

From Mandatory to Voluntary:

A Study of Nonprofit Information Sharing in Public-Nonprofit Collaboration

By

Shuyang Peng

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Professor Gregg G. Van Ryzin

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ABSTRACT

In public-nonprofit collaboration, information sharing is an essential activity that can advance a common understanding, resolve conflict, and enhance the capacity of both parties. Although previous research has well documented how the wealth of knowledge that nonprofit organizations have can facilitate problem solving and policy making in government, few studies have examined the motivational factors driving such information/knowledge sharing by nonprofit organizations. Adopting a social psychology framework of cooperation theory, this dissertation attempts to address this gap in our understanding.

The dissertation views information sharing by nonprofits as a cooperative behavior composed of two dimensions - required and voluntary information sharing. Employing a mixed methods design, this dissertation first explores the concept of voluntary information sharing using a qualitative study, and then quantitatively tests the effects of instrumental and social motivational factors on predicting both types of sharing.

By conducting interviews with 22 executive directors of nonprofit organizations in the State of New Jersey, the qualitative findings suggest that nonprofits engage in a variety of voluntary information sharing in collaboration with government. Specifically, three themes of information emerge: information about the organization, knowledge about the client and the community, and other specific types of information. A close examination reveals such voluntary sharing comes from instrumental and social motivational perspective. Instrumental perspective explains that nonprofit organizations voluntarily share information in order to acquire funding, resource, publicity, and

reputation. On the other hand, social motivational perspective suggests that nonprofits engage in voluntary information sharing because it is consistent with the organizations' values, image, and identity.

In quantitatively testing the effects of instrumental and social motivational factors on required and voluntary information sharing, this dissertation utilizes a data set from a national survey of 424 nonprofit organizations. The results of hierarchical regression analysis indicate instrumental factors, such as government funding and formal service contract, are two major factors predicting required information sharing by nonprofit organizations. However, social motivational factors in terms of affective commitment, goal congruence, and motive-based trust are most influential in shaping voluntary information sharing. Overall, the dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the motivational factors underlying nonprofit information sharing activities, which also offers broader implications for managing public-nonprofit collaboration.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....	 1
 CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	 7
2.1 Setting the Background: the Collaboration between Public and Nonprofit Organizations.....	 7
2.2 Information Sharing in Public-Nonprofit Collaboration.....	21
2.3 A Social-Psychological Model of Interorganizational Information Sharing	30
 CHAPTER III: TWO MODELS OF INFORMATION SHARING.....	 36
3.1 Instrumental Motivational Model.....	36
3.2 Social Motivational Model.....	41
 CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN	 48
4.1 A Mixed Methods Research Design	48
4.2 The Selection of Human Service Nonprofit Organizations.....	49
4.3 The First Phase: A Qualitative Study	50
4.4 The Second Phase: A Quantitative Study	54
 CHAPTER V: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS.....	 63
5.1 Description of the Organizations in the Interview.....	63
5.2 No Voluntary Information Sharing	68
5.3 Voluntary Information Sharing and Motivations.....	69
5.4 Discussion of Qualitative Findings	78

CHAPTER VI: QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS.....	83
6.1 Representativeness of the Sample	83
6.2 Descriptive Statistics and Measurement of the Dependent Variables	86
6.3 Descriptive Statistics	92
6.4 Hierarchical Regression Results	102
6.5 Discussion of Quantitative Findings	110
 CHAPTER VII: IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS.....	 117
7.1 Theoretical Contribution	117
7.2 Practical Implications.....	119
7.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions	121
 REFERENCES.....	 124
APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL.....	139
APPENDIX B. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE.....	140
APPENDIX C. SURVEY INVITATION MESSAGES.....	151
APPENDIX D. MEASUREMENT.....	154
APPENDIX E. CORRELATION MATRIX OF ALL VARIABLES.....	156

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Excluded Organizations in the Sample	52
Table 4.2 The Number of Organizations in the Population Stratified by Revenue Size and Service Sector	56
Table 4.3 The Number of Organizations in the Sample Stratified by Revenue Size and Service Sector	56
Table 5.1 Revenue Sizes of Interview Organizations	64
Table 5.2 Organizations by Service Sector, Type, and Revenue.....	65
Table 5.3 The Characteristics of Public-Nonprofit Collaboration.....	67
Table 5.4 Three Themes of Information Voluntarily Shared.....	78
Table 5.5 Motivational Factors and the Corresponding Types Of Information	82
Table 6.1. The Percentage Distribution of Organizations in the Population by Revenue Size and Service Sector	84
Table 6.2 The Percentage Distribution of Organizations in the Final Sample by Revenue Size and Service Sector.....	84
Table 6.3 Examples of Organizations Included in the Final Sample	85
Table 6.4 Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Value, and Midpoint of Dependent Variables	90
Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics of Required Information Sharing	91
Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics I.....	99
Table 6.7 Descriptive Statistics II	100
Table 6.8 Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Value, and Midpoint of Independent Variables	100
Table 6.9. Correlation Matrix of the Study Variables	101
Table 6.10 Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis of Required Information Sharing.....	107
Table 6.11 Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Voluntary Information Sharing.....	109

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1 A Model of Required Information Sharing	46
Figure 3.2 A Model of Voluntary Information Sharing	47
Figure 6.1 Required VS. Voluntary Information Sharing	88
Figure 6.2 Distribution of Voluntary Information Sharing	90
Figure 6.3 Distribution of Required Information Sharing.....	91
Figure 6.4 Distribution of Required Information Sharing (Coded as Dichotomous Variable)	91
Figure 6.5 Principle Service Areas of the Public-Nonprofit Collaboration.....	93
Figure 6.6 Ways of Public-Nonprofit Collaboration	95

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Now more than ever, the growing interdependence between public and nonprofit organizations in addressing and tackling social issues has evolved toward more collaborative and interactive partnership (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Such public-nonprofit collaboration spreads across various service areas such as arts and culture, community action, economic development, fire, parks and recreation, and health and human services (Gazley 2008). The collaboration between public and nonprofit organizations allows them to bring to the table their own set of advantages (Selsky and Parker 2005), which often produce a “synergistic” effect that each organization would not achieve alone (Kouwenhoven 1993, 120). For instance, the partnership is enhanced when government brings its advantages via stable financial resource, professional expertise, diversity in service delivery, and a democratic public priority setting. This combines with the advantages of nonprofits with their flexible and small scale of operation, social service expertise, community knowledge, and access to charitable resource and voluntary labor (Salamon 1995).

Information sharing not only represents an essential resource exchange activity between government and nonprofit organizations, but it is also critical to the success of every stage of public-nonprofit collaboration (Balser and McClusky, 2005; Brown and Troutt, 2004; Cho and Gillespie, 2006; Linden, 2002; and Shaw, 2003). Through information sharing, government provides nonprofits with expertise and technical assistance (Saidel 1991), and nonprofits can provide a wealth of social service expertise and local knowledge of the community with the potential to facilitate problem solving

and policy making (Alexander and Nank 2009; Frumkin and Andre-Clark 2000; Huxham and Vangen 1996).

A number of empirical studies have documented how information and knowledge possessed by nonprofit organizations tends to improve the capacity of government in service delivery and policy implementation. For instance, Alexander and Nank (2009) find that nonprofit organizations bring their in-depth knowledge about their community into the collaboration and assist government to develop services suited to the needs of the communities. Hale (2011) provides examples of how synthesized information about drug court programs in the forms of best practices, model programs, and program evaluation help local and state government in securing funding and implementing programs. The reasons nonprofit organizations can contribute in the information relationship with government are because their closeness to the community, a history of engagement in public sphere and connection to government policy making, and serving as the intermediary between the state and the citizen (Hale 2011).

Information sharing between public and nonprofit organizations involves two fundamental issues: 1) the information receptivity and absorptive capacity of government, and 2) the willingness of nonprofit organizations to share information. Information receptivity and absorptive capacity of government concerns the willingness and capacity of government to assimilate information and knowledge. From this perspective, public management scholars have called for public managers to build collaborative networks that allow cross-sector collaboration in providing goods and services and solving problems (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Isett et al. 2011; O'Toole 1997). Furthermore, public managers need to create "knowledge-based power sharing" by transforming the

“traditional bureaucratic and interest group repositories of information” that dominates decision making to collaborative problem solving, which allows community stakeholders to contribute their “folk knowledge” or “local knowledge” (Weber 2009, 321). Alexander, Nank, and Stivers (1999) also point out in order for government and nonprofit organizations work collaboratively, nonprofit organizations need to become more accountable, and government need to recognize the knowledge base of nonprofit organizations in professional services and in the community.

While government’s receptivity and capacity to assimilate and learn from the information transmitted by nonprofit organizations is important, the willingness of nonprofit organizations to share this information is even more important. In the private sector, information and knowledge are assets that provide corporations with competitive advantages (Davenport and Prusak 2000). The need to protect these advantages often is the primary obstacle to sharing. Although information and knowledge in nonprofit organizations are not as confidential and proprietary as in the private sector, there are still factors that may prevent nonprofit organizations from sharing information. For instance, Dawes (1996) and Dawes, Cresswell, and Pardo (2009) state that even if there is no financial or tangible value at risk, revealing information may impose negative consequences on organizations such as the threat of embarrassment or sanction, being criticized for giving bad advice, or regret associated with letting others get a “free ride” on their own knowledge. As such, if benefits of information sharing are not clear for nonprofit organizations, they may feel reluctant to share information with government.

In addition, information sharing is often shaped by the dynamic interactions between collaborating organizations (Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Tsang 2008). And

public-nonprofit collaboration is often characterized by power imbalances - simply given the role of government as the main resource contributor (Elbers and Schulpen 2011; Harlan and Saidel 1994). These power imbalances can shape the interaction between public and nonprofit organizations, which in turn can influence information sharing activities of nonprofit organizations. Yet, there is a lack of understanding about the influence of the dynamic interaction (e.g. trust and justice) on nonprofits' information sharing activities. This is because the study of information sharing has been mainly carried out in network research that studies the influence of network structure and network tie strength (e.g. Huang 2014; Huang and Provan 2006, 2007) and in information technology research that examines information sharing in the context of public organizations (e.g. Dawes 1996; Gil-Garcia, Chun, and Janssen 2009).

The dissertation, therefore, responds to the gap in our understanding about information sharing in the dyadic relation between public and nonprofit organizations. In particular, the influence of the dynamic interactions (e.g. trust and justice) on information sharing conducted by nonprofit organizations. Consistent with the call for more applied studies of social psychology in collaboration research (e.g. Bingham and O'Leary 2006), this dissertation adopts a cooperation theory developed by Tyler (2011) to examine information sharing in public-nonprofit collaboration. Focusing mainly on the nonprofit aspect of these collaborations, this dissertation views information sharing as a cooperative behavior composed of two dimensions: required and voluntary information sharing. Required information sharing describes the process whereby nonprofit organizations share information because they are required to do so by government; voluntary information sharing describes self-initiated information sharing by nonprofit

organizations. In the context of public-nonprofit collaboration, required information sharing is widely discussed. For instance, Boris, de Leon, Roeger, and Nikolova (2010) find that government requires nonprofit organizations to report information such as narratives of program accomplishments, outcomes, administrative data, and audits. Voluntary information sharing by nonprofit organizations, on the other hand, is less understood.

Hence, this dissertation is designed to first examine voluntary information sharing conducted by nonprofit organizations. Specifically, in the dissertation I examine the types of information that nonprofit organizations voluntarily share with government and the underlying motives driving these sharing behaviors. I, then, test the effects of two specific motivation models - instrumental and social motivational - on required and voluntary information sharing. Representing the two origins of motivation theory, the instrumental perspective aligns with rational choice theory, which emphasizes the use of incentives or sanctions to motivate cooperative behavior. The social motivational perspective is socially and relationally embedded. In this study I argue that aspects of, both, the instrumental motivational perspective (e.g., formal service contracts, government funding, instrumental trust, and distributive justice) and the social motivational perspective (e.g., goal congruence, affective commitment, motive-based trust, and procedural justice) have an impact on required and voluntary information sharing. I propose, though, that factors associated with the instrumental motivational perspective will be more influential in predicting required information sharing, while factors associated with the social motivational perspective will be more powerful in shaping voluntary information sharing.

Following this chapter, there are six chapters. The second chapter is literature review that contains three sections. The first section of the literature review provides background information regarding public-nonprofit collaboration. The second section reviews literature relating to information sharing. The third section introduces the theory of voluntary cooperation developed by Tyler (2011). This chapter of literature review ends with a discussion of research questions. The third chapter proposes hypotheses developed under two motivational frameworks of information sharing. The fourth chapter details the research design and the mixed methods approach utilized in this study. The fifth chapter discusses the qualitative findings and the sixth chapter discusses the quantitative findings. The final chapter concludes the dissertation and provides implications, limitations, and several potential directions for future research.

CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Setting the Background: the Collaboration between Public and Nonprofit Organizations

2.1.1 Privatization, Devolution, and Public-Nonprofit Relations

The complex and dynamic relation between government and nonprofit organizations is deeply rooted in the political ideologies of the proper role of government, preference for market structures, and varying value priorities (Grønbjerg and Salamon 2012; Smith and Grønbjerg 2006). In the past several decades, the policies of privatization and devolution have significantly shaped government and nonprofit interactions (Austin 2003). Privatization refers to the shift of activities, functions, or production of goods from public to private providers (Starr 1988); the changing purposes, forms, and content of privatization over the years along with different administrations (Abramovitz 1986) have varying effects on nonprofit organizations and their relationships with the government.

Although privatization gained its popularity in the 1970s and 1980s (Starr 1988), the use of nonprofit and for-profit organizations in public service delivery through grants, contracts, and tax incentives, had begun long before the twentieth century (Gruin 1989). But during the War on Poverty in the 1960s and 1970s, privatization resurged. This resurgence was primarily stimulated from an increase in government spending on welfare programs. Welfare spending during this time soared from \$77 billion in 1965 to \$290 billion in 1975 (McMillan and Bixby 1980). The expansion of the welfare state not only created new markets and opportunities for nonprofit and for-profit sectors to engage in

social service delivery (Abramovitz 1986), but also led to the increasing reliance of government on these two sectors (James 1987; Salamon 1995; Smith and Lipsky 1993; Wolch 1990).

Privatization under the Reagan Administration was intended to dismantle social welfare programs and increase the involvement of for-profit organizations in vying for grants and contracts that nonprofit organizations were the primary recipient (Abramovitz 1986; Grønbjerg and Salamon 2012). Nonprofit organizations, especially in the areas of legal services, housing and community development, employment training, and social service, experienced a remarkable reduction of government funding during this period (Salamon 1995). In response to federal funding cuts, some nonprofit organizations had to reduce their operations and became more commercialized by increasing service fees and charges (Liebschutz 1992; Salamon 1995). The Reagan Administration thus undermined the role of nonprofit organizations in public service delivery. As Salamon suggests (1995), this administration failed to rationalize the public-nonprofit relations and strengthen their partnership in public service delivery.

Nevertheless, during the late twentieth century, the movement of New Public Management (NPM) together with policies of devolution have dramatically reshaped government-nonprofit relations and has resulted in a stronger partnership (Alexander 1999). NPM advocates for replacing a growing inefficient bureaucracy with a market-oriented entrepreneurial government. One of its core principles is to transform the role of government from “rowing” (i.e. direct service delivery) to “steering” (i.e. governance) (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). This transformation can be done through marketization of public service to nonprofit and for-profit organizations. It also assumes public service

delivery can become more efficient and effective by bringing in market mechanisms and creating competition within the units of government as well as across government boundaries to include both nonprofit and for profit organizations.

Together with the NPM movement, policies of devolution are guided by the assumption that decisions can be tailored to meet local preferences, if they are made by people and government institutions that are close to the problem. In general, it refers to the policies that shift responsibility and decision-making authority from the federal government to state and local governments. It can also refer to federal expenditure cuts and state and local government may assume more responsibilities in compensating the funding losses (De Vita and Twombly 2006). The passage of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, also known as welfare reform, ended welfare entitlement and shifted the emphasis from providing cash assistance to enabling client self-sufficiency (Allard 2009). Welfare reform facilitated the devolution of authority from the federal government to the state and local level, which allowed the flexibility to experiment with more effective service delivery methods by using public-private partnership or service agreement (Gazley 2004).

Welfare reform has resulted in an increase in nonprofit activities and involvement in welfare-related programs; but at the same time, it has also imposed challenges on nonprofit operation and capacity in response to an increasing workload and competitive funding environment (Reisch and Sommerfeld 2003). With welfare reform came a shifted emphasis from cash assistance to service assistance, which was intended to promote client independence; and as a result, nonprofit organizations now have to compete with

for-profit organizations in service areas such as work readiness and employment - areas where traditional nonprofit organizations have not traditionally had strong competitive advantages (Grønbjerg and Salamon 2012). Even so, nonprofit organizations impacted by welfare reform utilized a variety of strategies to adapt to these challenges. For instance, Alexander's (2000) study of children and youth services organizations in Cuyahoga County, Ohio suggests that nonprofit organizations adapt by expanding service programs, adopting new management techniques such as strategic planning, technological capacity building, marketing, and fundraising, cultivating and strengthening ties with other organizations, and commercialization of service programs.

Despite the policy changes and challenges that nonprofit organizations have encountered in several decades, the number of charities¹ registered with the IRS has soared from 276,000 in 1977 to more than 1 million in 2007 (Grønbjerg and Salamon 2012). This growth has continued to current day and the number of charities has reached 1.4 million in 2014. Not only has the number of nonprofit organizations expanded tremendously, but nonprofit organizations have also been moved to the center of the policy debates about the proper role of government and have become a key instrument in welfare reform and development (Anheier and Salamon 2006). In 2009, a national survey estimated government agencies awarded 200,000 contracts and grants to human service nonprofits that valued more than \$100 billion (Boris et al. 2010). In addition, among the human service organizations receiving government contracts and grants, government funding accounted for 65 percent of the total revenue and was the single largest source of funding for 60 percent of these organizations (Boris et al. 2010).

¹ Nonprofit organizations recognized under section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4)

As the mutual dependence between government and nonprofit organizations intensifies, concerns that government influence may threaten the independence and autonomy of nonprofit organizations have drawn continuous academic attentions. For nonprofit organizations, government funding is the double-edged sword that, on one hand, it can contribute to improving capacity, increasing legitimacy, and enabling mission achievement (Allard 2009; DiMaggio and Powell 1983); on the other hand, it may also bring about a series of negative, and unintended side effects for nonprofit organizations. For instance, a common concern is that government funding may lead to mission drift, because nonprofit organizations may compromise their mission by tailoring the mission to meet funding requirements (Ferris 1993; Gazley and Brudney 2007; Lipsky and Smith 1989; Salamon 1995). Government funding may also lead to bureaucratization and professionalization of nonprofit organizations due to government financial and accountability control (Gazley and Brudney 2007; Grønbjerg 1993; Lipsky and Smith 1989; Salamon 1995). In response to the potential harmful effects of government funding on nonprofit organizations, Brinkerhoff (2002) argues that it is crucial for nonprofits to stick to their missions and values, which are endorsed by their key stakeholders. She also contends that it is important for nonprofits to protect the uniqueness of their organizational identity from other sources of influence that may distort the mission, goals, and values.

2.1.2 Theoretical Frameworks of Public-Nonprofit Relations

Scholarly work on theorizing public and nonprofit relations has progressed during the past decades as well. In his classic framework of government-nonprofit relations, Young (2000) views nonprofit organizations as playing – “supplementary,”

“complementary,” or “adversarial” roles in their relations with government. The supplementary framework is built on transactional economics and has its origin in Weisbrod’s (1975) government failure theory. The framework suggests that nonprofit organizations supplement service provision that government fails to provide. Government failure theory, however, has been cited for its inadequacy in fully explaining the current government and nonprofit relationships that exist (Lecy and Van Slyke 2012).

The complementary framework, on the other hand, does not consider nonprofit organizations as the derivative institution that fills in when other institutions fail (Salamon 1995). Instead, it considers government and nonprofit organizations as having “a partnership or contractual relationship in which government finances public services and nonprofit deliver them” (Young 2000, 153). As the primary advocate of complementary framework, Salamon (1995) points out that the inherent advantages and drawbacks of nonprofit organizations and government signify opportunities for partnership that “combines the service-delivery advantages of voluntary organizations with the revenue-generating and democratic priority-setting advantages of government” (Salamon 1995, 109). Salamon (1995) promotes a new governance model of public service delivery (Gazley and Brudney 2007) by advocating a cooperative relationship between government and nonprofit organizations whereby each sector complements the other with its own strengths.

Adversarial framework, based on Young’s (2000) conceptualization, looks at the tension and potential conflict between government and nonprofit organizations in the areas of policy advocacy and contractual arrangements. Under the lens of economic theory, nonprofit organizations’ advocacy for the interests of the minority population of

voters; and this may stand in opposition to government – who is driven by the preference of the median voter. The result could be government accepting the stance of nonprofit organizations or enacting regulations to restrict nonprofit advocacy (Young 2000). Also, in the area of contractual arrangements, government as the principal must prevent nonprofit organizations as the agent from opportunistic behavior and ensure the organizations' accountability. Although contract failure theory posits that the characteristic of the nondistribution of profit constraint makes nonprofit organizations a trustworthy agent (Hansmann 1987), tensions can also arise when such trustworthiness is violated (Young 2000).

Whereas the frameworks provided by Young (2000) mostly built on economic theory, frameworks brought forth by Smith and Grønbjerg (2006) offer additional insights using political theory and institutional theory. They examine government-nonprofit relations using three models - demand/supply model, civil society/social capital model, and neo-institutional model. The demand/supply model has its origins in economic theory that is in-line with the supplementary and complementary framework discussed in Young's work. Although the demand/supply model helps us to analyze and understand the increasingly complex relationship between nonprofits and government in public service provision, Smith and Grønbjerg (2006) contend that this model largely undermines the dynamic political interaction between two sectors.

The civil society/social capital model highlights the political interaction between two sectors. It emphasizes the political role of nonprofit organizations in promoting democratic values such as responsiveness, citizen participation, and social capital. It views nonprofit organizations as the intermediary institution between the state and

citizenry, which enables civic participation and enhances community responsibilities in solving social problems (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006). Nonprofit organizations create a public sphere for communities to work together toward solving collective problems, through which interpersonal relationships among community members are strengthened and collaborative social network can be built. Such building of social capital, according to Putnam (1995) is important to the building of civil society. In addition, the social movement perspective suggests that through active advocacy and other political activities, nonprofit organizations play a crucial role in challenging the status quo of government policy and driving policy changes.

Nonprofit organizations may, as the adversarial framework suggests, have a conflicting relationship with government on policy issues. Under this adversarial model, the relations between government and nonprofit organizations can be conflicting in ways that the growth of government provision may threaten civil society or nonprofit organizations may advocate for opposing agendas and values with government (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006; Smith and Lipsky 1993). Nonetheless, there have been some studies that have found that government funding by no means constrains nonprofit advocacy activities (e.g. Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Child and Grønbjerg 2007). Still, studies have also found government funding is positively associated with nonprofit's engagement in advocacy activities (e.g. Salamon 2002; Suárez and Hwang 2008; Leroux and Goerdel 2009; Moulton and Eckerd 2012) and shapes advocacy tactics employed by nonprofit organizations (Mosley 2012).

While the demand/supply model looks at the transactional exchange between government and nonprofit organizations, and the civil society/social capital model

considers nonprofit organizations as the critical link between the state and civil society, the neo-institutional model emphasizes the ways that government legislation, mandates, and policies can influence nonprofit organizations through shaping the institutional environment they operate within (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006). Government is capable of creating a hospitable environment for the growth and vibrancy of nonprofit organizations; at the same time, it is also capable of suppressing the development of the nonprofit sector through legislation, political influence, and financial support. The policies of devolution and privatization in the a few decades are perfect examples to illustrate this institutional perspective of government-nonprofit relations. The key of neo-institutional model, according to Smith and Grønbjerg (2008), is the interdependence between government and nonprofit organizations at the organizational level and the embeddedness in terms of the social network ties between public and nonprofit officials.

2.1.3 Defining Public-Nonprofit Collaboration

A survey of studies examining interorganizational collaboration suggests the “untidy character” (Ansell and Gash 2007, 544) of its conceptualizations and interpretations – primarily because the topic itself extends beyond any one discipline, research paradigm, theoretical perspective, and sectoral focus (Huxham 2013). Such untidiness is also produced by the complexity of the concept itself, varying scholarly definitions tailored to fit the research purposes of the study and the gaps between scholarly conceptualization and the real-world operationalization (Huxham and Vangen 1996). For instance, scholars have, at times, used cooperation, alliance, partnership, and collaboration, interchangeably without strictly defining their differences (Cornforth, Hayes and Vangen 2014; Selden, Sowa, and Sanford 2006). And some use the same term

but referring to different institutional arrangements and/or meanings. Given the myriad studies on collaboration across disciplines, this review of the literature has to be selective and limits the scope of the review to studies of collaboration between public and nonprofit sectors.

Nonetheless, several seminal works need to be introduced first as they have laid the groundwork for conceptualizing collaboration. Gray (1989, 11) in her book *“Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problem”* defines collaboration as “a process of joint decision making among key stakeholders of a problem domain about the future of that domain.” In her later work with Wood (Wood and Gray 1991, 146), they extended and redefined collaboration as it “involves a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain.” Both definitions consider collaboration from a process perspective that involves a defined problem domain, joint decision making, and autonomy. The latter definition, in addition, characterizes other key elements of collaboration as shared rules, norms, and structure that govern the collaboration as well as the capacity of all parties to decide and act. According to Gray and colleagues, collaboration is differentiated from other forms of interorganizational relations, such as coordination and cooperation, as neither of the relationships discusses the dynamic characteristics involved in collaboration. Forming collaboration allows organizations to achieve collaborative advantage (Huxham 2003) and better control environmental uncertainty. It also sets a high level of requirement for maintaining an interactive, collaborative, and equal relationship among organizations that sometimes may increase transactional costs (Wood and Gray 1991).

In public management research, a series of studies by Thomson and colleges represent a consistent effort in defining and measuring collaboration. Thomson and Perry (2006, 23), for instance, define collaboration as “a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interaction”. A later study by Thomson, Perry, and Miller (2009) empirically test five essential dimensions of collaboration that emerged from previous works. Their findings suggest that, among norms of trust and reciprocity, mutuality, organizational autonomy, administration (e.g. social coordination), and governance (e.g. jointly decision making), all dimensions except norms of reciprocity are found to support the conceptualization of collaboration. They attribute the insignificance of reciprocity to the fact that reciprocity often needs years to develop, while the collaborations in their sample are fairly young.

In discussing cross-sector collaboration, Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006, 44) broadly define collaboration as “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately”. Similarly, Fosler’s (2002) definition also emphasizes the sharing relationship, joint action, as well as the synergy or collaborative advantage produced by the collaboration. Fosler (2002) considers collaboration to be similar to partnership and alliance, all of which excludes authoritative coordination and cooperative relationships that requires minimal interaction. It involves “mutual planning and management, the conscious alignment of goals, strategies, agendas, resources, and activities, an equitable commitment of investment and

capacities, and the sharing of risks, liabilities, and benefits” between partners (Fosler 2002, 18).

Zooming in government and nonprofit collaboration, there is no shortage of works on the conceptualization of collaboration. Coston (1998), for instance, conceptualizes government-NGO relations based on three criteria in terms of government’s acceptance of institutional pluralism, the degree of formalization of the relationship, and the power asymmetry in the relationship. Coston (1998) differentiates collaboration from repression, rivalry, competition, contracting, third-party government, cooperation, and complementarity. She characterizes collaboration as a type of formal relationship that entails organization autonomy, symmetrical power relationship, resource sharing, information sharing, joint action and decision making, and mutual benefit. Collaboration therefore differs from other types of government-nonprofit relations, as it requires government and nonprofit organizations to have an equal and sharing relationship. Najam (2000), however, does not consider collaboration and cooperation as two distinct forms of government-NGO relationship. He argues that perfect power symmetry is not a prerequisite for cooperation or collaboration; cooperative behavior is highly possible as long as two actors share similar means and ends.

The study by Gazley (2004) is a systematic effort in identifying the scope, nature, and activities of collaboration between local government and nonprofit organizations. In defining collaboration, she draws from studies of collaboration by Gray (1989), Wood and Gray (1991), Fosler (2002), and Thomson and Perry (2006), and study of partnership by Peters (1998). She points out that collaboration and partnership have many shared characteristics in terms of joint planning and management, bargaining and negotiation,

and sharing of resources, responsibilities, benefits, and risks. Based on these elements, she conceptually excludes pure contractual relationships that had no shared power, limited autonomy, and no joint decision-making as one form of collaboration/partnership. In her survey of local government and nonprofit organizations in the State of Georgia, she finds there were indeed interactive and collaborative activities between the two sectors such as information exchanges, sharing resources, sharing volunteers, sharing workspace, sharing staff, and joint operations or decision making.² Yet, government contracts and government provision of grants and resources aggregated together remain as the highest percentage of reported government-nonprofit activities, which often do not reflect the reciprocal and sharing characteristics of collaboration. Gazley (2008) concludes that her findings suggest less evidence of collaborative and equal relationships between government and nonprofit organizations in her sample; rather, the notion of control-formality exchange in Peters (1998) is a strong indicator that better captures the government-nonprofit partnership. This finding is not surprising. Coston (1998), in fact, recognizes that authentic public-nonprofit collaboration is not easy to attain due to the imbalance of financial resources and power between the two sectors.

Drawing from Thompson, Frances, and Mitchell (1991), Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) point out that despite of the many conceptual and operational terms associated with government-nonprofit relations, there are three primary forms of public-nonprofit collaboration: contracts, partnership or network. Similarly, Amirkhanyan (2008) builds on Bingham and O'Leary (2006) and considered collaboration as embracing both high

² In specific, these joint operations or decision making involve joint service delivery, joint program development, joint fund-raising, joint policy development, joint advocacy, joint purchasing, joint staff/volunteer recruitment, and joint case management.

level, institutional arrangements and specific activities pursued by public managers. This dissertation, thus, defines public-nonprofit collaboration as encompassing high level, institutional arrangements, such as contractual relationships and partnerships, as well as less formal arrangement such as information sharing. Furthermore, instead of focusing on a network level where multiple government agencies and nonprofit organizations work together, this dissertation focuses on the dyadic relationship between a nonprofit organization and a government agency that the nonprofit collaborates most with.

Whereas the partnership here is consistent with Gazley's (2008) conceptualization, I consider contractual relationships to be a form of collaboration for two reasons. First, as Gazley (2008) suggests, government contracts are a prevalent form of public-nonprofit interaction. Leaving these out would likely lose valuable information concerning voluntary information sharing under this type of relationship. Second, contracting and collaboration are not irreconcilable with each other (Van Skyle 2008). For instance, Brown and Troutt (2004) find that the government-nonprofit contracting relationship is evolving to be more collaborative and supportive. In their study, government officials listen to and accommodate the needs of nonprofit organizations. In addition, contract failure theory also suggests that nonprofit organizations are more trustworthy than for-profit organizations in contractual relationships, because of their nondistribution of profit constraint and their shared social mission with government (Hansmann 1987; Brown and Potoski 2003a; Brown and Potoski 2003b; Van Slyke 2007). Of course, nonprofit organizations are not absolutely immune from accountability issues as some of them may use residual revenue from contracts to fund their other programs (Van Slyke 2007). But the nondistribution constraint and the social mission

orientation of these organizations has led to the call for a more important role of nonprofit as partners of government rather than just contractors of government services (Fosler 2002; Mandell and Keast 2009).

2.2 Information Sharing in Public-Nonprofit Collaboration

Information is defined as “data endowed with relevance and purpose” (Drucker 1988, 5); it is a “message” that intends to inform the receiver and to influence the receiver’s judgment and behavior (Davenport and Prusak 2000, 3). Unlike data, information is not objective or neutral but is organized in a way by the sender to convey certain meanings (Davenport and Prusak 2000; Moynihan 2008; Radin 2006). Sharing of information occurs at different level of analysis from individual level, intra-organizational level, to inter-organizational level. Information sharing in interorganizational relations, the main focus of this dissertation, has severable notable effects.

From the standpoint of relationship building, information sharing can facilitate a shared understanding, resolve conflict, and build trust between two organizations in collaboration (Coston 1998; Dye and Chu 2003; Gray 1989; Himmelman 1996). Through constant information sharing, organizations can gain better understanding about each other’s vision, mission, goals, services, programs, as well as expectations for collaboration. And only through information sharing, partners can become better aware of each other’s comparative advantage (Coston 1998). Information sharing also creates dialogues for organizations to resolve conflict and develop trust through continuous exchange.

From the standpoint of operation, information sharing can assist organizations to define and solve joint problems, coordinate programs and services (Dawes 1996), and enhance each other's capacity (Huxham and Vangen 1996; Weber and Kademian 2008). Collaboration sets a platform for partners to exchange ideas and provide recommendations for actions; most importantly, partners are able to empower the other so that both of them can be better at what they do (Himmelman 1996; Gray 1989). Information sharing is an essential vehicle for such collaborative empowerment and betterment (Himmelman 1996).

Furthermore, information sharing in collaboration underlies the autonomy-accountability dilemma (Huxham 1996) between partners. Information is an important source of control for individual organization to retain autonomy in collaboration; it is also a crucial means to fulfill responsibility and demonstrate accountability. As collaboration emphasizes shared control rather than individual control (Thomson and Perry 2006; Wood and Gray 1991), there is an essential tension between the protection of one's autonomy and the willingness to compromise the autonomy for the good of partners or collective goals.

From the standpoint of collaboration outcome, information sharing can lead to organizational learning and innovation (Ammons and Roenigk 2014; Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996). Here the sharing of information is mainly relevant to organizational knowledge. Although derived from information, Davenport and Prusak (2000, 6) differentiate knowledge from information and define it as "a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and

information.” They further note, organizational knowledge “is embedded not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms” (p.6).

2.2.1 Information Sharing in Public-Nonprofit Collaboration

Information sharing is an essential activity that underlines any forms of government-nonprofit interaction from networking, coordination, cooperation, to collaboration (Coston 1998; Himmelman 1996). Gazley’s (2008) study of public-nonprofit collaboration in the State of Georgia provides empirical evidence that information sharing is an essential activity. Her study indicates that approximately 41 percent of city and county government report collaborative activities in information sharing, which constitutes the most frequently reported activity when compared to activities associated with shared resources and joint operations or decision making. Similarly, 58 percent of nonprofit organizations that are not in contractual relationships, she finds, report collaborative activities in information sharing, and approximately 39 percent of nonprofit organizations that are in contractual relationships report activities of information sharing. The following discussion of information sharing in public-nonprofit collaborations draws from two themes in the literature. The first theme is performance reporting that concentrates on the sharing of performance information with government. The second theme concerns the information/knowledge sharing in collaborations.

Performance Information Sharing

Information sharing in public-nonprofit collaboration is related to sharing of organizational performance information. In the past few decades, government legislation

and mandates such as National Performance Review, Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) have led to the prevalence of the use of performance measurement and management in the public sector. Nonprofit organizations, which are responsible for many social service deliveries, have been under increasing government pressure to measure and report their performance to demonstrate impact and accountability (Ebrahim and Rangan 2010). In 2010, Boris et al. (2010) find 89 percent of nonprofit organizations in their national sample have government contracts or grants that require reporting of results, outcomes, and impact of programs and services. Such performance reporting goes beyond financial performance and refers to performance that is directly related to social mission and goal achievement. Although financial performance is important as it can enable or constrain mission achievement (Kaplan 2001), the success of nonprofit organizations in pursuing social mission cannot be simply measured by financial performance (Moore 2000).

Depending on the theoretical view taken, there is a fine line between performance reporting and performance information sharing. Agency theory originates from conventional economic theory that assumes the agent has different goals from the principal and tends to exploit information asymmetry for its own gain (Moe 1984). Under agency theory, nonprofit organization is prone to exploit information asymmetry and prioritize its own organizational goal. Nonprofit organization would present false information in order to obtain or secure contract and grant or not fulfill their obligation (Carman 2010). Performance reporting thus is a control mechanism to align the actions of the nonprofit organizations with the goals of the government (Van Slyke, 2007). Nonprofit performance reporting to government is what Kearns (1994) characterizes as

fulfilling compliance accountability, which is reactive in nature and compliant to externally imposed performance standards and operational procedures.

From the perspective of agency theory, it is reasonable to expect that control mechanism such as external mandates exacted by funders can be effective to ensure nonprofit organizations' reporting of performance information. Thomson's (2010) study of 237 nonprofit organizations in the city of Detroit from 2002 to 2007 indeed demonstrates that the increased use of outcome measures in nonprofit organizations is caused by the city's new requirement of outcome reporting. Yet, Thomson (2010) points out that external mandates have only threshold effect on nonprofit's use and report of performance information. The extent to which nonprofit organizations would go beyond that symbolic use of performance information, and consider it an effective management tool to guide organizational practices, is contingent upon its internal commitment and capacity in such effort.

Although there is an increasing emphasis on performance measurement in the nonprofit sector, research has suggested nonprofits encounter a variety of challenges. For instance, nonprofit organizations have difficulties in defining and measuring outcome and have to deal with tensions between what nonprofit organizations value as outcome, and funder-mandated measures (Carnochan, Samples, Myers, and Austin 2013). In addition, there is a shortage of staff, funding, time, and a lack of expertise, knowledge, technical assistance, and management support (Carman 2007; Carman and Frederick 2010). In terms of challenges in the reporting process, Boris et al (2010) find over 75 percent of organizations indicate problems associated with government reporting requirements. Specifically, nonprofit organizations complain about the problems such as different

reporting formats, inconsistent budget categories, and different requirements for reporting on outcome. Overall, nonprofit organizations are burdened by the complexity and inconsistencies of the reporting requirement.

Even if nonprofit organizations have full capacity in implementing performance measurement and the external reporting challenges are minimized, there are still issues associated with sharing of performance information. This is because performance information is essentially multidimensional, ambiguous, and subjective in nature. People can choose, define, and interpret data in a way that serves their purpose and advocacy needs (Moynihan 2010). Neale and Anderson (2001) have identified several issues associated with performance reporting. For instance, there are 1) few incentives for organizations to report more than required information, 2) increasing higher demand for outcome than output measures, 3) imbalanced emphasis on outputs, outcomes and capability in the reporting, 4) and the discretion of the reporter in choosing information.

Accountability issues associated with performance reporting may rise under agency theory when the agent is motivated to exploit its information advantage. In studying performance information use in public organizations, Moynihan (2010) indicates, performance information can be utilized in a variety of gaming strategies by bureaucrats. For instance, intentional selection of metrics or data that portray positive outcome, hiding numbers, or worst type of gaming - cheating or giving untrue or make-up numbers. In the study of dishonest performance reporting of government officials in Taiwan, Yang (2009) points out dishonest reporting involves delayed reporting, blaming unforeseeable events, and the use of jargons have broader impact than direct lying. Yet, he also acknowledges that performance information needs to be reported in a way to

maintain organizational image and honest reporting does not mean there is no discretion at all in reporting. The fine line between strategic communication and dishonest reporting is determined by whether democratic accountability is hampered. His study finds external political support and internal hostile politics shape organizational innovative culture and stakeholder participation, both of which in turn positively influence honest performance reporting. Although the gaming strategies are discussed in the context of public organizations, it can shed light on understanding performance reporting by nonprofit organizations. Especially under the circumstance that nonprofit performance reporting is mainly regulated by government's control mechanisms rather than motivated by nonprofits' internal commitment.

Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory suggests a different view of performance reporting. Having its roots in psychology and sociology theory, stewardship theory posits that the agent is not motivated by its own goal, but rather is a steward whose goal is aligned with the goals of the principal (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997). Given the shared interest and goals, the steward has motivation to act for the best interest of the principal because accomplishing the goal of the principal helps to achieve its own organizational goal. Stewardship theory is particularly applicable in nonprofit organizations given their virtues of nondistribution constraint and shared social mission with government (Van Slyke 2007). Under stewardship theory, although reporting performance is still a government requirement imposed externally, nonprofit organizations take a proactive role in defining and communicating performance information with government. In Kearns' (1994) typology, this is consistent with the fulfillment of anticipatory/positioning accountability.

Performance reporting thus evolves from a control mechanism to an “exchange mechanism” (Carman 2010, 258), in which sharing of performance information is not for the purpose of control and punishment but for the purpose of communication and improvement. Under such scenario, information sharing is a more appropriate term than performance reporting, which often suggests compliance. The transition from performance reporting to performance information sharing also requires government effort. Brown and Troutt (2004), for instance, call for government to transform its funding arrangements to match better with the social needs to be addressed. They contend government needs to shift away from requests for proposals (RFPs), which are often associated with strict reporting requirements, to a process that reporting is incorporated in the communication rather than driving the communication.

Information/Knowledge Sharing

Previous empirical research has suggested that nonprofit organizations have information and local knowledge that can essentially enhance government capacity in service delivery and policy implementation. Building on Thomas’ (1985) findings, Coston (1998) argued that the social expert knowledge possessed by NGO complements the professional expert knowledge possessed by government. Two types of knowledge can empower government and nonprofits to form better collaborations. By examining a partnership between a county Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and community-based nonprofits (CBN) that aims to build family and community capacity to raise children in the community, Alexander and Nank (2009) suggest partnering with community-based organizations has transformed the community’s perception about DCFS in terms of its lack of capacity to perform in the best interest of citizen. The

services provided under the partnership now match better with the needs of the community. This transformation is mainly attributed to the fact that the community-based nonprofit organizations bring their “intimate knowledge of the community” (Alexander and Nank 2009, 382) to the partnership. In such case, community-based nonprofit organizations serve as a bridge that, on the one hand, provide public organizations with an access to the community so they can build a trusting relationship with the citizen (Alexander and Nank 2009); on the other hand, channel the information about the community back to the public organizations so they can improve performance and policy making.

Hale’s (2011) book *“How Information Matters: Networks and Public Policy Innovation”* is a noteworthy example. With a focus on policy innovation of drug court, the book offers a comprehensive illustration about, how government’s information relationships with national nonprofit organizations has successfully enabled them to implement and institutionalize drug court programs, and improve their capacity for future policy initiatives (Hale 2011). Hale (2011) draws from a variety of research from network theory, policy diffusion, and nonprofit management. Her study conceptualizes information dissemination in an information network that is constituted by national nonprofit organizations and state and local government. These national nonprofit organizations are professional association/membership-based organizations, research institution, educational institution, and advocacy organization. They collect and synthesize information about drug court program in the forms of best practices, model programs, and program evaluation. Such information is crucial for the state and local government in securing funding, developing program standards, implementing programs,

and demonstrating success.

According to Hale (2011), the central value created by the nonprofit information network for public administrators is the synthesized information that constitutes a combination of various perspectives and the experience of multiple actors (Mossberger and Hale 2002; Yin and Andranovich 1986). Such synthesized information has saved public administrators' time and costs in seeking information, and also enabled public administrators to improve their capacity in implementing drug court program. For instance, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) provides public administrators with a guiding principle that contains a package of best practices. The guiding principle becomes the essential information tool for public administrators to replicate the values, ideas, and content of the drug court program in developing their own local programs (Hale 2011). NADCP also establishes a mentor drug court network program that provides different information channels for public administrators such as discussion sessions, expert assistance, jurisdiction and site visits, and training sessions. The information about implementation experiences disseminated through these channels together with model programs produce a form of information synergy (Hale 2011). Meanwhile, program evaluation studies and research reports containing program information across the States are also important information possessed by nonprofit organizations such as NADCP and National Center for State Courts (NCSC). Such studies and reports have informed public administrators' decision making and program implementation.

2.3 A Social-Psychological Model of Interorganizational Information Sharing

While nonprofit organizations clearly possess information/knowledge that can assist government problem solving, their willingness to share information needs to be further understood. Social psychological perspective is particularly useful in examining the factors forming the underlying motivations for sharing.

2.3.1 A Social Psychology Theory of Voluntary Cooperation

From social psychological perspective, Tom Tyler and colleagues have written a series of work on examining individual cooperative behavior in communities, groups, and organizations. In Tyler and Blade (2000), they differentiate two forms of cooperative behavior in groups – mandatory/required cooperative behavior and discretionary/voluntary cooperative behavior. Required cooperative behaviors are mandated or required by the group norms or rules. Individuals cooperate because they are required to do so. In contrast, voluntary cooperative behaviors are not specifically required by group rules but originated from individuals themselves. It is the extra one mile one is willing to go to do one's job. Tyler and Blade (2000) point out the key distinction between mandatory and discretionary cooperative behavior lies in their different motivational origins. In specific, required cooperation is motivated by instrumental concerns that engaging in the cooperative behavior will lead to rewards and not engaging will lead to punishment. Voluntary cooperation, on the other hand, is consistent with extra role behavior that is not directly link to rewards or punishment (Tyler 2011).

Tyler's (2011) book on "*Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivation*" continues this line of research and further tests the motivational basis of voluntary

cooperation. Tyler (2011) points out that cooperative behavior can be understood from two motivational perspectives – an instrumental perspective and a social motivational perspective. The instrumental perspective aligns with the rational choice model, which describes that individuals seek to maximize personal utilities by gaining rewards or avoiding sanctions. Individuals cooperate because they foresee future benefits obtaining from the resource exchange. Tyler (2011) provides a list of instrumental motivational factors that shape cooperative behavior. They are: 1) sanctions/incentives; 2) investment in social groups that can lead to material exchange; 3) instrumental motivations for work that directly links to material or monetary rewards; 4) justice from an instrumental perspective explains that the judgment of fairness is based on favorableness of outcome; 5) instrumental trust is based on calculation of risk and future predictability.

In contrast, the social motivational model does not consider cooperative behavior as dependent on external contingencies or surveillance of authorities; rather, it views cooperative behavior as motivated by the attitudes, values, and identities that are embedded internally. Individuals cooperate because of their internal desire and feeling of appropriateness (Tyler 2011). According to Tyler (2011), social motivational factors that shape cooperative behavior are: 1) individual attitudes in terms of commitment/intrinsic motivation, attachment to the group organization, or community, desirability and enjoyment of the tasks, and affect/emotion; 2) individual values in terms of legitimacy of the authority and moral values; 3) identity in terms of social identity and emotional identification; 4) procedural justice explaining judgment of fairness is based on procedures rather than outcomes; 5) motivated-based trust that is based on benevolence rather than risk calculation.

The central argument of Tyler's book is that individuals are motivated by a wide range of factors such as self-interest, internal desire, and feeling of appropriateness, but social motivation is at the core of shaping cooperation, especially for voluntary cooperation. Tyler's (2011) empirical test of voluntary cooperation suggests, both sets of instrumental and social motivational factors are positively associated with voluntary cooperation; yet, the magnitude of social motivational factors in shaping voluntary cooperation is larger than that of instrumental motivational factors.

2.3.2 Required and Voluntary Information Sharing

In interorganizational collaboration, information sharing is considered as an important reflection of cooperative behavior (Tjosvold 1988). Therefore, building on Tyler and Blade (2000), information sharing by nonprofit organizations can be differentiated as two forms – required and voluntary information sharing. Both required and voluntary information sharing are important for a comprehensive understanding of information sharing in collaboration. Required information sharing occurs when nonprofit organizations are required to share certain information according to written contract/agreement or based on government requests. In public-nonprofit collaboration, nonprofit organizations are often required to conduct performance reporting on financial information, performance information such as outputs and outcomes, administrative data, audits, and narratives of program accomplishments (Boris et al 2010). One may ask, what is cooperative if a behavior is required? Tyler (2011) argues that the cooperativeness of required behavior essentially reflects the quality of behavior and the effort taken to perform the behavior. In this case, required information sharing concerns if nonprofit organizations always fulfill their responsibilities of sharing when required by the

government. The variation thus exists to the extent that required information sharing is performed to the best manner possible.

Whereas required information sharing in the context of public-nonprofit collaboration can be clearly defined, voluntary information sharing is somewhat ambiguous. Adapting Tyler's (2011) definition of voluntary cooperation, voluntary information sharing describes nonprofit self-initiated information sharing without government requirement. Researchers that study interorganizational relations in the business sector have looked at similar type of information sharing. In the context of supply chain management, for instance, Du, Lai, Cheung, and Cui (2002) examine template-based and proactive information sharing. The former is sharing of data and information that are predetermined in agreement, whereas the latter concerns the willingness to go beyond template-based sharing and release internal confidential business and strategic information to partners who may later be competitors. In public management, Thomson and Perry (2006, 26) discuss information sharing as underlying the autonomy dimension of collaboration - "the willingness to share information for the good of partners even at the risk of compromising a particular organization's autonomy." Such information sharing can be also viewed as a type of voluntary information sharing because it is not originated from external mandate but the organization itself.

Yet, the proactive information sharing in business context may not be applicable in the context of public-nonprofit collaboration, simply because Information in nonprofit organizations is not as proprietary as in for-profit organizations and nonprofit organizations are mandated to disclose their financial information by law. Similarly, the autonomy-sacrificing information sharing in public management literature may or may

not be applicable in public-nonprofit collaboration either, given the tension between nonprofit autonomy and government control. Therefore, the dissertation attempts to address these four research questions:

- 1) What are the types of information that nonprofit organizations voluntarily share with government in collaboration?
- 2) What are the motivations driving such voluntary information sharing?
- 3) Do instrumental and social motivational factors shape required and voluntary information sharing?
- 4) Do instrumental motivational factors explain larger variance in required information sharing, while social motivational factors explain larger variance in voluntary information sharing?

CHAPTER III TWO MOTIVATIONAL MODELS OF INFORMATION SHARING

This chapter discusses two motivational models – instrumental and social motivational – and their effects on required and voluntary information sharing. The instrumental motivational model includes government funding, contractual relationship, instrumental trust, and distributive justice, while the social motivational model entails goal congruence, affective commitment in collaboration, motive-based trust, and procedural justice.

3.1 Instrumental Motivational Model

Government funding

The impact of government funding on nonprofit organizations has been examined from various aspects. For instance, studies have found that the receipt of government funding can affect nonprofit organizations in a number of ways such as shaping service activities (Grønbjerg 1993), constraining autonomy in defining mission, working procedures, outcome, and client group (Seyoum 1998; Smith 2004; Verschuere and De Corte 2014), changing organizational structures (Nikolic and Koontz 2008), increasing professionalization (Suarez 2011), and shifting advocacy focus (Mosley 2012). In these studies, resource dependence theory is a particularly insightful framework in explaining and understanding the behaviors of nonprofit organizations. Resource dependence theory focuses on the relationship between organizations and their external environment. It posits that organizations depend on external resource for survival; such resource dependence may be accompanied with a potential loss of autonomy and power to the resource provider (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The theory also points out the necessity

and importance that organizations learn to adapt and take actions to manage and influence their external environment (Oliver 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

Resource dependence theory can be applied to understand information sharing activities by nonprofit organizations. Government funding often comes with reporting criteria to ensure nonprofit accountability in using public funds. Carman (2009) finds federal government funding is positively related to nonprofits' compliance to external monitoring mechanism and use of performance measurement and evaluation, while state and local government funding is positively associated with nonprofits' descriptive reporting. Thus, due to the receipt of government funding, nonprofit organizations have to adapt to such reporting requirements and fulfill information sharing obligations. Besides adaptation, resource dependence theory suggests organizations take actions to influence external resource provider and allocation (Oliver 1991). It is reasonable to expect that nonprofit organizations would go beyond sharing required information and make extra efforts to voluntarily share information that can help them to maintain government funding.

Hypothesis 1a: The level of government funding is positively associated with required information sharing.

Hypothesis 1b: The level of government funding is positively associated with voluntary information sharing.

Contractual Relationship

Government contracts often come with a series of monitoring and oversight mechanisms. For instance, Martin and Kettner (1996) suggest performance measures

such as numeric measures, standardized measures, level of functioning, and client satisfaction are often specified in the contract or required in reporting. In studying public-nonprofit contracting in the areas of social services in the State of New York, Van Slyke (2007) finds that government employs many mechanisms to ensure nonprofit accountability such as making constant contact, conducting site visits, requiring performance audits and report, soliciting customer survey, enforcing corrective action plans, reviewing recommended treatment plans, and relying on feedback from caseworkers and other providers. Contract and the performance monitoring mechanisms are formal control mechanisms that can be effective in ensuring nonprofits' sharing of required information.

Nonetheless, contract as one of the instrumental motivations, which emphasizes sanction-delivery, may only have a marginal effect on ensuring cooperative behavior. In fact, instrumental motivation may further undermine social motivation (Tyler 2011), so it is possible that government contracts may actually crowd out nonprofits' volunteer cooperative behavior. If nonprofit organizations are occupied in and overwhelmed by fulfilling required reporting, they may not take the extra effort to engage in voluntary sharing. Gazley (2008) also finds that information exchange occurs more frequently in collaboration without existence of a contract than collaboration under a contract. On the other hand, government contracts provide access for nonprofit organizations to get in to the "political circle" (Suarez 2011, 309) and engage in more proactively voluntary information sharing such as advocating for needs of the community and underserved population (Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004). Thus, government contract is hypothesized to either positively or negatively relate to voluntary information sharing.

Hypothesis 2a: Government contract is positively related to required information-sharing behavior.

Hypothesis 2b: Government contract can be positively or negatively related to voluntary information-sharing behavior.

Instrumental Trust

The concept of trust has been examined in a number of disciplines such as economics, sociology, psychology, and management; each field has injected the concept with new aspects of understanding. It has been conceptualized as competence-based trust and goodwill trust (Nooteboom 2002), cognition-based trust and affect-based trust (McAllister 1995), deterrence-based trust, calculus-based trust, and relational trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998; Zaheer, McEvilly, and Perrone 1998). Tyler (2011) differentiates trust as instrumental trust and motive-based trust. Instrumental trust explains the trustors' prediction and expectation that trustees' future actions will be competent and dutiful (Lewis and Weigert 1985) and be beneficial or "at least not detrimental" (Williamson 1993) to the trustors. It aligns closely with cognitive-based trust (Kramer 1999) that predicts future actions based on previous experience or present knowledge. Since instrumental trust is based on rational choice calculation, it assumes that the trustors will only cooperate to the extent matching their prediction and estimation that the trustee will undertake expected actions (Scholz 1998; Tyler 2011). In cases where nonprofits' trust toward government is instrumental, they will share information as long as they can predict the result of information sharing is beneficial to the organization; it does not matter if the information is required or voluntary.

Hypothesis 3a: Instrumental trust is positively related with required information sharing

Hypothesis 3b: Instrumental trust is positively related with voluntary information sharing.

Distributive Justice

Distributive justice refers to the fairness of the distribution of an outcome in an exchange relationship (Deutsch 1985). Essential to distributive justice is the equity theory (Adams 1965). Inequity comes when one party perceives its contribution is high but the reward is low as compared with the other party whose contribution is low but the reward is high; vice versa. Tyler (2011) points out individuals' perceptions of distributive justice essentially guide their efforts in resource exchange. The experience of inequity can lead to the unpleasant emotional state such as dissatisfaction, which can motivate individuals to alter their input by reducing commitment or discontinuing ongoing exchange (Adam 1965; Greenberg 1987; Luo 2007). A number of studies have found that distributive justice is directly related to knowledge sharing (Liu, Huang, Luo, and Zhao 2012; Modi and Mabert 2007; Mohr and Spekman 1994) and indirectly related to tacit knowledge sharing (Lin 2007). If nonprofit organizations perceive distributive injustice in their collaboration with government, for instance government does not make payment on time (Boris et al. 2010), according to the equity theory, they will decrease their inputs by restricting their information sharing as one potential activity. Distributive injustice does not only affect the quality of required information sharing, but it can also discourage voluntary information sharing.

Hypothesis 4a: distributive justice is positively associated with required information sharing.

Hypothesis 4b: distributive justice is positively associated with voluntary information sharing.

3.2 Social Motivational Model

Goal Congruence

Goal congruence in this study describes the extent to which nonprofit organizations and government in collaborations have shared philosophies and visions, shared goals, and agreements about the approaches to achieve goals (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2012). A number of scholars have addressed the importance of goal congruence in successful collaboration. In the study by Fleishman (2009), shared goals are fundamental motivations for nonprofit organizations to participate in government-sponsored partnership, whereas inability to achieve common policy goals is the key factor for them to leave such partnerships. Incongruent goals can indirectly produce dissatisfaction (Smith and Barclay 1997), but shared goals can facilitate the creation of a shared identity between organizations that essentially reduces the costs of communication (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000; Kogut and Zander 1996; MacDuffie and Helper 1997). The shared identity, which grows out of shared goals and values among organizations in a network, is effective in fostering knowledge sharing for mutually beneficial results (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000; Dyer and Singh 1998). In public-nonprofit collaboration, when nonprofit organizations believe both government agencies and themselves are working toward the same goal, they will be more likely to work cooperatively. They would not only share required information, but also voluntarily share information that can advance

the achievement of their common goals.

Hypothesis 5a: Goal Congruence between nonprofit organizations and government is positively related with required information sharing.

Hypothesis 5b: Goal Congruence between nonprofit organizations and government is positively related with voluntary information sharing.

Affective Commitment in Collaboration

Meyer and Allen (1991) differentiate three themes of commitment that individuals have for their organizations – affective, continuance, and normative. According to their conceptualization, affective commitment describes emotional attachment and personal identification, continuance commitment reflects a rational weigh up the costs and benefits between staying and leaving the organization, and normative commitment is linked to a feeling of obligation. Individual affective commitment has been found to relate to extra occupation-related efforts as well as higher and more desirable work performance (Meyer, Allen, and Smith 1993; Meyer et al. 1989; Somers and Birnbaum 2000).

Although Meyer and Allen's (1991) framework focuses on the individual level, it also sheds light on the different dimensions of nonprofits' commitment in collaborating with government. Applying the model at the organizational level, nonprofit organizations' affective commitment toward the collaborations explains their emotional attachment derived from previously positive interaction and successful exchange with the government agencies (Tsasis 2009). Continuance commitment, on the other hand, describes that nonprofit organizations have to stay in collaboration mainly because of limited comparable alternatives. In Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995), information sharing is an important dimension of commitment in exchange relationship whereby high

levels of commitment translate into the sharing of confidential and proprietary information. It is thus reasonable to expect, nonprofit organizations that have affective commitment in collaboration make sure that they fulfill their responsibilities and take extra effort to facilitate collaboration.

Hypothesis 6a: Affective commitment in collaboration is positively related with required information sharing.

Hypothesis 6b: Affective in collaboration is positively related with voluntary information sharing.

Motive-Based Trust

Whereas instrumental trust is based on the predictability of the trustees' future actions, motive-based trust links to the character and the benevolent intention of the trustees (Tyler 2011). The character describes the partners' characteristics of integrity, responsibility, dependability, consistence, and discreteness (Gabarro 1978; Smith and Barclay 1997; Swan Trawick, Rink, and Roberts 1988). Benevolence or goodwill, which connotes the purpose underlying one's action is benign (Smith and Barclay 1997), is a widely recognized characteristic of the trustees that leads to the trust of the trustors (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom 2005). Benevolent trust has been found to enable knowledge creation and sharing in organizational information network (Abrams, Cross, and Levin 2003). In public-nonprofit collaborations, if nonprofit organizations trust that government agencies are well intentioned and have their best interests in mind, they are more likely to share required information, and take voluntary initiatives to share information.

Hypothesis 7a: Motive-based trust is positively related with required information sharing

Hypothesis 7b: Motive-based trust is positively related with voluntary information sharing.

Procedural Justice

Whereas distributive justice emphasizes the fairness of an outcome distribution, procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures through which outcomes are distributed. In interorganizational collaborations, the fairness of the procedure is mainly judged by the boundary spanners, often the top executives who represent the organization and organizational decisions (Luo 2005). In public-nonprofit collaboration, joint decision making is a key aspect emphasizing that both partners have equal participation in decision making, as opposed to domination by one particular party (Brinkerhoff 2002). Yet, scholars have been skeptical with such “true collaboration” between government and nonprofit organizations due to the imbalances of power (e.g. Coston 1998). In such cases of government dominance in decision making, nonprofit boundary spanners may not perceive high levels of procedural justice, because they don’t have a voice in the process or their input is not acknowledged or valued by government. When perceptions of procedural justice are low, voluntary information sharing can be discouraged. On the contrary, when nonprofit organizations feel their voices are heard and opinions are acknowledged, even if the decisions made are unfavorable, nonprofit voluntary information sharing can still be expected.

Hypothesis 8a: Procedural justice is positively related with required information sharing.

Hypothesis 8b: Procedural justice is positively related with voluntary information sharing.

3.3 Instrumental Motivational Model Versus Social Motivational Model

Tyler (2011) suggests that the underlying difference between required and voluntary cooperation lies in their different motivational origins. Required cooperation is mainly motivated by instrumental motivational factors, whereas voluntary cooperation is mainly motivated by social motivational factors. Consistent with Tyler (2011), this study argues, while both required and voluntary information sharing can be explained by instrumental and social motivational model, instrumental model explains a larger variance in required information sharing, whereas social motivational model explains a larger variance in voluntary information sharing. As shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2, solid lines and dotted lines are drawn to differentiate the effects of instrumental and social motivational factors on required and voluntary information sharing. In Figure 3.1, solid lines highlight the influential role of instrumental motivational factors in predicting required information sharing. But in Figure 3.2, solid lines highlight the important role of social motivational factors in predicting voluntary information sharing.

Hypothesis 9a: Instrumental motivational factors altogether explains a larger variance in required information sharing than social motivational factors.

Hypothesis 9b: Social motivational factors altogether explain a larger variance in voluntary information sharing than instrumental motivational factors.

Figure 3.1 The Model of Required Information Sharing





Figure 3.2 A Model of Voluntary Information Sharing



CHAPTER IV RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter introduces the methods utilized in examining the research questions. It begins with a discussion of the rationale behind the use of mixed methods and a brief introduction about the qualitative and quantitative component of the mixed methods. It then presents the sampling strategy, data collection, and analytical procedures in the qualitative and the quantitative study, respectively.

4.1 A Mixed Methods Research Design

Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007, 123) define mixed methods research as combining “elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g. use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.” To Johnson et al (2007), mixed methods research does not simply mix qualitative and quantitative methods data collection and analysis together, but it also involves the combination of the qualitative and quantitative worldviews. Similarly, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, 5) state, when mixed methods design is considered as a methodology, it “involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases of the research process.” When it is considered as a method, “it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies.”

This study utilized a mixed methods design that included a mixture of qualitative and quantitative studies. The qualitative study was guided by constructivism as it allowed to inductively generating a theory or a pattern of meaning (Creswell 2002; Creswell and

Plano Clark 2011). Thus the qualitative study was designed to gain an in-depth understanding of voluntary information sharing in public-nonprofit collaboration and to develop a pattern of information sharing behavior. In particular, the qualitative study intended to explore multiple views of the participants on the types of information nonprofits would voluntarily share with government in collaboration. Also, it aimed to unravel the motivational factors that drove such voluntary sharing. Based on the qualitative findings, the measures of voluntary and required information sharing were developed for the quantitative study. The quantitative study was guided by postpositivism to deductively test a theory with quantitative data, measures, and analysis (Creswell 2002). It aimed to apply the cooperation theory by Tyler (2011) to the context of public and nonprofit collaboration. Particularly, it examined the effects of instrumental and social motivational model on required and voluntary information sharing by nonprofit organizations.

4.2 The Selection of Human Service Nonprofit Organizations

The main focus of this study was on human services nonprofit organizations; and, for the purposes of this study, following the work of Grønbjerg (2001) I adopted a broader category of human services organization which included crime and legal services, employment, food and agriculture, housing and shelter, public safety, youth development, and multi-services organizations. Human services organization served as a good candidate to examine the research questions in this study for three reasons: first, human services organization has a long history of collaboration with government; second, human services organization (as a sub-sector) has the highest frequency of public-nonprofit collaborations (Gazley 2004); finally, over 50 percent of total government

funding to nonprofit organizations, which was approximately \$80,000 million in 2013, went to human services organization (Pettijohn et al. 2013).

4.3 The First Phase: A Qualitative Study

The qualitative study aimed to answer two research questions: 1) what are the types of information that nonprofit organizations would voluntarily share with government in their collaborations? 2) What are the motivational factors that drive such voluntary information sharing? The qualitative study involved data collected from interviews with executive directors of 22 nonprofit human services organizations in the State of New Jersey. The executive directors were identified as the key informant for the interview, because they have a high degree of familiarity and knowledge about organizational collaboration efforts (Babiak and Thibault 2009) and they often play the role of boundary spanning in collaboration (Linden 2002).

Sampling

Purposeful random sampling was utilized to select the organizations for the interviews. I chose to use this sampling strategy for two reasons. First, purposeful sampling allowed selecting information-rich cases for in-depth investigation (Patton 1990). The information-rich cases here were the human service organizations that had collaborations with government agencies. The purposeful sample of human services organizations was drawn from National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) Business Master File (BMF) 2014 (November). The BMF included all active nonprofits that had registered for tax-exempt status with the Internal Revenue Services. In the qualitative phase, only 501c (3) public charities that were located in the State of New Jersey were

included. Organizations were included if they were categorized by the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) as crime and legal services (I), employment (J), food, agriculture, and nutrition (K), housing and shelter (L), public safety, disaster response and relief (M), youth development (O), and human services (P). Consistent with several national studies of government-nonprofit collaboration and contracting (e.g. Boris et al. 2010; Pettijohn et al. 2013), two additional criteria were set in drawing the sample. First, the sample selection was limited to organizations that were required to file a form 990 with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and had more than \$100,000 in revenue. Second, only organizations that directly provided services were included in the study. Therefore, organizations that were 1) marked by common codes³, 2) marked by “Not Elsewhere Classified”⁴, 3) profession societies and associations within each service category were excluded. Table 4.1 presents the list of excluded organizations and the corresponding NTEE codes in the parenthesis. The total number of nonprofit organizations in the State of New Jersey that met the criteria was 1,403.

Second, random sampling was utilized to obtain a feasible number of organizations for the interview and also to increase the credibility of the interview results. Thus the list of 1,403 human service nonprofits was fully randomized using Excel. The executive directors of the organizations were contacted by email from top down the list. The email address of the executive director was obtained by visiting the organization’s website. If the email address was not publicly disclosed, the next organization on the list was tried until the email address of the executive director appeared. The invitation emails

³ The common codes include: 01 Alliance/Advocacy Organizations, 02 Management and Technical Assistance, 03 Professional Societies/Associations, 05 Research Institutes and/or Public Policy Analysis, 11 Monetary Support - Single Organization, 12 Monetary Support - Multiple Organizations, 19 Nonmonetary Support Not Elsewhere Classified (N.E.C.)

⁴ The “Not Elsewhere Classified” organizations are marked as 99 within each service category.

were then sent to the executive directors, to first inform them that the study was interested in interviewing organizations that had collaboration with government agencies, and second to seek their willingness in participating.

Table 4.1 Excluded Organizations in the Sample

Service sector	Excluded organizations	
Crime and legal related (I)	Law enforcement (I60); Public interest law (I83)	Alliances and Advocacy (01); Management and Technical Assistance (02); Professional Societies and Associations (03); Research Institutes and Public Policy Analysis (05); Single Organization Support (11); Fund Raising and Fund Distribution (12); Support N.E.C (19) N.E.C (99)
Employment (J)	Labor union (J40)	
Food, agriculture, and nutrition (K)	Agricultural Programs (K20); Farmland Preservation (K25); Animal Husbandry (K26); Farm Bureaus & Granges (K28)	
Housing and Shelter (L)	Homeowners & Tenants Associations (L50)	
Public safety, disaster response and relief (M)	Fire Prevention (M24); Safety Education (M40); Public Safety Benevolent Associations (M60)	
Youth development (O)	Youth Development - Religious Leadership (O55)	
Human services (P)	Thrift Shops (P29)	

Data Collection

In-depth interviewing – an extensively used qualitative data collection method – was utilized in this study. Conducting interviews allowed the researcher to collect valuable information from the participants' viewpoints and experience. All interviews were conducted by phone in December 2014. Most of the interviews lasted 20-30 minutes

with some exceptions lasting to one hour. The executive directors were informed of the confidentiality of the study in order to promote candor. During the interviews, a standardized open-ended interview approach, which is consisted of a list of pre-structured questions (Patton 2002), was used to direct the interview conversations. This type of interview is particularly good for keeping the interview highly focused on the defined themes (Marshall and Rossman 2011). The interview protocol is attached in the Appendix A.

Data Analysis

Interview data was transcribed and entered into NVIVO 10.2 for analysis. The analysis followed three qualitative analysis activities – data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing and verification – suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). The first activity is data reduction (data coding) that assists to “selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data” (p.10). The second activity data display is helpful to visually see and understand the pattern and themes emerged from the data. The third activity is conclusion drawing and verification. These three activities were not used independently; in fact they constituted a reiterative and interactive process in the analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994).

In coding the data, open coding and axial coding strategy were utilized in NVIVO. Open coding is also called initial coding; it is the first cycle coding strategy (Saldana 2009). Open coding was used to separate the data into discrete parts that allowed close examination and comparison of similarities and differences (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In this case, open coding helped focusing on the data that directly related

to 1) the types of information nonprofits voluntarily share with government and 2) the motivational factors driving such sharing. In the second step, axial coding strategy was utilized to reduce the number of open coding and group similarly coded data into conceptual categories (Saldana 2009). In this step, ten categories emerged to describe the types of information voluntarily shared by nonprofits and nine categories emerged to represent motivational factors behind such sharing.

4.4 The Second Phase: A Quantitative Study

The second phase of this study is a quantitative study. It aims to answer three research questions: 1) Do instrumental and social motivational factors influence required and voluntary information sharing of nonprofit organizations in collaboration? 2) Do instrumental motivational factors explain more variance of required information sharing, while social motivational factors explain more variance of voluntary information sharing? The data set used in the quantitative study was collected in February 2015 through an online survey of randomly sampled 424 nonprofit organizations nation-wide. The following paragraphs describe the adopted sampling strategy, design of questionnaire, and the process of data collection.

Sampling

The sampling frame used in the survey research was also drawn from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) Business Master File 2014 (November). Consistent with the sample selection in the qualitative phase, only 501c (3) public charities from crime and legal services (I), employment (J), food, agriculture, and nutrition (K), housing and shelter (L), public safety, disaster response and relief (M),

youth development (O), and human services (P) that had more than \$100,000 in revenue were included. Furthermore, the organizations that were excluded in the qualitative phase were also excluded in the quantitative phase (Table 4.1). Differing from the sampling frame used in the qualitative phase, which included only organizations located in the State of New Jersey, the sampling frame in the quantitative phase contained organizations in 50 states and the District of Columbia. The total number of organizations in the sampling frame was 52,921.

Stratified random sampling was used to select the sample of 2,000 organizations out of 52,921 organizations. 52,921 organizations were stratified by service sector and revenue size to ensure the chosen sample had even coverage of organizations from different service sectors and different sizes of organizations. Table 4.2 shows the number of organizations in each strata in the population. Within each strata, the list of organizations was randomized using Excel. Every tenth organization was randomly chosen to see if the email address of the executive director was publicly available on the website of the organization. If one organization did not publish the executive director's email address online, the next organization on the list was used until the email address of the executive director could be located. The sample was randomly drawn in each strata until it reached the number proportionate to the total number of organizations in the strata. Table 4.3 displays the number of organizations by service sector and revenue size in the sample. In the sample, human services was the largest sector that included 1,100 organizations, while public safety was the smallest sector that included only 16 organizations. Housing and shelter was the second largest sector with 435 organizations, while the sector on food, agriculture, and nutrition was the second smallest sector with 70

organizations. The sector of crime and legal related, employment, youth development is comparable with the numbers of 105, 107, and 167 respectively.

Table 4.2 The Number of Organizations in the Population Stratified by Revenue Size and Service Sector

Revenue Service Sector	Below \$250,000	\$1M- \$250,000	Above \$1Million	The number of organizations
Crime and legal related	834	1069	874	2777
Employment	335	976	1532	2843
Food, agriculture, and nutrition	663	544	634	1841
Housing and shelter	3074	4866	3570	11510
Public safety, disaster response and relief	202	160	68	430
Youth development	1479	1666	1268	4413
Human services organizations	7116	9820	12171	29107
The number of organizations	14026	19224	20158	52921

Table 4.3 The Number of Organizations in the Sample Stratified by Revenue Size and Service Sector

Revenue Service Sector	Below \$250,000	\$1M- \$250,000	Above \$1Million	The number of organizations
Crime and legal related	32	40	33	105
Employment	13	37	58	107
Food, agriculture, and nutrition	25	21	24	70
Housing and shelter	116	184	135	435
Public safety, disaster response and relief	8	6	3	16
Youth development	56	63	48	167
Human services organizations	269	371	460	1100
The number of organizations	518	722	760	2,000

The Development of Questionnaire

The questionnaire contained five major categories: the characteristics of public-nonprofit collaboration, nonprofit information sharing activities, government and nonprofit interactions, nonprofits organizational characteristics, and demographic information of the respondents. Two questions that captured the characteristics of public-nonprofit collaboration were adopted from Gazley (2004). Two questions regarding the frequency of different types of information shared and whether the information is required or voluntary, was developed based on the findings of the qualitative interviews. The survey questionnaire is attached in the Appendix B.

The questionnaire was developed using Qualtrics. Online survey was chosen not only because of its advantages in terms of low cost and speed (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2009), but also because it allowed certain features that traditional mail survey cannot compete with (Relmer and Van Ryzin 2010). For instance, piping text from a previously chosen answer was an important feature for the design of the questionnaire. The survey asked questions regarding nonprofits' information sharing activities and their interactions with government agencies in collaboration, the questions may become ambiguous since nonprofit organizations often have on-going collaborations with different levels of government agencies simultaneously. With the feature of piping text from a previously chosen answer, the survey can be designed to focus on one particular relationship. First, a priming question was used to induce respondents to think of the level of government they collaborated most. Once the level of government was chosen, all the following questions were tailored to ask about the chosen level of government. Another benefit of using online survey was that it allowed automatic saving and transformation of

data so it essentially reduced human errors in manual data-entering (Relmer and Van Ryzin 2010). Before the distribution of the online survey, the questionnaire was reviewed by a group of professors and doctoral students. It was also pretested with 5 nonprofit executive directors. The questionnaire was then revised based on the received feedback and was ready for distribution.

Data Collection

The implementation of survey data collection lasted for four weeks from February 10, 2015 to March 3, 2015. On February 10, 2015, an invitation email that described the purpose of the study, the anonymity of the study, and a survey link was sent to 2,000 executive directors. In order to increase the response rate, multiple contacts were made during the implementation process through reminder emails (Dillman et al. 2009; Relmer and Van Ryzin 2010). The first reminder was sent out after one week of the initial invitation email, and followed by the second reminder email in the third week of survey implementation and the third reminder email in the last week of survey implementation. The initial invitation email and three reminder emails are available in the Appendix C. As of March 3, 2015, 424 total responses were received that reached 21.2% response rate. Among 424 organizations, 32 organizations were removed because they indicated no collaboration with government. After removing missing values of all variables included in the regression analysis, 229 valid observations were used in the study.

Measurement

Independent variables. There were eight independent variables in the study.

Government funding was measured by the percentage of the organization's revenue that

came from the government agency in collaboration in 2014. Formal service contract was measured by whether the collaboration involved a formal contract (formal=1; none formal =0).

Instrumental trust was measured by a single item adapted from Tyler (2011), which captured trust based on future predictability. The item was “our organization is generally able to anticipate the decision that the government will make” (strongly disagree=1; disagree=2; neither agree nor disagree=3; agree=4; strongly agree=5).

Distributive justice was measured by four items: 1) the benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of the resources we contribute to the collaboration; 2) the benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of the amount of the effort we put into the collaboration; 3) the benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of the level of responsibility we have in the collaboration; 4) the benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of our performance in the collaboration. The measures were adapted from study of Griffith, Harvey and Lusch (2006) in the field of supply chain management research. Since the measures in Griffith et al. (2006) were developed for the context of business sector, the items were reworded in order to fit in the context of public-nonprofit collaboration. Principal component factor analysis indicated all items were loaded on one factor and Cronbach alpha was 0.87, indicating a good internal consistency of the measures.

Goal congruence was adapted from Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2012) that measured the goal agreement between government and nonprofit organizations in

collaborative contracting. It was measured via three items using Likert scale: 1) the government and my organization have a shared philosophy and vision; 2) the government and my organization have agreement about how to approach things; 3) the government and my organization have similar goals for our work together (strongly disagree=1; disagree=2; neither agree nor disagree=3; agree=4; strongly agree=5). Factor loadings from principal component analysis showed all items were loaded together and Cronbach alpha was 0.85.

Affective commitment was measured via three items using 1-5 Likert scale: 1) this collaboration has a great deal of meaning for our organization; 2) we do not feel a strong sense of belonging to this collaboration (reversed); 3) right now, staying in the collaboration is a matter of necessity rather than desire (reversed). The three items were adapted from Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993) that have been validated by previous research. Although the Cronbach alpha was only 0.59 that failed to meet the threshold of 0.7, the factor analysis showed that the items were all loaded together.

Both of the measures of motive-based trust and procedural justice were adapted from Tyler (2011). Motive-based trust was measured by two items using 1-5 Likert scale: 1) we trust the government to think about our welfare as well as their own when making decisions; 2) we trust the government to keep our best interests in mind. Procedural justice was measured by three items using 1-5 Likert scale: 1) decisions that affect our organization are usually made in a fair way in the collaboration; 2) most of the issues involving our organization are handled in a fair way in the collaboration; 3) overall, we are fairly treated by the government in the collaboration. For both of motive-based trust and procedural justices, factor analysis showed that all items were loaded in one factor.

And Cronbach alpha for motive-based trust was 0.85 and for procedural justice was 0.88. The table in the Appendix D summarizes the measures for all variables.

Control Variables

Three sets of control variables were included in the model. The first set was demographic variables of the survey respondents, which included age, education, race (using white as reference), and gender. The second set covered variables of organizational characteristics including the age of the organization and its revenue size. Two dichotomous variables were created to describe faith-based organization and the organization's national affiliation. Seven dummy variables were created to represent seven service sectors – crime and legal services, employment, food, agriculture, and nutrition, housing and shelter, public safety, disaster response and relief, youth development, and human services. The third set included control variables that described the characteristics of the collaboration. Three dummy variables were included to describe three levels of government in collaboration (local, state, and federal). Nineteen dummy variables were created to describe the ways that nonprofit organizations collaborated with government. These variables were formal service contract, government provides funding, share staff, share workspace, share volunteers, joint fundraising, joint advocacy, joint purchasing, joint program development, joint policy development, joint service delivery, joint case management/coordination, joint recruitment of staff, information exchange, government officials serve on nonprofit board of directors, government provides volunteers, government provides equipment/facility, nonprofit organization provides volunteers to government, nonprofit organization serves on a public board or advisory committee. Lastly, the length of the collaboration was also considered.

Analytical Procedures

Before regression analysis, Cronbach alpha test and principal factor analysis were conducted to examine the reliability and internal consistency of the variable measures. In testing the hypotheses, hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. Hierarchical regression was appropriate for this study, because it provided a unique partition of R-square that allowed the examination of the separate contribution of a set of predictors on dependent variable (Cohen and Cohen 1983). In this way, the separate effects of motivational and social motivational model on required and voluntary information sharing can be tested and compared.

CHAPTER V QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

This chapter discusses the findings from qualitative interviews. It has three sections. The first section provides a description of the organizations interviewed. The second section presents 10 types of information voluntarily shared and the motivations for sharing. The third section is a discussion about the qualitative findings.

5.1 Description of the Organizations in the Interview

All interviews were conducted with the executive directors of the organizations. All 22 nonprofit organizations included in the interviews were located in the State of New Jersey. These organizations were mid-sized and large-size judging by their revenues. As Table 5.1 shows, there were nine mid-size organizations that had revenue ranging between \$252,297 and \$865,523, and thirteen large-size organizations with revenue above 1 million dollars. The organizations came from six major service sectors – crime and legal related, employment, food, agriculture and nutrition, housing and shelter, youth development, and human services. All service sectors except for crime and legal related had an even mix of mid-size and large-size organizations. There was no organization from the sector of public safety, disaster preparedness and relief. This was because the service sector had relatively small number of organizations compared to other service sectors, and no organization responded to the interview invitation.

Table 5.1 Revenue Sizes of Interview Organizations.

Size	Revenue	Number of Interviewed Organizations	Service Sector
Mid-Size (\$250,000 ~ \$1million)	\$252,297 ~ \$865,523	9	1 Crime and Legal Related; 1 Employment; 1 Housing & Shelter; 1 Food Agriculture & Nutrition; 1 Youth Development; 4 Human Services
Large-Size (Above \$1million)	\$1,075,762 ~ \$42,393,142	13	1 Employment; 2 Housing & Shelter; 1 Food Agriculture & Nutrition; 1 Youth Development; 8 Human Services

Table 5.2 describes organizations by their service sector, type, and revenue. The sample included organizations with diverse service purposes. There was 1 crime and legal-related organization that mainly dealt with prevention of child abuse. 2 employment organizations provided job training and vocational rehabilitation programs respectively. 2 food, agriculture and nutrition organizations provided food programs and congregate meals respectively. Among 3 housing and shelter organizations, 2 of them dealt with housing development construction and management, while the other one was a homeless shelter. 2 youth development organizations were Boys and Girls Club and Big Brothers and Big Sisters. Among 12 human service organizations, there were 1 Salvation Army, 1 Young Mens Associations, 3 children and youth services organizations, 1 family counseling organization, 1 personal social services organization, 2 centers to support the independence of specific populations, 1 senior center, and 2 multiple human services organizations.

Table 5.2 Organizations by Service Sector, Type, and Revenue

Code	Service Sector	Organization Type	Revenue
Org 1	Crime and Legal Related	Child Abuse Prevention	\$512,877
Org 2	Employment	Job Training	\$730,861
Org 3	Employment	Vocational Rehabilitation	\$6,670,598
Org 4	Food, Agriculture & Nutrition	Food Programs	\$3,438,685
Org 5	Food, Agriculture & Nutrition	Congregate Meals	\$532,965
Org 6	Housing & Shelter	Housing Development Construction & Management	\$1,075,762
Org 7	Housing & Shelter	Housing Development Construction & Management	\$4,370,572
Org 8	Housing & Shelter	Homeless Shelters	\$526,573
Org 9	Youth Development	Boys & Girls Clubs	\$6,195,485
Org 10	Youth Development	Big Brothers & Big Sisters	\$865,523
Org 11	Human Services	Human Service Organizations	\$42,393,142
Org 12	Human Services	Human Service Organizations	\$327,132
Org 13	Human Services	Salvation Army	\$4,315,593
Org 14	Human Services	Young Mens Associations	\$14,167,310
Org 15	Human Services	Children & Youth Services	\$252,297
Org 16	Human Services	Children & Youth Services	\$8,262,878
Org 17	Human Services	Family Counseling	\$476,961
Org 18	Human Services	Personal Social Services	\$1,176,444
Org 19	Human Services	Centers to Support the Independence of Specific Populations	\$1,553,597
Org 20	Human Services	Centers to Support the Independence of Specific Populations	\$12,668,052
Org 21	Human Services	Senior Centers	\$460,328
Org 22	Human Services	Children & Youth Services	\$4,559,834

The characteristics of the collaborations are displayed in Table 5.3. It shows organizations by the level of government collaborated most, ways of collaboration, whether the relationship is formal or informal, and whether the organization received government funding in the collaboration. Overall, two thirds of the organizations had two

or more on-going collaborations with different levels of government. The table shows that although organizations collaborated with all three levels of government, most of the collaborations occurred at state and local level. Consistent with Gazley (2008), formal service contract and government providing funding/resource remained as the two primary ways of collaboration in the sample. But at the same time, there were other ways of collaboration. For instance, organization 1 and 15 collaborated with government on joint case management – the most prevalent forms of nonprofit collaboration with government agencies and other nonprofit organizations (Snively and Tracy 2000). Organization 3 collaborated with government through joint service delivery and organization 4 collaborated with government through joint policy development. In addition, organization 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, and 19 collaborated with government through serving on public boards, advisory committees, advocacy committees, and community planning committees. Unlike other collaborations that government act as the main financial contributor, the collaboration effort between organization 14 and its local government stood out as a true collaboration that was defined in the literature (e.g. Gray 1989). Both organizations co-invested, co-managed, and shared the revenue of a local recreation facility. The executive director describes it as “a unique and somewhat incorporated powerful relationship”.

Table 5.3 The Characteristics of Public-Nonprofit Collaboration

Code	The Level of Government Collaborated Most	Ways of Collaboration	Formal/ Informal Relationship	Government Funding
Org 1	State and local government	Government provides workspace; Joint case management;	Yes	Yes
Org 2	State government	Government provides funding and workspace	Yes	Yes
Org 3	State and local government	Government provides funding; Joint service delivery; Serve on community planning committee;	Yes	Yes
Org 4	State government	Formal service contract; Serve on public board; Joint policy development;	Yes	Yes
Org 5	Local government	Government provides funding; Serve on community planning committee;	Yes	Yes
Org 6	Local government	Formal service contract	Yes	Yes
Org 7	State and local government	Government provides funding	Yes	Yes
Org 8	Federal and state government	Government provides funding (federal) Government provides food (state)	Yes	Yes
Org 9	Local government	Formal service contract	Yes	Yes
Org 10	Local government	Formal service contract	Yes	Yes
Org 11	State government	Government provides funding; Formal service contract; Joint advocacy	Yes	Yes
Org 12	Local government	Government provides funding; Serve on advisory committee	Yes	Yes
Org 13	State government	Formal service contract	Yes	Yes
Org 14	Local government	Formal service agreement; Joint investment Revenue sharing	Yes	Yes
Org 15	State government	Joint case management/coordination	No	No
Org 16	State government	Formal service contract	Yes	Yes
Org 17	Local government	Government provides funding	Yes	Yes
Org 18	Local government	Government provides funding	Yes	Yes
Org 19	State and local government	Formal service contract Serve on advocacy committee	Yes	Yes
Org 20	State government	Formal service contract	Yes	Yes
Org 21	Local government	Government provides funding	Yes	Yes
Org 22	State government	Formal service contract	Yes	Yes

Formal and informal relationship described whether the collaboration involved a signed contract or other legal agreement. All organizations except organization 15 had a formal collaboration. And all organizations except organization 15 received government funding in collaboration to varying degrees.

5.2 No Voluntary Information Sharing

Organization 8 was the only one indicated that they did not conduct any voluntary information sharing activity with government. This organization mainly collaborated with federal government by receiving funding and state government by receiving food. In its collaboration with federal government, the sharing of information was only limited to those that were required. The unwillingness to conduct voluntary sharing was mainly influenced by the concern that sharing of information may backfire and government may penalize the organization for it. When asked if the organization voluntarily shared any information that was not required by the government, the executive director says:

“As little as we can. You say the wrong thing and you know they might jump on something... we really don’t share too much beyond what we’re asked for. I mean we give them the information that they required... They ask for so much there isn’t much more that we could volunteer that they don’t already know...(sometimes) because of the way they respond you’re really afraid to say anything you know, unless it pertains to what you’re actually doing, because you don’t know what they’re going to do with that information. I mean you don’t want to say anything that’s going to allow them to penalize you.” (Organization 8)

5.3 Voluntary Information Sharing and Motivations

The analysis of interviews with the executive directors of nonprofit organizations revealed that, except organization 8, all other organizations conducted a variety of voluntary information-sharing activities with government agencies in collaboration. Altogether, there were 10 types of information that can be categorized into three themes: 1) information about the organization including performance information, financial information, stories of program accomplishments, and the needs of the organization; 2) information/knowledge about the client and the community including the needs of underserved population, special knowledge of the client, and special knowledge of the community; 3) other specific types of information such as contract feedback, best practices, and research reports. A summary of the themes and types of information, motivational factors driving such sharing, and the corresponding organizations are displayed in Table 5.4.

Information about the Organization

Performance Information, Financial Information, and Stories of Program

Accomplishment In public-nonprofit collaboration, government often requires performance information and financial information from nonprofit organizations. Several executive directors (organization 9, 10, 17), however, indicated they would go the extra mile and share more performance information with the government agency in collaboration. Organization 10 conducted proactive and voluntary sharing of performance information such as graduation rate and college entrance rate of the students who participated in their program. Similarly, organization 9 shared program performance

information such as attendance rate, students' test score performance and improvement, and performance comparison of the students who participated in the program and those who did not. The primary motivation driving such sharing was to secure funding and demonstrate program and client success.

“It helps us to secure the funding necessary to put on the program... it's also a fundraising tool, but most of all it's about the success of the child, it is reporting out to the community the success and obviously recognizing the kids and giving them a sense of accomplishment.” (Organization 9)

Organization 17 stood out as a unique case among the organizations, although it received government funding, the organization was not required to conduct any financial or performance reporting. Nevertheless, the organization took the initiative to share all of their financial and performance information, when the executive director started leading the organization three years ago. She attributed such voluntary sharing to the motivations for funding and publicity, and also because it is consistent with the value of transparency. She states, *“my motivation to share is two-fold. It's to increase awareness (of our organization), so I guess PR and also to maintain the funding. So if I want to expect the commissioner will continue with that grant then I want to make sure he knows how well we're spending that money. And also it's the right thing to do, we want all the people that donate to us to understand what we are doing with their money...it's transparency.”*

Organizations 2, 7, 9, 10, and 11 proactively shared stories of program accomplishments and client success with the government agencies. Government contracts often ask for numeric measures but not narratives to describe the qualitative level of

performance (Blasi 2007). The executive director of organization 2 indicated the primary motivation to share such narrative stories was to better capture and give depth to the client and program success, which cannot be conveyed in performance matrix.

The Needs of the Organization Organizations 2, 7, 16, and 18 shared information about the needs of their organizations in order to have government feedback or support. The executive director of organization 16 discussed their self-initiated communication with the state government about the needs of the organization. *“We ... advocate to the state that they should raise the Medicaid rate and we let them know that this is how it affects our business, our turnover is a little low, we can’t keep staff because the salary is not competitive with other organizations. So we’ve been very open in sharing information that doesn’t necessarily reflect well on us, but we explain why it doesn’t...”*

Obtaining funding, resource, and support are the main drivers for organizations (3, 16, 18) to share the information about their needs. *“Motivation is we don’t have enough food to give out, we’re closing our doors. We handle about two million pounds of food a year through our facility, giving direct food to clients, meaning bag food and helping other organizations, over 30 of them, in our area do similar work in their areas. So when we don’t have food nobody else has food. So trying to get voluntarily it’s to say hey you need to pay attention because we have a real serious problem here. That’s only happened a couple times we’ve been low, we’ve only had to close once ever, because I advocate much sooner and I’ve learned to find the places that will respond and one of them is not government necessarily.”*(Organization 18)

Furthermore, the commitment of government in ensuring the success of nonprofit organizations also drove nonprofit organizations to voluntarily share information about their needs. The executive director of organization 16 says, *“the reason for it (sharing) is I have a belief that they’re committed to this program and making us successful. So anything that I can share with them that can improve the service that we provide for children and families I think it’s important for us to do that.”*

Information/Knowledge about the Client and the Community

The Needs of Underserved Population Organization 5 and 13 voluntarily shared information about the needs of underserved population with government agencies in collaboration. For instance, the executive director of organization 5 says, *“there is ... an invisible population ... that I don’t think is on the radar screen ... This isn’t a person that was born disabled and served by the government by virtue of their disability...This is an adult like you and I who has been working ... and all of a sudden one day they wake up and they ... discover they have some illness or they suffered a brain injury as a result of an accident or something. It tends to be people that are the working poor who have little resources and aren’t familiar with any sort of government service system. They don’t know what resources are available to them or what network they can tie into, so overnight they become homebound and they don’t know how to access services. This is a population that nobody is really servicing and there’s very little known about them. So we are seeing a lot of people like that and that is a population that I don’t think the government is really focusing on, so I’ve been talking a lot about that population.”*

The sharing of underserved population was motivated by two factors - serving the needs of the client and obtaining funding/resource. The executive director of organization 5 provided a good illustration of the motivation. *“The motivation is the needs of our clients; it’s all based on the needs of our clients, if you can document the need and just bring it out to the light. And obviously resources, we are a private non-profit that we don’t make a profit, we don’t have stockholders so obviously we depend on donations, government funds, corporate donations, foundational donations, individual donations. So documenting the need is important and also helps us in raising funds to continue to do what we do.”*

Special Knowledge of the Client Organization 1, 14, 15, and 22 shared client information and their special knowledge of the clients with government agencies in collaboration. The executive director of organization 1 says, *“if we’re treating a child and we’re clinically counseling a child and we see that there’s an issue we will definitely give them a call and let them know that there’s something going on.”*

During service provision, nonprofit organizations can develop special knowledge of their clients. The sharing of such knowledge in collaboration was crucial to the benefits of the clients. *“We’ve been identifying bullying situations, identifying kids that we find have undiagnosed health ailments because sitting in math class you wouldn’t know that a child perhaps is having, has asthma or because they never get up and move around. We’ve unfortunately had issues of finding kids with bruises and having to communicate and work collaboratively with the school to contact child services and then go through that entire process.”*(Organization 14)

Some organizations also emphasized that they did not disclose client information that was protected by confidentiality. And the sharing of special knowledge of the client often confined to those that were consistent with the best interests of the clients, because sometimes *“divulging personal information about our clients limits their ability to move forward and then kind of get stuck in government agency’s red tape”* (Organization 15). This point was also corroborated by another executive director who says, *“we may be reluctant to give a full story to a government and maybe a client going through a grant because it may hurt the client and meaning they may interpret the regulation so strictly that it would make this person ineligible to be a part of the grant.”* (Organization 3)

The motivation driving organizations to share their special knowledge of the clients with government agencies was to promote the best interest of the client. “Well the motivation would be in the best interest of the child that we’re providing services for so that they (the government agency) can get an accurate picture as to the state of health and the state of mind and the safety level of the child. So really we’re doing it because we feel that it benefits the child to have all the parties involved in providing services get a full complete picture.” (Organization 1)

Organization 22 also indicated the sharing of their knowledge of the client was driven by the philosophy and the value of the organization that was built upon “three major principles of the organization-partnership, collaboration, and accountability”. And this organizational philosophy and value emphasize the importance of the open communication with the agencies they are working with, and sharing of information to better meet the needs of the clients.

Special Knowledge of the Community Organization 6, 7, 19, 21, 23 voluntarily shared their special knowledge of the community with the government agencies in collaboration. They kept the government agencies informed about the needs of community and changes that were happening in the community. The main motivational factors to share their knowledge of the community were to better serve the needs of the client, obtaining funding, resource and support, and bringing about changes. For instance, the executive director of organization 6 comments,

“In 2010 the census track was 40% Hispanic and in 2014 this past summer we found that in doing a survey, we had someone doing this for us, it was 60% Hispanic. So we’re seeing the demographics of the city change, at least pretty dramatically in the census track. That helps understand what you need to serve the people in a census track because they’re going to have different goals, different culture, different ways of life than others and also for us it says that you need to have multilingual people on the staff, so it helps understanding when you’re hiring people in the future what you need to look for... so we shared this with them, they (the government agency) are able to take a look at this and get a real time snapshot of what’s going on in the community and I think they are happy with that.”(Organization 6)

Other Specific Types Of Information

Contract Feedback Providing contract feedback was a type of voluntary information-sharing activity conducted by nonprofit organizations. Government contract cannot foresee all the possible contingencies that may occur in the process of service provision, especially in the areas of human services where service delivery is specialized

and outcomes are often difficult to measure (Brown and Potoski 2003a). It is therefore crucial for nonprofit organizations – the direct service provider - to take the initiative to communicate with the government regarding the needs for contract modification. Boris et al (2010) also found that nonprofit organizations were more likely to communicate such feedback with government during meetings than through official government feedback mechanisms.

Executive directors of organization 4, 11, 13, 20 reported that they voluntarily provided feedback to government, if 1) the contract ceiling was too low or contract rules and requirements did not cover certain clients that should have been included; 2) either facilitated or prevented a quality service provision; 3) or were not consistent with what they believed to be the best interest of the people. For instance, the executive director of organization 13 comments on their contract with the state government on Kinship program.

“At one point non-blood related friends of the family were interested in taking in children who, because originally it was only blood relatives who were taking the children and so the, we shared information that they were, for instance, a godparent or a friend, a very close, lifelong close friend of the family was willing to take on the children and so we shared that information so that we could, for the betterment of the child and so they were, because we shared that information with them they were able to alter the outlines of the contract to include even these people. So in that way we voluntarily shared the information so that they could get information to make the determination as to whether or not they were going to stretch the guidelines.”(Organization 13)

The motivational factors driving nonprofit organizations to provide contract feedback varied depending on the nature of the feedback. In the case of organization 4 and 13, providing feedback on contract rules and requirements was driven by the intention of serving the best interest of the client. In the case of organization 20, the needs of funding and improving service effectiveness drove providing contract feedback. The executive director of organization 20 says, *“the motivation is purely selfish, I mean if we can pay our staff better we will reduce our turnover rate somewhat, I’m not going to say significantly, but we will reduce our turnover rate. When there’s something that we need to change to make the business run smoother in order to be more cost effective. I think it’s primarily motivators for us. When I say business smoother, I mean increase our ability to care for the consumers and the residents in our care.”*

Best Practices and Research Reports Organization 11 and 12 took the initiative to share their best practices with the government in collaboration. The executive director of organization 11 says, *“certainly best practices are shared kind of back and forth, anything that we would find out is the best way to provide services to someone with a mental illness would be something we would share with the government. Usually trying to get funding for that.”* The motivation behind sharing best practice was also two-fold – *“motivation in terms of the people we serve, and motivation in terms of making sure we’re financially stable”* (Organization 11). Organization 6 and 20 voluntarily shared the findings of self-conducted research reports. The motivation for organization 20 to share research reports was to demonstrate the effectiveness of the program model in implementation, whereas organization 6 was driven by potential future funding opportunities.

Table 5.4 Three Themes of Information Voluntarily Shared

Themes of Information	Types of Information	Motivational Factors	Organizations in the study
Information about the organization	Financial information	Funding; Organizational value	17
	Performance information	Funding; Demonstrate program success; Demonstrate client success; Organizational value	9, 10, 17
	Stories of program accomplishments	Demonstrate program success; Demonstrate client success	2, 7, 9, 10, 11
	The Needs of the organization	Funding/resource; The commitment of government	2, 3, 7, 16, 18
Information about the client and the community	The Needs of Underserved population	Funding/resource; The needs of the client	5, 13
	Special knowledge of the client	Best interest of the client; Organizational value	1, 3, 14, 15, 22
	Special knowledge of the community	Funding/resource; The needs of the client	6, 7, 19, 21, 23
Other specific types of information	Contract feedback	Funding; The best interest of the client; Improve service effectiveness	4, 11, 13, 20
	Best practices	Funding/resource; The best interest of the client	11, 12
	Research reports	Funding; Demonstrate program; effectiveness	6, 20

5.4 Discussions of Qualitative Findings

In terms of the characteristics of the collaboration in the sample, the qualitative analysis suggests that government contract and provision of funding/resource continue to serve as the major ways of public-nonprofit collaboration. Yet, these findings by no means imply the rigid hierarchical/principal-agent relations between government and nonprofit organizations. In fact, for most of nonprofits, they have mutual trust, on-going communication, negotiation, and collaboration with government, even in the context of contractual arrangement and government provision of funding/resource, which are often

considered as having few collaborative characteristics. For most of the nonprofits, they would actively communicate their problems and challenges with the government, and government officials would call upon nonprofit executive directors for opinions and recommendations. Furthermore, although government contracts and government provision of funding/resource are the major ways of collaboration, nonprofit organizations also collaborate with government by a variety of joint activities such as joint service delivery, joint policy development, joint advocacy, joint investment, revenue sharing, and joint case management. In addition, nonprofit organizations also collaborate with government by serving on public boards or committees.

The findings show that nonprofit organizations initiate a variety of voluntary sharing activities with government. Overall, there were 10 types of information that can be categorized into three themes: information about the organization, information/knowledge about the clients and the community, and other specific types of information. One type of information sharing that highlights the willingness to compromise one's organizational autonomy for the good of the partner as indicated in Thomson and Perry (2006), however, did not emerge in the interviews. This is probably because the power imbalances between government and nonprofit organizations in collaborations, in which government often has the upper hand and nonprofit organizations often concern about losing autonomy.

Table 5.5 displays the motivational factors that drive each type of information voluntarily shared. Specifically, the needs for funding/resource drive the sharing of financial information, performance information, the needs of the organization, special knowledge of the community, underserved population, contract feedback, best practices,

and research reports. Furthermore, the needs to demonstrate client success and program success motivate the voluntary sharing of performance information and stories of program accomplishments. Also, the need to demonstrate program effectiveness motivates the voluntary sharing of research reports. Lastly, the need to improve service effectiveness motivates voluntary sharing of contract feedback.

The aforementioned motivational factors are the needs for funding/resource, the need to demonstrate client and program success as well as program effectiveness, and the need to improve service effectiveness. These factors are instrumental motivations in a sense that they are linked to external rewards. Although the latter two needs are not direct financial/resource rewards, they have the potentials to help organizations obtain future funding, increase publicity, and promote reputation. The instrumental perspective thus suggests that, voluntary information sharing by nonprofit organizations is motivated by instrumental and strategic purpose of acquiring funding, resource, publicity, and reputation. Huang and Provan (2007) find that organizations, which voluntarily share information in a network, will have better reputation.

Besides instrumental motivations, Table 5.5 also shows a different set of motivations that drive voluntary information sharing. Specifically, serving the needs of the client and promoting the best interest of the client constitute the driving force for nonprofit organizations to voluntary share their special knowledge of the client, special knowledge of the community, the needs of underserved population, contract feedback, and best practices. Also, nonprofit voluntary sharing of performance information, financial information, and the special knowledge of the client are driven by their organizational values in terms of transparency and accountability. In addition, nonprofits'

belief that government is committed in their success drives the sharing of the needs of the organizations.

Differing from instrumental perspective, the motivations such as serving the needs of the client and promoting the best interest of the client, organizational values, and beliefs belong to social motivations because they are not regulated by external incentives and rewards. Nonprofit organizations voluntarily share information with government because such action is consistent with their identity as representing the underrepresented and disadvantaged, organizational values, and the belief that government is committed in their success.

To summarize, the qualitative findings indicate that voluntary information sharing by nonprofit organizations are driven by both instrumental and social motivational factors. Voluntary cooperation at the organizational level may not be as altruistic and prosocial as voluntary cooperation at the individual level. Even at individual level, Tyler (2011) acknowledges that voluntary cooperative behavior can be shaped by instrumental factors. As a matter of fact, his study finds external rewards and incentives directly are linked to individual voluntary cooperation, the only difference is that social motivational factors are more influential in shaping voluntary cooperation than instrumental motivational factors.

Table 5.5 Motivational Factors and the Corresponding Types Of Information

	Motivational Factors	Types of Information Voluntarily Shared
Instrumental Perspective	Funding/Resource	Financial information; Performance information; The needs of the organization; Special knowledge of the community; Underserved population; Contract feedback; Best practices; Research reports
	Demonstrate program success and client success	Performance information; Stories of program accomplishments
	Demonstrate program effectiveness	Research reports
	Improvement of service effectiveness	Contract feedback
Social Motivational Perspective	Serving the needs of the client Promoting the best interest of the client	Special knowledge of the clients; Special knowledge of the community; Underserved population; Contract feedback; Best practices
	Organizational value	Performance information; Financial information; The special knowledge of the clients
	Belief about the commitment of government	The needs of the organization

CHAPTER VI QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

This chapter is composed of five sections. The first section discusses the representativeness of the sample. The second section introduces the measures for two dependent variables. The third section presents the descriptive statistics of study variables and control variables. The fourth section shows the hierarchical regression results. The last section includes a detailed discussion of the findings.

6.1 Representativeness of the Sample

Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 display the percentage distribution of organizations in the population and in the sample stratified by revenue size and service sector. Overall, the distribution patterns in two tables are very similar. The percentage of organizations for crime and legal related, housing and shelter, and human services in the sample were consistent with those in the population. Public safety remained the smallest service sector in the sample, although 0.44 percent was a little underrepresented as compared with the 0.81 percent in the population. Organizations from the sector of food, agriculture, and nutrition as well as housing and shelter were a little overrepresented in the sample. Youth development was the most underrepresented service sector by comparing 4.8 percent of organizations in the sample with 8.34 percent of organizations in the population.

In terms of revenue size, the general pattern in the population shows that large-size organizations accounted for a higher percentage followed by mid-size and small-size organizations. The distribution in the sample followed this pattern, but large-size and mid-size organizations were somewhat overrepresented, while small organizations were a

little underrepresented. Table 6.3 displays examples of the organizations included in the sample.

Table 6.1. The Percentage Distribution of Organizations in the Population by Revenue Size and Service Sector

Revenue Service Sector	Below \$250,000	\$1M- \$250,000	Above \$1Million	Total
Crime and Legal Related	1.58	2.02	1.65	5.25
Employment	0.63	1.84	2.89	5.37
Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition	1.25	1.03	1.20	3.48
Housing and Shelter	5.81	9.19	6.75	21.75
Public safety, disaster response and relief	0.38	0.30	0.13	0.81
Youth development	2.79	3.15	2.40	8.34
Human Services	13.45	18.56	23	55
Total	26.50	36.33	38.09	100

Table 6.2 The Percentage Distribution of Organizations in the Final Sample by Revenue Size and Service Sector

Revenue Service Sector	Below \$250,000	\$1M- \$250,000	Above \$1Million	Total
Crime and Legal Related	3.06	2.18	0.44	5.68
Employment	0.44	1.75	5.24	7.42
Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition	1.31	0.44	3.49	5.24
Housing and Shelter	1.31	13.54	6.99	21.83
Public safety, disaster response and relief	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.44
Youth development	1.75	1.31	1.75	4.80
Human Services	8.73	19.65	26.20	54.59
Total	17.03	38.86	44.10	100

Table 6.3 Examples of Organizations Included in the Final Sample

Centers to Support the Independence	Independent Housing for People with Disabilities
Group Homes	Inmate Support
Human Service Organizations	Job Training
Adult & Child Matching Programs	Meals on Wheels
Adult Day Care	Neighborhood Centers
Big Brothers & Big Sisters	Personal Social Services
Boys & Girls Clubs	Pregnancy Centers
Boys Clubs	Prison Alternatives
Camp Fire	Protection Against Abuse
Centers to Support the Independence	Rehabilitation Services for Offenders
Child Abuse Prevention	Residential Care & Adult Day Programs
Child Day Care	Senior Centers
Children & Youth Services	Sexual Abuse Prevention
Congregate Meals	Sheltered Employment
Developmentally Disabled Centers	Spouse Abuse Prevention
Emergency Assistance	Supportive Housing for Older Adults
Employment Preparation & Procurement	Temporary Housing
Ethnic & Immigrant Centers	Travelers Aid
Family Services for Adolescent Parents	Vocational Rehabilitation
Family Violence Shelters	Women's Centers
First Aid	Young Mens or Womens Associations
Food Banks & Pantries	Youth Development Programs
Food Programs	Rehabilitation Services for Offenders
Foster Care	
Girls Clubs	
Group Homes	
Homeless Centers	
Homeless Shelters	
Housing Development, Construction & Management	
Housing Rehabilitation	
Housing Support	
Human Service Organizations	


6.2 Descriptive Statistics and Measurement of the Dependent Variables

The measures of dependent variables were developed based on the qualitative findings. The qualitative findings found 10 types of information that nonprofit organizations voluntarily shared with government in collaboration. They are performance information, financial information, stories of program accomplishments, needs of the organizations, special knowledge of the client, special knowledge of the community, contract feedback, the needs of underserved population, best practices, and research reports. One type of information – errors or mistakes – was added in the survey. Although it was not mentioned in the interviews, it underscores an important dimension of voluntary information sharing. For each type of the information, the respondents were asked to select if the information was required by the government or voluntarily shared by their organizations.

Figure 6.1 displays the 11 types of information. For each type of information, the three-color bar displays the percentage of the organizations indicating the information as required by government, voluntarily shared by nonprofit organizations, or not applicable. Consistent with the qualitative findings, except for performance and financial information, most types of the information were voluntarily shared by nonprofits. Over 80 percent of organizations reported special knowledge of the community (89.82%), the needs of the organizations (87.11%), the needs of underserved population (83.26%), special knowledge of the client (82.74%), stories of program accomplishment (83.19%), and best practices (81.61%) as information voluntarily shared. At the same time, there were around and below 10 percent of the organizations reported these types of information as required information by government. For research reports, contract

feedback, and errors/mistakes, the percentages of organizations reporting them as voluntary information were 61.75%, 64.44%, and 56.76%. There were 29.49 percent of organizations indicated research reports were not applicable for their relationships with government and 11.66 percent of organizations reported it as required information. The findings in Boris et al (2010) showed most of nonprofit organizations are required to provide contract feedback, here in this study, 23.11 percent of organizations reported contract feedback as required information. Interestingly, there were 25.68 percent of organizations reported errors/mistakes as required information by government, while 17.57 indicated errors/mistakes were not applicable in their collaboration. Two types of information emerged as mostly required information, 71.68 percent of organizations reported financial information as required information and 65.33 percent reported performance information as required information. But there were still 21.68 percent and 28.89 percent of organizations reported financial information and performance information as voluntarily shared information, while 6.64 percent and 5.78 percent reported not applicable.

Figure 6.1 Required VS. Voluntary Information Sharing



For each type of information, the respondents were asked about how often they shared this information with the government in collaboration (never=1, sometimes=2, often=3, always=4). For each type of the information that was voluntarily shared, an organization will have a score of voluntary information sharing equaled to the frequency of the information shared. Thus, voluntary information sharing was measured by the average score of voluntary information sharing, which was calculated using the total score of voluntary information sharing divided by the total types of information voluntarily shared. For instance, if one respondent indicated his/her organization

voluntarily shared two types of information with government: performance information and contract feedback. The respondent chose sometimes (coded as 2) to describe how often they voluntarily shared performance information and chose always (coded as 4) to describe how often they voluntarily shared contract feedback. The score of voluntary information sharing for the organization was calculated by the total score of voluntary information sharing ($2+4=6$) divided by the total types of information voluntarily shared (2). In this case, the score of voluntary information sharing is $6/2=3$. The measures for required information sharing was similarly developed. The only difference was that the score of required information sharing was calculated using the total score of required information sharing divided by the total types of information required by government.

The distribution of the dependent variables was examined before conducting hierarchical regression. Multiple regression assumes that the residuals/error term are normally distributed; but if the distribution of dependent variable is highly skewed, it is highly possible that the residuals are not normally distributed, unless the independent variables predict such skewed pattern (Acock 2014). The histogram in Figure 6.2 shows that the distribution of voluntary information sharing score is almost normal with a slight skew to the left. Table 6.4 shows that the minimum value and the maximum value of voluntary information sharing is 1.13 and 4 indicating nonprofits in the sample ranged from never voluntarily share information to always voluntarily share information. The mean value of voluntary information sharing was 3.06, which was larger than the midpoint (2.57). It suggested nonprofits in the sample conducted a relatively high level of voluntary information sharing activities with government in collaboration.

The histogram in Figure 6.3 illustrates the distribution of required information sharing score. The score was negatively skewed with 55 percent of the observations highly concentrated at score 4. It was not surprising to have so many nonprofit organizations indicating they always share required information, since it is their obligations. Given its skewedness, required information sharing was coded as dichotomous variable shown in Figure 6.4. Table 6.5 shows 55 percent of organizations reported always share required information (coded as 1) and 44 percent report not always share required information (coded as 0).

Figure 6.2 Distribution of Voluntary Information Sharing.




Table 6.4 Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Value, and Midpoint of Dependent Variables

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Midpoint
Voluntary Information Sharing	3.06	0.53	1.13	4	2.57

Figure 6.3 Distribution of Required Information Sharing.




Figure 6.4 Distribution of Required Information Sharing (Coded as Dichotomous Variable)




Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics of Required Information Sharing


Required Information Sharing	Percentage of Organizations
Always share required information	55
Not always share required information	44

6.3 Descriptive Statistics

Principal Service Area in Collaboration

Figure 6.5 displays the principle service areas in which the nonprofit organizations collaborated with government. 42.75 percent of organizations reported collaboration with government in social/human service, which was the most reported service area. 22.54 percent of organizations reported collaboration with government in senior services/aging, which constituted the second most reported service area. For senior services/aging, youth development, and education, there were 9.59 percent, 6.99 percent, and 5.7 percent of organizations respectively. The next tier of most reported service areas included health (2.07%), community action (2.07%), law enforcement/corrections (1.81%), and other service areas (2.07%). The rest of the areas had around 1 percent of organizations reported collaboration - arts/culture (0.52%), economic development/planning (1.3%), disaster planning/emergency response (1.04%), environment/nature resources (0.52%), and finance/fundraising (0.78%).

Figure 6.5 Principle Service Areas of the Public-Nonprofit Collaboration



Ways of Collaboration

Consistent with the findings in the qualitative studies and in Gazley (2008), Figure 6.6 shows that government provision of funding and formal service contract remained as the most reported ways of collaboration. 69.87 percent of organizations reported collaboration by receiving government funding, while 53.28 percent of organizations reported collaboration by formal service contract. Information exchange (50.66%) was the next most reported ways of collaboration. Besides government providing funding and formal contract, government providing volunteers and equipment were also reported by 5.24 percent and 10.04 percent of organizations. Nonprofit organizations also collaborated with government through a variety of resource sharing and joint activities. For instance, 2.62 percent, 7.86 percent, and 5.68 percent of organizations reported collaboration through sharing staff, workspace, and volunteers. For joint activities, 31 percent of organizations collaborated with government by joint advocacy, which was the most reported joint activity. For the rest of the joint activities, joint policy development accounted for 17.47 percent of organizations, joint service delivery accounted for 16.16 percent of organizations, and joint case management/coordination accounted for 16.16 percent of organizations; comparatively, less percentages of organizations collaborated in joint fundraising (3.93%), joint recruitment of staff and/or volunteers (3.06%), joint purchasing (1.75%). Another important activity for public-nonprofit collaboration was nonprofit organizations serving on public boards or advisory committees, and 27.51 percent of organizations reported such collaboration. Also, 11.79 percent of organizations reported having government

officials serving on their board. Lastly, 6.55 percent of organizations reported providing volunteers to government.

Figure 6.6 Ways of Public-Nonprofit Collaborations




Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 together present the descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample is described by three sets of variables- demographic variables of the respondents, variables of the organizational characteristics, and variables about the characteristics of the collaboration. The demographic variables described the age, education level, race, gender, position level, and position years of the respondents. As shown in Table 6.6, a majority of the respondents were from the age group of 50-59 (35.37%) and 60-69 (35.37%). This was reasonable given the targeted respondents were the executive director or senior leaders of the organization. The remaining respondents were from the age group of 20-29(0.87%), 30-39 (10.48%), 40-49(16.59%), and 70 and above (1.31%). A total of 60.26 percent of the respondents had master and above degrees, while 29.26 percent had bachelor's degree and 10.48 percent had some college. A total of 12.23 percent of respondents were white and 87.77 were non-white. Females accounted for 62.01 percent of the respondents and 37.99 percent were male. As intended, 97.38 percent of respondents were executive director, chief operating officer or president of the organization, while 2.18 percent was senior manager and 0.44 percent was professional staff. As shown in Table 6.7, the shortest position-holding years was a half-year, while the longest was 41 years. The mean of position years was 9.17.

The second set of variables described the organizational characteristics. Shown in Table 6.6, 34.5 percent of the organizations in the sample had affiliation to a national organization and 15.28 percent of the organizations were faith-based organizations. The distribution of organizations in seven service sectors was discussed in the first section of this chapter. As indicated in Table 6.7, the sample had a mix of both young organizations and organizations with long histories and a mix of small and large organizations judging

by revenues. The age of the organization ranged from 3 years to 139 years with mean value as 35.21 years. The revenue size of the organizations ranged from \$105,792 to \$127,000,000 with a mean value of \$4,324,680.

The third set of variables described the characteristics of public-nonprofit collaboration. Table 6.6 shows, 65.07 percent of the organizations collaborated most with local government, 27.07 percent collaborated most with state government, and only 7.86 percent collaborated most with federal government. Among these collaborations, 53.28 percent of the organizations had formal service contracts. In Table 6.7, the length of collaboration indicated that the public-nonprofit collaborations were fairly short, ranging from 2 years to 5 years. The mean of the length of collaboration was 4.16 years and the standard deviation was 1.05 years.

Table 6.8 displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value, and midpoint of the independent variables. Indicated by the mean of social motivational factors, nonprofit organizations reported a high level of goal congruence with government, a high level of affective commitment in the collaboration, and a high level of procedural justice in their relationships with government. Only the mean of motive-based trust was the same value as the midpoint, which suggested nonprofit organizations overall had a moderate motive-based trust toward government in collaboration. Nonprofit organizations in the sample ranged from having zero funding to 100 percent fully funded by the government agency in collaboration. The mean of government funding suggested, nonprofit organizations in average had 27.02 percent of funding coming from the government agency in collaboration. Both means of instrumental trust and distributive justice were larger than their respective midpoint, which suggested nonprofit

organizations had a high level of instrumental trust toward government and felt a sense of distribution justice in collaboration.

Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics I

Demographics		Percentage of Respondents
Age		
	20-29	0.87
	30-39	10.48
	40-49	16.59
	50-59	35.37
	60-69	35.37
	70 or older	1.31
Education		
	Some college	10.48
	Bachelor's	29.26
	Graduate Degree	60.26
Race		
	White	12.23
	Non-white	87.77
Gender		
	Male	37.99
	Female	62.01
Position Level		
	Executive Director/Chief Operating Officer/President	97.38
	Senior Manager	2.18
	Professional Staff	0.44
Organizational Characteristics		Percentage of Organizations
National Affiliation		
	No	65.5
	Yes	34.5
Faith-based Organization		
	No	84.72
	Yes	15.28
Service Sector		
	Crime and Legal Related	5.68
	Employment	7.42
	Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition	5.24
	Housing	21.83
	Public safety	0.44
	Youth development	4.80
	Multi-human services	54.59
Characteristics of Collaboration		Percentage of Organizations
Level of Government in Collaboration		
	Local	65.07
	State	27.07
	Federal	7.86
Formal Government Contract		
	Yes	53.28
	No	46.72

Table 6.7 Descriptive Statistics II

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Midpoint
Demographic Variable					
Position Years	9.17	9.01	0.5	41	20.7
Organizational Characteristics					
Age of the Organization	35.21	24.18	3	139	71
Revenue Size (in Dollars)	4,324,680	11,900,000	105,792	127,000,000	63,552,896
Characteristics of Collaboration					
Years of Collaboration	4.16	1.05	2	5	3

Table 6.8 Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Value, and Midpoint of Independent Variables

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Midpoint
Social Motivational Factors					
Goal Congruence	11	2.30	3	15	9
Affective Commitment	10.81	2.31	5	15	10
Motive-Based Trust	6	1.86	2	10	6
Procedural Justice	10.73	2.19	3	15	8
Instrumental Motivational Factors					
Government funding	27.02	28.71	0	100	50
Instrumental Trust	3.35	0.90	1	5	3
Distributive Justice	14.53	3.86	4	20	12
Formal Government Contract	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Correlation

The correlation matrix in Table 6.9 provides Pearson correlation coefficient for the key study variables. The correlation matrix including study variables and control variables are shown in the Appendix E. Table 6.9 shows all study variables were positively associated with voluntary information sharing; only instrumental trust was negatively associated with voluntary information sharing. The same for required information sharing, it had positive association with all study variables except instrumental trust. In the matrix, correlation between procedural justice and motive-based trust had the highest coefficient value ($r=0.66$), while the correlation between government funding and voluntary information sharing had the lowest coefficient value ($r=0.01$). In general, the magnitude of shared variance between any two of study variables did not exceed 43% ($r^2 = .43$).

Table 6.9. Correlation Matrix of the Study Variables (N=229)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Voluntary Information Sharing	1									
2. Required Information Sharing	0.24	1.00								
3. Goal Congruence	0.34	0.14	1.00							
4. Affective Commitment	0.31	0.14	0.52	1.00						
5. Motive-Based Trust	0.28	0.14	0.51	0.51	1.00					
6. Procedural Justice	0.14	0.08	0.53	0.60	0.66	1.00				
7. Formal Service Contract	0.16	0.14	0.07	0.06	-0.06	0.00	1.00			
8. Government Funding	0.01	0.26	-0.10	-0.13	-0.22	-0.19	0.11	1.00		
9. Instrumental Trust	-0.02	-0.02	0.29	0.26	0.30	0.37	0.02	-0.07	1.00	
10. Distributive Justice	0.18	0.04	0.53	0.44	0.44	0.59	-0.04	-0.13	0.20	1.00

6.4 Hierarchical Regression Results

Required Information Sharing

Since required information sharing was coded as dichotomous variable, logistic regression was performed. In Table 6.10, the results of hierarchical logistic regressions were displayed. Three sets of variables – control variable, social motivational variables, and instrumental motivational variables – were added in blocks in step1, step2, and step3. The control variables entered in step1 included demographic variables of the respondents, organizational characteristics, and the characteristics of the collaboration. The reason that control variables were entered first was to control for confounding effects that individual characteristics, organizational characteristics, collaboration characteristics may have on the relationship between independent variables and required information sharing. The order of entering social motivational factors in step2 and instrumental motivational factors in step3 was based on the need to test the extent to which adding instrumental motivational factors would significantly improve the explanatory power of the model.

In step1, none of the demographic variables and organizational characteristics was statistically significant. Although two characteristics of collaboration – government provides funding (odds ratio= 2.60, $P < 0.05$) and information exchange (odds ratio= 0.47, $P < 0.05$) – were significantly related to required information sharing, the model itself was not statistically significant given the likelihood-ratio chi-square was larger than 0.1.

In step2, the block of social motivational factors were added into the model. Confirming hypothesis 5a, nonprofit organizations that had affective commitment (odds ratio=1.20, $P < 0.1$) in collaboration were more likely to report they always share

information required by government. Interestingly, although procedural justice was significantly related to required information sharing (odds ratio=0.8, $P<0.1$), it was negatively associated with required information sharing (hypothesis 8a not supported). The hypotheses as regards to the effects of goal congruence (hypothesis 6a) and motive-based trust (hypothesis 7a) on required information sharing were not supported either. The overall model was marginally significant at the level of 0.1 (LR chi-square (40) = 51.96) and the McFadden's R-square was 0.19. The change in McFadden's R-square from step1 to step2 is 0.04. The Wald Chi-square (χ^2 (4)=9.59, $P<0.1$) indicated adding in social motivational factors only marginally increased the predictability of the model.

In step3, after the block of instrumental motivational factors was added into the model, none of the social motivational factors remained significant. Only two instrumental motivational factors – government funding and government contract - had effect on required information sharing (confirming hypothesis 1a and 2a). The effect size of government funding on required information sharing can be interpreted as, holding all factors constant, 1 percent increased in the receipt of government funding in collaboration was associated with 0.12 increase (odds ratio=1.12, $P<0.05$) in the odds that nonprofit organizations would indicate they always share information required by government. Similarly, for nonprofit organizations, changing from no contact to have contract was associated with 1.75 increase (odds ratio=2.75, $P<0.05$) in the odds that nonprofit organizations would indicate they always shared required information. Instrumental trust and distributive justice, however, showed no statistical significance thus hypothesis 3a and 4a were not supported. The overall model is significant at the 0.05level (LR chi-square (44) = 66.39) and the McFadden's R-square was 0.32. The

change in McFadden's R-square from step2 to step3 is 0.14. The Wald Chi-square ($\chi^2(4)=15.62$, $P<0.01$) suggested entering instrumental factors significantly increased the predictability of the model, thus supporting hypothesis 9b.

In step3, a number of characteristics of collaboration were found significantly related to required information sharing. In specific, they are nonprofit provides volunteer (odds ratio=2.86, $P<0.05$), joint policy development (odds ratio=2.83, $P<0.1$), joint program development (odds ratio=0.26, $P<0.05$), information exchange (odds ratio=0.35, $P<0.05$), joint fundraising (odds ratio=0.02, $P<0.1$), and government provides funding (odds ratio=2.95, $P<0.05$).

Voluntary Information Sharing

Table 6.11 presents the results of hierarchical multiple regressions for voluntary information sharing. Three blocks of variables – control variables, instrumental motivational variables, and social motivational variables – were added in order in step1, step2, and step3. In step1, race (coded as white) ($\beta = -0.14$, $p<0.05$) was found significantly associated with voluntary information sharing meaning non-white executive directors were more likely to report voluntary information sharing activities. Joint policy development ($\beta = 0.20$, $p<0.05$) was also found positively associated with voluntary information sharing. Both of race ($\beta = -0.12$, $p<0.1$; $\beta = -0.11$, $p<0.1$) and joint policy development ($\beta = 0.19$, $p<0.05$; $\beta = 0.17$, $p<0.05$) were still significantly related with voluntary information sharing in step2 and step3 even after more variable were added. None of the variables of organizational characteristics were found statistically related with voluntary information sharing.

In step2, instrumental motivational factors were added into the model. Consistent with the hypothesis 2b, formal government contract ($\beta = 0.15$, $p < 0.1$) was found statistically related to voluntary information sharing, which suggested nonprofit organizations that had government contract were more likely to conduct voluntary information sharing. Also, distributive justice was positively associated with voluntary information sharing ($\beta = 0.15$, $p < 0.1$), which in turn supported hypothesis 4b. Two of the instrumental motivational factors – government funding and instrumental trust – were not significantly related with voluntary information sharing, thus hypothesis 1b and 3b were not confirmed. The model in step2 was statistically significant in predicting voluntary information sharing ($F(41,187) = 1.49$, $P < 0.05$) and the model overall explained 25 percent of the variance in voluntary information sharing. The change in R-square from step1 to step2 is 0.04 and the change is statistically significant ($F(41,187) = 2.28$, $P < 0.05$).

In step3, social motivational factors were added into the model. In this final model, confirming hypothesis 5b, 6b, and 7b, goal congruence, affective commitment, and motive-based trust were all positively associated with voluntary information sharing. In particular, goal congruence had the strongest effect on voluntary information sharing ($\beta = 0.26$, $p < 0.001$), while motive-based trust ($\beta = 0.20$, $p < 0.01$) and affective commitment ($\beta = 0.15$, $p < 0.1$) had the second and third strongest effect on voluntary information sharing. Hypothesis 8b, however, was not supported. The overall model is statistically significant ($F(45,187) = 2.2$, $P < 0.001$) in explaining 35 percent of the variance in voluntary information sharing. From step2 to step3, the explanatory power of the model in predicting voluntary information sharing increased 10 percent from 25 percent to 35 percent ($F(41,183) = 7.42$, $P < 0.05$). The notable change in R-square produced by adding

social motivational factors has confirmed the hypothesis 9b that social motivational factors explain more variance in voluntary information sharing than instrumental motivational factors. As regards to instrumental motivational factors in the final model, government funding remained statically significant, whereas distributive justice was no longer significant. For control variables, race and joint policy development continued to show their significance, while joint advocacy ($\beta = 0.13$, $p < 0.1$) and government providing equipment ($\beta = -0.13$, $p < 0.1$) became significant.

Table 6.10 Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis of Required Information Sharing (N=229) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001

	Step 1 (Odds Ratio)	Step 2 (Odds Ratio)	Step 3 (Odds Ratio)
Control Variables			
Demographics			
Age	1.29	1.33	1.40
Education	1.01	1.15	1.00
Race (White)	0.95	1.09	1.24
Gender	0.83	0.70	0.82
Position level	0.82	0.56	0.53
Position years	0.98	0.98	0.98
Organizational Characteristics			
The age of the organization	1.00	1.00	1.01
Revenue size	1.00	1.00	1.00
National affiliation	0.75	0.72	0.70
Faith-based organization	0.55	0.54	0.60
Crime and Legal Related	0.63	0.59	0.65
Employment	0.43	0.29	0.18
Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition	0.62	0.46	0.52
Housing (Reference group)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Public safety (Reference group)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Youth development	0.37	0.20	0.66
Multi-human services	1.00	0.96	0.51
Collaboration Characteristics			
Local government	0.60	0.61	0.30
State government	0.48	0.61	0.27
Federal government (Reference group)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Years of collaboration	1.30	1.38	1.24
NP serve on public boards/committees	0.98	1.22	1.10
Nonprofit provides volunteer	2.87	2.49*	2.86**
Government provides equipment	3.66	2.99	4.65
Government provides volunteer	6.81	6.77	8.27
Joint staffing	0.29	0.18	0.09
Joint case management	2.16	2.16	2.88
Government serve on nonprofit board	1.96	1.89	2.31
Joint service delivery	1.25	1.14	1.42
Joint policy development	3.09	2.42	2.83*
Joint program development	0.49	0.42*	0.26**
Information exchange	0.47**	0.47*	0.35**
Joint purchasing	0.07	0.06	0.04
Joint advocacy	1.10	1.25	1.04
Joint fundraising	0.03	0.02*	0.02*
Shared volunteer	0.21	0.22	0.33
Shared workspace	1.21	1.01	0.96
Shared staff	1.31	1.48	0.86
Government provides funding	2.60**	2.65**	2.95**
Social Motivational Factors			
Goal Congruence		1.17	1.17
Affective Commitment		1.20*	1.17
Motive-Based Trust		1.12	1.12
Procedural Justice		0.80*	0.82
Instrumental Motivational			

Factors				
Government funding				1.12**
Formal Government Contract				2.75**
Instrumental Trust				1.12
Distributive Justice				1.00
McFadden's R^2	0.15	0.19		0.32
LR χ^2	LR χ^2 (36)= 41.42	LR χ^2 (40)=51.96*	LR χ^2 (44) = 66.39**	
McFadden's ΔR^2		0.04		0.13
Wald χ^2		χ^2 (4)=9.59**	χ^2 (4)=15.62**	

Table 6.11 Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Voluntary Information Sharing (N=229) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001

	Step 1(β)	Step 2(β)	Step 3(β)
Control Variables			
Demographics			
Age	0.09	0.09	0.09
Education	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03
Race (White)	-0.14**	-0.12*	-0.11*
Gender	0.09	0.12	0.07
Position level	0.10	0.09	0.04
Position years	-0.08	-0.08	-0.04
Organizational Characteristics			
The age of the organization	0.04	0.03	0.02
Revenue size	0.03	0.04	0.05
National affiliation	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
Faith-based organization	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04
Crime and Legal Related	0.21	0.13	0.17
Employment	0.17	0.04	0.08
Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition	0.14	0.04	0.06
Housing	0.18	0.00	0.11
Public safety (reference group)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Youth development	0.12	-0.01	0.03
Multi-human services	0.32	0.09	0.20
Collaboration Characteristics			
Local government	0.07	0.08	0.02
State government (reference group)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Federal government	0.06	0.05	0.00
Years of collaboration	-0.05	-0.08	-0.01
Nonprofit serve on public boards/advisory committees	0.10	0.07	0.11
Nonprofit provides volunteer	-0.05	-0.03	-0.07
Government provides equipment	-0.10	-0.10	-0.13*
Government provides volunteer	0.06	0.06	0.06
Joint staffing	0.06	0.04	0.05
Joint case management	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
Government serve on nonprofit board	0.11	0.10	0.08
Joint service delivery	0.01	0.00	-0.02
Joint policy development	0.20**	0.19**	0.17**
Joint program development	0.00	-0.03	-0.06
Information exchange	0.04	0.03	0.04
Joint purchasing	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05
Joint advocacy	0.11	0.11	0.13*
Joint fundraising	0.00	0.01	-0.03
Shared volunteer	0.02	0.02	0.03
Shared workspace	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Shared staff	0.07	0.08	0.10
Government provides funding	-0.04	-0.08	-0.08
Instrumental Motivational Factors			
Government funding		0.05	0.05
Formal Government Contract		0.15*	0.13**
Instrumental Trust		-0.07	-0.13
Distributive Justice		0.15*	-0.03
Social Motivational Factors			
Goal Congruence			0.26***
Affective Commitment			0.15*
Motive-Based Trust			0.20**
Procedural Justice			-0.14
R ²	0.21	0.25	0.35
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.08	0.19
F	F (37,191)=1.37*	F (41,187)=1.49**	F (45,183)=2.2****

ΔR^2	0.04	0.10
F for ΔR^2	F (4,187)=2.28*	F (4,183) = 7.42****

6.5 Discussions of Quantitative Findings

The overall aim of the quantitative study was to examine the effects of the instrumental and social motivational model on shaping required and voluntary information sharing in public-nonprofit collaboration. In the study, the instrumental motivational model and social motivational model represent two different motivational origins. The instrumental motivational model aligns with the rational choice approach, which includes variables such as government funding, contractual relationship, instrumental trust, and distributive justice, whereas the social motivational model emphasizes the motivations that are embedded in social relations, which includes goal congruence, affective commitment, motive-based trust, and procedural justice. Consistent with Tyler (2011), the results of hierarchical regression analysis supported the overall argument that instrumental motivational model explains more variance in required information sharing, while social motivational model is more powerful in predicting voluntary information sharing.

From instrumental perspective, the findings suggest government funding and formal service contract as two major predictors of required information sharing. With the presence of high levels of dependence on government funding and/or contractual relationship, nonprofit organizations are more likely to indicate that they “always” share information required by government. These findings are not surprising given government funding and service contracts often come with stringent requirement on financial and

performance information reporting. Nonprofit organizations have to fulfill such obligations of reporting in order to secure and sustain government funding. Nonprofit compliance to external resource and requirement is also found in Verbruggen, Christiaens, and Milis (2011), which suggest nonprofit organizations' compliance to financial reporting requirement is positively related to the level of government funding they receive.

The level of government funding, however, does not show any impact on voluntary information sharing by nonprofit organizations. Only government contract among four instrumental factors positively relates to voluntary information sharing. Since voluntary information sharing includes sharing of the needs of the organizations, the needs of underserved population, and special knowledge of the community, such sharing can be considered as nonprofit organizations engage in advocacy activities. From this perspective, the finding is in fact consistent with the empirical evidence suggested by nonprofit advocacy research, which points out that government contracts create an environment for nonprofit organizations to be more engaged in advocacy activities (Alexander and Nank 2009; Garrow 2011; Suarez 2011). Kelleher and Yackee (2009), for instance, propose two types of nonprofit feedback to government as results of government contract. One type of feedback is apolitical that refers to reporting of performance information, while the other type of feedback is policy-specific feedback that advocate for changes.

From social motivational perspective, current study suggests that goal congruence between nonprofit organizations and government agencies, and nonprofits' affective commitment in collaboration, and motive-based trust toward government are related to

voluntary information sharing activity by nonprofits. Goal congruence, in particular, constitutes the strongest influence. Nonprofit organizations that share philosophies, visions, and goals with government are more likely to self-initiate information sharing with government. It is often suggested that nonprofit organizations are preferable for government partnership and contract, especially in the areas of social services where the outcome is not easily measured. Such argument is based on the unique characteristics of nonprofit organizations in terms of their nondistribution constraint and sharing of social missions and goals with government (Andrew and Entwistle 2010; Frumkin 2002; Hansmann 1987; Van Slyke 2007). Yet, Meyer, Riccucci, and Laurie (2001) point out that it is difficult to ensure goal clarity in a multi-organizational system, especially in the public sector, in which multiple and conflicting interests are often present and exacerbated by political reasons. Their study of goal congruence between state and local welfare offices suggest consistent and continuous communication of goals is necessary in goal alignment.

Affective commitment is different from the economic commitment derived from economic “hostages” (Williamson 1985), in which commitment is maintained by contractual specifications or other economic constraints (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 1999). Affective commitment thus cannot be coerced but it grows out of a history of positive interaction and successful exchange. Previous studies have explored the link between commitment and information/knowledge sharing. For example, Willem and Buelens (2007) find that organizational commitment is linked to interdepartmental knowledge sharing in public organizations. Examining the commitment-information sharing link in the context of public-nonprofit collaboration, current study suggests,

nonprofit organizations that have a strong sense of belongingness in their collaborations with government are more likely to voluntarily share information and knowledge, which they believe can benefit their organizations, the government partner, the clients, or the communities. Meanwhile, affective commitment also has a moderate effect on nonprofit organizations' required information sharing activity, although such effect disappeared once the instrumental factors such as government funding and contracts were considered. But this finding imply that affective commitment in the collaboration can lead nonprofit organizations to put in more effort in sharing information required by the government.

A number of studies have discussed public managers' trust toward nonprofit organizations. Van Slyke (2007, 172), for instance, finds public managers' trust toward nonprofit contractors is built upon "repeated interactions and transactions over time in which goals are achieved with consistent responses given to questions and information that is made available in a timely fashion upon request". Trust, in Van Slyke (2007), is found to relate to information sharing activities; specifically, public managers would share information with nonprofit contractors they trust in order to assist them to prepare contract proposal and navigate the political system and bureaucracy. Yet, few studies have empirically tested nonprofit organizations' trust toward government. Present study found trust – mainly motive-based trust – is positively associated with voluntary information sharing. Nonprofit organizations, which trust government to have their best interests in mind and think of their welfare when making decisions, are more likely to conduct voluntary information sharing. Nonprofit organizations that actively share information with government can in turn reinforce government's trust toward the nonprofit organizations. Indeed, the link between trust and information sharing is a two-

way street and the direction of causality is open to debate (Dyer and Chu 2003). In this study, however, the trust measures nonprofit organizations' trust toward government, for them to voluntarily share information, there needs to be some degree of trust toward government.

The findings regarding distributive justice and procedural justice are quite interesting. First of all, the regression results suggest distributive justice is not significantly related to required information sharing and procedural justice is not significantly related to voluntary information sharing. These two findings are somewhat inconsistent with original expectation that instrumental motivational factors are better at predicting required information sharing, whereas social motivational factors are better at predicting voluntary information sharing. In fact, Kim and Mauborgne's (1998) study of strategic alliance indicate procedural justice could facilitate voluntary cooperation and knowledge sharing between partners. Nevertheless, they also state that when parties feel the decision-making process is fair in strategic alliance, they tend to show voluntary cooperation based on their attitudes of trust and commitment. Thus it is possible that the effect of procedural justice on voluntary information sharing is not direct but mediated by motive-based trust and affective commitment, both of which are present in the model. As for distributive justice, the plausible explanation could be that, when nonprofit organizations are required to share information predetermined in government contract and funding requirement, even they experience distributive injustice such as late government payment, they have to fulfill their obligation of sharing required information.

Second, the findings suggest procedural justice is negatively related to required information sharing, but its effect disappears after adding in instrumental motivational

factors. Similarly, distributive justice is positively associated with voluntary information sharing, but its effect does not hold if social motivational factors were taken into consideration. These two findings suggest, although social motivational factors can marginally affect required information sharing, instrumental factors are in fact more influential predictors. Also, even though instrumental factors can marginally affect voluntary information sharing, social motivational factors are more powerful in predicting voluntary information sharing.

To summarize, the quantitative findings provided support for the overall argument that, both of required and voluntary information can be influenced by external incentives/sanctions as well as social and relational factors. Nevertheless, instrumental motivational model is indeed more powerful in predicting nonprofit compliance, in this case, required information sharing, Social motivational model, on the other hand, is more effective in explaining voluntary information sharing, even when controlling for a variety of factors such as demographic variables, organizational characteristics, and characteristics of collaboration. For required information sharing, current study finds government funding and contract are two major predictors of nonprofit required information sharing. This finding indicates that nonprofit organizations receiving government funding and contracts are more likely to indicate they always fulfill their obligations in sharing required information. Although procedural justice and affective commitment are moderately related to required information sharing, their effects are minimal with the presence of control mechanisms such as funding and contract. For voluntary information sharing, nonprofits' goal congruence with government agencies, affective commitment in collaboration, and motive-based trust toward government are

influential factors in motivating their voluntary information sharing with government.

CHAPTER VII IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

This chapter summarizes the entire dissertation project. It first presents a summary of theoretical contribution. It then discusses practical implications. It ends the chapter with a discussion of the limitations and future research directions.

7.1 Theoretical Contribution

The main objectives of this dissertation is to 1) understand voluntary information sharing by nonprofit organizations in their collaboration with government agencies, 2) examine the motivational factors underlying required and voluntary information sharing. In achieving these two objectives, the dissertation can make several contributions to the existing literature.

First, this dissertation proposes two views of information sharing - required and voluntary information sharing. Proactive sharing of confidential and proprietary information by corporations in strategic alliance has been examined in management literature (e.g. Du et al. 2012; Dyer and Chu. 2003). But the nature of “voluntary” and the content of information voluntarily shared may differ in different contexts of collaboration, especially in nonprofit organizations where information is often not considered as proprietary as private corporations. Hence, this study makes such an effort to advance the understanding of voluntary information sharing by nonprofits while collaborating with government.

The dissertation does not only provide evidence that nonprofit organizations conduct various voluntary information sharing, but suggests such voluntary information

sharing is driven by two perspectives of underlying motivation. The first is instrumental perspective, which entails nonprofit organizations voluntarily share information for the purpose of obtaining and securing funding or resource. The second is social motivational perspective, which describes that voluntary information sharing is conducted because it is consistent with the needs and best interest of the clients, the organizational values, and the commitment of government in the success of the nonprofit organizations. The findings demonstrate that voluntary cooperation by organizations may not be as altruistic and prosocial as voluntary cooperation by individuals. In this case, voluntary information sharing is conducted for the instrumental and strategic purpose of acquiring funding, resource, publicity, and reputation. Nonetheless, given the unique characteristic of nonprofit organizations as stewards and as representing “the needs of disadvantaged, excluded, and underrepresented groups” (Andrew and Entwistle 2010, 684), voluntary information sharing by nonprofit organizations also has a social motivational perspective, as it is consistent with the organizational image and identity.

Second, although previous research has linked control and trust mechanisms with information sharing at various level of analysis, few studies have compared the explanatory power of instrumental and social motivational model in information sharing under the context of public-nonprofit collaboration. The dissertation is a comprehensive study that makes the first attempt on examining and comparing the instrumental and social motivational factors underlying required and voluntary information sharing by nonprofits.

The quantitative findings indicate that government funding and contracts are two major factors predicting required information sharing by nonprofits. The findings are

consistent with the hypotheses since government contracts are often accompanied with reporting requirements. And the dependence on government funding determines that nonprofit organizations have to share required information to maintain the funding. With the presence of contract and dependence on government funding, other instrumental factors such as instrumental trust and distributive justice and social motivational factors are not significant enough to have effects on required information sharing. As regards to voluntary information sharing, only government contract among four instrumental factors has effect on voluntary information sharing. The major predictors of voluntary information sharing come from social motivational factors such as goal congruence, affective commitment, and motive-based trust. These findings indicate, while motivational factors of required information sharing by nonprofit organizations is mainly instrumental, the motivational origin of voluntary information sharing is primarily embedded in social and relational factors, which are derived from the interactions between nonprofits and government agencies.

7.2 Practical Implications

The dissertation provides several practical implications for both nonprofit and public managers. There may be three take-away lessons for the executive directors of nonprofit organizations. First, nonprofit organizations conduct a variety of voluntary information sharing activities with government agencies in collaboration. Although some of the voluntary sharing is motivated by instrumental purposes for resource exchange, there is also voluntary sharing that is motivated by organizational values and the unique nonprofit characteristics as representing the needs of the disadvantaged. It is important for nonprofit organizations to continue such value-driven voluntary cooperation given its

value-expressive nature (Frumkin 2002). Second, one of the primary reasons for nonprofit organizations to participate in collaboration needs to be shared goals with government agencies. It is not beneficial for nonprofits to collaborate with government only for resources without the existence of goal congruence. With the presence of goal congruence, nonprofit organizations will be more motivated to cooperate voluntarily and work collaboratively with government. Third, government contract could be the gateway for nonprofit organizations to become more engaged in government policy making, they need to seize the opportunity to build a collaborative working relationship with government agencies.

Although the main focus of the study is nonprofit organizations, the findings also have implications for public managers. First, in building collaborative partnership, the first skill for public managers is being able to identify people who possess the resources such as knowledge, information, and expertise (McGuire 2006). Public managers need to acknowledge the value of the knowledge base that nonprofit organizations develop in their professional service and in their communities (Alexander, Nank, and Stivers 1999). Second, although control mechanisms such as contract, monitoring, and oversight may regulate cooperation of nonprofit organizations, it is the attachment of nonprofit organizations and their beliefs of government having their welfare in mind that are most effective in fostering voluntary cooperation. Because such commitment and trust are derived from positive and successful interactions in collaborations, public managers need to develop the skills to foster a positive interaction with nonprofit executive directors. Third, having shared goals between nonprofit organizations and government agencies is the top motivational factor for nonprofit voluntary cooperation. Thus it is crucial for

public managers to work closely with nonprofit organizations to align goals and establish agreements on how they approach issues in collaboration, even though sometimes it may be frustrating for government officials not to be able to engage nonprofit organizations (Fleishman 2009).

7.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions

Several limitations and future research directions are worth noting. The first limitation concerns the measures of voluntary information sharing. In the study, voluntary information sharing is measured by an average frequency score that is calculated by aggregating all frequency score of information voluntarily shared divided by the total types of information. Since the information voluntarily shared may differ in different ways of collaboration, such generic measure is appropriate in a sense that it well represents voluntary information sharing activities across various ways of collaborations. But the 11 types of information included in the survey may not cover all types of information nonprofits would voluntarily share with government. For instance, Thomson and Perry (2006) mention a type of information sharing that is motivated by the willingness to compromise one organization's autonomy but for the good of the partner. Such information sharing is not considered in the measures of voluntary information sharing in the study. Future research can explore this type of information sharing and examine the influence of instrumental and social motivational factors on it.

The second limitation is the representativeness of the final sample used in the quantitative study. The comparison between the sample and the population shows that large-size and mid-size organizations are overrepresented in the sample while small

organizations are underrepresented. Nevertheless, the result is somewhat expected because large-size and mid-size nonprofit organizations are more likely to have the capacity to collaborate with government than small-size organizations. Furthermore, the respondents in the sample may differ with the non-respondents on their level of cooperativeness. The executive directors who responded the survey may have a higher level of cooperativeness to begin with as compared with the non-respondents. Therefore, the findings need to be interpreted in light of the potential response bias of the survey. Future research is needed to test the generalizability of the findings with a more representative sample.

Third, the main purpose of the study is to test the direct effect of instrumental and social motivational factors on information sharing, but the study does not consider the interaction between these motivational factors themselves. In fact, several variables may relate to each other. Motive-based trust and affective commitment, for instance, may be interrelated to each other and both of them can be results of shared goals and procedural justice. Future research can further examine such mediating effects of trust and affective commitment between procedural justice and voluntary information sharing.

Fourth, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose three forces of pressure that drive institutional isomorphic change: coercive pressure, mimetic pressure, and normative pressure. This dissertation examines the influence of the coercive pressure stemming from government funding and formal contracts on nonprofit information sharing activities. Future research can examine how mimetic pressure influence nonprofit information sharing activities. Specifically, the extent to which nonprofit organizations

would mimetic other nonprofits, if other nonprofits' voluntary information sharing leads to effective advocacy.

Lastly, this dissertation mainly focuses on the interaction in the dyadic relationship between public and nonprofit organizations and how the results of interaction influence voluntary information sharing by nonprofits. Future research can consider other intervening variables. For instance, to what extent voluntary information sharing by nonprofits may differ, if they have to compete with other nonprofits for government contracts or collaborations, or if the government agencies in collaboration also compete with the nonprofits for clients?

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Appendix A. Interview Protocol

Introductory Comment

I would first like to start by thanking you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study is to better understand collaboration between nonprofit organizations and government agencies. This interview will take only about 30 minutes. The interview conversation is confidential and any information collected will not be linked to you or your organization.

Main Questions

1. In what ways does your organization collaborate with government? (i.e. Any active, formal or informal relationship with government agencies in any form of public service delivery or planning, in which you share financial or human resources; jointly recruit or manage staff, clients or volunteers; jointly plan or deliver public services, or exchange information. Examples might include sharing office space, a government grant or contract to your organization for service planning/delivery, joint fundraising, or joint community planning).
2. In the collaboration, what kind of information does government request from your organization?
3. Besides the information you are requested to communicate with the government, are there ways in which you share information voluntarily with the government? (i.e. information/knowledge that is not requested by the government but you take the initiative to share)
4. What motivate you to (not to) voluntarily communicate such information?

Appendix B. Survey Questionnaires

National Survey of Human Services Nonprofit Organizations

Q1.1 National Survey of Human Services Nonprofit Organizations

Thank you for participating in this survey. Answering this survey should take only about 15 minutes of your time. Your responses are entirely confidential. The survey is related to academic research on nonprofit organizations and results will be published only in summary form. If you have any questions about this survey, please email speng@rutgers.edu.

Q1.2 In your opinion, how important is it for human services nonprofit organizations to collaborate with government?

- ☐ Not at all important (1)
- ☐ Somewhat important (2)
- ☐ Neutral (3)
- ☐ Important (4)
- ☐ Very important (5)

Q1.3 How much collaboration is there between your organization and the following levels of government?

	A lot (1)	Some (2)	Only a little (3)	None (4)
Local government (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State government (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Federal government (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q1.4 With which level of government does your organization collaborate the most?

- ☐ city government (1)
- ☐ county government (2)
- ☐ school district (3)
- ☐ special district (4)
- ☐ state government (5)
- ☐ federal government (6)
- ☐ None \ not applicable (7)

If none \ not applicable Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey

Q1.5 Please indicate below the principal or most active service area in which your nonprofit organization collaborates with the government (piped text).

- ☐ Arts and culture (1)
- ☐ Community action (2)
- ☐ Economic development / Planning (3)
- ☐ Disaster planning/ Emergency response (4)
- ☐ Education (K-12) (5)
- ☐ Environment / Nature resources (6)
- ☐ Fire (7)
- ☐ Finance / Fundraising (8)
- ☐ Health (9)
- ☐ Homeless/ Housing (10)
- ☐ Law enforcement / Corrections (11)
- ☐ Libraries (12)
- ☐ Parks / Recreation (13)
- ☐ Senior services / Aging (14)
- ☐ Social / Human services (15)
- ☐ Transportation (16)
- ☐ Youth Development (17)
- ☐ Other (18) _____

Q1.6 In what ways does your organization collaborate with the government (piped text) in the principal service area? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Formal service contract (1)
- ☐ Share staff (2)
- ☐ Share workspace (3)
- ☐ Share volunteers (4)
- ☐ Joint fundraising (5)
- ☐ Joint advocacy (6)
- ☐ Joint purchasing (7)
- ☐ Information exchange (8)
- ☐ Joint program development (9)
- ☐ Joint policy development (10)
- ☐ Government provides funding (11)
- ☐ Joint service delivery (12)
- ☐ Government officials serve on our board of directors (14)
- ☐ Joint case management/coordination (15)
- ☐ Joint recruitment of staff, volunteers (16)
- ☐ Government provides volunteers (17)
- ☐ Government provides equipment/facility (18)
- ☐ Our nonprofit organization provides volunteers to government (19)
- ☐ Our nonprofit organization serves on a public board or advisory committee (20)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (21) _____

[Q1.5 and Q1.6 are adopted from Gazley (2004)]

Q1.7 Approximately, how many years has your nonprofit organization collaborated with the government (piped text) in the principal service area?

- ☐ 1 year or less (1)
- ☐ 2-5 years (2)
- ☐ 6-10 years (3)
- ☐ 11-20 years (4)
- ☐ More than 20 years (5)

Q1.8 Does the collaboration between your organization and the government (piped text) in the principal service area include any of the following? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ A contract (1)
- ☐ A grant (2)
- ☐ Other legal agreement (3)
- ☐ None of the above (4)

Q1.9 In 2014, approximately what percent of your total revenue came from the government (piped text)? Your best guess.

_____ (1)

Q2.2 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about your sharing of information with the government (piped text).

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
We only share organizational information that is specified in the terms of the contract/agreement.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We share information that will strengthen the operations and programs of the government (piped text), even when we are not required to so.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We are willing to share information for the good of the collaboration even though sometimes we would be better off withholding it.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q2.3 When required to share information with government (piped text), the information we provide is . . .

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
Timely	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Complete	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Accurate	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q2.4 In the last 12 months, about how often did your organization and the government (piped text) have meetings?

- ☐ Several times a week
- ☐ Weekly
- ☐ Monthly
- ☐ Quarterly
- ☐ Yearly
- ☐ Less often (or never)

Q2.5 How likely do you think it is that your organization will continue its collaboration with the government (piped text) in the future?

- ☐ Very Unlikely
- ☐ Unlikely
- ☐ Undecided
- ☐ Likely
- ☐ Very Likely

Q3.1 Please indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.
The benefit we derive from our collaboration with government (piped text) is fair in view of

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
the resources we contribute to the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
the amount of the effort we put into the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
the level of responsibility we have in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
our performance in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.2 The government (piped text) and my organization have ...

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
a shared philosophy and vision.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
agree about how to approach things.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
similar goals for our work together	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.3 Please indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about your collaboration with the government (piped text).

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
The government (piped text) is knowledgeable about the issues involved in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I think the government (piped text) makes competent decisions about how to solve problems in our collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Our organization is generally able to anticipate the decision that the government (piped text) will make.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We cannot always rely on the government (piped text) to keep promises made to us.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The government (piped text) has always been evenhanded in its negotiation with us.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We trust the government (piped text) to think about our welfare as well as its own when making decisions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We trust the government (piped text) to keep our best interests in mind.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.4 Please indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about your collaboration with the government (piped text).

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Our organization can openly express its concerns in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Our organization has a great deal of influence over the decisions made in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Decisions that affect our organization are usually made in a fair way in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Most of the issues involving our organization are handled in a fair way in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Overall, we are fairly treated by the government (piped text) in the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.5 In our collaboration, the government (piped text)

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
is candid in dealing with us.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
treats us with respect.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
listens to our concerns and problems	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
provides constructive feedback about our concerns and problems.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q3.6 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about your collaboration with the government (piped text).

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
This collaboration has a great deal of meaning for our organization.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We really feel as if the problems in the collaboration are our organization's problems.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We do not feel a strong sense of "belonging" to this collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would be very hard for our organization to leave the collaboration right now, even if we wanted to.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We feel that we have too few options to consider if we leave this collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Too many of our organizational activities would be disrupted if we decided to leave the collaboration.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Right now, staying in the collaboration is a matter of necessity rather than desire.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Answer If Q1.6. In what ways does your organization collaborate with ... Formal service contract is selected

Or Q1.6. In what ways does your organization collaborate with ... Government provides funding is selected

Or Q1.8. Does the collaboration between your organization and the ... A contract is selected

Or Q1.8. Does the collaboration between your organization and the ... A grant is selected

Or Q1.9. In 2014, what percent of your total revenue comes from the ... - 0 is not selected

Q4.1 In 2014, was the government (piped text) late (i.e., past due date) in paying your organization?

☐ Yes (1)

☐ No (2)

Answer If Q4.1. In 2014, was the government (piped text) late (i.e., past due date) in paying your organization? Yes is selected

Q4.2 In 2014, by how many days was the government (piped text) late in paying?

- ☐ 1-30 days
- ☐ 31-60 days
- ☐ 61-90 days
- ☐ 91-120 days
- ☐ Over 120 days

[Q4.1 and Q4.2 were adopted from Boris et al. 2010]

Answer If Q4.1. In 2014, was the government (piped text) late (i.e., past due date) in paying your organization? No is selected

Q4.3 Has the government (piped text) ever been late in paying your organization in the past?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Answer If Q4.3. Has the government (piped text) ever been late in paying your organization in the past? Yes is selected

Q4.4 By how many days was the government agency late in paying?

- ☐ 1-30 days
- ☐ 31-60 days
- ☐ 61-90 days
- ☐ 91-120 days
- ☐ Over 120 days

Q4.5 How would you rate the level of red tape in dealing with the government (piped text)?

Q5.1 Please give us a little background information about your nonprofit organization. (All responses are confidential and will be used in aggregate form only.)

Q5.2 In what year was your organization founded?

Q5.3 Is your organization affiliated with a national organization?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Q5.4 Is your organization a faith-based organization?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Q5.4 In 2014, to the best of your knowledge, what was the approximate percentage breakdown of your organization's revenue sources? For example: enter the number 20 for 20 percent. (Your best guess)

_____ Government Funding (e.g. grants and contracts)
 _____ Corporate/Foundation Grants
 _____ Individual Donations
 _____ Service/Program Fees
 _____ Investment Income and other Earnings

Q6.1 Before you finish, tell us a little bit about yourself.

Q6.2 Which of the following best describes your job within your organization?

- ☐ Executive Director/Chief Operating Officer/President
- ☐ Senior Manager
- ☐ Professional Staff
- ☐ Board Member
- ☐ Other (please specify) _____

Q6.3 How many years have you been in your current position?

Q6.4 Before holding your current position, did you work for any of the following? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Another nonprofit organization
- ☐ A private (for-profit) organization
- ☐ A local government agency
- ☐ A state government agency
- ☐ A federal government agency

Q6.5 Are you . . .

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

Q6.6 What is your age?

- ☐ 19 or younger
- ☐ 20-29
- ☐ 30-39
- ☐ 40-49
- ☐ 50-59
- ☐ 60-69
- ☐ 70 or older

Q6.7 Do you consider yourself to be . . .

- ☐ Hispanic
- ☐ Black
- ☐ White
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Other (please specify)

Q6.8 Which of the following best describes your highest level of educational attainment?

- ☐ High School
- ☐ Some college
- ☐ Bachelor's
- ☐ M.P.A. (or Public Affairs, Public Policy)
- ☐ M.B.A.
- ☐ Doctorate/Ph.D.
- ☐ J.D.
- ☐ Other Graduate Degree (please specify)

Q33 Thank you very much for your participation! Do you have any comments or suggestions about this survey or study? (Optional)

Q34 If you would like to receive a copy of the survey results when it is released, please click on yes and fill out the email address to which the report can be sent. (Your email address will not be linked in any way to the analysis of your answers.)

- ☐ Yes _____
- ☐ No

APPENDIX C SURVEY INVITATION MESSAGES

Invitation Letter

Subject: Invitation to Participate in a Study of Nonprofit Human Services Organizations

Dear Executive Director,

You are invited to participate in a national survey of human services nonprofit organizations. This survey is conducted by researchers at the School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers University. Your organization is one of only a few selected randomly, so your participation is important in helping to better understand nonprofit organizations like yours.

This survey will take only about 15 minutes to complete. All your responses will remain anonymous, so you will not be asked to identify yourself or your organization in any way. The survey is related to academic research and the results will be published in summary form in a nonprofit journal.

As a participant in this survey, we will share with you a summary of the survey results in advance of publication. Your participation is entirely voluntary. If you would like to participate, click below to begin the survey. If not, simply close the email. Of course, we hope you participate - and thank you very much in advance for your time!

`{!://SurveyLink?d=Click%20here%20to%20begin%20your%20survey}`

Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:

`{!://SurveyURL}`

If you do not hold the position of CEO/Managing Director/Executive Director or equivalent position, **please kindly forward this message to the appropriate person.**

We very much appreciate your cooperation. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or need any additional information about this survey.



Shuyang Peng, PI, PhD Candidate
P: 862-596-7136 | Email: speng@rutgers.edu



Gregg Van Ryzin, PhD and Co-PI, Professor
P: 973-353-3985 | Email: vanryzin@rutgers.edu

School of Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University
111 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102



This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board of Rutgers University (IRB#15-207M). If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you can contact: Institutional Review Board | Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey | Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200 | 335 George Street, 3rd Floor | New Brunswick, NJ 08901 | Phone: 732-235-9806 | Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

First Reminder

Subject: Invitation to Participate in a National Survey

Dear Executive Director, President or CEO

About a week ago, we sent you an invitation to participate in a national survey of nonprofit organizations. We are writing to you again because your organization is one of only a few selected randomly from across the US, so your response is very important to us.

This survey will take only about 15 minutes to complete and your answers will remain anonymous.

The survey is part of an academic study and the results will be published in aggregate form in a nonprofit journal. As a participant in this survey, you will receive a summary of the survey results in advance of publication.

To participate, just click below to begin the survey. (If you have started but did not finish the survey, we encourage you to click below to continue your response.)

[Click here to begin the survey](#)

If you do not hold the position of CEO/Managing Director/Executive Director/President or equivalent position, **please kindly forward this message to the appropriate person.**

We very much appreciate your cooperation. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or need any additional information about this survey.



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vanryzin@rutgers.edu



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P: 973-353-3985 | Email:

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Second Reminder

Subject: Reminder: Take Part in a National Survey

Dear Executive Director, President or CEO

This is a friendly reminder that you're invited to participate in a national survey of nonprofit organizations, conducted by researchers at Rutgers University. The survey is closing soon—and we hope to include your organization, which is one of only a few nonprofits selected randomly from across the US.

The survey is interesting and should take only about 15 minutes to complete, and all of your answers will remain anonymous.

The survey is part of an academic study of the activities of nonprofit organizations, and the results will be published in aggregate form in a nonprofit journal. As a participant in this survey, you will receive a summary of the survey results in advance of publication.

To participate, just click below to begin the survey. (If you have started but did not finish the survey, we would appreciate if you can take some time to complete. By following the link below, you will return to the survey where you stopped.)

[Click here to begin the survey](#)

If you do not hold the position of CEO/Managing Director/Executive Director/President or equivalent position, **please kindly forward this message to the appropriate person.**

We very much appreciate your cooperation. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or need any additional information about this survey.



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APPENDIX D. MEASUREMENT

Variable	Source	Cronbach Alpha	Questions and Measurement items
Government funding	N/A	N/A	In 2014, approximately what percent of your total revenue came from the government in collaboration?
Formal service contract	N/A	N/A	In what ways does your organization collaborate with the government? Formal service contract=1, no formal service contract=0
Instrumental trust*	Tyler (2011)		Our organization is generally able to anticipate the decision that the government will make.
Distributive justice*	Griffith, Harvey and Lusch (2006)	0.87	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of the resources we contribute to the collaboration; 2. The benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of the amount of the effort we put into the collaboration; 3. The benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of the level of responsibility we have in the collaboration; 4. The benefit we derive from our collaboration with the government is fair in view of our performance in the collaboration
Goal congruence*	Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2012)	0.85	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The government and my organization have a shared philosophy and vision; 2. The government and my organization have agreement about how to approach things; 3. The government and my organization have similar goals for our work together
Affective commitment*	Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993)	0.59	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. This collaboration has a great deal of meaning for our organization; 2. We do not feel a strong sense of belonging to this collaboration (reversed); 3. Right now, staying in the collaboration is a matter of necessity rather than desire (reversed).
Motive-based trust*	Tyler (2011)	0.85	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. We trust the government to think about our welfare as well as their own when making decisions; 2. We trust the government to keep our best interests in mind

Procedural justice*	Tyler (2011).	0.88	1. Decisions that affect our organization are usually made in a fair way in the collaboration; 2. Most of the issues involving our organization are handled in a fair way in the collaboration; 3. Overall, we are fairly treated by the government in the collaboration.
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* Variables were measured by likert scale with strongly disagree=1; disagree=2; neither agree nor disagree=3; agree=4; strongly agree=5

APPENDIX E. CORRELATION MATRIX OF ALL VARIABLES (N=229)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Voluntary Information Sharing	1												
2. Required Information Sharing	0.24	1.00											
3. Goal Congruence	0.34	0.14	1.00										
4. Affective Commitment	0.31	0.14	0.52	1.00									
5. Motive-Based Trust	0.28	0.14	0.51	0.51	1.00								
6. Procedural Justice	0.14	0.08	0.53	0.60	0.66	1.00							
7. Formal Service Contract	0.16	0.14	0.07	0.06	-0.06	0.00	1.00						
8. Government Funding	0.01	0.26	-0.10	-0.13	-0.22	-0.19	0.11	1.00					
9. Instrumental Trust	-0.02	-0.02	0.29	0.26	0.30	0.37	0.02	-0.07	1.00				
10. Distributive Justice	0.18	0.04	0.53	0.44	0.44	0.59	-0.04	-0.13	0.20	1.00			
11. Age	-0.01	0.07	-0.09	-0.10	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.02	-0.07	-0.05	1.00		
12. Education	-0.08	-0.05	0.05	-0.04	-0.07	0.13	0.09	-0.01	0.10	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	
13. Race (White)	-0.13	-0.03	-0.03	-0.08	0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.12	0.03	1.00
14. Gender	0.14	0.04	-0.01	0.08	0.07	-0.07	-0.12	0.06	-0.13	-0.06	-0.04	-0.14	-0.05
15. Position Level	0.12	0.06	0.13	0.02	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.11	0.03	-0.01	-0.07	-0.02	-0.16
16. Position Years	-0.07	0.01	-0.18	-0.16	-0.25	-0.21	0.03	0.10	-0.18	-0.12	0.37	0.06	0.07
17. The Age of the organization	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.07	-0.17	0.06	0.02	0.15	-0.16	-0.26	-0.10
18. Revenue Size	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.03	-0.09	0.00	0.06	0.18	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.14	0.08
19. National Affiliation	-0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.05	0.04	0.01	0.06	-0.01	0.05	0.09	0.14	0.00
20. Faith-Based	-0.09	-0.13	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.02	-0.11	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.05
21. Crime	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.00	-0.08	0.05	-0.13	-0.02	0.07	0.00
22. Employment	0.08	-0.04	-0.03	-0.11	-0.14	-0.23	0.14	0.07	-0.13	-0.13	-0.04	0.08	0.05
23. Food	0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.13	0.13	0.09	-0.11	-0.09	-0.05	0.04	-0.02	-0.04	0.09
24. Housing	-0.08	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.13	-0.05	-0.18	0.09	0.08	0.12	0.07	-0.07
25. Public safety
26. Youth development	0.03	-0.06	0.18	0.16	0.06	0.06	0.06	-0.13	-0.03	0.16	-0.15	0.04	0.00
27. Multi-human services	-0.03	0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.08	-0.05	0.00	0.24	0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.13	-0.01
28. Local government	0.10	-0.05	0.17	0.11	0.21	0.15	0.06	-0.38	0.23	0.11	-0.02	0.05	0.01
29. State government	-0.08	-0.05	-0.14	-0.12	-0.28	-0.17	-0.01	0.33	-0.20	-0.12	-0.05	-0.15	0.05
30. Federal government	-0.04	0.15	-0.06	0.00	0.09	0.02	-0.08	0.12	-0.06	0.00	0.11	0.15	-0.09
31. Years of Collaboration	-0.07	0.02	-0.23	-0.19	-0.21	-0.16	0.10	0.24	-0.09	-0.18	0.11	0.07	0.11
32. Nonprofit serve on public boards...	0.21	0.08	-0.01	-0.05	-0.13	-0.08	0.15	0.05	-0.12	0.06	-0.02	0.04	-0.07
33. Nonprofit provides volunteer	0.07	0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.10	0.02	0.05	-0.07	-0.09	-0.07	-0.02	-0.14
34. Government provides equipment	0.04	-0.01	0.11	0.14	0.10	0.03	0.14	-0.03	0.08	0.03	0.01	-0.06	0.02
35. Government provides volunteer	0.10	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.18	0.05	0.01	-0.10	-0.01	0.07	-0.02	-0.05	0.03
36. Joint staffing	0.08	-0.05	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.13	0.06	0.07	0.13	-0.03	0.02	0.06
37. Joint case management	0.15	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.03	-0.03	0.10	0.01	-0.02	-0.07	0.10	-0.02	-0.03
38. Government serve on nonprofit board	0.15	0.06	0.04	0.16	0.12	0.07	0.17	-0.12	-0.03	0.10	-0.06	0.03	0.04
39. Joint service delivery	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.00	-0.08	0.09	-0.10	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
40. Joint policy development	0.23	0.07	0.04	0.12	0.00	-0.01	0.10	0.09	-0.06	0.09	-0.01	-0.04	0.01
41. Joint program development	0.15	0.01	0.11	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.26	0.11	0.09	0.05	0.07	-0.04	0.11
42. Information exchange	0.18	-0.03	0.04	0.08	-0.03	0.00	0.26	0.02	-0.05	0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.03
43. Joint purchasing	-0.01	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.10	0.00	0.04
44. Joint advocacy	0.24	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.13	0.10	0.18	0.01	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.08	-0.14
45. Joint fundraising	0.07	-0.12	0.02	0.14	0.11	0.10	0.06	-0.12	0.04	0.04	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04
46. Shared volunteer	0.11	-0.06	-0.02	0.12	0.16	0.01	0.04	-0.10	0.00	0.14	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05
47. Shared workspace	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.00	-0.04	-0.10	0.15	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.09	0.01	-0.06
48. Shared staff	0.06	-0.03	0.05	0.15	0.08	0.07	0.04	-0.10	0.06	0.08	0.04	-0.06	-0.05
49. Government provides funding	0.00	0.23	-0.05	0.00	0.08	0.04	-0.06	0.19	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.04

	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
14. Gender	1												
15. Position Level	-0.06	1.00											
16. Position Years	-0.01	-0.03	1.00										
17. The Age of the organization	0.17	-0.02	-0.14	1.00									
18. Revenue Size	-0.18	0.04	0.10	-0.16	1.00								
19. National Affiliation	-0.18	-0.07	0.11	-0.21	0.14	1.00							
20. Faith-Based	-0.20	0.16	-0.05	-0.15	0.18	0.15	1.00						
21. Crime	0.12	0.09	0.04	0.10	-0.05	-0.09	-0.08	1.00					
22. Employment	-0.02	0.04	-0.06	0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.11	-0.06	1.00				
23. Food	0.09	-0.04	-0.04	0.09	-0.05	0.03	-0.09	-0.05	-0.07	1.00			
24. Housing	-0.12	0.03	-0.03	0.09	-0.14	0.05	0.04	-0.11	-0.15	-0.12	1.00		
25. Public safety
26. Youth development	0.06	-0.04	0.00	-0.07	-0.06	0.13	-0.08	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.11	.	1.00
27. Multi-human services	-0.01	-0.05	0.06	-0.15	0.18	-0.05	0.13	-0.24	-0.33	-0.27	-0.60	.	-0.24
28. Local government	-0.08	0.09	-0.04	-0.09	-0.09	-0.16	0.04	0.12	-0.06	0.00	0.08	.	0.07
29. State government	0.08	-0.06	0.05	0.11	0.13	0.15	-0.04	-0.08	0.12	-0.06	-0.21	.	-0.03
30. Federal government	0.00	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	-0.01	-0.07	-0.09	0.08	0.18	.	-0.07
31. Years of Collaboration	-0.04	0.07	0.16	-0.21	0.13	0.06	-0.06	0.02	0.14	-0.02	0.13	.	-0.25
32. Nonprofit serve on public boards...	0.05	0.11	0.10	0.06	0.14	-0.05	-0.02	-0.08	0.04	0.01	-0.08	.	-0.02
33. Nonprofit provides volunteer	0.08	-0.04	-0.03	0.11	0.20	-0.05	-0.01	0.08	0.03	-0.05	-0.12	.	-0.05
34. Government provides equipment	-0.11	-0.06	0.00	0.01	0.31	0.04	0.04	-0.07	-0.02	-0.08	-0.08	.	0.02
35. Government provides volunteer	0.06	-0.04	0.01	0.13	-0.07	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.10	0.04	-0.02	.	0.06
36. Joint staffing	-0.07	-0.03	-0.05	0.08	0.28	0.09	0.14	-0.04	0.08	-0.04	-0.01	.	-0.04
37. Joint case management	0.11	0.18	-0.03	0.02	0.14	-0.18	-0.05	0.18	0.03	-0.11	-0.11	.	-0.03
38. Government serve on nonprofit board	-0.03	-0.06	-0.04	0.12	0.00	0.11	-0.08	0.01	0.22	-0.09	0.02	.	0.18
39. Joint service delivery	0.05	-0.01	0.08	0.00	0.14	-0.08	-0.08	0.18	0.09	-0.05	-0.13	.	0.04
40. Joint policy development	0.06	-0.02	0.08	0.01	0.22	0.03	-0.13	-0.03	0.19	-0.05	-0.11	.	-0.03
41. Joint program development	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.17	-0.08	0.01	0.15	0.04	-0.10	-0.08	.	-0.08
42. Information exchange	0.11	0.08	0.06	-0.04	0.07	0.01	-0.05	0.06	0.00	0.10	-0.02	.	0.11
43. Joint purchasing	-0.13	-0.02	0.14	-0.03	0.08	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05	.	-0.02
44. Joint advocacy	0.13	0.05	-0.08	0.14	0.06	-0.10	-0.13	0.16	0.09	-0.10	0.01	.	-0.02
45. Joint fundraising	-0.07	-0.03	-0.11	0.07	-0.05	0.16	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	0.16	.	0.13
46. Shared volunteer	0.05	-0.04	-0.11	0.09	0.17	0.03	0.13	-0.05	0.11	-0.06	-0.07	.	0.18
47. Shared workspace	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.17	-0.04	-0.05	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	.	0.13
48. Shared staff	-0.03	-0.03	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.05	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	.	0.15
49. Government provides funding	0.22	-0.04	-0.03	0.21	-0.04	-0.07	-0.13	0.11	-0.21	0.00	-0.03	.	-0.09

	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
27. Multi-human services	1												
28. Local government	-0.12	1.00											
29. State government	0.18	-0.81	1.00										
30. Federal government	-0.08	-0.40	-0.22	1.00									
31. Years of Collaboration	-0.08	-0.15	0.07	0.14	1.00								
32. Nonprofit serve on public boards/advisory committees	0.08	0.02	0.06	-0.13	0.04	1.00							
33. Nonprofit provides volunteer	0.09	-0.02	0.07	-0.07	-0.07	0.19	1.00						
34. Government provides equipment	0.14	0.12	-0.06	-0.11	0.01	0.11	0.18	1.00					
35. Government provides volunteer	-0.06	0.16	-0.17	-0.01	-0.10	-0.01	0.16	0.07	1.00				
36. Joint staffing	0.01	0.07	-0.04	-0.05	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.40	0.24	1.00			
37. Joint case management	0.06	0.09	0.00	-0.15	-0.01	0.14	0.22	0.13	-0.06	0.01	1.00		
38. Government serve on nonprofit board	-0.17	0.15	-0.09	-0.12	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.11	0.20	0.15	0.10	1.00	
39. Joint service delivery	-0.01	0.17	-0.09	-0.15	-0.06	0.15	0.23	0.14	0.07	0.01	0.27	0.15	1.00
40. Joint policy development	0.03	-0.11	0.18	-0.10	0.06	0.39	0.09	0.18	-0.06	0.01	0.15	0.10	0.20
41. Joint program development	0.06	0.00	0.08	-0.13	-0.05	0.16	0.07	0.27	0.14	0.18	0.32	0.22	0.33
42. Information exchange	-0.10	0.11	-0.03	-0.14	0.14	0.36	0.18	0.08	0.16	0.10	0.22	0.16	0.15
43. Joint purchasing	0.09	0.09	-0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.07	-0.02	0.32	-0.03	-0.02	0.09	0.13	0.09
44. Joint advocacy	-0.07	0.07	-0.07	-0.01	0.05	0.22	0.24	0.19	0.04	0.04	0.26	0.15	0.34
45. Joint fundraising	-0.12	0.07	-0.04	-0.05	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.17	-0.04	-0.03	0.10	0.15	0.01
46. Shared volunteer	-0.03	0.10	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09	0.11	0.39	0.16	0.34	0.26	0.20	0.14	0.21
47. Shared workspace	-0.06	0.08	-0.07	-0.03	-0.11	0.20	0.12	0.10	0.01	0.07	0.22	0.02	0.18
48. Shared staff	-0.02	0.12	-0.10	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.14	0.33	-0.04	-0.02	0.13	0.18	0.23
49. Government provides funding	0.13	-0.17	0.13	0.08	-0.05	0.12	0.11	-0.06	0.01	-0.08	0.03	0.01	0.05

	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
40. Joint policy development	1									
41. Joint program development	0.32	1.00								
42. Information exchange	0.30	0.28	1.00							
43. Joint purchasing	0.09	0.16	0.00	1.00						
44. Joint advocacy	0.32	0.36	0.31	0.05	1.00					
45. Joint fundraising	0.10	-0.03	0.10	-0.02	0.19	1.00				
46. Shared volunteer	0.08	0.16	0.24	-0.02	0.11	0.11	1.00			
47. Shared workspace	-0.03	0.15	0.10	0.16	0.12	-0.05	0.19	1.00		
48. Shared staff	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.34	0.07	0.20	0.29	0.23	1.00	
49. Government provides funding	0.10	0.09	0.18	0.05	0.15	-0.16	0.00	0.00	0.08	1