WHY DO PEOPLE PROTEST? EXPLAINING PARTICIPATION IN THE 2011 AND
2013 EGYPTIAN UPRISINGS

By

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Program in Political Science
Written under the direction of
Dr. Jan Kubik
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New Brunswick, New Jersey
May, 2015
My study aims to advance research on the collective action dilemma in protest movements by examining protest mobilization leading up to and during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and 2013 June 30th Coup in Cairo, Egypt. The overarching question I attempt to answer is: Why do individuals who are not members of political groups or organizing members of political movements choose to engage or not engage in revolutionary protest under an authoritarian regime? By examining my 170 interviews with individuals who either protested or did not protest, I explore how social media, television framing, violent government repression, changes in political opportunities, and the deep state influenced individual decisions to protest or not protest. The central argument in this study is that individuals are rational actors whose decisions to protest or not protest are affected by the interplay of three sets of factors, conveniently grouped under the following headings: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Additionally, I assume that the ordering of individual preferences in the decision-making process takes place through emotional mechanisms that are activated by specific combinations of these factors.
To the martyrs of the revolution and all those who continue to fight for bread, freedom, and social justice
Acknowledgements

This dissertation was a four-year project and over that time period I was fortunate to have many people support my efforts.

First and foremost I thank my advisor, Dr. Jan Kubik, for his guidance and contribution to my intellectual growth. In the courses I took with him and during our collaboration on my dissertation he generously shared his vast knowledge of social movements. The way he consistently pushed me to think about, and then rethink, concepts and ideas made me feel as though I were having sessions with a gym trainer for the mind.

I also want to thank my committee member, Dr. Paul Poast, who spent hours of his free time working on my game theory model with me. Dr. Poast is known for always going above and beyond to help students, and I was fortunate to benefit from his expertise in research design and methods. In addition to the academic support I received, there are no words to express my gratitude to Dr. Kubik and Dr. Poast for their unflattering support when I was in the field. During the military coup and ensuing political violence, Dr. Kubik and Dr. Poast were always quick to answer my emails or Skype me whenever I had a question or concern about the viability of my project, given the political circumstances, or about my safety.

I would also like to thank committee member Dr. Roy Licklider for the thoughtfulness and kindness he has shown me, from sending me articles pertaining to my research topic to attending my conference presentations. I am beyond appreciative for his
willingness to take on my lengthy dissertation at such short notice and for providing constructive comments on my work.

I must also give many thanks to outside reader, Dr. Maye Kassem. Dr. Kassem has been by my side in my academic journey since 2007, when she agreed to be my master’s thesis advisor at the American University in Cairo. Dr. Kassem wears many hats. She has played the roles of professor, advisor, dissertation reader, and mentor, but most importantly she has become family. In addition to advising and supporting me throughout my fieldwork, she also provided emotional support and a safe haven when my project began to pose risks to my safety.

In addition to my dissertation committee, I am also indebted to a number of other professors. I would like to thank Dr. Alvin Tillery for being in my corner for the past five years. I am incredibly lucky to have such an amazing mentor whose unwavering support and belief in me has helped form who I am as a scholar today. Dr. Tillery has been selfless with his time and advice and I am forever grateful. I am also indebted to Dr. Douglas Blair for sparking my interest in game theory and to my Arabic teacher, Mona Labeeb, for preparing me linguistically before I embarked on my fieldwork. My development as a political scientist was shaped through my coursework with Dr. Eric Davis, Dr. Daniel Keleman, Dr. Jack Levy, Dr. Beth Leech, Dr. Andrew Murphy, and Dr. Manus Midlarsky. In addition to professors, I would not be graduating without the dedication of Graduate Administrative Assistant, Paulette Flowers-Yhap. Ms. Flowers-Yhap has worked tirelessly to answer all of my questions, provide me with information, and take care of appointments, forms, and due dates. She is the superwoman of our department.
My research would not have been possible without my research assistants, Diaa Galal and Mostafa Ramadan. These two men put their own security at risk to make sure that my fieldwork was completed and went to great lengths to ensure my safety. They put countless hours into this project and their linguistic expertise and knowledge of Cairo were vital to this study. Diaa and Mostafa, I am forever indebted to you. I am also thankful for my other research assistants, Dina Atef, Ahmed Abdelrazek, Karim Roshdy, and Zina El Nahel.

Throughout this process a number of friends have helped to make this project come to fruition. I am thankful to Isabel Esterman, Jano Charbel, Derek Ludovici and Lewis Sanders IV for the long nights talking about Egyptian politics, information provided on the Revolution and transitional period, and most importantly, friendship. We have been through so much together and you all know what you mean to me. I must also thank Derek Ludovici for the dissertation brainstorming sessions and critiques of my project. I would like to thank Gudrun Kroner and Karell Inga Valdez for so graciously welcoming me into their home on short notice when I was evacuated from Egypt, and I would like to thank Robert Wilson for providing his home as a space in which to write my dissertation. I am also grateful to Dr. Hanan Kashou for assistance in translation and encouragement throughout the dissertation process and Farah Jan for her advice and reassurance.

It was my parents who instilled the passion for learning in me at an early age. Thank you for your endless love and guidance. Thank you for only allowing me to watch Jeopardy and the news growing up. Thank you for supporting my decision to continue
with my fieldwork when so many people suggested I abandon the project. Thank you for believing in me.

Finally, I want to thank all my interviewees for participating in this project. They welcomed me into their homes, took hours out of their day to speak with me, and opened up to me not only on the political level but also on the personal one. Many expressed to me that their main hope was for a better Egypt; that is my wish as well.
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Chapter 1  Introduction

The current generation of youth mobilization in Egypt began in 2000 when groups such as Kefaya, also known as the Egyptian Movement for Change, and the Revolutionary Socialists protested in support of the Palestinian Second Intifada (Lynch 2013, 57). In 2004, Kefaya held its first anti-regime protest in front of the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo. This demonstration was the first time people chanted, “Down with Mubarak” in public. It was unheard of to openly denounce the government, and the act contributed to “breaking this barrier of fear” (InterviewB 2013). Kefaya, which comprised students, young professionals, and the unemployed had an estimated membership of 500, with 50-100 core activists in Cairo (Onodera 2009, 49). Calling for free elections, termination of the emergency law, blocking Gamal Mubarak from succeeding his father as president, and an end to the domination of politics by President Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) in the lead-off to the Egyptian parliamentary and presidential elections, Kefaya activists gained international recognition on May 25, 2005, now known as Black Wednesday, when Egyptian security forces violently attacked protesters in front of the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo (Associated Press 2005).

The April 6th Youth Movement was founded in 2008 in support of the workers strike in al-Mahallah al-Kubra. Attracting over 70,000 members on their Facebook page by the beginning of 2009 (Al Jazeera 2011), the movement called for people to stay home and wear black in support of the striking workers. While the group had a large number of online supporters, the actual number that protested in the streets was much smaller, with
about 50 activists demonstrating in Cairo (Onodera 2009, 53). On July 23, 2008, twenty-five April 6th activists were detained when they marched in Alexandria. Later, on November 4, 2008, members of the group attempted to protest in various parts of central Cairo to celebrate a National Day of Love, but facing plain clothes police, they moved to Al-Azhar Park where they were eventually arrested and their cardboard banners and plastic hearts meant for distribution were confiscated (Onodera 2009, 53-4).

The We are all Khaled Said Facebook page was created in 2010 following the death of Khaled Said, a young businessman from Alexandria who had been dragged out of a café and beaten to death by the Egyptian police after he posted a video online exposing police corruption (Giglio 2011, 15). Originally set up by Egyptian political activist and journalist Abdul Rahman Mansour, the page was eventually administered by both Mansour and Google executive Wael Ghonim (Khamis and Vaughn 2012, 150). The group organized a series of silent stands against the regime where participants stood on the corniches in Alexandria and Cairo wearing black. The first stand was called “A Silent Stand of Prayer for the Martyr Khaled Said along the Alexandria Corniche” (Ghonim 2012, 71). While the silent stands brought hundreds into the streets, the demonstrations were focused on justice for Khaled Said and sending a message to the Interior Ministry, not bringing down the regime.

When we look at political mobilization in the years leading up to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, we see a large disparity between the number of people politically participating online and the number of individuals protesting in the streets. During one silent demonstration organized by the We are all Khaled Said Facebook page when the numbers in the streets were limited, Wael Ghonim posted, “Where are the people who
said they were coming? Where are the 10,000 men and women?” (Ghonim 2012, 76). What remains unclear is, after years of organized protests by opposition activists that failed to draw significant numbers, why and how on January 25, 2011, and the following seventeen days thousands of Egyptians suddenly took to the streets against the Mubarak regime. The most general question posed is, therefore: Why do people protest? The answer will be sought, however, at a lower level of generality, defined in the next section.

Aims and Questions

This study provides an important contribution to the literature on collective action under authoritarian regimes. The literature on protest under democratic rule is vast (Kitschelt 1986) (Tarrow 1988), partially due to the fact that democratic systems offer an open space for research and data collection. Studies on protest under authoritarian rule have been more limited in terms of the extent and type of data collected due to the restrictions and risks associated with such research (Grdesic 2014) (Hassanpour 2012) (Kern 2011). My research adds to the existing literature on why people protest under authoritarian regimes.

To be even more precise, the question I attempt to answer is: Why and how do individuals who are not members of political groups or organizers of political movements choose to engage or not engage in anti-government protest under an authoritarian regime? In this study, I propose that individual decisions to protest or not protest are based on the intersection of three factors: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. I further argue that the way by which these decisions to protest or not protest take place is through emotion mechanisms. As subsets of the larger
question that is the base of my study I ask how and whether (a) social media acts as a stepping stone to on-the-ground political action (b) television framing affects decisions to protest (c) government repression during revolutionary protests encourages or discourages revolutionary bandwagoning and (d) real and perceived changes in political opportunities following revolutionary protest affect protest mobilization.

My dissertation aims to advance research on the collective action dilemma by examining protest mobilization leading up to and during the eighteen days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the four days of the June 30, 2013, uprising in Cairo, Egypt. This study makes a unique contribution to the field of political science by providing an empirical study of protesters and non-protesters in Egypt, testing the predictions of decision models regarding anti-government protest under repressive regimes. Solving the collective action dilemma implies looking at both protesters and non-protesters, yet some works still do not delve deeply enough into the decision-making processes of non-protesters (Rasler 1996). What makes my project different is the extensive time spent on interviewing and researching individuals who did not protest in order to understand the differences between the two groups.

Initial research on the January 25th Revolution by other scholars has been based on a few elite interviews and discussions with activists (Khamis 2011), who often do not reflect the perspective of the general population. This study is novel because it uncovers the experiences of a more diverse and representative sample by interviewing a large number of non-activists from 46 districts of Cairo. Additionally, while traditional agents of collective action in the Middle East have been previously studied (Beinin and Vairel 2011), the effects of new methods, such as social media, have only recently been assessed
in depth (Karagiannopoulos 2012). My work examines the relationship between new and old mobilization tactics and identifies which methods of mobilization used in the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian uprisings were catalysts for mass street protests. Many researchers were evacuated or chose to leave Cairo after the June 30th uprising and subsequent political violence. Thus, I may have one of the only large-scale data sets of interviews conducted during that time period.

**Why Egypt?**

There are very few historical instances of mostly unarmed protesters removing their country’s president twice within a short period of time. The closest example to the Egyptian scenario is Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution, which deposed President Askar Akayev in 2005, and the Second Kyrgyz Revolution, which removed President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010. In both the Kyrgyz and Egyptian cases, the people were able to remove the second president more quickly than the first. When a population lives under authoritarian rule for an extended period of time with minimal public challenge to the regime and then removes its president through popular protest, one should take note. However, when it occurs a second time within a few years, or in the Egyptian case, two years, there has clearly been a dramatic shift in political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, framing processes, and the psyche of the population. A second uprising also indicates a failure to meet protesters’ initial demands.

Studying protest decision-making in Egypt provides me with two large events within a relatively small time frame where the intention was to overthrow the government and where interviewees had to make a decision to protest or not protest. Studying protest
decision-making in Egypt also allows me to examine how variables change over time and provides cases involving events that are recent enough that interviewees can remember their decision-making processes. Thus, Egypt is an ideal setting for my study.

Defining Events

The importance of definitions is that they set the parameters for the theoretical context in which political events are examined. Inconsistencies in definitions may lead to the mislabeling of events or the inability to merge varying works into a greater body of scholarship. There has been much debate surrounding how to label the 2011 Egyptian protests against Mubarak (Stein 2012) and more of an argument concerning what to call the June 30th protests (Fisher 2013). Were they revolutions, coups, or some type of uprisings? Thus, an exploration and delineation of the term “revolution” is necessary in order to place this study within the appropriate context.

One of the principal arguments concerning the definition of revolution centers on the issue of actual change versus effort to change. Those who define revolutions by their outcomes, such as Theda Skocpol (1979), believe that revolutions occur when structural change takes place, whereas rebellions happen when people attempt to change the system but do not succeed.

“Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation. In contrast, rebellions, even when successful, may involve the revolt of subordinate classes - but they do not eventuate in structural change. Political revolutions transform state structures but not social structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict” (Skocpol 1979, 4).
For Skocpol, sociopolitical transformation, meaning actual change of the state and class structure, or at least the state structure, constitutes revolution, whereas failed attempts to do so fall into another category, rebellion.

Other scholars, such as Jack Goldstone and Timur Kuran, do not see actual change as a necessary element of revolution; merely the attempt to transform the system is sufficient. Goldstone’s focus on efforts to change values and institutions sees revolutions as “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by…mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities (Goldstone 2003, 54). Following this line of thinking, Timur Kuran’s definition of revolution denotes “a mass-supported seizure of political power that aims to transform the social order. By this definition it is immaterial whether the accomplished transfer of power brings about significant social change” (Kuran 1991, 13). Thus, Goldstone and Kuran’s definitions of revolution would fall into Skocpol’s category of rebellion rather than revolution.

The differences between these two approaches to defining revolution are significant and have wide-ranging implications. Kuran and Goldstone’s definitions allow scholars to identify revolutions from the time an uprising begins. If the stated aim of the people is institutional change and they revolt against the government, then revolution must be occurring. Skocpol’s definition makes identifying revolutions much more difficult. How do we know when institutional change occurs? For how long does that change have to last for it to be called institutional change? While Skocpol’s definition may be helpful for understanding revolutions that took place decades or centuries earlier, it may be more problematic for those studying more recent revolutions such as the fall of
many former Soviet states or the recent Middle Eastern uprisings. If scholars intend to begin academic work on these movements, how long would they have to wait before they could place them into proper context? In terms of the former Soviet states, some democratized and then began to de-democratize. Some changed their systems in name, but the same groups remained in power under the rubric of different political parties. Is regime change without institutional change revolution? Some held elections, which did not occur prior to the revolts, but the outcome of those elections were assured before the first person cast his ballot. Would these conditions be considered institutional change? If a country eventually de-democratized, how many years would it have to remain a democracy for the uprising to be labeled a revolution under the assumption of institutional change? If a scholar chose to follow Skocpol’s definition of revolution when researching the recent uprisings in the Middle East, he would have to place his study under the theoretical context of a rebellion and then later on, should actual institutional change occur, reconceptualize the entire work and analysis based on a different theory of revolution.

In my study, I subscribe to Goldstone’s definition of revolution. Thus, I argue that January 25, 2011, was a revolution because the aim of the protests was to change not only the president but also the political institutions within Egypt. This attempt was made through “mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions” that undermined existing authorities. Despite the reality that political institutions were not transformed and many remnants of the old regime remained, the fact that the people tried to change the system allows me to call what occurred in January and February 2011 a revolution. Skocpol’s
definition of political revolution does not apply to the Egyptian case because state structures, for the most part, remained the same.

Some academics would challenge my definition of 2011 as revolution because it led to a military takeover of the country by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) prior to Morsi’s election (Stein 2012). I would argue that while there were some elements of a coup in 2011 in that the military, as unelected officials, took over the transitional period, a military transitional government does not discount that in January and February 2011, the Egyptian people were protesting in an attempt to achieve regime change. Additionally, SCAF eventually stepped down and permitted presidential elections to be held in 2012, though they did make some attempts at a last minute power grab through a supplementary constitutional decree right before those elections (The Associated Press 2012).

Defining the June 30, 2013, protests is a bit more difficult. While there were a number of anti-regime activists protesting for regime change, the vast majority of individuals I interviewed were not demanding a transformation of the system; they only wanted to remove the president. Based on Goldstone’s definition, June 30th cannot be considered a revolution. The uprising was also facilitated by the military and Ministry of the Interior, which provided tactical and logistical support to the Tamarod movement. When we observe the way by which the military gave Morsi 48 hours to resolve the political crisis (Bradley and Abdellatif 2013) and the following transitional period that culminated in the election of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as president, the same general who was responsible for ousting Morsi, we see a need for conceptual innovation. I define June 30th as a popular participatory veto coup through opposition cooptation.
The Argument

The central argument in this study is that individuals are rational actors whose decisions to protest or not protest are affected by the interplay of three sets of factors, conveniently grouped under the following headings: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Additionally, I assume that the ordering of individual preferences in the decision-making process takes place through emotional mechanisms that are activated by specific combinations of these factors.

Organization of Chapters

The organization of my dissertation is as follows: In chapter 2, I discuss different theoretical propositions about why people protest and outline my research design and data collection. Part 1, “The Downfall of Mubarak,” is composed of chapters 3 through 6. The purpose of this section of the study is to outline Mubarak’s ouster, beginning with grievances and mobilization leading up to the Revolution, and continuing with protest mobilization during the Revolution. Chapter 3 provides background for the 2011 Revolution by examining the political and economic grievances of the upper and lower classes in Cairo, Egypt. Chapter 4 investigates information flows and the role of social media as a mobilizing structure for protest in 2011. This chapter also looks at the use of social media as a result of repressive political opportunity structures. In Chapter 5, I delineate the role of television framing in mobilization during the 18 days of the January 25th uprising. Here, I explore frames used by pro-regime and anti-regime television networks and observe how they affected decisions to protest or not protest. Chapter 6
examines the effect of violent government repression on protest mobilization and the emotional mechanisms that produce individual decisions to protest. Part 2, “The Transition and Downfall of Morsi,” comprises chapters 7 through 9. The aim of this segment of the dissertation is to examine the relationship between protesters and the military government during the transitional period, as well as to explain why and how Morsi’s presidency came to an end. Chapter 7 looks at how changes in political opportunity structures following the 2011 Revolution affected mobilization under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). In Chapter 8, I provide background for the June 30, 2013, uprising by outlining structural issues and the political decisions of the Morsi government that caused grievances in the Egyptian population. In Chapter 9, I examine June 30th as a popular participatory veto coup through militarily cooptation of the uprising. In Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, I summarize the results of my study and the applicability of my findings to other cases. I also propose suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2  Why do People Protest? Existing Theoretical Explanations, Data Sources, and Collection Methods

Chapter 2 reviews the dominant theoretical perspectives on why people protest. My study aims to enrich these existing approaches through combining aspects of each in order to paint a more complete picture of protest participation. The necessity of employing such a synthetic approach is strongly suggested based on my empirical findings. The different theoretical approaches include rational choice and the collective action research program, along with the synthetic political opportunity theory championed by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly. I observe that that while each of these approaches provides helpful insights into solving the collective action dilemma, no one approach offers a comprehensive explanation of the question under discussion. I argue that an accurate depiction of why people protest necessitates a multifaceted theoretical approach that combines these theories. In this chapter, I engage in a theoretical discussion of approaches to understanding why people protest, after which I outline the research design, data collection methods, challenges to data collection, and ethical considerations associated with this study.

The Theoretical Approach: Rational Choice, CARP, and the Collective Action Dilemma

Social movements have been studied from a number of angles. One large divide in the field has been characterized by Mark Lichbach (1998) as one between the Synthetic Political Opportunity Theory (SPOT) approach and the Collective Action Research Program (CARP) approach. While the SPOT approach, made popular by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, dominates the field and focuses on structure and political
processes, the less popular CARP approach, which has its foundations in Mancur Olson’s 1965 work *The Logic of Collective Action*, centers more on rational action by individual actors. What this dissertation aims to do is marry the two approaches, as suggested by Lichbach, to understand how individuals make rational decisions based on actual and perceived structural factors.

Rational choice is the framework for understanding and formally modeling political behavior. It may be preferable to view rational choice as an approach rather than a theory, as there is no single theory or unambiguous standard for rational choice (Green and Shapiro 1994, 13). The rational approach, referred to by Lichbach as CARP, examines the cost benefit calculations that individuals make before taking action. In rational choice theory, rational actor models assume that actors, also known as decision makers, make choices that they believe will lead to the best outcome as defined by preferences. Actors take constraints, such as impediments in nature, into account as well as the anticipated actions of others. They then act in a way that is consistent with their preferences or beliefs. These models look at past actions and anticipate actions of other decision makers (Bueno de Mesquita n.d.).

According to Drake (2002):

“In its purest form, the Rational Actor approach presumes that such a figure [as Constantine] has complete freedom of action to achieve goals that he or she has articulated through a careful process of rational analysis involving full and objective study of all pertinent information and alternatives. At the same time, it presumes that this central actor is so fully in control of the apparatus of government that a decision once made is as good as implemented. There are no staffs on which to rely, no constituencies to placate, no generals or governors to cajole. By attributing all decision making to one central figure who is always fully in control and who acts only after carefully weighing all options, the Rational Actor method allows scholars to filter out extraneous details and focus attention on central issues” (Drake 2002, 24).
There are four important factors to take into consideration in rational models, where individuals are central to collective outcomes. First, individuals are seen as utility maximizers, meaning that when presented with a number of options, they choose the one that best meets their objectives. The maximization assumption entails the maximization of some schedule of preferences, but it does not require specification of goals (Green and Shapiro 1994, 14) (Riker 1990, 173).

Second, there is a consistency requirement, which entails the possibility of all options to be ranked and ordered. Inherent in the consistency requirement is an assumption of connectedness where any two available outcomes may be either unequal (the individual prefers one over the other) or equal (the individual is indifferent). Preference orderings are also transitive (Green and Shapiro 1994, 14). “Transitivity assumes nothing about the intensity of preferences or the amount by which the different outcomes are valued in comparison with one another” (Green and Shapiro 1994, 15). Transitivity establishes a minimal consistency within preference ordering.

Third, individuals maximize the expected value of their payoffs measured on some form of a utility scale (Luce and Raiffa 1957, 50). Individuals make decisions based on expected utility rather than actual utility because decisions are often made under conditions of uncertainty (Green and Shapiro 1994, 15). Finally, individuals are the relevant maximizing agents in this approach. Thus, collective outcomes are explained by reference to the maximizing actions of individuals (Green and Shapiro 1994, 15).

An important aspect of the rationalist approach is that decision makers are not completely free to act as they would like because they are not in full control. Instead, actors must look at the potential constraints on their desired outcome and adjust behavior
accordingly. Sometimes this means choosing a second or third place desired outcome if the primary desired outcome is not possible. In rational models, decision makers do not consider all possible alternatives if the cost of doing so exceeds the marginal gains, as doing so would be an irrational waste of resources and time.

In 1971 Mancur Olson published the book *The Logic of Collective Action*, which examines why people choose to join or abstain from groups and how to overcome the collective action dilemma. The collective action dilemma, which is the question of how to produce the public good when individuals can receive the benefits produced by the group without actually joining, is at the core of my study.

Refuting the traditional view that groups and private organizations are ubiquitous and that the ubiquity comes from a fundamental human propensity to form and join associations, Olson points to empirical evidence found by sociologist Murray Hausknecht that the average person does not typically belong to large voluntary associations and that the idea of Americans as typically joiners is a myth (Olson 1965, 17). Olson’s proposition for understanding why individuals choose or decline to join a group or organization is that scholars must study “the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action open to individuals in groups of different sizes” (Olson 1965, 21). According to Olson, each individual in a group may place a different value upon the collective good desired by his group. Olson identifies the different scenarios under which individuals will choose to participate in or not participate in a group, based on the costs and benefits of joining. When discussing latent groups, Olson says, “The only requirement is that the behavior of individuals in large groups or organizations of the kind considered should generally be rational, in the sense that their objectives, whether selfish or unselfish, should be pursued
by means that are efficient and effective for achieving these objectives” (Olson 1965, 64-65). Thus, rather than assuming that it is structure that determines group mobilization and activity, Olson takes an agentic, rational approach that sees participation as a function of individual human preferences, as defined by an ontology that views humans as rational actors. For Olson, it is not the structure of the system but instead the rational choices of individuals that lead to participation or non-participation.

Lichbach (1998) claims that an explanatory sketch of CARP includes the Five Percent Rule, collective action (CA) processes, politics as causes of collective action, and pathologies as consequences of collective action. These components constitute the four-step rationalist perspective (Lichbach 1998, 412). The Five Percent Rule is that fewer than 5% of a cause’s supporters will actually become actively involved in the cause and that non-activists outnumber activists 19 to 1 (Lichbach 1998, 408). Collective action theorists predict that this rule will be correct 95% of the time (M. I. Lichbach 1996). Francisco explains that the 5% rule is not confirmed in cases of bandwagoning mobilization because bandwagoning “has little or no cost and might well benefit each active individual in the immediate future” (Francisco 2010, 12).

According to Lichbach, rationalists also produce an explanatory map of collective action processes in an attempt to explain the 5% who do participate in collective action. The four approaches mapped out are market approaches, contract approaches, community approaches, and hierarchy approaches. Mobilization by market occurs when individuals are driven by a number of individual-level forces, mobilization by hierarchy occurs when dissident organizations mobilize their followers, and mobilization by the binding nature of a contract or community takes place through self-organization by dissidents. “Pure
contract implies a single-function, self-governing arrangement that is targeted only at protest. Pure community implies a multifunction, self-governing arrangement that has been mobilized into protest” (Lichbach 1998, 410). In chapter 4, I add to theories that explain the 5% by demonstrating that the emergence of social media permits bandwagoning online before protesters take to the streets.

Rationalist models need to be complemented with approaches that consider structural factors. Lichbach argues that political causes of collective action remain uncovered if we do not explain the “key operative and inoperative CA processes” (Lichbach 1998, 410). Thus, contexts, structures, and institutions need to be investigated to understand how they shape the competing interests of the regime, dissident entrepreneurs, dissident followers, and dissidents’ allies and opponents. Only then can we achieve a fuller explanation of how collective action processes begin, are maintained, and end.

In this study I will explore individual decision models of collective action, where payoff matrixes of collective action treat the group as a unitary actor. I will also rely on simple threshold models. Such models of group action are founded on the idea that each person’s propensity to protest is a function of the number of others who are already protesting (Oliver 1993, 289). In individual decision models, equations for the net payoff of participating in collective action as a function of the benefit of the collective good, the benefit of selective incentives, and the costs of participation are often produced, but “authors rarely manipulate these equations mathematically to produce derivations or new results, but instead use them heuristically to organize a term by term verbal discussion of the determinants of participation” (Oliver 1993, 278). The level of interest in a collective
good is often operationalized with attitude scales measuring the intensity of opinion about a collective issue (Oliver 1993, 278). What needs clarification in threshold models is how individuals know how many people are protesting in the streets and how preferences are ordered in making cost/benefit calculations. In chapter 5, I explain how television framing informs individuals about how many others are already protesting. In chapters 5 and 6, I outline the emotional mechanisms that help to order individual preferences.

*Emotions as Causal Mechanisms in Rational Decision-making*

In order to understand how individuals make the decision to protest or not protest it is necessary to examine causal mechanisms. There is no single definition of causal mechanism. George and Bennett claim that causal mechanisms are “ultimately unobservable, physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (George and Bennett 2005, 137), while Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998) state, “Mechanism-based explanations usually invoke some form of ‘causal agent’ that is assumed to have generated the relationship between the entities observed” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998, 11). Mahoney (2001) defines a causal mechanism as “an unobservable entity that - when activated - generates an outcome of interest” (Mahoney 2001, 580). He favors this particular definition because it moves beyond correlational analysis. In contrast, many conventional analyses of causal mechanisms point to causal variables, which increase or decrease the probability of having a higher or lower value on an outcome. Mahoney also claims that his definition’s
use of the term “unobservable” indicates that it cannot refer to a particular set of empirical conditions (Mahoney 2001, 581).

Regarding Mahoney’s definition of causal mechanism, as well as that of George and Bennett, I do not concur that causal mechanisms are always “unobservable.” I would argue that there are indicators and proxies for some mechanisms that can be observed. Eva Bellin’s research on the Arab Spring cites the emotional triggers of anger, fear and euphoria as mechanisms compelling ordinary citizens to take to the streets (Bellin 2012). While emotions are not observable, the manifestation of the emotions, such as angry graffiti writing, angry signs, the content of chants, and the burning of buildings are indicators of particular emotions.

In simple terms, causal mechanisms are the black box between the independent and dependent variable. If x is the independent variable and y is the dependent variable and x causes y, then the causal mechanism is how x causes y (Kiser and Hechter 1991, 5). This explanation not only identifies what a causal mechanism is but also how causal mechanisms relate to variables. The variable-based research and causal mechanism research are complementary and their combination produces a more complete explanation of causality. Without causal mechanisms, we do not know how the independent variable causes the dependent variable. For this dissertation, I draw on Koslowski (1996) for my definition of causal mechanism. “A causal mechanism is the process by which a cause brings about an effect. A mechanism is a theory or explanation, and what it explains is how an event causes another” (Koslowski 1996, 6).

Some academics believe that rational choice models produce the best results because they posit strategic rational reasoning (usually treated as an unobservable entity
and represented with the help of a utility function) as the mechanism that directly generates behavior (Mahoney 2001, 581) (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998) (Cowen 1998) (Schelling 1998). In rational decision-making models, individuals have ordered preference and make cost/benefit analyses accordingly. Within the approach used in this study, I argue that among the causal mechanisms that lead to the decision to protest or not protest are emotions; emotional mechanisms help to order preferences.

Early works on emotions within the context of social movements characterized emotions as irrational, causing individuals to be impulsive and irritable (Le Bon 2002). In these works, individuals were driven to frustration, and emotions were reinforced by crowd dynamics (Sin 2009, 88). The pathologizing perspective on crowds that saw reason and emotions as antithetical was usually grounded in the theories of Sigmund Freud (Freud 1959).

Rational actor approaches eventually replaced pathological explanations of protest, and researchers moved away from focusing on the “why” motivations of protest, to questions of “how”. In early rational models, grievances and emotions were largely ignored in discussions of causality. Emotions were viewed as constant and pervasive (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, 250). Referring to grievances, McCarthy and Zald stated, “For some purposes we go even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1215) (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000, 70). Rather than connecting emotions to the development of social movements, resource mobilization theorists focused on the largesse of elites to explain their emergence (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000, 70). Concepts of motivation and grievance formation “disappeared from the agenda in
resource mobilization research, in part because they were viewed as ubiquitous and constant rather than varying” (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000, 415).

Political process theorists moved away from explanations of elite allies and turned toward an understanding of the emergence of social movements based on political opportunities and people’s ability to exploit them (Tilly 1978) (McAdam 1982). Thus, when new opportunities present themselves, mobilization occurs. Charles Tilly presented collective action as a function of interests, organizations, mobilization of resources, power, repression, and opportunities in his well-known “mobilization model” (Tilly 1978). These variables were structural and independent of an individual’s emotion.

According to Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2000), Tilly:

“Recognized, if implicitly, that emotions matter for what people want (i.e., their interests) and for their collective identities (a component of organization in his scheme), and that emotional reactions mediate between repression, opportunities, and threats, on the one hand, and actual collective action, on the other. Yet Tilly’s rationalistic and organizational language and formulas discouraged sustained analysis of emotions” (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000, 70).

More recent scholarship does not see collective action and emotions as incompatible. “Instead, they are simultaneously rational and emotional processes that structure, motivate and form the basis of strategic action” (Sin 2009, 90). Jon Elster examines how gut feelings help individuals form rational beliefs and how emotional reactions may be cues for an individual’s unconscious assessment of a situation (Elster 1996, 1393-4). Both Elster and Dennis Wrong discuss the idea of emotions sustaining social norms and the role of social norms in regulating emotions in rational decision-making (Wrong 1997). In his work on ethnic violence, Roger Petersen argues that emotions operate to meet situational challenges by raising the saliency of one desire/concern over another, meaning “emotion helps select among competing desires,”
and “an emotion heightens both cognitive and physical capabilities necessary to respond to the situational challenge” (Petersen 2002, 17-18). The concept of emotions as irrational derives from assumptions that they are produced in moments of passion that lead individuals to do what they normally would not, or do not, really want, a perception explained and refuted in recent works (Demertzis 2013). However, Jasper (1998) argues that even fleeting emotions are rooted in “moral and cognitive beliefs that are relatively stable and predictable. In addition, most emotions, far from subverting our goal attainment, help us define our goals and motivate action toward them” (Jasper 1998, 421). Thus, “To the extent that they are collectively shaped, depend on context, and are based on cognitions (themselves changeable through learning), they do not appear irrational” (Jasper 1998, 403).

In her analysis of the Arab Spring, Pearlman (2013) claims that the fact that Egyptians were feeling subjects does not indicate that they were not also strategic. “Emotions affected protestors’ appraisals of changing circumstances and willingness to assume risk” (Pearlman 2013, 399). This finding is consistent with that of Damasio (Damasio 2003), who ran clinical tests on patients with damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortices and found that emotions play a vital role in decision-making on the unconscious level in both everyday life and in laboratory conditions (Markič 2009, 55-58). Damasio found that an important aspect of the decision-making process is that an individual compares potential alternatives with emotions and feelings from similar past situations. Additionally, the process involves estimating effects resulting from past experiences and the potential rewards or costs that may have been incurred during such events (Markič 2009, 58). Thus, emotions are part of the learning process and are rational.
From this discussion we are able to observe that emotions are a crucial element in the decision-making process. Therefore, in this study, emotions will be examined as causal mechanisms in individual decision-making to either protest or not protest. In chapter 4, I present the emotional mechanisms that lead individuals to participate politically online and those that draw individuals offline and into the streets. In chapter 5, I outline the emotional mechanisms activated by television framing that either cause individuals to protest or remain at home. Later, in chapters 6 and 7, I explain the emotional mechanisms produced in response to government violence against protesters that motivate individuals to protest against the regime.

**Critiques of Rational Choice**

While there are many benefits to rational choice, there are also many critiques of the approach. Rational choice approaches assume that complex social phenomena can be explained by elementary individual actions of which they are composed. This perspective is called methodological individualism and holds, “The elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals” (Elster 1989, 13). Some academics point to criticisms of methodological individualism, which argue that political phenomena cannot be reduced to individual calculations made by rational actors (Monroe 1991). Another compelling criticism of rational choice is that while the assumption of rationality serves as a starting point for constructing theory, it only tells how people are likely to choose actions, given preferences, but it says nothing about the content of those preferences (Zagare 1990) (Jackman 1993). Cultural, psychological, and
cognitive models can complement rational choice by uncovering how preferences are formed. Thus, through qualitative investigative methods such as interviewing and archival research, studies that provide historical, cultural, or psychological accounts can be used to inform rational choice theorists on the content of preferences. Hence, the approaches should not be seen as antithetical but instead complementary.

Critiques of Olson’s work relate to broader critiques of rational choice approaches. In terms of causality, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly state, “Although he named his theory “collective action,” Olson had little to describe beyond individual motivations and the problem of their aggregation. He gave little attention either to the historical traditions and institutional contexts of episodes of collective action or to the interactions among actors, their opponents, their allies, and significant others” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2009, 269). Thus, in the next section, we will observe how the SPOT approach of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly may serve as a useful addition to the CARP approach.

**SPOT**

SPOT is a structure-oriented approach focusing on contentious politics, collective action, and collective mobilization (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) that combines resource mobilization and political process approaches. Resource mobilization theory focuses on the resource capacity of states and their challengers and assumes that social movements are rational responses to conflicting interests and injustices (Tilly 1978). This approach looks at the question of participation. “Engagement in collective action is determined by careful cost-benefit calculations on the part of potential participants. Individuals are likely to participate if the benefit from participating is greater than its cost” (Khawaja
1993, 49) (Tilly 1978) (Gamson 1975) (Oberschall 1973). Thus, in resource mobilization theory, which may be merged with the rational choice approach, institutional politics and political variables become central to explanations of collective action. The relationship between state actions and individual decisions to protest are thoroughly examined in chapters 6 and 7.

Central to the resource mobilization approach is the premise that social movement activities are not spontaneous and disorganized and that participants in social movements are not irrational (Ferree 1992, 29). Thus, the approach relies heavily on organizational studies. Resource mobilization also tends to focus on actual processes of mobilization, including how social movement organizations (SMOs) mobilize resources such as money and people, build coalitions, and select leaders, neglecting macrosocial causes of social movements (Neidhardt and Rucht 1991, 439). Ferree (1992) criticizes the approach for not providing a “plausible account of values, grievances, and ideology in the basic model” (Ferree 1992, 29).

In the political process approach, social movements are “triggered by the incentives created by political opportunities, combining conventional and challenging forms of action and building on social networks and cultural frames” (Tarrow 1994, 1). Three important aspects of this approach that are relevant to this study are political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. In the following pages I will outline how these three components affect my study.
Political Opportunity Structures

Political opportunity structures are the particular set of variables that explain the variations in how movements pursue strategy. These structures are composed of “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others” (Kitschelt 1986, 58). According to Tarrow (1988), political opportunities comprise the following factors: the degree to which the polity is open or closed, the stability or instability of political alignments, the presence or absence of allies, divisions within the elite or its tolerance for protest, and the policy-making capacity of the government (Neidhardt and Rucht 1991, 443-44) (Tarrow 1988, 429).

Approaches to political opportunity structures do not necessitate path dependence, where a certain political opportunity structure ensures that a social movement will take a particular course, but they do explain variations in movements in terms of choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment (Kitschelt 1986, 58). An important point acknowledged in this study is, “No opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is a) visible to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 43). In chapter 9, I present another perspective on political opportunities. These opportunities are perceived by the opposition as being open, but in “objective” terms these are, in fact, short-term openings created by a segment of the regime in order to overthrow another part of the regime with the intent of closing opportunities in the long run.

McAdam (1996) reminds us that “the kinds of structural changes and power shifts that are most defensibly conceived of as political opportunities should not be confused
with the collective processes by which these changes are interpreted and framed” (McAdam 1996, 25-6). The two are related, but they are not the same. Treating them separately allows us to preserve definitional integrity and also allows us to discern a particular empirical phenomenon where collective action occurs even though there has been no significant change in the relative power position of challenging groups (McAdam 1996, 26). This concept is most important in the case of the 2011 Revolution, when actual relative power positions were not altered but the opposition still mobilized.

Scholars often examine political opportunities as open or closed structures, where open structures permit easy access to the political system and closed structures make access difficult (Kriesi 2004, 70-71). At the core of these structures are formal institutions. Kriesi (2004) argues that the greater the degree of decentralization, the more that formal access exists and the less capacity there is for any one part of the system to act (Kriesi 2004, 70). Institutions shape social movements and their responses. “Different regime types and different forms of repression generate different kinds of social movements with differing tactics and internal cultures.” (Swidler 1995, 39). According to Kitschelt (1986), when political systems are open and weak, groups engage in assimilative strategies, meaning they work through political institutions. When political systems are closed, groups are more confrontational and work outside established policy channels (Kitschelt 1986, 66). Political opportunity structures determine what informational resources groups can extract from their setting and employ in protest, and institutional rules reinforce patterns of interaction between the government and interest groups.
Kitschelt’s argument is not very different from that of Swidler (1995), who argues that “institutions structure culture by systematically patterning channels for social action” (Swidler 1995, 39). Institutions pose both constraints and opportunities for individuals. Reacting to institutions, individuals may act in a culturally uniform manner, not because of shared experience, but because they must confront the same institutional hurdles. Thus, social movements are shaped by the institutions they confront. Commonalities between the cultures of movements may reflect similarities in the institutions the movements are attempting to change. “Different regime types and different forms of repression generate different kinds of social movements with differing tactics and internal cultures” (Swidler 1995, 37). The way in which political opportunities shape repertoires for contention and mobilizing tactics will be highlighted in chapter 4, which examines the use of social media as an avenue for dissent under an oppressive regime.

Finally, McAdam (1996) recognizes that political opportunities should be seen as a dependent variable, not only an independent one. “Movement scholars have spent comparatively little time and energy systematically studying the role that movements have played in reshaping the institutional structure and political alignments of a given polity” (McAdam 1996, 36). Political and mobilization opportunities may occur during cultural breaks (M. N. Zald 1996, 268), and while opportunities open doors to political action, movements may also create opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 276). Chapter 7 examines how the 2011 Revolution changed political opportunities, creating new spaces for political dissent which in turn altered repertoires for contention leading up to the June 30th uprising.
**Mobilizing Structures**

In this study, mobilizing structures are “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam 1996, 3). As we have observed in the previous section, the types of mobilizing structures that develop are often shaped by political opportunity structures. Scholars examining mobilizing structures focus on the ability to raise material resources and mobilize dissent. Rucht (1996) breaks down mobilizing structures by outlining mobilization and movement structure:

“Mobilization is the process of creating movement structures and preparing and carrying out protest actions which are visible movement “products” addressed to actors and publics outside the movement. For large-scale and sustained movement activities, mobilization requires resources such as people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technical tools to process and distribute information and to influence people” (Rucht 1996, 186).

Movement structures are the mechanisms and organizational bases that collect and use the movement’s resources (Rucht 1996, 186). Kriesi’s (1996) discussion of mobilization includes distinguishing between four types of formal organizations: social movement organizations (SMOs), supportive organizations, movement associations, and parties and interest groups (Kriesi 1996, 152). The type of formal organization that is relevant to this study is the SMO. The two criteria that distinguish SMOs from other types of formal organizations are: “(1) they mobilize their constituency for collective action, and (2) they do so with a political goal, that is, to obtain some collective good (avoid some collective ill) from authorities” (Kriesi 1996, 152). Social movement organizations and their ability to mobilize dissent online and in the streets are explored in chapter 4, in relation to the January 25th Revolution, and in chapter 9, regarding the June 30th uprising.
While mobilizing structures of SMOs are important, this study goes further to explore mobilizing structures as they relate to disorganized networks. McCarthy (1996) includes tactical repertoires, social movement organization forms, and modular social movement repertoires in his explanation of mobilizing structures (J. McCarthy 1996, 142). However, he believes that mobilizing structures also constitute “the range of everyday life micromobilization structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated” (J. McCarthy 1996, 142), such as family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and parts of the state structure. This dissertation examines friendship and work networks in the streets and online that aid in the mobilization process. In the past few years a growing literature on mobilization through online networks has developed (Siegel 2009) (Allagui and Kuebler 2011) (Herrera 2014). I explore how friendship networks on Facebook mobilize dissent both in conjunction with SMOs and independent of them.

**Framing Processes**

There are many definitions of the term frame, including “schemata of interpretation” that allow individuals “to locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences within their personal space and the world around them (Snow, Rochford, et al. 1986, 464), and “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam 1996, 6). Benford and Snow (2000) explain the function of frames stating, “Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614).
Many social movements scholars today focus on meaning work, or “the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings” (Benford and Snow 2000, 613). In such approaches, movement actors are seen as agents actively producing and maintaining meaning for constituents and observers. This viewpoint is agentic and sees culture and meaning as resources. Mayer Zald (1996) highlights the importance of ideas and cultural elements in mobilization or participation in social movements and framing of political opportunities. He discusses cultural construction of repertoires of contention and frames, the importance of cultural contradictions and historical events in offering opportunities for framing, framing as a strategic activity, competitive processes that exemplify the context within which frames are selected and eventually dominate, and how frames are transmitted and reframed in the mass media. Some of the key concepts Zald presents are (a) social movements exist in a larger societal context and “they draw on the cultural stock for images of what is an injustice, for what is a violation of what ought to be” (M. N. Zald 1996, 266) (b) not all social movements have equal access to the larger cultural stock and “they draw upon the repertoires and frames available to and compatible with the skills, orientations, and styles of the groups that make them up” (M. N. Zald 1996, 267) (c) movements draw on the cultural stock of how to organize and protest and (d) while the frames of winning movements become translated into public policy, losing movements are marginalized.

Frames in collective action are the outcome of negotiating shared meaning. Framing can also be viewed as a purposeful activity where actors use frames for mobilization. Activists must frame mobilizing structures in an appropriate manner for the
social change task at hand. These frames are geared internally toward movement activists as well as externally toward bystanders and opponents (J. McCarthy 1996, 149).

In order for frames to be effective, they must resonate with the people toward whom they are directed. Frames perform a transformative function in mobilization for collective action by “altering the meaning of the object(s) of attention and their relationship to the actor(s), as in...the transformation of routine grievances or misfortunes into injustices or mobilizing grievances in the context of collective action” (Snow 2004, 384). In collective action framing, a group negotiates an understanding of a problem that needs to be addressed, decides whom to blame, posits alternative arrangements, and urges others to act together to effect change. According to Della Porta and Diani (1999):

“Appropriate interpretive frames allow a phenomenon whose origins were previously attributed to natural factors, or which was the responsibility of those already involved, to be transformed into a social or political problem. It comes to be perceived as being determined or at least largely conditioned by the dynamics of social order or related factors; and precisely for this reason, the potential for modification through collective action is recognized” (Della Porta and Diani 1999, 69).

This study relies on a definition of framing by Fahmy (2011), which claims, “A frame is an interpretive framework that makes events meaningful, and thus is able to organize experiences, guide action, and affect behavior” (Fahmy 2011, 22). The relevance of frames to this study is that the way in which a political movement frames grievances may determine an individual’s cost/benefit analysis when calculating whether or not to protest. I examine how movement frames in petitions and on Facebook define grievances, attribute them to the political order, and suggest the necessity for modifying the political order through collective action. I also outline how frames are used to
produce new collective national identity. My work demonstrates that frames are not only created by movement activists but are also produced by television media.

**Synthesizing SPOT and CARP**

Lichbach (1998) outlines the structure-action problem or how to interrelate the micro (individual), meso (group) and macro (societal) levels of analysis (Lichbach 1998, 403). His solution to this dilemma is to integrate the SPOT and CARP approaches. SPOT is strong on structure and weak on action, while CARP is strong on action and weak on structure (Lichbach 1998, 412). Lichbach argues:

“Structuralist arguments are strong on why people rebel and tend to miss how they do so. Structuralist theories of revolution and reform therefore need process arguments if they are to explain mobilization into protest and rebellion. All macro theories, in other words, need micro foundations…Similarly, rational action arguments are strong on how people rebel and tend to miss why they do so. Rationalist theories of protest and rebellion therefore need structures if they are to explain the reformist and revolutionary change of institutions” (Lichbach 1998, 415).

Thus, when merged, the CARP and SPOT approaches are complementary, where CARP provides the action and SPOT the structure.

In Part 1, this study takes on Lichbach’s challenge to integrate the SPOT and CARP approaches. The dissertation is rooted in the CARP approach because I investigate individual decisions to protest or not protest. I explain how people decide to protest by examining individuals’ cost/benefit analyses, including preferences, and how emotions help to order preferences. At the same time I answer why people protest by exploring the manner by which political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes affect individuals’ decisions. “Structure without action has no mechanism; action without structure has no cause” (Lichbach 1998, 415). Using the CARP approach
allows me to look at the mechanisms involved in the decision-making process, while the SPOT approach provides me with the causes of those decisions. In Part 2, which discusses the SCAF transitional period and June 30th coup, I focus primarily on changes in political opportunity structures and the discrepancy between perceived and actual opportunities. The reason for this shift toward a SPOT-centered approach is that, while emotions and individual decision-making still provided explanations for protest, I found that the changed political opportunity was the most important factor that influenced the dynamic of the movement during that particular time period.

**Data Sources and Collection Methods**

In this study I examined a number of secondary sources. In order to provide historical background and theoretical context, this dissertation used books and academic journal articles. Reports and documents from international organizations, non-governmental organizations, research institutes, and governments were utilized to establish facts and obtain statistics on the Egyptian economy, police brutality, and corruption. Newspaper articles were viewed to establish factual timelines of the 2011 Revolution and 2013 uprising; they were particularly important for documenting events during the Morsi presidency and June 30th protests, as there are few academic sources touching on that time period.

The data collection methods I employed to obtain primary sources for my study were open-ended interviews, structured interviews, informal conversations, participant observation, and non-participant observation. I began my preliminary research during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Each day I read newspaper articles to locate names of
activists, found the activists on Facebook, and established contact for interviews I intended to conduct when I began my field research. In April 2011, I interviewed Srdja Popovic, who trained the April 6th Youth Movement in non-violent protest tactics, to understand group mobilization methods and framing processes. Later, in 2012 and early 2013, I conducted 10 open-ended test interviews with individuals in Cairo that included test questions for the structured interviews I intended to conduct in 2013. The purpose of these interviews was to assess whether my research design and hypotheses were accurate and to fine-tune my interview questions. From June through December 2013 I conducted 170 interviews with members of the lower and upper classes in 46 districts of Cairo who either protested or did not protest in the January 25th Revolution. One hundred fifty-nine of those interviews also covered questions on the transitional period and the June 30th protests. My sample size was close to the standard set by Gerson and Horowitz (2002). On July 1, 2013, I began including questions on the transition and June 30th protests. The criteria for my interviewee selection was that each individual could not have been a member of a political group or an organizer in a political movement before January 25th and he or she had to be an Egyptian citizen whose primary residence was Cairo at the time of the January 25th protests.

Peter Hall points to the value of extending analysis to cases in which the outcome does not occur, in addition to cases in which the outcome does occur, as a better means of explaining the outcome (Hall 2006, 30). This is an approach that John Owen (1994) takes in his investigation of the democratic peace. The importance of including negative cases is that the explanatory theory being tested implicitly includes predictions about cases
where the phenomenon is present and cases where it is not. My study benefits from the inclusion of both positive and negative cases.

The large number of cases under investigation places my project in the category of a medium-N study. While the number of cases under investigation is not random or large enough to engage in regression analysis and establish statistical significance for my findings, I am able to calculate percentages of like responses to estimate - in a preliminary fashion - the distribution that may exist in the population at large. No better estimates exist.

Due to government restrictions and the extreme level of political violence that took place during the time of my field research, it was impossible to obtain a random sample without putting my safety and/or the safety of my interviewees in jeopardy. Additionally, in order to collect a random sample I would have needed to have full information on the universe from which I was sampling. It would have been extremely costly to obtain such knowledge and to sample properly based on this knowledge. However, throughout the interviewing process I attempted as much as possible to obtain variation based on gender, age, area of the city, and social class. In addition to snowball sampling, interviews were obtained through my extensive contacts in the upper and lower classes and the contacts of my six research assistants.

Being unable to draw a statistically representative (random) sample, I turned to other methods of sampling, particularly theoretical sampling. “Theoretical sampling is done in order to discover categories and their properties and to suggest the interrelationships into a theory. Statistical sampling is done to obtain accurate evidence on distributions of people among categories to be used in descriptions and verifications”
Instead of probability sampling, I engaged in purposive sampling, a non-probability form of sampling that does not aim to sample participants on a random basis. The aim of purposive sampling is to “sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed” (Bryman 2012, 418). The type of purposive sampling that I performed was “maximum variation sampling,” a type of sampling that aims to ensure a wide variation in terms of the dimension of interest (Bryman 2012, 419) and snowball sampling, a non-probability sampling technique where existing interviewees recruit new subjects from among their acquaintances. Snowball sampling is often used when probability sampling is not feasible or is impossible (Bryman 2012, 424).

Theoretical saturation in purposive sampling occurs when the researcher samples theoretically until a category is saturated with data, meaning there does not appear to be any new or relevant data emerging from an interview category, the category is well developed in demonstrating variation, and the relationships among categories are validated and well-established (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 212). At the end of my research I was reasonably sure that I was reaching theoretical saturation.

The majority of my interviewees were under the age of 40 at the time of the January 25th Revolution, which is consistent with the country’s demographics where the median age is 25.1 (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). Additionally, there are more interviews from the lower class than the upper class, which also corresponds with the country’s demographics where 48.9 percent live below the poverty line (Sabry 2014) and many more live just above it. At the beginning of my project I sound recorded my interviews. However, as my research progressed, I chose to end the practice because I
was concerned for the safety of human subjects based on having recordings of their voices that could be identified, and because when I moved into lower class districts my recorder was viewed with suspicion. Throughout my research I also engaged in many informal conversations with people in Cairo about their political perceptions and their personal accounts of the 2011 Revolution and transitional period. The follow-up research I conducted in July and August 2014 was based solely on informal conversations.

The participant observation in which I engaged included observing weekly anti-Morsi protests in Dokki, Cairo in 2012 and 2013, pro-Morsi demonstrations in 2013, and the marches to Tahrir Square from June 28th through July 3rd 2013. I conducted field research while attending the November 27, 2012, protest in Tahir Square against Morsi, the anti-Morsi protests in Tahrir Square on July 1, 2013, which was the second official day of the June 30th uprising, and the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in in August 2013. I was able to obtain data through non-participant observation of Facebook group pages and individual Facebook pages, where I viewed political discussions and wall posts. One of the purposes of examining Facebook content was to uncover methods for raising political awareness and political participation online.

**Challenges to Data Collection**

The challenges to data collection were many due to government restrictions, high levels of suspicion of foreigners during the time of my fieldwork, mass political violence, and post-revolutionary preference falsification. The purpose of this segment of the chapter is to provide an overview of the research conditions under which this fieldwork took place and provide the reader with a greater understanding of what types of data
collection were possible and what methods would have been either too risky to undertake or would have been restricted by the Egyptian government.

In Egypt, all large-scale research projects must be approved by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), a government agency that oversees projects such as survey research within the country. The problems that arise when attempting to register one’s research with CAPMAS include the agency’s refusal to approve a study, its refusal to approve all the questions in the study, or a prolonged approval process lasting up to two years. If one looks at the World Values Survey for Egypt, questions from the survey were omitted when data was collected in Egypt because the government would not approve them. Even if a large-scale project were approved by CAPMAS, the government’s mere knowledge of the project would put both the researcher and interviewees in danger of being watched by a government minder. The presence of a government minder would violate the anonymity of the human subjects in the study, thus violating policies of the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The purpose of my study was to understand individual decision-making processes to either protest or not protest. While smaller scale, in-depth interviews were the best way to examine these processes, it would have been helpful to then continue by testing the findings on a larger scale using survey research. Unfortunately, impediments including those presented by CAPMAS made survey data collection on a larger scale too difficult. Additionally, time and financial constraints on the dissertation project made conducting surveys impossible.

Continuing with the issue of financing, this dissertation fieldwork was initially funded through a Boren Fellowship grant. However, after my first month in the field, a military coup took place in Egypt on July 3, 2013. The fellowship program evacuated me
from the country and I was told that I would be able to take the fellowship money and study Arabic in another country, but if I wished to return to Egypt, I would have to pay back the fellowship money and return with no financing, since the Egypt program had been cancelled due to political unrest. Because I chose to return to my research site and complete my study without outside funding, the amount of money I could devote to research assistants, travel, and other interview considerations had to be recalculated and reduced considerably.

The issue of researcher safety in respect to both the government and interviewees played a part in determining where and with whom I conducted interviews. At various points during my fieldwork, I had to confront the possibility of being put in danger by my interviewees. In 2012, Egyptian state television had run advertisements warning Egyptians about foreigners being spies (El-Shenawi 2012) leading to a wave of xenophobia, and on two occasions in the middle of interviews I was questioned and accused of being a spy. One interviewee asked if I had cleared my project with the ministry of the interior, stopped the interview in the middle, and picked up his phone to make a call, threatening to contact the police. Additionally, a journalist had warned me of instances of foreign journalists being mobbed and threatened when conducting interviews in public settings.

Even more disconcerting was the possibility of being arrested for conducting research. In Egypt, research is not technically illegal. However, the government will arrest researchers or haul them into the police station on suspicion of spying. A few months before I began my fieldwork an American colleague of mine was meeting an interviewee in Mahallah al Kobra. He was arrested and falsely accused of spying and
paying children to throw rocks at the police and was held and questioned in an Egyptian jail for 56 hours. He was then questioned and charged by the Mahallah al Kobra general prosecutor, had his photo and information circulated in the newspapers, and endured a travel ban for almost a year that prevented him from leaving Egypt. Additionally, a colleague who was arrested along with him had his house raided and belongings confiscated. Egyptian authorities will usually not physically harm American detainees. However, another of my American colleagues who was arrested by Egyptian authorities reported being subjected to psychological torture and witnessing firsthand the torturing of Egyptian youths. In view of the risk posed by the possible objections to my research by the Egyptian government because I was conducting interviews, either my research assistants or I had to scout out interview locations to ensure the personal safety of all involved and, as much as possible, interviewees had to be checked out to make sure they would not pose a threat to me. With such a large number of interviews this process was not always fully successful. Fortunately, I was able to complete my project without government interference.

The next problem I faced was high levels of political violence and sexual assaults against women at protest sites during the time of my fieldwork. From the time of the 2011 Revolution onward there was an epidemic of sexual assaults on female protesters. At one protest in Tahrir Square there were eighteen confirmed attacks on women with six requiring hospitalization (el Sheikh and Kirkpatrick 2013). Women were mob attacked, had their clothes violently torn off of them, and were sexually assaulted in the middle of the Square. Because of the threat of sexual assault, whenever I conducted fieldwork at a protest site, I had either one or two large men accompany me as bodyguards. However, I
limited the number of protests I attended because there had been too many instances of women being gang-raped at demonstrations. In reality, two men were no protection against a mob.

Regarding political violence, my residence happened to be located on a main protest route where protesters marched by on a weekly, and sometimes daily, basis. While my location afforded me a prime view of the events, it also placed me in a center of political violence. Throughout the summer of 2013 there were days when I was unable to leave my home because there was continuous shooting taking place either on my street or close by. I was tear gassed one day as I ventured outside my home, when I also observed government tanks shooting warning shots at protesters only one street away. To give an idea of the magnitude of violence, on October 6, 2013, tens of anti-coup protesters were killed by the regime on my street and the streets surrounding my home (P. Kingsley 2013). I was never fully sure if my area would remain safe for an entire day, or whether violence might erupt in an area where I was researching. One week after I completed my fieldwork at the Raba’a al-Adawiya sit-in in Nasr City, the government violently cleared the protests and over 1,000 protesters were killed. Human Rights Watch stated that it was the largest mass killing of protesters in history (Human Rights Watch 2014). Another day I went to Ain Shams University to meet a few interviewees but had to relocate my interviews because of protests taking place on the campus. The immense amount of violence slowed down my research considerably because there were many days when it was too unsafe for either my interviewees or me to go outside.

Following the August 14, 2013, dispersal of the Raba’a al-Adawiya sit-in, the military implemented a nation-wide curfew that began at 7:00 pm and ended at 6:00 am.
While over time the length of the curfew was reduced, the fact that people had to be home by a certain time posed serious challenges to my research. First, many interviewees could not meet with me because by the time they finished work they had just enough time to make it home before the curfew went into effect. Second, I had to cut interviews short in order to arrive home before curfew myself. Third, if I was unable to make it home before the start of curfew, I had to remain in my interview location overnight.

Other potential difficulties in my research were post-revolutionary preference falsification (Kuran 1991), memory loss, and time period. Following a revolution that leads to the successful overthrow of a president, there is always the potential for individuals who were pro-regime to say that they were anti-regime after the fact. Additionally, as time progresses, individuals often forget important details. During the interviews I conducted in 2013, when asked what television networks they watched during the Revolution, many respondents said CBC. However, my research assistant pointed out to me that CBC did not come on air in Egypt until July 2011 (Dubai Press Club 2012, 46). Interview responses may have also been affected by the time period in which they were conducted. Because my interviews took place at a time when the majority of interviewees were highly dissatisfied with the Morsi government that succeeded Mubarak, their perception of the Mubarak regime may have been more favorable in 2013 than it was in 2011.

The final fieldwork problem that I faced was that my research was cut short in December 2013 because of an untrustworthy research assistant. When research takes place under an authoritarian regime, one of the jobs of a research assistant is to ensure the researcher’s safety at all times. Thus, a lot of trust is involved and the research assistant
must be vetted and recommended by others. Unfortunately, my determination to have a representative sample that included enough women overtook my usually sound judgment and concern for my own safety. When my other research assistants and I had exhausted our contacts with women in the lower class, an acquaintance offered to assist me in obtaining interviews with the additional numbers needed for the project. Toward the end of his work this acquaintance threatened that if I did not pay him LE8,000 he would go to the police and say that I was a spy. Knowing the real risks of being accused of spying while researching, I was forced to leave my home in the middle of the night, go into hiding, and terminate my research early by departing the country one week later. While I only completed 170 of my 200 intended interviews, I was fortunate to have preserved my personal safety, since both my family and I were receiving threatening messages during this precarious time.

**Ethical Dilemmas and Representation**

The ethical dilemmas faced by the field researcher are often addressed in anthropology, but are often sidelined by political scientists. However, it is important for a researcher to be aware of her role in the investigation process, her impact on human subjects, how human subjects and the research environment affect the researcher, and how to represent the stories of human subjects.

Previous anthropological works on Cairo discuss the challenges of navigating the social dynamics in a particular neighborhood of the city or of a few families being studied (Early 1993) (El-Kholy 2002). What I realized through my fieldwork is that by conducting 170 interviews, I was not as heavily engaged with any one person or group as
I would have been had I studied a small community. However, the majority of my interviews still came with social obligations and expectations that I found difficult to meet given the large number of individuals involved in the study. Research contacts who were on a friendly basis with me prior to the study often wanted to share time following the interview, and new interviewees with whom I built a strong rapport wanted to “hang out” later. Despite interviewing for hours per day, I also had to make time to socialize and attend events both to acquire new interviewees and to ensure that those whom I had previously interviewed did not feel exploited, i.e. that I was interested in them solely for what I could gain from my research. Thus, my research left me in a constant state of obligation, where I had the dual task of obtaining new interviews while maintaining contact with previous interviewees.

When interviewing the lower classes there were many times when I would arrange to meet in people’s homes, eating with their families, holding a baby or young child in one arm while I wrote with the other, and learning about their personal lives. When I had completed interviewing in that area and had to move on to another, I often did not have time to pay a return visit. When I was told that the families were asking about me, I would sometimes call to give an excuse as to why I had not visited, but I often felt that I had abandoned them after they had welcomed me into their homes. Egyptians are known for being very hospitable people, and at times I felt that I had violated norms of reciprocity by failing to interact with interviewees after the completion of my work.

At the other end of the spectrum, when I was interviewing cabaret workers in Faisal and Giza, many treated me as a rich foreigner and tried to extract as much as
possible from me while they had the opportunity. My experiences ranged from interviewees bringing along friends and ordering excessive amounts of food and drink for which I was expected to pay to having my personal belongings stolen.

The questions that continued to reemerge throughout my fieldwork were whether I was being exploitative or being exploited and whether there was a balance between what I was taking from my interviewees and the communities wherein I was researching and what I was giving back to them. I was never fully able to answer these questions, but I did develop some thoughts on them. While I did not exploit my human subjects and they gave their consent to the interviews, I did not do enough to give back to the communities that participated in my research. I am still struggling to find a way to do so, but many of my ideas were not feasible due to increased Egyptian government restrictions on projects with foreign funding (P. Kingsley 2014). What I came to realize from my experience interviewing in the cabaret scene was that some interviewees were attempting to exploit me because they viewed me as someone trying to take advantage of them. I believe that this perspective was a product of a lifestyle where nothing comes for free, the general perception of foreigners as being rich, and the colonial heritage of Westerners arriving in the Middle East to exploit native populations (Said 2003).

Beyond the issue of exploitation was the one of how to present the stories reported to me by my interviewees. I had to find a balance between representing their personal perspectives and, as a political scientist, engaging in an analysis that placed the many various stories in an objective framework, taking into account the broader issues of structural context, culture, social class, and the effects of interactions between individuals and between individuals and groups. I attempted to tackle this dilemma by looking for
patterns of experiences and viewpoints across interviews and investigating whether variables such as exposure to specific types or sources of information were the common denominator between reasons for protesting or not protesting. I was also able to connect responses on issues such as dissatisfaction with the Mubarak regime to the failing economy and inflation in order to relate individual perception to structural realities.

Using content analysis, I placed particular word usage and issue framing in a broader cultural context. One of the greatest challenges was differentiating between what people said and what people did, an example of which was individual perceptions on the role of groups in the decision-making process to protest or not protest. While the majority of individuals interviewed claimed that groups had no effect on their decision to protest, most interviewees who protested on January 25th gained their information about the protests from group invitations on Facebook and many were influenced by others’ accepting group invitations on Facebook. Thus, while the answer to the direct question of whether groups influenced their decision to protest was negative, the responses to other questions and the reported sources of information and interactions with others made it apparent that groups did, in fact, affect their decision to protest. Despite the many research challenges outlined above, this study aimed to present as accurate and representative a depiction of protest mobilization as was possible.
Part 1

The Downfall of Mubarak
Chapter 3  Grievances against the Hosni Mubarak Regime

In this chapter I examine grievances leading up to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. It is still helpful to separate my explanation of grievances by social class in order to identify which experiences were similar across classes and which ones were particular to, or more salient in, a specific segment of the population. However, social class as a causal variable is not central to my study. The purpose of the chapter is to understand why a large portion of the Egyptian population was unhappy with the Mubarak regime in the years leading up to the Revolution and where they attributed the blame for their plight. I find that both the lower and upper classes placed the blame for their problems on the police, the Mubarak regime, and a select few big businessmen. I demonstrate that both upper and lower classes had similar economic grievances concerning lack of suitable employment, and while the upper classes did not experience poverty, they sympathized with their compatriots who did. I determine that upper class and lower class grievances regarding police brutality and Islamist targeting mirrored one another. The only differences in experience between classes in terms of their relationship with the police were that the lower class was more likely to be subjected to arbitrary arrest. I also find that the upper class and lower class had almost identical grievances and experiences concerning police and regime corruption.

The chapter begins with a discussion of social class in Egypt and how I determined social class. Next, I outline the economic challenges that Egypt faced, along with the economic grievances of the lower and upper classes. The following segment looks at police brutality in Egypt and the personal experiences of the lower and upper
classes in regard to police brutality, Islamist targeting, and arbitrary detention.

Subsequently, I explore the nationwide problem of corruption, after which I present corruption stories from the lower and upper classes. The last section offers reasons why some lower class and upper class interviewees were satisfied with the Mubarak regime. I conclude with remarks about the contribution of grievances to revolutionary mobilization.

**Defining Social Class in Cairo**

Defining social class in Cairo is not an easy task. Traditional ideas of class such as Marx’s (Marx and Engels 2014), where class is determined by one’s relationship to the means of production and where society is divided into a proletariat (workers who do not own the means of production), bourgeoisie (who live off investments), and aristocracy (who own land as a means of production), do not fully explain social class dynamics in the Egyptian city. Writing about social class in Cairo, El-Kholy (2002) criticizes approaches where social class has been defined narrowly in economic terms and “thus do not allow for an understanding of rankings people invoke, based on prestige or social status, rather than on wealth and income alone” (El-Kholy 2002, 56). There have been some thought-provoking attempts to expand the understanding of social class beyond economic terms and in relation to social consciousness (Ossowski 1963), as well as explain the emergence of new forms of social stratification in Western countries (Clark and Lipset 1991). Max Weber’s definition of social class, or stratification, based on wealth, prestige and power (Weber 2010) is particularly useful in the context of this study, as it takes into account not only wealth and land ownership, but also prestige and
status, along with power. However, his view of social class misses many of the cultural nuances specific to Egypt in general, and Cairo in particular.

In my research design, I determined social class through asking interviewees about their education level, profession, and area of residence at the time of the Revolution, where they grew up, parents’ professions, monthly income at the time of the Revolution, and current monthly income. I also directly asked interviewees to state their social class. In retrospect, it would have also been helpful to ask about family assets, but unless a person was the head of a family, he or she probably would not know. It was also too intrusive a question to ask.

In order to determine my interviewee’s social class based on how social class is constructed in Cairo, in addition to carefully assessing how the above criteria fit together, I also had to rely on visual and social cues to determine social class. Thus, I also observed the surroundings in the types of places interviewees chose to meet, speech patterns, dress, gestures, and social class markers in the stories that were told. I also consulted with my Egyptian research assistants to make my final determination.

Previous anthropological works on the middle class in Egypt (Peterson 2011) and the habits of those residing in baladi (popular) districts (Singerman 1995) were most helpful in placing my interviewees into class categories. De Koning (2009) finds that members of the Cairene upper-middle class are often employed in managerial and professional positions, many times in international companies, and are the high-income earners discussed by Sassen (de Koning 2009, 6). This social class earns relatively good wages in comparison to the insecure private sector jobs and the low-level government positions of the lower-middle class (de Koning 2009, 6). According to de Koning, the
upper-middle class is set apart from the other middle classes (e.g. middle class and lower-middle class) by what he calls “cosmopolitan capital” or “familiarity with globally dominant, First World repertoires and standards - for example, fluency in English - as well as the ability to participate in conspicuously cosmopolitan lifestyles that have become the prerogative of Cairo’s upper-middle class and elites” (de Koning 2009, 6).

During my fieldwork, I remained aware of signs of “cosmopolitan capital,” such as the language an interviewee was most comfortable speaking (many from the upper-middle and upper classes prefer to speak English or a mixture of English and Arabic, even at home), mentions of whether they vacationed and where, the types of clothes and accessories interviewees wore, and references to the types of shops and businesses interviewees frequented.

Being a member of the middle class in Cairo does not mean that a person is at a particular income level (Armbrust 1996) (Waterbury 1983). One can be an educated member of the middle class with little to no income. “Their financial circumstances did not contradict their middle class identification or the social salience of their education and office jobs” (de Koning 2009, 12). Instead, low income in the middle class reflects the growing predicament of many in the middle class, which is unemployment or low pay after investing in higher education.

Examples of the difficulty in placing interviewees into social class categories based on income include a fruit seller and a recent college graduate. During my fieldwork, I came across a fruit seller who made LE30,000 per month before the Revolution. It was quite obvious that she was selling items other than just fruit. While the woman had a high income, she grew up and continued to live modestly in a popular
quarter, socialized with members of the lower class, and had the mannerisms of someone from the lower class. Thus, I put her in the category of lower class. Early (1993) found this same phenomenon in her study of the Bulaq popular quarter. Certain families could afford to move to higher status districts, but they preferred to remain in popular quarters because they were comfortable with their way of life. “With their modest furnishings and consumption habits, they do not stand out as different in Bulaq” (Early 1993, 58).

In contrast, I interviewed a recent graduate whose income was only LE3,000 because of the country’s unemployment problems, but he drove an expensive car and lived in a luxury apartment in a high class area. I placed him in the category of upper class. “In an uncertain world where the labor market is susceptible to sudden changes and the state machinery is contentiously threatened by instability, membership in household or kin-based groups is a person’s chief means of access to resources and security” (Hoodfar 1997, 8). Thus, even though this man did not earn a wage commensurate with his social class, he is defined by the resources and security provided by membership in an upper class household.

Rather than “lower class,” El-Kholy (2002) uses the term “low-income.” While she found variations in lifestyle and beliefs in the populations that she studied, she also found that members of the “low-income group shared characteristics such as having low levels of income, lacking formal education, being employed in the informal sector, and being deprived of access to some basic services” (El-Kholy 2002, 55). Wikan (1980) finds that while the lower class is not homogenous with categorical social parameters, there are different degrees of poverty among the poor that have implications for interpersonal relationships (Wikan 1980, 16). Cooper (1983) uses unskilled labor and
dependence on the state for access to basic subsistence goods, such as buying state-
subsidized bread and sugar, to identify the lower class (Cooper 1983, 454). Other signs of
membership in the lower class include bodily practices, such as gestures, as significant
markers of identity and status (Elyachar 2011, 84), language patterns, and arrangement of
space in the areas in which lower class individuals reside. In the old historical baladi
(popular) quarters, the districts have defining attributes, such as hara (narrow alleyways)
(Ismail 2006, 13-14).

Two examples illustrate class perception and identification in the Cairene population. One afternoon after finishing an interview in an upscale café in Maadi, I exited the establishment with my interviewee and approached my Egyptian friend who was waiting for me in her car with her father. When I entered the car the first question she asked was, “Who was that? He looks like a baweb (doorman)!” I was shocked by her question because the man was, in fact, the son of a baweb. Despite coming out of a swanky café in an upper class district, the man was immediately identified by his apparel and bodily movements. In my second story, I asked a friend of mine what would happen if a man with a significant amount of money, but from a family that sold foul (bean) sandwiches, went to her family and asked for her hand in marriage. According to my friend, the response would be, “Absolutely not.” Even though the man might have money, his social class, which could be easily identified by his parents’ profession, would immediately eliminate him as a potential suitor.

In my research, I categorize my interviewees as upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, lower-middle class, and lower class. In the category of protester, I identified 5 upper class, 18 upper-middle class, 20 middle class, 9 lower-middle class, and 43 lower
class. In the category of non-protester, I identified 3 upper class, 10 upper-middle class, 13 middle class, 7 lower-middle class, and 42 lower class. In my analysis, I simplify these categories into upper class and lower class. The upper class includes members of the upper class, upper-middle class, and middle class, and the lower class includes lower-middle class and lower class. I pay special attention to responses from the middle class, as they fall on the dividing line between classes and at times have responses exemplifying attributes of both classes. While in my study interviewees were labeled as upper class or lower class, these are not distinct, clearly defined categories.

Though many interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the Mubarak regime due to lack of freedom, the poor education and health systems, and the January 2011 Alexandria church bombing, in the following pages I focus on the three areas of dissatisfaction most cited by both lower and upper class protesters: economic grievances, anger over police brutality, and frustration with corruption. By examining these grievances through individuals’ stories, I demonstrate that in almost every category the reasons for lower class and upper class resentment against the Mubarak regime coincided and that the two classes had very similar experiences in their confrontations with the regime.

**Economic Grievances**

Leading up to the Revolution one of the greatest concerns of both lower class and upper class interviewees was the economic conditions in the country. While country reports by the IMF and Bloomberg had a relatively positive outlook on the Egyptian economy regarding resilience to the world financial crisis, financial market conditions,
and economic performance (International Monetary Fund 2010), prospects for areas of the economy that affected everyday life, such as inflation and employment rates, were dismal.

During 2007/2008, the Egyptian economy performed at a strong level, expanding at 7.2 percent compared to 3.5 percent during 2000/2001 (Ghanem 2010, 11). In the third quarter of 2010, the Egyptian economy expanded by 5.6 percent (Wahba and Shahine 2010). However, Egypt was also undergoing a serious liquidity crisis due to the loss of hard currency from tourism. Foreign exchange reserves had declined from $30 billion to $15 billion because of the government’s inconsistent policies on the Egyptian pound, which was devalued many times (Elaasar 2010). Estimated losses in the tourism sector ranged from $2 to $3 billion, and the airline and shipping industries were hit by a 50% increase in insurance premiums (Elaasar 2010).

Adding to these serious market concerns was the problem of extremely high inflation, which had a direct impact on the domestic population and their ability to meet their basic needs. There had been a series of inflation spikes in the decade leading up to the Revolution. In 2003-2004 inflation rates increased due to a huge devaluation of the Egyptian pound, in 2006-07 inflation spiked because of the avian flu outbreak, and in 2008 inflation hit a high of 18.3% (IndexMuni 2011) because of the world commodity price increase (Moriyama 2011, 5). By the 2010/2011 fiscal year, inflation sat at 10.2% (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2013, 4)

Another problem for Egypt was the youth bulge and the inability of the Egyptian workforce to absorb the growing number of recent graduates. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines youth as those belonging to the 18 to 29 age
group, which represents approximately 20 million members of the Egyptian population. A 2006 census reported that 25% of the Egyptian population fell into the youth category (Handoussa 2010, 35). Over the course of Mubarak’s almost 30-year rule, the country’s population increased by 90%, from 45 million to 85 million (Roudi-Fahimi, El Feki and Tsai 2011), but job creation did not keep up with people creation.

In 2010, the unemployment rate in Egypt stood at 9.7% (Indexmuni 2011). In 2006, more than 80% of the unemployed were under age 29 and 82% of the unemployed had never held a job before (Handoussa 2010, 148), implying that there was a labor market insertion problem in Egypt, with youth being unable to transition from study to work. As of 2010, approximately 90% of those unemployed were under the age of 30 (Handoussa 2010, 6), and many who were not unemployed were underemployed. While it is often assumed that when young individuals complete their schooling they will transition into the workforce, 58.5% of 18 to 29-year-olds were out of the workforce (Handoussa 2010, 38), meaning they were not considered to be unemployed because they were not even seeking employment.

The demographics of youth unemployment may surprise those who assume that unemployment is a problem principally for the lower classes. “Unemployment is highest among youth who come from households in the fourth wealth quintile, slightly drops for those in the highest wealth quintile, and is lowest among youth who come from households in the lowest wealth quintile” (Handoussa 2010, 139). The explanation for this distribution is that graduates from the upper classes can afford to wait for suitable employment, often with the support of their parents, while those from the lower classes are more willing to take any job available to them, thus having a lower reservation wage.
Those in higher socio-economic brackets expect to obtain positions in the formal economy, while those in the lower socio-economic brackets are more willing to take work in the informal sector rather than remain jobless. Diane Singerman, who studied popular quarters in Cairo, observed, “Two-thirds of the men and women in the community I studied were supported by the informal economy in either their primary, secondary, or tertiary economic activity” (Singerman 1995, 176), and in 2006 Ismail (2006) noted the “growing informalization of the labor force” (Ismail 2006, 4). However, employment does not mean wealth. While poor youth have higher employment rates, they are still subsisting on meager wages and are more often underemployed than their counterparts in the upper classes.

**Lower Class Economic Grievances**

The number of Egyptians living below the poverty line of $2 per day rose from 17% in 2000 to 22% in 2010 (Roudi-Fahimi, El Feki and Tsai 2011). However, nearly half of Egyptians live under or just above the poverty line (Newsmax 2011). To understand the economic grievances of lower class Egyptians one must familiarize oneself with their living conditions and the daily challenges they face. A return to my field notes makes me aware that it is what I saw and experienced outside the time of conducting formal interviews that best describes the exasperating conditions that impel a person to face the danger of protest against an armed regime.

As part of my research I took a number of trips to El-Baragil, an area of Giza at the edge of Greater Cairo. I was fortunate to find a taxi that would take me there, as usually only tuk-tuks would agree to navigate the rough, unpaved roads and narrow
streets. As we made our way to my destination we had to avoid flooded streets, and a man riding a horse behind us seemed to be having an easier time, eventually passing us on the road. When I arrived at the home where I was supposed to conduct a number of interviews, I climbed the stark stairwell with eroding walls to a small apartment that consisted of one large bedroom, a small bedroom, a kitchen, and a bathroom.

Because the number of inhabitants did not permit the luxury of a sitting room, my interviews had to take place in one of the bedrooms, which was a common occurrence when interviewing in lower class homes. At one point during my stay, I asked to use the bathroom and the lady of the house seemed to be a bit embarrassed and began to fidget. Having previously lived in Sayeda Zeinab, a popular district of Cairo, I was not surprised by the washing facilities. In many of the poorer homes, the plumbing is not very functional. A bathroom is a small space with a toilet, sink, and drain, and buckets of water must be thrown into the toilet to flush. When guests are not present, the toilet is often left unflushed through several uses, no matter what the contents left behind.

As I held one of the women’s babies in one arm and I wrote in the other, we spoke about economic hardships. One woman’s husband had been “unfairly” arrested (Interview#129 2013), which made her situation even more difficult than most because of the financial burden. In the lower classes, while economic conditions have caused many women to enter the workforce out of necessity, a woman’s holding a job is often not looked upon as something positive. As one woman in the room put it, “We are housewives for real men. We don’t have to think about politics or money” (Interview#121 2013), meaning the men of the family could financially support their families, allowing the wife to stay at home. The majority of my interviewees from both
the upper and lower classes reported having mothers who were housewives or being housewives themselves. However, this self-reporting of employment status can be deceptive. In her work on popular districts Hoodfar (1997) explains:

“Field studies in the poorest districts of Cairo suggest that as many as 40 percent of all households contain women who are involved in various forms of gainful employment. In extremely poor neighborhoods in Cairo, Andrea Rugh (1979) found many women engaged in piecework for manufacturers, food vending, domestic service, poultry raising, and water carrying. The census fails to capture these activities because the vast majority of women are categorized as housewives and are only included in labor force data if they hold jobs in the formal economic sector” (Hoodfar 1997, 8).

In the lower class, which is more traditional, the need for a woman to work is sometimes viewed as shameful for the husband who cannot support the family on his own. Thus, women will often categorize themselves as housewives, even when they perform some type of work in the informal economy. In the case of women whose husbands have been detained, they face having to work as the sole breadwinner of the family or put more stress on other family members to care for them.

The difficulties of a husband’s arrest arose again when I interviewed a woman in a local café in Haram. Sitting and sipping my tea, I had just finished my interviews for the day when a woman like no other I had seen entered the room. Everyone in the café turned around to stare at her hot pink, skin-tight abaya (robe) and black niqab (face covering). Curious, I enlisted one of my companions to approach her and ask if I could interview her, and she agreed. Removing her niqab, she sat down and we began to speak. Through my interview and a discussion my companion had with her afterward, I learned that before the Revolution she had worked as a belly dancer in a cabaret and her husband had served as her manager. When her husband had been detained indefinitely by the police, she had been forced into prostitution to survive (Interview#115 2013).
I took my research to the cabarets of Faisal and Haram to experience another side of lower class women’s work. Accompanied by my research assistant and his friend, I set off one evening to visit cabaret workers in the rundown section of Cairo known as Faisal.

We had to arrive early, before 7pm, because of the nationally imposed military curfew that extended from 7pm until 6am, and for the same reason I knew it would be a long night since I would not have the option to return home before the curfew was lifted. When I entered the cabaret I stepped into a dark room with various colored lights covering the ceiling. The room was filled with tables of men, and I soon realized that I was the only woman there who was not working. Live musicians and a singer were blasting shaabi (popular) music from a stage in the far corner. As my two male companions and I sat down at our table, a large platter of fruit was brought out, along with an assortment of beverages. A woman approached our table, introduced herself, and began to chat with the men accompanying me. As I looked around the room, I realized that each table was assigned one woman whose duty it was to attend to her guests for the night, serving and entertaining them. This was the job of a cabaret worker. Ranging in age from early 20s to 40s, the women would belly dance, flirt, and hand feed their clients in an attempt to make more tips.

Soon the first belly dancer came out. Being used to legends such as Fifi Abdou and the high reputation of Egyptian belly dancing, I was shocked at the woman who appeared on the stage. Heavily overweight and wearing neon cut-out spandex pants and fishnet over her stomach, the dancer looked uninterested in what she was doing and had a vacant expression in her eyes. Between spells of simply standing, she would shake her body around to the music in a less than artistic manner. After dancing to a few songs,
such as “Wenaby Yammah,” she left the stage and a little while later another belly dancer took her place. At one point I turned around and saw the first belly dancer exiting the cabaret wearing a long black \textit{abaya} and black \textit{hijab} (head covering).

The cabaret was a sad place. Under the façade of a festive venue to let loose were the realities of economic deprivation and disturbing power dynamics. The women appeared to feel empowered by using their charms to deplete their male customers of the money in their pockets, but in reality they were being exploited and lived very difficult lives. A few days after my visit to the cabaret I learned that one of the workers had had a seizure attack from taking too much Demerol, a prescription painkiller that she and many other women took when having sex for money in order not to be aware of what they were doing. Many of the men at the cabaret did not appear to be wealthy. Smoking and drinking beer in silence, they barely paid attention to the women trying to entice them, as if they were lost in their own world. When they did stand up to dance with a belly dancer or a cabaret worker, they seemed to feel empowered by their assumed dominant position in relation to the woman, possibly compensating for their economic and political emasculation in society outside of the cabaret. However, in reality, this feeling of empowerment came at a high financial price.

Other lower class women facing financial hardship make different choices from accepting what Egyptian society views as “immoral” employment. I spoke to the 20-year-old sister of a cabaret worker, who had chosen not to enter that profession, explaining to me that she had at one point sold her kidney to make ends meet. Having grown up on the streets, she believed that her desperate economic and living conditions, which she blamed
on the Mubarak regime, pushed her to do things she would have never done (Interview#101 2013).

My interviews with lower class men usually took place at their worksite or at street cafes. Many were students, unemployed, or underemployed, so they had plenty of time to talk. They had societal pressure to be breadwinners, and many claimed that at the time of Mubarak, people could not survive economically. As one young man said, “I want to live in a better life. Work, eat good food, have money” (Interview#50 2013). Fulfilling the basic need of eating was often difficult, and I was told that many of the poor would drink tea with a lot of sugar to stave off hunger. Another interviewee related, “People were walking in the streets hating themselves. What will I eat today? Mubarak was a thief, just telling people there was stability in Egypt but in a loser way” (Interview#64 2013), and a young man told me that he knew many people who did not have enough money to eat and would say, “Where is Nasser?” (Interview#77 2013). One of the saddest stories was related by a 21-year-old student from Shobra. One day he was in the market with his mother buying tomatoes and they came across an old woman crying. The old woman said, “Mubarak is eating and he’s good so Alhamdullillah.” (Interview#64 2013). What she meant was that she was starving, but at least the president was eating well.

Many of the lower class men I interviewed also complained of being underemployed or being unable to obtain work commensurate with their education level or in their field. They explained to me that young people who had graduated from university were working at any job they could find, not necessarily one in their specialty (Interview#58 2013). Examples given were an engineer washing plates in the tourist
resort of Sharm-el Sheikh (Interview#60 2013) and a friend with a PhD who drove a microbus for a living (Interview#85 2013). As one young man said in exasperation, “I wanted a better life. I have a good degree and think I should have a better level. I wanted to change my level” (Interview#59 2013). A mother from a poor family in El-Waily told me that she was distressed because her sons had no job opportunities after graduating with high degrees (Interview#45 2013), and a young man told me that when he graduated from university he dreamed of a job he knew he would not get (Interview#68 2013). “I saw how [the Mubarak regime] killed the dreams of young people” (Interview#19 2013). It should be noted that there were also a few women who were dissatisfied with the lack of employment opportunities (Interview#101 2013). Many interviewees complained of nepotism as a barrier to employment or advancing their status. “An engineer’s son became an engineer, a doctor’s son became a doctor. Wealth was passed on and there was nepotism” (Interview#89 2013).

The inability to afford marriage was another concern of many lower class male interviewees. In Egypt, marriage is an expensive process. In order to marry a man is expected to pay for the wedding, give the woman a shabka (jewelry gift), mahr (dowery), and the marital residence. In 2008, the average cost of marriage in Egypt was almost the same as the average per capita annual income, $5,460 (Roudi-Fahimi, El Feki and Tsai 2011). While families often help out or fully cover the expenses, the large cost of marriage and high unemployment levels have caused many young people to wait longer periods of time before marrying. A 21-year-old man from Sayeda Zeinab who worked at a media company expressed in an almost desperate tone, “I have to get married. I have to have children, good hospitals. I need
basic things. The rights of the people are not dreams. These are their rights.”
(Interview#39 2013).

**Upper Class Economic Grievances**

In contrast to my interviews with the lower class, my research with the middle and upper classes took place in posh Nile cafes, luxury apartments, and villas in newly-built compounds. Of course there was the occasional young man who preferred the local street café, but for the most part, I noticed that when I offered to cover the bill, the cost had changed from LE5 to LE50.

In Egypt there is a significant income disparity between the upper classes and the majority of the population in the lower classes. While the lower classes struggle to survive on a day-to-day basis, the upper classes are able to take overseas vacation, eat at fancy restaurants, and shop for international brands at the large shopping malls and supermarkets that cater to foreign clientele and rich Egyptians. To understand the difference in lifestyle, if a person from the lower class were to grab lunch, she would most probably have a *foul* (bean) sandwich, which costs LE1, while an upper class woman might stop at McDonalds, where a meal costs LE35. A lower class man trying to make his way across Cairo from the district of Dokki to the Maadi area would either pay LE1 to take the metro or a little more to take a microbus, whereas an upper class man, in his worst case scenario, would pay LE20 for a taxi if for some reason he were unable to drive his air-conditioned car or his driver were unavailable. There are a number of well-off foreigners in Egypt who take the metro on a regular basis, but many upper and upper-middle class Egyptians express horror at the idea. They would rather sit for hours in
smoggy Cairo traffic than undergo what they describe as “packed, hot, and smelly” metro cars.

I had a great deal of exposure to the lifestyle of the Egyptian upper middle and upper classes while attending the American University in Cairo for my undergraduate study abroad and my master’s program, as well as in numerous encounters across the years at social events and through family friends. One way immediately to identify a person’s social class in Cairo is by visiting his home. Before even entering the building, the district and area within the district where the person lives is a dead giveaway. Posh areas such as Zamalek and Maadi, which are also home to many foreign diplomats, are well-known, and just by hearing the name one assumes that the class of the person living there is high. When you enter an upper class home you will know right away based on the size of the space and the furnishings.

One of my upper class interviews took place in a luxury apartment in Zamalek. A baweb (doorman) was leaning back in his chair in the hot summer sun when I arrived. He glanced up at me, but realizing that he had seen me before, he just nodded his head. Usually if the building has a baweb and he does not recognize the visitor, the guest will be questioned and sometimes interrogated about whom she is going to see. I took the elevator upstairs, and when I exited there were only two doors in front of me; the apartments in the building were so large that each took up half a floor. I rang the doorbell and the new housekeeper answered the door. She was Coptic Christian and worked during the day; the last one had been Ethiopian and often stayed overnight. As the door opened wider, a Chihuahua scrambled past her legs and began to jump on me enthusiastically. Because of the apprehension surrounding the cleanliness of pets in
Islam, it is rare to see a dog as a pet in Egypt, but they are gradually becoming more popular with the upper classes.

I walked through the “American style” modern kitchen, which was about the size of a New York living room and dining room combined, and sat myself down on the extremely tasteful, modern sofa in front of the enormous television. Always trying to feed her visitors, the lady of the house had the housekeeper bring out a tray with lunch and juice. I was sitting in the informal living room, the smaller of two living rooms in the house. The much larger formal living room down the hall, decorated in modern arabesque style, was so large that it was segmented by furniture into two distinct spaces. The home was beautifully decorated in a casual luxury style and could have been featured in a magazine. The apartment also included a large office, formal dining room, a master bedroom with a master bathroom, and two other bedrooms with a shared bathroom. There was another half bathroom near the entrance way. Furniture tells a lot about one’s social class in Egypt. Before the recent opening of the first Ikea in Cairo, it was very difficult and very costly to obtain modern style furnishings. The common question that foreigners jokingly asked one another was, “Did Louis XIV decorate your apartment?” referring to the heavy wood furniture with spray-painted gold trimming that filled many rental apartments.

Middle class to upper-middle class homes are not always as elaborate as the one just described, but there are a few key features that define them. The apartment building almost always has a baweb, the area in which the building is situated has wide, paved streets and international dining options and/or upscale cafes, and while the apartments may be more simply furnished without attention to smaller aesthetic details, the furniture
is of good quality and purchased at a formal store, not at the small side street workshops. The apartments may not take up half the floor of a building, but they are large with spacious rooms.

The lifestyle of upper class youth is more than comfortable. A typical week includes frequent trips to upscale cafes, where friends gather to drink pricey juices and smoke hookah. Long weekends are passed travelling to beach resorts, such as Sharm el-Sheikh and the North Coast, where families either own their own beach houses or are able to afford staying at resort hotels. However, looks can be deceiving. Given the poor economic situation, this lifestyle of the young upper class is supported by parents, not by their own incomes. Other than a few from the very upper classes with connections, it is almost impossible for upper class youth to find decent-paying jobs, despite their families’ having invested thousands of dollars in foreign educational institutions. One person I interviewed, whose family had an apartment in Mohandeseen and a massive villa on the outskirts of Cairo and who had been educated abroad, was elated when he finally received a job offer from an international company that paid LE3,500 (approximately $500) per month. With a lifestyle that included trips to Europe and riding around Cairo on his motorcycle, that type of pay would only serve as pocket money. Thus, the socio-economic status of the current young generation, is defined principally by what their parents do and the assets their parents hold. Even when an upper class man is unemployed or underemployed, he is still able to marry, because his family will cover the cost of the house, car, and wedding; however, for what I would call the solid middle class, things are a bit more difficult.
Both middle class and upper-middle class interviewees who were about to enter the workforce expressed anxiety about securing a position following graduation, particularly after seeing the failure of so many of their friends. An upper-middle class student who resided in Zamalek complained that many recent graduates had difficulty finding jobs (Interview#150 2013), and another upper-middle class youth who was unemployed informed me that there were no job opportunities or salaries were low, asserting, “You had to be connected to someone to get a job, even if you’re the best one for the position” (Interview#149 2013). A 20-year-old middle class student from Dokki told me, “A simple guy can’t find a job, rise in a good social way, or get married” (Interview#139 2013), and a 30-year-old man whose father was a military officer explained that after completing university, he found that there were no jobs. He had graduated with a degree in business administration and English but then could not find a position in his field. Eventually, he had to take any job he could get. He told me that men could not afford to marry because of low incomes, and the rents for flats were at minimum LE2000 per month. His friends were hurt by the recent hikes in rent. “Every year the rent is more and more and they don’t have the income to pay it. Private companies pay better than the government, but they still don’t pay enough to keep up with inflation.” (Interview#41 2013). He then used words that I heard over and over again, that at the time of Mubarak, “The people didn’t have their rights.”

In addition to the unemployment and low pay grievances of the upper classes, a running theme throughout my interviews with them was sympathy for the lower classes. Many in the upper class were uncomfortable with the vast income disparity between the rich and poor in their country. Passionately describing the political and economic
situation in the time of Mubarak, a young female doctor told me, “It’s not fair. The economy was like shit…and all the money was in the hands of 1% of the population while the other 99% were almost starving” (Interview#1 2013). A 26-year-old upper-middle class man from Dokki who worked in real estate reiterated the sentiment saying, “The people were getting weaker and the country was dealing with people like they were slaves. The poor were like slaves and the upper class were the owners of the country. The middle class were lost with what to do” (Interview#163 2013). Another upper-middle class student said, “I wasn’t hurt by the Mubarak regime, but I worried about the lower class” (Interview#82 2013). A general feeling was that the country was becoming one of rich and poor with a rapidly dwindling middle class.

The empathy and solidarity that the upper class demonstrated for the plight of the lower class was the reason why one lower class man decided to protest in the Revolution. At the beginning, he thought the Revolution was going to be a joke. On January 25th he went down to Tahrir Square out of curiosity and went up to a “posh” upper class young woman and asked, “Why are you here?” She replied that maybe the poor people did not have time to speak, so she would speak for them. Her words inspired him, and after the encounter he was hopeful (Interview#65 2013).

**Police Brutality**

It is no secret that the Egyptian police torture detainees, and the practice is not new. In his autobiography, Anwar al-Sadat, discussing his time as vice-president of Egypt under Nasser, wrote, “In the first four years of revolutionary rule, when the Revolutionary Command Council wielded all power, there were mistakes and violations
of human rights but these were limited in scope. It was after 1956 that they began to
acquire huge dimensions” (el-Sadat 1977, 209). The torture of communists and Islamists
was widespread in the 1960s but lessened at the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s.
However, with the 1981 assassination of President Sadat, torture made a comeback as a
tool of the state (Human Rights Watch 2011, 13).

The backdrop to the Egyptian state practice of torture is an emergency law that
has been in place for the majority of the past one hundred years, and consistently since
1981 when Mubarak came to power (Reza 2007, 534). With the assistance of emergency
law, the General Directorate for State Security Investigation (SSI) has been able to use
extralegal means to extract information from, and punish, prisoners and arbitrarily detain
citizens. Emergency law “gives the executive—in practice the Interior Ministry—
extensive powers to suspend basic rights by prohibiting demonstrations and detaining
people indefinitely without charge” (Human Rights Watch 2011, 10). The SSI, which is
under the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior, is an internal-security agency
whose number of employees, soldiers, and officers is unknown and considered to be a
state secret (Sherry 1993). The agency “maintains a system of nationwide surveillance,
using both its own plainclothes agents and a network of informers, some of whom appear
to be recruited while in custody” (Sherry 1993).

The list of abuses in Egypt is long and varied and includes intimidating or
recruiting police informers, punishing a citizen as a favor to a third party, pressuring
individuals to forfeit property, punishing those who challenge police authority, obtaining
information or confessions illegally from detainees, intimidating individuals because of
their sexual orientation, religious beliefs, or political beliefs and activities, and abusing
women and children related to suspects, in what some describe as a hostage taking policy (Human Rights Watch 2011, 16).

Police brutality in Egypt takes many forms including threatening victims that their families will be killed and interrogating prisoners while they hear the screams of fellow inmates being tortured nearby (Amnesty International 2007, 18). Victims of torture are then threatened with re-arrest if they lodge complaints against their abusers (Amnesty International 2009). In a Human Rights Watch report on the persecution of homosexuals in Egypt, men who were imprisoned because of their sexuality reported being electric shocked on their genitals, limbs, and tongue, raped by other prisoners, “whipped, beaten, bound and suspended in painful positions, splashed with ice-cold water, and burned with lit cigarettes” (Reproductive Health Matters 2009, 173). Describing torture methods, Sherry (1993) relates:

“Detainees, usually stripped to their underwear or totally naked, and almost always blindfolded, endure beatings with sticks and other hard objects; electric shocks on sensitive body parts, sometimes while doused with water; forced standing for long periods, often in front of an air conditioner; hanging by the wrists or other forms of painful suspension; and harsh psychological torture, including threats of sexual violence against themselves or female family members” (Sherry 1993).

One young man who had participated in the storming of Amn al-Dawla (State Security) offices during the Revolution claimed to have found Tasers, torture devices, and prison cells in the building. He described the offices as “the Middle Eastern Guantanamo Bay” (Interview#26 2013).

Many writings on the Revolution have cited police brutality as one of the primary grievances of protesters (Lesch 2011). In my research I found a complex phenomenon that extended beyond torture to include arbitrary arrest, abuse of power, corruption, and
the targeting of specific populations. What was surprising was the similarity in experiences of confrontations with the police that upper class and lower class Egyptians faced. The stories of upper and lower class interviewees coincided most closely when describing the arrests of friends, family members, or acquaintances on the grounds of being Islamists or suspected Islamists. Accounts of police abuse of power and police brutality were also similar. Where class narratives began to diverge was in the area of arbitrary arrest. Lower class interviewees were much more likely to report being subject to arbitrary arrest (Ghannam 2013, 68).

While the important role of videos and photographs of torture in fomenting dissent has been rightly examined, this part of the chapter focuses on firsthand experiences of abuse and torture of interviewees and stories about such experiences related by people they knew. When asked if there were any stories in the news prior to the Revolution that bothered them, the number one answer for both upper class and lower class interviewees, both protesters and non-protesters, was that of Khaled Said. However, as one interviewee put it, “I didn’t need the news; I saw it with my own eyes” (Interview#64 2013).

Lower Class Police Brutality

Many of the lower class accounts of police brutality did not take place in prisons but instead on the streets. Police acted with such impunity that they did not even feel the need to hide their actions from public view. One young man told me of an old man, Nabil, who had frequent disputes with another man from his area (Interview#50 2013). Unfortunately for Nabil, the man with whom he had had disagreements had police...
connections. One day the police showed up at Nabil’s shop and beat him up and tortured him in his own store.

Another young interviewee related that there was a man from his neighborhood who owned a small supermarket where the police used to take items without paying, but the shop owner was too afraid to say anything. One day the shop owner had had enough and began to fight with one of the police officers. In retaliation, the officer went to the shop owner’s house and hit the man’s sister. This story came to an ugly end when the shop owner shot the police officer for disrespecting his sister (Interview#86 2013).

Other stories of public police brutality included a young man who was walking in the streets when the police demanded to see his ID. When the man told the officer that he did not have it with him, the officer hit him (Interview#74 2013). Another person came across a protest downtown and saw a police officer dragging a woman by her hair. When the man tried to intervene, the officer said, “If you interfere, I’ll take you instead” (Interview#67 2013).

Worse than the cases of public displays of excessive force was the story of a young man who was arrested during the Revolution by military police. While this chapter aims to explain grievances leading up to the Revolution, I believe this particular story of arrest and torture provides important information on Egyptian torture practices.

A young Egyptian man who reported that he went to the January 25th protests to observe, but not participate, was picked up by the military police and taken to military prison. While in custody he, along with many others, was repeatedly electric shocked. He was wearing boots with thick rubber soles, which caused the police difficulty because of how they helped to conduct the electricity. After the young man had been subjected to
repeated shocks, his head was bashed numerous times by his torturers and to this day he has an indentation in his head where they fractured his skull. Following his stay in military police custody, he was transferred to a military hospital where he received top-notch care. Before releasing him back on the streets his captors tried to ensure that there were little or no signs of the torture that had taken place. This story demonstrates that torture was institutionalized in Egypt and practiced by both the police and military. While this particular incident took place during the Revolution, it is hard to believe that the military only began engaging in brutality during the few days of the uprising. Hence, in prior years, those arrested on terror charges, or other charges that would place them under military jurisdiction, were most likely subjected to similar treatment by the military.

**Upper Class Police Brutality**

While many might assume that only the lower classes were subjected to police brutality, there are just as many stories involving the upper class. A young filmmaker in his early 20s, who resided in Dokki, related that he had been attacked by the police on multiple occasions. One evening he was with his American girlfriend in Muqattam. A police officer stopped the couple and became angry and impatient when the man persisted in interpreting to his American friend. The police officer kicked him and pulled the hair out of his head (Interview#34 2013).

Many of the stories of police brutality and harassment were told by men, but an affluent, young female doctor, when asked why she decided to protest in the Revolution, replied:

“A hundred million reasons. I suffered from police brutality; everyday, on a daily basis. Police officers are very rude, very cruel. They are abusive. They are
sexually abusing me every time they stop me. They are flirting and if I don’t flirt back or give my number back, they might cause me trouble, make me pay a ticket and I didn’t do anything wrong, you know. And I’ve seen the way they act around. I know it’s not fair. I had some police officers as friends. I saw how they treat people. How they beat the shit out of them, how they take the drugs from some young man and then go to their cars and then smoke the drugs in front of everyone and their older officers. And there’s nothing wrong about that, as if it’s ok to just apply the rules for the population but the rules don’t apply to you, you know” (Interview#1 2013).

The abuse experienced by women was not necessarily beating. Women were exposed to sexual harassment and sometimes physical violations by male officers abusing their positions of authority.

Many other descriptions of police brutality towards the upper classes concerned involvement in political activity. A female school director angrily told me that a friend of hers who was a journalist was arrested and sodomized by the police for his political activism (Interview#107 2013). She believed the friend was a member of the April 6th Youth Movement. Another upper middle class young woman who lived in Zamalek had known political activists who were grabbed away and beaten up by the police when protesting against the Mubarak regime (Interview#170 2013). A middle class engineering student had a friend who was beaten by police at a protest in front of the Journalist Syndicate (Interview#143 2013), and a middle class pharmacist told me, “I had friends who protested before the Revolution and got arrested; some got out and some disappeared” (Interview#142 2013). Finally, a young middle class film editor related that one of his friends had been taken to a police station and tortured. Later, that same film editor was detained during the Revolution by military police and witnessed young boys being tortured in front of him (Interview#15 2013).
Islamist Targeting

The stories related above speak to police brutality based on abuse of power against everyday citizens going about their business and the targeting of secular anti-regime political activists. In this next section, I examine how police specifically seek out Islamists and suspected Islamists from both the lower and upper classes for detention and torture.

The most well-known and influential Islamist group in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 by elementary school teacher Hasan al-Banna as a reaction to what he saw as the lack of religion and morality in society, the group transformed into a political organization by the end of the 1930s, supporting the monarchy of King Faruq (Fahmy 2011, 84) and fielding its first candidates for parliament in 1941 (Davis and Robinson 2009, 1306) and by the late 1940s seeking to implement Islamic law in Egypt (Onians 2004, 78).

Though there have been times in the 20th century when the Muslim Brotherhood has experienced relative freedom to organize, they have also been subjected to state repression, such as the 1949 assassination of al-Banna by state agents in response to the Brotherhood’s assassination of Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, who had attempted to dissolve the Brotherhood in 1948 (Davis and Robinson 2009, 1306). According to Fahmy, “The initial relationship of the Brotherhood with Nasser’s regime was a close and mutually beneficial one” (Fahmy 2011, 87). However, in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood became a banned organization after one of its members tried to assassinate President Nasser (Onians 2004, 78). More than 4,000 Muslim Brotherhood
members were arrested, thousands went into exile (Onians 2004, 78), and a number of its
leaders were executed (Kepel 1995, 110).

When Sadat assumed power in 1970, he needed Brotherhood support against
Nasserite leftists and radicals, so he freed Brotherhood prisoners (Kepel 1995, 111) and
leaders such as the General Guide Hudaybi and Sister Zainab Ghazali on condition that
they would engage only in limited political activity (Sattar 1995, 18). However, after
Sadat accused Muslim Brotherhood General Guide Tilmisani of trying to overthrow his
regime, the president had Tilmisani arrested, along with hundreds of activists, Muslim
Brotherhood publications were banned, and ten Islamist societies were dissolved (Sattar
1995, 19). This confrontation with Islamists led to Sadat’s 1981 assassination by
members of the al-Jihad group.

Sattar (1995) describes the Egyptian regime’s approach to Islamists as
“confrontation-suppression-accommodation” (Sattar 1995, 10). While Islamists were
arrested en masse following Sadat’s assassination, in 1984 they won eight seats in the
People’s Assembly (Reza 2007, 546). The following year, Islamists were again
confronted by the regime when the government sealed off a mosque that was supposed to
serve as the starting point for a march, denied the group a march permit, and detained five
hundred expected demonstrators (Reza 2007, 546).

The Mubarak regime, like those before it, had a schizophrenic relationship with
Islamists. After the 1997 Luxor massacre (BBC 1997), the government crushed the
military capabilities of al-Jihad, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and other fringe groups,
arresting or killing their leaders (Gerges 2000, 592-3). However, since 1997 the
government has released approximately 8,000 Islamist prisoners belonging to al-Gama’a
al-Islamiyya, the group responsible for the Luxor massacre, the purpose of which was to “reward its recent positive behavior and punish Jihad” (Gerges 2000, 596).

While the Muslim Brotherhood was a banned organization, 88 members were elected to the People’s Assembly in 2005 as independents (Amnesty International 2007); however, when the group won almost 20 percent of parliamentary seats that same year, the regime arrested thousands of Brotherhood members, confiscated the group’s assets, and passed a constitutional amendment that banned “any political activity based on a religious point of reference” (Rutherford, Cook and Wawro 1976, 5). According to Al-Awadi (2005), Mubarak was threatened by moderate Islamists’ ability to provide social services to the poor through their organized networks, thereby challenging state power. Thus, the Mubarak regime attempted to diminish Brotherhood influence through launching an offensive campaign against the group (Al-Awadi 2005, 62).

An Amnesty International report expressed concern that detainees were being held for political beliefs and membership in unauthorized Islamist groups. They also worried that Islamists were at risk for torture, particularly at SSI headquarters in Lazoghly Square, Cairo and other SSI branches (Amnesty International 2007, 18). The relationship between the Egyptian state and Islamists is best described by Masoud (1999):

> “Islam is both avowed enemy and jealously defended state religion. Police routinely arrest Muslim radicals who would overturn the political order and establish a state based on their faith; but they also arrest those who would offend that faith. This is not merely a case of the Egyptian government throwing its Islamist opponents a few bones in an attempt to quiet them down. It is part of a repressive state's attempt to make up for what it lacks in democratic legitimacy by wrapping itself in the mantle of Islamic legitimacy” (Masoud 1999, 128).

When interviewees were asked if they or someone they knew were hurt by the Mubarak regime, the primary answer for both the upper and lower classes was,
“Yes….for having a beard.” My findings were similar to those of Masoud (1999), who describes how individuals were routinely arrested for suspicion of Islamist activities. “It is often said that a beard, the universal sign of Islamic zealotry, is all it takes to arouse such suspicion” (Masoud 1999, 127). The following are accounts of arrest for suspected Islamist affiliation related by both lower class and upper class interviewees, stories that mirror one another.

**Lower Class Islamist Targeting**

The number of lower class tales of arrest “because of a beard” is endless. One young man told me that his cousin was arrested for having a long beard and State Security put him in prison for six months upon learning that he was a Salafi (Interview#99 2013). Another man told me that the *imam* (preacher) at his own mosque was imprisoned and tortured with electricity (Interview#92 2013). An older woman recounted that one of her neighbors was the son of a sheikh and was praying in a mosque one day. He was unlucky enough to be praying next to men who were being sought on terrorism charges. The sheikh’s son ended up being arrested along with the men praying around him (Interview#69 2013). Another 49-year-old woman from a popular quarter related that one of her neighbors went to jail for 4 or 5 years for teaching his children Qur’an and for going to mosque often. She maintained that “he wasn’t in any political or Islamist organization” (Interview#42 2013).

Sitting in a café across from Ain Shams University, a student described an incident involving his father who had a beard. One day his father was outside fixing his car when a microbus stopped and an officer from State Security got out. The officer went...
over to his father and asked him to produce his national ID. The father asked, “Who are you?” and the officer replied, “I’m an officer from State Security.” After inspecting the father’s ID, the officer asked to see the phone numbers in his mobile phone. When the father asked why, the officer said, “There are a lot of terrorists with beards” (Interview#81 2013).

One interviewee explained to me that if a person wants to spend the last 10 days of Ramadan in the mosque, he has to go to a special mosque and carry his national ID with him. If one prays fajr (morning prayer) too often at the mosque (as one of his friends did) he will be arrested (Interview#88 2013).

A final story is about the friend of a lower class man whom I interviewed. This friend, in his late thirties, was arrested for praying fajr.

One morning the man went to the mosque to pray fajr and the police stopped him and asked if he was a member of an Islamist organization. Despite replying in the negative, the friend was arrested for being a suspected Islamist. In Egypt, those who pray fajr at mosque are viewed by the authorities as being potentially too religious. The friend was detained for over a year and when he was released after the Revolution he was a completely changed man. He no longer spoke clearly and was often disoriented from being exposed repeatedly to electric shock torture. After speaking with his friend, the interviewee said that could not stop crying for what his friend had been through. They used to go on trips together and now the tortured man was a ghost of his former self (Interview#22 2013).
Upper Class Islamist Targeting

The upper class stories of Islamist related arrests are not different from those of the lower class. One upper class student explained that his uncle was arrested and detained because he was religiously conservative (Interview#19 2013). A 23-year-old man who grew up in Heliopolis and worked in sales said that he had a friend in university who was arrested for being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. His cousin was part of an Islamist movement in the 1990s and was jailed without trial for 15 years (Interview#153 2013). An upper middle class student reported that his aunt’s husband had a beard and was arrested at fajr prayer at the mosque and held for questioning (Interview#160 2013), while the grandfather of a middle class student from Dokki was arrested for being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (Interview#164 2013). Finally, an upper middle class man in his mid-20s told me that a friend from college had been “disappeared” for three years for being religious and being suspected of knowing members of al-Qaeda. When he came home “he didn’t know anything about our religion” (Interview#163 2013).

Abuse of Power and Arbitrary Detention

The final type of police conduct which I will describe is abuse of power through arbitrary, and what may be deemed unnecessary, arrest. A 2010 report by Amnesty International described how Egyptian authorities used emergency law to detain not only terror suspects, but also critics of the regime. Many were detained without charges or trial, even when the courts ordered their release (Amnesty International 2010). In a 2009 Amnesty International report, unofficial sources suggested that the number of
administrative detainees might have been as many as 10,000, including many who had been held for years without a trial or even charges (Amnesty International 2009).

Oftentimes, following a terror attack, state security conducts mass arrests, not only of suspects but also of family members of suspects, the purpose of which is to force wanted criminals to surrender by holding their wives and children as virtual hostages of the SSI (Amnesty International 2007, 10). In many cases, suspects are held incommunicado for weeks or months, being tortured during that time, and their male relatives may also be tortured (Amnesty International 2007, 10). While such arrests violate the constitution, which states that anyone arrested must be permitted to communicate with the outside world and immediately have access to a lawyer (Amnesty International 2007, 11), when it comes to state security in Egypt, the contents of the constitution seems to be more of a suggestion than a set of legal procedures to be followed.

Human rights organizations often focus on illegal police conduct related to detainees being held on suspicion of terrorist activities or political dissent. However, there is a whole other set of examples, less often discussed, of everyday citizens being arrested due to police abuse of power, implementation of excessive penalties for infractions, and what may be seen as low-level investigative abilities. The following section examines arbitrary arrest in the upper and lower classes and how lower class individuals were more likely to be detained, while those from the upper class more often were able to pay bribes or use contacts to avoid arrest or detention.
Lower Class Arbitrary Detention

My first encounter with a story about arbitrary arrest was a conversation in 2006 that I had with an American woman married to a lower class Egyptian man from a popular district of Cairo. Now residing in the upscale area of Maadi because of her husband’s work, she related a story that at the time shocked me. Every day her husband finished work around 11pm or 12am and would immediately come home for dinner, or at least call to say that he would be late. One evening he did not come home. By 1am she decided to call and check on him, but his phone continued to ring with no response. With dinner prepared and no husband to feed, she sat on her sofa calling her husband every half hour, becoming more and more worried as time passed. Finally, around 5:30am her husband showed up at their door looking exhausted. When she asked him where he had been and what had happened, he told her that he had been detained by the police and taken to the Maadi police station. Knowing that her husband was not one to be involved in illegal activity, she confusedly asked why. He told her that because he was walking around Maadi late at night with a national ID that indicated he was from Sayeda Zeinab, they assumed that he was up to no good and decided to take him in. When she told her story to an upper class Egyptian friend, the friend told her that what had happened was not uncommon and that the same thing had happened to her driver. The Cairo police were known for rounding up thousands of lower class men at night and then sifting through them to see if any of them was a criminal. The Egyptian woman had had to go to the police station in the middle of the night to have her driver released. During my research interviews, stories of police officers arresting young men for being in affluent areas while holding IDs from poor areas popped up frequently.
A 37-year-old tour driver told me that one day he had gone to Tahrir Square to hang out with his friends. Before the Revolution, Downtown was a popular hangout for lower class men who would socialize on street corners and cafes in the Borsa area. A police car stopped him and his friends and asked what they were doing there. They said they were waiting to meet other friends. The police officer conducted body checks on them and found nothing. Still, they were hauled off to the police station where they were held for two days. They were not given the right to a phone call, and their families had no idea what had happened to them. While detained, they were asked if they were with Kefaya or the April 6th Youth Movement. They were then asked if they liked Hosni Mubarak. As a condition for being released the men were forced to say that they loved Hosni Mubarak. Later, they were let go with no charges. The interviewee told me that the police would pick random people off the streets and arrest them, even higher class individuals. In his group of friends who were arrested, at least one of the men with him was not from the lower class. One of the main reasons that the tour driver decided to protest in the Revolution was because of his arrest (Interview#22 2013).

Another story of arrest was particularly distressing. On an August evening I sat down with a 21-year-old young man in a barber shop who looked much younger because of malnutrition. He had stopped going to school after first grade and worked as a street vendor in order to survive. His mother had died and his father was unemployed, so he had to fend for himself at a young age. The issue of street vendors in Downtown Cairo is a contentious issue. Technically, street vending without a license is illegal, but Cairo is full of young men working in the informal economy due to the dearth of formal employment. One can find street vendors all over the city. One day a police officer arrested the young
man for selling clothes on the street without a license and he was held in jail for one week. All he was doing was “trying to be an honest decent guy selling on the street” (Interview#50 2013). With a first grade education and no family support, he had had no other options.

*Upper Class Arbitrary Detention*

Arbitrary detentions were not a problem that the upper classes faced to the same extent as the lower class. An upper middle class PhD student from Maadi explained, “I wasn’t in direct confrontation with the police. Class determines the relationship with police. A girl from the upper class was not in direct conflict” (Interview#169 2013). An upper class male student said he was not politically active because he “didn’t want to waste time in the police station” (Interview#19 2013). However, he knew he would be released immediately because he had connections. While on rare occasions members of the upper class faced arbitrary detention, in general they did not.

A young man told the story of reaching a checkpoint and being asked by the policeman for his national ID in a disrespectful manner. Because of the way he was addressed, the young man refused to show his ID. Then a higher ranking officer came over and asked again for the ID and wanted to know why it had yet to be produced. In the end the young man had to pay a LE500 bribe before he was permitted to go on his way (Interview#88 2013). Ghannam describes similar police profiling of youth in his work on gender dynamics in urban Egypt (Ghannam 2013, 68). Another middle class young man from Nasser City who had attended the German University was arrested when passing near a protest site to bring food to a friend who was protesting. The young man was
arrested, but his father used his contacts to free him before he was transferred to jail (Interview#26 2013). While those in the upper class were more likely to be able to pay bribes or use contacts to avoid arrest or be released from jail quickly, it should be noted that they were not the only ones who had police contacts. There are Egyptian police who come from the lower-middle class ranks, and one lower-middle class student told me, “I had connections from a high level, so no one could touch me, but for people with no connections, they could get hurt” (Interview#91 2013).

**Corruption**

In Egypt corruption permeates all levels of society, from favoritism by the president in awarding government contracts to friends and associates to the taking of bribes by low-level officials. In 2007 Egypt ranked 105 out of 178 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2007) and in 2010 they ranked 98, tied with Mexico (Transparency International 2010).

The basis for Egypt’s present-day economic corruption at the state level was laid when President Anwar Sadat shifted from economic nationalism and populist social policies to state-led development. However, Sadat’s 1974 *Infitah* (open door) economic policy led to little actual economic structural change. “The aim of political liberalization was to encourage foreign capital investment in Egypt and to rearrange ties and alliances in order to form the broadest possible front for the encirclement of Nasserist and socialist trends” (Kassem 2004, 53). Nasser’s objective of income redistribution conflicted with the need to increase investment and expand industry, and Sadat was left with a crisis of import-substitution industrialization (Baiasu 2009). Economic liberalization aimed to
improve Egypt’s economic situation, as Sadat had inherited an underdeveloped economy in debt (Baiasu 2009).

Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1981. After Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War led to a new agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and debt forgiveness, Egypt began to engage actively in privatization of state-owned enterprises and to eliminate Nasser-era job security and striking rights. Sadat had redistributed land upward and Mubarak continued the trend with the redistribution of national income to self-employed individuals and corporations. He also implemented the Law 96 land reforms. While Nasser’s land reforms were “intended to break any political opposition to the revolution from the ancien regime’s pasha class” (Bush 2002, 9), and populist policies were meant to gain the support of the masses, Mubarak’s Law 96 served to reverse course. Law 96 of 1992 redistributed land upward and robbed tenants of their tenure security:

“Unlike Nasser’s legislation, which drew its strength and legitimacy from trying to redress the economic disparity between landholders and the political power that large landowners wielded, Mubarak’s legislation has rewarded the economic strength of landlords with increased financial and social power” (Bush 2002, 18).

Mubarak’s land reform was necessary because the IMF’s calls to cut government subsidies broke the social contract, established under Nasser, between the government and the people that allowed for the leader’s personal rule to be sustained through mass support from the peasants and working class. With the government unable to maintain populist policies of subsidies, this redistribution of land allowed Mubarak to consolidate authoritarian rule through shifting patronage from the masses to a small, economically influential elite (Baiasu 2009). This redistribution of income was sanctioned by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). When the government
could no longer gain legitimacy through populist means, it turned to faux
democratization, economic liberalization, and a manipulated rule of law. Thus, the
purpose of Egypt’s economic reform and shift from Arab socialism to economic
liberalization under the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP)
was to bring the country out of debt and renegotiate the contract of control through
patronizing the masses to maintain their support, which proved too expensive, to a more
sustainable patronage of, and support from, a small, powerful elite (Baiasu 2009).
Economic liberalization promoted the political and social status of the business elites,
who were often accepting of the regime that provided them preferential treatment (Baiasu
2009).

The extent of Egyptian government corruption was exposed after the Revolution
when regime officials and their business associates were investigated on corruption
charges. The majority of cases were related to the sale of public assets, particularly land,
at below-market prices (U.S. Department of State 2013). Some of the most prominent
cases were against Hussain Sajwani, the Chairman of Damac Properties, Ahmed
Maghrabi, former Housing Minister, and Ahmed Ezz, CEO of Ezz Steel (U.S. Department
of State 2013).

Ahmed Ezz was a steel tycoon with close ties to Mubarak’s son Gamal. Involved
in both politics and business, he controlled two-thirds of the steel market, was a member
of parliament, where he chaired the budget committee, and was an officer and lieutenant
in the governing party (Fahim, Slackman and Rohde 2011). Following the Revolution,
Ezz was accused of having used his political connections, particularly Gamal Mubarak, to
monopolize the steel market (BBC 2012). Mubarak’s sons were charged with insider
trading and corruption (BBC 2012). Ezz was charged with money laundering, illicit gains, and rigging the 2010 parliamentary elections (Egyptian Streets 2014).

The corruption case of Ahmed Ezz was one of the more prominent ones, and he and Gamal Mubarak were the two individuals toward whom interviewees directed much of their anger. Both the upper class and lower class participants in this study claimed that only a few families were running the country. Interviewees described the situation as “thieves controlling the country,” “a gang ruling the country,” and it was like “a mini Egyptian mafia” (Interview#36 2013). However, there were many more instances of deliberate economic mismanagement beyond Ahmed Ezz and Gamal Mubarak.

Following the Revolution, the courts found that many companies were sold at prices below their value, including Shebin Textile, which was estimated at LE600 million but was sold at LE174 million (The Laws of Rule 2011). Al-Nasr Company for Steam Boilers and Pressure Vessels was sold at $17 million but there were government estimates that valued the company at double that amount (The Laws of Rule 2011). Thus, economic liberalization policies and privatization processes instituted under Mubarak were tainted with extensive corruption. “Privatization meant workers’ rights were undercut, companies were sold under value, and Egyptian production was destroyed” (Marroushi 2012).

In addition to the corruption surrounding privatization, there was also a problem of land grabbing and real estate fraud. At the November 12, 2007, parliamentary session, the People’s Assembly deputy Gamal Zahran announced that the state had lost some L.E. 800 billion through illicit privatization of Egyptian territories and benefits distributed to senior officials and businessmen, and it was found that the “land mafia” already had
seized 16 million feddans of the Egyptian people’s land (Schechla n.d., 4). Later, in December of 2011, auditors from the Urban Communities Authority issued report No. 755 claiming that former President Hosni Mubarak, Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif and other ministers took property and granted lands and villas to senior officials, select companies and elites of other Arab states. These deals, based on direct executive order, led to the selling of property at much less than its actual value, violating Egyptian law (Schechla n.d., 4). Other corruption headlines included the report by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIRP) that found that poor negotiations and corruption cost Egypt $10 billion in lost revenue between 2005 and 2011 (Mada Masr 2014). These losses derived from export agreements that locked Egypt into selling natural gas at below-market prices (Mada Masr 2014).

While most of what has just been described were high profile cases on the national level, corruption did not escape lower level officials. According to the U.S. State Department, even U.S. investors continue to report requests for bribes from Egyptian government officials (U.S. Department of State 2013). In a 2008 New York Times article, low-level corruption was exposed through a story on state-subsidized bread. An unidentified government inspector explained that the government sells bakeries 25-pound bags of flour for approximately $1.50, and the bakeries are supposed to then sell bread at a subsidized rate, giving them a profit of about $10 per sack of flour. However, the baker can also sell the flour on the black market for $15 per sack. After three months, if the inspector certifies that the baker used the flour to bake bread, the baker is refunded $1 per sack. Thus, a baker who uses 40 sacks of flour per day over three months would be refunded around $3,300, a portion of which could be shared with the inspector. Given
that the inspector is only paid $42 per month, he has a significant incentive to certify the baker’s flour usage and then feed his family with the kickback he receives (Slackman 2008).

Beyond government indiscretions is a type of corruption that permeates all sectors of society called *wastaa* (influence), a term used widely across the Arabic-speaking world. Many have described *wastaa* as how Egyptian society functions. It can be used to gain employment or a promotion, to be released from detention after an arrest, to have one’s paperwork move faster through the government bureaucracy, or even to gain favors in one’s local community. One survey found that 40% of Egyptian respondents believed that personal connections were more important than personal skills for securing a job (Roudi-Fahimi, El Feki and Tsai 2011). In Egypt, a person needs *wastaa* to make his way in the world.

*Wastaa* is best depicted in a children’s cartoon clip that was recently circulated on Facebook (MBC3 2010). A Saudi man, Hemood, stands alone in the middle of the desert, where he has found a magic lamp. He rubs it and a genie appears. Hemood says, “Please grant me my greatest wish of all.” The genie tells the man OK, but he can only have one wish. The man says, “Give me *wastaa*.” The genie asks Hemood why he does not ask for a piece of land north of Riyadh or money, but Hemood insists on wanting *wastaa*. The genie grants Hemood his wish and immediately a powerful Saudi sheikh appears. Hemood then asks the sheikh for all the wishes that the genie had suggested such as land and money. The sheikh pulls out his mobile phone and suddenly both the deed for a piece of land north of Riyadh and a check for one million Riyal appear. Realizing that his power to grant wishes is no match for the man who has *wastaa*, the genie kisses the
stomach of the powerful Saudi sheikh, pleading to have his own wish granted. At the end, Hemood asks the Saudi sheikh to make the genie grant him three more wishes and the genie complies.

Now that some of the types of corruption in Egypt have been outlined, this chapter turns to the stories of those directly affected by corrupt practices in the country, from encounters with the police and the demanding of bribes to land confiscations. There was little difference between the accounts of the lower and upper classes on this issue and the majority of stories related to police corruption. The one variation that stood out was that corruption had reached such a high level that it prevented many upper class businesses from functioning at their potential, while for the lower class, corruption and lack of wastaa prevented more individuals from obtaining employment or rising in status. However, even the upper classes experienced employment problems due to lack of wastaa.

**Lower Class Corruption**

Lower class interviewees told a few stories about regime corruption, such as the one by the 39-year-old housewife from el-Waily whose family home was illegally appropriated by Suzanne Mubarak (Interview#44 2013) or that of the man who had to remain in the same government position for 17 years without a raise because he did not have wastaa (Interview#64 2013). They mostly described corruption related to police actions. The son of a baweb told me that his brother worked in tourism sales in a Sinai resort town. The police tried to force his brother to become a police informant, and when he refused, he was imprisoned for three months (Interview#21 2013). Another man
related that prior to the Revolution he made his living driving a bus. At checkpoints the police would often take the man’s driver’s license and refuse to return it unless he paid them a LE50 bribe (Interview#22 2013).

Other stories about police misconduct included interviewees having seen police take money from drug dealers and then allow the dealers to work in the district (Interview#86 2013) and a 50-year-old fruit seller from Kit Kat who complained that police took fruit from her stand without paying when all she was trying to do was make a living and put food on the table (Interview#128 2013). Finally, a 29-year-old unemployed man told of an incident when his father and brother went to the police station to make a complaint against another family. Because the other family was more powerful and had a lot of wastaa, the other family made a complaint against his family saying that they had guns in their house. As a result, the interviewee’s father was put in jail for one year (Interview#46 013).

**Upper Class Corruption**

In my research I found that the upper classes had just as many, if not more, complaints about corruption as the lower classes. In addition to stories such as a young man who had drugs planted on him by the police after his arrest for fighting (Interview#57 2013), and the police officer from Rehab whose colleague was demoted and put on probation for refusing to beat protesters in 2005 (Interview#161 2013), there were a number of other accounts that made evident the unhappiness of the upper class with police practices.
An older doctor was dissatisfied with the incompetence of the police and their desire to hide facts. Thieves had broken into his clinic, beat him up, and stolen from him. The police bungled the investigation, unable to locate either evidence or the attackers. Because the police were embarrassed about how the case was handled, they offered to give the doctor a gun license if he agreed to keep the incident quiet (Interview#145 2013). A 22-year-old student from Mohandeseen was furious about instances of police putting hash in people’s pockets at checkpoints in order to make a case against them and his observing the police destroying an illegal kiosk and beating the man who had built it. “He had no other way to survive” (Interview#36 2013).

Beyond police actions, the grievances of the upper class related mostly to institutional corruption and land confiscations. An upper-middle class surgeon lost his farm when a prominent businessman bribed officials so that he could take the land for himself for a development project. The surgeon was never compensated for the loss of his land (Interview#13 2013). Another young man dealt with university corruption. His grades put him at the top of his class and in a position to receive a teaching assistant job. One of his classmates had wastaa and wanted the teaching assistantship, so the university made up a story that my interviewee had failed a course that he had not so that his classmate would rank first in his class and receive the coveted position (Interview#15 2013). My interviewee took his case to court, but lost. In fact, a number of people I interviewed had pending cases, or had previously filed cases, against educational institutions or government offices relating to corruption. Others complained that by 2007 the corruption in the country had gotten so bad that it hurt company owners and their ability to operate their businesses efficiently (Interview#157 2013) (Interview#147 2013).
Satisfaction with Mubarak

The majority of both protesters and non-protesters from both the upper and lower classes were unhappy with the Mubarak regime. However, there were a few interviewees from both the lower and upper classes who were satisfied with Mubarak. Both lower and upper class interviewees who liked Mubarak cited security, stability, Mubarak’s patriotism, economic prosperity, and having no other president to whom they could compare him. Thus, there was little difference between classes regarding positive perceptions of the Mubarak regime.

Upper and lower class interviewees pointed to stability and Mubarak’s protecting the country from going to war as major reasons for liking him (Interview#13 2013). Giving praise to the former leader, one interviewee said, “He is from the military, so he loves this country. Maybe he stole money, but he was faithful to the country” (Interview#61 2013). Some people were willing to excuse many of Mubarak’s indiscretions because they believed so strongly that he had been a committed patriot.

Some in the upper class expressed satisfaction with Mubarak based on economic factors and the fact that they had benefitted from the corrupt system. An upper class car importer and advertising executive from Zamalek said about life under Mubarak, “Personally, I had nothing to complain about at that time” (Interview#25 2013). For him, the economy had been good and business had been doing well. When asked if there were anything he had disliked about the Mubarak regime, he replied, “No, on the contrary. I was loved by the Mubarak regime, especially by Suzanne” (Interview#25 2013). Having produced ad campaigns for Suzanne Mubarak, which required him to meet with her on a
weekly basis, he believed that Mubarak, Suzanne, and Alaa were nice people; he just did not like Gamal. A young female student who attended the American University in Cairo said she loved the time of Mubarak because, being a member of the upper class, she was taken care of. He “provided us with an easy life to go out and have fun” (Interview#144 2013). One of her friends chimed in saying, “I liked how easy I could get things done with one phone call” (Interview#145 2013), referring to wastaa.

What was surprising were the lower class interviewees who believed that before the Revolution they were doing well financially (Interview#21 2013). In retrospect, one interviewee explained satisfaction with Mubarak saying, “We were blind. We never saw what was happening. We had food. Didn’t know the conditions of our life” (Interview#51 2013). Being born into families living on meager wages, some did not realize how bad their situation was until their problems were expressed by protesters during the Revolution. However, some members of the lower class were actually doing financially well. One cabaret worker told me that at the time of Mubarak “there was money” (Interview#105 2013). This particular worker brought home LE8,000 per month before the Revolution, and many cabaret workers cited similar amounts. Thus, some of the cabaret workers I interviewed, as well as a few others from the lower class who worked in other professions, enjoyed relative economic prosperity under Mubarak.

Another reason for contentment with the Mubarak regime was ignorance of other possibilities. As one 31-year-old lower class man told me, “Mubarak was good. I didn’t like him as a person, but I liked him as a president. There was no one else” (Interview#63 2013). Those in their early 30s or younger did not remember a time when there was another president of Egypt. They had spent their whole lives surrounded by billboards
and posters of Hosni Mubarak’s face and were indoctrinated to the point where a different president was not even a possibility. A middle class woman said about Mubarak, “I was born and he was there. I lived 20 years and he was still there….Unchangeable.” (Interview#159 2013). One day during the Revolution a little girl had said to her, “Oh, are we going to change Mubarak? I thought there was a Mubarak in every country in the world” (Interview#159 2013). Thus, some in the upper and lower classes, particularly those who were too young to have seen another president, accepted the regime and its system as a given.

Finally, some interviewees expressed displeasure with police actions, but did not equate the police with the Mubarak regime. An upper-middle class dentist told me that for her, Mubarak and the police were separate. She thought Mubarak was brainwashed by people around him, but that he was good. She was angry at the police for the killing of Khaled Said and brutality, but thought “that wasn’t Mubarak; that was the police” (Interview#28 2013) This idea of a good leader in his ivory tower who is ignorant of, rather than a participant in, the corruption and abuse in his country was portrayed in a 2008 Egyptian film titled “The President’s Chef” (Hamed 2008).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I find that the upper and lower classes had the same three main grievances: poor economic conditions, police brutality, and corruption. In the section on economic grievances I am able to present not only facts about economic problems on the national stage, but also the personal stories of those affected by them. I show that both the upper and lower classes had similar concerns about the job market and that even though
the upper classes did not experience poverty directly, many sympathized with those who did.

One of the most striking similarities between classes in this chapter appears in the accounts of the state’s confrontation with suspected Islamists. The lower and upper class stories were identical and imply that when it came to Islamists, the state made no distinction between classes. With many Egyptians having an Islamist neighbor or family member, a large number of interviewees had heard about instances of arrest and torture because of “having a beard.” The upper and lower classes’ poor relationship with the police was also very similar. Even though the upper class was more frequently able to use influence or pay bribes to avoid arrest and/or detention, almost all interviewees from both classes expressed negative feelings toward the police, even those who had family members who were police officers. Finally, I demonstrate that the upper class and lower class had almost identical grievances concerning police and regime corruption.

Why is it so important to outline the grievances of both classes and the stories behind them? Long-term grievances contribute to explaining how a society reaches its boiling point, though a triggering event or events is still necessary to push people over the edge. Speaking about the torture and killing of Khaled Said and the regime’s actions in general, one interviewee said, in a way that I could hear the rage and hurt in his voice, “Thirty years of being wronged, treating us like….Khaled Said represents the humiliation in the country” (Interview#6 2013). The economic hardships, the police brutality and abuse, and the corruption were all ways in which the regime robbed citizens of their dignity. People do not start revolutions because they are happy with their governments. A contributing factor to why people protest may be that they are unhappy with their
situation and attribute that dissatisfaction to actions taken by the regime in power. According to many interviewees, “People were fed up” (Interview#36 2013) (Interview#167 2013). When people have had enough and their grievances can be mobilized into actions, mass protests may ensue.

In June and July of 2009, Mohammad Adel from the April 6th Youth Movement, along with blogger Dahlia Ziada of the American Islamic Congress and other human rights activists who later joined Egyptian political groups such as The Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya), went to Belgrade to train in nonviolent protest tactics with Srdja Popovic of the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) (Popovic). In discussions of framing for the April 6th Youth Movement, Mohammad Adel was pushed to think about frames that would be effective in mobilizing the Egyptian population. It was concluded that frames using bread and butter issues would be better than those using political issues (Popovic). The reason that bread and butter issues rather than those advocating democracy would be preferable is that the regime would have trouble cracking down on protesters demanding social benefits such as economic resources or better health care. In theory, when the government cracks down on people asking for social benefits, they become angrier and may go out into the streets in larger numbers. However, if protesters demand democracy, at the slightest threat of force from the regime they may return to their homes.

During workshops, Popovic had the trainees think about which social grievances would arouse people’s response. In order to determine the social and political concerns that would mobilize the masses, organizers would have to return to Egypt, listen to everyday citizens, and then list their grievances (Popovic). Knowing that a revolution
could not take off without the involvement of the lower class, the April 6th Youth Movement focused on social justice issues and economic grievances that would incite the lower classes to protest (Frontline, 2011). When mobilizing for the Revolution, activists walked through poor areas such as Abbasseya, shouting up to the balconies, “Come on down. Anyone who comes with us will have a better life” (Jones, 2011), as well as the chant, “Bread, freedom, social justice” (Jones, 2011). In a Frontline video an April 6th Youth Movement activist said, “Our mission is to get people to join up in peaceful marches and converge on Tahrir Square. We’re going to a working class district where poor people live, who are suffering from dire economic conditions” (Frontline, 2011). An upper class musician who participated in mobilizing efforts in the days leading up to January 25th reported that he and his friends walked through the streets playing music, passing out flyers, and calling out to people in the streets, “Yella, Egyptians, come take your rights” (Interview#20, 2013). On January 28th, once the Revolution was underway, a middle class teacher said that she observed others going from house to house cheering, “Don’t be afraid. Come out of your house and protest” (Interview#9, 2013).

Beyond the facts and statistics, the stories in this chapter tell us why people reached a point of frustration and what they were trying to reclaim when they demanded dignity and social justice as they protested in Tahrir Square. Now that we have evaluated some of the reasons why people were dissatisfied with the political situation, in the next chapter we will observe the mechanics of how they were mobilized online to protest against the regime.
There has been much debate surrounding the role of social media in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Tapscott 2011). Though the movement that led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak has been dubbed the “Facebook Revolution,” it is not the first time that foreign media has been quick to connect a social networking site with a popular uprising. The 2009 Iranian protests were labeled the “Twitter Revolution,” and ever since there are those who are adamant that social media is a vital instrument for mobilizing the masses while others argue that social media is just a new means of communication in a history of popular uprisings that fared quite well without these new technological innovations (Tarrow 2013). This chapter explores information flows and the role of social media, investigating how sources of information affected mobilization of individuals who were not members of political groups or movements, prior to the revolutionary protests. I find that social media served four important functions in the few years leading up to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: it facilitated the building of a politically conscious civil society over the course of a number of years, it contributed to reinforcing grievances and mobilizing opposition to the regime through exposing corruption and human rights abuses, it allowed people to realize that they were not alone in their opposition to the regime, and it lowered the threshold for engaging in political participation and dissent by providing a relatively safe, easily accessible space for political expression in a country that outlawed gatherings of five or more people that could threaten public order or security. In the few weeks leading up to January 25th, social media provided the information about when and where the protests would take place and allowed users to
observe who would be attending and a potential number of how many people were planning to protest. One of social media’s new contributions to protest mobilization is that it facilitates revolutionary bandwagoning online before protests begin.

Theoretically, my chapter adds an intervening step to Timur Kuran’s concept of transitioning from private preference to public preference (Kuran 1991) and a reformulation of Roger Petersen’s model of individual roles during rebellion (Petersen 2001). I argue that online spaces such as Facebook offer a third option somewhere between engaging in preference falsification and openly joining the opposition. While the revolutionary threshold, at which the external cost of joining the opposition falls below the internal cost of preference falsification, may be very high for individuals joining the public opposition in the streets, the threshold for participating in the online opposition or simply professing one’s true political opinion online is much lower, under the circumstances outlined in the following paragraph. The significance of this chapter is that it investigates whether or not social media acts as a stepping stone to on-the-ground political action. While social media may allow for more people to express their actual political views, not everyone who participates online will go out into the streets and protest. The two main questions posed in this chapter are: Does social media serve as an intermediary step between private preferences and the expression of public preferences, lowering the threshold for political participation? Are there two political thresholds to be overcome, a lower one for going online and a higher one for going into the streets for political protest?

In terms of the universe of application for this study, my generalizations may be applicable to cases where a) the regime is autocratic with limited freedom of speech, b)
social media is used for political expression by at least some sector of the population, c) there are few or no domestic restrictions on internet content, d) law enforcement tracks down online criminals, and e) the state has relatively low enforcement capabilities in terms of restricting online political dissent.

The chapter is divided as follows: The first section will provide an overview of various conceptualizations of civil society. The following section will explore civil society in Egypt in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The subsequent section examines the way in which the internet and social media provided a new space for the development of civil society under a restrictive regime. Next, the relationship between online civil society and social movements will be viewed through the lenses of political opportunity structures and mobilizing structures, after which I present my model on how individuals move from non-participants to online participants to protesters on the street. I continue by explaining how, by combining forces, opposition groups encourage non-group members to protest. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the role of social media in the revolutionary process.

**Conceptualizations of Civil Society**

From Hegel and Marx to de Tocqueville there have been many views presented on the meaning of the term “civil society”. Charles Taylor defines civil society as “a web of autonomous associations, independent of the state, which [bind] citizens together in matters of common concern, and by their mere existence or action could have an effect on public policy” (Taylor 1995, 204). The key phrase in Taylor’s definition is “independent of the state,” which is a notion that is sometimes contested. The classic
The liberal dichotomy of public versus private spheres sees civil society as individuals engaging in voluntary action, separate from state institutions and struggling against the state (El-Mahdi 2011, 21).

According to Aronoff and Kubik, “Western” civil society is a normative ideal, an “arrangement of social relationships in a modern society, historically evolved and normatively privileged in the West” (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 200). The authors label the ideal type of civil society “legal transparent civil society” (LTCS), where there exists transparent civil society and legally protected social space (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 204). One aspect of the Western ideal is that civil society is organized by people outside of state control. However, Kubik and Aronoff demonstrate that there are multiple models of civil society, including ones that do not fully separate civil society from the state, particularly in the non-Western context. Ekiert and Kubik (2014) describe associational life under state socialism in communist Hungary and Poland as “politicized, bureaucratized, centralized, and comprehensive,” since civil society groups were controlled by the state (Ekiert and Kubik 2014, 47). At the same time, these institutionalized associations served as interest groups that lobbied the state for economic concessions. Thus, while the associations were controlled by the state, they still maintained some independence. Ekiert and Kubik refer to this situation for associations in mid-1980s Poland as “incomplete” civil society.

The Western ideal is also founded on the idea that civil society is composed of secondary groups that are formed by people contracting freely as sovereign individuals, rather than of primary groups founded on kinship (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 215). Scholars such as Gellner (1994), who take a Western-centered approach, find that
democratization is hindered by imperfect forms of civil society that lack a full separation between civil society and kinship groups (Gellner 1994). However, Aronoff and Kubik argue that under authoritarianism, civil society needs to be immersed in kinship structures and informal networks (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 213). Thus, we must examine not only in what cases secondary groups replace primary groups but also where they complement them.

Aronoff and Kubik argue that the relationship between civil society and the government can take three different forms. In the first form, illegality, there is no room for independent organizations, and the state embodies totalitarian characteristics. In the second form, selective legality, the government selectively authorizes specific groups to function. In full legality, the third form, the government protects and creates social space, and any association or group fulfilling the state’s requirement may operate in that space (democratic-liberal solution) (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 204). Egypt fits into the second form of civil society, where select groups and associations are able to function but are not fully separate from the state.

In order to understand non-Western, non-ideal types of civil society, those who are used to Western approaches to civil society (Putnam 2000) are advised to identify real, existing forms of social organization within each case, compare cases to the ideal type, and identify where they diverge, similar to Collier and Levitsky’s use of diminished subtypes (Collier and Levitsky 1997), and assess the “evolutionary potential of a historically given form of social organization” (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 204). Aronoff and Kubik acknowledge that some countries with functioning civil societies are moving toward LTCS while others may be de-democratizing.
In addition to the plethora of Western takes on civil society, in a similar fashion to Aronoff and Kubik some Middle Eastern scholars have disputed the validity of any definition of civil society stemming from the Western experience. They argue that any definition of civil society applicable to the region must reflect the specific experiences of Islamic and Arab culture (al-Sayyid 1995, 271). Others, such as Hawthorne, have identified five sectors particular to Arab civil society: 1) the Islamic sector, 2) nongovernmental service organizations, 3) membership-based professional organizations such as labor unions, professional syndicates, doctors’ and engineers’ syndicates, and chambers of commerce, 4) associations whose main purpose is to foster solidarity and companionship, and sometimes to provide services, among groups of friends, neighbors, relatives and colleagues, and 5) prodemocracy organizations (Hawthorne 2005).

In this chapter, civil society will be defined as a web of autonomous or semi-autonomous associations that bind citizens together in matters of common concern and that, by their mere existence or action, could have an effect on public policy. This definition is a modified version of Taylor’s that removes the phrase “independent of the state” and allows for semi-autonomous associations, thus reflecting the reality of civil society in Egypt. If Taylor’s definition were to be taken as is, it would discount significant associations and civil society actors that are semi-co-opted by the state or choose to play by the restrictive rules of the Egyptian state, a situation also exemplified in 19th century continental Europe where the state was involved in civil society building (Bermeo and Nord 2000). In the social movements literature Ann Swidler argues, “Institutions structure culture by systematically patterning channels for social action” (Swidler, Cultural Power and Social Movements 39), where institutions both pose
constraints and provide opportunities for individuals. Thus, the opposition is shaped by the authority it confronts (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). This conceptualization of the relationship between the state and those engaging in social action is applicable to ideas of civil society in that how civil society manifests itself will in some ways be determined by the state it confronts, or in less antagonistic terms, the state within which it functions (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).

**Civil Society in Egypt**

Consistent with the Western definition of the concept, civil society’s quality is measured by secondariness, transparency, tolerance, and legality. Non-Western, “imperfect” forms of civil society may be identified and evaluated through equivalents of the Western form by identifying social arrangements that:

“(a) allow people to organize themselves ‘above’ the level of kinship, (b) maintain (a modicum of) transparency in the public arena, (c) champion and practice the climate of toleration within and between various organizations (including the state), and (d) constitute at least a tolerated (if not legally sanctioned) counterbalance to the state’s monopolistic tendencies to dominate the public life” (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 211).

Al-Sayyid outlines three minimal conditions for civil society: 1) the presence of associations catering to the varied interests of citizens in their social activities, 2) state respect for a reasonable measure of societal autonomy, and 3) acceptance of intellectual and political dissent as a legitimate right as long as it is bound by peaceful methods of individual and collective action (al-Sayyid 1995, 271). According to al-Sayyid, only the first condition is met in the case of Egypt. In Egypt, the coexistence between the state and civil society is characterized by the dominance of the Egyptian state (Fouad, Ref’at and Murcos 2005, 102).
For most of the twentieth century, Egyptian civil society has not enjoyed large
degrees of autonomy from the state, and while state tolerance for intellectual and political
dissent has varied, acceptance of opposing views has been very low. Abdelrahman argues
that Egypt has been characterized by corporatism, as defined by Schmitter, and that
modern Egyptian corporatism was not created by Nasser, but was inherited and expanded
by him (Abdelrahman 2004, 126). Syndicates and NGOs did not act as expressions of the
interest of society; under Nasser they were turned into instruments of the state through
which it increased dominance over society. The three basic principles of this corporatism,
which particularly apply to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are (a) units of the
system of interest representation (such as NGOs) are organized into singular, non-
competitive, and functionally differentiated categories, (b) the State licenses, and in some
cases creates, these organizations, and (c) the State awards these organizations certain
privileges in return for their accepting various forms of control over their activities
(Abdelrahman 2004, 121). In Egypt, corporatist lines have been successfully applied to
NGOs. This phenomenon is not unique to Egypt. Ekiert and Kubik (2014) describe a
similar situation in civil society development and treatment of NGOs in some non-

There is a long history of active civil society in Egypt. If one begins only in the
twentieth century, the 1923 constitution included an article allowing for the formation of
NGOs, which resulted in an increase in their number to 300 by the year 1925
(Abdelrahman 2004, 124). However, both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in
Egypt have also been characterized by state repression and restrictions on civil society.
For example, the May 30, 1944, Universities Law, amended by the People’s Assembly,
stated that professors could not elect deans of faculty. Instead, positions would be
determined by rectors of universities who were appointed by the Egyptian president on
recommendation of the Minister of Education (al-Sayyid 1995, 287). The purpose of the
law was to curb the political activism of academics. The state extended its control over
larger segments of civil society in 1945 when Law 49 placed all charities under the
supervision of the state (Abdelrahman 2004, 126). Under Law 66 of 1951, religious
NGOs found themselves overseen by the Ministry of the Interior (Abdelrahman 2004, 128).

One of the biggest changes in the relationship between the Egyptian state and
civil society came with Law 32 of 1964, where all activities of civil society were placed
under the control of the central authority (Ismael 2001, 442). The law, issued under
Nasser, legalized the Ministry of Social Affairs’ (MOSA) control over NGOS in Egypt.
This new law gave MOSA the authority to determine whether or not an NGO had the
right to exist, to dissolve organizations without authorization from the courts, and to
participate in the internal dynamics of organizations. Violating Law 32 could result in
penalties of up to six months in prison (Clark 2000, 171). According to article 8 of Law
32, an NGO was not permitted to be established if the community did not need its
services or if there were other organizations providing similar services in the area.
However, the state, not the community, determined whether or not the service was
needed. An example of an organization that fell victim to article 8 was the religious
organization Hizb al-Wasat. The state determined that other organizations were already
providing similar services in the area; thus, Hizb al-Wasat was not given official
authorization by MOSA to operate (Norton 2005).
Without listing all of the many laws enacted by the Egyptian government to limit the autonomy of civil society, a few others to be noted are Law 348 of 1956, which allowed for the dissolution of any NGO considered to be posing a threat to the security of the republic or republican form of the state (Abdelrahman 2004, 129), the Political Parties Law no. 40 of 1977, the main motive of which was to control and limit the efficacy and power of any political party (Ismael 2001, 439), Law no. 153 of 1999, which restricted activities that were political or related to syndicates (Fouad, Ref’at and Murcos 2005, 116), and the 1993 law on Guarantees of Democracy in Elections of Professional Syndicates that gave the judiciary the authority to supervise syndicate elections rather than allowing each syndicate to be fully responsible for its own electoral process. The government used this law to “curb the increasing Islamic influence within professional syndicates” (Ismael 2001, 441). Government authorities were also able to limit the activities of professional associations, trade unions, and political parties, and prior authorization had to be obtained for public meetings.

Prior to the Revolution, civil society in Egypt was an amalgam of voluntary associations including class-based associations, professional societies, social care and development organizations, traditional institutions, and political parties (al-Sayyid 1995, 271). In addition to the more secular groups, there existed a large network of mosque and church-based organizations, often run not by imams and priests, but by young professionals educated in Western-type universities who were socially and politically marginalized for one reason or another. Three of the most politically influential and most organized areas of Egyptian civil society were the business associations, powerful due to their members’ connections with international corporations and international financial
institutions and their political and economic backgrounds; Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood; and legal professional associations, such as the Judges’ Club (Rutherford 2008).

In the 1980s and 1990s, there was growing international interest in NGOs and human rights, which had a direct impact on the status of NGOs and other associations in Egypt. In addition to obtaining greater financial support and moral recognition, “These transformations generated a new field of actions, which were destined to produce political and social change. This is how the ‘advocacy’ and the ‘protest’ NGOs were created in Egypt” (Fouad, Ref’at and Murcos 2005, 104). Coinciding with this increased international interest in NGOs was the development of Egyptian economic liberalization policies and privatization initiatives, where the state began to withdraw from the areas of healthcare, housing, and education. The state began to show more interest in civil society organizations as it diminished its role in these sectors, allowing NGOs to fill the social service gap and to play a complementary role to the state, as long as the NGOs remained under state influence and/or control. As can be observed from the numerous laws put in place to control civil society:

“The legal infrastructure has been employed for decades to co-opt these organizations in order to use their resources and mass base for [the state’s] own interests instead of totally crushing them - a process not dissimilar to that used with the labour movement and professional syndicates” (Abdelrahman 2004, 120).

While the majority of NGOs in Egypt were concerned with social services and were not overly political, particularly in challenging the state, there were those who argued that the rise of advocacy NGOs in the late 1980s was a response to the problem of political parties (Pratt 2005, 132). Because of strict state regulations concerning the
creation and activities of political parties, the political parties were left with small constituencies, and individuals and groups sought other avenues for political action.

Egyptian advocacy NGOs worked to bring about change in the nature of governance. Their work could be considered political because they addressed the power relationships between citizens and the state. While they did not take the place of political parties, they did address political issues and the policies of the state. However, within this emerging arena of civil action, most of the contesting organizations fighting for human rights, women’s rights, and the environment registered as civil companies, regulated by the civil code, not NGO laws, in order to escape falling within the purview of the Ministry of Social Affairs (Fouad, Ref’at and Murcos 2005, 105) (Clark 2000, 172).

**Civil Society Online**

After examining the relationship between civil society and the state in Egypt from the 1920s through the early 2000s, one can conclude that while there was some room for autonomy, for the most part the state attempted to control and maintain authority over civil society organizations, particularly those with any political objectives. While there were ways to circumvent the oversight of the Ministry of Social Affairs, such as registering one’s organization as a civil company, it was difficult to fully escape the watchful eyes of the regime.

Given strict government controls over political parties and civil society organizations and the threat of imprisonment and torture for those who countered the regime, I argue that social media sites, such as Facebook, aided in building a politically conscious civil society in a space that was relatively safe and free from government
oversight. Philip Howard defines “cyberactivism” as “the act of using the Internet to advance a political cause that is difficult to advance offline” (Howard 2011, 145). It was more difficult for the government to identify and apprehend political activists operating online than at brick and mortar locations. In the case of Egypt, this online community was built over a number of years prior to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

While the focus of this chapter is the relationship between the Internet and domestic civil society, the literature on the Internet and global civil society is helpful for understanding how to conceptualize the connection between these two phenomena. Warkentin believes that this connection can be viewed on three levels:

“First, the characteristics that have informed the Internet’s development and defined its inherent qualities parallel those of global civil society. Second, the Internet’s inherent qualities facilitate development of global civil society’s constitutive network of social relations. Third, as coexisting phenomena, the Internet and global civil society reinforce each other in an ongoing manner” (Warkentin 2001, 32).

Unlike brick and mortar organizations and NGOs, online interactions take on an informal and nonhierarchical dimension.

In Egypt, prior to the Revolution, social media was used as a forum for political discussion and expression and a tool for political organizing. Through conducting content analysis on the Facebook pages of the April 6th Youth Movement, We are all Khaled Said, and Kefaya from January 2010 through January 2011, I found that, despite the apprehension of some Egyptians about speaking openly in their homes and on the street concerning their disenchantment with the regime, online the political discussion became quite intense and lively. One might even say that under authoritarian rule, the Internet became the new site for de Tocqueville’s town hall meetings. Political discussions and opinion sharing took place on the walls of Facebook group pages. Even those who were
not so bold as to actually post on the wall took the lesser step of “liking” a political statement posted by another member of the group.

Some of the most informative data and information on Facebook use for political purposes came from Wael Ghonim’s *Revolution 2.0*, which described the author’s work as an administrator for the National Association for Change and We Are All Khaled Said Facebook pages. On the National Association for Change page, Ghonim initiated opinion polls, as well as an online petition (Ghonim 2012, 45). The first poll that Ghonim conducted aimed to assess page members’ satisfaction with the status quo and why they had not signed the online petition. The fact that over 15,000 participants completed the questionnaire (Ghonim 2012, 51) demonstrated that while there may have been only a few political activists protesting in the streets, there were thousands who were willing to engage in politics online.

When Ghonim created the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, 36,000 people joined the page in the first day and left 1,800 comments (Ghonim 2012, 62). Ghonim used this page to organize silent stand protests in Alexandria and other cities democratically, allowing page members to engage in discussion and make decisions on which protest tactics would be used. After the protests took place, he would post pictures and videos of the silent stands to encourage more individuals to become politically active. Referring to June 19, 2010, when he organized a silent stand on the Facebook page, Ghonim reported, “Until that day the average number of members who “liked” the daily published content had not gone above 5,000 and the comments had never exceeded 7,000. But on that Friday the number of “likes” reached 37,000 and comments 120,000” (Ghonim 2012, 84). Other campaigns that took place fully online included encouraging
individuals to change their Facebook profile pictures to a banner of Khaled Said, a symbolic gesture in which thousands participated (Ghonim 2012, 67).

While this chapter identifies social media’s function in helping to build civil society under restrictive regimes, it is also important to point out its limitations. Domestically, there is always a ‘digital divide,’ where some will have greater access to the Internet than others. This divide may be on economic, political, race, class, or gender lines. Because of the digital divide, the Internet can reinforce divisions while shaping civil society (Warkentin 2001, 34). For example, in places where only the wealthy have access to the Internet, income determines who has the opportunity to participate.

Additionally, in 1999, English was used in almost 80 percent of websites, although fewer than 1 in 10 people worldwide spoke the language (UNDP 1999). Thus, language can determine access. While in the Egyptian case the majority of political groups post more information in Arabic than in English, many groups still have two Facebook pages, one in Arabic to cater to the domestic population and one in English, which is used both to connect domestically and to reach out abroad. In my research I found that the digital divide in Cairo was based on social class, education level, and age. Of the 7% of protesters who did not have access to the Internet, all were from the lower class. Regarding the 31% of non-protesters without access to the Internet, 91% were from the lower class, 4% were from the lower-middle class, and 4% were from the upper-middle class. Thus, there is a clear correlation between social class and Internet access. While some lower class interviewees did not have access to the Internet because of the financial cost, many were also unable to use the Internet because they were illiterate. Additionally,
it was found that the vast majority of members of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page were youth (Ghonim 2012, 113).

We have now observed the ways by which social media serves as a facilitator and space for the development of civil society, particularly under restrictive regimes, but only by connecting the literature on civil society with works on social movements will we be able to theorize how online civil society can contribute to the formation of social movements and revolution.

**Political Opportunity Structures**

Identifying political opportunity structures allows us to understand the environment in which social movements and protest action take place. Political opportunities may be constantly changing and they exist whether or not they are perceived by potential challengers; however, they lead to mobilization when challengers are able to perceive them.

Examining political opportunities, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly state, “Rather than look upon ‘opportunities and threats’ as objective structural factors, we see them as subject to attribution. No opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is a) visible to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 43). This understanding of opportunities sees them as subjective rather than objective; opportunities that matter are not ones that just exist, but the ones that are perceived and acknowledged by mobilizing groups. Goodwin and Jasper criticize this approach to political opportunities by saying, “McAdam’s distinction between political opportunities and people’s perceptions of those opportunities is a case
of misplaced concreteness: Culture is recognized but excluded from what really counts…Opportunities may be there even if no one perceives them” (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 8). In my work I subscribe to the idea that political opportunities are there even if no one perceives them, but only those that are “perceived” can contribute to mobilization. In my research, I outline political opportunity structures created within both international and domestic contexts and the interplay between the two. On the international level, the Internet is a completely free, non-regulated realm in which people are able to express any idea they wish with little fear of retribution. On the domestic level, political opportunities are determined by a) the desire of domestic governments to control the internet and go after those who subvert domestic internet rules, b) the ability of domestic governments to control the internet and go after those who subvert domestic internet rules and c) the ability of the opposition to remain technologically ahead of the government. The three regimes of internet regulation are exemplified by the United States, Egypt, and China.

In the United States, internet restrictions are limited to those who violate federal or state laws, such as viewing or distributing child pornography. Even local law enforcement agencies have the ability to track down violators by tracing Internal Protocol (IP) addresses. In 1994, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), which further defined the existing statutory obligation of telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in executing electronic surveillance, as long as there existed a court order or other lawful authorization (AskCALEA 2012). Arguing that the increased threat of terrorism called for expanding the authority of law enforcement to monitor the Internet, in 2010 federal law enforcement
and security officials asked Congress to require all services that enable communications, including encrypted e-mail transmitters like BlackBerry, social networking websites, such as Facebook, and software that allows direct “peer to peer” messaging, such as Skype, to be technically capable of complying if served with a wiretap order (Salvage 2010). Despite increasing questions about law enforcement’s encroachment on individuals’ right to privacy, online freedom of speech is respected and Internet content remains free.

In Egypt, Internet content remains uncensored, but because free speech is limited, law enforcement attempts to track down those who voice opposition to the government online, considered a form of criminal activity. The Egyptian government’s methods of curbing online political opposition have traditionally been technologically rudimentary. There is “no evidence of internet filtering in Egypt” (OpenNet Initiative 2009), and authorities “typically employ ‘low-tech’ methods such as intimidation, legal harassment, detentions, and real-world surveillance of online dissidents” (Freedom House 2011, 1). In 2005, The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information criticized the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior for putting into effect new rules that required Internet café managers and owners to record their customers’ names and ID numbers (The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information 2005). This policy was taken a step further in 2008 with a requirement that Internet cafes provide the names, email addresses, and phone numbers of clients before they were permitted to use the Internet. Following the provision of such information, customers would receive a text message on their mobile phone along with a pin number allowing them access to the Internet (AFP 2008). However, in practice, many internet cafes did not implement the more stringent
procedures and individuals were able to walk into establishments and use the Internet without providing identification.

While no one knows for sure to what extent the Egyptian security services monitored the Internet prior to the Revolution, all Internet users within Egypt were required to register their personal information with the ISP operator. “Those who buy a USB modem have to fill out a registration form and submit a copy of their national identification card” (Freedom House 2011, 6). These types of regulations also applied to home Internet subscribers. Additionally, the Egyptian security services used both legal and extralegal means to collect users’ Internet and mobile-phone records from ISPs, Internet cafes, and phone companies when investigating cases (Freedom House 2011, 7). One interviewee recalled visiting a friend’s father at Amn al-Dawla (State Security) in 2010. He happened to walk into a room filled with approximately 40 to 50 people on computers tracking Facebook and blogs. He was not sure whether State Security created fake accounts or had the ability to hack into accounts. However, from two other interviews the picture became clearer that the government was able to do both.

A middle-aged man from Amn al-Dawla told me that he had gained political information from Facebook, but when I followed up with the question of whether he had obtained the information from friends on Facebook, he told me that he did not have any friends on Facebook. In a not-so-subtle fashion, he indicated to me that he was watching other people’s political activity on Facebook as an agent of the state. The Egyptian government’s use of fake online accounts for policing purposes is not new. Following the 2001 Queen Boat raid, when 52 men were arrested at the gay-friendly nightclub, gay hangouts began to disappear and people turned to the Internet. Consequently, members of
Egyptian law enforcement began to pose as gay men online, persuade contacts to meet in a public place and then arrest the contacts when they showed up at the agreed-upon spot (Kershaw 2003).

A second interviewee who participated in storming the Amn al-Dawla offices during the Revolution recounted how revolutionaries took mobile phone video of their findings, posting them on YouTube, and removed government documents from the offices, uploading them to the Amn Dawla Leaks website. Amn Dawla Leaks can be thought of as the Wikileaks of the Egyptian Revolution. One of the documents found by this particular interviewee contained information about the Egyptian government’s purchase of software from a German company to spy on online users and extract their passwords. A list of activists and their passwords was also discovered. Thus, while the Egyptian government did not appear to have the manpower and technological knowhow to run a sophisticated online law enforcement operation to track down dissidents, from the limited information I was able to acquire, it seems that they were attempting to increase their capabilities.

China’s highly restrictive policy helps to situate the Egyptian strategy for Internet monitoring in the middle of the range between open and closed approaches. The Chinese policy is very different from that of both the United States and Egypt. In addition to tracking down those who engage in criminal activity and those who oppose the government, they take preventative measures by regulating Internet content. In 2005, while the Egyptians were asking Internet café owners to record customers’ names and ID numbers, China’s authorities were recruiting an Internet police force, estimated at 30,000, to work as censors and monitors (Watts 2005), prowling websites, blogs, and chat rooms
to seek out offensive content. They also began using new monitoring software and issued a warning that all bloggers and bulletin board operators must register with the government or be closed down and fined (Watts 2005).

In addition to its Internet policing force, China has become infamous for its Great Firewall of China. The main contact points connecting China's Internet with the worldwide web consist of nine Internet access providers that control the physical lines to the outside world. Through the use of Internet filters, traffic over the Internet lines can be restricted, and software is used to deny access to specific Internet sites and addresses (Hermida 2002). When passing through government controlled gateways, emails containing offending words, such as “democracy,” can be pulled aside and trashed (Einhorn and Elgin 2006). Finally, for companies who host their sites on servers in China, the rules are even tougher. Companies are pressured to sign the government's Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the Chinese Internet Industry, "agreeing not to disseminate information that breaks the law or spreads superstition or obscenity or that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability” (Einhorn and Elgin 2006).

In the cases of the United States, Egypt, and China, the Internet as an international structure offers boundless opportunities for dissent, but domestic regimes restrict such opportunities based on desire and ability.
Table 3.1 Internet Restrictions in China, Egypt, and the United States

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>China</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom of Speech</strong></td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Media for Political Discussion</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internet Content Regulation</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Law Enforcement Tracks Down Online Criminals</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Enforcement Capabilities</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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However, there is another factor to examine, which is the ability of the opposition to remain technologically ahead of the government. Gamson and Meyer state, “Opportunities open the way for political action, but movements also make opportunities” (Gamson and Meyer 276). These types of opportunities, created both domestically and internationally, allow opposition groups to circumvent government restraints. On the international level, groups such as Anonymous, an international decentralized online community of hackers, engages in international hacktivism in order to promote Internet freedom and freedom of speech. In addition to hacking Arab government websites during the Arab Spring, hacktivists set up a website during the 2009 protests in Iran that allowed information exchange between Iran and the rest of the world, despite Iranian government attempts to restrict news on protest events (Duncan 2009). They also provided support and resources to protesters, including guidance on how to circumvent government online restrictions (Hawke 2009). On the national level, domestic groups and individuals also share information concerning how to protect oneself from online identification by the government and how to go around government Internet
restrictions (Mokhtari n.d.). These methods demonstrate the ability of movements to create opportunities.

**Mobilizing Structures**

Rather than looking only at how people mobilize, this chapter also seeks to explain the factors that determine whether or not people choose to mobilize and engage in online collective action under autocratic rule. In order to understand the significance of mobilizing structures we may begin with the arguments put forth by Mancur Olson, Timur Kuran, and Roger Petersen about why people choose to participate in protest.

To gain a greater understanding of why individuals may or may not be motivated to join a group and engage in political action, it is helpful to review Mancur Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action*. Refuting the traditional view that groups and private organizations are ubiquitous and that the ubiquity comes from a fundamental human propensity to form and join associations, Olson points to empirical evidence found by sociologist Murray Hausknecht that the average person does not typically belong to large voluntary associations and the idea of Americans as typically joiners is a myth (Olson 1965, 17).

Olson proposes an alternative method for understanding why or why not individuals, who are already members of primary groups such as families, choose to join secondary groups, such as organizations. He advocates a study of “the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action open to individuals in groups of different sizes” (Olson 1965, 21). According to Olson, each individual in a group may place a different value upon the collective good desired by that group. Each group wanting a collective good
also faces a different cost function. In his research, Olson identifies the different scenarios under which individuals will choose to participate in, or not participate in, a group, based on the costs and benefits of joining. Two key arguments in Olson’s work as it pertains to my research are that people join groups based on a cost/benefit analysis and that the incentives for joining are not necessarily economic but may be social sanctions and rewards. Olson recognizes that in addition to economic incentives, there are alternative incentives such as personal prestige, social status, and self-esteem, which are individual, noncollective goods (Olson 1965, 61).

In *Now Out of Never*, Timur Kuran distinguishes between an individual’s private and public preferences, where private preference is effectively fixed at any given instant and public preference is a variable under an individual’s control (Kuran 1991). Particularly under authoritarian regimes, people will engage in preference falsification, when the preference an individual expresses in public differs from the preference he holds privately. An individual’s choice between joining the opposition and engaging in preference falsification will depend on a trade-off between external and internal payoffs (Kuran 1991, 17). The external payoffs of supporting the opposition are personal rewards and punishments. The net payoff becomes more favorable the larger the size of the public opposition. The internal payoff is founded in the psychological cost of preference falsification. The individual experiences discomfort from suppressing his wants. An individual’s internal payoff for joining the opposition varies positively with his private preference. The more psychologically aggravating it becomes to lie about his true feeling, the higher the cost of doing so (Kuran 1991, 18).
Given the very real threat of retribution for expressing one’s preferences publicly under authoritarian regimes, different people will hold varying revolutionary thresholds, which are the particular points at which a person is willing to publicly engage in political action. As public opposition grows and private preferences remain constant, the revolutionary threshold is the point at which the external cost of joining the opposition falls below the internal cost of preference falsification (Kuran 1991). Anything that changes the relationship between the size of the public opposition and an individual’s external payoff for supporting the opposition will change his revolutionary threshold. A fall in thresholds and a rise in public opposition are mutually reinforcing trends that may produce a revolutionary bandwagon (Kuran 1991). An individual is both powerless and potentially very powerful in producing a variation: powerless because revolution requires mass mobilization, yet powerful because under the right conditions he may cause a chain reaction that leads to the necessary mobilization.

Roger Petersen’s work moves beyond Timur Kuran’s in two ways. First, his distribution of thresholds is linked to observable social structure. While Kuran infers that the distribution of thresholds is unknowable, Petersen claims that the distribution of thresholds can be determined from a knowledge of community subsets. Second, Petersen’s thresholds are not viewed as static, but may be affected by “the operation of normative mechanisms emanating from one’s own community” (Petersen 2001, 47). Individuals may alter their thresholds over the sequence of a course of events in a rebellion or resistance situation based on these mechanisms. While Kuran hypothesizes how small alterations in the distribution of thresholds may produce large differences in
outcomes, Petersen’s work attempts to offer more direction as to how one can understand overall tipping dynamics.

Rather than modeling individuals as moving from private preference to public preference, Petersen views thresholds as a multiple step process. In the zero position, individuals are neutral, neither for nor against the regime. When individuals move from 0 to +1, the +1 level represents unarmed and unorganized opposition to the regime, such as attending a mass rally or writing anti-regime graffiti. The +2 position represents support of, or participation in, a locally-based, armed organization, and the +3 position stands for mobile and armed organizations (Petersen 2001, 9). Petersen’s model is richer than that of Kuran, since he identifies multiple mechanisms that cause individuals to move from each position to the next. The triggering mechanisms in stage one, moving from 0 to +1 are resentment formation, threshold-based safety calculations with society-wide referents, status considerations linked to local community, and focal points. In stage two, moving from +1 to +2, the triggering mechanisms are threshold-based safety calculations based on community referents and community-based norms of reciprocity. Finally, sustaining mechanisms, or those mechanisms that allow an individual to remain at +2, are threats and irrational psychological mechanisms (Petersen 2001, 14).

The mechanisms driving individuals from 0 to the +1 position are not community based, but those leading an individual from +1 to +2 are. Moving from 0 to +1 represents unorganized, lower-risk, one-shot actions such as graffiti writing or showing up at demonstrations. The frequency of such actions reveals how many others are opposed to the regime and how many others are willing to engage in some form of resistance. “Thus, for the movement from 0 to +1, the reference group is society at large or the larger
corporate groups in which the individual is embedded” (Petersen 2001, 24). In the move from +1 to +2, the battle must be fought in the village or workplace, at the community level, as the powerful regime controls much of the outside world but cannot easily infiltrate communities. Petersen places a high value on the importance of community because of the high levels of face-to-face contact and because the community allows potential rebels to cope with the high risk involved with recruitment. In the community scenario, an “individual’s decision is dependent on the expected choices and actions of others” (Petersen 2001, 18).

My Model

The purpose of my model is to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter: Does social media serve as an intermediary step between holding private preferences and the expression of these preferences in public, lowering the threshold for political participation? Are there two political thresholds to be overcome, a lower one for going online and a higher one for going into the streets for political protest? In order to answer these questions, I return to Kuran’s model as a starting point.

Kuran presents a dichotomy between private preference, where people do not let others know their actual political preferences, and public preference, where people publicly join a social movement and engage in collective action. I propose adding an intervening step between private and public preference which I will call “online preference.” In this scenario, people subscribe to political Facebook pages, post comments on Facebook walls, and openly profess their political preferences online. However, they do not necessarily physically attend political meetings or protests, engage
in political organization or mobilization, or take any type of political action on the
ground. In this case, people no longer engage in preference falsification, but they do not
protest in the streets. They may adopt pseudonyms online, use high privacy settings on
Facebook so that people cannot gain information about them, or simply assume that the
government will not be confronting them in the same way that might occur if they were
protesting in the streets, for which they might be arrested and possibly even tortured.

By introducing online preference as an intermediate step between private
preference and public preference, my model begins to look more like a fusion between
that of Kuran and the one of Petersen, though the assumptions and mechanisms may
differ. Thus, in my model, the 0 position is private preference, the +1 position is online
preference, and the +2 position is public preference. While Petersen sees the move from 0
to +1 as unarmed and unorganized opposition in various on-the-ground forms, I see the
move from private preference to online preference as unarmed, but not necessarily
unorganized, and I limit the various forms of opposition to those conducted on the
Internet. In my model, the move from +1 to +2 does not entail support for an armed
organization. Instead, it indicates physical participation in a mass demonstration or
protest in the street. I do not include a +3 position.
Stage 1

The contribution that Petersen provides to this area of research is his determination of particular mechanisms that cause the jump from 0 to +1 and +1 to +2. Given that my case rests on the assumption of non-violent rather than violent opposition to the regime and that I am examining online communities rather than village communities, my mechanisms are slightly different from Petersen’s. Similar to Petersen’s triggering mechanism in stage one, moving from 0 to +1, the triggering mechanisms in my model are resentment formation, threshold-based safety calculations with Facebook-wide referents, and status considerations linked to Facebook community.

Beginning with the 0 position, I concur with Olson in assuming that individuals are not naturally inclined to join associations or groups. However, in his work, Olson focused on individuals residing in a democracy. Because this model looks at individuals
living under authoritarian rule, we must go beyond the idea that people are not inclined to join groups to the idea that there is a disincentive to join or that joining does not even enter the minds of the average citizen. John Gaventa (1980) argues that in situations of inequality, the responses of deprived groups may be viewed as functions of power relationships in a way that power serves to maintain and develop non-elite quiescence. He poses the question: Why, in a social relationship involving the domination of a non-elite by an elite, does challenge to that domination not occur?

In outlining the nature of power and roots of quiescence, Gaventa presents three dimensional approaches to power, arguing that each carries with it differing assumptions about the nature and roots of participation and non-participation. In the *One-Dimensional Approach to power*, which is that of pluralists, participation is assumed to occur within decision-making arenas, grievances are recognized and acted upon, and leaders are representatives of the masses, as they operate in an open decision-making process. This approach goes back to Robert Dahl’s idea of power where A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. In this case, non-participation or inaction is not a political problem because people do act upon recognized grievances in this open system either by themselves or through their leaders. In the *Two-Dimensional Approach to power*, non-participation is attributed to ignorance and indifference, but also, according to Elmer Eric Schattschneider, the suppression of options, where power can exclude certain participants and issues altogether. If issues are prevented from arising, then actors may be prevented from acting. In the *Three-Dimensional Approach*, Steven Lukes argues that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests. A can also exercise power over B by
influencing, shaping or determining B’s wants and affecting B’s conceptions of the issues altogether. Occurring in the absence of observable conflict, the situation must allow for considering the ways that potential issues are kept out of politics “whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions” (Gaventa 1980, 12).

In the first dimension, political silence is a sign of consensus, in the second dimension, the silence is not due to consensus but rather due to power relations, while in the third dimension, having the power to create ideological hegemony creates consensus and prevents conflict. Gaventa’s third dimension provides a useful model for understanding quiescence in Egypt and the state of individuals in the 0 position. The third dimension specifies the means through which power influences, shapes or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of latent conflict. This can be approached through the study of language, symbols, and myths and how they are shaped or manipulated in power processes (Lukes 1974) (Gramsci 1957). “It may involve a focus upon the means by which social legitimations are developed around the dominant, and instilled as beliefs or roles in the dominated” (Gaventa 1980, 15).

In Egypt, the Mubarak regime shaped the power process (third dimension) by promoting the concept of the “Islamist threat.” This idea of the Islamist threat was that the only alternative to the Mubarak regime was the takeover of the country by Islamist extremists. Thus, it was better to have an authoritarian secular government than the terrifying alternative. The regime’s argument was reinforced by incidents such as the Luxor massacre, when in 1997, 58 foreigners and 4 Egyptians were killed at the Deir al-
Bahri archeological site in Luxor (Cowell and Jehl 1997) by members of Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Other incidents included the April 7, 2005, suicide bombing in the tourist area of Khan el Khalili in Cairo (Audi and Slackman 2009), the April 30, 2005, Cairo bus station attack by a man with a nail bomb, and another attack on tourists on the same day by two gunwomen near the Cairo citadel (Stack 2005). These attacks reinforced the regime’s argument that without authoritarian rule the country would fall into the hands of extremists. As one woman with whom I spoke in 2005 told me, “The devil you know is better than the one you don’t.” Failure to engage in politics because of fear of extremism was articulated in depth by one of my interviewees. “I guess I was convinced by the regime of the Islamist threat, so while I knew there was a lot of clamping down on civil liberties, I was, selfishly so, kind of happy that they were clamping down on what I perceived to be a threat to my life and a threat to Egypt as well.” He continued on saying, “I was indoctrinated into thinking that any change meant Islamists, just like Mubarak convinced the West it was either him or the Islamists…so he convinced his own country” (Interview#5 2013).

There was also a second dimension of power that took place under Mubarak, when power dimensions prevented certain issues from arising. While Egyptians were known to complain about problems in the country, such as education and the economy, many were careful not to directly and publicly attribute those problems to the regime. Phrases such as “the walls have ears” were repeated, and many parents taught their children not to become involved in anything political but instead to mind their own business. One day when I was sitting in a home in Sayyida Zeineb a few years prior to the Revolution, I attempted to engage in a political conversation. I was immediately shut
down and told to be careful about speaking of such things. There was a strong fear of State Security, particularly from the older generations who remembered the repression of the 1950s and 1960s. As one interviewee stated, “I didn’t feel safe thinking…torture” (Interview#6 2013). Thus, many were raised in a manner that left politics out of their consciousness.

The first triggering mechanism that leads individuals to move from 0 to +1 is resentment formation. Many of the political Facebook pages aimed to foment dissent through inciting resentment and even anger in the hearts of their followers. They did this by posting images of Khaled Said’s tortured body, YouTube videos of torture and police corruption, and statements about the poor economy. These postings, along with those put up by individuals, were widely circulated on Facebook and angered those who viewed them. Gaventa finds that powerlessness caused by the third dimension is overcome when individuals go through the process of issue and action formulation where people develop a consciousness of the needs, possibilities, and strategies of challenge (Gaventa 1980, 28). Many interviewees said they were particularly shocked by what had happened to Khaled Said and felt that he could have been they. Khaled Said was a young man from Alexandria who was arrested at a cybercafé and tortured to death by Egyptian police. Photos of a clean-cut, middle class youth alongside those of his post-mortem disfigured body went viral. The event made many middle and upper class Egyptians realize that police brutality was not limited to the lower classes and that anyone could be affected. “It was this process of ‘self-identification’ with this victim, coupled by the wide circulation of his pre- and post-beating photos that have gone viral on the Internet, that made people extremely furious and outraged to the extent that they decided to take action against this
brutality” (Khamis and Vaughn 2012, 149). One interviewee went so far as to say Khaled Said “was our Mohamed Bouazizi” (InterviewC 2013), referring to the man who had engaged in self-immolation in Tunisia, sparking the Tunisian Revolution. It was the constant exposure to story after story of police abuse and corruption that began to make the political pot simmer, eventually reaching a boiling point. As individuals became increasingly outraged, they moved from simply viewing political stories to “liking,” sharing, and commenting on them.

Regarding threshold-based safety calculations with Facebook-wide referents, Olson claims that people join secondary groups based on a cost/benefit analysis. In the case of Egypt, when an individual chose whether or not to post politically on Facebook or on a blog, the cost was very low because the Egyptian authorities did not have the technical knowhow or resources available in countries such as China to track dissidents. Additionally, it seems that the Egyptian government focused more on the creators of blog and Facebook sites rather than those who read the blogs or commented on them (Hill 2010). When interviewees who used Facebook were asked if they felt safe sharing or commenting on political Facebook posts prior to the 2011 uprising, the majority of protesters and non-protesters responded that they felt safe, they did not care, or they did not think about safety issues. One interviewee reported that he knew the government was monitoring Facebook but he was not afraid because his political activities online were marginal compared to others. Another said he felt safe because “they can’t arrest all the people” (Interview#22 2013). An even more blunt response was, “No one cared because Facebook was full of political shit. Everyone was speaking about politics. People you wouldn’t imagine would talk about politics were speaking about it” (Interview#36 2013).
The perspective for many was that only committed activists and organizers would be pursued by the authorities, while an everyday student or worker making an occasional political comment or post would not be given much attention.

Kuran’s concept of revolutionary thresholds may be useful when examining online preference. As the number of people expressing preferences online grows, more people are likely to feel comfortable expressing opposition online. People can easily gauge how many others feel the same way they do by looking at the number of “likes” on a Facebook page. These “likes” embolden individuals to participate online due to threshold-based safety calculations that the government will not single them out if many people online express similar opinions. However, one must take into account distortions of the numbers resulting from international, non-Egyptian participation, which may also have a positive effect on Egyptians’ expressing online preference. Thus, both the visible count of “likes” on a Facebook page, along with reinforcing participation from non-Egyptian, international individuals, lowers the threshold for political participation.

Other factors to be examined are how people come to participate online and how they initially gain political information on Facebook, as well as the mechanism of status considerations linked to Facebook community. Most people do not join Facebook for political purposes. They join for social reasons, to interact with their friends. A friend may post a political article on his page and another friend comments on it for all their friends to see. Maybe someone posts a comment and a usually non-political person decides to add his two cents, not intending to make some great political statement, but to respond to a friend’s opinion. Maybe someone sees that a friend “liked” the page April 6th Youth Movement, so he goes and checks out the page to see what it is all about. The
fact that Facebook is not a defined political space but is primarily a space for social interaction greatly lowers one’s threshold for political participation in terms of openly expressing one’s political beliefs. If one physically attends a political meeting, he is going with the intention of being political. If one logs on to Facebook, he is not necessarily doing so to be political. Thus, Facebook captures those who are not necessarily politically inclined from the outset, but eventually are exposed to “political” messages. While the recipient’s eventual participation in political discussion may be an unintended consequence of going online, the sender’s message may be considered intended, as he posts political comments or articles with the intention that others will read them and possibly react to them.

When interviewees were asked whether they read any political Facebook pages prior to the Revolution, 45% of protesters and 16% of non-protesters responded yes. Eighteen percent of protesters and 55% of non-protesters did not have a Facebook account. What we can observe here is that protesters were more likely to have a Facebook account than non-protesters and they were more likely to gain political information from that Facebook account. The most popular political Facebook page for both protesters and non-protesters was We are all Khaled Said. Many protesters also followed the April 6th Youth Movement, while fewer followed Kefaya.

When interviewees who read political Facebook pages were asked how they became aware of them, a very few reported learning about them from the news, Internet searching, or face-to-face interaction, whereas 77% of protesters and 83% of non-protesters responded that they knew from friends either sharing or sending invites on Facebook. However, it should be noted that only 12 non-protesters read political
Facebook pages before the Revolution, which may indicate that exposure to political Facebook pages had an effect on the decision to protest. When those who were exposed to political Facebook postings shared by friends were asked if they themselves “shared” these postings or events, posted comments, and/or “liked” comments on the postings, 67% of protesters and 67% of non-protesters responded with some combination of sharing, commenting, and/or liking political postings. However, the equality of these percentages is a bit deceptive, as 66% of protesters were exposed to political posts shared by friends, while only 28% of non-protesters were exposed to such information. It should be noted that not everyone who read political Facebook pages actually “liked” the page, so the popularity of some of the group pages was underrepresented in the number of “likes” they received. What we can observe from these results is that individuals on Facebook are most likely to learn about political Facebook pages and gain political information from friends sharing, even if they were not on Facebook for political purposes to begin with, and that those who protested in the Revolution were more likely to have engaged in active political participation on Facebook than non-protesters. Thus, there is an indication that Facebook serves as a stepping stone to on-the-street protesting.

The status considerations linked to the Facebook community mechanism are related to a key finding in Olson’s research that incentives are not necessarily economic; they can be social sanctions and rewards. Olson recognizes that in addition to economic incentives there are alternative incentives such as personal prestige, social status, and self-esteem (Olson 1965, 61). The incentive in the case of Facebook may not be directly connected to politics. The incentive may be the personal prestige, self-esteem, or social status connected to the reading of one’s post by others, their “liking” it, commenting on
it, or agreeing with it (Tanner 2011). Therefore, what we can observe in a cost/benefit analysis of individuals’ expressing online preferences in Egypt is that the costs may be political while the benefits may be social. When one performs a cost/benefit analysis, both the costs and benefits do not have to fall within the same category, whether that classification is economic, political, or social. In my research, the realm of perceived costs of openly expressing one’s preferences online may be very different from the realm of perceived benefits of such participation.

**Stage 2**

In stage two of the model we examine how, and if, individuals move from +1 to +2, meaning whether individuals intensify their political participation by taking their online grievances into the streets. In this stage, the triggering mechanisms are belief in the possibility of success based on the success in Tunisia, status considerations linked to the Facebook community, and threshold-based safety calculations with Facebook-wide referents and enhanced by community encouragement linked to work, family, and friend communities.

The first way in which Facebook brought individuals into the streets was simply to inform them that a protest was going to take place. Of the individuals who knew that protests would take place on January 25th prior to January 25th, 79% knew about them from Facebook. Even for those who knew about them from face-to-face interaction with colleagues or word on the street, the information circulating by word of mouth most likely originated from Facebook, as that was the place where the protests were announced and promoted. Linking back to stage one mechanisms, 64% of individuals who protested
for the first time on January 25th or before who knew about the January 25th uprising from Facebook cited previous grievances, mainly economic issues, police brutality, and corruption, as the reason for protesting. Thus, for many, the grievances enhanced by information circulated online that led them to political participation on Facebook were enough to then propel them into the streets. All they needed was a date and time.

The second way that Facebook caused individuals to move from +1 to +2 was through discussions and promotion of the success of Tunisia. Following Ben Ali’s resignation speech, the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page added the word “revolution” to the advertisement for the January 25th protests, calling it “January 25: Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption, and Unemployment” and changed the page’s profile picture to an Egyptian flag with a Tunisian symbol in the red section of the flag (Ghonim 2012, 136-7). References to the Tunisian uprising began to appear on the April 6th Youth Movement Facebook page on December 28, 2010, and on January 11, 2011, a picture of the Tunisian flag was posted on the page’s wall.

When asked if the success of Tunisia had any effect on their view of the protests, almost every interviewee said yes. The repeated line was, “If they could do it, we could do it” (Interview#145 2013), or “Because change happened in Tunisia, it could happen in Egypt” (Interview#99 2013). The responses of interviewees did not reflect pan-Arabism. The Egyptians interviewed in this study did not refer to a common identity with Tunisia. Instead individuals stated, “I didn’t like when the foreign minister said Egypt isn’t Tunisia. It was a bit provoking. Tunisia is smaller” (Interview#30 2013) and “Tunisia did it. As Egyptians we think we’re stronger” (Interview#138 2013). Another interviewee compared Egypt to Tunisia saying, “Egyptians are the bravest fighters in the world. It
says this in Qur’an” (Interview#91 2013). Thus, it was an Egyptian sense of pride and feelings of superiority to Tunisia that made them believe that they could, or at least empowered them to attempt, overthrowing Mubarak. Wael Ghonim was on point when he wrote about Egyptian pride for being cultural and scientific leaders, “Our pride had now been challenged: Tunisia had taken the lead in the quest for liberty…The psychology of the proud and courageous Egyptian played a major role in enabling our country to follow in Tunisia’s footsteps” (Ghonim 2012, 133).

If we return to the discussion of political opportunity structures and the debate on the significance of real versus perceived political opportunities, the door that Tunisia opened represents the importance of perceived opportunities. From the time of the Tunisian Revolution, nothing had really changed in Egypt. However, the fact that the Tunisians had been successful in overthrowing Ben Ali caused a change in Egyptians’ perception of what was possible. Beyond the issue of competition, a better way to understand the effect of Tunisia outside of the Arab nationalism context is represented by two quotes from interviewees who protested: “It felt like another country in the region close to us. It was a different context, but something familiar. Similar socioeconomic conditions” (Interview#170 2013), and “Tunisia gave us inspiration. It was the same dictator with the same regime. It broke the barrier of silence” (Interview#152 2013). The success of Tunisia, which was promoted and discussed on Facebook, contributed to a breaking of the fear barrier and a belief in the possibility of success as Egyptians made their decision about whether to go out into the street. “Tunisia was the spark that triggered Egypt” (Interview#61 2013).
The third manner by which Facebook caused individuals to move from +1 to +2 was through the observation of the number of others declaring that they would protest on January 25th. This mechanism may be called “threshold-based safety calculations with Facebook-wide referents.” Facebook groups such as the April 6th Youth Movement and We are all Khaled Said had sent out invitations on Facebook for people to attend the January 25th protests. Some of these invitations, such as the one from April 6th Youth Movement, used the term intifada (uprising/rebellion). As the invitations were circulated, individuals would click the “join” button, indicating that they would attend.

As many who use Facebook know, the number of individuals who click the “join” or “going” button does not indicate the actual number of individuals who will attend an event. Some people will not reply to the invitation but will attend anyway, and some will say they are attending but will not show up. Thus, as many interviewees reported, it was difficult to gauge from invitation acceptances how many people would actually participate in the January 25th protests. However, they did know that more people would attend than at any other protest before. How did they know this?

On April 6, 2009, the April 6th Youth Movement organized A General Protest in Egypt, also dubbed “The Day of Anger in Egypt.” The four main demands of the organization were 1) a minimum monthly wage, 2) indexation of wages, 3) election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution to guarantee the country’s political and trade union freedoms and to set a maximum of two terms for any president to stay in power, and 4) suspension of exporting gas to Israel (April 6 Youth Movement 2009). Despite the numerous members of the site, only 70 people accepted the online invitation to participate (Facebook 2009), although 454 people did end up attending the event (April
6 Youth Movement 2009). Thus, in this case, more people attended than were willing to say they would attend, most probably out of fear of government reprisal. However, given the large number of individuals who had liked the April 6th Youth Movement Facebook page, the number of actual participants for the event was very low. With turnout for many political events often in the low hundreds, despite hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of members of Facebook pages, it appears that prior to the Revolution social media was more effective in raising political awareness and facilitating political discussion than bringing people into the streets. While many were willing to take the risk of speaking out online, fewer were willing to take the greater risk of protesting on the street. During the 2008 Day of Anger, police were instructed to arrest anyone participating in pro-democracy demonstrations (AFP 2009).

The difference in the January 25th protests was that for the first time it was not 70 people who accepted the invitation but over 80,000 (Sutter 2011). While no one knew how many would actually attend, the drastic increase in the number of invitation acceptances indicated that the number of participants would be unprecedented, even if only 25% of those who accepted actually showed up. A computer programmer in his 40s explained, “One hundred thousand accepted on Facebook. We knew it was going to be big. The build-up was huge” (InterviewC 2013). Thus, individuals were able to make threshold-based safety calculations with Facebook-wide referents through observing the number of acceptances to the protest invitation. In sum, if individuals were concerned about safety in numbers, they were relatively assured that there would be enough protest participants to reduce the likelihood of their being arrested. However, it was not only the number of individuals attending but also who was attending. When one observes
acceptances to an event on Facebook, the screen gives the names of Facebook friends who have accepted the invitation. Petersen points to the mechanism of “status considerations linked to local community,” where individuals gain status through participation and may be sanctioned for non-participation. While I would not argue that individuals can be sanctioned for non-participation on Facebook or that the community pressure on Facebook is equivalent to that which can be achieved through face-to-face interaction, there is something to be said for what I would call profile pic-to-profile pic interaction. Returning to the stage one mechanism of status considerations linked to Facebook community, it appears that by not only seeing the number of individuals attending but also that one’s friends are attending, individuals are encouraged to participate because of the positive status attained through “joining.”

My findings on status considerations and participation are not limited to the Egyptian case. In 2010 and 2014 an experiment was conducted on Facebook using an “I Voted” button. The treatment group had an “I Voted” button that they could click on to demonstrate to their friends that they had voted in the United States national elections. Similar to the January 25th invite, individuals could see how many others in the United States had voted and also how many of their Facebook friends had voted. The findings for 2010 were that 340,000 more people voted because of the “I Voted” button (Peralta 2014). Those notified that their friends had voted were more likely to vote than the control group who did not receive a notification, and the decision to vote seemed to be tied to the behavior of Facebook friends.

The final mechanism that we will observe in stage two is community encouragement linked to work, family, and friend communities. This is a mechanism that
functions offline but reinforces the online mechanisms. Many interviewees who cited learning about the January 25\(^{th}\) protests from Facebook prior to January 25\(^{th}\) also heard about the protests from friends, family, and/or colleagues, with whom they eventually attended the protests. After discussing the invitation that they had seen on Facebook and the number of people who were talking about the protests and saying that they would go, many friends, family and/or colleagues decided to attend the protests together. Thus, the face-to-face interaction that Petersen describes was key to reinforcing the mechanisms that occurred online. After individuals found out from Facebook that there would be a protest, were aware that protests had succeeded in toppling a regime in another country, and knew that many others, including Facebook friends, would be attending the protests, their decision to participate was reinforced through face-to-face interaction with people they knew and through feeling assured that there would not only be many others in the streets when they arrived at the protests but also that they would have friendly faces going along with them. One must keep in mind that for the majority of interviewees, January 25\(^{th}\) was the first protest they had ever attended. Thus, knowing that there would be someone who would attend with them and being encouraged to attend in face-to-face conversation by those close to them was just as important as knowing that they would not be part of a perilously small number when they arrived at the protest site.

**Opposition Groups and Individual Thresholds**

On the first day of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution the number of protesters in the streets was much larger than had ever been seen in the country before. In the past, while a few protests had gained sizeable crowds (Khamis and Vaughn 2012), in general anti-
regime protests drew numbers in the tens and low hundreds (Alterman 2011). In this section, I examine how opposition groups (social movement organizations) get non-group members into the streets to protest, finding that they do so by combining multiple groups to close the “threshold gap.”¹ In the years leading up to January 25, 2011, anti-regime protests were often conducted by one group composed of a small number of members who were quickly surrounded and arrested by the Egyptian security forces. Knowing of these arrests and detainments, non-group members chose not to participate out of fear of falling victim to a similar fate. The difference between the January 25th protests and those that had come before was the number of groups who publicly declared that they would support the demonstrations. The large number of assured participants altered non-group members’ cost/benefit analysis, leading many to go out into the streets against the regime for the first time in their lives.

Protests before January 25th

One of the first secular groups to openly contest the Mubarak regime was Kefaya, also known as the Egyptian Movement for Change, which held its first protest in 2004. Kefaya comprised students, young professionals, and the unemployed and had an estimated membership of 500, with 50-100 core activists in Cairo (Onodera 2009, 49). While Kefaya’s political frames opposing social injustice resonated with the population, only very committed activists protested in the streets. In April and May of 2006, the group demonstrated in front of the Judges Club in Cairo. Sixty of the group’s members were arrested and held from a few days to a number of months (Onodera 2009, 51). Onodera argues that over time members of the group became disillusioned with the

¹ See appendix 1 for a game theoretic depiction of the argument.
purpose of protest and “lost heart due to the strengthened security constraints over street activities” (Onodera 2009, 51). With small numbers of activists protesting in the streets, leading to speedy arrest by security forces, not only were outsiders deterred from joining the movement, but those in the movement also began to leave. One interviewee who had been affiliated with Kefaya claimed that the downfall of the group was that people started calling their protests an “act of political masturbation, where you let out some steam outside the Journalists’ Syndicate and then go home” (InterviewB). When people tried to march they were beaten up and arrested, so protesters were often confined to the stairs outside the Journalists’ Syndicate. Over time, there were always the same faces at protests, using similar chants.

The April 6th Youth Movement was established in 2008 to support the workers strike in al-Mahallah al-Kubra. While the group had a large number of online supporters, the actual number that protested in the streets was much lower, with about 50 activists demonstrating in Cairo (Onodera 2009, 53). The April 6th Youth Movement faced a similar problem to that of Kefaya in regard to mobilization on the ground. While the group had tens of thousands of online supporters, the number of individuals willing to protest in the streets was few. Additionally, non-group members were deterred from joining the protests due to swift police crackdowns. During the 2008 “Day of Anger” protest organized by the April 6th Youth Movement, police were instructed to arrest anyone participating in pro-democracy demonstrations (AFP 2009). One interviewee claimed that in 2008 he attempted to join an April 6th demonstration that he had learned about via the internet, but by the time he and his friend arrived, the entire demonstration was surrounded by security forces and the police would not allow others to join in. He
never again tried to partake in an April 6\textsuperscript{th} protest or any other anti-regime protest until January 25, 2011, because usually only one group protested at a time and the demonstration would be shut down quickly by police (Interview\#15 2013).

In the years leading up to the January 25\textsuperscript{th} uprising there was a large disparity between the number of people politically participating online and the number of individuals protesting in the streets. During one silent demonstration organized by the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, where the numbers in the streets were limited, Wael Ghonim posted, “Where are the people who said they were coming? Where are the 10,000 men and women?” (Ghonim 2012, 76). The Egyptian population was increasingly willing to show their support for opposition groups online, but on the streets was another matter.

One significant difference between the January 25\textsuperscript{th} protests and those that had come before was the number of groups participating. The January 25\textsuperscript{th} protests were initiated by Wael Ghonim as a Facebook event, and a large number of activist groups agreed to participate in the protests, mobilizing both online and in the streets. One interviewee claimed the appeal of January 25\textsuperscript{th} was that it was not just one group protesting. The difference this time was that everyone was going to go out into the streets. Some of the groups that he listed were We Are All Khaled Said, April 6\textsuperscript{th} Youth Movement, the Ultras, the National Association for Change (El Baradei’s group), and other local groups (Interview\#12 2013). Thus, the large number of activist groups that confirmed that they would attend the January 25\textsuperscript{th} protests informed non-group members that the January 25\textsuperscript{th} protests would be larger than those that had come before it.
The Argument

Kuran’s proposed explanation for why the first few individuals choose to leave their private preferences and expose such preferences publically by protesting despite the enormous risk to their personal safety is that if an individual’s “private opposition to the existing order is intense and/or his need for integrity is quite strong, the suffering he incurs for dissent may be outweighed by the satisfaction he derives from being true to himself” (Kuran 1991, 18-19). Throughout this chapter I have demonstrated that social media allows individuals to make predictions of how many people will attend a protest, thus altering the reasons why the first protesters go out into the streets. Many individuals who are potential bandwagoners, people who only protest after they see others out in the streets but would not be the first ones out based on Kuran’s explanations, protest on the first day because bandwagoning has already taken place online before people even start protesting in the streets. Thus, my explanation for why the first individuals go out is that by going online they are able to estimate in advance how many others will participate. In addition to making a rough calculation of the number of people who will protest based on the number who accepted the event invitation on Facebook, potential protesters are able to make a more accurate prediction of the lowest number of individuals who will demonstrate based on the number of groups who agree to partake in the protest.

What the relevant literature fails to consider is the possibility of a threshold gap. Prior to the January 25th protests only one group, or a select few groups, organized each protest. In such a circumstance, groups were only able to draw committed group members for protest. In most instances such a small number of protesters went out into the streets that they were quickly surrounded by security forces and arrested. Non-group
members, aware of the rapid crackdown on these protesters, were deterred from joining public protests in the streets. The primary question in this section of the chapter is: How do opposition groups get non-group members into the streets to protest? I argue that the answer is by combining a large number of groups to close the “threshold gap.” I define the threshold gap as the difference between the street protest threshold for group member \( i \) and the street protest threshold for non-group member \( j \). Using randomly chosen numbers to illustrate my argument, I posit that members of opposition groups have a threshold set of \([0,100]\). However, non-group members have a threshold set of \([500,\infty]\). Therefore, when a group goes into the streets to protest, it will be unable to garner external support due to the fact that the threshold for non-group members begins at 500, not 100. Hence, there is a threshold gap that must be closed if a protesting group wants to mobilize non-group members to go out into the streets to protest.

In order to close this gap, opposition groups must combine, raising their numbers to the 500 that will bring non-group members into the streets. My argument counters the claim made by Olson that small groups are more effective than large groups in tackling the collective action dilemma ( Olson 1965, 61). Instead, I argue that combining a large number of small groups is most effective. Like Petersen in his move from +1 to +2, I contend that the distribution of thresholds can be determined both from the number of group members who participated in protests previous to January 25\(^{th}\) and the number of groups who promoted the January 25\(^{th}\) protest and said that they would attend. Kuran views preferences dichotomously as private or public. Thus, only when people actually begin to go out into the streets do revolutionary thresholds become known. However, the advent of social media has expanded the set of preference types to three: private...
preferences, online preferences, and public preferences. Through social media sites such as Facebook, non-group members in Egypt were able to see the number of groups and individuals that had accepted the Facebook invite and/or claimed that they would be participating in the protest before the protest actually occurred. While the number of individuals who accepted the Facebook invitation for the January 25th protests did not provide a definite number of how many people would actually go out into the streets, the fact that the number who said they would attend was much larger than previous protests indicated that participation levels would be much higher than before. Though even protest organizers were not sure how many people would actually show up at the protest (Ghonim 2012), what both organizers and non-group members did know was the number of groups and their core activists that would take part. Groups who claim they will participate are more reliable than individuals who say they will protest, because groups are made up of members who have been previously politically active.

In this model, the benefit of protesting for non-group members is expressing their dislike for the regime and the cost is the probability of arrest and the abuse that come with being arrested. The cost to non-group members varies depending on the number of groups protesting. If one group protests, the probability of a non-group member’s being arrested may be 30% to 100%, whereas if two or more groups protest, the probability of a non-group member’s being arrested decreases to between 0% and 70%. Thus, when multiple groups protest, the cost of protesting for non-group members decreases, potentially making the benefits of protesting greater than the cost, leading non-group members to go out into the streets and protest. The perceived probability of arrest can be viewed through a lens similar to Petersen’s threshold-based safety calculations based on
community referents, in this case, an online community. Additionally, newspapers such as Egypt Independent reported on the large number of groups that had confirmed attendance (Afify 2011). The following discussion leads to this testable hypothesis: *If protest groups combine, then non-group members will participate in protesting.*

**Findings and Implications**

What we find from solving the game is that individual non-group members will only protest if both Group 1 and Group 2 protest. Thus, in this game of complete information, Groups 1 and 2 both choose to protest, as their aim is to get non-group members into the streets. The reason that non-group members only protest when both groups protest relates to the cost/benefit analysis of non-group members. When only one group protests non-group members know from prior incidents that the probability of being arrested is high. With small numbers of protesters, the Egyptian security forces are able to quickly surround and round up protest participants. Thus, the cost of protesting is high. However, when more than one group protests, the number of people protesting is larger, making it difficult for the security forces to arrest everyone, so the probability of being arrested is lower. Hence, when more than one group protests, the probability of being arrested (the cost for non-group members) is lower, making it more likely that non-group members will go into the streets against the regime. This model only works under the initial assumptions that non-group members have prior grievances against the regime and that the grievance frames that groups use resonate with non-group members. Additionally, the model only pertains to non-group member mobilization on the initial day of protesting. Following the first day, subsequent days of protesting are determined
not only by the number of groups demonstrating but also by individual thresholds (Kuran 1991), since individuals know how many others are already protesting in the streets, community sanctions (Petersen 2001), and the actions of government, as the game becomes one between the choices of the government during the uprising and the choices of protesters. Thus, in its entirety, anti-regime protest cannot be seen as a one-time event, but instead as an iterated game that is played multiple times.

The implications of my findings are that multiple groups publicly agreeing to protest encourages non-group members to go into the streets to oppose the regime. While many authors focus on the importance of mobilizing networks, particularly online networks, such a type of mobilization is usually initiated by groups. The difference between groups who agree to protest and individuals who claim they will protest relates to the issue of full information. From prior instances of protests organized by groups, non-group members know that when a group says that it will protest, the group does, in fact, protest. Non-group members also know approximately how many people from a particular group usually show up for a protest. However, when individuals accept a Facebook invitation online, indicating that they will attend an anti-regime protest, the number of those who have accepted the invitation is never the same as the number that actually shows up. Thus, in terms of information, group participation gives non-group members a more accurate measure, prior to the protest, of the number of people who will actually go into the streets than does the number of individuals who accept the Facebook invitation, which provides non-group members with a less accurate number of people who will actually participate in the protest.
The purpose of this section is to emphasize how opposition groups act as the initial catalysts for change. Core organizers function both online, as administrators of their Facebook pages, and offline, holding meetings in physical locations, securing sites for rallies, and forming plans of action. Thus, they serve as intermediaries between online spaces and on-the-ground, physical spaces. In addition to the fact that a number of groups combining encourages individuals to protest, networking, sharing of invites to a protest, and planning of protests all begin with core organizing groups that meet in physical spaces or email back and forth through secure emails outside the public view of Facebook and Twitter.

**Conclusion**

The importance of this chapter is that it examines the ways in which social media, particularly Facebook, aids in building a politically conscious civil society under restrictive regimes and how online civil society may contribute to political participation and political protest. Taking into consideration the advent of social media, it also reconceptualizes Timur Kuran’s work on non-violent protest in Eastern Europe by including a new level of analysis, “online preference,” and reconfigures Roger Petersen’s model of individual participation in rebellion.

In this chapter, I argue that social media, particularly Facebook, assisted in building a politically conscious civil society over the course of a number of years leading up to the Revolution. As we have seen, while individuals were hesitant to take to the streets and protest before the Revolution, they gradually became more and more comfortable being involved in political discussion on Facebook and engaging in online
political actions such as using political Facebook profile pictures. While many individuals were hesitant to participate in public political discussions on the street, Facebook provided a safe environment with a greater level of anonymity where individuals were able to observe that they were not alone in their political ideas. Being able to observe the large number of people expressing their political views lowered the threshold for political participation as political discussion online became normalized.

This chapter also demonstrates that Facebook mobilized the opposition through reinforcing grievances against the regime. As Facebook users were constantly exposed to posts and videos exposing corruption and police brutality, along with information on regime corruption, they became more and more dissatisfied with the regime and its practices. Fomenting anger and resentment is the foundation of anti-regime mobilization.

Theoretically, this chapter tests Timur Kuran’s concept of transitioning from private preference to public preference and adds the intervening step of online preference. As technology progresses, we witness not only new mobilizing tools, but also new mobilizing and protest spaces. Whereas at the time of the Eastern European revolutions the only possibility of mass gathering in opposition to the regime was through street protests, in the era of social media a new and safer space for political protest has been created through Facebook. Those who may not be ready to risk their safety and confront authorities on the ground now have the option of voicing dissent online for others to see and making a stand through political posts and the adoption of political profile pictures.

The chapter also investigates whether social media serves as a stepping stone to on-the-ground protests or whether individuals who protest online will remain in their safe space as an alternative to street protests. As we have seen, many who protested on the
first day of the Revolution protested because of grievances that had been amplified by negative information about the regime on Facebook. Additionally, promotion of the success of Tunisia on Facebook had an effect in moving people offline and into the streets. Reinforcing theories of information cascades and bandwagoning, I have also demonstrated how an individual’s ability to see how many others plan to attend a protest, along with how many Facebook friends say they will be attending, affects his decision to protest and how these factors drew out many protesters for the first day of the Revolution.

The importance of profile pic-to-profile pic interaction adds a new dimension to Petersen’s theories of community based and face-to-face interaction. While not everyone who politically participated online decided to protest in the streets during the 18 days, we are able to see how Facebook affected those who did. Thus, there are two thresholds to overcome, a lower one for going online and a higher one for going into the streets for political protest.

The importance of this chapter is that it not only tests existing theories but also contributes to theory building by adding new dimensions to existing theories. It also investigates the mechanisms that lead individuals from being non-participants to active political participants. However, if we are to examine the Revolution in phases, this chapter only tells the story of political mobilization leading up to January 25th and the motivations of those who protested on the first day of the Revolution. In the next chapter, we will examine how different mobilization tools became more important once the Revolution was underway, how television brought protesters into the streets, and how revolutionary thresholds and bandwagoning can again be reconceptualized when television framing is considered.
Chapter 5  The Effects of Television Framing on Protest Participation

Television plays a central role in the homes of many Egyptians. Prior to 2011, while news was not the primary genre of programming to which Egyptians turned, in living rooms from Sayaida Zaineb to Zamalek talk shows and television soap operas would be left blaring for hours as background noise to housework and mealtimes. However, in a country with an adult illiteracy rate of 28% in 2010 (The World Bank 2014), individuals who could not access social media and newspapers because of their inability to read often turned to television for their news.

Discussing television in Egypt, Lila Abu-Lughod notes that the majority of Egyptians, leading completely different lifestyles, “business tycoons and tenant farmers, Bedouin and urban aristocrats, Islamists and leftists, mothers and movie stars, peddlers and professors - still tend to watch more or less the same television series every evening” (Abu-Lughod 2005, 6). In fact, statistics show that the percentage of households with a television falls between 93% and 97%, with Egyptians watching on average 3.5 hours of television per day during the week and 4.5 hours on weekends (Abdulla 2013, 20). In 2009, there were more than 19 million TV households in Egypt, the highest number in the Arab region. Forty percent of those households had satellite television and all had access to terrestrial television (Dubai Press Club 2010, 87).

In this chapter, I examine how television framing mobilized individuals who were not members of political groups or movements to protest during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution or, alternatively, dissuaded them from protesting. Most interviewees reported obtaining information on the protests from television throughout the 18 days beginning
on January 25th. Though television was a crucial news source from the first day of the Revolution, it became even more significant on January 28th, the beginning of the communications blackout, when Cairo residents lost Internet connection and mobile telephone service due to government disruptions (Richtel 2011). While landline telephones were still operational, television networks, such as Al Jazeera, informed Egyptians about the uprising and political events surrounding it (Tufekci and Wilson 2012) (Hassanpour 2012, 4). During the Revolution, even the April 6th Youth Movement installed a television at its headquarters to keep abreast of events in Cairo and other areas of the country (Al Jazeera 2011).

Previous research has focused on newspaper and television framing of protests (AlMaskati 2012) (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012) (Fornaciari) (Watkins 2001) or on the effect of television framing on viewers’ perceptions of protests (Iyengar 1994) without relating framing to protest mobilization. While other research has attempted to uncover, on an aggregate level, a more direct connection between television and viewers’ decisions to protest (Grdesic 2014), there have been few empirical investigations of how television affects individual decisions to protest (Hassanpour 2012) and even fewer that explore potential influential aspects of television beyond linguistic framing (Detenber, et al. 2007). Additionally, works that investigate on the aggregate level suffer from an ecological fallacy, whereby attributes of individuals are inferred from the attributes of collectivities under investigation to which the individuals belong.

My research addresses the problem of ecological fallacy by directly examining individual decision-making rather than inferring how it works from the available data on the relevant aggregate level. The primary question posed in this chapter is: How does
television framing affect individual decisions to protest or not protest? I argue that television framing is an independent variable that had an impact on individual decisions to protest or not protest. I also argue that the mechanisms through which television framing affects decisions to protest or not protest are the fear abatement and fear enhancement mechanisms. Thus, I argue that individuals decide to protest because of the masses of people already protesting in the streets, individuals know about the masses protesting from seeing them on television, and television influences individual decisions to protest or not protest through triggering the fear enhancement and fear abatement mechanisms.

This research on the role of television in individual decisions to protest or not protest contributes to the literature on media and protest by bridging theories of revolutionary bandwagoning and television framing. While the previous chapter examined how the first protesters in a revolution are mobilized to go out into the streets, this chapter explores how bandwagoning occurs, when additional protesters decide to protest because there are already people protesting in the streets.

In this chapter, I examine how visual framing of protests may be more important in some circumstances than linguistic cues for individuals’ processing of how many people are in the streets. Hence, I argue that it was not only journalists’ linguistic framing, but also visual framing on television that contributed to protester mobilization. I also determine that individuals’ preconceived views were more important than television framing in shaping perceptions of the 2011 revolutionary protests and Mubarak regime. However, while television framing did not alter perceptions, it did alter behavior.
The chapter proceeds in the following manner. The first section will provide an overview of shortcomings in the existing literature on television framing and on revolutionary bandwagoning, identifying situations under which these two programs of study may be combined. I continue by presenting my hypotheses and research questions and then outlining my data analysis methods. Later, I examine the relationship between visual framing and revolutionary thresholds. Finally, I end with some concluding remarks on television and protest.

**Shortcomings of Existing Understandings**

*Information Cascades, Television, and Protest*

The literature on revolutionary collective action and information cascades, where information on protest levels allows individuals to understand the political preferences of others, is vast (Yin 1998) (Lichbach 1998). Rational choice models tackling one of the most central dilemmas in the study of social movements, how to overcome the collective action dilemma, have focused on revolutionary thresholds and bandwagoning (Kuran 1991) (Gavious and Mizrahi 2001), explaining how individuals transform from protest observers to participants.

Central to this chapter is the work of Timur Kuran, who examines protest during the 1989 Eastern European revolutions. Kuran argues that an individual may hold a private view of the government counter to the one he displays in public. Thus, Kuran distinguishes between public preference and private preference. While private preference is fixed at any given instant, public preference is under the control of the individual
When public and private preferences diverge, Kuran labels this act by the individual *preference falsification*. Preference falsification is common under authoritarian regimes, where publically expressing a negative opinion of the government may pose a serious risk to a person’s well-being, or even his life.

In Kuran’s model, different individuals hold varying revolutionary thresholds, which are the particular points at which a person is willing to engage publically in political action. During a revolutionary protest, when public opposition grows and private preferences remain constant, individuals decide to protest at the point at which the external cost of joining the opposition falls below the internal cost of preference falsification (Kuran 1991, 18). In this scenario, Kuran discusses the term bandwagoning, which is when an individual decides to protest after seeing the increasing size of the public opposition. When individuals see large numbers protesting in the streets some may begin to think about alternatives to the status quo, and private preferences may shift against the government, leading to an acceleration of revolutionary bandwagoning (Kuran 1991, 24).

While works produced by Kuran and others (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1998) who model information cascades have greatly contributed to our understanding of why individuals decide to participate in revolutionary protests, they have not explained how individuals obtain information on protest levels. How do individuals find out that protests are occurring? This is a question posed by Crabtree et al. (2014). Even more pertinent, assuming the research on information cascades is accurate, how do individuals know how many people are protesting in the streets? I argue that
television is a means by which individuals uncover both the fact that people are protesting and the size of revolutionary protests.

While there has been some work connecting media to collective action, much of this research has centered on democratic regimes (Tarrow 1989) (McAdam and Rucht 1993) (Johnson 2008) (Boyle and Schmierbach 2009). Few have explored the relationship between media and protest under authoritarian rule (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya 2011). Some of the most innovative research on the topic appears in works on the effect of foreign media, particularly West German television (WGTV), on protest in East Germany and protest diffusion in general (Crabtree, Darmofal and Kiern 2014) (Kern 2011) (Grdesic 2014).

Crabtree et al. (2014) use a natural experiment to examine whether WGTV served as a coordination device for anti-regime protests during the revolution in East Germany and find that it did not. Their analysis determined that WGTV had no effect on the probability of a protest event occurring (Crabtree, Darmofal and Kiern 2014, 18). While the empirical evidence in this study showed no effect of WGTV on protest activities in East Germany, the authors do note that their findings cannot rule out the possibility of the media’s facilitating collective action in other cases (Crabtree, Darmofal and Kiern 2014, 19). While Crabtree et al. find no relationship between WGTV and protest, Grdesic’s results are mixed. Using a time series analysis, he finds that West German coverage of protests correlated with an increase in protests during the first phase of the revolution, but not in the second phase, a time when conditions for organizing eased and state repression was reduced (Grdesic 2014, 93).
Taking a slightly different approach, Kern (2011) looks at the effect of WGTV on protest diffusion, hypothesizing that foreign media facilitates the diffusion of protest in authoritarian regimes by providing information to potential protesters that could not be gained from domestic state-controlled television (Kern 2011, 1181). Using aggregate and survey data from communist East Germany and focusing on university students, Kern finds no evidence that WGTV sped up the depth of protest diffusion during the East German revolution or that exposure to it increased protest participation.

Kern’s work is one of the few that refer to individual-level analysis. While he finds that WGTV is negatively associated with protest participation, he does relate that if “WGTV facilitated the diffusion of protest, exposure to WGTV must have affected protest participation at the individual level” (Kern 2011, 1195). Another study on the individual level that covers the relationship between television and protest is the research on the effect of communication disruption on political unrest by Hassanpour (2012). Hassanpour finds a “significant disparity in the modes of news consumption between steadfast protesters and those who abstained from the protests” (Hassanpour 2012, 1). In fact, analysis of his survey leads to the conclusion that television did not have an impact on protest in Egypt during the 18 days of the 2011 Egyptian uprising, a determination that runs counter to my findings.

As we can observe, there are mixed results regarding the relationship between television and protest in authoritarian regimes, though most of the works under discussion pertain to one instance of revolution in Eastern Europe. The literature as it relates to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution is minimal given that it has only been a few years since the uprising occurred. What is missing from much of the broader literature is a large
number of thorough interviews that go beyond whether there is a correlation between television and protesting to uncover how and through what mechanisms television brings individuals into the streets.

**Television Framing and Influence**

Research on media framing and public perception is extensive, but often limited to democratic regimes (Iyengar 1994) (Wittebols 1996) (McLeod and Detenber 1999) (Detenber, et al. 2007) (Robinson 1968). While the applicability of these studies to an authoritarian framework is unconfirmed, the insights gained from these works are useful in forming hypotheses to be tested on populations living under authoritarian rule. McLeod and Detenber (1999) look at framing effects theory, which takes into consideration not only the construction of news stories by the media, but also how viewers encounter these messages (McLeod and Detenber 1999, 6). McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) use the term *second-level agenda setting* to describe the relationship between the salience of aspects of media coverage and viewer interpretations of news reporting. Rather than solely focusing on how media frames political events, these works connect the messages sent by the media to how audiences receive those messages.

McLeod and Detenber (1999) find strong support for media framing’s influencing of audience perceptions of protest, particularly when the media produces frames that reinforce the status quo (McLeod and Detenber 1999, 16). Shoemaker (1982) found a connection between framing in newspaper stories and readers’ views on a political group’s legitimacy. At the other end of the spectrum, other works have found media had no effect on viewer perceptions of protest. In Robinson’s research on the anti-war
demonstrations in Chicago on August 28, 1968, where television coverage was sympathetic to the protesters who clashed with the police, public opinion remained overwhelmingly unsympathetic. In fact, television stations such as CBS received letters complaining about their interpretation of events and stating that viewers supported police actions (Robinson 1968).

For many, the results are mixed. Detenber et al. (2007) and Iyengar (1994) have found that the effect of media framing varied based on the news topic being discussed and particular circumstances in which ideology and political party affiliation held different amounts of sway. It seems that the influence of media’s framing of political events on viewers depends on a number of factors, including preexisting cognitive orientations and knowledge of the issue. McLeod and Detenber (1999) find that individuals with preexisting knowledge of a news topic will have more entrenched orientations toward the groups and issues depicted in the story (McLeod and Detenber 1999, 19). Thus, media framing is more likely to influence or cause an attitude shift in television audiences where viewers are not well informed about the subject of the story, a conclusion supported by others (Zaller 1992) (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 1976) (Detenber, et al. 2007, 446).

**Hypotheses and Research Questions**

Drawing on the work of Detenber et al. (2007), my research examines the way in which television framing not only influences audience perceptions of protest, but also their decision to protest. There are many ways that television can influence viewers, from voice inflections and facial expressions to body language. Various cues provide the
viewer with signals as to the reporter’s position on an issue (Detenber, et al. 2007) (McLeod and Detenber 1999). Extending beyond the presenter to the camera, “The selection and juxtaposition of visual content can reflect a particular stance or ideological orientation. Indeed, the very nature of images …makes them less obtrusive as framing devices than linguistic constructions” (Detenber, et al. 2007, 444). This study examines the effect of framing by television networks on individual decisions to protest and postulates that (a) the visual imagery of seeing masses of protesters contesting the Mubarak regime in the streets caused potential protesters to protest and (b) individual preconceptions were more important than media framing in influencing television viewers’ perceptions of the protests and the Mubarak regime during the 18 days. Thus, my research questions are: Do television frames affect viewer perceptions of protest? Can framing by television networks influence individual decisions to protest? If so, how? Can framing by television networks influence individual decisions not to protest? If so, how? I therefore pose the following six hypotheses:

H1: Protesters and non-protesters did not learn about the January 25th protests from television prior to January 25th.

H2: Protesters and non-protesters gained information about the protests during the 18 days from television.

H3: Protesters who started protesting after January 25th did so because of the large number of people protesting in the streets.

H4: Protesters who started protesting after January 25th because of the large number of people protesting in the streets determined that number from television.
H5: Protesters and non-protesters who gained information about the protests during the 18 days from television did not change their views on the government after being exposed to television framing.

H6: Television framing did not affect individual decisions to protest.

**Data Analysis Methods**

A number of works on media and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution have analyzed framing by particular media sources without demonstrating why the sources chosen for the study were more important than others or whether Egyptians were even gaining their information from these particular sources (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012) (Fornaciari 2011). In my research, I first conducted interviews asking individuals from which sources they gained information during the 18 days of the January 2011 protests. I then examined the programming and reporting on the Revolution of the most-watched networks, as reported by interviewees, and categorized them into pro-government and anti-government news sources. It should be noted that, as with any typology, there is some gray area where networks may not strictly fit into pro-government or anti-government categories. I was then able to compare pre-January 25th views on the Mubarak regime to perceptions during the 18 days to determine whether the framing conducted by television networks watched caused a change in viewer perceptions of the protests and the Mubarak regime or whether long-held beliefs were a stronger influence than television framing.

In order to investigate whether news framing affected individual perceptions of the revolutionary protests or whether preconceived views dominated how individuals processed news information, I used the answers to questions from my structured
interviews with protesters and non-protesters. I compared prior views on the Mubarak regime with views on that same regime and the protests against it during the 18 days after watching particular news channels. First, protesters and non-protesters were asked, “Prior to the Revolution, were you satisfied with the regime?” in order to uncover their views of the Mubarak regime before the Revolution commenced. Next, the sources of information from which protesters and non-protesters gained information on the Revolution were identified through the questions, “How and when did you first learn about the January 25, 2011, protests?” “Prior to the Revolution, from what sources did you learn that protests were going to take place on January 25th? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?” and “During the 18 days, how did you get information about protests or political occurrences? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?” Because the focus of this segment of the inquiry was the effect of television framing, I only proceeded to investigate data related to protesters and non-protesters who reported television as a source of information on the uprising. From the data collected on which networks each individual watched, I was then able to compare the preferred television networks, which I had previously categorized as pro-regime or anti-regime, to individuals’ pre-revolutionary views of the Mubarak government. Through this comparison I determined whether individuals were watching television networks that presented information about the regime, in relation to the protests, that was consistent with their previously held views or contrary to them.

Weighing the impact of television framing against previously held views would not be possible if I examined only the answers of individuals who watched television networks that framed coverage of the uprising in a manner consistent with their initial
perspective on the regime. However, for protesters who watched television networks that framed coverage of the protests in a manner contrary to their pre-revolutionary perception of the Mubarak regime, I continued by investigating their answers to the questions, “Were there any particular government actions before or during the 18 days that made you decide to go out into the streets and protest?” and “What reasons or issues inspired you to protest in the Revolution?” For non-protesters the questions were, “Were there any particular government actions before or during the 18 days that strongly bothered you?” “During the 18 days did you ever want to go out and protest?” and “What reasons made you decide not to go out into the streets and protest?” If individuals changed their view of the Mubarak regime after being exposed to television framing contrary to their initial perspective, then television framing may have shifted beliefs. However, if individuals did not change their view of the Mubarak regime after being exposed to such framing, then previously held beliefs were more important than television framing in influencing perceptions of the Mubarak regime.

To determine whether television affected decisions to protest based on visual cues of the number of people in the streets, for protesters I combined the answers to the questions, “What reasons or issues inspired you to protest in the Revolution?” and “Why protest during the Revolution and not before?” with the answers to the questions, “Before participating in the revolutionary protests, did you know how many people were already out protesting? If no, how many people did you think were protesting? From what sources did you know this information?” I then linked the answers of the non-protester questions, “During the 18 days did you ever want to go out and protest?” and “What reasons made you decide not to go out into the streets and protest?” with the answer to
the questions, “During the 18 days, did you know how many people were out protesting? If no, how many people did you think were protesting? From what sources did you know this information?” to uncover whether non-protesters who stated that they had wanted to protest because of the large number of people protesting in the streets determined that number from visual cues on television.

Finally, the answers to the questions, “Prior to the Revolution, from what sources did you learn that protests were going to take place on January 25th? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?” and “During the 18 days, how did you get information about protests or political occurrences? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?” were used to determine whether television was a source of news on the protests for both protesters and non-protesters before or during the 18 days.

Results and Discussion

Television as a Source of Information

Through analysis of the data, I found support for H1: Protesters and non-protesters did not learn about the January 25th protests from television prior to January 25th. Leading up to the 2011 uprising, the primary source from which protesters learned about the January 25th protests was Facebook. Non-protesters were more likely to learn about the protests from people talking in the streets or from a friend, colleague, or family member. However, Facebook and word of mouth cannot be seen as two distinct sources of information. The relationship between Facebook and word of mouth must be acknowledged. The January 25th protests were first advertised by movements such as We Are All Khaled Said and the April 6th Youth Movement on Facebook. While tactics such
as distributing flyers, writing political graffiti in public spaces, and holding small
marches were used to inform the public about January 25th prior to the event, organizers
used Facebook as the major tool for imparting information. Thus, most news regarding
the protests disseminated by word of mouth prior to January 25th most probably
originated from Facebook. The purpose of highlighting the relationship between
Facebook and word of mouth is not to downplay the importance of face-to-face
interaction as a means of imparting information but to understand that sources of
information may not function independently. Instead, they may interact to accelerate or
broaden dissemination of protest news.

Comparable to the relationship between Facebook and word of mouth leading up
to the uprising, during the 18 days of protest there may have been a similar
correspondence between television news sources and word of mouth. If one has ever
played the game Telephone, one knows that there is one person, the source, who imparts
a piece of information that is then transmitted through multiple individuals to a final
individual who may receive the original message in its initial form or in a distorted
manner. Information sources are similar to the game of Telephone. Each source does not
act independently but instead relies on other sources of information in the formation of
the final message received by an individual. Thus, news reported on television in its
verbal form may relay information from a variety of individuals, including eyewitnesses
and political experts. The original source of a news story is not always the presenting
journalist, but may be her informants.

When an individual receives information by word of mouth, the original source
may range from a television news report to, as one interviewee recalled, a person’s son
who protested in the Square. Hence, the information that someone received about the protest could have been as direct as that the individual experienced the protest first-hand to as indirect as that a protester informed a news reporter who in turn imparted information to a viewer. Then the viewer might have relayed the information to a neighbor who posted it on Facebook for a final viewer to see. In this scenario, the final viewer will report that he gained the information from Facebook. However, in truth, he received the information from Tahrir Square, television, word of mouth through face-to-face interaction, and then Facebook. We should also not assume the directionality of information. Just as some non-protesters reported gaining information on the uprising from friends or family protesting in the Square, some protesters reported gaining information from non-protester family members sitting at home, whose information most probably derived from television. While it is still important to uncover the direct source from which an individual receives information, these caveats concerning source linkage should be kept in mind.

In contrast to the lead-up to January 25th, when protest information was disseminated widely on Facebook, I found that on January 25th and throughout the 18 days the majority of both protesters and non-protesters reported television as a source of information on the uprising. Sixty-five out of 95 protesters, or 68 percent, and 71 out of 75 non-protesters, or 95 percent, reported gaining information on the uprising from television during the 18 days. These findings give support to H2: Protesters and non-protesters gained information about the protests during the 18 days from television. One hundred percent of protester respondents claimed to have also gained information on the protests from Tahrir Square, which is only logical given that they were at the event
location. However, my study is interested in understanding sources of information outside of protest areas themselves.

The results on the use of television as a news source during the Revolution are not surprising given previous findings on television consumption in Egypt. In addition to the above-cited figures on average daily television viewing in Egypt, Lila Abu-Lughod points to the Egyptian public’s captivation with television dramas, watched religiously by a large portion of the population, claiming, “Television and radio, in Egypt and elsewhere, sit in the home, at the heart of families” (Abu-Lughod 2005, 10). In a 2010 report on television viewership in Egypt, 27 percent of Egyptians reported watching television for sports, 18 percent for movies, 16 percent for news, and 13 percent for general entertainment (Dubai Press Club 2010, 88). An examination of the categories in the report indicates that 64 percent of viewers watched television for entertainment value. These figures can be compared to Meyen (2003), as reported in Grdesic (2014), who found that in 1987 East Germany, 72 percent of viewers claimed that they watched television for entertainment and relaxation while 59 percent reported watching television to gain political information. However, in 1989 during the revolutionary protests, the percentage of individuals who reported watching television for entertainment value remained nearly constant while the number of viewers who reported watching television for information on political events jumped to 77 percent (Meyen 2003, 70) (Grdesic 2014, 94). It may be inferred that some individuals who do not watch television for news purposes but are accustomed to watching television for entertainment may be inclined to flip the channel and watch the news on television when an event as large as a revolution is taking place. One area of further research on this subject would be to identify
individuals who did not seek political news information from any source prior to the Revolution but were avid viewers of entertainment on television and observe how many of them sought news on the Revolution from television.

Regarding Hassanpour (2012), one of the works closest in topic to my investigation of television and the Egyptian uprising, my finding on television as an information source for non-protesters during the 18 days is in agreement with his conclusion, while comparing results regarding protesters leads to a gray area in definition. Hassanpour examines the “disparity in modes of news consumption between steadfast protesters and those who abstained from the protest” (Hassanpour 2012, 1). However, he fails to define what he means by “steadfast.” One might assume he means protesters who protested for a large number of days, but because he does not delineate parameters for who falls into the category of steadfast protester and who does not, I am unable to compare his findings to my work, even though I do have the data on the number of days each of my interviewees protested. Additionally, my work separates information gained inside Tahrir Square from information acquired outside. Thus, when Hassanpour finds that “the most ardent protesters relied heavily on their local social network for receiving updates on the events” (Hassanpour 2012, 2), I am unable to determine whether he is referring to information gained while in Tahrir Square or outside of protest sites. Because of my inability to decipher the limits of the category of Hassanpour’s protester, I cannot determine whether his findings on sources of information for protesters during the 18 days contradict mine or not.

When analyzing the dynamics of protest during the 18 days, it is important to acknowledge that most protesters did not protest every day of the Revolution and those
who did may have gone home for a few hours in a day to take a shower or rest. Thus, even if a protester claims to have protested on a particular day, his presence in Tahrir does not preclude his gaining information from sources other than the protest site on the same day. Protesters were able to watch the news on television at cafes less than one block away from protest sites and obtained information from family members via mobile. Additionally, many interviewees explained that they did not protest all 18 days because of work, school, family responsibilities, fatigue, the necessity of remaining at home to protect their families from looters and thugs, or joining popular committees to protect the neighborhood.

Television and the Number of People Protesting

Now that it has been established that most Egyptians gained information on the 2011 uprising from television during the 18 days, how do we understand the effect of television on individual decisions to protest? Of the 57 protesters interviewed who protested for the first time on January 26th or after, 31, or 54% reported the large number of people protesting in the streets as a reason for their protesting, which was the reason for protest most reported in this category of protester. This finding supports H3: Protesters who started protesting after January 25th did so because of the large number of people protesting in the streets. In this part of the analysis I do not include individuals who protested for the first time on January 25th or before because they were less likely to know how many people were already in the streets protesting and relied more on the number of people who reported that they would protest on that date rather than the number of people who were already protesting. Of the 31 individuals who protested
because of the large number of people already protesting, 10 reported directly knowing or estimating the number of protesters already out in the streets from television before they protested, and from 12 interviewees it can be indirectly inferred that their information source was television. What I mean by indirectly is that while these individuals did not answer the question regarding how they knew about the number of individuals protesting before they themselves went out, I have data on how they learned about the protests. If we are to combine these numbers, 22 out of 31, or 71 percent, of individuals who protested because of the large number of people already protesting in the streets knew or estimated the number of people already in the streets from television, supporting H4: Protesters who started protesting after January 25th because of the large number of people protesting in the streets determined that number from television.

**Television Framing and Attitude Shifts**

From examining the data, I found support for H5: Protesters and non-protesters who gained information about the protests during the 18 days from television did not change their views on the government after being exposed to television framing. There were no individuals who had an unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime prior to the Revolution but then changed to a favorable perception of Mubarak during the 18 days after being exposed to pro-government television framing. Additionally, the number of individuals who held a favorable view of the Mubarak regime prior to the Revolution but then changed to an unfavorable perception of Mubarak during the 18 days after being exposed to anti-government television framing was insignificant. How do we explain these results?
Individual level analysis is important because individuals have different beliefs, experiences, and characteristics. These factors affect decision-making, which is why different people exposed to the exact same information potentially make different choices about whether to protest or not to protest. The differences between them arise from their beliefs and other personal and psychological traits. There are many studies in the literature on media and public perceptions that delve into individual traits as a factor in information processing (Neumann, Just and Crigler 1992) (Pan and Kosicki 1993) as well as research in the field of international relations (Levy 2003) that may provide useful insights as to why protesters and non-protesters make different decisions when faced with the same information.

According to Alexander George, an individual’s beliefs form an interdependent and hierarchical system whose elements are consistent with one another and resistant to change. The more interdependent and hierarchically-organized the belief system, the more the individual tends to discount, as the basis for decisions, any new information that is inconsistent with already existing beliefs, particularly central beliefs. The properties of interdependence and hierarchy make a change in one belief likely to cause a change in others, especially if the initial change is in a belief near or at the center of the hierarchy. The more interdependent and hierarchically organized the belief system, the greater the consistency between the individual’s beliefs and decisions (George 1969).

Examining a range of political psychology works, Jack Levy raises the issue of the influence of cognitive bias, or a person’s prior beliefs, on the observation and interpretation of information. Levy suggests that beliefs create a set of cognitive predispositions that shape the way new information is processed. “The central proposition
is that people have a strong tendency to see what they expect to see on the basis of their prior beliefs. They are systematically more receptive to information that is consistent with their prior beliefs than to information that runs contrary to them. This ‘selective attention’ to information contributes to the perseverance of beliefs. There is a related tendency toward ‘premature cognitive closure’” (Levy 2003, 264-65). People tend to end their information search when they acquire enough information to support their existing views, rather than complete a full information search for a particular problem.

Detenber et al. discuss a mechanism they call accessibility, where “people are cognitive misers who rely on heuristic processing or mental shortcuts to help reduce the load of information processing” (Detenber, et al. 2007, 442). Instead of evaluating a lifetime of all relevant information, associations, and feelings one has stored, individuals interpret information and form opinions based on the most accessible constructs. What this means is that when individuals are exposed to news stories framed in a particular manner, they evaluate the issues in the story based on certain considerations that become more readily accessible because they have been triggered by the framing. “In this way, news frames enhance the accessibility of particular interpretations of characters, events, and issues in news stories” (Detenber, et al. 2007, 442). McLeod and Detenber (1999) conceptualize the effect of television framing on the viewer as shaping the way he thinks about the event or issue rather than causing an attitude shift. Thus, framing causes certain thoughts to be more salient or readily accessible to viewers through their cognitive responses to the way in which the television network frames the story (McLeod and Detenber 1999, 4). Television framing matters in terms of the relationship between
previously held beliefs and experiences and frames that trigger certain associations with these thoughts that are already present.

Iyengar (1994) has demonstrated how media framing of a particular news story can lead viewers to perceive the event in a manner consistent with the leaning of such framing. However, there are studies concluding that television framing is more likely to reinforce previously held public opinions and attitudes than to influence them (Gross 2002) (Pintak 2008, 17). Levy (2003) and George (1969) claim that an individual’s prior beliefs will determine how she processes information. Thus, if she is already unhappy with the Mubarak regime, she will search for information in the news report that supports her already formed views and may even gravitate toward news sources that support her established belief system or ideological perspective (Bartels 1993)(Kern 2011, 1195). While changes in beliefs are possible, they are difficult (Tetlock and Breslauer 1991, 27-31). Individuals tend to actively create meaning from the media sources they encounter (McLeod and Detenber 1999, 4) rather than be influenced by them, particularly when it comes to issues about which the viewer has preexisting knowledge (McLeod and Detenber 1999, 19). Interviewees’ steadfastness in perceptions of the Mubarak regime despite exposure to television framing counter to their viewpoints demonstrates that television served as an accessibility mechanism. Television framing made previously held views more salient, but did not change them.

**Television Framing and the Decision not to Protest**

While television framing did not change individual perceptions of the Mubarak regime, a surprising finding in my study was that television framing affected individual
decisions to protest or not protest. Examining the population of individuals who gained information on protests during the 18 days from television, I separated the data into two groups: individuals who had a favorable view of the Mubarak regime prior to the Revolution and individuals who had an unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime prior to the Revolution. I then further separated these groups into those who were only exposed to anti-regime television framing and those who had at least some exposure to pro-regime television framing and then observed which groups were most likely to protest or not protest. The significant finding in this analysis was that individuals who had a prior unfavorable view of Mubarak and were exposed to pro-regime television framing were less likely to protest than those who had a prior unfavorable view of Mubarak and were only exposed to anti-regime television framing. In the population of individuals who had a prior unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime and were only exposed to anti-regime television framing, 63% protested. However, of individuals who had a prior unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime and were exposed to pro-regime television framing, only 35% protested.
Thus *H6: Television framing did not affect individual decisions to protest* was disproved for this category of interviewees. The effect of television framing on the decision not to protest for this particular population is most interesting because they did not like Mubarak before the Revolution. Thus, they already had a higher potential to protest than the population that had a favorable view of the Mubarak regime prior to the Revolution. The finding that television framing affected decisions to protest or not protest is interesting, but I still needed to uncover what it was about the pro-regime framing that caused potential protesters to stay at home. Thus, I examined individuals’ explanations for their decision not to protest.

For individuals who had a prior unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime, were only exposed to anti-regime television framing, and did not protest, the top reasons for not protesting were fear of government violence against protesters (30%), family pressure

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<th>X2: exposure only to anti-regime TV</th>
<th>Y: protest</th>
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*Individuals who gained information from TV during 18 days*
(22%), and not being political (13%). For individuals who had a prior unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime, were exposed to pro-regime television framing, and did not protest, the top reasons for not protesting were fear of instability/chaos and thugs in the streets (36%), fear of government violence against protesters (27%), and family pressure (27%). Government violence against protesters was depicted more on anti-regime television networks than pro-regime networks, and while it deterred some individuals from protesting, in the next chapter we observe how government violence against protesters was one of the top reasons why individuals decided to protest. However, fear of instability/chaos and thugs in the streets was an issue particularly promoted by pro-regime television networks.

In order to discourage people from going to Tahrir Square, pro-regime channels described armed thugs and criminals roaming the streets and suggested that people stay home to protect their homes and families. Thus, pro-regime television promoted an atmosphere of fear, framing the political situation as chaotic, unstable, and unsafe. Individuals who had a prior unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime and were exposed to such framing were less likely to protest, citing fear of chaos and the need to protect their homes as the reason for not protesting. I label the mechanism produced by pro-regime television framing the fear enhancement mechanism. By framing the political situation as chaotic and unstable, focusing on unsavory people roaming the streets and the necessity for people not to leave their homes unguarded, pro-regime television framing enhanced people’s fears of going out into the streets, causing them to stay at home rather than protest, even if they were opposed to the Mubarak regime. While exposure to pro-regime framing reduced the probability of protest, it should be noted that regarding
protesters with a prior unfavorable view of the Mubarak regime, of those who protested because of the number of people in the streets as seen on television 76% were only exposed to anti-regime television framing.

Visual Framing and Revolutionary Thresholds

Now that we have come to some conclusions regarding the relationship between television framing and individual decisions not to protest, we can continue with an exploration of what it is about the large masses of individuals in the streets that makes individuals decide to protest under an authoritarian regime and how television contributes to an understanding of that number.

Previous Protests

In the decade leading up to the 2011 Revolution there were a number of anti-regime protests beginning with those organized by the Kefaya movement in 2004 to protest against the possible succession of Gamal Mubarak, Hosni Mubarak’s son, to the presidency, unfair presidential and parliamentary elections, and corruption. Later, in 2008, the April 6th Youth Movement, which began its political activities supporting the labor strike in Mahallah al-Kobra, joined in openly opposing the Mubarak regime. Other movements, such as al Baradei’s National Movement for Change and We are all Khaled Said, challenged the unfair political process and police brutality. While these movements attracted a number of online followers, they had difficulty transforming Facebook “likes” into feet on the ground.
The first problem that many anti-regime movements faced was that not enough people knew that protests were going to take place. When asked the question, “Prior to the Revolution, did you know about protests before they occurred?” 129 out of 170 respondents answered “no.” Some even answered that there were no protests before the Revolution. Many who knew of the protests at all heard about them from television after the fact, as anti-regime protests only lasted from half an hour to a few hours before being cracked down on by police. What people saw when they watched the news was described by interviewees as a few people protesting and then a rapid police crackdown and arrest of protesters. Images such as those from 2005, when female Kefaya protesters were beaten and dragged through the streets by Egyptian police, did not exactly encourage others to publically join efforts to counter the regime, especially when there were so few people participating.

At this point, we can identify three dominant reasons for potential protesters to not protest prior to January 2011. First, people did not know that protests were happening. If an individual does not know that protests against the regime are taking place it does not even cross his mind to protest, because there is no precedent for doing so. He does not seek information on groups who protest because he does not know they exist. For the individual who finds out about protests on the evening news, it is too late for him to join. Unless the individual is politically inclined, there is little chance that he will take the time to begin following updates from the movements he saw on television so that he can participate in the next event. Thus, there was a mobilization problem of information flow. Many citizens could not participate in protests because they simply did not know about them.
Second, those who knew of protests after the fact were presented with visual images of protesters being beaten and hauled off to prison. What people saw caused them fear. Women were also concerned about the possibility of being sexually harassed by the police. When individuals saw protesters being beaten or heard stories of what happened to those who were arrested and put in jail, they feared a similar fate, which was a large deterrent to protesting. As one interviewee said, comparing January 25th to previous protests, “People knew if you got arrested this time. Before the 25th, people were taken and disappeared. Sometimes bodies were found in the prison” (Interview#152 2013). The fear of arrest was well-founded. A January 2011 report by Human Rights Watch titled “Work on Him Until He Confesses” documented how the Mubarak government implicitly condoned police abuse and reported numerous first-hand accounts of torture (Human Rights Watch 2011). Interviewees who knew someone who had been harmed by the Mubarak regime prior to the uprising reported friends, family members, or neighbors who had been subjected to everything from brutal beatings and electric shock torture to sodomy. When asked about the potential costs of protesting in the Revolution, while almost every interviewee listed being killed, injured, or arrested, many articulated that being arrested would be worse than being killed on the spot, referring to the fate of Khaled Said. The implication was that it would be better to die with one bullet than to be tortured, or even tortured to death, in an Egyptian prison.

Third, there were very few protesters out in the streets. The number of people attending a protest is a decisive factor when an individual is considering whether or not to protest. The expression “safety in numbers” applies, and relates to the previously discussed issue of fear. When there are only a few protesters countering the regime, it is
likely that all or most of the protesters will be arrested because they are easily outnumbered by the police. However, when masses take to the streets and outnumber security forces, the cost of protesting declines, the idea being that the police cannot arrest everyone. According to one interviewee, prior to the Revolution, “No one had the thoughts of protesting. You would have been an individual standing against a huge regime” (Interview#160 2013).

*The Number of People and Fear Abatement*

Kuran’s proposed explanations for overcoming the collective action problem are: (1) the individual overestimates his personal political influence [cognitive illusion], (2) the individual feels compelled to do his fair share in reaching a jointly desired outcome [ethical commitment], (3) the individual feels the need to be true to himself (Kuran 1991, 24-5). These scenarios do not reflect bandwagoning, where an individual decides to participate in public protest after seeing the size of the public opposition grow. Instead, they explain why an initial few choose to leave their private preferences and expose such preferences publically despite the enormous risk to their personal safety.

The vast majority of a population will not be courageous enough to stand alone or in a small group against a powerful, oppressive regime. Individuals wait until they feel that there are a satisfactory number of people out in the streets before joining in, that is, they hold a revolutionary threshold where a certain number of people must be out protesting before they will protest as well. The reason for having a revolutionary threshold often relates to the previously-discussed concept of safety in numbers. If only a few individuals are protesting, it is likely that all or most will be beaten or arrested.
However, if a large number of people protest, an individual will rationalize that security forces could not arrest everyone. Hence, the more people who protest, the less the chance of being assaulted or imprisoned. One interviewee who was asked about the potential consequences of going out to protest related:

“Getting arrested, sure. Gas bombing for sure. I thought we were going be a really small group so all of us would be arrested…When I saw the number of people, I thought even the police, I didn’t think they were prepared…Before I went out I thought I was going to get arrested, but when I saw the people…” (Interview#11 2013).

Johnston (2014) examines protest under violent repression. He explains that the fear of violence by the regime can be managed collectively and that the effects of fear on mobilization can be reduced when large numbers of people protest in the streets, even though, rationally, the cost of protesting is still high (Johnston 2014, 35). Exploring fear as an emotional state that influences cognitive processes and interpretations of cost/benefit analyses, Johnston uncovers a mechanism he calls fear abatement. “If fear can be transcended by certain collective mechanisms, then mobilization will occur, regardless of how high the costs may seem to detached observers and analysts” (Johnston 2014, 35). When a large number of people protest, despite the reality of government violence against protesters, fear of violence is reduced through the collective mechanism called fear abatement. In this scenario, individuals alter their perception of the cost of protesting in the face of violence because there are so many people willing to do so.

According to Johnston, fear abatement plays a two-step role in protest. First, the fear that motivated Kuran’s concept of preference falsification has to be transcended. Fear abatement breaks the status quo of political silence that gives the regime implied legitimacy (Johnston 2014, 35), and breaking the fear barrier is the first step in
mobilization. Second, when people take to the streets, the collective perception of safety in numbers enhances the second dimension of fear abatement. The perception of safety in numbers is reinforced: “(1) as decreased fear is collectively manifested through the persistence and support of other protesters; and (2) …by the apparent inability of the forces of social control to contain the increasing number of protesters” (Johnston 2014, 35).

During the 18 days, when individuals saw the large number of people protesting in the streets, they realized they were not alone and that others had similar thoughts about the regime. Thus, the private preferences shared by so many now became public. Statements such as, “I always thought before that I was alone. I didn’t know there were so many” (Interview#136 2013) and, “I realized I’m not alone. There are a lot of people like me. I realized others thought like me. Before I thought it was just me and a few more” (Interview#149 2013) were repeated by interviewee after interviewee. Others claimed that they wanted to participate in something bigger than themselves, and an even more unexpected finding related to individuals who went down to watch.

Egyptians are known for being curious. When the government imposes nationwide curfews, people sit on their balconies or go into the streets to see what a curfew looks like. Some interviewees recalled that after seeing the number of people in the streets they went down to the protests to see what was going on and then decided to join in. Even some non-protesters reported gaining information from Tahrir Square. When I pointed out that they said they had not protested, they replied that they were not in the Square to protest, just to watch. As a side note we should be aware that while we often count all the people in the streets as protesters, not everyone in Tahrir Square was,
in fact, protesting. In addition to individuals who claimed to be spectators rather than participants, some drug dealers and women involved in cabaret work cited being in the Square for business reasons.

**Televised Framing Space Filled, Not Numbers**

Up until this point, the chapter has discussed the number of people in the streets in a manner that implies that people actually knew the number of individuals protesting. In reality, that was not the case. When I asked interviewees if they knew how many people were out protesting, or how many people they thought were out protesting, a discussion would sometimes ensue about the number of people reported by news outlets, usually one million or more, and the number of people the interviewee thought spaces such as Tahrir Square could hold, often fewer than the reported figure. “They said it was about a million in Tahrir Square but I don’t think it was a million. It can’t fit a million, just five to six hundred thousand” (Interview#42 2013). I would argue that a) it is not the number of people filling the streets but instead the perception of the amount of space in the streets filled by people that causes individuals to go out and protest and b) for those gaining their information about the number of people in the streets from television, it is not the actual amount of space filled by protesters but is instead the manner by which the television network visually portrays the amount of space filled that is most important in affecting individual perceptions of the number of people in the streets.

My first argument stems not from observations of the January 25th protests but from those of the June 30, 2013, uprising. There was a debate about the number of people protesting on June 30th. Google Earth finally made a statement, after some people cited
them as the source for protester numbers, that they could not determine actual numbers (Egypt Independent 2013). At the same time, as I watched the protests on television with different people in multiple households, the conversation always turned to how many squares and side streets were completely filled with people, which indicated an unprecedented number of people in the streets. It was from observing and participating in these discussions that I uncovered that individuals estimated numbers of people protesting from how much space was filled and that, for most people, it was not even a particular number of people in the streets, as those theorizing about revolutionary thresholds and bandwagoning would argue, but whether people thought the number of people was “a lot” or “not that many.”

When pressed for estimates of how many people they thought were protesting in the January 25th Revolution, many interviewees said they did not know. They just thought there were “a lot.” If they had to give an estimate, some thought “a lot” meant one thousand, some thought it meant ten thousand, and some thought it meant one million. This revolutionary threshold that people held, which theorists often postulate is a specific number, was really not a number but a simple concept of “a lot.” “A lot” is the largest number a person can grasp. Thus, two people will see the same street filled and both will think that there are “a lot” of people out on the street. However, one person thinks that a street that is filled means there are 1,000 people in the street, while the other thinks that the same street’s being filled means that there are 10,000 people in the street. These two differing numbers do not mean that the individuals hold different revolutionary thresholds. Their threshold is related to the visual imagery of the street’s being completely full rather than half full. However, the number they associate with that image
is related to how big a number their mind can conceive, which is articulated as “a lot.” Thus, for the two individuals, 1,000 and 10,000 are actually the same number.

My second argument is exemplified by an interview with a baweb (doorman) from Dokki. He told me that at the start of the Revolution he was watching state television, and because the cameras were focused on side streets and non-protest areas, he believed their reports that there were no protests occurring. At one point he decided to change the channel, and he was shocked to find that Tahrir Square and the streets of Cairo were flooded with protesters. What networks choose to film and how they choose to film it determines how viewers will perceive the amount of space being filled by protesters.

Writing about Czechoslovakia, Johnson (1995) argues that while newspapers and television conveyed the same messages, television had a greater impact because it was “visual, it reached the largest audience, and it penetrated the countryside” (O. V. Johnson 1995, 229). However, the impact of television goes beyond simply reach. We must not assume that media is neutral (Adams 1996, 421). How the camera focuses on the crowd and how a network chooses to visually frame a protest affects perceptions of how much space in the streets is being filled.

According to Kern, mass media in authoritarian regimes is tightly controlled and “instead of increasing the public’s awareness of protest events, they often ignore protests entirely or portray them as the work of foreign agents provocateurs” (Kern 2011, 1180) (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1966). This is, and has been, the case in Egypt, where television has been used as an arm of the state to influence and mobilize the public (Amin and Napoli 2000, 181) (Amin 1997). However, satellite television has been a game
changer with alternate perspectives from the outside being broadcast into people’s homes, sometimes challenging domestic authoritarian regimes. Pintak claims that what has been written about Al Jazeera and its successors is true. “The genie was out of the bottle; with their fingers in the electronic dike, Arab governments tried vainly to stem the flow of information, with only limited success. Al-Jazeera reframed and in many cases created the debate” (Pintak 2008, 17).

From the beginning of the January 25th Revolution, Egyptian state television portrayed the protests as small or non-existent, not only through words, but through focusing their cameras on spaces devoid of protesters. State television was a political agent that had an interest in framing the protests in a manner that downplayed their importance. In contrast, Al Jazeera, an arm of the Qatari state, had an interest in promoting the protests. Kraidy argues that even in 2002, Al Jazeera remained a constant source of tension between Qatar’s rulers and the Egyptian government (Kraidy 2002, 6). During the January 25th protests, Al Jazeera’s cameras seemed to be strategically placed to show angles of the protests that made the streets look the most full. In sum, we can observe that it is not the number of people, but the space filled, that affects individual decisions to protest and, for those gaining their information from television, it is not the actual space filled, but how the television network visually frames the space filled, that influences individual decisions to protest.

**Conclusion**

The importance of television cannot be understated in terms of its role as a means for imparting information and its influence on potential protesters. In this chapter, I have
examined the relationship between television and individual decisions to protest or not protest. I found that television framing is an independent variable that plays a causal role in individual decisions to protest or not protest. Individuals protested because of the masses of people already protesting in the streets, as seen on television. Television framing influenced individual decisions to protest through activating the fear enhancement and fear abatement mechanisms. While television framing did not alter views, it did cause a shift in behavior by discouraging a particular population of potential protesters from protesting through triggering the fear enhancement mechanism.

By re-conceptualizing theories of bandwagoning and revolutionary thresholds, I have suggested that it may be more accurate to replace the idea of number of protesters with spaces filled. Rational choice models are simplified versions of reality that are enormously helpful to our understanding of why people engage in collective action. However, their numerical depictions of revolutionary bandwagoning lead to the assumption that individuals calculate a particular number of protesters in the streets before participating. What I have found is that numbers may not be as relevant as space filled. In future research, when interviewees are asked about the “number” of people in the streets, it might be beneficial to ask them for an actual number and then also ask whether there were “a lot” or “not that many” protesters. This may be a more systematic way to compare the assessed numbers with their actual meaning.

In the previous chapter, we observed the effect of social media on mobilizing the first protesters to take to the streets. In this chapter, we determined that once protests commenced, television was the most importance source of information on the protests and that television framing both deterred and mobilized potential protesters. While we
just explored why individuals decided to join the revolutionary bandwagon, protesting

*despite* the threat of government violence because of the masses of people protesting in
the streets and the collective perception of safety in numbers (fear abatement), in the next
chapter we will observe how the emotional mechanisms of moral shock and national
collective identity led people to protest *because of* government violence against
protesters.
This chapter examines rational altruistic decisions to protest and the emotional mechanisms that produce such decisions. In rational choice approaches, altruism, “the motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare” (Baston and Shaw 1991, 108), entails costs for the individual and benefits for another. In a collective, political approach, political altruism can be defined as “all actions (a) performed collectively, (b) that have a political aim and (c) an altruistic orientation” (Passy 2001, 6).

I find that during the 18 days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, many individuals decided to protest because of the violence against protesters committed by the Mubarak regime. I argue that this decision to protest was altruistic and based on the moral shock of viewing fellow Egyptians being shot at by security forces for demanding their rights. Thus, the decision of whether or not to protest because of violence against protesters entailed a cost of being injured or killed. In this chapter, I also argue that individual desires to come to the aid of those already protesting in the streets was a result of empathetic emotions based on collective identity and a newly-formed vision of national identity countering the Mubarak regime and its failure to meet the needs of its people.

The chapter begins with an analysis of the data on decisions about whether to protest because of violence committed against protesters and continues with an outline of instances of violence during the eighteen days. The following section discusses moral shock as a protest-driving mechanism and interviewee descriptions of experiencing moral shock. Next, I examine concepts of collective identity and nationalism, followed by an exploration of expressions of nationalism in 20th century Egypt. The final section looks at
the new form of nationalism that developed in Egypt in the decade leading up to the 2011 Revolution and how this articulation of collective identity based on victimization and a rejection of the Mubarak regime mobilized individuals to protest. I conclude with a discussion of the place of emotions in rational decisions to protest.

**Government Violence against Protesters**

Findings on the relationship between government repression and protest are mixed, with some results showing that repression encourages protest (Gurr 1970) (Opp and Roehl 1990) (Khawaja 1993) and others demonstrating the contrary (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996) (Gupta, Singh and Sprague 1993), particularly in the short-run (Rasler 1996). In my study, I found that after “the number of protesters in the streets,” the second reason for deciding to protest most cited by interviewees was regime violence against protesters. Forty-four percent of protesters who protested for the first time on January 26th or after claimed that they protested because of regime violence against protesters, and even 53 percent of non-protesters reported being angry about the regime’s violent attacks on protesters. When asked why he decided to protest, one interviewee responded, “Violence against protesters. That’s why most people were against the regime. The regime tried to use power to get out of trouble” (Interview#149 2013).

In the years leading up to the Revolution, the regime had been known to beat and arrest activists in the streets, and videos of police brutality had circulated on the Internet, but the Revolution was the first time that citizens had seen the police take the additional step of shooting at, and even killing, protesters. The extent of regime violence was
unprecedented and disturbed many Egyptians who watched the reports on television or witnessed the brutality live in the streets.

On January 25th, as protests flared up in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Mansura, Beni Suef, and other areas of the country, there were reports that three protesters had been killed in Suez (Fahim and El-Naggar 2011). These first three deaths had an effect on the psyche of the Egyptian population. The regime had actually shot its own people. That day, demonstrators in Cairo were injured in clashes with police, and in addition to protesters being met by security forces in riot gear with water cannon trucks, there were bouts of rock-throwing between the police and protesters (Fahim and El-Naggar 2011).

By the evening, the police had escalated the violence against protesters by attacking the Tahrir sit-in with shotguns and live rounds (El Hakim 2012). When asked why he protested, one interviewee stated, “What I saw on the 25th; the violence. People I saw die in front of me. People were getting killed inside the Ministry of Interior vehicles” (Interview#71 2013). Another interviewee described watching from his balcony on the 25th as the police blocked protesters from marching down his street. When two protesters approached the police to negotiate, they were hit with tear gas. This incident, along with the reality of finding his own apartment filling with tear gas, made this interviewee decide to protest against the regime (Interview#68 2013). In fact, there were many accounts of individuals, near the Square but not protesting, who were angered when they observed plainclothes police beating and arresting protesters (Interview#162 2013).

By Wednesday the 26th, the police were firing rubber bullets, tear gas, and concussion grenades at protesters in Cairo in an attempt to drive demonstrators out of Tahrir Square. Television images showed plainclothes police officers beating
demonstrators (Fahim and El-Naggar 2011), and the Ministry of Interior put out a statement warning that it would “not allow any provocative movement or a protest or rallies or demonstrations” (CNN 2011). “The police were there in the morning to protect the people, but at night they were beating them, also spraying people with water and tear gas. I saw a lot of people on TV where the police ran over them with cars” (Interview#9 2013). In addition to using water cannons and batons to disperse protesters, police fired live ammunition into the air, and a protester and police officer were killed in central Cairo (Al Jazeera 2011). The Committee to Protect Journalists claimed that ten journalists had been beaten by Egyptian security personnel while covering protests (CNN 2011). The attack on journalists only served to fuel the fire. When journalists are attacked it often moves the media to cover protest violence even more, allowing journalists to share their own stories of injury at the hands of the police.

The scene in Suez on the 26th was even worse than on the 25th. Medical personnel in the city reported that 55 protesters and 15 police officers had been injured (Al Jazeera 2011). In Suez, police fired rubber-coated steel bullets, tear gas, and water cannons at protesters, and in Ismailiya the police used batons and tear gas to disperse demonstrators (BBC 2011). In the northern Sinai area of Sheikh Zuweid, hundreds of Bedouin and police exchanged live gunfire, killing a 17-year-old man and bringing the national death toll to seven by the end of Thursday the 27th (Al Jazeera 2011). The significance of the violence that took place was not only that it was an unprecedented use of force by the police but also that the footage was shown on television for the whole country to see (CNN 2011). Hour by hour, citizens sat in their homes watching their compatriots being
shot, beaten, and brutalized by their own government, the most horrific images being played over and over again for maximum effect.

If Egyptians thought the violence that took place up to the 27th was shocking, the brutality that occurred on the 28th was beyond anything they could have imagined. In the early morning of January 28th, which activists had planned as the “Day of Rage”, the government took the extreme, repressive step of shutting down the country’s Internet and blocking text messages (CNN 2011). Possibly afraid of the potential size of the day’s protests and the Muslim Brotherhood’s call for its members to take to the streets (CNN 2011), the regime attempted to stifle mobilization by cutting off communications. The act only intensified anger, and tens of thousands poured into the streets. An upper class student from Zamalek said that cutting off the Internet and phones “sent me into a rage basically. They cut off people’s ability to communicate” (Interview#10 2013).

Another young man from Faisal related that he had protested on January 25th but then decided to return home. Later, on January 27th, there were rumors about an information blackout. He thought it would not actually happen and he and his friends were making jokes about the mere idea that the government would cut communications. Suddenly, while at Cairo Jazz Club, he experienced the blackout. He was “angry” about the power of the government, that they were demonstrating “full power.” He recalled:

“Really I couldn’t imagine that they are this...how hard they think about us, like this silly thing. ‘We’ll do this to stop you.’ But it’s not going to help if I just say, ‘OK they cut the internet,’ and I stay at home. ...the way that [the regime] is still treating these people who are speaking, who just want to be heard, and [the regime] is doing this...because they have the control, they have the power. They used to stop people from talking before, but with this obvious way it was...” (Interview#15 2013).
He also felt that the communications blackout showed that the government was afraid of protesters. The shutdown made him feel that the protesters were gaining ground and that they should continue. Hence, after the shutdown he went back into the streets, remaining camped in Tahrir for the rest of the Revolution.

On January 28th, clashes took place throughout the country, leaving 11 dead and 170 injured in Suez. At least 1,030 were injured nationwide (Al Jazeera 2011). Live television broadcast the events (BBC 2011) as riot police again responded to protesters with rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons. In a television report, BBC Arabic reporter Assad Sawey described his arrest and beating by plainclothes policemen in Cairo (BBC 2011). In a CNN running timeline of events, there were reports of a police truck driving on the 6 October Bridge randomly firing tear gas at point blank range. At 9:45am there were eruptions of automatic and single-shot gunfire in Alexandria, and at 9:49am Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper reported on Twitter that one woman had been killed in the Cairo clashes. At 11:34 am a Cairo protester was shot when he picked up a rock to throw at police (CNN 2011). As protesters began to burn government buildings, a ship captain from Sayaida Zaineb remembered, “I didn’t believe the Sayaida Zaineb police station was on fire until a friend woke me up and told me. I saw with my own eyes a police car running over people and police shooting people.” He made his decision to protest “Because the police were so hard with the people and took them to jail” (Interview#40 2013).

Reports of regime brutality and death continued throughout the day. A twenty-five-year old man from Mansheyat Nasr claimed that he sympathized with the protesters from the beginning. “When I saw the hungry…a lot of people with good education and
don’t work. I’m not educated but thank god I have work.” However, “After seeing violence on the Friday of Anger, I went out” (Interview#74 2013).

By Saturday the 29th, reports from the day before continued to pour in and new incidents of regime repression were exposed to the Egyptian public (Bhaty and Hirst 2011). In Beni Suef, 17 people trying to attack two police stations were shot dead by police. At 5:38pm witnesses said that there were snipers on the roof of the Ministry of Interior building in Cairo firing live rounds at anyone attempting to approach the building. A middle-aged man who worked in the tourism industry described the violence he experienced firsthand: “There were gunshots out of nowhere. You would be standing next to someone and the person would fall. We didn’t know where the shots were coming from” (Interview#22 2013). The severe violence against protesters had a profound effect on those sitting at home. A young circus performer, citing the killing of protesters as the reason he decided to protest, told me, “One of my friends got injured” (Interview#96 2013). For some it was watching the images of unknown citizens being assaulted that caused them to go out into the streets; for others it was knowing people who had been hurt or killed personally.

One regime action that infuriated the public was the releasing of prisoners onto the streets. While Nile TV reported that hundreds of prisoners had escaped from a Fayoum prison (Ahmed, Abdoun and Elyan 2011), interviewees did not see the event as an “escape” but instead a “release” orchestrated by the government to wreak havoc on the population. Police had virtually disappeared from the streets, and men with metal bars and knives were roaming the city of Cairo. An upper-middle class woman from Nasr City described her experience with the lack of security:
“It was the first time I felt scared in Cairo…I was on a train going back from Alexandria and there wasn’t anyone collecting the tickets, and it was the day when the prisoners escaped and there were prisoners on the train. I never felt so scared. And then they had all these army men come with guns, searching for prisoners” (Interview#17 2013).

There were reports of widespread looting, and citizens, armed with machetes and hockey sticks, set up popular committees to protect their residences and local streets.

People barred themselves in their homes and were terrified by rumors of rape and armed robbery:

“I remember, I’ve never been that scared, because there was no police, no army, no control over anything. I remember, it was only me and my mom in the house, I remember everyone was spreading the worst rumors ever. So I remember the night of the 29th it was the hardest night ever. My mom got out the knives, the sticks, anything that could be used as a weapon and it wasn’t a comedy show it was real, we had no one, we had no protection. And all the neighbors were standing down there and I had to go out of my balcony and look and there were three guys around 60 years old and there are two boys around 15 years old and the baweb, and these are the protectors of the realm. These are the only responsible men out there and the women were standing there on the balconies and we were going down and giving them food, but then I’d see a microbus rushing by and they start banging, they had signs, they had like this language. From across the street if you see a suspicious car coming or there are thieves, they banged on the walls or with iron, so it would be loud. And they would say “asha” “asha” which means wake up wake up. We didn’t sleep at all that night and when the landlines worked and I called up my friends in Nasr City, my friend kept saying many people had stories about the thugs and the thieves coming in and raping women and coming in and stealing the houses and killing people and stealing the cars. So this was like, what kind of jungle are we living in? What kind of regime just lets the thieves and the thugs out to kidnap and rape people? You didn’t know if it was rumors or not. Everyone around you is telling you that this is what’s happening. People are being kidnapped, the houses are being robbed, the women are being raped, the cars are being broken. There was no protection. We were so scared. We didn’t get any sleep. I got angry. I got angry. I don’t care what happened in the protests you shouldn’t just let the thieves and thugs out to scare the people off. And I was also angry first because of the people dying and then the reaction…it’s like we’re going to punish you, we’re going to show you who the big guy is here. You can’t just live without us. We are everything. The regime, the police, the ministry of the interior, we are the big boss here. But they’re not. That got me so pissed off, the whole police thing…and they let a lot of thieves and thugs out. That was a big thing. Five hundred prisoners escaped from I don’t know which prison and they’re now on the streets killing and raping women and the police are
not doing anything because they have orders to. Ten-year-old boys and twelve-year-old boys were actually the ones keeping the peace. It was crazy. But they did a good job actually” (Interview#4 2013).

By 11:18pm on January 29, 2011, AFP news agency reported that the death toll from the first five days of protesting had reached 102 and that thousands were wounded (Bhatty and Hirst 2011).

**Battle of the Camel**

In addition to the mass violence in the first week of the Revolution, particularly on the days of the 25th, 28th, and 29th, the incident that most affected decisions to protest was the “Battle of the Camel”. In the afternoon of February 2nd, men on horses and camels entered Tahrir Square in an effort to disperse protesters (Fathi 2012). Leaving 11 dead and over 600 injured, this move to end the protests only provided the Revolution with more momentum.

On the evening of February 1, 2011, President Mubarak gave a speech promising that he would not run for office when his presidential term ended and spoke of his love for Egypt, vowing that he would remain in the country until his death. The speech touched the hearts of many Egyptians, and many protesters left the Square. One lower-middle class man from Shobra explained that after the Mubarak speech, he changed his mind and felt sorry for Mubarak for a little while, “but then the Battle of the Camel happened the next day and I changed my mind back to being against Mubarak” (Interview#91 2013). Another interviewee told me he decided to protest “because I saw people killed…. After the second speech some friends said that they won’t go out and protest again. I told them, ‘You said this because you didn’t lose anyone. If one of your
friends were killed, you wouldn’t say this.’” The next day was the Battle of the Camel and then his friends decided to return to the Square (Interview#88 2013).

Around noon on February 2\textsuperscript{nd}, pro-Mubarak demonstrators began to approach the Square from the Abdel Moneim Riyad opening, led by Abdel Nasser El-Gabry and Youssef Khattab who were members of parliament (Kortam 2013). Then, as the world looked on, men on horseback and camels rode into the Square carrying whips and clubs, viciously attacking protesters. It was one of the most shocking and horrifying incidents of the Revolution. It was later reported that the members of parliament had hired the thugs from the Nazlet El-Saman district of Cairo (Fathi 2012). During the Battle of the Camel, one of my interviewees was whipped twice by a horseman. The interviewee was able to pull one of the riders off of his horse. He described it as “like the old Egyptian movies of people in the time before Islam where people rode horses and made war” (Interview#22 2013). Protesters figured out that the riders were paid by the Mubarak regime when they found LE1,000 in the pocket of one of the horsemen (Interview#22 2013).

Pro-regime marches continued to approach the Square from all directions and one witness reported, "In a matter of minutes, we were outnumbered. We were about 20,000 and they were at least 70,000" (Fathi 2012). The pro-regime demonstrators raided protesters’ tents and removed banners, but anti-regime protesters fought back. As busloads of regime supporters continued to be unloaded near the Square and assailants threw Molotov cocktails at protesters, anti-regime protesters began to break the pavement in Tahrir Square, hurling stones back at their attackers. Toward the evening, as live ammunition was fired at anti-regime protesters, they were able to push the pro-regime attackers out of the Square.
It is clear that violence against protesters was a major factor in individual decisions to protest. As one protester put it:

“I didn’t think [the protests] were going to be big enough, and actually they wouldn’t have been big enough unless the brutal killing and brutality started. So it wasn’t going to be that big unless the police started to be very aggressive against the protesters. That’s when people started to go, started to take actions, and the numbers went down to the streets” (Interview#1 2013).

However, the response “violence against protesters”, to describe why individuals decided to take to the streets only explains why they protested. The aim of this chapter is not only to understand why they made the decision but also what mechanisms were involved in the decision-making process. Thus, the next section of the chapter examines “how” violence against protesters led individuals to leave the safety of their homes and protest, knowing that the government was shooting at demonstrators.

**Moral Shock**

Jasper (1998) divides emotions in social movements into two categories: affective, which are usually based on stable bonds and loyalty (sentiment), and reactive, which are transitory, context-specific emotions, usually in reaction to information and events. Sin (2009) views affect emotions as linked to Affect Control theory, a theory that explains the effectiveness of persuasion in appealing to an individual’s fundamental sentiment about things in society (Berbrier 1998, 440). In contrast, reactive emotions are shorter-term responses to events and are “evoked by external stimuli” (Sin 2009, 92). Rather than a binary, Jasper finds, “Affects and reactive emotions are two ends of a continuum with a grey area in the middle” (Jasper 1998, 402). Two emotions that Jasper sees as primarily reactive are anger and outrage (Jasper 1998, 406). He also finds that
shock, anger, and outrage are emotions that develop outside of a movement or even before individuals join a movement. “Primary emotions such as anger and surprise may be more universal and tied directly to bodily states,” while complex secondary emotions such as compassion or shame may depend more on cultural context (Jasper 1998, 400).

Jasper and Poulsen (1995) use the term “moral shock” to explain how movements recruit strangers who may not even have a network of activist contacts. In this scenario, an event raises such a strong sense of outrage that people become inclined toward political action (Jasper and Poulsen 1995, 498). The types of events that produce moral shock are usually public, highly publicized, and unexpected. Emotions are tied to moral values; therefore, particular emotions of shock and/or outrage may arise when there is a perceived infraction of moral rules. Emotions may be conditioned by our expectations, which derive from knowledge about appropriate conditions in the world (Hochschild 1983, 219-221) (Jasper 1998, 401). In the case of the Egyptian Revolution, moral shock is the emotion/mechanism that best explains why violence against protesters led others to take to the streets. The emotion not only encompasses the “shock” the people felt when presented with unexpected images of violence against their protesting compatriots, but also the assault on moral values felt by those who perceived what was taking place as an injustice.

Gamson (1992) finds that if moral shock is to lead to protest, there must be someone to blame for the problem. In this instance, citizens blamed Mubarak and his regime for the slaughter in the streets. “Protesters were peaceful and didn’t do anything wrong” (Interview#166 2013), a student from Heliopolis declared, citing Mubarak as responsible for violence committed against protesters and viewing protesters as innocent
victims of the brutal regime. “The ability to focus blame is crucial to protest, and it differs according to the perceived ultimate causes and the direct embodiments of each threat or outrage” (Gordon and Jasper 1996) (Jasper 1998, 410). When blame can be assigned, a common response is outrage. From the first few days of the protests when citizens started to fall at the hands of the regime, the Egyptian people began to experience this outrage. “What happened in Suez…Seven people died in the first 3 days. That made all Egyptians angry” (Interview#35 2013).

According to Gamson (1992), injustice is the emotion most closely associated with “the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (Gamson 1992, 32). The outrage felt by Egyptians, as they looked on in horror, sprang from the sense of injustice associated with the killing of protesters. “What really made me go was the amount of brutality and amount of torture that I saw. I couldn’t stay at home while other people were getting killed for just asking for their rights” (Interview#1 2013). According to this particular interviewee, it was “the emotional…even if the number wasn’t that great and I saw the same thing, I would have protested” (Interview#1 2013). Egyptians felt a strong sense of injustice because protesters were being killed for demanding their rights. These were rights to which many people sitting at home believed all Egyptians were entitled. Thus, a common perception was that protesters were justified in demanding “bread, freedom, and social justice” while the Mubarak regime was unjust for shooting protesters asking the state to fulfill these basic needs. This sense of injustice underpinned moral shock and moral outrage.

Moral outrage is a powerful motivator and mobilizer. Moral outrage “plays a significant role in the delegitimation of the polity and the engendering of collective action
whenever state conduct is perceived as arbitrary, as violating willy-nilly what is socially accepted as ‘just,’ ‘allowable’ punishment, and ‘bearable’ suffering” (Reed 2004, 667). A twenty-one-year-old manager for a media company told me, “I protested because of the violence against the protesters, and it wasn’t right. [The regime] was using guns, tear gas, and rubber bullets. It was really bad and I felt bad about that. So I decided to go into the streets” (Interview#39 2013). When asked about her analysis of the costs and benefits of protesting, another interviewee responded:

“I thought every number adds. Every freaking person would help. The amount of injustice you feel, you wouldn’t think of the benefits. You just need to help. Like when you are in the street seeing some guy beating down a woman and harassing her and raping her. You don’t think, ok if I go defend her I will have any benefit because you know he may take you also. He may harass you and you might not be able to stand up to him, but you can’t just stand there and watch” (Interview#1 2013).

Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) argue that protest participation barriers are more difficult to overcome for “first-timers”. In order to motivate first-time protesters, extra incentive is needed. The emotional reaction of being scandalized by what they may deem immoral actions drives first-time protesters to make the decision to protest (Verhulst and Walgrave 2009). Pearlman (2013), theorizing on the role of emotions in the Arab Spring, would place the moral outrage of Reed (2004) into the category of emboldening, rather than dispiriting, clusters of emotions (Pearlman 2013, 392), concluding that moral shock encourages individuals to protest.

Below is an excerpt from an interview with an upper-middle class oncologist who outlined the experiences that led to her decision to protest. Prior to the Revolution she was apolitical. She described the shock and horror of the violence she witnessed and how the sense of injustice led her to protest against the regime and care for victims in Tahrir
Square. Her story was similar to that of many doctors I met who went to the Square to protest and/or provide medical assistance to injured protesters:

“The reason that triggered the protest for me was seeing all these people dying and bleeding in front of me and the women crying and screaming and people were dying for no reason. They were young people, they looked like normal people. A lot of people dying. This was the trigger. I got very pissed. I’m a doctor, I’ve seen many people dying every day, but not like that. It’s so, so cruel. They got shot, they got beat up, and they’re dying, and they did nothing wrong. It was after the events that took place on the 28th, the Friday of Rage…On the 28th I started to be political. I decided I would go, but I went after two days, on the 30th I think. That was the first time ever to be interested in politics. I work in a hospital called Damerdash. It’s a public hospital and on the 28th I was there. My department is the oncology department so there is nothing there going on. I had night shift on the 28th, a 24-hour shift, so I started following the news on TV and then people around me in the hospital started saying there’s gunfire in Tahrir, it’s getting very serious, everyone has to go there, and people started going there, and I couldn’t leave the hospital. I couldn’t understand what was happening, and suddenly they cut off the phone lines, the Internet and all we had was al-Jazeera. And I could see, because the hospital is in Abasaya, but you can see Ramsees from, I could see the October Bridge from, I could see Ramses and I could see Abasaya and I started seeing from far people running and then later on the tanks, so I went down from my building. And then we didn’t have any phone lines but everyone was panicking. The patients were panicking, the nurses, no one could go out or in the hospital. Everyone was trying to reach home so people were starting to panic. I went down and I went to the building where there is the ER and the surgery rooms. We have a big hospital and we are all in the same area, but my building is away from everything else so I went down and then I found ambulances everywhere and people, like my friends in the ER, I have friends in the ER and intensive care, so they were out in the streets in front of the hospital and they were like, we have many many gunshot wounds and people are dying inside, and I saw with my own eyes the ambulances and people being thrown from the ambulances just like 5 or 6 people in front of the hospital and the ambulance rushing back to get more people. And I was standing and I found, this is a public hospital, where people are. It treats the lower class people. I found a woman rushing in with a car, a very expensive car, and she opened the window and she screamed at me, “They told me my son got shot.” She looked very upper class. And she’s like, “my baby’s shot; my son is shot. They told me they brought him to Damardash. Where can I find him?” She didn’t know anything and it’s a very big hospital. And she was panicking and crying and she had another boy sitting beside her, I guess her other son, and he was crying. And I was like, everyone who has been wounded is rushed to the ER. The woman was devastated, she was crying; her son was crying. She just left the car and went out of the car running. And then I went into the ER, I wanted to see what’s going on. I went to the ER and there were patients everywhere. The beds weren’t enough. People were sitting on the floor. There
was every kind of wound there like people with their eyes blown, people with bullets…and a lot of injuries just from the gas. There were a lot of injured people and most of them were young people and every class, like lower class people, upper class people, mostly men, I don’t remember seeing any women…it was the first time for me to see something like that. I had to go back to my department because I was the on-shift doctor there, so I couldn’t really see everything, but then my friends, the next morning, went to the blood bank and… they don’t have any blood donors, the blood is finished because the many wounds they got and many people died. By 7am next morning I went again back. In the morning I went back to the ER, and my friend there, she’s an anesthesiologist, and she works in the OR of the general surgery so she kept, and another boy also, they kept telling me how many people just died and they didn’t even have time to do investigations. People were coming rushing in with wounds everywhere so you just had to do exploration surgery. They didn’t have time to clean the wounds. Many people died this day and they didn’t have the death certificates. Everything was a mess. They didn’t have time to do all the routine work. I remember them saying that the count was 31 dead people at Damerdash, but this wasn’t official. My friends who worked the ER; they said there were 31 dead people. But I don’t think there was ever an official number and most of them didn’t have death certificates with a real cause. And this was my hospital which was not the first hospital that people from Tahrir got to. It was, I think, the third one. So, this is when I decided that I can’t believe this is happening in my country. I’ve never seen anything like that before, and I decided that there has to be something done” (Interview#4 2013).

Reed (2004) finds that morally shocking events not only focus potential participant’s attention on a particular problem but also offer a “cognitive space” for re-evaluating an existing political order based on moral standards or the urgency of the social climate (Reed 2004, 662). In the oncologist’s story, we observe how the morally shocking nature of the events on the 28th led her to re-evaluate her approach, or lack of approach, to the regime, propelling her into the streets to protest.

As Revolutionary violence moved past the first few days, the division between the just and unjust became more solidified in people’s minds. An interviewee who was “angry about government violence” before he went out to protest used the term “martyrs” to describe protesters who had been killed (Interview#85 2013). The use of the term “martyr” implies that he viewed protesters as dying not only for a just cause but also for a
sacred one. Putting dead protesters on a pedestal, making them infallible martyrs, exemplifies people’s distinction between those who were justified in their actions and those who represented injustice. Interviewees discussed the need to protest in order to “complete the goals of people who died on the 25th” (Interview#124 2013) and “support the youth generation who died there” (Interview#122 2013). A few even listed the possibility of becoming a shaheeda (martyr) as a potential benefit of protesting (Interview#124 2013), which is a viewpoint interesting to consider on its own because social scientists often categorize death as a cost of protesting, not a benefit.

Moral outrage can also serve as a revolutionary accelerator (Reed 2004, 656) and sustainer. A twenty-four-year-old woman who worked as a designer recounted, “On TV I saw a guy killed who I saw in Tahrir Square the day before. I could tell by his shirt. That’s what kept me protesting” (Interview#162 2013). While interviewees began by discussing their decision to protest because of violence against people they did not know, as the Revolution continued, they experienced additional shocks when friends and/or family were killed in the protests. These additional shocks had a sustaining effect and caused them to return to the streets day after day. “Once you start spilling blood, there is no stopping it. If I’m a parent and my child got killed, I’d move mountains. Same if I’m a child with parents who got killed” (Interview#165 2013). A young graphic designer said, “Before I was happy with my career and salary. My family and I didn’t get into trouble. No problems with anyone. My father and uncle had good conversations with Suzanne Mubarak. Two friends got killed at Qasr El-Nil. That’s why I kept going out” (Interview#29 2013). While some works (Verhulst and Walgrave 2009) point to moral shocks as a mechanism for instigating first-time protest, I argue that, in addition, a
sequence of additional shocks incurred while protesting may serve as a sustaining
mechanism. Many protesters demonstrated during the day and returned home at night.
Thus, each day, or on many days, they were faced with a new decision of whether or not
to protest. The news that a friend or family member had been killed would produce
additional shocks, which would sustain and accelerate their drive to protest. However, the
death of a friend or a family member was not the only type of moral shock that occurred
once individuals began to protest. When people protest, they tend to create bonds of
community and solidarity with those around them (Oliner and Oliner 1992). Thus, the
shock of seeing a fellow protester killed may produce an effect similar to that when
facing the brutally unjust violation of a relative or close friend and may impel a protester
toward a sustained response.

Collective Identity and Nationalism

In the previous section of the chapter we examined how the moral shock of
viewing violence against protesters caused interviewees to protest. In order to experience
moral shock, an individual must believe that an injustice has occurred, meaning that one
group perpetrated the injustice while another group was victimized. If an individual
views one group as victims of injustice, then it is likely that he either sympathizes or
empathizes with them, a condition necessary to the emotional dimension of moral shock.
Sympathy is “an emotional response stemming from the apprehension of another’s
emotional state or condition, which is not the same as the other’s state or condition, but
consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for the other” (Eisenberg and Eggum 2008, 54),
while empathy means “understanding others’ thoughts and feelings and feeling with
them” (Oliner and Oliner 1992, 380). In the following pages, I argue that the emotional content of moral shock was engendered by empathy with the victims of violence based on nationalist collective identity. I also demonstrate that the form of nationalism that created empathy was not the top down Egyptian nationalism constructed with indoctrination by a series of regimes but was instead a new type of nationalism that took form in the years leading up to the Revolution and was based on feelings of shared grievances and victimization by the regime. The shared victimization as a form of national collective identity was publically proclaimed in the chants heard in Tahrir Square. Thus, the Egyptian people modeled a new national collective identity based on countering the regime, rather than a nationalism constructed by it. This type of collective identity, articulated by those in the Square, caused individuals sitting at home to develop empathy for the protesters. Some studies have shown that high levels of collective identity make individuals more likely to protest under repression (Gupta, Singh and Sprague 1993) (Fireman and Gamson 1979). Chants about previous injustices committed by the regime, injustices to which those sitting at home could relate, coupled with the morally shocking injustice of the attacks on protesters, caused many to go out into the streets to protest.

**Egyptian Nationalism in the 20th Century**

In order to understand the new national collective identity developed in the years leading up to the 2011 Revolution, it is helpful to begin with an outline of other forms of Egyptian nationalism that arose during the 20th century. Nationalism, defined as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 2008, 1), is a type of collective identity. The term “collective
identity” sometimes refers to a feeling of solidarity among members of a social movement, and at other times it may refer to a type of social categorization in whose name a movement claims to speak (Jasper 1998, 415). More generally, identities may be founded on ascribed traits such as race, class, or nationality. Jasper (1998) argues that collective identity is not simply a way of drawing cognitive boundaries. Collective identity is an emotion, “a positive affect toward other group members on the grounds of that common membership. Defining oneself through the help of a collective label entails an affective as well as cognitive mapping of the social world” (Jasper 1998, 415). Thus, participating in a social movement can be a pleasurable act, independent of the movement’s goals and achievements, because protesting allows an individual to articulate something about himself and his morals, finding happiness and pride in them (Jasper 1998, 415).

Over the years, views of nationalism in Egypt have fluctuated between Pharaonism, Egyptian particularist nationalism, Orientalism, and Pan-Islamism (Tibi 1997, 184). National identity has reflected the relationship between the people and the state, as well as the regime’s manipulation of national ideology in order to maintain authoritarian rule.

While the emergence of modern Egyptian nationalism can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when nationalism emphasized territorial factors and external loyalties to the Ottoman Empire (Jankowski 1991, 244), the present discussion begins with the nationalist movement against British domination of Egypt and Sudan, led by Saad Zaghlul. The movement against British colonialism culminated in the Egyptian Revolution of 1919. From March through April 1919, peasants, urban workers, and many
others staged a revolt against thirty years of British domination. The revolt was triggered when four leaders of the Egyptian national movement were arrested on March 9, 1919, and exiled to Malta because they had insisted on recognition of the Egyptian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in order that they might demand acknowledgement of Egypt as an independent state (Goldberg 1992, 261). Adopting slogans of Egyptian nationalism (Goldberg 1992, 262), Egyptians revolted against British rule. The 1919 Revolution was a grassroots movement that saw the emergence of Egyptian liberalism. All walks of Egyptian society were represented in the movement, which expressed Egyptian nationalism as a refutation of foreign domination and exploitation by a colonial oppressor. According to Tignor (1976), the 1919 Egyptian revolution marked “a peak period in the growth of Egyptian nationalism and saw the emergence of Egypt's most important political party. The Wafd was to remain at the centre of political life until the military coup d'etat of 1952” (Tignor 1976, 41).

On July, 23, 1952, military officers, led by Mohammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, staged a military coup. The aim of this Free Officers Movement was to overthrow King Faruq and end the British occupation of Egypt. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 led to the eventual rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the introduction of a new type of nationalism defined by his regime. Musekamp (2010) argues that rather than being static, Egyptian nationalism as a state ideology “has been modified and rearticulated based on challenges the state has faced. The authoritarian regimes in Egypt since 1952 have maintained power as much through ideology as bureaucracy” (Musekamp 2010, 25).

Nasser was an Egyptian nationalist who allowed for the coexistence of Egyptian and Arab identities. The initial form of nationalism to which Nasser subscribed was a
national identity that grew out of opposition to British occupation. Nasser transformed this anti-British nationalism into one that rejected Egypt’s domination by any foreign power. The reasoning behind Nasser’s Arab nationalism became clear on July 26, 1957, when he gave a speech celebrating the nationalization of the Suez Canal and emphasizing the link between Arab nationalism and Egyptian national interests:

“Our policy is based on Arab nationalism because Arab nationalism is a weapon for every Arab state. Arab nationalism is a weapon employed against aggression. It is necessary for the aggressor to know that, if he aggresses against any Arab country, he will endanger his interests. This is the way, brotherly compatriots, that we must advance for the sake of Egypt, glorious Egypt, independent Egypt” (Jankowski 2002, 33-34).

“States do provide many influential and authoritative communications that can greatly influence identities” (Amenta and Caren 2004, 466). In Nasser’s speech, the purpose of focusing on the unity of all Arabs was to demonstrate strength against any potential foreign aggressor. Thus, Arab nationalism served the purposes of Egyptian nationalism and the safekeeping of Egyptian independence, a cause for which Nasser had fought through the Free Officers Movement. Discussing Egyptian sovereignty and independence in another speech at al Azhar, Nasser emphasized the Egyptian “homeland” (watan) and “the people of Egypt” (sha’b misr) as important factors in his view of Arab nationalism (Jankowski 2002, 30). At no point did Arab nationalism overtake Egyptian nationalism as a dominant ideology (Dawisha 2003, 136). Nasser’s Arab nationalism also did not take on a religious tone. In fact, Arab nationalism was a secular ideology rejecting religion as a foundation for national identity. As discussed in chapter three, one of Nasser’s most fundamental domestic challenges was the threat from the Muslim Brotherhood. The secular nature of Nasser’s nationalism aimed to marginalize the Brotherhood.
The integration of Islam into the nationalist discourse took place under the rule of Anwar Sadat and continued during the Mubarak regime as a counter to the Islamist militancy and extremist ideology that emerged in Egypt during the 1970s. Responding to a movement that challenged the secular state by claiming that the regime was apostate, Sadat attempted to co-opt Islamic discourse in order to give the state religious legitimacy in the face of religious opposition. Through a popular referendum in 1979/1980, Sadat amended the Egyptian constitution to include Islam as the state religion and made Islamic law the guiding force in state legislation (Musekamp 2010, 30). Musekamp (2010) argues that the state thus altered the way that it articulated Egyptian nationalism. “However, the state has tried to alter the nationalist discourse only to the extent that Egyptian nationalism both retains credible unifying characteristics and reinforces the legitimacy of the ruling authority, especially in the face of significant domestic opposition from Islamist groups” (Musekamp 2010, 27).

Mubarak continued Sadat’s incorporation of Islam into his nationalist ideology as a means of maintaining and consolidating his power. While attempting to preserve a secular state, Mubarak played lip service to Islam through state censorship of books and films offensive to Islam, promoting religious themes in the media, implementing prayer services in government offices, and opening up controlled public dialogue with the regime’s religious opposition (Musekamp 2010, 32). Both Mubarak and Sadat turned their backs on Nasser’s nationalist ideology. Sadat implemented his infitah (open door) economic policies, reinforced the state’s Islamic status, linked Egypt to the West, and signed a peace treaty with Israel, and Mubarak continued with the coexistence rather than
confrontation approach to Israel (Hatina 2004, 100). Thus, under Nasser and Sadat, state policy reflected de-Nasserization.

Ideologies and norms of the region are not simply inherited from history and tradition but are selectively chosen in modern times to suit the needs of the state or movement. Fred Halliday finds, for example, that “it is contemporary forces which make use of the past: they select and use those elements of the past, national, regional or religious, which suit their present purposes” (Halliday 2005, 322). Halliday (1999) presents the idea of changing national identities depending on the economic, political, or cultural climate. In his *The Formation of Yemeni Nationalism*, Halliday discusses the way in which Yemeni leaders used history selectively, based on the type of nationalism that they wanted to create or the circumstances they faced. The national identity alternated: sometimes they were Arab, sometimes Islamic, and sometimes they derived from the pre-Islamic period as the descendants of Saba and Himyar (Halliday 1999, 27). In a similar fashion, Sadat and Mubarak constructed a national identity that attempted to maintain the secular nature of the state while simultaneously promoting the state’s Islamic legitimacy as a counter to its Islamist opponents.

As we have observed so far, national identity can be created in a bottom up manner, such as during the 1919 Egyptian Revolution with its expression of national identity as opposition to colonialism, or in a top down manner, such as in the attempts of Sadat and Mubarak to construct a national ideology that aided in the maintenance of authoritarian rule in the face of challengers. According to Bourdieu (1991), “The state molds *mental structures* and imposes common principles of vision and division…and it thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national
identity” (Bourdieu 1991, 61). The state engages in a construction and consolidation of a particular vision of the state consistent with the values and interests of those producing them (Bourdieu 1991, 55). “Through the framing it imposes upon practices, the state establishes and inculcates common forms and categories of perception and appreciation, social frameworks of perceptions, of understanding or of memory, in short state forms of classification” (Bourdieu 1991, 68). In the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the Egyptian government made a concerted effort to construct a narrative of national identity that aided in legitimizing its authority and repelling challengers. However, a “regime’s domination over political authority is only as far-reaching as a plausible nationalist ideology permits it to be” (Musekamp 2010, 27).

**Nationalism by the People**

Calhoun (1997) argues that the concept of nationalism partially grew out of popular challenges to the authority and legitimacy of those leading the country (Calhoun 1997, 69). An important part of the development of nationalism was the idea that “political power could only be legitimate when it reflected the will, or at least served the interests, of the people subjected to it” (Calhoun 1997, 69). In the decade leading up to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Mubarak regime began to lose its legitimacy as it failed to serve the interests of the Egyptian people.

In the mid-2000s, political opposition began to grow against the Mubarak regime. As movements such as Kefaya began to form, a new narrative of nationhood developed based on a collective identity of victimization by the regime. This new identity that was constructed and framed by opposition groups in the years leading up to the Revolution
challenged the regime’s legitimacy by faulting the Mubarak government for failing to serve the interests of its people. Early attempts at re-appropriating the idea of Egyptian nationhood for the people were made by the Kefaya movement in 2005. Movement organizers changed the words to the national anthem to include demands for freedom of speech and human rights, singing, “I need revolution to reform my country” (Interview#169 2013). The new words to the national anthem emphasized the denial of people’s rights by the regime and the use of the word “my” indicated that the country belonged to the people, not the regime.

In 2010, the We Are All Khaled Said movement began as a response to the death of a young Alexandrian man who was killed at the hands of police after being tortured. Wael Ghoneim, the founder of the movement, started a Facebook page challenging police brutality under the banner of “We are all Khaled Said”. The significance of the name was that it set a tone of collective identity where everyone was, or could be, Khaled Said. As discussed in chapter three, a large percentage of Egyptians had either endured violation by the state police themselves or knew someone else who had been subjected to it. Thus, the phrase “we are all” emphasized Egyptians’ collective feelings of victimization.

According to Taylor and Dyke (2004):

> “Acting collectively requires the development of solidarity and an oppositional consciousness that allows a challenging group to identify common injustices, to oppose those injustices, and to define a shared interest in opposing the dominant group or resisting the system of authority responsible for those injustices” (Taylor and Dyke 2004, 270).

Benford claims that emotions are “a valid social movement resource” that movement actors “produce, orchestrate, and strategically deploy” (Benford 1997, 419). The fact that We are all Khaled Said was the most popular anti-regime movement
demonstrated that a large number of individuals dissatisfied with the Mubarak regime were ready to cloak themselves in the garments of Khaled Said and say, “I identify with this man; I identify with the collective that feels abused by the police, and the opponent of this collective is the regime.”

In Egypt, the term *al-sha’b* is traditionally used to refer to the Egyptian people (Onodera 2009, 55), but *sha’bi* as an adjective is more often used to mean “popular” in terms of popular quarters (*sha’bi* neighborhoods) or popular music (*sha’bi* music), often implying lower class or from the streets. In 2008, opposition activists such as those from the April 6th Youth Movement, used the term *al-sha’b* (the people) when referring to those who were stripped of their basic rights and suffered poor conditions due to the regime’s failed policies (Onodera 2009, 55). Throughout the eighteen days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the most popular chant was “*Al-sha’b yurid isqaat al-nidham*” (The people want the downfall of the regime). In this chant, *al-sh’ab* was not limited to the lower classes but meant popular in terms of all Egyptians who were not associated with the regime. According to Eyerman (2005), “Demonstrations are processes of identity and empathy formation re-enacting narrative dramas, as public practices, a form of ritual theatre” (Eyerman 2005, 50). Through collective acts, including singing and shouting slogans such as “the people” wanted the “downfall of the regime,” protesters separated the regime from the rest of the nation. The implication was that protesters did not include the regime in its conceptualization of what it meant to be Egyptian. This type of collective identity in opposition to the regime was exemplified by interviewees claiming that the benefit of protesting in the Revolution was “contributing to the regime’s downfall” (Interview#37 2013) and “changing the regime; showing people what Egypt
is” (Interview#6 2013). According to Gribbon and Hawas (2012), “So far removed from the needs and aspirations of the majority of Egyptians was the prevailing government that a thorough rebirth of the concept of popular, collective will was in order” (Gibbon and Hawas 2012, 16).

When asked about their cost/benefit analysis during the decision-making process to protest or not protest, many interviewees gave similar replies saying that the benefit was “not about us; we love this country” (Interview#163 2013) and “I would have felt ashamed if I didn’t protest. This time Egyptians really cared for their country, not personal benefit” (Interview#19 2013). The common theme running though many interviews was that the benefit to protesting was not personal but was instead the improvement of the nation as a whole. When someone says, “If I go out, I could change the country, not for myself, for my country as a whole” (Interview#152 2013), the statement implies a sense of nationalism. However, this nationalism was not the nationalism constructed by the state. It was a new type of nationalism counter to the state that began to take shape in the anti-regime movements leading up to the Revolution and then took off once protests began.

If we reflect back to the different articulations of collective identity in Egypt in the 20th century, the new form of nationalism that took hold during the 2011 Revolution is reminiscent of the 1919 Revolution against British occupation, when the movement defined nationalism as an expression of opposition to foreign domination and a government that collaborated with the exploitative power. However, in 2011, it was not a foreign power but rather a domestic regime that the people rejected. Following 1919, various regimes, rather than the people, defined Egyptian nationalism as a means of
consolidating power. In 2011, the Egyptian people reclaimed the right to determine what it meant to be Egyptian. The new definition of collective identity, based on victimization by the Mubarak regime and the regime’s failure to meet the people’s needs, resonated with those sitting at home.

Interviewees’ decisions to protest were partially founded on a desire to join anti-regime protesters who were reclaiming the narrative of Egyptian nationalism. Rather than submitting to state definitions of Egyptian nationhood that emphasized the country’s, and more particularly the regime’s, distinct place in regional politics, Egyptians were taking back the country for its people saying, “It’s our country and time for people to hear our voices” (Interview#163 2013). The perception of many was that the Mubarak regime had hijacked the country, so it was “Egyptians’ dream to get back Egypt to her real people” (Interview#20 2013).

When discussing the benefits of protesting, one twenty-two-year-old entertainer said, “Justice for everyone, to give everyone his rights. No one is bigger than justice…” (Interview#20 2013). Another interviewee was so passionate about helping his country “get their rights,” a phrase used frequently by interviewees, that he said he had wanted to die if it meant obtaining the rights of the Revolution (Interview#22 2013). Referring to the youth generation who were faced with high unemployment and a dismal future due to regime mismanagement, one woman said she went to Tahrir Square “to give my soul for the country and young generation” (Interview#126 2013), while another explained her participation saying, “Because of my country, to give the young generation what they lost and make the country better” (Interview#128 2013). “By taking back the streets,
protesters – al-sha‘b – took back their rights, and with that, reappropriated an entire lexicon that had been abused by the regime” (Gribbon and Hawas 2012, 17).

According to Turner (1999) and Stekelenberg and Klandermans (2013), when social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, individuals define themselves based on what makes them similar to others (Turner 1999). “The redefinition from an ‘I’ into a ‘we’ as a locus of self-definition makes people think, feel and act as members of their group and transforms individual into collective behavior” (van Stekelenberg and Klandermans 2013, 4). When interviewees heard the protesters’ chants in Tahrir Square, they experienced an emotion of collective identity that propelled them into the streets. A middle class business owner claimed, “I wanted a better leader, not for me, but for my country” (Interview#157 2013), while a middle class film director related, “I was thinking who was there and how many we were. I was looking to see what I could add or share in supporting this. Nobody before this day said anything about Mubarak in a loud voice” (Interview#34 2013). People wanted to join in the “beautiful experience of Egyptian solidarity” (Interview#17 2013). Jasper (1997) claims, “The ‘nation’ is a powerful collective identity capable of inspiring massive mobilization” (Jasper 1997, 361). What we have observed is that a sense of collective identity based on nationalism stimulated the empathetic emotions of potential protesters, causing them to go out and protest in the streets.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrate that when individuals were deciding whether or not to protest, one of the reasons why they made the choice to protest was because of the
violence committed by the regime against protesters. Protesting because of an injustice inflicted on someone else is an altruistic decision. Knowing that the cost of protesting could be injury or death, interviewees still chose to protest because they found a benefit in coming to the aid of fellow citizens.

This chapter also identifies the emotional mechanisms that produce the decision to protest because of violence inflicted on protesters. Uncovering these mechanisms is important to understanding how individuals come to protest and not just the basic answer of why. Thoroughly examining these processes on the individual level may aid in resolving the debate about whether government repression causes individuals to protest more or less (Lichbach 1987), or least provide a more nuanced analysis of the question. Interviewees protested because of the moral shock of seeing protesters brutalized, feeling a sense of injustice that their fellow Egyptians would be killed for demanding their rights. That moral shock arose from the emotion of empathy with protesters already in the streets.

I demonstrate that the empathy felt by those deciding to protest was due to feelings of collective identity based on a newly-developing form of nationalism defined by the Egyptian people rather than by the regime. The new nationalism was founded on feelings of collective victimization resulting from the regime’s persecution of its people and failure to meet their needs. Interviewees sitting at home observed expressions of this national identity in the chants and songs of protesters in the streets and this particular form of collective identity resonated with them, thus producing empathy for protesters.

In the previous three chapters, we examined a number of factors that affected individual decisions to protest. In chapter three we looked at popular dissatisfaction with
the Mubarak regime and how the upper and lower classes shared many grievances due to similar experiences and encounters with the state. In chapter four, we saw how social media affected mobilization. Chapter four demonstrated that social media served as an intermediary step between private preferences and public preferences, lowering the threshold for political participation. It also showed that there were two political thresholds to be overcome, a lower one for going online and a higher one for going into the streets for political protest. Chapter five explored the impact of television framing on decisions to protest and the mechanisms that produce revolutionary bandwagoning. Now that I have produced a comprehensive picture of why and how individuals decided to protest or not to protest in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, in the next section I will examine political opportunities, mobilization, and cycles of protest under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) transitional government.
Part 2

The Transition and Downfall of Morsi
Chapter 7  Protest Dynamics under the SCAF Transitional Government

The previous chapters explored protest mobilization leading up to and during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. This chapter examines how changes in political opportunity structures following the revolutionary protests affected subsequent anti-regime mobilization and the dynamics between the regime and those who contested it. I argue that changes in political opportunities created during the 18-day uprising altered repertoires of contention and reconfigured the power relationship between the regime and its opponents.

I also claim that particular elements of protest dynamics under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) led to a relatively quick transition to civilian rule. The key factors that characterized the interaction between protesters and the government were their interests, concepts of how to achieve goals, strategies, reactions, learning, strengths and weaknesses of each side, concepts of legitimacy, and the changes in political opportunities. The cycles of contention between the regime and its opponents were also permeated by tensions between protesters trying to maintain and further open political opportunities and the regime attempting to close them. The interaction of all these factors eventually served to push SCAF toward facilitating parliamentary and presidential elections. Additionally, I find that there are other ways to view protester perceptions of the regime that are not limited to a weak/strong binary. I argue that protesters did not construe the regime as either weak or strong but instead saw SCAF as challengeable.
The chapter begins with an overview of changes in political opportunity structures. Next I examine SCAF’s role in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, followed by SCAF’s assumption of power. I continue with an investigation of SCAF’s economic and political interests, along with the measures it took to maintain them. In the next section I outline the dynamics of the protest cycle under SCAF and then proceed with analysis of regime-protester interactions under SCAF. Finally, I conclude with an assessment of political opportunities and mobilization under SCAF rule and how they affected the transition to elections and a civilian government.

**Changes in Political Opportunity Structures**

According to Tilly (2006), “The outcome of any particular struggle alters the positions of the participants” (Tilly 2006, 57). Following the 18 days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the positions of both the regime and its opponents had changed significantly. Protesters were empowered by their success in overthrowing Mubarak, which had opened fresh political opportunities. The position of the new government, run by SCAF, had been weakened by these opportunities created by protesters. Protesters had proposed a new legitimacy principle according to which any person or group claiming power would have to be supported by the people. However, it should be noted that, in this case, “the people” refers to those who were active in the streets and not the entire Egyptian population.\(^2\) This new definition of legitimacy was particularly relevant for the ruling military government, as the military had always prided itself on being a military of the people.

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\(^2\) There is also no reliable survey evidence to identify how much legitimacy was granted to the regime by the people.
Political and mobilization opportunities occur during cultural breaks (Zald 1996, 268). By overthrowing the Mubarak regime, protesters created new opportunities for dissent and altered repertoires of contention in Egypt. No longer was opposition to the regime limited to Facebook protests and silent stands. If the people were dissatisfied with their government, the new way to express that displeasure and demand change was through mass protest. Regimes create environments of political opportunities and threats. Any change to the environment produces changes in contention, particularly in the way that regimes repress or facilitate collective action (Tilly 2006, 43-4). Spirals of contention may ensue, which provide new opportunities for claim-making (Tilly 2006, 44). McAdam et al. argue that the repertoires of contention are shaped by the regime that the opposition confronts (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). However, when the opposition’s repertoires change, the regime’s repertoires of response may also be altered under the impact of the opposition it confronts, as occurred during the 18 days. In the year following the 2011 Revolution, SCAF’s answer to mass protests was to alternate between violent repression and concessions. While SCAF continued to rely on old repertoires of violence against protesters, it also employed a new tactic of concessions because it feared losing whatever legitimacy it had in the eyes of the people. SCAF’s inability to close political opportunities through violent tactics without losing its legitimacy eventually led it to acquiesce to opposition demands for quick parliamentary and presidential elections. In the following pages I examine SCAF’s ascent to power, along with its political and economic interests.
The Military during the 2011 Revolution

The role the military played in the transitional period following the 18 days of the 2011 Revolution had its beginning during the protests when the institution made the choice not to back the Mubarak regime. According to Barany, autocratic regimes depend on the loyalty of their soldiers and police (Barany 2011, 29). While there are multiple security apparatuses that work to preserve a regime, such as intelligence agencies, police, and the armed forces, during a revolution “regime survival turns on the military (primarily the army) and its willingness and capacity to bring in the tanks, the heavy weapons, and the men in numbers large enough to contain a mass uprising” (Bellin 2012, 131). Bellin argues that the two factors that determine whether or not the military will repress an uprising are the institutional character of the military and the level of social mobilization (Bellin 2012, 131).

The military’s purpose is to defend the country, maintain security, and protect its own institutional interests. These institutional interests are to maintain internal cohesion and morale within the corps, protect the image and legitimacy of the military, and secure the military’s economic position (Bellin 2012, 131). A military’s decision about whether or not to repress an uprising is shaped by perceptions of the legitimacy of the regime by soldiers, security officials, and the general public; the relationship between the military and the state, as well as civil society; whether the soldiers called upon to suppress an uprising are ethnically divided; the extent to which the military relies on the state; and the military’s relationship with foreign powers (Barany 2011, 29).

The Egyptian military chose not to intervene in the 2011 Revolution and protect the Mubarak regime for a number of reasons. First, conscripts felt a degree of kinship
with the protesters, many of whom were their friends and family; it would, therefore, have been difficult to maintain internal cohesion and morale if soldiers were ordered to shoot at protesters. Second, the military prided itself on being a military of, and for, the Egyptian people. Thus, firing on protesters would undermine the institution’s legitimacy. It would also be difficult to argue that the army was serving the maintenance of order and security if it killed peaceful protesters (Bellin 2012, 132). Third, the military’s economic interests had been diverging from those of the state in recent years as Gamal Mubarak’s cronies impinged on the military’s economic territory (New Sources 2011). Hence, the military was not enthusiastic about stepping in to protect the Mubarak regime. Fourth, the army was not happy with the regime for increasing privileges to police and security apparatuses that employed as many as 1.4 million people (Barany 2011, 32). Finally, while the U.S. government initially supported the Mubarak regime during the Revolution, as time progressed and more protesters were killed, the U.S. began to put pressure on Mubarak to leave and on the military not to intervene on the side of the government.

Under a special relationship, the U.S. government was providing the Egyptian military with a large amount of annual aid, including approximately $2 billion in 2010 (The Telegraph 2011). At the beginning of the 2011 Revolution, many senior Egyptian military officials were being hosted at the Pentagon for the annual bilateral defense talks of the Military Cooperation Committee, which was jointly chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense, Sandy Vershbow, and Lieutenant General Sami Anan, the chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces (Rozen 2011). During the Revolution, President Obama had direct conversations with President Mubarak urging him to step down (Nicholas 2011) and also placed steady pressure on the Egyptian army to deliver on protester demands (Dreyfuss
The U.S.’s announcement that it had assurances from the Egyptian military that it would not fire on protesters (Macey 2011) indicated that the military was circumventing regime authority by engaging in political discussions and decision-making independently of the Mubarak government and that it believed that its interests coincided with the demands of the U.S. government not to repress protesters.

The Mubarak regime lost its legitimacy with the military when it used extensive violence against protesters. “The generals concluded that Mubarak’s mix of concessions (agreeing not to seek reelection or have his son succeed him) and repression (the February 2 attacks) had failed, and that rising violence and disorder would only hurt the military’s legitimacy and influence” (Barany 2011, 31-2). Military leaders realized that they could play a new and important role under a new regime (Gause 2011, 82), and “with Gamal’s crony capitalist allies out of the way, there [was] no longer any competitor whose ambitions [were] a counterweight to the army’s appetite for economic expansion” (Marshall and Stacher 2012).

**SCAF Takes Over**

In an attempt to demonstrate efforts at political reform, on January 29, 2011, Mubarak appointed former spy chief Omar Suleiman as vice-president (Al Jazeera 2011), and in a televised address on the 10th of February, Mubarak handed over “the functions of the president” to Suleiman while retaining the title of president (Al Jazeera 2011). However, on February 11, 2011, Suleiman made a statement on television that Mubarak was stepping down and authority would be transferred to the military’s Supreme Council of the Armed forces (Al Jazeera 2011) led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi,
Mubarak’s veteran defense minister (CNBC 2011). In a statement on the 11th, the military announced that it would eventually lift the emergency law in force when the precarious atmosphere ended and that it would guarantee changes to the constitution, as well as free and fair elections (Al Jazeera 2011). SCAF’s stated objective was to restore stability (Karawan 2011, 43). Its first cabinet included Ahmed Shafik as prime minister, Samir Radwan as minister of finance, Ahmed Abul Gheit as minister of foreign affairs, Counselor Mamdou Mohyiddin Marie as minister of justice, and Lieutenant General Mahmoud Wagdy Mohamed Mahmoud as minister of interior. Ahmed Shafik was a former senior commander in the Egyptian Air Force and had been appointed prime minister by Mubarak on January 31, 2011, during the 18 days of the uprising. Ahmed Abul Gheit had been the foreign minister of Egypt under Mubarak since 2004 and retained his post under SCAF. Lieutenant General Mahmoud Wagdy Mohamed Mahmoud had been appointed minister of interior by Mubarak on January 31, 2011, and had participated in the repression of protesters during the 18 days. Thus, SCAF’s initial cabinet comprised many members of the old regime, including those who had taken action against the Revolution. Not all the newly-appointed ministers were figures from the old regime. Ahmed El-Borai, a prominent law professor and member of the United Nations Committee on Migrant Workers, was appointed minister of manpower and immigration, and Samir Radwan had previously worked for the International Labor Organization (ILO). However, some of the most prominent and politically influential ministries were allocated to Mubarak-era figures.
Military Interests

In order to understand SCAF’s decision-making during its year in power it is necessary to examine the military’s interests, which were predominantly economic. The Egyptian military has had a strong presence in the economy since the 1952 Revolution, also known as the coup of the Free Officers, and assumption of the presidency by Gamal Abdel Nasser. During Nasser’s presidency, the state used nationalization programs to take hold of the country’s economic assets and means of production. The new ruling elite of military officers took charge of managing state-owned enterprises, a task they were unprepared to fulfill (Abul-Magd 2011). In the 1970s, when President Anwar al-Sadat rerouted the Egyptian economy from socialism to a market economy, the military’s economic monopoly began to wane. As the state embarked on a path of privatization of state-owned sectors that the military controlled, the military was forced to share economic influence with crony capitalists who were close to Sadat (Abul-Magd 2011).

The military regained its power after the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Rather than laying off thousands of army officials who were no longer needed, the state decided to establish the National Services Projects Organization (NSPO), an economic body that founded commercial enterprises run by retired generals and colonels (Abul-Magd 2011). The NSPO managed factories that only produced civilian goods (Joudeh 2014). The military enjoyed subsidies and tax exemptions for these enterprises, it was not accountable to any government body, it was above the laws and regulations applied to other companies, and it enjoyed other special privileges. Even after 1992, when President Hosni Mubarak implemented intensive economic liberalization plans, military companies remained untouched and high-ranking army officers benefitted from the government’s
corrupt privatization deals through prestigious positions in newly-privatized enterprises (Abul-Magd 2011).

In addition to the NSPO, the military’s role in the civilian economy was, and still is, also managed by another holding company, The Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI). AOI is controlled by the ministry of state for military production and oversees nine factories that produce civilian and military goods (Joudeh 2014). The army also oversees a number of subsidiaries of state-owned holding companies and has shares in public-private ventures, many of which are embedded in transnational conglomerates “that reach into several economic sectors, from construction and maritime shipping to weapons manufacturing” (Marshall and Stacher 2012). Additionally, retired officers control enterprises that fall under the category of “commanding heights”, “including the Suez Canal Authority (one of the biggest sources of foreign exchange in the country), as well air and sea transport companies (including all sea-ports), electricity, water and sanitation projects” (Raphaeli 2013).

The Egyptian military also partners with foreign companies, such as the Chinese national oil company (Sinopec) for drilling and oil production and Italian companies Breda and ETI for petroleum services and gas stations. The army joined with Chrysler for the assembly of Jeep Wranglers, using funds from its U.S. military aid package for their production (Raphaeli 2013). In addition, the military benefits from maritime transport and overseas investment in the energy sector through its holdings in Tharwa Petroleum, Egypt’s sole state-owned oil company, which engages in exploration and development (Marshall and Stacher 2012).
Military ventures also include real estate. While Egyptian law allows the military to seize public land for the defense of the nation, in reality it has engaged in land seizures for commercial purposes (Raphaeli 2013). The Armed Forces Land Projects has engaged in residential building on public lands confiscated by the military, and the army also owns real estate in Sharm el-Sheikh, a resort town (Raphaeli 2013).

According to Joudeh, “Military enterprises have undercut local entrepreneurship, enhanced a deep-rooted patronage system, and led to unequal development” (Joudeh 2014). The military is able to veto business contracts that interfere with its business interests and has access to reduced-cost state resources. The military also holds a competitive advantage through free labor supplied by conscripts (Cousin 2013). In a secret cable signed by U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey in September 2008, it was stated that “military-owned companies, often run by retired generals, are particularly active in the water, olive oil, cement, construction, hotel and gasoline industries.” Embassy staff claimed, “We see the military's role in the economy as a force that generally stifles free market reform by increasing direct government involvement in the markets” (Simpson and Fam 2011).

It is clear that the Egyptian military can be seen as a business more than a fighting army. Marshall states:

“The Egyptian military produces a staggering array of manufactured goods: kitchen cutlery, flat-screen televisions, agricultural and household chemicals, refrigerators, industrial machinery, railway cars, and election booths. And while many of the military’s factory webpages make a concerted attempt to promote their wares, the careful observer gets the feeling that the production of air conditioners and gas stoves has superseded the production of guns and ammo” (Marshall 2012).
With the military controlling anywhere from 5 to 40 percent of the Egyptian economy (Marshall and Stacher 2012), it becomes clear that one of its primary goals is securing its economic interests.

In an interview on military interests, Robert Springborg claimed that the military was in favor of Mubarak’s privatization initiatives as long as it gained from them. Its reason for opposing intensified privatization efforts in 2004 under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and overseen by Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohie Eddin was that Gamal Mubarak’s cronies, rather than the military, were benefitting from the sale of state-owned enterprises (New Sources 2011).

When SCAF assumed power in February 2011, it began by ensuring that politicians and businessmen would not infringe upon the military’s economic endeavors, pushing out businessmen who challenged the military’s economic position (Cousin 2013). One of its key tactics was its selective anti-corruption campaign. “By jailing big businessmen like Ahmad ‘Izz, an intimate of Gamal’s, and unpopular officials like the former housing minister, Ibrahim Sulayman, the SCAF channeled the public’s demand for justice” (Marshall and Stacher 2012). However, civilian businessmen tied to the military were not targeted for prosecution, signaling that failure to accept the military’s role in the economy would lead to marginalization in the business world. In 2011, the Assistant Minister of Defense, General Mahmud Nasr, made a statement that the military “would never surrender the military-controlled projects to any other authority because these projects are not assets owned by the state but are ‘revenues from the sweat of the ministry of defense and its own special projects’” (Raphaeli 2013).
According to Marshall and Stacher, SCAF created new electoral laws that benefitted supporters of the status quo, with one-third of seats in the lower house of Parliament allotted to single-member districts, giving an advantage to those who profited from the patronage of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) (Marshall and Stacher 2012). SCAF also went further with a provision that half the seats in the lower house be reserved for workers and peasants, slots that were usually filled by retired military and police (Marshall and Stacher 2012). The retired military and police members of parliament “then take up membership in the parliament’s defense and national security committee, the only body with even nominal responsibility for overseeing the military” (Marshall and Stacher 2012). Another attempt by the military to secure its position through legislative channels was SCAF’s March 30, 2011, constitutional declaration that established new rules for the formation of the Constituent Assembly, giving a privileged role to SCAF (Youssef 2013). The declaration infringed on the constitutional document that had passed in the national referendum.

It was never clear whether SCAF desired to engage in direct rule when it came to power after the 18 days, and it can even be argued that SCAF did not want the responsibility of presiding over a country marred by economic troubles and a dissatisfied population with high expectations. However, it is clear from SCAF’s actions during its time in power that its primary aim was to entrench the economic position and institutional independence of the military in a manner that would secure it from challenges by any future regime.
Cycles of Contention

SCAF’s year in power was characterized by cycles of contention, with SCAF taking actions to secure its position and protesters challenging these power-grabbing attempts. In the following pages, I outline how both violent repression and tactics of accommodation failed to quell dissent, eventually forcing SCAF to facilitate a transition to civilian rule.

On February 25, 2011, protesters returned to Tahrir Square and the Parliament Building to demand the dismissal of Prime Minister Shafiq, the release of political prisoners, and the prosecution of those responsible for killing and torturing protesters. Opposition to Shafiq stemmed from his ties to the Mubarak regime. In response, the military violently dispersed the protests, using soldiers and masked plainclothes police to beat and attack protesters with Tasers (Khawly 2012). Later, on March 3, 2011, Shafiq resigned from office, days before a planned sit-in demanding that he step down and after he was shamed on television by writer Alaa Al Aswany for being a member of the Mubarak regime. Essam Sharaf, who had been minister of transportation from 2004 to 2005 under Mubarak, was appointed prime minister in Shafiq’s place, based on the recommendation of opposition activists. In addition to Shafiq, the foreign, justice, interior, and oil ministers also stepped down. The former governor of Minya, Mansour El Essawi, became interior minister, Mohamed Abdel Azi Al-Guindy took on the role of justice minister, and Nabil Elaraby became foreign minister. “The prompt acceptance by the military of Shafiq’s resignation shows the sensitivity of the ruling generals to the demands of the uprising's leaders” (Abd El Ghany 2011).
However, on March 9, 2011, Egyptian soldiers and thugs attacked anti-SCAF protesters. According to a Human Rights Watch report, witnesses claimed that hundreds of men in civilian clothes, armed with wooden sticks, metal pipes, and paving stones, beat protesters in Tahrir Square. Then the attackers and army officers forced protesters into the Egyptian Museum, handcuffed them, and beat them with electric cables, sticks, and metal pipes (Human Rights Watch 2011). It was also reported that female demonstrators were beaten, subjected to electric shock, strip-searched, and forced to submit to virginity checks (Amin 2011). Attempting to suppress protesters’ challenges to its rule, on March 23, 2011, SCAF approved a cabinet decree criminalizing protests and strikes. Anyone organizing or calling for protests or strikes would face imprisonment and/or a LE500,000 fine (Egypt Independent 2011).

SCAF’s anti-protest law failed to quell dissent. Protests in Tahrir Square continued and on April 8, 2011, dubbed “Cleansing Friday,” tens of thousands of protesters, including fifteen to twenty-one army officers, demonstrated against the military government in Tahrir Square, demanding full dismantling of the Mubarak regime and transition to civilian rule (Watson and Fahmy 2011). Protesters chanted, “The army and people are not one hand.” Ten protesting officers were arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison and at least one protester was killed (Ibrahim 2012). In order to break up the protests, police fired shots and beat protesters with batons and Tasers (Reuters 2011). Following the incident, SCAF released a statement saying that the attacks had targeted thugs and members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party who were conducting sabotage in the Square (Ibrahim 2012). In another statement they said that anyone
participating in sit-ins in the Square past the military-imposed curfew was an outlaw (Ibrahim 2012).

Following April 8th, other instances where the military used live ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas to disperse protesters included the May 15, 2011, protests at the Israeli embassy in Cairo commemorating the Palestinian catastrophe (El Deeb 2011) and June 28-29, 2011, when outside of Cairo’s Balloon Theater in the Agouza district and later in front of the Interior Ministry (Lynch 2011) police clashed with demonstrators who were led by relatives of martyrs of the Revolution demanding justice.

On July 8, 2011, tens of thousands demonstrated in Alexandria, Suez, and Cairo, where a month-long sit-in in Tahrir Square was begun with at least 26 political parties and movements taking part (RFI 2011). Protesters called for all politicians linked to the Mubarak regime to be removed from the prime minister’s cabinet, and, accusing SCAF of intentionally slowing revolutionary progress, for the executive power of SCAF to be reduced (Shenker 2011). Many protesters chanted, “Down with the Marshall,” referring to Field Marshall Tantawi (Hauslohner 2011). Additional demands included terminating military trials for civilians, suspending police officers accused of killing protesters, restructuring the Interior Ministry, holding public trials for former members of the Mubarak regime accused of crimes, and creating a better budget that would respond to the needs of the poor (Abdel Kouddous and Slazar 2011). By July 11th, hundreds of university professors were holding simultaneous sit-ins across the country calling for the replacement of university administrators appointed under Mubarak with elected representatives (Abdel Kouddous 2011).
On July 17th, the tenth day of the sit-in, Prime Minister Essam Sharaf unveiled a cabinet shakeup in an attempt to appease protesters. Sharaf, who was being pressured to resign by his former supporters protesting in Tahrir Square, had been negotiating for days with SCAF over the firing of ministers. According to some reports, there was a power struggle taking place between SCAF and the weak civilian government, and a senior military official reminded the local media that “Sharaf was not entitled to appoint or dismiss ministers under the interim constitution” (Shenker 2011). Major General Hassan al-Ruweiny claimed that SCAF was the only body with authority over the cabinet, “a statement likely to infuriate protesters, who have already drawn comparisons between recent public statements by Scaf and the rhetoric deployed by Mubarak's regime” (Shenker 2011).

At least fourteen of the twenty-seven cabinet members were eventually replaced. Hazem el Beblawy, who had previously worked for the United Nations, was named the new deputy prime minister and finance minister, and Mohamed Kamel Amr, a former Egyptian representative to the World Bank and former Egyptian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, was appointed foreign minister (Kirkpatrick 2011). Another prominent change was the replacement of Zahi Hawass by Abdelfattah al-Banna as minister of antiquities (Ahmed 2011). Hawass, a well-known figure in Egypt, had come under criticism for his praise of Mubarak during the Revolution. Other measures taken by the prime minister to address the demands of the sit-in included the firing of over 600 senior police officers accused of violence against protesters during the Revolution (Kirkpatrick 2011). However, the positions of justice minister and interior minister did not change. Though
Interior Minister Mansour el-Essawy and Justice Minister Mohamed al-Guindy were unpopular with protesters, they were well-liked by SCAF.

Despite SCAF’s efforts to address protesters’ grievances, the sit-in continued until August 1, 2011, the first day of Ramadan, when security forces cleared Tahrir Square by force (Chick 2011). Both army soldiers and police participated in shredding tents, as well as arresting and beating protesters. The military deployed over a dozen tanks in the Square to prevent protesters from returning, but by the evening hundreds were back chanting, “Down with military rule” (Afify and Audi 2011). It was also reported that soldiers and police officers stormed the Omar Makram Mosque, where 500 people were praying, and beat suspected protesters (Afify and Audi 2011). Later, on September 9, 2011, the military government extended the emergency law in response to the storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo by anti-SCAF protesters (Associated Press 2011).

One of the most horrifying incidents of SCAF violence against protesters took place on October 9, 2011, in the Maspero district of Cairo. The protests were organized in response to the attack on a church in Aswan by Islamist radicals. Protesters claimed that the government was too lenient on perpetrators of anti-Christian violence and demanded that the governor of Aswan be sacked (BBC News 2011). They also called for Field Marshall Tantawi to step down. Protesters felt that state television was fanning the flames of sectarianism. As thousands of Christians, and some Muslims, marched from the Shobra district of Cairo toward the state television building in Maspero Square, demonstrators were attacked by plainclothes police, and clashes with security forces ensued. At least 24 were killed and 212 injured, as protesters were hit with live ammunition and run over and crushed by military armored vehicles (Ibrahim 2012).
Army soldiers were also reported to have thrown dead bodies of protesters into the Nile (Ibrahim 2012).

The most deadly clashes under SCAF rule took place in November 2011 on Mohammed Mahmoud Street off Tahrir Square. On Friday, November 18, 2011 (Rees 2011), tens of thousands participated in “The Friday of One Demand” protest, calling for SCAF to cede power to civilian rule. Protesters were attacked by military and security forces that fired rubber bullets and tear gas into the crowd (Taylor 2011). Clashes continued when security forces attacked a sit-in in Tahrir Square on the morning of November 19, 2011. The sit-in had been organized by families of those killed or injured during the 18 days of the Revolution and was a continuation of the protests that had been violently dispersed on June 28-29, 2011 (BBC News 2012). News of what had happened to the families spread and demonstrators began to return to the Square. The protests extended beyond the issue of martyrs. “The military is stealing our revolution,” said protester Ihab Farouk. “When we started our revolution in January, we had hope. Now there’s no elections, no security, no money, no jobs. So we don’t trust anyone but ourselves. Now we’re starting a new revolution” (Chick 2011). On November 19th alone almost 50 people were killed and over 1,500 injured by security forces that attacked protesters with tear gas, rubber bullets, and batons (Taha and Kortam 2013).

The intensity of violence perpetrated by both police and military forces against demonstrators during the Mohammed Mahmoud clashes was shocking (Chick 2011). Protesters claimed that the tear gas used against them was stronger than ever before. Symptoms from inhaling it included epileptic fits, coughing up blood, and collapsing (BBC News 2012). Tear gas canisters were also used as weapons, with the security forces
aiming them at protesters. The most horrific aspect of the clashes was the eye snipers. Security forces used snipers to shoot out the eyes of many protesters (BBC News 2012), a number of whom I encountered over the course of my research. Following the violent events, the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party came under criticism by opposition activists for not having officially partaken in the Mohammed Mahmoud battles and supporting protesters (Ibrahim 2012). The Freedom and Justice Party was gearing up for parliamentary elections set to begin on the 28th of November and many felt that the party wanted to avoid coming into direct conflict with the military.

In response to the violent events, SCAF called for crisis talks with major political parties and movements, and on November 21st the interim civilian cabinet, including Prime Minister Essam Sharaf, submitted its resignation, which Field Marshal Tantawi accepted (Middle East Voices 2011). Later, on November 25, 2011, Sharaf was replaced with Kamal El-Ganzouri, who had been prime minister under Mubarak from 1996 to 1999.

On November 22, 2011, Tantawi made a televised statement that a new government with a proper mandate would be formed, parliamentary elections would be held on November 28th as scheduled, and presidential elections would take place by June 2012 (Abdoun and Rabie 2011). Tantawi attempted to reassure the public that a civilian transition would take place by stating that SCAF did not intend to remain in power and that the military had been restrained when attacked with insults and accusations that tarnished its image. According to Tantawi, the transitional process was difficult and, “We do not care who runs for elections and who is elected president and yet we are accused of being biased” (Abdoun and Rabie 2011). He even offered that SCAF would give up
power through a national referendum if it became necessary. In addition to claiming that the military “has not fired a single shot at any Egyptian” (Abdoun and Rabie 2011), Tantawi offered his regrets over the recent clashes and condolences to the families of the victims. He also said that military trials for civilians had been limited and that investigations into the Maspero and Mohammed Mahmoud clashes would be transferred from the military to public prosecution (Abdoun and Rabie 2011). Despite attempts to appease demonstrators, chants of “leave, leave” continued from protesters demanding civilian rule in the packed Tahrir Square. “Many likened the speech to ousted president Hosni Mubarak’s first televised appearance during the January uprising that eventually toppled him” (Abdoun and Rabie 2011). They saw the speech as political theater rather than an offer of real concessions.

On December 16, 2011, army soldiers attacked an anti-SCAF protest camp outside of the Cabinet Building near Tahrir Square. Protesters, who had been staging a sit-in calling for a transition to civilian rule, were beaten with clubs and electric prods (Kirkpatrick 2011). In response, thousands took to the streets. Protesters threw stones at security forces that were building a concrete wall and setting up barbed wire to create a barrier between Tahrir Square and the parliament building. In response, soldiers on rooftops hurled stones back at the protesters. Soldiers in riot gear proceeded to chase protesters through the streets into Tahrir Square and set fire to tents in the Square (Michael 2011). By the end of the clashes, at least three people were dead and 257 wounded (Dahan and Elyan 2011).

Addressing the incident, the prime minister denied that military and police had shot at protesters, instead claiming that the attacks and killing of protesters were
committed by third parties and unknown assailants. In a press conference on state television the prime minister said, “I stress here that the armed forces didn’t engage with protesters and didn’t leave the building” (Michael 2011). He argued that the government was for “the salvation of the revolution” and that protesters outside the Cabinet Building were “anti-revolution” (Michael 2011).

The Port Said Massacre took place on February 1, 2012, when 74 people were killed and over 1,000 injured from violence at the Port Said stadium following a football match between Al-Masry, the home team, and Cairo-based Al-Ahly. When the match was finished, Al-Masry fans ran across the pitch to attack Ahly fans, who were unable to escape because the steel doors of the stadium were bolted shut. Dozens were crushed to death (The Guardian 2012). The police stood by and watched, refusing to open the stadium gates as fans attacked one another with rocks, chairs, knives and swords (Fahmy 2012). Armed thugs were also reported to have arrived at the stadium in cars during the second half of the game (The Guardian 2012).

The next day, in response to the massacre, Al-Ahly fans gathered at the team’s headquarters in Zamalek, Cairo, and were joined by fans from the rival Zamalek football club who came out in support. Anti-regime protesters and football fans chanted against military rule, blaming SCAF for the deaths in Port Said. A 10,000-strong march began from Al-Ahly headquarters to the Interior Ministry near Tahrir Square. The police responded with tear gas, rubber bullets and birdshot, leaving three dead. The health ministry reported 1,500 injured in the clashes (The Guardian 2012). Protests continued for days, with thousands in the streets demanding that SCAF hand over power to civilian rule (Al Akhbar 2012).
The Port Said Massacre was not a sports issue but rather a political one. A particular group of Al Ahly fans, the Ultras, were known to chant anti-SCAF chants at football matches. The Ultras from both al-Ahly and Zamalek clubs had played a prominent role in the Revolution against Mubarak, particularly during the Battle of the Camel, and had challenged state authority. Many believed that the chaos created by the riots in Port Said was used by SCAF to justify further repression and strengthen its ability to crack down on dissenters such as the Ultras. It was also seen as a pretext to re-impose the emergency law that had been recently cancelled (The Guardian 2012). Field Marshal Tantawi had earlier stated that the emergency law would be reinstated if the regime needed to combat “thuggery” (Maass and Petkov 2012). In response to the events, Tantawi declared that the massacre had been caused by violent conspirators who wanted to destabilize Egypt (Maass and Petkov 2012), using a common regime tactic of blaming an unknown third party.

Protests continued on a smaller scale for the rest of SCAF’s rule, but on June 16-17, 2012, Egyptians were finally permitted to vote for a new president, which resulted in the election of Mohamed Morsi. Prior to the election the Supreme Court dissolved the Islamist-dominated parliament on June 14, 2012 (Hearst and Hussein 2012). This action would have benefitted secular candidate Ahmed Shafiq, had he won, and served as a blow to Islamist candidate Mohamed Morsi. Later, SCAF made a few power grabs in the final hours. While the presidential elections were taking place, SCAF passed legislation giving it control of the constitutional drafting process and immunity from oversight, in particular of military activities. It also issued an interim constitutional decree granting itself broad powers over military affairs, the national budget, and legislation under the
new government (Aboulenien 2012). Thus, Morsi began his presidency in a relatively weak position.

**Understanding Regime-Protester Dynamics under SCAF**

During the cycles of contention under SCAF, the regime employed tactics of both violent repression and concessions in order to address protesters in the streets. In the theoretical literature on the relationship between government responses to protests and protesters’ perceptions and reactions to those responses, Rasler (1996) finds that when a regime offers concessions, it further spurs protests. If protesters obtain their desired public good, they are more likely to view protest as the best way to achieve their goals (Muller and Opp 1986) (Ondetti 2006, 85); thus, they continue to protest. “If governments make concessions to the opposition, it raises the expectations that the opposition's goal will be achieved, which in turn encourages people to participate in dissent activities” (Carey 2006, 3). Additionally, offering concessions signals that the government is unable to maintain power with repressive methods (Ginkel and Smith 1999, 304). Policies of accommodation (Carey 2006) under restrictive regimes lead to perceptions that the government is weak and that the weakness can be exploited by protesters. Not only accommodation but also policies of “inconsistent signaling” create views of the regime as inept (Ferrara 2003, 306). Lichbach concludes that inconsistent polices of coercion and accommodation increase dissent because they send mixed signals to the opposition (M. I. Lichbach 1987, 287). Thus, actual or perceived weakness increases the opposition’s belief that it has a higher probability of achieving its goals. Lichbach claims, "Dissidents' beliefs and expectations about their potential successes and
failures are crucial to collective dissent. Rational dissidents do not participate in losing causes” (M. I. Lichbach 1995, 62).

Two problems with the literature on government concessions and protest are: (1) most works assume that concessions offered to protesters by the government are perceived as concessions by the protesters themselves, and (2) these works propose a simple binary where protesters can only understand the regime as either weak or strong. Protesters at the July 2011 sit-in made a number of demands, including the removal of Mubarak-era officials. Sharaf’s response was to ignore the numerous concerns put forth by protesters and focus solely on the issue of ministers who held office under the Mubarak regime. However, the Mubarak-era officials that Sharaf removed were strategically unimportant to SCAF. Thus, the institutional concessions that the prime minister offered were aimed at making sacrificial lambs out of unpopular ministers to whom he was not committed. At the same time, ministers such as the ministers of interior and justice were politically and strategically important to SCAF. The individuals in those positions had to demonstrate unwavering support for SCAF policies. The minister of interior was required to oversee and initiate repressive acts against protesters and opponents of the regime on behalf of the SCAF government. SCAF needed the minister of justice not to oppose constitutional decrees and laws put forth by it to ensure its long-term independence and power. SCAF was unwilling to risk changing the ministers of interior and justice who had demonstrated their allegiance to the interim government. Thus, for SCAF and Sharaf the concessions offered to protesters were not really concessions at all. However, the change in ministers was framed by the regime as offering concessions to protesters.
Possibly more important than the fact that Sharaf’s cabinet shuffle was not really a concession from the regime’s standpoint was the view of protesters that the move was political theater. Protesters did not perceive the removal of these non-strategic ministers as concessions. Instead, when the regime played on pre-existing grievances to offer cosmetic concessions, the act insulted protesters’ intelligence, and they were even more motivated to continue to protest. It is for this reason that after Sharaf changed the composition of his cabinet the sit-in did not end. The literature on protest often does not distinguish between what types of concessions lead to protesters’ viewing the regime as weak. I argue that when protesters perceive the concessions offered by the regime as superficial, when the regime’s gesture towards compromise fails to demonstrate any significant sacrifice on its part, protesters do not perceive such offers as acts of weakness but instead see them as a further affront to protesters and their demands. Additionally, Carey (2006) finds that when protest leads to repression, that repression, in turn, leads to more protest. Repression is not a useful way to quell opposition because it causes the opposition to protest more (Carey 2006, 8) (Francisco 1995) (Khawaja 1993). The regime’s use of violence against protesters, either by itself or in combination with concessions, angered protesters, based on perceptions of injustice described in the previous chapter. An upper-middle class father in his 40s who participated in the Mohammed Mahmoud clashes with his wife by his side explained:

“We show that we don’t care about our lives anymore. We don’t care about our safety. We are in an anger situation. They will not take my country; they will not take my freedom; they will not take my rights…One of my greatest fears is that my kids feel that there is no hope because the revolution is failing” (Interview A 2012).

Thus, the regime’s violent response to protests led to more protesting.
Previous literature argues that concessions will lead protesters to perceive the regime as weak. Thus, there is an inherent assumption that protesters only view the regime they confront as either weak or strong. I posit that there are other ways to view the relationship between the regime and its challengers that are not limited to this binary. On January 25, 2011, protesters opened up political opportunities by staging the first mass protest against the Mubarak regime (InterviewA 2012). These opportunities were opened a bit more on January 28, 2011, when tens of thousands more took to the streets to oppose Mubarak, despite the risk posed by the regime’s violent repression (InterviewA 2012). Opportunities were further opened on February 11, 2011, when Mubarak stepped down in response to 18 days of mass protests against him. One of the purposes of protest under SCAF was to open these opportunities further and continue to challenge the regime in power until the demands of the revolution were met. In contrast, the aim of SCAF’s violent repression of protesters was to try to close the political opportunities that were opened during the Revolution, thus giving SCAF control of the political process. I argue that both when Mubarak and then Sharaf under the directive of SCAF offered concessions to protesters, such acts did not make protesters view them as weak. However, the fact that the regime felt the need to address protester demands in some way signaled that the regime was challengeable. Hence, a distinction must be drawn between perceptions of a regime as weak versus challengeable (Ludovici).

Implied in the view of a regime as weak is that the regime will inevitably be overthrown or that protesters are almost guaranteed to achieve their goals if they persist in their protest, because the regime is too weak to continue to resist. In contrast, to see a regime as challengeable means that protesters are not sure if their demands will be met
through protest. However, there is a space open for the possibility of achieving goals through the acts of protesting and publicly contesting the regime. Protesters’ success in removing Mubarak opened the door to the possibility that a strong regime could be successfully challenged, but it did not ensure such an outcome. In sum, when we examine protest cycles under SCAF, at no point did protesters view SCAF as weak. SCAF had control of the armed forces and their weapons, and it was supported by the country’s major institutions, as well as strategically important ministers. Protesters demonstrated against SCAF despite its strength because the political opportunities that were opened through the successful removal of Mubarak created a perception that the regime might be strong but it was challengeable.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to examine protest dynamics under SCAF and show how the contentious interactions between the military and protesters led to a relatively quick transition to civilian rule. These interactions were influenced by each side’s interests and goals, strategies, relative strengths and weaknesses, and relevant concepts of legitimacy, as well as the changes in political opportunities.

As outlined, the primary goal of protesters was to achieve the aims of the revolution, namely bread, freedom, and social justice. The goals of SCAF were to secure its finances and independence in the face of an unknown future regime. A problem was that the perception of each side about how to achieve its goals led to conflicting strategies. Protesters concluded that the way to achieve the aims of the revolution was through a swift transition to civilian rule. In contrast, SCAF believed that it needed to
remain in power long enough to manipulate laws and institutions in its favor. One side’s strategy to attain its goals was to protest, while the strategy of the other side was to use violent repression against its opponents. Protesting served to sustain and further open the political opportunities that had been expanded by the protests against, and overthrow of, Mubarak, while violent repression aimed to close those newly opened political opportunities. The reaction of protesters to violent repression was to become angry, mobilize more demonstrations, and delegitimize SCAF. SCAF’s response was to offer concessions to protesters because it was afraid of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the population, as the army considered itself a “military of the people”. However, the types of concessions offered were unsubstantial. Protesters continued to protest because their major demands were not met and they were angered by the regime’s violent repression. While protesters did not view SCAF as weak, they nevertheless believed that the regime was challengeable, based on the opening of political opportunities, and thus concluded that protest was the best strategy to achieve their goals. SCAF learned that it could not quell dissent through violence or concessions, so it eventually facilitated the transition to civilian rule arguably much more quickly than would have happened without the protests. Concurring with my assessment, Ibrahim (2012) claims, “The [Mohammed Mahmoud] clashes, which led to numerous subsequent marches and rallies against military rule, ultimately forced the SCAF to provide a formal timetable for relinquishing political power” (Ibrahim 2012).

An important aspect of the interaction between protesters and SCAF was the relative strength of each side. The protest movement held an advantage because it relied on momentum from the recent revolution. The population was on a revolutionary high.
There were a large number of individuals willing to protest repeatedly and they were not afraid to die for their cause. In fact, some viewed dying as a benefit because they would be memorialized as martyrs in the struggle. According to Opp and Roehl, “Repression may generate or raise expectations of important others not to abstain from protest but to increase it. Moreover, informal positive sanctions (prestige, approval, or attention granted to persons who have been exposed to repressive acts) may be generated” (Opp and Roehl 1990, 524). When a movement has many people willing to protest in the face of violence and it has a relatively unified demand for transition to civilian rule, its weaknesses are few. According to Azzam (2012):

“Despite a strong sense among many Egyptians that the revolution has not attained its goals of dismantling the old order, it is clear that the barrier of fear has been broken, so much so that the SCAF is itself now threatened by the new politics of confrontation from the street. The position of the military still remains a ‘red line’ that activists are warned not to cross, but that line is in fact constantly being crossed by activists, journalists and political groups. Never before have so many Egyptians spoken out so openly against the upper echelons of the military” (Azzam 2012, 9).

In contrast to the protesters’ strength, while SCAF had a monopoly on violence, strong coercive capacity, and control of a police force willing to do its bidding, it also had a weakness which centered on its ability to maintain legitimacy. When Mubarak was overthrown by protesters, they made it clear that any new government could only maintain legitimacy through the support of the people. Gamson and Meyer state, “Opportunities open the way for political action, but movements also make opportunities” (Gamson and Meyer 276). By redefining the terms of legitimacy, anti-Mubarak protesters created new opportunities. SCAF was arguably susceptible to this new definition of legitimacy because the army already claimed to be legitimate as a military of the people. Thus, when the chants changed from “the people and the military
are one hand” to “the people and the military are not one hand,” SCAF’s status diminished considerably because it could no longer claim authority based on the will and support of the people. Each subsequent protest further eroded SCAF’s power because protesters were publicly refuting the foundation of SCAF’s claim to legitimacy. Because SCAF could not continue to use violence to close political opportunities without throwing away its legitimacy, it was forced to facilitate democratic elections. This chapter ends with the 2012 transition to civilian rule. In the next chapter, I examine the foundations of opposition to the Morsi presidency.
Chapter 8  Grievances against the Mohamed Morsi Government

When Mohamed Morsi assumed power in June of 2012, he faced a number of economic and political challenges. In addition to an economy that was not recovering after the disruption caused by the 2011 Revolution, military decrees had robbed him of full executive powers. This chapter examines the grievances that the Egyptian population developed against Morsi over the course of his presidency. While structural factors, actions by the military, and remnants of the Mubarak regime that were out of Morsi’s control were the basis of some of the grievances, many others were a result of Morsi’s decisions. While grievances alone did not cause the 2013 uprising against Morsi, they definitely contributed to it.

Morsi’s Election

Understanding how grievances contributed to President Mohamed Morsi’s fall requires first investigating the strength of his political mandate. In June 2012, Morsi was elected president of Egypt in a tight race that saw Morsi capture 51.7% of the vote in an election with a turnout of 51% (The Carter Center 2012). In order to assess the strength of Morsi’s support, it is important to understand the primary reasons why voters elected him. Solid backing came from members of the Muslim Brotherhood and various other Islamist groups seeking to place a candidate with similar ideological values in the presidency. He also gained votes from Islamists unaffiliated with any group or party. However, Islamist support alone was not enough to secure Morsi’s presidential win.
According to interviewees who were not members of Islamist groups, many who voted for Morsi did so because they could not stomach voting for Ahmed Shafiq, who had been a member of the Mubarak regime. “I voted for Morsi because I couldn’t vote for Shafiq. His hands were full of blood” (Interview#163 2013). A lower class student from Ataba claimed, “I was running away from Shafik” (Interview#65 2013). Thus, many voted against Shafiq rather than for Morsi. Others voted for Morsi because he seemed like a “good Muslim” and a “man of the people” or because “he was speaking well. He promised people a lot of things. He was much better than others” (Interview#83 2013). Some people who voted for Morsi and were not Islamists believed that because the Muslim Brotherhood had been persecuted by the regime, they would not do the same to others. “The Muslim Brotherhood did some bad things, were treated badly and went to prison. People chose them because they thought they wouldn’t do what Mubarak did” (Interview#68 2013). Another said, “Before the Revolution I knew people from the Muslim Brotherhood and did volunteer work with them. I liked the social services they provided to the lower class. The Muslim Brotherhood had money, so I thought they wouldn’t steal” (Interview#137 2013). Others simply voted on hope. “I was trying to believe that they were wrong before but would be better” (Interview#66 2013).

Almost half of voters, i.e. 48.3%, did not support Morsi at all and voted for his opponent Ahmed Shafiq, who was favored by many due to his political credentials and experience in the Mubarak regime (Interview#78 2013). Some were also strongly opposed to what was described as “Muslim Brotherhood rule” (Interview#67 2013). There was also a large percentage of the population that did not vote either because they disliked both candidates (Interview#91 2013), they did not have national identification
cards (Interview#76 2013), or they worked in an area of the country far away from their polling station and were therefore unable to vote. Others believed in protest as an agent for change but were not yet convinced that voting would make a difference (Interview#102 2013). What these various reasons for not voting indicate is that not all non-voters were politically apathetic and so they had the potential to be mobilized either in favor or against the president.

Because Morsi’s election was not based solely on solid support by ideologically like-minded voters but was also founded on a mixture of deals with various political factions and on the support of those who opposed Shafiq, when he did not meet the demands of the people he soon learned how weak his political mandate was.

**Expectations and Promises**

The 2011 Egyptian uprising centered on the demands of bread/life, freedom, and social justice. In more specific terms, interviewees cited the poor economic situation, police brutality, and government corruption as their main grievances against the Mubarak regime. Thus, the expectation was that these grievances, along with many others, would be ameliorated swiftly with regime change.

Contributing to Morsi’s downfall were these high expectations, fueled by great promises made by Morsi himself, and the low performance of the Morsi government. When an uprising results in the overthrow of a ruler, the population often has unrealistic expectations that the next person in power will quickly solve all the countries woes. When these expectations are not met, citizens may become disenchanted with the new government very quickly, as can be observed in the case of Egypt post-2011.
During Morsi’s election campaign he vowed to address the security vacuum, traffic congestion, bread scarcities, food shortages, and problems with public sanitation, all within his first 100 days in power (AhramOnline 2012). These promises, which originated in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Renaissance Project (Halime 2013), set very high hopes for a rapid transformation of the economy and success in addressing problems that had plagued the country for decades. Thus, Morsi’s pledges for the first 100 days reinforced the population’s view that the country would turn around swiftly.

Rather than temper these unrealistic expectations, Morsi’s speech in Tahrir Square on June 29, 2012, only served to raise them. In his speech he vowed to advance the tourism sector, achieve justice for the martyrs and wounded of the Revolution, rejuvenate the economy and “alleviate the suffering of millions of Egyptians seeking a decent dignified life,” respect the constitution and law, advance democracy, and establish the principles of freedom and social justice while removing all forms of injustice, corruption and discrimination (IkhwanWeb 2012). Opening his jacket and pushing his security guards aside to show that he was unafraid, because of his support from the people and his trust in God, he proclaimed, “I come to you, today, my beloved Egyptian people, and I wear no bullet-proof vest, because I am confident, as I trust God and I trust you, and I fear only God. And I will always be fully accountable to you” (IkhwanWeb 2012). Morsi promised everything from an inclusive government that represented all Egyptians to justice for the martyrs of the Revolution. Many Egyptians who hesitantly supported him during the elections hoped for a fulfillment of the Revolution’s aims and promises.
The grumbles of a disgruntled population began to be heard soon after Morsi’s first 100 days in power when there was still no security, garbage was not picked up in the streets, traffic congestion was heavy, the economy and tourism continued to decline, and gas shortages and power outages were rampant during the hot summer months. It did not help that Prime Minister Hisham Qandil demanded that people wear cotton clothes and gather in one room in order to save electricity (Al Arabiya 2012). According to interviewees, “Nothing happened in his first 100 days” (Interview#32 2013) and “He didn’t fulfill his promises” (Interview#52 2013). A lower class secretary from Saad Zaghloul supported Morsi in the beginning “because the Muslim Brotherhood were good people and said they were going to do good things for the country. I was satisfied with the promises, but not with the results. The Muslim Brotherhood did the opposite of what they said they were going to do” (Interview#95 2013). Even Morsi admitted that he had failed to meet all his targets (ahramonline 2012).

Morsi’s failure to fulfill his promises in his first one hundred days marked the beginning of a long list of grievances against the Morsi presidency that accumulated over the course of his year in office. The following section of the chapter examines what those grievances were.

**Overview of Grievances**

Examining the data, I find that lower class and upper class interviewees held most of the same grievances, but their ranking of grievances differed. The top reasons for upper class dissatisfaction with the Morsi regime were: Morsi’s speeches and representation of Egypt abroad (44%), mixing religion and politics (32%), political
decision-making and appointments (29%), favoring the Muslim Brotherhood and excluding other groups (25%), and simply disliking the Muslim Brotherhood (19%). The top reasons for lower class dissatisfaction with the Morsi regime were: disliking the Muslim Brotherhood (35%), Morsi’s speeches and representation of Egypt abroad (26%), Muslim Brotherhood militia violence against protesters at the Ittihadiya Palace (25%), favoring the Muslim Brotherhood and excluding other groups (24%), and economic decline (20%). Lower class interviewees were more likely than those in the upper class to be unhappy with the Morsi presidency because of their negative feelings about the Muslim Brotherhood, the violence against protesters at Ittihadiya, and poor economic conditions. While upper class interviewees were also affected by the economic decline, the poor state of the economy had a greater impact on the lower class because they barely had enough money to eat. Upper class interviewees were more likely than lower class interviewees to be unhappy with the Morsi regime because of his speeches and representation of Egypt on the international stage, the mixing of religion and politics, and Morsi’s political decisions and appointments. The lower class was more comfortable than the upper class with mixing religion and politics, but many did not like the Muslim Brotherhood because of its violent history. Where upper class and lower class grievances most coincided was dissatisfaction with Morsi’s pandering to the Muslim Brotherhood and not listening to the demands of the rest of the country.

Other prominent complaints from both classes included the absence of security and stability, electricity and gas shortages, and the fomenting of sectarianism when Islamists used anti-Shi’ite rhetoric during the 15 June 2013 Egypt-Syria Solidarity Conference (Reuters 2013) (Interview#169 2013), as Morsi sat in tacit approval. Some
believed that months of hate speech culminating in the statements made at the Conference contributed to the mob attack killing of four Shi’ite Muslims in the village of Abu Musallim in the Giza governorate on June 23, 2013 (Human Rights Watch 2013). Many also blamed the Morsi government for the accident where a train plowed into a school bus killing 50 people, mostly children (Blair 2012) (Interview#44 2013). When interviewees were asked whether there were any government actions that affected their decision to protest on June 30th, many replied with answers similar to that of a middle-aged woman from Shobra who said, “Everything. He destroyed the country” (Interview#62 2013).

**Economic Woes**

While the Egyptian people attributed the poor state of the economy to Morsi’s inadequacy as president, there was plenty of blame to go around regarding the declining economic situation following the 2011 uprising. The January 25th Revolution and the political unrest that followed led to a fall in the value of the Egyptian pound. In order to prevent the pound from continuing to slide, the policy under the first transitional government of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and that continued under Morsi was to prop up the pound using the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Doing so allowed the value of the pound to remain artificially high (Bradley and Abdellatif 2013). Reserves that stood at $36 billion at the time of Mubarak’s ouster fell to $15 billion by November 2012 (Reuters 2013). By the end of 2012, this currency policy was no longer sustainable, as Egypt’s foreign reserves dropped to record low levels (Werr 2012). Because Egypt relied heavily on foreign imports, low reserve levels caused
problems on a number of levels. As the largest importer of wheat in the world (McFarlane 2013) and of a number of other food products, Egypt faced the problem of a dollar shortage for importing food staples (Badawi 2013). Additionally, international business and transactions were disrupted because U.S. dollars became hard to come by. The Egyptian Central Bank initiated U.S. dollar auctions to prevent a run on the pound (Shahine and El-Tablawy 2012), and banks began to put restrictions on the amount of dollars that could be withdrawn per day. They also charged large fees for transferring money outside of the country. The black market for dollars became very active, with independent money exchanges giving much higher than official rates to individuals selling dollars and charging even higher rates for those trying to buy them (Badawi 2013).

In addition to currency issues, foreign investors were hesitant to risk their capital in Egypt because of the political unrest that never seemed to subside. It was reported by Democracy Index that there was a 700 percent increase in the number of protests in the year Morsi was in power compared to Hosni Mubarak’s final year as president (Taha 2013). There were, on average, 1,140 protests per month in 2013 compared to 176 protests per month in 2010 (Taha 2013). Between January and March 2013 there were over 2,400 protests or strikes. In total, there were 9,427 protests against the Morsi regime during Morsi’s first and only year in power (Taha 2013). Even prior to Morsi’s presidency, from January to June 2012 under the SCAF, there were 185 protests or strikes per month, accounting for 29% of protests in the 2012 calendar year (Aboulenein 2013). The large number of protests, combined with the ever-shifting political landscape of
changes to the law and frequent government appointments and resignations did little to placate investors’ concerns about the stability of the country.

Not only did political unrest scare off investors but it also made tourists hesitant to visit Egypt. Before the Revolution, in 2010, the tourism sector had generated $12.5 billion, but in 2012 that number dropped to $9.4 billion (Farouk 2012). The number of tourists dropped from 14.7 million in 2010 to 9.8 million in 2011 (Egypt Independent 2013). Morsi, who had initially promised to improve the tourism sector, saw the numbers climb to 11.5 million in 2012 (Egypt Independent 2013), but those numbers were nowhere near pre-Revolutionary levels. While some tourists took advantage of cheap package deals to beach resorts such as Sharm el Sheikh and Hurghada, the number of foreigners visiting Cairo and its primary attractions such as the Egyptian Museum and the pyramids was reduced to historically low levels. This in turn led to an increase in harassment of tourists at the pyramids by overly aggressive and sometimes violent vendors (Lynch 2013) who were trying to make money on the few tourists left, further deterring visitors to Cairo.

Another lingering problem for the Morsi regime was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that never was. Given the poor financial state of the Egyptian economy, extending from the time SCAF was in power, the Morsi government attempted to negotiate a $4.8 billion loan package from the IMF (Fahim 2012). However, the terms that the IMF set were politically difficult for Morsi, given that there were already weekly protests against his rule. The demands of the IMF for subsidy reductions and other measures (Bradley and Abdellatif 2013) that would have been an additional economic strain on the average citizen could not be implemented at a time when a large segment of
the population was already voicing its displeasure with the government. Mass protests would have certainly ensued had the IMF demands been implemented.

So far, we can observe that the economic problems in Egypt after the Revolution were a mixture of flawed policies by SCAF that were continued by the Morsi regime, political unrest that deterred investors and tourists, and the population’s lack of confidence in, and support for, Morsi’s political and economic decisions, leaving him in a weak position and unable to implement the hard measures needed to revive the Egyptian economy. Thus, the poor state of the Egyptian economy could be attributed to Morsi, but also to other forces. However, when it comes to mobilizing society against the regime, perception is more important than fact. Instead of a reduction of Egypt’s unemployment rate by 5 percent per year, as was the aim of the Renaissance Project, Egypt’s unemployment rate actually rose from its original 9 percent to almost 13 percent in two years, and during that same time economic growth had slowed to 2 percent from approximately 5.5 percent (Halime 2013). An upper class woman from Zamalek expressed her frustration with Morsi: “His mismanagement of the economy was so severe that it affected everyday life in a very short space of time… petrol shortages, inflation, food prices, and power cuts. Usually it takes years for these things to come into effect” (Interview#37 2013). Upper class interviewees complained of losing money because of electricity shortages and the declining economy (Interview#28 2013) and lower class workers worried about a decline in work opportunities and the inability to make ends meet (Interview#103 2013). The Morsi period was described as “economically the worst days I’ve ever lived” (Interview#50 2013) and “it was unfair under Mubarak and more
unfair under Morsi. He made living hard” (Interview#31 2013). Even graffiti on a wall in downtown Cairo spelled out, “We don’t want beards; we want bread.”

Electricity and Gas

Much of what takes place on the Egyptian political scene is covert, and the reasons for electricity and gas shortages during the Morsi period will never be known for sure. However, there are indications that these problems were partially due to Morsi’s mismanagement, partially due to increased use of electricity and gas as the Egyptian population continued to grow, and partially due to what is known as the ancient regime, or those major players from the time of Mubarak.

There is no question that Egypt has an electricity problem. In Cairo and other major cities, power outages lasted on average 90 minutes on many days in summer 2012. The reason for these shortages was that peak demand for power was approximately 3000 megawatts more than could be provided by the national grid (Sabry 2012). While the actual reason for power outages was tied to a long-term problem of a growing population and a system that could not keep up with demand, conspiracy theories, a popular pastime in Egypt, circulated that electricity shortages were due to Morsi’s providing power to Gaza.

Egypt’s electricity problem is also tied to its gas problem. “Around 70 percent of Egypt’s electricity is produced via natural gas” (Esterman 2013). Egypt has had a long-term fuel problem, reportedly due to hoarding and black market sales of gas (Kirkpatrick 2012) (Sabry 2012), along with the currency crisis and corruption (Kirkpatrick 2013). While Egypt has petroleum resources, it is unable to attract a satisfactory amount of
investment in oil and gas to meet its energy needs (Esterman 2014). The country requires outside investment because bringing natural gas to the market-place is both difficult and expensive. Under Mubarak, Egypt engaged in long-term contracts to spread cost risks and “in order to secure agreements between buyers and sellers, promote cost stability and assure investors that they’ll have time to recoup their capital outlay” (Esterman 2014). However, such contracts locked Egypt into low export prices. From the Mubarak era to 2012, Egypt exported its surplus natural gas to Israel at below market prices. This contractual obligation to export gas at below-market rates left a shortage of gas for its own country, thus forcing Egypt to compete on the global market to import gas (Esterman 2013). In addition to the difference between Egypt’s export and import prices due to the lack of uniformity in the natural gas market and the fact that there is no actual market price for gas, gas contracts signed in the early 2000s under the Mubarak regime lacked transparency and accountability and were subject to widespread corruption.

Despite the many real problems that Egypt faced regarding gas, there were a number of interviewees who suspected that those who controlled the gas in Egypt were creating additional problems in order to damage the Morsi regime. While these reports were based on speculation, it was curious that the week before June 30, 2013, there was a nationwide gas shortage leading to eight-hour gas lines and fueling anger against the Morsi presidency, whereas on July 4, 2013, when Morsi was ousted, gas supplies suddenly returned to normal levels.
Security and Sexual Harassment

In addition to electricity and fuel, another immediate concern for the Egyptian public following the 2011 uprising was the lack of security. During the January 25th Revolution the Egyptian police retreated from the streets and never seemed to return. Interviewees reported increased incidents of robberies, violent carjackings, and individuals being shot in the street because of minor disputes. One dentist reported that a high school student had been stabbed in front of her clinic because thieves wanted his motorcycle (Interview#28 2013). However, the issue that continued to top the headlines was sexual harassment and gang-rapes.

For many years during the Mubarak regime, Egypt had been known to have a problem with sexual harassment in the streets, from verbal abuse to groping. This societal problem was depicted in the 2010 film 678 (Diab 2010). However, after the Revolution, with police nowhere to be seen, harassment escalated to frequent instances of gang-rape, particularly on the Cairo Corniche and at protest sites. The assault on the security of women took two forms: (a) harassment of women going about their daily lives and (b) violent sexual assaults on women choosing to participate in political protests.

In 2013, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women published a report stating that 99.3% of Egyptian women had experienced sexual harassment on the Egyptian streets (El-Dabh 2013). Women felt anxiety leaving their homes, anticipating lewd remarks at best and groping, or even rape, at worst. While it was this type of sexual violation that affected women on a daily basis, it was the sexual assaults in Tahrir Square that continued to make headline news.
Violence against women was a tactic used by the Mubarak regime during the 2005 Kefaya protests when female protesters could be seen on television being dragged and assaulted by security forces (Slackman 2005). However, the statistics on rape at protests in Tahrir Square during the Morsi regime were truly abhorrent. At one protest in Tahrir Square, there were 18 confirmed attacks on women with six needing hospitalization (el Sheikh and Kirkpatrick 2013). One of the women was stabbed in her genitals, while another required a hysterectomy. Women were mob attacked, had their clothes violently torn off, and were sexually assaulted in the middle of the Square. Even on July 3, 2013, as the Morsi government fell, more than 80 women reported being sexually assaulted at the anti-Morsi protests, and there were 169 reported incidents of mob sexual assaults from June 30th through July 3rd (Kingsley 2013).

One person who spoke with me following a protest in the Square in November 2012 reported that when a man had tried to rip an attacker off a woman, even bashing his head against a metal bar, the attacker continued on as if he felt no pain. There were other instances reported to me, such as when a woman failed to stop an assault even after gouging her attacker’s eyes with her nails. It seemed to some observers that the men committing these assaults showed signs of having taken the drug PCP before going to the Square so that they would not feel pain should they be caught up in scuffles or be arrested by police and tortured.

There was also speculation that these attackers were paid by individuals or groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood to scare women away from attending protests (FoxNews 2012). Mohamed Abu Al Ghar, president of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, believed that the “Muslim Brotherhood ‘plotted the sexual harassment in Tahrir
Square’ to intimidate the demonstrators” (el Sheikh and Kirkpatrick 2013). While these speculations cannot be confirmed, the fact that some citizens either blamed the government for the attacks, or at least for its failure to stop them, did not bode well for the Morsi presidency.

While the regime did not respond adequately to the growing epidemic of sexual violence, the blame for it was often placed on the women themselves. A New York Times article from March 2013 quoted Adel Abdel Maqsoud Afifi, a police general, lawmaker and ultraconservative Islamist as saying, “Sometimes a girl contributes 100 percent to her own raping when she puts herself in these conditions,” and Reda Saleh Al al-Hefnawi, a lawmaker from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party posing the question, “How do they ask the Ministry of Interior to protect a woman when she stands among men?” (el Sheikh and Kirkpatrick 2013).

The horrific sexual assaults on women in Tahrir Square, the harassment that women experienced in the streets due to reduced police presence, and the increase in violent crime made many citizens view the Morsi regime as being incapable of attending to their basic needs of security and stability.

**Speeches and International Representation**

When asked if there were any government actions or stories in the news that caused interviewees to be unhappy with the Morsi regime, one of the more common responses was “Morsi’s speeches” (Interview#26 2013). Describing Morsi as a buffoon, in so many words, based on his reputation for rambling, incoherent speeches, an upper-middle class engineer from Garden City said, “He was like a cartoon character. Someone
when every time he speaks, he wins if you understand one word. He was an idiot. You're a hero if you understand one word of him” (Interview#45 2013). Another claimed that Morsi was “not just incapable but also stupid” (Interview#27 2013).

In the second half of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, Egyptians had grown accustomed to strong military leaders who presented themselves in an authoritative manner. The impression that Egyptians had of Morsi was that he was weak and incompetent. Morsi’s failure to demonstrate presidential strength caused him to lose the respect of his people. Speaking of Morsi’s unsuitability for the position of president, a twenty-four-year-old lower class man from Sayaida Zaineb said, “He was just like a village manager…It was too much for him to head a village” (Interview#55 2013), and another young lower class man expressed disliking Morsi “because he was a donkey. In his head there was no brain, only shoes in his head” (Interview#75 2013).

Critics of the regime argued that Morsi lacked presidential qualities when representing Egypt on the international stage and that he shamed his country. One interviewee even claimed that when he went to Dubai, the people in the Emirates made fun of him for choosing Morsi. “Even the passport control officer made fun of me,” he said (Interview#5 2013).

One of the more embarrassing moments of Morsi’s presidency has often been referred to as the “ball scratching incident” (Mowafi, 2012). In September 2012, Morsi held a live television press conference with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard. As cameras rolled, Morsi adjusted his package on live television. In response, the Twitter scene blew up. Posts such as, “I cringed watching this! No one told Morsi that it's ‘frowned upon’ to touch your penis in public?” (Twitchy, 2012) and others, too explicit
to repeat, were posted. Egyptians, including Islamists, found Morsi’s actions mortifying. As one unemployed lower class interviewee put it, Morsi had “no international respect…he was scratching his balls on camera” (Interview#47 2013). Many felt that “Morsi made a fool out of the country” (Interview#145 2013) and that he was “embarrassing us in front of other presidents” (Interview#151 2013).

Another embarrassment for the Morsi presidency occurred on June 3, 2013, when Egyptian politicians were broadcast on television discussing ways to halt Ethiopia’s Nile River dam project (Stack 2013). While those in the room made suggestions such as backing Ethiopian rebels to use as a bargaining chip and politician Ayman Nour proposed, “We can leak information, for example intelligence information, that Egypt seeks to buy certain kinds of [military] planes... and that pressure, even if it wasn't actual, could have an impact in the diplomatic process” (Al Jazeera, 2013), they were unaware that the cameras were still rolling. Interviewees could not believe that the politicians “didn’t realize they were airing it live” (Interview#10 2013) and felt that the “minister of water sources was in a total coma about the Ethiopia dam” (Interview#78 2013). The general feeling articulated by many interviewees about Morsi and those surrounding him was expressed by one man who said, “Really every time he opened his mouth on TV, he or any of his people, or he traveled to anywhere in the world…that brought a great anger and shame to me” (Interview#13 2013). While interviewees listed many more instances of international missteps, the two cited above were the ones most commonly discussed.
Mixing Religion and Politics

Another problem for the Morsi presidency was that there were many in the country who just “didn’t like the Muslim Brotherhood” (Interview#56 2013). As discussed in chapter three, the Egyptian government’s policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood has vacillated between accommodation and repression over the years based on the government’s perception of the strength of the organization, acts of violence committed by the group, and the policy interests of the Egyptian president in power. While there were many in the Egyptian population who were either members of the Muslim Brotherhood or sympathized with it, there were even more who opposed it, particularly based on the group’s history of violence and its aim to merge religion and politics.

While the Muslim Brotherhood made efforts to work peacefully within the system in the decade leading up to the Revolution, one lower class woman from Shobra said, “I didn’t like the Muslim Brotherhood control of Egypt. I knew the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of violence and their understanding of Islam” (Interview#62 2013). Many also used the term “liars” to describe the group, demonstrating that they were not trusted. “They’re professional liars. They are murderers and liars and we know about them as liars and promising and not delivering on promises since Hassan al Banna” (Interview#32 2013). Those who could not forget the violence of the 1980s and 1990s said, “We had a bad history with the Muslim Brotherhood since 1928. We don’t need to try again” (Interview#162 2013).

Other than the issue of associating the Muslim Brotherhood with violence, a large number of interviewees, particularly from the upper class, did not like the idea of mixing
religion and politics. In Egypt, many upper class individuals are satisfied with having family law dictated by religion but they do not want their entire legal system governed by Islamic law. A 70-year-old, upper-middle class lawyer related:

“I was against the Muslim Brotherhood. I belong to a generation that saw how nasty they were to the country. Some expectations were that Morsi was not the right man. Not acceptable to have a religious political party. It proved to be the case…. His mere existence as a president is contradictory to the past 200 years in Egypt. Mohammed Ali led to development in Egypt. The economy and society went in a very different direction from the Muslim Brotherhood. It didn’t go in a religious direction, secularism. Secondly, when Morsi was elected he split the country into two or three parts. As an elected president he had supporters and opponents. After the election he should have brought people together. He divided people more” (Interview#123 2013).

Many upper class interviewees, as well as some from the lower class, were unhappy with the vision that the Muslim Brotherhood had for the place of religion in politics. Interviewees did not like that Morsi was “using religion. There is a space for religion and a space for politics. The place for religion should not go into the place for politics and the place for politics should not go into the place for religion” (Interview#41 2013). Comments such as, “I was afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood in power. I didn’t want the government to mix religion and politics” (Interview#23 2013) and I did not like Morsi because “it was a religious state. I want a secular state” (Interview#168 2013) demonstrated discomfort with perceived attempts at theocratic rule.

Interviewees also complained that the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood were using religion to control the masses. Descriptions of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as “hypocrites using religion to manipulate the people” (Interview#133 2013) and “trying to control Egyptians with religion” (Interview#161 2013) expressed the view that Morsi was attempting to play on religious sentiments to control the country rather than represent it. According to an upper-middle class woman
from Maadi, there was “political oppression on behalf of the government in the name of religion. [In comparison to Mubarak] religious fascism is even scarier. There is another level of threat when it is in religious words” (Interview#169 2013).

Interviewees saw Morsi as “trying to resurrect authoritarianism” through “religious fascism rhetoric” (Interview#169 2013) rather than implementing the political freedoms that Egyptians demanded during the 2011 Revolution. “There was no change. It was like having Mubarak with a beard; the only difference was that Morsi played the religion card” (Interview#152 2013). Interviewees often used the same words to express their views of Morsi and Mubarak, describing the former as a continuation of Mubarak’s authoritarian rule, but with the addition of religion. Explanations such as, “He was the same as Mubarak but with a beard. There was no progress to revolution. He took us back” (Interview#53 2013) and “They kicked Mubarak out and then put someone worse in the chair” (Interview#58 2013) were repeated over and over again. While Mubarak was viewed as a stronger president (Interview#124 2013), for most interviewees, “Nothing changed. He was the same as Mubarak, worse because he used religion. He didn’t learn anything from Mubarak” (Interview#141 2013).

Another problem for many interviewees was not only Morsi’s integration of religion into politics but also his perceived attempts at ideological hegemony. Egyptians did not want to be told what to believe and what type of Islam they should practice. Many felt “they were trying to enforce their beliefs on us” (Interview#166 2013). During Morsi’s time in office, there were many imams (religious leaders) who would make comments during the Friday sermon in support of the president and tell worshipers that it was their Islamic duty to support him. On May 17, 2013, a fight broke out at the Mostafa
Mahmoud Mosque in the Mohandeseen district of Cairo between supporters and opponents of Morsi. Government opponents were angered when the *imam* offered a prayer for the Islamist president during the sermon (Ahram Online, 2013). Interviewees did not appreciate attending Friday prayers only to be told they were not good Muslims if they did not support the president. “The Muslim Brotherhood thinks that they’re right and everyone else is wrong. They think they’re Muslim and everyone else isn’t” (Interview#63 2013).

**Political Appointments**

In order to gain the backing that he needed from various other political parties to win the 2012 presidential election, on June 21, 2012, Morsi held a meeting at the Fairmont Hotel in Heliopolis where he promised influential members of civil society such as Wael Ghonim, administrator of the We are all Khaled Said Facebook page, and Ahmed Maher, founder of the April 6th Youth Movement, that he would adhere to their three main conditions in exchange for their support. These conditions were the launching of a national unity project, the formation of a national salvation government that would include representatives from all political factions and would be headed by an independent political figure, and a presidential team that would reflect the diversity of the Egyptian political arena (Shukrallah 2013). While it would seem that an Islamist party and liberal factions would make for strange bedfellows, the distaste for voting for Ahmed Shafiq, a member of the former Mubarak regime, led many liberal political movements and individuals to lend their support to Morsi. The terms of the Fairmont talks were agreed upon, and Morsi gained the votes he needed.
Support for the Muslim Brotherhood had been estimated at 20 to 30 percent of the Egyptian population (Steinvorth 2011), which hardly gave Morsi the backing to push through decisions without coalition support and consensus building efforts. However, as time progressed during the Morsi government, the disregard for protesters in the streets and the agreements made with various political factions became strikingly obvious. Many of his non-Muslim Brotherhood political appointments were seen as “show” appointments, with the real power going to the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau. Interviewees felt that “he put all his people in positions of power and neglected the rest of the people” (Interview#3 2013).

The view that Morsi was “making the country full of Muslim Brotherhood in every position from officers to ministers” (Interview#139 2013) was lent credibility by a number of his political appointments during his presidency. On August 2, 2012, Morsi replaced outgoing Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri with Islamist-supporting Hisham Qandil, who then appointed a cabinet with a large number of ministers from the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters (DPA 2012). Later in his presidency, on January 6, 2013, Morsi made a number of changes to the cabinet, increasing the number of appointees who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party from five to eight (Hauslohner 2013). Morsi changed the cabinet again on May 7, 2013, when he appointed three more members of the Muslim Brotherhood to ministerial positions, bringing their number to eleven out of the thirty-five cabinet members (Deeb 2013). Finally, in a move that shocked the country, on June 17, 2013, Morsi appointed sixteen new governors, four of whom were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and one, the governor of Luxor, from Muslim Brotherhood ally al-Jamaa al-Islamiya (El-Behairy 2013). Egyptians were
outraged at the Luxor appointment because al Jamaa al-Islamiya was the group that had committed the terror attack on foreign tourists in Luxor in 1997. The gubernatorial appointments sparked protests and clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and opponents in a number of governorates.

In addition to Morsi’s political appointments and his marginalization of alternative voices, many interviewees complained that Morsi acted as a president of the Muslim Brotherhood and not of all the people. Interviewees pointed to Deputy Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat al-Shater, and the Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide, Mohammed Badie, as the real decision-makers and claimed that the two spoke as if they represented the government when they held no official posts (Interview#56 2013) (Interview#91 2013). “[Morsi] wasn’t the actual ruler; the Supreme Guide was” (Interview#20 2013). During anti-regime protests in November and December 2012, demonstrators chanted, “Down with the Supreme Guide” rather than, “Down with Morsi,” though they did declare, “The people want the downfall of the regime.” Interviewees referred to Morsi as a “puppet” (Interview#121 2013), “sheep” (Interview#134 2013), and “robot taking orders from the Muslim Brotherhood” (Interview#124 2013). Thus, part of the perception of Morsi as a weak president came from the belief that he was following the orders of others, rather than making his own policy. Angry interviewees felt that “they were all serving the needs of the Muslim Brotherhood, not the needs of the public and country” (Interview#20 2013).

Morsi’s uncompromising approach to politics and his adherence to the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood, ignoring all others, lost him the good will of many of the non-Muslim Brotherhood citizens who voted for him. “In the beginning I was hoping for
the best, when he was in Tahrir saying he was a good man. After, that I hated everything. He didn’t act like a president. Everything was for the Muslim Brotherhood” (Interview#117 2013). Another lower class student from Shobra who appreciated Morsi’s religiosity and voted for him because he was a “man of the people” explained to me that in the first two or three months she was happy because Morsi was praying fajr (morning prayer) and walking around without guards. She recalled:

“He was eating like us. It was never like that with Mubarak. I thought Morsi was good and would change Egypt. He said his family was all the Egyptian people, but then I found that his family was only the Muslim Brotherhood. After three months I saw that the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to control the country alone and put Muslim Brotherhood members in the ministries” (Interview#76 2013).

Many Egyptians began to feel that Morsi had “lied” to them and that he was not in the presidency to help the people, but instead to control the country (Interview#51 2013). One interviewee expressed feeling “guilty for voting for [Morsi]. I brought him here. It’s my responsibility to get him out” (Interview#166 2013). Such proclamations of regret at voting for Morsi were also heard at the November 2012 anti-Morsi protests.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined a number of grievances against the Morsi government that contributed to individual decisions to protest on June 30, 2013. Egyptians held high expectations following the Revolution, expectations that Morsi was unable to meet. The president also made a number of political appointments and decisions that angered his constituents. However, the decision that particularly incensed so much of the population was the November 22, 2012, constitutional declaration, which led to mass protests and violent clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and opponents. The violence
and torture committed by Muslim Brotherhood militias against the opposition during those clashes was one of the primary grievances cited by interviewees. In the next chapter, I demonstrate how Morsi’s constitutional declaration and the subsequent violence during the Ittihadiya protests generated mobilization against his presidency, eventually leading to the June 30th coup and his ouster.
Chapter 9  The June 30th Coup

In the previous chapter, I outlined the numerous grievances of the Egyptian public against the Morsi presidency. While grievances alone do not cause an uprising, grievances can be framed by a social movement organization in such a manner that individuals are mobilized to act on them. The Tamarod movement that emerged in April 2013 placed the grievances of the Egyptian public in a petition that called for nationwide protests on June 30th.

In this chapter, I argue that the events of June 30, 2013, exemplify a popular participatory veto coup through opposition cooptation. This new term, founded on Samuel Huntington’s concept of a veto coup, not only describes the type of coup that took place but also the process by which it occurred. Highlighting the coup process is important because the way in which the June 30th coup transpired differs slightly from Huntington’s outlined characteristics of a coup. I describe how the coup was a veto coup triggered by the military’s opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood as a militant organization and Morsi’s infringement on the military’s independence and political power. I explain how the coup took place through opposition cooptation when the military influenced and provided support to the Tamarod movement. I outline how the coup involved popular participation of the public, the post-coup government’s encouragement of demonstrations to support the military against the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Egyptian people’s election of Sisi as president. In this chapter, I also argue that there was a difference between the general public’s perception of political opportunities and actual political opportunities. Finally, I argue that the military engaged
in a retain and restrict policy that intensified repression and prevented a return to civilian rule out of fears of what would happen should it lose its veto power. I demonstrate how the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre, subsequent actions by the military, and Sisi’s election contributed to consolidating the coup.

The chapter begins by outlining theories of military coups d’etat. Next, I explain Morsi’s November 2012 constitutional declaration and the way it ignited mass mobilization against the president. I then explain the Tamarod movement that organized the June 30, 2013, uprising against Morsi, followed by a description of people’s perception of political opportunities and an investigation of actual political opportunities, which were affected by the military’s cooptation of the Tamarod movement. I continue by discussing Tagarod, a counter movement to Tamarod, and then provide a synopsis of events leading up to the June 30th protests. After presenting the events of the four days of the June 30th uprising/coup, I analyze the coup through veto coup theory. The next segment explains how the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in challenged the rationale behind the coup, and I then provide a description of the actual sit-in. The following section describes the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre and the Egyptian people’s response to it. The final part of the chapter provides an analysis of the role of the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre and Islamist violence in consolidating the military coup. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings.

Coup Theory

Many works on military coups d’etat rely on the typology of coups outlined in Samuel Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies*. In his book, Huntington
describes different types of coups from breakthrough coups, when junior officers attempt
to implement a new social order, to guardian coups, when the military attempts to protect
the status quo against intra-elite conflict (Huntington 1968). The theoretical approach that
informs this chapter is Huntington’s concept of veto coup. A veto coup benefits the
middle and upper classes and attempts to exclude mass participation by the lower class. It
occurs when 1) a party or movement that the military opposes and wishes to exclude
from political power wins an election (Huntington 1968, 223) and/or 2) the government
in power “begins to promote radical policies or to develop an appeal to groups whom the
military wishes to exclude from power” (Huntington 1968, 224). In these circumstances,
the coup prevents the broadening of political participation by radical groups and slows
the process of social-economic reform (Huntington 1968, 224). The military is opposed
to any group or organization that threatens its position, and thus accepts a leader “only
until he begins to organize his own mass following with which he can challenge the
army’s role as arbiter of national values” (Huntington 1968, 227). In Egypt, the military
was opposed to Morsi’s rule based on his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, a
group that previous governments had targeted due to its militant actions, and because he
attempted to undermine the independence and authority of the military. In Huntington’s
version of the veto coup, the military vetoes mass participation by the lower class. I argue
that in Egypt, while the coup benefitted the upper class, the coup was more a veto of
Islamist ideology and the power of the Muslim Brotherhood. The military was able to
influence lower class perceptions in a manner that allowed the military to benefit from
lower class participation.
The stated purpose of the coup is for the military to become involved in politics for limited and intermittent purposes in order to guard and/or purify the existing order (Huntington 1968, 225). According to Huntington:

“Military intervention, consequently, is prompted by the corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, subversion of the established political system. Once these are eliminated, the military claim that they can then return the purified polity to the hands of the civilian leaders. Their job is simply to straighten out the mess and then to get out” (Huntington 1968, 226).

Thus, the military presents itself as apolitical, intervening in politics because of a danger to the country based on the prospect of disorder. The military’s stated purpose is to restore order and then return power to a civilian government (Huntington 1968, 227). On June 30th, the military claimed that its aim was to intervene to prevent chaos and to support the will of the people.

The dilemma for the military, once it assumes power, is that simply removing a leader cannot ameliorate the problems in the political system. In addition, once the group or leader is removed, the military’s institutional and personal self-interest make it fearful of retaliation if it ever withholds its veto (Huntington 1968, 232-33). Therefore, while the military’s initial rationale for intervention is based on guarding the political order and a claim that the situation is temporary, with the country quickly returning to civilian rule, the military has a strong incentive to further intervene in politics so that the ousted group never returns to power.

Once the military removes the leader, it has four option of how to proceed: a) Return and Restrict, where the military allows a return to civilian rule after purging government officials. In this case, the army continues to restrict the rise of specific new groups to political power (Huntington 1968, 233), b) Return and Expand, where the
military allows a return to civilian rule and permits the ousted group to vie for power under particular restrictions and with new leadership (Huntington 1968, 234), c) *Retain and Restrict*, where the military retains power and restricts the expansion of political participation. In this case, the military is driven toward more repressive measures (Huntington 1968, 235), and d) *Retain and Expand*, where the military retains power and permits expansion of political participation (Huntington 1968, 236). As we will observe in the case of the June 30th coup, the military adopted a retain-and-restrict policy where it remained in power and engaged in severe repression.

Huntington’s outline of the characteristics of a coup d’etat include: (a) that the event must be an attempt by a political coalition to illegally overthrow the existing government by violence or the threat of violence, (b) if violence is employed it is usually limited, (c) the number of people participating is small, and (d) participants in the coup already have institutional bases of power within the political system (Huntington 1968, 218). A coup succeeds (a) when the number of participants in the political system is small, or (b) if the number of participants in the political system is large, but a substantial proportion of them support the coup (Huntington 1968, 218). In this chapter, we observe a novel coup characteristic, which is that the number of people participating in the coup was large. By co-opting the Tamarod movement, the military was able to use approximately 30 million people to unseat the government. It should be noted that these 30 million people were unwitting participants to the coup. However, once the coup took place its success relied on a large number of participants, a vast majority of the Egyptian population, to support continued military intervention. Thus, I label the events of June 30, 2013, a *popular participatory veto coup through opposition cooptation*. In the following
pages I outline the popular movement to oust Morsi, the military’s coopting of that movement, and the way in which the military gained support for its sustained intervention in Egyptian politics.

**Constitutional Declaration**

Sustained public opposition to the Morsi government began in November 2012 in response to the president’s constitutional declaration. In order to explain the impact of the constitutional declaration it is important to outline the events leading up to the proclamation. The first elected constituent assembly charged with writing the new constitution following the 2011 Revolution was elected by the Islamist-dominated parliament. Non-Islamists felt that the assembly was not representative of the population, as 66 out of 100 members were Islamists (Partlett, 2012) and only 6 women held seats on the assembly (Caspani, 2013). Interviewees complained, “The Shura Council was all Muslim Brotherhood. The parliament was all Muslim Brotherhood. Everything in the country was Muslim Brotherhood” (Interview#51).

In April 2012, the Egyptian courts found the constituent assembly unconstitutional and the Supreme Administrative Court dissolved it because it included members of parliament and because the Islamist majority composition was not representative of the diversity in Egyptian society (Fahmy, 2012). A March 2011 constitutional decree had stated that members of parliament were permitted to elect the members of the constituent assembly but were not allowed to serve on it. The assembly was dissolved not only because of participation by members of parliament but also because it comprised too few youth, women, and minorities. By the time of the
assembly’s dissolution, many groups had already withdrawn their members, including SCAF (Ottaway, 2012).

On June 7, 2012, an agreement on a new assembly with a more diverse and representative composition was made (Ahram Online, 2012) (Ottaway, 2012). However, while this new assembly was more representative of the population, it still faced court challenges because members of parliament were participating. Additionally, many secular groups continued to be dissatisfied with the composition of the assembly and staged a walk-out. These groups included those in the Egypt Bloc and the Revolution Continues Alliance, some in the Wafd party, the Hurriyah Party, the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, the Egyptian-Arabic Union Party, the Egyptian Citizen Party, and many independent candidates (Ottaway, 2012).

In what appeared to be a June 2012 power grab by SCAF in the lead-up to the presidential elections, SCAF made a supplementary constitutional decree stating that SCAF was permitted to veto any clause drafted by the assembly if the clause conflicted with the goals of the Revolution or the principles of previous constitutions (The Associated Press, 2012). This decree placed SCAF above the constituent assembly. However, if the assembly attempted to overturn the veto, the clause would be referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court. If the assembly did not complete the constitution within three months and was dissolved, then SCAF would be responsible for appointing a new assembly (Labib, 2012).

In the June 2012 new Constituent Assembly Law regulating the work of the assembly, drafted by Parliament's legislative committee, article 3 stated, “The Constituent Assembly should be representative of all segments of Egyptian society to the fullest
extent possible” (El Gundy, 2012). This particular article led to an Egyptian administrative court’s referring to the Supreme Constitutional Court a case seeking the dissolution of the assembly, again based on the assembly’s not being inclusive and representative of Egyptian society (Al Arabiya News, 2012). For months there had been fights over Islamist domination of the assembly and many non-Islamists withdrew from the assembly again. Rather than serving as rubber stamps for an Islamist created constitution, many secular groups believed that by withdrawing from the assembly they would prompt its dissolution as an unrepresentative institution, thus pressuring Islamists to include other voices. This plan failed when Morsi changed the rules of the game through his constitutional declaration.

With the Egyptian courts set to rule on the legality of the assembly, Morsi issued a constitutional declaration on November 22, 2012, giving the presidency powers that led many to call him the “new Pharaoh.” Most controversial of the seven articles in this declaration was article 2, which stated, “All constitutional declarations, laws and decrees made since Morsi assumed power on 30 June 2012 cannot be appealed or canceled by an individual or political or governmental body until a new constitution has been ratified and a new parliament has been elected. All pending lawsuits against them are void” (Egypt Independent 2012). The declaration also stated that the Shura Council and constituent assembly were immune from dissolution (AhramOnline 2013). The opposition began to mobilize against Morsi, claiming that the constitutional declaration granted the president dictatorial powers until a new constitution was passed. Those who disagreed with the politics surrounding the constituent assembly and how the constitution was being drafted were forced to choose between voting for a constitution that they did not support or
accepting a dictator as president until a more satisfactory constitution could be created.

When asked if he had voted in the 2012 constitutional referendum one interviewee said, “No. It would have been in vain. The Muslim Brotherhood did whatever they wanted. Voting wouldn’t make a difference” (Interview#28 2013).

**Ittihadiya**

Morsi’s constitutional declaration led to mass anti-government street protests in Tahrir Square and at the Ittihadiya Presidential Palace in November and December 2012 (Mackey 2012). As it was put by an upper class student with whom I spoke, “Morsi didn’t understand what his mandate was. He got too big for his britches. People voted not-Shafiq. Morsi didn’t understand they didn’t vote for him” (Interview#10 2013).

Protests commenced on November 23, 2012, and continued for weeks. On November 27, 2012, more than 100,000 protested in the streets of Cairo against the constitutional declaration. Protest organizers set meeting points around the city and the marchers descended on Tahrir Square (The Guardian 2012). Demonstrators chanted, “Leave” and, “The people want the fall of the regime” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2012), reminiscent of the 2011 Revolution and anti-SCAF protests in 2011. The secular opposition, which had been fragmented for a while, overcame their differences in order to challenge the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2012). In response to the demonstrations, the Muslim Brotherhood mocked the protesters on one of its associated television networks, calling the protesters “remnants” of the Mubarak regime (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2012).
Protests intensified on December 4, 2012, with tens of thousands of protesters gathering at the Ittihadiya presidential palace and Tahrir Square to express their displeasure with the Islamist-drafted constitution. Protesters chanted, “Bread, freedom and bring down the Brotherhood,” a revised version of chants used in 2011, and, “Shave your beard, show your disgrace, you will find that you have Mubarak’s face!” (D. D. Kirkpatrick 2012). Demonstrations also took place in Alexandria, Suez, and other cities in Egypt. Eleven newspapers made the decision to halt publication in protest of the new constitution’s impeding freedom of expression, and three television networks claimed that they would go dark the next day (D. D. Kirkpatrick 2012).

Protesters pushed against police barricades when they reached the Ittihadiya Palace around 6 p.m. The police responded by firing tear gas at the approximately 10,000 demonstrators, some of whom broke through police lines and were able to protest near the perimeter wall of the palace (Saleh and Awad 2012). In an attempt to avoid further confrontations with protesters, the police retreated behind the walls of the palace (D. D. Kirkpatrick 2012). Eventually Morsi evacuated the palace as two rows of riot police guarded his motorcade, clearing the way for it to pass (D. D. Kirkpatrick 2012).

The most intense fighting between opposition protesters and Morsi’s Islamist supporters took place on December 5, 2012. At 6 a.m. the Muslim Brotherhood twitter account posted the message, “Muslim Brotherhood & Islamist parties call for Million-Man March today afternoon outside Itehadyya palace in supprt the elected president” (Mackey 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood bused supporters into Cairo from other governorates and members of the group posted istinfar (en garde) on Facebook (InterviewA 2012). In response to the Facebook posts calling for Brotherhood members
to be prepared, the son of Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Beltagy posted on Facebook that members should not circulate everything on Facebook and that *istinfar* was an internal order (Interview A 2012). Clashes began when thousands of Morsi supporters approached the 300-person sit-in outside the Ittihadiya Palace. Muslim Brotherhood members tore down opposition tents, rifled through the possessions of the sit-in participants, and chased and beat anti-Morsi protesters (Associated Press in Cairo 2012). After a relative period of calm, hundreds of opposition protesters arrived at the palace, and opponents and supporters of the president began throwing Molotov cocktails and rocks at each other (Associated Press in Cairo 2012).

That evening, Freedom and Justice Party Deputy Secretary Essam al-Erian gave a television interview where he said, “Everyone must go now to Ettihadiya and surround the thugs and separate the real revolutionaries out for one or two nights and then we can arrest them all” (Human Rights Watch 2012). That night approximately 10,000 Morsi supporters were outside the palace putting up barricades to keep traffic away from the palace (Associated Press in Cairo 2012).

Throughout the night, opposition and pro-Morsi protesters attacked each other with stones, Molotov cocktails, rubber pellet rifles, and handguns, while Central Security Forces stood back and watched. Because the Muslim Brotherhood feared that security forces would not protect the president, the Muslim Brotherhood militias were sent out to guard the Palace (Youssef 2012). The militia’s actions during the protests transcended acting as security guards, as they set up outdoor torture chambers where members of the opposition were detained and tortured (Shukrallah 2013). At least 49 opposition protesters were unlawfully detained by the Muslim Brotherhood militia outside the palace.
gate, an area under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood and overseen by the police (Human Rights Watch 2012). According to Human Rights Watch, a police report from the Masr Gedida police station recorded that “youth from the Freedom and Justice Party handed the detainees over to the station” (Human Rights Watch 2012). The following day, the 49 detainees were turned over to state prosecutors. In total, 133 detainees from that day were released without charge because of lack of evidence (Human Rights Watch 2012).

By the end of the clashes, the Ministry of Health recorded 10 dead and 748 injured (Human Rights Watch 2012). This violence against citizens demanding their rights further inflamed the anti-Morsi movement. When asked whether he thought Morsi had been a legitimate president, one student said, “He was because he won the election, but he wasn’t when he sent guys out to beat up his own citizens” (Interview#10 2013).

Protests resumed on December 6, 2012, in Cairo, prompted by Vice-President Mahmoud Mekki’s statement to the press that Morsi would not back down (Hussein 2012). In addition to four deaths and over 300 injuries in Cairo, protesters in the city of Ismailia burned down the headquarters of Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party (Hussein 2012). That same day, three members of Morsi’s advisory team, Seif Abdel Fattah, Ayman al-Sayyad and Amr al-Leithy, resigned. Morsi called for dialogue with opposition forces, but the National Salvation Front (NSF), a loosely formed group of the main opposition parties created after Morsi’s declaration, declined the invitation. Opposition advocate Mohamed El Baradei made a statement claiming, “We hold President Morsi and his government completely responsible for the violence that is happening in Egypt today” (Hussein 2012). He then continued by saying, “A regime that is not able to protect its
people and is siding with his own sect, [and] thugs is a regime that lost its legitimacy and is leading Egypt into violence and bloodshed.” (Hussein 2012).

As protests continued, over two dozen Muslim Brotherhood headquarters around the country were ransacked (D. D. Kirkpatrick 2012). On December 9, 2012, Morsi issued a new constitutional declaration rescinding the old one that had sparked the recent protests (Hauslohner and Hassieb 2012). While the new declaration removed the president’s immunity from judicial oversight, it still safeguarded the constituent assembly and Shura Council from dissolution. The declaration also maintained that the November 22nd declaration and all other constitutional declarations made by Morsi could not be challenged by the courts. The new declaration did not offer the concessions that protesters were demanding, namely cancelling the constitutional referendum, which they saw as illegitimate. Thus, protesters remained active and, in response, the president gave arrest powers to the military up until the day of the referendum (D. D. Kirkpatrick 2012), a move that did nothing to stop demonstrations. Violent clashes between Morsi opponents and supporters, as well as confrontations between anti-Morsi protesters and police, continued through February 2013 in spite of a state of emergency, particularly on the days surrounding the anniversary of the 2011 Revolution, including January 26th when 21 people convicted of participation in the 2012 Port Said riot were sentenced to death (Al Jazeera 2013). Many instances of violence were also reported in the following months.
The Tamarod (Rebel) movement was founded on April 28, 2013, by five activists from the Kefaya movement (Kingsley 2013). The face of the Tamarod movement was Mahmoud Badr, a 28-year-old journalist and activist (Giglio 2013). The other founders were Moheb Doss, Walid el-Masry, Mohammed Abdel Aziz, and Hassan Shahin. Not only did Tamarod call for Morsi’s resignation but it also organized the June 30th protests to remove him. According to Abdel Aziz, “The president lost his legitimacy when he didn’t follow the law or the constitution and when he put the interests of his group before those of the Egyptians” (Abdullah 2013).

Tamarod distributed a petition demanding President Morsi’s resignation and the holding of early presidential elections. The petition was circulated online and in the streets by activists and everyday citizens alike, and Tamarod claimed to have gained 22 million signatures (BBC News 2013). While a number of interviewees admitted having signed the petition multiple times, and while I personally observed a woman from Yemen sign the petition without producing a national identification card, from the number of people who took to the streets on June 30th one can reasonably assume that the number of valid signatories was large.

While the statements from Tamarod, particularly to the official press, centered on the anti-democratic character of Morsi’s rule and the need to steer the Revolution back on track through a proposed roadmap, the petition itself appealed to the people’s dissatisfaction with Morsi’s performance as president as a whole and the ailing economy that was leading to people’s basic needs being unfulfilled. The petition included the statements, “Because there is still no security in the streets…we don’t want you,”
“Because the economy is collapsed and based on begging…we don’t want you,” and “Because there are still not rights for the martyrs…we don’t want you” (Tamarod 2013).

The movement, which had organizers in every Egyptian governorate, grew with the participation of the April 6th Youth Movement, the National Salvation Front, the Constitution Party, the Egyptian Conference Party, and other movements opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood (Atteya 2013) that also provided logistical support and office space (BBC 2013). Activists covered the Egyptian streets, often blocking traffic and stopping cars to hand out petitions. They also circulated the petition on the Tamarod website, Facebook, and Twitter. Everyday citizens, too, took part in mobilization, paying to make their own copies of the petition, collecting signatures, and returning the signed petitions to Tamarod offices. Signatories were required to provide their name, proof of residence, and national ID number. The movement appeared to be a national grassroots effort.

By late June, Tamarod announced that it had collected 15 million signatures that had been checked against a recent interior ministry electoral register (BBC 2013). At a June 29th press conference, Tamarod proposed a six-month transitional road map where an independent prime minister would lead a technocratic government, with the head of the constitutional court as president until presidential elections could be held. They also announced that they had collected over 22 million signatures (Abdullah 2013).

Military Cooptation of Tamarod

Mobilization for the June 30th protests was very different from mobilization for January 25th 2011. While 73% of protesters and 51% of non-protesters knew about the organization of the January 25th protests before they occurred, 100% of interviewees
knew about the June 30th protests before that date, and all but 9 interviewees knew about the Tamarod movement. The majority of interviewees had seen the petition being circulated in the streets and in their offices, and many also knew about it from Facebook, television, and newspapers.

Before January 25, 2011, most mobilization had to take place online because of the threat of arrest for distributing flyers or a petition challenging the regime in public. Prior to 2011, El Baradei’s National Association for Change had circulated an online petition challenging the Mubarak regime. The petition, which required name, address, and national ID number, gained 10,000 signatories (Ghonim 2012, 47). However, the Tamarod petition represented the first time that a petition had been widely circulated on the streets. Additionally, the numbers willing to sign the El Baradei petition were insignificant in comparison to those who signed the Tamarod petition.

Mass public participation in the Tamarod effort and the ability to mobilize without interference implies that a drastic change in political opportunities had occurred. The change in political opportunities that everyday citizens who mobilized against Morsi perceived was that the people had become stronger than any regime. The success of prior protests had taught them that if the people demanded the downfall of the regime there was a high probability that the regime would fall. When interviewees were asked the questions, “In the few days prior to the January 25th Revolution, did you believe that change was possible through protest?” and, “In the few days prior to June 30, 2013, did you believe that change was possible through protest?” 54% of those who protested in 2011 and 57% who did not protest, changed their answer from “no” for 2011 to “yes” for 2013. An additional 7% of protesters and 5% of non-protesters changed their answers
from “not sure,” or “I didn’t think about it,” to a definitive “yes.” The common rationale for not believing in the success of protests in 2011 was that “[Mubarak] was autocratic. He was so tough. The government was so powerful. We are normal citizens. We didn’t know we could do this” (Interview#164 2013). However, in regard to the 2013 protests, the most common answers were, “If we could change Mubarak who was there for 30 years, we could change Morsí after one” (Interview#101 2013), and “The people can do anything after January 25th. We broke the fear barrier” (Interview#46 2013). It should be noted that it appeared my data suffered from what Timur Kuran calls an “I knew it would happen” fallacy where people exaggerate foreknowledge (Kuran 1991, 10-11). The reasons why many interviewees claimed to have “known” that the January 25th protests would result in the overthrow of Mubarak caused me to believe that at the time they did not actually believe that the protests would be successful. Thus, there were probably more changes from “no” to “yes” than my data indicates.

A striking statistic is that while only 40% of interviewees who protested in the 2011 Revolution began their participation before or on the first official day of protests, January 25th, 91% of interviewees who protested in 2013 claimed they had participated before or on the first official day of protests, June 30th. While those protesting in 2011 were influenced by the number of people protesting or saying they would protest, in 2013 the majority of interviewees who protested claimed that neither the number of people saying they were going to protest on June 30th nor the number of people who signed the Tamarod petition had an effect on their decision to protest. They wanted to “get Morsí out” and they were going to protest no matter what the number of people protesting in the streets. Protest had become a common tool in the repertoire for contesting the
government and, as demonstrated in chapter 7, many individuals did not fear protesting even if there were a threat of violence. Thus, while on January 25th many waited to see how many others would go out into the streets before they decided to protest, on June 30th the obvious action to take if one opposed the Morsi regime was to protest. There had also been enough protests in the past two and a half years for individuals to know that if there were a call to protest, a significant number of people would show up.

One unique aspect of the June 30th events was the discrepancy between perceived political opportunities and actual ones. Many ordinary citizens, as well as social movement organizations that had previously contested the Mubarak regime, believed that their newfound strength relative to the Morsi government derived from a change in political opportunities initiated by the ouster of Mubarak. In reality, the political opportunities that opened the door to protests against Morsi were created by the military. I will now outline the actual change in political opportunities that occurred.

What the participating movements, everyday citizens, and even many members of Tamarod did not know prior to June 30th was that, a little while after the Tamarod movement was established, it was co-opted by the military and the Ministry of the Interior. Officials in the Ministry of Interior helped collect signatures and participated in the protests (Frenkel and Atef 2014). The Interior Ministry was also providing Tamarod with tactical and logistical support for the protests, which explains why, when protesters took to the streets on June 30th, hundreds of thousands of water bottles and mini Egyptian flags were spread throughout the crowds (Frenkel and Atef 2014). Not all five founding members of Tamarod were involved in the collaboration. Doss, who separated himself from the movement after June 30th, described how in the lead-up to June 30th, Badr, Aziz,
and Shahin began attending meetings at the Ministry of the Interior and with Sisi and returning with changed talking points (Frenkel and Atef 2014). One Tamarod activist resigned before June 30th because she was unhappy that the secret police and former Mubarak supporters were “infiltrating the movement” (Saleh and Taylor 2013).

Doss also claimed that the statement that was read on television on the evening of July 3, 2013, bore no resemblance to the one he had participated in drafting hours earlier (Frenkel and Atef 2014). Instead of calling for a peaceful transition to democracy, the presenter quoted Tamarod’s request for the army to step in to protect the people from terrorists and chaos. Doss realized later that he was at the end of a process “in which the army and security officials slowly but steadily began exerting an influence over Tamarod, seizing upon the group’s reputation as a grassroots revolutionary movement to carry out their own schemes for Egypt” (Frenkel and Atef 2014).

It was also reported that elite businessmen from the Mubarak era were providing financial support to the Tamarod movement. One report claimed that Naguib Sawiris, owner of Orascom, the largest private sector company in Egypt, transferred over $28 million to fund the Tamarod movement (PR Buzz 2013). While January 2011 was a protest organized against the Mubarak regime, some of the major funders of the June 30th protests were falool (supporters and sympathizers of the Mubarak regime), hoping to regain power through the overthrow of the Islamist government. Additionally, the support given to Tamarod by the military and Ministry of the Interior before June 30th demonstrates that not only was there falool participation but also that the state’s security institutions became key decision-makers and mobilizers in a campaign that the public thought was a grassroots popular movement against the Morsi government.
It should be noted that falool funding of Tamarod and military participation in the campaign only became public after the June 30th uprising. Prior to June 30th, Tamarod used frames such as, “Because the economy is collapsed and based on begging...we don’t want you” (Tamarod 2013), to mobilize the public based on popular grievances. Framing the petition as a list of demands by “the people,” Tamarod painted a picture of a return to January 25th when the people stood up to an oppressive regime to ask for their rights. However, in reality, June 30th was in large part funded and organized by supporters of that oppressive previous regime. Thus, Tamarod was a top down movement disguised and promoted to those they mobilized as a bottom up one. The change in political opportunities that allowed for mass public mobilization was not an opening up of the system but instead an opportunity provided by one part of the state system challenging another part.

Military Opposition to Morsi

As outlined in the beginning of the chapter, a veto coup usually occurs when a party or movement that the military opposes and wishes to exclude from political power wins an election (Huntington 1968, 223) and/or when the government in power “begins to promote radical policies or to develop an appeal to groups whom the military wishes to exclude from power” (Huntington 1968, 224). The Egyptian military opposed Morsi because it viewed the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that the military had been charged with targeting under previous regimes, as a terrorist organization and because Morsi attempted to undermine the independence and authority of the military. In chapter 7, I outlined the military’s manipulation of the legal system in a manner that would ensure its
strength and independence under any future regime. While Morsi was president, he undermined the military’s position, which contributed to the military’s decision that he needed to go.

The major challenge to the military’s authority occurred on August 12, 2012, when Morsi retired Defense Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, Army Chief of Staff Sami Anan, and other senior generals, replacing Tantawi with the head of military intelligence, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi. In addition, Morsi nullified the June constitutional declaration issued by the military before Morsi was elected that limited the power of the presidency (Fahim 2012). Thus, Morsi regained the executive and legislative power that had been delegated to the military. The move came after an embarrassing incident for the military earlier in the month when 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed in Sinai (Fahim 2012). Trying to ease the blow of what some called a “soft coup” against the military, on August 14, 2012, Morsi awarded Tantawi and Anan The Order of the Nile medal, the most prestigious honor in the country (Shull and Hassieb 2012). Both Tantawi and Anan were also named presidential advisors. Morsi thought that changing defense ministers would alter SCAF’s mentality toward the Muslim Brotherhood, believing that Sisi would be more sympathetic to the group (Youssef). Unfortunately for Morsi, he was wrong in his assessment. The military would not accept a reduction in its power due to a reversal of its June 2012 constitutional declaration, and it was further displeased with Morsi’s November 2012 constitutional declaration.

Morsi also challenged the judiciary, which had been a friend to SCAF. On October 11, 2012, Morsi sacked General Prosecutor Abdel-Meguid Mahmoud and appointed him envoy to the Vatican by presidential decree (Daily News Egypt 2012).
However, a few days later Morsi reversed his decision after judges claimed that the move was illegal. On April 19, 2013, Islamists protested at the High Court demanding a purge of the judiciary, which had challenged domination of the parliament and constituent assembly on numerous occasions (AlSharif 2013). The judiciary was not pleased with the harassment it received from Islamists. Morsi’s antagonism toward the military and the judiciary that supported it appeared to influence the military’s decision to overthrow Morsi through co-opting the Tamarod movement. In the next section, I outline the counter movement to Tamarod.

Tagarod

In response to the Tamarod campaign, on May 12, 2013, Assem Abdel Maged from Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya launched the Tagarod (Impartiality) counter movement, which circulated a petition to maintain the “legitimately elected president in his post” (Mourad 2013). The petition stated, “We, the signatories, agreeing or disagreeing, with Dr Mohamed Morsi, the elected president, insist that he should complete his term as long as we do not see from him outright blasphemy; we have in him a sign from God, may God bless him and guide his footsteps” (Mourad 2013). Tagarod spokesman Ahmed Hosni later outlined the viewpoint of the Tagarod movement stating, “Protests lead to violence and unrest. Real change comes through the ballot box, not through mass protests. Egyptians had elected Morsi as president and approved the constitution drafted.” He then continued by saying, “The constitution stipulates that the elected president stays on for four years to see through his duty. That is what Tagarod is supporting” (El-Shenawi 2013).
By June 30, 2013, Hosni reported that the movement had gathered 26 million signatures (El-Shenawi 2013), but the number is suspect given that in the same statement he claimed, “June 30 is a successful day for Tagarod as it prevented millions of people from taking to the streets and protesting” (El-Shenawi 2013). Thus, it appeared that his sense of reality was a bit off.

Like Tamarod, Tagarod not only circulated a petition but also organized demonstrations. On June 21, 2013, Tagarod participated in a mass demonstration to support Morsi in front of the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in Nasr City (Assran 2013). Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters waved Egyptian flags and carried pictures of the president (Al Akhbar 2013). Demonstrators claimed to be protesting in support of the president’s legitimacy and/or Islamic law.

**Lead-up to June 30\(^{th}\)**

On June 25, 2013, the military called on all parties to reach a settlement that would “save the nation from serious political conflict,” which implied that the military was sympathetic to the opposition’s demands for change (Ahram Online 2013). This statement was supported by both Al-Azhar and the Coptic Orthodox Church and came after a military ultimatum referring to its “constitutional capacity as guarantor of national security” (Ahram Online 2013). The next day, opposition leaders met with the Salafist Nour Party to express fears of political chaos if Morsi did not address the demands of the people. The Nour Party then communicated the points of this meeting to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership and offered to mediate between all parties (Ahram Online 2013). This offer of mediation was supported by the military, which began to deploy into the
streets without coordination with the president. Morsi then had a meeting with the defense minister but was unable to reverse the deployment; Morsi also failed to find support for his attempt to remove the defense minister (Ahram Online 2013).

On June 26, 2013, four days before the planned June 30th protests, Morsi made a speech, or “two and a half hours of headache,” as protester Emile Azmy described it (Nagi, 2013). Tensions in the country were running high, and many were hoping that Morsi would take a conciliatory stance, making concessions to the opposition and preventing political divisions from deepening. A young, upper-middle class student from Muqattam described the speech as, “Declaring war on the people and [Morsi] in complete denial” (Interview#11 2013).

In his speech, Morsi mentioned “thugs” causing chaos in the streets (Loveluck, 2013). Many in the opposition were unhappy with this characterization, believing that the “thugs” of whom he spoke were the anti-regime protesters. Morsi criticized the opposition for failing to engage in constructive dialogue. He also blamed unspecified "enemies of Egypt" for sabotaging the democratic system and warned Egypt would turn to chaos if the country continued to be politically polarized (Kingsley, 2013). Singling out political rivals as these “enemies,” Morsi warned the judiciary to stay out of politics. One interviewee specifically mentioned being upset with this part of the speech “where he was naming judges” (Interview#27 2013).

During the two and a half hours, Morsi admitted to some failings and apologized to Egypt’s youth for not involving them enough in the new political system. He also apologized for fuel shortages and long gas lines, saying, “I am saddened by the lines, and I wish I could join in and wait in line, too” (Hendawi, 2013). However, comments such
as the one just mentioned angered many Egyptians and led them to mock Morsi further, as he seemed out of touch with the grievances of his people. A newspaper report assessing the reaction of viewers described how “people laughed and cursed at the president while watching his lengthy remarks on a projector in the square” (Nagi, 2013).

On June 27, 2013, the military deployed vehicles into the streets with stickers expressing its support for the opposition’s demands (Ahram Online 2013). Then, on June 28, 2013, the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in commenced. While thousands of anti-Morsi demonstrators congregated at Tahrir Square and the Ittihadiya Presidential Palace, thousands of Morsi’s supporters gathered at the Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque in Nasr City to express their support for the president’s legitimacy. The demonstration, called “Legitimacy is a red line,” was said to be open-ended. In a press conference, eleven Islamist political parties launched the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy to “protect the Egyptian people’s democratic gains” (Ahram Online 2013). The alliance included the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood, the centrist al-Wasat Party, the Salafist Watan Party, the Building and Development Party of al-Jamaa al-Islamiya, and the Professional Syndicates Union, composed of 24 syndicates and tribal coalitions from Sinai, Upper Egypt, and Marsa Matrouh (Ahram Online 2013). It was reported that on June 27th the military, police, and intelligence leadership made a decision to support the will of the people and that opposition activists were meeting with the military to discuss the political transition following Morsi’s ouster (Ahram Online 2013).
June 30th

On June 30, 2013, residents in the Dokki area of Giza decorated their apartment buildings with the Egyptian flag. One building had a long Egyptian flag running down the entire side of it. Around 2:30 pm a few protesters began to make their way down Tahrir Street toward Tahrir Square. After 3 pm a few more groups of protesters followed. Then, at 4:45 pm, the crowds started. Tens of thousands of protesters marched down Tahrir Street chanting “Freedom,” “The people want the downfall of the regime,” “Get out,” and “Get out supreme guide.” There were men and women of all ages filling both sides of the two-way street and the sidewalks. There were also microbuses, cars and taxis flying the Egyptian flag, as well as pickup trucks with protesters on the back encouraging the chants. Beating drums, launching fireworks, and carrying Egyptian flags and signs, the crowd continued to grow. While exact numbers are not available, estimates place the number of protesters on June 30th at 30 million (Gomaa 2013). As protesters marched down Tahrir Street in Dokki, police outside of the Dokki police station held up flags in support of them. Some officers held out signs saying “Leave!” By 11 pm helicopters were circling Tahrir Square and protesters were cheering because they saw them as a sign of support from the military. Egyptians on Facebook were labeling the event a revolution and saying the protests were bigger than anything they had ever seen.

By July 1, 2013, one day after the start of the June 30th protests, a large number of ministers and cabinet members had submitted their resignations (Bradley and Abdellatif 2013). Later on that day the military gave Morsi an ultimatum of 48 hours to resolve the political crisis (Bradley and Abdellatif 2013). During the military’s televised address, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said:
“If the demands of the people are not met within the given period of time, [the military] will be compelled by its national and historic responsibilities, and in respect for the demands of Egypt’s great people, to announce a road map for the future, and procedures that it will supervise involving the participation of all the factions and groups” (Hauslohner, 2013).

Later on in the day, the military put out another statement on Facebook stating, “The ideology and culture of the Egyptian armed forces does not allow for the policy of a military coup” (Hendawi, El Deeb and Michael 2013), attempting to negate any claims that the military was staging a coup.

The military statement was supported by the Ministry of the Interior that issued its own statement:

“[The police force] is renewing its commitment to protect the people and the vital institutions of the country, and to ensure the security of the protesters, confirming that it will be under the service of the people, and that it will stand at an equal distance from all the different groups and entities without taking sides” (Bradley and Abdellatif 2013).

That evening, Tahrir Square took on a carnival-like atmosphere with colorful fireworks bursting in the night sky. Families with children and women and men, both young and old, were crammed shoulder to shoulder enjoying what they already felt was a victory, based on the military’s statement. Few people were chanting political slogans, as was usual at a Tahrir protest rally. Instead people were waving Egyptian flags, smiling, and celebrating.

In response to the military’s July 1st statement, Morsi sent out a tweet at 4:39 pm on July 2nd stating, “President Mohamed Mursi asserts his grasp on constitutional legitimacy and rejects any attempt to deviate from it, and calls on the armed forces to withdraw their warning and refuses to be dictated to internally or externally” (Fitzpatrick, 2013). However, by that time the military had already taken over the state newspaper, Al
Ahram, using the front page of the newspaper to enforce the ultimatum that they would remove Morsi if he did not meet the protesters’ demands (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). The military and security forces had also put a number of Muslim Brotherhood allies under house arrest and stated that anyone resisting arrest would be put on trial in special courts (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). In Tahrir Square, the Interior Ministry removed the concrete blocks that had been erected as a barrier to assaults on the police during protests, saying that they were no longer needed because “the police had joined ‘the people’ in the new uprising against Mr. Morsi” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013).

On the evening of July 2nd Morsi gave a speech that outraged many viewers watching from their homes. Rather than addressing protester demands, he took a defiant stance, using the term “legitimacy” to define his rule tens of times during the speech and implying that there would be bloodshed if his power were threatened. According to Morsi, this legitimacy came from the fact that he was elected in “free and clean elections, witnessed by everyone in Egypt and abroad,” despite the fact that “there remained tails and claws, and there remained the deep state, and the vandals and many challenges remained” (Mackell, 2013). During the speech Morsi was mocked on Facebook by Egyptians for his excessive use of the word legitimacy. One Egyptian posted, “If you missed it here's #Morsi’s speech: Legitimacy is Me. Then he looks at his arms, and wonders if he's moving them convincingly. #Egypt,” while another from an expat mocked, “Every time# Morsy says shar3aya (legitimacy) we drink ... is gonna be a long night ...”

While many jokes circulated about the president, Egyptians were truly horrified by the content of his speech and its allusion to retaliatory violence against anti-Morsi
protesters. Some of the statements most disturbing to listeners included, “And the biggest responsibility now, is that we ensure its security and that of its people and keep their blood from being shed through holding onto the legitimacy that we have brought forth together…” (Mackell, 2013), “If the price of protecting legitimacy is my blood, I’m willing to pay it… it would be a cheap price for the sake of protecting this country” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013), and “Legitimacy is the only thing that guarantees for all of us that there will not be any fighting and conflict, that there will not be bloodshed” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). Labeling the anti-Morsi protesters as counter-revolutionaries, Morsi continued, “I see now, oh Egyptians, that this revolution is being stolen from us, and that it is desired for us to be submerged in a sea of never ending conflicts,” and “What I see now, is that there are desperate attempts for this revolution to be stolen, so that we can return to square one, so we can start anew, which I absolutely refuse, I do not accept it and I do not agree to it” (Mackell, 2013).

After Morsi’s speech, his cabinet resigned, stating on Twitter, “The cabinet declares its rejection of Dr. Morsi’s speech and his pushing the country toward a civil war,” and “The cabinet announces taking the side of the people” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). The military’s response to the speech was to state that it is “more honorable for us to die than for the Egyptian people to feel threatened or terrorized,” and that the military would “sacrifice our blood for Egypt and its people against every terrorist, extremist or ignorant person” (Ibish 2013). The military’s statement was one of the first to label the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization during that time period. On July 2nd there were also reports of violence around the country, including fighting in Giza and Midan Kit Kat, as well as clashes near Cairo University that left 3
dead and 90 injured. There were gunfights in Midan Dokki that continued until 7 am the next morning, and one could hear the sound of gunfire in the area.

On the morning of July 3rd, the military held negotiations with El Baradei and various political factions. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party refused to participate (Haddon, et al. 2013). At 4:30 pm the military deadline had passed and Egyptians were waiting to see what would happen next. State news agencies reported that the military had extended its deadline in an attempt to reach a consensus that would prevent further violence, offering a guarantee of the president’s safety in exchange for the Muslim Brotherhood’s agreeing to contain bloodshed (Haddon, et al. 2013). By 5:35 pm there were Twitter reports that Morsi was under house arrest and that other Muslim Brotherhood officials were barred from leaving the airport. At 5:45 pm military helicopters began to fly overhead. By 6:00 pm the military was deploying tanks throughout Cairo. Pictures on Twitter showed military tanks crossing Al Gamaa Bridge toward Cairo University and soldiers praying on another bridge. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) were rolling down Tahrir Street. At 7 pm the military informed Morsi that he was no longer president of the country (Haddon, et al. 2013).

At 9:00 pm General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi gave a live televised address. Attendees at the press conference included a number of top military and police officials who sat in two rows on either side of the podium, the Coptic Orthodox patriarch Tawadros II, Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar Ahmed El-Tayyeb, ElBaradei, a representative of the Nour Party, Tamarod’s Mohamed Abdel-Aziz, and a senior judicial figure (Haddon, et al. 2013). During the speech people in the streets were roaring with jubilation and fireworks were
set off; by the time it finished, car horns were honking, people were cheering wildly, and an enormous fireworks display was set off in Tahrir Square.

Sisi announced the ouster of Morsi to make way for new presidential elections and outlined the transitional roadmap. The roadmap included the temporary suspension of the constitution, the assignment of the head of Egypt’s High Constitutional Court to run the country until a new presidential election could take place, the formation of a technocratic government, the intention to pass revised parliamentary election laws so that new parliamentary elections could take place, the formation of a committee to amend controversial articles in the temporarily suspended constitution, the creation of a media code of ethics to guarantee media professionalism, the formation of a committee to encourage national reconciliation, and the inclusion of youth in decision-making circles (Ahram Online 2013).

During the speech, Sisi explained that the military had made many attempts to resolve the issues between the president and opposition, beginning with the November 2012 constitutional declaration, but that Morsi would not compromise. The military intervention had occurred after a strategic assessment of the important challenges and dangers facing the country on the political, economic, and social levels (Ahram Online 2013). Sisi claimed that the military had no intention of interfering in politics, but it would “never turn a blind eye to the aspirations of the Egyptian people” (Ahram Online 2013). After Sisi thanked the army, police, and judiciary for their sacrifices for Egypt, the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb, Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawdros II, and opposition figure Mohmed El Baradei gave speeches, demonstrating that the country’s major institutions and political figures supported the military’s actions. The next day, the
Egyptian Air Force put on an airshow over Cairo drawing hearts, Egyptian flags, and waterfalls in the sky.

**Understanding the Coup**

The military coup on July 3, 2013, displays some elements of the veto coup as defined by Huntington. During the four days of the uprising and the speech on the final day, the military continued to highlight that the country risked being destabilized by chaos and that the current government posed political, economic, and social threats to the country. Thus, the military was forced to rectify the situation, with the support of the public, by temporarily intervening to set the country back on the right course. By outlining a roadmap for new parliamentary and presidential elections, Sisi emphasized that the military’s intention was to remain out of politics in the long-run and permit civilian rule.

In theory, the new transitional government, led by the head of Egypt’s High Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, was a civilian government. However, Huntington points out that while the military’s role as guardian may have justifications and rationales, it has a corrupting and debilitating impact on the political system, since responsibility and power are divorced. “Civilian leaders may have responsibility, but they know they do not have power and are not allowed to create power because their actions are subject to military veto” (Huntington 1968, 228). In turn, the military has power, but they are not responsible for the consequences of their actions because authority is technically in the hands of the civilian government.
Another issue that arises after a veto coup is that the military must make the decision to proceed in one of the four ways outlined in the beginning of this chapter. They can engage in return and restrict, return and expand, retain and restrict, or retain and expand. While the military junta that comes to power following a veto coup promises a rapid return to civilian rule, hardliners in the military will argue that they must remain in power in order to permanently bar the ousted group from returning and to implement structural and political reforms in the system (Huntington 1968, 231). These hardliners resist political expansion through public participation (Huntington 1968, 232). As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, while the military claims at the start of the coup that it intends to take power only temporarily, its desire to have control over political system reforms and its fear of retaliation if it relinquishes its veto power may lead to increased political intervention. “Hence the incentives to intervene escalate, and the army becomes irreversibly committed to insuring that the once-proscribed group never acquires office” (Huntington 1968, 232-33). In the case of Egypt post-June 30th, the fear of retaliation was intensified by the fact that the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in to support Morsi’s legitimacy continued. Thus, the president and his organization may have been overthrown, but thousands were participating in a sit-in to demonstrate that they were not willing to leave quietly and were calling into question the legitimacy of the military’s actions by claiming that Morsi was legitimately and democratically elected and that the military had therefore overthrown a democracy. In response to this challenge the military chose the option of retain and restrict, where the military retains power and restricts political expansion while being driven toward more repressive measures. In order to understand how the military implemented this policy, we must examine the Rabaa al-
Adawiya sit-in and how the military crackdown on the demonstration led to events that provided an excuse for the retain and restrict policy. Rather than implement retain and restrict by force, the military helped to create an environment where the population would support the policy.

**Rabaa al-Adawiya**

The Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in took place in Nasr City, Cairo, from June 28th to August 14th, 2013. The demonstration was organized by a number of Islamist groups that called themselves the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy. The stated purpose of the sit-in was to support the legitimacy of Morsi as president based on his democratic election and to refute the military coup. In addition to members of Islamist groups, among those in attendance were those who supported the Islamist agenda but were not members of any group or party, those who wanted an Islamic state, those who wanted “Islamic democracy,” those who believed that Morsi was not given enough time in office to prove himself, those who believed that Morsi should have completed his four years as president, those who believed that they had been robbed of their vote after the Islamist parliament was dissolved and the Islamist president was deposed, and those who had protested for an Islamist government in the 2011 Revolution and thus believed that they were continuing the revolution.

The protest site held a sea of tents lined up in the form of a makeshift city. Each tent was treated as a mosque, and those entering followed the custom of removing their shoes. The protest site reached right up to the sides of residential buildings, which had been evacuated by residents unhappy with being surrounded by the Islamist sit-in. Radio
Shack, a bank, and other businesses were closed, but there was no evidence of damage to the stores. There was ample room to navigate the streets dividing the tents, and the level of organization was striking. There were security checkpoints at the entrances to the site, and security personnel with orange vests, hard hats, and large flashlights patrolled the sit-in to ensure that no sexual harassment or fights took place in the camp. There were also a few men lined up near the entrances with hard hats and large sticks, but there were no weapons in sight.

All the tents had posters hanging on them in Arabic, English, French, and occasionally German, or even Russian. There were posters depicting Morsi that read, “No to the coup” in Arabic, and one in English showing a woman saying, “Killing won’t silence my voice.” There were other posters with the words, “We want the president and parliament,” “Anti-coup,” “Where is my ballot?” and “The revolution continues,” referring to January 25, 2011. There was even a sign with an Otpor fist. There were also a number of posters of martyrs with the face of the victim before his martyrdom and then another of him on a respirator, or dead and mutilated. One poster portrayed a number of corpses lined up and said, “Paid for by U.S. tax dollars.” Young men were also walking around with posters on sticks, some with the faces of martyrs on them. There were Egyptian flags throughout the site.

A sex-segregated crowd assembled at a makeshift stage. Nearby was a hanging effigy of the minister of interior and a live donkey walking around with a boot hanging around its neck. Young children were lined up on the stage to sing, and small boys led the crowd in anti-American and anti-military chants. One of the chants was, “Get out, get out military rule.” There were few, if any, televisions in the camp and most information was
disseminated by a man on a loudspeaker on a 24-hour basis. Over and over again he drummed on the themes of legitimacy and democracy.

The entire area of the sit-in was remarkably clean, aided by sweepers who could be seen circulating through the streets. The atmosphere was almost festive, with swings and playground equipment for children, tents decorated with Sponge Bob and Mickey Mouse balloons, and street vendors selling clothes, accessories, and tea. Young men were spraying passersby with water to relieve the discomfort from the intense summer heat.

The people walking around Rabaa looked like a cross-section of those in the streets of Cairo. There were men with beards and men without beards, women in niqab (face covering), women in hijab (headscarf) wearing abaya (long robe), and others in hijab dressed in skirts. Only a few women were not wearing a hijab. There were a number of couples strolling, as well as families, children, and groups of men or women. Many people would go to work during the day and then go to Rabaa before iftar (breaking the Ramadan fast) to stay for the evening or overnight.

There were no weapons displayed out in the open at the sit-in. However, there were some unconfirmed reports that torture was taking place under the stage, there were men with weapons in specific areas, and dead bodies with evidence of torture were found near the sit-ins (Lofty 2013). There were also speeches made by Morsi supporters and on the Rabaa stage that implied violence. During the June 30th protests, Mohamed al-Beltagy of the Muslim Brotherhood made the statement about violence in Sinai, “Events in Sinai are in retaliation for the military coup, and will stop immediately once the coup is withdrawn and Morsi is back” (Allam 2013). Later, on July 5, 2013, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood gave a speech on the Rabaa stage promising that “we will
sacrifice our lives for Morsi and bring him back” (Allam 2013). On that same evening there were nationwide clashes that left 30 dead and 1,100 injured. In addition to the violent clashes between supporters and opponents of Morsi that engulfed the country in the months following the coup, there was also sectarian violence, including the murder of four Christians in Luxor by Islamist attackers and the murder of a Coptic priest in a drive-by shooting in Sinai (Allam 2013).

The Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in posed a direct challenge to the rationale behind the military coup. Refuting the military’s argument that the president needed to be ousted in order to put the country on track, the claims of demonstrators at Rabaa al-Adawiya were that the military had overthrown a democratically-elected president who held legitimacy based on the ballot box. The military, with the help of the media that supported it, countered the claims of the sit-in by describing the Muslim Brotherhood and those who supported them as terrorists. The media reported that the sit-in was filled with armed Islamists who tortured suspected infiltrators (Fahim and Gladstone 2013), and on July 26, 2013, the military called for all Egyptians to take to the streets to support the military and fight terror.

Around 3:00 pm on July 26th, the Muslim Brotherhood began marching down Tahrir Street in Dokki, carrying colorful long flags over their heads with Morsi’s picture, blasting music and dancing. Later, at 5:15 pm, a pro-Sisi march made its way down the same street as military helicopters flew overhead. It was also reported that the military was using helicopters to drop Egyptian flags over the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in. By nightfall, Tahrir Square was packed with pro-military demonstrators. Men and women of all ages, some with their children, were waving Egyptian flags and holding up posters of
General Sisi. Street vendors were selling masks with Sisi’s face on them and posters of Morsi’s face with an X on it. In Maadi, many apartment buildings were draped with Egyptian flags, and Egyptian flags were planted in the divider area of two-way streets. People waved Egyptian flags from their cars, and there were posters of Sisi on the backs of tuktuks. The mood was jovial. Television networks played live video of mass demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and Port Said.

At least 72 members of the Rabaa sit-in were killed the next day by security forces when they protested at an overpass near Rabaa (Fahim and El Sheikh 2013), but the large portion of the Egyptian population that supported Sisi did not seem to care. They had bought into the military’s statements that the Rabaa protesters were terrorists, and they were happy to support the military against Muslim Brotherhood supporters, even if the means by which to do so included violence. The killing of protesters on July 27th was not the first time that security forces had attacked Morsi supporters. On July 8, 2013, at least 51 pro-Morsi protesters had been killed in front of the Republican Guard compound in Cairo (Dziadosz and Nasralla 2013).

**The Rabaa al-Adawiya Massacre**

By August 2013, the Egyptian military had had enough of the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in, as well as its sister sit-in at Al-Nahda Square, and it decided to end them. Doing so would assist the military in completing its coup and eliminating vocal opposition. While the government had already shut down Islamist television networks, conducted nationwide arbitrary arrests of Islamists, and frozen the assets of Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist leaders (Allam 2013), it had yet to quell the protests and media statements
challenging the coup. In theory, clearing the protests would also end the nationwide violence and clashes between supporters and opponents of Morsi.

On July 31, 2013, the military-backed government instructed security forces to disperse the sit-ins (Fahim and Gladstone 2013). In a televised address, the government stated that the sit-ins were disruptive and represented “a threat to the Egyptian national security and an unacceptable terrorizing of citizens” (Fahim and Gladstone 2013). However, the government did not set a date for the dispersal. The statement came in the middle of Ramadan, and many believed that the military would not end the sit-ins during the holy month or the following Eid holiday.

At 6:00 am on August 14, 2013, central security forces, supported by the military, began their violent dispersal of the Al-Nahda Square sit-in. Smoke could be seen emanating from the protest site, and videos of participants who were burned alive in their tents because they did not hear the warning announcements were later circulated on YouTube. At 7 am police officers encircled the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in, firing tear gas at the protest camps and destroying tents with bulldozers. According to a New York Times report, while the Interior Ministry had stated that it would leave safety exits and move in gradually, “Soon after the attack began several thousand people appeared trapped inside the main camp, near the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque, as snipers fired down on those trying to flee and riot police officers with tear gas and birdshot closed in from all sides” (D. D. Kirkpatrick 2013). Human Rights Watch found that security forces fired on protesters using live ammunition and killing hundreds with bullets to the head, neck, and chest. Lethal force was used indiscriminately, “with snipers and gunmen inside and alongside APCs firing their weaponry on large crowds of protesters” (Human Rights Watch 2014,
There were also reports of snipers firing from helicopters over Rabaa Square. The Human Rights Watch report additionally stated that there was no specification of on what day the dispersal would take place and that many protesters did not hear the warnings that were announced on the loudspeakers at two entrances early in the morning only minutes before security forces opened fire, thus providing virtually no time for people to escape. Security forces then attacked protesters from all five main entrances to the Square, leaving no safe exit until the end of the day (Human Rights Watch 2014, 6). While debate continues over whether security forces gave adequate warning to sit-in participants, whether exits for escape were provided to demonstrators, and whether demonstrators were armed and fired on security forces, what cannot be disputed is that in one day over 1,000 people were killed in what Human Rights Watch called the largest killing of protesters in a single day in recent history (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Following the massacre, prime minister Hazem El Beblawi made a statement that security forces “observed the highest degrees of self-restraint” in clearing the camp and security forces “were forced to intervene” (The Guardian 2013). In the televised speech, the prime minister also claimed that the government had “exhausted all opportunities” before deciding to disperse the sit-in. Mohamed El Baradei refuted this claim of the government when he resigned as vice-president on the 14th and wrote in his resignation letter, “As you know, I saw that there were peaceful ways to end this clash in society, there were proposed and acceptable solutions for beginnings that would take us to national consensus.” He continued, “It has become difficult for me to continue bearing responsibility for decisions that I do not agree with and whose consequences I fear. I cannot bear the responsibility for one drop of blood” (Hill 2013).
The peaceful proposals to address the sit-in to which El Baradei referred were many. El Baradei had invited a number of international mediators to Cairo, including European Union (EU) Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton. European Union envoy Bernardino Leon, who co-led mediation efforts with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, claimed that there had been a political plan on the table that was acceptable to the Muslim Brotherhood (Taylor 2013), an option the government could have taken. El Baradei also attempted to negotiate a deal where Rabaa protesters would scale back their encampment in exchange for the prison release of Saad El-Katatni, head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, and Al-Wasat leader Abul Ela Madi (Howeidy 2013). After approval of the deal by both sides, the government reneged and refused to release El-Katatni. There were additional confidence building measures proposed by negotiators from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the U.S. and the EU that included prisoner releases and Morsi’s honorable exit from politics, an amended constitution, and new elections (Taylor 2013). Despite the numerous deals put on the table by negotiators, deals to which the Muslim Brotherhood agreed, the government still chose the option of a violent dispersal of the sit-in.

The Egyptian public’s general reaction to the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre was enthusiastic approval of the government’s actions. When on August 16, 2013, an Egyptian journalist posted on Facebook that he had witnessed the police violently attacking pro-Morsi protesters in Ramses Square, the responses to his post included, “Yabny stop looking one way because you hate the police the police have every right to kill those son of a bitch terrorists when they go around burning churches and killing innocent people fuck THE MB and i hope they all die a slow painful death” and “THE
MB ARE NOT HUMAN not even animals even animals have more humanity then those beasts.” These comments were not from marginal extremists but instead represented comments heard all over the Cairo streets in reference to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian public had been worked into a frenzy and were out for blood, emphatically supporting any actions that the military took against the Islamist group and its supporters, no matter how violent.

Any criticisms of the government’s handling of the Rabaa sit-in were met with rationales for the government’s actions. The public believed that there was no other way to clear Rabaa, and that the military had attempted all other options before the dispersal. Egyptians continued to maintain that the blocking of roads, residential buildings, and businesses by the anti-coup protests necessitated the dispersal. Additionally, many claimed that the demonstrators in Rabaa were sufficiently warned that the protest would be cleared and were given opportunities to leave. Thus, anyone who stayed, knowing there were gunmen among protesters, was clearly a terrorist. Claims were also made that sit-in participants knew that they were supporting a terrorist group because of some of the speeches inciting violence made on the Rabaa stage.

Consolidating the Veto Coup

On the day of the Rabaa massacre the Egyptian government declared a state of emergency at 4:00 pm and a military curfew that would begin at 9:00 pm that day (Al Jazeera 2013). The curfew, which was supposed to last for one month, was later extended to three months. While there are no reports or interviews with military officials that would explain the intentions behind this decision, the fact that the state of emergency was
declared prior to the end of clearing the Rabaa sit-in implies that the military knew that a violent attack on the sit-in would precipitate a violent response by Islamists in the following days. International negotiators had presented the government with peaceful options to address the sit-in that were rejected in favor of a violent response. However, the government argued to the Egyptian public that violence was the only option after all others had been exhausted. Thus, it appears that the violent response was indeed the government’s favored one. Statements made by international negotiators implied that from the beginning the Egyptian government had no intention of implementing a peaceful approach to the sit-in; they were committed to violent tactics (Taylor 2013) despite mediators’ warnings that moves to disperse the sit-in “would likely cause hundreds of deaths and drive many conservative Salafi Muslim activists, initially supportive of Mursi’s overthrow, to join forces with the Brotherhood in fierce opposition to the authorities” (Taylor 2013).

Whether or not it was the intention of the military to provoke the violence committed by Islamists in response to the government’s dispersal of Rabaa, the reaction provided the military with an excuse to implement repressive measures and consolidate its hold on the country. Egypt had been experiencing violent clashes across the nation prior to the Rabaa dispersal, but without a highly visible incident of mass violence, it would have been difficult for the military to impose the extremely repressive measures that would follow. In its rationale for the state of emergency, the government did not refer to the slaughtering of Rabaa protesters by security forces but instead painted a picture of armed terrorists attacking security forces at the sit-in.
The Rabaa massacre and the associated state of emergency was a watershed moment for the military’s retain-and-restrict policy. In one day, the military was able to virtually wipe out the possibility of a political return by the Muslim Brotherhood, engage in mass arrests and suppression of both Islamists and anti-military secular opponents with little challenge, and intensify its retaking of the country. Similar to support for the repressive Patriot Act in United States following the 9/11 attacks because of the population’s fear of terrorism, the Egyptian public wildly supported the military’s repressive measures. Day after day the words “Egypt fighting terror” were displayed on the upper right-hand side of the television screen on state channels, and programming included patriotic films and documentaries on the Egyptian military. The Egyptian public appeared to be worked up by the concept of a terrorist threat, promoted by the government and state media, into supporting a “war” effort against the Islamist terrorists attacking their country. At the beginning of this chapter, I labeled what occurred in Egypt a *popular participatory veto coup through opposition cooptation*. The popular participatory aspect of the coup was confirmed on July 26, 2013, when Egyptians took to the streets to support the military in its fight on terror and intensified after the Rabaa massacre. Egyptians’ support for, and justification of, the military’s repressive measures and their participation in rallies that the military promoted to encourage the population to manifest support for its actions demonstrates the popular participatory characteristic of the coup.

Not only was there a demonstration of passionate patriotic support for the military by the Egyptian people but a personality cult surrounding General Sisi also began to develop. Earlier in the chapter, I described the posters and masks of Sisi at the July 26th
rally. That day was only the beginning. The Sisi paraphernalia popped up around the country. Shops sold Sisi sandwiches, Sisi chocolates, Sisi jewelry, Sisi T-shirts, and Sisi perfume. Street vendors sold fake “Sisi” ID cards where under “profession” the card read, “Savior of Egypt” and under address, “The Presidential Office” (Nour and Robinson 2014). It should be noted that this was a time before Sisi officially ran for president. A woman who sold a Sisi jewelry line said that she believed Sisi had “liberated Egypt and freed it from fascism” and that her line was called “The Second Victory” because the army’s ousting of Morsi was its biggest success since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Nour and Robinson 2014). In the streets and on the doors of residential apartment buildings hung posters of Sisi next to a lion, couples threw military-themed wedding parties, and pro-military songs such as Teslem al Ayadi (May those hands be safe) became popular mobile phone ring tones.

The media also fawned over Sisi. Columnist Ghada Sherif described Sisi as Nasser’s “reincarnation” and wrote, “He doesn’t need to order or command us, all he needs to do is give us a wink with one eye, or even just flutter his eyelashes,” continuing, “This is a man adored by Egyptians. And if he wants to take four wives, we’re at his service” (AFP 2013). Egypt’s airwaves were flooded with songs praising the defense minister’s victory against terrorism, and an editorial in the state newspaper described Sisi’s “bronzed, gold skin,” and “herculean strength” (CBS News 2013).

The number of political incidents that occurred in the months following the Rabaa massacre are too many to chronicle in this chapter, but to provide a brief summary, the nation saw violent attacks by Islamist militants on police and military institutions and personnel, including bombings, drive-by shootings, and attempted assassinations of
government officials, such as the Minister of the Interior. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, a terrorist group that later aligned with the Islamic State began to strengthen its organization and attack soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula. There were also attacks on soldiers by Islamist militants in other areas of the country, Islamist attacks on Christians and their houses of worship, and a bombing of a tourist bus in Taba. Both peaceful and violent protests by Morsi supporters continued across the country and were met with a violent response by security forces. The assets of those associated with Islamist groups were frozen, Islamists were imprisoned en masse, and mass death sentences were handed out to Islamist protesters.

The military’s repressive tactics were not limited to Islamists. The Third Square, a movement opposed to both the Muslim Brotherhood and military rule, had its protests shut down, international journalists such as Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Peter Greste, and Baher Mohamed of Al Jazeera, who did not toe the party line, were imprisoned, and secular activists who had initiated the 2011 Revolution, such as Ahmed Maher of the April 6th Youth Movement, were imprisoned under the new protest law.

The protest law, or anti-protest law, was signed on November 24, 2013. The law forced protesters to obtain seven separate permissions before organizing a protest and banned overnight sit-ins. If an application was rejected, activists would have to appeal to the courts (Kingsley 2013). The law banned unsanctioned gatherings in private or public of more than ten people, and the police would have the final say on whether or not a protest could take place (Kingsley 2013). The law also imposed heavy fines and prison sentences for those who broke the law. The new protest law was utilized to give long
prison sentences to prominent secular political activists who challenged the law by protesting without obtaining prior permission.

As the months went on, the military-backed government became more repressive and the people grew more in love with Sisi. As early as September 2013 there were calls to elect Sisi president, months before presidential elections were even announced. A popular campaign called “Finish the Job” was collecting signatures urging Sisi to run for president, and most of the candidates from the previous presidential election had already endorsed him (Lindsey 2013). Participants in the campaign said that it was their way of expressing their appreciation for Sisi. The name “Finish the Job” is ironic because that is exactly what Sisi did through the military-backed constitution that freed the military from oversight, which was passed in a January 2014 referendum, and his run for president in May 2014. He was finishing the job of consolidating the veto coup through a retain and restrict policy. By running for president, Sisi and the military would ensure that there would be no challenges to, or retaliation for, their veto.

On March 26, 2014, Sisi announced his formal resignation from the Armed Forces and his intention to run for president, claiming that it was his duty and desire to serve the nation (Ezzat 2014). In Egypt, the president must be a civilian; therefore, Sisi had to resign from office before announcing his candidacy. However, one Egyptian man astutely posted on Facebook that Sisi’s taking off his uniform and calling himself a civilian was the same as his putting on a bra and calling himself the first female president of Egypt.

On June 3, 2014, when Sisi was proclaimed the winner of the presidential election, the popular participatory aspect of the coup was complete. Sisi had won more
than 96% of the vote, while his challenger, Hamdeen Sabahi had received only 3.9% of the vote (CNN 2014). Responding to the violence committed by Islamist militants one voter said that the army was the “only body stronger than the Muslim Brotherhood, and it would have been impossible to free the country from the Brotherhood without the army. For this reason, we need the chief of the army to be president. The conflict with the Brotherhood is not over yet” (Ezzat 2014). The people gave their support to a military president and his retain-and-restrict approach to politics because they were convinced by the government’s and media’s framing of the military’s repressive tactics as the only way to combat Islamist extremism.

**Conclusion**

Explaining the events surrounding June 30th is challenging because doing so requires differentiating the perspectives of multiple parties from the reality of what occurred. Analysis of the coup is also made difficult by the fact that the military’s decision-making process during a coup is not usually made public. However, from the information available, I determined that June 30th was a popular participatory veto coup through opposition cooptation. The military and the interior ministry were successful in their attempts to influence leaders of the Tamarod movement and co-opted both the social movement organization and the popular uprising. When people rose up against the Morsi government, the military staged a veto coup that ousted the president from power. In the following months, the military labeled the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and mobilized the public against the group through calls for mass demonstrations in support of the military in their fight on terror. Later, the military used the violent
dispersal of the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in as an excuse to impose a state of emergency and intensify repression. By creating an atmosphere of fear, the government and media were able to influence the public to support the repressive measures. Additionally, the glorification of Sisi by the media, portraying him as the savior of the country, contributed to a cult of personality that developed around the general, which in turn led the people to petition for his presidential run. Sisi’s win in the presidential elections consolidated the coup and conserved the military’s veto power as a key element of Egyptian politics. It also demonstrated that the military was successful in galvanizing popular support for its coup.

While the overwhelming majority of the electorate voted for Sisi, it should be noted that there were still many who opposed military rule in the country. In addition to Islamists, there were many secular activists and members of the general public who continued to fight for civilian rule and oppose the military regime. What we can observe from this chapter is that after the 2011 Revolution remnants of the old regime remained. These remnants capitalized on an opportune moment to regain power, returning stronger than they ever were under Mubarak’s rule.
Chapter 10  Conclusion

The main goal of my study was to understand why and how individuals who are not members of political groups or organizers of political movements choose to engage or not engage in anti-government protest under an authoritarian regime. Throughout my chapters I employed the Synthetic Political Opportunity Theory (SPOT) and the Collective Action Research Program (CARP) approaches to investigate protest mobilization leading up to and during the eighteen days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the four days of the June 30, 2013, uprising in Cairo, Egypt. Using these two approaches, I explored how the interplay of political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes affected decisions to protest or not protest. I also examined the role of emotions in ordering preferences in the decision-making process. In this final chapter, I summarize my findings from each chapter and the main arguments of the dissertation. I will then discuss the generalizability of my work and its implications for future research.

My dissertation traced the experiences and decision-making processes of individuals in Cairo in the years leading up to the 2011 Revolution through the 2013 June 30th protests. In chapter 3, I found that leading up to the 2011 Revolution, individuals of all classes shared similar grievances against the Mubarak regime regarding dissatisfaction with the economy and the high rate of unemployment, police brutality, and corruption. Many Egyptians felt that the regime had robbed them of their dignity, through the brutality and humiliation they experienced at the hands of the police and through their inability to provide for their families because of unemployment and underemployment.
Many interviewees also felt hopeless because of the high levels of corruption that made it difficult to obtain employment or function successfully in society without connections. Grievances alone, however, do not lead to revolution, but activists may use grievances as a starting point for mass mobilization against a regime if they are able successfully to frame them in a way whereby individuals are led to attribute these problems to failures of the regime and can be convinced that the way to address them is through protest. I documented how social movement organizers reinforced these grievances through disseminating information on police brutality, corruption, and labor issues online, thereby intensifying exasperation and anger against the state, and then channeling the resulting discontent into a call for collective action to contest the Mubarak regime.

In chapter 4, social media was found to be the most important tool for disseminating information and mobilizing individuals to protest in the weeks leading up to the 2011 Revolution and on January 25th. I also argued that while social media is not a necessary element of the revolutionary process nor does it always accelerate the rate of mobilization, in the Egyptian case, Facebook facilitated the building of a politically conscious civil society over the course of a number of years prior to the Revolution. In addition, it contributed to reinforcing grievances and mobilizing opposition to the regime through exposing corruption and human rights abuses, allowed people to realize that they were not alone in their opposition to the regime, and lowered the threshold for engaging in political participation and dissent by providing a relatively safe, easily accessible space for political expression in a country that outlawed gatherings of five or more people that could threaten public order or security. Many people were hesitant to protest in the streets in the years leading up to the Revolution because of the harsh crackdowns on
demonstrations by state security. However, Facebook provided a relatively safe space to express grievances and share ideas. Additionally, the large number of people engaging in political activities online lowered the threshold for political participation based on the normalization of online political discussion, even for individuals who were not initially intending to use Facebook for political purposes.

The advent of new technologies leads to new spaces for mobilization and protest. In chapter 4, I also re-conceptualized Timur Kuran’s idea of private and public preference by adding an intermediate step, online preference. While Kuran’s explanation for first protesters out centers on their being selfless individuals who possibly have a higher moral standard than the rest of the population, I demonstrate that individuals are able to break the barrier of fear quite early by estimating how many people will attend a protest based on the number of people who accept the Facebook invitation to a protest event and by the number of groups that publicly proclaim that they will participate. Thus, revolutionary bandwagoning takes place online before anyone even starts protesting in the streets. I found that Facebook not only mobilized individuals online but also served as a stepping stone to on-the-ground protests.

In chapter 5, I explored television as a tool for protest mobilization and found that once the 2011 Revolution began, the majority of protesters and non-protesters gained information on the demonstrations from television. I determined that in explaining individual decisions to protest or not protest (dependent variable), it was television framing that served as the main causal (independent) variable rather than direct encounters with the masses protesting in the streets. When individuals saw the masses of people already protesting in the streets on television, particularly anti-regime television
stations, the fear abatement mechanism was activated. Individuals decided to join the revolutionary bandwagon despite the threat of government violence because viewing the large numbers of protesters caused them to develop collective perception of safety in numbers. In the chapter, I re-conceptualized the concept of revolutionary bandwagoning by suggesting that scholars replace the notion of number of protesters with that of spaces filled. Numerical depictions of revolutionary bandwagoning lead to assumptions that individuals calculate a particular number of protesters in the streets before participating. I uncovered that numbers may not be as relevant as images of spaces that are filled by people. I also found that while television framing did not alter individual perceptions of the Mubarak regime, pro-regime television framing caused a shift in behavior by discouraging a particular population of potential protesters from protesting through triggering the fear enhancement mechanism.

In chapter 6, I explained how government violence against protesters caused individuals to decide to join in the demonstrations. I argued that the key emotional mechanism that contributed to ordering individual preferences and producing the decision to protest was moral shock. Viewers at home experienced moral shock when seeing the brutal treatment of protesters and felt a sense of injustice that their compatriots were killed for demanding their rights. One component of the emotion was empathy with protesters. In the chapter I outlined how the empathy felt by those deciding to protest was based on feelings of collective identity, a newly-developing form of nationalism that could be defined as “bottom-up.” This national collective identity was founded on feelings of collective victimization stemming from the regime’s persecution of its people and failure to meet their needs. When individuals sitting at home observed expressions of
this national identity in the chants of protesters in the streets and this particular form of collective identity resonated with them, it produced empathy with the protesters.

In chapter 7, I transitioned from explaining decisions of whether or not to protest in the 18 days of the 2011 Revolution to protest dynamics under the transitional rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and how protesters were able to successfully pressure SCAF to facilitate parliamentary and presidential elections. Protesters had opened political opportunities through their actions during the 18 days of the Revolution and their ousting of Mubarak. They attempted to sustain and further open those opportunities through continuing to protest against SCAF rule. Protesters believed that the goals of the revolution could only be achieved through a swift transition to civilian rule, which was the primary demand of the anti-SCAF protests. Simultaneously, SCAF aimed to remain in power long enough to manipulate laws and institutions in its favor. Thus, it tried to close political opportunities through violent crackdowns on its opponents. As explained in chapter 6, violent repression increased protesters’ anger, furthering mobilization against SCAF.

When protesters overthrew Mubarak, they redefined the terms of regime legitimacy in Egypt in a manner that required a ruler’s approval from the people. Because the military prided itself on being a military of the people it was very susceptible to challenges based on this definition. Every time protesters publicly challenged SCAF’s rule and the military government used violence to quell demonstrations, SCAF further eroded its legitimacy. After failing to suppress protests with either concessions or violence, SCAF eventually gave in to protester demands for democratic elections because it could not maintain its legitimacy if it continued to use violence against protesters in an
attempt to close political opportunities. The chapter is important not only theoretically but also because it is one of the first scholarly pieces to summarize political and protest events under SCAF. Therefore, I hope that it can be useful as a source of information and a foundation for further research on political events in Egypt during that particular time period.

Chapter 8 outlined the individual grievances arising from political, economic, social, and religious conditions under the government of Mohamed Morsi that became the foundations of opposition to his rule. In Chapter 9, I identified the discrepancy between real and perceived political opportunities and the effect this gap had on political mobilization for June 30th. I was able to outline how the Tamarod movement used popular grievances in its petition to mobilize the mass protest against Morsi on June 30, 2013. Chapter 9 also goes through the intricate details and step-by-step process of the military coup. I labeled the coup a popular participatory veto coup through opposition cooptation. Opposition cooptation occurred when the military and the interior ministry successfully influenced leaders of the Tamarod movement and the popular uprising. During the four days of the June 30th uprising, the military intervened with a veto coup that ousted the president from power. In the months that followed, the military designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and mobilized the public against the group through organizing mass demonstrations in support of the military in their fight on terror. The public’s participation in such events exemplified the popular participatory aspect of the coup.

The military followed by using the violent dispersal of the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in as an excuse to impose a state of emergency and intensify repression. By creating an
atmosphere of fear, the government and Egyptian media influenced the Egyptian public to support the repressive measures. Additionally, the cult of personality that developed around General Sisi led some people to petition for his presidential run. Sisi’s victory in the presidential elections consolidated the coup and again reflected the popular participatory dimension of the coup.

The central argument in this study is that individuals are rational actors, but their decisions to protest or not protest are affected by the interplay of three sets of factors, conveniently grouped under the following headings: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. I also assumed that the ordering of individual preferences in the decision-making process took place through emotional mechanisms that are activated by specific combinations of these factors. In Part 1, I integrated the SPOT and CARP approaches using CARP to explore the emotional mechanisms involved in the decision-making process to protest and SPOT to identify the causes of such decisions. In Part 2, I moved toward a SPOT-centered approach after finding in my data that changes in political opportunity structures and the discrepancy between perceived and actual opportunities were the most important explanatory factors for understanding protest dynamics during the period in time under study.

I discovered that each stage of the political process was associated with different emotions. In chapter 3, I delineated how the political opportunity structures created by the Mubarak regime produced emotions of anger and exasperation, which social movement organizations were able to manipulate for mobilization against the Mubarak government. Chapter 4 examined social media and online networks as tools for protest mobilization. I found that online participation was produced through the mechanisms of
resentment formation, threshold-based safety calculations with Facebook-wide referents, and status considerations linked to Facebook community. Later, I uncovered that triggering mechanisms that caused individuals to move offline and into the streets were belief in the possibility of success based on the success in Tunisia, status considerations linked to Facebook community, and threshold-based safety calculations with Facebook-wide referents, which were enhanced by community encouragement linked to work, family, and friend communities. Chapter 5 investigated the effects of television framing on decisions to protest or not protest, finding that pro-regime television framing activated the fear enhancement mechanism, deterring individuals from protesting, while anti-regime television framing triggered the fear abatement mechanism, leading individuals into the streets. Chapter 6 returned to political opportunities and how government violence against demonstrators caused individuals to protest. I demonstrated that regime violence produced moral shock, which was reinforced through empathy based on collective national identity.

Chapters 7 through 9 focused on structural issues rather than individual calculations and emotions. While emotions and individual decisions to protest were relevant aspects of mobilization during the SCAF transitional period and Morsi government, I found that structural factors of the mobilization process were more important for understanding these events. Chapter 7 was similar to chapter 6 in its exploration of regime violence against protesters. However, the protests in chapter 7 took place under SCAF rather than Mubarak. In chapter 8, I outlined the structural issues and actions taken by the Morsi regime that Tamarod was able to play upon in its mobilization
for June 30th. Finally, in chapter 9, I used political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes to explain the June 30th coup.

This study did not aim to produce a grand theory of revolution or collective action. However, I do believe that many of the elements and processes found in the Egyptian case may be useful for understanding protest events under other authoritarian regimes. I hope that my contributions to the literature on revolutionary bandwagoning and thresholds, such as online preference and images of spaces filled instead of number of people, encourage scholars to rethink these concepts, particularly given the advent of new media and communication technologies. Additionally, further research into emotional mechanisms, such as moral shock, may help to identify how and when individuals protest in the face of violent repression. While there is a large body of literature on the influence of television framing on perceptions, little work has been produced on the effects of television framing on decisions of whether or not to protest. Thus, more work in this area may be very fruitful. Some of the few studies that do exist on the topic suffer from an ecological fallacy where aggregate data is used to explain individual decision-making.

My research highlights the importance of understanding both the micro-foundations of protest and broader structural mechanisms. Both can be uncovered by interviewing individuals about their experiences. It would be interesting to ask the same questions I used in Egypt of individuals who participated in another uprising, such as the Tunisian Revolution or the 8888 Uprising in Burma, to uncover whether or not individuals had similar experiences or went through similar processes in their decisions of whether or not to protest. While interviewing allowed me to identify causal
mechanisms and the intricacies of decision-making processes, the number of interviews in my study was not large enough to determine solid statistical significance for some of my findings. A mass survey that asked similar questions would further confirm my claims.

Finally, this study is one of the first to examine protest dynamics under the SCAF transitional government and the circumstances surrounding the June 30th coup in detail. Despite the difficult research conditions presented by the current political climate in Egypt, I encourage scholars of Egyptian politics to continue to investigate these events, as well as those that occurred after the time period of my project.
Appendix 1: Opposition Groups and Individual Thresholds Model

The Setup

Pre-History: Prior to the current game, group 1 and group 2 have been protesting against the regime individually based on different frames. The question for group 2 is: protest or not protest? Prior to the current game, non-group member individuals have not participated in anti-regime protests. The question for non-group member individuals is: protest or not protest?

Actors and Actions: There are two groups and a non-group affiliated individual. Group 1 must decide to protest (P) or not to protest (¬ protest). Based on whether Group 1 chooses to protest or not to protest, Group 2 must decide whether to protest (P) or not to protest (¬protest). The non-group member decides to protest (P) or not to protest (¬ protest) based on the choices of both Group 1 and Group 2.

Outcomes: If Group 1 protests (P) and Group 2 does not protest (not P), then the non-group member will not protest (¬ P). If Group 1 does not protest (¬ P) and Group 2 does not protest (¬ P), then the non-group member will not protest (¬ P). If Group 1 does not protest (¬ P) and Group 2 does protest (P), then the non-group member will again not protest (¬ P). Only if Group 1 chooses to protest (P) and Group 2 chooses to protest (P), will the non-group member choose to protest (P).

Information: In terms of information in this game, my game is one of full and complete information.

Payoffs: If the game ends in full protest, then the expected value for Group 1 is $B_1+B_2+B_i-C_1$, Group 2 receives $B_1+B_2+B_i-C_2$, and the non-group member receives
If the game ends with only Group 1 protesting, then the payoff for Group 1 is $B_1 - C_1$, Group 2 receives $B_1$, and the non-group member receives $B_1$. If only Group 2 protests, then Group 2 receives a payoff of $B_2$, Group 1 receives $B_2 - C_2$, and the non-group member receives $B_2$. If no one protests then all players receive a payoff of 0.

Solving the Game: Considering Individual Non-Group Member’s Incentives

This game, depending on the values of the parameters, can have multiple equilibria. However, I am only interested in an equilibrium where non-group member $i$ protests. I will identify what conditions need to be present for such an equilibrium to exist. Non-group members will only protest if both Group 1 and Group 2 choose to protest. Thus, at a, $i$ chooses $P$ iff $B_1 + B_2 + B_i - C_i > B_1 - C_i$. At b, $i$ chooses $\neg P$ iff $B_1 + B_1 - C_i < B_1$. At c, $i$ chooses $\neg P$ iff $B_2 + B_i - C_i < B_2$. At d, $i$ chooses $\neg P$ iff $B_1 - C_i < 0$.

Solving the Game: Considering Group 2’s Incentives

Given what individual $i$ chooses at his decision nodes, we must look at what Group 2 will choose. At f, Group 2 chooses $P$ iff $B_1 + B_2 + B_1 - C_1 > B_1$. At e, Group 2 chooses $P$ iff $B_2 - C_2 > 0$.

Solving the Game: Identifying Group 1’s Incentives

To solve the game, one must also formulate beliefs for Group 1. At g, Group 1 chooses $P$ iff $B_1 + B_2 + B_1 - C_1 > B_2$. 
**Model**
Appendix 2: Protester Interview Questions

1) Gender

2) Age at time of 2011 Revolution

3) Education at time of 2011 Revolution (including public or private high school)

4) Profession at time of 2011 Revolution

5) At the time of the 25th of January Revolution, were you employed or unemployed?

6) Social class

7) Area of residence at time of 2011 Revolution and where grew up

8) Prior to the Revolution, were you satisfied with the regime? If not, what problems did you have with it?

9) On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being strongly like and 10 being strongly dislike) how would you rate your feelings about the Mubarak regime in the months leading up to the Revolution?

10) Were you ever politically active prior to the Revolution? If so, how?

11) How did you become politically active?

12) When did you attend your first protest?

13) Who organized the protest?

14) What reasons or issues encouraged you to protest?

15) How did you learn about the protest?

16) With whom did you attend the protest?

17) Why didn’t you protest before then? Was it because of fear?

18) Are you or have you ever been a member of a political group? If so, which ones?

19) When did you join the groups and how did you learn about the groups?
20) For what reasons did you join the groups?

21) Why did you leave the groups?

22) If no, why didn’t you protest or engage in political activity before the Revolution? Was it because of fear?

23) Prior to the Revolution, did you know about protests before they occurred? If yes, from what sources (e.g. social media, television, newspapers, SMS, flyers, friends face-to-face, activists face-to-face)? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?

24) Prior to the Revolution, did you ever participate in a strike? (If yes, revert to protest questions)

25) Prior to the Revolution did you ever speak with anyone face-to-face or online about disliking some aspect of the regime or its policies? If yes, with whom?

26) Prior to the Revolution, were you or anyone you know hurt by the Mubarak regime?

27) Prior to the Revolution, did you believe that changing the system would lead to good results? Why or why not?

28) In the few days prior to the Revolution, did you believe that change was possible through protest? Why or why not?

29) Did you experience any community or family pressure not to participate in the revolutionary protests?

30) How and when did you first learn about the January 25, 2011 protests?

31) Prior to the Revolution, from what sources did you learn that protests were going to take place on January 25th (e.g. social media, television, newspapers, SMS, flyers, friends face-to-face, activists face-to-face)? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?

32) Prior to January 25, 2011, what groups did you know of that were going to protest on the 25th? From what sources did you know that each group was going to protest?

33) Did you feel a connection to any of these groups based on their demands, activism they had done in the past, what they stood for, goals they had achieved in the past, or their reputation in the community?
34) Prior to January 25, 2011, how many people did you think would protest on January 25th?

35) What day of the Revolution did you first participate in protests?

36) What reasons or issues inspired you to protest in the Revolution?

37) Why protest during the Revolution and not before?

38) Were there any particular government actions before or during the 18 days that made you decide to go out into the streets and protest?

39) Did the number of people or groups saying they would participate on January 25th affect your decision to protest?

40) Were the number of people or groups saying they would participate on January 25th different from previous protests?

41) Leading up to the Revolution were there any political events or stories in the news that made you have anger toward the government?

42) Before participating in the revolutionary protests, did you know how many people were already out protesting? If so, from what sources did you know this information? How many people did you think were protesting? Did you know of friends or family who were already out protesting?

43) Before participating in the revolutionary protests, did you see people in your area or outside your house protesting?

44) When you were deciding whether or not to protest in the Revolution, what benefits did you think you would gain personally if you protested, and what consequences did you think you would face personally if you protested (e.g. getting arrested, losing financially, having problems with family/community)?

45) With whom did you attend the Revolutionary protests?

46) How many days and which days did you protest?

47) Why didn’t you protest on all days of the 18 days?

48) During the 18 days, how did you get information about protests or political occurrences (e.g. social media, television, newspapers, SMS, flyers, friends face-to-face, activists face-to-face)? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?

49) Were you able to use internet or watch satellite TV during the 18 days of the Revolution?
50) Prior to the Revolution, did you read any political Facebook pages? If so, which ones?

51) How did you become aware of these political Facebook pages?

52) Did you “like” the Facebook pages or just read them?

53) Did you gain any information from political Facebook pages posted/shared by friends?

54) Did you “share” postings or events from political Facebook pages or post comments and/or “like” comments on or about them?

55) If yes, did you feel safe (from the government) sharing or commenting? If no, did you feel unsafe (because of the government) sharing or commenting?

56) Prior to the Revolution, did you read any political blogs or gain political information from online or social media sites? If so, which ones?

57) Prior to the Revolution, from what places did you access the internet?

58) Did you have internet on your mobile? If yes, when did you start using it?

59) Did the success of Tunisia have any effect on your view of the protests?

60) What was your monthly income at the time of the Revolution? What is your monthly income now?

61) What are your parents’ professions?

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62) Did you vote in the presidential election between Morsi and Shafik? If yes, who did you vote for in the first and second rounds and why? If no, why not?

63) Did you vote in the December 2012 constitutional referendum? If yes, did you vote yes or no and why did you vote the way you did? If no, why not?

64) Were you satisfied with the Morsi presidency? If not, why not? If yes, why?

65) On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being strongly like and 10 being strongly dislike) how would you rate your feelings about the Morsi presidency?

66) Before June 30, 2013, did you believe that changing the system would lead to good results? Why or why not?
67) In the few days prior to June 30, 2013, did you believe that change was possible through protest? Why or why not?

68) How and when did you first learn about the Tamarod campaign?

69) Did you sign the Tamarod petition?

70) Did you protest on June 30, 2013 or any of the days after (or the 28th or 29th before)? If yes, which days did you protest?

71) If yes, what made you decide to protest? If no, why not?

72) Did the number of people or groups saying they would protest affect your decision to protest/not to protest?

73) Did the number of people who signed the petition affect your decision to protest/not to protest?

74) Did you know how many people were already in the streets protesting before you went out/during the 30th protests? Did this affect your decision to protest/not to protest? Before the 30th, how many people did you think were going to protest on the 30th?

75) Were there any particular government actions that affected your decision to protest/not to protest?

76) Leading up to June 30, 2013 were there any political events or stories in the news that made you have anger toward the Morsi government?

77) What is your definition of the word democracy?

78) What is your definition of the word legitimacy?

79) Do you think that Morsi was legitimate?

80) Do you think that Mubarak was legitimate?

81) How many people do you think signed the Tamarod petition?

82) After the past two/three years of political transition, how do you view the Mubarak regime now? Have your feelings changed about it?

83) Do you want democracy in Egypt?
Appendix 3: Non-protester Interview Questions

1) Gender

2) Age at time of 2011 Revolution

3) Education at time of 2011 Revolution (including public or private high school)

4) Profession at time of 2011 Revolution

5) At the time of the 25\textsuperscript{th} of January Revolution, were you employed or unemployed?

6) Social class

7) Area of residence at time of 2011 Revolution and where grew up

8) Prior to the Revolution, were you satisfied with the regime? If not, what problems did you have with it?

9) On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being strongly like and 10 being strongly dislike) how would you rate your feelings about the Mubarak regime in the months leading up to the Revolution?

10) Were you ever politically active prior to the Revolution? If so, how?

11) How did you become politically active?

12) When did you attend your first protest?

13) Who organized the protest?

14) What reasons or issues encouraged you to protest?

15) How did you learn about the protest?

16) With whom did you attend the protest?

17) Why didn’t you protest before then? Was it because of fear?

18) Are you or have you ever been a member of a political group? If so, which ones?

19) When did you join the groups and how did you learn about the groups?
20) For what reasons did you join the groups?

21) Why did you leave the groups?

22) If no, why didn’t you protest or engage in political activity before the Revolution? Was it because of fear?

23) Prior to the Revolution, did you know about protests before they occurred? If yes, from what sources (e.g. social media, television, newspapers, SMS, flyers, friends face-to-face, activists face-to-face)? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?

24) Prior to the Revolution, did you ever participate in a strike? (If yes, revert to protest questions)

25) Prior to the Revolution did you ever speak with anyone face-to-face or online about disliking some aspect of the regime or its policies? If yes, with whom?

26) Prior to the Revolution, were you or anyone you know hurt by the Mubarak regime?

27) Prior to the Revolution, did you believe that changing the system would lead to good results? Why or why not?

28) In the few days prior to the Revolution, did you believe that change was possible through protest? Why or why not?

29) Did you experience any community or family pressure not to participate in the revolutionary protests?

30) How and when did you first learn about the January 25, 2011 protests?

31) Prior to the Revolution, from what sources did you learn that protests were going to take place on January 25th (e.g. social media, television, newspapers, SMS, flyers, friends face-to-face, activists face-to-face)? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?

32) Prior to January 25, 2011, what groups did you know of that were going to protest on the 25th? From what sources did you know that each group was going to protest?

33) Did you feel a connection to any of these groups based on their demands, activism they had done in the past, what they stood for, goals they had achieved in the past, or their reputation in the community?
34) Prior to January 25, 2011, how many people did you think would protest on January 25th?

35) During the 18 days did you ever want to go out and protest?

36) What reasons made you decide not to go out into the streets and protest?

37) Were there any particular government actions before or during the 18 days that strongly bothered you?

38) Did the number of people or groups saying they would participate on January 25th affect your decision not to protest?

39) Were the number of people or groups saying they would participate on January 25th different from previous protests?

40) Leading up to the Revolution were there any political events or stories in the news that made you have anger toward the government?

41) During the 18 days, did you know how many people were out protesting? If so, from what sources did you know this information? How many people did you think were protesting? Did you know of friends or family who were out protesting?

42) During the 18 days, did you see people in your area or outside your house protesting?

43) When you were deciding whether or not to protest in the Revolution, what benefits did you think you would gain personally if you protested, and what consequences did you think you would face personally if you protested (e.g. getting arrested, losing financially, having problems with family/community)?

44) During the 18 days, how did you get information about protests or political occurrences (e.g. social media, television, newspapers, SMS, flyers, friends face-to-face, activists face-to-face)? If TV, newspapers, or social media, which ones?

45) Were you able to use internet or watch satellite TV during the 18 days of the Revolution?

46) Prior to the Revolution, did you read any political Facebook pages? If so, which ones?

47) How did you become aware of these political Facebook pages?

48) Did you “like” the Facebook pages or just read them?
49) Did you gain any information from political Facebook pages posted/shared by friends?

50) Did you “share” postings or events from political Facebook pages or post comments and/or “like” comments on or about them?

51) If yes, did you feel safe (from the government) sharing or commenting? If no, did you feel unsafe (because of the government) sharing or commenting?

52) Prior to the Revolution, did you read any political blogs or gain political information from online or social media sites? If so, which ones?

53) Prior to the Revolution, from what places did you access the internet?

54) Did you have internet on your mobile? If yes, when did you start using it?

55) Did the success of Tunisia have any effect on your view of the protests?

56) What was your monthly income at the time of the Revolution? What is your monthly income now?

57) What are your parents’ professions?

June 30th Protests

58) Did you vote in the presidential election between Morsi and Shafik? If yes, who did you vote for in the first and second rounds and why? If no, why not?

59) Did you vote in the December 2012 constitutional referendum? If yes, did you vote yes or no and why did you vote the way you did? If no, why not?

60) Were you satisfied with the Morsi presidency? If not, why not? If yes, why?

61) On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being strongly like and 10 being strongly dislike) how would you rate your feelings about the Morsi presidency?

62) Before June 30, 2013, did you believe that changing the system would lead to good results? Why or why not?

63) In the few days prior to June 30, 2013, did you believe that change was possible through protest? Why or why not?

64) How and when did you first learn about the Tamarod campaign?

65) Did you sign the Tamarod petition?
66) Did you protest on June 30, 2013 or any of the days after (or the 28th or 29th before)? If yes, which days did you protest?

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70) Did you know how many people were already in the streets protesting before you went out/during the 30th protests? Did this affect your decision to protest/not to protest? Before the 30th, how many people did you think were going to protest on the 30th?

71) Were there any particular government actions that affected your decision to protest/not to protest?

72) Leading up to June 30, 2013 were there any political events or stories in the news that made you have anger toward the Morsi government?

73) What is your definition of the word democracy?

74) What is your definition of the word legitimacy?

75) Do you think that Morsi was legitimate?

76) Do you think that Mubarak was legitimate?

77) How many people do you think signed the Tamarod petition?

78) After the past two/three years of political transition, how do you view the Mubarak regime now? Have your feelings changed about it?

79) Do you want democracy in Egypt?
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