

THE NORMATIVE DISCONNECT: EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT,
NORMATIVE POWER, AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN HUNGARY AND THE
CZECH REPUBLIC

by

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Abstract

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism in Europe, the various countries in Central and Eastern Europe experienced a radical and hasty political and economic transformation. Shortly after this, many of these countries began to seek a ‘return to Europe’, launching applications for membership of the European Union, with the aim (at least partially) of anchoring and consolidating these changes. Out of these various candidate states, the Czech Republic and Hungary were amongst those that were considered in particular to be leading candidates for membership, and indeed, both of these countries were among the first group of states to open negotiations in 1998, and subsequently to join the EU in 2004. Following their accession to membership, it was widely considered that these countries had become stable, consolidated liberal democracies, and that they had internalized and accepted the various norms associated with membership of the European Union. However, since then, the two countries have experienced very different trajectories in terms of their adherence to EU norms, and specifically those that relate to liberal democracy. Although it has faced several difficulties over the years, the Czech Republic has enjoyed somewhat stable progress towards the consolidation of its liberal democratic political structures. On the other, Hungary has experienced a notable reversion towards a more authoritarian and illiberal form of government, a series of developments that were completely at odds with the expectations of the EU when these countries were granted membership. This study argues that in neither state has liberal democracy been strongly consolidated: however, the reasons for the divergence between the two countries are that a comparatively weaker and more ineffectual civil society in Hungary has been unable to either encourage or develop the societal

internalization of the norms of the EU in the state, or to prevent domestic elites from turning the country back towards a new form of authoritarian government. In the Czech Republic, the civil society has been able to play a stronger role in constraining the activity of the elites, and as such, governing parties have not been able to concentrate power in the same manner as has happened in Hungary. Additionally, the normative power of the EU has been enervated in this regard by an over-instrumentalization of membership in favor of the material, economic aspects of the EU and to the detriment of the democratic aspects, and also by a perceived lack of consistency on the behalf of the EU in responding to developments throughout the union over the last decade.

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List of Acronyms and Diminutions

ANO-	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens party
CEECs-	Central and Eastern European Countries
ČSSD-	Czech Social Democratic Party
ENP-	European Neighborhood Policy
EPP-	European People's Party
ESS-	European Social Survey
EU-	European Union
GDP-	Gross Domestic Product
HCLU-	Hungarian Civil Liberties Union
HZDS-	The People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
IMF-	International Monetary Fund
ISPA-	Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
Jobbik-	Movement for a Better Hungary
KDNP-	Christian Democratic People's Party
KDU-ČSL-	Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party
KSCM-	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
LGBTQ-	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Queer community
MEP-	Member of the European Parliament
MIÉP-	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MSzP-	Hungarian Socialist Party
NATO-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO-	Non-governmental Organization
ODS-	Civic Democrat Party (Czech Republic)
OECD-	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE-	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSI-	Open Society Institute
PES-	Party of European Socialists
PHARE-	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies programme
SAPARD-	Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
TAIEX-	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
TOP 09-	Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita (Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity; Czech political party)
Úsvit-	Dawn of Direct Democracy
WWI-	World War One
WWII-	World War Two

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Europe, the various Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) experienced a radical and hasty political and economic transformation. Shortly after this democratic and economic transition, many of these countries began to seek a ‘return to Europe’, and the establishment of a relationship with the various states of Western Europe, and the European Union collectively.¹ The relationship between the EU and the former communist states initially saw the signing of a number of Association Agreements; this was followed very shortly by the conclusion of a series of more advanced European Agreements, and subsequently, the launching of applications for membership of the European Union by the CEECs, with the aim (at least partially) of anchoring and consolidating the democratic and economic changes these countries had gone through. The development of this relationship, along with accession into other Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO, was considered to be the key foreign policy objective for several of the new regimes in these countries, as it was to mark the symbolic endpoint of the previously mentioned ‘return to Europe’ and was intended to give the countries a clean break from their histories of communist rule.² Furthermore, it must be noted that the primary driving consideration for seeking integration into the Euro-Atlantic

¹Wojciech Sadurski: (2006) “EU Enlargement and Democracy in New Member States”, in Wojciech Sadurski; Adam Czarnota; Martin Krygier (eds.) *Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal Orders*, Dordrecht: Springer Publications pp. 27-28.

²Milada Anna Vachudova: (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-4

structures quickly became more specifically utilitarian (rather than symbolic) in nature, with the desire to improve and develop the economies of their countries.³

From analyzing documents related to the EU's enlargement strategy, it is clear that the EU did not seek to be the driving force behind the changes in Central and Eastern Europe following their transitions to democracy⁴, but rather to shape and support the changes in these countries.⁵ In essence, the EU sought to assist the consolidation of the new liberal democratic systems in the candidate countries.⁶ Additionally, the EU was motivated to offer a membership prospect to these countries in order to prevent any future backsliding on democratic reforms, and a reversion to some form of authoritarian rule.⁷ The EU did have two specific strategic objectives for the enlargement, namely the guarantee of political stability on the European continent and the strengthening of the EU as an economic power.⁸ The EU also specified that political stability was not merely about the creation of some sort of buffer zone, and that it was clearly related to the spread of 'European' values of "...democracy, the rule

³ Ibid., p. 4

⁴ In this work, I will accept Linz and Stepan's definition of a democratic transition, which is a situation whereby "...sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*." Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press p. 3

⁵ European Commission: (2000) "Enlargement Strategy Paper: Report on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries", *European Commission*, p. 3, [online], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/strat_en.pdf (accessed on 9/20/2013)

⁶ According to Linz and Stepan, a consolidated democracy is one where democracy has become "...the only game in town". Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press p. 5

⁷ Erin K. Jenne; Cas Mudde: (2012) "Hungary's Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?", *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3), p. 147

⁸ Ibid.

of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities”.⁹ The transmission of these values to the neighboring countries would then contribute to the security and economic development of the European continent by mitigating sources of instability and conflict such as minority issues and border problems, by improving the living standards of citizens in the new member states, and by providing the old member states with new export markets.¹⁰ Subsequently, the EU insisted on the implementation of a large raft of reforms based on the ‘acquis communautaire’ (the entire body of EU legislation) and, more specifically on the Copenhagen Criteria, so as to ensure that the admitted countries would be able to meet the requirements of membership following their accession to the EU, and so that they be unlikely to destabilize the union from the inside.

Statements made in the various annual reports on the progress of the candidate countries towards achieving membership of the EU indicate that the European Commission saw the candidate countries as making good progress towards membership: in particular, a group of several countries including the Czech Republic and Hungary were seen as having fulfilled the political requirements for membership at a very early point, and continued to meet these requirements right up until the point

⁹ Ibid. pp. 3-4. This is based on the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which outlines the basic legal structures, human rights and civil liberties that signatory countries are expected to uphold. However, this text does not define what is understood by the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘liberal democracy’. As such, for the purposes of this dissertation, I will use Vachudova’s definition of liberal democracy, which is supported by the EU’s various recommendations and statements about the applicant countries during the : “...a political system where state institutions and democratically elected rulers respect juridical limits on their powers and the political liberties of all citizens”. Milada Anna Vachudova: (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3 The relevance of this formulation to EU approaches to the democratic standards in the applicant countries is shown by the European Commission’s criticisms of Vladimír Mečiar’s regime in Slovakia during the mid- to late-1990s as being incompatible with the requirements of EU membership.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 4

of achieving membership.¹¹ Drawing on the definition of “democratic consolidation” provided above by Linz and Stepan, and the definition of “liberal democracy” provided by Vachudova, *I use the term consolidated liberal democracy to mean a situation whereby a political situation where the state institutions and democratically-elected rulers of a country respect juridical liberties on their powers and the political liberties of all citizens, and whereby such a specific situation has become accepted, normalized and socialized by the broader society in that state.* A state where a large proportion of the citizenry favor or support majoritarian, chauvinistic, or authoritarian political parties and leaders or where such political groups enjoy electoral success, then, would not be considered a consolidated liberal democracy. *I consider an authoritarian regime to essentially be the inverse of a liberal democracy: according to this definition, an authoritarian regime is one whereby rulers of a country ignore, circumvent, or remove juridical restrictions on their powers, and where elections (be they competitive, open and pluralistic or not) are manipulated in such a manner that opposition parties are effectively denied any realistic possibility of victory.* This definition is in keeping with Schedler’s definition of ‘electoral authoritarianism’.¹²

From the perspective of the EU, then, these countries were becoming consolidated liberal democracies. Sadurski, for instance, argues that enlargement would provide liberal democratic forces in the CEECs with both physical and moral support

¹¹ European Commission: (2003) “Comprehensive monitoring report of the European Commission on the state of preparedness for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia”, *European Commission*, [online], available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0675:FIN:EN:PDF> (accessed on 9/21/2013)

¹² Andreas Schedler: (2009) “Electoral Authoritarianism”, in Todd Landman; Neil Robinson (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics*, London: Sage Publications, pp. 381-382

against nationalistic, populist and authoritarian forces, and in so doing, would strengthen the democratic consolidation process in these countries.¹³ Since then, however, the enlargement has had somewhat uneven results, most notably in Hungary. Since the landslide victory of Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party in the 2010 elections where they achieved 68% of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament, the country has undergone a marked illiberal turn, which has been referred to by Lendvai as having “...put an end to the liberal democracy existing in Hungary since 1990 and has smoothed the path to a populist autocracy.”¹⁴ Since 2010, the Orban government has impinged upon media freedoms in the country, has undermined and negated the system of checks and balances in the country, and has frequently used its Parliamentary ‘supermajority’¹⁵ to set legislative changes in stone by enshrining them in a new constitution, one which was passed without virtually any input from opposition political parties or sections of society outside the Fidesz party. This is also supplemented by a growth in support for populist radical right-wing political groups such as Jobbik, who also achieved close to 18% of the vote in the 2010 elections while campaigning on a xenophobic, authoritarian and radically nationalistic platform. These elements of Hungary’s illiberal, authoritarian turn have received considerable attention from the media, and have raised much concern within the institutions of the EU. They are also

¹³ Wojciech Sadurski: (2006) “EU Enlargement and Democracy in New Member States”, in Wojciech Sadurski; Adam Czarnota; Martin Krygier (eds.) *Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal Orders*, Dordrecht: Springer Publications pp. 47-48.

¹⁴ Paul Lendvai: (2012) *Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, New York: Columbia University Press p. 207

¹⁵ According to the Hungarian constitution, a 66% majority of seats in the House of Parliament is required in order to make changes and revisions to the constitution. Thus, a party or a coalition that possesses such a majority is allowed to make changes to the constitution and is said to have a ‘supermajority’.

notable for the contrast they present with other, similar countries that joined the EU at the same time. The Czech Republic, for instance, has had some problems since achieving membership of the EU involving political scandals (most notably, the resignation of the Petr Nečas government in early 2013 as a result of a corruption scandal), but it has seemingly not strayed from its path towards being a consolidated liberal democracy. Neither have radical nationalist political groups in the country received any support in elections since accession to the EU.

Post-accession performance of the new Member States

It was to be expected that following the accession of both states to the EU, that further, concerted efforts might be required to ensure that the processes of consolidating the various different reforms were successful. In 2004, based on the findings of the annual progress reports that the European Commission had compiled during the period of application for membership, the two areas which seemed the most likely to be particularly problematic for the Czech Republic and Hungary (and for the CEECs in general) were minority rights (specifically relating to the Roma community), and corruption. Given the continent-wide difficulties of ensuring the integration of nomadic communities such as the Roma into society, it is no surprise that this continued to be a source of difficulty in both countries; indeed, in the Commission progress reports for each country, the poor status of the Roma community in each of the two new members had often been highlighted. Additionally, given the absence of a liberal approach to ethnic/minority integration in communist regimes, it is fully understandable that this

issue might take prolonged work in the CEECs in order for it to be resolved.¹⁶ Problems related to corruption were a little more worrisome, as high levels of corruption have been shown to have a deleterious effect on democracy in a state.¹⁷ However, in light of the relatively poor economic situations in the CEE states, combined with the insidious nature of corruption and the inherent difficulty found in rooting it out, it is somewhat to be expected that the new members would have to show sustained commitment to the reform process in order to bring their states in line with the standard of the Western European members. As such, it is too not surprising that corruption has continued to be somewhat of an issue in Hungary and the Czech Republic (not to mention the rest of the 2004, 2007 and 2013 accession states), although, as the graph in figure 1.1 demonstrates, some small progress has been made in both countries.

While it may have been expected that progress on some issues such as these would slow (or even that a slight, temporary amount of backsliding might occur) when the conditionality requirements were removed after accession, it was considered to be very unlikely that regression would happen in the area of the core norms that were stressed in the Copenhagen Criteria and which underpinned the enlargement: the prevalence of market-based economic structures, and the existence of liberal democratic political structures.¹⁸ Additionally, given the seeming stability of the Czech

¹⁶ While somewhat severe problems exist in terms of integrating Roma communities in many Central and Eastern European states, these are problems which are not confined to the new member states. Indeed, France and Italy (amongst other Western European member states) have had significant problems in terms of integrating nomadic communities in recent years. As such, barring cases of extreme repression such as state-sanctioned violence or systematic disenfranchisement, problems with integration of minority communities should not be considered synonymously with problems regarding the level of democracy in a state.

¹⁷ Luigi Manzetti; Carole J. Wilson: (2007) 'Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(8), p. 951


¹⁸ While the rule of law and minority rights were stressed as part of the requirements for gaining access to EU membership, they were not considered to be prerequisites for the commencement of negotiations

Republic and Hungary at that point, the ease with which they had met these parts of the Copenhagen Criteria, and the perceived relative maturity of the economic and democratic institutions in these states by 2004, it was considered particularly unrealistic that reversions would occur in these fields in these countries.

Hungary

However, such an expectation has not been borne out in reality. While the Czech Republic has continued (with some bumps in the road) to make forward progress in many areas, Hungary has experienced a spectacular decline in terms of the quality of

Figure 1.1: Levels of corruption in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 1996-2013



*Source:
Transparency
International's
Corruption
Perception
Index¹⁹*

and for the development of their relations with the EU. On the other hand, it is quite clear that in order for any possible relationship to be contemplated, requirements regarding the existence of a market-based economy and liberal democratic political institutions had to be fulfilled. As such, I consider the latter two norms to be the 'core' norms of the EU and of the 2004 Enlargement.

¹⁹ Figures taken from Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, between 1996 and 2013; scores are awarded based on a scale from 0-100, with 100 being almost totally free of corruption and 0 being almost completely corrupt.


its democracy since its accession to the EU, to the point that it would now be considered the laggard of the 2004 enlargement group. As can be seen in figure 1.2 on page 11, which displays data from three separate organizations that monitor the levels of democracy in different states, Hungary has strayed away from the path of reform ever since its accession to the EU, and has become increasingly authoritarian in terms of its political structures. This trend has been particularly noticeable following the election of the Viktor Orbán-led Fidesz party to government in 2010 with a parliamentary constitutional supermajority. The populist radical right-wing Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) party has emerged as a major force on the political scene in the country, enjoying significant success in the 2009 European Parliamentary and 2010 National Parliamentary elections. This on its own is not necessarily problematic, as similar radical right-wing parties have also managed to obtain success in numerous other European countries²⁰, although the scale of Jobbik's victories were somewhat concerning (14.7% in the 2009 European Parliament elections, and 16.7% in the 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary elections).²¹

What are of much greater concern are the activities of the Hungarian government under Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party. Following their success in the 2010 elections, where they won 52.7% of the popular vote and 263 seats out of 386, the Orbán government set about centralizing power and removing constitutional and

²⁰ Radical right-wing parties who are ideologically close to Jobbik have won significant amounts of votes in elections in most of the traditional democracies of the EU, most notably in France, Austria and the Netherlands, where the National Front (FR), the Freedom Party (AT), and the Party for Freedom (NL) have enjoyed such sustained success over the years that they can almost be considered part of the political mainstream in their respective countries.

²¹ Jobbik were actually able to increase their vote share by nearly 4% in the 2014 Hungarian Parliamentary elections to 20.3%. I deal with the conduct and results of this election in greater detail in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

Figure 1.2: Levels of democracy in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 2003-2013



a) Graph based on data taken from the Freedom House Nations in Transit Index, between 2003 and 2013.²² As explained in the footnote at the bottom of this page, Freedom House's index runs in reverse numerical order.

b) Graph based on data taken from the Bertelsmann Transformations Index, between 2003 and 2014.²³

c) Graph based on data taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy index, between 2006 and 2013.²⁴

²² Figures taken from Freedom House's Nations in Transit reports, between 2003 and 2013; scores are awarded based on a scale from 1-7, with 1 representing the highest possible level of democratic progress (i.e. most democratic society), and 7 representing the lowest level of democratic progress (i.e. least democratic society). Scores are calculated based on the findings of a group of researchers, both within the country and outside of it, and the categories that are assessed include the standard of democratic governance at the national level; the electoral process; civil society; independence of the media; the standard of democratic governance at the local level; the judicial framework and independence; and the presence of corruption within the state.

²³ Figures are taken from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, between 2003 and 2014, which measures the state of democracy in developing and transitional countries. Scores are awarded from a scale of 0-10, with 10 being the highest possible quality democracy. Scores are calculated based on the findings of a group of researchers, and the categories that are assessed include the 'stateness' of the state in question; political participation; rule of law; stability of democratic institutions; and political and social integration

²⁴ Figures are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index between 2006 and 2013, and which uses a scale from 0-10, with 10 being considered the highest possible quality democracy. Scores are awarded based on Electoral Process and Pluralism; functioning of government; political participation; political culture; and civil liberties. Scores ranked between 8-10 are considered full democracies; 6-8 are considered flawed democracies; 4-6 are Hybrid regimes; and 0-4 are authoritarian countries.

institutional checks and balances on the extent of their power. Almost immediately upon coming to power, Orbán set about dismantling constitutional restraints: using his party's supermajority, he got rid of a requirement for an 80% parliamentary majority in order to set the rules for writing a new constitution. Following this, he began to restrict the power of the Constitutional Court in the country to review and oversee legislation and sought to adulterate its independence and neutrality, and also stacked the Election Commission in the country to thwart any attempt by the opposition to hold a referendum on his reforms.²⁵ With this achieved, Orbán began work on a new constitution for Hungary, a process which did not involve input from the political opposition or from civil society in the country to any great extent.²⁶ Other pieces of legislation, which sought to further undermine the independence of the judiciary and which would have led to the forced retirement of numerous judges were struck down by the European Commission. However, the Commission was powerless to stop Orbán from stuffing many other oversight institutions with political appointees who were widely considered to be Fidesz loyalists, including the Central Bank, the Ombudsman, the Public Prosecutor, and the previously mentioned Election Commission.²⁷

Following his subversion of the system of judicial and institutional oversight in the country, Orbán then introduced his new constitution to the country, having rushed its production through the Parliament. According to Halmai, the resulting text was one which does not fit with standards and understandings of democratic constitutionalism

²⁵ Miklós Bánkuti; Gábor Halmai; Kim Lane Scheppelle: (2012) "Hungary's Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution", *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3), pp. 139-140.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 141-142

²⁷ Jacques Rupnik: (2012) "Hungary's Illiberal Turn: How Things Went Wrong", *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3), p. 134

and the basic principles of the EU, due to its extension of its application in its preamble to Hungarian communities based outside of Hungary and its lack of prohibitions on discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.²⁸ Additionally, Orban subsequently used his supermajority to pass several ‘cardinal’ laws, which are pieces of ordinary legislation that require a two-thirds parliamentary majority to be overturned, repealed, or otherwise altered.

These developments brought Hungary into further conflict with the European Commission, and the government was forced to amend several aspects of the new constitution, including pieces that would have resulted in the curtailment of the freedom of the press in the country to report on elections and political campaigns. However, these were somewhat secondary issues, and many of the most problematic elements remain. Additionally, through the use of these cardinal laws and the undermining of checks and balances in the country, Fidesz has created a situation whereby even if they were to lose power, they would continue to exercise influence and the power of any replacement government would be curtailed. Subsequent amendments to the constitution were introduced throughout 2012 and 2013. The most controversial of these, the fourth amendment, was again introduced without much input from the opposition (as the 265-11 parliamentary vote in favor of the amendments would suggest)²⁹, and proposed several features which consolidated the weakening of the constitutional court, including restricting its ability to review legislation that had been

²⁸ Gábor Halmai: (2012) “Towards an Illiberal Democracy”, *Eurozine*, [online], available at <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-01-25-halmai-en.html>, accessed on 1/19/2014

²⁹ MTI: (2013) “Parliament passes constitutional amendment that critics call unconstitutional”, *Politics.hu*, [online], available at: <http://www.politics.hu/20130311/parliament-approves-constitutional-changes-that-critics-condemn-as-undemocratic/>, accessed on 2/26/2014

passed by a two-thirds majority of the parliament, and limiting its ability to use legal precedent from cases decided upon prior to 2012 in making its decisions.³⁰

These developments were considered to be highly problematic by the EU. As was noted above, the European Commission defeated a number of the proposed alterations to the retirement age of Constitutional Court justices, and challenged several other provisions regarding the freedom of the media. Following the passing of the fourth amendment, the European Commission sent an official letter to the Hungarian authorities highlighting their concerns over the compatibility of the legislation with EU law.³¹ This was shortly followed by the adoption on the 3rd of July 2013 by the European Parliament of the Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary (also known as the Tavares Report, after its rapporteur, Rui Tavares of the Green/European Free Alliance group). This report was particularly critical of the manner of adoption and of the content of the new Hungarian Constitution, which itself was introduced and voted in by the Hungarian Parliament on the 18th of April 2011, and also noted, amongst other things, various concerns over the standard of the system of checks and balances in the country, the infringements on the power and independence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and of the use of ‘cardinal laws’ (laws which require a parliamentary supermajority of 66% to be repealed) to enshrine many policies of the current governing coalition in the country.³² The issuance

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ European Commission: (2013) “The European Commission reiterates its serious concerns over the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of Hungary”, *Europa.eu Press Releases Database*, [online], available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-327_en.htm (accessed on 2/26/2014)

³² European Parliament: (2013) “Texts adopted: Situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary”, *Europarl.Europa.Eu*, [online], available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0315&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0229> (accessed on 2/20/2014)

of this report was considered to be a sharp rebuke to the Hungarian government, and throws into sharp focus the degree to which Hungary had slipped in terms of its abidance with the norms of the EU.³³

Czech Republic

If we are to refer back to figure 1.2, it is quite clear that there is an appreciable deviation between the Czech Republic and Hungary in the standards of democracy in the two countries. While Hungary has experienced a significant decline, the Czech Republic has experienced a stabilization, and even a mild improvement, in terms of the overall quality of its democracy.

It must be noted that it would not be entirely accurate to claim that the Czech Republic has always performed as a model member state ever since its accession to the EU, or that there have been no problems regarding the activities of political elites in terms of respecting liberal democratic standards of practice that relate to the observation of constitutional limits on their power and the rule of law. On the contrary, there have often been some serious disagreements between Prague and Brussels, and there have also been some problems regarding the democratic performance of government officials in the country ever since 2004. The most notable examples are the developments that surrounded the parliamentary crisis in the wake of the collapse of the Petr Nečas-led government in 2013. This collapse was brought about in June, when Nečas, the centre-right Prime Minister from the Civic Democrat Party (ODS), was

³³ Kim Lane Scheppele: (2013) "In Praise of the Tavares Report", *Hungarian Spectrum*, [online], available at: <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2013/07/03/kim-lane-scheppele-in-praise-of-the-tavares-report/> (accessed on 2/20/2014)

linked to a scandal involving corruption and illegal spying. Nečas's chief-of-staff and future wife, Jana Nagyova, was accused of bribing members of the Czech Parliament to give up their seats in return for key posts in several state-owned companies, and was also suspected of ordering the military to illegally spy on three people, including Nečas's then wife.³⁴ This scandal came in the wake of a number of other corruption scandals in 2012, which had undermined the legitimacy of the government and which had led to the withdrawal of the ODS's coalition partners, TOP 09, from government, and the tabling of several motions of confidence (which the government had narrowly managed to survive).³⁵ In order to end the turmoil, Nečas offered his resignation to President Miloš Zeman. Charges were later brought against the former Prime Minister and several of his colleagues but were subsequently dropped, when it was found that they were elected legislators at the time of the alleged crimes.³⁶

This in itself was not necessarily a problem for the standard of democracy in the country. According to Safarikova, the fact that such inappropriate behavior was dealt with so decisively, that the perpetrators were held to account, and that those accused of wrong-doing faced up to their actions rather than trying to shut down or otherwise hinder the investigations, was actually evidence of the growing integrity of the Czech

³⁴ British Broadcasting Corporation: (2013) "Czech PM Petr Necas resigns over aide scandal", *BBC News Europe*, [online], available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22930710> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

³⁵ Freedom House: (2013) "Czech Republic", *Freedom in the World 2013*, [online], available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/czech-republic#.Ut2TNdI1jIU> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

³⁶ Leos Rousek: (2013) "Czech Bribery Probe Effectively Ended", *The Wall Street Journal*, [online], available at: <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323993804578611311917910582?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887323993804578611311917910582.html> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

political system.³⁷ However, the aftermath of this crisis was somewhat more worrying. In accordance with the state's traditions, President Zeman was obliged to nominate an interim Prime Minister who enjoyed strong support from the Parliament as a whole. However, in contravention of these traditions, Zeman instead nominated Jiří Rusnok, a politician who was widely considered to be an ally of Zeman, in defiance of the wishes of a vast majority of the Parliament, a move which threatened the very nature of the Czech Republic as a parliamentary democracy.³⁸ Such presidential overreach is not totally unheard of in the Czech Republic; for example, Zeman's immediate predecessor, Vaclav Klaus, also tested the boundaries of his power and attempted to interfere in the country's domestic and foreign affairs during his term, particularly in the country's dealings with the European Union.³⁹ However, Zeman's insistence on proposing an interim government which did not even possess a parliamentary mandate, never mind an electoral mandate, was a far greater step than even those taken by Klaus in his prime, who had always insisted that any government needed to have parliamentary approval.⁴⁰

³⁷ Katerina Safarikova: (2013) "The Unhappy Hero", *Transitions Online*, [online], available at: <http://www.tol.org/client/article/23827-necas-czech-republic-politics-scandal.html> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

³⁸ Sean Hanley: (2013) "Miloš Zeman's attempt to impose a caretaker government in the Czech Republic is a fundamental challenge to Czech parliamentary democracy", *London School of Economics*, [online], available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2013/07/04/milos-zemans-attempt-to-impose-a-caretaker-government-in-the-czech-republic-is-a-fundamental-challenge-to-czech-parliamentary-democracy/> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

³⁹ Freedom House: (2010) "Czech Republic", *Nations in Transit 2010*, [online], available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2010/czech-republic#.Ut2gVdI1jIU> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

⁴⁰ Sean Hanley: (2013) "Miloš Zeman's attempt to impose a caretaker government in the Czech Republic is a fundamental challenge to Czech parliamentary democracy", *London School of Economics*, [online], available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2013/07/04/milos-zemans-attempt-to-impose-a-caretaker-government-in-the-czech-republic-is-a-fundamental-challenge-to-czech-parliamentary-democracy/> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

Despite this, it is clear that while the parliamentary crisis in the Czech Republic raises questions regarding some aspects of the democratic performance of political elites in the country, these problems pale in comparison to those being experienced in Hungary. Although Zeman's attempt to impose an interim government on the country in defiance of the wishes of the rest of the parliament were somewhat successful, in that Rusnok was able to form a caretaker government, the Czech Parliament rejected Rusnok's appointment, thus leading to the holding of early elections in October 2013.⁴¹ This outcome was hailed by *The Economist* as being "...the most democratic of results."⁴² These elections saw a sharp rejection of Zeman's party, the Party of Civic Rights, who failed to pick up any seats, and subsequent opinion polls showed a strong decline in the President's popularity.⁴³ Also worrying was the increased support for radical populist parties, such as the new Dawn of Direct Democracy party and the Communist Party, although in the case of the latter the improvement was lower than had been predicted by pre-election opinion polls. It is apparent from this that Zeman's blunt attempt to exert influence on Czech politics has been nowhere near as successful as the creeping authoritarian moves by Orban in Hungary, and the rejection of these by the Czech electorate would seem to indicate the comparative strength and solidity of liberal democracy in the Czech Republic.

⁴¹ British Broadcasting Corporation: (2013) "New Czech Government loses Confidence Vote", *BBC News Europe*, [online], available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23608881> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

⁴² The Economist: (2013) "The Wild Card in Prague Castle", *The Economist Online*, [online], available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/08/czech-politics> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

⁴³ The Economist: (2014) "Sobotka v Zeman", *The Economist Online*, [online], available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/01/czech-politics> (accessed on 1/20/2014)

Comparison of cases and research questions

These two countries are useful “most similar design” case studies as they are broadly similar in a number of ways. Both of them underwent a transition in the early 1990s from one-party communist rule and a centrally planned economy, to a competitive, multi-party political system with a market economy. Following this transition, they both went on to install liberal democratic systems, whereby their political leaders abstained from blatant rent-seeking behavior, and showed respect for the requirements of a liberal democracy.⁴⁴ They were both leading candidates for EU membership, being amongst the first group of states to begin negotiations with the EU, and had to implement the same body of legislation (and in that sense, had to undertake a very similar reform process) in order to achieve membership. Economically, too, both countries had very comparable levels of GDP, GDP per capita, and economic growth in the period between 1989 and 2004 (although Hungary had greater economic problems and higher levels of sovereign debt resulting from communism). From a cultural perspective, there a number of areas of overlap between the two countries: they are both members of Visegrad group of states, they were both parts of the Habsburg empire until 1919, and they have both had long-standing historical relationships with the Western European states, and Germany and Austria in particular.⁴⁵

There are also several differences between the two cases: the Czech Republic was more industrialized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and has had a greater

⁴⁴Milada Anna Vachudova: (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3

⁴⁵Peter Katzenstein: (1997) *Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany*, Oxford: Berghahn Books. It should be noted, however that Hungary’s relationship with Germany and Austria has traditionally been much more positive than the relationship between these two countries and the Czech Republic.

exposure to democratic rule (being the successor state to Czechoslovakia, which was the only country in Central and Eastern Europe to remain a full democracy between 1919 and 1939). Additionally, whilst both countries experienced Communist rule from 1946 until 1989, the ‘ghoulash’ form of Communism in Hungary was much more liberal and relaxed than the Stalinist form that prevailed in Czechoslovakia following the 1968 Prague Spring. Finally, the ways in which these states were created differ greatly: while the creation of Czechoslovakia was the result of a decades-long cultural and political struggle on the part of Czech and Slovak émigré communities in the United States and Western Europe (thus meaning the country’s creation was a source of celebration for the citizens of this state), the modern Hungarian state was created with the Treaty of Trianon following the end of the First World War, a treaty which continues to be a source of great national pain for the Hungarian nation, given the large swathes of ethnic Hungarian-populated territory the new state was forced to give up to its neighboring states (most notably Romania and Czechoslovakia).

While it is important to take note of and pay attention to these differences, given the very similar paths which these countries took in the first twenty years following their transitions to democracy, they make a particularly useful pair of states with which to examine the effectiveness of the EU’s enlargement policy as a tool for guaranteeing long-lasting liberal democratic consolidation in target countries. With this in mind, one is presented with a clear problem in the seeming contrast in the failure of EU enlargement and EU membership to guarantee the long-term liberal democratic consolidation of Hungary, with the comparative success of this exact same approach in the Czech Republic. While both countries were judged to be at the same level in terms of their liberal democratic consolidation in 2004, Hungary has gone on to become

increasingly authoritarian and problematic from the perspective of the EU, in comparison to the Czech Republic, which has remained a ‘good student’. *This then leads to my central research question for this dissertation: how can we account for the marked contrast in terms of liberal democratic trajectories in the Czech Republic and Hungary following their admission to the EU? Additionally, I propose the following supplementary questions: what implications does this divergence in democratic standards have for the study of the normative power of the EU? And what, if anything, can the EU do to reverse these trends in Hungary, and to prevent them from happening again in other member states?*

Chapter structure and hypotheses

I propose the following chapter structure for this dissertation in order to answer these questions. In the first chapter, I will examine in detail the concept of a ‘norm’ and of ‘normative power’, how this relates to the liberal democratic consolidation of the Central and Eastern European countries, and how it relates to the EU’s strategy of enlargement. I will begin by reviewing the literature on the concept of ‘norms’ in international politics, normative power, and ‘norm diffusion’, the process through which norms are spread from one actor to another. In this section, I will subsequently present the literature on the normative power of the EU⁴⁶, how it is wielded, and the core ‘European’ values which it is based upon. In particular, I will consult the

⁴⁶ Normative power, especially within the context of studying the EU, can be understood as the ability of an entity to have its own norms and practices be understood by actors outside of its territorial boundaries as what constitutes ‘normal’ in world politics. Elizabeth de Zutter; Francisco Toro: (2008) “Normative Power is in the Eye of the Beholder: An Empirical Assessment of Perceptions of EU Identity at the WTO”, *United Nations University Working Paper Series*, 2008-074 p. 5. See also, Ian Manners: (2008) “The normative ethics of the European Union”, *International Affairs*, 84(1), p. 45

arguments of various authors such as Ian Manners, Hiski Haukkala and Frank Schimmelfennig in this section. Having established this, I will then go on to explain the use of enlargement as a tool of the EU's normative power, and what the EU's stated goals, objectives and expectations for the 2004 round of enlargement were.

In the second chapter, I will discuss the issue of democratic change and consolidation in Hungary and the Czech Republic, and what role EU accession was to play in this. I will first look at the broader theory and literature behind democratic transitions and consolidation, specifically focusing on the research of authors such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Leonardo Morlino, and Michael McFaul. At this point, I will reiterate the various explanations for when and why a country will transition to democracy (and when it might revert from democracy to an illiberal or undemocratic form of government), and the relevant factors which contribute to these processes. This will include expanding upon the theory on the impact of economic, social, and political variables on the level of consolidation of democracy in a country. Specifically, I will examine the academic knowledge on variables such as economic growth, sectoral economic and employment performance (meaning the economic and employment performance of different sectors of the economy), income and wealth inequality, and relative deprivation. From a more political and social perspective, I will also discuss the theory on the role of variables such as historical and geographic exposure to democracy and democratic political systems, civil society development, political corruption, and globalization on the development of democracy in a specific country or region. I will go on to present the specific goals and objectives of the Czech Republic and Hungary prior to the 2004 accession, and their respective expectations for how the accession process and membership of the EU would affect and change their countries.

I will test the existent literature and the traditional understandings for why countries undergo changes in their democratic systems against the facts and statistics available for the two countries. I will then identify the gaps in the existing research, and will identify the discrepancies between what has transpired in the two countries, and the traditional explanations and predictions for what has transpired in these states.

In the third chapter, I will offer up the alternative approach that my dissertation will take. This will be based on the previously-located gaps in the research, and will present my own theoretical approach to explaining the divergence in trajectories of liberal democratic consolidation in Hungary and the Czech Republic following accession to the EU. A transition to democracy is not a mono-causal process, and many variables have been suggested as having an effect.⁴⁷ As such, it is illogical to believe that a transition away from democracy, or a transition to some form of autocratic government, could have one single cause or driving factor. Thus it is necessary to look at many traditional explanations of democratic transition and consolidation in order to explain the central puzzle of this dissertation. In this chapter, I will also present the research design and methodology that will be used to undertake this research, while also presenting my core hypotheses. The research design is that of a comparative case-study analysis, using a “most similar systems” design. It will use a mixed-methodological approach, combining statistical analyses of relevant variables and qualitative data drawn from literature reviews, newspaper reports, and interviews with

⁴⁷ Samuel P. Huntington: (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century*, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 37-38

relevant policy-makers, activists, and experts. The core hypotheses of this dissertation are as follows:

hypothesis 1- the divergence in terms of democratic standards between Hungary and the Czech Republic is a result of the presence of significantly greater problems with inflation and unemployment combined in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, which subsequently leads to an increase in support for authoritarian approaches to resolving the problems.

hypothesis 2- the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic trajectories is primarily a result of an elite-driven process, and a comparative lack of commitment amongst elites in Hungary, as opposed to elites in the Czech Republic, to the normative values they signed up to as part of the accession of their country to the EU.

hypothesis 3- the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic standards is the result of a greater normative commitment to enacting reforms aimed at strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law in the Czech Republic as opposed to Hungary in the wake of their accession to the EU in 2004.

hypothesis 4- the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic standards is the result of significant increase in the holding of ‘self-expression’ and ‘emancipative’ values amongst the general population in the latter during the period between 2004 and 2008, an increase which was not matched in scale in Hungary during the same period, thus leading to a greater consolidation of the democratic systems in the Czech Republic than in Hungary.

hypothesis 5- the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic standards is the result of a greater level of civil society support for, and a lower level of civil society opposition to, these norms in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, thus leading to a more successful internalization process in the former than in the latter.

The fourth and fifth chapters will then examine each hypothesis as they relate to the respective countries. Chapter four will focus on Hungary, first looking at the history of democracy and democratic government in the country. It will then go on to examine in close detail the democratic regression in the state, testing each hypothesis individually. Likewise in chapter five, the major hypotheses will be tested and examined as they relate to the Czech Republic. These two chapters will show the impact of the democratic transition and of EU membership on the general population in each country, how these major changes affected the economic and political structures in each country, and ultimately, the ways in which they altered the trajectory of the democratization trends in each state. As was noted above, these chapters will use both quantitative analyses based on ‘hard’, objective sets of data (such as economic and employment statistics) and ‘soft’, subjective data (opinion polls and perception-based data), and qualitative data drawn from interviews with relevant policy makers, activists, and experts.

The sixth and final chapter of this dissertation will be focused on the EU, and will attempt to tie together the previous chapters to shed light on the normative power of the EU, and the effectiveness of enlargement as the EU’s primary normative tool. At this point, I will compare and contrast the findings of the previous two chapters, and will outline which hypotheses are supported by the data and which are not. I will then

relate these findings to the goals, objectives, and efforts of the EU to try to help consolidate the liberal democracies in these countries. I will explain if the differing trajectories of democratic consolidation in each country is a result of something specifically related to the EU accession process or EU membership (e.g. perhaps the EU did not sufficiently support civil society in Hungary vis-à-vis the Czech Republic, etc.), if it is something that is entirely unrelated to EU membership, or if it is somewhere in the middle between these two poles. Through this process, I will systematically answer each of the main research questions of this study, and will then construct a theory based on these findings about the nature of the EU's normative power, and its use of enlargement as a normative tool. I will conclude by making several policy recommendations, based on the findings of the study.

Chapter 1- The norms and normative power of the European Union

In the field of international politics, the EU is often held up as a unique type of global actor: one which uses its example, or its power of attraction, rather than the force of its military or economic hegemony to spread its values throughout the world.⁴⁸ Additionally, according to Manners, this unique nature ensures that the EU thus not only draws its external policy power from its normative attractiveness, but also subsequently leads it to make its external relations be informed by a variety of norms which are based on the European Convention of Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴⁹

Arguably both the highlight of the EU's normative power, and its strongest tool, is the policy of enlargement of the Union. In this case, the EU is able to use its normative power to attract new members, and to then encourage these prospective new members to take on a raft of reforms designed to ensure that the normative transfer process is as extensive and far-reaching as possible. It was not until 1993, however, that the EU began to use enlargement as a tool for encouraging reforms in target countries, when the 'Copenhagen Criteria'⁵⁰ was created. The first group of countries to whom these

⁴⁸ Mark Leonard: (2005) *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*, New York: Public Affairs, pp. xi-xiii. See also: Ian Manners: (2002) "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 239-240

⁴⁹ : Ian Manners: (2002) "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 241-242

⁵⁰ The 'Copenhagen Criteria' refers to the basic set of requirements that a country must fulfill in order to be considered for membership of the EU. They include the following as the specific criteria required of applicants: "political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; acceptance of the Community acquis; ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union." See Europa.eu: (2013) "Glossary: Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)", [online], available at:

requirements applied were Sweden, Austria, and Finland, who all joined in 1995; given that these countries already met these requirements for decades before, the normative impact of this round of enlargement was minimal. However, the same cannot be said for the membership bids of the post-Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, who had recently transitioned from authoritarian rule to democratic, capitalistic societies; for these countries, the relevance and significance of the Copenhagen Criteria would be significantly higher.

This chapter examines in depth the concept of the EU's normative power, and the normative goals of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. It will first examine the concept of 'norms' in international politics. It will then discuss the normative power of the EU and the core 'European' values upon which this normative power is based. Additionally, it will look at how the EU wields its normative power in an international context. Finally, this chapter will examine EU enlargement as a tool of the EU's normative power, and will attempt to lay out the normative objectives and expectations on the part of the EU of the 2004 enlargement.

What is a 'norm'?

The concept of norms is a very important one in modern international relations theory. Norms are crucial elements of social constructivist theories of international politics, and also form the basis of much of international law; for instance, the global ban on slavery and forced labor, which is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, was based on long-standing norms regarding the impropriety of slave labor. In addition, many norms, whilst not necessarily enshrined in any formal legal code, may nonetheless have a powerful constraining or empowering effect on global actors; a prime example would be the absence of international legislation forbidding the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, an act which is nonetheless strongly constrained in international politics.⁵¹ However, this begs the question: how is it that something comes to be accepted as a norm? Norms are not perpetually existing concepts, but rather, are developed contextually over time. For instance, no norm existed against the use of nuclear weapons on the morning of August 6th, 1945 (the date of the Hiroshima bombing); likewise, no social or cultural prohibition against slavery existed (to anywhere near the extent that such a prohibition exists today) at the height of the imperial conquest of the Americas by the Spanish in the 15th and 16th centuries. This section will next discuss the concept of norms, and will ask what is understood by the term ‘norm’? What constitutes a ‘norm’ in world politics? How, and in what ways, may a norm be introduced into the global discourse? And finally, how does a particular norm go on to become socially accepted as such on a global or regional scale?

A review of the literature on norms reveals that much like many other concepts and terms in the fields of political science and international relations, there is no single definition of what a norm is. Minimalist definitions such as that proffered by Thomson, argue that international norms can only be defined as something that, as a rule, states

⁵¹ Ann Florini: (1996) “The Evolution of International Norms”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3), p. 366

engage in.⁵² Axelrod offers a similarly spartan meaning for the term, arguing that international norms are standard behaviors that states engage in, and which actors will be punished or otherwise censured for breaking.⁵³ Likewise, Klotz defines norms broadly as a shared set of understandings among states of standards for behavior.⁵⁴

However, such approaches are clearly too vague, and offer no clear meaning to what a norm involves. Florini supports this point by saying that minimalist definitions such as these ignore the crucial implication of obligation and ‘oughtness’ that is associated with the term ‘norm’.⁵⁵ A more effective definition of a norm is provided by Finnemore, who argues that norms are a set of readily apparent understandings and behavioral claims on actors, and who states that “...because they are intersubjective [or shared], rather than merely subjective, widely held norms are not idiosyncratic in their effects. Instead, they leave broad patterns of the sort that social science strives to explain.”⁵⁶ Finnemore and Sikkink build upon this understanding of norms, first by arguing that many things that political scientists treat as norms, such as ‘sovereignty’, are actually collections of norms, whose treatment varies widely over time.⁵⁷ They go on to state that norms involve standards of appropriate or proper behavior (i.e. a general

⁵² Janice Thomson: (1993) “Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis”, *International Journal of Group Tensions*, 23(?), p. 81

⁵³ Robert Axelrod: (1986) “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”, *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), p. 1095

⁵⁴ Audie Klotz: (1999) *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid*, New York: Cornell University Press, p. 14

⁵⁵ Ann Florini: (1996) “The Evolution of International Norms”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3), p. 364

⁵⁶ Martha Finnemore: (1994) “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.): *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 153

⁵⁷ Martha Finnemore; Kathryn Sikkink: (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, *International Organizations*, 52(4), p. 891

understanding of how a state or other actor should act in a specific set of circumstances), and that one is able to spot whether a norm exists based on the reaction of a given community or society: norm-breaking behavior evokes condemnation and possibly punishment, while norm-confirming behavior elicits either praise (in the case of new or weakly internalized norms), or no reaction (in the case of highly internalized norms).⁵⁸

Hoffmann also adds to this, listing three conditions that underpin understandings of what a norm is: that they involve compliance with a given standard throughout society, that they feature a shared set of expectations regarding their outcomes, and that they are self-reinforcing.⁵⁹ Thus, based on these texts, *I define a norm as being a set of prescriptive and/or constraining behavioral understandings, which are broadly shared both at the international and societal levels, and which are robust (meaning they are not easily discarded) and self-reinforcing.*

Moving on from this, we must then consider how, and in what ways, a norm is introduced into the global discourse. It is widely accepted that in many cases, this process of diffusion begins with a ‘norm entrepreneur’, a specific actor that works to convert a particular set of domestic norms in a given country into international norms, or who might use international norms to strengthen nascent domestic norms (for example, a human rights campaigner in an authoritarian country may appeal to international norms in order to legitimate their own demands, and to encourage their

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 891-892

⁵⁹ Matthew J. Hoffman: (2001) “Entrepreneurs and Norm Dynamics: An Agent-Based Model of the Norm Life Cycle”, [online], available at: http://scholar.google.hu/scholar_url?hl=en&q=http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/papers/h/Hoffmann_norms.doc&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm2sQZbZyD9spduG4g8aaMF9BC1Y9g&oi=scholar&ei=UQlvUruWKIma4wSKwICoBQ&ved=0CCsQgAMoADAA, p. 4 (accessed on 21/10/2013)

own state to introduce reforms in line with the global standard).⁶⁰ There is no specific profile to a norm entrepreneur: they may be large and powerful states, small or weak states, international organizations, or even single individuals (Raphael Lemkin being a good example of such an entrepreneur).⁶¹ However, given the level of complexity and difficulty involved in the creation and diffusion of an international norm, entrepreneurs need to be able to create and sustain vast networks among domestic and international actors; these advocacy networks remind countries in which the norms already exist of their duty to promote them on a global scale, whilst helping to cast the spotlight on norm violators, and also serve to empower and reinforce domestic opposition groups who (like the example above of human rights advocates in authoritarian countries) are struggling to introduce these standards of behavior into their own countries.⁶² It must be noted that it is not necessarily essential that a norm entrepreneur exist in order for a norm to develop and spread; in some cases, states may choose to emulate the behavior of a particularly prestigious actor, particularly if the prestige of the actor is closely linked to their practice of the particular norm.⁶³ Hoffmann also argues that in the case of particularly complex norms, or in cases where there is not a well-developed support network, norm entrepreneurs may actually be ineffective, and it will only be through

⁶⁰ Martha Finnemore; Kathryn Sikkink: (1998) "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", *International Organizations*, 52(4), p. 893

⁶¹ Ann Florini: (1996) "The Evolution of International Norms", *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3), p. 375; see also, R. Charli Carpenter: (2007) "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks", *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(1), pp. 113-114

⁶² Thomas Risse; Kathryn Sikkink: (1999) "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices", in Thomas Risse; Stephen C. Ropp; Kathryn Sikkink (eds.): *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5

⁶³ Ann Florini: (1996) "The Evolution of International Norms", *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3), p. 375

other avenues (such as the afore-mentioned example of the prestigious actor) that a norm will emerge and spread.⁶⁴ In addition, it is often crucial that the norm entrepreneur be consistent in terms of its application of the norm: according to Ingebritsen, a major reason why Scandinavian countries have been effective in assisting the development of norms in the fields of sustainable development and the environment is because they ‘practice what they preach’; they demonstrate consistent and determined application of the norms, and in so doing, improve the credibility, both of themselves as entrepreneurs, and of the norm itself.⁶⁵ However, even in these situations, norm entrepreneurs may still play an important role in the spread of norms, by fostering the lock-in of behaviors and rules associated with new norms, or to embed or normalize these actions.⁶⁶

The next aspect that must be considered is how a norm will go on to become successfully internalized and accepted globally, both at the elite and mass levels of society. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the ‘life-cycle’ of an international norm involves three stages: norm emergence, in which entrepreneurs often play a key role in terms of encouraging states to accept the norm; norm cascade, when it gains broad societal acceptance from a critical mass of international actors and/or states; and norm internalization, whereby the norm becomes socialized to the point where it is no longer part of the public debate.⁶⁷ In the norm cascade phase, the norm entrepreneurs and the norm leaders (the initial group of actors and states to adopt the norm) will attempt to

⁶⁴ Matthew Hoffmann: (2001) “Entrepreneurs and Norm Dynamics: An Agent-Based Model of the Norm Life Cycle”, *University of Pennsylvania Political Science Department*, [online], available at: www.polisci.upenn.edu/ps-i/Pamla/Hoffmann_norms.doc (accessed on 3/11/2013), p. 31

⁶⁵ Christine Ingebritsen: (2002) “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(1), p. 14; p. 20

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32

⁶⁷ Martha Finnemore; Kathryn Sikkink: (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, *International Organizations*, 52(4), p. 895

socialize the rest of the states into becoming norm followers; the cascade will happen when a sufficient number of states accept the norm, such that it creates pressure on other states to follow suit.⁶⁸ Additionally, at this stage, some states may adopt these standards primarily because of the desire to conform to the behavior of other actors, and may not need significant domestic pressure in order to do so.⁶⁹

Of greater relevance to this dissertation, however, is the final stage of the cycle, dealing with norm internalization. In this case, actors will act according to a norm without questioning or considering it; this is when the norm has its greatest strength, as any activities which would violate the norm would be considered to be particularly bizarre or inappropriate. According to Risse and Sikkink, this internalization process occurs through three steps: instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining; processes of argumentation, dialogue and persuasion; and processes of individualization and habituation, which mark the final steps in the socialization of a norm, whereby sub-state actors become habituated into acting in the manner demanded by the norm.⁷⁰ Cortell and Davis Jr. build on this, arguing that the effect a norm will have on the domestic politics of a state (and thus, the extent to which such a norm will become societally internalized) is dependent on the “domestic salience” of the norm, and by the context in which the debates regarding the domestic policy implications the norm’s acceptance

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 895-896

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 902

⁷⁰ Thomas Risse; Kathryn Sikkink: (1999) “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices”, in Thomas Risse; Stephen C. Ropp; Kathryn Sikkink (eds.): *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5-6

will have are carried out.⁷¹ They then identify five main factors determining a norm's domestic salience, including:

- the cultural match between the norm and national understandings of the issues related to the norm (in cases where such a match exists, domestic actors are likely to treat the norm as a given. However, when there is a clash between domestic norms or values and the international norm, the salience of the norm will be lower, and it may even be equated with cultural imperialism);
- the material interests of political actors, and whether or not these norms support the various material interests of the state (or the political actor) in question;
- the pronouncements of national leaders on the legitimacy of the obligations that an international norm will place on the state in question;
- domestic political institutions, that set the rules of the game for citizens and state officials, and which can drastically improve the salience of a norm by incorporating it into their working procedures; and
- the presence of socializing forces working for (or against) the norm's acceptance.⁷²

Each one of these factors will this have a major impact on whether or not a norm is socialized and internalized in a state, or if it retains no more than a superficial influence.

⁷¹ Andrew P. Cortell; James W. Davis Jr.: (2002) "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda", *International Studies Review*, 2(1), p. 66

⁷² Ibid., p. 73-79

The Normative Power of the EU

Having established what constitutes a norm and how a norm is diffused, it is necessary to examine the norms and normative power of the EU, and its capacity to function as a normative power. This section establishes the ‘core’ norms and values of the EU, and sets out the traditional understandings about how the EU works to spread these norms.

The project of European integration has, from its very beginnings, been heavily linked with the process of democratization and with the promotion of peace, security, and democracy on the continent of Europe. According to Lords and Harris, one of the most important aspects of European history after the end of the Second World War has been the common efforts of the members of the EU to shape European society such that it only includes states which adhere to international standards of democracy, with these states consciously working together to spread and enhance democracy throughout the entire continent.⁷³ *This, then, is the basis of what is defined as the EU’s “normative power”: its ability to have its own norms and practices to be understood by external actors as what constitutes ‘normal’ in world politics.*⁷⁴ According to Manners, the normative basis of the EU is centered around five ‘core’ norms (peace, liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law), and is supplemented and realized by four additional norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance).⁷⁵ He adds to this, stating that these norms evolved within the

⁷³ Christopher Lords; Erika Harris: (2006) *Democracy in the New Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 88-89

⁷⁴ Elizabeth de Zutter; Francisco Toro: (2008) “Normative Power is in the Eye of the Beholder: An Empirical Assessment of Perceptions of EU Identity at the WTO”, *United Nations University Working Paper Series*, 2008-074 p. 5. See also, Ian Manners: (2008) “The normative ethics of the European Union”, *International Affairs*, 84(1), p. 45

⁷⁵ Ian Manners: (2002) “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), p. 242

contexts of political developments in Europe throughout the twentieth century: peace and liberty were established early on in the process, while the other three core norms developed later in order to help distinguish Western Europe from the Communist East.⁷⁶

Manners argues that the EU seeks to diffuse its norms (and thus flex its normative power) in six ways: through contagion (whereby norms diffuse unintentionally from the EU to other actors); informational diffusion (whereby the EU will establish strategic communications and initiatives with a given external partner); procedural diffusion (when the EU makes aid or assistance to a third country conditional on the importation by these countries of various 'European' norms, practices, and standards); transference (when the EU exchanges more tangible items such as goods, services, aid or technical assistance with a third party after the transfer of EU norms and standards to the third party); overt diffusion (when the EU establishes a physical presence in a third state or organization); and cultural filter (whereby the impact of European norms and political learning based on EU practices in a third state leads to the adoption, learning, and/or rejection of international norms by the state or organization in question).⁷⁷ Borzel and Risse also describe the various mechanisms through which norms can be diffused, proposing coercion (legal and/or physical imposition of norms and rules); incentivization (manipulating recipient countries' value calculations through the provision of rewards or punishments in return for adoption of norms and values); socialization (promotion of ideas through the provision of an

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 243

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 244.

authoritative model); persuasion (using the power of argumentation to promote ideas as being legitimate or true); and emulation (an indirect method of diffusing norms, whereby third countries become attracted to the EU's way of doing things, independently of any actions on the part of the EU).⁷⁸ Haukkala builds upon this, arguing that the EU is not passive in terms of this process, but rather actively pursues the export of these norms and values to third countries in many (if not most) cases, using its economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetric relationships in order to influence these countries.⁷⁹

There are some question marks regarding the effectiveness of the EU's normative power, and to what extent the EU is truly able to define what is considered 'normal' on a global stage. Pace, for instance, argues that the way in which the EU's normative power is limited in the area of persuasion and socialization: she claims that without a centralized rule-making and enforcement authority, the EU's capacity to convince states to accept its norms is seriously weakened.⁸⁰ Johansson-Nogues argues that over the course of the last decade, the EU's normative power and its 'power of attraction' has dwindled due to its introspection and its lack of sensitivity to the needs and ideas of its partner countries.⁸¹ As well as this, de Zutter and Toro state that while many countries do see the EU as embodying the norms it claims are its own, such as

⁷⁸Tanja A. Börzel; Thomas Risse: (2009) "The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas", *Kolleg-Forscherguppe Working Paper Series*, 1, pp. 8-9

⁷⁹Hiski Haukkala: (2008) "The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(9), p. 1602

⁸⁰Michelle Pace: (2007) "The Construction of EU Normative Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(5), p. 1059-1063

⁸¹Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués: (2011) "The Decline of the EU's 'Magnetic Attraction'? The European Union in the Eyes of Neighbouring Arab countries and Russia", *London School of Economics European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper*, 2011/1, p. 22

peace, democracy, and economic co-operation,⁸² they do not see the EU's global actions as being driven by norms, but rather as being driven by self-interest.⁸³ In demonstrating this, de Zutter and Toro call into question the EU's abilities to spread its norms actively, whilst supporting the capacity of the EU to diffuse its norms passively, by acting as a beacon which countries can gravitate towards. Lucarelli and Fioramonti add further weight to these points, stating that the EU's foreign policy and its capacity to act as a normative power is undermined by its short-sightedness, hubris, and its general inability to recognize what the rest of the world sees itself as, rather than what it feels the world should see it as.⁸⁴

Even on the continent of Europe, its ability to transform countries in its own image has been debated. As was stated earlier, Haukkala argues that the EU's ability to influence countries is directly linked to the legitimacy of the policy instrument used to effect these changes.⁸⁵ As such, attempts at wielding normative power in Europe and in its immediate neighborhood through tools such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the Mediterranean Union, and the Eastern Partnership, which seek to promote the diffusion of European norms through the granting of closer economic integration to participant countries that choose to align themselves with the EU's values, are not sufficiently powerful or legitimate to coax significant reforms.⁸⁶ He argues instead that

⁸² Elizabeth de Zutter; Francisco Toro: (2008) "Normative Power is in the Eye of the Beholder: An Empirical Assessment of Perceptions of EU Identity at the WTO", *United Nations University Working Paper Series*, 2008-074 p. 13

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 15-16

⁸⁴ Sonia Lucarelli; Lorenzo Fioramonti: (2008) "Have You Heard of the EU? An Analysis of Global Images of the European Union", *Garnet Policy Brief*, 7, pp. 1-2

⁸⁵ Hiski Haukkala: (2008) "The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(9), pp. 1612-1613

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 1617

the only tool the EU possesses which is truly capable of spreading its values is the instrument of enlargement, whereby countries are offered a prospect of membership in the EU, and are subsequently required to make a host of reforms in order to achieve this goal. Jakovleski re-affirms this point, stating that the offer of membership is the strongest means available to the EU for not just encouraging countries to adopt reforms, but also for making fundamental, long-term transformations and fully internalizing the reforms demanded.⁸⁷ Schimmelfennig also argues that nothing short of a “...credible conditional accession perspective has proven effective in allowing the EU to influence target countries.”⁸⁸

EU Enlargement Policy and its capacity for supporting the diffusion of EU norms

The EU’s enlargement policy in its present form is a quintessential example of the sort of asymmetric relationship that the EU builds with partner countries in order to spread and stabilize its core norms, and also displays the full array of ways in which the EU diffuses its norms. At the beginning of the process, the EU attracts potential candidates through passive means, such as emulation and contagion. In the case of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the candidate states, having recently transitioned from authoritarian communism to democracy, were incentivized to align their policies with those of the EU member states in order to stabilize the new political systems in their states.⁸⁹ It is

⁸⁷Velibor Jakovleski: (2010) “The Logic of E.U. Enlargement: Exporting Stability or Inheriting an Empire?”, *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, 21(0), pp. 38-40

⁸⁸ Frank Schimmelfennig: (2008) “EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(6), p. 920

⁸⁹Wojciech Sadurski: (2006) “EU Enlargement and Democracy in New Member States”, in Wojciech Sadurski; Adam Czarnota; Martin Krygier (eds.) *Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal Orders*, Dordrecht: Springer Publications pp. 46-47.

important to note that at this stage, these countries had not been given a clear perspective of membership from the EU, nor had they even received much in the way of encouragement that they would one day be given a membership perspective.⁹⁰ However, Pridham notes that irrespective of this, CEEC political elites had come to believe that integration with the EU was central, if not critical, to a successful outcome from the democratization process, and that as such, many of them had come to hold the attitude that the right way to conduct their political affairs was to conform with official European standards.⁹¹

According to Mattli and Plümpert, membership bids by the CEECs and their desire to create a set of closer relations with the EU were motivated by the level of democratic reforms achieved in the respective countries immediately after the collapse of communism: those countries that had achieved a higher level of democratization at this early stage were incentivized to press on with the reform process and to seek EU membership as a means to bolster this process, due to the higher level of accountability of political elites in these countries to their electorates.⁹² Pridham adds to this, stating that four basic imperatives informed the CEECs' membership bids: historical, democratic, security, and modernization and economic.⁹³ The historical imperative involved the ideas of the 'return to Europe', rejecting the recent communist past of each

⁹⁰ Walter Mattli; Thomas Plümpert: (2002) "The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and the application for EU membership", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9(4), p. 551

⁹¹ Geoffrey Pridham: (2005) *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan pp. 89-90

⁹² Walter Mattli; Thomas Plümpert: (2002) "The Demand-Side Politics of EU Enlargement: Democracy and the Application for EU Membership", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9(4), pp. 551-552

⁹³ Geoffrey Pridham: (2005) *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan p. 84

country in favor of restoring the pan-European connections of the further past.⁹⁴ The democracy imperative was an underlying and interdependent imperative, but was perhaps not as large a priority for the CEECs.⁹⁵ The security imperative referred to the strong commitment by Brussels to political solidarity with the new members, and was particularly important, as it was explicitly linked to the survival of the new democracies and their emergent economies.⁹⁶ Finally, Pridham argues that the modernization/economic imperative was perhaps the most important motivator for the CEECs, due to their desire to reach the same levels of prosperity as are found in Western Europe, and the strong connection between this and the economic advantages the CEECs expected to obtain from EU membership.⁹⁷ Pinder also supports these claims, stating that the EU had three main aims in its policies towards Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s: to support their movement towards a market economy, to buttress the creation of pluralist democracies in these states, and to help them to integrate into the international community.⁹⁸ He also notes that agreements signed between the EU and the CEECs in the early 1990s, such as the Europe Agreements and the Association Agreements, committed the political leaders in the countries involved to strengthening political and economic freedoms.⁹⁹

There is some debate, however, as to why the EU decided to upgrade its relationships with the CEECs and offer them a clear and credible EU membership

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 85

⁹⁵ Ibid., p88

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 91

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 93

⁹⁸ John Pinder: (1997) "The European Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe", in Geoffrey Pridham; Eric Herring; George Sanford (eds.): *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, London: Leicester University Press, p. 114

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 115

perspective. Preston claims that many of the existing EU member states were wary or outright hostile of the new countries, because of their high levels of economic poverty and the fact that this could threaten the interests of major groups in their own societies (such as farmers).¹⁰⁰ Schimmelfennig builds on this, stating that the amount of actors genuinely supportive of eastern enlargement was actually quite small, amounting to little more than Germany, the UK, and the European Commission.¹⁰¹ Schimmelfennig goes on to state that while many of the EU member states were actually opposed to the idea of offering a membership perspective to the CEECs, they were effectively ‘rhetorically trapped’ by the CEECs and their supporters in Europe, whereby the disclosure of the past failures and inconsistencies of the EU in honoring past commitments to the CEECs was used to shame opponents into supporting enlargement.¹⁰²

On the other hand, several theorists argue that the EU’s decision was motivated out of genuine interests, and that while there may have been some hesitation and trepidation, the members were all generally favorable to enlargement. Baldwin, for instance, argues that the EU had much to gain from Eastern enlargement, including the opportunity to lock in favorable democratic and economic reforms in these countries, and the offer of membership to these countries was particularly intended to stabilize and consolidate democracy, rather than out of any major economic concerns.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Christopher Preston: (1995) “Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 33(3), p. 459

¹⁰¹ Frank Schimmelfennig: (2001) “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, *International Organization*, 55(1), pp. 49-50

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70

¹⁰³ Richard E. Baldwin: (1995) “The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, *European Economic Review*, 39(3-4), pp. 475-476

Moravcsik and Vachudova affirm this point, claiming that EU leaders promoted accession because it was in their long-term economic and geopolitical interests.¹⁰⁴ Higashino also supports the argument that the decision to enlarge eastwards was based on genuine interests, but argues that security was the major consideration for this offer, rather than anything else. He claims that enlargement was a means of ‘securitizing’ and subsequently ‘desecuritizing’ relations with the CEECs, meaning that it was a process whereby the EU would stabilize previously conflictual and threatening relations with its Eastern neighbor, and then subsequently (through enlargement and integration) move these relationships out of the ‘threat’ sphere and thus normalize political relations with these countries permanently.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, Zielonka states that while the EU states may have sometimes created the impression that enlargement was a problem for them, that they had similar motivations to the candidates for seeking new members (albeit with less of an emphasis on the emotional/historical reasoning and more emphasis on the promotion of security, prosperity, and democracy).¹⁰⁶ He goes on to add that no matter how vaguely defined these interests were, that they provided genuine benefits for the Western European members and thus were real motivators.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Andrew Moravcsik; Milada Anna Vachudova: (2003) “National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement”, *East European Politics and Societies*, 17(1), pp. 42-43

¹⁰⁵ Atsuko Higashino: (2004) “For the Sake of ‘Peace and Security’? The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 39(4), pp. 349-350

¹⁰⁶ Jan Zielonka: (2006) *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 50; see also, Christopher Hill: (2002) “The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement”, in Jan Zielonka (eds.): *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*, London: Routledge, pp. 95-96

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 51

The process of enlargement: tools, instruments, and policies

Once the reform process had begun, and the CEECs began to look more explicitly for the development of a relationship with their Western counterparts, the EU began to take a more formal and active role in shaping the reforms in these countries. The 1993 Copenhagen Summit, which established the criteria for membership of the EU, saw the EU focus on encouraging reforms in the CEECs in order for them to be able to meet the requirements of the ‘acquis communautaire’, the full body of EU legislation and regulations.¹⁰⁸ At this point, the EU moved towards active norm diffusion, and in particular the informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, and overt diffusion methods. The EU then stepped up its ‘conditionality’, the explicit linkage of the provision of aid, assistance, and eventually membership to the successful implementation and fulfillment of democratic and human rights standards, with these conditions becoming increasingly stringent as relations were upgraded.¹⁰⁹ Schimmelfennig, al. note that in doing this, the EU made basic liberal democratic reforms essential conditions for aid fulfillment and the continuation of membership bids.¹¹⁰

According to Grabbe, the relationship between the EU and the CEECs went through three phases following the institutionalization and formalization of dealings between the two. The first phase lasted for much of the early-mid 1990s, and involved

¹⁰⁸Wojciech Sadurski: (2006) “EU Enlargement and Democracy in New Member States”, in Wojciech Sadurski; Adam Czarnota; Martin Krygier (eds.) *Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal Orders*, Dordrecht: Springer Publications pp. 27-28.

¹⁰⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig; Stefan Engert; Heiko Knobel: (2005) “The Impact of EU Political Conditionality”, in Frank Schimmelfennig; Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press p. 30

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 31

the creation of various trade and aid programs, including the PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA and TAIEX programs; the second phase went from the creation of the EU's first pre-accession strategy to the publication in 1997 of the Commission's opinion on the applicants; and the third phase involved the 1998-2002 accession partnerships and application negotiations.¹¹¹ Grabbe adds that during the first phase, the European Commission was also given the task of coordinating aid from the G24 and macroeconomic assistance from a host of other institutions to the CEECs, thus giving the Commission unprecedented power to channel advice to the CEECs about the transition process.¹¹² All agreements overseen by the Commission were linked to a suspension clause, which explicitly linked the continuation of the programs to five conditions (rule of law, human rights, multi-party political systems, free and fair elections, and a market economy).¹¹³ However, Grabbe also notes that many of the EU's programs, including the PHARE program in specific, were somewhat limited in their effectiveness due to a lack of coherence.¹¹⁴

Hughes et. al. also argues that the conditionality attached to the aid programs supplied by the EU was one of the main instruments employed by the EU to expand its influence in the CEECs and to promote systemic change. They add that as the enlargement process went on, the effectiveness of instruments such as the aforementioned PHARE, SAPARD, and ISPA became supplemented by the potential future benefits of massive assistance from the EU structural and regional funds, thus providing

¹¹¹ Heather Grabbe: (2005) *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 7-8

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 8

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8

one of the biggest motivators for CEECs to comply with the enlargement conditionality and to continue their reforms efforts right up to the point that they would eventually gain membership of the EU.¹¹⁵

However, despite the heavy emphasis on democracy promotion in the CEECs, the vast bulk of this aid was channeled to the support of the economic transition and the development of market economies in these countries, as opposed to supporting the political transition, as evidenced by the fact that only 1% of PHARE's budget was earmarked for 'civil society and democratization'.¹¹⁶ Additionally, Hughes et al. argue that while the EU's conditionality had a powerful 'Europeanizing' effect on national elite norms and behaviors in the target countries, the over-emphasis on negotiations with national and governmental elites by the EU meant that lower-level and sub-national elites experienced weaker (and in some cases, unsatisfactory) levels of Europeanization, in terms of their knowledge of the EU, their support for EU membership, and their adoption and internalization of the EU's norms.¹¹⁷ Sadurski reinforces this point, stating that the EU's focus on the swift implementation of the *acquis communautaire* and on the efficient use of resources strengthened national-level actors and elites, but weakened and undermined regional ones.¹¹⁸ Hughes and Sasse add to this, stating that the focus of the accession process was often more on accelerating economic integration than on consolidating the transfer of political and

¹¹⁵ James Hughes; Gwendolyn Sasse; Claire Gordon: (2004) *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave pp. 16

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 163

¹¹⁸ Wojciech Sadurski: (2006) "EU Enlargement and Democracy in New Member States", in Wojciech Sadurski; Adam Czarnota; Martin Krygier (eds.) *Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal Orders*, Dordrecht: Springer Publications p. 46

social norms, with the end result being that the adoption of these norms was not carefully monitored by the EU.¹¹⁹

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier also offer a critique of the EU's enlargement process, arguing that it successfully furthered the democratic consolidation in these countries, but at the expense of their parliamentary processes; that it locked in the capitalist free market economy, while also introducing widespread state intervention and regulation to these states; and it removed forever the specter of Russian domination from Eastern Europe, whilst still managing to relieve these countries of much in the way of their new-found autonomy.¹²⁰ Likewise, Vachudova points out that the extreme requirements of the accession process, whereby candidates were required in a relatively short space of time to accept, implement and transpose a set of standards and laws that had taken the older members of the EU fifty years to write and develop, downgraded domestic policy-making to being of secondary concern, and promoted the adoption and implementation of the work of an external political organization over the process of finding their own solutions to domestic problems.¹²¹ With that said, Vachudova took care to state that this degradation was unlikely to happen in countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, as these states had had eight years prior to the beginning of

¹¹⁹James Hughes; Gwendolyn Sasse: (2003) "Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs", *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 1(1), p. 14

¹²⁰Frank Schimmelfennig; Ulrich Sedelmeier: (2005) "Conclusions: The Impact of the EU on the Accession Countries" in Frank Schimmelfennig; Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press pp. 222-223

¹²¹Milada Anna Vachudova: (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 226

accession negotiations and the implementation of the *acquis* to develop their processes of democratic policy-making, a period that she felt was more than sufficient.¹²²

It is clear that the EU was successfully able to diffuse its norms to the CEECs, at least at the elite level, through the enlargement procedures. Following the beginning of accession negotiations in 1998 until their conclusion in 2002, democratic consolidation and marketization was supported, and the CEECs were able to successfully take on the full body of the *acquis communautaire*. Indeed, according to Zielonka, while the CEECs were often treated as a threat to the economic well-being and political stability of their Western cohorts, in truth, their achievements in introducing and stabilizing the reforms demanded of them was truly historic, even in the face of the great pain many of these reforms caused in the short terms.¹²³ Indeed, some of the economic reforms in particular led to sharp downturns in production in each of the CEECs, drops in employment, and a general fall in wage levels.¹²⁴ However, the CEECs were still able to take on, install, and stabilize democratic reforms while simultaneously taking on vast economic reforms, in marked contrast to the expectations of many social scientists.¹²⁵

With that said, it is widely agreed in the literature that the EU's enlargement policy did have some unintended negative consequences on the CEECs, including the weakening of regional actors and the concentration of power and influence in these countries around the national and governmental elites at the expense of parliamentary

¹²² Ibid., p. 228

¹²³ Jan Zielonka: (2006) *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-30

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 29-30

¹²⁵ With that said, it has to be noted that civil society and political parties throughout the region remain somewhat weak and underdeveloped throughout the entire region. Ibid., pp. 33-38

actors. Additionally, the EU's heavy emphasis on economic transformation and adoption of the *acquis* caused a degree of pain in the CEECs, and also helped create a situation whereby the civil society in these countries would remain somewhat underdeveloped. However, this does not take away from the successes of the enlargement process in getting the target countries to take on, and adopt the EU's norms and in so doing, fully 'Europeanize' themselves at a functional level. The very strong mandates given to EU membership in each of these countries in referendums on EU membership also indicates that accession resonated with the citizenry.

Evaluation

From this, it is possible to synthesize several points about the EU's norms, normative power, and its use of enlargement and the prospect of membership as a tool for transferring these norms. In accordance with the previously mentioned arguments of Ian Manners, the EU's normative basis, and the norms it tries to then export to partner countries, are centered around five key areas (peace, liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law) and four supplementary areas (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance). These are a set of values that grew and developed over the course of some fifty years, prior to the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Eastern accession process. Following the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the new regimes in these countries set as their primary foreign policy goals integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, and in particular the EU and NATO. In response to this, the EU sought to transfer its norms to the CEECs through the method of enlargement in order to guarantee the security and stability of the Union in a post-Cold War world, and to encourage the development of market

economic structures and liberal democracies in these countries. This process was very successful in terms of getting the governments in the respective candidate states to introduce reforms in line with the requirements of the EU, although it did lead to several problems, such as the weakening of the parliamentary decision-making process (in order to make the reform process more efficient), and the undermining of sub-national and regional elites, and possibly even civil society actors. In the subsequent chapter, I will discuss the 2004 enlargement from the perspective of the candidate countries; in this section I will examine the importance of the concept of the ‘return to Europe’ for them, and the goals and objectives of these countries. At this stage, I will focus on the Czech Republic and Hungary, the two case studies of this dissertation.

Before moving on, however, it is worth noting that what is somewhat absent from the academic debates about the normative power of the EU and its use of enlargement as a normative tool, are discussions about the social, mass-level internalization of the norms associated with the enlargement. Relatively little mention is made of the EU’s attempts to normalize and socialize its norms at the mass level in the target countries. Generally, the literature tends to focus on the norm emergence and norm cascade phases of the EU’s normative efforts: these two stages are the most elitist parts of the norm development process, and the existing literature on the EU focuses primarily on the EU’s attempts to influence and sway political leaders and other members of the decision-making elite in the target states. Only Jakovleski mentions the necessary element of norm internalization, and even with this, he treats it almost as a *fait accompli*, an event or process that will naturally and inevitably follow the accession of a country to the EU. In this sense, then, membership of the EU is treated in an endogenous manner, with it being both a tool for normative diffusion, and the final

endpoint of the process. This ignores the role of public and social acceptance of a norm in order for it to be fully realized, and disregards the possibility that while the public of the target countries might have strongly supported membership for their state in the EU, they might not have supported, realized, or internalized and accepted the normative dimensions of EU membership. Additionally, this review indicates that the EU itself paid somewhat scant regard to the process of mass level internalization and habituation; as stated, the emphasis was heavily on economic development and meeting the technical aspects of the *acquis*, with the creation of legal frameworks that acted in accordance with the *acquis* and the Copenhagen Criteria being of secondary importance, and the development of civil society and of grassroots affiliation to the new norms coming in a distant third in terms of priorities. While one might argue that this latter point was not the job of the EU (acting in its role as a norm entrepreneur), and that this process should either have taken place automatically or should have been handled by the governments and political elites of the states in question, such a claim relegates the EU to a very passive role, while also implying that what has taken place resembles less a normative transfer process resulting in broad societal transformation, and more a set of treaties signed between state-level actors, and enforced coercively at the national level regardless of mass-level support or opposition to it. It is thus necessary to examine what implications this disregard might have for the long-term consolidation of liberal democratic norms in these countries.

Chapter 2- Democratic Transitions and European Union Accession in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 1989-2004

One of the most important political developments of the late 20th century was the transitions from Communism to democracy and market-based capitalism that occurred throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, the emergence of the Solidarity trade union and the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland set in motion a chain-reaction which would eventually lead to the successful completion of democratic revolutions throughout the Communist world, and the end of the Cold War. The new regimes that thus emerged in Czechoslovakia (shortly to split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, and several other countries spoke openly of a 'return to Europe', and set integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, specifically the EU and NATO, as their primary foreign policy goals. This objective was to have significant impacts on the process of democratization in each of these countries over the next fifteen years, as the reforms demanded by the EU (in particular) had a stark impact on the legislative perspectives of each state.

This chapter examines the experiences of Hungary and the Czech Republic from 1989 up until the point of their accession to the European Union. It will focus on the goals and objectives of each country, and the obstacles and pitfalls they faced during these years. The first segment of this chapter will start by examining what exactly it is that constitutes a democratic system of governance. It follow this up by analyzing the literature on democratic transitions and democratic consolidation, and will detail the sundry variables that have been suggested as contributing to the democratization of a state, including economic, social, and external (third-party) variables. Moving on from

this, the discussion will then focus on the quality of a democracy, what this term refers to, and how democracy becomes more deeply embedded in particular society. Finally, this section will look at the ways in which democracy can be undermined in a state, and how a country may cease to be a democracy and return to an autocratic or semi-autocratic state.

With this established, the chapter will then move on to discuss the democratic transitions of the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, focusing particularly on Hungary and the Czech Republic. It will outline the process by which these states underwent their transitions, including the initial agreements that led to the regime change, the institutional decisions which decided the form of democracy each country would take, and the subsequent results in terms of democratic consolidation. Additionally, this chapter will also discuss the prospect of EU membership from the perspective of these new democracies, what the ‘return to Europe’ meant for each state, and the process by which these countries implemented the reforms necessary to achieve accession to the EU.

What is a democratic state?

There is often a general tendency to conflate democracy with the holding of competitive elections. This is a tendency which exists not just among the general public, but amongst many academics as well. For instance, Schumpeter argued that democracy was “...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s

vote.”¹²⁶ Such formulations, however, leave a lot to be desired: many countries hold genuinely competitive elections, but clearly could not be considered democracies for a variety of reasons. For instance, Iran elected Hassan Rouhani in 2013 after an election that was generally considered to be competitive: however, virtually no-one considers Iran to be a traditional democracy in any way, given its widespread violations of civil and political liberties, its prohibitions on the range of candidates allowed to stand for election, and, most importantly, the inability of those authorities that are elected to truly and independently govern. Zakaria also proposes a somewhat minimalist definition of democracy, saying that it involves free and competitive elections, wide enfranchisement, and some protections regarding the freedom of speech and the freedom of assembly.¹²⁷ Zakaria goes on to argue that more inclusive definitions lose their analytical power and become little more than “badges of honor”.¹²⁸ However, this is also problematic, as such a formulation ignores the issue that a government may not act in a democratic manner once it is elected in a competitive election, and may thus diminish the competitiveness of future elections; additionally, it ignores the problem that a democratically-elected government may not be able to exercise effective power in the country in question, especially in cases where unelected actors (or actors that did not win the election) are able to severely constrain and impinge upon their ability to rule effectively.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Joseph A. Schumpeter: (1950) *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd edition, New York: Harper Collins, p. 250

¹²⁷ Fareed Zakaria: (1997) “The Rise of Illiberal Democracies”, *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), p. 25

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Guillermo O’Donnell: (1996) “Illusions about Consolidation”, *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), pp. 35-36 ; see also, Marc F. Plattner: (2014) “The End of the Transitions Era”, *Journal of Democracy*, 25(3), pp. 8-9

A more compelling understanding of what a democracy involves is provided by Linz and Stepan, who state that a democracy is one where there is a consolidated state boundaries (i.e. no major internal threats or challenges to territorial sovereignty of the state in question), free and contested elections, and where rulers govern in a democratic manner, including respecting minority and individual rights, the national constitution, and the rule of law.^{130,131} Morlino proposes a slightly different definition, stating that a democracy at least has universal adult suffrage; recurring free, competitive, and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information.¹³² This formulation offers an improvement upon Schumpeter's one, but still misses several key points. Levitsky and Way offer a more detailed alternative, stating that democratic regimes all meet four criteria:

1. Executives and legislatures are chosen through genuinely free, fair and open elections;
2. The existence in the state of universal adult suffrage;
3. The existence of political and civil liberties, including basic rights such as the freedom of the press and the freedom to criticize the government without reprisal;

¹³⁰ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) "Towards Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), pp. 14-15

¹³¹ According to Morlino, rule of law can be defined as the principle of the supremacy of the law in the state, and entails the capacity to make authorities respect the laws, and for these laws to be non-retroactive, public knowledge, universal, stable, and unambiguous. Leonardo Morlino: (2009) "Qualities of Democracy: How to Analyze Them", *Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane*, [online], available at: <http://indicatorsinfo.pbworks.com/f/Morlino+Qualities+of+Democracy.pdf> (accessed on 12/20/2013), p. 8

¹³² Leonardo Morlino: (2009) "Qualities of Democracy: How to analyze them", *Studies in Public Policy*, 465, p. 3 University of Aberdeen, Scotland

4. That elected authorities possess the real authority to govern, independently of military or clerical control.¹³³

These three definitions, combined, offer a more nuanced and developed view of what a democratic regime involves, and can offer a clear differential between such regimes and authoritarian, semi-authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. Vaclav Havel confirms this idea, stating that a democratic society based on the rule of law cannot exist unless it is also "...humane, moral, intellectual, spiritual, and cultural...without commonly shared and widely entrenched moral values and obligations, neither the law nor democratic government, nor even the market economy, will function properly."¹³⁴ In addition to this, in several of his writings, he advocated a more socially involved brand of politics, which he described as 'antipolitical politics'. Havel argued that in order for political regimes to serve the people, rather than the apparatus itself, it necessarily needed to be one based on active participation and responsiveness, whereby "...one simple electrician with his heart in the right place, honoring something that transcends him and free of fear, can influence the history of his nation..."¹³⁵ As such, it is clear from all of this that a truly democratic political system involves more than just elections; it involves a deeper system of conditions, which include the existence of the rule of law in the state, a free press, basic human rights, and active political participation on the part of the general population, and that can allow a polity to exert effective

¹³³ Steven Levitsky; Lucan Way: (2002) "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism", *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), p. 53

¹³⁴ Vaclav Havel: (1994) "Democracy's Forgotten Dimension", *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 31(1), pp. 3-4

¹³⁵ Vaclav Havel: (1984) "Politics and Conscience", *The Natural World as Political Problem: Essays on Modern Man*, Prague: Edice Expedice, Vol. 188, Section V (no page number available)

control over their elected political leaders (who themselves become the de facto and de jure rulers of the country).

When and how will an authoritarian or autocratic country undergo a democratic transition and consolidation?

The study of democratic systems of government has a long history, with numerous variables having been suggested by a variety of political theorists to explain why and how a country will become a democracy. Traditionally, many theorists focused on the structural conditions in a country which are necessary for a democracy to emerge. Barrington Moore, for instance, argued that in order for a liberal democracy to develop in a country, certain socio-economic configurations needed to be present. This included the development of a balance of power between the crown and the nobility; the evolution of an appropriate form of commercial (as opposed to feudal or some other type) agriculture which could facilitate modernization; the weakening of the landed aristocracy, and the subsequent emergence of a sense of solidarity between the former agricultural peasantry, the urban working classes, and the nascent urban bourgeoisie (rather than an alliance between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie against the peasants and workers); and an eventual revolutionary break with the past.¹³⁶

Moore applied his theory to six countries (England, France, the United States, China, Japan and India) and argued that each step was critical to the emergence of a democratic order in a country. For instance, a society which possessed all of the other

¹³⁶ Barrington Moore, Jr.: (1966) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 430-431

attributes, but which did not feature a revolution, would become only partially democratic and would remain somewhat backward. This is because the revolution was an important key to the re-ordering of society, and to allowing the emergence of truly credible political forces outside the traditional elites.¹³⁷ Moore also argued that the absence of the development of commercial agriculture, combined with a polarization between the urban and peasant classes on one side and the proto-bourgeoisie and the aristocracy on the other side, would lead to the emergence of a communist society.¹³⁸ This theory fits somewhat uncomfortably with the cases of the former communist countries; these were countries which (for the most part) had had totalitarian communism effectively imposed upon them coercively (and often from the outside) in the aftermath of World War II, and so lacked many of what Moore considered to be the social bases for either democracy or communism when they underwent their transitions in the late 1980s. However, Moore's necessary condition for the emergence of a democratic society was a functional middle-class: in his words, "...no bourgeois, no democracy".¹³⁹ This provides us with a crucial starting point for our analysis of how countries undergo a transition to democracy.

It is widely acknowledged that economic factors play a major role in this process. Samuel Huntington, for one, argued that most societies remain undemocratic as long as they remain poor and underdeveloped.¹⁴⁰ Lipset builds on this, by acknowledging that economic development in a society could produce a middle class

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. 431-432

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 477-378

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 418

¹⁴⁰ Samuel P. Huntington: (1991) "Democracy's Third Wave", *Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), p. 33

capable of standing up to the state, and of providing resources to independent groups outside of the regime.¹⁴¹ Additionally, he noted that a competitive capitalist market economy was the best way of reducing the impact of the nepotistic networks in a society which form the basis of many undemocratic states.¹⁴² Huntington was also careful to note that while there existed a strong correlation between economic growth and democracy, and that the causal direction seemed to run from the economy to democracy, that it was neither clear at what level a state needs to develop before they undergo a democratic transition, nor was it even assured that a country which had reached such a level would become a democracy.¹⁴³ Huntington dealt with this problem by proposing that as countries become wealthier, they entered a certain band whereby a transition to democracy (or to another form of government) became a credible option for them.¹⁴⁴ He also stressed that the subsequent regime trajectory in such a state would be decided not necessarily by sustained economic growth and development, but also by other factors, including social, cultural, and political factors.

With this said, it must also be borne in mind that economic factors other than those purely related to growth and development may play a role in the democratic transition of a country. Armijo et. al. argue that in contrast to the conventional wisdom of many policymakers in the West, that countries that go through a ‘dual transition’ (referring to a process of democratization, coinciding with a process of marketization/market reform) may subsequently struggle to complete either transition,

¹⁴¹ Seymour Martin Lipset: (1994) “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited”, *American Sociological Review*, 59(1), pp.2-3

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Samuel P. Huntington: (1984) “Will More Countries Become Democratic?”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 99(2), pp. 199-200

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 201

and may have to choose one or the other. They argue that this is the case because the costs of economic reform can lead to increasing opposition to the new political system from those most negatively affected by the changes, and could result in mass disillusionment with democracy and/or governmental repression; or it could undermine the credibility of the new system.¹⁴⁵ They note that these problems may be mitigated if, as a result of gaining access to extra resources as part of either the marketization or democratization process, a state can increase expenditure and reward all groups: however, they also note that this outcome is very rare.¹⁴⁶

Emergence of democracy in a state

It is important to consider other factors that contribute to the emergence of democracy in a state. Societal and social factors have been identified by several authors as having an important role to play in this process. The logic behind this is that democracy needs fertile ground in order to thrive and flourish; no matter what the level of economic development of a society is, no democracy will emerge in a state if the necessary social conditions are absent. Lipset, for instance, argues that while economic factors are necessary for the emergence of democracy in a state, that it must be supported a supportive culture, including the acceptance of the public and of the political elite of fundamental rights such as free speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and so on.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Leslie Elliott Armijo; Thomas J. Biersteker; Abraham F. Lowenthal: (1994) "The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions", *Journal of Democracy*, 5(4), pp. 163-164

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 162

¹⁴⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset: (1994) "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review*, 59(1), p. 3

Welzel and Inglehart build on this, stating that the emergence of democracy in a society depends heavily on the existence of societal preconditions such as the wide distribution of resources, and the existence of a trusting, tolerant public that prizes free choice.¹⁴⁸ For them, these factors that contribute to the emergence of democracy in a country are themselves linked to the previously mentioned economic factors; they argue that when a country experiences economic development, if this is also associated with a simultaneous process of modernization which empowers people and provides them with the resources with which they can demand and ensure the emergence of a democratic system in their state.¹⁴⁹ Once they have been provided with these resources as a result of economic growth, Welzel and Inglehart argue that this will lead to the emergence of ‘self-expression values’, such as self-expression, participation in society and politics, support for gender equality, high levels of interpersonal trust, and tolerance of ethnic and sexual minorities; subsequently, the emergence of these values in a society will lead to increasing demand for civil and political liberties, and governmental responsiveness.¹⁵⁰ Welzel and Inglehart later note that modernization does not necessarily result automatically in a democratic society, nor does it proceed in a linear and irreversible manner towards democracy.¹⁵¹ Rather, they stress that modernization merely brings about a series of societal and cultural changes, such as rising education and economic security, which are more likely to encourage the development of self-expression values, and that this is a process which could easily go into reverse, should

¹⁴⁸ Christian Welzel; Ronald Inglehart: (2008) “The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization”, *Journal of Democracy*, 19(1), p. 126

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 130

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 128-129

¹⁵¹ Christian Welzel; Ronald Inglehart: (2009) “How Development Leads to Democracy: What We know about Modernization Today”, *Foreign Affairs*, 88(2), pp. 37-38

a country face a severe economic collapse.¹⁵² Welzel also argues that another important part of the relationship between modernization and democracy is the creation and dissemination of ‘emancipative’ attitudes, such as the amount of a priority that people put on having their say in important governmental decisions, having their say in their community, the importance of free speech, their participation in large-scale civic actions; their interpersonal trust levels; and their tolerance for non-conformist and non-traditional lifestyles.¹⁵³ Welzel states that these attitudes help to sustain and attain democracy in societies by motivating mass actions aimed at democratic achievements.¹⁵⁴

Another societal factor that has been widely suggested as having an impact on the direction of a transition in a country is the level of development of civil society in a country. According to Morje Howard, civil society is a key ingredient in the continued success of advanced Western democracies, and is an important element in the emergence of democracy in many developing countries.¹⁵⁵ Lipset also argues that a functional civil society is crucial to pushing a transition towards democracy, as they prevent the isolation of political institutions from the general population, and thus keep them both responsive to and responsible to the masses.¹⁵⁶ With that said, there are several arguments that the relationship between civil society and democratization is a

¹⁵² Ibid., pp. 38-39

¹⁵³ Christian Welzel: (2007) “Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy”, *International Political Science Review*, 28(4), pp. 401-402

¹⁵⁴ Welzel also noted, however, that emancipative attitudes only mattered to the outcome of a democratic transition in cases where the process was a societal-driven one. Ibid., pp. 419-420

¹⁵⁵ Marc Morje Howard: (2003) *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32

¹⁵⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset: (1994) “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited”, *American Sociological Review*, 59(1), pp. 12-13

complex one; Kopecky and Mudde, for instance, argue that the positive nature of the relationship between civil society and democracy cannot be assumed, and that the actual effect on the nature of the regime in a state will depend a lot on the interactions between civil society organizations, the state, and other civil society organizations.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, Mudde also points out that there are circumstances where a civil society may actually be bad for the trajectories of democracy in a new state, in cases where certain civil society organizations try to crowd out other organizations and prevent the emergence of a truly pluralist civil society in a new democracy.¹⁵⁸ Thus it seems that the level and extent of civil society development in a country does have an effect on the democratic nature of a regime, but it is not always clear the direction of the effect.

History is the next variable that must be considered. Historical exposure to democratic government, religion, and a cultural tradition of liberal values are often suggested as playing a role in whether or not a country will become a democracy. Lipset, for instance, notes that cultural factors appeared to play a particularly important role in deciding which countries became democracies, with countries that were predominantly Protestant or Catholic being more likely to produce democracy than Islamic or Buddhist countries.¹⁵⁹ Putnam also argues that historical factors can have a long-lasting effect on the level of democracy and democratic institutions in a state, and can help shape developments long down the historical timeline.¹⁶⁰ Inglehart supports these arguments somewhat, stating that the culture of a society creates certain path

¹⁵⁷ Petr Kopecky; Cas Mudde: (2003) "Rethinking Civil Society", *Democratization*, 10(3), p. 11

¹⁵⁸ Cas Mudde: (2007) "Civil Society", in Stephen White; Judy Batt; Paul G. Lewis (eds.): *Developments in Central and East European Politics 4*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.224-225

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5

¹⁶⁰ Robert D. Putnam: (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 179

dependencies, and that the dominance of religious affiliations can create different sets of norms and values within a society, which will continue to have a long-term effect on its political system.¹⁶¹ However, these ideas must be tempered somewhat when we consider the transitions of the post-communist CEE countries. According to Badescu, given the totalitarian nature of communism in this part of the world, it is rather incredible to expect that influences from the pre-communist era would still be observable; additionally, he shows that attitudes did not vary significantly between those born after the advent of communism, and those born before (who would have had some direct experience of living under a democratic regime), thus meaning that it is somewhat unlikely that attitudes which might have influenced democratization and democratic transition would have been transmitted from the pre- to the post-communist periods.¹⁶² As a result, it is possible that cultural and historical factors might have some influence on the emergence and consolidation of democracy in a country: however, it should not necessarily be expected that in the case of the CEE countries, that this effect would be decisive or even particularly large.

Having considered sociocultural factors behind the democratization of a society, it is now important to look at the impact external actors can have on democracy and democratization. It is important to stress that it is very difficult for an external actor to be a sufficient factor contributing to the democratization of a country, except in the case of a democratic regime that is imposed upon a country by a military conqueror.

¹⁶¹ Ronald Inglehart: (2000) "Culture and Democracy", in Lawrence E. Harrison; Samuel P. Huntington (eds.): *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, New York: Basic Books, p. 80

¹⁶² Gabriel Badescu: (2006) "Historical and Cultural Borderlines in eastern Europe", in Hans-Dieter Klingemann; Dieter Fuchs; Jan Zielonka (eds.): *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge, p. 85; p. 96

Additionally, Welzel argues that an external actor cannot guarantee the creation of a particularly robust democracy in a country, but can only trigger the spread of electoral democracy.¹⁶³ With that said, other states can have a strong supportive effect on the process of a regime transition, by shaping the environment in which the transition occurs. Huntington, for instance, has shown that two of the five factors leading to what he described as the ‘third wave of democratization’ between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s were the ‘snowballing effect’, whereby earlier transitions provided a model for states that featured similar societal and economic conditions; and changes in the policies of major global actors such as the European Community (the forerunner to the EU), the United States, and the Soviet Union to either actively promote and support attempts at democratization, or at least to not explicitly and physically oppose such efforts.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, Huntington noted in a separate article that the global prospects of democracy were often a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states in the world, and that as these states’ fortunes improved, so would democracy emerge in more and more countries.¹⁶⁵

Another factor contributing to the fate of a transitional regime are the democratic transition itself, the type of regime in place in the country prior to the transition, and the nature of the actors most centrally involved. According to Linz and Stepan, the prior regime that a state is transitioning out of will have a dramatic effect on the course of democratization and democratic consolidation in the state. For

¹⁶³ Christian Welzel: (2009) “Theories of Democratization”, in Christian W. Haerpfer; Patrick Bernhagen; Ronald F. Inglehart; Christian Welzel (eds.): *Democratization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 82

¹⁶⁴ Samuel P. Huntington: (1991) “Democracy’s Third Wave”, *Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), pp. 13-16

¹⁶⁵ Samuel P. Huntington: (1984) “Will More Countries Become Democratic?”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 99(2), p. 206

instance, they argue that countries transitioning from authoritarian regimes such as Spain and Portugal in the early 1980s would face a much different set of challenges to those countries which transitioned from Communism in the early 1990s, as the totalitarian nature of the latter type of regimes would mean that a new regime would have to construct from scratch the ‘five arenas’ necessary for the emergence a stable democratic system: a free and lively civil society; an autonomous and societally-valued political society; a system guaranteeing the rule of law and equality in the eyes of the judiciary; an effective state bureaucracy; and an institutionalized economic society which can regulate interactions between the state and the market.¹⁶⁶ Additionally, they note that the characteristics of those groups that are involved in the transition can also have a strong impact; for a transition to result in the emergence of a true democratic state, all major decision-makers in the old regime need to either be a part of the transition, or should otherwise be replaced entirely. If a transition occurs, even one which features competitive elections, but the true ‘power behind the throne’ remains intact and retains its position in society, then the outcome is highly unlikely to be a truly democratic state.¹⁶⁷ Linz and Stepan state that the nature of the transition will also affect the outcome; whether it is a civil society uprising (which would result in the creation of an interim government, and will itself set off another set of dynamics), an elite-driven process involving moderates from the old regime and from the opposition negotiating a pacted reform, leading to a new regime, or a process whereby the state or regime itself

¹⁶⁶ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press p. 7; p. 55

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4

leads the transition, which may lead to a more tenuous democratization (or a new form of authoritarianism).¹⁶⁸

This latter point is critiqued by Vachudova somewhat. She argues that in the case of the former Communist CEE states, the single most important ingredient for democratic success was the emergence from the reform process of a competitive political system; where the collapse of the Communist system was followed quickly by the creation of a competitive democratic political system, and where a balance of power emerged between the old regime and its challengers, there was a relatively quick and painless transition to a liberal democratic system of government. On the other hand, in cases where one dominant group or party emerged, democratic and liberal democratic institutions would struggle to survive.¹⁶⁹ McFaul goes even further than this, stating that democracy only emerged in the wake of the breakdown of Communism in countries where pro-democratic forces had a decisive advantage in terms of the power relations in the state, and could forcibly ensure the creation of a democratic system; otherwise, the regimes that tended to emerge were either unstable, unconsolidated and incomplete democracies, authoritarian regimes, or full-blown autocratic dictatorships.¹⁷⁰ While he did partially agree Linz and Stepan, stating that the way in which the transition occurred had a major impact on these resulting power balances (revolutionary or non-pacted transitions were most likely to lead to non-democratic outcomes), he stressed that what was most important for a democratic transition was that the agreements reached by the

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 61; p. 71

¹⁶⁹ Milada Anna Vachudova: (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11

¹⁷⁰ Michael McFaul: (2002) "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World", *World Politics*, 54(2), p. 214

major sides all included three components: that they sought to limit the agenda of policy choice; that they would share proportionately in the distribution of benefits (rather than favoring one ethnic or societal group over another); and that the participation of outsiders (i.e. those not involved in the pact, either within or without the state) in decision-making must be restricted.¹⁷¹ Levitsky and Way support this argument, stating that in cases where the authority of an authoritarian government decays (or where such a regime faces large amounts of international pressure), such that they are compelled to introduce reforms, but where the democratic opposition is insufficiently strong to force the issue, what will emerge will not be a democratic system, but a competitive authoritarian regime. In such a system, some democratic institutions such as competitive elections or civil liberties will exist, but are violated regularly and with such impunity that the country does not meet the standards of a democracy.¹⁷² As a result, it can be argued that the democratic challengers in a state need to hold at least a small advantage in terms of power and support over the regime in order for a transition to result in democracy: without this, any transition is more likely to result in a stalemated or fragile democracy, or is likely to revert to another form of non-democratic government.

Consolidation of democracy in a state

Having established many of the economic, social, political and international variables that explain when and how democracy will emerge in a state, it is necessary to consider

¹⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 216-217

¹⁷² Steven Levitsky; Lucan Way: (2002) "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism", *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), p. 52; p. 60

Table 2.1: Democratic transition variables

Economic variables:	GDP per capita
	GDP growth per capita
	Size of the middle class
	Presence of a dual transition
Socio-cultural variables:	Religion and history
	Level of education
	Extent of ‘self-expression’ values in the state
	Level of civil society development
	Level of civil society pluralism
External actor variables:	Presence of regime transitions in similar states
	Activities of major international powers
Transition-specific variables:	Type of pre-transition authoritarian regime
	Attainment of the new ruling elite of de jure and de facto sovereignty within the state
	Power balance in favor of democratic opposition movement

how a democracy becomes consolidated, and how it becomes “the only game in town”. There is quite an overlap between the two areas: many events that have an influence on the emergence of democracy in a state can also decisively affect the consolidation of democracy in a state. For instance, many of the societal and attitudinal factors that can lead a regime transition to produce democracy in a state will be particularly helpful in terms of helping the new system to become normalized and internalized. Additionally, the previous regime type can influence the outcome of the consolidation, by changing the range of tasks that must be done in order for the new system to be consolidated.

However, before we start delving into the different variables regarding democratic consolidation, it is important to consider what this term refers to. As was established in the introduction, this study uses Linz and Stepan’s definition of a consolidated democracy as being one whereby democracy becomes “the only game in

town”.¹⁷³ Schedler expands on this. He states that democracy becomes the only game in town when it is likely to endure well into the future, an event that will occur only if all the relevant actors in the state decide to play by its rules.¹⁷⁴ For Schedler, this can best be detected not by looking for incidences of good democratic behavior, but looking for instances of antidemocratic behavior. He categorizes three types of antidemocratic behavior: the use of violence in the political arena; the rejection of elections, the denial of the opportunity to participate in elections to other groups, or the rejection or contestation of the outcomes of democratic elections; and the transgression of authority, including breaching laws, the constitution, and/or mutually accepted norms regarding appropriate political conduct.¹⁷⁵ Schedler argues that the way in which political actors handle alternations in government is a very useful means of testing their true commitment to democracy, and thus the ‘two turnover’ test, whilst not perfect, is a valid indicator of the level of democratic consolidation in a state.¹⁷⁶

We can now begin to consider many of the variables that influence a democratic consolidation. As was stated above, many of the factors that contribute to a democratic transition must also be maintained afterwards in order to guarantee the new system becomes consolidated. This is related to the key issue of legitimacy: new democracies must become legitimated amongst the population in order to maintain their position.

¹⁷³ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press p. 5

¹⁷⁴ Andreas Schedler: (2001) “Measuring Democratic Consolidation”, *Studies in Comparative and International Development*, 36(1), p. 67; p. 70

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71

¹⁷⁶ The ‘two turnover’ test is way of examining the extent of democratic consolidation in a state, by examining to see if an incumbent party is voted out of government, and then their successor is also voted out of government, if the state maintains its democratic constitutional order. *Ibid.*, p. 73

According to Lipset, this is done through the government's prolonged effective performance, and the degree to which they are able to satisfy the basic needs of most of the population and the key power groups in society.¹⁷⁷ Alternatively, Lipset argues that the new regime may become legitimated through their preferability over their immediate predecessors, if the latter was particularly harsh, brutal and unpopular at the point of the transition.¹⁷⁸ Inglehart builds on this by tying the discussion on democratic legitimacy and consolidation into the socio-cultural and attitudinal drivers of democracy. He states that self-expression values will not automatically develop within a state and lead it to become a more stable democracy; instead, he states that in new regimes, continued economic development and the realization of people's material ambitions and objectives can support the further development of these values, which will themselves make democracy more likely to thrive and to flourish.¹⁷⁹

One of the most important elements that has been suggested as helping to guarantee democratic consolidation is the strength of the rule of law in a state, and the extent to which the new elites are legally and constitutionally constrained from acting in a certain manner. According to Linz and Stepan, a strong rule of law is essential to the consolidation of democracy in a state as it can prevent a single leader from abusing his majority and/or his mandate and altering or ignoring other institutions.¹⁸⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell builds on this, stating that the rule of law in a consolidated democracy should

¹⁷⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset: (1994) "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", *American Sociological Review*, 59(1), p. 8

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ronald Inglehart: (2006) "East European Values Systems in Global Perspective", in Hans-Dieter Klingemann; Dieter Fuchs; Jan Zielonka (eds.): *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*, Oxford: Routledge, pp. 83-84

¹⁸⁰ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) "Towards Consolidated Democracies", *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), pp. 19-20

be sufficiently strong to prevent politically powerful groups from arbitrarily removing elected officials from their positions before the end of their constitutionally-mandated terms.¹⁸¹ According to Diamond, strong and effective rule of law can be guaranteed in a state by having an independent, well-trained and well-staffed judicial system which can pass judgment on the activities of political elites without basing their decisions upon partisan lines.¹⁸²

The final factor that I will consider that can have an important influence on the democratic consolidation of a state is the support the state subsequently receives from international actors. Mansfield and Pevehouse develop upon this point, arguing that countries that undergo a democratic transition are often quite likely to seek to enter International Organizations as a means to helping their new political elites to credibly commit to carrying out democratic reforms, and to reduce the prospect of an authoritarian reversion.¹⁸³ Additionally, they argue that such states are more likely to join those organizations which are predominantly made up of democratic members, as membership in such organizations is more likely to send a credible signal to international and domestic audiences that their efforts to reform their national system are genuine, and also because they can lock-in democratization by raising the cost of backsliding in the new member state.¹⁸⁴ Pevehouse also goes on to add that international organizations may provide positive incentives for societal groups to support the new democratic system, by providing material resources to such groups or by pushing for

¹⁸¹ Guillermo O'Donnell: (1996) "Illusions About Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), pp. 35-36

¹⁸² Larry Jay Diamond: (1994) "Toward Democratic Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3), p. 16

¹⁸³ Edward D. Mansfield; Jon C. Pevehouse: (2006) "Democratization and International Organizations", *International Organization*, 60(1), p. 138

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 140

Table 2.2: Democratic consolidation variables

Economic variables	GDP per capita
	GDP growth per capita
Socio-cultural variables	Extent of ‘self-expression’ values in the state
	Religion and history
	Level of civil society development
	Level of civil society pluralism
	Independence of Judiciary
	Strength of rule of law
External actor variables	Membership of democratic International Organizations
Prior regime-specific variables	Type of pre-transition authoritarian regime

policies that can help improve the position and status of the losers from the transition.¹⁸⁵ Additionally, he stated that in order for an organization to truly act as a force for democratization, it must have at least three characteristics: the will to set pre-conditions for membership, the will to enforce these conditions once a new member is admitted, and the means to enforce these conditions.

How do we explain the quality of democracy in a new democracy?

Having established the various determinants that have been identified in the literature as contributing to the democratic transition and consolidation of a state, at this point it is necessary to discuss variations in the levels of democracy in a state, or in other words the quality of democracy in a state, and how democracy becomes more deeply embedded in a state. Once a democracy can be considered to be at least partially consolidated, it becomes crucial to consider how effective the new regime actually is

¹⁸⁵ Jon C. Pevehouse: (2002) “With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3), p. 615

in bringing about democratic outcomes. This issue has been heavily researched Leonardo Morlino and Larry Diamond, in particular; as such, this section will look in detail at their discussions regarding the quality of democracy in a state.

Morlino's argument states that a quality democracy is a 'good' democracy, one which possesses a "...stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functions of its institutions and mechanisms."¹⁸⁶ In order to achieve this outcome, the regime needs to possess three qualities in particular: quality of result (a broadly legitimated system that satisfies its citizens); quality of content (the citizens, associations, and communities within it enjoy at least moderate levels of liberty and equality); and quality of procedure (citizens possess the power to check and evaluate the performance of the government in terms of their adherence to the rule of law).¹⁸⁷

Additionally, Morlino states that there are seven main conceptualizations of democracy, each with a different focus: the liberal (or representative) democracy, the responsive democracy, the participatory democracy, the deliberative democracy, the associative democracy, the egalitarian democracy, and the democratic governance.¹⁸⁸ Each conceptualization has a different, albeit recurrent, emphasis: for instance, the egalitarian democracy formulation emphasizes outcomes that stress freedom, equality and social solidarity, while the participatory democracy specifies political participation and freedom; however, this study will focus on the liberal democracy formulation,

¹⁸⁶ Leonardo Morlino: (2009) "Qualities of Democracy: How to Analyze Them", *Istituto Italiano di Science Umane*, [online], available at: <http://indicatorsinfo.pbworks.com/f/Morlino+Qualities+of+Democracy.pdf> (accessed on 12/20/2013),

p. 4

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 4-5

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

which concerns itself principally with political competition and elite accountability¹⁸⁹, combined with equality and the protection of basic freedoms.¹⁹⁰ Diamond and Morlino build upon this, stating that these elements are inherently linked to one another, as freedom and equality are often the standards by which citizens assess their political leaders.¹⁹¹ Additionally, strong and independent rule of law and effective oversight of political elites is an imperative for a good democracy; the former because it guarantees the defense of citizen's rights and the equality of all citizens before the law, and the latter because it guarantees that office holders answer for their conduct, and that their behavior in power can be reviewed by other institutional actors.¹⁹² In particular, they argue that political systems where democratic norms are not deeply rooted, and/or where there are traditions of corruption, require these agencies of accountability, and that these agencies should be given constitutional safeguards protecting their autonomy so as to prevent authorities from using the appointment procedure to limit their capacity to scrutinize government.¹⁹³

Morlino describes eight qualities on which good democracies (and by extension, bad democracies) may vary: five procedural ones (rule of law, electoral accountability, inter-institutional accountability, participation, and competition); two substantive ones

¹⁸⁹ Morlino defines accountability as "...the obligation of elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked by citizen-electors or other constitutional bodies." This also involves information on the activities of politicians, justification for their actions, and consequences for transgressors following an assessment of the facts related to these activities. Ibid., p. 11

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 5

¹⁹¹ Larry Diamond; Leonardo Morlino: (2004) "The Quality of Democracy", *Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Working Paper Series*, 20, available at: <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20729/Diamond-Morlino.QoD.intro%28book%29.drft1.pdf>, (accessed on 12/20/2013), p. 7

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 7; p. 17

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 21

(freedom and equality); and one separate one (responsiveness to the citizenry).¹⁹⁴ Based on the presence of these criteria in a state, Morlino proposes a scale which can help one understand the quality of democracy in a state. A blank space is assigned in cases where a state observes the minimum levels of a given procedure; a ‘+’ sign is awarded in instances where the procedure is particularly strongly present; and a ‘-’ sign is awarded where the procedure is either completely nonexistent, or does not meet the minimum required standards. This table is displayed in table 2.3. As can be seen from the table, the basic ingredient in any ‘good’ democracy is a particularly strong respect for, and guarantee of, the rule of law; likewise, it is the one ingredient that is missing from any ‘bad’ democracy. While these are somewhat ideal type cases, they provide a useful point of reference, and serve to highlight the importance of rule of law to a democracy. In many ways, the various types of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ democracy are mirror images of one another. For example, while an effective and an ineffective democracy might have many of the same (or similar) qualities in terms of accountability, responsiveness, freedom, and equality, an effective democracy will also have a very strong, neutral, corruption-free and independent judiciary; an inefficient democracy, on the other hand, will be one whereby widespread corruption allows privileged groups evade legal responsibility (or unduly influence judges and politicians), and which allows political elites to mitigate the independence of the judiciary.¹⁹⁵ Likewise, a perfect democracy is a hypothetical state whereby all of the requirements of a ‘good’ democracy are present

¹⁹⁴ Leonardo Morlino: (2009) “Qualities of Democracy: How to Analyze Them”, *Istituto Italiano di Science Umane*, [online], available at: <http://indicatorsinfo.pbworks.com/f/Morlino+Qualities+of+Democracy.pdf> (accessed on 12/20/2013),

p. 6

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 25-26

to a great extent, while a minimal democracy (sadly, a much more real and less hypothetical variant) is one where almost all the elements of a democracy are missing, with the exception of free and fair elections.

Table 2.3: Morlino's model of the quality of democracy in a state¹⁹⁶

Rule of Law	Accountabilities ¹⁹⁷	Responsiveness	Freedom	Equality	Outcome
+					Effective (good)
+	+				Responsible (good)
+	+	+			Legitimate (good)
+	+		+		Free (good)
+	+			+	Egalitarian (good)
+	+	+	+	+	Perfect (good)
-					Inefficient (bad)
-	-				Irresponsible (bad)
-	-	-			Illegitimate (bad)
-	-		-		Reduced (bad)
-	-			-	Unequal (bad)
-	-	-	-	-	Minimal (bad)

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 26-27

¹⁹⁷ In coming up with this model, Morlino combines electoral accountability, inter-institutional accountability, participation, and competition into one generalized 'accountability' heading.

What can cause the breakdown or decay of democracy in a state?

Having established what is necessary for democracy to emerge and be consolidated in a state, and having considered what contributes to a better quality of democracy, this study now turns its attention to considering how and why democracy can fail in a state, and what contributes to this process. In many ways, some of these are mirror images of the variables that lead an authoritarian state to undergo a democratic transition. For instance, while economic growth can foster democracy by bringing countries into a specific band whereby they are likely to experience a regime transition, the same effect can be seen in the case of economic recession. Schedler, for instance, argues that cases of extreme economic distress can subvert some of the minimal conditions for democracy, and can potentially lead to a de-consolidation of democracy and a slide towards some form of non-democratic governance.¹⁹⁸ Levitsky and Way add to this, stating that the inability of a democratically elected government to deal with a longstanding set of economic and political crises can create conditions where the government begins to undermine democratic institutions, thus leading to some form of competitive authoritarian or authoritarian regime.¹⁹⁹ Gasiorowski supports these arguments, although he narrows their scope somewhat: he shows that while economic crises have had an effect on democratic breakdowns, that it is only recessionary crises which have a general effect; inflationary crises led to breakdowns in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, but did not have an effect in the 1980s (including during the

¹⁹⁸ Andreas Schedler: (2001) "Measuring Democratic Consolidation", *Studies in Comparative and International Development*, 36(1), pp. 80-81

¹⁹⁹ Steven Levitsky; Lucan Way: (2002) "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism", *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), p. 61

period of the breakdown of the Soviet Union).²⁰⁰ Such findings would seem to indicate that what is most troublesome for a democratic regime and what might put it in particular danger are not economic crises, broadly speaking, but rather economic crises which hinder growth and which can potentially mitigate the ability of people to achieve their personal objectives. This process can then lead to the de-legitimization of the regime, as it may not be able to satisfy the needs of the citizens, and can undermine one of the most important requirements for the long-term consolidation of a democracy.

Another factor which has sometimes been suggested as being a factor behind democracies sliding towards authoritarianism has been the presence of, and support for, extremist political movements. While a vibrant, pluralistic and active civil society can support the consolidation of a democracy (albeit in certain circumstances and with certain conditions attached), it has been suggested by several theorists that radical political movements and political parties can cause the opposite effect, i.e. the deconsolidation and discrediting of democracy in a state. According to Mudde, there is often a strong tendency in the theory on democratic consolidations to assume that contentious politics of the sort favored by nationalist, 'bad' civil society groups is damaging to the consolidation of democracy in a state.²⁰¹ Much of this is based on the experience of Europe during the interwar years: the Nazi party in Germany, for example, used the structures of parliament and of the democratic Weimar system to capitalize on the support it had received from society by encouraging and whipping up

²⁰⁰ Mark J. Gasiorowski: (1995) "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis", *The American Political Science Review*, 89(4), p. 892

²⁰¹ Cas Mudde: (2003) "Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe: Lessons from the 'Dark Side'", in Petr Kopecky; Cas Mudde (eds.) *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe*, London: Routledge, p. 164

nationalistic sentiment in post-WWI Germany to bring down democracy in the country, and to introduce a brutal, totalitarian government. Elsewhere in Europe during this time, several new democracies and weakly consolidated democracies also regressed into authoritarian forms of government through the activities of nationalist and extremist political and social movements. Pedazhur and Weinberg present a more modern take on this idea, stating that modern-day ‘bad’ civil society movements can destabilize a democracy by launching attacks on ethnic minorities in the state and on government officials, and furthermore, that they present a particularly dangerous threat given the closeness of their links to the grassroots of the society.²⁰² Additionally, they state that in contrast to traditional nationalist or extremist movements, the modern ‘uncivil’ society does not launch direct attacks on democracy (for example, the use of putsches or coups to seize power violently), but rather seeks to stir up and exploit anti-liberal democratic sentiment, and to then challenge the various social, political and legal institutions that make up a liberal democracy.²⁰³

However, there are some significant problems with this idea. Mudde attacks the idea of ‘bad’ civil society necessarily being bad for the fate of democracies, saying that such nationalist movements do not necessarily always use violent, and that these groups that use non-violent tactics may actually contribute to the democratic consolidation of the state, by demonstrating their acceptance of the ‘rules’ of a democracy and by improving the amount of communication between the new political elites in the state

²⁰² Ami Pedazhur; Leonard Weinberg: (2001) “Modern European Democracy and its Enemies: The Threat of the Extreme Right”, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 2(1), pp. 69-70

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 70

and the masses they are intended to represent.²⁰⁴ Indeed, it follows logically that provided they are working within the system and respecting the rules of democracy, there is no reason why the strength of radical movements might be dangerous for democracy as a whole: it is only when these movements begin to seek to deny the voice of other groups in society, to undermine the democratic institutions of the state, or otherwise seek to violently or illegitimately install a totalitarian or non-democratic regime in the state, that they may become a threat to democracy. So with that in mind, it is not just a question of the strength of ‘bad’ civil society in a state acting as a factor behind its ‘authoritarianization’, but also whether the ‘bad’ civil society acts in a manner that breaches the rules of a democratic state, and whether or not it is strong enough for such actions to threaten the democratic rights of other members of the state.

Another problem with the idea of the ‘bad’ civil society and radical political groups causing a regression towards authoritarianism in a society, is that it ignores and obscures the role mainstream groups themselves play in the democratic deconsolidation of a state. In most cases, it is those groups which ostensibly support democracy in the state which are most likely to threaten its survival. Linz and Stepan argue that it is often the supporters and beneficiaries of democratic regimes that are most probable to bring about the breakdown of a democratic regime, as in times of crisis, they are more likely to vacillate and/or defect to the side of the regime’s opponents, thus bringing down the regime.²⁰⁵ Valenzuela, writing in the same volume, elaborates on this, stating that it is

²⁰⁴ Cas Mudde: (2003) “Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe: Lessons from the ‘Dark Side’”, in Petr Kopecky; Cas Mudde (eds.) *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe*, London: Routledge, p. 164

²⁰⁵ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan (eds.): (1978) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

usually not the actions of the extreme right or the extreme left that have brought down democratic regimes; instead, it is more likely to be the inability of centrist and pro-democratic forces to co-operate and work together in the face of a given political crisis, and to construct an agreement that can save the democratic system from an authoritarian threat, that will cause a transition from democracy.²⁰⁶ This, he argues, was the biggest contributor to the downfall of the Allende government in Chile and the installation of the military junta; political leaders sought to defend their own political power rather than the system as a whole, and as a result, did not seek adequate compromises amongst themselves to could have protected Chile from the anti-democratic forces.²⁰⁷

However, this is not the only way in which mainstream political groups or democratically elected elites can threaten the system which gave them their positions in the first place: Zakaria argues that there is oftentimes a tendency for a democratic government that has been given a strong majority by the electorate to believe that it has absolute power, and a mandate to enact wide-ranging changes as it sees fit; this tendency can often lead to the extra-constitutional centralization of authority in the state, with grim results for the consolidation and quality of democracy in the state.²⁰⁸ Zakaria argues that such governments, which are able to govern without much in the way of constitutional constraint, are not simply inadequate, but are actively dangerous and may erode liberties and abuse their powers.²⁰⁹ Schedler supports this, arguing that cases where officials in a democratic government that begin to ignore the legal

²⁰⁶ Arturo Valenzuela: (1978) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. xiii

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 107

²⁰⁸ Fareed Zakaria: (1997) "The Rise of Illiberal Democracies", *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), p. 30

²⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 42-43

boundaries of their office, when they impinge on the constitutional separation of powers, or even when they use the constitution and the strength of their electoral mandates to redraw the constitution to give themselves extra powers, are particularly worrying and can lead directly to the deconsolidation of democracy in the country and a reversion to some form of non-democratic governance.²¹⁰ Thus it is very important to take into account the performance of elites when trying to understand the reasons for why a democratic regime will breakdown or become deconsolidated. Political elites may abuse their mandate to grant themselves more power, thus leading to the emergence of some form of illiberal democracy, competitive authoritarianism, or outright authoritarian state; alternatively, they may be unable to build anti-authoritarian coalitions amongst themselves and so may fall to a particularly united and organized anti-democratic opposition. As a result, it is necessary to consider the performance of mainstream elites as a variable for democratic breakdown as well.

It is useful at this stage to take stock of the sundry variables that have been considered in this chapter as considering to democratic transitions, consolidations, and breakdowns, respectively. These are listed in table 2.4. As one can clearly see from this chart, there is a an overlap between many of these variables, as several phenomena that will lead to a country's democratic transition would also need to be nurtured and strengthened in order to ensure that the state continued on to become a fully consolidated democracy. In addition, several of these will also impact the quality of the democracy in a state. On the other hand, while the 'breakdown' variables are somewhat

²¹⁰ Andreas Schedler: (2001) "Measuring Democratic Consolidation", *Studies in Comparative and International Development*, 36(1), p. 72

different, in many ways several of them are mirror images of the corresponding variables in the other categories (e.g. level of development of extremist movements may be a mirror of the level of development of civil society). This gives us a comprehensive view of the various contributing factors behind democratization and 'authoritarianization' in a state.

Democratic transitions in Central Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s

Having established this, it is now incumbent to look at the process of democratic transition and consolidation in the post-Communist CEE countries. This section will describe the process of transition in the region, and will pay particular attention to Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is important to be clear on the fact that the democratic transitions of 1989 were a truly historic occasion, not just for the CEE countries that were directly involved in the events, but for the international political system as whole. The impact and meaning of the transitions were not uniform throughout these states: for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union meant that not only would these countries be experiencing a new democratic regime, but also that they would be reclaiming the independence they had lost during the 1940s. This was a somewhat similar situation to the countries formed out of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, such as Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the Višegrad states and Bulgaria, on the other hand, the transitions meant both democracy and the restoration of the effective state sovereignty that they had not been able to exercise during the Cold War. Romania, too, had been under the yoke of communism, and so the transition meant a similar chance to construct a democratic system of government. In contrast to the others, however, Romania had

Table 2.4: Variables contributing to democratic transition, consolidation, quality, and breakdown

Transition	Consolidation	Quality	Breakdown
GDP per capita	GDP per capita	GDP per capita	Presence of economic recession in the state
GDP growth per capita	GDP growth per capita	GDP growth per capita	Level of development of extremist movements
Size of the middle class	Extent of 'self-expression' values	Extent of 'self-expression' values	Extent to which extremists observe democratic rules
Presence of a dual transition	Religion and history	Independence of judiciary	Extent of acceptance of political leaders of constitutional limits
Religion and history	Level of civil society development	Strength of rule of law	Ability of political elites to co-operate in times of crisis
Level of education	Level of civil society pluralism		
Extent of 'self-expression' values in the state	Independence of judiciary		
Level of civil society development	Strength of rule of law		
Level of civil society pluralism	Membership of democratic international organizations		
Presence of similar regime transitions	Type of pre-transition authoritarian regime		
Activities of major international powers			
Type of pre-transition authoritarian regime			
Attainment of the new ruling elite of de jure and de facto sovereignty within the state			
Power balance in favor of democratic opposition movement			

exercised a greater degree of sovereignty during the Cold War. For other states, such as Belarus and (at least initially) Serbia, the end of communism did not see the birth of

democracy; instead, it merely set the scene for the emergence of different types of authoritarian regimes. For most of the states in this region, however, the end of communism and the restoration (or creation, as the case was in several countries which had no prior experience of democratic government) of democracy meant the chance to re-open friendly relations with the Western world, and to integrate themselves into the Euro-Atlantic political and economic structures.

Those states that did replace their former communist forms of government with some form of democratic political systems did not all follow the same path over the next few years. Indeed, according to Vachudova, there was quite a degree of divergence between them in terms of the initial policies that each of them took to build democracy and craft a market economy; this, she argues, is a function of the quality of political competition in each country immediately after the regime change.²¹¹ Vachudova says that where the collapse of communism was followed shortly after by the creation of a competitive democratic system, such countries made relatively quick progress in terms of introducing and implementing democratic and market-based economic reforms; however, in those countries where one dominant party emerged after communism (be they the major opposition party during the transition, as in the case of the HZDS in Slovakia, or the reformatted version of the communist party, as in the case of Bulgaria), there was somewhat of a regression, as liberal democratic institutions were suppressed.²¹² This also affected the pace and urgency with which the relevant country chased EU membership; those with more liberal polities pursued membership with

²¹¹ Milada Anna Vachudova: (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 2-3

²¹² Ibid., pp. 11-12

more vigor, while those with more illiberal polities, understandably, dragged their feet. The leading countries in terms of democratization and economic reform were Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and these would later go on to be the leading at this point, I will now focus on discussing the process of transition and reform in each country individually.

Hungary's transition and path to EU membership

When one considers the 1989 transitions, Hungary is arguably the most noteworthy country outside of the Soviet Union. Hungary's transition from communism actually began long before 1989; it introduced a certain level of liberal, market-based reforms in the early 1980s, relaxed some of the tight communist controls on civil and political liberties, and opened itself up to a limited amount of trade and currency exchange with the West. Ironically, while this relaxation of control did improve the living standard of ordinary civilians, the experiment with foreign trade and international borrowing led the country to become severely indebted by the late 1980s, and created significant social pressures for reform.²¹³ According to Linz and Stepan, by 1987 and 1988, reformist members of the Hungarian Communist party had begun to meet with members of the democratic opposition; meanwhile, a plethora of civil society groups began to emerge (albeit on a rather limited scale) and were able to put added pressure on the regime.²¹⁴ As the pace of reform in Hungary began to pick up, a decision was made by the regime

²¹³ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 295-296

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 300-301

to allow German citizens cross its borders and to travel to Austria; this decision itself was to "...put the first cracks in the Iron Curtain...", and had a major effect on political developments in the other CEE states.²¹⁵ Soon the transition process began to take on a life of its own as Hungary hurtled steadily towards democracy.

The mechanism through which Hungary carried out its transition was an elite bargain; following discussions amongst the Hungarian elites with their paymasters in the Soviet Union, it was agreed that free elections would be allowed to be held. Following this, consultations took place between members of the opposition and the communist elites in order to agree a shape for the future Hungary.²¹⁶ McFaul argues that at this stage, there was still no guarantee of a democratic outcome; it was not until the democratic side crushingly won the first set of free elections that were held in 1990 that the country was pushed decisively towards democracy (in these parliamentary elections, anti-regime political groups won close to 90% of the vote)²¹⁷. Elements of the communist regime no doubt remained; the new constitution was essentially an updated version of the communist constitution, albeit a substantially revised one.²¹⁸ Additionally, the communist party reformulated itself as the Hungarian Socialist party (MSZP), updated its platform and its policy outlook to reflect the new system in place

²¹⁵ Christian W. Haerpfer: (2006) "Hungary: Structure and Dynamics of Democratic Consolidation", in Hans-Dieter Klingemann; Dieter Fuchs; Jan Zielonka (eds.): *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge, p. 148

²¹⁶ Eszter Babarczy; Gábor Csordás; Jody Jensen; János Salamon; Gábor Schein: (2007) "Does a civil-war mentality exist in Hungary?", *Eurozine*, [online], available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-08-30-interview-en.html>. [Accessed on June 20, 2014].

²¹⁷ Michael McFaul: (2002) "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World", *World Politics*, 54(2), pp. 229-230

²¹⁸ Andras Bozoki: (1999) "Democracy in Hungary: 1990-1997", in Mary Kaldor; Ivan Vejvoda (eds.): *Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe*, London: Pinter Press, p. 106

in the country, but otherwise retained many of the same members it had possessed during the regime.

The new democratic structures functioned reasonably well in Hungary, in and of themselves; Bozoki argues, for instance, that there had been no appetite for large-scale nationalist or extremist political positions in Hungary during the 1990s, but instead there was a somewhat unimaginative and uninspiring procession of political leaders.²¹⁹ Bozoki also adds that the biggest problem in the country at the time was the deep penetration of both politics and the economy by noninstitutionalized and informal interests, a direct result of the problem of undergoing a simultaneous transition.²²⁰ Agh also notes that Hungary did not face problems with the functioning of its democracy, in terms of coming close to breakdown, but rather the main problems in the country resulted from an overly-optimistic assumption that the transition would directly result in major improvements in people's standard of living, an assumption that subsequently resulted in a dominant sense of pessimism in the country amongst the general population when the expected benefits from democracy did not immediately appear.²²¹ Lendvai supports this point, arguing that while the new government led by Jozsef Antall enjoyed a favorable international reputation, the extent to which they had hyped up Hungary's economic prospects came back to bite them as the reality of the economic distress, price increases and redundancies associated with undergoing major structural reforms of the economy damaged the popularity of the new government, and led to a

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 109; p. 119

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 120

²²¹ Attila Agh: (2010) "Democratic Consolidation or Backsliding in East-Central Europe: Rediscovery of the Past Twenty Years of the 'Lands in Between'", in Rafal Riedel (eds.): *Central Europe: Two Decades After*, Warsaw: University of Warsaw Press, p. 118

certain amount of dissatisfaction at the mass level with the performance of democracy in the state.²²²

Meanwhile, at this point, Hungary also began its integration into the Euro-Atlantic political institutions. As the country had already joined the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as part of its liberalization program in the 1980s, it set its priorities this time on achieving membership of the EU and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While NATO membership was a real goal for Hungarians (just as for many other post-Communist states) and played a clear role in Hungary's 'return to Europe', as it is somewhat beyond the scope of this dissertation I will focus purely on the process of Hungarian accession to the EU. Hungary first began to develop an active relationship with the EU in 1991 when it signed an association agreement which established a legal basis for relations between Hungary and the Union, and established several reciprocal trading advantages. Accession to the EU was sold as a means for Hungarians to successfully re-engage with their past; this is highlighted, for instance, in their application for membership which they submitted in 1994, where they made specific note of the centuries-old linkage between Hungary and the culture and values of Western Europe.²²³ Hungary's application for membership was accepted without any major problem at this time, with the country being hailed as having a stable democracy with strong rule of law, and was praised in particular for the 'smooth transition' it had made to being a parliamentary

²²² Paul Lendvai: (2012) *Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 39-40

²²³ European Commission: (1997) "Commission Opinion on Hungary's Application for Membership of the European Union", *European Commission*, p. 4, [online], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/hungary/hu-op_en.pdf (accessed on 12/23/2013)

democracy, its electoral and parliamentary procedures, and the independence of its judiciary.²²⁴ On the other hand, specific problems with the state of the bureaucracy, corruption and organized crime, and the plight of the Roma community were also highlighted.²²⁵

Hungary continued to make steady progress over the course of the next ten years. It was amongst the first group of CEE countries (alongside Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia) to begin negotiations for membership with the EU in 1998, and was able to continue making steady progress. By this stage, Hungary's goal for EU membership had changed somewhat; whereas originally, the symbolic meaning of the 'return to Europe' was played up, as the accession process wore on, this symbolic meaning faded away and was replaced with a more instrumental view of EU membership as of being a necessity for economic survival and growth.²²⁶ However, this did not alter the course of Hungary's accession bid in any way; it was continually acknowledged by the Commission that if Hungary was to maintain its pace of reforms, it would be able to successfully join the EU shortly. Particular problems which continued to crop up throughout the years included the quality of minority rights protection in the country, and the levels of societal corruption; also, at certain stages, concerns were noted at the state of Hungary's fiscal deficits and its level of economic stability (or instability as the case may be). However, Hungary was able to show sufficient commitment to reform throughout the process for these problems not to

²²⁴ Ibid., pp. 9-10, p. 12, p. 17

²²⁵ Ibid., pp. 11-12, p. 110

²²⁶ Milada Anna Vachudova: (2005) *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-4

amount to anything major. In truth, Hungary was probably the ‘best student’ of the 2004 enlargement class; it implemented reforms throughout the years without much fuss and continuously made relatively unhindered progress towards the goal of EU membership. Following a favorable report from the Commission in 2003, which noted Hungary’s achievements in meeting various targets and benchmarks, and while also pointing out that ongoing work needed to be done to effectively tackle corruption, Hungary was recommended for membership and joined the EU on January 1st 2004.

The Czech Republic’s transition and path to EU membership

Of the former communist CEE countries, only the Czech Republic and Slovakia together as part of Czechoslovakia had experienced a stable democratic political system prior to World War II. However, like Hungary and the rest of the countries in the region, shortly after the war Czechoslovakia succumbed to communist rule. In the mid- to late-1960s, Czechoslovakia had begun to make diplomatic and trade overtures to the West and introduced a number of democratic reforms; however, due to the unease this caused amongst other communist leaders of the time, and out of fear of the potential consequences of a wide-ranging liberalization in Czechoslovakia both for the integrity of the Warsaw Pact and for the levels of dissent among the citizenry in their own countries, Czechoslovakia’s allies invaded the country and crushed the ‘Prague Spring’ reforms.²²⁷ The leader of the party in the country, Alexander Dubcek, was replaced by a communist hardliner, Gustav Husak, who installed a neo-Stalinist regime which

²²⁷ David W. Paul: (1981) *Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist Republic at the Crossroads of Europe*, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 52-55

would become one of the strictest in the entire Communist world. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Czechoslovak communist regime eschewed reform and did not engage in any type of economic experimentation. This meant that the democratization process in the Czech Republic would be somewhat different to that in Hungary: these lack of reforms meant that the Czechoslovak regime did not build up large amounts of debt, as in the case of the Hungarians, and did not face any incremental pressures for reform that might have been brought about by adopting a small-scale liberalization earlier in the decade, but on the other hand it also meant that when the transition did come, that the Czechs had a significant advantage over the Hungarians in that the new democratic regime did not have to grapple with the economic problems that were bequeathed to them by the predecessor regime.²²⁸

Reform came swiftly and suddenly to Czechoslovakia. Husak's refusal to contemplate any softening of his regime's approach or to make any concessions on political and civil rights meant that the Czechoslovak communists were isolated (given the ongoing reforms in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union); and following the emergence in November 1989 of opposition movements such as the Civic Forum (in Bohemia and Moravia) and the Public Against Violence (in Slovakia), pressure on the regime spiked.²²⁹ Demands that had originally been quite moderate evolved into calls for an entirely new system of government following a successful general strike later that month, and within two months of the outbreak of protests, Czechoslovakia had

²²⁸ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 295-296

²²⁹ John K. Glenn: (1999) "Competing Challengers and Contested Outcomes to State Breakdown: The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia", *Social Forces*, 78(1), p. 192

appointed a non-communist government and had begun preparations to hold the first free democratic elections in the country since 1946. The mechanism for the transition was fundamentally different than that which had driven the Hungarian transition, as while the latter was a case of an elite pact leading to democracy, Czechoslovakia was very much a case of a socially-driven revolution, involving a challenge from a broad social movement which was well connected to the citizenry pushing the regime in the country to swiftly collapse and usher in a new political system in the country.²³⁰ According to McFaul, the swift and impressive display of power by the democratic challengers to the authoritarians in the country quickly forced them to surrender power, and guaranteed the emergence of a democratic system.²³¹ One of the primary leaders of the Charter 77 social movement and the Civic Forum, Vaclav Havel, had wanted the party to continue on and become the dominant party in the new state; however, given the vast differences over their political and economic outlooks of many members of the group (who had come together merely to challenge the communists in the most effective manner), it shortly split into a number of different parties, leading to the creation of a competitive liberal democratic political system. Shortly after the establishment of democracy in Czechoslovakia, the state itself split into two different entities as a disagreement between the major Slovak and Czech political parties over the correct way to divide power between the two regions in the new regime (the Czech leaders

²³⁰ Juan J. Linz; Alfred Stepan: (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 321-322; see also, Judy Batt: (1997) "The International Dimension of Democratisation in Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic", in Geoffrey Pridham; Eric Herring; George Sanford (eds.): *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, London: Leicester University Press, p. 157

²³¹ Michael McFaul: (2002) "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World", *World Politics*, 54(2), pp. 230-231

wanted a tighter federation, while the Slovaks favored a looser federation with more powers delegated to the regional parliaments) led to an agreement between Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, the respective Czech and Slovak leaders, to dissolve the state and to create two new countries, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

The process of reform and transition over the next few years also saw a number of differences from that which was experienced in Hungary. While Hungary maintained its prior reforms and continued to liberalize at a steady pace, the Czech Republic adopted a ‘shock therapy’ approach to economic reform, involving swift privatization of state-owned industries and a rapid transition to a market economy.²³² Although this approach was seen at the time as being significantly more successful than the gradual approach, Keynesian economists such as David Ellerman have argued that it brought with it severe long-term problems, and incentivized corruption and rent-seeking behavior among the new political and economic elites.²³³ This was also to have some impact on the political transition, as the enormous power of the banks in the state, combined with the issues of corruption and opaqueness amongst the elites created, a sense of popular disillusionment with the new system.²³⁴ However, with that said, the political reforms progressed quite well; by the time of application to the EU for membership, the Czech elites had created a system with broad freedoms, which only featured restrictions on very specific political activities, such as incitement to racial

²³² Oleh Havrylyshyn: (2007) “Fifteen Years of Transformation in the Post-Communist World: Rapid Reformers Outperformed Gradualists”, *CATO Institute Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity Development Policy Analysis*, No. 4, [online], available at: <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DPA4.pdf> p. 6

²³³ David Ellerman: (2001) “Lessons from Eastern Europe’s Voucher Privatization”, *Challenge*, 44(4)

²³⁴ Zdenek Kavan; Martin Palous: (1999) “Democracy in the Czech Republic”, in Mary Kaldor; Ivan Vejvoda (eds.) *Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe*, London: Pinter Press, pp. 83-84

hatred and other activities which could threaten the survival of democracy and pluralism in the new state. A competitive political system emerged very quickly after the transition thanks to the breakdown of the Civic Forum into its constituent groups, thus helping liberal democracy to survive and flourish.

As with Hungary, the Czech Republic began developing its relationship with the EU with the creation of an Association Agreement, although due to the ‘Velvet Divorce’ that split Czechoslovakia, the process was somewhat more complex for the latter: an agreement signed with the predecessor state in 1991 had to be re-signed with the two successor states. As for the other former communist states, membership of the EU did have some symbolic value, but it was very clear that for a significant proportion of the electorate and for the new Civic Democratic party (ODS) led by Vaclav Klaus, membership of the EU was first and foremost a tool for economic integration, a means of deepening economic co-operation and enlarging markets.²³⁵ This might explain the process of the Czech Republic’s membership bid; while it was always one of the leading candidates for membership, and it made constant steady progress towards membership, negotiations did not go as smoothly as with Hungary. While the Czech Republic was consistently appraised as having a stable democracy and an independent and neutral judiciary, it was seen as being somewhat aloof, difficult, and stubborn in its the EU: in its opinion of the Czech application for membership, the Commission directly stated that “...confident of its progress towards meeting the obligations of EU membership, the Czech Republic has at times shown signs of reluctance to acknowledge difficulties

²³⁵ Petr Kopecky: (2004) “An Awkward Newcomer?” in Robert Harmsen; Menno Spiering (eds.): *Euroscpticism: Party Politics, National Identity, and European Integration*, Rodopi press: New York, p. 239

and seek a collaborative approach to resolving them”.²³⁶ Corruption and the poor standard of policing in the country were regularly raised as issues, along with anti-Roma discrimination. Additionally, reforms aimed at improving the performance and capacity of the judiciary and the bureaucracy were quite slow in coming; as late as 2000, reforms to improve the backlog of cases in the Czech judicial system, improve work conditions and pay for public prosecutors and to shorten case lengths were deemed to be wholly insufficient²³⁷, while it was not until 2002 that a sufficient reform of the bureaucracy which could guarantee the fixity of appointment of civil servants, decent work conditions, and an acceptable wage.²³⁸ This did not majorly hinder the Czech Republic’s progress towards accession, but it does indicate that their relationship with the EU was a little rockier than that which was enjoyed by some other states. Like Hungary, the Czech Republic was recommended for membership in 2003, with exhortations to continue the struggle to improve the living standards of Roma minorities, to bring down corruption levels, and to complete the necessary reforms of the judiciary.

²³⁶ European Commission: (1997) “Commission Opinion on the Czech Republic’s Application for Membership of the European Union”, *European Commission*, [online], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/czech/cz-op_en.pdf (accessed on 12/23/2013), p. 8

²³⁷ European Commission: (2000) “2000 Regular Report from the European Commission on the Czech Republic’s Progress Towards Accession”, *European Commission*, [online], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/cz_en.pdf (accessed on 12/23/2013), p. 20

²³⁸ European Commission: (2002) “2002 Regular Report from the European Commission on the Czech Republic’s Progress Towards Accession”, *European Commission*, [online], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/cz_en.pdf (accessed on 12/23/2013)

Evaluation

Although there are a number of idiosyncrasies in the experiences of Hungary and the Czech Republic, including the process and type of economic transition in each state, the meaning of EU membership for each, and the type of democratic transition experienced in both countries, the story for each is broadly similar. Both underwent democratic transitions around the same time and quickly developed competitive political systems with liberal democratic structures, and both enjoyed swift and relatively smooth progress towards EU membership. At all times, both states were considered to be two of the ‘best students in the class’. The process of transition of these two countries clearly reflects many aspects of the literature on democracy and democratization. According to the ‘two turnover’ test and the opinions of the European Commission monitors and negotiators, by 2004 both Hungary and the Czech Republic could be considered consolidated liberal democracies. Economic development and the precedent of similar transitions had a very important effect on the introduction of democracy in both these countries, and they both used the process of accession to international organizations such as NATO and the EU as methods for stabilizing and consolidating these changes. Additionally, the strength of the rule of law in each country and the independence of the judiciary helped both countries to lock down these changes and to achieve accession to the EU. This is to be expected, of course, as much of the literature on democratic transitions and consolidation is heavily influenced by the post-communist CEE transitions, of which the Hungarian and Czech versions were some of the most high-profile and noteworthy ones.

What is vaguer is the literature on democratic breakdown and its relationship with the quality of democracy discussions. Much of the literature on this issue focuses

on regression to fully-fledged authoritarianism or to some sort of competitive authoritarianism. However, it is not totally clear how this relates to degenerations in the quality of democracy in a country. It is conceivable that disimprovements in the quality of democracy in a country may be a step on the road towards a country becoming authoritarian; alternatively, it may be that the quality of democracy in a country may be a catalyst towards, or away from, authoritarianism. However, it is possible that these two concepts might also be unrelated in a state, and that a country may experience a decline in the quality of its democratic system without the system itself coming under threat. Furthermore, much of the democratic breakdown literature focuses on fragile democracies, or on states that are in the process of consolidating democracy, and are relatively new democracies. While some of the literature, such as Linz and Stepan's *"The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes"* does look at the process of breakdown in consolidated states, this text focused mainly on Cold War- and interwar-period breakdowns. Such breakdowns occurred during fundamentally different time periods, and involved countries that became democracies in circumstances that were very different to the circumstances in which the post-communist CEE states achieved their democracy. Finally, the democratic breakdowns literature somewhat ignores the role of international actors in preventing or facilitating the 'authoritarianization' of a state. It is assumed (and has been demonstrated) that an international organization can assist in the consolidation of democracy in a state. However, it is not entirely clear what role such an organization can play when a consolidated democratic member state of the organization encounters difficulties, nor is it clear how membership of such an organization might influence the politics of a democratic breakdown in a previously consolidated state.

Chapter 3: Theorizing the Impact of EU Membership on the Liberal Democratic Consolidation of New Member States

The previous chapters have established the basic literature that attempts to offer some explanations for the differences in liberal democratic trajectories in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Following the transitions to democracy of the various former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, the EU offered the prospective of membership to these countries in return for a raft of legislative reforms, aimed at strengthening and reinforcing the necessary institutions required for a state to become a consolidated liberal democracy. This idea was introduced in chapter one, where it is shown that in the period between 1989 and 2004, the EU acted as both a passive and an active norm entrepreneur, using its reputation for improving the economies of member states and for guaranteeing peace and security on the European continent to encourage states throughout the world, but particularly in its immediate neighbourhood, to try to emulate its political and economic systems (passive norm entrepreneurship), and then building upon this by extracting reforms and concessions from these would-be partners and new members in return for preferential treatment, funding, and even membership (active norm entrepreneurship). The reform process went smoothly in both Hungary and the Czech Republic (albeit with some hiccups, particularly in the case of the latter), and legislation which was in line with the EU's expectations was introduced and accepted in both countries. Based on this, it was believed that the EU had been able to act as an effective normative power and norm entrepreneur. Additionally, given that many of the reforms introduced by these states were designed to create the institutional structures required to guarantee the survival and consolidation of democracy in a state,

it was also assumed that these normative efforts had been successful in consolidating democracy throughout the CEE countries. However, as has been described in the introduction, these expectations were not met following the accession of Hungary and the Czech Republic (along with the other post-Communist states) to the EU. Rather than consolidating the new liberal democratic structures in the country, Hungary has diverged quite substantially from this path and has become increasingly illiberal and authoritarian. This contrasts quite starkly with the Czech Republic, the country which bore the most similarities to it in the period up to 2004, which has broadly succeeded in meeting the expectations the EU had for it following its accession. Whilst it may not necessarily be the most robust and mature democracy in Europe, it has seemed to enjoy greater stability than Hungary, and has ostensibly continued upon a path of steady, if gradual and tenuous, consolidation of its democratic system.

The previous two chapters of this study focused on reviewing the various different approaches taken to explaining problems such as these. Chapter one presented the literature on the normative power of the EU, and enlargement policy as a tool of this normative power. It also presented the findings of various academics on the impact of the 2004 Eastern enlargement round. Following on from this, chapter two examined the research on various elements related to democracy and democratization. It listed the sundry variables which have been suggested as contributing to the consolidation of democracy in a state, and which may lead a country's democratic system to breakdown and regress to some form of illiberal or authoritarian government. Having established these points, this chapter sets out to identify which variables are most likely to account for the differing democratization trends observable in Hungary and the Czech Republic since 2004. It presents the major hypotheses of this study, and develops its theoretical

framework. The chapter begins by first examining several different explanations for why this divergence may have occurred, and will show how these explanations are insufficient to explain the contrasting trends between the two countries. Following this, it will suggest several possible explanations that have been presented in the literature, and which hold greater potential for explaining the divergence between the states. These explanations are split into ones related to the ‘breakdown’ variables, and ones related to the ‘consolidation’ variables. In presenting these different approaches, it will also generate several testable hypotheses. Finally, this chapter will describe the methodological approach taken to test these hypotheses, and will show how this study intends to answer its primary research questions.

Differentiating between ‘breakdown’ variables and ‘consolidation’ variables

If we return to the variables established in the previous chapter as contributing to the consolidation and/or breakdown of democracy in a country, there are a number of potential explanations for the variation in trajectories of democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic following their accession to the EU in 2004. As was shown in the previous chapter, it is important to distinguish between factors that might lead to the consolidation of the democracy in a state, and those that might lead to the breakdown of democracy. There might seem to be some degree of overlap between the two areas, as the absence of a variable contributing to the consolidation of democracy in a state could lead to that state regressing to a more authoritarian format. However, there is an important distinction to be made between the breakdown of a consolidated democracy on the one hand, and the failure of a democracy to consolidate on the other, as the process by which each phenomenon occurs is very different. In the case of the

breakdown of a consolidated democracy (as was defined in the introduction and again in chapter two), a series of events (as listed in chapter two) might occur which would serve to undermine the democratic nature of the state, and which would eventually result in the emergence of a new form of autocratic or authoritarian government in the state in question. In the case of a failed democratic consolidation process, the absence of some or all of the variables (which were listed in the previous chapter) in a state that are necessary for the consolidation of democracy might mean that a radical reversal of political structures (as in the breakdown case) would not occur. Instead, the lack of these prerequisites for consolidation would potentially mean that democracy does not become consolidated in the state, allowing authoritarian elements that are related to the preceding non-democratic regime to creep back into the country's government.

Explanations for the variance: factors related to the breakdown of democracy in states

It is crucial to note that when the CEE countries gained membership, much of the EU's leverage to ensure continued reforms was lost, as these states were no longer bound by the conditionality associated with the process of application. This is not to say that the EU had no tools in which to ensure the new member states continued their reform efforts: for instance, the EU is potentially able to influence countries to continue efforts aimed at tackling corruption by monitoring the usage of structural funds provided to these countries by the European Commission, and by suspending these funds in cases where safeguards in the countries in question were insufficient to guarantee that the

money would not be siphoned off illegally, as happened to Bulgaria in 2008²³⁹, and again in the Czech Republic in 2012.²⁴⁰ Additionally, the EU possesses the ability to initiate an ‘Article Seven’ procedure against member states in the case of a severe violation of the EU’s core values, which would see a country’s membership of the Union suspended (such a measure has never actually been used). However, it is fair to say that these coercive mechanisms are either blunt, reactive, or can only apply in very specific cases. As such, they do not possess anything near the sensitivity and effectiveness of the pre-accession conditionality, and could not coercively ensure continued commitment to the norms of the EU. At the same time, this lack of EU leverage, whilst surely a facilitating factor in any instances of backsliding, cannot account for variance between the new member states, as they were all subject to the same regime. No pieces of legislation existed which could ensure compliance in the Czech Republic with the EU’s standards regarding democracy without also ensuring similar compliance in Hungary, for example. With this in mind, alternative explanations must be looked for.

The influence of radical anti-democratic political groups

A useful place to start would be to consider the contrasting strength of radical and/or extremist movements in either country, and the tendency of these movements to observe (or not) the ‘democratic rules of the game’, that is, to accept the results of elections, to

²³⁹ Jim Brundsen: (2008) “Fear of fraud costs Bulgaria EU funding”, *European Voice*, [online], available at: <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/11/fear-of-fraud-costs-bulgaria-eu-funding/63174.aspx> (accessed on 1/21/2014)

²⁴⁰ Tomáš Sacher; Kateřina Šafaříková: (2012) “Czechs jittery about frozen EU funds”, *VOX Europ*, [online], available at: <http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/2168661-czechs-jittery-about-frozen-eu-funds> (accessed on 12/12/2014)

not use violence in order to achieve political power, and to participate in elections in a free, fair, and non-violent manner. This phenomenon, as established in the previous chapter, has previously contributed to the decline of democratic political systems in other countries, such as in interwar Germany and Italy. In this sense, it is conceivable that differences in the presence of extremist groups²⁴¹ in each country and their determination to interfere with and upset the democratic balance in a country could have an impact on the level of democracy in either country. However, it is unlikely that such groups have had a causal impact on the decline of democracy levels in Hungary following its accession to the EU. It can be shown that radical nationalist groups have enjoyed significant support in Hungary since 2004, with the Jobbik Party achieving 14.8% of the vote in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, and 16.7% of the vote in the 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary elections. Additionally, radical nationalist movements or ‘uncivil’ society groups proliferated and became active in the country in the years after 2004, and particularly in coincidence with the electoral rise of the Jobbik Party.²⁴² However, while these movements are often violent and have committed numerous attacks against minority communities in Hungary, at no stage have they attempted to seize power in the state and overthrow the democratic order in the state. Jobbik’s success may not necessarily be considered as weakening democracy in the Hungarian political system, as they have not sought to undermine elections in the country or to use violence to achieve their electoral or political goals. This should not

²⁴¹ Such groups may include skinhead movements, terrorist organizations, and radical or extremist political parties that advocate the violent overthrow of the existent democratic political order in the country and/or the persecution of a particular demographic group within the state.

²⁴² Paul Iganski: (2011) *Racist Violence in Europe*, Brussels: European Network Against Racism/Open Society Foundation, p. 29

be taken to mean that their success strengthens Hungarian democracy, however; according to Mudde, populist radical-right parties such as Jobbik are not necessarily anti-democratic, but nor are they necessarily pro-democratic, and that they have a very tense relationship with Western understandings of 'liberal democracy', with its emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities; for the populist radical-right, an acceptable form of a democratic state would be an 'ethnocracy', which places the needs of 'the nation' at the top of society, and in which minority rights can only exist when and where they are supported by the will of the majority.²⁴³ It is thus unlikely that the presence of extremist nationalist movements in Hungary is driving the country's decline in levels of democracy, but rather may be a symptom of this decline.

The likelihood of the strength of radical movements leading to the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of their standards of democracy is further undermined when one looks at the strength of such organizations or groups in the Czech Republic. While the success of radical right parties here has been far lower in the years since 2004 than in Hungary, with only the Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit) party achieving any parliamentary representation during this time (6.9% and fourteen seats in the 2013 Parliamentary elections), the radical left-wing Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) has enjoyed substantial support in the country, winning over 10% of the vote in every election that has been held in the country since 1990. The KSCM is considered to be an unreformed, old-school communist party, as it still subscribes to traditional Marxist theories and has not disavowed its lineage with

²⁴³ Cas Mudde: (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155-157

the Czechoslovak Communist Party (although they do condemn the excesses of that regime).²⁴⁴ Just as Jobbik's ideology leaves it ill at ease with liberal democratic political structures, so too does this revolutionary Marxist outlook mean that the KSCM is inherently inimical to these same structures. In this sense, then, it is even more unlikely that the divergence in democratic standards between the two countries can simply be related to the support for groups that are hostile to the core concepts of liberal democracy.

The influence of economic factors


Another potential driver for the discrepancies in democratic standards between the two states may be found by looking at economic factors. As was established in the previous chapter, one of the strongest variables behind the breakdown of democracy in a country is the presence of economic recession in a state. Given the presence of the global economic crisis from 2008 onwards, both states have experienced sluggish economic growth during this time period, and have dipped into out-and-out recessions at several points. If Hungary had been particularly hurt by this, and had suffered a more severe economic crisis than the Czech Republic, then this could possibly account for the divergence between the two countries. This would also tie in with the data provided in figure 3.2 on the level of democracy in the two states, as Hungary only began to seriously diverge from the Czech Republic in 2008.

²⁴⁴ Matthew Day: (2013) "Czech Elections: Communists could end up back in power", *The Telegraph*, [online], available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/czechrepublic/10404238/Czech-elections-Communists-could-end-up-back-in-power.html> (accessed on 1/25/2014)

However, if we look at figure 3.1, it is clear that there has been no serious deviation between the two countries in terms of their economic performance during the period in question. While growth did not reach quite as steep heights in Hungary as in the Czech Republic from 2004 until 2008, the overall trends in both countries are very similar (figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b)). Additionally, the sharp drop in growth rates that occurred in both countries between 2006 and 2009 were actually greater in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, although the depths to which growth in Hungary plunged were lower than those reached by the Czech Republic. There is some difference noticeable in the comparative levels of inflation in each country, with Hungary's inflation rate consistently above that of the Czech Republic (figure 3.1(c)). However, this is an unlikely explanation for the variation between the two countries in terms of post-accession democratic standards. As one can see from the chart, the gap between the two was much higher before the two states entered the EU, at a time when the democratic standards of the two countries were much closer together, and since then the discrepancy between the states in terms of inflation has actually narrowed. In addition, as was established in the previous chapter, monetary problems on their own generally do not seem to have a major impact on the breakdown of democracy in states, and only had an effect in specific cases and circumstances.²⁴⁵ Instead, according to the literature on democratic breakdowns, what is usually problematic is the presence of economic crises, such as economic recessions, which can enervate a person's ability to achieve their personal objectives. In this case, the divergence in the employment rates

²⁴⁵ Mark J. Gasiorowski: (1995) "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis", *The American Political Science Review*, 89(4), p. 892

Figure 3.1: Economic performance in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 2000-2012.²⁴⁶



a) GDP per capita in Hungary and the Czech Republic between 2004 and 2012

b) GDP growth percentage in Hungary and the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2012

c) Inflation rate in Hungary and the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2012; figures are based on percentage inflation year-on-year in consumer goods

d) Unemployment rate in Hungary and the Czech Republic between 2000 and 2012; figures are based on the percentage of the total labor force unemployed

²⁴⁶ Figures in all diagrams are taken from the World Bank's online database, covering the years from 2004 to 2012; figures are provided in current US dollar prices

between the two countries may offer some more potential for explaining the democratic variance between them, especially when combined with growing inflation; according to this line of thinking, the loss of incomes would compound the impact of the higher prices for consumer goods, and could cause people to lose faith in the ability of the democratic political elites in their country to help them achieve their personal goals. According to Kornberg and Clarke, who analyzed the impact of inflationary crises and unemployment on societal satisfaction with democracy, increases in levels of joblessness and inflation could lead to comparable increases in the level of societal dissatisfaction with democracy.²⁴⁷ As unemployment and growing prices entrench themselves in an economy, people may prioritize economic issues over all others, and thus may become tempted to support even radical and authoritarian solutions, which would promise easy ways out of the crisis. With this in mind, while differences in economic performance cannot fully account for the contrasting levels of democracy in each country on their own, it is possible that they may lead to a strengthening of authoritarian attitudes amongst the population, and/or a growth in support for extremist parties and movements (from both sides of the political spectrum) which could itself could cause a breakdown in democracy. As such, this leads us to our first hypothesis:

H1: the divergence in terms of democratic standards between Hungary and the Czech Republic is a result of the presence of significantly greater problems with inflation and unemployment combined in Hungary than in the Czech Republic,

²⁴⁷ Allan Kornberg; Harold D. Clarke: (1992) *Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 224-225

which subsequently leads to an increase in support for radical and authoritarian approaches to resolving the problems.

The role of mainstream political elites

Another variable associated with the breakdown of democracy in a country which could explain the divergence in the level of democracy in Hungary and the Czech Republic is the performance of mainstream political elites in terms of their observance of the constitutional limits on their power, and their propensity to use their parliamentary power to change the democratic rules of the system²⁴⁸, so as to entrench themselves in power in an undemocratic manner. This is distinct from their performance in terms of attempting to retain power and achieve re-election through the alleviation of social problems and the implementation of their electorally-approved mandate. It is clear from the actions of Viktor Orban and the Fidesz-led government that this is an issue in Hungary. While the activities of the government in the country have not breached the constitution, it cannot be said either that they have observed the limitations on their power that were laid down in the constitution. Instead, they have used the rules that were previously laid down in the constitution to legally do away with many of the constraints on them. These new laws effectively restrict the opportunities of their

²⁴⁸ This refers to the previously listed democratic ‘rules of the game’, but also includes the understood norms in constitutional democracies about accepting the results of elections regardless of the outcome for one’s own party, respecting the constraints placed on one’s power by the constitution of the state, and attempting to seek some form of mandate before changing these rules, whether it be through broad-based Parliamentary support, explicit mandate provided by an electoral victory based on campaign pledges to make such changes, or (most commonly) referendum. These norms regarding the alteration of the constitutional rules are clearly shared by the European Union, as they were referred to in the Tavares Report on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (25th June, 2013) as being abused by the Hungarian government.

opposition to challenge them effectively, either through the courts or through referenda. Additionally, these changes were pushed through the Parliament and received no support from any members of the Parliament outside of the governing coalition, and were not subjected to a public referendum at any point.

However, on its own, the propensity for Fidesz to rewrite the constitution in a way that would allow them to accumulate greater power and control over the state may not necessarily be sufficient to fully explain the divergence in democratic standards between the Czech Republic and Hungary. Political elites have also shown a willingness to test and stretch the limits of their constitutional power in the Czech Republic, as witnessed by President Zeman's attempts to force through the creation of a replacement government (in place of the collapsed Nečas government) which did not achieve sufficient parliamentary support when presented to this House for ratification on August 7th, 2013. Additionally, as noted earlier, other officials in the state, such as the former President Vaclav Klaus, have sought to exert influence on policy areas which are outside of their jurisdiction. It should be noted that while they have displayed some ambitions towards increasing their power, Czech elites have not shown the same desire to fundamentally re-structure the political order in the country; additionally, these ambitions should not necessarily be considered a sign of undemocratic tendencies towards creating a more authoritarian version of the Czech state, although the actions of President Zeman during the 2013 Constitutional crisis, as noted above, could potentially have led to an undermining of the parliamentary nature of the Czech political system. No elected Prime Minister in the country has sought to limit constraints on his power to the same extent as was shown in Hungary. The tendencies (and success) of Fidesz in making radical alterations to the fundamental principles of the state thus

stands in marked contrast to the comparative failure (or unwillingness) of the officials in the Czech Republic to do likewise.

As well as this, in many ways, the Fidesz's disrespect for the constitutional restraints on their power is partially the method through which Hungary's illiberal turn has taken place, rather than being the driving force. If we are to assume that they act in a rational, utility-maximizing manner, then we can say Fidesz have pursued this approach because they perceive that any negative costs they suffer (such as electoral defeats, or declines in popularity) will be less than the benefits that they gain. However, in fully consolidated liberal democracies where liberal norms are deeply internalized, activities which might threaten these norms would be considered particularly distasteful, and would likely be severely punished by actors within both the political elite and the general population. This would thus tend to suggest that when Hungary and the Czech Republic both joined the EU in 2004 and the conditionality on each state was relaxed, that democracy as a norm was more deeply internalized and consolidated in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. This leads me to suggest the following hypothesis:

H2: the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic trajectories is primarily a result of an elite-driven process, and a comparative lack of commitment amongst elites in Hungary, as opposed to elites in the Czech Republic, to the normative values they signed up to as part of the accession of their country to the EU.

Explanations for the variance: factors related to the consolidation of democracy in states

In order to be able to develop upon and test these hypotheses, and thus to understand why there is a divergence between the two countries in question since their accession to the EU, it is further necessary to consider the extent to which these democratic norms are internalized at the societal level, and the extent to which the liberal democratic transition was consolidated in either country. This leads us to consider the variables that contribute to democratic consolidation in a country, and the extent to which these can help explain the differential levels of norm internalization in each country. Some of these variables can be discarded fairly easily; for instance, membership of democratic international organizations in and of itself cannot account for the difference between the two countries, as they are both members of major democratic international organizations such as the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The levels of GDP per capita in each state may offer some explanation for the variance between them. As was shown earlier, the Czech Republic's GDP has been noticeably higher than in Hungary ever since accession to the EU in 2004. On its own, however, this is unlikely to be sufficient to account for the differences between the countries, as we can see when we look at figure 3.1, the discrepancies between the two states in terms of democratic levels did not noticeably emerge until after their economic digressions had stabilized. As well as this, this does not account for the years between 1989 and 2004, when Hungary and the Czech Republic had undergone intensive reform procedures aimed at consolidating the new democratic systems.

Indeed, as we can see in figure 3.4 on the following page, the levels of GDP per capita in each state were very similar in the years prior to accession to the EU, when it was considered that both states had become stable democracies.

Finally, it is necessary to briefly consider the role of the type of political regimes and structures that were present in each state prior to their democratic transitions in 1989. It is tempting to dismiss this as a factor out of hand; both countries were Communist dictatorships for the majority of the 20th Century, and while there were certain differences between the nature of the Communist regime in either country, it is true that both of them remained more or less totalitarian Communist societies with very low levels of civil or political liberties up until 1989. However, it is important to consider the influence these differences had in determining the future outcomes of each state, as the differences in the regimes were quite significant. The ‘ghoulash’ form of liberal Communism which emerged in Hungary in the aftermath of the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 allowed a degree of intellectual and artistic freedom in the country, and also permitted some limited capitalistic economic elements.²⁴⁹ However, its exposure to global financial markets and the ructions of the 1980s meant that the Hungarian economy fared particularly poorly during this time, and became significantly indebted.²⁵⁰ The legacy of this indebtedness was to haunt the new democratic regime in Hungary, which struggled throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to deal with this legacy. By contrast, under the leadership of Gustáv Husák after 1968, Czechoslovakia was one of the most autocratic and totalitarian states in the Communist


²⁴⁹ Archie Brown: (2009) *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, New York: Harper Collins, pp. 528-529

²⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 529-530

world, with very little democratic participation, and a governing class that was almost entirely alienated from the society it ruled over.²⁵¹ By the same token, however, the lack of participation in the global economy by Czechoslovakia shielded it somewhat from the global economic downturn that Hungary was particularly affected by, and meant that the successor states and regimes (the democratic Czech Republic and Slovak Republic) did not have to deal with these economic problems to the same extent that the Hungarians had to.

On the balance of this, it is unlikely that the nature of the Communist regime that preceded the democratic systems in these countries has had a major effect on the democratic trends in these countries. While the damage wrought on the Hungarian economy by its experiment with free-market capitalism before 1989 might have left the

*Figure 3.2: GDP per capita in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 1991-2004*²⁵²



Source: World Bank online database

²⁵¹ David W. Paul: (1981) *Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist Republic at the Crossroads of Europe*, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 89

²⁵² Figures taken from the World Bank's online database, covering the years from 1991 to 2004; figures are provided in current US dollar prices

new elites in the state with greater challenges than those faced by the Czech authorities, it can also be expected that this would have been balanced by the greater exposure to political participation and civil rights enjoyed by the Hungarian people under the regime. Nor is it likely that there is a greater level of nostalgia for the Communist past in Hungary which is driving its illiberal turn: while János Kádár, the leader of the Hungarian Communist party for much of the Cold War and the creator of ‘ghoulash’ Communism, was voted the ‘greatest Hungarian of the twentieth century’ in 1999²⁵³, this should not be interpreted as a longing on the part of a significant section of the Hungarian population for the previous regime, as the Hungarian Workers Party which succeeded the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party in 1989 has never managed to win a single seat in the Hungarian parliament. If anything, this may be evidence of some retrospective nationalism on the part of Hungarians. On the contrary, there seems to be fonder memories of the Communist regime in the Czech Republic, where (as was noted earlier) the KSCM has consistently attained over 10% of the vote in national elections. As such, it is possible to discard the type of Communist regime which predominated in each country as a causal factor for the differing trends in democratization of each state.

Although we might discard the influence of the form of Communism on display in each country, the impact of previous regimes on the present political systems in each country should be considered more broadly to include those that preceded Communism. In this sense, there is a more clear difference between the two states. From the point of its independence in 1918 until it was invaded by Nazi Germany in 1939, Czechoslovakia had one of the strongest democracies in Europe at the time. It had a

²⁵³ Archie Brown: (2009) *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, New York: Harper Collins, p. 529

developed, market-based economy, which was one of the best performing economies on the continent throughout the 1920s and in the late 1930s.²⁵⁴ This is in marked contrast to Hungary, which experienced a significant amount of tumult following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It initially became a communist republic under Bèla Kun, who led the country into war and defeat against its neighbors, and was shortly replaced by an authoritarian government led by Miklós Horthy in 1920.²⁵⁵ Hungary did not enjoy a liberal democratic form of government (as was defined on page 53) during the interwar years, and its only experience with parliamentary forms of government prior to 1989, the diet of Hungary during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had a heavily nationalistic outlook and was not built based on the concept of popular sovereignty, although it remained a comparatively liberal system (compared to what succeeded it).²⁵⁶

It is clear from this that a greater legacy of democratic government exists in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. However, given the length of time that transpired between the fall of the interwar Czechoslovak Republic and the creation of the new democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1989 and the Czech Republic in 1993, it is very unlikely that a direct causal relationship exists between this historical heritage and the differing democratic trends in the two states. Additionally, as history is a constant variable, it cannot account for variation within the respective states across time. While

²⁵⁴ Zora P. Pryor; Frederic L. Pryor: (1975) "Foreign Trade and Interwar Czechoslovak Economic Development, 1918-1938", *VSWG: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 62(4), pp. 501-502

²⁵⁵ Carlile Aylmer Macartney: (1968) *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-1937*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 198-199

²⁵⁶ András Körösi: (1999) *Government and Politics in Hungary*, Budapest: Central European University Press, p. 146

it is possible, and indeed likely, that the different democratic traditions of these two countries are supporting factors in the respective paths of democratization of each state, arguments based on the pre-1939 regimes in the country can be dismissed as causal factors. While it is possible that as a result of the different historical paths taken by each country, that one might have to clear a higher threshold in order to achieve a democratic society than the other, the importance of these paths surely recedes over time. Historical constants also cannot explain why, upon both states becoming democracies in 1989 and subsequently stabilizing and strengthening their new regimes, Hungary went on to reject this path, whilst Czech Republic continued to take steps towards consolidating its democracy.

The impact of the rule of law

As such, we must look to the other societal factors for our explanation. Two related factors which might offer more explanatory power would be the independence of the judiciary and the strength of the rule of law in the two countries. In both cases, factors related to the judiciary were specifically highlighted throughout the accession process by the EU as being problematic, and as requiring ongoing commitment in order to bring them in line with European standards. As was described in the previous chapter, the rule of law and the independence of courts is particularly important in new and consolidating democracies, as it can prevent individual leaders from accumulating power and abusing his mandate to alter the functioning of state institutions. Given that the decline in democratic standards in Hungary heavily involved attempts to undermine the strength and impartiality of the justice system in the country, it is possible to suggest

that this might provide an answer to the questions posed by this series of events. As such, I propose the following hypothesis:

H3: the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic standards is the result of a greater normative commitment to enacting reforms aimed at strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law in the Czech Republic as opposed to Hungary both before and after their accession to the EU in 2004.

The impact of societal, mass-level attitudes

Having established these hypotheses which focus more on the elite levels of society in each country, it is important to consider the attitudes of the general public in each country towards democracy and the relevant cultural and social values associated with democracy. As was described in chapter 2, societal attitudes and opinions which value ‘self-expression’ ideas like gender equality, minority rights, and interpersonal trust, and ‘emancipative’ outlooks, such as the priority people place on being able to influence government, or their level of tolerance for non-traditional lifestyles, are very important factors that contribute to the democratization of a state.²⁵⁷ They do this by motivating the population to actively participate in the governing of their country, and thus hold their elected leaders responsible for their activities. According to Welzel and Inglehart, these attitudes are fostered during times of economic growth and modernization. As has been shown previously in this chapter, while GDP growth levels in Hungary and the

²⁵⁷ Christian Welzel: (2007) “Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy”, *International Political Science Review*, 28(4), pp. 401-402

Czech Republic have usually been quite similar between 1991 and the present day, growth in the Czech Republic did accelerate more rapidly between 2004 and 2008 than in Hungary, before returning to a more similar growth rate. If, then, the reasons for the divergence between the two states in terms of levels of democracy are a result of mass-level attitudinal factors, we would then expect to see a significant growth in terms of the level of these attitudes in the Czech Republic in the period between 2004 and 2008, a growth which was not matched in Hungary. I propose the following hypothesis, based on this:

H4: the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic standards is the result of significant increase in the holding of 'self-expression' and 'emancipative' values amongst the general population in the latter during the period between 2004 and 2008, an increase which was not matched in scale in Hungary during the same period, thus leading to a greater consolidation of the democratic systems in the Czech Republic than in Hungary.

A corollary to this cultural, mass-based argument is the issue of religion. It may be somewhat tempting to discard religious identity as an explanation for the differences between the two countries. In both countries, there is a significant proportion of the population who are explicitly atheistic (26% in the Czech Republic, 19% in Hungary),²⁵⁸ and the most dominant religion amongst those that are left is Catholicism. In and of itself, then, it is unlikely that religious identity can account for the varying successes of the democratic consolidation in the two countries. As was also explained

²⁵⁸ European Commission: (2005) "Special Eurobarometer: Social Values, Science, and Technology", *Special Eurobarometer 225*, [online], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf (accessed on 1/26/2014)

in the chapter two, the impact of totalitarian communism on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (when religion was significantly repressed) was so great that it would be difficult to expect there to necessarily be a causal relationship between the religious history of Hungary and the Czech Republic and their adherence to liberal democratic standards. However, religion could possibly have a lingering influence on the cultural attitudes of people in both states, not in terms of their direct support for democracy as a concept, but in terms of shaping the mindsets of people in a direction that might be susceptible to authoritarian or liberal democratic influences.

It is true that the extent of atheism and irreligiosity, and religious beliefs in general in the Czech Republic are heavily affected by the emergence in the fifteenth century of Hussitism, a brand of Christianity based on the teachings of Jan Hus, which was deemed to be heretical by the Catholic Church. Hus was a predecessor of Martin Luther and John Calvin, although he never officially broke ranks with the Catholic Church, and his burning at the stake in 1415 had a major influence on anti-Catholicism and Czech nationalism over the course of the following centuries, even up to the point of Czechoslovak independence in 1918.²⁵⁹ This antipathy towards the Vatican was heightened by the experience of the Second World War, when the Catholic clergy in Slovakia were effectively used as pawns by Hitler to undermine and control the country.²⁶⁰ Froese states that these sentiments, and the reformation of Hussite beliefs into the Protestant Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren, led to the emergence of

²⁵⁹ Paul Froese: (2005) "Secular Czechs and Devout Slovaks: Explaining Religious Differences", *Review of Religious Research*, 46(3), p. 276

²⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 277-278

a distrust and rejection of Catholic values, which lasts to this day.²⁶¹ Hungary, on the other hand, has not experienced such a rejection of Catholic values, even though participation in the Church remains not particularly high. As the Catholic Church is an inherently authoritarian organization which preaches subordination to the teachings and decisions of hierarchical authorities, the absence of an outright societal rejection of this in Hungary could conceivably have a path-dependency effect whereby the general population in Hungary becomes more receptive to ideas such as a strong, centralized leadership, and the subjugation of personal beliefs and values to the broader nation.

However, with that said, it is somewhat of a stretch to expect that religion is having any significant causal effect on the standard of democracy in Hungary and the Czech Republic in the 21st Century. While there are certainly differences in terms of the history of religion in each country, and there are some subtle differences in the levels and nature of religion in the two states in the modern era, it is unlikely that these contrasts are enough to be having an effect on the mindsets of the majority of the population at anything other than the subconscious level. Thus, any effect of religion on the quality of democracy in Hungary and the Czech Republic that exists is likely to be very indirect. While this issue might have helped ‘prepare the ground’ for any authoritarian or critical/democratic attitudes in the respective countries, its effect is likely to be diluted and augmented by a variety of other issues such as nationalism, communism, and so on. As such, this project will not specifically test for the importance of religion on the divergent democratic trends in each country.

²⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 276-277, p. 281

The impact of civil society

Finally, it is also necessary to examine the potential of variables related to civil society to explain the difference between the two states. As was established in chapter 1, norm diffusion and norm internalization depends on a complex interplay between a variety of actors at the national and sub-national levels, and amongst political elites and civil society actors. As such, civil society plays an important role in the internalization of a new norm in a state. However, it is not necessarily the case that any civil society actor would be relevant to the transfer of a norm: for instance, it makes very little sense that a sporting organization, or one which is predominantly focused on immigrants' rights, would be an important driving force for the internalization of norms related to sustainable development and the environment. Alternatively, some elements within the civil society might actually oppose the internalization of a given norm, as can be seen in the contestation by churches and religious organizations of norms relating to LGBTQ rights. As a result, what is important is that a norm has support from organizations which are specifically committed to the internalization of the norm in question. Within the context of the process of transferring EU norms regarding democracy to target states, it can then be suggested that non-governmental organizations that have a particular ideological support for European integration, or that are focused primarily on democracy and democratization, civil liberties, and/or human rights would be the most relevant civil society actors who might support the internalization of these norms in the state in question, and that they might be challenged by groups with a eurosceptic outlook, or who might be ideologically opposed to some or all aspects of a liberal democratic system of government. It has been previously noted the accession process was almost entirely focused on legislative reforms at the elite level, with little attention

paid to developing civil society and to encouraging mass-level internalization of the norms. However, this does not discard the civil society in each country as a factor in the internalization of these norms. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:

H5: the divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of democratic standards is the result of a greater level of civil society support for, and a lower level of civil society opposition to, these norms in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, thus leading to a more successful internalization process in the former than in the latter.

Methodology

In order to examine and test these hypotheses, I use a mixed-methodological approach, with an emphasis on qualitative data. My research is predominantly based on a series of interviews I conducted with over thirty experts; my respondents have included politicians and policymakers, journalists, civil society activists, political consultants and political experts, and high-level bureaucrats. These interviews took place in Brussels, where I spoke to several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), fonctionnaires from the Directorates-General for Enlargement, Legal Service, and Employment, and also members of the Cabinet of several different European Commissioners; Budapest, where I spoke to a number of civil society activists, journalists, lawyers, and political commentators; and Prague, where I also spoke to civil society activists and journalists, as well as a number of politicians that were directly involved in the democratic transition and in the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. Questions were asked about a broad range of topics, including the respondent's own personal experiences regarding the democratic transition in their country, the

process of their country's accession to the EU, and/or the political developments in their state following their achievement of membership of the EU. Other questions were asked about the state of the civil society in their country, the attitudes of politicians and ordinary civilians towards national and European political developments, the state of the judiciary and the rule of law in their country, and about the relationship of the country to the EU. A list of questions that was asked of the respondents, and which was approved by the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board, is contained in the annexes of this dissertation. Given that the interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis, there was some differentiation in each interview in terms of follow-up questions that were asked. Additionally, the list of questions is a comprehensive list of approved questions: as such, no respondent was asked every question, but rather, interviews were tailored to suit each respondent's experience and knowledge. A comprehensive list of respondents is contained in table 3.1 on the following page, although, as the interviews were conducted on an anonymous basis, only job titles and types of employers are listed.

Discourse analysis

In order to analyze the data drawn from these interviews, respondents are separated into one of three separate categories (Brussels, Hungary, Czech Republic), depending on their area of expertise. So for example, a former Director-General of Enlargement would be assigned to the 'Brussels' category, while a dissident involved with the Charter 77 movement would be assigned to the 'Czech Republic' category. In the case of MEPs, they are assigned to the group of their country of origin, unless they came from a third country, in which case they would be assigned to the 'Brussels' category.

Table 3.1: list of respondents that were interview for this study between 2013 and 2014

Brussels	Budapest	Prague
Respondent 2: Team Leader, European Parliament	Respondent 1: Deputy Ambassador, Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Respondent 12: Deputy Ambassador, Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Respondent 3: Retired fonctionnaire, Directorate-General for Enlargement (European Commission)	Respondent 4: Political Adviser, European Parliament	Respondent 15: Member of the European Parliament, PES Party
Respondent 5: Head of Unit, Directorate-General for Enlargement (European Commission)	Respondent 7: Political Consultant, Hungarian Political Consultancy	Respondent 22: Journalist, Czech business newspaper
Respondent 6: Director, Directorate-General for Enlargement (European Commission)	Respondent 9: Former Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs	Respondent 23: Academic/Formal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Respondent 8: Fonctionnaire, Legal Service, European Commission	Respondent 11: Member of Commissioner's Cabinet, European Commission	Respondent 24: Former Dissident/Formal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Respondent 10: Member of the European Parliament, ALDE Party	Respondent 13: Political Director, Hungarian Civil Society Organization	Respondent 25: Velvet Revolution organizer /Ambassador-at-large, Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Respondent 16: Former Director-General for Enlargement (European Commission)	Respondent 14: Campaign Director, Hungarian political party	Respondent 26: Executive Director, International Civil Society Organization
	Respondent 17: Community Developer/Activist, International Civil Society Organization	Respondent 27: Political Consultant/Activist
	Respondent 18: Director of Research, Hungarian Political Foundation	Respondent 28: President, Czech Civil Society Organization
	Respondent 19: Editor in Chief, Hungarian business newspaper	Respondent 29: Deputy Director, Czech Political Think-Tank
	Respondent 20: Freelance Journalist	Respondent 30: Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, former Deputy Prime Minister
	Respondent 21: Intellectual/Political Analyst, Hungarian Civil Society Organization	

Respondents in the ‘Hungary’ and ‘Czech Republic’ categories were only asked questions that directly related to their own state, and were not asked to speculate on issues related to any other country. This is not the case with respondents in the ‘Brussels’ category, as given that their portfolios often covered an overview of the countries involved, this means that they may have direct personal knowledge of horizontal issues involving both states.

Following on from this, so as to use these interviews to test the various hypotheses, I the impact of EU membership in the countries in general, and to explain why there has been such a divergence between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of adherence to EU norms regarding democracy in the wake of accession to the EU in 2004. Differences between the responses from members of the ‘Hungary’ and ‘Czech Republic’ category are then scrutinized, with responses from the ‘EU’ category shedding light on why these differences exist. In addition, I utilize process-tracing to show exactly the manner in which these two countries diverged from one another, and the various social, political and legal developments in the respective countries which determined the trends in each state.

Responses from interviewees are broken down by grouping statements made on different topics into similar thematic groups. Some of these thematic groups overlap somewhat, as an interviewee might make a statement on a particular phenomenon which also relates to another one of the themes. These nodes are the following:

- Objectives of the transition: whenever a subject makes a statement about the goals and objectives of the democratic transition in their country, this is coded into this group.

- Objectives of EU membership: subjects' responses that reference the expectations in their country, both at elite and mass level, and their reasons for wishing to join the EU.
- Impact of accession on reform: answers from respondents that cite the impact the prospect of accession to the EU had on reforms in their state, whether weak, strong, or absent.
- Results of EU membership: statements from respondents about the results of the accession process, and whether or not the achievement of EU membership had the desired impact in the country in terms of helping it to meet its objectives.
- Performance of national elites: answers indicating the manner in which political elites and elected leaders in the respective countries have performed following the transition to democracy in the state.
- Performance as a member of the EU: interview subjects are asked about the relationship between the EU and their country since the achievement of membership, whether or not this relationship has featured a large degree of conflict, and the reasons for this. Responses to these questions are then coded into this node. There is sometimes an overlap between this theme and the 'performance of the national elites' theme.
- Opposition to EU membership: this group includes declarations by interview respondents about the presence and strength in their country of groups opposed to membership of the EU or the values associated with EU membership, or about social opposition to membership of the EU.

- Response of the EU: interviewees' statements about the reaction of the EU to political, economic and social developments in their country, how these reactions were received by elites and masses in the states in question, and what the response was in the country to this.
- Liberal democracy: responses that refer to the state of democracy in the respondent's country, the societal perception of and support for democracy, or the strength or support for anti-democratic movements in the country are included under this heading. There is some overlap here with the 'opposition to EU membership' node.
- Civil society: answers from interviewees which evaluate the strength and effectiveness of civil society in their country, the amount of support civil society has received from institutional and external actors, and the degree of embeddedness of the civil society within the general populace are grouped together in this node.
- Effectiveness of institutions: statements that discuss the impact of the post-transition institutions on the development of the political, economic, and democratic system in the respective country both before and after the accession to the EU are included under this heading.
- Rule of law: discussions about the importance of corruption in the respective countries, the role of the judiciary and the police, and the independence of the courts are grouped together under this theme.

Following on from this, statements are analyzed using nVivo software to establish running themes and trends which are part of the interviews. Based on this, it will then

be possible to suggest certain explanations for the questions posed in this study. Additionally, specific quotes from individual respondents are used at different intervals to highlight particular points or to give clarity to a particular phenomenon.

Quantitative elements

Supplementing this qualitative approach, I substantiate claims and highlight specific points using quantitative analyses of several analytical variables. I take as my dependent variable the level of democracy in the country in question; this is based on the findings of the Freedom House Nations in Transit reports, the Bertelsman Transformations Index, and the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index. I then analyze this against a variety of independent variables, including the presence of strong legislative governmental majorities in parliament (I consider a share of 60% of Parliamentary seats or higher as being a strong majority); strength and independence of the judiciary over time; the presence of democracy-compatible cultural values amongst the general population; and on respect for and strength of civil society in the particular country. Data on these variables is drawn from a number of sources, including the following:

- The Eurobarometer: this contains data on the levels of trust citizens in the state feel towards the government, the judiciary, and the civil society in their country, along with their levels of trust in the various institutions of the EU and the Union itself as a whole. Additionally, it also contains information on the reactions people have had to economic developments in their relevant states. Data is collected twice yearly in every member state of the EU, and also in a number of applicant member states.

- The European Social Survey: this amalgamation of surveys contains detailed information on societal attitudes across Europe towards various issues including respect for democracy as a system, the functioning of the political system and political parties in the respective countries, participation in social and political groups and organizations, the impact of immigration on the state, and social problems such as crime and unemployment. It is collected bi-annually, with the first wave being gathered in 2002. The Czech Republic was omitted from the 2006 wave of the survey; as such, I will also omit Hungary's entry for this wave from the analysis. This does not present an issue, however, as it allows me to show a before- and after-EU accession picture of the various issues in the respective states.
- The European Electoral Database: this contains comprehensive data on election results in countries across Europe, including Parliamentary, Presidential, and European Parliamentary elections; for the purposes of analysis, I focus specifically on Parliamentary results, although I also occasionally use Presidential and European Parliamentary results to highlight certain points.²⁶²
- Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index: this index is useful for developing arguments about the state of the judiciary in a country, as corruption has a very strong effect on the rule of law. This can be

²⁶² Disclaimer: (Some of) the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on material from the "European Election Database". The data are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here.

combined with data from the Eurobarometer on the level of trust in the judiciary to show the extent to which people within the state in question believe the judiciary is impartial and seeking to improve the legal situation in the country, or if it is part of the problem.

- World Bank Human Development Indicators Databank: this dataset contains an array of resources on various aspects of economic performance; these indicators can help to measure the extent of economic and societal change in countries before, during and after accession to the EU.
- The Quality of Governance Dataset: this dataset consists of a basket of variables related to governance, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the extent of civil liberties and human rights in a vast range of countries (including Hungary and the Czech Republic). The variables are compiled from a variety of different human rights, democracy, and rule of law datasets; as such, there is no single scale or range for the sundry variables in question. Because of this, the scale and source of the variable being analyzed in each case will be explained in a footnote at the bottom of the relevant page.
- CIRI Human Rights Data Project: this dataset contains information on the extent of political freedoms in a country, the amount of rights women have, and the independence of a state's judiciary. It was collected between 1981 and 2011, and includes full information on the Czech Republic and Hungary during this time. Scores are presented in the format of a scale, with certain indicators having a different scale to others. For instance, the indicator 'women's economic rights' is presented on a scale from 0-3, with 0 meaning

no legal guarantees of economic rights for women and 3 meaning full or nearly full legal guarantees. On the other hand, the ‘independent judiciary’ scale awards a score of 0 to countries without an independent judicial system, a 1 to a partially independent judiciary, and a 2 to generally independent system.

In order to examine this data, I focus on scrutinizing basic descriptive statistics related to several different indicators and variables, to examine if noticeable differences exist between the two states in the various areas, and if these differences can be inferred to be causing the variation between the two states in terms of adherence to EU norms regarding democracy. These tests also tie in with the process-tracing and discourse analysis elements of the study in order to give a comprehensive and detailed answer to the principal research questions posed in this study. These approaches are used to test specific individual hypotheses, independently of one another. This is because some of the hypotheses are not conducive to statistical analysis, and require purely qualitative and/or historical analyses. These tests are also not intended to provide the most important elements of the research, but rather are intended to highlight certain findings from the qualitative approach.

Testing of hypotheses and measurement of variables

As was mentioned above, the qualitative aspect of this dissertation is intended to provide the bulk of the evidence in support of the various arguments made, and will be primarily used to test hypotheses. However, this will be supplemented at various points by specific quantitative approaches. I intend to examine each hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 1: In order to test this hypothesis, which deals with the impact of unemployment and inflation on the support for authoritarian government practices, I intend to predominantly use statistical analysis of relevant pieces of data. Due to the limited number of observations available to me in this study (only two countries over twenty years), it is not possible to draw meaningful results from a regression analysis: as a result, I examine basic figures from a series of indicators from the European Social Survey that are associated with support for democratic or authoritarian governance, and perform a simple comparison to statistics on inflation and unemployment from the same period of time. These latter indicators are selected based on the research of other analyses on the correlation between different societal values and the prevalence of democracy in a country (as elaborated on in the previous chapter), and are as follows: the percentage of respondents who worked in a political party or action group in the prior twelve months; the percentage of respondents who took part in lawful public demonstrations in the prior twelve months; the satisfaction of respondents with the economic performance of their country; the satisfaction of respondents with the way in which democracy functions in their country; the percentage of respondents who take part in social activities in each country; the percentage of respondents who participated in a social club in the last twelve months; and the level of trust placed in other people by respondents. I combine the variables for social trust and participation in activities into a single ‘self-expression’ index, whilst keeping this index separate from the two ‘satisfaction’ figures. Likewise, I combine the inflation and unemployment values together into a single ‘hardship’ index.

These indicators are used to show the extent of ‘self-expression’ values such as participation in social and political life, interpersonal trust, and satisfaction with

democracy. Should the hypothesis be shown to be accurate, we would expect to see the levels of inflation and unemployment having a significant effect on the extent of these attitudes in society, with increases in the ‘hardship’ index leading to noticeable decreases in the number of respondents holding these values. Additionally, it will also be necessary to cross-examine these analyses with each country, in order to show that the higher levels of inflation and unemployment in Hungary than in the Czech Republic have led to a greater strengthening of authoritarian values in the former as opposed to in the latter. These analyses are supplemented with the answers provided by respondents to the qualitative interviews conducted as part of this study.

Hypothesis 2: in order to test this hypothesis, which relates to the commitment of elites in both countries to the normative values they signed up to when their countries entered the EU, a different approach is needed, as it is not one that is easy to quantifiably measure. In this case, analyses are based on a two-fold approach. Interview respondents that are grouped in the “performance of national elites” node are analyzed for running themes related to the extent to which the respective state is shaped and dominated by the actions of an individual politician (or group of politicians, as the case may be). This can then partially help to reflect whether or not the democratic trajectories of each state are a result of the personal commitment of a particular set of elites to upholding liberal democratic values in their country. It will also be necessary to examine the manifestos and campaign pledges made by these elites prior to elections, in order to see what mandate they were given by voters in parliamentary elections. This will allow us to examine if political parties have made authoritarian reforms (such as downgrading the power of the Constitutional Court and centralizing political power in their hands, etc.) because they were tacitly encouraged to do so by the voters, if they made these reforms

in spite of a lack of a mandate from the voters, or if (in the case of narrow elections where the largest individual party in parliament did not enter government) their mandate was implicitly rejected by a majority of the voters.

Hypothesis 3: this hypothesis examines the continued commitment of Czech elites, as opposed to Hungarian elites, to undertaking judicial reforms aimed at strengthening the rule of law in the country after gaining access to the EU. Again, the testing of this hypothesis will require the examination of interview responses contained in the ‘rule of law’ and ‘effectiveness of institutions’ nodes. Analysis of responses will be made in order to triangulate similarities from the respondents, and to examine if their respective countries have shown differences in terms of the level of their commitment to undertaking difficult reforms, without the lever of EU conditionality to encourage their constituents to accept these changes. Additionally, in order to supplement these results, information will be drawn from the Corruption Perception Index, the CIRI Human Rights Data Project dataset, and from the World Justice Project dataset. This data will be presented in a basic graphical format, and will add emphasis to the interview results by showing basic trends in terms of the judicial reform process in each country.

Hypothesis 4: this hypothesis, which is specifically related to the self-expression values of people in the two countries, will require a more heavy quantitative focus. Indicators are drawn from the European Social Survey, and are similar to many of the variables used to test hypothesis 1. However, in this case, they will focus more carefully on examining the period between 2004 and 2008, and on testing if the required social attitudes for ensuring a country’s successful democratic consolidation, which were described in chapter two, were present in either of the two countries and/or became

even more prevalent in the years after gaining access to the EU. The indicators used here will be more broad than those used in the testing of the first hypothesis; they will also encompass the attitudes of people in these societies towards members of the LGBTQ community and immigrants, and the emphasis they place upon the importance of being able to influence politics and political leaders. If the extent of these values decreases significantly in Hungary following 2004, whilst remaining stable (or increasing) in the Czech Republic during the same time period, it can be considered that the hypothesis is at least partially supported by the available data.

As with the testing of hypothesis 1, there are insufficient observations available to be able to obtain meaningful results from complex analytical approaches such as regression analyses or t-tests. As such, this hypothesis will be examined using basic statistics and line graphs. I will then attempt to draw inferences from any observable trends. Additionally, the findings of these surveys will be analyzed against statements and discourses from interview respondents, using responses from the ‘liberal democracy’ and the ‘results of EU membership’ nodes.

Hypothesis 5: this final hypothesis relates to the impact of civil society on the consolidation of democracy in each country, and its ability to act as an effective agent for internalization of the norms of the EU. The testing of this hypothesis will focus much more closely on the results of the qualitative interviews. Responses found in the ‘civil society’ and ‘liberal democracy’ nodes will be considered and analyzed. For the purposes of this analysis, as was alluded to earlier, only civil groups that are engaged in the various areas related specifically to a democratic society are considered, as while the activities of sporting organizations (for example) might be of a much higher quality in one country than in the other, the nature of these organizations are such that they are

somewhat unlikely to have any sort of notable impact on the internalization of EU norms related to liberal democratic practice. Groups that respondents were particularly asked about include democracy and human rights watchdog and advocacy organizations, minority rights organizations, anti-corruption NGOs, and women's rights groups.

In order for the hypothesis to be supported, that Czech civil society was more capable than Hungarian civil society of acting to support the internalization of the norms of the EU both during the application process and after the accession of the countries to the EU, it will need to be shown that civil society in the former was able to have a greater impact on both legislators and the general population than in Hungary. In order to have done so, it is necessary to show that Czech civil society was either quantitatively stronger than Hungarian civil society, meaning that membership of civil society groups in the former country is significantly greater than in the former. Alternatively, it might be that Czech civil society is qualitatively more effective than its Hungarian counterpart, in that its message is more respected, it functions more cohesively, and/or it is capable of reaching and impacting upon a greater public audience, and so can exercise greater influence over elected officials. In addition to the discursive analyses, these findings will be supplemented and highlighted by the provision of statistics from the European Social Survey on the percentage of people who are members of such organizations in each country, on their opinion of the worthiness of such groups, and on the likelihood of a person in either country taking part in such an organization in the future.

How the hypotheses relate to the utility of EU enlargement as a tool of normative power

Finally, it is important to consider how these hypotheses relate to the other questions posed by this research project. Depending on the results of the hypothesis testing, a general answer and explanation for why there is a divergence in liberal democratic standards between Hungary and the Czech Republic since their accession to the EU will be provided. Having answered that, it will be necessary to explain the implications these findings have for the concept of the normative power of the EU. If, for instance, it is found that the divergence between the two countries is purely (or primarily) related to the activities of political leaders, and that all other things having been accounted for, there were was no major difference between the two states in terms of civil society and societal values and attitudes (in other words, if hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 are not supported), then this might imply that the EU's ability to act as a normative power is ineffective in the short- to medium-term, and might need to take on a more 'hegemonic' approach, whereby standards are applied and rigorously enforced both before and after accession, so as to ensure that countries do not regress in terms of their levels and standards of democracy after gaining access to the EU in future.

On the other hand, if it is found that the civil society and the values of ordinary citizens have a major impact on the divergence between the two states, it would imply that the EU's norms were not strongly internalized at the mass level in Hungary, as opposed to in the Czech Republic, and that future attempts at diffusing the EU's norms to target countries would necessarily have to ensure that the sufficient non-elite partners exist within these states, so as to ensure that the normative transfer process is fully internalized successfully. Thus once this has been completed, it will then become

possible to suggest what actions the EU might be able to take both in Hungary itself, and in any future states which might stand to become members of the EU in future.

Contribution to literature and limitations of the study

This study makes four distinct contributions to the literature at a number of different levels. As was outlined in chapters one and two, it is assumed in much of the research on the enlargement of the EU that upon the accession of the former communist states to the EU in 2004, these countries had become consolidated democracies, and that although it was possible that there might be some small problems in terms of the continued process of reform in specific areas, it was unlikely that these countries would stray away from the core liberal democratic norms of the EU in the foreseeable future. Obviously, this has not been the case. This dissertation thus contributes to the body of knowledge available on democratization and democratic consolidation by examining how and why Hungary diverged from these liberal democratic norms after gaining access to the EU, while the country which had been most similar to it in 2004 in terms of its development, the Czech Republic, did not experience such a divergence to anywhere near the same extent. It will specifically show whether this phenomenon is a case of a breakdown of a consolidated liberal democracy in Hungary into a different type of regime, or if it is a case of a failed consolidation of liberal democracy in the country, leading to the reversion of the political system in the state to authoritarianism. From this perspective, by comparing Hungary with the Czech Republic, it will make some suggestions as to what conditions are necessary for a consolidated democracy to emerge, or for a consolidated democracy to regress to authoritarianism.

At the European level, this dissertation will show the obstacles that exist to the EU's exportation of its norms and values. In particular, it will show the economic, political and cultural factors which make a state more or less likely to internalize these norms at the societal level, and the causal mechanism by which these factors achieve this process. This is an aspect which has been, to some extent, underdeveloped in the literature to date. Traditionally, much of the literature which critiqued the 2004 accession and the policy of EU enlargement focused on issues related to the process of accession: research looked at the efficacy of aid programs, the implementation of the various requirements of membership and their influence on political elites in the relevant candidate countries, and the impact of the accession process on the decision-making processes in each state. More recently, literature that has looked at the troubled reform process in various new member states has tended to focus on the lack of control the EU has over individual member states once they gain access, with the assumption again being that the problem is one of instruments, tools, and policies.²⁶³ What is not truly questioned, however, is the extent to which democracy was truly consolidated and internalized as a norm in these countries during and after the accession process. The idea of societal internalization of liberal democratic values in the Central and Eastern European member states is one which is only scantily considered. This, then, is another major contribution of this study. This dissertation focuses on the internalization of

²⁶³ See for instance, Ulrich Sedelmeier: (2014) "Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accession", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(1); Milada Anna Vachudova: (2014) "EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(1)

European norms in the field of liberal democracy, and will test the importance of political elites and mass-level actors in internalizing these norms.

The generalizability of the findings of this study extend beyond the two main case study countries, and can potentially be applied to any of the other countries that have either joined the EU since 2004, or are currently candidates for accession to the EU. This is the universe of cases to which this research is most relevant, although, given the small number of states used in the comparison, the findings may not fit other cases as neatly as the two countries that are the primary subjects of this study. This research is thus limited to countries that have been offered a clear prospective of membership in the EU, and are considered official applicant states; its applicability to states such as Ukraine or Moldova is tenuous at best. This is because the latter states, although subjects of the EU's normative power themselves, face a much different set of challenges than those countries that have been offered the possibility of membership, and are at much different stages of their democratic, economic, and social development than their counterparts in Central Europe and the Balkans. Additionally, this study cannot be generalized to have implications for the normative power of other global actors such as the United States or China. The emergence and spread of European norms regarding liberal democracy are highly contingent upon the activities and public perception of the EU; as such, it is not clear that other actors exert their normative power in the same manner as the EU, and as such, would be faced with their own unique set of difficulties and challenges in the spreading of their normative agenda to target countries.

Chapter 4- EU Norms, Democratization, and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary, 1989-2014

As has been established in the previous chapters, Hungary's accession to the EU in 2004, far from having the effect of stabilizing and consolidating the liberal democratic structures established in the country following its democratic transition- and advocated by the EU in the period of application for membership- has been followed by a somewhat significant regression in terms of its democratic standards. This provoked, and continues to provoke, a considerable degree of consternation in Brussels, and led to the adoption on the 3rd of July 2013 by the European Parliament of the Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary (also known as the Tavares Report, after its rapporteur, Rui Tavares of the Green/European Free Alliance group). This report was particularly critical of the manner of adoption and of the content of the new Hungarian Constitution, which itself was introduced and voted in by the Hungarian Parliament on the 18th of April 2011. The report also highlighted, amongst other things, various concerns over the standard of the system of checks and balances in the country, the infringements on the power and independence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and of the use of 'cardinal laws' (laws which require a parliamentary supermajority of 66% to be repealed) to enshrine many policies of the current governing coalition in the country.²⁶⁴ The issuance of this report was considered

²⁶⁴ European Parliament: (2013) "Texts adopted: Situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary", *Europarl.Europa.Eu*, [online], available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0315&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0229> (accessed on 2/20/2014)

to be a sharp rebuke to the Hungarian government, and throws into focus the degree to which Hungary had slipped in terms of its abidance with the norms of the EU.²⁶⁵

This chapter traces the process through which Hungary's performance as a democratic member of the EU declined to the point where it was the subject of such a strongly-worded report. It starts by examining the history of democracy and democratic politics in Hungary, with particular focus on the interwar years and the impact of nationalist irredentism on democratic politics in the country. It then goes on to examine the various hypotheses proposed in the previous chapters, to see how they relate to the growing illiberalism in Hungary after accession to the EU. In each case, it will establish the causal logic behind the hypothesis in question; why it is proposed that each hypothesis may be true; and will then examine to see if there is any tangible evidence that can support these hypotheses. Finally, it will evaluate the results of these various hypothesis tests, and will construct a tentative explanation for Hungary has experienced democratic backsliding since its accession to the EU.

A brief history of democracy in Hungary

Like many of the other Central and Eastern European countries that became democratic states in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hungary's experience with liberal democratic government is somewhat limited. However, democracy as a concept is not particularly new to the country. Hungarian nationalism and the drive for Hungarian independence from the Austrian Empire itself emerged in the late 17th and early 18th Centuries,

²⁶⁵ Kim Lane Scheppele: (2013) "In Praise of the Tavares Report", *Hungarian Spectrum*, [online], available at: <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2013/07/03/kim-lane-scheppele-in-praise-of-the-tavares-report/> (accessed on 2/20/2014)

culminating in the Rákóczi Rebellion, an uprising of national liberation that was led by Ferenc Rákóczi and in which "...the nation was united, and class distinction sunk, as never before or since."²⁶⁶ While this rebellion failed in its attempt to attain Hungarian independence from the Habsburg monarchs and led in the immediate term to the infliction of severe destruction on the Hungarian people and their lands, it led in the longer term to a greater appreciation by the Austrian nobility for the grievances of the Hungarian people²⁶⁷, and the delegation to them of a significant amount of sovereignty and control over their own national budget within the Empire.²⁶⁸ Democracy and demands for a democratic government in Hungary re-appeared in the mid-19th Century. At this time, the 'father of Hungarian Democracy', Lajos Kossuth, rose to prominence as a leader of the Hungarian nation. Kossuth was originally an advocate for the creation of a parliamentary democracy in Hungary and constitutional system in the Austrian Empire, but later came to demand full independence for Hungary. By the beginning of 1848, Hungary's regional diet had passed significant reforms which led to the later replacement of the erstwhile feudal system in the region with a liberal form of government.²⁶⁹ Armed revolution broke out in March of that year, when Kossuth gave an ultimatum to the Austrians which demanded the introduction of a liberal system of government throughout the empire.²⁷⁰ The situation was exacerbated a few days after this when an anti-royalist group of intellectuals, known as the "Young Hungarians" and

²⁶⁶ Carlile Aylmer Macartney: (1961) *Hungary: A Short History*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 92-93

²⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 93-94

²⁶⁸ Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, pp. 163-165

²⁶⁹ Béla K. Király: (1975) *Ferenc Deák*, Boston: Twayne Publishers, pp.118-119

²⁷⁰ Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, p. 215

led by Sándor Petőfi, issued a radical twelve-point program which demanded the effective end of the monarchy, the full independence of Hungary, and its unification with Transylvania.²⁷¹ Kossuth was successful in obtaining several wide-ranging concessions from the Habsburgs, known as the April Laws, which included the installation of Hungarian as the official language of the unified territory, and the introduction of a liberal, constitutional government.²⁷² In little more than a year, however, the revolution had been crushed by a combined force of Austrian and Russian troops, Petőfi had been killed, and Kossuth had been forced into exile in the United States under pain of execution should he have returned to Hungary.²⁷³ Meanwhile, much of the concessions the Hungarians had obtained were effectively or actively repealed by the Habsburg authorities.

Although several supporters of the revolution shortly came to advocate for the maintenance of some form of relationship with the Austrians, rather than a complete break, this did not resolve the question of Hungary's independence. In the twenty years that followed the suppression of the revolution, the objective of a constitutional Hungarian state remained alive under the guidance of Ferenc Deák, who replaced Kossuth as the *de facto* leader and driving force of the Hungarian national and democratic movement. The defeat of the Habsburgs in several wars weakened their position in the 1860s, and gave Deák his chance to press the case of the Hungarians.²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 216-217

²⁷² Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, p. 223

²⁷³ Donald S. Spencer: (1977) *Louis Kossuth and Young America: A Study of Sectionalism and Foreign Policy, 1848-1852*, London: University of Missouri Press, p. 1-3

²⁷⁴ Stephen Borsody: (1988) "State- and Nation-building in Central Europe", in Stephen Borsody (eds.): *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, pp. 8-9

He demanded that a territorially-consolidated Hungary be granted constitutional independence and sovereignty over its internal affairs and the restoration of the April Laws (albeit with room for amendment), in return for the maintenance of the Empire and assurances for the dynastic rights of the Habsburgs.²⁷⁵ This led to the Compromise of 1867, which created the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, and secured the hegemonic position of the Hungarians alongside Germans in the multi-ethnic empire. This latter issue was problematic in many respects, as it created problems for the Slavic ethnic communities. František Palacký, the Czech intellectual and politician, was a notable attacker of the Compromise, and warned of the potential for further ethnic conflict within the Empire: "...the day dualism is proclaimed...will also be the birthday of Panslavism in its least desirable form, and the godparents of the latter will be the parents of the former."²⁷⁶

The performance of the Hungarian state within the Austro-Hungarian Empire was to have severe implications for the survival of the latter over the next fifty years. While the Habsburg Monarchy reigned over a multitude of ethnic and national groups, and thus tried to remain a supranational entity, Hungary increasingly became a nation-state during this period, and attempted to 'Magyarize' many of the non-Hungarian groups within its territory.²⁷⁷ The internal politics of Hungary could also be somewhat unsettled at this time, as was evidenced by the resignation of Kalman Tisza in 1890 as

²⁷⁵ Béla K. Király: (1975) *Ferenc Deák*, Boston: Twayne Publishers, p. 175

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 181

²⁷⁷ Stephen Borsody: (1988) "State- and Nation-building in Central Europe", in Stephen Borsody (eds.): *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, p. 9; see also, S. Harrison Thomson: (1943) *Czechoslovakia in European History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 268-269; Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, p. 294

the Prime Minister in the wake of strong public demonstrations against the passage of a Defense Bill which had prioritized the German language over Hungarian in the army.²⁷⁸ Indeed, Hungary was to have four different Prime Ministers over the next ten years: Gyula Szapáry, Alexander Wekerle, Dezső Bánffy, and Kálmán Széll. This instability in terms of government structures persisted into the early-1900s. Kosáry argues that while the liberal political structures which had been put in place following the Compromise brought prosperity and security to the Hungarian people during these years, they failed to deal with the previously-mentioned nationality issues and did not successfully grapple with a host of other social problems which were underlying the state at the time.²⁷⁹ While industrialization had taken place in the country, Hungary remained a predominantly agrarian state: thus, when global agricultural production expanded massively towards the end of the 19th Century and the price of grain dropped severely, the Hungarian economy suffered a severe blow.²⁸⁰ Meanwhile, Croat and Serb political parties became significantly more active during the early 1900s, and developed close links with their Slavic brethren in the Russian Empire.²⁸¹ Romanian politicians also began to speak openly about annexing Transylvania from Hungary.²⁸² Additionally, a new generation of Slovak politicians emerged which helped to develop

²⁷⁸ Dominic G. Kosáry: (1941) *A History of Hungary*, Cleveland: Benjamin Franklin Bibliophile Society, p. 303

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 311

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 317

²⁸¹ Carlile A. Macartney: (1961) *Hungary: A Short History*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 200-201

²⁸² Ibid., p. 202

the national consciousness of the Slovak people, and which began to develop links with their Czech counterparts.²⁸³

The failure of the policy of Magyarization to overcome the identities of the various national groups in the Hungarian Empire, and the subsequent lack of resolution of these issues, would shortly lead the Hungarians to disaster. Following their defeat in World War I, Austria-Hungary was split up and both states were carved up in the name of recognizing the right to self-determination of the various nationalities that were part of the Empire. Hungary was particularly badly hurt by this: under the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary gave up vast swathes of territory to the newly-formed states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and also ceded the province of Transylvania to Romania. In total, almost three-quarters of the country's territory and two-thirds of its population were lost to Hungary's neighbors, with many people who considered themselves to be ethnically Hungarian finding themselves living in a foreign country. Additionally, these losses had a significant economic impact on Hungary. Austria-Hungary's economy had been one based on interdependence, with the Hungarian-held lands providing the agricultural aspects of the economy and the Austrian-held lands containing the industrial heartland of the Empire. The loss of access to Austrian and Czech industrial production left the Hungarian economy unbalanced, and the loss of territories to its neighboring countries deprived Hungary of significant quantities of material

²⁸³ S. Harrison Thomson: (1953) *Czechoslovakia in European History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 272-273

resources.²⁸⁴ The scathing terms of Trianon became a major source of grievance to Hungarian nationalists, one which is still felt to this day.²⁸⁵

As a result of this, Hungary was thrown into chaos. The faith of the people in the Hungarian political elite and in the political system was severely damaged by the outcome of the war, and the ability of governing politicians to enact legislation was hamstrung by the pressures of demobilization, interference from foreign powers, and a relative lack of political experience.²⁸⁶ The Prime Minister, Mihály Károlyi, lost popularity, and amid the dismissal of several governing ministers, the majority coalition party in the government (the Independence Party) fractured.²⁸⁷ Meanwhile, their governing partners, the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, became radicalized by the return from Russia of a group of prisoners of war who had converted to communism whilst in prison. These individuals, led by Béla Kun, merged with expellees from the Social Democrats to form the Hungarian Communist Party.²⁸⁸ Four months after this, in March 1919, the rest of the Social Democrat party came under the control of Kun and his acolytes, and subsequently established a Soviet Republic in the country.²⁸⁹ Kun's Leninist perspective of communism led Hungary into conflict with

²⁸⁴ Dominic G. Kosáry: (1941) *A History of Hungary*, Cleveland: Benjamin Franklin Bibliophile Society, p. 407

²⁸⁵ References to the unjustness of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon are frequently made at rallies by the Jobbik party, and the revanchist "Greater Hungary" map is often adopted and displayed by members of nationalist and "patriotic" groups. One example of this rhetoric was during an anti-EU protest in Budapest in 2012, when protestors chanted "down with Trianon". Jobbik: (2012) "Jobbik leaders urge Hungary to quit EU", *Jobbik: The Movement for a Better Hungary*, [online], available at http://jobbik.com/jobbik_leaders_urge_hungary_quit_eu (accessed on 4/16/2014)

²⁸⁶ Mária Ormos: (2007) *Hungary in the Age of the Two World Wars*, New Jersey: Atlantic Research and Publications Ltd., p. 20, p. 23

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 31

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, p. 366

Czechoslovakia and Romania, and after some notable early successes (such as their invasion of Slovakia and establishment of a Socialist Republic there), they were forced to turn back by threats from the French Premier, George Clemenceau.²⁹⁰ Subsequently, the Romanians went on the offensive, seizing Budapest in August of 1919. Meanwhile, the rule of the Communists was challenged by the emergence of one of the most important Hungarian figures of the 20th Century, Admiral Miklós Horthy. Horthy led a coup against the government of the country following the withdrawal of the Romanian forces, one which was supported by the Allied powers of Europe, and would become the Regent of Hungary (in effect, its head of state) in 1920. Meanwhile, army units that were loyal to Horthy carried out a series of retributive attacks, known as the White Terror, on the Communists and on societal elements that were seen as having been loyal to the Communist regime.²⁹¹

Horthy's appointment as Regent essentially meant that Hungary became an autocratic government with him as the leader. This was because Hungary, although legally a kingdom, did not have a king; when the rightful claimant to the throne, King Charles, attempted to ascend in October 1921, Horthy (with the backing, again, of the Allies) had him taken prisoner and exiled.²⁹² In conjunction with the impunity given to the executors of the White Terror, Hungary lurched towards right-wing extremism and fascism, signing alliances with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in 1927 and 1939,

²⁹⁰ Carlile A. Macartney: (1937) *Hungary and Her Successors*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 109-110

²⁹¹ Mária Ormos: (2007) *Hungary in the Age of the Two World Wars*, New Jersey: Atlantic Research and Publications Ltd., pp. 66-69

²⁹² Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, p. 381

respectively.²⁹³ These alliances also strengthened Hungary's irredentist ambitions towards the territory it had surrendered, although given the gravitation of Romania towards the Axis cause during World War II, its ambitions eventually became focused more on securing land from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. This combination of right-wing extremism and revanchist nationalism was again to lead Hungary to disaster, as the country found itself on the losing side of yet another major international conflict. The poor performance of the Axis meant that by 1943, Horthy had started to send out peace feelers to the Allies; having found out about this, Hitler effectively annexed Hungary, appointing the leader of the extremist Arrow Cross Party (Ferenc Szalasi) in place of Horthy as the puppet ruler of the state, and launching a campaign of extermination against the Jewish population.²⁹⁴ This sealed the fate of the country, as they were occupied by the Soviet Union in February 1945, leaving Hungary firmly in the hands of the Communists for the duration of the Cold War.

Communist Hungary and the 1956 Revolution

It is clear that up until 1914, and even for a few years afterwards, that liberal democratic government was highly valued by Hungarians. The creation of an independent, liberal regime in the country was the primary goal and ambition of the intellectual and political elites of the nation for a large part of the 19th Century. Following the Compromise of 1867, the almost full achievement of this goal was one which led to a relatively

²⁹³ Jorg K. Hoensch: (1996) *A History of Modern Hungary, 1867-1994*, London: Longman Group, pp. 136-141

²⁹⁴ Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, pp. 423-424

prosperous fifty years for the Hungarian state. However, a recurring problem during this time was the inability of the regime to grapple with the demands of the diverse blend of ethnicities which made up the state. The ill-advised attempt to create a unitary Hungarian state through the forced Magyarization of these peoples rebounded spectacularly, as the latter retained their cultural and national identities. Based on the principle of self-determination, they were successfully able to press claims for independence from Hungary and/or re-unification with their brethren in another state. This led to the Hungarian Empire being dismembered, an outcome which was to have severe effects on the democratic system in the country. First the Communists, and then later Horthy's fascists, were able to come to power on the wave of a nationalist foment in the country, while the liberal elites in the country were completely discredited by the result of World War I and by their perceived association with the subsequent settlement plan which ended the war. This led Hungary into the Axis camp in World War II, leaving the state further removed from their democratic past. Upon the conclusion of the war, free elections were held in the country, in which the Smallholder's Party won 57% and the Communist Party won a relatively paltry 17%. However, the Communists were quickly developing their grassroots organization, and with the support of the Soviet Union, were able to seize power in the country within two years of this and went on to establish one of the most repressive regimes in Central Europe.

This situation was to remain until the early- to mid-1950s, with little in the way of civil liberties existing in the country and the newly-established secret police favoring the Stalinist approaches that were prevalent in the Soviet Union at the time. Mass

arrests, interrogations, and informant networks were all realities of life in the state.²⁹⁵ However, this situation slowly began to shift following the death of Joseph Stalin and the subsequent emergence of a power struggle within the Communist Party of the USSR. This tumult in Moscow led in June 1953 to the elevation in status of Imre Nagy to the head of the Hungarian government at the expense of the previous *de facto* leader of the country, Matyas Rakosi. As part of his ascent, Nagy announced a series of policy revisions in line with the demands of his Soviet sponsors (Nikita Khrushchev, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Georgy Malenkov), which would have seen some liberalization of the country's economic and agricultural policies, and the release of a number of political prisoners.²⁹⁶ Rakosi fought back against this, rallying his support within the Hungarian Communist Party, and capitalizing on the ongoing disagreements between Khrushchev and Malenkov to strengthen his position.²⁹⁷ When Malenkov (Nagy's former supporter) criticized Nagy at a meeting of the Hungarian and Soviet Party leaderships in early 1955, Rakosi was able to take advantage of this and wrest the support of the Party away from his rival.²⁹⁸ Rakosi, a committed Stalinist and a hardliner, attempted to consolidate his return to power by resuming the policies he had pursued prior to his removal as leader of the Party. However, by this point, the mechanism of reform had been set in motion: Rakosi's approach had been undermined by Khrushchev's strident condemnation of Stalin, large (and eventually, public) splits in the Communist Party were beginning to develop, opponents and victims of Stalinism

²⁹⁵ Andrew Felkay: (1989) *Hungary and the USSR, 1956-1988: Kadar's Political Leadership*, New York: Greenwood Press, p. 45

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48

²⁹⁷ David Pryce-Jones: (1969) *The Hungarian Revolution*, London: Ernest Benn Limited, pp. 49-51

²⁹⁸ Tibor Meray: (1959) *Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, pp. 27-29

became more and more outspoken, and pressure was increasingly placed on Rakosi and the rest of the Party to implement wide-ranging reforms and to rehabilitate and restore Nagy to his position.²⁹⁹ Additionally, upheaval in Poland and East Germany at the time contributed to the unrest in the country. Rakosi resigned as leader of the party in July, and mass demonstrations subsequently led to the restoration of Nagy in October 1956 as the leader of the Communist Party.

It was not believed at the time that these protests held any greater significance outside of restoring Nagy, and the Soviets thwarted Rakosi's initial plans to violently repress the demonstrations that were threatening his rule.³⁰⁰ Nor did Nagy immediately act in a truly revolutionary manner upon his return to power, opting instead to first restore law and order to the country.³⁰¹ However, by the time of Nagy's re-appointment on the morning of October 24th, 1956, the protests had increasingly begun to take on a nationalistic character, with the citizens demanding a more equitable relationship with the USSR, and isolated fighting had broken out between the protestors and the state security forces.³⁰² This was highlighted by the speech by Peter Veres, President of the Hungarian Writers' Association, on the afternoon of October 23rd, when he formulated seven demands on behalf of the Hungarian people, which included clarification on the true economic situation in the country after Rakosi's Stalinist policies, re-organization

²⁹⁹ Andrew Felkay: (1989) *Hungary and the USSR, 1956-1988: Kadar's Political Leadership*, New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 52-53; see also, Paul Kecskemeti: (1961) *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 106

³⁰⁰ Andrew Felkay: (1989) *Hungary and the USSR, 1956-1988: Kadar's Political Leadership*, New York: Greenwood Press, p. 54; p. 58

³⁰¹ Paul Kecskemeti: (1961) *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 108

³⁰² Herbert Aptheker: (1957) *The Truth about Hungary*, New York: Mainstream Publishers, pp. 187-189

of the system of factory management, the purging of hardline elements in the party, and most importantly of all, the holding of free and fair elections and the creation of an independent Hungary.³⁰³ Indeed, when Nagy himself appeared at the parliament building in Budapest and began his address to the assembled crowds with the words, “Dear Comrades”, he was booed and whistled until he exhorted the crowd to join him in singing the national anthem.³⁰⁴ Meanwhile, other important officials of the Communist Party, such as Ernő Gerő (the right-hand man of Matyas Rakosi and leader of the party in the short time between Rakosi’s resignation as leader and Nagy’s return) warned of conflict between the proletarian internationalist goals of the party and the nationalist ambitions of the protesters.³⁰⁵

Following these events, the tone of the demonstrations began to harden, with slogans such as ‘out with the Russians’ being openly shouted.³⁰⁶ What had initially been viewed as, at the most, a demand for the restructuring of the Hungarian communist system, very quickly became an out-and-out revolution, aimed at overthrowing the dictatorial rule in the country and at removing the influence of foreign power from Hungarian politics, and which swept along Nagy and other reformist-minded politicians in a direction they had not originally been willing to contemplate, but which Nagy himself acknowledged on October 28th.³⁰⁷ In response to this existential threat to the

³⁰³ Hungarian News Agency: (1957) “Peter Veres Addresses the Demonstration”, in Melvin J. Lasky (eds.): *The Hungarian Revolution: The Story of the October Uprising as Recorded in Documents, Dispatches, Eye-witness Accounts, and World-wide Reactions*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, pp. 48-49

³⁰⁴ Time (New York): (1957) “Nagy Confers”, in Melvin J. Lasky (eds.): *The Hungarian Revolution: The Story of the October Uprising as Recorded in Documents, Dispatches, Eye-witness Accounts, and World-wide Reactions*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, p. 50

³⁰⁵ David Pryce-Jones: (1969) *The Hungarian Revolution*, London: Ernest Benn Limited, p. 64

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Paul Lendvai: (1999) *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company, pp. 450-451

system, Gerő requested military intervention from the rest of the communist bloc late in the night of October 23rd, which, following a limited intervention by Soviet tanks on October 24th, subsequently resulted in the decision on October 31st by the Warsaw Pact to invade Hungary and crush the revolution before it had had a chance to be consolidated.³⁰⁸ On November 4th, Soviet tanks entered Budapest and began to violently suppress the protestors, who had largely been abandoned by the Hungarian army.³⁰⁹ Nagy himself fled to the sanctuary of the Yugoslav embassy, and was officially deposed as leader of the country later that day in favor of Janos Kadar. The revolution was officially put down altogether on November 11th, 1956. Following this, Kadar would go on to restore one-party communism to Hungary, although, as has been discussed in chapters two and three, this was to become the most liberal form of communism in Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Nagy was executed in June 1958, despite having been promised safe conduct and immunity by Kadar.³¹⁰

Evaluation of the democratic history of Hungary

Given the fate of most of Hungary's neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe following World War II, it is almost certain that Hungary would have fallen into the communist sphere during the Cold War. However, what is more important in terms of considering the legacy of democracy in the country is the extinguishing of the liberal regime in the wake of World War I. While Czechoslovakia was able to remain a democracy throughout the interwar years, the societal disenchantment with the loss of vast swathes

³⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 451-452

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 453

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 454

of territory meant that Hungary became an authoritarian state. Additionally, the national trauma of the Trianon settlement left a huge imprint on the cultural memory of the Hungarian people. To this day, as was noted above, the dismemberment of Hungary is a rallying call for moderate and radical nationalists in the country alike, although the latter are obviously more extreme in their demands for restitution than the former. Although it must be noted that in the case of the 1956 revolution, the calls for the creation of a democratic, multi-party electoral system in Hungary were at least partially fuelled by Hungarian nationalism and a desire to remove foreign influence from Hungarian politics, this sentiment was somewhat different to the irredentist outlook which prevailed throughout the interwar years, and which has begun to re-emerge in the country since 1989. Thus it can be said that these attitudes have at least somewhat dogged and hampered the achievement of a devotion to the concept of democracy itself amongst the Hungarian people since the end of WWI.

However, it is overstating the case to assert that the developments of the interwar years and the emergence of ethnocentric patriotism in Hungary are having a causal effect on the state of Hungarian democracy in the present day. Even with the status of Hungarians abroad being a grievance around which extremist groups like the Jobbik party can appeal for support, it is unlikely that this is a major cause for the illiberal turn of Hungary since 2010: after all, these issues had existed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and did not cause Hungarian people to support the abandonment of liberal democratic principles. Indeed, if such problems were to have had an effect on the state of Hungarian democracy, it is far more likely that this would have been experienced in the early 1990s, when democracy was still relatively alien (in practice, if not in concept) to most people in the country. However, Hungary was one of the best

performing of the new democracies that emerged in the wake of the collapse of the communist system, and remained that way until the onset of the Financial Crisis and the election of Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party to government in 2010. As such, it is necessary to examine other reasons for the illiberal turn of Hungary, which may or may not play off these unresolved nationalist complaints.

Testing hypothesis 1: the impact of inflationary and unemployment pressures on the quality of Hungarian democracy

This paragraph thus introduces the first proposed hypothesis, that the impact of inflationary and unemployment problems on the Hungarian economy has led to people in the country favoring radical and authoritarian solutions to these issues. According to this hypothesis, the combined presence of these two variables creates a sense of increased hardship amongst the people, leading them to adopt and favor more authoritarian approaches (or the inverse of this, to de-prioritize public participation in politics and liberal approaches). As was discussed in chapters two and three, it has been shown in previous research on the impact of monetary and inflationary crises, that on its own, there is little connection between these problems and the breakdown of democratic systems. However, this study proposes that when rising prices on basic household items are combined with high unemployment rates in a country, that this can create a greater level of economic hardship, as the purchasing power of regular individuals is squeezed both in terms of income and expenditure. Additionally, this can have broader effects on the community, by increasing social conflict and by creating feelings of economic insecurity amongst people who may have tenuous or low-paying unemployment. One respondent who was interviewed for this study, a Budapest-based

journalist, highlighted this issue in response to a question about the impact of economic crises on the social conditions in Hungary:

“...For a lot of people, they started to lose everything, they lost their houses, they became unemployed, and it became a vicious circle. More people lost their jobs so you had more bad loans appearing on the balance sheets of the banks. And then banks would increase interest rates on the mortgages...so the standard of average living became very difficult, and that’s when things went to the extremes. So this is why people start adopting very different views, even though they are inconsistent...so you could see that people were not thinking clearly anymore, because they had these two different directions in their mind. This is a difficulty for politicians.”³¹¹

Another respondent, a public intellectual and political analyst in Hungary, said the following:

“...Democratic values always have a strong correlation with your everyday life, with your standard of living, and the better you live, the more attention you can pay to democratic values, human rights and freedoms. The life did not become better at the speed people expected, and secondly, when the people experienced some dislocation in their life, they turned their attention more to making money, to having a decent salary and to be able to maintain some standard of living that they had or to improve it, so they paid less attention to democratic values. It

³¹¹ Interview with Respondent 19, Editor in Chief; Budapest, interview conducted on December 13th 2013

doesn't mean that they became less important; it just meant that they were less in the forefront of people's minds.”³¹²

By the same token, a different respondent drew a different set of conclusions about the problems related to the economy in Hungary:


“...People just want politicians to get on with it and agree, and to do what is best for the country. I think a lot of people are irritated by that [the lack of agreement amongst politicians from different parties on the correct course for Hungary]. And then you have the issues with the corruption, and the problems with the economy. Over the last few years it has been a bit of a problem, but if you look at things like real income growth and GDP growth and so on Hungary has done alright! It has only been a small few years since 1989 when there wasn't clear growth in the economy and income. I think a lot of these complaints are exaggerated, and have a lot to do with the very strong complaints culture we have in this country.”³¹³

While there is a little differentiation between them, these responses are generally in keeping with the expectations of this hypothesis, that financial distress and dislocation related to growing prices for consumer goods and rising unemployment have caused people to de-prioritize democracy and democratic values. However, this does not necessarily mean that such concerns are sufficient or even necessary conditions for the democratic backsliding in Hungary to occur. In order for this to be the case, it is

³¹² Interview with Respondent 21, Intellectual/Political Analyst; Budapest, conducted on December 20th 2013

³¹³ Interview with Respondent 20, Freelance Journalist; Budapest, interview conducted on December 16th 2013

Figure 4.1: inflation and unemployment levels in Hungary between 1993 and 2012



a) Inflation levels in Hungary, 1993-2012. Figures listed display the annual percentage of inflation in consumer prices, as recorded by the World Bank.

b) Unemployment rate in Hungary, 1993-2012. Figures listed display the annual rate of unemployment as a percentage of the total labor force in Hungary, as recorded by the World Bank.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.

important to comprehensively analyze the statistics available on these variables and to compare them against data drawn from the European Social Survey on liberal and ‘democratic’ attitudes in Hungary.


Basic graphs outlining the issues of inflation and unemployment in Hungary between 1993 and 2012 can be found in figure 4.1 on the following page. A preliminary ‘eye test’ examination of this data paints a rather complex picture of the situation. In

the case of inflation, the rate spiked very shortly after the transition to democracy and capitalism in the country, due to the economic difficulties faced by the country in transitioning from communism (even the liberal form found in Hungary) to market-based Capitalism. Additionally, this reflects some of the structural legacy problems that the previous regime had left, specifically the high levels of national debt that the country had incurred. Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, however, the situation dramatically improved, with prices stabilizing since 2009 around 5% inflation. Unemployment levels also faced a similar (albeit less drastic) trend in the 1990s and early 2000s, as jobless rates were quite high immediately after the transition (again reflecting the difficulties faced by Hungary in transitioning away from a largely protected economy). The situation improved up until the early 2000s, when it somewhat stabilized. However, at this point, unemployment began to creep back up until the financial crisis, when the rates shot up, to the point that joblessness in Hungary is currently at a comparable level to that which the state faced in the early years of democracy. It is at this point that it is anticipated by this hypothesis that attitudes in Hungary became less inclined towards participating in politics and agitating for a more democratic system of government, and/or became more favorable to authoritarian solutions.

Based on this, I construct a ‘hardship index’ which combines the inflation and unemployment statistics into one index. This is necessary for the testing of this hypothesis, as it assumes that the impact of these two variables is cumulative, and that on their own, each one is unlikely to have a major impact on the levels of authoritarianism in the country. This is displayed in figure 4.2, on the following page. A line has been added to the graph to denote when the country joined the EU. The graph

shows that while the hardship index declined sharply in the years prior to accession to the EU, it began to gradually increase again after the achievement of membership. This finding is potentially in line with the expectations of the hypothesis, as the increases in hardship after ascension to the EU coincide with the decline in the standard of democracy in Hungary which also followed membership. However, this hypothesis proposes that the mechanism by which this increase in hardship leads to greater levels of authoritarianism in the state is by causing attitudinal changes amongst the population which lead them to abandon 'self-expression' values that are associated with

Figure 4.2: 'Hardship' levels in Hungary between 1994 and 2013



democratization, in favor of more authoritarian values. As such, it is necessary to examine trends in a variety of areas: interpersonal trust, participation in civil and social organizations, participation in political organizations, and participation in lawful demonstrations. I also look at trends in the areas of satisfaction with the state of the economy in the country and satisfaction with the state of democracy in the country. These statistics are based on findings from the European Social Survey, gathered between 2002 and 2012. The findings are summarized in table 4.1 on the following page. Again, in order to accurately analyze the relationship between the hardship index and the extent of self-expression values in the country in question, it is necessary to also compile the latter set into a self-expression index, which will then give a clear idea of the relationship between the two variables. Satisfaction with the state of the economy and with democracy in the country are not included in this index, as they are not truly ‘values’, but rather emotions which may or may not be influenced by the sundry self-expression values. Ordinarily, prior to compiling the self-expression index, it would be necessary to compute the constituent variables using z-score standardization, given that these variables, on their own, have different scales; however, as I have compiled them in the table based on ‘percentages of people indicating a favorable response to the question’ etc., it is not necessary to conduct the z-score standardization. The figures which this index consists of are the percentage of people displaying ‘more’ levels of interpersonal trust; the percentage of people who did participate in civil, social, and political organizations; and the percentage of people who did participate in lawful demonstrations. These results are summarized graphically in figure 4.3 on page 168.

Table 4.1: Findings from the European Social Survey, 2002-2012³¹⁴

	Year		Levels of interpersonal trust ³¹⁵	Participation in civil organizations ³¹⁶	Participation in social organizations ³¹⁷	Participation in political organizations ³¹⁸	Participation in lawful demonstrations ³¹⁹	Satisfaction with state of the economy ³²⁰	Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy ³²¹
	2002	2005							
	Less	45.1	52	46.8	53.1	42.8	41		
	More	23.2	24.5	30	24.8	31.4	39.1		
	No	97	97.8	97.7	94.7	93	95.6		
	Yes	2.8	1.9	1.2	5	6.6	3.2		
	Less	51	49.4	49.3	47.7	51.4	45.7		
	More	10.3	12.7	10.7	9.8	10.3	11		
	No	96.9	98.7	96.5	98.9	97.2	97.8		
	Yes	2.9	.9	2.4	.8	2.6	1.1		
	No	96.1	98	95.2	97.8	97	95.1		
	Yes	3.7	1.6	3.7	1.8	2.7	3.5		
	Dissatisfied	49.8	71	73.3	88.2	72.3	65.3		
	Satisfied	20	11	8.8	3.4	10.9	17		
	Dissatisfied	36.2	52.4	59.3	66.2	43.5	45.5		
	Satisfied	32.4	23.8	18.3	12.3	29.2	32.8		

³¹⁴ All figures listed in this table are percentages of the respondents.

³¹⁵ Respondents to the ESS are presented with the statement “Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful”. Respondents then rank their response to this on a 0-10 scale, with 0 meaning “you can't be too careful” and 10 meaning “most people can be trusted”. I consider responses between 0-4 to be ‘less trusting’, responses between 6-10 to be ‘more trusting’, and responses of 5 to be ‘neither trusting nor distrusting’

³¹⁶ Respondents to the ESS were asked if they had worked for an organization or association in the last 12 months.

³¹⁷ Respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 1-5 how much they participated in social activities relative to people of a similar age to them, with 1 being much less than most and 5 being much more than most. I consider responses from 1-2 to be less likely to participate in social activities, 4-5 to be more likely to participate in social activities, and 3 to be the average.


³¹⁸ Respondents were asked if they had worked in a political party or organization in the last twelve months.

³¹⁹ Respondents were asked if they had participated in a lawful public demonstration in the last twelve months.

³²⁰ Respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 0-10 how satisfied they were with the present state of the economy in their country, with 0 representing views that were “extremely dissatisfied”, and 10 representing views that were “extremely satisfied”. I consider responses between 0-4 to be ‘less satisfied’, responses between 6-10 to be ‘more satisfied’, and responses of 5 to be ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.’

³²¹ Respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 0-10 how satisfied they were with the way democracy works in their country, with 0 representing views that were “extremely dissatisfied”, and 10 representing views that were “extremely satisfied”. I consider responses between 0-4 to be ‘less satisfied’, responses between 6-10 to be ‘more satisfied’, and responses of 5 to be ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.’

Figure 4.3: Comparison of hardship index, self-expression index, and democratic and economic satisfaction in Hungary, 2002-2012



Based on this graph, it is possible to infer several trends. Firstly, there does not seem to be much of a relationship between the Hungarian ‘hardship’ level and the extent of self-expression values in the country. The hardship level is initially static, before mildly, but noticeably, increasing from 2007 onwards. If the proposed hypothesis was to be fully accurate, we would have expected to see the standardized ‘self-expression’ index to decline in concert with this. However, this is clearly not the case: the self-expression index is mostly static for the entire period being examined, and if anything, shows some mild improvement. This does not necessarily mean that this hypothesis should be completely discarded without looking at the same data for the

Czech Republic, but it does suggest that whatever else, there is little reason to believe that increases in economic hardship necessarily lead to decreases in democracy-friendly attitudes in Hungary.

On the other hand, a number of interesting trends may be noticed regarding the levels of economic and democratic satisfaction in Hungary, and the relationship these have with the hardship index. The slopes of the line for both these variables are extremely similar, indicating that they are possibly linked to one another. It stands to reason that the direction of this relationship is that increased satisfaction with the economy leads to increased satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country, as the inverse of this would not make much logical sense. Additionally, the closeness of the match between the two trends indicates that it is quite likely that a very significant proportion of the Hungarian population may have a somewhat instrumentalized view of democracy, seeing it as something that is beneficial when it allows them to attain economic success, but not as something which is necessarily positive in and of itself.

When compared with the hardship level, it would indicate that these two variables are 'subjective' emotions rather than expressions of objective fact. In both cases, the satisfaction levels decline continually, hitting their nadir in 2009, the last year of the Socialist government that preceded the convincing electoral victory of the Fidesz party. This coincides with the hardship level, which experienced its sharpest increase between 2006 and 2009. However, the hardship level continued to rise after this, while the satisfactions levels both (counter-intuitively) increased after 2009. This indicates that the population approved of the measures taken by the new government to rectify the economic situation in the country, and suggests that this may be somewhat blinding

the people to the economic realities that they face. Alternatively, it might be possible that the Hungarian population felt that the country was in a very bad economic situation by 2009, and that painful reforms (which would lead to a further decline of the country's position in the short-term) would be necessary to rectify the situation. In order to find the answer to this problem, it will be necessary examine the other hypotheses presented by this dissertation.

Testing hypothesis 2: the impact of mainstream Hungarian political elites on the quality of democracy in the state

The previous section established that the cumulative increase in levels of inflation and unemployment in Hungary from 2006 onwards do not correlate with a rise in attitudes either sympathetic to, or conducive to, a more authoritarian form of political rule amongst Hungarian citizens during the same period. As a result, it can reasonably be stated that the economic difficulties faced by the country have not necessarily turned Hungarian people away from the attitudes and values that have been associated with liberal democracy, any more than they may already have turned away from them. Thus, it is necessary to consider other reasons for the decline in democratic standards in Hungary, and the country's increasingly weak relationship to the norms of the European Union. The next hypothesis I will examine is the 'mainstream elites' hypothesis, which proposes that this decline is primarily a result of an elite-driven process, and a lack of commitment amongst political leaders in Hungary to the normative values they signed up to as part of the accession of their country to the EU. In other words, this hypothesis suggests that the Hungarian elites have acted in a manner that is effectively independent of the demands of the general citizenry, and that the controversial political

developments in Hungary (which were outlined in the introduction and chapters two and three) have little or no relationship to the objectives and demands of the Hungarian masses. It is quite clear that the crushing victory of Fidesz in 2010 allowed Viktor Orban an unprecedented opportunity to drastically re-shape the political system in the country in his image, as never before had an individual party gained so many seats in a Hungarian parliamentary election.³²² However, this on its own does not necessarily mean that the problems in the country are purely a result of activities by the government. As was suggested previously, it is possible that these anti-democratic government policies were enabled and supported by the electorate as a short-term necessity, in order to allow the government to take strong action against the economic difficulties Hungary was facing. In order to test this, it is important then to examine the electoral manifesto that Fidesz campaigned under and the subsequent mandate it was explicitly given by the electorate to govern the country. Following this, it will be necessary to examine the policies that Fidesz actually did implement following their election, to see what discrepancies exist between the two, and how serious they may be.

³²² While the 1994 Parliamentary elections in the country also saw a new government elected with a two-thirds majority, this government did not have the same opportunity to fundamentally re-shape the Hungarian system as Fidesz enjoyed in 2010. This is because in 1994, the government was only able to achieve this majority through a coalition between the MSzP and the Alliance of Free Democrats party (SzDSz), two groups that were entirely independent of one another and that had quite different political platforms. As such, the government could not operate with the amount of flexibility required to make fundamental alterations to the functioning of the state. Whilst Fidesz is technically also in a coalition government, its partner, the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) is little more than a satellite party of Fidesz, and exerts little or no influence over the government. See Alexander Herholz: (2012) "Sanctions on Hungary: What For and Why Now?", *Fair Observer*, [online]. Available at: <http://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/sanctions-hungary-what-and-why-now/> [accessed on June 3, 2014]; HVG.hu: (2011) "Lázár a KDNP-nek: 'ez nem egy koalíciós kormány'" ("Lázár on the KDNP-party: 'it is not a coalition government'"), *HVG*, [online]. Available at: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20110718_lazar_kdnp_nem_koalicio_s_kormany [article translated using Google Translate; <https://translate.google.com/#auto/en/a%20KDNP-nek%3A%20%22ez%20nem%20egy%20koal%C3%ADci%C3%B3s%20korm%C3%A1ny%22%20>] [accessed on June 3, 2014].

It is clear that Viktor Orbán himself has had a massive impact on the Hungarian political scene ever since his emergence as a leading opposition figure against the communist regime in Hungary. Indeed, in June 1989, he gave a speech at the reburial ceremony for Imre Nagy, where he demanded free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country.³²³ Orbán was a founding member of Fidesz, quickly assuming leadership of the party; under his tenure, the party has gone from being relatively marginal to being the most powerful political force in the country since the demise of the Communists. Indeed, since his emergence, Orbán has been the only politician in Hungary to have led his party to victory in a parliamentary election on more than one occasion (1998, 2010, and 2014).³²⁴ Additionally, according to Bozoki and Kriza, since 2002 Orbán has been able to redraw the political landscape in Hungary such that campaigns are conducted, not between rival political parties, but between ‘pro-Orbán’ and ‘anti-Orbán’ factions.³²⁵

The view that Orbán has been one of the most important political driving forces in the country since the late 1980s and early 1990s is one that was clearly shared by a number of the respondents that were interviewed for this project. For instance, one respondent, the director of research at a Hungarian political foundation, had this to say

³²³ Edith Oltay: (2013) *Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right*, Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado, pp. 14-15

³²⁴ Whilst Ferenc Gyurcsány was Prime Minister in two different governments, the first time (between 2004 and 2006) came as a result of his ascent to the position in the wake of the resignation of Peter Medgyessy, his predecessor as leader of the MSzP. Gyurcsány won one election as leader of the MSzP, in 2006.

³²⁵ Andras Bozoki; Borbala Kriza: (2008) “The Hungarian Semi-Loyal Parties and Their Impact on Democratic Consolidation”, in Andrew M. Blasko; Diana Janauskiene (eds.) *Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, pp. 238-239

in response to a question about the reasons for the popularity of the Hungarian government vis-à-vis its challengers:

“Well, I think that the opposition collapsed in 2010, this is no question. The reason of the collapse was how they governed the country between 2002 and 2010, I think this is also not a question. And in 2010, the question was, could the left side [the MSZP] survive this sort of collapse or not, or else the situation will be like that which happened in Poland, where there is no real left side...They could manage this crisis, the Socialists, they survived the revolution. They don’t have a leader though. For Fidesz, it was a fifteen year-long fight to make one right side, because they also had coalition partners during the first Orban government, but finally they could create one bloc, and the left side doesn’t have this one bloc. And because of the new Hungarian electoral system and how people think in Hungary, this would be very important for them in order to be able to win an election.”³²⁶

The juxtaposition between the lack of leadership on the side of the MSZP, and its subsequent impact on their electoral prospects, and the strong leadership provided to Fidesz by Mr. Orban is heavily implied in this answer. Another respondent was even more explicit about the significance of Orban, stating:

“...If you were to just take Orban, he is so powerful within the party and he is so powerful within the country because of this majority, that he could have done anything. And what he’s doing, which is the centralization of power and the

³²⁶ Interview with Respondent 18, Director of Research; Budapest, interview conducted on December 12th 2013.

removal and checks and balances, is largely a reflection of his personality, which is an authoritarian way of thinking. Those are things that he seems to believe in... So I think everything that he has done is a mark of his personality. I mean, he's the most important politician since the change of regime in the country. He has single-handedly shaped the way Hungarian conservatism works."³²⁷

Additionally, several authors have noted the crucial role Orbán has played in the development, not just of Hungarian conservatism, but also of the entire Hungarian political system; his control over Fidesz is virtually complete, and his only major political challenger, Ferenc Gyurcsány, has slipped into relative obscurity since his fall from power in 2009.³²⁸ From this, it is possible to suggest that Orbán has remained a relevant political leader for a longer period than any other politician in the country, and that he has had a more important influence on the trajectory of developments in the country than any other figure. Other people, such as József Antall, the country's first democratically-elected Prime Minister since before the emergence of the Communists, and Gyurcsány, have not had anything near the sustained relevance that Orbán has enjoyed.

³²⁷ Interview with Respondent 20, Freelance Journalist; Budapest, interview conducted on December 16th 2013.

³²⁸ Paul Lendvai: (2012) *Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, New York: Columbia University, p. 83, pp. 204-205. See also: The Economist: (2014) "Hungary's Divisive Prime Minister", *The Economist*, [online]. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economist-explains-0?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e> [accessed on June 8, 2014]; Miklós Haraszti: (2002) "The Real Viktor Orbán", *Open Democracy*, [online]. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-newright/article_358.jsp [accessed on June 8, 2014].

Given his dominance both of the Hungarian political scene and of his own political party, it is almost certain that Orban has a great amount of responsibility for Hungary's creeping authoritarianization. Additionally, it is quite clear that Fidesz's constitutional reforms were not a case of events taking on a momentum of their own, but that these reforms were explicitly intended to bring about a fundamental change in the entire Hungarian political system. Jozsef Szajer, a Fidesz MEP who was heavily involved in the drafting of the new constitution, has been quoted as saying in regards to this that "change must come from the foundations".³²⁹ The need for such a radical transformation of the state was justified as a response to the lack of a clean break with the communist past of the state; Oltay argues that "...following the transition to democracy, the political elite failed to promote symbolic steps that would have made an emotional and moral identification with the regime change possible."³³⁰ Szajer himself also said that "...the omission of 1990, the fact that Hungary did not adopt a new constitution, the fact that we did not mark our transition to a new system formally...had a ripple effect felt for many years to come, bringing with it numerous unresolved disputes", explicitly linked the financial difficulties of the state in the early 1990s and early 2000s to this failure to introduce a new constitution as part of the democratic transition, and contrasted this approach with the efforts taken by previous emergent political elites such as the 1848 revolutionaries and the Communists in 1949 to stamp their mark on the new system in a similar manner.³³¹ Another of the architects

³²⁹ Balint Ablonczy: (2012) *Conversations on the Fundamental Law of Hungary: Interviews with Gergely Gulyas and Jozsef Szajer*, Budapest: Elektromedia Kft., p. 15.

³³⁰ Edith Oltay: (2013) *Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right*, Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado, p. 14.

³³¹ Balint Ablonczy: (2012) *Conversations on the Fundamental Law of Hungary: Interviews with Gergely Gulyas and Jozsef Szajer*, Budapest: Elektromedia Kft., pp. 18-19.

of the new constitution, Gergely Gulyas, has argued that the adoption of the new constitution was just an extension of the democratic transition, saying that “...the transition from dictatorship to democracy took place separately from the adoption of the new Constitution...for this reason, the two should be viewed as parts of a single process that has now been concluded in this sense.”³³²

However, the manner in which Fidesz went about implementing the introduction of this new constitution was highly problematic. As was noted before in the introduction, neither was there a public referendum held on the new document, nor was broad-based parliamentary consensus sought for it (the only members of the parliament who voted in favor of the text were members of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition). Additionally, it does not seem that Fidesz prioritized this issue in its manifesto for the 2010 election, nor did it heavily emphasize any of the other political reforms associated with the decline in Hungary’s democratic standards, such as the freedom of the media and the power and neutrality of oversight bodies. According to the ‘Mit ígérek?’ program, a civic initiative which analyses the promises political parties make in their campaigns and assesses their performance in terms of fulfilling their promises, the issues Fidesz prioritized in their pre-election promises included developing the economy and the national infrastructure, increasing spending on the police and making the judicial system more efficient, and improving the healthcare system.³³³ Additionally, the party also emphasized education reforms and Roma integration

³³² Ibid., p. 22.

³³³ Anonymous: (2014) “Budgetary impact of promises” [Ígéretek költségvetési hatása], *Mit ígérek?*, [online], available at: http://mitigernek.hu/images/docs/fidesz_igeretlista.jpg. [Accessed on June 19, 2014].

projects.³³⁴ Of these proposed policies, the only one which could possibly be conceived as being related to the wide-ranging reforms of the political system is the promise to improve the efficiency of the judiciary. Even at that, this promise relates more to speeding up the amount of time needed for court cases to be heard and processed. As such, it does not seem that Fidesz received any specific mandate from the Hungarian electorate to implement these changes. This lends support to the hypothesis that the declines in the quality of Hungarian democracy since 2010 are largely an elite-based, Fidesz-driven series of events which are somewhat independent of the demands of the Hungarian citizenry.

One interesting to note is the appeals to Hungarian nationalism that Fidesz have made post facto in order to legitimize and gain support for these changes. Amongst other things, Fidesz included amendments in the constitution which extended citizenship and voting rights to all ethnic Hungarians, even those living in the neighboring countries of Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Serbia, provided they can show competence in the Hungarian language and can show proof of their Hungarian ancestry. This formulation thus gave political status to Hungarian culture, a radical departure from the traditional norms of statehood and citizenship exercised throughout the rest of Europe.³³⁵ Additionally, Orban has frequently courted support from the radical right-wing elements of Hungarian society. According to Dalos et. al., he frequently builds support for his authoritarian reforms by “chanting empty patriotic

³³⁴ Anonymous: (2014) “Scoring in four important areas” [Négy fontos terület pontozása], *Mit ígérnek?*, [online], available at: http://mitigernek.hu/images/docs/fidesz_reszterulet_prog.jpg. [Accessed on June 19, 2014].

³³⁵ Gábor Halmai: (2012) “Towards an Illiberal Democracy”, *Eurozine*, [online], available at <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-01-25-halmai-en.html>. [Accessed on January 19, 2014].

slogans” and adopting a staunchly nationalistic posture.³³⁶ Prior to this, von Ahn states that Orban also tacitly encouraged and inflamed the violent street protests against the Gyurcsany-led government that rocked Budapest in 2006.³³⁷ This argument is somewhat supported by Oltay, who notes that Fidesz constantly criticized the response of the government to the riots, and even conducted their own protests against the government (with that said, Oltay does not suggest that Fidesz sought to radicalize the protests in the manner implied by other authors). One such demonstration was held on October 23rd to commemorate the victims of the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Revolution, and also to protest against the brutality of the police in their response to the protests.³³⁸ It is not difficult to see how these two issues might have thus become linked in the minds of the protestors. Fidesz were thus able to link nationalist issues to their own political objectives (in this case, the delegitimization and undermining of the Gyurcsany government). One interview respondent for this study gave a succinct example of the sort of nationalistic discourse used by Fidesz both to buttress their own support, and to weaken the support of other parties. When asked a question about the impact of EU membership on her country, she responded:

“I would say there is one impact, and sorry to be political, but the Socialist party in opposition all the time uses the EU to attack the centre-right government. All the time, because they are used to this; earlier they went to Moscow to ask for

³³⁶ György Dalos; Miklós Haraszti; György Konrád; László Rajk: (2012) “The decline of democracy – the rise of dictatorship”, *Eurozine*, [online], available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-01-25-rajk-en.html>. [Accessed on June 20, 2014].

³³⁷ Thomas von Ahn: (2007) “Democracy or the street? Fragile stability in Hungary”, *Eurozine*, [online], available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-07-vonahn-en.html>. [Accessed on June 20, 2014].

³³⁸ Edith Oltay: (2013) *Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right*, Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado, p. 165.

permission, and they were told what to do, and now all the time they come to Brussels and try to get Brussels to punish the Hungarian government. So this is a very interesting political impact on domestic policy. And what is strange is that in any other country, if you go abroad, you are united. You are not socialists or liberals or Christian democrat, but you are Hungarian, Irish, or whatever. Hungary is different: if you go abroad, and especially if you are a socialist, you are not Hungarian first but you are Socialist first, and you use Brussels to attack the Hungarian government. This is a very, very strange political impact, which I have never seen in any other country.”³³⁹

Additionally, since coming to power in 2010, the party has repeatedly used nationalistic rhetoric to counter criticism from external actors such as the European Commission, and internal actors from the Hungarian civil society. Several interviewees for this study affirmed this. One respondent, the political director for a Hungarian civil society organization, had this to say when asked about the impact of criticisms from the EU on the political situation in Hungary:

“It is hard to evaluate, because as I observe, many Hungarians believe that the EU bodies and the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission and the Strasbourg Court try to do everything to challenge the Hungarian government’s moves. And they believe that this government is a very bad one and that it puts the country in a bad situation. But those who believe such things are a minority in the Hungarian population, because the government has a very strong and

³³⁹ Interview with Respondent 4, Political Adviser, European Parliament; Brussels, interview conducted on July 14th, 2013.

effective communications strategy. And in this communicative strategy, the criticisms from the Hungarian NGOs and from abroad, the EU bodies, and the Council of Europe, are attacks on the Hungarian national interest. The EU, the government says, wants to dominate the Hungarian government, and they don't let the government to decide freely. So those who think in favor of the government agree with this, and the criticisms are not just criticisms but are just attacks on the recent government. And I think the majority of the Hungarians believe this.”³⁴⁰

Another respondent, the campaign director of a Hungarian political party, had similar things to say in response to the same question:

“I think it depends on where you are in politics. If you are on the left, or a non-aligned member of the electorate, you tend to believe that there were some legitimate criticisms that were being made by the EU. If you're from the right, from the far-right or Fidesz, Hungary is fighting a civil war against the foreign institutions so these electorates learn from their parties that the EU is trying to act against our independence. So basically the answer to your question from an individual point of view is that it depends on where you are in terms of politics. I think because the incumbent government directly and intentionally wanted to benefit from anti-EU sentiment, and more, from creating anti-EU sentiment during the financial crisis, the populist right-wing government accused the EU of forcing the incoming government to bring about this consolidation against

³⁴⁰ Interview with Respondent 13, Political Director, Hungarian Civil Society Organization; Budapest, interview conducted on October 3rd, 2013.

the interests of the Hungarian people. Of course the result of that is that the acceptance and respect towards EU institutions declined.”³⁴¹

On the other hand, a different respondent had the following to say:

“Hungarians have their own identity; we are on one hand in the middle of a lot of Slavic countries, and on the other hand, we are close to the German countries. So in order to keep our identity we have to fight sometimes. These kind of fights with the European Commission are supported by Hungarians, and it is interesting because when Hungary joined the EU it had one of the highest levels of support for the EU, so they were very optimistic, and maybe it was a bit excessive.”³⁴²

In this sense, Orban’s attacks on critics from the EU and the Hungarian civil society, rather than being a reactive move to delegitimize any critique of his policies from actors outside of the government, are instead a reflection of deep-seated feelings among the Hungarian people. However, this still supports the argument that Orban and Fidesz have tapped into unresolved nationalistic sentiments amongst the Hungarian people in order to cement these policies.

What is also important to consider is the relationship between the populist radical-right Jobbik party and Fidesz. Both groups have been at pains to distance themselves from one another rhetorically; Jobbik have repeatedly attacked Orban and Fidesz, equating them with every other political party in the country whilst setting

³⁴¹ Interview with Respondent 14, Campaign Director, Hungarian Political Party; Budapest, interview conducted on October 4th, 2013.

³⁴² Interview with Respondent 19, Editor in Chief, Hungarian business newspaper; Budapest, interview conducted on December 13th 2013

themselves up as the only support true alternative in the parliament to this “consensus”.³⁴³ For their part, Fidesz have issued several statements emphasizing their distance from, and opposition to, Jobbik. For instance, immediately prior to the 2010 elections, Orban described Jobbik as a party with “...violence written on its flag” which serves merely to discredit the Hungarian right wing.³⁴⁴ In the lead up to the 2014 elections, he again criticized the group as being “racist” and “deeply un-Christian”.³⁴⁵ However, several authors have described the influence that Jobbik have had on Fidesz’s policies. Biro Nagy et. al., for instance, argued that Fidesz policies after their election in 2010 clearly overlapped in several areas with the pre-election platform of Jobbik (rather than their own), including some of their reforms related to the regulation and control of the media, their creation of a national holiday commemorating the Treaty of Trianon, and their increasingly anti-European (or at least, anti-EU) foreign policy stances.³⁴⁶ According to the authors of this piece, a possible reason for this large-scale implementation of Jobbik policies by Fidesz may be that they are trying to circumvent a potentially dangerous challenger to their political dominance by offering a policy platform which would prevent Jobbik from coaxing away more radical Fidesz

³⁴³ Jobbik: (2012) “Gabor Vona re-elected as the president of the Jobbik party”, *Jobbik: The Movement for a Better Hungary*, [online], available at: http://www.jobbik.com/gabor_vona_re-elected_president_jobbik_party (accessed on 6/24/2014). See also, Jobbik: (2013) “Fidesz and MSZP ally against Turanic nations”, *Jobbik: The Movement for a Better Hungary*, [online], available at: http://www.jobbik.com/fidesz_and_mszp_ally_against_turanic_nations (accessed on 6/24/2014)

³⁴⁴ Veronika Gulyas: (2009) “Hungary’s Center-Right Fidesz Clearly Separates Itself From Far-Right Jobbik Party”, *The Wall Street Journal: Emerging Europe*, [online], available at: <http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingEurope/2009/12/14/hungary%E2%80%99s-center-right-fidesz-clearly-separates-itself-from-far-right-jobbik-party/> (accessed on 6/24/2014)

³⁴⁵ Budapest Times: (2013) “Orban notices Jobbik ‘racism’”, *The Budapest Times*, [online], available at: <http://budapesttimes.hu/2013/03/08/orban-notices-jobbik-racism/> (accessed on 6/24/2014)

³⁴⁶ András Bíró Nagy; Tamás Boros; Zoltán Vasali: (2013) “More Radical than the Radicals: the Jobbik Party in international comparison”, in Ralf Melzer; Sebastian Serafin (eds.) *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 245-247

supporters.³⁴⁷ This, then, would mirror the approach that Balogh argues Fidesz took in 2002 in dealing with the radical predecessor of Jobbik, The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (or MIÉP), when they moved their policies to the right, and in so doing, cut into the electoral support of MIÉP to the point that they failed to meet the vote threshold required to achieve parliamentary representation in the elections of that year.³⁴⁸ Balogh also states that it is a goal of Fidesz to eventually create a party which caters to all shades of right-wing opinions, including radical and extremist views; this flirtation with the policies of MIÉP and Jobbik can thus be characterized as an attempt to integrate the supporters of these parties into the Fidesz camp.³⁴⁹ In a separate article, Balogh notes the significant overlaps between the attitudes of young Fidesz and Jobbik voters, particularly in terms of their propensity for chauvinistic and nationalistic beliefs.³⁵⁰

However, it is possible to conceive of an extra layer of Fidesz's relationships and interactions with Jobbik and other parties from the Hungarian radical, beyond that which was outlined above. Without implementing some of the nationalistic policies of these radical parties, Fidesz's adoption of nationalistic discourse would seem hollow and would lack credibility. The introduction of legislation such as the citizenship law and the creation of the National Unity Day commemorating the Trianon Treaty thus serves to bolster Fidesz's (and Orban's) patriotic credentials. Thus, when the party

³⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 248-249

³⁴⁸ Eva S. Balogh: (2009) "The Hungarian Right: Fidesz, Jobbik, and MIÉP", *Hungarian Spectrum: Reflections on Politics, Economics and Culture*, [online], available at: <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2009/05/01/the-hungarian-right-fidesz-jobbik-and-miep/> (accessed on 6/25/2014)

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Eva S. Balogh: (2014) "Young Jobbik and Fidesz sympathizers have a great deal in common", *Hungarian Spectrum: Reflections on Politics, Economics and Culture*, [online], available at: <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2014/05/18/young-jobbik-and-fidesz-sympathizers-have-a-great-deal-in-common/> (accessed on 6/25/2014)

attacks particular civil society organizations as being agents of ‘meddling foreigners’ and tries to threaten their access to funding³⁵¹, or when Orban describes Brussels as “the new Moscow” and alleges that the EU is trying to colonize Hungary³⁵², such statements carry greater weight amongst nationalistic circles in the country. In this way, Orban is able to effectively tap into these unresolved and powerful emotions in such a way that he can credibly present himself as the defender of the Hungarian nation, and in so doing, rally public support for his controversial political reforms.

Given all of this, there is reason to expect that hypothesis 2 has relatively strong evidentiary support, and that the decline in democratic standards in Hungary is primarily a result of activity by the mainstream political elites, and Fidesz in specific. One caveat must be noted, however: whilst a proactive demand on the part of the population for these constitutional and political reforms does not exist in Hungary, the activities of Fidesz are still not completely independent of the general public. They are the drivers of this relationship; through their rhetoric and their offers of policy concessions to nationalistic elements, they create a reactive demand for these reforms. Additionally, these mainstream elites tap into the unresolved nationalist feelings of the Hungarian people to validate and legitimate their (increasingly authoritarian) rule. Comparison with the Czech case in the coming chapters is necessary to decipher the importance of this issue as opposed to others.

³⁵¹ Marton Dunai; Balazs Koranyi: (2014) “Hungary raids NGOs, accuses Norway of political meddling”, *Reuters*, [online], available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-hungary-norway-funding-ngo-idUSKBN0ED1QW20140602> (accessed on 6/25/2014). See also, Benjamin Novak: (2014) “Janos Lazar accuses Norway of interfering in Hungary’s domestic affairs”, *Budapest Beacon*, [online], available at: <http://budapestbeacon.com/featured-articles/janos-lazar-accuses-norway-of-interfering-in-hungarys-domestic-affairs/> (accessed on 6/25/2014).

³⁵² Deutsche Welle: (2013) “Moving right in Hungary”, *DW.de*, [online], available at: <http://www.dw.de/moving-right-in-hungary/a-16563266> (accessed on 6/26/2014)

Testing hypothesis 3: the continued commitment of Hungarian elites to strengthening the rule of law in the country post-accession

The past two hypotheses that were tested related to the “breakdown” of democracy in Hungary, and consider whether the issues that have been witnessed in the country over the past several years are a case of the de-consolidation of democracy in the country. In a sense, they take it as given that liberal democracy was consolidated in Hungary, and that the present situation is one whereby a new regime has emerged in the state. With this in mind, it is important to analyze the other hypotheses which consider the extent to which liberal democracy became consolidated in Hungary in the first place. The third hypothesis focuses on the issue of the rule of law in the country. As was established in chapters two and three, the strength of the rule of law in a country is strongly correlated with its continued democratic consolidation. As a part of its accession to the EU, Hungary was required to introduce a number of reforms aimed at achieving this very thing. However, upon the achievement of membership, while it was hoped by the EU that the new member states would continue the reform process post-accession, there was no longer any obligation on these countries to continue with their efforts. As such, the impetus for this would necessarily have to come from the states themselves. In order to see if this hypothesis holds, it is necessary to show that once the pressure of EU conditionality was removed, that efforts to improve the standard of the judiciary and of the rule of law in Hungary declined or at least stagnated. This would then indicate that there are issues regarding the internalization and consolidation of democratic norms, specifically those related to the rule of law, that are contributing to the problems in Hungary at present.

One of the obvious issues related to the standard of the rule of law in a country is the level of corruption. As was noted earlier in the introduction to this study, corruption levels in Hungary have slightly improved ever since the early 2000s (according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index), although it is still a relatively stagnant line. This does not necessarily mean that consolidation has not occurred; as was stated earlier, corruption is a somewhat 'sticky' problem which can be very resistant to improvement, even in countries with relatively strong and well-established judicial systems. Additionally, when asked to evaluate the problem of corruption in Hungarian society, interview respondents tended to downplay the phenomenon as a major issue in Hungarian politics. Respondent 7, a political consultant, had this to say:


"I would say that corruption has had a bigger impact on the quality of the decisions, and not truly the democracy. If you see the elections, so far they are free and fair so in the overall working of democracy in the last twenty years, I wouldn't say that corruption has been the biggest problem... We just had a study last month and what we saw is that the biggest drops in popularity were always related to undemocratic measures, and very rarely to do with corruption cases. If I was to sum it up as to how average people see it in Hungary, it is like "all politicians are corrupt, so let's see what they can do. If they can do something good I will vote for them, if they can't I won't, but they're all corrupt so that's not something that will really bother me.""³⁵³

³⁵³ Interview with Respondent 7, Political Consultant, Hungarian Political Consultancy; Budapest, interview conducted on September 12th, 2013

As such, it is important to look at other aspects of the rule of law, such as the independence of the judiciary and the quality of decision-making by Hungarian judges. Several datasets compile data on these variables. ‘Judicial Framework and Independence’ is a major variable in the Freedom House Nations in Transit index; the Bertelsmann Transformations Index and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project also compile ‘Independent Judiciary’ scores. Graphs displaying these scores can be found on the following page. Each of these three organizations paints a similar picture: Hungary retains the minimum level of independence in its judiciary that one would expect from a democracy. In addition, the more nuanced Bertelsmann and Freedom House indices both show that there have been continuing disimprovements in terms of these standards since the achievement of EU membership in 2004. However, this trend has been particularly noticeable since the election of Fidesz in 2010. According to both of these measures, while the standard of judicial independence may have declined slightly shortly after 2004, it was not until either 2010 or 2011 that this trend became particularly worrying. Additionally, all of these measures show that prior to this, the standard of the Hungarian judiciary was quite high. Indeed, according to the Nations in Transit Index, when compared to other new EU member states, Hungary consistently compared well to its peers (see figure 4.5 on page 189). However, since 2010, its score has disimproved at a sharper rate than any of the other states.

While this may indicate support for this hypothesis, this needs to be somewhat tempered. While Hungarian standards have obviously declined after 2010, there is no reason to believe that this is because the rule of law was less consolidated than in any of the other CEE member states that joined the EU in 2004, given the high scores

Figure 4.4: Graphs displaying the independence of the judiciary in Hungary




³⁵⁴ According to the CIRI Human Rights Data Project codebook, a score of two (or a fully independent judiciary) requires the following attributes: 1) The right to rule on the constitutionality of legislative acts and executive decrees. 2) Judges have a minimum of a seven-year tenure. 3) The President or Minister of Justice cannot directly appoint or remove judges. 4) Actions of the executive and legislative branch can be challenged in the courts. 5) All court hearings are public. 6) Judgeships are held by professionals. David L. Cingranelli; David L. Richards: (2014) "The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual Version 5.20.14", *CIRI Human Rights Data Project*, [online], available at: <http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html> (accessed on 6/29/2014)

³⁵⁵ Figures taken from Freedom House's Nations in Transit reports, between 2003 and 2014; scores are awarded based on a scale from 1-7, with 1 representing the highest possible level of judicial independence, and 7 representing the lowest possible level. Freedom House: (2014) "Hungary", *Nations in Transit*, [online], available at: http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/hungary#.U6_0pJRdWSp; http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2004/hungary#.U6_zKZRdWSo [accessed on 6/29/2014]

³⁵⁶ Figures taken from the Bertelsmann Transformations index, collected bi-annually between 2003 and 2014; Scores are awarded from a scale of 0-10, with 10 being the highest possible level of judicial independence. Bertelsmann Transformation Index: (2014) "Transformation Index 2014", *BTI 2014*, [online], available for download at: <http://www.bti-project.org/index/> (accessed on 6/29/2014)

Hungary received from 2003 to 2009. It is quite possible that what this graph suggests is that constant reform and vigilance is needed in these member states for a certain period in order to cement these improvements, and that without this, the courts in these countries may fall victim to the machinations of powerful political or social actors. In that sense, these findings might then provide more support for hypothesis 2 (that the growing authoritarianization of Hungary is a result of conscious activities by the Fidesz party, rather than any other societal group). As such, there is potentially mild support for the third hypothesis; that the reason for Hungary's illiberal turn is that there was a greater commitment and dedication to legislative and judicial reform in other countries after accession to the EU than there was in Hungary, thus allowing Hungary to slip back drastically after its accession. However, in order to conclusively show this, it will be necessary to cross-examine these findings with the case of the Czech Republic.

*Figure 4.5: Standards of the Judicial Framework and Independence in new EU Member States*³⁵⁷



³⁵⁷ All figures are taken from the Nations in Transit index. Several countries have not been included for the sake of clarity, as their trend lines heavily overlapped with other states. The Czech Republic's score is included in a similar graph in chapter 5.

Testing hypothesis 4: the importance of mass-level attitudes towards liberal democratic values

As was stated in the introduction of this study, a consolidated liberal democratic regime is one where the state institutions and democratically-elected rulers of a country respect juridical liberties on their powers and the political liberties of all citizens, and whereby such a specific situation has become accepted, normalized and socialized by the broader society in that state. In this sense, the attitudes and values of the general public in such a state is equally important as the activities of its political elites. Thus, in order for liberal democracy to become deeply rooted in a country, it needs the masses to have strongly internalized the values associated with it.

From this, the attention then turns to the values and beliefs of the general public in Hungary. Thus, it becomes necessary to evaluate the extent to which liberal democracy became consolidated at the mass level of Hungarian society. In order to test for the extent of liberal consolidation in Hungarian society, it is possible to examine the opinions of people and their attitudes towards various different phenomena associated with liberal democratic values. For the purposes of this, I include the position of Hungarian people towards groups from outside the traditional mainstream of the country, such as homosexuals and immigrants; the levels of trust towards other people; the interest of people in politics³⁵⁸, and their propensity to engage in petition-writing or

³⁵⁸ This is used as a proxy indicator for the amount of influence people feel they can have on politics in their own state; several studies show a link between the interest of people in politics and their belief in their ability to effect and bring about political change, and also demonstrate that politically interested people are more likely to demand opportunities to engage in and involve themselves in the political decision-making process. See Thomas J. Johnson; Barbara K. Kaye: (2003) "A Boost or Bust for Democracy? How the Web Influenced Political Attitudes and Behaviors in the 1996 and 2000 Presidential Elections", *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 8(3), pp. 18-19; Shaun Bowler; Todd

public demonstrations; the likelihood of people to participate in social and/or civic organizations and activities; and the general satisfaction of these people with their lives and with the performance of the state in different areas. The data from this is gathered from the six rounds of the European Social Survey that were carried out between 2002 and 2012. Should this hypothesis hold, one would expect to see a particularly low presence of these values in Hungary. Additionally, it will also be necessary to compare these results with results from the Czech Republic; if there are significantly lower levels of these attitudes in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, this would then indicate that there is support for this hypothesis.

The measure of these values is presented in table 4.2 on the following page. The figure for “tolerance towards immigration” is a composite variable, consisting of reactions by respondents to the European Social Survey to questions covering the following topics: whether to allow more or less immigrants from ethnic groups other than that of the national majority; whether to allow more or less immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe; and whether or not immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live. The scale for the two questions regarding the acceptability of more or less immigrants in the country runs from 1 (more favorable to allowing immigrants to come to the country) to 4 (less favorable to immigration); meanwhile, the scale for the question regarding whether immigrants make the country better or worse runs from 0 (makes the country worse) to 10 (makes the country better). As these scales are different, I then turn these responses into percentages (as in, the percentage

Donovan; Jeffrey A. Karp: (2007) “Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies”, *Political Research Quarterly*, 60(3), pp. 355-356.

of respondents expressing a more positive or more negative response to the question of immigration) and average them out. On the question as to whether immigration makes the country better or worse, I consider '5' to be a neutral response, and thus, I exclude it from my analysis. Once I have percentages for those expressing favorable and less favorable opinions towards immigrants, I find the mean for these three figures.

An analysis of these figures shows rather little deviation from each survey to the next, as the attitudes of Hungarian citizens remain quite static. Several of these variables were analyzed earlier in this chapter (such as the level of satisfaction with the democratic performance of the state, the level of satisfaction with the economy of the state, and the level of interpersonal trust in the state (see table 4.1, p. 167; figure 4.3, p. 168). As such, I will focus more on examining the other variables presented in this table. If we look at the footnotes on the following page, interest in politics is scored on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 meaning that the respondent is "very interested" in politics, while a 4 means the opposite. As such, a mean figure between 1 and 2.5 for this variable would represent a more interested polity as regards politics, while a figure between 2.5 and 4 would reflect less interest (as 2.5 is the midpoint between 1 and 4). With this having been established, then, it is clear from these statistics that there is a somewhat low level of interest in politics throughout Hungary, as the six rounds of the European Social Survey that are examined all show that the mean of the responses consistently edges towards 4, round on round (see figure 4.6). The first three rounds of the survey (2002, 2005, and 2006/2007) are not quite as problematic, as in each of these cases, the mean remains very close to 2.5. From the 2009 round onwards, however, the trend is for interest in politics to decline quite severely. This culminates in 2012, when the mean response in Hungary is just over 3, meaning the average person in Hungary has hardly

Table 4.2: the presence of values associated with liberal democracy in Hungarian society

Year	Levels of interpersonal trust		Interest in politics ³⁵⁹		Participation in a political group in the previous 12 months ³⁶⁰		Participation in a civic group in the previous 12 months ³⁶¹		Participation in lawful demonstrations in the previous 12 months ³⁶²		Satisfaction with the state of the economy in the country ³⁶³		Satisfaction with the state of democracy in the country ³⁶⁴		Homosexuals free to live as they please ³⁶⁵		Tolerance towards immigrants	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Positive	Negative
2002	4.08	2.39	2.63	.862	1.97	.168	1.99	.167	1.96	.188	4.09	2.01	4.85	2.32	2.79	1.26	13.7	73.2
2005	4.11	2.28 ₆	2.74	.931	1.99	.095	1.98	.135	1.98	.127	3.21	1.94 ₂	4.1	2.21	2.75	1.26 ₇	18.8	68.8
2006 2007	4.33	2.55 ₈	2.71	.924	1.98	.154	1.99	.111	1.96	.19	2.84	2.08 ₉	3.52	2.45 ₈	2.74	1.28 ₂	n/a	n/a
2009	4.09	2.33	2.8	.916	1.99	.09	1.95	.219	1.98	.133	1.78	1.82 ₄	3.01	2.38	2.87	1.31 ₈	16.7	73.3
2010	4.48	2.325	2.79	.901	1.97	.158	1.93	.249	1.97	.162	3.16	1.982	4.42	2.332	2.69	1.222	18.1	69.7
2012	4.8	2.352	3.06	.859	1.99	.103	1.97	.177	1.96	.185	3.35	2.294	4.5	2.49	2.84	1.292	22.7	65.2

³⁵⁹ This figure is based on responses to indicating the extent of the respondent's interest in politics. Respondents were asked to assign a value between 1 and 4 that indicated their level of interest in politics, with 1 indicating "very interested", and 4 indicating "not at all interested". The figures listed indicate the mean of these responses, and the standard deviation.

³⁶⁰ Interviewees were asked whether or not they had participated in a political or political action group in the past 12 months. A figure of 1 indicates 'yes', a figure of 2 indicates 'no'. The figures listed in this table are the mean of the responses, and the standard deviation.

³⁶¹ Interviewees were asked whether or not they had participated in a civic organization (or in some other form of organization) in the past 12 months. A figure of 1 indicates 'yes', a figure of 2 indicates 'no'. The figures listed in this table are the mean of the responses, and the standard deviation.

³⁶² Interviewees were asked whether or not they had participated in a lawful demonstration in the past 12 months. A figure of 1 indicates 'yes', a figure of 2 indicates 'no'. The figures listed in this table are the mean of the responses, and the standard deviation.

³⁶³ Interviewees were asked to evaluate on a scale from 0-10 how satisfied they were with the economic performance of their country over the previous 12 months (with 0 representing extreme dissatisfaction and 10 representing total satisfaction). Figures provided here include the mean and the standard deviation.


³⁶⁴ Interviewees were asked to evaluate on a scale from 0-10 how satisfied they were with the functioning of democracy in their country over the previous 12 months (with 0 representing extreme dissatisfaction and 10 representing total satisfaction). Figures provided here include the mean and the standard deviation.

³⁶⁵ Interviewees were asked to indicate on a scale from 1-5 the extent of their agreement with the following statement: "Gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish". A response of 1 indicates strong agreement with this statement (i.e. a more tolerant attitude to sexual minorities), while a response of 5 indicates strong disagreement. The figure listed in the table indicates the mean and the standard deviation of these responses.

any interest in politics at all. Based on this, it is possible to say that while the average level of interest in politics is low (but not abnormally so) between 2002 and 2010, by 2012, the average level of interest is particularly low throughout the country. This potentially indicates that Hungarians increasingly feel that they cannot influence politics in their state, an attitude which is somewhat incompatible with the effective functioning of a liberal democratic political system.

Curiously, the attitude towards homosexuals that was displayed by the respondents to the survey was consistently quite positive. The scale for this variable runs from 1 to 5, meaning that a mean value between 1 and 3 would indicate a more favorable attitude on the part of Hungarian society towards homosexuals, while a score between 3 and 5 would indicate a more hostile environment. In this instance, responses to the European Social Survey have been somewhat remarkable in their continued (albeit mildly tenuous) support for the rights of homosexuals. As can be seen in figure 4.7, support for the chosen lifestyles of homosexuals has remained almost exactly the same, slightly positive level throughout the six rounds of the European Social Survey. In a way, this is a very counter-intuitive phenomenon. Given the very high levels of


Figure 4.6: The level of societal interest in politics in Hungary



support for radical and extremist right-wing political movements in the country, and the socially-conservative outlook of the most popular political party in the country (i.e. Fidesz), one would have expected that there would be much lower levels of support for homosexuals in the country. Given this reasonably positive attitude towards sexual minorities in the country, it is possible to draw one of two conclusions: either there is a healthy tolerance for diversity in Hungarian society, or the influence of more authoritarian and conservative religious organizations (such as the Roman Catholic Church or some of the more austere versions of Protestantism) is low. In either case, the broadly positive attitude of Hungarian people towards homosexuals is a comparatively positive phenomenon for the existence of liberal democracy in the country, and potentially shows that there was consolidation of some liberal democratic values before and after the accession of Hungary to the European Union.

The final variable that is examined here is the tolerance of Hungarian society towards immigrants and immigration. Hungary is generally not a very big target for immigrants, although it is not completely unheard of either: according to Eurostat, in 2009, Hungary received the 13th most immigrants in the Union, with less inward


Figure 4.7: The level of societal approval of homosexuality in Hungary



migration than its neighboring states of Austria and the Czech Republic, but more than Slovakia and Slovenia.³⁶⁶ Based on this, it is reasonable to expect that responses from the European Social Survey would be based on some sort of genuine understanding of the merits (or demerits) of immigration for the country, rather than being merely a reflection of uninformed prejudices about a phenomenon which the respondents are unlikely to have much (if any) direct experience of.

The results of the survey are summarized graphically in figure 4.8. As was stated above, the responses to three questions related to immigration have been compiled into a composite variable. Additionally, the sharp dip in both trend lines in 2006/2007 is a result of the absence from the third round of the European Social Survey of responses relating to immigration. As one can see from this, a far different picture is painted in

Figure 4.8: The level of societal positivity and negativity towards immigration in Hungary



³⁶⁶ Eurostat: (2013) "Immigration by main citizenship group", *European Commission- Eurostat*, [online], available at: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Immigration_by_main_citizenship_group_2010_\(1\).png&filetimestamp=20130204085131](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Immigration_by_main_citizenship_group_2010_(1).png&filetimestamp=20130204085131) (accessed on 2/18/2013)

this case than in the case of Hungarian attitudes towards homosexuals. In this case, it is quite obvious that the citizenry harbors much more negative feelings towards immigrants and immigration, with the graph consistently showing much greater levels of negativity. Interestingly, the situation does improve somewhat after 2009, as the two lines begin to converge from this point onwards. Even with this, however, it seems that respect for non-nationals in Hungary is relatively tenuous. These findings somewhat counteract the more positive attitude of Hungarians towards homosexuals, and suggests that the tolerance of sexual minorities in the country, rather than being an indicator of positivity towards diversity, may actually reflect the lack of influence of religious authorities in the country, as was suggested above.

When taken collectively, then, there is strong reason to believe that liberal democratic values were not particularly deeply consolidated in Hungary by 2004; each of the variables (with the exception of the societal acceptance of homosexuality) is rather low. Additionally, the situation does not seem to improve much: while there is a trend of growing acceptance of immigrants and immigration, the level of interest in politics declined quite noticeably over the same time period, while support for the rights of sexual minorities remained relatively static. Based on this, it is possible to suggest that the consolidation of liberal democracy had not been completed at the mass level in Hungary upon its accession to the EU.

Testing hypothesis 5: the role of civil society actors in the internalization of liberal democratic norms in Hungary

The final hypothesis that will be discussed is the role that civil society has played in Hungary, both in terms of the democratization and consolidation process, and the

subsequent decline in democratic standards in the country after 2010. As was stated earlier in this dissertation, one of the most important phases in the life-cycle of a norm is the ‘internalization’ phase. Internalization comes about through a number of channels, including through activities at the political elite and institutional level, but also through the activities of ‘socializing forces’.³⁶⁷ Such socializing forces can often be found amongst the civil society actors, who allow people to engage with, and exert influence upon, issues that are particularly interesting or important to them. In this sense, then, civil society can be characterized as the potential ‘normative partners’ of a particular norm entrepreneur (especially an external entrepreneur, such as an international organization or another state), helping to embed and deepen the societal acceptance of a norm that has been introduced to the country. Within the context of the accession of the post-communist CEE countries to the EU, it is the civil society that should ideally have acted as the partner of the EU, building support for the reforms associated with EU accession at the grassroots levels and educating the citizenry about the rights, responsibilities, demands and rewards that came with these norms.

A number of points have already been established earlier in this dissertation about the role of civil society in Central Europe during this time period. First, in chapter 1, it was shown that efforts by the EU to develop were relatively weak and inconsistent, resulting in this sector being ignored (at least when compared to the EU’s efforts to transfer its norms to the elite level of these countries, and to ensure their internalization at the ‘top end’ of these societies’). Another point that was made earlier was that there

³⁶⁷ Andrew P. Cortell; James W. Davis Jr.: (2002) “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda”, *International Studies Review*, 2(1), pp. 72-73

is not necessarily always a directly positive link between the development of civil society in a country and its standard of democracy, and that in certain cases, such as when (particularly strong) civil society actors act in a manner that prevents other actors (and thus, a truly pluralist civil sector) from emerging, this can actually have negative consequences for democracy. Additionally, the term ‘civil society’ covers a very broad range of organizations, including sporting and cultural bodies. Such organizations are not likely to be particularly relevant to the internalization of norms specifically related to liberal democracy in a country. Instead, what is more important to focus on are the sort of groups that, as part of their *raison d’être*, involve themselves explicitly and directly with issues relevant to liberal democratic norms. These might include organizations with a specifically pro-European integration outlook (such as the European Movement), or groups that are involved in democracy promotion, human rights, civil liberties, women’s rights, and minority integration/protection. As these are all organizations that hold values similar to those which are espoused by the EU, and which are explicitly mentioned in the Copenhagen Criteria, it is reasonable to expect that these organizations would be the sort of ‘normative partners’ the EU would have been relying on to help in the internalization of its norms in the new member states. Additionally, it is also important to consider the level and strength of the opposition that these groups receive, whether it is from the state, or from other civil society groups.

Several authors have noted the continuing weakness of civil society in the post-communist states of Europe. Marc Morje Howard, for instance, has repeatedly emphasized the low levels of societal participation in such civic groups throughout the region, and has argued that this can lead to a potential weakening of the democratic consolidation process by lowering the influence regular citizens can have and by

slowing the development of “civic skills”.³⁶⁸ This is supported by Petrova and Tarrow, who claim that “...even when different types of organizational participation are reviewed separately, the postsocialist mean is much lower than that of older democracies and postauthoritarian countries for all types of participation, except for labor unions, where East European countries rank higher than postauthoritarian ones”.³⁶⁹ They confirm Morjé Howard’s fears, stating that “...East Europeans have developed few of the civic skills that are believed to be important for supporting a democratic system”.³⁷⁰ Rose-Ackermann also notes the lack of strength among civil organizations in the region, stating that this has facilitated the emergence of partisan governments, which seek to reward their supporters whilst punishing their opponents.³⁷¹ However, this is not to say that civil society is uniformly ineffective and worthless in the region; Petrova and Tarrow do note that civil society organizations in the region have been quite effective at developing ties, both with other groups from the civic sector, and also with public officials and policy-makers.³⁷² Additionally, civil society has been instrumental in preventing democratic decay in other countries in the region, notably in Slovakia, where non-governmental organizations were able to help mobilize the society, and to assist in the opposition to the efforts of Vladimír Mečiar to roll back the democratic reforms in the state.³⁷³

³⁶⁸ Marc Morjé Howard: (2003) *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 151-152; See also, Marc Morjé Howard: (2002) “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society”, *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1), pp. 157-158

³⁶⁹ Tsveta Petrova; Sidney Tarrow: (2007) “Transactional and participatory activism in the emerging European polity: the puzzle of East-Central Europe”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(1), p. 76

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 78

³⁷¹ Susan Rose-Ackerman: (2007) “From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe: Public Participation and the Role of Civil Society”, *East European Politics and Societies*, 21(1), p. 34

³⁷² Tsveta Petrova; Sidney Tarrow: (2007) “Transactional and participatory activism in the emerging European polity: the puzzle of East-Central Europe”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(1), p. 79

³⁷³ Jacques Rupnik: (1999) “The Postcommunist Divide”, *Journal of Democracy*, 10(1), p. 60

As such, it is possible to conceive of two ways in which civil society can assist in the internalization of liberal democratic norms in a state. The first way, the traditional understanding of its role, is for it to grow in size, and through direct political pressure and discourse formation, to allow ordinary citizens to exert influence on the state in a proactive manner. The second way is for it to act as a ‘safety net’, and to prevent and guard against the worst excesses of the political elites in the state. In this sense, it assists internalization in a more reactive manner, by preventing the abandonment of these norms and by keeping them on the agenda until a more favorable environment emerges where these norms can be fully internalized.

Based on this, it is necessary to test the level to which Hungarian civil society has been able to act in either way as a normative partner for the EU. This is done through an examination of responses from interviewees, who were asked a variety of questions about several issues related to civil society. These responses were coded and analyzed using nVivo 10, a qualitative data management program. Responses that were related to civil society were included in a node entitled ‘civil society’; a second node, entitled ‘liberal democracy’, also contained some references to civil society, although the emphasis of this node was more on other issues. Additionally, within the ‘civil society’, I created two ‘child’ or sub-nodes, which categorized the positive and negative mentions by the respondents of issues related to the Hungarian civil society. I first use a basic ‘word cloud’ of the parent ‘civil society’ node to examine what broader, underlying themes associated with civil society are most frequently mentioned. This is displayed in figure 4.9 on the following page. While this is not the most insightful method of examining the discourses surrounding civil society in Hungary, it does shed some light on the most important issues related to this sector. Certain terms like

‘society’, ‘civil’, ‘organizations’, and ‘Hungary’, unsurprisingly, appear very commonly, as a result of the very nature of the questions being asked. Two specific NGOs also feature: the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee. This is most likely a reflection of the high-profile role these two organizations have played in opposing the legislative efforts made by the Hungarian government in 2010 to undermine the power of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.³⁷⁴ What is more interesting is the frequency of use of terms related specifically to the two functions of civil society described above. The relevant terms here include ‘watchdog’, ‘advocacy’, and ‘democracy’. The word cloud indicates that these terms are not particularly heavily used, but it also shows that the term ‘watchdog’ is used noticeably more frequently than ‘advocacy’ or ‘democracy’. This may indicate that issues related to the ‘safety net’ role of Hungarian civil society may be given somewhat more

Figure 4.9: word frequency cloud displaying common themes mentioned by Hungarian interviewees, and collected in the parent ‘Civil Society’ node³⁷⁵

³⁷⁴ In 2010, the HCLU and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee were amongst a group of five non-governmental organizations (the others being Transparency International, the Eötvös Károly Policy Institute, and the K-Monitor Association) that penned an open letter to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, expressing their consternation at the Fidesz-driven restrictions of the powers of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Subsequently, the HCLU and the Helsinki Committee were amongst the co-signatories of a letter to the European Parliament which sought to expose supposed ‘lies’ committed by the Hungarian government in their response to the Tavares Report. Hungarian Civil Liberties Union: (2013) “The Truth About the Tavares Report”, *Tarsasag a Szabadsagjokert [Hungarian Civil Liberties Union]*, [online], available at: <http://tasz.hu/node/3568> (accessed on 7/11/2014); See also, Hungarian Helsinki Committee: (2010) “Hungarian NGOs turn to Council of Europe”, *Hungarian Helsinki Committee*, [online], available at: <http://helsinki.hu/en/hungarian-ngos-turn-to-council-of-europe> (accessed on 7/11/2014).

³⁷⁵ Words less than four letters long were omitted from the search, so as to prevent the word cloud being populated with irrelevant consonants and verbs.

With this noted, it is important to then turn to the two ‘child’ nodes, which each contain positive statements and negative statements by respondents in regards to the state of Hungarian civil society, respectively. Again, a word cloud is used to display basic themes and ideas relating to these two nodes; these will later be examined in closer detail. Figure 4.10 displays the results from the ‘positive’ sub-node. This sheds greater light on several phenomena. One of the most noticeable terms which appears is the word ‘important’, indicating that several respondents argued that Hungarian civil society was important in some way. Additionally, terms like ‘watchdog’, ‘accountable’,

and ‘criticizing’ are quite heavily featured. In contrast, terms like ‘advocacy’, ‘democracy’ and ‘constitutional’, which would more likely refer to the discourse formation role of civil society, barely feature. This would thus imply that the safety-net functions of Hungarian civil society are indeed more important than discourse formation activities. This does not mean that respondents would identify these safety net functions as being explicitly more important and effective; more accurately, it means that when asked about the role of civil society, interviewees only mentioned the watchdog functions, and neglected to consider the advocacy and education roles. For instance, when asked about the role of civil society in Hungary over the previous six years, one respondent had the following to say:

“It is difficult to say. On one hand there are these civil organizations with this watchdog function that are helping to provide accountable feedback for the government and for other governmental organizations, they are also preparing several reports, and on the other hand they are providing services to the different groups of society, but there are so few groups like this in society.”³⁷⁶

Another respondent, answering a question about what role he saw for NGOs and civil

Figure 4.10: word frequency cloud displaying common themes mentioned by Hungarian interviewees, and collected in the ‘positive mentions’ sub-node of the ‘Civil Society’ node

³⁷⁶ Interview with Respondent 9, Former Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs; Brussels, interview conducted on September 24th, 2013.



society in Hungary, said:

“From our point of view, organizations like the HCLU and Helsinki are very important. They were very brave to raise their voices against previous governments and previous mistakes and of course the incumbent government as well. We don’t want to use their public credit but we can help them as much as possible, and it is very important and beneficial for our quality of democracy, even in its deteriorated situation, to see these organizations criticizing these governments, the old status quo, and so on.”³⁷⁷

The word cloud for negative statements is displayed in figure 4.11 on the following page. In this case, the themes are far more disparate, with no major trends

³⁷⁷ Interview with Respondent 14, Campaign Director, Hungarian political party; Budapest, interview conducted on October 4th, 2013

immediately apparent. However, when one delves more deeply and examines the interview responses in greater detail, several particular issues are mentioned repeatedly by respondents. One of these is the lack of connection between Hungarian civil society organizations and members of the broader citizenry, which was noted by respondents 11, 13, and 17. Respondent 11 had the following to say when asked about the role of such organizations in Hungary, before and after accession to the EU:

“The impact of these organizations in reaching people is limited. They can only reach out to the intellectual elite, but cannot reach the common people. Maybe they helped the intellectual and political elite, but they had no impact on the general population.”³⁷⁸

Similarly, when asked about the impact the watchdog activities of Hungarian civil society had on the mindsets of the broader mainstream of society, respondent 13 made the following observation:

“...and the fact that the watchdog NGOS were shouting and sending messages to the Council of Europe was not a big deal to the average citizen.”³⁷⁹

Finally, respondent 17 had the following answer to a question about the level of activity of ‘watchdog’ and ‘advocacy’ organizations:

“...regarding the agenda or implementation of the advocacy programs, they are

Figure 4.11: word frequency cloud displaying common themes mentioned by Hungarian interviewees, and collected in the ‘negative mentions’ sub-node of the ‘Civil Society’ node

³⁷⁸ Interview with Respondent 11, Member of Commissioner’s Cabinet, European Commission; Brussels, interview conducted on September 24th, 2013

³⁷⁹ Interview with Respondent 13, Political Director, Hungarian Civil Society Organization; Budapest, interview conducted on October 3rd, 2013.



not ready. That means the local people are not involved in the planning process or the implementation, and advocacy organizations or watchdog organizations are somehow floating on the society, and as such are not rooted in the society.”³⁸⁰

Another recurring notion is the polarization of Hungarian civil society, and its consequences for the societal perception of these organizations. This was expressed by respondents 7, 13, 17, and 21. Respondent 7 said the following:

“And one more thing is that in Hungary, most of the NGOs are funded by the state or survive based on state aid, and this means that before the accession the state gave a lot of money for these kind of activities, and of course it was a driving force to establish the NGOs. So it’s not just the enthusiasm that

³⁸⁰ Interview with Respondent 17, Community Developer/Activist, International Civil Society Organization; Budapest, interview conducted on December 2nd, 2013

disappeared, but also the state funds... But where these funds are limited and where there are changes in government, no more financial aid and subsidies are given to these NGOs, their role has decreased. And you see now currently, the NGOs that have a bigger impact are the conservative or nationalistic ones.”³⁸¹

Respondent 13 developed on this point:

“However, many of our followers or readers are not our friends, but our enemies, and many of the Hungarian citizens feel or believe that the watchdog NGOs are very far from the everyday life of Hungarians, and are doing their job for the sake of the interest of the OSI [Open Society Institute], George Soros, and so on. So many citizens believe that what we say and the things we are talking about are not true.”³⁸²

Respondent 17 also added to this:

“The Hungarian civil society is traditionally over-politicized. So this is one of the main problems of the sector, as I see it. This is not a direct relationship, it simply means that from one end the Hungarian civil society organizations are dependent on state and local government funding, which is an obvious political dependency... Even the human rights and watchdog organizations like the Helsinki Committee and the HCLU were categorized in recent articles as being supported by foreign interests and George Soros and as being politically motivated... Obviously because of that, they lost their reputation for neutrality,

³⁸¹ Interview with Respondent 7, Political Consultant, Hungarian Political Consultancy; Budapest, interview conducted on September 12th, 2013

³⁸² Interview with Respondent 13, Political Director, Hungarian Civil Society Organization; Budapest, interview conducted on October 3rd, 2013.

but only as a result of the government's arguments that these organizations are not neutral, they are politically motivated, etc.”³⁸³

Respondent 21 confirmed this:

“Hungarian civil society has never been as effective as Bulgarian or Serbian or Polish civil society. It is relatively low activity. But even that is basically gone. This is for several reasons. First of all, the parties hijack almost every civil society organization, not this one, but they try to hijack all of them. Secondly, there is no money. The government gives money only to those that support them, their own NGOs. And this was the same with the other governments. Also the Western donors left. They thought “ok, it is done”, and then they left.”³⁸⁴

From this, we can begin to develop a general explanation about the effectiveness of Hungarian civil society as a normative partner for the EU. Based on the responses from the people interviewed for this project, it is possible to suggest that the role that has emerged for the Hungarian civil society has been that of a ‘safety net’, which seeks to perform watchdog functions and to prevent governments and political elites from abusing their powers. It is widely recognized by many of the respondents that this is a very important function, especially in the present climate. However, the effectiveness of these organizations has been quite low, and has been mitigated by its lack of a deep connection with Hungarian society-at-large, by a lack of access to resources and funding, and by its politicization and polarization. This latter point is arguably the most

³⁸³ Interview with Respondent 17, Community Developer/Activist, International Civil Society Organization; Budapest, interview conducted on December 2nd, 2013

³⁸⁴ Interview with Respondent 21, Intellectual/Political Analyst; Budapest, conducted on December 20th 2013

important problem, although it is demonstrably driven by the lack of access to funding; as organizations are generally deprived of funds (at least partially due to their lack of a meaningful connection with the Hungarian citizenry), this means that they are increasingly reliant on funding from the government, which (according to respondents 7, 17, and 22) awards funds based on political grounds. The alternative to this is that civil society organizations seek funding from external sources, particularly the Open Society Foundation; however, this can lead to a perception that these organizations are merely a tool of foreign interests, and can result in them being tarred with the idea that they are a threat to the Hungarian nation. In this sense, this polarization ties in very strongly with the approach of Viktor Orban and the Fidesz party (as was discussed between pages 155 and 167). As such, there is strong evidence supporting this hypothesis, and there is reason to believe that the weakness, polarization, and perceived lack of neutrality of the Hungarian civil society are a major reason for the decline in democratic standards of Hungary following 2004. Civil society has not been able to act as a normative partner for the EU, meaning that the norms that were promoted by the accession and enlargement process could not be internalized at any deep level. As a result, their continued existence in the form of policy and legislation became strongly contingent upon the activities of the Hungarian political elite.

Evaluation

Based on these findings, it is possible to make several preliminary suggestions. Hypotheses 2 (relating to the impact of mainstream political elites) and 5 (relating to the role of Hungarian civil society in internalizing the norms of the EU) seem to have strong evidentiary support, while there is potential support for hypothesis 4 (the

predisposition of Hungarian people to values associated with liberal democratic norms), mild support for hypothesis 3 (relating to the continuing post-accession commitment of Hungarian elites to the reform of the national judicial system), and somewhat scant evidence for hypothesis 1 (the relationship between economic 'hardship' and the extent of authoritarian-friendly values among Hungarian citizens). However, in order to fully test these hypotheses, it is still necessary to compare the findings of this chapter with findings from the Czech Republic, as will be done in the subsequent chapter.

Throughout this section of the project, there is a running theme of the impact of ethnic nationalism and chauvinism on democracy in Hungary. Nationalism was initially conducive to the emergence of democracy in the region during the mid- to late-19th Century, and both concepts were integral parts of the Hungarian drive for independence from the Habsburg Empire. However, upon the achievement of the dual monarchy, this situation began to change, as nationalism began to exert a more negative influence on Hungarian politics. Efforts were made to create an ethnically unitary state in what was a relatively heterogeneous state, with 'Magyarization' policies being implemented in the country. These problems were exacerbated following the conclusion of World War I, when Hungary was on the losing side; the subsequent Treaty of Trianon saw Hungary lose vast tracts of territory and population, and created a source of grievance amongst Hungarian people which lasts to this day. In the aftermath of this, the Hungarian political system became destabilized and liberal democratic politicians were discredited, leading to the rise to power of Miklos Horthy. Horthy capitalized on the post-WWI sentiment to consolidate himself as the 'regent' of Hungary, and led a strict

authoritarian regime in the state between 1920 and 1944, when he was effectively deposed by his Nazi allies in favor of a more virulently extreme leader, Ferenc Szálasi.

Following the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, the Communists were able to insinuate their way into power, supported by the might of the Soviet Union. After this, nationalistic sentiment helped drive demands the creation of a democratic state, by building opposition to the Soviet presence in Hungary. These feelings culminated in the revolution of 1956, which briefly raised hopes for the creation of a democratic, multi-party political system in the country; however, the revolution was swiftly crushed, and communist control over the country was consolidated (albeit in an admittedly watered-down format). Nationalism did not play an explicit role in the democratic transition of 1989, but it clearly remained in the public discourse. Upon the restoration of a multi-party state, virulent nationalism began to reemerge, with radical parties such as MIÉP and Jobbik achieving quite significant levels of parliamentary representation. Fidesz, too, have been able to tap into these unresolved issues, and have arguably capitalized on them more successfully than their radical counterparts. Legislation that appeals to Hungary's historical background has been utilized to consolidate Fidesz's support in the country, and to legitimize their other, more controversial policy initiatives such as the creation of a new constitution. In this sense, Fidesz seek to set themselves up as the defenders of Hungarian nationality. Using this construction of themselves, they are able to deflect any criticisms from international actors such as the EU or from the indigenous civil society, by saying that these are either attacks on Hungary itself by foreign powers and their domestic proxies. In cases where policy reverses are necessitated, particularly in cases where Hungary has been found to be blatantly in breach of EU legislation or of the European treaties, the

government has been able to make the minimum changes required to bring the country into line with its treaty obligations and to appease its critics, without having to pursue a fundamentally different approach or reconsider its basic agenda.³⁸⁵

As a result of this, opposition movements find themselves delegitimized and deprived of resources, while critics from the European Commission and the European Parliament find their critiques rebounding on themselves and inadvertently reinforcing Fidesz's grip on Hungarian society. Fidesz are thus able to prevent the deep internalization of these liberal democratic norms which might threaten their rule. This also creates a feedback loop, whereby liberal civil society organizations are stigmatized as enemies of the nation, and are thus unable to break free of this control and engage more deeply with the broader public. This constrains their ability to gain access to resources, thus making them more reliant on either governmental support (which leaves their independence hostage to the government), or on support from external actors (which further exposes them to accusations that they are tools of foreign interests). As such, they are unable to act effectively as 'normative partners' to the EU, either in a proactive manner (advocacy and education functions) or in a reactive manner (watchdog and scrutiny functions).

It is this unresolved sense of nationalistic grievance which underlies and undercuts the developments in Hungary, and which has allowed Viktor Orban to successfully deflect and/or avoid any major opposition to his divisive policy initiatives.

³⁸⁵ Erin K. Jenne; Cas Mudde: (2012) "Hungary's Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?", *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3), p. 151; see also, Robert Hodonyi; Helga Trüpel: (2013) "Together against Orban: Hungary's new opposition", *Eurozine*, [online], available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-03-22-hodonyi-en.html> (accessed on 7/16/2014); Erin Marie Saltman; Lisa Herman: (2013) "Hungary versus Europe", *Policy Network*, [online], available at: http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4436&title=Hungary-versus-Europe (accessed on 7/16/2013)

It was stated earlier that history is a constant, and cannot be considered a true causal factor in and of itself behind the decline in democratic standards in Hungary and the (at least partial) rejection of the EU norms that had been amongst the most important objectives of the 2004 accession of the former communist countries. While this is still true, it is nonetheless clear that Hungary's historical legacy and the continuing sense of injustice amongst Hungarian society that resulted from the Treaty of Trianon is a necessary factor behind these developments. It helps to undermine liberal political forces, empower conservative and radical nationalists, and allows the cunning Orban and his political allies to outmaneuver domestic critics and effectively ignore complaints from the European institutions.

Chapter 5- Democratization and the Internalization of EU Norms in the Czech Republic: Comparing the two Case Studies

As has been established earlier in this dissertation, the Czech Republic, like Hungary, was considered to be one of the leading members of the group of countries that accessed to the EU in 2004. In contrast with Hungary, however, the Czech Republic has gone on since then to remain one of the better-performing members of the 'class of 2004'. This is not to say that the situation has been perfect, or that the Czech Republic doesn't have further progress to make. Indeed, in some ways, the Czech Republic has been something of an 'enfant terrible' in terms of its performance as a member of the EU. For several years (particularly during the presidency of Vaclav Klaus), the country became virtually synonymous with obstructionist euroscepticism, as President Klaus sought (unsuccessfully, in the end) to undermine and defeat major European policy initiatives, such as the Treaty of Lisbon. In addition, it has steadfastly refused to join the Eurozone, and was one of only two EU member states to decline signing up to the European Fiscal Stability Treaty when it was introduced in 2012 (the other being the United Kingdom; Croatia is also yet to adopt the treaty, although it was not a member state at the time that it was introduced). Additionally, some problems have remained in terms of the level of corruption in the state, and in terms of the rights of ethnic minority groups (such as the Roma) in the state. However, when it comes to the core norms of the EU, the prevalence of market-based economic structures and liberal democratic principles in the state, there have been no serious problems, and the situation has steadily improved (as was envisaged by the EU prior to the accession of these states). In this sense, the experiences of Hungary and the Czech Republic have increasingly diverged from one another ever since 2004; while the Czech Republic has generally

made progress (however small this progress may be), Hungary has dramatically declined in its devotion to these norms.

This chapter will compare the findings from the previous chapter, and will examine how they relate to the development of the Czech Republic over the same period of time. Additionally, it will make sure to compare the results with those from the previous chapter, in order to shed light on why Hungary has become increasingly less democratic, while the Czech Republic has not. As before, it will begin by examining the development of the Czech state from its origins in the late 19th and early 20th Century, and of the history of democracy in the country. After this has been completed, the chapter will go on to test each one of the hypotheses proposed by this study. Each section will contain a comparison with its counterpart from the research on Hungary. It will conclude by comparing the general trends and themes of developments in the Czech Republic, and how they compare and contrast with developments in Hungary.

The historical origins of the Czech state and the development of the democratic system

It is generally perceived that the Czech Republic's historical exposure to democracy is much greater than many of its Central and Eastern European counterparts. However, in many ways, the concept of democracy has existed in Czech history for a similar length of time to Hungary. Like Hungary, the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia were consolidated parts of the Austrian Empire by the middle of the 19th Century. Indeed, Bohemia had not been a truly sovereign, independent region since the early 16th Century, when it was first absorbed into the Habsburg Empire. Its independence was further damaged by the defeat of the Bohemian forces at the Battle of Bila Hora (White

Mountain) in 1620, when a rebellion against the Habsburgs was crushed, its leaders were executed, the population of the region was forcibly re-converted to Catholicism at the behest of foreign nobles and clergymen, and a period of ‘Germanization’ began, with the Czech language being banished from many areas of public life.³⁸⁶ From this point until the end of WWI, Bohemia and Moravia were to remain subject territories of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Czech agitation for greater rights and (ultimately) independence re-emerged in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, when the Czech National Revival began. This started with the actions of Josef Dobrovsky, who sought to re-codify and popularize the Czech language (which had degenerated over the previous decades into the language of the illiterate peasantry, and few others), and to compile research on the history of Bohemia and Moravia.³⁸⁷ It was through his work that the Czech language was able to survive and recover from the influence of Austrian rule; additionally, Dobrovský’s research was to have a major influence on figures like František Palacký and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, who would go on to be driving forces behind Czech independence.³⁸⁸ In the face of this revival, the Habsburg rulers attempted to quash it using wide-ranging censorship of Czech-language literature (and in some cases, outright repression of proponents of the National Revival).³⁸⁹ At this time, Bohemia

³⁸⁶ Robert J. Kerner: (1940) “The Czechoslovaks from the Battle of White Mountain to the World War”, in Robert J. Kerner (eds.) *Czechoslovakia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 29-30.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 32-36

³⁸⁸ Robert Auty: (1970) “Changing Views on the Role of Dobrovsky in the Czech National Revival”, in Peter Brock; H. Gordon Skilling (eds.) *The Czech Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 18-19

³⁸⁹ Joseph F. Zacek: (1970) “Metternich’s Censors: The Case of Palacký”, in Peter Brock; H. Gordon Skilling (eds.) *The Czech Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 96-97

and Moravia remained predominantly agrarian provinces, but the peasantry had begun to chafe against the ritual humiliation and subjugation they faced at the hands of their Austrian overlords.³⁹⁰ In addition to this, industrial unrest amongst Czech workers in the main cities of Prague and Brno contributed to growing tensions and disgruntlement with the Habsburg rule. The research of Palacký, who followed in Dobrovský's footsteps, helped to direct this anger: his research, focused as it was on the history of the Czechs and their recurring conflicts from the past with the Germans, helped to instill pride in the Czech people, and ensured that "a Czech nursed on Palacký's history would never again be content to see his nation die by default or vegetate without purpose".³⁹¹

After this, the demands of the Czech leaders increasingly took on a political character.³⁹² Panslavism began to emerge as a concept at this time, as the Czechs searched for potential allies and sponsors; however, the realities of the Romanov Empire in Russia (in terms of its corruption, autocracy, and backwardness) meant that this was not a realistic option for the time being.³⁹³ Instead, Palacký sought to orient the Czechs towards a policy of 'Austro-Slavism', where the various Slavic people within the Habsburg Empire would align themselves alongside one another, so as to ensure the transformation of the Empire into a federal state.³⁹⁴ The various revolutions of 1848 that happened across Europe, including the outbreak of Kossuth's uprising in Hungary, added to the tension, and by March of that year, the Czechs were also in open

³⁹⁰ Stanley Z. Pech: (1969) *The Czech Revolution of 1848*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, pp. 15-16

³⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 25-26

³⁹² Ibid., p. 35

³⁹³ Ibid., pp. 37-38

³⁹⁴ Paul Vysny: (1977) *Neo-Slavism and the Czechs: 1898-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5-6

revolt against the Habsburgs. In marked contrast to the Hungarian revolution, however, the Czech uprising did not have as its goal independence: instead, the Czechs wished to achieve the creation of a federal Empire at least, and at best, the total reorganization of the monarchy into a constitutional state with guarantees for human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law.³⁹⁵ However, the hopes of Palacký and the other Czech leaders that the new Emperor, Franz Josef I, would be sympathetic to the goals and objectives of the various constituent nations of the Empire were soon dashed, when he summarily rejected their demands and used his army to quash the uprising.³⁹⁶ The hope for a democratic and decentralized Empire faded, and instead, it became even more centralized and rigid in its approach. Indeed, the only concession the Czechs were able to obtain was the abolition of serfdom.³⁹⁷ With that said, this latter point was to have important consequences for the future, as the liberation of the peasantry allowed the Czechs to develop into a wealthy, industrialized nation, with a well-educated, progressive, and politically conscious citizenry.³⁹⁸

Like in the case of the Hungarians, Czech hopes for political concessions were renewed following the military and political defeats the Habsburgs suffered in the late 1850s and early 1860s. However, when faced with a choice between federalism (which was favored by the Slavs of the Empire) and dualism (which was preferred by the Hungarians and the Germans), Franz Josef again opted to spurn the demands of the

³⁹⁵ S. Harrison Thomson: (1943) *Czechoslovakia in European History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 167-168

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 169

³⁹⁷ William V. Wallace: (1976) *Czechoslovakia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 21-22

³⁹⁸ Victor S. Mamatey: (1973) "The Establishment of the Republic", in Victor S. Mamatey; Radomír Luža (eds.) *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 1

Slavs in favor of the creation of the Dual Monarchy.³⁹⁹ Following this, the leaders of the Czech National Revival began to fall out of favor. They were replaced in 1891 by a group known as the ‘Young Czechs’, who were supported by Prof. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. Though differing little in terms of policy, they pursued a more progressive agenda, and played an important role in the introduction of universal suffrage to the Empire in 1907. The emergence of the Young Czechs transformed the Czech national movement from one confined to the elites, to one which incorporated a large workers element.⁴⁰⁰ In the years leading up to World War I, the Czechs still did not demand full independence; rather, they sought a larger role in the Empire and the establishment of a federal constitution. However, the manner in which the Austro-Hungarian Empire (as it was known after 1867) entered the war in 1914 caused particular disquiet amongst the Czech citizenry (amongst others), as war had been declared without the approval of the Austro-Hungarian Parliament, and purely at the whim of the Emperor.⁴⁰¹ Additionally, there was great apprehension amongst the Slavic peoples of the Empire that they might have to go to war with their Russian and Serbian cousins. As the war progressed, the Czechs became increasingly unhappy with their position in the Empire, and, driven by the figures such as Masaryk, Edvard Beneš, Andrej Hlinka and Milan Rastislav Štefánik (the leaders of the Slovaks), the idea of an independent Czech-Slovak federation began to gather momentum. This culminated in the respective meetings of a variety of Czech and Slovak organizations in Pittsburgh and Turčiansky Svätý Martin

³⁹⁹ Thomas Capek: (1926) *The Origins of the Czechoslovak State*, London: Revell Press, pp. 22-24

⁴⁰⁰ Edgar P. Young: (1938) *Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy*, London: Victor Gollancz, p. 52

⁴⁰¹ Robert J. Kerner: (1940) “World War, Revolution and Peace Conference”, in Robert J. Kerner (eds.) *Czechoslovakia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 51-52

in 1918, which resulted in the creation of an agreement on the May 30th, 1918 to establish a “...union of the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State...”⁴⁰² Following this, Edvard Beneš informed the Allied forces in October 1918 of the establishment of a provisional Czechoslovak Government. Throughout the following weeks, a revolutionary movement swept across the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, which helped to further weaken Austrian control over the country.⁴⁰³ These developments directly led to the official recognition of Czechoslovakia as an independent state at the Treaty of St. Etienne in 1919, in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations that was favored by President Woodrow Wilson.

The new Czechoslovakia was established as a liberal democratic state with a parliamentary system and a semi-executive President.⁴⁰⁴ Masaryk was elected as the first President, and was later succeeded by his Foreign Minister, Beneš, in 1935. The first Czechoslovak Republic, as it later came to be known, was to remain a democracy throughout the interwar period, and is still remembered today as a beacon of liberalism in Central Europe during a particularly fraught and difficult time period. The fledgling state was immediately faced with several problems; amongst other things, it was experiencing a severe food shortage as a result of a disruption of food production, caused by WWI.⁴⁰⁵ Of greater significance, however, was the presence of several sizeable minority groups within the territory of Czechoslovakia. Alongside the Czechs

⁴⁰² Jaroslav Krejčí; Pavel Machonin: (1996) *Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory for Social Change*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 8-9

⁴⁰³ Edgar P. Young: (1938) *Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy*, London: Victor Gollancz, pp. 64-65

⁴⁰⁴ Victor S. Mamatey: (1973) “The Establishment of the Republic”, in Victor S. Mamatey; Radomír Luža (eds.) *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 26

⁴⁰⁵ Glorney Bolton: (1955) *Czech Tragedy*, London: Watts & Co. Publishers, p. 86

and Slovaks, there were also large populations of Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Jews, and Polish. Particularly aggrieved by the new situation were the Germans and Hungarians, who went from being the dominant, ruling ethnic groups in the Habsburg Empire to being minorities in a state that was now being governed by their former subjects. Indeed, for a brief period after the creation of the state, there were fears that the Germans would violently resist the imposition of the new state; these fears only subsided when the demoralized and war-weary Germans could not muster the resolve required to establish the armed volunteer forces necessary to oppose the Czechoslovaks.⁴⁰⁶ Subsequently to this, they sought to achieve inclusion in either Germany or Austria, and appealed to the principle of self-determination as the basis of their claim. This plan was comprehensively defeated by the Allies, however, who were in no mood at this time to make such concessions to their vanquished enemies.⁴⁰⁷ This presented the new state with a significant dilemma. Initially, rather than seek to repress these groups, the Czechoslovak leadership instead sought to allay their concerns by guaranteeing their rights in the new state. In May 1919, Beneš promised to make Czechoslovakia “a sort of Switzerland”, with universal suffrage and language rights for all major minority groups in the country, although this promise was also made under pressure from the victorious Allied powers.⁴⁰⁸ However, in practice, it seemed that the Czechoslovaks were intent on exacting some sort of punishment on the recalcitrant

⁴⁰⁶ Victor S. Mamatey: (1973) “The Establishment of the Republic”, in Victor S. Mamatey; Radomír Luža (eds.) *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 29

⁴⁰⁷ Josef Korbel: (1977) *Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of its History*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 113

⁴⁰⁸ R.W. Seton-Watson: (1965) *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks*, Connecticut: Archon Books, pp. 326-327

Germans: for instance, Jenne states that “the new banknotes [of Czechoslovakia]...placed German third on a list of the Republic’s four languages-after Ruthenian, a language spoken by about 100,000 people. German street signs were torn down in Prague and other towns across the country.”⁴⁰⁹

Throughout the 1920s and the early 1930s, ethnic tension continued to rise as pressure was exerted on the state both from inside and outside its borders. Smaller examples of this were the conflicts with Béla Kun’s Hungary in 1919 (as detailed in the previous chapter), and the border disputes with Poland over the mineral-rich Teschen region of northern Silesia in 1920, an area which contained a demographic majority of Polish people, but which had been come under the control of Czechoslovakia shortly prior to the Paris Peace Conferences in 1919.⁴¹⁰ Much more serious, however, was the ongoing problems with the Sudeten German minority, which were severely exacerbated by the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany. According to Jenne, from an initial point in late 1918 where the Sudetens explicitly claimed the right of secession from the state, their demands steadily de-escalated and became less radical until 1929, at which point they required merely cultural autonomy and affirmative action programs.⁴¹¹ This was done in order to allow them to play a role in the decision-making of the state (which they had hitherto effectively excluded themselves from), especially given the unlikelihood of re-integration into Germany or Austria at this stage.⁴¹² As the 1920s

⁴⁰⁹ Erin K. Jenne: (2007) *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 64

⁴¹⁰ R.W. Seton-Watson: (1965) *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks*, Connecticut: Archon Books, pp. 327-328

⁴¹¹ Erin K. Jenne: (2007) *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 54-55

⁴¹² Ibid., pp. 66-67

progressed, relations between the Sudetens and the Czechoslovak state became increasingly stable, albeit with occasional flare-ups. However, Jenne argues that the emergence of Adolf Hitler as the German Chancellor and his desire to unite all German-speaking peoples within one state had a huge influence on relations between the Czechoslovaks and the Sudetens. From this point on, the Sudetens became re-radicalized, electing the ethno-separatist Sudeten German Nazi Party under Konrad Henlein as their majority representatives in the Czechoslovak Parliament, and renewing their demands for autonomy, and eventually, secession.⁴¹³ This was specifically a result of Hitler's signaling of his support for Sudeten demands, whatever they may have been; this encouraged the Sudetens to make increasingly bold demands, even in the face of greater and greater concessions from the Czechoslovaks. This culminated in the Munich Agreement, when the Sudetenland was granted to Germany in order to appease Hitler's demands; within one year, Hitler had incorporated much of the rest of Czechoslovakia into his Empire; the Slovaks were granted a puppet state of their own, with minor territories carved off from their south and granted to Hungary.

Following the Munich Agreement, the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia spent WWII as reluctant vassals of the Nazis. Repression of the Czechs from late 1940 onwards resulted in the waging of an active campaign of resistance by the Czechoslovak army in exile (which had sent several teams of men back into the country in 1941) against the Nazi apparatus.⁴¹⁴ This campaign was to remain active throughout

⁴¹³ Ibid., p. 55; pp. 87-89

⁴¹⁴ Gotthold Rhode: (1973) "The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia: 1939-1945", in Victor S. Mamatey; Radomír Luža (eds.) *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 313

the war, and had some notable successes (most famously, the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich), but also provoked brutal responses from the Nazis (including the obliteration of the villages of Lidice and Ležáky), although it never led to a wide-scale uprising, such as what happened in Slovakia towards the end of the war.⁴¹⁵ By 1945, the parts of Bohemia and Moravia that were controlled by Nazi Germany were becoming smaller by the day, as the Americans on one side and the Soviets on the other made rapid advances throughout the country. The Czechs held out hope that the Americans would win the race to liberate the country, but were unaware of agreements between General Eisenhower and his Soviet counterparts that the Americans would proceed no further than the Karlovy Vary-České Budějovice, an agreement that had also been facilitated by the signing in 1943 by President-in-exile Beneš of an alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.⁴¹⁶ At the same time, plans were being drawn up about how to deal with the German and Hungarian minorities. Initially, these plans involved deportations of all those people from these groups that had not “actively” resisted the Nazis; those who had would be guaranteed full Czechoslovak citizenship.⁴¹⁷ However, a later governmental decree, promulgated in August 1945, went further, saying that all Sudeten Germans were considered to be citizens of the Nazi Reich, and that in order to retain their obtain Czechoslovak citizenship, they first needed to conclusively prove their loyalty to the state.⁴¹⁸ Transfers began on January 25th, 1946, and by the time of their conclusion, almost the entirety of Czechoslovakia’s German

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., p. 317

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 317-318

⁴¹⁷ Ludvík Němec: (1973) “Solution of the Minorities Problem”, in Victor S. Mamatey; Radomír Luža (eds.) *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 417

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., p. 420

minority had been transferred out of the country with no compensation, a process that also cost the lives of thousands.⁴¹⁹

The years between 1945 and 1948 were to prove to be extremely disappointing for many Czechs and Slovaks. It was felt by many that the defeat of Nazi Germany would allow Czechoslovakia to restore its democratic system and adopt a new role in uniting the Eastern and Western parts of Europe. President Beneš (who had been reappointed as President of the country following the end of the war), displaying a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the Stalinist USSR, had hoped that the Soviets would eventually move towards democracy of their own accord, and that they would help to underwrite a new, peaceful order in Central and Eastern Europe.⁴²⁰ In this way, he was to be cruelly disappointed. Following the end of the war, the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which had already been one of the more well-developed parties of its kind in the region before 1939, was able to rapidly expand its membership to 826,527 people by the end of 1945.⁴²¹ They also had the trust of the Czechoslovak people, who remembered the Soviet's support for the country at the Munich Conference in 1938, and the vociferous manner in which the Communists had opposed the agreement.⁴²² The Communists earned 38% at the elections in 1946 (making them the biggest party in the country, and allowing their leader, Klement Gottwald, to become Prime Minister), with other left-wing parties such as the Social Democrats and the National Socialists (no relationship with the Nazis) also earning

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., p. 421

⁴²⁰ David W. Paul: (1981) *Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist Republic at the Crossroads of Europe*, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 43

⁴²¹ Archie Brown: (2009) *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, New York: Harper Collins, p. 154

⁴²² Ibid., pp. 154-155

strong support. As a result of this, while the country initially remained a democracy, socialist measures were increasingly introduced, such as nationalization of banks and key industries.⁴²³ Additionally, although Soviet troops began leaving the country after 1946, they had made sure to reorganize the Czechoslovak army and local government, and the Soviets maintained a strong influence on the country, as witnessed by the pressure they exerted in 1947 to get Czechoslovakia to withdraw from the US-designed Marshall Plan.⁴²⁴ The Communists seized total control of the country in early 1948 and did away with the democratic system, following a coup d'état led by Gottwald. Beneš and the other democratic political forces were caught unaware by the activities of the Communists, and given the pressure imposed on them by the fears of an invasion from the Soviet Union, quickly capitulated. The Communists quickly outlawed all other political parties and established a one-party state. Within just three years of its liberation from Nazi oppression, Czechoslovakia had again reverted to authoritarianism.

The Prague Spring

Following the successful takeover of the state by the Communist party, Czechoslovakia adopted Stalinist models of economic planning and political organization. All alternative modes of thought were effectively abolished, and the political ideologies of Masaryk, Beneš, and Štefánik were eliminated.⁴²⁵ Slovak nationalism, which had sought to guarantee the rights to self-representation of the Slovaks within the state (a

⁴²³ Ibid., p. 155

⁴²⁴ David W. Paul: (1981) *Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist Republic at the Crossroads of Europe*, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 43

⁴²⁵ H. Gordon Skilling: (1976) *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 13

point which had been agreed in 1918, and never realized, and which had again been promised in 1945), had been effectively suppressed in the 1950s when the Slovak leadership was purged and extreme centralism was imposed as part of the 1960 Constitution.⁴²⁶ By the time of his death in 1953, Stalin's system had been deeply embedded and internalized in the country, and was to prove more robust and durable than almost anywhere else in Europe; this is evidenced by the fact that while revolutions occurred in both Poland and Hungary in the 1950s, and Romania and Yugoslavia were even able to break free of Soviet control to establish some form of national sovereignty, no such ructions even remotely looked like appearing in Czechoslovakia until the late 1960s.⁴²⁷ This situation was to change spectacularly in 1968, and was strongly linked to the aborted economic reforms that the new Czechoslovak leadership, under Antonín Novotný, had briefly pursued following the emergence of Khrushchev and de-Stalinization in the USSR. Novotný's regime had introduced policies in 1953 which allowed for modest economic liberalization, the suspension of forced collectivization, and a greater emphasis on the production of consumer goods.⁴²⁸ However, these reforms were "...on the whole shifts in emphasis rather than basic changes of direction, and were not broadened or deepened in the subsequent two years."⁴²⁹ Indeed, many of these reforms were quickly rolled back, including the restoration of collectivized farming in 1954. The refusal to liberalize any of the major bases of the economic system was to lead to an economic depression in 1968, even after the party had tried to stem

⁴²⁶ Ibid., pp. 9-10

⁴²⁷ Zbyněk A. B. Zeman: (1969) *Prague Spring*, New York: Hill and Wang Books, p. 13

⁴²⁸ H. Gordon Skilling: (1976) *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 30

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p. 31

the danger to its rule with extensive reforms in early 1967.⁴³⁰ In June of 1967, the first stirrings of revolt emerged, when a number of leading intellectuals, including the prominent writers Ludvík Vaculík and Milan Kundera, issued an articulate criticism of the communist system in the country at the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers in 1967.⁴³¹ Meanwhile, Novotný continued to lose support, partially because of disgruntlement over his continued repression of the Slovaks, and was replaced as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January 1968 by Alexander Dubček, himself a Slovak, and a seemingly acceptable compromise leader for both Czechs and Slovaks (Novotný remained President of the country, although he was also replaced in this position two months later by Ludvík Svoboda).⁴³² These developments raised some suspicion in Moscow, where there was particular concern with events in a country that was deemed as being of the utmost importance to the interests of the Soviets.⁴³³

The appointment of Dubček was to be particularly fateful. Two theories about his role in the ensuing events of 1968 proliferated: the first was that he was a reluctant appointment, who only ascended to his position because no-one else was acceptable enough to the various groups that opposed Novotný's rule; the other was that he was a powerless figurehead of the reformists, and that his expressed views were not actually his own.⁴³⁴ According to Shawcross, neither of these views was accurate: he argues that

⁴³⁰ Robin Alison Remington: (1969) *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, p. 3

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4

⁴³² Philip Windsor; Adam Roberts: (1969) *Czechoslovakia, 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 7-9

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, p. 8

⁴³⁴ William Shawcross: (1970) *Dubcek*, New York: Simon and Schuster Books, p. 98

Dubček was opposed to many of the Party's methods, and that by 1964, Dubček sincerely believed (as opposed to many other members of the Communist Party at the time, Novotný included) that at least mild reform was necessary.⁴³⁵ In this sense, Dubček was a much more pro-active participant in the events than he sometimes appeared, even in spite of his less-than-public persona prior to his ascent to power. Either way, it seems that the Soviet leadership was convinced that Dubček was a reliable communist with a solid pedigree, one who could be relied on not to rock the boat.⁴³⁶ They were to be surprised. Even immediately prior to his appointment as First Secretary, Dubček had begun to implement wide-ranging economic reforms that were ostensibly aimed at getting Czechoslovakia out of the financial mire it found itself in: upon his promotion, these reforms were to become the first stage of a wide-ranging transformation of the country's political and economic systems.⁴³⁷ This is somewhat ironic, as Dubček was to remain a committed Socialist in terms of his economic perspective up until the 1990s.

Dubček then went on to commit himself to deep and meaningful reforms when he declared his intent to introduce a government which would epitomize "Socialism with a human face".⁴³⁸ This was to lead to his issuance of the Action Program in April 1968, which proposed a variety of major changes to the political system. These included the creation of a federal government, thus mollifying Slovak demands for political self-rule; wide-ranging freedom of the press; freedom of speech; curtailments of the powers

⁴³⁵ Ibid., pp. 98-99

⁴³⁶ Ibid., pp. 141-143

⁴³⁷ Philip Windsor; Adam Roberts: (1969) *Czechoslovakia, 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 9-10

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 10

of the Secret Police and the security apparatus; and freedom of association; the door was also subtly, rather than explicitly, opened to the possibility of multi-party elections.⁴³⁹ These reforms would have had a seismic effect on the nature of the political system in the country, and were stringently opposed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Indeed, the effects of these reforms were immediately felt, as the newly-liberated press in the country immediately exercised its new freedoms to criticize communism and the communist regime in the country.⁴⁴⁰ Faced with this, Czechoslovakia's neighbors took decisive action, invading the country in August 1968 (similarly to how they responded to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956) and crushing the Prague Spring. The Czechoslovak people mounted a campaign of passive resistance to the invaders, but this did nothing to prevent the occupation of the country and the arrest of the 26 leading Czechoslovak politicians. It was only by the dramatic intervention of President Svoboda, who flew to Moscow a month later and threatened to shoot himself while meeting with Soviet leaders, that these politicians were released unharmed.⁴⁴¹ The reforms were quickly repealed, and almost a year to the day of his introduction of the Action Program, Dubček was replaced as First Secretary by Gustáv Husák, a hardline communist who would go on to restore one of the strictest and most neo-Stalinist communist regimes in Europe. This situation was to prevail in the country

⁴³⁹ William Shawcross: (1970) *Dubcek*, New York: Simon and Schuster Books, pp. 147-150. See also, Robin Alison Remington: (1969) *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 104-106, pp. 107-108

⁴⁴⁰ Victor Weeraratne: (1970) *Springs of Freedom in Czechoslovakia*, North Quincy, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, p. 51

⁴⁴¹ Osgood Carruthers: (1968) "Svoboda defied Russian might, saved Dubcek, *Ottawa Citizen*, [online], available at: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2194&dat=19680927&id=mLoyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=5ewFAA-AABAJ&pg=1163,3623090> (accessed on 7/29/2014)

until the late 1980s, when a group of key exiled dissidents (including several of the key figures involved in the Prague Spring), Charter 77, was able to co-ordinate a broad platform of opposition to the Communist regime, which was then able to bring about the downfall of the Communist system during the event that is now known as the Velvet Revolution.

Evaluation: comparing the Hungarian history of democracy with the Czech history

Based on this, it is clear that the concept of democracy has a long history in the Czech lands. Following the abolition of serfdom in the region in the mid-19th Century, many of the requisite social bases for democracy emerged: a sizeable and liberal bourgeoisie, a comparatively well-educated and politically active working class, and a thriving civil society. The emergence of such a society was largely a result of activities by a number of leading Czech intellectuals during the Czech National Revival, which itself had morphed from a cultural revival movement into a pro-democracy and political decentralization movement opposed to the dominance of the Habsburg Empire by the Austrians. In this sense, democracy was a concept that came down from the Czech elites, and was picked up and internalized at the mass level thanks in part to a favorable set of economic developments. Democracy remained a guiding principle for the Czechs throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries; even when their goals changed from decentralization to outright independence during WWI, the Czechs remained committed to the creation of a democratic system. This democratic tradition lasted until 1939, when the country was forcibly occupied by Nazi Germany; and was briefly restored from 1945 to 1948, when the Communists took control of the state and ushered in forty years of one-party Communism. Hopes for a restoration of the democratic

system were briefly raised during the Prague Spring, but were swiftly dashed by the military intervention of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. It is interesting to note that Czechoslovak leaders in 1968 made few, if any, attempts to tie their attempts to institute “Socialism with a human face” to the country’s democratic history, or to the legacy of past leaders such as Masaryk and Beneš. Regardless of this, it is clear that while many of these leaders remained committed to the idea of a Socialist economy, they were supportive of a pluralistic and open society, rather than the conservative, reactionary regimes that immediately preceded and succeeded the 1968-1969 government.

An important phenomenon to consider is that even though Czechoslovakia suffered two democratic ‘breakdowns’ (three, if you include the death of the Prague Spring) during its history, neither of these were truly a result of broad-based mass opposition to democracy. In each case, the breakdown was brought about by some combination of internal subversion by a specific political or ethnic group on the one hand (the Sudeten Germans in 1938, the Communists in 1948), and by intimidation and overt aggression from an undemocratic neighboring superpower. For example, while the Communists had significant support in 1948, it is an exaggeration to say that they had majority support from Czechoslovak society: in the preceding elections, non-Communists had received over 60% of the vote, and the Communist takeover was heavily reliant on implicit and explicit support from the Soviet Union. Throughout the interwar period, while there certainly existed some problems (especially when we consider them by the standards of a modern liberal democracy), particularly in terms of the discrimination and repression that was sometimes suffered by the German minorities in the state, no challenge to the basic democratic functions of the state

emerged from a majority of the population, nor from any of the major political leaders in the state. In this sense, then, it can be argued that democracy as a system was remarkably stable and internalized among Czechoslovak people prior to 1948, and that the system only collapsed on two occasions because it was overthrown (rather than because it broke down).

There are a number of broad similarities in terms of the history of democracy in the Czech lands and the history of democracy in Hungary. The concept gained traction amongst elites in both countries around the same time in history, and both nations launched national uprisings in 1848 that were aimed at creating a democratic government (although Hungary's uprising was separatist as well as democratic). Both states endured Communist takeovers in the immediate aftermath of WWII, and, despite attempted liberal or democratic revolutions during this period, remained authoritarian states until 1989. However, there are a number of notable differences as well. While the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia were not allowed to establish their own indigenous forms of parliamentary democracy independently of Austrian control prior to 1918, Hungary was allowed broad powers of self-rule following the 1867 *Ausgleich* compromise, and went on to become an imperial power in its own right. Furthermore, while Czechoslovakia was to remain a (comparatively) liberal democracy throughout the interwar years, Hungary swiftly became a Communist, and shortly, a conservative-nationalist autocracy under Miklos Horthy. What are more important are the reasons for why democracy came to an end in either country. While it has been established that Czechoslovakia's democracy ended due to foreign intervention and internal subversion, Hungary's democracy ended in 1919 as a result of nationalistic foment that was caused by the country's defeat in WWI and its subsequent carve-up at the Treaty of Trianon.

In this sense, Hungary's democracy can be clearly described to have broken down. This nationalistic sense of grievance remains to this day. In Czechoslovakia (and subsequently, the Czech Republic), no such sense of nationalism ever managed to take hold of the population. This is a significant and noteworthy difference in the histories of the two states.

Testing hypothesis 1: the impact of inflationary and unemployment pressures on the quality of Czech democracy

While there are some clear differences and similarities between the two countries' histories, this cannot possibly explain on its own the different trajectories of the two states following their respective accessions to the EU. As such, it is thus necessary to examine the various hypotheses suggested by this dissertation, and to examine results from tests carried out on both countries that are related to these hypotheses. As was the case in the previous chapter, the first hypothesis that will be examined is the impact of 'economic hardship' on societal attitudes towards 'self-expression' values. I defined 'hardship' as a combination of unemployment and inflation in the state, and theorized that the higher the level of hardship in a state, the more likely people are to adopt attitudes that are sympathetic and conducive to authoritarian leadership. In this sense, people will tacitly demand a shift away from liberal democracy and the norms associated with it; and in driving the state in a less democratic direction, elites are merely representing the wishes and demands of their electorate. As was suggested in the previous chapter, there was relatively scant support from the data on Hungary alone to suggest that this was truly having a major impact on the quality of democracy in the country. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the extent of 'hardship'

may somewhat suppress the emergence of self-expression values in a country. In order to see if this is the case, it is necessary to look at the impact of ‘hardship’ in the Czech Republic: if these results show a lower level of hardship in the Czech Republic as opposed to in Hungary, coupled with a subsequent increase in self-expression values, this may suggest that the impact of ‘hardship’ is indeed that it prevents the emergence of liberal democratic-compatible values in countries.

While it was clearly shown earlier in this dissertation that the economic performance of the Czech Republic has been substantially better than that of Hungary since the accession of both countries to the EU (when measured in terms of GDP per capita), this does not mean that the Czech Republic has not faced any problems over this period. Indeed, if one is to return to figure 3.1 (located on p. 101), that the Czech Republic has faced many of the same problems that Hungary has, and that its level of GDP growth per capita has followed a remarkably similar trajectory over the last twenty years (outside of a period between 2005-2007, when the Czech economy significantly out-performed the Hungarian economy). With that said, few of the respondents interviewed for this study highlighted problems related to the economy as being serious issues that the Czech Republic has faced ever since it acceded to the EU, and of those that did make mention of economic issues, they tended to focus on other areas that are somewhat unrelated to the ‘hardship’ index. For instance, when asked about any tangible problems that had emerged in the Czech Republic following its accession to the EU, respondent 12 had the following to say:

“Since the talks took longer than expected, and since the preparation period already started by the early 1990s, the economy didn’t suffer any major shocks, but yes, certain segments have been heavily affected negatively, like for

example in the Common Agricultural Policy, where the competences are given to Brussels and the shaping of the Agricultural sector is done through Brussels and not through the Czechs. So yes there are segments, probably also the heavy industry. For me, it is difficult to discern what the Europeanization is responsible for and what the globalization is responsible for, how these two processes mingle.”⁴⁴²

Another respondent had this answer to the same question:


“I personally don’t think so, but many people have different views. Since then, in the last few years, according to some people all domestic problems do not originate in Prague, they originate in Brussels. And they say because of all this bureaucracy, there are certain things we cannot do, we cannot develop, we cannot be as competitive as the Chinese, this type of argument...[but] I completely disagree with them. Because ok, if this is the case, why is it not the case in Germany, which is part of the EU and is the most successful country in the world, and why is it in the Czech Republic? Why are all the neighbors of the Czech Republic, Austria, Germany, Slovakia and Poland economically growing and not the Czechs?”⁴⁴³

No other respondent made specific reference to economics and the performance of the Czech economy in their interviews. These responses do not contradict the idea that there has been lower levels of ‘hardship’ in the Czech Republic, and that this has enabled the

⁴⁴² Interview with Respondent 12, Deputy Ambassador, Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Brussels, interview conducted on September 25th 2013

⁴⁴³ Interview with Respondent 15, Member of the European Parliament, PES Party; Brussels, interview conducted on November 5th, 2013

development of the ‘self-expression’ values necessary to embed and strengthen



democracy in the Czech Republic. However, on their own, they are insufficient to make this case. It is necessary to examine the

figures and statistics related to these phenomena, and to compare them to the findings from the European Social Survey.


Figure 5.1 on the next page displays some basic graphs that present the statistics about inflation and unemployment in the Czech Republic from the point of the ‘Velvet Divorce’ in 1994 (the year after Czechoslovakia was divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the first year that statistics on these issues were gathered in each country individually) until 2012. In these graphs, I also included the corresponding statistics from Hungary, so as to allow for a clear comparison between the two states. Like in the case of Hungary, inflation in the Czech Republic was at its peak in the mid-to late-1990s, albeit at a significantly lower level than in Hungary. However, it declined significantly in 1999, and since then, has remained at a fairly static level. While there are some strong fluctuations, year on year, the trend for the inflation rate has remained

Figure 5.1: Inflation and unemployment in the Czech Republic between 1994 and 2012
a) Inflation levels in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 1994-2012. Figures listed display the annual percentage of inflation in consumer prices, as recorded by the World Bank.

b) Unemployment rate in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 1994-2012. Figures listed display the annual rate of unemployment as a percentage of the total labor force in each country, as recorded by the World Bank.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators

consistent ever since then. In this sense, it is broadly similar to the inflation trends in Hungary, without the sharp spike that Hungary experienced in 1995. It must also be noted that the inflation level in the Czech Republic has consistently been lower than in



Hungary.


In contrast, the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic is almost a complete inversion of the trend in Hungary

during the same time period. It starts at a fairly low level (just over 4%) in 1994, reflecting the more favorable economic situation the Czech Republic was faced with upon its transition from communism to free-market capitalism. By 1998, however, the unemployment rate had more than doubled, and was to remain stubbornly high until the Czech Republic joined the EU, whereupon it began to return to its original level. However, it is clear that the Global Financial Crisis took a significant toll on the Czech economy, as the unemployment rate had begun to edge upwards again in 2009. It is

important to realize that the level of unemployment in the Czech Republic is still significantly lower than the unemployment level in Hungary; this is in keeping with the suggestions of the hypothesis.


Based on this, the ‘hardship’ index can be constructed. This is displayed below in figure 5.2. As in the previous chapter, a line has been added to indicate the point at which the Czech Republic acceded to the EU. The general trend in the graph is for ‘hardship’ to consistently decline in the Czech Republic from 1994 onwards, albeit without being a strictly linear relationship. This trend is again in keeping with the expectations of the hypothesis. However, as was stated in the previous chapter, it is expected that the way this index has an impact on the level of democracy in a state is by shaping people’s attitudes, whether in a way that is favorable to the development of a liberal democratic state, or one that is inimical to it. As was stated in the previous chapter, the following indicators are used to examine the level of liberal democratic compatible values: areas: interpersonal trust, participation in civil and social organizations, participation in political organizations, and participation in lawful demonstrations; trends in the areas of satisfaction with the state of the economy and satisfaction with the state of democracy are also examine. These are summarized in table 5.1. As these values do not represent ‘tangible’ figures, and as they are arranged

Figure 5.2: ‘Hardship’ levels in the Czech Republic, 1994-2012




in different scales from one another (i.e., some are based on scales from 1-5, while others are based on scales from 1-10), it would ordinarily be necessary to use z-score standardization, so as to make them comparable. However, as the figures presented are divided into ‘percentages of people responding positively to this question’ and ‘percentages of people responding negatively to this question’, it is possible to combine the values directly into an index with standardizing them. Again, satisfaction with the state of the economy and with democracy in the country are not included in this index, as they are not truly ‘values’, but rather emotions which may or may not be influenced by the sundry self-expression values. The results of this are summarized graphically in figure 5.3 on page 243.

Figure 5.3: Comparison of hardship index, self-expression index, and democratic and economic satisfaction in the Czech Republic, 2002-2012



The findings of this graph essentially confound the expectations of this hypothesis. In order for it to be salvaged, it would be necessary to show that low levels of ‘hardship’ are matched by noticeable improvements in the self-expression index. While there are low and static levels of hardship in the Czech Republic over the time period in question, self-expression has also remained static, and has slightly declined, if anything. When one takes into account the fact that satisfaction with the economy, whilst still rather negative, has increased over time, it lends further evidence to the idea that ‘hardship’ does not have an impact on the prevalence of liberal democratic-compatible values in either state. Additionally, if one is to more carefully compare the

Figure 5.4: Comparison of 'hardship' and 'self-expression' indices from Hungary and the Czech Republic



findings from Hungary and the Czech Republic directly, as is displayed in figure 5.4, one can clearly see that trends in each case directly confound the expectations. While 'hardship' has increased at a greater rate in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, the levels of self-expression values in each state have actually begun to converge. Based on this, then, it is possible to discard the combined impact of inflation and unemployment on the levels of democratic values as an explanation for why Hungary has shown signs of rejecting the liberal democratic norms that were the centerpiece of the EU's accession program, while the Czech Republic has not done so. As such, it is thus necessary to examine the other hypotheses, to see if these can offer stronger explanations for these cross-country variations.

Testing hypothesis 2: the impact of mainstream Czech political elites on the quality of democracy in the state

Having established that the previous hypothesis is unlikely to have any explanatory power for the divergence in adherence to liberal democratic standards between Hungary and the Czech Republic following their accession to the EU, it is necessary to examine the second hypothesis, that this phenomenon is a result of activities by mainstream political elites. As was stated in the previous chapter, it is clear that events in Hungary have been strongly influenced by Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party, who have sought to fundamentally change the entire nature of the Hungarian political landscape in such a way as to embed and solidify their rule in the state. In doing this, they have tapped into underlying insecurities in Hungarian society as a means of legitimizing their controversial policy initiatives and of building support for themselves.

In order for this hypothesis to hold, it would be necessary to show that Orbán's actions are fundamentally different than those of his counterparts in the Czech Republic, and that the difference is not just a case of a lack of opportunity on the part of Czech leaders; it is also reflective of a lack of will on the part of major Czech leaders to make such radical changes to the fundamental political structures of their society. Alternatively, it may be a result of individual leaders showing an interest in centralizing and expanding their power, but lacking the support from other members of the political elite to undertake such changes. Another possibility is that Czech leaders, rather using their positions to consolidate their power, have actively worked to deepen and consolidate the democratic structure of the state. It is clear that no political leader in the Czech Republic has ever had the electoral strength that Viktor Orbán has enjoyed; the strongest showing of any political party in the country in a parliamentary election since

the ‘Velvet Divorce’ was the performance of the Civic Democrat party (ODS) in 2006 when, under the leadership of Miroslav Topolánek, they won 36% of the popular vote and 81 seats out of 200.⁴⁵² No party has ever won a sufficient majority to allow themselves to construct a stable, single-party government; even in the case of the ODS’s victory in 2006, while they were initially able to form a cabinet on their own (with support from independent deputies), it was not until they agreed to a coalition with the Green party and the Christian Democratic party (KDU- ČSL) and obtained support from two rebel Social Democratic (ČSSD) deputies that they were able to officially achieve a parliamentary majority capable of withstanding a vote of confidence.⁴⁵³ As such, it is evident that no-one has had the same opportunity that Viktor Orban had to radically restructure the political scene in the Czech Republic; this section will thus go further, and will examine if any politician has attempted to either undermine or consolidate the liberal democratic nature of the Czech political system during their political tenures, and what the reactions amongst the other members of the political elites these impulses generated.

One major difference between Hungary and the Czech Republic that is immediately apparent (aside from the differing levels of electoral opportunity) is that while in Hungary, Viktor Orban has emerged since 1989 as the single most important politician in terms of shaping and constructing the political discourse in the country, in the Czech Republic, there were three such figures: Vaclav Klaus, Miloš Zeman, and

⁴⁵² Figures based on data compiled by the European Electoral Database.

⁴⁵³ Manuel Álvarez-Rivera: (2014) “Parliamentary Elections in the Czech Republic - Elections to the Chamber of Deputies”, *Election Resources on the Internet*, [online], available at: <http://www.electionresources.org/cz/> (accessed on 8/2/2014)

Vaclav Havel, the three men who have gone on to become President of the Czech Republic (Klaus and Zeman were also Prime Ministers). A number of people that were interviewed for this study identified these three men as having a crucially important role in terms of shaping the modern political scene in the Czech Republic, although this influence was not always entirely positive. For instance, when asked about the impact of individual political leaders on politics in the Czech Republic, respondent 23 had the following to say:

“We had three important personalities, Vaclav Havel, Vaclav Klaus, and Miloš Zeman. Havel was the man that could lead us through the Revolution, but couldn’t lead us through the daily life. Vaclav Klaus was the pragmatist, with the strong emphasis on the free-market and on state-oriented politics, because he was the one who wasn’t privatizing enough, who was tied with the special interest groups, not reforming the banking system, and who is living completely out of reality...and then there was Milos Zeman, who was the person who united the Social Democrats, and who was able to reform the banking system after he won the election. On the other side, he made a so-called “opposition agreement” with Klaus, and they divided their spheres of influence in politics. And this was one of the most damaging things for the Czech political and social system, because it created the notion that if you work for one of these, then they will always make some sort of agreement and go over the heads of the society...If there is any role of the political leaders, then this was the role of these two men,

Mr. Zeman and Mr. Klaus, in dividing the state into spheres of influence between the two parties and the political representations.”⁴⁵⁴

Another respondent had the following to say when asked the same question:

“I think it comes back to personalities. I think Vaclav Havel was by far the most important politician that we had. We had huge disagreements, I think we disagreed on many things, but I still had respect for him...with him, I never had to question what it is that he wanted, did he want to get things done or did he just want to enrich himself, which is a question I often have to ask myself when it comes to others. So definitely, personality counts. This is very important. It's not just about being a celebrity, which he was, but it was also about if he is a scumbag, or if he is real. Havel was real.”⁴⁵⁵

Respondent 27 also highlighted the significance of the leadership of Havel, Klaus, and Zeman:

“The first important player was Vaclav Havel. At the beginning he influenced the whole society by ‘getting back to Europe,’ having the spirit of civil society, human rights. And it influenced people...if you look on the people with whom the actual [Foreign] minister cooperates, if you look at the people who are now cooperating with the ANO movement and Babiš,⁴⁵⁶ they are following Havel’s foreign policy ideas and the ideas of Havel men...The second and,

⁴⁵⁴ Interview with Respondent 22, Journalist, Czech business newspaper; Prague, interview conducted on January 24th, 2014

⁴⁵⁵ Interview with Respondent 25, Velvet Revolution organizer /Ambassador-at-large, Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Prague, interview conducted on February 11th, 2014

⁴⁵⁶ The ANO Movement is a political party, led by the multi-millionaire Andrej Babiš, that came second in the 2013 Czech Parliamentary election and which subsequently formed part of the coalition government with the ČSSD party and the KDU-ČSL.

unfortunately, more successful influential man was Vaclav Klaus. His influence on the Czech economic, Czech perception of the country abroad and especially the EU was the most important in the Czech political landscape...[Vaclav Havel] was a very democratic man. So, our Constitution was written to fit Havel. There were many things later that said when the president can do something or cannot do something. But it is not properly described...Klaus was using these holes in the Constitution to improve his power, and Zeman is much worse than Klaus...what Havel never intended to do, Klaus was using a little, and Zeman is totally doing that. Klaus was, from nowadays point of view, not totally disrupting the democratic system. He was just downgrading it. Zeman is doing worse. And each after each is doing the same, so they are downgrading the standards of democracy those that are not written in the Constitution directly or in the laws. Unfortunately, the influence of these leaders was not positive for democratic standards. They are just using the weakness of the system to improve their power...Still the level of democracy here has been very good. People are not supporting these acts. You see the dropping approval ratings of Zeman. He really raped the Constitution by appointing Rusnok...Klaus was not that bad, and Havel was absolutely on a different level.”⁴⁵⁷

These three quotations are just a small example of the responses received from the various interviewees when asked about the importance of political leadership in the country, as every respondent identified Klaus, Zeman and Havel as being the three most

⁴⁵⁷ Interview with Respondent 27, Political Consultant/Activist; Prague, interview conducted on February 27th, 2014

important leaders the country has seen. Other politicians that were identified by some of the interviewees included Karel Schwarzenberg, founder of the TOP 09 party and a former Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic; Jiří Dienstbier, a central figure in the Prague Spring and the Velvet Revolution, and the first Foreign Minister of the country after the transition; and Petr Nečas, the ODS Prime Minister who was forced to step down in 2013 as a result of the corruption scandal detailed earlier in this dissertation; however, none of the respondents expanded greatly upon the importance of these politicians. The responses paint a very interesting picture of the impact of political leadership in the Czech Republic. They each highlight the major role played by Klaus, Zeman, and Havel, but they also describe each of these men as having a different role to play. Havel is universally identified as having had a positive impact on the Czech political scene, and is essentially described as the main driver of liberal democratic values amongst the political elite in the crucial years following the country's democratic transition.

On the other hand, Klaus and (particularly) Zeman are described as having had a much more ambiguous impact on the system. Respondents accused both of them of trying to abuse and expand their powers through constitutional loop-holes. Incidentally, in both cases, the bad behavior was most apparent after they became President, a position that is prestigious but largely ceremonial.⁴⁵⁸ This may be because, once free of the constraints of parliamentary politics, these men felt freer to impose their own

⁴⁵⁸ The Presidency retains some important roles, such as the ability to veto or delay the signing of certain types of legislation, and to make appointments to important positions (including Prime Minister, in the case of an interim government). However, many of these functions are dependent on Parliamentary consent, and the President is often essentially dictated to by the Parliament.

personal objectives and ambitions on the office, and to test and strain the constitutional limits on their power. Either way, it is clear that both men were quite controversial in terms of their use of power. Klaus was often quite populist in his approach to politics, and regularly expressed opinions that criticized civil society and non-governmental organizations, human rights, environmentalists, and homosexuals, and was a fervent supporter of market-based capitalism (positions that often drew him into conflict with his Presidential predecessor, Havel).⁴⁵⁹ While Havel dominated the political scene in the immediate aftermath of the Velvet Revolution, following the split of Czechoslovakia, Klaus was to become the most important politician in the country, and eagerly sought to impose his political ideologies on the new state. Again, in contrast to the approach taken by Havel, Klaus denigrated the importance of ‘non-political politics’ and civil society-level activism, adopting rhetoric reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher, and eschewed any sort of social democratic or welfare state policies.⁴⁶⁰ Indeed, Stroehlein argues that Klaus was so fervently in favor of the creation of a free-market democracy in the Czech Republic, that he was willing to mobilize Czech feelings of nationalism to achieve this end, and to make the Czech Republic an even more sterling example of a market economy than those that existed in the West, let alone in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.⁴⁶¹ These approaches on their own were not necessarily problematic, and indeed, even critics of Klaus are careful to concede that

⁴⁵⁹ James Kirchick: (2013) “Bad King Klaus: The Failings of a Czech President”, *Spiegel Online*, [online, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/bad-king-klaus-the-failings-of-a-czech-president-a-885928.html>] (accessed on 8/2/2014); see also, Frederick W. Powell: (2007) *The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism Or Social Left?*, Bristol: Policy Press, p. 154

⁴⁶⁰ Andrew Stroehlein: (1999) “Three Vaclavs”, *Central Europe Review*, 1(10, online, available at: <http://www.ce-review.org/99/10/stroehlein10.html>) (accessed on 8/3/2014)

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

his economic policies, such as coupon privatization and seeking foreign direct investment, did have the effect of helping the Czech Republic to convert to capitalism without the same amounts of difficulty as other transitional states.⁴⁶²

However, what were more damaging to Czech democracy were Klaus's ideas regarding the roles of political leaders. Klaus firmly believed that political issues were secondary to economic concerns, and that the role of a political leader in a Central European state was merely to facilitate the functioning of the free market, to ensure the existence of a competitive party system, and to build public support for the market economy and the reforms required to introduce it.⁴⁶³ According to Pontuso, Klaus did not believe that the creation of a robust democracy was particularly difficult, and that it only required the creation of a competitive electoral system: once this was achieved, people would maintain the system through a rational calculation of self interest, and that the market would be able to guarantee the stability of the system.⁴⁶⁴ However, Pontuso points out that this over-emphasis on economic priorities did not have the results Klaus intended; partially as a result of his attacks on the idea of civic responsibility and on the concept of a broadly-conceived democracy, the kind of self-regulating approach to everyday economic transactions did not emerge, undermining the development of a true market economy in the Czech Republic and allowing

⁴⁶² James F. Pontuso: (2002) "Transformation Politics: The Debate between Václav Havel and Václav Klaus on the Free Market and Civil Society", *Studies in East European Thought*, 54(3), pp. 153-154; see also, James Kirchick: (2013) "Bad King Klaus: The Failings of a Czech President", *Spiegel Online*, [online, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/bad-king-klaus-the-failings-of-a-czech-president-a-885928.html>] (accessed on 8/2/2014)

⁴⁶³ James F. Pontuso: (2002) "Transformation Politics: The Debate between Václav Havel and Václav Klaus on the Free Market and Civil Society", *Studies in East European Thought*, 54(3), pp. 154-155

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 155

corruption to flourish.⁴⁶⁵ Framed this way, these actions by Klaus did not constitute an abuse of his political power, per se, but they certainly were not helpful to the emergence of a stable, consolidated democracy in the Czech Republic.

This changed upon Klaus's ascent to the position of President. While Klaus had long been a consistent critic of the EU, he still supported Czech membership throughout his parliamentary career. However, his approach radicalized somewhat following his party's loss of power in 1997, and particularly upon becoming President in 2003; Klaus began to espouse strongly nationalistic positions, railed against what he described as 'Europe-ism' (which he viewed as being an existential threat to the Czech Republic), and called for the process of European integration to be thrown into reverse.⁴⁶⁶ As President, Klaus refused to ratify the nominations of several judges, and vetoed pieces of legislation based on his own ideological outlook.⁴⁶⁷ Most notable was his obstinate refusal to sign off on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a treaty that was created to allow for easier and more efficient decision-making in the EU. Even when Klaus himself had become isolated following his own ODS party colleagues⁴⁶⁸ insistence that he sign off on the bill, Klaus remained firm; in order to further delay its passage, Klaus refused to agree to the treaty unless a footnote was inserted guaranteeing that it would not be used to force Czech people to pay reparations to the families of German people expelled

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 171

⁴⁶⁶ Sean Hanley: (2013) "Václav Klaus: A political phenomenon without political power", *University College London School of Slavonic and East European Studies*, online, available at: <http://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/2013/03/07/vaclav-klaus-a-political-phenomenon-without-political-power/> (accessed on 8/3/2014)

⁴⁶⁷ Jiří Pehe: (2009) "The Other Vaclav: How the Czech president became Europe's public enemy number one", *Foreign Policy*, online, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/12/the_other_vaclav (accessed on 8/3/2014)

⁴⁶⁸ Klaus had officially left the ODS in 2008, but remained closely associated with them.

from the country in 1945.⁴⁶⁹ However, Klaus's ideology and nationalism was comprehensively rejected by the majority of Czech people (as witnessed by the decision of many of his previous supporters in the ODS to endorse Karel Schwarzenberg for the position of President in the 2013 elections, a man who stood for many of the things Klaus most vehemently opposed).⁴⁷⁰ His Presidency was to end on a somewhat ignominious note when he was investigated for high treason, based on his decision to grant an amnesty to several thousand prisoners and to halt criminal proceedings in dozens of corruption cases, a decision that was particularly objectionable given the Czech Republic's ongoing difficulties with white-collar crime.⁴⁷¹ Klaus was almost entirely isolated by the conclusion of his Presidency, and had become more of a nuisance or a source of irritation than a genuine threat to the functioning of Czech democracy.

In a similar manner to how Klaus tested his constitutional limits, Miloš Zeman also pursued an approach that seemed designed to allow him to impose his own personal political views and ideologies on the Czech political system following his ascent to the Presidency in 2013. Zeman is another veteran of the Czech political scene. He was a frequent critic of the practices of the Communist party in the immediate period prior to the Velvet Revolution, and did play a role in the Civic Forum, albeit a much less important one than Klaus or Havel played. Zeman was a founding member and the first

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Sean Hanley: (2013) "Václav Klaus: A political phenomenon without political power", *University College London School of Slavonic and East European Studies*, online, available at: <http://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ssees/2013/03/07/vaclav-klaus-a-political-phenomenon-without-political-power/> (accessed on 8/3/2014)

⁴⁷¹ The Economist: (2013) "Vaclav Klaus's controversial amnesty", *The Economist*, online, available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/01/czech-politics> (accessed on 8/3/2014)

leader of the ČSSD after the split in the Civic Forum in 1992 (which also led to the creation of the ODS under Klaus). He became the Prime Minister in 1998, and negotiated the ‘Opposition Agreement’ with Klaus, whereby the ČSSD would be allowed to govern as a minority government by the ODS, in exchange for parliamentary positions and co-operation on the introduction of several constitutional amendments related to the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.⁴⁷² This agreement was considered quite controversial at the time; as respondent 23 noted above, it created a sense amongst Czech people that it did not matter who they voted for, as the elites would go above their heads and make their own arrangements, regardless of the result of the election, and it was seen as being a grand coalition in all but name.⁴⁷³ Rather than being something sinister, though, Roberts argues that the opposition agreement was a response to the gridlocked nature of Czech politics at the time: no party would go into government with the Communists, who remained almost the exact same party in terms of their policies as they had been prior to 1989, and ČSSD attempts to negotiate a coalition government with some of the smaller centre-right parties were thwarted by the obstinacy of the Freedom Union party, without whom no majority would have been possible.⁴⁷⁴ Roberts also notes that civil society did manage to gain a better foothold in Czech society at this time, as while several high-profile protest movements emerged and subsequently died in short order (due to their tendency to focus their efforts on individual politicians rather than on suggest comprehensive strategies for reform), trade

⁴⁷² Andrew Roberts: (2003) “Demythologising the Czech Opposition Agreement”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 55(8), p. 1273

⁴⁷³ Ibid., p. 1274

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 1277-1278

unions were received more sympathetically by Zeman, and the creation of an Ombudsman's office (in line with the demands of the EU) allowed Czech citizens to scrutinize their elected leaders more carefully.⁴⁷⁵ What is also notable at this time is that Zeman began to start adopting several nationalistic poses. This was to bring him into unnecessary conflict with Germany and Hungary, when in several interviews in the media, he praised the 1945 expulsion from Czechoslovakia of the German and Hungarian minorities, and specifically referred to the Sudetens as a 'fifth column'.⁴⁷⁶

Taken on their own, these incidents did not majorly threaten the democratic nature of the Czech political system, and Zeman retired from politics in 2001; he partially re-emerged in 2009 when he established his own political party, Zemanovci-The Party of Civic Rights. Zeman was to fully come out of retirement in 2013, when he stood in the first ever direct Presidential elections; following a run-off with Karel Schwarzenberg, he was successfully elected President. It was at this point that Zeman's political activities began to take on a somewhat more sinister character. His abortive attempts to create an interim government with Jiří Rusnok as its leader, despite the wishes of the Czech Parliament, have been detailed earlier in this study. Zeman's attempts to expand and widen his influence have gone further than this. He expressed an interest in uniting the various elements of the Czech left under him as leader, and attempted to inspire a coup within the ČSSD to replace the party's leader (and new

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 1285

⁴⁷⁶ Jacques Rupnik: (2002) "The Other Central Europe", *East European Constitutional Review*, 11(1-2), p. 68; see also, Richard Ned Lebow: (2006) "The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe", in Richard Ned Lebow; Wulf Kansteiner; Claudio Fogu, eds. *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, p. 2

Prime Minister of the Czech Republic), Bohuslav Sobotka, with a political crony.⁴⁷⁷ To date, he has been completely unsuccessful in this, and has found himself experiencing some of the same isolation that Klaus felt after 2009. He has not raised the same level of opprobrium in Brussels that Klaus generated, largely because of his outspoken support for European integration, but his domestic approval seems to have suffered, and his political party, Zemanovci- The Party of Civic Rights has achieved almost no electoral success whatsoever, achieving a mere 1.5% of the votes (a decline of nearly 3% from their performance in 2010).

It is clear from this that there is a significant difference in terms of the impact of Czech mainstream political elites on the political system in the country to the developments in Hungary under Orban. Obviously, Orban has been far more successful in his attempts to re-configure the nature of the Hungarian system. Klaus and Zeman, on the other hand, both found themselves effectively disempowered and isolated (although the situation with Zeman may change, given the short amount of time he has been in power for). There are several possible reasons for this. Evidently, opportunity has been a key factor; no politician in the Czech Republic has enjoyed the parliamentary security that Orban enjoys in Hungary. The different institutional structure of each country has also played a role: the most controversial actions of Klaus and Zeman were both conducted after the respective person had become President, a position that does not hold significant levels of power. However, what is more important is the inability of each of them to thoroughly dominate their respective parties in the manner in which

⁴⁷⁷ Sean Hanley: (2014) "Czech Republic: Miloš Zeman's year of living dangerously", *Dr. Sean's Diary*, [online], available at: <http://drseansdiary.wordpress.com/2014/03/11/czech-republic-milos-zemans-year-of-living-dangerously/> (accessed on 8/4/2014)

Orban has been able to. Orban has been able to create a situation whereby he has unquestioned control over the entire Fidesz party: what he says goes, and no other member of his party seems either willing or able to publicly question him. Through his electoral successes, he has been able to extend this control to encompass almost the entire Hungarian mainstream right, with only very minor parties and Jobbik remaining outside of his control. Klaus and Zeman, however, have been more dependent on support from their respective parties, and were not able to impose their wills in the same way. In cases where they went out on a political limb, they were clearly challenged and constrained by their (former) colleagues, and found themselves politically isolated. It is also quite likely that this is a dynamic that existed when they were the Parliamentary leaders of their parties; neither of them seems to have made major efforts to centralize power in their hands and to consolidate their control over the political scene in the country, possibly because their worst excesses were challenged by their fellow party members. Another interesting comparison to make is the ineffectiveness of nationalistic discourse. Both Klaus and Zeman attempted at different stages to encourage anti-German and anti-European sentiment in order to garner support from the Czech population for their political interests, but were unsuccessful in using this as a rallying point. This is in stark contrast to Orban's highly profitable strategy of appealing to Hungarian nationalistic grievances in order to legitimize his rule, and to de-legitimize any opposition to him. While it would be incorrect to assert that nationalism does not exist in the Czech Republic, there is not the same sense of lingering injustice as exists in Hungary in regards to the Treaty of Trianon. While it is impossible to say for definite that things would be different if these roles were reversed, it is quite likely that this absence of a particular sense of a historical wrong having been committed on the Czech

people undermines any attempts to justify controversial political initiative based on nationalism. As such, it is clear that the reasons for why Zeman and Klaus have not been able to concentrate political power in their own hands is not just a result of a lack of opportunity, but also because of their inability to thoroughly dominate their respective parties and to find resources around which they can generate support for their constitution-testing activities.

A particularly notable difference between the influence of political elites in Hungary and the Czech Republic is the absence in the former of a well-respected figure like Vaclav Havel, who was devoted to the development of a broadly-conceived democracy in his country, with significant levels of civic responsibility and participation. As was noted above, Havel's ideals conflicted strongly with the hardcore economic perspective of Klaus, and this did undermine the emergence of the civic society he advocated. However, while his direct influence on the Czech political system after the Velvet Revolution was almost certainly less than that of Klaus, and possibly also Zeman, Havel brought a sense of integrity to Czech politics, and introduced the concept of the importance of democratic values. In this sense, he came to embody the democratic ideals of the Velvet Revolution, as witnessed by the many testimonials paid to him at his funeral in 2011: even his rival, Klaus, was moved to state that Havel was "the symbol of the new era of the Czech state."⁴⁷⁸ At no point after Hungary's transition did a political leader emerge who had both the dedication and commitment to the deepening of democratic values in the state, and the high public profile and historical

⁴⁷⁸ Associated Press: (2011) "Czechs, world leaders pay tribute to Havel", *CBC News*, [online], available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/czechs-world-leaders-pay-tribute-to-havel-1.1017676> (accessed on 8/4/2014)

legacy of Havel. The existence of such an important and famous advocate for democracy was thus a valuable asset for supporters of liberal democracy in the Czech Republic, one which was not available to their counterparts in Hungary.

Based on this, it is possible to conclude that there is strong support for hypothesis 2. While there are certainly some issues with the activities of political elites in the Czech Republic (such as corruption), and leaders such as Vaclav Klaus and Miloš Zeman displayed some illiberal tendencies and a willingness to test and stretch the constitutional limits of their power, these incidences have not resulted in the large scale roll-back of liberal democratic norms that has been witnessed in Hungary. This is for several reasons. A lack of electoral opportunities and the different institutional structures of each country certainly play a role. More importantly, the Czech Republic possesses more critical political elites than their Hungarian counterparts, thus constraining the room for maneuver of leaders who might have been capable of undermining the liberal democratic nature of Czech politics; there is a lack of major nationalistic or ethnic grievances, thus preventing Czech politicians from using this as a resource to build legitimacy and support for anti-democratic reforms; and finally, high-profile liberal politicians such as Vaclav Havel have been able to advocate for democracy more effectively, and from a greater position of authority, than any other politician in Hungary. This does not mean that the puzzle is fully solved: while there is clear evidence that the decline in democratic standards in Hungary as opposed to the Czech Republic is a result of mainstream elite activity, this does not necessarily mean that it is a result of a breakdown of a consolidated democracy. In the following sections, I examine other hypotheses relating to the consolidation of democracy in the Czech Republic in order to understand the dynamics surrounding the societal reaction in each

country to the issues of democracy and the liberal democratic norms and values of the EU. This will also shed further light on whether the problems in Hungary are a result of a failed/aborted process of norm internalization and consolidation, or if they are purely a matter of democratic breakdown.

Testing hypothesis 3: the continued commitment of Czech elites to strengthening the rule of law in the country post-accession

The first hypothesis related to the consolidation of democracy in each state to be tested is hypothesis three, which relates to the continued commitment of elites in each country to the reform and strengthening of the rule of law. The previous chapter showed that there was some support for this hypothesis in the case of Hungary, but that the results should be somewhat tempered: while Hungary's rule of law scores in the Bertelsmann and Freedom House indices have declined since the country gained membership of the EU, it did not do so until after 2009; up until this point, it enjoyed particularly good scores, especially when compared to other countries that joined the EU in 2004. As such, it is not necessarily clear if these results are indicative of a lack of consolidation of liberal democracy in the country (and specifically in this case, a lack of consolidation of the rule of law), or if they are further reflective of the 'de-consolidation' or breakdown of these norms in Hungary. In order to shed light on this matter, it is thus important to make a comparison between Hungary and the Czech Republic.

This section first begins by considering the issue of corruption in the Czech Republic, something that has received a lot of coverage and which was a notable problem for the state throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. As was shown in figure 1.1 in the introduction, according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception

Index, the level of corruption in the Czech Republic has consistently improved from its nadir in the early 2000s; however, this still meant that the level of corruption was considered to be higher than it was in 1995, when the Corruption Perception Index was first compiled. It is clear that over the last several years, political leaders in the Czech Republic began to take more seriously the fight against corruption and white-collar crime. Somewhat ironically, the government of Petr Nečas, that took some of the most concrete steps towards improving the prosecution of white-collar criminality in the country, itself collapsed in 2013 as a result of a scandal related to grand corruption. Respondent 22 had the following to say about this:

“The Nečas affair was a by-product of what I spoke about earlier. His government was the one which gave the prosecutor the space to work freely. They became a victim of their own policy. From one side, he pretended to play the role of Mr. Clean, but he couldn’t keep the distance from the dirty people. This particular affair is a by-product of an investigation of a particular group of persons and lobbies which we have been hearing about for a long time, who have been milking the public budget.”⁴⁷⁹

It is clear that corruption remains a sticky issue in the Czech Republic; however, this on its own should not be taken to mean that the rule of law has not been consolidated in the Czech Republic. Indeed, the willingness of Nečas to tackle the issue head-on, and the fact that this led to the downfall of his own government, can be seen as being evidence that Czech elites have continued to work to improve the rule of law in the

⁴⁷⁹ Interview with Respondent 22, Journalist, Czech business newspaper; Prague, interview conducted on January 24th, 2014

country after the pressure to adhere to EU standards in order to achieve membership was lifted.

In order to get a full picture of the issues relating to the rule of law in the country, it is necessary to also consider the standard of decision-making and the independence of the judiciary in the country. As was the case in the previous chapter, graphs displaying data relating to the standard and independence of the judiciary from the Freedom House Nations in Transit index, the Bertelsmann Transformations Index and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project are compiled in figure 5.5. Figures for Hungary are also included, for the purposes of comparison. These datasets display some very different trends from each other. In the case of the Bertelsmann and Nations in Transit indices, both of these show that the Czech Republic has been reasonably consistent in terms of the performance of its judiciary ever since 2003, with both showing a slight improvement in standards in 2010. This is somewhat in keeping with the expectations of the EU in terms of post-2004 dynamics, that the respective new member states would continue their improvements.


By contrast, however, the CIRI index displays a very different story, showing severe issues with the standard of the Czech judiciary and the extent of its independence between 2005 and 2010. According to this dataset, severe problems emerged in the Czech Republic during these years, leading to a point between 2007 and 2008 when there were particularly large constraints on the activities of the Czech judiciary. The findings of the CIRI index are based on the annual country reports on human rights practices compiled by the United States State Department. Issues that were highlighted in reports prior to 2007 included judicial corruption, problems with law enforcement, lengthy delays in the prosecution of investigations and court cases, and the exploitation

of loopholes by high-level political leaders to avoid prosecution on corruption charges.⁴⁸⁰ These reports also maintained that, in spite of these troubles, the governments of the country generally continued to observe and protect the human rights of its citizenry. However, reports in 2007 and 2008 argued that governmental intervention in the judicial process had become more invasive, to the point that important political figures were interfering in sensitive cases. For instance, the 2007 report specifically mentioned the (allegedly) politically-motivated sacking of the Chief Justice of the Czech Supreme Court by Vaclav Klaus, a decision that was later overturned by the Constitutional Court. Another example from this report was the suspension by the State Prosecutor of a corruption case against the former Vice Prime Minister, Jiří Čunek, a move that was believed to have been influenced by political pressures.⁴⁸¹ The allegations regarding interference in the Čunek trial were repeated in 2008 report, along with the general references to elite-level interference in corruption investigations. By 2009, the situation may have been remedied somewhat, as while the US State Department report for this year still noted the problems relating to widespread political and judicial corruption and backlogs and delays in the reference to interference by political elites in the judicial process. This also is reflected in a subsequent improvement in the score awarded to the Czech Republic by prosecution

⁴⁸⁰ United States State Department: (2007) “Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the Czech Republic, 2006”, *U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action*, [online], available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78808.htm> (accessed on 8/22/2014); See also, United States State Department: (2006) “Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the Czech Republic, 2005”, *U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action*, [online], available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61644.htm> (accessed on 8/22/2014).

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

Figure 5.5: Graphs showing the judiciary independence in Hungary and the Czech Republic



⁴⁸² According to the CIRI Human Rights Data Project codebook, a score of two (or a fully independent judiciary) requires the following attributes: 1) The right to rule on the constitutionality of legislative acts and executive decrees. 2) Judges have a minimum of a seven-year tenure. 3) The President or Minister of Justice cannot directly appoint or remove judges. 4) Actions of the executive and legislative branch can be challenged in the courts. 5) All court hearings are public. 6) Judgeships are held by professionals. David L. Cingranelli; David L. Richards: (2014) "The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual Version 5.20.14", *CIRI Human Rights Data Project*, [online], available at: <http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html> (accessed on 6/29/2014)

⁴⁸³ Figures taken from Freedom House's Nations in Transit reports, between 2003 and 2014; scores are awarded based on a scale from 1-7, with 1 representing the highest possible level of judicial independence, and 7 representing the lowest possible level. Freedom House: (2014) "Hungary", *Nations in Transit*, [online], available at: http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/hungary#U6_0pJRdWSp; http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2004/hungary#U6_zKZRdWSo [accessed on 6/29/2014]

⁴⁸⁴ Figures taken from the Bertelsmann Transformations index, collected bi-annually between 2003 and 2014; Scores are awarded from a scale of 0-10, with 10 being the highest possible level of judicial independence. Bertelsmann Transformation Index: (2014) "Transformation Index 2014", *BTI 2014*, [online], available for download at: <http://www.bti-project.org/index/> (accessed on 6/29/2014)

of cases, it did not make the CIRI index.

It is quite likely that the CIRI database does overstate the problems in the Czech judiciary over the time period in question, especially when one compares it with the findings of the Nations in Transit and Bertelsmann indices. With that said, when considered alongside the research conducted by the United States State Department, it undermines the idea that Czech authorities displayed a greater commitment to the independence and reform of the judiciary in their country than their Hungarian counterparts. As was shown above, there is strong reason to believe that Czech political elites interfered with criminal investigations and the independence of the judiciary when it suited them to do so; and that while the standard of the judiciary may have somewhat improved since 2004, this may not necessarily be a result of any commitment to improvement, but rather may be a function of the increased rate of political competition in the Czech Republic. This idea is supported by respondent 22, who had the following comments to make when asked about the impact of the prospect of EU accession on judicial reform initiatives in the Czech Republic:

“Of course, because this was the main driver of reforms, and it is one of the reasons why the reforms stalled after 2004. I wrote a whole book about it. It is a symptom of the third decade. First we had the changes from Communism to something else, then there was the prospect of EU membership, which promised something close to paradise. And this was pushing a lot of changes, but after we entered the EU, this internal engine disappeared. There was no other target or step; no-one was able to define it...And we don't have things like this [a consistent commitment to reform after accession to the EU] in the Czech

Republic, we have a constant quarrel amongst the political parties, and we have seen after the Presidential elections that our political system is weak and that we have one strong political personality, Mr. Zeman, who decides to go against all rules and habits that were here for 20 years.”⁴⁸⁵

This response complements the statements of respondent 25, who said the following about the efforts to improve the independence of the judiciary in the Czech Republic:

“I think now, a large part of the judiciary is ok. Criminal law, and the administrative courts are pretty good, pretty strong. I have my doubts about plenty of the judicial decisions in the commercial sector, and you can make a lot of money there by not playing by the rules. It is just a feeling of mine. But definitely we have moved towards a more independent judiciary...I think it [the prospect of EU Membership] did [help]. In general, it is always useful when you have an outside look at what you are doing. I think the EU is pretty good at this, of giving you an outsider view. You may not like it!...You mightn’t always like the mirror, but it’s there. It might tell a different story to what you feel. So from this perspective, I would say that accession to the EU was a very good process, and like I said before, it probably ended too soon.”⁴⁸⁶

The idea, then, is that the major impetus for reform in the Czech Republic came from the need to meet the requirements of EU membership, and once this pressure was removed, much of the motivation for improvement also disappeared. From this

⁴⁸⁵ Interview with Respondent 22, Journalist, Czech business newspaper; Prague, interview conducted on January 24th, 2014

⁴⁸⁶ Interview with Respondent 25, Velvet Revolution organizer /Ambassador-at-large, Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Prague, interview conducted on February 11th, 2014

perspective then, the situation is not so different than the situation in Hungary, and the more favorable dynamics in the Czech Republic are a result of factors other than the commitment of Czech political elites to sustained reform, particularly in the field of the independence of the judiciary. As such, it is necessary to continue considering other explanations.

Testing hypothesis 4: the importance of mass-level attitudes towards liberal democratic values

Having established the lack of major differences between Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of the effectiveness and performance of the judiciary and the commitment of elites in the respective state to reforming and improving the standard of the judiciary, the study then moves on to considering the extent to which liberal democracy and liberal democratic-friendly values had become consolidated at the mass level in the Czech Republic, as opposed to Hungary. It was established in the previous chapter that societal attitudes in Hungary to various different concepts associated with liberal democracy, such as tolerance towards immigrants, tolerance towards sexual minorities, and interest in politics were each quite negative (with the possible exception of attitudes towards sexual minorities) and somewhat incompatible with the development and consolidation of a liberal democracy. Should it be shown that the attitudes of Czech people towards immigrants, sexual minorities and politics are noticeably more positive than those of Hungarian people, it would indicate that liberal democratic values were more deeply consolidated at the mass level in Czech society. This would then indicate that liberal democratic norms would have become more

deeply rooted in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, making them more difficult for a government to roll back without suffering a serious political backlash.

Figures indicating the level of these values can be found in table 5.2. As in the previous chapter, I include a composite variable for ‘tolerance towards immigrants’, composed of responses to questions about whether to allow more or less immigrants from ethnic groups other than that of the national majority; whether to allow more or less immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe; and whether or not immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live.⁴⁸⁷ Additionally, as the levels of interpersonal trust and of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and the economy in the state has also already been discussed in this chapter, with the figures compared with those drawn from Hungary, I focus on looking at the figures describing political interest, tolerance towards homosexuals and the activities of sexual minorities, and tolerance towards immigrants. In each case, I will also cross-examine them against the relevant figures from the Hungarian case.

The first value that will be examined is the interest in politics amongst ordinary citizens in the Czech Republic. The scale for this value runs from 1 to 4, with ‘1’ showing that the respondent in question is “very interested” in politics. Based on that, and as was explained in the previous chapter, a mean score between 1 and 2.5 would

⁴⁸⁷ As in the previous chapter, the scale for the two questions regarding the acceptability of more or less immigrants in the country runs from 1 (more favorable to allowing immigrants to come to the country) to 4 (less favorable to immigration); meanwhile, the scale for the question regarding whether immigrants make the country better or worse runs from 0 (makes the country worse) to 10 (makes the country better). As these scales are different, I then turn these responses into percentages (as in, the percentage of respondents expressing a more positive or more negative response to the question of immigration) and average them out. On the question as to whether immigration makes the country better or worse, I consider ‘5’ to be a neutral response, and thus, I exclude it from my analysis. Once I have percentages for those expressing favorable and less favorable opinions towards immigrants, I find the mean for these three figures.

Table 5.2: the presence of values associated with liberal democracy in Czech Republic society

	Year		2002	2005	2009	2010	2012	Levels of interpersonal trust
	Mean	Std. Dev.						
	Mean	Std. Dev.	2.391	2.401	2.567	2.479	2.405	Interest in politics ⁴⁸⁸
	Mean	Std. Dev.	2.8	3.03	3.11	3.11	3.07	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	.771	.732	.747	.765	.751	Participation in a political group in the previous 12 months ⁴⁸⁹
	Mean	Std. Dev.	1.95	1.97	1.97	1.98	1.98	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	.211	.177	.156	.153	.127	Participation in a civic group in the previous 12 months ⁴⁹⁰
	Mean	Std. Dev.	1.85	1.92	1.91	1.92	1.94	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	.358	.271	.282	.268	.235	Participation in lawful demonstrations in the previous 12 months ⁴⁹¹
	Mean	Std. Dev.	1.95	1.97	1.96	1.95	1.93	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	.209	.18	.201	.219	.253	Satisfaction with the state of the economy in the country ⁴⁹²
	Mean	Std. Dev.	3.74	3.66	3.63	3.48	3.87	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	2.124	2.235	2.142	2.169	2.569	Satisfaction with the state of democracy in the country ⁴⁹³
	Mean	Std. Dev.	4.85	4.61	4.79	4.85	5.04	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	2.348	2.388	2.385	2.427	2.501	Homosexuals free to live as they please ⁴⁹⁴
	Mean	Std. Dev.	2.38	2.47	2.23	2.19	2.4	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	1.196	1.266	1.184	1.119	1.152	Tolerance towards immigrants
	Mean	Std. Dev.	38.9	n/a	32.5	29.4	29.2	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	49.3	n/a	58	62.2	61.6	

⁴⁸⁸ This figure is based on responses to indicating the extent of the respondent's interest in politics. Respondents were asked to assign a value between 1 and 4 that indicated their level of interest in politics, with 1 indicating "very interested", and 4 indicating "not at all interested". The figures listed indicate the mean of these responses, and the standard deviation.

⁴⁸⁹ Interviewees were asked whether or not they had participated in a political or political action group in the past 12 months. A figure of 1 indicates 'yes', a figure of 2 indicates 'no'. The figures listed in this table are the mean of the responses, and the standard deviation.

⁴⁹⁰ Interviewees were asked whether or not they had participated in a civic organization (or in some other form of organization) in the past 12 months. A figure of 1 indicates 'yes', a figure of 2 indicates 'no'. The figures listed in this table are the mean of the responses, and the standard deviation.

⁴⁹¹ Interviewees were asked whether or not they had participated in a lawful demonstration in the past 12 months. A figure of 1 indicates 'yes', a figure of 2 indicates 'no'. The figures listed in this table are the mean of the responses, and the standard deviation.

⁴⁹² Interviewees were asked to evaluate on a scale from 0-10 how satisfied they were with the economic performance of their country over the previous 12 months (with 0 representing extreme dissatisfaction and 10 representing total satisfaction). Figures provided here include the mean and the standard deviation.

⁴⁹³ Interviewees were asked to evaluate on a scale from 0-10 how satisfied they were with the functioning of democracy in their country over the previous 12 months (with 0 representing extreme dissatisfaction and 10 representing total satisfaction). Figures provided here include the mean and the standard deviation.

⁴⁹⁴ Interviewees were asked to indicate on a scale from 1-5 the extent of their agreement with the following statement: "Gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish". A response of 1 indicates strong agreement with this statement (i.e. a more tolerant attitude to sexual minorities), while a response of 5 indicates strong disagreement. The figure listed in the table indicates the mean and the standard deviation of these responses.

indicate more interest in politics, while a score between 2.5 and 4 indicates less interest. Based on that, it can be seen that there is clearly a consistently low level of interest in politics in the Czech Republic. The round that reflected the most interest in politics, the 2002 round, still had a mean score of 2.8, with a standard deviation of 0.771, showing that even at its height, Czech interest in politics was broadly quite low. Following this, interest declines appreciably: figures of 3.03, 3.11, 3.11, and 3.07, respectively, show that in the years following Czech accession to the EU, apathy increased amongst the general population. This is even more significant when we compare it with Hungary. As is described in figure 5.6 (on the following page), interest in politics has consistently been considerably lower in the Czech Republic than in Hungary; although these figures have somewhat converged in the last few years as apathy grows in Hungary, this merely serves to reinforce the point that there seems to be a generally low level of interest in politics in the Czech Republic.

With this having been established, the section moves on to look at the levels of tolerance towards homosexuals and other sexual minorities on display in the state. As we saw in the case of Hungary in the previous chapter, the tolerance towards the freedom of homosexuals was quite high, especially when one considers the strength of support in the state for radical right-wing political parties such as Jobbik. One would naturally expect that there would also be high levels of support for LGBTQ rights and freedoms in the Czech Republic, given the reputation of the country: it was the first post-communist state to grant legal recognition to same-sex couples, and is one of the

Figure 5.6: The level of societal interest in politics in the Czech Republic and Hungary⁴⁹⁵




few states amongst the new EU members to allow officially sanctioned gay pride rallies.⁴⁹⁶ A basic examination of the statistics reveals that Czech attitudes are generally quite positive to homosexual freedom. As the scale in this question runs from 1 (most tolerant) to 5 (least tolerant), scores between 1 and 3 can be considered to indicate a more positive attitude towards homosexuals and homosexual rights. With this in mind, there has been a consistently high level of positivity towards sexual minorities in the Czech Republic, as every round of the ESS records a mean figure below 3 (2.38, 2.47, 2.23, 2.19, and 2.4, respectively). When compared with Hungary, as can be seen in figure 4.7, the high level of tolerance towards sexual minorities in the Czech Republic is clearly highlighted, as the Czech Republic's levels of tolerance are even higher than those in Hungary. As such, this indicates a more positive picture as regards the presence

⁴⁹⁵ As the 2006/2007 edition of the European Social Survey was not collected in the Czech Republic, I have inserted a trendline to clarify the overall trend in the Czech Republic during these years, without trying to surmise what the level of interest in politics would have been in the country according to the 2006/2007 round.

⁴⁹⁶ The Economist: (2012) "Gay Pride in Prague", *The Economist* [online], available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/08/czech-politics-0> (accessed on 8/10/2014)


Figure 5.7: The level of societal approval of homosexuality in the Czech Republic and Hungary



of democracy friendly values in the Czech Republic.

Finally, it is necessary to consider the societal attitudes displayed in the various rounds of the ESS towards immigrants and immigration, and to infer from that the level of tolerance in the Czech Republic for non-nationals and to compare it with the level in Hungary. In the second round of the ESS (2005), data was not gathered in the Czech Republic on immigration, so that year has also been omitted. The statistics reflect a generally more negative attitude towards non-nationals in the Czech Republic. In each of the years where the survey was conducted, negative attitudes outweighed positive ones, a trend that increased from each round to the next. This is also a trend that was observed in Hungary. However, when we directly compare the two countries in figure 5.8, an interesting picture emerges. It can be seen that anti-immigrant sentiment in the Czech Republic is lower in every round of the ESS than in Hungary; meanwhile, positive attitudes have also been higher. However, whilst negative attitudes in the Czech Republic have consistently grown since the first round of the ESS, similar attitudes have declined in Hungary; the same trend is observable in the case of positive

Figure 5.8: The level of societal positivity and negativity towards immigration in the Czech Republic and Hungary



attitudes in the two countries. Given the increasing strength of support for radical nationalist political parties in Hungary during this time, which contrasts with the successes of similar parties in the Czech Republic during the same period, this finding is in some ways counter-intuitive. However, it is still clear that, however slight it was by 2012, that there is a noticeably consistent level of greater tolerance towards immigrants in the Czech Republic as opposed to in Hungary.

Based on these findings, it is possible to suggest that there is some support for the hypothesis that liberal democratic values, reflected in the societal attitudes of people, had been more deeply consolidated and internalized in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. While the level of interest in politics is generally slightly lower in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, it has been shown that the Czech Republic consistently displays more accepting attitudes towards sexual minorities and immigrant communities. However, this does not necessarily provide a definitive answer to why the Czech Republic has been able to remain committed to the liberal democratic norms

of the European Union to a much greater extent than Hungary. Firstly, while the situation is better in the Czech Republic, it is still quite clear that the presence of these values is not necessarily particularly large. As noted about, Czech interest in politics is quite low, and Czech attitudes towards non-national communities, whilst more tolerant than in Hungary, still displays a much greater level of hostility than support. As such, in order to have a clearer perspective of the true reasons for the improved liberal democratic performance of the Czech Republic as opposed to Hungary, it is vital to analyze the final hypothesis, which considers the role played by civil society actors in the internalization of liberal democratic norms in both countries.

Testing hypothesis 5: the role of civil society actors in the internalization of liberal democratic norms in the Czech Republic

At this stage, the discussion turns to examining the role played by civil society actors in helping the Czech Republic internalize the norms of the European Union, both before and after accession to the EU. It has already been established during this study that there are two principal ways in which civil society can help to facilitate the internalization of a norm in a state: to act in a proactive, discourse-forming manner, which seeks to help consolidate and deepen internalization of the norm; and to act in a defensive manner, as a ‘safety-net’ against regression away from the norm. The previous chapter established that the primary role for civil society which emerged in Hungary was that of a ‘safety net’: of observing and scrutinizing political elites to ensure that they did not regress in their efforts to reforms the states in the image of an archetypal EU member state. Activities that involved building awareness and educating people about the propriety and suitability of these reforms, and in so doing, more deeply internalizing

the values associated with these pieces of legislation. However, it was also found that the effectiveness of non-governmental actors in performing these roles was considerably limited, as a result of lack of a deep connection to the general population in the country, a lack of access to funding, and most importantly of all, an increasing polarization and politicization of this sector. These three factors fed into one another, as the lack of a broad sense of resonance with Hungarian people means that Hungarian NGOs cannot raise enough funding from their own efforts, thus leading them to rely on support from either governmental sources (which impinges upon their freedom of activity) or from external sources (which negatively influences their perceived neutrality amongst the public). As civil society actors can be considered to be the ‘internalization agents’ of a particular norm, it stands to reason that the weakness of Hungarian civil society is at least a partial explanation for why the country has experienced such a strong reversal in terms of its adherence to EU norms in the wake of achieving membership. Based on this, it is necessary to examine if a similar or opposite trend is noticeable in the case of the Czech Republic, and what effects (if any) it has had on the liberal democratic performance of the country after its accession to the EU.

As in the previous chapter, responses from interview conducted between 2013 and 2014 with a variety of Czech political, academic, and media figures are used to derive information on the strength and effectiveness of Czech civil society. Again, these are then coded into a parent node entitled ‘civil society’, with two further sub-nodes dividing up the positive and negative responses. These nodes are analyzed using nVivo 10 software. ‘Word clouds’ are generated in order to allow us to see broader trends in terms of what the respondents identify in their statements as being relevant to the

the frequency of the word ‘strong’, ‘important’, and ‘influence’, words which were not as heavily featured in the Hungarian counterpart to this word cloud. In addition to this, terms such as ‘support’ and ‘funding’ are reasonably heavily mentioned, indicating that access to resources may be a major issue in the country. Finally, words such as ‘watchdog’, ‘democracy’, and ‘corruption’ feature to only a very small degree, possibly indicating a lower emphasis being placed on these ‘safety-net’ functions in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. However, in order to get a more clear and accurate idea of the respective dynamics within the Czech civil society, it is necessary to focus on and examine in closer detail the two sub-nodes, covering ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ statements about civil society, respectively.

A word cloud summary of the ‘positive’ sub-node can be viewed in figure 5.10. Several trends emerge. Words like ‘strong’, and to a lesser extent ‘influence’ and ‘important’, all feature to a notable extent. This reflects the assertions by several respondents that civil society in the Czech Republic is in good, or at least improving, health. In addition, ‘safety-net’ related terms such as ‘watchdog’, ‘corruption’, and ‘legislation’ are particularly prominent; on the other hand, discourse formation-related words such as ‘democratic’ and ‘activists’ are less notable, with others like ‘advocacy’ or ‘education’ being completely absent. This indicates that, just as in the case of Hungary, the respondents were more likely to identify these defensive mechanisms as being the primary role of civil society in the Czech Republic, and that these groups act as ‘sentries’ so as to prevent governmental elites from regressing in their reform efforts. Additionally, it seems that respondents identified the role played by civil society in tackling corruption as being particularly noteworthy. For instance, one respondent had the following to say:

before EU accession, the government was really open to accepting legislation that was not really good for them, which would have raised governmental accountability, because they wanted to gain access to the EU, and these were the conditions. But after that, they basically stopped everything, because the pressure was off and we were already in, and the EU didn't have strong capabilities to enforce legislation. And at that time, the watchdog activities started to become more important than they were before.”⁴⁹⁹

Similarly to this, a further interviewee had the following to say:

“Another significant influence of the civil society when the new energy for the public activism appeared with the fight against corruption...It was 7-8 NGOs united together in one movement, the project I think or the brand, to force politicians to do the work which is necessary: to reconstruct the state, to change the laws about spending of public money, about the public control. Eight different laws that are very influential in fighting corruption. These NGOs were very successful in changing the people's minds prior to the elections in 2013.”⁵⁰⁰

It is interesting to note the frequent references that were made by interviewees to one specific civil society organization: the People In Need organization that was established by the activist Šimon Pánek. Respondent 25 had the following to say:

“I'll put it to you this way. It is always about people. Leaders. I like Simon Panek, he's the guy who runs the People in Need foundation, which is by far

⁴⁹⁹ Interview with Respondent 26, Executive Director, International Civil Society Organization; Prague, interview conducted on February 19th, 2014.

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with Respondent 27, Political Consultant/Activist; Prague, interview conducted on February 27th, 2014.

the biggest NGO in Central Europe, and they do things about civil and human rights from Burma to Belarus to Cuba. We have been friends since the revolution, and he was one of the leaders. He is a very effective organizer. And kudos to him, he managed to build up an influential NGO from scratch, and now it's very big and it distributes aid in Afghanistan and now in Syria, and he has a huge amount of people who are devotees, not volunteers.”⁵⁰¹

Similar sentiments were expressed by respondents 15, 23, 29, and 30. Interviewees noted the professionalism and organizational effectiveness of People In Need and Pánek, a phenomenon that could also be noticed with other successful and influential NGOs in the country. In concert with this, respondent 27 made the following points:

“I think that the level of confidence of the people to NGO activists is higher than [in] the politicians. In 1990s, NGO activists were greedy men going after the big chimney and waving with the flag. And those are not popular in this country, especially the environmental activists who are blocking the highway constructions [sic]. But later activists more respected by the media and the public, and the politicians. The perception of activists is better accepted than in 1980-90s. There is higher level of professionalization of the civil society and because of the dropping of the confidence in political structures. .”⁵⁰²

The word cloud for the ‘negative’ sub-node can be found in figure 5.11. It is immediately noticeable that one of the most frequently referenced terms is ‘funding’;

⁵⁰¹ Interview with Respondent 25, Velvet Revolution organizer /Ambassador-at-large, Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Prague, interview conducted on February 11th, 2014.

⁵⁰² Interview with Respondent 27, Political Consultant/Activist; Prague, interview conducted on February 27th, 2014.

indeed, aside from words such as ‘civil’, ‘society’, and other coincidental terms, no other term was mentioned heavily. This indicates that the biggest problem facing the Czech civil society in the modern day is a lack of access to resources. This is an attitude that was expressed by respondents 25, 26, 27, 28, and 30. For instance, respondent 26 said the following:

“Even now, it is very hard to get funding as an NGO or as a think-tank or as an academic institution; if you would like to make some changes to the system or to change some legislation, it is very hard to get funding for this... There were many NGOs that were dependent on international funding, and which are now unhealthily dependent on State and European funding. So this is basically something which now, after the crisis, state funding is decreasing continually and there are many NGOs which are running into difficulty in terms of funding their activities.”⁵⁰³

Likewise, respondent 27 made the following point:

“What is not good is the level of individual donations here, compared with the US or Britain. Big companies are not supporting well [sic] the civil society. This is the financial problem and I think civil society structures in our country are not well funded, and the state financial health is more focused on the services.”⁵⁰⁴

Respondent 28 had similar remarks to make:

⁵⁰³ Interview with Respondent 26, Executive Director, International Civil Society Organization; Prague, interview conducted on February 19th, 2014.

⁵⁰⁴ Interview with Respondent 27, Political Consultant/Activist; Prague, interview conducted on February 27th, 2014.

researchers and the rest are Masters students. Before, the civil society was much stronger, so that's a problem now.”⁵⁰⁵

Respondent 30 also noted a similar trend:

“On the other hand, if it wasn't for the EU money, I would say many of the major NGOs I know would not be able to function at all. There is very limited government funding. There is some, but it is very limited. Again, without the EU, many of them would break down.”⁵⁰⁶

With that said, several respondents also noted that this tightening of resources would have some positive, almost Darwinian, effects on the standard and effectiveness of Czech civil society. For them, the lack of resources has, in a sense, ‘thinned the herd’, leaving just the most professionally organized and most influential ones to thrive. For instance, in response to a question about funding and support for NGOs in the country, respondent 26 had this to say:

“I think it is partially good, because there are many NGOs which are not so professional or good, and they will not be able to survive.”⁵⁰⁷

This relates back to the previous points about the increasing professionalization of civil society in the Czech Republic.

It is also worth noting that a number of interviewees were not so positive about the state of Czech civil society, and made specific note of the decline of the sector ever since 2004. For instance, respondent 15 made the following point:

⁵⁰⁵ Interview with Respondent 29, Deputy Director, Czech Political Think-Tank; Prague, interview conducted on March 7th, 2014.

⁵⁰⁶ Interview with Respondent 30, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, former Deputy Prime Minister; Prague, interview conducted on March 13th, 2014.

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with Respondent 26, Executive Director, International Civil Society Organization; Prague, interview conducted on February 19th, 2014.

“Again in general terms, it should be important, but if I look at the last 24 years, it was more important at the beginning because then the politics were run by the people who led the Velvet Revolution. With ordinary people, they don’t resonate very much at all, unfortunately.”⁵⁰⁸

On a comparable note, respondent 22 said the following:

“So from that, sometimes you can see some wider movements popping up, but you don’t see the widespread dissatisfaction like in 1989. But on the other side, civil society is not in a good shape. There are many NGOs and different organizations, but there is a generation of politicians that is sitting on the top and keeping the pressure on...And so you don’t have strong institutions, you don’t have strong civil society, because people are still thinking in terms of ‘B’ and ‘A’ about political elites. They don’t have this feeling on the mass scale that they can influence things, other than going to vote every four years.”⁵⁰⁹

With that said, it is still possible to suggest that civil society is in a much healthier shape in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. A majority of responses pointed to the growing strength and professionalism of the sector in the country, and indicated that they approved of the effectiveness of the sector in constraining the behavior of politicians. The role of NGOs in unearthing and tackling corruption was particularly noted. Even the biggest problems that were identified with it had a considerable silver lining. While funding was noted as being a problem for NGOs, and that it had

⁵⁰⁸ Interview with Respondent 15, Member of the European Parliament, PES Party; Brussels, interview conducted on November 5th, 2013

⁵⁰⁹ Interview with Respondent 22, Journalist, Czech business newspaper; Prague, interview conducted on January 24th, 2014

constrained the abilities and growth prospects of a number of organizations, it was also asserted by several interviewees that this might actually have a beneficial effect in the long term, as it would most likely lead to the decline of the weakest and most ineffectual NGOs, whilst allowing the most effective ones to thrive and gain greater traction. This is a stark contrast with the situation in Hungary, where the civil society is plagued with a number of problems. As was established in the previous chapter, Hungarian civil society also suffers from a lack of access to resources; however, this has led to a politicization of the sector, as governments choose to selectively fund and support those organizations which reflect their political perspectives, while those that have found themselves isolated from state funding have been forced to rely on external actors. This has opened these groups up to accusations that they are agents of foreign interests, and that they are attempting to undermine the Hungarian state. Based on the responses gained from the interviews conducted for this study, such accusations have either not been made against Czech civil society organizations, or have not been able to gain much traction. Based on this, there seems to be strong support for the fifth hypothesis, that civil society in the Czech Republic has been able to act as a more effective partner to the EU as an ‘internalization agent’, by providing strong criticism and an effective safeguard against any attempts by political elites to stretch and breach the boundaries of their power.

There are several possible reasons for the contrast in health of civil society in the two states. Evidently, the role played by activists in the Velvet Revolution, and the subsequent support afforded to the sector by Vaclav Havel helped to strengthen the societal perception of civil society in the country, even in the face of Vaclav Klaus’s opposition. On the other hand, in Hungary, political elites played a much larger role in

the downfall of Communism, with Viktor Orbán himself occupying a prominent role in the transformation. Additionally, nationalist sentiment has a much greater foothold in Hungary than it does in the Czech Republic; as such, accusations of foreign interference carry much greater weight in the former country than in the latter. However, one of the biggest differences seems to be in the level of organization and professionalism of NGOs in either country. No Hungarian respondent identified the civil society in their state, or any particular NGO, as being notably professional. On the other hand, Czech respondents made repeated references to the growing sophistication and competence of the sector, with specific reference being made to the People In Need organization. In this sense, it is possible to suggest that while Hungarian civil society may face bigger obstacles than their Czech counterparts, the biggest problem facing them may be their lack of professional development, particularly amongst watchdog and politically-related organizations, which leaves them relatively incapable of comprehensively responding to the challenges and criticisms levelled at them.

Evaluation

Based on the findings of this chapter, several issues have been clarified. From cross-examining the findings from the Czech case with that of the Hungarian case, it is possible to suggest that there is strong support for hypotheses 2 (the impact of mainstream political elites) and 5 (the role of civil society actors in internalizing the norms of the EU), while there is some support for hypothesis 4 (the predisposition of people in each state to values associated with liberal democratic norms), little support for hypothesis 3 (relating to the continuing post-accession commitment of elites in each state to the reform of the national judicial system), and a strong refutation of hypothesis

1 (the relationship between economic ‘hardship’ and the extent of authoritarian-friendly values among citizens in either state). Based on this, it is clear that there is very little reason to believe that the primary driver behind Hungary’s illiberal turn, and the comparative successes enjoyed in the Czech Republic is a function of economic performance. Additionally, given the weak evidentiary support for the differential commitment to judicial reform in the Czech Republic as opposed to Hungary, it is possible to discard this hypothesis as well.

With this in mind, it is possible to suggest that the three ‘values’-based hypotheses may be retained based on the existent evidence. However, it must also be stressed that the evidence for hypotheses 2 and 5, respectively, was much stronger than in the case of hypothesis 4; as such, it is likely that these two hypotheses are the primary causes for the divergence between the two states after accession to the EU. It is clear that in the Czech Republic, elites have not been able to re-shape the state and the political system in their image as has been the case with Hungary under Viktor Orbán. Additionally, civil society seems to be more effective in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, and is more capable of providing a check on the worst impulses of political leaders in the country.

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the biggest undercurrents surrounding the weakness of civil society in Hungary, and the ability of Viktor Orbán to undertake his various power-grabs, was the unresolved sense of nationalist grievance in the country. This has allowed Orbán to legitimize himself as the defender of Hungarian nationality, while also allowing him the political capital to undermine and weaken the influence of civil society actors who may oppose him, and ignore criticisms from the European Commission and the European Parliament. This impulse has been somewhat

missing from the Czech Republic. While the state (and its predecessors) has suffered several democratic breakdowns throughout its history, none of these were a result of a mass-level rejection of democracy, and none of them were related to Czech nationalism. This has continued on to the present day. No Czech leader has been able to build a platform for radical political changes based on appeals to nationalistic grievance to the same extent that Orbán has been able to, nor have they been able to become as clearly dominant of their respective political parties. Václav Klaus and Miloš Zeman, for instance, both sought at various stages to expand and enhance their personal political power, and used nationalistic rhetoric in their speeches in order to build support for their initiatives; however, in neither case were they anywhere near as successful as Orbán has been in Hungary. As such, it is more difficult for any Czech political leader to denigrate the efforts of opposition groups as some sort of national treachery, or to wave away objections from the country's international partners as some sort of politically-motivated on the sanctity of the state.

With that said, the importance of nationalism as a causal factor should not be overstated. Indeed, as the presence of nationalist grievance is more akin to a constant variable (albeit a soft constant), it cannot possibly be a cause for the variance in adherence to liberal democratic norms within Hungary. It certainly plays a facilitative role, and is an important contributory factor in the democratic regression of Hungary as it creates a 'feedback loop', weakening civic and progressive actors whilst increasingly empowering nationalistic and anti-democratic forces. Nationalism and nationalistic grievance on its own cannot cause a state to become undemocratic, nor can it lead directly to a weak civil sector; if this was the case, then a country such as Ireland would surely not be a democracy. However, if this sentiment remains in an unreconstructed

form, it can be used as a potent weapon by political actors who might seek to weaken opposition and legitimize their rule. As such, while revanchist and ethnic nationalism is present in Hungary to a much greater extent than in the Czech Republic, this is only a catalyzing factor behind the different performances of each state, not a cause in itself.

What is more important is the comparative strength of civil society in each state, and its ability to constrain political leadership. It is likely that even if nationalistic arguments carried greater weight in the Czech Republic than they do, that the civic sector would still be able to act as some sort of a barrier to the centralizing impulses of leaders in the state. This is largely because of the greater professionalism and prestige of civil society in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. As has been shown in this chapter, NGOs and civic actors have repeatedly been able to generate significant public opposition from across the political spectrum to specific controversial acts by politicians (such as the opposition agreement of 1998 and the attempts by Zeman to seize extra powers in 2013), and while there are other causes for why these political initiatives were either withdrawn or prevented from developing, it is quite likely that the societal pressure raised had at least a substantial impact on the trajectory of these events. This is probably related to two things: the comparatively strong profile enjoyed by the Czech civil society as a result of its (perhaps perceived) central role in the Velvet Revolution and its subsequent support by Vaclav Havel; and its comparatively higher level of professionalism and prestige.

As a result of this, it is possible to suggest that the answer to the primary research question of this study is that Hungary's divergence from the liberal democratic norms of the EU is a result of a weak civil society being unable to either encourage or develop the societal internalization of these norms in the state, or to prevent domestic

elites from rolling back reforms to a new form of authoritarian government. This allowed Viktor Orbán to undermine and remove the constitutional limits on his power without serious challenge, and to re-shape the state in his image. Additionally, based on the findings of these past two chapters, it is possible to say that liberal democratic norms have not yet been deeply consolidated in either state; there is a low presence of these values in either state, along with high levels of corruption and question marks over the effectiveness and impartiality of the judiciaries in each state (albeit moreso in Hungary than in the Czech Republic). However, due to the comparatively parlous state of its NGO sector and the lack of commitment to democracy and good governance amongst its political leaders, combined with a slightly lower level of liberal-compatible values and a far greater sense of ethno-nationalist grievance, Hungary has suffered a reversion to authoritarianism, rather than a breakdown of its democracy.

Chapter 6- Conclusion: The Implications of Differing Norm Internalization

Trends in Central Europe for the Normative Power of the EU

Since the beginning of 2014, political developments in Hungary have somewhat taken a turn for the worse. Fidesz were able to win the parliamentary elections in April of that year, whilst retaining their parliamentary supermajority. However, the fact that they were able to retain their share of seats whilst losing over 8% of the votes they had received in 2010 raised suspicion, and the government was accused of rampant electoral gerrymandering, and of tipping the balance even further in their favor.⁵¹⁰ In these same elections, Jobbik was able to increase its vote-share to 20.1%, making it the second biggest political party in the state; the Unity coalition, which obtained 23% of the vote, was an amalgamation of smaller parties which has since broken up into its constituent parts. Fidesz increased their vote share in the subsequent European Parliamentary elections in May, although this result (51.5% of the vote and twelve seats) represented a slight decline from their performance in the 2009 European elections. Turnouts in both elections were low.

In addition to this, following the crackdown on civil society organizations in receipt of funding from Norway, attacks on this sector continued throughout the year,

⁵¹⁰ Jan-Werner Mueller: (2014) “Hungary's election offers some disturbing lessons for Europe”, *The Guardian*, [online], available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/09/hungary-election-europe-prime-minister-viktor-orban> (accessed on 11/1/2014); see also, Cas Mudde: (2014) “The 2014 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections, or How to Craft a Constitutional Majority”, *The Washington Post*, [online], available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/14/the-2014-hungarian-parliamentary-elections-or-how-to-craft-a-constitutional-majority/> (accessed on 11/1/2014); The Economist: (2014) “Hungary’s Election: To Viktor, the Spoils”, *The Economist*, [online], available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/04/hungarys-election> (accessed on 11/1/2014).

with police officers conducting further raids the offices of two NGOs that had participated in the dissemination of foreign funds (in particular, those from Norway) to civil society actors in the state, on the grounds that they were suspected of “misappropriation and unauthorized financial activity”.⁵¹¹ In a particularly telling move, Orbán explicitly rejected liberal democracy at a public conference on July 26th, stating that he intended to create an ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary and claiming that “...liberal democratic states can’t remain globally competitive” in the wake of the ongoing financial troubles affecting the European Union.⁵¹² In the same speech, he also expressed an admiration for the political systems of countries such as Russia, China and Singapore, as a result of their economic successes in spite of the global climate (ignoring, of course, the myriad problems faced by the Russian economy even prior to the introduction of European and American sanctions resulting from the War in Ukraine).⁵¹³

It is clear from these developments that Hungary’s continued adherence to EU values regarding democracy are at best extremely tenuous. While Orbán and Fidesz have suffered some electoral reverses, their position of power at the top of Hungarian politics remains almost unchecked. In this sense, they have been assisted by the incompetence of their challengers from the left side of the political spectrum, whose inability to work together cohesively has prevented them from capitalizing effectively

⁵¹¹ Lydia Gall: (2014) “Dispatches: Hungary’s Police Raids Squeeze Civil Society”, *Human Rights Watch*, [online], available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/08/dispatches-hungary-s-police-raids-squeeze-civil-society> (accessed on 11/4/2014).

⁵¹² Zoltan Simon: (2014) “Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in Hungary”, *Bloomberg*, [online], available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-28/orban-says-he-seeks-to-end-liberal-democracy-in-hungary.html> (accessed on 11/5/2014)

⁵¹³ Ibid.

on Fidesz's losses; only Jobbik seems to be capable of challenging the government's power in any meaningful manner.

In contrast to this, while it may not necessarily have become a paragon of liberal democratic values, the Czech Republic's political scene has remained stable. Following the 2013 elections that saw the emergence of Andrej Babiš's ANO party, a government was formed featuring the ČSSD, ANO, and the KDU-ČSL. The subsequent European elections saw ANO achieve the highest representation, but with 16% of the vote, this was slightly lower than the share they received in the parliamentary elections; the ČSSD won 14%, down 6% from the general elections, the liberal-conservative TOP 09 party also won 16% (up 5%), the KDU- ČSL received 10% (up 3%), and the Communists received their customary 10%. However, a worrying trend could be noticed; voter turnouts in this election were remarkably low, involving barely 19% of the electorate (the second lowest level of voter turnout in the entire EU).⁵¹⁴ This decline shadowed the continuous decline in voter turnout for parliamentary elections which had begun in 2006, although they still managed to attract close to 60% of the electorate. While the decline in electoral participation could eventually become a problem for the functioning of democracy in the Czech Republic, it is not at that stage yet. Low turnouts in European Parliamentary elections are not a new occurrence and are not even unique to the Czech Republic (although the scale of apathy is somewhat more relevant to the Czechs), and at present, mark a more important challenge for the Parliament as an institution to overcome, than for the respective member states.

⁵¹⁴ Sean Hanley: (2014) "Eastern Europe's euro-elections: from anger to apathy?", *Dr. Sean's Diary*, [online], available at: <http://drseansdiary.wordpress.com/2014/05/29/eastern-europes-euro-elections-from-anger-to-apathy/#more-2505> (accessed on 11/7/2014)

Having established some of the main reasons for the divergence between the two states in terms of their adherence to the liberal democratic norms of the EU, it is important to consider the implications this has for the normative power of the EU. This chapter will attempt to outline some of the issues with the EU's policies towards the new member states, both before and after the achievement of membership. It will assess the approach the EU took towards assisting the internalization of these norms in the former Communist states, and will try to examine the importance of European values both to the EU and to the new member states. It will also offer some policy suggestions throughout, by which the EU can seek to proactively deal with issues relating to the internalization of liberal democratic values in the member states.

Values monitoring and watchdog functions of the European Union

It has been established earlier that very little academic attention has been paid to the EU's activities in terms of assisting in norm internalization. Several authors have pointed out how the EU's top-down focus has often stunted the development of the civil society sector in the new member countries. However, this does not mean that the EU could not have picked up some of the slack for the weakened civil society in these states, and could have worked to take up the internalization and watchdog roles itself in these states. Indeed, in many ways, the EU often acts as the final arbiter when policies in the member states breach (or threaten to breach) European legislation. For instance, respondent 8 had this to say on the EU's response to developments in Hungary over the last five years:

“...On the strategy of the EU, the fourth amendment of the Hungarian constitution was problematic for several reasons: it forbade the transfer of cases

between courts, it forbade private broadcasters to broadcast political advertising, and it allowed Parliament to pass taxes in order to meet the costs of any fines imposed by the EU or any other international organization. This infringed on the principle of loyal co-operation, meaning that there were no consequences for the government for any bad behavior, and instead passes the cost on to the Hungarian citizens. The fourth issue was related to the mandatory employment of university students in Hungary after graduation. For the EU, it was felt that it would be proportional if students were to stay in Hungary for the same length as their studies had taken. When this happened, Hungary began a constructive dialogue, brought in the Fifth Amendment, and removed the prohibition on the transfer of cases and the special tax, and allowed private broadcasters to advertise. This shows that the EU has a strong influence. There is still some work to do, but the issues with the fourth amendment are satisfied as far as EU law is concerned.”⁵¹⁵

This referred to several policies introduced by Fidesz that were controversial, including the limitation of the Hungarian courts to refer cases to a higher chamber, and to pass the burden of EU fines from the government onto the citizens of the country. Such a move would have allowed Fidesz to avoid any sanction for their activities, whilst also turning the Hungarian citizenry more and more against the EU. In this case, as respondent 8 clearly explains, Orbán’s government was defeated, and was forced to make changes to the laws in question. However, as has been alluded to earlier in this

⁵¹⁵ Interview with Respondent 8, Functionnaire, Legal Service, European Commission; Brussels, interview conducted on September 23rd, 2013

study, this is a highly instrumental approach to the problem, which state actors in several of the new member states have been able to skirt by altering their laws to respect the letter of European legislation, rather than the spirit.⁵¹⁶ Respondent 16 outlined the problem succinctly, when asked about whether he felt that political elites in the new states acted in a “European” manner:

“I have not followed the situation in great detail, but my general impression is that the EU loses leverage immediately after the signature of the accession agreement, so our ability to crack the whip diminishes immediately when the treaty is signed, and even more so when a country joins. So unless you’re in the egregious situation of Bulgaria and Romania whereby there was ongoing monitoring after the agreement is signed, then the EU’s influence is very slight. After the Lisbon Treaty there are some provisions where if a country is in gross violation of its treaty obligations towards the fundamental rights of the EU it can be suspended or even under some circumstances expelled from the EU, but that’s only in extreme cases.”⁵¹⁷

Similarly, respondent 10 had this to say about the response of the EU to political developments in the new members:

“That’s quite difficult to answer. We have some instruments, but they are for extremely clear breaches of fundamental rights. We don’t have the clutch of instruments to manage a degradation of the political situation in these member

⁵¹⁶ Jean-Paul Marthoz: (2014) “Orbán walks fine line in Brussels with Hungary’s media law”, *Committee to Protect Journalists*, [online], available at: <https://cpj.org/blog/2014/11/orban-walks-fine-line-in-brussels-with-hungarys-me.php> (accessed on 11/9/2014)

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Respondent 16, Former Director-General for Enlargement (European Commission); Brussels, interview conducted on November 5th, 2013

states. The treaty of the European Union states that we should respect the domestic constitutions of the member states, but there is indeed a clause that says these member states should respect the values, principals and norms of the EU. I hope we can install that in the next treaty change.”⁵¹⁸

These responses point towards an over-instrumentalization of European Union membership, as transgressions can only be punished if they breach the letter of the law; acts that run contrary to the spirit of the law can be committed with virtual impunity. Instrumentalization of EU membership is thus a tendency which has had negative effects on the importance of liberal democratic values. Accession to the EU was seen in the new states as a way to obtain the living standards of Western European states such as Austria and Germany, with the importance of enshrining and consolidating democracy, minority rights, and the rule of law very much becoming secondary concerns. This exact point was expressed by almost all the people interviewed for this study in both Hungary and the Czech Republic. While one could plausibly argue that democracy and the rule of law are part and parcel of ‘the living standard of Austria’, several respondents specifically mentioned the material elements of a high living standard, and downplayed the more intangible, normative elements. For instance, respondent 7 said this about what Hungary’s long-term goals (both at the elite and mass levels) were for EU membership:

“...I think the basic goal was to achieve the living standard of Austria. That was the common ground between the politicians and the people, that the reason that

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Respondent 10, Member of the European Parliament, ALDE Party; Brussels, interview conducted on September 25th, 2013

we wanted to join was to increase the living standard of Hungary, and I still think it's the only real goal of the average person. So I can differentiate between the average population and the academic sphere etc. Of course politicians and elected people expect a lot of things like democracy and the free market and some more abstract objectives, but the number one objective was to improve living standards. This is why a lot of Hungarians and a lot of segments of Hungarian society are disappointed, because, and it is a sad co-incidence, just after accession, the economic crisis of Hungary and then the global economic crisis began.”⁵¹⁹

Similarly, respondent 20 had the following to say:

“I think [liberal democracy] was mainly a concern more of the elites. I don't know how small the group was, although I think it was mainly among the middle classes and the intelligentsia. The main issue for the society at large was better living conditions. This is not to say that people frowned upon the new freedoms, because the people didn't have them under the previous regime. But it was a soft authoritarianism. So for the people, the main thing was that they were poor. They were noticeably poorer than people living just a few hundred kilometers away.”⁵²⁰

Respondent 27 put it even more pointedly, when asked about the importance of European values to Czech people prior to accession in 2004:

⁵¹⁹ Interview with Respondent 7, Political Consultant, Hungarian Political Consultancy; Budapest, interview conducted on September 12th, 2013

⁵²⁰ Interview with Respondent 20, Freelance Journalist; Budapest, interview conducted on December 16th 2013

“People felt that joining the EU is the only alternative we have. It was the result of the long-term idea of the date. I think most people who were voting for the EU [were doing so] because of that. But I do not think they knew what EU values are. They think that EU is money and prosperity. I know that the EU has its own idea, its own agenda, but it is not accepted by the people.”⁵²¹

Meanwhile, respondent 3 indicated that even though the EU had identified liberal democracy, the rule of law, and minority rights as integral parts of the EU’s accession requirements, responsibility for governing and assessing this was largely delegated to the Council of Europe:

“So when in Copenhagen, the member states had to decide what to do with accession, and they picked the Copenhagen criteria, and the first criteria specified “...have a stable democracy, human rights, and respect for minorities”. These principles have come more precisely from the Council of Europe. Later in the context of reforming the institutions, the EU adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Nice Treaty, but that is almost entirely based on the Convention of the Council of Europe. So on political issues, it was more or less already enshrined in the conventions of the Council of Europe. Of course in the meanwhile, some of the issues which were quite important, like the protection of minorities, and changes happening in the Eastern European countries, these led towards a kind of movement in favor of defining the protection of minorities.

⁵²¹ Interview with Respondent 27, Political Consultant/Activist; Prague, interview conducted on February 27th, 2014

There was a convention, a charter on minority languages. The EU was behind the Council of Europe on this one.”⁵²²

In this context, then, it is not surprising that liberal democratic norms have only been slightly internalized in these states; such values were allowed to be constructed in such a manner that they were effectively seen as secondary to, and potentially even contradictory to, the material goals of a thriving economy. It cannot be said that the EU did not attempt to develop civil society in any manner, nor that it did not attempt to support the internalization of liberal values in these states. For instance, according to respondent 16,

“...Under these circumstances in the early 1990s, when civil society was extremely weak even in the Czech Republic, one could say that the EU came in almost as a substitute for civil society, and that...the EU sought to create a vibrant civil society from the outside through external assistance programs and twinning arrangements and so on. I think that by the time the experience was over and the fifth enlargement was behind us (with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), that although the EU continued with a type of this activity in the Western Balkans and Turkey, I think we have become more modest about the extent to which civil society can be generated through outside activity...I don't think we have the ability to come in and generate civil society if it's not there to begin with. We can come in in support of issues like ecology, women's equality, freedom of expression and so on. But I think we have become

⁵²² Interview with Respondent 3, Retired fonctionnaire, Directorate-General for Enlargement (European Commission); Brussels, interview conducted on July 10th, 2013

more modest, and a country's willingness to accept the responsibilities of membership is now seen as depending to a great extent on endogenous developments within that country, as opposed to the EU grabbing that country by the scruff of the neck and shaking it and telling it must do certain things, including civil society development."⁵²³

In this sense, the EU tried to insert itself into the 'advocacy' or education-based roles of civil society in these states. However, as respondent 16 alluded to, this may have been misguided: the EU does not have the ability to generate a civil society using a top-down approach. Indeed, the very notion runs contrary to the idea of a healthy, grassroots-based civil society.

This is not to say that there is nothing that the EU can do to support the internalization of liberal norms in its partner countries. On the contrary, while it may not be able to actively take on the advocacy functions of civil society, it can more credibly take up and support the watchdog functions of civil society. In this sense, it can (and should) be more robust in its approach to dealing with violations of the spirit of European law, and not just those that breach the letter of the law. Proposals to do just that have been circulated in Brussels, with the former Commissioner for Justice, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights (now a Member of the European Parliament), Viviane Reding, being a staunch promoter of new legislation which would give the European Commission the ability to more actively monitor democracy in the European

⁵²³ Interview with Respondent 16, Former Director-General for Enlargement (European Commission); Brussels, interview conducted on November 5th, 2013

Union member states (not just in the post-communist countries).⁵²⁴ However, towards the end of 2014, it is instead the United States government which has taken a more active role in defending democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe, and particularly in Hungary, with several high-ranking officials making thinly-veiled (or even explicit) criticisms of the state of democracy in Hungary, and with sanctions being launched against several important public officials in the country for their links to corrupt activity.⁵²⁵ In contrast, the European Union has been comparatively silent. Indeed, in many ways, the EU's record on democratic governance has itself suffered some damage over the recent years. This is partially a result of the economic problems being faced by the Eurozone since 2008. During this time, decisions at the European level in response to the crisis have become increasingly remote and centralized at the most elite level of European decision-making (the European Council), to the detriment of input from the mass levels of society and from voters.⁵²⁶ Dissatisfaction with the functioning of national democracy in the individual member states is also high, as citizens have become increasingly angry at the often aloof and technocratic (and even authoritarian) manners in which their governments have dealt with the crises being

⁵²⁴ James Fontanella-Khan: (2014) "Brussels seeks greater powers on rule of law", *Financial Times*, [online], available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1fa9684a-9d70-11e3-a599-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ImN43z2y> (accessed on 11/12/2014)

⁵²⁵ Rick Lyman: (2014) "U.S. Denial of Visas for 6 in Hungary Strains Ties", *New York Times*, [online], available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/world/europe/us-denial-of-visas-for-6-in-hungary-strains-ties.html?_r=0 (accessed on 11/12/2014); Free Hungary: (2014) "President Obama talks about intimidation of civil society in Hungary", *FreeHungary.hu*, [online], available at: <http://www.freehungary.hu/index.php/56-hirek/3231-president-obama-talks-about-intimidation-of-civil-society-in-hungary> (accessed on 11/12/2014); Eva S. Balogh: (2014) "Assistant Undersecretary Victoria Nuland's Keynote Address at the 2014 U.S.-Central Europe Strategy Forum", [online], available at: <https://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2014/10/03/undersecretary-victoria-nulands-keynote-address-at-the-2014-u-s-central-europe-strategy-forum/> (accessed on 11/12/2014)

⁵²⁶ Vivien A. Schmidt: (2013) "The Eurozone Crisis Challenge to Democracy: which way forward?", *Open Democracy*, [online], available at: <http://opendemocracy.net/vivien-schmidt/eurozone-crisis-challenge-to-democracy-which-way-forward/> (accessed on 11/15/2014)

experienced throughout the continent, and most notably, at the imposition of painful fiscal reforms upon these countries by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank.⁵²⁷ Additionally, the perception of a ‘democratic deficit’⁵²⁸ within the institutions of the EU has led to allegations of hypocrisy from critics who oppose the idea of the EU ‘meddling’ in the internal political affairs of member states (with this said, according to Müller, it can also be argued that the EU draws its legitimacy from the mandates provided to democratically elected national parliaments, and that relatively few people deny the EU’s power to arbitrate in cases where states have been accused of breaches of the economic rules of membership.)⁵²⁹ This in some ways overlaps with issues relating to democracy in the other member states, including some of the older member states. According to Sedelmeier, states that are governed by parties that are ideologically close to those parties (such as Fidesz) that transgress European norms are unlikely to support sanctions against them.⁵³⁰ Indeed, it is likely that certain member states may be unwilling to turn the spotlight on Hungary, should they subsequently become the future subject of any similar proceedings. Italy, for instance, might be particularly reluctant to see Hungary sanctioned for its breaches of European liberal democratic norms: it is a state which has consistently been ranked as

⁵²⁷ Klaus Armingeon; Kai Guthmann: (2014) “Democracy in Crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(3), pp. 437–439

⁵²⁸ The concept of a ‘democratic deficit’ within the European Union is a long standing controversy, whereby the functioning of the European institutions, the lack of direct, mass-based elections for positions within the European Commission and the European Parliament, and the perceived aloofness of bureaucrats within the European Commission from the European citizenry.

⁵²⁹ Jan-Werner Müller: (2013) “Defending Democracy within the EU”, *Journal of Democracy*, 24(2), pp. 141–142

⁵³⁰ Ulrich Sedelmeier: (2014) “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accession”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(1), pp. 118–119

one of the most corrupt in Europe, and which, during the Premiership of Silvio Berlusconi, was suspected of infringing European guidelines on the independence of the media and the rule of law.

Supplementing this, there is somewhat of a lack of political will at the European level when it comes to addressing anti-liberal democratic activity in member states. Whilst strong criticism of Hungary has come from Members of the European Parliament from the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of European Liberal Democrats (ALDE), and the Green Party, the European People's Party (EPP), the group to which Fidesz belongs, has been much more supportive of Orbán during this time period. For instance, the former leader of the EPP, Joseph Daul, praised Orbán for his 'courageous' economic reforms in April of 2014; this was in addition to only very mild criticisms from Angela Merkel, and a notable lack of comment from the new Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker (both of whom come from political parties that are members of the EPP group in the European Parliament).⁵³¹ It is possible that this situation could change in the future; Orbán's outspoken opposition to the candidacy of Juncker for Commission President (as a result of his links to the previously mentioned critic of Hungary, Viviane Reding) could certainly lead to a reappraisal of the EPP's hitherto strident support for Fidesz.⁵³² In addition to this, based on the voting

⁵³¹ Thorsten Brenner; Wolfgang H. Reinicke: (2014) "Fixing Europe's Orbán Problem", *Project Syndicate*, [online], available at: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/thorsten-benner-and-wolfgang-h-reinicke-demand-that-eu-leaders-force-hungary-s-authoritarian-prime-minister-to-change-course> (accessed on 11/23/2014); see also, Spiegel Staff: (2012) "'Booming Silence': Europe's Conservatives Fail to Criticize Hungary", *Spiegel Online*, [online], available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/booming-silence-europe-s-conservatives-fail-to-criticize-hungary-a-810863.html> (accessed on 11/23/2014)

⁵³² Johannes Wachs: (2014) "With Fidesz opposing Juncker's candidacy for Commission President, it is time for the European People's Party to reconsider its support for Viktor Orbán", *London School of Economics*, [online], available at: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2014/06/03/with-fidesz-opposing->

patterns of the time, it is certain that several EPP members voted to accept the Tavares Report in 2013.⁵³³ However, to date, criticism from the EPP has been either absent, indirect, or otherwise muted, and Orbán continues to use this as a source of strength for his parliamentary initiatives in Hungary.⁵³⁴

In concert with this support from major political actors in the European Parliament, the European Commission has continued to show its unwillingness to use any of the more robust tools at its disposal, particularly the article 7 procedures which allow the voting rights of an EU member to be suspended. The use of this procedure was mooted in the European Parliament following the publication of the Tavares Report, and had previously been suggested in 2012 as a possible sanction against Hungary by the Dutch Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, but no active moves to use it have been made since then.⁵³⁵ It is widely accepted that the use of an article 7 is a ‘nuclear option’, only to be used in the most extreme of circumstances. In this sense, it is somewhat understandable that either the European Commission or the European Council is hesitant to use it. However, given the developments throughout 2014, such as the crackdowns on NGO activity and Orbán’s “illiberal regime” speech, it becomes

[juncckers-candidacy-for-commission-president-it-is-time-for-the-european-peoples-party-to-reconsider-its-support-for-viktor-orban/](#) (accessed on 11/23/2014)

⁵³³ Benjamin Novak: (2014) “Princeton’s Kim Scheppele on Viktor Orban and his Fidesz supermajority”, *Budapest Beacon*, [online], available at: <http://budapestbeacon.com/politics/princetons-kim-scheppele-on-viktor-orban-and-his-fidesz-supermajority/> (accessed on 11/28/2014)

⁵³⁴ With this said, it must be remembered that other parties within the European Parliament have continued to maintain pressure on Fidesz and Orbán. The most recent example of this was the rejection of the Hungarian nominee for the European Commission, Tibor Navracscics: he had been proposed for the position of Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Citizenship, but was found to be unsuitable for the position as a result of Fidesz’s controversial policies towards the citizenship of Hungarians in neighboring states. He was eventually ratified when his Citizenship portfolio was replaced with a less controversial Sport portfolio.

⁵³⁵ Nikolaj Nielsen: (2012) “Kroes threatens nuclear option against Hungary”, *EU Observer*, [online], available at: <http://euobserver.com/justice/115209> (accessed on 23/11/2014)

rather more troubling as to why the EU has not broached this topic more seriously. It is possible to suggest that the reason for this reticence is the experience of the attempts to sanction Austria in 2000, when, following elections in the country, the centre-right Austrian People's Party entered into a coalition government with the radical-right Freedom Party. According to Müller, this led to a "traumatizing" chain of events for the EU: the Austrian People's Party decision to coalesce with the Freedom Party resulted in an attempt by the other members of the EU to discipline Austria bilaterally by, amongst other things, refusing to support Austrian candidates for positions in international organizations; however, following the findings of the European Court of Human Rights that there was nothing necessarily undemocratic about the Freedom Party participating in government, the EU was forced into making an embarrassing climb-down.⁵³⁶ To date, this has been the only time that the EU has attempted to sanction a member state for testing the boundaries of the liberal democratic requirements of membership, and it is quite clear that the counter-productive nature of this intervention is playing a role now in hampering efforts to deal with backsliding on democracy in the new EU member states.

Based on this, one can identify the primary reasons for the lack of credible actions aimed at acting as a 'democracy watchdog', and as a final safety net against transgressions against European liberal democratic norms, on the part of the EU. These include a perception of a lack of consistency in terms of its response to the financial crisis, when the EU favored technocratic and/or authoritarian solutions to the problems

⁵³⁶ Jan-Werner Müller: (2013) "Defending Democracy within the EU", *Journal of Democracy*, 24(2), pp. 139

of the Eurozone, with scant regard for the democratic consensus in countries most affected by the economic chaos; an unwillingness on the part of ideologically-friendly political parties and governments within the EU to support the punishment of their cohorts; and an ongoing trauma amongst the European institutions resulting from the abortive attempts to punish Austria in 2000 for including a populist radical-right wing party in government. It is undoubtable that the latter point has had a major impact on the EU's decision not to invoke sanctions against Hungary, as to do so and to fail again would be a major embarrassment for the EU, and would hobble any future criticisms of developments within Hungary (or any other state that would potentially transgress the liberal democratic norms of the EU). However, it is also clear that at present, the EU does not possess enough sensitive tools to deal with a country such as Hungary. It is quite likely that, rather than weakening Fidesz's grip on the country, any attempt to use an article 7 procedure against Hungary would play into Orbán's hands, and would allow him to use such an intervention as 'proof' of the EU's 'colonial' ambitions towards Hungary. As was previously established, much of Orbán's political capital comes from his attacks on the EU and the European Commission, as this allows him to present himself as the ultimate embodiment and defender of Hungarian nationhood. Indeed, a move to deprive Hungary of its voting rights in the European Council might have the effect of encouraging Orbán to unilaterally remove the state from the EU altogether. Indeed, the possibility of an exit for Hungary has already been mooted by László Kövér, the speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, should criticisms continue to come from the

EU.⁵³⁷ Whilst such a move is unlikely at present, the same could not be said if the ‘nuclear option’ of an article 7 procedure was used against the state. This scenario would be a worst-case for all concerned, as it would most likely be economically and politically disastrous for Hungary, and would also see the EU lose all leverage and control over Orbán and Fidesz, whilst creating a potentially hostile state within the current frontiers of the Union.

As such, it is crucial that the EU develop some more practical ways of monitoring democracy and sanctioning norm violations in member states, such that they may be able to exert greater influence on states such as Hungary which seem to be hurtling towards authoritarianism. On paper, the establishment of monitoring tools should not be a major challenge: the EU conducts extensive and detailed democracy monitoring in applicant countries prior to membership, and as such, has ample capacity in this area to be able to apply these same approaches to existent member states.⁵³⁸ Additionally, these efforts could potentially be married to the activities of watchdog and monitoring NGOs in the various member states, a move which could help improve the visibility and effectiveness of indigenous civil society groups.

On the other hand, the creation of a set of sensitive and credible (yet also robust and effective) sanctions may be somewhat trickier. Leaving aside the issues regarding political will for the next section, it is clear that the creation of a new set of institutions

⁵³⁷ Georgi Gotev: (2014) “Hungarian parliament chief: We could leave the EU”, *EurActiv*, [online], available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/central-europe/hungarian-parliament-chief-we-could-leave-eu-309519> (accessed on 11/25/2014)

⁵³⁸ Democracy Reporting International: (2013) “In Need of New Tools: Protecting Democracy in EU Member States”, *Democracy Reporting International: Briefing Paper 39*, p. 3, [online], available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files/contributions/16.1.democracyreportinginternationaldribp39_in_need_of_new_tools_protecting_democracy_in_eu_member_states_en.pdf (accessed on 11/25/2014)

or procedures for governing and prosecuting breaches of democratic norms would be an entirely new innovation. As such, one needs to consider what the most effective method of applying and arbitrating these standards would be. Jan-Werner Müller has proposed a “Copenhagen Commission”, which would involve the creation of an agency with a “...mandate to offer comprehensive and consistent political judgments...” regarding the situation of democracy and the rule of law in an EU member state; this agency would then make recommendations to the European Commission, which could subsequently decide to implement fines and/or a restriction of EU funds to transgressor countries.⁵³⁹ Such a formulation would still allow the EU to use the article 7 procedures at a future point, if they were required. However, whilst Müller’s proposal would surely mark an improvement on the current framework, on its own it would be an insufficient measure to comprehensively deal with norm violations in the member states. For instance, de Witte points out that such an institution, whilst constraining the ability of democratically-elected elites to act in undemocratic fashions, would also have the effect of “...[limiting] self-determination, both on the level of the individual citizen and on the level of the polity.”⁵⁴⁰ Komarek acknowledges that a demand (and a mandate) for something similar to Müller’s proposal might exist at the European level (especially as the EU expands into countries within the Western Balkans which have recent experiences with warfare and the vicissitudes of nationalistic authoritarianism), but he

⁵³⁹ Jan-Werner Müller: (2013) “Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of the Liberal Order”, *Transatlantic Academy 2012-2013 Paper Series*, (3), p. 25, [online], available at: http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Muller_SafeguardingDemocracy_Feb13_web.pdf (accessed on 11/26/2014)

⁵⁴⁰ Floris de Witte: (2013) “Less Constraint of Popular Democracy, More Empowerment of Citizens”, *VerfBlog*, [online], available at <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/less-constraint-of-popular-democracy-more-empowerment-of-citizens-2/> (accessed on 11/26/2014)

also explains that the current manner in which the EU functions, particularly in its response to the Financial Crisis, enables the sidelining of citizens at the expense of efficiency of action and top-down solutions.⁵⁴¹ Komarek argues that, instead, the EU should interpret European law in such a way that the European legislation obliging member states to abide by their treaty obligations could encompass respect for the “foundational values” of the EU; this would then allow the Commission to implement infringement procedures against the member states, and then sanction them explicitly for breaching the EU’s norms regarding liberal democracy and the rule of law.⁵⁴²

Whilst both of the proposals have their merits, they also run into the issue that they continue to perpetuate the idea of top-down, elite-based instrumentalist responses to the authoritarian slides of countries such as Hungary. Without some manner of enabling citizenry and civil society actors in Central and Eastern European states, the internalization of these norms will remain shallow, and their continued survival will remain somewhat contingent upon the acquiescence of the national political authorities. As such, any solution should seek to actively involve and empower the civil society. This could be achieved by adapting part of Komarek’s proposal, by allowing the European Court of Justice to investigate breaches of the spirit of European law regarding liberal democracy, but by adding a provision by which non-governmental and individual actors could bring cases against their government. How this might work in practice, for example, is that the two Hungarian NGOs that were targeted in the 2014

⁵⁴¹ Jan Komarek: (2013) “The EU is More Than A Constraint on Populist Democracy”, *VerfBlog*, [online], available at: <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-eu-is-more-than-a-constraint-on-populist-democracy-2/> (accessed on 11/26/2014)

⁵⁴² Ibid.

crackdown would then potentially be able to bring a case against the Hungarian authorities for infringing their rights to self-expression and political activity. Additionally, the expansion of the overview of the European Court of Justice should be accompanied with the introduction of legislation guaranteeing the independence of the NGO sector, and their right to exist and organize. This, in theory, would thus help to raise the profile and credibility of the ‘norm internalization agents’ in member states, and in the long-run, could help them to branch out from their defensive, ‘watchdog’ facilities, into more proactive, advocacy-based activities.

Norm internalization and the importance of consistency of action on the part of the EU

Much of this feeds into the above-mentioned issues relating to political will, and the fears in certain member states that a more capable EU would be increasingly likely to interfere in the political decisions made in their country. While it is possible that members of the European People’s Party could come to explicitly support the use of more sensitive tools against Hungary, and to even support strong sanctions against the state (should Fidesz’s relationship with their counterparts continue to deteriorate), it is likely that many states and political actors in Europe would be hesitant to allow the creation of a formal set of procedures which could then potentially be used against them in the future. This is in addition to the ongoing problems involving the EU’s technocratic and elitist response to the Eurozone crisis, the plunging public support for democracy in both old and new EU member states, and the continued instrumentalization of EU membership. As such, it is clear that in the present situation, there are some serious questions being raised as regards the standard of democracy available in the EU as a whole.

If we are to return to the discussion on the effectiveness of norm entrepreneurs in chapter 1, it has been established in the literature that one of the most important sources of capacity for norm entrepreneurs is that they are perceived to act in a manner that is consistent with the norms they are trying to spread. In this sense, the extent to which the entrepreneur practices what it preaches can have a major bearing on whether or not the norms it is trying to disseminate are taken on in the first place in other countries.⁵⁴³ This does not merely extend to the ‘norm emergence’ phase of the development of an international norm, as the entrepreneur (and those states that initially took on the norms) necessarily need to remain consistent throughout the entire ‘life-cycle’ of the norm. Should the actors that are advocating for the norm be found to be acting in a manner inconsistent with the norm, both these proponents and the norm itself will lose credibility, and may even come to be viewed with suspicion and cynicism amongst the general population in the countries that are struggling to internalize these values. For instance, Sweden is currently a major norm entrepreneur in the areas of sustainable development and environmental protection. However, if, for example, the country’s Minister for Natural Resources was to announce that the state had located massive new resources of brown coal⁵⁴⁴, and that the Swedish government intended to exploit these resources fully and to use strip-mining⁵⁴⁵ to extract them, they would lose

⁵⁴³ Christine Ingebritsen: (2002) “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(1), p. 14; p. 20

⁵⁴⁴ Brown coal, otherwise known as lignite, is an immature form of the more regularly used black coal, formed from compressed peat; it has a relatively low energy yield and releases comparatively high levels of carbon and soot emissions, making it a particularly ‘dirty’ source of energy.

⁵⁴⁵ Strip-mining is a horizontal (as opposed to a traditional, vertical) form of mining, which strips away the surface soil covering a particular resource to allow easy access. It is a process that is extremely harmful to the environment, as it requires heavy use of toxic chemicals, which can subsequently poison soil and groundwater deposits, and can destroy entire regional ecosystems.

much of their credibility as a normative actor, as many people would assume that their previous stance was merely because of a lack of access to sources of hydrocarbon energy.

Similarly, then, the EU's perceived problematic relationship with the liberal democratic values that it claims to uphold and promote, have somewhat affected its ability to remain credible when dealing with a situation such as we find in Hungary or in other member states. Thus, when a political leader like Orbán describes the EU as the new Moscow, aside from the nationalistic overtones, this is a charge which carries greater credibility than it otherwise might. It is important, then, that if the EU is to get a greater handle on the problems of democratic regression in several member states, it needs to also become more introspective; any attempt to deal with the problems being faced by new members such as Hungary or Romania should not be framed as a situation where old member states adopt a paternalistic attitude towards the new members, and should rather be integral parts of a re-emphasis of the importance and relevance of the liberal democratic values of the EU. Additionally, the institutions of the EU need to be capable of being held accountable themselves; otherwise, the proposed reforms above will surely result in a Eurosceptic reaction, and may end up causing as much harm as good. In general, in order to improve its effectiveness as a normative actor, and to ensure the acceptability and internalization of its norms, the EU needs to be consistent in the application of its own standards; it must insist upon old members as well as new ones remaining committed to the values they signed up to as part of their accession to the EU; and it must work to try to counteract the instrumentalization of EU membership by advocating for the beneficence of the liberal democratic norms as well as the economic norms, and by stressing that the EU is not just a community of economies,

and that it is also a community of values. This is what the EU can do to respond to the problematic developments regarding liberal democratic norms in several member states.

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Appendix A: IRB Approval Notices for a Research Project



Office of Research and Regulatory Affairs
Arts and Sciences IRB
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
335 George Street / Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200
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December 18, 2014

Michael Toomey
162 South Street
Jersey City NJ 07307

P.I. Name: Toomey
Protocol #: 13-749Mx

Dear Michael Toomey:

Initial	Amendment	X Continuation	Continuation w/ Amend	Adverse Event
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Protocol Title: "The Normative Disconnect: European Union Enlargement, Normative Power, and Democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic"

This is to advise you that the above-referenced study has been presented to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, and the following action was taken subject to the conditions and explanations provided below:

Approval Date:	12/18/2014	Expiration Date:	12/17/2015		Expedited Category(s): 8c
Approved # of Subject(s):	50	Currently Enrolled:	30		

This approval is based on the assumption that the materials you submitted to the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs (ORSP) contain a complete and accurate description of the ways in which human subjects are involved in your research. The following conditions apply:

- **This Approval**-The research will be conducted according to the most recent version of the protocol that was submitted. **This approval is valid ONLY for the dates listed above;**
- **Reporting**-ORSP must be immediately informed of any injuries to subjects that occur and/or problems that arise, in the course of your research;
- **Modifications**-Any proposed changes MUST be submitted to the IRB as an amendment for review and approval prior to implementation;
- **Consent Form(s)**-Each person who signs a consent document will be given a copy of that document, if you are using such documents in your research. The Principal Investigator must retain all signed documents for at least three years after the conclusion of the research;
- **Continuing Review**-You should receive a courtesy e-mail renewal notice for a Request for Continuing Review before the expiration of this project's approval. However, it is your responsibility to ensure that an application for continuing review has been submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to the expiration date to extend the approval period;

Additional Notes:

- Continuation Expedited Approval per 45 CFR 46.110;
- **IRB Approval has been provided for data analysis only. PI is to contact the IRB prior to the recruitment of additional subjects or further interactions/interventions with subjects;**

Failure to comply with these conditions will result in withdrawal of this approval.

Please note that the IRB has the authority to observe, or have a third party observe, the consent process or the research itself. The Federal-wide Assurance (FWA) number for the Rutgers University IRB is FWA00003913; this number may be requested on funding applications or by collaborators.

Respectfully yours,

Acting For--
Beverly Teppe, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Food Science
IRB Chair, Arts and Sciences Institutional Review Board
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

(MW:bk)

cc: Dr. Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
ASB III, 3 Rutgers Plaza, Cook Campus
New Brunswick, NJ 08901

September 27, 2013

P.I. Name: Toomey
Protocol #: 13-749M

Michael Toomey
 162 South Street
 Jersey City NJ 07307

Dear Michael Toomey:

(Initial / Amendment / Continuation / Continuation w/ Amendment)

Protocol Title: "The Normative Disconnect: European Union Enlargement, Normative Power, and Democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic"

This is to advise you that the above-referenced study has been presented to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, and the following action was taken subject to the conditions and explanations provided below:

Amendment Approval Date: 09/17/2013 **Expiration Date:** 5/30/2014 **Expedited Category(s):** 6,7

This approval is based on the assumption that the materials you submitted to the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs (ORSP) contain a complete and accurate description of the ways in which human subjects are involved in your research. The following conditions apply:


- **This Approval**-The research will be conducted according to the most recent version of the protocol that was submitted. **This approval is valid ONLY for the dates listed above;**
- **Reporting**-ORSP must be immediately informed of any injuries to subjects that occur and/or problems that arise, in the course of your research;
- **Modifications**-Any proposed changes **MUST** be submitted to the IRB as an amendment for review and approval prior to implementation;
- **Consent Form(s)**-Each person who signs a consent document will be given a copy of that document, if you are using such documents in your research. The Principal Investigator must retain all signed documents for at least three years after the conclusion of the research;
- **Continuing Review**-You should receive a courtesy e-mail renewal notice for a Request for Continuing Review before the expiration of this project's approval. However, it is your responsibility to ensure that an application for continuing review has been submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to the expiration date to extend the approval period;

Additional Notes: **Amendment Approval per 45 CFR 46.110 (b)(2) on 09/17/2013 for: Revised Interview Protocol.**

Failure to comply with these conditions will result in withdrawal of this approval.

Please note that the IRB has the authority to observe, or have a third party observe, the consent process or the research itself. The Federal-wide Assurance (FWA) number for the Rutgers University IRB is FWA00003913; this number may be requested on funding applications or by collaborators.

Respectfully yours,



Acting for -
 Dr. Beverly Tepper, Ph.D.
 Professor
 Chair, Rutgers University Institutional Review Board

cc: Dr. Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
ASB III, 3 Rutgers Plaza, Cook Campus
New Brunswick, NJ 08901

June 25, 2013

P.I. Name: Toomey
Protocol #: 13-749M

Michael Toomey
 162 South Street
 Jersey City NJ 07307

Dear Michael Toomey: ✓

(Initial / Amendment / Continuation / Continuation w/ Amendment)

Protocol Title: "The Normative Disconnect: European Union Enlargement, Normative Power, and Democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic"

This is to advise you that the above-referenced study has been presented to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, and the following action was taken subject to the conditions and explanations provided below:

Approval Date:	5/31/2013	Expiration Date:	5/30/2014
Expedited Category(s):	6, 7	Approved # of Subject(s):	50

This approval is based on the assumption that the materials you submitted to the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs (ORSP) contain a complete and accurate description of the ways in which human subjects are involved in your research. The following conditions apply:


- **This Approval**-The research will be conducted according to the most recent version of the protocol that was submitted. **This approval is valid ONLY for the dates listed above;**
- **Reporting**-ORSP must be immediately informed of any injuries to subjects that occur and/or problems that arise, in the course of your research;
- **Modifications**-Any proposed changes **MUST** be submitted to the IRB as an amendment for review and approval prior to implementation;
- **Consent Form(s)**-Each person who signs a consent document will be given a copy of that document, if you are using such documents in your research. The Principal Investigator must retain all signed documents for at least three years after the conclusion of the research;
- **Continuing Review**-You should receive a courtesy e-mail renewal notice for a Request for Continuing Review before the expiration of this project's approval. However, it is your responsibility to ensure that an application for continuing review has been submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to the expiration date to extend the approval period;

Additional Notes: Expedited Approval per 45 CFR 46.110

Failure to comply with these conditions will result in withdrawal of this approval.

Please note that the IRB has the authority to observe, or have a third party observe, the consent process or the research itself. The Federal-wide Assurance (FWA) number for the Rutgers University IRB is FWA00003913; this number may be requested on funding applications or by collaborators.

Respectfully yours,



Acting For--
 Dr. Beverly Tepper, Ph.D.
 Professor
 Chair, Rutgers University Institutional Review Board

cc: Dr. Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia

Appendix B: Sample Email Invitation to Participate in the Study

* These emails have been redacted and the names and personal information of participants and/or others has been removed in order to protect their identity.

2/20/2015

Rutgers University Mail - Request regarding the possibility of setting up an interview



Michael Toomey <mitoomey@scarletmail.rutgers.edu>

Request regarding the possibility of setting up an interview

Michael Toomey <mitoomey@scarletmail.rutgers.edu>

Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 2:43 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

My name is Michael Toomey. I am a PhD. student at the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University, and I am currently undertaking research contributing towards my doctoral dissertation. For my dissertation, I am examining the impact of European Union membership on the consolidation of democracy in the Czech Republic and Hungary.

I previously contacted you regarding the [REDACTED]. Following on from that, I was hoping to inquire if it would be at all possible for me to set up an interview with you at some point over the next few weeks for the purposes of my research? I am currently living in Budapest, and so would be free to meet you wherever is most convenient for you. I will be leaving for Christmas on the 23rd of December, but I would be available to meet you at any time before that date.

I look forward to hearing from you. Should you have any questions or queries for me, you are welcome to contact me by email at mitoomey@scarletmail.rutgers.edu.

Thank you again,

Michael Toomey

Appendix C: Interview Protocols

ATTACHMENT 7

Title of Project: “The Normative Disconnect: The Normative Disconnect: European Union Enlargement, Normative Power, and Democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic”

Principal Investigator: Michael Toomey

Co-Principal Investigator: Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia

Interview questions

This is an exhaustive list of the questions I intend to ask respondents, however I will not ask every question in each case. Instead, interviews will be tailored to the respondent to ensure the most accurate and useful information is obtained. I intend to ask no more than ten questions in each interview.

1. In your opinion, do you feel that there have been any problems that have emerged in Hungary and/or the Czech Republic specifically as a result of EU membership or of the accession process?
2. How would you characterize the strength and vibrancy of civil society in Hungary and the Czech Republic at the time of their applications for membership of the European Union?
3. What do you think did the EU want Hungary and the Czech Republic to look like ten years after membership?
4. What impact do you feel the issue of corruption has had on the quality of democracy in your country?
5. Has the level of corruption in your country had any impact on the attitudes of the general public towards democratization and the democratic process, and politics in general?
6. Do you believe that the success of radical political parties such as Jobbik in Hungary and the KSCM in the Czech Republic has had any influence in the democratic trajectories of the two countries? Have they in any way influenced the manner in which mainstream political parties in these two countries approach the issue of democracy and democratization?
7. What impact do you believe high profile political scandals, such as the ‘Gyurcsany scandal’ in Hungary and the scandal which forced the resignation of Petr Necas in the Czech Republic, have had on the attitudes of people in these two countries towards liberal democracy and politics in general?
8. What impact did the EU have on the democratization process in your country during the accession phase?

1. When discussing the 2004 Eastern Enlargement, much is made (both by the EU itself and by academics studying the process) of the 'return to Europe' and the normative goals of the Accession process. What do you feel were the EU's objectives and expectations for the Enlargement, broadly speaking?
2. Given the prominence afforded to 'political conditionality' in the process of Accession, in your opinion, what do you feel was the motivations of the pre-Accession programs such as PHARE, SAPARD, and ISPA in helping Hungary and the Czech Republic meet the conditions for membership?
3. What do you believe was the efficiency and effectiveness of these programs in helping these countries meet the Enlargement conditions?
4. What do you believe the expectations on the part of the EU were regarding political reform and democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic?
5. Given the success of certain nationalistic parties and populist leaders in elections in these countries over the last ten years, how would you characterize the nature of political life and democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic following enlargement?
6. What reasons do you think exist for the successes of radical right parties in Hungary, as opposed to in the Czech Republic, over the same period of time?
7. What do you feel should be the EU's response to the political developments of the last five years in these countries?
8. Do you feel that the EU accession process had a significant impact on the nature of political life in these two countries?
9. Do you believe that membership of the EU has had a significant impact on the nature of political life in these countries following the 2004 Accession?
10. During the period of accession to the EU, what were the expectations about the impact that EU membership would have in your country?
11. How would you evaluate the efficiency of the EU's policies and tools in helping your country realize these expectations?
12. Do you feel the accession process to the EU has been beneficial to your country?
13. All in all, do you feel EU membership has been beneficial or detrimental to the political reform and the democratization process in your country?
14. What do you feel is a native perception of 'democracy' or democratic political system in your country?

15. Do you feel that the form of democracy outlined by the EU in the Copenhagen Criteria is sensitive to a traditional understanding in your country of what a democratic society is?
16. Do you feel that there is a potential contrast between the EU norms regarding liberal democracy that were defined in the Copenhagen Criteria, and the norms in your country regarding democracy?
17. Do you feel that EU membership has been economically beneficial to your country?
18. In your opinion, has EU accession and membership been beneficial to the democratization process in your country?
19. Do you feel that the EU has had a significant and beneficial impact on the development of a functioning civil society in your country?
20. What role do you think civil society played or should have played in the democratization process in your country over the past twenty years?
21. Do you feel that EU accession and membership has had a significant impact on the economic situation in your country?
22. Do you feel that EU accession and membership has had a significant impact on the broader political culture in your country?
23. How do you evaluate the nature of the focus of protest politics in your country? As in, is it focused against the EU, against democracy, or against something else?
24. Do you believe that the nature of protest politics in your country has an impact on democracy and democratization in your country?
25. In your opinion, have protest movements in your country impacted on your country's membership of the EU?
26. Has satisfaction with either national or EU politics had a significant impact on the nature of protest politics in your country?
27. How do you account for the emergence and/or resilience of protest politics in your country?
28. Who do you feel is the most effective institution in responding to the emergence of protest movements in your country?
29. What role do you feel that the EU has to play in responding to political protest movements in your country?

30. What impact, if any, do you feel that EU membership has had on the electoral support levels of the major right-wing and left-wing political parties in your country?
31. Since accession to the European Union, what impact, if any, do you feel membership has had on the levels of democracy in your country?
32. Do you feel that membership of the European Union has had any impact on the levels of trust people feel in their national politicians? Why so?
33. In your opinion, do you feel as if there has been any reaction against the concept of liberal democracy in your country as a result of its accession to the European Union?

Appendix D: Approved Consent Forms

Attachment 5

Oral Consent to Participate in an Interview

I am a doctoral student at the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University, and I am conducting interviews for my doctoral dissertation research. I am studying the impact of European Union enlargement on the consolidation of democracy in Hungary and the Czech Republic.

During this study, you will be asked to answer some questions regarding the EU accession process in Hungary and/or the Czech Republic, and about the nature of political and economic life in those two countries. This interview was designed to be approximately forty-five minutes in length. However, please feel free to expand on the topic or talk about related ideas. Also, if there are any questions you would rather not answer or that you do not feel comfortable answering, please say so and we will stop the interview or move on to the next question, whichever you prefer.

This research is anonymous. Anonymous means that I will record no information about you that could identify you. This means that I will not record your name, address, phone number, date of birth, etc. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be assigned a random code number that will be used on each test and the questionnaire. Your name will appear only on a list of subjects, and will not be linked to the code number that is assigned to you. There will be no way to link your responses back to you. Therefore, data collection is anonymous.

The research team (composed of myself, the primary investigator, and my dissertation supervisor, Prof. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia) and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. Upon completion of this project, all data will be kept for three years and stored in a secure location; after three years, all data will be destroyed. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated.

Participation in this interview is voluntary. If, for any reason, at any time, you wish to stop the interview, you may do so without having to give an explanation. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the interview without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study.

Participation in this study may not benefit you directly. However, the knowledge that I obtain from your participation may help me to better understand the effectiveness of European Union enlargement as a policy for helping to stabilize, consolidate, and develop liberal democratic political structures in target countries, and for transferring the liberal democratic norms of the European Union to target countries. The data gathered in this study are confidential with respect to your personal identity unless you specify otherwise.

You understand if you say anything that you believe may incriminate yourself, the interviewer will immediately rewind the tape and record over the potentially incriminating information. The interviewer will then ask you if you would like to continue the interview.

The recording(s) will be used for analysis by the principal investigator, and for no other purpose.

The recording(s) will include no identifying information or information which might otherwise reveal the identity of the interviewee. The recording(s) will be stored on a secure, encrypted server and will be destroyed three years after the completion of the research.

Once you have read the above form and, with the understanding that you can withdraw at any time and for whatever reason, you need to let me know your decision to participate in today's interview. Do you have any questions? Then by participating in this study/these procedures, do you agree to be a study subject?

APPROVED

MAY 31 2013

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB

EXPIRES

MAY 30 2014

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB

ATTACHMENT 4

CONSENT FORM

Project Title: "The Normative Disconnect: European Union Enlargement, Normative Power, and Democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic"

Michael Toomey, Principal Investigator; Prof. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, Co-Investigator/Dissertation Supervisor

INTRODUCTION

You are invited to participate in a research study. This study is the Doctoral dissertation of the Principal Investigator, and is being undertaken under the supervision of the Co-Investigator/Dissertation Supervisor, Prof. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia. Before you agree to participate in this study, you should know enough about it to make an informed decision. If you have any questions, ask the investigator. You should be satisfied with the answers before you agree to be in the study. Following the provision of your informed consent, you are fully entitled to terminate the interview at any point should you so wish, without any penalty to you. You are also entitled to not respond to any questions you feel uncomfortable answering.

BACKGROUND/PURPOSE

This project is intended to examine the impact of European Union enlargement on the consolidation of democracy in Hungary and the Czech Republic, using a series of semi-structured interviews. All interviews will be conducted by the Principal Investigator; subjects are academics, policy-makers, bureaucrats, politicians and civil society representatives. Approximately fifty people will be interviewed for this study.

INFORMATION

Your participation involves a verbal semi-structured interview. The total duration of your participation will be a single interview of approximately forty-five minutes in length. Following completion of the interview, no further participation will be required on your part. If you consent, the investigators will make an audio tape of the interview for the purposes of preparing a transcription for analysis. This tape will be destroyed upon completion of the study.

RISKS

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study.

BENEFITS

Participation in this study may not benefit you directly. However, the knowledge that I obtain from your participation may help me to better understand the effectiveness of European Union enlargement as a policy for helping to stabilize, consolidate, and develop liberal democratic political structures in target countries, and for transferring the liberal democratic norms of the European Union to target countries.

CONFIDENTIALITY

The records of this study will be confidential. Confidential means that the research records will include some information about you, such as your job title and type of employer. I will keep this information on these records confidential by keeping the research records in a secure location and limiting access to the data. The data will only be disclosed to the people on the research team or the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board, unless disclosure is otherwise authorized by your consent or a court order. The Principal Investigator, the Co-Investigator/Dissertation Supervisor, and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated, and pseudonyms will be used in all reporting on this project.

APPROVED

MAY 31 2013

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB**EXPIRES**

MAY 30 2014

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB

AUDIOTAPE ADDENDUM TO CONSENT FORM

You have been approached to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Michael Toomey, a Doctoral student from Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey, USA. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of European Union enlargement on the consolidation of democracy in Hungary and the Czech Republic. This study will help to broaden the scope of existing knowledge in the field of European Union enlargement and normative power.

You are asked for your permission to allow me to audiotape (sound), as part of that research study. You do not have to agree to be recorded in order to participate in the main part of the study. The recording will last approximately 45 minutes.

Participation means providing certain information about yourself (job title, type of employer) and responding to semi-structured questions which are related to the objectives of this research.

All information will be confidential. Confidential means that I will keep this information confidential/private by limiting any individual's access to the research data and keeping it in a secure location. The Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University and I are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept until the research is officially approved by Rutgers University.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. You may not have any direct or indirect benefits from this study. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the study procedures without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

The recording(s) will be used for analysis by the researcher. The recording(s) will be stored on a secure, encrypted server, linked with a code to the subjects' identity, and will be destroyed after three years of completion of this research.

Your signed consent grants the investigator named above permission to record you as described above during participation in the above-referenced study. The investigator will not use the recording(s) for any other reason than that/those stated in the consent form without your written permission.

APPROVED

MAY 31 2013

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB**EXPIRES**

MAY 30 2014

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB

CONTACT

If you have questions at any time about the research or the procedures, you may contact the Principal Investigator, Michael Toomey, at mitoomey@scarletmail.rutgers.edu, or the Co-Investigator/Dissertation Supervisor, Prof. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, at arianecd@andromeda.rutgers.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Sponsored Programs Administrator at

Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
3 Rutgers Plaza
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559
Tel: 732-932-0150 ext. 2104
Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

PARTICIPATION

Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate at any time without penalty to you. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you withdraw from the study before data collection is completed your data will be removed from the data set and destroyed.

Your signature _____	Date _____
Principal Investigator's signature _____	Date _____
Co-Investigator's signature _____	Date _____

YOU WILL BE PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF THIS FORM FOR YOUR OWN RECORDS

APPROVED

MAY 31 2013

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB**EXPIRES**

MAY 30 2014

Approved by the
Rutgers IRB