

**Genocide Education in Cambodia: Local Initiatives, Global
Connections**

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A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School—Newark

Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Global Affairs

Written under the direction of

Professor Alexander Hinton

and approved by

Newark, New Jersey

May 2015

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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The content and pedagogy of genocide education in Cambodia has been effectively connected to the changing patterns of the country's political regimes. This relationship clearly demonstrates the link between history, politics and pedagogical practices in schools. Not only do history and national politics shape the way the Cambodian genocide is taught, but the teaching is also influenced by the flows of global education philosophies in general and certain segments of global genocide education ideas and strategies in particular.

This dissertation primarily asks two core questions: In what ways do history and national political changes determine the ways Cambodia teaches about the genocide? In what way does Cambodian genocide education adopt and adapt global genocide education practices? Responding to these two primary questions, the dissertation examines how history and political changes in Cambodia bring about the changes in the statuses of its genocide education. Further, the dissertation explores the local initiatives and global connections that help in mainstreaming Cambodian genocide education. From this perspective, the dissertation examines how global genocide education practices have manifested, vernacularized, transmitted and circulated into the context of Cambodia.

The dissertation argues that the prevailing national political developments have constrained, or at certain junctures dictated, the content of Cambodian genocide

education: the way teachers convey messages in the classrooms; the choices of historical content; the methods used to teach about the genocide; and the way people view, discuss and debate the Khmer Rouge (KR) period. Based on the theory of vernacularization developed by Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, the dissertation further argues that global genocide education practices find their way into Cambodia and influence and intersect with local genocide education initiatives through a vernacularization process in which global ideas and strategies are translated, appropriated and harmonized with the local context and culture. These intertwined global-local genocide education practices provide overall parameters for the approach to be taken and are applied to a variety of relevant teaching models and materials that enrich the existing local genocide education content.

Theoretically, the dissertation research contributes to an understanding of global genocide education in general and Cambodian experiences in particular, as well as to an understanding of how globalization and localization function in this important area of education. In particular, the dissertation contributes to an understanding of how and why certain dominant global genocide education practices have arisen in genocide education efforts around the globe; how and why these dominant global practices have affected genocide education in post-conflict Cambodia; and how and why local Cambodian initiatives have adopted, modified and reconciled those dominant global genocide education practices to adapt to the local educational contexts and the local country conditions. It also shows how the choice to adopt particular features of prevailing dominant global practices has great consequences for the local genocide education programs and their social impacts.

The dissertation uses multiple research methods including qualitative study (semi-structured interviews), archival research, secondary research, and classroom observations in order to provide both comprehensive and in-depth analyses.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research, writing and completion of the dissertation required a long and complicated process and much hard work. The completion of the dissertation would not have been possible without assistance, encouragement, inspiration and suggestions from several people. I am deeply indebted to DC-Cam's Director, Youk Chhang, who has constantly and tirelessly encouraged me and offered me the opportunity for both personal and professional growth. He not only founded DC-Cam, but also pioneered and oversaw the Cambodian genocide education project, which became a cornerstone and a central theme of this dissertation.

I am most grateful to my dissertation chairperson, Professor Alexander Hinton, who has patiently reviewed several drafts of my dissertation and helped to improve it. Since I began my Master's study program at Rutgers Newark in Fall 2007 and began my PhD study in 2009, Professor Hinton has unstintingly given me academic advice and personal and professional encouragement. My enrollment in two of his courses (*Holocaust, Genocide and Human Rights* and *Global Justice*) strengthened and inspired me as I worked on this dissertation research topic. Likewise, I would like to thank Professor Tomas La Pointe and Professor Nela Navarro of the Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights. They have helped me in many ways since I began my study at Rutgers Newark in 2007.

The critical and insightful advice of three other dissertation advisers has improved the rigor of the arguments in this dissertation. I am indebted to Professor John D. Ciorciari, Assistant Professor at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of

Michigan; Professor Frank Chalk, Professor of History and Director, the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies at Concordia University, Canada; and Professor Jean-Marc Coicaud, Professor of Global Affairs and Director of the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers. Professor Ciorciari has been with me since the development of the dissertation proposal. He has helped me shape and streamline the direction of the dissertation. Professor Chalk, one of the fathers of genocide education, has enlightened me about global genocide education practices and the highly contested meaning of "genocide." Professor Coicaud has given me insight into the relationship between localization and globalization which is one of the theoretical approaches of the dissertation.

My dissertation would not be as accurate as it is without critical peer review from Chris Dearing, Christine Su and Jillian Nowak. I would also like to thank all my friends at DC-Cam, who have helped me in many ways during the dissertation writing process. I would like to especially thank Peou Dara Vanthan, Kokthay Eng, Farina So, Sok-Kheang Ly, Sovann Mam, Sophat Mam, Socheat Nhean, Samphors Huy, Lim Ky, Terith Chy, Long Aun and Bunthorn Som as well as many other friends whose names I could not all list here.

I am also deeply indebted to the many national, provincial and commune teachers who shared their educational experiences and insights through several stages of interviews. Twenty national teachers from the Ministry of Education travelled with me around the country to conduct classroom observations, surveys with teachers and students, and the interviews which substantially inform my dissertation research.

I would like to express gratitude to Ms. Ann Martin, DGA Associate Director, for her technical help and advice on the planning of my studies and my dissertation research. Thanks also go to Ms. Desiree Gordon, DGA administrative assistant, for her untiring administrative support. I am indebted to the Graduate School of Rutgers (Newark), especially Dean Claire Bautista, who has provided me with financial support since I embarked on my Master's degree studies at Rutgers in fall 2007. I would also like to thank Ms. Jeannie Wang, Director of the Office of International Student and Scholar Services (OISS), for facilitating the documents necessary for my travels in and out of the United States.

Finally, I would like express my wholehearted gratitude to my family, especially my wife Sokun Say, who helped me catalogue my research documents. She has been with me all along the way to this success.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AKP	Agence Kampuchea Press
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCM	Centre of Conflict Management
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CESCR	Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CGHR	Center for the Study of Genocide, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights
CGJA	Cambodia Genocide Justice Act
CGP	Cambodian Genocide Program
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CNRP	Cambodia National Rescue Party
CORKR	Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CRC	Committee on the Rights of the Child
CTM	Cambodian Tribunal Monitor
CTN	Cambodian Television Network
DC-Cam	Documentation Center of Cambodia
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
EFA	Education for All
FHO	Facing History and Ourselves
FTP	Facing the Past
IAGS	International Association of Genocide Scholars
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICP	Indochinese Communist Party
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice

ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
INoGS	International Network of Genocide Scholars
ITF	International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
KR	Khmer Rouge
KRT	Khmer Rouge Tribunal
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIGS	Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PGD	Prolonged Grief Disorder
PRCK	People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PRPK	People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RAC	Royal Academy of Cambodia
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
RUPP	Royal University of Phnom Penh
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UFNSK	United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea
UNCG	United Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

USHMM	United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VPA	Victim Participation Project
W2I	Willing 2 Intervene
WCEFA	World Conference on Education for All

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: RATIONALES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Chapter One provides the rationale for the study, thesis statements, theoretical frameworks and key terminologies of the dissertation, laying out the theories of globalization and vernacularization around which the dissertation revolves. Finally, the chapter introduces the research methodologies employed in this research and the dissertation outline.

1. Rationales of the Study

Three main reasons form the conviction for this dissertation research. (1) First of all, this study is deeply grounded in my first-hand experiences with the legacies of the Cambodian genocide as a child in a remote Cambodian village; my experiences from primary to tertiary schools as a student; and my professional experiences at the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) as a writer, author and researcher.

When I was at primary school in my hometown in the Northeast province of Kratie, which is situated about 340 kilometers from the capital city of Phnom Penh, I was educated about the ferocious acts of the KR against the Cambodian people. From grade 1 to grade 5 (1987-1991), I studied the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) government-produced textbooks, which identified the KR as blood-sucking monsters and devils who wanted to kill human beings and destroy the whole country. At home my parents also narrated their experience of suffering during the KR regime. My father, an adult at the time, was asked to do labor at a dam construction project in Kampong Thom

province, where he witnessed forced labor and executions. My mother, then a young girl, was asked to collect cow dung and grass to produce fertilizers for the rice fields. The commune office, which was across the road just opposite my house, produced a straw effigy of Pol Pot with black clothes for the kids to hit and kick to express hatred, anger and revenge toward the KR. I also joined the other kids in my village in hitting and kicking the Pol Pot effigy for fun, although I absolutely had no idea who Pol Pot was.

Professionally, I was introduced to the field of genocide studies when I graduated from university and began my volunteer work at DC-Cam in 2003. During this time I was made responsible for reading and cataloguing the KR documents for database research. One year later, I was tasked to lead the newly founded Genocide Education Project. My over ten years of experience as the project team leader of the Genocide Education Project at DC-Cam greatly enhanced the vision of this study. Established in 1995 by Yale University-based Cambodian Genocide Program and becoming an independent local non-governmental organization in 1997, DC-Cam has been documenting and researching the KR atrocities with twin objectives: memory and justice. It is the world largest repository of the KR archives.

Academically, I have attended a number of global genocide education programs, conferences, symposiums and workshops such as the ones held by International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Facing History and Ourselves (FHO), the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, the Salzburg Global Seminar and Georg Eckert Institute. I have also audited undergraduate and graduate courses on genocide as a fellow at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS), Concordia University, and done an internship at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

(USHMM). My knowledge of genocide education around the world grew enormously when I attended the graduate study program of the Division of Global Affairs (DGA) of Rutgers University. It was here that I began a concentration in genocide and human rights.

(2) The development of genocide education in Cambodia has never been thoroughly investigated. Cambodian genocide education has gone through four important stages since its inception in 1979. The first stage (1979-1993) is the politicization of genocide education during the PRK regime. Genocide education was strictly implemented along the lines of the pro-Vietnamese and anti-Chinese Soviet communist model and was strongly influenced by regional and international wars, power struggles, and state policy. It effectively became a vehicle for state political propaganda and was part of the competing power struggles inside and outside Cambodia.

The second stage (1993-2004) emerged when Cambodia transitioned from communism to multi-party democracy. It featured the deletion of the massively politicized, ideological texts to accommodate what the newly elected Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) claimed were the goals of national reconciliation, sustainable peace and political stability. Accounts of the KR years were completely deleted from the school curriculum, and teachers were reluctant to discuss any questions that touched upon KR issues in the classrooms. Exactly two sentences on KR history and Pol Pot were ultimately reintroduced to the school curriculum in 2001, far too little to facilitate the younger generations understanding of their country's extensive encounter with KR mass atrocities.

The third stage (2004-2008) was characterized by the initiatives of a local non-governmental and not-for profit organization, DC-Cam. Through its Genocide Education Project, DC-Cam engaged with the Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (Ministry of Education) to institutionalize genocide education through various educational advocacy works. One success story in this process was the publication and nationwide circulation of an approved textbook, “A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)”, which shaped both public opinion and national policy toward formal genocide education. The textbook helped to increase public awareness of the genocide and to galvanize a movement to address the dire need for a formal curriculum that would teach the history of this genocide to Cambodia’s younger generations, born after the overthrow of the KR regime.

The fourth stage (2008-present) saw the introduction to Cambodia of global genocide education ideas and strategies. DC-Cam is the principal channel through which international stakeholders and institutions influence and inform Cambodian genocide education. In this fourth stage, DC-Cam raised the history of the Cambodian genocide from two sentences in a chapter on Cambodian modern history to its current position, where it occupies an entire chapter of its own. Formal genocide education in Cambodian classrooms is additionally supported by a textbook exclusively devoted to the history of the KR years and a specialized Teacher’s Guidebook, which are used as supplementary materials for students and teachers at the secondary school and high school levels nationwide.

From a marginalized project which donors, educators and practitioners ignored at the outset, DC-Cam’s Genocide Education Project has become a high profile, imperative

national project, leading DC-Cam to be perceived by the Cambodian government as a strategic partner not only in preserving the memory of the KR years, but for promoting historical empathy, national reconciliation, and genocide prevention. Moreover, thanks to the Genocide Education Project, the Government of Cambodia now sees DC-Cam as an ally in reforming Cambodia's problematic education system. The integration into the Cambodian curriculum of global genocide education practices served as a catalyst, helping Cambodia to adopt, adapt, modify and reconcile global educational practices with the country's educational and cultural practices.

Studying the development of genocide education in Cambodia, especially in what ways Cambodians adopt and adapt global practices, is unprecedented. This dissertation research, the first ever of its kind, will contribute greatly to the on-going discussion of the field of genocide education. The four main stages of the development of genocide education in Cambodia provide a structural framework for the dissertation and analyses of the relationships between the global flows and local adoptions.

(3) During the course of this dissertation research, I had the opportunity to interview and talk to a number of local educators (people from and/or working in post-conflict countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Armenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey, Syria, Kenya, Ghana, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Israel, Palestine, India, Pakistan and Uganda) as well as international experts and scholars working on Holocaust and genocide education, history education and textbook and curriculum development and research. Two contradictory trends can be detected when speaking to Holocaust and/or genocide education specialists in America,

Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.¹ Interviewing an educator from Facing History and Ourselves, I was told, "We don't go to them [educators in post-conflict countries] and ask them to implement our approaches in their classrooms. They approach us and ask for our assistance."² Interestingly, this description was contradicted by educators and curriculum designers from post-conflict countries where FHO collaborates on genocide education programs. An educator from South Africa told me, "We don't go to them; they come to us."³ This contradiction illuminates some questions that this study will address: Do post-conflict countries seek out genocide education approaches from the West and apply these approaches to their localities or do these post-conflict countries put a stamp on their own initiatives, albeit using filtered interpretations of global practices? Is the growth of global genocide education models and their influence on post-conflict practices related to the resources of the institutions advancing them?

There has been little scholarly study of the relationship between global and local currents in genocide education, including a variety of local initiatives. Indeed, local initiatives and the global flow of dominant global genocide education programs have formed the main force behind the development of genocide education in post-conflict countries. The literature on genocide education in post-conflict countries is even smaller. One can hardly find papers or articles discussing the development of genocide education in Cambodia, Rwanda and South Africa. The under-researched subject of the development of genocide education in Cambodia and the limited understanding of the


¹ Some of these programs were subsequently expanded to countries in Asia and Africa.

² Dy Khamboly's interview with an educator from Facing History and Ourselves (FHO), interviewed via Skype, February 1, 2013.

³ Khamboly Dy's interview with an educator in South Africa, textbook and teaching program developer of the Ministry of Education of South Africa, Skype interview between South Africa and Cambodia, February 11, 2013; Khamboly Dy's interview with Yael Siman, founder and director of "Nenemi Paxia," Skype interview between Mexico and Cambodia, February 19, 2013.

interconnectedness and influences circulating between global genocide education and local initiatives together with my personal, professional and academic experiences and research on genocide education form the path-breaking ground which this dissertation explores.

Diagram 1: Developments of Genocide Education in Cambodia



2. Thesis Statement and Questions

This dissertation examines the relationship between politics and the way genocide education is delivered in post-conflict Cambodia. In addition, it reveals how local genocide education initiatives lay the groundwork for genocide education and build pathways to global genocide education practices. Finally, the dissertation explores how Cambodians adopt, adapt and reconcile global education practices, selecting which practices should be appropriated and how they should be applied in the local cultural and the Cambodian national context. The thesis pursues answers to two questions: In what ways do history and national political changes determine the ways Cambodia teaches about the genocide? In what way does Cambodian genocide education adopt and adapt global genocide education practices?

The dissertation argues that the political development of Cambodia has constrained, and to some degree dictated, the content of genocide education including the

way teachers convey messages in the classrooms, the substance of the history they teach about the Cambodian genocide and political conflicts, the methods used to teach about the genocide, and even the way the people of Cambodia view, discuss and debate about KR mass atrocities. The vagaries of Cambodia's national politics, not the influence of educational theory, have often determined the content and accuracy of teaching about the history of the KR period, with all its complexities, in Cambodia.

Second, the dissertation argues that Cambodian genocide education adopts and adapts global genocide education practices through a vernacularization process. The vernacularization of genocide education takes place around four central concepts: historical empathy (compassion, tolerance, and forgiveness), memory, genocide prevention and national reconciliation, all of which comprise vital components of the Cambodian genocide education values package, the overall genocide education objectives. The dissertation further argues that the vernacularization process takes place unevenly and is driven by a number of factors, including the social position of the vernacularizers; the social, political and historical contexts of the teaching locality; the process of appropriation; the local perception of the genocide education values package; and the channels and technology used to communicate the values package. In each Cambodian community, educators shape genocide education initiatives whose content and priority in the curriculum is influenced by local political discourses and their fluctuations over the past three decades. The classroom outcomes of the never ending vernacularization process around which this dissertation revolves are always partly the product of compromise and reconciliation between global genocide education practices and local initiatives.

3. Theoretical frameworks

The theoretical approach of this study will make use of the theory of globalization and the theory of vernacularization to understand the intertwining of global-local genocide education practices with the processes of transmitting, translating, appropriating and integrating global practices into local educational realities. The dissertation research is analyzed within the frames of these two theoretical frameworks which illuminate how global genocide education values packages are vernacularized.

Theory of Globalization

A political scientist, Jan Aart Scholte, explains globalization as a contested concept and a multidimensional process, inviting numerous debates from a number of academic disciplines.⁴ It is a process that has evolved for centuries and is both integrative and fragmented. Globalization scholar, John Tomlinson, adds that the globalization process spreads ideas, culture, norms, values and knowledge to certain localities⁵ through a variety of mechanisms such as Western hegemony, technological innovation, the flow of civilization and/or human migration and networking. An upsurge in the global migration of ideas, which Scholte refers to as “respatialization,” incorporates flows of culture, norms, values and knowledge from the United States (hereinafter the U.S.) and the West to the rest of the world. It allows the U.S. and Western countries to dominate global politics, the global economy, global education and, in our case, global genocide education practices.⁶ These globalization mechanisms underlie the intertwining of

⁴ Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 15-20.

⁵ John Tomlinson, “Globalization and Cultural Analysis,” in *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 164.

⁶ Jan Aart Scholte, 15-17.

globalization and localization, promoting the currents of ideas flowing between the wealthy Western countries and poorer non-Western countries, as well as how they shape each other.

The globalization process and its associated mechanisms are directly relevant to the evolution of post-conflict genocide education in Cambodia, which has been the product of global and local forces circulating between the dominant developed countries and the developing countries. As political scientist, James N. Rosenau, puts it, the local political order is, in many ways, influenced by the global, and the accumulations of local activities can have strong implications for the global order.⁷

Theories of globalization well elucidate the antagonistic relationship between global and local efforts in constructing contemporary genocide education in post-conflict societies. The globalization mechanisms and global flows of ideas, as well as the experiences of post-conflict societies, help explain how certain dominant global genocide education practices find their ways into post-conflict societies and influence their local genocide education initiatives.

Theory of Vernacularization

Sociologist Peggy Levitt and anthropologist Sally Merry define “vernacularization” as “the process of appropriation and local adoption of globally generated ideas and strategies.”⁸ In other words, vernacularization is a process in which the local vernacularizers and local people make sense of global practices, which are vernacularized to fit into the local historical, social and cultural contexts, thereby

⁷ James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 251.

⁸ Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, “Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States,” *Global Networks* 9, no. 4 (2009): 441-461.

producing shared notions without marginalizing the global principles. The success of vernacularization depends on a number of key factors including the ideas contained within the global values packages, the social position of the vernacularizers, framing the ways ideas are presented to encourage collective action, the channels and technologies through which ideas flow, and the geographies of history and culture.⁹ Levitt and Merry further argue that the vernacularization process commonly differs in different settings and takes different forms depending on the above key factors.¹⁰

The theory of vernacularization is significantly related to the overall theme of this study and helps to explain how global genocide education practices are transmitted into and connected with local Cambodian initiatives, creating shared notions that encourage collective actions and approaches to genocide education. In Cambodia, both national and international stakeholders, especially local teachers, are the primary vernacularizers who shape and decide on which global flows to appropriate. As Levitt and Merry point out, the social position of such vernacularizers is key to how the ideas of genocide education values packages are framed and in what way they are vernacularized.

4. Terminology

Genocide and *genocide education* are key terms in this dissertation. They embody theoretical concepts that need to be clearly explained as they are often used in what follows. Consequently, the dissertation will explain the general concept of genocide, as well as specific concepts such as global genocide education and local Cambodian genocide education initiatives.

⁹ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 446.

¹⁰ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 441.

What is Genocide?

Genocide is not a recent human tragedy. Genocide scholars agree that genocide and acts of genocide have existed in all parts of the world and throughout human history. As genocide scholars such as Leo Kuper, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn point out, while genocide has existed since antiquity, the concept remains hotly contested.¹¹

The departure point for exploring the meaning of genocide is the legal definition of genocide contained in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. Article II of the Convention defines the term *genocide* as follow:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The legal definition of genocide has been criticized for its shortcomings, the fact that it narrowed the scope of what can be considered ‘genocide.’ Its narrowed scope carried important consequences including significantly marginalizing the prevention efforts which could be employed to address the phenomena excluded from the legal definition, as well as the constellation of acts that eventually fell under the rubric of crimes against humanity. Genocide scholars have repeatedly asked several hard questions

¹¹ Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 9. Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (Routledge/Taylor & Francis Publishers, 2006), 3. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), Part One.

related to the legal definition of genocide. Should 'social groups' and 'political groups' be included in Article II of the UNGC, which lists the protected groups by the legal definition of genocide? What is the meaning of the terms “as such” and “in whole or in part” in Article II? What acts constitute incitement to commit genocide under article III of the UNGC? What are the obligations of states party to the UNGC to prevent genocide under its terms? These questions greatly inform genocide studies as they have evolved over the past four decades.

A number of genocide scholars have argued that the legal definition of "genocide" does not capture an adequate range of vulnerable groups. The definition only focuses on "national, racial, ethnical and religious groups," groups whose boundaries are often subject to different interpretations. In addition, the mental state of "intent" to commit acts of genocide has always been difficult to prove, as shown by the proceedings before the international criminal courts.¹² From 1959 to the present, at least twenty-two genocide scholars have attempted to redefine genocide by offering a more practical definition grounded on their studies of genocidal cases in Africa, Asia, Europe and elsewhere. These efforts enrich and directly contribute to the growth of the field of genocide studies. The fathers of genocide studies have argued for a broader definition that would include in Article II political and social groups thus covering a wider variety of mass killings in the modern-day world. Leo Kuper, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonnasohn are among the advocates for the inclusion of "political groups." They believe the destruction of political and social

¹² Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 57-73.

groups signals the subsequent genocidal acts against national, racial, ethnical and religious groups.¹³

In 1959, Pieter Drost took the initiative to revisit the definition of genocide. For Drost, "genocide is the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any human collectivity as such."¹⁴ Like most genocide scholars, Drost assailed the UN genocide definition for its exclusion of political groups, which would allow perpetrators to exploit this weakness. Following in Drost's footsteps, Vahakn Dadrian in 1975 began to look into the definition in his article entitled "A Typology of Genocide". The debates on the definition were also bolstered by Irving Louis Horowitz in his work *Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder* (1976) and Leo Kuper's book *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (1981) and *The Prevention of Genocide* (1985).

During the 1990s, as the number of scholars in the field of genocide studies began to proliferate, more definitions were coined to respond to the two most critical concerns of genocide scholars: genocide definition and prevention. These scholars include Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990), Helen Fein (1993), Steven T. Katz (1994), and Israel Charny (1994). The search for a practical scholarly definition of genocide continued into the 2000s. The latest definition was given by a genocide scholar and historian, Donald Bloxham in 2009. Bloxham defined genocide as "the physical destruction of a large

¹³ Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

¹⁴ Ibid., Adam Jones, 16-22

portion of a group in a limited or unlimited territory with the intention of destroying that group's collective existence."¹⁵

Genocide scholars use different case studies to explore the definition of genocide. However, as Adam Jones writes, they converge around the elements that form their definitions including agents, victims, goals, and scale.¹⁶ From the 1990s, scholars identify the agents of genocide more broadly, shifting their strategy from state-centric approaches to a simple agent. As Adam Jones rightly observes, the agents have shifted from "state bureaucratic apparatus, government or its agents, state or other authority" to "perpetrator, armed power organizations, whatever agents."¹⁷ Nonetheless, states continue to be effective agents in conducting genocide or acts of genocide, and the study of the role of the state in carrying out the elements of the crime of genocide defined in Article III of the UNGC and other forms of mass violence remains centrally important.

In coining new definitions, genocide scholars find that defining the victims of genocide is more controversial and challenging. The target groups are diverse, including "minorities, civilians, non-combatants, essential defenselessness, and innocent and helpless." Leo Kuper stands out for his decision to include the "political group," while Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonnasohn argue that the perpetrators define the group, assigning individuals to it according to their own criteria, not those of the social sciences.¹⁸ Chalk and Jonnasohn's defined victim group creates a bigger umbrella to protect the vulnerable victims as their definition attempts to eliminate the exclusion of any possible vulnerable

¹⁵ Donald Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), (Kindle edition, kindle location 440).

¹⁶ Ibid., Adam Jones, 21.

¹⁷ Ibid., Adam Jones.

¹⁸ Leo Kuper, *The Prevention of Genocide*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), 126-148. See also Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonnasohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), 23.

groups from the definition by leaving open the nature of the target group and focusing on the perpetrator's definition of the group slated for destruction in whole or in part. The other scholars who attempt to redefine genocide stand on this core concept. Scholars employ several terms to explain the goals of the perpetrators. Their terms include "destruction, eradication, denationalization, [and] extermination." The scale of the killing which constitutes genocide varies from one definition to another. The range of killing varies from "in its totality and total destruction" to "in whole or in part, in whole or in large part, mass murder, [and] substantial casualties."¹⁹

Another definitional issue that arises among scholars working in genocide studies is the introduction of new terms including *politicide*, *ethnocide*, *ecocide*, *gendercide*, *democide*, *autogenocide*, *genocidal massacre*, *ethnic cleansing*, *mass murder*, and *mass atrocity crimes*.²⁰ Although these concepts have been widely analyzed and debated, only ethnic cleansing has been criminalized under international law (see the statutes of the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).

Legal scholars such as William Schabas and David Scheffer propose shifting the debate on the UNGC to agree on a more practical and accurate term than genocide that would meet the need for a timely and collective response to the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing as laid out in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. While William Schabas advocates the establishment of a

¹⁹ For a chronology of genocide definitions by genocide scholars from the late 1950s to the present and the discussions about the agents, victims, goals and scales, please see Adam Jones "Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction," p. 16-22.

²⁰ Ibid., Dominik J. Schaller, 251.

UN Convention on Crimes against Humanity,²¹ David Scheffer offers the composite concept of “atrocities crimes” as the framing principle of “atrocity law.”²² Scheffer believes that with this new concept, governments and international organizations, as well as scholars, will be liberated from the constraint of obscurity and ambiguity that surrounds the contemporary term of “genocide.” Parallel to the proposals of Schabas and Scheffer, scholars such as Christian Gerlach propose focusing greater inquiry onto the concept of an “extremely violent society” as an alternative to the narrower legal concept of genocide.²³

Over the past six decades, since the adoption of the 1948 UNGC, genocide scholars, lawyers and politicians have not reached a consensus on the genocide definition. Despite this lack of consensus, customary international law has largely arisen around the UNGC’s definition as it has come to be an established reference in the foundational documents for a number of international institutions including the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and, most recently, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Despite much dissatisfaction, the UNGC, as Scott Straus has claimed, “is a benchmark for genocide scholars and an important place to begin a review of definitions.”²⁴ In any circumstance, these legal and non-legal debates set the ground for broader debates on alternative

²¹ William Schabas, “What is Genocide? What Are the Gaps in the Convention? How to Prevent Genocide?” *Politorbis*, Nr. 47-2/2009, 33-46. Also see William Schabas, “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” United Nations: United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008, <http://www.un.org/law/avl> (accessed on July 15, 2014).

²² David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no. 3 (December 2006): 229-250.

²³ Christian Gerlach, “Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 455-471.

²⁴ *Ibid.* Scott Straus, 361.

measures for genocide prevention; one alternative that this dissertation focuses on is the increasingly growing field of genocide education.

Genocide Education

Genocide education is one of the non-judicial and non-violent mechanisms for genocide prevention and also one of the components of the transitional justice enterprise. Genocide education can be conducted either in a formal school program with specific course content, rigorous methods and specific teaching objectives or in informal settings such as community dialogues, public forums and even at the homes of victims and perpetrators. Genocide education can also take the form of memorialization through memorials, museum exhibitions and tours. Likewise, genocide education curricula vary from one institution to another and are often contextualized within a particular educational and cultural context. While one curriculum may start with the history of one case of genocide, other educators may introduce courses employing comparative genocide studies. Some curricula examine on the motives of the perpetrators of genocide, while others may focus on the bystanders and the individual survivors' stories to offer a larger picture of genocide.

Genocide education is most commonly linked to Holocaust education, which, for many Holocaust scholars, serves as a starting point to teach about other genocide cases. However, the emerging genocide scholars argue that Holocaust should not be treated as a precondition or a template against which to judge all other genocides.²⁵ Genocide education is also linked to human rights education as genocide is one of the worst forms

²⁵ Presentation by Professor Joyce Apsel, a genocide scholar and Professor of Liberal Studies Program at New York University, at a symposium held by Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University, April 11-13, 2013.

of grave human rights violations. Genocide education is taught across a variety of disciplines including international law, history, political science, sociology or anthropology. The topics range from cases of genocide and theory of genocide to causes of genocide, genocide denial and genocide and the respect of human rights. Similarly, the fundamental focus of human rights education aims at developing a common responsibility of all state members, relevant institutions and stakeholders to contribute to “the long-term prevention of human rights abuses and violent conflicts, the promotion of equality and sustainable development and the enhancement of people’s participation in decision-making processes within democratic system.”²⁶ Certain overlapping areas that both genocide education and human rights education aim at are promoting stability and harmony within communities, mutual understanding, tolerance and peace.

Although the subject of the Holocaust appears to remain dominant over other cases of genocide, the field of genocide studies appears in the curricula of many universities around the world.²⁷ The field of genocide studies has been dramatically expanded in recent years, directing scholarship in several critical directions.²⁸ One of the new emerging topics in this field has been comparative genocide studies, particularly the convergence between Holocaust studies and genocide studies. In this new framework, genocide scholars have paid great attention to the reconsideration of Raphael Lemkin’s

²⁶ For the details on context, definition and objectives of human rights education, please visit the statement of the World Conference on Human Rights held on 14-25 June 1993 in Vienna, Austria, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx>. Also view Volume VIII of Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center at http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/human_rights_education_in_asian_schools/section2/2005/03/plan-of-action-for-the-first-phase-2005-2007-of-the-world-programme-for-human-rights-education.html (accessed on October 30, 2014).

²⁷ A. Dirk Moses, “Revisiting a Founding Assumption of Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, 3 (December 2011): 287-300.

²⁸ Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, 1 (April 2012): 4-15.

original definition of genocide. In his original draft, Lemkin defined genocide as the act of annihilating many groups including “political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral.”²⁹ Lemkin did not make any effort to differentiate the Holocaust from other cases of genocide.³⁰ That said, genocide studies is no longer subordinate to Holocaust studies as a field.³¹ In the latest stage of its development, genocide studies has been seen to intersect multi-disciplinarily with other fields of study, such as, “indigenous studies, philosophy, cultural studies, visual and literary arts, semiotics, and critical theory.”³² Simultaneously, genocide scholars are also shifting the attention to many forgotten cases of possible genocide, such as the mass killings of political groups under Stalin and Maoist China, as well as such topics as colonial genocide, “conquest, settler societies, and modernity.”³³ These topics, which have all been in the periphery of the field of genocide studies to date, call for a new need of what anthropologist Alex Hinton has termed “critical genocide studies.”³⁴

Global Genocide Education

Global genocide education in this study refers to the dominant influence in the field of Holocaust education programs that have emerged since World War II. Holocaust education is characterized by the use of teaching methods to encourage dialogues and survivors' participation that encourage the students to develop historical empathy and discourage them from romanticizing history. In addition, Holocaust education shapes human behavior for the purpose of implementing the slogan “never again” to prevent the

²⁹ Alexander Hinton, *Genocide: An Anthropological Reader*, (Blackwell Publishing, 2001), p. 29-35.

³⁰ Ibid. A Dirk Moses, p. 295.

³¹ Ibid. Alexander Laban Hinton, p. 4.

³² Ibid., Alexander Laban Hinton, p. 7.

³³ Ibid., Alexander Laban Hinton.

³⁴ Ibid., Alexander Laban Hinton, p. 11.

recurrence of genocide. These emerging patterns of Holocaust studies have been implemented globally by a number of public and private institutions among which are Holocaust studies programs designed by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Facing History and Ourselves (FHO) and the Yad Vashem Museum. They have been applied not only in the U.S. and Europe, but also in some parts of Africa and Asia. For instance, Yad Vashem's International School for Holocaust Studies has worked with over forty countries to develop Holocaust education programs that it deems appropriate in those localities. Its educational materials are available in twenty languages, making it one of the dominant global genocide education programs.³⁵ Moreover, the universal moral responsibility to implement the genocide prevention injunction “never again” frequently influences global genocide education practices in post-conflict genocide education.

Holocaust education gradually developed since 1985 from a discretionary program in the curriculum of high schools of California and Illinois into a growing educational movement that is mandated in three more states, New Jersey, Florida and New York, while it impacts many students across the curriculum in many more American states. Informal learning about the Holocaust is advanced by the immense amount of writing and scholarship on the subject, in addition to radio broadcasts, films, and more recently, e-learning. Today, Holocaust education is a required subject in many American high schools around the world. Besides the United States, laws calling for the teaching of the Holocaust exist in Austria, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Not only has Holocaust education been

³⁵ For additional information, please see official website of Yad Vashem Museum at <http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/school/about.asp> (accessed on January 16, 2013).

institutionalized in a number of countries, but the United Nations now features a program devoted to outreach on behalf of Holocaust education. It is mandated by a General Assembly Resolution and the UN has set aside 27 January as “an annual International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust.”³⁶ Jewish communities around the world actively work to disseminate and finance activities designed to foster awareness of various dimensions of the Holocaust, by sponsoring organizations and institutions to conduct trainings, seminars or conferences. Thanks to these developments, Holocaust education has become a global genocide educational practice.

Local Genocide Education Initiatives

By ‘local initiatives,’ the dissertation refers to genocide educational programs as they have emerged within post-conflict societies. The Cambodian genocide education program that is being promulgated today, for instance, is the product of many different global efforts that combined with local dynamics. There are two paths for transmitting genocide education ideas in Cambodia—the formal one through the state public education system and an informal one via non-governmental organizations such as the Documentation Center of Cambodia, known widely as DC-Cam. In the informal framework, the ECCC is one of the institutions which reinforce the pedagogical effects of the formal genocide education effort. Other contributions to informal education include the public education forum, outreach program, memorial project, museum project, study tour to genocide sites, and radio programs developed by DC-Cam and other civil society

³⁶ The Holocaust and the United Nations Outreach Program, <http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/index.shtml> (accessed on July 15, 2014).

organizations. In spite of the various forms of the Cambodian genocide education, the dissertation concentrates its theoretical analyses within the framework of state-sanctioned genocide education and DC-Cam's efforts and initiatives to engage with the government, international stakeholders and related international institutions to activate a genocide education curriculum in Cambodian public education today.

5. Research Design and Methodology

To examine the emergence, development and vernacularization of contemporary genocide education in Cambodia, I used multiple research methods including qualitative study, archival research, desk research, and classroom observations in order to provide comprehensive and in-depth analyses of genocide education in post-conflict Cambodia and its relation to global genocide education practices.³⁷

Qualitative Study

The qualitative method consisted of semi-structured interviews. I conducted fieldwork by interviewing 78 informants, including former officials of the Ministry of Education who worked on rebuilding the Cambodian education system after the genocide, current government officials and teachers, as well as international scholars working on genocide-related issues. I also interviewed civil society actors whose work involves various forms of genocide education in Cambodia and officials of the ECCC. In addition, I made use of existing interviews conducted by DC-Cam's staff members

³⁷ Valaerie Raleigh Yow, *Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences* (New York: Altamira Press, 2005), 5-8; Ranjit Kumar, *Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners* (South Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman Australian Pty Limited, 1996). Robert M. Groves et al., *Survey Methodology* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004).

including my own interviews with 161 teachers, school directors and local education officials, which I conducted as part of the DC-Cam's quality control project.

Desk Research

While engaged in field research in Cambodia, I benefited from the online resources available at the Dana Library of Rutgers Newark and relevant scholarly journals such as the *Journal of Genocide Research*, *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, the *Journal of Holocaust Education* and *Global Networks*, among others. Given the poor state of library collections in Cambodia, my research is primarily based on electronic resources, both journal articles and the available electronic academic books. I also purchased copies of key academic books to strengthen the conceptualization of the dissertation. My desk research proved especially beneficial for Chapter Two, which investigates the evolution of genocide education and its influences on post-conflict countries' genocide education programs. My desk research using secondary sources also informed my findings in the other chapters of the dissertation.

Archival Research

For the purposes of this dissertation research, I used DC-Cam's archives, which house hundreds of thousands of pages of original KR documents and a collection of textbooks from the 1980s published by the PRK regime and the KR provisional government in exile (1979-1998). In addition, I consulted the relevant archival materials located in the National Library of Cambodia and the internal archives and library of the

Cambodian Ministry of Education. I worked regularly with a variety of Ministry of Education officials who guided me to the relevant documents and social study textbooks published in the 1980s. This archival research especially contributed to the findings in Chapter Three, in which I discuss the politics of teaching genocide during the PRK regime and the politics of the PRK textbooks.

Classroom Observations

As part of DC-Cam's Genocide Education Project, I have led more than ten teacher training workshops nationwide on the teaching of KR history and its teaching methodologies, involving the training of nearly three thousands teachers specializing in History, Geography, Khmer Studies, and Citizen Morality. In this role, I came into contact with all the national, provincial, and commune teachers who participated in the training. Some of them have been working in the educational field for over twenty years. Moreover, from January 2011 to June 2012, I conducted a quality control project to assess the effectiveness and challenges of teaching KR history in Cambodian lower and upper secondary schools. As part of this process, I made 15 trips with 20 national trainers and inspectors from the Ministry of Education to 78 sample schools in 24 provinces and Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. During the trips, I had an opportunity to conduct surveys involving nearly 3,000 teachers and students, to observe approximately 70 classroom teaching sessions and to interview about 300 teachers, students, and local education officials. These interviews and the quality control study results are valuable sources which inform this study.

To further research my subject, I additionally conducted classroom observation in 10 selected high schools in Phnom Penh and in five provinces (Battambang, Prey Veng, Kandal, Takeo and Kampong Cham). During these classroom observations, I conducted more in-depth interviews with teachers in order to clarify unclear points. The classroom observations especially support the findings in Chapter Five, in which I analyze how global and local genocide education approaches interact and are reconciled, and how teachers functioning as secondary vernacularizers translate and vernacularize the global genocide education values packages for Cambodia's local contexts.

Risk Assessments and Risk Control

I have been involved in the Cambodian genocide education program since 2004 and am one of the founders of contemporary genocide education in Cambodia. I am in the unique position of having access to all the necessary information for this dissertation, including reports and other primary documents related to genocide education in Cambodia. I oversee, from time to time, DC-Cam's genocide education activities in order to foster genocide prevention, memory preservation and national reconciliation.

As a participant who has helped to shape and will continue to influence genocide education in Cambodia, and as part of DC-Cam's education project, I am aware of potential conflicts of interest and the challenge of maintaining scholarly neutrality about my dissertation subject. I have striven to be as transparent and as rigorous as possible. I continuously tried to overcome and take account of the ways in which my association with the informants could influence their opinions about the project. There was no way to eliminate my connection to the genocide education project or the teachers and students

who have been involved in it. It was a challenge to try to be neutral in the context within which I worked. However, I have several neutral readers who assisted me to cope with this challenge and overcome it. Moreover, my advisor and committee members have constantly been aware of my roles and monitored my dissertation project to minimize potential bias issues.

A second challenge I faced was to manage the difficult working conditions of teachers and education officials, many of whom have tight class and administrative schedules. Therefore, the interviews took into consideration their teaching and office hours. The interviews were conducted only during their breaks or other free time. Because the history of the KR is still a politically sensitive topic, it was imperative that the interviews be conducted sensitively and with attention to the interviewees' personal situation. Some education officials felt reluctant to participate in an interview that discussed Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia from 1979 to 1989. To mitigate these issues, interviewees were informed of their rights and their option to decline any question or interview. Moreover, anonymity was the core tenet of this research. The names of interviewees were not revealed unless they specifically authorized me to make their names public.

6. Organization of the Dissertation

As stated above, Chapter One introduces the rationale of the study, the conceptual framework, theories and terminologies I used to answer several preliminary questions about the concepts of genocide, genocide education, local genocide education initiatives and global genocide education. Since the study examines the interactions between local

and global genocide education practices, the first chapter briefly looks into the theory of globalization and the theory of vernacularization, which are keys to the entire dissertation.

Chapter Two examines the evolution of genocide education, especially the post-World War Two complexities of Holocaust education. Since Holocaust education and genocide education are often shaped by politics, Chapter Two will provide some of the concrete theory development of the dissertation and offer various examples derived from developed and poor post-conflict countries to substantiate my two core claims. Moreover, Chapter Two will highlight the various global genocide education values packages and how they are transmitted and vernacularized to resonate harmoniously with post-conflict situations. The chapter explores the literature that provides a conceptual overview of global genocide education practices and post-conflict genocide education initiatives.

Chapter Three channels the discussion into a discussion of the case of genocide education in Cambodia and the influence on its national political developments during the 1980s and early 1990s. Genocide education during this period was primarily influenced by communist education models rather than any dominant global practices. It was also under enormous capacity constraints pertaining to a grave loss of teachers from the KR genocide and the severe lack of qualified educators after the genocide.

Chapter Four looks into the second stage of genocide education within Cambodia as it grew increasingly marginalized as a consequence of the search for political compromises leading to peace, national reconciliation and political stability. This Chapter also explores the local political constraints which marginalized the effort to launch new attempts of genocide education in Cambodia. Simultaneously, it explores the initial flow

of global education initiatives that directly or indirectly impacted local Cambodian genocide education initiatives.

Chapter Five examines the early institutionalization of Cambodian genocide education at the inception of DC-Cam's Genocide Education Project. At this time, the detailed history of the KR and genocide content rose from marginal treatment to occupy a chapter of its own in the official curriculum of lower and upper secondary schools. This chapter analyzes what the political motives of the Cambodian government and the international community were in pushing DC-Cam-initiated genocide education into the schools and institutionalizing it.

Chapter Six delves more deeply into the current stage of DC-Cam-pioneered genocide education, in which it began to interact more broadly with global genocide education practices. It provides the final test of my two arguments by addressing how national political development and the deeper penetration of dominant global practices shaped genocide education in Cambodia today.

Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation by highlighting the overall findings and conceptual theoretical contributions of this study, as well as offering recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

GLOBAL GENOCIDE EDUCATION AND VERNACULARIZATION

Chapter Two looks into the emergence and development of global genocide education, tracing its genesis back to the immediate post-World War Two complexities of Holocaust education, and examines the role politics has played in its emergence and development. In evaluating these issues, the chapter explores the flow of Holocaust education from Europe to America and the later flow from Europe to Asia and Africa as a prototype for the migration of genocide education discourse. In this context, the chapter discusses how Holocaust education became a universal reference point for genocide education efforts around the globe and how the field of genocide education became a dominant discursive topic in this global age.

The chapter also looks at how post-conflict countries make sense of global practices and asks: What are the global genocide education values packages and how have they developed, manifested and been vernacularized? Addressing this question, the chapter examines the interactions between global practices and genocide education initiatives in two post-conflict countries: Rwanda and South Africa. These case studies serve as the basis for a theoretical overview of how global practices inform local genocide education initiatives. Overall, Chapter Two develops the theoretical core of the dissertation.

1. The Developments of Holocaust Education

Within the conceptual historical universe, the history of contemporary Holocaust education can be divided into three major phases since the end of World War Two. Its

developments have been determined by the interaction of political, social and emotional conditions. Holocaust education emerged slowly during the early post-war period in which the Holocaust was integrated as part of the larger history of World War Two to the point of Holocaust centrality embedded within debates on "the uniqueness of the Holocaust" from the late 1960s to the 1980s. This second development has led some scholars to conclude that Holocaust education and consciousness may have flourished in the late 1960s, particularly after the 1967 Six-Day war between Israel and neighboring Arab nations, an alarming threat to the future existence of the state of Israel. At the end of the Cold War, Holocaust education progressively grew with more scholars emerging in the field, more publications, more schools and university courses dedicated to the field, and more Holocaust education centers (mostly in North America and Western Europe). The ubiquity of Holocaust consciousness and the success story of Holocaust education have been one of the cornerstones of the proliferation of genocide education efforts in post-conflict countries. The core question here is how Holocaust education has been hindered and/or fostered by the national and international politics and the political agendas of the countries and institutions advancing it.

Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder argue that the three countries prominently facing the legacy of the Holocaust—Germany, Israel and the United States—have different motivations for their treatment of the Holocaust,³⁸ the notions of which are discussed below.

³⁸ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder. "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory," *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 1 (2002): 94.

The Slow Revival

In the immediate post-World War Two period, Holocaust education and consciousness were in slow revival in the face of many immediate historical, emotional, social, and political challenges. It was at a near stage of silence, and the history of the Holocaust did not appear in textbooks for formal education programs until almost ten years later in 1954.³⁹ Holocaust education and consciousness at this juncture was largely limited to the impacts of *The Diary of Anne Frank*, first published in 1947, the judgment of the Nuremburg trials, and such works as the one by Raphael Lemkin outside the formal educational framework. Interestingly, as Peter Novick argues, there was no "Holocaust" but simply a "holocaust" encompassing the other mass murders during World War Two.⁴⁰

The succeeding German regimes were caught in the dilemmas of post-Holocaust German national identity, the question of "collective guilt" or shame over the Nazi crimes, the unwillingness to name the Nazi crimes, and the lack of empathy toward German victims.⁴¹ The conservative nationalist group considered themselves apart from Nazi Germany, claiming that they were also victims and that the crimes committed were organized by a small group of people in the name of Germany. In general, the first German generation after the Holocaust perceived National Socialism and the Holocaust as "a negative stigma" that undermined their national identity.⁴² To the time that Theodor Adorno delivered his inspirational speech entitled "Education after Auschwitz" in 1966,

³⁹ Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education," *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, no. 4 (October 2004): 619-636.

⁴⁰ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, (New York: Mariner Book, 2000), (Kindle edition, p. 133.)

⁴¹ A. Dirk Moses, "Stigma and Sacrifice in the Federal Republic of Germany," *History and Memory*, 19, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2007): 139-180.

⁴² Reinhold Boschki, Bettina Reichmann and Wilhelm Schwendemann, "Education after and about Auschwitz in Germany: Towards a Theory of Remembrance in the European Context," *Prospects*, 40, no. 1 (2010): 140.

Germany appeared to be unprepared to confront the Nazi past in the face of national despair at losing the war and division of the country into two different ideological states, although education ministers of the German Federal State agreed, by 1960 and 1962, to incorporate the history of the Holocaust into social studies curricula nationwide, partly under pressures from the allied forces.⁴³ Historical learning was considered to be a key feature in the state schools, ensuring that another Auschwitz would not be replicated.⁴⁴ However, in a general sense, "the early 1960s provided no basis for any critical or constructive addressing of the Nazi past or issues surrounding the Holocaust, whether in school settings or at home."⁴⁵

In Israel, the history of the Holocaust was subsumed into non-Jewish history and world history. In the 1950s, the main emphasis of Holocaust education was about the Jewish resistance and rebellion, for instance, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, but not the killing of over six million Jews and millions others that shocked the world.⁴⁶ The presentation of these selective, heroic aspects of Holocaust history, in the mind of Jews, would liberate Jewish citizens, especially Jewish youth, from the national humiliation of being depicted, in the words of Gerald Reitlinger, as "passive citizens" guilty of "cowardice" or "incompetence."⁴⁷ These emotional and ideologically biased descriptions indeed attempted to direct the general reader away from the connection between the *Judenräte* and its complicity in the deportation of the Jews from the ghettos as part of

⁴³ Reinhold Boschki, et al.

⁴⁴ Wolfgang Meseth and Matthias Proske. "Mind the Gap: Holocaust Education in Germany, between Pedagogical Intentions and Classroom Interactions," *Prospects* 40, no. 2 (2010): 201-222.

⁴⁵ Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 134-135.

⁴⁶ Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education," *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, no. 4 (October 2004): 619-636.

⁴⁷ Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews in Europe*, (New York: University of Michigan, 2009): 275.

what Raul Hilberg characterizes as the ghetto's "self-destructive machinery"⁴⁸ and its leaders "automatic compliance in their own destruction,"⁴⁹ or what Hannah Arendt characterizes as "the darkest chapter of the whole dark history,"⁵⁰ the national humiliation of the Jewish race. Contrary to these damning images, Holocaust history teaching in Israel aimed to "[give] readers the impression that Jews had joined the Allied Forces to face the Germans in the battlefield"⁵¹ and had made valiant efforts in the daily struggle for self-defense, a representation of Jewish heroism that Yad Vashem has strongly defended since its inception in December 1953.

In addition, the Israeli textbooks emphasized 'statism', the brave *sabra* of the newly born sovereign state of Israel, standing equally to other nation-states in the world. The textbooks further enhanced Ben-Gurion's vision of the new Jews— "the tanned, masculine, brave Jew who countered the pale, fragile, fearful exilic one."⁵² At this early stage, not many Israeli schools expressed their interests in introducing the complexities of the history of the Holocaust. According to Dan A. Porat, a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, only 25.30 percent of the surveyed schools conducted activities related to the Holocaust, and teachers largely avoided discussions about it.⁵³ In addition, the Holocaust survivors were largely ignored, invisible and anonymous, unable to talk about their traumatic experiences during the Holocaust.⁵⁴ Commemoration ceremonies were limited to individuals who had connection to the Holocaust. Surprisingly, the

⁴⁸ Raul Hilberg, "The Ghetto as a Form of Government," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 450 (July 1980): 98-112.

⁴⁹ Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of European Jews*, (New York, 1961): 662-69.

⁵⁰ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (New York, 1963): 117.

⁵¹ Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education.

⁵² Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education.

⁵³ Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education, 623.

⁵⁴ Zehavit Gross, "Holocaust Education in Jewish Schools in Israel: Goals, Dilemmas, Challenges," *Prospects*, 40, no. 1 (2010): 93-113.

official commemoration was not celebrated until 1950 after approval from the Israeli Knesset.

The relative absence of Holocaust education in the early postwar period in the U.S. was tied to cultural, social, and political conditions. The memory of the Holocaust was marginalized by the early contentions of the Cold War in which West Germany was an American ally while America's former ally, the Soviet Union, became its enemy. As part of its geostrategy, the U.S. made an exceptional effort to unify the European states to counter Soviet communist expansion. In the highly charged race for geostrategic leverage in the Cold War, political unity superseded moral and educational endeavors. Thus, awareness about the Holocaust took a backseat to winning over the people in West Germany.⁵⁵ As Peter Novick argues, "the American government was laying the groundwork for the rearmament of Germany, and sweeping the Nazi past into the dustbin of history was the price German elites were extracting for their cooperation in the anti-Soviet crusade."⁵⁶ The main pillar of American foreign policy then was not much about "Nazism" or Holocaust consciousness, but the fight against the spread of communism.⁵⁷

For American Jews and Holocaust survivors in America, talking a great deal about the Holocaust meant naming Germans and their collaborators in other countries as the perpetrators of the Holocaust, and the U.S. as their "passive accomplice", while noting America's failure to act or respond in a meaningful way meant acknowledging that American bystanding cost the lives of millions of innocent people.⁵⁸ Post-war silence about the Holocaust permitted some American Jews to participate in shaping and

⁵⁵ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider. "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory."

⁵⁶ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 90.

⁵⁷ Natan Sznaider, Review of Peter Novick's "The Holocaust in American Life," *Jewish History*, 14, no 2 (2000): 245-251.

⁵⁸ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 159.

implementing US Cold War policies.⁵⁹ On the other hand, some members of the first generation of Holocaust survivors who escaped to the U.S. did not want to acknowledge their victimhood, which they regarded as a legacy of "the Old World" that could jeopardize the status of the Jewish people and distract attention from the fact that many American Jews had served in the U.S. armed forces, a post-war symbol of the Jewish contribution to victory in World War II.⁶⁰ Moreover, a large part of the American people perceived the Holocaust as "a horrifying spectacle" and preferred not to acknowledge it, which Novick calls a "self-protective aversion."⁶¹ According to Novick, "earlier silence was a manifestation of [psychological] repression."⁶²

A wide array of factors shaped post-Holocaust memory in America. From the perspectives of the survivors of the Holocaust, Eric Stover argues that "the atmosphere of denial, self-censorship, and economic survival" were the main factors behind the near silence of survivors.⁶³ Stover claims that in the post-war period "survivors simply wanted to reintegrate quietly and, to whatever extent possible, productively into their communities."⁶⁴ They were in search of an identity in American society which no longer depicted them as a "victimized pariah people."⁶⁵ Novick agrees that the Holocaust survivors' recent arrival in the U.S. isolated them from the social mainstream.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder. "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory."

⁶⁰ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 120.

⁶¹ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 109.

⁶² Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 3.

⁶³ Eric Stover, *The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in the Hague*, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 21.

⁶⁴ Eric Stover, *The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in the Hague*, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 21.

⁶⁵ Eli Lederhendler, Review of Peter Novick's "The Holocaust in American Life," *Jewish Social Studies*, 7, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 2001): 159-168. See also Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 90.

⁶⁶ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 109.

The Jews, as well as the institutions and countries drawing on the Holocaust legacy in the immediate post-war period, were caught in the middle of huge dilemmas about the future fate of the State of Israel and remembering the past, between Holocaust consciousness and the early issues of Cold War politics, and between valiant American fighters against Nazism and a symbol of victimization. Though some genocide scholars may question, or even deny, the claim that these factors shaped Holocaust education and Jewish consciousness at the end of World War II, clearly the Holocaust in the early post-war period was implicated in the slow renewal of American Jewish identity and part of a marginalized, but vital discourse.

Holocaust Centrality

By the late 1960s, the Jews began publically acknowledging their difficult past, claiming the Holocaust as a Jewish tragedy, and slowly nudging it toward the center of Jewish consciousness. Gradually, the Holocaust was imbricated in a new culture of victimization, with some Jewish intellectuals and religious leaders advocating for rigid notions of Jewish "uniqueness," Jews as "the ultimate victims" or as "superior victims". Thus, the seeds of "Holocaust centralism" or what Norman Finkelstein would eventually label "The Holocaust Industry," were sown.⁶⁷ Some explanations about how this came about locate the beginning of this process in the debates over the official definition of who were the victims of the "Holocaust" and the fight over the "six-versus-eleven million victims" terminology. Peter Novick calls the notion of uniqueness the root of an intrinsically unhealthy and unbalanced understanding of the Holocaust, which serves to

⁶⁷ Norman Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering*, (New York: Verso, 2000).

promote “evasion of moral and historical responsibility.”⁶⁸ Likewise, Paul Ricoeur argues “there is no scale of the inhuman, because the inhuman is outside of any scale, once it is outside of even negative norms.”⁶⁹ The contradictory understandings aroused controversial debates among the general public and among Holocaust and genocide scholars, and marked the second stage of Holocaust education and consciousness.

In the 1970s, talks about the Holocaust began to occupy larger space in German discourse. The second generation perceived National Socialism and the Holocaust positively as a catalyst for dealing with issues then facing Germany. Some private groups and communities initiated activities to remember the victims of the Nazis with commemorative plaques and ceremonies of remembrance.⁷⁰ The broadcast of the television series, *Holocaust*, in 1979, though amid local criticisms and objections, “led to significant debates in public, in families, and in schools.”⁷¹ Subsequently, teachers began teaching more broadly with the improved textbooks and history teaching curricula. In 1986, contentious debates emerged among West German historians and philosophers on the representation of the crimes of Nazi Germany. Well-known fascist and neo-conservative revisionist historians like Ernst Nolte attempted to relativize—and to a great extent to absolve—Nazi crimes by attributing them to Germany’s legitimate fear of Soviet communism and called for the cessation of international condemnation of the Nazis, the position that the *Republikaner* political party took from its inception in 1983, while moderate and leftist scholars like Jurgen Habermas advocated the opposite

⁶⁸ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 14.

⁶⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), (Kindle Edition, Kindle Location 4923-4924).

⁷⁰ Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 135.

⁷¹ Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 136.

opinion.⁷² The debates, which became known as the "historians' quarrel" (*Historikerstreit*), crystallized the formation of two opposite academic poles of "right-wing" and "left-wing" intellectuals, and later spread beyond the academic sphere to agitate politicians and publicists. Overall, the debate reflected the complexities of West German social, political and cultural developments.⁷³ In spite of this controversy, fifty years after the event, Germany commemorated for the first time in 1988 the anniversary of Kristallnacht with a number of activities including "memorials, events, masses, lectures, speeches, youth activities, and school events."⁷⁴ This unprecedented event was "the turning point in Germany's long-delayed confrontation with the Holocaust."⁷⁵

In Israel, the 1961 Eichmann trial precipitated widespread recognition of the Holocaust and promoted its relevance to the State of Israel and the history of the Jewish people as a whole. The live radio broadcast of the trial, and especially the testimony of survivors, jolted the Israeli public into letting the Holocaust out of the closet containing Israel's darkest fears of annihilation and memories of Jewish powerlessness. The Israeli Ministry of Education only very slowly began to revise the textbooks for secondary schools with a view to making the history of the Holocaust a normal part of the Israeli curriculum. During the two decades that followed the Eichmann trial, the study of the Holocaust was never more than an elective subject in Israeli schools. It was only after a group of Holocaust education activists, with assistance from administrators within the Yad Vashem Museum, pressured the Minister of Education to promote the history of the Holocaust from an elective course to a compulsory subject in schools that the government

⁷² Konrad H. Jarausch, "Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians," *German Studies Review*, 11, no. 2 (May 1988): 285-301. See also Hans-Georg Betz, "Politics of Resentment: Right-Wing Radicalism in West Germany," *Comparative Politics*, 23, no. 1 (October, 1990): 45-60.

⁷³ Konrad H. Jarausch, p. 288.

⁷⁴ Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 136.

⁷⁵ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 213.

of Israel bowed to public pressure. According to "The Crisis in Israel's Holocaust Education" (an April 2014 article by Ayana Nir), it took more than 20 years before Holocaust education obtained a permanent place in Israeli schools and became a mandatory subject for study by 1982.⁷⁶

In 1983, the Ministry of Education approved a 200-page textbook for nationwide use entitled *The Holocaust and Its Significance*; it gave students a standard view of the Holocaust but was largely divorced from the history of the countries in which it took place.⁷⁷ The textbook made survivors' stories a key tool for Holocaust education, emphasizing Jewish rebellions against the Nazis and heroic stories of resistance to the detriment of a wider understanding of the Holocaust as a systematic genocide carried out throughout Europe and North Africa in the context of the Second World War.⁷⁸ Promulgated eight years after the near defeat of Israel in the 1973 October War, the Holocaust course reinforced the notion that Jews needed a strong state of their own with enough military capability to protect their national sovereignty as citizens of a Jewish state living within a specific territorial boundary.⁷⁹

Beginning from the late 1960s, the Holocaust became "ever more central in American public discourse—particularly, of course, among Jews, but also in the culture at large."⁸⁰ As Eli Lederhendler argues, "the relative silence on the unique victimhood of the Jewish people that prevailed in American discourse in the early post-war years was reversed, and the Holocaust's newly defined centrality to the Jewish experience was

⁷⁶ Ayana Nir, "The Crisis in Israel's Holocaust Education," published on April 23, 2014, <http://www.tikkun.org/tikkundaily/2014/04/23/the-crisis-in-israels-holocaust-education/>, (access on August 19, 2014).

⁷⁷ Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education," 633.

⁷⁸ Dan A. Porat, "From the Scandal to the Holocaust in Israeli Education," 627.

⁷⁹ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider. "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory," 96.

⁸⁰ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 2.

institutionalized in ways calculated to protect American Jewish interests, domestic and foreign.”⁸¹ Holocaust awareness was translated into being Jewish. The Jews were no longer ashamed of their own identity and history. Jewish intellectuals, religious leaders and academics subsumed the old talk about Jewish "timidity," "cowardice" and "failure" within a larger debate aimed at confronting the Jewish past.⁸²

The 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War—and much later, in the 1980s, the Palestinian *intifada*—awakened American Jewry once again to the danger of another Holocaust that could extinguish the Jewish people, or, at least, the Jews of the State of Israel.⁸³ The increasing recognition in American discourse of the evil of the Holocaust and the unjustness of the anti-Semitism in America, which preceded it, reinforced the centrality of Holocaust consciousness among American Jewry. Moreover, the fate of the State of Israel, which for Jews stands out as a monument to the memory of the Holocaust and historically, as Zion, had been “a strong pole of attachment” for many Jews since the end of the nineteenth century, and became ever more important to American Jewry.⁸⁴ Both American Jews and Jews in Israel adopted the slogan "never again,"— an exhortation which emphasized the lessons of the Holocaust. Since then, for many Jews around the world, the collective memory of the Holocaust has moved to the center of the collective identity of the Jewish people.

Within the American government, recognition of the importance of the Holocaust became a means to mobilize political support from American Jewish communities and

⁸¹ Eli Lederhendler, Review of Peter Novick’s “The Holocaust in American Life.”

⁸² Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 159.

⁸³ Dan A. Porat., 626. See also Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 149.

⁸⁴ Jack Goody, *The Theft of History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), (Kindle edition, p. 19.)

"an effective weapon for defending Israel in American political forums."⁸⁵ Stories about the suffering of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust and survivors aided American political leaders to justify massive U.S. government support for Israel, militarily, politically and logistically.⁸⁶ However, Novick argues that although the American public's moral concern and conscience-driven-sympathy for Holocaust survivors played a role in American support for Israel, the key driver of American foreign policy backing of Israel was Israel's potential as an ally against Soviet ascendance in the Cold War struggle that unfolded in the Middle East. He downplays the role of any guilt arising from the American decision not to bomb Auschwitz or the weak American response to the Holocaust, generally.⁸⁷

Holocaust Universalization

In the post-Cold War era, Holocaust education and consciousness of genocide as a crime against all of humanity came close to achieving the status of a universal moral value. What happened during the Holocaust became a warning and a reminder to anyone that attempted to annihilate an entire group of human beings simply because they belonged to a group, as their membership in it and the boundaries of the group were defined by perpetrators, who could strike anytime and anywhere in the world.⁸⁸ Genocide is no longer exclusively about the Jewish people, and the sanctity of the Holocaust and the debates about "Holocaust uniqueness" have gradually faded away. Education and

⁸⁵ Natan Sznajder, Review of Peter Novick's "The Holocaust in American Life," *Jewish History*, 14, no. 2 (2000): 245-251.

⁸⁶ Hasia Diner, *Post-World-War-II American Jewry and the Confrontation with Catastrophe*, (Jewish Studies: New and Notable Books and Journals, Indiana University Press, 2003), 445.

⁸⁷ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, 73 and 166.

⁸⁸ Natan Sznajder, Review of Peter Novick's "The Holocaust in American Life," *Jewish History*, 14, no. 2 (2000): 250.

awareness of the history of genocide and the Holocaust reached a third stage and became one of the most interesting courses in the university curriculum.⁸⁹ Richard Libowitz claims that:

There was an expansion of Holocaust education on college and university campuses, public symposia and commemorations crowded the spring calendar, statuary and other forms of memorials were dedicated as new museums were being erected, survivors and their children increased their public activities as speakers and memoirists, documentaries and fictionalized efforts filled television and motion picture screens while more traditional scholarly efforts flourished to the extent that it became difficult to remain abreast of current publications.⁹⁰

The convergence of the end of the Cold War; the publication of the key books by the pioneers of genocide education such as Leo Kuper, Kurt Jonassohn, Frank Chalk, Samuel Totten, Israel Charny and Helen Fein; the upsurge of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda; and the evolution of a well-known Jewish scholar Yehuda Bauer's thinking that drifted away from the notion of the centrality of the Holocaust, played critical roles in changing the conception on "the uniqueness of the Holocaust" and providing a broader platform to other genocides which "were raised to the same plane as the Holocaust, and the Holocaust was recognized as part of a broader problem that was still with us."⁹¹

Leo Kuper, a Lithuanian Jew born in South Africa, published several monographs dealing with the genocide and genocide studies issues that profoundly enhanced the field of genocide studies. In his early publication *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (1981), Kuper revealed a number of genocide cases from the sociological and

⁸⁹ Dominik J. Schaller, "From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 245-256.

⁹⁰ Richard Libowitz, "Holocaust education," *Review of Developments in Modern Jewish Studies*, 10, no. 3 (1990): 271-281.

⁹¹ Personal email communication with Professor Frank Chalk.

comparative perspectives which drastically contribute to the modern genocide studies.⁹² Kuper provided analyses of the problem of genocide, referencing a number of genocidal cases, such as the competition between the Hindus and Moslems in India, the Apartheid in South Africa, and religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, as well as genocides against the Armenians, the Jews, the Cambodians, the Bangladeshis, the massacres of the communists in Indonesia, Burundi, Uganda and Nigeria. Kuper compares the Holocaust case to other genocide cases as one among many, and this relativity rules out the claims of the uniqueness of the Holocaust. Kuper also included in his book an analysis that strongly criticizes the historical weakness of the United Nations in its capacity to curtail genocide, although many scholars may want to look into the sources of genocide in each particular sovereign state rather than putting the blame on the UN, which is not in itself a sovereign entity but just the combination of the nation-states.

Another of Kuper's major works, *The Prevention of Genocide* (1985), dealt with the question of genocide prevention, which until the present day continues to be a question for both scholars and policy makers.⁹³ In this later work, Kuper presented a systematic study on the failure of the genocide convention and the international communities to curtail genocide. Kuper called for a mechanism that gives a more immediate and pragmatic preventive action, namely an early warning system that could monitor the "precursors of genocide" and alert beforehand both the international institutions and the public opinion. Kuper gave a broader scope beyond the UN genocide definition which covers even the atomic bombing of the U.S. on two Japanese cities. He

⁹² Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981).

⁹³ Leo Kuper, *The Prevention of Genocide*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).

proposed for more pragmatic international procedures and the establishment of a more effective international judicial body that could bring any alleged genocidal criminals to justice.

Two other genocide studies pioneers, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, provide the foundation for the field with their comparative work, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (1990)⁹⁴. With the sociological frame, Chalk and Jonassohn begin their work with the discussions and debates on the contested concept of genocide, its origin, typologies, the precondition of genocide, and a more practical definition of genocide. To prove their theory, the two scholars provide examinations of twenty episodes of genocide since the antiquity up to the late twentieth century. They provide a theoretical framework which gives foundation for the comparative genocide studies.

Samuel Totten has also laid out a concrete foundation for genocide education since he first entered this field in 1986.⁹⁵ In his editorial book, *Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources*,⁹⁶ Totten, among other authors, provides an effective educational foundation and strategies for teaching and preventing genocide to teachers, policy makers and government leaders, as well as the comprehensive history of genocides in the world. The first chapter, "Educating about Genocide, Yes: But What Kind of Education?", by Carol Rittner lays out impressive teaching strategies in which the author argues for a kind of genocide education that is not solely about the perpetrators but also about the victims, the resisters, the rescuers, the bystanders and the upstanders. Like Leo

⁹⁴ Frank Chalk, and Kurt Jonassohn, "The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies," (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).

⁹⁵ Samuel Totten, "The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and Analysis of Some Key Issues." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 213.

⁹⁶ Samuel Totten, ed. *Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources*, (Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004).

Kuper, Totten also criticizes and discusses the controversial definition of the UN genocide convention, the discussions of which link to the ten case studies of the genocides that happened in the twentieth century. Further, in his chapter with Paul Bartrop, Totten looks into the conceptualized brief history of genocide, the discussions of which are dependent on the cultivation of genocide prevention mechanisms. The book also deals with the issues of human rights, intervention issues and teaching strategies. The book is just one of the many books and scholarly articles Totten has contributed to the field of genocide education.

Without the established groundwork of the above-mentioned scholars and many others, the field of genocide studies would have not reached its current state, in which genocide studies has become a universal focus alongside other disciplines. On the efforts of the pioneers of genocide studies, Samuel Totten rightly observes:

Without their pioneering efforts and the efforts of the scholars who followed shortly thereafter, it is probable that the field of genocide studies would never have developed, or at least not as early as it did. That too many sound like hyperbole, but had they not individually and sometimes collectively organized the first conferences dedicated to the subject of genocide, presented papers at conferences hosted by their respective disciplines or universities, written the first books, developed the first research tools, and created the first institutes, there certainly would have been no foundation for second-, third-, and fourth generation scholars to conveniently step onto, as they now can and do, and proceed apace as if genocide studies had existed forever.⁹⁷

As the field of Holocaust and genocide studies became more attractive, the emerging Holocaust and genocide scholars during the 1980s and the 1990s founded a number of Holocaust and genocide study centers and institutes.⁹⁸ In the early 21st century, Holocaust and genocide studies centers and institutes can be found in many countries,

⁹⁷ Ibid., Samuel Totten, 212.

⁹⁸ Samuel Totten, "The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and Analysis of Some Key Issues," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 214.

mostly in the U.S. and Europe. Some centers are operated independently while others are run as the university departments which provide enormous genocide study programs that attract a number of students from other disciplines, such as social science, history, international relations, global affairs and international law. One of the most recent centers is Rutgers University-based Center for the Study of Genocide, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights.⁹⁹ In addition, Holocaust and genocide museums and memorials have been built and have become the centers for Holocaust and genocide studies, research and centers of memory.

Similarly impressive, Holocaust and genocide pioneers and emerging scholars have created a number of international and scholarly journals. An increasing number of journal articles have been written up—a development which is hard for any expert to trace. These journals include: *The Internet on the Holocaust and Genocide*, published in 1985 and edited by Israel Charny; *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review*, published in 1988 and edited by Israel Charny; *Journal of Genocide Research*, published in 1999 and edited by Henry R. Huttenbach, Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer; *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, published in 1987 and edited by Richard D. Breitman; *Encyclopedia of Genocide* in 1999, edited by Israel Charny; *Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, edited by Dinah Shelton; *The Dictionary of Genocide*, edited by Samuel Totten and Paul Bartrop; *The Oxford Handbook on Genocide Studies*, edited by Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses; *the Historiography of Genocide*, *Journal of Holocaust Education*, *Genocide Studies and Prevention* in 2005; and *Genocide Prevention Now: A Holocaust and Genocide Review on the Internet for All People*,

⁹⁹ For the vision, missions, projects, events and updated news about the Center, please visit the link <http://www.ncas.rutgers.edu/cghr> (accessed on December 3, 2014).

published in 2010 and edited by Israel Charny. These journals and encyclopedias serve to better improve the field of Holocaust and genocide studies and research worldwide.

In Germany, the Holocaust became a major part of German national history, which reinforced Germany's bid to achieve political and cultural integration into the European system. The West German government and the state or land of West Germany began to introduce extensive Holocaust education to German pupils in the upper grades of high school or gymnasia, including classroom teaching, memorial days, class visits to memorial sites, education programs for adults, religious education, films, internet sites and the introduction of new teaching media.¹⁰⁰ The new emphasis on Holocaust education in Germany was predicated on a collective acknowledgment of the need to prevent another Holocaust and for the German people to acknowledge Germany's obligation to make amends for the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity. Holocaust education in Germany also faces newly emerging challenges in the face of the drastic shift from a nearly homogenous society to a more pluralistic, multicultural one, plagued by growing anti-Semitic and anti-immigration movements mounted by right-wing extremists and the neo-Nazis.¹⁰¹

Some leaders in Israel, as Levy and Sznajder demonstrated, viewed the post-Cold War period as the time to strengthen the peace process with their neighbors and to mitigate the use of the Holocaust for political purposes. Peace activists used the Holocaust to inspire compassion toward Holocaust survivors and Palestinians.¹⁰² In this respect, in 1999, two new textbooks were introduced emphasizing oral history and, for

¹⁰⁰ Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 136-139.

¹⁰¹ Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 141.

¹⁰² Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder. "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory," 97.

the first time, including non-Jewish victims from groups such as the Poles and Roma. Israeli students were no longer required to parrot a standard narrative of the Holocaust. Instead, they were encouraged to provide critical analyses and evaluations from multiple perspectives.¹⁰³ The new educational approach attempted to make Holocaust education less particularistic and more universalistic, shifting the emphasis of Holocaust classes from a national to an individual story that extended beyond the boundaries of Israel and the Jewish people. In other words, the new trend of Holocaust education in Israel featured a deconstructive, epistemological approach that dealt with the present and the future, in contrast to its former trend.¹⁰⁴

Likewise, in the U.S., the Holocaust moved closer to the center of American public discourse and American memory. Sznajder suggests that "through America, it has [even] become central to the discourse of the world."¹⁰⁵ The construction of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), situated in the heart of the American capital, Washington D.C., the release of the Hollywood-made film *Schindler's List*, the development of the Holocaust curriculum by Facing History and Ourselves, an American NGO, and the official endorsement of Holocaust education as a compulsory subject in some states symbolized the growing centrality of the Holocaust in American memory. The USHMM's building physically stands as a memorial, a center of memory with the potential to influence the attitudes of policy makers and government officials, as well as new generations who will shape the future of the society. Edward T. Linenthal suggests that the museum is more than a place to remember because it conveys a sense of civil and

¹⁰³ Zehavit Gross, "Holocaust Education in Jewish Schools in Israel: Goals, Dilemmas, Challenges," *Prospects*, 40, no. 1 (2010):101-103.

¹⁰⁴ Zehavit Gross, p. 103.

¹⁰⁵ Natan Sznajder, Review of Peter Novick's "The Holocaust in American Life," *Jewish History*, 14, no. 2 (2000): 249.

moral responsibility to many American visitors and visitors from around the world, enabling them to confront the horrific past and acknowledge the suffering of the victims.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, studying the Holocaust in American public schools is legislatively mandated in a few states, and in these and some other states, holding annual "Days of Remembrance" is sometimes compulsory and publicized as a moral duty. This degree of centrality has prompted some scholars to equate the universalization of the Holocaust with its "Americanization." Although the trend exists, it may be premature to regard it as dominant or to exaggerate its strength at this time.

There is no doubt, however, that since 1945, the field of Holocaust and genocide education has proliferated and become more interdisciplinary or even trans-disciplinary, as genocide is being studied from various disciplinary perspectives, such as history, political science, social science, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, international law, international relations, and global affairs.¹⁰⁷ The field has also become more intercultural as the new generation of genocide scholars has examined a number of critical issues in a variety of cultures.¹⁰⁸ Samuel Totten provides a list of genocide-related topics that have been written about and discussed in the past three decades. These topics and issues, he observes, include: "genocide theory, causes of genocide, cases of genocide, the impact of colonialism on indigenous groups across the globe, forgotten genocides, comparative studies of genocide, prevention of genocide, intervention against genocide, genocide and international law, court cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic

¹⁰⁶ Edward T. Lenenthal, *Preserving Memory: The Structure to Create America's Holocaust Museum*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), xiii.

¹⁰⁷ Dominik J. Schaller, "From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies," 254.

¹⁰⁸ Daniel Feierstein, "Leaving the Parental Home: An Overview of the Current State of Genocide Studies." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 257-269.

cleansing, the aftermath of genocide, and denial of genocide.”¹⁰⁹ In addition, genocide scholars have also turned their attention to comparative approaches in which specific features of the Holocaust and other genocides are pointed out comparatively without the intention of deflecting attention from any particular history of genocide. Teaching about genocide has now become a global affair in which local and global genocide education programs shape and influence each other.

This discussion of the emergence and development of Holocaust education and global genocide education practices provides a foundation of knowledge and understanding for an examination of global genocide education values packages, and how they have been adopted and adapted in many post-conflict societies which are discussed below.

2. Global Genocide Education Values Packages

Global genocide education is characterized by its global values packages including: encouraging civil, military and moral responsibility to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, thereby implementing the words ‘never again’; collective memory; and understanding the connection between preventing genocide and universal human rights. Global values packages are expressed through a set of national, regional and international laws, practices, and platforms like the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the International Holocaust Remembrance Day; the days to commemorate the Armenian Genocide, the Ukrainian Famine, and the mass atrocities in Darfur; the new paradigms of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Will to

¹⁰⁹ Samuel Totten, “The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and Analysis of Some Key Issues,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 214.

Intervene (W2I), and the scholarly works of many international Holocaust/genocide education institutions. These global value packages directly and indirectly inform the practices of genocide education in post-conflict countries through vernacularization.

Genocide Prevention: 'Never Again'

Genocide scholars agree that genocide is a continuing problem which plagues humanity and did not end with the conclusion of the genocides that occurred in the twentieth century; likewise, it is clear that "suffering does not end once the killing has ended."¹¹⁰ The specter of genocide continues to haunt the world today and will continue to persist in the future. With the withdrawal of European colonizers from their colonies, the dissolution of the communist world system, and the emergence of independent Third World countries, ethnic conflicts, armed conflicts, and racial and political violence have proliferated.¹¹¹ Jack Goody agrees with Robert Melson, but argues from a different angle that the divisions among ethnic groups resulted from the European dominations over time, space and history. "If Europe didn't invent love, democracy, freedom, or market capitalism, it did not invent ethnocentricity either."¹¹² The collapse of the empires, and thereby the break-up of colonialism, left behind a number of unorganized political regimes that lacked legitimacy and rule of law. The illegitimate regimes of the Third World were preceded by culturally plural societies in which the culturally dominant ethnic groups attempted to impose hegemony on the others. The oppressed responded with rebellions in their quest for self-determination, which contributed to the outbreaks of

¹¹⁰ Samuel Totten, "The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and Analysis of Some Key Issues," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 224.

¹¹¹ Robert Melson, "Critique of Current Genocide Studies," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 3 (December 2011): 279-286.

¹¹² Jack Goody, *The Theft of History*, p. 5.

ethnic wars and genocide across many less developed countries.¹¹³ Genocide scholars attempt to understand all factors that lead to genocide and how it can be prevented. Genocide scholars also try to understand why genocide persists in modern times and why the most vulnerable groups are often the majority population inside the state that governs them.

The recent growth in the field of genocide education has been fostered by the quests of scholars seeking to apply academic theories to genocide prevention measures. That a major function of genocide education is to promote genocide prevention has become a shared notion in the global genocide education values package that prevails today. The words "never again," though originating as a post-Holocaust symbol, have been taken up by a number of post-conflict countries as one of their moral responsibilities and strengthened their commitment to combat the recurrence of genocide. Moreover, scholars in post-conflict countries have begun to implement some genocide prevention measures domestically, for instance, vernacularizing global genocide education ideas and strategies, a gesture of contributing to the global campaign against genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Education Project developed by DC-Cam in collaboration with the Cambodian Ministry of Education is an exemplar of post-conflict efforts to address the task of genocide prevention.

Collective Memory

The Holocaust has now become part of a collective memory in the U.S. and Europe. It has been institutionalized and even universalized to some extent. For example, January 27 has been officially endorsed as European Holocaust Memorial Day by the

¹¹³ Robert Melson, "Critique of Current Genocide Studies," 280.

European Union and International Holocaust Remembrance Day by the United Nations.¹¹⁴ In another instance, former Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, spearheaded the establishment of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF) in 1998, which held that “every construction of European identity must acknowledge [the Holocaust] as a point of departure.”¹¹⁵ In the late 1990s, a number of European political leaders advocated that the Holocaust should “became a civilizational foundation of a new official European memory”¹¹⁶ which emphasized timely interventions to prevent future cases of genocide and compassion for all victims, regardless of their politics or race. Levy and Sznajder subsume the process of Holocaust universalization within the formation of “cosmopolitan memory.”¹¹⁷ Some lessons drawn from mass atrocities such as the Holocaust pertain to the prevention of contemporary inhuman acts of injustice, including discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, persecutions based on religious differences, and other forms of grave human rights violations in the world today, including those arising in Myanmar, South Sudan and Central Africa.

Nevertheless, it is critical to note that for Holocaust education in some countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in many states in South America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East which have small or non-existent Jewish communities and national histories, memory or identities barely touched by the Nazis, political leaders and educators see

¹¹⁴ For list of countries commemorating the Holocaust Memorial Day or Holocaust Remembrance Day, please visit the link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust_Memorial_Days (accessed on August 18, 2014).

¹¹⁵ Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 146.

¹¹⁶ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder. “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory,” 100.

¹¹⁷ Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder. “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory,” 87-106.

Holocaust education as irrelevant or even antithetical to their concerns.¹¹⁸ According to Michael Gray, these views are strongly connected to differences in the national histories and the contemporary political agendas of such states.¹¹⁹ The contents of Holocaust education in these countries is often politically motivated and mostly focuses on non-Jewish victims. Such is often the case in Eastern Europe, where this emphasis is designed to distract potential critics from depicting Holocaust-era governments as Nazi collaborators and bystanders or as Communist lackeys in the post-Communist era. In these countries, lack of knowledge of the Holocaust among students and teachers could lead to erroneous presentations of the Holocaust that, Michael Grave contends, could “de-Judaize” and universalize it.¹²⁰ Critics such as Grave fear that presenting the Holocaust in the framework of multidisciplinary and comparative perspectives and using it as one among several examples of genocide, rather than as the paradigmatic example, will universalize and thus trivialize the Holocaust.

Universal Human Rights

The phenomenon of genocide education can be explored through multiple elements, one of which is “how human rights education started to play a role in the wake of the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”¹²¹ The creation of human rights bodies, human rights laws and human rights education components is, in part, a direct response to the Holocaust, and other genocides, and primarily a response to inhumanity. In this sense, genocide education is not merely a lesson on the history of

¹¹⁸ Michael Gray, *Contemporary Debates in Holocaust Education*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), (Kindle edition, kindle locations 630-708).

¹¹⁹ Michael Gray, *Contemporary Debates in Holocaust Education*, (Kindle Locations 630).

¹²⁰ Michael Gray, *Contemporary Debates in Holocaust Education*, (Kindle Locations 1865).

¹²¹ Author's interview with Karen Murphy, International Director at Facing History and Ourselves, February 1, 2013.

each case of genocide, but a lesson about humanity, in which past mass atrocities are connected to possible solutions to the problems facing humanity today.¹²² According to Patricia Bromley, who has done extensive research on the discussions of the Holocaust in 465 secondary school social science textbooks from 69 countries, over half of the Holocaust discussions in these textbooks are linked to the notions of human rights or crimes against humanity.¹²³

Genocide education and human rights education are essentially separate discourses, but they often overlap. Like Holocaust and genocide education, human rights education is already a complicated discourse of its kind and the overlapping of these discourses are even more complex. In spite of these complexities, the new trend appears to be that genocide scholars prefer to combine the two discourses in an educational setting, and we see a close link between human rights protection and genocide prevention. Studying the Holocaust and other genocides does provide many contexts where extreme forms of human rights violations occurred, and studying them can generate more awareness of the urgent need for effective human rights protection.¹²⁴ Likewise, learning about human rights violations encourages the desire to learn more about genocide prevention. "Understanding the Holocaust in human rights terms can help

¹²² Reinhold Boschki et al., p. 144-145.

¹²³ Patricia Bromley, "Holocaust Education and Human Rights: Holocaust Discussions in Social Science Textbooks Worldwide, 1970-2008," *Journal Fur International und Interkulturell Vergleichende Erziehungswissenschaft*, 19, no. 1 (2013): 14-37. See also J.W. Meyer, P. Bromley, & F. O. Ramirez, "Human rights in social science textbooks: Cross-national analyses, 1970-2008," *Sociology of Education*, 83, no. 2 (2010): 111-134.

¹²⁴ Monique Eckmann, "Mapping Holocaust Education: Relating about Human Rights, Citizenship Education, Genocide Prevention or Other Approaches," (2013). *Policy and Practice: Pedagogy about the Holocaust and Genocide Paper. Paper 5*. <http://commons.clarkedu/pedagogy2013/5> (accessed on December 16, 2014).

foster civic and democratic values...and can be a means to promote tolerance, peace and justice,"¹²⁵ argues Patricia Bromley.

3. Vernacularization: Local Adoptions of the Global Practices

The flow of Holocaust and genocide education practices from the global north to post-conflict countries of the global south has been motivated by both the post-conflict countries' emerging demand for genocide education and the rapid growth of global genocide education practices. The past decade saw a remarkable growth of genocide education programs in post-conflict countries, although the global north remains dominant. As anthropologist Alex Hinton rightly observes, genocide scholars from Latin America such as Daniel Feierstein "are questioning the boundaries of genocide studies from an alternative regional and Spanish-language perspective."¹²⁶ The key conceptual question for this section is: How are global and local ideas consolidated, compromised and contextualized to fit into the local contexts?

Some post-conflict countries may see the global values packages relevant to their local contexts, as these packages can help the local people understand how genocides and other violent conflicts arise in their countries.¹²⁷ Other countries may need to reformulate the global values packages due to differences in culture, historical geographies, and the social positions of the institutions and local activists who function as vernacularizers. Two case studies which follow explain how Rwanda and South Africa adopted and adapted global genocide education ideas and strategies to their localities. A comparison of

¹²⁵ Patricia Bromley, p. 26-29.

¹²⁶ Alexander Laban Hinton, "Critical Genocide Studies," *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, 7 no. 1 (April 2012): 4-15.

¹²⁷ This conclusion derives from my conversations and interviews with several educators and practitioners in these countries.

these two conflict-afflicted countries demonstrates their great resilience and strong commitment to using Holocaust and genocide education to protect their citizens from suffering another genocide in the future. The examples of Rwandan and South African efforts in this endeavor also enrich the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

Rwanda Case

In the efforts to promote justice, reconciliation, peacebuilding and national unity after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, both the new Rwandan government and the international communities launched several crucial measures. Among them were the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the creation of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), implementation of a traditional dispute resolution and community justice measure called the *gacaca court*, the founding of the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (NCFAG), the *ingando* solitary camps for the reeducation of certain segments of the population, the government's outlawing of ethnic identity, the annual national mourning week, the rewriting of Rwanda's history books, and, finally, commemorating the UN-recognized twentieth anniversary of the "genocide against the Tutsi."¹²⁸ These efforts often combine local initiatives and international assistance to help the new Rwandan government to achieve its goals.

Post-genocide Rwandan education came under stronger international influences from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the United Nations Millennium Development Goals of Education for All (EFA) and some international

¹²⁸ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 113-114.

organizations such as UNICEF, UNDP and Facing History and Ourselves (FHO).¹²⁹ Rwandan education is also influenced by various education models imported from neighboring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania through Tutsi refugees who returned to Rwanda from those countries. Post-genocide Rwandan education has also been characterized by the country's quest for reconciliation, national unity, forgiveness, tolerance, solidarity and mutual respect among human beings.¹³⁰ However, along with the existing problematic education system and the earlier decimation of teachers and students during the genocide, the post-genocide Rwandan government, at the same time, faced many serious educational challenges, such as poor curriculum, lack of teaching materials and educational infrastructure, shortages of qualified teachers, propagandistically political interpretation of history and traumatic experiences facing both teachers and students, making history teaching in Rwandan schools a highly contested territory. Educating Rwandan students about the country's history, especially the history of the 1994 genocide, has been constrained and marginalized by politics, remarkably the post-genocide government's political agenda of national unity with the ban of the use of ethnic identity.

Out of a concern that history could be politically manipulated and used as a weapon of propaganda and ethnic division, jeopardizing reconciliation and peace building efforts, on coming to power, the post-genocide Rwandan government immediately placed a moratorium on teaching history in schools, turning down the previous history textbooks

¹²⁹ Michele Schweisfurth, "Global and Cross-National Influences on Education in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *Oxford Review of Education* 32, no. 5 (November 2006): 697-709.

¹³⁰ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 110-120.

which were perceived by the new government as tools stereotyping against the Tutsi.¹³¹ In one sense, the moratorium merits consideration to a relative extent due to the nature of the Rwandan genocide, which involved hundreds of thousands of Hutu perpetrators who are living side-by-side with Tutsi survivors of the genocide.¹³² Moreover, a very high proportion of children were severely traumatized by the extent and violence of the genocide. They had witnessed the death of their immediate family members and suffered other horrific experiences such as mass killings, narrow escapes from the genocide, hard lives in the refugee camps, famine and fear of the renewed war and violence.¹³³ Some children participated in the genocidal killings and many saw members of their families murdered. For these reasons, the government decided to construct a single official narrative which totally denied the very existence of ethnicity, leaving no room for students to analyze their ethnic identity. The official narrative propagandistically put all the blame of genocide on the Hutu elites, the Belgian colonial powers and Western missionaries whom the textbooks accused of inventing ethnicity leading to ethnic division and false teaching, dividing and polarizing the entire society; this division and polarization was the ultimate cause that led to the 1994 genocide.¹³⁴

However, historian Marian Hodgkin argues, "the construction of one unchallenged history, which the population has received from above, rather than participated in creating, allows no capacity for critical thinking and independent analysis

¹³¹ Lyndsay McLean Hilker, "Young Rwandan's Narratives of the Past (and Present)," Chapter 20 in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, eds., *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), p. 316-330.

¹³² Ibid., Francois Masabo's speech.

¹³³ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 112-113.

¹³⁴ Sarah Warshawer Freedman et al, "Teaching History in Post-Genocide Rwanda," chapter 19 in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, eds., *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), pp. 297-315.

on the part of those being educated."¹³⁵ The moratorium, though serving the government's political goal of introducing a single official history for the sake of social unification of all Rwandans, contradicted with other governments' efforts in education reform, in which one primary aim of education is to instill in students the critical-thinking skills so that the students are able to analyze and evaluate historical complexities.¹³⁶ Pursuing the later endeavor and embracing the recommendations from the international organizations and international stakeholders, the Rwandan government began to change its mind in the ways to educate Rwandan children about their country's history, including the events that led up to the 1994 genocide. As a result, after one decade of transition and marginalization, in which history teaching was absent from government sponsored schools, the official moratorium on history teaching was lifted in 2004. Since then, the history of the 1994 genocide has been developed and integrated into various textbooks for primary and secondary schools. Even then, the government remained careful of the negative consequences of history teaching by constantly intervening in the development of curricular materials and syllabi.

In 2004, with financial assistance from UNICEF, the government introduced a primary school textbook entitled, *A Guide to Civic Education*, to support history teaching. Other textbooks for students in grades one to six followed suit. Although the textbooks were globally-informed, their contents address the Government's local concerns of national unity and reconciliation, the root causes of the genocide and the impact of colonialism in Rwanda, tracing the history of the conflict leading to the genocide back to

¹³⁵ Marian Hodgkin, "Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State," *Journal of International Affairs*, 60, no. 1 (Fall 2006): 199-210.

¹³⁶ Ibid., Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al, p. 298-99.

the 1959 massacres of the Tutsi. The new textbooks also introduce comparative genocide education.¹³⁷

Two other international stakeholders also assisted the Rwandan National Curriculum Development Center and scholars from the National University of Rwanda (NUR) to write textbooks for secondary schools. These stakeholders included the University of California at Berkeley's Human Rights Center and Facing History and Ourselves (FHO), which specializes in Holocaust education and post-conflict history teaching methods.¹³⁸ Under the long-term Rwandan history project, the two international institutions aimed at institutionalizing the new teaching resources and the promotion of democratic teaching in ways in which students are endowed with the opportunity to construct their own versions of historical narratives. The new teaching methods challenge the past official narrative by embracing multiple-perspective points of view. FHO's program, *Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior*, allows students to make connections between their Rwandan history and historical case of the breakdown of democracy of Germany's Weimar Republic.¹³⁹ Sarah Warshauer Freedman et. al., some of the key international stakeholders who have conducted extensive research on history teaching in post-genocide Rwanda, relay as follow:

By studying the sociohistorical context; the rise of a totalitarian state; the role of propaganda, conformity, and obedience in turning people against each other; and stories of courage, compassion, and resistance, participants were able to discuss ideas and events and raise feelings that were too threatening to approach directly. The external case study helped teachers and their students begin to connect out from their history, to not only view their history as "exceptional," and to see patterns that contribute not only to better historical thinking, understanding, and interpretation but also to prevention.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 131.

¹³⁸ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 133.

¹³⁹ Ibid., Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al, p. 300.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al, p. 300.

The 2008 third initiative involved creating the curricular guidelines for lower secondary schools, and, in 2010, upper secondary school guidelines were also developed by the National Curriculum Development Center.¹⁴¹ The fourth initiative saw another critical step forward, which again links history teaching to peacebuilding and a more open approach to history teaching. Students are expected to participate more actively in the learning process and connect the contents in the class to real life in their communities. Students are further expected to possess high-order thinking skills after analyzing and evaluating the historical complexities of the genocide, although the actual implementation on the ground may differ substantially from the theories, since teachers remain aware of the political constraints by the government, which limit the efforts of Berkeley's Human Rights Center and FHO in democratizing the history teaching.

In the process of developing post-genocide primary and secondary school curricular materials, such as textbooks and syllabi, a vernacularization process in Rwanda emerged, which involved multiple national and international stakeholders and vernacularizers. The way Berkeley's Human Rights Center and FHO helped construct a new version of history teaching in Rwanda, explains how Rwanda vernacularized the global practices by reconciling the existing local resources and local political concerns and educational context with the globally adopted model. Initially, the production process drew on Rwandans of all ethnic backgrounds—Hutu, Tutsi and Twa—coming from different geographical areas. Foreign and domestic advisers broadened the initial local idea which favored a selective history aimed at preventing discrimination and division among ethnic groups, to encourage the Rwandan students to critically analyze the new

¹⁴¹ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 134.

Rwandan government's contested historical narrative for the same endeavors.¹⁴² Elisabeth King relays that "the [initial global-local] guide served as a significant starting point for the reintroduction of history to Rwandan school children without focusing on a single narrative."¹⁴³

Unfortunately, in the politically-charged situation of post-genocide Rwanda, politics and official government policy continues to determine what an acceptable historical narrative and classroom history discussion is. Teachers sense the political constraints imposed by the government in which discussion on ethnicity is perceived to be a "taboo subject"; teachers and students who discuss this subject could face charges according to the so-called law against "genocide ideology."¹⁴⁴ Some teachers even refrain from discussing such hot issues as ethnicity in their classrooms. While some teachers fear political constraints, some others believe in the government-promoted idea that the promotion of ethnic identity could provoke violent conflicts again in Rwandan society.¹⁴⁵ As King argues, "... the history curriculum is a reflector of dominant government narratives from which deviation is not permitted. Most educators believe that this sort of teaching runs counter to meaningful peacebuilding."¹⁴⁶ This represents the outcome of the unequal contest between the local constraints imposed by government officials and global approaches. It also suggests that vernacularization does not work well when politics remains dominant over history education. Although critical thinking about historical complexities, crucial to a global educational model, was at first embraced in theory by the government, historical narratives and classroom discussions are practically always in line

¹⁴² Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 134.

¹⁴³ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 134.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al, p. 308.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al, p. 307.

¹⁴⁶ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 137.

with the government's position. The continuing control and censorship of history teaching—whether the Government's intentions are judged to be good or bad—are harmful to Rwanda's efforts to achieve a sustainable peace and a meaningful reconciliation process. In the long run, such repression of ideas and free discussion will promote ethnic division and discrimination, ensuring the recurrence of political conflicts in the future.¹⁴⁷ Sarah Warshauer Freedman et. al., while having good evaluation of their history curriculum project in Rwanda, do have overall concern on political constraints in history teaching:

The inability to discuss issue of ethnic identity, the distortions of a history that the government wishes to tell, the constraints against teaching students how to be critical thinkers, and, above all, the fears of productive conflict have profoundly depressing implications for the establishment of a healthy democracy in Rwanda.¹⁴⁸

South Africa Case

In South Africa, educating children about the history of apartheid immediately after the abolition of the apartheid regime followed the routes of propaganda and political indoctrination. Teachers taught history without proper methodology and adequate content knowledge. Education in history was initially launched in tandem with the establishment of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This court-like restorative justice organ, which was established in 1995, immediately after the abolition of the apartheid regime, generated educationally-useful testimonies from victims and perpetrators. However, an institution to train teachers to bring these raw materials into the history syllabi was not available until 2003, when a program called Facing the Past (FTP), an FHO project in South Africa, was launched to support the teachers through

¹⁴⁷ Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, 165. See also Marian Hodgkin, "Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State," *Journal of International Affairs*, 60, no. 1 (Fall 2006): 199-210.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al, p. 309-310.

training and seminars, making South Africa the only country in Africa where Holocaust education was mandated in 2007.¹⁴⁹ These developments evolved regardless of the fraught past relationships between Israel and Apartheid South Africa, which tarnished the image of Israel and the Jews in the eyes of Africans and African-Americans and undermined Black-Jewish relations in the U.S.¹⁵⁰

FHO's program in the South Africa represents a vernacularization process in which the local Apartheid history teaching intersects with the global Holocaust education practices brought into the country by key national and international vernacularizers. Initially, FTP's program involved training about Apartheid, the Holocaust, and human behavior in its efforts to fill the educational gap in genocide education at secondary schools, particularly in grades 9 and 11, and to address the lack of background and content knowledge among South African teachers. FTP also conducted professional development in the form of seminars and follow-up workshops, which integrated complex questions about citizenship and human behavior. FTP's training also included case studies on the failure of democracy in the Weimar Republic in Germany and the factors leading up to the outbreak of the Holocaust, the same content FHO introduced in Rwanda. However, the initiative in launching such programs came from South African educators. Gail Weldon, senior history curriculum planner for the Western Cape Education Department, comments that South Africa came up with its own initiative on teaching the country's history and FHO's approaches, especially through the adaptation of

¹⁴⁹ Speeches by Richard Freedman, Director of the South African Holocaust and Genocide Foundation (SAHGF) and the Cape Town Holocaust Centre and Tracey Petersen, Education Director of Cape Town Holocaust Centre, as quoted in the 2012 report by Salzburg Global Seminar "Learning from the Past: Global Perspectives on Holocaust Education," June 27-July 1, 2012.

<http://www.salzburgglobal.org/mediafiles/MEDIA68454.pdf> (accessed on February 13, 2013)

¹⁵⁰ Yvonne D. Newsome, "International Issues and Domestic Ethnic Relations: African Americans, American Jews, and the Israel-South Africa Debate," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 5, no. 1 (Autumn, 1991): 19-48.

its case studies, serving to enrich the history curriculum through concrete examples from history.¹⁵¹

Karen Murphy, FHO's International Director, who has taught FHO's approach in a number of countries, agrees with Weldon and provides an example of how FHO transmits its curriculum to South Africa and connects with the local context and history. She relates that:

Facing History and Ourselves has used an approach since its founding that the content and methodologies go together... One of FHO commitments is to help students and their teachers to make a substitute connection and distinction. So FHO is not just a Holocaust study in a sense that our goal isn't to memorialize a particular history. It is about trying to create relevance. So FHO would be a window and a mirror. The window enables you to go through it and make a connection to your own history, and at the same time, a mirror reflects back to you, giving you an opportunity to see things that perhaps are horrible for you to see within your own history.¹⁵²

Later the FHO program was expanded to include the study of racial ideology, the rise of the Nazis, and the struggles of civil rights movements, including those advancing rights for African-Americans in the U.S. The program also explores further "difficult" questions of judgment, memory, and legacy, as well as the necessity for responsible civic participation to prevent injustice and to protect democracy today and in the future. The language and vocabulary that is taught to the students becomes tools for entry into the history of human rights—words like perpetrator, victim, defender, opportunist, rescuer and bystander."¹⁵³ All of these encourage conversations about violence, shame,

¹⁵¹ Khamboly Dy's interview with Gail Weldon, textbook and teaching program developer of the Ministry of Education of South Africa, Skype interview between South Africa and Cambodia, February 11, 2013. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Gail Weldon]

¹⁵² Dy Khamboly's interview with Karen Murphy, International Director at Facing History and Ourselves, overseeing Facing History's work outside North America, including its programs in China, England, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and South Africa, interviewed via Skype, February 1, 2013.

¹⁵³ Karen Murphy et al., "Facing History and Ourselves in Post-Conflict Societies," <http://www.facinghistory.org/about/where/southafrica> (accessed February 13, 2013).

humiliation, nationalism, superiority, and inferiority, all of which allow the students to connect history to their current reality.¹⁵⁴ However, as Karen Murphy repeatedly emphasizes, FHO does not dictate content that needs to take into account local culture and context and what local children need and want to learn in order to make connections and ask themselves how they can make a difference in the present and for the future.¹⁵⁵ The FHO-assisted program allows teachers to look at history from multiple perspectives and deconstructs official narratives; it seeks to displace propaganda and indoctrination. The new curriculum gives teachers a better understanding of the history-making process and emphasizes that mass atrocity should not be considered as an inevitable event.¹⁵⁶ Students are able to compare and contrast Apartheid and various aspects of the Holocaust without marginalizing their own country's history, thereby making vernacularization in South Africa a more successful process compared to the same efforts in Rwanda.

4. Conclusion

Holocaust consciousness and Holocaust education have been hindered and fostered by the political conditions wherever they have been introduced. They have journeyed a long way from the margin of Western consciousness to the mainstream of many social discourses and becoming part of a world-wide, universal discourse. The emergence of Holocaust education started with the impetus of survivors and intellectuals who were anxious to connect the Holocaust to contemporary issues confronting all younger generations. As Chalk relays, “they were anxious to connect the Holocaust not

¹⁵⁴ Khamboly Dy's interview with Karen Murphy.

¹⁵⁵ Khamboly Dy's interview with Karen Murphy.

¹⁵⁶ Karen Murphy et al., "Facing History and Ourselves in Post-Conflict Societies," <http://www.facinghistory.org/about/where/southafrica> (accessed February 13, 2013).

just to their younger generation, but to all younger generations. Holocaust education in private Jewish school systems was on their agenda, but education about the Holocaust across societies ranked high in their priorities.”¹⁵⁷ In this regard, Holocaust consciousness and education have grown tremendously among Jewish communities, which import the Holocaust as an emblem close to the heart of their collective memory and collective identity. The proliferation of Holocaust consciousness and education to non-Jews cannot be detached from the efforts, support, and resources of the Jewish communities and the resonance of universal moral responsibility to give effect to the words "never again." There is interdependence between the desire of survivors, the development and provision of educational resources, political agendas, and the broader, world-wide response to the Holocaust.

Though consciousness of the Holocaust is on the road to becoming universal, Holocaust education beyond North America and Western Europe is still limited. Introducing Holocaust education in post-conflict countries faces a number of challenges including the politics of memory, the lack of teacher training and content-appropriate teaching materials, anti-Semitism, and the degree of relevancy of local political ideologies. Moreover, post-conflict states want to put their own national stamp on their local initiatives. Therefore, teaching the Holocaust in countries that were not directly affected by the Holocaust, and where there are no Jewish communities, requires taking into consideration local educational and cultural contexts. Universalizing the Holocaust in the Global South risks provoking students to ask why the Holocaust is being studied rather than the history of other genocides and mass atrocities to the detriment of giving effect to the words “never again”. Educators need to recognize that the concept of

¹⁵⁷ Personal email conversation with Professor Frank Chalk, dated August 23, 2014.

genocide and education about the Holocaust is, to some extent, part of identity and memory politics. It is still a challenge to find the right balance between local national interests, culture, and history, on the one hand, and the broader significance of the Nazi campaign to annihilate the Jewish people, on the other, in teaching about the Holocaust in post-genocidal countries. However, Holocaust education has achieved *de facto* domination in many parts of the world and thereby provides a platform and a language for articulating discussions about other genocides. It has contributed significantly to the field of genocide education.

In this sense, we must ask “what does the tension between universal and local needs mean for our understanding of the transnational transfer of genocide education practices and genocide education values packages?” The intertwined concepts arising from global ideas and local initiatives incorporate shared notions of genocide education values, and these values packages undergo a vernacularization process which strive to make sense of them for local users. The case studies of Rwanda and South Africa exhibit the importance of genocide prevention within the common values package. This values package informs existing local practices through the meaning-making accomplished by the values translation process. In the context of Cambodia, preventing the return of KR atrocities and encouraging inter-generational dialogues to foster national reconciliation and preserve the memory of the KR genocide grows out of a vernacularization process which translated parts of the global values package and made them part of the genocide education program in Cambodia. The effort to achieve genocide prevention is a universal and moral responsibility of all humans, regardless of geopolitics, nationality, ethnicity, and religion, which makes it an invaluable framework for genocide education in post-

conflict countries. We live on one planet, and we are all members of the human race which inhabit that planet. Any attempt to destroy a racial, religious, ethnic or national group of human beings is an attack on all of us.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICS OF TEACHING CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE IN ITS AFTERMATH

Chapter Three investigates the emergence of genocide education in Cambodia, the politically-charged genocide study curriculum of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime (1979-1989). This chapter looks into how history, politics and internal power struggles during the last decade of the Cold War determined how the PRK regime taught about the Cambodian genocide. This chapter also explores international models—particularly from the communist blocs (Vietnam, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe)—that educators of the PRK regime followed when designing general education and genocide education strategies. This chapter especially looks into the Vietnamese on-going involvement and role in reconstructing the general education system, which deeply informed the genocide education program. Finally, this chapter looks into the internal and regional conflicts that strongly influenced the way that PRK educators conveyed the meaning of genocide in their classrooms. In these respects, this chapter focuses particular attention on various PRK-published school textbooks, political magazines and bulletins.

This chapter argues that educational reconstruction during the PRK regime was largely influenced and shaped by communist education models, particularly in Vietnam. At the time, the PRK's educational goals were inseparable from its nation-building imperatives. In the face of daily incursions from the KR guerillas and other resistance movements near the Thai border and political and economic sanctions from the Western

worlds, the construction of the revolutionary consciousness deeply entwined with the goals and projects for rebuilding the state.

This chapter further argues that genocide education during the PRK was ideological or state-sponsored. The PRK used genocide education as a tool to rebuild Soviet-oriented socialism in Cambodia, to condemn Chinese expansionism, to absolutely prevent the return of the KR regime, and to keep the "7 January 1979 Day" alive in the people's hearts, all of which contributed to a long-lasting political survival of the regime. In this respect, the PRK employed the term "genocide" as a proxy word for the Khmer Rouge regime. The term had been contentious outside of the PRK framework, and Cambodia once again became a proxy battleground for the political and ideological competitions between super powers. Regardless of the ideologies the PRK subscribed to, educational rehabilitation was one of the regime's greatest achievements, although the PRK faced severe capacity constraints. During this period, education repair was set into motion as a basis for national reconstruction and development.

Finally, this chapter looks into the ambivalent state of the State of Cambodia (SOC) regime (1989-1992), the new face of the PRK, which was caught between struggling for political survival and accommodating political transition from communism to multi-party democracy, overseen by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

1. Historical, Political and Social Background of the PRK Regime

An understanding of the political context of teaching Cambodian genocide during the PRK regime requires some background knowledge of the general historical, political

and social conditions during that period. The history of the PRK can be traced to as recent as the time of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which came in the last decade of the Cold War. However, to understand the context in which the Vietnamese invasion came about, a brief look into the KR history helps.

The emergence of the KR movement can be traced back to the 1940s when various Cambodian liberation movements called Khmer Issarak rose up against the French colonization on Cambodia. In 1951, when fighting with the French colonizers intensified, the Vietnamese communists helped in establishing Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), which was renamed Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in 1966.¹⁵⁸ After the 1970 coup which deposed Prince Sihanouk from Head of State, CPK, with assistance from China and Vietnam, fought the five-year civil war with the American-backed Khmer Republic government (1970-1975) and took over power on April 17, 1975.

Upon victory, the KR leaders designed many ambitious national plans and state-building projects that far outweighed the ground reality, the true strength of the people, and the capability of the government facing the nearly complete destruction of the country after the devastating civil war. The leaders led the country with a radical transformation program. People were forced to abandon their lives in the cities and to live collectively in cooperatives in the countryside. The KR abolished formal education, health-care system, foreign clothing styles, currency, free market, traditional Khmer

¹⁵⁸ Khamboly Dy, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*, Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, p. 6.

culture and religious practices. Public buildings, pagodas, mosques, churches, schools and universities were turned into granaries and/or prisons.¹⁵⁹

According to the four-year plan, CPK leaders attempted to rebuild the country from the ground-up, turning Cambodia into the most socialist country in the world—even greater than China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.¹⁶⁰ To achieve this impractical, imaginary goal, the CPK leadership demanded that all people had to have a clear and strong allegiance toward the party and the revolution—deemed importance for a modern socialist state.¹⁶¹ The CPK leaders dreamed of pushing Cambodia toward complete independence, self-mastery, and self-reliance. The strategic goal was a society that was utterly free of poverty, inequality, exploitation or oppression.¹⁶² In this sense, Cambodia and her people did not need to learn, adapt, or receive anything from the outside world. Cambodians were required to deny all forms and products of Western culture, which was perceived as corrupt and perverted.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., Khamboly Dy, p. 2.

¹⁶⁰ In the CPK's four-year plan to build socialism in all fields (DC-Cam's Archives, document no. D00591), the KR leaders claimed that communist China, North Korea and Vietnam spent too long to develop socialism. "Considering collective and socialist condition, we are faster than them from four to ten years by jumping from the national democratic revolution to socialist revolution."

¹⁶¹ "Revolutionary Flag," Issue no. 2-3, February-March 1976 (DC-Cam's Archives, document No. D21413), 68-82. In this bulletin, criticism and self-criticism is important not only in educating oneself but also in building the party more strongly and constantly. Each party member and citizen had to build up oneself in terms of political stance, mentality and appointment. These mean that all people had to have strong stance in building up socialist revolution, strong stance in abolishing private ownership and strengthening collectivization, and strong stance in encouraging others to respect the party's regulation and free attitude.

¹⁶² "Revolutionary Youth" DK monthly bulletin, issue March 1977 (DC-Cam's Archives, D21399)

¹⁶³ The KR ideology is embedded in their Constitution, National Anthem, songs, poems, slogans and its monthly bulletin "Revolutionary Flag." In the National Anthem, one phrase states that "Long live 17 April, the great victory! More wonderful and much more meaningful than the Angkor era! We unite together to build up Kampuchea and a glorious society, democratic, egalitarian, and just; independent-mastery; absolutely determined to defend the country, our glorious land...." For the analyses of the DK Constitution which Chandler describes as radical, please see David Chandler, "The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia): The Semantics of Revolutionary Change: Notes and Comment," *Pacific Affairs* 49, no. 3 (Autumn, 1976): 506-515.

To produce a socialist, independent and equal society, the KR engaged in class struggle, the abolition of privatization and the introduction of collectivization, with a strong emphasis on egalitarianism. Feudalism, aristocracy, and capitalism were perceived to have a strong relationship with colonialism and imperialism. Workers, poor peasants, and laborers were glorified.¹⁶⁴ In addition, the CPK leaders embarked on the policy of "eliminating enemies burrowing from inside."¹⁶⁵ The CPK leaders carried great suspicion and paranoia. The leaders suspected that some party members were preparing plans to rebel against the Central Party or cooperate with Vietnam or other foreign agencies, such as the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Soviet KGB. The policy of finding these enemies became a key tenet of the national defense strategy. Eliminating what were called foreign enemies and agents became an effective scapegoat strategy for the low-level cadres to execute hundreds of thousands of people with orders from the party center.

Within almost four years of the KR reign (April 1975-January 1979), nearly two million Cambodian people died of execution, forced labor, malnutrition, torture and diseases without proper medical treatment. The KR regime ended with the Vietnamese invasion into Cambodia.

On December 25, 1978, the combined forces of nine battalions of the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea (UFNSK) (of which most members were former KR defectors who escaped from the massive KR purges) and twelve divisions of

¹⁶⁴ "The Situation in Cambodia," speech by Pol Pot on September 28, 1977 on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the CPK, (FE/5632/C/1, 5 October 1977), (DC-Cam's Archives, Document D29823).

¹⁶⁵ "Revolutionary Flag" DK monthly magazine, Special Issue, December-January 1975-76, DC-Cam's Archives, Document Number D21412. Also see "Decision of the Central Committee on Some Issues," dated March 30, 1976 (DC-Cam's Archives). The document clearly stated the authority in smashing the enemies inside and outside the party in which all levels of hierarchies could decide within their own zones or autonomous regions but had to report the issues to Office 870 (Pol Pot's Office) on the weekly basis.

nearly 120,000 forces of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), supported by naval forces, tanks, artillery and air strikes, fought their way into Cambodia under the command of Vietnamese General Le Duc Anh.¹⁶⁶ The PAVN-UFNSK forces entered Cambodia using seven major avenues and effectively occupied Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979.¹⁶⁷

The following day, Vietnam swiftly assisted the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea (PRCK) to temporarily govern the country. Shortly thereafter, a new regime—the PRK, a socialist one-party state—was officially proclaimed on January 12, 1979. Comrade Heng Samrin, former KR Chief of Division 4 of the Eastern zone, was elected President of the new PRK regime,¹⁶⁸ and Pen Sovann, former Khmer Issarak member who had lived in Vietnam since 1954, became the first PRK Prime Minister. The first operation of the PRK government was to find the appropriate buildings for their respective ministries and to recruit the left-over and educated people from the camps around Phnom Penh to fill in various positions in each ministry.¹⁶⁹ For

¹⁶⁶ Propaganda and Education Committee, *The Propaganda*, Special Issue, Number 131, 1989. Also see Merle L. Pribbenow II, "A Tale of Five Generals: Vietnam's Invasion of Cambodia," *The Journal of Military History* 70, no. 2 (April, 2006): 459-486.

¹⁶⁷ The combined PAVN-UFNSK forces entered Cambodia from national road 1 through Svay Rieng province to Phnom Penh; from Vietnam's Tay Ninh province to Kampong Cham province and the East bank of the Mekong River; from Tinh Bien district (An Giang province) to Takeo province and to Phnom Penh; from Tinh Bien to Kampot province and to Phnom Penh; from Vietnam's Pleiku province to capture the Cambodian provinces in the Northeast; from Snuol district to Kratie provincial town; and a naval infantry to capture Ream and Sihanoukville harbors.

¹⁶⁸ According to the confession of Sam Huoy alias Meas Tal, Heng Samrin's brother, Heng Samrin's original name was Sam Him alias Rin. Heng Samrin became Chief of Division 4 in mid-1978 after the former Division Chief Kuy Chhoeun was arrested and sent to S-21 on 5 June 1978. (Documents D25548 and K03404, DC-Cam's Archives)

¹⁶⁹ Tens of thousands of people gathered in all exits to Phnom Penh, waiting for the permission to enter the Capital. All exits were strictly guarded by Vietnamese soldiers. Until late January, only families of the government staff were allowed to enter the Capital. Until April were the general people allowed to enter Phnom Penh.

the first three months, all members of the PRK stayed and worked in the Royal Palace, which was used as the immediate headquarters of the new regime.¹⁷⁰

The PRK regime was characterized by several major challenges including the political, economic and diplomatic sanctions by the U.S. and its Western allies; the inevitable adoption of Soviet-oriented socialist ideology; daily incursions by the KR guerrillas and other Khmer resistance movements; the client state of Vietnam; and the infamous Vietnamese-initiated K-5 plan. The adoption of the pro-Soviet socialist ideology and the clientelist relationship with Vietnam continued to shape Cambodian politics, culture and education for fourteen years, from 1979 to 1993.¹⁷¹

The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia provoked concerns from the international community. Cambodia appeared to serve an important role as one of the strategic battlegrounds for the global competition between superpowers. The United States, its Western allies, China and ASEAN member states opposed the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, while the occupation was supported by the former Soviet Union and some thirty socialist allies, as well as India. The U.S. and the Western bloc overtly supported the KR as the U.S. perceived Vietnam as a real threat to its interests and saw the KR as strategic and capable force to counter this threat. Unable to support the KR publically, the U.S. encouraged China to support the KR through Thailand, another U.S. ally. In the public arena, the U.S. and its Western allies demanded the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces, whose presence was seen as a tool for spearheading Soviet influence in Indochina. In the eyes of the West, Vietnam was using Cambodia as a

¹⁷⁰ Erin Collins, Khamboly Dy and Dany Long's interview with Pen Sovann at Headquarter of Human Rights Party (HRP), August 10, 2013, [hereinafter Khamboly Dy, Errin Collins and Dany Long's Interview with Pen Sovann]. Sovann said that all Ministers worked and stayed inside the Royal Palace. Sovann slept in the bedroom of King Norodom Soramarith.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., David M. Ayres, *Anatomy of a Crisis: Education, Development, and the State in Cambodia, 1953-1998*, (Silkworm Books: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 121.

doorway for projecting communist ideology and influence onto the Asian region.¹⁷² As a result, the U.S. and its Western allies imposed economic and political sanctions against the Vietnamese-backed PRK government, which then endured international isolation and poverty for the entirety of the 1980s. To contextualize this, U.S. support for the KR resembled its post-World War II position toward Germany against the USSR, the American former ally; as Peter Novick rightly observed, "Faced with a current enemy, past crimes could not be allowed to interfere with strategic requirements."¹⁷³

Due to the international political tension and the implications of the Cold War, the PRK failed to obtain a Cambodian seat at the UN General Assembly; instead, it remained a de facto government with limited international recognition. The UN granted the seat to the KR in 1979, and in subsequent resolutions, awarded the seat to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) (which included the KR faction). These UN decisions did not represent the dire needs of the country and the Cambodian people, but purely acknowledged "the regional and international geopolitical imperatives" in the face of the Cold War's final intensification.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, the Cambodian problem continued to be of grave concern and one of the most important foreign policy issues of ASEAN nations, China, the U.S. and Soviet Union, among other countries involved. As David Ayres rightly explained, "the ASEAN states had wanted to punish the Vietnamese for their December 1978 invasion; China was hopping to bleed Vietnamese resources by promoting a continuation of the Cambodian conflict; the United States was concerned about an increasing Soviet presence in Southeast Asia; while Vietnam was reluctant to

¹⁷² Michael Eiland, "Kampuchea in 1984: Yet Further from Peace," *Asian Survey* 25, no. 1 (January, 1985): 106-113.

¹⁷³ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, (Kindle Edition: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000, 249.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., David M. Ayres, 136.

negotiate while they considered that the Chinese were attempting to secure greater influence in the region.”¹⁷⁵

The presence of the Vietnamese forces, the uncontrolled flow of Vietnamese settlers, and the Vietnamese grip on political and foreign affairs in Cambodia heavily undermined national unity of the population largely adherent to two major conflicting views.¹⁷⁶ Some Cambodians identified the Vietnamese as the saviors of the Cambodian nation, while other Cambodians characterized the Vietnamese as invaders or territorial expansionists. The former group cited recent history and their own horrific experiences under the KR as the benchmark for evaluating Vietnam’s intervention and presence in Cambodia. The latter group was persuaded by historical stereotypes and images of Vietnam that were passed down through generations. This latter notion came to be symbolized by the myth of "spilling the master's tea."¹⁷⁷

Although Cambodians living inside the country may have considered Vietnam as their savior, they were often unsatisfied with policy differences and what was perceived to be an unequal relationship between the two countries. Many Cambodians were uncomfortable with the introduction of new political and administrative structures that seemed to be replications of Vietnamese structures and appeared to disproportionately benefit Vietnam. As Thomas Clayton observed, "These structures comprised both coercive or repressive state apparatuses and hegemonic or ideological state apparatuses.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., David M. Ayres, 136.

¹⁷⁶ Khamboly Dy, Errin Collins and Dany Long's Interview with Pen Sovann. According to Pen Sovann, the first PRK Prime Minister until December 2, 1981 when he was arrested and sent to jail in Hanoi, Vietnam demanded for the settlement of about 3,000 Vietnamese families in Cambodian small provinces and around 5,000 to 7,000 Vietnamese families in Cambodian big provinces. Pen Sovann's being ousted from power and arrest could stem from his opposition to this demand and his objection to the K-5 Plan.

¹⁷⁷ Ben Kiernan, "Myth, Nationalism and Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, no. 2 (2001): 187-206.

The occupying army, reaching a strength of 220,000 at its peak, served a coercive function by its mere presence."¹⁷⁸

One of the Vietnamese-initiated policies that many Cambodians believed to be most brutal of the PRK period was the so-called K-5 Plan (the Cambodian Berlin Wall).¹⁷⁹ The K-5 plan was designed in 1982 and was implemented from 1984 to 1988. The plan had several stages. The first undertaking was to clear out over 800 kilometers of forest along the Thai border. Then the trenches were excavated and bamboo fences with barbed wire were constructed. Millions of anti-personnel mines were planted along the fences and trenches. The goal was to seal off the border with Thailand and prevent the infiltration of resistance forces, especially the KR guerillas. Under the K-5 plan, hundreds of thousands of people from around the country were required to “volunteer” as labor forces. Many people died from starvation, exhaustion, landmines, and disease (most notably Malaria).

Regardless of the many negative images of the Vietnamese, the PRK leadership had been extremely thankful to the Vietnamese forces and regarded them as "liberators" and an "eternal brother". As historian Margaret Slocomb argues, "In a very real sense, Cambodia during the PRK was a client state of Vietnam, and it can be legitimately argued that it was the Vietnamese who determined the structure and nature of the administration in 1979. The debt to Vietnam has never been denied by the former

¹⁷⁸ Thomas Clayton "Education under Occupation: Political Violence, Schooling and Response in Cambodia, 1979-1989," *Comparative Education* 2, no. 1 (2002): 70-79.

¹⁷⁹ According to Margaret Slocomb, the letter "K" is the first letter of Khmer alphabet which meant "defense" while the number "5" referred to the fifth plan of defense designed by the Vietnamese. Pen Sovann, former KPRP President and the first PRK Prime Minister, agreed that the K-5 plan was designed by Vietnam but explained the meaning of the term “K-5” differently. In his memoir, *Brief Biography and the National Cause of Cambodian Motherland* (Seattle: Khmer Vision Publishing Company, 2002), 197-204, Pen Sovann writes that K-5 means “conscripting labor forces to clear up the forest to protect Kampuchea.”

People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK), now the Cambodian People's Party (CPP)."¹⁸⁰ This sentiment was acknowledged in a number of school textbooks produced during the 1980s with assistance from Vietnam and public speeches of the leaders.

Two years before the end of the PRK regime, regional and international politics changed considerably. East Germany and West Germany began to merge, while the Soviet Union slowly loosened its grip on Eastern Europe and consequently Indochina. This steady recession of Soviet influence, in the practical sense, translated into steep reductions and eventually the dismantling of all financial support for foreign communist governments, thereby dismantling the Soviet foreign assistance program for Vietnam and Cambodia.

As the Cambodian conflicts intensified, the international community and the Khmer resistance factions under the CGDK flag increased their demands for the complete withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and a more fruitful negotiation process among Cambodian factions. Facing massive international pressures and local struggles for a decade, Vietnam completed its troop withdrawal by September 1989, at the conclusion of the Cold War.

The PRK, through its various textbooks and the political magazine, *The Propaganda*, which represented the voice of the party's Central Committee, provided answers to many questions concerning the armed withdrawal and the politics surrounding it. One key explanation the PRK offered to the question about the Vietnamese invasion from the beginning was to oppose the return of the “genocidal KR regime.” This political trend dictated the contents of all school textbooks published in the 1980s.

¹⁸⁰ Margaret Slocomb, *The People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1979-1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot* (Bangkok: O.S. Printing House, 2003), 449.

2. Background of Cambodian Education System

The Cambodian education system has gone through both successes and crises. It transitioned from its indigenous framework around religious teachings to a more modernized system under the French colonial regime. The education system flourished during Sihanouk's regime, but it was almost frozen in time and severely destroyed during Lon Nol and KR regimes, respectively. The PRK period was therefore a time in which the education system had to be rehabilitated amidst great difficulties.

Historically, the Cambodian education system is rooted in the traditional/indigenous form of education in which children, primarily boys, received basic instruction from Buddhist monks in nearby pagodas to gain the ability to read and write for the daily practices of living. As the majority of Cambodians are and were Buddhists, religious teaching was institutionalized to serve the purpose of spreading and strengthening Buddhism and to give basic literacy to the students.¹⁸¹

When Cambodia was colonized by the French in 1863, the Cambodian education system was ostensibly modernized, adapting to the French-style education, but was not well developed until the late French colonial period. Access to education during the French colonial period was largely limited to the children of the elite families in the cities, and higher education was only available abroad, mostly in France.¹⁸²

When Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953, Prince Norodom Sihanouk embarked on massive school expansion projects. In 1969, the Cambodian education system “comprised 5,275 primary schools, 146 secondary schools, and 9

¹⁸¹ Sideth S. Dy and Akira Ninomiya, "Basic Education in Cambodia: The Impact of UNESCO on policies in the 1990s," *Education Policy Analysis Archives* 11, no. 48 (2003).

¹⁸² Thomas Clayton, "Restriction or Resistance? French Colonial Educational Development in Cambodia," *Education Policy Analysis Archives* 3, no. 19 (December, 1995).

institutes of higher education.”¹⁸³ Scholars and researchers alike agree that education development was one of the great achievements during Sihanouk’s regime.

Following the 1970 coup, the Cambodian education system was characterized by a series of crises. The education system was dramatically damaged during the first half of the 1970s due to civil war, which forced the Khmer Republic government to close a number of schools, especially those in the rural areas:

We could not teach anything as we were busy with demonstrations. Schools were closed. All teachers and villagers participated in the demonstration right after the coup. In late March, there was a mass movement of people which marched close to Phnom Penh. The Lon Nol armed forces pushed them back to Kampong Cham. During that time, demonstrators created chaos every day. The teachers did not do anything. We would hang Prince Sihanouk's photo in front of our house to avoid being persecuted. In May, the KR soldiers came in and attacked the government soldiers who guarded the district office.¹⁸⁴

Chhang Song, former Minister of Information and spokesman of the Khmer Republic government commented that the education conditions at that time were highly disruptive for two main reasons— namely the KR artillery attacks and the student demonstrations that led to the assassination of Education Minister Keo Sangkim and his colleague Thach Chea.¹⁸⁵ Song recalled that all schools throughout the country were reorganized to be military garrisons with sand sacks to protect from bullets. A number of ordinary people, school teachers, and students were grouped and armed to protect their

¹⁸³ Thomas Clayton, “Building the New Cambodia: Educational Destruction and Construction under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979,” *History of Education Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (Spring, 1998): 5.

¹⁸⁴ Khamboly Dy's interview with Mom Meth, former primary school teacher during Lon Nol regime and now inspector of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, Phnom Penh, February 7, 2013. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Mom Meth.]

¹⁸⁵ Khamboly Dy's interview with Chhang Song, former Information Minister of the Khmer Republic government, Phnom Penh, February 8, 2013. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Chhang Song]

respective villages and offices.¹⁸⁶ Song's remarks echoed Mom Meth's claim that all male teachers carried guns to guard the schools at night.¹⁸⁷

The education system was almost totally dissolved and “ceased at all levels and in all locales” between 1975 and 1979, as the KR did not value formal education.¹⁸⁸ All kinds of education under the KR were reflected in work and revolutionary struggle. Two of the regime’s slogans support this claim: “There are no more diplomas, only diplomas one can visualize. If you wish to get a Baccalaureate, you have to get it at the dams or canals.”¹⁸⁹ Another slogan said, “Study is not important. What’s important is work and revolution.”¹⁹⁰ Though the KR did not destroy the school buildings, they converted many school complexes into prisons and warehouses. Tuol Svay Prey (literally meaning “a wild mango tree hill”) High School and Tuol Sleng (literally meaning “a hill with poisonous tree”) Primary School, together with the surrounding flats were converted into the KR top security center (Office S-21 or Tuol Sleng prison), where a number of prominent educators and intellectuals were interrogated, tortured and eventually executed.¹⁹¹

3. Rehabilitating the Education System after the Genocide

The PRK came to power faced with a severe crisis in education, given the near complete destruction of the national infrastructure including its educational facilities and resources. Many educated people and teachers were killed, and the surviving teachers fled the country in search of a safe zone in third countries. The remaining teachers that

¹⁸⁶ Khamboly Dy's interview with Chhang Song

¹⁸⁷ Khamboly Dy's interview with Mom Meth.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., Thomas Clayton, 6.

¹⁸⁹ Henry Locard, 95-96.

¹⁹⁰ Dy Khamboly, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2007), 43.

¹⁹¹ For the list of intellectuals killed at Tuol Sleng, please see Ing Pich, *Tuol Sleng prison* (Phnom Penh: Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum of the Ministry of Propaganda and Culture), (DC-Cam's Archives).

survived the KR atrocities experienced severe trauma after witnessing the deaths of immediate family members. Over 200,000 children were left orphaned and lived in orphanage centers in various parts of the country. The entire country lacked educational infrastructure, materials, qualified curriculum and education officials to oversee the daily educational processes. Education started from the ground and the few surviving teachers had to come with their own efforts and resources to help get the education system off the ground. At the same time, both the teachers and students were struggling with poverty, national security and the political instability. An estimated 20,000 to 40,000 KR forces operated in various parts of the country and regularly conducted sabotages and incursions killing people and damaging property.

In addition, the PRK's Ministry of National Education consisted of a small number of unqualified officials who had little experience in education and few specialized skills.¹⁹² Chan Ven, the first education Minister, and his other few Cambodian colleagues largely had no clear direction of what to do other than their desire to put as many students in school as possible.¹⁹³ In general, the PRK regime did not have adequate professional experts to develop curricula and textbooks. So in what way did the PRK regime rehabilitate the education system? The PRK assessed the education destruction during the KR as follows:

Under the false socialist proverb, they [the KR] nearly killed all intellectuals, students, professors, teachers and families of educational staffs... They trickily deceived and appealed to the intellectuals outside the country to return back to the country and then they cruelly killed nearly all of them. Besides this cruel killing, they forced educational staffs to work in the dangerous places, and some intellectuals were living in the lack of shelter, medicine, sanitation, clothes and food. They not only killed educational staff but also destroyed schools and studying tools both in the city and remote areas... From study,

¹⁹² Ibid., Duggan, Stephen J., "The Role of International Organization in the Financing of Higher Education in Cambodia."

¹⁹³ Ibid. David M. Ayres, 128.

children only know how to blame, to hate their own tradition, to spy on one another and especially to kill people. They wanted children to be skillful killers. By understanding all kinds of these matters, the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea is making great effort to restore the national education to be rapidly developed. Primary schools, secondary schools and high schools are reopened one after another. Ministry of Education is trying to gather the surviving educational staffs to train them to be new educational staffs in accordance to the new education system.¹⁹⁴

The PRK gradually built up its education system from primary to secondary and then to tertiary schools. The first level of education was largely based on the efforts of the local authorities, local villagers and surviving educators.

National Appeal for Teachers

The PRK claimed that an estimated 75 to 80 percent of all “teaching forces” were killed, leaving a mere 20 percent of the intellectual class alive.¹⁹⁵ It further asserted that the KR killed 675 lawyers and professors, 18,000 teachers and 10,550 university students.¹⁹⁶ Being the first Education Minister, Chan Ven, a former Math teacher, was responsible for reactivating the foundation of the national education system.¹⁹⁷ From 7 January to 24 September 1979, when the first academic year was opened, Chan Ven’s main priorities were to look for surviving teachers and teaching materials and to set up educational infrastructure at all levels and throughout the country.

¹⁹⁴ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 4 for Adult People* (Ho Chi Minh City, 1980), 28-30 (unofficial translation by the author).

¹⁹⁵ Cambodian Ministry of Education of the State of Cambodia as quoted in Thamas Clayton, p. 7-8. See also Evan Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building*, 73.

¹⁹⁶ Report on “The Crimes of the Beijing Expansionist and Its Lackey Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan during the Period 1975-1979,” published by Department of Propaganda, Training and Writing of the Nationwide Council of the United Front for National Salvation, Construction and Defense of Kampuchea of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, dated September 12, 1983. The Chief of the Research Committee was Min Khin (now Minister of Region and Cult). The other five members were: Chea Kean, Tit Sunthorn, Kim Ly, Ms. Srun Seanglim and Tes Heng.

¹⁹⁷ Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis. *Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal*. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005), page 21.

In an attempt to recruit more teachers, the PRK appealed to all surviving educators and educated people nationwide to register as teachers. The government's strategy to rescue national education at that time was to have "the literate teach the semi-illiterate, and the semi-illiterate teach the illiterate," which was the motto of the PRK Ministry of Education.¹⁹⁸ To overcome this lack of teaching forces, the PRK depended heavily on Vietnamese advisors to train and to recruit teachers, as well as to develop the curricula at all levels.¹⁹⁹ As David Ayres rightly argued, "[the] response to the question of educational quality and access, including the concern of the recruitment and training of teachers, whom would attend school, and of what would be taught, were clearly beyond the capacity of the new Cambodian Ministry of Education."²⁰⁰

Educational Structure and Resources

Under the PRK, the structure and the management of education were identical to that of the Vietnamese. However, the teaching materials and instructional strategies were the combination of four main sources: pre-DK educational system, French-style education, Vietnamese educational influences, and Soviet bloc flows. The school system with ten grades was divided into three levels: Level-I Primary School, Level-II Secondary School and Level-III Secondary School (in Vietnamese: Kab Mok, Kab Hay and Kab Ba). As in Vietnam, the curricula introduced "political morality" study, which aimed at instilling socialist ethics in children in an effort to turn Cambodia into a socialist

¹⁹⁸ Khamboly Dy's interview with Sek Sokha, official of Department of General High School Education of the Ministry of Education, Phnom Penh, February 7, 2013 [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Sek Sokha]. See also Evan Gottesman, 72-73.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., Duggan, Stephen J., "The Role of International Organization in the Financing of Higher Education in Cambodia."

²⁰⁰ Ibid. David M. Ayres, 128.

state.²⁰¹ According to Pen Sovann, most political study texts which were published in school textbooks and state and party bulletins were written by Vietnamese experts. The texts were translated into Khmer and printed in Ho Chi Minh City in the first few years, as Cambodia did not have a printing house yet.²⁰²

Primary Education

In the early days of the PRK regime, teachers did not receive adequate support from the central government. The teachers had to come up with their own teaching strategies, materials and self-support for both the teaching profession and their daily living. The in-service teachers recruited and trained the new teachers, who, in turn, helped recruit more teachers to kick-start education in their respective localities. In addition to this crucial educational mission, teachers struggled with poverty, trauma and frequent incursions of the KR remnants.

Education in the far-off provinces was largely at the discretion and volunteerism of the local surviving educators who made decisions on the teaching materials and curriculum since the Ministry of Education could not manage the entire structure of the education system. Moreover, the nearly destroyed national infrastructure did not allow for effective communication between central officials and local educators.²⁰³ The teaching content and materials were extracted from the pre-1970 French textbooks that the teachers could find in their respective villages.

There was no teacher [in early 1979]. Therefore, those who had the capacity and could teach could register as teachers as long as they volunteered. We registered with nothing

²⁰¹ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea "Morality and Political Education" for grade 5, published in 1982 by Curriculum and Textbook Development Department of the Ministry of Education, published in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, p. 19-25.

²⁰² Khamboly Dy's interview with Pen Sovann.

²⁰³ Ibid., David Ayres, 126-28.

on hand. We looked into what we learned when we were students in order to design the lessons. The students and teachers alike did not have uniform; they could wear anything they had. The students sat on the floor to study. There were no tables and chairs. Later, teachers received salary of about 90 riel and other additional social supports such as rice, cloth, cooking oil, kerosene and shampoo.²⁰⁴

There was no single newly published textbook in the beginning. I had to pick up the lessons from the old textbooks [published] during Sihanouk's regime, for example, Tang Kimhuon's book on geography in French. I translated it into Khmer for teaching. I also took some books from my house as materials for the teachers.²⁰⁵

I brought my newly born baby to the classroom. As I gave assignments to the students to work in groups, I had time to breastfeed my baby. When I was occupied with the teaching, students would take turns to comfort the baby in a hammock outside the classroom within my sight.²⁰⁶

I used poems, songs, dramas and short stories to persuade the villagers and to attract the children to school. It was easy for me to recruit actors for the performance. I could get both thin and fat actors as I wished because some children were so skinny while others had swollen bodies due to unrecovered illnesses from the KR period. I advised them that "All students! You cannot walk. The time does not allow us to walk; we have to run because Pol Pot had stolen our time for over three years. Therefore, we have to run not to waste time for education."²⁰⁷

With assistance from Vietnam, the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries, education was restored and primary schools were rebuilt throughout the country. The first academic year, 1979-1980, officially started on September 24, 1979. PRK President Heng Samrin declared that date as the National Day of Education.²⁰⁸ He added, "the reconstruction and expansion of cultural, educational and national study foundation are the most important and urgent tasks."²⁰⁹

²⁰⁴ Khamboly Dy's interview with Sek Sokha.

²⁰⁵ Khamboly Dy's interview with Mom Meth.

²⁰⁶ An interview on local CNC Television with a former teacher during the PRK regime and is now an official at the Ministry of Interior. The interview was to mark the coming historical day of 7 January 2012, (interviewed on December 17, 2012.)

²⁰⁷ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Nguon Sopha, Battambang City, Battambang Province, February 12, 2011. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's Interview with Nguon Sopha]

²⁰⁸ Letter from President Heng Samrin to the nation on the occasion of the first academic year (1979-1980), DC-Cam's Archives, Document D40864).

²⁰⁹ Speech by Heng Samrin, President of the People's Revolutionary Council, on the occasion of the first academic year 1979-1980 of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The speech is quoted from Ministry of

Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS)

To cope with the shortfall of teachers and respond to the urgent need for the rehabilitation of the secondary school education throughout the country, the PRK initiated the establishment of the first Teacher Training College (well-known as Ecole Normale Supérieure or ENS) in July 1980. ENS was one of the fundamental instruments in the recreation of lower and upper secondary school education systems in the KR aftermath. The mission of the College was to train the trainers and lower and upper secondary school teachers from various provinces and Phnom Penh.²¹⁰ It was located in the current Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) and directed by former Buddhist monks, Phet Phanou and later Va Sunsamrith.²¹¹ Teachers were recruited through the national announcement.²¹² During the first academic year, the College was able to register 27 upper secondary school teachers and 180 lower secondary school teachers.²¹³

At the outset, means of instruction were predominantly in the French language because most surviving teachers spoke French, many teaching materials were in French language, and Vietnamese instructors also spoke French fluently (although French and English were regarded as imperialist languages and were technically strictly

Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Language Studies for Grade 4, Party 1* (Phnom Penh: Department of Curriculum and Textbook Development, 1984), 9-12, unofficial translation by the author.

²¹⁰ Official history of the Royal University of Phnom Penh,

http://www.rupp.edu.kh/content.php?page=about_rupp#hist (accessed on August 28, 2013).

²¹¹ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Sambo Manara. The first jobs of the cadres responsible for its operation were to collect the remaining school equipment and supplies, to clear up the grass and forest inside the school compound, to clean the unattended dirty school building, to set up furniture in the classrooms, to prepare the organizational structure, to recruit instructors, and to design the programming and other teaching materials.

²¹² Former teachers or those who held diplomas would travel to Phnom Penh to register. As certificates and other documents to prove their qualification were destroyed during the KR, the recruitment was based on the self-proclaimed degree of each participant.

²¹³ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Sorn Samnang, former instructor of the Teacher Training College in 1980, Phnom Penh, August 28, 2013. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's Interview with Sorn Samnang] All teachers stayed in the dorm inside the school compound. They received salary of about 90 riel per month and additional supplies such as rice, shampoo, oil, milk, coin, cloth, mosquito net, mat, and kitchen utensils.

prohibited).²¹⁴ Gradually, Vietnamese instructors with French fluency returned back home or were transferred to teach in socialist African countries. They were replaced by new cohorts of Vietnamese instructors with less French fluency, and the means of instruction were dominated by the Vietnamese language.²¹⁵ Students were then required to study the Vietnamese language, and political morality was integrated into Vietnamese language study. Students studied such topics as Leninist ideology and the history and ideology of Ho Chi Minh in addition to Cambodian history.

The teaching materials were donated by the Soviet Union and Vietnam. However, many instructors and students found the left over pre-DK course books in various places in Phnom Penh.²¹⁶ In around 1986, the College received technical and material support from the newly established Foundation, Danielle Mitterand-France Libertés, which provided many French textbooks to improve the instructions.

I went to Tuol Tumpong and O Russei markets to buy the left over French books from the 1960s. The books were so expensive. I dared not tell my wife to avoid blame. Sometimes, I exchanged rice with books.²¹⁷

In 1979, I stayed at Chraing Chamreh. I traveled eleven kilometer to visit my former school [Royal University of Law and Economics]. I saw people delivered piles of books from the second floor to the ground to sell to Vietnamese vendors. I selected the relevant books, and I got a sack of book. I carried the sack on my shoulder back home. Later, when I returned back, most books were gone as people delivered the books through ox carts and sold them to Vietnamese at Chhbar Ampov."²¹⁸

²¹⁴ Khamboly Dy's interview with Sorn Samnang.

²¹⁵ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Sorn Samnang

²¹⁶ Most books in the National Library also disappeared as people invaded the library, took the books and sold them for the urgent needs for living. Luckily, the National Archives remained untouched.

²¹⁷ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Professor Siv Thuon.

²¹⁸ Khamboly Dy's interview with Professor Sorn Samnang.

Tertiary Education

Vietnam and other socialist countries also provided tremendous support for tertiary education. Throughout the PRK period, five university-level institutes were established to improve human resources in all fields. In December 1979, the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Pharmacy were opened with assistance from Vietnamese doctors. In July 1980, the Teachers' Training College (or ENS) started its class as discussed above. The Khmer-Soviet Friendship Higher Technical Institute was reinstated in September 1981, followed by the establishment of Economics Institute in September 1984, and the Agricultural Institute in January 1985.²¹⁹ In 1988, the biggest and most famous University of Phnom Penh was reinstated. At the conclusion of the PRK regime, "Cambodia's institutes of higher education had graduated 977 doctors, dentists, or pharmacists, 2,196 senior secondary teachers, 1,481 foreign language specialists, 474 technical engineers, 400 economists, and 184 agricultural engineers."²²⁰ Thomas Clayton, who did extensive research on the Cambodian education development during the 1980s, claimed that the PRK relied heavily on Vietnamese professors and teachers for its educational implementation from primary to tertiary levels for the first few years. However, by 1987, most Vietnamese professors and teachers were replaced by Cambodian teachers who had been trained either in Vietnam or in Cambodia by the Vietnamese experts.²²¹

Vietnam sent thousands of professional experts and advisers who worked alongside "the Ministry of Education, university professors, physical plant repair, books,

²¹⁹ Ibid. Thomas Clayton "Education under Occupation: Political Violence, Schooling and Response in Cambodia, 1979-1989," p. 72-73.

²²⁰ Ibid., Thomas Clayton, 73.

²²¹ Ibid., Thomas Clayton, 72.

equipment, and curricular materials, and scholarships by the thousands for advanced study at universities in Eastern-bloc countries."²²² Between 1983 and 1989, some 2,650 Cambodian students had been sent to study in such countries as Vietnam, Cuba, the former Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Before departing, all students were required to attend the one-year intensive language course which provided instruction on the language of the respective destination country.²²³ Vietnamese and Russian languages were integrated into the national curriculum and the required study courses for students at higher education institutions.²²⁴ The PRK sent thousands of its cadres to attend political and military studies in Vietnam. Most of these cadres returned back to Cambodia to take up important positions in the government.

Educational Challenges

The educational challenges stemmed from several factors. In its first few years, the regime was mainly struggling to rehabilitate educational institutions by "putting children back to schools and combating the illiteracy among adults."²²⁵ The PRK education appeared to disproportionately favor Vietnamese ideals. In addition, given their traumatic experiences during the KR regime, many teachers could not concentrate on their careers since they were worried about the whereabouts of their family members and burdened by ongoing poverty. Moreover, the content and curriculum were informed and improved upon by the past experiences of the surviving educators, the surviving textbooks from the pre-1970 period and Vietnamese experts. Although Cambodian

²²² Ibid. Thomas Clayton "Education under Occupation: Political Violence, Schooling and Response in Cambodia, 1979-1989," p. 71.

²²³ Ibid., Thomas Clayton

²²⁴ Khamboly Dy's interview with Siv Thuon, official of the Ministry of Education, Phnom Penh, January 25, 2013 [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Siv Thuon]

²²⁵ Ibid., Sideth S. Dy, 93.

educators were involved in the production and construction processes, the content of the textbooks had to be approved by the Vietnamese.²²⁶ The education system continued to mount efforts upon the alignment with the Soviet-led socialist block and rejected capitalism and China-led socialism. Students and the general population alike were encouraged to study Vietnamese, Russian, German, Laotian and Spanish, the languages of the socialist worlds.²²⁷ Many people may have found these languages uninteresting and irrelevant.

Facing severe international sanctions, the PRK was denied international development aids. The regime received only limited humanitarian assistance from international organizations, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which successfully negotiated with the PRK regime for the humanitarian work by the end of 1979.²²⁸ However, the two agencies could not do much to help the existing educational problems, including education about the recent atrocities of the KR period.

Another facet of PRK education was that all levels of education were infused with political doctrine or at least political messages that were taught alongside the technical courses. As Clayton argued, "Vietnam's important humanitarian contribution cannot, however, be disconnected from that country's hegemonic *mission civilisatrice* in occupied Cambodia."²²⁹ In addition to course books for professional and technical skills, *Political Studies* textbooks and *The Propaganda* magazine, among others, such as songs, poems and slogans were issued as additional teaching materials to ensure the objectives of

²²⁶ Ibid., David M. Ayres, 134.

²²⁷ Ibid., David M. Ayres, 142.

²²⁸ Ibid., David M. Ayres, 132.

²²⁹ Ibid., Thomas Clayton, p. 73.

instilling the concept of Soviet-oriented socialism and revolutionary consciousness in students and the general populace at large.

In spite of the above challenges, the educational rehabilitation that occurred during the PRK was one of the regime's great achievements,²³⁰ as the PRK "used rapid education expansion as the basis of nation building", which was opposite from the previous DK regime that perceived education as the main obstacle to national development.²³¹ Moreover, the new regime also believed that education, when compared to other sectors that were in need of extreme attention, had a strong connection with the creation of the "new socialist workmen" and a new socialist state at large.²³² By the early 1980s, the total enrollment of students at all grade levels was more than one million, and as many as 37,000 teachers were recruited and trained.²³³ Nonetheless, only about 10% of these teachers had formal educational qualifications.²³⁴ Teacher Training Schools were reopened throughout the country.

4. The Politics of Teaching Genocide

Unlike the KR, the PRK valued education as one of the main forces behind national development and the revolutionary cause. The PRK used the KR's brutal acts against education and educators as a yardstick for the new regime to measure and highlight its achievements. Education was seen as a vehicle for cultivating the revolutionary identity and ensuring socialist-oriented behavior and attitudes among the

²³⁰ Ibid., Evan Gottsman, 73.

²³¹ David M. Ayres, "Tradition, Modernity, and the Development of Education in Cambodia," *Comparative Education Review* 44, no. 4 (November 2000): 452.

²³² Ibid. David M. Ayres.

²³³ Duggan, Stephen J., *The Role of International Organization in the Financing of Higher Education in Cambodia* (Melbourne: Victoria University, 1997).

²³⁴ Ibid. Stephen Duggan

population, especially the young children. Education was central to the PRK state-making project, as it was to the PRK's predecessors (i.e. Prince Sihanouk's Buddhist socialism, Lon Nol's neo-Khmerism, and Pol Pot's self-reliance and self-mastery). In this sense, the PRK regime gave significant attention to the concept of socialist revolution and the building of socialism, which were embedded in the school curricula at all levels and in both formal and informal education.

Political education became the cornerstone for the PRK to achieve the goal of building up Soviet-oriented socialism. Textbooks for students had to be aligned with Marxist-Leninist socialism. New textbooks had to at least stress one important ethos—the century-long friendship and brotherhood between the Cambodian and Vietnamese people.²³⁵ Sek Sokha recalled a small lesson that he taught his students in the 1980s. "In the future, the world will become socialism. The free world will disappear. Indochina will have a common map with no border for the three countries."²³⁶

According to surviving academic materials used in the PRK schools, students spent parts of their school time learning the texts, songs and poems that praised the revolutionary fighters, the heroism of "the Vietnamese voluntary forces," the "glorious liberation day of 7 January" and the "long-lasting friendship between Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos." The materials also encouraged ideological vigilance and commitment to the national cause at all cost. In addition, they incited revolutionary anger and vengeance toward what the PRK called the "Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan genocidal cliques" and condemned "KR genocidal massacres of innocent people," "expansionist

²³⁵ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Pen Sovann. During the interview, Pen Sovann claims that Vietnam demanded that the phrase "Cambodian-Vietnamese Friendship" and the good conduct of the Vietnamese in liberating Cambodian people from the KR genocidal clique have to be emphasized.

²³⁶ Khamboly Dy's interview with Sek Sokha.

China," "Beijing genocidal ambition," "Nazi fascism," and "American imperialism."²³⁷

The PRK national anthem clearly stated these objectives. The first paragraph of the anthem read:

The Cambodian people are the determined forces vow to completely destroy the enemies. Commit to solidarity for magical power. Devote life and let the blood come out in exchange for victory.²³⁸

In addition, the Morality textbook for grade 1, mentioned the students' responsibility to give wholehearted love and respect toward Lenin. Lesson 5 entitled "Love and Respect for the Great Leader" read:

One day, during the break, Sopheap entered Sam's classroom. She glanced to a picture hung on the wall. Sopheap asked her brother, "Whose picture is it?" Sam replied that, "it is the picture of Lenin. He is Russian. He is the leader of the proletariat races and helped the oppressed toward prosperity and independence. His good leadership has been adopted by the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea in order to liberate Cambodian people from Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique and the Chinese-Beijing reactionary and expansionism... We survive, are able to attend this class and receive happiness to the present day because of the gratitude of Lenin, friend Vietnam and the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea. Therefore, you have to love and respect the United Front and him who is our great leader who brings us happiness." Sopheap nods her head quickly, smiles and hugs her brother with utmost pride.²³⁹

The representation of Lenin as the "great leader" of the proletariat and oppressed classes, a painted picture of Lenin in the textbook, as well as the photos of Lenin hung inside each classroom along with photos of Ho Chi Minh and Heng Samrin, symbolize the political and ideological influences of the former Soviet Union and Vietnam on the PRK education. The number of Cambodian students that were sent to study in the Soviet Union and other countries in Eastern Europe, along with the number of advisers and

²³⁷ All of these terms were used repeatedly in many school textbooks from primary to tertiary levels and the official documents of the PRK regime.

²³⁸ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Language Studies for Grade 4, Part I* (Phnom Penh: Department of Curriculum and Textbook Development, 1984), 199.

²³⁹ Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality*, Grade 1 (Phnom Penh: 1981), 18-19 (Translation by the author).

experts that were sent from Vietnam, Soviet and Eastern European countries to assist the PRK government exemplify the flow of communist ideology and influences from these countries to PRK general education at this critical juncture. Like Vietnam, the former Soviet Union was the main supporter of the PRK for both internal affairs and on the international stage, but the Soviet Union was not able to solicit and convince the international communities to back the PRK for a seat at the UN.

5. Analyses of the Textbooks

Daniel Bar-Tal argues that textbooks “construct the social reality of the students. They enforce the self-perception, values of a society, or more accurately its dominant elite, required norms, societal goals, nature of relations with different groups, stereotypes of other groups.”²⁴⁰ Often students are first exposed to their country’s history, specific important social events, and interpretations that channel them toward specific world-views, largely through textbooks. Any misconceptions embedded in the textbooks will have far-reaching implications on the people’s understanding about the past as well as how memory is constructed.

As stated above, when the PRK came to power in 1979, rehabilitating the education system was one of the top priorities, and remodeling the education system to align with the socialist bloc ideology was essential in turning young children into the new revolutionary workforce that could be utilized to achieve the political aims of the newly formed, young state. Drawing on a foundation of the KR genocidal massacres, freshly embedded in the mind of all Cambodians both young and old, the new PRK government

²⁴⁰ Daniel Bar-Tal, “The rocky road toward peace: Beliefs on conflict in Israel textbooks,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 6 (1998): 725.

rewrote textbooks for primary and secondary schools, incorporating a common ideological consciousness that was closely aligned with the Soviet- and Vietnam-oriented communist ideology, which was bolstered by the common threats from the persistent KR guerrilla forces at the border areas.

Revisiting the PRK textbooks, I recalled my memories as a primary school student in Krakor Primary School in Kratie province and remembered how my knowledge on KR history was constructed through those textbooks when I started grade 1 in 1987.²⁴¹ One of the lessons that struck me the most was entitled "Criminal Acts of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan on Chhay Ny's Family."²⁴² The lesson derived from the real tragic story of a Cambodian family during the KR. Chhay Ny's family was evacuated from Kandal to Pursat province where her mother and two brothers were brutally tortured and killed because of her father's background as a teacher who had been in Vietnam since 1974.

Her story personally resonated with me because I emotionally connected to the story of one of her brothers, although I had no idea what the KR was back then. Chhay Ny's younger brother Chhay Mon was taken by a group of KR soldiers and executed near her detention camp. The soldiers cut out Mon's flesh and liver and ate it for food. Later the soldiers killed another brother, Chhay Moeun, and Chhay Ny's mother. Chhay Ny saw these inhuman acts with her own eyes. As I conducted research for this dissertation, I encountered Chhay Ny's story for the second time, at which she was a witness to the 1979

²⁴¹ Krakor Primary School is located in Krakor village, Krakor commune, Kratie district and Kratie province where I was born. I studied in this primary school for five years from 1987 to 1991. At that time, there were four wooden buildings to accommodate children in Krakor commune and some from the nearby communes. The school still exists today.

²⁴² Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 3, Part 2* (Phnom Penh: Rannakse Printing House, 1984), 1-2 (Unofficial translation by the author). The author tried to identify the current status of Chhay Ny, but the information about her has remained unfound.

PRK's People's Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT).²⁴³ Only at this time did I learn that Chhay Ny herself had her finger cut off because the KR soldiers accused her of catching insects for food without permission, and that she is the sole survivor in the family. In the 1980s, national radio broadcasted Chhay Ny's story as part of the regime's propaganda against the KR.²⁴⁴

Back then, I had no idea of the political implication behind each lesson in the textbooks I read every day. I took the KR leaders and soldiers as the kind of devils that attempted to destroy the country and kill human beings. I imagined how I would escape or fight back to save my life if I had been one of Chhay Ny's brothers. Chhay Ny's story powerfully strengthened my commitment to follow the advice in the textbooks, which was to fight against "the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary cliques" and to follow the correct ideologies of the new regime.

This educational experience provided a thorough understanding of how an education system under the constraints of the state ideology shapes the social-structural conditions. The analyses of the textbooks below further shows how school textbooks serve to enhance state legitimacy, policies and objectives.

Reading Textbooks for Primary School Students

My analyses of forty-seven PRK and SOC textbooks and political magazines identified five core ideological and political goals at the heart of the PRK's social and political reconstruction of a loosely sovereign state, which Judy Ledgerwood called "the

²⁴³ Case file on the prosecution of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique of the People's Revolutionary Tribunal, 58-62. See also record of the answers from witness Chhay Ny, dated July 9, 1979 (DC-Cam's Archives, Document D40624).

²⁴⁴ Face-to-face personal conversation between Khamboly Dy and a local TV newscaster, September 29, 2014. Though he knew of Chhay Ny but did not know if she is still alive.

master narrative of the state."²⁴⁵ This identification does not underestimate the positive sides of the PRK education, such as combating the illiteracy among children and adults and constructing social integrity, morality and culture. The five ideological goals included the following: 1) the creation of socialism in Cambodia; 2) commendation of the Cambodian-Vietnamese long-lasting solidarity and fraternal friendship; 3) condemnation of "the Chinese expansionism;" 4) the non-return of the KR "genocidal regime"; and 5) celebration of the glorious liberation day, the 7th of January, 1979.

Among the five ideological goals, the first three were mainly cultivated by Vietnam and clearly showed and served Vietnamese foreign policies and the Cold War politics of the socialist bloc. Whether or not PRK was coerced or endorsed these goals voluntarily, these core political themes were deeply embedded in the PRK's textbooks and school teachings throughout the period. The hidden curriculum that transmitted ideologically driven social norms, values and dispositions had long-lasting impacts on students' attitudes, beliefs and social perceptions.

Building up Socialism

Influenced, and to some extent determined, by Vietnam, the PRK attempted to bring communism to Cambodia hoping that it would become a socialist country like Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The desire for a moderate socialist state, contrary to the radical socialist KR regime, was one of the core objectives of the PRK general education at all levels. This Soviet-led socialist link also characterized the way the PRK addressed

²⁴⁵ Judy Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narratives," *Museum Anthropology* 21, no. 1 (1997):82-98.

the defeated KR faction by calling them "fascist" or "Maoist clique" that the PRK claimed robbed and subverted the true socialist revolution of the people.

The PRK, with assistance from Vietnam, used education as a strategic mechanism in conveying the Marxist-Leninist ideologies to the Cambodian students from primary to tertiary levels.²⁴⁶ A general notion of former students in the PRK period was that political study was superior to general education: political study was endorsed as a compulsory subject.²⁴⁷ Political study was also prepared separately for the PRK party members and cadres outside the school system, ensuring that the party members understood the socialist ethics more than the rest of the population.²⁴⁸ The descriptions in the textbooks demanded that the people's main responsibilities were to participate in building socialism and protect the country against the invading enemies:

Our people are determined to overcome all kinds of up-coming dangers and happily strive to defend and build up the country. They believe that the pure and correct socialism will absolutely bring peace and good living conditions.... After the liberation of 7 January 1979, Vietnamese people helped us to build up the country in all fields.²⁴⁹

Sam, who is a class monitor, commits to protect Cambodian motherland to be prosperous and long-lasting. The teacher smiled with satisfaction and asked students that "in the present day, do our parents have enough food, proper clothes and comfortable shelter?" Sopheap, a female student, quickly answered before the others that, "in the present day, we don't lack anything. In addition, we, students, are able to attend proper school with good leading from the teacher." Sam added that, "we live under one household with parents and all siblings." The teacher emphasized that, "this is the prosperous and happy life. Look! We live with solidarity and justice; we help one another like siblings. The children study their national language with joy. This is a road toward the real socialism that Cambodia needs. Therefore, are you satisfied with it?" All children responded spontaneously that, "we all love and are satisfied with socialist regime and commit to study to the fullest and closely unite to grab this [socialist] regime."²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ Ibid. Thomas Clayton, p. 71.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. Thomas Clayton

²⁴⁸ Ibid., Margaret Slocumb, "Commune Election in Cambodia: 1981 Foundations and 2002 Reformulations," p. 451.

²⁴⁹ Reading textbook for grade 2, part 1. Publish by the Ministry of National Education of the PRK. Published in Phnom Penh.

²⁵⁰ The Ministry of National Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality for Grade 2* (Phnom Penh), 10-12.

Moreover, the Preface of the Morality textbook for grade 3 clearly stated the political functions of education and the expectations to be achieved by all students. The primary five learning objectives of the textbook included (1) true spirit of loving the country and the spirit of glorious international proletarians, (2) correct attitude toward education and labor work, (3) understanding collectivism, (4) pity on human beings, and (5) qualifications as the socialists.²⁵¹ With these objectives, the textbook became a means for shaping students' attitudes toward socialism beginning at a young age. The objectives emphasized attitude over life skills. The objectives not only attempted to construct students' knowledge but also their political and ideological consciousness to ensure that the students' attitudes complied with the state policies and ideologies.

Commendation of Cambodian-Vietnamese long-lasting Friendship

The textbooks glorified the long-lasting solidarity and fraternal friendship between the Cambodian and Vietnamese people. In this sense, every single textbook emphasized the good gestures of the Vietnamese in liberating Cambodia and helping Cambodian people in all sectors. The textbooks constantly invoked Kampuchean-Vietnamese friendship and called upon young people to adopt the resistance movements of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos as a model in fighting “reactionary enemies”:

We are striving to strengthen and expand Kampuchea-Vietnam-Laos friendship to be even stronger and long lasting....Friend Vietnamese have helped and supported our Cambodian people in every possible way... Most farmers in Svay Rieng province lacked cattle, plows, rakes, etc. Our friend Vietnamese bought plowing machines to plow our people's rice fields for four days. We, male and female students, strongly love our brother Vietnamese, for they eliminated our Kampuchean foes.²⁵²

²⁵¹ The Ministry of Education and National Study of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality Studies for Grade 3* (Phnom Penh), unofficial translation by the author.

²⁵² Reading textbook for grade 1. Publish in 1982 by the Ministry of National Education of the PRK. Publish in Ho Chi Minh City, pp. 93-172.

We clearly know that apart from Vietnam there are other socialist nations such as Laos and the Soviet Union, which are supporting us in every section.²⁵³

The strengthening of fraternity and friendship between the two countries was not limited to the state level. This notion was injected much more deeply into the people's hearts and the consciences of young children through education.²⁵⁴ Through school textbooks and political publications, the PRK had indicated clearly how Vietnamese support, advice and resources were critical to the existence of the regime. At the state level, the long-lasting fraternity was enforced and made formal through the Treaty of Friendship signed by the two countries in March 1979.²⁵⁵

In addition, the PRK used textbooks for primary schools to describe the KR genocide in propagandistic terms to justify the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. This justification was explained from humanitarian and legal perspectives: the first humanitarian justification was that the PRK claimed that the Cambodian people, who the KR committed atrocities against, had the right to end these brutal acts and the right to ask for assistance from neighboring countries to defeat the KR and to save the people's lives. The second justification for Vietnam's presence in Cambodia was consistent with the Vietnamese claims of ongoing KR encroachment on Vietnamese border, whereby Vietnam was only exercising its right to self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter. Moreover, the PRK claimed that Vietnamese fighting in Cambodia was in response to the appeal of the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea (UFNSK).

²⁵³ Reading textbook for grade 2, part 2. Publish in 1981 by the Ministry of National Education of the PRK. Publish in Phnom Penh, p. 130-131.

²⁵⁴ Erin Collins, Kamboly Dy and Dany Long's interview with Pen Sovann.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. David M. Ayres, 124.

Condemnation of “Chinese Expansionism”

Genocide education during the 1980s became part of the domestic conflicts among rival Cambodian political factions as well as the international conflicts among the dominant powers and countries involved in the Cold War politics. The PRK genocide education content embedded in the school textbooks was substantially influenced by the Vietnamese world view and those of the Soviet blocs. The PRK had to “please the Vietnamese advisers who would not have appreciated any critical allusion to the Vietnamese role. Therefore, [PRK historians] had to operate in a restricted framework.”²⁵⁶

In this respect, the textbooks were written with many notions of hatred toward the enemies of Vietnam, including China, America and their allies regardless of the ideological contradiction between China and the U.S. The textbooks labeled Americans as imperialists and the Chinese as expansionists and hegemonists, who supported the KR since the pre-1975 period. Through textbooks, the PRK blamed China for the deaths of millions of Cambodians and the near annihilation of the country’s infrastructure. The textbooks not only implicated China in the genocide, but also accused China of being the mastermind behind the KR, while downplaying the role of the KR as having only “lackey” or “client” subordinate role in the genocide. The following excerpts reveal how the PRK provoked racist sentiments and incitement of hatred and anger among the young students toward the enemies of Vietnam, Soviet Union and the socialist bloc:

Cambodian people won over the invasive, country-swallowing China-Beijing.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Frings K. Viviane, “Rewriting Cambodian History to Adapt It to a New Political Context: The Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party’s Historiography,” *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 4 (October, 1997): 812.

²⁵⁷ Reading textbook for grade 1, part 1. Publish in 1979 by the Ministry of National Education of the PRK. Published in Phnom Penh, p. 42.

Recently, our people have eliminated the genocidal regime of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary and their master, the Beijing expansionists.²⁵⁸

Under the ideas of the great crazy hegemonists Beijing, Democratic Kampuchea became the invaded base and was a pedestal for them to attack the nearby countries in Southeast Asia. The power holders in Beijing ordered Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to invade and offensively fought against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.²⁵⁹

All people in Indochina have confronted to fight the enemies together: the French colonialism, American imperialism, and Beijing expansionism and its lackeys Pol Pot-Ieng Sary, who were the masters of genocide in Cambodia.²⁶⁰

Because of the support from Soviet party and people, China became socialist in 1949. However, after occupying power, the reactionary Chinese cliques trickily wanted to convert China to be the first super power in the world. The power holders in Beijing implemented expansionism, great nationalism, and hegemonism. They held tightly in their hands the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary cliques so that Cambodia would become Chinese puppet. Their main purpose was to convert our beloved country to their battlefield, as pedestal and as perpetrators to implement the plan to invade other countries... The reactionary Chinese wanted to continue the trick of the previous emperors, which they wanted to be the world emperor and expand their power to Southeast Asia. They ordered their lackeys, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, to convert Cambodia into a military base.²⁶¹

All children should clearly remember that the real and forever enemies are the American imperialists and the hegemonist and expansionist Beijing-China against which you have to absolutely fight until the last drop of your blood.²⁶²

Misunderstanding about China's direct involvement in the Cambodian genocide continues to have its effect until today. During DC-Cam's teacher training workshops, repeated messages about China being the mastermind behind the 1975-1979 KR atrocities appeared. This speculation was deeply entrenched in the minds of both teachers from the PRK period and former PRK students, some of who are now secondary school teachers. Lacking research and education on KR history has allowed the continued circulation of

²⁵⁸ Reading textbook for grade 2, part 2. Publish in 1981 by the Ministry of National Education of the PRK. Published in Phnom Penh, p. 86.

²⁵⁹ Reading textbook for grade 3, part 1. Publish in 1981 by the Ministry of National Education of the PRK. Published in Ho Chi Minh City, p. 63-65.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 80-81.

²⁶¹ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 2, Party 2 for Adult People* (Phnom Penh, 1980), 25-26.

²⁶² The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 5, Part 2* (Phnom Penh: Education Printing House), 25-26 (unofficial translation by the author).

this prejudiced assumption. Moreover, national political intensification encouraged politicians to employ this rhetoric for political gain.

As a result, many people including the highly educated, and especially teachers, constantly keep in mind that there is a suspicious figure(s) or unknown country behind the KR genocide. They do not believe that the KR planned the genocide, and they think the truth may not yet be uncovered, even with the establishment of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and the many modern publications on KR history. These stereotypical descriptions understandably resonate with the people since the KR put them in a state of constant suspicion and worry for almost four years, not knowing who the "Angkar" was. And then for another decade, the PRK put them in an ambivalent position where they received daily propagandistic information and ideological instruction instead of objective education and understanding of the KR period.

Preventing the Return of the Khmer Rouge

The fourth main goal of the PRK's genocide education was preventing the return of the KR and the other two Cambodian factions that were expanding their armed forces along the Cambodian-Thai border with assistance from China, the U.S. and its Western allies and ASEAN member states, especially Thailand. In other words, the PRK policy was to completely abolish what it called the "Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan genocidal clique." Toward these objectives, the contents of all textbooks introduced the crimes of the KR to students as early as primary school. Children from grade 1 and up were taught via these textbooks to hate and fear the KR:

Our people supplied foodstuffs to soldiers who were sweeping up the traitors Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. The United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea eliminated the traitors Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique.²⁶³

Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique killed more than 3 million people and completely destroyed everything in Cambodia. We are absolutely furious and strongly struggle against these atrocities.²⁶⁴

Since the KR and two non-communist factions were still fighting to attain complete withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, the PRK introduced political studies that focused attention on national security. According to the views expressed in the textbooks, the PRK strongly believed that the United States, China and France were attempting to take over Cambodia by using first Lon Nol and later Pol Pot as their tools. The PRK textbooks presented the following stereotype:

The three countries in Indochina—Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos—have joint border and similar geographical situation. People of the three countries have shared suffering and happiness together for a long time. The colonialist and imperialist France, Japan, America and lastly the expansionist China-Beijing through Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan cliques have exploited our Cambodian people for nearly a century....²⁶⁵

The emperor and expansionist Beijing exercised genocidal policy in Cambodia, which they chose their absolute slaves Pol Pot-Ieng Sary to act as murderers. They hoped that they would be able to send millions of Chinese soldiers and people to live in Cambodia in order to convert Cambodia into the front garrison to serve the expansionism in Southeast Asia. In late 1979, Beijing was having an agreement with Washington in order to form a separate movement against the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The expansionist Beijing and the American Imperialists had a big plan to send Lon Nol, who is the puppet of the Americans, and the soldiers loyal to Lon Nol to lead a movement to destroy the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Beijing policy to restore the dictatorial bloodthirsty regime of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary will absolutely not be achieved. The People's Republic of Kampuchea with the support from Socialist countries will not fall into the trap of the reactionary, imperialist and expansionist regime.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Ministry of National Education, *Reading Book for Grade 1*, Part 1, Publication of the, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1979, page 43 and 46.

²⁶⁴ Ministry of National Education, *Reading Book for Grade 2*, Part 1, Publication of the, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1979, page 59.

²⁶⁵ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality and Political Studies* (Phnom Penh: Center for Education Program and Textbook Development, 1982), 24 (unofficial translation by the author).

²⁶⁶ Reading textbook for grade 3, part 1. Publish in 1981 by the Ministry of National Education of the PRK. Publish in Ho Chi Minh City, p. 108-109.

“The Glorious Liberation Day 7 January 1979”

"7 January 1979" has been a politically controversial and debateable day with several social and political interpretations and the celebration of it has fluctuated, depending on political changes. The latest reinstatement of the day was not done until 1995 after it was dropped from the list of national holidays in 1992 in favor of reconciliatory necessity with the three other conflicting parties: FUNCINPEC, BLDP and the KR.²⁶⁷ Although these Cambodian factions considered "7 January 1979" as the day of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the PRK and its successors—SOC and the current CPP—have celebrated it as the "the victorious day," "the day of the KR's defeat," "the liberation day" or "the national independence day." Peace Scholar Sok-Kheang Ly, states that though he agrees that the day always triggers two opposing interpretations, considers 7 January 1979 as "a day of reconciliation," believing it provides a platform or a forum where "interpersonal understanding between victims and former KR cadres" are forged during the annual celebration.²⁶⁸

Within the 1980s political timeline, the PRK self-proclaimed liberation day, or 7 January 1979, was the utmost important day with its fundamentally political pulse. The day was written, printed and mentioned in every single school textbook, political magazine, speech and many other publications. Each school textbook contained at least one lesson devoted to "7 January" to constantly remind students of this historic day, and students were expected to acknowledge this day as their second birthday. Some textbooks mentioned “7 January” more than ten times.

²⁶⁷ Sok-Kheang Ly, "The Dynamics of Cambodia's Reconciliation Process, 1979 to 2007," PhD Dissertation in Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, 2014, p. 93-99.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., Sok-Kheang Ly's PhD Dissertation, p. 90.

The PRK considered "7 January" as the symbol of many social and political aspects. According to the primary school textbooks, "7 January" was a new historical page in Cambodian history because it brought in a "fresh face" for the people after surviving the deadly danger.²⁶⁹ The date marked the end of genocide and gave rights and freedom back to the people who could return back home and start new lives. It was a liberation day and second birthday of all Cambodian people as it gave confidence, happiness and meaning for the people to live on. Moreover, the textbooks continued to boast that the day restored economy, national tradition, schooling and religion. Accordingly, Cambodia and the national soul were born again, as the textbooks claimed.²⁷⁰

In addition, the PRK did not forget to link this historical date to its overall goal of building up socialism and denying the return of the KR. The reading textbook for grade 4 stated that Cambodian people welcome "7 January" for the following reasons:

- It eliminated forever the reactionary and genocidal regime of the traitors Pol Pot and Ieng Sary;
- It brought back rights, freedom, happiness and prosperity of Cambodian people;
- It ended the reactionary war waged by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary against Vietnam and strengthened the military solidarity with friends Vietnam and Laos;
- It destroyed the awkward tricks of the hegemonism and expansionism of China-Beijing, the American imperialism and other reactionary groups.²⁷¹

More particularly, the PRK more broadly considered "7 January" as the great victory of Leninist ideology.²⁷² It was described as "the victory of justice of the

²⁶⁹ Ministry of National Education, *Reading Book for Grade 2*, Part 1, Publication of the, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1979, page 96.

²⁷⁰ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 1, Party 2 for Adult People*, page 75-76.

²⁷¹ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 4, Party 2* (Phnom Penh, 1980), 18-19.

²⁷² The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 5, Party 1* (Phnom Penh, 1988), 80-81.

international revolutionary movement against the invading imperialism and international reactionary persons."²⁷³ The 7 January victory, as the regime claimed, provided the foundation for the PRK to uncover "the true degraded face of China, who instigated massacre within Cambodia."²⁷⁴ This representation favored the Soviet Union and its allies and denied the very existence of Chinese communism, the U.S. and their allies in Cambodian society and politics.

Although the PRK's claim attempted to convey the ideological correctness of the day to gain political support, the "7 January Day" did have merit for appreciation. Neither the UN nor the U.S. or any countries other than Vietnam took timely action to stop genocide in Cambodia and rescued many lives that were on the edge of execution or death. The question of what Vietnam did in Cambodia after "7 January" is a separate issue and merits a separate evaluation.

Morality and Political Studies Textbooks

The PRK employed "Morality and Political Studies Textbooks" for the same purposes of preparing children from an early age for engagement in the country's politics and shaping their attitudes consistent with socialism and other state imperatives as explained above. The textbooks were published in the form of fictitious stories with two key actors: Sam (a male student) and Sopheap (a female student). Sam is Sopheap's older brother, and they both studied in the same school in an unspecified village. This

²⁷³ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 1, Party 2 for Adult People*, page 25-26.

²⁷⁴ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 2, Party 1 for Adult People*, 1982, page 107-108.

collection of morality and political studies textbooks were likely introduced in 1981, two years after the rehabilitation of the education system nationwide.

Primary Revolutionary Consciousness

From grade 1 to grade 4, the textbooks were entitled only “Morality”, and the contents were more about daily moral social practices than politics. Among the twenty-nine lessons in the Morality textbook for grade 1, only three lessons were devoted to political indoctrination.²⁷⁵ From grade 5 to grade 7, the title of the textbooks was modified from “Morality” to “Morality and Political Studies.” In addition, the content on politics dominated that on daily moral practices. For instance, of the twenty-eight lessons in the textbook for grade 5, only eight lessons were devoted to social morality, while the other twenty lessons educated students on various aspects of the KR crimes against the Cambodian people.

This latter collection (textbook for grade 5) played a more direct and substantial role in shaping the behavior of the students along the state policies. With these textbooks, young students were expected to present long-lasting love for their nation and fully participate in rebuilding and protecting both the country and the revolution. In order to become the backbone of the country, according to the textbooks, young students needed to do the following:

Love those who have the same ideology....; contribute in building up the country, pass the transitional period and step forward to Marxist-Leninist socialism; be constantly ready to serve the country and dare to devote one’s life with no regret; commit to serve the country with no condition although one is to be sent to the mountainous and forest areas and can possibly get exposed to malaria in order to regain the national economy; volunteer to

²⁷⁵ The Ministry of Education and National Studies of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality Studies for Grade 1* (Phnom Penh).

serve in the army with no fear; hold anger against the enemies and be highly conscious on the enemy's tricks....; and love socialism and always adhere to the international proletariat class....²⁷⁶

Morality textbooks also linked the education to the military struggle. To educate the children to love and respect the revolutionary soldiers, Lesson 14 entitled “We Go to Clean up the Soldiers’ Tombs” in Morality textbook for grade 2 reads:

Sam, who has good attitude, is selected to join a group of model children. This group works effectively. They assist in taking care of small children after class, looking after the trees along the road, and setting up a plan to collect pieces of glass to supply to the factories. Tomorrow is the anniversary of commemoration ceremony for the spirit of the soldiers who gave their lives in the struggle for national liberation. Today, the model children group with Sam as a member has to go and clean up our soldiers’ tombs. All children dress properly. They compete with each other in doing this work with joy. Each child tries to clean and pile up earth on the tombs higher without being afraid of tiredness. These high tombs are the symbols provoking the children’s spirit to struggle and to take turns to accept the revolutionary tasks....²⁷⁷

The textbooks further explained the contested and controversial questions that both Cambodians and the international community were engaged in in endless and unfruitful debates for decades. One example of such a contentious debate was over the characterization of the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. In favor of Vietnam and its own interpretations, the PRK explained why Vietnam helped “liberate” Cambodian people in the form of a fictitious story in the Morality textbook for grade 2:

The teacher walked the students down the mountain with joy. On the way, they walked across the graveyard with about ten tombs. Sam and all friends stopped briefly and looked to the graveyard. The teacher quickly understood the students’ doubt and said that, “Please don’t be doubtful. They are the tombs of Vietnamese soldiers who died during the liberation of Cambodian people out of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique.” Sopheap asked, “Teacher! Why did Vietnam help liberate us?” The teacher answered that, “The reason Vietnam helped liberate us is because the two countries adhere to socialism, have

²⁷⁶ The Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality and Political Studies for Grade 5* (Phnom Penh: Center for Educational Program and Textbook Development, 1982), 8-9 (unofficial translation by the author).

²⁷⁷ The Ministry of Education and National Studies of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality Studies for Grade 2* (Phnom Penh), unofficial translation by the author.

joint borders and have been exploited by the colonialists and the imperialists. Therefore, the two countries considered each other as siblings. Besides Vietnam, we also have Laos as friend. We have to love all socialist countries in the world....²⁷⁸

Another lesson legitimized the Vietnamese and Laotian nationals in Cambodia, as the PRK endorsed the educational services for Vietnamese and Laotian children. Lesson 3 entitled, “Long-Lasting Solidarity between Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos”, in the Morality Studies textbook for grade 5 read as follows:

On Saturday evening after dinner, Sam’s family gathered in the middle of the house. At that time, Sam asked, “Father, you read the Cambodian newspaper every day, you must fully understand our country’s political issues. Would you mind enlightening me on one of my doubts?” The father put down the newspaper and replied, “What are you doubtful about, Sam?” I wonder why at school the teacher advised the students that “we have to love and be friend with Vietnamese and Laotian friends who are studying with us like siblings. You have to forgive each other and don’t get into fights.” Moreover, I also frequently hear and see the same thing on radio, newspaper and magazine about the long-lasting and close friendship between Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos. Hearing this question, the father put down the newspaper and said that, “Your doubt is really good, and this is the issue that you have to fully understand. We should not have racial discrimination against our friends Vietnam and Laos... During the chaos, only these nearby friends can help us on time. Friend Vietnam and Laos not only helped us defeat the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos had joined mind and forces to defeat the common enemies three times already: first against the invading French colonialist, then the American imperialist, and now the traitorous Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique....²⁷⁹

High Revolutionary Consciousness

The demand for students to understand the PRK's politics reached its peak when the students entered grade 8. From grade 8 to grade 11 (the highest grade of secondary school in the PRK reformulated eleven-year education system), the title of the textbook was changed to simply “Political Studies.” The word “Morality” was deleted, as the PRK

²⁷⁸ The Ministry of National Education of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality for Grade 2* (Phnom Penh), 13-15.

²⁷⁹ The Ministry of National Education of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality for Grade 5* (Phnom Penh: Department of Printing House and Education, 1988), 17-19, unofficial translation by the author.

wanted not only to ensure that students clearly understood and grasped the Cambodian revolutionary political lines, victory and tasks, but also “to strengthen their stance, consciousness and high revolutionary vigilance.”²⁸⁰ In this sense, students needed to understand the political, economic, cultural and social aspect of the PRK regime, as well as the rights and responsibilities of each citizen to protect and build the motherland and respect national laws and other regulations.²⁸¹

In grade 11, students studied more deeply into both the national politics and the concepts of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The political studies textbook for grade 11 stressed six main points: (1) the historical building-up of the country by the Cambodian worker class, (2) the enemies of the Cambodian worker class, (3) the forces of the Cambodian revolution, (4) the strategic responsibilities of the Cambodian revolution, (5) the actual responsibilities in constructing the country toward socialism, and (6) the determination of the Cambodian youth to serve the country and the people.²⁸²

While the PRK used textbooks to encourage children to love the Vietnamese and Laotians, the regime hypocritically injected hatred, anger and a grudge toward what it called “French colonialists” and “American imperialists.” More importantly, the PRK asked students to hold a strong grudge against the KR remnants, and this act undermined any possible peace deal and future national reconciliation. The Political Studies textbook for grade 11 identified four major enemies of the Cambodian people:

1. The American imperialist is the enemy of the Cambodian people, the Indochinese people and people in the world.

²⁸⁰ Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, *Political Studies for Grade 8* (Phnom Penh: Department of Educational Program and Textbook Development, 1984).

²⁸¹ Ibid., *Political Studies for Grade 8*.

²⁸² The Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, *Political Studies for Grade 11* (Phnom Penh: Printing House and Education, 1987).

2. The expansionist China-Beijing is the direct and most dangerous enemy of the Cambodian people and the three countries in Indochina.
3. The reactionary power holder Thailand destroys the Cambodian revolution and Indochinese countries.
4. The Pol Pot genocidal cliques and other reactionary Khmers in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, who are the absolute lackeys of the expansionist China-Beijing and the American imperialist, are the most cruel and most dangerous enemies of the Cambodian people.²⁸³

In addition, the textbooks made clear the division between Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. The school textbooks glorified the former and strongly denounced the latter. The textbooks constantly linked “China-Beijing expansionist” and “Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique.” Though the Cambodian students at that time may have known little about the differences between Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, they were taught that Marxist-Leninist communism was the correct ideological line, while Maoism was reactionary and betrayed workers and peasants. The Political Studies for grade 11, for instance, stated that:

The China-Beijing expansionist ordered the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique to destroy the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea. They transformed the Marxist-Leninist party, which is the pure revolutionary organization of the worker class, to Maoist party, which betrays the worker class and Cambodian people, betrays the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the international proletarian ideology and converts the party into the traitorous revolutionary organization and a genocidal tool.²⁸⁴

In 1988, the PRK morality and political studies textbooks were renamed for the third time to their original name, “Morality Studies.” The renaming of the textbook coincided with PRK efforts to enter negotiations with the other Cambodian factions. Under pressure from the United Nations and the international community, the PRK was encouraged to settle the Cambodian conflict as quickly as possible, particularly given the

²⁸³ Ibid., Political Studies for Grade 11, 41-69, unofficial translation by the author.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., Political Studies for Grade 11, 53, unofficial translation by the author.

political and economic exhaustion of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Vietnam had suffered under Western sanctions, and the Soviet Union was moving in a new direction in managing its liabilities overseas turning its attention to its own economic and social problems. As the Soviet Union, and consequently Vietnam, began to reduce their support for the PRK, the PRK's interest in achieving a peaceful settlement in the Cambodian conflict intensified. Despite these changes in the international dynamics, the new textbooks continued to focus attention on building up socialism along the lines of Marxist-Leninist ideology and continuing the fight against "the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique."²⁸⁵

Textbooks for Adults

During the PRK period, the government developed general education and political education programs for the adult population in a variety of venues. The international sanctions and pressures, and armed conflicts with Cambodian resistant factions assured the PRK that political study and revolutionary consciousness, in addition to basic writing and reading literacy for adults, had to be well cultivated. The party saw the people's continuous consciousness of the recent "genocidal crimes by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique" as critical to their winning what they called "the enemy's psychological war," the military recruitment, and the implementation of the K-5 plan throughout the country.²⁸⁶ Toward these goals, textbooks for illiterate adults and old people were developed.

²⁸⁵ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Morality Studies for Grade 5* (Phnom Penh: Department of Printing House and Education, 1988).

²⁸⁶ "The Seventh Congress of Propaganda and Cultural Competition," dated 19-24 April 1986, published by the Ministry of Propaganda and Culture of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1986.

The textbooks' objectives were to strengthen the spirit of national and international solidarity with "the peace-loving countries in the world, especially with Vietnam, Laos, Soviet and other socialist countries" and "to raise the vigilant spirit ready to fight and sacrifice for preventing and building up the country."²⁸⁷ In this respect, in addition to studying Khmer language and basic Mathematics, the adults and older people were required to realize the political lines of the UFNSK, their revolutionary responsibilities, ethics of the revolutionaries, administrative management, economic management and agricultural techniques.²⁸⁸

In a speech in 1980, President Heng Samrin appealed to all governmental and party's institutions nationwide to help the old people with knowledge related to the socialist political lines. The abstract of Heng Samrin's message reads:

Under the oppression of the Feudalists along with the exploitation of the colonialists and imperialists, almost all Cambodian people became illiterate, mostly women who could not read and write their national language. The Lenin socialist regime much values knowledge. In this sense, the movement of educating old people is not only the humanitarian acts that educated people should help the uneducated ones but also the effective foundation in building up national economy and defending the country. If our people want to use new technique in producing something, they have to learn this technique by themselves. Similarly, if people want to well understand the national political stances or socialist lines, they have to study as well. Cadres, government staff, workers, and soldiers, namely those from low level to high level, have to have high knowledge in order to build up the country to be prosperous and splendid.²⁸⁹

Political study for the adult population was also conducted through art and culture such as writing, publication, poems, classic songs, traditional songs (Ayai), political posters, books, newspapers, magazines, sports, radio broadcast, films and dramas, all of which served the military and political purposes. The Ministry of Propaganda and

²⁸⁷ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Program for Primary School for Old People* (Phnom Penh, 1980).

²⁸⁸ Ibid., *Program for Primary School for Old People*, 48 (unofficial translation by the author).

²⁸⁹ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 4 for Adult People* (Ho Chi Minh City, 1980), 8-10 (unofficial translation by the author).

Culture, as its mere name clearly suggested, was made responsible for this work. Political study was considered a catalyst and an inevitable component for military success at the border. Political education and propaganda were enhanced during the 1984-1985 offensives during which the PRK and Vietnamese forces successfully drove the KR and the other two resistance forces temporarily into Thailand. The seventh congress document instructed the following:

From now on, expert departments have to pay serious attentions on the plans that serve the above party's political responsibilities... Especially, they have to pay additional attention on the battlefields by making efforts to educate the people and the masses to clearly understand the purely national patriotic spirit and international socialist solidarity, especially the solidarity, friendship and cooperation with Vietnam and provoke the people to participate in agricultural production... The propaganda work has to serve the promotion of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the political lines of People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea.²⁹⁰

A former newscaster of the national radio during the 1980s recalled his broadcasting work in the national radio. The newscaster said that he and his team broadcasted sections of *The Propaganda*. He emphasized that he rarely had a chance to go live on-air, which was exceptionally reserved for only special events such as the 7 January anniversary day. Normally, all broadcasted texts were pre-approved, and their contents were strictly reviewed before release. The newscaster relayed the following:

You have to understand that the media of the socialist/communist regime did not allow live broadcast on the radio. You could not create anything on your own. Every morning, a messenger would take all kinds of texts and information from SPK [News Agency of Kampuchea created in 1980]. You just broadcasted the information from SPK and you would never be wrong."²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Ibid., "The Seventh Congress of Propaganda and Cultural Competition," 2.

²⁹¹ Khamboly Dy's interview with a former newscaster of the PRK's national radio and now an official of Agence Kampuchea Press (AKP) and Adviser to the Ministry of Information, Phnom Penh, February 6, 2013. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with a former newscaster] SPK was created at the same time with "Voice of Kampuchean People" radio on December 3, 1978, just one day after the official creation of the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea in Snuol district, Kratie province on December 2, 1978. At the outset, the radio station with its base in Vietnam consisted of only 33 staff members.

Each province or city was required to establish an art group to serve the people's political consciousness in their respective locales. Moreover, the competitions on such works as stories, songs, publications, dramas and/or paintings with political messages consistent to the party lines were encouraged at various public and private institutions among cadres, workers, armed forces and students. Cadres in all provinces and locales, who received political and ideological education as well as education on culture and other skills from Vietnam, had to go down to give political and ideological education to cadres at the district, commune and village levels. The political study session at the district level ran from twenty days to one month, while the one at the commune and the village levels were between ten and fifteen days.²⁹²

The PRK primary and secondary school textbooks as well as other educational materials were largely the byproducts of the overall state political program. As the main sponsors, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, were socialist states and because the PRK clearly aligned itself with the socialist blocs in its state-building projects to become a socialist country, the textbooks did not denounce the KR for being communist, but instead called it "a new slavery regime that had no real characteristics of socialism."²⁹³ In many cases, the PRK used the term "fascist" or "Maoist clique" to refer to the KR.

In summary, the contents of "Reading textbooks", "Morality and Political Studies" and textbooks for adults indicated that the PRK leadership attempted to instill prescribed social beliefs in young people through indoctrination, political propaganda, and high vigilance toward their countries' enemies. The textbooks presented a positive self-image of the winners of the war, while totally discrediting its losers. Moreover, the

²⁹² Ibid. "The Seventh Congress of Propaganda and Cultural Competition," 9-10.

²⁹³ Ministry of National Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, "Reading Textbook" for Grade 2, Part 1, 140-141.

textbooks became part of the national campaign against the return of the KR regime as well as a campaign to attract support from among the Cambodians who fled to the Thai border and joined the resistance factions and those who were living abroad. To a larger extent, the textbooks were part of the PRK political movement to extinguish international support for the exiled DK government, which later became part of a larger movement of the CGDK. In this sense, as Judy Ledgerwood argues, the popular memories were covered up by the national master memories.²⁹⁴

Through textbooks, the PRK prepared young children to serve the revolution from a young age, as early as five years old. The responsibilities of children to understand the national political objectives and the revolution were more highly demanded when they reached the age of about twelve years old, at the secondary education level. For example, a slogan in the textbook for grade-4 students read, “People’s lives are not born to live but to fight for victory.”²⁹⁵ Through education, the regime attempted to accomplish many things within a short time span. These political objectives set in the textbooks brought tremendous challenges to an already damaged and fragile society, notwithstanding other social problems, as well as the daily fighting with other Cambodian resistance factions and international pressures and sanctions.

The success or failure of the PRK genocide education is primarily linked to the success or failure of its general education system and the state policies and ideologies at large. Although the PRK was successful in rehabilitating the educational infrastructure, such as school buildings, and accommodating massive enrolment, this success largely aligned with the socialist agenda and can be considered the success of socialism in

²⁹⁴ Ibid., Judy Ledgerwood.

²⁹⁵ Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea “Language Studies” for Grade 4, Part 1, Phnom Penh: Center for Curriculum Development and Textbook Publication, 1984, 198.

Cambodia. The educational goals of the regime were to build moderate Soviet-led socialism, promote the Cambodian-Vietnamese long-lasting solidarity, to condemn China as the mastermind of the KR genocide, to deny the return of the KR at all cost, and to glorify the "7 January Day" as the historic liberation day and second birthday of all Cambodian people. These national goals were well cultivated through school textbooks and political studies at all levels.

David Ayres rightly argued that “the PRK did not create a crisis in education. It inherited one” from the Cambodian civil war and the KR genocide.²⁹⁶ The regime was engulfed in the national chaos and many other social disparities in which the PRK leaders claimed to be building Cambodia from the ground up and with their bare hands after 1979. The regime faced shortages of qualified educators to strengthen education and had to rely heavily on Vietnam, Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc countries. It was ideologically convinced—and in some cases constrained and dictated—to endorse the Soviet-led socialist ideals as one of its main educational agendas. It was tasked with reconstruction and rehabilitation of the nation-building project and had to defend the nation against the return of the KR. All of these difficult conditions accumulated into a great burden on the PRK’s ability to cultivate quality education at the outset or even within the first few years of its efforts.

However, “the PRK leaders were guilty of sustaining [the disoriented education system].”²⁹⁷ Most of the new generation of educated people during the PRK regime were only exposed to education from the socialist countries, and the rest of the population, especially the young children, were constantly indoctrinated in socialist ethics at the

²⁹⁶ Ibid., David Ayres, 147.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., David Ayres, 148.

expense of individual opportunity for intellectual development. The PRK genocide education that was part of its general education shaped the behavior of the general population to be consistent with socialist and state objectives. Genocide education at the time was determined by those who controlled the education system and the state at large. Educators, especially history teachers, were pressured to deliver lessons that conformed to the state's social and political norms.

As Elizabeth A. Cole and Judy Barsalou argued, in post-conflict societies, "politics frequently determines how and what history is taught."²⁹⁸ Genocide education became the most effective tool for legitimizing the regime's existence and the fundamental basis for the regime's struggle to maintain its presence on the national and international political stage during the 1980s. Political instability, scarce resources, an undeveloped economy and shortages of human resources undermined the PRK's educational reform efforts. These same factors disrupted the PRK's genocide education initiative. However, the PRK's tremendous efforts in general education, which put hundreds of thousands of children back into schools, cannot be overlooked and should be acknowledged.

The messages in the textbooks seem to clarify that the relationship between state apparatus and the people is crucial. Under communist ideology, the actions of the state are automatically translated into the well-being and happiness of the people. According to the textbooks, failure to support, love, dedicate and devote one's life to the state and the revolutionary cause could result in the return of the KR to power, and thereby the return of the suffering the people endured between 1975 and 1979.²⁹⁹ In this sense, the

²⁹⁸ Ibid., Elizabeth A. Cole and Judy Barsalou.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., Judy Ledgerwood.

textbooks and other means of propaganda played a central role in the psychological war to win the people's hearts. One propaganda poster read, "In the past, as in the present, as in the future, Pol Pot remains genocidal."³⁰⁰ The textbook descriptions effectively became a means for the government to construct the national identity and to shape the memory of the KR genocide in Cambodian people at that time. As Ledgerwood argued, "The PRK state narrative of genocide is one of multiple and overlapping explanations, but it is one of the most powerful and encompassing tellings."³⁰¹

6. *The Propaganda: Political Studies for the Party's Members*

The Propaganda was a monthly political magazine of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK) Central Committee and was part of the official state political education program. Core party members were obliged to undergo political studies at the High-Cadre Political Training School in Phnom Penh, which was under direct supervision of the PRPK Central Committee. Senior cadres would be sent to study politics in Vietnam and return back with important positions.³⁰² The PRK relied heavily on propaganda for internal political stability, unity among the Cambodian people living under its control, reconstruction of the country, and building up socialist revolution and the fight against its rivals both nationally and internationally. Large billboards with revolutionary slogans were displayed at every formal meeting and national ceremony to encourage the cadres, party members and the general population to firmly uphold the party's rules and principles:

³⁰⁰ Ibid., Judy Ledgerwood, 91.

³⁰¹ Ibid., Judy Ledgerwood, 91.

³⁰² Khamboly Dy's interview with Sambo Manara, August 22, 2013 [hereinafter Khamboly Dy's Interview with Sambo Manara]. At that time, Manara was the administrative staff of the School. Siv Pha was Director of High-Cadre Political Training School. He was Tou Samouth's messenger.

“Long Live the Firm Solidarity and Cooperation on All Sectors between Kampuchea-Vietnam-Laos-Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries, the Eternal and Long-Lasting Siblings.”³⁰³

“President Ho Chi Minh, the Founder of the Indochinese Communist Party, Always Lives in Our Revolutionary Cause.”³⁰⁴

The Propaganda and Education Committee of the PRPK’s Central Committee was responsible for the publication of *The Propaganda*, similar to other socialist countries that had their own internal party’s magazine as part of their political education and instructions. Over 143 issues of *The Propaganda*, published since 1979, comprised a collection of important documents on communism, revolution, speeches of the leaders, party’s regulations, congress documents and state official documents. Each issue of the magazine focused on particular political issues happening in each year within the life span of the PRK and the SOC.

The magazine was a vehicle for advancing the PRK's ideology for the cadres and party members who were obliged to fully understand the party’s stance and the ideology that governed the country and the people. The cadres and the party members were expected to study *The Propaganda* regularly and to educate people at their respective locales in order to build up strong grassroots bases, namely in the communes, villages, government Ministries and departments, Youth League, party’s core groups, propaganda groups, operation groups, and factories and enterprises nationwide, so that every single institution in the country would have the strong political and revolutionary consciousness to form the backbone of support, protection and uprising of the country, party, and the revolution. The cadres and party members also targeted teachers, monks, high school

³⁰³ The Propaganda and Education Committee of the PRPK’s Central Committee, *The Propaganda*, Number 83 (1985.9).

³⁰⁴ Ibid., *The Propaganda*, Number 83 (1985.9).

students (third level students), university students, and armed forces. The fifth party's congress and the resolution of the second party's Central Committee, dated 21 March 1986, required that the cadres and party members implement three main points:

1. Strengthen the quality of the meaning of the propaganda, expand the struggling spirit and education and encourage and advise on the propaganda works.
2. Improve the propaganda measures in order to attract the interests of the listeners, readers and watchers.
3. Strengthen the appointment and leading works ensuring that the propaganda meaning would be circulated down to especially communes, enterprises, and factories and penetrate into the masses.³⁰⁵


Most importantly, the resolution specified that the party's cadres and members had to ensure that the people were closely linked to the party with "both flesh and blood" and that all the masses understood the Marxist-Leninist lines.³⁰⁶ To ensure that the people were constantly with the party under all circumstances, criticism and self-criticism (similar to the ideological conduct during the KR regime) were required for all party members so that no member would "move their mouth without moving their hands," which meant that saying and doing should coincide for the purpose of winning the people's hearts.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ Propaganda and Education Committee of the Central Committee, *Propaganda*, Issue 91, 1986.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., *Propaganda* (Issue 91, 1986), 16-18.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., *Propaganda* (Issue 91, 1986), 16-18.

Diagram 2: The PRK's Ideological Genocide Education



In addition, the PRK strategically set up ambitious but largely ineffective national propaganda campaigns in a concerted effort to reintegrate the resistance forces into the social mainstream, to foster reconciliation and to reunify and reconstruct the country.³⁰⁸ These campaigns, which were implemented throughout the 1980s, included the establishment of the committees on "Bringing Back Those Losing Their Ways with the Enemies," the state-run radio program, the "Motherland's Appeal," "Justice Light School," and the infamous K-5 plan.³⁰⁹ Though the campaigns were conducted mainly outside of the school system, they effectively became parts of the PRK's long-term effort

³⁰⁸ Sok-Kheang Ly, "The Dynamics of Cambodia's Reconciliation Process, 1979 to 2007," PhD Dissertation in Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, 2014, p. 128-152.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., Sok-Kheang Ly, PhD dissertation, Chapter Five, p. 128-197.

in educating the population, especially the young children, both formally and informally about the atrocities that happened during the KR regime. Popular engagement and students' participation in writing leaflets³¹⁰ appealing to resistance defections at each community formed a foundational grassroots movement toward formal genocide education in schools.

7. *Genocide*: a Proxy Word for the PRK Regime

The term *genocide*, or in Khmer, *Brolaiy Pouch Sas*, which the PRK used to identify the KR reign of terror between 1975 and 1979, became commonplace terminology among the general Cambodian population and young students throughout the 1980s. Although Cambodia ratified the UN Genocide Convention on October 14, 1950, the official translation of the Convention into the Khmer language was not done until the early 1980s, by Kheiu Kanharith (current Minister of Information), as part of the Cambodia Documentation Commission project.³¹¹ The term was once used during the Khmer Republic regime (1970-1975) by the United Front for the Liberation of the Oppressed Races (FULRO)—some of its members were minority Cham people led by General Les Kasem—which accused the Vietnamese of committing genocide against the Kingdom of Champa, who lost their capital, Vijaya, to Anam in 1471, and then their whole Kingdom (the current central Vietnam) in 1835.³¹² Between 1471 and 1835, many Cham fled in multiple waves for a new settlement in Cambodia, where they became a

³¹⁰ Ibid., Sok-Kheang Ly, PhD dissertation, Chapter Five.

³¹¹ Cambodia Documentation Commission Records, 4499. Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library. A copy of the translation is available at DC-Cam.

³¹² Kok-Thay Eng. "From the Khmer Rouge to Hambali: Cham Identities in a Global Age." PhD Dissertation in Global Affairs, Rutgers University, 2012, p. 134-136.

minority and adopted what a scholar on Cham history, Kok-Thay Eng, called "a new core religious identity as Muslim."³¹³

The use of the term *genocide* in the context of the KR mass atrocities was originally inspired by Vietnamese, popularized by the PRK, legalized by the People's Revolutionary Tribunal, legitimized by Cambodian popular uses, politicized by political interpretations, controversial among the international political stakeholders, and debated within the academic sphere.

The Vietnamese-Inspired Term

The term was used politically for the first time by the Vietnamese in its anti-DK propaganda leaflet in mid-1978, when Cambodia and Vietnam entered into large-scale cross-border fighting, which led to severe incidents and thousands of casualties on both sides.³¹⁴ Throughout 1978, after the two countries broke diplomatic relations, Vietnam accused DK of attacking its eight provinces along the Cambodian border, while DK accused Vietnam of invading Cambodia and infiltrating the DK ranks, especially the DK leadership in the Eastern zone. The KR attacks and massacres on Vietnamese people in Ba Chuc village³¹⁵, Bensoy and Benkov communes, as well as many other Vietnamese villages along the border, not only led to the anti-DK propaganda but also convinced Vietnam that the KR leadership had to be replaced by a new group of Cambodian leaders

³¹³ Ibid., Kok-Thay Eng's PhD dissertation, p. 137. Dr. Eng did not characterize whether the destruction of the Kingdom of Champa counted toward "genocide." However, according to the case studies since antiquity and the typology of genocide developed by genocide studies pioneers Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassonh, the Vietnamese destruction of the Kingdom of Champa may fall into the category of genocide.

³¹⁴ Email conversation with Professor David Chandler, an expert on Cambodian history (May 13, 2013). See also Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis. *Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal*. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005), page 6.

³¹⁵ For the detail of the massacres of about 3,000 Vietnamese in Ba Chuk village, please see Joe Freeman and Phak Seangly, "The Forgotten Massacre: Killing Fields in Vietnam Recalled by Few," *The Phnom Penh Post*, April 19, 2013.

under Vietnamese guidance. Accordingly, Vietnam strategically employed the term *genocide* to attract international attention through foreign journalists who were allowed to observe and document the KR massacres in Vietnamese villages. This tactic was also used to justify Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Vietnam may also have used the global concept of genocide to galvanize support from the West, although it failed in this endeavor.

The PRK-Popularized and Legalized Term

On November 11, 1978, Heng Samrin, in his capacity as member of the CPK Central Committee of the Eastern Zone and commander of military Division 4, wrote and signed a leaflet appealing to all cadres, combatants, youths and people in the Eastern Zone and throughout the country to join the struggle against what the leaflet called "the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gang," "the chieftains of traitors and butchers," "most barbarous fascists," and the "gang of dictatorial, militarist and nepotistic rulers." The slogan at the bottom of the leaflet read, "fight or die."³¹⁶ However, the leaflet did not use the word *genocide* to identify the nature of the KR crimes.

With Heng Samrin's appeal and with the assistance from Vietnam, UFNSK was created in Snuol district, Kratie province, as the founding organ of the PRK on December 2, 1978. UFNSK declared an eleven-point political program, again none of which mentioned the word *genocide*. During the UFNSK congressional meeting, Heng Samrin (UFNSK President) simply characterized the KR and its mass atrocities as the

³¹⁶ Leaflet signed by Heng Samrin, dated November 11, 1978 (DC-Cam's Archives, Document D40792.)

"reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary nepotistic regime," "slave of the outside reactionary forces," "cruel regime," "blood debt," and "blood-sucking and bone-gnawing regime."³¹⁷

Likewise, Pen Sovann, who held three important positions (President of PRPK, PRK first Prime Minister and PRK Defense Minister), and who spoke fluent Vietnamese, admitted that he had had no knowledge of the UN Genocide Convention or the word *genocide* either in Khmer (*Brolaiy Pouch Sas*) or in Vietnamese (*diệt chủng*) prior to the 7 January 1979 victory.³¹⁸ Moreover, the PRK leadership focused more attention on the immediate state-building projects outlined in the UNFSK's eleven-point political program.

The term *Brolaiy Pouch Sas* was officially used for the first time in Cambodia in the declaration of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea on January 8, 1979, one day after the UNFSK's victory over the KR.³¹⁹ PRCK pronounced the term on January 8:

“The dictative, fascist and **genocidal** Pol Pot regime is completely eliminated. From now on, a new regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, is the only pure and legitimate representative of the Kampuchean people. For implementation, the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea will lead the entire Kampuchean people to implement the eleven-point political program proclaimed in the declaration of the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea on December 2, 1978 with no change.”³²⁰

In August 1979, the newly established Vietnamese-backed PRK government took the first state initiative to prosecute two senior KR leaders—Pol Pot (DK Prime Minister)

³¹⁷ Ney Pena, "The Fall of the Pol Pot's Genocidal Regime," the publication of the Pracheachon Newspaper, Phnom Penh, 1991, 144-151. Members of UNFSK included: Heng Samrin (President), Chea Sim (Vice President), and Ros Samay (General Secretary). The other core members were Matt Ly, Bun Mei, Hun Sen, Mean Sam An, Neou Samom, Meas Samnang, Venerable Long Sim, Hem Samin, Chey Kanha, Chan Ven and Prach Sun.

³¹⁸ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Pen Sovann.

³¹⁹ Ney Pena, "The Fall of the Pol Pot's Genocidal Regime," the publication of the Pracheachon Newspaper, Phnom Penh, 1991, 184.

³²⁰ Ibid., Ney Pena. (Ney Pena was elected member of the Politburo of Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party in 1985.)

and Ieng Sary (DK Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs)—for the crime of genocide committed between April 1975 and January 1979. The court, which was organized by the PRK Ministry of Propaganda, Culture and Information and was presided over by Minister Keo Chenda, was largely considered "a show trial" or "political act" and was not recognized by the international community.³²¹ Article I of Decree Law No. 1 for the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Tribunal, dated 15 August 1979, defined genocide as:

The planned execution of innocent people; forcing people to leave the cities and home villages; concentrating the population; forcibly putting the population to forced labor in the condition that destroyed the people physically and spiritually; destroying religion; and destructing structure of economy, culture, family relationship and society."³²²

Though the law was established to prosecute individuals for the crime of genocide, the final verdict, statement of the prosecutors and statement of the defense lawyers made many references implicating China in the Cambodian genocide by calling China "the mastermind of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique."³²³ This implication characterized the nature of the court as the byproduct of national, regional and international politics. Nevertheless, the final verdict of the tribunal endorsed the use of the term *genocide* in the legal context. Although it can be argued that the term was officially endorsed after January 8, it was only popularly and more broadly used after the conclusion of the August 1979 tribunal.

³²¹ Case-file for the prosecution of "Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Genocidal Cliques," published by the Ministry of Propaganda, Culture and Information of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1981. See also Decree Law No. 4 on the appointment of President and Vice President of People's Revolutionary Tribunal, dated July 20, 1979. (DC-Cam's Archives, document D40592).

³²² Decree Law No. 1, dated July 15, 1979 and endorsed by the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, (Document D40590, DC-Cam's Archives). The law which consisted of 8 articles was signed into force by Heng Samrin, President of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea.

³²³ Document D40702: Final verdict of the People's Revolutionary Tribunal dated 19 August 1979; Document D40703: Concluded statement by Defense Lawyer Dith Monty (no date); and Document D40695: Formal accusation of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary of the crimes of genocide by prosecutors (no date).

Popular Uses

Chuor Keary, a Cambodian Professor of Khmer language and an expert in Khmer linguistics, commented that the term “genocide” was popularized by swift social change and political movement.³²⁴ From a linguistic perspective, the term *Brolaiy Pouch Sas* still does not exist in the Khmer dictionary today. The translation of “genocide” into Khmer requires the combination of three separate words.³²⁵ According to the Khmer dictionary written by the supreme patriarch, Chuon Nath, published in the 1960s, the word *Brolaiy* means "the destruction, the destruction of the universe, the destruction of life...."; *Pouch* refers to "genealogy of the family line or race of the people or animals such as Cambodian race, Chinese race...."; and *Sas* means "religion such as Buddhism and Hinduism or people with different nationalities but practicing the same religion. For example, Cambodian, Thai, Laotian, Burmese and Sri Lankans have the same religion, Buddhism." Therefore, the words *Brolaiy Pouch Sas* could be linguistically defined as the destruction of a whole family line, race or religion.³²⁶

While people had no knowledge of the UN’s legal definition of *genocide*, they colloquially adopted and used the term for over a decade both formally and in everyday conversation about their experiences during the KR. For many survivors, the term *genocide* at least helped them to describe the agony they experienced and endured during the KR regime, although survivors often claimed that no single magical word could be used to describe what they called the most unprecedented and unspeakable suffering in world history.

³²⁴ Personal conversation by phone between the author and Professor Chou Keary, Professor of Khmer linguistics at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, May 2014.

³²⁵ Personal conversation by phone with Dr. Vong Meng, Director of Department of Controlling and Checking, National Council of Khmer Language, Cambodian Council of Ministers, May 2014.

³²⁶ Personal Conversation with Professor Chuor Keary.

Political Interpretation

In general practice, the legal definition of *genocide* under the UN Genocide Convention was not used. The PRK employed the term *genocide* for many political reasons—to discredit the DK regime as genocidal, to legitimize the very existence of its state apparatus and the presence of the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, and to distinguish itself from the KR's version of communism. The PRK described the KR as Nazi Germany-like fascist but not like the kind of Soviet-like communist regimes.³²⁷ The term was used in various venues and occasions and in school textbooks, party's magazines and bulletins, state newspapers and public billboards, with slogans condemning the "KR genocide." The word had also been used for many official titles of the institutions and official state documents. For instance, the KR top security center office, S-21, was renamed the "Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum" in 1979. The word was repeatedly used in the party's congressional declarations, National Assembly resolutions, leaders' speeches, and various national ceremonies.

According to the official booklets of the PRPK's Central Committee and various school textbooks, the PRK explicitly, politically and ideologically referred to the KR genocide as the KR's "evil conduct" or an attempt to eliminate the entire Khmer race under the order of "the reactionary and expansionist China-Beijing, which wanted to bring its citizens to live on Cambodian land."³²⁸ In this sense, the PRK referred to China as "the master of genocide" in Cambodia, and "the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique" as the "Chinese genocidal lackeys." The accusation that China was the

³²⁷ David Chandler, "The Effort to Invent S-21: Would Have Been Far too Costly for the Vietnamese," *Searching for the Truth*, Issue No. 161, May 2013.

³²⁸ Face-to-face personal conversations with Cambodian historians and teachers of History in Cambodian high schools.

mastermind of Cambodian genocide is plainly false. Although China appeared to be the only country that had strong influence on Democratic Kampuchea, Chinese assistance was only able to shape DK trade and commerce but had little influence on its military and infrastructure,³²⁹ notwithstanding the Chinese influence on DK policies and ideologies that led to mass killings regardless of how much DK adopted Maoist ideology.

In addition, the PRK referred to the KR genocide with various terms such as “the devil”, “stupid regime”, “genocidal clique”, “criminal acts” or “human-oppressive regime”. The PRK's textbooks charged the KR leaders of practicing "a barbarous leading style on the Cambodian people" and eliminating the common way of family living; infringing on people's fundamental rights, freedom and production means; oppressing people's daily activities; and indiscriminately killing all kinds of people regardless of age, and including pregnant women, monks, Buddhist followers and other nationalities.³³⁰ In another instance, genocide was equated to "hell on earth."³³¹

The PRK also defined the KR era as the "oppressive regime" in which it claimed the KR leaders and cadres considered all kinds of people, including "even the newly born babies", to be enemies.³³² Along this line, genocide referred to the elimination of national traditions, such as the wedding ceremony and the Khmer New Year's Day celebration, as well as the elimination of schools and starvation that killed a number of people.³³³

³²⁹ Andrew Mertha, *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 9-11.

³³⁰ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 1, Part 2* (Phnom Penh), 1.

³³¹ Ibid., *Reading Textbook for Grade 1, Part 2*, 48.

³³² The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 2, Part 1* (Phnom Penh, 1982), p. 5-6.

³³³ The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 2, Part 2* (Ho Chi Minh City, 1982), 5-6.

The above assumptions do not necessarily divert historical truths; however, portraying the KR as blood-sucking monsters characterized all former KR members as wicked, and that notion cultivated stigmatization, categorization, exclusiveness and polarization, all of which are pre-conditions to the outbreak of genocide. This kind of description divided the nation into "us" vs. "them," which was also one of the precursor conditions that led to the outbreak of the horrific 1994 Rwandan genocide.

The Internationally Controversial Term

The word “genocide” became politically intense and contested beyond the PRK frame. The Cambodian conflict in the post-KR era was intertwined with the conflict and the politics of the Cold War in which Cambodia, once again, became a proxy battleground for the political and ideological competition among dominant superpowers. The Cambodian conflict was a central focus in US, Chinese and the Soviet Union's diplomatic relations and foreign policies in Southeast Asia. In the eyes of the U.S. and the Western world, Cambodia was a strategic wall protecting the spread of communism to other ASEAN member states, especially nearby Thailand, and a tool to avoid what was called "the domino game." The political alignments of the superpowers and their allies prioritized their own self-interests over the interests of the Cambodian people who bitterly suffered from the long protracted war, genocide, domestic and international power struggles and political violence for over three decades.

Although the PRK, with assistance from Vietnam, the former Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, tried to define the KR regime as ‘genocidal’ to the Cambodian people and the world, the U.S., who helped the Khmer Republic (1970-1975) fight against the

KR with massively deadly bombings in 1973, swiftly turned to support and to define the KR (its former enemy) as a strategic partner in an effort to stop communist domination in Southeast Asia. This support gave the KR the upper hand in demanding that the term "genocide" not be used in the Paris Peace Agreement. After multiple tense negotiations, the term, "genocide", was therefore supplemented with the phrase, "the non-return to the policies and practices of the past".³³⁴ As George Chigas observed, the U.S. did not employ the word "genocide" until after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991.³³⁵ Immediately after becoming one of the eighteen signatories to the Peace Agreement, the US began to discuss the possibility of bringing the KR leadership to justice. The U.S. Congress subsequently passed the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act in 1994, endorsing the first ever thorough state-level investigation of its kind into the KR crimes. This change in U.S. policy served to advance the U.S. strategic interest. Historically, the U.S. was defeated badly by the Soviet- and Chinese-backed Vietnamese communists in the Second Indochina War. This defeat was the first ever loss to the communists in American history. Learning about the KR history and bringing the KR leaders to prosecution would show the Chinese involvement in the KR mass atrocities and the long-term negative effect of communism on Cambodian society. Moreover, teaching genocide in Cambodian classrooms and assisting the ECCC prosecution would provide justification for the U.S. moral and legal responsibility to respond to the mass

³³⁴ Paris Peace Agreement Document (DC-Cam's Archives). Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen gave a speech at the inauguration of a new Buddhist building at Wat Langkar Kosamaram on May 25, 2013, emphasizing how hard and how difficult it was for him to demand without success the inclusion of the term 'genocide' in the Paris Peace Agreement. His comment was in response to the opposition leader Kem Sokha, who commented on May 18 that Tuol Sleng was a stage prepared by Vietnam. Kem Sokha's comment outraged the victims, especially Chum Mey and Bou Meng, who are among the very few survivors of Tuol Sleng prison.

³³⁵ Chigas, George (2000). "The politics of defining justice after the Cambodian genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2:2, 245-265.

atrocities happening in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979, at which time the U.S. was a bystander.

The Academically Debatable Term

The debate over the KR "genocide" was, and still is, controversial among scholars and lawyers. Some scholars called the KR mass atrocities a "genocide," such as Ben Kiernan, who studied the KR's desire to eliminate such ethnic minorities as Cham Muslims, Vietnamese and Buddhist monks, among many other minorities including ethnic Chinese, ethnic highlanders and the Kampuchea Kroam minority (lower delta Cambodians).³³⁶ Others, like David Chandler, saw the atrocities as crimes against humanity as they believed the KR had the ambition to cultivate a radical socialist transformation along the Marxist-Leninist line.³³⁷ Michael Vickery denied both claims and likened the KR mass atrocities to a nationalist movement or a peasant revolution in which city people, especially those who fell into the category of *bourgeoisies*, were disregarded and discarded.³³⁸ Others, like Hurst Hannum and David Hawk, chose the term "auto-genocide" to describe the KR atrocities due to the fact that the majority of the killings were conducted against Khmer nationals. Regardless, the mental state or intent has been a highly controversial and contentious point, taking into consideration the narrowly protected groups under the UN Genocide Convention.³³⁹ John D. Ciorciari observed that "from a legal standpoint, however, the question of whether the KR

³³⁶ Ben Kiernan, "The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979," (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996).

³³⁷ David P. Chandler, "The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945," (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991).

³³⁸ Michel Vickery, "Cambodia from 1975 to 1982," (Bangkok: O.S. Printing House, 1984).

³³⁹ John D. Ciorciari, "Auto-Genocide and the Cambodian Reign of Terror," in A Dirk Moses, *Genocide: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies*, (Routledge Publication, 2010), 428.

committed genocide is far from settled."³⁴⁰ He stated that the KR "committed politically motivated atrocities on a large scale."³⁴¹

Whether or not the atrocities that took place during the KR period were “genocide,” the question as to the nature of the KR regime is a matter of academic, legal and political interpretation rather than a verifiable historical fact, given the wide range of perspectives seen in the many discussions and debates in the literature summarized above. Regardless of popular, political, legal, international and academic debates over the KR genocide, the term *genocide* was widely used during the PRK and SOC regimes, for the entire 1980s and early 1990s, and people living under the regimes’ control generally accepted and endorsed the term as a valid historical fact. The effectual influence of this widespread acceptance remains today.

8. From PRK to SOC: Genocide Education in Ambivalence

Vietnam completed its troop withdrawal by September 1989. Sino-Soviet relations were improving, and the two communist powers began to decrease support for their clients (China with regard to the KR and the Soviet Union to Vietnam/PRK).³⁴² In 1989, the PRK was renamed the SOC, and its constitution, national anthem and national flag were revised to attract international support and accommodate market-oriented economic liberalization. The SOC privatized many former state-run sectors and allowed people to have private ownership of their land.

However, the newly formed SOC was basically the new face of the PRK with the same state apparatuses that had to adapt to the new international economic and political

³⁴⁰ Ibid., John D. Ciorciari, 413.

³⁴¹ Ibid., John D. Ciorciari, 422.

³⁴² Ibid., David M. Ayres., 143-145.

environments emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The SOC retained most of its former leadership and the one-party state system, consistent with Marxism-Leninism. However, as David Ayres rightly observed, there was a huge contradiction between the party's socialist principles and the reality on the ground in which the state and the population were increasingly beginning to embrace more capitalist ideals as political negotiation with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) drew near.³⁴³ This factor, along with international pressure, forced the SOC to gradually abandon the Marxist-Leninist ideals and grudgingly seek cooperation even from its rivals—including the KR faction, which was finally allowed to sit at the negotiation table with equal weight to other Cambodian factions. After the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, the SOC began to explicitly move from socialism toward a liberal free-market economy, at least on the surface. The PRPK was renamed Cambodian People's Party (CPP) in 1991. The newly established SOC continued to govern Cambodia even when United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) temporarily commenced its work in Cambodia on March 15, 1992. Even then, the SOC remained in charge of most of the state apparatuses, including the police and armed forces, until the restoration of the second Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993.

At its inception, the SOC began to reform its education system with assistance from several international organizations including World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and the World Bank. These international organizations assisted in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the education system to prepare the SOC to regain its

³⁴³ Ibid., David Ayres, 145.

footing in the region among neighboring developing countries.³⁴⁴ This time period saw the early flows and influences of global education practices into the Cambodian education system outside the frame of the socialist bloc. The topics of genocide and human rights were not highlighted as these international organizations focused on more urgent tasks including providing educational opportunity for young children, eliminating illiteracy among the adult population, strengthening the management system, enhancing the quality of basic education, reforming the curriculum and developing teaching materials.³⁴⁵ The efforts of these international organizations did not yield substantial results as the SOC Ministry of Education still lacked capable human resources, and the country at-large continued to face economic challenges, making education reform a very slow process.

In 1992, UNTAC was established and Prince Norodom Sihanouk reentered the country. The SOC symbolically handed over its state apparatuses, opening the door for UNTAC to supervise the country's transitional government (March 1992-September 1993). The primary and secondary school textbooks' content remained intact. This could possibly be due to the narrow mandate of UNTAC, which had limited authority and financial capability to reform general education. Within a short period of the eighteen-month mandate, UNTAC was not able to directly impact education, which by definition required long-term, constant efforts. At the same time, UNTAC focused more particularly on establishing a free and fair general election, arranging the military, and repatriating and resettling Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, all of which were essential to ensuring peace and stability in Cambodia.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., Sideth S. Dy and Akira Ninomiya.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., Sideth S. Dy and Akira Ninomiya.

Interestingly, the textbooks published in 1993 were disseminated to schools without the title of the state, although the Ministry of Education remained responsible for the publication.³⁴⁶ The painting of the school compound in the textbook included an unrecognized flag, unlike the textbooks published in the 1980s, in which the PRK's five-tower flag was clearly presented. Content on genocide education was absent from 1993 until 2000. This major change may have stemmed from the SOC's commitments to give the country a new face and prepare herself to accept the Western ideals of governance.

9. Conclusion

The PRK never referred to its teachings of KR history as “genocide education.” Genocide education scholars and practitioners may reasonably argue that the 1980s was a period without genocide education and that the teaching of the history of the KR atrocities in Cambodian classrooms at the time was merely comparable to the way the history of Nazi Germany was integrated into the general World War Two history, Western history or the Jewish history, as discussed in Chapter Two. However, the discussions and emphases on the recent history of the KR atrocities were bolded, multiplied, repeatedly emphasized and propagandized to a level in which the KR atrocities dominated the primary school and secondary school textbooks, textbooks for illiterate adults and state and party documents and publications. State leaders and officials as well as party members at all levels injected accounts of KR genocidal acts into the social fabric, right at the heart of the population who suffered from these unspeakable atrocities. Together with the on-going discussions about individuals' stories and on the

³⁴⁶ The Ministry of Education, *Khmer Studies for Grade 3*, (Phnom Penh: Department of Publication and Education, 1993).

whereabouts of disappeared family members, the teaching of the KR history during the PRK regime effectively became the first ever form of genocide education in Cambodia.

Genocide education during the PRK period was a political/ideological or state-sponsored genocide education program caught within the nation-building imperatives, including the construction of a common civic revolutionary consciousness and vigilance, at the expense of embracing common genocide education values, which will be discussed in Chapter Six. The PRK genocide education ignored the universal moral responsibility to protect against the reoccurrence of genocide and implement the words “never again.” Political propaganda was prioritized over curriculum, content and pedagogy, all of which were gravely marginalized but necessary for the PRK political survival and state legitimacy. As Cole and Barsalou argue, "In societies recovering from violent conflict, questions of how to deal with the past are acute, especially when the past involves memories of victimization, death, and destruction so widespread that a high percentage of the population is affected."³⁴⁷

Post-genocide education in general and genocide education in particular faced tremendous challenges in Cambodia. Not only was education under political constraints, but it was also implicated in the inflammation of further political conflicts and civil wars in the already war-torn Cambodia. The schools helped entrench and justify the PRK's legitimacy and political objectives to bolster domestic support, which, in turn, fostered conflicts among opposing Cambodian factions living with inadequate access to diverse information, one single historical narrative, non-critical thinking skills, poor quality education and limited objective understanding of the KR genocide. From a very young

³⁴⁷ Elizabeth A. Cole and Judy Barsalou, "Unite or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching History in Societies Emerging from Violent Conflict," (Washington: Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace, 2006).

age, Cambodian children were educated with the emotional and ideologically biased textbooks to differentiate between friends and enemies. Students were taught the recent history of the KR genocide with overtly political overtones, and in many cases over-exaggerations, which played a more harmful role in existing intergroup conflicts. In this situation, the students were affected by the textbooks' content, which, in turn, had severe, far-reaching, negative implications on the society at-large. In other words, the PRK's radicalized education system marginalized the efforts for peacebuilding, reconciliation, national unity and national development. In addition, the textbooks' content had long-lasting effects on the population's perception of successful progression of the society, displaying violent mechanisms or at least warning signs of impending violence.³⁴⁸ This educational approach encouraged hatred, intolerance, division, discrimination and polarization among the population, replicating the destructive KR educational stride.

The lessons in the textbooks were problematic for social unity and antagonized intergroup relations, particularly relationships between people living in different geopolitical areas—the lessons highlighted political enmity between the people living under the PRK-controlled areas and those in areas occupied by the resistance factions. The textbooks' lessons portrayed the resistance groups as the sole source of the past atrocities and other social ills, which facilitated group-based scapegoating and further stigmatized those to whom the textbooks gave no value. The textbooks did not objectively address the causes and consequences of the genocide and instead provided unchallenged, single-sided narratives.

The PRK genocide education was not influenced by global genocide education practices for two reasons: the international isolation of the PRK regime and the many

³⁴⁸ Elisabeth King, 165.

practical challenges of the global genocide education programs during the 1980s, such as the rising trend of anti-Semitism and the question of particularistic memory, as discussed in Chapter Two. Instead, the PRK genocide education drew from communist models and was strongly motivated by regional and international wars, power struggles and state political objectives. It had no connection with Holocaust education but was strongly influenced by the Vietnamese and the socialist world's views. The PRK genocide education is an example of a Cambodian genocide education program conducted outside the mainstream of dominant Holocaust education practices. As a consequence of this global absence, the PRK's genocide education was characterized by the state-controlled, mandated texts with strong political manipulation.

In summary, the PRK genocide education was influenced by the international flow from the communist blocs, the pre-1970 education system and French-style education. The kind of communist flow and ideological genocide education was swiftly fading from the school curriculum when Cambodia opened its doors to the larger world in 1991. Chapter Four will address how Cambodia began to receive broader international influences from the West during its fourteen-year transitional period, which allowed momentum for the cultivation and reconstruction of local genocide education initiatives.

Illustration 1: Covers of PRK's Reading Textbooks (DC-Cam's Archirves)







Illustration 2: Covers of PRK's Morality and Political Studies Textbook (DC-Cam's Archives)





Illustration 3: Covers of PRK's Magazine "The Propaganda" (DC-Cam's Archives)







Illustration 4: PRK's Liberation Map (DC-Cam's Archives)



CHAPTER FOUR

GENOCIDE EDUCATION IN TRANSITION: LOCAL CONSTRAINTS, GLOBAL INFLUENCES

Chapter four examines Cambodian genocide education with regard to the gradual transition from the PRK's massive, politically-motivated KR history curriculum to the long absence of the subject. This absence can largely be attributed to both the country's aspiration for peace and national reconciliation and the continued internal political turmoil throughout the 1990s. Toward this examination, this chapter looks at two contradicting trends: (1) the decrease in national interest and intra-governmental conflicts, which led to the marginalization of genocide education in public schools from 1993 to 2004, and (2) the rise in international interests and influences as triggering forces behind local genocide education.

With regard to global trends, this chapter examines early global flows and influences including the creation and growth of NGOs; the flow of international human rights regimes that introduced Cambodia to the Western ideal of democracy and the concept of universal human rights; and the early American influences and initiatives that resulted in the passage of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act (CGJA), which contributed to decreased international hesitation in using the word "genocide" to mark the KR atrocities. This chapter then investigates the issue of local marginalization in which the Cambodian government, between 1993 and 2004, decided to moderate the importance of teaching genocide in the interests of courting the KR defection and seeking political compromise within the coalition government.

This chapter argues that genocide education in the immediate aftermath of the political conflict in Cambodia underwent a long and critical political transition, determined largely by local political constraints. Insights on genocide education in Cambodia in the 1990s continued to be undermined by three important state imperatives: peace, national reconciliation and political stability. In this ongoing politically-charged context, the prospect of comprehensive genocide education depended almost exclusively on local NGOs, which built up the local genocide education initiatives and introduced global values that resonated with the new state democratic pattern and the aspirations of the local people. The work of local NGOs and global flows and influences appeared to be the critical driving forces triggering local genocide education initiatives and challenging its political marginalization.

1. Intra-Governmental Conflict: An Obstacle to Genocide Education

Local constraints on Cambodian genocide education in the 1990s and mid-2000s were greatly exacerbated by the intra-governmental conflict between the two main political parties in the coalition government. Cambodia in the early 1990s experienced uncertain and unstable peace.³⁴⁹ Although the term “genocide,” which was banned during the course of the four-faction political negotiations in the late 1980s was reemployed, studying the history of the KR genocide remained severely undermined by what the government claimed was the country's urgent need for peace and national reconciliation. Thus, politics continued to dictate the content of KR history, this time not with

³⁴⁹ Frederic Z. Brown, "Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace," *A Survey of Asia in 1991* 32, no. 1 (January 1992): 88-96.

politicization and political propaganda, but with silencing, ignorance and a lack of political will.

Power Struggles within the Coalition Government

Within the framework of the coalition government born out of the 1993 UN-sponsored election, the Co-Prime Ministers, Prince Norodom Rannariddh and Hun Sen, did not get along well although they had promised to minimize their differences and to solve conflicts in a peaceful manner. The main contentions between the two leaders as well as their respective parties (FUNCINPEC and CPP) stemmed from the unequal share of power. Although FUNCINPEC won the 1993 election and the party's President became First Prime Minister, the CPP dominated most of the state apparatuses including civil administration, military and police. The mistrust between the two parties had led to political polarization. The then upcoming 1998 national election competition and the two parties' attempt to strengthen their respective military forces through courting the KR defections further exacerbated the existing intra-government conflict. Small, armed clashes between the two parties began to erupt in late 1996. The clashes extended into 1997 when troops loyal to the opposing parties broke out in violence in several provinces, including the relatively large-scale clash in the Northwest Battambang province. These clashes indicated that the two Prime Ministers could no longer work together in the fragile coalition government and seemed to suggest that all political parties lacked political maturity in resolving the conflicts through peaceful means.

To counter CPP politico-military dominance, Prince Rannariddh hastily launched a new political front known as the National United Front (NUF).³⁵⁰ The National Congress of the NUF was held in Chaktomok Hall in Phnom Penh on February 27, 1997, and was attended by members of FUNCINPEC, Sam Rainsy's Khmer National Party (KNP), and the Son Sann-led Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP).³⁵¹ Ieng Sary's newly established Democratic National Union Movement (DNUM) party stayed silent during the NUF appeal, but DNUM representatives Sok Pheap (KR military commander in Malai) and Prum Sou (KR military commander in Thmar Pouk) were present and vowed complete support for the NUF. The Congress elected First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Rannariddh as its President.

Hun Sen responded to the NUF by building up a new political alliance with Chhim Om Yon's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the BLDP faction led by Ieng Mouly that broke away from Son Sann in 1996.³⁵² The political intensification became more acute when twelve members of parliament from the FUNCINPEC party revolted against Prince Rannariddh in April 1997. Hun Sen quickly moved to support the FUNCINPEC-revolted group. One month later, Hun Sen seized arms shipments intended to strengthen FUNCINPEC's forces.³⁵³ At that moment, the conflict between the two

³⁵⁰ Ker Munthit, "NUF Launch Revives Political Fireworks," *The Phnom Penh Post*, March 7-20, 1997. See also Ker Munthit, "Smiles all round as one-time foes join hands in UUF," *The Phnom Penh Post*, March 7-20, 1997.

³⁵¹ The 14-point UNF political agendas included: (1) defending the nation, religion and monarchy; (2) holding free and fair elections; (3) supporting the idea of one Prime Minister in the next elections; (4) strengthening the legislative system and a neutral administration; (5) defending human rights and fighting against dictatorship; (6) improving international cooperation but defending national sovereignty and in territorial integrity; (7) resolving immigration problems; (8) promoting the people's standard of living; (9) developing human resources; (10) eliminating corruption; (11) fighting against drugs; (12) resolving lost public properties; (13) defending Khmer culture; and (14) defending the environment. Is this a quote? Should it be cited?

³⁵² Sorpong Peou, "Cambodia in 1997: Back to Square One?" *Asian Survey*, 38, no. 1 (1998): 69-74.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, Sorpong Peou, 70.

parties was on the brink of erupting into civil war. This power struggle marginalized any prospect of genocide education.

Courting the KR Defections

Another setback for genocide education in the 1990s was the competition between the CPP and FUNCINPEC to court KR defectors to join their forces in order to build up their respective military strength, which was another episode of the contentious intra-governmental conflict. The government's desire to gain the KR forces meant disdaining the prospect of genocide education, as they viewed studying the KR history in the classrooms and discussing it publically would discourage KR defections and would damage trust and confidence from the KR members who had long suspected the government's motivations for negotiation. The government was trying to appease former KR soldiers and supporters. The government used both hard and soft approaches to encourage, and sometimes to coerce, KR defections. The government proposed to the National Assembly the "Khmer Rouge Outlaw" law, which was passed on July 15, 1994, and stated that KR leaders and soldiers were deemed illegal but not soldiers' family members.³⁵⁴ Taking a softer approach, both CPP and FUNCINPEC secretly negotiated with individual KR military commanders at different times and different locations for their defections. Although each party claimed that they were negotiating in their governmental capacity, clearly they were building up their own respective military strength.

³⁵⁴ The "Khmer Rouge Outlaw" law, which consists of ten articles, was passed by the Cambodian National Assembly during the second plenary meeting of the first legislation on 7 July 1994, and was signed by Acting President of the National Assembly Loy Sim Chheang. The law came into effect on July 15, 1994 after the promulgation by the Acting Head of State Chea Sim.

Keo Pong, a KR military commander with cadres based on Oral Mountain (Kampong Speu province), became the first KR defector to the government in March 1996. Pong sided with the CPP within the coalition government. With assistance from Pong as mediator, Hun Sen gained the upper hand during the negotiations with and defection of other KR factions. Led by Ieng Sary, with support from military division commanders Y Chhean of Division 415 and Sok Pheap of Division 450, the KR factions in Pailin and Malai defected to the government in November 1996. The defectors received semi-autonomy for their former strongholds, various positions in the government and ownership of their existing property as promise during the negotiation.³⁵⁵

Likewise, FUNCINPEC had secretly negotiated with KR hardliners in Anlong Veng, the largest KR group that had continued its struggle against the coalition government. Ta Mok, the warlord and most influential leader in Anlong Veng, began the first ever negotiation with FUNCINPEC since the KR boycotted the election in 1993 in order to assess the possibility of integrating into the government through FUNCINPEC's door. Ta Mok made contact with the late Hem Bunheng, then FUNCINPEC's Second Deputy Governor of Siem Reap province and former FUNCINPEC military commander during the struggle period in the 1980s.³⁵⁶ The subsequent negotiation was conducted without Pol Pot's knowledge.

³⁵⁵ Subsequently, other small KR factions defected to the government. These defections included KR remnants in Samlot; KR Division 519 in Banteay Meanchey province led by So Hong and Dul Saroeun; KR remnants in Kamrieng, Phnom Prek and Sampov Loun districts (Battambang province) led by Ny Kan, Son Chhum and Meas Mtuh; and those in Veal Veng district (Pursat province) led by Uon Yang and Ek Sophal.

³⁵⁶ According to Khamboly Dy's interview with Nop Socheat, former KR military commander in Anlong Veng, Hem Bunheng made a secret trip to Anlong Veng on February 14, 1997. Bunheng's trip was not only for the integration negotiation. Bun Heng was also assigned to hand a copy of the document of the FUNCINPEC-initiated NUF to convince the KR in Anlong Veng to take part in the Front. As the meeting was taking place, soldiers close to Pol Pot fired guns to interrupt the talk. Bunheng injured his leg, and he was arrested and transported to Anlong Veng. Bunheng died from serious injuries when he arrived in Anlong Veng. The other ten negotiators, including General Phuong Bunphoen and General Hang Sochan

Despite the CPP's strong opposition, FUNCINPEC and the KR in Anlong Veng continued the second round of negotiation. Nhek Bun Chhay and Khan Savoeun (the top FUNCINPEC military commanders), Tun Chay (FUNCINPEC's Siem Reap Governor), and Long Sarin (FUNCINPEC's Second Secretary of the Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok) were chief negotiators for FUNCINPEC³⁵⁷, while the KR was represented by Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, Tep Khunnal and Long Tem. The negotiations took place over several weeks. One of FUNCINPEC's critical demands was the exclusion of Pol Pot, an infamous figure by both domestic and international opinion. In return, Ta Mok demanded that Anlong Veng be given status as an autonomous region, in the same way the Pailin group had. Ta Mok also asked for amnesty from the King—as Ieng Sary had obtained amnesty in September 1996.³⁵⁸ Moreover, Ta Mok demanded preservation of his administrative and military structure in Anlong Veng. If these conditions were met, Ta Mok's forces would agree to integrate themselves into the government's army and respect the Cambodian Constitution and the laws.

Prince Rannariddh agreed to Ta Mok's terms.³⁵⁹ In response, the KR faction in Anlong Veng agreed to support the FUNCINPEC-initiated NUF, following a meeting

from the Ministry of Defense, were killed on the spot. The helicopter was burned down. Four pilots who were waiting near helicopter were arrested and detained in Anlong Veng. The negotiation failed.

³⁵⁷ During the negotiation, FUNCINPEC negotiators also demanded the release of the fifteen people (the first group of negotiators) who were arrested and kept hostage a few weeks earlier. The KR ignored this request because Hem Bun Heng and ten other negotiators were killed after February 14. Only four pilots survived in the KR holding cell and the revelation of their deaths could have jeopardized the negotiation. This lack of attention from the KR remnants in Anlong Veng angered FUNCINPEC's negotiators Nhek Bun Chhay and Khan Savoeun, who ordered their military units to ready the bases near Anlong Veng for any possible offensive. Finally, the four pilots were released on July 6, after the negotiation had ended. They returned back to Phnom Penh through Thailand.

³⁵⁸ Royal Decree granting pardon to Ieng Sary, dated September 14, 1996 (DC-Cam's Archives, D42278).

³⁵⁹ Long Sarin, "The Trial of Pol Pot in Anlong Veng on July 25, 1997," a documentary film by Long Sarin, (DC-Cam's Archives). Pol Pot strongly opposed the plan and tried to block the negotiation but could not stop it. Pol Pot seemed to believe that any attempt for peaceful negotiation with the government would not yield any fruitful solution. The only way was to continue struggle until the KR could take over the country back. Many KR soldiers and people were not enthusiastic with Pol Pot's idea. The soldiers and people saw

between Prince Norodom Rannariddh and the KR chief negotiator Khieu Samphan at Preah Vihear temple on June 5, 1997. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for June 10 but did not occur as conflict in Anlong Veng between those loyal to Pol Pot and those loyal to Ta Mok reached its peak, and the KR chief negotiators Khieu Samphan and Tep Khunnal were taken hostage by Pol Pot's faction. Ta Mok asked for assistance from Nhek Bun Chhay to help defeat Pol Pot and recover what Ta Mok believed was "the plan for peace and national reconciliation."³⁶⁰ Nhek Bun Chhay agreed and transported ammunitions by helicopter from his military base in O Smach to Anlong Veng.³⁶¹ This accelerated the negotiation, which concluded with a deal on July 4th. After Pol Pot and his close commanders were defeated and arrested, Ta Mok could consolidate total power in Anlong Veng.³⁶² This alliance would give FUNCINPEC a counterweight to the CPP.

The July 4th deal between FUNCINPEC and Ta Mok's faction, however, sparked fighting in Phnom Penh on July 5-6, 1997.³⁶³ It was a clash between the forces loyal to

his idea as unrealistic and illusive as they could not see how the KR could win over the government. As Khieu Nov commented during his speech at the opening of the People's Tribunal for the prosecution of Pol Pot, "Pol Pot asked the people and soldiers to uphold their stand and to keep fighting. However, our occupied areas were shrinking dramatically and enemies were surrounding us."

³⁶⁰ Long Dany's interview with Yim Phanna, male, a former messenger of Division 801 and later Chief of Division 980, Anlong Veng District Hall, February 2012. The second interview was conducted by Khamboly Dy and Long Dany in March 2012. According to Yim Phanna, one of the visions that struck him the most was the speech by Hun Sen, who said during their meeting in Phnom Penh, "I was also former KR cadre myself, but I joined the government ahead of you. I was not the one who created war. You, Yim Phanna, were also not the one who had the ability to create war. They created war and dropped it on us. We received the suffering from them. So please stop fighting each other and work together for national reconciliation and national unity."

³⁶¹ Ibid. Long Sarin, "The Trial of Pol Pot in Anlong Veng on July 25, 1997."

³⁶² It would have severely distracted, or even destroyed the negotiation if Pol Pot happened to win over Ta Mok in the five-day infighting after the killing of Son Sen and his entire family on June 9, 1997.

³⁶³ Some observers and researchers called the 5-6 July 1997 event a coup d'état, an assertion that Hun Sen strongly rejected. Nhek Bun Chhay, who initially denounced the coup, later called it an internal military clash within the Royal Government of Cambodia. Foreign countries including the US chose not to use the word "coup." The 5-6 July event provoked fighting between the KR in Samlot and the government forces in August, one month after the event. The rebel leaders included Ny Kan (who had defected earlier), Iem Phan, Meas Muth and So Hong, who did not participate in the fighting. Ny Kan, Iem Phan and Meas Muth were arrested by the Pailin forces of Y Chhean and were detained in Pailin for several months. All of these rebel leaders later agreed to join the government in December 1997.

First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Rannariddh and those loyal to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. The two-day infighting resulted in Prince Rannariddh being ousted from power. Subsequently, many high-ranking FUNCINPEC officials and members of Parliament fled abroad. A number of FUNCINPEC officials and military officers who remained in Cambodia were summarily murdered. FUNCINPEC forces escaped and regrouped near the Thai border. General Nhek Bun Chhay led the royalist forces to their former military base in O Smach and asked for help from the KR in Anlong Veng.³⁶⁴

Hun Sen, who effectively took exclusive control of Phnom Penh, backed FUNCINPEC's Foreign Minister Ung Hout as the new First Prime Minister and denied Prince Rannariddh any chance of returning to power. Hun Sen encouraged the prosecution of Prince Rannariddh for treason. These actions further antagonized the broken FUNCINPEC party and further exacerbated political instability in the country's history. Additionally, major donor countries and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) moved to reduce or limit their aid to humanitarian assistance, and thousands of foreigners were evacuated from Cambodia. ASEAN foreign ministers held an emergency meeting on July 10 and decided to suspend Cambodia's entry into ASEAN membership until 1999. The UN General Assembly voted to leave Cambodia's seat vacant right after the 1997 coup and would not support the resumption of the seat until a new legitimate government was formed in 1998.³⁶⁵ The prospect of democracy in Cambodia seemed doomed. The fragile reconciliation process was further

³⁶⁴ Video footage of the interview with Ta Mok, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan in Anlong Veng on February 4, 1998. The footage was provided to DC-Cam by Jame Gerrand, unofficial translation of the footage by Men Pechet, (DC-Cam's Archives). The 5-6 July 1997 event convinced Ta Mok that the KR remnants could not live with Hun Sen and that they had to continue armed struggle. Some of Ta Mok's military commanders were disappointed and began the third and final round of negotiations for a peace deal, which was reached in late 1998.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., Sorpong Peou, 73-74.

marginalized. The unsophisticated political climate and the subsequent political deadlock after the 1998 and 2003 national elections resulted in continued absence and further marginalization of genocide education in Cambodian classrooms. At this critical juncture, the then King Norodom Sihanouk played a key role in reconciling all conflict parties and in bringing back peace and international recognition back to Cambodia.

2. Political Marginalization of Genocide Education

Political conflicts within the unstable coalition government between CPP and FUNCINPEC continued to the second legislation (1998-2003) and further undermined and dictated the nature of texts on the KR account. For the academic year of 2000-2001, the Ministry of Education finally revised the curriculum and published new social studies textbooks for grades 9 and 12. The new textbooks included an account of modern Cambodian history, from the independent period in 1953 up to the 1998 national elections, and a brief account of the Cambodian genocide; however, while the Cambodian government, via these textbooks, introduced KR history into classrooms, the account was far too brief to ensure that young Cambodians understood what really happened at that time, or to allow for more critical thinking and deep inquiry into the history. In fact, the 9th grade textbook devoted only two sentences to the KR era:

From April 25 to April 27, 1975, the Khmer Rouge leaders held a special general assembly in order to form a new Constitution and renamed the country ‘Democratic Kampuchea.’ A new government of the Democratic Kampuchea, led by Pol Pot, came into existence, following which the massacre of Khmer citizens began.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁶ Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Royal Government of Cambodia, *Social Study textbook for Grade 9*, Lesson 12, page 169, edition 2000. (Unofficial translation by Bun Sou Sour, Documentation Center of Cambodia)

The short text suggests that the Cambodian students at the secondary school level at the time were educated to understand the KR only in relation to Pol Pot and the massacre of the Cambodian people. Pedagogically, the text supported the notion that students were required to remember but not to understand, analyze or evaluate the Cambodia's complex history due largely to its political sensitivity. A textbook writer admitted that he had concern about personal safety and professional security while writing Cambodian modern history since he did not know the political position of the ruling party toward a particular Cambodian history as well as how the ruling party wanted to portray KR history in the national textbooks. It appeared that the writers did not want to talk about the KR period if it was avoidable. However, since the KR regime is an important period in the Cambodian chronicle, the writers decided to insert two sentences to provide a transition to next historical period that is the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime.³⁶⁷

In the 12th grade textbook, the chapter on KR history spanned three pages in the Khmer language (about one and a half pages in English). The lesson briefly discusses the political conditions before the KR, the formation of the DK government and economy, and the people's lives under the KR.³⁶⁸ The lesson allocated one hour of instruction for the entire academic year.

Additionally, Cambodian politicians appeared to have reversed their stance about the role genocide education could play. Government officials suggested that to prevent past mass violence from resurfacing, people should forget the past and the dark side of

³⁶⁷ Personal interviews and conversations with three textbook writers who requested anonymity. They said that the final decision maker on the textbook contents was the Minister of Education. For important and severe cases, the Ministry would approach the Prime Minister for direction.

³⁶⁸ Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Royal Government of Cambodia, *Social Study Textbook for Grade 12*, Lesson 4, edition 2001 (Unofficial translation by Bun Sou Sour, Documentation Center of Cambodia).

recent Cambodian history should be expunged from the minds of Cambodian youth—the then Head of the Committee for Curriculum Development said that the government-produced textbooks did not discuss the killings in detail because “we don’t want Khmer children to repeat the bitter history. We try to bury even the smell.”³⁶⁹ This comment echoed Prime Minister Hun Sen’s remark stating that “it is time to dig a hole and bury the past even when we consider that the past is for thousands of Cambodians an unbearable burden.”³⁷⁰ Similarly, though former DK Head of State Khieu Samphan denied knowing anything about what happened during KR regime, he apologized for those who died and suffered during the KR period and called upon the Cambodian people to “forgive and forget.”³⁷¹ Cambodian educators were reluctant to discuss political issues in the classrooms, and especially reluctant to discuss topics related to the KR period because certain discussions could undermine their personal safety and employment security.³⁷²

By the early 2000s, the depiction of modern Cambodian history in school textbooks remained politically controversial. For example, while the 12th grade textbook mentioned the CPP’s victory in the 1998 national election, it neglected to mention that the Royalist FUNCINPEC Party won the first national election in 1993. The textbook writers, most of whom were former PRK officials, selectively portrayed history by deciding to omit the historical section that would glorify parties other than the CPP. After

³⁶⁹ Pin Sisovann and Matt Reed, “Textbook Delay Reflects Sensitivity of Cambodia’s Recent History,” *The Cambodia Daily*, March 23-24, 2002. (DC-Cam’s News Clip)

³⁷⁰ Suzana Linton, *Reconciliation in Cambodia*, Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2004, p 84.

³⁷¹ “Khieu Samphan: Sorry and Please Forget the Past,” *Reaksmei Kampuchea Daily*, January 1, 1999. (DC-Cam’s News Clip)

³⁷² During one training workshop conducted in Prey Veng province on May 8-14, 2010, in which I participated, one teacher trainee came to me and said that her husband asked her to leave the training because the whole theme was about KR issues. Her husband, who is a police officer, was concerned that her participation would undermine his career. I told her that the training and course materials had been approved by the Ministry of Education. She returned back the next day, saying that her husband, by seeing the seal and sign of the Ministry of Education, was convinced and approved her participation.

the description of the 1991 Paris Peace Conference, the writers jumped quickly to the 1998 election, which the CPP won by a large majority. Prince Norodom Rannariddh (then head of the FUNCINPEC party and President of the Cambodian National Assembly) criticized the content of the textbook for failing to mention his party's victory in the 1993 UNTAC-sponsored election and called for further revisions.³⁷³ In response, officials of the Ministry of Education (the top leadership of which was dominated by members of the FUNCINPEC party including its Minister Tol Lah, a member of FUNCINPEC's Executive Committee) agreed to review the textbook and add more information on the KR history section.³⁷⁴ Yet subsequent discussions between the two political leaders, Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Rannariddh, led to even more omissions, which were politically motivated and ideologically driven. To avoid further political controversies and to calm the situation of the fragile coalition government between CPP and FUNCINPEC, which had been escalated amidst the coming 2003 election, the Minister of Education ordered the removal of the section on Cambodian modern history from 1953 to 1998, including the account of the KR era, entirely, from the 12th grade textbook. The Ministry of Education withdrew the old edition from schools while the newly distributed edition of the textbook was thinner and focused exclusively on histories of foreign countries.³⁷⁵ In the middle of the school year in 2002, Hun Sen ordered the withdrawal of all 12th grade social studies textbooks, which were not returned until May 2011, when the Ministry of Education introduced a new

³⁷³ Lor Chandara, "Prince Ranariddh Slams New History Textbook," *The Cambodia Daily*, April 27-28, 2002.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., Lor Chandara.

³⁷⁵ Pin Sisovann, "Prime Minister Orders Recall of Textbooks," *The Cambodia Daily*, April 29, 2002. The two versions of the government's social study textbook for grade 12. The first version consists of over 200 pages while the second version consists of only 167 pages.

edition.³⁷⁶ During the nine-year absence of the textbook, schools continued to teach Cambodian modern history, but teachers had to copy the disappeared lessons for students and had to instruct this part of history with constant sensitivity and caution. Whether the intention to omit the modern history was to foster optimism or pessimism, marginalizing the teaching of KR history for the sake of national unity and reconciliation has since been detrimental to the government efforts for sustainable peace and a meaningful reconciliation process.

3. The Early Global Flows and Influences

The process of reinstating interest in Cambodian genocide education can be studied from the time when the four conflicting Cambodian factions reached the Paris Peace Agreement (hereafter, the Agreement) on October 23, 1991. The Agreement marked the end of longstanding internal conflicts and provided a platform for a number of successive developments and political, social and economic transitions and reforms in Cambodia. The Agreement was followed by the flow of the international human rights regimes into Cambodia, the presence of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992, and the creation of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

As the Agreement guaranteed, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Head of the Supreme National Council (SNC), returned back to Phnom Penh for the first time on November 14, 1991, after living in exile (mostly in Beijing) for more than twenty years. UNTAC, along with the SNC and existing SOC state apparatus, temporarily supervised Cambodia's transition from war to peace and from communism to liberal democracy.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., Pin Sisovann, "Prime Minister Orders Recall of Textbooks."

With the inclusion of the universal human rights provision in Article 15 of the Agreement, the thirteen-member SNC ratified the two international human rights covenants on April 20 and five other important UN human rights instruments on September 20, 1992.³⁷⁷

Early global flows and influences, particularly human rights and democracy, coincided with Cambodia's transition from Soviet-led communism toward liberal democracy. These global flows and influences introduced Cambodia to the international ideals of democracy and human rights from which the later reemergence of genocide education in Cambodia has been vested. Genocide education and human rights have a multifaceted relationship in which genocide is a form of a grave human rights violation, and genocide education contributes to not only genocide prevention but also the respect for human rights and human life. From the outset, the introduction of international values of human rights and democracy was intimately linked to the popular desire to prevent the recurrence of the KR genocide and the grave human rights violations that occurred both during and after the KR regime.

There are two main questions posed in this chapter. First, how have international human rights regimes helped inform Cambodian genocide education? Second, was the arrival of the international human rights regime in Cambodia understood as the flow of global concepts to enrich the local meaning of human rights, and subsequently the institutionalization of genocide education? Responding to these two questions, I will look at the roles of local Cambodian NGOs and UNTAC's early efforts in articulating,

³⁷⁷ Paris Peace Agreement document (DC-Cam's Archives). According to Ledgerwood and Un, the international human rights instruments that were ratified by the SNC include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention and Protocol relating to the status of Refugees, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See also Terence Duffy, "Toward A Culture of Human Rights in Cambodia," *Human Rights Quarterly* 16, (1994): 82-104.

stimulating and reconciling the global human rights concepts and democracy with the local Cambodian traditions and contexts.

The Creation and Growth of NGOs in Cambodia

The process of political development—establishing a new state system more consistent with liberal democratic values—began to take shape after the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement. Spontaneously, demands for civil society, equality, transparency and engagement of the people emerged. This swift political change markedly challenged the traditional Cambodian state system, which had been deeply entrenched in a "dual political heritage" between the traditional idea of *mandala*, centering on the god-king and political rulers, and that of "the quasi-rational-legal Marxist-Leninist state," which hindered the contemporary political development in Cambodia.³⁷⁸ The 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, the presence of UNTAC, the 1993 liberal constitution, and external assistance fostered the emergence of civil society groups, including new political parties, unions, associations, NGOs, social movements and academic and professional groups. The number of local Cambodian NGOs has since grown dramatically from 100 in 1996 to several thousands in the present.³⁷⁹ The emergence of these groups channeled and enhanced the concept of universal human rights and Western ideals of democracy and many other critical global concepts in Cambodia, as opposed to the previous waves of communist ethos that poured into Cambodia from China through the KR regime and from the Soviet Union through the

³⁷⁸ Sue Downie and Damien Kingsbury, "Political Development and the Re-Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia," p. 46-47.

³⁷⁹ Sue Downie and Damien Kingsbury, "Political Development and the Re-Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 23, no. 1 (April 2001): 43-64.

PRK and SOC. As Judy Ledgerwood and Kheang Un argue, prior to the Agreement, the concept of human rights "was never a part of the sociopolitical discourse embraced by either the state or societal actors," regardless of the patterns of Cambodian political regimes.³⁸⁰ Increased communications with the outside world through both the government and civil society, particularly the works of NGOs, introduced these new ideas and strategies to Cambodia.

By definition, NGOs are non-profit, non-partisan and non-governmental actors working independently with independent objectives, purposes and principles. In theory, the decision-making of NGOs is made in a democratic manner with participation from many stakeholders. NGOs have expanded their efforts, which range from humanitarian aid and mobilization of the people to influencing the state and its policies. NGOs often work to convince, criticize and encourage states to pay attention to the people's concerns. In some respects, NGOs are able to advocate for public education in order to shape public policy. Some NGOs even lobby the policy makers and can critically influence the internal affairs of a country. The emergence of NGOs may have stemmed from the fact that many problems cannot be solved by a single state and that states have thus far failed to address many local and global concerns.³⁸¹

The meaningful integration of the concepts of democracy and human rights into the local Cambodian context was primarily driven by the work and efforts of local NGOs.³⁸² With support from international agencies, and foreign governments and donors, NGOs embraced principles, strategies and networks that translated, transmitted and

³⁸⁰ Judy L. Ledgerwood and Kheang Un, "Global Concepts and Local Meaning: Human Rights and Buddhism in Cambodia," *Journal of Human Rights* 2, no. 4 (December 2003): 531-549.

³⁸¹ Charles Tilly, *Social Movement, 1768-2004*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004, 14.

³⁸² Ibid., Ledgerwood and Un, 534.

circulated the global ideals of rights-based and democratic thinking. Of the NGOs that emerged in the early 1990s, the following Cambodian NGOs are still active today: Association des Droits de l'Hommes au Cambodge (ADHOC), created in December 1991 by a group of former political prisoners; La League Cambodienne pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de l'Homme (LICADHO), created in 1992; and the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), a branch office of Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP), created in 1995. These and other Cambodian NGOs have worked to promote judicial reform, good governance, human rights, rule of law, anticorruption, poverty relief, healthcare, sanitation and education on democratic values, as well as to raise people's political consciousness in order to challenge the power of the state and limit the power of the political elites.³⁸³

According to Caroline Hughes, who did extensive research on democratic reform in Cambodia during the 1990s, Cambodian human rights NGOs practiced two approaches: “militant” and “mystic.”³⁸⁴ Under the militant approach, NGOs organized direct confrontation such as mass demonstrations to challenge the power and certain policies of the government. In contrast, the mystic approach was conducted through such forms as education. As Hughes pointed out, “mystic approaches to human rights reform center on appeals to the conscience of abusers. This takes place both in petitions for redress of particular cases and in training sessions with officials and villagers.”³⁸⁵ Judy Ledgerwood and Kheang Un argued that NGOs can implement the militant approach mostly in the urban areas. The government is highly unlikely to tolerate any form of

³⁸³ Kheang Un, “State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia,” *Pacific Affairs*, 79 no. 2 (Summer, 2006): 235.

³⁸⁴ Caroline Hughes, “Mystics and Militants: Democratic Reform in Cambodia,” *International Politics*, 38 (2001): 54-57.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Caroline Hughes, 58.

militant approach in the countryside, which accounts for the majority of the population and the strategic base for the ruling party's (the Cambodian People's Party) political survival. The Cambodian Institute of Human Rights (CIHR), for example, used this mystic approach by localizing the global concepts of human rights and integrating them into Buddhist principles. CIHR found many parallels between the two notions, especially the common principles of non-violence, compassion, tolerance and the belief that substantial changes begin from within individuals' hearts and consciences.³⁸⁶ With education as its primary mission and embracing a philosophy of non-confrontation and reconciliation of Cambodian traditions with Western ideals of human rights and democracy, the Institute set out to enhance peace, tolerance, national reconciliation, human rights and democracy.³⁸⁷

However, though many Cambodian NGOs had contributed to the above endeavors, they achieved limited success in implementing democratic practices,³⁸⁸ democratic reform and human rights respect. The issue of human rights respect and democratic practices in Cambodia remained of grave concern in the late 1990s although the general political and social conditions were better than they were in the early 1990s. Moreover, the leaders at that time did not fully accept the notion of universal human rights, citing prolonged civil war and internal conflicts, especially the near-complete destruction of the country during the KR regime.³⁸⁹ Cambodian leaders appeared to believe that giving too much freedom to the people of the newly emerging post-conflict country would create chaos and political instability and that expecting genuine

³⁸⁶ Kassie Neou with Jeffrey C. Gallup, "Teaching Human Rights in Cambodia," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 4 (1997): 154-164.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., Kassie Neou with Jeffrey C. Gallup.

³⁸⁸ Kheang Un, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," *Pacific Affairs*, 79 no. 2 (Summer, 2006): 243.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., Ledgerwood and UN, 538.

democratic practices and respect for human rights in situations in which many people have little, or in some cases no, knowledge of human rights and democracy would not be ideal.

The local Cambodian NGOs in the past as well as in the present, themselves, fall short of democratic practices. The structure of many NGOs is hierarchical, centralized and dependent on individuals' charisma.³⁹⁰ Many NGOs have difficulties engaging with the government for political changes, and their activities in many respects have been changed or modified depending on the agendas, dollars and interests of the international donors. Among the over 3,000 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Interior today, only 350-400 remain operational, and almost all of them depend exclusively on funding from donors.³⁹¹ Human rights researcher, Jorn Dosch, further argued that most Cambodian NGOs are "young and weak," and that the "far-reaching aid dependence of NGOs has resulted in a predominantly donor-driven peace-building process."³⁹² However, neither Hughes nor Dosch discredits the contributions that NGOs have made to empower individuals and strengthen their roles and rights to participate in civil society and national politics. In fact, it was the work of NGOs that provided the foundation for today's human rights networks that continue to challenge state power in Cambodia. Moreover, NGOs have established what Hughes called "public political action," an alternative to past warfare.³⁹³ The work of NGOs has also provided a platform for articulating the genocide education efforts in Cambodia. The global ideas and strategies that NGOs brought into Cambodia provided insights or at least an example for the articulation of the local

³⁹⁰ Ibid., Caroline Hughes, 59.

³⁹¹ Jorn Dosch, "The Role of Civil Society in Cambodia's Peace-Building: Have Foreign Donors Made a Difference? *Asian Survey*, 52 no. 6 (November/December 2012): 1069.

³⁹² Ibid., Jorn Dosch, 1070.

³⁹³ Ibid., Caroline Hughes, 60.

genocide education initiatives. Discussing issues of human rights has always provoked a broader discussion, awareness and learning about the KR genocide that happened in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.

Generally, the emergence and growth of local Cambodian NGOs cannot be separated from external assistance in terms of funding, strategies and technical implementation. As Downie and Kingsbury rightly observed, "many of the civil society actors adopted—intentionally or unconsciously—foreign practices, procedures, and priorities that they did not fully understand or agree with, and in some cases were incongruous with Cambodian culture."³⁹⁴ Some NGOs are so influenced by the donors' political agendas and may choose to disregard or under-represent the reality on the ground to fit those agendas.

UNTAC and the Promotion of Human Rights

UNTAC conducted a wide range of human rights monitoring and education programs by training government officials, judges, police and NGO workers throughout the nation, with the exception of the KR-controlled areas. These human rights-related activities included radio programs, community education programs, court case monitoring, workshops, television programs and many printed materials and posters, educating the Cambodian people about human rights on a daily basis.³⁹⁵ Moreover,

³⁹⁴ Sue Downie and Damien Kingsbury, "Political Development and the Re-Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia," p. 58.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., Ledgerwood and Un, 534.

UNTAC also promoted human rights by providing financial assistance to local human rights NGOs.³⁹⁶

UNTAC's efforts, however, achieved only limited success for several reasons. Most state apparatuses including civil administration, police and military were effectively under the control of the SOC. UNTAC could do little to address this problem as it needed strong cooperation from the SOC to advance the election and democratization processes. Moreover, UNTAC did not have enough staff and resources to reform the highly problematic institutional structure of the SOC during its short-term mandate. Despite these challenges, UNTAC managed to train over 90,000 people nationwide on the concept of universal, individual human rights.³⁹⁷ More importantly, UNTAC's Human Rights Component arguably may "have established a solid basis for progress" toward promoting a culture of human rights in Cambodia.³⁹⁸

The limited progress of human rights protection was further exacerbated by subsequent setbacks in political development, namely the savage coup on 5-6 July 1997 (when Hun Sen ousted his Co-Prime Minister Prince Norodom Rannariddh from power), which suddenly plunged the country back into great uncertainty and political instability. The coup also posed the threat of recurrent civil war as FUNCINPEC's forces escaped to the forest near the Thai border and readied themselves for another struggle.³⁹⁹ Human rights took another blow when pardons and protections were provided to any KR member, regardless of rank, as long as they accepted to join the government (although these protections were deemed necessary for national reconciliation). From the time of

³⁹⁶ Caroline Hughes, "Mystics and Militants: Democratic Reform in Cambodia," *International Politics*, 38 (2001): 49-52.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., Ledgerwood and UN, 534-535.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., Terence Duffy.

³⁹⁹ Kassie Neou with Jeffrey C. Gallup, "Teaching Human Rights in Cambodia," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 4 (1997): 154-164.

the 1997 coup to 2004, the pursuit of human rights protections and mechanisms had been largely left to the work and efforts of local Cambodian NGOs.

In light of these circumstances, the combined efforts of the international community and UNTAC, local social movements and the work of NGOs, successfully channeled the flow of global concepts of human rights and democracy into Cambodia. These concepts were adopted and adapted into local Cambodian practices and provided a concrete foundation for a culture of human rights in Cambodia. However, although these NGOs worked on issues related to human rights and democracy, they faced challenges in using individuals' human rights education to articulate the country's worst experience in grave human rights violations—the KR genocide. It was not until the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) that these NGOs began developing programs that touched more deeply upon the KR-related issues. DC-Cam has been a major organization working to document the KR atrocities and to enhance the genocide education efforts since the mid-1990s. As Michelle Caswell argued, "Since its inception, DC-Cam remains unparalleled among nongovernmental organizations in its interest in collecting Khmer Rouge records and its ability to attract international resources."⁴⁰⁰

4. The Start of American Influences

Discussion on the emergence of contemporary genocide education in Cambodia can also be traced back to the early 1980s when a group of American activists and academics launched the first campaign in the U.S. to prevent the KR from playing a role

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., Michelle Caswell, "Rethinking Inalienability: Trusting Nongovernmental Archives in Transitional Societies."

in any future Cambodian politics and to bring the KR leaders to trial. I do not suggest that the current Cambodian genocide education is rooted in that campaign, but it did provide the groundwork for the initial steps toward today's genocide education in Cambodia. Among these activists and academics were those who established DC-Cam in 1995, which is today accredited as the founding institution of the current genocide education program. This section will examine how the role of the bilateral activists and academic-oriented campaigns, together with the shift in American politics, led to the emergence of DC-Cam, as vernacularization of the global genocide education practices has been characterized by the social and historical positions from which DC-Cam was framed. Moreover, the activities of the early activists and academics were mechanisms to facilitate the flow of global ideas and strategies into Cambodia.

The Early American Initiatives

DC-Cam can trace its beginnings to Cambodian Genocide Project⁴⁰¹, which was established in 1981 by a student at Yale Law School, Gregory Stanton.⁴⁰² The project's primary objective was to gather evidence to bring the KR leaders to justice. Stanton, who served as a Field Director of the Church World Service's relief program in Cambodia and toured Phnom Penh in June 1980, just after the genocide had ended, believed that "the Khmer Rouge had violated every international humanitarian law in the books, including the Genocide Convention."⁴⁰³ With the Cambodian Genocide Project recognized as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, and with funding from the United States Institute of

⁴⁰¹ Usually, researchers have a hard time to distinguish Cambodian Genocide Project (which was founded in 1981) and Cambodian Genocide Program (which was founded in 1994). Both have the acronym of CGP. To avoid confusing, I do not use the acronym of "CGP" for the 1981 Cambodian Genocide Project.

⁴⁰² Gregory H. Stanton, "The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Five Year," Genocide Watch, <http://www.genocidewatch.org/reviewoffirstfiveyrs.html>. (Accessed on October 4, 2012)

⁴⁰³ Ibid. Gregory H. Stanton, Genocide Watch.

Peace (USIP), Stanton and his co-chair, David Hawk, became the first American activists to begin gathering documentary evidence and survivors' testimonies. These efforts formed a legal, evidentiary foundation for an anticipated international tribunal to try the KR leaders, although no tribunal existed at that time.

The initial efforts of Stanton and Hawk were limited in their success since condemnation of the KR leaders encountered much resistance, not only in Asia, with China backing the defeated KR guerilla forces, but also in the U.S., Europe and Australia. Most countries, including the Southeast Asian member states, preferred and promoted a peaceful political solution to the Cambodian problem and felt that prosecuting the KR leaders could jeopardize the peace process, which was already extremely fragile and contentious. Moreover, the KR faction retained the only forces militarily capable of countering the Vietnamese-backed PRK regime; therefore, U.S. foreign policy had to back the KR forces that were fighting against Vietnamese communist dominance in Cambodia, even though this stance marginalized the pursuit of the legal accountability for the KR atrocities. Influential Cold War politics ensured that the vision of justice after the KR genocide remained plausible only on paper. The People's Republic of Kampuchea's (PRK) and Vietnamese governments made all efforts to place measures ensuring the non-return of the KR genocide to Cambodia, but China and the Khmer resistance factions strongly insisted the phrase be taken out from the peace agreement document. The U.S. and its Western allies agreed with China and submitted the amendment which contained no reference to the word "genocide." The U.S. government strongly objected to any plan or action that would give the upper hand to its rival, the former Soviet Union and its allies, particularly Vietnam. Vietnam, with the support from

Soviet Union and other socialist allies, firmly controlled Cambodian political, social and economic affairs throughout the 1980s.

Until 1990, the word "genocide" remained absent from any US statements concerning Cambodia.⁴⁰⁴ Stanton wrote that he had learned a critical lesson:

"Human rights are not lost because of the absence of law, but because of the lack of political will to enforce it. We need to change the political will of crucial nations, notably the United States, which opposed pursuing the case because it might legitimize the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh."⁴⁰⁵

During the 1980s, the U.S. government effectively brushed the legal prosecution of KR leaders under the rug of Cold War politics and its coinciding foreign policies.

Attempting to reshape the political will of the U.S. government (which appeared to be the only actor with the potential to push the UN to adopt an agenda supporting legal action against the KR's top leaders), a group of American activists formed a coalition called the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge (CORKR) in January 1990. At the time, Cambodian politics were approaching a new political stage, and the U.S. began to pull out support from the Cambodian resistance groups, including the KR faction, pursuant to the Paris Peace Agreement signed in 1991.⁴⁰⁶ CORKR, which consisted of antiwar activists, scholars and Cambodian refugees, and including members such as Youk Chhang (DC-Cam's future Director), Gregory Stanton, Ben Kiernan, Craig Etcheson, Sally Benson and others, became the international campaign to end genocide.

The movement was initially met with disappointment when the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement included the unpopular KR faction, represented by Khieu Samphan (former

⁴⁰⁴ George Chigas, "The politics of defining justice after the Cambodian genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 2, no. 2 (2000): 245-265.

⁴⁰⁵ Gregory H. Stanton, Genocide Watch, op cit. note.

⁴⁰⁶ Chanthou Boua, "Development Aid and Democracy in Cambodia," in Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia, Ben Kiernan, ed., New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993.

DK Head of State) and Son Sen (former DK third Deputy Prime Minister in charge of National Defense), in the agreement document toward political settlement in Cambodia. This document legitimized the KR leaders and their followers and they were able to fly freely into the capital city of Phnom Penh in November 1991.⁴⁰⁷ These KR delegates were well received and protected by the Phnom Penh government (though they were later chased out of the capital by an angry mob that nearly killed Khieu Samphan and Son Sen).

Political contentions emerged, not only inside the PRK government, but also among the three resistance movements and their backers—the U.S. and its allies, China and ASEAN member states. These contentions directly influenced ongoing efforts to pursue justice, truth and genocide education. Although politically biased genocide education had become widespread in Cambodia during the 1980s, as explained in Chapter Three, the notion of adopting global ideas on genocide education did not exist because the global-local interconnectedness to transmit and circulate these ideas was largely nonexistent from the 1990s to mid-2000s.

Cambodian Genocide Program: The Early American Flows

Despite its initial setbacks, CORKR did not lose its optimism. Its members, especially Gregory Stanton (then a Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University), and Ben Kiernan, worked with Senator Charles Robb's aide Peter Cleveland and many other legal experts to write the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. Following a three-year

⁴⁰⁷ Khieu Samphan, Son Sen, Mak Ben, Yim Phanna, Khun Ly (currently member of Anlong Veng district council), Nuon Bun No alias Mei Makk (former Pol Pot's adviser and currently Deputy Governor of Pailin province), Nup Socheat, and Neak Vong (former Chief of Regiment of Division 519 and currently military commander stationing at Ta Mon temple) were among the ten-member delegation who was sent to work in the KR newly established office in Phnom Penh.

campaign, the Act was passed by the U.S. Congress in April 1994 and was signed into law by the newly elected President Bill Clinton one month later.⁴⁰⁸ Section 572 of the Act commissioned the U.S. government to conduct investigations into the KR crimes:

- a. In General. -- consistent with international law, it is the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975, and January 7, 1979.
- b. Specific Action Urged. -- To that end, the Congress urges the President—
 - 1. to collect, or assist appropriate organizations and individuals to collect relevant data on crimes of genocide committed in Cambodia;
 - 2. in circumstances which the President deems appropriate, to encourage the establishment of a national or international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of those accused of genocide in Cambodia; and
 - 3. as necessary, to provide such national or international tribunal with information collected pursuant to paragraph (1).⁴⁰⁹

The Act was the first legal action in U.S. foreign policy that supported bringing the KR leaders to justice. When the Act was passed, the KR guerilla forces, which boycotted the first democratic election in Cambodia, sponsored by the U.N. in 1993, were still active along the Cambodian-Thai border. Not realizing the consequences of the Act, the KR continued cursing and waging war against the newly elected RGC headed by Co-Prime Ministers, Prince Norodom Rannariddh of the Royalist FUNCINPEC party and Hun Sen of the CPP. In 1997, the KR experienced the consequential effects of the Act for the first time when the two Co-Prime Ministers requested assistance from the UN in preparation for the establishment of a tribunal.⁴¹⁰

As Section 572 shows above, the law was narrow, limiting the scope of any prospective tribunal to the crimes committed during the period between 1975 and 1979,

⁴⁰⁸ Gregory H. Stanton, *Genocide Watch*, op cit. note.

⁴⁰⁹ Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, DC-Cam's Archives.

⁴¹⁰ Letter from Cambodian Co-Prime Minister Prince Norodom Rannariddh and Hun Sen, dated June 21, 1997. UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan forwarded the letter to the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council for attention and action, dated June 23, 1997. For the details of the two letters, please visit: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/June_21_1997_letters_from_PMs-2.pdf (accessed on July 23, 2013).

thus selectively omitting the massive U.S. bombings, which were the heaviest air raids in the twentieth century.⁴¹¹

Pursuant to its obligation under the Act, the U.S. State Department created the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in July 1994.⁴¹² The Office's steering committee awarded funds to the dormant Yale University-based CGP, founded by historian Ben Kiernan. The CGP was an academic institution with three main objectives:

1. To create an international computer database listing archives and collections of documents and other literature on the Pol Pot regime;
2. To commission new research on the 1975-1979 period;
3. To train Cambodian scholars, legal officials and human rights workers to carry out further historical and legal investigations of the Khmer Rouge regime.⁴¹³

In January 1995, the CGP established the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) as its field office in Phnom Penh.⁴¹⁴ DC-Cam began collecting hundreds of thousands of original KR documents from various sources including the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, National Archives of Cambodia, Cambodian Ministry of Interior, foreign governments and private donors both inside and outside Cambodia. The CGP's documentation project provided a concrete theoretical basis for the then unpredicted KR history textbook for Cambodian secondary and high school students as the descriptions in each of the chapters (which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter) rely primarily on these original KR documents. Without these original archives, the history textbook would

⁴¹¹ Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan, "Bombs Over Cambodia," http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf, (accessed October 5, 2012). According to declassified US documents, between 4 October 1965 and 15 August 1973, the U.S. dropped 2,756,941 tons of ordnances on Cambodia and could have killed over 100,000 Cambodians.

⁴¹² History and Description of DC-Cam, <http://www.dccam.org/Abouts/History/Histories.htm>, (accessed October 5, 2012).

⁴¹³ Letters from Ben Kiernan, Director of Cambodian Genocide Program to H.E. Sar Kheng and H.E. You Hockri, Co-Ministers of the Ministry of Interior, dated January 20, 1995. (DC-Cam's Archives).

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., Letters from Ben Kiernan.

have to have been theorized, framed and structured differently due largely to the lack of the original sources to enrich the textbook, whose content would have had to rely on secondary sources or testimonies. The lack of original documents would determine or at least influence the learning outcomes, rationales and objectives, and would thereby create a different set of genocide education values packages and memory in Cambodia.

As part of its historiographical research, the CGP conducted a program to train Cambodian historians to produce research monographs on KR history. This program marked early aspiration of Cambodian genocide education and sparked the early flow of global ideas and strategies on documentation into the Cambodian context.⁴¹⁵ Each of six contracted Cambodian historians focused on different KR-established geopolitical locations that covered various aspects of the KR history.⁴¹⁶ The monograph research was based on various documentary materials housed at the library of the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), the Russian Cultural Center and Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. The six historians conducted interviews with former KR survivors and cadres and made use of existing secondary sources, including books written by both Cambodian and foreign scholars.

Unfortunately, the historiographical research project was largely unsuccessful due to the limited competency of the Cambodian researchers, the unstable political conditions due to the intra-government conflict between the two ruling parties (FUNCINPEC and

⁴¹⁵ Letters from Dr. Craig Etcheson, Project Manager of Cambodian Genocide Program, to the six researchers, dated September 19, 1996 (DC-Cam's Archives). According to the contracts signed on March 10, 1995, six leading Cambodian historians and researchers were contracted to undergo a three-month computer training at DC-Cam and to devote another three months to produce 60 to 100 pages of research monographs to be submitted by September 1, 1996.

⁴¹⁶ The research papers produced by the six historians can be obtained from DC-Cam's internal library in Box 61. Sambo Manara-DK Region 4 of the Northwest Zone, Heng Samnang-DK Western Zone, Troeng Lim-DK Northern Zone, Iv Chan-DK Eastern Zone, Siv Thuon-DK Southwest Zone, and Chou Chandary-Siem Reap province of DK Autonomous Zone

CPP) and the ongoing incursions from the KR guerillas, actively engaging in the jungle wars near the Thai border.⁴¹⁷ Siv Thuon, one of the researchers, commented that he had difficulty conducting interviews because people were still afraid to talk about the KR period.⁴¹⁸ Moreover, Thuon selected only important former KR cadres for interviews, the data from which contained only one perspective from the KR side and no perspective from victims. Sambo Manara, another researcher, said that he risked his life in writing the monograph:

"I traveled to Phnom Sampov and Kamping Puoy Dam to interview the people. I traveled by bicycle from Battambang downtown. There the KR soldiers were active, and I was shot at several times. I gave them cigarettes in exchange for safety. I slept with the villagers."⁴¹⁹

In January 1997, after the two-year agreement between the U.S. State Department and Yale's CGP expired, the CGP reinstituted DC-Cam as an independent non-governmental, non-partisan and apolitical local Cambodian organization. DC-Cam continued to collaborate with the CGP for the documentation project with continued financial support from the U.S. State Department and additional funds from the government of the Netherlands and Yale's Sterling Memorial Library.⁴²⁰ When CGP's

⁴¹⁷ In the letters from Craig Etcheson to the six historians, Etcheson stated "...You did not complete these obligations. Because we have still not received monograph from you, we have concluded that we have no option but to consider that a breach of the contract has occurred, and therefore we now regard the contract as null and void." The papers lacked rigorous research, due largely to the limited capacity of Cambodian researchers in research skills and methodology at that time. The overall use of primary resources was inadequate, and the choices of secondary resources were academically less credible. The research made use of few interviews. The overall structures of the monographs were mostly descriptions of the geographical areas and the social and political conditions of the DK zones and regions. In spite of this fact, the project succeeded in human resource development. Sambo Manara, who had the best English among the six researchers, received a scholarship to study for a Master of History degree in the U.S. He has since returned and has been one of the leading historians in Cambodia. DC-Cam stayed connected with the other five historians, some of whom have been involved in various DC-Cam projects to date.

⁴¹⁸ Khamboly Dy's interview with Siv Thuon.

⁴¹⁹ Khamboly Dy's interview with Sambo Manara.

⁴²⁰ Letter from Dorothy K. Robinson, Vice President and General Counsel at Yale University, to Youk Chhang's DC-Cam's Director, dated April 14, 2004, (DC-Cam's Accounting Archives).

two-year commission to investigate the KR crimes failed to fulfill the primary goals of the Act, DC-Cam carried on the commission independently from CGP and the U.S. State Department. Since then, DC-Cam has multiplied its efforts under its overall vision and mission to achieve twin objectives: memory and justice.⁴²¹

Although the CGP's objectives did not specifically include or foresee genocide education, its work in collecting documents, conducting historical research and providing legal training has had didactic effects on the current genocide education and "broader implications for Cambodian society as well."⁴²² The CGP cultivated important flows of American initiatives and the creation of DC-Cam, an important agent of Cambodian genocide education and subsequent adoption, appropriation and circulation of the global ideas and strategies. More importantly, the CGP's original record-keeping and the creation of four major databases provided a substantial foundation for subsequent researchers, scholars and practitioners to integrate KR history into classroom teaching.

5. Conclusion

The Cambodian genocide education during the transition period from 1993 to 2004 was caught between two contradicting trends: (1) the continuation of local political constraints and (2) global influences that would serve as catalysts for the emergence of local Cambodian genocide education initiatives. Locally, the struggle to institutionalize Cambodian genocide education was exacerbated by the lack of support from Cambodia's political institutions. George Chigas argued as follows:

⁴²¹ DC-Cam's website <http://www.d.dccam.org/index.htm>, (accessed October 5, 2012).

⁴²² Susan E. Cook, "Documenting Genocide: Cambodia's Lessons for Rwanda," *Africa Today*, 44, no. 2 (1997): 223-228.

Political institutions affect our efforts more than any other institution because they provide the overarching framework in which we conduct our activities. Without the support of government it would be very difficult to obtain the necessary permission, financial and legal support and security to conduct our activities. Thus, political institutions exert the first and perhaps most profound influence on our efforts and have the greatest potential to help or hinder our objectives.⁴²³

With KR guerrilla forces remaining active in areas near the Thai border until late 1998, the RGC remained at odds with the extension of genocide education into its general education system. Courting KR defections became a win-win policy for the government and a strategic approach for national reconciliation, during which time the RGC avoided any concrete discussions on KR history, or at least did not see it as an urgent issue. Moreover, under the political constraints and suppressions in some cases, local historians and textbook writers appeared to believe that the KR history curriculum could be developed only after sixty years and when historians and textbook writers were able to resolve, or to a lesser extent narrow, the historical differences, especially the politically-charged contested issues. However, reconciliation is an ongoing process that requires immediate examination of the past mass atrocities. Embracing the broad teaching of KR history and related independent debates, as well as addressing the dramatic need for psychological healing, should have been part of the government's reconciliation program. Imposing an official single narrative or marginalizing the teaching of KR history only served to hinder the reconciliation process.

In addition, genocide education in this transitional period was the product of significant compromise between historical narration and the continued political conflicts between rivals within the divided dual coalition government. The politics at this stage

⁴²³ George Chigas, "Responding to Genocide: The Role of Institution," Paper presentation at the DC-Cam's National Teacher Training Workshop in June 2009.

determined and sometimes dictated the reconstruction of the textbooks and curriculum. The ruling political figures of both the CPP and FUNCINPEC employed historical interpretations that favored their respective political interests to gain public symbolic spaces, which determined their future political victories. The power struggles embedded in the education system have altered both historical accuracy and objective teaching, thereby suppressing the national curriculum. Implicitly, the suppression of memory contributed to the marginalization of the fragile, young and weak democracy in Cambodia. The relegation of genocide education was a serious setback for historical consciousness that undermined the ability of the Cambodian young generations to grasp the violent past, therefore, limiting their ability to analyze and evaluate its historical complexities, which are integral to the country's quest for peace, reconciliation and genocide prevention.

Globally, the Paris Peace Agreement and the arrival of UNTAC ushered the important flow of major international human rights instruments and the creation of civil society organizations into Cambodia for the first time in 1991, which shaped Cambodian politics and reinstated a culture of human rights respect and democracy as the country began transitioning, itself, from communism to liberal democracy. Though most civil society organizations failed to incorporate the institutionalized democratic practices and were primarily donor-oriented, they have since played important roles as catalysts for change on issues that the government failed to address. The works and efforts of these organizations, particularly DC-Cam's work in documenting and researching the KR atrocities, explicitly gave meaning and foundation to the genocide education endeavor.

The international community, civil society organizations and private donors, alike, were not only interested in democratizing Cambodia, bringing peace and political stability, and ending the over twenty years of war and conflicts, but they also wanted to assist the country in coming to terms with its past mass atrocities, ending the culture of impunity by bringing about the legal accountability and justice, preserving the memory and honoring the KR victims, and thereby acknowledging the suffering of the victims. The U.S. swiftly shifted its foreign policy from supporting the KR and refraining from the use of the word "genocide" to actively engaging activists to conduct investigations and cultivating the legal means to bring the KR leaders to justice. The change in the U.S. foreign policy triggered international interest in the Cambodian genocide and the mechanisms to deal with its legacy. Eventually, the 1994 passage of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, after a long period of American silence and inaction, led to the creation of the CGP, which launched its field office DC-Cam in Phnom Penh to begin investigating and collecting documents on the KR regime. When the legal, institutional and financial supports were in place, DC-Cam was able to initiate the activities that have led to today's Genocide Education Project. The early international support and influences and American initiatives and ideas did provide didactic legacies and fundamental groundwork for reactivating Cambodian genocide education. The global flows and influences and the early American initiatives were critical forces in the establishment of a foundation for institutionalizing genocide education that would follow when the national politics found their way out of the deadlock in 2004. The next chapter will discuss DC-Cam's role in institutionalizing local genocide education initiatives in Cambodia.

CHAPTER FIVE

LOCAL INITIATIVES: PROMOTING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING GENOCIDE EDUCATION

Chapter Five explores different pathways and activities that one local NGO, Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), has used to reactivate and institutionalize the marginalized genocide education in Cambodia between 2004 and 2008. This chapter illustrates three important discourses: the early promotion of genocide education; the construction of a history textbook, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*; and the pedagogical impact of the ECCC as an impetus for genocide education. This chapter analyzes DC-Cam's informal genocide education activities for the purpose of addressing public opinions and eventually shaping national policy toward institutionalized genocide education, namely formal genocide education in Cambodian classrooms. These informal activities endured both political optimism and momentum, and political censorship and scrutiny. These informal approaches and activities are the foundations from which DC-Cam established local genocide education initiatives.

This chapter argues that DC-Cam's informal genocide education activities and its interactions with the government have established the legal framework and fundamental groundwork for the reactivation and institutionalization of formal Cambodian genocide education. The optimistic social and political development in the country from 2004 to 2008, at which time the CPP had a stronger position in power and greater distance from being implicated in the KR crimes, provided space for this reactivation process. This chapter further argues that local genocide education initiatives have been grounded in

input and affirmation from survivors, thus creating a grassroots genocide education movement, a process that culminated in the publication of the KR history textbook in 2007. This process has been the catalyst not only for more concrete momentum of genocide education, but also for the adoption and adaption of global practices in the field.

1. The Early Local Genocide Education Initiatives

DC-Cam's local genocide education initiative was galvanized from grassroots perspectives including the personal desires of the KR survivors as well as DC-Cam's own institutional goal of preventing the possible recurrence of genocide. Youk Chhang, DC-Cam's Director and founder of the Center's genocide education initiative, identified the choice of genocide education as both a personal and institutional desire for genocide prevention.⁴²⁴ Chhang is a survivor of the KR's killing fields. Born to a well-off family in Phnom Penh, Chhang and his family members were evacuated to Preah Netr Preah commune, Preah Netr Preah district, Battambang province in Cambodian northwest when the KR took power in April 1975. Under the brutal KR village chief, Chhang and his family members suffered tremendously. As Chhang recalls, his brother-in-law was taken for execution simply on the grounds that he was a teacher, while his older sister was starved to death and left behind a daughter who has repeatedly asked the same question for many years: "Why [were] the Khmer Rouge so ferocious that they deprive[d] her mother even of sufficient rice for her just to live on?"⁴²⁵ Chhang's uncle, Keo Chhoeun, disappeared without a trace. Youk Chhang himself was thrown into prison and tortured.

⁴²⁴ The author's interviews with Youk Chhang.

⁴²⁵ Youk Chhang, "My Sister," *Searching for Truth*, Issue Number 1, January 2000, Documentation Center of Cambodia, p. 66.

These bitter personal experiences inspired Chhang to “search for the truth” (one of DC-Cam’s mantras), and he believes that educating younger generations about what happened during the KR period is critical to providing concrete answers to many young Cambodians who have asked similar questions to the one asked by his motherless niece.

Chhang's vision of genocide education came to light when he accepted a job as a program officer with the Yale University-based Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP), and later as a field officer of CGP’s branch office, DC-Cam, in Phnom Penh. When DC-Cam became independent from CGP in 1997, the Center, under Chhang’s directorship, began to advocate for genocide education along with support for the KR Tribunal. DC-Cam’s mission seeks to fulfill twin objectives—memory and justice—in dealing with Cambodia’s past mass atrocities and reconciling the fragile and war-torn Cambodian society.

By the early 2000s, the issue of genocide education in formal schools remained largely marginalized, as discussed extensively in Chapter Four.⁴²⁶ At the time, public opinion was shaped largely by the media and existing social and political climates, which presented negative perceptions about the plausibility of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. These negative perceptions had strong implications for the prospect of formal genocide

⁴²⁶ Politically, many Cambodian high ranking government officials are former KR cadres and were allegedly associated with the crimes although they were not in the decision-making positions. The CPP clearly understood that genocide education is more at the advantage of the party; however, the teaching can also generate a reversed impact. CPP’s reluctance at this moment was both political and technical. Being severely challenged by its main rival FUNCINPEC with regard to its association with the KR, the CPP was looking for a more practical way that KR history could be taught in school without marginalizing the party’s credibility. Moreover, the CPP would not be able to earn historical credential if it undertook the initiative to produce KR history textbook or teacher guidebook as any depiction of the KR history by the CPP would be at best questionable among the Cambodian public opinions. Moreover, the then King Norodom Sihanouk, who was once a KR collaborator and deeply involved in the KR struggle against “the American-backed imperialist Lon Nol government,” was still alive. The Cambodian modern history focused more on the Royal crusade for independence, the independent aftermath and the glorious Sangkum Reasrt Niyum regime.

education.⁴²⁷ Furthermore, the international community remained more committed to issues related to human rights and democracy, as one could see more readily the blossom of human rights NGOs and ideals.⁴²⁸ Both national and international stakeholders remained skeptical of the past attempts for genocide education and did not see the important relation between human rights and genocide education at a time when large all-encompassing ideals like human rights was being heralded. Donors questioned DC-Cam's credibility in conducting the politically and emotionally sensitive, technical work and asserted that none of DC-Cam's staff possessed skills related to or backgrounds in genocide education, in general, or KR history, in particular. To obtain the confidence of the government and the international donors, DC-Cam worked diligently to galvanize public support through their voices via media and DC-Cam's outreach activities. With the demands and voices from the public opinions, DC-Cam's work and debates stressing the importance of genocide education regularly appeared on both local and international media to convince the government that people really needed formal genocide education in order to preserve memory, to validate their suffering and to promote genocide prevention, reconciliation and historical empathy, all of which would later become genocide education value packages.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ There was a tendency either in informal conversation or via media which say, "It is not possible because the CPP is the KR," the language that reporters are still reiterating today. For additional information, please see Phann Ana and Adam Prore, "Ex-Khmer Rouge Could Threaten Stability," *The Cambodia Daily*, Volume 17, Issue 5, Friday, January 21, 2000. Also see Songpol Kaopatumpit, "Forgive and Forget: Ex-Rebel: Need for Reconciliation Outweighs that for Revenge," *Bangkok Post*, Sunday, February 6, 2000. (DC-Cam Archives)

⁴²⁸ The main objectives of USAID have always been democracy, human rights and governance. Accordingly, USAID sees genocide education as part of its effort in promoting democracy and human rights in Cambodia.

⁴²⁹ Letter to Editor by Sorya Sim, "KR History Book only as Good as Its Sources," *The Cambodia Daily*, Tuesday, February 13, 2001. Mr. Sim and several other DC-Cam's staff members and affiliated researchers such as Sophal Ear had written a number of editorial articles to the local news as part DC-Cam's advocacy campaign for genocide education.

Engaging with the government, particularly the Ministry of Education, was a critical step toward an institutionalized genocide education within Cambodia's general education system. As such, in 2002, DC-Cam proposed a project entitled "Khmer Rouge History with High School Students" to the Ministry of Education.⁴³⁰ DC-Cam initially approached the late Minister Tol Loh, and subsequently former Minister Kol Pheng, both from the FUNCINPEC party. Unfortunately, the proposal was rejected on the grounds that the initiative might upset the CPP, and the political climate did not provide adequate space to launch this initiative.⁴³¹ By then, the CPP and FUNCINPEC remained at odds with each other in the disputed coalition government. Official historical narratives were central concerns of political leaders. History textbooks remained narrating only the positive historical events in a chronological order, which benefited the two ruling parties. History writers were careful in the production of the textbooks and choices of history. Deconstructing the official narratives and embracing a new and more truthful history through the revision of history curricula in schools was very controversial, not only among the writers, but also among political leaders. Using history teaching as the foundation for social reconstruction and sustainable peace was at best in theory.

With regard to international support, Canada was the first country DC-Cam approached for funding.⁴³² However, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) too rejected DC-Cam's proposal for three reasons. First, CIDA believed that the proposed project was "politically sensitive in nature" and that it required concrete

⁴³⁰ Youk Chhang prepared a Cambodian researcher Sorya Sim to undertake this project.

⁴³¹ Khamboly Dy's interview with Youk Chhang.

⁴³² DC-Cam's letter to Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Civil Society Fund section, dated February 7, 2002, requesting financial support for genocide education project. The choice of CIDA to reject the proposal was largely credited to the neutrality of Canada, which is politically neither part of the European Union (EU) nor part of the U.S. Furthermore, Canada has had no past controversial experience with Cambodia and one of the anti-Vietnam War initiators.

cooperation from certain government's ministries and the schools. CIDA's letter of refusal stated that DC-Cam's proposal did not demonstrate a clear project design, nor did it give any clear indication that DC-Cam could acquire cooperation from the relevant government departments.⁴³³ Second, CIDA expressed concern that DC-Cam did not possess adequate expertise and ability to conduct the tasks related to the teaching initiative. Finally, they felt the proposal did not indicate clearly such an undertaking's expected results or performance indicators.⁴³⁴ CIDA's concern about the commitment from relevant government's departments was legitimate while the other two concerns regarding DC-Cam's expertise and project's indicators merit reconsideration, as DC-Cam had a strong research foundation, archives related to the KR period and the world's biggest repository of the KR archives.⁴³⁵ In terms of DC-Cam's cooperation with education-related government departments, although DC-Cam had already approached the Ministry of Education with a proposal on genocide education by 2002, the two institutions had never entered into any formal agreement. DC-Cam's first formal agreement on Genocide Education Project with the Ministry of Education was reached six years later, in 2008.

After failing initially to obtain international and governmental support, DC-Cam shifted its efforts toward garnering popular and political support for the Genocide Education Project. DC-Cam's work with the people suggests that its genocide education

⁴³³ Letter from Michael Barton, Coordinator of Civil Society Governance Initiatives Fund of CIDA, to Youk Chhang, dated May 10, 2002. [Hereinafter Letter from Michael Barton to Youk Chhang]

⁴³⁴ Ibid., Letter from Michael Barton to Youk Chhang.

⁴³⁵ In an informal email from Youk Chhang to Michael Barton, dated May 11, 2002, Chhang wrote that "I wish to point out that we have never been asked by CIDA to provide 'evidence' in regard to your first concern... The second concern is purely a wrong judgment on our ability which I cannot accept. The third concern is understandable from 'development' point of view. Our work is dealing with human suffering. We cannot project a result in advance. Otherwise, we are commercializing the spirit of millions who died under the Khmer Rouge—which we do not do and cannot do."

initiative is a bottom-up approach, giving voices to the people, disseminating the voices across the country through its publications and outreach activities, and bringing the voices to the policy makers. Its early genocide education attempts were largely activist campaigns to shape public policy. Chhang relayed the following message:

My strategy is to make it become public and digest the teaching and leave the rest to the experts. What I do is to break the ground and to create a policy. The law is in place; the policy is in place, so there are plenty of works [to be done] with genocide education.⁴³⁶

2. Promoting Genocide Education

The promotion of genocide education between 2004 and 2008 was facilitated by political optimism (the CPP stronger position and power in national politics and its greater distance from the acute implication with the KR), the efforts and commitments of local actors and international influences. Genocide education in Cambodia was not necessarily embraced by international institutions or local politicians at this point. Three elements—political and social optimism, the Genocide Education Project, and informal genocide education activities—paved the way toward the institutionalization of genocide education in Cambodia.

Political and Social Optimism

By 2004, political development in Cambodia allowed the prospect of genocide education to be realized. By then, a one-year political deadlock had been resolved, and the CPP was able to consolidate almost exclusive power of all state apparatuses. King Norodom Sihanouk, though welcomed to play a ceremonial role, had little control over

⁴³⁶ Interview with Youk Chhang.

Cambodian politics.⁴³⁷ Citing old age and suffering from chronic disease, the King abdicated the throne in favor of his son, King Norodom Sihamoni, who has since presented no challenges nor demands for political power to Hun Sen. Since his son ascended the throne in 2004, the ex-King Norodom Sihanouk had only a symbolic role as the “King Father” and the father of national independence, territorial integrity and Khmer national unity, granted by the National Assembly.⁴³⁸ The FUNCINPEC party clearly became subordinate and lost power to the CPP, but the very survival of FUNCINPEC, which was made possible by the CPP, served to legitimize the supposed multi-party democratic system in Cambodia. The opposition Sam Rainsy Party posed the only major challenge to the CPP and could only make enough noise to annoy the CPP-led government but did not affect any sort of substantive changes to society. By the end of 2004, the CPP appeared to possess adequate political power to govern the country and to control major national and international issues.

Unlike the past attitude toward genocide education, the media began to express different views from what they had in the past few years. With a number of DC-Cam's informal genocide education activities, media began to express a more positive outlook on the possibility of teaching KR history in classrooms (though skepticism about the CPP's willingness to implement or endorse such a project still prevailed). Furthermore, the more prospective emergence of the ECCC after a long and difficult negotiation between the RGC and the UN inspired even stronger popular demand for broader understanding of the KR history. DC-Cam's survey conducted in 2003, through its

⁴³⁷ Milton Osborne, "Cambodia: Hun Sen Firmly in Control," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, (2003): 81-94.

⁴³⁸ The law on the title of the former King and Queen was adopted by the National Assembly on October 20, 2004 and was promulgated by the new King on October 29, 2004.

monthly magazine, *Searching for the Truth*, showed that more than eighty-five percent of the respondents favored formal education on the KR in secondary school levels.⁴³⁹

Still, the government-produced social studies textbook for grade 12, which included a small section on KR history, remained absent. Students continued to study without the textbook. However, the trove of available documentation (both primary and secondary sources) collected allowed DC-Cam to do thorough research and to write a KR history textbook, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*, which was accepted by individuals from different political backgrounds and academic perspectives. Moreover, the textbook has since become a useful tool and a local initiative that DC-Cam has used to advocate for broader formal genocide education.

Building up Genocide Education Momentum

In September 2004, after seven years spent documenting and researching the KR crimes, and in tandem with optimistic political and social reassurances, DC-Cam launched a second genocide education initiative under the project title, "Educating the Children of Democratic Kampuchea's Victims." The project was later renamed the "Genocide Education Project," which preliminarily received financial support from U.S.-based organizations, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Open Society Foundation (OSF).⁴⁴⁰ Both NED and OSF are non-governmental foundations

⁴³⁹ Suzana Linton, *Reconciliation in Cambodia* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2004).

⁴⁴⁰ DC-Cam's proposal dated March 31, 2004 and submitted to John Knaus (NED Program Officer for Asia) and Heather Purvis (OSI Grant Officer, The Burma Project/SEA Initiative), DC-Cam's Accounting Archives. According to the proposal, the objectives of the project are to instill the ethic of participating in civil society through educating high school students about Democratic Kampuchea. The project also seeks to enhance the capabilities of teachers and the Ministry of Education to convey the KR regime's history through the provision of ideas, materials, recommendations on curricula, and a short text on Democratic Kampuchea. The project set out to work to build the capacity of future Cambodian historians, including both DC-Cam staff and selected high school students. I was chosen to lead this project when it was

dedicated to democracy, human rights respects, rule of law and education around the world, especially in post-conflict societies. Though CIDA saw teaching KR history in the Cambodian classroom as political, NED and OSF saw it as a human rights and democracy issue that needed to be addressed. The latter two institutions are more activist-oriented, and they wanted to challenge the difficult circumstances in teaching genocide in Cambodia. The international support to the local initiative marked an important aspect in building up genocide education momentum in Cambodia. With financial supports from NED and OSF, between 2004 and 2008, the Genocide Education Project was a measure that DC-Cam undertook to advocate for the government's confidence, trust and support in formalizing genocide education.

The title of the project was changed for a second time in 2009 to “Genocide Education in Cambodia: The Teaching of *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*,” a title that not only educated the children of the victims but the Cambodian young generation, in general. Institutionally, the project was and continues to be led by a Cambodian team under the guidance of a panel of national and international educators.⁴⁴¹ The historical content of the project (the KR history textbook) was written by a Cambodian, with comments and guidance from national and international experts. Pedagogically, the accompanying teacher's guidebook to the textbook was written by a Cambodian-American and an American, with combined Cambodian traditional teaching

founded, and I was tasked to author the textbook, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*, which in 2008 has been endorsed by the government as an essential component of secondary school and high school curricula.

⁴⁴¹ The early educators involved in the project included Sambo Manara (History Professor at the History Department of the Royal University of Phnom Penh); Im Sethy and Pok Than (Secretaries of State of the Ministry of Education); David Chandler (Professor Emeritus of history at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia); Frank Chalk (History Professor and Co-Director of Montreal Institute for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada); and Sonia Zylberberg (Director of Education at the Montreal Holocaust Memorial Centre and an educator from the US Holocaust Memorial Museum).

methods (teacher-centered approach) and global education practices. Ideally, this intersection between the local and global perspectives would allow the Genocide Education Project to enter into its second phase, which included not only global influences but also how these global dimensions began to find places in local practices.

Addressing Public Opinion

In a post-conflict country where opinions had been severely oppressed, or to a lesser extent dictated for many years, addressing public opinion formed the first critical step to shaping public policy, which, in turn, institutionalized the local genocide education initiatives. The informal genocide education and other outreach activities were conducted in an attempt to galvanize public support and opinion about the value of genocide education and to address and inform public concerns and debates, both nationally and internationally, about young children's knowledge about, belief in and attitude toward learning KR history. The 2009 report of a survey with 1,000 young Cambodians born after the KR by University of California, Berkeley suggested that 81% described their own knowledge about the KR regime as poor or very poor, and 69% said that they had never talked about the KR period.⁴⁴² Students interviewed by DC-Cam relayed their opinions below:

The KR were bad, but they also wanted to save the country. I don't know how to hate the KR regime because I know so little about it. When one commits a mistake, one doesn't know that he is committing a mistake. If I were a KR soldier, I would choose my life. I wonder why they did that? Why and how did that regime happen? Why did they kill people?⁴⁴³

⁴⁴² Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Mychelle Balthazard, Sokhom Hean and Eric Stover, "So We Will Never Forget," Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, January 2009.

⁴⁴³ Khamboly Dy's interview with Kheang Sokkhak, Student at Hun Sen Chamkar Andong High School, Kampot province, May 23, 2011. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Kheang Sokkhak]

Telling the story by parents alone could not galvanize enough trust and confidence from children to believe in the existence of the KR atrocities. Likewise, the textbook alone would not have enough impact on students' understanding and knowledge on KR history. Students hardly believe what their parents merely told them. When they read the textbook and are taught in the classroom, they totally believe.⁴⁴⁴

To address the concerns illustrated by the two comments above and others like them, DC-Cam conducted a variety of informal genocide education activities outside of the formal school system. It has distributed over half a million copies of the KR history textbook, not only to the over 1,700 secondary schools and high schools nationwide, but also to members of the general population and government officials, with hopes of galvanizing a movement toward formal genocide education. The textbook, which provides Cambodian students and the general population with a fundamentally comprehensive historical background of the KR history, has been translated into French, Vietnamese, Thai, Japanese, Chinese, and English, in an effort to reach Cambodian diasporas, increase understanding between Cambodia and its neighbors, and contribute to the global knowledge on the causes and consequences of genocide.⁴⁴⁵

Responding to the reality that Cambodian schools severely lack functional libraries and reference books, and that so much information and history is stored within individual survivors, DC-Cam has conducted public education forums nationwide, in even the most remote areas to encourage the older generations to share their KR experiences. These forums encourage inter-generational dialogue at the community level, which, in turn, encourages the study of KR history in schools.

⁴⁴⁴ Khamboly Dy's interview with Lim Sopha, M, Director of Maong Russey High School, Battambang province, February 11, 2011. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Lim Sopha]

⁴⁴⁵ Only Khmer and English versions are printed. The soft copies of the other five languages can be found at <http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A%20History%20of%20DK%202007.htm> (accessed on July 8, 2013). The translation into Thai language remained in process as of October 2014.

The DC-Cam magazine, *Searching for the Truth*, is published monthly in Khmer and quarterly in English, and, since 2000, has played an active role as a catalyst for formal genocide education in Cambodian schools. The magazine is divided into six main sections, the first of which is a letter from DC-Cam's Director, presenting DC-Cam's voice and position to the public. The other five sections are on documentation, history, public debate, legal commentary and family tracing, in which people's appeals in search of disappeared family members are printed.⁴⁴⁶ The magazine not only serves to better inform the public about what happened during the KR, but also gives a space for the survivors to have their voices heard and published as personal stories or public debates. In addition, the magazine promotes both "a better understanding of the legal procedure of the ECCC and KR history, based upon materials held at DC-Cam and other institutions."⁴⁴⁷ In effect, DC-Cam's magazine played an informal educational role as a truth-telling mechanism long before the establishment of the Genocide Education Project or the ECCC.

DC-Cam is the front-runner and the only institution working with the Cambodian government to establish formal genocide education in Cambodian schools. Indeed, many other local Cambodian NGOs have worked on genocide education in Cambodia in informal ways outside the school system, and these informal activities have contributed greatly to DC-Cam-government's efforts on formal genocide education. As a leading institution in this genocide education endeavor, DC-Cam has published its debates and information on genocide education in local newspapers and via the internet. In addition, it

⁴⁴⁶ For additional information and all issues both Khmer and English of the magazine, please visit http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Magazines/Magazine_Searching.htm (accessed on July 10, 2013).

⁴⁴⁷ Youk Chhang, "For the Truth," Letter from Editor, *Searching for the Truth*, Number 1, January 2000, Documentation Center of Cambodia, p. 3.

distributes anti-genocide posters to students, teachers and the general public as part of its public awareness activities, to keep people updated about the progress of genocide education. DC-Cam has published a number of monographs on its research, outlining and analyzing different aspects of the KR history. All of these publications help disseminate information about genocide education values.

DC-Cam at-large is featured in the media on the regular basis. Its works and activities are especially highlighted on important dates, such as the KR occupation of Cambodia on April 17, the PRK's "Liberation Day" on January 7, and "Remembrance Day" on May 20. The TV and newspaper reporters often interview DC-Cam's staff members who use the media coverage as an opportunity to draw public attention to genocide education, which thereby serves to shape public opinion.

3. Writing *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*

The groundbreaking textbook published in 2007 used both local historical content and local initiatives as a foundation from which to formalize and institutionalize genocide education and to connect with the global practices. The textbook is not only written by a Cambodian, but also utilized more local resources (KR archives and photos) and local voices (survivors' stories) than sources produced by foreign scholars. The textbook took into consideration how Cambodians see KR history and how they want to comprehend it. The textbook provides more comprehensive answers to the question "what" than "why", as many Cambodian children did not even know what happened during the KR period. The process of constructing the textbook formed an important answer to the theoretical question: "In what ways are local genocide education initiatives established?"

The Author

Why was I chosen to carry this important and historic task? During the course of this study, I tried to objectively understand the reasoning behind this decision. It is difficult to analyze myself in this context. I was at the time an undergraduate student and had limited knowledge on KR history, but rose gradually to capture the essence of the history when I was tasked with reading and cataloguing the original KR archives as part of DC-Cam's Documentation Project. My understanding of the KR history was subsequently enlightened when I joined trips to remote villages of Cambodia with the Center's Promoting Accountability Project, and conducted interviews with victims and former KR cadres. These two important primary foundations served as a platform for my intellectual development and initiated my special interest in and decision to delve into the causes and effects of the KR regime on Cambodian people.

There were two main reasons behind DC-Cam's decision. First, one of the overall goals of the Genocide Education Project was and is to produce local researchers and historians. A number of publications on KR history have been written by foreign scholars and a few Cambodians living abroad.⁴⁴⁸ By giving opportunities to Cambodian youth to contribute to and participate in their nation's rebuilding and reconciliation processes through research and writing, the project's processes helped produce a new generation of Cambodian leaders who can help guide their country away from its brutal past.⁴⁴⁹ This empowerment allows Cambodians to begin to prepare themselves to take ownership of and responsibility for coping with the violent past, as researcher Mark Clement found so important:

⁴⁴⁸ Most Cambodian Diasporas who take interest in writing their personal experiences during the KR are from the U.S. and France.

⁴⁴⁹ Interview with Youk Chhang

It is important that Cambodian students learn their own history, at least in part, through sources produced by their fellow citizens, for it is Cambodians who must take ownership of their history and work out their future as an independent nation state."⁴⁵⁰

Second, neither victims nor perpetrators may have an objective and unbiased projection in writing this politically and emotionally sensitive KR history. Most often, victims claim that no single textbook can describe their suffering experiences during the KR period, which for them are beyond any form of description. The quote below explains a set of impressions many survivors have embraced:

The textbook is good for the young generation, but it is not detailed on the individual suffering of the survivors. For me, I am an April 17 person, and I suffered a lot, and we should give students details about the suffering. I was tortured during the Khmer Rouge and was forced to eat forty chili peppers. They pulled me behind a truck while I was sitting. I am not happy with the textbook. I am upset that the suffering is not pictured. I am afraid that the history will be lost, but I keep telling my children and relatives about it. You want to mention all the suffering and the torture, but instead you put the happy, joyful photographs of the cadres.⁴⁵¹

When I interviewed former KR cadres in Anlong Veng district and other former KR strongholds, I learned that they share a different common understanding:

I suffered more than the ordinary people. I was indoctrinated to serve the murderous revolution since childhood. When the KR collapsed in 1979, I was forced to go along with them to the Thai border on foot during which I went through a number of fatal dangers, including daily firing from Vietnamese soldiers and lack of food."⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ Mark Clement, "Review of Genocide Education Project's A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)." Clement holds a doctorate in History and is currently teaching History at the International School Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.

<http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/Review%20by%20Mark%20Clement.htm> (accessed on October 25, 2012)

⁴⁵¹ Seng Sitha, a teacher from Battambang, Provincial Teacher Training Report, http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/DC-Cam_GEP_Training_Report.pdf, (accessed July 17, 2013), p. 105.

⁴⁵² Dy Khamboly's interview with Savat, male, a former soldier in division 801, Anlong Veng district, April 21, 2012. Interview with Chum Chuong, Dany Long, Koh Thmei village, Anlong Veng commune, Anlong Veng District, (April 18, 2012)

Yim Phanna, one of the KR top military commanders, said that between 1979 and 1998 all former KR cadres and soldiers lived a nomadic life in the forest, where thousands of them died or became injured because of landmines and diseases.⁴⁵³ Youk Chhang, who has had extensive experiences working with victims and perpetrators, came to the conclusion that the new generation born after the regime could help overcome this challenge.

The Reviewers

The drafts of the textbook were reviewed by a panel of national and international historians and experts in genocide and genocide education. David Chandler, the leading reviewer and historian of Cambodian history, made several rounds of reviews and assisted with the improvement of the text's content and the overall structure. In addition, DC-Cam also invited Frank Chalk, a scholar on Holocaust and genocide education, to review the textbook.⁴⁵⁴ Because genocide education is a global topic, the need for international assistance was certain. However, at this stage, global approaches had little intersection with the local initiatives. The textbook is primarily for high school teens, so its content was less analytical but more chronological. In this sense, international reviewers did not bring in any distinctive set of normative, analytic or conceptual approaches that could have shaped the textbook.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ Khamboly Dy and Long Dany's interview with Yim Phanna.

⁴⁵⁴ From August to November 2005, Khamboly Dy was granted a fellowship at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS), where he observed two courses on "American Foreign Policy, Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention from 1898 to the Present (undergraduate seminar) and U.S. Foreign Relations and Major Issues in the Comparative Study of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity (graduate seminar). During the course study, Mr. Dy had the opportunity to work with Professor Chalk to improve the draft of the book.

⁴⁵⁵ Personal email conversation with David Chandler, who stated that "I repeatedly read your drafts, I never wrote any material myself... I don't think any differences of opinion developed between you and me as we

In addition, three prominent Cambodian historians were invited to review the textbook, but two refused the invitation, believing that the textbook was politically sensitive and that their names could be used only to legitimize the textbook. Professor Sambo Manara was the only Cambodian historian who offered to review it. Professor Manara explained that he decided to take part in the initiative because of his desire to see young Cambodian researchers beginning to embrace their own history; moreover, he believed that the DK history textbook initiative was an important step to dealing with the past mass atrocities.⁴⁵⁶ DC-Cam's Director Youk Chhang is credited in the book's acknowledgement for his review of the political issues, and Wynne Cougill helped with refining the text in English.

Sources

The writing process involved scrutinizing the abundant primary documents and survivors' testimonies housed at DC-Cam. I made extensive use of these documents with references both in the footnotes and the bibliography, which allow the readers, especially students, to learn not only the content of the text but also how that content was formed from multiple primary sources. Mark Clement commented on the construction of the textbook in his review:

Readers are afforded some insights into 'how we know' about the events of the period. One footnote, for instance, refers to various estimates of the number of deaths attributable to the DK regime and indicates how these were derived. The acknowledgement of differing estimates not only sets students an example of good scholarly practice, but also provides an opportunity for classroom discussion about how such statistics are compiled. Learning about the process of constructing History helps

worked on [the draft]... I wasn't all that happy with having my help acknowledged officially because this might lead some readers to exaggerating my role and diminishing your authorship. Foriegners have written far too much about Cambodia already!" dated October 30, 2014.

⁴⁵⁶ Personal conversation between the author and Sambo Manara.

to promote critical thinking and the ability to distinguish between 'truth' and propaganda, so necessary if future genocides are to be prevented.⁴⁵⁷

The textbook also made use of a number of documentary films that allowed me to visually experience the actual lives of people and the activities of the KR leaders and cadres. Selected survivors' testimonies are also integrated into each chapter to introduce the readers to a more personal picture of people's lives. The textbook also benefited from a wide range of secondary sources produced by prominent foreign and Cambodian scholars.

Photographs

Sixty-two original photos and four maps are used in the ninety-page textbook in Khmer (seventy-three pages in English); images appear on almost every page. The images include pictures of the KR leaders, cadres, soldiers, dam construction projects, party meeting, foreign delegations, a "killing field" map, and two geography maps. The book also includes the photos of the covers of a DK magazine, a document from KR central prison S-21, and the DK flag and its national emblem. Two organizational charts depicting DK government structure and CPK structure assist students in understanding the hierarchy of the KR governing bodies. These photos help explain and enhance the other aspects of KR history that the text does not cover. The photos speak for themselves, identifying the nature of the KR regime and the lives of the KR cadres in comparison to those of the ordinary people. Teachers and students can exclusively use photos as the subjects for discussions.

⁴⁵⁷ Mark Clement, "Review of Genocide Education Project's A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)." <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/Review%20by%20Mark%20Clement.htm> (accessed on October 25, 2012)

However, there is no single photo depicting the brutality of the KR and the suffering of the victims, and this choice of selection has been criticized by a number of readers. Youk Chhang, who was at the forefront in selecting the photos for the textbook, believes that using photos that depicted KR cruelty could serve to dehumanize the KR cadres. The depiction of KR soldiers and cadres as blood suckers or devils in the 1980s still persists in the mind of the Cambodian youth today. This dehumanization of all KR members would be detrimental to the country's hard-to-earn peace and reconciliation, in which both the victims and former KR members need to live side-by-side peacefully and in the same communities. In this sense, those photos were used that would humanize the KR to encourage forgiveness, understanding and tolerance—fundamental grounds for national reconciliation.

In addition, the book is intended primarily for secondary school and high school students. Using certain images can have traumatic mental side effects for young students in the long run, and/or could create frictions among students, some of whom are children of the former KR cadres. However, the teaching of KR history is not confined within the information presented in the textbook. If students wish to see different images, teachers can assist them in locating these kinds of photos from a variety of other sources.

When the photos were being selected for the textbook, the ECCC was on its way to arresting those senior leaders and most responsible for the crimes committed during the KR regime. DC-Cam believed that going beyond the work of the ECCC to pinpoint anyone as a senior leader or most responsible could create a setback for the judicial process. Therefore, most photo captions depicted only the place and date but not the names of individuals.

Approach

Political history is the approach used in the textbook's description, excluding Chapter Seven, about the daily life of the people during the KR, which can be regarded as social history.⁴⁵⁸ The content of the textbook is intended to be both coherent and thematic and to comprehensively narrate the rise, rule and demise of the DK regime. Within this structure, the textbook thematically discusses key aspects of the KR period, particularly the creation of the DK government, the country's geographical division, the four-year plan (1977-1980), daily life of the people, security systems, Office S-21 (Tuol Sleng Prison) and DK foreign relations. The textbook is largely a brief historical description of the important facts that occurred during the KR period. However, the textbook provides some analyses of several contested issues and events including the forced evacuations, the rationale behind the four-year plan, the reasons for collective weddings and those issues related to arrest and execution.⁴⁵⁹ The structure of the textbook, with eleven interrelated chapters, allows teachers and students to easily trace the sequence and essence of the KR history.

Problem of Biases

Although the reviewers and I tried to provide the most objective account of the history possible, the explanations of some of the contested historical events and complexities can inevitably introduce biases embedded in the interpretations of the events and the words used. Scholars of KR history have so far presented different views toward,

⁴⁵⁸ Laura Summers, "Life after DK—Exploring the History of Pailin," a paper presented at the National Teacher Training, conducted by the Documentation Center of Cambodia in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. The training was held in Senate Library, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, June 29-July 7, 2009.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., Kamboly Dy.

for instance, the question of execution. In this situation, my decision to stand on any particular argument could be interpreted as bias. For example, the fact that I explained the KR mass atrocities as a result of extreme Marxist-Leninist ideology could be criticized that I favored Chandler's arguments over others. However, a number of KR primary documents, especially the KR *Revolutionary Flag* magazine, clearly suggested that the KR followed Marxist-Leninist line. Though historian Mark Clement does not make accusations about my biases in the textbook, he argues that broadly the relationship between historical facts and bias is "inescapable"⁴⁶⁰:

The reasons for the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge, for instance, are complex, involving interplay between various economic, social, political, ideological and diplomatic factors. Different approaches to history give primacy to one or a particular combination of these. It might be relatively simple to determine the truth of an isolated fact, but it is not simple—and there is no universally agreed method—to determine why a catastrophe like the Cambodian genocide occurred. While Secondary school students require simplified accounts, I do not think it serves them adequately to steer clear of controversy.⁴⁶¹

Political Controversies

Writing KR history inevitably faced certain political constraints and normative boundaries, as history by nature is problematic, controversial and political. The KR period was a politically significant event, a central event that links Cambodian modern history (from the French colonial period to the present) from one regime to another. When talking about KR history, one cannot avoid discussing events from the French colonial period, Cambodia under Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Khmer Republic regime and the American bombing of Cambodia. Nor can one stay away from discussion of the

⁴⁶⁰ Mark Clement, "Review of Genocide Education Project's A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)."

⁴⁶¹ Ibid. Mark Clement.

PRK regime, the State of Cambodia (SOC), the transitional period of UNTAC and the present second Kingdom of Cambodia. The full scope of the KR genocide can hardly be understood unless it is presented in a framework that highlights the emergence of the communist movement in Cambodia from the French colonization, up to the time of its total collapse in 1998, and its present legacy and implications for the future.

Moreover, when writing KR history, one encounters many names of high-profile Cambodian political figures that are identified in relation to the crimes, violence, harmful political decisions, turmoil, power struggles and various associations to the infamous communist movements or deadly bombardments. Many of these political figures are still alive and are holding various powerful positions in the current government. Working with a non-governmental institution, I did not experience political pressure arising from these controversies, although I do not claim that I am totally immune to them. Political constraint can be seen in my writing, which shows clearly my efforts to reconcile various political controversies in the texts. Other reviewers may see this as my effort to escape historiographical dichotomies, to engage in a specific objectification of certain historical perspectives, and to limit the dialogical exchanges between historical facts and historical controversies. However, the achievement of the textbook is not the avoidance of the “Why?” question but the approach of reconciling various political interpretations. I carefully selected the language to explain certain historical events, for instance, with events related to the 1979 Vietnamese invasion—insensitive word choice regarding this event could provoke aversion from the government currently ruled by the CPP, which defensively described the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia during the 1980s as a

friendly gesture to liberate Cambodian people from "the KR genocide."⁴⁶² Yet describing the Vietnamese presence as "liberation" or merely "foreign interference" would frustrate the opposition and many displaced Cambodians who have long viewed the 1979 Vietnamese presence as an "invasion." To reconcile these opposing political views in the textbook, I wrote, "The Vietnamese forces and the forces of the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea fought their way into Cambodia."⁴⁶³ During an interview, I told the U.S.-based *Associated Press*, "This is the fact. Whether they invaded or liberated is only political interpretation,"⁴⁶⁴ which I believe is an objectively neutral term.

The importance of normative boundaries is evidenced by my choice to limit my explanations on certain unresolved questions in the textbook, especially when discussing the motives behind the KR atrocities. Since the collapse of the KR regime, there have been many attempts to explain the intentions behind the regime. The investigations and research have led to many inconsistent, sometimes contradictory, interpretations of KR motives and the issues have always been controversial among scholars, historians and lawyers. Neither did I try to characterize the alleged genocidal nature of the KR regime by leaving it open to the students' analyses. The word "genocide" does appear throughout the textbook.

In addition, political interpretations of the KR intent have been manipulated for more than three decades. Some people believe a secret prominent political figure was behind the KR leaders who carried out genocidal acts, as I widely discussed in Chapter

⁴⁶² Ministry of National Education of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, *Reading Textbook for Grade 1*, Ho Chi Minh City: Publication and Education Department, 1982, p. 135.

⁴⁶³ Khamboly Dy, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)* (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2007), 75 (Khmer version).

⁴⁶⁴ Ker Munthit, "New Text Gives Cambodians Glimpse of Khmer Rouge Period," *Associated Press*, June 18, 2007.

Four.⁴⁶⁵ Others see the KR atrocities as a trick by Vietnamese communists who have allegedly attempted to swallow Cambodian land for centuries, or at least to annex Cambodia into the Indochinese Federation under the Vietnamese supervision.⁴⁶⁶ Some others consider the tragic event a Chinese ambition to convert Cambodia into a Chinese province. China, as these individuals allege, masterminded the mass deaths in an attempt to kill all Cambodian men and leave only about three million female Cambodians purportedly to breed with the Chinese men.

To overcome these issues of normative boundaries and academic politics, I decided not to enter into or entertain endless debates but rather to simply link the KR radical ideologies to the mass atrocities along with survivors' stories to support the factual claims.

Reactions from Readers

Michelle Caswell argued that with the publication and massive distribution of the textbook, "DC-Cam is stepping way beyond the traditional boundaries of archives by creating public memory through education. Therefore, DC-Cam has been successful in fostering accountability for, establishing truth about, and creating memory of the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia."⁴⁶⁷ Philip Short, the author of *Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare* suggested that "[the textbook] deserves to be not only merely an approved

⁴⁶⁵ According to my classroom discussions with teachers during DC-Cam's teacher training workshops, some teachers believed that the KR leaders may not have been able to carry out such a massive plan that antagonized the whole nation and people and that there must have been a powerful figure behind these KR leaders.

⁴⁶⁶ The issues of border conflict with Vietnam and illegal Vietnamese migrants continue to be controversial debates in Cambodian politics today. The main opposition party, the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), used these issues in their main arguments in the July 2013 political campaign.

⁴⁶⁷ Michelle, Caswell, "Khmer Rouge Archives: Accountability, Truth and Memory in Cambodia," Springer Science+Business Media, School of Library and Information Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, April 2010.

textbook for Cambodian schools, but a compulsory text, which all Cambodian school children should be required to study.”⁴⁶⁸

Moreover, the textbook helped build up DC-Cam’s reputation and credibility, which allowed the Center to move beyond addressing the public opinions and shaping public policy to working with the government to fully implement the Genocide Education Project. The 3,000 copies of the book ran out of stock within a few months of its first publication. DC-Cam received many letters of appreciation from Members of Parliament, senior government officials, teachers, students, monks and the general population:

I have spent time to thoroughly read every word to consider all events in the 3 years, 8 months, and 20 days, which should not have happened in the Kingdom of Cambodia as well as to the Cambodian people. I also suffered in this killing field period. Although 28 years have passed, after reading this textbook, it reminded me of all the things that the Khmer Rouge did to me, which seem to have happened recently.”⁴⁶⁹

I thank you very much for sending me this extremely important textbook and would like to wholeheartedly express my support for the initiative of including this textbook into the official curriculum of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport.”⁴⁷⁰

I would like to request a book written by Khamboly Dy to be used as material for teaching students about the history of Democratic Kampuchea, the regime that killed more than three million Cambodians. Moreover, I would like to use this book as a basis to explain to students about this heinous Khmer Rouge period.”⁴⁷¹

I am really glad to receive the complete copy of *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)* written by a young Cambodian researcher. You have been so kind to let us share with you as well as a writing from Mr. Youk Chhang. I am so proud that it is a fruit of a young Khmer researcher who has devoted himself to shine light on this dark period of our national history. Through you, I would like to present to its author my very sincere and very warm congratulations and admiration. I hope his writing would constitute a starting point that would encourage other Cambodians to research and to write on Cambodia.”⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁸ Ker Munthit, "New Text Gives Cambodians Glimpse of Khmer Rouge Period," *Associated Press*, June 18, 2007.

⁴⁶⁹ Letter from Mong Rithy, Cambodian Tycoon and member of Senate, to DC-Cam, dated June 3, 2007.

⁴⁷⁰ Letter from Ngy Tayi, Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Economics and Finance, to DC-Cam, dated June 5, 2007.

⁴⁷¹ Letter from Em Chariya, a Teacher from Kandal Province, to DC-Cam, 2007.

⁴⁷² Letter from Mey Siphall, a Cambodian Diaspora from France, to DC-Cam, 2007.

DC-Cam also received many letters from teachers and students requesting copies of the textbook for their respective schools. This high demand was presented to both the government and international donors to consider stepping in and pushing the genocide education vision to a reality.

One year after the publication of the textbook, the Cambodian Ministry of Education agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for joint implementation of the Genocide Education Project. The MoU provided a long-awaited legal framework for the institutionalization of genocide education in Cambodia. The textbook has since been the linchpin in promoting national and international support for institutionalized, formal genocide education.

4. Institutionalizing Genocide Education

Institutionalization of genocide education was forged through a concerted effort between DC-Cam and the Ministry of Education. Institutionalization meant, by definition, working within the framework of the existing government structure, procedure and hierarchies. In other words, DC-Cam's KR history textbook had to go through censorship, scrutiny and review by the government before it could be integrated into official secondary school and high school curricula.

Censorship and Scrutiny

In an effort to put KR history into the official curriculum, in September 2006, DC-Cam sent four copies of the draft of the textbook to four key people: Prime Minister Hun Sen, then Minister of Education Kol Pheng, and two Education Secretaries of State,

Im Sethy and Poc Than.⁴⁷³ Although all education matters fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education either by law or in practice, KR history bypassed this mandate, as it needed approval from top politicians as I discussed its controversy in Chapter Four. Being fully aware of this political complexity, DC-Cam tactfully approached the Prime Minister, who was presumably the only person able to truly endorse this politically sensitive history.

The draft received both positive comments and criticisms with proposed changes and deletions. Sean Borath, education adviser to the Prime Minister, was the first person to seriously review the draft and gave positive comments:

I observed that this text shows the events that occurred during Democratic Kampuchea. It is extremely beneficial for Cambodian people as well as people throughout the world, especially students who will be able to learn about the unforgettable and most cruel regime."⁴⁷⁴

Along with this positive momentum, however, Borath criticized the draft for implicating the CPP with the KR and suggested two major changes. First, in the preface of the textbook, I wrote the following:

"Since the collapse of the Angkor Empire up to the present, Cambodian people have witnessed wars of invasion and internal power struggles among its leaders."⁴⁷⁵

Borath suggested the revision of the sentence to read:

"From the collapse of the Angkor Empire to 7 January 1979, Cambodian people who survived the execution of the Democratic Kampuchea regime were born again. On 23 October 1991, Cambodia reached a Peace Treaty in Paris. After that, the United Nations

⁴⁷³ Letters from Youk Chhang to Hun Sen, Kol Pheng, Im Sethy and Poc Than, dated September 5, 2006, DC-Cam's Archive.

⁴⁷⁴ Letter from Sean Borath, Education Adviser to Hun Sen, to Hun Sen, dated September 19, 2006. <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/C1.pdf> (accessed October 27, 2012)

⁴⁷⁵ The sentence is part of the Preface of the early draft of the textbook. The Preface was deleted entirely from the book upon suggestion from the office of the Prime Minister.

organized a national election held on 25-27 May 1993. Cambodia then organized elections by itself on 26 July 1998 and 27 July 2003.”⁴⁷⁶

Borath explained his suggestion:

The text at this point must clearly indicate that the Cambodian People’s Party, under the glorious leadership of Samdech [Hun Sen], had never struggled for power with anyone. Namely, the power that the Cambodian People’s Party has held effectively up to the present day comes from the active and strong support of the people.⁴⁷⁷

His first reservation underlined two important political messages: first, as a high-ranking member of the CPP, Borath defended the party’s core claim in which ‘7 January 1979’ is considered by the CPP as the “second birthday” of all Cambodian people. Second, Borath dismissed the almost two-decade internal conflict (1979-1998), of which the CPP was one of the major players, and the victor. Two important political developments within the frame of his politically-motivated suggestions were the 1993 national election, at which time the CPP refused to cede its power to FUNCINPEC, and the July 1997 coup, when the CPP consolidated all power through armed violence and killings.

Second, in Chapter One of the draft, I wrote the following:

“In December 1978, Vietnamese troops and the forces of the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea (the Front was led by men who had defected from the Khmer Rouge) fought their way into Cambodia. They captured Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979.”⁴⁷⁸

Borath suggested this point be revised:

⁴⁷⁶ Letter from Sean Borath to Hun Sen <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/C1.pdf> (accessed October 27, 2012.)

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid. Letter from Sean Borath to Hun Sen.

⁴⁷⁸ The office of the Prime Minister suggested that DC-Cam’s Director Youk Chhang and the book’s author Kamboly Dy hold a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Council of Ministers Sok An to discuss more on the issue.

In December 1978, Vietnamese troops and the forces of the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea liberated Cambodian people and captured Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979.⁴⁷⁹

Borath explained:

The phrase (the front led by men who had defected from the Khmer Rouge) must be totally deleted because the Cambodian People's Party did not originate from the Khmer Rouge soldiers. It was the force of the masses who stood up against the cruel regime led by Pol Pot until they could create the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea on 2 December 1978."⁴⁸⁰

The second suggested change suggested that the CPP supported the teaching of KR history but definitely rejected any notion that a link between the CPP and the KR exists. It is similar to the way that today German government wants to have a clear distinction between Germany and the Nazis. However, senior CPP leaders appear to be open about their relations with the KR. Hun Sen on many occasions admitted that he had joined the KR as a soldier. Heng Samrin, the CPP's Honorary President and President of the National Assembly, has never denied on any occasion his position as former KR military commander of Division 4 of the Eastern Zone.

DC-Cam, upon discussion with Sean Borath, complied with the two suggested changes, which did not necessarily jeopardize the main content of the textbook.⁴⁸¹ Borath's recommendation, though politically biased, was an initial stepping stone to the remainder of the government's review process.

⁴⁷⁹ Letter from Sean Borath to Hun Sen <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/C1.pdf> (accessed October 27, 2012.)

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid. Letter from Sean Borath to Hun Sen

⁴⁸¹ Interview with Youk Chhang

Political Momentum and Sensitivity

Prime Minister Hun Sen personally reviewed the draft of the textbook, and in doing so, created a momentum that challenged both the political sensitivity of KR history and the fear embedded in the conscience of lower officials who would be highly unlikely to take any initiative on genocide education. Hun Sen made a short handwritten note which read, "To His Excellency Sok An to please create a group to review."⁴⁸² Hun Sen's note, though brief, represented a decision and strong attention from the nation's top executive leader, formally initiating a more positive potential for formal genocide education in Cambodia. With the green light from the Prime Minister, the relevant stakeholders had more confidence in working to incorporate KR history into the official curriculum. Indeed, Deputy Prime Minister Sok An responded with a resolution to establish a Government Working Commission (hereinafter "Commission") to review the draft of *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)* under the chairmanship of Im Sethy, then Secretary of State of the Ministry of Education.⁴⁸³

DC-Cam's efforts in addressing public opinions and shaping public policy reached an unprecedented stage in which the institutionalization of genocide education began to emerge. Moreover, Hun Sen's note and the government's resolution provided a foundation

⁴⁸² Letter from Sean Borath to Hun Sen <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/C1.pdf> (accessed October 27, 2012.) Hun Sen's note was made on September 26, 2012, just one week upon receiving the recommendation letter.

⁴⁸³ The resolution No. 77SSR was endorsed on October 6, 2006. The composition of the Government Working Commission included seven members: Im Sethy (Secretary of State of the Ministry of Education) as Chairman; Sorn Samnang (President of the Royal Academy of Cambodia) as Vice Chairman; Ros Chantrabot (Vice President of the Royal Academy of Cambodia) as Vice Chairman; Chhoy Aun (Member of Economic, Social and Cultural Inspection Committee) as Standing Member; Eat Sok (Member of the Bar Association) as Member; Ton Sa Im (Head of the Pedagogical Research Department of the Ministry of Education) as Member; and Kuoy Theavy (Deputy Head of History and Political Science Department of the Royal Academy of Cambodia) as Member.

for DC-Cam to develop further activities and strategies to strengthen the movement and to make genocide education a mandatory and compulsory subject.

Still, the review processes included round of censorship and scrutiny. The Commission members presented different views on the textbook's content, authorship, scope and political sensitivity.⁴⁸⁴ Sorn Samnang, a Cambodian leading historian and the then-President of the Royal Academy of Cambodia (RAC) commented:

I recognize that its description goes too far beyond the period 1975 to 1979.... This history of Democratic Kampuchea's description is too long on the causes and gives the names of many people. I suggest the author give a brief summary of the causes and not give many names. The author should try to show the true events and avoid giving his own opinion and analysis. Moreover, the author should try to explain more about the executive activities of the regime.... For security reasons, I request that the author reduce the number of individuals' names mentioned. Moreover, the author should recognize it as a new history beginning from the independence period. History before the colonial period affects those who are still alive. Therefore, it should be kept for at least 60 years before starting to discuss it....⁴⁸⁵

Another Commission member, Ros Chantrabot, who is also a leading historian, had a similar opinion:

I think that this history of Democratic Kampuchea is the opinion of one group or a person, so we cannot use it generally.⁴⁸⁶

The above two comments reveal two important threads common among local historians. First, these comments suggest that anyone who writes history should avoid giving personal opinions or analyses. For many local historians, history is all about dates, places and people in a particular setting. History is about so-called "facts," not opinions

⁴⁸⁴ The meeting was held on December 14, 2006, under the presidency of In Sethy at the Ministry of Education. <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf> (accessed October 27, 2012).

⁴⁸⁵ Minute Meeting of the Government Working Commission, comments from Sorn Samnang, for the detail, please visit <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf> (accessed on October 27, 2012).

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid. Minute Meeting <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf>.

or analysis; therefore, giving analyses will damage the essence and principle of history.⁴⁸⁷

In truth, each historical event that has been recorded endured the complexities of political, economic and social discourses as interpreted from a number of different perspectives and disciplines. For instance, the genocidal nature of the KR regime has been analyzed in a variety of disciplines and there has never been consensus on every aspect of the event. These different interpretations of facts provide grounds for students to develop their own critical ideas and thinking skills rather than simply believing a given distortion of facts. The second message received by these comments was that history should not be written and studied when it is less than sixty years old for security reasons (i.e., retribution by political leaders). General historians and social science researchers may rebut this claim.

The third member of the Commission, Chhoy Aun, presented skepticism of its credibility to be used as a core material on KR history in the official curriculum per DC-Cam's request. Aun demanded for the deletion of Chapter Two, which discusses the biography of the CPK and how the KR came to power, which Aun said was "unofficial."⁴⁸⁸ To study CPK history, one needs to trace back to the 1951 creation of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), which is also the origin of the CPP. Aun may refer to the official biography written by the Cambodian People's Party's (CPP) Department of History, which presents a clear division between CPP and the KR Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), and in which the CPP accuses the CPK of looting the CPP's victory. The fourth member of the Commission, Kuoy Theavy, was concerned that the violent descriptions could provoke conflict and violence among young

⁴⁸⁷ Face-to-face personal conversation with a Professor from the National Institute of Education (NIE).

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid. Minute Meeting <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf>.

students.⁴⁸⁹ The fifth member, Eat Sok, expressed concern that DC-Cam used the name of the Commission to publish the book without making corrections; moreover, Sok criticized that the book did not have inputs from the experts of the Ministry of Education.⁴⁹⁰

The sixth member and rapporteur of the Commission, Ton Sa Im, who has been in the education field for almost forty years and who understands the education system well, gave a more balanced comment. Ton Sa Im, while criticizing parts of the textbook such as its consistency in describing one particular event, did not rule out the possibility of using the textbook either as part of the official curriculum or supplementary material. She commented:

We can use this text as supplementary discussion material to write a history book for schools. There are many other problems that have to be considered such as different figures on one event. The inconsistency makes it difficult for students and researchers to learn what is accurate. In the official curriculum, we give the account of DK in grade 9th and then in grade 12th. Students learn main points in grade 9th and learn the details in grade 12th. We make the tragic story into a narrative story for students in comprehensive school. Therefore, we can take some parts from this text as supplementary materials to produce a textbook and other parts can be used as history lessons. But we cannot take the entire text as a textbook for general knowledge.⁴⁹¹

Despite the fact that most Commission members downplayed the importance of the textbook, the meeting Chairman, Im Sethy, gave it a high evaluation and rejected any changes to its original content. Im Sethy stated, “This text is well written and well prepared for historians for further study.... We should not make changes to this text

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid. Minute Meeting <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid. Minute Meeting <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf>.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid. Minute Meeting <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf>.

because it is the research, opinion and analysis of the researcher...."⁴⁹² Ultimately, the Working Commission made the following decision:

The text can be used as a core reference to write a history textbook, but cannot be used as a history textbook for general education."⁴⁹³

5. The ECCC: An Impetus of Genocide Education

Genocide education initiatives and local ideas about bringing the KR leaders to justice occurred almost simultaneously, launched in 2004 and 2006 respectively.⁴⁹⁴ There have been contradictory arguments as to the educational role of the ECCC. Some observers see it as a court of law with the prime role of convicting or acquitting the defendants. Others perceive it as a court of public opinion, having impact on genocide education and other national struggles (for example reconciliation). In this respect, one key question arises: In what way does the ECCC contribute to the genocide education in Cambodia?

⁴⁹² Ibid. Minute Meeting <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/A11.pdf>.

⁴⁹³ Letter From Im Sethy to Sok An, dated January 3, 2007, <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/D1.pdf> (accessed on October 27, 2012). In the letter, five important criticisms were raised. "(1) The description of the events is too broad and beyond the period of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979); it mixes Khmer Rouge history with the period of the Khmer Republic regime and mention DK after 1979 (pages 77-79). (2) The descriptions of the party's history are unclear and unofficial (Chapter 2, pages 13-21). (3) The descriptions of many individuals are unnecessary and also affect the security of those individuals. (4) Most descriptions are in the form of narrative story, but are not depicted as historical events. (5) The text shows a variety of figures on one event with many references, for example, the number of people killed during DK (pages 55-80). This makes it difficult to study. On the other hand, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport has a specific curriculum on the history of Democratic Kampuchea, which was put into the history textbooks for grade 9th and grade 12th for general education."

⁴⁹⁴ In 1997, when DC-Cam became independent from Yale, it began advocating for genocide education. At the same time, Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers Prince Norodom Rannariddh and Hun Sen sent a request to the UN Secretary General, seeking assistance to establish a kind of criminal tribunal to prosecute the KR leaders.

A Court of Law

Basically, the ECCC is set up to deliver justice by bringing the KR leaders to trial. The Court is not specifically designed to give a historical account of the KR, nor is it obliged to bring about national reconciliation and rule of law in Cambodia. Rather, the Court prosecutes individual criminals for specific crimes. Assuming the Court to play the didactic role, as Lawrence Douglas pointed out, will reduce the historical content to legal judgment.⁴⁹⁵ Mark Drumbl agreed with Douglas's statement by stating, "Criminal trials are deliberately selective in terms of the truths they produce."⁴⁹⁶ The modern rule of law and procedure limit the truth-telling, unlike the broader availability of truth provided in restorative justice measures such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Eric Stover agreed with the above claims, suggesting that the didactic justice the court could deliver is doubtful. In Stover's argument, genocide and other forms of mass atrocity are the results of political conflicts and violence; therefore, the criminal tribunals created to respond to these mass atrocities are also political.⁴⁹⁷ With the nature of politics, Stover argued that "victims and, indeed, entire societies can interpret a tribunal's decision, procedures (modes and manners of investigation, selection of cases, timing of trials, types and severity of punishments), and its very existence in a variety of ways."⁴⁹⁸

For Stover, the Court cannot even produce collective memory, because post-conflict countries are so damaged. By giving examples of Rwanda and Bosnia, Stover argued that collective memory hardly existed in these situations. After genocide and

⁴⁹⁵ Lawrence Douglas, (2001) *The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 4.

⁴⁹⁶ Mark A. Drumbl, *Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 176-77.

⁴⁹⁷ Eric Stover, *The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in the Hague* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 14.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Eric Stover.

ethnic cleansing, he argued, societies are so divided within communities, between communities and among neighbors.⁴⁹⁹ In the case of Rwanda, the Hutu extremists killed their Tutsi neighbors. After the genocide, both judicial and non-judicial revenge occurred and intensified the acrimonious relationship between members of the communities. Stover believes this kind of societal division cannot hold people to remember one thing collectively.

Moreover, the evidentiary rules and due process requirements of the law are challenges to truth-telling, as they allow the defense to cross-examine the evidence and witnesses. This cross-examination limits the ability of the witnesses to narrate their own stories, as certain narrations, especially those of the former KR cadres, could implicate themselves in the crimes or provide personal accounts that they do not want to share with the public. In addition, the law also allows defendants the rights not to answer some particular questions and the ability to say “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember.”⁵⁰⁰

A Court of Public Opinion

In fact, the ECCC does have didactic effects. In addition to its contribution to retributive and procedural justice to provide criminal punishment for the KR crimes and a fair trial respectively, the ECCC, borrowing John Ciorciari’s words, “can also serve as an invaluable truth-telling mechanism in a country where public education about the Khmer Rouge tragedy has been sorely lacking.”⁵⁰¹ However, the primary question is to what extent the ECCC contributes to truth telling and genocide education in Cambodia schools.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., Eric Stover.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., Mark A. Drumbl, 176-77

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., Mark Drumbl, p. 18.

The didactic impact of the ECCC is both about the provision of answers to the long-pondered questions of the regime's survivors and the way it triggers what Jorn Dosch calls "a process of reflection and coming to terms with the KR past. The idea that a profound understanding of the past is necessary to prevent conflict in the future is gradually taking hold."⁵⁰² This idea is evidenced in the following quotes:

...we must never forget that it is the purpose of courts such as this one to establish truth, unflinchingly, without fear, restrictions or prejudice, so that humankind may learn and history not repeated.⁵⁰³

The tribunal gives us a reason to start the genocide education. When the tribunal is obstructed in any circumstance, the teaching remains important. If the tribunal fails, the teaching is still important as genocide education has become a global politics.⁵⁰⁴

A study of didactic legacies of the ECCC can be divided into five main streams. The first is the hearing process, all of which are broadcast through a number of means of media, particularly newspapers, TVs and websites on a regular basis for the purpose of disseminating information to the public on the updated news about the tribunal.⁵⁰⁵ The Cambodian Tribunal Monitor (CTM) website, a joint project between DC-Cam and Northwestern University's Center for International Human Rights (CIHR), specifically exemplifies how the ECCC's proceedings are used as a teaching tool in the classrooms. The CTM website contains the most current information about the ECCC, including expert commentary, summary of testimonies, trial footages, ECCC and NGO reports, trial

⁵⁰² Ibid., Jorn Dosch, 1076.

⁵⁰³ Chea Leang, national co-prosecutor, ECCC, March 31, 2009, quoted from Michelle Caswell, "Khmer Rouge Archives: Accountability, Truth and Memory in Cambodia," *Springer Science+Business Media*, April 2010.

⁵⁰⁴ Interview with Youk Chhang, DC-Cam's Director.

⁵⁰⁵ A local television Cambodian Television Network (CTN) broadcasts the court proceedings during some important hearings. DC-Cam, in collaboration with Northwestern University School of Law's Center for International Human Rights, has launched a website Cambodian Tribunal Monitor (CTM) <http://www.cambodiatribunal.org>. The website posts the whole footages of the ECCC proceeding on the regular basis. The website also posts commentary on the tribunal from prominent scholars who work on the areas of the tribunal and related KR issues.

proceedings, and other related materials.⁵⁰⁶ All documents, audios and videos are uploaded into CTM website on a regular basis to provide public access worldwide to the ECCC and to generate discussions about the ECCC's legal processes.⁵⁰⁷ CTM effectively has become a digital library and archives and serves as an educational tool in Cambodian universities and high schools with access to the Internet. Furthermore, the CTM team travels to various universities in Cambodia where they meet and discuss the use of the website, KR history and ECCC's progresses with thousands of students.⁵⁰⁸

The public hearings on the ECCC have not only provided additional historical narratives but also coerced the former KR leaders to begin to recognize the suffering of the victims, to accept their responsibilities, at least at personal and moral levels, and finally to apologize to the victims, although some of them have not admitted and confessed their past wrong doings.

Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, during one of his 77-day hearings accepted full responsibilities and admitted his role as chief of the notorious Office S-21, which imprisoned, tortured and executed approximately 14,000 prisoners. Duch asked for forgiveness from the people and to give him space to rehabilitate his righteousness.⁵⁰⁹ Nuon Chea admitted his position as CPK Deputy Secretary and DK President of the People's Revolutionary Assembly and his role in KR ideological education and

⁵⁰⁶ Memorandum of Understanding between the Center for International Human Rights, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and Documentation Center of Cambodia, dated January 1, 2013, (DC-Cam's Internal Document).

⁵⁰⁷ For detail about the CTM, please visit: <http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/blog> (accessed on January 20, 2013). The website has won three awards: 2010 Golden Trumpet Winner-Publicity Club of Chicago, 2011 Silver Trumpet Winner-Publicity Club of Chicago, and 2011 Webby Honoree.

⁵⁰⁸ Public announcement on the presentation of CTM website at Build Bright University, Phnom Penh, July 12, 2013 and personal discussion with Phalla Chea, CTM's Project Manager.

⁵⁰⁹ From March 2009 to March 2011, Duch made 20 statements of apology. His last statement was made on March 30, 2011. <http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/video/apology>, (Accessed June 12, 2013).

propaganda.⁵¹⁰ Likewise, Khieu Samphan admitted his position as DK President of the State Presidium and recognized the suffering of the civil parties who testified for case 002.⁵¹¹ However, both Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan did not express apologies and firmly denied having had any knowledge of the mass executions and the unspeakable suffering testified by witnesses, expert witnesses, complainants and civil parties. In spite of this fact, the victims and observers commented that these senior leaders' testimonies at the court represent a positive moment for healing and complemented the accuracy of the historical narrative in schools.

The second legacy of the Court relates to the tribunal-related projects conducted by civil society groups. These civil society projects educate the public on both the progress of the tribunal proceedings and KR history, because the two cannot be separated in any course of discussion. These NGO projects have been implemented in various forms such as drama, public forums and student outreach as the projects were and are implemented in line with the Court's endorsed reparation projects.

In the middle of Case 002 (the prosecution of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan), the ECCC's Lead Co-Lawyers took another step to link the ECCC's hearings to its future educational legacies. The Lead Co-Lawyers submitted a letter to the Cambodian government to obtain formal endorsement for the reparations projects for civil parties and the KR victims. One of the three main points of the letter requested that the government provide instruction to the Ministry of Education to incorporate KR history into the

⁵¹⁰ Nuon Chea's Testimony in front of the ECCC, Dated June 6, 2013.
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/06-06-13_CTM%20Blog%20Entry_Trial%20002.pdf
 (Accessed on June 12, 2013).

⁵¹¹ Cambodian Tribunal Monitor, Khieu Samphan Testimony, Dated May 27, 2013,
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/05-27-13_CTM%20Blog%20Entry_Trial%20002.pdf
 (Accessed June 12, 2013).

official curriculum.⁵¹² The government responded positively and agreed in principle to all the proposed requests, and the ECCC's Office of Administration, the Ministry of Education and related organizations will be responsible for coordinating this reparation project.⁵¹³ Regardless of the ECCC's reparation projects, DC-Cam and the Ministry of Education had worked on the genocide education since 2004. The inclusion of a chapter on forced transfer into the existing DC-Cam-produced teacher guidebook not only enhances the genocide education but also honors the victims.

Third, the documents left by and after the closure of the tribunal will serve broader educational purposes for a variety of fields such as law, history, sociology, anthropology, international relations and political science. Schools and universities in Cambodia as well as abroad will be able to utilize these resources for future research.

The fourth legacy relates to public access. For the first time in the history of the international criminal court, the ECCC allows victims to fully participate as civil parties in the court proceedings and to have their voices heard alongside the prosecution. The ECCC recognized 3,864 victims as civil parties for case 002.⁵¹⁴

Fifth, the ECCC is located inside Cambodia. The location facilitates "closer proximity to the evidence and witnesses and better accessibility for victims."⁵¹⁵ The in-country location gives hundreds of thousands of local people and students opportunities to participate and learn about different aspects of KR history, or at least encourages them

⁵¹² Letter from Lead Co-Lawyers Pich Ang and Elisabeth Simonneau Fort to Prime Minister Hun Sen, dated March 7, 2013. The other two reparations mentioned in the letter include issuing a sub-decree establishing a Remembrance Day and preserving "former crime sites or killing fields, construction of stupas or monuments, establishment of small libraries, documentation centers, museums or exhibitions...."

⁵¹³ Letter from Hing Thoraxy, Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers, to ECCC's Lead Co-Lawyers, dated June 11, 2013.

⁵¹⁴ For the detail about civil parties, please visit <http://www.eccc.gov.kh/articles/22271>, (accessed on July 24, 2013).

⁵¹⁵ Jorn Dosch, "The Role of Civil Society in Cambodia's Peace-Building Process: Have Foreign Donors Made a Difference? *Asian Survey*, 52, no. 6 (November/December 2012): 1067-1088.

to begin delving more deeply into the KR history. With this strategic geography, over five hundred people attended the court hearings on Duch's case (Case 001) every day. They were brought in from various Cambodian provinces by a number of NGOs and the ECCC's outreach project. By bringing selected representatives from each village to attend the portion of the trial, survivors have the opportunity to learn from the testimonies of witnesses, defendants and experts. The representatives return back to their villages and engage their communities in discussion on the tribunal issues, and how each individual experienced the KR both expands and internalizes the community dialogues. These pedagogical effects of the ECCC not only contribute to educating the young Cambodian generations about the past, but also help survivors to reassess their beliefs in the history.

The ECCC is unique with regard to its pedagogical justice, its didactic legacy. The court was created twenty-seven years after the collapse of the regime. With the unfortunate political climate and instability heretofore, survivors buried their suffering experiences. However, the court created a platform for people to talk and to openly share their KR experiences with their children and grandchildren, establishing intergenerational dialogues. In this sense, the ECCC represents a kind of informal genocide education mechanism that has stronger didactic legacies than have other international courts, such as International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁶ For additional argument on the didactic legacy of the ECCC, please see John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel, *Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*, (University of Michigan Press, 2014).

6. Conclusion

A number of social and political spaces provided changed public perspective toward a less politicized genocide education and gave rise to local genocide education initiatives. The most common rationales supporting genocide education programs among Cambodians have been the formation and reshaping of the national consciousness, genocide prevention, national reconciliation and acknowledgment of the epistemological relationship between the past, the present and the future. Political reinforcement and optimism provided a platform to institutionalize genocide education as the Cambodian government at this critical juncture wanted to have broader global recognition; therefore, responding to the past mass atrocities through both the ECCC's legal proceedings and more formalized genocide education have become political priorities for Cambodia as the country seeks integration into the ASEAN community and the global order. Likewise, the international conscience and desire to promote human rights, democracy and accountability provided momentum for the rise of local genocide education initiatives.

The stronger CPP position in national politics in 2004 provided more optimistic political and social reassurances that endorsed an important step toward institutionalization of genocide education. By then, the ruling CPP party gained political momentum and credibility to consolidate national power, a catalyst that gave shape to formal genocide education, as the CPP has long attempted to end the KR militarily, politically, legally and historically, although it has been careful with the kind of education that may, either directly or indirectly, implicate the CPP in the KR atrocities. The desires of key politicians, local civil society leaders and the survivors formed another catalyst. Hun Sen's note to have a governmental resolution to establish a Working

Commission to review the draft of the textbook provided political support to the process. Through formal collaboration with the Ministry of Education, DC-Cam became the sole non-governmental organization commissioned by the government to undertake the genocide education mission. Backed by international donors and inspired by its international advisers, DC-Cam has constantly engaged with the government, the local community and the Cambodian public to multiply its efforts in this endeavor.

DC-Cam's 2007 published textbook *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)* has been the linchpin holding together the various local interests of the general population, students, teachers and policy makers. It has since been a key tool for encouraging the formal teaching of KR history in schools. The textbook has been officially endorsed as a core reference for Cambodian secondary school and high school students and teachers. The wide circulation allows the teaching of KR history in schools to gain momentum. The incorporation of parts of the textbook into the official curriculum in 2011 marked the official institutionalization of genocide education. Adopting a nuanced perspective supported by original archives and survivors' testimonies from the KR, the textbook inaugurated the field of KR historiography received by many Cambodians and historians of Cambodian history, in general, thereby becoming the master narrative for Cambodian teachers and students. In addition, the textbook writing process conformed to a more pragmatic approach that pushes for the creation of a new material, regardless of the politically-charged situation or contested historical events, in order to timely catch up with the optimistic political development. The disputed issues, in any cases and in any political and social situations, could not be completely resolved but could be tackled (narrow down the contested issues) in multiple stages. The textbook

writing process is one platform in resolving the differences. Other spaces include the teaching and learning in schools, where critical thinking skills through embracing the more interactive and modern teaching methods allow students to analyze and evaluate different historical perspectives and narratives.


The 2006 establishment of the ECCC was another driving force behind this institutionalization process. Although the ECCC is a court of law and was from the outset not created for historical or educational purposes, the court is believed to have didactic legacies. At the very least, the Court provides a platform where people talk and share experiences across generations, thereby creating intergenerational dialogues within Cambodian families and communities, which in turn support the formal study of KR history in schools. The testimonies and massive amount of documents from the Courts provide tremendous educational resources for students. Moreover, the fact that the court is located inside Cambodia provides space for hundreds of thousands of people to have the opportunity to attend the hearings, and observe the Court first-hand, which has further generated debates and discussions about the KR history.

There appeared to be mixed motives for the international support of genocide education. In addition to helping Cambodia to come to terms with its past and promote human rights respect, democracy and justice, foreign governments continued to play politics over Cambodian issues, particularly the ECCC and genocide education. The U.S. provided financial and political support to DC-Cam long before the initiative to establish the ECCC. The legal investigation into the KR crimes and the teaching of KR history in formal classrooms not only reflects the fatal consequences of communism but also presents China's involvement in DK. Traditionally, China and Russia provided support to

communist and dictatorial states like North Korea, Vietnam, DK and Iran. Cambodian foreign policy, though it adheres to the principle of non-alignment, continues to favor China over the West. The ECCC's legal proceedings and the institutionalization of genocide education are examples of Cambodian efforts to deal with a past tragedy in which China had a major hand.

In summary, local genocide education initiatives have made KR history a relevant issue for the Cambodian population, whose desire to have formal genocide education is reflected in the success of the efforts of DC-Cam, the government and major international stakeholders. Documenting the KR atrocities, preserving memory, promoting justice and educating Cambodia's youth about their country's tragic history are life-long pursuits for all stakeholders. The political support, local NGO initiatives, international moral responsibility in responding to the mass atrocities and international flows of ideas and strategies provide a fascinating foundation for the reactivation and institutionalization of genocide education in Cambodia. The next chapter will discuss how local genocide education initiatives both adopt and adapt modern global practices.

Illustration 5: Cover of the Textbook "A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)" (DC-Cam's Archives)



CHAPTER SIX

GLOBAL CONNECTIONS: ADOPTING AND ADAPTING GLOBAL PRACTICES

Chapter Six explores the adoption and the adaptation of the global genocide education practices through an ethnographic study of a non-governmental organization, DC-Cam. Specifically, the chapter analyzes DC-Cam's *Genocide Education Project*, which has sought to combine and synthesize local initiatives and global practices in genocide education. The project has also promoted, transmitted, translated and vernacularized the global genocide education practices for local use in Cambodia. The chapter illustrates that there have been two paths for transmitting and vernacularizing global practices in Cambodia: a non-governmental NGO (DC-Cam) and a governmental agency (the Ministry of Education). The path of the government follows the formal education system while the path of DC-Cam operates in an informal way, outside of, but as a complement to, the formal education system to better reform it and society at-large. However, both paths employ the same mechanisms: vernacularization processes including adoption, combination and compromise.

The chapter further argues that the struggle for genocide education in Cambodia is part of broader national struggle to prevent the reoccurrence of the KR genocide and to promote memory, historical empathy and national reconciliation, all of which are the shared values of genocide education in both the Cambodian context and reflective of global practices. Within the vernacularization processes, local educational context and national politics and culture play fundamental roles. Moreover, the social positions of the

key vernacularizers—DC-Cam’s Director and staff members and local education officials and teachers—have played a decisive role in framing and shaping the vernacularization processes.

From these critical grounds, the chapter examines how local and global motivations and international connections that DC-Cam has made have influenced its Genocide Education Project. The project has been a case study that explores the interactions between local and global practices and the respective flows of ideas, strategies and networking between them.

1. Genocide Education Values Packages


Research shows that there are four common genocide education values: memory, genocide prevention, national reconciliation and historical empathy.⁵¹⁷ These overarching values encompass the idea that students should learn about the past to better the future by analyzing and evaluating Cambodia’s historical complexities. These values also are grounded in sympathy to victims of the KR, acknowledgment of the suffering of the survivors, development of a sense of compassion and tolerance, and cooperation and peaceful coexistence in the broader Cambodian society. In addition, these shared values seek to encourage young generations to be the agents for preventing the possible recurrence of the KR atrocities and for future social change. These younger generations can assist their communities to reconcile through education and inter-generational dialogues, guiding the young generations away from senses of hatred, anger and revenge. In Cambodia, genocide education seeks to instill these values packages by improving

⁵¹⁷ The four common values of genocide education come from interviews with teachers and international stakeholders and scholars on Holocaust and genocide education.

young Cambodians' knowledge and understanding of the KR genocide. As DC-Cam Director Youk Chhang suggests, "A society cannot know itself if it does not have an accurate memory of its own history."⁵¹⁸

These shared genocide education values are the results of the vernacularization of the global concepts discussed in Chapter Two and their integration into the local culture, context, politics and broader national struggles.

Diagram 3: Genocide Education Values Packages



⁵¹⁸ The slogan represents DC-Cam's core concept to provide objective history to the Cambodian society.

Memory

The transmission and circulation of ideas about genocide education are intimately linked to the concept of memory. The concept of memory is associated with individual and national identity, and is connected to nations of truth, social belief, master national narratives and social responsibility of Cambodia's youth. This concept of memory reflects universal principles and is associated with local desire and cultural norms:

I asked myself whether or not the young generation of Cambodians believe that the Khmer Rouge crimes did exist in Cambodia. Do they believe what their parents and grandparents have told them about their suffering at that time? Has any author or historian written about this history for official school curriculum yet?⁵¹⁹

The young generation should learn and analyze why the KR killed their own people. Why did they come up with such ideas as abolition of religion and family separation? When I was young, I learned about the story of "spilling master tea" in which the Vietnamese dumped three Cambodians into the ground to their necks which were used as stove to boil water for the Vietnamese master. However, the story is just a folktale since there is no learning and book to prove it. And I don't want KR history to become a folktale like this one. It is important that parents narrate the KR history to their children to enforce their belief.⁵²⁰

As Cambodian citizens, it is vital that we know our own history. Do not let other nations say that foreigners know more about our history and why the next generations of Cambodian citizens don't know of what happened. Therefore it is crucial that next Cambodian generations learn about our history.⁵²¹

These three comments suggest the crucial relationship between genocide education and memory. Memory of the KR atrocities should be kept alive not just by survivors, but permanently preserved through formal and informal education. As such, institutionalized memory should be cultivated through formal education, because students

⁵¹⁹ Soh Seiha, a female Cham Muslim community leader from Kratie province of Cambodia, expressed her sorrowful impression after visiting the former Khmer Rouge (KR) central security center S-21 also known as Tuol Sleng prison and the killing fields at Choeung Ek. Some members of her family were killed or had disappeared during the 1975-1979 reign of the KR.

⁵²⁰ Khamboly Dy's interview with Ho Lai Chy, member of Prey Kabas District Council, Takeo Province, Phnom Penh, October 16, 2013.

⁵²¹ Documentary Film "Cambodia Youth Contemplates Positive Outcome of Khmer Rouge Trial," Documentation Center of Cambodia, Produced by Fatily Sa, Makara Ouch and Penhsamng Kan, 2013.

"need to be formally and properly taught about Democratic Kampuchea in their schools."⁵²²

Genocide Prevention

The phrase, “genocide education is genocide prevention”⁵²³ illustrates the core value of DC-Cam’s Genocide Education Project since its inception. Within the local context, genocide prevention values contain such dimensions as preventing the return of the KR genocide, preventing the return of the KR tragedy or preventing the return of the KR regime. Since Cambodia has experienced not only genocide but also other violent conflicts, civil war and political power struggles, these values extend to these historical conflicts as well. Teachers, students and villagers have repeatedly requested “not to repeat the past mistakes” or “not to step in the footprints of history.”

We have to educate our students not to hold anger and revenge; otherwise, it will be endless; war will continue in the country. Whenever there is war, there are difficulties such as disabled people, widows, etc. Therefore, we have to instill in [students] that if they [the KR leaders] made mistakes, it is a lesson for us in the future. If the young children become leaders or somebody in the future, they have to avoid such [mistakes].⁵²⁴

With influence from global ideas and DC-Cam’s positioning to enact Cambodian genocide education, Cambodians from the grassroots up to the top levels of the government have shifted their positions from a “bury the past” attitude to supporting critical analysis and evaluation of past complexities and controversies through education.

⁵²² Concept note of Genocide Education Memorial by Dacil Q. Keo, http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/Genocide_Education_Banner_By_Dacil.pdf (accessed on October 24, 2013).

⁵²³ This slogan has been incised into a stone and installed in many high schools in Cambodia. The installation of this slogan stands as a genocide education memorial, reminding the Cambodian students on the importance of studying the history of the KR genocide and other cases of genocide around the world.

⁵²⁴ Documentary Film “Teacher Workshop: Reclaiming Cambodian History,” Documentation Center of Cambodia, produced by Ratanak Leng, December 25, 2011, Preah Vihear.

Reconciliation

Genocide education has significant links to the larger national struggle for reconciliation, or "Kar Phsah Phsa" in Khmer. Cambodia and its people have been described as physically and mentally "fragile," and demand for national reconciliation remains high. There is no single definition of national reconciliation, or what Desmond Tutu called a "handy map" to reconciliation, but rather it is a process that evolves over a long period of time and across generations.⁵²⁵ Sok-Kheang Ly, who has done extensive research on the reconciliation processes in Cambodia commented that "there is no once-fit-all formula" to reconciliation.⁵²⁶ The process requires multiple mechanisms, one of which is genocide education. In the educational context, reconciliation encompasses values such as *unity, forgiveness, healing, reconnecting the broken pieces, coming together, coming to terms with the past, moving forward and harmony*.⁵²⁷ One crucial common notion demonstrated by both victims and former KR cadres is the need "to learn to live together peacefully in the society." All of these dimensions are incorporated into the learning objectives and students' activities in the "Teacher's Guidebook: The Teaching of *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*."

To me, the teaching is not about hatred, anger or revenge. Instead, it enables the young to learn that genocide actually took place in Cambodia. More importantly, it attempts to encourage the young to reconcile and learn to live together.⁵²⁸

⁵²⁵ Sok-Kheang Ly, "The Dynamics of Cambodia's Reconciliation Process, 1979 to 2007," PhD Dissertation in Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, 2014.

⁵²⁶ Ibid., Sok-Kheang Ly's PhD Dissertation.

⁵²⁷ Ibid., Sok-Kheang Ly's PhD Dissertation.

⁵²⁸ Ibid., Documentary Film by Ratanak Leng.

Historical Empathy

One of the objectives of genocide education is to instill in students the notion of historical empathy. This principle, which is adopted from global concepts of teaching about the Holocaust, incorporates teaching compassion, tolerance and forgiveness. These teachings are used to guide the local population, especially young students, away from senses of hatred, anger and revenge that could remain in people's consciousness, as they were entrenched deeply into the Cambodian social fabric during both the KR and the PRK regimes. In fact, many KR slogans encouraged people to constantly hold on to these feelings of hate and anger. Likewise, in the 1980s, the PRK regime made "May 20" the national "Day of Anger" against the KR. Against this backdrop, and pursuant to the new social and political conditions, both the government and the people have since been inclined to embrace compassion, tolerance and forgiveness. DC-Cam introduced its own slogan dedicated to these values; the slogan has been installed as granite stone memorials in many high schools around the country. The slogan reads as follows:

Talking about experiences during the Khmer Rouge regime is to promote reconciliation and to educate children about forgiveness and tolerance.⁵²⁹

In documenting and researching the KR atrocities for almost two decades, DC-Cam pieced together these genocide education values, leading to the creation of the Genocide Education Project. These shared notions have been transmitted and circulated through both the national education system and non-educational activities that have impacted national policies.

⁵²⁹ This slogan is one of the two slogans that form memorials installed and hung in twenty schools in Phnom Penh and five provinces. The other one is "Learning about the history of Democratic Kampuchea is to prevent genocide."

2. Vernacularization Processes

According to Levitt and Merry, “vernacularization is a widespread practice that takes different forms in different kinds of organizations. It produces a set of ideas and practices that are remote from the original documents and intentions and that may differ from ideas that international organizations and agreements produce.”⁵³⁰ Vernacularization in the Cambodian context has involved the adoption and translation of the global practices and the combination and cooperation of three important elements: 1) the local NGO's initiatives; 2) existing traditional education practices; and 3) global approaches. The process further involves appropriation, transmission and circulation of the adopted global practices. Vernacularization emerges at different stages of the genocide education process, for instance, when DC-Cam developed the Teacher's Guidebook (the guidebook).

Co-authors Phala Chea and Christopher Dearing developed the guidebook using components of the global philosophy of education and with extensive input from international reviewers (experts on curriculum development and Holocaust and/or genocide education).⁵³¹ Along with the DK history textbook (discussed in Chapter Five), the guidebook is essential to subsequent teacher trainings at national, provincial and commune levels. The guidebook represents global connections that channel the flow of global knowledge, ideas and modern teaching methods into the Cambodian educational context.

This section provides theoretical analyses to especially test the second claim—that contemporary genocide education in Cambodia has always been a concerted effort

⁵³⁰ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, p. 458

⁵³¹ The Teacher Guidebook is the first ever, teaching guide of its kind published in 2009.

between local initiatives and global connections. It fleshes out specific global practices, which have been adopted and adapted into Cambodia and examines how these practices are reconciled within the Cambodian context.

Adoption

The adoption of global practices operates in two frameworks: global education philosophies and global genocide education practices. Since genocide education in Cambodian schools has been part of the History subject and the general education system, the two frameworks above were adopted simultaneously during each stage of vernacularization process.

In adopting the global genocide education practices, co-authors Phala Chea and Christopher Dearing initially consulted with the Facing History and Ourselves' (FHO) Holocaust curriculum. They adopted FHO's rationales for teaching, and its learning objectives and learning outcomes, such as non-repetition of the history, showing compassion and empathy, thinking independently, not following leaders down the wrong path, and making the right decisions.⁵³² The co-authors decided not to use the FHO's content, however, as it focuses almost exclusively on the Holocaust (which represents the global context, but the guidebook has to align with the local content—DC Cam's history textbook).⁵³³

⁵³² Kamboly Dy's interview with Phala Chea.

⁵³³ The co-author of the Teacher's Guidebook: The Teaching of A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) Mr. Chris Dearing wrote in an email communication with me that "In Cambodia, because we were introducing a new pattern of behaviors (both for the teacher and student) as well as new content in the way of DK history, I took the position of assuming a 'model' that invoked a hybrid of Cambodian concepts of learning (teacher-centered) and student-centered learning. The outcome was a curriculum that invoked some criticism (if you recall) by the international committee with respect to not having enough critical thinking activities, but then also criticism by Cambodians for having too many." Another co-author Dr. Phala Chea wrote in an e-mail communication, "I echo Chris' response. We used our experiences and our

The co-authors also adopted the guidelines for teachers developed by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. The fourteen-point guidelines for teaching about the Holocaust were adopted as additional materials for the national teacher trainings and are as follows:

Define the term “Holocaust”; avoid comparisons of pain; avoid simple answers to complex history; just because it happened does not mean it was inevitable; strive for precision of language (e.g., “all Germans were killers”); make careful distinctions about sources of information; avoid stereotypical descriptions; avoid romanticizing history in order to engage students’ interest; contextualize the history you are teaching; translate statistics into people; be sensitive to appropriate written and audiovisual content; strive for balance in establishing whose perspective informs your study of the Holocaust; select appropriate learning activities; and reinforce the objectives of your lesson plan.⁵³⁴

The adoption process occurred also during the teacher training workshops where international experts and scholars directly trained and transmitted global ideas to Cambodian teachers through their presentations, discussions and conversations. For instance, Frank Chalk, an international genocide scholar participating in the national teacher training, presented on “Genocide in a Global Context.”⁵³⁵ Chalk introduced comparative perspectives between teaching in Canadian society and that in Cambodia, providing a comparison that allowed participants to understand basic human rights concepts as they exist in the developed world, and then to reflect on the human rights situation in Cambodia. In this comparative approach, Chalk discussed various definitions of genocide and mass atrocity crimes in the twentieth century including those involving

knowledge about American/western pedagogy and instructional strategies as our guide. We designed lessons that any social studies/history classes here would implement...teaching topics/subjects by doing a launch (introducing the topic and activating prior knowledge), explore (having students apply their knowledge with an activity or activities), and summary (assessing students’ learning).”

⁵³⁴ Ibid., Chris Dearing “Understanding Matters: Holocaust Curricula and the Social Studies Classroom,” (summarized from K. Riley and R. Totten).

⁵³⁵ Frank Chalk, “Genocide in a global Context,” June 2009, a paper presented to the National Teacher Training held in Cambodian Senate Library on June 29-July 7, 2009. The paper can be accessed through <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/Papers-EN/Frank%20ChalkGenocide%20in%20Global%20Context-EN.pdf>. (Accessed on November 10, 2012).

the Armenians in Turkey, the Ukrainians in Stalin's Soviet Union, the Jewish people in Hitler's Europe and the Tutsi in Rwanda.⁵³⁶ Further, Chalk compared the legal definition under the UN Genocide Convention and with his own definition, saying that the UN definition was the result of political compromise and created a big loophole in international law.⁵³⁷ Chalk's comparative approach exemplifies the flow of global genocide education ideas, and has allowed Cambodian educators to place the KR genocide into the broader context of genocide and mass atrocities worldwide.

For the teacher's guidebook, general American education philosophies provided a fundamental basis. Phala Chea said that the guidebook was developed from her own experiences as an educator at Lowell Public Schools (Massachusetts) and the American education standards with three major pedagogical steps: launch, exploration and summary.

The adopted global education philosophies included Jean Piaget's constructivist philosophy of education, the theory of analytical and reflective thinking skills, the theory of critical thinking and the art of Socratic questioning. Other Western pedagogies were drawn from the works of Dewey, Hunter, Bloom, Gardner, Totten, Mumford and Freire.⁵³⁸ These global models and the Cambodian teacher-centered approach formed another critical global-local component of the Cambodian genocide education.

Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development, which focuses on the logic, reasoning and thinking processes of students in developing answers, not whether those answers are right or wrong, allows Cambodian educators to reflect on their traditional methods. Generally speaking, in Cambodia, teachers are the sole authority in classrooms

⁵³⁶ Ibid. Frank Chalk, "Genocide in a global Context," p. 4.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., Frank Chalk, "Genocide in a global Context," p. 4.

⁵³⁸ Khamboly Dy's interview with Chris Dearing.

and students are required to recite what is written in textbooks in order to receive good scores and evaluations. As Phala Chea stated in the following:

Piaget's educational pedagogy emphasizes a learner-centered educational philosophy. Therefore, educational curriculum and learning experiences should be planned to allow opportunities for assimilation and accommodation. Students need to explore, to experiment, to manipulate, to question, and to search out the answers for themselves. However, this does not mean that they should be allowed to do whatever they want."⁵³⁹

Moreover, Piaget's four stages of cognitive development can help Cambodian educators engage in appropriate methodologies, while also considering students' ages, as children's knowledge and level of understanding are invented and reinvented as they grow older and gain more life experience in the world around them.⁵⁴⁰

The guidebook is also greatly influenced by Mumford R.L.'s "Teaching History through Analytical and Reflective Thinking Skills,"⁵⁴¹ which Chris Dearing employed in his presentation during the national teacher training and several commune teacher trainings. Mumford's theory introduces the eight levels of thinking skills each student possesses, and requires teachers to understand these when designing lessons and questions for students. Students' thinking skills begin with level one, in which a student "distinguishes between factual-type statements and statements of inferences and opinion" and "draw[s] inferences from statistics and from quantified information."⁵⁴²

In addition, international experts also introduced Socratic questions and dialogues, which allow students to grapple with complex issues and to consider the

⁵³⁹ Phala Chea, "Jean Piaget's Cognitive Development," June-July 2009, a paper presentation at the National Teacher Training at Cambodian Senate Library, June 29-July 7, 2009.

⁵⁴⁰ Phala Chea, "Jean Piaget's Cognitive Development," June-July 2009, a paper presentation at the National Teacher Training at Cambodian Senate Library, June 29-July 7, 2009.

⁵⁴¹ Mumford, R.L., "Teaching history through analytical and reflective thinking skills," *Social Studies*, September-October 1991, Vol. 82, Issue 5.

⁵⁴² Ibid., Mumford, R.L., <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/Papers-EN/Chris%20Dearing-Teaching%20History-EN.pdf>, (accessed November 11, 2012).

implications of genocide on their daily lives.⁵⁴³ Cambodian educators are instructed on the art of Socratic questioning and its relation to critical thinking, as both share a common foundation and will hopefully make discussions more disciplined and fruitful.

Combination

Combination refers to the process of combining global practices and local initiatives. Current Cambodian genocide education has been developed by combining local genocide content and existing traditional methods with global genocide education approaches and philosophies. The guidebook that was developed by a Cambodian Phala Chea and Christopher Dearing, an American, represent a blending of Cambodian and global ideas and strategies. The combination approach has been necessary to ensure that Cambodian students can deal with their country's genocide through global and local contexts, as genocide itself is a global crime rooted in specific localities.

The process of developing the guidebook involved selection of the methods the authors believed would contribute to not only the intellectual development of students but also the shared notions of empathy, forgiveness, tolerance and compassion.⁵⁴⁴ Four other cases of mass atrocities are used in the guidebook, including the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, and mass killing in Iraq. These

⁵⁴³ Richard Paul and Linda Elder, "Critical Thinking: The Art of Socratic Questioning," quoted from Chris Dearing's presentation paper for the national teacher training, <http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/Papers-EN/Chris%20Dearing-Socratic%20Questioning%20Part%201-EN.pdf>, (accessed on November 11, 2012).

⁵⁴⁴ Khamboly Dy's interview with Chris Dearing. Structurally, the guidebook is divided into four main parts. Part one is the overview which includes the rationale for teaching KR history, course objectives and instructional strategies. Part two provides methodological instruction teachers can use to teach each of the eleven chapters in the textbook. Part three provides the evaluation rubrics, the parameters to evaluate students' understanding and knowledge at the conclusion of each chapter and the entire course. And part four lists a number of resources and references for additional learning materials such as books, films, magazines and some relevant websites on genocides and Holocaust/genocide education programs around the world.

examples are incorporated as part of the “Jigsaw” exercise.⁵⁴⁵ This structure allows teachers to use various alternative teaching methods that would be best applied to a particular classroom situation. Moreover, the sequence of teaching methods from one lesson to another reflects the appropriate thinking order of students, which increases as students gradually progress to subsequent chapters in the textbook.⁵⁴⁶

The guidebook is the first Cambodian genocide education teaching guide that provides teachers with lessons, objectives and activities that parallel materials and correspond effectively to the narratives in the DK history textbook. As students progress through their reading of the textbook, the teachers may refer to the guided questions, many of which are open-ended, to illicit discussions with students and to build critical thinking skills. The main instructional methodologies in the guidebook include: facilitating students’ reading comprehension, and the acquisition and practice of effective and critical reading strategies through guided questions; developing higher-order thinking skills and self-reflection through essays and oral presentations; promoting small group discussions and problem solving through cooperative group work; encouraging students to ask questions, discuss and learn from family and community members through interviews; promoting independent inquiry and learning through research; reiterating and supporting learning and visual understanding through film screenings; direct communication with first-hand survivors through guest speakers; and experiencing the history from the field studies through field trips.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ Phala Chea and Christopher Dearing (2009). "Teacher's Guidebook: The Teaching of A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)," Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, p. 89.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., the author’s interview with the co-authors.

⁵⁴⁷ Phala Chea and Christopher Dearing (2009). "Teacher's Guidebook: The Teaching of A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)," Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia.

There is a strong link between the content of the course and the methods used. Inadequate understanding of the content may encourage teachers to veer away from the modern teaching methods. For example, if teachers do not understand the content, they will not be able to effectively use Socratic questioning, as they will not be able to control the discussions and to guide students through the teaching objectives. By consolidating the local content with the global rationale, however, the teacher guidebook clearly represents the combined global-local approaches to effectively incorporate both an understanding of the content and methodologies of genocide education.

Compromise

The combination of global and local practices has encountered some contradictions between Cambodian and international reviewers' methods, activities, objectives and the values embedded in each lesson of the guidebook. As Levitt and Merry pointed out, contradictions and tensions between global and local practices are quite common.⁵⁴⁸ In this context, compromise is another necessary measure within the vernacularization process, and reconciling the global genocide education practices with the local educational approaches and local cultural norms plays a significant role in the vernacularization process.

Compromise is described as "flexible adjustment and openness to other sources."⁵⁴⁹ Compromise became crucial to the guidebook review process when national teachers and international experts gave comments to improve the guidebook's content. The criteria for reviewing the guidebook derived from the overall and specific objectives

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 441.

⁵⁴⁹ Meng Liu Yangong Hu and Minli Liao, "Travelling Theory in China: Contextualization, Compromise and Combination," *Global Networks* 9, no. 4 (2009): 539.

of DC-Cam's Genocide Education Project.⁵⁵⁰ Reviewers assessed whether the methods and activities would allow students to obtain accurate and unbiased KR history; to value survivors' stories and acknowledge their suffering; and to avoid dehumanization of former KR cadres. Moreover, reviewers also looked to see if the guidebook encouraged students to think critically about the causes, effects and consequences of the genocide so that they could identify similar situations and processes and contribute to preventing genocide. The reviewers also took into consideration how the guidebook would help students investigate human behavior, ideology and beliefs.

The international reviewers also pressed for more methods and skills development, involving skills such as writing, speaking, presentation and basic research skills.⁵⁵¹ In contrast, Cambodian reviewers complained about the high standards set by the guidebook's methods and felt there were too many activities, considering the limited capacity of the Cambodian teachers and lacking school resources.

Another point of contradiction was the educational level of the guided questions in each lesson. The Cambodian reviewers demanded uniform answers that would enable teachers and students nationwide to acquire the same knowledge of controversial areas of KR history. In contrast, international reviewers criticized the guidebook for its shortcomings in introducing critical thinking skills, which is incongruent with the global education goal of the 21st century. For example, two international reviewers, Tom La Pointe and Nela Navarro of the Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights (CGHR), made the following comment:

⁵⁵⁰ Drafts of the guidebook were reviewed by genocide scholars and education experts. The drafts were also reviewed by a panel of Cambodian experts, which consisted of twenty-four educators and officials from the Ministry of Education. Some of these experts have been working in the field of education for over twenty years and have been involved in the national textbook development.

⁵⁵¹ Comments from Professors Nela Navarro and Tom La Pointe on the early draft of the guidebook.

The examples of process writing limit the student to filling in the blanks and short answer responses that rely more on memorization of facts and less on critical thinking skills. This is reflected in the outlined objectives which are heavily weighted toward the idea of identification, knowing, and recognizing factual information (basic reading comprehension skills). While these reading skills are critical, they are only the beginning of the spectrum of reading skills that should be developed at this level. Research on educational development around the world suggests that to effectively prepare students for the 21st century all reading skills should be developed and practiced, particularly at the secondary level, regardless of whether or not the students choose to move on to higher education.⁵⁵²

Furthermore, the two sides have opposing opinions about the amount of reading texts and provision of reading skills. National reviewers contended that these reading texts and skills could not be fully implemented in the Cambodian context, arguing that Cambodian students do not have a habit of reading and that the existing national curriculum is already congested. International reviewers counter-argued that "reading skills such as connecting content, making inferences, sequencing, drawing conclusions, making generalization, making predictions, analyzing and evaluating are not incorporated significantly, particularly as these should be the primary skills that appear in a secondary school text."⁵⁵³ The international reviewers suggested that the level of reading skills introduced in the guidebook should correspond with the ones in Blooms Taxonomy, a classification of learning objectives, which have been the inspirational education philosophy to date.

The national and international reviewers have contradictory views toward the genocide education values. International reviewers suggest that the guidebook introduces the value of democracy—that is, some lessons should focus on democratic thinking skills in order to promote democratic ideas and attitudes as opposed to the authoritarian ones

⁵⁵² Ibid., comments from Professors Nela Navarro and Tom La Pointe.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., comments from Professors Nela Navarro and Tom La Pointe.

exercised during the KR regime.⁵⁵⁴ National reviewers reject this subset concept since the term 'democracy' has been politically controversial. The national reviewers claim that the values should focus more on the historical memory, primarily the key factual events that took place during the KR period, and preventing the recurrence of KR genocide.

The different views between local educators and international experts could also stem from the local cultural norms in which a Cambodian teacher is traditionally considered as the master in the classroom. Students are supposed to listen to the teacher's advice and to follow suit with no or at best little resistance. The tradition that students need to listen to teachers contradicts with the modern teaching methods from which students are required to do more work for their own insight and to challenge the teacher's ideas in many cases.

Within the local educational and cultural context itself, contradictions also exist between the conservative teachers and the more liberal students. According to my face-to-face personal conversations with the teachers, teachers generally complain that students nowadays do not respect teachers, while the students believe that the teachers always want to discipline too much, which marginalizes their freedom of thinking in challenging them for the best. Old teachers from the 1980s may have difficulty in instructing students in the 2000s due to different ideas, thinking, knowledge, way of life and the changing education environment over time. This is an example in place of the conflict between the Cambodian traditional teaching practices and the adopted global models that Cambodian teachers may have a hard time to adjust if the global practices do

⁵⁵⁴ May-Brith Ohman Nielsen commented that "democratic skills have transformative value and can be applied to other areas of life/society. This, I think, needs to be reflective in the way we ask questions and formulate tasks for the students."

not come through the vernacularization process which includes an important process of compromise.

The guidebook's co-authors responded to the two drastically different suggestions by incorporating the ideas of the national and international reviewers without marginalizing the overall objectives of the project and its overall values, considering inputs from both national and international reviewers in their revisions.⁵⁵⁵ Though the idea of introducing democracy may not be appropriate at this point, the co-authors maintained certain American standards of education and teaching methods that help cultivate more interactive classrooms and assist students in developing critical thinking skills, independent and self-learning skills, historical empathy, forgiveness, tolerance and compassion.

Cambodian students need to have high expectations with regard to knowledge and critical thinking so that they can become competent members of the work force and excellent leaders in the future. However, to address local concerns pertaining to the ensuing local educational and capacity constraints, the co-authors stated in the guidebook that teachers have the freedom to make use of the guidebook, in part or in whole, to fit their actual classrooms.⁵⁵⁶

Local teachers are exposed to and make sense of global practices, but they are cautious in applying these practices because they must work within the existing national educational framework. With the flexibility introduced in the guidebook, however, teachers are able to adjust the global practices they gain from the teacher training to their current classroom reality. Although some teachers dare not deviate from or challenge the

⁵⁵⁵ Khamboly Dy's interviews with the co-authors Phala Chea and Christopher Dearing.

⁵⁵⁶ Khamboly Dy's interview with Phala Chea.

current local education system, some are much more open to new sources. These positive developments contributed greatly to the compromising process.

Appropriation

Appropriation is a process in which global ideas and key terminology is translated, modified, simplified, transformed and adjusted to fit with the local meaning, logic, resonance, culture and politics. In other words, appropriation involves cultivating new ways to convey messages, making new ideas more acceptable locally. In order to appropriate global ideas, DC-Cam translated the terms “genocide education” to be simply “the teaching of A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979),” so that the local people understand that they are working to teach their own history although they are implicitly working within the global frame. The use of the simplified term reflects the local context as some teachers and other indirect audiences (for example parents) survived the KR period themselves, thus resonating more with the local terms. Those born after the KR understand this period as part of their national history and memory, and thereby this terminology gives them a sense of ownership and responsibility for their history.

In addition, genocide prevention, or implementing the words “never again,” was translated into local meaning by using the words “preventing the return of the KR crimes in Cambodia.” This genocide prevention campaign is also associated with the CPP-dominated local politics, which attempted to glorify the '7 January 1979' as the second birthday and liberation day of all Cambodian people from the KR genocide.

Likewise, the “universal memory” concept of the Holocaust education was transformed into local meaning using the terminology, “preserving the memory of the KR crimes.” The goal of memory is linked to the ultimate objective of the ruling CPP party, which aimed to end the KR not only militarily and politically but also historically. To end the KR historically meant to study this history in schools so that history permanently prosecutes the KR crimes in addition to the judicial process. Diagram 3 below shows the appropriation of global and local idea in relation to the larger national struggles:

Transmission and Circulation


Vernacularization of genocide education was fostered through the transmission of ideas in a number of encounters and exchanges.⁵⁵⁷ The idea of genocide education has been formulated, reformulated and modified many times through the exchanges of ideas between local and global stakeholders.

Transmission in this context is the flow of the globally adopted ideas from the intermediary vernacularizers (DC-Cam and the Ministry of Education) to the local officials and teachers who perform the work of circulation between the local officials and teachers and the final beneficiaries (students and villagers). Transmission refers more to the overall process of dissemination, while circulation deals more with the dissemination of specific messages. The transmission and circulation processes work through either formal education or non-formal education. Through formal education, the transmission and circulation processes have to respect the government policies and administrative procedures. In contrast, DC-Cam has been able to transmit and circulate the adopted

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid. Levitt and Merry.

ideas informally and avoid violating national policies in order to make more substantial changes and reforms that reflect global principles.

Diagram 4: The Appropriation Process



Within the formal education framework, shared values are communicated through education in the formal school system on a national scale. Through global adaptation and with DC-Cam as a mediator, ideas have been transmitted from DC-Cam and the Ministry of Education to local education officials and teachers who then circulate these values to students and then to parents or guardians at home. These transmission and circulation processes are achieved through a number of teacher training workshops and then through the teaching-learning processes in the classrooms. The ideas are circulated and

transmitted back from parents to students and then to teachers who pass these ideas back to DC-Cam's staff members who can then communicate these ideas back to the international stakeholders.⁵⁵⁸

Within the framework of the informal education system, globally generated ideas and strategies are channeled from international sources to DC-Cam and then to Cambodian villagers, teachers and students through a number of outreach activities outside the formal education system. This transmission is enforced through DC-Cam's staff members who traveled abroad and absorbed new ideas. Drawing upon its networks around the world, each year DC-Cam sends between five to ten staff members abroad either to pursue higher education or to attend short trainings, seminars or conferences on genocide, human rights, international law and related issues. As a result, staff members have received more than forty master's and doctoral degrees from developed countries; some staff members have earned more than one degree.⁵⁵⁹ In return, DC-Cam has hosted a number of foreign scholars, researchers and undergraduate and graduate student interns and legal associates. The meetings and conversations between staff members and international visitors and interns have provided a platform for idea transmission. With global connections and interactions, staff members have learned about genocide education from diverse sources, exposing them to new ideas and experiences. Within the last eighteen years, DC-Cam's staff members have traveled to almost every village in Cambodia, where they meet, discuss and transmit globally adopted genocide education

⁵⁵⁸ N. Rajaram and Vaishali Zararia, "Translating Women's Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Spiral Process in Reducing Gender Injustice in Baroda, India," *Global Networks*, 9, no. 4 (2009): 426-484.

⁵⁵⁹ DC-Cam's quarterly reports on staff development, for additional information, please visit http://www.dccam.org/Abouts/Annual/pdf/DC-Cam_Second_Quarterly_Report_April-June_2012.pdf (accessed by July 20, 2013).

ideas to the villagers, all outside the realm of formal education.⁵⁶⁰ The staff members also bring and encourage the sharing of local ideas and transmit these ideas back to international stakeholders. These idea transmissions and exchanges create a process of "mutual influence,"⁵⁶¹ which is one of the processes of globalization.

In the mutual influence process, beneficiaries transmit ideas and theoretical approaches back to global sources. Notably, the backward flow does not necessarily go through the hierarchies as explained above. Sometimes, villagers and students bypass the second level vernacularizers and transmit ideas directly to DC-Cam. Likewise, local teachers and education officials can communicate their ideas directly to the international sources through different platforms, either with or without DC-Cam mediation. However, it is much more difficult for locals to spread ideas within the global context due to the complexities of local culture and practices and that have narrow spaces on the global platforms.

3. Vernacularizers

According to Levitt and Merry, "vernacularizers convey ideas from one context to another, adapting and reframing them from the way they attach to a source context to one that resonates with the new location."⁵⁶² In the context of Cambodian genocide education, there are two types of vernacularizers: DC-Cam (the Director and staff who have travelled abroad, interacted with the international stakeholders and channeled the

⁵⁶⁰ For the locations DC-Cam's staff members have visited since 1995, please visit its outreach maps by province, <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Maps/Outreach%20Maps.htm> (accessed on July 21, 2013).

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., Meng Liu, Yanhong Hu and Minli Liao, 541.

⁵⁶² Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 449.

flows of global ideas) and local education officials and teachers (the largest group of vernacularizers who work directly with the beneficiaries of genocide education).

DC-Cam: Intermediary Vernacularizers

DC-Cam plays the role of the intermediary vernacularizer between the international stakeholders and local vernacularizers. One question arises: how does the social position and local and international networks that DC-Cam established influence its work on adapting the global practices? DC-CAM has served as a middle vernacularizer, building good relations with both the international stakeholders and the local agents in order to facilitate the flow of information and communication between the local and the global players.

One of the goals underlying the shared genocide education values is to encourage policy reform for a better education system and society at-large. When DC-Cam started its operations, first in 1995 as a branch office of Yale's CGP, and later in 1997 as an independent local organization, it engaged primarily in collecting documents and researching the KR crimes. This work has since shaped DC-Cam's social position and principles. Spanning nearly two decades, DC-Cam has gathered a total of 141,604 documents, which account for approximately one million pages.⁵⁶³ DC-Cam has since become the world largest repository of KR primary documents. These documents contain a wealth of information that assist scholars and researchers in examining the larger picture of the KR regime, and DC-Cam has become a huge educational and academic

⁵⁶³ The information on the number of documents and the number of pages is based on actual counting of archivist Yin Nuan, who updated the information as of June 2013. All of DC-Cam's documents are divided into five major types (paper documents, physical evidence, interview, photo and film), which can be divided down to twenty smaller collections.

resource for a variety of beneficiaries. The archives play a substantial role as a catalyst for the Center's Genocide Education Project, which produced the local historical content "A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)" textbook, thereby attaining and legitimizing it as a local initiative. DC-Cam has rejected any kind of the global content that does not fit into the local context, culture, politics and history. This social position and these principles shaped the way that vernacularization works in the Cambodian context.

International influences on DC-Cam's goals and daily practices are explicitly apparent. DC-Cam has partnered with a large number of international civil society organizations and universities in the U.S., Europe, Africa and Asia, and therefore has been exposed to many global ideas and practices. In collaboration with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), for instance, DC-Cam led the establishment of the "Affinity Group," which is attempting to create documentation centers in countries that have experienced genocide and mass violence around the world.⁵⁶⁴ The group meets once a year and its members have shared their experience and expertise, and have succeeded in establishing documentation centers in Former Yugoslavia, Guatemala, Burma, Iraq, Afghanistan and South Africa.

In addition, DC-Cam receives funding from a variety of international donors ranging from private institutions to foundations and government's institutions, and whose ideas and practices have been channeled into Cambodia through DC-Cam. The characteristics of the communication channels, especially through funding sources,

⁵⁶⁴ For the detail of the Affinity Group, please visit <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Affinity/Affinity.htm>, (accessed on July 22, 2013).

substantially influence the dissemination and appropriation of these ideas.⁵⁶⁵ Each donor has its own priorities that could shape DC-Cam's goals, and it is inevitable that DC-Cam, in certain cases, has to reconcile its objectives with donors' priorities. Some donors provide funding with political agendas while others are unlikely to fund projects when certain donors are already involved. For instance, Japan and Germany are unlikely to fund the projects or NGOs that are funded by the U.S. government. In this case, DC-Cam has to make clear-cut decisions on whether or not to accept certain sources of funding in order to preserve its principles and the local initiatives.⁵⁶⁶

Within the local framework, DC-Cam has obtained several stages of agreement with the Cambodian government to implement genocide education ideas. Many commentators have presented doubts on the CPP-led government's willingness to engage in genocide education efforts. This raises a question: What are the political motives behind the CCP's willingness to grant this politically sensitive work to a non-governmental actor when the CPP may risk being implicated in the KR crimes, considering that many of its members were former middle-level and low-level KR cadres and military commanders? The decision to grant this work to DC-Cam stemmed from DC-Cam's professionalism, personal friendliness and overall trust of DC-Cam's founder, Youk Chhang, as well as the CPP's determination to end the KR's very existence militarily, politically, judicially and historically.⁵⁶⁷ DC-Cam's objectives parallel the genocide education values in the government's objectives within the larger national struggles to deal with the violent past. In this sense, ending the KR historically means preserving the memory of the KR atrocities through education.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 453.

⁵⁶⁶ Face-to-face personal conversation with Youk Chhang.

⁵⁶⁷ Face-to-face personal conversation with Youk Chhang.

DC-Cam's principle, since it is not a human rights-oriented organization, is to engage with the government to make changes. DC-Cam takes a tactile approach, one with political neutrality and non-confrontational stance. DC-Cam believes in the philosophy of friendly engagement for change, research and scholarship using small-scale advocacy but shaping large national policy. Engagement is to work collaboratively with the various governmental institutions to both empower the existing institutions and their personnel and reach out to the grassroots by constantly maintaining the Center's principles and objectives.⁵⁶⁸ The Center always seeks areas where cooperation is possible and gives recommendations for solutions to the problems instead of directly confronting the government.

To deal with the current government's hierarchical and problematic system, the Center collaborates with key actors at the highest level in the government and at the grassroots but less with the mid-level branches of government institutions. DC-Cam's Director Youk Chhang called this technique "strategic diplomacy."⁵⁶⁹ With policy set up from the central government, the middle authorities function as catalysts to implement the strategies at the grassroots level.

As the intermediary vernacularizer, DC-Cam channels the forward and backward flows between the local teachers and international stakeholders. Within the formal education framework, it transmits global ideas and practices down to the local education officials who circulate them further to the teachers and finally to the students. In some cases, DC-Cam reaches out to local teachers and students directly, bypassing the education officials and government policies for a more effective transmission. Outside

⁵⁶⁸ DC-Cam's Director Youk Chhang's remarks in various internal meetings where the author is present.

⁵⁶⁹ Youk Chhang, "Memory of Myanmar," DC-Cam's Introductory Remarks, July 24, 2013.

the formal system, DC-Cam communicates information directly with the villagers who, in turn, send the messages back to the international stakeholders through DC-Cam.

Overall, because DC-Cam is a local NGO pressing for a local ground, and the Ministry of Education is the government's agency, the two institutions apply the combination of locally-centered and government-centered contextualization in vernacularizing global genocide education values into the local practices. However, this frame does not suggest that DC-Cam operates within the parameters of the government policy. DC-Cam is a "messenger with legitimacy," with prestige and credibility in conveying the genocide education values to different audiences in society. As a prominent institution dedicated to KR research, DC-Cam uses genocide education values as a bridge to communicate to a variety of stakeholders, especially to convince both the government and international donors to support building genocide education consciousness in Cambodia.

Local Teachers: Second Level Vernacularizers

Local education officials and teachers account for the largest group of vernacularizers at the second level of the vernacularization processes. Levitt and Merry called this group of local officials and teachers “both beneficiaries and enactors of vernacularization.”⁵⁷⁰ Most of them are locally based. They interact with the international stakeholders and gain new ideas and practices, mostly through DC-Cam’s mediation. Teacher training workshops, for example, have provided common platforms that DC-Cam has employed for its mediated communication and for circulating ideas and messages back and forth between the grassroots and international sources. Since the

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 449.

trainings have been conducted nationwide, and because the beneficiaries are tremendously huge in number, the trainings are conducted at three hierarchical levels: national, provincial and commune levels. The national and international experts train national teacher trainers who, in turn, train provincial teacher trainers who then train the commune teachers who are teachers of history, geography, Khmer studies and citizen morality from all lower and upper secondary schools throughout Cambodia. "This 'trickle-down' training approach provides an opportunity for Cambodians to train each other, thus taking ownership of and responsibility towards their national history."⁵⁷¹ Although the channels are highly structured and strictly follow the government's administrative procedure, the generated global ideas and instructional strategies travel easily through this structure.

As Levitt and Merry argued, this set of vernacularizers, who perform the ground implementation of the project and work directly with students in the classrooms, inform the sources either about the effect of the genocide education values and the practicality of new teaching methods introduced in the guidebook. This feedback could strategically impact global practices in genocide education.

The success of adopting and adapting global practices depends largely on the work, effort, commitment and the will of the vernacularizers. DC-Cam's Director and staff members function as intermediary vernacularizers, in between the international stakeholders and the local vernacularizers and beneficiaries. DC-Cam adopts global ideas, then translates and transmits them to the local education officials and teachers who, in turn, circulate these ideas to students and villagers. Local education officials and

⁵⁷¹ Report on the National Teacher Training, Sarah John Dicken, Documentation Center of Cambodia, July 2009.

teachers play the role of second level vernacularizers, while at the same time they are first level beneficiaries. Ideas flow back to the sources through hierarchical channels from villagers to students to teachers and then to DC-Cam and the international stakeholders. In some cases, international stakeholders have connected directly with the local teachers, but communication takes place mostly through DC-Cam's mediation. Likewise, DC-Cam also communicates directly with students and villagers through both formal and informal genocide education activities, such as the informal public education forum between teachers, students and parents.

4. Dilemmas within the Vernacularization Processes

Vernacularization processes in Cambodia face three major dilemmas: educational, practical and political. All three dilemmas are inter-related and take long time to tackle with critical national reforms. The three dilemmas have persistently marginalized the genocide education efforts from 1979 to the present.

Educational Dilemma

Cambodian education has gone through several stages of both success and crisis due largely to long-standing political conflicts and instability. One major problem in implementing genocide education has been the shortage of qualified teachers, especially for schools in rural and remote areas. A significant number of teachers in Cambodian schools today lack the expertise, credentials and professional development in their fields. By regulation, teachers of upper-secondary school are required to obtain at least a bachelor's degree and complete a one-year pedagogical training at the National Institute of Education (NIE), the only institution that produces teachers for upper-secondary

schools.⁵⁷² In practice, this regulation cannot be upheld. In certain provinces where there is a shortage of teachers, this requirement is sidestepped: local education authorities recruit less qualified teachers to teach as long as they are able to deliver the messages in the classrooms. According to a survey of 44 teachers from twenty-four provinces, 38.60% had only a bachelor's degree; 40.90% a high school diploma; 18.20% a lower-secondary school education; and 2.30% a primary school education. Overall, 61.40% of the teachers were teaching without the required credentials.⁵⁷³ One shocking result of the survey revealed that 2.30% of the teachers designated to teach secondary school students had only a primary school education.⁵⁷⁴


Figure 1: Educational Background of the Teachers

Degree		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Primary	2.3%	1
Secondary	18.2%	8
High School	40.9%	18
College	38.6%	17
Graduate	0.0%	0
<i>answered question</i>		44
<i>skipped question</i>		9

⁵⁷² Personal conversation with Cheng Hong, Professor of History at National Institute of Education.

⁵⁷³ Ibid., DC-Cam's quality control report.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., DC-Cam's quality control report.

Diagram 5: The Spiral Vernacularization Processes

Teachers' difficult living standards and low incomes account for the second major challenge to education quality.⁵⁷⁵ Interviews with teachers revealed that many

⁵⁷⁵ When I was at primary school in the late 1980s and at secondary school and high school in the 1990s, I witnessed teachers selling food inside the classrooms, conducting private courses for personal incomes, engaging in the business outside the schools or spending more time working on agricultural work at home to support themselves. Often times, teachers would seek assistance from students to plow the rice fields and

Cambodian school teachers continue to focus and engage more on private business activities to secure their living than on quality teaching skills development.⁵⁷⁶ In addition, some teachers today, especially those who are in leadership positions, are more involved in political work. These teachers usually hold position in the party and are responsible for mobilizing students in their schools to join their respective parties. Others are involved in corrupt practices, such as collecting private donations from parents in exchange for extra care for their children during class hours. Although these donations are not compulsory, many parents have made all efforts to contribute. DC-Cam's quality control report reflects teachers' lives below:

A teacher from Kampong Speu High School has to drive a motor taxi after class in order to earn extra income to support his family. As a newly employed teacher, Top from another high school in Kampong Speu earned less income (about 80 US dollar per month) than most teachers. Therefore, Top worked an extra job as an English teacher. Likewise, Sok from another high school in Kampong Speu province claims that she comes to the school only two days per week. She spends the rest of the week on her home business as a tailor. She is able to earn adequate living from her second job. Sok said that she would never be able to survive on her net salary. Keo from a Lower Secondary School in Stung Treng province has to ride motor for over twenty kilometers to school. Keo said that he spent almost the whole salary on gasoline to travel back and forth between school and his house. Right after finishing his teaching, Keo rushed back to fulfill another work as a security guard of a telephone company. Thoang from a high school in Ratanak Kiri province worked as a potato farmer. He spent many hours per day on the farm. Other teachers own small grocery stores at home.⁵⁷⁷

Teachers' engagement in private business and politics takes away from their time that could be spent reading extra materials, preparing lesson plans or doing research to enhance their knowledge and expertise in the field.

to transplant rice seedlings. In many cases, it was a fun time for young students to escape class and enjoy working, eating and playing together at the rice fields. As of 2013, this practice appeared to largely persist.

⁵⁷⁶ When I travelled the country to observe the teaching of KR history, I took the opportunity to discuss with teachers about the implications of their living conditions on education quality.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid., DC-Cam's Quality Control Report.

Student dropout and truancy rates constitute the third dominant challenge facing the Cambodian education system today. Poverty, transiency, marriage, helping families with work and long distance commutes to school all contribute to the high dropout and truancy rates. Many school directors and teachers confirmed that poverty compels students to drop out of school in order to seek work to earn extra money to help ease financial burdens of their families.⁵⁷⁸ Factors forcing or encouraging students to dropout vary from province to province, but the high dropout appears to be common for all schools across the country, with slightly greater vulnerability in the provinces along the border.⁵⁷⁹

Each year, a lot of students drop out and go to Thailand to work in various factories and farms. Some students take a very long leave to work in the sugar farms as they can earn about 2.50 USD per day. Other students work in the casino at the border to help their families, while others help their fathers in sea fishing. Usually, during the harvesting seasons, parents in the rural and remote areas encourage their children to stop going to school for a while to help out with farming and cultivation.⁵⁸⁰

I have nine siblings in the family. Seven of them including all girls dropped out of school to help my parents. Only my younger brother and I are in school. The rest work to earn money to support both the family and the two of us who are pursuing the study.⁵⁸¹

In the capital city of Phnom Penh, most dropouts are female students who quit school in order to work in various nearby garment factories and business centers. The long distance to the schools from rural and remote areas forms another reason why

⁵⁷⁸ In one high school in Kampot province, for example, some students come to school with no textbook or notebook. Several of them have to ride bicycles for more than ten kilometers to get to school. They are from poor families living in the far-off villages. However, some of them manage to stay in school.

⁵⁷⁹ During the first semester of 2011-2012 academic year, for example, 94 out of 1,787 students from Hun Sen Dang Tung High School (Kampot province) dropped out, which accounted for about 5.26% of the total students. Most school dropouts worked in the cement companies that are situated along the mountainous areas in Kampot and Kep provinces. Thun, a teacher at a high school in Ratanakiri province, said, "students take leave for one month or so during harvesting and crop collecting seasons."

⁵⁸⁰ Khamboly Dy's interview with students in Koh Kong High School, Koh Kong province, April 3, 2011.

⁵⁸¹ Khamboly Dy's interview with Pen Kosal, Student at Preah Beida Cheat High School, Kampot province, May 28, 2011. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Pen Kosal]

students choose to drop out. Some students live twenty kilometers from the schools, and while some ride bicycles, some travel on foot. They pack rice and food with them so that they can have lunch at school and return back home in the evening. To continue their education at the high school level, some male students have to come and stay in the pagodas. Female students rent private houses, and others stay with their relatives. Phok Sophana, Director of Virakchey Lower Secondary School in Veun Sai district, Ratanak Kiri province said the following:

Veun Sai district is divided into two separate areas by Se San River. Students in the West bank have to cross the river by ferry to school. Most of the time, the ferry leaves the West bank late; students come to class late, and in some cases, they do not come to class at all. This factor increases the dropout rate in the district. For another example, Hat Pakk is one of the seven communes in Veun Sai district. Hat Pakk can only be reached by boat that takes about three hours. There were only five students from Hat Pakk last year. I have not yet received any new students from Hat Pakk for this year [2012 academic year].⁵⁸²

Many students who cannot withstand the long-distance travel drop out before finishing lower secondary school. The quality of education is undoubtedly related to these problems. The school can only give advice but it cannot take any measures to fail the students for absence; otherwise, there would be no students in the school left to teach.⁵⁸³

The fourth critical challenge for Cambodian general education is the lack of teaching materials, which refers to the government-published textbooks for all grade levels. The interviewed teachers claimed that as of 2012 they had not received the teacher's guidebook for grade 11 and students in grade 12 had not yet received their textbooks. In many schools, three to five students share one copy of the textbook. In

⁵⁸² Khamboly Dy's interview with Phok Sophanna, Director of Vireakchey Lower Secondary School, Ratanak Kiri province, February 7, 2013.

⁵⁸³ Khamboly Dy's interview with Thon Yun, M, Director of Hun Sen Phum Thmei High School, Ratanakiri, February 11, 2012. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Thon Yun]

addition, among the more than ten subjects a student must take during the school year, he or she is allowed to borrow only three kinds of textbooks due to the limited number of copies. Students have to come up with their own solutions for acquiring materials for the other seven subjects. Those who are from well-off families may buy the textbooks, while poor students have to share the textbooks among friends. In some cases, teachers have to copy part of the textbooks for students or ask one student to read the lesson aloud in the classroom.

Because of the lack of materials, most teachers decide to use traditional methods of asking one or two students to read sections in the book, followed by simple comprehension questions. This challenge also exists in schools in the capital city of Phnom Penh. The publication and distribution of the textbooks for millions of students nationwide is very costly, and the Ministry of Education finds this to be an acute challenge to its educational goal of “education for all.”⁵⁸⁴ Furthermore, the KR textbook writers were asked to limit their writing not to exceed to limit number of pages to avoid additional cost.⁵⁸⁵

To catch up with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Ministry of Education requires that each school have a passing rate of at least 93 percent. To fulfill this requirement, the Ministry of Education dropped the requisite passing score below the average test score by 50%. This meant that if the average score is twenty-five, the Ministry of Education drops the required passing score to seventeen to ensure the 93%

⁵⁸⁴ Face-to-face personal conversation between the author and officials of the Ministry of Education.

⁵⁸⁵ Face-to-face personal conversation between the author and a textbook writer from the Department of Curriculum Development of the Ministry of Education.

passage rate.⁵⁸⁶ Teachers agreed that this decision has strongly affected the quality of education. In essence, the number of graduating students takes precedence over the graduation standard, and teachers are concerned that human resources will suffer in the long run. As students are promoted to the higher grades, they cannot catch up with the course levels and have to drop out or graduate with poor qualifications.

In general, teachers' performance in the classroom is strongly impacted by their minimum wages, limited educational background and professional development, and the lack of instructional materials. The teachers' low performance and lacking qualifications in turn impact student learning and performance. Students in urban areas receive better quality education, greater opportunities and more access to better educational infrastructure than those in the rural and remote areas, because most qualified teachers, quality teaching materials and facilities are concentrated in the cities. These challenges impact academic growth and thwart educational development in Cambodia, constituting a huge obstacle to the vernacularization processes of genocide education since teachers perform the secondary level vernacularization on the ground. Accordingly, the above challenges have long-term implications on the dissemination and circulation of the globally generated ideas and strategies.

Practical Dilemma

To be impactful, globally generated genocide education practices must not only be adopted locally but must also possess practicality and what Levitt and Merry called “institutional teeth,” so that all beneficiaries at least recognize and realize the genocide

⁵⁸⁶ Face-to-face personal conversation between Khamboly Dy and officials of the Ministry of Education. The officials requested their name be anonymous for personal safety.

education values and how these values benefit them.⁵⁸⁷ The lack of practicality poses another challenge, or a practical dilemma facing genocide education in Cambodia.

The implementation of globally adopted ideas in Cambodian classrooms does not differ based on geography. DC-Cam's Genocide Education Project provides teachers with equal access to the same teaching materials, instructions and knowledge regardless of where the teachers come from. The numbers of texts, the extent of integration, teachers' knowledge regarding the new teaching methods, and teacher's awareness of the importance of genocide education have uniformly improved among the trained teachers.⁵⁸⁸

Local education officials, too, are aware of their role in implementing the new genocide education curriculum. In Peou Sambath, Deputy Head of Kampong Cham Office of Education, commented during the opening ceremony of the tenth commune teacher training workshop:

Many younger generations refuse to believe that violence and genocide happened in Cambodia. For this reason, I believed that this training is important and crucial to ensure that the younger generation will learn about the past and this tragic history so that it will not be forgotten."⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 457.

⁵⁸⁸ In the interviews, Im Mang, a high school teacher from Kratie province, commented, "I feel happy [because] I received more knowledge and experience from my participation in the training. I will use what I learned to explain the DK history [to my students] [to build on] the reconciliation process." Likewise, Hang Minea, a high school teacher from Kampong Cham, claimed to have gained new knowledge and experiences as she participated in the training. Minea said, "I feel it's different for those who come to study and those who don't come to study. Those who come know more of what happened in the DK period. I think the workshop is very good." Tuy Sokhoeum from Kampong Cham expressed similar opinions. As a young teacher born after the KR, Sokhoeum has frequently heard about the KR but says he was unsure whether he believes what he has heard: "Now that I've participate [in the training], I'm learning to believe more of what I've heard because the workshop provides a lot of materials for me so that I can verify the information."

⁵⁸⁹ For details, please see report on commune teacher training in Kampong Cham, http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/Report_On_Tenth_Commune_Teacher_Training_in_Kampong_Cham.pdf (accessed on September 21, 2013).

As of 2013, nearly two thousand secondary school and high school teachers nationwide have attended the training. Every school has received copies of the DK history textbook. More importantly, the incorporation of DC-Cam's DK history textbook and teaching methods from the guidebook into the official national curriculum in May 2011 marked an unprecedented step that spurred a more effective vernacularization and broader teaching of the subject.

However, Im Mang, who provided positive assessment on the trainings and agrees with the genocide education values, has a different opinion on the implementation of the new genocide education curriculum:

The trainees received the training, but it depends on their commitment if they will use what we've trained them to teach their students. I think that they will continue to teach the way the Ministry of Education required them to do and won't integrate the DC-Cam's training.⁵⁹⁰

Likewise, Sek Chamroeun, a high school Director from Prey Veng province who observed the conduct of his teachers who participated in the training, agreed with Mang's comments and added, "the trained teachers only give short messages as part of integration during their sessions. The whole teaching of KR history remains inactive."⁵⁹¹ DC-Cam's quality control assessment has shown similar results.⁵⁹² Very few schools have taken

⁵⁹⁰ Sreyneath Poole's Interview with Im Mang.

⁵⁹¹ Khamboly Dy's interview with Sek Chamroeun, Director of Hun Sen Kampong Trabek High School, Prey Veng, January 29, 2011.

⁵⁹² The quality control assessment is the national evaluation program conducted in cooperation between the Documentation Center of Cambodia and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport to assess the effectiveness of the teaching of "A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)" in Cambodian secondary school nationwide. Moreover, quality control is also deployed to assess recent and longer-term impacts of the Genocide Education Project on students, teachers, schools administrators, families and the community. The results are assessed to see if there are inconsistencies with the training objectives and the project's overall goals in order to identify challenges and solutions. With assistance from twenty national education experts and inspectors from the Ministry of Education, I travelled to and observed the classroom teaching of 78 selected secondary schools and high schools in all twenty-four provinces. I also had the opportunity to talk to and interview over three hundred teachers, students and local education officials.

initiative to integrate KR history, and the trained teachers hardly employ the new teaching methods during their instructions since the integration of any new teaching methods to be employed in schools have to be officially incorporated into the government-funded teacher guidebooks. Teachers teach only the part that has been accepted into the national curriculum.⁵⁹³ Implementing the rest of DC-Cam's materials depends on the teachers' desire, available time and conscience. The Cambodian national curriculum affords no flexibility to schools and teachers to modify their syllabi. A Ministry of Education official, Chin Yahan stated the following:

The [globally adopted] teaching methods are splendid and scientifically modern. They are very good. We have to admit that these foreign methods contain quality and can help children to quickly understand [the lessons]. However, to be applicable in the classrooms, we have to first integrate these methods into the Ministry of Education's teacher guidebook, which determines clear time, lessons and methods to be used. If it is outside the Ministry's guidebook, teachers will face difficulty in reconciling the two. Second, the implementation depends on teachers' will. If teachers do not have will, we cannot apply these methods. Teachers' will is linked to the incentive, salary and many other factors. Moreover, the methods need adequate teaching materials. For example, Jigsaw exercise requires each student to possess a copy of the textbook. In our situation, we cannot guarantee that each student possesses a copy on their hand. Another key challenge is that the teachers who understand and are able to use these methods are still small in number. Only certain number has attended the training. We need to ensure that all teachers from all schools know how to use these methods.⁵⁹⁴

Moreover, Cambodian teachers perceive the newly adopted teaching methods to be overloaded. Comments suggesting that the methodological instructions in the guidebook are too wide in scope seem to be recurring in all the training workshops. A provincial teacher from Kampong Cham commented that if he taught in an actual classroom, he would not have enough time to go through all the steps in the guidebook in

⁵⁹³ The Ministry of Education selected small sections of each chapter of the textbook “A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)” and incorporated it into the its social studies textbooks for grade 9 and grade 12.

⁵⁹⁴ Khamboly Dy’s interview with Chin Yahan, Curriculum Developer of the Department of Curriculum Development of the Ministry of Education, Kampong Cham, September 24, 2013.

which some instructions include multiple activities such as the discussion of key words, guided questions, substantive discussion, summaries and review.⁵⁹⁵ Likewise, Nguon Sophal said that group discussion would not be applied in the classrooms with students squeezing together into small tables. Sophal commented, “We cannot adopt their models and apply the whole thing. But we can take their models and modify them to fit into our situation.”⁵⁹⁶ Teachers recommended that the guidebook be revised to include instruction that takes into account how much flexibility teachers actually possess (or do not possess) in using and implementing the instructional methodologies.

The teachers additionally criticized the learning objectives of each lesson in the guidebook. Often times, teachers complained that the objectives did not speak to the course content. According to the government-funded teacher guidebooks, the objectives of each lesson in the guidebook correspond explicitly to the content in the student textbook. In the case of DC-Cam's guidebook, extra interactive activities are included. With new teaching methods, teachers are required to spend more time to guide students to work on other activities that are not related to the course content. For example, teachers are expected to guide students to engage in such activities as a survival box, guest speakers, film screenings, designing brochures, composing poems and conducting interviews. Teachers express concern about whether or not they can adhere to the stated objectives in the guidebook due to the practicality in the classrooms. As a result, during

⁵⁹⁵ For the details about the challenges facing Cambodian teachers during the provincial teacher training, please see the training's report at http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/DC-Cam_GEP_Training_Report.pdf (accessed on July 16, 2013), p. 135.

⁵⁹⁶ Khamboly Dy's Interview with Nguon Sophal.

the model teaching of the training, teachers employed less structured teaching techniques than was required by the guidebook.⁵⁹⁷

In addition, the implementation of the new teaching methods in DC-Cam's teacher's guidebook continues to challenge Cambodian traditional teaching practice, the teacher-centered approach.⁵⁹⁸ Teacher-student interaction was considerably low. Teachers make little efforts to encourage students to ask questions or be involved in activities that provoke students' critical thinking. The evaluation results showed that only 30.40% of the teachers encouraged their students to ask questions during the class. The other 69.60% give questions to students and encourage students to give the answers, in many cases, by citing directly from the textbooks.⁵⁹⁹ There was little evidence of active student-centered learning during the classroom observations. In addition, teachers used the dictation method in which they summarized the lessons on the board while students wrote the information down in their notebooks. Teachers appeared to spend a great deal of time lecturing and subsequently had trouble completing a lesson effectively. Moreover, teachers consistently ignored the underlying purpose of teaching about genocide by teaching the KR history simply as history with little consideration on the rationale, objectives, learning outcomes and its values.

⁵⁹⁷ The three-column, five-step classroom structure is a popular technique generally used by all teachers nationwide and officially endorsed by the Ministry of Education. The three columns include: teacher activities, course content and student activities. The five steps include: class administration, recalling old lesson, teaching, strengthening knowledge and homework.

⁵⁹⁸ During a provincial teacher training in Kampong Cham, instead of following the instructions in the guidebook, Sek Sokha incorporated his personal experiences during the KR into the teaching. Siv Thuon focused more on the fact-finding questions but less on discussions, while another national teacher, Mom Meth, was obsessively concerned about the method from her early lesson, which was the three-column and five-step technique. Another teacher commented, "I want to know if some parts of the teacher guidebook can be changed to suit the Cambodian style of teaching. I sometimes cannot relate the objectives to the lessons."

⁵⁹⁹ DC-Cam's quality control report.

Several other technical challenges also comprise the teachers' constraints in applying new teaching methods. The classroom structure, with fixed tables and chairs, does not allow students to move easily, so teachers are discouraged from practicing group work. Spatial constraints are further exacerbated by the typical large class size. On average, there were 40 to 50 students per class. Some classes contained more than 60 students or close to 100 students.⁶⁰⁰ These over-crowded conditions do not give teachers and students the chance to practice teaching methods that require the use of group work. Ros Sophea from a school in Prey Veng claimed, "If I use the methods in the guidebook such as Jigsaw or K-W-L, I would not be able to finish my lessons on time."⁶⁰¹ Sophea continued to use the traditional method, in which he asked students to read passages aloud in the class and then led a Q&A session. The teaching ended with a brief summary of what the students learned for the day. Teachers in most cases did not encourage debate, critique and analysis.

The implementation of genocide education is largely dependent on the desire and willingness of individual teachers. Most teachers taught the new genocide education curriculum through integration. The KR teaching is implemented as a small part of a larger lesson such as foreign history or geography study. The integration quality appeared to be strongly limited. All observed teachers integrated new materials through brief oral descriptions at one or several points during the regular teaching. When space was available, teachers would pose several fact-finding questions related to the KR, which lasted a few minutes, and then the teachers would return back to their regular lessons.

⁶⁰⁰ One classroom in a high school in Kampong Speu province contained over seventy-three students. When I led a team to observe this classroom, we did not have space to sit. I shared the table and chair with the students. I observed that students in the back rows did not listen to the teacher. They played among each other or with cell phones while the teacher appeared to have little control of the students' activities.

⁶⁰¹ Khamboly Dy's interview with Ros Sophea, M, Teacher, Svay Rieng High School, Svay Rieng province, February 3, 2011. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Ros Sophea]

This method has little impact on students' understanding about the genocide. The answers to the questions are based primarily on students' prior knowledge, which they learned from their parents, relatives and media sources.

Further, while local education officials agree in principle with the adopted global practices and local teachers are sympathetic to shared genocide education values and modern teaching methodologies, these educators tend to fall back to traditional practices due to practical consideration on the ground. Local practical constraints prevent the ability and willingness of the teachers from promoting global practices and oftentimes teachers fall back on traditional practices. As a result, the integration and teaching of the new genocide education curriculum are largely limited to teachers' will and commitment regardless of geographical area.

At this stage, although the Cambodian Ministry of Education has agreed in principle for the introduction of globally adopted practices, the local educators are the key agents who decide to what extent those global practices are adopted and in what way they are circulated and delivered in the classrooms along with the local content. Although the level of commitment to genocide education varies considerably among the local education officials and teachers, they serve to disseminate ideas and strategies about genocide education, creating a productive framework for pursuing and achieving shared global values. Therefore, all vernacularizers, especially DC-Cam, need to take into consideration not only the local culture and context but also the local practicality.

Political Dilemma

Political dilemma is usually embedded in the uses of the DK history textbook. There are contradicting positions between the way teachers perceive the DK history textbook and how they use it in the classrooms. The way teachers perceive and receive the history textbook is well vested. Teachers find the textbooks accurate and free from political biases. They also find that the textbook is detailed enough for students to learn about DK history and is appropriate for secondary school students. Among the observed teachers, 36.50% strongly agree; 61.50% simply agree; and 1.90% disagree.⁶⁰² With regard to the content of the textbook, 34.70% strongly agreed that the content of the textbook was detailed enough for students' knowledge of the DK regime while 53.10% simply agreed; 10.20% disagreed; and 2% strongly disagreed.⁶⁰³ The number of teachers who strongly agreed that the content of the textbook is appropriate for secondary school students was at 33.30%; while 64.70% simply agreed; and 2% disagreed.⁶⁰⁴

Whether or not the textbook can be accurately described as politically unbiased and appropriate for secondary school students, teachers and school directors still expressed fear of political constraints in using it. This sentiment was exacerbated by the fact that the DK history is more politically sensitive than any other history topic and that politics still play a role in current Cambodian genocide education. Seng, from a high school in Battambang province, said that history teachers in his school would not dare deviate from the approved social studies textbooks of the Ministry of Education.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰² DC-Cam's quality control report.

⁶⁰³ DC-Cam's quality control report.

⁶⁰⁴ DC-Cam's quality control report.

⁶⁰⁵ Khamboly Dy's interview with Seng Kun, M, Director of Net Yang High School, Battambang province, February 9, 2011. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Seng Kun]

Moreover, teachers were discouraged to answer political questions for fear of being blamed by higher education officials:

It is dangerous to try to write history when the leaders are still alive. The more we talk, the more we are wrong. We don't want to talk about a history that affects current leaders. Teachers need safety. The Ministry of Education published only a small portion of DK history in the social studies textbook; therefore, we cannot expect teachers to teach more than that. The [DC-Cam's] textbook is just a supplementary material. The teachers focus only on the Ministry's social studies textbooks. The teachers need to make sure that they finish all lessons in the social studies textbook for students' semester and final exams. When we keep integrating supplementary materials into the teaching, we won't be able to finish the Ministry's social study textbook on time, and this will affect students' exam scores as they prepare to graduate.⁶⁰⁶

Schools dare not take the liberty to teach from DK history textbook unless there is decision from the Ministry of Education to allow the schools to teach certain sections from the textbook. In the meantime, schools follow strictly the social study textbooks of the Ministry of Education. There has to be a new procedure from the Ministry."⁶⁰⁷

These fearful comments gave a sense that Cambodian educators are not immune from political pressures, which in turn affect the content and instructional strategies in the classrooms. New generations' historical learning is deeply intertwined with the politics of memory. As a result, students' knowledge on KR history remains largely limited, and the lack of historical knowledge poses a threat to the country's democratic culture, which is extremely young and fragile. The quality of history education, particularly KR history, poses substantial obstacles and questions and needs improvement.

The above dilemmas do not demonstrate that the local traditional practices are effective. Local educators find the globally adopted genocide education practices ideal for the students' educational development but tended to fall back to traditional practices, and in some cases appeared to resist the global practices, because of the educational

⁶⁰⁶ Khamboly Dy's interview with It Brosoeut, M, Director of Hun Sen Phnom Sampov High School, Battambang province, February 12, 2011. [Hereinafter Khamboly Dy's interview with Ith Prasoeut]

⁶⁰⁷ Khamboly Dy's interview with Sek Chamroeun, Director of Hun Sen Kampong Trabek High School, Prey Veng, January 29, 2011.

obstacles, the local political constraints and practical considerations in the actual Cambodian classroom situation.

5. Conclusion

In post-conflict Cambodia, contemporary genocide education programs are influenced, determined and shaped by three important factors: the local NGOs' initiatives, the government's policies and broader national political struggles, and the flow of global practices. These factors have far-reaching implications on the genocide education values promulgated in Cambodia today. Political constraints and global influences continue to play competing roles even at this stage with regard to how post-conflict Cambodia is to face its genocidal past.

On the one hand, politics continues to play integral role on the way Cambodians choose to remember their past. Although democracy and rule of law in Cambodia have remained fragile in recent years and there are still political constraints on the way the genocide should be taught in the formal schools, there has been considerable enthusiasm allowing for the endorsement of the KR texts in the official curricula, the nationwide teacher training, the endorsement of the teaching and integration of KR history into various social studies subjects (although as a minor teaching), and the government's support for DC-Cam's mission for genocide education and research for fifty years and beyond. However, the political climate regarding the KR issues outside the classroom has remained acute due largely to the repeated use of KR rhetoric for political gains. Highlighting the KR crimes and promoting the CPP's leaders as the saviors of the nation remains the fundamental strategy for the CPP to gain people's votes and to preserve its

political momentum. In contrast, implicating the CPP in the KR atrocities and identifying it as including former KR members and later Vietnamese puppets has always been the opposition party's strategy for similar political endeavors. The allegations by politicians have created longstanding speculation with regard to the accuracy of the KR history. The political rhetoric has implications for young students' understanding and the way memory is being remembered and preserved.

On the other hand, DC-Cam's organizational characteristics have determined how the KR past is being taught and what genocide education activities are implemented. DC-Cam, as an independent non-governmental organization, has built a large network at home and abroad, which shapes the Center's work, objectives, missions and visions—the achievements of which in turn shape government policies and the agendas of the international stakeholders. The genocide education project has been the product of combined local initiatives and global influences. However, DC-Cam has been selective in forging partnerships and in adopting global practices. DC-Cam has aimed to avoid too much global dominance, as the local initiatives sometimes question the boundaries of not only global concepts, but also the contents and pedagogy of teaching genocide in Cambodia, although global influences and global flows of certain practices have been inevitable and undeniably useful. In some cases, DC-Cam has ruled out certain global notions or has at least vested itself in local initiatives. As the dominant institution working in the field of genocide education in Cambodia, and an intermediary vernacularizer in the vernacularization processes, DC-Cam's position and choice to adopt a particular global partner, concept or model has shaped the way genocide education is

implemented in Cambodia, how the young Cambodians are educated, and how Cambodia chooses to remember its genocidal past.

The intersection of local initiatives and the flow of global practices are achieved through the vernacularization mechanism—the process of reconciling local and global differences and cultivating practical ways through which global practices can have a meaningful place in the local context and are appropriated within the local culture and the existing local ideologies and initiatives. Within the vernacularization processes, DC-Cam has undertaken six important measures: adoption, combination and compromise, followed by appropriation, transmission and circulation. The adoption process includes both global genocide education practices (teaching rationale and learning objectives and outcomes) and global education philosophies. However, Cambodian genocide education makes almost exclusive use of local content, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*, with minimal global content (the history of the Holocaust, ethnic cleansing in Former Yugoslavia, Rwandan genocide and mass execution in Iraq), which are integrated as part of the comparative genocide study in the *Teacher's Guidebook*. The history of the Holocaust and those of other genocides have an extremely small space and may not be easily integrated into the Cambodian genocide education mainstream due partly to the politics of memory, as discussed in Chapter Two. The actual teaching of the Holocaust and other cases of genocide in Cambodia today can be described as a near silence given the practical limitations discussed in this chapter.

The success or failure of genocide education, in general, and the vernacularization process, in particular, is significantly linked to the development of the local general education system, which has faced a number of key challenges regarding the depth and


scope of content to methodologies and logistical issues. One of the persistent challenges is the continued practice of the traditional teacher-centered approach and the capacity and qualification of the teachers who have little or no professional development or access to new educational resources. The education system operates under a nationally-endorsed, standardized curriculum. It is this sole curriculum that all teachers and students must follow. This kind of curriculum limits the ability and willingness of the teachers and students to use extra materials and resources, thereby limiting students' knowledge and the quality of the education at-large. Moreover, teachers fear retribution for addressing sensitive issues that deviate from the national curriculum. This fear culminates in limitations on the scope of students' general knowledge.

The inefficiency of the Cambodian education system has matured into an institutional norm as many educators, accustomed to certain professional dynamics, have become deeply entrenched within a system that prioritizes tradition over innovation, experience, intellect and seniority over merit. Unsurprisingly, the quality of education today has been impacted by the long history of conflict, war, violence and political instability that persisted for nearly three decades (1970-1998). The quality of education is linked to the economic, social and political development of the country that lacks institutionalization and the rule of law. The development and operation of public institutions are largely determined by political elites and the rich. Moreover, the education system has been severely lacking in qualified experts to produce effective curricula, reliable contents and to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of education.

Cambodian genocide education can serve as a model for future quests to launch or enhance similar genocide education programs in other post-conflict countries. As noted

earlier in the introduction, there have been a number of cases in which the local initiatives contradict global practices due to a lack of consideration of how the vernacularization process can mediate the gaps between the two spheres, as well as a lack of respect and understanding for local cultures and contexts. Post-conflict genocide education efforts modeled after the one DC-Cam has designed and implemented in Cambodia will continue to inform other similar programs in many countries currently facing violent conflicts or near-genocides like in South Sudan, Central Africa, Somalia and Myanmar. The successful experiences and dilemmas of the Cambodian genocide education endeavor provide insights for both local vernacularizers and global sources on measures that need to be planned carefully and strategically when local and global initiatives converge toward shared goals. The dilemmas and misconceptions about the Cambodian genocide embedded in the minds of the young people makes it even more critical that objective and politically-unbiased genocide education be effectively pursued and implemented in a more timely, sensitive and aggressive manner than it has been before.

Illustration 6: Cover of the Teacher's Guidebook: The Teaching of "A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)" (DC-Cam's Archives)



CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTION OF GENOCIDE EDUCATION IN POST- CONFLICT CAMBODIA

Since its inception in 1979, genocide education in Cambodia has been constructed and shaped in four different stages. From a more ideological system, genocide education developed into more marginalized teaching, then to an institutionalized program, and finally to the current genocide education that is grounded in local initiatives, fostered by the adoption and adaptation of global practices through the vernacularization process. In other words, Cambodian genocide education was under control of the state for fourteen years and endured another eleven years of marginalization. Both a local NGO (DC-Cam) and the Cambodian government spent four years addressing and galvanizing public opinion and shaping public policy in order to institutionalize and formalize the genocide education that exists today in Cambodia.

The focus of this dissertation research was to examine how politics shape and determine the way Cambodia teaches about the genocide, and in what ways and to what extent the existing local genocide education initiatives adopt and adapt global genocide education practices. The primary assumption this dissertation holds is that national political developments constrained, and in some cases dictated, the content of the KR history, the way teachers portray the history in classrooms and how young children understand it. Political constraints remain active today. Though politics do not directly suppress the historical content and pedagogical practices in Cambodian schools, it continues to dictate historical accuracy in the public political platforms, which have far-

reaching implications on the Cambodian people's memory of the KR genocide. Another basic assumption is that genocide education in Cambodia is grounded in local culture and initiatives and improves upon adopted and adapted global practices through vernacularization, involving not only the adoption process but also the processes of combination, compromise, appropriation, transmission and circulation of globally adopted ideas and strategies. The transmission and circulation processes are facilitated by various vernacularizers, especially DC-Cam's staff members, functioning as intermediary vernacularizers, with local teachers serving as secondary-level vernacularizers.

The ways in which local initiatives interact with global practices through the vernacularization processes have uniquely combined to form a new pattern of post-conflict global-local genocide education that is being promulgated in Cambodia today. The approach that Cambodia has taken to construct the intertwined global-local genocide education program has culminated in a new theory of genocide education that can serve as a model for other post-conflict situations. The study and understanding of how political/ideological genocide education was constructed in the 1980s, as well as its implications for the education system and national development at-large, illuminated the approaches DC-Cam, the current Cambodian government and concerned international stakeholders have taken to develop a new global-local genocide education.

Evidence from this research further suggests that it is crucially important to engage current education conditions that strongly shape the ways teachers deliver lessons, especially when teachers are designated to teach a new genocide education curriculum that requires them to integrate new values, teaching objectives and outcomes, and teaching methods that alter traditional teaching practices. Equally important is the fact


that teachers' knowledge about KR history has eroded substantially due to the long absence and marginalization of the subject. Teachers' confidence in implementing the new curriculum is determinative of the success and failure of the new global-local genocide education.

The study also suggests that for a local post-conflict genocide education program to be successful, it may well require the commitment and political will of a global super power to sponsor an effective mechanism to deal with the genocidal legacies, at least politically, if not also financially and legally. The support of one or more major world powers has proven critical in addressing with other issues such as democratic reforms and human rights progress in the developing world. For example, the establishment of the ICTR and the ICTY would not have been possible or may have encountered great challenges without the backing of super powers. However, post-genocide countries must consider and manage major powers' politics and their international interests and agendas. Most often, the world powers' political and financial support come with a set of agendas. The U.S.' ongoing political and financial support to DC-Cam and the future Sleuk Rith Institute discouraged other major powers such as China, Japan, France and Germany to provide assistance or forge any substantive collaboration, as DC-Cam is perceived to be American-funded NGO and suspected of serving American interests and foreign policy.

This concluding chapter analyzes the process of constructing a new global-local genocide education approach that revolves around the values of the new state system and the extent to which new meanings of the KR history were reconstructed in the formal secondary and high school curricula. It will also address the dilemmas facing the

implementation of the new genocide education curriculum and offers a new theory to ongoing debates on genocide education.

Diagram 6: Global-Local Genocide Education



1. The Politics of Post-Conflict Genocide Education

This dissertation shows that post-conflict Cambodian genocide education has changed with national political patterns, and that this process has always been determined, and in some cases dictated, by politics. The study further shows that the historical narratives have shifted to suit contemporary political agendas. Political compromises and negotiations led to a particular education policy that marginalized

historical content. Education officials working under political constraints usually entail selective history.

Specifically, genocide education during the 1980s under the PRK regime was constructed along the line of the PRK's policies and other primary state-building imperatives. This study suggests that genocide education during this period was a political genocide education or state-sponsored ideological genocide education caught within the responsibility of constructing a common revolutionary consciousness and vigilance, especially the long-lasting solidarity and fraternal friendship between Cambodia and Vietnam, the construction of Soviet-oriented socialism, the fight against the return of the KR and the glorification of the very existence of the new regime. A study of various school textbooks produced in the 1980s showed that politics marginalized historical facts and conveyed political messages to the people—especially to young children. The government-funded history textbooks mentioned the glorious events of the ruling regime and talked about all the negative aspects of the defeated regimes, leaving no space for students to analyze and evaluate the historical complexities.

In the politically-charged, propagandistic, PRK-influenced context, the crucial relationship between state apparatuses and the people was constantly emphasized through textbooks and public speeches of the political leaders. The past experiences of civil war and genocide became effective pretexts for politicians to gain political advantages. According to textbooks, the existence of the state, the party and the prominent political figures appeared to automatically translate to the happiness of the people. Failure to support, love and devote oneself to the state and the party could result in political instability, war or even the return of the KR genocide or other violent conflicts. These

textbooks thus served as instruments for the PRK government to construct national memory and identity, controlling education via national master narratives.

The study further shows that prolonged political conflicts and instability have implications on the way national memory and history curriculum are developed. During the 1990s, one of the political priorities with regard to the KR was to court KR defections. As discussed in Chapter Four, although UNTAC and international communities brought about peace and democracy to Cambodia and ushered in a number of global practices, they failed to end internal conflicts among Cambodian rivalries, particularly between the newly elected RGC and the remaining KR remnants. In this contentious situation, Hun Sen launched a win-win policy that touched the hearts of the KR soldiers and their family members. This policy defined a new meaning of life for the remnants of the KR by granting them semi-autonomy over their occupied areas and affording them the rights to live and possess all properties and positions in their strongholds. It gave the KR the necessary confidence to defect to the government, one after another, the last defection of which occurred in Anlong Veng in December 1998, ending the almost two decades of internal conflict. Hun Sen, while representing and receiving a mandate from his CPP party, has on many occasions claimed credit for ending the genocide, saving millions of lives, rebuilding the country with his bare hands, and bringing about ultimate peace to Cambodia.⁶⁰⁸ Hun Sen has used these major achievements to gain political advantages, to suppress the opposition, and to silence the international criticisms about the increasing authoritarianism of the government. With

⁶⁰⁸ Presentation by Ros Chantrabot, Hun Sen's personal adviser, on "The Path to Peace in Cambodia." He concluded that Hun Sen and the CPP are the major actors in bringing about final peace and political stability in Cambodia, http://d.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/pdf/Seminar_for_Army_Officers_and_Students.pdf, published June 8, 2013. (Accessed June 12, 2013).

criticisms from the international community and the UN Special Rapporteur to Cambodia on issues of human rights and freedom of expression, Hun Sen countered, "When the KR were killing and gravely abusing people's lives and human dignity, where were the UN and the international communities? Why didn't you come in and help?"⁶⁰⁹ These undeniable credits determined, or at least influenced, the national memory and the ways teachers have since taught about the KR genocide.

In 2000s, teaching genocide in Cambodian classrooms encountered a new set of political marginalization, this time by the government's policies toward peace and reconciliation at the expense of justice and memory. As discussed in Chapter Five, the notions of bringing a larger number of KR leaders to justice and remembering the KR genocide through formal classroom education were not the government's priorities. The last phase of the current Cambodian genocide education sees both the remarkable improvement in the field with improved content and pedagogy and the return to political manipulations in which the CPP and the opposition CNRP used the KR rhetoric as their whole political campaign toward the July, 2013 national election. In any circumstance, KR history, as well as the Cambodian genocide, belongs to the people. Using KR rhetoric to survive political shifts only serves to damage the objective of genocide education and the important steps toward establishing national memory, peace, justice, reconciliation and genocide prevention. To achieve these endeavors, students need not only to understand and analyze the historical complexities but also to engage in a deeper academic research.

⁶⁰⁹ Hun Sen gave this kind of speech which was broadcasted on several TVs owned by his families and his aids.

Politically-charged genocide education culminated in great challenges for all involved stakeholders in reformulating the genocide education values from those that served state political objectives and those that are marginalized by politics to values that embrace local and global norms. The ways in which Cambodia has dealt with this situation creates a unique theoretical contribution to cultivating objective genocide education in post-conflict countries.

2. Constructing Global-Local Genocide Education

Constructing and reformulating post-conflict Cambodian genocide education has been a long, complicated and enduring process since it has undergone a lengthy period of politicization and marginalization. Post-conflict genocide education has always been conditioned by politics and changes in political patterns of the emerging governments. It has also been influenced by the global ideas and practices, which flowed into Cambodia at various political junctures and through different agents. As such, the new genocide education ideas and strategies have had to account for political conditions and government bureaucracy. At the same time, these ideas must adopt and adapt global ideas and strategies to strengthen the existing local initiatives. In other words, the construction and reformulation of the new genocide education approach has to not only be associated with the global genocide education values and resonate with the local culture and context, but also be appropriate with the broader national political struggles that determine the education system around which the new genocide education pattern revolves.

The construction of the global-local genocide education in post-conflict Cambodia began with the cultivation of local genocide education initiatives, addressing

of public opinions, shaping of public policy, institutionalization of the existing local genocide education initiatives and finally, vernacularization of global practices. Each process involved social, political, pedagogical and practical dilemmas.

Cultivating Local Initiatives

The genocide education initiative in Cambodia is a grassroots movement encouraged and fostered by the flow of global ideas, strategies and values. It began with the personal impulses of the KR survivors and the corresponding institutional goals of DC-Cam in preserving memory, fostering justice and preventing the recurrence of genocide. Through experiences sharing and understanding each other's stories, both victims and former KR cadres reinforced their shared collective memory and helped encourage study in formal schools, although, in some cases, sharing of collective memory is difficult to achieve in a post-conflict society. Yet the reinforcement of personal stories during the KR gives meaning to the people's very survival of the KR atrocities. Thus, the Cambodian people stand proudly as a testament to mankind's resilience in the face of traumatic experiences. The grassroots understanding and desire for a more comprehensive teaching of the KR genocide has been a crucial driving force behind the genocide education initiative.

The local genocide education initiative was enhanced by a number of local and global catalysts. This foundation included the passionate survivors preserving the KR memory and searching for the truth by educating their young about the KR genocide; the early flow of international human rights regimes and democracy; international efforts in collecting and preserving the original KR archives; and many publications by both

Cambodian survivors and foreign scholars. The cultivation of these local initiatives attempted to and succeeded in building momentum behind genocide education in Cambodia.

With the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, Cambodia began to open its doors to the outside world and transformed itself from a communist system to a liberal democracy. The arrival of UNTAC and international humanitarian assistance and the creation of local NGOs channeled the global flows of international human rights practices and democracy. These global flows and the growths of the local NGOs served as catalysts that triggered the genocide education initiatives.

In addition, the change in American foreign policies, from supporting the KR in the 1980s to bringing the KR leaders to justice after 1991, created greater momentum behind genocide education in Cambodia. The promulgation of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act in 1994 provided the legal framework for an official investigation into the KR crimes, and led to the establishment of DC-Cam. After it gained independence in 1997, DC-Cam began mobilizing local and international support and advocating for genocide education along with DC-Cam's support for the ECCC. These early global flows and American initiatives and local efforts on documentation and research played significant roles in building up momentum behind genocide education in Cambodia.

Addressing Public Opinions and Shaping Public Policy

In post-conflict Cambodia, where education about the history of the genocide was politically propagandized, where the people have been exposed to a number of misleading interpretations of the past, and where the young sorely lack fundamental

understanding of the genocide history, addressing and galvanizing public opinions proved to be a strategic measure in the larger genocide education process. Accordingly, DC-Cam launched multiple informal activities to galvanize public awareness and inform the public about genocide education and its values and importance. The objective was to insert the demands and concerns of genocide education into all levels of public debate, nationally and internationally. In this regard, this study shows that the success of constructing and reformulating post-conflict genocide education requires efforts and commitments beyond the formal education system and beyond state-controlled activities. In fact, informal genocide education activities conducted by DC-Cam outside the school system were the primary catalysts behind the construction and reformulation processes. These informal activities led to local genocide education initiatives, which then engaged with the formal education system to create fundamental groundwork upon which to adopt and adapt global practices.

The Center's *Searching for the Truth* magazine has been at the forefront of this informal public education since its first publication in 2000. This monthly publication became a channel through which DC-Cam communicated with Cambodian villagers, policy makers and international stakeholders. The magazine allows space for public debates, scholarly commentaries and historical narrations, all of which have helped cultivate common knowledge and shared values in genocide education.

Public education forums with villagers, teachers and students in remote areas of Cambodia have ensured that genocide education initiatives reach out to all parts of the country and that the local demands and desires are communicated back to the initiators

and the policy makers. More importantly, the forums encourage inter-generational dialogue within the communities.

In addition, the publication of the first-ever textbook of its kind, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*, marked strong momentum in genocide education. The textbook became the linchpin, holding together the common interests of teachers, students, policy makers and the general population. The textbook represents local content and local initiatives that provided the foundation for connecting with global practices.

The addressing public opinion process, in return, has allowed genocide education actors to be able to galvanize public opinion, as the actors interact directly with the key beneficiaries—villagers, students and teachers—at which time the actors learn the ways and appropriate content for the KR history to be introduced to students in formal schooling. In past practices, public opinion that is usually contested was largely ignored and poorly measured by both politicians and non-governmental actors. Public opinion forms an important part of the genocide education-related measures and policies that inform global-local genocide education today.

The desire of the people is positively related to new genocide education values. Achieving value congruence in post-conflict Cambodia has been one of DC-Cam's success stories. DC-Cam has spent over a decade working with the people to address public opinions and to engage with the government to shape public policy. This has been a complicated process and has involved personal and professional efforts to gauge a variety of different stakeholders and to mobilize common interests and beliefs.

Institutionalizing Genocide Education

The institutionalization process was marked by the integration of KR history into the official curriculum. This process required cooperation with government departments and the schools, meaning that DC-Cam had to work within the government structure, policies and hierarchy. Using strategic diplomacy, DC-Cam has sought cooperation, rather than confrontation with the government. In this sense, DC-Cam has done less policy advocacy work but has instead provided constructive recommendations for improvement. Within this approach, DC-Cam has achieved several stages of agreement with the government, which led to the signing of the first formal Memorandum of Understanding for a formal collaboration on the existing genocide education initiatives. A *Teacher's Guidebook* was developed, followed by a series of teacher training workshops, which trained over three thousand teachers nationwide. By 2011, the Cambodian Ministry of Education had incorporated part of DC-Cam's history textbook into the official curricula of secondary schools and high schools. As public support for the genocide education vision, teaching materials, and policy and legal frameworks fell into place, genocide education became formally institutionalized.

Vernacularizing Global Practices

DC-Cam has used the KR genocide as a starting point and utilized, adopted and adapted global practices as a guide to promote memory, genocide prevention and reconciliation and to teach compassion, tolerance and forgiveness—all of which are at the core of global-local genocide education values. DC-Cam has used both local and global resources to formulate its genocide education approach. However, global ideas and

strategies cannot be simply transferred to the local context, as such swift and heedless global application would result in three implications. First, local educators would likely resist new approaches that contradict traditional ideas and practices. Second, overtly global approaches may bypass the competency of the local educators. Third, the existing local genocide education initiatives have been deeply vested in the local education system; therefore, the combination, reconciliation and compromise between the existing local initiatives and the global practices must be cultivated through the vernacularization approach. This approach in the Cambodian context includes the adoption, combination, compromise, appropriation, transmission and circulation processes.

Vernacularization, as Levitt and Merry argued, allows global practices to resonate with the local initiatives without marginalizing the global principles. They commented, “Not just values and norms matter. The identities, concepts and categories that underlie them also determine, in large measure, the degree to which it is possible to translate something into a communicable message with appeal to potential recipients.”⁶¹⁰ In this sense, the term “genocide education” was simplified to be “the teaching of *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*.” The simplified terms evoked a sense in Cambodian teachers that they are working on their own history and dealing with their own difficult past. In other words, this simplification was intended to convince local education officials and teachers that the new genocide education ideas have deep foundations in Cambodian history and culture. The term “genocide education” has primarily been used only in official documents and communications among DC-Cam's staff members and with international stakeholders. The underlying concepts of genocide

⁶¹⁰ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 451.

education remain pervasive in local genocide education initiatives, but the way it is presented differs due to the Cambodian social, political and historical contexts.

The next process of genocide education required the cultivation of the “genocide education values packages” constituted by shared ideas and beliefs held not only by the local people but also by international stakeholders. These packages include the concepts of memory, genocide prevention, reconciliation and historical empathy. The values packages both inform the practices of genocide education on the ground and retain the shared notions of global values packages discussed in Chapter Two. DC-Cam has framed its Genocide Education Project around these concepts as they both resonate with the Cambodian people's desires and needs and are consistent with the Cambodian government's policy.

The Cambodian genocide education values reflect a unique example of how theories of global genocide education practices are transformed into reality in response to past mass atrocities. Genocide education in Cambodia has traveled over a rocky, twisting road on a vehicle of political fluctuation, which has shaped its values packages. A long tradition of ineffective education and political conflicts also shaped the way genocide education was understood and perceived in Cambodian classrooms.

Moreover, the vernacularization of genocide education is coordinated through a number of agents who function as vernacularizers and who present the global ideas and strategies in terms that resonate with local Cambodian teachers. According to Levitt and Merry, “vernacularizers are people in between, conversant with both sides of the exchange but able to move across borders of ideas and approaches.”⁶¹¹ DC-Cam has bridged the gaps between local educators and global stakeholders (international partners,

⁶¹¹ Ibid., Levitt and Merry, 449.

scholars, experts, activists, practitioners and donors). DC-Cam functions as an intermediary vernacularizer whose role is to convey the global education philosophies and global genocide education ideas to the local vernacularizers and the beneficiaries. In this capacity, DC-Cam is familiar with the needs and desires of both sides and can also control the flows of ideas and approaches back and forth between the global sources and the local vernacularizers.

As a vernacularizer, DC-Cam has gathered strategic partners locally and internationally to foster genocide education. Maintaining congenial relationships with the government and international networking partners has been DC-Cam's strategy in articulating the vernacularization processes. DC-Cam has conducted public outreach through the media, which plays an important role in the dissemination, transmission and circulation of the globally generated ideas. DC-Cam has used various technological mediums such as radio broadcasts, television and internet as channels of communication. Finally, the teacher training workshops facilitated by DC-Cam are a means to circulate new global-local genocide education practices within the formal education system.

Local teachers who participate in the teacher training workshops and education officials who work with DC-Cam's Genocide Education Project are second-level vernacularizers. This group usually does not travel outside of their locales to absorb global ideas directly, but they do have the opportunity to interact with the international stakeholders, albeit through DC-Cam's mediation. The teachers, some of whom are direct victims of the KR and had direct exposure to the suffering throughout the KR period, know how genocide education mechanisms might help to alleviate their own emotional pain as well as to develop their damaged post-conflict country at large.

Teachers are determinant agents who not only carry out the vernacularization processes but also determine the success of the implementation of the global-local genocide education in schools. In other words, they are not only the ground vernacularizers but also the agents who work to change students' behaviors and attitudes by inculcating the genocide education values into the classroom. Therefore, teachers require a large support system in terms of materials and professional development and other incentives from both DC-Cam and the government. Teachers also need support from the local villagers to serve as references for students within the framework of teaching genocide in schools.

Although DC-Cam has strong ties with the local government and international institutions that are advancing Holocaust/genocide education, its work to promote genocide education is not limited only to supporting government ideals of genocide education or those of the international institutions. DC-Cam also encourages more expansive, globally-informed genocide education practices, broader global education philosophies and student-centered teaching approaches which contribute to better education and a better society at large. DC-Cam serves to balance local positions with those of the global stakeholders and institutions.

3. Considering Dilemmas

Vernacularization of genocide education faced educational, practical and political dilemmas due largely to the limitations of the Cambodian education system and the political nature of the subject itself. Teachers agree in principle with the globally adopted and adapted education philosophies and genocide education practices, which for them are

applicable, relevant and resonant with the Cambodian context. However, local educational constraints—including the limited capacity and professional development of the teachers, teachers' incentives, students' dropout and truancy rates, shortages of teaching materials, lack of teaching facilities and the non-functioning libraries that cannot accommodate students' research—prevent teachers from fully and effectively implementing the globally-generated ideas and strategies in the classrooms. The study suggests that within the vernacularization processes, genocide education values and ideas need not only resonate with existing local initiatives and be appropriated with local culture and context, but also must consider the technical practical conditions. It is the actual practical implementation on-the-ground that pushes the vernacularization processes to its meaningful success and establishes the legitimacy of the new global-local genocide education.

Tension and contradictions between local initiatives and global practices, between local political orders and global values, and between the global education philosophies and the traditional teaching practices must be mediated, reconciled and compromised at all levels. It has always been difficult to find the right balance between the genocide education goals set in the new curriculum and the practicality of using it on the ground since the local implementers—the teachers—have problems with the depth of the content and their knowledge continues to be shaped by past traumatic experiences and educational legacies that inform their attitudes and teaching delivery. The teachers who are using the new curriculum need to make a lot of changes and revisit their own capacities including their attitudes, practices, knowledge, skills, methodologies and teaching values. It is very difficult to minimize the impact of the past genocide education

practices and education practices, in general, on the new genocide education curriculum. However, both local education officials and teachers are much more open to recognizing the gaps within the local education system and are willing to not only be exposed to the new globally generated ideas, but also to learn and share them. More importantly, they have tried to put global ideas into practice despite the local practical and political constraints.

DC-Cam's relationships with its donors form another dilemma in the vernacularization processes. As Liu argued, "International influences on the NGO's goals and daily practices are readily apparent."⁶¹² In many cases, donors introduce different agendas with funding. Nonetheless, DC-Cam has largely survived donors' political agendas by avoiding donors who provide funding with too many strings attached. This decision reflects the framework within which the vernacularization process operates. However, the international networks that DC-Cam has built expose DC-Cam to new ideas and strategies about genocide education. The post-Holocaust education values packages and teaching guidelines have served as a reference point that DC-Cam has reframed and reformulated to parallel its genocide education objectives.


DC-Cam tactically cultivated common ground among local political agendas and global genocide education values, an approach that can both ensure the government's confidence and support and maintain global principles. The Center invites high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Education and international scholars to serve on its textbook and guidebook review committees as a kind of "insurance policy."⁶¹³ The new global-local genocide education has been codified into an official tool, which all teachers are

⁶¹² Ibid., Meng Liu, Yanhong Hu and Minli Liao, 541.

⁶¹³ Ibid., Meng Liu, Yanhong Hu and Minli Liao, 550.

required to use during the course of their instructions on KR history. This official status endows it with authority that has broad influence on the local education system at large.

Diagram 7: Construction of Global-Local Genocide Education



5. Future Research

One of the most appealing fields of future research that emerges from this study is an assessment of the effectiveness of implementing the new genocide education approach in Cambodian classrooms. Teacher trainers and local teachers, though they have completed the training workshops, remain concerned not only about the various issues described in this dissertation but also about their capacity to teach in an effective manner. Although genocide education has been conducted since 1979, the implementation of the new curriculum and teacher trainings created by DC-Cam represents the first time that Cambodian teachers have undergone formal professional preparation to introduce Khmer Rouge history into classrooms in a balanced and unbiased manner. Research on the effectiveness of the new curriculum and the teacher training for professional development is a logical next step.

The research on this issue should include development of a tool for evaluating, assessing, monitoring, guaranteeing and improving the quality of applying the new curriculum in the official school setting. Analysis of the results will increase teacher effectiveness and ensure that teachers are comfortable as well as accountable in their contexts as professional educators. The research will provide recommendations about areas in which teachers can improve or benefit. Teachers have to make a commitment to teaching Khmer Rouge history and the history of other cases of genocide and mass atrocities accurately and guide their students away from emotional anger. Further research will provide teachers with knowledge and confidence in their abilities to make changes to their teaching. The research will also provide recommendations for continued support and follow-up to which teachers can refer for guidance. Teachers should also be

given the opportunity to learn from their fellow teachers, sharing experiences and having a dialogue about various teaching methods.

The suggested research will investigate the impact that the new curriculum and the professional development trainings have had on teaching performance, student learning, and on the schools and the community at large. Future researchers who delve into this topic should be able to answer the following questions: Are teachers able to apply the knowledge, skills, and teaching methodologies gained from the training workshops in their classrooms? How much content from the textbook, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)*, are teachers able to use in their classrooms?

To ensure the sustainable progress of genocide education, teacher effectiveness must be evaluated. Though teachers must conform to existing education policies and the government-endorsed curriculum, they are the key actors in setting up the classroom environment, organizing student learning, and managing the overall plan and structure of the teaching-learning process. It is the teacher who outlines the goals and objects of a given project and performs the related teaching tasks. Therefore, undertaking the evaluation, data collection and analysis to determine strengths and weaknesses in both the curriculum and the transfer of training into practice is essential to ensure the effectiveness and the efficiency of teaching about genocide in Cambodia.

Appendix 1: Lessons from the 1984 PRK Textbook: Criminal Act of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan on Chhay Ny's Family

Lesson 1: Criminal Act of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan on Chhay Ny's Family

After 17 April 1975, Chhay Ny's family was evacuated from their hometown by Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan. This family was seriously tortured. The genocidal criminals had killed her mother and her younger siblings in a serious manner which has had never been seen in human history. One day Chhay Ny met her old friend "Neary" at a park. They happily ran toward each other. After being asked by Nary about the family's condition, Chhay Ny teared up and said, "My families, my mother, my two younger siblings, and me, were evacuated by Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Kieu Samphan from Chheu Khmao village, Chheu Khmao sub-district, Svay Torng district, Kandal province to Phnom Tauch in Pur Sat province. After knowing that may father joined the revolution in Vietnam, they considered my families as enemies and forced us to do very hard work. They asked us to cut down forests from 20 to 30 square meters per day. We gradually became thinner and thinner because of food shortage and overwork. One day in 1978, a militiaman named Seng requested for one of my younger siblings to kill for food. Hearing this word, we were very taken aback. My mother wept with sorrow and remorse. However, after 17 April 1975, would we be able to reject their word "request"? They seized one of my siblings from my mother's hands.

Chhay Ny stopped for a while, wiped up her tear and continued, "I secretly looked at their activities. The killing of my sibling was very cruel. After killing, they cut some part of my sibling's flesh and bones and put on the already prepared tree leaves. I told my

mother about this action. My mother came to see and was hit until she died. On that time, I was very frightened; I ran back home and asked the other sibling of mine to escape from the village. They followed us and my sibling was caught and hit to death with butt. I managed to escape and reached one village called Ro Vieng in Pur Sat province. I met United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea's soldiers and Vietnamese soldiers. I would be survived. However, I still remembered my parents and siblings. Bones of one of my siblings that had been cut off from the flesh were still in my brain. Nary said, "of course, they are very cruel. Just only more than three years, more than three million of our people had been killed. Therefore, we have to raise high revolutionary spirit in fighting against any kind of their tricks. Moreover, we have to convert this painful anger to be the struggling strengths in order to build up and defense our country to be more prosperous and stable forever.

Text Explanation

A. Pronunciation

Spirit	[sma-r-dei]
Sustainability	[thet-the]
Forever	[ni-ron]

B. Vocabulary

Event (noun): anything that happens, story

Butt (noun): the handle of a rifle

Forever (adverb): that have no loophole, that exist for long time

C. Homologous Meaning

Forever: ever, always, incessantly, persistently, continually

D. Multiple Meaning

- Multiple meaning of the word "Trim"

Trim (verb): to cut into a hedge or small pieces (e.g. to trim banana leave)

Trim (verb): cut (e.g. to trim hairline)

- Multiple meaning of the word "Recover" which has three meaning in Khmer

"recover", "to be" and "name of a kind of snake).

Recover (adjective): become well again

Be (model verb): word used to indicate noun to have a separate meaning. (e.g. knowledge is a tremendous property.)

Name of a Snake (noun): a name of a kind of snake with strong poison.

Appendix 2: Lesson from 2007 DK History Textbook: Chapter 7: Daily Life during Democratic Kampuchea

The Creation of Cooperatives

During the 1970-1975 civil war, most of the people living in the areas liberated by the Khmer Rouge were organized into “mutual aid teams” of 10 to 30 families. However, starting in 1973 and especially after the 1975 victory, mutual aid teams were organized into “low-level cooperatives,” which consisted of several hundred people or an entire village. By 1977, low-level cooperatives were reorganized into “high-level cooperatives,” which consisted of about 1,000 families each or an entire sub-district.

The CPK’s leaders established cooperatives as part of their move to abolish private ownership and capitalism, and to strengthen the status of workers and peasants. To the Khmer Rouge, a cooperative meant that people were supposed to live together, work together, eat together, and share each other’s leisure activities. This resulted in severe restrictions on family life. Cambodian families had eaten together for thousands of years, so eating in cooperatives, especially when food was so scarce, was unpleasant and cruel. In addition, everyone in a cooperative had to give all of their property, which was their important means of production, to be used collectively. Such property included tools, cattle, plows, rakes, seed rice, and land.

The cooperatives were designed to be as self-sufficient as possible. The Khmer Rouge leaders described cooperatives as “great forces” for building up the country and as “strong walls” for protecting Democratic Kampuchea against its enemies.

Two New Classes

Although the Khmer Rouge claimed they were building a nation of equals and tearing down class barriers, they in fact created two new classes in Cambodia. They named these “the base people” and “the new people.”

The base people, or old people, were those who had lived in rural areas controlled by the CPK prior to April 17, 1975. The Khmer Rouge classified them as full-rights people or candidates. Full-rights people were those who had no relatives who had worked for the Khmer Republic. They were members of the poor or lower-middle classes (farmers and laborers). They were allowed to vote and to run for elections, although only one election was held during DK, on March 20, 1976 (this election was not in accordance with international standards, and those voted in as members of the National Assembly were not announced publicly). Full-rights people could also become chiefs of cooperatives and other units. Candidates were people who had relatives associated with the Khmer Republic; they were tolerated as long as they worked hard.

The new people, or 17 April people, were those evacuated from the cities and towns in April 1975. However, many of them were from the countryside and had gone to the cities to escape the war. They were considered unreliable and were viewed by Angkar with hatred and suspicion. They were classified as “parasites” and had no rights as the Khmer Rouge slogans asserted: “17 April people are parasitic plants. They are the losers of the war and prisoners of war.” Another slogan, recalled by many survivors, was: “To keep you is no gain; to lose you is no loss.” New people were treated much more harshly than base people. But the degree of harshness differed from one region to another. For

example, people in Svay Rieng and Prey Veng provinces in the East Zone were treated somewhat better than those evacuated to Pursat and Battambang in the Northwest Zone.

Chap Sitha, a 65 year-old woman living in Phnom Penh, described her life as one of the 17 April people:

During the evacuation in 1975, my family consisting of 14 members fled to Koh Thom district, Kandal province. There, Angkar assigned me to plant vegetables and do farming. One day, at nine o' clock at night, Angkar requested my husband to go to study. I had been waiting for him, but he never returned. A woman in the village told one of my children: "You don't have to wait for your father and be careful with your words. Your entire family could be taken away. Your father had a big working history." I knew that my husband must have been killed since he was a governor of Kandal province. Two months later, Angkar told me to move to Phnom Penh. In fact, they took us to Battambang. Angkar gave us a small decayed cottage. We were separated to live in different units. Only my six year-old child stayed with me. Life in Battambang was an unforgettable experience for me. Within ten days, four sons and one daughter of mine died one after another. Some of them died of malnutrition and disease, while others were accused of being enemies and were killed. A while later, my 70-year-old mother-in-law died of malnutrition. Life there was so fearful. Every day, I never slept well. Many of the villagers were taken away by Angkar and disappeared.

Purges and Massacres

The Khmer Rouge were always searching for enemies and believed that their enemies were everywhere. Suspects were falsely accused of serving the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), KGB (Soviet secret police), or the Vietnamese.

Fighting with Vietnam in 1977 and 1978 led to extensive purges. In late 1977, after Pol Pot returned from China, Vietnamese troops entered eastern Cambodia. They withdrew after several months, taking hundreds of Cambodian civilians with them. The Khmer Rouge then accused people and cadres in the East Zone of cooperating with the Vietnamese, which led to many people being arrested and executed, including longtime Khmer Rouge loyalists and political colleagues like So Phim.

The worst purges in the zone occurred in 1978 after some units rebelled against the DK government. From June to September, while warfare continued with Vietnam, much of the East Zone became a battlefield between the DK government and these rebellious troops, and as many as 100,000 people in the East Zone died in battle or were executed. The government sent troops from the Southwest Zone to fight the rebels. Thousands of people fled to the Vietnamese border to escape the killings that followed the arrival of these troops.

A purge also occurred in the North Zone in 1977. This one concentrated on educated people and people connected with Koy Thuon, who had served as the zone's secretary until early 1976. During the purge, Angkar arrested Minister of Information Hu Nim, Koy Thuon's mentor Tiv Ol, and many of his colleagues, including Phok Chhay and Doeun. There were several attempted coups and rebellions (especially by Cham Muslims) during DK, 15, but because they were unsuccessful, they only served to intensify the search for internal enemies, which in turn led to purges throughout the country.

San Teimnah, a 74-year-old woman living in Kampong Cham province, recalled how the Khmer Rouge massacred the Cham minority, especially her own family, during the rebellion:

In the Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime, my village had been home to thousands of Cham families. The Khmer Rouge killed almost all of them. People in my village and Koh Phal suffered more than the rest because they rebelled against the Khmer Rouge. As for my family, they killed my parents, two of my children, two grandchildren and all of my siblings. My son Musa was taken from us after the rebellion and disappeared; I heard rumors that he was killed in 1978 while he was searching for me. My daughter Rofiah and her husband and two children were killed for unknown reasons.

Afterwards, the Khmer Rouge moved my family to Sre Veal village in Stoeung Trang district. At first, they assigned me to fell tall trees with the evacuees from Phnom Penh.

Many people were killed because they performed their tasks poorly or because the trees fell on top of them. Then, I was made to raise pigs. I objected, claiming that I was afraid of these animals. But, they forced me to do this, threatening that Angkar would send me off for study if I did not do it. The Khmer Rouge even forced me to eat pork, but I refused, saying that I had never eaten meat since childhood. After that, they refused to give me any food. I asked for salt, but they said the salt ration was in the pork soup. My body became swollen. Luckily, I survived the regime. I returned to my home village in 1979.

Teaching Methodology (Extract from Teacher's Guidebook)

LESSON 1: ACTIVELY READING CHAPTER 7

Objectives:

1. Students identify key concepts of daily life in Democratic Kampuchea.
2. Students critically analyze what life was like under Khmer Rouge rule.
3. Students identify and define key vocabulary terms related to daily life under the Khmer Rouge.
4. Students evaluate information and evidence from family and others.

Materials: Textbook and Student Workbook

Key Vocabulary:

Base People	New People	Reeducate
Purges	Loyalist	Massacres
Execution (CIA)	Soviet Secret Police (KGB)	Central Intelligence Agency

Procedure and Process:

Launch (5-10 minutes)

Before beginning the lesson, the teacher introduces the objectives of the day and discusses what students already know about the daily life under Democratic Kampuchea. Afterwards, the teacher goes over key vocabulary in Chapter 7.

Explore (15-45 minutes)

Students actively read and take notes on important facts from Chapter 7 and write in their Student Workbook to reflect on their learning.

Summarize (15-25 minutes)

Teacher goes over the Guided Questions with the whole class to evaluate and summarize student learning.

GUIDED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Why did the Khmer Rouge establish cooperatives? **To facilitate the abolition of private ownership and capitalism, and to strengthen the status of workers and**

peasants.

2. To the Khmer Rouge, what did a cooperative mean? **It meant that people were supposed to live together, work together, eat together, and participate in indoctrination sessions together.**

3. Were the two new classes established under the Khmer Rouge? **The base people and the new people.** Why did KR put such labels on groups of people? **Answers will vary.**

4. Name at least 2 characteristics of the “base people.”

- **They tended to live in rural areas controlled by the CPK prior to April 17, 1975.**
- **They were classified as full-rights people.**
- **They were allowed to vote, run for elections, and to be chiefs of cooperatives**
- **They generally did not have relatives who had worked for the Khmer Republic.**

5. Name at least 2 characteristics of the “new people.”

- **They were called 17 April people.**
- **They were typically evacuated from the cities and town in April 1975.**
- **They were considered “unreliable.”**
- **They were viewed by Angkar with disdain and suspicion.**
- **They were classified as “parasites” and had minimal rights according to Khmer Rouge slogans.**
- **They were often treated harshly depending on the particular region.**

6. How were couples married in DK weddings? **They were married in mass ceremonies in which there were as few as 3 to 10 couples or as many as 30 to 100 couples at each ceremony.** How did these ceremonies deviate from the traditional Khmer wedding? **The answers will vary.**

7. Why were mass weddings used by the Khmer Rouge? **The Khmer Rouge thought that wedding ceremonies were a waste of time and of no help in producing rice. Mass weddings were established because they took so little time—the time saved would be devoted to cooperative work and to what the Khmer Rouge called the “Super Great Leap Forward Revolution.” The main purpose of weddings was not to form family units but to produce children who could serve the revolution.**

8. What was the primary focus of Khmer Rouge education? **Political indoctrination.**

9. Where were the best places for education according to the Khmer Rouge? **The workplace, the fields, the dams, canals, and other labor sites.**

10. How long was the typical workday under the Khmer Rouge? **Nearly everyone who was not sick worked 12 or more hours a day, often 7 days a week without adequate rest or food.**

11. After fighting with Vietnam in 1977 and 1978 occurred, how did the Khmer Rouge

treat people in eastern Cambodia? **The Khmer Rouge accused people and cadres in the East Zone of cooperating with the Vietnamese, which led to many people being arrested and executed, including longtime Khmer Rouge loyalists and political colleagues such as So Phim, who committed suicide.**

12. Which regions mentioned in the book experienced coups, rebellions or purges?
(Name 3.) **Units in the East Zone rebelled against Democratic Kampuchea troops. Rebellions also sprang up in the Southwest Zone and the North Zone.**

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Interviews

Author's Interviews

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2. Khamboly Dy's interview with a former newscaster of the PRK's national radio and now an official of Agence Kampuchea Press (AKP) and Adviser to the Ministry of Information, Phnom Penh, February 6, 2013.
3. Khamboly Dy's interview with Siv Thuon, M, official of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, Phnom Penh, January 27, 2013.
4. Khamboly Dy's interview with Mom Meth, F, former primary school teacher during Lon Nol regime and now inspector of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, Phnom Penh, February 7, 2013.
5. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chhang Song, M, former Information Minister of the Khmer Republic government, Phnom Penh, February 8, 2013.
6. Dy Khamboly's interview with Karen Murphy, F, International Director at Facing History and Ourselves, overseeing Facing History's work outside North America, including in China, England, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and South Africa, interviewed through Skype, February 1, 2013.
7. Khamboly Dy's interview with Gail Weldon, F, textbook and teaching program developer of the Ministry of Education of South Africa, Skype interview between South Africa and Cambodia, February 11, 2013.
8. Khamboly Dy's interview with Yael Siman, F, founder and director of "Nenemi Paxia," Skype interview between Mexico and Cambodia, February 19, 2013.
9. Khamboly Dy's interview with Youk Chhang, M, Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), Phnom Penh, September 7, 2012.
10. Khamboly Dy's interview with Eugenie Mukeshimana, F, Executive Director of Genocide Survivors Support Network, Skype interview between the U.S. and Cambodia, February 25, 2013.
11. Khamboly Dy's interview with Daniel Feierstein, M, Director of Centre for Genocide Studies, Argentina, March 5, 2013.

12. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chris Dearing, M, Co-Author of the *Teacher Guidebook: The Teaching of "A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)"*, Phnom Penh, December 16, 2012.
13. Khamboly Dy's interview with Keo Mardy, M, a villager in Kratie province, Kratie, March 6, 2013.
14. Khamboly Dy's interview with Krang Sina, F, a villager in Kratie province, Kratie, March 6, 2013.
15. Errin Collins, Khamboly Dy and Dany Long's interview with Pen Sovann, M, former PRK's Prime Minister, August 10, 2013.
16. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sambo Manara, M, History Professor of the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), August 22, 2013.
17. Khamboly Dy's interview with Phala Chea, F, Co-Author of the *Teacher Guidebook: The Teaching of "A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)"*, Phnom Penh, August 6, 2013.
18. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sorn Samnang, M, Professor of History, Phnom Penh, August 28, 2013.
19. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ben Neang, F, Curriculum Developer of the Department of Curriculum Development of the Ministry of Education, Kampong Cham, September 24, 2013.
20. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chin Yahon, F, Curriculum Developer of the Department of Curriculum Development of the Ministry of Education, Kampong Cham, September 24, 2013.
21. Khamboly Dy's interview with Siv Thuon, M, official of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, Kampong Cham, September 25 2013. (Second interview)
22. Khamboly Dy's interview with Tum Thary, M, Teacher from Kampong Cham, Kampong Cham, September 10, 2013.
23. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kim Seng Hor, M, Teacher from Kampong Cham, Kampong Cham, September 8, 2013.
24. Khamboly Dy's interview with Youk Chhang, M, Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), Phnom Penh, July 11, 2013 (second interview).
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26. Dy Khamboly and Long Dany's interview with Yim Phanna, M, a former KR military commander of Division 801, Anlong Veng district, April 20, 2012.
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29. Khamboly Dy's interview with Cheab Bony, F, School Teacher, Prey Veng province, January 31, 2011.
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31. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sek Chamroeun, M, School Teacher, Prey Veng province, February 1, 2011.
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40. Khamboly Dy's interview with Yu Hel, F, School Teacher, Svay Rieng province, February 5, 2011.
41. Khamboly Dy's interview with Seng Kun, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 9, 2011.
42. Khamboly Dy's interview with Seng Sitha, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 9, 2011.
43. Khamboly Dy's interview with Eng Phearum, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 10, 2011.
44. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ngoun Sophal, F, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 10, 2011.
45. Khamboly Dy's interview with Lim Sophal, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 11, 2011.
46. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sean Va, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 11, 2011.
47. Khamboly Dy's interview with Nget Sokhon, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 11, 2011.
48. Khamboly Dy's interview with It Broseout, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 12, 2011.
49. Khamboly Dy's interview with Seou Hach, M, School Teacher, Battambang province, February 12, 2011.
50. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kit Minea, M, School Teacher, Kampong Chhnang province, January 3, 2012.
51. Khamboly Dy's interview with Suong Phearith, M, School Teacher, Kampong Chhnang province, Jan. 3, 2012.
52. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sok Sophea, M, School Teacher, Kampong Chhnang province, January 4, 2012.
53. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chea Phal, M, School Teacher, Kampong Chhnang province, January 4, 2012.
54. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ny Mao, M, School Teacher, Kampong Chhnang province, January 5, 2012.
55. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chea Thida, M, School Teacher, Kampong Chhnang province, January 5, 2012.

56. Khamboly Dy's interview with Heng Chandara, M, School Teacher, Pursat province, January 6, 2012.
57. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kuch Sithal, F, School Teacher, Pursat province, January 6, 2012.
58. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kheng Mao, M, School Teacher, Pursat province, January 7, 2012.
59. Khamboly Dy's interview with Mae Simakk, M, School Teacher, Pursat province, January 7, 2012.
60. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ping Sokha, M, School Teacher, Pursat province, January 8, 2012.
61. Khamboly Dy's interview with Khim Bunthai, M, School Teacher, Pursat province, January 8, 2012.
62. Khamboly Dy's interview with Mei Meakk, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 21, 2011.
63. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chuob Sambath, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 21, 2011.
64. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ly San, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 21, 2011.
65. Khamboly Dy's interview with Long Vannak, F, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 21, 2011.
66. Khamboly Dy's interview with Huor Ham, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 22, 2011.
67. Khamboly Dy's interview with Song Malen, F, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 22, 2011.
68. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chub Vantha, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 23, 2011.
69. Khamboly Dy's interview with Nouch Kimlot, F, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 23, 2011.
70. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kim Len, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 23, 2011.
71. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chhuon Arun, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 23, 2011.
72. Khamboly Dy's interview with Saom Chhai, M, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 23, 2011.
73. Khamboly Dy's interview with Tam Chanthou, F, School Teacher, Pailin province, February 23, 2011.
74. Khamboly Dy's interview with Y Bunkhuon, M, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 24, 2011.
75. Khamboly Dy's interview with Tiev Sopheaktra, M, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 24, 2011.
76. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kim Srol, M, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 25, 2011.
77. Khamboly Dy's interview with Som Borath, F, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 25, 2011.
78. Khamboly Dy's interview with That Chandara, M, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 26, 2011.

79. Khamboly Dy's interview with Bun Yoeng, M, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 26, 2011.
80. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kem Chorn, M, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 27, 2011.
81. Khamboly Dy's interview with Lon Sokly, M, School Teacher, Banteay Meanchey, February 27, 2011.
82. Khamboly Dy's interview with Phat Sitha, F, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 7, 2011.
83. Khamboly Dy's interview with Pum Sokunthy, F, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 7, 2011.
84. Khamboly Dy's interview with Norng Yanara, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 8, 2011.
85. Khamboly Dy's interview with Khim Sothea, F, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 8, 2011.
86. Khamboly Dy's interview with Lay Lot, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 9, 2011.
87. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ly Buntha, F, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 9, 2011.
88. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ly Bunthai, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 10, 2011.
89. Khamboly Dy's interview with Peou Bopear, F, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 10, 2011.
90. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sou Try, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 11, 2011.
91. Khamboly Dy's interview with Hun Tusita, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 11, 2011.
92. Khamboly Dy's interview with Hong Sok-Sora, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 11, 2011.
93. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ieng Bunhean, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 12, 2011.
94. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ching Soklim, M, School Teacher, Kampong Thom, March 12, 2011.
95. Khamboly Dy's interview with Men Sothat, M, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 3, 2011.
96. Khamboly Dy's interview with Im Vanthat, F, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 3, 2011.
97. Khamboly Dy's interview with Oeun Sothy, M, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 4, 2011.
98. Khamboly Dy's interview with Mao Sitha, M, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 4, 2011.
99. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kao Kosal, M, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 5, 2011.
100. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ven Vanny, M, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 5, 2011.
101. Khamboly Dy's interview with Hun Bunthoeun, M, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 6, 2011.

102. Khamboly Dy's interview with Muong Vatey, F, School Teacher, Koh Kong, April 6, 2011.
103. Khamboly Dy's interview with Long Sophea, M, School Teacher, Kep, May 23, 2011.
104. Khamboly Dy's interview with Pang Sophea, F, School Teacher, Kep, May 23, 2011.
105. Khamboly Dy's interview with Lib Habb, M, School Teacher, Kep, May 24, 2011.
106. Khamboly Dy's interview with Vit Sam-Orn, M, School Teacher, Kep, May 24, 2011.
107. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kong Sophat, M, School Teacher, Kampot, May 25, 2011.
108. Khamboly Dy's interview with Seng Sovanmony, M, School Teacher, Kampot, May 25, 2011.
109. Khamboly Dy's interview with Hong Channa, M, School Teacher, Kampot, May 26, 2011.
110. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sam Yut, M, School Teacher, Kampot, May 26, 2011.
111. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ngorn Ly, M, School Teacher, Kampot, May 27, 2011.
112. Khamboly Dy's interview with Pang Chhoeung, M, Kampot, May 27, 2011.
113. Khamboly Dy's interview with Men Bunyoeun, M, School Teacher, Kampot, May 28, 2011.
114. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chham Samnang, M, School Teacher, Kampot, May 28, 2011.
115. Khamboly Dy's interview with Teng Chhiek, M, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 3, 2011.
116. Khamboly Dy's interview with Hak Sensophea, M, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 3, 2011.
117. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chhun Sarum, M, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 4, 2011.
118. Khamboly Dy's interview with Tit Vanleakena, F, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 4, 2011.
119. Khamboly Dy's interview with Tea Misa, F, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 5, 2011.
120. Khamboly Dy's interview with Lim Sambo, M, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 5, 2011.
121. Khamboly Dy's interview with Samut Mouly, M, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 6, 2011.
122. Khamboly Dy's interview with Nov Sokhon, M, School Teacher, Phnom Penh, June 6, 2011.
123. Khamboly Dy's interview with Peou Lyheang, M, School Teacher, Preah Vihear, January 24, 2012.
124. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kong Narany, F, School Teacher, Preah Vihear, January 24, 2012.
125. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chea Sopheak, M, School Teacher, Preah Vihear, January 25, 2012.

126. Khamboly Dy's interview with Chhom Chhavuth, M, School Teacher, Preah Vihear, January 26, 2012.
127. Khamboly Dy's interview with Buth Vanthol, M, School Teacher, Preah Vihear, January 26, 2012.
128. Khamboly Dy's interview with Lon Bonet, M, School Teacher, Preah Vihear, January 27, 2012.
129. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kong Sovanhet, M, School Teacher, Preah Vihear, January 27, 2012.
130. Khamboly Dy's interview with Thaong Thon, M, School Teacher, Ratanakiri, February 6, 2012.
131. Khamboly Dy's interview with Meas Phanny, M, School Teacher, Ratanakiri, February 6, 2012.
132. Khamboly Dy's interview with Phok Sophanna, M, School Teacher, Ratanakiri, February 7, 2012.
133. Khamboly Dy's interview with Thon Yun, M, School Teacher, Ratanakiri, February 8, 2012.
134. Khamboly Dy's interview with Nhunh Yon, M, School Teacher, Ratanakiri, February 8, 2012.
135. Khamboly Dy's interview with Leim Sovannarith, M, School Teacher, Stung Treng, February 9, 2012.
136. Khamboly Dy's interview with Huot Chhay, M, School Teacher, Stung Treng, February 9, 2012.
137. Khamboly Dy's interview with Phat Pheap, M, School Teacher, Stung Treng, February 10, 2012.
138. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kim Hun, M, School Teacher, Stung Treng, February 10, 2012.
139. Khamboly Dy's interview with Seng Kaingheng, M, School Teacher, Stung Treng, February 11, 2012.
140. Khamboly Dy's interview with Keo Sovat, M, School Teacher, Stung Treng, February 11, 2012.
141. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sam Sam-Art, M, School Teacher, Kampong Speu, March 1, 2012.
142. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sok Lim, M, School Teacher, Kampong Speu, March 1, 2012.
143. Khamboly Dy's interview with Ti Sokleng, M, School Teacher, Kampong Speu, March 2, 2012.
144. Khamboly Dy's interview with San Ly, M, School Teacher, Kampong Speu, March 2, 2012.
145. Khamboly Dy's interview with Men Sothat, M, School Teacher, Kampong Speu, March 3, 2012.
146. Khamboly Dy's interview with Top Sophea, M, School Teacher, Kampong Speu, March 3, 2012.
147. Khamboly Dy's interview with Oeung Vantha, F, School Teacher, Preah Sihanouk, March 5, 2012.
148. Khamboly Dy's interview with Srey Kimsin, F, School Teacher, Preah Sihanouk, March 5, 2012.

149. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kem Rom, F, School Teacher, Preah Sihanouk, March 6, 2012.
150. Khamboly Dy's interview with Pheou Bol, M, School Teacher, Preah Sihanouk, March 6, 2012.
151. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sor Sokheng, M, School Teacher, Preah Sihanouk, March 7, 2012.
152. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sem Roeun, M, School Teacher, Preah Sihanouk, March 7, 2012.
153. Khamboly Dy's interview with Proun Va, M, School Teacher, Kandal, February 15, 2012.
154. Khamboly Dy's interview with Kien Lyheang, M, School Teacher, Kandal, February 16, 2012.
155. Khamboly Dy's interview with Siek Bunnal, F, School Teacher, Kandal, February 16, 2012.
156. Khamboly Dy's interview with Roeun Sopheap, F, School Teacher, Kandal, February 17, 2012.
157. Khamboly Dy's interview with Korng Vuth, M, School Teacher, Kandal, February 18, 2012.
158. Khamboly Dy's interview with Sim Ny, M, School Teacher, Kandal, February 18, 2012.

Others' Interviews

1. Dany Long's interview with Chum Chuong, M, Koh Thmei village, Anlong Veng commune, Anlong Veng District, April 18, 2012.
2. Dany Long's interview with Yim Phanna, M, Anlong Veng commune, Anlong Veng district, February 2012.
3. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Tum Limyon, M, School Teacher, Kampong Cham, May 8, 2012.
4. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Chring Likeang, M, School Teacher, Kampong Cham, May 8, 2012.
5. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Huot Leang-Cheang, M, School Teacher, Kampong Cham, May 9, 2012.
6. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Yi Sophy, F, School Teacher, Kampong Cham, May 9, 2012.
7. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with San Savoeun, M, School Teacher, Kampong Cham, May 10, 2012.
8. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Phoeuk Phal, M, School Teacher, Takeo, May 11, 2012.
9. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Peam Heng, M, School Teacher, Takeo, May 11, 2012.
10. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Por San, M, School Teacher, Takeo, May 12, 2012.
11. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Phou Sokhorn, M, School Teacher, Takeo, May 12, 2012.
12. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Siek Van, M, School Teacher, Takeo, May 13, 2012.

13. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Phat Yoeun, M, School Teacher, Takeo, May 13, 2012.
14. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Seng Tonghong, M, School Teacher, Kratie, June 7, 2012.
15. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Hy Bunchhi, M, School Teacher, Kratie, June 7, 2012.
16. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Chan Sret, M, School Teacher, Kratie, June 8, 2012.
17. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Sot Kolida, M, School Teacher, Kratie, June 8, 2012.
18. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Lean Morn, M, School Teacher, Kratie, June 9, 2012.
19. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Theim Ra, M, School Teacher, Kratie, June 9, 2012.
20. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Pronh Vorn, M, School Teacher, Kratie, June 9, 2012.
21. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Chea Sith, M, School Teacher, Mondul Kiri, June 11, 2012.
22. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Tauch Sokun, M, School Teacher, Mondul Kiri, June 11, 2012.
23. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Keat Channy, F, School Teacher, Mondul Kiri, June 12, 2012.
24. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Saing Sina, M, School Teacher, Mondul Kiri, June 12, 2012.
25. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Orn El, M, School Teacher, Mondul Kiri, June 13, 2012.
26. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with In Kin, M, School Teacher, Uddor Meanchey, May 21, 2012.
27. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Mann Sokha, M, School Teacher, Uddor Meanchey, May 21, 2012.
28. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Phou Ouk, M, School Teacher, Uddor Meanchey, May 22, 2012.
29. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with San Chhev, M, School Teacher, Uddor Meanchey, May 22, 2012.
30. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Ning Sambath, M, School Teacher, Uddor Meanchey, May 23, 2012.
31. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Chhorn Mon, M, School Teacher, Uddor Meanchey, May 23, 2012.
32. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Khann Sokun, M, School Teacher, Siem Reap, May 24, 2012.
33. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Leng Sreymom, F, School Teacher, Siem Reap, May 24, 2012.
34. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Ien Kimoeun, M, School Teacher, Siem Reap, May 25, 2012.
35. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Sao Morn, M, School Teacher, Siem Reap, May 25, 2012.
36. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Keo Sou, M, School Teacher, Siem Reap, May 26, 2012.

37. Sok-Kheang Ly's interview with Souy Udom, M, School Teacher, Siem Reap, May 26, 2012.