90% of people don’t participate in any form in civil society. Nevertheless, we need to consider that system was set up in that way that would promote passivity, where thought and expression would be suppressed. Therefore that suppression creates rare instances of negative expression like those protests that happened in February. No one wanted that kind of thing to happen. The instances of violence and vandalism only provide an argument to those that will point their finger at the NGO sector and say, “This is what happens when citizens become active.” Events of that kind are used effectively for the demonization of the NGO sector. I believe with a broader approach the NGO sector in BiH can achieve much more, but NGOs in BiH need to focus at the same time on people and on political parties. The priority should be to stimulate the awareness of BiH citizens. I believe it can’t be done in a hastened way. Moreover, it should begin in the schools by educating two or three generations about democracy. There should be a systematic approach in order to have a generation that knows that their voices are valuable; the things they say matter; individuals can accomplish little, but as a group they can achieve a lot, and the like. Therefore, I believe there is a lot of potential, but the efforts of NGOs should be inspired, motivated, systematic and organized in order to achieve the aforementioned goals (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next question was related to the role of NGOs in democracy promotion in BiH. The informant was asked to share their personal opinion about the level of support the NDI enjoys with people, politicians, and other stakeholders in the Bosnian political scene. The informants responded,

Now when we speak about BiH citizens, I am not sure how much they know about us, since we are not a group that uses media for its popularity. We are keeping a low profile due to the sensitivity of our work within the political sector. Nevertheless, in the government and nongovernment sectors, political parties, and in general public opinion we are well known, and much more valued than BiH citizens. Most political parties are interested and ready to cooperate with us. With the governmental sector we don’t have a certain cooperation since we are focused on political parties, and parliamentary programs. Thus, we work with individuals from the governmental sector. In most cases we work with representatives in parliament. There is a demand for opinions and analyses from us by political representatives, but since we are a small team we need to remain
within specific projects. We are being exposed to the public not by our own will, an American organization working on some issue has a finger pointed at it in one way or another. You are always good to someone, and perhaps bad to someone else. But the fact that we attract so much media attention indicates the credibility we currently have. We receive requests to make our research, and analyses available even to those we are not working with, and with those that are most frequently attacking us. We have a serious problem with the Republic of Srpska (RS), because we are characterized as a defamer of the RS. On the same list of those that supposedly are working on the destabilization of RS are the NDI, NED, and Transparency International (TI). The book published by Karganovic is a media attack not only on the NDI but on other NGOs in RS as well. This is part of the politics and ruling system in RS, where all NGOs are struggling. In many cases NGOs are shutting down, or doing their work in secrecy since they can’t expose themselves publicly, and the realization of their projects is systematically interrupted. In some instances the NDI has no problem meeting with representatives in RS, but there are those that don’t want to meet with us, or are not allowed to do so (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next question the informant was asked was about the ethno-nationalism vs. liberalism thesis in the current Bosnian context. The informant argues that there are no traditional parties, since the approach of contemporary ethno-national parties has no connection with the preservation of ethno-national or other interests, except the private interests of those in power. Ethno-nationalism, according to the informant, is only being used as a tool by political leaders to achieve their personal goals. Moreover, the informant suggests that the struggle in BiH is not about the modern vs. traditional, rather it is the battle between good and evil. Thus, the informant asserts that “currently it is a façade that such a struggle exists. It is the easiest thing in BiH to call for who is green, red, and blue in order to have people use their designated sheep pens.”

The next section in the interview was about the democratic transplant. The informant was asked to elaborate on which value is seen by the NDI as a BiH priority in democratization. The informant asserts that it is difficult to choose the specific democratic value that should be prioritized by NGOs, because BiH society needs all
democratic values. The informant suggests that somehow the parties involved in
democracy promotion don’t manage to consolidate democracy, and the democratic
transplant is being rejected. However, according to the informant, democracy in BiH can
and should be successfully transplanted. It can’t be done literally, since special attention
should be paid to the specifics of the situation in BiH. The informant suggests that the
core values could be transplanted, but adjustments made according to the psyche of BiH
citizens. The informant believes that has been some progress in democratization in BiH.

In regards to the NDI, the informant suggests that currently the NDI is working on
establishment links between the government, political parties, and citizens in BIH. First,
the focus is to foster responsibility by those in power towards those who voted for them,
since the informant believes there is a lack of awareness by officials that they have
responsibility towards voters. Therefore, accountability can be considered the prioritized
value by the NDI. The second value prioritized by the NDI is transparency. The
informant suggests that these two prioritized values are interrelated, and it is important to
make people aware of democracy; to educate them about what democracy is, and where
the real leverage of power is in a democracy.

The informant claims the NDI works on accountability and transparency by
linking the hitherto polarized sides, because there is a big gap between two segments
(elected and electors). Thus, the informant suggests, small magnitude projects where
different actors work on bringing citizens and politicians together is important as well. In
most cases, these are the local NGOs working on communication projects. These projects
range from the public inquiries about the topics related to government and its activities,
to accountability in regards to projected goals. According to the informant, this is
basically the segment missing in Bosnian democracy, and the one that should be mostly addressed.

The next question is related to the democratic values promoted in BiH by NGOs. This question refers to the criticism that frequently the values promoted do not represent the underlying problems in BiH, and therefore they are remote or abstract to BiH citizens. The informant indicated that the recent floods in BiH are an example of this. Accordingly, who would be preoccupied in thinking about democracy while they need to make sure their family needs to have a roof over its head. In addition, the informant argues that the vouchers that represent relief aid from the international community to BiH citizens are not seen as a property of BiH citizens. Moreover, some of the political parties used the vouchers as their own property while issuing them to those in need.

In addition, the informant suggests that there is absence of awareness about the function and importance of individual voting. Therefore, the informant suggests that it can be said that the democratic values promoted do not reflect the underlying problems in BiH. However, the informant suggests, the nonexistence, unawareness, and disuse of those values reflects the problems, or the problems are caused by the unawareness and absence of the values promoted. Therefore, the informant suggests that providing some sort of education to citizens would be the best option for both individuals and society. If the system matures enough to provide some concrete benefits to citizens, then citizens will follow it. Consequently, the informant suggests, “there would be fewer problems, and the BiH society would work on the solution of problems. In this case democratic values would be implemented in the society.”
When asked to share their personal opinion about whether it is possible to transplant democratic values from the West to BiH, the informant responded as follows:

It is not possible to literally transplant the values. However, we are accustomed to the cliché that we used to live in a different system; therefore we cannot adapt and accept certain new things. On the contrary, we can see that Macedonia, Albania, and even Serbia and Croatia are countries that used to share the same values as we did, the same mentality, and yet they are adopting new values. I believe it is not correct that we can’t adopt new values because of the mentality we have. Moreover, that claim is being used by some to keep the positions they acquired. The way our politicians think is that it is better to have a bird in the hand, than two in the bush. A good example of this is the Sejdic, Finci vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina verdict.9 It went in a totally different direction than it should (personal communication, July, 2014).

Thus, the informant suggests that for the development of democracy BiH society needs to accept that other than ethno-national interests, there are broader interests for all BiH citizens.

In regards to a popular claim that over time the NGOs displaced their initial goals to promote liberal democratic values and became agents for someone else, the informant suggested that some people are using this claim to defame of the NGO sector. The informant asserts that this is especially the case when the subjects of defamation are international NGOs like the NDI. Thus, the informant suggests that the NDI will always for some parties in BiH be an organization with a secret agenda. However, the informant personally doesn’t consider “that organizations change their initial goals for someone else; rather they are being created to work for someone else.” The informant suggests

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9 *Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina* Judgment: This refers to the case of two BiH citizens of Jewish and Rom origin who were plaintiffs in the European Court for Human Rights contesting the constitutional arrangements of BiH where the country’s Presidency and members of the House of Representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina is granted only to constituent nations (Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats), and where minorities are excluded (European Court of Human Rights, 2009).
that “there are plenty of organizations that are created once the political parties understood that they could achieve a certain political goals” by establishing NGOs. Today, the informant suggests that “the political parties are creating all kinds of foundations. It can be known for certain that some people are a member of the political party, member of city council, and also that they lead an NGO. It is not a secret that some NGOs are established in order to work for someone else.”

“In regards to the NGOs changing their initials goals”, the informant suggests that, “the NGOs frequently deviate from their goals despite claiming that they are dedicated to a certain mission. Therefore, the informant argues that the NGOs deviate because of financial resources. They are simply shifting their missions because it is necessary for them to acquire money so they could survive.”

When asked whether foreign donors are affecting efforts of NGOs to promote democracy, the informant suggested that foreign donors affect the processes, but also have the projected goals that are very difficult to deviate from. Hence, if an NGO deviates from the projected path, the donors will pull out their money, and the NGO would accomplish nothing. The informant suggests that the NED is one of the organizations with a broad approach, and that the organization uses the same approach elsewhere in the world. Further, the informant suggests that the NED is very tolerant; they don’t stalk NGOs they fund, and they don’t put conditions on NGO programs. Rather, the informant asserts, the NED is respectful and tolerant about the opinion of local organization. In contrast, the informant compares the approach used by the EU, which recently, became an important donor for BiH NGOs. .The EU is more strict, and doesn’t accept indirect costs. Therefore, according to the informant, it is much more
difficult for organizations with low capacity to acquire grants from the EU.

Consequently, the informant suggests that most often the resources allocated by the EU for NGO projects in BiH end up in the budgets of those mogul organizations that already have excessive resources at their disposal.

It appears there is a sort of oligarchy in the BiH NGO sector, according to the informant’s response. When asked whether a sort of oligarchy exists in the NGO sector in BiH, the respondent provided an affirmative answer.

Lastly, the informant suggests that there should be more space and resources allocated to smaller organizations that are unrepresented and underdeveloped but frequently doing important projects. Increasing their capacity would make important improvements in regards to democracy promotion and consolidation in BiH.

b. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The interview with the NDI was very important from the standpoint of this study. The NDI is the major recipient of resources provided by the NED to nongovernmental organizations in BiH. In addition, the NDI deals primarily with political parties, providing them necessary knowledge and expertise in regards to elections and the creation of policies. The major role of the NDI can be seen through its tendency to shift the focus of political parties from ethno-national rhetoric to concrete issue-based policymaking.

Several analytical categories are observed in the interview with the NDI official, such as:
**Democratic Transplant:** In relation to democratic transplant, the informant believes that it is not literally possible to transplant values from the developed Western democracies to the transitional system in BiH because BiH might have certain specifics different than those in the U.S. Nevertheless, through education, systematic effort, and time, the process can be successful.

**Neoliberalism vs. ethno-nationalism (modern vs. traditional):** This analytical category refers to the struggle between the ethno-nationals vs. liberal NGOs. Based on the interview it can be said that frequently ethno-national political elites use ethno-national rhetoric as a cover up for the current dire situation in the country. Further, ethno-national political parties accuse NGOs of working to destabilize the system. In the interview it is indicated that the NDI, NED, and Transparency International are also on the list published in Karganovic’s book. Further, political parties held NGOs in BiH responsible for the February 2014 riots in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, the informant indicated that some NGOs were created with the specific purpose of serving political parties.

**Challenges--Transition:** This refers to the analytical categories that encompass the transitional challenges NGOs face in BiH. In the case of the NDI, based on the data from the interview, the transitional challenges can generally be described as a passivity of BiH citizens that is mainly created by lack of awareness of democracy. In other words, BiH citizens are not aware that they are in power, since they are voting for those that will represent them. Nevertheless, the ethno-nationalist propaganda and current bad economic trends in BiH put people in a passive mode, and the political situation in the eyes of regular BiH citizens is not seen as a priority. The informant provided a good example
indicating the behavior of both politicians in power and BiH citizens: the catastrophic 2014 floods.

*Values seen as a priority:* refers to values that an NGO sees as a priority in BiH’s democratization. The NDI sees its priority values as accountability and transparency.

*Foreign donors:* This is analytical category referring to the behavior of foreign donors and impact they make on the democratic process in BiH. The NDI argues that foreign donors do make an impact in the democratic process in BiH simply by putting some specific requirements for grants they provide.

*Oligarchy in the NGO sector:* This analytical category is derived from the interview. It refers to large NGOs that manage to exert control over the grant system in BiH. They acquire big grants and then subcontract them to small NGOs. With their specific requirements and demands they exert influence over the smaller NGOs that are struggling to survive due to the scarcity of resources in the NGO sector.

Lastly, the role of the NDI is important in democratization processes, because by working with political parties on issue-based policymaking, they might change the behavior of political parties. If political parties in BiH shift the political dialogue constructively towards consensus on necessary reforms, the Dayton Peace Agreement could be revised. Thus, changes in the Dayton Peace Agreement will automatically lead towards constitutional changes, since Annex IV of the Agreement represents the Constitution of BiH.
6. Individual Case Study Research: Youth Communication Center (OKC)

The Youth Communication Center (trans. Omladinski Komunikativni Centar) or OKC is an NGO founded in 1997 in the city of Banja Luka (Republic of Srpska), Bosnia-Herzegovina. The center cooperates well with other NGOs in BiH. The primary focus of OKC is youth.

In the last eight years the project was supported by an NED grant. Projects have to do with accountability and education. There are slight differences in grant amounts over the years, and the project descriptions. In essence this is a long-term project run for eight years. According to its 2010 Annual Report NED provided $42,500 to OKC to work on a civic education project. Its goal was “to assist young people in playing a more effective role in advocating for youth related cases.” (NED, 2010). The project description is as follows:

The Center will provide capacity building training to student councils in over 200 schools, continue to strengthen two leading student council networks, and facilitate their mutual collaboration as well as cooperation with government authorities. The Center will also encourage students of voting age to participate in the country’s October 2010 general elections. (NED, 2010).

This is a long-term project that is currently twelve years old. Several generations of BiH high school students were taught about democratic values and norms through this project. In addition to civic education, these projects resulted in important networking activities with other NGOs. The OKC achieved the upbringing of cohorts of young BiH citizens that became aware of democratic values, democratic processes, and their rights and responsibilities as the citizens of a democratic BiH.
a. The Interview with OKC

The interview with OKC was conducted in Ormanica, a small countryside town in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Hotel Orion. At the time of the interview, the hotel was used as a venue for the OKC project sponsored by the NED. The project was an initiative to train and educate youth in leadership and democracy, so that they could disperse the knowledge to other cities as well. It was a great opportunity to observe the methods used by OKC, and also a chance to obtain interviews with the project participants. The fact that participants come from different organizations from different cities in BiH is beneficial for the study.

The informant or representative of OKC was the high official of the OKC. The informant was business attired, motivated, professional, and well educated. The informant was provided the interview protocol weeks before the actual interview. The informant was thoroughly informed about interview consent, and a copy of the informed consent form was given to the informant as well. The informant was asked whether further explanation of the study is required. Once the informed consent was signed the formal interview took place.

The first question in the interview was about the challenges NGOs face in democracy promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The informant suggested that the basic problem in democratization in BiH is that citizens misunderstand the role of government and the state. The informant suggested that such a phenomenon can be attributed to the former-Yugoslavia’s socialist model, where the shared assumption was that citizens were there for the state, and not the reverse. Educating and making citizens aware of this issue is
extremely difficult, since the informant suggests there is a sort of cult of religiosity
towards the leaders by BiH citizens. The second thing the informant suggests is that

There is a great misunderstanding by the state apparatus, the government
officials, and others who are in contact with the NGO sector over, what the sector
is about. Hence, the informant suggests, the NGO sector in BiH is not perceived
as a voice of the people; as a voice of needs, as a corrective force for government.
In BiH the NGO sector is perceived that way in theory, but not in practice. The
informant suggests that in BiH there is a popular societal belief that the NGO
sector is an extended hand of some international actors (personal communication,
July, 2014).

Predominantly, it is in RS where the list of unwanted NGOs is being published. The
informant indicates that among them are organizations that are sponsored by NED. The
informant asserts that despite the fact that NED sponsored the OKC for the longest time
when compared with other NED sponsored NGOs in BiH, the OKC is not on the list. The
informant suggests this is probably because the OKC doesn’t work on issues salient to RS
politicians,, and also due to the approach of the OKC to work by promoting cooperation
and not conflict with stakeholders in BiH.

The informant concludes that the majority of people in power consider the NGO
sector in BiH as extended hands of some international actors suggesting that

The NGOs get the money in order to impeach the government. On the other hand,
voters misunderstand the NGO sector; they don’t know what the NGO sector is doing.
Nevertheless, the informant agrees that the NGO sector itself is the one to blame for that
phenomenon. The NGO sector in BiH doesn’t promote NGO ideas, and that is the reason
civil society should exist in the first place. The informant suggests that if one pays
attention to NGO’ projects he or she can observe that they do seminars and the like,
however, there is no long-term goal or commitment. Somehow, the NGO sector still doesn’t know how to do that (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next challenge according to the informant is the uncoordinated nature of the NGO sector in BiH. Satirically, the informant suggests that “NGOs are on the level of teenagers, describing their behavior as if you have ten boys at a party and only one girl, where all the boys compete over who will first get to the girl” (personal communication, July, 2014). The consequence of such behavior is that the NGOs in BiH can’t get organized. Since, according to the informant “The NGOs don’t believe that once they are connected, coordinated, and organized, together, their joint efforts will enrich their resources, and there will be enough money for all program, and for everybody” (personal communication). Thus, the informant suggests “The current situation is as if all NGOs eat from the same plate, where all of them struggle over who will get more” (personal communication, July, 2014). The informant suggests that the consequence of the aforementioned NGO behaviors is “Sporadic cooperation between NGOs in BiH, often related to only one project” (personal communication, July, 2014) Thus, the informant suggests that kind of cooperation is short lived, unsustainable, and feeble.

In the next question, The informant was asked to elaborate on how effective NGOs in BiH can be in regards to promotion of democracy.

The informant suggested that their effectiveness can best be seen if there are participants in the projects certain NGOs run. The informant suggests that this is the common perception in the NGO sector as well. Participation in projects for democracy promotion indicates participants’ adaptation of democratic values, which results in societal changes. However, the informant suggests
The targeted population of BiH citizens by NGOs is relatively small, and the NGO’s have a tendency to produce new leaders and work with youth. However, the majority of the BiH population are left forgotten. Further the NGOs’ work with youth is highly ineffective. It is wrong assumption by NGOs to wait for the young population to promote changes, if the NGO sector doesn’t work with youth.

Lastly, some donor organizations are fostering ineffectiveness by imposing a focus on only certain groups of BiH society (personal communication, July, 2014).

In the next question the informant was asked about the support the OKC enjoys from BiH citizens, government, and other stakeholders in the Bosnian democratic process. The informant asserted that the OKC enjoys solid support, since promote and organize their projects well. The informant suggests that the OKC is always transparent and open, and also they have their own radio station they use for to promote their activities. The informant adds that the level of support they enjoy from different parties in BiH is due to a very flexible approach. However, the informant suggests, there is a large population in BiH that doesn’t know anything about the OKC. According to the informant, these citizens “are not interested in the OKC’s programs. Therefore, the OKC will never have any effect on them, nor will it be in a position to reach out to them” (personal communication, July, 2014). The informant suggests that:

In general, the NGO sector still hadn’t developed the proper tools to promote the NGO sector. Hence, as I said before, people don’t know what the NGO sector is doing. Consequently, it is difficult to measure the level of support. In regards to participants of our projects, we surely have their support, but if we ask some Perica (personal name used as an example) that lives in some X place, he would tell you that he never heard that an NGO sector exists in his place. I believe we have a certain support, but we are not working systematically on the development of support. We are more focused on programs and activities (personal communication, July, 2014).
The next section of the interview is about the democratic transplant. The informant was asked to elaborate on what value is seen as a priority in democracy promotion by the OKC. The informant listed peace and reconciliation, voluntarism, rule-of-law, and raising the awareness of BiH citizens as values prioritized by the OKC. However, the informant suggests that the education of youth and citizens is the priority of the OKC.

Regarding whether the values promoted by the OKC represent the underlying problems in BiH, the informant responded that around 20% of BiH understands the values promoted, whereas 80% of the population is not aware of the values promoted. The primary reason for that, according to the informant, is the dire economic situation in a country where socio-economic status plays an important role. The informant suggests that people are struggling to provide basic needs to their families; therefore, they have no time to dedicate to political issues. The informant suggests that often people say that they don’t care what the country is going to be called or who will lead it, they are just trying to feed their families. Further, the informant notes that the dire economic situation creates aggressive tendencies that further cripple peace and reconciliation in BiH.

When asked whether it is possible to transplant democratic values of the West to the transitional BiH context, the informant asserted that democratic values in BiH can be transplanted relatively easily. This claim appears to contradict the previous suggestion by the informant that 80% of people are uninformed about democracy. Thus, the informant suggests that 80% of it population is distracted due to the problems they face. Therefore, a population characterized by low esteem and confidence can be both easy prey for political manipulation, and become democratically responsible individuals who can
promote democratic changes. The informant uses an argument suggesting that one can create a conflict in BiH in three seconds, then with some systematic method the NGO sector can transplant democracy, and democratic values as well. The informant suggests that the current BiH context is a fertile ground for both; ethno-nationalists, and those who promote democracy.

In regards to NGOs’ efforts in democracy promotion, the informant suggests that despite the low impact NGOs have in BiH, they still have managed to transplant some democratic values. However, the informant suggests, the process of transplanting can be seen as a case of gardening. It would be great if there were enough time and resources to have all the garden decorated and flourishing. However, the informant suggests that due to the lack of capacity NGOs are forced to prioritize issues based on urgency and feasibility of projects. According to the informant, the methods are viable, but create sporadic development of projects by NGOs.

In regards to the critique that some NGOs have changed their initial goals and became agents for someone else, the informant asserted that due to the scarcity of resources the NGOs in BiH do frequently switch their initial goals. Thus, the informant suggests that this is not case with the OKC, because the OKC has an authentic approach where from time to time it can develop a project that will fit the interests of the donors; however, they never go astray from their initial values and goals. The informant said that after years of working with youth and democracy promotion, the OKC could not suddenly switch its priority to fighting HIV in order to receive funds. The informant suggested, however, that this is the case with most NGOs; there are NGOs that are shift
their mission statements to match the grant descriptions. Nevertheless, the author suggests, this type of organization is slowly fading away.

When asked about the impact that dependency on foreign donors has on democracy promotion in BiH, the informant asserted that foreign donors do not pressure NGOs, but simply choose those that will best do the job. Otherwise, it would be easier for a foreign donor to select the NGOs that are struggling with resources, and have them do the project according to the donor’s preferences. The informant suggests this was never the case, and that projects are given to the NGOs that know what they are doing.

In regards to NED’s approach and behavior as a donor, the informant suggests that the NED deserves compliments due to their authentic approach. The informant indicated that NED listens and understands the demands of the NGOs they sponsor. In addition, NED deals with the contextual differences in BiH by having a staff member that understands the BiH context. The informant asserts that if you need to make a change in an ongoing project, you need only inform them about the necessary changes, and promptly they assist the NGO in changing the program. On the contrary, with some other donors like the EU, it takes up to eight months to make changes in a project. Therefore, the informant praises the NED’s approach, and suggests that the other NED-sponsored NGOs in BiH have the same experience.

b. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The interview with the OKC was a unique opportunity for this observer to make direct observations of a program on the go. When comparing the mission statement of the
OKC, the grant description of the OKC on the NED’s website, the responses made by the OKC official, and participants at their program, in this case theory is being successfully put into practice. The program conducted by the OKC is indeed targeting the right population with its goals, with successful results. In addition, the program’s location is extremely suitable for a several-day workshop. Not only does the location provide a good venue for the workshop, but it also provides an excellent opportunity for socializing and networking among the youth participants. It contributes to the program being not exhausting and monotonous, but rather interesting, exciting, and rich. In the case of the OKC, it can be seen that the organization is committed to its goals. They have dozens of published materials referring to democracy promotion. Their staff is young and ambitious. One can see that the level of cooperation of the OKC with other NGOs across the whole country is high, and they contribute to further NGO cooperation.

Several analytical categories are observed. The informant believes that it is possible to transplant democracy as it is. Thus, the current context in BiH is a double-edged sword. It is fertile ground for democracy promotion, and yet it is also fertile ground for ethno-national rhetoric. It is important to have a systematic approach in democracy promotion. The lack of awareness of democracy and democratic values by BiH citizens is a significant problem. This unawareness is due to the current economic situation in BiH, and ethno-national rhetoric. The OKC promotes the values of peace and reconciliation, voluntarism, and democratic awareness. It appears that foreign donors are not imposing values on the OKC program, but that some NGOs change their mission to get resources. The OKC informant gave NED credit for being flexible, reasonable, understandable, and not imposing its values on the democracy promotion process. In addition, the OKC long-
term approach appears to produce good results, and it should be incorporated into programs of other NGOs in BiH. Further, the OKC chooses cooperation rather than conflict, and rather would engage in a dialogue (even if a much longer process) than protests and civic unrest. The generations of young BiH citizens that are participating in programs like the OKC’s will surely contribute to the development of democracy in BiH.
C. Interviews- Participants in NGOs) activities

1. The Individual Case Study: Participant 1

The interview was held in the Hotel Orion, located in the town of Ormanica in Northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, the location used as a venue for the OKC project discussed above. Further, it is the project for which the OKC received a grant from NED. While answering the questions, from the interview protocol the informant was confident, open, comfortable, eloquent, and motivated. The informed consent was handed to the informant, as well as the copy of the interview protocol. The study was explained to the informant, and he was asked if additional explanation was required. Once the informed consent was signed, the formal interview began.

The first question focused on the efforts of NGOs to promote democracy and democratic values in BiH. The informant asserted that NGOs are key factors in democracy promotion in BiH, since they supplement the educational system in BiH, which is very old. The informal education provided by NGOs allows younger generations of BiH citizens and other members of society to understand democracy and democratic values. Further, the informant believes that through NGO activities BiH citizens have a chance to actively engage in democratic processes.

In order to check whether the informant had a good understanding of the current project, the informant was asked to briefly describe the activity that the informant participated in and that was organized by the NED-sponsored NGO, in this case the OKC. The informant explained that the program they participate in provides support to
young people in BiH. The program focuses on high school students. The informant asserted that through training and seminars, the current OKC project helps the high school students to develop skills and self-confidence. The participant appeared to have a good knowledge and understanding of the program.

The informant suggested that projects like this are very important for democracy in BiH. Hence, the informant argued, it is important when high-schools students are eligible to vote to know for whom they should vote. Further, the informant argues that a person who participates in projects like this one will be able to understand what is good and what is bad for him/her. Also, they will be able to represent themselves in the best way to society.

The second topic of the interview regarded democratic values. When asked about what democratic values were promoted in the activity, the informant answered that the project seeks to support student councils in high schools in BiH. It provides high school students a chance to express their opinions in their schools. Hence, the democratic value promoted in the activity is freedom of speech and expression. In addition, the informant believes that by promoting freedom of expression it will further enhance the personal development of high school students. It could be observed that the informant has a clear understanding of the values promoted, the goals of the project, and that there is no evidence that the informant misunderstood its values.

In the next question the informant was asked to share his personal opinion of the importance of the values promoted, and to elaborate on whether the promoted democratic values were or were not abstract to him. The answer is as follows:

When you consider the whole situation in BiH, and how we as young people have so little opportunity to express ourselves, to show our faces, then the NGOs
help us a lot. Because they support us, appreciate our work and our ideas, and provide us support to express our opinions. There are many good ideas that come from the youth, but they don’t have the opportunity to express them. Then the NGO sector comes and provides the opportunity to young people to show their real face, and by promoting democratic values it helps our country towards a better future (personal communication, July, 2014).

Regarding whether the values promoted are abstract to participants, the informant asserted that in the beginning of the program the democratic values promoted were abstract to participants because they were not exposed to them previously. This is the reason the participants weren’t aware of the importance of democratic values. The informant gave the OKC program as an example of the aforementioned phenomenon, suggesting that in the beginning of programs like OKC’s, participants are not aware of how important these values are (i.e. voting, freedom of expression, and etc.). Therefore, voting in elections for them would be remote, in which they would spend time on something irrelevant to them. Consequently, democratic values like freedom of expression were an abstract for them. However, after the program they become aware that voting makes a large impact on their lives, because they vote for those that will lead the country on their behalf. They understood that democratic values like freedom of speech/expression are important because they grant them the right to bring up the issues they face. In that case they will participate in the democratic process.

In the next question the informant was asked to share his personal opinion about the democratic values promoted in the OKC program and whether the values promoted are important according to his opinion. The informant provided this answer:

When I compare my self before and after participation in programs organized by NGOs who work on democracy promotion, I understand that after those programs I am a totally new, different person. Based on the skills and values I was taught throughout the projects I understand that afterwards, I am capable of applying for grants that can be useful for my community. Therefore, I am also more useful for
my community as well. In general, NGOs’ efforts change the individual so he/she can be useful for a community and society as well (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next topic in the interview was about suggestions. The informant was asked his opinion about what can be done so NGOs’ democracy promotion efforts can be more effective. The informant implied that there are too many NGOs in BiH. On the one hand there are organizations that try to promote democratic values, but on the other hand there are organizations that are only registered, and do nothing. The informant argued that the latter are registered just because some people seek personal gains. The informant claimed that such nongovernmental organizations are doing significant harm to their popularity in BiH. Therefore, the informant believes that there should be stricter laws regulating the founding, registering, and functioning of NGOs in BiH. Lastly, the informant concluded that this would produce a clearer image of NGOs activities in BiH. People in BiH would be able to distinguish NGOs that do a good job from those that are fakes.

In the last question the informant was asked whether he had any additional thoughts on democracy promotion in BiH by NGOs that are sponsored by NED. The informant added that programs like the one currently run by the OKC should be continued, as well as other NGOs’ democracy related projects that focus on youth, since the young people in BiH will have more opportunity to develop of personal values and skills that are necessary today.

**a. The Individual Case Study Report**

For this informant, democracy promotion activities run by the NGO made a significant impact on his life. Not only did the informant’s participation produce
awareness of the democracy and democratic values, but it also motivated the informant to contribute to democracy promotion in BiH by helping other young people understand its importance. One can see that the informant clearly understood the goal of the projects, and the democratic values they promoted. Further, the informant understood why the promotion of such values is important, and what impact it has on society as a whole.

Several analytical categories are observed in this interview:

*Revelation of democratic values* is an analytical category refers to an instance where the participant in democracy promotion projects run by NGOs are initially not aware of democratic values or their importance. Through the program, they became aware of them. In the case of this informant the values observed were freedom of expression and democratic awareness.

*Education:* this analytical category refers to the importance of education in democracy promotion. The informant indicated that there is no formal education about democracy and democratic values in school. Therefore, the only institutions that work on educating BiH citizens are NGOs.

*Positive criticism of NGOs:* The informant believes that NGOs are doing a great job in BiH in the field of democracy promotion. However, there are NGOs that are only fictive—without program or activities- that do significant harm to the popularity of the NGO sector.

*Increasing awareness of BiH citizens:* This analytical category refers to the omnipresent lack of awareness of BiH citizens, and the need to increase it that would result in an active and critical approach of BiH citizens toward the democratic process in BiH.
Long-term goals: This analytical category refers to the longevity of the program:

How a long-term approach had a significant impact on the success of the democracy promotion project.
2. The Individual Case Study: Participant 2

This interview was also conducted in the hotel Orion in town of Ormanica, Northeast BiH. At the time of the interview the informant was participating in the OKC’s program, sponsored by the NED. The program was about the creation of student councils in high schools across BiH. During the interview the informant was comfortable, open, and eloquent. The informant is from a small town located in central BiH. Prior to the interview the informant was provided with the informed consent form, and a brief explanation of the study. After the principal investigator was assured that the informant understood the informed consent form, it was given to the informant for a signature. In addition, one hard copy of the consent form and the interview protocol was given to the informant as well. After the form was signed, and the researcher confirmed with the informant that no additional explanation of the study was required, the formal interview began.

The first topic in the interview protocol is about the NGOs. There are two questions in the first topic. In the first question the informant was asked to share his opinion about the involvement of NGOs that work on democracy promotion and democratic values in BiH. The informant asserted that he/she has been working in an NGO sector for a while, and has a good knowledge about democracy promotion activities by NGOs. Through the projects the informant participated in, the informant confidently claimed that NGOs working on democracy promotion in BiH achieved a lot in BiH. Thus, it is necessary for NGOs to focus on younger generations. The informant implied that older generations have some remnants in their psyche of the ex-Yugoslavian system,
and therefore they don’t have an adequate understanding of democracy. The informant asserted that “Although we have freedom of speech in this country that didn’t exist in the previous system, the older generations still fear to speak openly about the bad things done by government” (personal communication, July, 2014).

Further, the informant provided examples of projects where NGOs encouraged high school students to work on issues in different cities. The informant gave an example of a program in which he/she participated. The program was about the mobile democracy laboratory. In that program, the informant together with other students went to different cities in central BiH and resolved issues like the removal of domestic animals from urban areas, trash disposal, and similar issues. The informant indicated that it was the NGO that made it possible for them to meet with other high school students and discuss the issues, and their solutions in a democratic way.

In the second question in the first topic the informant was asked to briefly describe the project organized by the NED-sponsored NGO that he has personally participated in. This question was a proxy question to indicate whether the informant understood the project and its goals. The informant described the current OKC program that seeks to develop student councils across high schools in BiH that will develop students’ freedom of expression. Further, the program enables participants to become trainers of new students to come. The informant’s answer indicated that he/she clearly understood the project, and its goals. In addition to the creation of student councils across high schools in BiH, the informant indicated that by developing such a network, the OKC developed a sense of loyalty among participants. This is an extremely important feature since the societal level of trust is extremely low. Therefore, it is very important that the
youth develops social capital and social cohesion that will contribute to the consolidation of democracy in BiH.

The next topic is about democratic values. The informant was asked to describe what democratic value was promoted in the project. The informant asserted that the democratic value promoted is indeed needed in BiH society. It is a culture of dialogue or freedom of expression/speech. In addition to these values, respect and tolerance, commitment to promises, and respect for the rule of law are promoted by the project, and BiH youth greatly lack these values. The response clearly demonstrated that the informant clearly understood the focus of this democracy promotion project.

When asked about the criticism that the democratic values promoted in transitional societies are abstract and remote to citizens, the informant asserted that those individuals who participated in the project do not perceive these values as abstract and remote since they have learned them through the project. Further, the informant indicated that the student councils have a hierarchical structure. The informant referred to different levels of members involved in the students’ council. The lowest level membership is composed of the members of a high school class that participate in the project. The next level is the president of the class, who is a member of the student council in a given school. Lastly, student councils from different schools have cantonal and state level meetings with the representatives of other student councils. The informant asserts that at least 90% of information gained from the OKC project will be conveyed to the lowest levels of students’ councils. He/she meant that the democratic values promoted in the program will be conveyed and introduced to every student whose school participates in the OKC’s project. The fact that the current project is expected to form student councils
in more than 200 schools across the BiH suggests that the OKC’s project will make a significant contribution to BiH democracy.

In the third question of the second topic, the informant was asked to share his opinion on whether the values promoted are important and reflect the underlying needs of the society. The informant responded that the current absence of those values represents a big problem for BiH society. Therefore, promotion of those values is extremely important. The informant referred to the culture of dialogue mentioned earlier, and reflected on the absence of a culture of dialogue among the political leaders. The informant suggested that the absence of those values can be noticed instantly when observing the way political leaders treat journalists, and when they give interviews. The informant indicated this is not only a problem with the leaders of the six ruling political parties, but also with those of lower rank.

The informant’s response reflects problems with the way political leaders behave towards media and journalists. Frequently media members are physically and verbally scorched by politicians.

In the next section of the interview the informant was asked to suggest ways to improve NGO programs whose goal is democracy promotion. The informant indicated that he/she worked for NGOs for a long time, and that people working in the NGO sector are trying hard to do something good. Nevertheless, the informant suggests that these efforts are not being accepted by society in the way they should. The NGO sector promotes change, while the community rejects and resists change. The informant believes that this resistance towards change is probably a consequence of the community’s fear of
change. The informant suggested that NGOs should promote these values on the ground and that NGOs working on democracy promotion should be supported more.

The informant indicated that currently in BiH there are around 11,000 registered NGOs. Most are not functioning. The informant suggests that in his/her city there are 200 registered NGOs. After observation, the informant concluded that more than 100 of them are not working. They don’t have projects or goals. Therefore, stricter requirements should be imposed on NGOs, so the classification of NGOs that do something good can be contrasted to the fake ones.

In the last topic the informant was asked to share any other thoughts the informant might have about democracy promotion through NED-sponsored NGOs in BiH. The informant suggested that there should be more youth engaging in NGOs activities since they will contribute something there, and their work will not be in vain. The informant asserted that it will be beneficial to them and to society.

a. The Individual Case Study Research Report

There are several analytical categories observed in the case of “Participant 2”.

“Stricter control of NGOs’ activities”: This would prevent the existence of “ghost NGOs”.

“Ghost NGOs” refers to the category of NGOs that are registered, but inactive. They are either created for some other purpose or they are simply inactive. The existence of this type of NGOs significantly damages the reputation of the NGO sector in BiH.
“Importance of youth”: This refers to the importance in getting youth involved in the democracy promotion projects.

“Values seen as a priority”: This refers to the values being prioritized by NGOs. In this case the value promoted are freedom of expression/culture of dialogue. It can be concluded that the value observed to be promoted matches the values in the project description.

“Youth coming together”: This refers to youth coming together in the democracy promotion project. It could be noted from an interview that this has several benefits. Networking, loyalty, and solidarity are some of the values the informant suggested.

“The strategy of NGOs”: This refers to the strategy used to promote democracy in BiH. In the case of OKC, from the interview with the informant it can be concluded that OKC has a unique approach that enables it to promote democratic values across BiH.

In relation to the question about what values are promoted, and whether the promoted values are abstract to BiH citizens, based on the informant’s response the value prioritized was freedom of speech. Regarded whether values are abstract, the value(s) promoted by the NGO were not abstract to the informant since he/she was exposed to that type of value through the NGO’s programs. Further, through the network of students’ councils the knowledge about democratic values will be disseminated across more than 200 high schools in BiH.
3. The Individual Case Study: Participant 3

The interview was also held in July 2014 in Ormanica, Northern Bosnia, in the hotel Orion. The informant was motivated, open, and comfortable when answering questions. The informant was provided an informed consent form and description of the study as well. Once the researcher was assured that the informant fully understood the content of the informed consent, the informant was asked to sign an informed consent form, where one copy was provided to the informant and one to the researcher. Prior to starting with questions from the interview protocol, the informant was asked whether further explanation of the study is required. The formal interview started with the researcher asking whether the informant had additional questions.

The informant was asked to share the personal opinions about the involvement of NGOs in the democracy promotion in BiH. The informant asserted that the efforts of NGOs in regards to democracy promotion in BiH are extremely important, especially projects focusing on youth. Particularly, focus of democracy promotion projects should be at high school student population. Further, the informant suggests that focusing on the youth is the best way to promote democracy in BiH. Since, the young generation is the one that represents the future of BiH. In addition, the informant indicated that currently in BiH youth are not able to participate in the democratic process since their voice can’t be heard.

In the second question of the first topic, the informant was asked to briefly describe the project organized by the NED-sponsored NGO that he personally participated in. The informant responded:
I participated in the program whose goal is the creation of student councils in BiH. I was the president of the student councils in Sarajevo Canton. I personally focused on the student councils in Sarajevo, but I also contributed to the development of the student councils’ network in BiH. In Sarajevo Canton, we had regular meetings; we worked to resolve some general problems high school students face in Sarajevo. In addition, we focused on the things that high school students need, but are not provided with. We tried to organize more cultural activities in the Sarajevo Canton. We have organized several cultural activities, expositions, days of culture and the like. Through these activities we tried to create better conditions for education and a better future of high school students (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant’s answer demonstrates a good understanding of the NGO project. The informant appears to play an active leadership role in the program.

The next topic is about the democratic values promoted by NGOs that work on democracy promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the first question of the second topic the informant was asked to describe what democratic values were promoted in the aforementioned activity. The informant stated that the purpose of the program was the development of civil society among BiH youth and another goal of the project was increasing the awareness of BiH youth. By making high school students aware that once they are 18 years old, they can vote and also be elected, they will be able to express themselves. They will participate in democracy by choosing who will speak and make decisions on their behalf. The informant’s answer illustrates that the democratic value prioritized by the NGO in this case is freedom of expression.

The second question in the second topic is about the informant’s opinion towards the value promoted by the NGO and whether the prioritized value was or was not abstract to him/her. The informant asserted that there are those who are more or less aware of the values. Thus, the informant argues, those who spend more time in the project and those who are in a leadership position (presidents of student councils) are more aware of the
values, so the values promoted are not abstract to them. Being in a leadership position also provides them a chance to spend more time with NGO stuff, and therefore it further contributes to their understanding of the values promoted. Lastly, those who are more aware of the democratic values promoted convey the message to those who are less aware. Nevertheless, at the initial stages the values promoted by the NGO was abstract to participants in the project. Therefore, the participants become more aware of the values through the program. In regard to the first research questions, whether values promoted by NGOs are abstract to BiH citizens, it can be said, from the informants answer, that the values promoted were abstract initially, but through education and training the NGO managed to enlighten the participants and make them aware of importance of the promoted values. Further, the informant claimed that the more time the participant is exposed to democratic values the more aware about the values he/she becomes.

In the next question of the second topic, the informant was asked to share his/her opinion about the value promoted and whether the a value is important or not. The informant stated that the promotion of the democratic value (in this case freedom of expression) was very positive, and that BiH citizens should appreciate people from NGOs working on democratic values promotion more. Hence, NGOs are working on the creation of civil society among the youth. Since youth are very unaware and they haven’t realized their potentials and power, it is important to have organizations that will work with them. The informant asserted that this is important for BiH society as well, since youth program participants will soon be in a position to run for office, and decide the future of the country.
The next topic was informant suggestions for improving the efforts of NGOs in democracy promotion in BiH. The informant suggests that the project he/she currently participates in (OKC student council project) needs to be continued. Further, there should be better coordination and cooperation with ministries (referring to the departments of education on the state, entity, and cantonal level in BIH), since the effectiveness of the program depends on the participation of high schools that are managed by the ministry. The cooperation with ministries would improve the effectiveness of the program, and also get more people involved in it.

In the last section the informant was asked for any additional thoughts about democracy promotion through the NED-sponsored NGOs in BiH. The informant stated that some NGOs are doing a great job in BiH, being very useful to society. Nevertheless, there are those NGOs that exist without purpose. They may be the reason why the NGO sector in BiH is frequently subject to negative criticism. Therefore, the informant suggests, attention should not be paid to the ineffective nongovernmental organizations, but the attention should be on those whose work contributes to society.

a. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The interview with Participant 3 provided important information that can be used for the study. First, the values the informant was introduced to at the beginning were abstract to the informant, but through the program, incrementally, the informant became aware of the importance of the value promoted. In this case it is freedom of expression.
The informant asserts that the values promoted are important for consolidation of democracy in BiH, since the youth that participates in similar programs and projects will soon be in a position to make political decisions. In addition, the informant argues that there are NGOs that are not active, and that intensify the negative criticism of the NGO sector in BiH. Lastly, what could be observed in this participant is that the informant is engaged and motivated to further contribute to the development of democracy in BiH by disseminating his comprehension of democratic values and youth democratic potential to other youth. The important conclusion from this interview is that focusing on youth in democracy promotion activities seems to be a predictor of success.
4. The Individual Case Study: Participant 4

The interview was similarly held in the hotel Orion in Ormanica, Northeastern Bosnia, the venue for OKC’s project. The informant was motivated, engaging, eloquent, and comfortable during the interview. The researcher explained the contents of the informed consent. In addition, the researcher provided a description of the study, and asked the informant whether further explanation is required. Once the researcher was assured that the informant understood the contents of the informed consent, the researcher provided signed copies (one for researcher, and one for the participant) of the informed consent form for the participant’s signature.

The informant was asked to share his/her opinion about the involvement of NGOs that work on promotion of democracy and democratic values in BiH. The informant asserted that, in general, BiH society is uninformed about organizations whether they are governmental or nongovernmental. People don’t have an interest in that due to the popular belief in BiH society that no one should pay an attention to the NGO sector. In addition, BiH citizens believe that it is easier to be a passive citizen than an active one. Moreover, the informant argues that citizens’ activism in NGOs activities is more on an individual level. Further, the informant suggests that in regards to democracy promotion, people in BiH in essence don’t know what democracy means. Since, they don’t understand values like equality, right to be chosen, or right to choose. Nevertheless, the informant believes that it is not the people who should be blame for such a situation. It is the society itself, and political system that is to blame for that. Therefore, the informant concludes, it is important to have organizations that will work on democracy
promotion. The informant provided an example of the current NGO in whose program he/she participates, and suggested that, there should be more organizations like OKC, and that people should participate in the activities with other NGOs as well.

The informant was asked to describe in general terms the project/activity organized by the NED-sponsored NGO in which he/she participated, and the informant provided the example of the OKC project. The informant suggested that the goal of the program was to make high school students aware of the power they will have in society since in a few years, high school students will have the right to both vote and run in elections for city councils, cantonal and state governments, and elsewhere. The informant had a very good knowledge of the program, its goals, strategy, and expected outcomes.

The next topic was about the democratic values promoted by the NGO in a given activity. In the first question of the second topic the informant was asked what values are promoted by the NGO in the projected aforementioned. The informant asserted that raising the awareness of high school students, and their freedom of expression were the values promoted. In addition, the informant illustrated how formal education in BiH does not teach students about the democracy. The informant stated that

We have learned so many things through participation in NGOs’ activities. We have learned how to write a project proposal, CV, etc. We haven’t learned or thought about how to do that in school. For example, throughout my high school education I had 24 different subjects, but I didn’t have any subject related to democracy. I argue that it was more important for me to learn about democracy than about physical education. I believe that physical education is important, and that it is important that kids are playing and doing sports. Nevertheless, we are doing that anyway, but they don’t teach us how to write a CV, or how to fight for your rights (personal communication, July, 2014).
The informant’s answer shows on the important educative role of NGOs that promotes democracy in BiH. Nevertheless, in addition to democratic values, participants learn other skills necessary for educational and professional life.

In the next question of the second topic the informant was asked whether the values promoted were abstract to her. The informant responded,

The whole system in our country is somehow abstract. I believe that even people that are in power don’t know how this country is functioning. The values promoted by the NGO are not abstract once we go through certain training, but when someone for the first time comes to this type of activity it is all very abstract to us (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant suggested that the NGO staff working on promotion of democratic values are doing the best they can to make sure that programs are challenging and exciting for students. The informant suggests that it is not some sort of seminar where the participants are just sitting in their chairs and listening to the instructor. Rather, the NGO staff promote open and interactive discussions. In addition, once the participants to the NGO’s program are trained and educated in democratic values, they can go back and teach their peers in the schools who are not educated in democratic values. In this way the values taught on the seminar are disseminated to other students.

In the last question of the second topic that is dedicated to values, the informant was asked to share her opinion about the importance of the value promoted. The informant asserted that “the training changes them as a person.” The participants “become more mature, responsible, and independent. Therefore by participating in this type of projects they learn things they otherwise wouldn’t be in position to learn.” Thus, the informant suggests learning the particular value (in this case freedom of expression) provided a unique opportunity for the informant to learn how to express her opinions. She
illustrated by indicating how the program changed the informant personally. The informant asserted that four years ago she was very shy and quiet. Thus after participating in the training, the informant feels comfortable when expressing herself, or giving an interview.

In the next topic, the informant was asked whether she for NGOs’ improvement in democracy promotion. The informant suggested that NGOs should be more presentable and visible since, they are not well presented in media. The informant provided an example, suggesting that on TV you could only see politicians although the youth project is doing more than some politicians during their mandates; they still don’t have enough media attention. Consequently, the informant asserts, people are not aware of the activities NGOs provide to their communities. In addition, the informant suggests that freedom of media is another problem. In BiH you could see that there is no freedom of media; therefore corrupted media is manipulating people, and BiH citizens are not even aware of that. Nevertheless, if the NGOs’ activities were more reflected in media, then people would see what is being done. The informant suggested that since people believe in the things they see, it is extremely important for NGOs to be more visible in BiH media.

In the last question the informant was asked if he/she has any additional thoughts about democracy promotion through NED-sponsored NGOs in BIH. The informant said that democracy should be respected, but that is not the case in BIH. Hence, the political system in BiH appears to be democratic, but in reality it is not. Thus, the informant suggests that they are working on the promotion of democratic values among high school students, and incrementally, these efforts will have more effects in the future. Since
participants are now aware of democratic values, in time they will introduce their parents and peers to those democratic values as well. In this way democratic values will spread out in the society.

a. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The case study focuses on the role of education in democracy promotion. In regards to the first research question whether the values promoted are abstract to BiH citizens, from the information provided by the informant it can be concluded that at the beginning the values promoted were abstract to participants. However, throughout the program participants became increasingly familiar with and aware of the importance of democratic values promoted.

Further, the informant indicates that there are no democratic themes or subjects in formal education. Therefore, only the NGOs provide education on democracy to BiH youth, in this case high school students.

Lastly, the NGO sector should try to become more visible in media, whereas media should be more objective and independent in regards to NGOs activities. In this way people will become aware of the efforts NGOs spend in BiH to promote the democracy. According to the informant, once the BiH citizens see the results, they will provide more support to NGOs. Finally, they will probably engage more often in NGO activities as well.
5. The Individual Case Study: Participant 5

The interview was also held at the hotel Orion, in Ormanica in Northeastern BiH. At the time of the interview the informant was participating in OKC’s project, where they had training. The informant was open, comfortable, eloquent, and motivated when answering the questions. The researcher provided a brief description of the study, and asked whether further explanation was required. In addition, the informant was provided an informed consent form, and given explanation about its contents, the rights the informant has as a human subject in the study. Once the researcher was assured that the informant understood the content of the informed consent agreement, and once it was signed, the formal interview started.

In the first question in the first topic the informant was asked to share his/her opinion about the democracy promotion by NGOs in BiH. The informant asserted that democracy promotion by NGOs is important for BiH and provided an example of the current OKC project developing a network of student councils in high schools across the BiH. Further, they are working on developing their own staff, so the project can be sustainable. The informant suggested that the current situation in BiH is not good, and projects like this are very important, and something that BiH society needs.

In the second question of the first topic the informant was asked to describe in general terms the project organized by NED-sponsored NGOs that he/she personally participated at. The informant suggested that it is the current OKC’s program. In this program the aim is to develop the network of student councils in FBiH, and RS, and to foster cooperation among the councils. The informant indicated that it is his sixth year in
the project. This long-term project allows students to participate long enough to learn
democratic values, and become motivated to promote changes in their local communities.

The second topic in an interview protocol is about the democratic values
promoted by the NGO in a given project. In the first question of the second topic the
informant was asked to describe what values are promoted in the project.. The informant
said the value promoted was peace and reconciliation with a goal to promote cooperation
among young people regardless of ethno-national origins.

In the second question of the second topic, the informant was asked to share
his/her opinion about prioritizing of the aforementioned value by the NGO. The
informant asserted that he has participated in the current project since he/she was 14.
Therefore, the informant suggests that he had enough time to accustom himself with
values promoted, and also the strategy OKC uses. The informant suggested it was
extremely important that OKC focused on high school students, recalling that he/was
introduced to the project when he was in the first year in high school. In elementary
school students cannot express their opinion, but in high school they have the chance to
present themselves and their ideas. Therefore, the informant suggests, once he attended
the seminar on democracy in his/school, he/decided to get involved in the project himself.

In the third topic of the interview protocol the informant was asked to provide
suggestions to improve the efforts of NGOs promoting democracy and democratic values
in BIH. The informant asserted that there should be more active support to NGOs
working on such goals. This support should be from donors, foreign governments, and
other related organizations. Further, the informant asserts, there should be a clear
emphasis put by the supporters on NGOs to focus on democracy promotion and
development, and not on some irrelevant topics. The informant argues that considering the current situation in BiH, it is essential to work on democracy promotion. Specifically, focusing on high school students will teach BiH youth to provide good support to generations to come about what can be done, and how it can be done in BiH.

In the last question in the interview protocol, the informant was asked to share any additional opinion he/she might have in regards to the topic of democracy promotion by NGOs sponsored by the NED. The informant indicated that it was his pleasure to be part of a student council project, and that every high school student in BiH should participate at such a program since, the informant suggests, participating in this program will provide high schools students new ideas about the situation and people in BiH. Further, the informant indicated that participants in this type of project acquire a lot of knowledge, and also spend time together, socialize, and have loyalty to each other.

The final question was whether the informant’s peers who didn’t participate in projects, such as the informant’s, have a different opinion about democracy. The informant suggested that it is really hard to reach of people who are not part of such a program as the informant’s. It is difficult to converse on such themes with youth since, according to the informant, youth are generally passive, disappointed, and they accept what is served to them without thinking critically. Furthermore, the BiH environment serves them different kinds of stereotypes based on a bloody war and infamous regional history. Unfortunately, the informant argues, the stereotypes are being carried from generation to generation, and it has a bad influence on youth. Participating in programs like this would provide the Bosnian youth different ideas about the national situation.
a. The Individual Case Study Research Report

The information obtained from the interview indicates that the informant has a
good knowledge about the program, and democratic values of the program the informant
personally participated at. Further, the informant suggests that it is very important for the
NGOs to engage in democracy promotion activity by focusing on high school students,
since the high school years are a time when students start to present their ideas and
opinions. In addition, the individual case study indicates that the long-term approach is
successful, and provides extraordinary results. In the case of “Participant 5”, the
informant was introduced to the program in the first year of high school. Thus, by the
time the informant finished a high school he became motivated to work on the project
himself. The informant provided a good comparison of the way his/her peers—who didn’t
participate in the project—anticipate democracy in BiH. The informant suggests that
those peers are simply uninterested, disappointed, and easy to manipulate. Therefore,
NGOs should focus more on developing themes and programs for youth about democracy
and democratic values.
CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS

A. Cross-Case Study Analysis

The findings section of the current study represents the cross-case studies’ analysis of the individual case studies in the previous chapter. In total there were eleven cases that were subject to case-study research in the current study. Six of the cases are related to the NGOs, and five are related to the participants in programs organized by the NED sponsored NGO. The interview conducted as a part of the case studies provided significant data that will be used for the analysis. In total there were 103 analytical categories observed in interviews. The list of analytical categories with their brief description, number of sources cited, and relevant number of times the category is being cites are available in APPENDIX III in the APPENDICES section of the current study. The analytical categories are derived from information obtained from interviews, and from the relevant literature. Further, the analytical categories that are clustered around certain phenomena are organized into analytical patterns. In the current study, 45 analytical patterns are observed. In the next level there are themes that are formed by the analytical patterns that illustrate the importance of certain subject of analysis. In total there are 24 themes in the current studies. The constellations of themes are used for the conceptualization of certain phenomena observed in the study. In total there are five concepts comprised of the aforementioned 24
themes. These concepts will provide necessary insights required for answering the research questions posed in the current study.

Lastly, the Nvivo computer software is used for the organization and analysis of the categories, themes, and concepts. Thus, using Nvivo provides an opportunity to check for density of analytical categories in the data. The software provides both this opportunity, and also the opportunity to sort the analytical categories according to the sources used for the data. In this way the disassembling, reassembling, and analysis of data is a feasible task. It also contributes to the organization of the overall analysis, and the following chapters dedicated to conclusions and policy implication.

The findings chapter will proceed with the concepts observed. Each concept will be dedicated to a section in the findings section, where the concepts will be studied in inverse order—top to bottom—starting with the concept, and going down to the analytical categories. Thus, due to the volume of the study, all analytical categories will not be thoroughly explained. There will be a focus on those analytical patterns that have significance for the study. Thus, the significance of the analytical category is derived from the reflections certain analytical categories have in regards to the overall study: in other words, how much the corresponding analytical category is related to the research questions posed in the study. Further, its density in the data, or the frequency of the instances of the analytical category being observed. Lastly, the significance of the corresponding analytical category may lay in the occasions where it represents an important finding that is not evident in the current literature on the topic.

At the end of each concept a general conclusion about the concept will be drawn that will be used for the “Conclusions” chapter of the study. Once the analysis is
completed, the research questions will be rendered through the findings for potential answers.

1. The Concepts

There are five major concepts observed in the study. These concepts represent the clusters of themes around certain phenomena observed in the research. These concepts are as follows: Challenges, Criticism, Democratic Transplant, International Relations, and Suggestions.

2. Challenges

The Challenges concept is comprised of several analytical categories referring to challenges of democracy promotion in BiH. Moreover, the challenges in this concept are the challenges NGOs working on democracy promotion face in BiH. In some cases, the challenges refer to the challenges of democracy promotion in general. There are five themes forming the concept of challenges. They are themes that can be listed as follows: Civil Society Challenges, Cultural Challenges, Economic Challenges, Ideological Challenges, and Social Challenges.

Civil Society Challenges: This refers to the challenges originating from civil society, and factors relating to civil society. Four analytical patterns are observed in regards to the civil society challenges. The analytical patterns observed in the case of
Civil Society Challenges theme are: Capacity, Coercion, Cooperation (both among NGOs and between NGOs and politicians), and Image. The analytical patterns refer to the common challenges NGOs face in democracy promotion in BiH, where the root of challenges is the civil society itself. These challenges significantly affect the performance of the NGO sector in BiH.

**Capacity.** Refers to the challenges that originate from the limited capacity of NGOs. Thus, several analytical categories are observed in regards to capacity. The most significant and omnipresent one is the “High Expectations from NGOs”. Thus, the public and donors expect NGOs to do certain tasks; nevertheless, due to the lack of capacity, the NGOs are not able to provide the services anticipated, and as a result there is a great disappointment with the NGOs among the public and other parties involved in democratization in BiH.

**Coercion.** This refers to the analytical category labeled as “NGOs coerced” indicating that in some cases NGOs in BiH are coerced to run certain projects in a certain way. Often it is when the foreign donors impose certain values and strategies upon the grant. This significantly decreases the efficacy of the NGOs in their efforts to promote democracy in BiH. Hence, instead of finding a feasible authentic approach to successfully conduct the project—where the approach is adjusted according to the contextualities in BiH—in some occasions NGOs are coerced to follow the approach that is set up by donors.

**Cooperation Among NGOs.** This analytical pattern indicates the presence or lack of cooperation between NGOs in BiH. It represents a significant problem in the NGOs sector. Hence, instead of coordinated efforts in democracy promotion that would
increase the capacity and strength of the NGO sector, the NGOs show uncoordinated efforts and competition among themselves. This NGO behavior further decreases the capacity of NGOs to deal with certain issues and become a more formidable power in BiH. It can be seen from the OKC example that through cooperation among the NGOs they manage not only to develop a network of student councils in BiH, but also they manage to develop good cooperation with educational bureaucracies as well. A once-small idea started by OKC evolved into a serious network that includes 200 high schools all over BiH. Another good example of cooperation is the one of CRMA’s flagship anticorruption project “ACCOUNT”. By forming small watchdog teams in cities across BiH, they developed a strong network that involved hundreds of local, regional, and international actors that work on fighting corruption in BiH.

*Cooperation between politicians and NGOs.* This an analytical category refers to an observed issue, the lack of cooperation between the NGO sector, and politicians. Frequently, the politicians misunderstand NGOs. They see NGOs in a different way, but mostly negatively, and perceiving a small degree of threat from them as well. Therefore, they are not using the resources and policy-making expertise provided them by the NGOs. However, several types of resources developed by NGOs can be used by politicians. The most important type is related to the policy making, and expertise NGOs can provide. In the interview with the CPU it was observed that the organization suggested several economic policies that could help improve the economic situation in BiH. Nevertheless, politicians do not pay attention to the suggested policies. Hence, instead of dealing with the issue based policies they are inclined to use ethno-national rhetoric that will provide them success in the election.
Image. “Image” refers to the way the NGOs are perceived by BiH society. There are several reasons why BiH society perceives the NGOs in the way they do. However, the specific analytical category that is distinct when compared to the others is labeled as “NGOs as a new thing”. This analytical category corresponds to the interview with CIN, where the informant suggests that after the war the NGO sector came into the social sphere as a new thing. Therefore, people are not familiar with the idea of NGO activism. Consequently, that greatly affects the image of NGOs. It could be observed in the CRMA’s interview as well, where the informant suggests that the image of NGOs over time, if their activities are successful, acquire certain features. These are that NGOs deal with the underlying problems in the society. This features of NGOs’ image suggests that they have started to tackle the underlying problems, and this contributes to the image of NGOs.

“Cultural Challenges”. refers to the challenges associated with the cultural context of nation building in BiH. There are four analytical patterns observed that form this theme. The analytical patterns are as follows: Comprehension, Cultural Differences, Lies, and Participation.

Comprehension. This analytical pattern the comprehension of democracy by BiH society. It shows how a democratic value in one society means one thing, yet in other society it can mean another. In most cases different cultural contexts have different norms.

“Accepting and facing reality” is an analytical category grouped under the “Comprehension” pattern. It refers to the notion that despite almost 20 years since the war ended still there is no consensus by the political parties, society, and other
stakeholders in regards to the war, and the current situation in BiH. One of the informants suggests that the lack of consensus in regards to understanding of the recent past and the current situation represents a serious challenge for BiH as a country, since it is the main reason for its stagnation. Accordingly, the informant suggests that

The first challenge for us should be to identify what kind of situation BiH is in, and to say ‘this country has this number of refugees; a destroyed economy; these potentials and so on.’ So we would be in a position to construct a normal state and strong society so we can work on catching up to the EU, and the world. Unfortunately, we never did that, and we pretend it is normal (personal communication, July, 2014).

This phenomenon greatly affects the situation in BiH, because BiH society needs to face reality and take responsibility for it in order to deal with the problems.

*Democracy Misinterpreted or Misunderstood* refers to the misunderstanding of democracy by BiH society. One of the informants in an interview estimates that 80% of people in BiH do not understand, or are not willing to understand democratic values. Further, democracy is only seen through the prism of freedoms and rights, but not through the prism of citizens’ social responsibility --first of all, to vote, and while voting to make a reflective decision regarding to whom they grant the privilege of representing them.

*Misunderstanding of NGOs by BiH Citizens*. This analytical category refers to the misunderstanding of NGOs and their activities by BiH citizens. The same was observed in the literature (Grødeland, 2006). Misunderstanding of the role of NGOs by BiH citizens undermines NGOs’ democracy promotion efforts, and therefore undermines the understanding of democracy as well.

*Cultural Differences* is the next analytical pattern in the “Cultural Challenges” theme. “”. The information obtain from the interviews provides quite controversial
results. On one hand the informants indicate that it is not possible to transplant democracy because of cultural and societal differences in BiH. On the other hand, one of the informants suggests that this contextual mismatching may not solely be attributed to the differences in cultural and societal values. Moreover the mismatch is the product of the absence of norms and laws interpreted through certain democratic values. A good account of the same is provided by one of the informants in regards to reporting of cases of domestic violence. The informant suggests:

> The problem is when I report my neighbor for such an act, he will soon come back from prison, and not lose a thing. The first person he will go after is me. He will wait for me in the entrance of our apartment building and beat me up. In Germany, it is not the case, since, the one being reported will spend at least five years at prison, regardless of his Therefore, that is the difference. I am for that strategy where we will first build a system, and then we will be able to implement values (personal communication, July, 2014).

The informant’s suggestion above can be summarized in the following way. There should be an emphasis on the normative backgrounds behind the values. Once the values are interpreted through laws empowered with certain norms then acceptance and conformity to the values promoted by BiH citizens can be achieved. However, with the current normative framework it is hard to expect BiH citizens to adopt values that will not have any reflections in reality. In one instance, the author of the current study is asked whether there is a freedom of speech in BiH. The author answered affirmatively, but suggested that one may speak freely, but no one is listening.

**Lies** are the next analytical pattern under “Cultural Challenges.” This is the most original finding and critical idea about democracy promotion in BiH. It suggests that the democratization context in BiH is a cover used by society in general. It includes lies by politicians, the international community, international donors, citizens and other actors
involved in democratization. It sounds very controversial, but information from the data indicates a certain level of validity in regards to this claim. The pattern is comprised from two analytical categories.

*Skewed truth about the past* is an analytical category that refers to the case where the truth about the recent history of BiH is severely skewed with biases. Moreover, the truth about the Bosnian War is taboo in that the recent war in BiH is not put in textbooks of primary and secondary education. In relation to this, in history textbooks, history only goes up to 1992, prior to the outbreak of the war, and continues after 1995. Therefore formal education on the history of the 1992-1995 period does not exist. Consequently, the lack of formal education on the recent war provides the opportunity for different parties to teach their children history in the way they choose. This provides solid ground for ethno-nationalists to infiltrate the course of history by providing their own versions of events that will further strengthen the support they enjoy from their constituent nations. Most often, this rhetoric is based on the endangerment of the corresponding ethno-nationalists’ constituencies, and historical discrimination against it sustained from other constituent nations in BiH. Therefore, ethno-nationalists use this rhetoric and present themselves as the saviors or guardians of their nations. In this way, they shift the focus of BiH citizens from real problems on the ground to quasi-existential issues of ethno-national group in BiH. If unchallenged, the historical thesis developed by the ethno-nationals successfully serves their personal interests as has been proved by elections thus far.
“Lies” as an analytical category also refers to instances where different stakeholders in BiH democratization are using the same as a cover for them to obtain certain resources or benefits. Several parties are involved in this: the international donor administrators, referring to those who administer the grant, not the donors themselves. Further, they may include NGO officials and citizens of BiH. One of the informants provides a good illustration of such a behavior. He suggested that:

…These challenges would be that certain foreign donors that bring resources to BiH have a focus here in BiH. That means that NGOs in BiH, regardless of their mission, will do whatever is the focus of foreign donors. The biggest challenge for NGOs here is how to wrap the project proposal up in the way that foreign donors will like. In other words, how can I take the money.. So at the end, the goal of the NGO sector, and foreign donors here is for NGOs to justify the use of resources, and for foreign donors to justify the resources used to the tax payers, so at the end everyone would be satisfied. That is seen as the satisfactory formula. Whether something was successfully done or not done is not a relevant question. I must say that there are exceptions, but here I am referring to the majority of NGOs. In addition to this, neither does the International Community pays attention where the resources are being used (personal communication, July, 2014).

Nevertheless, the informant claims that this is not case with the NED since the NED carefully chooses NGOs that will do the job in the right way. Although it is simply a claim, this claim should be thoroughly investigated. Hence, there were so many completed projects related to democracy promotion by NGOs being evaluated as successful by donors, though, so little change could be observed in of BiH democratization.

Participation is the next and last analytical pattern in the constellation of Cultural Challenges. “It could be observed from the interviews that the informants in general describe the participation of BiH citizens in NGOs activities to be very passive.
This civic passivity is one of the major problems in the society. Despite the fact that much of the society is aware of the problem of corruption, still citizens are very passive. There are several reasons for civic passivity suggested by information obtained from the interviews. The basic reason might be people’s need to deal with livelihood issues. In other words, many people in BiH are struggling to provide the basic needs for their families; therefore they don’t have time to spare for NGOs activities, or projects related to democratization. Further, NGOs promote changes, citizens fear changes, and are not willing to accept new things.

Economic Challenges. This refers to economic challenges that further cripple the efforts of the NGOs working on democratization in BiH. These challenges are at the same time related to donors that provide resources to NGOs. There are two analytical patterns observed; “Dependency” and “Scarcity”.

Dependency refers to the dependency of NGOs on foreign and ethno-national donors. In the case of dependency of NGOs on ethno-nationals’ for funds,, Sejfija (2009) also observed this and labels this type of dependency as “ethnic conformism,” in which NGOs conform to the demands of ethno-nationals in order to receive grants.

In the case of foreign donors, the fact is that a majority of the resources for the NGOs in BiH comes from abroad. There is a great dependency on funding provided by foreign donors. This opens a new discussion about foreign donors that will be discussed in the section on “Criticism”. In regards to economic challenges, not only are funds allocated to NGOs decreasing, but there is also a demand for increased efficiency of NGOs. Therefore, on one side NGOs are facing the conundrum of scarcity, while on the
other being forced to increase their efficiency. This puts pressure on the NGOs, and the feasibility of their work is in question.

“Scarcity” is an analytical category that falls under the current theme. From the information obtained and from direct observation one may see that the scarcity of resources to NGOs is having a great impact on their behavior. Frequently in order to acquire resources NGOs would apply for grants that are not necessarily their field of expertise.

The next constellation of analytical patterns in the “Challenges” concept is a theme labeled as

**Ideological Challenges.** This refers to the ideological obstacles in the process of BiH democratization. There are two major ideologies involved. At the same time they represent analytical patterns: ethno-nationalism, and socialism. The ideological challenges represent a serious challenge in the case of democratization of BiH. Apparently, in the current BiH story, ethno-nationalism constantly wins over liberalism, and Yugoslavian socialism. The triumph of ethno-nationalism resulted with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, followed by the bloodiest European war since World War II. The outbreak of nationalism evolved into extreme ethno-nationalism that led some of the ex-Yugoslavian nation states to conflict and widespread ethnic tensions in the Balkans. Furthermore, ethno-nationalism takes a high toll on democratization since it is a strong tool for ethno-nationalists agendas (Martin & Miller, 2003; Sejfija, 2009). Interview data suggests two types of ideological use of ethno-nationalism. First, where ethno-nationalism is not the ideological issue, politicians’ utilize ethno-nationalism in order to cover the real reasons behind the dire situation in the states. Second, ethno-nationalism
can be promoted not as a means to political power, but rather as the supreme identity of both politicians and citizens of BiH. Its work can be seen through the work of local NGOs (Sejfija, 2009) where in some cases even sports associations bear ethno-nationalist prefixes in their names. Thus, regardless of the purpose of ethno-national ideology, its consequences can be seen on the way it influences society. Accordingly, the society itself tolerates a high level of corruption of their constituent representatives for the sake of quasi-vital interests of their constituent ethnicity/nations. The information obtained from the interviews, as well as relevant literature suggests that challenging ethno-national ideology is among the hardest tasks for NGOs, yet the one that should be prioritized through programs focusing on transparency, fighting corruption, raising awareness, and education of the younger population.

The next analytical pattern observed in the Ideological Challenges theme is

Socialism. In the BiH context this analytical pattern it has a broad meaning. It refers to the values, norms, beliefs, ideologies, and culture inherited from the previous political system in Socialist Yugoslavia. It encompasses socialism as an economic system, and communism as an ideology. It is not communism itself, but moreover, the Yugoslavian version of communism, or Yugoslavian socialism. The distinction in the aforementioned ideologies from the commonly known communism and socialism seen in the USSR and elsewhere in the world is the fact that in later years the Yugoslavian political system provided certain liberties and freedoms to people that wasn’t the case with other communist regimes. Further, the socialist system provided security and extensive social benefits (i.e. health care and welfare), extremely low crime rates, similar for everyone in the society. The system, according to many BiH citizens, was perfect.
However, many of them will agree that only one problem with the old system existed: the
fact that the much-praised political system in ex-Yugoslavia failed to deal with ethno-
nationalism. The failure to deal with ethno-nationalism was the ultimate doom for
Yugoslavia, which resulted in the tragedy of millions of people who suffered the
consequences from the fall of Yugoslavia, and from the “civil” wars following it.

Finally, the transition from communism to democracy for regular BiH carries two
types of experience. First, a painful memory of the destruction of Yugoslavia, marked
with the bloody war followed by it. Second, the experience of living in a “democracy”
that is far from what that word means in the West. In the context of BiH democratization,
the perceptions of democracy, evidently, appear to be rendered through current socio-
economic issues. Accordingly, for regular BiH citizens, living in a democracy means
bearing with issues like high unemployment rates, job insecurity, high corruption levels,
nepotism, segregation in education, and similar issues. Therefore, democracy in this
context is a reality that is hardly seen by BiH citizens as a means to deal with the
aforementioned issues. More likely, democracy in BiH is perceived as a political system,
where the aforementioned issues are planted and nourished by triumphant elites\(^1\) to
increase their wealth and powers, whereas, the majority of the Bosnian population is on
the verge of existence. Subsequently, it leads the majority of the BiH population to feel a
certain level of nostalgia for the ex-Yugoslavian system despite the major flaws it had.
Ultimately, this nostalgic drive represents a great obstacle for NGOs working on the
promotion of democracy and democratic values in BiH, because the nostalgia for the

\(^1\) The *triumphant elites* term in this context represent different groups that may be
criminal, political, or business that used the vacuum of rule-of-law in post-socialist,
conflict, post conflict, and current transitional periods in BiH to accumulate wealth and
power.
previous political system diminishes the desirability of the democracy as the best possible political system. The generations that grew up in the previous system are extremely nostalgic about the ex-Yugoslavia (it could be observed in some of the interview responses by informants), and extremely disappointed and pessimistic about the future of the current system. Therefore, focusing on youth that were not exposed to socialist nation building by Yugoslavia would be the best way to consolidate democracy in BiH.

*Social Challenges* is the next theme in regards to the “Challenges” concept. It refers to the social challenges that NGOs face while promoting democracy in BiH. It is comprised of eight analytical patterns referring to several analytical categories observed.

*Citizens.* This is an analytical pattern referring to instances where characteristics of BiH citizens pose the challenge to NGOs.

*The Shattered Society.* The most significant analytical patterns observed within the “Social Challenges” is “Shattered Society”. This analytical category indicates the challenges posed by the current troublesome state of the BiH society. One of the best descriptions of such a society is provided by one of the informants:

> Despite everything that happened in regards to victims of war, war torn economy, today we have one more thing that is not being spoken of, and that is crucial for the reconstruction of the state, it is the destroyed or shattered society. Therefore, we don’t have a society, it doesn’t exist in the form it should. Today, whatever is considered as a society from the aspect of political system, civil society, education and similar, is one big lie. I intentionally used the word lie, since we are the masters of lies to ourselves. Academics don’t have the background to prove that academic status; we don’t have a normal civil society, normal academia etc. Every village has a university, everyone opens the universities. The self-styled intellectuals that are hot public figures achieved that status through media exposure, not by their merits. The media is connected with politicians and it follows like that (personal communication, July, 2014).

Thus, such a society represents both a challenge, and an advantage for the NGOs. Accordingly, the disadvantage can be seen when the NGOs need to deal with a society
that has a disturbed system of values and norms. In other words, it is difficult for the NGO sector to develop programs that will foster change when it is difficult to anticipate the reaction to certain NGOs strategies by BiH citizens. For example, like in the case of “satisfactory formula” mentioned earlier, it is not important whether something will actually be done by the project; moreover, it is important for BiH citizens, NGOs, and NGO donors to satisfy the primary source of grants. The sources might be governmental resources, private funds, endowments and the like.

Based on the data obtained, in a shattered society it is difficult to set up any strategy because instead of society there are individuals, or individual groups with different perceptions, expectations, and interests. Therefore, the NGOs’ goal to promote democracy on a societal level is difficult since it is difficult to speak about social norms and values. Therefore, the NGOs are forced to focus on programs and projects related to certain interest groups instead of focusing on society-wide changes. Consequently, it has a substantial effect on the overall changes in society by continually prolonging them. Therefore, there should be more focus on reintegrating society by developing programs and projects that will develop the sense of societal values and norms. Focusing on values that are democratic but were respected by society in its previous political system might be a good strategy. For example, the one thing the previous system managed to do was respect for the rule-of-law. Honesty was a social value, and a norm that was highly valued. The crime rates were extremely low. It can be argued whether the justice system was harsher than ones in the West; nevertheless it was highly functional. Obviously, crimes related to political issues should be excluded from the comparison. Hence, there were many instances where basic human rights were not respected in the case of political
prisoners in Yugoslavia. Regardless, BiH citizens still respect the previous system for the “iron hand” approach to crime. Conclusively, BiH citizens anticipate a similar political system in current society. Therefore, the success of programs related to raising awareness of BiH citizens of corruption, and transparency are developing at a necessary pace for societal wide changes. This can be seen from the example of the ACCOUNT flagship program by CRMA. The informant of CRMA describes it as follows:

The organization I currently work at enjoys solid support from citizens. We are working on one very delicate project. It is to develop an NGO network that fights against corruption in BiH. The abbreviation of the project is ACCOUNT. Over two years since the establishment of ACCOUNT, the network managed to achieve exemplary results on raising the awareness of BiH citizens about the corruption problem in BiH. We have managed to convey the seriousness of the corruption issue in BiH not only to our selves but to the other actors as well (personal communication, July, 2014).

Nevertheless, regardless of ACCOUNT’s success, when the current state-of-mind of BiH society is compared to the one seen in Western societies, BiH society is still premature. It requires more projects, resources, expertise, civic activism and involvement, and other resources required for the consolidation\(^2\) of the society

*Corruption.* This analytical pattern refers to the society wide problem of the corruption. In general, corruption in BiH is omnipresent. It is present in healthcare, education (Infohouse, 2013), and in the other sectors as well. The corruption counter available on ACCOUNT’s website indicates that since 2012 more than $3 billion were lost due to the corruption in BiH (ACCOUNT, 2014). This amount of resources lost in corruption is outrageous, since the BiH budget for fiscal 2013 was around $19 billion dollars.

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\(^2\) The “consolidation of society” is term used to describe the necessity of reintegration of societal values and norms in shattered BiH society necessary for a statewide promotion of democratic values in BiH.
Nevertheless, the *corruption* as an analytical pattern is an assemblage of different analytical categories related to corruption in BiH. However, “*100 families*” is an exceptional analytical category that was constantly reiterated in interviews with informants, and it is also present in data obtained from direct observations. It refers to the oligarchic phenomenon where approximately one hundred families are in control of everything that is happening in BiH political, business, and the other aspects of life. These families can be conceived as an oligarchic elite that runs the country, and also, as those who are the ultimate winners of the Bosnian tragedy. In most cases these families held the high political, economic, and military positions in the previous system. Some of them have been significant stakeholders during the war. During the same period, they were involved with some fraudulent activities like weapons smuggling during the war, the trade of humanitarian aid, and similar illegal entrepreneurship. Further, they were prepared for the transitional period. Just after the war they were ready for the hastened privatization of once social goods in BiH. In most of cases they enjoyed the transitional chaos and vacuum of governmental power to develop organizations involved in all kinds of organized crime (drug trafficking, human trafficking, trafficking of women, and similar vicious crimes). Lastly, they are either connected to political elites through nepotistic or beneficial relationships, or they are in high political positions. Consequently, they have accumulated political and financial power great enough to play the key role in decision making in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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3 The *One hundred families* number is not to be taken as an exact number, moreover it is an approximation for a dozens of families.
The *Dayton Agreement*. It refers to the legal framework in BiH, and its provisions created by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Annex four of the Dayton Agreement constitutes the constitution of BiH. Earlier in the study the consociational approach in regards to the Dayton Agreement was being discussed by the international community. The consociational approach delegated state power to the constituent ethno-nations in BiH. Instead of creating a ground for democratic changes and reforms, the Dayton Agreement promoted the interest of ethno-national groups.

The Dayton Agreement can be attributed to two phenomena observed in the case of democratization and nation-building in BiH. First, it created an abstract state filled in with controversial and overcomplicated state apparatuses. Therefore, as suggested by one of the informants, it is even difficult to craft certain legislation due to the confusion over which jurisdiction the law should be implemented in. Furthermore, passing laws is another hardship, since on several levels the law can be vetoed. Despite the small size of the country, the state apparatus is one of the most elaborate when compared to the number of officials per capita observed elsewhere.

*Daytonian Gridlock*. This is an analytical category that refers to the frequently listed issue in the literature. It is a ubiquitous challenge for NGOs according to informants. It refers to the situation in which the complicated state structure, ethno-national tendencies, Daytonian provisions, and interests of various national and interests groups create a gridlock, or stagnant situation that resists democratic changes in BiH. This reflects more on the top-to-bottom reforms, since they are delegated to political elites. A good example is the 2004 reform attempt by the IC. Once the IC exerted pressure for institutional reforms that might lead towards
constitutional changes, the ethno-nationals stomped upon the reforms by using ethno-national rhetoric and their veto rights.

Ultimately, not only did they succeed resisting major changes, but also they called for the implementation of the provisions of the original Dayton Agreement. Simply, the Dayton Agreement granted huge power to the ethno-nationals, who are anticipated erroneously by the Dayton creators as a force of change. The only obstacle for them to remain unchallenged in their power was to win elections. Thus, what better tool for winning the elections in post-conflict BiH other than the ethno-national rhetoric that would be digested by the war-torn ethno-national constituencies.

In summary, the ethno-nationals remain in power by using the ethno-national rhetoric, empowered by the Daytonian Provisions. Since the findings of this study suggest that the media is supposedly under the control of the politicians, then the only vague opposition ethno-nationals face comes from the NGO sector in BiH.

Media. This analytical pattern is comprised of several analytical categories that refer to instances of problematic situations in regards to media in BiH. In regards to democratization, media can be used as powerful tool to present both issues society faces, and also NGOs working on the promotion of democracy. Thus, if significant control over the information by the government is exerted (i.e. Turkey banning the use of some Internet websites in 2014) then democracy, and democratic movements will most likely regress. In other words, those in power can use the media to slow democratic changes that would otherwise result with the lessening or loss of their power. Further, in several recent democratic stories (Arab Spring; Gezi Protests in Turkey 2013, Turkish Government declaring war on the NGOs related to the Gulenist Movement 2014, the so
called “Black List” in RS, conflicts in Ukraine, and similar instances), media in those countries are used to demonize the proponents of democratic changes, and organizations that are working on the consolidation of democracy. In regards to the BiH context, there is significant evidence from the data that suggests the media in BiH is under control and biased. One informant provided a good account of the control of media in BiH, suggesting that:

the NGOs are not visible in public space since most of the media in BiH are either under the control of political parties or interest groups that are also somehow connected to political organizations. In addition, there is a high level of censorship; selective overseeing of information. This is generally the reason that NGOs are not in a position to present their activities and results to the public. On the other side, understaffing and unpreparedness prevent NGOs from successfully using the resources available to them. These are the reasons why NGOs are not in a position to use media to promote their activities. This may be the primary challenge the NGO sector faces here. This is the reason why the NGO sector has a very weak influence on social changes in BiH.

The control of media in BiH represents a serious obstacle for the consolidation of the democracy. Nevertheless, control over the media was not always the case. One of the informants suggests that soon after the war, the media was provided grants from different foreign donors, and those resources provided the independence required for high quality and objective work. Unfortunately, the international community and foreign donors suddenly decided to end their support to media. Since media was not prepared for such a cut off, they were left at the mercy of political parties that could provide them the necessary resources. At that point, most of media came under the umbrella of political parties. Not only did media come under parties’ control, but also it is now frequently used against the NGOs working on the promotion of democracy in BiH.

Politics. This is an analytical pattern comprised of several analytical categories related to the political problems and social challenges. The findings suggest
that there are two major political challenges in regards to democracy promotion in BiH.

First, the infamous ethno-national rhetoric used by ethno-national politicians to cover the real problems. The ethno-national rhetoric is frequently a subject of discussion throughout this study, and it will also be discussed in the final chapter.

*Government not supporting NGOs* is an analytical category that refers to lack of government support in sponsorship of the NGOs’ activities. The reason for the lack of support of the NGO sector in BiH might be a misunderstanding of the role of NGOs by BiH politicians. As one of the informants suggests:

> There is a great misunderstanding by the state apparatus, the government officials, and other people in contact with the NGO sector, what the NGO sector is about. The NGO sector is not perceived as a voice of the people, but as a voice of needs. Frequently, in literature it is said that the NGO sector is a corrective sector because it is a voice of the people. However, here in Bosnia it is not perceived as a corrective to government institutions. It is perceived in that way in theory, but not in practice. Therefore, they don’t see us as the sector that recognizes needs of the people, areas that they need to work on. Moreover, they perceive us as if we were the extended hand of some international actors. Especially, recently it is the case in RS. There is a list of unwanted NGOs; among them are organizations that are sponsored by NED. Although NED sponsors us, probably for the longest time in BiH, we are not on that list. Probably it is because we are not doing programs that represent very salient issues (personal communication, July, 2014). Furthermore, ethno-nationals have a tendency to support ethno-national NGOs (ENGOS) that work on the promotion of ethno-national ideology. In this way the NGOs that promote liberal democratic values are facing a conundrum. On one side the government does not support them, and on the other side they are left to compete for diminishing resources provided by foreign donors that might set up certain constraints for NGOs in order to fund them. It appears that there is a huge gap between the government and the NGO sector. Bridging this gap is a great challenge, but an endeavor that could open a new chapter in the promotion of democracy in BiH.

The next analytical pattern observed in the “Social Challenges” theme is
Transition. It refers to the challenges NGOs face related to transitional issues. Transitional challenges are well summarized in one of the informants respond:

I believe that the primary challenge is the fact that here in BiH we have had a change in the whole system. Accordingly, we had socialism until the 1990’s; after that we had a bloody war that marked the transition from a single-party to multiple-party political system. Just after the war, we started with reform of the entire system: judiciary branch, executive branch, and legislative branch. Then at that time NGOs came to the scene. They came as a brand new form. They came as a new sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then we have the case of privatization of state owned capital to private ownership, resulting in new private businesses. This was all happening while regular citizens of BiH were struggling to survive; they were trying to find a way to deal with that chaos, while trying to acquire basic life needs. At that time the implementation of democracy as a new political system in BIH occurred (personal communication, July, 2014).

In summary, the challenge observed in the aforementioned context is a large number of reforms, and the intensity of change in a very short period of time. Although it looks like nothing has changed in BiH, still when the course of 25 years of political, social, and economic life is chronologically analyzed, it could be observed that the regular BiH citizen has absorbed a myriad of reforms and changes. Ostensibly, the issue with the transitional context is that no end is seen in the BiH story of democratization. There should be consensus about the general strategy to be followed by NGOs, government, and the public in regards to democratization of BiH. The current end game in BiH democratization is to make certain reforms so the country could become a member of the EU and NATO. Nevertheless, such a strategy doesn’t prevent a fire, it only puts it off temporarily. Conclusively, the Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH will be mere absorption of problems (ethno-nationalism) into EU and NATO; and not the democratic triumph of liberal democracy over ethno-nationalism. Therefore, the consolidation of democracy in BiH should be focused on dealing with the basic problem observed in BiH, which is raising the awareness of BiH citizens to critically decide what
political candidates are best for them, where such behavior will force BiH politicians to focus on issue based policy making, and not on ethno-nationalist manipulations.

_Miscellaneous._ This refers to miscellaneous social challenges to democracy promotion in BiH. It was difficult to categorize these analytical categories in any of the analytical patterns. Therefore, they stand as ad hoc analytical categories.

_BiH as a bad example._ This analytical category refers to BiH as a bad example of developmental efforts. It coincides with the literature review (Martin & Miller, 2003), and the informants responses. When compared to the other regional contexts of nation building and democracy promotion, the BiH context shows some resemblance to its regional context. Nevertheless, the overall democratic transition in BiH scores far less than others in the region (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, etc.).

_Young people leaving the country._ This analytical category refers to young BiH citizens leaving their country and trying to find their future abroad. In most cases, they are seeking a better future in developed Western democracies. Unfortunately, this is the population that is frequently well educated, carrying liberal ideals, and has high democratic potential. Their disappointment and pessimism are “push” factors in their migration. The best example of this can be seen in one of the informant’s responses:

One of the major challenges is that a majority of students who develop their talents and scholarship to a certain level develop it in order to go abroad. They go to a university entrance examination in order to develop their skills so they can leave Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, this issue again reflects the fact that politicians do not work on the production of new jobs. Youth cannot see a way to secure their future and stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina (personal communication, July, 2014).
The aforementioned issue is popularly known as a brain drain, and in the near future it can become a serious obstacle for the functioning of the BiH as a state, since there is danger of an extreme deficit of well-educated people. 

_The Unions._ This analytical category focuses on the role of the unions in democracy promotion of. The unions or “syndicates” representing the interests of the working class in theory can play significant role in social change in BiH. Nevertheless, Sejfija (2009) suggests that there should be further academic scrutiny on the unions in BiH due to their current status, and relationships with political elites. The role of unions is important, since in the beginning of 2014, unsatisfied workers in Tuzla ignited general protests and the most serious uprisings in recent history of BiH.

The last analytical pattern that will be discussed in regards to the concept of “Challenges” and as a part of the “Social Challenges” theme is the

_Urban vs. rural_ Evidently, this is one of the most understudied issues in the literature in regards to democracy promotion in BiH, and indicatively elsewhere. The issue of differences in democratization between rural and urban areas is serious, and yet little considered by the stakeholders in democracy promotion in BiH. The urban vs. rural contexts of democracy promotion is a prime issue of democratization, since it is closely connected to several other issues. For illustration purposes the response by one informant will be provided:

The educated level of the urban population is much higher than that in rural areas. In addition, in urban areas there are a large number of people who lived in the West, and then brought some of the values seen there back to BiH. It is a much different situation than in rural areas where for example politicians are treated as ‘gods’ and not like those who are being elected by citizens (personal communication, July, 2014).
There are several factors to consider in regards to democracy promotion in urban vs. rural contexts. First, according to the statistics (CIA, 2014) more than 50% of the BiH populations live in rural areas. Therefore, voter turnout from rural areas is critical for contestants craving political power. Second, the general level of education in rural areas is much lower than that of urban areas. Therefore, rural areas are more prone to political manipulation than urban areas due to their limited understanding of political complexities that surround them. Third, presumably the rural areas in BiH are more conservative. They have a more traditional, or conservative attitude towards changes. Therefore, they are more likely to follow the traditionalists’ patterns in regards to promotion of change. In other words, they will resist changes, and oppose modernist tendencies.

Naturally, these features of the rural population represent the perfect target population for ethno-nationalists to use the ethno-national propaganda that will secure them electoral success. Tackling the problem of urban vs. rural contexts requires further academic scrutiny. Currently, the sporadic NGO focus on democracy promotion in rural areas is the only thing left between the rural population and ethno-nationalists’ propaganda. Realistically, the best strategy to tackle the problem would be implementation of educational programs about to democracy in elementary and high schools on a state level. In this way, generations to come would be able to resist the ethno-national tendencies that currently cripple the BiH democracy.
3. Criticism

Criticism is a concept in this study that represents a constellation of the themes formed from analytical patterns and categories that refer to different types of criticisms regarding democracy promotion by the BiH NGO sector. There are several themes forming this concept. They are as follows: *Criticism of Democracy Promotion, Dayton Peace Agreement, Criticism of Donors, Criticism of International Community (IC),* and most importantly *NGOs Criticism.*

*Criticism of Democracy Promotion.* Criticism refers to the way democracy is promoted, the goals of democracy promotion, results of democracy promotion, and costs related to it. The dissatisfaction with democracy promotion in BiH could be found in one of the informant’s responses:

> When we look globally, especially from a democratization perspective, it is difficult to find democracy to be brilliant. I consider that if you have a system where you know what is truth and what is a lie, what is justice, and what is injustice, and if you have in that system justice, prosecution, etc. then you have a democracy. There is a wrong assumption that we know what democracy is. Maybe it will sound stupid, but in the previous political system [referring to Socialist Yugoslavia] we had a democracy. Since democracy is the will of many, we already had a form of democracy in that system. Though there was a minority that suffered in one way or another. Today we have a problem in the current democracy that was unfortunately brought to us by the international community: it is not the will of the many, but will of the few. It is the minority that decides in this country. Again, we are speaking about those 100 families, they are a minority when you consider that there are 3,5 millions BiH citizens according to the last census. Therefore, the IC brought us a totally wrong democracy where we have a will of 100 families ruling over 3,5 million. Consequently we live in a catastrophic situation, since, the democratic thesis is reversed. If it is a transplant, then the body is rapidly dying, and in our lives it is a very slow process where we are suffering a lot (personal communication, July, 2014).

Despite the fact that the informant is professionally involved in democracy promotion in BiH, the obvious dissatisfaction in regards to the current democracy
promotion is evident. Moreover, the informant suggests that the result of the lame strategy of the international community resulted in the antithesis of democracy, where the will of the minority is superior over the will of the majority (the case of the 100 families’ oligarchy). Similar patterns of behavior are found in direct observation. Accordingly, citizens in BiH are highly unsatisfied with the current state of democracy, and the issues democracy has brought to them. The previous comparison made between living in the socialist Yugoslavia and democratic BiH indicates the same pattern. Conclusively, BiH citizens have a perception that democracy brought them more bad things than good.

The next theme in the **Criticism** concept is the

*Dayton Peace Agreement Criticism.* It refers to instances where the Dayton Agreement is criticized for the current complex and fragile political situation in BiH. Many problems have come from the Daytonian provisions, as one of the informants suggests:

There are plenty of problems coming from Dayton Peace Agreement, since the structure became so complex that one doesn’t know from where he/she needs to start in order to change even a small (insignificant) law. I refer to it as a small law, since it is not a question that carries a lot of importance, like laws about the jurisdiction of entities in BiH, or similar things. There are so many obstacles that you just simply don’t know where to place the law. You face the dilemma whether there should be 34 laws or 13; or whether there should be one or three laws per entity. I believe that this is such a complicated task (personal communication, July, 2014).

The Dayton Agreement was criticized for its complex legal framework, and the different levels of veto rights allowed at different institutional levels in BIH. Criticism of the Dayton Agreement nominates it for the prime cause of the current political stagnation in BiH.

The next theme is
Donor Criticism. This refers to criticism over donors’ behaviors in regards to democratization in BiH. Donors are criticized for different issues, but three of them are found significant in this study.

Imposing values from above. This refers to claims that donors impose their values from above. There are different ways they can impose values, but the most common can be seen in the form of “conformism” (Sejfija, 2009), where NGOs conform themselves to the values and norms donors dictate in order to receive grants. In addition, there is another issue regarding NGOs in BiH called “mimicry” (Sejfija, 2009). It means when NGOs disguise their actual mission and goals. From the informant responses it appears this type of behavior is rather common for local NGOs that are used for different ideological and illicit business purposes. Thus, one of the informants suggested that another thing is that the donor organizations through the programs they are sponsoring are forcing you to be narrowly focused on a certain targeted population.

In the aforementioned example, the foreign donors are exerting influence by choosing the target population of the project. Ironically, in some instances the targeted populations were mixed marriages, as can be seen from this example:

I don’t want to accept the foreigner to tell me what is important and what is not. Like in the case when they approached and asked me to promote interfaith or mixed marriages. My response was: “What has that to do with anything?” I mean, why should they care to whom a member of one religious group would marry? Why do you care? Why are you changing our values? This is just one of those stupid examples where you are being put in one of the endless situations where foreign donors are asking you to do stupid things. Therefore, I assert that you can’t just transplant the values as they are because they are not true and honest values (personal communication, July, 2014).

Nevertheless, imposing values frequently occurs before the NGO applies for a certain project. In the project description the values promoted are defined as well. In the
case of NGOs behavior towards the donors imposing the values over the grants, one of the informants suggests that:

I can provide an answer based on my personal experience. So, we apply for the projects that are close to the mission and vision that we are working on like: fighting against corruption, development of media etc. However, we never had a case that someone dictates from above what to do, and how to do it. Maybe we deliberately offered solutions that are in accordance with donors, but we have offered solutions that are in accordance with the societal needs and our values. I believe that a majority of the organizations are behaving in a similar way. Nevertheless, I always leave the space open for the possibility that some sort of dictate or steering exists (personal communication, July, 2014).

Although in the latter case the informant asserts that his organization did not have values directly imposed from above, they developed projects consistent with donors’ expectations. The informant suggests there is a possibility that some sort of imposing and dictating of values exist. The question is, whether imposition of donors’ values through projects they are sponsoring is an intentional or unconscious act?

Criticism of Donors. This includes two analytical categories.

Foreign donors--justifying resources used. This analytical category refers to instances observed, when donors work to justify the resources allocated to them by showing their benefactors they used them, rather than focusing on the actual work they did. The priority is to find a satisfactory formula, where the actual results of NGO work are not important. This greatly diminishes the quality of work NGOs provide, and consequentially, negatively affects the image citizens have of the NGO sector in BiH.

Donors need a better selection of NGOs to do the job. Both groups of informants in the study, participants in NGO activities and NGOs staff members, criticized the choices donors made of NGOs to fund. According to the criticism, frequently donors choose NGOs that don't have sufficient capacity to carry out the project. Therefore, those
projects are either unsuccessfully run, or unfinished. This also furthers the negative image of NGOs in BiH. The criticism suggests that donors should implement more demanding criteria for the selection of NGOs to conduct their projects.

_Criticism of International (IC)_ This criticism is focused on several issues in regards to the IC’s strategy of the nation-building in BiH. The data is obtained from the interviews with informants, direct observations, and literature pertaining to the topic. There are several analytical categories in regards to this theme. At the same time IC Criticism represents the analytical pattern as well.

_Interference of IC_. This analytical category refers to IC interference in the internal politics of BiH. Nevertheless, one of the goals of IC in the BiH is to interfere in certain political processes if it is seen as necessary. Nevertheless, the IC interference in BiH internal affairs of is used by ethno-nationals (regardless of identity) as an argument that IC is interfering with political issues in BiH. The argument used suggests that the IC prevents political parties in BiH from working on important issues themselves by fostering interethnic cooperation, consensus, and reconciliation. By interfering into BiH internal affairs, the IC is criticized for contributing to further ethnic-division and political havoc in BiH.

_Misinterpretation of Bosnian context by international community_. This analytical category suggests that IC didn’t pay attention to the Bosnian context as it is; rather, the international community came to BiH with certain presumptions that did not

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4 International Community or IC has a specific meaning for BiH citizens. One that will be used with capitalized initials International Community (IC) will refer to instances where the term is used to describe the IC as an institution in BiH (OHR, PIC, and etc.). The “international community” term is used by BiH citizens as a label for different institutions, representatives, and parties coming abroad and working on different project related to nation-building in BiH.
coincide with the situation on the ground. A good example of such a criticism comes from one informant’s testimony:

Well, we had that problem in 1996/1997 when delegations from the West came to BiH and said: “Hey, let’s go and celebrate Christmas!” Then we tried to explain to them that we do celebrate Christmas here, but this is not only a Catholic country, it is a country where Catholics, Orthodox Christian, Muslims, and Jews live together. For example, in Sarajevo there was always a Midnight Mass, but that was not the central manifestation, it wasn’t major holiday. Then, they tell us that: ‘Well, wait, wait! You have here Christmas, and Christmas movies right?’ Then we would try to explain to them that they are coming from states where one nation and religion is in the majority, and we are not: we are a multinational, multi-religious, and multicultural society (personal communication, July, 2014).

The best example of the misinterpretation of the BiH context by the international community can be seen in the institutional provisions of the Dayton Agreement. The consociational approach developed by the Dayton Agreement is the primary reason for political gridlock. Further, the assumption of the international community that the ethno-national political elites would lead democratic changes in BiH was premature and weak.

Connected to misinterpretation of the BiH context, neglect of previous forms or signs of democracy is evident as well. This phenomenon is wrapped up in an analytical category labeled as

\textit{IC neglecting the existence of prior signs of democracy}. This analytical category is clearly observed in the interview where one of the informants suggested that We can see that the values we accepted, are values that we already had in our society. The values we erased and we accepted that IC will come and set up the necessary values. In other words, IC will come to BiH to teach B (referring to Bosniak) and S (referring to Serbian) new values.\footnote{(M) and (B) were edited version of real names provided by informant in order to keep the identity of informant protected.} So, they will come to BiH and
teach B and S that they can sit on the same table, and that they can work together (referring to reconciliation efforts by IC). Despite the fact that, B and S are doing that same thing for millennia, where they sit and work together. Thus, we are playing stupid when they approach us with those ideas, and we are saying to them, well we never had such an idea that B and S could sit together regardless of what they believe in, or where they live. Therefore, we forgot that B and S were living together and we accept that as a fact.

Not only is there evidence obtained from the informants about the IC neglecting elements of democracy, but also the literature review suggests that a similar pattern of behavior is documented in the literature as well.

The next theme is about

Criticism directed at NGOs. The NGO is a constellation of the analytical patterns to do with various criticism of NGOs. The criticism focuses on several areas that can be divided on negative and positive evaluations.

Ambiguous NGOs. This analytical pattern refers to negative criticism of NGOs suggesting that some NGOs’ goals are ambiguous.

NGOs as a foreign agents is the analytical category most frequently present in the interviews with informants. Simply, it criticizes the NGOs of being foreign agents, or organizations that work for someone else. One of the informants suggested, “I don’t think that organizations are changing their initial goals, and working for someone else. Rather, they are being founded to work for someone else.”

This is more related to the local NGOs founded by politicians to use for their own goals. Ambiguity can be seen in different forms; most frequently in the form of
conformism, and mimicry (Sejfija, 2009), but also other types of ambiguous NGOs activity are present in BiH nation-building/democratization.

*Shifting focus and mission.* This criticism is another important finding in the current study. It is the analytical category that refers to NGOs that are criticized for shifting from their initial goals, missions, and areas of expertise in order to fit within certain parameters required by certain donors funding programs. For an example one informant’s illustration is provided in the following passage:

Well, they didn’t just change their goals, the goals are being changed almost on a daily basis. You have a large number of foreign donors here that come from abroad that do jobs for their salaries and their interests that they need to justify to their governments and their tax payers. On the other side, we understood you could take a serious amount of money—in the current economic situation—while doing nothing. Therefore, we can be sure that the goals will be changed on a daily basis. It is like I am working for an NGO, and you are foreign donor. I meet and ask you:” Hey, did you bring some money? Yes you did? For what?” Then you tell me that you have brought the money for the production of i.e. beach umbrellas, and you tell me: “Well, you know, you are working in radio, and I need someone who makes beach umbrellas, so…” Then I respond: “Yes, indeed, I work at a radio station, but you should see the beach umbrellas I make.”

It is important for me to deceive you, and I will get the money. Unfortunately, an infinite number of deceptions exist, such as: “How much money have you allocated for that project?” You answer: “One million dollars.” Then I suggest to you: “Ok! If you give $900,000 to me to run a project, you can take for yourself $100,000”. Finally it is like, I am making the best beach umbrellas, you have justified your expenditures to your taxpayers, and I have justified it here in BiH, and at the end everyone is happy and satisfied. Most often this is the case (personal communication, July, 2014).

*Ghost NGOs.* This analytical category refers to instances where NGOs are registered and exist in the registry, but in reality they do not have any function, nor do they have any projects. Most often they are just open to serve individual interests. According to statistics available on NGOs in BIH, there are around 12,000 registered NGOs, of which a few thousand are active. The ghost NGOs are doing substantial damage to the NGO sector. Since the BiH citizens often point the finger at those NGOs
when they need an argument that NGOs in BiH are doing nothing. Accordingly, one of the participants in NGO activities suggests:

The organizations that work on the promotion of democracy and democratic values in BiH should be supported. Thus, we have an issue where there are 12,000 registered NGOs, but the majority of them are not functioning. Just in my city there are more than 200 organizations, where we never heard of about 100 of them. We never heard they did any activities, programs, or whatever (personal communication, July, 2014).

The most frequent suggestions by informants is that there should be stricter control over NGO registration, internal controls, and the activities they provide.

*NGOs under the attack of ethno-nationals (EN).* This is an analytical category referring to the criticism of NGOs coming from ethno-national political parties and politicians. The best example of THIS criticism is seen in the recently published book (Karganovic et al., 2014), where the authors criticize the NGOs in BiH working for foreign governments, claiming their purpose is the destruction of RS and overthrow of the current SNSD government. The issue with the publication is that the author developed a list of NGOs, in which a majority of the listed NGOs are sponsored by foreign donors, and they are described as working as “extended hand” for foreign governments. Thus, most of the NGOs sponsored by NED in BiH are on the list.

*NGO doesn’t serve its purpose.* This is the analytical category that refers to the criticism where the NGOs in BiH are criticized for not doing their job. The informants suggest that NGOs somehow lack integrity, as can be seen from the following passages: "am not sure that the NGO sector serves its purpose in BiH. It appears to me that sometimes NGOs in BiH are dealing with marginal issues that will not make an impact on regular BiH citizen."

The other informant suggests that:
If you one day deal with the ecology, the next day with culture, and the day after with the protection of minorities in BiH you are wasting your resources, expertise, and energy, and becoming ‘scrapbooks’ \(^6\) (personal communication, July, 2014).

Therefore, it is important for NGOs to focus on one area, and avoid significant mission shifting so they have the integrity required for their work, and also the support of the BiH citizens.

The next analytical pattern that will be covered under the negative criticism of NGOs who work on the promotion of democracy in BiH is

*Donor Seeking Behavior.* This analytical pattern is a constellation of analytical categories that refers to the omnipresent issues of NGOs seeking donors. There are several issues connected to the behavior of NGOs. In the Bosnian context the most relevant are conformism (to donors) and blending in. Conformism, as described previously, refers to an instance when an NGO conforms to the values and norms developed by the donors. Thus, the blending in can be seen as the initial phase of the conformism. It is an instance where an NGO blends in with requirements and parameters of grants in order to maximize the chance of receiving the grant. Both behaviors significantly affect the development of an authentic approach by NGOs, where the same would develop strategies and approaches suitable for the Bosnian context. In some cases, these two terms are wrapped up into the impudent term “prostitutes,” referring to the NGOs readiness to do everything in order to receive the grant.

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\(^6\) *Scrapbook* is the term used by one of the informant to describe NGOs that frequently shift their focus, and mission and do every type of project just to maximize the number of grants they receive.
The next finding in the current study under the category of *Criticism* and under *Negative NGO Criticism* theme is related to the effectiveness of the NGOs working on the promotion of democracy, and democratic values in BIH. Accordingly, *NGO Effectiveness* is an analytical pattern regarding NGO effectiveness. There are two analytical categories in this analytical pattern: *NGO’s Effectiveness*, and *NGO’s Impact*. The first refers to the criticism in regards to the effectiveness of the NGOs working on the democracy promotion. The criticism suggests that NGOs in BiH should and must do more than they have done so far. They need to expand their capacities, conduct better outreach, and show integrity in their work. The latter refers to the criticism claiming that NGOs didn’t make any significant impact in regards to democracy promotion in BiH.

*Monopoly in NGO sector.* This is an analytical category that refers to the negative criticism of the NGOs working on democracy promotion in BiH. It refers to the existence of some sort of monopoly existing in the NGO sector. It can also be described as an oligarchic structure in the NGO sector in BiH. Such a structure is comprised of a few big NGOs. Thus, “big” in this context refers to the influence, capacity, and resources these NGOs have at their disposal. The oligarchic or dominating NGOs are hunting the large grants. Upon the receipt of substantial resources they either run the projects themselves, or in most often cases they sub-contract or sub-grant the projects to the NGOs with a lesser capacity. In this way, although the NGO with lesser capacity is acting on the local level successfully, its integrity and approach are greatly affected with the demands coming from the dominating organization. In this way, the capacity of the NGO sector in BiH to develop authentic approaches is diminished, and those small NGOs that
successfully ran projects are forced to adapt to the new approaches set up by the big NGOs.

*NGOs as businesses* refers to an analytical pattern in which some of the NGOs are criticized for their businesslike behavior. In other words, some NGOs operate as businesses, working purely for profit. There are several analytical categories observed in regards to this criticism. As one of the informants suggests:

> These are some of the problems of the NGO sector in BIH. Now we are talking about the negative things related to the NGO sector in BiH. Hence, some of the NGOs, especially those large NGOs, developed a business out of the sector, where the NGO sector is some sort of well financed job, where for lucrative salaries, one can live a good life without any responsibility (personal communication, July, 2014).

The next analytical category observed in the *NGOs as Businesses* analytical pattern is the analytical category labeled as

*Project-ization.* Briefly, it is an instance where the NGOs are using interventions to reach the projected goals (Sejfija, 1999). In addition, Sejfija (1999) suggests that such behavior might be an outcome of the external factors (donors). Hence, the interventions are not the "authentic" demands of BiH society; moreover, they are based on the criteria set up by donors. Further, the author suggests that the projects are reducing the role of citizens from being “source and bearer of action” into the role of consumers.

Finally, the author notes that projects in this category do not culminate in new policies (results); rather as he quotes Sampson: “projects are obviously always ending with the goal to be changed with the policy, thus, they are frequently being changed with another project.” (Sampson in Sejfija, 1999, p.16) with the goal of simply perpetuating new projects. Therefore, the project-ization can be seen as NGOs, instead of focusing on
the problems in society and developing strategies to resolve them, focus on developing projects for their own sake, and creating the need for new projects in order to receive funding for them.

"The NGO sector as a new form of entrepreneurship" refers to the criticism that the NGO sector became a new sector of entrepreneurship in BiH. Indeed, according to some number more than 20,000 people work in an NGO sector in BiH, or 3% of the employed citizens in BiH works within the NGO sector in BiH. Therefore, NGO sector in BiH is an important employer.

Further, there is another phenomenon where there is a new sector observed within the NGO sector in BiH, comprised of professional NGOs. These NGOs employ professionals to do jobs requiring higher skills. This type of NGOs is label as a

Professional NGOs as a new sector. In regards to this type of NGOs, one of the informants suggests that:

…on the other side there are no free . . ., this is not a volunteer organization, . . . we are a professional organization that deals with a specific activity, and we are sponsored by a foreign donor. If you ask whether we would work the same job if there were no money? Yes, journalists would work like they currently do, but the question is whether they would have enough space to work in the same way since they would need to earn for their livelihood.. In that aspect, I think that in this terrain the new special sector inside the NGO sector is being formed, it is professional organizations that do professional programs, and have specific research. Therefore they emerge as a special form of assembly (personal communication, July, 2014).

Short-term Projects. This represents the analytical pattern that refers to criticisms of NGOs for projects that are too short-term. In the case of BiH democratization, it is observed that NGOs are focusing on short-term projects, and therefore lack the capacity to deal with issues that require a long-term approach.
The next theme in the *Criticism* concept is dedicated to positive evaluation of NGOs activities. This includes several analytical categories.

*NGO Authenticity.* This is an analytical category that represents a positive evaluation of the NGOs in BiH over the authentic approach they use. The authentic approach means a strategy used by NGOs to successfully reach the projected outcomes of their programs. Further, authenticity can refer to the non-conformism of NGOs towards parties providing resources to the NGOs. It can be seen in the interview response by an informant:

> We never take commercials, we are not commercial in any sense, but we are depending on it. If we return to the previous point that there are no resources available for media, we are financing our media related projects by doing some other projects, why not let the media project shut down? Hence, we use the media project to maintain the attendance of the public in regards to the relevant topics. Therefore, we are depending, and we are adapting, but always we are trying to stay within our framework (personal communication, July, 2014).

Another positive criticism about the NGOs is in regards to the question what would happen if there were no NGO sector. This analytical category is labeled *If there were no NGO sector.* Informants suggests that if there were no NGO sector, nothing would stop the ethno-nationals, or corrupt government from grasping total control over the society in BiH. After the biased and controlled media, the last obstacle to totalitarian rule in BiH is the NGO sector.

### 4. Democratic Transplant

The next concept is a *Democratic Transplant.* It refers to the analytical categories observed in regards to the transfer of democratic values seen in the West into
the BiH transitional context. The concept is comprised of themes referring to the different phenomena observed within this concept. The themes consist of positive and negative views observed on democratization, the role of NED, the neoliberalism vs. ethno-nationalism struggle, and values promoted as a part of democratic transplant in BiH.

**Democratic Transplant-- Positive.** Refers to the analytical pattern that suggests the positive outcomes of the democratic transplant. In the case of BiH case of democratic transplant

Revelation of democratic values represents the most important finding in the theme suggesting the positive outcomes of democratic transplant. It refers to the instance where the participants at the beginning of the program are either not aware of the value, or not aware of the importance certain democratic values have in regards to their individual lives, and the society as well. As one of the participants in NGOs activities describes,

"Those values are not abstract, because before we didn’t have such values, but we have understood their importance through NGO programs. Maybe, in the very beginnings they were unimportant things in our lives, but through participation in the project that sometimes lasted up to three years we understand that those values are very important for us. They provide us the possibility to independently make decisions in our lives. In the beginning those values were trivial for us. In the beginning we just came to have fun, and socialize, but later we become more serious, when we went through the program we understood that those values are significant for us, and that they are not abstract (personal communication, July, 2014)."

**Democratic Transplant--Negative.** Represents negative views in regards to democratic transplant in BiH. This theme is comprised of two analytical categories; Abstractness, and Existing Democratic Values in the Society.

**Abstractness.** This analytical category refers to an instance where the values promoted are abstract to the participants in the NGO programs. Moreover, it
suggests that the NGOs working on the promotion of democracy, and democratic values are also promoting values that are abstract and remote to the participants. According to the response made by one of the informants, the values promoted are only “reasonable” to 20% of the BiH population, whereas, for 80% of the BiH population the values introduced by the NGOs working on the and democratic values are remote.

*Existing Democratic Values.* This analytical category refers to the negative perception of the democratic transplant in BiH, suggesting that there were certain “democratic” values that existed in society before, but citizens, NGOs, IC, and other stakeholders did not recognize them as democratic. One the informant suggests that

Simply, the system of values in BiH is damaged. Bosnia wasn’t a primitive society until twenty years ago. Bosnia was a rather developed society, with developed consciousness about the rights of people, and the participation of the people in some global mosaic. I must admit that Yugoslavia was a country that, despite the socialist system, had managed to educate people to be conscious about their roles. There were values in that society such that, regardless of the fact that Yugoslavia was a secularist state, religious freedom was promoted. Therefore some of the values promoted in the ex-political system like respect, responsibility, and rights of other people existed. Although these values existed, their current importance is diminished, especially the importance the responsibility is greatly diminished, and I see that it is the primary problem in the country (personal communication, July, 2014).

This analytical category was observed several times in different sources of data. Interestingly, the NGOs, and donors insist on not paying attention to the existing democratic values within the society. The question remains, why are such values are neglected and not utilized in democratization efforts in BiH? Further, this issue is followed by the undermining of authentic civil movements described in (Sejfija, 2009) study. In addition, the informants in this study indicated the same issue where IC and some NGOs neglect the authentic civil movements.
NED refers to an analytical pattern related to the analytical observations of NED regarding democratization of BiH. According to direct observations, documentation, and the interview data the NED in general has a positive role in the process of nation building, or democratization in BiH. The way NED selects the NGOs to do the job is marked by strong criteria and an objective approach. The NED is more reluctant to sponsor ongoing projects, and in that way contributes to the development of authentic NGO strategies in the context of democracy promotion in BiH. Further, NED-funded NGOs do not promote values by imposing them, rather NGOs support projects that fall under their general values. Further, the informants suggest that there is no substantial interference with the NGO, once the same is granted the funding by NED. In addition, the NED was given a positive score for the support and flexibility they provide to the NGOs they sponsor and fund. Providing flexibility to NGOs allows them to make necessary changes in ongoing programs necessary to adapt to the BiH context. Regarding democratic transplant, NED doesn’t impose values on those they fund; rather, they set up general parameters of values supported by NED. The NGO is left on its own in deciding what type of project to develop, what strategy and content to use, and how to execute the project. Several sources of data indicate the unique approach used by the NED that has been successful over the years. Nevertheless, there is a need for NED to increase the volume of projects both run and funded by them in BiH.

Neoliberalism vs. Ethno-nationalism. This is the analytical pattern referring to the democratic transplant concept observed in the study. It is comprised of analytical categories referring to the issue of the modern vs. traditional struggle in BiH. The existence of such a context is hypothetically considered as a theoretical construct used in
the study. There are several instances where the pattern is actually observed on the ground. In the BiH context, the NGO sector that works on democracy promotion, particularly if sponsored by the foreign donors, is perceived as a threat by ethno-national political parties and politicians. The NGOs promoting democracy in BiH can be seen as part of the modern stream, whereas, the ethno-nationals are seen as resisting modern changes and represent the traditional stream. They use traditional values as an argument. Unfortunately, in the case of BiH traditional values are the ethno-nationalism of the three constituent nations in BiH. Therefore, promotion of democratic values by the NGOs in BiH is resisted by the ethno-nationals. It can be seen from one of the NED sponsored NGO’s strategy noted in an interview:

We have managed to make corruption the primary issue. Therefore, themes like nationalism, hatred, ethnic-divisions and the like will become secondary issues. We are trying simply to present to the people that behind the so far promoted values like nationalism, ethnic-hatred and the like stands crime and corruption, and that these other themes are just a cover. Further, how the political establishment in this country—that is the prime issue—misuses its positions and the resources we have delegated to them (personal communication, July, 2014).

Although it can be seen from the interview that these values are used as a cover for ethno-nationals or politicians’ real intentions, not the promotion of ethno-national interests of the corresponding national constituencies, the modern vs. traditional struggle can be observed in the behavior of the BiH citizens. No matter what proofs the NGO sector provides them of corruption, and other crimes related to the ruling elites, the citizens are still susceptible to ethno-national rhetoric. They either do not comprehend the situation, or they play blind because they are more comfortable accepting the current ruling elites than to open themselves to change.. The great contribution to the conformism of the BiH citizens can be seen as the shattered society, where individuals
are more comfortable obtaining short-term personal interests in a trade-off of long-term societal goods that greatly affect their lives.

Values Promoted. This refers to analytical patterns and categories referring to the values NGOs promote in the BiH context of democracy promotion. Based on direct observations, interview data, and NGO documentation it can be concluded that interviewed NED-sponsored NGOs correspond to the values they claim to promote. In most cases, the promoted values are fighting corruption, transparency, raising awareness of BiH citizens, peace and reconciliation, and economic policies.

5. International Relations

International Relations is a concept that represents the constellation of themes related to cooperation of different actors in the international relations that are related to the BiH democratization. There are two themes that represent two levels of international relations cooperation; Institutional Level and State Level.

Institutional Level. This theme focuses on the institutional level of cooperation in international relations related to the BiH democratization. This theme is comprised from two analytical categories.

Cooperation between IC and NGOs refers to the cooperation between the International Community and NGOs working on the democracy promotion and democratic values in BiH. In the very beginning this cooperation was marked by tension between the IC and NGOs. IC accused NGOs of several issues, while the NGOs accused IC of inefficacy and blunt work in regards to the institutional changes in BiH.
Nevertheless, cooperation reached a satisfactory level, and currently IC and the NGO sector work closely together on the issues related to democracy and state-building in BiH.

*Exposure to international NGOs.* This refers to the institutional level of cooperation in regards to democratization in BiH. This analytical category indicates that exposure to the international NGOs produced certain effects on local NGOs in BiH. These effects can be either negative or positive depending on the strategy and the purpose of the INGOs.

### 6. Suggestions

The last concept listed in the cross sectional analysis, or finding that was persistent across the individual case studies developed for the current thesis is Suggestions. Briefly, it refers to suggestions provided by the NGOs and their participants in regards to what can be done to improve democracy promotion efforts of NGOs in BiH. There are several analytical patterns in regards to suggestions referring to different types of suggestions.

*Control of NGOs.* This analytical pattern regards suggestions related to control or regulation of NGOs in BiH. Informants suggested that there should be tighter control of NGOs in BiH. This does not refer to control of activities and values promoted. Rather, it refers to assessment of whether NGOs are active or not, and that their work is consistent with their stated purpose. Criticism and challenges of the NGOs suggest their use by different political or private persons for their personal interests. In some case it is a sort
of money laundering, and in some cases political parties use the *Ghost* NGOs for ambiguous financial transactions.

*Education.* This analytical category refers to suggestions by both groups of informants—the NGOs’ representatives, and participants in the NGOs’ activities—to focus on democracy promotion through education. This suggestion considers the introduction to democracy, and democratic values through formal primary, and secondary education. There are already some projects related to the introduction of students to democracy in the schools. It is not part of the formal curriculum, rather it is the incentive started by the OKC, and their network of NGOs across BiH to develop student councils in more than 200 schools in BiH.

*Youth.* This refers to the analytical pattern comprised of suggestions related to the focusing on youth in democracy promotion. There are two analytical categories in regards to this analytical pattern: *Importance of the Youth,* and *Youth Coming Together.*

*Importance of the Youth* first refers to the importance of the youth in the process of democracy promotion and consolidation in BiH. Data obtained from the direct observations, interviews, and documentation suggests that the youth is the best potential target population in democracy promotion. They were not exposed to nation building practices of ex-Yugoslavia, and ethno-nationalism yet. Therefore, projects focusing on the promotion of democratic values among the youth provide them an opportunity to develop democratic values, that once implemented on the societal level will result in societal democratic norms and values currently absent in the shattered BiH society. Although the fall of Yugoslavia happened almost 25 years ago, the nation building
practice of Yugoslavia created a loyalty to the values and ideas that persist even nowadays among generations exposed to it.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the current study. Thus, making distinction between general conclusions and conclusions related to the research question is beneficial. Once the general conclusions and the research question-related conclusions are presented, the policy implications section will follow.

A. Conclusions Related to Research Questions

The next step is to render the findings of the research questions posed in this study. The general research question is “What is the role of NGOs in promoting democracy as a strategy of nation-building in BiH?” However, the primary research question is divided into four secondary research questions or sub-questions.

1. Research Question #1: What type of democratic values are NGOs promoting in BiH?

The first research sub-question “What type of democratic values are NGOs promoting in BiH?” focuses on the values promoted by NGOs that work on democracy promotion. The specific focus is placed on those NGOs that are sponsored by the NED to run democratic projects in BiH. However, the findings in this study also apply to other
NGOs working on democracy promotion in BiH. Hence, the data obtained from the interviews, also, refers to other NGOs working on democracy promotion as well.

From the interview data it can be said that the values promoted in general are related to transparency, accountability, and raising citizen awareness of pertinent societal issues in BiH. Education as a value can be included as well. However, the first three listed values are prioritized by NGOs that receive grants from NED for democracy related projects in BiH.

Evidently, the lack of accountability and transparency at different levels of government in BiH creates a fertile ground for malign corruption. It is not only the case for government, but also at almost every level of social life in BiH. However, the extent of government corruption is at an unprecedented level. According to ACCOUNT’s data, in BiH around $50 of BiH taxpayers’ money is lost per second due to corruption (ACCOUNT, 2014).

Corruption affects other social processes in the country as well. Reasonably, it also affects the democratic process in BiH as well. In relation to this, the political leaders in BiH who use ethno-national rhetoric to cover up issues predominantly caused by corruption are further crippling democratization. The reason for such an ethno-national strategy is simply to prevent social changes, since the political status quo allows them to acquire power without being scrutinized for high levels of corruption. Therefore, fighting corruption can be seen as a priority by nongovernmental organizations working on democracy promotion in BiH. In many instances, the informants indicated that all other social issues in the country are the consequence of corruption. Therefore, dealing with it is of utmost importance. Not only that fighting corruption is essential in regards to
democracy promotion in BiH. It draws the attention of regular BiH citizens. It is evident that BiH citizens support NGOs working on fighting corruption.

From data collected from the interviews, NGO documentation, and direct observations it is noted that the common strategy of NGOs in BiH to fight corruption is by promoting accountability, transparency, and raising the awareness of BiH citizens. Thus, promotion of transparency by NGOs, particularly in regards to public acquisitions, is an attempt to deal with the issue of corruption on a societal level. NED-sponsored NGOs working on to promote accountability and transparency generated loads of materials in regards to corruption: reports, publishing, and evidence of corruption creating a valuable hub of resources that is at the disposal of regular BiH citizens. In addition to this, in the case of CRMA’s leading project ACCOUNT, the NGO managed to develop a strong network the goal of which is to thwart corruption on a societal level. ACCOUNT members’ approach is to create small watchdog teams across the country that will report on cases of corruption. Not only did the NGOs provide resources and means for reporting corruption, they also fought for anti-corruption legislation that will increase transparency and accountability. Further, the NGOs successfully lobbied for legislation that will protect those reporting cases of corruption.

While promoting accountability and transparency, NGOs are increasing BiH citizens’ awareness of the corruption issue in the country. The NGOs’ strategy is to use their mission of raising awareness to tackle ethno-nationals’ rhetoric. In this way, NGOs aim to promote democracy by acknowledging to BiH citizens that ethno-nationalists’ manipulation is used to cover up the real problems in the country, which are caused by corruption. Therefore, the NGOs adopted a strategy where issue-based policymaking is
highlighted over interethnic issues. Ethno-nationals are aware that shifting the public’s attention from the ethno-national realm to issue based policies will expose politicians to voters’ scrutiny of corruption. Therefore, instead of adopting the suggestions made by the NGO sector in regards to national socio-economic issues, ethno-nationals are criticizing the NGOs as the extended hands of foreign government that seek to impeach the government (The Black List in RS), and therefore, are threatening the existence of the corresponding ethnic constituency in BiH.

In addition, increased awareness of BiH citizens is represents the goal of NGOs to develop a set of values that will act as a mechanism to safeguard democracy. BiH citizens tolerate the majority of problems by their civic conformism. Therefore, BiH citizens’ awareness must be increased not only to enjoy the rights provided by democracy, but also to embrace the responsibility required for democracy. This may be why NGOs frequently underline the fact that citizens choose politicians, and that politicians acquire power through the votes of regular citizens. Therefore, the democratic citizen needs to be socially responsible, and active in social, economic, political and other issues. Regarding civic responsibility, one may conclude that BiH citizens experience a sort of plight whether, on the one hand, to embrace democracy, and democratic values that lead towards social change—towards something new--or on the other side, to stay loyal to the ethno-nationalism that provides them some sort of security regarding the interests of their particular ethno-national groups and the quality of life they currently have. Although this appears to be an illogical plight, the outcome of the 2014 elections shows that BiH citizens prefer the ethno-nationals. However, regular Bosnian citizens are in a difficult position: on one side they have ethno-nationals, and on the other side they have no
alternative for which they can vote. The opposition to ethno-nationals is extremely vague. The best illustration for the lack of opposition can be seen in SDP losing the mandates that they acquired in previous elections. In other words, the SDP wasted its chance to oppose ethno-nationals’ political supremacy. The reasons for the SDP decline should be thoroughly investigated, yet the common perception by BiH citizens is that they have done nothing so far. The only party that, indeed, increased its mandate and scored a 20% increase in votes on an FBiH level is the party of Fahrudin Radoncic, the SDB. They don’t engage in ethno-nationalism or in socialism, but in fact they promote democratic values. The party’s priority is fighting corruption and other criminal activities.

Interestingly, the rule-of-law as a democratic value is among the most anticipated democratic values in BiH. In most cases, interviewees had a nostalgic perception of the rule-of-law in the ex-Yugoslavia. The same anticipation is observed in the popular media, literature, and daily conversations of BiH citizens. This may be why a relatively new political actor, Mr. Radoncic, received substantial support by the FBiH citizens. However, his alleged connections to the criminal lords in the Balkans region are still an obstacle he needs to overcome in order to triumph in the elections.

Conclusively, the current struggle with the ethno-nationals of NGOs working on democracy promotion shows traces of success. However, the resources deployed by the donors, and the supports NGOs enjoy from BiH citizens are not adequate to create the democratic momentum necessary to achieve societal changes. The best evidence is the election results for the 2014 general elections in BiH. According to the preliminary results (95% of votes counted) the ethno-nationalists thrived in the elections, achieving a majority of votes in their constituent nations. As said before, the SDP (Social Democratic
Party), one of the few political parties that doesn’t promote ethno-nationalism and the party that received broad support of BiH citizens in previous elections, failed utterly in the 2014 elections. They have lost a majority of mandates over the ethno-nationals in two entities (FBiH, and RS). The results of the elections left the ethno-nationals in a position to tighten their grasp over the political processes in BiH.

The civic education of BiH citizens, particularly of the youth is also prioritized by the NGOs. Unfortunately, the education of youth is a second priority, since the NGOs spend the majority of their time and resources on fighting corruption. However, the data suggests that youth are willing to engage in the social process once they are educated by NGOs about democracy. The NGOs prefer to promote social responsibility and awareness throughout civic education activities. Interviews with participants in NGO projects indicate the strong motivation participants have to engage in the democratic process in BiH. It is also evident that they are highly motivated to disseminate the knowledge they acquired through the NGO workshops to their peers. In addition to this, as in the case of the OKC program that developed a network of NGOs to create student councils nation-wide, the strong network of student councils allows dissemination of information participants acquire at NGO workshops to their classmates. In this way, society-wide populations of students are being informed about democratic values, processes, and their responsibilities as citizens of a democratic state. They share common values, and shortly they will be in a position to vote and be elected in various government and bureaucratic positions. On a societal level they are adopting the analogue democratic values, which shows hope that the new generation to come will hold similar beliefs and values in regards to BiH democracy, and not afflicted with the malign form of ethno-
nationalism that cripples BiH democratic change. However, more resources should be allocated to NGOs working with youth so they can increase the capacity of their programs, hastening promotion of democratic values. It is evident that in some cases the ethno-nationals noticed the danger coming from the NGOs’ civic education of youth, and they responded by starting their own youth projects, but in most cases they carry an ethno-national prefix.

2. Research Question #2: Are the democratic values promoted by the NGOs abstract to BiH citizens?

Abstractness as a conceptual framework will be investigated by encompassing several factors.

First, abstractness can be seen as a product of socio-cultural differences that exist between the developed Western democracies and BiH. Due to these differences, western values might be perceived differently by BiH society. The best example is the previously addressed issue of corruption in BiH health care.

Second are instances of abstractness perceived by BiH citizens in the form of remoteness. BiH citizens may perceive democratic values promoted by NGOs as remote in cases where the values promoted do not reflect the underlying problems in society. In some cases, BiH citizens may perceive the promoted democratic values as irrelevant to their lives since they are preoccupied with existential issues like meeting their basic needs. Therefore, values like accountability, or transparency might be abstract to BiH citizens, making them disengaged from the democratic processes, and unsupportive
towards the NGOs’ democracy promotion in BiH. Remoteness can be seen in one of the answers provided by the informant in the interview with NGO representatives. The informant suggests that some people in BiH are struggling to survive; therefore before engaging in the democratic process, they are forced to think about how to provide basic needs to their families. However, they fail to realize that the dire conditions they find themselves in are the results of political issues in the country.

Third is the issue of BiH citizens’ familiarity with the democratic values promoted by the NGOs. A regular BiH citizen may not be aware of the promoted democratic value since he/she has never been exposed to it. Therefore, the promoted democratic value might be perceived as abstract. It is reasonable that such instances can be frequently the case with the generations raised in the previous socialist system. Accordingly, democratic values such as transparency and accountability can be expected to be abstract since they were proscribed in the ex-Yugoslavian system.

According to the data from interviews and direct observations, the values promoted by NGOs in BiH can be mainly considered as abstract to BiH citizens. However, the source of abstractness, according to the responses of participants in NGO activities, is unfamiliarity with the promoted values. Regarding values promoted by the NED-sponsored NGOs in BiH, learning is required. In most cases, in the very beginning of the projects that aims to promote a certain democratic value, the participants are not aware of the promoted value and its importance. However, through the program the participants become familiar with the promoted value, and they became aware of its importance for the participant individually, and also societally. In the findings section such a phenomenon is labeled as “Revelation.” Once the participants understand the
democratic value and its importance they are willing to engage in the democratic process, and promote the given democratic values themselves.

Data obtained on the topic suggests that there are some instances of abstractness cause by socio-cultural differences. However, one informant suggests that this is caused by the lack of a normative framework that defines the legal aspects of the democratic value. Therefore, once the democratic value is followed with the appropriate normative framework it will have a similar meaning to what it has in the West. The informant gave an example of reporting domestic violence in modern Western democracies and in BiH. In Western democracies the person that reported the crime will be protected from the perpetrator’s retaliation, while in BiH he or she would most likely suffer concealed retaliation by the perpetrator.

The last issue with abstractness is also a popular and controversial claim by some of the informants: that the attitude of BiH citizens, as well as NGOs promoting certain democratic values, reflects lies. These lies are used by different actors in BiH to achieve certain ends. One informant provides an account of such a phenomenon, suggesting that currently some people in BiH pretend that they have never been able to work and sit together due to the ethnic, religious, and similar differences. This is despite the fact that in BiH, different ethnic, religious, and other groups lived in a heterogeneous society for centuries. However, they pretend it is necessary that international actors come to BiH and teach citizens how to coexist in the same country. In addition, international actors pretend that it is indeed the case that they need to come to BiH and use their resources, acquired from taxpayers’ money or their philanthropically oriented citizens, in order to make BiH citizens aware that they can coexist together.
The same claim goes along with the other informants’ response that frequently foreign donors do not reflect the real results or effectiveness of the program sponsored by them. Such a behavior by foreign donors can be explained as an effort to avoid the scrutiny over the recruitment of a given NGO that failed to meet expectations. In summary, the informants suggest that the lies are a required formula sought by foreign donors, local NGOs, and citizens that receive some benefits from the programs while nothing is done on the ground. This implies that the international actors come to BiH and work for their lucrative salaries, the NGOs working on projects are receiving substantial resources for their project, and their officials are earning lucrative income without any responsibility. In summary, lies as a finding in the current study suggests that the whole story about democracy promotion in BiH is just a big hoax. However, there is no adequate evidence to support the claim. Rather, some reflections of it can be seen in sporadic and rare examples.

In summary, the values promoted by the BiH citizens are abstract until they are revealed to the BiH citizens. Once they are revealed, BiH citizens become aware of their importance, and if the situation allows them, they are willing to engage in the democratic process. They are becoming active in the democratic process, and also they convey the democratic knowledge acquired to their peers and families.

3. Research Question #3: Is it true that over time the NGOs displaced their initial goal to promote democratic values, and became agents for someone else?

It is rather a controversial and often reiterated critique that some NGOs that work on democracy promotion, and democratic values are actually agents for someone else.
This claim suggests that the mission statements of such NGOs are filled with democracy promotions, human rights and similar philanthropic goals, but this is used to cover the real goals and motives of the ambiguous NGOs (Sejfija, 2009). The research sub-question on the topic carries three important elements that need to be discussed in order to provide clarity on the issue of alleged ambiguous behavior of the NGOs working on democracy promotion in BiH.

First, the displacement of initial goals of the democracy-promoting NGOs can be described as a shift. In this shift, the NGO shifts its focus from the initial mission in order to fit within the parameters determined by the foreign donors. Second, the claim that NGOs became “agent” for someone else raises the question that ambiguity is required by that type of NGO in order to perform its clandestine functions. Third, foreign donors have a motive or interest that will lure them to use NGOs for their clandestine agenda.

The criticism addressed to NGOs in BiH by ethno-nationals indeed focuses on the claim that such NGOs are ambiguous agents whose goal is to serve the purpose of their donors. In the case of RS, the agenda of the foreign donors is to impeach the government of RS President Milorad Dodik. The ethno-national’s argument is that these NGOs are working on the centralization of BiH that will result with the fall of RS as an entity. In the case of FBiH, these claims cluster around the notion that the foreign sponsors of the NGOs oppose some cultural, and religious traditions, and they favor the SDP as a pluralist party.

According to the findings in the current study there is no evidence that NGOs displaced their initial goals in order to work as clandestine hands for foreign governments. However, the informants suggest that there are cases when NGOs
intentionally suggest the strategies and values that will satisfy foreign donors. However, these NGOs remain loyal to their ideals and missions. In contrast, informants suggest that there are NGOs that often change their missions in order to receive grants. Thus, such a behavior of NGOs is not due to the clandestine agenda of foreign donors, but rather an effort of the NGOs to acquire resources. This behavior is enhanced with the current scarcity of resources for NGOs.

The ambiguity of the NGOs is evident in the case of those registered but not active. The informants refer to them as “Ghost NGOs”. Informants suggest that this type of NGO is formed either by politicians aiming at certain political or personal goals, or by individuals that use the NGO for their own benefits. This goes along with the claim one of the informants made. When asked whether the NGOs shift their initial mission, and become agents for someone else, the informant responded that not only are such NGOs shifting the mission, but the NGOs are created for the purpose of working for someone else. However, the informant in this context was referring to the ethno-nationals establishing the NGOs that will serve as a tool for their ethno-national agenda.

In summary, in the case of BiH the data obtained suggest that NGOs are not displacing their initial goals of promoting democracy and democratic values in order to work for someone else. Moreover, the shifting of NGOs programs is based on harsh economic situation. Due to resource scarcity and demands for increased NGO efficacy by donors, many NGOs are forced to change their mission statements and adjust themselves according to the donors expectations in order to receive desperately needed resources. Lastly, the information obtained suggests that one criticism coming from both of the BiH entities (RS and FBiH) in regards to NGOs working on democracy promotion does not
have solid ground. In both entities NED sponsored NGOs are being scrutinized and labeled as extended hands of foreign governments. However, when the NED’s mission statement and democratic values listed in it are compared to the mission statement and project description of NED sponsored NGOs there is no evidence the NED uses the NGOs as extended hands. Rather, the values promoted by the NED-sponsored NGOs are the core democratic values that NED supports. Therefore, the ethno-nationalists claims are questionable, since one may conclude that they are against the promotion of core democratic values like transparency, accountability, and equality. In addition, since the NED is sponsored by the U.S. Congress, the existence of some hidden agenda would indicate the presence of the U.S. national interest. However, when the BiH geopolitical, geostrategic, and natural resources are considered, it can be concluded that there is no significant national interest for the U.S. except to finish the nation-building project that the Clinton’s Administration started, and to prevent one more failure of U.S. nation-building, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore in the case of NED sponsored NGOs, the evidence obtained indicates a transparent approach of NED with a clear mission to support the NGOs working on democracy promotion in order to consolidate democracy in BiH.
B. Democratization in BiH as a contested field where the modern and traditional competing streams clash?

The main argument of the study is the theoretical assumption that echoes from the works of Giddens (2000, 2001) in regards to globalization and modernization. The specific focus is the struggle described by Giddens (2001) between the traditional and modern institutions. In the current study, the modern vs. traditional concept is implied in the context of nation-building in BiH. A significant amount of data on the issue was obtained in direct observations and interviews with NGOs and participants in NGO activities. This provides the necessary empirical data to elaborate on the modern vs. traditional struggle in the BiH context of nation-building. In the cross-sectional analysis of the current study, several analytical categories of the modern vs. traditional context were observed. The modern, in the context of modern vs traditional struggle, is represented by NGOs working on democracy promotion. The ethno-national politicians, political parties, and NGOs represent the traditional stream. While the modern stream tries to promote the changes, the traditional is resisting changes.

The findings of this study suggest several answers to the current sub-research questions. Some of the findings sound contradictory. However, they all indicate struggle between the traditional stream that is resisting change and the modern stream that promotes change. Several conclusions might be drawn from the current study.

First, the modern vs. traditional context is represented in the nature of the two populations. The population that seeks to follow a modern liberal democratic path is characterized by pluralism and tolerance. The second population is concerned with
questions regarding its ethno-national status. BiH citizens who promote tolerance and pluralism support the idea of BiH as a country that will have a centralized state structure. It is the reflection of the Socialist BiH, where all three people lived together in peace, and prosperity. The latter seeks to promote the ethno-national idea and create an ethno-national struggle. In this struggle, there are different ideas about the future that the ethno-national constituencies would like to choose. The R.S. is for the dissolution of the BiH, where the R.S. will be granted independence. However, the ethnically cleansed entity would only have Bosnian Serbs as a dominant population. The Bosniaks promote the idea of centrality of the state within its historic borders. However, the current politics of the ethno-national political leaders indicates their preference of the status quo as the best solution. The status quo allows them to collect votes by disseminating ethno-national propaganda throughout their voter populations. The Bosnian Croats are the third constituent nation in BiH. They are promoting the idea of a third entity that will be dominated by Bosnian Croats. Although the ethno-nationalists’ preferences appear to create a conflict within the political dominion in BiH, they all promote the status quo that provides them a victory in the elections. The argument used by the R.S. ethno-nationalist politicians is that a centralized BiH would provide a chance for Bosniaks to outvote them since the Bosniak population has the highest percentage of the overall population. In addition, they claim that BiH as a state is not showing traces of progress and is doomed to fail. Therefore, they suggest that the best option for RS, and for all would be to dissolve the country into three independent states. The Bosniak thesis is that Bosniak and BiH citizens will not accept the independence of the RS, since it was created by genocide. Therefore, international approval of such a state would be impossible and uncivilized.
The Bosnian Croat arguments is that both, the RS, and FBiH, would have majority populations in both entities, and therefore Bosnian Croats would suffer injustice, since they don’t have their own entity. Therefore, they are promoting the idea of a third entity. The ethno-nationalists’ ideas in BiH are in struggle themselves. However, this struggle creates the status quo that is further cemented by the Daytonian provisions. The same is used to shift the focus of the BiH citizens from the dire socio-economic issues to the ideological realm of ethno-nationalism. In this way, they avoid issue-based policies and promote the ethno-national debate. The common practice of ethno-nationals is to blame the politicians of other ethno-national constituencies for political stagnation, and the general dire situation. However, despite their claim that the political status quo is due to lack of political will and consensus among ethno-national political leaders, the laws regarding compensation, salaries, and benefits for politicians in BiH are passed rather smoothly at every level of government.

Finally, the general conclusion drawn in this study is that ethno-nationalists themselves are generally not promoting their ideas based on their ideological dedication. Rather, ethno-nationalism is only used by them to manipulate the masses for personal gain. The personal gains are a mixture of different political mandates, oligarchies, and corruption that provide substantial material compensation to the ethno-nationals for their loyalty to ethno-nationalism. The argument for this is that on several levels politicians holding certain offices accumulated substantial wealth in the post-conflict BiH, despite the fact that prior to the war they were ordinary citizens.

The modern stream in the BiH context is represented by the I.C. and NGOs working on democracy promotion in BiH, and BiH citizens who support a pluralist BiH.
The data obtained suggests that the modern stream is working on the promotion of issue-based policy making. They are promoting pluralism, equality, transparency, accountability, and similar values. By promoting such values they oppose the ethno-nationals’ ideas, and therefore, they are the subject of criticism and accusations by all three constituent nations in BiH.

Since the modern stream consists of the I.C. and NGOs, it does not hold political power granted to them by the citizens of BiH. Therefore, they face a serious political conundrum by only promoting democratic values to BiH citizens. They are the serious underdog in this race, since the ethno-nationals are granted the political power distributed along ethno-national lines by the Dayton Agreement. Further, since the people choose them, they can use state power and resources against the modernists. One informant suggests that the resources at the disposal of ethno-nationalists to attack the efforts of NGOs promoting democracy in BiH are a hundred times more than the resources the NGOs have to promote democracy. Therefore, the capacity of the NGOs to create the momentum for political change is extremely limited. Further, the lack of strong opposition to ethno-nationals is another huge problem for the NGOs. Hence, while they are trying to promote issue-based policymaking, transparency, and accountability, on the political stage no party can be presented as an example of those values on a society wide scale—including both entities, and the district of Brcko. Most likely, this was the reason the SDP was seen initially as a political party that could adopt the NGOs’ values, but somehow due to internal conflicts in the party, and perhaps ex-regime heritage, they were not accepted by the citizens. According to the last elections’ preliminary results it can be confirmed that the ultimate loser in the elections was the SDP. Consequently, the loss of
public support in the 2014 elections brought the SDP to the point where the party will most likely break up. The breakdown of the SDP in BiH will further impose difficulties on the NGOs since there will be no party that will promote a pluralist BiH nurturing democratic values.

The 2014 general election results in BiH indicate the success of the traditional stream, where they fortified their political positions and enhanced their political power. Despite the success of the ethno-nationals, a trace of success of the modern stream can be seen in the combination of the NGO sector’s activism and the experience BiH citizens acquired over years of ethno-national reign. The best indication of such success is the democratic uprisings in BiH earlier in 2014, where a small workers’ protest sparked national level protests against corrupt government officials. Despite the uprising’s lack of leadership, and of an alternative to the current political system, it still indicated that BiH society is sensitive to salient issues in the country. Most likely the 2014 uprisings in BiH failed to create necessary democratic momentum due to the lack of political leaders that would be trusted by BiH citizens to work on political change. However, from daily conversations, social media, newspapers, and public discussion it appears that citizens in BiH anticipate changes. However, they currently see no alternative to the ethno-national political parties. Therefore, it appears that currently citizens fear political change and pluralism. The last pluralist political experiment of BiH as a socialist republic within Yugoslavia ended with the infamous war, horror, trauma, and misery it wreaked upon the citizens.

Further, globalization itself is contributing to the modernist vs. traditionalist struggle in BiH. The availability of information over the Internet made BiH citizens
aware of democratic changes elsewhere in the world. Initially, the Arab Spring created a
good example for citizens of how to topple the dictators and corrupt governments.
However, the results of the democratic changes in the Arab world, and elsewhere created
a more chaotic situation than in the time prior to the uprisings. The regression of
democracy can be seen in after the democratic uprisings in Ukraine, Syria, Egypt, Libya
and elsewhere, where the toppling of authoritarian regimes created anarchy and civil
wars.

In the case of Ukraine, the secession of Crimea from Ukraine, and her annexation
into the Russian Federation may encourage the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to
pursue the same path. Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats have two more powerful
 corresponding nation states (Serbia, and Croatia) bordering BiH. However, the political
leaders of Serbia and Croatia appear to respect the internal affairs of BiH and are not
willing to interfere in it. The fragile balance in the current global political system, the
global economic recession, and other factors may lead towards the radicalization of the
political milieu in Serbia and Croatia, which might bring the ethno-nationalists to power
in those countries. In that case the ethno-nationalists in Serbia and Croatia would want to
choose the path of their ethno-nationalists leaders (President of SRJ Slobodan Milosevic,
and President of Croatia Tudjman), and their aspirations towards the expansion of their
territories into the BiH territory populated with the corresponding Bosnian Serb, and
Bosnian Croat populations. However, the attitude of the I.C., particularly the U.S. as a
 guarantor of the Dayton Peace Agreement is that it won’t tolerate any secessionist
tendencies that might jeopardize the status of BiH as a country. This study suggests that
the international relations or global affairs factors that might play a significant role in the
modern vs. traditional struggle also perpetuate the status quo of the fragile Bosnian political system.

Finally, the data obtained from different sources illustrates the struggle between the modern vs. traditional streams in the context of democratization of BiH. The real motives of both, the ethno-nationals and the NGOs promoting democracy, are not completely transparent. There is evidence that politicians who appear to be highly inspired by ethno-national motives are instead pretending such. Moreover, they are looking to maximize their political power and material gains by using ethno-nationalism as both the means to achieve their political ends and a cover for their corruption. On the other hand, some of the NGOs promoting democracy have questionable agendas. Recently, in the sub-research question in regards to the question of whether the NGOs work for someone else, it is concluded that there was not enough evidence to prove so, Additionally, such motives were absent among foreign donors. In the context of democracy promotion in Arab world, Ukraine, and Hong Kong-China there could be solid motives for western democracies to promote democracy in the aforementioned regions due to various interests. NGOs could create the necessary democratic momentum to overthrow leaders that don’t comply with the developed democracies. In addition, the NGOs could promote the system that best suits the interests of capitalist democracies. In this context, the NGOs would be used as, presumably, the most efficient and advanced arsenal of the Western democracies. However, in the context of BiH, a clear motive of the West is not present, and several sources claimed the NED sponsored NGOs in BiH working on democracy promotion are not involved in some clandestine agenda. Moreover, the support of NED for the fragile, developing BiH democracy is in order to
consolidate democracy in BiH. Perhaps, it is the only viable way to stabilize of the country, and prevent the next episode of violence in the Balkans.

C. General Conclusions

The general conclusions that can be drawn from the current study regarding the democratic process in BiH focus on several analytical categories or phenomena that were sorted out through the data. These phenomena do not directly correspond to the research questions. They do reflect to the issues covered with the research questions; however, they are the significant findings that are worth further explanation.

The urban vs. rural context in BiH is the most understudied area of democratization in BiH. However, the urban vs. rural contrast relates to several questions in this current study. Almost half of the BiH population lives in rural settings. This population has a lower educational level than that of the urban areas. It was noted that the rural population is the easiest prey for ethno-nationalists propaganda. In addition, as it is elsewhere, rural regions are naturally more conservative and traditional than urban ones.

Further, as mentioned earlier, the NGOs persistently focus on urban areas, neglecting the democratic capacity of the rural areas. According to the 2014 general elections preliminary results in BiH, the voter turnout in rural areas was much higher than in urban areas. In addition, the ethno-nationals focused more on rural areas than did the NGOs promoting democracy. This resulted in the significant triumph of the ethno-nationals in the elections, where they increased their political power. The question
remains, which requires substantial academic scrutiny, why the NGOs were not focusing on rural areas as well in their efforts of democracy promotion, and why the urban population, despite the NGO activism, had such low voter turnout. Answering these questions will perhaps be the topic of another study. However, it might provide crucial data for the democracy development in BiH, and elsewhere.

The shattered society is another phenomenon that require substantial academic scrutiny. The data in this study suggests that the shattered society patterns exist within the BiH society. It is a society that is passive, individual, lacking motivation and solidarity, marked with anticipated corruption that is lacking citizen opposition. It is a society that is difficult to be subject to any democracy promotion program. It is a society that partially appears to be socially disorganized. In addition, the several transitions of BiH society throughout the 20th century, and the democratic transition from 1990 to the present created a resistance by BiH society to transitions and change. These changes took a substantial period for the developed democracies, but in the case of BiH they took substantially less time. There was less time for the people living in BiH to adapt themselves to change. Most important was the swift transition from state socialism to democracy, not allowing citizens to adapt themselves to new democratic trends. In the case of the economy, the transition from agricultural to industrial, and from industrial to consumerist society was even more rapid when compared to develop democracies. Therefore, the volume of changes society needed to absorb was too high compared to the time they had to adapt to new trends.

Although the aforementioned attributes in regards to the BiH society are in general negative, they are only applicable in the context of democracy promotion or
politics. However, the recent floods indicate that BiH society has enormous social capital, where literally the BiH citizens filled the absence of the state in dealing with the disasters. Just hours after the floods hit, society started to organize and respond in the best way to prevent further cataclysm and save lives. It was a simultaneous response of almost a reflexive nature shown by BiH society to deal with the floods of biblical proportions (one third of the country was under water), where the state lacked any capacity to deal with the disaster. Somehow, in the floods once more the old Bosnian maxim “We are good only when we are in trouble!” was tested on the ground by BiH citizens, who responded to the alarming threat faster than the developed Western democracies.

The democracy saga in BiH illustrates one important phenomenon: is the lack of leadership inspired to promote democracy and democratic values in BiH. Further, it is the leadership that will be perceived by the BiH society, as the leadership that will lead towards the equality, transparency, accountability, safety, and security of its citizens, similar to the one they enjoyed during Tito’s time. These demands for leadership can be attributed as the primary symptoms of a shattered society. Hence, as previously mentioned, there is no viable alternative or opposition to the current ethno-nationalist parties. The BiH citizens comply with corruption and everything that is bad in the country so that the situation will not become even worse, or result in another war that will throw the country 50 years backward. They have pledged their support to the ethno-nationals in recent elections; however a myriad of evidence suggests that the citizens of BiH are waiting for a new leadership with a new way for the future.
The citizens of BiH also criticize the outcomes of capitalist democracy. In addition, they are also fed up with the ethno-nationalism. Therefore, the data obtained throughout the four years the current study was developed indicates that BiH citizens are looking for a new way. It is not either complete capitalist democracy nor ethno-national statehood. It can be concluded that they are looking for the political system best described by Gidden’s (2000) study, the concept known as a third way: a symbiosis of traditional and modern values. This system will show a close resemblance to the ex-Yugoslavian political system that BiH citizens are accustomed to. However, the system will adopt the necessary foundations of democracy as a guarantee of equality, pluralism, human rights, transparency, accountability, a liberal economy, etc. At the same time the system will promote and support the traditional values nurtured by the constituent nations, and others living in BiH.

Although there is little indication that the political leaders anticipated by BiH society will emerge soon, the data obtained from NGO interviews and direct observations indicates that youth is the hope for democracy in BiH. During the interviews one could observe that the youth was both democratically inspired, and responsive to their traditions. However, they are driven by problem solving policies, and evaded talking about cultural differences or ethno-national issues. They are aware of the bloody past, yet confident about a better future.

Most importantly, it was evident that they are motivated to make changes in the suffering BiH society.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

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Lies 2 7

Comprehension 3 6

Democracy-Misinterpreted, Misunderstood 4 5

Shattered Society 2 4

Daytonian accords 2 3

Corruption 100 Families 2 3

Daytonian Gridlock 3 3

Current Situation Pos. 1 2

NGOs and Local Community + 1 1

Large number of reforms and transitions 1 1

Dayton Criticism 1 1

Deliberatively changed truth about the past 1 1

Control over media 3 6

Biased Media 1 2

Ex-Yugoslavia’s political system-remnants 3 5

Cooperation between IC and NGOs 1 4

The challenges NGOs are facing. They can be the current political system, corruption, misinterpretation of democracy and NGOs job similar.

The ideological remnants, and memories from previous political system in BiH. It appears that people in BiH still have substantial admiration for socialism.

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<td>Imposing the values from above</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9 This set refers to the impact that international organization and NGOs have on the process of nation-building and democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to international NGOs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Promotion Criticism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 This set refers to criticism addressed at democracy promotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values promoted</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of values NGOs are promoting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Transplant POSITIVE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Values existing in Society</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Transplant NEGATIVE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grafting Democracy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revelation of Democratic Values</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Differences</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Donors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Donors-Justifying resources used in project to their tax payers and supporters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors-need for better selection of NGOs to do the job</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This set of analytical categories refers to foreign donors, describing their role and impact in the democratization in BiH.
Despite the importance of formal education is not frequently addressed in previous studies, several references and data sources imply that the role of education in democracy promotion is of paramount importance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-national Politics</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism vs. ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians using ethno-national rhetoric to hide the real problems</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government not Supporting NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen in Ethno-nationals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs under the attack of Ethno-nationals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO being subject to accusations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence on ethno-national funding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital interests of the entity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This set refers to the issues related to ethno-nationals’ strategies to control the process of democracy promotion. It also refers to current political issues in the country. It describes the ethno-national NGOs, funding, control over media and etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scarcity</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of resources affecting NGOs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of available funding for NGOs activities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced funding increasing efficacy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This set refers to the issues related to funding. How the scarcity of funding is crippling the NGOs in BiH, as well as how it plays role in the shift of their initial goals and missions.

| US vs. EU strategy | 1 | 1 |

Some studies, and informants respond indicate on the differences between the U.S. and the EU strategy of funding, grants, and projects related to the democracy promotion in BiH.

<p>| US role | 2 | 2 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Value 1</th>
<th>Value 2</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncoordinated Efforts of IC NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>This sets refers to the negative criticism towards the strategies of International Community in BiH in regards to democracy promotion. They indicate on the issues that IC created over years in BiH that impedes the process of democratization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference of International Community</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misinterpretation of Bosnian Context by International Community</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC neglecting pre-existing signs of democracy in BiH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The influence of IC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC created NGOs as a new form of entrepreneurship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC Passive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NGO's Impact</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>This set refers to the impact that NGOs had in the process of democratization in BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernity vs. traditionalism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>This set refers to the last research question that represents the struggle between the ethno nationalism vs. liberal democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED-Positive</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>NED related views, and opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonists of Nation-building</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The opposition (academia, politicians and etc.) regarding the nation-building and democracy promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift of nation-building strategy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Strategy of NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>This set refers to the analytical categories related to NGOs. Their strategies, effectiveness, and some miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of the NGOs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NGOs complained | 2 | 3 |
---|---|
NGO as a new thing | 1 | 1 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGOs as foreign agents</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Authenticity</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shifting focus and mission of NGOs</td>
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<td>Public not supporting NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donor seeking Behavior NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative Criticism of NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monopoly</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low capacity of NGOs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs as foreign agents</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO doesn't serve its purpose</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low impact NGOs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Underdevelopment of NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs as prostitutes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectization</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO short term projects</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs donor seeking behavior</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO sector as a new form of entrepreneurship</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO underdeveloped</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blending in</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermining the authentic civil movements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambiguous NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO Sector underdeveloped</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs coerced</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. NGOs as a new sector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Criticism of NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If there was no NGO sector</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs gain on image</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the activities of NGOs do not reflect the underlying problems in Bosnia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative Increase</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs as business</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Control of NGOs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghost NGOs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This set refers to the issues created or those that can be attributed to NGOs. It is comprised of criticism regarding the current strategies of NGOs. It encompasses their projects, activities, image, behavior and different sorts of issues regarding the NGOs involved in the process of nation-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values seen as a priority</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO priority-Economic policies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness increasing of BiH citizens</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH as a bad example</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstractness of the state</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What can be done</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Support NGOs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban vs. rural context</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of the Youth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth coming together</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people living the country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This set refers to analytical categories related to priorities in regards to democracy promotion in BiH. Resolving the issues being described by these analytical categories will significantly improve the work of NGOs.

The issues that significantly impede the democratization process in BiH and NGOs activism in the field of democracy promotion.

Suggestions for improvement

Support towards the NGO activism by BiH citizens.

The most understudied aspect of democracy promotion in BiH. This analytical category set refers to the issues

This set of analytical categories indicates that the youth is critical to the development of democracy. It addresses some issues in regards to the youth aspect of NGO activism.