THE MASSACHUSETTS QUINN BILL: A CASE STUDY IN THE QUEST FOR QUALITY

by

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This dissertation employs a case study methodology to examine the Massachusetts Police Pay Incentive Program (Quinn Bill) and the effect recent commitments under the Quinn Bill to improve criminal justice education have had on that education. Focusing on how policy is developed, Barbara Ann Stolz’s study (2002) on federal roles and processes in the making of criminal justice policy were applied to criminal justice educational policy at the state level. More specifically, to tell the Massachusetts story, four policy analysis perspectives—symbolic politics, interest groups, political culture, and implementation—were applied to four somewhat distinct stages of the policy development process that eventually produced the Massachusetts Quinn Bill in its current form: the passage of the Quinn Bill and its early implementation, the conflicts and concerns that arose after implementation of the program, the intensification of the conflict that ultimately produced an amendment to the policy, and the current picture. According to the Massachusetts Office of Student Financial Assistance (n.d.), the Quinn Bill contains two stated objectives: to encourage police officers in participating municipalities to earn degrees in law enforcement and criminal justice and to provide educational incentives through salary increases. Assuming these goals were accomplished, the following questions are addressed by this study: What was the effect of the Quinn Bill on criminal justice higher education policy in Massachusetts? What happened and why? Did criminal justice programs in the state of Massachusetts change under the Quinn Bill? If so, how
and why? Secondary data analysis and semi-structured personal interviews were used to explore these questions. Interview participants were identified using purposive sampling and responses were organized into topics, themes, and issues, with data analyzed relative to the research questions. Criminal justice education programs were found to have eventually changed under the Quinn Bill. The story surrounding that change in light of the assumptions of the benefits of an educated police officer is discussed. The case study concludes with an examination of the Quinn Bill’s relevance to the national scene on quality in criminal justice education.
PREFACE

The writing of this dissertation has taught me lessons beyond the obvious. I have so many folks to thank for teaching or helping me to learn those lessons. Prof. Jim Finckenauer whose model of patience, wisdom and perseverance will forever remain with me. You are a true mentor. Dean Todd Clear, Prof. Ko-lin Chin and Prof. Alida Merlo, whose guidance and encouragement kept me on track. Prof. Mike McCartney and Prof. Richard Talbot, whose friendship, feedback and consistent availability as my sounding boards helped me over many hurdles. Family, friends and colleagues who offered support, contacts, and direction. My children, Nicole, Nina and Austin who embraced independent roles and gave endless hugs. And my husband, Paul, who always knew I could do it. Thank you.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The landscape of criminal justice education continues to evolve. Research and study trends, publications on pedagogy, standards and certification, and public policy initiatives indicate that the purpose, impact, and quality of criminal justice education are a national focus. Compounding this is the fact that criminal justice, and its educational system, is lucrative. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2010), federal, state, and local governments spent approximately $228 billion on police protection, corrections, and judicial activities in 2007. Coupled with this is the projection that jobs in these areas are predicted to increase by 10% by 2018 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that state and local law enforcement agencies alone retain some 1.1 million full-time and 100,000 part-time employees (Reaves, 2011).

According to the U.S. News University Directory, in 2011 there were approximately 600 associate’s degree programs, 600 bachelor’s degree programs, and more than 800 master’s degree programs available to potential students (U.S. News University Connection, 2014). Although the number of programs, particularly at the master’s degree level, includes the recent swell in online programs and graduate certificate programs, a figure that doubles if you count those programs offering both on-ground and online degrees, the numbers are telling. Criminal justice education is big business. And a recurring theme in this business has been the challenge of quality in the face of such potential for quantity.

From the onset, criminal justice education has struggled for position and prestige through definition of purpose (Finckenauer, 2005; Stephens, 1976). An early influx of federal funding for criminal justice education, coming in at a rate “faster than institutions
could spend” (Ward & Webb, 1984, p. 183), prompted a situation in which politics, poor planning, lack of leadership, and institutional abuse of the federal economic opportunities contributed to questions of quality within both the academic and the professional communities. It has not been until recent years that the “coming of age” of criminal justice education has been recognized (Clear, 2001; Cullen, 1995; Southerland, 2002) and that criminal justice educational policy has changed most drastically. Both formal and informal policies and standards for quality criminal justice education have been at the center of discussions surrounding that change. Within the framework of these discussions, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has experienced substantial reform in its criminal justice educational policy.

Implicated in this discussion are specific issues concerning policymaking in criminal justice. Stolz (2002) tells us that understanding how criminal justice policy develops requires an examination beyond the legislative stage to other levels and players. We must look to the role of goals and their consequences, explicit and latent, that drive policy and decision making. Of interest to this study are those roles relative to recent criminal justice educational policy. As early as 1967, decisions at the national level concerning the creation and adoption of criminal justice education standards were driven by the field’s professional associations’ desire to improve quality education (Southerland, Merlo, Robinson, Benekos, & Albanese, 2007). Implied in that desire are the issues that contributed to decisions regarding criminal justice educational policy in Massachusetts—quality concerns and policy issues that transcended those of education, beset by a public outcry and risking a potential outcome of having little or no impact on real reform. In this
scenario, the landscape of criminal justice education in the state of Massachusetts merits a closer look.

**The Massachusetts Quinn Bill**

Scholars of the advancement and practice of public policy and reform are often presented with a clean, linear model of how such policy is developed and implemented and how it impacts change. The reality of the environment in which public policy is created and promotes change tends to be more chaotic. Such is the case of criminal justice educational policy in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

This dissertation employs a case study methodology to examine the development and implementation of a public policy enacted in Massachusetts formally titled the Police Career Incentive Pay Program and commonly referred to as the Quinn Bill (named for Robert H. Quinn, a former Democratic state representative from Boston, House speaker, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney General from 1969 to 1975) and the effect that recent commitments under the Quinn Bill to improve criminal justice education have had on the quality of that education. The Quinn Bill was passed by the Massachusetts legislature in 1970 offering salary increases to officers that corresponded with their education.

Developed in the midst of a national movement to encourage higher education for police officers, the Quinn Bill is unique to Massachusetts and states in part:

Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 108L. There is hereby established a career incentive pay program offering base salary increases to regular full-time members of the various city and town police departments, uniformed members of the department of state police under said section ten, state police detectives appointed under section ten of said chapter twenty-two C, as a reward for furthering their education in the field of policework.
Police career incentive base salary increases shall be predicated on the accumulation of points earned in the following manner: one point for each semester hour credit earned toward a baccalaureate or an associate degree; sixty points for an associate degree; one hundred and twenty points for a baccalaureate degree; and one hundred and fifty points for a degree of master or for a degree in law; provided, that said credits or degrees were earned in courses leading towards a degree in law enforcement or any courses of degree program approved by the board of higher education prior to July 1st, 1976. All semester credits and degrees shall be earned in an educational institution accredited by the New England Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools or by the board of higher education, and shall be credited for the purpose of determining points under this section, notwithstanding the date of appointment of an individual to a position described in the first paragraph of this section.

The board of higher education is hereby authorized and directed to establish and maintain a list of approved courses leading to a degree in law enforcement. (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L; see Appendix A for the full text of the law)

Following changes at the federal level regarding educational compensation for police officers, and a 1967 report from the Massachusetts Committee on Law Enforcement that found education levels among Massachusetts police officers relatively low compared to the national scene, the Quinn Bill was enacted in 1970. The bill’s intent was to encourage police officers to enroll in higher education programs under the assumption that this would improve police performance (Massachusetts Department of Higher Education, 2003).

In essence, the Quinn Bill provides salary compensation to police officers in the commonwealth for earning degrees in criminal justice or law enforcement at a rate of a 10% increase in base pay for an associate’s degree, 20% for a bachelor’s degree, and 25% for a master’s degree. Some towns and municipalities adopted higher percentages of up to 30% pay increases as approved and funded by local governments. A 2001 study by Burriesci and Melley that examined national police educational incentives found that 35 states offer financial incentives for higher education including bonuses, tuition
reimbursements or pay raises. Many of these were at local or municipal levels. Overall, Massachusetts was found to have the largest financial incentive.

Parallel to the national criminal justice education scene, criminal justice programs in Massachusetts began proliferating in the early 1970s (Morn, 1995; Ward & Webb, 1984). This proliferation was a result of both state and federal policies that, while issuing incentives to achieve their explicit goal of providing access to higher education for police officers, provided little direction as to how this was to be accomplished. This growth continued through the 1990s at a rate of gain higher in the northeast than any other part of the country (Southerland, 2002). A 1999 study that tracked the expansion of criminal justice programs through the Quinn Bill years found steady growth in the number of available criminal justice programs as Quinn Bill spending increased (Pease, 1999). Over time, questions regarding the value and quality of criminal justice higher education provided by these programs have surfaced (Southerland et al., 2007).

In Massachusetts, excerpts from 1985 Boston Globe articles express the value and quality concerns relative to criminal justice higher education and the Quinn Bill, bringing the issues into public consciousness and creating a firestorm of negative press for all involved. As reported by Kurkjian, Golden, and Malone (1985b, p. 1),

By looking the other way, educational and law enforcement authorities have allowed colleges and police alike to profit from a program that has forsaken its goals of exposing officers to sound college-level instruction and diverse student bodies.

By its sheer scale, the pay incentive program has spawned a police education industry at Massachusetts colleges. It found . . . heavy credit for police academy . . . courses, demanded little reading or writing skills . . . woefully easy exams . . . instructors often were police themselves, with minimal academic credentials and teaching or research experience . . .

Most of these characteristics violate guidelines set last year by a commission of criminal justice educators. . . .
Quoting State Representative Kevin Blanchette, “We’re very concerned about some of the apparent abuses. . . . It was never meant to be a get-rich-quick scheme” (Golden, 1985a, p. 31).

While the issues brought forth in these reports were not universally applicable, the problems highlighted had some grounding. Further investigation of this issue by reporters from the *Boston Globe* revealed that a federally funded 1973 report of criminal justice programs in Massachusetts called for quality improvements in faculty and curriculum (Kurkjian et al., 1985a). The chancellor of higher education responded with promises of reform. However, it was not until 1999 that the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education (MDHE)\(^1\), reporting its intent to respond to the increase in criminal justice programs in the commonwealth and to exert its administrative role in overseeing the Quinn Bill, conducted a paper review of criminal justice programs offering degrees under the legislation (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2000). Additional news headlines following this state review reflect the quality concerns that resulted: “Panel to Eye Legitimacy of Police ‘Diploma Mill’” (Marantz, 1999); “Quinn Bill Under Fire as School ‘Cash Cow’” (Kurkjian, 2001); “Policing the Colleges” (Editorial, 2001); “Responsibility for Abuses Lies within the Degree Granting Institutions” (Klein, 2001).

Over time, it became apparent to legislators that the policy in Massachusetts had to be expanded to include explicit state oversight of the quality of programs being offered by degree-granting institutions, both public and private. The 1970 version of the Quinn Bill stated, “The board of higher education is hereby authorized and directed to establish

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\(^1\)The Massachusetts Board of Higher Education changed its name to the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education in 2010.
and maintain a list of approved courses leading to a degree in law enforcement”

(Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L). In 2002, the Quinn Bill was amended and now says in part:

[The board of higher education shall establish quality guidelines, including, but not limited to, standards and review processes, for programs pursued for police career incentive pay increases under this section. Any such degree shall have been earned through a program approved by the board of higher education as meeting or exceeding academic standards established by the above-mentioned guidelines. . . . For the purposes of fulfilling the duties and obligations set forth in this section, the board of higher education shall have the authority to conduct periodic reviews of criminal justice or law degree programs offered by the independent regionally accredited colleges and universities. The board of higher education shall only certify career incentive pay increases earned through the completion of programs that meet the board’s guidelines . . . (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L)

However, the process that produced this amendment was itself so controversial that it has, while addressing one issue, become an issue itself, resulting in unintended consequences that have generated continuing policy concerns such that the ultimate fate of the Quinn Bill remains unsettled. A policy initially praised for its innovation, the Quinn Bill has existed for more than 40 years but later became the target of much criticism. The story of the Massachusetts Quinn Bill raises questions surrounding the intent and integrity of policy and reform in relation to the value and quality of criminal justice education.

**Study Purpose and Summary**

Merton (1936) revealed that all social actions produce both intended and unintended consequences. Consequences can be both functional and dysfunctional; those that are manifest are expected while those that are latent are not only unintended but often unrecognized. While ample studies have examined the role of goals and their consequences relative to policy development and reform, limited discussion of this exists
within the area of criminal justice educational policy. And no studies to date have addressed the effect that recent commitments to improving criminal justice education in Massachusetts may have had on the quality of that education (Southerland et al., 2007). A study of the Quinn Bill process allows for the consideration of both the advantages and pitfalls of the Massachusetts experience with criminal justice education and provides insight into the role of goals and consequences and their effects within public policy processes. To do this effectively, it is important to tell the story of the policy evolution as it unfolded in Massachusetts because, at various stages in the process, new issues surfaced, different actors gained or lost prominence, and the political environment changed. If one is to consider the effectiveness or lack thereof of the Massachusetts model from the standpoint of its broader applicability, then one must be acquainted with the way in which the policy emerged over time.

Massachusetts has wrestled for years with quality education issues for police officers. The Quinn Bill and its implications provide a timely case study because it links the various issues through a public policy approach that has been both praised and criticized. First, the Quinn Bill sought to encourage Massachusetts police officers to enroll in college programs at the associate’s, bachelor’s, and master’s levels. To qualify, the degree must be in criminal justice or law enforcement and earned at an institution accredited by the New England Association of Colleges and Schools. Second, policymakers had to address the growing concerns of critics who questioned the quality of criminal justice programs. They claimed that the benefits of the program as it was being implemented failed to justify the cost to the people of the commonwealth who were contributing to the program (via salary increases) at both the state and local levels.
Finally, to address the first two issues, policymakers had to create a mechanism to assure quality standards and control sufficient to alleviate the concerns surrounding the merits of the Quinn Bill.

Focusing on how policy is developed, Stolz’s study (2002) on federal roles and processes in the making of criminal justice policy will be applied to criminal justice educational policy at the state level. More specifically, to tell the Massachusetts story, four policy analysis perspectives suggested by Stolz will be applied to four somewhat distinct stages of the policy development process that eventually produced the Massachusetts Quinn Bill in its current form. The four perspectives are (1) symbolic politics, (2) interest groups, (3) political culture, and (4) implementation. The four stages are (1) the passage of the Quinn Bill and its early implementation, (2) the conflicts and concerns that arose after implementation of the program, (3) the intensification of the conflict that ultimately produced the amendment to the policy that required governmental oversight of criminal justice programs at the state’s colleges and universities, and (4) the current picture.

Rather than take on powerful police organizations head on, elected officials charged the MDHE with the task of establishing quality standards for higher education programs in criminal justice and then investigating whether the various colleges and universities offering such degrees met the new quality standards (Massachusetts Department of Higher Education, 2014b). If they did, their graduates would be eligible to receive Quinn Bill benefits. If they did not, their graduates would be ineligible for the benefits. Along with the political culture that produced it, implementation of the Quinn Bill at its various stages is the focus of this part of the study. Referring to academic
research on implementation, Stolz (2002) stated, “Such studies also usually looked at the interplay of various political, technical, bureaucratic, organizational, and socioeconomic factors that impinge on these efforts” (p. 10). Virtually each of these factors plays a role in the story of how the Quinn Bill impacted academic programs in criminal justice. The process by which the Quinn Bill and the affected institutions of higher education came to terms with the implementation of these new requirements is a central theme, for, as Stolz noted,

> It is assumed that those who have discretionary power in the direct delivery of services are more significant in the shaping of policy than the senator or agency executive. . . . Therefore, understanding public policy includes the study of the process by which policy is implemented, as well as the discretion exercised by the bureaucrat who delivers the service to the client. (p. 10)

Furthermore, Michael Lipsky (1997) observed that these street-level bureaucrats affect policy in part due to goal ambiguity. Stolz concluded that “such grass-roots decisions in the broader context of criminal justice policy making . . . enhances our understanding of policy as formally established and policy in practice and as viewed by the public” (p. 10).

The discretion of higher education in that service delivery was among those issues called into question through the Quinn Bill reform process. Examining the role of criminal justice programs in the implementation stage and beyond is a key focus of this study. Included in this examination is a look at why programs needed supervision and whether those practices that led to this need would have continued without changes to Quinn Bill oversight.

As discussed earlier, the MDHE was the agency charged with oversight of the Quinn Bill from inception.

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or by the board of higher education, and shall be credited for the purpose of determining points under this section, notwithstanding the date of appointment of an individual to a position described in the first paragraph of this section.

The board of higher education is hereby authorized and directed to establish and maintain a list of approved courses leading to a degree in law enforcement. (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L)

According to the text of the Quinn Bill, the MDHE had the authority to address quality issues from the beginning. They did not do so, however, until December 2000. The MDHE stated its reasons for becoming directly involved as twofold: (1) the increase in statewide criminal justice programs and (2) its role in administrating the Quinn Bill (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2000). There is assumed, however, to be a third and perhaps more compelling reason why the MDHE decided to become involved as an oversight agency some 30 years after inception and more than 15 years after the first concerns were raised regarding program quality: public outcry. Public criticism of the costs and impact of the Quinn Bill led to questions regarding the integrity of criminal justice program delivery and demanded a response.

Bureaucratic oversight is central to a discussion of the MDHE’s role as the state’s regulatory agency for all programs within higher education. One might question the level of authority the MDHE possessed and exerted in assuring the quality of criminal justice education programs as the Quinn Bill was implemented. Having sat virtually silent for 30 years, the MDHE sprang into oversight action during the reform stage and only under mounting pressure leading to legislative mandate.

From the standpoint of data collection, Stolz (2002) noted that “the behaviors of [interest group] actors are observable. Conflicts and preferences are revealed through participation” (p. 7). Moreover, she found that the methodology employed in the work is most suitable: “Typically, researchers who study interest groups develop case studies,
using legislative documents, newspaper accounts, and interviews, to depict who participated in a particular policy decision. They describe and categorize interest groups according to their goals, resources, and how they participate in the political system” (pp. 7–8). Stolz also pointed to the need to “look beyond the legislative stage, to other stages in the policymaking process . . . if we are to understand the who, what, and how of criminal justice policymaking” (p. 425). To examine the public policy formation process of the Quinn Bill, this study employs that very methodology.

In summary, a study of the process undertaken to produce and maintain the Massachusetts Quinn Bill can provide lessons learned and insight into the direction and future of broader issues surrounding quality and the criminal justice “cash cow.” This case study is appropriate to Massachusetts in that it is alone in having adopted a state policy such as that embodied in the Quinn Bill, a policy that now has the dual objectives of producing more highly educated state and local police officers while guaranteeing that the colleges and universities offering degrees in criminal justice provide programs that meet high-quality educational standards.
CHAPTER 2: THE CHANGING WORLD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EDUCATION

The Assumption of Change

John-Baptiste Alphonse Karr’s “Plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose” has been called an epigram of change management. As Sirkin, Keenan, and Jackson (2005) noted, 

For over three decades, academics, managers, and consultants, realizing that transforming organizations is difficult, have dissected the subject. They’ve sung the praises of leaders who communicate vision and walk the talk in order to make change efforts succeed. They’ve sanctified the importance of changing organizational culture and employees’ attitudes. They’ve teased out the tensions between top-down transformation efforts and participatory approaches to change. And they’ve exhorted companies to launch campaigns that appeal to people’s hearts and minds. Still, studies show that in most organizations, two out of three transformation initiatives fail. The more things change, the more they stay the same. (p. 1)

Scholars of policy and reform agree that change cannot take place overnight. To be successful, change is incremental and occurs in developmental stages. In this, reformers recognize the need and respond to various pressures for change. Accepting the need for change is usually proceeded by some major problem or event. It is the acceptance of this change, however prompted, that is cited as necessary for change to occur (Dessler, 1986). Southerland (2002) reminds us that reform is not easy or quick, and criminal justice education is no exception. If one assumes that in the case of the Quinn Bill any changes to criminal justice education happened only after public exposure and oversight, they would not be alone in this. Public education, health care, and even the recent crisis with the Massachusetts Parole Board might be viewed as having experienced this same fate.
At the heart of the discussion of the Quinn Bill lies the notion of change itself. It is assumed that the ultimate goal of policy development and reform is change. But change to what end? Merton (1936) reminds us that latent consequences of social action can be both functional and dysfunctional. In the case of the Quinn Bill, one might assume that the development and implementation of quality standards would have improved the quality of criminal justice programs in the state of Massachusetts under the Quinn Bill. Finckenauer (2005) states that “as a result of these steps, delayed though they were, Massachusetts has ‘bitten the bullet’ with respect to criminal justice education and is now in a much stronger position as a result” (p. 417). While this is certainly true, if it is assumed that the response of criminal justice higher education may have been due only to public exposure and strict oversight, then one might also assume that where quality was a concern, reform was introduced, and even absorbed, with little or no impacting change.

A review of the various issues driving and promoting change and reform in institutions as well as the barriers to successful reform will draw on administration literature from both the public and private sectors. This review will serve to frame the story of the Quinn Bill, allowing for its application to a broader perspective. It begins with the larger area of public policy, specifically exploring the area of policy development and the concept of reform within institutions. The review then moves the discussion into the area of education and higher education policy. A general overview of the roles that goals and their consequences play in the development and implementation of policy and reform is followed by an examination of the various issues concerning goals: conflict, ambiguity, misidentification, and displacement.
The review then focuses on criminal justice higher education, briefly tracing the history and development of criminal justice education and policy as it changed at the national level. This will start with its evolution, from the early vision of August Vollmer through the Law Enforcement Education Program years and beyond, and will set the foundation for exploring the field’s corresponding struggle with its goal of quality. The bigger picture of the evolution of criminal justice education relative to the issues embodied in the quality discussion provides the context for understanding the climate in which the Quinn Bill was conceived and continues to survive. Important to this study is understanding from where criminal justice education came and how it arrived to where it is today.

The study then parallels this history and development with that of the state of Massachusetts, focusing on the unique nature of legislative mandates and initiatives regarding criminal justice education. Given the assumptions of this study, it may be appropriate to examine additional areas within the literature as they inform various perspectives. The direction of this area of review will be led by the study as issues unfold in the gathering of data.

**Drivers of Policy Development and Reform**

Anyone who follows the news and political scene can connect the relationship among policy, crisis, and reform. In recent years, unethical practices, low student achievement rates, and various crimes have led to policy changes in our finance, education, and criminal justice systems, respectively. Drucker (1999) states that “change is unavoidable . . . in a period of upheaval, such as the one we are living in, change is the norm” (p. 73). However, change should not be introduced for the sake of change itself.
Organizations looking to implement meaningful change must have clear and communicated goals to direct and inform the process. Further, those goals must include a consideration of how that process will be delivered.

The political culture of the policy process can be examined through its players and environment. Symbolic politics and interest groups are central to understanding what drives policy development and reform; ultimately, however, people are at the heart of these processes. Actions that are grounded in symbolic politics are directed at these stakeholders. Interest groups are stakeholders with a vested interest in the policy and reform and the goals they seek to serve. Leaders, constituents, and other change agents comprise the web of stakeholders and thus policy implementers that weave its future.

Wilson (1989) notes that effective agencies are the result of effective leaders. Drucker (1999) explains that it takes willingness, methods, techniques, and policies to be a leader of change. Curtin and Meijer (2006) point out that organizational transparency, which includes the sharing of information relative to decision making and responding to citizens, is central to a successful policy process. Koppell (2005) views organizational transparency as a value in itself, stating that the public wants to believe in the openness of government. Successful policy processes can be enhanced by this transparency through an increase in public support and understanding (Fairbanks, Plowman, & Rawlins, 2007).

In the case of public policy, the public is an identified stakeholder. The public assumes and demands transparency of its organizations and should hold organizations and institutions publicly accountable when transparency is not present and when policies fail to live up to goals and expectations.
Change is difficult, and it is compounded by the lack of agreement on which factors enter into the equation for success and implementation. These factors include goals. Whereas visionary, steadfast leaders drive change, goals provide avenues to measuring success and guide implementation. Change within criminal justice educational policy is one example. Without the vision and persistence of August Vollmer and other early pioneers, the landscape of criminal justice education may look vastly different today.

Leaders communicate an institution’s goals, values, and culture that have been long cited as pathways to successful change. Seen largely as a leadership issue, beliefs and values, when cultivated, can promote a positive culture within which to move forward. Such leaders set the “values, beliefs, and expectations” of an organization (Dessler, 1986, p. 367). Values may also impact the processes or consequences of a policy. If change is to occur, values and beliefs, including how these are enacted, may require change as well.

Having clearly stated, shared goals that are communicated to stakeholders by effective leaders is also valuable in successful policy reform. Duffee, Fogel, Thomson, and McAnany (1984) recognized goal conflict, goal ambiguity, and goal displacement as central themes in their examination of probation effectiveness. Reform may be necessary to modify these goals to more closely align with realistic problem solving.

Merton (1957) tells us that one characteristic of a dysfunctional bureaucracy is displacement of goals, which can develop into resistance or an inability to adjust to change. This could be interpreted as the drive to survive or succeed taking precedence over broader institutional goals, and it frames a context for understanding why, when
goal conflict is present, some organizational goals surpass others, however intended. Understanding how the unintended consequences of goal displacement happen, then, becomes important to a discussion of policy reform.

Bohte and Meier (2000) look to goal displacement and goal ambiguity to explain the motivation within public education organizations to “cheat.” They state that the social problem of crime, along with a myriad of other social problems, presents challenges to proper understanding and accountability of such organizations in that objective standards for assessing performance toward goals are not clear. Thus, institutional outputs become the measure of evaluation over contributions to social outcomes. When this occurs, the motivation to direct outputs at the risk of attaining desired outcomes might lead to organizational cheating—purposely manipulating outputs, and thus goals, to be seen as doing well. Bohte and Meier concluded that scarce resources and excessive task demands drive institutional cheating.

Through an ethnographic study of goal displacement in an adult care institution, Abramson (2009) found that two factors, both related to funding, influenced the goals of the social service organization: “the type of funding source and the degree to which the organization is accountable to that funding source” (p. 68). The study’s conclusion revealed that “the goal of improving the elders’ lives remained, but only in brochures and ideology, not institutional practice” (p. 84). In the example of criminal justice education, one might assume that for some programs, performance or the cash-cow phenomenon, regardless of source, became the practice and output goal of institutions and took precedence over the impact goal of quality programs, a goal that remained in ideology.
Criminal Justice Higher Education Policy:

The Evolution of Criminal Justice Education—Early Years and Advancement

The history of criminal justice education is in many ways a story of change and symbolic politics. It began 100 years ago when the study of criminology complemented the curricula being offered by law school faculty. Early courses in criminology were offered through sociology departments in such institutions as the University of Chicago and Indiana University (Durham, 1992; Hale, 1998). The movement from a more scholarly education to include practical perspectives sought, in part, to develop in students the “capacity for correct and effective action” (Morn, 1995, p. 4). With a primary focus on professionalizing the police, early pioneers of criminal justice education—August Vollmer, O. W. Wilson, and V. A. Leonard—distinguished between the “whys” of academic inquiry and the “hows” of the practitioner, and sought to equip their students with the ability to take the why and apply it to the how (Finckenauer, 2005; Morn, 1995).

Many early scholars of the field found their roots in sociology or political science, as, aside from the pockets of study just mentioned, criminal justice as a discipline had yet to emerge (Finckenauer, 2005). In its early years, criminal justice education followed the path of practical, professional education. This was reflected in both curriculum and the hiring of faculty with special consideration of their professional experience. Technical how-to courses accompanied traditional academics and comprised a curriculum designed to move the field of policing forward. Teaching the practical was essentially the responsibility of part-time faculty whose day jobs were in the field and resulted in tensions between and within academic departments. This pull between the theoretical and
a systems-based approach to the study of criminal justice as the first School of Criminology was developing foreshadowed a theme that continues today and plays into the perception of the discipline and its struggle to come of age (Morn, 1995). Related to this is that the field’s “history demonstrates the lack of definition of the scope and content of the academic field of criminal justice” (Stephens, 1976, p. 92).

Criminal justice education as an academic pursuit can trace its roots to August Vollmer, a visionary police leader in Berkeley, California, who observed that “when more than 90 percent of the police force do not possess even the intelligence requisite for the performance of their duties, then it is certainly no exaggeration to say that they are inadequate for the purpose for which they have been selected” (Vollmer, 1971, p. 224).

Concerned by the lack of character and intellectual standards, Vollmer began a program of study for police officers that included traditional police academy pursuits (the sole option for teaching the practitioners) along with classes taught by University of California, Berkeley, faculty (Vollmer, 1971). Eventually developing to on-campus education, Vollmer shared and executed a vision of higher education for police professionals that mirrored that provided for other professions, such as doctors and lawyers (Finckenauer, 2005; Stephens, 1976).

The course of study eventually developed into a traditional undergraduate program of study with Berkeley’s first graduate in 1923 bearing a baccalaureate in economics with a minor in criminology. A. F. Brandstatter, as cited in Stephens (1976), described this early period as a time “when Vollmer was endowing his spirit and enthusiasm for scientific police work and police education to his young protégés” (p. 93) and when the press commonly referred to these protégés as “college cops.”
Police educational programs spread across the United States with academy programs in Detroit, Los Angeles, and New York being among the earliest. From the onset, two distinct models of criminal justice education emerged: those based in academics and those based in state-of-the-art training (Stephens, 1976). The 1922 meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police saw police leaders encouraging its members to provide better educational opportunities for police across the country (Stephens, 1976). Institutions responding to this call included Northwestern University, Harvard University, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Southern California, and the University of Chicago. These early programs had rough beginnings, with many closing their doors within the first few years (Stephens, 1976). Traditional academies continued to be the primary vehicle for training police.

Vollmer’s protégés, who included O. W. Wilson and V. A. Leonard, continued to bring their expertise and ideas of education to various institutions, influencing their curriculum development and direction. Vollmer himself joined the faculty at the University of Chicago for a brief stint, long enough to influence the program to develop a model of education that would “expose regular college students to police administration as well as to upgrade educational opportunities for police” (Stephens, 1976, p. 94). Wilson, once chief of the Wichita, Kansas, police department, joined the faculty at the University of California, Berkeley, taught police administration, and started the first doctoral program in the field in the mid-20th century. San Jose State College’s Police School, opened in 1930, became the first program for police professionals that was included as a major within the college’s academic curriculum. The University of California, Berkeley, under Vollmer, who had returned from Chicago, began its
undergraduate degree program in criminology three years later. In 1935, Edwin Sutherland’s proposed degree program in police science at Indiana University took off. Michigan State University began its law enforcement major, also in 1935, under its newly formed Department of Police Administration housed in the Division of Arts and Sciences. This program included a five-year curriculum, paid internship program, and salary incentives upon graduation and hire by the Michigan State Police (Stephens, 1976).

Following a lull in program development during World War II, criminal justice education began to boom in post–World War II years. In 1949, the Society for the Advancement of Criminology requested that a survey of criminal justice educational programs be conducted. F. M. Boolsen answered this request and included in his survey every institution of higher learning in the country. The goal was to determine the number of programs being offered in the field of criminology. He received 325 responses, with 20 schools offering a two-year degree (or more) in the broadly defined field of criminology (Boolsen, cited in Stephens, 1976).

Many developing programs at this time were two-year associate’s degree programs and, in 1954, the City College of New York entered the picture. Rapidly developing programs at both the undergraduate and graduate level (in conjunction with the school’s business and public administration programs) were unique for the time in that enrollment was limited to those engaged in police work (Stephens, 1976).

By 1957, another survey showed that “56 institutions in 19 states [offered] 77 programs leading to academic degrees in the Criminal Justice field” (Stephens, 1976, pp. 97–98). The data revealed that while undergraduate programs were concentrated in law
enforcement and criminalistics, graduate programs were more focused on the field of corrections. Further, California had, by far, the largest concentration of programs (Stephens, 1976).

The 1960s saw additional growth in criminal justice education programs as the notion of minimum training standards for police officers, an early idea of Vollmer, was revived in discussions within various police professional organizations and eventually within the meetings of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

The Law Enforcement Education Program

The increase in every category and the concentration of programs identifying themselves as “criminal justice” can be attributed in part to President Lyndon Johnson and his Crime Commission. Johnson addressed the members of his newly appointed commission by stating, “We know that the problems of crime do not yield to easy answers. But today I am challenging you to try to find these answers” (Woolley & Peters, 1965, p. 1). The commission led to the establishment of the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP), an initiative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), succeeding the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance and the Office of Justice Programs, as created by the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

A review of the political culture provides a context for looking at program development. Nationally, crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s had begun to escalate to historic proportions, creating a climate of fear such that polls indicated fear of crime was the primary concern of most Americans (Moore & Trajanowicz, 1988). In an attempt to both understand its causes and provide for its solution, President Lyndon Johnson appointed his Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The
resident envisioned that government could address a wide range of social problems (Feucht & Zedlewski, 2007). Compounding the environment in which the commission met were riots and demonstrations throughout the country that centered on issues of civil rights, the war in Vietnam, racial discrimination, political polarization, and social disorganization in core city areas. In each of these cases, the police were positioned as first-line administrators obliged to implement law and public policy under the most untenable of conditions. Given the complex nature and broad scope of the social, economic, and political problems of which crime and disorder seemed to be symptomatic, the commission concluded that police officers would be better able to cope with crime and chaos if they developed a keener understanding of their causes. Based on that belief, the commission urged policymakers to encourage police officers to seek college educations. Feucht and Zedlewski (2007) further noted that “the task—breathtaking in scope—reflected not only the ‘can do’ attitude . . . but also a growing confidence in the ability of science and technology to solve problems . . . the Nation was already improving public health, harnessing atomic energy, and putting a man on the moon. Why not unleash that same creative power to eliminate crime?” (p. 1). Challenging criminal justice practitioners to conceive of the application of the wonders of science and technology to their professions, the funding of this academic pursuit seems a natural step.

The commission determined many needs of law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice, but what it discovered to be the greatest need is the “need to know” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 273). The commission further endorsed higher education for law enforcement by noting that “the ultimate aim of all police departments should be that all
personnel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 109). This idea was supported by numerous additional commissions and associations whose reports recommended higher education for police officers to address issues of corruption, diversity, and community awareness, including the 1931 Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (The Wickersham Commission); the 1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders; the 1969 Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence; the 1972 American Bar Association on Standards for Criminal Justice; the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals; and the 1978 Police Foundations’ Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers (Beckman, 1976; Paynich, 2009).

Upon inception, LEAA stated its purpose to “help fully professionalize the law enforcement and correctional staffs of local government in every part of the country” by administrating “programs of grants and loans to finance college degree studies by criminal justice personnel and promising students preparing for careers in the field” (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1969, p. 29). Within LEAA, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (today’s National Institute of Justice) was created and made grant resources available to fund research in the study of crime and justice. It also provided funding through LEEP for criminal justice practitioners to attain college degrees, thereby creating an increased demand for the study of criminal justice that was relevant to their professions. Resources were also granted to institutions to develop graduate programs to prepare faculty to meet the demand (Finckenauer, 2005).
The intention of LEEP was to make operational the recommendation of the
President’s Commission. For example, in 1995 Jeremy Travis, past director of the
National Institute of Justice, stated,

The issue of education as it relates to the police is a long-standing one—in fact, of
longer standing than some might think. The most familiar accounting of the roots
of the issue takes us back to the 1960’s, to the various blue ribbon commissions
established partly in response to the misconduct of some police officers during the
urban riots of the time and the consequent need for greater professionalism. We
all know that one of the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, established in 1967, was “that all
police personnel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees.”
This was, of course, presented as “an ultimate” rather than an immediate, goal.
(Travis, 1995, p. 1)

The provision of federal funds by way of grants to higher education institutions
for financial assistance to criminal justice practitioners led to an explosion of new
programs (Hale, 1998; Langworthy & Latessa, 1989). Criminal justice degree programs
participating in LEEP more than doubled in the first five years of its administration. The
growth of criminal justice programs was also of interest to the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, who began to include these data in its directories. From 1964 to 1975,
the growth tracked is represented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1

*Criminal Justice Area Academic Degree Programs, 1965 to 1975*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>Associate</th>
<th>Baccalaureate</th>
<th>Masters</th>
<th>Doctorate</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964–1965</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–1967</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968–1969</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1971</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–1973</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1976</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source.* Adapted by Stephens (1976, p. 99) from the International Associations of Chiefs
Stephens (1976) summarizes that “the growth from 56 degree-granting institutions in the field of Criminal Justice in 1957 to 683 in 1973 represented a growth rate that has perhaps never been experienced in any other field of study” (p. 102). Many institutions offered more than one degree program, and the explosive growth at the two-year degree level was largely the result of training provisions for practitioners in the field. Programs participating in LEEP grew from 485 in 1969 to 987 in 1973 (Stephens, 1976). Ward and Webb (1984) observed the lure of financial incentives as greatly outweighing the intellectual rewards for potential students. By 1978, the number of institutions offering opportunities to study criminal justice had more than doubled (Ward & Webb, 1984). D. D. Camp, cited in Stephens (1976), concludes the development of the field of criminal justice to be unique, seeking to legitimize training for police officers through the grounding of that training in institutions of higher learning, rather than the development of an academic discipline for the sake of knowledge itself. Although the development of the study of criminology at the University of Chicago may challenge this conclusion, Camp speaks of the various perspectives surrounding education that continue today.

Programs and degree titles have become much broader over the years, moving in many schools from police science and education programs to criminal justice and criminology. This shift also reflects recognition of the desire to expand programs to criminal justice professionals outside the realm of law enforcement. The degree titles themselves embody the development of the field, its influences and primary purpose (Stephens, 1976).

In 1975, budget cuts forced a closer look at the resources expended through LEAA in grants and loans to students for criminal justice education, and the categories of
eligible students began to shrink. A California-based study concluded that financial and political abuses could not be adequately controlled at the local or state levels (Pearson, 1981). Lessons learned from LEAA’s lack of control over the mechanisms created to access its lucrative funding may have provided guidance to Massachusetts as it developed its Quinn Bill. In the midst of the expansive program growth, the 1978 Police Foundation Reports’ (Sherman Report) examination of criminal justice education questioned the value and quality of such education and its broadly practiced approach of pandering to political forces and leaving academic decisions in the hands of police and other criminal justice professionals (Loewenthal, 1980; Newman, n.d.; Sherman, 1978). The connection between economic advantages and poorly resourced mechanisms for cashing in on these advantages was clear. The Sherman Report states that “many colleges seem to have created police education programs only because federal funds were available . . . not because of any long-range plans to make police education part of their mission. Their commitment to police education may be no more lasting than the funding” (Sherman, 1978, p. 93). The part-time faculty and students making up this mechanism were hardly in a position to complain (Southerland et al., 2007; Ward & Webb, 1984).

Loewenthal (1980) relates this crisis in criminal justice education to a crisis in higher education itself, as quality questions began to surface. Questions asked of higher education at the national level beginning in the 1960s included: “What societal purposes does higher education fulfill, who benefits, and who pays?” (Moriarty, 2006, p. 410). A federally funded 1980 study to examine curricular concerns found that while trends indicated a move from vocational education to theoretical education in some programs, they were recent and perhaps only indicative of the higher-quality programs that
participated in the study—the quality of criminal justice programs was an area of concern (Pearson et al., 1980). Dull, in his 1982 examination of the aftermath of the Sherman Report, states that primary areas of concern regarding criminal justice education focused on curriculum, faculty, and accreditation remain at issue. Parallel to the discussion of the role of leadership and the policy process, he concludes that given a common goal of quality, criminal justice education can only move forward by developing clear goals and the necessary leadership to guide the field there. That leadership would eventually be taken up by the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences.

The political culture existent through the reduction and eventual end (LEAA was defunded in 1982) of the hundreds of millions of dollars that flowed through the federal government to the nation’s colleges and universities brought about a period of uncertainty within criminal justice education that led to the understanding that the “worst fears and the most optimistic projections” would be realized (Durham, 1992, p. 35). Some predicted that many programs, left without the bulk of students that provided their main revenue source, would close their doors (Durham, 1992). However, although this did happen to those programs that had relied solely on professionals to populate their programs, many programs that had taken a broader approach to criminal justice education and moved into the delivery of that education to more a traditional college student population not only survived but continued to flourish (Langworthy & Latessa, 1989; Sorenson, Patterson, & Widmayer, 1992). In addition, those programs that sought to diversify their student demographics saw this change as having a greater impact on enrollments than LEAA funding alone, leading Wierman and Archambeault (1983) to
conclude that criminal justice education would remain lucrative without education incentives such as those provided under LEAA.

In 1984, the Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education discovered 1,500 institutions offering some type of coursework in the field (Ward & Webb, 1984). In a count of criminal justice programs from 1986 to 1987, Langworthy and Latessa (1989) found more than 140,000 students in over 900 programs: faculty numbered near 10,000. They go on to state that reports of the death of criminal justice education by the departure of LEAA and LEEP were premature . . . it would appear that indeed the “war on crime” sponsored by the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act created a new area for intellectual endeavor that has taken on a life of its own . . . while the Crime Control Act may have breathed life into a new substantive discipline the discipline has yet to mature. (p. 182)

They conclude that “criminal justice has emerged as an academic area of inquiry and has demonstrated that it can sustain itself without a Federal support program” (p. 184). What the discipline was lacking was infrastructure to guide and support its development.

In July 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice and its Office of Justice Programs sponsored a conference in Washington, DC, to analyze the long-term effects of the LEAA and LEEP initiatives. In a subsequent summary of the conference’s conclusion, Assistant U.S. Attorney General and Office of Justice Programs Director Laurie Robinson reported that one general observation of those attending was that LEAA and LEEP contributed to law enforcement professionalism by providing higher education opportunities. The Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) enabled 100,000 students to attend more than 1,000 colleges and universities, and dispensed hundreds of millions of dollars into criminal justice programs. A significant majority of current law enforcement leaders around the country are LEEP alumni. (Robinson, 1997, p. 1)
Forty years following President Johnson’s commission that ultimately led to the creation of the LEAA and LEEP programs of funding, Feucht and Zedlewski (2007) acknowledge that the question driving the commission then remains a central issue today: “What should be the role of the Federal Government in fighting crime and enhancing public safety?” (p. 1). Given the value and quality issues that surrounded the development of criminal justice programs to provide for LEEP, additional questions arose concerning how to address those issues. The state of Massachusetts, under the Quinn Bill, would consider similar questions.

**Striving for Quality: The Development of Professional Associations**

Considering the role of various interest groups, it could be argued that the first grouping of professionals in the field of criminal justice was the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. Around the same time that Vollmer was realizing his vision, Northwestern University held a National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology (Stephens, 1976). The 1909 conference brought together both academics and practitioners who resolved (Stephens, 1976, p. 92):

1. To establish the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology
2. To initiate the publication in 1910 of the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*
3. To have translated into English foreign authored key works in Criminology (works included that of Enrico Ferri, Caesare Lombroso and Raffaelle Garofalo and others whose works contribute to those “classics” often assigned to first year students in criminology for study).

Although it may be argued as to whether this institute constituted a professional association, it was some 40 years later that Vollmer and Wilson worked to establish the American Society of Criminology, with membership reaching across most degree programs by 1959. Morn (1995) discusses the drift that occurred among some of the
organization’s members regarding its primary focus—namely, the study of crime causation and the treatment of criminals. Such ideological differences resulted in a break in the organization, led by many of its original founders (Hale, 1998). In response, the International Association of Police Professors formed in 1963 to “meet the need of exchanging ideas and data in the field of police education” (Stephens, 1976, p. 109). At their second meeting in 1964, 30 members were in attendance (Hale, 1998). In 1970, this organization became the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS), reflective of a move toward a broader focus of criminal justice programs. It is this organization that, beginning with quality concerns dating back to the 1960s (Stephens, 1976), provides leadership and becomes instrumental in bringing the issue of quality to a national level, leading from early accreditation guidelines to the adoption of the ACJS Certification Standards for Academic Programs in 2005. Today, both the American Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences are widely recognized. ACJS has approximately 2,800 members internationally from virtually every criminal justice educational program of study (Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 2014).

**Early Quality Concerns**

Scholars of criminal justice have been discussing the major concerns of criminal justice education policy for years. Quality and standardization have been at the top of those concerns. The first and subsequent meetings of the National Association of College Police Training Officials (later to be renamed the American Society of Criminology) under the direction of Vollmer presented the organization’s purposes (American Society of Criminology, 1941, p. 3):

- To associate officials engaged in professional police training at the college level;
• To standardize the various police training curricula;
• To standardize, in so far as possible, the subject matter of similar courses in the various schools;
• To keep abreast of recent developments, and to foster research;
• To disseminate information;
• To elevate standards of police service; and
• To stimulate the formation of police training curricula in colleges throughout the nation.

Since this time, the call for evaluation for quality in criminal justice programs has come from professionals in the field, academics, and even from the public. Reckless (1967) notes, in the 1960’s that the field “cannot at present be considered as a profession in its own right, it has potential qualities which, under certain conditions, may ensure its transformation into a profession distinct from those at present encountered in the field” (Reckless, 1967, p. 6). He describes a field searching for identity. Thus, the definition of criminal justice as a field of study unto itself centers this discussion, further compounded by concerns of adequately prepared faculty, inferior educational standards, and the cash cow that criminal justice education provides to institutions. The American Bar Association’s 1972 Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Urban Police Function, questioned criminal justice higher education for police officers, citing it as good training at best and simply serving to reinforce the status quo at worst (Remington, 1973).

A 1976 examination of criminal justice programs found that curricula were too grounded in the practical, lacking a theoretical foundation and providing training over education (Brandstatter & Hoover, 1976). This was compounded by the placement of criminal justice education within technical classifications to maximize the availability of funding (Brandstatter & Hoover, 1976). The following year, after a decade of federal funds, law enforcement officials by way of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police were calling for an evaluation of police education programs to examine their impact (Balboni, 1977). At the same time, various academics and criminal justice faculty were calling for quality control in these programs (Fabianic, 1977; Misner et al., 1975). A state-sponsored study of criminal justice education quality in North Carolina found poorly qualified faculty and too great an emphasis on technical coursework (Adams, 1980). ACJS was called on to lead a process of self-assessment to evaluate the scholarly temperament of the student population and to substantiate that criminal justice education was realizing its objectives (Fabianic, 1977).

Between the recommendations of the 1978 Sherman Report and the discussion of standards put forth by Ward and Webb (1984), criminal justice educational quality was clearly a topic with staying power. In his 1976 study of the evolution of criminal justice education, Stephens observes that “failure to identify a captive body of knowledge, a vocational orientation, few terminal degree holding faculty members, and few graduate programs designed to provide faculty for the field have plagued Criminal Justice education in its quest for academic respectability” (p. 107).

Quality control over criminal justice programs remains at the heart of discussions of criminal justice education. These discussions continued through the tumultuous 1960s and led to a rapid growth of criminal justice studies under a relatively unprepared faculty and administration, supported by generous federal dollars. Thus, it was not surprising that many academics and practitioners continued to voice quality concerns (Ward & Webb, 1984). Formal accreditation guidelines first appeared in 1969 and, when regional accrediting bodies balked at efforts to work with professional associations to look at specific programs within institutions, and institutions themselves lacked an incentive to
change, discussions of accreditation and guidelines were placed in the hands of ACJS and its regional counterparts (Southerland et al., 2007). In the midst of academic attention on marked deficiencies in criminal justice education, the Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards was established in 1977 to examine quality issues in criminal justice education. Driven by ACJS and funded through LEAA, the commission would eventually produce its 1984 report *Quest for Quality*, which made strong recommendations for minimum quality standards, further impacting the quality discussion (Southerland et al., 2007; Ward & Webb, 1984). Drawing from earlier works of the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers and ACJS, its purpose was to examine criminal justice education in the broader context in which it evolved and provide “a benchmark of academic quality for the numerous career-oriented criminal justice programs launched at colleges and community colleges since the late 1960’s” (Ward & Webb, 1984, p. 4). The study concluded that “minimum standards should be developed for a field in transition that does not [meet] with universal academic acceptance” (Ward & Webb, 1984, p. 4). Recommendations, most of which found their roots in earlier ACJS efforts, included (Ward & Webb, 1984, p. 11):

- **Administration**—criminal justice programs should have parity with other academic programs, including access to and control of funding, adequate library resources, and academic freedom;
- **Curricula**—criminal justice programs should provide a broad education, should replace skill training courses with coursework intended to develop analytical and cognitive skills;
- **Faculty**—minimum qualifications for teaching full time in an associate degree program should include a Master’s degree . . . for a baccalaureate or graduate program, should include a PhD; and part time faculty should provide no more than 25 percent of the courses taught;
- **Students**—criminal justice students should be treated the same as other students.
The recommended criteria evolved through the regional associations in criminal justice and ACJS, eventually becoming guidelines, adopted in 1989, for voluntary peer review by ACJS of institutions seeking input on the delivery of quality in criminal justice education (Hale, 1998; Southerland et al., 2007). It is these same criteria that would become the benchmark for program certification under the Quinn Bill in Massachusetts.

**Quality Concerns Continue to Present**

In his book on academic politics, Morn (1995) discusses the quality of criminal justice programs, including placement of departments, the absence of criminal justice departments from “quality research institutions” (p. 181), curriculum, vocational or liberal arts orientation, and faculty qualifications as among the issues that were and continue to be discussed relative to quality criminal justice education. Hale (1998) reminds us that while department names and titles may imply differences, they all descend from one source and link the large number of today’s programs titled criminal justice to LEAA’s criminal justice system flowchart.

In some circles, the need for and emergence of criminal justice as a stand-alone discipline has been questioned (Monk-Turner, Triplett, & Green, 2006). Clear, in his 2001 ACJS presidential address, states that “critics thought that criminal justice was based on a weak empirical and theoretical foundation, and that it has nothing to offer which was not already available through some established discipline, principally sociology or the law” (p. 710). Earlier studies from John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards found evidence of the field’s movement toward self-standing (Langworthy & Latessa, 1989).
Scholars also brought to light many of the issues that continue to compound criminal justice education, the very critiques that were at the center of the Massachusetts Quinn Bill outrage occurring at about the same time. In its quest for credibility,
a significant part of this struggle arose from a lack of quality control, that is from not maintaining a bright line between training and education, from depending on too few instructors who were themselves unqualified or under-qualified, from trying to serve too many students for the limited resources typically made available, and by too often literally simply looking the other way. (Finckenauer, 2005, p. 415)

Southerland (2002) shared with ACJS members that many would have to “face the hard fact that our programs are not what we profess them to be” (p. 597).

Clear (2001) described the identities of some criminal justice programs as “academically ‘weak’ . . . , attracting below-average students who are taught by questionably prepared instructors. The worst epithet tossed at these programs is “cop shop.” On the other hand, criminal justice is often an academic cash cow, with a far higher than average ratio of student majors to FTE faculty” (p. 711).

Hale (1998) spoke of the challenges programs face with their administrators and place in the academic community as one of providing immediate funds to feed the “sacred cows” of academic institutions: “The ‘hands-on’ orientation of many growing programs during the 1970’s, the in-service practitioner student population, and the clear understanding that most such nontraditional students would not be present at the university without the financial support of the federal government created significant image problems for many criminal justice programs” (Durham, 1992, p. 38).

Misner, as cited in Ward and Webb (1984), likens criminal justice program staff to “an awful lot of hustlers, and some college presidents serving as pimps . . . all looking for LEEP dollars” (p. 56). As long as the funds were flowing, criminal justice
departments were “tolerated” by colleges and universities and by their colleagues in more traditional disciplines. A 2008 study found that while criminal justice faculty themselves had strong support for program quality; this support was not always shared with their institutions’ administrators and colleagues (Carlan, 2008). Hunter (2008) states that “the willingness of many college and university administrators to cash in quickly on the funding opportunities and growing student enrollments that were available within a cheaply funded subject area” and the “turf protectionism by other social sciences who wished to keep the ‘cash cow’ within their purviews” were among those issues relevant to the slow pace in which recommendations of quality have emerged in the field (Hunter, 2008, p. 196). In a study of faculty from 1993 to 2002 who noted criminology as their area of specialization, faculty with terminal degrees from less prestigious institutions and those teaching at less prestigious institutions were more likely to list this specialty (Monk-Turner et al., 2006). Current studies looking at criminal justice faculty prestige and graduate productivity demonstrate that these same issues are still very much alive (Cohn & Farrington, 2011; Steiner & Schwartz, 2007). The stigma of the LEAA experience cast a shadow on efforts to legitimize criminal justice education and reach its potential (Durham, 1992).

However, scholars in the field do hold that criminal justice is an academic discipline (Clear, 2001; Cullen, 1995). A 1983 survey by Thompson of leaders in criminal justice education concluded that criminal justice education did have a defined purpose and that the field must change in the future toward this. A study of faculty productivity within criminal justice and criminology doctoral programs points to the agreement on the part of early criminal justice education evaluators of the need for the
discipline to establish a distinct body of knowledge and conclude that “doctoral-granting institutions are fulfilling their obligation in regard to publishing” (Sorenson et al., 1992, p. 29). Ward and Webb (1984) contribute to the discussion by linking this productivity to “instilling in students a basic sense of inquiry” (p. 161). Sorenson et al. (1992) view this as driving scholars of criminal justice to create rather than disseminate knowledge. Clear (2001) concludes that while criminal justice may have quantity under wraps, in both productivity and students, the issues of quality and policy relevance remain at the heart of all discussions regarding the coming of age of criminal justice. And, although faculty may advocate for quality, institutional administrators seem slow to respond given their perceived risk of upsetting the lucrative flow of students.

The ACJS Certification Standards for Academic Programs, adopted in 2005, were the result of a long history of discussions and negotiations around the evolution and meaning of quality education in criminal justice. Recognizing the complexity of a field that undergoes continual development, from system and societal changes to the impact of technological discoveries, leaders within ACJS sought to address these changes to better prepare those seeking to work with and understand it (Hunter, 2008). Thus, the goal in adopting the standards, as stated by ACJS (2005a), is “to measurably improve the quality of criminal justice education.” Early predictions saw a move away from a voluntary, peer-led effort to an independent accrediting agency (Dull, 1982). The center of much debate, minimum standards were rolled out as “guidelines that can be used with any criminal justice curriculum, whether it is a professional program or an academic discipline” and “not the precursor of accreditation” (Hale, 1998, p. 392). Furthermore, the interdisciplinary nature of the field was seen to make accreditation less appealing and
threaten the autonomy of criminal justice educational programs (Ward & Webb, 1984). While the move to a free-standing accrediting body has yet to be resolved, the adoption of standards toward certification could be a significant step. However, in the nine years since the standards were adopted, twelve criminal justice programs have received certification under ACJS. The number of participants may require a closer look. Perhaps voluntary participation alone is not adequate.

Earlier models of the standards provided a framework from which the MDHE would begin to address quality issues under the Quinn Bill. The standards cover nine areas including program structure and curriculum (both type and delivery), faculty, enrollment, resources, integrity, and assessment of program effectiveness and quality. Curriculum and faculty, as examples, are briefly discussed next.

**Curriculum**

The role of interest groups and their view on the nature of criminal justice education, and whether it is simply an extension (or in some areas the initial step) of academy training, also remain at the heart of the quality discussion. The Police Foundation’s 1978 report recommended that those programs with broad curricula with no credit allowance for academy and other trainings should be those to receive federal funding under LEEP (Sherman, 1978). A 1980 review of this report by the then-vice president of John Jay College concludes that overly practical curriculums can be balanced with liberal arts through the cooperation of police and academia (Repetto, 1980). Further recommendations from the report included having education precede professional careers in the field, an initiative that was put forth on inception of education incentive programs and continues to be currently promulgated as a condition of hiring (Carter,
Sapp, & Stephens, 1988; Ward & Webb, 1984). Debates regarding the awarding of academic credit for professional training have contributed to this initiative (Schafer & Castellano, 2005). Fabianic (1980) warns that a narrow view of criminal justice, one that focuses on rules and standards, inherent in many curriculums may hinder the ability of graduates to develop a complete understanding of the complexities of the field. A Bureau of Justice Statistics report of police departments found that 16% of law enforcement agencies had some college education as a condition of hiring, consistent with levels found in 2003 and three times as high as 1990 (Reaves, 2007).

Academics today promote that students must be introduced to the literature of the field and cover essential areas of study within criminal justice (Southerland, 2002). Recent efforts to define a core foundation of knowledge in criminal justice, while having sparked some debate, demonstrate a continued movement in the field toward standardization (Gabbidon & Martin, 2010; Lytle & Travis, 2007; Sorenson, Snell, & Rodriguez, 2006; Vito & Tewksbury, 2008).

Flanagan (2000) promotes a multidisciplinary study of criminal justice that fits well into liberal education programs, consistent with many early recommendations for criminal justice education (e.g., Birzer & Palmiotto, 2002). Curriculum and course development workshops often encourage faculty to consider the distinction between teaching students what is and teaching them to explore (with all the tools they have been taught) what ought to be. This distinction mirrors that of training versus education. Training is specific and, in the field of criminal justice, often assumed to happen in the various academies and on-the-job trainings that comprise many hours on the part of the criminal justice practitioner. Education is a natural extension of this. Overlap is inherent,
yet we need not define it. What is taught and how is closely related to the need for faculty. Scholars within and critics of criminal justice education might assume that the purpose of such education is not to make professionals more capable of performing in a system as it is but rather to make professionals more capable of improving the system by examining what it ought to be. The standards for criminal justice education are clear in that higher education seeks to provide the levels of analysis beyond training, which often lie solely in the practical.

The Massachusetts Guidelines for Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Academic Programs, consistent with ACJS standards, require at a minimum that programs demonstrate certain components that are reflected in all curricula (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2

Criminal Justice Program Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course/Content Area</th>
<th>Related Content Topics (including but not limited to)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration of Justice</td>
<td>Contemporary criminal justice system, major systems of social control and their policies and practices, victimology, juvenile justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>History, theory, practice and legal environment, development of correctional philosophy, incarceration, diversions, community-based corrections, treatment of offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminology</td>
<td>The nature and causes of crime, typologies, offenders, and victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Law</td>
<td>Criminal law, criminal procedures, prosecution, defense, and court procedures and decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Issue of ethics in criminal justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>History, theory, practice and legal environment, police organization, discretion, and subculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Methods for conducting criminal justice research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criminal Justice Faculty

Early faculty members in criminal justice have their roots in the practical. The visionaries for criminal justice education as it developed—Vollmer, Wilson, and Leonard—were first and foremost practicing law enforcement professionals. Greene, Bynum, and Webb (1984), in their study of criminal justice faculty, found that by 1980 many criminal justice faculty were educated in disciplines other than criminal justice, primarily sociology and political science. Early critics of the field were quick to recognize that the need for prepared criminal justice faculty outweighed the field’s ability to produce. A 1978 study of criminal justice faculty found that “less than three-fourths of criminal justice programs had even one full-time faculty member and the LEAA student-faculty ratio guideline of 60:1 was met by less than half” (Dull, 1982, p. 321). Further, the levels of full-time criminal justice faculty staffing were lower at LEEP-supported institutions than all others (Dull, 1982). The Police Foundation’s report of that same year recommended full-time faculty with professional experience as neither a requirement nor a handicap (Sherman, 1978).

The Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education recognized that in the pursuit of quality, “criminal justice education, its basic nature, its future direction, and its future level of quality depends on the faculty in the field” (Ward & Webb, 1984, p. 16). The ACJS certification standards state, among other quality standards, that “two-thirds of all full-time faculty in baccalaureate degree programs must hold the earned doctorate (PhD) in criminal justice or closely related discipline” (Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 2005b, p. 12). The requirements differ slightly for associate’s and graduate programs. While much debate surrounded the proper
terminal degree for the field, the earned doctorate in criminal justice is clearly the standard (see Hemmens, 2008; Hunter 2008). Hale (1998) observes that while LEAA “was the catalyst for the expansion of undergraduate programs . . . it was also instrumental in the creation of doctoral programs at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the University of Albany, and Michigan State University” (p. 387). Morn (1995) concluded that, historically, “very few universities of national repute offered a doctorate in criminal justice” (p. 181).

Clear (2001), in a study that examined graduation rates for doctoral programs, concludes that periods of growth have occurred in doctorates in criminal justice. Levine (2011), in his reflection on doctoral education in criminal justice, emphasizes that “doctoral education in criminal justice has come of age” (p. 16), tying this to a number of programs, the formal meetings of the leaders of those programs, and the productivity of their students and graduates. Nevertheless, while graduate programs in criminal justice are producing at a higher level, it has yet to be concluded if resources have met the demand.

**The Massachusetts Quinn Bill and Academic Standards**

Inherent in this research is an ongoing conflict between quality standards and the desire of institutions to have the resources needed to attract students. In essence, the issues surrounding LEEP in the 1960s may be happening again at the Massachusetts state level. The demise of federal funding under LEEP did not bring about the decrease in student population that was expected. What occurred was a change in demographics. Nationally, an increase in programs was attributed to the growth of full-time undergraduate students, women, and minorities. Those programs with reliance on part-
time practitioner students saw decline (Weirman & Archambeault, 1983). However, enrollments in Massachusetts remained steady or even increased among these in-service populations, even as LEAA funding declined. The most obvious explanation for this is the Massachusetts Quinn Bill. The value of education for police officers has long been at the heart of these issues. If education is seen as beneficial, then the funds flow, even in the face of no measureable benefits. The goal of education may have been pursued with no regard for how this would be accomplished. Further, media coverage of such issues in Massachusetts would circulate these discussions in the public arena.

The Massachusetts Quinn Bill had grown substantially in just over 30 years in terms of beneficiaries, direct costs, and programs willing to serve. As reform advocates geared up for change, 250 municipalities were participating with 9,900, or 60%, of police officers and 2,100, or 89%, of state police receiving some level of benefit. All this cost the state and municipalities more than $126 million a year (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003).

The controversy in Massachusetts surrounding the Quinn Bill and the quantity, value, and quality of criminal justice programs serving it eventually resulted in a 2000 paper review of criminal justice programs in the state. Like the experience of ACJS with its standards and peer review, the MDHE was not an accrediting body and no mandate accompanied its actions to ensure quality delivery.

On the whole and prior to the above review, programs offering criminal justice degrees were approved, with no focused review or oversight, through regional institutional accreditation under the New England Association of Schools and Colleges.
Southerland (1990) reminds us that “university accreditation does not guarantee that all programs within the university will meet the standards for accreditation” (p. 87).

The 2000 review tapped ACJS resources for both reviewers and standards. Recognizing the limitations of a paper review, the MDHE proceeded to examine self-studies voluntarily submitted by programs relative to meeting the educational needs of the commonwealth, program quality, and the relationship of the Quinn Bill to that quality. Findings and recommendations were reported in 2001 and cited “serious concerns” regarding program quality relative to faculty, curriculum, and resources, primarily in the form of underfunding (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 9). A summary of the recommendations lists (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, pp. 18–19):

- High expectations for criminal justice degree programs.
- Quality of the academic program should be a precondition for approving criminal justice programs for eligibility under the Police Career Incentive Pay Program.
- The Commonwealth [should] empanel a well-qualified and prestigious Criminal Justice Advisory Board to the Massachusetts Board of Higher Education.
- The Chancellor, working with presidents and provosts, [should] develop guidelines to implement a statewide, on-site program review of all criminal justice programs . . . whose graduates are eligible for Police Career Incentive Pay.

Given that minimum standards for quality had been promoted by ACJS for more than a decade, it was clear that voluntary adherence to quality benchmarks in the field was not enough. Finckenauer, in his 2005 presidential address to ACJS, emphatically states that “many programs, and not only in Massachusetts, simply ignored the standards . . . with impunity . . . presidents, provosts, deans, department chairs, and faculty—have
neither heard nor seen any evil in the rip-off of the educational process that they either participated in or condoned, and in too many cases still do” (p. 420).

In response to the 2001 report, the MDHE developed an Academic Program Advisory Committee and charged it with developing standards and processes for reviewing criminal justice programs for participation in the Quinn Bill. Public pressure in the wake of the findings and recommendations resulted in the current 2002 version of the Quinn Bill statute mandating that all approved criminal justice programs under the Quinn Bill meet or exceed the quality standards developed under this committee. The statute further limits programs’ autonomy in transcribing various training and other forms of nontraditional credit toward degrees in criminal justice.

The resulting MDHE criminal justice program guidelines were developed using a variety of resources, including ACJS’s Minimum Standards, past quality studies, and a review of transcripts from students seeking state compensation under the Quinn Bill (Southerland et al., 2007). The process of approval under the guidelines requires each degree program to submit a self-study and participate in an onsite review by criminal justice experts outside the commonwealth, demonstrating that they meet or exceed all standards. Not only did the number of institutions offering criminal justice degree programs under the Quinn Bill decrease, many changes aligned with quality occurred within institutions. These changes included the curriculum, faculty composition, and qualifications, and where and how programs were delivered. For example, in a study of student assessment in criminal justice programs, Moriarty (2006) found a “concerted push toward assessment in 2000” (p. 418), including the adoption of student learning objectives. That this was the same year of the first MDHE assessment that required
institutions to submit self-evaluations in these areas may be more than coincidence. Overall, the Massachusetts experience with the Quinn Bill, culminating in its compliance review, has been said to restore confidence in its criminal justice programs and has “helped provide the impetus for the Academy to pursue certification” (Southerland et al., 2007, p. 99).

**Summary**

Understanding and planning for the intended and unintended consequences of a policy prior to its implementation may speak to the continuity of such policy. Drift from original goals—intentional or not—conflict, and the misidentification of latent goals or consequences are areas to be considered. If considered prior to implementation, planning for the unexpected becomes part of the solution. Planning should be goal oriented, leadership driven, and grounded in stakeholders. The development of the *ACJS Certification Standards for College/University Criminal Justice Baccalaureate Degree Programs* is one example of how this can be effectively accomplished (Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 2005b).

However, not all scholars agree that the people and values comprising various interest groups are enough to effect transformation. Sirkin et al. (2005) conclude that while these may be important and indirect influencers for some initiatives, they are not essential for all. Recognizing the difficulties inherent in changing attitudes, values, and beliefs, they conducted a study examining the denominators of organizational change and found common elements within institutional reform that determined success or failure. These elements are related to people and values and include duration, the time between review of goals and objectives, performance integrity or capabilities, the commitment to
proposed change by leaders and stakeholders, and the additional effort to be made to cope with the change. A combination of both these hard and soft factors must be considered in the planning stages as they may impact successful reform (Sirkin et al., 2005).

If people are the key to successful implementation and policy reform, they are also a barrier to overcome. Scholars of institutional change and reform often agree on why people resist change: its social consequences. The resistance is often not to the change in the policy itself but to the change in their own role and relationships. For example, a change in an organization’s function could lead to changes in responsibilities that may be perceived as lessened job security (Dessler, 1986). Wilson (1989) concludes that of the problems bureaucrats face, serving too many masters could be a barrier to change. When one tries to serve many competing goals, placating becomes the norm. This is what makes public sector organizations inefficient and leads to scandal (Wilson, 1989). Mederer & Silver, (2010) examined the slow pace of change within institutions of higher learning and found that change happens at the interactional level and includes perceptions of fairness, supervisory challenges and hassles, cultural norms, and concerns of cost and productivity loss. Thus, it may not be the goal of change that upsets its process but the process itself.

In more than 100 years since its inception, criminal justice continues to grow as a lucrative program of study within institutions of higher learning. In 2005, the year ACJS approved its standards, more than 830 accredited institutions offered degrees in criminal justice (Moriarty, 2006). Today, a search for undergraduate and graduate criminal justice programs on Petersons.com yields approximately 3,000 results combined. At the same time, with the quality bar having been raised for criminal justice education, questions of
effectiveness remain. Toward that quality effect, standards are only a part of the equation. Implementation and adherence to those standards are equally important. Having adopted and mandated quality standards under the Quinn Bill for almost 10 years, Massachusetts provides a timely case study.
CHAPTER 3: THE STUDY

The development of academic standards under ACJS is another step in the history of conflict between quality agents and the desire of institutions to obtain resources that attract students. According to Ward and Webb (1984, p. 183), the “quick source of income” provided by the federally funded LEEP program created a situation where “in many ways, criminal justice educators in particular and higher education in general put self-interest before the need for a reasoned approach to the development of the discipline.” However, the quality issues and economic resources that began to arise during the LEEP years continue through various policies at the state level in Massachusetts and tie into ACJS efforts at the national level concerning program quality and the capacity of institutions to change under certification and standards. Nationally, it has been concluded that “the bar has been raised for criminal justice education and the discipline has benefited from the adoption of standards,” and in Massachusetts, “the MDHE experience in using a compliance review process has contributed greatly to restoring the confidence in criminal justice programs in that state” (Southerland et al., 2007, p. 101). The impact of these policies, standards, and review processes are examined next.

Theoretical Framework and Research Questions

According to the Massachusetts Office of Student Financial Assistance (n.d.), the Quinn Bill contains two stated objectives: to encourage police officers in participating municipalities to earn degrees in law enforcement and criminal justice and to provide educational incentives through salary increases. Derived from the literature and brief discussion of the Quinn Bill, this study assumes that the Quinn Bill goals were
accomplished. As of 2003, more than 60% of all police officers in participating municipalities and 89% of all Massachusetts State Police had earned degrees and exercised their right to Quinn Bill financial benefits. On the basis of that assumption, the following questions will be addressed by this study:

- What was the effect of the Quinn Bill on criminal justice higher education policy in Massachusetts? What happened and why?
- Did criminal justice programs in the state of Massachusetts change under the Quinn Bill? If so, how and why?

**Study Design**

The roles of symbolic politics, interest groups, political culture, and implementation issues relative to the Quinn Bill provide the structure for gathering information to inform the questions posed by this research. In the design to collect information about the development and impact of the Quinn Bill, two research strategies—personal interviews and secondary data analysis—are appropriate methods. Each makes unique contributions and provides a range of information. Examining goals and their effects on criminal justice higher education, organizing data to identify recurring themes, and analyzing information relative to the research questions comprised the study. The explicit goals of the Quinn Bill are clearly stated. Implicit in the Quinn Bill is how they would be achieved.

The research process for this dissertation was an iterative process. Analysis was ongoing and, at various points, there was a need to add and adapt to new developments that arose in the process of data collection. Those processes are discussed next. The accumulation and exploration of the information gathered was the goal of this design.
What secondary data could not provide, questions were asked via personal interviews. For example, data regarding criminal justice program enrollments in Massachusetts were collected using secondary methods. Once collected, interviews were used to examine the nature of any enrollment trends that occurred.

**Proposed Method: Primary and Secondary Data Analysis**

Information regarding the legislative history of the Quinn Bill and the MDHE’s role relative to its impact on Massachusetts higher education institutions that offer degrees in criminal justice, along with demographic information for those institutions, was included in the data sources located and analyzed relative to the area addressed. Various resources were available to provide information related to this study’s research questions. It was through the discovery of the boundaries and limitations of this available information that the direction of the interview and interview questions, where structured, were formulated.

**Personal Interviews**

To trace the legislative history of the Quinn Bill and the MDHE’s role relative to criminal justice programs, the identification of appropriate agencies, and within them individuals, complemented secondary data sources, filled in any exposed gaps in information, and allowed for a more detailed examination of the questions presented in this study. To maximize efficiency and analysis, general questions were developed and served as an overall interview guide. Although shaped by the various issues throughout this section, interviews were designed to be semi-structured and open ended, presenting just a few questions to encourage open responses. All interviews began with rapport-building demographic questions. A basic strategy of inquiry guided the interview.
Who: What was this particular interviewee’s role in the process?

What: What exactly did this interviewee do in the process? What was he or she seeking to accomplish?

When: At which stage in the process did this interviewee become involved?

Where: Where is this interviewee’s vantage point on the process—where does his or her perception lie?

How: How did this interviewee contribute to the process in his or her role?

Why—or a more casual “how come”: Why did this interviewee do what he or she did—and sources of pressures to do so—and/or why does he or she hold certain opinions?

Each interview ended with a discussion exploring the implications of the Quinn Bill. When and how all questions were asked was guided by the interviewee’s role, questions posed throughout this section, and the natural course of the interview. Please see Appendix B for the Quinn Bill interest group interview guide.

For interviews conducted with individuals representing criminal justice education programs in Massachusetts, a semi-structured interview guide was developed with the intention of providing consistency. It included demographic information and broad categories of assumed impact relative to questions posed on roles and perceptions of change. The categories were based on the quality standards developed by both ACJS and MDHE and cover the time frames relevant to the study. Please see Appendix C for the criminal justice program subject interview guide.

Twenty-two personal interviews were originally proposed, twelve from the criminal justice education communities and ten from all other groups combined. In total,
25 interviews were conducted. Distributions are discussed within each of the following sections. All information gathered from subjects was assured confidentiality, with informed consent preceding every interview. Please see Appendix D for the institutional review board-approved consent form.

**Sampling**

A combination of purposive and random sampling was originally proposed for the study. However, due to the nature of the topic and the goal of the study to include those who had direct knowledge of the Quinn Bill, it was decided early to solely pursue a purposive sample. For example, due to timing and faculty turn over, a random sample of the criminal justice academic community may have excluded those best suited to share information. Thus, for all groups, purposive sampling techniques were used. Documents supplemented all areas, including those where interviews were not possible. Resources such as public records, newspaper accounts, internal documents, communications, and program information assisted in identifying individuals who appeared best situated to enlighten the study and provide referrals to additional participants and resources. Interviews and sampling targeted a cross section of individuals and perspectives. Both secondary data sources and qualitative personal interviews were found to be the most effective methods to explore and explain the issues. Relevant to the research questions, the nature of intentions and perspectives may not have been easily found or observed; thus, personal interviews sought to provide this information.
Legislative History of the Quinn Bill

Data collection began with a brief legislative history of the Quinn Bill. This history examined the various processes involved in the development and eventual implementation of the Quinn Bill. The study required a look at the legislative events that occurred in the process of enacting the Quinn Bill. This involved researching the documentation created during its development and eventual change. The State Library of Massachusetts in Boston provided entrance into locating the original bill, redrafts, and amendments—both adopted and defeated—testimonies presented, reports and studies commissioned by the legislature, voting chronology, records, debates, actions (from both the floor and committees), and interpretations shared by the attorney general following its signing. The state’s Legislative Documents, House and Senate Journals, House and Senate Proceedings Collection, and the State House News Service provided relevant information. The latter two resources were not available until after 1972 and were used primarily for changes that were introduced to the Quinn Bill during the time of its reform. These processes informed further inquiry through the identification of the various parties, or interest groups, who played some role in moving the Quinn Bill to its current state.

While the analysis of such social artifacts provided a framework for answering and understanding many of the questions posed, personal interviews provided insight into the symbolic and political processes and the players who defined its development and implementation relative to the impact on higher education.

Once various players were identified, potential respondents were contacted by phone or email and invited to participate in the study. Interview dates and times were then arranged and conducted. Identified sources in this area included legislators, law
enforcement representatives, and members of the higher education (MDHE) and larger criminal justice academic community. The initial proposal included spotlight reporters from the *Boston Globe* or *Boston Herald* and public interest groups, a combined group who brought the issues into the public arena and demanded action. Logistics and timing of the study did not allow for the inclusion of this latter group for personal interviews. Articles, reports, and communications were used to gain this perspective.

It was originally proposed that at least two representatives from each of the legislative and law enforcements groups would be identified and interviewed. However, because the law enforcement group represents both consumers and beneficiaries of the Quinn Bill, interviews within this group were doubled, better informing the quality and policy discussion. The goal was to represent various areas within the law enforcement community and allow emerging themes to become apparent.

**The Role of the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education**

The interpretation of the Quinn Bill legislation is also noteworthy to this study as it informs the implementation of the bill and its adherence to stated goals. The administrative agency charged with overseeing the delivery of the Quinn Bill upon its passage in 1970 was the MDHE. More than 30 years later, this same agency would be specifically charged to oversee the quality issues related to the bill. Understanding the role the MDHE played in the initial and later stages of the bill provides valuable insight into the problems that arose around programs, access, and quality concerns. Secondary data sources, including MDHE public documents, requests for action, and reports, were researched to define this role. A follow-up personal interview was conducted within the MDHE to enhance data collection.
Personal interviews with ACJS members and the larger criminal justice academic community were also conducted as an extension of the MDHE. ACJS was the national organization called on by the MDHE to conduct the initial evaluation of criminal justice programs, offer guidance on the development of standards with their own Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Education, and provide reviewers with the onsite reviews of criminal justice programs in fall 2003 and beyond.

Purposive sampling was utilized here as interviews sought to include individuals identified by secondary data sources and referrals. Given the political nature of the process, it was possible that various players with a vested interest in the Quinn Bill would be identifiable only through primary sources. It was originally expected that two MDHE members would be identified and interviewed along with two ACJS members and those involved in the standards and review process representing somewhat discrete stages in their involvement: the 1999 review, the development of standards, and the 2003 review.

The total interviews originally expected for this group was four. Once the study began, it was decided to maintain the total number of interviews with participants involved in the standard and review process at four, even though only one MDHE member was available for interview. This small cross section did allow for intended areas to be covered and themes to emerge.

**The Role of Criminal Justice Programs**

Being both stakeholders and leaders in the criminal justice educational policy discussion, the role of the various criminal justice programs is important to the understanding of what happened in Massachusetts. Similar to the trust that LEAA initiatives placed in the states to carry out its goals, the Quinn Bill’s goals were entrusted
to be delivered and implemented by criminal justice degree programs. From the inception of the Quinn Bill to the implementation of Massachusetts’s quality standards and beyond, Massachusetts higher learning institutions with criminal justice programs are a rich source of data to this study.

Criminal justice programs contributed to legislative history. Given that the programs and their administrators represent a distinct interest group in this study, it was deemed necessary to know which role they may have played in the early stages of the Quinn Bill—its development and implementation. Exploring a possible lack of participation on the part of criminal justice educational programs was also important to the larger context. That they played some role in later changes is known; however, the nature of that role needed to be explored.

This study area consisted of some secondary data analysis of programs and personal interviews with individuals representing a purposive sample of the 45 colleges and universities offering criminal justice education programs or a close derivative as a major at the associate’s, bachelor’s, and master’s levels in the state of Massachusetts. Many institutions offer more than one degree. This section began with the collection of data through secondary sources to illustrate change over time and to develop a framework for subsequent interviews and discussion. Where gaps in information were identified, questions were unanswered, or opinion was sought, personal interviews were conducted. The total interviews expected for this section was eight. However, it became apparent that the heart of the Quinn Bill quality story is with this population, and 14 interviews were conducted.
Defining the Population of Criminal Justice Institutions

Unlike the various data sources mentioned earlier, the population of institutions offering criminal justice programs was partially defined at the study’s onset. Initially, 30 Massachusetts institutions offering criminal justice programs were identified, along with their degree offerings. Only institutions offering degrees in criminal justice or law enforcement, as defined and approved under Section 108L of the Massachusetts General Laws as being eligible programs of study under the Quinn Bill, were included. Although Quinn Bill students attended schools outside of Massachusetts, this study was limited to those programs within Massachusetts given the difficulty inherent in identifying every school a Massachusetts police officer may have attended over the years to receive Quinn Bill benefits. Appendix E lists 30 Massachusetts-approved Quinn Bill institutions, their locations, and the degree(s) offered at the time of the study. The total number of approved programs offered under these institutions was 37.

Sampling Frame of Criminal Justice Institutions

Utilizing a purposive sample was due to time, desired variation, and the changing dynamics of the population. Interviewing individuals within each institution was not feasible within the proposed time line of this dissertation. In addition, institutions have added or discontinued programs over the years and individuals within the population have changed—faculty and administrators have left or been hired during the period in which this study focuses. In an initial effort to address heterogeneity, a stratified random population sample of institutions was originally proposed as the basis for data collection in this area. While much of this research is descriptive, a random sample was originally proposed to increase the likelihood that the sample will be representative of the
population and allow for generalizations. The proposal called for the population of 30 institutions to be collapsed into four strata: (1) public institutions offering only approved undergraduate degrees (N1); (2) private institutions offering only approved undergraduate degrees (N2); (3) public institutions offering approved graduate degrees (N3); and (4) private institutions offering approved graduate degrees (N4). The decision was made to combine institutions in this manner to allow for each stratum to be mutually exclusive. Dividing schools by degree alone (associate’s or bachelor’s programs) put many institutions into multiple strata, and not all criminal justice programs at all institutions are Quinn Bill approved. For example, although one state university offers both a BS and an MS in criminal justice, only the BS is a Quinn Bill-approved program. Although those institutions identified in the strata offering graduate programs in all likelihood also offer undergraduate programs, it was the graduate program that was the focus when gathering data and interviewing individuals representing those institutions.

It was decided prior to data collection that moving from a stratified random sample to a purposive sample that could be examined along those same strata was the preferred method. Purposive sampling allowed the study to address the issue of faculty and administrators moving between, within, or out of institutions and reaching those faculty best situated to respond to the study. Because of the Quinn Bill division of benefits according to this education level grouping and the differing role of the MDHE regarding oversight of public and private institutions, these strata were maintained within the purposive sample to capture various perspectives and information along these lines. In addition, the MDHE’s initial paper review of criminal justice programs under the Quinn Bill paid particular attention to concerns regarding the quantity and quality of
degrees being offered at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Effects of the Quinn Bill relative to a school’s degree offerings and private or public orientation are subgroups worth examining. Relative to the context of the study, it was anticipated that with this method a cross section of individuals could be reached and identified who were involved with programs at various stages, allowing for data saturation and information redundancy relevant to the study’s research questions.

It was originally proposed that within each stratum, a sample would be taken with the goal of a target total sample of eight institutions offering criminal justice or law enforcement programs in Massachusetts. It was assumed that each stratum would be randomly sampled according to its proportionate allocation in the population (%n1 = total number in population divided by total population calculating %n1 of total sample then n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = n). Due to the relatively small size of two of the four strata (N2 = 3; N4 = 3), it was necessary to oversample these strata to identify themes and capture diverse perspectives within each stratum. Thus, it was determined that a disproportionate stratified sample would best serve the study’s sampling needs and include at least two institutions from each stratum. This sample is represented by n1, n2, n3, and n4. The final sample maintained a minimum of two within each stratum.

It was additionally proposed that the data collected on the institutions included in the sample would be accessed to identify basic demographic questions relevant to the study. From each individual included in the sample, basic information was collected on his or her institution in accordance with the guide found in Appendix C. This information was accessed via two main sources: (1) online reported program information via common datasets (e.g., the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System) and (2) program
catalogs, either online or hard copy. Department chairs, directors, coordinators, or key faculty for each criminal justice program were identified, often through referral, and contacted by phone or email to arrange for personal interviews.

Information collected was informed by the adopted standards for quality criminal justice education in Massachusetts and ACJS, including degree programs offered (and when and where), the year the program was first offered, faculty credentials and full-time or part-time status, enrollments, curriculum, admissions criteria, and when Quinn Bill certification occurred. However, when these sources were accessed, the data were inconsistent and often not specific to criminal justice programs. It was determined that limiting external data collection to enrollments and asking participants to share information directly regarding their programs would be sufficient to address the study’s research questions.

The original sampling frame of programs did not include criminal justice programs that do not participate in the Quinn Bill (N = 14). Not participating in the Quinn Bill would be the result of either the institution’s decision not to submit for approval under the quality standards or by the institution not gaining MDHE approval following submission. However, because these institutions’ perspectives provide valuable information relative to the Quinn Bill and program quality posed by this study, a small purposive sample of this population (n = 2) was interviewed and included in the criminal justice program sample.

In all, a total of 22 personal interviews were originally proposed for this study, 10 with subjects familiar with the legislative and implementation history of the Quinn Bill and 12 with subjects who represent the criminal justice academic community: MDHE,
ACJS, and subjects representing criminal justice institutions. The final sample included 25 different perspectives from four interest groups, as noted in Figure 3.1.

**Figure 3.1.** Respondent Perspectives, N = 25

In the criminal justice program interest group, where ample interview participants were available for inclusion, interviews continued until the information gathered began to repeat itself. At this point it was assumed that saturation had been reached and marked the end of data collection.

**Alternative Methods Considered**

In the process of developing this study, alternative methods were considered. These included electronic and mail surveys, sampling students, and sole reliance on secondary data sources. The nature of the research questions are not easily addressed by such methods and may miss the richness of data unavailable through traditional survey methods or secondary sources alone. Structured surveys also lack the flexibility needed to
explore perception. The study requires inquiry into the meaning and understanding of subjects regarding the Quinn Bill process—inquiry that some quantitative methods may not uncover.

Sampling students of the Quinn Bill in addition to program faculty and administrators was considered but determined to pose difficulties in answering the research questions and identifying the population given that the Quinn Bill has been in existence for more than 40 years. This population may also introduce another level of bias, given personal interests in the Quinn Bill. While criminal justice program faculty and administrators certainly present bias through perspective and social desirability, it was decided that comparing student and faculty perspectives would be difficult given the variation of programs and students in the commonwealth. The limited sample of law enforcement/students was purposely selected to allow for a discussion of larger issues concerning the Quinn Bill along with any personal education experience. In addition, looking at the impact of college education on police performance was not a goal of this research.

As previously stated, random sampling methods were also considered regarding the criminal justice program component. However, an attempt to generalize answers to the larger population of Massachusetts criminal justice programs was not a goal of this research. In addition, various subgroup configurations within the population of criminal justice programs were considered. It was decided that a breakdown according to degree and the institutions’ public or private orientation would produce a sample appropriate to the research questions posed.
Alternate sample sizes and populations were also considered. In addition to consideration of time and resource constraints, the final sampling method and number was chosen because under stratified representative sampling, as the sample size increased, the only stratum that would result in an increase in actual representation was that of public undergraduate programs. This is due to their larger representation in the population and rounding of calculations to the nearest whole number.

**Data Collection and Time Line**

Secondary data collection and analysis took place during fall 2012. From these secondary sources and early referrals, individual research subjects were identified and interview questions were adjusted relative to the questions and issues. Personal interviews for all groups were conducted during spring and early fall 2012. When logistics proved problematic, contact efforts continued to be made through summer 2013.

Once identified, potential respondents were contacted to schedule a personal interview. In each instance where reciprocal contact was made, participants agreed to be interviewed. Among the various identified potential participants across all groups, five did not return either phone calls or emails. In all but two instances, face-to-face interviews were conducted at the participant’s place of employment. The remaining two were conducted at the participants’ homes. In the three instances where a face-to-face interview was not practical or invited, phone interviews were conducted. Signed (or verbal in the case of phone interviews) informed consent began each interview explaining the study and methods. A request was made and approved to tape the interview using a microcassette recorder in all face-to-face interviews. Note-taking accompanied the taping and allowed for focused notes around emerging themes and ideas. Note-taking was also
used for phone interviews. An estimate of one hour was planned for each interview. It was assumed that interview lengths would vary and they did, from 35 minutes to 90 minutes, with the average around 50 minutes. Interviews were flexible, continuing until the topics were covered or the subjects cued they were done. Sources remained confidential through the data analysis stages, with participants being given both a letter and number. The former represented the stratum (A–D) and the latter the program number (1–x) within that stratum.

In an effort to ensure confidentiality, sample analysis and data results were combined into four groups: the law enforcement interest group (n = 4), which combines both Quinn Bill recipients and union representatives; the public interest group (n = 3), which combines legislators and other public policy representatives involved in implementation of the Quinn Bill; the standards interest group (n = 4), which combines an MDHE representative and reviewers and standards developers through national associations (ACJS); and the criminal justice program interest group (n = 14), which combines criminal justice program faculty and administrators from Massachusetts institutions. The latter group was further divided into their representation within the previously described strata: private undergraduate programs, public undergraduate programs, private graduate programs, and public graduate programs. In addition, the interest groups were further defined when doing so allowed for greater contextual understanding of their responses and would not compromise confidentiality. For example, nine out of 14 criminal justice faculty members were also administrators, an area where questions on the resources provided for criminal justice programs had varying responses. In this case, the distinction between faculty and administrator was made when that role
was interpreted to be informative on a particular issue. Two areas where further breakdown of the group would result in some subgroups having only one participant and participants being identified through the study were the standards interest group and the public interest group. Thus, all answers from these groups are combined.

Interviews followed, as closely as possible, the guides presented in the appendices. Some information was completed prior to the interview relative to various demographics attained through program materials or websites. However, a check of the accuracy of what was previously recorded was included in each interview to both assure and build rapport. The interview guide was pretested on a member of the population not included in the sample. The pretest aided in question delivery, clarity, and time management. All efforts were made to follow the interview guides. Interviews did not, however, result in a clean recitation of answers. Once study participants, particularly those within the criminal justice educator group, began talking, the conversation began to flow naturally, guided by the topics but away from a traditional question-and-answer session.

All criminal justice program interest group respondents appeared at ease and open to sharing information during the interview. In some instances, these participants had to be redirected to the interview purpose. This was interpreted as an indicator that participants had much to share regarding the topic that went beyond the study’s scope. Interviews with this group all lasted longer than those of the law enforcement, standards, and public interest group respondents.

Respondents representing a law enforcement perspective had less to say and seemed guarded. To encourage open dialogue, they were reminded of the researcher’s
role as a nonjudgmental student. These interviews contained more stories and examples. There was also an element of defense in some responses.

The standards and public interest groups had the least to say of all interviewed. Responses in these groups were shorter and contained more references to policy, procedure, and documents that had been produced throughout the Quinn Bill story. This group shared various documents in response to questions, many of which are included in the discussion and cited in response to various issues.

The natural flow of the conversations, while seemingly successful in encouraging participants to share information, proved difficult to categorize into topics. Criminal justice program participants, for example, spoke of faculty in broader terms, some responding generally to questions about ratios, status, and credentials. Most could not recall exact numbers in regard to enrollment, faculty ratios, and the like.

**Data Organization and Analysis**

Data analysis combined both secondary data and interview responses. Given that secondary data documents supplemented information not presented through the interviews, the presentation is often combined. Secondary data were quantified, where possible, to examine some demographic information relative to individuals, programs, and agencies. It was assumed from the onset that analysis would be ongoing and, at various points in the research process, there was a need to add and adapt to new developments that arose during data collection. This is discussed in each section where the research conducted varied from the research planned.

Once data had been collected, notes were rewritten and audio files were transcribed. Transcribed data were saved in Word files, as were all interview notes. The
variation within the interviews and the abundance of secondary data sources required transcripts, notes, and other resources to be reviewed and information and responses placed into broad themes and time lines. The research guides served as informal coding instruments around which responses and information were broadly grouped. As the data were analyzed, additional emergent themes, including those raised by respondents, were added. These outlier topics were incorporated after and discussed accordingly.

Demographic information on respondents not pre-recorded occurred within the body of the interviews and was pulled out and recorded using categories derived from the responses. Categories included years of service, role within agency or institution, type of agency or institution, and private or public and level of degree offered. Further breakdowns allowed for additional demographic reporting and analysis.

Transcribed data and those from secondary sources were organized and led to the coding of the data files according to the topics, themes, and issues that emerged. In reading the transcripts and data, patterns, similarities, dissimilarities, and the like were located. Expected themes and topics were visited within the framework of the Quinn Bill story. Responses were grouped and supporting quotes to the observed areas were marked for inclusion. Data was semi-quantified at this level. The original plan was to analyze the data with the aid of the NVivo qualitative database software program. However, reviewing and coding the data without using such software was decided as the better option given the various sources of information.

Organizing to identify themes and information relative to the research questions comprised both secondary and interview data analysis. Analysis began by pulling out those themes that guided the data collection for program impact: enrollment, curriculum,
faculty, perception of quality as probed through questions, and resources across the various time frames presented—the early years of the Quinn Bill, the MDHE’s involvement in the Quinn Bill’s oversight, and the current picture. Additional themes were added as they appeared within the data. Research questions posed to the study led to the decision to break themes into topics and issues according to areas such as program offerings, standards, roles, attitudes and perspectives on the Quinn Bill, criminal justice education and standards, changes to programs observed, overall and quality concerns, and future trends.

The methods proposed allowed for an analysis of the range of roles that interest groups played in the development and impact of the Quinn Bill at the various stages. Understanding whether goals were shared by all interest groups and whether they changed over time were used to shed light on which set of competing interests was more accurate in its predictions and possibly more successful in its outcomes and aids in understanding how the Quinn Bill and its changes evolved and were implemented.

Some early expectations of findings and analysis included:

- If the research provides evidence that the Quinn Bill had an impact on change for some criminal justice programs more than others, the analysis will focus on those programs most affected. For example, looking at whether program enrollment increases coincided with adoption of the Quinn Bill by the various towns or municipalities that would provide this source of student revenue, or adoption of the MDHE’s standards, could provide a source of explanation. Similarly, changes in criminal justice educational programs prior to the adoption of the Quinn Bill may tell a different story.
• If the research provides little evidence of change—that institutions simply went through the motions without actually changing irrespective of the passing and application of quality standards—a discussion of the risks of providing new resources without underlying restructuring to receive those resources relative to institutional leadership and integrity is warranted.

• If the research provides evidence that the Quinn Bill as a means of providing education to police officers became the center of controversy and that the value of educating police officers was never at issue one might conclude that institutional goals were displaced and their outputs redefined.

The information gathered from the proposed sources was then used to link a discussion of symbolic politics, interest groups, political culture, and implementation to the policy development process that eventually produced the Massachusetts Quinn Bill in its current form: the passage of the Quinn Bill and its early implementation, the conflicts and concerns that arose after implementation of the program, the intensification of the conflict that ultimately produced the policy amendment that required governmental oversight of criminal justice programs at the state’s colleges and universities, and the current picture. In this, the study’s research questions can be addressed regarding the nature of the goals and the impact of the Quinn Bill on criminal justice higher education.

**Study Limitations**

Interviewer bias and the researcher’s role limit this study. Given that the researcher is employed at a Massachusetts institution of higher education that offers criminal justice programs, the research project, participant selection, interviews, and interpretation may be subjective based on that experience. In addition, because the
number of criminal justice programs in Massachusetts is relatively small, the inclusion of those programs in the sample of participants known to the researcher was unavoidable. This may have had certain advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages to the researcher’s role included knowledge of the landscape of criminal justice education in Massachusetts, various players, and insight into the experiences of a variety of institutions in the Quinn Bill process. In data collection, this provided a starting point and the ability to ask questions within the context of criminal justice and higher education. Knowledge of the larger issues concerning the history and processes of the Quinn Bill demonstrated commitment to the research and in some cases may have helped pave the way for open and candid conversations.

Disadvantages to the researcher’s role were that too much knowledge may have provided a barrier to the willingness of participants to share information, possibly seeing the sharing of information in this area as threatening. Given the researcher’s affiliation with criminal justice programs in Massachusetts, subjects may have had preconceived ideas regarding the researcher’s role and intent. Efforts at building rapport early in the interview stage and identifying subjects through referrals may have helped to address any issues concerning access to subjects and their willingness to be open and candid in the interviews. Knowledge of various institutional demographics by way of secondary sources prior to the interview may have helped to address this issue as well.

The researcher sought to maximize the advantages and minimize the effects of any disadvantages by following established interview guidelines and adhering to the research plan. Where variation from that plan was deemed necessary, all attempts were made to gather information in a consistent and reliable manner. Efforts to be clear and
understandable when asking questions were aided by the researcher’s knowledge of the topic and setting and secondary data knowledge gathered prior to interviews being conducted. Minimizing interviewer effects was addressed by arranging to meet subjects at a location of their choosing, whether within or outside of the institutions they represent.

While the study sought to examine the goals of the Quinn Bill, it was limited in its scope to the impact the achievement of those goals had on higher education institutions in Massachusetts that offer criminal justice degrees. The role the Quinn Bill played in professionalizing police was beyond the scope of this study.

The decision not to include a large sample of criminal justice students was also a limitation. Examining the quality of criminal justice education by speaking directly to the consumers of that education could have countered the biased perspectives of those charged with delivering it. While members of the law enforcement community included in the sample did comment on their personal education experiences, responses seemed guarded and sought to present a positive perspective. Interviewer bias may have played a role in this as well. Because such topics were limited they should serve as a direction for future research.

The timing of this study also proved to be a limitation. The Massachusetts Quinn Bill and the institutions offering programs under its legislation had seen ample news coverage in past years, much of which was negative. That, combined with recent action on the part of the MDHE to review all approved criminal justice programs outside of the planned time line, created a situation in which some potential respondents were simply unavailable or chose not to participate given their role or their institution’s or agency’s
position. In three instances, it was deemed that a combination of timing and the researcher’s role made objective data collection difficult and interviews were not pursued.

Another study limitation was the small number of participants, particularly in the public and standards interest groups. These two groups were the most difficult to contact and arrange for interviews. Logistics played a role in some cases, timing others. Secondary data was used to supplement all perspectives and special attention was made to incorporate such data from these particular groups into the final analysis.

A related and final limitation to the study had to do with the reporting perspectives of the respondents themselves. Given the overall controversy surrounding the Quinn Bill, social desirability bias may certainly have played a role in shaping responses. Respondents from the standards and public interest groups collectively had less to say in regard to the study questions. This may have been due to their being further removed, in some stages, from the issues. These groups may be less to blame for what happened as a result of this. For example, study participants from the public interest group relied on information they had received or gathered, rather than having experienced it firsthand. In another example, standards interest group respondents often referred to documents that served as the source of their information. Thus, this necessitated the inclusion of many such artifacts in Chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 4 presents data collected from personal interviews. The chapter begins with sample demographics and continues with grouped question responses. Chapter 5 presents the story of the Massachusetts Quinn Bill as interpreted through personal
interviews and secondary data. Chapter 6 concludes the study with implications and future directions.
CHAPTER 4: THE INTERVIEWS

Interview data is presented in a format that combines areas addressed through the interview guide with natural deviations within the interviews themselves. Demographics for criminal justice program respondents are followed by grouped responses on general questions asked. Where criminal justice program responses were given that allowed for separate reporting along the various groups or strata, they are broken out. Data were not divided by either strata or groups when maintaining confidentiality became an apparent issue.

Twenty-two responses were collected over an eight-month period. Due to logistics, an additional three interviews were conducted within the nine months following the initial data collection. Because the sample for public, law enforcement, and standards interest groups are limited, specific demographics are not reported to protect confidentiality. Criminal justice program respondent demographics are reported as collected through both secondary data and personal interviews.

Demographics

Criminal Justice Program Interest Group Demographics

Demographic data were collected on criminal justice programs using a combination of secondary sources, supplemented by personal interview data. Data on private or public orientation and level of degree offered were gathered on all criminal justice programs represented by respondents. Interviews began by asking respondents to discuss their institution and their work. Figure 4.1 shows their representation in the sample.
The exception was enrollment data. Because all but three respondents did not know or could not recall enrollment levels at their institutions prior to 2000 (the year of the first statewide criminal justice program review), data reported on criminal justice degrees conferred from the MDHE on current Quinn Bill-approved programs between July 1, 1999, and June 30, 2000, is combined with data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System between July 1, 2008, and June 30, 2009, to show enrollment trends across the board. Table 4.1 lists the program type and degrees conferred. Six of the 11 programs were included in the interview group and show enrollment trends across the board.
Table 4.1

Criminal Justice Degrees Conferred

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<td>39</td>
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<td>Public2</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public3</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>161</td>
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<td>98</td>
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<tr>
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<td>208</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Private1</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Private6</td>
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<td>67</td>
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Although many respondents could not recall specific information on enrollment trends for their institutions, responses were given that reported on male-to-female ratios (4), and enrollment as a result of the new standards under the Quinn Bill: three reported a decline in enrollments in all schools at the master’s level, four reported a shift in enrollment demographics from predominately male to more of a 50/50 male-to-female ratio, and two reported that while they have not seen a decline in enrollment over the years, they have witnessed a shift from professional Quinn Bill-seeking students to more traditional students. Two reported an increase in immigrant and diverse student populations. One participant reported that institutional enrollments have suffered as a result of a damaged reputation following the Quinn Bill years. All public and private institutions offering graduate programs noted that graduate enrollments for professional
students have declined under recent Quinn Bill changes, while undergraduate enrollments have maintained or increased.

When asked about enrollments, some criminal justice program respondents also reflected on the relationship between criminal justice program enrollments and overall enrollments at their home institutions. All respondents reported that their programs were among the largest, especially through 2002, during the high Quinn Bill years and before changes, with more than half reporting their programs as the largest on campus. Speaking to the opportunities that criminal justice programs provide relative to enrollment, one participant reported, “The day-school part is we have such demand for the program that when enrollments for the institution are weak, they’ll lean on criminal justice to back-fill the open spaces.”

Demographics on the criminal justice program respondents themselves were collected directly from participants. Information was gathered on years of teaching, administrative assignment, professional experience, full- or part-time status, level of degree earned, and organizational affiliations. Given the limited sample size, the data is presented separately to protect the identity of the participants.

Years of teaching for all respondents was reported as ranging between 10 and 40, with a mean of 25.21 years. The high number of years teaching was expected as respondents identified for inclusion in the study tended to be those whose institutional history coincided with the various eras of the Quinn Bill. In addition, of the 14 institutional respondents, nine also served currently or formerly in an administrative role, including dean, chair, and director. Those same nine, across all strata, also wrote a program self-study for Quinn Bill program review.
Eight of the 14 criminal justice program respondents had professional experience in the field of criminal justice prior to their academic appointments, ranging from 14 to 34 years. Four reported having 20 years or more of professional experience. While some respondents may have served in part-time roles at one point in their academic careers, all but one held full-time appointments at the time of interview. Figure 4.2 represents the degrees held by respondents.

**Figure 4.2.** Criminal Justice Program Respondents’ Education

![Degree Distribution](image_url)

Criminal justice program respondents were also asked about their program history. Responses included academic orientation, year the program was first offered, modes of delivery, program administration and faculty, curriculum, and resources. These same areas were visited later in the interviews as they related to program change under the new standards.

Four participants reported that criminal justice as a major or department came from a separation from earlier sociology departments. Two were offered through that institution’s business department. Seven reported that their departments either broke from another (3) or were developed (4) as a result of Quinn Bill mandates that students...
graduate with degrees in criminal justice. Two respondents added that state institutions in general began to offer criminal justice in conjunction with the Quinn Bill development. Two respondents noted that, while criminal justice was being offered, it was labeled law enforcement, changing to criminal justice under the Quinn Bill. One also noted that program development dated back to early LEEP funding. Eleven respondents recalled the year their programs were first offered, reporting between 1967 and 2005. Three of the 11 were developed prior to the 1970 Quinn Bill—two from public institutions and one private. Figure 4.3 illustrates those years.

**Figure 4.3.** Year Criminal Justice Program First Offered

Programs were also asked about their Quinn Bill approval dates. Figure 4.4 represents each program and its approval status, both before and after the Quinn Bill standards implementation in 2003.
When asked about program delivery, participants reported on where programs were offered. Eight respondents noted that prior to the 2003 changes under the Quinn Bill, criminal justice programs were offered at multiple locations, ranging from 26 locations to two. The most common responses for locations included police departments, municipal buildings, jails, and other institutions of higher education. All eight reported that after 2003, the number of locations decreased. Five reported that programs are now offered only on the main campus. While programs from all strata reported off-campus offerings, those from public institutions reported fewer off-campus programs, often located at other higher education institutions.

When asked about program administration, participants reported on whether full-time and part-time programs were administered separately and had separate faculty. Of
the 14 respondents, seven reported that their day and evening programs were administered separately. Administrative oversight outside of the criminal justice department was reported to reside with schools or divisions of professional studies (5) and two within the business department. Four reported that while administration was separate, faculty were shared among all criminal justice programs.

Criminal justice program participants were also asked about teaching faculty. Responses included faculty qualifications and experience and student-faculty ratios. While all currently approved programs reported meeting or exceeding the current 30:1 student-faculty ratio required under the Quinn Bill, reports of ratios prior to 2003 differed. Of the six who reported actual numbers the range was 16:1 to 125:1, with a mean of 76:1.

Faculty credentials were reported as looking very different prior to the implementation of the Quinn Bill standards. Eight respondents, including six of the eight graduate programs, reported that prior to 2003 they employed primarily non-PhDs, PhDs outside criminal justice, or practitioners with master’s or bachelor’s degrees. Six of the eight mentioned that this was the available faculty demographic and these hires were encouraged. All but one discussed early conflict among other departments and faculty as a result of criminal justice faculty composition. While all noted the use of part-time faculty, only one respondent reported on the percent reliance on part-time faculty prior to 2003, that being 90%. That same program now meets the two-thirds full-time faculty standard under the Quinn Bill.

Respondents were asked about curriculum. While all programs stated that they now meet the standard content and assessment criteria, half (7) of the programs across all
strata responded that prior to 2003 the curriculum had a much more practical orientation with courses more reflective of police training academy curriculums. Six program respondents mentioned having had transfer policies for various areas of academy, specialized training, and work experience credits. All six represented institutions with undergraduate programs. Four of the six, while also offering graduate programs at their institutions, reported that such credit was not granted at the graduate level.

Respondents were asked about program resources. Across the board, all stated that they never have enough. Ten respondents noted that the new standards under the Quinn Bill either provided or ensured resources for their department. All six private school respondents were in this group.

Finally, criminal justice program interest group respondents were asked about professional affiliations within their institutions. All respondents across all strata, with two exceptions, stated that they belong to at least one criminal justice organization. Those mentioned most frequently were ACJS (10) and the Northeast Association of Criminal Justice Sciences (NEACJS) (8). The two exceptions explained that while their field of study was related to criminal justice, their professional affiliations lie within their primary discipline.

**Quinn Bill Interest Group Demographics**

The Quinn Bill interest group is divided into three areas:

1. The law enforcement interest group (n = 4), which includes all Quinn Bill recipients, with two also serving as union representatives
2. The public interest group (n = 3), which combines one legislator and two public policy representatives involved in the implementation of the Quinn Bill
3. The standards interest group (n = 4), which combines one MDHE representative and three reviewers or standards developers from national associations (NEACJS and ACJS).

When asked about their work, all were currently working or recently retired within the area represented. One respondent from the law enforcement group and two from the public interest group reported that they also taught part-time in criminal justice programs until the Quinn Bill standards redefined teaching roles. Among the public interest group was Robert Quinn, for whom the legislation is named. (Excerpts from his interview are presented and discussed individually in Chapter 4.) Another from the group had experience dating back to the early LEEP years, through a regional criminal justice development agency. Respondents in this group reported years of experience ranging from 58 to 20, however not all with the same agency.

**The Quinn Bill Questions**

Questions asked of respondents relative to the Quinn Bill are grouped loosely into the four stages of the Quinn Bill policy development process presented in Chapter 1.

These four stages are:

1. The passage of the Quinn Bill and its early implementation.
2. The conflicts and concerns that arose after implementation of the program.
3. The intensification of the conflict that ultimately produced the amendment to the policy that required governmental oversight of criminal justice programs at the state’s colleges and universities.
4. The current picture.
Stage I: The Passage of the Quinn Bill and Its Early Implementation

Legislative History

Following a report in the late 1960s describing police officers in Massachusetts as some of the least educated in the country, state officials began a process of inquiry to address both this and rising crime rates within the commonwealth. Committees and administrations undertook a study aimed at producing a proposal for action, declaring Massachusetts police officers lacking in education when compared to the national scene (Massachusetts Committee on Law Enforcement, 1967).

Shortly after, state legislation was introduced to provide incentives for police education in the commonwealth. After failed attempts to subsidize that education, legislation was introduced and passed by Attorney General Robert Quinn that provided financial benefit—“a reward”—once that education was earned (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L).

More than a dozen changes to the Quinn Bill were made over a period of more than 40 years. Changes in 1976 moved from a process of incremental remuneration for police education based on points earned toward the degree to financial rewards for degrees earned. Changes that year also shifted salary increases from 15% (of one’s base pay) for an associate’s degree, 20% for a bachelor’s degree, and 30% for a master’s degree to 10%, 20%, and 25%, respectively.

The original legislation provided little language as to the delivery of education, and a final change to the Quinn Bill in 1976 stated, “The board of higher education is hereby authorized and directed to establish and maintain a list of approved courses leading to a degree in law enforcement” (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L).
This last amendment was pivotal in redefining the Quinn Bill and would be used to restrict the type of degree to criminal justice, law enforcement, and law accepted for participation in the Quinn Bill.

According to the law, access to the approved list was gained through an institution’s New England Association of Schools and Colleges accreditation or, in the case of new programs, by the MDHE:

All semester credits and degrees shall be earned in an educational institution accredited by the New England Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools or by the board of higher education, and shall be credited for the purpose of determining points under this section, notwithstanding the date of appointment of an individual to a position described in the first paragraph of this section. (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L)

Pease (1999) found that as of 1999, no college or university petition for a program in law enforcement had been rejected by the MDHE.

Additional attempts over the years at changing the Quinn Bill included oversight, the legislative broadening of degrees that would qualify, limiting access to benefits by date, and replacing the percentage-based-on-degree formula with flat stipends. In 1985, the governor’s office presented a bill to the state legislature that would “require the Massachusetts Board of Regents of Higher Education to create the first guidelines for law enforcement and criminal justice programs offered by public and private colleges. Only police officers attending programs approved by the board would be given pay increases for their college degrees” (Malone, 1985, p. 74). This initiative was unsuccessful. Additional attempts at change also failed and were criticized because of a process that attached them as riders to budget bills as opposed to completing the formal legislative process (Associated Press, 2001). Ultimately, this would become the pathway for change.
Legal challenges to the Quinn Bill have altered the interpretation of its intent and the process of its application. One of the earliest challenges was from an officer denied Quinn Bill benefits through his local department on the basis that his degree in accounting was not included under the Quinn Bill umbrella of acceptable police work programs. The 1975 case found its way to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which applied a measure of higher education over type of degree, stating that “furthering their education in the field of police work is to be liberally construed . . . ‘education’ is not limited to studies directly related to law enforcement” (*John B. Palmer vs. Board of Selectmen of Marblehead & others*, 1975). Attorney General Quinn, as well as representatives for the State Police Association of Massachusetts, was permitted to submit briefs in support of the officer. The court placed future decisions under the discretion of the MDHE ruling:

> The Board of Higher Education shall accept for point consideration from approved institutions courses in such degree programs as tend to contribute to the field of police efforts and effectiveness of police departments. . . . In considering other programs, the Board will consider higher education per se as of primary import in improving law enforcement, and will judge each other program separately on its merits. (*John B. Palmer vs. Board of Selectmen of Marblehead & others*, 1975)

The case also referred to earlier versions of the Quinn Bill that included an emergency preamble stressing the need to recruit and retain qualified police in the commonwealth. Through numerous rewrites of the bill, this preamble remained until the end—showing the intent of its authors. Justices concluded that to deny benefits based on which degree is earned and when would undermine that intent. They concluded,

> Are we to infer that the dropping of the emergency preamble was intended to negative the legislative policy of aiding recruitment? We think not. Rather, we believe that one of the purposes of Section 108L is to improve the educational
level of the police force through recruitment and the luring of, among others, college educated persons.

Furthermore, to deny incentive pay to an officer simply because he or she earned credits or a degree before joining the force would not only frustrate the legislative purpose, but would result in untenable distinctions: of two police officers serving together, both with a college degree, one might and one might not get incentive pay . . .

*(John B. Palmer vs. Board of Selectmen of Marblehead & others, 1975)*

**Role of Respondents**

All respondents were asked about their role with the Quinn Bill, beginning with their early experiences, if any, and whether they played a role in its processes. Responses included:

- Program participation, either as educators or recipients
- Criminal justice program teaching and development
- Relationships
- Resources

When asked about their role with the legislative history, none of the respondents across all groups recalled direct involvement in the drafting and passage of the Quinn Bill. The only exception to this was Attorney Robert Quinn. The conversation about early experiences with the Quinn Bill blended naturally into the area of the impact of the Quinn Bill in both the early years and then later under the years of scrutiny and reform.

Six study respondents across all groups, did, however, comment on the legislative development of the Quinn Bill, specifically on the limitations placed on the type of degree permitted for earning benefits. Absent from the original version, the later inclusion of criminal justice degrees to the Quinn Bill was described by one criminal justice program respondent as “speaking more to smoothing the pathway of access for
students seeking benefits under Quinn than to actual oversight.” One law enforcement respondent saw it as “limiting access” to Quinn Bill benefits.

Reform efforts for providing greater oversight of program delivery under the Quinn Bill was met with opposition from various interest groups and all were unsuccessful. One law enforcement respondent recalled at that time that “unions were having none of that.” A criminal justice program respondent remembered these early efforts at standards and stated, “This was all to reign in a few renegade programs.”

**Early Issues with the Quinn Bill: Criminal Justice Programs**

When asked specifically about the early effects the Quinn Bill had on criminal justice education (prior to the move toward standards), criminal justice program respondents spoke of the combined impacts summarized in Table 4.2. While responses varied, consensus was observed for reporting impact on program enrollments and development driven by financial incentives and faculty impact. This is consistent with the data collected on program enrollment and change over the Quinn Bill years.

Table 4.2

*Criminal Justice Program Sample Responses Regarding the Early Impacts of the Quinn Bill*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Enrollments and Incentives</th>
<th>Academic Fit and Quality Standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Development</td>
<td><em>Faculty</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Program Curriculum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide education</td>
<td><em>Credentials</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Meet market demand</td>
<td><em>Recruitment</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Requirements</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Fit</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Delivery</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enrollments**

One hundred percent of criminal justice program respondents recalled that criminal justice programs developed as a result of financial opportunities—from
enrollment projections to early tuition waivers at the state level to the Quinn Bill. Linking full-time enrollment levels to part-time program development, one criminal justice program respondent stated, “As on-campus enrollments in the undergraduate college declined, requests to open off-campus programs went up.” Additional responses included, “there was a flood,” “there was no question people came,” and “the off-campus program back then—I can’t give you the numbers—must have been in the thousands,” demonstrating the ease of populating classrooms.

When asked about how their institutions addressed the opportunities that the Quinn Bill provided for education, 12 institutions across all strata reported that they built or expanded programs to meet the needs of potential students. In these cases, faculty with “interests,”—described as experience or “understanding of the links between their discipline and criminal justice”—“cobbled together” programs to respond to the surge of student inquiry. Eleven criminal justice program respondents cited incentive programs as the reason for the establishment of stand-alone degree programs in criminal justice. “Oh, it’s a cash cow” was a shared observation. These 11 included all graduate programs and two-thirds of undergraduate programs. Table 4.3 provides a summary of responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Built or Expanded Programs to Meet Needs of Potential Students n=12</th>
<th>Incentive Program as Reason for Stand Alone Program Development n=11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Graduate = 3</td>
<td>Private Graduate = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Graduate = 3</td>
<td>Public Graduate = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Undergraduate = 3</td>
<td>Private Undergraduate = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Undergraduate = 3</td>
<td>Private Undergraduate = 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.3*  
*Criminal Justice Program Responses Regarding Program Development under the Quinn Bill*
When probed as to what their programs were seeking to accomplish through development, growth, or continuation of offering criminal justice programs under the Quinn Bill, responses included two common answers: to provide education to police officers (12) and to meet market demand (10). Four respondents from the criminal justice program interest group recalled criminal justice programs being developed solely in response to the Quinn Bill—three of these were at the graduate level and all four represented private institutions. One respondent paralleled the growth in Massachusetts to that at the national level: “CJ programs popped up with PhD programs to staff them.”

At the federal level, LEEP funding provided for the establishment of state and regional planning offices responsible for the oversight of program development. Planning involved, among other things, informing and complementing criminal justice planning efforts at the state level, including how to provide such educational opportunities and how to encourage police officers to avail themselves of higher education.

When asked about how to provide education and meet demand, criminal justice program respondents cited motivating factors. Again, education (12) was mentioned as well as money (14) needed for development and motivation. One recalled,

There was no motive on the part of police officers to go to college. They didn’t see any particular reason why they should: why studying liberal arts subjects [as recommended by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice] would improve their ability to be police officers. And consequently there was no motive on the part of schools to provide that kind of education. It was money. The government seemed to realize that in order to create an incentive for police officers to go to college, as they had decided they would, they had to entice them to do it with money.

Another remembered that once LEEP money was made available, “all of a sudden the colleges and universities were interested in attracting that population.” Criminal justice programs, whose roots precede the 1970 criminal justice education initiatives for
police, tied their beginnings to federal and state funding. One respondent’s institution’s criminal justice program “was funded by LEEP money . . . they hired a former New York City police officer to sort of get the program running.” The respondent also stated that programs were developed and the police officer-turned-student population responded: “Most of the student population was police officers who were basically being paid to go to school.” When speaking of state police officers opting for private educational institutions with higher costs, one criminal justice program respondent noted, “Oddly enough, they were willing to pay more money to get it.”

**Academic Fit and Program Quality**

When asked about program quality, academic fit with their institution was an issue reported by four different criminal justice program respondents across all strata. One stated,

One [conflict] was the idea amongst members of the other social sciences and behavioral science disciplines that criminal justice was not something that should exist even as an academic department—it wasn’t an academic discipline; they saw it as a sort of training type of exercise, and they didn’t think we belonged on campus—I can remember feeling almost derision from sociologists and psychologists and other people that we had the gall to even do this sort of thing. . . . So you had this sort of conflict right off the bat as to whether or not we even belonged on the campus.

Three criminal justice program respondents stated that while criminal justice was being offered at their institution prior to LEEP and the Quinn Bill, it was limited to coursework under sociology and public policy departments. This was reinforced by one respondent who noted that the nature of the programs “grew beyond what the sociology program could handle.” When asked about the separation of criminal justice from other programs, criminal justice programs were described as a direct response to “the initial funding” and “the Quinn Bill.” One respondent stated that “student enrollment required
and justified” a stand-alone department. Another criminal justice program respondent recalled such program development: “The [program] never had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice. Then Quinn comes along. Boom, it blossoms, from one day having 750 sociology students and no criminal justice students, to having 250 sociology students and 500 criminal justice students. And that happened elsewhere too.” Three respondents stated that the combination of academic fit and large enrollments made criminal justice “stand out.”

**Faculty Impacts**

When asked about the early impact of the Quinn Bill and faculty, all criminal justice program respondents spoke of scholarly credentials, recruitment and availability, and their relationship to academic fit. In addition, three respondents noted that during that time criminal justice programs that were first developing terminal degrees in the field were scarce at best. This, in the context of growing student demand for criminal justice degrees, was reported as limiting the availability of qualified faculty to deliver newly developed curricula: “Most of the people who were hired as faculty members were former criminal justice professionals, with nothing more than master’s degrees.” Other responses included, “There was no requirement to have a PhD.” and “faculty in soc and psych wanted nothing to do with teaching these courses.”

All but two respondents reflected on the recruitment of faculty to criminal justice programs through traditional and nontraditional processes. These are summarized in Table 4.4. Responses ranged from active recruiting of professionals in the field to informal invitations from one professional to another. Nontraditional process responses included one participant recalling a colleague who was a retired police officer being hired
for a teaching position in criminal justice, even though he had applied for a position in food services. Another said it was not uncommon to simply call criminal justice agencies and hire people to teach without reviewing resumes or conducting interviews.

Table 4.4
*Reported Recruitment of Faculty to Criminal Justice Programs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Recruitment</th>
<th>Non-Traditional Recruitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Local Advertising</td>
<td>• Recruiting Retired Professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Advertising through Higher</td>
<td>• Contacting Criminal Justice Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Sources</td>
<td>• Hiring by Referral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Advertising through Criminal Justice</td>
<td>• Hiring Outside Faculty Handbook Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>• Hiring without Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Informal Invitations through Professional</td>
<td>• Hiring without Reviewing Resumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>• Hiring without References</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The availability of qualified faculty (a PhD in criminal justice or a closely related field as defined by the standards) was a common theme, with 11 out of 14 citing this as having a direct impact on the composition of their faculty. Three respondents noted the lack of PhD programs in criminal justice in the commonwealth until very recently. One respondent spoke of hiring experiences in which out of “90 or 100 applications . . . there’d be six or seven that met the criteria, and there were years where they weren’t any good . . . there simply weren’t enough PhDs out there in the pipeline to serve our program.” Another reflected on an internal issue where a program administrator in
criminal justice with credentials in a related discipline was challenged by a colleague as to the appropriateness of the role and “thought I shouldn’t be chair because I didn’t have a PhD in CJ.” One faculty respondent further noted, “PhDs in criminal justice were few and far between and, consequently, the academic nature of the programs was not that highly developed.”

**Curriculum and Delivery**

Criminal justice program participants’ responses regarding the curriculum being offered in the early years and the impact of the Quinn Bill are reported in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5

*Criminal Justice Program Sample Responses Regarding Curricular Impacts of the Quinn Bill*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receptivity of Students Practical Curriculum</th>
<th>Satellite Program Offerings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientation (n=6) and Requirements (n=6)</td>
<td>Delivery (n=6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nontraditional education</td>
<td>• Range from 2-26 locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Practitioner-based programs</td>
<td>• Non academic settings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments included one who spoke of “students who were more receptive to being educated in the law enforcement tradition.” Orientation and requirements were very similar in that they both generally referred to a “practical” curriculum that allowed for nontraditional education. Responses included, “We were basically teaching them what we knew, partly from our master’s degrees but mostly from our professional experience, and that fit right into all they wanted to know anyway.”; “They weren’t interested in studying ancient Roman history or philosophy.”; “You basically had professionals teaching—
criminal justice professionals—teaching other criminal justice professionals.”; and “We were a practitioner-based program and our faculty reflected this.”

Six criminal justice program participants reported that their institutions were offering programs at satellite locations, ranging from two to 26 separate off-campus sites. When asked about the incentive for off-campus offerings, all noted cash incentives. Satellite locations were referred to by one respondent as “mushrooms popping up all over the place.” Not all locations offered the degree in its entirety, with some programs offering only a class or two for “convenience and then requiring students to take additional courses at a more central location.” Locations described by respondents included other colleges; high schools; federal, state, and municipal buildings, including jails and police departments; hotels; union halls; and rented storefronts. A few criminal justice program respondents commented that these sites were in some instances “great classrooms” and in others “better classrooms than they had here.”

References to location surfaced four times when criminal justice program respondents were asked about faculty and curriculum. Responses differed according to the public and private strata. Private respondents spoke to differences in faculty and curriculum across location while public respondents spoke to consistency. Responses from the private sector included comments on the separation of programs within criminal justice that occurred, resulting in two programs: full-time on campus and part-time off campus, with different faculty, curriculum, and administrative oversight. Responses from the public sector included one reporting that because they were the same, no matter how or where or by whom they were being offered, “we didn’t really modify the program all that much to respond to the markets.” Another added, “people did feel uncomfortable
about the whole notion of satellites . . . we said we’d only do it if it was going to be our curriculum, our standards, our admission requirements . . . and would be staffed by our people, full-time people.”

Criminal justice program respondents from all strata reported that program offerings in various locations were a result of requests from professionals in the field. Faculty spoke to the comfort level of students and how those programs came about:

“Actually, the first program was not here on campus but rather at [a remote location] in response to a solicitation by folks [professionals and the state police] in that area to bring a program there.”

**Early Issues with the Quinn Bill: Additional Interest Groups**

All four law enforcement interest group respondents replied to the same questions about their early experiences with the Quinn Bill. While responses varied, there was general consensus on the hiring practices dictated by civil service and the role of the Quinn Bill, as well as agreement that education and money were goals for Quinn Bill participation.

Law enforcement interest group respondents began by recalling municipal meetings to adopt the bill, early policies and advocacy, and concerns about the civil service system for hiring police officers. One stated that as a union negotiator “they [the municipality] would not negotiate the Quinn Bill so we virtually forced it into a town meeting and we won by six votes.” Another recalled that their department already employed officers with advanced degrees and that to get promoted they knew an advanced degree was needed, even before the Quinn Bill. The respondents further reported that “it wasn’t just about the money; it was about promotion and pride.” Pride
and prestige was a theme carried over by another respondent, speaking of the link between esteem and education: “If you didn’t have the Quinn Bill, it wasn’t as good a department as it could be.”

When asked what the Quinn Bill sought to accomplish, 100% of law enforcement interest group participants spoke of concerns about the civil service requirement for hiring. One respondent saw the Quinn Bill as another tool for attempting to professionalize police where the “weak tool” of civil service had failed. Another agreed and called the state test “outdated, underfunded, understaffed, and unprofessional” and observed that in Massachusetts “you have on the one hand the most highly educated police force . . . and on the other hand the worst tool for implementing.” Along these lines, one union representative stated, “The towns that come out of civil service can then set their own minimum standards for hiring.”

When asked specifically about advocacy for the Quinn Bill, one law enforcement interest group participant recalled that while police departments and unions supported the Quinn Bill in the early years, municipalities “were worried about the cost of it . . . it was a huge pay increase.” Another noted that the municipalities “would have negotiated outside Quinn had they seen the issues coming.” References to cost and alternatives were also mentioned by one member of this interest group, who also heads the department’s internal affairs division: “Has it been a burden? Yeah . . . it’s been a big cost. But what’s the cost for the lawsuits?”

When asked what they were seeking to accomplish through participation in the Quinn Bill, law enforcement interest group participants reported education (4), money (4), and promotion (1). One also noted that the Quinn Bill represented quality in policing.
Another mentioned “cashing in.” One further commented that Quinn Bill incentives were “needed as a motive for officers to get educated.”

When asked about early experiences with the Quinn Bill, responses varied. Public interest groups recalled various personal roles played in the process, including legislative, advocacy, and planning. One respondent noted that the arrival of the Quinn Bill in Massachusetts on the heels of LEEP funds to help develop programs “formalized this whole process that now not only through the LEEP program did you get money to attend college but [you had the added benefit of] the rewards for graduating from a community college or with a bachelor’s or master’s degree.” Another recalled a meeting where the administrator at one academic institution actively sought advice from local planning agencies as to which types of programs could be developed to reap the advantages of such funding. One spoke to the planning process itself, calling the Quinn Bill “bad planning on the legislative and administrative side of it—of course, political suicide if they did.”

When asked about the early impact of the Quinn Bill on criminal justice programs, interest group respondents from outside criminal justice agreed that increased enrollments stemmed from financial incentives for participation and program development and that quality varied among the criminal justice programs. These two areas of consensus reflect those reported earlier from criminal justice program participants. Compared to the criminal justice program group, faculty were not mentioned in this early phase.

When specifically asked if they saw the Quinn Bill as responsible for increased enrollment in criminal justice programs in Massachusetts, respondents across all groups
agreed that enrollments were linked to money. Two participants from the law
enforcement interest group, three from the standards group, and two from the public
interest group mentioned that increased enrollments and professional education were also
the direction of the field.

When asked if they viewed the prospect of increased revenue from the Quinn Bill
as the only motive for colleges to create or expand criminal justice departments, all
groups agreed. One public interest group respondent added that it also was the motive for
schools to change from law enforcement degrees to criminal justice degrees.

Quality

Quality was another area mentioned by all interest groups. General responses are
reported in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6

Sample Responses from Criminal Justice Interest Groups Regarding the Early Impacts of
the Quinn Bill on Program Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unprepared Institutions</th>
<th>Responded to Need</th>
<th>Varying Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs Grew Beyond Capacity</td>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td>Private v. Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs Overwhelmed</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Program Orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs Unprepared</td>
<td>Practical Curriculum</td>
<td>Level of Degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three law enforcement respondents spoke to unprepared institutions offering
programs that were “too much too soon,” that “schools should have been prepared for
numbers,” and that schools were “overwhelmed” when it came to quality. The fourth
respondent pointed out that some schools were unfairly criticized in the process and
noted that public and private institutions both responded to the call for need. One public interest group respondent observed, “Schools were offering programs all over the state so you wouldn’t have to travel to the [home] institution to get the degree.”

When asked if they thought the quality of criminal justice programs varied widely among the different colleges and universities prior to implementation of the 2003 Quinn Bill standards, all groups agreed. Three respondents from the public interest and standards groups further discussed that this was also based on whether a school was public or private and on the program orientation. Quality at the master’s-degree level was specifically mentioned by all those in the public interest and standards groups. One respondent from the standards group provided sociology versus law enforcement orientation (before becoming criminal justice) as examples.

**Curriculum and Delivery**

Three out of the four law enforcement interest group respondents stated that quality was not a concern for education. When asked about the rigor of their education or their perception of that of others, the group was split. Two expressed their satisfaction with the quality of education, while two others noted that they did “what they had to do.”

When asked about their role in or contribution to the Quinn Bill process, none of the respondents could recall any discussion at either the state or federal levels as to what the other was doing in regard to criminal justice education. One public interest group respondent noted that using federal money to access a state benefit equated to “double dipping.”

Initial responses during Stage I were consistent across all groups when asked about early impacts of the Quinn Bill on criminal justice programs: financial incentives
drove the process. Other responses are generally inconclusive given the variation. Both criminal justice program participants and other group respondents spoke of program quality and curriculum. Faculty were discussed only by criminal justice program respondents, perhaps because of their own role as faculty and their role in the delivery of criminal justice programs under the Quinn Bill.

**Stage II: Conflict and Concerns Following Implementation**

As noted earlier, enrollments swelled in criminal justice programs across the commonwealth under the Quinn Bill. This created interest group opposition because of the increasing costs. Political forces then weighed in heavily. As enrollments continued to climb, funds appropriated through the state budgeting process for the program were often insufficient to support the bill, straining some municipalities to pick up more than their 50% percent share. This first became an issue as far back as 1973 when the Massachusetts Selectman’s Association criticized Quinn for the funding issues surrounding his policy (Pearson, 1973). Tight state budgets would force the issue to surface again in the mid- to late-1980s and in the early years of the 21st century.

Pockets of criticism arose, usually accompanied by recommendations or a demand for change. Highly critical “Spotlight” coverage by the *Boston Globe* focused on issues plaguing the Quinn Bill, and criminal justice programs popular with police officers raised concerns about cost, apparent abuses, and education quality. Responding to the adverse publicity, legislators were quoted as saying, “We’re very concerned about some of the apparent abuses . . . it was never meant to be a get-rich-quick scheme” (Golden, 1985a, p. 31).
Fifteen years after inception, the Quinn Bill and its implementation came under fire, not through the administration of the program and its finances but through the programs developed to welcome students. While newspapers ran headlines such as “$12M a Year for Loosely Run Program to Educate Police” (Kurkjian et al., 1985b) and “Police Flock to Quick, Easy MA Program” (Kurkjian et al., 1985a), criminal justice programs faculty and administrators formed “Blue Ribbon Panels” to address issues discussed in the newspaper accounts. In several cases, faculty participants reported that while “some changes were made in curriculum and administrative structure, many of the problems remained unaddressed and were actually exacerbated by the rapid expansion of satellite programs.”

Amid the numerous articles that appeared in 1985 slamming institutions and their students for intentionally stomping on the integrity of higher education, it was discovered that 12 years earlier, in 1973, the MDHE had itself supported two separate probes into criminal justice programs being offered in the state. The first was a yearlong federally funded study that provided recommendations for improving what the MDHE saw as quality issues with public and private institutions offering programs in criminal justice, including appropriate faculty hires, nontraditional credit granting, and academic rigor. The report was largely ignored: “former staff members and advisers within the agency that has overseen the program say their initiatives were stymied by the indifference of superiors and the opposition of colleges and universities” (Golden, 1985b, p. 31). One study author was quoted as saying that state officials “essentially buried” the report (Golden, 1985b, p. 31). The report also quotes the then-deputy chancellor of the MDHE as saying the board had limited authority over state schools that were in opposition to
such efforts: “The community colleges and state colleges did not want us to say, ‘This is the way it is done nationally at the best places. Why aren’t you doing it that way?’” (Golden, 1985b, p. 31)

The second probe was the establishment by the MDHE of its own advisory group whose recommendation was to develop program standards. This, too, met with resistance from both the MDHE, which chose not to adopt the recommendations, and the institutions that did not want their programs “so stiff as to deter police.” One board employee who advocated for change from within stated, “The message was, ‘We don’t want to hear this. We don’t want to deal with this’” (Golden, 1985b, p. 31). Responding to public and political pressure, recommendations from the MDHE were proposed in 1985 to address academic rigor and oversight, especially for satellite programs, and require only law enforcement degrees under the Quinn Bill. Despite what may have been good intentions, such large-scale initiatives were never undertaken. However, promises of reform from the MDHE and the spotlighted institutions kept the issue quiet for another 15 years.

All respondents were asked what they thought about the conflicts and concerns that arose in the early years and what changes they saw under the Quinn Bill in regard to criminal justice education. Responses (reported in Table 4.7) focused on criminal justice programs: enrollments, motive, quality concerns, faculty and administration, curriculum and delivery, and attitudes and perceptions. Interest group responses are combined as all were asked similar questions. Shared group responses are reported according to interest group or stratum where responses differed.
Table 4.7

*Reported Changes Under the Quinn Bill to Criminal Justice Programs N = 24*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increasing Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Professional students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Financial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality Concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Compromised for enrollments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Program orientation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty and Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Student-faculty ratios</td>
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<td>• Faculty credentials</td>
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<th>Curriculum</th>
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<td>• Credits</td>
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<td>• Delivery</td>
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<td>○ Off-campus locations</td>
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| Attitudes and Perception                     |

**Enrollments**

Again, healthy enrollments in criminal justice programs were reported across the board. Raised concerns, either internal or external, did little to thwart potential students from enrolling in programs that provided the needed credentials for accessing Quinn Bill benefits or institutions from offering or expanding programs. Eight criminal justice program interest group participants reported that at their institutions quality was compromised to increase enrollments. Respondents were split between the public and private institution strata but included all three respondents from the private graduate stratum. One respondent stated, “It was quantity and not quality that we were after.”

Notably for these institutions, quality was a concern shared among faculty but it was not shared by administrators charged with bolstering enrollments—often at the expense of quality. One criminal justice program participant reported that the result was a severing of programs—faculty who knew better were left to oversee full-time or on-
campus criminal justice programs, often undergraduate, while the “administration charged ahead” with its own version of program delivery—often with part-time off-campus programs taught by part-time faculty operating outside traditional forms of assessment and quality measures. One reported, “We were all struggling with the quality, we were all struggling to take advantage of the demand and profit from it—I think some of us worked harder than others at doing it.” One recalled a request by a college president to have criminal justice students replace parking lot security guards on campus, receiving academic credit for the work. Another remembered meetings where the senior administrator would begin with an update on adherence to standards and end with a demand for increasing the student population given no additional resources, all within the criminal justice department. Yet another recalled that their institution got into the business of criminal justice education at the graduate level because “it was perceived that that’s where the money was . . . they did that by essentially cobbling together groups of people they had, even though we had no formal criminal justice faculty at the time.”

Another criminal justice program interest group respondent recalled faculty bringing quality concerns, especially regarding the delivery of off-campus programs, to the administration some 10 years before MDHE involvement and “they were told to keep their mouths shut, from the administration.” Another reported that for fear of their jobs, faculty chose to “play the game.” One recalled a colleague stating, “This is all wrong, but I got a job.” Another tied a colleague’s unsuccessful bid for tenure to the individual’s persistent requests for change.

Student composition was mentioned by four criminal justice program and two law enforcement interest group respondents—that programs were heavily populated by
“cops.” A participant from the criminal justice program group further commented that “early students were paid to go to school and that made them different from others in terms of attitude to faculty and higher education.”

Criminal justice program interest group respondents show that, for five programs, recruiting in union halls and during shift changes at barracks and departments were common practices.

**Motive**

During discussion of changes under the Quinn Bill, all respondents were asked about institutional motive to create or expand criminal justice departments. Again, all stated financial incentives—money—as the main reason why institutions offered criminal justice programs and why students came. Three criminal justice program respondents, all with professional backgrounds from both private and public institutions, added that they saw the financial incentive as a good thing for their institutions. One criminal justice program interest group respondent further noted that “some schools were simply entrepreneurs,” stating that the motive was “philosophical, not corruption.”

**Quality Concerns**

Study participants were asked directly whether they thought the quality of criminal justice programs varied widely among the different colleges and universities prior to the implementation of standards. All study participants across all groups and strata agreed. Two respondents from the public interest group noted that some variation occurred along public and private orientation lines. When probed, they explained that while public schools had to answer to a higher authority, private institutions could operate under less scrutiny. The public/private variation was also referred to by one
criminal justice program interest group participant from a public institution, who noted that state schools had to “run . . . the gauntlet to fix something that wasn’t a problem with us.” The issue of public/private would surface again when respondents were asked a related question about their own program quality concerns.

Academic orientation of the program was mentioned by two criminal justice and one standards interest group participants as an additional cause of quality variation, giving the example that criminal justice programs offered under sociology tended to be of higher quality than those offered under a law enforcement orientation.

Criminal justice program interest group participants were asked if they were concerned about their programs’ quality and what was happening within their institutions. Responses were split, with four from the public institution stratum and two from the private institution stratum responding no, and four from the private institution stratum and four from the public institution stratum responding yes. All respondents representing the private graduate interest group responded yes. Four out of the six who responded no, all from the public stratum, stated that it was always a private institution issue. One public stratum respondent noted that there were quality concerns but only with their assessment process. That same respondent also noted that some concerns were raised by faculty outside the criminal justice department.

Of the eight who responded yes, a follow-up question was asked regarding how those concerns were addressed. Two referred back to the full-time/part-time severing of programs. The remainder responded that concerns were not addressed. Three gave examples of their institutions’ responses when concerns were raised: “I spoke of concerns but nothing could be done.”; “I used to lose sleep over it all the time and the
administration and the deans pushed for revenue.”; and, perhaps more directly, “I was told to keep my mouth shut.”

Similarly, the Quinn Bill interest group participants were asked if they thought faculty in criminal justice departments had concerns about program quality. Four answered yes but saw these concerns as in the minority, and none saw them addressed until MDHE intervention. One public interest group participant replied that some complaints on quality came from the institutions themselves, or faculty within those institutions.

**Faculty and Administration**

Criminal justice program respondents varied in their responses to questions regarding the program quality concerns they had at their own institutions. Overall, these results are inconclusive. Faculty and administration-related responses were most common, with 10 reporting concerns in this area. High student-faculty ratios, faculty credentials, heavy advising loads, and insufficient resources were among the various responses cited, along with lack of administrative oversight and administrative pressure for high student enrollments. For example, one criminal justice program respondent spoke to faculty credentials in that “most of the teachings were being done by police officers with master’s [degrees]. Ninety percent of them had master’s [degrees]. The other 10% had a specialty.”

Additional responses across all groups included stories of truncated class meetings, faculty hiring, teaching practices, and attitudes. For example, one criminal justice program respondent stated that classes might be “45 minutes in the parking lot” with faculty “pretty unabashed by it.” Regarding faculty teaching practices, one
respondent noted, “Looking at the grades the kids received . . . a lot of them gravitated toward certain professors. And to be honest with you, there were probably a couple of professors who were teaching in the off-campus program who were teaching subject matters that they had no knowledge of.” Some criminal justice program respondents linked the questionable practices of faculty directly to their status or role on campus and low rate of compensation. Status or campus role included part-time teaching status—often as an “overtime gig”—limited contact and participation with the full-time faculty, college governance, and, in some cases, isolation because of site teaching assignment. In essence, you had “faculty members who aren’t connected and who aren’t making a lot of money.” One criminal justice program respondent spoke positively about part-time faculty: “They were very conscientious, and they didn’t want to put these individuals out on the street because they are going to allow someone to get a degree, go up through the ranks, who are incompetent.”

One criminal justice program respondent focused on the hiring practices of part-time faculty to “staff” satellite programs, noting that “they wouldn’t know them. They would just hire them, because there was like a circuit of people, these adjuncts, and they’d teach at different schools . . . with no evaluation, no mentoring . . . that’s where you have the problems. And that’s where you have the complaints.” Elsewhere in this study, respondents cited having faculty or administrators as a resource or insulator against questionable practices.

**Curriculum and Delivery**

Program administration related to delivery also surfaced as a variation during the quality discussion. In two responses, part-time criminal justice programs were offered off
campus through those institutions’ business schools, with a “whole different identity” and little or no relationship to full-time criminal justice faculty. One observed, “Many programs with satellite campuses didn’t have a regional manager to provide oversight of students, faculty, curriculum, and course offerings.”

Additional issues with off-campus locations related to matters of academic fit were reported by six criminal justice program interest group respondents, four of whom were also administrators. One recalled a successful off-campus program that was discontinued because it “had trouble from other departments getting the faculty to go out to [an off-campus location] to do the local core courses.” Another recalled that this became such an issue that they “began hiring faculty in other disciplines at the sites without any input from those departments.” This created a situation were “criminal justice faculty were hiring philosophers and scientists to teach core classes.” One respondent, who taught primarily at off-campus locations, observed, “In some instances, off-site faculty had no consistent connection to the academic institutions they taught for. Many colleges did not have a mechanism to mentor adjunct faculty and college marketing materials highlighted the fact that it was brother teaching brother—cop teaching cop. This sent a negative tone to the public.” One further noted, “Hearing and verifying stories of colleges granting degrees without a reasonable residency requirement became a lightning rod. Sort of like Name That Tune . . . we can give you a B.A. or B.S. degree in 10 courses.”

Faculty credentials, academic rigor, and admission and transfer policies were also named as differing quality concerns between full-time traditional and part-time or off-
campus programs. These responses were across all groups and strata and are reported in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8 *Reported Quality Concerns Relative to Criminal Justice Program Delivery, Full versus Part Time*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Credentials (n=6)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Part Time Programs Often Taught by Less Qualified Part Time Faculty</td>
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<tr>
<td>• More Practitioners Teaching in Part Time Programs</td>
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| Academic Rigor (n=6)                                                                                 |                                    |
| • Curriculum More Practitioner Based                                                               |                                    |
| • Waivers Given For Requirements Based On Experience                                               |                                    |
| • Not As Rigid In Part Time Program                                                                |                                    |

| Admission and Transfer Policies (n=5)                                                               |                                    |
| • Over Generous Transfer Policies                                                                  |                                    |
| • Fee Charged for Non Traditional Credits                                                           |                                    |
| • Working Around Policies                                                                          |                                    |

One participant representing the law enforcement perspective commented on transfer credit policies: “Credit for work experience was perhaps over generous. Colleges collected a fee, processed paperwork, yet didn’t have to hire faculty to teach—a win for the college that set the hook for the student, and a win for the student who didn’t have to attend what would have been several more classes.” The divisive result was two programs, two faculty, and two measures of success—quality or quantity—earning the same degree.

Standards interest group respondents also shared stories of academic practices, with one recalling an early result of their review of college transcripts: “[The] student, who wouldn’t otherwise qualify for Quinn, got accepted into a school’s undergraduate
criminal justice program, took two courses, and got a 10% letter [having earned 60
credits or more and enrolled in a criminal justice program]. Then the student would
transfer to the master’s program.” Cited as a “standard practice” at some institutions, the
student could “generate extra cash to help pay for [graduate] courses.” This respondent
also referred to an executive summary of internal review, where the MDHE reported that
this practice resulted in officers “essentially jumping from a 10% pay-benefit level to a
25% benefit level without completing a baccalaureate degree.” It was also reported that
the majority of degrees were earned at only three institutions with a cost analysis of the
Quinn Bill projecting that there was a “significant possibility for officers already
involved in the program to earn advanced degrees” (Massachusetts Board of Higher
Education, 2002).

When asked if questionable practices at various institutions were a result of some
form of agreement between police and criminal justice programs, respondents from all
groups agreed, with the exception of two. “I think it’s more based on the philosophy of
the schools . . . some schools are more entrepreneurial,” said one criminal justice program
interest group respondent. Another stated that while some practices were indeed
questionable, “I don’t see it as . . . corruption.” One law enforcement interest group
respondent replied that they had “gone to classes assuming the school knew what it was
doing.” Another spoke to institution choice, stating, “We didn’t choose the easiest but the
most convenient.”

Of the two respondents who disagreed with the question, one criminal justice
program interest group participant instead stated, “I was once offered cash in return for a
degree . . . and while it was delivered with a smile, I often wondered.” Another reflected,
“It may have been an unstated agreement . . . you make it easy and I’ll come to your program.”

**Attitudes and Perception**

Criminal justice faculty respondents had much more to contribute in regard to their views of these questionable criminal justice educational practices. Results are generally inconclusive in that all groups focused around one central theme: while not spread equally across all institutions offering criminal justice programs, there was some truth in the views of questionable practices. Stories related to this theme were numerous throughout the interviews. Some responses from the criminal justice program group included, “The logical question is ‘What did you get out of it?’ Particularly when you have diploma mills. And that’s what they were.” Another referred to colleges playing “Let’s Make a Deal,” thus encouraging students to “shop around for what program would give them more.”

Responses from the law enforcement interest group were abundant. One respondent reflected on the decision-making process fellow officers used when deciding to attend a particular school, saying, “Why go to [program X] and take all those studies and work hard to put together a twenty- or thirty-page paper when I can go someplace else and do it with four pages?” Another added to the discussion of questionable practices with stories about fellow officers attending school in large groups and taking attendance turns, “You start to hear ‘Well, where’s Joe?’ ‘Oh, he’s on a detail.’ And Joe would be in the next week but Phil wasn’t there. ‘We’re taking notes for Phil.’ That’s when I could see . . . the abuses . . . the effort. And those people flourished? No. Those people got their money . . . they’re probably not coming up with new philosophies.” Another spoke to the
timing of officers earning degrees, “When somebody has three years left in their career and they go in and get their degree . . . they want the money. They want the three years in retirement; they don’t care how they get it.” One law enforcement interest group participant spoke to the frustration with police officers not availing themselves of Quinn Bill incentives, “There was a group that came in, they came and worked 20% and they left it there . . . they took the Quinn Bill for face value and didn’t cash it in to compound another 5%.” Another law enforcement respondent stated, “There’s always been a disconnect for doing it right. . . . I was always taken aback by the people who did not do it right.” One noted, “I think it was a misconception that all cops were in it for the money. They weren’t . . . that gave you that push to be a professional.” Another commented that officers thought “‘I can do more’ and I think the people wouldn’t have done it without the Quinn Bill.”

Guilt by association was a perception that surfaced during the study among both law enforcement and criminal justice program respondents. Reflecting on their education, one law enforcement interest group respondent stated, “I was embarrassed. You know, I’m embarrassed going to class every night and doing the right things. My own father would question it . . . ‘This is a waste of money,’ and it’s kind of our fault.”

Four criminal justice program interest group respondents also expressed negative attitudes toward their institution or affiliations, regardless of their personal practices and behavior. One reflected on the negative press for some “sloppy” institutions: “Once it’s in the Globe it becomes very political and the politicians go nuts . . . and then everyone gets beaten.” Another referred to this through the interviewer’s past institutional affiliation and stated, “Now when you walk into a room as a professor from [the institution] you
don’t feel like a long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking chairs.” This last comment speaks to both past perceptions and the respondent’s observed change in that perception as a result of state oversight.

Stage II responses demonstrate some common ground among respondents: increased enrollments and quality concerns, varied quality among institutions, and that some truth existed in the questionable practices of some institutions. The variation among responses could be explained by respondents’ personal experiences coupled with their orientation or group. Consistent responses from the graduate program stratum in regard to quality concerns mirror the heightened concerns reported during the oversight stage on those programs.

**Stage III: Conflicts and Concerns Lead to Legislative Oversight**

Stages I and II focused on the development of the Quinn Bill, its early years, and the concerns that surfaced. Stage III refocuses on those concerns and their culmination into oversight. This section incorporates a discussion of legislative and policy history compiled from a variety of sources to frame the interview questions and responses. Study respondents were initially asked if they had any comments on this second wave of quality concerns. While all spoke to reasons of timing and areas of change, seven respondents (three from the law enforcement, two from the standards, and two from the criminal justice program interest groups) commented directly on the events that took place. Those comments are interspersed into the following discussion of mounting concerns and their outcome.
Mounting Concerns

Public and political pressure stemming from the 1985 concerns that were somewhat quieted by promises of reform that never bore light, surfaced again some 15 years later as the commonwealth’s largest police department’s patrol union adopted the Quinn Bill. This renewed interest in the Quinn Bill and the surrounding issues is best summed up by a law enforcement interest group respondent who reflected, “There was all this media and then nothing. You might have thought everything was okay. And then rumblings began within the associations that costs under Boston’s Quinn might bring it all back around.”

The Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, after years of political volleying regarding the adoption of the Quinn Bill, found an election-year solution and attached the bill to its collective bargaining process. Not wanting to take on such a powerful union in an election year, Boston city officials adopted the Quinn Bill in 1999, bringing costs to the commonwealth around $75 million in its first year. Recalled one law enforcement interest group respondent, “The police commissioner sent a memo to all the bargaining units involved [Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, the Detective’s Benevolent Society, and the Superior Officers’ Unit] outlining the process and lists of programs.”

By 2002, annual costs for administering the Quinn Bill had risen to more than $120 million (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003). The thinking was that there would be an interval where Boston police would gradually begin seeking degrees and coffers would adjust accordingly. Two criminal justice program interest group respondents commented on the impact this would have on the bill moving forward. One respondent stated that “no one was prepared for the Boston officers who flooded
programs. They anticipated it would take a longer time.” Another added, “Boston settled an agreement with the union . . . to accept Quinn in lieu of drug testing . . . and that’s where the feeding frenzy started. . . . Boston was the kind of elephant that led the charge.” The political maneuvering and soaring costs caught the attention of public interest groups such as the Boston Municipal Research Bureau and the State House News Service. After reports on the high participation rates surfaced, this latter group noted, “Higher education officials say they are alarmed and are moving to set up tough new academic standards” (Levenson, 2003, p. 1).

In 2003, the Boston Municipal Research Bureau, a nonprofit organization and member-funded agency, noted the shift in patterns of attendance for programs that occurred alongside Boston’s adoption and called for reform of the Quinn Bill itself, characterizing it as a program “extraordinarily generous and . . . not aligned with the services received by the public and the taxpayers” (p. 2). Among its suggested reforms was the recommendation to change the Quinn Bill compensation package to “a smaller percentage of salary with a maximum cap or fixed dollar amount so that costs are aligned more appropriately with the public benefits” (Boston Municipal Research Bureau, 2003, p. 1)

**What Took You So Long?**

The combined responses from study participants regarding the reasons for oversight of the Quinn Bill include:

- The cost of the Quinn Bill
- Media coverage: public pressure and politics
- Quality concerns: faculty driven, institutional capacity for change
Legislative change

All respondents were asked about criminal justice programs and whether they thought the quality concerns were real. Those responses are reported in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9

Responses Regarding Reality of Criminal Justice Program Quality Concerns, All Groups

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Quality Concerns Real (n=17)</th>
<th>Quality Concerns Related Other Issues (n=18)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on Questionable Practices</td>
<td>Financial Costs</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Cost of Quinn Bill</td>
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All law enforcement interest group participants, and 11 of the 14 criminal justice program interest group respondents, spoke of money as the “real driving force.” One response from a law enforcement participant included, “It’s always been an easy target. . . they go after the costs and the cost looks exorbitant.” Three criminal justice program interest group respondents stated that concerns were not real but instead the result of amplified media coverage. For example, one felt there were “only anecdotal issues fueled by the press.” Ten of the criminal justice program group participants, and all of the standards and public interest groups, replied that the concerns were based on questionable practices. One did expand to say, “Yes at other institutions but not at ours.”

Oversight, or change, began to be introduced to criminal justice education from various influencing factors throughout the Quinn Bill years and for some beginning prior to legislative intervention. First, and the most common theme reported in this study, was from faculty members themselves in criminal justice programs. Almost ironically, considering the questions of academic legitimacy that had been leveled against criminal justice early on by members of traditional disciplines, they spoke of quality concerns. Of
the 12 study participants who believed faculty had quality concerns, eight criminal justice program interest group respondents echoed this source of quality concern. However, as reported earlier, not all had the resources or support to act on those concerns.

Eight respondents from all criminal justice program interest group strata, whether they had reported having concerns or not, commented on the source of various types of change coming internally from faculty. One reported that a movement “began to percolate within criminal justice departments themselves to disabuse themselves of this notion of being police training programs . . . and to become more academically credible.” Respondents believed that this occurred “without any influence from the state Board of Higher Education or from the Quinn Bill at all” and added, “If the idea is that the Board of Higher Education came in and said ‘Criminal justice programs have to be more academically competent,’ what I’m saying is there was a movement in that direction long before.” Another recalled that the “institution itself wanted an assessment in place . . . so there was that influence.” Yet another reflected on internal program decisions to redesign the curriculum four years prior to the MDHE guideline that was “fortuitously a good decision to make.”

Five of the six criminal justice program interest group respondents and all four of those within the public institution stratum who stated they had no concerns about their programs’ quality referred to their schools’ own internal review process and support for secondary accreditations or their equivalents on campus. One such respondent, also a program administrator, summed it up this way: “I don’t know if it would have been these [MDHE] standards but we certainly would have been held to standards of our own, of our own creation.” Another stated that about the time the Quinn Bill assessments began
due to the support of institutional administrators, “We had done a top to bottom assessment of the criminal justice program . . . so when they came in, we matched.“

Three respondents noted that they used the ACJS model for internal program review prior to the 2003 MDHE standards adoption.

Assuming that change can happen organically, questions asked of all respondents sought to answer why it did not, or why it took so long to happen. All interest groups believed that money or financial incentive was the leading reason why it took so long for change to come, and, alternately, that money or cost was also the reason for legislative-mandated intervention. Comments from criminal justice faculty respondents included, “You know, there’s people who need to make the money and they’re focused on the money part of it.”; “It was the financial.”; “It always comes down to money.”; “Because of the money.”; “The deans pushed for revenue.”; and “You say, ‘Hey, look, lets really look at the students and help the students,’ and they say, ‘Now we’ve got great income.’ They were bringing in four or five million a year.”

Four additional responses across groups for why it took so long for change to happen spoke to institutional capacity—programs grew too rapidly. For example, one criminal justice program interest group participant replied to the question of why standards were not in place from the beginning, saying, “I think they just grew too fast, they were not prepared for the numbers.” One law enforcement interest group respondent replied, “It was too much too soon . . . we all kind of came in this at the same time . . . schools were overwhelmed.” Participants also talked about “shortcuts.” Speaking of differences between state schools and small private colleges relative to administrative attitudes on quality changes, one respondent stated, “You start losing students and . . .
you start thinking about whether or not the college is going to continue to exist.” Schools were afraid that changes in program delivery, even in the name of quality, would impact enrollments: “They were just afraid that their enrollment would fall off.” One criminal justice program respondent stated that when their program was developed, there were no “accepted set of standards” that had been agreed on by faculty in the field and “that could be a part of where some implied variance from program to program happened.”

Study participants were also asked questions that addressed why they thought the MDHE intervened with criminal justice programs under the Quinn Bill when they did. In addition to quality concerns, the most common three responses were money, public perception, and politics/political pressure.

When asked if they thought concern about the academic quality of criminal justice programs was stimulated only by the increased cost to taxpayers, 10 criminal justice program interest group respondents agreed, three said it was one of the reasons, and one disagreed. Two additional responses to this question from this group were internal influences. One respondent expanded on their agreement to the question by stating that “this is also the reason why the Globe, Herald, as well as taxpayer groups got involved.” Eight out of 11 respondents from the Quinn Bill interest groups also agreed with this question, including all law enforcement interest group respondents. Responses are reported in Table 4.10.
When asked specifically why they thought the state intervened when it did—why it took so long for some form of formal action—responses echoed the earlier money theme. One criminal justice program respondent placed the financial and policy blame squarely on the shoulders of the legislature and its refusal to change the Quinn Bill: “I’m blaming our legislators for this—instead of just coming out with ‘Hey, look, we’re wasting a lot of money’ . . . they could have solved this problem long ago.” One criminal justice program interest group respondent commented on the process of involving the MDHE: “Municipalities were saying, ‘Are we spending this money wisely? Are these degrees worth anything?’ and that pressure moved the Board of Higher Education to look more closely at it.” Another agreed: “They finally started getting involved in it because of the price tag. I think they were really getting a lot of feedback or pressure from our legislators in regard to the monies.”

The second most common response to why the state intervened when it did involve the issue of publicity and public perception. Fifteen respondents across all groups responded to this category with comments such as “It hit the public arena.” and “Once the papers began to dig, it played out publicly.” One respondent from the public criminal
justice interest group stratum spoke to the perception of police, that this became a state issue because of “cop haters.” Other criminal justice program and law enforcement interest group participants spoke to the general negative attitude of the public toward the police: “They hate us, anything we do.”; “A lot of people hate the police . . . they just hate them for whatever reason.”; “Maybe they’ve been in trouble with the police before.”; “They don’t like authority.”; and “The cops . . . they’re making money . . . wait a second.”

One criminal justice program interest group respondent spoke to the abundance of “newspaper headlines citing police abuse of Quinn and the publishing of top salaries among the rank and file” as a contributing factor to these negative perceptions. Another mentioned “rogue students claiming they did little or no academic work and became a target for public criticism.” One law enforcement interest group respondent recalled attending a program not traditionally populated with police officers: “I didn’t let too many professors know that I was a full-time cop . . . because of the dislike toward police officers.”

One criminal justice program interest group participant added, “The Board of Higher Education wound up getting involved because taxpayers started to revolt” and “the *Boston Herald* and other people started to say, ‘Hey, wait a minute. Shouldn’t there be some demand for quality here?’” Other participants responded to questions of change with stories of outside pressure in the form of imposed standards. This was often reported along with accounts of mounting negative media pressure. One criminal justice program respondent recalled of the Quinn Bill, “Anytime you have such a program that’s growing, you have ‘watchers.’” Another criminal justice program participant spoke of programs “reporting” on one another and thus influencing the media agenda: “They see another
program and they’re stuck with their little program . . . so all they can do is that they can report them . . . so I don’t think it was as bad as it was portrayed in the newspaper.”

Another public interest group respondent stated, “First, the Boston Globe Spotlight story of the mid 80s never really went away. Second, as a political issue [Democrats in favor and Republicans against] it was always underlying budget fodder thus never leaving political debate.”

This latter response combines public perception with the third most common response—politics—where 14 participants, 10 from the criminal justice program and four from the Quinn Bill interest groups, responded to the general area of politics with comments such as “MDHE is a political entity.” and “Politics played in.” One criminal justice program interest group respondent recalled that during the time of review, they would have prepared media statements in response to growing negative coverage reminding them that “the [program] spokesperson needs to speak to the academic side of the consequences of the Quinn Bill, not to the social/economic side, which is a political one.” Another recalled “the Globe [reporters] sitting in the parking lots” or that “the phones rang constantly with reporters looking for information and asking questions . . . sometimes armed with documents they had received from the MDHE.” Another referred to their institution’s internal press package that had been developed to provide consistency and accuracy for faculty responding to such requests, stating that while “media requests were funneled through our PR department, you never knew where or who a reporter may be.” One law enforcement interest group respondent simply stated, “Why did it take so long? Why? Politics.”
One standards interest group participant responded that “the governor felt that it wasn’t our place as the board of higher education to look at private colleges.” One criminal justice program interest group respondent answered, “It’s a bureaucracy . . . and what do they really do? And I think they probably made it into something bigger than it actually was.” One participant representing the law enforcement interest group observed, “BHE [Board of Higher Education] involvement—legislature enacted—was a way for the legislature to wash their hands and let others be the heavy hand of being the standard setters.”

All criminal justice program interest group respondents from public institutions also cited quality concerns (and thus the reason for MDHE involvement). Some saw this only as a private school issue: the “reputations of a few privates led to issues across the board.” The perception of one participant was that such issues did not exist at public schools because “they don’t make money.” When that participant was also asked if public programs benefit in other ways by increased student enrollments, the response was, “It would benefit more for the students, but how do we [schools and departments] benefit? We don’t make money. . . . The prestige, yes.”

However, three criminal justice program interest group respondents from the private sector saw the move by the MDHE as “based upon state schools, private schools . . . so what they did, they did anything they possibly could to undermine any private school.” Two additional criminal justice program respondents saw the shortcomings of criminal justice programs to maintain quality assurances without the involvement of the MDHE as a “shared accountability,” but one that was out and ready to be addressed: “Once Quinn [standards] came along, along came transparency and openness.”
Two related responses, one from the public and one from the private criminal justice interest group strata, mentioned the politics involved between public and private institutions. For example, one criminal justice interest group respondent commented on the jurisdiction of the MDHE, stating that “the lack of standards and curricula that wasn’t uniform was an easy way to get a foothold in all programs.” Two criminal justice interest group participants reported that previous interactions with the MDHE were only required when “a new program was to be offered.” An increase in this latter interaction for criminal justice programs was a contributing factor for change.

There are two outlying responses worth mentioning. The first comes from one member each of the standards and public interest groups, who believe that consumer protection as a reason for formal involvement is why they “demanded accountability for state and municipal spending in many areas, this included.” The second response came from a member of the standards interest group who, in speaking of why a more structured response did not come with the first wave of concerns, stated that “institutions were taken at their word and by their mission that they would change.”

Study participants representing the law enforcement interest group were asked if they could recall prior discussions at the union level in regard to the Quinn Bill and implementing change. All four responded yes. Comments included, “We kick ourselves that we didn’t see . . . that we should have adjusted.” and “We blame the school for failing at one point, we also blame the towns. The towns should’ve forecasted that the cost was going to become too prohibitive and there should have been adjustments made . . . to alleviate this burden on the town.” Another stated, “We were fat and happy and
greedy and we didn’t think it would ever end.” Another added, “I’d love to see Quinn gone . . . Quinn’s getting to be too much of a stigmatism.”

In response to this question, one law enforcement interest group participant pointed to a lack of communication among law enforcement agencies in the commonwealth that resulted in a failure to share what was happening outside their own municipalities: “We don’t see press releases from the state house . . . you don’t see people in caucuses coming back with information saying we don’t think the Quinn Bill is sustainable. We didn’t see these studies.” One spoke of lack of union support on the matter, stating that the “[police department] is huge lobbying . . . lobbying so they were keeping things off the table in Boston.” Another referred to the staying power of the Quinn Bill: “Nobody wanted to be the person that ended the Quinn Bill. It would have been political death for them.” In summary, as one law enforcement respondent put it, “Politics. Its power, politics.”

Members of the standards interest group were asked about timing and their role in the administration and oversight of the Quinn Bill. One participant cited the MDHE’s limited legislative role under the bill. Another referred to the MDHE’s authority to interpret the type of degree, stating, “It is not the mandate of Quinn to only approve degrees in criminal justice but the practice of the board.”

When asked a follow-up question regarding why it took so many years for MDHE involvement to change, respondents referred to a 2003 document that clearly laid out the major administrative functions for the Quinn Bill through the Office of Student Financial Assistance: to review documentation and certify municipal and state police officers for benefits, to certify the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the state to each
municipality, to estimate such reimbursements for the following fiscal year, and to maintain records for more than 14,000 Quinn Bill participants (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003). In addition, the office heard appeals, requests for exceptions to the policy, and acted as a source of information (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003). Another standards interest group respondent stated, “The BHE is charged with consumer protection . . . for both the public and private sectors. Our role is to review the programs to see whether or not they meet quality standards, in the case of the independent sector, its minimal quality standards. So that is our role to be involved in the review and approval of academic programs.” When asked about timing, the response was, “The reason that a handful of institutions in the private sector may not have had close interaction with the board over the years is that our interaction is triggered when an institution seeks to change its degree authority or change it.” This is consistent with one of the reasons cited by the MDHE for beginning the review process.

**Why Change?**

In the midst of growing concerns around the Quinn Bill and criminal justice program quality, the MDHE decided in 2001 that a review of criminal justice programs in Massachusetts was the first step to understanding the issues. The MDHE cited the increasing number of programs seeking approval and its legislative role in administering the Quinn Bill to respond to “concerns raised in the local media regarding the quality and standards of criminal justice programs” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 1) as reasons for their 2001 initial paper review.

When asked about these initial reviews, study participants responded with reasons as to why change began to happen in both oversight and program delivery. The majority
of responses across all groups mirrored those in regard to timing: money, politics, and perception. One comment from the public interest group, referring to soaring costs of the Quinn Bill, stated that “another contributing factor was the legislature began to take a look at these costs.”

Additional responses were recorded to include published white papers (3) and program proliferation (4). A third reported influencing factor for change was criminal justice organizations. Six criminal justice interest group participants and all four standards interest group respondents referred to the influence of such organizations. Specifically, ACJS and, at the local level, NEACJS, were cited as influencing bodies at some institutions where quality matters were tied to faculty being “very active in ACJS and other groups picking up this idea.” Active participation by faculty in such organizations was also noted by four criminal justice program interest group respondents as playing a role in which institutions sought change organically and those for whom change was mandated by outside forces: “The impetus [for change] came from faculty members belonging to professional associations outside the institution, and being acculturated into that idea.” Referring to a program that had no such organizational affiliations, another noted, “You couldn’t pay them to go to a meeting of the ACJS.” When asked if this could be a matter of not knowing, the response was “not caring.”

**Review Process**

The 2001 Criminal Justice Review Committee was comprised of 18 criminal justice faculty from across the United States who observed that it knew of “no other state that has undertaken such an extensive initiative to assess and improve the quality of criminal justice education at the secondary level” (Massachusetts Board of Higher
Education, 2001, p. 1). While assessing for improvement was its primary goal, communication and collaboration among criminal justice programs was a desired outcome. Paralleling the growth in criminal justice programs in the commonwealth to the overall growth in criminal justice programs since the 1970s, the committee commented, “As with any new academic field, especially one that is interdisciplinary in nature, criminal justice has and continues to face the challenges of defining standards of quality while providing flexibility so that programs can be both responsive to changes . . . and innovative in their pedagogy” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 1).

In addition to a quality review of programs, the committee was charged with assessing whether state workforce needs and standards were being met and the impact of the Quinn Bill on the quality and delivery of criminal justice programs. Forty-three institutions offering 58 criminal justice programs participated in the review—all 23 public institutions were mandated to participate, while 20 independent schools joined voluntarily. The final report states that review criteria were informed by NEASJC and ACJS standards and that limitations within the review require its findings to be preliminary (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001).

Although it did mention some positive practices in criminal justice programs, the committee’s final report found wide variety in quality and cited concerns with faculty, resources, curriculum, enrollments, and assessment. General criticisms cited from this review included wide variation in program quality, with a few presenting serious concerns by not keeping up with changes and growth in the field. The committee also commented on the lack of PhD programs in criminal justice in the commonwealth, a failure by the programs to keep up with changes in the field, and that programs “may be
producing more baccalaureate and master’s degrees than needed for direct entry into the field” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 16).

The Criminal Justice Review Committee commented on the oversight of the MDHE and its interpretation of the Quinn Bill statute, stating, “The Board has chosen to interpret degrees in criminal justice as the equivalent of a degree in law enforcement to qualify for the Quinn Bill” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 16). It also concluded that “there is no direct evidence that the Quinn Bill has improved the quality of criminal justice education in Massachusetts” and that “the Quinn Bill’s economic incentives may be responsible, at least in part, for making criminal justice an academic ‘cash cow’ for some institutions, and for concomitant concerns about program quality” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 17). The committee recommended standards and a process for ensuring all criminal justice programs offering degrees under the Quinn Bill meet acceptable standards of academic quality. ACJS was endorsed by the committee as both an advisory body and for its criminal justice education standards.

Criminal justice program interest group respondents were asked if they were familiar with and willing to share their thoughts on both the process and results of this 2001 paper review. All respondents stated that they either directly remembered (11) or knew of the review (3). Diverse views on this review were expressed, with seven reporting positive and welcoming comments—five from public and three from private institutions at all levels. “We welcomed the review,” said one. “It gave us a chance to demonstrate we were not part of the negative press.” Another commented, “Programs were doing things they shouldn’t have been doing . . . and it was time to stop.”
Seven criminal justice program interest group respondents across all strata were much more critical of the 2001 paper review, not in its intent but in the process. Three respondents, two representing private graduate institutions and one undergraduate public institution, saw it as the “state’s excuse to get inside private schools.” One respondent recalled it was a process where “reviewer comments were subjective, biased, and often unsupported” and included “factual inaccuracies and the inclusion of information not in the self-study from sources unknown to the [school].” Another commented on “the injection into the paper review of standards not in the board’s guidelines.” Another referred to comments written specifically for their institution’s review, adding that “there was very little positive . . . the comments were contradictory, incoherent; they were very poorly written.” One standards interest group respondent also commented on this process and intent stating “although the stated goal of the statewide review process is the improvement of criminal justice education in the Commonwealth, the Board may use this process to scapegoat certain private colleges, thereby absolving the public higher education system from blame.”

The committee noted the challenges inherent in a paper review: “By its very nature, a review that does not include on-site visits presents challenges to reviewers and to institutions. Data cannot be independently verified and incomplete data cannot be supplemented” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 2). They went on to recommend the MDHE not end its process of inquiry here but to consider it a “necessary and appropriate first step in assessing and improving criminal justice education in the Commonwealth” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2001, p. 2). The MDHE responded with a move toward standards development.
The board cited the authority given to them to set standards and review programs as a direct response to their 2001 external review report on criminal justice programs where they “recommended that the Board be given greater authority for quality assurance of academic programs approved under the Quinn Bill” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003). The bill underwent further changes in 2004 once the guidelines were approved to reflect the established criteria and process. To summarize the changes, the chancellor of the MDHE reported,

The Criminal Justice Review is an excellent example of the difference authority can make in achieving desired results. For thirty years, the Board was responsible for publishing a list of programs “approved” for Quinn Bill benefits but has no authority either to oversee the programs or ensure their quality. Over the three decades, the integrity and quality of many of these programs were regularly challenged, and the Police Career Incentive Pay Program itself was often in jeopardy. With the Legislature’s decision to change the statute to establish the Board’s authority for program quality and oversight, the quality of criminal justice programs and the integrity of the [Quinn Bill] have dramatically improved. (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2004)

When criminal justice program interest group respondents were asked about this continued process, seven participants recalled an early meeting between the MDHE and representatives of criminal justice programs at independent institutions following the 2001 review to discuss the development of standards and next steps: “We all met up at [the institution] where the board spoke to concerns and their plans.” Two respondents recalled representatives from the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts, also in attendance, citing two areas of influence—standards and process—stating that

on standards we [independent institutions] urge the broadest possible participation in development . . . on process, similarly, we urge the broadest possible participation in development and review . . . the “paper” review of criminal justice programs by the BHE inevitably colors your work . . . a central problem seems to be the continued force of conclusions and recommendations of the BHE’s Review
Committee . . . one of its recommendations would transform ACJS into a de facto accrediting agency for criminal justice programs in Massachusetts. ACJS is not an accrediting agency; its standards are voluntary; its standards have not been accepted, formally or otherwise, as controlling by many colleges and universities; its standards are not accepted by many experts in the field or by other professional organizations in the field . . . the application of . . . standards . . . “after the fact” is an ancient grievance against misuse of administrative or legislative power. It is so damaging that it is expressly forbidden in the US Constitution. But a version of ex post facto is an issue in our differences with the Review Committee. (Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts, 2002a)

While the role of ACJS in this process had been previously mentioned by all criminal justice program respondents, primarily as a positive influence throughout the process, four criminal justice program interest group participants responded that they did question, at this point in the process, their role and motivation to the process at hand. Two of the four also identified themselves as being members of ACJS. One criminal justice program interest group respondent stated that the inclusion of ACJS standards and faculty requirements into the process was like “tying to promote your union in a sense.” Two others referred to their role as “profession promoting.”

Law enforcement interest group respondents specifically were asked what they thought about this era of questionable quality and what was happening. All respondents spoke of the benefits of an educated police officer. Responses cited links between education and diversity, decreased civil suits against police officers, and community relations. In this context, one stated, “Putting someone on a college campus, you can’t replace that.”

One criminal justice program interest group respondent reflects on this time in Massachusetts: “I felt my job as the program director was to bob and weave, to survive, to keep the institution alive, to get students to show up, to maintain quality standards, but not to think that there was some sort of Holy Grail set of standards out there that wasn’t a
part of a political agenda.” When speaking of the review process, two criminal justice program interest group respondents from private institutions recalled being invited to meet directly with union representatives in a move to combine efforts. One respondent stated, “We met at their [union] offices to discuss the impact changes to oversight might have on our programs but ultimately their access to our programs. When it was clear that we were powerless to stop a process already begun, there were no more meetings.”

One standards interest group respondent indicated that what made the Quinn Bill review different was “the legislature decided that it wanted to have strong quality control for these criminal justice programs. The legislature looked at what was being spent . . . [and] articles in the newspaper about practices that some institutions were engaged in with respect to delivering those degrees to officers.” The result was the 2001 review of criminal justice programs conducted under the auspices of the MDHE by an independent review team; “as a result of that review, legislature asked that we develop specific guidelines that were meant to address some of the practices that had been engaged in by the institutions and that the legislature was ultimately disturbed about.”

**Legislative Mandated Guidelines for Change**

In its Fiscal Year 2003 Appropriations Bill, the commonwealth added language that charged the MDHE with developing guidelines for reviewing programs offering courses under the Quinn Bill. It also stated that “under no circumstances, shall said board certify any program which grants credit for the following: life experience; courses taught by instructors lacking appropriate educational degrees as determined by said board; and courses lacking appropriate concentration on academic and scholarly research” (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L). The amendment gave written authority to
the MDHE to conduct reviews, approve criminal programs for certification under the Quinn Bill, and set out a method, along with specific criteria, for doing so.

Out of the push and pull between abolitionists and beneficiaries of the Quinn Bill rose the Massachusetts Guidelines for Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Academic Programs. Developed by the Criminal Justice Committee on Academic Programs, a group of law enforcement professionals and academics from all institutional levels, and grounded in standards for criminal justice education originally penned by NEACJS and later ACJS, the guidelines delineated the criteria that all criminal justice programs must meet if their graduates are to reap the rewards of the Quinn Bill.

Four respondents to this study, two from the criminal justice program and two from the standards interest groups, served on that committee and were asked about the process. All four recalled lively debates that ensued about residency requirements, defining a “criminal justice course,” and the number of courses required for a major. These issues characterized the committee’s work in drawing distinctions between research-oriented and professional-oriented programs and faculty—particularly over the inclusion of the JD as an appropriate terminal degree. These debates were also referred to within committee correspondence (Criminal Justice Committee on Academic Programs, 2002).

One additional criminal justice program respondent who was declined a role on the committee reflected that while various interest groups were included in the process, those interest groups were limited: “They refused to allow me on that board because I didn’t have a doctorate . . . but I know more about Quinn in relation to education than
anybody. . . . This is a cobbled together thing which just by accident has had these great beneficial results.”

Politics and quality concerns were also referred to by all the committee respondents. One criminal justice program interest group participant who served on the committee recalled that “there was a lot of political pressure . . . and there was a real problem . . . there were programs that were in essence selling degrees.” Another comment from a standards interest group member was that “the purpose of the Quinn Bill was to ensure a better educated police force and it was not necessarily providing a better educated police force, money aside. . . . If it wasn’t accomplishing its original goal and it was costing the state millions of dollars a year, then it’s a problem. And they were right to go and look at it.”

Speaking to the process itself, another committee member from the criminal justice program interest group recalled that the committee chair was “really wonderful in making sure everybody had a voice . . . everybody was heard . . . and that nobody was more important or significant that anybody else.” And while “internal politics among programs” was mentioned by one criminal justice program interest group committee member, all agreed that ultimately the “standards were adopted by consensus.” One respondent from the standards interest group stated the committee’s purpose clearly: “We were charged to develop quality guidelines for programs that wanted to become eligible for certification under the Quinn Bill, in terms of their graduates being able to get the Quinn Bill benefits.” The other respondent from the standards interest group was clear in the distinction that this was a “government oversight role as opposed to a criminal justice education role.” That respondent also referred to the power given to the MDHE by the
legislature who “wrote the statute”; in the early days of the Quinn Bill they defined their role “to certify individual officers and individual schools, and the only way that we could certify them based on the original statute was whether or not they were accredited. That was our role and a state agency can’t go beyond its authority.” No respondent in this area could recall any involvement in the process that led to the adoption of the original Quinn Bill statute.

After the first set of guidelines was sent back by the board demanding that a higher standard be set, the guidelines were approved by the board in February 2003 and included “both quality standards and the program review process” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003, p. 1). The MDHE defined the guidelines as “derived from NEASC standards, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, the results of several major studies over the past three decades on criminal justice education, and the BHE’s own evaluation of more than 400 PCIPP [Quinn Bill] participant transcripts” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003, p. 5). Unique in their focus on programs, not institutions, as had been typical with past MDHE involvement, the standards were reported by one respondent from the standards interest group to be new territory: “There was debate over which standards to use: NEACJS standards were seen as common ground and ACJS was not an accrediting agency—in the end they were both.”

Study respondents were asked to comment on the standards themselves, and because their responses were redundant to those given to questions of change and issues surrounding change, all but committee responses are discussed in Stage IV. Committee members spoke generally of the limits of the standards.
One committee member from the criminal justice program interest group who reflected on the standards themselves captured the general consensus of the group—that while the standards may have been limiting, those limits were needed to accomplish the goal of quality. One example given was the standard that only full-time faculty could teach core courses, thus prohibiting a police chief with a master’s degree from teaching a core introductory course in policing: “Maybe we went a little overboard in trying to ensure academic quality and short changed what some of the practitioners have to offer.” Faculty leaves and sabbaticals can “present a hardship when you have people with . . . other assignments.” On the other hand, this respondent also stated that it was this one standard that “did probably more that any single thing immediately to raise the quality of our programs.”

Programs seeking MDHE approval under the Quinn Bill were required to submit an electronic “summary of the program’s fulfillment of the criteria under the specific standard area and . . . evidence demonstrating fulfillment of that criteria” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003, pp. 2–3). Reviewers with “extensive experience as faculty in criminal justice programs and as program reviewers” were invited to Massachusetts to visit institutions, assess compliance, and make recommendations for approval (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003, p. 3).

Due to their practical role in this process, criminal justice and standards interest group participants were asked to reflect on this stage of the review process. Respondents had both favorable and unfavorable comments. Eleven of the 16 respondents in this section referred to the review experience as being “collegial,” “informative,” and “fair.” One criminal justice program interest group respondent further stated that “the teams that
came through in 2003 were great; we had a fantastic team. They were all first-rate academics.” Another in this group, while acknowledging a fair process also reflected that “our institution was being targeted by the board. The reviewers saw through that agenda to give us a fair look.”

Attention to only certain programs on the part of 38 external reviewers invited to serve on the board were cited by some, and this theme was coupled with unfair application for six of the 16 respondents, all from the criminal justice program interest group and including all from the private graduate stratum (3). “Bias” was mentioned by one criminal justice program interest group respondent, who spoke of having gone through an external review within a couple of years preceding that of the MDHE, receiving very different results. “Arbitrary and capricious” was mentioned by another. Referring to the actions of some reviewers invited to the commonwealth during this stage, participants described the process as “more reviewer bias than it was assessment . . . sometimes you get reviewers who want to mold your program rather than evaluate your program.” Another recalled attending a meeting shortly after the review process and “comparing notes” with colleagues at lateral institutions, finding “it wasn’t consistent.” For example, “These reviewers said you should have a constitutional law class [at the associate’s level], these reviewers said you shouldn’t have a constitutional law class, they should wait until they get in to their bachelor’s degree program.”

Reviewers were cited by two criminal justice program interest group respondents, one from each of the public and private stratum, as an influential factor in the process of final approval under the new standards. One respondent recalled a situation in which they
were sure they would not receive approval because they simply did not meet certain standards:

They said, “Why do you care whether you get approved or you don’t get approved?” I said, “The reason we care is that we don’t want to look inferior, even if we are,” and they recommended that we be approved. I didn’t even ask them why they came to that conclusion because I was shocked. There was no reason why, just on the basis of faculty alone. But they did; they recommended us for it. And I was blown away when the BHE went along with the recommendation and then approved it.”

Another respondent recalled being approved for their undergraduate program but not for their graduate program. When their administration pushed for the latter, he said:

Talk about pushing your luck. I made some moves in that direction and somebody from the BHE . . . finally called me and said, “Take my advice. Withdraw this application. And withdraw it for two reasons. First of all, it’s not going to be approved. And secondly, if you don’t we may revisit your undergraduate application.” In other words, don’t raise any more flags, keep your head down.

Overall, the MDHE was viewed by six of the 14 criminal justice program interest group respondents as the “weak link” in the process. Referring to the assignment of reviewers, one respondent stated that “because we were in their [MDHE] sight, we were assigned some heavy hitters.” Another spoke to “good intentions,” saying, “The Board of Higher Education, wherever it stemmed from, probably had the right idea to make sure you had qualified people teaching. But they didn’t know what they were doing.”

Reflecting on a previous conversation with a colleague in the field who had served as a reviewer, another participant reflected that “prep” meetings delivered by the board at host hotels “requested special attention be paid in the reviews to certain issues within certain programs” and that “the process lacked pure integrity as a result.” One participant linked the role of the MDHE with the public venue stating “public criticism of the cost of the Quinn Bill vis a vis the quality of criminal justice education programs which qualify
police for these benefits has reflected poorly upon the performance of the Board of Higher Education.”

Criticism of the Quinn Bill reporting instrument was cited often as a lesson to be learned from the process itself by five criminal justice program interest group respondents: “It’s a horrible instrument,” said one. “It is redundant, it is conflicting, the data doesn’t match up,” was stated by another. Overlap, unclear definitions, and formatting issues were mentioned as problems. The lesson learned is that although academics were included among interest groups in the development of the standards, they should also be included when developing such measurement tools: “Bureaucracy and efficiency—are they opponents?” Another added, “We were a little worried about the faculty-to-student ratio but then they changed the formula . . . they ignored the formula.” Yet another spoke of their hope for “divine intervention and justice in the true sense of the word if whomever designed the forms that we have to fill out had to actually fill out the forms.” One respondent from the standards interest group referred to the ambiguous nature of some of the terms within the standards and the application of academic policy by a “government bureaucracy”: “You combine both of these things and it becomes a bureaucratic red tape.”

One criminal justice program respondent spoke to special arrangements that were made, allowing programs to teach out one program while closing another: “Our president and the Board of Higher Education put their minds together and all of a sudden we stopped the master’s program . . . then an agreement was made that we will continue on with [program] . . . [but] not bringing on new students: we would continue on allowing students who were initially enrolled in the program to complete their education.”
Out of 36 institutions (representing 49 programs, 60% of which were on the prior “approved” list) that began the review process, 12 were approved (14 programs), 11 deferred (14 programs), 9 given extensions (14 programs), and 4 withdrew their applications. One additional institution withdrew their application prior to the review process. Although the board ultimately approved 12 institutions in its first round of formal approvals, its recommendations sometimes differed from that of the independent program reviewers. For example, the MDHE reported that some programs were originally approved by reviewers but deferred by the board, while others were deferred by the reviewers yet approved by the board. Reasons cited included consistency, new evidence, factual changes, and the external reviewers themselves (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003). By June 2004, a total of 34 programs offered by 28 institutions were approved. Given that the state began with 80 programs, program access in criminal justice education for Quinn Bill seekers was cut by more than half. For three programs, faculty ratios and credentials were the reasons for either deferment, or, for one program, denial. In the case of denial, programs had the opportunity to withdraw the application in a good-faith effort.

Participants from the standards interest group, a group that included two respondents who played a direct role in the reviews, also commented on the review process. All noted a “fair” and “quality” process. Two mentioned the difference between the review for Quinn Bill purposes and other program reviews, with one stating that a “typical program review is prospective because the program hasn’t been offered yet. In terms of Quinn Bill approval, it was a compliance review.” The other mentioned that “in
traditional reviews evidence that you are moving toward a standard is acceptable; with Quinn it was evidence that you were meeting a standard that was required.”

One standards interest group respondent reflected that for some institutions, it was the level of assessment that proved the more difficult standard to meet as “at the time there wasn’t the focus on assessment that was required by NEASC at that time either.” Another went on to state that “if this had taken place in the Middle Atlantic States where there was a strong culture of assessment and evaluation those institutions would have had an easier time meeting that particular standard.”

Respondents from the standards interest group were also asked about program change for institutions under the 2003 standards review. Similar to the results of the initial 2001 review and the layout of the Guidelines for Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Academic Programs adopted in 2003 all felt there were six main areas of program accountability and change; these were best expressed by one participant:

One was the rigor of the academic program itself, the rigor and currency of courses. The second was the faculty credentials, the appropriate faculty credentials. The third was a heavy reliance on adjunct faculty, especially in programs that were offered through continuing education or on satellite campuses. The fourth was the awarding of credit for nonacademic experiences. The fifth was really high student-faculty ratios and then minimal use of program assessment and evaluation—basically lack of accountability for these programs.

These same general categories are reflected next in the discussion of change under the current picture.

Stage III explored a process of change under the Quinn Bill as well as the reasons that led to change. Participant responses were varied and inconclusive relative to the change process and its impact, which was expected given the various experiences and perspectives of those involved. However, the responses to the reasons for such change
yielded two common areas of agreement across all groups: that Quinn Bill financial costs and public pressure demanded it.

**Stage IV: The Current Picture—Resolving the Conflict**

**Change**

Criminal justice program interest group respondents were asked if they thought the Quinn Bill quality standards caused institutions to change their criminal justice programs. Overwhelmingly, the answer was yes, toward improvement. One further explained that for their institution, the standards “forced their hand but movement toward the standards had already begun.” Six respondents again mentioned that they had issues with process and standards.

Only one private institution believed that the Quinn Bill was not the cause of program changes on its campus, but they were careful to clarify that their answer was specific to their own institution. When change was probed, they added that while they didn’t see a lot of changes now “you had to document and write down and just explain what you are doing,” and change was limited to their curriculum being “tweaked.”

A follow-up question asked of all groups was if improvement would have been an issue without the standards. Criminal justice program interest group respondents across strata were split, with 10 responding yes, but not in all areas. One gave as an example that “NEASC requires assessment but not at the level of faculty credentials within certain programs.” Four responded no, that faculty were involved in professional organizations, were aware of standards, and were already moving in that direction, and that the MDHE finalized the process.
All criminal justice program interest group respondents were asked about institutional changes, as well as the changes they saw criminal justice programs as having experienced under the Quinn Bill. Discussion included the following areas:

- Enrollment: full-time versus professional students
- Quality
- Faculty: credentials and full-time hiring
- Curriculum
- Resources

**Enrollment**

In spite of quality oversight, and perhaps due to internal or external influences, 10 criminal justice program interest group respondents from all strata reported that students continued to populate Massachusetts’ criminal justice programs—with five stating they eventually changed in composition. Two graduate-level programs reported their master’s-level enrollments declined, while undergraduate programs maintained similar enrollments. One undergraduate program participant reported that their enrollment was cut in half, while another undergraduate program respondent noted that their program was not approved, and the enrollments reflected this.

The absence of Quinn Bill incentives, either by institutional choice or by student population, was also reported to have little impact on overall enrollments. All but two criminal justice program interest group respondents noted that their traditional full-time undergraduate programs enrollments remained constant or are growing. This was linked by half of the participants as parallel to the declining market of professional students in general. Six criminal justice program interest group respondents commented that while
their professional undergraduate enrollments have declined, with ranges from almost half to the discontinuation of the program, traditional enrollments have “more than replaced” those enrollment shortfalls. In addition, while professional student populations may not be as abundant as they have been in years past, especially in graduate programs, one criminal justice program interest group respondent stated, “We were concerned we were going to see a dip, particularly in our graduate population, and its growing . . . we have a lot more traditional undergraduates who are staying on.” Another noted that they have simply expanded their recruiting efforts beyond Massachusetts. One spoke to the “push for higher education in order to be successful . . . providing the police departments continue looking at the quality. . . . Where they need a college education, I think CJ will always be around.”

However, two criminal justice program respondents were not as optimistic about future enrollments. One stated, “There’s still a lot of people out there who could get the degree, but without the Quinn Bill benefit, who knows whether they’ll keep coming to our institutions.” The other spoke of outside factors that influenced the drive and availability of police officers to attend programs as overtime details became available: more may choose to “get the money that is available then, rather than taking the classes.”

When asked about enrollments, six criminal justice program interest group participants reintroduced the theme that maintaining traditional Quinn Bill population enrollments was not without conflict (see the Challenges to Change section).

**Quality**

When probed about areas of change under the Quinn Bill and its resulting standards, prestige and perception were mentioned by 12 of the criminal justice program
interest group respondents. This is best captured through the words of two respondents, who stated, “We earned prestige through the standards.” and “Conflict between criminal justice and other faculty were resolved with requirements.” Another felt that criminal justice now “fit” on their campus.

All but one criminal justice program interest group participant responded that the standards had, in some way, worked to improve quality at their institutions. When asked about their move to an institution that had experienced a negative spotlight during the oversight process, one replied, “I didn’t know what was going on . . . but something was going on that’s good. In other words, I’d seen us as kind of all in the same boat, and now I’m beginning to see [the program] riding the tide to the rest of us and wonder why.” Another stated, “We stretch the standards as far as we can without drawing attention . . . much is subject to interpretation.”

Five faculty reflected on the prestige of criminal justice faculty at their institutions post-standards. One respondent stated, “Having standards and a process of review helped put us on a level of legitimacy.” Another observed that the increase of full-time faculty on their campus to meet quality standards under the MDHE had the latent function of faculty being involved in the day-to-day operations of the faculty body as a whole: “Our discipline is being represented in some of the most important committees in the college.” This was viewed as necessary for the fair allocation of resources and for the “fit” of criminal justice within an institution.

**Faculty**

When asked about the resulting changes in criminal justice education programs that came about during this initial step toward oversight at some institutions, criminal
justice program respondents noted the most common change as the faculty. Eleven respondents across all strata also mentioned this as the change having the greatest impact on their programs. Specifically mentioned were faculty credentials, including the hiring of faculty with defined credentials and curricular requirements; changes in part-time and full-time hiring policies; and faculty numbers.

While all criminal justice program interest group respondents discussed faculty credentials, not all agreed that change was a result of oversight alone. Five criminal justice programs, four from the public institution stratum, stated that they began requiring PhDs of their faculty “even before the college required the PhD.”

The shift to a PhD in criminal justice as the hiring standard was mentioned by 10 criminal justice program respondents across all strata. One reflected, “We went from this situation where the faculty were practitioners and the students were practitioners to where most of the faculty members were PhDs” to where “most of them [faculty] didn’t have any criminal justice experience at all.” Or, in the words of another, “From no academics to all academics.” In this shift, three criminal justice program respondents linked faculty and perception: their colleagues in other departments “belonged more now on campus” and “it was that rite of passage thing.” One, however, viewed this situation as creating another conflict: “While we were satisfying the other faculty members we were antagonizing the hell out of our student population.” Two respondents spoke to the shift from hiring unknown part-time faculty to qualified full-time faculty, with one of these participants noting that it was during this time that they hired their first PhD in criminal justice. One additional response stated that with the move to a heavier reliance on full-time faculty, their off-campus problems were “no more.”
Six criminal justice program interest group respondents further reflected on faculty hiring processes for meeting quality standards under the MDHE-approved guidelines. Their comments pointed to a general theme of impersonal hiring, indicating that institutions hired for degree above all else, including teaching ability, research agenda, and institutional fit. As one respondent stated, “They weren’t hiring me because I had a reputation of being this great teacher that would enhance the quality of their department. They were looking for a PhD.” Another added, “When I got there as the resident PhD, ‘Sit by the window so they’ll know we have one’” was the message.” Two participants also commented that they viewed the new faculty standards as “limiting” the type of faculty qualifications to teach.

Seven criminal justice program interest group respondents noted the desirability of criminal justice programs in Massachusetts to faculty looking for teaching positions. Speaking of their recent experience with standards and review, one respondent stated, “You know when they look at the websites . . . they’re looking at the quality of what the faculty has accomplished over a period of time.”

**Curriculum**

With the change in faculty, it seemed logical that discussions of curricular changes under oversight would follow. When probed about curriculum, criminal justice program interest group participants across all strata responded with discussions of four basic themes: generality (7), theoretical orientation (4), workload/changes in practice (4), and perception (2). The discussion of each topic was related and the comments were generally unsupportive of changes.
Under generality, criminal justice program interest group respondents spoke of criminal justice programs requiring a basic move from specialized or “unique” curricula to a model that was, in the words of one, “antiquated and boilerplate.” Another added that they had to eliminate some formerly required areas of study, in this case “victimology, because base requirements were too rigid and too many.” One respondent under generality noted that with the curricular change requirements, a “more integrated curriculum” was the result.

Four criminal justice program interest group respondents discussed the curricular changes as moving from practical to more theoretical. This was tied to the type of work required of students, with respondents mentioning different student assessment, the introduction of a thesis requirement (at the graduate level), and the move from “training to growth.”

Workload and practice changes included the elimination of all academy and nontraditional credits, an assessment of accelerated semesters, as well as the closing and consolidation of off-campus programs. Perception was mentioned directly as curricula were viewed as more “rigid and structured.”

Because the issue of satellite campus offerings was at the center of public criticism and quality concerns, it is not surprising that their closings had a great impact on both institutions and public perception. One faculty respondent stated, “It was like an octopus that just had all of its tentacles cut off . . . because of the Quinn Bill. Getting rid of those was the result of them coming under scrutiny from the Board of Higher Education. And then, of course, you know, obviously when you bring all that back . . . everything improves.”
Resources

The labeling of resources as an area of change under oversight was cited separately by 10 out of the 14 criminal justice program interest group respondents. All 10 stated that access to resources for criminal justice programs improved. The manner of securing and maintaining program resources was also cited as a change. In the words of one respondent, “Resources are protected by the Quinn Bill.”

Overall, budgets, faculty, and campus space were noted to have increased. Budgets were reported to include resources for faculty development and memberships. Nine criminal justice program interest group respondents reported that criminal justice faculty hiring lines are tied to the standards. Seeing this as using “the Quinn Bill when it’s convenient,” another administrative respondent added that “this year, despite that fact that most other departments couldn’t have new faculty, criminal justice was approved for three lines . . . that just demonstrates the commitment.”

Library resources and holdings were cited by four respondents as having also increased. One criminal justice program interest group respondent laughed, “We’ve always negotiated from a position of strength. You know, ‘We’re going to do this.’ You can’t tell the 800-pound gorillas they can’t do it.” Student-faculty ratios were seen as a direct result of increased resources, with one respondent stating, “One of the really good features [of the standards] was the limit the number of advisees each faculty member could have.”

Program administration was another resource mentioned by four criminal justice program respondents as promoting change, or, in some cases, insulating them from questionable practices: “Because I’m an academic and most people who have sat in that
[administrative] position are academics, the focus has been on academic integrity while ensuring that you are figuring out ways to grow profitable programs.”

Improved resources were viewed positively as criminal justice programs across the state found partnerships and common ground. Three participants reported that “now we’re all working together” and they “supported the Quinn initiative because it brought better quality education to our students and that what it’s all about.” Given that this was an early objective of the Criminal Justice Review Committee as oversight began, those who mentioned open lines of communication saw it as a positive outcome.

Two faculty respondents went beyond state lines and cited experiences across the country where their programs have been viewed and commented on by “heavy hitters” in the field of criminal justice. Of this resource they claim, “Well, that didn’t happen by accident, that happened by banging into people all over this country.”

Assessment resources were mentioned by one criminal justice program respondent, who stated that “when they came in to do that first Quinn Bill evaluation, the only pieces that we ever worried about had to do with assessment . . . the standards forced the hand of our school’s administration. Since NEASC hadn’t really required . . . assessment, schools hadn’t done it.”

All 14 criminal justice program interest group respondents reported that they are in a better position post-Quinn Bill oversight to lobby for resources that may have been previously denied them.

Respondents from the Quinn Bill interest group were also asked about change in criminal justice education as a result of the guidelines and MDHE oversight. Change in teaching faculty was mentioned by all law enforcement, standards, and two public
interest group respondents. “Higher quality” and “more academics” are two examples of
the responses given. Curriculum was mentioned by half of all groups as another area of
change. All respondents from the standards and public interest groups mentioned changes
in enrollment numbers, specifically that enrollments in Quinn Bill programs had
decreased. These responses are similar to those reported by the criminal justice program
respondents. Faculty, curriculum, and enrollment are visible areas and those among the
most targeted in the questionable quality discussion. That these groups did not mention
resources may be due to the availability of resources as an area known only to those with
direct experience in criminal justice program delivery. Quality perception is another area
that may have more directly affected criminal justice program participants, thus its
inclusion in their responses.

Additional responses to change from the standards interest group were mixed.
One respondent stated that “if you use the term criminal justice education writ large,
there were only about 40 programs that ended up being approved under the Quinn Bill.
There are still many criminal justice programs that are not Quinn Bill approved. For those
approved, they’ve had to meet certain standards.” Another added, “The standards were
put in place to ensure, to facilitate, to promote the delivery of quality education, and to
eliminate some of those practices that existed . . . programs that are Quinn Bill approved
had to demonstrate they met certain standards.” One noted, “We can objectively say that
faculty credentials and faculty ratios improved. We can say for these Quinn Bill-
approved programs that there’s been an elimination of these satellite sites and
programs—we’ve put into place guidelines . . . programs had to demonstrate that they
met those guidelines and that they continue to meet the guidelines.” A side comment was
mentioned by two standards interest group respondents that this assumes that “all the information we’re getting from the institutions is accurate.”

When asked if change could be attributed to quality standards, criminal justice program interest group respondents replied that “things were moving in that direction, they just sort of formalized the process.” and “I think that probably what they did do was they vetted the system so that those institutions out there that had no intention of ever meeting those standards were just . . . just push delete and they were gone. And those institutions that might have been content to stay on the margins had an incentive not to stay on the margins.” Another noted, “We’re now self-policing, not to make a pun here, we have become self-policing.”

One law enforcement respondent added to this discussion that “if Quinn goes away there would be no market for these throwaway degrees. . . . I think we’ve gotten to the point where we, the people inside the programs, are driving the policy outside of the programs. And we have a big enough voice now. ACJS over that last 15 years has grown immensely in its stature.”

Many of these change themes were again mentioned by the groups discussed next when asked about the functions and dysfunctions they saw as a result of the Quinn Bill.

**Challenges to Change**

Criminal justice interest group program respondents were asked what they saw or experienced as challenges to change during this time of oversight. The most commonly reported response surrounded issues related to maintaining enrollments.

Maintaining traditional Quinn Bill population enrollments post-oversight was not without conflict. When asked if the early changes and resulting attitudes as reported
impacted enrollments, the answer from 10 criminal justice program interest group respondents was no—they didn’t think it changed. However, six respondents, four from the private stratum and two from the public stratum, commented on the effect of change on their student populations in terms of friction between students and faculty, workload, and location: “Because there was still the incentive to go . . . they put up with anything. They just resisted as much as they could during the whole process—I remember guys just taking a nap in the back of my classroom.” and “The motive for most of them being there in the first place was not an education, not the idea of getting a college education, but only because the college education translated to higher pay.” Another added that “quality concern was not foremost in the eyes of the receivers.” Other respondents cited direct quotes from their students: “You’re making us jump through hoops to get our pay raise.”; “What we’re learning from these more improved academic programs is completely useless to us out in the field.”; and “What I need to know I already know about how to do my job.”

Lengthy stories were told during the interviews on this topic:

When we originally started we were mostly practitioners without terminal degrees. And then as we went along we were mostly terminal degrees . . . our student population got their backs up. . . . The police officers were sort of indignant. The idea was that “These PhDs have nothing to teach me . . . if anything I can instruct them on the realities of life.” It got very contentious at times.

“You had this battle of the academics trying to teach the police; trying to teach their own student population that there is a lot more to this higher education than getting you the money; that there is more to this whole process than you envision it to be, and them not wanting it to be any more.”
Respondents reported the challenge here, for example, “was not so much even to educate the students in terms of the disciplines . . . but to educate them as to why it was useful to them to know these things.” “It became not only a matter of improving the curriculum, but trying to teach the students why the curriculum was something they should be interested in, in order to do their jobs.” One further reflected,

I remember trying to explain the concept of team policing to an [agent]. He listened politely enough—when I got through he said, “There’s only one thing people have to understand. Well, two things: they have to understand this is the law and . . . it’s going to be obeyed.” And he dismissed anything else we had to say on the subject of how to improve the delivery of police services in that regard.

Another criminal justice program interest group respondent commented that “most of the Quinn Bill folks, they just want to get it done . . . they don’t care about it . . . they don’t see it as a growth type of thing.”

Not all criminal justice program interest group respondents found this friction in their programs and Quinn Bill students. Although these previous respondents told unflattering, even comical stories, about their experiences, two others had some good things to say about the officers in their programs: “They were motivated to learn, they did their work.” and “Bringing their experience to class enriched the course.”

One criminal justice program interest group respondent felt that large enrollments and quality concerns were compounded by attitudes such as those expressed earlier: “We clearly benefited from the Quinn Bill . . . but it was a mixed blessing because most of those guys were not there to learn, but to get a degree so they’d get a pay raise.” In addition, “It was a fight day and night, all the time. If it’s a four-hour class you have to stay for a four-hour class, you’ve got to write, all those things. And we lost some and we kept some.”
Another criminal justice program interest group respondent spoke of the challenge in maintaining enrollments through their experience in the recruiting processes for criminal justice programs in union halls: “I got up and I said, ‘Look, the first thing I want you to know if you come to [this institution] is you’re going to have to read, write, think critically, and do a thesis—half the room got up.”

**Why Does It Matter?**

When asked why Quinn Bill standards matter, responses from criminal justice program interest group participants reflected “resources and perception,” which is consistent with the responses to change. One stated, “The program has legitimacy. How does the program have legitimacy? Through the fact that Quinn puts a stamp on it and says you have the proper number of faculty . . . you have the proper number of courses . . . your core is substantial . . . legitimacy plays out in benefits.” One criminal justice program respondent linked this positive perception to resources: “There will always be [a] need for people those areas,” resulting in a steady stream of students.

Not all institutions that participated in the MDHE approval process served a student population seeking Quinn Bill benefits. Two institutions that did not serve this population were asked in this study about why they decided to involve their institutions in the process. The reply was consistent across the respondents: the perception of quality. Comments included, “When the [MDHE] came out with a list of programs that they had approved and [our school] was not on it, then students would not come . . . because they would think it was an inferior program.”; “Not because they had any real desire to improve the academic standards of the college—they were just afraid that it would be a black mark and that students would choose to go elsewhere.”; and “You’d lose that
population and undergraduate students who were not Quinn Bill covered would begin to get the idea that there is something really faulty about this program.”

Study respondents from the Quinn Bill interest group were also asked why it matters. Their responses matched earlier comments in that they answered in the areas of quality perception and access to quality programs. Six respondents from this group, two each from law enforcement, standards, and public interest groups, spoke of the negative view of law enforcement because of the Quinn Bill—that what happened to programs improved that perception.

In a related question, criminal justice program interest group respondents were asked if they thought programs conformed to standards without actually improving program quality in any substantive way. Seven responded no, that true improvement resulted. Two responded yes, that some programs conformed without improving. The five remaining respondents did not answer either way. Comments were grouped into four themes: issues with standards, the MDHE’s role, faculty attitudes, and perception.

Speaking generally about issues with standards, four respondents noted that “many standards are subject to interpretation.” One related this to reviewer bias, stating that the process of review was “more reviewer bias than actual assessment.” The MDHE’s role was also mentioned by four criminal justice program interest group respondents, including that “the BHE made it into something bigger than it actually was,” the MDHE “probably had the right idea but didn’t know what they were doing,” and the MDHE was a “bureaucracy—do they really have oversight?” Two criminal justice program respondents spoke of faculty attitudes and noted that “some professors don’t give a damn.” Two others spoke of perception, that there was no real concern for quality
but “anecdotal issues fueled by the press.” Another mentioned that while there were legitimate issues, it “went down the way it did because of politics.”

Four criminal justice program interest group respondents who participated in the first round of reviews saw it as a one-time deal, or, in the words of one respondent, a “temporary hoop”—having gone through a process of self-evaluation and subsequent approval may not mean sustained quality. One stated, “I realized after we got approved by the BHE for the first year, we weren’t going to get it five years down the road.” Another reflected, “I’m just banking on the fact that in five years from now, this won’t even be an issue—in other words, that the Quinn Bill and the BHE would just go away.” And another: “We shouldn’t have got it that year because we just didn’t meet the criteria. . . we were lucky to get this the first time . . . five years down the road this won’t happen again.” For one criminal justice program interest group respondent, the concern was faculty credentials. After having advised their department that they risked losing approval status unless properly credentialed faculty were hired “they told me, ‘Don’t even think about it because we’re not doing it,’ that was the attitude there.”

Responding institutions that had initially applied for approval from the commonwealth and subsequently rescinded that request did so under recommendation from the MDHE or reviewers that they were not going to be approved. Three criminal justice program interest group respondents whose programs fell into this category were asked about this situation. All three responded that pulling back from the process was viewed as preferable to being denied. Two mentioned the importance of reputation, with one respondent noting, “We couldn’t risk the bad press that would have caused.” Another
commented, “We know we have a quality program and that our review was on the side of unfair . . . reapplying made sense over denial.”

Functions and Dysfunctions of the Quinn Bill

All study respondents were asked their views on what they saw as the functions and dysfunctions of the legislation. These responses are summarized in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11

Sample Responses Regarding the Functions and Dysfunctions of the Quinn Bill, All Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Dysfunctions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Educated Police</td>
<td>Standards Limited Program Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Benefit Profession</td>
<td>• Constrained Curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Benefit Community</td>
<td>• Faculty Limitations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lower Use of Force</td>
<td>Limiting Degree to Criminal Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Criminal Justice Education</td>
<td>Limited Process of Follow Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Indirect Function</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Review Process</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Perception and Confidence</td>
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Under functions, all but two respondents across all groups and strata spoke about the benefits to police and the community that higher education brings. All further noted that without an incentive this may not have happened. One criminal justice program interest group respondent stated that with other professions such as medicine and law, you go to school and get licensed and that with “criminal justice, they’re trying to take some of those good things and apply them here.” Another criminal justice program interest group respondent mentioned that the challenge in this was to educate police officers as to “why they needed the education, why it was a value.” Two respondents from the law enforcement interest group responded with examples that an educated officer means lower incidents of unnecessary use of force.
Another response given by 15 respondents, again across all groups, spoke to the review process under the Quinn Bill: the perception of and confidence in criminal justice programs were a function that “police education now means quality.”

Dysfunctions included the standards, process, degree limitations, and politics. Under the standards, curriculum and faculty requirements were common responses given by the criminal justice interest group program respondents. The curriculum and faculty requirements under the Quinn Bill standards were cited as a dysfunction with the assumption that “the cookie cutter is going to fit every situation. The curriculum is constrained . . . that has been a disservice to the field.” While citing Clear (2001) as advocating for common expectations in undergraduate preparation, one criminal justice program interest group respondent did not see that as “requiring all programs to offer the same. . . . I felt they made a mistake in coming up with the standards the way that they did, because they essentially came up with a boilerplate for core courses. And while those historically have represented the kind of care, its innovation in CJ that is interesting . . . if you look at the grid, it’s a 20-year-old model.” Another simply stated that the standards have “squashed the evolving nature of the field . . . faculty qualifications don’t reflect the nature of the discipline.”

Related to curriculum, a process issue raised here had to do with the complete elimination of nontraditional credit from the criminal justice curriculum. While recognizing that academy and other forms of training alone should not be given academic credit, two criminal justice program interest group respondents noted that there are legitimate ways of both evaluating and awarding credit in a nontraditional manner. One stated, “We did some life experience evaluations . . . that involved a committee; students
had to write long portfolios . . . they’re general electives, they don’t go toward the major, but they recognize the value of the practitioner.” This criticized practice throughout the MDHE review process was singled out as “just giving away credits . . . and it wasn’t true . . . but that was a weak point and we got rid of it for CJ.” Another referred to early work by NEACJS on nontraditional education and added that at the time some competency-based degrees were “harder” to get through. One additional comment spoke to the approval process under the program’s administration as “a dysfunction in that . . . they only certify them once per year.”

One criminal justice program interest group respondent was concerned with the process of follow-up from the MDHE after the initial 2003 review. Stating that while annual reports were submitted along with self-studies in 2009 and resubmitted in 2011, “I’m not really sure they really care anymore about what they are doing with it. . . . I don’t even know if they review it . . . you don’t get feedback, and if you don’t get feedback then there is not a lot of point to that.” Another criminal justice program interest group respondent tied this directly to decreasing funding and participation in the Quinn Bill.

More than half of the study respondents across all groups mentioned limiting the degree to criminal justice under the Quinn Bill as a dysfunction. For example, “That it’s only focused on criminal justice . . . it’s a disadvantage to police officers who want to be educated.” and “If other programs fit the job better, why stick with CJ?” Seven different criminal justice program interest group respondents and all law enforcement interest group respondents mentioned the masters in public administration as a preferred program for “any police officer who wants to move up in ranks.” Five criminal justice program
interest group respondents observed their graduates returning to public administration programs after having earned a graduate degree in criminal justice. One law enforcement interest group respondent spoke to the narrow definition of allowable degrees under the Quinn Bill, noting that “placing limits on the type of degree showed the shortsightedness of an evolving field.” One law enforcement respondent made a distinction between the incentive and the education, stating that “the Quinn Bill gets us the money but the degree gets us the promotion.”

Politics was the final dysfunction mentioned by 10 respondents, four from the criminal justice group and two from each group within the Quinn Bill interest groups. Comments included, “bob and weave politics were involved” and “politics was the theme.” One referred back to an earlier statement that the while there were legitimate issues, it “went down the way it did because of politics.”

Although the responses to the challenges, functions, and dysfunctions of the Quinn Bill varied across groups, some general themes emerged. One was that criminal justice programs under the Quinn Bill have in some ways limited program autonomy in the delivery of criminal justice education—in its title and curriculum. The other and most consensual response was that the change process and the implementation of standards under the Quinn Bill have improved the quality of criminal justice programs in Massachusetts and the perception of that quality.

An Interview with Attorney Robert Quinn

Due to his unique role in the Quinn Bill, an interview with Attorney Robert Quinn was conducted. In a brief phone interview, Attorney Quinn was asked questions
surrounding the legislative history and his perspective on what has happened with the Quinn Bill.

When asked about the history of the legislation and his role, Attorney Quinn spoke eloquently of a process that began with a discussion of concerns in the late 1960s about “police not being sufficiently educated with the expertise” required to address the needs of their profession. He recalled a pilot plan modeled after LEAA that sought to use education to improve officers. He stated that “people saw merit to education for police officers.”

Attorney Quinn noted that he was “encouraged by the chief of [the] police association to lend his name to the legislation.” He recalls being a bit “squeamish about it” as he was not too familiar with all the issues. He further stated that then-Speaker of the House David Bartley encouraged him, saying that “anything with his name on it would not get lost.” He recalled that “towns complained because they did not want to increase budgets” and that gave police associations another argument moving forward. He also stated that to address this he endorsed “self-rule” within the legislation that allowed towns and municipalities to decide for themselves whether the legislation fit their needs. The state legislature “made sure that legislation went through” in 1970.

When asked about what he thought of the changes to the bill over the years, Attorney Quinn responded that the 1976 amendment that removed the liberal arts component so that only degrees in law enforcement or criminal justice would qualify for pay incentives was unfortunate. When speaking of limited access and the defunding of the Quinn Bill, he felt “saddened by the betrayal of the commitment the legislature made
to cities and towns when they agreed to fund it in the first place,” stating that what has happened was “disappointing.”

When asked what he thought about the role of criminal justice programs in regard to the Quinn Bill, Attorney Quinn responded that if some reports were accurate, schools “should have known better.” He also stated that the schools, with the legislation, attracted a lot more people to become police, and that “50 years later, this has indeed improved our police.”

Attorney Quinn’s final comments spoke to the benefit of the Quinn Bill over the years to encourage “more talent” to become police officers and that to do away with it would discourage others from the same. He concluded that Massachusetts is a “better community” for having experienced the Quinn Bill.

**Looking Ahead**

At the conclusion of all interviews, study respondents were asked their thoughts on what has happened with the Quinn Bill and what they saw as future trends. In response to what has happened, most answers echoed previous responses, including references to programmatic change, changes in attitudes, and perceptions of criminal justice programs and law enforcement.

Continuing this discussion, law enforcement interest group respondents had much to say about two additional items: concerns with current legislation and who is to blame for it all. Concerns with the current legislation were mentioned by three law enforcement interest group participants, but their responses were varied. One saw the process as “pitting law enforcement against programs and faculty.” Two others discussed hiring issues in regard to “renegotiated Quinn Bill benefits at the union level that puts
departments against one another.” The example provided to reinforce these views is that one town may hire and send an officer through the academy, and then that officer might leave and go to a Quinn Bill town for more money. Another respondent referred to this as “leverage for hiring.”

Three law enforcement respondents commented that they blame the schools for the negativity associated with the Quinn Bill. One stated that the schools “should have been prepared for the numbers.” Another noted that law enforcement participants were portrayed unfairly and that “not all were in it for the money.”

Two criminal justice program interest group respondents discussed what might keep this from happening again. Both mentioned standards and oversight prior to growth. One stated that “when you put money on the table you can actually compel people to do things—you can actually utilize programs to motivate change as long as you are putting in place those standards at the same time.” One standards interest group respondent also discussed this issue, stating “the need for periodic review is paramount when dealing with public policy issues.”

Future trends of both the Quinn Bill and criminal justice programs were reported. Quinn Bill interest group respondents spoke predominately of the former, while criminal justice program interest group participants spoke of the latter. Responses are summarized in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12

Sample Responses Regarding Future Trends, All Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future Trends for Criminal Justice Education</th>
<th>Future Trends of the Quinn Bill</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrollments</td>
<td>Continued Problems with Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Popularity of Major</td>
<td>Change in Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Healthy Bottom Lines</td>
<td>• Minimum Standards for Hiring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Program Development</td>
<td>• Educational Stipends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Certification</td>
<td>Change in Administration</td>
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</table>

The Quinn Bill itself, under recent budget cuts, has again been altered to allow benefits to officers who were enrolled in a Quinn Bill-certified program by July 2009 or who were already receiving benefits at some level. All law enforcement interest group respondents commented on the current state of the Quinn Bill and what it might mean for the future. One predicted that “there’s still a pipeline of students who will be pursuing the Quinn Bill degree for quite some time.” Another stated, “The challenge is going to be whether or not the cities and towns are on the hook for the full costs of the program.” One cautioned that “eventually what’s going to happen is it’ll be probably contractually voted out in unions—gone because the kids coming in that don’t get it are going to want pay raises . . . eventually they’re going to have the vote.” Labor contracts, court cases, and bargaining agreements are all factors in the future of Quinn Bill benefits and its funding.

One law enforcement interest group respondent commented on the current state of the Quinn Bill, which now allows for disparity in practices and benefits across the state. Depending on the collective bargaining agreements of various municipalities, some officers have kept full Quinn Bill benefits; others have lost the 50% state portion, while
others no longer qualify: “There was no uniformity to it . . . We asked the state reps. We asked the governor and nobody could ever tell you a direct answer.” Another saw the current situation as impacting the commonwealth’s law enforcement labor market: “What you’re starting to see is local officers who get the Quinn Bill who would’ve gone and become troopers not leaving now.” Another referred to hiring practices, stating that “there was a price to pay . . . how many more officers could we afford without the Quinn Bill?” One criminal justice program interest group respondent saw the Quinn Bill as having a twofold direct impact on decreased opportunity for entry into the field of policing: “Current officers not moving” and veteran officers “stayed on rather than retiring” because they were “making beaucoup amounts of money because of the Quinn Bill.”

Responses regarding future trends of the Quinn Bill spoke to recommended changes in the legislation and administration of educational benefits. Two public interest group and three law enforcement respondents spoke in favor of eliminating the Quinn Bill for educational stipends.

Two criminal justice program, two law enforcement, one standards, and one public interest group respondents shared that raising minimum standards for hiring would eliminate the need for the Quinn Bill. Two discussed difficulties with union buy-in to that policy, stating that “unions will never go along with minimum educational standards—it hurts veterans and other special preference groups.” Referring to the growing push in Massachusetts for an entry-level hiring requirement of an associate’s degree for police officers, one respondent stated that “while well intended to increase the level of education of the workforce over 40 years ago, most new officers of today have had a postsecondary
experience. While many would obtain a second degree in CJ just for the incentive, their real talent may reside elsewhere—computer science, social work, etc.—but a restrictive program would discourage that pursuit.” Another predicted that “in five years, you’re going to need an associate’s degree to become a police officer in the commonwealth.”

One standards interest group respondent reflected that around the same time of the Quinn Bill, other states had begun to look at requiring a minimum academic degree for entry-level law enforcement and “our way of doing it ended up costing our state a fortune.”

One criminal justice program respondent added as a final interview reflection that “the idea is still a pretty sound idea to have a more highly educated, critical thinking pool. Any yet we are no closer to increasing the entrance requirements for police officers than we were in 1967.” A law enforcement interest group respondent also spoke to this issue by asking, “Are we a profession or not? And if we’re a profession, we should have to have a degree when we get it [the position].”

For future trends in criminal justice programs, the most frequent responses from criminal justice program interest group respondents were continued enrollments and bottom lines (13) and online programs (12). One respondent noted that “money continues to motivate even without the Quinn Bill because of the popularity of the criminal justice major,” thus producing healthy enrollments. Another stated that “if you go back to the turn of the 20th century where Vollmer says we should have a school of criminology . . . how long did it take? It took forever. But I think it’s here now and I think it’s here nationally.”

One criminal justice program interest group respondent drew parallels between LEEP funding and the Quinn Bill, observing that “large funding initiatives have the
potential to change the higher education process.” Another continued, “Its practical useful life has long since passed, but . . . like any other entitlement program, it just sort of kept that momentum going. I swore I’d never see the day where it would go away because of the various labor unions and things of that nature.” Given the national decrease in practitioner-based programs following the demise of LEEP, mainly at the community college or two-year program levels, it could be concluded that Massachusetts experienced the same. Enrollment data and participant responses support declining enrollments in professional student populations, and this difference could be attributed to programs and legislation changes related to the Massachusetts Quinn Bill.

Eight respondents further paralleled the growth of online programs to criminal justice program growth under the Quinn Bill: “I think the thing we are going to have to pay closer attention to is the online portion of it and the pressures that might be exerted to expand that programming.” In reference to online programs, another added, “How do you do it in a meaningful way?”

Four respondents spoke to a broadened perspective for criminal justice education as a result of what happened with the Quinn Bill—moving from a narrow law enforcement perspective to a larger criminal justice perspective. Three respondents also mentioned the future process—that the Quinn Bill demonstrated what could be accomplished with people working together and that “in developing public policy, [we] need to take into consideration all the moving parts.”

Six criminal justice program interest group respondents stated that they have already planted seeds with their institutions for ACJS certification. Citing financial constraints on programs as perhaps the only setback, the message of one criminal justice
faculty respondent was clear: “It’s a certification so we are going to move to do that, too.”

When asked the question, “Where do you think we are now relative to quality criminal justice education and the Quinn Bill?” study respondents mentioned the impact on teaching (6) and the assumption of the benefits of police education (9). For example, one criminal justice program interest group respondent stated, “In terms of education, from when I started it is light years different. Not only in terms of faculty, but the receptivity of the students to actually be educated in a liberal arts tradition. I can talk about Durkheim now and they are interested. They [the students] seem to have a much better understanding of the purposes of higher education.” Another stated that “you just turn a light on in their minds because they bring so much life experience in.” And another: “It’s the students’ idea about why you’re here in the first place that seems to have changed. That clearly they are still interested in any kind of monetary incentive that they can get, but you don’t have this antagonism between PhDs and students.” One law enforcement interest group respondent noted that “the vast majority of police officers who received their education over the years are better off. I think the police departments are better off.”

A related, common theme spoke to the staying power of quality and the broad appeal of criminal justice education to areas beyond law enforcement. When asked what might happen to their program if the Quinn Bill standards were to go away, criminal justice program interest group respondents spoke to the staying power of quality and the continued appeal of the major: “I think it would have zero impact . . . in terms of the quality, it’s been in place since [program inception]. I don’t really see anything changing
there at all.” Concerning the appeal of criminal justice education, one administrator observed, “This is a runaway train now. I don’t think that if Quinn goes away it changes anything. I don’t think the schools will go backward. I think we have broadened our perspective. We were police oriented . . . we are now broad spectrum criminal justice oriented.”

All study respondents agreed that criminal justice higher education has provided opportunities, breaking down barriers and stereotypes in the careers students seek:

“Quinn has a lot to do with [changes] because now we value your mind more than how tall you are, or how fast you can run.” One MDHE committee member noted that “maybe once you’ve made the changes and you . . . cleaned up the mess . . . [you] go forward.”

“It [the Quinn Bill] has been endorsed by the people. . . . I think it has proved its point,” stated Attorney Robert Quinn. Regardless of perspective, all study respondents agree that criminal justice programs in Massachusetts have been forever changed through the Quinn Bill experience. This chapter provided study responses and themes—insights into and tales on why and how criminal justice programs changed throughout the history of the Quinn Bill. Chapter 5 will discuss those themes and responses in a theoretical framework that seeks to shape the Quinn Bill case study.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

This study posed the following research questions:

- What was the effect of the Quinn Bill on criminal justice higher education policy in Massachusetts? What happened and why?
- Did criminal justice programs in the state of Massachusetts change under the Quinn Bill? If so, how and why?

In response to these research questions, the preceding chapter combined various resources to examine the history of and change surrounding the Quinn Bill and criminal justice education. Did criminal justice programs change? Yes. But, as the case study shows, not without the inherent conflict that often accompanies change. The effect of the Quinn Bill and the nature of that change is the story of criminal justice education in Massachusetts. Told through the Quinn Bill experience, it unfolds in a manner similar to a classic drama involving the dynamics typical of a three-act play:

1. First, the conflict arises: education for police.
2. Second, the conflict intensifies: quality concerns.
3. Third, it is eventually resolved: standards and change.

What is left is the current picture.

First, conflict was established when, in accordance with a 1967 recommendation by the President’s Commission of Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, criminal justice departments were created by colleges and universities and were, in many instances, viewed by more traditional disciplines as inferior intruders into the liberal arts domain. This problem was exacerbated in Massachusetts by passage of the Quinn Bill as a monetary inducement to entice police officers who might otherwise be uninterested in
education for its own sake onto campuses. Hostility toward the newly created or expanded criminal justice departments by colleagues from cognate disciplines and the use of public funds as a lure raised a key question: Is a legal instrument such as the Quinn Bill an appropriate public policy tool? The conflict involved the emergence of the Quinn Bill coupled with the evolving differences of opinion over whether the Quinn Bill is an appropriate public policy tool.

Second, the conflict eventually intensified and grew beyond campus borders as publicity about the cost of the program at both the state and local levels began to fan concern among the general public. Of course, taxpayers are also voters; hence, their question about the price of the program was echoed by the state’s elected officials. Once the issue of cost fixed itself in the public’s mind, the questions about program quality soon followed. What, taxpayers and their legislative representatives wanted to know, were they getting for their money? Critics emerged in the press and in the State House, further stimulating public concern and demands for some type of program oversight or for outright abolition of the legislation that created and sustained it. Conflict eventually resulted in pitched political battles between critics who wanted the program disbanded and the Quinn Bill beneficiaries who mounted a counter-campaign to save it. Finally, legislative changes and the MDHE quality standards came about as an attempt to resolve the conflict.

As indicated at the outset of this work, a general theme emerged and was supported by this research in the study of the evolution of the Quinn Bill and attempts to assess its effectiveness as a method for developing successful public policies. That theme can best be understood by assessing the degree to which the process in Massachusetts
conformed to the four roles that Stolz (2002) argues are fundamental to the formulation of criminal justice policy:

1. Symbolic politics
2. Political culture
3. Interest groups
4. Implementation

In this chapter, research results are discussed in terms of the four categories identified by Stolz as critical to understanding the development of criminal justice policy, and it will demonstrate the process, arguably a somewhat dramatic one, through which the crisis emerged, intensified, and was resolved.

**The Role of Symbolic Politics**

This study began with an understanding of the goals, intents, and consequences that underlie the Quinn Bill policy process, both manifest and latent. It assumed and supported the concept that its founders wished to professionalize law enforcement practitioners (i.e., make a better police officer) as well as provide resources to promote the delivery of higher education to this population—although they may not have actually distinguished between the two.

This phase of the study described how and under what circumstances the Quinn Bill was conceived and initiated. In other words, how and why the state legislature was moved to create the program and who were the principal characters involved in the original process. An important aspect of this was the examination of the roles of Massachusetts’ colleges and universities—those who would provide access—in the development of the Quinn Bill. The role of symbolic politics provided perspective
because the very uniqueness of this Massachusetts approach, combined with the absence of any proof at the time that a college-educated police force produced a tangible public benefit, made audience perception central to the establishment and implementation of the policy. As Stolz (2002) explains,

> From this perspective, political acts are viewed as symbols. It is assumed that these acts are directed toward an audience—usually the general public. Moreover, the substance of the act is less important than the audience’s perception of and/or reaction to the act. In general, political acts, as symbols, are said to serve to reassure or threaten the onlooker. Each political act reinforces the impression that the political system is to translate individual wants into public policy and, thus, symbolization instills a feeling of well-being. According to the literature, political acts also perform a more general educative function. That is, symbolic politics may serve to educate the public about an emerging policy issue. (p. 6)

Nationally, crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s had begun to escalate to historic proportions, creating a climate of fear such that polls indicated fear of crime was the primary concern of most Americans (Moore & Trajanowicz, 1988). In an attempt to both understand its causes and provide for its solution, President Lyndon Johnson appointed his 1967 Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Given the complex nature and broad scope of the social, economic, and political problems of which crime and disorder seemed to be symptomatic, the commission concluded that police officers would be better able to cope with crime and chaos if they developed a keener understanding of their causes. Based on that belief, the commission urged policymakers to “encourage” police officers to seek college educations (see Chapter 4, Legislative History).

College education and police performance had been associated decades before, perhaps most prominently by reformers August Vollmer and O.W. Wilson (Schmalleger & Worrall, 2010). Because police officers are public servants, it logically follows that the
government would play a role. But the commission’s recommendation was unsupported by any evidence that a college education for police officers would actually yield benefits. This study supports the assumption that an educated police officer is “better,” as reported by all the interest groups introduced in this work (see Chapter 4, Enrollments).

Some studies have now concluded that higher education does produce many valuable benefits for police, but it was not until years later that academic studies would address this issue (Carter et al., 1988). ² In that sense, the goal of promoting the idea of higher education for police as one element in a strategy that would meet the “challenge of crime in a free society” was a function of symbolic politics. Further, perhaps the goal of this education was symbolic in the sense that education is its own reward, and, therefore, yields unexpected benefits as a kind of unintended yet valuable consequence (Finckenauer & Gavin, 1999, p. 215). If the goal was to provide education and improve police performance—something that higher education had yet to demonstrate it could achieve—then this goal may have intentionally been blurred in order to pass the Quinn Bill.

But even in the commission’s recommendation there seemed to be a hint of concern that academic quality and narrow educational focus may be an issue. In its final publication, the commission urged the development of “programs to encourage college education for police in liberal arts and sciences” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 108) and “curriculum development to guide police-science programs away from narrow vocational concentration”

²A meta-analysis of earlier studies linked higher education to desirable law enforcement characteristics such as increased motivation, ability to utilize innovative techniques, less authoritarian, display of clearer thinking, and having a better understanding of the world (Hayeslip, 1989).
(President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 285). A criticism of, and a warning against, low-quality programs is implicit. Also implicit is the recognition of a distinction between professional training, which police officers already receive through their academies, and education (see Chapter 4, Motive).

The relevance of symbolic politics to the Quinn Bill story was also emphasized earlier: “An article appearing shortly after the Quinn Bill passed was headlined “State selectmen label Quinn bill ‘politics’” (Pearson, 1973, p. 16). When Massachusetts public officials undertook the task of formulating and promoting the Quinn Bill, they were scarcely any better able to offer indisputable proof to assure a public consumed by the fear of crime that college-educated officers were better equipped to allay the causes of their concerns. To address the public concern over rising crime rates and social disorder, policymakers intervened through the creation of the incentives. Policymakers had to rely, for the most part, on the use of symbolic politics which, in Stolz’s (2002) words, “serve to reassure . . . the audience” (pp. 14–15).

Research data in this study support the idea of the significance of symbolic politics in the formation of public policy and demonstrate the role it played in creating a climate favorable to passage of the Quinn Bill. As early as 1967, the Massachusetts Committee on Law Enforcement mounted an argument in favor of a more educated police force, despite the lack of research available to support that position. In 1968, both

3See Chapter 4, Legislative History: Following a report of the late 1960s that described Massachusetts police officers as some of the least educated in the country, state officials began a process of inquiry to address both this and the rising crime rates within the commonwealth. Committees and administrations undertook the study aimed at producing a proposal for action, declaring Massachusetts police officers lacking in education when compared to the national scene (Massachusetts Committee on Law Enforcement, 1967).
the Governor’s Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice submitted studies “which outlined the need for strengthened police education programs and for the funds to help support them, including student financial aid” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 1969, p. 13).

It is important to note the phrase “which outlined the need.” As stated earlier, no scholarly studies were published about the effectiveness of higher education on improving the professional abilities of police officers until the early 1970s (Carter et al., 1988). And yet Massachusetts had already begun programs that assumed a college-educated police force would be a public good. In the absence of any proof of their effectiveness, Massachusetts public officials could only rely at the outset on symbolic politics to instill “a feeling of well-being” (Stolz, 2002, p. 6) and thus begin the process of marshaling taxpayer and voter support for that assumption.

And that strategy was working. Higher education programs for police officers were already in existence in Massachusetts. Consistent with data collected in this study, regional community colleges had begun to offer police science courses under tuition waivers provided under Chapter 811 of the acts of 1967 (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 1969). At that time, 852 students, mostly police officers, were enrolled in nine state institutions, with 51 sections of police science courses offered. Appropriations were given to the schools to help defray the tuition waivers. Federal funds were also available through LEEP. In addition, bills were being introduced in Massachusetts “to provide education for police officers at locations in various parts of the state, and to provide courses directly under the auspices of this Board [MDHE]” (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 1969, p. 15).
The programs already in place in Massachusetts in the late 1960s mirrored those being offered at the national level. Given that the span of years of service of professional respondents included in this study was between 20 and 58, with all four law enforcement interest group respondents having more than 20 years of professional experience, the idea of educational incentives for pursuing degrees in higher education was not new.

According to one law enforcement interest group respondent, “I came on with a group that had a lot of benefits from the Vietnam era. We had officers that took advantage of the previous educational stipends . . . it wasn’t foreign to us that there were other options out there.”

The Quinn Bill was characterized by its founders as answering a national concern, that police officers were not being “sufficiently educated.” Even after its passage, the purpose of the Quinn Bill was in need of clarification so that defenders could make a case in its support. The final version of the Quinn Bill provided for a career incentive “as a reward for furthering their education in the field of policework” (Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L), which provoked immediate requests by the chancellor of the Board of Higher Education (MDHE) and the State Commissioner of Administration for proper interpretation and intent of the act.

Among the various clarification requests of Attorney General Quinn was his definition of police work. In his 1971 Report of the Attorney General, Quinn responded,

It is my opinion that the General Court intended some flexibility in determining what constitutes “education in the field of police work.” In this regard, I note that the Advisory Committee on Police Education of the Board of Higher Education takes the position that higher education per se is of primary importance in improving law enforcement and that specific courses or programs are of secondary importance.

I would not restrict the phrase . . . solely to degree programs in criminal justice and law enforcement. (pp. 121–122)
Consistent with federal recommendations for liberal arts education programs for police, Quinn (1971) states, “It is my further opinion that courses of study in sociology, psychology, English, mathematics, chemistry, other liberal arts subjects, and business administration contribute to the improvement of police efforts and the effectiveness of police departments and thus cannot be said as a matter of law . . . to be outside the field of police work” (p. 122).

But his was an “opinion” unsupported at the time by any academic proof, and in the final analysis, despite such a broad interpretation by the legislation’s author himself, the scope of programs deemed suitable under the Quinn Bill were defined more narrowly, suggesting that symbolic politics rather than any empirical certainty was the guiding light in the process.

In the same vein, a second request sought clarification of implementation around police participation in the program relative to when their “points” toward degrees had been accumulated. This request was answered by referring to the intent of the Quinn Bill “to upgrade police forces and personnel” (Quinn, 1971, p. 122). Citing “education as the primary means of such upgrading,” Quinn went on to address a series of implementation questions using a liberal standard of interpretation that provided access to police free of procedural roadblocks (p. 122). In other words, at this early stage of producing a policy and its supporting legislation that would result in immense taxpayer expense, even the principle advocate of the idea was unable to offer a definitive political argument for its value. He had to fall back symbolically on his “opinion” and a “liberal standard of interpretation.”
A review of early versions of the bill and notes revealed a few debatable issues indicating at the outset conflict of opinion over the reach of any potential public policy initiative. One issue involved several opinions as to which law enforcement groups the bill should apply, specifically involving the Massachusetts State Police, the Capitol Police, and the Metropolitan District Commission Police (see Chapter 4, Legislative History). Earlier versions also sought to include firefighters and inspectors in the division of motor boats using a broader public safety approach.¹ Each potential beneficiary tried to portray itself as an agency whose mission was symbolic of the legislation’s goals. The final version was inclusive of all police officers at the state level and those whose municipalities chose to accept Chapter 41, Section 108L, of the Massachusetts General Laws.

Earlier versions also included an emergency preamble that emphasized the need to recruit and retain well-qualified police, again in a sense leaving to the imagination what the phrase “well qualified” symbolized. This preamble, while removed from the final version, would later be cited as a reason for a liberal interpretation of the Quinn Bill process.

Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, the judiciary was a main venue for decoding the symbolic meaning of the legislation (e.g., John B. Palmer vs. Board of Selectmen of Marblehead & others, 1975). Advocates and opponents of most issues regarding the Quinn Bill sought judicial interpretations that surfaced through legal proceedings. These included whether municipalities could repeal the Quinn Bill once adopted. In one case, the court ruled that “a decision to support a collective bargaining

¹See, for example, 1970 House Documents Nos. 328, 332, 909, 1645, 5851, 5882; 1970 Senate Document No. 1599.
agreement is a discretionary matter. The exercise of independent judgment concerning such matters serves an important public purpose. We conclude that elected successor public officials cannot be required to indorse publicly the terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their predecessors” (Labor Relations Commission v. Board of Selectmen of Dracut & another, 1978). This issue surfaced again in later years as the Quinn Bill was defunded and collective bargaining agreements were challenged by municipalities during times of financial hardships.

The original intent of the legislation was explicit in its stated goals and served as the basis for interpretations of the law by Quinn himself during his tenure as the commonwealth’s attorney general. And yet the intent of the Quinn Bill was reflected on by various respondents throughout this study who did not seem to understand its purpose with complete clarity. One criminal justice program interest group respondent stated, “I think Bob Quinn realized that an educated police officer, like an educated doctor or an educated lawyer, was what was needed. I think what happened was like any piece of legislation . . . it starts out with a goal and then all these things get cobbled into it.”

The Role of Political Culture: Conflict

This study supports the conclusion that the public policy story of the Quinn Bill evolved as it did in large measure due to the changing political culture in Massachusetts. Over the course of 40 years, support for taxpayer-funded incentives to promote police higher education and concerns about the academic quality of the programs being offered changed dramatically. As Stolz (2002) points out, “The public’s perceptions of what is expected of government are affected by the political culture” (p. 9). Moreover, she adds, “Since the criminal justice system and its constituent components are part of the political
system, we may assume that political culture affects the structures of the criminal justice system and the public’s perceptions of what is expected of that system and its components” (p. 9). Consequently, she notes, “Employing this approach to study criminal justice policy contributes to our understanding of bureaucratic policy making and public perceptions of criminal justice policy” (p. 9).

When passed by the Massachusetts legislature, the focus of public attention on the Quinn Bill was on the assumed intent and value of a more highly educated police force. But the state’s political and economic culture began to change, growing more politically conservative in economically difficult times. The programs’ escalating budgets caused cost-benefit concerns to become paramount.\(^5\) The costs were clear, but the benefits were not.\(^6\)

Soon, the public, often prodded by the media, began to question the value of the educational degrees that police were earning in order to qualify for the significant salary increases provided by law as incentives. By the beginning of the 21st century, in fact, concern for academic program quality in criminal justice became the main focus of the Quinn Bill debate, yet the political culture was such that neither Democrat nor Republican could confront the issue squarely, nor could the Legislative and Executive branches of government, influenced by the political power of law enforcement unions, find an easy road to common ground. Conflict between legislators and the governor in

\(^5\)In 2002, the year of legislative mandates regarding the oversight of Quinn Bill programs, it was estimated that the price tag of the Quinn Bill to the commonwealth was approximately $101 million (Boston Municipal Research Bureau, 2003).

\(^6\)Consider, for example, the data collected pertaining to the driving force of “financial opportunities” for the institutions rather than the public good (see Chapter 4, Enrollments).
2003 provides one of the many examples of the significant role played by the changing political culture. At the time, some 12,000 police officers in 250 Massachusetts communities were receiving Quinn Bill benefits. The legislature proposed a change to the law that would have established stipends, specific dollar amount increases in academically qualified officer’s salaries (between $6,000 and $8,500 annually) and eliminated the more lucrative percentage-based incentives provided in the Quinn Bill. The tentativeness of legislators was made obvious by the fact that they appended the idea to the annual state budget so that member representatives and senators wouldn’t have to vote directly on a measure that would offend the powerful police interest groups.

The political climate was further affected at that time by the introduction of another public safety educational incentive, an education bill for firefighters modeled after the Quinn Bill. “Firefighters wanted in on a similar benefit, raising the notion of cost for their proposal and relooking at the police incentive program,” said one interest group participant. Critics were quick to respond, “I’m not sure what it has to do with firefighting . . . firefighters do their job because they have a certain amount of brawn and courage, things they probably don’t need an education for,” said the then-executive director of Citizens for Limited Taxation (Sutner, 2001, p. A10).

A 2003 story in the Boston Globe describes the problem in a way that demonstrates the significance and the interrelationship of symbolic politics, interest groups, and political culture and foreshadows the problems of implementation.

Efforts to rein in spending in a $110 million bonus program for police officers have all but collapsed after Governor Mitt Romney refused to sign off on the Legislature’s changes. State legislators approved changes earlier this year to the so-called Quinn Bill, which awards bonuses to police officers who continue their education. It was the first significant attempt to control costs in the program’s 30-year history.
But Romney, who was endorsed by two top police unions during his election campaign last year, returned the reforms to the Legislature with a few suggested alternatives. The Governor’s objections would have forced lawmakers to readdress the politically treasured program under intense pressure from police unions, and one top legislator doubts that will happen.

“This thing was right at the goal line,” said state Senate President Robert I Travaglini. . . . “The minor changes that he made had a major effect. It killed the bill.”

By not signing the Legislature’s changes, Romney’s inaction required the full House and Senate to vote specifically to place limits on pay available under the Quinn Bill. The state budget includes various policy changes, and lawmakers vote on the entire spending bill without taking a specific stand on individual issues in the package.

A vote on the Quinn Bill’s changes appears unlikely, and even less likely to succeed due to vigorous lobbying by police unions, said Michael J. Widmer, president of the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, a nonpartisan, business-backed group that supports limits to the extra pay. Many House and Senate members would rather avoid being publicly recorded in opposition to a key union priority, he said.

“There’s an obvious connection between [the unions’] power and action on this issue,” Widmer said. “It was tough to get agreement out of the Legislature to reform the incentives in any way, and the governor’s [objection] has made it much more difficult. This was a major opportunity to achieve an important reform which now may be lost.”

Fehrnstrom [a national republican consultant] said the governor saw no sense in rushing an imperfect bill into law when minor changes can get the reform right.

But Travaglini said Romney could have signed off on the changes if he truly supported them, and then suggest amendments that could have been quickly adopted by the Legislature.

Some Democrats suspect Romney was seeking to avoid alienating police unions, which are fiercely protective of existing Quinn Bill benefits. In his campaign for governor last year, Romney was endorsed by the State Police Association of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association. When Romney introduced his budget in February, he included full funding for the Quinn Bill, saying he believed the state was getting its “money’s worth” from the program.

“He’s a reformer only when it suits his political purposes,” said Philip W. Johnston, chairman of the state Democratic Party.

Backer of Quinn Bill changes say they’ll continue to fight to change the system and control costs. And they’re celebrating a victory; for the first time, the state’s Board of Higher Education is checking up on degree-granting programs for officers to make sure they engage in class work that is relevant to their jobs.

In April, the Boston Municipal Research Bureau urged the Legislature to revamp the program. It found that Boston police officers were clustering at a handful of local colleges that conducted programs that are close to police stations
but far from campus libraries and other resources, and include courses often taught by adjunct faculty sympathetic to officers and willing to cut them a break in class work. (Klein, 2003, p. A1)

It was at this stage of the changing political culture that long-simmering conflicts grounded in symbolic politics and interest group pressures intensified to the point that some sort of resolution could no longer be postponed or avoided. Still, the first attempt at resolving those conflicts might be viewed as another effort by the political culture to avoid giving direct offense to interest groups. Massachusetts lawmakers were caught between voter pressure to reform the system and union pressure to leave the Quinn Bill in place. Hence, the first step involved elected policymakers in both the Legislative and Executive branches bowing obliquely to public pressure and passing the heat off to an agency in the public policy bureaucracy, the state’s Department of Higher Education (MDHE).

These responses regarding the timing of MDHE involvement with oversight of criminal justice program offerings under the Quinn Bill are consistent with prior statements of the MDHE, where “program approval is not the responsibility of the Director of the Police Career Incentive Pay Program. Rather, accredited colleges and universities with criminal justice programs were previously determined to be approved by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges or the Board of Higher Education” (Pease, 1999). In 2002, the MDHE stated that the role had been changed by the legislature. Prior to June of that year, all programs approved under the regional accrediting body, the New England Association of Schools and Colleges were eligible, with the exception of newly created programs outside their original charter, which required MDHE approval. After that date, the MDHE’s authority included developing
and implementing quality guidelines for participating programs and ensuring that only officers graduating from these programs would be certified under the Quinn Bill. They also noted that the Legislature did not provide the resources needed by the board to do this (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2003). This view is consistent with the mechanism used to mandate change. Attaching changes to the Quinn Bill through the budget bill did not force any political dispute.

Under the cross section of public perception, pressure, and politics, one criminal justice program interest group respondent said, “The Board of Higher Education realized . . . the politics had changed, such a human cry over how many cops were getting Quinn Bill money.” And another, “What they didn’t understand was that when they took on Quinn as that little tiny focus they took on the broader spectrum of criminal justice education.” The general theme was that because of Quinn and the police, the entire spectrum of professionals in criminal justice would benefit.

MDHE documents show that during one independent criminal justice master’s program approval, shortly before the 2003 legislative oversight was questioned and “changed,” the process included “a review team that evaluated the program and recommended approval.” As reported earlier, criminal justice faculty interest group respondents spoke of review, and one stated that they included reviewers from academic programs in criminal justice outside the commonwealth who could “appreciate” the “reflective practice model” of the curriculum and advise the board accordingly. This process was consistent with the board view that their oversight was limited to state schools and new program approval.
This early development period was not without conflict (see Chapter 4, Early Issues with the Quinn Bill: Criminal Justice Programs). Not only did law enforcement interest groups have to contend with a lack of popular support and active opposition from municipal officials concerned about costs, but they met opposition even on the campuses. A few conflicts of that sort happened early on and mainly centered on concerns about the placement of criminal justice within the academic institution, faculty qualifications, and the nature of the curriculum to be offered and how it would be delivered. Proponents of criminal justice higher education then had to make tenable two arguments: (1) that higher education for police officers was a public good and (2) that criminal justice constituted an academic discipline worthy of a place in the academy alongside the traditional social and behavioral sciences.

That phenomenon only stoked campus antipathy to the newly emerging criminal justice departments. Not only were they seen as unworthy, but soon they were viewed as actually detrimental to the liberal arts tradition because they were siphoning off students from departments considered to be more legitimate (see Chapter 4, Academic Fit and Program Quality). The conflict over the academic “fit” of criminal justice education was a common theme reported among criminal justice program interest group respondents. One captured the general sense of this theme:

We weren’t seen as academics, you know? We were seen as a sort of police training program. “Here come the cops” was the way [they] thought of our program. . . . This issue was compounded by the specific nature of the Quinn Bill, only certifying degrees in criminal justice [to the exclusion of more traditional departments and disciplines]. As the program grew they wanted to split off from the sociology department . . . that’s probably where the influence of the Quinn Bill was really felt.
Responses about the academic fit of criminal justice demonstrated some antipathy toward criminal justice programs and the students enrolled in them, and had the effect, in some cases, of causing law enforcement officers to symbolically defy their academic critics. For example, in a follow-up question asking if the student population reflected that level of conflict, a criminal justice interest group participant recalled graduation ceremonies in which police officers requested and were granted permission to receive their degrees not in cap and gown but in their police uniforms. “So they would parade across the platform, get their degree in their jodhpurs, and this, the idea that that communicated from them to the academic community was, ‘We’re more proud of our police uniform than we are of your academic regalia—ours is superior to yours.’”

The availability of qualified faculty was a common theme and related to academic fit. Respondents noted the lack of criminal justice PhD programs in the commonwealth until very recently. This reflected the national scene, with studies reporting fewer than 100 new graduates per year meeting the nationwide demand (Applegate, Cable, & Sitren, 2009; Frost & Clear, 2007). Other criminal justice program interest group respondents voiced additional concerns about producing a faculty and thus a curriculum that was too narrow in its focus. Such comments spoke of the desirability of a multidisciplinary approach to criminal justice that is then reflected in teaching and tied to the needs of the field. One criminal justice program interest group respondent’s characterization of this issue was that it “really represents the fact that trying to figure out crime and criminal behavior and all of the sort of theoretical sides are just pulling from all kinds of different fields.”
The discussion of fit and legitimacy was made more complex still by the fact that, in some cases, programs were offered away from main campuses. This concern was a theme among some respondents. The push for consistency across locations was observed to have met with resistance not just from criminal justice faculty who “wanted to do things their way,” but from faculty in other disciplines who lamented having to travel away from campus to teach.

Location was observed in the study to have boosted enrollments, but it compounded the faculty credentialing and resulting curricular issues: “These programs were still being taught by police officers and probation officers and correctional officers [. . .] and students] were more comfortable with that.” One law enforcement interest group respondent commented, “We got the same benefit without going through all of this nonsense that they want us to go through.” Location was also tied to external pressure for change. As one criminal justice program interest group respondent stated, “It was the satellite campuses I think that people were really starting to take pot shots at because they saw them as being kind of overt attempts to capitalize on a potential market without worrying too much about quality [. . .] and I think that’s what really starting ticking people off” (see Chapter 4, Curriculum and Delivery).

Generally, criminal justice program interest group respondents supported the idea of the Quinn Bill but held various concerns about the quality of criminal justice program delivery. Faculty credentials and program curriculum and delivery were among the most commonly reported concerns (see Chapter 4, Faculty Impacts).

Overall, the integrity of criminal justice programs was questioned under the Quinn Bill. “You can’t give degrees that aren’t valid degrees” was a direct comment by
one public interest group respondent. Additional comments of “bad practices,” “abuse of 10% letters,” “graduation of students with less than the required number of courses,” “attitudes dismissive of academic standards,” and general “lack of oversight” contribute to this. One criminal justice program interest group respondent reflected on the words of another colleague, prior to the development of standards at the state level, regarding the impact that questionable practices at one institution was having at their own: “I remember him saying, ‘We like the Quinn Bill the way it is because we have standards and the Quinn Bill actually kept the quality of our students quite strong because the people who wanted to come to get an education came here, and all the people who just wanted to get the money from [the ]Quinn Bill were going elsewhere’ . . . he was entirely correct.”

Respondents reflected on the political and public processes that played out in Massachusetts and provided lessons under the Quinn Bill. Comments included, “There was a whole lot of beating people and programs, particularly the small privates that was unnecessary, led by a lot of real incompetent people at the state level and in the early ACJS people.” and “Changes in educational practice will not eliminate the economic or political problems associated with the bill itself.”

**The Role of Interest Groups: The Conflict Intensifies**

The role of various interest groups in the development and implementation of the Quinn Bill also informs this study. To achieve their goals and turn the idea of the Quinn Bill into an actual policy, state officials had the advantage of another of the political perspectives identified by Stolz (2002): the role of interest groups. This can be characterized by a collision of interest groups coming together around “crusading issues” (Stolz, 2002, p. 19). The concept of higher education for the police officer was not itself
new, nor was the notion that a government might provide financial incentives to officers to attend college a novel one, as LEEP demonstrated (see Ward & Webb, 1984, p. 183).

But LEEP was a federal, not a state, program. Moreover, even the recommendation of President Johnson’s commission “that all police personnel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees” was “‘an ultimate’ rather than an immediate goal,” according to a 1995 address given by Jeremy Travis, Director of the National Institute of Justice. While incentives would soon provide for the immediate goal, it was assumed that having police officers complete higher education prior to performing their duties was the ultimate goal.

More than a quarter century later, advocates of police higher education were still lamenting the less than universal support for the idea, and some were still emphasizing the need to mobilize interest groups in its support. Acknowledging that he was “preaching to the choir,” Travis, for example, emphasized to the 1995 Forum on Police Higher Education the importance of interest groups in furthering the organization’s aims:

But as you are well aware, many others do not share our conviction. The movement to educate the police did not really begin in earnest until the 1960s. But the very deep roots of the issue, the fact that it has been debated from these many years and is still a matter of some controversy, suggests that we need to continue to be “proselytizers” and advocates—to the extent we see ourselves in that role—if we are to win adherents.

Stressing that while the literature on interest groups in criminal justice policymaking is sparse, these groups are often central to establishing the public policy agenda. Stolz (2002) notes that “nonprofessional groups may affect whether or not a policy becomes a matter of public debate” (p. 8) Stolz also refers to work done by Erika S. Fairchild, who found “that criminal justice legislation generally is conceived by small numbers of influential legislators, administrators, and interest group representatives and
enacted on a consensual basis by state legislatures” (p. 8). Stolz adds, “Viewing policy making from the perspective of interest groups rests on certain assumptions regarding the distribution of power and how decisions are made” (p. 7). By adapting these assumptions to analyze the evolution of the Quinn Bill, this work incorporates the following with respect to interest group participation: the political power or influence of the various individuals or organizations that attempted to influence the legislative process and how the conflict between these groups, and the method by which it was resolved, contributed to the formation of and eventual change in Quinn Bill policy.

When the MDHE commissioned a review of criminal justice programs in 2000, various interest groups were brought to the table. These interest groups included faculty and administrators representing the variety of education institutions offering programs in criminal justice in Massachusetts, law enforcement professionals, and various public interest groups. These groups would become a major force of influence in the standards development and shared with them was the work of NEACJS and ACJS relative to their Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Education.

The principle sources of interest group pressure promoting the Quinn bill were law enforcement officers and their unions and the colleges themselves. Money was expected and found to be a major motivating factor in both cases—police officers employed in towns and municipalities participating in the Quinn Bill and all members of the State Police obtained significant pay increases, and colleges profited from the increased enrollments not only by in-service professionals but by a growing body of traditional undergraduates who chose criminal justice as a major.
At times, Quinn Bill proponents were at odds. For example, the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts, a leader in public policy issues for higher education among its independent member institutions, used its influence to inquire into the political process on behalf of its members: “The police unions will accept any over-regulation of colleges that leaves the pay bonus in place” (Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts, 2003). The association’s comments on the 2002 amendments to the Quinn Bill demonstrate a further divide: “We are unhappy with the legislative seizure of academic program authority in authorizing the [MDHE] to ‘conduct periodic reviews of criminal justice or law degree programs . . . we want to be present when the BHE sets out to ‘review’ some of our law schools” (Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts, 2002b).

Varying levels of support for oversight initiatives were also referred to by the MDHE, whose chairman stated, “We don’t see it as a very serious amendment to the Quinn Bill.” and “Private universities and colleges may have a larger problem with it than police organizations.” (Astell, 2002, p. A2). The apparent focus on private institutions is suggested by respondents in this study to be construed as a political maneuver.

Proponents of the Quinn Bill get due credit for mounting a campaign to save the bill in its original form. Opposition came from unions, educational programs, and associations, entities that sought to continue the policy and its financial rewards. When asked what he thought about the Quinn Bill some 30 years after its inception, and on the eve of oversight, Robert Quinn advocated for keeping it intact, adding that because of the incentive “Massachusetts police officers are more sophisticated and more aware of

Conversely, the principle sources of interest group pressure opposing the Quinn Bill and its effects were twofold. First were municipal officials concerned about shouldering the costs, and faculty from traditional social and behavioral science departments who viewed criminal justice as an unworthy discipline intruding on sacred liberal arts territory and draining students from their fields. Second were those representing the public perspective, public interest watchdogs who viewed the money being spent on the Quinn Bill as a reason to question its quality.

These were major players in the intensifying conflict over Quinn Bill implementation whose concerns had to be met and overcome if the legislation was to be accepted as sound public policy. Given the responses to this study, it is clear that not all institutions had the capacity nor the motivation for change as a movement toward oversight began. Even with the presence of some internal oversight, the earlier motivating factor of money suppressed any organic movement in this direction.

College administrations provided their own difficulties for criminal justice faculty seeking program quality. When asked about administrative support, participants reported on all ends of the spectrum. Some offered tremendous support and, in the words of one criminal justice program respondent, some demonstrated a “level of commitment” evident in allocated resources to the program. Others were provided what they needed and no more. Overall, faculty expressed frustration with the role of administrators in the
seemingly endless conflict between quality and quantity (see Chapter 4, What Took You So Long?).

On the eve of criminal justice guidelines adoption, police and their unions continued to voice opinions about standards and the threats they were perceived to pose to Quinn Bill access. Citing the benefits of educated police officers and the communities they serve, excerpts from union officials included, “Questions about academic quality should not overshadow the programs’ advantages. . . . Cops live in a closed culture, and going to the classes opens us up” (Associated Press, 2001, p. 1). One reflected that the “allusion to the ‘unholy’ alliance between police officers eager to accrue Quinn Bill credits and colleges hungry to fill their classes is a misrepresentation of the unique challenges facing both groups . . . the unusual and unpredictable working hours of officers present colleges with problems regarding scheduling and location of classes” (Cherry, 2001, p. A14). A position paper countered claims that criminal justice program curricula were stale and their faculty unqualified: “These college programs no longer focus strictly on criminal justice subjects. They cover a much broader base, including social sciences, communication, conflict resolution, human behavior, and problem solving” (Gardella & Collins, 2002). Another union representative stated,

In a startling display of anti-police bias, arrogance and ignorance, the Commonwealth’s Board of Higher Education met yesterday to consider new “guidelines” for certification of criminal justice programs . . . pandering to hyped up media hoopla . . . guidelines that would virtually wipe out Quinn Bill benefits for officers entering programs . . . and decimate the ability of colleges and universities across New England to offer criminal justice degrees. . . . If its criminal justice that you’re interested in well, on behalf of the elite academic wannabes at the Board of Higher Education, “Sorry, but we’ve got our collective asses to cover!” (Boston Police Superior Officers Federation, 2003)
Quality oversight for these programs came from outside influences and surfaced as public outrage began to mount over program quality and public spending.

**Implementation: Resolving the Conflict**

Evolving from the political culture that produced it and the interest group conflicts that threatened it, implementation of the Quinn Bill at its various stages is the focus of this part of the study.

Rather than confront powerful police organizations head on, elected officials charged the MDHE with the task of establishing quality standards for higher education programs in criminal justice and investigating whether the various colleges and universities offering such degrees met the new quality standards. If they did, their graduates would be eligible to receive Quinn Bill benefits. If they did not, their graduates would be ineligible for the benefits.

Referring to academic research on implementation, Stolz (2002) contends, “Such studies also usually look at the interplay of various political, technical, bureaucratic, organizational, and socioeconomic factors that impinge upon these efforts” (p. 10). Virtually each of these factors plays a role in the story of how the Quinn Bill impacted academic programs in criminal justice. The process by which the Quinn Bill and the affected institutions of higher education came to terms with the implementation of these new requirements is a central theme, for, as Stolz notes, “It is assumed that those who have discretionary power in the direct delivery of services are more significant in the shaping of policy than the senator or agency executive. . . . Therefore, understanding public policy includes the study of the process by which policy is implemented, as well as the discretion exercised by the bureaucrat who delivers the service to the client” (p. 10).
Michael Lipsky (1997) further observes that these street-level bureaucrats affect policy in part due to goal ambiguity. Stolz concludes that “such grass-roots decisions in the broader context of criminal justice policy making . . . enhances our understanding of policy as formally established and policy in practice and as viewed by the public” (p. 10).

The discretion of higher education in choosing how that service delivery was to be implemented was among those issues called into question through the Quinn Bill reform process. Reports of quality concerns and resulting change from respondents across all groups provide a level of validity to these concerns. The role of criminal justice programs in the implementation stage and beyond is therefore critical. Why programs needed supervision and whether those practices that led to this need would have continued without changes to Quinn Bill oversight also became issues.

Study participant interviews support the notion of varied discretion on the part of criminal justice programs toward implementation in regard to the initial delivery of education under the Quinn Bill. Faculty and program administrators were both cited as vital to the direction and choices an institution made with regard to quantity, or financial gain, over program quality. Factors influencing that decision included the role of faculty and administrative support for quality as a priority as well as their own knowledge of and connection to external marks of quality, including criminal justice professional organizations, quality standards for criminal justice, or a dedication to the goal of education itself. Where such support or influences were lacking, quality was compromised. The direction of discretion used in the implementation of education under the early Quinn Bill may have impacted the direction of implementation following the introduction of standards in later years.
As discussed earlier, the MDHE was the agency charged with oversight of the Quinn Bill from its inception. According to the text of the Quinn Bill, the MDHE had the authority to address quality issues from the beginning. They did not do so, however, until December 2000. The MDHE stated their reasons for becoming directly involved as twofold: (1) the increase in criminal justice programs statewide and (2) their role in administrating the Quinn Bill (Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, 2000). However, this study brought to light a third and perhaps more compelling reason why the MDHE decided to become involved as an oversight agency some 30 years after inception and more than 15 years after the first concerns were raised regarding program quality: public outcry.

The oversight of bureaucrats described by Lipsky (1997) as the direct service-delivery agents is central to a discussion of the MDHE’s role as the state’s regulatory agency for all programs within higher education. One might question the level of authority the MDHE possessed and exerted in assuring the quality of criminal justice education programs as the Quinn Bill was implemented because, having sat virtually silent for 30 years, the MDHE sprang into oversight action during the reform stage and only under mounting public pressure that led to legislative mandate.

Given the political nature and public arena in which the Quinn Bill story played out, it can be concluded that due to tougher economic times, public officials were simply looking for ways to reign in the continually expanding costs of the Quinn Bill as more towns and municipalities adopted the legislation, regardless of whether the goals of the Quinn Bill were being achieved.
This study indicates that the introduction of standards to criminal justice education had varying effects on criminal justice programs. For a few it was business as usual, for others it meant substantial change. For some, it was a bit of both.

Respondents were asked about the MDHE’s involvement, as well as to expand on any changes their institutions may have seen under the oversight of criminal justice programs in Massachusetts. For some programs, the magnitude of the situation and needed change was reflected in those same reasons for MDHE oversight—public perception, politics, and pressure. For example, one criminal justice program interest group respondent stated, “Pressure on Quinn held us to a better standard. And I often resented it because I felt so much of it was political.”

Criminal justice program interest group respondents cited money as an incentive for their involvement in the MDHE process. According to one respondent, “We were faced with losing millions . . . the choice was clear, we had to play.” Another recalled lengthy discussions with their administration about the impact of the changes: “We weighed the costs of hiring new faculty against the loss of student revenue.” For this program, decreasing the number of off-campus programs won. MDHE documents also provide evidence of the financial incentive for programs to participate in the approval process: “For . . . the three [colleges] with the largest number of Quinn Bill degrees for police officers, revamping the programs to meet the new standards offers a great tuition source” (Lambiaso, 2003, p. 22).

The criminal justice program changes cited as positive by study respondents included facultyhirings and changed qualifications, curriculum restructuring, the closing ofsatellite campuses, and increased resources to administer their programs—including
faculty, faculty development funding, and other educational resources. These are summarized in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1

Reported Changes Under Quinn Bill Oversight and Standards to Criminal Justice Programs

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<th>Increased Resources</th>
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<tr>
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<td>• Increased Hiring of Full Time Development Funding</td>
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<td>• Educational Resources</td>
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<td>• Consolidation of Programs to Main Campus</td>
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Of these, the most common resource mentioned by respondents was faculty, where the guidelines “really did give us leverage” and “forced the hand of the college.” Another participant “found it to be the one thing that allows us under bad economic situations to maintain our faculty level, to maintain our levels of expertise . . . and other states are trying to emulate us.”

Additional Discussion

Given the national movement toward standards for criminal justice education, it could be concluded that the MDHE, or some other academic entity, would have created standards for criminal justice education in Massachusetts without the Quinn Bill, and that this could have moved the quality issue forward. Certainly, the development of standards
in regard to criminal justice education parallel to program growth would have benefitted
the educational experiences of all students within those programs, irrespective of the
Quinn Bill. The MDHE may have been concerned with criminal justice programs in
general. Oversight and standards in other disciplines within the MDHE have not been
initiated by scandal and legislative mandate. For example, the MDHE periodically
reviews academic programs in various disciplines, most recently business and computer
science (Massachusetts Department of Higher Education, 2014a). Reported movement
within programs to endorse and implement quality standards, whether formal or not, and
prior to the legislative mandate of standards, provides support for this notion. That
criminal justice program interest group respondents who do not serve a Quinn Bill
population view their reasons for participation in program review as related to quality
indicates a link between the two.

Confidence in criminal justice programs to police themselves could explain the
MDHE’s lack of involvement prior to legislative mandate. Respondents from the criminal
justice program, standards, and law enforcement groups spoke directly to this. Trust in
programs that they would fulfill their mission and do the right thing was the general
theme. Trust was specifically mentioned by the law enforcement interest group and leads
to a larger discussion of who is to blame for what happened.

One law enforcement interest group respondent replied that they had “gone to
classes assuming the school knew what it was doing.” Another spoke to institution
choice, stating that “we didn’t choose the easiest but the most convenient.” This was
consistent with news reports at the time featuring interviews with law enforcement
professionals about their choices. One union head stated the reason police officers chose
certain programs (those same programs were most often under fire) was because of “time, convenience and money—that’s why they go where they go” (Kurkjian & Greenberger, 2003, p. A1). In addition, a 2002 position paper circulated by a former police chief and general counsel for the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police further illustrates that “individual police officers should not be used as scapegoats or have their education pay held hostage if colleges—all of them accredited by appropriate academic authorities—need closer supervision” (Gardella & Collins, 2002).

Overall, this study reports that participants from all interest groups, regardless of the type of support they offered for the Quinn Bill over its various stages, place the blame on institutions offering criminal justice programs, not the law enforcement population seeking their educational benefit through these programs. Further, this study supports a rift between the public and private criminal justice program interest group respondents on this same issue (see Chapter 4, Curriculum and Delivery).

Public stratum respondents made numerous distinctions throughout the study between institutions based on their orientation, commonly reporting various issues as belonging to private schools and that what happened in Massachusetts was a result of their practices. Some MDHE review documents support this, as do news accounts and independent reports that spoke of quality concerns being highest among private graduate programs.

Who is to blame within those programs is more complicated. A combination of administrative or faculty directions and attitudes were cited as driven by financial incentives. It is clear from the study that some criminal justice program interest group respondents, including all from the public graduate stratum, felt their voices were not or
would not be heard. When some faculty did object to questionable practices, programs were moved out of their administration into separate professional programs or under schools unrelated to criminal justice.

The supposition that standards lead to quality may be shared among many criminal justice educators. Standards can work to improve program quality if interested parties adopt them and are committed to change. Ample evidence of reported change under the 2003 standards at some institutions has been given. Findings of substantial change on the part of the programs following the implementation of the standards may indicate change only occurs with oversight.

But why did some programs experience such change and not others? This study shed light on this issue and examined the notion that institutions, when introduced to reforms such as quality standards, or such reforms are forced on them, may absorb those reforms with little or no resulting change. Financial quantity may overcome program quality if the opportunity presents itself and no oversight to prevent this exists. Of course, it may alternately be concluded that standards and their oversight were not sufficient to hold schools accountable for change. The financial vulnerability of programs may have played a role.

Another conclusion of this study is that programs that changed very little did not require external oversight to maintain a goal of quality education. Internal mechanisms for quality were strong and institutionally supported. Some criminal justice program interest group participants reported that their programs were just fine and that standards only confirmed the notion that their programs were already of expected quality. Here,
professional organizational influences such as that from NEACJS and ACJS also played a role and could potentially insulate institutions for the future.

In summary, a study of the process undertaken to produce and maintain the Massachusetts Quinn Bill provided lessons learned and insight into the direction and future of broader issues surrounding quality and the criminal justice “cash cow.” This case study is appropriate to Massachusetts in that it is alone in having adopted a state policy such as that embodied in the Quinn Bill, a policy that now has the dual objectives of producing more highly educated state and local police officers while guaranteeing that the colleges and universities offering degrees in criminal justice provide programs that meet high-quality educational standards.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

When the Quinn Bill was enacted in 1970, its goals were clear: to produce a more educated police force and to provide incentives to encourage law enforcement officers to pursue a college education. Assuming “more” is a quantifier meaning “more than before,” those goals have been met. With a $120 million price tag in its highest years, the goal of providing incentives, predicated upon law enforcers earning a college education, has also been realized. But while those goals and the public goods they were designed to produce might seem to imply a rather straightforward approach to a commendable public policy initiative this study’s narrative tells a story of implementation that undoubtedly has taken the Quinn Bill on a journey that, in all likelihood, could not have been predicted.

An assumption of the President’s Commission and of the Quinn Bill was that police officers would seek higher education if it was offered and would be motivated to do so for its own sake. The President’s Commission was optimistic on this point to the extent of recommending that police officers should be enrolled in college-level courses in the “liberal arts and sciences” and not in programs with a “narrow vocational concentration.” (Page 285). The Quinn Bill by contrast, was at odds with Commission, insisting that curricula should be specific to criminal justice. And yet, aside from taking a less expansive view than the Commission, the Quinn Bill offered no guidance on the shape that criminal justice education should take. Complicating the issue further was the fact that in the late 1960s, as the Quinn Bill was being debated, there was no accepted model for criminal justice education to follow.

And therein lies the rub. What was absent from the Quinn Bill, and remains absent to this day, are benchmarks of success, both those obvious in nature and others
less tangible. That vagueness and imprecision, combined with the exorbitant costs accruing to taxpayers over the years, would call into question the very value of the entire educational enterprise as far as it related to publicly funded college education for the police. Fueling the fires of public discontent was the evolution of an unintended consequence of the Quinn Bill: The existence, in the absence of agreement on what should constitute credible curricula, of educational programs of questionable merit to which police officers tended to flock in order to obtain degrees that would qualify them for the salary increases mandated by the law without subjecting themselves to a truly rigorous academic regimen.

These consequences might be replicated in the future when economic times improve and the legislative/lobbyist balance shifts, if the lessons learned from the Quinn Bill experience are not understood and taken to heart. Funds for the Quinn Bill, or for legislation of a similar sort, could easily be restored and access again opened.

The opportunity of avoiding such an eventuality is one of the lessons learned from the participants in this study, many of whom expressed the conviction that staying true to the original goals—and intent—of the Quinn Bill may not require such a paradigm shift in the thinking of proponents but rather a policy focus on how and, perhaps more importantly, when they are achieved. Participants in this study firmly believe that having a more highly educated police force could be accomplished with quality programs, reduced financial incentives or even minimum standards for hiring.

Perhaps one of the most problematic of the Quinn Bill’s unintended consequences has been the corrupting of some academic institutions themselves. The Quinn Bill as a public policy tool incorporated no measure of success, except the goal of educating
police officers. And it was the very imprecision about how to achieve that goal led to questions about the motives, not of the student police officer, but of some of the degree-granting institutions themselves. Drawing from the literature, one might conclude that the intended output of a well-educated police force was manipulated to attract more police enrollees only because it was driven by competition for enrollments and resources, something Bohte and Meier (2000) refer to as institutional cheating. In today’s culture in which evaluation and assessment are stressed, one would hope that a critical lesson has been learned: Standards and assessment must be policy tools in the creation of a culture of quality and accountability in criminal justice education.

An underlying policy issue in the preceding chapters is the misdirection of the basic concerns. This was clearly stated by one criminal justice program interest group respondent who said, “While media coverage has focused on previous and existing educational abuses . . . changes in educational practice will not eliminate the economic or political problems associated with the bill itself . . . what is required is changes in the bill itself that will meet the objectives of both sound educational practice and good public policy.”

The old saying “Money Talks” seems applicable to some extent not only to the travails that led up to a crisis in confidence in the Quinn Bill but even to the attempts to correct its faults. The factors that repeatedly drove the Massachusetts process were economic (the cash cow for the institutions, the monetary benefit to officers, and the cost to the commonwealth) and political (claims of having no authority to intervene and kowtowing to union and public pressure). Early and later planning around these lines may have altered the course, but the lack of any recent follow up by the MDHE in regard to
criminal justice program review, occurring alongside a shrinking financial backing for the Quinn Bill highlights the issue of misdirection: What drives the quality discussion? Is it the money that is spent or is it the issue of quality?

It appears that what precipitated MDHE involvement was the pressure about the quality in combination with the money. But the money ultimately trumped quality as the primary motivating factor for MDHE involvement. Incentives work, as this case study shows, for both pursuing an education and for ensuring quality education programs.

Regarding the substance of a viable education for police officers the differing opinions of the President’s Commission and the administrators of the Quinn Bill was a concern expressed by respondents in this study, some of whom came down on the side of the Commission. Dictating the type of degree and the inclusion of only criminal justice programs to qualify a student for the salary increases, at least in the early years of the Quinn Bill, appear to have been placed in the interpretive hands of the MDHE. Study respondents commented on this, with one criminal justice program participant stating that “the narrow interpretation of acceptable degrees under Quinn may have served as a financial gatekeeper to curtail costs and workload for administering the program.” Perhaps the issues may have been avoided all together if broader degree acceptance had been the norm.

Still, the matter of motivation and incentives, and their relationship to the purposes the Quinn Bill, was an issue not lost on the study’s respondents. For potential students, education for its own sake may not have been seen as a goal but rather as a means to a monetary end. One criminal justice program study participant articulated that he/she had the task of convincing students that education was the primary goal:
It just seems like they [the policymakers] would think that once this opportunity was made available to police officers that they would flower in that particular climate . . . they seemed to think that perhaps a lesson to be learned is that without buy-in from all folks from the beginning, a policy is doomed. In other words, had the police been convinced that higher education was important to the profession before incentives were offered; the outcome may have been vastly different.

Involving all interest groups in the planning process might also have prevented or avoided that difficulty. The Quinn Bill provided the potential for growth without the infrastructure to do so.

The question arises as to whether the incentive and the result can ever be separated. First, police officers were targeted for not having degrees, then, when they did get them, they were criticized for the type of degree as well as having their motives impugned as schemes for “getting rich” as a result of participating in the incentive. Golden (1985a) wrote that “my understanding is that the intention of the Quinn Bill was not to make richer police officers, but better-educated and better-prepared officers” (p. 31). This matter of motive raises a thorny question: Is the police officer who avails himself or herself of an exclusively monetary incentive and takes the path of least resistance more culpable when it comes to abuses? One criminal justice program interest group respondent sums up the answer: “If you pay people money, they will step up and they will do it, but you want to make sure that you have all your Is dotted and your Ts crossed before you put it in place.” The incentive brought them to the door, criminal justice institutions took it from there. The path some followed was for their own self-interested gain, with no loftier educational intention.

The benefits of assessment, review, and evaluation are not limited to higher education. Although the Quinn Bill story illustrates those benefits in terms of criminal justice education, the concomitant advantage of reviewing and evaluating the Quinn Bill,
leading to reform as it did in the case of criminal justice educational programs, is also clear. Quinn Bill reform, coupled with standards for criminal justice education, makes for good public policy. Clear, 2001, states that the next step in the coming of age for criminal justice, after quality issues, is policy relevance. This case study shows that required quality standards for criminal justice education have clear policy relevance and, moreover, it provides a framework for a national agenda.

This study assumes that in achieving the stated goals of the Quinn Bill, interest groups, despite their varying motives, did not dispute those goals. It was the mechanism itself that was created to achieve the goals of the Quinn Bill that was at issue. The creation of a professionalized police force through quality criminal justice education is a goal not easily refuted. However, the goal of a professionalized police force is one not easily measured. Thus, it is assumed that the success of the Quinn Bill and, at least initially, the quality of criminal justice education, was not based on these outcomes but rather on the outputs of the policy: education as a goal itself. In the process of achieving this goal, the process itself, or the means by which it could be accomplished, became the issue.

Criminal justice education ballooned in the state of Massachusetts under the Quinn Bill. It may be assumed from this phenomenon that the Quinn Bill was a value rational policy, both in its inception and its eventual oversight. Arguably, the results of this study might be interpreted to mean that change in criminal justice educational policy and in the institutions that implement it came about only as public pressure began to mount concerning program quality. Thus, there must have been something that overshadowed those goals and consideration of the policy’s consequences. The
inescappable conclusion lies with the economic opportunities that the Quinn Bill presented to those educational programs. Related to this were conflicting goals and goal displacement within institutions stemming from issues concerning quality versus quantity.

While the research relates specifically to the evolution of the Quinn Bill and its impact on criminal justice programs in the state of Massachusetts, it is arguably beneficial to larger and more generalized issues surrounding criminal justice educational policy relative to quality and standards. This chapter explores effects and lessons that can be learned from Massachusetts’s experience with the Quinn Bill and its implications for a national agenda regarding criminal justice educational policy and its future.

What happened in Massachusetts and why? Why does the discussion of program quality factor so significantly into criminal justice education ideology when it may have a minimal role in practice? Where does the proverbial “cash cow” lead? Important to a national agenda is whether the original intents of the Quinn Bill, extended broadly to criminal justice education, became lost in the process of policymaking and implementation in Massachusetts.

Knowing why those original intents may have become lost and who was responsible for their obfuscation is a lesson worth learning. That is why the analytical tools of symbolic politics, interest groups, politics, and implementation relative to the role of goals in policy development and reform are among the perspectives that were used to analyze the Quinn Bill case study to understand the lessons it teaches.

The symbolic nature of the Quinn Bill becomes manifest in reviewing the information gathered relative to actual change on the part of the institutions implicated in
the process. Examining the various roles and intentions of interest groups also contributed to understanding the cause and effect dynamic of the process, illuminating what happened and why. Understanding change on the part of criminal justice programs was viewed from various perspectives to help policymakers understand a central and vexing question: If quality was a goal from the outset within criminal justice programs, why and how did the process become so academically and politically scandalous? Likewise, if quality reform was introduced and absorbed with no resulting change, the integrity of those institutions and their leadership comes into question.

These lessons must be applied to a larger discussion regarding the implications of this research on policy processes and initiatives in criminal justice education and the effects commitments to improving criminal justice education can have on the quality of that education. The evolution of the Massachusetts Quinn Bill and criminal justice education is not entirely unique. It can serve to illuminate various issues regarding the roles of institutions, the key players, and policy reform tactics and strategies in the continued quest for quality.

Two major policy issues surfaced during the course of this study. One is the question of whether the Quinn Bill had a beneficial effect on criminal justice education in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The other is whether the approach taken to achieve that goal represents an appropriate method of formulating public policy.

In seeking to answer these two questions, this case study details the implementation of the Quinn Bill through the perspective of key interest groups outside the traditional legislative process: criminal justice program faculty and administrators, law enforcement personnel, public office holders, and public interest groups. Sharing the
common experience of the Quinn Bill, these four broadly defined interest groups arguably had greater influence over what happened in that story than that of any of the formal participants.

While the research codified in this case study represents findings that might be perceived as being unique to Massachusetts, Stolz (2002) suggests that what occurred in the Commonwealth is a common and general occurrence. However, as stated earlier, she maintains that although the literature on such interest groups in criminal justice policymaking is sparse, she is convinced that they are often central to establishing the public policy agenda. In an observation consistent with the findings of this case study she asserts: “Nonprofessional groups may affect whether or not a policy becomes a matter of public debate” (p. 8).

This study, then, helps fill the research gap that Stolz (2002) identifies and offers empirical support for her theory about the influence of interest groups on criminal justice policy. By following the Quinn Bill’s evolution from its inception through its periods of conflict, intensified debate, and final resolution, this study also serves to authenticate Stolz’s theory about the importance of symbolic politics, political culture, and the challenge involved in policy implementation. The case study provides data on the manner in which the conflict within each of those areas helped to shape the policy debate and produce a final resolution.

**Criminal Justice Education Improved In Massachusetts**

As to whether the Quinn Bill had a beneficial effect on the quality of higher education programs in criminal justice in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the study results confirm that it did. While many approached the subject from different angles and
with different perspectives, the general consensus of the study respondents was that the legislation did lead, however circuitously, to the imposition of state-mandated requirements that oblige any participating institution to meet quality standards at least equal to those recommended by the ACJS. In other words, study respondents agree that criminal justice education has improved in Massachusetts as a result of the Quinn Bill, its oversight and resulting standards.

In this regard it is important to note, as several respondents did, that some colleges had already established similar standards for themselves and had begun to implement conformance to them before the MDHE became involved. A sense of professional responsibility and a commitment to academic integrity seemed to be the motivating forces in those instances. However, the value of the standards imposed as an ultimate consequence of the debate over the Quinn Bill was the insistence by the state that any and all institutions not similarly inclined be compelled to do so as a matter of public policy or suffer immediate consequences.

**Quality Education Is the Impact of Today’s Quinn Bill**

Those consequences involved the refusal of the MDHE to approve the programs and the denial of monetary benefits to the graduates of any institution not earning its endorsement. The message was clear: if you are in it for the money alone, either as an educational institution or as a student, the situation has changed. This is a dramatic shift in the impact of the Quinn Bill.

Evidence of the success of that effort surfaced when colleges consented to comply with the standards and subjected themselves to objective peer review, or made required
adjustments to their programs in order to win approval, or simply discontinued their participation in the Quinn Bill program rather than work to meet the standards.

The fact that this dynamic did not occur until conflict over the efficacy of the Quinn Bill itself was resolved by the MDHE’s involvement and the establishment of the required standards suggests that the ultimate consequence of the legislation had a very beneficial effect, even if that effect was not foreseen by the authors of the law.

The second issue—whether the approach taken with the Quinn Bill provides an appropriate model for emulation regarding the development of public policy—is more difficult to answer with a simple yes-or-no response.

On the one hand, the legislation achieved its original objective of inducing police officers to enroll in college-level programs, and it did so quickly and decisively. Although it was perhaps an unintended consequence of the original legislation, conflict over the efficacy of the Quinn Bill resulted in the imposition of standards intended to assure that the policy was worth its costs by requiring that all such programs covered by the Quinn Bill be of defensible quality. And yet, as one study respondent pointed out, institutions both in Massachusetts and in other states were simultaneously producing high-quality criminal justice programs with less conflict and at much lower costs. Nonetheless, a benefit of the debate the Quinn Bill and the manner in which it was concluded moved the issue from the individual choices made by private institutions into the public policy arena and provided Massachusetts with a legal tool to insist on quality among those institutions that lacked the initiative to bring their programs up to academic snuff.
As a result of these issues, this study points to two larger themes: the notion of a better-educated police officer and the role of higher education in realizing that ideal.

In an interview, former Attorney General Robert Quinn reflected on the 40-plus years since the Quinn Bill passage: “People who talk to me, and sometimes those people are scholars and sometimes they are what we call ‘wise guys’ in the trade, they say that the man on the street, the policeman with the badge is a better person and more effective in his job as a result of the opportunities for higher public education” (Quinn, 2009).

And yet, the notion that going to college will produce a better police officer is an unfounded conclusion. But this study provides numerous references and direct comments relative to the prevalence of this belief as an underlying assumption. Such comments across groups included: “I think in Massachusetts that without the Quinn Bill, we would never have had as many law enforcement officers educated . . . they had no motive to go to school except the financial motive. It’s the only reason they went.”; “If it wasn’t for the Quinn Bill I don’t think they’d ever have started going to college, so you wouldn’t—at least in Massachusetts—you wouldn’t have this educated police force.”; and “The quality of the programs that began to develop—because of the colleges, not because of the Quinn Bill—they were for whatever reason, the way that academic offerings went up, you’re really now producing what the LEAA wanted to produce in the first place. You really are producing an educated police force.” One law enforcement interest group respondent was clear: “If Quinn goes away tomorrow we still get better, and we don’t get worse.”

One criminal justice program interest group respondent referred to a study on the horizon in Massachusetts that may address this gap in the research. Referring to the cross
section between education and civil service, the issue addresses concerns with civil service and whether requiring minimum standards for education is preferable. However, before this issue can be addressed definitively, evidence that education is beneficial is needed.

In their perceptions of the future, two respondents, one from a criminal justice program and one from a public interest group, discussed recent moves from legislators, colleagues, and organizations seeking to have the Quinn Bill, now a defunded initiative, reinstated in the state budget. News accounts also cited the benefits of an educated police force, the costs of the Quinn Bill relative to expensive lawsuits, and a situation where “Quinn Bill cuts could persuade veterans to retire, causing a devastating shortage of trained officers . . . [and] place an additional burden on our community struggling to maintain a basic level of service, and on each individual police officer” (Stucka, 2009, p. 1). Proponents were unsuccessful in reinstating the funding.

The role of higher education involves a related discussion. Assuming the benefit of an educated police officer, the Quinn Bill provided access via incentives to that education. As the research and respondents indicate, the idea of incentives for higher education was widely supported. Law enforcement wanted it, the legislature wanted it, and programs wanted to provide for it. This study provides the answer to the perplexing question about why they all went along with it in the manner that they did: In both direct and indirect ways, money and education are the answers.

The study supports that faculty and administrators carry primary responsibility for the deficiencies in implementing the Quinn Bill and resulting failures. It has been previously stated that people resist change because of its social consequences. The
resistance is often not to the change in the policy itself but to the change in their own role and relationships. Was there a premeditated decision to circumvent the integrity of the educational process under the Quinn Bill? Considering the perspectives of study respondents, one could make a case that Massachusetts faculty may not have engaged in a willing and purposeful shirking of professional responsibility. Instead through a process of evolution involving a dialectical conflict in which the faculty actively engaged, the Quinn Bill eventually produced quality standards.

As the case study conveys, that process began with “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society”, 1967, which recommended higher education for police officers and specified a liberal arts curriculum that thoughtfully avoided replicating training program curricula. But police officers were not motivated to attend college for the singular sake of obtaining an education and some incentive had to be developed. Thus, the means provided by the Quinn Bill, money, achieved the desired end of bringing the police into the academic world. At the outset, at least, the intent of faculty and administration was not to compromise integrity but, rather, to implement the Commission’s recommendation.

At the time, there were no criminal justice departments as such. Existing departments, such as sociology, often tried to accommodate officers but there was a prevailing attitude among the police, and embedded in the organizational culture of some departments, that those who had never worked in law enforcement had little or nothing of value to teach them. To overcome these obstacles, colleges created specific criminal justice departments. But there were few models to guide how they should be structured and what should be offered. Nor were there many prospective faculty members with
doctorates specifically in criminal justice. As a result, faculty tended to be drawn from the ranks of criminal justice professionals, lacking the credentials of traditional academics. Not surprisingly, they drew upon their own experiences to design curriculum which, of necessity, resembled the very training academy type the Commission had warned against.

The Quinn Bill emerged in this climate as a noble experiment in public policy to implement the Commission’s recommendation, which by then had been somewhat transformed by the necessity of the above circumstances. Arguably, money and not education then became the principle motive force driving ever-increasing enrollments. But not because faculty had decided to ‘sell their academic souls’. Rather, a process had been put in motion by a combination of unanticipated factors in a highly nuanced situation in which conflicting interests created more confusion than clarity about exactly what they were responsible for maintaining and protecting.

College administrators, responsible for the financial viability of their institutions, saw an opportunity to take economic advantage of the situation, presumably supported by Presidents and Trustees whose principle objective, indeed a duty, is funding. Study participants reported conflicting emotions they and colleagues had about their role in a phenomenon that had, to a certain extent, escaped their control. Conflicting opinions about what they should be doing, how and where they should be doing it, were all issues that arose in a very novel and fluid situation that none had experienced before.

Thus, what happened with the Quinn Bill was not so much the result of a deliberate strategy but an evolutionary process. Also, those in a position to shape the
academic culture of criminal justice education under the Quinn Bill were not all academics.

One value of the Quinn Bill was its unintended consequence of eventually forcing a resolution of that evolving conflict by the establishment of specific quality standards. Ironically, the Quinn Bill’s value as an instrument of public policy was something never perhaps envisioned by its author. The process of articulating standards and quality development happened faster in Massachusetts than elsewhere because of the Quinn Bill and its financial motives. Ironically, money became the reason for questionable quality engendered by self-interest, and money, at taxpayer expense, also became the reason for the demise of the Quinn Bill.

A logical follow-up question is: What would prevent this from happening again? If we learn from the Massachusetts story, the answer lies squarely on the shoulders of criminal justice institutions. Standards and the support of professional organizations are key components of that answer. But, as the story also tells us, these alone may not be sufficient.

Devoid of underlying restructuring relative to institutional leadership and integrity in regard to the various resources that standards may provide for programs and institutions, change may be superficial or short lived. Dwindling Quinn Bill populations and the rise of online programs were among the participants’ responses as to these perceived vulnerabilities. Studying history allows the opportunity to learn from the past, just as a failure to take account of history’s teaching can lead to a repeat of past mistakes. As such, the Quinn Bill was developed without learning some lessons from other
experiments in criminal justice innovation and improvement, such as the ill-fated LEAA effort at the federal level.

**Lessons Learned**

What lessons might be learned from the Quinn Bill case study? As the field continues to grow the discussion of standards, certification, and accreditation for addressing issues in criminal justice education stretches across the nation and study respondents were wary of the vulnerability of the field and the need for continued work in this area. Various comments from criminal justice program interest group respondents point to this conclusion: “I keep going back to the idea that among academic professionals there is a sense of professionalism, that they want their programs to be academically defensible just because they are professionals. But that’s for those programs that have that kind of faculty.” Another said: “There may certainly be a need for somebody to say, ‘You must at least meet these minimal criteria, as there is in Massachusetts.’ Left to their own devices some will do okay, but . . . some other institutions may not necessarily. Nobody had to tell [academic professionals] ‘You have to do this.’” On the nature of incentives, one criminal justice program interest group respondent reflected, “I think one of the take-aways is when you put money on the table you can actually compel people to do things . . . you can actually utilize, incentivize programs to motivate change as long as you are putting in place those standards at the same time.”

On the flip side, one claimed: “You have all these people who are all about capitalism making money that just completely annihilated the foundation of what it was supposed to be.” Others spoke to the experience itself, mentioning their own positions
with regard to standards, self-studies, and a culture of assessment. One criminal justice program interest group respondent stated, “ACJS and NEASC, they’re out there, they’ve helped change the focus of the dialogue and the discourse within departments on what you’re doing.”

The saga in Massachusetts that produced the Quinn Bill and ultimately resulted in state level intervention and the imposition of standards demonstrates several matters that are of interest to scholars in the field. These include:

- A case study in how certain parties co-opted well intended recommendations on criminal justice education and subverted it in the service of their own special interests.

- A case study in how the consequences of that cooptation by interest groups eventually led to a debate about the quality of criminal justice higher education per se which, by extension, forced a public discourse, however unintentionally, of the assumption made originally that programs should not replicate training academy curricula and should reflect more of a traditional liberal arts focus. This assumption has not been fully examined in the public policy arena before the Quinn Bill conflict in Massachusetts.

- The case study offers public policy support for both the assumption of education beyond training and Stolz’s hypothesis.

Overall, the sentiment looking ahead was optimistic. As one criminal justice program respondent reflected, “The nature of education is ever evolving. If we are doing our jobs as educators, we seek to improve.” Another commented,

I’ve learned a tremendous amount about higher education, about how to run a good program, about how to meet standards, how to really know you’re meeting
them, what you can tolerate as the mediocre in your program and where you draw the line that has all been the result of this work. And I’m a better chair, coordinator, teacher, academic because of that.

Some study respondents took this discussion to a higher level at various times in the interviews. One criminal justice interest group respondent observed, “We went through some things where schools were handing out diplomas for just paying the bill, that wasn’t a Massachusetts’ exclusive. That was a nationwide issue and we saw criminal justice degrees being denigrated by schools. We still have some issues with some for-profit schools.” The concern of repeating history was also cited by one administrator: “I’ve seen some starting to slide back a little bit, and then we remind them, ‘Hey, it was you guys that got us in trouble once before, let’s not do this again.’” One respondent representing the law enforcement perspective commented that “the need for periodic review is paramount with dealing with public policy issues.” One public interest group respondent stated that “a lesson learned should be to look at options to achieve the goal. Perhaps the cookie-cutter approach is yesterday’s strategy not tomorrow’s vision . . . cost analysis needs to be a real part with a long-term view of any public policy initiative including the cost of not implementing a particular policy.” And finally, from one standards interest group respondent, “When crafting public policy, bring together representatives from the various disciplines that will be charged with implementing the policy in question, fiscally and programmatically. An effective exchange can take place in advance and hopefully a consensus gained in the process.” This latter comment speaks directly to the lack of inclusion that may have handicapped the development of the Quinn Bill and it offers a lesson for the future.
Perhaps the response to the lack of inclusion lies with Rensis Likert’s solution to the organizational problem of communication. Policies are formulated by those at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid and are to be implemented by those at the bottom. But it is the people at the bottom who have the best information about what is actually occurring and what and how problems might best be addressed. In traditional chain-of-command structures, this information never gets to the top level where policy is being made. Likert (1967) proposed a solution, called the “Linking Pin” approach, in which teams are constructed so that the information from the street-level bureaucrat is passed up the chain of command. In the case of the Quinn Bill, open communication and information sharing at all levels may have played a constructive role.

Criminal justice program interest group respondents also referred to the Quinn Bill as teaching lessons in states outside of Massachusetts. One referred to a situation in another state where “the state police academies want to take over those community college criminal justice programs and bring training back as a college credit. I explain to them what we’ve done with Quinn, how wonderful the programs have become,” and part of that was doing away with all nontraditional credit at the state level for criminal justice. Another noted that “if you go back to the turn of the 20th century where Vollmer says we need to have educated police officers . . . how long did it take? It took forever, but I think it’s here now and it’s here nationally.” One simply stated, “However they got there . . . the end result was a good one.”

Perhaps there are also lessons to be learned beyond criminal justice education. As one criminal justice program interest group respondent observed, what happened with criminal justice education in Massachusetts may “now [be] happening, repeating . . . we
see that now with education programming. The same institutions that were on board for the CJ programs all across the state are now doing the same thing with the education.”

Did criminal justice programs change, even improve, under the Quinn Bill? Ultimately, the answer to this question is yes. However, as this case study indicates, it was not without conflict. One might argue that in some cases, quality, as denoted by a stamp of approval, is perception, not reality. In such cases, reform and not change was the result. Others have experienced a true paradigm shift within their programs and in some cases their institutions.

Respondents agree that the state of Massachusetts is in a much better place in regard to criminal justice education because of the Quinn Bill. Respondents’ assessments that there is “a definite awareness of the existence of standards in Massachusetts . . . a byproduct of having gone through this and experiencing it” and “the environment changed . . . that is probably coupled with the national awareness through ACJS of standards and a changing field” support this.

Looking forward, the future of criminal justice education post-Quinn Bill was explored with the study participants. Online programs, criminal justice faculty, and alignment of criminal justice education to workforce needs were among the responses. All bear some relationship to the larger discussion of standards moving forward. Lessons learned from the Quinn Bill case study about program and policy development could shape those discussions.

The future of online programs seemed to weigh on criminal justice program respondents in that it provoked a concern that the technology might be an instrument of regression in the advancements made under the Quinn Bill. Perhaps this is best summed
up by one participant who serves as an administrator: “History may be repeating itself with the proliferation of online programs where there is no face of the college continually connecting with the individual student.” Both ACJS certification documents and the Massachusetts Quinn Bill standards provide for quality online programs and could drive program development and delivery. Standards were discussed by some respondents as a way to manage this: “If they want to run with a model that is entirely part-time faculty teaching . . . criminal justice cannot play that way.” One criminal justice program interest group respondent recalled at the time of large numbers of satellite campuses, adjuncts who would teach the “circuit” linked this to online programs as risking the same fate but at a much larger level because geography does not limit the pool.

Although the idea of brother teaching brother gathered negative attention in the Quinn Bill debate, a similar discussion is occurring in criminal justice academic circles. “Pracademics have emerged,” stated one of the eight professionals turned faculty who were included in this study. Speaking of their 30-plus years of experience in the field, this participant contended that “the pure academics will always have a place; the pure practitioners will always have a place, but somewhere in the middle is a place for people like me.” These issues surrounding the Quinn Bill have cast a shadow in that “we were kind of looked down [on] as something of a lower life form.” The consensus being that “we should not come so far from cops teaching cops that we neglect educational qualifications.”

The future of criminal justice education illustrates an issue raised during the Massachusetts review process—that limited analysis of workplace needs exists in the field and are often presented only at the National level. One criminal justice program
interest group participant reported future change as “workforce alignment; there might need to be some work done here to . . . begin to better document where students are going . . . and ensuring that we are working with our students toward that goal.” Another stated that they must decide “is it meeting work force demand in high-needs areas . . . and criminal justice certainly does that.” Add to this the lack of evidence supporting the assumption of a better-educated criminal justice professional and a focused research agenda for criminal justice education emerges.

To be fair to state legislators, when the policy was being debated and enacted in the late 1960s, criminal justice programs were just beginning to emerge. It is highly possible that local consultants simply were not available. A 1967 report of a Massachusetts special crime commission compared the education and training of police officers to the “wide range of professional competence, ranging from police officers and lawyers to psychiatrists, journalists and clergymen” (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1967, p. 3). Less than a year later the Quinn Bill began to make its way through the State House.

As noted earlier, perhaps developing partnerships early in the policy process is a lesson learned. Partnerships between the MDHE and academic associations to encourage high-quality criminal justice programs were recommended by the 2002 Criminal Justice Committee on Academic Programs—a recommendation perhaps 32 years late (Criminal Justice Committee on Academic Programs, 2002). Lack of authority is repeatedly cited by the MDHE as a primary reason why it did not act sooner. Yet the initial paper review of criminal justice programs that included 43 institutions representing 58 programs voluntarily participating began at least two years prior to any legislative changes.
One might conclude that what happened in Massachusetts was a necessary step in the coming of age of criminal justice programs, thus moving the discipline forward. Demonstrating the role that symbolic politics, interest groups, politics, and implementation played in the quest for criminal justice educational quality, this case study provides a model both for what may and may not work: inclusive, rational, and efficient policymaking with standards and benchmarks for implementation. However, there are greater strides to be made. One criminal justice program interest group respondent spoke of such a step:

The field [of criminal justice] hasn’t agreed on the sort of paradigmatic questions that most other disciplines have because they’re older and they’ve been doing it longer. . . people are asking a different set of questions [and] they become fashionable or they become the thing that people are writing or doing their research on. So there’s a natural progression to that and an evolution. And I really think CJ has been held back from those more creative discussions because they have to default to this kind of template.

To repeat and amplify an earlier observation it could be argued that the story of criminal justice education in Massachusetts reiterated through the Quinn Bill was unique. While this may be true in one sense, it is more accurate that the story, while amplified, is eerily similar to those being told across the country in regard to criminal justice education. The section titles used in this work could easily be changed to The Evolution of Criminal Justice Education, The Oversight of Criminal Justice Education, and Governing Criminal Justice Education, reflecting the experiences of the field.

Responding to large enrollments (cash cow) with a request for appropriate resources to sustain programs, hiring qualified and credentialed faculty, curricular review, and assessment were all issues under the Quinn Bill.
The question of lessons learned itself implicates more than criminal justice and the Quinn Bill. Evident in this study, higher education itself is an evolutionary process. New disciplines have to run their course to quality and criminal justice continues to struggle with long standing issues regarding quality and quantity. The above question also goes to the heart of what some might see as a degradation of higher education in general—a process that is transforming the vital integrity of learning for its own sake into a mere business, the individual institutions of which having as their principle goal survival for its own sake in a competitive market. This is a situation that, parallel to that which occurred under the Quinn Bill, so often pits administrative and faculty interests against each other. Competing definitions of success—quality education and financial—are at the heart of that situation.

Historically, these can be linked by both time and occurrence to national trends. Massachusetts surpassed the national scene in this regard—programs can and will change under mounting pressure. Some will not survive, some will see tremendous growth, but all can respond to the challenge to maintain quality standards and seek balance in the future to ensure the continued success of criminal justice education.

**Implications for Future Research**

Whether or not going to college produces a better police officer remains an open question. Due to the reliance of criminal justice educational policy on this assumption, it is a logical direction for further research.

Study limitations discussed in Chapter 3 also provide direction for future research. Expanding the study sample to include a much larger representation of student consumers
of the Quinn Bill could provide a very different perspective and counter the biased perspectives of those charged with delivering it. This sample would also allow for research asking questions focused on the impact of higher education for such populations.

Expanding the study to include a larger sample of all interest groups or employing a random sampling methodology could allow for results to be generalized. Further research could also include a quantitative study of areas of change to criminal justice education programs found here under the Quinn Bill.

Just as this study can supply some empirical support for Stolz’s theory (2002) that she states is lacking, it can simultaneously instruct proponents of the policy science school of thought who, according to Schneider and Ingram (1997), think that the very elements of the process Stolz describes are a problem that academic experts can solve rationally and efficiently.

The policy science approach to public policy can be attractive to academics because it stresses an intellectual method rooted in rationality and devoid of the otherwise messy influences of politics. Schneider and Ingram (1997) describe how policy science proponents define the problem:

The unifying theme among various approaches within the policy science framework is that policy analysis, conducted in accord with appropriate scientific standards, will provide information enabling public policy to solve problems and achieve goals. . . . The policy crisis that exists in the United States is caused by an excess of “politics” characterized by self-interest, bargaining, partisanship, competition, corruption, demagoguery, ideology, and policies that serve narrow special interests rather than the public interest. (p. 29)

This study demonstrates that the process is quite unlikely to be as tidy as the policy science school assumes. By telling the story of the complicated way in which a particular public policy evolved in Massachusetts and applying Stolz’s general standards
(2002) to that process through deductive reasoning (drawing conclusions about the particular case from the universally applicable rules) it appears that the scientific school might be too optimistic about its capacity for success in a political world. By definition, any policy that is to be made public involves politics.

This study might also stimulate further research on the efficacy of a related approach to public policy formation called the Public Choice model—a methodology that has been advocated by social scientists distinctly interested in criminal justice policy (Sedgwick, 1980; Wilson & Hernstein, 1998). In its simplest form, the Public Choice model applies the basic principles of microeconomics to the field of public policy. It assumes that all people have preferences and that they act on the basis of those preferences. Therefore, if enough voters/taxpayers prefer a certain policy, they will demand it and public officials, responsive to citizen pressure, will oblige them and supply it. It has the political virtues of being both representative of and responsive to the will of the majority while at the same time promoting efficiency, putting self-interest to work in the service of the public interest.

If the elements of Public Choice, including utility, demand, supply, and cost, are applied to this case study; the story of the Quinn Bill’s evolution might be further analyzed and understood under Stolz’s framework (2002).

Symbolic politics induced a majority of taxpayers/voters to express a preference for, or at least agree to, the idea that higher education for police officers would be a public good. They were sufficiently persuaded of the utility of the idea, believing that it had potential benefits for themselves. The aggregate number of taxpayers/voters who
were persuaded through symbolic politics created sufficient demand for the policy, even at the cost needed to warrant its supply.

The political culture then became favorable for the passage of the Quinn Bill, and it remained viable as long as the taxpayers/voters deduced that the costs of forgoing the benefits of some other public policy and the utility of continuing the Quinn Bill remained within their preference.

Implementation of the legislation continued for several years as perceived market equilibrium (police officers willing to “buy” their education at a “price” schools were willing to sell) and consumer sovereignty prevailed. Eventually, however, the dynamic of diminishing utility emerged when taxpayers/voters began to question the value of the Quinn Bill and the wisdom of continuing it, concluding that money involved might be better spent elsewhere. Interest groups then mobilized to regain control of symbolic politics and the political culture and thereby maintain the implementation of the program.

The conflict that emerged and intensified, finding at least a compromise in the last analysis, was motivated by competing self-interests, symbolized by money. In the end, perhaps the public interest was served not because participants took a virtuous high ground but because self-interest required it. Parallels can be drawn between the above case study and the discussion put forth by Ward and Webb (1984) regarding opportunities for criminal justice education during the LEEP years and self-interest.

Perhaps this is simply another step in the ‘coming of age’ of criminal justice. While this may have happened, this case study demonstrates the incremental and conflicting nature of that process. It is not the conclusion of this research that academics in MA universally put aside their professional responsibility as educators for financial
gain. There were voices advocating for quality in criminal justice education, parallel to that at the national level, from the beginning. It does, however, demonstrate the reality that some criminal justice programs and educators through the evolution of the Quinn Bill, may have found themselves in a situation where conflicting interests created more confusion than clarity about where their responsibility lay. College administrators, Presidents, and Trustees, responsible for the financial viability of their institutions, had an opportunity to take economic advantage of the situation. Conflicting emotions and direction may have, to a certain extent, escaped faculty and departmental administrative control. Conflicting opinions about what they should be doing and how they should be doing it were all issues that arose in a situation none had experienced before. One value of the Quinn Bill was its unintended establishment of quality standards for criminal justice education. Thus, this case study shows that mandates or incentives, here in the form of standards, can be effective in putting quality along with financial gain as primary responsibilities of all involved. For a national agenda, quality standards, as learned from this case study tied to policy mandate or incentive may be the next logical step in moving criminal justice education further into its age.
REFERENCES


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John B. Palmer vs. Board of Selectmen of Marblehead & others, 368 Mass. 620 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1975).


Massachusetts General Laws 41 MGL 108L. Police career incentive pay program; salary increases; reimbursement of cities or towns. Boston, MA.


Woolley, J., & Peters, G. (1965, September 8). *Lyndon B.. Johnson-Remarks to the Members of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration*
APPENDIX A: TEXT OF THE QUINN BILL

Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 108L

Section 108L. There is hereby established a career incentive pay program offering base salary increases to regular full-time members of the various city and town police departments, uniformed members of the department of state police appointed under said section ten, state police detectives appointed under section ten of said chapter twenty-two C, as a reward for furthering their education in the field of policework.

Police career incentive base salary increases shall be predicated on the accumulation of points earned in the following manner: one point for each semester hour credit earned toward a baccalaureate or an associate degree; sixty points for an associate degree; one hundred and twenty points for a baccalaureate degree; and one hundred and fifty points for a degree of master or for a degree in law; provided, that said credits or degrees were earned in courses leading towards a degree in law enforcement or any course or degree program approved by the board of higher education prior to July 1st, 1976. All semester credits and degrees shall be earned in an educational institution accredited by the New England Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools or by the board of higher education, and shall be credited for the purpose of determining points under this section, notwithstanding the date of appointment of an individual to a position described in the first paragraph of this section.

The board of higher education is hereby authorized and directed to establish and maintain a list of approved courses leading to a degree in law enforcement.

Base salary increases authorized by this section shall be granted in the following manner: a three per cent increase for ten points so accumulated, a six per cent increase for
twenty-five points, a ten per cent increase for forty points, a fifteen per cent increase for sixty points, a twenty per cent increase for one hundred and twenty points, and a thirty per cent increase for one hundred and fifty points so accumulated.

Any city or town which accepts the provisions of this section and provides career incentive salary increases for police officers shall be reimbursed by the commonwealth for one half the cost of such payments upon certification by the board of higher education. The board of higher education shall certify the amount of such reimbursement to be paid to such city or town from information filed on or before September first of each year with said board, on a form furnished by it, the chief of police, or one of similar rank, of the city or town police department. The board of higher education shall also certify the amount of the career incentive salary increases to be allocated to the members of the department of state police appointed under section ten of chapter twenty-two C from information filed with said board on or before September first of each year by the colonel of state police. Said information shall be filed on a form to be furnished by the board of higher education.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, no such regular full-time police officer shall be entitled to such pay increase for points earned after September 1st, 1976; provided, however, that such police officer who is certified as of September 1st, 1976 in the police career incentive program leading to a degree in law enforcement shall only be granted further base salary increases of fifteen per cent for an associate’s degree in law enforcement, or sixty points earned toward a baccalaureate degree in law enforcement, a twenty per cent increase for a baccalaureate degree in law enforcement, a thirty per cent increase for a master’s degree in law enforcement or for a degree in law; or any police
officer enrolled in any course or degree program approved by the board of higher education, prior to July 1st, 1976, shall only be granted further base salary increases of fifteen per cent for an associate’s degree or sixty points earned toward a baccalaureate degree, a twenty per cent increase for a baccalaureate degree, and a thirty per cent increase for a master’s degree or for a degree in law, provided further, that such percentage increase shall in total, including any previously earned increase, not exceed fifteen per cent for an associate’s degree or sixty points earned toward a baccalaureate degree, twenty per cent for a baccalaureate degree, and thirty per cent for a master’s degree or for a degree in law, provided further, that any regular full-time police officer commencing such incentive pay program after September 1st, 1976 shall be granted a base salary increase of ten per cent upon attaining an associate’s degree in law enforcement or sixty points earned to a baccalaureate degree in law enforcement, a twenty per cent increase upon attaining a baccalaureate degree in law enforcement, and a twenty-five per cent increase upon attaining a master’s degree in law enforcement or for a degree in law.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the board of higher education shall establish quality guidelines, including, but not limited to, standards and review processes, for programs pursued for police career incentive pay increases under this section. Any such degree shall have been earned through a program approved by the board of higher education as meeting or exceeding academic standards established by the above-mentioned guidelines. Under no circumstances, shall said board certify any program which grants credits for the following: life experience; courses taught by instructors lacking appropriate educational degrees as determined by said board; and
courses lacking appropriate concentration on academic and scholarly research. For the purposes of fulfilling the duties and obligations set forth in this section, the board of higher education shall have the authority to conduct periodic reviews of criminal justice or law degree programs offered by independent regionally accredited colleges and universities. The board of higher education shall only certify career incentive pay increases earned through the completion of programs that meet the board’s guidelines, but police officers enrolled, prior to the implementation of the quality guidelines, in degree granting programs in order to receive career incentive base salary adjustments shall, upon attainment of said degree, be eligible for certification by the board of higher education to receive career incentive base salary increases pursuant to the provisions of this section in effect prior to the quality guidelines established pursuant to this paragraph. Police officers receiving career incentive base salary adjustments prior to the implementation of the quality guidelines shall continue to receive such base salary adjustments, as certified by said board, pursuant to the provisions of this section in effect prior to the quality guidelines established pursuant to this paragraph.

Only graduates of: (1) criminal justice or law enforcement programs that meet or exceed the guidelines for criminal justice and law enforcement programs, as set forth by the board of higher education and implemented on January 1, 2004; or (2) law schools that are New England Association of School and Colleges accredited or board approved and who have passed the Massachusetts bar examination, shall be eligible for the police career incentive pay program.

The president of a New England Association of Schools and Colleges accredited institution or board of higher education approved institution shall submit a letter of intent
to seek approval of its criminal justice degree program to the chancellor of higher education by May 1 of the year in which the institution intends to submit an application. The letter of intent shall include a statement of commitment to implement Standard D, Admission and Articulation, for all students enrolling in a criminal justice or law enforcement program after May 1 of the calendar year in which the letter is submitted. All programs shall meet the guidelines for criminal justice and law enforcement programs as approved by the board of higher education.

An application for approval as a police career incentive pay program participating institution shall be developed by the board of higher education and shall include the following: (1) a profile of the program; (2) demonstration of the program’s fulfillment of the standards as stated in the guidelines; and (3) an application fee to cover the evaluation costs of the review process. Applications shall be submitted according to the timetable established by the board of higher education.

Each institution shall pay an evaluation fee to the board of higher education’s police career incentive pay program quality assurance trust fund to cover the costs of review of its program. In addition to the fee, the institution shall pay for travel, room, board and other normal expenses of the external evaluation committee. If the committee requires subsequent visits, the board of higher education shall charge for further expenses at its discretion. Evaluation fees shall be determined by the total number of degrees awarded to all students enrolled in the criminal justice and law enforcement program being reviewed based on an average of the 3 years immediately prior to the submission of the application.
Fees shall be determined by the total number of degrees awarded to all students in the criminal justice and law enforcement program being reviewed in the following manner: $1,000 for institutions awarding fewer than 20 criminal justice or law enforcement degrees per year; $1,500 for institutions awarding between 20 and 50 criminal justice or law enforcement degrees per year; $2,000 for institutions awarding between 51 and 100 criminal justice or law enforcement degrees per year; $2,500 for institutions awarding between 101 and 150 criminal justice or law enforcement degrees per year; $3,000 for institutions awarding between 151 and 200 criminal justice or law enforcement degrees per year; and $3,500 for institutions awarding over 200 criminal justice or law enforcement degrees per year.

Once an application is submitted, the following timetable shall apply: (1) within 30 business days, board staff shall determine whether or not the application is complete and notify the institution; (2) within 30 business days of notification to the institution that the application is complete, an external evaluation committee shall be appointed in accordance with the guidelines; (3) within 30 business days of completing the evaluation of a program’s application, the external evaluation committee shall submit a report to board staff; (4) within 30 business days of receipt of the report, board staff shall send the committee’s report to the institution with a response required; (5) the institution may request an extension, if needed, to respond adequately to the committee’s report; (6) within 30 business days of receiving the institution’s response, the staff of the board shall evaluate materials submitted by the institution, the committee’s written report, the written response from the institution, and any additional information submitted by the institution, including a request for a delay; (7) based on its review, board staff shall make a
recommendation to the board for deferral, approval, or disapproval, and the board shall take action by formal vote; and (8) if the board’s determination is to disapprove the institution’s request, the board shall provide a statement of reasons for the decision.

Programs approved by the board of higher education shall be included on an approved program list for 5 years. The institutions shall annually submit a status report on its approved programs to the board. Programs receiving deferrals from the board shall receive specific conditions that must be met and a timetable for coming into compliance. Programs not approved by the board may not re-apply for at least 1 calendar year following the board’s determination.

When, in the judgment of the board staff, a review or inspection of a degree program is necessary, the board, in consultation with the applicant institution, shall select and appoint an external evaluation committee to serve in the following manner: (1) the committee shall review the materials submitted by the program, visit the institution, and submit a report to the board containing recommendations regarding the program’s request for approval; (2) the number of reviewers on the committee shall be determined by size, number and level of the program being reviewed and shall, under no circumstances have fewer than 2 academicians; (3) to be eligible to serve as an evaluator, individuals shall have earned at least a master’s degree in criminal justice or a closely related discipline and academic team members shall have professional experience in college-level teaching, research, administration or other relevant activities with institutions of higher education, and practitioners shall have at least 5 years of full-time supervisory or administrative experience as a criminal justice practitioner, as well as specific knowledge of or experience in criminal justice education; (4) no person shall serve as an evaluator who is
employed by an institution considered by the board to be in direct competition with the institution under review; (5) no person shall serve as an evaluator who has a present or recent official or unofficial connection with the institution under review, or who the board has reason to believe has independent or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the board’s final action; provided, however, that external evaluators shall have a disinterested professional commitment to the task of rendering objective finding and recommendations based upon empirical evidence and informed judgments; (6) each committee shall have a chairperson who shall be responsible for providing leadership to the committee, for being the committee’s liaison with the institution and for preparing with other committee members, the committee’s report; (7) the committee shall submit a written report, including recommendations to the board, and board staff shall forward a copy of the report to the institution to correct factual errors and respond to the content and recommendations within the report; (8) evaluators shall be given an honorarium by the board of higher education and all expenses shall be paid by the institution under review; and (9) evaluators shall be provided an orientation before conducting reviews.

Annually, each approved institution shall submit 2 copies of a report to the board reviewing the status of the institution’s criminal justice and law enforcement program. This report shall certify that the criminal justice program is being maintained and operated within the provisions and guidelines set forth by the board of higher education guidelines for criminal justice and law enforcement programs. If at any time, in the judgment of the board staff, there is a reasonable probability of non-compliance with the board’s guidelines by a particular institution, the board may review the institution to determine if continued approval of the institution is proper.
An institution that is in objection of an adverse decision may appeal the board’s determination. The appeal shall be heard by a review panel appointed by the board of higher education and the findings and recommendations of the panel shall be received by the board whose decision shall be final.
APPENDIX B: QUINN BILL INTEREST GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE

I. Your Agency/Position and Your Work

1. Please tell me about your agency/organization. (PROBE: major functions, etc.)

2. Please tell me about your work. (PROBE: title, role and responsibilities, how long at current agency)

II. The Quinn Bill

1. As you know, the Massachusetts Quinn Bill was established more than 40 years ago. What can you tell me about your role with the Massachusetts Quinn Bill?

2. How did you contribute to the Quinn Bill process? (PROBE: stages of involvement over time and why)

3. What were you seeking to accomplish with the Quinn Bill?

4. What resources were or did you see developing to meet the goals of the Quinn Bill?

5. What do you think about what has happened with the Quinn Bill?

III. Criminal Justice Programs and the Quinn Bill

1. What changes do you see criminal justice programs as having experienced since the Quinn Bill’s inception?

2. Did you see changes at some institutions more than others as a result of the Quinn Bill? Why? (PROBE: enrollment, financial incentives, quality standards, faculty, curriculum)

3. How would you characterize those institutions that have experienced such change?

4. Do you think that the Quinn Bill was responsible for increased enrollment in criminal justice programs in Massachusetts colleges and universities?
The Quinn Bill specifies that police officers will receive salary increases only if they receive degrees specifically designated as “criminal justice” or “police science.” In your opinion, was the prospect of increased revenue from the Quinn Bill the only motive for colleges to create or expand criminal justice departments at their institutions? (PROBE: motives, etc.)

IV. Quality Standards

1. Years after the Quinn Bill became law, the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education (MDHE) was instructed by the state legislature to establish quality standards for all criminal justice programs offered by both public and private colleges and universities. Do you think the quality of criminal justice programs varied widely among the different colleges and universities prior to the implementation of the MDHE standards? (PROBE: questionable quality, etc.)

2. Do you think concern about the academic quality of criminal justice programs was stimulated only by the increased cost to taxpayers that Quinn Bill salary increases imposed?

3. Do you think faculty in criminal justice departments had concerns about program quality independently of the MDHE? (PROBE: were concerns addressed by MDHE, administrators, etc.)

4. Do you think the quality standards imposed by the MDHE caused more institutions to improve their criminal justice programs? (PROBE: Would improvement have been an issue without the standards? Did some colleges conform to standards without actually improving the quality of their programs in any substantive way?)
5. Is there anything else you would like to share regarding your overall impression of the effects of the Quinn Bill on the quality of higher education programs at Massachusetts colleges and universities? (PROBE: faculty, curriculum)

6. What do you see as the future of the Quinn Bill?

   Interviewer’s Comments (cooperation, knowledge, attitude, location):
APPENDIX C: CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM INTEREST GROUP

INTERVIEW GUIDE

I. Your Institution and Your Work

1. Please tell me about your institution. (PROBE: public/private, enrollment trends, mission)

2. Please tell me about your work. (PROBE: title, role and responsibilities, how long at current agency, positions with other institutions)

II. Criminal Justice Program

1. Please tell me about your criminal justice program.

2. What is your program’s mission?

3. What is your program’s history? (PROBE: date first offered, enrollment trends, Quinn Bill approval date)

4. Which degrees/majors/minors are offered?

5. Where are your programs offered?

6. Under which modes of delivery is your program offered?

7. What are your programs enrollments? Percent of total institutional enrollment?

8. Please discuss your curriculum. (PROBE: objectives, foundation areas)

9. Please discuss your faculty. (PROBE: full-time/part-time, credentials, percent reliance on part-time)

10. Please discuss the resources you have to administer your criminal justice program.

III. The Quinn Bill

1. As you know, the Massachusetts Quinn Bill was established more than 40 years ago.

What can you tell me about your role with the Massachusetts Quinn Bill?
2. How did your institution contribute to the Quinn Bill process? (PROBE: stages of involvement over time and why)

3. What do you see the Quinn Bill as seeking to accomplish?

4. What resources do you see as needing to have developed to meet the goals of the Quinn Bill?

5. What do you think about what has happened with the Quinn Bill?

III. Criminal Justice Programs and the Quinn Bill

1. What changes do you see criminal justice programs as having experienced since the Quinn Bill’s inception?

2. Did you see changes at some institutions more than others as a result of the Quinn Bill? Why? (PROBE: enrollment, financial incentives, quality standards, faculty, curriculum)

3. How would you characterize those institutions that have experienced such change?

4. How would you characterize any change that has occurred at your institution as a result of the Quinn Bill? (PROBE: enrollment, financial incentives, quality standards, faculty, curriculum)

5. Do you think that the Quinn Bill was responsible for increased enrollment in criminal justice programs in Massachusetts colleges and universities? Your institution?

6. The Quinn Bill specifies that police officers will receive salary increases only if they receive degrees specifically designated as “criminal justice” or “police science.” In your opinion, was the prospect of increased revenue from the Quinn Bill the only motive for colleges to create or expand criminal justice departments at their institutions? (PROBE: motives, etc.) Your institution?
IV. Quality Standards

1. Years after the Quinn Bill became law, the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education (MDHE) was instructed by the state legislature to establish quality standards for all criminal justice programs offered by both public and private colleges and universities. Do you think the quality of criminal justice programs varied widely among the different colleges and universities prior to the implementation of the MDHE standards? (PROBE: questionable quality, etc.)

2. Do you think concern about the academic quality of criminal justice programs was stimulated only by the increased cost to taxpayers that Quinn Bill salary increases imposed?

3. Do you think faculty in criminal justice departments had concerns about program quality independently of the MDHE? (PROBE: Were concerns addressed by MDHE, administrators, etc.?)

4. Were you concerned about your program’s quality and what was happening within your institution? (PROBE: What happened to those concerns?)

5. Do you think the quality standards imposed by the MDHE caused institutions to improve their criminal justice programs? (PROBE: Would improvement have been an issue without the standards? Did some colleges conform to standards without actually improving the quality of their programs in any substantive way?)

6. Was any change (PROBE: growth, curricular change, faculty, quality, perception, resources) in criminal justice degree programs (new program or expanded existing program) stimulated by reasons other than the anticipation of economic rewards for
the institutions and their students under the Quinn Bill? In other words, did they change as a result of the Quinn Bill? MDHE’s oversight?

7. Is there anything else you would like to share regarding your overall impression of the effects of the Quinn Bill on the quality of higher education programs at Massachusetts colleges and universities? Your own institution? (PROBE: faculty, curriculum)

8. What do you see as future trends for criminal justice programs given the current state of the Quinn Bill?

**Interviewer’s Comments (cooperation, knowledge, attitude, location):**
APPENDIX D: INFORMED CONSENT FORM
(Adopted through the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs at Rutgers University, http://orsp.rutgers.edu/Humans/policy_socialbehavior.php)

The Massachusetts Quinn Bill: A Case Study in the Quest for Quality

You are invited to participate in a research study to be conducted by Patricia Gavin, a student in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to examine the development and impact of the Massachusetts Police Pay Incentive Program (the Quinn Bill) relative to criminal justice education in Massachusetts.

The study consists of interview questions and should last approximately one hour. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be assigned a code number that will be recorded and used on an interview guide. Interviews will be aided with the use of a microcassette recorder. The information provided will be confidential. The information will be kept confidential by limiting access to the research data and keeping it in a secure location. The researcher and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time without penalty. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

If you have any questions about the study, you may contact Patricia Gavin at 508.849.3377. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Sponsored Programs Administrator at Rutgers University at:

Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
3 Rutgers Plaza
New Brunswick, NJ 08901–8559
Tel: 732-932-0150
Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.

Please sign below if you agree to participate in this research study.

Subject _____________________________________________ Date
________________________________________

Principal Investigator _____________________________ Date
________________________________________
APPENDIX E: POPULATION OF QUINN BILL APPROVED INSTITUTIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS

Massachusetts institutions with approved criminal justice programs under the Quinn Bill by institution, degree, and location, 2012 (N = 30)

American International College: BS Springfield
Anna Maria College: BS, MS Paxton
Bridgewater State University: BS, MS Bridgewater
Bristol Community College: AS Fall River
Bunker Hill Community College: AS Boston
Cape Cod Community College: AS West Barnstable
Curry College: BA, MA Milton
Dean College: AS Franklin
Endicott College: BS Beverly
Fitchburg State University: BS Fitchburg
Greenfield Community College: AS Greenfield
Holyoke Community College: AS Holyoke
Lasell College: BS Newton
Massachusetts Bay Community College: AS Wellesley Hills
Massasoit Community College: AS Brockton
Middlesex Community College: AS Bedford
Mount Wachusett Community College: AS Gardner
North Shore Community College: AS Danvers
Northeastern University: BS, MS Boston
Northern Essex Community College: AS Haverhill
Quincy College: AS Quincy
Quinsigamond Community College: AS Worcester
Roxbury Community College: AS Roxbury Crossing
Salem State University: BS Salem
Springfield Technical Community College: AS Springfield
University of Massachusetts Boston: BA Boston
University of Massachusetts Lowell: BS, MA Lowell
Western New England University: BS Springfield
Westfield State University: BS, MS Westfield
Worcester State University: BS Worcester