GEORGE CROGHAN: THE LIFE OF A CONQUEROR

by

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and approved by

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This dissertation integrates my own specifying paradigm of “situational frontier” and historian David Day’s generalizing paradigm of “supplanting society” to contextualize one historical personage, George Croghan, who advanced the interests of four eighteenth-century supplanting societies—one nation (Great Britain) and three of its North American colonies (Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia)—in terms of three fields of endeavor, trade, diplomacy, and proprietorship. Croghan was an Irish immigrant who, during his working life on the “situational frontiers” of North America, mastered the intricacies of intercultural trade and diplomacy. His mastery of both fields of endeavor enabled him not only to create advantageous conditions for the governments of the three colonies to claim proprietorship of swaths of Indian land, but also to create advantageous conditions for himself to do likewise. The loci of his and the three colonies’ claims were the “situational frontiers” themselves, the distinct spaces where particular Indians, Europeans, and Euro-Americans converged in particular circumstances and coexisted, sometimes peacefully and sometimes violently. His mastery of intercultural trade and diplomacy enabled him as well to create advantageous conditions for Great Britain to claim proprietorship in the Old Northwest (present-day Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Illinois) and for himself to do likewise. The supplanting process, according to David Day, involved three
overlapping or contemporaneous “stages”: (1) the claiming of legal or *de jure* proprietorship; (2) the claiming of effective or *de facto* proprietorship; and (3) the claiming of *moral* proprietorship. The first stage involved a symbolic gesture like the raising of a territorial flag; the second involved territorial exploration and its consequences, like the naming of geographic features, the fortification of borders, the tilling of soil, the development of resources, and the peopling of lands; and the third involved the conceiving of a suitable justification of conquest. Since Croghan at one time or another claimed *de jure, de facto,* or *moral* proprietorship of Indian lands for himself, the three colonies, or Great Britain, he was a conqueror.
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Donna Ruth Giannini Daiutolo, who did not live to see its beginning, and to my father, Robert Daiutolo, Sr., whose love and support enabled me to finish it.
Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank his dissertation adviser, Dr. Jan Lewis, for her guidance and support throughout the researching and writing of this dissertation. The author wishes also to thank the other members of his dissertation committee, Dr. Paul Clemens, Dr. Peter Silver, and Dr. James Merrell, for their advice. The author wishes also to thank two more contributors to this dissertation, his lawyer brother-in-law, Richard Hackman, for analyzing and synopsizing the several court cases in the Epilogue, and his artistic teenage nephew, Jesse Dauutolo, for rendering the maps that delineate the situational frontiers whereon the subject of this dissertation operated.
## Abbreviations

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<td>CCHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCQC</td>
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<td>HSP</td>
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<td><em>Documentary History of the State of New York</em>, edited by E. B. O’Callaghan (Albany, 1850-51)</td>
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<td>MPCP</td>
<td>Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania from the Organization to the Termination of Proprietary Government</td>
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<td>PA</td>
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Introduction

“Over the long term, the history of the world has been a history of wave after wave of people intruding on the lands of others,” writes historian David Day in Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others. Successive waves of intruding people define the history of native North America, for example. The intrepid pioneers who first crossed the Bering “land bridge” from Siberia some 20,000 years ago occupied empty lands in present-day Alaska, Washington, and Oregon, but they did not enjoy uncontested occupancy for long, as waves of new arrivals either pushed them farther inland or forced them to resist. If the first arrivals resisted fiercely, the new arrivals circumvented the lands and sought empty places. Thus over millennia all the habitable lands of the Americas were occupied. Naturally, groups of native-born occupants jostling with one another for choice lands and living space set territorial boundaries for their societies, but the boundaries shifted as the societies waxed and waned. In the seventeenth century, for example, the confederated Iroquois Five Nations of New York (the Mohawk, the Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga, and the Seneca nations) appropriated a vast hunting preserve in the Ohio Valley, roughly present-day Ohio and tramontane Pennsylvania, by driving out its southerly natives, the Shawnees. Seen from Day’s perspective, the Iroquois intruders, or refugees called Mingoš, were the newest wave of arrivals in the Ohio Valley. For them and other Northeast Woodland Indians, intrusion, or conquest, was a legitimate means of changing “landownership.” The other means were purchase (by Europeans) and abandonment.1

1 For “Over the long term” see David Day, Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3; for Bering “land bridge” see Francis Jennings, The Founders of America: How Indians discovered the land, pioneered in it, and created great classical civilizations; how they were plunged into a Dark Age by Invasion and conquest; and how they are now reviving (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993), 25-35; for preoccupancy and conquest as legitimate means of changing “landownership” see Jedidiah Morse, The American Universal Geography, . . ., 2 parts, 3rd ed. (New York, Philadelphia, and other cities, 1796), 1: 632; for conquest, purchase, and abandonment as legitimate means of
The European conquest of native North America may be understood in the same terms.

The arrival of Europeans—most significantly, the Spanish, the French, and the English—initiated a prolonged, multilayered process whereby waves of new arrivals supplanted the hold of prior occupants over North America’s lands. In the first six decades of the twentieth century historians on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean interpreted the process largely through the prism of European colonialism, but in the reformative 1960s they revised the interpretive paradigm in favor of balance or even in favor of the Indians. Today historian David Day accounts the interpretive paradigm wholly inadequate because European colonialism was supposed to have ended with the coming of independence, such as occurred with the Declaration of Independence in July 1776 or more precisely the Treaty of Paris in November 1782. “Yet the European conquest of North America did not stop with the coming of independence but rather accelerated, only now it was orchestrated by the newly independent republic of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson,” writes Day. His point is sound. Instead of the narrow paradigm of European colonialism he substitutes a broad one, “supplanting society,” which he defines as a society “that moves onto the land of another with the intention of making the land its own.” His paradigm is broad enough to encompass instances where Indian societies expand onto Indian territories.  

The earliest Spanish, French, and English arrivals in North America founded colonies that supplanted seaboard Indian populations. As they moved outward from colonial centers, new Spanish, French, and English arrivals appropriated peripheral lands, thus sup-

changing “landownership” see Anthony F. C. Wallace, “Political Organization and Land Tenure among the Northeastern Indians, 1600-1830,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter 1957): 318. The Bering “land bridge,” which was actually a 1,000-mile wide subcontinent that stretched from Siberia to Alaska, was the habitat for hundreds of native-born generations. Groups of native-born persons migrated from Siberia to Alaska and beyond.

2 For “Yet the European conquest” and “supplanting societies” see Day, Conquest, 5-6.
planning displaced or indigenous Indian populations. According to Day the supplanting process involved three overlapping or contemporaneous “stages”: (1) the claiming of legal or *de jure* proprietorship; (2) the claiming of effective or *de facto* proprietorship; and (3) the claiming of *moral* proprietorship. The first stage involved a symbolic gesture like raising a territorial flag; the second involved territorial exploration and its consequences, the naming of geographic features, the fortification of borders, the tilling of soil, the development of resources, and the peopling of lands; and the third involved a justification of conquest. European and Euro-American supplanters couched their conquests in terms of an invidious contrast between “civilization” and “savagery,” for instance. Mostly, Day takes a bird’s-eye view of world history, but here and there he views close-up historical personages and events to illuminate facets of his argument. This dissertation applies his conceptual framework to contextualize one historical personage, George Croghan, who advanced the interests of four eighteenth-century supplanting societies—a nation (Great Britain) and three of its North American colonies (Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia)—in terms of three fields of endeavor, trade, diplomacy, and proprietorship.³

Throughout his colonial life, which featured stints as an Indian trader, a go-between, an army scout, a militia captain, an imperial official, and a land speculator, Croghan pursued self-interest. He could do so because imperial and colonial interests often coincided with his interests in this way—the supplanting of Indian societies for gain. Yet Croghan saw himself not as a supplanter but rather as a peacemaker who advanced Indian political and economic interests. True, he did occasionally negotiate peace that benefited Indians, but he did so more out of self-interest than out of philanthropy, altruism, sympathy, empathy, or duty, for the occasional peace created for him conditions favorable to the advancement

³ For “stages” see *ibid.*, 6-9.
of his interests. According to current scholarly consensus the occasional peace he negotiated accelerated westward expansion and abetted the historical process that debilitated Indian populations and extended Euro-American hegemony over them. Since the historical process also culminated in the continental proprietorship of the United States of America, he was in essence a conqueror, albeit one very different from Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, or Adolf Hitler.  

Yet the interpretive paradigm of “supplanting society” is flawed. Although Day does acknowledge that the historical process of “supplanting” occurred gradually, he does not account for nuance. In North America the process unfolded simultaneously on multiple frontiers, if one views North American history through the biased prism of European colonialism. There were Spanish frontiers, French frontiers, and English frontiers, for example. When Spanish, French, and English colonies endeavored to appropriate lands on the same frontiers or vied with one another for intercultural trade or natural resources on the same frontiers, or when Spain, France, and England vied with one another for territories in North America or for intercultural trade or natural resources on the same frontiers, war ensued. Although they shared the same imperial goals, which were to expand their colonies and to exploit natural resources for their own gain, Spain, France, and England pursued different and competing Indian policies, partly because government officials in each of their colonies pursued Indian policies in response to unique geopolitical circumstances. In eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, for example, there was a diverse, polyglot population of colonists and Indians. Generally, the Spanish, French, and English colonists of North

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America called “untaken” land “frontier.” In other words “frontier” was “unimproved” or “undeveloped” land beyond colonial settlements or between colonial settlements or between colonial settlements and Indian villages or between Indian villages. However, “frontier” was even land inhabited by Indian groups. Why were colonists of two minds about the same land? Since the “supplanting” process played out on such land throughout the eighteenth century, it is necessary for us to know precisely what a “frontier” was.

Today the word “frontier” is defined as “a region that forms the margin of settled or developed territory.” That is to say, “frontier” is a concept that is understood in terms of geography. Region, margin, territory—these words concern spatiality. What do they mean? A “region” is defined as “a broad homogeneous geographical area.” Region, then, is distinct space. The word “margin” is defined as “the outside limit and adjoining surface of something” or, simply, as “edge.” We may speak of a fox at a wood’s “edge,” for example. Margin, then, is peripheral space. “Territory” is a word that has five meanings in relation to spatiality, including the following: “a geographical area dependent on an external government but having some degree of autonomy” and “an indeterminate geographical area.” By the former definition the colonies of eighteenth-century British North America were territories, for each colony had a bicameral legislature that represented local interests and a governor who at least theoretically if not actually represented Crown interests. By the latter definition the Ohio Valley at mid-eighteenth century was territory, for it was the locus of overlapping colonial boundaries and land claims. Territory, then, may be both dependent space and undefined (or ill-defined) space. In sum “frontier” may be defined as distinct, peripheral, dependent, undefined (or ill-defined) space.
What is “settled,” “improved,” or “developed” territory? Surprisingly, the answer derives solely from cultural perspective. For the Eurocentric historians of the first five decades of the twentieth century “settled,” “improved,” or “developed” territory is only the territory that Euro-Americans or Europeans occupied, transformed, or exploited in traditionally Western ways. The outlying or “peripheral” territory that Indians inhabited is “frontier,” but it is unlikely that any Indians who inhabited the “frontier” called themselves “frontiersmen.” “Frontier,” then, is a culturally biased term. In his seminal essay “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (1893), Frederick Jackson Turner highlighted colonial Euro-Americans at the expense of Indians, citing an ever-present threat of Indian violence as a factor in the development of Euro-American “self-reliance.” By admitting the threat of Indian violence, however, he betrayed the true meaning of “frontier” as violent space, contested space, space where mortal enemies conflicted, often with bloody results, even if he brushed off the threat that Euro-Americans posed to Indians. His “frontier” was an isolated region where the founding of a city like Chicago in the early nineteenth century marked the culmination of a slow evolutionary process of rural agricultural and cultural growth. Trappers, hunters, traders, cattle raisers, subsistence farmers, intensive grain farmers, urban manufacturers—these in successive “stages” had disintegrated “savagery” in what was once a “zone” of “free land.” Were Indians merely the human element of “savagery”? Were they, like rivers, forests, and mountains, merely natural impediments to westward expansion? Where did they go? Surely, now and then, on his way to hunt distant game, a lone Indian hunter squeezed himself between all those subsistence farmers and cattle raisers.5

5 In the nineteenth century Neville B. Craig compiled primary sources about the Ohio Valley. He reveals his Eurocentric mindset in his compilation’s subtitle. See Neville B. Craig, The Olden Time; a Monthly
Turner’s “frontier,” then, existed only in his Eurocentric mind. It was imagined. No isolated, Indian-free, absolute “frontier” of easily discernable “stages” and “zones” that featured archetypes engaged in specific kinds of economic activity ever existed in American history. Complicated situational frontiers did exist, however. These frontiers—for want of a better term—were distinct spaces where particular Indians, Europeans, and Euro-Americans converged in particular circumstances and coexisted, sometimes peacefully and sometimes violently. The conflicted and the conciliatory thoughts and actions of real human beings are what Turner’s “frontier” lacks, for Turner deals in metaphors and archetypes, in human beings en masse, in human behavior patterns, but not in individual humans. Euro-Americans move in “streams” and “torrents,” for instance. Over the last five decades historians have scrapped Turner’s culturally biased and spatially erroneous concept of “frontier”—the very concept that informs the two previous full-length biographies of Croghan—in favor of studying this distinct, peripheral, dependent, undefined (or ill-defined) space on its own terms, as it actually was, so to speak—as lived space. That is to say, historians have redefined “frontier” to encompass not only spatiality but particularity and imagination as well. My paradigm of “situational frontier” refines the current definition. The secondary purpose of this dissertation is to contextualize Croghan by integrating Day’s generalizing paradigm of “supplanting society” and my specifying paradigm of “situational frontier.”

How do the two biographers judge their subject? For Albert T. Volwiler, Croghan was a “representative American” whose motives—one of which was “for amassing wealth” by means of the fur trade and land speculation—produced ideas and actions that hold “social significance and influence.” Yet Croghan was no mere fur trader or land speculator; he was a commonwealth-builder “who gave expression to the deep impulses of American life to seek homes by pushing westward.” For Nicholas B. Wainwright, Croghan was a rascal and a liar who “extracted money by dishonest means” but whose “ability to create, to get things done, and to get people to work together was well appreciated by his contemporaries.” In other words Croghan possessed complexity. My research in primary sources may help me render his character more fully than either Volwiler or Wainwright could. My research in post-1950s scholarship on intercultural relations may help me contextualize his life more accurately than either could. What were the norms of his fields of endeavor? Did he conform to the norms or flaunt them? How did he deal with success or failure?

Volwiler’s *George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782* (1926) requires revision because it exudes Eurocentric bias. “The quest for furs,” Volwiler writes in the first chapter after he has sketched the history of the fur trade from ancient Greece to eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, “took the place of the quest for gold, silver, and precious stones in luring the white man to penetrate into the vast unknown regions north of Mexico.” Doubtless, the “unknown regions” were well-known to the Indians who shaped the “trader’s frontier” beyond the “settler’s frontier.” As always, language tells. Here, for example, Volwiler displays his characteristically bald Eurocentrism:

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For “representative American,” “one of which,” and for “who gave expression” see Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Western Movement*, 335; for “extracted money” and “ability to create” see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 308-309.
If the trade in furs and skins is looked at from the point of view of the uncivilized native who could furnish peltry and hides, one finds equally strong economic forces influencing his conduct. In his estimation of values, based upon the laws of supply and demand, the exchange of fine beaver pelt for a single sharp knife was a great bargain. The mutual immense profits of the trade in furs and skins and other irresistible economic forces involved, led both savages and civilized men to desire to establish and maintain trading relations in spite of the heavy risks to life and property to all concerned in such trade.

The best that can be said of the paragraph is that it contains a pretense of objectivity, but just four pages later Volwiler drops even the pretense: “The man who played the most prominent part in this highly important and significant phase of the westward movement of Anglo-Saxon civilization was George Croghan.” The sentence, like the above paragraph, reeks of Eurocentrism. “Uncivilized native,” “savages and civilized men,” “Anglo-Saxon civilization”—these phrases, which echo Frederick Jackson Turner, Josiah Strong, and eighteenth-century colonial apologists—reveal the author for what he truly was, a man who was subject to the prejudices and distortions of his time. For him, Indians exist as mere foils for Euro-Americans and Europeans. Still, he does acknowledge the significance of his subject.7

Wainwright’s *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat* (1959) requires revision, too, because it contains the kind of outdated Eurocentric perspective that informed much pre-1960s scholarship on colonial North America. For Wainwright, Croghan is an archetypal “frontiersman,” a hapless European who achieved success and fame on the wild North American “frontier.” Of necessity Croghan became an expert “wilderness” negotiator upon whom colonial officials periodically depended to defuse intercultural crises. As a colonial negotiator, Croghan “soothed” and “pacified” Indians. Such words of course evoke the stereotype of the “hostile Indian,” one that recent scholarship has corrected.

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7 For block quotation and other quotations see Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement*, 18-19, 23.
Did not “hostile” colonists require “pacification” as well? What were the conventions of “frontier” diplomacy? How did they relate to local and imperial Euro-American politics and policy? How did they relate to local and imperial Indian politics and policy? How did Croghan operate within both contexts? These are questions that Wainwright could not answer fully because he wrote before scholars began to extract new meaning from Euro-American and European primary sources. Today scholars decipher the Indian signifiers that informed intercultural diplomacy at the “crossroads” or in the “dark woods” or on the “middle ground.”

Throughout his book Wainwright uses language that betrays Eurocentric bias. More than once, for example, he calls intercultural interpreter and negotiator Andrew Montour a “half-breed.” This was a derogatory term that Euro-American colonists and Europeans used in everyday parlance but that has no place in modern scholarship. Put another way, the term is as derogatory today as it was in the eighteenth century. Wainwright, in fleshing out his description, writes that Montour was “a man of consummate impudence, only half–civilized, seemingly ‘unintelligible’ to the discerning [Richard] Peters, frequently and wildly drunk, and generally in debt.” Besides implying that only Euro-American colonists and Europeans—Pennsylvania official Richard Peters was an English immigrant—were “civilized,” the words evoke the stereotype of the “drunken Indian.” Perhaps a few well-placed details can evoke the real Montour, the flesh-and-blood Montour, the Mont-—

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tour who was a full human being, not a stereotype. If Montour did drink to excess, what were his reasons for doing so? Details, after all, illuminate context. So do well-chosen phrases. What does “seemingly ‘unintelligible’” mean? A person is either intelligible or unintelligible.9

Throughout his book Wainwright demonstrates an inability to plumb surface realities. In his chapter on the Battle of the Monongahela (1755), for example, he describes a pre-battle “war dance.” British-allied warriors perform the war dance after the British army under Major General Edward Braddock has demonstrated its superior power by firing its canons. Described in Eurocentric terms, the war dance features the mock scalping of a French soldier. Perhaps Wainwright’s intent in writing the scene was to juxtapose British and Indian customs to highlight their similarities and differences. Perhaps Wainwright was trying to foreshadow the battle or to enliven his prose. Perhaps Wainwright simply could not cut what he thought was dramatic material. Whatever the case may be, Wainwright actually succeeds in demonstrating his injudiciousness, as the scene reinforces the stereotype of the “ignoble savage,” the sort of Indian who deserves conquest, the stereotypical belligerent found in much pre-1960s art, film, and literature. The scene displays little insight into Indian ways beyond the sensory impressions recorded by the Eurocentric British officer upon whose account Wainwright relies. Another characteristically egregious example of surface analysis is this: Croghan took a Mohawk “wife” or “mistress” who bore their daughter, but there is no explanation about why or how the union cemented his relationship with his father-in-law, the Mohawk sachem Nickus. What does the union reveal about Croghan? What does it reveal about his wife or his father-in-law?

9 For “half-breed” and “a man of consummate impudence” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 19, 43, 49, 73, 222; for discussion of cultural significance of words like “civilization” and “savagery” in colonial English and French literature see Sayre, Les Sauvages Américains, 79-143.
What was the function of intercultural unions in intercultural trade, diplomacy, or land transactions?10

Despite its flaws, each biography is a serviceable guide to the life of George Croghan. Each records the incidents of his life and treats the colonial personages who populated it—from the famous (George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Sir William Johnson) to the obscure (ordinary hunters, trappers, traders, scouts, settlers, negotiators, and land speculators). Each also treats the Indian personages who populated his life—from the famous (Pontiac, Teedyuscung, and Joseph Brant) to the obscure (ordinary hunters, trappers, traders, scouts, villagers, refugees, and negotiators). Each cites relevant primary sources and archives, but most important, each highlights a single facet of his colonial career—commonwealth-building or wilderness diplomacy. The secondary purpose of this dissertation is to highlight each facet of his career as it relates to the conquest of native North America. That is to say, my job is to view archival sources through the prism of my own time, when historians like David Day aspire to write more nearly balanced history. Up-to-date secondary sources should enable me to add breadth and depth to the significant incidents of Croghan’s life and to avoid the pitfalls that snared my predecessors.

In 1893 William M. Darlington judged George Croghan the “most conspicuous name in Western Annals, in connection with Indian Affairs for twenty five years preceding the Revolutionary War.” In 1911 Charles H. Hannah dubbed him “king of the traders.” Yet over the next hundred and more years few historians bothered to write even a scholarly

10 For “war dance,” “wife,” and “mistress” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 88-89, 138; for discussion of cultural significance of phrase “ignoble savage” in colonial English and French literature see Sayre, Les Sauvages Américains, 79-143.
article about him. Those who did write about him bear mentioning. For Robert Grant Crist, who recounts Croghan’s activities at Pennsborough (now Pennsboro) Plantation on the Conedoguinet Creek in Pennsylvania, Croghan was a frontier merchant-trader. For Alfred A. Cave, Croghan was not just “the quintessential frontier entrepreneur,” but a devoted Crown agent, too. Cave writes, “The story of Anglo-American Ohio begins with George Croghan.” William J. Campbell, covering Croghan’s “backcountry jockeying” during the French and Indian War, characterizes Croghan likewise but adds this caveat: “Without question he sought to guide Crown policy in the northeastern borderlands to meet his own favor.” Campbell develops this theme further in an article about the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty, which Croghan shaped to fit his speculative interests west of the Appalachian Mountains. Volwiler recounts Croghan’s land schemes in central New York, and Wainwright recounts Croghan’s early failed trading partnership and “role” in a 1747 “Indian uprising.” In other articles Wainwright excerpts Croghan’s opinions on American Indians and Croghan’s journal about a voyage to England. Finally, George Swetnam establishes the place and time of Croghan’s death.11

Today, in books on eighteenth-century colonial North American intercultural trade, diplomacy, or proprietorship, scholars judge Croghan harshly. Gregory Evans Dowd calls him “an artful liar and a determined smuggler.” James H. Merrell calls him a hypocrite. “Once a treaty was over and Indians out of earshot,” writes Merrell, “the trader and agent routinely spoke not of coexistence but of conquest, not of admiration but contempt.” Francis Jennings states that he habitually adjusted his writings “to his purposes at different times.” Alan Taylor states that he “was the most avid, indeed manic, land speculator in colonial North America.” Part of my job is to test these judgments against my own.

Was artifice or smuggling de rigueur on the eighteenth-century “frontier”? Was Croghan a public hypocrite or a private hypocrite or both? Did he adjust his writings for self-serving purposes or for Euro-American purposes? If so, what were the private or public consequences of his adjustments? Did self-interest inform his judgment whenever trade, diplomacy, or proprietorship was at stake? In short, who was the real George Croghan?12


12 For “an artful liar” see Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 6; for “Once a treaty” see James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods, 291; for “to his purposes” see Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 154, n. 49.; for “was the most avid” see Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 5. On the frontiers of Pennsylvania, Irish immigrants reinvented themselves. Adapting to a new culture, they fashioned new identities for themselves as colonists and men. “‘Real’ early American men were idealized as brave, independent, and virtuous masters of their public and private domains,” writes historian Judith Ridner. “They conquered [my italics] peoples, lands, and markets. They won the esteem of their peers and served the public. They owned property and controlled households of dependents. At its essence, manhood was about possessing and expressing power—over things, over others, over self. It was a performance.” See Judith Ridner, “William Irvine and the Complexities of Manhood and Fatherhood in the Pennsylvania Backcountry,” PMHB, Vol. 125, No. ½ (Jan.-Apr. 2001): 9.
Prologue

In a room of a boarding house on the outskirts of Philadelphia in August 1782 a forlorn old man was dying in pain. Besides the swelling and stiffness of rheumatism his joints showed tophi, the remnants of an ailment so persistent that remedies of diet and exercise had only worsened his misery. Ten years before, in hopes of improving blood flow to and from his joints, the old man had immersed himself in the mineral waters of Berkeley Warm Springs in Virginia (now West Virginia), a hospitable spot that had drawn the Fairfaxes, the Prentices, and the Nicholases of the Chesapeake upper crust as well, but to his surprise and dismay he had found that their polite company had actually eased his pain more than the waters. His ailment was gout, which during an attack made him feel as if shards of glass were being ground into his afflicted toe every minute of every day for weeks on end. Now, as rheumatism inflamed each gout-ravaged joint, he welcomed death, the only permanent cure for his woe. “Heaven gives its blessings & takes away & we must submit,” he had written a bereaved father some months or years before, when his hand was still supple and his mind still clear.¹

On a good day, when the stifling heat of August in southeastern Pennsylvania broke, and his stiff joints and cloudy mind yielded to his will, the bedridden old man might have

propped himself up enough to glimpse his prized possession, a fancy carriage, harnessed but horseless, very near the boarding house, and in his mind’s eye he might have seen his robust younger self careening its refined splendor through a meadow of thistle, in anticipation of an evening’s revelry with backwoods cronies, rough and raucous as the rain-swollen Ohio in April, and nearly as likely to overflow abundant cheer, and he might have grinned his delight, until the rheumatism flared his gout-ravaged joints, prostrating him. Not so long ago the carriage had defined British colonial style, but now it was “antediluvian,” a relic of a bygone era and an eyesore to passers-by and callers alike, so that his last friends, when they did call on him, could not help but see the truth—that the old man, like his carriage, was done.²

Still the truth was hard for them to take, for the old man was once the stuff of legend. Newspapers from New Hampshire to Georgia had apprised their readers of his deeds as an Indian trader and an intercultural negotiator and a land speculator on the frontiers of Appalachia, and his own account of his first journey into the vast North American interior, where he had escaped death at the hands of Kickapoo and Maskoutin captors tracking its wild lushness, had excited the ambitions of land speculators and government officials on both sides of the Atlantic, but captivity among distant Indians was not his only ordeal or escape from them his only feat. In an early lost battle of the French and Indian War he had outwitted well-hidden sharpshooters while many of his comrades had not, and when he was voyaging to London after the war to conduct official business for his mentor, Sir William Johnson of New York, he was shipwrecked off the coast of France in a furious winter storm, a severe trial that gave him material for a yarn that in time would rival the

² Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 306-307; for “antediluvian” see “Inventory of Sundry Goods belonging to the Estate of Colonel George Croghan, deceased, taken at Passyunk at the House of John Sellar, this 6th Day of September 1782, by the said John Sellar and Patrick Rice,” Etting Coll., Croghan-Gratz Papers, Vol. 1, Folder 91, HSP.
best of them, especially the tale of his false arrest for treason during the American Revolutionary War. Besides adventure and pluck the old man was the stuff of legend for another reason—the many Byzantine suits involving his dealings, one of which was argued before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.3

But perhaps all this was as nothing in comparison with his discovery of fossil bones at a lick in Kentucky country, for the find sparked an international sensation, though he was not the first person of European ancestry to visit the venerable salt spring or to collect fossil bones there. A canny self-promoter, he sent a few fossil bones (tusks, vertebra, and molars) with a copy of his journal to a well-connected acquaintance, Benjamin Franklin, who was acting as a provincial agent in London, and a few more fossil bones (tusks, molars, and jawbone) to Lord Shelburne, who was then Secretary of State for the Southern Department, with jurisdiction over the North American colonies. The two heavyweights subjected the specimens to scientific inquiry on both sides of the Atlantic. Where did the specimens originate? Were they elephant bones? Were they remains of an extinct species? How old were they? Why were they so well preserved? Why were there so many at the lick? The illustrious Franklin weighed in with an opinion. Peter Collinson, a lead-

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3 Croghan was a staple of The Pennsylvania Gazette, The Pennsylvania Evening Post, The Pennsylvania Packet, the New York Gazette, the New York Journal, the New York Mercury, the Otsego Herald, The New Hampshire Gazette, The Connecticut Courant, The Boston Evening-Post, The Boston Post-Boy & Advertiser, The Massachusetts Gazette, The Georgia Gazette, and other colonial newspapers; for ordeal see “Croghan—Private Journal. Fort Pitt to Illinois Country, 1765, 1766,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; see also George Croghan, “Croghan—Journal, 1765,” ibid., Box 204, Folder 7, HSP; for survival in battle see relevant documents, BRC; for shipwreck see George Croghan, entries, 26, 29, 30 Dec. 1763, “Diary, 1763,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 24; see also Croghan to Johnson [typed copy], 24 Feb. 1764, ibid., Box 202, Folder 31, HSP; for false arrest see Unnamed Discharge Document, 3 Dec. 1778, ibid., Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; see also Oath of Allegiance, 16 Jul. 1778, ibid., Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; see also [Croghan] to Thomas Walker, 23 Jul. 1778, ibid., Box 201, Folder 34, HSP; see also [Anonymous], Blacklist. A List of Those Tories Who Took Part with Great-Britain, In the Revolutionary War, and Were Attainted of High Treason, Commonly Called the Black List! . . . (Philadelphia, 1802), 10; for Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision see Opinion of the Supreme Court in the Case of Cromwell, Plaintiff in Errour against Lee of Simon Gratz, Def. in Errour (n.p., 1774), D. H. Ramsey Library, Special Collections, University of North Carolina at Asheville, 28804.
ing fellow of the Royal Society opined, too. In the last volume of his magisterial Natural History (1749-1767), French naturalist Georges Buffon cited not only Franklin and Collinson but the amateur bone collector and his journal too, and for a brief, giddy moment the old man, a semi-literate backwoodsman who spelled phonetically, was the talk of the Atlantic Enlightenment community. His journal even informed a 1769 atlas of the British Empire in North America. As for his fossil bones, they were deposited at the prestigious British Museum.4

The old man imprinted the intellectual landscape of his age in other ways too. Intercultural treaties accorded him featured status, as did journals of the Pennsylvania House, the New York House, the Virginia House, and the Continental Congress. He played a major role in Pennsylvania official Charles Thomson’s anti-proprietary polemic, Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians from the British Interest (1759), and he played a minor one in missionary Christian Frederick Post’s Second Journal (1759), New Jersey official Samuel Smith’s History of the Colony of Nova-Cae-

saria, or New-Jersey (1765), and militia ranger Robert Rogers’ Journals (1765). Irish immigrant and former Indian trader James Adair dedicated his History of the American Indians (1775) to him, and Thomas Jefferson, writing in 1781, cited the old man’s 1759 estimate of western Indian populations in his Notes on the State of Virginia (1787). In Great Britain popular fare like The Annual Register, The Universal Museum, The London Magazine, and Miscellaneous Correspondence noted his doings, as did the journals of Parliament, the anonymous polemic, French Policy Defeated (1755), and General Henry Bouquet’s memoir, Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians (1766). British scholars noted his doings as well in works like John Mitchell’s Contest in America between Great Britain and France (1757), the anonymous An Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania (1759), and Lieutenant Stephen Payne Adye’s A Treatise on Courts Martial (1769). His expert knowledge of Indian culture lent authority to a lengthy section of Scots historian William Robertson’s History of America (1777). In France he figured in the anonymous polemic, Memorial Containing a Summary View of Facts, with Their Authorities. In Answer to The Observations Sent by the English Ministry to The Courts of Europe (1757).5

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But now the old man was forgotten by everyone save those who cared for him and those who called on him. In his early years on the western Pennsylvania frontier he had amassed a small fortune in the Indian trade, but he had squandered it, and his attempts to realize its like again in succeeding years had failed miserably, forcing him into debt and ultimately into penury, so that he could not pay his doctor, Abraham Chovet, whose bedside visits were becoming frequent, or his nurse, Ann Gallagher, whose care comforted him, or his servant, James Forrest, whose solicitude deserved more than thanks. Whenever creditors hounded him despite—or perhaps because of—his infirmities, the old man felt lucky that old friends Barnard and Michael Gratz still called on him, for these Philadelphia merchant-creditors were quick as ever with a joke or a dollar, the latter of which the old man accepted with regretful but profuse thanks, but later, in the stillness of his room at night, with only a stack of unanswered letters from his daughter Susannah to keep him company, the old man might have pondered his life like this: Was not his Con-
edogwinet (now Conedoguinet) Creek plantation in Pennsylvania on Lewis Evans’ *Map of Pensilvania, New-Jersey, and New-York, And the Three Delaware Counties*? Was not a gap in the Blue Mountains at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, named after him? Was not a Cherry Valley, New York, plantation named after him? Was he not the founder of Belvidere Township in New York? He had seen and done what few men of his or any age had seen and done. He was George Croghan, and in his prime he was the stuff of legend. What had brought him so low?  

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Chapter 1: Irish Immigrant

George Croghan (pronounced 'krō-ən) of Dublin sailed from Ireland to America in 1741 for the most basic of reasons—survival. Although nothing is known of his birth and little of his formative years, this can be said of him with certainty: He came of age in the hardest of times. Massive crop failures in 1717-1719 and again in 1726-1728, along with severe, cattle-decimating winters, shredded the fabric of Irish society, swelling the streets of Dublin and other cities, particularly those to the north in Ulster, with thieves and beggars and infirm and dying. “This hath been avery hard yeere amongst the poore people,” an Irishman wrote his sister in New Jersey in 1728, “for Corn failed very much and now wheat is at twenty shillings abarell and other Corne proporsianable lands is got to an Ex-

trame Rate heree so y\textsuperscript{t} they y\textsuperscript{t} teakes land is likely to be teaken by their lands.” In the singularly cruel year of 1740 alone famine took 480,000 souls, or one in every five Irish, an epic catastrophe that imprinted itself so indelibly on Ireland’s national psyche that to this very day the year is remembered in Irish history as the “Year of the Slaughter.” But it is remembered too for its utter inhumanity: Anglican landowners, mostly absentee, racked farmland despite crop failures, compelling poor tenants to migrate to cities like Dublin for work. The migrants, like Croghan, knew that in America land was bountiful and rent-

free, with fish and game aplenty for any man who had the fortitude to voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. They knew, because colonial letters and advertisements told them so.\footnote{For Croghan’s birth and formative years see James Hamilton to Horatio Sharpe, 7 Jan. 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:113-115; for hard times in Ireland in the first half of eighteenth century see Jay P. Dolan, \textit{The Irish Americans: A History} (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008), 6-8; see also R. F. Foster, \textit{Modern Ireland, 1600-1972} (New York: The Penguin Press, 1988), 197-199; see also David Hackett Fischer, \textit{Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 611-612; for “This hath been” see James Wansbrough to Ann Shepherd, 18 Apr. 1728, Kerby A. Miller, Arnold Schrier, Bruce D. Boling, and David N. Doyle, eds., \textit{Irish Immigrants in the Land of Canaan: Letters and Memoirs from Colonial and Revolutionary America, 1675-1815} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 21.}
In sullen city streets across Ireland famished migrants struggled to survive let alone pay a recent tax to support the Church of England, or rather its titular Irish arm, the Church of Ireland. Many were Ulstermen. In the first quarter of the eighteenth century about six hundred thousand people lived in Ulster. Although half of them were Catholic, a quarter Presbyterian, and the rest members of other Protestant denominations, the Church of Ireland, comprised largely of landowning elites, ruled the province. More than a century before, the English government had settled thousands of Scots Presbyterians with English Anglicans on lands it had confiscated from native Irish Catholics. By settling loyal Protestants on Ulster soil the English government had hoped to “civilize” the province, long a bastion of Gaelic Catholic culture, but instead it had provoked Catholic dissent. To stifle such dissent and other forms as well, the English government had passed a series of cruel Penal Laws that victimized not just Catholics but Protestants belonging to denominations save the Church of Ireland. One of the laws, the Sacramental Test Act of 1704, required government officials to receive Communion in the Church of Ireland, for instance. Such laws aggrieved Ulster’s Irish Catholics and Scots Presbyterians and so for many of them liberty was as good a reason to voyage to America as work.\(^2\)

Economic depression exacerbated the times. In the seventeenth century linen manufacture, stimulated by English parliamentary legislation, had supplanted farming as the backbone of northern Ireland’s economy, so that by 1720 linen composed half of all exports from Ireland to England. Whole families involved themselves in its production—growing flax, spinning yarn, bleaching cloth. They rented land on which to live and to raise crops and they achieved self-sufficiency and then the backbone cracked. European linen

flooded the English market in the 1720s, so that English demand for the Irish manufacture declined, while rising rents ate higher proportions of familial earnings. In 1729 the industry slumped, forcing even middling families to liquidate their assets to buy passage to America. Seven thousand Ulster inhabitants—whole Scots-Irish families, mostly—sailed to America, the majority settling in the Pennsylvania backcountry because of long-standing trade ties between Ulster and Philadelphia. In the 1730s many thousands more made the voyage, a number as indentured servants. From other regions too Irish by the thousands followed the Ulster course. One of the thousands was George Croghan, who embarked at Dublin in 1741. Did he or a family member sell assets to buy his passage? Historical sources are silent. Presumably, though, fare was paid, for he departed Dublin not as an indentured servant but as a free man, an optimistic sort aboard a ship of anxious humanity. Perhaps he heaved a sigh of relief when Ireland, poor and hungry and bereft, receded in the ship’s wake.3

When the ship arrived at Philadelphia after three weeks or more at sea, Croghan beheld a thriving commercial center. All manner of vessels—from brigs and ships to sloops and schooners—sailed to or from or along the Delaware River. At one bustling wharf after another English cargo vessels discharged manufactures as per Parliament’s Navigation Acts, which required European goods destined for America to pass through England. A happy exception was wine from the Portuguese islands; hence Madeira and port became Philadelphia favorites. Amid whirls of activity local vessels took on Pennsylvania flour,

corn, bread, flaxseed, and barrel staves—the non-enumerated goods of the Navigation Acts—and sailed for ports in Ireland, Wales, Britain, southern Europe, and the West Indies. Perhaps a passenger vessel discharged Irishmen, Scots-Irishmen, Scotsmen, Welshmen, Englishmen, or Continentals, especially Palatine Germans. Some of the immigrants would have arrived as free men and some as indentured servants, but all of them would have arrived in New Canaan, as Pennsylvania was called in advertisements circulating in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England, and on the Continent, to improve their lots. Soon they would make great strides toward that goal, for there was work for artisans and laborers in the city and land beyond it for farmers, especially in and around fertile Lancaster County, about seventy miles due west. Commerce was indeed the lifeblood of Philadelphia, and Philadelphia was fast becoming the beating heart of British North America.4

Just beyond the forest of spars and rigging on the Delaware River perched the wooden flaming urns of Christ Church, classical symbols befitting the Quaker city, as they represented transcendent fellowship and love. Below them rose their red brick roost, the tripartite east façade, whose eminent central wall boasted ornate neoclassical pediment and entablature atop two tall pilasters. Between the pilasters rose a large tripartite Palladian window, whose round central arch peeked over the skyline like the dawning sun. The arch invariably caught the eye of anyone on the Delaware River, although exquisitely wrought wood and stone trim below it recalled the glory of Greece and the grandeur of Rome. The window, which stood on a massive pedestal, was the first of its kind in British North America. The addition of a square red brick tower and an octagonal wooden spire to the west façade in 1751-1754 would make this Georgian-style church the tallest

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structure in British North America as well, but it was in fact impressive even in 1741:
Red brick pilasters separated the north and south balustrades and walls into eight sumptuous bays, for example. An ambitious sort like Croghan might have seen the church for what it truly was—a noble symbol of human aspiration as well as a bold statement of urban progress. If Anglican immigrants like him could build so magnificent a church in so recent a city, then what might he do, if he put his mind to it?5

After the ship docked and he went ashore, Croghan familiarized himself with the city. The street pattern, laid out in 1682 by William Penn, the Quaker founder of Pennsylvania, and his surveyor general, Thomas Holme, epitomized proto-Enlightenment simplicity and practicality: It was a grid. Numbers designated north-south streets, save First Street, which was called Front, on the Delaware River. Names designated east-west streets. On Front and High (now Market) Streets, Croghan found the “old Coffee House,” where he might have devoured a savory meal of braised turkey, smashed red potatoes, and Brussels sprouts, allowing long drafts of Madeira or port to punctuate his appetite. He might have made his first business contacts in this merchants’ haunt. On Second Street near Mulberry (now Arch) he saw Christ Church up close, but not its elegant interior, which was three years from completion. Beside the church he saw Benjamin Franklin’s busy print shop. Quickly, Croghan found that accepting and tolerant Philadelphia abounded with churches and taverns for every taste, the former with sermonizers who could pierce the heart, and the latter with barkeeps who could salve it, and he found too that meeting houses, notably the Bank Meeting House on Front north of Mulberry and the Great Meeting House at

High and Second Streets, drew old-line Quakers who wielded influence in business and in politics. West on High at Biddle Alley loomed the Indian King, whose legendary repasts eclipsed even those of the Blue Anchor, the Indian Queen, and the Three Tuns on Chestnut.  

On High, Croghan saw brick and frame shops that sold Ulster linen and other imported manufactures, but the abundant sensual delights in the other shops, and especially in the stalls in front, astonished him, though colonial advertisements had filled his mind with vivid images of this New World conceit long before he had emigrated from Dublin to Philadelphia: fragrant herbs, spices, seasonings, and grains; rich fruits and vegetables; juicy meat, game, fowl, fish, and seafood. Here were exotic seasonings (sassafras and syrup), vegetables (squash, pumpkins, potatoes, and bell peppers), fruits (tomatoes and hot peppers), game (buffalo), fowl (turkey), and fish (catfish and American eel). Here, too, were dried fruits, pickled vegetables, salted fish, jerked game, smoked meats, brandied fruits, preserved sweets, and pemmican, the durable food that Pennsylvania Indians made from strips of lean deer or buffalo meat. Croghan might have indulged himself with food, sampling a Lancaster specialty like schmierkase (cottage cheese) or bratwurst and lewerwurscht (sausage and liver pudding) or English-style pot cheese. He might have handled eggs to judge their weight, nibbled cheese to check its taste against his memory of its Irish like, or munched cookies between sips of sweet cider or spiced chocolate.  

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6 For Philadelphia streets see Weigley, ed., *Philadelphia*, 6-10, 51, 15, 100, 107, 57-58; for possible meal see Walter Staib, *The City Tavern Cookbook: 200 Years of Classic Recipes from America’s First Gourmet Restaurant* (Philadelphia: Running Press, 1999), 88, 104, 112. During the American Revolution the City Tavern superseded the “old Coffee House.”

Moving before him and behind, moving to and fro, crossing the street, were the people. Working men nodded in salute to their “betters,” or tipped their round-crowned, round-brimmed flop hats, each with a side turned up and pinned in the good weather—half the men in leather vests, half in leather jackets, aprons, or waistcoats, the last of which distinguished the better craftsmen, but all in homespun shirts and breeches, bleached snowy white or dyed muted shades of blue, black, red, brown, or yellow. Among them moved working women, the older ones in lengthened bodices, the young ones in shortened bodices and ankle-length skirts, beneath which their laced, straight-last shoes sank and surfaced. There were pinafores and woolen cloaks and eared caps with lappets falling like scarf along throats and bowl-shaped mobcaps with drawstrings tied under chins. Moving, too, were genteel women, the young ones swaying in tight-waisted, cut-away sacques that revealed bell-shaped petticoats—both garments in bold combinations of rainbow-colored silks, satins, and velvets, their long folds throwing off shimmers of light and shadow—and the older women in fuller gowns and petticoats of white and pale blue cotton, buttressed by stays rather than newer, waist-slimming panniers. And there were more than a few felted beaver hats, cocked in stylish bicorn form, bobbing in the street. Gentlemen sporting straight-cut heavy coats with massive turn-back cuffs and tails accompanied the women, the older men diverting canes now and then to scrape caked mud off their gartered hose or buckled shoes. Plain-garbed Quakers of both sexes neither acknowledged nor signed deference, though their stylish brethren conformed to social custom. Moving this way and that too were well-dressed lower-middle-class men and women, the beneficiaries.
of the first British “commercial revolution” (1690-1740), wherein a pronounced increase in per capita wealth and disposable income in Britain and her colonies enabled even the lowest of the “middling sort” to consume stylish and heretofore unattainable clothing.\(^8\)

Croghan caught snatches of German, Dutch, French, Swedish, Finnish, Welsh, Gaelic, and English. Perhaps he paused now and then to appreciate a thick brogue like his own or to study strange faces and things. At shops and stalls Germans wearing straw hats and plain smocks unloaded produce and preserves from outsized wagons. German-crafted, deep-bellied, designed to haul loads to market over longer distances than in Europe, over the Great Wagon Road from Lancaster to Philadelphia, for instance, designed in fact to haul four times the load of an English wagon, and to hold up, too, Conestoga wagons truly earned their moniker, “moving houses.” And the Germans bred horses to pull them, large, strong horses that seemed behemoths to Croghan, who was used to seeing the small but sturdy horses of Ireland. Then perhaps he glimpsed the men of whom he had heard so much in taverns but as yet seen nothing, rugged men toting long guns, a stubborn few men in greasy buckskin, but more in presentable T-shaped frocks called hunting jackets, whose wide fringe could wick water away, and all wearing felted round hats turned up on one side and stuck with a decorative feather or animal tail, new men for a New World, stout, keen-browed men—pioneers, for whom enterprising German gunsmiths crafted a

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new type of gun, the rifle. Light and sturdy, the Pennsylvania rifle was accurate to two hundred yards, making it ideal for frontier use, but although it was indeed a Pennsylvania original, it would achieve lasting fame as the Kentucky long rifle, the very one used by Daniel Boone, who was himself born and reared in Pennsylvania.9

Like many new arrivals Croghan eventually followed the Ulster course westward, tracing the grooves of the Great Wagon Road, which guided him through such outlying Welsh villages as Wynnewood, Merion Square (now Gladwyne), Bala, Cynwyd, Haverford, Humphreysville (now Bryn Mawr), and Radnorville (now Radnor), and then over the low ridges and narrow valleys of the Upper Piedmont and through the town of Lancaster and into the fertile Conestoga Lowlands, where he saw one prosperous German farm after another, but instead of tracing the grooves through York and then across the Potomac River at Williamsport, Maryland, and along the Shenandoah River into the Great Valley of Virginia, he veered northwest to Harris’ Ferry (now Harrisburg), a fledgling Scots-Irish hamlet on the Susquehanna River about thirty-five miles from Lancaster town. Founded in 1719 by Welsh-born English trader and ferryman John Harris, the hamlet supported traders and farmers. Its traders transported bundles of peltries to Philadelphia along the Great Wagon Road and its farmers, bushels of produce. Called “Paxtang” by Indians, the area suited intercultural trade, for it lay at the crossroads of ancient Indian paths from the Delaware River to the forks of the Ohio and from the Potomac River to the upper Susquehan-

9 For immigrants see Weigley, ed., Philadelphia, 24-25; for smock and Conestoga wagon see Wolf, As Various as Their Land, 96, 172; for Conestoga wagon see Hawke, Everyday Life in Early America, 29; see also Tandy and Charles Hersh, Cloth and Costume, 159-163, 169; for pioneer clothes see Copeland, Working Dress in Colonial and Revolutionary America, 97-103; for Pennsylvania rifle see Robert Morgan, Boone: A Biography (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 2007), 20; see also William C. Davis, Frontier Skills: The Tactics and Weapons that Won the American West (Guilford: The Lyons Press, 2003), 54.
na. Croghan probably gleaned such from his “trust & well beloved friend Peter Tostee,” the owner of a “plantation” in Paxtang (now Paxton) Township in Lancaster County, or from Edward Shippen, the Philadelphia merchant for whom Tostee probably worked. In his ledger Shippen recorded that on 9 June 1742 he consigned Croghan goods for transport westward to Tostee. The entry marked Croghan’s debut in recorded history.¹⁰

Shippen and Tostee were major players in the Indian trade, as the exchange of English goods for Indian furs and skins was called in 1742, but by rights the trade should have been called the Ohio trade, for in just eight years it would cover the entire Ohio Valley, or roughly present-day Ohio and tramontane Pennsylvania. In the seventeenth century the confederated Iroquois Five Nations of New York (the Mohawk, the Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga, and the Seneca nations) had appropriated a vast hunting preserve by driving native Shawnees from the area. In the second quarter of the eighteenth century the preserve had absorbed the following eastern refugees: displaced Algonquian-speaking Delawares and Shawnees who had retreated before advancing colonial settlements between the Delaware and the Susquehanna Rivers; and Senecas, Cayugas, and other Iroquois who had drifted southwest because external forces and internal strife had embroiled the Iroquois Confederacy. The Iroquois refugees were “Mingos.” The preserve had also absorbed Iroquoian-speaking Wyandots, or remnant Hurons and Petuns, who had migrated to the French trading post of Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit (now Detroit, Michigan) to

¹⁰For Great Wagon Road migration see Fischer, Albin’s Seed, 635; see also David C. Cuff, William J. Young, Edward K. Muller, Wilber Zelinsky, and Ronald F. Abler, eds., The Atlas of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 18-21; see also Parke Rouse, Jr., The Great Wagon Road, (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1995); for Indian paths see Paul A. W. Wallace, Indian Paths of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1987), 4, 19-20, 38, 49-54, 72-74, 98-99, 115-119, 127-128, 142-147, 158, 177-178; for “trust & well beloved friend” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 6; for mention of “Peter Tostee, Indian Trader of the Township of Paxton in the County of Lancaster” see letter dated 13 Aug. 1739, Papers of the Shippen Family, 15:33, HSP; see also Peter Tostee Account, Papers of the Shippen Family, 28:71, HSP. The document that Wainwright cites as the source of the quotation is now missing from Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.
exploit lands south of Lake Erie. In 1738 they had founded a village at Sandusky Bay, now an inlet of Lake Erie in Ohio. Indian traders like Tostee followed sources of pelts westward and thus established ties with Indians who ordinarily traded with Canadians, so that as many as three hundred Indian traders might have been plying the Ohio Valley before the French and Indian War. As German immigrant and frontier negotiator Conrad Weiser said at the Albany Conference in 1754, “The Road to Ohio is no new Road.”\footnote{For Ohio trade see Yoko Shirai, “The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1985), 2, 6; for Indian migrations see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 24-25; see also Paul A. W. Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania, rev. 2nd ed. (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission), 108-141; see also George P. Donehoo, “The Indians of the Past and Present,” PMHB, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1922): 181-195; for “The Road to Ohio” see DRCNY, 6:872.}

The “road” to which Weiser referred was both literal and metaphorical. The literal road was the Allegheny Path, whose two branches ran from the forks of the Ohio and strategic points on the Allegheny to Harris’ Ferry on the Susquehanna, and thence through present-day Myerstown, Morgantown, and Paoli to the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The Allegheny Path was just one of several ancient Indian paths that crisscrossed Pennsylvania, connecting national territories, communities, and people. Once used by Indians only, the path was in the eighteenth century the surest way west for thousands of Irish, Scots-Irish, Scottish, Welsh, English, and Continental immigrants. The Great Wagon Road traced the Allegheny Path westward through Lancaster and York and then another Indian path, the Virginia Path, southward to Georgia. The literal road, in other words, was shared physical space. Although the metaphorical road denoted communication, diplomacy, or cultural exchange between Indians and colonists, its invokers threw up impediments to cooperation every bit as thorny as brambles on a real road—power politics and trade rivalries, for instance. Only discourse conforming to Indian conventions could clear away impediments, could “open the road,” so to speak. Because the Indian trade was, by its very na-
tute, subject to impediments both natural and man-made, Croghan would have to learn its ins and outs. His education began in earnest.12

Croghan learned that peaceable coexistence marked Pennsylvania’s two situational frontiers, one of which lay to the west of Philadelphia between the Delaware and the Susquehanna Rivers and the other to the north. Situated at the fringes of empire, these relatively “open” spaces supported roughly equal, polyglot Indian and European populations. The Indian population included Algonquian-speaking native Delawares and refugee Conoys and Nanticokes from the Chesapeake, Iroquoian-speaking Tuscaroras and Siouan-speaking Tutelos from the Piedmont of North Carolina, Algonquian-speaking Shawnees from southern Ohio and Mahicans from the upper Hudson River Valley of New York, and Iroquois from central and western New York; the European population included Irish, Scots-Irish, Scots, Welsh, English, German, and other European immigrants. Each population, unable to predominate, would meet the other to settle differences without recourse to war. In an intercultural crisis diplomats of each population would meet “at the crossroads,” for instance. There they would usually find a shared interest in checking the grasp of Britain, France, and Iroquoia and to that end agree on ways for their people to support one another. They did not know that the agreed ways would be ephemeral. Mutual support would stabilize peace and promote prosperity on both situational frontiers only until advancing colonial settlements and heightened imperial interests intensified competition for natural resources in the early 1750s. Before then, Indian paths and colonial roads “literally and figuratively passed through and between communities, connecting their lives and histo-

12 For Allegheny Path see Wallace, Paul A. W., Indian Paths of Pennsylvania, 19-21, 177; for literal and metaphorical “road” see Merritt, At the Crossroads, 1; see also Merrell, Into the American Woods, 111-156.
ries,” writes historian Jane T. Merritt. In sum, both situational frontiers were inclusive in 1742.\(^\text{13}\)

Croghan learned, too, that cultural exchange marked both situational frontiers. Robert Morgan, a biographer of Daniel Boone, observes that Indian and European communities mirrored one another in important and telling ways. From colonists Indians learned to use firearms, wear woven cloth, use metal tools, build log cabins, cultivate small grains, and drink whiskey; from Indians colonists learned to cultivate indigenous crops like corn, squash, and potatoes and hunt game Indian-style. Indians began to wear long linen hunting shirts with their traditional buckskin leggings and breech clout and to use metal axes, saws, adzes, and augers to build log cabins rather than their traditional pole-raised bark, hide, and brush shelters. “It is said,” Morgan writes, “that Indians preferred to notch their logs on the underside, while whites notched theirs on the top.” Having learned Indian herbal medicine and survival techniques, colonists settled as far west as the Susquehanna River. Although colonists taught Indians how to use firearms (muskets, shotguns, pistols, and rifles), the hunting techniques of both cultures—the calls, disguises, and decoys, the surrounds and fire hunts, for example—remained Indian in origin. “Most emigrants to America,” writes Boone biographer John Mack Faragher, “came without hunting traditions, for in most European countries hunting had been reserved for the nobility, so the hunting way of life that developed in the backwoods depended on Indian knowledge and skill.” So did another lifestyle that developed on the frontiers, the trading way of life.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{13}\) For frontiers and “literally and figuratively” see Merritt, At the Crossroads, 1-5; for refugee Indians see John Mack Faragher, Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1992), 18; see also Wallace, Paul A. W., Indians in Pennsylvania, 108-128.

\(^{14}\) For “It is said” and for cultural exchange see Morgan, Boone, 18-21; for “Most emigrants to America” and for cultural exchange see Faragher, Daniel Boone, 17-23. The Iroquois of course spoke Iroquoian in Iroquoia and in the Ohio Valley.
By the early 1740s Pennsylvania recognized three types of Indian trader. The first type was a licensed private trader, but a license was difficult to procure. A prospect applied to a county court for a recommendation, then paid the court a £100 fee or submitted a bond in lieu of cash. The court submitted the recommendation to the governor for approval or rejection. Because the initial fee of £100 was more than men of ordinary means could afford, the privilege was limited to prospects who could exploit connections to placemen or merchants—to sponsors or bondsmen, in other words. By law a licensee had to renew his license annually. The second type of Indian trader was an unlicensed trader who was registered as an employee of a private trader or of a merchant; the third type was an unregistered trader who might be an independent trader, a partner of a private trader, an employee of a private trader, or an employee of a merchant. In June 1742 Croghan was a greenhorn, so he likely began his career as an unlicensed or unregistered trader under the tutelage of his first friend and mentor, Peter Tostee, who was himself one or the other type.  

The Indian trade was seasonal. At Tostee’s plantation in the fall Croghan joined one of Shippen’s goods-laden pack trains destined for the Ohio Valley. In the winter the pack train visited Indian villages where its veteran traders taught him to speak dialects of the Iroquoian and Algonquian languages and barter goods for spring and summer peltries. In the spring the peltry-laden pack train returned to Tostee’s plantation and was unloaded and refitted. In the summer Croghan accompanied the pack train to Indian villages where the train’s veteran traders taught him to barter goods for fall and winter peltries. Perhaps the need to own a base like Tostee’s prompted Croghan to buy a lot in Lancaster town on 28 June 1743 for £5 Pennsylvania money. Perhaps the need was basic—ground on which to build a house or in which to invest. In any event Croghan had learned the Indian trade

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15 For application process see Shirai, “The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania,” 7-8.
well enough to procure a license in May 1744, the same month Tostee himself procured one, likely at his protégé’s urging. Although King George’s War (1744-1748) had broken out in early May, Croghan fared well on his own, accumulating many horse-loads of valuable deerskins. In Philadelphia on 22 October he exchanged 1317 skins for goods worth £146.12.0, for example. In all, he bought some £950 worth of goods from Philadelphia merchants in 1744. More important, he believed he was moving up in the world: He was a yeoman, or so his deed identified him, with an eye to the future.16

For him the future lay at a site that few Indian traders had yet worked—the new Mingo village at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River on Lake Erie. Likely acting on a tip, he set up a trading post there in fall 1744, but its existence provoked Canadian officials to act against him, for in their view it was stealing trade from Canadian traders who had been plying the area for more than two years. In spring 1742 the villagers—Seneca and Onondaga refugees, mostly—had solicited the commander of Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit, Captain Pierre-Joseph de Céleron de Blainville, for trade. If the commander traded with them, they would cease to trade with the interlopers, but if he did not, they would look to the interlopers for goods. To supplant the competition, Céloron had dispatched Canadian traders, who had returned before June 1743 with tangible proof—two hundred packs of peltries—that he had in fact established trade relations with the Mingos, and yet when he

16 For seasonal Indian trade see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 5; for lot purchase see Deed Book D, Vol. 3, 599-600, Archives Division, LCC; for procurement of license see Indian Traders 1743-1748, PA, 2nd ser., 2:619; for skins and goods see account, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folder 1, HSP; for exportation of furs and skins from colonial New York and Pennsylvania to London see Stephen H. Cutcliffe, “Colonial Indian Policy as a Measure of Rising Imperialism: New York and Pennsylvania, 1700-1755,” The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Jul. 1981): 240-244. Wainwright presumes that Croghan traveled west with one of Tostee’s pack trains, but my conjecture is that Croghan went west with one of Shippen’s, for until Tostee procured his license he was probably an unlicensed or unregistered trader in the employ of Shippen. In May 1744 Tostee and Croghan procured licenses. Each man must have paid the licensing fee himself because in the historical record there is no mention of a bond in the name of either man.
was transferred to Fort Niagara, the Mingos cut their ties with Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit. Where the Mingos had seen an opportunity to play off Pennsylvania and Canadian traders, Canadian officials had seen a threat to French dominance of the Indian trade and urged French allies near Détroit, the Ottawas and the Potawatomis, and French allies in western Ohio, the Miamis, to attack the interlopers. No attack had occurred, however.

Now Canadian officials handpicked thirty-five Ottawa warriors “to plunder and kill” Croghan and his band of upstarts or “to fetch them prisoners.” Again no attack occurred.¹⁷

From the French perspective the cause of the conflict was this: Croghan was appropriating intercultural trade reserved to their Indian traders only by terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, which had ended the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713). The French interpreted the treaty to mean that the Allegheny Mountains delimited the western extent of the British colonies. The French based their claim to Ohio on that interpretation. The British, however, claimed Ohio by virtue of Article XV, which recognized the Iroquois as subjects of Great Britain. Because the Iroquois, by right of conquest, claimed suzerainty over Ohio and its Indian inhabitants, Ohio was British territory. Great Britain had fought the War of Spanish Succession to prevent the union of Spain and France under the Bourbon royal family. Spain and France of course rivaled Britain for influence in Europe and for the exploitation of North America. The war had begun in Europe and spread to North America when British and French colonists and their Indian allies had raided one another’s settlements. British colonists had called the North American phase Queen Anne’s War. Besides title to Ohio this was a source of conflict between France and Great Brit-

¹⁷ For Cuyahoga trading post and Canadian reaction to it see Abstract of Dispatch of Messrs. de Beauhar- nois and Hocquart, 10 Oct. 1743, DRCNY, 9:1099-1100; see also M. de Beauharnois to Count Maurepas, 8 Oct. 1744, ibid., 9:1104-1105; see also M. de Beauharnois to Count Maurepas, 7 Nov. 1744, ibid., 9:1111-1112; see also Hanna, Wilderness Trail, 1:315-318.
ain: Pennsylvania and Virginia, by virtue of their sweeping seventeenth-century royal charters, claimed Ohio. Their charters had never clearly defined their western limits. Indeed Virginia’s western limit theoretically extended to North America’s West Coast 18

In the winter of 1744-45 Croghan established far-flung trade ties. Near Détroit he dick-ered with Wyandots over the prices of spring and summer peltries, while his trading partner, Peter Tostee, paddled goods down the Allegheny River. Here and there Tostee and his crew of two servants, an African slave, two Lancaster traders, and a servant of a Phil-adelphia widow paddled ashore to trade. When their canoes brimmed with peltries, they paddled upriver until they encountered a Shawnee war party near a massive camp on 18 April 1745. Brandishing muskets, pistols, and cutlasses, the war party seized Tostee, his crew, and the peltries, some of which belonged to Croghan. A warrior cocked his pistol, pressed its muzzle to Tostee’s chest, and, looking to two Frenchmen, waited for orders to shoot, whereupon one Peter Chartier ordered him and them inside his cabin. After a heat-ed exchange of words they emerged. A private trader turned French captain, Chartier im-pounded the peltries and liberated the slave and the servants, all of whom vanished into the forest with some warriors. Chartier permitted Tostee and his remaining crewmen to leave with their lives. While Tostee led them north, probably on foot, Chartier resumed his mission, which was to relocate the Shawnees to the northwest.19

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19 For Chartier affair see Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Pt. I, 32, HSP; for Chartier affair and losses of property see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744. (Philadelphia, 1774), 4:13. Although Wainwright states that Croghan entrusted Tostee with goods to trade down the Allegheny River, Tostee was likely one of the following: (1) Croghan’s trading partner, if only on a temporary basis; (2) Croghan’s employee; or (3) a former mentor who helped his former student. My conjecture is that Tostee and Croghan were trading partners, because Indian traders formed and dissolved trading partnerships throughout their careers. It is unlikely that a form-er mentor would work for his former student so soon after the student’s “graduation.” Moreover there is a court judgment that indicates that Tostee and Croghan were trading partners. During the September 1745
Under orders from Chartier the selfsame Shawnee warrior and a French soldier were to convey a message to the commander of a French fort a few days west of Croghan’s trading post (now Cleveland, Ohio) at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River and, if possible, to capture Croghan and his effects. They raided the trading post about five days later, but were obliged to resume their primary mission because the resident Mingos shielded Croghan, who hurriedly packed his peltries on horseback and fled eastward, chancing upon Tostee, who recounted his own ordeal. In Philadelphia, Croghan, Tostee, and Lancaster trader James Dinnen testified to their losses before Mayor Edward Shippen, Tostee invoicing deerskins, beaver pelts, bear hides, and furs, Croghan invoicing deerskins, and Dinnen invoicing deerskins, beaver pelts, bear hides, and furs. Tostee and Dinnen, citing their losses at £1600, petitioned the Assembly for relief. “Entirely ruined, and utterly incapable to pay their Debts, or carry on any further Trade,” they prayed that the Pennsylvania Assembly would “take their unhappy Circumstances into Consideration, and afford them such Relief as shall be judged meet.” The Assembly nevertheless withheld relief.  

Besides the Tostee-Dinnen petition the Pennsylvania Assembly reviewed a letter from Conrad Weiser, who had “laid the whole Affair” before the “Grand Council” or great assemblage of Iroquois chiefs at Onondaga (now Syracuse), New York. The chiefs represented the six confederated Iroquois nations, the refugee Tuscarora nation, formerly of North Carolina, having become the sixth confederated nation in 1722. Weiser reminded the chiefs that by terms of the 1744 Lancaster Treaty the Six Nations “would not suffer

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20 For incident see Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Pt. I, 32, HSP; for invoicing of losses see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 4:13. Wainwright states that after the incident Croghan helped Tostee financially, but there is no evidence to support the statement. See Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 8.
the parties at War with one another, to commit Hostilities on their Ground.” Such terms had encouraged Pennsylvania Indian traders, especially those who had attended the treaty, “to go again to Ohio, fearing nothing,” but since “that Traitor Chartier” had breached the treaty, Weiser “desired the Council to weigh the Matter well, and give an Answer, after they had well agreed among themselves.” Following Iroquois protocol, he presented the chiefs a large wampum belt. The chiefs deliberated, and when they finished their deliberations, they answered that they would take the belt to Canada, because they “looked on the affair as an open Breach of the Peace on the French Side, and the Blow that is given, we receive as if it were given to us.” Although Weiser had furthered official policy, which since 1731 had recognized Six Nations’ suzerainty over all Pennsylvania Indians, the affair convinced the provincial secretary, Richard Peters, that the Six Nations were losing the Ohio Valley. In July 1745 Peters consigned provincial goods to Croghan for conveyance to still-cordial Shawnees on the Allegheny River, thus initiating a policy of direct negotiations with Ohio Indians.21

The Lancaster Treaty between the Six Nations and two burgeoning southern colonies, Virginia and Maryland, had lasted from 25 June to 4 July 1744 in the Lancaster courthouse. The issue for resolution had been a neglected boundary between Iroquois territory and Virginia and Maryland. By terms of a treaty at Albany, New York, in 1722, the then Five Nations and Virginia had fixed the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge Mountains as the boundary and renewed their Covenant Chain, which had amounted to all the alliances and treaties that the Iroquois had negotiated with Dutch and then English New York and with Virginia and the other English colonies since the early seventeenth century to limit blood-

21 For quotations see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 4:13; for consignment of goods see entry of Edward Shippen, Penn Mss., Accounts, 1:66, HSP.
shed and cement trade ties. The Iroquois would stay west of the line when they traveled south to war against their ancient enemies, the Catawbas. In the 1730s settlers and immigrants from several English colonies had streamed west of the Blue Ridge Mountains and into the Shenandoah Valley. The Great Council at Onondaga had protested this breach of the 1722 Albany Treaty, but Virginia had countered with the claim that the treaty had fixed the line not on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge Mountains, but on the western slope of the Shenandoah Mountains. The line checked settlement west of the latter mountains, not east. While Iroquois war parties had requited the breach by raiding the Shenandoah Valley in 1743, the Great Council had pondered a war declaration against Virginia until Virginia Governor William Gooch had paid £100 sterling in compensation. At the ensuing Lancaster Treaty, Iroquois diplomats, conceding that colonial settlement east of the Shenandoah Mountains was a fait accompli, had sold their Virginia and Maryland counterparts all Iroquois claim to the rest of the Shenandoah Valley for £200 in gold.22

The Cuyahoga incident nearly fatal to Croghan occurred within the French-allied pays de’n haut, the vast region upriver from Montréal, beyond Huronia and west of Iroquoia. The pays de’n haut supported large numbers of Algonquian-speaking Indian peoples and smaller numbers of other Indian peoples. Extending from present-day Chicago on lower Lake Michigan and north and west through present-day Milwaukee and Green Bay, Wisconsin, to the Mississippi River, the first and westernmost of the blocs supported Sauks, Fox, Kickapoos, Mascoutens, Winnebagos, Menominees, and Potawatomis. The second

bloc, centered in the Illinois country, supported Peorias who lived at Pimitou, Kaskaskias who lived at the juncture of the Kaskaskia and Mississippi Rivers, and Miamis who lived in today’s Maumee and Wabash regions. Situated at Détroit in present-day Michigan, the third bloc included Ottawas, Hurons, Petuns, Miamis, Potawatomis, and other Indian peoples. Bands of proto-Ojibwas formed villages to the east of Détroit and became the Mississaugas of northern Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. Situated at Michilimackinac, an island in the Straits of Mackinac in present-day Michigan, the fourth bloc supported the Chippewa village of Sault Sainte Marie and the Ottawa village on Manitoulin Island. Like the Mississaugas, the Chippewas began as proto-Ojibwas. The fifth and easternmost of the blocs was in the Ohio Valley, which extends from Lake Erie south to the Ohio River and from the Appalachian Mountains west to the Wabash River. Its inhabitants had migrated from the other blocs and from outside them, too. Miami, Kickapoo, Mascouten, Ottawa, Huron, and Petun inhabitants had come from the blocs. Delaware and Shawnee inhabitants had come from Pennsylvania, and Iroquois inhabitants from New York.²³

The villages of the blocs of the pays d’en haut in the first half of the eighteenth century were small republics. “They represented a mixture of peoples who established a political existence that was inside the pays d’en haut but outside the French alliance,” writes historian Richard White. “They were also beyond the control of the British and their usual [Indian] allies, the league of the Iroquois.” That is to say, the villages were autonomous. East of the Wabash River, they sat between Lake Erie and the upper Muskingum River or on the banks of the Ohio River and outward from them. Canadians called the Indians living in the villages between Lake Erie and the upper Muskingum River the White River Indians. The White River Indian villages included migrant Iroquois, Delawares, and Ma-

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²³ For pays de ’n haut and its blocs see White, Middle Ground, 1, 146-147.
hicans and French-allied Ottawas and Chippewas. The Ohio Indian villages included migrant Delawares, Shawnees, and Iroquois and migrant fragments of French-allied Indians. To exploit the resources of the pays d’en haut and to extend their control over its peoples, New France and the Iroquois Confederacy competed with each other for village loyalties and natural resources. When Croghan and other British Indian traders began to trade in the region, they, like the Iroquois Confederacy, competed with New France for village loyalties and natural resources. In a decade the competition between the French and the British for natural resources in the form of furs, skins, and lands would ignite the French and Indian War. After all, both the British and the French could colonize the pays d’en haut as surely as they had colonized a coastal region.24

Beginning in the 1740s French and British competition for influence in the Ohio Valley created leadership opportunities for minor figures in Algonquian society. The prototype of this sort of opportunistic Indian leader was intercultural trader Peter Chartier, the son of a Shawnee mother and a French father. In the 1720s he migrated west of the Appalachian Mountains with other Shawnees and settled at a village on the Allegheny River, below the Kiskiminetas River in western Pennsylvania. He traded with the French and the British and soon allied himself with the British because British goods superseded French goods. Although the village became known as “Chartier’s Town” because of his skill in acquiring British goods, he participated in Shawnee negotiations for French sanction and protection. His participation in the negotiations of course soured his relationship with the British and the Iroquois, for the Iroquois did not permit dependents like the Shawnees to undertake intercultural negotiations on their own. The French distrusted him, too. “Only when he led a large party of Shawnees who plundered several British traders [Tostee and

24 For “They represented” and for competition for village loyalties see ibid., 188-189.
his crew on the Allegheny River, for instance] in 1745 did the French become convinced of his loyalty,” writes historian Richard White. “Chartier proved to be no more reliable as a French partisan than he had been as a British agent. In fact he successfully opposed French attempts to relocate the Shawnees at Détroit and did his father’s will only when it coincided with his own.” White may have added that Chartier’s men threatened Croghan during the 1745 Cuyahoga incident.25

Whenever the Algonquians and the Frenchmen of the pays d’en haut could not achieve their ends through force, they tried intercultural negotiation. Gradually they created what White calls the “middle ground” to settle intercultural differences. Intercultural trade, for example, was a process wherein Algonquians and Frenchmen employed violence at times to acquire and protect goods. Since common agreement on the nature of intercultural exchange developed gradually, murder settled bitter disputes. “Perhaps the most perplexing intercultural concern of the French and the Algonquians was how to limit and settle the number of murders arising from the trade, when there was no authority in the West capable of creating a monopoly on violence and establishing order,” writes White. “Violence became one of the central concerns on the middle ground.” Intercultural murders created situations wherein each side applied different cultural formulas. For the Algonquians, the French or their Indian allies could compensate for the murdered people either by presenting gifts or slaves or by killing a member of the offending group. Although the deceased person’s kin made the choice, the village wherein they lived ordinarily pressured them to accept compensation short of blood revenge, for killing a person of the offending group might invite retaliation. For the Frenchmen, society at large, and not the victim’s kin, as-

25 For Chartier and for “Only when he” see ibid., 189-190.
sumed the responsibility for punishing the murderer. That is to say, the state compensated for the murder by executing the murderer.\textsuperscript{26}

Two differences were significant. For the Frenchmen, the identity of the murderer was significant because the murderer would be held responsible for the crime. “Only when a group refused to surrender a known murderer did collective responsibility arise,” writes White. For the Algonquians, however, the identity of the group to which the murderer belonged was significant, for “it was the group—family, kin, village, or nation—that was held responsible for the act.” To bridge this cultural gap, the Frenchmen and the Algonquians created “cultural measures of equivalence in compensating for the dead.” Nevertheless, there were cultural crosscurrents. While the Frenchmen invariably demanded the execution of a murderer, the Algonquians, though they ordinarily invoked a similar doctrine of revenge, preferred, whenever possible, to either “raise up” or “cover” the dead. The former obligated the Algonquians to “restore the dead person to life by providing a slave in the victim’s place,” whereas the latter obligated the Algonquians to “present the relatives with goods that served as the equivalent.” How did justice actually play out on the “middle ground”? The Algonquians and the Frenchmen imagined mutually agreeable solutions according to the facts of unique cases. That is to say, the Algonquians and the Frenchmen re-contoured their mental landscapes to include features of the other side’s mental landscapes. For both sides, then, the pays d’en haut encompassed the borderlands between violence and retaliation, between conflict and resolution, or more precisely, between vast situational frontiers.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} For “Perhaps the most perplexing” and for cultural formulas see \textit{ibid.}, 76-77.

\textsuperscript{27} For “Only when a group,” “it was the group,” and “cultural measures of equivalence” see \textit{ibid.}, 76-77.
In spring or summer 1745 Croghan formed a trading partnership with William Trent, whose father, William Trent, Sr., had been a Pennsylvania statesman. In 1719 William, Sr., had built a country house on the Delaware River in central New Jersey and so begat “Trent-towne” (now Trenton). Five years later he had died suddenly, leaving his nine-year-old namesake to find his own way in life. Using familial connections, William, Jr., apprenticed himself to Edward Shippen, who taught him to merchandise skins and furs, and so to the partnership Trent brought mercantile expertise. Prudently he and Croghan divided duties according to their strengths. Croghan would lead pack trains to distant Indian villages where he would trade goods for pelts and then transport or ship the pelts to a base managed by Trent. At the base Trent would process the pelts, ship them to Philadelphia for sale or export, keep books, order goods, and stall creditors. Being a partner in an export business, Trent would handle the export of the pelts from Philadelphia to London because Parliament had added North American pelts to its list of enumerated articles in 1722. Probably, the base was in Shippensburg, where Croghan had purchased lots and Trent had gained field experience. Named for its largest landowner, Edward Shippen, the hamlet exploited such Indian crossroads as the Raystown Path from Harris’ Ferry to the Ohio-Allegheny country and the Virginia Path from Harris’ Ferry to Winchester, Virginia. The Raystown Path was the southern branch of the Allegheny Path.28

Although they had located their base wisely, Croghan and Trent soon eyed a better site at a bend in the Conedoguinet Creek in Pennsborough (now Pennsboro) Township, Lan-

28 For William Trent see Sewell Elias Slick, William Trent and the West (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, 1947; reprint, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennonwoods Publishing, 2001), 1-3; for partnership see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 8-9; see also Robert Grant Crist, George Croghan of Pennsboro (Harrisburg: Dauphin Deposit Trust Company, 1965), 10; see also David Magaw to Edward Shippen, 25 Jan. 1745/46, Shippen Papers, Correspondence, 1:73, HSP; see also Wallace, Paul A. W., Indian Paths of Pennsylvania, 142-145, 177.
Caster County, about six miles west of Harris’ Ferry. The site marked the beginning of the easternmost feeder of the New Path, which Pennsylvania Indian traders were using with increasing frequency by the mid-1740s. The feeder, which was called the Franks-town Path but was actually an ancient shortcut on the northern branch of the Allegheny Path between Harris’ Ferry and Aughwick (now Shirleysburg), ran northwesterly until it joined the New Path just before the Blue Mountains, passed through Stephens’ Gap, and turned southwest, beginning a tortuous route to the Allegheny River. If they relocated their operation to the site, Croghan and Trent could intercept trade ahead of Harris and satisfy traders’ needs for food, fodder, and drink. On 7 October 1745 they jointly bought a 354-acre tract for £300 Pennsylvania money from Lancaster yeoman William Walker and his wife Elizabeth. On 16 April 1746 Croghan obtained a patent for a contiguous 171-acre tract from James Saw and on 4 July 1746 Trent sold his 171 acres to Croghan. The deed designated Croghan a merchant and Trent a Philadelphia resident, designations that indicate that the partners had already altered their duties: Croghan would not only acquire peltries at Indian villages but also process them at his base and then ship them to Trent, who would sell them in Philadelphia or export them. Landowner and merchant—these were statuses Croghan relished because he could not have achieved them in Ireland. For him the future seemed bright as a sunny meadow.29

29 For Indian paths see Wallace, Paul A. W., *Indian Paths of Pennsylvania*, 115-116, 49-54, 142-145; for sequence of deeds see Revised Mayhill Lancaster County Deeds Pertaining to Cumberland County, Folder 125-20, CCHS; for history of Croghan house see Nancy Van Dolsen and Bernard L. Herman, “Report on the ‘George Croghan House,’ Hampton Township, Cumberland County,” ibid., 1, CCHS; for 354-acre Walker tract see Land Records, Copied Survey Book, C 224, PSA; for photo copy of 354-acre Walker tract see Box 27A, Folder 7, CCHS; for patent of contiguous 171-acre Saw tract see Land Records, Copied Survey Book, A 70, 177, PSA; for photocopy of contiguous 171-acre Saw tract see Box 27A, Folder 7, CCHS; for sale of 354-acre Walker tract to Croghan and Trent see Record Book S, 1:262-265, Recorder of Deeds, CCC; for sale of Trent’s 171 acres to Croghan see Deed Book B, 1:445-449, Archives Division, Records and Archives Services, LCC.
To sustain himself and his horses, Croghan needed to improve his base, so he sent to Ireland for this trusted help: Roger Walton, Irishman; Thomas Smallman, cousin; Edward Ward, half-brother; Thomas Ward, stepfather, and his wife, Croghan’s mother, likely née Smallman, widowed when Croghan was a boy. Another woman might have arrived with them or been living with him when they arrived. Biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright posits that the woman was his wife. Daughter Susannah’s birth in 1750, he says, “furnishes presumable evidence that he had taken a wife,” who presumably died after giving birth. Her death would explain why there is no mention of her in any historical source.

Historian Robert Grant Crist cites as corroborating evidence a 1749 invoice itemizing two peacock shoes, which he construes as wifely gifts, for such shoes were meant to adorn feet rather than merely protect them. Crist cites this as evidence, too: In 1765 Susannah, aged fifteen years, married Lieutenant Augustine Prevost. Her age at marriage indicates that she was born during her father’s Pennsborough tenure, which ended when he sold his property on 17 September 1751. But is it not just as reasonable to assume that Croghan bought the shoes for a pregnant lover? After all, he did not have to be a husband to be a father, especially after the Great Awakening, when fiery revivalists like William Tennent, Sr., and his sons flamed the passions of single men and women throughout the Delaware Valley. Such outbursts of passion would lead generations of American humorists to quip that religious revivals caused “more souls to be made than saved.”

30 For help and “furnishes presumable evidence” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 12, 34; for daughter and “wife” see Crist, George Croghan of Pennsboro, 19; for sale of “tanyard” see Deal with Hockley, 3 May 1752, Richard Hockley, ca. 1749-1753, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 14, HSP; see also Attached Schedule, ibid., HSP; see also Bill of Sale of George Croghan’s Pennsborough Plantation, 17 Dec. 1751, ibid., HSP; see also Walton & Smallman Bond to Hockley, 19 Sept. 1753, ibid., HSP; see also unnamed document, 21 Sept. 1753, ibid., HSP; for “more souls” see Morgan, Boone, 26. Susannah’s epitaph at St. James Protestant Episcopal Church in Evansburg, Pa., reads that she died “Dec. 24, 1790. Aged 40 Years.”
In the eighteenth century settling was arduous work that few in our relatively comfortable time can visualize. In April 1746 Croghan, directing relatives, employees, and slave, would have constructed a tentative habitation, a rough shelter, no more than a lean-to, or a wattle hut, but something that could ward off wind, rain, cold, and wild animals. In the following months he would have built livestock huts with pens of poles, pickets, branches, split logs, brush, or rocks and cleared a kitchen garden and fenced it to keep out foragers like deer and raccoons. The clearing of a kitchen garden, a task that seems simple to us, was not so simple in the eighteenth century, for the work required days of grubbing, digging, chopping, hacking, cutting, sawing, bending, lifting, carrying, and stacking. The labor was done by hand, without the aid of modern labor-saving devices like chainsaws and wood-chippers, so that during breaks the men, sweaty, sore, thirsty, and tired, likely went to the Conedoguinet Creek to drink cool water and lie under shady trees.31

Clearing a kitchen garden was as nothing in comparison with clearing fields for crops, however. Rocks, boulders, and logs had to be dug up and moved. Trees had to be felled by ax, and their branches and trunks chopped, moved, and stacked. Stumps had to be dug up, chopped, and moved, too. Big trees could be ten feet or more in diameter, so felling them by ax was futile. In the Indian way Croghan’s men would have “girdled” the trees, or hacked rings around the trunks, thereby cutting off the lifeblood of sap in the bark from the roots to the branches. Within a year or so the deadened trees would have begun to wither, their rotting twigs and small branches falling to the ground in stiff winds and violent storms. The twigs and branches would have been cleared. Within a few more years large branches would have fallen to the ground and the bark would have cracked and peeled off in dead hunks and the branches and the bark would have been cleared too.

31 For construction of habitation and livestock huts and for garden-clearing see Morgan, Boone, 33-34.
By then, the soil would have been hoed and tilled, so that corn and other crops could be planted in long rows. A barn would have been built to store the crops and keep horses and cows, and then real farm labor would have begun, the mind-numbing, body-wearying rounds of weeding and watering, feeding and mucking, milking and churning, sowing and harvesting, building and repairing, the tethers of a rooted existence that would have stymied an adventurer like Croghan, who preferred to inhale the fresh air of the mountaintop to the stale air of the cattle pen.\textsuperscript{32}

The most important crop was corn, a nutritious cereal grass that Indians had cultivated for thousands of years. Called maize by Indians, corn was hardy and versatile. It could be grown in newly cleared fields where wheat and rye and other Old World crops could not. It grew faster than weeds, so it was easier to tend than other crops. When it ripened in the summer, its ears could be roasted and its milky kernels eaten on the cob or off, and when it reached maturity in the fall, it could be grated into meal that could be made into mush, pudding, or bread. It could be fed to horses, hogs, cattle, and oxen, too. “The sweet fodder was stripped from the lower stalks in late summer and kept as winter feed for the horses,” writes Boone biographer Robert Morgan. “The tops of the stalks were cut just above the ears and piled in stacks for winter feed for cattle.” Corn husks were used for mattress-stuffing. Corncobs were used for kindling fires in the morning, for fashioning tobacco pipes, and for the private purpose that toilet paper now serves. A heavy wooden pestle was used to crush and grind mature (dried) corn on a hollowed stump, which was called a hominy block, after the Indian word for hulled and soaked corn, but another way to crush and grind corn into meal was European in conception and execution, the stream-powered gristmill, whose millstones could do the work of several

\textsuperscript{32} For field-clearing see \textit{ibid.}, 34.
men and women in a shorter time. Corn could be made into whiskey, too. Kernels were dampened and left to sprout. Sprouted kernels were ground with sprouted barley to make malt, which was mixed with water and sugar and allowed to ferment. When the mash was heated, the alcohol boiled off as steam, which was caught in a still and allowed to cool as drops of whiskey. Boiled again, the whiskey became potent liquor.33

To simplify things, Croghan divided his base, which he called Pennsborough Plantation, into a large farm and a small farm. On the large farm he grazed sheep, cattle, and horses and built a log house and two outhouses. The one-story log house, 26 by 24 feet, had six windows and a chimney. On the small farm he cultivated both subsistence and commercial crops and built a storehouse and a tannery. He located the tannery downwind of his log house and Harris’ Ferry. In time he added a dairy, a smithy, and stables. His dairymen milked his cows and churned butter from the cream. The milk, cream, and butter sustained his plantation, and the surpluses were sold in Lancaster and Philadelphia. His smith shoed horses and repaired carts, wagons, plows, pitchforks, spades, hoes, shovels, and guns, so that traders, hunters, trappers, wayfarers, and farmers began showing up to get their horses shoed and their equipment repaired. The stables held horses.

Beginning operation about the time he sold his property on 17 September 1751, a water-powered sawmill turned out planks for improvements. His storekeeper satisfied traders, hunters, trappers, farmers, and wayfarers by stocking items like broadcloth, calico, vermilion, linen, muslin, thread, garters, duffels, lace, shirts, handkerchiefs, hats, hat bands, bandannas, beads, rings, Jews harps, knives, penknives, tobacco, flints, lead, gunpowder, gun stocks, and strouds (rough blankets). His tanner, Roger Walton, turned out leather, which relatives or Trent on trips to Philadelphia shipped to merchants in London. Be-

33 For cultivation and uses of corn see *ibid.*, 34-35.
sides working leather into saddles for plantation use and for sale, his saddler, Thomas Smallman, repaired saddles.\textsuperscript{34}

Croghan welcomed hunters, trappers, and traders to his plantation, which achieved renown for its cheer. In good weather his guests would congregate outside his log house, where he would mingle with them while his African slave, Que Magenis, and his Irish indentured servant, William Munney, served them food and drink, but in inclement weather or in the chill evening the host and his guests would go inside to sit on wooden benches at the cloth-covered board table near the fireplace in the “fire room,” a kitchen that doubled as a parlor. Perhaps, with the help of Magenis and Munney, “Mrs. Croghan” herself was stewing meat and vegetables in a brass or iron pot over the fire. She would have ladled the cooked stew into pewter, tin, or wooden bowls, or onto like-crafted plates, which her appreciative guests would have passed round the table. Perhaps she was roasting turkey, mutton, or beef when the guests arrived. A gregarious sort, her “husband” would have carved the roast turkey, mutton, or beef himself, wielding his knife like a baton to orchestrate conversation, while she plated stewed or roasted vegetables, which Magenis and Munney served the guests. Later, she would have retired to the “back room” for bed, while her “husband” and his guests, bellies full, swapped stories and swilled rum, port,

\textsuperscript{34} For a contemporary definition of “plantation” see Tandy and Charles Hersh, \textit{Cloth and Costume}, 3; see also Crist, \textit{George Croghan of Pennsboro}, 16; for Ridge and Valley see Cuff, et al., \textit{Atlas of Pennsylvania}, 21, 49, 52, 66; for sawmill see Thomas Cookson and Sand. Flower to Trent, 23 Nov. 1751. Hockley, Trent, & Croghan, 1751, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 18; for sale of “tanyard” see Deal with Hockley, 3 May 1752, Richard Hockley, ca. 1749-1753, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 14, HSP; see also Attached Schedule, ibid., Box 202, Folder 14, HSP; see also Bill of Sale of George Croghan’s Pennsborough Plantation, 17 Dec. 1751, ibid., Box 202, Folder 14, HSP; for goods see Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folders 1-3, HSP; for jobs of Walton and Smallman see Walton & Smallman Bond to Hockley, 19 Sept. 1753, Richard Hockley, ca. 1749-1753, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 14; see also unnamed document, 21 Sept. 1753, ibid., Box 202, Folder 4, HSP; for market in England for deerskins from Pennsylvania Indian traders see William I. Roberts, “Samuel Storke: An Eighteenth-Century London Merchant Trading to the American Colonies,” \textit{The Business History Review}, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer 1965): 164. Samuel Storke entered joint ventures with Philadelphia merchant Thomas Lawrence, future business partner of Edward Shippen.
Madeira, hard cider, or corn whiskey until the wee hours of the morning. Perhaps a pipe and tobacco, retrieved from storage in the “loft,” followed the bottle round the table. Finally, after his guests had left, Croghan would have staggered to the back room, the rough wooden floor creaking loudly enough to wake his “wife.”

The creaky wooden floor, which sat on a spot once occupied by Delawares, symbolizes the colonization or “supplanting” of Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century. According to historian David Day a “supplanting society” is a society “that moves onto the land of another with the intention of making the land its own.” Nothing embodied such intent more clearly than the proliferation of European-style “improvements” to the landscape. The cabin, the fields, the pastures, the barn, the barnyard, the tannery, the tanyard, the store—these were European-style “improvements” that changed the land in big ways and not only strengthened Croghan’s *de facto* proprietorship, but strengthened his *de jure* as well. Croghan had bought an unimproved tract from settlers, who had bought it from the Penns, who had bought it from native Delawares, who seemed to most colonists to live off nature’s bounty, to range far and wide for seasonal foodstuffs, neither practicing settled agriculture nor improving the land through permanent settlement. Because Pennsylvania’s native Delawares and refugee Indians failed to master their natural environment in recognizably European ways, the colonists accounted them “uncivilized” and therefore *deserving* of conquest. Working out a justification of conquest marks Day’s third “stage” of “supplanting,” the claiming of *moral* proprietorship. In this context trade and diplomacy were simply the tools whereby ambitious pioneers like Croghan could and did en-

35 For African slave see Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 20, HSP; for Irish indentured servant see ibid., Box 202, Folder 16, HSP; for likely cabin layout and tableware see Tandy and Charles Hersh, *Cloth and Costume*, 5-11, 82-83, 155; see also Morgan, *Boone*, 63. Croghan bought Que Magenis in 1746 and William Munney on 2 September 1749.
rich themselves and, wittingly or unwittingly, soften up Pennsylvania’s two situational frontiers for conquest. Ultimately, ambitious pioneers like Croghan would use the tools to soften up the polyglot frontiers of the North American interior for conquest as well.36

As an Indian trader Croghan was operating on five situational frontiers when he began improving his land purchase in April 1746—the Pennsylvania frontier west of Philadelphia between the Delaware and the Susquehanna Rivers, the Pennsylvania frontier north of Philadelphia between the selfsame rivers, the western Pennsylvania-eastern Ohio frontier, the northeastern Ohio frontier at the Cuyahoga River on Lake Erie near present-day Cleveland, and the southeastern Michigan frontier at present-day Detroit. The frontiers supported rival Indian tribes with different linguistic and cultural heritages and different economic, social, and political circumstances and aims even if the rival tribes did share an interest in trading with traders like Croghan. The frontiers also supported rival colonial presences with different linguistic and cultural heritages and different economic, social, and political circumstances and aims even if some rival colonials did share an interest in trading with Indians. Biographer Albert T. Volwiler conceptualizes not the five situational frontiers whereon Croghan actually operated by mid-1740, but rather a monolithic frontier that unfolded in successive economic “stages,” one wherein a widespread settlers’ frontier superseded a widespread, shifting “trader’s frontier.” In fact no monolithic frontier had ever existed in North American history. Croghan was by mid-1740 both an Indian trader and a settler, for example. He was a trader when he was haggling over the

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prices of skins and furs at far-flung Indian villages, but he was a settler when he was supervising the employees, indentured servant, and slave on his plantation.37

For immigrant pioneers like Croghan, it was all about attaining a status that had been unattainable in Europe. The first British “commercial revolution” (1690-1740) enabled the “middling sort” to buy manufactured goods in unprecedented amounts for use in conspicuous displays of leisure, social ritual, status affirmation, and status arrogation. Like their conspicuous aristocratic counterparts, “middling” consumers in Britain and her colonies not only upgraded such necessities as bedding, eating utensils, and clothing, but bought luxury goods and amenities as well. In Pennsylvania the “consumer revolution” spread from Philadelphia to the countryside and from the countryside to the far corners of the province. It was not unusual for immigrant pioneers to own baubles, for instance, or to own farmland or eat meat regularly. Landownership and regular meat-consumption were virtually impossible dreams for the ordinary men of the British Isles or the Continent, where domineering landed aristocrats used their power, influence, and judicial and ministerial connections to limit opportunities for commoners—even prosperous ones—to authenticate landownership or to purchase parcels, while high price limited regular meat-consumption to the aristocracy and the upper middle class. In Pennsylvania there were swaths of “unimproved” land for farming or settlement, and meat was readily available, so that land and meat were cheap by European standards. In Philadelphia shopkeepers regularly sold meat to ordinary persons, for example. On the frontiers, where game was plentiful and livestock thrived, meat was so readily available that farmers, hunters, and traders ordinarily went to bed with full bellies. In Pennsylvania anything was possible:

37 For “trader’s frontier” and “settler’s frontier” see Volwiler, George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 19, 26
Frustrated, unemployed, impoverished, starved, oppressed, landless, or war-weary European immigrants could realize their wildest dreams of joining the middle class or imitating the aristocracy or even eating like a king or a queen.38

Chapter 2: Private Trader

On 10 June 1746 Governor George Thomas authorized the formation of four militia companies of a hundred men each for action in a British campaign against Canada. Ambitious to make a name for himself in battle, Trent volunteered. He received a captain’s commission and enlisted his hundred men, but before he marched them to New York, he sold to George Croghan, who engaged trusted family, relatives, and friends so he could pursue his overarching goal of enriching himself by trading far west. With their help he and his plantation prospered. While his plantation won the designation of “Croghan’s” on a 1749 map of the Middle Colonies, the steady stream of peltries to, and goods from, his plantation via nearby Stephen’s Gap grew to such epic proportions that local Indian traders took to calling the pass “Croghan’s Gap,” an honorific that appeared on a map of Pennsylvania in 1770 and earned mention in various other publications until 1795. If Croghan was not Pennsylvania’s wealthiest private trader by 1749, he was certainly the best-known.¹

Croghan spoke enough of the Algonquian and Iroquoian languages to trade extensively and profitably in Ohio and Pennsylvania. His willingness to negotiate with Algonquian and Iroquoian traders on their terms complemented his amiable disposition and personal charm and put him in good standing not only with Algonquian and Mingo chiefs, but with the Onondaga Council, which admitted him as an honorary member, a high honor indeed.

for a non-Iroquois who was a European immigrant, too. The Onondaga Council permitted him considerable latitude in intercultural trade, so he built a trading post at the forks of the Ohio. Thence he transported English goods to his trading post at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River. In the winter of 1746-47 he learned that the Cuyahoga Indians had turned to him for trade because a British naval blockade of North America had dwindled Canadian imports to virtually nothing. While the scarcity of French goods had driven up the prices, the high prices had positioned him so advantageously vis-à-vis Canadian traders that the Canadian government had ordered the commander of Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit to recruit French-allied Ohio Indians for an attack on the Cuyahoga trading post. The commander recruited the Indians, but no attack occurred. Croghan meantime agitated against his Canadian rivals and made vague promises of provincial support to the Indian customers who turned against them.2

An ensuing event, the “Sandusky Massacre,” complicated matters. Led by bitter Huron chief Nicolas (Orontony), the Wyandots had left the area of Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit in 1738 to found an autonomous village on a Lake Erie inlet that is today called Sandusky Bay. Nicolas had permitted English traders to build a blockhouse at the village, which in time became the only significant Indian village between Détroit and Sandusky Bay. His policy was a sensible one, given the high cost of French goods. In early spring 1747 five Canadian traders who were transporting pelts from the Cuyahoga River to Détroit made a stopover at the Wyandot village on Sandusky Bay. A party of Cuyahoga Mingos had ei-

ther tailed the Canadian traders to the village or been visiting it when the traders arrived. In any event some Wyandot villagers joined the Mingo party in plundering the pelts and murdering the Canadian traders. The “Sandusky Massacre,” which sparked a widespread Indian rebellion that the Canadian government squelched only when Indian rebels burned a Canadian fort on the Maumee River, was the byproduct of King George’s War (1740-1748), not of anything Croghan had done. No hard evidence linking him or any English trader to the plunder or to the murders or to the rebellion existed in early spring 1747.3

Canadian government officials nevertheless linked both the murders and the rebellion to English traders in general and to Croghan in particular. One Canadian government official claimed that English traders had instigated their “devoted Creatures” to murder “the French at Sandoské.” Another claimed that English traders had “fomented” rebellion “by force of presents and lies,” the latter of which insinuated that the French had no goods to trade, as the English had captured their ships. (The lies, however, were facts, because the very real British naval blockade of Canada had drastically cut imports.) The alleged “testimony” of a captive Pennsylvania Indian trader named John Patten confirmed the claims that Croghan had instigated both the murders and the rebellion: Through lavish gift-giving Croghan had persuaded the Lake Erie’s Indians “to destroy” French traders like those at Sandusky so that he could “engross the whole trade.” Actually, however, by agitating against his Canadian rivals, Croghan promoted the economic interests of both Pennsylvania and Patten. If Croghan was trying to monopolize the Indian trade, he was only being a good capitalist, for in the eighteenth century large-scale capitalist enterprise tended to-

ward monopoly just as it does today. In any event Croghan’s encroachment of the Lake Erie Canadian trade likely caused Patten to feel as threatened as his French competition. Perhaps, in imputing sinister motives to Croghan’s actions, Patten was trying to precipitate the destruction of his Pennsylvania competition. 4

In spring 1747 Croghan returned to his plantation and rested before sending Governor Thomas a Cuyahoga Mingo letter with a scalp. “Last fall when our Kings of ye Six Nations were Down att Albny,” the letter read in his inimitable hand, “you & our Brother of New York, gave them ye hatchett to make use of against ye French, which wee very willingly, & with True harts Tuck hould of, and has Naw Made use of itt and killd five of ye French in These parts.” Was he making excuses for himself or for the Cuyahoga Mingos or for himself and them? Were the Cuyahoga Mingos making excuses for themselves or for him or for themselves and him? If the Cuyahoga Mingos got “Some Powder & Lead, to Carrey on ye Expedition with a Vigor,” they would defeat the French “in Those parts” and send Governor Thomas scalps. Croghan was for compliance. “Those Ingans ware always in the French Intrest till now,” he wrote Richard Peters on 26 May, “Butt This Spring, almost all the Ingans in the Woods, have Declared against ye French, & I Think this will be a fair Opertunity, if pursuied by some Small Presents, to have all ye French Cut off in them parts, for the Ingans are very much Led by Any Thing that will tend to their own self Intrest, and will think a Great Dail of a Little powder & Led att this Time, besides it will be a Mains of Drowing them, that has nott yet Joyn’d.” The eviction of the

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French from the Ohio Valley would enable him to expand his trading enterprise west in the pursuit of greater profits, other Indian traders to expand their trading enterprises, and the British Crown to add a vast swath of the North American interior to its domain.\(^5\)

Croghan benefited from circumstances. Appreciative of his efforts in their behalf, the Cuyahoga Mingos increased trade with him. In 1748 the Wyandots, led by cordial chief Nicolas, torched their village at Sandusky Bay and relocated eastward to “Kuskuskies,” a group of five Mingo villages on the Beaver River at the confluence of the Shenango and Mahoning Rivers in western Pennsylvania. Their aim was to improve access to English goods. A rebellious western Ohio tribe seeking to improve access to English goods but expecting French retaliation for doing so, the Miamis, led by chief Old Briton, relocated eastward to Pickawillany on the upper Great Miami River. As for Croghan, his efforts in behalf of the Cuyahoga Mingos were making him indispensable to the provincial government. Following his advice, the Pennsylvania Assembly appropriated £400 to reward the Cuyahoga Mingos for their loyalty to Great Britain. Occupied by other matters, Conrad Weiser, the usual provincial emissary to the Iroquois or their emigrants, rejected the job of conveying the £400 present westward and nominated Croghan to act in his stead, saying “I always took him for an honest man, and have as yet no Reason to think otherwys of him.” Croghan accepted the job quickly, for he knew that if he performed it well the provincial government might appoint him liaison to the Ohio Indians, in which capacity he could trade farther west than any Pennsylvanian had ever traded. After all, he already had a base and two trading posts upon which to build.\(^6\)

\(^5\) For “Last fall” see Indian letter to George Thomas, *PA*, 1\(^{st}\) ser., 1:741-742; for “Those Ingans” see Croghan to Peters, 26 May 1747, *ibid.*, 1\(^{st}\) ser., 1:742.

His base, Pennsborough Plantation, sat in the fertile Limestone Valley at the eastern edge of the region that sweeps diagonally through Pennsylvania and is known today as Ridge and Valley. Tall, deciduous, broad-leaf white oak and red oak canopy the ridges, as do scarlet oak, scrub oak, chestnut oak, and black oak. These oak varieties blend with other species—sugar maple, sweet birch, butternut hickory, beech, tulip poplar, and white pine, for instance—to form canopies that blot out the midday sun. The rocky but fertile valleys are grazeable. Croghan used Conedoguinet Creek, which meanders into the Susquehanna River, to water European crops (cabbages, turnips, cucumbers, onions, wheat, barley, rye, straw, and hay) and Indian crops (mostly corn, beans, potatoes, and squash), and although the sale of agricultural surplus turned a profit for him, he believed that real money was to be made in tanning skins and hides for manufacture in London. To the north, west, and south, water valleys teemed with raw materials, the animals that Indian hunters killed and skinned. At his store Indian hunters traded animal skins and hides for English goods, but he knew that the hunters would soon exhaust the outlying sources of raw materials, so he used his trading post at the forks of the Ohio River and his other at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River to tap new sources and hedge against financial loss. That is to say, although he had received only a smattering of formal education in Ireland, he could and did project for the coming years not only profits and losses, but detrimental environmental factors.\(^7\)

Ohio and Pennsylvania Indian hunters primarily targeted herd animals. Deer, which shed their reddish summer coat in August and September and gray-brown winter coat in May and June, lived in family groups at forest edges. When hunters discerned deer at a

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\(^7\) For geology see Cuff, et al., *Atlas of Pennsylvania*. 21, 49, 52, 66; for goods see Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folders 1-3, HSP.
creek, river, or lake, they hid to the windward of the animals so as to avoid being scented. When the deer, alert and wary, moved into range, the hunters shot them with arrows or balls and skinned the still-warm bodies and peeled off and jerked the meat in strips. To make pemmican, hunters dried strips of meat in the sun and then pounded the strips into a paste they mixed with melted fat and berries. Packed in hide bags for storage up to five years, pemmican was perfect journey food. Dull and hard of hearing, buffalo, which shed their light brown summer coat in August and September and dark brown winter coat in May and June, moved in great lumbering herds across tramontane Appalachia in search of food and water. When they grazed in a meadow or lapped at a creek, river, or lake, the shaggy-haired beasts were particularly vulnerable to hunters, who prized the bulls, which weighed upwards of a ton. To kill buffalo, hunters hid to the windward of a herd and unleashed arrows or balls at will, whereupon the stricken dropped like scythed cornstalks. 8

Ohio and Pennsylvania Indian hunters secondarily targeted bear, whose thick, soft fur was not so valuable to colonials as the sweet, tender meat. Colonials savoried bear bacon, for instance. Solitary animals, bear haunted meadows in the spring and the summer to eat plants, berries, and insects, but at times they stalked creeks, rivers, and lakes for fish and beaver. In the fall, bear occupied mountain laurel thickets where they gorged on acorns, nuts, roots, and bark that sweetened their meat as they accumulated fat up to four inches thick. Bear denned in November and December and hibernated for up to seven months,

when they lived off their fat, not eating, drinking, urinating, or defecating. When they awoke, they ate laurel, which opened their bowels. To kill bear, which were alert and wary, Indian hunters used deadfalls. Into a bear runway they drove two rows of branches to support a heavy log or stone, tilted up; then, they set one of the branches—the trigger—loosely on stacked rocks and baited its offshoot, so that when a victim gnawed the bait, the branch fell, bringing down the log or stone with crushing force. A colonial iron trap, however, required less preparatory work. Indian hunters anchored the hand-forged trap in a bear runway and pressed its tong-shaped spring closed, thus forcing its hinged jaws to fall open as semicircles. Then they slipped its trigger in place. On the trigger was a coin-like pan, and when it was pressed, the trap’s sharp, heavy jaws slammed shut with enough force to break a man’s leg in half. Indian hunters baited the trap with raw meat and then concealed the trap with leaves or grass, so that only the bait was visible.9

The skins and hides of wild animals were stiff as plastic, so Croghan and other colonial tanners treated them. First they fleshed the skins and hides and removed the hair. Next they cut up the sappy bark of winter oak or chestnut and pounded the pieces until tannic acid seeped out into troughs. Next they immersed the fleshed materials in successively stronger slurries of tannin for at least a month. Last they dyed the tanned materials and curried them with grease or waxes. When they finished the last step, they had leather. Since tannins stank, tanners located their operations in farmyards outside villages, towns, or cities, on the prevailing downwind side, but stench was not the only risk for tanners, for tanning exposed them to hoof-and-mouth (anthrax) and lock-jaw (tetanus). Tanners converted deerskins, buffalo hides, and bear hides into leather that London manufacturers

converted into finished products for sale to colonial or European customers or to London merchants for resale to Continental manufacturers or merchants. Although clothing, footwear, pouches, parchment, and strings made of deerskin and buffalo hide were popular in the colonies, and bedding and outerwear made of bear hide, too, the skins and hides of domestic animals were the choice raw materials for conversion into leather. Steer hides came from steer slaughtered at prime, when their meat was best for eating and their skin best for tanning. Cows, longer-lived, were used for dairy purposes. Slunk, which was tanned, unborn calf with hair, was used to cover trunks and boxes. Calfskin or goatskin tanned in sumac, Russia leather was used to cover chairs. Dog skins were used to fit dancing shoes, and feathery chicken skins were used to make fans.¹⁰

By trading for the skins and hides of wild animals, Croghan softened Pennsylvania and Ohio for conquest. When he named his Conedoguinet Creek base, he claimed de facto proprietorship, which he visibly strengthened when he tilled its soil. When Indian traders renamed Stephen’s Gap in his honor, they too claimed de facto proprietorship—for themselves as well as him. Although local Indians had been calling the gap by another name for unknown generations, the name did not matter to traders and colonists. When native Miami and refugee Wyandot villages relocated eastward to improve access to his goods, they altered their lifestyles to accommodate him. When he built trading posts, he claimed de jure proprietorship, but when he exploited riparian animals for profit, he claimed de facto proprietorship. Historian David Day writes that “the history of the world has been a history of wave after wave of people intruding on the lands of others.” His viewpoint is

¹⁰ For tanning process see Cuff, et al., Atlas of Pennsylvania, 66; see also Morgan, Boone, 62; for oak and chestnut tannins see Charles Fergus, Trees of Pennsylvania and the Northeast (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2002), 104-128; for colonial leathers see Morgan, Boone, 62, 71; see also Faragher, Daniel Boone, 20-21; for buffalo see McHugh, Time of the Buffalo, 150; for Continental leathers see Axtell, “The First Consumer Revolution,” in Beyond 1492, 130.
applicable to Ohio and Pennsylvania at mid-eighteenth century, for Indian, French, and British intrusions on one another’s lands marked both the territory and the colony.¹¹

Unintended consequences marked both territory and colony as well. To attain tradable skins and hides, native and refugee Ohio and Pennsylvania Indians decimated the animal populations that sustained them. Soon Ohio and Pennsylvania Indian hunters journeyed farther afield to hunt such life-sustaining animals as deer. Deer were as essential to their culture as buffalo were to nineteenth-century Plains Indian culture. From deer, they derived food and materials. They ate the stringy meat and used the antler and bone to make tools and ornaments, the tail hair to make embroidery, the sinew to make bindings, the hoofs to make glue and rattlers, the dewclaws to make decorations on belts and anklets, and the paunch and bladder to make bags. From the skin, they made clothing, footwear, pouches, strings, containers, and parchment. From the skin of male deer, Indians made buckskin. Indians soaked the skins of male deer in water rather than tannins for a week or so, draped them over graining logs, scraped them, dressed them with brain or liver paste, soaked them in water again, wrung them, stretched them, and dried them. Using colored clays or earth, Indians dyed the skins various hues. The Delawares dyed them black, for instance. Colonials adopted buckskin because it was warm, comfortable, and virtually impenetrable to thorns and branches. Its only drawback was that it would wet through during rainstorms, but this was a minor annoyance since it dried completely with some rubbing. To soften the skins of male deer, colonials used a process called graining, during which they drew the skins back and forth across a straking board.¹²

¹¹ For “the history of” see Day, Conquest, 5.
¹² For deer see Waldman, Dictionary of Native American Terminology, 61; for deerskin and buckskin see Parker, Indian How Book, 70-76.
In spring 1747 an Indian trader in Croghan’s employ brought this news to Pennsborough Plantation: “the Inguns att this side of lake Eary is Makeing war very Briskly Against the French. Butt is very impatiant To hear from there Brothers, ye English, expecting a Present of powder & Lead.” If they received nothing, Croghan wrote Philadelphia merchant Thomas Lawrence, they would “Turn to the French,” who would be “willing to make up with them again.” Croghan advised that a present be conveyed directly. Should his advice be ignored, he would “not Send out any Goods or Men this year for fear of Danger.” Biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright conjectures that Croghan wrote the letter out of fear that “the Indians would accuse him of failing to support them after having involved them in a war.” Wainwright’s conjecture may be true, but it may be true as well that the governments of Pennsylvania and New York secretly set the Cuyahoga Mingos on the war path. In any case Lawrence passed Croghan’s advice to the Pennsylvania Council, which asked Croghan to convey a £200 present to the Indians. Croghan arranged for his wagoner to transport the present to Harris’ Ferry, but before he could arrange for its transport farther west, fifteen Ohio Indians arrived at Lancaster, whereupon Conrad Weiser, who was attending to personal business, advised them to go to Philadelphia. On 12 November 1747 this item appeared in the Pennsylvania Gazette: “Last night came to town some Indians from Ohio, a branch of the Mississippi, all warriors, and among them one captain, on a visit to this government, about some particular affairs relating to the war betwixt the English and the French in those parts.” The “affairs” involved provincial aid.13

13 For “the Inguns” see Croghan to Lawrence, 18 Sept. 1747, PA, 1st ser., 1:770; for present see MPCP, 5:72, 97-98, 119-120, 121-122, 139; see also Peters to Weiser, 26 Sept. 1747, Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Part 2, 29, HSP; see also Council’s Speech & Assembly’s Message, 26 Aug. 1747, ibid., 80, HSP; for “the Indians would” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 16; for “Last night” see Pennsylvania Gazette, 12 Nov. 1747.
The Indians met the Pennsylvania Council from 14 to 16 November 1747. Opening the conference, their leader, Canachquasy, said that his people, the Mingos, had been neutral at the war’s outset because the Onondaga Council had adopted a neutrality policy according to the wishes of Pennsylvania and New York. Despite receiving colonists’ messages urging them to war against the French, the Mingos had remained neutral until their young warriors had resolved “to take up the English Hatchet against the will of their old People, and to lay their old People aside as of no use but in time of Peace.” The warriors needed “better Weapons” than “little Sticks & Hickeries,” which were “of no service against the hard Heads of the French.” President Anthony Palmer assured Canachquasy that he had made a good case for his people. “To shew that we take kindly of them, and are desirous to cultivate and improve the Friendship subsisting between the Six Nations & Us,” Palmer said, “we have provided a Present of Goods, a list whereof will be read to You at the close of our Answer.” Conrad Weiser would accompany Canachquasy to Harris’ Ferry and give his party stockpiled goods. In the spring Weiser would convey a “proper Present” to “all the Indians at Ohio, at Canayiahaga [Cuyahoga], & about the lake Erie.”

To repay the Cuyahoga Mingos for their ‘kind Message,” Palmer promised to send “a small Present of Powder & lead by Mr. Croghan,” asked Canachquasy to announce the present in Ohio, and gave him a wampum belt “for that purpose.” After consulting Indian deputation leader Scarouady, Canachquasy took up the belt and all the belts that he had received “in the order they were presented, and repeated the Substance of every Paragraph, express’d high Satisfaction at what the Council had said, & promised to send the wampum belt to the Canayiahaga Indians, who being their own Flesh & Blood they were pleased with the Regards shewn to them.” In “Testimony of their entire Satisfaction &

14 For quotations see MPCP, 5:146-147, 150-151.
Devotion to the English Interest” the Indians “gave the Indian Marks of Approbation and Danced the War Dance.” On 18 November, Weiser arrived at Harris’ Ferry and in Croghan’s presence separated goods meant for the Cuyahoga Mingos from those meant for the other Ohio Indians and then added two barrels of gunpowder to the four barrels meant for the Cuyahoga Mingos. Croghan hired wagoners to convey the presents to Ohio and added two casks of liquor to the presents, but Weiser did not oppose the addition of the liquor because the Indians “did not get drunk” in town or “by the way.” Before leaving Harris’ Ferry, Scarouady confided to Weiser that “the French Party” was “very strong among us, and if we had failed in our Journey to Philadelphia, or our Expectations wou’d not have been granted by our Brethren in Philadelphia, the Indians would have gone over to the French to a Man, and wou’d have received Presents (or Supplies) from the French, who have offer’d it, but now I hope We’ve got the Better of them.”

Because diplomacy was a corollary to trade in eighteenth-century Indian North America, English and French traders learned to read native isomorphic writing, which featured repeated tally marks that might denote how many buffaloes one had killed in a hunt or how many enemy warriors one had killed in a battle. Marks on trees and on animal skins and hides and even on human beings in the form of tattoos—English and French traders read tattoos as signs of tribal leadership—were forms of isomorphic writing. Sticks used by Indian diplomats during conferences and treaties were forms of isomorphic writing, too. The practice of diplomacy could be exact, egalitarian, cooperative, and pubic in this way: one article, one stick, one person. During their speeches Iroquois diplomats, for example, would accompany each article with a wampum belt or a beaver pelt. To memorize or re-

15 For quotations see ibid., 5:150-151, 166-167.
cord speeches, they would represent each article with a stick. Wampum belts and beaver pelts were forms not only of writing but of clothing, and money as well. “Colonists often valued sincerity much less than the tokens of it, and this may explain the common refrain of colonial officials that they wish to bring about peace among all the warring tribes in a region,” writes historian Gordon M. Sayre. “Not only did war divert energy from the pursuit of beavers, but also the process of concluding peace could bring a wealth of pelts to the European soldiers and traders.” To obtain valuable beaver pelts and the wampum belts that could be exchanged for beaver pelts, English and French traders read the signs and so redefined themselves. The Iroquois redefined themselves when they used English and French manufactures for traditional purposes. The Ohio Valley Mingos, being refugee Iroquois, redefined themselves thrice, once by moving to the western Pennsylvania-eastern Ohio frontier, again by negotiating directly with Pennsylvania without the Onondaga Council’s consent, and again by accepting and using English manufactures.16

Wampum informed intertribal and intercultural conferences as far west as the Mississippi River. Although wampum beads had value in terms of skins, hides, and furs, and even English and French coin, their true value was in their usefulness in signifying such concepts as war, peace, and friendship. Beads had two hues—light (white) or dark (purple, blue, or black)—and were indigenous to the eastern seaboard, so inland tribes would travel as many as six hundred miles to trade skins, hides, and furs for them. Light beads were formed from conches (large spiral-shelled marine gastropod mollusks) and the dark

from quahogs (thick-shelled edible clams). Beads varied in value. Usually dark beads were worth two to three times more than light. Beads laced together by narrow deerskin strips were made into necklaces, bracelets, collars, girdles, strings, and belts. In intertribal and intercultural conferences inland tribes like the Miamis of western Ohio used wampum in the form of collars and girdles, whereas the Pennsylvania and New York refugees of eastern Ohio used wampum in the form of strings and belts. Three-foot leather strips tied together at one end were wampum strings. Called strands, the strips held painted beads whose colors signified different concepts. Wampum strings were used for minor public events and wampum belts for major ones. Wampum belts, which featured both horizontal and vertical strips, could be as large as six feet. Six-footers were used for major public events. “The greater the size of the belt or string the more valuable it was and the more emphatic it made any speech that the wampum accompanied,” writes historian Wilbur R. Jacobs. “In each case, the string and the belt served as a ‘word’ or even a complete statement.”

The fur trade was a cultural nexus. English and French traders believed that the key to profitable intercultural relations lay in reading and understanding as language Indian cultural signifiers like clothing. For Indians clothing signified value not through sale but rather through the prestige that one could earn by giving it away. For English and French traders Indian clothing, which consisted of pelts and softened or tanned skins and hides, seemed more like raw materials than like finished garments. So, says historian Gordon M. Sayre, Indian clothing was “tied up with exchange and profit.” To obtain beaver pelts

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for making hat felt, English and French traders literally stripped Indians of their clothing, depriving them “of necessity to make a luxury for European gentlemen far away.” Why did Indians acquiesce? Giving away clothing brought them prestige and goods. While Indian traders prized woolen cloth for its versatility and durability, English and French traders, knowing that only dirty, greasy, worn beaver pelts felted properly, married into distant tribes to gain access to Indian clothing. In short, the pursuit of self-interest by English, French, and Indian traders trumped cultural loyalties and differences.18

Marriage to Indian women was a good means for English and French traders to access skins, hides, and furs, but it was not the only means. Showing proper respect for chiefs and following Indian protocol usually achieved the same goal. This verity of frontier life was one that Croghan learned at the outset of his career. Another was that Indians knew when they were being cheated. Indians called ingenuous English and French traders “fair traders.” Fair traders traded necessities rather than whiskey or rum. Fair traders lived in Indian lodgings, shared the road with Indians, ate and slept with Indians, hunted and traded with Indians. Fair traders might even bed Indian women. “Besides the obvious sexual advantages, this woman provided an outsider with the network of personal connections that gave shape and meaning to life in Indian country,” writes historian James H. Merrell; “she also taught him the language, prepared his meals, even helped him out in the store.” Indians bonded with fair traders by adopting their names or renaming them. An Indian name or nickname might expedite the transformation of an outsider into an insider. Min-gos renamed the affable Croghan Anaquarunda, for example. “Kinship in Pennsylvania native communities included more than those people born or married into a family,” writes historian Jane T. Merritt. “Indians recognized the importance of turning strangers

18 For quotations see Sayre, Les Sauvages Américains, 148, 153.
into ‘either actual or symbolic kinspeople’ to strengthen political alliances or increase access to available resources.” So it was in the refugee-inhabited Ohio Valley.  

For Ohio Valley Indians the most valuable animals for intercultural trade were the beavers, otters, and minks that lived on Lake Erie and its tributaries, the Ohio River and its tributaries, and the Allegheny, Monongahela, and Susquehanna Rivers and their tributaries. Beavers lived in colonies of mated pairs and their offspring. From the colonies they fanned out into the forest to gnaw down trees for food and damming material. Attaining lengths of thirty-two to forty-eight inches, they weighed from thirty to seventy pounds. Soft as summer breeze, their chestnut or reddish brown coat, prized by European hatters, was best in winter, when it was thick and shiny with oil because of the cold. Otters, like beavers, were social animals. Attaining lengths of thirty-five to fifty inches and weighing from twelve to twenty pounds, otters had two layers of fur, a dark-brown coat and a light-brown underfur. These layers combined with a subcutaneous layer of fat to insulate their bodies. In winter their oil waterproofed their fur, making their pelt ideal for conversion into outerwear. Unlike beavers and otters, minks were solitary animals save during mating season from February to April, when males and females made distinctive chuckling calls and used a potent scent from their anal glands to attract mates. Denning in abandoned muskrat dens or in hollows beneath roots of streamside trees, they attained lengths of eighteen to twenty-six inches in length and weighed between one pound and two-and-a-half pounds. Their coat was dark brown save for a white patch under the chin. A coarse patch overlaying their soft, water-repellent underfur gave their pelt its distinctive sheen.  

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19 For “Besides the obvious” see Merrell, Into the American Woods, 81; for “Kinship in Pennsylvania” see Merritt, At the Crossroads, 55; for Anaquarunda see MPCP, 4:88.  
20 For animals and their furs see Cuff, et al., Atlas of Pennsylvania, 66-67; see also Fergus, Wildlife of Pennsylvania and the Northeast, 52-56, 105-111; see also Morgan, Boone, 38.
Ohio Valley Indians used inclosing and arresting traps perfected over millennia to catch or kill beavers, otters, or minks. A common inclosing trap was the pit, which caught victims alive. A trapper dug a deep, bottle-shaped hole, removed dirt, covered the hole with leaves or branches, and set bait on the leaves or branches. Reaching for the bait, the victim fell through the leaves or branches and into the hole, from which there was no escape, because the bottom of the hole was wider than the mouth, and the up-tapered sides were steep. For catching small game a trapper would hide in the hole, reach up and grasp his victim by its legs, and then draw it down and crush it between his knees. A common arresting trap was the snare, which noosed prey by its head or feet at a baited stake. A trapper attached a noose to the end of a long, trimmed branch, which he bent and set trigger-like under the end of a shorter, trimmed branch, or catch, which he positioned in a tree-notch. When it thrust its head through the noose and gnawed the bait, the victim sprung the trigger branch, which flew up, hanging the victim high in the air. Both snares were effective in catching gnawing animals like beavers, otters, and minks, even if Mingo trappers preferred to bait a string rather than a branch. Sometimes a trapper covered a snare with leaves or grass, set bait on them, and waited for his victim. When it stepped into the snare, he drew the noose tight around its legs. Alternatively a trapper might set a net that, when sprung, wrapped up a victim and jerked it high in the air. To mask his scent, a trapper would drip water on things he had touched or would fan pungent smoke at them.²¹

Besides using inclosing and arresting traps Ohio Valley Indians used traditional hunting techniques or European traps and trapping techniques to kill beavers, otters, or minks. At a beaver dam, for example, a trapper might attract a victim with castoreum, a scent taken from the perineal glands of another beaver, and spear the victim with a traditional barbed

²¹ For traditional Indian traps see Parker, Indian How Book, 47-48.
gig, or he might use colonial iron traps to catch or kill more beavers than he could with traditional traps. However, since beavers caught in iron traps could escape by biting off their clamped feet, trappers had to set their traps exactly right. Often they set their traps in water to drown caught beavers. If they set the traps too deep, the animals would swim over them, and if they set the traps too shallow, the animals would pass around them. To minimize such risks, trappers set the traps below beaver slides or runways entering or exiting streams, or between boulders and rocks through which the animals usually passed. Sometimes trappers chained their traps to boulders or rocks or saplings or roots or risked losing caught animals, which could jerk traps away and be carried downstream. When trappers used iron traps to kill small animals, they used traditional hunting techniques to lure victims. In mink mating season, for example, a trapper might imitate a mink chuckling call or use the perineal glands of another mink to lure a victim. Finding that soft furs of small animals were their most valuable commodities and that iron traps could catch or kill many more small animals than traditional traps, Indian trappers incorporated the iron traps into their repertoire of devices and thus changed their culture in a fundamental way: Over time they had to journey farther afield to attain tradable pelts.22

Beaver, otter, and mink furs became valuable to Ohio Valley Indians because of rising demand in Europe. Since the medieval era monarchs, royals, aristocrats, and Church hierarchs had worn imported Scandinavian and Russian beaver, otter, and mink furs to distinguish themselves from commoners. Monarchs had worn flowing fur robes and adorned themselves with fancy fur accessories, while royals, aristocrats, and Church hierarchs had worn costly fur coats and adorned themselves with fancy fur hats and gloves. Some

22 For traditional Indian hunting techniques see Parker, Indian How Book, 44–49; for European traps and trapping techniques see Morgan, Boone, 37–38.
aristocrats had even taken to sleeping on fur bedding. In the early modern era imitative merchants, entrepreneurs, and burghers, enjoying the fruits of capitalist enterprises, wore fur coats and accessories to show they were men of means and so worthy of ascending a step in the social hierarchy. Commoners of lesser means wore furs but could afford only the least desirable ones, which came from domestic cats, dogs, rabbits, goats, and sheep. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the influx of beaver, otter, and mink furs from British and French North America increased the number of furs in Europe exponentially. Although monarchs, royals, aristocrats, and Church hierarchs purchased most of the furs, the increase in number brought down the price, so that even commoners of lesser means could afford the most desirable furs and, sporting them, feign airs of importance around their still less fortunate peers.23

Rising demand in Europe for furs caused English and French colonials to trap, kill, and skin their share of North American beavers, otters, and minks. English trappers showed preferences. To mask their scent, they neither dripped water on nor fanned smoke at the traps they had touched. Rather they boiled the traps and then handled them with boiled gloves. Secretive about their traplines, which stretched along rivers, creeks, and lakes, they camped at a distance and cached their pelts in multiple locations (in thickets and in caves, for example), so that thieves of both cultures could not steal all their pelts at once. Among English trappers it was well-known that thieves of both cultures would steal traps as well as trapped animals, for both pelts and traps could be bartered for goods. English trappers, like their Indian counterparts, peeled off and scraped the skins of dead animals.

23 For rising demand for furs in Europe see Eric Jay Dolin, Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur Trade in America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 6-8; see also Alan Axelrod, A Savage Empire: Trappers, Traders, Tribes, and the Wars That Made America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011), 1-22.
English trappers cut beaver pelts and stretched them flat on withe hoops made of hickory shoot or grapevine. They turned otter and mink pelts inside out and stretched them flat on boards or bent branches. They bundled cured pelts and packed the bundles on horses. A sturdy packhorse could carry up to two hundred valuable pounds. “A trapper might come out of the woods in March with more wealth than the wages of a blacksmith or miller or weaver for a year’s work,” writes Boone biographer Robert Morgan.  

Rising demand in Europe for furs caused Northeast Woodland Indian communities to undergo a “consumer revolution” akin to the one that the English colonies underwent in the first English commercial revolution (1690-1740). Indian trappers killed and skinned small fur-bearing animals in increasing numbers because English and French traders exchanged five kinds of goods for pelts—tools, clothing, decorations, novelties, and food. Of these, only tools impacted generally. Metal tools like axes, hatchets, awls, chisels, knives, and hoes eased toil because they held their edges longer than tools of annealed native copper, bone, fired clay, stone, or wood. Metal axes could be used to fell trees in less time than it took to “girdle” them. Metal hatchets could be used to gather firewood and metal awls to puncture leather and drill shell beads. Metal ice chisels could be used to penetrate beaver lodges and metal knives to skin beavers more quickly and efficiently than breakable flint knives or unwieldy stone scrapers. Metal hoes could be used to till soil deeper than could be done with deer scapula or short digging sticks. Barbed metal fishhooks could be used to catch more fish than was possible with smooth bone hooks, and metal kettles could be used in creative ways that would crack fragile clay pots.  

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24 For colonial English traps, trapping techniques, and “A trapper might” see Morgan, Boone, 31, 38-39.  
25 For effect of metal tools on Indian communities during the first English commercial revolution see Ax-tell, “The First Consumer Revolution,” in Beyond 1492, 127-129, 135-136. Scholar Laura Rigal states that the Indian commercial revolution caused its antithesis in the Indian Ohio Valley, Indian prophetic revivalist
English and French cloth and European and Chinese decorations improved the material culture of Northeast Woodland Indian communities nearly as generally as tools. Called stroud or duffel, English woolen blanketing was not clothing, but Indians wore it because of its surpassing quality. Stroud was as warm as and lighter than matchcoat (or native fur mantle). Stroud dried faster than matchcoat and kept its softness, suppleness, and warmth longer, too. Stroud sported brighter colors than native berry and root dyes could achieve. Using metal knives and scissors, Indian women could shape stroud into leggings, breechclouts, tie-on sleeves, or mantles without curing and dressing pelts. Although Indian men preferred to wear clothing made of stroud to English fitted clothing like leather breeches, which impeded natural functions like running and urinating, they wore brightly patterned calico shirts open at the neck. A few favored chiefs wore braided, buttoned, and cuffed military coats. Decorations of foreign manufacture or material were in demand because they enhanced the appearance and the status of wearers of both sexes. Chinese vermilion replaced native red ochre, for example. European silver earrings adorned Indian men as well as women. So did European copper and brass bracelets, tin finger rings, glass beads, and silver pins, gorgets, and brooches. So too did silver and gold coins and metal scraps that had been shaped into traditional native objects like pendants.26

European novelties and food improved the material culture of the Northeast Woodland Indian communities to varying degrees. Mouth harps, bells, and clothing fasteners like buttons, buckles, and lace points were seldom used, yet guns, alcohol, and mirrors were often used. Guns could be used to kill game in hunts or enemies in battle, and although

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26 For cloth and decorations see Axtell, “The First Consumer Revolution,” in Beyond 1492, 138-139.
guns had deficiencies—they were heavier than bows and arrows, slower and louder, more expensive, harder to make and repair, and less reliable in wet weather—Indians nevertheless adopted them wholeheartedly. Since guns like flintlocks could inflict more internal damage than the sharpest arrowheads, warriors used them in ambushes. But there was no upside to alcohol use. To achieve heightened states wherein they felt invincible or more open to dreams wherein “guardian spirits” revealed their scared secrets for success, Indian men drank alcoholic beverages like brandy, wine, and rum until they were inebriated. Now and then they participated in days-long drunken “frolics” that caused mayhem and bawdry. For them drunkenness became an excuse for murder. Mirrors, or looking-glasses, devastated Indian communities in a different way. True, young warriors used mirrors to apply paints to their faces and arrange decorations on their bodies, but they did so primarily to liberate themselves from the traditional functions of solicitous women. To the same end young fops used mirrors to apply paint to their faces and arrange their hair and decorations. Sometimes, when men or women suffering from smallpox or another European disease used mirrors to see their disfigured faces, they killed themselves. European food—prunes and raisins, for example—served mostly as gifts, but sugar, flour, and tea made their way slowly into Indian larders whenever colonial settlements were nearby.  

Although he was being drawn into public affairs, Croghan was foremost a private trader. Leading goods-laden packhorses, his traders left his plantation in March 1748 to trade in the Ohio Valley for winter skins and hides, while he stayed behind, readying twenty or so horses to convey west the provincial government’s “proper present,” which now included 18 barrels of gunpowder, 20 lead bars, 40 guns, 50 dozen knives, and 6,500 flints. Weeks

27 For novelties and food see *ibid.*, 139-145.
later the present had not arrived, for the Pennsylvania Council hesitated to send it after receiving intelligence that the Cuyahoga Mingos would not declare war on the French until the Onondaga Council had declared it first. “What must be said to the Indians by George Croghan?” Weiser wrote Richard Peters. “His own cargo is already gone, & he must follow it in a few Days.” So the question before the Pennsylvania Council was whether to send the present, valued at £828, at all. James Logan, as the elder statesman of Indian affairs, argued for sending it. “As G Croghan has waited long wth his Horses he ought not to be Sent empty away,” he said, “and I wod Imagine he might have at least [£]300 with him to have Conrad Send a Suitable Lett with him with ye Substance of what ye Said to himself.” The Pennsylvania Council instead messaged Croghan to give the Ohio Indians a small present and to tell them why the provincial government hesitated to send a large one. “Sensible” of his “Expence” and his “inconvenience,” the Pennsylvania Council ordered him to “make a Charge of every thing,” so that he might “be paid” to his “Satisfaction.” The intelligence on which the body based its decision to withhold the large present contradicted what Croghan had reported in his spring 1747 letter to Governor Thomas.28

In late April, Croghan left for Logstown, a populous Mingo village some fifteen miles downriver of the forks of the Ohio in western Pennsylvania. Originally Shawnee, Logstown had been in existence for more than twenty years. Because of the influx of Mingos, Logstown had become the preeminent Indian village of the Ohio Valley and an essential stop for any French or English colonial delegation in the region. Its accessible location on the Ohio River and proximity to the forks made it an essential stop for French specula-

28 For inventory see *MPCP*, 5:197; for “What must be said” see Weiser to Peters, 28 Mar. 1748, *ibid.*, 5:213; for delay in sending present see Logan to Weiser, late Mar. or early- or mid-Apr. 1748, Logan Letter-book, 1748-1750, 2, HSP; for “As G Croghan” and “Sensible” see Logan to Son [William Logan], late Mar. or early- or mid-Apr. 1748, *ibid.*, 3; for message to Croghan see Peters to Croghan, 31 Mar. 1748, *MPCP*, 5:214.
tors in the region as well and inspired Montréal policy-makers to reinforce it with several European-style log cabins to draw influential Indian clientele. As the village grew in size and significance, Montréal policy-makers gifted its residents with goods to strengthen its ties with New France. Even the Onondaga Council acknowledged its significance by assigning Tanaghrisson to permanent residence. In short, Logstown had become the battleground between the French and the English for the loyalties of the Ohio Indians.²⁹

There on 28 April, Croghan met Mingo and Shawnee chiefs. In behalf of the Pennsylvaniana Council he thanked Cuyahoga Mingo chiefs for “the French Sculp sent down last Spring” and for “engaging in the War against the French.” He said that the Pennsylvania Council had prepared “a large Present” for them and “Brethren” who lived “in and about Ohio,” that hunters could use its powder, lead, flints, and knives to “kill Meat” for their families, and that Conrad Weiser would bring up “the rest of the Goods” by 1 August. Croghan distributed the small present (twelve horse-loads of goods) and in token of the large one presented a wampum belt. Because the small present was insufficient for the fifteen hundred or so Mingos and Shawnees on hand, he distributed his goods (powder, lead, flints, knives, brass wire, vermillion, and tobacco) and billed the provincial government, which later recompensed him. On 4 May the chiefs said that they had just “one thing” of which to acquaint him, “that is there [is] a great Nation of Indians come from the French to be your Brothers as well as ours, who say they never tasted English Rum yet, but would be very glad to taste it now as they are come to Live with the English.” That nation was the Miami, or Twightwee, nation of western Ohio.³⁰

²⁹ For Logstown see Brady J. Crytzer, Guyasuta and the Fall of Indian America (Westholme Publishing, LLC: Yardley, Pennsylvania, 2013), 11-12. Logstown was near present-day Ambridge, Pennsylvania.
³⁰ For “French Sculp,” large present, and small present see MPCP, 5:287; for additional goods, bill, and recompense see ibid., 5:294-295; for “one thing” see ibid., 5:289.
In mid-June, Croghan reported to the Pennsylvania Council in Philadelphia. His report summarized the Logstown conference, itemized official and personal expenses, and contained a letter from Mingo and Shawnee chiefs who were accompanying a Miami delegation to Lancaster. He returned to Pennsborough Plantation. In early July he intercepted the Miami delegation between Harris’ Ferry and Lancaster, but because the delegation, fearing contagions, refused to budge, he informed the Council of the predicament, so that the Council ordered Conrad Weiser to Lancaster. Weiser, readying the large present for transport west, recommended a proxy, Andrew Montour, a multilingual go-between of mixed Iroquois and French heritage, and the Council accepted the recommendation, ordering Montour to Lancaster and putting the large present on hold. The latter action of course freed Weiser from his instructions, which in part read “Mr. George Croghan, the Indian Trader, who is well acquainted with the Indian Country and the best Roads to Ohio, has undertaken the Convoy of you & the Goods with his own Men and Horses at the Publick Expence.” The Council ordered Weiser to Lancaster to act as a second interpreter. Croghan, having put his own preparations on hold, went there, too.³¹

From 19 to 23 July 1748 four Pennsylvania Council commissioners met fifty-five Mingos, Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, and Nanticokes before a throng of magistrates and townsfolk in the Lancaster Courthouse. Weiser interpreted for the Mingos and Montour for the Miamis, the Shawnees, and Scarouady, who was ill. As per their instructions, the commissioners confirmed the Miamis as allies, learned the locations and extents of their

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³¹ For Mingo and Shawnee letter see ibid., 5:289; for Miami reluctance see Weiser to Peters, 14 Jul. 1748, PA, 1st ser., 2:9-10; for letters from Weiser and Croghan to Council see MPCP, 5:98-299; for Weiser’s recommendation see ibid., 5:289-290; for “Mr. George Croghan” see “Instructions to Conrad Weiser, Interpreter for the Province of Pennsylvania,” ibid., 5:290-291; see also Weiser to Peters, 10 Jul. 1748, PA, 1st ser., 2:8; for Croghan’s arrival at Lancaster see Thomas Cookson to Peters, 14 Jul. 1748, ibid., 2:9; see also Weiser to Peters, 14 Jul. 1748, ibid., 2:9-10.
villages, restored Chartier-disavowing Shawnees to their place in Pennsylvania’s Chain of Friendship, disapproved Mingo wartime “behaviour,” and announced future peace between Great Britain and France. To signify their sincerity, the Miami delegates gave the commissioners two strings of wampum and thirty beaver pelts and lit and passed around a tobacco-stuffed calumet wrapped in multi-colored wampum, their token of peace. Later Richard Peters wrote, “Croghans and Montours Negotiations have as yet done no harm, [and] perhaps much Good may ensue from them as they certainly were the Instruments of engaging the Twightwees or Miamis in the English Interest; and these who are more numerous than the Six Nations will steady the Councils at Onondago.”

Acknowledging “the Delivery and acceptance of the Calumet Pipe” as “the Ceremonies which render valid & bind fast” Miami alliances, the commissioners related English protocol thus: The English “draw up a Compact in writing, which is faithfully Interpreted to the contracting Parties, and when maturely consider’d and clearly and fully understood by each side, their assent is declar’d in the most publick manner, and the stipulation render’d authentick by Sealing the Instrument with Seals, whereon are engraven their Famille’s Arms, writing their names, and publishing it as their Act & Deed, done without force or constraint freely and voluntarily.” All members of Pennsylvania’s Chain of Friendship had executed “instruments of this Nature.” The Chain of Friendship between the provincial government and Indians in Pennsylvania derived from William Penn’s famous 1701 peace treaty with the Delaware Indians. The “instruments” were as alien to the Miamis in particular as they were to Indians in general. The commissioners signed the treaty on 23 July and the Indian diplomats marked it. Two of the twenty-three intercultural witnesses

32 For commissioners’ instructions see *MPCP*, 5:300; for treaty minutes see *ibid.*, 5:306-319; see also Weiser to Peters, 4 Aug. 1748, *PA*, 1st ser., 2:10-11; for “Croghans and Montours Negotiations” see Peters to [?] Penn, n.d., *Penn Mss.*, Official Correspondence, 5:199, HSP.
who signed or marked the treaty were Richard Peters and George Croghan. The treaty was significant for Peters because it drew the Miamis into the British orbit, for the Miamis because it guaranteed British protection from French retaliation, and for Croghan because the Miamis had brought “a few Skins to begin a Trade.”

The commissioners ordered Weiser to present the Miami delegation goods, whereupon he bought goods from Croghan and billed the provincial government for £60. The commissioners further ordered Weiser to present the other Indian delegations goods “at Mr. Croghan’s,” where “English Goods” were “lodged” for just such a purpose, and to present re-allied Shawnees goods when he went to the Ohio Valley to deliver the large present. In late July the Indian party, accompanied by Croghan and Weiser, went to Pennsylvania Plantation and laid over a day or so before heading west. Meantime Weiser presented the Miami delegates the goods he had bought from Croghan and presented the other Indian delegations the goods he had taken from the general present—“a Stroud match coat, a shirt, a pair of Indian Stocking, a Knife, and a ½ Barrel of powder, and 100 lb. of let [lead], one lb. of vermilion betwixt them all.” The Nanticoke delegation was problematic, for its members “stood and looked very dull, because they got nothing,” wrote Weiser to Peters. “I was quite out of Humour with them, for the disorder they occasioned; yet, upon second thought, I gave them 25 lb. of powder and 50 lb. of let [lead] out of the general present, rather to please the Indians from Ohio . . . than the said Nanticokees, with which they went of[f], glad to have some thing.” The Indian delegations then departed, leaving behind a few Mingos to look after Scarouady, who was too ill to travel.

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33 For treaty minutes and “a few Skins” see MP CP, 5:306-319; see also Weiser to Peters, 4 Aug. 1748, PA, 1st ser., 2:10-11.
34 For Mingo goods see MP CP, 5:314; for bill for Mingo goods see Weiser to Peters, 4 Aug. 1748, PA, 1st ser., 2:11; see also Croghan to Peters, 8 Aug. 1748, ibid., 2:13; for “some English Goods” see MP CP,
In early August, Croghan led a goods-laden pack train westward along the Frankstown Path, which ran from Paxtang (now Paxton) on the Susquehanna River to Frankstown on the Juniata River and to Kittanning on the Allegheny River. Weiser and a party that included William Trent, whose militia enlistment had expired, followed. On 20 August, Weiser and his party caught up with Croghan at Frankstown, where four of Croghan’s men had fallen ill. A few days later Weiser and his party resumed their journey, riding northwest then southwest then crossing Two Lick Creek and picking up a branch path that ran westward to Chartier’s Town (now Tarentum, Pennsylvania) on the Allegheny River. Thence Weiser and his party rode southwest to the forks of the Ohio. Called Kiskiminetas Path, the forks branch began in present-day Indiana, Pennsylvania. Like most Indian paths the Frankstown Path and its forks branch ran on high ground to avoid thickets, marshes, and streams. Here and there the paths ran between trees or boulders, skirted thickets or hollows, or narrowed until they disappeared altogether and only the practiced eye of an Indian or a pioneer could detect them. Inevitably the paths descended to low ground, where they opened to flush meadows or shallow fords with stepping stones. The Kiskiminetas Path crossed the Kiskiminetas River at a shallow ford, for example. When Weiser and his party approached Chartier’s Town, they retired their horses and rented a canoe. They paddled down the Allegheny to the forks of the Ohio and thence down the Ohio to Logstown and disembarked. In all they covered some sixty miles by water. Croghan and his pack train followed when his four ill men felt well enough to travel.35

5:314; for “a Stroud match coat” see Weiser to Peters, 4 Aug. 1748, PA, 1st ser., 2:11; for “stood and looked very dull” see ibid., 2:11; for Scarouady and other Indians see Weiser to Peters, 15 Aug. 1748, ibid., 2:15.

35 For Frankstown Path and Kiskiminetas Path see Wallace, Paul A. W., Indian Paths of Pennsylvania, 49-55, 79; for high ground see Morgan, Boone, 95-96; for Trent see Penn to Peters, 20 Feb. 1748/9, Penn Letter Book, 2:255, HSP; for Weiser’s account of route see MPCP, 5:348-349; see also PA, 1st ser., 2:12-13.
At Logstown in September 1748 Conrad Weiser and Andrew Montour apprised Mingo, Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, and Mahican diplomats that the Miamis had allied with Pennsylvania though the war between France and Great Britain had ended, that Croghan had brought with him a small Virginia present as well as the large Pennsylvania present, which had no war supplies per se for the Cuyahoga Mingos but which did have such useful “hunting” supplies as guns, gunpowder, flints, bar lead, and knives. Soon thereafter Croghan distributed the presents and benefited greatly from his own diligence. In return for desirable goods and in conjunction with Ohio Mingos, the Onondaga Council “granted” him 200,000 acres at the forks of the Ohio on 2 August 1749. The “grant” (or sale) was for the Iroquois a token of their gratitude for his part in removing colonial squatters from Iroquois lands beyond the Blue Mountains and in the Juniata Valley, but it was for him the potential means to acquire unimaginable wealth. The acres were appropriate for development because of their proximity to the forks of the Ohio, and under the right circumstances he could parcel them and sell the parcels to colonists who were as ambitious to improve their lives as he was to improve his life. His intention to develop the acres not only exemplifies how he could promote the public good (future land sales) and his private good (future land sales) simultaneously, but expresses as well what Croghan biographer Albert T. Volwiler calls “the deep impulses of American life to seek homes by pushing westward.” Although the Mingos—or Iroquois refugees—had pushed west when internal conflict had engulfed the Iroquois Confederacy in the first half of the eighteenth century, Volwiler does not include them in his take on “American life.” Had they too not sought homes by pushing westward?36

36 For Logstown conference see *MPCP*, 5:350-358; for lists of Virginia and Pennsylvania goods see Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 29, HSP; for Iroquois-
By 1749 Pennsylvania’s native Delawares had been accommodating European settlers for more than sixty years, yet a vast cultural chasm yawned between them and those settlers. Blending into the forest, living in villages of brush and bark, thatch and logs, skins and hides on poles, Delawares lived according to nature—respecting it, deriving sustenance from it—even if they changed it in small ways and in large. European farming—plowing fields and grazing livestock—was as alien a concept to them as landownership, which in truth made about as much sense to them as owning sunlight. Still, to further intercultural accord, Delawares “sold” Pennsylvania lands to William Penn’s sons, who parceled the lands and sold the parcels to prospective farmers in hopes of deriving income from quit-rents. Plowing changed ecologies, and livestock drove out game, so that Delaware hunters had to hunt farther afield, even on other Indians’ hunting grounds. Conflict with the Indian “landowners” resulted. Nature itself was a point of cultural divergence, for Delawares drew no distinction between beasts and humans, whereas Europeans, by right of biblical injunction, designated the earth’s lesser creatures for exploitation. To Delawares, all living things had spirits integral to nature. When Delaware hunters killed game, they thanked the dead animals’ spirits for providing sustenance and also apologized to them. Animal spirits held religious significance too, for the guardian spirits, or totems, of Delawares ordinarily appeared as animals. To Europeans, the Delawares’ seasonal migrations in pursuit of foodstuffs suggested that the Delawares were more like beasts than humans and therefore needed conquest. Such thinking resonates with historian David Day’s third stage of conquest, the one wherein the conquerors work out ideological justifications of

Mingo land grant see Map of Croghan’s Lands (n.d.), Prevost to Cadwalader and Baldwin (14 Aug. 1809), Deed from Six Nations (Aug. 1749), Memorial of George Croghan (8 Jun. 1764), and Lands Surveyed for George Croghan in 1754 by Order of the Land Office, ibid., Box 204, Folder 16, HSP; for “the deep impulses of” see Volwiler, George Croghan and the Western Movement, 335.
conquest. The salient reality of moral proprietorship is that in colonial Pennsylvania it occurred even before the European settlers finished conquering Pennsylvania.37

Pennsylvania go-betweens like George Croghan, who was Irish, Conrad Weiser, who was German, and Andrew Montour, who was mixed French and Iroquois, could and did bridge the chasm between the Indian and the colonial worlds—but only temporarily. By 1749 the interactive frontier on which they operated—the “crossroads” of historian Jane T. Merritt—resembled the competitive and incompatible “dark woods” of historian James H. Merrell. On this competitive frontier go-betweens downplayed differences and played up areas of common ideology, interest, and experience. They learned and understood one another’s protocols. They shared food. “Ultimately, however, negotiators’ fortunes (and misfortunes) in the woods uncover how no cross-cultural borrowing altogether closed the distance between colonist and Indian,” writes Merrell. “Men sharing the rigors of the paths, wearing the same sorts of clothes, eating from the same pot, puffing on the same pipe, nonetheless did not shake their different ways of thinking about the landscape and about the people who traveled across it.” The Indians saw not just themselves as integral parts of nature but the animals and woods as well, whereas the Europeans envisioned an Indian-free, pest-free, treeless landscape with Western-style farms dotting stretches as far as the eye could see. Not surprisingly, both provincial and Indian go-betweens saw them-

selves as strangers in a strange land where artifice and duplicity were de rigueur. On basic issues, then, they remained worlds apart. Perhaps Merritt’s “crossroads” and Merrill’s “dark woods” were actually flip sides of an ever-changing dual reality, one that mirrored human nature in all its contradictions.38

Croghan, Weiser, Montour, and other go-betweens held together Pennsylvania’s incompatible worlds from Quaker founder William Penn’s famous peace treaty with the native Delawares in 1701 to the “Paxton Boys’” massacre of the peaceable Conestoga Indians in 1763. Between the events Indian go-betweens, often prideful men of high status, insisted that intercultural diplomacy conform to Indian protocol even when their purpose was to dispossess other Indians of their lands. Euro-American go-betweens, often practical men of modest or low status, mastered Indian diplomatic conventions like “burying the hatchet” to check violence or presenting wampum belts to confirm a speech or an article or to close a conference or a treaty. Indian chiefs and provincial officials often turned to go-betweens to defuse volatile situations. An intercultural murder, for example, might give credence to rumors of Indian conspiracy or impending war, so that under specific orders go-betweens from both camps would meet at designated spots to exchange assurances of peace and “bury” the murderer ceremonially by giving the deceased’s grieving relatives remunerative presents. Peace based on compromise never endured, however. This was the perilous yet exciting milieu of Euro-American go-betweens like Croghan and Weiser in the late 1740s, a milieu where opportunities for capitalist enterprise like intercultural trade or land speculation emerged from the volatile situations themselves.39

38 For “Ultimately, however” and competing visions see Merrell, Into the American Woods, 27, 129.
39 For social status of Indian and colonial go-betweens see ibid., 58-59, 61-65, 77-79; for cultural differences regarding murder see ibid., 48-53, 120-121, 167. A go-between was often an interpreter whose job included more than just the literal interpretation of one language into another. An interpreter had to ob-
Straddling the boundaries between the Indian and the Euro-American worlds took a toll on some go-betweens. Andrew Montour, for example, descended from an august line of interpreters and go-betweens, yet found he belonged in neither the Indian world nor the Euro-American. His lineage included the following: his uncle, a métis (or mixed-lineage) fur trader who defected from the French to work for the English in New York and was assassinated by order of the governor of New France; his aunt, a go-between who not only married a Miami but negotiated for French-leaning Miamis, too; and his mother, the famous interpreter Madame Montour, who was born in France, captured by the Iroquois, ransomed to Canada, and returned to Iroquoia. Madame Montour married an Oneida war chief, who was murdered when their son Andrew was very young. When her brother was murdered, Madame Montour assumed his duties and became the most trusted interpreter in New York. When Andrew became an adult, he found he was as comfortable smearing war paint on his face and warring against traditional Iroquois enemies like the Catawbas of North Carolina as he was brokering intercultural deals in Albany or Philadelphia. The Onondaga Council trusted him implicitly, but both the New York and the Pennsylvania government officials for whom he worked never trusted him. For some of them he was too French and for others too Indian, though he carried a French bounty on his scalp and barely escaped a Pennsylvania mob demanding Indian blood at the outset of the French and Indian War. He was not wholly accepted by the Indians among whom he lived and moved, either. For some of them he was too tight with colonial government officials and for others too white despite his blood and marriage ties to Iroquois, Delaware, and other

serve native customs and traditions and achieve in his translation the symbolic and poetic character of the particular Indian speaker’s speech or the speech might be flat or misunderstood by the hearers, Indian or non-Indian. See Yasuhide Kawashima, “Forest Diplomats: The Role of Interpreters in Indian-White Relations on the Early American Frontier,” American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1989): 1.
Indian peoples. In truth he embodied the very incompatible worlds he was trying to hold together. “No wonder he drank a lot,” writes historian Scott Weidensaul.40

No wonder, indeed. Nicholas B. Wainwright, who wrote his biography of George Croghan in the late 1950s just before ethnographical and anthropological monographs began to revise the history of colonial North America in favor of balance, depicts Andrew Montour stereotypically. For him Montour was “a man of consummate impudence, only half-civilized, seemingly ‘unintelligible’ to the discerning [Richard] Peters, frequently and wildly drunk, and generally in debt.” To whom was Montour impudent? To colonists? To Indians? To both? If he was impudent to colonists or to Indians or to both, he had good cause to be so, for he often dreamed of a place where, in Weidensaul’s words, men like him—“the other in-betweens and castoffs, half-bloods and immigrants, refugees and wanderers”—could live in peace, but whenever he tried to realize his dream, both of his worlds, “the European and the Indian, conspired to crush” it. That crushed dream might have been the root cause of his heavy drinking. Was he “only half-civilized”? He was a mixed-lineage illiterate who straddled competing worlds while belonging wholly to neither—a conflicted métis whom Weidensaul rightly calls “a complicated mess.” Drunkenness might have made Montour “‘unintelligible’” to Peters now and then, but to say that Montour was “generally in debt” is to state the usual about those who lived or moved on the borderlands. Daniel Boone and George Croghan were generally in debt, for example. So were some of the Indians who dealt with them. Croghan, moreover, was a frequently drunken, semiliterate in-between himself, as comfortable wearing buckskin or brokering intercultural deals on the frontiers of North American as he was socializing in Philadel-

40 For Andrew Montour and “No wonder” see Scott Weidensaul, The First Frontier: The Forgotten History of Struggle, Savagery, and Endurance in Early America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 261-263.
phia taverns, but Wainwright does not call him “only half-civilized.” It is just as likely that Croghan drank frequently to forget the hardship of realizing his dream of fabulous wealth as it is that he did so because he enjoyed socializing or because the drinking water was unsafe. He and Montour might have been worlds apart on basic issues, but in truth they were not so different from each other, too. A human being is, after all, human, and to be human means to dream.\footnote{For “a man of consummate impudence” see Wainwright, \textit{George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat}, 49; for “the other in-betweens” and for “a complicated mess” see Weidensaul, \textit{The First Frontier}, 263.}
Chapter 3: Trading Partner

The name Ohio, Iroquoian in origin, means “river-fine, -good, or -beautiful.” The name appeared first in colonial French sources, wherein government officials regularly translated it as La Belle Rivière and sometimes attributed it to the Iroquois. Colonial French usage applied the name to the Allegheny River as well. Now, however, the name denotes only the Ohio River itself or the state named after it. The river, which forms at present-day Pittsburgh in southwestern Pennsylvania, is the largest tributary of the Mississippi River, which flows south into the Gulf of Mexico. In the first half of the eighteenth century the Ohio River and its major tributaries, the Muskingum, the Scioto, and the Great Miami Rivers, abounded in fur-bearing animals and thus became convenient if arduous conduits for pelts that Canadian and Pennsylvania traders acquired from the local Indians. To the north and west of the Ohio River flow several non-tributary rivers. The most important of these for Canadian and Pennsylvania traders were the Cuyahoga, the Sandusky, and the Maumee, all of which empty into Lake Erie, whose lush southern shores teemed with fur-bearing animals in the first half of the eighteenth century. Today, Lake Erie borders the state of Ohio, within which are natural lakes aplenty, small-, medium-, and large-sized. Because of its riparian animal life the region known as Ohio in the first half of the eighteenth century was, in short, nearly ideal for the fur trade.¹

Canadians and Pennsylvanians were not the only colonials to envisage Ohio as a hotbed of trade, however. Virginia elites led by Thomas Lee, a former burgess who had assumed leadership of the Virginia Council, were rumored to be close to building trading posts on the Allegheny River in what is now western Pennsylvania. Such trading posts, Provincial

Secretary Richard Peters wrote Proprietor Thomas Penn on 28 July 1748, would “rob this Province of great advantages.” To legitimate their budding venture, the Lee-led Virginia elites had petitioned the Crown for permission “to build Forts on yᵉ Frontiers of Virginia on some of yᵉ Waters of Ohio,” as though “all yᵉ Country might be” theirs for the taking “up to the Mississippi.” Peters advised Penn to verify the rumor and to enlist a merchant who could extend credit of £1,000 sterling or more to William Trent in return for “a certain Share of yᵉ Profits.” Trent could use the credit to buy trade goods that he and George Croghan could present the Ohio Indians and thereby thoroughly “disappoint” the Virginia elites’ “prejudice,” for the two of them could “do more wᵗʰ yᵉ Indians [than] all the other Traders put together.” There was another compelling rumor, too: Lord Thomas Fairfax and his Virginia crowd, “hurrying into yᵉ trade wᵗʰ all the Expedition possible,” had sent Hugh Parker, who once was an apprentice to Edward Shippen, “to Ohio wᵗʰ a large Quantity of English Goods.” Penn vowed to verify at least the Lee-related rumor, but dismissed Peters’ “Indian trade Scheme” out of hand.²

An Oxford-educated cleric, Peters had emigrated from London to Philadelphia in fall 1734 after becoming too controversial to remain in the pulpit, given his unusual marital history, which featured the disappearance and presumed death of his coarse first wife, a second marriage to a genteel woman whom he had impregnated, and the reappearance of his first wife, who tried to profit from his discomfiture. Failing to defend himself against consequent accusations of bigamy and unable to inherit his father’s estate, which by law passed to his older brother, Peters had voyaged across the Atlantic to begin his life anew.

As assistant minister at Christ Church he had preached regularly until old rumors of bigamy and new ones of abandonment had forced him from the pulpit in October 1737. He had not been helpless, however. Exploiting the influence of Quaker statesman James Logan and Proprietor Thomas Penn, both of whom had seen promise in him, he had secured employment as land office secretary and then as provincial secretary, in which capacities he had accessed the inner circles of political power and informed Penn about provincial politics. Now he exploited the organs of provincial government to expedite “ye Settlem’ of Lands over Sasquehanna” and thereby advance sales of proprietary lands as well as his own. Today such an action would be called a conflict of interest.3

To emulate Logan, who had made a fortune in the fur trade, Peters seized an opportunity to enter the trade himself. In mid-November 1748 William Trent asked him to write a letter of introduction to Thomas Penn. Out of “a Sense of the Spirit he shew’d when the Canada Expedition was set on foot,” Peters wrote the letter for him. Querying him afterward, Peters learned that Trent was close to “agreeing with some top Merchants here on a Scheme for carrying on a Large Indian Trade in conjunction with M’. Croghan & them.” Trent would sail to London and use investments to induce wholesalers to sell directly to him and Croghan, thereby cutting out Philadelphia sellers, who charged more for English manufactures. A savvy businessman, Penn could help Trent negotiate London’s business district. Since Trent had not had a contract drawn up, Peters persuaded him to wait until he “had time to say something” to him “on this Subject.” Peters dashed to a High Street dry goods store and spoke excitedly with its storekeeper, Penn protégé Richard Hockley, about investing in the venture. Hockley predicted that Penn would “advance a Sum of

Money for him provided he cou’d be brought into the Indian Trade on an honourable & profitable Scheme.” Peters dashed back to Trent and proposed a partnership involving Hockley and Croghan as well as himself.⁴

The proposal called for Peters and Hockley to lend Trent £1,000 sterling to voyage to London to buy trade goods. Trent would ship the goods to Philadelphia for consignment to Hockley, and within five years Trent and Croghan would extinguish the debt and then all four partners would “put in a like Sum not Less than two thousand Pounds Sterl⁸.”

Trent convinced Peters to increase the loan to £2,000 sterling, half to be used for buying spring goods and half for buying fall goods, and then Trent went west to fetch Croghan. Peters meantime failed to procure the sum. “I did not expect that considering Mr. Croghan was exceedingly well found in Servants & Horses & proper material of all sorts & actually carried on a Trade for above one thousand Pounds a year this Money that he wou’d accept the proposals,” Peters wrote Thomas Penn, “but he [Trent] prevail’d upon him [Croghan] to come down & he [Croghan] gladly came into the thing, & satisfied me that he cou’d tho’ he owed three thousand Pounds to the City Merchants to pay all that off in Six Months & enter a free independent & unindebted man into the Partnership.” In fact, by the late 1740s, Croghan employed more than one indentured servant and owned more than one slave.⁵

Peters had good reasons to partner with Hockley, Trent, and Croghan. Nearly bankrupt, Hockley wanted a fresh start. An “honest able man,” Trent understood “the Indian Trade

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⁵ For “put in a like Sum” and “I did not expect” see Peters to Penn, 24 Nov. 1748, Peters Papers, Letter Books, 1737-1741, 1743-1745, 1747-1750, 335-336, HSP.
exceeding well” and “ye Indians[, his] having been partner with George Croghan,” who was “one of the most reputable & sensible Traders.” Peters might have seen something of himself in Croghan. After all, Peters had worked in the provincial land office, which had recorded all land sales in Pennsborough Township since its inception. The records showed that Croghan was as opportunistic as he. In December 1745 Croghan and Trent, for example, had mortgaged their 350-acre tract to Philadelphia hatter Abraham Mitchell for £200 Pennsylvania money that they had then used to buy trade goods. In July 1747 Croghan had satisfied the mortgage, which had become his when he had purchased the title to Trent’s 171 acres a year earlier. On 3 December 1747 Croghan had mortgaged the 350-acre tract and a contiguous 171-acre tract (for which he had obtained a patent in July 1746) to Philadelphia felt-maker and merchant Jeremiah Warder for £1,000 Pennsylvania money, and a payment amounting to half of the mortgage had been due on 1 September 1748. Croghan had used the cash to buy trade goods from Warder.6

On 24 November 1748 Hockley, Trent, and Croghan signed partnership articles drafted but unsigned by Peters, who doubted Hockley could wheedle £2,000 sterling from Thomas Penn. The articles established an entity to operate in Pennsylvania and “adjacent and other proper Countries and places” where the Indian trade could “be most advantageously carried on for the term of Ten Years.” Hockley was to advance Trent £1,000 sterling that Trent, under the guidance of London merchant Thomas Hyam, or persons recommended by Thomas Penn, was to use to buy and to ship goods to Philadelphia for consignment to

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6 For “honest able man” see Peters to Penn, 28 Jul. 1748, Peters Papers, Letter Books, 1737-1741, 1743-1745, 1747-1750, 323, HSP; for “one of the most reputable” see Croghan see Peters to Penn, 24 Nov. 1748, ibid., 335, HSP; for Croghan’s mortgage to Mitchell see Indenture, Trent & Croghan to Mitchell, 24 Dec. 1745, Deed Book B, 1:299-300, Archives Division, Records and Archives Services, LCC; for Croghan’s mortgage to Warder and Croghan’s payments to Warder see Indenture, 3 Dec. 1747, Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Part 2, 86, HSP; see also Indenture, Croghan to Warder, 3 Dec. 1747, Deed Book B, 1:476-478, Archives Division, Records and Archives Services, LCC.
Hockley. Each partner was to advance £368 Pennsylvania money “to be laid out and applied by the said George Croghan for purchasing a proper Assortment of Goods and also a sufficient number of Horses for beginning and carrying on the said intended joint Trade with the Indians the ensuing Spring.” Each partner was to “be faithful just & true to the other in all and every his Bargains Sales Payments Receipts Accompts Dealings Transactions and things concerned the said joint Trade and Copartnership,” and to “give or make each to the other a true Accompt from time to time and at all time upon request.” For the first five years profits were to be reinvested and for the last five profits and debts were to be apportioned equally. For all ten years Trent and Croghan were to trade with Indians and “keep fair & regular Books of Accompts for & concerning all the said Joint Trade and every thing relating thereto,” while Hockley was to “assist in all Business relating to the s[d]. joint Trade which is to be transacted and done at the City of Philadelphia.”

Trent embarked for London a week later. Shortly after his arrival he met Thomas Penn and pleaded for Hockley and Peters. “Trade ought to be left to Traders,” Penn later wrote Peters, who hoped to join the partnership. “Governm[t]. & offices to Governors & officers, & if Trade in general, much more this Trade, w[ich] is not carryed on Between Subject & Subject, and where differences may arise that require Government totally disinterested to Settle, which cannot be the Case where the Governor or Secretary are engaged in interest on one side, if we suppose frail human creatures are in those Stations.” Penn insisted that Peters increase their fortunes “by a Frugal Oconomy, rather than by engaging in any Project so different” from their “other callings.” Besides, Penn did not have £2,000 sterling to spare, for he was using his “Separate fortune” to resolve family matters. Did Peters

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7 For quotations see Indenture, Hockley, Trent, & Croghan, 1748, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 15, HSP; for partnership see Observations on Partnership with Trent & Croghan, n.d., Richard Hockley, ca. 1749-1753, ibid., Box 202, Folder 14, HSP.
even grasp “the State of such a Trade”? To a “Man of business,” Penn cautioned him, “there is manifest inconsistency in the Account of it, where you say Croghan deals for a thousand pounds a Year, and owes £300, if so the Trade I think must be a bad one.”

Meanwhile Croghan had mortgaged a tract to Philadelphia widow Mary Plumstead for £600 Pennsylvania money and then sold her another tract for £300. The net result of the deals was of course debt—£300 more, to be exact—for Croghan.8

Although he doubted the partnership, Penn backed Hockley, who was not a public official. “What you want,” Penn advised him, “is a Trade by which you may support your Self.” The partnership articles specified that Hockley would not earn a dividend for five years. How would Hockley support himself or his family during the five years? Equally troubling to Penn was his protégé’s rashness: “I think the entering into a contract for . . . a number of years, without taking any time for settling accounts, a very wild Scheme, and you should have known the people well before you entered into it.” Although Penn knew that preexisting debts boded ill for the venture, he nevertheless advanced Hockley £500. Since the sum was not enough to cover his initial investment, Hockley used his home as collateral to secure a £500 loan to pay the balance.9

Penn turned out to be prescient. To the detriment of Hockley, Croghan and Trent stopped promoting the partnership once they realized that Peters would not join it, but to keep

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8 For quotations see Penn to Peters, 20 Feb. 1748/9, Penn Letter Book, 2:257-258, HSP; for similar opinions see Penn to Hockley, 19 Feb. 1748/9, Penn Mss., Correspondence of the Penn Family, 18:58, HSP; for Plumstead loan and Croghan’s payments see unnamed document, 3 Dec. 1748, Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Part 2, 113, HSP; for Croghan’s land sale to Plumstead see Indenture, 3 Dec. 1748, ibid., Vol. 2, Part 2, 114, HSP; see also Indenture, Croghan to Plumstead, Deed Book B, 1:476-478, Archives Division, Records and Archives Services, LCC; for Croghan’s mortgage to Peters see Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Part 2, 120, HSP; see also Indenture, George Croghan to Richard Peters, Deed Book B, 1:572-573, Archives Division, Records and Archives Services, LCC.

9 For quotations see Penn to Hockley, 19 Feb. 1748/9, Penn Mss., Correspondence of the Penn Family, 18:58, HSP; for Hockley’s mortgage see Hockley to Penn, 15 Feb. 1749/50, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 4:185, HSP; see also Hockley to Penn, 2 Jul. 1749, ibid., 4:215, HSP.
up appearances, Croghan promised Hockley the delivery of skins worth £1,000 in the fall. Learning that the Thomas Lee-led Virginia elites were negotiating with the British Ministry for a 500,000-acre grant in Ohio, Croghan solicited the Onondaga Council for an Ohio tract for himself. The Onondaga Council allowed him to claim a tract at a location of his choice in return for a promise of a large present. On 29 June 1749 he mortgaged his contiguous Pennsborough tracts and two other tracts to Peters for £2,000. The timing of the mortgages was not coincidental. Biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright surmises, probably correctly, that Croghan mortgaged the properties to raise cash for the large present. That Peters in fact paid off Croghan’s mortgage to Mary Plumstead in June 1752 proves that there existed between him and Croghan a business connection of some kind. 10

Like Peters, Governor James Hamilton found Ohio problematic. On 30 June 1749 he learned that the Canadian governor had ordered a 1,000-man force under Céloron de Blainville to Lake Erie to scare off Pennsylvania traders and to reconcile local Mingos to trading with Canadians only. Hamilton responded to the threat by ordering Croghan to the Allegheny River to engage a trustworthy person to scout Lake Erie for proof of Canadian aggression. On 3 July, Croghan messaged Lake Erie resident Andrew Montour to scout the area and rendezvous with him at Logstown, but as Montour was scouting Lake Erie, this common frontier incident forced Croghan to delay his departure for Logstown: Four Iroquois warriors returning to Onondaga halted at a “Still-house” (either a distillery or a tavern) a mile south of Pennsborough Plantation and proceeded to drink themselves

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10 For non-promotion of partnership see Hockley to Penn, 15 Feb. 1749/50, 4:185, HSP; for Croghan’s promise to Hockley see Hockley to Penn, 2 Jul. 1749, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 4:215, HSP; for Wainwright’s surmise see George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 26; for Croghan’s mortgage to Peters see Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Part 2, 120, HSP; see also Indenture, George Croghan to Richard Peters, Deed Book B, 1:572-573, Archives Division, Records and Archives Services, LCC; for Croghan’s land sale to Plumstead see Indenture, 3 Dec. 1748, Peters Papers, Vol. 2, Part 2, 114, HSP; see also Indenture, Croghan to Plumstead, Deed Book B, 1:476-478, Archives Division, Records and Archives Services, LCC.
into stupors; overnight one of them was fatally stabbed. “I Cannot yett find out whether he was kill’d by one of them Selves or a white man,” Croghan wrote Peters, “But I Shall Secure all ye white Men that was att ye plese till I find outt the Truth of ye affair, & then I will Lett you know More fully ye Truth of ye Matter, Butt I think all Stillers & tavern keepers Should be fined for Making ye Indians Drunk, & Espesely warriers.” In conducting the impartial inquiry and writing the follow-up letter, Croghan scrupulously fulfilled his duty as a newly appointed justice of the peace for Lancaster County, even if the incident illustrated that Pennsylvania’s well-intended Proclamation of 1748 had not ended liquor sales to the Indians. His duty also required him to pay £3 to any bounty hunter who delivered a runaway slave named Scipio, who had been passing himself off as a free man. Croghan was to remand Scipio to his Maryland master.11

On 8 August 1749 Croghan entered Logstown, where Mingo and Shawnee chiefs told him that Céloron de Blainville had recently conveyed a wampum belt from the governor of Canada. The belt had communicated the governor’s request that the chiefs prohibit their people from trading with Pennsylvanians, but the chiefs had denied the request, so that Céloron had led his men west to a Miami village (likely Pickawillany on the upper Great Miami River), in hopes of persuading its inhabitants to return to their former location in western Ohio. Céloron had made his case for relocation, but the village chief had refused to cooperate with him and stated that he and his people would continue to trade with their “brethren,” the Pennsylvanians. What the Mingo and Shawnee chiefs at Logstown, and probably the chief at the Miami village, had found particularly galling was that

11 For Canadian force see MPCP, 5:387; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 31 Aug. 1749; for Croghan’s instructions see Croghan to [Peters], 3 Jul. 1749, PA, 1st ser., 2:31; for incident see Croghan to [Peters], 24 Jul. 1749, ibid., 2:32; for Croghan’s appointment as justice of the peace see MPCP, 5:378; for Proclamation of 1748 see ibid., 5:194-198; for Scipio see Pennsylvania Gazette, 13, 27 Jul. 1749.
Céloron had ordered his men to bury or post lead plates along the Ohio River. Since the lead plates stated French claims to the river, the chiefs suspected Céloron and his men of trying to steal their lands. By 25 August, Croghan had made a report to Governor Hamilton in Philadelphia. Six days later a summary of the report appeared in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, the newspaper of record for provincial Indian affairs. Clearly, by this juncture in his life on the frontiers of North America, Croghan had become more than a go-between or a trader or a pioneer: He had become news. Henceforth his deeds would be grist for the newspapers of Pennsylvania and the other twelve British colonies.  

While he was gathering intelligence at Logstown, Croghan pursued his own interests, but as was his wont he couched them in terms of public service. In acknowledgement of his “constant attention” to peace and in testament of their desire for continued peace, Iroquois chiefs, “of their own free will and without any Application” on his part, granted him the right to a “Considerable Quantity of Land” at a “Publick Council at Onondogo.” To improve his chances of plying the Indian trade for a long time, he claimed a 200,000-acre tract at the forks of the Ohio River. On 2 August three Iroquois emissaries, in return for a large present, confirmed his title to the 200,000 acres. Fifteen years later, Croghan would cite that confirmation in his “Memorial to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations.” Since the “Deputies of the Publick Council at a Meeting of the Western Indians” held “for that purpose at Logstown” had urged him “earnestly and affectionately” to “give them further proof of his regard for them by accepting the favor they intended for him,” he had accepted the favor, but he had done so primarily to preserve “the British

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Interest among those Indians.” He had “made them several presents out of his own pri-

tive fortune in token of his Gratitude and the sense he had [had] of their regard.” There

was truth in his statements—the “grant,” its subsequent confirmation, and his gifting of
trade goods drawn from his own private stock did occur, for example—but there was al-
so falsehood, for he did solicit the Onondaga Council for a tract in Ohio. In any case the
Onondaga Council reconfirmed his title on 4 November 1768, and it did so in testament
to the esteem that the Iroquois in general had long felt for him. That was another truth.13

In its first eight months Hockley, Trent, & Croghan operated in the red, forcing Hockley
to buy trade goods from London merchants on credit, yet unbeknownst to him, Trent had
gone west to join Croghan in forming a rival partnership with Pennsylvania Indian traders
Robert Callender and Michael Teaffe. Throughout the summer both Trent and Croghan
suffered from an enervating malady (perhaps malaria) that forced them to work sporadi-
cally, but when they did work, they promoted their partnership with Callender and Teaffe
rather than their one with Hockley. Although Hockley consequently had little of import
to do during the summer, there were two reasons for him to be optimistic about his part-
nership with Trent and Croghan. The first reason was each partner’s well-defined role.
In the field Croghan would lead crews of unlicensed and unregistered traders. The crews
would acquire pelts and under Croghan’s direction ship them to Pennsborough Plantation,
where employees under Trent’s direction would process the pelts and ship them to Hock-
ley in Philadelphia. Hockley would keep records and direct employees who shipped the
processed pelts to London merchants, who in turn would ship trade goods to him in Phila-

13 For quotations see “Memorial of George Croghan,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4,
George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 16, HSP; for confirmation and reconfirmation of Iroquois land
grant to Croghan see “The Lessee of Aug[ustine]. Prevost,” n.p., n.d., ibid., Box 204, Folder 16, HSP.
delphia, where he would store them in a rented warehouse and freight them to Trent, who would freight them to Croghan or his men wherever he or his men were in the field. The second reason for Hockley to be optimistic about his partnership with Trent and Croghan was that the Indian trade in general was flourishing. “If the Trade was to remain in its present State unmolested by the French,” Richard Peters wrote Thomas Penn, “the Traders wou’d in a very few Years be rich men, and indeed supposing the worst, as Mf. Croghan is to be in the Indian Country, they cannot fail of making very considerable gain.”

A typical bookkeeping entry during the era read thus: “Invoice of Sundry merchandize bought by order of Thomas Penn Esq’ and ship’d aboard the Myrtilla Capt. Rich Burden. Bound for Philadelphia on account & risk of Richard Hockley Merchant there . . . .” The goods, which cost £546.12.7, included linen, beads, nails, looking glasses, brass thimbles, knives, rings, gun flints, kettles, brass weights, guns, vermilion, strouds, and imperial paper. No record of remittance exists, but because records of shipments to Thomas Hyam & Sons, Inc., do exist, it might have been that in lieu of cash Hockley shipped skins and furs. Other documents indicate that in the rented warehouse Hockley stored trade goods that he bought from the Philadelphia mercantile firm of Shippen & Lawrence on 11 November 1749 for £87.6.0. He paid the bill in cash and on time. There is no way to know with certainty whether proximity was the determining factor in his making the payment on time, but it is probable that had he not paid the bill in a timely manner either Edward Shippen or Thomas Lawrence would have demanded the payment in person.

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14 For credit see Trent to Elias Bland, 8 Oct. 1749, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 15, HSP; for rival partnership and malaria see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 29; for disease see William Trent to [?], 10 Jan. 1749/50, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 15, HSP; for “If the Trade” see Peters to Proprietors, 5 Jul. 1749, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 4:219, HSP.
15 For invoices, invoice quotation, remittance, warehouse rent and payment see Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 15, HSP; for skins shipped to Thomas Hyam
In the fall Thomas Lee, the acting governor of Virginia, found that he could not further the interests of his cronies’ newly formed Ohio Company, which was making inroads into the Ohio Valley. In its behalf he complained to Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton about “the insidious behaviour” of Pennsylvania’s Indian traders, who tended “to disturb the Peace” of Virginia by alienating “the affections of the Indians.” The king had granted the company “a large quantity of Land West of the [Allegheny] Mountains” on condition that it erect and garrison a fort to protect the trade of Virginia, and that of its neighboring colonies, from the French, “& by a fair open Trade to engage the Indians in affection to His Majesty’s Subjects, to supply them with what they want, so that they will be under no necessity to apply to the French & to make a very strong Settlement on the Frontiers of this Colony.” The king, moreover, had directed Virginia’s previous governor “to assist” the company “in carrying these Laudable Designs into Execution,” but Pennsylvania’s Indian traders had thwarted fort construction by convincing the Mingos that the fort would “be a bridle to them” and that its roads would be used not only by their ancient enemies, the Catawbas, “to destroy them,” but by Virginia settlers to displace them. A “naturally Jealous” lot, the Mingos were “so possess’d with the truth of these insinuations” that they intimidated company agents who tried to survey lands or to build roads on them, though the Iroquois had ceded those very lands to Virginia during the 1744 Lancaster Treaty.16

Every “insinuation” save the one about Catawba attack was true, but the truth did not faze Lee, who pressed Hamilton “to take the necessary means” to end the “mischievous practices” of Pennsylvania’s Indian traders. Hamilton balked at curtailing the lucrative

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16 For quotations see Lee to Hamilton, 22 Nov. 1749, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 4:257, HSP.
Indian trade, however. As for the Iroquois negotiators who had attended the 1744 Lancaster Treaty and signed the deed of cession, they believed that they had recognized the right of “‘the King of Great Britain to all the lands within the said colony [Virginia] as it is now or hereafter may be peopled and bounded by his said Majesty . . . his heirs and successors.’” That is to say, they believed they had disclaimed only Virginia. For them Ohio was imperial territory, a massive, aggrandized hunting preserve whose disposition lay within the Onondaga Council’s purview. “Nobody told the Iroquois that Virginia’s charter gave boundaries extending from sea to sea which could be argued to contain half of North America,” writes historian Francis Jennings, “and this bit of enlightenment was postponed by the outbreak of ‘King George’s War’ between Britain and France.”

In the winter of 1749-50 Croghan lived at Pickawillany, or “Pick’s Town,” on the upper Great Miami River. Recently its pro-British chief, Memeskia, known to the French as La Demoiselle and to the British as Old Briton, the nickname given him by Croghan and his Indian trade cronies, had refused to turn out Pennsylvania’s Indian traders despite repeated threats of reprisal from Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit. Seeing opportunity for self-aggrandizement, Croghan presented Old Briton a plan for a fort, a plan that Old Briton accepted. Croghan and his charges built the fort with the help of rival Pennsylvania traders, who needed little urging upon hearing that Canadian raiders had captured a pack train on the Scioto River and carried it off to Détroit. The captives were employees of Trent, Croghan, Callender, & Teaffe, and the captured goods, property. If Croghan and his partners could lose employees and property to the enemy, the rival Pennsylvania traders reasoned, anyone could. Using the fort as his base of operations, Croghan pushed the limits of his

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17 For Lee accusations see Peters to Proprietors, 10 Jul. 1750, ibid., 5:33-35, HSP; for “to take the necessary means” see Lee to Hamilton, 22 Nov. 1749, ibid., HSP; for deed, “the King of Great Britain,” and “Nobody told the Iroquois” see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 10.
private trade so far west that his alarmed yet admiring Canadian competitors dubbed him “sieur George Croqueu Négociant,” “grand-interprète Anglois pour les Sauvages,” and “interprète général.” Alarmed by Croghan’s latest English incursion into the French fur trade, the commander of Détroit offered a bounty for Croghan’s scalp, while the alarmed commander of an outpost on the Maumee River sent authorities exaggerated reports of Croghan’s activities, and an alarmed officer stationed at a far-flung outpost in Illinois reported that “the English man” had instigated Old Briton to conspire against Canada.\(^{18}\)

In the winter of 1749-50 Trent and Croghan bamboozled Hockley. Trent met Hockley in Philadelphia in January 1750 to arrange for a shipment of skins to London, but Hockley confronted him about accounts. Instead of presenting accounts as per the partnership articles, Trent equivocated, promising to ship Hockley bundles of skins in the spring and summer to cover his debts, yet warning him to be patient because impassable winter and spring roads would delay the pack trains. In truth Hockley was a colossal dupe who believed in his partners despite their sharp ways. To his mentor, Proprietor Thomas Penn, he wrote, “We don’t only sell to y° Indian Traders and pick & choose y° best of them but are really Indian traders ourselves which is a great advantage as M°. Croghan has an Eye over all he trusts, and [is] so well esteemed by the Indians generally that if he has assortable Cargo not one Trader in the Woods at y° Indian Towns can sell anything till he has done.” Unable to live off Croghan’s reputation or Trent’s promise, Hockley felt trapped, indebted to his creditors for £1,000 sterling and £368 Pennsylvania money, their demands

\(^{18}\) For Memeskia see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 30-31; for captured men and goods see “An Account of the Goods taken by the Frenchmen and Indians and Debts which was due by the Indians at the Times the French drove the English off the Ohio River and the Waters thereof Belonging to William Trent, George Croghan, Robert Callander and Michael Teaff in Company,” 1 Nov. 1749, Etting Coll., No. 40, Ohio Company, Vol. 1, Folder 7, HSP; for nicknames see Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Western Movement*, 78; for scalp bounty see “Examinations of Morris Turner and Ralph Kilgore,” n.d., *MPCP*, 5:483; for French officer see *IHC*, 29:105-216; for conspiracy see *WHC*, 18:58.
clamping him like the jaws of a sprung iron trap, but unlike a trapped animal, he could not gnaw off a limb to escape, and neither could his partners. By 11 March, the scheming Croghan owed Lancaster merchant Levy Andrew Levy £3,400. Indebted to Levy and to others, Croghan might have felt as if he were caught between the jaws of an iron trap. If only he could negotiate the traps of the colonial business world as dexterously as he did those of the frontiers of North America, he might have mused.19

In early May 1750 Croghan returned home “with the greatest Quantity of Skinns ever heard of;” yet Trent made only token shipments to Hockley. Trent went to Philadelphia to order trade goods, but when he tried to persuade Hockley to place a £500 order with a London merchant, Hockley protested that he had not received enough skins to cover his initial outlay. Trent assured him of more skins to come. When Hockley borrowed money to place the order, Trent headed west. Trent delivered bundles of skins to Hockley in Philadelphia in early July, but Trent was himself in financial straits, so that he entreated Hockley to do what was expedient to keep the partnership afloat—to ship the bundles of skins overseas rather than to sell them to pay off his debts. The chief recipients of the shipments were London merchants Thomas Hyam, John Samuels, and Elias Bland. The size of the shipments was impressive by eighteenth-century standards. On 9 July, for example, Hyam & Sons received 1,371 fall skins worth £522.12.2, and on 12 September, Bland received 2,360 fall skins worth £454.7.3. Did the merchants buy the skins? Were the skins barter for goods? There is no way to know, for the records of Hockley, Trent, & Croghan are incomplete. To appease creditors and confirm an inchoate suspicion that his partners were duping him, Hockley followed the bundles to London in the fall, leav-

19 For “We don’t only sell” see Hockley to Penn, 15 Feb. 1749/50, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 4:185, HSP; for Croghan’s debt see Peters to Trent, 11 Mar. 1750, Richard Peters, 1751-1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 11, HSP.
ing his affairs to Richard Peters. While Hockley investigated his affairs in London, Trent and Croghan, as newly appointed justices of the peace for Cumberland County, assisted Peters in evicting squatters from Iroquois lands on the Susquehanna River in May and June, thereby strengthening the provincial government’s ties with the Onondaga Council, which continued to exercise suzerainty over all Pennsylvania Indians.  

By late October, Trent had asked Peters to write Hockley to send fewer goods. Should not you write the letter? Peters replied. Hockley simply could not sustain the partnership without the promised skins. “Especially when another thing . . . repeatedly promisd, and made an express Article in the Instrument of Partnership has not been done: I mean that you and M’ Croghan shoud put an End to your private trading and in lieu thereof that the Capital should be augmented.” Peters was “a Witness for M’ Hockley that M’ Croghan declared over and over . . . that he woud owe not a Groat of his old Debts by Christmas Day, not take up any more Goods on his private Account, not trade separately any more, and engaged for you that you shoud do the same.” Croghan instead engaged Trent in “a larger Trade than ever,” incurring debts of £3,000, £4,000, or even £5,000, while Trent incurred debt by buying an “abundance of Goods” on his “private Account.” Peters, being a friend, could be blunt: “Now Sir let me ask You was you in M’ Hockley’s Place or in the Place of any of his Friends, is it possible if this be so, not to believe that M’ Hockley is likely to come off loser, nay must do it[?]” Peters was blunt indeed—to the point of recrimination. “Are not all the Horses used promiscuously? [A]re not many things

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20 For “with the greatest Quantity” see Peters to Proprietors, 5 May 1750, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:5, HSP; for invoices and correspondence see Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 16, HSP; for Indian complaints and magisterial appointments see MPCL, 5:394-395, 400-401, 431-439; for magisterial appointments see Penn to Hamilton, 27 Aug., 1750, Penn Letter Book, 3:20-21, HSP; see also Peters to Penn, 12 Jul. 1750, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:29, 31, HSP.
which at an Estimate of your own be paid his Part for used in common? [A]nd will not all mankind say that the bad Debts will be thrown upon the Partnership Account[?] Nay is it possible to make up Accounts? [A]nd if not who must suffer? [W]here lies the Risque, on You or Mf Croghan? No. On Mf Hockley entirely[.]” Trent could prove that he valued his friendship with Peters by presenting the accounts for which Hockley had asked.21

In early November, Croghan and Andrew Montour undertook a diplomatic mission for Governor James Hamilton. As per their instructions Croghan was to deliver a £100 present to the Miamis and Montour to invite them and other Ohio Indians to a spring conference at Logstown, which was the first stop of their mission. On 25 November, Christopher Gist, a Maryland frontiersman, entered Logstown and “found scarce any Body but a Parcel of reprobate Indian Traders, the Chiefs of the Indians being out hunting.” The few Indians in the village queried him about his business, but he equivocated, and his equivocations caused them “to suspect” him. They confronted him with their suspicion that he had “come to settle.” They threatened him. Knowing that “this Discourse was like to be of ill Consequence,” Gist, feigning nonchalance, asked about Montour and Croghan, the latter “a meer Idol among his Counrymen the Irish Traders,” and the Indians replied that Montour and Croghan had left the village a week earlier. Gist said that as carrier of the king’s message he needed to consult Montour, and “this made them all pretty easy (being afraid to interrupt the King’s Message).” He messaged Croghan that he would catch up.22

21 For quotations see Peters to Trent, 13 Nov. 1750, Richard Peters, 1751-1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 11, HSP.
22 For Croghan and Montour’s diplomatic mission see Pennsylvania Gazette, 1 Nov. 1750; for Hamilton’s instructions to Croghan and Montour and for Assembly’s £100 appropriation see Votes and Proceedings of
On 14 December, Gist espied two British flags over Muskingum, a Wyandot village of some one hundred families. Entering the village, he saw a flag flapping above the chief’s “house” and a flag flapping above Croghan’s trading post. He asked about their purpose and was told that they alerted Indians and traders alike to danger (“the French had lately taken several English Traders”). He was told as well that the chief and Croghan had dispatched messengers to invite Indians and traders to a council. On 17 December two employees entered the village and told Croghan of the capture of two other employees, their horses, and their skins. Next day Gist acquainted Croghan and Montour not with his private mission to locate level lands for Ohio Company settlement, but only with his public mission to invite Ohio Indians to Fredericksburg, Virginia, to receive a present from the king. On 4 January 1751 Michael Teaffe returned from Lake Erie’s southern shores with news that pro-British Wyandots had warned him to “keep clear of” Ottawas because they were allied with the French, and news that neutral Wyandots were leaning toward allying with the British. On 9 January two English traders brought from Pickawillany this news: The French had captured an English trader; three French deserters had surrendered to English traders who had dissuaded Miamis from carrying out revenge executions; and three English traders would escort the deserters to Muskingum for deliverance to Croghan. On 14 January, Croghan and Montour apprised Muskingum’s chief of the king’s invitation to Fredericksburg for a present, but the chief said that he would refer the matter to a council. Next day Croghan, Montour, Gist, Robert Callender, and others exited Muskingum.

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23 For details and quotations see Darlington, ed., Christopher Gist’s Journals, 37, 40-41.
On 28 January the party entered a small Delaware village. Montour invited the chief to the Logstown conference, which the chief promised to attend. Next day the party left the village and soon arrived at the mouth of the Scioto River opposite Lower Shawnee Town, which was a Shawnee village of some one hundred and forty “houses.” The party fired their guns in the air to announce their arrival, and the English traders who were at Lower Shawnee Town replied with their own gunfire, then ferried the party across the river and accompanied it into the village. Next day in the Shawnee equivalent of a colonial “State-House,” Croghan, in behalf of the provincial government, delivered a speech to Delaware chiefs. Its purport was that the French were offering “a large Sum of Money” for his and Montour’s capture or for their scalps, threatening Shawnees and Wyandots, and plundering goods. Montour invited the Delaware chiefs to the Logstown conference, and they promised to attend it. On 12 February the party exited the village.\textsuperscript{24}

Over the next five days the party covered flatland that abounded with buffalo and other game. Crossing the Little Miami River, they headed southwest and arrived at the upper Great Miami River. The river, which teemed with catfish, was high, so they made a log raft and crossed their saddles and goods on it. They “swam” their horses across. On the far bank they fired their pistols in the air to announce their arrival. The shots brought a Miami warrior, who lit a calumet, which the party ritually smoked with him. Afterward, the Miami warrior escorted the party to Pickawillany, which was a village of about four hundred families. The party entered, bearing a British flag, which the chief set atop his “House.” In the evening the party met him and other chiefs in the “long House.” Montour followed Miami protocol exactly, addressing the chiefs as “‘brothers’” and presenting them two strings of wampum “‘to remove all the Trouble’” from their hearts and to

\textsuperscript{24} For details and quotations see \textit{ibid.}, 43-45.
“‘clear’” their eyes, so they might “‘see the Sun shine clear.’” Through hastily selected interpreters Montour delivered this message from pro-British Wyandots and Delawares: “‘You made a Road for our Brothers the English to come and trade among You, but it is now very foul, great Loggs are fallen across it, and We would have You be strong like Men, and have one Heart with Us, and make the Road clear, that our Brothers the English may have free Course and Recourse between You and Us.’” He presented the chiefs four strings of wampum, whereupon the chiefs uttered “‘Yo Ho’” in approval and then passed around a lighted calumet. When they finished smoking the calumet, they said they would send for better interpreters the next day.25

Two eventful weeks followed. Besides directing his employees to bolster Pickawillany’s fort with an interior line of logs, Croghan held another longhouse meeting during which he gave Miami chiefs the small provincial present. Then four Ottawa emissaries bearing a French flag entered the village and held a longhouse meeting to ally the chiefs to the French, but were unsuccessful. Then emissaries of the Piankeshaws and the Weas, two Miami tribes on the Wabash River, an Illinois-Indiana tributary of the Ohio River, entered the village to ally their tribes with the British. To show their sincerity, the emissaries presented Croghan and Montour two bundles of skins. Of course the skins pleased Croghan, who in behalf of the provincial government allied both Miami tribes to Great Britain by means of indentures drawn up by Gist. Yet the Pennsylvania Assembly later reproved Croghan and Montour for exceeding their instructions in this instance, though Governor Hamilton believed that they had “intended well in what they had done.”26

25 For details and quotations see ibid., 46, 48-49.
26 For details of events over two-week period see ibid., 49-52; for alliance see MPCM, 5:522-524; see also Assembly Message to Hamilton, 9 May 1751, MPCM, 5:26; for “intended well” see Votes and Proceedings
The meetings highlight how refugee Delaware chiefs and provincial emissaries used kinship terms and gift-exchange to create kin-like alliances. In their speeches the chiefs addressed Croghan and Montour with the metaphorical term “brothers” and expected to be addressed likewise, so that Croghan and Montour routinely evoked familial images whenever they delivered speeches. The chiefs also addressed the governor as *Brother Onas* or as “father” and referred to their own people as “children.” The word *Onas*, which meant “pen” or “feather,” was the Iroquoian approximation of Penn, the surname of Pennsylvania’s Quaker founder, William Penn. Reciprocal gift-giving cemented political and economic accords, but both the chiefs and provincial officials differed over its meaning. The chiefs saw gifts of provisions and clothing for their families as rightful compensation for their loyalty, whereas provincial officials saw gifts as the excessive cost of westward expansion. “Instead of reciprocity in kind, the provincial government expected obedience, even subordination, in return for their protection and alliance,” historian Jane T. Merritt writes. “Indeed, they used the gift exchange as a tool of empire, first to create dependence on English trade goods, then to control Indian populations, and, finally, to force cessions of western lands.” By the early 1750s the provincial government, using gift-giving emissaries like Croghan and Montour to pioneer conquest, had evicted most of Pennsylvania’s native Delawares, who consequently had brought with them to the Ohio Valley such conventions of diplomatic protocol as their usage of the phrase *Brother Onas*.27

The meetings highlight ritual, too. To meet their hosts, emissaries of both camps usually traveled long distances over terrain fraught with obstacles and dangers—from gloomy

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27 For kinship ties, term *Onas*, and “Instead of reciprocity” see Merritt, *At the Crossroads*, 51-8.
forests, steep mountains, impenetrable thickets, soggy marshes, wild rivers, or faint paths to ferocious animals or Indian or colonial belligerents or both. Emissaries of both camps were usually so sore, tired, dispirited, and disoriented from their ordeals that their hosts felt obliged to heal their psychic and physical wounds, or rather to remove common impediments to productive negotiations, by ritually wiping clean each emissary’s eyes, ears, throat, etc. “Then, and only then, when the travail of the woods had been countered and the wayfarer was whole again, was back in the clearing, could he set about the next phase of his work,” writes historian James H. Merrell, who calls the formality the At the Woods Edge Ceremony. Being masters of Algonquian and Iroquoian diplomatic protocol, Croghan and Montour knew precisely when and how to observe that common formality and related conventions like the condolence ritual, which soothed the grieving heart, which was another impediment to productive negotiations.  

When he returned home in late March or early April 1751, Croghan found a large present with a message instructing him and Montour to transport the present to Ohio, though the bill for its transport to Croghan’s home had miffed the provincial government. William Trent had added 30 percent to the bill, which totaled £245, to recoup his partnership with Croghan and Hockley for the loss of horses that had frozen to death in the winter. Ignoring a rumor that Lancaster merchant Levy Andrew Levy was about to sue him for £3,400, Croghan delivered a murder suspect to the sheriff of Cumberland County and hastened to Philadelphia. After his arrival he reported to Governor Hamilton, whereupon he entered

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28 For At the Wood’s Edge Ceremony and “Then, and only then” see Merrell, Into the American Woods, 153-154; for At the Woods Edge Ceremony see Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier, 85-86; see also Nancy L. Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them’: The Interpreter as Cultural Broker during Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-1770,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1988): 63.
a policy dispute. On one side of the dispute Provincial Interpreter Conrad Weiser argued for a continuation of current policy, which favored the Onondaga Council even though its suzerainty in Ohio was waning, and on the other side Provincial Secretary Richard Peters argued for a policy shift wherein the province would strengthen its relations with Ohio’s Iroquois refugees, the Mingos, whose burgeoning population, in his opinion, merited the status of independent nation. Having refused the governor’s diplomatic mission to Ohio and nominated Croghan and Montour to go in his stead, Weiser now argued that gifts to the Mingos would offend the Onondaga Council, but Croghan countered that gifts to the other Ohio Indians would offend the Mingos, whom he, like Peters, reckoned merited the status of independent nation. “Upon this difference of opinion between two persons who are supposed to understand Indian affairs the best, I cannot satisfy my own mind,” Governor Hamilton wrote Proprietor Thomas Penn. When Weiser and Croghan compromised, Hamilton authorized Croghan to use his own discretion in presenting gifts. The Pennsylvania Assembly, however, distrusted Croghan.29

Governor Hamilton wrestled with a more divisive issue while Croghan was in Philadelphia. In the winter the Mingos had asked Croghan to write him about their desire for a

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29 For Trent’s charge see MPCP, 5:490; see also Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 4:186-187; for lawsuit see Peters to Trent, 11 Mar. 1750/51, Richard Peters, 1751-1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 11; for Crohan’s delivery of suspected murderer see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 4:189, 215; for Peters’ and Croghan’s opinions of Mingo population and strength see Indian Conference at George Croghan’s, 7 Jun. 1750, MPCP, 5:439; for Peters’ opinion see also Peters to Penn 28 Sept. 1750, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:59, HSP; see also Peters to Penn, c. Sept. 1753, ibid., 6:105, HSP; for policy dispute see Hamilton to Penn, 18 Nov. 1750, ibid., 5:89, HSP; for Hamilton’s choice of Weiser to go to Ohio see Peters to Weiser, 12 Apr. 1751, Peters Papers, Vol. 3, Pt. 1, 35, HSP; for Weiser’s recommendation of Croghan and Montour for job see Weiser to Hamilton, 22 Apr. 1751, MPCP, 5:518; see also Penn to Peters, 24 Feb. 1750/51, Penn Letter Book, 3:42, HSP; for “Upon this difference” see Hamilton to Penn, 18 Nov. 1750, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:89; for instructions to Croghan see James Hamilton to George Croghan and Andrew Montour, 25 Apr. 1751, MPCP, 5:518-522; for Pennsylvania Assembly’s distrust of Croghan see Assembly Message to James Hamilton, 9 May 1751, ibid., 5:526.
provincial fort. Having read the letter, the governor had conveyed its contents to leaders of the Pennsylvania Assembly, but they had balked at appropriating funds for the project, out of opposition to Proprietor Thomas Penn, who had long advocated the construction of just such a fort. What had motivated Croghan to write the letter was neither philanthropy nor altruism nor solicitude but rather self-interest, for he had reasoned that only a provincial fort could protect the Indian trade—his Indian trade, to be precise. Now he changed his story, stating that he had written the letter not in behalf of all the Mingos, but in behalf of a few who were “not of the most considerable.” What was the truth? This 11 April 1751 letter to Hamilton displays his way of promoting the public good (alliance) and his private good (trade) simultaneously: “[S]ince there seems to be a good disposition in all the Indians towards the English, it is my opinion, that it be immediately proposed to the Indians to erect for them a trader house or place of refuge this summer. [I]f the Indians consent, as they probably will, this will secure them from the French.” Hamilton sided with Croghan but insisted that Croghan obtain evidence of the Mingos’ true position before instructing him to “sound out” the Mingos without making “publck mention of building a fort.”

In the spring Croghan, Montour, and others went to the Ohio and switched horses for canoes. They canoed down the river, reached Logstown on 18 May, and unloaded the provincial present, whereupon a “great number” of Mingos, Delawares, and Shawnees fired their guns in salute and hoisted a British flag. Three days later French interpreter

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30 For meeting see Memorandum, MPCT, 5:514–515; for meeting and “not of the most considerable” see Hamilton to Weiser, 27 Apr. 1751, Peters Papers, V. 3, Pt. 1, 38, HSP; for meeting see also Hamilton to Penn, 30 Apr. 1751, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:135, HSP; for fort advocacy see “An extract from the Proprietarie’s Letter,” MPCT, 5:515; for “[S]ince there seems” see Croghan to Hamilton, 11 Apr. 1751, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:133, HSP; for private instructions see Hamilton to Penn, 30 Apr. 1751, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:135; see also Hamilton to Weiser, 27 Apr. 1751, Peters Papers, Vol. 3, Pt. 1, 38, HSP; see also MPCT, 5:522.
Philippe Thomas Joncaire entered Logstown with forty Mingo warriors and held a meeting wherein he recalled Céleron’s speech to the chiefs two years earlier: “That their Father the Governor of Canada desired his Children on Ohio to turn away the English Traders from amongst them, and discharge them from ever coming to trade there again, or on any of the Branches, on Pain of incurring his Displeasure.” To add force to his words, he presented a large wampum belt, and then a Mingo chief arose and said, “’You are always threatening our Brothers what you will do to them, and in particular to that man (pointing to me); now if you have anything to say to our Brothers tell it to him if you be a man, as you Frenchmen always say you are, and the Head of all Nations. Our Brothers are the People we will trade with, and not you. Go and tell your Governor to ask the Onondago Council If I don’t speak the minds of all the Six Nations.’” The chief returned the belt.  

On 28 May, Croghan met Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandot, Miami, and Mingo chiefs, and addressed them all through his interpreter, Montour. Their “brother,” Governor Hamilton, had sent him “with this Present of Goods to renew the Friendship so long subsisting between Us.” He presented four strings of wampum to “open” their eyes so they might “see the Sun clear.” Then, in behalf of Hamilton, he addressed the Delaware chiefs and presented a wampum belt, which elicited utterances of “Yo-hah,” whose English equivalent might have been “huzzah” or “here-here.” The purport of his speech was that Hamilton would maintain peaceful and amicable relations with the Delawares. Then, in behalf of Hamilton, Croghan addressed the Shawnee chiefs and presented a wampum belt, which elicited utterances of “Yo-hah.” His speech evoked peace and amity. Then, in behalf of Hamilton, Croghan addressed the Wyandot chiefs and presented a wampum belt,

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31 For quotations see “An Account of the Proceedings of George Croghan, Esquire, and Mr. Andrew Montour at Ohio, in the Execution of the Governor’s Instructions to deliver the Provincial Present to the several Tribes of Indians settled there,” MPCP, 5:530-531.
which elicited utterances of “Yo-hah.” His speech evoked peace and amity. Likewise he addressed the Miami chiefs and the Mingo chiefs, and in each instance his presentation of a wampum belt elicited utterances of “Yo-hah.”

During his address to the Mingo chiefs Croghan mentioned that he had told Governor Hamilton that the French obstruct Pennsylvania’s traders “and carry away their Persons and Goods, and are guilty of many outrageous Practices, Whereby the Roads are rendered unsafe to travel, nor can we ask our Traders to go amongst you whilst their Lives and Effects are in such great Danger.” How did this happen? Croghan asked before presenting a wampum belt in behalf of the governor. Then the Mingo chiefs’ speaker rose to his feet and addressed Joncaire thus: “‘How comes it that you have broke the General Peace? Is it not three years since you as well as our Brothers the English told Us that there was a Peace between the English and French, and how comes it that you have taken our Brothers as your Prisoners on our Lands? Is it not our Land (Stamping on the Ground and putting his Finger to John Cœr’s Nose)? What Right has Onontio [the governor of Canada] to our Lands?’” The speaker demanded that Joncaire tell the governor of Canada to convey his reasons for ordering the capture of Englishmen. The speaker then presented four strings of black wampum, which denoted war. Finally the chiefs of all the tribes divided the provincial present and told Croghan that “it was Custom with their Brothers whenever they went to Council to have their Guns, Kettles, and Hatchets mended.” Thus Croghan ordered repairs, so that the chiefs “might depart well satisfied.”


33 For quotations see “A Treaty with the Indians of the Six Nations, Delawares, Shawonese, Owendatts and Twightwees,” ibid., 5:532-536; for black wampum beads see Merrell, Into the American Woods, 189.
The chiefs of all the tribes did depart satisfied, for in a session on 29 May they or their spokesmen ceremonially thanked Governor Hamilton for his solicitude and ceremonially presented Croghan and Montour two to four strings of wampum for delivery to him. The strings of wampum were probably made of white beads that denoted peace. More important, the speaker of the Mingo chiefs ceremonially thanked the governor of Virginia for holding at Fredericksburg the king’s present for their people and presented Croghan and Montour four strings of wampum for delivery to him, but in this purported excerpt of his speech to Governor Hamilton the speaker of the Mingo chiefs also raised the fort issue: “‘We expect you our Brother will build a strong House [fort] on the River Ohio, that if we should be obliged to engage in a War that we should have a Place to secure our Wives and Children, likewise to secure our Brothers that come to trade with us, for without our Brothers supply us with Goods we cannot live.’” Announcing that in two months hence the Mingo chiefs would choose “‘a Place fit for that Purpose’” and message their choice, he gave Croghan and Montour a wampum belt. The purported excerpt was to affect Croghan’s life in profound ways.\(^{34}\)

On 30 May, Croghan presented each chief a small gift and set out for home. Upon his arrival he wrote a letter and mailed the letter and a copy of his Logstown journal to Governor Hamilton. Dated 10 June, the letter ended thus: “I hope what has been transacted at this Treaty will be pleasing to your Honour, as I am sure the Present had its full Force, and shall defer any farther Account till you have the opportunity of examining Mr. Montour.” The treaty did please the governor even though he had not expected to see a fort request in it. Believing the request genuine, he advocated for the fort, which he called a

\(^{34}\) For speeches, wampum-giving, and quotations see “A Treaty with the Indians of the Six Nations, Delawares, Shawonese, Owendatts and Twilightees,” *MPCP*, 5:535-538; for white wampum beads see Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 189.
“strong house” in conversation with Isaac Norris, speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly, and Israel Pemberton, leader of its Quaker party. Norris and Pemberton suggested that they might support him if Proprietor Thomas Penn, and not the Pennsylvania Assembly, funded its construction. They suggested too that Indian traders might build the fort. Upon learning of the conversation’s import Penn wrote Provincial Secretary Richard Peters that “if anything is done it should be done under the direction of George Croghan, and he be obliged to build it and keep . . . men constantly in it.” In other words Croghan was his man to build and garrison the fort regardless of the whether the Assembly appropriated a penny for either purpose.35

In mid-August, Governor Hamilton conveyed Croghan’s Logstown journal to a convening Pennsylvania Assembly, which called Andrew Montour to verify its contents. When Montour testified that the journal was inaccurate in relation to the Mingos’ request for a “strong Trading House,” he ignited a political firestorm. Had Croghan invented a fiction to advance his own interests? assemblymen asked one another. Had he manipulated the Mingos? Had their speaker really requested a provincial fort? In its 21 August message to Hamilton the Assembly stated that it had “Reason to believe that the Request inserted in George Croghan’s journal” had been “misrepresented by the Person in whom the Governor [had] confided for the Management of the Treaty.” Croghan had related the request to the Mingos, who, sensing war with the French, had requested a provincial fort to protect their wives and children from loss, but Montour testified that Croghan himself had proposed the fort and that the Mingos had promised to consider the proposal and to ap-

35 For small gift see “A Treaty with the Indians of the Six Nations, Delawares, Shawonese, Owendatts and Twitchtwees,” MPCP, 5:538; for “I hope what has been transacted” see Croghan to Hamilton, 10 Jun. 1751, ibid., 5:539-540; for Hamilton’s advocacy see Hamilton to Penn, 14 Sept. 1751, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:173, HSP; for “if anything is done” see Penn to Peters, 28 Sept. 1751, Penn Letter Book, 3:105, HSP.
prise him of their decision in two months. “Whence it should seem that Croghan had im-
pos’d upon me and the Province by a false representation, for which we have gott great Cause to be offended with him,” Hamilton wrote Thomas Penn, “and the Assembly who never thought well of him were really so.” Hamilton admitted that the Assembly was using Montour’s testimony as a pretext for giving the fort’s construction “the go-by at this time” and perhaps for a long time. The Assembly even rejected Penn’s offer to fund fort construction and insisted that “upright Dealing,” “friendly treatment,” and “suitable Presents” were the “best means” of allying Ohio Indians to Pennsylvania. Instead of harping on a fort, Penn ought to be sharing with the Assembly the expense of gift-giving.³⁶

As for Croghan, he was broke. The Pennsylvania Assembly ignored his plea for a hear-
ing (or public opportunity) to clear his name even though he had elicited a retraction from Montour himself. There would be no provincial jobs for him now. “I Could have wished that Andrew had Come by my house but I know very well that his guilty Consence would [not] admit him, his Syning a paper in favour of George Croghan agin,” Conrad Weiser wrote Richard Peters. A provincial fort might not have improved Croghan’s fortunes, ei-
ther. Peters, acting as Richard Hockley’s attorney, begged William Trent to report “how the Company’s Accounts stand, and whether any Skins are to go this year to London ei-
ther in discharge of past debts or to purchase [trade] Goods,” but Trent equivocated, for he and Croghan, their debts mounting to an estimated £10,000, borrowed £1,000 Pennsyl-
vania money from Lancaster merchant Joseph Simons on 5 September. They paid down their debts but still went bankrupt. Croghan fled to Ohio, and Trent soon followed, even though the inhabitants of Cumberland County had recently elected him to the Assembly.

³⁶ For Assembly message and “Reason to believe” see MPCTP, 5:547; for contents of Assembly message and “Whence it should seem” see Hamilton to Penn, 14 Sept. 1751, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:173, HSP; for “upright dealing” see MPCTP, 5:547.
which was to convene on 24 October. The “tanyard” at Pennsborough Plantation was “sold” (or entrusted) to Croghan’s half-brother Edward Ward and tanner Roger Walton for £2,000 Pennsylvania money on 17 September. The “sale” included “tanyard” stock, a mill horse and other horses, cows, sheep, a cart, store stock, household items, a ferrier, and four African slaves. On 23 November, Ward and Walton transferred the property to creditor Richard Hockley, and on 15 October, Richard Peters “bought” the rest of Pennsborough Plantation for £1,000 Pennsylvania money and extinguished an encumbrance, Croghan’s debt to Mary Plumstead. In short, the “sale” was tantamount to a foreclosure.37

Croghan was jobless, too. “I have not heard any thing from the Indians at Ohio relating to their Building a Fort among them, as was promised in George Croghan’s Journal from whence I concluded nothing of the kind was intended by them,” wrote Governor Hamilton to Proprietor Thomas Penn on 29 November, “but that the Whole was a fable of Crog-
ghan’s Contrivance to give his negotiation an air of consequence.” Provincial Secretary Richard Peters reserved judgment. “If they [the Ohio Mingos] ask [the Onondaga Council] & obtain Leave [permission for Pennsylvania] to build a Fort it should seem that Croghan reported the Truth, if not, that Montours Account given to the Assembly is the true one,” he wrote Penn. For Hamilton, Croghan seemed a tragic figure. “Croghan was the most sensible man I ever knew among them [Indian traders], and was very well qualified to serve the province in all affairs that related to those western Indians, [and] had he been an Aconomist [economist],” he “[might have] kept his mind free from that anxiety which is always occasion’d by labouring under a load of Debt,” he wrote Penn. “But I have observ’d him of late very much perplexed on that account; and at length his mismanagement has brought his Ruin, for I am told he has gone off, vastly indebted to many People, and among the rest I am afraid poor M’l. Hockley will be a very great sufferer by him.” In other words Croghan was an expert pioneer, an expert Indian trader, and an expert go-between, but he was too an exceptionally poor economist and an exceptionally poor and impractical businessman. Most important, he was a flawed human being, whose devious, conniving, callous, and duplicitous ways seemed to have consigned him to oblivion. He might have been lost to history altogether if he had not possessed the particular skills that the provincial government required from time to time to defuse volatile situations.38

The collapse of Hockley, Trent, & Croghan in a mass of unpaid debt to a large degree caused the Pennsylvania economy to spiral downward. Governor Hamilton wrote Proprietor Thomas Penn that the “affair of Croghan & Trent” was “unfortunate,” for “while they flourished,” they “drew a great Trade to that part of the Country [Carlisle], and made

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38 For “I have not heard” see Hamilton to Penn, 29 Nov. 1751, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:193, HSP; for “If they ask” see Peters to Penn, 20 Jun. 1752, ibid., 5:251, HSP.
money circulate briskly, but so unexpected a Bankruptcy in them who were the principal dealers, had made every body desirous of withdrawing their effects from the precarious Trade as soon as possible, which must necessarily occasion a great scarcity of Money in those remote parts, and will, I fear, retard the progress of the Town [Philadelphia], as well as lessen the Value of Lands for the present.” Besides deflating money, slowing the growth of Philadelphia, and depressing real estate, the collapse of Hockley, Trent, & Croghan impaired lending, so that Philadelphia merchant and creditor Edward Shippen even entertained thoughts of “quitting the Indian trade” altogether. The collapse of Hockley, Trent, & Croghan is attributable to the law of supply and demand. An overabundance of North American skins and furs in Europe had caused their prices to decline and English and French colonial merchants to import fewer trade goods. The paucity of trade goods in colonial cities had caused the prices of trade goods to soar. Operating on the competitive situational frontiers of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan, rival Indian traders had resorted to desperate means, including disastrous underselling, to defeat their competition. Croghan and Trent, for example, had employed capital to expand their clandestine trading partnership with Robert Callender and Michael Teaffe rather than their one with Hockley and to speculate in land rather than to pay off debts.39

In the winter of 1751-52 Croghan and Trent lay low. Only in late February 1752, when Trent appeared on the Pennsylvania frontier to write Philadelphia merchant Edward Shippen for a letter of license, did the icy demeanors of Philadelphia creditors begin to thaw. A letter of license, or letter of leniency, as it was sometimes called, was an agreement

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39 For “affair of Croghan” see J. H. [James Hamilton] to Penn, 19 Jun. 1752, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:245, HSP; for “quitting the Indian trade” see Shippen to Penn, 21 Mar. 1752, ibid., 5:231, HSP; for Pennsylvania’s economic decline because of Hockley, Trent, & Croghan’s bankruptcy see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 45-46.
made by creditors to their insolvent debtors. The agreement granted the debtors not only more time to pay their debts but also protection from arrest of their persons or property while the letter was in effect. That is to say, for a stipulated time the debtors were free to continue in business in hopes of remedying their financial distress. On 9 March, Shippen entrusted Robert Callender with a four-month letter of license for conveyance to Trent. “I hope your other Creditors in the Country will also sign it,” Shippen wrote Trent. “I will assure you it was with much difficulty I got ye Letter Signed by So many.” Although Richard Hockley grumbled about his partners, Philadelphia creditors seemed “willing enough” to let them “have Some Goods” on their own account. Interestingly, Hockley himself had been “guilty of so many follies & extravagances” over the winter that Richard Peters believed that he could no longer help Hockley. In late March, Trent went to Philadelphia and promised Hockley that he should “not suffer by his partnership” and assured him that he should “not lose one Farthing,” but having found that Trent and Croghan had “taken up Goods” with Hockley’s money and without Hockley’s privity, Peters confronted Trent with facts. As usual Trent pleaded ignorance, saying that “it was all Mr. Croghan’s doing” and promising that he would “take care [that] all these Debts be discharged.” Naturally Trent hurried back to Ohio.40

Knowing that Trent had lied, Richard Peters gladly reported to Proprietor Thomas Penn that the partnership articles were to be “superceded by an Instrument under hand and Seal in which there is an Explanation” that would legally “set M’ Hockley at Liberty from all Debts contracted by Croghan & Trent without his Privity on the Partnership Account, in

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40 For “I hope your” see Shippen to Trent, 9 Mar. 1752, Shippen Letter Book, 1751-1752, Shippen Family Coll., No. 595 A, HSP; for stipulated time see Shippen to William Harrison, 9 Mar. 1752, ibid., HSP; see also Peters to Penn, 20 Jun. 1750, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:251, HSP; for “willing enough” see Peters to Penn, 20 Mar. 1752, ibid., 5:229, HSP; for “guilty of so many follies” and other Peters quotations see Peters to Penn, 20 Jun. 1752, ibid., 5:255, HSP.
case these Debts should not be paid.” The instrument, or formal legal document, would dissolve the partnership of Hockley, Trent, & Croghan once the partners had signed it. Trent brought the instrument with him to Logstown, where he and Croghan signed it in the presence of two witnesses. Hockley did likewise in Philadelphia. On 20 May 1752 the signed and sealed instrument was finalized and filed in Philadelphia. It ended thus: “We do hereby mutually declare that it was the true Intent and Meaning of us and every of us whom we enter’d into the s[d] Copartnership that we nor any of us, nor our s[d] joint Stock and Proceeds thereof shou’d be liable to or for any of our private or separate Debts or to or for any more or other Debts or Engagem[en]s whatsoever than such as shou’d be contracted by or w[ith] the Privity & Approbation of all of us.” Despite the bankruptcy and subsequent dissolution of his partnership with Trent and Hockley, Croghan had traded farther west than any Pennsylvanian had ever traded, a singular exploit that represented a partial achievement of his overarching goal, which was to enrich himself by trading as far west as he possibly could. Would he ever be wealthy?

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Figure 1 North Carolinian Joseph Hewes’ eighteenth-century engraving of Christ Church
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Figure 2 From Wainwright, Nicholas B., *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 11
Figure 3 From Merritt, Jane T., *At the Crossroads: Indians & Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763*, 35
Figure 4 From White, Richard, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*, 162-163
Figure 5 Croghan’s mid-1740s log cabin as it is today in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
Courtesy of the Cumberland County Historical Society
Figure 6 “Croghan’s” (Pennsborough Plantation) on Lewis Evans’ *A Map of Pensilvania, New-Jersey, and New-York, And the Three Delaware Counties* (1749)
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Figure 7 Croghan’s early base of operations in the Pennsylvania fur trade, from Nicholas Scull’s *The Map of the improved Part of the Province of Pennsylvania* (1759)
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Figure 8 “Croghan’s Gap” on William Scull’s *Map of the Province of Pennsylvania* (1770)
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Chapter 4: Indian Agent

In late May 1752 the Virginia government convened a Logstown conference to help the Ohio Company comply with its 1749 royal grant, which entitled it to 200,000 acres near the forks of the Ohio but stipulated that it build a fort and settle a hundred families on the acres to receive a Crown grant of 300,000 more acres. The stipulations were problematic because the Onondaga Council claimed the Ohio Valley and a refugee Indian population inhabited it. As per their instructions Virginia commissioners were to confirm the 1744 Lancaster Treaty and to establish cordial relations with Ohio Mingos so that the Crown could draw upon them for support should war with France break out. The commissioners faced this problem: The Virginia government interpreted the 1744 Lancaster Treaty so as to claim the Ohio Valley, yet the Mingos might oppose the interpretation. How could the commissioners negotiate a treaty without alienating the Mingos, who were fast becoming a makeweight in the scales of empire? In attendance were interpreter Andrew Montour and Ohio Company agent Christopher Gist. George Croghan attended the conference on his own for the dual purpose of rehabilitating his reputation and exploiting his truck with the Mingos to further his mercantile interests, but he acted in behalf of the Pennsylvania government, too—unofficially, of course.¹

In a “Council House” on 1 June, Croghan—called “the Buck” by Mingos because of his penchant for tradable buckskins—advised the gathered Mingo, Delaware, Shawnee, and Wyandot chiefs to “receive” the Virginia commissioners “kindly” to please Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton. Seneca chief Tanaghrisson arrived by canoe on 4 June. Dub-

bed “Half King” by colonials to honor his status as Logstown’s Iroquois viceroy, he met the Indian chiefs on his own until the Virginia commissioners convened an outdoor session on 10 June. During the session the commissioners invoked the 1744 Lancaster Treaty and declared the British king’s “Design” to settle “British Subjects on the South East Side of Ohio.” British settlement on the Ohio River would afford Ohio’s Indian peoples advantages like cheap goods and armed support. “Brethren,” the commissioners waxed sympathetic, “be assur’d that the King, our Father, by purchasing your Lands, had never any Intention of takeing them from you, but that we might live together as one People, & keep them from the French, who wou’d be bad Neighbours.”

The Virginia commissioners differentiated between the rival kings of France and Great Britain. Although the French king called himself “Father,” he had used armed force three years earlier “to take Possession” of Indian “Country by setting up Inscriptions on Trees, and at the Mouths of Creeks on this River [the Ohio River].” The commissioners heaped goods worth more than £1,000—tokens of their king’s goodwill—on the ground before their listeners. After the Indians apportioned the goods among themselves, their speaker Tanaghrisson addressed the commissioners thus: “Brethren, it is a great while since our brother, the Buck . . . has been doing business between us, & our Brother of Pensylvania, but we understood he does not intend to do any more, so I now inform you that he is approv’d of by our Council at Onondaga, for we sent to them to let them know how he has helped us in our Councils here; and to let you & him know that he is one of our People and shall help us still & be one of our Council, I deliver him this string of wampum.”

The remarks thrust Croghan center stage.²

On 12 June the commissioners turned to Croghan to defuse a volatile situation. About forty miles to the north, an Indian trader had slashed the wrist of a Mingo or an Iroquois, stolen his gun, and threatened revenge against any traders who plied the area. Knowing that an outbreak of violence might disrupt the conference, the commissioners fetched the Indian, gave him a gun, and relied on Croghan to allay his wrath. In conformity with Iroquois custom in such matters, Croghan presented him “a thousand of Wampum to pay for the Cure, on which the Indian returned thanks for the Care his Brethren had taken, & as- sured them they had remov’d all Anger from his Breast, and that he wou’d think no more of what had happened.” Having defused the situation, Croghan believed he would again be atop the intercultural world that historian James H. Merrell calls the “dark woods.”

The conference lasted two more days and proved productive for the Ohio Company and for Virginia. At first Tanaghrisson—the only Indian conferee with whom Ohio Company agent Christopher Gist and the Virginia commissioners negotiated—contested Virginia’s claim, saying that because the Six Nations had “never understood . . . that the Lands then sold were to extend further to the Sun setting than the Hill on the other Side of the Alle-gany Hill,” he would defer the matter to the judgment of the Onondaga Council. A delay was unacceptable to Gist and the commissioners, however. Having “drawn an Instrument of writing for confirming the Deed made at Lancaster, & containing a Promise that the Indians wou’d not molest our Settlements on the South East Side of Ohio,” Gist and the commissioners persuaded Montour “to confer with his Brethren, the other Sachems, in private, on the Subject, to urge the Necessity of such a Settlement & the great Advantage it wou’d be to them, as to their Trade or their Security.” Montour, Tanaghrisson, and the chiefs “retir’d for half an Hour.” After the meeting Tanaghrisson yielded publicly to Vir-

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Virginia’s interpretation of the treaty. Probably Montour had allayed his fears by convincing him that any British settlement in the Ohio Valley would resemble Pickawillany, the very prosperous Miami village whose fortified trading post, built and maintained by Croghan and his employees, benefited Mingos as well as Miamis.⁵

Although Tanaghrisson privately sanctioned the construction of a “strong House” (fortified trading post) at the forks of the Ohio, he said nothing publicly about either its territorial implications or its political implications, for he had just gotten material support to strengthen his tenuous standing with the very Indians whom he was supposed to lead. In effect the Virginia commissioners bought his silence, but they could not buy the silence of the Indian chiefs, each of whom from experience knew that “a Settlement of [British] People” in the Ohio Valley would threaten the ability of his people to control their lands and hence their future. To induce the Delaware chiefs, who represented the second most numerous refugee people in the Ohio Valley after the Mingos, to acquiesce, Tanaghrisson recognized minor Delaware chief Shingas as their “king.” The lofty status entitled Shingas not only to speak for all the refugee Delawares of the Ohio Valley, but also to negotiate for them. Tanaghrisson reminded the Delaware chiefs and the Virginia commissioners that the Logstown Treaty was inapplicable until the Onondaga Council ratified it, but he did not have to do so, for the refugee Delawares of the Ohio Valley were too far west and too numerous to remain forever under Iroquois suzerainty. In short, geopolitics had begun to work in their favor.⁶

⁶ For conference see “Treaty of Logg’s Town, 1752,” VMHB, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Oct. 1906), 169, 171; see also “Copy of Mr. George Croghan’s Account of Indian Affairs from 1748/9 to General Braddock’s Defeat,”
Having burnished his reputation (the Mingo chiefs had verified his contested 1751 journal entry) and protected his interests (a fortified trading post could protect his trade goods as well as his employees), Croghan was upbeat as he departed Logstown. He was not upbeat for long. On 21 June a party of Chippewa and Ottawa warriors and Détrroit soldiers under French-Ottawa officer Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade attacked Pickawillany after its Indian traders ignored a warning to evacuate. The war party was following orders to kill “all such Indians as are in amity with the English” and seize “the Persons and Effects of all such English Traders as they could meet with.” Most of the village’s male Indians were hunting, so that the attackers captured the females, who were working nearby in the cornfields. After six hours Langlade ordered a ceasefire and announced that he would release the captives and spare defenders who surrendered English traders. Having no choice, the defenders acquiesced, then watched as the attackers finished off a wounded trader, scalped him, and “took out his heart and eat it.” To reward Old Briton for “his attachment to the English,” the attackers “boiled [him], and eat him all up.” Seizing five terrified English traders and booty, the attackers departed the smoldering village for Détrroit. Although he had missed the raid, Croghan felt its impact immediately, for survivors and rival traders fell back to his base on Pine Creek four miles north of the forks of the Ohio. The base belonged to his illegal 1749 land purchase from the Onondaga Council. 7

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7 For warning see Benjamin Stoddert to Hamilton, n.d., MPCP, 5:550; for quotations see Goodman, ed., Journal of Captain William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany, 87-88; for secondary account see Anderson, Crucible of War, 28-29. The Ottawa and Chippewa raiders belonged to peoples who practiced ritual cannibalism to transfer enemies’ spiritual power to themselves. Langlade relinquished Old Briton because he appreciated the ritual and because some of the Ottawa raiders were his kinsmen, but he did not partake of the “feast.” See White, Middle Ground, 231. Nicholas B. Wainwright implies that Croghan was present at Pickawillany during the attack, but actually there is no evidence to support the implication. See Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 50.
On 29 May 1753 Robert Callender and Michael Teaffe testified before the Pennsylvania Assembly about French depredations in Ohio, but instead of appropriating money for frontier defense the body appropriated £200 to condole those Miamis who had appealed for aid. Hamstrung, Governor Hamilton messaged the Miamis to appeal to Virginia, and the Miamis did so. Upon receiving the appeal new Virginia governor Robert Dinwiddie commissioned not Croghan but William Trent to deliver the aid with an invitation to an intercultural conference at Winchester, Virginia. Swallowing his disappointment, Croghan led forty packhorses high into the Alleghenies to the fortified storehouse built in 1749 by the Ohio Company at the confluence of the Potomac River and Wills Creek in present-day Cumberland, Maryland. In August 1753 Trent used the packhorses to deliver the aid to the Miamis while the new Canadian governor, Ange Duquesne de Menenville, marquis de Duquesne, built a string of forts from Presque Isle on Lake Erie to Rivière au Boeuf (French Creek) and other tributaries of the Allegheny River. The string of forts secured French portage to the upper Ohio River and permitted the building of a fort at the forks. The French had “invaded” the Ohio Valley, but when Pennsylvania and Virginia, beset by internal squabbling, did nothing to repel them, the Miamis wavered in their loyalties. Miami vacillation made intercultural trade risky.\(^8\)

Still, things improved for Croghan. Whenever he entered Pennsylvania’s Cumberland or Lancaster County, creditors denying his letter of license pounced on him. Usually he

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disarmed them with wit before reminding them that his debts, though small, were various, so that he needed extensions. Usually the creditors relented and in a few months he paid them. Although his letter of license was effectual in Philadelphia, he hung back from entering the city because it harbored creditors who wanted to skin him. A notable exception was ex-mayor Edward Shippen, who remained cordial though defunct Hockley, Trent, & Croghan owed his mercantile partnership £702 and Richard Peters was beseeching him to intercede in behalf of Richard Hockley. Croghan, on his current partnership’s account, sent Shippen fifteen horse-loads of skins and supervised the freight of pelts from delinquent Indian traders to the Philadelphia merchant and his mercantile partner, Thomas Lawrence, but Croghan showed no such compunction with those frosty creditors who hounded him for payment or who endeavored to seize his assets. Under the names of his partners Callender and Teaffe three or four hundred horse-loads of his pelts reached Philadelphia merchants, for instance. Upon discovering the ruse Peters pleaded with Croghan to “fix on a Place of Rendezvous” in Virginia rather than “Pennsylvania for Fear of Arrest.” Peters also apprised him that Peters intended to bring Hockley to the rendezvous.9

At Winchester, Virginia, in September 1753, William Fairfax, president of the Virginia Council, held the intercultural conference. Croghan attended the conference on his own. During one session Scarouady, speaking for the assembled Mingo, Delaware, Shawnee, Miami, and Wyandot diplomats, withdrew his consent to the construction of a fort at the forks of the Ohio, but during another he consented to the construction of a strong-house after discussing its merits privately with Croghan, who urged him to meet Pennsylvania

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9 For skins see Shippen to Croghan, 8 Aug. 1752, Shippen Letter Book, 1751-1752, Shippen Family Coll., No. 595 A, HSP; see also Shippen to Burd, 12 Dec. 1752, ibid., HSP; for nonpayment see Peters to Penn, 5 Jul. 1753, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 5:73, HSP; for “fix on a Place” see Peters to Croghan, 3 Nov. 1752, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 11, HSP.
Governor James Hamilton. Scarouady agreed to meet Hamilton at Carlisle, which was nearer to his home than Lancaster or Philadelphia. When Scarouady left Winchester at the conclusion of the conference, a hundred Indians went with him. Having a letter from Fairfax to Hamilton, Croghan hastened to Shippensburg. On 18 September he arrived at Shippensburg and gave the letter to Edward Shippen, who forwarded it to Hamilton. The letter apprised Hamilton that the Indians would await him at Carlisle but that “for the particulars” he should “refer to Mr. Croghan, who has kindly assisted me [Fairfax].” Hamilton received the letter on 20 September and commissioned Richard Peters and assemblymen Isaac Norris and Benjamin Franklin to give the Indians a provincial present. In May the Pennsylvania Assembly had appropriated £800—£200 for buying condolence goods for the Miamis and £600 for buying guns, powder, and lead for the other Ohio Indians.10

The Carlisle conference from 1 to 4 October 1753 almost ended before it began. Upon their arrival on 26 September the provincial commissioners conferred with Croghan, who informed them that the Indians would not discuss “important Matters” until the commissioners had condoled with them over recent French-caused losses. When the provincial interpreters asked why the condolence ceremony was necessary, Scarouady replied that “the Indians could not proceed to Business while the Blood remained on their Garments, and that the Condolances [sic] could not be accepted unless the Goods, intended to cover the Graves, were actually spread on the Ground before them.” The commissioners could not invoke a condolence ceremony without the provincial present, and the Indians would

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10 For Croghan and conference see Shippen to Hamilton, 9 Sept. 1753, *MPCP*, 5:661; see also “Copy of Mr. George Croghan’s Account of Indian Affairs from 1748/9 to General Braddock’s Defeat,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 1:51, HSP; for “for the particulars” see Fairfax to Hamilton, 14 Sept. 1753, *MPCP*, 5:657; for provincial commissions see *ibid.*, 5:657-658; for present see *Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744.*, 4:246-247; see also “Memorandum: Preliminary Conference with the Indians,” *BFP*, 5:62-63.
accept neither wampum belts nor strings of wampum in lieu of it. Thus the commissioners dispatched a messenger to “hasten the Waggoners” who were hauling the present.11

Meantime the provincial commissioners learned from Scarouady that Ohio Indians had thrice messaged the French commander to withdraw his army and from Croghan that at the Winchester conference Ohio Indian diplomats had forbidden Virginia to build a forks fort and requested guns, lead, and powder for use in driving off the French. After supplying the guns the Virginia government had resolved to secure powder and lead for them on the eastern side of the Ohio and commissioned Christopher Gist, William Trent, and Andrew Montour to distribute the powder, lead, and sundries according to need. From Conrad Weiser, who like Montour was acting as a provincial interpreter, the commissioners learned of the necessity of pleasing Indians and therefore bought goods from local Indian trader John Carson to augment the provincial gift. By a message from Robert Callender and Michael Teaffe the commissioners learned that Tanaghrisson “had been received in a very contemptuous Manner by the French Commander, who was then preparing with his Forces to come down the [Allegheny] River,” and as a result when Tanaghrisson had entered Logstown, he had tearfully warned “the English traders not to pass the Ohio, nor to venture either their Persons or their Goods, for the French would certainly hurt them.”12

Having received the provincial present at last, the provincial commissioners invoked a condolence ceremony on 1 October. Next day they presented the Indians a wampum belt with six hand-holding figures. The first five figures represented the Five Nations and the sixth figure Pennsylvania. On 3 October, Scarouady addressed the commissioners thus:

12 For quotations see *ibid.*, 163-164; for chronology and for pre-conference activities see “Memorandum: Preliminary Conference with the Indians,” *BFP*, 5:64-66.
“You have wiped away the Blood from our Seats, and set them again in order. You have
wrapped up the Bones of our Warriors, and covered the Graves of our wise Men; and
wiped the Tears from our Eyes, and the Eyes of our Women and Children: So that we
now see the Sun, and all Things are become pleasant to our Sight.” Now the business of
the Carlisle conference began. Scarouady advised Pennsylvania and Virginia to suspend
settlement west of the Alleghenies because of the French threat. For purposes of expedi-
cency and communication he designated Croghan go-between and Croghan’s house at
Aughwick “the Place where any thing may be sent” Ohio Indians. Scarouady also desig-
nated three safe places for trade. On 4 October the commissioners entrusted the present
to Croghan, who was to send Governor James Hamilton “a true and faithful Account” of
how things turned out for the Indians, to whom he was upon orders to give the present.13

The Carlisle conference thrust Croghan to the forefront of Indian affairs. To Proprietor
Thomas Penn, Richard Peters wrote that Croghan “appeared to have the absolute confi-
dence and management of the Indians” and that Assembly speaker Isaac Norris, who held
“a mighty opinion of him,” would “heartily recommend him to the Assembly to be em-
ployed for the government in Indian affairs.” Yet any joy Croghan felt while he departed
Carlisle turned to misery when he fell ill upon his arrival at Aughwick. Indeed his doctor
gave him little chance of recovery. News of the prognosis reached Edward Shippen, who
heretofore had coaxed just one debt payment from Croghan. Shippen visited Aughwick,
but Croghan “could not” or “would not” speak to him. Shippen later wrote his son-in-
law, James Burd, “If you should go to Mr. Croghan and find him well disposed to me &
Mr. Lawrence, maybe he will give us a bill of sale for his horses, skins and debts.” Burd

13For quotations see Kalter, ed., Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania, & the First Nations: The Treaties of
1736-62, 167-175; for eyewitness provincial perspective of conference see Peters to Proprietors, 6 Nov.
1753, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 6:113, HSP.
did visit Aughwick, where he saw thirteen horse-loads of skins, but could not coax Croghan into parting with them. “I hope M’r. Croghan has made over his Skins & Horses to me, or rather he has got quite well again,” Shippen wrote his family on 22 November. “I am very uneasy when I consider how I stand circumstanced with him.”

About 22 October 1753 Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie received Crown instructions to warn encroachers and belligerents “to desist” from “unlawful” activities in Ohio. If they persisted, he was to “to repel” them. When William Trent confirmed the belligerency of the French commander, Dinwiddie proposed to commission youthful volunteer George Washington to learn “by what Authority” the French commander “presumes to make Incroachments on his Majesty’s Lands on Ohio.” The Virginia Council, which included William Fairfax, approved the proposal and formed a three-man committee to compose a message to the French commander. Dinwiddie ordered the conscription of a hundred militiamen on 19 December and commissioned Washington their leader and Trent a captain with authority “to raise what Traders and other Men he can to annoy the Enemy.” In July the Ohio Company had sent Trent and two men to build a fortified depot at the forks of the Ohio and cut a wagon road from the fortified depot at Wills Creek to the mouth of Redstone Creek on the Monongahela River some thirty-seven miles north of its confluence with the Allegheny.

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14 For “appeared to have” see Peters to Proprietors, 6 Nov. 1753, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 6:145, HSP; for “a mighty opinion” see Peters to Penn, 7 Dec. 1753, ibid., 6:113, HSP; for Thompson’s receipt, 9 Apr. 1754, see Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folder 8, HSP; for “could not,” “would not,” “if you,” and Burd’s visit see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 56; for “I hope” see Shippen to his children, 22 Nov. 1753, Shippen Papers, APS.

15 For Crown instructions, Trent’s letter, Washington’s commission, and Trent’s commission see Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 5:442-444, 460; see also “Copy of Mr. George Croghan’s Account of Indian Affairs from 1748/9 to General Braddock’s Defeat,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 1:51, HSP.
Governor Hamilton, like his Virginia counterpart, needed current intelligence to make informed decisions about the Ohio Valley, so he engaged Indian trader turned mapmaker James Patten in a spy mission and used a recent event to devise a cover for him. To appease Shawnees, Hamilton had negotiated the transfer of two Shawnee prisoners, the alleged perpetrators of frontier crimes, from Charleston, South Carolina, to Philadelphia. Officially Hamilton charged Patten with the task of delivering the Shawnee prisoners to their kin, the task of consulting Croghan about how to deliver the governor’s message to the Shawnees’ kin, and the task of engaging Andrew Montour as his interpreter. Patten’s unofficial charge was to locate any and all actual and proposed French forts, to calculate their distances from Shannopin’s Town, which was near the forks of the Ohio, and to ascertain the numbers and dispositions of local Mingos, Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and Miamis. Patten, moreover, was to ascertain whether Virginia had sent materiel to the Indians. If the colony had, he was to ascertain whether the Indians had put the materiel to good use. When Patten returned to Pennsylvania, he was “to call on Mr. Croghan and desire his Letters to the Governor,” inspect the goods left by the provincial commissioners, learn what Croghan intended to do with the goods, and verify the arrival of orders from Virginia for the delivery of the goods left with Gist, Trent, and Montour.  

Patten reached Aughwick in late December and departed immediately so as to overtake Croghan, who had transported the provincial goods to Shannopin’s Town. On 12 January

16 For transfer of Shawnee prisoners see Hamilton to Dinwiddie, 30 Oct. 1753, MPCP, 5:696-698; see also [South Carolina Governor] James Glen to Hamilton, 12 Oct. 1753, ibid., 5:699-700; for arrival of Shawnee prisoners by ship see Council minute, ibid., 5:699; see also Council minute, ibid., 5:700; see also Hamilton to Dinwiddie, 16 Nov. 1753, ibid., 5:704-705; see also “A Message from the Honourable James Hamilton, esquire, Lieutenant Governor of the Province of Pennsylvania, to the half King Scarrooyady, and other Chiefs of the Six Nations at Ohio,” ibid., 5:705-706; for instructions to Patten and “to call on Mr. Croghan” see “The Instructions of the Honourable James Hamilton, Esquire, Governor of Pennsylvania, to Mr. John Patten,” ibid., 5:707-708; for transfer of Shawnee prisoners to Shannopin’s Town, see Hamilton to Dinwiddie, 6 Dec. 1753, ibid., 5:708-709.
1754 Croghan reached John Fraser’s trading post on Turtle Creek about eight miles from the Ohio River and learned that George Washington and his party had laid over there during their return to Williamsburg, Virginia. Croghan stayed the night and in his journal recorded that Washington had disclosed that the French commander’s orders were “to take all the English he found on the Ohio” and build a fort at Logstown or thereabouts in the spring. Next day Croghan entered Shannopin’s Town and met Patten and Andrew Montour. On 13 January the three men and their parties traveled to Logstown and “found the Indians all drunk.” Over the next two days the three men resolved one serious problem, their capture by Shawnees, but could not resolve another, the arrival of a French diplomatic party that in council on 26 January presented Shawnees goods to buy allegiance.17

On 27 January, Croghan, Montour, and Patten convened a rival council wherein they “cloathed the Two Shawonese according [to] the Indian Custom, and delivered them up,” and Croghan and Montour “adapted” Governor Hamilton’s speeches “to Indian Forms” and presented goods. On 31 January, Tanaghrisson thanked Hamilton for delivering the prisoners and beseeched him to build and garrison a strong-house at the forks of the Ohio and beseeched Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia to do likewise. “We now acquaint our Brethren that we have our Hatchet in our hands to strike the Enemy as soon as our Brethren come to our assistance,” Tanaghrisson said. On 2 February the conference ended. By then William Trent had delivered Virginia’s present, but because he could not “talk ye Indian Languidge,” Croghan “was oblig’d to stay and assist him” with the distribution of the present. Croghan gave his journal to Patten and Montour, who gave it to Governor Hamilton, who gave it to the Pennsylvania Council, which on 20 February perused it and a diary kept by Patten. Besides containing intelligence the diary contained “pretty much the

17 For details and quotations see “George Croghan’s Journal, 1754,” MPCP, 5:731-733.
same Account . . . of publick Business down with the Indians.” Because his journal had proven accurate, Croghan regained favor with Governor Hamilton and his Council.18

Besides his journal Croghan had given Patten and Montour two letters that intertwined self-interest and advocacy. One letter was to Provincial Secretary Richard Peters and the other to Governor James Hamilton. In the letter to Peters, Croghan reported that the Ohio Indians expected the provincial government to build “a Treading house” and to supply it “with Necesserys to Cary on ye war against ye French.” Croghan opined that the provincial government should “Build a Strong Log’d house and Stocked it Round”—“itt wold Do, which wold Nott Cost a great Dale”—and call Pennsylvania’s Indian traders “there to Live and be Lay’d under some Regulation, and then ye Number of Treaders who gets thire Bread by ye tread wold be able to defend that house with ye Assistance of ye Indians, which . . . we may Depend on, if we assist them.” In the letter to Hamilton, Croghan reported that both he and Montour were of the opinion that “if y’ Honour should thin[k] Proper to build a Treading house that the Treaders should all be Call’d together att that ples and Lay’d under some Regulations, which wold be a Mains of securing ye Tread, and there ye Indians Could be well suply’d and the Treaders Run no Resque of being Taken by ye French.” In other words a Pennsylvania-built fortified trading post might enable him and his trading partners to withstand French attacks, while a trade regulation enacted by the Pennsylvania Assembly might eliminate their competitors for the Ohio trade.19

In the spring Croghan and Montour advocated armed support of the Ohio Indians. Croghan wrote Peters that he was “sorry to hear y’ [Pennsylvania] Assembly was Nott Con-

18 For “cloathed the Two Shawonese” and “We now acquaint” see ibid., 5:733-34; for Trent’s arrival see Croghan to Hamilton, 3 Feb. 175[4], PA, 1st ser., 2:119; for “pretty much the same” see MPCP, 5:731.
19 For “a Treading house” see Croghan to Peters 3 Feb. 175[4], PA, 1st ser., 2:118; for “if y’ Honour” see Croghan to Hamilton, 3 Feb. 175[4], ibid., 2:119.
venced of ye absolute Nesesatty, there is att present of assisting ye Indians, whos Cuntry is Invaided by a Number of French, and I hear Likewise they are in Suspence whether Ohio will fall any part of itt within this province.” Croghan wrote Hamilton that the Assembly’s pacifism had caused the Ohio Indians to “Suspectt ye Virginians as only attacking ye French, on Account of Settling ye Lands.” The time had come for the provincial government to reformulate Indian policy. “Ye Government may have what opinion they will of ye Ohio Indians, and think they are oblig’d to Do what ye Onondaga Counsel will bid them, Butt I shure ye honour they will act for themselves att this time without Consulting ye Onondago Councel.” Montour wrote Peters that the Ohio Indians anticipated “every Day the armed Forces of this Province to their Assistance against the French, who by their late Encroachments Are like to prevent their planting, and thereby render them incapable of Supporting their Families.” Since the Ohio Indians did not “look upon their late Friendship with Virginia as sufficient to engage them in a War with the French,” the provincial government “ought instantly to send out some Men” to preserve its alliance with them.20

Meanwhile Virginia acted. Working in conjunction with Ohio Company agent Christopher Gist and Colonel Thomas Cresap of the Virginia militia, William Trent, who was an Ohio Company agent as well as a Virginia militia captain, supervised some thirty workmen who rafted supplies down the Monongahela River to Redstone Creek to build the company depot there, but before the workmen finished the task, he left to recruit help to build the company fort at the forks of the Ohio. While Trent was recruiting unemployed

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20 For “sorry to hear” see Croghan to Peters, 23 Mar. 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:132; for “Suspectt ye Virginians” see Croghan to Hamilton, 14 May, ibid., 2:144; for “every Day the armed Forces” see Montour to Peters, 16 May 1754, MPCP, 6:46; for general need for change in provincial policy see Walter Klinefelter, “Lewis Evans and His Maps,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New ser., Vol. 61, No. 7 (1971): 41-41.
Indian traders for the job, Croghan sent Governor Hamilton intelligence about a French officer who had threatened Logstown’s Mingos, who then had sent Croghan a string of wampum “to desire him to hurry the English to come, for that they expected soon to be attacked, and pressed him hard to come and join them, for they wanted necessaries and assistance, and then would strike.” When Trent returned to the Redstone Creek depot, he brought with him forty men who joined the workmen in rafting supplies to the forks of the Ohio and then in building the company fort. Seeing the fort rise gave “the Indians great Pleasure and put them in high Spirits” indeed according to Croghan, but seeing it fall to a French army on 27 April put them in low spirits. Before going to the company depot at Wills Creek for provisions Trent instructed Croghan’s half-brother, Ensign Edward Ward, to supervise the workmen, and it was Ward who capitulated to the French army, which he estimated at one thousand men.21

During the first two weeks of May, Croghan shipped provisions worth £200 to an Ohio destination for storage. “I Can Dispose of them to ye Virginia for sess,” he wrote Governor Hamilton, “Butt if y’ honour Should have ocation of them for ye use of this government, I will Nott Ingage to Virginia, besides I have bought £300 worth more in ye Con- trey, y’ Flower a’ 9 ¥ hundred, which y’ honour may have, only paying me for ye Caridge out.” Having received a message from Tanaghrisson to go west, Croghan left for Ohio. Near the forks he met Tanaghrisson, observed the rising of Fort Duquesne, and received

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21 For Trent’s activities and “to desire him to hurry” see Croghan to Hamilton, 3 Feb. 1753[1754], PA, 1st ser., 2:119; for Trent’s activities and “the Indians great Pleasure” see Croghan to Hamilton 23 Mar. 1754, MPCP, 6:21; for Trent’s activities see also “Copy of Mr. George Croghan’s Account of Indian Affairs from 1748/9 to General Braddock’s Defeat,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 1:51, HSP; for Ward’s capitulation see “Testimony of Edward Ward before Samuel Smith at Carlisle,” 13 Jun. 1756, Etting Coll., No. 40, Ohio Company, Vol. 1, Folder 10, HSP; see also Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 5:468; see also Washington to Hamilton, [c. 24] Apr. 1754, GWPCS, 1:83; see also Washington to Sharpe, 24 Apr. 1754, ibid., 1:85; see also Washington to Dinwiddie, 25 Apr. 1754, ibid., 1:87; see also entry, 23 Apr. [1754], GWD, 1:78.
Hamliton’s instructions to buy flour for the Ohio Indians. He went to Winchester, Virginia, to buy the flour, and while he was there he met Governor Robert Dinwiddie, who discovered that Croghan was buying the flour for and transporting it to Ohio Indians rather than the Virginia militia commanded by George Washington, who out of desperation had thrown up Fort Necessity at the Great Meadows west of Chestnut Ridge in the Allegheny Mountains. Dinwiddie hired Croghan to assist Washington with the delivery of presents and to advise him “in all matters.” Boasting that he had forty thousand pounds of flour at hand, Croghan, on 31 May, contracted with the military commissary, Major John Carlyle, to transport ten thousand pounds of flour to Fort Necessity in fifteen days. 

Dinwiddie and Carlyle were of opposite minds about Croghan. To Dinwiddie, Croghan was “a Gent. well acquainted with Indn Affairs” and “Matters relating to the Delivery of Presents,” an expert for Washington to consult during negotiations “with the Half King & the Inds. in the British Alliance & In[teres]t.” To Carlyle, Croghan was “not a man of Truth and therefore could not be depended on.” Croghan had not delivered the contracted ten thousand pounds of flour to Fort Necessity, though he had boasted to Dinwiddie that he had forty thousand pounds at hand. In fact Croghan had had only four hundred. Dinwiddie was “Sorrey” he had “put” Croghan “into any Trust,” but since Croghan had

22 For “I Can Dispose” see Croghan to Hamilton, 14 May 1754, *PA*, 1st ser., 2:145; for meeting between Croghan and Tanaghrisson see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 62; for meeting between Croghan and Dinwiddie see Dinwiddie to Hamilton, 18 Jun. 1754, *RDP*, 1:215; for Croghan’s charge as interpreter see Dinwiddie to Washington, 1 Jun. 1754, *GWPCS*, 1:119; see also Dinwiddie to Washington, [18 Jun. 1754], *ibid.*, 1:146; for Croghan’s contract with Carlyle see Carlyle to Washington, 17 Jun. 1754, *ibid.*, 1:140, 143; see also Dinwiddie to Washington, 2 Jun. 1754, *ibid.*, 1:121; see also Washington to Dinwiddie, 10 Jun. 1754, *ibid.*, 1:129. Biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright states that Croghan contracted with Carlyle to deliver fifty thousand pounds of flour to Fort Necessity. Actually the contract was for ten thousand pounds. Wainwright conjectures that Croghan rode “his new brown gelding, Woolabarger, a natural pacer,” westward to meet Tanaghrisson, but the document that Wainwright cites as evidence for his conjecture indicates that Croghan sold the horse to Daniel Hart of Lancaster County for £20. For Wainwright’s statement and conjecture see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 62. For document see Bill of Sale for Woolabarger, 2 Mar. 1754, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folder 8, HSP.
departed for Fort Necessity, it was up to Washington to persuade him to deliver the flour. Washington, however, proved as incapable of persuading Croghan as Carlyle had proved, so Fort Necessity went without flour for six days, putting the entire expedition into jeopardy, a fact not lost on Dinwiddie, who wrote Carlyle that “Croghan has deceived us.”

Besides defaulting on his contract with Carlyle, Croghan had not paid down his debt to Edward Shippen, who had moved his mercantile enterprise from Philadelphia to Lancaster. Shippen went to Winchester to confront him in late May and to his “astonishment” found him and William Trent “intirely destitute” of skins and goods. Their destitution seemed to legitimize their excuses. “They complained that the French had Blockt up ye Indian Trade & therefore that they could not venture to go to Allegheny to collect In their Outstanding debts which were very large,” he wrote Thomas Penn. “They informed me that their horses were employed In yœ Service of Major Washington carrying Provisions & ammunition to yœ Camp at Fort Necessity and Great Meadows & that they designed to Sell them In the Fall & Send ye [?] to [?] their Creditors to be distributed proportionally for that they now resolved to give no one Preference.” They claimed to own 150 horses. If the horses were worth £5 apiece, the sale would yield £750. Divided proportionally, the sum would be “better then nothing tho’ a trifle to each Creditor.” As for Richard Hockley, in whose behalf Penn had asked Shippen to intercede, Shippen admitted, “I am very sorry it has not [been], nor, I am afraid ever will be in my Power to [help] him.”

By 12 June, Croghan had joined Washington at Fort Necessity, where an Ohio Indian passed intelligence that just-finished and -reinforced Fort Duquesne had inspired Log-
town’s Delaware and Shawnee warriors to take up the tomahawk against the British. Despite logistical problems Washington stuck to a plan that he had formulated during a war council at the Wills Creek depot on 23 April, a plan that called for him to lead a force to Redstone Fort (the Ohio Company depot), store ammunition there, and then raft artillery pieces on Redstone Creek “for the attack on the fort.” Led by Tanaghrisson, Mingo warriors and their families accompanied the force. Tanaghrisson sent messengers to several Ohio villages to invite warriors to join the expedition at Redstone Fort, and heeding advice from Croghan and Andrew Montour, he sent messengers to Logstown to invite belligerent Delaware and Shawnee warriors to Redstone Fort for a parley. Logstown in reply sent a forty-man party of Delaware and Shawnee warriors to intercept Washington’s expedition at Christopher Gist’s settlement about a day’s march from Redstone Fort. At Gist’s settlement Washington parleyed with the forty-man party from 18 to 21 June, but neither he nor Montour could persuade any of its members to ally Logstown militarily with Virginia or Pennsylvania, and the party, led by Shingas, left for the Great Meadows. Shortly thereafter the Mingos, led by Tanaghrisson, did likewise. Washington suspected that the party of Delaware and Shawnee warriors had spied for the French army.25

Washington sent Croghan with this message for the Mingo warriors: Their request for Governor Dinwiddie to send Virginia militia obliged them “to join” Washington to await Scarouady, who was bringing intelligence; Washington had deceived Indian spies by telling them that he had halted his advance to await reinforcements when he had actually ordered his men to resume “marking out and clearing a road towards Redstone” once the

25 For intelligence see entry, 12 Jun. [1754], GWD, 1:92-93; for “for the attack”see entry, 23 Apr. [1754], ibid., 1:76-79; for Tanaghrisson’s arrival see Washington to Dinwiddie, 3 Jun. 1754, GWPCS, 1:122-123; see also Dinwiddie to Washington, [18 Jun. 1754], ibid., 1:146; for Tanaghrisson’s messengers see Washington to Dinwiddie, [22 Jun. 1754], GWW, 1:77-78; for parley see entries, 18-21 Jun. [1754], GWD, 1:93-101.
spies had gone. On 25 June three Mingos from the Great Meadows conveyed a message from Croghan. The message informed Washington that Croghan was having difficulty “in finding any Indians willing to come to us” and that Tanaghrisson “was preparing to join us, but had received a blow which was a hindrance to it.” Washington sent Montour to the Great Meadows to persuade Tanaghrisson to join the expedition, but Montour fared no better than Croghan had because of the “blow” to Tanaghrisson. The blow was this: The Onondaga Council had messaged Tanaghrisson to be neutral should war break out between Britain and France. Rejoining the expedition, Scarouady informed Washington that a large French force was about to attack, so that Washington ordered a retreat.26

Croghan and Trent could retrieve neither goods nor supplies from Fort Necessity because their horses were hauling artillery pieces from Gist’s settlement to the fort. On 1 July the Virginians entered Fort Necessity—it was poorly situated in a bright meadow in dark forest—and girded for battle, but the remaining Indians deserted the fort and went to the Wills Creek depot as soon as they had seen how sweat and hunger had enfeebled the Virginians. On 4 July a superior yet well-hidden French force besieged the fort so that Washington had to capitulate. Of the encounter Ensign Edward Ward stated that if not for his half-brother the Virginians “wou’d not have had ammunition to make the least defense that day the French defeated them.” Yet his half-brother took heat for the debacle. Washington fixed on flour and horses, for example. “The promises of those Traders, who offer to contract for large Quantities of Flour,” he wrote William Fairfax, “are not to be depended upon; a most flagrant instance of which we experienced in Croghon, who was under obligation to Maj. Carlyle for the delivery of this Article in a certain time, and who was an eyewitness to our Wants; yet had the assurance, during our sufferings, to tantalize

26 For quotations see entry, 25 Jun. [1754], GWD, 1:101.
us, and boast of the Quantity he could furnish, as he did of the number or Horses he cou’d command; notwithstanding we were equally disappointed of these also: for out of 200 he had contracted for, we never had above 25 employed in bringing the flour that was engaged for the Camp; and even this, small as the quantity was, did not arrive within a month of the time it was to have been delivered.” Washington neglected to mention that Croghan’s horses hauled artillery pieces from Gist’s settlement to Fort Necessity.27

Washington blamed not the Ohio Company or the Virginia government or himself for his want of Indian support during his ill-fated expedition against the French at the forks of the Ohio, but Croghan and Montour, who boasted “of their interest with the Indians” yet “never could induce above 30 fighting Men to join us, and not more than one half of those, serviceable upon any occasion.” In truth the Mingo, Delaware, and Shawnee warriors whom Washington had striven to recruit knew that the Ohio Company and the Virginia government had been conspiring to seize their lands since the 1752 Logstown conference, so that Washington had been fortunate to have had any Ohio Indians on his side. In “a charming field for an encounter” he had had thrown up a circular fort that a superior French force hidden in the dark forest had easily besieged, but being a proud Tidewater aristocrat, he looked not to himself but to others for the cause of his defeat. “If we depend on Indian assistance,” he wrote William Fairfax, “we must have a large quantity of proper indian goods to reward their Services, & make them presents; it is by this means alone that the French command such an interest among them, & that we had so few: This, with the scarcity of provisions was proverbial; would induce them to ask, when they were to join us, if we meant to starve them as well as ourselves.” To ascribe the desertion

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27 For inability of Croghan and Trent to retrieve property see Etting Coll., No. 40, Ohio Company. Vol. 1, Folder 7, HSP; for “wou’d not have” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 64; for “The promises of those Traders” see Washington to Fairfax, 11 Aug. 1754, GWPCS, 1:187.
to a dearth of goods was to misunderstand the Ohio Indians, however. The Mingo, Delaware, and Shawnee warriors had withdrawn to the Wills Creek depot as soon as they had calculated that the Virginians would lose the battle. Why should they risk their lives for English-speaking intruders? At the Wills Creek depot they could negotiate for legitimate military support, and if they failed to get it, they could always seek refuge at Aughwick.28

Croghan had misrepresented his ability to deliver Indians and flour, but he did own the spread to which Tanaghrisson and Scarouady led their contingents after failing to get legitimate military support at the Wills Creek depot. The spread, however, was inadequate to their needs. “As there is a large Body of them and no Ground there to hunt to support their Families, they expect their Brothers the Pennsylvanians will provide for their Families as their Men will be engaged in the War,” Andrew Montour wrote Governor Hamilton, who had repeatedly asked the Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania Assembly to appropriate funds for defense but repeatedly received bills with strings—taxes on proprietary estates, for instance. Virginia authorities blamed Croghan for the warriors’ departure from the Wills Creek depot, but the truth was that the warriors had departed the depot on their own. “Had I been at Wills’ Creek when they sat off,” Croghan wrote Hamilton, “I should have endeavored to have made them stay in Virginia at the camp before I would have drawn such an expense on the province or such trouble on myself.” The warriors had taken refuge at Aughwick because they trusted its owner. So did other Indians. On 22 August the Pennsylvania Journal reported that ten Shawnees who had gone to Augh-

28 For “of their interest with the Indians” see Washington to Fairfax, 1 Aug. 1754, GWPCS, 1:185; for “a charming field for an encounter” and for building of Fort Necessity see Alan Axelrod, Bleeding at Great Meadows: Young George Washington and the Battle that Shaped the Man (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2007), 185, 195; for “If we depend on Indian assistance” see Washington to Fairfax, 1 Aug. 1754, GWPCS, 1:187.
wick from Lower Shawnee Town refused to divulge their mission to Tanaghrisson or to anyone else until they had consulted Croghan, who might have been visiting William Trent at the Wills Creek depot or Colonel James Innes, the commander of its militia.29

Governor Hamilton was nonplussed. From frantic western counties had come petitions for action, so that he had asked the Pennsylvania Assembly for defense appropriations, but the Quaker-dominated body had refused to appropriate money without strings largely because its pacifist Quaker speaker, Isaac Norris, had reasoned that under the pretext of royal sanction the Ohio Company had endeavored to involve all the colonies of British North America in the defense of its land claims. Yet the stakes were higher than frontier defense or Ohio Company land claims or even Quaker pacifism. The French, as William Trent wrote a friend, “make no doubt of being masters of all America.” In the end Hamilton tired of battling the Assembly and wanted out, but Proprietor Thomas Penn talked him into remaining in office until his successor, Robert Hunter Morris, the former chief justice of New Jersey and a supporter of royal prerogatives, reached Philadelphia.30

When Croghan returned to Aughwick, he found Delawares as well as the ten Shawnees. While they were visiting Fort Duquesne, the Delawares had met Captain Robert Stobo, a Virginia militia captain who had been captured during the Battle of the Great Meadows. They gave Croghan a letter written secretly by Stobo, and though the letter, which urged an attack on the poorly guarded Fort Duquesne, was meant for the commanding officer in Virginia, Croghan opened it and copied its contents for Governor Hamilton. Croghan of

29 For “As there is” see Montour to Hamilton, 21 Jul. 1754, *MPCP*, 6:130; for “Had I been” see Croghan to Hamilton, 30 Aug. 1754, *ibid.*, 6:160-161; for ten Shawnees see *Pennsylvania Journal*, 22 Aug. 1754; for Wills Creek depot as Croghan’s likely destination see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 71.

30 For Norris’ opinion see Norris to Robert Charles, 19 Apr. 1754, Norris Letter Book (1719-56), 49-50, HSP; for “make no doubt” see Trent to James Burd, 7 Jul. 1754, Papers of the Shippen Family, 15:119, HSP; for appointment of Morris to governorship see Penn to Peters, 9 Jan. 1754, Penn Letter Book, 3:193, HSP; see also *ibid.*, 3:296, HSP.
course knew that his action would expose him to criticism, so he made the excuse that the Delawares had had “the letter broke open.” In late December, Maryland Governor Horatio Sharpe would reject the excuse and urge the new governor, Robert Hunter Morris, to heed rumors that Croghan was a traitor, a Roman Catholic in league with one Campbell, a Roman Catholic who had visited Fort Duquesne on treasonous business. During four speeches to Croghan and Tanaghrisson, the Delawares and Shawnees confirmed the letter’s contents. “The Indians,” Croghan wrote James Hamilton, who was as yet the outgoing governor, “are all very uneasy to see the Backwardness of the English, and say they fear what the French tell them of their Brethren is too true, that is, that the English are afraid of the French notwithstanding their superior Number.” The Indians had visited Aughwick to see plans for an attack on Fort Duquesne in the fall. “They imagine it will not be hard to do now,” said Croghan, “but if deferred till next Spring, they think it will be very difficult to do.”

Tanaghrisson sent the Aughwick Delawares and Shawnees invitations to a conference at Aughwick and Croghan a request to invite incumbent Governor Hamilton to the conference. “They all seem to think,” Croghan wrote Hamilton, “if the English do nothing this Fall when they have it in their Power, that the Ohio Lands will belong to the French, so that it is my Opinion this meeting will determine the Ohio Indians, either in Favour of the English or French.” Tanaghrisson had asked Croghan to invite Colonel James Innes, who, being “very much for attacking this Fall,” had gone to the Wills Creek depot to re-join its militia. Croghan enclosed an expense account that showed “what a Burden it is to maintain so may Indians.” He hoped the Pennsylvania Assembly would “allow” it so he

31 For letter, excuse, and quotations see Croghan to Hamilton, 16 Aug. 1754, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 6:217, HSP; for Sharpe’s opinion see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 71.
could “pay the People” who sold him flour and meat or else he should “be obliged to the Expences.” Upon receiving the invitation Hamilton appointed Conrad Weiser proxy and gave him £300 to buy Indian provisions. “I may venture to assure you that Your Services will be duly considered,” Hamilton wrote Croghan, “and that a prudent Behaviour in the Management of such an important Concern as is now committed to Your Care will recommend you to the favour of the Government.” The maintenance costs were beyond Croghan’s means, however. While the Indians “destroyed” thirty acres of his corn, provisions were “very dear and hard to be got” because local farmers took “all Opportunities to extort an extravagant Price” for their fare. Croghan needed an agent to keep accounts so that the government could not question his expenses.32

Upon his arrival at Aughwick, Weiser verified Croghan’s plight to Governor Hamilton. Around Croghan’s house were over twenty cabins that housed at least two hundred hungry Indian men, women, and children while the Indians who were “scattered thereofabout, some two or three miles off” came “to fetch Meal.” Croghan, having “between twenty-five and thirty Acres of the best Indian Corn,” sent “his servants every day to fetch four or five Bags full of roasting Ears” for the Indians, but there was “not an hour in the day what some steal into it and fetch more.” Weiser opined that the Indians would “destroy one-half” of the corn before it could “be gathered in, to say nothing of the Butter, Milk, Squashes, Pumpkins, they daily fetch, for all which if he be not allowed he must be a great Loser.” Weiser related that he had advised Croghan “to charge for it what was reasonable, and to get two or three creditable men . . . to value the Corn that the Indians took

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32 For “They all seem” see Croghan to Hamilton, 16 Aug. 1754, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 6:217, HSP; for Hamilton’s appointment of Weiser as proxy see “Instructions to Conrad Weiser, Esq.,” 24 Aug. 1754, MP CP, 6:147-148; for “I may venture” see Hamilton to Croghan, 23 Aug. 1754, ibid., 6:147; for “destroyed” and “very dear” see Croghan to Hamilton, 30 Aug. 1754, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 6:219, HSP.
away, and certify it.” Weiser opined that “Mr. Croghan must either be trusted to buy and distribute Provision or the Government must keep a Man in there in whom they can confide to receive the Provision from Mr. Croghan or those that being it and so distribute it according to the Governor’s Instructions,” though some Indians would “scatter before the Winter comes.” Weiser appealed to Hamilton to end liquor sales because Croghan could not end them on his own. Sellers kept their stock “in the Woods about or within a mile from his House” to entice Indians, who would go into the woods to “drink their Cloathing” and then, “drunk and naked,” go back “to Croghan’s.”

The 3-6 September conference was inconclusive and Croghan messaged Colonel James Innes, who forwarded the message to Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie. The message is lost, but its contents may be inferred from Dinwiddie’s reaction to it. The letter, written “in a very odd Stile,” advised Innes to send the Aughwick Indians presents. “As for his not being concerned for Virg’a, the Co’t’y will be at no great Loss on y’t head,” Dinwiddie wrote Innes, “for I am convinced he does nothing without private Views of Int’t [interest].” Perhaps Dinwiddie, an Ohio Company investor using the public trust to pursue self-interest, was right about Croghan relative to Virginia, but Croghan was using his own crops to feed the Aughwick Indians, and they were showing signs of impatience and fear, there being current intelligence that the French army intended to kill him, Scarouaday, and Andrew Montour. “The Indians here seem very uneasy at their long Stay, as they have heard nothing from the Governor of Virginia, nor your Honour since M’Weiser went away,” Croghan wrote Hamilton; “nor do they see the English making any Preparations to attack the French, which seems to give them a great deal of Concern.”

33 For quotations see Weiser to Hamilton, 13 Sept. 1754, MPCP, 6:148-150.
ghan hoped that the new governor would aid him because he could not “keep them together much longer.”

Upon his arrival in Philadelphia on 3 October 1754 Governor Robert Hunter Morris began work immediately. Because the western frontier was vulnerable to French and Indian attack, he urged the Pennsylvania Assembly to appropriate funds for defense and delivered the letters that the previous governor had received from Croghan and Weiser since August. The Assembly appropriated money for Croghan, who used it to pay some of his expenses though the lives of his fellows on the western frontier were at stake, too. Croghan informed the provincial government that the Indians who visited Aughwick told him that the French were wooing them with promises of food, clothing, and protection and boasts of sending war parties against Pennsylvania’s western inhabitants to prevent the expedition against Fort Duquesne in the fall. As to the expedition Croghan wrote Richard Peters, “I think they Need Nott dread.” Croghan informed the provincial government that Colonel James Innes invited the Aughwick Indians to the Wills Creek depot to receive a Virginia present. “They Sett off Tomorrow butt Laves thire women & children here behind till they Return which they Expect will be in ten Days.” Upon their return they “Intends to build a town hear and Expects ye government will Stockead itt Round for them,” for they “aperahind [apprehend] Danger this fall from the Enemy.”

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34 For conference see “Journal of Proceedings of Conrad Weiser in his Way to and at Aucqwick, by Order of His Honour Governor Hamilton, in the Year 1754, in August and September,” ibid., 6:150-160; for “in a very odd Stile” see Dinwiddie to Innes, 18 Sept. 1754, RDP, 1:320-321; for “The Indians here seem” see Croghan to Hamilton, 27 Sept. 1754, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 6:221, HSP.
Tanaghrisson died before the Ohio Indians left Aughwick for the Wills Creek depot and his death obliged Croghan “to Make a Condolence Speech to them and a present of goods to Cover his Grave in ye. Name of ye. governor of this province as they Could Not See ye. Road Nor hear whatt the governor of Virginiia had to say to them till that Seramoney [ceremony] had been Don.” The ceremony cost him £23.14, but because he had “Don itt without any orders,” he omitted its cost from his account, which he intended for the Pennsylvania Assembly and enclosed with his letter to Peters. The ceremony’s cost was virtually nothing compared to his major expense, however: Out of thirty acres of “good Indian corn” the Indians had left him “but 86 bushels.” An appreciative Governor Morris wrote him, “Mr. Peters has mentioned you to me in a very favourable manner, & I am Glad the Province has a man at this critical time among the Indians that they so much de-pend upon.”

Still, Croghan needed to unburden himself. On 8 November the Ohio Indians who had gone to the Wills Creek depot returned with their Virginia present. Although ten of them went back to the depot two days later to undertake winter scouting duties for the militia, Aughwick numbered 180 mixed Indian men, women, and children who expected provincial assistance. The expense of assisting them, Croghan wrote Governor Morris on 23 November, would be great because the Indians were “afread to Separate or go out in ye. Woods A hunting for fear of the Enemy.” Croghan was “Senceable” that the Indians were “A greatt Expence to this government,” but the expense was “Much More” for him because they had “Destroy’d” his winter corn and grain stores. “Now I am oblidg’d. to kill My own Cattle for thire Suport,” he complained to Morris, “besides ye. Cheiffs has fre-

36 For “to Make a Condolence Speech” see Croghan to [Peters], 16 Oct. 1754, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 19, HSP; for “Mr. Peters has mentioned” see Morris to Croghan, 25 Nov. 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:203.
quently Kept out Scouts to watch ye. Motchons [motions] of ye. French and oblidg'd. Me to pay them which has Cost Me above £50 worth of goods this Sumer which is A burden I am Nott able to bear and I Cant Charge ye. government as I had No orders to Do So.” He pleaded with Morris to send “Some person to provide for them of the government” and “Soon as there will be No Carring aCross the Mountains in a Little time.” He contemplated relocation, not just because Indians had consumed stores of his crops, but because he felt unsafe at Aughwick, too. 37

On 1 December, Croghan presented the Aughwick Mingos provincial goods as well as a small gift “to Condole with them on ye death of the half king [Tanaghrisson], and to Wipe ye Tears from thire Eyes to ye mount of £20.10.” He delivered Morris’ speech to the Mingos, who received it kindly. Next day he iterated his desire to leave Aughwick because his guests expected him to fulfill provincial promises to them. Unable to “Do any thing for them,” he thought “itt proper” that a provincial interpreter be sent “to take Care of them.” On the one hand they believed that he had received orders to supply them with goods yet intended “to Cheet them outt of their Rites,” and on the other hand provincial officials believed that he misrepresented expenses. “To acquit” himself of “Reflections on boath Sides,” he asked that “some other person” be “apointed to provide for them,” someone who might “Do itt Better” than he could. He made the request not because he had never received “any thing” for his “truble,” but rather because he wished “to avoid Sencur [censure].” Still, he assured Morris that he had “Neaver Received a farthing” for his “own time & truble Spent on those ocations” because provincial officials “allways paid” him “fer ye Services” of his horses” but never for his “Truble.” When

37 For quotations see Croghan to Morris, 23 Nov. 1754, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 19, HSP.
they sent Indian trader John Patten “to Ohio with a Letter” during the previous winter, they “aLowed him £50,” but when they sent Croghan on a similar mission, they made him not “y£ Least acknolidegement,” though he “was outt three Months.” Morris passed the request to the Pennsylvania Assembly, which expressed a willingness to grant it.38

Governor Morris refused the request because in his view Croghan had been acting as an Indian agent on his own accord and because ex-governor James Hamilton and not he had promised compensation. Morris nevertheless sent Croghan £50 as compensation for past services and to prevent “further misunderstanding” between the two men required him to set his own wages. For his part Croghan was “to act for” the provincial government as it “maintained” the Indians “in their troublesome affairs.” Morris paid a £65 bill for Croghan, sent him £100 for use in the maintenance of the Aughwick Indians, requested that he bill the provincial government for destroyed corn, and advised him to make drafts on the provincial treasurer or secretary. Pleased, Croghan withdrew his request though he had given some Shawnee visitors goods that he had bought for £42. He had “Don itt,” he wrote Richard Peters on 5 December, “for y£ good of y£ Government, as Every Body is Sencable I Can have No vews of Tread.” On 10 December, Peters wrote back that if Croghan “faithfully performed” his charge, the Pennsylvania Assembly would be very well-disposed toward him. Croghan substituted cheap local grain for game because local Indian hunters avoided the enemy-infested forest. He used the £100 to buy the grain, whose price soon rose because a nearby British encampment demanded it too. To help Indians who were in “great want,” he stretched funds. To prevent Indians “from Spending thire Cloase [clothes]” on alcohol, he warned settlers and Indian traders “Nott to barter or Sell

38 For Morris’ speech see “The Speech of Governor Morris to the Indians at Aughwick,” n.d., PA, 1st ser., 2:193-194; for quotations see Croghan to Morris, 2 Dec. 1754, ibid., 2:209-211; for economic distress, etc., see Croghan to Peters, 2 Dec. 1754, ibid., 2:211-212.
Spiretus Liquers to the Indians or to any person to bring amongst them.” Now and then, however, to buoy up their spirits, he gave them “a Cag” for “a frolick” with “no bad Consequences” to them” and at no expense to the provincial government.39

In early 1755 the duke of Cumberland, William Augustus, urged his father, King George II, to use British regulars to conquer French North America. The ministry consequently targeted the following forts for capture—Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio, Fort Saint Frédéric at Crown Point on Lake Champlain, Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario, and Fort Beauséjour in Acadia. Two British regiments supported by colonial militia raised by Massachusetts Governor William Shirley and merchant-baronet William Pepperell would capture the forts. The ministry appointed Major General Edward Braddock commander-in-chief of all British forces in North America and ordered him to marshal regulars and militia for the attack on Fort Duquesne, first at Williamsburg, Virginia, and second at the Ohio Company’s fortified depot at Wills Creek, Maryland. Sir John St. Clair, the deputy quartermaster, preceded him to the depot. In the ensuing flurry of logistical activity the depot was renamed Fort Cumberland in honor of the hawkish duke. To great fanfare on 23 February 1755 Braddock entered Williamsburg, where he met Governor Robert Dinwiddie over militia, money, and supplies. In mid-March, British warships carrying the two regiments of regulars sailed into Hampton Roads, where the James and Elizabeth Rivers flow into the Chesapeake Bay. For Williamsburg’s denizens, the disembarkation

39 For letter transfer see Morris’ Address to Assembly, 4 Dec. 1754, MPCI, 6:188; see also Norris to Morris, ibid., 6:189-190; for “further misunderstanding” see Morris to Croghan, 7 Dec. 1754, Records of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, 14 Apr. 1753 to 1 Apr. 1755, PSA; for “Don itt” see Croghan to Peters, 5 Dec. 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:213; for “faithfully performed” see Peters to Croghan, 10 Dec. 1754, ibid., 2:214; for grain purchase see Croghan to Peters, 23 Dec. 1754, ibid., 2:218-219; for “great want” and “Nott to barter” see Croghan to Morris, 23 Dec. 1754, ibid., 2:219.
was nearly as august as an ancient Roman triumph. Surely the general and his men would bring glory to Great Britain.\textsuperscript{40}

By then Croghan had accounted his quarterly expenses for the Pennsylvania Assembly. “[Y]e Expences Runs very high you will see by My accout,” he wrote Assembly Speaker Isaac Norris, “Butt I aShure you itt was Nott in My Power to Mentain them Less.” Croghan suggested that the provincial government ought to relieve itself of “heavy Expences Fer yë. Futer” by designating a place for his Indians to build a village and plant corn, “as they Dont Same to Incline to go From hear till they See how this Ware will End between ye English & French.” To repay his suppliers for goods and provisions, he needed payments, and “to Manidge For yë. Futer,” he needed instructions. Norris passed Croghan’s account to the Assembly, which deemed charges for wheat and flour excessive, appropriated just £50 for payments, and passed the account to “a very grave and serious man” for final disposition—assemblyman Joseph Armstrong of Cumberland County. Unlike the critical Assembly, Governor Morris trusted Croghan with public funds. On 14 February, Sir John St. Clair had written Morris about Pennsylvania’s cutting a wagon road westward toward Fort Duquesne, a road over which the army could move men, supplies, and equipment more efficiently than could be accomplished otherwise. On 10 March, Morris and his agreeable Pennsylvania Council resolved to survey a road from Raystown to Turkey Foot at the forks of the Youghiogheny River and a road from Raystown to Fort Cumberland and to commission five Cumberland County residents—George Croghan, John Armstrong, James Burd, William Buchanan, and Adam Hoops—to survey the roads.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} For British strategy see “Council Held at Alexandria, Virginia,” 14 Apr. 1755, \textit{MPCP}, 6:365-368; see also Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 68; see also Wainwright, \textit{George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat}, 79.

\textsuperscript{41} For “[Y]e Expences Runs” see Croghan to Norris, 25 Mar. 1755, Etting Coll., Misc. Mss., 1:82, HSP; for appropriation see \textit{Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania}. \smallskip
Governor Morris and his Council instructed John Armstrong, who was then at Carlisle, to assemble his fellows to divulge the business at hand. “If the Indians enquire,” the instructions stated, “leave it to Mr. Croghan to give them an Answer, viz: that the inhabitants want to find out Roads to carry their Flower or any Thing else that he pleases.” At a Shippensburg store Armstrong divulged the secretive business to his fellows, who drank with him until Croghan paid the tab. On 29 March the commissioners, two chains-men, two horsemen, three pioneers, and some Aughwick Mingos left for Fort Cumberland. Of the four packhorses carrying food and supplies, Croghan owned three. On 11 April the party reached the Youghiogheny River and turned south upon receiving intelligence that a large party of French and Indian scouts and hunters was ahead. As the party journeyed south, Mingos deserted, whereupon Croghan boasted that he could pick up the trail once the cutters began to cut the road. At Fort Cumberland the party met the deputy quartermaster, Sir John St. Clair, who, raging “like a Lyon Rampant,” refused to peruse the commissioners’ schemata. Pennsylvania, he roared, had given the French army time to reinforce Fort Duquesne. Despite St. Clair’s prejudice the commissioners went about their work and in a few weeks Croghan returned to Aughwick. On 30 April he received Morris’ orders to attach Aughwick warriors to the army and solicit Ohio warriors for aid.42

In the morning of 1 May, Croghan sent messengers west and in the morning next day went southwest with Scarouady and fifty Aughwick Mingo warriors and their families.

42 For “If the Indians enquire” see Peters to Armstrong, 15 Mar. 1755, MPCP, 6:324; for meeting see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 80; for journey see Burd to Morris, 17 Jul. 1755, MPCP, 6:484-485; for “like a Lyon Rampant” see Commissioners to Morris, 16 Apr. 1755, ibid., 6:368; for Croghan’s orders see Morris to Croghan, 23 Apr. 175[5], ibid., 6:372.
Edward Ward stayed behind to oversee Mingos and African slaves at the agency, which was quiet, for even its horses, rented to the army, were gone. After arriving at Fort Cumberland, Croghan wrote Morris of his reluctance to provision Mingos because he found “it very difficult to settle” his accounts and could not “go to Philadelphia” to “see them settled.” In May, upon Joseph Armstrong’s recommendation, the Pennsylvania Assembly paid some of his bills, but more gratifying to him was a new letter of license that exempted him from creditors for six years. He promised to pay its undersigned creditors a sum equal to his income from horse rentals and army salary. Of those creditors who refused to sign it, Edward Shippen was most persistent. To his debt-collecting son-in-law, James Burd, he wrote, “Act as wise as a serpent, & a harmless as a dove, for Mr. Croghan may possible be led but can not be driven.” Although Burd was supervising road-cutting in western Pennsylvania, he set up a meeting with Croghan to settle Shippen’s accounts. The meeting was to occur about 6 May after Croghan returned from Fort Cumberland.

“Don’t be Uneasy that this affair is not Settled before,” Burd wrote Shippen, “as it is Entirely owing to Severall things occurring that has prevented it, but rest assured if I live it Shall be done upon M'. Croghans return.” Even when Croghan overstayed at Fort Cumberland, Burd was hopeful. “I expect G: C at our camp every day,” he wrote Shippen.43

Croghan stayed at Fort Cumberland to escape other legal troubles. He had sold bits of his 1749 “purchase” from the Onondaga Council, but the “purchase” had been and was illegal since the proprietors had not approved it. If private individuals could purchase Indian

43 For orders see Morris to Croghan, 23 Apr. 175[5], MPCP, 6:372; for compliance see Croghan to Morris, 1 May 1755, ibid., 6:374-375; for “it very difficult to settle” see Croghan to Morris, 20 May 1755, ibid., 6:399; for “Act as wise as a serpent” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 83; for “don’t be uneasy” see Burd to Shippen, 27 Apr. 1755, Papers of the Shippen Family, Correspondence, 1:179, HSP; for “I expect” see Burd to Shippen, 31 May 1755, ibid., 1:191, HSP.
lands, Proprietor Thomas Penn had written Richard Peters on 22 February, then Indians would be “practic’d upon for the private advantage of every worthless fellow that goes among them.” To win Penn, Croghan offered to survey a tract for him, but the offer only appeased Penn, who balked at a later offer of an improved tract. “I would not give him one shilling for the whole of it,” Penn wrote Peters. “I think the location of twelve tracts of good land of more value than all these improvements, which tracts I suppose he proposes for Mr. Hockley’s benefit, that is the location of them.” Croghan had proposed to locate lands for Hockley, but the proposal had fizzled. “At the joint instance of Messrs. Hockley & Croghan I made twelve surveys in the new purchase, the bargain betwixt these gentn broke up, and neither of them paid me one shilg of fees,” wrote surveyor John Armstrong. “After some years Geo: Croghan by virtue of his Indian deed was granted the lands on the whole of Ochwick p an order sent to me to survey them.” If Penn nullified the “Indian deed,” then he nullified the sales, too. Croghan had thus shifted a “dispute” between him and the proprietors to one between the proprietors and “private people,” so that Penn, reluctant to engage settlers in a public legal battle that might excite the proprietary party, allowed the deed and sales to stand. Still, four mortgagers launched a preemptive strike in the 9 October 1755 issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette, wherein they stated that they would not honor notes given Croghan for his tracts.  

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44 For “practic’d upon” see Penn to Peters, 21 Feb. 1755, Penn Letter Book, 4:38, HSP; for survey offer see Penn to Peters, 29 May 1755, ibid., 4:89-90, HSP; for “one shilling” see Penn to Peters, 3 Jul. 1755, ibid., 4:118, HSP; for “joint instance” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 84; for “private people” see Penn to Peters, 14 Aug. 1755, Penn Letter Book, 4:141, HSP; for titleholders’ warning see Pennsylvania Gazette, 9 Oct. 1755.
George Croghan was doing his duty for king and country, or more precisely his double duty, for both Governor Robert Hunter Morris of Pennsylvania and the Colonel of the Six Nations and their Allies, William Johnson of New York, had ordered him to go to Fort Cumberland, Maryland. Between his trading post at Aughwick (now Shirleysburg, Pennsylvania) and his destination to the southwest rose the mighty Allegheny Mountains, and yet a journey over these Appalachian ranges posed no challenge to the rugged Irishman, for thirteen years in the Indian trade had inured him to hardship and privation. The purpose of his mission was to do a service for Major General Edward Braddock, who was readying two regiments of British regulars and nine companies of Virginia militiamen for an expedition against French-held Fort Duquesne, strategically situated at the confluence of the Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers in southwestern Pennsylvania. Surprisingly, though his orders stressed the need for Indian aid in wilderness combat, Braddock had yet to engage the services of Indians, especially Ohio Indians, whom both Morris and Johnson insisted would be crucial to the success of the operation. What the general needed, in their considerable opinion, was a seasoned negotiator who could not only deliver Indians but also lead them. Croghan was their man.¹

Croghan did not intend to serve only the public interest, however. As the indispensable man in the present crisis, he intended to use his new status to revive his finances, which had declined steadily since the early 1750s, when low prices in Europe for furs and skins.

¹ For Morris’ orders and Indian aid see Morris to Charles Hardy, 5 Jul. 1756, PA, 1st ser., 2:689; see also “A Journal of Indian Transactions by George Croghan, Esq.,” 14 Mar. 1757, Mss., Transcripts of Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, Vol. 16 (Bundle P, 2-20), HSP; for Johnson’s orders and Indian aid see Johnson to Croghan, 23 Apr. 1755, SWJP, 1:475-476; for Braddock’s instructions see “General Braddock’s Instructions, 1754,” PA, 1st ser., 2:205; for context of Johnson’s orders see James Thomas Flexner, Mohawk Baronet: A Biography of Sir William Johnson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959; reprint, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989), 125-126; for Braddock’s need for Indian aid see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 151.
had forced him to sell at a loss, and when the suddenly aggressive French and Canadians
had driven him from his trading post deep in Miami territory, in what is now western
Ohio. Although he and his former trading partners, Richard Hockley and William Trent,
had lost nearly everything, well-connected creditors were threatening suit, for they be-
lieved the cause of their financial woes lay not so much in falling prices and foreign com-
petition as in his poor judgment and questionable dealing. Life was hard, and fortune
fickle, but rather than gripe he acted, for experience had taught him that in the unforgiv-
ing wilderness complaints died quickly, like the screeches of wounded game in the deep
valleys among the ancient Alleghenies. Perhaps military service might be the perfect ex-
pedient to recover losses or secure debt relief or duck creditors. Perhaps, if he performed
his duties well, he could burnish his reputation. In his mind there existed no conflict be-
tween public service and opportunism: Self-interest was as natural to men like him as
self-preservation was to the white-tailed deer or the black bear that Delaware, Shawnee,
and Mingo hunters stalked beyond Aughwick.2

Before and after arriving at Fort Cumberland, the new fort and barracks complex on the
Maryland bank of the Potomac River near Wills Creek, sixty-year-old Edward Braddock
groused incessantly. How could he fight the infernal French without his full complement
of men and supplies? Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia had promised militiamen,
but all he ever sent were “very indifferent men” who “cost infinite pains and labour” to

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2 For Croghan’s pursuit of self-interest see Croghan to Johnson, 15 May 1755, SWJP, 1:496-497; see also
“A Journal of Indian Transactions by George Croghan, Esq.,” 14 Mar. 1757, Mss., Transcripts of Board of
Trade Papers, Plantations General, Vol. 16 (Bundle P, 2-20), HSP; for Croghan’s pursuit of self-interest
and its context see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 22-87; see also Volwiler, George
Croghan and the Westward Movement, 17-79; see also Merrell, Into the American Woods, 80, 96, 98, 134-
135, 205-208, 295. Colonial elites held Indian traders in low esteem. Governor Robert Hunter Morris of
Pennsylvania, for example, said that Indian traders were “mostly of a Low sort of people, generally too ig-
norant to be employed as Spys [sic], but not at all too virtuous.” See Morris to Charles Hardy, 5 Jul. 1756,
PA, 1st ser., 2:690. Charles Hardy was the governor of New York.
exercise “any sort of Regularity and Discipline.” Dinwiddie had promised supplies and warriors, too. Where were they? Only when the general threatened to “march back” to the colony, wrote an anonymous British officer, did Virginia stir, undertaking “to furnish us with Horses, Bread, and Beef” but delivering “nothing but Carion for Meat, Indian Corn for Bread, [and] Jades for Horses that cannot carry themselves.” One bad day the general barked this threat at Pennsylvania agent Richard Peters: “Unless the Province of Pennsylvania would hearken to his Applications to them by Mr. [Benjamin] Franklin, the army could not stir this Summer, and he would complain to the King of the Remissness of the contiguous Provinces.” The general sized up his situation thus: The Virginia hawks were incompetent, whereas the Pennsylvania doves were stingy. Nothing was his fault. Between rants during which his ruddy face turned crimson, the general fussed with details or disciplined regulars or indulged in “whoreing & feasting.” Otherwise, he flaunted his status, which favor at court, not distinction in the field, had brought him.3

One day, after he and Benjamin Franklin had concluded the business of logistics, Braddock disclosed his plan to capture Fort Duquesne. “The only Danger I apprehend of Obstruction to your March, is from Ambuscades of Indians, who by constant Practice are dextrous in laying & executing them,” said the Philadelphia sage after listening intently. “And the slender Line near four Miles long, which your Army must take, may expose it to be attack’d by Surprize in its Flanks, and to be cut like a Thread into several Pieces, which from their Distance cannot come up in time to support each other.” The general smirked. “These Savages may indeed be a formidable Enemy to your raw American Militia,” he said, “but, upon the King’s regular & disciplin’d Troops, sir, it is impossible they should make any Impression.” Conscious of the “Impropriety” of disputing with a general “in matters of his profession,” Franklin retreated. When ninety-one Pennsylvania wagons, eleven bursting with cheese, bacon, and the like, did arrive at last at thankful Fort Cumberland, the anonymous British officer opined privately that “your Cheese and your Bacon” are “the Baits that draw Rats to Destruction.”

Like Franklin, Croghan deferred to Braddock. Following orders from Governor Morris and Colonel Johnson, Croghan had brought fifty Aughwick Mingo warriors to Fort Cumberland on 14 May 1755, and although these Ohio Iroquois refugees knew the forest around Fort Duquesne, and more important how to fight in it, Braddock ignored their call

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for a war council and ordered Croghan to recruit Ohio Delaware and Shawnee warriors. Bristling at this slight, the Aughwick Mingo warriors approached Braddock repeatedly, but because they had brought their measly families to Fort Cumberland instead of his warrior legions he put them off until six Ohio chiefs arrived eight days later. “We often endeavored to advise him and tell him the danger he was in with his Soldiers,” said Aughwick Mingo spokesman Scarouady, “but he never appeared pleased with us, & that was the reason that a great many of our Warriors left him & would not be under his Command.” Another reason was callousness. To end “disruptive” sexual relations between his officers and Mingo women, Braddock barred the women from camp and then ordered Croghan to send them back to Aughwick. Who would protect their women when war came? the warriors likely asked Croghan. Who would protect their children? Only eight warriors stayed on as scouts; the rest, having pledged to rejoin the expedition before it reached the Great Meadows, escorted their families out of Fort Cumberland.⁵

No official record of the conference between Braddock and the six Ohio chiefs on 22 May exists, but Ohio Delaware chief Shingas did relate its substance to captive Charles Stuart in October. At great personal risk Shingas had smuggled out of Fort Duquesne a

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⁵ For Morris’ orders to recruit Mingo warriors see Morris to Hardy, 5 Jul. 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:689; for Johnson’s orders to recruit Mingo warriors see Johnson to Croghan, 23 Apr. 1755, SWJP, 1: 475-476; for Braddock’s orders to recruit Ohio Delaware and Shawnee warriors see “A Journal of Indian Transactions by George Croghan, Esq.,” 14 Mar. 1757, Mss., Transcripts of Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, Vol. 16 (Bundle P, 2-20), HSP; for arrival of Croghan and Aughwick Mingos see Pennsylvania Gazette, 29 May 1755; for “We often endeavored” see “Philadelphia Council between Governor Morris, Conrad Weiser, etc., and Indians, incl. Scarroyady & Andrew Montour,” 22 Aug. 1755, MP CP, 6:589; for disruptive sexual relations and Braddock’s actions see “Minutes of Richard Peters,” 2 Jun. 1755, ibid., 6:397; for desertion of all but eight Mingo warriors see “A Journal of Indian Transactions by George Croghan, Esq.,” 14 Mar. 1757, Mss., Transcripts of Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, Vol. 16 (Bundle P, 2-20), HSP; see also “Mr. Croghan’s Account of Indian Affairs from 1748/9 to General Braddock’s Defeat,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 1:52, HSP; see also C. A. Weslager, The Delaware Indians: A History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 223; for exit of Mingo women and children and desertion of Mingo warriors see Croghan to Morris, 20 May 1755, MP CP, 6:398; for Mingo warriors’ exit and pledge see Edward Shippen to William Allen, 4 Jul. 1755, Shippen Papers, 1:207, HSP; for primary source details see BRC, 185-186, 191-192, 199-201, 205.
map drawn secretly by captive Robert Stobo. Shingas had given the map to Croghan, who had forwarded it to Philadelphia authorities, who had forwarded it to Braddock, but because Braddock dismissed this goodwill gesture outright, Shingas and the other chiefs asked him questions bearing upon their interests. What did he intend “to do with the Land” if he could “drive the French and their Indians away”? “The English Shoud Inhabit & Inherit the Land,” he said. Would friendly Indians be permitted “to Live and Trade Among the English and have Hunting Ground sufficient To Support themselves and [their] Familys”? “No Savage Shou’d Inherit the Land,” he said, before distributing gifts. Next morning, in hopes that he had changed his mind, the chiefs confronted him, but he had not, so they said that if they did “not have Liberty To Live on the Land they wou’d not Fight for it,” and he snapped back that he “did not need their Help and had No doubt of driveing the French and their Indians away.” After promising him military aid the chiefs returned to their Ohio villages, where they divulged his true intentions to outraged listeners. Public indignation compelled the chiefs to adopt a neutral course; public outcry inspired some very aggrieved warriors to join the French army mustering at Fort Duquesne.6

Why had Aughwick Mingo warriors and Ohio Delaware and Shawnee chiefs withheld military aid? Simply put, Braddock had alienated them. When he had met with them, he had conformed to the conventions of frontier diplomacy (the use of metaphorical lan-

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6 For “to do with the Land” see Charles Stuart, “The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-57,” ed. Beverly W. Bond Jr., Mississippi Valley Historical Review 13, 1 (Jun. 1926), 63-64; for complementary primary source account see “A Journal of Indian Transactions by George Croghan, Esq.,” 14 Mar. 1757, Mss., Transcripts of the Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, Vol. 16 (Bundle P, 2-20), HSP; see also “Captain Orme’s Journal,” in Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, ed. Sargent, 314; see also [Anonymous], “A Journal of the proceedings of the Seamen . . .,” in ibid., 380; for other primary source details see BRC, 215-216; for secondary source account see Anderson, Crucible of War, 94-96; see also Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 155-56. Francis Jennings states that the Ohio Indians might have offered to capture Fort Duquesne for Braddock, but this of course would have been intolerable to the general, whose attitude may be summed up thus: He would not let mere “savages” steal his glory.
guage and the act of reciprocal gift-giving) but not to the process (extensive discourse leading to consensus agreement). Rather than meeting them “at the crossroads” he had dictated to them and thereby betrayed himself and the British for what they truly were—ravenous imperialists. The real price of Braddock’s gifts was not loyalty but submission. Feigning loyalty, the warriors and the chiefs had promised Braddock military aid, but in truth they were looking out for their interests: They were gambling that the coming battle between the British and the French would presage the coming war. “These people are villains,” a British officer wrote, “and always side with the strongest.” Allying with the “strongest,” however, was prudent, not villainous. Already, Braddock had slighted the Aughwick Mingo diplomatic process and scorned Ohio Delaware and Shawnee tribal rights, especially those of village autonomy and land usage, so there was no practical advantage in allying with him and his army, but a military alliance with the French, should their army prove stronger in battle, might prove advantageous in the long run. Certainly, tangible rewards would accrue to those tribes that had helped the French win a full-blown war. More important, however, was this question: When had a vanquished ally honored prewar deals? Both the Aughwick Mingo warriors and the Ohio Delaware and Shawnee chiefs adopted a wait-and-see policy—a sensible policy indeed.7

Despite oppressive heat and humidity Croghan was buoyant, for he was “in great respect with the general,” who had designated him “Conductor” of Indians at ten shillings a

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7 For mismanagement of meeting with Indians see William Shirley to Peters, 21 May 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:321; for conventions and process of Indian diplomatic protocol see Merritt, At the Crossroads, 80-81, 210-213; see also Merrell, Into the American Woods, 58-60, 179-181, 186-193, 212-214; see also Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them’” The Interpreter as Cultural Broker during Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-1770,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1988): 60-80; for Indian promise and for “These people” see [Anonymous], “A Journal of the proceedings of the Seamen . . .,” in Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, ed. Sargent, 380; for Indian promise see also “A Journal of Indian Transactions by George Croghan, Esq.,” 14 Mar. 1757, Mss., Transcripts of the Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, Vol. 16 (Bundle P, 2-20), HSP.
day, promised to “represent his Case” in England, and assured him that he would be “re-

funded if so.” He turned to Pennsylvania agent Richard Peters to solve his legal problem. 

To this end Peters had brought Richard Hockley and summoned William Trent, who had 

accompanied Croghan to Fort Cumberland. Peters told Croghan and Trent that Lancaster 

merchant Edward Shippen was making a £700 demand on Hockley “for goods bought, as 

he says, by us, or one of us, for the Use of Hockley, Trent & Croghan,” and that Paxton 

trader John Carson was making a £900 demand on Hockley “for goods, alleged by him, 

to be delivered by us, for the Use of Hockley, Croghan & Trent.” Hockley stated that he 

had purchased the goods for his partners’ personal use only, so Peters prepared a certifi-

cate to the effect that the goods were “on their account and not on that of Hockley Trent 

& Croghan.” On paper at least Croghan and Trent owed Shippen and Carson. On 24 

May, Croghan and Trent signed the document and Hockley witnessed it. Confident that 

Braddock would pull strings for him in official circles in England, Croghan conveyed to 

Peters and Hockley powers of attorney to accept any refund that the British government 

should return for his losses to the French and Canadians. Out of the refund would come 

the money owed Hockley. Notwithstanding official support, Hockley feared that Shippen 

and Carson would again “come upon” him again. A month later his fears were born out 

when they refused to sign Croghan and Trent’s “new letter of license.”

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8 For “great respect” see Hockley to Penn, 23 Jun. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:65, HSP; 

for primary source details see BRC, 205; for trade losses see Croghan to Johnson, 15 May 1755, SWJP, 

1:497; see also Morris to Hardy, 5 Jul. 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:689; for Hockley’s arrival and Trent’s summons 

see Hockley to Penn, n.d., Penn Mss., Correspondence of the Penn Family, 1732-1767, 18:85, HSP; for 

“for goods bought” and for document-signing see “Document Signed by William Trent & George Cro-

ghan,” 24 May 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:43, HSP; for conveyance of powers of attor-

ney to Peters and Hockley and for “come upon” see Hockley to Penn, 23 Jun. 1755, Penn Mss., Official 

Correspondence, 7:65, HSP; for secondary source account see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness 

Diplomat, 87.
At Fort Cumberland on 24 May 1755 there was of course more at stake than Croghan’s finances—the fate of North America, for instance. The expedition against Fort Duquesne would be the crucial operation of Braddock’s four-pronged plan to evict the French from North America. Braddock himself would lead the expedition against Fort Duquesne, while Colonel William Johnson would lead an expedition against Fort Saint Frédéric at Crown Point on Lake Champlain and Massachusetts Governor William Shirley another against Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario. A naval force, reinforced by New England colonials, would attack French Acadian outposts. After capturing Fort Duquesne, Braddock would lead his force north along the Allegheny River, destroy the remaining French forts, and join Shirley’s force at Fort Niagara. There was this rub, however: To capture Fort Duquesne, Braddock’s army would have to build a one-hundred-ten-mile road over the stubborn Allegheny Mountains, a road that upon completion would be a marvel of eighteenth-century military engineering. Worse, Croghan said later, Braddock’s army would have to do so with “no more Indians than I had with me,” for Virginia agent Christopher Gist had reported that neither Cherokees nor Catawbas would fight beside their ancient northern enemies, the Iroquois, whom Colonel Johnson had personally committed to the expedition. Undaunted, Braddock gave the order to march on 10 June.9

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“Thus we marched out,” a British officer recalled, “the Knight [General John St. Clair] swearing in the van, the General Cursing and bullying in the Center & their Whores bringing up the rear.” Croghan and his eight Aughwick Mingo warriors scouted beyond the vanguard, while two proud regiments of red-coated regulars, the 44th and 48th Foot, each boasting seven hundred veterans of the Second Jacobite Rebellion, stepped smartly behind, an occasional breeze fluttering regimental colors, as if to announce professionals. The regulars covered three hundred axmen and workmen, who, sweating and cursing and ruining the day they had entered into the king’s service, hewed a twelve-foot-wide road from the wilderness. Nine Virginia militia companies, four hundred and fifty blue-coated souls strengthening their colony’s claim on the Ohio Valley and improving their own prospects of land ownership, augmented the regulars, while a few small New York and South Carolina militia companies—“good for nothing,” griped Braddock, who rode amid his battle-tested regulars—performed miscellaneous duties, along with a single Maryland militia company. Thirty sailors, working block and tackle, hauled artillery pieces and cleared debris, and some fifty prostitutes, driving cattle, tailed the column.¹⁰

In just six days the tangled mountain country northwest of Fort Cumberland slowed the march to a crawl, so that Braddock divided his army into a “flying” column and a support column. The former, having about thirteen hundred top men, fifty-five ordnance and provision wagons, and twelve light artillery pieces, would advance quickly, while the latter, led by Colonel Thomas Dunbar, commander of the 48th Foot, would follow with the rest of the men, who would improve the road while hauling a baggage train of seventy-two

¹⁰ For “Thus we marched out” see John Rutherford to Peters, [13] Aug. 1755, Peters Mss., 4:41, HSP; for force see Braddock to Napier, 17 Mar. 1755, Military Affairs in North America, ed. Pargellis 77-79; see also BRC, 212; see also McCardell, Ill-Starred General, 124-125; see also Weslager, Delaware Indians, 222; for “good for nothing” see Braddock to Napier, 17 Mar. 1755, Military Affairs in North America, ed. Pargellis 78; see also BRC, 84.
ordnance and provision wagons and heavy artillery pieces. The flying column, meeting little enemy resistance and racing sixty miles forward, passed the Great Meadows on 25 June. At an encampment eight days later St. Clair, solicitous about the column’s fighting strength, proposed a halt to “send back” all the horses “to bring up Colonel Dunbar’s detachment.” Braddock did order a halt, but instead of bringing up support he advised with his senior officers, who argued for advance, because a delay of any length might give the enemy “time to receive their reinforcements and provisions, and to entrench themselves, or strengthen the fort, or to avail themselves of the strongest passes to interrupt” the advance. Braddock concurred, ordering the advance to resume.11

But what was the lay of the land before Fort Duquesne? And where was the enemy? Unable to “prevail upon” the Aughwick Mingos to scout the fort since the flying column had passed the Great Meadows without adding warriors to its number, Braddock ordered Croghan to induce compliance with “presents and promises.” Croghan failed repeatedly in this duty but persuaded Scarouady’s son and another Aughwick Mingo warrior to accept the mission on 4 July. The two Aughwick Mingos disappeared into the wilderness with the general’s savvy guide, Christopher Gist. On the morning of 6 July the Mingos reappeared, Scarouady’s son brandishing the scalp of a French officer he had killed about a half-mile from the fort. They made a favorable report, which Gist verified when he arrived later that day: Seven miles of ill-defended open forest lay ahead. But the stretch would have to be crossed without Scarouady’s son, whom some anxious “out-rangers,”

11 For division of force see Peters to James De Lancey, 19 Jul. 1755, SWJP, 1:750; see also John Rutherford to Peters, [13] Aug. 1755, Peters Mss., 4:41, HSP; see also “Captain Orme’s Journal,” in Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, ed. Sargent, 336; see also Shippen to Allen, 4 Jul. 1755, MPCM, 6:460; see also Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, 1 Oct. 1755, RDP, 2:220-221; see also Flexner, George Washington, 1:124; for primary source details see BRC, 424-425, 450, 284-290, 293-294, 300-305; for “send back” and “time to receive” see Orme, ibid., 320-321.
investigating the killing and scalping of three or four men “loitering in the rear of the Grenadiers,” had mistakenly shot and killed. On 7 July a scouting party under St. Clair found two fords on the Monongahela. On 8 July the flying column crossed a tributary creek and halted at a narrow valley where Braddock threw out flanking parties to secure high ground. Overnight the men encamped on a hill. Early on 9 July, Braddock awoke to reports that as yet no warriors had arrived. By this time Scarouady, dutiful in spite of his grief, had advised him to “proceed no further but Incamp and Fortify the Army on this side of the Monongahela.” Should the flying column continue to advance, Scarouady had warned, it “must of necessity be all Surrounded and cut off by Superior numbers, having no safe place to Retreat.” Braddock ignored the warning.\(^\text{12}\)

After an advance party under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage had flushed some enemy warriors, who had melted away, the flying column forded the river. Under a blistering midday sun Braddock ordered a halt at the second ford and threw out flanking parties to secure hilltops. When engineers and workmen, wiping moist brows, had smoothed the far bank, the great mass of men, with bayonets fixed, “Colors flying, Drums beating, and Fifes playing the Grenadiers’ March,” forded the river and reformed. Up a gentle slope Croghan and his seven Mingo scouts led a vanguard of three hundred regulars and grenadiers under Gage and a New York militia company under Captain Horatio Gates. The vanguard covered St. Clair’s work party of two hundred and fifty sweat-soaked axmen

\(^{12}\) For “prevail upon” and “presents and promises” see entry, 3 Jul. 1755, “Captain Orme’s Journal,” in Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, ed. Sargent, 349; see also Orme, BRC, 321; for Mingos’ acceptance of mission see entry, 4 Jul. 1755, “Captain Orme’s Journal,” in Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, ed. Sargent, 349; see also Orme, BRC, 327; for events of 6 July see entry, 6 Jul. 1755, “Captain Orme’s Journal,” in Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, ed. Sargent, 349; for scalp see British Officer 1, BRC, 332; for “out-rangers,” “loitering in the rear,” and death of Scarouady’s son see Halkett/Disney, *ibid.*, 330; for death of Scarouady’s son see Batman, *ibid.*, 333; for 7 July scouting party see Orme, *ibid.*, 336; for events of 8 July see Orme, *ibid.*, 340; for events of 9 July and “proceed no further” see *ibid.*, 345, 349-350, 354-355, 358, 424.
and workmen who felled trees marked by two engineers. Working block and tackle with exemplary skill, crews of burnt sailors accustomed to sun-drenched toil by deck work on the high seas hauled felled trees off the road. Behind the sailors rumbled horse-drawn wagons bearing tools and supplies, and a hundred yards behind them trudged the sweat-soaked main body of axmen, workmen, regulars, and militiamen. Some regulars flanked the general and his staff, which included two youthful colonials, George Washington, an aide-de-camp from Virginia, and William Shirley, Jr., a secretary from Massachusetts, while others flanked cumbersome artillery pieces, bulging wagons, weary prostitutes, and balky cattle. A Virginia militia company under Captain Adam Stephen, an agile veteran of wilderness combat, filled out Sir Peter Halkett’s rearguard. Up and down the column British officers talked confidently of victory, their laced regimentals glinting bright sunlight. Surely the French would blow up the fort to prevent its capture.  

About 2:00 p.m., a quarter-mile or so from the Monongahela, Croghan and Scarouady spotted an enemy force ahead and so with the other scouts fell back to the vanguard and took cover. Croghan later estimated enemy strength at three hundred men, but actually there were two hundred and fifty French regulars and Canadian militiamen and six hundred and forty allied warriors: Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Shawnees, Mingos, and Delawares. Gage’s men hurried forward and formed into units. When someone shouted “God save the King!” they unleashed three volleys into the forest. One of the balls killed Captain Daniel Liénard de Beaujeu while he was waving his hat left and right to dispose...
his men. His sudden death stunned the French regulars and the Canadian militiamen, but not their Indian allies, who swooshed left and right of the vanguard and then raked its flanks. The cross fire, continual and deadly, reeled Gage’s men into St. Clair’s work party and then onto Indian hunting ground.\textsuperscript{14}

Here undergrowth had been burned annually to enhance fodder, reduce cover, and afford easy access to game. Now, to exploit easy access to big game, the warriors darted furtively to better positions, their French and Canadian allies in tow. Behind trees, logs, stumps, shrubs, boulders, and rocks they hid, training their gazes at the multi-hued chaos on the sun-dappled hunting ground between them. Crouched in hollows and in gullies, poised atop opposed hills, they cocked their trusty muskets. And then they shot with lethal accuracy. In seconds stricken men fell in ragged heaps on the perimeters of the chaos, while at the center survivors huddled, their hearts pounding, their eyes searching the grim forest for signs of movement. When they heard shrill war whoops coming from the rear, they froze, imagining the worst: They were going to be surrounded; they were going to be captured and tortured; they were going to be scalped and killed. Instinctively, they bolted rearward, smacking into a red wave surging up the road, and in the ensuing tangle knots of confused men received devastating fire but returned ineffectual fire: Balls riddled trees, chipped boulders, kicked dirt, but struck precious few sharpshooters, faint

\textsuperscript{14} For primary source account of engagement see Charles Swaine to Peters, 5 Aug. 1755, Peters Mss., 4:38, HSP; see also Morris to Peters, 17 Jul. 1755, ibid., 4:23, HSP; see also Hermanus Alricks to Morris, 22 Jul. 1755, \textit{PA}, 1\textsuperscript{st} series, 2:383-384; see also Isaac Norris to Robert Charles, 27 Nov. 1755, Norris Letter Book (1719-1756), 91, HSP; see also Burd to Morris, 25 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:89, HSP; see also John Armstrong to Peters, 21 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:93, HSP; see also \textit{BRC}, 356, 370, 384, 395, 415, 425, 451-452; for secondary source account of engagement see Wainwright, \textit{George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat}, 92; see also Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 99; see also William M. Fowler Jr., \textit{Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763} (New York: Walker & Company, 2005), 68; for “God save the King!” see Leckie, \textit{“A Few Acres of Snow”}: \textit{The Saga of the French and Indian Wars}, 284; for estimate of numbers of French-allied Indians in battle see Dowd, \textit{War Under Heaven}, 46. Primary sources place the battle about a quarter-mile to a mile from the Monongahela River and estimate the battle’s beginning from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.
in the leafy gloom as devious phantasms. Wielding swords overhead, Gage’s mounted officers tried to restore order, but instead their flashing steel and jutting torsos drew such ferocious fire that in just ten minutes nearly all had fallen. Unnerved, axmen and workmen disentangled themselves and restarted their mad flight rearward.¹⁵

Hearing fire, Braddock had ridden forward. Wielding a sword over his men, he ordered that the colors of the 44th and 48th Foot be “advanced” (posted) as rallying points for their units, but instead of forming into units his men simply fell “like Leaves in Autumn.” “Numbers ran away, nay fired on us, that would have forced them to rally,” the anonymous British officer later confessed. Croghan and Washington begged Braddock to give them “the Command and let the men spread, but he would not consent,” and with the flat of his sword he beat the “Cowards” who had begun to fight from cover like Indians, even though remnants of New York militia had begun to do so with success, as had Virginia militia units that without orders had rushed up the road and into the fray. Some regulars and grenadiers, spurred by stout officers executing direct orders from Braddock, did charge one of the hills, but after sustaining light casualties they recoiled, “leaving their Officers (entreating & commanding but) without any regard to what they said,” a British officer later admitted. Most teamsters had seen enough. Convinced “things would turn out badly,” they took “the gears from their Horses & galloped quite away,” leaving few horses “to draw the Train forwards” should the battle turn in favor of the British.¹⁶

¹⁵ For hunting ground see Anderson, Crucible of War, 99-100; for secondary source account see Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow”: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 284-285; for primary source account see Orme to Morris, 18 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:91, HSP; see also Swaine to Morris, 23 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:97, HSP; see also Burd to Morris, 25 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:89, HSP; see also Stephen, BRC, 358-359; see also Hughes, ibid., 481; see also Lemay, ed., Benjamin Franklin: Writings, 1441.

¹⁶ For “like leaves in Autumn” and “Numbers ran away” see [Anonymous], Expedition of Major General Braddock to Virginia, 28; for “the Command” see Swaine to Morris, 19 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:85, HSP; for “Cowards” fighting like Indians see Burd to Morris, 25 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:89,
Surprisingly, a company of Virginia militiamen shouldering firelock muskets stormed the opposite hill and captured it while suffering just eight dead. Under their quick-witted captain’s direction they threw themselves behind a massive log atop the hill and then shot at figures flitting in the shadowy darkness below, their steady discharges emitting plumes of pungent grayish-black smoke. The log, about five feet in diameter, served well as a bulwark against frontal assault, but as might be expected it could not serve as a shield against rear attack. A host of trigger-happy regulars and grenadiers well back of the hill espied signs of movement in the smoky cloud and loosed salvos toward them. The salvos, whizzing, smashed the hilltop with sudden elemental violence, spraying the log and its human fodder with shot and compelling the militia captain to order a hasty retreat. After he and thirty of his men had scrambled back to the road, the smoke behind lifted, betraying writhing wounded in clumps of dead. Farther down the road, as the rearguard crumbled about them, a Virginia militia company held their ground, thus demonstrating the wisdom of their captain, Adam Stephen, who had trained them to load and fire from cover.¹⁷

Braddock rode amid his regulars, trying to inspire them by example. A horse was shot out from under him. And then another and another and another. He was mounting a fifth when a musket ball passed through his right arm and pierced his lung. He fell, gasping, into the shrubs beside the road. His men had held for nearly three hours, but because he had fallen, their will broke and pell-mell they fled toward the Monongahela, abandoning

¹⁷ For charge up hill see Burd to Morris, 25 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:89, HSP; for rearguard see British Officer 2, BRC, 426.
not only him but virtually everything else as well: food, drink, cattle, wagons, ordnance, artillery pieces, war chest, official papers, personal papers, belongings. Some men forded the river and ran wildly for miles before collapsing, exhausted; others were not so fortunate: They fell in the river to pursuing warriors and were scalped. Behind the bloody river the hideous screeches of the wounded ceased when warriors swarmed the field and delivered fatal blows. Had Croghan and a few teamsters not put him in a wagon and then moved him swiftly out of danger, the general “would have been scalped by the Indians,” opined Isaac Norris, the speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly, after hearing early battle accounts.  

Throughout the pitiless night terror drove remnants of Braddock’s beaten army steadily southeastward toward Dunbar’s distant camp. Shedding lead, weapons, gear, and even wounded comrades, remnants stumbled down the rough-hewn road or through the thick forest until fifty miles back they found the camp, a somber flicker in a sea of blackness. Bruised, scraped, scratched, tattered, and distraught, remnants entered the camp, gasping warnings so dire that Dunbar ordered retreat as soon as Braddock was carried into camp on a makeshift litter. Throughout the day Braddock lay silent, looking up once to say, “Who would have thought it?” On 11 July, despite a weak voice, he ordered the destruction of food, ordnance, and artillery pieces, and then, after a long silence, he said, “We

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18 For wounding of Braddock and its immediate aftermath see Morris to Peters, 17 Jul. 1755, Peters Mss., 4:23, HSP; see also Swaine to Morris, 23 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:97, HSP; see also Orme to Morris, 18 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:91, HSP; see also Burd to Morris, 25 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:89, HSP; see also BRC, 352, 354-355, 368, 410, 412, 429-430, 438, 453; for “would have been scalped” see Isaac Norris to Robert Charles, 27 Nov. 1755, Norris Letter Book (1719-1756), 91, HSP; for secondary source account see Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow”: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 285; see also Koppelman, Braddock at the Monongahela, 178. There is another and contradictory account about what happened to Braddock after he was wounded. Perhaps wishing to die honorably like an ancient Roman general, he attempted to kill himself on the battlefield. According to Charles Swaine, Croghan verified the following anecdote: Braddock, after being wounded, reached for Croghan’s pistols. See Swaine to Peters, 5 Aug. 1755, Peters Mss., 4:38, HSP.
shall better know how to deal with them another time.” For him, however, there would
not be another time. Next day intense pain silenced him. On the evening of 13 July he
drew on his last ounce of strength to curse his regulars and to praise his officers and the
Virginia militia. Then he died. “More out of vexation & grief, as is said,” a Maryland
doctor privy to eyewitness accounts later wrote, “than of his wounds.” Next day, about a
mile from the Great Meadows, George Washington and a few regulars, who feared that
pursuing warriors would pounce on them at any moment, laid the corpse in a “bark cas-
ket” and buried it hastily in an unmarked trench beneath the very road that the army had
hewn from the wilderness. To efface the grave so that it could elude the notice of pursu-
ing warriors bent, as was mistakenly believed, on merciless destruction, the demoralized
flying column retreated over it.19

The expedition against Fort Duquesne—the key operation of Braddock’s campaign to
evict the French from North America—had failed utterly, upsetting British military plans
and exposing the western counties of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland to raids from
Ohio. Two-thirds of the officers and men of the flying column had been casualties. The
dead included William Shirley, Jr., and Sir Peter Halkett, and the wounded Sir John St.
Clair, Thomas Gage, and Horatio Gates. Resplendent in their regimentals, British offi-

19 For retreat see Orme to Morris, 18 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:91, HSP; see also
Swaine to Morris, 19 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:85, HSP; see also Swaine to Morris, 23 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:97, HSP;
1755, Peters Mss., 4:41, HSP; see also Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, 1 Oct. 1755, RDP, 2:222; see also Le-
may, ed., Benjamin Franklin: Writings, 1442; see also BRC, 352-353, 372, 377, 468; for “More out of vex-
ation & grief,” see A. Hamilton, ibid., 454; for “Who would have thought it” and “We shall better know
how to deal with them another time” see Robert Leckie, The Wars of America: A Comprehensive Narra-
tive from Champlain’s First Campaign against the Iroquois through the End of the Vietnam War, revised
Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow”: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 285-286; see also Anderson,
Crucible of War, 104.
cers had proved easy targets: Sixty-three of eighty-five had been casualties. About half the prostitutes had perished; the rest had been captured or lost to the wild. Food, drink, cattle, ordnance, artillery pieces, war chest, official papers, personal papers, belongings—all these had been captured. What had happened? “I am yet of the Opinion,” Croghan testified during an official inquiry, “that had we had Fifty [Aughwick Mingo] Indians instead of Eight, that we might in a great measure have prevented the Surprise that Day of our unhappy Defeat.” Who was to blame? As supervisor of Indian affairs at Fort Cumberland, Colonel James Innes had advised that Aughwick Mingo women and children “would be very Troublesome, and that the General, need not take above eight or nine men out with him, for if he took more he would find them very Troublesome, on the march & of no service,” so Braddock had ordered Croghan “to send back, all the women & children” to his house in Pennsylvania and to keep only eight or ten men “as scouts & to hunt.” Despite misgivings Croghan had carried out the order, for self-interest had come to rule his heart as well as mind. To court restitution, he had kept quiet, advising neither on the sexual nature of Indian hospitality nor on the discursive process of Indian diplomacy. Croghan, then, was as blamable as Innes.  

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20 For Indian raids from Ohio see A. Hamilton, BRC, 454-456; for British casualties and losses see Burd to Morris, 25 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:89, HSP; see also “A List of the Officers who were present and of those killed and wounded in the Action on the Banks of the Monongahela the 9th Day of July, 1755,” MPCP, 6:489-491; see also Dunbar to Shirley, 21 Aug. 1755, ibid., 6:593; see also BRC, 352, 386-387, 389-390, 439-440, 466-467; see also Lemay, ed., Benjamin Franklin: Writings, 1441; see also Dinwiddie to Lords of Trade, 6 Sept. 1755, Dinwiddie to [North Carolina] Governor [Arthur] Dobbs, 23 Jul. 1755, 17 Sept. 1755, and Dinwiddie to Thomas Robinson, 25 July 1755, RDP, 2:193, 204, 116-117; for secondary source accounts of casualties and losses see Anderson, Crucible of War, 100, 105; see also Borneman, French and Indian War, 56; for “I am yet of the Opinion” see “Mr. George Croghan’s Account of Indian Affairs from 1748/9 to General Braddock’s Defeat,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 1:52, HSP; for “would be very Troublesome” see “A Journal of Indian Transactions by George Croghan, Esq.,” 14 Mar. 1757, Miss., Transcripts of Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, Vol. 16 (Bundle P, 2-20), HSP; for want of Indians and reasons for want of Indians see Morris to Shirley, n.d., MPCR, 6:496-498; see also Dunbar to Shirley, 21 Aug. 1755, ibid., 6:593; for Indian hospitality see Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975; reprint ed., New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976), 149; for sexual nature of Indian
Provincial Secretary Richard Peters gave credence to Braddock’s order to send all the Mingo women back to Aughwick when he charged them with prostitution, but in truth, to be hospitable, the Mingo men had simply shared their women. In this instance there was nothing to gain by the sale of sex, for both the men and the women lived at Aughwick under the auspices of Croghan and Pennsylvania. Still, Peters’ charge of prostitution cannot be discounted outright since Great Lakes Algonquian society included a class of females who were called “hunting women.” Young and single, hunting women afforded welcome companionship and labor on hunting treks with the men of their villages. On the “middle ground” of the late seventeenth century, however, coureurs de bois (or Canadian or métis trappers) began to substitute for Algonquian hunters. On treks into the North American interior with coureurs de bois, hunting women performed vital tasks like cooking food, cutting wood, and making clothes, in return for what amounted to wages, but here and there they engaged in sexual relations with the coureurs de bois. Thus they obscured the line between trade relations and sexual relations and even permitted the coureurs de bois to peddle sex with skins and furs. In other words coureurs de bois did not exploit Great Lakes Algonquian prostitution but rather created it.21

Scarouady blamed Braddock for the paucity of Aughwick Mingo warriors on the disastrous expedition against Fort Duquesne. “We must let you know that it was the pride and ignorance of that great General that came from England,” Scarouady told Governor Robert Hunter Morris in council on 22 August 1755. “He is now dead; but he was a bad man

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21 For Peters’ charge of prostitution see “Minutes of Richard Peters,” 2 Jun. 1755, MPCP, 6:397; for hunting women and their transition from companions to prostitutes see White, Middle Ground, 63-65, 334; see also Thomas, Miller, White, Nabokov, and Deloria, Native Americans, 253-254.
when he was alive; he looked upon us as dogs, and would never hear anything that was said to him.” Scarouady opined truthfully. Braddock had not met Aughwick Mingo warriors on anything like “middle ground” or “crossroads” or even “dark woods.” For him, they were nothing more than exotic nuisances, useful in marginal capacities like hunting and scouting and but mostly hindrances to British settlement, just so many obstacles to be surmounted as rivers, forests, and mountains were surmounted. Thus a simple and consequential truth was lost on him: Rivers, forests, and mountains do not feel slighted and do not desert. In other words the Aughwick Mingo warriors were fully human. In hindsight Governor Morris wrote that Braddock had “found by dear experience that they would have been his best Guard; and I have reason to believe that had he lived he would have altered his Conduct towards them.” More likely, Braddock’s mean, chronic, and decidedly Anglocentric bias would have precluded effective intercultural relations. Braddock had accepted Innes’ poor advice because it had jibed with his own bias. Pride in the English army and ignorance of Indian ways had indeed done in Braddock—and his flying column as well.\footnote{For quotations see “Philadelphia Council between Governor Morris, Conrad Weiser, etc., and Indians, incl. Scarroyady & Andrew Montour,” 22 Aug. 1755, \textit{MPCP}, 6:589-591.}

Had Braddock likewise caused Ohio Delaware and Shawnee chiefs to withhold warriors? According to Croghan, Braddock had made the chiefs “a handsome Present, and behaved as kindly to them as he possibly could during their stay, ordering me to let them want for nothing.” In return they had “promised in Council to meet the General on the Road, as he marched out, with a Number of their Warriors,” but the chiefs had “disappointed” him. Some of their warriors had fought against the British, while others had observed the battle from neutral ground. Perhaps “the Former Breeches of Faith on the Side
of the English [had] prevented them [from joining the expedition].” Perhaps the chiefs had “before engaged to assist the French.” The Ohio Delawares and Shawnees, as Croghan opined rightly, had withdrawn military aid as a result of deteriorating intercultural relations, but Braddock himself had driven the deepest wedge between them and the British. The chiefs had accepted his gifts, but what they had wanted was his acknowledgment of their right to live as they always had—to hunt, fish, forage, trade, etc.—in Ohio once the British had defeated the French. What they had gotten instead was his disavowal of their right. His haughtiness had caused them to make a perfunctory pledge of military aid, and his defeat, and not a secret alliance, had driven their warriors into the French camp.23

At Fort Cumberland on 23 May 1755 William Shirley, Jr., had griped that “we have a G_______ most Judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the Service he is employed in, in almost Every Respect,” and yet Croghan, an Irish immigrant and a frontier Indian trader who was equally well acquainted with such failings, defended the haughty British general during the official inquiry. What was Croghan’s motivation for doing so? Either as lead scout or as go-between Croghan might be judged culpable by association; therefore, it was in his interest to vindicate Braddock. More likely, however, Croghan was trying to save his own skin, so to speak, because his own conduct had been questionable. He was, after all, a successful veteran frontier negotiator who had gained the general’s trust, but rather than exploit this trust to demonstrate just how to negotiate wisely with the

23 For quotations see “Mr. George Croghan’s Account of Indian Affairs from 1748/9 to General Braddock’s Defeat,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 1:52, HSP; for significance of intercultural trade see O’Toole, White Savage, 52-54. Although they preferred English trade goods to French, the Ohio Delawares and Shawnees threw in with the French for the very reasons Croghan stated. For analysis of those reasons see Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1940; reprint edition, 1969), 75-81; see also Weslager Delaware Indians, 190-194, 204, 209-210; see also Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 342-346; see also Robert Dautolo, Jr., “The Role of Quakers in Indian Affairs during the French and Indian War,” Quaker History, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Spring 1988): 12.
Ohio Delaware and Shawnee chiefs, he had succumbed to self-interest: He had made obeisance for the sake of restitution and in doing so had doomed the conference to failure. His subsequent inaction, moreover, bears out this judgment, for at no time in the weeks or days or hours leading up to the battle had he ameliorated Braddock’s tactlessness. More damning, he had not even tried.24

What had caused the Iroquois to defect? “The ill usage they met with from Collo. Innes when I sent 3 or 4 with a Packet to Gen1 Braddock,” Sir William Johnson claimed. The facts prove otherwise. Jealous of Johnson’s “sole management & direction of the Affairs of the Six Nations & their Allies,” Massachusetts Governor William Shirley had wrested away Iroquois warriors for his expedition against Fort Niagara. Of course the slight had tarnished Johnson, who had been preparing his own expedition against Fort Saint Frédéric at Crown Point. By the time Johnson had reestablished his influence over the Iroquois, it was too late for him to send Braddock warriors. Coincidently, political infighting had caused Governor Dinwiddie’s southern recruits, the Cherokees and the Catawbas, to withdraw, even if their stated reason for doing so was hostility toward the Iroquois. Their true ally, South Carolina Governor James Glen, had advised neutrality to spite Dinwiddie, who had ignored his call for a southern governors’ military conference and who had blocked his invitation to a Virginia strategy conference.25

24 For quotation see Shirley, Jr. to Morris, 23 May 1755, MPCM, 6:405. Like Croghan, George Washington defended the general. According to Washington, Braddock had been an honest and competent general who had done the best he could in strange circumstances. Braddock’s poor generalship was not to blame for the rout. Rather, cowardly British regulars were. For Washington’s defense see Flexner, George Washington, 1:131; see also Anderson, Crucible of War, 105-106.
25 For “ill usage” see Johnson to [Thomas] Pownall, 31 Jul. 1755, SWJP, 1:804; for necessity of using tact in dealing with Iroquois see Johnson to Braddock, 17 May 1755, ibid., 1:513-514; for “sole management & direction of the Affairs of the Six Nations & their Allies” see “Commission from Edward Braddock,” 15 Apr. 1755, ibid., 1:465-466; for Iroquois defection see Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, 1 Oct. 1755, RDP, 2:224-226; see also Dinwiddie to Governor [William] Littleton, 18 Sept. 1756, ibid., 2:508-510; for Iroquois defection and its purported and true causes see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 152-156; see also
Although Braddock had violated a hoary military maxim against dividing his forces, colonials like Benjamin Franklin blamed his adherence to European tactics for his defeat. “The general was I think a brave Man, and might probably have made a Figure as a good Officer in some European War,” Franklin wrote in his Autobiography. “But he had too much self-confidence, too high an Opinion of the Validity of Regular Troops, and too mean a One of both Americans and Indians.” This was sound judgment. In the heat of battle French regulars, Canadian militiamen, American militiamen, and warriors of both sides had adapted to wilderness conditions, whereas Braddock had not. On a European battlefield, where easily discernable armies faced each another with ample room to maneuver, European tactics might have brought victory, but in the western Pennsylvania wilderness, where cover concealed the enemy and terrain limited maneuverability, they had invited disaster. Thirteen-hundred regulars had been trapped on a “battlefield” about two hundred and fifty yards from end to end and about a hundred feet wide. In the blunt judgment of Virginia militia captain Adam Stephen, the enemy had “come against Us, creeping near and hunting Us as they would do a Herd of Buffaloes or Deer.”

26 O’Toole, White Savage, 121-129, 52; see also Dowd, War Under Heaven, 38; see also Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington, 25.

26 For “The general was” see Lemay, ed., Benjamin Franklin: Writings, 1440; for “come against Us” see Stephen, BRC, 358; for modern scholarly analysis of battle and for modern judgment about Braddock’s inadaptability to wilderness combat see Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 297-318; see also Anderson, Crucible of War, 100-105; see also Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow”: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 280; see also Peter E. Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760,” WMQ, 3rd ser., Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct. 1978): 629-630, 642-645. For contemporary analysis of battle and contemporary judgment about Braddock’s inadaptability to wilderness combat see Goldsbro Banyar to Johnson, 26 Jul. 1755, SWJP, 1:772; see also Allrict to Morris, 22 Jul. 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:383-384; see also Morris to Thomas Penn, 31 Jul. 1755, MPCP, 6:517; see also Swaine to Morris, 19 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:85, HSP; see also Burd to Morris, 25 Jul. 1755, ibid., 7:89, HSP; see also Armstrong to Morris, 21 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., ibid., 7:97, HSP. Contrary to the usual colonial viewpoint Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie wrote, “If the Gen’l had tho’t proper to rem’n there [the place of encampment on 8 July] till the other Forces had come up, I am of Opinion our Affairs w’d have succeeded much better, but he was pleas’d to order the forces with him to march, w’ch was the 9th of July.” See Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, 1 Oct. 1755, RDP, 2:220-221. Even if Braddock had had more regulars in his
In short, hubris had doomed the expedition. More than anything else, British regulars had feared torture and scalping, but their fears were largely unfounded. French-allied Indians were ordinarily concerned not with torturing captives and scalping corpses but with gaining spiritual power and proving their merit as warriors. They could achieve these goals by taking captives, plunder, and trophies. In other words the things they prized lay on the battlefield behind Braddock’s fleeing army: bound captives, groaning wounded, brave dead, and abandoned equipment. French-allied Indians ordinarily finished off only mortally wounded enemies and either integrated captives into village society as replacements for dead kin or sold or ransomed them. French-allied Indians ordinarily scalped only dead enemies. If Braddock had permitted military necessity to override his hubris, he might have appreciated the secondary roles of scalping and torture within Indian culture and conveyed his knowledge to his regulars, who then might not have imagined the worst—imaginings that had caused panic that had led to rout. But hubris was his great character flaw. “Braddock’s Defeat,” therefore, was a real-life Greek tragedy.27

For Croghan the defeat proved bittersweet since his hope of recovering his losses to the French and Canadians through the exertion of influence in official circles in England had died with Braddock in the wilderness. Who would plead his case in England now? True,

27 For capture of war chest see Dinwiddie to Earl of Halifax, 1 Oct. 1755, RDP, 2:222; for Braddock’s hubris and for Indian ways see also Anderson, Crucible of War, 95-97, 103-105; see also Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 151-159; see also Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow”: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 273-286; see also Flexner, George Washington, 1:119-131; see also Weslager, Delaware Indians, 221-260; see also Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 21; see also Sipe, Indian Wars of Pennsylvania, 177-202; see also Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, 4 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925; reprint, Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1958), 4:340-350.
by operating his Aughwick trading post, Croghan might yet revive his finances, but surely the coming war between England and France for control of North America would disrupt the Indian trade. Under such circumstances he might have to do something else to earn a living, but what should that be? He had done his duty for king and country, but what had that got him? He had not been paid a shilling, because the French army had captured Braddock’s war chest, which had held the funds that included his wages. Would the British army ever pay him? Would Governor Morris, who had ordered him to go to Fort Cumberland? Would William Johnson, who had done likewise? Would there ever again be call for a scout who had led a general and his army to slaughter? Would he ever be able to pay his debts? What should he do? Where should he go? At least he was not moldering in an unfinished bark coffin beneath a trampled road. Perhaps things were not so bad after all. The Alleghenies still reigned in the dusk, and the meadowlarks’ song still proclaimed the dawn. He was alive.
Chapter 6: Militia Captain

In the summer and the autumn of 1755 the worst that could happen did happen so far as George Croghan and other pioneers in Cumberland County were concerned. French-allied warriors streamed down Braddock’s Road and ravaged the frontiers of western Virginia, whose well-reported misfortunes panicked the settlers on the western edges of its northern neighbor. While the panicked settlers of western Pennsylvania fled eastward, the more intrepid sort stayed put, fortifying their houses or banding together for protection, for as surely as those in flight they expected that military aid would not be coming any time soon, given the tight-fisted pacifism of the Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania Assembly in distant Philadelphia. They were right to think so, for in the present crisis Governor Robert Hunter Morris met with stubborn opposition whenever he appealed to the Assembly for military appropriations. At wit’s end one day he utilized executive prerogative, not only authorizing the residents of Cumberland County to form volunteer militia companies and elect their officers, but also choosing a site in Carlisle for the construction of one log fort and a site in Shippensburg for the construction of another. Afterward, he could breathe a sigh of relief, for at last the western frontier—that vast expanse of forested mountain country between the lower Susquehanna River and the upper Ohio River—would be defended, even if responsibility for its defense lay in untried private hands.¹

¹ For French-allied Indian attacks on western frontiers of Virginia see Dinwiddie to [North Carolina] Governor [Arthur] Dobbs, 23 Jul. 1755, RDP, 2:111; see also Dinwiddie to Sir T. [Thomas] Robinson, 23 Jul. 1755, ibid., 2:112; see also Dinwiddie to Bishop of London, Aug. [1755], ibid., 2:161; see also Dinwiddie to Earl of Granville, 15 Nov. [1755], ibid., 2:275; see also Dinwiddie to Charles Hardy, 1 Jul. 1756, ibid., 2:452; for panicked western Pennsylvania settlers see John Armstrong to Peters, 21 Jul. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:93, HSP; see also Morris to Peters, 17 Jul. 1755, Peters Papers, Part I, 4:23, HSP; see also James Hamilton to Morris, 18 Dec. 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:538; for panicked western Pennsylvania settlers and Pennsylvania Assembly’s opposition to defense appropriations see Morris to [Maryland] Governor [Horatio] Sharpe, 20 Jul. 1755, ibid., 2:382-383; see also Morris to Thomas Penn, 31 Jul. 1755, MPCP, 6:517-519; see also Peters to Thomas Penn, 8 Nov. 1755, Peters Letter Book, 1755-1757, 8-10, HSP; for attacks on western Pennsylvania settlers and western demands for defense see Croghan to John-
As for Croghan, he was a man of action, too. Dispirited after “Braddock’s Defeat,” he had gone home, only to find that his Mingo dependents had deserted Aughwick for such “safer” havens as Harris’ Ferry (now Harrisburg) and Shamokin (now Sunbury) farther up the Susquehanna River. When he found too that French-allied warriors were going to attack the western frontier in the winter, that the divided provincial government was not attempting “to Draw any of yᵉ Indians back or Even to Secure those that are yet in our Intrest,” and that he himself was a marked man, he raised a militia company at his own expense and built “a Small Stockade fort” to protect his person and “to Secure what little Estate” he had left, but he was not looking out for himself and his property only, for his militia company would “be Ready att any Time to Serve his Magesty when Call’d. On,” even if he knew the call was unlikely. Herein lay his predicament: The desertion of the Aughwick Mingos had led Governor Morris not only to lose faith in him but to turn to rival go-between Conrad Weiser for advice on Indian affairs. Once indispensable to provincial Indian affairs, Croghan had become a pariah. Still, he did have this consolation: He was blameless. “Glad I am that I have no hand in Indian affairs at this critical time, where no fault can be thrown on my shoulders,” he wrote Charles Swaine, who was the provincial commissary at Shippensburg. He was glad too that he sold parcels of his 1749 Iroquois land grant to four men for “cash notes,” until the men suspected that he had had no “right” to do so. The men informed the *Pennsylvania Gazette* of their suspicion, and the newspaper gave “notice to all persons not to take any Assignment of said notes.”

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2 For probable winter Indian attacks on western frontier and for Indians’ marking of Croghan for death see William Buchanan to Croghan, 2 Nov. 1755, Shippen Papers, 2:7, HSP; see also Peters to Thomas Penn, 8 Nov. 1755, Peters Letter Book, 1755-1757, 8-10, HSP; see also Peters to Penn, 25 Nov. 1755, ibid., 18-21, HSP; for same and for stockade fort see also Armstrong to Morris, 2 Nov. 1755, *PA*, 1st ser., 2:452; for “to
Fault for the deteriorating Indian affairs could be thrown on other shoulders, however. While Quaker assemblymen had voted against military appropriations, their anti-proprietary colleagues had squabbled with Governor Morris over one bill to create an elective militia and another to fund it through a property tax. Both bills had been the handiwork of the anti-proprietary assemblymen, who sought to reduce the prerogatives of Proprietor Thomas Penn by taxing his estates. Governor Morris and his allies in the proprietary party had opposed the bills, as had the Quaker assemblymen and their allies in the Quaker party, which on principle opposed all military appropriations. The political infighting had persisted despite alarming news from each of the province’s frontiers, the vulnerable western and the vulnerable northern. On 16 October 1755 an Ohio Delaware war party had raided a European settlement at Penn’s Creek, a Susquehanna tributary southwest of Shamokin, and killed and scalped thirteen men and women and an infant and captured eleven young men and women. On 31 October, Ohio Delaware and Shawnee war parties had raided European settlements on the Blue Ridge Mountains west of the Susquehanna, at Path Valley and at Great Cove (now McConnellsburg) in Cumberland County. Led by Shingas, the raid at Great Cove had left more than half the settlers dead. Shingas’ brother Beaver, moreover, had led Ohio Delaware and Shawnee raids on European settlements at Tulpehocken and at spots north of Philadelphia, while Susquehanna Delaware war parties had raided European settlements north of Philadelphia, at the forks of the Delaware River and at other spots. Soon three panicked western counties had dispatched petitions calling

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Draw any of y° Indians,” “a Small Stockade fort,” “to Secure what little Estate,” and “be Ready att” see Croghan to Johnson, 10 Sept. 1755, SWJP, 2:29-30; for stockade fort see Croghan to James Hamilton, 12 Nov. 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:484; for “Glad I am” see Croghan to Swaine, 9 Oct. 1755, MPCM, 6:642; for “notice to all persons” see Pennsylvania Gazette, 9 Oct. 1755. According to an Ohio Indian sent to Aughwick by Croghan’s “old Indian Friends,” Croghan’s scalp “would be no small Prize to the French.” See Croghan to Swaine, 9 Oct. 1755, MPCM, 6:642.
for retaliatory action. At least Governor Morris had had the good sense to put the public good before party.³

The raids were not indiscriminate acts of violence, as most settlers believed, but rather the calculated acts of legitimately aggrieved human beings who saw violence as the best, and perhaps the only, means of drawing attention to their overriding concern, the repeated encroachment of their lands. Since the raiders were Delaware and Shawnee refugees who had targeted settlements on lands once inhabited by Delawares, either within the infamous 1737 Walking Purchase, by which the proprietors, abetted by the Iroquois, cheated Delawares out of lands at the forks of the Delaware River, or within the 1754 Albany Purchase, by which the proprietors, abetted by the Iroquois, divested Delawares of lands in south-central Pennsylvania, the raids were tantamount to messages, drastic statements against civilian corruption and rapaciousness, provincial fraud and injustice, and Iroquois complicity and hegemony. Yet on Pennsylvania’s two situational frontiers incipient racism garbled the messages, dashing whatever hopes refugee Delaware and Shawnee chiefs had held for a redress of their grievances or for a meaningful dialogue. English, Welsh, Irish, Scot, Scots-Irish, and German settlers who harbored Old World prejudices against, and suspicions of, one another began to cooperate for mutual protection once they discovered they had more in common with one another than they had with their “savage neighbors,” their onetime coconspirators in checking the covetous grasp of London, Paris, or Onondaga. So the frontiers split along an invidious conceptual fault line—race. Once

³ For politics and Governor Morris’ actions see Peters to proprietors [Richard and Thomas Penn], 25 Nov. 1755, Peters Letter Book, 1755-1757, 18-21, HSP; see also Daiutolo, “The Role of Quakers in Indian Affairs during the French and Indian War,” Quaker History, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Spring 1988): 2-4; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 96-97; see also Peters to Thomas Penn, 8 Nov. 1755, Peters Letter Book, 1755-1757, 8-10, HSP; see also Shirley to Morris, 15 Nov. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:153, HSP.
open and friendly, the frontiers closed, harboring untold “savage” terrors for settlers: brutish “red men,” blood-thirsty savages, irredeemable heathens, inveterate Judases, destructive barbarians, the lot drunken, violent, and worthless. The split was final.4

Although they shared a hatred for Delawares and Shawnees, settlers split over politics and religion. German Pietists backed the Quaker party because of its traditional program of tolerance and pacifism and because of their trust that the Quaker party would protect their religious and civil liberties from the kind of aristocratic encroachment that they had suffered in Germany. The German Pietists suspected that Proprietor Thomas Penn and his placemen were very like the grasping and oppressive aristocrats from whose clutches they had escaped. Opposed to the alliance of German Pietists and Quaker pacifists were German Lutherans and Reformed sectarians who supported the proprietary party and its policy of frontier defense. Liberty-loving Scots-Irish New Light Presbyterians appreciated the Quaker party’s anti-proprietary stance, but because they were mostly ordinary folk who feared losing their religious and civil liberties to wealthier neighbors, they opposed an appointive militia controlled by Governor Morris’ and supported an elective one controlled by the Pennsylvania Assembly. Owing their wealth largely to the Penn family, Anglicans, Scots-Irish Old Light Presbyterians, and persons of the same political stripe supported the proprietary party’s policy of frontier defense. Although Proprietor Thomas Penn was an Anglican, the Anglicans for the most part cooperated with the few defense-minded Quakers in the province to check the influence of both the German Pietists and the Scots-Irish Presbyterians.5

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4 For “savage neighbors” see Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), 39-95.
Despite being a pariah Croghan sent Governor Morris intelligence, but when Morris ignored it, Croghan sent it to former governor James Hamilton, a political insider known to oblige friends of the provincial government. “Permit me att this Critical Time, to give ye following Information of ye Designs of ye Enemy,” Croghan began his accompanying 12 November letter. “Itt was my duty to have Wrote to ye Present Governor, butt as he has nott thought proper to Desire me to give him any accounts of Indian Affairs, since ye De-fate of Gineral Braddock, I did nott Now how his honour wold take it from me, or what Creadett he wold give to such an Account, as I have nott the Lest acquaintance of his honour.” His account was this: In the winter French-allied Ohio warriors would drive back settlers of western Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, while French-allied Great Lakes warriors would reinforce French and Canadian forces defending Fort Niagara against Massachusetts Governor William Shirley’s expedition and Fort Saint Frédéric against Colonel William Johnson’s expedition. “From ye Misfortunes I have had in Tread, which obliges me to keep at a Greatt distance, I have itt nott in my power to for-ward Intelegance so soon as I could wish,” Croghan added to his account to elicit support as well as sympathy. “However, if itt be thought worth Notice, I will aquaint the Govern-ment with any thing I can find outt that will tend to ye hurt of my King & Country, for certainly ye Indians are only amuseing the Government, while they are privy, if not as-sisting to ye Merders done.” That is, he would forward intelligence to Governor Morris and distinguish friend from foe for him, but only if he could avoid imprisonment for debt. The stipulation had to be met quickly, for he could not tell “how long” he would “be able to keep” his forty-man “Stockade fort.” Having improved his reputation, he embarked on a career that required him to deal in intelligence rather than goods.6

6 For “Permit me” see Croghan to Hamilton, 12 Nov. 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:483-484. The ridges of the South
Valuing timely military intelligence and vigilant frontier defense, Hamilton did oblige. At his behest thirteen principal creditors endorsed a petition stating that the French conquest of the Ohio Valley and the defection of the Ohio Delawares from the British interest had caused Croghan and his partner, William Trent, to be “destitute of Money or Effects to make that Satisfaction to their Creditors, which their Inclination and Conscience would oblige them to do, were it in their Power.” Fearing arrest if he entered the “more settled Parts of the Province,” Croghan languished at Aughwick “in the most melancholy and deplorable Circumstances, in a Condition very defenceless, destitute of all Kinds of Provisions, but what is procured at the Hazard of his Life, and daily liable to the Invasion and Massacre of our Barbarian Enemies.” Because he could “answer no good End” in his “present unhappy Circumstances” and because his knowledge of, and influence with, the Indians might yet benefit the provincial government, the creditors pronounced themselves “willingly cheerful” to dismiss their demands against him and Trent for ten years. On 26 November the Pennsylvania Assembly received the petition. Upon perusal the Assembly granted its conveyers “Leave to bring in a Bill for the Purpose mentioned in the Petition.” Two days later they delivered a bill, which the Assembly passed as “An Act for the Relief of George Croghan and William Trent for and during the Space of Ten Years.” Governor Morris signed the bill into law on 1 December. Published, the act sold for six shillings.7

There was more good news for Croghan. On 25 November the Pennsylvania Assembly passed the militia bill, which authorized free men to form militia units and elect officers, contingent on the approval of Governor Morris as commander-in-chief. Morris next day

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signed the militia bill into law while the Assembly cut the property tax from the funding bill after learning that Proprietor Thomas Penn had pledged £5,000 from quitrent arrears to the defense of the province. The Assembly appropriated £55,000 to augment the gift and handed control of the appropriation to a bipartisan commission headed by Councilman James Hamilton and Assemblyman Benjamin Franklin. On 27 November, Morris signed the funding bill into law. Although the bipartisan commission asserted its belief that the best means of defense was “to carry the war into the Enemy’s Country and hunt them in all their Fishing, Hunting, Planting, & dwelling places,” it called in experts for advice. The experts—Croghan, who represented Cumberland County, Conrad Weiser, who represented Berks County, and James Galbreath, who represented Lancaster County—advised the commission to use the appropriation to construct a chain of forts along the western frontier. The commission, combining the experts’ advice with its own like view, put this pertinent question to Morris: Whether “the best means of affording defense” might not be “to order out parties from Forts to range on the West side of Sasquehanna, quite to Ohio & the Neighborhood of Fort Duquesne, to Annoy the Enemy, take Prisoners, & obtain Intelligence” that might be valuable if “any Attempt on that Fort should be ordered this summer by Lord Loudoun,” whom the British ministry had appointed commander-in-chief of British forces in North America after “Braddock’s Defeat.”

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8 For provincial actions see Daiutolo, “The Role of Quakers in Indian Affairs during the French and Indian War,” *Quaker History*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Spring 1988): 2-4; see also Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 101; for “to carry the war” and “the best means” see “A Letter to the Governor from the Commissioners,” 14 Jun. 1756, *MPCP*, 7:153; for militia bill see Peters to the proprietors [Richard and Thomas Penn], 25 Nov. 1755, Peters Letter Book, 1755-1757, 18-21, HSP; see also Edward Shippen to William Allen, 16 Dec. 1755, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 185, HSP; for Croghan, Weiser, and Galbreath and their advice see Hamilton to Morris, 18 Dec. 1755, *PA*, 1st ser., 2:537-538; see also Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 4:526; see also Peters to [?] Penn, 17 Feb. 1756, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:29, HSP. John Campbell was the fourth earl of Loudoun.
The bipartisan commission’s question spurred Governor Morris, who ordered the construction of four forts west of the Susquehanna River. Fort Lyttelton, which was to be situated about twenty miles from settlements on unfinished Burd’s Road, which fell a few miles short of Braddock’s Road, would “prevent the march of any regulars that way into the Province” and also serve as “an advanced post or magazine, in case of an attempt to the westward.” Already situated some twenty miles to the north of Fort Lyttleton, “near the great Path used by the Indians and Indian Traders, to and from the Ohio,” Croghan’s Aughwick stockade fort was to be fortified and renamed Fort Shirley. Fort Shirley would block “the easiest way of access for the [French-allied] Indians into the settlements of this Province.” Fort Granville, which was to be situated some fifteen miles to the northeast of Fort Shirley, at the mouth of Kishacoquillas Creek, a branch of the Juniata River, would guard “a narrow pass where the Juniata falls through the mountains” and “leads to a considerable settlement upon the Juniata.” Pomfret Castle, which was to be situated some fifteen miles from Fort Granville, which was some twelve miles from the Susquehanna River, would command the opposite side of the Juniata Valley and prevent French-allied warriors “from penetrating into Settlements from that quarter.” Each of the forts would support a seventy-five-man militia company, “exclusive of officers who are from time to time to detach partys to Range and scour the woods Each way, from the several forts, by which means the Indians will be prevented from falling upon the inhabitants.” Governor Morris expected that by next summer the provincial militiamen would be “expert woodsmen” and “proper rangers” who could “attend an army in case it should be thought necessary to march to the westward.”

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The “Scheme” for frontier defense necessitated that the “Spaces” between the forts be defended, too, so Governor Morris commissioned Croghan a militia captain and ordered him to Cumberland County to choose “proper Places” for building three “stockades,” one stockade behind Patterson’s farm, one at Kishacoquillas Creek, and one at Sideling Hill (an Allegheny Mountain ridge extending southwest to Maryland). Each stockade was to be fifty square feet and contain a blockhouse with a fifty-man barrack. Croghan was to recruit workmen, set wages at one dollar per day, and hire foremen. Why had a known quitter been commissioned at all? “As I knew not of whom else to employ, and upon Supposition that He is honest,” Councilman James Hamilton wrote Governor Morris, “no body is fitter for that Service.” As if to test his supposition, Hamilton “enjoined” Croghan “to engage” Indians across the Susquehanna for a conference at Carlisle though he knew that Croghan held “a Sorry opinion of that treaty” since few friendly Indians could be found across the river.” In other words Croghan was to perform a double duty for the provincial government—supervising defense of the lower Susquehanna and summoning western Indians to a conference. At last, it seemed to him, his fortunes had improved.10

Indeed the provincial government extended him a generous line of credit, which he expended immediately for the public good. At a Lancaster store on 22 December he bought £50 worth of silver truck for provincial stores and Indians and ordered 250 tin canteens for his recruits. On 27 December he paid an inn’s barkeep £8 for soldiers’ lodgings. The payment covered three days’ room and board for some fifty pioneers whom he had recruited to garrison the provincial forts and protect the spaces between them. A few days

10 For captain’s commission and “proper Places” see “Orders to Captain George Croghan [about mid-Dec.], 1755,” PA, 1st ser., 2:536; for “A I knew not” see Hamilton to Morris, 18 Dec. 1755, *ibid.*, 2:538; for captain’s commission see Morris to Hardy, 5 Jul. 1756, *ibid.* 2:690; see also Peters to Thomas Penn, 26 Dec. 1756, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:213, HSP.
later he and his recruits, now 180 strong, quit Carlisle for the western frontier. Croghan had recruited his men “in a very Expeditious manner,” Governor Morris later wrote Governor Charles Hardy of New York, “but not so frugally as the Commissioners for disposing of the Publick money thought he might have done.” Yet if Croghan had done otherwise, he might have lost recruits, for they, like most westerners, harbored grudges against the eastern political establishment. Knowing that his recruits relished a good time at provincial expense, he had entertained them lavishly, and at his own expense he had bought prized weapons like firearms and tomahawks and given them to his recruits. He had even given his own rifled muskets to his recruits. The rifled muskets were more accurate than the province-issued smoothbore muskets. For the moment, then, Croghan deserved commendation, not criticism.  

While Croghan regaled his recruits on the western frontier, the neutral Delawares on the Susquehanna River took up the hatchet against the settlers of the northern frontier. On 24 December a war party raided Gnadenhütten, a Moravian mission about seventy-five miles northwest of Philadelphia. The war party killed and scalped peaceable men, women, and children and burned the mission, while Delaware and Mahican converts cowered nearby.

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11 For Croghan’s purchases, bills, and activities see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 102-103; see also *Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser*, 1753-1756, 1 Jan. 1756; see also “An Account of Arms and Ammunition 1756,” *PA*, 1st ser., 3:25; for “a very Expeditious manner” see Morris to Hardy, 5 Jul. 1756, *PA*, 1st series 2:690; for Croghan’s giving his recruits rifled muskets see Hugh Mercer to Morris, 19 Apr. 1756, *ibid.*, 2:632. The bayoneted flintlock musket used in the French and Indian War was of two types—the rifle-bore and the smoothbore. “The Indians make use of rifled guns for the most part,” Edward Shippen wrote Governor Robert Hunter Morris on 24 April 1756, “and there is such a difference between these sort of Guns and Smooth bored, that if I was in an Engagement with the Savages, I would rather Stand my chance with one of the former Sort, which might require a minute to clean, load and discharge, than be possessed of a Smooth bored gun which I could discharge three times in a y^e^ same space, for at 150 yards distance, with the one, I can put a ball within a foot or Six Inches of y^e^ mark, whereas with the other, I can Seldom or ever hit the board of two feet wide & Six feet long.” See Shippen to Morris, 24 Apr. 1756, *PA*, 1st ser., 2:643. In short, the smoothbore musket, though easier to load and fire than the rifle-bore musket, was inaccurate. See Jones, *Art of War in the Western World*, 269-271.
From Wyoming (now Wilkes-Barre) and other Susquehanna villages war parties forayed into the Tulpehocken Valley and beyond the Delaware River, killing with abandon, burning homes, taking scalps, captives, and plunder. To escape retaliation, the war parties led their families and captives north to a village called Tunkhannock, leaving behind a single party to foray into settlements north of the Kittatinny Mountains. By early January 1756 the war party, which included a Moravian convert named Teedyuscung, had rejoined its band at Tunkhannock. Having thus achieved the status of war chief, Teedyuscung led a hundred Delawares to Tioga (now Athens), where the Chemung River joins the Susquehanna’s north branch. From Tioga he led his band to Passigachkunk, which was on the Cowanesque River, a tributary of the Chemung. Altogether the three villages sustained some two hundred warriors who reveled in avenging the encroachment of their lands and the corruption of their culture. To the distress of pacifist Quaker civilians and statesmen, the old friends of William Penn had become the scourge of the northern frontier.12

As sole superintendent of Indian affairs in the northern colonies William Johnson could and did act to quell the Delaware belligerents and their allies, the Shawnees. Although he succeeded in inducing a promise from the Iroquois to restrain their rebellious “nephews,” the Delawares, from raiding Pennsylvania’s northern and western frontiers, he knew that the Iroquois would not keep their promise unless he involved the one Iroquois nation that remained true to Great Britain—the Mohawks, mostly out of gratitude for his having contained the encroachment of their lands. While the Onondagas and the Oneidas collaborated with the French in the east, the Senecas did so in the west. Supported not only by the

12 For raids and their aftermaths see [Thomson], An Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delawares and Shawnee Indians from the British Interest, And into the Measures taken for recovering their Friendship, 83-84; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 4 Dec. 1755; see also Weslager, Delaware Indians, 229-231; see also Jack D. Marietta, Reformation of American Quakerism, 1748-1783 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 151-152.
French and Canadians, but by the Cayugas and the Senecas (who outnumbered the other five Iroquois nations combined), the refugee Delawares living in villages on the Susquehanna and Ohio Rivers had rebelled against the humiliating status of “women,” the inferior status to which their New York “uncles” had relegated them after conquering them in the second half of the seventeenth century. The status had prohibited them from making war and negotiating treaties. After realizing that bluster might spur the Susquehanna and Ohio Delawares to unite against the Iroquois, the Mohawks used tact to persuade only the Susquehanna Delawares to meet Johnson at Onondaga, New York, in the spring. Put another way, Johnson’s objective was to divide and conquer.¹³

At Reading on 2 January 1756 Governor Morris ordered Croghan to bring in western Indians for the Carlisle conference. Eleven days later Croghan returned with just seven Mingos who had once lived at Aughwick, so that the Carlisle conference amounted to nothing. Still, the Carlisle conference caused valuable intelligence to surface. Croghan had sent an ally named Delaware Jo to spy in Ohio. At a rendezvous at Aughwick on 8 January, Delaware Jo had reported that he had visited “the Residence of Chingas [Shingas],” or Kittanning, a village about forty miles north of Fort Duquesne. At Kittanning he had “found one hundred and forty Men chiefly Delawares and Shawonese, who had then with them above one hundred English Prisoners big and little taken from Virginia and Pennsylvania,” and he had learned why the Ohio Delaware and Shawnee warriors had “taken up the hatchet” against the British. In April or May 1755 an Iroquois war party en route

to attack southern enemies had consented to their doing so, but “neither [Shingas’ brother] the Beaver nor several others of the Shawoneese and Delawares [had] approved of this measure nor had taken up the Hatchet, and the Beaver believed some of those who had were sorry for what they had done, and would be glad to make up with the English.” The intelligence was valuable indeed, for split loyalties indicated that some Ohio Delawares and Shawnees might be neutralized through trade or negotiation, even if the consent of a passing Iroquois war party was weak evidence of a shift in Iroquois western policy.\footnote{For Reading conference see “Meeting of Governor & Commissioners at Reading,” 2 Jan. 1756, \textit{MPCP}, 6:780; for Carlisle conference see “Carlisle Council,” 13 Jan. 1756, \textit{ibid.}, 6:781-782; for geopolitics see Dowd, \textit{War Under Heaven}, 38.}

After the Carlisle conference Croghan forwarded stronger evidence to Assemblyman William West, who forwarded it to Governor Morris. The evidence pointed to a serious (and legitimate) grievance. On one side of Iroquois French forts were encroaching Iroquois lands, and on the other British settlers were, a situation that must “End in a totall Extirpation” of the Iroquois “unless timely prevented.” British settlers “purchased the Lands they settled, yet it was of Little Importance to them [the Iroquois] whether it was taken by force or Settled by Virtue of purchasing it, since in either Case they wou’d lose their lands, and the Consideration they got was Soon Spent, altho’ the lands Remain’d.” Believing “it absolutely Necessary to assert their own Independency,” the Iroquois would incorporate the Ohio Delawares and Shawnees into the Iroquois Confederacy in return for “good behaviour,” which would require the new members to “fall on the back Inhabitants of this Province and drive them as far as the South Mountain which with the assistance of the French they Expected they wou’d be able to Effect.” The raids would force the British “to make peace.” The Iroquois “intended to comply with” the peace, “provided that [the South] Mountain was agreed upon as a boundary to their Settlements.” The Iroquois
would then ally with the British “to drive off the French from Ohio, which they expected
wou’d be Easily Done by Cutting off the Communication between their Forts and Starv-
ing them out.” Playing one imperial European power against another had been standard
Iroquois policy for some time, but Iroquois complicity in the Ohio Indian raids into Penn-
sylvania was new policy, as was the deal to incorporate the refugee Ohio Indians into the
Iroquois Confederacy. The evidence convinced Governor Morris that he would have to
court the Iroquois on three fronts—Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio.\textsuperscript{15}

In reality the Iroquois never intended to incorporate displaced Delawares and Shawnees
into the Iroquois Confederacy as equal members. Rather, their intention was to reestab-
lish their hegemony over the tribes dealing directly with the Pennsylvania and Virginia
governments. There was, however, little the Iroquois could do to substantiate their pre-
tensions to domination, for Ohio was too far from the center of Iroquois activity in New
York and the periphery in Pennsylvania and Virginia. Such favorable geopolitical factors
had freed Ohio’s Delawares and Shawnees to pursue their own interests, to negotiate their
own deals, and to war against enemies of their own choice. The same geopolitical factors
had enabled Ohio’s Mingos, refugee Iroquois all, to exercise a measure of autonomy, too.
Given such geopolitical factors, Croghan’s evidence amounted to conspiracy theory, yet
the theory did contain kernels of truth. British and French encroachment in Iroquoia \textit{had}
caused the Iroquois to become so adamant about maintaining \textit{their} geopolitical indepen-
dence that they had thrown up a smokescreen to the detriment of the politically assertive
Ohio tribes. There was a conspiracy afoot, but it was not the one Croghan imagined, for
cought between advancing French and British civilizations, Pennsylvania and Ohio Indi-

\textsuperscript{15} For quotations see William West to [    ], 12 Jan. 1756, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:13,
HSP; for geopolitics see Dowd, \textit{War Under Heaven}, 38.
ans had developed a sense of intertribal unity, one that would erupt in 1763 as Pontiac’s Rebellion. Of course Ohio Mingos were among the tribes that had developed this sense of intertribal unity. Governor Morris, then, was right: To end bloodshed on Pennsylvania’s two situational frontiers, he would have to court the Iroquois on three fronts.\(^{16}\)

On 21 January 1756 Governor Morris informed the Pennsylvania Council that Croghan had recruited three hundred pioneers for active duty west of the Susquehanna River. To garrison the western forts, three of which were “already in hand,” and one of which—Fort Lyttelton—would be soon, Morris called up four militia companies and apportioned Croghan’s recruits among them. Morris appreciated that Croghan’s recruits had “Inlisted in the Kings Service for a certain term [ninety days],” for just such an enlistment required him to choose the officers. Morris had proposed legislation that would give him control of appointive militia companies, but the Pennsylvania Assembly had passed a militia act that authorized the formation of elective companies with elective officers. Morris might have expressed his sentiments to Croghan. Be that as it might, by enlisting frontiersmen in the king’s service, Croghan had demonstrated his loyalty to his commander-in-chief, who in turn commissioned a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign for every company. Being captain of Fort Shirley, Croghan received this full complement of officers: Scottish physician Hugh Mercer as lieutenant, Indian trader Hugh Crawford as ensign, and Thomas Smallman as commissary. The youthful Smallman was of course Croghan’s cousin.\(^{17}\)


\(^{17}\) For “already in hand” and “Inlisted in the Kings Service” see Morris to the Pennsylvania Council, 21 Jan. 1756, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 8:13, HSP; for commissions see Governor Robert Hunter Morris’ Orders & Instructions to James Burd, 17 Jan. 1756, Papers of the Shippen Family, 2:21, HSP; see also
Croghan acclimated to Fort Shirley. Now and then, as per his orders, he ordered parties to scout between the provincial forts, but when the Susquehanna Valley proved too dangerous for civilian contractors to supply Fort Shirley, he ordered parties instead to guard supply trains. Although this tack occasionally left Fort Shirley undermanned, French-allied warriors found that they could not assault it directly, so they resorted to lurking on its fringes and attacking vulnerable civilians or militiamen. In late January 1756, for example, James Baker, Croghan’s nineteen-year-old indentured servant, was going to a garden about a quarter-mile from Fort Shirley when Shingas’ nephew “sprung up from the side of the Path, and leaped upon his Back.” Another Delaware “rose up,” then “carried him off Prisoner, and led him to a Town on the Ohio.” The town was Kittanning, where Baker saw “more than an hundred English Boys and Girls Prisoners” and learned “the Indians had taken several old People Prisoners from Virginia and Pennsylvania,” but “sold them to the French either because they were cross or useless.” He learned too the captors “were carrying the Guns they had taken from General Braddock to the upper French Fort [Fort Duquesne].” Delaware war parties came and went, and one day Shingas led out a party upon proclaiming his objective of taking scalps at Fort Lyttelton. Later Baker was told to “help” a young Delaware drive horses across a river about two miles north of Kittanning. When he and the Delaware had completed the task, the Delaware asked him “to hold his Gun whilst he got on his Horse, and as the Delaware turned about to mount his Horse” Baker “shot him in the back scalped him and made his Escape to Fort Shirley.”

Governor Robert Hunter Morris’ Additional Orders and Instructions to Captain James Burd, 18 Jan. 1756, Papers of the Shippen Family, 2:23, HSP; for Croghan’s complement of officers see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 104.

18 For dangers see George Croghan [at Fort Shirley] to Captain James Burd [at Fort Granville], 5 Feb. 1756, Papers of the Shippen Family, 2:25, HSP; see also James Patterson to W. Bird, 25 Feb. 1756, Papers of the Shippen Family, 2:29, HSP; see also New-York Mercury, 22 Mar. 1756; for guarding supply trains see Peters to Thomas Penn, 25 Apr. 1756, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 8:73, 75, HSP; for “sprung up”
Another vicious reprisal occurred near Fort Shirley in early February 1756. Having received presents from the garrison “to Bring in a Large number of Indians,” two Ohio Delawares, “invited one of the Soldiers to Goe out a Little way to drink a Little Whiskey.” The Delawares and the militiaman had walked only a “Small Distance off” when the Delawares “stabbed him on the Ribbs, but not mortally.” A reconnoiter alarmed the fort upon finding his bloody comrade. A thirteen-man party was “order’d out after” the Delawares. The party caught up with the Delawares, who opened fire, wounding one pursuer. The party then returned fire, killing one Delaware. The party attempted to take the other Delaware alive, “but [he] wou’d not Submit,” so he was killed, too.¹⁹

French-allied Ohio Indians acted in kind. Throughout February 1756 Ohio Delaware war chief Shingas sent out war parties that inflamed the northern frontier. On 11 February forty or so civilians who had taken refuge in a “fort” at McDowell’s Mill on the east side of the west branch of Conococheague Creek, a tributary of the Potomac River, saw smoke curling upward from “the Widow Cox’s about two Miles distant.” One civilian was a solicitous widow who requested that someone be sent “to see what was become of her Sons who were sent that Morning to her Plantation to fodder the Cattle.” That someone was John Craig, who had gone about a half-mile from the fort when five Ohio Delawares captured him and “stripped him tied a rope around his neck and drove him before them.” At a farm some two miles away Craig did see the widow’s sons, “with Ropes about their Necks the Ends whereof were tied to saplings.” Then his captors met a war party led by Shingas, who put Craig’s feet “into a pair of Stocks and left him so all that

¹⁹ For quotations see Francis West to William West, 9 Feb. 1756, PA, 1st ser., 2:571.
Night which proved so severe a one that his Feet were frost bitten.” During the next five days Shingas’ party peppered Craig with questions “about the Size Figure and Strength of McDowell’s Fort making him draw out the Plan of it and likewise about the other Forts and what the English were doing.” Craig cooperated, so Shingas permitted him to ask questions about Ohio Delawares. Why did they “murder the People of Pennsylvania who were so kind to them”? he asked. Why did they turn against a government that “never injur’d them”? Pennsylvanians “had killed too many” Delawares for Ohio Delawares “ever to come into Pennsylvania to a Treaty,” Shingas replied, adding that if Pennsylvanians “now wanted to treat with the Indians the Government must now come to their Towns.”

Shingas in turn asked Craig questions about Croghan and Pennsylvania. Why had Croghan gone “to War in the English Army”? Why had “the People of Pennsylvania assisted that Army with Provisions Flower Waggon and Horses”? “M’ Croghan had lost all his Effects by the French coming to Alegainy and was obliged to leave his Place and so go to Virginia to the Army,” said Craig. Why had Croghan “returned to Pennsylvania”? Why was he “so well received there”? “The Government thought M’ Croghan had great influence over the Indians and would keep them true to their Covenant Chain with the English & they encouraged him to return to his House,” said Craig. Shingas called all Craig’s answers lies, for he had seen “a Letter taken from the English after the Defeat of General Braddock,” and the letter indicated that England and France would “divide between them the Lands belonging to the Indians,” who “would prevent it if they could having all join-

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ed in a League together for that Purpose.” The intertribal league would include sixteen hundred Indian warriors—Delawares, Shawnees, Mingos, Cherokees, Chippewas, and other Indians—who would “begin with the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania and cut them off this Summer” and then “arrive in Philadelphia.” Shingas “particularly threatened” that if Ohio warriors “could catch” Croghan and Scarouady, they “would burn them.” Shingas boasted that if the fourteen Ohio warriors who at that moment were scouting Fort Shirley captured Croghan, “they would burn him.” Croghan’s men were in danger, too. On 29 February a Shingas-led war party raided McDowell’s Mill while Ensign Hugh Crawford and thirteen men were away foraging. After the attack two of Croghan’s men lay dead.21

While spring enlivened the western frontier, conditions within the provincial forts deteriorated. Provisions, supplies, arms, ammunition, and accouterments were in short supply. About half the men had not received guns. None of the men had received pay, even though their terms of service were nearly up. Many were not reenlisting. Negligent and dilatory provincial officials searched for a scapegoat. They did not search long. In early March they summoned Croghan to Philadelphia, and when he appeared before them, they hammered him. “[T]hey said that his Extravagance and undue connection with the Men wou’d not Suffer them to continue him in the Service,” Richard Peters wrote Thomas Penn on 26 December 1756. “[T]hey overhauled his Accounts and censur’d his Conduct whereupon he resigned, and finding no place for his Indian Talents here, he went to Sir William Johnson, offered his Service, and was accepted, and had now the Title of Deputy Agent.” On 9 April the selfsame officials proposed that Governor Morris issue a procla-

21 For quotations see Deposition of John Craig, 30 Mar. 1756, Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 1754-1756, 2:78, HSP; for contemporary account of incident see Pennsylvania Gazette, 29 Feb. 1756; for 29 February attack see James Patterson to Capt. Bird, 7 Mar. 1756, Papers of the Shippen Family, 2:33, HSP; for deaths of Croghan’s men see Benjamin Blett to James Burd, 5 Mar. 1756, ibid., 2:33, HSP.
mation offering scalp bounties—150 dollars for the scalp of an Indian male older than ten years and 50 dollars for the scalp of an Indian female. That barbarous proposal marked the desperate final act of culpable bureaucrats unable to defuse an unfolding crisis. Disgruntled militiamen had not reenlisted. They had done their duty and wanted to be paid. Croghan, too, had done his duty, not in conformity with the standards of polite Philadelphia society perhaps, but he had done it nonetheless. To judge his actions in the field by civilian standards was to be unfair to him and every man under his command, for unlike his comfortable censurers, who worked in secure Philadelphia, he had tested himself in battle—the Battle of the Monongahela, to be exact—and then exhausted his financial and material resources for his command at Fort Shirley. In short he had sacrificed much for the public good, so he should have been commended, not excoriated.22

Croghan acted as interpreter for Governor Morris during an intercultural conference in Philadelphia in late March. Scarouady and Andrew Montour had called the conference after completing official business that had required them to enlist Iroquois aid in negotiating a settlement between the provincial government and the belligerent Delawares and Shawnees. The Iroquois who had accompanied Scarouady and Montour to Philadelphia were on hand, as were the Mingos who had lived at Aughwick and at Harris’ Ferry, but there was nothing for anyone to do because the diplomats of the belligerent Delawares and Shawnees avoided the conference. The conference therefore accomplished nothing.

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22 For poor conditions in forts, lack of military pay, and other issues see [Captain] Elisha Saltar to [?], 4 Apr. 1756, PA, 1st ser., 2:611; see also Saltar to Morris, 5 Apr. 1756, ibid., 2:613; see also John Steel to Morris, 11 Apr. 1756, ibid., 2:623; see also James Burd to Morris, 19 Apr. 1756, ibid., 2:631; see also Captain Hugh Mercer to Morris, 19 Apr. 1756, ibid., 2:632-633; see also Shippen to Morris, 24 Apr. 1756, ibid., 643; see also Peters to Thomas Penn, 25 Apr. 1756, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 8:73, 75, HSP; see also Peters to Thomas Penn, 26 Jun. 1756, ibid., 8:125, HSP; for “[T]hey said that” Peters to Thomas Penn, 26 Dec. 1756, ibid., 8:213, HSP; for Shippen to [James] Burd, 24 Mar. 1756, Papers of the Shippen Family, 2:35, HSP; for scalp bounties see “Minute of Commissioners’ Premiums for Scalps,” 9 Apr. 1756, PA, 1st ser., 2:619; see also Morris to the Commissioners, 9 Apr. 1756, ibid., 2:620.
but Scarouady and Montour did tell Croghan of their intention to move his former Mingo charges—including warriors who had fought with Braddock—to New York’s Mohawk Valley. Perhaps their desire to relocate the Mingos inspired Croghan to seek employment at William Johnson’s headquarters—Fort Johnson—in the Mohawk Valley. Perhaps not. In any case Croghan left Philadelphia to attend to personal affairs and to transfer his Fort Shirley command to Captain Hugh Mercer, who kept on Thomas Smallman as ensign of the garrison. In April, Mercer gave Croghan a receipt for the arms and “other necessaries” still at Fort Shirley. On 15 April the provincial commissioners reimbursed Croghan for the expense of supplying food and goods to the four militia companies he had raised. On 1 June they reimbursed him for the construction of Fort Shirley. The reimbursements were £213 and £200 respectively—not much for his trouble, but better than nothing.23

By late March 1756 war had become the crucial question in provincial politics. In Philadelphia, Scots-Irish and German refugees from each frontier demanded action, so that upon the recommendation of five of the eight assemblymen on the appropriations committee Governor Morris and the Pennsylvania Council considered declaring war on the Delawares and Shawnees and offering scalp bounties. Quakers resisted the pull of war while proprietary leaders exploited the situation by iterating that besides eschewing the militia law Quakers had conducted Indian affairs with culpable negligence. The tactic spurred malcontents, and in late March the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Ministers and Elders was marred by an incident that reflected growing support for war. Up and down streets around the meetinghouse on Second and Market Streets pioneers from Gnadenhütten on

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23 For conference see MPCP, 7:64-77; for Mercer’s receipt see Mercer to Morris, 19 Apr. 1756, PA, 1st ser., 2:633; for reimbursements see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 6:618, 620.
the northern frontier pulled a wagon containing the dead bodies of two or three comrades. Behind the wagon tramped a mob of Philadelphians who cursed Indians and Quakers. The spectacle shocked Quaker John Churchman. “What will become of Pennsylvania?” he thought as he stood in the doorway of a friend’s house, “for it felt to him that many did not consider, that the sins of the inhabitants, pride, profane swearing, drunkenness with other wickedness were the cause, that the Lord had suffered this calamity and scourge to come upon them.” Walking the street, he thought, “This Land is polluted with blood, and in the day of inquisition for blood, it will not only be required at the frontiers and borders, but even in this place where these bodies are now see.” He thought too, “How can this be? since this has been a land of peace, and as yet nor much concerned in war.”

On 14 April the clamor for war abated because Governor Morris and his Council, over Quaker protest, declared war on the Delawares and Shawnees and issued a proclamation announcing scalp bounties. Next day Indians visiting Philadelphia met Quaker leaders and “confirmed” Quaker “Apprehensions” that “Dissatisfaction” with land transferals had estranged the Susquehanna Delawares and the Ohio Delawares. On 16 April, with some £5,000 in donations at his disposal, Israel Pemberton, Jr., a wealthy Quaker merchant and ex-assemblyman who was clerk of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, persuaded Governor Morris to authorize a meeting with the Indians. With Morris’ approbation the Pennsylvania Gazette, which had publicized rewards for the heads of Delaware war chiefs Shingas and Jacobs, readied the scalp bounty proclamation for publication in its 22 April issue.

25 For war declarations and scalp bounties see entry of 14 Apr. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, AM 25, HSP; see also Peters to [Penn], 23 Feb. 1756, Reverend Richard Peters Letters to the Proprietors of the Province of
On 19 April the Quakers and the Indians met at Pemberton’s home on Chestnut Street for dinner and business. Besides curious denizens Pemberton’s home held thirteen Indians and several prominent Quakers. The following conducted business, which involved the mollification of the Susquehanna Delawares, who had gathered at Tioga: Scarouady, who as “half king” of the Iroquois Confederacy had supervised the affairs of Ohio Delawares and Shawnees until the French had superseded him in 1754; Conrad Weiser, who in addition to being an interpreter and a go-between was a leader in the proprietary party; Daniel Claus, an agent for William Johnson; and Andrew Montour, the peripatetic go-between-interpreter of mixed ancestry. Eager to regain his authority in Indian affairs and to enhance his reputation as a friend of Pennsylvania, Scarouady promised to conciliate the Susquehanna Delawares, but only after eliciting reassurances that Quakers would mediate between them and the provincial government. The meeting broke up, but twice more the principals gathered at Pemberton’s home for dinner and business. On 21 April, Pemberton gave Scarouady a wampum belt signifying peace and a few silver medals depicting the bust of King George II on one side and the Royal Arms on the other. On 23 April, Scarouady stated that three friends would take the wampum belt to Tioga and then left for New York, intending to win support for peace—from William Johnson and the Iroquois Confederacy. Of the Indians at his home Pemberton wrote Johnson, “The Frankness &
Sincerity of their Expressions & Conduct leave no room for doubt of their being heartily pleased with meeting some of their old Frds., in whom they can wish confidence & I hope their dispositions may be impro’d to our mutual Advantage.”

Governor Morris prepared a peace message for the Susquehanna Delawares, for he had received from New York Governor Charles Hardy a letter proposing that William Johnson negotiate peace with the Susquehanna Delawares via his Iroquois allies and advising against a declaration of war on the Delawares and Shawnees “until we know what steps they [the Iroquois] have [taken] and will further take with their nephews [the Delawares and Shawnees].” The Quakers offered to fund the peace mission to Tioga, but Governor Morris declined the offer, arguing that private persons had no prerogatives in official business. Although his purpose was to downplay favorable publicity for Quakers, he nevertheless attempted to elicit a favorable response to his peace message by affixing a clause reporting that the descendents of William Penn—the Quakers—were willing to be mediators. On 26 April, Delaware messengers Newcastle, Jagrea, and Lacquis left for Tioga.

The war declaration and the scalp bounties ruined William Johnson’s plans, however. On 5 May, Governor Morris and the Pennsylvania Council perused a somewhat belated report from Governor Hardy, one that included a communiqué from Johnson to William Shirley. “What will the Delaware & Shawonese think of Such Opposition and Contradiction in our Conduct?” Johnson asked in the communiqué. How should he “behave at the

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26 For 19 April 1756 meeting see Several Conferences, 19-20; see also Etting Coll., Misc. I, 84, HSP; for 21 April 1756 meeting see Several Conferences, 21; see also Etting Coll., Misc. 1:84, HSP; for silver medals see Harrold E. Gillingham, “Silver Ornaments,” PMHB, Vol. 58, No. 2 (1934): 105; for 23 April 1756 meeting see Several Conferences, 25; see also entry, 26 Apr. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; see also Etting Coll., Misc.1:87, HSP; see also Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 7:75, HSP; for “The Frankness of” see Pemberton to Johnson, 25 Apr. 1756, Pemberton Family Papers, No. 1036, HCQC.

27 For governor’s peace message and Quakers’ offer to fund mission to Tioga see MPCP, 7:101-102; see also Theodore Thayer, Israel Pemberton: King of the Quakers (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1943), 102; for dispatching of Delaware messengers see MPCP, 7:109.
Approaching Meeting at Onondaga, not only to these Indians but to the Six Nations,” as “these hostile Measures which Mr. Morris has Entered into is Throwing all our Schemes into Confusion, and must Natureally Give the Six Nations such Impressions and the French such Advantages to work on Against us that I tremble for the consequence.” The report caused the Council to advise Morris to cease hostilities until the results of the Onondaga conference were known, so that on 26 May he declared a temporary cessation of hostilities in northern Pennsylvania. On 3 June, Newcastle, Jagrea, and Lacquis returned from Tioga with news that the Susquehanna Delawares would meet him to end the war. On 10 June, Morris sent back Newcastle and Jagrea with a copy of his declaration as well as a request for a conference.28

Still, recent developments in London troubled Quakers, who through correspondence with London Quakers, knew of the progress of a petition that was the handiwork of two of Proprietor Thomas Penn’s most loyal placemen: William Smith, the Scots-Anglican who was the provost of the College of Philadelphia (now the University of Pennsylvania), and William Allen, Jr., the Scots-Irish Old Light Presbyterian who was the chief justice of the province and a wealthy land speculator. The Smith-Allen petition called for Parliament to enact a law that, in violation of Quaker religious principles, would require all government officials to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown. To remove a source of proprietary intrigue and to stymie parliamentary action on the petition, Lord Granville, the president of the Privy Council, struck a bargain with London Quakers: He would exert his influence to block the Smith-Allen petition if they would convince Philadelphia Quakers opposed to defense measures to withdraw voluntarily from the Pennsylvania As-

28 For “What will the” see MCPF, 7:117; for declaration of cessation of hostilities see ibid., 7:130; for events of 3 June and 10 June 1756 see ibid., 7:137-144, 151.
sembly for the duration of the military crisis. Defense-minded Quakers would remain in
the Assembly to vote on military measures and oppose the proprietary party. The Lon-
don Meeting for Sufferings drafted an epistle on the matter, sent it to the Philadelphia
Yearly Meeting, and commissioned two emissaries, John Hunt and Christopher Wilson,
to persuade Philadelphia Quakers to comply with it.²⁹

Yielding to dual pressures of political expediency and religious principle even though
they had not yet received the epistle, six Quakers—William Callender, Joshua Morris,
Francis Parvin, James Pemberton, William Peters, and Peter Worral—resigned their seats
in the Pennsylvania Assembly on 4 July 1756, leaving in the majority the defense-minded
Quakers and the Anglicans led by Benjamin Franklin, who viewed Indians unfavorably.
Soon, however, religious sensibilities compelled the resigners to act, to do something to
pacify the frontier, and so they joined like-minded Quakers in pondering alternative ways
of influencing the shaping of Indian policy. They did not ponder long. On 19 July, Gov-
ernor Morris received a reply from Tioga: The Susquehanna Delawares would meet him
at Easton so long as Quakers were welcome. Because a final cessation of hostilities now
seemed possible, the Assembly appropriated £300 to fund the conference. Next day at
their new meeting house the Quakers resolved to raise funds to help the Assembly cover
its expenses. On 22 July, having raised £2,000 in subscriptions that included a sum of
£400 from Israel Pemberton, Jr., John Pemberton, John Reynell, and Jonathan Mifflin,
the Quakers formed the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with
the Indians by Pacific Measures, an informal private organization sponsored indirectly by
the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, which hoped to avoid political accusation. In behalf of

²⁹ For London-Philadelphia politics see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 223-243; see also Marietta, Reformation of American Quakerism, 1748-1783, 142-145, 159-161.
the Susquehanna and Ohio Delawares the Friendly Association would solicit provincial favor, witness conferences, and purchase goods and clothing, but the organization would also pursue self-interest: It would try to discredit the proprietary party. 30

During this roiling time Croghan engrossed himself in personal affairs. There was the unresolved issue of losses to the French before 1755, for example. Before the Battle of the Monongahela, he and William Trent had listed their losses in hopes of recovery, but in the battle’s chaotic aftermath the French had seized the list along with Braddock’s baggage. Somehow, Croghan and Trent recreated the list and traveled from pillar to post in April, May, and June 1756 to procure depositions from fifteen other traders who had lost goods to the French and French-allied Indians. Croghan, Trent, and their fellows formed a group that henceforth would be called the “suffering traders” of 1754. Croghan acted as supervisor of the group and Trent as attorney. Trent drafted a memorial to the Crown. The memorial, which argued for recompense “out of the money arising from the Sale of the French Prizes taken before the Declaration of the last War,” read thus:
The French and their Indian allies “in the Time of a profound Peace in Europe between England and France most barbarously and unexpectedly attacked your Memorialists or their Agents and robbed them of all their Goods Merchandize and Peltrys, murdered several of their Agents and sent some of your Memorialists Prisoners to Canada and from thence to

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30 For resignation of Quakers from Assembly see MPCP, 7:148-149; for resolution of Friendly Association see entry, 20 Jul. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; see also Samuel Parrish, Some Chapters in the History of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures (Philadelphia, 1877), 15-16; for founding of Friendly Association see entry, 22 Jul. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; see also subscription agreement, 22 Jul. 1756, Gratz Coll., Case 17, 1756-1758, HSP; see also entry, 22 Jul. 1756, Friendly Association, 1756-1760, Autograph Coll., Case 20, Box 13, HSP; see also Parrish, Some Chapters in the History of the Friendly Association, 17; see also Richard Bauman, For the Reputation of Truth: Politics, Religion, and Conflict Among the Pennsylvania Quakers, 1750-1800 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 81-84.
France whereby your Memorialists were despoiled of all their Property and they and their Familiys reduced to the greatest Distress.” Philadelphia merchants who were in the Indian trade likewise petitioned the Crown, and Governor Morris legitimized their claims in a 14 June 1756 letter to the Crown.31

Unbeknownst to Croghan, however, dark and malignant forces had arrayed against him. Two letters, purportedly written by one “Filius Gallicae” in Philadelphia in January 1756 and addressed to the former French ambassador to Great Britain, the duc de Mirepoix, had been intercepted in Ireland. Two more letters, purportedly written by the same writer in March, were intercepted, too. All four letters were treasonous, as they revealed that although their writer received a commission to muster an “army” in Pennsylvania to capture Fort Duquesne, he nevertheless intended to lead the army against the British, because he was a closet Roman Catholic sympathetic to France. His army of traitors would be easy to muster in Pennsylvania, where there were plenty of Irish and German Roman Catholics itching to fight against George II rather than Louis XV. What the writer needed from the duc de Mirepoix were official letters of support.32

Lord Halifax, president of the Board of Trade and Plantations, believed the letters to be authentic and thus conducted an investigation to uncover their author. His investigators pointed to obvious candidates like William Shirley, but although Shirley had spent time in France and had a French wife, Halifax focused on another suspect, George Croghan, an Irish Anglican labeled a Roman Catholic in an anonymously written pamphlet entitled

31 For depositions see Etting Coll., No. 40, Ohio Company, Vol. 1, Folder 7, HSP; see also ibid., Vol. 1, Folders 8-11, 19-33½, HSP; for quotations from memorial see “Dra. of Memorial from M’ Frank to the King &c for retribution—1754,” ibid., Vol. 1, Folder 5, HSP; for petition see Merchant Petition, ibid., Vol. 1, Folder 6, HSP; for Morris’ letter see Document Signed by Robert Hunter Morris, 14 Jun. 1756, ibid., Vol. 1, Folder 7, HSP.

32 For letters see Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1896 (Washington, 1897), 1:688-693, American Philosophical Society, APS.
An Answer to an Invidious Pamphlet, entitled, A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania (1755). In a communiqué to the duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State Henry Fox wrote that “one Capt George Croghan, an intriguing, disaffected person, and Indian trader in Pennsylvania was very much suspected.” Halifax ordered an investigation of Croghan. Should the investigation prove Croghan was guilty of treason, British officers would arrest him. In the end the investigation established superficial similarities between the facts of his life and those of the writer’s as recounted in the letters. Perhaps the letters were a hoax intended to discredit Croghan. Perhaps a creditor or an enemy of the Quakers wrote the pamphlet. In any event Croghan knew nothing about the investigation or its findings. When British officer Daniel Webb arrived in New York City in June 1756, he brought the letters with him. Webb gave them to New York Governor Charles Hardy, who compared them to Croghan-penned letters forwarded by Governor Morris. Governor Hardy found the writing styles so different that he exonerated Croghan, who knew nothing about what transpired. What Croghan did know was that he was going to the Mohawk Valley, and to ease his transition to new surroundings, he had gotten a letter of introduction from Governor Morris.33

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33 For Croghan as suspect see Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1896, 1:698, APS; see also Charles H. Browning, “Francis Campbell,” PMHB, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1904): 63-64; see also Joseph J. Casino, “Anti-Popery in Colonial Pennsylvania,” ibid., Vol. 105, No. 3 (Jul. 1981): 303-304; for Croghan’s being labeled a Roman Catholic and for invective against him see [Anonymous], An Answer to an Invidious Pamphlet, entitled, A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania (London, 1755), 19-21; for recent facts of Croghan’s life see Morris to Hardy, 5 Jul. 1755, PA, 1st ser., 2:689-90; for scholarly opinion about the intercepted letters see Anderson, Crucible of War, 130; see also Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 335-240; for forwarded Croghan letters see Hardy to Morris, 9 Jul. 1756, PA, 1st ser., 2:694.
Chapter 7: Deputy Superintendent

His letter of introduction in hand, George Croghan left Cumberland County for Albany, ten miles south of the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers in eastern New York. When he arrived, he solicited William Shirley, Sr., acting commander-in-chief of British forces in North America, for back pay, but Shirley ignored him for selfish reasons. Shirley had planned attacks on Fort Ticonderoga on the southern shore of Lake Champlain and Fort Saint Frédéric on the western and drafted 7,000 militiamen for the attacks, but his efforts had come to naught. After New England militia had executed their part of Major General Edward Braddock’s four-pronged plan to evict the French from North America—the naval attack on French Acadia—Shirley had ordered the seizure of cattle and lands and the herding of some 5,400 captured Acadians aboard ships destined for England or her colonies. The callous deportation of so many civilians—especially women and children—and the withering criticism of colonial rival William Johnson had caused the high command in London to recall him. As he awaited his replacement, Shirley contemplated his fate at the expense of duty. Frustrated, Croghan lit out for the Mohawk Valley, Levy Andrew Levy in dogged pursuit.¹

As Croghan entered the Mohawk Valley, he saw proof that his decision to leave ill-defended and ungrateful Pennsylvania had been wise—a Georgian-style stone mansion with a parapet and four bastions. Because the Mohawk Valley was vulnerable to attack from Lake Ontario in the west, William Johnson had decided in 1748 to build the mansion a quarter-mile or so up the Mohawk River from the wooden house where he had lived since 1739. Called Fort Johnson, the mansion declared not just his permanent residence on the

¹ For letter of introduction and for arrival of Croghan at Albany see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 111; for Shirley and his recall see Anderson, Crucible of War, 110-114, 130-132; see also Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow: ” The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 187-192.
frontier northwest of Albany, but the arrival of European gentility, too. Although it was only partially fortified when Croghan first saw it, the mansion was grand indeed: Rising sixty feet above ground, its two stories dwarfed such ancillary structures as a guardhouse, a storehouse, a barn, a mill, and a barrack. The barrack quartered workmen, servants, and slaves. The mansion befitted its owner, upon whom King George II had conferred the title of first baronet of New York to honor his role in capturing a high-ranking enemy officer, Jean Erdman, Baron de Dieskau, during the Battle of Lake George on 8 September 1755. The handsome interior of the mansion complemented the grand exterior: Downstairs were a living room, a dining room, a kitchen, and an office; upstairs were four bedrooms accessible by an elegant staircase.²

After settling in, Croghan learned there was more to Johnson’s meteoric rise from immigrant to baronet than heroism—the mentorship of Peter Warren, for example. In 1730 Warren, a naval officer, was posted to New York City, where a year later he married Susannah De Lancey, the fetching daughter of wealthy fur trader Stephen De Lancey, who had married into the powerful Van Cortlandt family of Dutch merchants. Besides a network of connections with the powerful Dutch clans of New York, marriage into the De Lancey family afforded Warren money and property, so that by the age of twenty-six he had made his fortune. Ambitious and energetic, he augmented his fortune in the 1730s and the 1740s by seizing French and Spanish ships and claiming prize money. Between 1739 and 1748 alone he claimed goods and precious metals worth £127,405 sterling and used his new wealth to buy a Broadway mansion in New York City and a forested tract about 180 miles to the north, near the confluence of the Mohawk and Schoharie Rivers.

² For Fort Johnson see SWJP, 1:6-7, 10, 13-15; see also Anderson, Crucible of War, 132; see also Flexner, Mohawk Baronet, 173-174; for Fort Johnson and for Johnson’s baronetcy see O’Toole, White Savage, 110-111, 152-153.
So long as his nephew converted to Protestantism, Warren invited him to gather tenants who were willing to colonize the tract. A pragmatist, Warren dared not risk his rising status in New York society by entrusting a Catholic with a tract on the sensitive frontier between Catholic France and Protestant Britain. Drawn by his uncle’s example of daring adventure and fabulous reward, Johnson rejected his Catholic father’s modest existence and sailed to Massachusetts in 1738. Thence he went to New York City. He converted to Anglicanism and set about gathering tenants. Within a year he had gathered a goodly number and led them to his uncle’s Mohawk Valley tract.3

While he supervised Warensburgh, as his uncle called the settlement, Johnson cleared a tract on the Mohawk River for himself. As per his uncle’s instructions he traded with the local Mohawks and by that trade learned their language and customs. The Mohawks, having observed him toiling to clear his tract, named him Warraghiyagey, which meant “Chief Much Business.” In 1742 or thereabouts the Mohawks strengthened their budding relationship with him by adopting him into their nation. Over the next fourteen years he enriched himself by trading with them and other Iroquois who valued English textiles and metal tools over their French like. In January 1756 British government officials, intending to draw the hostile Ohio Delawares and Shawnees from the French by utilizing his expert knowledge of Iroquois culture and fluency in the Mohawk language, commissioned him Sole Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northern Colonies. Croghan immediately identified with Johnson. Both were ambitious and purposeful Irish Anglican immigrants. Both were expert Indian traders. Both were effective intercultural negotiators who envisioned the virtually limitless potential for personal enrichment and advancement in colonial North America or on its frontiers, but whereas Croghan was making his own

3 For relationship between Peter Warren and Sir William Johnson see O’Toole, White Savage, 35-38.
way, Johnson was benefiting from a blood mentor. Croghan reasoned that Johnson could be his Warren—sans blood ties. After paying his debt to Levy Andrew Levy, Croghan was in good spirits indeed.4

The Iroquoia whereon Johnson operated stretched from the region south of Lake Ontario eastward across present-day upstate New York from Buffalo to Albany. The easternmost of the six nations that made up the Iroquois Confederacy was the Mohawk nation, which lived on the Mohawk and upper Susquehanna Rivers. The Mohawk River flows east into the Hudson River, which flows south into the New York Bay. The Susquehanna River flows south into Pennsylvania, then into Maryland, and then into Chesapeake Bay. From east to west the Oneida, the Onondaga, and the Cayuga nations lived in the relatively vast region between the Susquehanna and Genesee Rivers. The Genesee River, which feeds Lake Ontario, supported the Seneca nation, the westernmost nation, as did the headwaters of the Allegheny River, which flows south until it joins the Monongahela River to form the Ohio River at present-day Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Tuscarora nation, which migrated from westward-expanding North Carolina to Iroquoia in the early eighteenth century, lived on the upper Susquehanna River just north of the boundary between present-day New York and Pennsylvania. In short, being riparian, Iroquoia was rich in natural resources, which of course included fish and game for food and fur-bearing animals for pelts. Forests provided fuel for heating and cooking. The winters were long and harsh, but the mild summers bore abundant crops that the seasonal gatherings of fruits, nuts, roots, and sap from maple trees supplemented.5

4 For Johnson’s career see ibid., 39-46, 57, 68-69, 153, 66-67, 132.
5 For Iroquoia see Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier, 14-17.
For the Iroquois, intercultural trade and diplomacy were means to bring material wealth into their communities. At first the Iroquois traded furs and skins for Dutch goods at Fort Orange (now Albany) and French goods at Montréal and also at spots on the borderlands between Iroquoia and New France, but after the British overran Dutch New York, the Iroquois began to trade furs and skins for British goods at Albany and at spots on the borderlands between Iroquoia and New York. Diplomacy, the handmaiden of trade, transferred material wealth in the form of gifts to Iroquois communities, but the Iroquois found diplomatic agreements difficult to consummate because the deals ordinarily required them to sell lands belonging to other native peoples. To surmount the difficulty, the Iroquois interceded between other native peoples and the British Empire. So long as the Iroquois did so, “they could continue to extract goods from British imperial agents in exchange for selling land distant from their own,” writes historian Timothy J. Shannon. “The trick was to convince the British that Iroquois intercession was necessary if the colonies were to remain at peace with other Indians and continue their westward expansion.” The Iroquois executed the trick brilliantly at the 1754 Albany Congress when they persuaded British imperial agents and Pennsylvania government officials that Iroquois intermediacy was necessary to peaceable westward expansion in Pennsylvania. To display their influence, the Iroquois (or more precisely the Mohawks) sold a swath of south-central Pennsylvania to the Penns without the consent of the true landowners, Delawares.\(^6\)

When the Iroquois expanded their influence beyond Iroquoia in the eighteenth century, they stationed viceroys at strategic locations in Pennsylvania. The Iroquois, for example, stationed Shickellamy at Shamokin and Tanaghrisson at Logstown to speak for the Confederacy at intercultural conferences and to supervise local Indians. An Oneida, Shickel-

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6 For “they could continue” and Albany Congress see ibid., 137, 138-142.
lany performed his dual jobs until his death in December 1748. Besides his Delaware and Shawnee neighbors at Shamokin, the Delawares and Shawnees who lived on the Susquehanna River in central Pennsylvania fell within his purview. Tanaghrisson was a Catawba who as a youth had been captured and adopted by the Senecas. He performed his jobs until his death in October 1754. Besides his Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, and other neighbors at Logstown, the Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, and other Indians who lived on the Ohio River and its western Pennsylvania tributaries fell within his purview. British imperial agents called him “Half-King” in deference to his authority as the voice of the Iroquois Confederacy in the Ohio Valley, but like his Shamokin counterpart, he had no coercive power over his neighbors. He did have useful connections that afforded him access to goods that brought him influence, however. His replacement was Scarouady, the Oneida whom Delawares called Monacatuatha, and through him the Iroquois intended to control the Ohio Valley. Although he maintained ties with the Iroquois, Scarouady acted independently of them whenever he conducted diplomacy for Ohio Indians. The Iroquois did not replace Shickellamy because of Shamokin’s proximity to Iroquoia, thereby unintentionally creating a power vacuum in the Susquehanna Valley. For them, the Susquehanna and Ohio Valleys constituted edges of empire or rather situational frontiers.  

Although the Iroquois expanded their influence beyond their homeland in the first half of the eighteenth century, they conducted diplomacy as usual. They “opened paths” between them and colonial governments and between them and other native peoples, for instance. The Iroquois “linked arms” with colonial governments and other native peoples, too. In the 1750s they used the metaphors to further their main objectives, which were not only to survive, but to prosper, even at the expense of other native peoples. The Iro-

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7 For role of half-kings and for specific half-kings see *ibid.*, 128.
Iroquois favored frontier towns like Albany or Lancaster for intercultural conferences since frontier towns were less likely to spread infectious diseases than crowded ports like New York City or Philadelphia. During intercultural conferences Iroquois diplomats observed traditional ceremonies like the At the Wood’s Edge ceremony to transform strangers into friends and bestowed ceremonial names on newcomers. The Iroquois referred to British magistrates at Albany as Quider and to the governor of New France as Onontio, of New York as Corlaer, of Pennsylvania as Onas, and of Virginia as Assaraquoa. The Iroquois demanded that their viceroys, diplomats, and spokesmen balance eloquence and gravitas with bluster and bluffs during intercultural and intertribal conferences.⁸

Escorted by the grenadier company of the 50th regiment, Johnson, Croghan, three interpreters, and a Mohawk delegation departed Fort Johnson for Onondaga on 3 June 1756. Although Johnson saw the conference as a means to negotiate Iroquois military support, his ostensible purpose was to negotiate peace between Great Britain and hostile Indians—namely, Susquehanna Delawares and the Ohio Delawares and Shawnees. As he and his party approached Onondaga Castle—the British colonists of New York called the leading village of an Iroquois nation “castle”—Johnson ordered a halt before a group of Iroquois who were seated in a ceremonial semicircle on the path. With exactly the right solemnity Johnson waited for the Iroquois to conclude their condolence ceremony, and then he led them and his party into the castle. Soon thereafter he departed to secure his goods-laden bateaux at Onondaga Lake. When Iroquois diplomats from the Onondaga Castle arrived at his spot at Onondaga Lake, he convened the conference, but because only a few diplomats for the hostile Delawares trickled in, he could not negotiate peace for Great Britain.

⁸ For Iroquois diplomacy see *ibid.*, 49, 84-86, 132-133.
Still, the conference was not a disaster for him, for he reconciled the six Iroquois nations to Great Britain and broached the subject of Iroquois military support. The conference was not a disaster for Croghan either, for its minutes listed him among Johnson’s “gentlemen” attendants. Gentleman was a designation he could not have achieved in Ireland.  

After leading his party to Fort Johnson, then enjoying a respite, Johnson attended a war council called by the acting commander-in-chief, Major General James Abercromby, for 16 July at Albany. The war council resolved both to raise ranger companies and to reinforce the Oswego post on the southeastern shore of Lake Ontario because the post was vulnerable to invasion from Canada. Acting in concert with Iroquois warriors, the ranger companies would harass French regulars and Canadian militia. Fort Edward on the Hudson River and Fort William Henry on Lake George were vulnerable also to invasion from Canada, but the war council decided against reinforcing them. Its work finished, the war council broke up. Thereafter British officers and regulars lapsed into lethargy, and they remained lethargic until their new commander-in-chief, Major General John Campbell, the fourth earl of Loudoun, landed in New York City, went west, and stirred them. Over the rest of the summer Lord Loudoun acclimated himself to his environment. His officers apprised him regularly of French troop movements while Johnson acquainted him with Indian affairs. Having found that his new position in the British imperial bureaucracy required competent assistance, Johnson asked Loudoun to create a second-tier position and to fill it with Croghan, who was not only “acceptable” to the Iroquois and other Indians, but “well acquainted with their Customs and Manners,” too. Loudoun acceded, creating the position of Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northern Department.

and appointing Croghan to it at a salary of £200 per year. Johnson then deputized Croghan.10

Mean time the British army floundered. While Colonel Daniel Webb was floating the 44th Regiment up the Mohawk River to reinforce Oswego, he learned that the post had already fallen to a French-and-Indian force commanded by Field Marshall Louis-Joseph de Montcalm-Grozon, Marquis de Montcalm. Webb ordered a halt at the portage between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek. The portage, located north of the Palatine German settlement of German Flats, was the very spot where rangers and warriors had encamped. Apprised of Webb’s halt, Loudoun ordered Sir William Johnson to raise a thousand-man militia to join Webb’s force at German Flats. While Johnson raised the militia, fifty support warriors led by Andrew Montour and Scarouady arrived at German Flats and awaited his arrival. With each passing day their numbers increased yet their interest in providing military support waned. Johnson’s arrival with the militia on 31 August did little to buoy up the warriors, who were to him “vastly Dejected” by the French advance into Iroquoia. Prostrate from dysentery, Johnson ordered the warriors, who by now numbered a hundred, to accompany Croghan to Webb’s encampment. The warriors executed his order faithfully, only to learn that Webb had decamped, obliging them to retreat with him and Croghan. Afterward, the Six Nations reassessed their sympathies, leaving only the Mohawks steadfastly loyalty to Great Britain.11

10 For war council see “A Council of War,” SWJP, 9:483-487; for king’s appointment of Loudoun as commander-in-chief of British forces in North America see MCPP, 7:178-179; for “acceptable” and “well acquainted” see Johnson to Loudoun, 27 Aug. 1756, SWJP, 9:511-512; for Loudoun’s appointment of Croghan as deputy superintendent of Indian affairs in the northern department and for Croghan’s salary see Johnson to Loudoun, 20 Sept. 1756, ibid., 9:538.
11 For Oswego’s fall see Johnson to Loudoun, 22 Aug. 1756, SWJP, 2:549; see also Johnson to Loudoun, 22 Aug. 1756, ibid., 9:506-507; for Loudoun’s order to raise militia see Loudoun to Johnson, 20 Aug. 1756, ibid., 2:548; for “vastly Dejected” see Johnson to Loudoun, 23 Aug. 1756, ibid., 9:508; for Johnson’s
In the circumstances Croghan found his job problematic and searched for a better one. Hearing that Loudoun was raising ranger companies, he went to Albany in mid-September 1756 to solicit a command. When he met Loudoun, he boasted that he could recruit two hundred prospects—most “good woods men”—for enlistment as rangers, yet when Loudoun questioned him about the intercepted letters, Croghan was evasive, so that Loudoun withheld a command. Knowing nothing of the letters, Croghan responded to Loudoun’s questions as most people would have in the same circumstances—evasively. Be that as it might, after the meeting, Loudoun received from Sir William Johnson Indian intelligence about an imminent French attack on Fort William Henry, which was only eighteen miles from Fort Edward, which was the key to controlling the Hudson River. Since both forts were undermanned, Loudoun ordered Webb and Johnson to reinforce them.12

Webb and Johnson acted. Webb dispatched the 44th Regiment, and Johnson dispatched Iroquois warriors. When Croghan returned to German Flats, Johnson assigned him sixty-nine additional warriors for Fort Edward, which Johnson reasoned was more vulnerable to attack than Fort William Henry. Croghan, assisted by Johnson stalwart Jelles Fonda and five rangers, led the warriors to Fort Edward on 29 September. Johnson, having recovered somewhat from his bout of dysentery, led sixty-three warriors to Fort Edward on 17 October, but by that time Commander-in-chief Loudoun had arrived at Fort Edward and learned that the first war party had stolen away. Croghan scanned the troops and recognized survivors of “Braddock’s Defeat,” but instead of mingling with them he kept to

orders to warriors and to Croghan see Johnson to Loudoun, 27 Aug. 1756, ibid., 9:511-512; for Mohawk loyalty to Great Britain see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 115.
12 For Croghan’s meeting with Loudoun see Loudoun to Johnson, 19 Sept. 1756, SWJP, 9:562; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 115-116; for Indian intelligence see Johnson to Loudoun, 15 Sept. 1756, SWJP, 9:528-529; for Loudoun’s orders to Johnson see Loudoun to Johnson, 16 Sept. 1756, ibid., 2:560-561.
his charges, his intent being to prevent their desertion. His vigilance, however, was for naught, because Loudoun ordered the army into winter quarters in November. Nevertheless Croghan was satisfied that he had done his duty for king and country.\footnote{For war parties see Johnson to Loudoun, 1 Oct. 1756, \textit{SWJP}, 2:549; for Croghan’s march to Fort Edward see \textit{Pennsylvania Gazette}, 21 Oct. 1756.}

Croghan returned to Fort Johnson and reviewed Pennsylvania’s recent frontier history with Sir William Johnson and South Carolinian Edmund Atkin, the former Indian trader who was Sole Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Southern Colonies. At Passigach-kunk on the Cowanesque River in northern Pennsylvania, Delaware war chief Teedyuscung organized war parties and sent them into the northern frontier. British settlements went up in flames, and their like on the western frontier burned as well. Led by Captain François Coulon de Villiers and Ohio Delaware war chief Jacobs, a party of French regulars, Canadian militia, Ohio Delaware warriors, and Ohio Shawnee warriors destroyed Fort Granville on the Juniata River in late July and captured its garrison. In September four militia companies commanded by Colonel John Armstrong retaliated by marching from Fort Shirley (still called “George Croghan’s Fort”) to the Allegheny River and then torching Kittanning, the village of Jacobs, in the morning of 8 September. Jacobs burned alive with his family. After the “raid”—or massacre according to survivors—Armstrong judged Fort Shirley indefensible and ordered his militia companies to abandon it. Meanwhile Philadelphia Quakers tried to mediate peace between the provincial government and the hostile Indians. From afar Johnson observed the Quakers with a wary eye. He begged Loudoun to prohibit outsiders from meddling in his domain and ordered Croghan to Philadelphia to sort out provincial Indian affairs and to ally not just friendly Delawares and Shawnees to Great Britain, but the divided Six Nations as well. More important, he
ordered Croghan to ally hostile Delawares and Shawnees to Great Britain by addressing their grievances.¹⁴

In December 1756 Croghan traveled to Philadelphia, where he found that his mentor was right to be wary of Quakers, as they had insinuated themselves into Indian affairs through their ostensibly humanitarian arm, the Friendly Association, which they had founded late in the governorship of Robert Hunter Morris. The Friendly Association had commissioned Israel Pemberton, Abel James, and Jeremiah Warder to spend £120 for goods for presentation to the hostile Susquehanna Delawares during the first Easton conference, which had occurred from 25 to 31 July 1756. Pemberton, James, Warder, and forty or so other Quakers, some taking notes, had witnessed its sessions for the Susquehanna Delawares. Early in the conference, which included provincial invitees like Iroquois diplomats, Morris had monitored the Quakers’ activities. Beholden to Proprietor Thomas Penn for his position and sympathetic to popular anti-Quaker opinion, Morris had deemed the Quakers’ activities detrimental to the proprietary party. To deter mingling between the Quakers and the Susquehanna Delawares, he had posted guard outside the Indians’ lodgings. Thereafter he had wrangled with the Quakers, for he had insisted on bulking his meager present with their goods, while they had insisted on presenting their goods separately. To

appease the Quakers, he had listed their goods and combined them with the provincial present. Then he and his entourage had presented the list with the lot. Had the Quakers not “added their large present to that provided by the [Pennsylvania] Assembly,” Provincial Secretary Richard Peters had admitted to the proprietors, “we should have been ruined, the Indians would have gone away dissatisfied, and matters infinitely Worse.”15

Despite the wrangle the conferees had completed the business at hand. Iroquois diplomats and Susquehanna Delaware war chief Teedyuscung had negotiated a compact that had satisfied Governor Morris and his entourage. Besides lifting the Susquehanna Delawares from the status of “women” the Iroquois diplomats had legitimized Teedyuscung’s uninherited authority over his fellows in return for Teedyuscung’s acknowledgement of Iroquois hegemony and acceptance of peace. In truth he could not have done otherwise, for unlike Shingas, who lived in the distant Ohio Valley, he lived on Iroquois frontier in proximity to Onondaga to the north and to settlers to the east and south. Henceforth Governor Morris could address the Susquehanna Delawares through a spokesman who was beholden to the Iroquois. Ohio Delaware war chief Shingas was another matter, however. In July 1742 proprietary placemen and western Iroquois had made a treaty that upheld the 1737 Walking Purchase, which had forced the Delawares of the upper Delaware Valley to relocate to Iroquois territory on the north branch of the Susquehanna River. Many of them had migrated to the Ohio River. When Ohio Delaware chief Sassoonan had died in 1752, the Iroquois, by virtue of conquest, had confirmed Shingas’ hereditary authority.

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15 For goods see entry, 22 Jul. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; for conference minutes see Kalter, ed., Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania, & the First Nations: The Treaties of 1736-62, 181-199; for guard see Parrish, Some Chapters in the History of the Friendly Association, 18; for wrangle see entries, 25-31 Jul. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; see also Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 2:97, HSP; see also PA, 1st ser., 2:728-729; for same and “added their large present”see Peters to [Penn], Aug. 1756, Reverend Richard Peters Letters to the Proprietors of the Province of Pennsylvania, 1755-1757, Gratz Coll., Case 2, Box 33, A, 72-73, HSP.
over all the Ohio Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos. In league with the French the self-
same chief now sent war parties to raid settlements east of the Susquehanna. Sir William
Johnson’s Mohawk allies could monitor Teedyuscung and his Susquehanna Delaware
warriors for the provincial government, but not Shingas and his seven hundred or so mixed Ohio warriors. Distance and French military success worked against the Mohawks.16

During his December investigation into Indian affairs Croghan found that Pemberton and his cohorts had withdrawn from public life until they had heard that the post at Oswego had fallen to the French and that the Susquehanna Delawares had repudiated the Easton compact. At their new meeting house on 2 November seventy-nine Quaker activists had formalized the Friendly Association, which was to operate outside the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. At Israel Pemberton’s home next day associates had drafted an address that articulated its purpose, cited its rapport with the Susquehanna Delawares, and requested the recently arrived new governor, William Denny, an ex-army officer who had brought his wife and mistress with him to Philadelphia, to consent to its mediatory role between the Susquehanna Delawares and the provincial government. Associates had given the address to Denny, who upon reading it had sanctioned the organization’s presence at a second Easton conference, whereupon the organization had resolved to buy goods worth £500 for presentation to those Susquehanna Delawares who attended

16 For compact see [Thomson], Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delawares and Shawnee Indians from the British Interest, 91; for Walking Purchase and Shingas see Weslager, Delaware Indians, 190-194, 204, 209-210; see also Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 342-346; see also Francis Jennings, “Iroquois Alliances in American History,” in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League, ed. by Francis Jennings (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 45-46; see also Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1983), 182-186; for Teedyuscung see Peters to [Thomas Penn], 22 Nov. 1756, Reverend Richard Peters Letters to the Proprietors of the Province of Pennsylvania, 1755-1757, Gratz Collection, Case 2, Box 33, A, 113, HSP; for Shingas see Peters to [Thomas Penn], 15 Nov. 1755, ibid., 16, HSP; for Ohio Indians see Peters to Proprietors, 4 Dec. 1755, ibid., 20, HSP.
the conference. For Denny, who had been attempting to pacify the northern frontier, the question had been this: Would the Friendly Association adhere to its stated purpose?17

To his chagrin the Friendly Association had not adhered to its stated purpose. From the outset of the second Easton conference to the end the Friendly Association had conflicted with him. Angered by the Kittanning “massacre” and wary of provincial duplicity, most of the Susquehanna Delawares had stopped six or seven miles short of Fort Allen (now Weissport) to the northwest of Easton to await evidence of good faith in the form of a conciliatory envoy. Meanwhile Susquehanna Delaware war chief Teedyuscung and his entourage had arrived at Easton. Eager to exercise his new chiefly power, Teedyuscung had proposed sending an envoy bearing strings of wampum from him and Governor Denny, but Israel Pemberton and his associates had demanded the addition of a third string of wampum in their name. Because his aides had advised him that Pemberton and his associates might attempt to coax complaints of proprietary injustice from the Susquehanna Delawares, Denny had refused the demand. In retaliation Pemberton and his associates had fraternized openly with Teedyuscung and the Susquehanna Delawares. Emboldened by Quaker support, Teedyuscung demanded a Quaker-led investigation into his charge of proprietary land fraud. To humiliate Denny yet prove their indispensability to him, Pemberton and his associates presented the Susquehanna Delawares goods.18

The conference, which had occurred from 8 to 17 November 1756, had turned on the issue of proprietary land fraud. Against the advice of his principal aides, Richard Peters

17 For formalization and address see entry, Nov. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; for resolution see entry of 3 Nov. 1756, ibid., HSP; for Denny see Nicholas B. Wainwright, “Governor William Denny in Pennsylvania, PMHB, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Apr. 1957): 170-190.

18 For conference minutes see Kalter, ed., Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania, & the First Nations: The Treaties of 1736-62, 199-219; for wampum controversy see PA, 1st ser., 3:109; for aides’ advice see Peters Letter Book, 27 October 1755 to 14 February 1757, 155, HSP; for fraternization and gift-giving see entry, 16 Nov. 1756, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP.
and Conrad Weiser, Denny had queried Teedyuscung about the causes of Susquehanna Delaware hostility toward Pennsylvania, and in reply Teedyuscung had said that “grievances” had been the main cause. By “Fraud and Forgery,” for instance, the provincial government had stolen the very ground upon which Denny was standing. When Denny had queried him further, the chief had cited irrefutable proof like the 1737 Walking Purchase. “When one Man [William Penn] had formerly Liberty to purchase Lands, and he took a deed from the Indians for it, and then dies, if, after his death, his Children forge a Deed like the true One, with the same Indians Names to it, and thereby take Lands from the Indians which they never sold: This is a Fraud,” he had said pointedly. “Also when one King has Lands beyond the River, Creeks and Springs, which cannot be moved and the Proprieters, greedy to purchase lands, buy of one King what belongs of another: This is Fraud.” In reply to further query he had said that “all the Land extending from Tohiccon [Tohichon Creek] over the great Mountain [Blue Mountain] as far as Wyomen [Wyoming]” had been taken from the Susquehanna Delawares “by Fraud,” that the Susquehanna Delawares had sold “the Land to the old Proprietary [William Penn],” and that by getting the tract “run by a straight Course by the Compass” his sons had appropriated “double the Quantity intended to be sold.” Here Peters, who had been recording the minutes, had thrown down his pen in disgust and advised Governor Denny to stop querying Teedyuscung, but instead of heeding the advice Denny had offered Teedyuscung recompense. The chief, declining the offer, had proposed a conference for the purpose of addressing the grievances of other Delaware chiefs who disputed the Walking Purchase.19

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19 For quotations see [Thomson], *Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delawares and Shawnese Indians from the British Interest*, 100-101; see also *MPCP*, 7:325-326. In the preface of Israel Pemberton (p. iii) Theodore Thayer states that Pemberton and his associates “attempted to fasten the blame for the Indian war upon the Proprietors for alleged land frauds [my italics] but without success.” In truth Pemberton
“M’ Croghan is come, from S’ W. Johnson, with the Title of Deputy Agent, of Indian Affairs, & has particular Instruction . . . to enquire into the Causes of the Defection of the Delawares,” Richard Peters wrote Proprietor Thomas Penn on 11 December 1756, “and, as I know the man, & that he has, already, been in close conversation with Mr Norris the Speaker I am sure, something is brewing against you, in this Quarter.” Peters was half-right. Croghan was talking to Norris, not to make hay for partisans, but rather to uncover facts. If Croghan did turn up evidence of malfeasance, he had to report it to his superior or risk losing his influence or position. Professing “great Friendship” for Peters and high “regard for the Proprs,” he acknowledged Ohio Delaware resentment of the 1754 Albany Purchase, which had transferred to the proprietors a vast tract in south-central Pennsylvania. On 13 December, Croghan advised Governor Denny to meet both the Ohio Delawares and the Susquehanna Delawares in March. Next day Denny informed the Pennsylvania Council about the advice, but “knowing Mr. Croghan’s Circumstances,” the Council was “not a little surprized at the Appointment, and desired to see his Credentials.” Croghan produced his instructions, which satisfied the Council. Shortly thereafter the Pennsylvania Assembly appropriated funds for dispatching messages to the Ohio Delawares and the Susquehanna Delawares, and the Friendly Association augmented the funds. With wampum belts in hand Croghan went to Harris’ Ferry, where he recruited peaceable Conestoga Indians for the missions. The Conestoga Indian messengers carried the belts to Delaware villages on the Ohio River and on the Susquehanna River, so that in
March friendly Delawares began to trickle into colonial settlements on both the western and northern frontiers.20

Croghan lingered at Harris’ Ferry until mid-February 1757, then returned to Philadelphia, found lodging at the Indian King on Market Street, and awaited the arrival of Lord Loudoun, who had called a council to divulge his strategic objectives to the governors of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina and to southern notables like Edmund Atkin and George Washington. Loudoun arrived on 14 March, but before convening his council he met Croghan, who by means of a self-written journal recounted provincial Indian affairs from 1748 to 1755. Croghan, moreover, advised him on the impending conference with the Ohio Delawares and Susquehanna Delawares. As a result Loudoun shaped the conference in conformity with Croghan’s advice. The conference would be novel insofar as Croghan, rather than Governor Denny, would conduct it to ensure objectivity. In entrusting Croghan to manage the conference and utilize funds appropriated by the Pennsylvania Assembly, Loudoun demoted veteran but partisan policymakers and frontier negotiators Richard Peters and Conrad Weiser. The demotions infuriated Peters, who in a letter to Weiser derided Croghan as “a great man.” The demotions of trusted placemen did not sit well with Thomas Penn either. “I see very clearly that Indian Affairs will be taken out of

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20 For “M’ Croghan is come” see Peters to [Thomas Penn], 11 Dec. 1756, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 8:207, HSP; for Albany Purchase see Cuff, et al., eds., Atlas of Pennsylvania, 82-83; for “great Friendship” and advice see Croghan to Denny, 13 Dec. 1756, MPCP, 7:355; for Croghan’s instructions see “William Johnson’s Instructions to George Croghan, Esquire,” ibid., 7:355-356; for Assembly appropriation see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 4:672-673; see also MPCP, 7:382-385, 391; for Friendly Association’s monetary contribution see Parrish, Some Chapters in the History of the Friendly Association, 54-55; for Conestoga messengers see Peters to [Penn], 26 Dec. 1756, 10 Jan. 1757, Reverend Richard Peters Letters to the Proprietors of the Province of Pennsylvania, 1755-1757, Gratz Coll., Case 2, Box 33, A, 125, 127-128, HSP; see also Peters to [Penn], 10 Jan. 1757, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 8:219, HSP; see also Edward Shippen to Joseph Shippen, 12 Jan. [1757], Papers of the Shippen Family, Correspondence, 2:17, HSP; see also Burd to Edward Shippen, 3 Jan. 1757, ibid., 101, HSP; for arrival of friendly Delawares at Lancaster town see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744., 4:702; for arrival of friendly Delawares at frontier settlements see DRCNY, 7:266.
the hands that are capable of conducting them, and intrusted to Men of no Character,” he wrote Peters.21

The defensiveness was a reaction to Quaker activism. In a letter to Thomas Penn, Peters conceded that Israel Pemberton and his associates had defeated the proprietary party by shifting the cause of frontier hardship from tightfisted pacifism to proprietary malfeasance. In another letter to Penn, Peters characterized Pemberton and his associates not as mediative but as meddlesome, for they “publicly declare the[y] cannot trust the Proprietors nor their Officers who to their knowledge have abused the Indians.” They “will mould, fashion, turn twist and arrange matters at the ensuing treaty as they please,” and “when they have made the Proprietors as black as the Enemy of mankind then they will officiously come with Towels to wipe off the dirt they have thrown on them, then they will offer Cash aid of the poor Proprietors and publish to the World the innocence and righteousness of their proceedings their Love of Justice and their great regard for the Proprietaries.” Having read Peters’ letters and the conference minutes, Penn concluded that Pemberton and his associates had instigated Teedyuscung to make the “wicked insinuation” of proprietary land fraud against him. Naturally Penn instructed Peters to conciliate the chief. For his part, Croghan knew not of the letters or the instructions, but because of his past interactions with Peters and the proprietary party he knew of the sentiments. Of course Penn had been instrumental in perpetrating the fraudulent Walking Purchase.22

21 For return to Philadelphia see Croghan to Burd, 14 Feb. 1757, Papers of the Shippen Family, Correspondence, 2:111, HSP; for lodgings and meeting see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 121; for war council see Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 218; for journal see Croghan to Johnson, 14 Mar. 1757, DRCNY, 266-267; for “a great man” see Peters to Weiser, 19 Mar. 1757, Conrad Weiser Papers, Correspondence, 2:45, HSP; for “I see very” see Penn to Peters, 13 Aug. 1757, Penn Correspondence, 5:172, HSP.

22 For defeat of proprietary party and for “publicly declare” see Peters Letter Book, 27 October 1755 to 14 February 1757, 116, 147-148, HSP; for “wicked insinuation” and instructions to Peters see Penn to [Peters], 12 Mar. 1757, Charles Roberts Autograph Letters Collection, No. 705, HCQC.
After advising Loudoun on Indian affairs, Croghan traveled to Harris’ Ferry, where on 29 March 1757 he met Scarouady and about 160 Indians, most belonging to an Iroquois delegation that Croghan had asked Sir William Johnson to send to Pennsylvania. Although their aim was to help Croghan in reconciling both Ohio Delawares and Susquehanna Delawares to Great Britain at the upcoming Philadelphia conference, the Indians balked at entering the city, which was reeling from an outbreak of smallpox. Prudently, Croghan moved the conference to Lancaster, where he and the Indians awaited Teedyuscung for days. While forty or so Conestoga Indians and Tioga Delawares arrived and awaited the chief, fifty Tioga Delawares, including his own two sons, awaited him at Fort Allen for the purpose of escorting him to Lancaster. Inferring that the chief was avoiding Lancaster, Croghan sent William Trent to Fort Allen to convince him to proceed to Lancaster, but Trent’s effort proved of no avail when the chief, thinking that the Iroquois delegation might compromise his authority over the Susquehanna Delawares, avoided Fort Allen, too. Days passed, and then weeks, and then the Iroquois delegation became restive, so Croghan hurled some of its warriors against hostile Indians who were ravaging the western frontier. Then the smallpox ravaged Lancaster and claimed Scarouady and five other Iroquois among its victims. Fearful of exposure to smallpox as well as missing his spring sowing, Mohawk chief Little Abraham demanded that the conference begin immediately, so Croghan forwarded Little Abraham’s demand to Governor Denny, who replied that he would leave Philadelphia for Lancaster shortly.23

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23 For Croghan’s arrival at Harris’ Ferry see Shippen to “Dear Son,” 28 Mar. 1757, Papers of the Shippen Family, Correspondence, 2:143, HSP; see also Croghan to Denny, 2 Apr. 1757, MPCP, 7:465; for same, for purpose of conference, and for Iroquois delegation’s fear of entering Philadelphia see Kalter, ed., Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania, & the First Nations: The Treaties of 1736-62, 226, 229-230; for Iroquois delegation’s fear of entering Philadelphia see Croghan to Denny, 10 Apr. 1757, MPCP, 7:479; for arrival of Tioga Delawares at Fort Allen see Denny to Croghan, 6 Apr. 1757, MPCP, 7:473-474; for Teedyuscung’s avoidance of Harris’ Ferry and Fort Allen see Wallace, Anthony F. C., King of the Delawares, 153; for In-
Yet Croghan was ambivalent toward Governor Denny. During his investigation into provincial Indian affairs Croghan found that placemen like Richard Peters had been distracting Denny from facts that might substantiate Teedyuscung’s charge of proprietary land fraud. “Every one seems fond of an inquiry being made into the Complaints of the Indians except some of the Proprietary Agents, who don’t seem to like it,” he wrote Sir William Johnson. “As to their dislike I take no notice of it, being determined to enter into no dispute with them on that head.” Yet he did take notice of their “dislike” and thereafter corresponded with their well-funded adversary, the Friendly Association, which appointed Jeremiah Warder and Israel Pemberton to consult him at importunate moments. By May, Croghan had stepped up his correspondence. “I see clearly the S[ecretar]y and C[ouncil] is doing all they can to make a differance between his honour and me,” he disclosed in a letter to an Association leader; “however I am determined to act up to my instructions and lave them no room to find the least hole in my coat.” To help him implement his instructions at the upcoming Lancaster conference, he solicited the Association for funds.24

In the crowded Lancaster courthouse Croghan managed the conference from 12 to 20 May 1757. On hand were the following: Governor Denny and his entourage of councilmen, assemblymen, and commissioners; Iroquois and Susquehanna Delaware diplomats and their entourages; Israel Pemberton and a hundred Quakers; and local magistrates and

24 For “Every one” see Croghan to Johnson, DRCNY, 266; for Friendly Association’s appointment of Warder and Pemberton to consult Croghan, for “I see clearly,” and for interaction with Friendly Association see Parrish, Some Chapters in the History of the Friendly Association, 60-62; for Croghan’s solicitation of funds see Croghan to William West, 28 Apr. 1757, Norris Mss., Loan Office Accounts, Indian Charges, 27, HSP.
denizens. Conrad Weiser interpreted for the province. Seneca, Ohio Delaware, and Ohio Shawnee diplomats were absent, as was Susquehanna Delaware war chief Teedyuscung. Governor Denny stymied Quaker interference by prohibiting civilians from taking notes and by assigning Croghan a secretary, but because of Teedyuscung’s absence the governor could do little to make peace between the Susquehanna Delawares and his provincial government. He asked the Iroquois diplomats for advice about Indian protocol, and their spokesman, Mohawk chief Little Abraham, replied that since the Susquehanna Delawares acknowledged only one Iroquois nation, the Seneca, as “uncles,” the governor should invite Senecas to a conference to mediate peace between their “nephews” and the province. Denny resisted the advice, but Croghan persuaded him to accept it and drafted a speech acknowledging it. After the governor delivered the speech, Croghan delivered one of his own. “Warm and animated” according to a Quaker observer, it implored the Iroquois to relate Teedyuscung’s charge of proprietary land fraud in full. Little Abraham thus said that the Iroquois knew nothing of Teedysucusng’s charge but did know something of the cause of Susquehanna Delaware hostility—the encroachment of Delaware lands.\(^{25}\)

The Lancaster conference was a minor success for Croghan. After provincial officials gave Iroquois chiefs goods on 21 May, he consoled with them and gave them a stroud to cover the graves of their smallpox victims. Next day he met them and acquainted them with a Governor Denny-penned message to Teedyuscung. With their approval he sent the message, which invited the war chief to an undetermined conference and left him to decide whether or not to invite Senecas. Although Ohio Delaware chiefs had not attended the Lancaster conference, they had expressed a desire for peace. Delaware war chief

Custaloga of Venango, for example, might have attended the conference if Croghan had sent him a wampum belt depicting the figure of Croghan holding hands with Ohio Delawares. Either Croghan had blundered or Custaloga had cited a technicality to justify his absence from the Lancaster conference, wherein Iroquois chiefs might have confronted him over issues of suzerainty. In any case the excuse revealed to Croghan that Custaloga might negotiate, if not at Lancaster, then elsewhere. Although the Lancaster conference had pacified neither the northern frontier nor the western frontier, it had furthered peace, and that outcome pleased Thomas Penn. What pleased him more was Israel Pemberton’s inability to raise the issue of proprietary land fraud. Penn wrote Richard Peters that, given Quaker aims to incite Susquehanna Delawares to raise the issue, Croghan had acted “tolerably well.” In a letter to a relative, Isaac Norris, a Quaker, commended Croghan’s objectivity and accused Conrad Weiser of stymieing Pemberton at every turn.26

The Lancaster conference was a means to an end for the provincial enemies of Proprietor Thomas Penn, however. To the Pennsylvania Assembly the conference exposed the vulnerability of him and his brother Richard. The Assembly had sent Benjamin Franklin to England in early April to plead for a royal inquiry into Teedyuscung’s charge of proprietary land fraud at the Easton conference. A royal inquiry might expose the slippery dealings of Thomas Penn and his placemen and force him and his brother Richard to cede to the Assembly or even to abdicate their proprietorship, whereupon Pennsylvania

would become a royal colony. The truth was that to pay off debts, Thomas Penn and his brother John *had* defrauded Delawares of lands at the forks of the Delaware River on 19-20 September 1737. Although its members did not share Franklin’s enthusiasm for royal government, which might enhance the power of the Church of England in Pennsylvania, the Friendly Association resolved to substantiate Teedyuscung’s charge of proprietary land fraud. Franklin reached England in late July. He would stay nearly six years.\(^{27}\)

Croghan intended to return to Fort Johnson after the Lancaster conference, but a common incident compelled him to go to new Fort Loudoun on Pennsylvania’s southwestern frontier in present-day Franklin County. In early 1757 Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie had negotiated southern warrior support against the Ohio Shawnees who had been ravaging his colony’s western frontier since “Braddock’s Defeat” on 9 July 1755. On 1 May a Cherokee war party had pursued an Ohio Shawnee war party into Pennsylvania and killed four. When Croghan, having ascertained the facts of the incident, advised Governor Denny to reward the Cherokee warriors, Denny ordered him to gift them. Croghan made the arrangements and dispatched a messenger to Virginia to invite the Cherokees warriors to Fort Loudoun to receive the gift. The messenger found them at Winchester, where they were consulting Edmund Atkin, who was Superintendent of Indian affairs for the Southern Department. The Cherokees deliberated the message and decided to go to Fort Loudoun, though Atkin advised them to stay. They were within *his* jurisdiction, so he wrote

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Croghan that “Giving Presents is so Essential a part of my office that without that Power in my Hands, it is impossible for me to do his Majesty any Service at all, & any interfering wth me therein, as well as in talking, is striking directly at the Root of my Commission.” Atkin demanded that Croghan not only message the warriors to stay at Winchester but report there himself as well, for “every thing” was “at Stake in this District.”

Croghan transported the provincial present to Fort Loudoun, where he received an Atkin-penned message dated 10 June. Although he believed that Cherokee warriors who rendered services to the northern district deserved compensation, he left for Winchester the next day. Upon his arrival on 12 June he assisted Atkin in scrounging £100 to buy a present that pleased the warriors, who left for Georgia. At night of 15 June an express reported this: A French-and-Indian force from Fort Duquesne was marching toward Fort Cumberland. The report proved false, yet Croghan used it to the advantage of the northern district when a Cherokee war party released a captive French officer to Atkin on 19 June. Atkin compensated the warriors with a “very trifling” present that displeased them because they had done Governor Dinwiddie’s bidding for four months. While they made ready to return to Georgia, Croghan persuaded Atkin to permit him to take them to Fort Loudoun, where he could compensate them with the provincial present and engage them for Colonel John Stanwix, the district military commander. Croghan promised to respect Atkin’s prerogatives before leading the warriors from Winchester on 24 June, yet when he and they arrived at Fort Loudoun three days later he reneged. “I am not ignorant how much M’r. Croghan had it really at heart to get those Indians to himself in Pennsylvani[a], (tho’ he told me he could have 100 or 150 Susquehanna Indians at any time for sending

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for,” Atkin complained to Governor Denny, “nor of the Arts employed to accomplish it, or the Use made of it.” Croghan gave the warriors the provincial present, and by order of Colonel Stanwix they began to scout Pennsylvania forests for hostile Indians. Meantime Atkin stewed.29

Urged by the Cherokee warriors, Croghan led four of their chiefs to Colonel Stanwix’s headquarters at Carlisle. The chiefs met Stanwix, who promised to compensate all Cherokee warriors for services rendered to Great Britain. While he was at Carlisle, Croghan received a provincial express advising that Susquehanna war chief Teedyuscung had accepted an invitation to meet Governor Denny at Easton. “I give you this Notice by the Express,” Denny had written, “desiring you will order your Matters, so as to be here in time enough to attend the Treaty, which I will not open Unless you be present.” His mission completed, Croghan left for Philadelphia on 4 July. Three days later he met Denny, who told him that Teedyuscung and some two hundred Susquehanna Delawares and Ohio Shawnees had already reached Fort Allen and that a hundred Senecas were on their way to Easton. Croghan found lodging for ten days and as per orders from Colonel Stanwix bought and shipped goods to Fort Loudoun for presentation to the Cherokee chiefs and their warriors. Croghan ran up tabs for work performed by a blacksmith, a tailor, a shoe-maker, a saddler, and a laundress, approved goods for presentation to those Indians who were gathering at Easton for the conference, and bought paper, quills, and wampum. On

29 For Atkin’s letter and Croghan’s arrival at Winchester see entries, 10–12 Jun. 1757, “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:11, HSP; for Croghan’s attitude toward compensation for Cherokee warriors see Armstrong to Denny, 19 Jun. 1757, PA, 1st ser., 3:187; for £100 present, false report, Cherokee war party with captive French officer, “very trifling,” and Fort Loudoun present see entries, 14, 15, 19, 21, 28 Jun. 1757, “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:11, HSP; for Croghan’s return to Fort Loudoun see entry, 24 Jun. 1757, ibid., 3:12; for cost of Stanwix’s Cherokee present see entry, Indian Agency Accounts, n.d., Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 27, HSP; for “I am not ignorant” see Atkin to Denny, 15 Sept. 1757, PA, 1st ser., 3:270.
17 July he put the latter items in saddlebags and left Philadelphia. On the road to Easton there was much for him to ponder.\footnote{For Stanwix’s meeting with Cherokee war chiefs and for “I give you this” see Denny to Croghan, 23 Jun. 1757, \textit{MPCP}, 7:605-606; for Croghan’s departure from Carlisle, arrival in Philadelphia, and meeting with Denny see entries, 4, 7 Jul. [1757], “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:12, HSP; for Croghan’s meeting with Denny see Denny to Croghan, 7 Jul. 1755, \textit{MPCP}, 7:634; for Stanwix’s orders see Atkin to Denny, 15 Sept. 1757, \textit{PA}, 1\textsuperscript{st} ser., 3:270-271; for Croghan’s approval of goods see \textit{Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Beginning the Fifteenth Day of October, 1744.}, 4:809; for Croghan’s departure from Philadelphia see entry, 17 Jul. [1757], “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:12, HSP.}

At the same time the Friendly Association acted in behalf of Teedyuscung. On 5 July it resolved to buy “suitable” gifts for him and to apprise provincial officials of its intention to attend the conference. On 11 July five associates approached provincial officials who were making ready for the conference and learned from them that Governor Denny was making ready for the conference too, so they called on him. He gave them a document that not only stated the proprietors’ unequivocal opposition to the Friendly Association but that forbade its members from attending the conference on the grounds that British law prohibited private persons from negotiating with foreign nations. On 13 July an Association committee submitted a reply to Denny. The reply cited the longtime friendship between Quakers and Indians in Pennsylvania and defended the Quakers’ prerogative of attending intercultural conferences. Denny issued a rejoinder that forbade any and all Association members from attending the Easton conference, but the Association, accounting their activities “highly advantageous to the Province,” dispatched members, nevertheless. Besides, they might ascertain the facts of the Walking Purchase and turn them over to the Pennsylvania Assembly, which could marshal them to attack the proprietors.\footnote{For 5 July 1757 Association resolution see entry, 5 Jul. 1757, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; for events and proprietary document of 11 July 1757 see \textit{MPCP}, 7:637-638; for 13 July 1757 Association reply to Governor Denny see entries, 13, 14 Jul. 1757, (appended) Address to Governor Denny, 14 Jul. 1757, MFA, 1755-1757, HSP; see also entry, 14 Jul. 1757, Parrish Coll., Pemberton Papers, Friendly Association, HSP; see also Robert Proud, \textit{History of Pennsylvania}, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1797, 1798), 2:55-64; for Denny’s re-}
On 17 July, Croghan arrived at Easton and met Teedyuscung, who had brought with him two hundred Susquehanna Delaware men, women, and children. Croghan said he aimed to “hear” the chief’s “complaints” and record them by means of a “Clerk.” The secretary was William Trent, who had been Croghan’s secretary during the Lancaster conference. Croghan said too that if Teedyuscung’s complaints proved “justly grounded,” Sir William Johnson, in behalf of the Crown, would “take the most speedy and effectual Measures” to redress them. Leery of Johnson because of his partnership with the Iroquois chiefs who had sold the Susquehanna Valley to the proprietors during the 1754 Albany Conference, Teedyuscung consulted his entourage, who nevertheless advised him to accept the plan. Provincial interpreter Conrad Weiser, having arrived at Easton ahead of Governor Denny, read Teedyuscung’s demeanor thus: The chief was more interested in negotiating peace than in complaining of proprietary land fraud. A Seneca delegation accompanied by a hundred or so Seneca men, women, and children arrived, and then on 20 July, Denny arrived with his entourage of Richard Peters, Pennsylvania Assembly Speaker Isaac Norris, six councilmen, and six commissioners. By this time a Friendly Association delegation led by Israel Pemberton had arrived as well. Pemberton and his associates aimed to add force to Teedyuscung’s utterances.32

The Easton conference from 25 July to 7 August 1757 was contentious even before it began. On 21 July, Teedyuscung demanded a personal secretary to record accurate minutes, whereupon Governor Denny consulted Croghan, who advised rejection. Next day

joinder see MPCP, 7:647-649; for “highly advantageous” see Samuel Emlem to Abraham Farrington, 9 Jul. 1757, Anna Wharton Wood Coll., No. 958, HCQC.
32 For “hear” see entry, 17 Jul. 1757, “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:12, HSP; for provincial envoy’s arrival see Croghan to Johnson, n.d., DRCNY, 7:322; for Weiser’s opinion see Weiser to Denny, 18 Jul. 1757, PA, 1st ser., 3:221.
Denny told the chief that Sir William Johnson customarily authorized only one secretary per conference. Teedyuscung acquiesced to protocol, but in the evening Israel Pemberton met him privately to discuss the matter, while provincial commissioners Joseph Galloway and William Masters confronted Croghan in the street. Being leaders of the Friendly Association as well, Galloway and Masters peppered Croghan with pointed questions. Had Denny accepted the chief’s demand? Croghan replied that the governor had not, because the chief was “well satisfied that none but the Clerk” whom Croghan had brought to Easton “should take down the Minutes.” Galloway and Masters hurled this at Croghan: If the governor rejected the demand, they “would set off home, and take the Provincial present with them and not give a single shirt to the Indians.” On 23 July the chief presented Denny a remonstrance composed by Galloway, Masters, and two other Quaker commissioners. The remonstrance warned that Teedyuscung would leave Easton if Denny rejected his demand, while it contradicted what Teedyuscung himself had told Croghan regarding a secretary. Croghan told the chief that he suspected the demand had been “put in his Head by some ill disposed People,” but the chief retorted scornfully that “there are many Things that come in a Man’s Mind during the Course of Business.” Although the retort “confirmed” his suspicion, Croghan advised Denny to accept the demand. Denny’s concession was unprecedented for an intercultural conference in Pennsylvania.33

On 23 July, Croghan told Norris and Galloway that “he was under a good deal of Concern on Account of the Differences subsisting between the Governor and Council and the

33 For Teedyuscung’s demand see MPCP, 7:652; for events of 21-22 July see DRCNY, 7:289-291; see also entries, 21-22 Jul. 1757, “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:13, HSP; for Pemberton’s meeting with Teedyuscung see Thayer, Israel Pemberton, 141; see also Wallace, Paul A. W., Conrad Weiser, 479; for “well satisfied” and “would set off home” see Croghan to Johnson, n.d., DRCNY, 7:322; for remonstrance see MPCP, 7:656-657; for “put in his Head” see entry, 23 Jul. 1757, “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:13, HSP.
People of the Province at this Time when there seemed to be a good Disposition in the Indians and a Prospect of making a Peace on a lasting Foundation.” Having “good reason to fear” that Norris and Galloway would bring “their own private Differences into Council with the Indians,” Croghan showed them his commission and instructions, whereupon they argued the Susquehanna Delawares’ case against the proprietors so well that he sent William Trent to Norris’ lodgings to record its details. On 25 July, Teedyuscung named Charles Thomson his personal secretary. Thomson was a Philadelphia schoolmaster who had substituted for Richard Peters during the previous Easton conference after Peters had discontinued the minutes. Teedyuscung then declared his purpose by speechifying about the “Almighty Power” that had given Pennsylvania to all Delawares (and by implication not their suzerains, who had upheld the fraudulent Walking Purchase after the real landowners had appealed to them for help).34

Over the next thirteen days Teedyuscung impugned the deeds that had transferred Delaware lands to the proprietors, demanded the deeds for his perusal, and stated his terms—the establishment of a Susquehanna Delaware “town” at Wyoming, a permanent town where a schoolmaster and a minister would teach the Susquehanna Delawares the ways of white men and the principles of Christianity. The region between Shamokin and Wyoming had not yet been deeded the proprietors, so Governor Denny agreed to build the town, whereupon Teedyuscung repeated his demand for impugned deeds, not because he intended to base upon them demands for recompense, but rather because he intended to

34 For Croghan’s meeting with Norris and Galloway and for “good reason to fear” see entry, 24 Jul. 1757, “A Copy of Mr: Croghan’s Journal from the Close of the Treaty at Lancaster in May 1757,” Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:13, HSP; for Teedyuscung’s personal secretary and for “Almighty Power” see entry, 25 Jul. 1757, “Original Minutes of the Council of Pennsylvania in the Autograph of Richard Peters with negociations between the Governor and the Delaware Indians,” Am 20195, HSP; see also [Thomson], Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawnee Indians from the British Interest, 110-114.
copy them and add the copies to the minutes. Teedyuscung demanded that the copies be conveyed to the English king for final disposition. Said he, “I want nothing of the Land till the King hath sent Letters back, and then if any of the Lands be found to belong to me, I expect to be paid for it, and not before.” His statement implied that Iroquois land sales to the proprietors were invalid because the Iroquois had not owned the lands. For Croghan the statement held another implication: Since his “purchase” from the Onondaga Council on 2 August 1749 might be invalid for the same reason, it was in his interest either to dissuade Teedyuscung from demanding impugned deeds or to confirm Iroquois suzerainty over him and all Pennsylvania Indians. Croghan chose the latter course, which provincial interpreter Conrad Weiser backed since it would preserve the alliance between the provincial government and the Onondaga Council and legitimize any and all contested or questionable proprietary deeds. Croghan advised Denny to display the deeds, but instead of displaying them Denny and his entourage equivocated and delayed.

Some Susquehanna Delawares protested the equivocation and delay by loading their guns and menacing provincial officials, but Israel Pemberton and his associates persuaded them to disarm. Governor Denny placed several deeds on a table. Most of the deeds were indistinct or imperfect. A few were perfect but tainted, for their Delaware signatories had authorized them under duress. Conspicuously absent form the tabletop were the deeds relating to the 1737 Walking Purchase. Teedyuscung made no challenge because the deeds on the table were irrelevant to his charge of proprietary land fraud and because his entourage had been encouraging him to conclude a truce with Denny. Teedyuscung did conclude a truce with Denny, but only after persuading a sympathetic Quaker, Isaac

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Norris to convey his copies of deeds and his private minutes to the king of England. In late August or early September, Croghan wrote Sir William Johnson that if Pemberton and his associates had not meddled in the third Easton conference, Teedyuscung would not “have thought of chusing M’ Norris for their Agent to send home their Complaints.” At least the northern frontier was calm. “How long it [the truce] may continue I ca’nt tell or what Regard the Indians may pay to them Engagements as they see how divided his Majesty’s Subjects was in that Government,” Croghan wrote Johnson, “but I shall not wonder if I hear of their committing fresh hostilities on his Majesty’s Subjects whenever they want a present of goods.” After the conference Denny deposed witnesses to prove that Pemberton had influenced Teedyuscung underhandedly.36

Men on each side of Pennsylvania’s political divide criticized Croghan for his handling of the third Easton conference. While Isaac Norris, the Quaker who was Speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly, referred to Croghan as an imperial “Tool,” Israel Pemberton, the Quaker who was leader of the Friendly Association, referred to him as a vile wretch who “used every artifice in his power to prevent a settlement of peace.” In truth Norris and Pemberton decried him not because he had advanced imperial interests or had prevented peace, but rather because he had transferred settlement of the Walking Purchase to British government authorities instead of settling it himself in favor of Teedyuscung. Croghan’s transferal of settlement upset Provincial Secretary Richard Peters and Proprietor Thomas Penn as well—but for another reason. Although Croghan had furthered provincial policy

36 For gun-wielding Delawares and their disarmament see “Statement of Wm. Peters and J. Duche, 1757,” PA, 1st ser., 3:275; see also Pemberton Papers, 7:55, HSP; for conference details see [Thomson], Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delawares and Shownese Indians from the British Interest, 118-121; for Teedyuscung’s choice to conclude a truce rather than to press his charge of proprietary land fraud see Wallace, King of the Delawares, 158; for “have thought of chusing” see Croghan to Johnson, [circa. Sept. 1757], DRCNY, 7:323; for depositions see PA, 1st ser., 3:249-250, 254-255, 263-265, 274-276.
by confirming Iroquois suzerainty over the Susquehanna Delawares, he had not defended proprietary interests against Teedyuscung’s charge of proprietary land fraud. Now settlement of the Walking Purchase rested with imperial bureaucrats in London, so that it was impossible to know which way the judicial pendulum would swing. The uncertainty was unbearable. When Peters apprised him of the situation, Penn replied that “your account of G_____ C_____’s behaviour being such as had deceived all sides is very disagreeable, as we know not what to depend on, to what purpose can he court Mr. Norris.” Yet in deceiving “all sides” in this instance Croghan demonstrated the praiseworthy objectivity of a devoted Crown agent. He was friend to none of his critics and enemy to all of them and the proof was that all of them decried him. For him the third Easton conference signified this: He had preserved not just his ownership of lands at Pittsburgh, but also the very Iroquois suzerainty upon which Sir William Johnson based his entire Indian diplomacy.37

There was another truth, however. When he confirmed Iroquois suzerainty over Pennsylvania’s Indians, Croghan furthered provincial policy and abetted Proprietors Thomas and John Penn. In furthering provincial policy he strengthened his de jure proprietorship of his Pittsburgh lands. In abetting the Penns he revealed himself to be as unscrupulous as they were. To pay off debts, the Penns had defrauded Delawares of lands at the forks of the upper Delaware River on 19-20 September 1737 by a device called the Walking Purchase. Thomas Penn and his placemen had persuaded Delaware landowners to agree to sell him and his brother John acres at the forks of the Delaware River—as many acres as a man could walk in a day. Placemen had hired and trained three athletes to run, not walk, on a path hewed through the forest for the purpose. On 19-20 September 1737 the

37 For “Tool” see Norris to Franklin, 17 Oct. 1757, BFP, 7:265; for “used every artifice” see Pemberton to John Fothergill, 3 Aug. 1757, Etting Coll., Pemberton Papers, 2:27, HSP; for “your account of” see Penn to Peters, 14 Nov. 1757, Peters Papers, Vol. 4, Pt. 2, 122, HSP.
athletes had realized the Penn’s device by executing a long distance run wherein they had covered many thousands more acres than the Delaware landowners had actually intended to sell the Penns. By forging or doctoring deeds the Penns had later strengthened their *de jure* proprietorship of the lands. By selling parcels to settlers the Penns had not only derived income from stolen acres, but strengthened their *de facto* proprietorship of them as well. In short Croghan was abetting the conquest of Pennsylvania’s northern frontier in order to strengthen his own proprietary rights to Pittsburgh-area lands. Thus he really was no better than the Penns.38

After the third Easton conference Croghan left for Fort Johnson. En route he mulled over his failure to negotiate peace. Ultimately he fixed blame for his failure not on himself or on Governor Denny or on the proprietors, but rather on the pesky meddlers, the Quakers: “The whole conduct of the Quakers seemed to me as if they wanted to make themselves popular with the Indians, and carry the management of Indian Affairs out of the channel His Majesty had ordered them to go in, indeed they took every step in their power to distinguish themselves, as a separate body of People from all His Majesty’s Subjects.” The Quakers had usurped the Crown’s prerogative to negotiate treaties with “foreign Princes.” Would they usurp another prerogative? Would they cause “Fatal Consequences” to “His Majesty’s Subjects”? Would they cause refugee Indians to reclaim the entire province if France won the war? Would landowners defend their property against such reclamation? Would land speculators defend their property? The Quakers might cause even unknown

conflict. “Shure those people must be mad,” Croghan thought. They had not protested
the 1754 Albany Purchase, whereby the proprietors had purchased a larger tract from the
Iroquois than the one they had “purchased” from the Susquehanna Delawares in the 1737
Walking Purchase. Croghan and Sir William Johnson had criticized the Albany Purchase
though provincial agent Conrad Weiser had conformed to provincial policy in making it.
They would continue to criticize it, too. After all, they were reasonable where Indian af-
fairs were concerned.39

39 For “whole conduct” see Croghan to Johnson, [circa Sept. 1757], DRCNY, 7:323; for “Fatal Conse-
quences” see Croghan to Peters, 18 Aug. 1757, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence. 3:271, HSP; for
“mad” see Croghan to [Peters], 18 Dec. 1757, PSA; for future criticism see Journal of the Commissioners
for Trade and Plantations from January 1754 to December 1758. Preserved in the Public Record Office
(London, 1933), 347; see also Johnson to Loudoun, 3 Sept. 1757, SWJP, 9:827; see also Johnson to Thom-
as Powell, 8 Jul. 1757, ibid., 2:738; see also Johnson to Lords of Trade, 28 Sept. 1757, DRCNY, 7:276-277.
Chapter 8: Objective Agent

George Croghan entered Fort Johnson in early October 1757 in hopes of getting another chance to negotiate peace, but rather than giving him one, Sir William Johnson sent him on a minor mission to the Oneidas and Tuscaroras. Upon completion of the mission Croghan returned to Fort Johnson and found his mentor bedridden with “pleurisy & violent stitches.” Croghan looked after him for weeks and was doing just that when a dispatch from Fort Herkimer arrived on the morning of 12 November. The dispatch warned that German Flats was in imminent danger of being attacked. Croghan gave the dispatch to Johnson, who forwarded it to Loudoun, who ordered Brigadier General George Augustus Howe to Fort Johnson. Riding fast, Howe made Fort Johnson that night. When four hundred regulars from Schenectady entered Fort Johnson in the morning, Howe knew that he had the beginnings of a force. Over the next few days, two hundred regulars from Schenectady and four hundred more from Forts Herkimer, Hendrick, and Hunter completed his force. Howe marched his force to German Flats and amid its smoldering ruins learned from survivors that three hundred French regulars, Canadian militia, and allied warriors had attacked the morning before and vanished into the forest. When his force could not locate the attackers, Howe disbanded it and left for Loudoun’s Albany headquarters.1

Loudoun meanwhile ordered Croghan to investigate German Flats. When Croghan arrived there, he saw the ruins and learned that Fort Herkimer as well as the German Palatine settlers themselves had ignored warnings of attack. He returned to Fort Johnson and wrote a report. He mailed Loudoun the report and wrote Richard Peters that “all our Garrisons is left two Weak, and No Regard paid to Indian Intilagance.” If the army mounted

1 For “pleurisy & violent stitches” see Johnson to Abercromby, 21 Oct. 1757, SWJP, 2:748; for illness see Johnson to Loudoun, 10 Dec. 1757, ibid., 2:761-762; for Howe see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 136-137.
a winter offensive, it would find the Iroquois “fast friends,” yet a winter offensive was unlikely because “British Offisers” were “to Delicatt to undertake a Winter Expedition.” The statements betray inner conflict. On the one hand they indicate that he respected the Iroquois, especially their warriors—they would fight in the winter, for instance—and on the other the statements indicate that he scorned the Iroquois as well, for their very existence thwarted British capitalist enterprise (settlement and farming). In truth he imagined a world devoid of Iroquois, one where British settlements and farms dominated the North American landscape from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi River. For him, then, diplomacy was tantamount to artillery fire—an effective means to soften up Iroquois-occupied or —dominated lands for invasion.

In late 1757 Croghan took up with or married the daughter of a Mohawk chief named Nickus, who lived at Canajoharie on the Mohawk River. If Croghan did take up with her, he probably followed the example of his mentor, whose many amorous exploits with Iroquois women had become legendary. The “mistress” of Fort Johnson, for instance, was Mary “Molly” Brant, a beautiful and well-connected Christian Mohawk whom Johnson would impregnate before disease (probably tuberculosis) killed his Palatine German common-law wife, Catherine Weisenberg, in April 1759. Catherine had born three children with him. Molly would bear the first of their nine children in September 1759. Like his mentor Croghan had good reason besides procreation to marry Nickus’ daughter, even if she bore him a daughter whom they named Catherine, likely in honor of Peter Warren’s wife: Marriage into the family of an important Mohawk chief would afford him access to Iroquois politics and peltries. At a general store in Schenectady, Croghan bought super-

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2 For investigation and report see Croghan to Johnson, 3 Dec. 1757, *SWJP*, 9:859-863; see also Croghan to Loudoun, 12 Nov. 1757, *ibid.*, 9:855-858; see also Abercromby to Croghan, 2 Dec. 1757, Gratz Coll., HSP; see also *Boston Gazette, and Country Journal*, 12 Jun. 1758; for “all our Garrisons” and “fast friends” see Croghan to [Peters], 18 Dec. 1757, *PA*, 1st ser., 3:319-320.
fluous garments like silk stockings and knee garters. Were the garments for a groom, a lover, or a philanderer? There, too, on 17 December he bought ribbon, which to Indians was an item that probably connoted sexual desire or favors. Did he buy the ribbon for a bride, a lover, or a mistress? The question is legitimate because no one knows whether his first wife was alive or dead. No one even knows her name.  

On 30 January 1758 Johnson ordered Croghan to German Flats to gather intelligence. Croghan went there but lodged at Fort Herkimer, the three-story, palisaded stone house across the Mohawk River. In the winter and the spring the Schenectady general store shipped him Jamaica rum and Madeira with domestic items like tableware and ribbons. Presumably the rum and the wine were for him and the domestic items for a female co-habitant, who might have used the ribbons to adorn her person or things. Be that as it might, the war showed up a second time across the Mohawk River, on 19 February at 3:00 a.m., when a house and a barn went up in flames. Croghan dispatched three Oneidas to “Discover ye. Number of ye. Enemy.” Two hours later, they returned and reported that they had scouted the enemy camp’s “large fier.” Croghan scribbled a message and sent it to Johnson, who upon reading it ordered eight hundred regulars, rangers, militiamen, and warriors to German Flats. Upon their arrival the regulars counted five dead and scalped

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3 For Mohawk “wife” see Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant, 1743-1807: Man of Two Worlds* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 51; for “Molly” Brant see O’Toole, *White Savage*, 169-177; see also Flexner, *Mohawk Baronet*, 185-187; for mixed-heritage daughter Catherine see Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*, 128; for purchases see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 138; for ribbon’s connotation see Ann Smart Martin, *Buying into a World of Goods: Early Consumers in Backcountry Virginia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 167. Margaret Pearson Bothwell claims that Croghan’s wife of European descent was one Ann Heron, who bore their son, whom they named William. Bothwell bases her claim on questionable genealogical evidence prepared by Mary Jessup Stitgraves of Boston. Bothwell received the genealogy from Dr. Samuel W. Thomas, who in early 1964 received it from Mrs. U. M. Leavett-Shenley. Thomas was Research Director, Locust Grove Restoration, Louisville, Kentucky. “The records are supposed to be documented rather than family tradition,” he wrote Bothwell. No independent verification of the claim exists, however. The William Croghan to whom Stitgraves, Leavett-Shenley, Thomas, and Bothwell refer was probably the son of George Croghan’s cousin. For “The records are” see Margaret Pearson Bothwell, “The Astonishing Croghans,” *The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr. 1965): 122.
settlers. When they could not locate the enemy, the regulars withdrew, forcing Croghan to engage snow-shoed warriors to scout regularly in each direction. “I think the Enemy Can Nott stale upon us in ye Night,” he wrote Johnson on 12 March.⁴

Meanwhile change was afoot in the British military. Popular British statesman William Pitt, the first earl of Chatham, devised an innovative fourfold strategy that the high command in London began to execute straightaway. Besides the seizures of Fort Duquesne in western Pennsylvania, Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island in present-day Nova Scotia, and Québec on the St. Lawrence River, the strategy featured an invasion of Canada. Yet the strategy depended upon a shakeup of military personnel. First, because Loudoun had marched to Louisbourg, only to retreat after he had verified specious intelligence about its strength, and because Fort William Henry on Lake George’s southern shore had fallen during his retreat, the high command replaced him with Major General James Abercromby, whose assignment was to invade Canada via Forts Carillon on the southern shore of Lake Champlain and St. Frédéric on the western. Second, the high command assigned Brigadier General John Forbes to seize Fort Duquesne. When Forbes assumed command of troops in Pennsylvania, Brigadier General John Stanwix left the colony to build a fort at the portage of the Mohawk River and Wood Creek in New York. Third, the high command assigned Major General Jeffery Amherst to seize Louisbourg, and fourth, Major General James Wolfe, a supremely gifted combat tactician and a commoner of middle-class background, to seize Québec.⁵

⁴ For orders see Johnson to Croghan, 30 Jan. 1758, SWJP, 2:778; for shipments and attack see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 140; for attack see also Croghan to Johnson, 19 Feb. 1758, SWJP, 9:876; for “Discover ye Number” see Croghan to Johnson, 12 Mar. 1758, ibid., 2:780.
⁵ For war strategy see Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow”: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 341; see also Anderson, Crucible of War, 211-216; see also Abercromby to Johnson, 4 Apr. 1758, SWJP, 9:890-893.
On 4 April, Abercromby ordered Sir William Johnson to recruit Iroquois warriors for the invasion of Canada and to commit Croghan to Forbes for the expedition against Fort Duquesne. Forbes needed Croghan to neutralize hostile Pennsylvania-Ohio Indians who might hinder road construction or assist the French in defending Fort Duquesne. Johnson committed Croghan to Forbes, then reneged, messaging that Quakers had raised and were utilizing a “private Fund” for holding “private and separate” meetings with Indians, “flagrantly illegal” meetings that might “confound” and “perhaps render ineffectual” Governor William Denny and the Pennsylvania Council. So long as Pennsylvania was thus circumstanced, Johnson saw “little Advantage” in dispatching “M’ Croghan or any other Person thither.” Instead, Johnson sent agents to Iroquois villages to recruit warriors for the invasion of Canada and sent Croghan and Andrew Montour to Onaquaga to do likewise. “I expect to be on my march from hence in 3 weeks from this day,” he wrote Croghan on 29 May. Croghan and Montour rode to Canajoharie and met Indian scouts who displayed a chunk of the wooden cross erected by the French regulars who had captured the Oswego post in August 1756. Croghan acquired the chunk and sent it to Johnson before setting out with Montour along the eastern shore of Otsego Lake, the source of the Susquehanna’s north branch. When they reached the north branch, they followed it to Onaquaga, which was an Oneida village near present-day Windsor, New York.6

At Onaquaga, which had a sizeable refugee population of Tuscaroras from South Carolina and Nanticokes from Virginia, Croghan and Montour recruited a hundred warriors, but the recruitment took too long to suit Johnson, who had put off Abercromby, who had demanded that Johnson join him in the field. Johnson had made the excuse that he could

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6 For Abercromby’s orders to Johnson see Abercromby to Johnson, 4 Apr. 1758, SWJP, 9:890-893; see also Forbes to Johnson, 4 May 1758, ibid., 9:897-898; for “private Fund” see Johnson to Abercromby, 28 Apr. 1758, ibid., 2:833; for instructions to Croghan and Montour and for “I expect to be” see Johnson to Croghan, 29 May 1758, ibid., 9:908-909; for route see ibid., 9:914-915.
not march until he had enough warriors to constitute an auxiliary. He would have enough warriors only when the Onaquaga recruits arrived. Croghan entered Fort Johnson on 27 June and announced the arrival of a hundred Onaquaga recruits, precisely when a number of Onondaga, Oneida, and Tuscarora warriors entered Fort Johnson. Over the next two days Mohawk and Mahican warriors trickled into Fort Johnson. In all there were about two hundred warriors, or enough to suit Johnson. Leaving Croghan behind to greet the Onaquaga recruits for him, Johnson set out with his Indian auxiliary. His destination was Abercromby’s encampment at Lake George. Next day Montour arrived with the Onaquaga recruits. In Johnson’s name Croghan greeted them, and then he and Montour, intending to catch up to Johnson, led them out of Onaquaga. At a Hudson River portage about ten miles from Fort Edward, Johnson halted for a night encampment on 4 July. He messaged ahead that in two days he would arrive with two hundred Iroquois warriors and that Croghan and Montour would follow with one hundred more warriors from Onaquaga, but the halt allowed Croghan and Montour to catch up. On 6 July the message reached Abercromby’s Lake George encampment, but by then Abercromby had begun an amphibious advance toward Fort Ticonderoga, which guarded Lake Champlain’s southern shore.7

Early in the morning of 6 July a flotilla of whaleboats, bateaux, and rafts floated sixteen thousand men across Lake George and landed them at a cove within a few miles of Fort Ticonderoga. As the men made their way through the forest toward the fort, they took enemy fire that killed their favorite officer, Brigadier General Howe. Next day they drew

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close to the fort, but rather than ordering up cannon to position atop a nearby height for clear shots into the fort, Abercromby ordered frontal charges. Next morning Johnson arrived with his Indian auxiliary and received orders to hold the height. Assisted by Croghan and Montour, he positioned the warriors atop the height. In the afternoon Johnson, Croghan, Montour, and the warriors witnessed the small but well-ensconced force under Louis-Joseph de Montcalm-Gozon, Marquis de Saint Veran, repulse each frontal charge until Abercromby ordered retreat. Given his sobriquet, “Mrs. Nanny Crombie,” the retreat surprised no one. When his men made safe ground, Abercromby disbanded the Indian auxiliary and ordered Johnson to arrange for an intercultural conference in Pennsylvania. Johnson chose Easton for the conference and ordered Croghan and Montour there to advise Governor Denny. Upon their arrival Croghan and Montour learned that Denny had not left Philadelphia, so they hurried there to meet him. During the meeting Croghan would have been jailed for debt if Denny had not interceded in his behalf; after the meeting Croghan and Montour hurried to Easton so that Croghan could dodge his creditors.8

Because of circumstances Johnson doubted that the conference could succeed. He had received a petition from the Board of Trade. The petition, written by the proprietors before the previous Easton conference, called for him to adjudicate Teedyuscung’s charge of proprietary land fraud. If he adjudicated the charge, he could ameliorate the tenuous relationship between the Susquehanna Delawares and the Iroquois and unite them against the French. Yet the Friendly Association could block the realization of that goal by harping on proprietary land fraud to gain political advantage over the proprietors and the pro-

8 For Ticonderoga debacle see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 142-143; for Abercromby’s nickname see Leckie, “A Few Acres of Snow”: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars, 341; for Abercromby’s orders to Johnson see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 143; for Johnson’s orders to Croghan and Montour see Johnson to James De Lancey, 10 Sept. 1758, SWJP, 2:896; for arrival of Croghan and Montour in Philadelphia see Denny to Johnson, 30 Aug. 1758, ibid., 2:890; for Croghan’s avoidance of jail see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 145.
proprietary party. Although the Friendly Association had heretofore inspired Teedyuscung to raise the issue of proprietary land fraud at intercultural conferences, the chief had nevertheless drawn mostly on the Senecas and the Cayugas for support, for those two Iroquois nations opposed what Johnson had been cultivating for years to enhance his own power and prestige—Mohawk leadership of the Iroquois Confederacy. Ignoring an Association missive to invite only Seneca and Cayuga chiefs to the conference, Johnson had in fact invited Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Tuscarora chiefs, too. Remaining in New York to negotiate Mohawk mediation, he had ordered Croghan and Montour to Easton to advise Governor Denny, who intended to settle the issue of the Walking Purchase permanently. Before the fourth Easton conference Croghan wrote Johnson that he had “a bad opinion of this treaty.” The words confirmed Johnson’s doubt.9

Brigadier General John Forbes, despite suffering from dysentery, had been organizing his army since March upon receiving his orders to seize Fort Duquesne. His army was composed mostly of Pennsylvania militia companies under Colonels James Burd, Hugh Mercer, and the murderous John Armstrong, but it was composed too of Virginia militia companies under Tidewater aristocrats George Washington and William Byrd and Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina militia companies under like commanders. Forbes’ army felt Croghan’s influence. In 1755 Burd and Croghan together had supervised road-builders, and Mercer had risen to the rank of lieutenant in Croghan’s Fort Shirley militia company, for example. Armstrong had led the vengeful 1756 militia expedition against Kittanning. But Forbes was just as bullheaded as Braddock had been. He rejected Washington and Byrd’s plan to march up Braddock’s Road from Fort Cumberland, Maryland,

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in favor of his own plan to march across the rugged Allegheny Mountains from Carlisle. His plan necessitated the construction of a wagon road. When his men began to construct the wagon road, they found that they lacked even the most basic supplies largely because of his incompetent quartermaster, Sir John St. Clair. Forbes wrote thus to Abercromby in August: “Sir John [St. Clair] having served me as he did Gen Braddock promising every thing and doing no one Individual thing in the world, except confusing what he undertakes.” Still, Forbes’ men progressed, so that Forbes on 18 August wrote his second-in-command, Colonel Henry Bouquet, that “after many Inteigues with the Quakers, the Commissioners, the Governour &c. and with the Governour and Government of New Jersey and by the downright Bullying of Sir William Johnson &c, I hope I have brought a Convention with the Indians of whatever denomination or tribe, pretty near to a Crissis.” Forbes expected Croghan to neutralize all the hostile Indians who might impede road construction or who might defend Fort Duquesne.10

The fourth Easton conference from 7 to 26 October 1758 proved a major victory for Governor Denny and his advisors, Croghan and Montour. Among the colonial officials on hand were Provincial Secretary Richard Peters and Governor Francis Bernard of New Jersey. Among the five hundred or so Indians on hand were chiefs of the Susquehanna Delawares, Ohio Delawares, New Jersey Delawares, and New York Iroquois. On hand, too, were Israel Pemberton and his associates, who circumvented a provincial ban on the sale of alcohol to Indians by doling rum at provincial expense. As a result Susquehanna Delaware war chief Teedyuscung drank to excess and exploded in anger, claiming autonomy for himself and his people and ranting about the Walking Purchase. The rant exas-

10 For Forbes’ plan to build road across Pennsylvania see Denny to Johnson, 30 Aug. 1758, SWJP, 2:891-892; for dysentery and “Sir John [St. Clair] having served me” see Forbes to Abercromby, 3 Jul. [actually unknown day in Aug.] 1758, JFW, 168-169; for “after many Inteigues” see Forbes to Bouquet, 18 Aug. [1758], ibid., 180-181.
pered Mohawk chief Nickus, who sneered that Teedyuscung was nobody and his people were “women.” Then, stating that the Susquehanna Delawares presumed ownership of Pennsylvania lands, the other Iroquois chiefs—notably the Seneca and Cayuga chiefs—confirmed the Walking Purchase. In return Governor Denny not only forfeited a Susquehanna Valley tract that the provincial government had stolen from the Iroquois during the 1754 Albany Congress, but redressed a major Seneca-Cayuga grievance by promising to prohibit settlement west of the Alleghenies, too. Governor Bernard indemnified the New Jersey Delaware chiefs for stolen New Jersey lands, so Teedyuscung iterated his charge of proprietary land fraud, but Governor Denny did not indemnify him for stolen Pennsylvania lands. Thereafter Teedyuscung begged the Iroquois chiefs for title to the Wyoming Valley, but they referred the matter to the Onondaga Council for final disposition.11

Between the public sessions of the fourth Easton Conference Croghan had met Iroquois chiefs privately. After one private meeting Nickus had erupted against Teedyuscung and the Susquehanna Delawares. Had Croghan instigated Nickus to the outburst? Friendly Association leader Israel Pemberton suspected that Croghan had. Croghan was, after all, Nickus’ “son-in-law.” Had Croghan instigated the Seneca and Cayuga chiefs to confirm the Walking Purchase? He probably had. “Mr. Croghan has exerted himself on all occasions for the good of His Majesty’s service,” Governor Denny wrote Sir William Johnson, “and it required his peculiar address to manage the Indians, and counteract the de-

11 For minutes of October 1758 Easton conference see Kalter, ed. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania, & the First Nations: The Treaties of 1732–62, 291-333; see also Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:89, HSP; for events of conference see [James] Logan Papers, Indian Affairs, 11:55, HSP; see also entries of 12, 19, 20, 21 October 1758, Benjamin Chew’s Diary of a Treaty at Easton, AM 043, HSP; see also entries of 12, 19, 20, 21 October Richard Peters’ Diary, September to November 1758, Peters Papers, No. 15, HSP; for Pemberton’s motive in getting Teedyuscung drunk see Croghan to Peters, PA, 1st ser., 3:544; for secondary accounts of conference see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 145-150; see also Wallace, Anthony F. C., King of the Delawares, 194-207; see also Wallace, Paul A., Conrad Weiser, 520-552; for meaning of gender metaphor “women” see Nancy Shoemaker, “An Alliance between Men: Gender Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century American Indian Diplomacy East of the Mississippi,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1999): 241.
signs of a wretched and restless faction [the Friendly Association].” Croghan also wrote Johnson that Iroquois mediation had made the difference. Unlike the third Easton conference, which had produced an uneasy truce between the provincial government and the Susquehanna Delawares, the fourth Easton conference established a durable peace based on power politics (the reassertion of Iroquois hegemony). Hence Forbes could construct his road over the Alleghenies without fear of attack by the Susquehanna Delawares, and the provincial government could focus on trying to neutralize the hostile Ohio Delawares and Shawnees.  

In November 1758 the mood of the Ohio Delawares changed dramatically. Because of blockaded ports Canadian officials could no longer present the goods that the Ohio Delawares demanded as the price for remaining loyal to France. When the delegation of Ohio Delawares to the fourth Easton conference returned with the news that the Susquehanna Delawares had made peace with the provincial government, the Ohio Delaware chiefs reasoned that they ought to make peace, too. A sudden change in leadership reflected the new mood. Fearing for his life because bounty hunters were seeking his scalp, Shingas passed his “scepter” (or chiefly powers) to his peaceable brother Beaver, and thereafter the Ohio Delawares stopped defending Fort Duquesne. Yet in spite of the peace overture covetous Pennsylvania colonists blatantly defied the Easton accord when they settled the Monongahela and Youghiogheny Valleys via the roads the British army had hewn from the wilderness. Covetous Connecticut colonists too blatantly defied the Easton accord when they settled the Wyoming Valley, which the Connecticut government had been

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12 For “M’ Croghan has exerted himself” see Denny to Johnson, 24 Oct. 1758, SWJP, 3:10-11; for suspicion see William Logan to John Smith, 17 Oct. 1758, Correspondence of John Smith, HSP; see also [Thomson], Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delawares and Shawnese Indians from the British Interest, 172-173; for mediation see Johnson to Abercromby, 10 Nov. 1758, SWJP, 10:54.
claiming since the summer of 1754. Given the Iroquois’ reassertion of hegemony, the Susquehanna Delawares could do nothing to stop the encroachments.13

On 20 November, Croghan entered General Forbes’ encampment about thirty miles east of Fort Duquesne. He had with him fifteen Iroquois and Delaware recruits, though he had promised fifty and though Richard Peters had given him £150 at Easton in October to supply as many. Over the next few days Forbes chose 2,500 crack troops for an assault on Fort Duquesne. Forbes ordered them out, and Croghan ordered three scouts forward. Two of the scouts discovered that the French had abandoned and burned Fort Duquesne on 24 November because of Indian desertion. Early next day the troops occupied the forks and Forbes ordered Colonel Hugh Mercer to build a makeshift fort beside Fort Duquesne’s charred remains. The makeshift fort was named after William Pitt. In the afternoon the troops and the warriors encamped on the very tract Croghan had “purchased” from the Onondaga Council in 1749. Probably suspecting that they had collaborated with the French during “Braddock’s Defeat,” Forbes next day ordered Croghan to isolate the Delaware warriors. Croghan did not protest because it was Forbes who had regained the tract. Forbes assigned Mercer two hundred men to build Fort Pitt and planned to reinforce outlying forts like Loyalhanna (renamed Fort Ligonier), Raystown (renamed Fort Bedford), Fort Lyttelton, and Fort Loudoun. Forbes planned also to fortify the trading posts at Shippensburg and Carlisle. His purpose in making the plans was to consolidate territorial gains.14

13 For mood change and colonial settlement see Weslager, Delaware Indians, 211, 215-216, 237, 252; see also Wallace, Anthony F. C., King of the Delawares, 207.
14 For Pennsylvania Delaware warriors see Peters to Weiser, 22 Dec. 1758, Conrad Weiser Papers, Correspondence, 2:143, HSP; for £150 see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 152; for Forbes expedition see Pennsylvania Gazette, 14 Dec. 1758; see also Forbes to [Washington], 20 Nov. 1758, 259-26, JFW, 259-260; for isolation of warriors see Joseph Shippen orderly book, APS.
Forbes could not preempt attacks from French strongholds like Venango, LeBoeuf, and Presque Isle, but could and did attempt to assuage Ohio Delaware hostility, ordering his go-betweens to set up an intercultural conference. Croghan and Montour messaged the Delawares at Kuskuskeys to meet them at Sauconk, a Delaware village on the Ohio River about a mile south of the mouth of Beaver River. Escorted by friendly Delaware and Iroquois warriors on 28 December, Croghan and Montour left Forbes’ encampment on foot. They passed through deserted Logstown, where they saw French-built houses, and they entered deserted Sauconk and saw more French-built houses. The inhabitants, who had fled to escape reprisal, returned overnight. When a Kuskuskeys delegation arrived next day, the meeting occurred. Croghan presented a wampum belt in Forbes’ name and said that he had come to take Delaware chiefs to Forbes, but four Delaware notables, Shingas, Beaver, Pisquetomen, and Delaware George, refused to leave Sauconk without an absent colleague, the chief Custaloga. Still, Croghan had fulfilled Forbes’ expectations for the mission and even those of creditor Edward Shippen. “As a private person I have no reason to say anything in favour of Mr. C------,” Shippen had written a friend on 18 December, “but this I am pretty sure of that if he could not bring them in, no man on the continent could do it, . . . except Sir William Johnson himself you see.” When Custaloga arrived, Croghan and Montour led him and the other chiefs toward Forbes’ encampment.15

On 3 December, Croghan, Montour, and their party entered the encampment just as Forbes was leading men out to reinforce the outlying forts and to fortify the trading posts at Shippensburg and Carlilse, so that the negotiations fell to Colonel Henry Bouquet and his advisors, Croghan and Montour. During the snowy two-day conference Bouquet dis-

15 For Forbes’ orders to go-betweens see HBP, 2:613-614, for meeting see PA, 1st ser., 3:561-565; for “As a private person” see Shippen to William Allen, 18 Dec. 1758, Shippen Papers, 3:223, HSP.
closed that after its completion the fort would protect trade, not advance settlement. But the chiefs reasoned the disclosure was false. In his journal Croghan recorded that Beaver, speaking in behalf of fellow Delaware chiefs, accepted British occupation of the forks as a fait accompli, but an impartial eyewitness to the proceedings—the Moravian missionary Christian Frederick Post, to be exact—flatly contradicted Croghan by writing that Beaver had not only opposed British occupation of the forks, but accused Croghan and Montour of mistranslating Algonquian words to serve a sinister end (settlement or de facto proprietorship). In any case Bouquet told the chiefs about the Easton peace and asked them to invite the chiefs of other hostile Ohio Delawares to confirm the peace at an intercultural conference. Afterward, Croghan left the forks area to join Forbes at Fort Ligonier, fifty-six snowy miles away. By 8 December, Croghan had entered Fort Ligonier, only to find that Forbes was too sick to receive him, so Croghan went to Fort Bedford, where he ended the year in fine frontier form—carousing with old friends like John Fraser and buying seven quarts and nineteen bottles of wine and two gallons, one quart, and a half pint of rum for revelries. The drink assuaged the general privation and disorder of the fort.16

Having sated his appetite for drink, Croghan returned to Fort Ligonier and met Forbes, who indicated that he felt well enough to winter in Philadelphia. Croghan and Forbes rode three hundred snowy miles before they perceived the city’s altered skyline, which had risen since Croghan, shipboard, first glimpsed it in 1741. An imposing statehouse tower joined Christ Church’s 196-foot steeple in piercing the skyline, for instance. Entering the city at night on 17 January 1759, Croghan and Forbes heard bells toll the victo-

16 For trade see Johnson to Amherst, 22 Feb. 1759, SWJP, 10:103-104; for Bouquet’s account see HBP, 2:624-626; for impartial account see Post, Second Journal of Christian Frederick Post, 57-61; for Croghan’s purchase of alcohol see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 155.
rious general’s arrival and a battery fire laudatory shots. The city was bigger and wealthier and brighter than Croghan remembered, and it carried more night traffic. Its fine new homes peeved him—would he ever be rich?—even as its cozy new taverns beckoned him from streets lined with prosperous new shops. The streets themselves reflected pride and prosperity. Some streets boasted cobblestone or paving-block inlays. Most sported brick or flag-stone sidewalks. Whale-oil lamps depending from well-spaced posts illuminated the boisterous main streets. Eventually the main streets stilled, and Forbes and Croghan parted on poor terms. “I have all along thought that the publick measures and the private interested views of Sir William Johnstone and his myrmidons have never once coincided in my time,” Forbes wrote Jeffery Amherst on 7 February. “Nor can I at present conceive why I am honoured with one of Sir Willm Johnstones people at this place.”

Forbes neglected his duties as his health worsened. He ignored a Mingo delegation that arrived with Captain Edward Ward to learn British military plans for 1759. Apprised of quickening French activity, he sent 250 regulars to Fort Pitt, but then neglected a request from its commander, Colonel Hugh Mercer, for goods to trade for the furs and skins of former hostile Indians, even though Croghan pleaded for orders to transport the goods. Croghan appealed to Sir William Johnson, who appealed to Jeffrey Amherst, but Forbes himself settled the matter when he died on 11 March and was replaced by Brigadier General John Stanwix, who soon was en route to Philadelphia. Croghan stayed, awaiting his orders and in the meantime visiting his mother, his half-brother Edward Ward, and his former trading partner William Trent, and attending an auction of furs and skins near the Market Street courthouse, and shopping. He bought fine clothing and accessories like a

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17 For Croghan and Forbes’ arrival see Pennsylvania Gazette, 18 Jan. 1759; for city see Weigley, ed., Philadelphia, 68-69; for “I have all along” see Forbes to Amherst, 7 Feb. 1759, JFW, 289.
gray bagwig and a brown Spencer wig. He halted his buying spree on 3 April only upon receiving Stanwix’s orders to “hold” himself “in readiness to go to Ohio, there to transact business with the Western Indians as Sir William Johnsons Deputy and promote the good of His Majestys Indian Interest.” The days that followed were very anxious ones for him because the Pennsylvania Council informed him of the Crown’s repeal of the Pennsylvania Assembly’s 1755 Relief Act that had freed him from debt for ten years. Would he be able to fend off his creditors when they swooped down on him like ravenous hawks after carrion? What would he do? What should he do? To whom should he turn for help?18

On 9 April, Jeffery Amherst entered Philadelphia. Next day he met the Mingo delegation twice. During the second meeting he read a Croghan-penned speech that addressed Mingo concerns about British military plans for 1759. Since large-scale operations were in the works, the Mingos could support Brigadier General John Stanwix without fear of French reprisal. Stanwix attended the meeting. Governors William Denny of Pennsylvania, Francis Bernard of New Jersey, and James Delaney of New York attended the meeting, too. Amherst set a militia quota for each governor and the meeting broke up. “After being Gentely Cloathed” on 12 April the Mingos left “for their own Country in Company with Captain Ward and well satisfyed with the recaption they had met with,” according to Croghan, who had given Ward £10 for expenses. Next day Amherst left for New York.

What were his military plans for 1759? Although William Pitt had devised them in late

18 For Mingo delegation see Croghan to Johnson, 30 Jan. 1759, SWJP, 91; for ill-health see Forbes to Amherst, 6 Jan. 1759, JFW, 275; for French activity and for British response see Mercer to Denny, 8 Jan. 1759, MPCP, 8:292; see also Mercer to Forbes, 8 Jan. 1759, HBP, 25-26; for Fort Pitt reinforcements see Forbes to Amherst, 26 Jan. 1759, JFW, 285; for plea see Croghan to Johnson, 30 Jan. 1759, SWJP, 10:91; for Croghan’s and Johnson’s appeals see Johnson to Amherst, 22 Feb. 1759, ibid., 10:104; for Croghan’s shopping spree see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 158; for Croghan’s orders see Nicholas B. Wainwright, ed., “George Croghan’s Journal, 1755-1763,” PMHB, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 1947): 313; for western Indians see Memorandum, MPCP, 8:301; for Crown’s repeal of Relief Act see meeting of Governor Denny and Pennsylvania Council, 2 Apr. 1755, MPCP, 8:320; see also entry, Jul. 1760, K. H. Ledward, ed., Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Vol. 11 (Institute of Historical Research, 1935), fo. 189.
1758, Amherst had not received them until March 1759. According to the plans, Major General James Wolfe was to sail twelve thousand men down the St. Lawrence River and capture Québec. Amherst was to invade Canada and to destroy Fort Ticonderoga and en route to Montréal he was to capture the newly built fortification at Crown Point on Lake Champlain. As yet unspecified officers were to rebuild the fortification at Oswego, capture Fort Niagara, and build a permanent fort at the forks of the Ohio. While Wolf, Amherst, and the other officers were executing the plan, the Southern Department was to create diversions on the western frontiers.19

In late April, Stanwix ordered Croghan to buy goods on the Crown and transport them to Pittsburgh for the purpose of using them to appease former hostile Indians and to court allies, but the orders violated provincial law. In 1758 the Pennsylvania Assembly had enacted a law that banned the sale of liquor to Indians and created a provincial monopoly of the transmontane Indian trade. The Assembly had commissioned provincial officials to supervise the trade and to set up stores at Fort Augusta, Fort Allen, and Pittsburgh, but because the stores had been ill supplied and ill managed, Stanwix’s predecessor, Brigadier General John Forbes, had allowed Israel Pemberton to build a competing store at Pittsburgh. On 18 June, Croghan entered Pittsburgh after a particularly arduous journey during which reports of enemy attacks had forced him to pick up a Virginia envoy led by Captain Adam Stephen. Soon Croghan had licensed traders, priced goods, urged the provincial storekeeper to adopt his prices, and boasted that Stanwix himself had given him carte blanche to trade with Indians. The boast caused the commissioners and Pemberton to complain to Stanwix that Croghan had licensed men who inebriated Indians to cheat

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them. Because of the complaint Stanwix conducted an investigation that found in favor of Croghan, whose men actually were trading on the sly. Whether they broke the law or did not break the law is unclear, however. What is clear is that neither Croghan nor the provincial storekeeper was creating a giftopia, so to speak. Rather, each was creating favorable conditions for conquest. If refugee Indians like the Delawares had learned anything over the last seventy-five years, it was that intercultural alliances were slanted toward the colonial invaders. As for Pemberton, he was the unwitting abettor of conquest, for trade preceded conquest throughout the colonial era of American history.20

From 4 to 11 July 1759 Croghan held an intercultural conference up the Allegheny River. In attendance were notables like Beaver, the peaceable, middle-aged Delaware chief who had superseded his warlike younger brother and rival Shingas, who was an attendee, too. Among the five hundred other attendees were Wyandot chiefs who represented the interests of their tribes and other Great Lakes tribes. Croghan shifted the conference up the Allegheny River after several invitees balked at going to Philadelphia. As usual he conformed to Indian protocol. “I called all the Indians togetheer, bid them welcome, and condoled with them on account of their People who dyed & were killed at War since I see them, which is agreeable to an ancient Custom of theirs,” he recorded in his journal on 5 July. During the conference he related the terms of the Easton accord and also the main points of the governor’s prohibition on transmontane settlement, solicited the release of

captive, and justified the British military presence in western Pennsylvania thus—the defense of intercultural trade and the defeat of France. Once Great Britain defeated France, British regulars would leave western Pennsylvania. Since the refugees—especially those from Pennsylvania—knew first-hand that trade always preceded conquest, they mistrusted the statements and acted accordingly, depleting Fort Pitt’s supplies of food (Colonel Mercer resorted to slaughtering cows to feed his garrison) and goods (the provincial trade commissioners ignored Croghan’s request for more goods). Although the refugees allied themselves to Great Britain, they doubted that the British could defeat the French, especially after two Mingo-dispatched messengers entered the camp and reported that a large French force was preparing to haul artillery pieces down the Allegheny River for the purpose of laying siege either to Fort Pitt or to Fort Ligonier.21

To secure Pittsburgh, Mercer moved civilians into Fort Pitt and destroyed their houses so that the houses could not harbor enemy combatants. In the fort he formed the civilians into militia though he lacked the supplies to outfit or feed them. Food, for example, was in short supply because a supply convoy sent by Stanwix had not yet arrived. The civilians, especially the Indian traders, hunkered down for the siege. In the evening of 14 July two of Croghan’s Mingo spies entered the fort and reported that the commander of Fort Machault had been ordered to reinforce Fort Niagara, which British regulars, New York

militia, and Iroquois warriors led by Sir William Johnson were besieging. The spies saw 700 or so troops march off and 950 or so allied warriors disperse, yet enough warriors remained in the vicinity to wreak havoc on Forbes Road. The convoy arrived safely at Fort Pitt on 18 July, its cargo containing trade goods that Croghan used to win hostile Indians who were wavering in allegiance to France. Over the next two weeks more convoys delivered more goods that Croghan used to win still more wavering hostile Indians. “The success I have met with in drawing the Indians from the Enemy, and preventing others joining them, with the advantage gained by our Intelligence,” he wrote Stanwix on 31 July, “will I hope make your Honour think the Expence not ill bestowed.” From 7 to 8 August such largess enabled him hold a Pittsburgh conference with Beaver and some three hundred hostile Indians who in return for goods buried “the War Hatchet.”

On 13 August the news that Sir William Johnson had captured Fort Niagara on 25 July sparked a wild celebration in Fort Pitt. Fort Niagara, situated on the eastern bank of the Niagara River at Lake Ontario, was now Britain’s because Johnson had had the presence of mind to complete its siege after a mortar test-shot had beheaded his commander. Out-numbered by Jeffery Amherst’s army, subject to artillery fire, the French had abandoned and burned Forts Carillon on the southern shore of Lake Champlain and St. Frédéric on the western and the forts north of Fort Pitt—Fort Machault at Venango, Fort LeBoeuf on

French Creek, and Fort Presque Isle on Lake Erie—before falling back to Détroit. The Indians did not celebrate with the Fort Pitt garrison and civilians because they knew the North American power dynamic had shifted in favor of Great Britain. For them, Stanwix made this statement when his chief engineer, Harry Gordon, began to build a pentagonal earthen fort at the forks of the Ohio: The British had come to stay. From a distance the Indians looked on anxiously as the fort’s garrison of thirteen hundred men busied themselves with work. Almost seventy and nearing retirement, Stanwix wanted this Fort Pitt to be his legacy.23

From 24 to 26 October 1759 Croghan, assisted by former trading partner William Trent and Indian trader Thomas McKee, held an intercultural conference. Present were Stanwix, Beaver, Ohio and Pennsylvania Delaware diplomats, and Ohio Shawnee, Mingo, Miami, and Wyandot diplomats. Stanwix related the terms of the Easton accord and then pledged friendship and trade, whereupon the Indian diplomats did likewise, but they had little choice after he told them that Major General James Wolfe had captured Québec. A Wyandot diplomat spoke thus: “You are appointed by the King to transact Business with us, the Indians; you have hitherto done it to our Satisfaction; we hope the King’s General will act on the same principles; you have it now in your power to have all the Indian Nations in your Interest; it is true, for some time we were led blindfold.” Reciprocity had heretofore defined the “principles,” or conventions, of intercultural diplomacy, but now high-ranking British officers thought it anachronistic. Why present Indians goods once New France was British? The army should dictate, not reciprocate. Liberal gift-giving

was in fact a waste of time, energy, and money. Stanwix wrote William Pitt that liberal gift-giving had indeed impressed the Indian diplomats more than expository oratory, but also that the gifts amounted to “nothing in comparison with the advantage of the fur trade reestablish’d here, and the sure and immediate protection of the three great provinces Virginia, Maryland & Pennsylvania.” Although Stanwix had sugarcoated British diplomacy, trade, and victory, each had indicated only one true end to the perceptive Ohio and Pennsylvania Indian diplomats—the British conquest of North America. Québec had fallen to Wolfe. Surely New France would fall to Great Britain. How long could the tribes of the Ohio Valley restrain the British colonists who would inevitably migrate west when Great Britain won the war?²⁴

The army so baffled Croghan that in the winter he contemplated returning to Fort Johnson. “The Success of his Majestys Arms, this Campaign, in Different Parts, gives rise to an Opinion generally received in the Army, that We have conquered the Continent,” he wrote Sir William Johnson on 25 January 1760; “it is True We may say We have beat the French; but we have nothing to boast from the War with the Natives, yet it is thought every Penny, thrown away, that is given them, which Obliges me to think the Service very disagreeable tho’ I will by no means Resign without your Consent and Approbation.” His spies told him that the French had regrouped at Détroit and begun to recruit western Indians to disrupt British military communication and to attack British colonial frontiers in the early spring. His own experience indicated that fort construction vexed both Pennsylvania and Ohio Indians and that the French needed only to indulge them to draw them into their camp. In his mind, then, the key to final victory was to out-indulge the French.

²⁴ For minutes of October conference and “You are appointed” see MPCM, 8:429-435; for British attitude see Croghan to Johnson, 25 Jan. 1760, SWJP, 10:134; for “nothing in comparison” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 168.
Why had Stanwix failed to impress that simple truth on his fellows? “I am of your Opinion,” Johnson wrote back on 16 February, “not only from y^c. Intelligence you have, but from my observation & knowledge of the Country, that the French f^m. Detroit with a few ill-disposed Indians may interrupt the Convoys w^th. provisions to your Post, & thereby distress that Garrison if not Seasonably prevented by your being qualified to give presents & treat with those you may Suspect will act against Us, and by your keeping good Scouts towards Presque Isle & along Lake Erie.” Johnson advised Croghan to “acquaint General Amherst with said Intelligence” and to stay put.25

So Croghan traded with the Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, Miami, Wyandot, Ottawa, and Chippewa parties that went to and from Pittsburgh in the winter and the spring. Some of the parties delivered captives and others imparted intelligence regarding French military activities, but all ascertained that unfinished but imposing Fort Pitt was indeed positioning Great Britain for final victory over France. Croghan indulged the Indians but pursued self-interest, too. He had neither the time nor the means to rebuild his former trading empire, but he did have enough of both to recover a semblance of its luster. Up the Allegheny he built an imposing house where he entertained Indian visitors and traders as lavishly as he once had at his Aughwick plantation in his and its heyday, but now, instead of trading his goods for Indian peltries, he traded army goods for Indian intelligence. He even had occasion to convince two Indians to spy at Détroit. When they returned, they reported that the Shawnees and other Ohio Indians had begun to war against their traditional southern enemy, the Cherokees, who, having turned against Great Britain, were attacking the western edges of her southern colonies. To get his petition for loss-recovery to sym-

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25 For “The Success of his Majestys Arms” see Croghan to Johnson, SWJP, 10:134; for Indian intelligence and for Croghan’s experience see Croghan to Johnson, 22 Dec. 1759, ibid., 10:131; see also Croghan to Johnson, 31 Dec. 1759, ibid., 10:132-133; see also Croghan to Johnson, 26 Jan. 1760, ibid., 10:136-137; for “I am of your Opinion” see Johnson to Croghan, 16 Feb. 1760, ibid., 10:137-139.
pathetic London officials, he had ingratiated himself with Governor Denny by shipping him quality furs, but Proprietor Thomas Penn replaced the philanderer with ex-governor James Hamilton. Before Denny embarked for England, he wrote Croghan of “the pleasure of representing” his “great services in a proper manner to the Secretary of State.”

In the spring, while his chief engineer, Harry Gordon, supervised construction of Fort Pitt’s last defensive works, Brigadier General Stanwix left for Philadelphia, whence he was to voyage to England for a promotion. Croghan accompanied him east, but got only as far as Fort Bedford before being recalled to meet Shawnees who, encamped in large numbers outside Fort Pitt, refused to budge until they had met him. At the Croghan-led Pittsburgh conference from 6 to 12 April 1760 the Shawnees delivered fourteen captives and demanded intercultural trade beyond Fort Pitt. To strengthen Britain’s alliance with the once-hostile Shawnees, Croghan presented goods and promised to send Indian traders to their villages. Without military approval he outfitted a hundred Shawnee warriors to fight the Cherokees, his dual goals being to tie up Britain’s southern Indian enemy and to clear Fort Pitt of the warriors who were depleting its food supply. But Amherst had his own idea about how best to utilize the Shawnee warriors: They were to reinforce a British expedition to seize Montréal. Under its new leader, Brigadier General Robert Monckton, the Southern Department was to support military operations that were in fact outside the South. Monckton, for example, was not only to reinforce Fort Niagara with four hundred Royal Americans, but to secure communications between Forts Niagara and Pitt as well by building a blockhouse at Venango, another at LeBoeuf, and another at Presque

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26 For Croghan’s trade with Indian parties see entries from December to May, Wainwright, ed., “George Croghan’s Journal, 1755-1763,” *PMHB*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 1947): 363-372; for Croghan’s house up the Allegheny see entry, 15 [Nov. 1759], *ibid.*, 360; for Croghan’s spies see entry, 18 [Mar. 1760], *ibid.*, 368; for “the pleasure of representing” see Denny to Croghan, 6 Jun. 1760, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 24, HSP.
Isle. Fort Niagara was of course one hundred and fifty rough, vulnerable miles from Fort Pitt.27

On 29 June, Monckton entered Fort Pitt. He met Croghan and disclosed his orders yet refused to allow Croghan the time to ask the Indians for right-of-way. The Indians later remarked facetiously that Croghan made a road “Throw thire country” and then acquainted them that he was “going to Do itt.” His force, which began to march on steamy 7 July, went awry when Croghan’s drunken Indian guides led it down the wrong path. The force made Presque Isle in ten days and, leaving behind Colonel Henry Bouquet and a contingent of regulars to build a blockhouse, embarked in bateaux for Fort Niagara. Between Fort Pitt and Presque Isle were several Indian villages where Croghan had stopped to present goods and wampum belts and to invite villagers to an intercultural conference at Pittsburgh. Croghan assured Bouquet that the villagers would not attack Presque Isle, but because here and there hostile Détroit Indians picked off men, Croghan raised a war party to take captives and scalps as recompense. Meanwhile, under the command of his cousin, Major Thomas Smallman, Pennsylvania militia built a blockhouse at LeBoeuf, and Virginia militia built another at Venango, where French Creek joins the Allegheny River. Croghan sent sutlers, traders, and agents to both blockhouses and left Presque Isle when Monckton asked him to return to Pittsburgh for the intercultural conference. On 25

27 For design of defensive works and for naming of fort see Stanwix to Pitt, 20 Nov. 1759, Gertrude Selwyn Kimball, ed., Correspondence of William Pitt: When Secretary of State, with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissions in America, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1906), 2:211-212; for partial completion of defensive works and for Stanwix’s exit see Stanwix to Pitt, 17 Mar. 1760, ibid., 2:265-267; for Stanwix’s recall see John Tulleken to Bouquet, 2 Apr. 1760, HBP, 4:506; for conference see “Minutes of Conferences &ca.,” 6-12 Apr. 1760, SWJP, 3:208-212; for Croghan’s outfitting of Shawnee warriors see Croghan to [Gates], 1 May 1760, Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th Ser., 10 vols. (Massachusetts Historical Society, 1871), 9:246-247; for Monckton appointment see Gates to Croghan, 7 May 1760, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 9, HSP; for Stanwix’s disapproval of Croghan’s Cherokee war plans and for Monckton’s orders see Gates to Croghan, 8 Jun. 1760, ibid., Box 202 Folder 9, HSP; for Amherst’s war plans and Amherst’s orders see Pitt to Amherst, 7 Jan. 1760, Kimball, ed., Correspondence of William Pitt, 2:238-242; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 171.
July, Croghan rode into Fort Pitt. In tow was a pack train from Lake Erie. He was going to need its cargo.28

About one thousand Indians—Mingo, Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandot, Miami, Ottawa, and Pottawatomie chiefs, warriors, women, and children—attended the Pittsburgh conference, which occurred from 15 to 18 August 1760. Croghan and interpreter Andrew Montour advised Monckton, who opened the conference with a message from Commander-in-chief Jeffery Amherst. The message was ambivalent. On the one hand, so went the message, the king had sent Amherst not to deprive the Indians of their “Lands and Property,” but rather to maintain them in their “Just Rights” so long as they adhered to “His Interest.” On the other hand the king had sent Amherst to retaliate “Ten-fold for every Breach of Treaty or Outrage” and to punish those Indians who committed “any Act of Hostility” against “His Majesty’s Subjects.” Wanting peace, the chiefs, including Beaver, vowed to further the king’s interest and to act peaceably toward British subjects. “I Can AShure you with Truth,” Croghan wrote Sir William Johnson on 6 September, “that Dureing y[e] Time they were ASemble[d] hear they behave[d], well & kept Very Sober Nott withstanding y[e] Greatt Temtations they had from the great quan-titys of Luquer hear after y[e] busness was over & they had Received thire presents y[e]. Gineral was Ginerouss ANouff to order them a Sufficient quantity of Rum to Make y[e] whole Drunk fer Some Days.” And yet they behaved “with So Much Sivelety to Every person” that they convinced Croghan that “they were Sinceer in all thire promises & well plesed with thire Renewall of friendshipe

28 For Monckton’s arrival at Fort Pitt and for Monckton’s disclosure of orders see Pennsylvania Gazette, 17 Jul. 1760; see also Boston Evening Post, 28 Jul. 1760; for Monckton’s meeting with Croghan see Croghan to Johnson, 30 June 1760, SWJP, 10:174; for “Throw thire country” see Croghan to Johnson, 6 Sept. 1760, ibid., 10:179; for march, meetings, and war party see Bouquet to Monckton, 9 July 1760, Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th ser., 9:264-265; see also Bouquet to Monckton, 18 Jul. 1760, ibid., 9:271-274; for Monckton’s request see Gates to Croghan, 10 Jul. 1760, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 9, HSP; for forts and for Croghan’s arrival at Pittsburgh see Monckton to Bouquet, 28 Jul. 1760, HBP, 4:658-659.
with his Majestys Subjects[.]” Of course Amherst’s threats of retaliatory strikes, in the minds of the chiefs, cemented the deal.29

Yet there were two serious problems. The first problem was that Teedyuscung delayed invitees to the Pittsburgh conference by holding a rival intertribal conference at Salt Lick Town (now Jackson, Ohio) to relate the substance of the Easton peace treaty for the provincial government. Croghan objected to the provincial government’s interference in Indian affairs in his jurisdiction, the northern district. The second problem was that John Langdale, the provincial storekeeper at Pittsburgh, interfered in his jurisdiction as well. Like Israel Pemberton at the 1757 Easton conference, Langdale, a Quaker, incited Teedyuscung to demand a secretary during the preliminaries to the Pittsburgh conference. The ploy backfired, for Monckton refused the demand, and his refusal incited Teedyuscung to drink so heavily and publicly that Beaver and some other chiefs heaped public scorn on him. Langdale thus shifted to this tack: He publicly belittled Monckton’s present, which Croghan had accounted sufficient. On 29 August, Richard Peters thanked Monckton for holding the conference at Pittsburgh and not at an eastern town where Delawares would have echoed “some stories told them underhand by Israel Pemberton” instead of relating their true sentiments. Peters thanked Monckton as well for following the advice of Croghan, who knew “how to time things” because he was “not disturbed by Quakers.”30

29 For conference quotations see PA, 1st ser., 3:745; for conference minutes see ibid., 3:744-753; see also “Heads of an Indian Treaty at Pittsburgh,” 15-18 Aug. 1760, Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, 3:92, HSP; for “I Can AShure you” and “with So Much Sivelety” see Croghan to Johnson, 6 Sept. 1760, SWJP, 10:178-179.
The Pittsburgh conference demonstrated British designs on Indian North America. Commander-in-chief Jeffery Amherst guaranteed Indian land rights so long as Indians furthered Crown interests, yet he threatened retaliation against Indians who violated treaties or committed hostile acts against British subjects. Crown interests were imperial interests that required vigilant defense. Put another way, Amherst applied Renaissance Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli’s dictum—the end justifies the means—to Indian North American. For him the end was final victory over New France. The means to his end included alliances with indigenous populations. To ally Great Britain with Indians who might ally with New France or who had once been allies of New France, he utilized the iron fist in the velvet glove—intimidation (threats of violence) and conciliation (presents of goods). What, after all, was his real purpose for Fort Pitt? He could extract more concessions with presents and pointed guns than he could with presents alone, but the Indians knew that the final victory of either side was not in their best interests because they could no longer play one side off against the other. So it was with grim resignation that the Indians at Fort Pitt and then the Indians at other spots in the Old Northwest accepted the news that Amherst had captured Montréal on 7 September 1760, forcing the capitulation of New France.31

This was how Amherst’s policy of conciliation worked. At an intercultural meeting in Philadelphia on 9 April 1759, for example, Amherst gifted Ohio Mingos with clothes and so comported himself well insofar as the Ohio Mingo diplomatic convention of reciprocity was concerned. His ostensible motive in conforming to it was to maintain amicable relations with potential allies of France, but his ulterior motive was to conquer them. Once Britain had supplanted France in North America there would be little need to observe the

31 For capture of Montréal see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 425.
convention. For Amherst, the maintenance of amicable relations with the Ohio Mingos was militarily expedient. He and his highest-ranking officers saw intercultural trade in exactly the same terms. In late April 1759, for example, Brigadier General John Stanwix ordered Croghan to buy trade goods on the Crown, to transport them to Pittsburgh, and to use them to court Ohio Indian allies. Croghan had already reestablished the intercultural trade in Ohio on a small scale for Crown and country, as he would say, but in truth he had done so for himself only. Now Stanwix’s orders made him the western conduit of British trade goods for use in winning hostile Ohio Indians and maintaining allied Ohio Indians. In other words, Stanwix ordered Croghan to buy peace in Indian Ohio until Great Britain had defeated France and thus could concentrate on dispossessing all the Ohio Indians, including amicable Mingos. For Stanwix, Amherst, and Croghan, gift-giving and intercultural trade were the legitimate means not only to defeat France in North America, but also to establish Britain’s proprietorship of the North American interior.
Chapter 9:  Reluctant Deputy

Four days after he accepted the surrender of New France (Canada) on 7 September 1760, Commander-in-chief Jeffery Amherst ordered Major Robert Rogers southwest to accept the surrenders of Pontchartrain du Détroit and other French forts. Rogers left with two ranger companies next day. He passed through Presque Isle (now a harbor of Lake Erie in Pennsylvania) in advance of his men, entered Fort Pitt on 17 October, relayed the orders to its commander, General Robert Monckton, and rejoined his men at Presque Isle. The orders directed him and Monckton to garrison Pontchartrain du Détroit with George Croghan’s help. Monckton assigned a hundred Royal Americans commanded by French-speaking Captain Donald Campbell to garrison the fort; Croghan dispatched Mingos and Delawares to tell Détroit Indians of the orders. By the time Croghan’s messengers completed their mission, Monckton’s troops had joined Rogers’ rangers at Presque Isle. On 3 November a ranger detachment led by Rogers and Croghan embarked along Lake Erie’s southern shore. From their lead whaleboats Rogers and Croghan formed seventeen trailing whaleboats and bateaux into a column of two abreast and one alone. Ashore, troops drove cattle in a column paralleling the watercrafts, for Croghan had advised Rogers that cattle could be driven on a shoreline path that Croghan himself had often used when he was a private trader. Warriors led by Andrew Montour helped the troops drive the cattle, which could feed Captain Campbell’s troops during the winter.1

Croghan aided Rogers by allaying French-allied Indians’ fears of conflict. During a 5 November encampment west of Allegheny River tributary Crooked Creek, for example, Croghan spoke to French-allied Indians about New France’s defeat and his companions’ mission “to take Possession of Fort D’Troit, Mishalimackinac, and Fort St. Joseph [now Niles, Michigan],” to “take the French Garrisons away Prisoners of War,” and to “Garri-
son them Forts with English Troops.” French inhabitants might retain their property if they took an “Oath of Fidelity” to the king of Britain. Presenting a wampum belt, Cro-
ghan assured the Indians that their nations would “enjoy a Free Trade with their Brethren the English, and be protected in Peaceable Possession of their Hunting Country as long as they wou’d adhere to His Majesty’s Interest.” The Indians “express’d their satisfaction in Exchanging their Fathers the French for their Brethren the English,” who were “better able to supply them with all manner of necessaries.” Stating that they had sided with the French of necessity, not of choice, the Indians begged forgiveness. Presenting a belt or a string of wampum, they confirmed each of their points. The rangers resumed their jour-
ney. They reached the Cuyahoga River on 12 November, put ashore, and met Ottawa warriors who treated them “very kindly they being formerly acquainted” with Croghan.2

On 22 November the rangers put ashore at Sandusky, where Détroit Indians waited for them as per Croghan’s October message. An Indian spoke thus: “Your Intention to Re-
move the French Garrison from amongst us, and Establish in their Room a Garrison of our Brethren the English is very agreeable to us, and your care in sending timely notice of it is a Confirmation of your Sincerity and upright Intentions towards us, and part of our Business in meeting you here was to bid you Wellcome to our Country.” On 27 Novem-

2 For 5 November meeting, “to take Possession of,” “enjoy a Free Trade,” and “express’d their satisfaction” see Wainwright, ed., entry, 5 Nov. 1760, “Croghan’s Journal, 1755-1763,” PMHB, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 1947): 388; for loyalty oath see Monckton to Rogers, 19 Oct. 1760, HBP, 5:80; for Ottawa hunters and for “very kindly” see entry, 12 Nov. 1760, ibid., 389; see also Amherst to Johnson, 22 Feb. 1761, SWJP, 3:343.
ber the rangers took to the boats. When the rangers reached the mouth of the Détroit River, they put ashore, whereupon Wyandot, Ottawa, and Pottawatomie chiefs welcomed them and arriving troops. When the troops moved out, the chiefs accompanied them, so that the rangers took to the boats and paddled up the Détroit River. About six miles upriver the rangers, seeing a French officer hoist a “flag of Truce and Beat a Parley,” put ashore and encamped. Soon a French officer arrived and acquainted Rogers with “his business.” Next day Rogers ordered Captain Campbell to Pontchartrain du Détroit to accept its surrender under a flag of truce. Campbell returned at night and reported that its commander had “behaved very Polite” and “desired we wou’d March in tomorrow and take Possession of the Fort and Country.” At midday Rogers and his men took to the boats. Soon they put ashore, entered the fort, and relieved its garrison, so that Canadian militia laid down their arms and took the oath of fidelity. Over the next few days other Canadian militia did likewise.³

On 3 December “the Principal Indians of the different Nations” visited Croghan at his “Lodgings.” According to his journal the Indians acknowledged British “Possession of this Country” by presenting him a wampum belt. Did the belt really denote possession? An adage is applicable here: Actions speak louder than words. The Indians requested English substitutes for a French gunsmith and a French doctor. To show good faith, the Indians delivered forty-two British captives four days later. Croghan rightly believed that the Indians had acted out of desperation, not friendship. Firearms had not replaced bows and arrows, but they had become integral to Indian hunting and warfare as far west as the

Mississippi River. Who but gunsmiths could repair them? Western medicine had not replaced traditional remedies, but its practitioners had earned an honored place in Indian society as far west as the Mississippi River. Who but doctors could cure the sick when traditional herbal remedies failed? In other words intercultural contact had exposed the Indians of the Old Northwest (present-day Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin) to European diseases, the unintended consequences of European imperialism.  

Croghan aided Rogers on 7 December by attaching an interpreter to a ranger party that relieved Fort Miami on the Maumee River at present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana. Croghan gave the interpreter a wampum belt with instructions about “what manner to Speak to the Indians in those Parts.” The party relieved the fort at Ouiatenon on the Wabash River as well. On 8 December, Croghan attached Andrew Montour and four Indians to a Rogers-led party that was to relieve the fort on Michilimackinac, an island in the Straits of Mackinac in present-day Michigan. The four Indians were “well acquainted with the Country and the Indian Nations that Inhabit it.” When icy Lake Huron prevented headway, Rogers led his party back to Pontchartrain du Détroit, whence he made his way back to Fort Pitt by 23 January 1761. To the western Indians the garrison changeovers signified this: One potential conqueror had substituted for another. Thinking of the moment, Sir William Johnson wrote to Amherst on 9 June 1764 that “the Western Indians would not have suffered us to take possession of Detroit, but from the precaution I took in sending M’r. Croghan to prepare them for it.” The “it” was the de jure proprietorship of Détroit.  

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5 For “what manner” and “well acquainted” see Wainwright, ed., entries, 7, 8 Dec. 1760, “Croghan’s Journal, 1755-1763” PMHB, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 1947): 395; see also Croghan to Monckton, 13 Jan. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 22, HSP; for mis-
“Keeping” western Indians “in An attachment to His Majesty’s Interest” depended upon the transitional fort commanders’ “Steady, Uniform, and friendly Conduct, and behavior towards them,” Sir William Johnson wrote Amherst on 12 February 1761. “Next to that there’s nothing can more Effectually Establish & preserve a good Understanding between us and them than a free and open Trade to be Carried on with them under proper Regulations & Restrictions, by a Law to be passed for that purpose, which Law should be put into Execution by proper officers or Intendants against All Delinquents.” Until then, the transitional fort commanders ought not only to arm, clothe, and provision allied western Indians according to their expectations, customs, and needs, but to provide them with a smith to repair their arms and “utensils.” Such largess resulted not from altruistic or diplomatic motives, however. “Ministers & schoolmasters amongst them would tend greatly to the Civilizing even the worst of them, after which they could be the Easier managed.” The “civilizing” imperative was not just the typical colonial British justification of conquest (or claim of moral proprietorship), it was the very means. By fostering dependence on its manufactures and compelling adaptation to its ways, British colonial society could overwhelm Old Northwest Indian society with this bonus—the money to be made in land speculation. Political insiders like Johnson and Croghan welcomed land speculation.

Biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright writes that Old Northwest Indians possessed abundant furs that “the British had to purchase, not only to maintain the new alliance, but to provide the Indians with the necessities of life.” Why did Indians who had fended for themselves for centuries need foreign patrons? The answer is conquest. Indian trappers and hunters were going farther afield for necessities, for they had been killing off game

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* For quotations see Johnson to Amherst, 12 Feb. 1761, *SWJP*, 3:330-331.
for decades to feed demand for furs and skins in France and to acquire the French manufactures upon which their people had become dependent. British traders simply replaced French. Indeed Fort Pitt commander Colonel Henry Bouquet encouraged Indian traders to work the west. Once they had obtained licenses, Indian traders could convey almost anything but liquor to those spots designated for trade by Croghan or by the commander of Pontchartrain du Détroit, but the licensees had to sell at prices set by Croghan according to the prevailing exchange rate, which was based on a buck (or one fall buckskin). A buck usually equaled two spring buckskins, two doeskins, one male beaver pelt, six raccoon pelts, four fox pelts, two fisher pelts, or two otter pelts. A blanket usually equaled four bucks and a matchcoat three. A pint of gunpowder, a hundred wampum beads, or four small knives usually equaled a buck. British Indian traders like Robert Callender, Michael Teaffe, John Hart, Alexander Lowrey, and Hugh Crawford worked such designated spots as Sandusky and Pontchartrain du Détroit. Merchants like George Ross and Joseph Simon of Lancaster and Abraham Mitchell and David Franks of Philadelphia financed the traders. So did such Philadelphia mercantile firms as Baynton & Wharton.7

Bouquet policed the Indian trade for six months until it bore a semblance of order, yet he predicted that Indian traders, being a debauched, recalcitrant lot, would revert to their licentious ways. Croghan, having returned to Fort Pitt on 9 January 1761, hired the following men to assist western fort commanders: Major Edward Ward, his half-brother; Thomas Hutchins, ex-quartermaster of Fort Pitt; and Alexander McKee, the son of Indian trader Thomas McKee and a free Shawnee or a Shawnee captive. McKee substituted for

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7 For “the British had to purchase” and Indian trade see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 175-176; for scarcity of game see Bouquet to Monckton, 15 Sept. 1760, HBP, 5:38. Bouquet reasoned that “the Scarceness of game is probably the Reason that there are no other Indians settled on this Side the Lake [Erie] from Niagara to Detroit, except a few wandering families who have no fixed habitations.”
William Trent, who had resigned his position in the Northern Department to rejoin the Indian trade. Croghan moreover hired smiths, gunsmiths, doctors, interpreters, and laborers to assist western fort commanders, but after reviewing Croghan’s list of hires Commander-in-chief Jeffery Amherst concluded that Croghan had hired more men than he and the fort commanders needed and hence ordered retrenchment and expense-cutting. In April 1761 Croghan discharged three assistants and three bateaux men and cut expenses, but he sneered this upon hearing that a French officer had passed through Illinois with a hundred Indians to ally to the Cherokees: “If [t]his be true Certianly yᵉ French has aNouffe to Do to Sperrett up the Cherrokes to Continue yᵉ warr by going So far to bring them Suckers,” perhaps the very warriors Bouquet wanted Croghan to recruit to fight *against* the Cherokees. Croghan relied heavily upon old friend Andrew Montour even though Montour had been acting erratically lately. Early in 1760, for example, Montour had lost dispatches to Fort Pitt and been detained in Carlisle for a tavern debt that the army had felt compelled to pay so that he could continue to assist Croghan. In other words Croghan was loyal to a fault—to old friends like Montour and to Great Britain.8

While high-ranking British officers like John Stanwix, Robert Monckton, and Horatio Gates praised Croghan to Sir William Johnson, Bouquet criticized him harshly for fudg-

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8 For traders’ licentiousness see Bouquet to Campbell, 9 Jul. 1761, *HBP*, 5:622; for Croghan’s return to Fort Pitt see Croghan to Monckton, 13 Jan. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 22, HSP; for Croghan’s hires see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 176; for list of hires see “George Croghan’s Return,” 12 Jan. 1761, *SWJP*, 3:300; for background of McKee see Walter R. Hoberg, “Early History of Colonel Alexander McKee,” *PMHB*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (1934): 26; for Amherst’s opinion of list see Amherst to Johnson, 22 Feb. 1761, *SWJP*, 3:346; for Amherst’s expense-cutting orders see Monckton to Croghan, 12 Feb. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 39, HSP; for Amherst’s policy of retrenchment and expense-cutting see Monckton to Croghan, 6 Apr. 1761, ibid., Box 202, Folder 39, HSP; for Croghan’s retrenchment and cost-cutting actions see Croghan to [Monckton], 19 Apr. 1761, ibid., Box 201, Folder 22, HSP; for “If [t]his be true” see Croghan to Monckton, 10 Feb. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 22, HSP; for like sentiments see Croghan to Monckton, 19 Mar. 1761, ibid., Box 201, Folder 22, HSP; for Bouquet’s desire that Croghan recruit warriors see Monckton to Croghan, 12 Feb. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 39, HSP; for Croghan’s reliance on Montour see Johnson to Croghan, 14 May 1760, *SWJP*, 10:148.
ing expense accounts and influencing others to do likewise. On 19 December 1761 Bouquet wrote Monckton, “There is a veil kept over the transactions of our managers which will not disappear till we get rid of them all.” Still, Bouquet appreciated Croghan’s ability to draw western Indians to Fort Pitt and Croghan’s efforts to eliminate abuses in the Indian trade. At Croghan’s behest, Monckton, in fall 1761, prohibited sales of large quantities of spirits to the Indians, but the prohibition proved hard to enforce, for Pittsburgh’s provincial storekeeper, John Langdale, opposed it on grounds that the British army had no right to regulate the activities of a provincial official. What angered Croghan was that the provincial government had shipped its Pittsburgh store “a Large quantity [of spirits] to Sell y. Indians” though the Pennsylvania Assembly over the past fifty years had passed several laws prohibiting the sale of spirits to the Indians. A dispute ensued. Langdale accused Croghan of favoring William Trent’s private store, and Croghan threatened to close the provincial store. Despite the occasional row, Pittsburgh bored Croghan, who longed to go home. The winter was the ideal time for him to journey home since his department had little to do and he wanted to report on his Détroit journey in person. Did Sir William Johnson intend to keep him in Pittsburgh until his hair was gray? “I beg ye faver you will give me Leve to go onst to Fort Johnson that I may have the Plesher of Seeing you onst there at y'. Country Sete in y' Woods,” Croghan wrote Johnson on 10 February 1761.  

The winter and spring were productive for Croghan personally because there was little for him to do professionally. He worked with William Trent to reduce mutual debts. He

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9 For praise of Croghan see Johnson to Croghan, 14 May 1760, SWJP, 10:149; see also Johnson to Amherst, 12 Feb. 1761, ibid., 3:330; for criticism of Croghan see Bouquet to Monckton, 15 Sept. 1760, HBP, 5:38; for Croghan’s ability to draw Indians to Fort Pitt see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 178; for prohibition of sale of spirits see Croghan to Johnson and for “a Large quantity” see 13 Jan. 1761, SWJP, 3:303; for Croghan’s reasons to return to Fort Johnson see Croghan to Johnson, 1 Nov. 1760, ibid., 3:276; for Croghan’s growing gray hair see Croghan to Johnson, 13 Jan. 1761, ibid., 3:304; for “I beg ye faver” see Croghan to Johnson, 10 Feb. 1761, ibid., 3:330.
transferred tracts in Cumberland County to creditor-agents David Franks and Jeremiah Warder. In the name of ex-business partner Richard Hockley, he transferred to Richard Peters heretofore forgotten assets worth £500 and lands valued at £1,000. In hopes of obtaining restitution one day, he and Trent worked up a list of their losses to the French and Canadians before the war. Attending to finances satisfied Croghan, but he felt downright joyful when on 15 May he received orders from Sir William Johnson to journey with him to Détroit to formalize the agreements between Croghan and western Indians. Two days later Croghan left for Fort Johnson. Upon entering it on 15 June he delivered news of an upcoming conference between Pennsylvania and the chiefs whom Johnson was to meet at Détroit. Angling for western Indian confirmation of the 1758 Easton treaty, Pennsylvania had called the conference. The news miffed Johnson, who ordered Croghan to Albany to apprise Amherst of the situation and to Pittsburgh as well to dissuade western chiefs from going to Philadelphia and to tell them that Johnson was going to Détroit “in order to settle all affairs with the Indians in them parts.” Delayed in Albany and in Philadelphia, Croghan accumulated liquors, wines, olives, and anchovies. On 23 July he arrived in Pittsburgh. Next day he sent messengers westward to convince chiefs to wait for Johnson.10

Johnson and his agents meanwhile canoed a large present to Détroit. Their conduits were the Mohawk River, Lake Ontario, the Niagara River, and Lake Erie. Amherst had wondered whether a large present containing powder and lead was impolitic. After all,

he had limited the trade in, and the gifting of, the items since 1760 because Indians could use them to kill Britons. He had wondered too whether the expense was impolitic given that Great Britain had won the North American interior. Why should he continue French policy? Gifting the Old Northwest Indians, who were an insatiable lot, would tax British military resources to the hilt. The Indians should fend for themselves. Amherst had approved the present only because Johnson had persuaded him of its diplomatic necessity, but Amherst had ordered Johnson to tell its recipients that if they committed violent acts against Britons, “they Must not only Expect the Severest Retaliation, but an Entire Destruction of all their Nations,” for he was “firmly Resolved” to “Extirpate them Root & branch” whenever they gave him “Occasion” to do so. In other words Amherst threatened genocide.11

On 25 July a Seneca entered Pittsburgh and told Croghan the Six Nations, particularly the Senecas, considered “themselves to be very ill Treated by the English General.” At the war’s outset the Senecas had “stood Nuter but still gave intelligence to their Brethren the English of the Motions of the French.” Finding “some of their Young Men engaged in the Warr on both Sides Contrary to their Inclination,” they “Join’d the English to encourage all their Young Men to Act in favour of them and went with General Abercromby against Ticonderoga with 500 Men.” Next summer they “Join’d Sir Wm Johnson at Niagara with all their force.” The fort would not have “fallen” if they had “appeared in favour of the French.” Last summer they “waited on General Amherst with all the Warriors they cou’d Collect to go with him to Canada,” but “turn’d back” when he “wou’d

11 For Amherst’s opinion see Amherst to Johnson, 11 Jun. 1761, SWJP, 10:284-285; see also Amherst to Johnson, 11 Jul. 1761, ibid., 3:507; see also Amherst to Johnson, 9 Aug. 1761, ibid., 3:514-516; for “they Must not” see Amherst to Johnson, 18 Aug. 1761, ibid., 3:520; for contemporary reference to genocide see Monckton to Croghan, 6 Apr. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 39, HSP.
not allow them to prosecute the Warr agreeable to their own Custom and seem’d not to want their services.” Custom required them “to take revenge of the French for the many of their Ancestors which the French had Murdered when they first settled in Canada.” After the English “Conquered the french,” the English would not let Senecas “travel thro’ their own Country.” Traders were “not suffered to go amongst them”; powder and lead were “prohibited being sold to them”; and the general was “giving away their Country to be Settled, which the King of England long ago Promised to secure for their use.” Taken together, the steps threatened genocide, being “as if the English had a mind to Cut them of[f] the face of the Earth.” The threat of genocide caused the Senecas to message their “Complaint” to the Western Nations.”

Fretting about Amherst, who was “not at all a friend of Ind‘.,” Johnson revealed this to his German-born protégé Daniel Claus, who upon his recommendation had been appointed Deputy Secretary to Indian Affairs in Canada on 20 September 1760: He was “verry apprehensive that something not right is a brewing, and that verry privately among them. I do not only mean the Six Nations, I fear it is too generall.” He was prescient, too. On 25 July the Iroquois messengers to the western Indians entered Pittsburgh. Next day they requested to meet Bouquet and Croghan to relate “what Pass’d between them and the Indians about D’Troit.” On 27 July they met Bouquet and Croghan and according to Croghan “denied ever asking the Western Nations to strike us, but acknowledged they had told them that the English General had used the Six Nations very ill since the Reduction of Canada and had great reason to believe that the English had some bad design against

all Nations of Indians, upon which they desired them to be on their Guard.” The Six Nations had read Amherst’s intentions accurately.\(^{13}\)

In the evening Croghan invited the messengers to his house. When they entered it, he gifted them. They conversed with him, and two of them “Confessed” to him “the whole design.” First, Détroit Indians would seize British traders, murder the Fort Pitt garrison, and plunder as much as they possibly could. Second, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, and Indians of those nations living between the Ohio River and Lake Erie would attack British posts between Pennsylvania and Fort Pitt. Third, Mingos living on the Ohio River would attack the British forts at Presque Isle, Le Boeuf, and Venango. Fourth, aided by Susquehanna Indians, Iroquois would cut off communication between Fort Niagara and German Flats, starve the uncaptured posts in the region, and thereby become “Masters of their Country again.” Fifth, Iroquois would send a hundred warriors south to encourage Cherokees to continue to war against Britain. The Indian messengers’ expectation was that the northern Indian nations would join the French army after it retook Canada, while the western and the southern Indian nations would harass British colonial frontiers. The entire strategy was the “Senicas Plan, which they had Conserted since the Reduction of Canada, and the English refusing them Am-munition.” In fact Indians other than the Delawares had begun to steal horses and insult British Indian traders and British regulars.\(^{14}\)

On 28 July, Croghan left for Détroit. On 2 August he rode into Beaver’s Town on the Muskingum River and told Beaver that two “White Men” had murdered one of his people, been imprisoned, and were awaiting trial. Croghan consoled with Beaver and


invited him and other Delaware chiefs to accompany him to Détroit for Sir William Johnson’s conference. On 4 August the chiefs left with him. At Sandusky four days later the party found five old chiefs and a few warriors who had not “gone against the Cherokees.” Croghan invited chiefs to join his party and sent two Indians to Détroit for two boats. As he awaited the boats, he chose a site for Amherst to build a fort between Pittsburgh and Détroit. On 10 August, Captain Donald Campbell sent a bateau, a canoe, provisions, and a message wherein he promised to regale Croghan with “tolerable Claret and Madeira.” Croghan exchanged his horse for one watercraft and left a partial party to convey Shawnees to Détroit in the other. On 16 August he and his party arrived at Détroit. Next day Wyandots, Ottawas, and Pottawatomies received him “in a very respectful manner” and welcomed him “to their Country.” He told them of the impending conference and dispatched messengers to invite chiefs of a village near Michilimackinac.15

After his “tedious” six-week journey to Détroit, Sir William Johnson convened the conference with two cannon blasts on 9 September 1761. When the blasts brought a throng of Indians, Johnson held the conference outside. The chiefs of thirteen nations released captives, honored him, and confirmed the April 1760 Pittsburgh accord negotiated—or promulgated—by Croghan in behalf of Commander-in-chief Jeffery Amherst. Johnson believed the Indians would “never break the Peace.” In return for their goodwill he vowed to curb abuses in the Indian trade and began to do just that on 16 September when he “drew up & Delivered to Captain Campbell Regulations for the Indian Trade at the Détroit, Michilimackinack, Miamis, & Sandousky as also for Fort Pitt, & the River Susque-

15 For details, “White Men,” and “gone against” see Wainwright, ed., entries, 28 [Jul. 1761], and 2, 4, 10, 16 [Aug. 1761], “Croghan’s Journal, 1755-1763” PMHB, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 1947): 412-413; for Croghan’s choosing of fort site see entry, 5 Aug. 1761, “Diary of James Kenny,” HSP; see also Bouquet to Monckton, 14 Jul. 1761, HBP, 5:654; for bateau, canoe, and “tolerable Claret and Madeira” see Campbell to Croghan, 10 Aug. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 11, HSP.
hanna to M’ Croghan Deputy Agent for Indian affairs in that quarter[.]” Johnson assigned fort commanders like Captain Donald Campbell enforcement duties. Fort commanders were to keep an interpreter on hand at all times, to correspond with one another to coordinate policy, to supervise the Indian trade, and to ensure that no colonist traded in the Old Northwest without a license from Johnson or Croghan. Fort commanders were to order the gunsmiths residing in their forts to repair the guns of Indians who made “application to have their Arms & ca. mended.” To receive annual reimbursements, the gunsmiths were to present Johnson annual accounts of their repairs for Indians. At the conference’s end Croghan distributed Johnson’s present among the chiefs and their entourages.16

To offset the Iroquois Confederacy, Johnson created a confederacy of Ohio Delaware, Shawnee, and Wyandot refugees as well as whole western nations. He accomplished the feat by holding “private conferences to create a misunderstanding between the 6 Nations, & [the] Western Indians, as also between the latter & those of Ohio so as to render them Jealous of each other.” His purpose in fomenting jealousy between the Iroquois Confederacy and the Old Northwest Confederacy and between the western and Ohio members of the Old Northwest Confederacy was to conquer North America’s interior Indian populations by employing a Western military strategy more ancient than one of its most famous and successful practitioners, Julius Caesar—the strategy of divide and conquer. Croghan encapsulated the strategy in this sentence of a 3 October 1761 letter to General Robert Monckton: “All those Nations apear very well plas’d att being Made a Confederacy in themselves Seprett from the Six Nations, and as itt is Devideing thire Intrests I hope itt will oblige boath to behave better for y° futer to his Majestys Subjects[.]” Did the infin-

16 For arrival and for “tedious” and “never break” see Johnson to Amherst, 5 Nov. 1761, SWJP, 10:330; for conference proceedings see ibid., 3:474-495; for “drew up” see ibid., 3:495; for duties of fort commanders see “To Officers of Western Posts,” 16 Sept. 1761, ibid., 3:527-528.
itive phrase mean that Old Northwest and Iroquois warriors might attack fewer colonial settlements or that he and Johnson might more easily manipulate divided indigenous populations until British settlers could one day overwhelm them? The answer is both.  

Johnson thanked Croghan for the Indian curios by gifting him with goods. Then the two men journeyed east together, inspected blockhouse construction at Sandusky, and parted. Johnson canoed toward Fort Niagara while Croghan rode toward Fort Pit. En route Croghan accepted captives. On 3 October he led them into Fort Pitt, yet for months he felt unease about the Indians who had yielded the captives. Amherst had admonished him to be frugal. Would the Indians turn when they realized that British frugality had replaced French largess? On 3 April 1762 Croghan ordered assistant Thomas Hutchins west on a six-month mission to determine the Indians’ mood and groused about Amherst’s frugality policy because it forced him to use £100 of his own money to buy presents for Indian visitors at Fort Pitt. He intended to use summer pay for the same purpose, yet he hoped that in light of the financial burden, Johnson would permit him to resign in the fall. “I have sent Gineral Amhurst my Account of Expences this Last half year amounting to £317 Excluseff of y^e pay of the people Imploy^d. hear & att Detroit which No Doubt he will think too Much tho Certify^d. by Coll. Boquet agreeable to his orders,” he wrote Johnson on 10 May. Nearly a year later Amherst’s frugality policy imposed real hardship on him. “Indians that pass by this post to & from Warr are very unesey att our Not Suplying them with Amunision & Nesereys,” he wrote Johnson. “Notwithstanding I aShure you itt has Cost me above a years Salery within this twelf Months in trifels, More then y^c. officer

17 For “private conferences” see Johnson to Gage, 12 Jan. 1764, *ibid.*, 4:296; for “All those Nations” see Croghan to Monckton, 3 Oct. 1761, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 22, HSP.
Commanding heer wold aLow them In order to keep them In Temper (So that I Can Say Now I Searve the king for Nothing & find myself [penniless.]’’ Naturally Johnson refused to allow him to resign.18

From 3 to 21 August 1761 there had been a fifth Easton conference between Governor James Hamilton of Pennsylvania and Onondaga, Oneida, Seneca, Cayuga, Susquehanna Delaware, Nanticoke, Conoy, and Mahican diplomats. Israel Pemberton of the Friendly Association had presented the Indians goods and endeavored to persuade Hamilton and his aides to deed the Wyoming Valley to the Susquehanna Delawares, whose entreaties over the past few years had received little sympathy from the Onondaga Council. Pemberton had failed. The conference had done nothing to promote intercultural harmony in Pennsylvania, but it had proved to Johnson that the Walking Purchase was an open issue. And Johnson knew that Croghan could help him to settle the issue permanently.19

Johnson ordered Croghan east to participate in the sixth Easton conference beginning 15 June 1762. Croghan relinquished his duties to Edward Ward and left for Easton. En route he made a stopover at Bedford to visit his mother. Although his mother was ailing, he left his daughter Susannah in her care. Upon his arrival at Easton he assisted Johnson, who had called the conference to conduct an impartial inquiry into the Walking Purchase for the Privy Council, which had directed him to do so because it had heard Pennsylvania Assembly agent Benjamin Franklin’s case against the proprietors in 1759. Andrew Montour also assisted Johnson. Present was Crown appointee Witham Marsh, who recorded the minutes for government officials in London. Present were Governor James Hamilton

18 For Johnson’s gift to Croghan see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 182; for Croghan’s arrival at Fort Pitt see Wainwright, ed., entry, 3 Oct. [1761], “Croghan’s Journal, 1755-1763” PMHB, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 1947): 415; for Amherst’s admonishment see Johnson to Amherst, 7 Jan. 1762. SWJP, 3:601; for Hutchins, presents, and “I have sent” see Croghan to Johnson, 10 May 1762, ibid., 3:733; for “Indians that pass by” see Croghan to Johnson, 12 Mar. 1763, ibid., 4:62.
19 For Israel Pemberton see MCP, 8:660; see also Proud, History of Pennsylvania, 2:320-325.
and political allies Richard Peters and Benjamin Chew, who intended to defend proprietary interests against the machinations of Israel Pemberton and his associates. Present were Joseph Fox and John Hughes of the Pennsylvania Assembly, which controlled the provincial purse. Because of controversy the sixth Easton conference did not begin until 18 June. To reduce provincial expenses, provincial commissioners proposed a joint conference in the summer. Beaver and other Old Northwest chiefs had promised to go to Lancaster in the summer to deliver captives to the commissioners. Now the selfsame commissioners proposed that Johnson hold his conference at Lancaster. Johnson flatly refused to postpone his conference, which occurred at Easton from 18 to 24 June 1762.20

The sixth Easton conference accented the failure of Israel Pemberton and his associates to discredit the proprietors and their political party by reviving the issue of the Walking Purchase. Although Israel Pemberton faulted Johnson’s direction of the conference and supported charges of proprietary misdeed, Teedyuscung capitulated to Johnson by finalizing a document that dropped his charges against the proprietors and yielded his claims on Pennsylvania lands, in return for which he received a nominal monetary indemnity drawn jointly from provincial and Friendly Association finances. The sixth Easton conference not only settled the Walking Purchase issue and culminated Johnson’s inquiry into it for the Privy Council, but became the talk of Philadelphia, for it resulted in a split within the Friendly Association between those who approved of Pemberton’s actions and those who disapproved of them. Naturally Pemberton and his associates avoided the Coffee House, which was the fashionable spot to discuss politics and current affairs. Croghan himself went to Philadelphia and found that Pemberton and his associates were, so

20 For Franklin petition and Privy Council instructions see Johnson to Lords of Trade, 1 Aug. 1762, SWJP, 3:837; for inquiry and for upcoming Lancaster conference see Pennsylvania Commissioners to Johnson, 26 May 1762, ibid., 3:745-746; see also Johnson to Pennsylvania Commissioners, 2 Jun. 1762, ibid., 10:465-466.
to speak, licking their wounds. “Every Gentleman hear observes that those Trublesome peple Never gott such a Check before,” Croghan wrote Johnson on 10 July. “They now seem prity quiett & tis easy to see by there Conduct that there pride is Humbled.”

But Pemberton and his associates were not so humbled as to forgo a stand at a Lancaster conference called by provincial commissioners to accept captives from Ohio Indians, to resolve outstanding land disputes between Ohio Indians and the Penns, and to reconcile the Susquehanna Delawares to colonial inroads into the Wyoming Valley. Croghan hastened west to assist Governor James Hamilton though three provincial commissioners—John Hughes, Joseph Galloway, and Joseph Fox—had told Provincial Secretary Richard Peters that they would not cover provincial expenses if either Sir William Johnson or his deputy superintendent directed the conference. En route to Lancaster, Croghan met Ohio Delaware chief Beaver and escorted him and his entourage of chiefs to Harris’ Ferry to await Susquehanna Delaware chief Teedyuscung and his entourage of chiefs. Croghan set the conference’s beginning date, notified Governor Hamilton of it, resolved a few of the land disputes between Ohio Indians and the Penns, and messaged Peters to expedite paperwork before the Penns’ enemies learned of the deals. Peters wrote Johnson, “The Proprs settled all their differences thro the means of Mr. Croghan as well with the Shawonese as with the Conoys and Nantycokes, and I know of nothing now that is not satisfactorily bought and paid for.” That is to say, Croghan furthered his mentor’s policy

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of collaborating with the provincial government at the expense of the refugee Indians living in the Ohio Valley and on the Susquehanna River.\textsuperscript{22}

In mid-August 1762 Governor Hamilton opened the Lancaster conference, which lasted into September. Croghan advised him and Andrew Montour interpreted for him. Present were provincial commissioners and officials and 550 Old Norwest Indians including the Ohio Delaware and Shawnee chiefs. Present too were Israel Pemberton and his associates, who failed to persuade Ohio Delaware chief Beaver and his entourage to raise anew the Walking Purchase issue yet showered them with presents in exchange for captives. In return for the presents the Ohio Shawnee chiefs as well as the Ohio Delaware chiefs vowed to deliver captives at Fort Pitt in a few months. Besides achieving the provincial goals relating to the Ohio Delawares, Ohio Shawnees, and other Ohio tribes, Governor Hamilton achieved the provincial goal relating to the Susquehanna Delawares when he reconciled Teedyuscung and his entourage to the presence of settlers in the Wyoming Valley. Hamilton, moreover, persuaded Teedyuscung and his entourage to authorize a document relinquishing their claims to landownership in Pennsylvania and legitimizing all proprietary claims to landownership. One result of the conference was that the Friendly Association flagged until it quietly disbanded in 1764. Another was that Teedyuscung burned to death while he slept in his cabin at Wyoming on 11 April 1763. Connecticut encroachers so inebriated that he staggered into his cabin and collapsed, whereupon they torched his cabin. They torched the other cabins at Wyoming, too.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22} For dispatch see Croghan to Peters, 31 Jul. 1762, Laux Coll., HSP; for “The Proprs” see Peters to Johnson, 23 Oct. 1762, Misc. Mss. Coll., 200, APS.

\textsuperscript{23} For conference minutes see \textit{MPCP}, 8:729-774; see also “Minutes of Treaty of Lancaster,” Aug. 1762, \textit{SWJP}, 10:498-499; for Friendly Association’s activities see Croghan to Johnson, 4 Sept. 1762, \textit{ibid.}, 3:874; see also Pemberton Papers, 16:25, HSP; for secondary account of conference see Wallace, Anthony F. C., \textit{King of the Delawares}, 252-256; for demise of Friendly Association’s see Gratz Coll., Case 17, Box 7,
After the Lancaster conference Croghan went to Philadelphia, where he might have recalled walking its streets in 1741. The Quakers whom he had passed in the streets in that year might have come to mind, the plain-garbed men and women who had acknowledged no gesture of deference and made none themselves. He might have pondered why they had been—and were—so different from him. They chased after riches as greedily as he did—a goodly number of them lived on the most fashionable streets, for instance—yet they sugared-coated ambition and success in unfathomable ways. They wore plain garb because clothes denoted class distinctions. They acknowledged no signs of deference because such signs denoted class distinctions. God cared nothing for class distinctions, they would say. Yet they made gobs of money. If Heaven required no entrance fee, why did they make so much money? They believed that God dwelled in Indians just as He did in other human beings, so they treated Indians pacifically, but their pacifism in the face of war had forced them to withdraw from the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1756, whereupon Israel Pemberton and like-minded Quakers had formed the Friendly Association, not to fulfill William Penn’s peaceable, Indian-friendly “Holy Experiment,” but rather to afford cover for Quaker dominance of Indian diplomacy and intercultural trade in Pennsylvania and for Quaker pursuit of an anti-proprietorial agenda, too. During the Lancaster conference Governor Hamilton had heeded Croghan’s advice and rendered the Friendly Association irrelevant by settling the Walking Purchase issue permanently. Was not Croghan, then, as much a conqueror as Hamilton or his land-grabbing bosses, the Penns? Croghan, moreover, was an accomplice to the dispossession of the Wyoming Delawares.²⁴

²⁴ For Quakerism see Daigutolo, “The Early Quaker Perception of the Indian,” *Quaker History*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Fall 1983): 103-119; see also Merritt, *At the Crossroads*, 204.
Proprietary partisans praised Croghan. Richard Peters wrote Sir William Johnson that Pemberton and his fellows had played “the same Game at Lancaster as at Easton.” One point they “wanted to carry” was “to set up the Claims of private Indians in Sales made by the Six Nations of Lands to the People.” The other point was “to persuade Beaver & the Delawares on the Ohio to claim the Lands in dispute wth. Teedyuscung.” With “infinite trouble” and “considerable Expence” they endeavored to realize both points, but Iroquois chiefs “would not meddle with private Claims and Beaver honestly in open Council declared that None of the Indians with him had any Claims to Lands on the Delaware or in the Forks—that they had sold all their Lands to the Proprs. & were honestly paid for it.” Governor Hamilton “consulted Mf Croghan on every occasion and had he not been at Lancaster, they woud have imposed more egregiously on the Indians & made them speak things which were untrue & extremely injurious to the Rights of the Six Nations.” Hamilton wrote Johnson as well. Throughout the conference Croghan acted “a part” of which Johnson “would have approved.” Being “able to counterwork the Quakers,” he prevented the introduction of “wild Schemes and projects” that would have caused “trouble.” Thus the conference ended “happily enough for the Government, but to the grievous mortification of the Friends.” Of course the outcome pleased Proprietor Thomas Penn, who granted Croghan land in Pennsylvania. Yet the bleak reality was that Delaware and Shawnee chiefs discarded presents on the trail back to Ohio and would release no more captives.25

In the first week of September, Croghan began to journey to Fort Pitt despite feeling ill. Soon he realized that his ill-health would make the journey more arduous than usual and

25 For “the same Game,” etc., see Peters to Johnson, 30 Sept. 1762, *SWJP*, 10:537; for “a part” see Hamilton to Johnson, 17 Oct. 1762, *ibid.*, 10:554; for Thomas Penn’s land grant to Croghan see Penn to Peters, 10 Dec. 1762, Penn Letter Book, 7:233, HSP; for Ohio Indians’ returning to Ohio and discarding presents on the way see entries, 11 Sept. 1762, 30 Nov. 1762, “Diary of James Kenney,” HSP; see also Thomas McKee to Johnson, 1 Nov. 1762, *SWJP*, 3:921; see also McKee to Johnson, 2 Nov. 1762, *ibid.*, 3:924-925; see also Johnson to Croghan, 24 Oct. 1762, *ibid.*, 560-561.
even painfully arduous. A man who traveled with him from Bedford told James Kenney that Croghan had “the pox so bad that he cant live long having a hole at the bottom of his belley that runs constantly.” Probably Croghan had contracted syphilis. The “hole,” or chancre, so pained Croghan that he took to wearing a kilt upon entering Fort Pitt, so Sir William Johnson later advised him “to treat” his condition “as a Venereal Disease as the only means to obtain a Cure & Enable” him to “lay aside” the kilt. Following the advice, Croghan felt better by year’s end and made a gift of the kilt to a Scots aristocrat. Did he mention his venereal disease when he gave the Scots aristocrat the kilt? Did he mention Johnson’s advice, which had produced excellent results? Did the Scots aristocrat knowingly accept a syphilitic kilt? What passed verbally between the two men is unknown.26

While he was stationed at Fort Pitt in 1762, Croghan involved himself in two business partnerships. One business partnership was Buchanan, Hughes, & Smallman. Friends William Buchanan and Barnabas Hughes had moved to Baltimore and opened an import business because the Pennsylvania government had reopened the Indian trade west of the Susquehanna River. To interest Indian traders in their goods, Buchanan and Hughes had advertised their business in the Pennsylvania Journal. Croghan had seen in the business an opportunity for his cousin, Thomas Smallman. Croghan had persuaded Buchanan and Hughes to partner with Smallman though Smallman owned no capital. On 12 February 1762 the parties had signed an indenture designating Buchanan and Hughes the suppliers and Smallman the seller. In behalf of Smallman, Croghan had signed an addendum that was actually a £10,000 bond with Buchanan and Hughes for the capital to open a trading

26 For “the pox so bad” see entry, 10 Sept. 1762, “Diary of James Kenney,” HSP; for “to treat” see Johnson to Croghan, 30 Dec. 1762, SWJP, 3:987; for Croghan’s recovery and presentation of kilt to Scots aristocrat see Croghan to Johnson, 12 Mar. 1763, ibid., 4:63.
store at Fort Pitt. Thus Buchanan and Hughes had considered Croghan their silent fourth partner though Croghan had demanded no profit and limited his involvement to advising his cousin or acting for his cousin when his cousin was absent from the store. Still, early on in its existence, Croghan did involve himself in its day-to-day operation, so its clerk, James Harris, had written Buchanan and Hughes, “Any thing we do here is promoted by the influence of Mr. Croghan without which it would not be worth while to keep a store open at this place.” Since his influence had made neither the store nor the business partnership profitable, Croghan had partnered with known rogue Theodorus Swaine Drage to open a competing store. At the competing store Croghan had bought items on credit for his daughter Susannah and his mother, Mrs. Ward.27

Croghan also availed himself of another opportunity when the provincial land office in May 1762 began to grant warrants for tracts west of the Susquehanna River. Besides locating choice tracts for Colonel Henry Bouquet to acquire, Croghan himself acquired so many tracts that Proprietor Thomas Penn complained that there would be few left for him or his brother to acquire. On one tract Croghan built “Bellfield,” a plantation of several buildings. On both sides of “Broad Street” (Forbes Road) at Fort Bedford, he subdivided

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27 For Buchanan and Hughes’ advertisement see Pennsylvania Journal, 30 Oct. 1760; for indenture see “Indenture between Buchanan & Hughes and Thomas Smallman,” 12 Feb. 1762, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 6, HSP; for early transactions see “Will Buchanan Account & Receipt in Full,” 13 Feb. 1762, ibid., Box 201, Folder 6, HSP; see also “Mr. George Croghan . . . of Buchanan & Hughes,” ibid., Box 201, Folder 6, HSP; see also “Stock Account of Buchanan & Hughes & Thomas Smallman,” ibid., Box 201, Folder 7, HSP; for early bond payment see “George Croghan & Tho Smallmans Bond Payd 4 Novembr 1762,” ibid., Box 201, Folder 6, HSP; for early internal conflicts of Buchanan, Hughes, & Smallman see Croghan to William Fisher, Samuel Shoemaker, Thomas Wharton, Edward Pennington, and Benjamin Fuller, 22 Dec. 1768, ibid., Box 201, Folder 27, HSP; for “Any thing we do here” and Croghan’s partnership with Drage see Accounts: 1762, Cadwalader family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folders 16, 17, HSP; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 191; for purchases see Theodore Swain Drage, entries, 10 Oct. 1762, 29 May 1762, 3 Dec. 1762, and 26 Feb. [1763?], Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 2, HSP; for “Miss Susan” and “Mrs. Ward, Sen.” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 191. Biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright cites evidence at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania for Croghan’s entries to Susannah (“Miss Susan”) and Mrs. Ward (“Mrs. Ward, Sen.”), but either he has cited evidence that is lost or that never existed or he has incorrectly cited the archive wherein the evidence is actually stored.
tracts for sale to settlers and imparted this idea to ex-partner William Trent, who imparted it to Proprietor Thomas Penn: Penn ought to lay out a town at Fort Bedford. In Carlisle, Croghan bought and sold lots and rented a building. Bouquet, having stayed at the rental, wrote Croghan, “I think it very convenient to find that you have a house wherever I go.” Actually Croghan owned more houses, rentals, and tracts than he could maintain himself, so he persuaded his half-brother and assistant, Edward Ward, to resign from the Northern Department to assist him in maintaining them. Friends and locals began to call his house at Fort Pitt “Croghan’s House,” which he renamed “Croghan’s Hall” after refurbishing it. Around the house he searched for silver and copper ore and his searches so impressed locals and friends that they addressed him as “Colonel” though he had not risen above the rank of militia captain in the 1750s. Perhaps it was their way of according him respect for opening a new field of capitalist enterprise at Pittsburgh—mining. In any event, he was a country squire, and his honorific attested to the fact. 28

Fort Pitt afforded nothing of a country squire’s secure comfort, however. In the spring heavy rains caused the Monongahela, Youghiogheny, and Ohio Rivers to overflow their muddy banks and flood Fort Pitt. In the winter heavy snows confined soldiers and locals to vermin-ridden spaces. To assuage their misery, soldiers and locals turned to drink or to complaisant Indian women or girls, for to look elsewhere for physical intimacy meant to risk conflict. For example, the doctor whom Croghan employed to tend to the local In-

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28 For warrants see Pennsylvania Gazette, 29 Apr. 1762; see also George Armstrong’s receipt, 5 Jul. 1762, Etting Coll., American & British Army, Vol. 1, Box 31, Folder 6, HSP; for choice tracts for Bouquet see Croghan to Bouquet, 20 Mar. 1763, HBP, 6:169-170; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 191; for Penn’s complaint see Penn to Peters, 10 Dec. 1762, Penn Letter Book, 7:232, HSP; for carpentry work at Bedford see Croghan to George Little, 25 Nov. 1762, Accounts: 1762, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folder 18, HSP; for “I think” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 192; for Carlisle lots and Ward’s resignation from Northern Department see Croghan to Johnson, 4 Sept. 1762, SWJP, 3:875; for “Croghan’s House,” “Croghan’s Hall,” mining enterprise, and “Colonel” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 192.
dians seduced the daughter of the fort blacksmith and dueled with a soldier over rights to her. One of the two duelers later impregnated her. To escape the pervasive gloom of the fort and its environs, sociable officers led by Colonel Henry Bouquet’s successor as fort commander, Captain Simeon Ecuyer, held Saturday night dances wherein a dozen or so couples swirled on the dance floor to lively songs played by garrison musicians as single men and women sipped whiskey or punch and mingled until they worked up the courage to partner and dance. “Croghan generally pushes aboute the glass so copiously and briskly amongst the old women that before half the night’s over they forget their errand as well as their charge, and what then follows is easily guest at,” dance frequenter William Potts wrote Bouquet. Ecuyer and his officers preferred to ply the prettiest young women with drink. “You may be sure that we shall not be completely cheated,” Ecuyer wrote Bouquet. The weekly dance enabled the officers and local women to relieve stress and tolerate the harsh weather and poor living conditions. Even the odd drunken quarrel or fistfight relieved stress. “We really live in great harmony,” Croghan wrote Bouquet.29

Besides attending the weekly Saturday evening dance officers and intimates attended an informal meeting or “club” every Monday evening. A meeting occasioned boisterous camaraderie with swapping of anecdotes, limericks, and toasts. Commander-in-chief Jeffrey Amherst was a favorite subject of toasts, but the following epitomized the favorite subject:

May the Friend we trust be honest
the Girl we love be true & the Country
we live in be free

29 For daily life at Fort Pitt see entries, 26 Jul. 1762, 15 Aug. 1762, and 6 Apr. 1763, “Diary of James Kenney,” HSP; for same and for “Croghan generally pushes” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 192-193; for “You may be” Ecuyer to Bouquet, 8 Jan. 1763, HBP, 6:142; for “We really live” see George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 193.
Holidays often inspired excess. On St. Patrick’s Day, for example, officers and intimates would beg Croghan to toast, and the bawdy Irishman would deliver on their expectations, offering silly to salacious toasts that always drew peals of laughter: “May we kiss whom we please & please whom we kiss”; “days of Ease & Nights of Pleasure”; and “the whole that makes two holes merry.” Between swills of wine, rum, hard cider, corn whiskey, or Madeira, he would recite salty limericks or narrate juicy anecdotes or pass the jug round the table until his comrades were as inebriated as he was. Although their heads would often pound like cannon fire during the next day, his comrades would count the pain a very small price indeed to pay for such stress-relieving merrymaking and would gather again the next Monday evening to trade anecdotes, limericks, and toasts with him and to drink deep into the raucous night.30

Drunken boisterousness could not assuage this disturbing reality, however: The army’s relations with the Old Northwest Indians were deteriorating, as were the army’s relations with the Indian Department. In the summer Commander-in-chief Amherst ordered cuts in the Indian Department, cuts that required a £500 reduction in salaries. Croghan reluctantly discharged one assistant but retained the other, his old friend and departmental colleague Alexander McKee, whose mother was Shawnee. But what was even more objectionable to Croghan than retrenchment was that Amherst shrugged off not only his pleas for gifts of powder and lead to the Indians, but also those of Sir William Johnson and the outpost commanders. Although Croghan, Johnson, and the outpost commanders argued that gift-giving ought to be the cornerstone of British Indian policy, Amherst ordered cuts in expenditures for gifts. The cuts caused the Old Northwest Indians to drift toward the

30 For toasts see “Toasts & Tavern Bills,” 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 14, HSP; for meetings and hangovers see entry, 20 Mar. 1763, “Diary of James Kenney,” HSP; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 194.
French. On 5 October 1762 Croghan wrote Amherst of French provocation. From his former assistant Thomas Hutchins, Croghan had learned about a wampum belt’s passage through the Old Northwest. The wampum belt denoted war. Amherst wrote back on 31 October, “I look upon the alarming intelligence you received of the French stirring up the western Indians of little consequence, as it is not in their power to hurt us.” Like Major General Edward Braddock, Amherst underappreciated both Indians and Indian culture. By 10 December, Croghan foresaw war. The Old Northwest Indians resented the presence of British forts on their lands and interpreted Amherst’s frugality policy as prelude to attack. “How itt May End yᵉ Lord knows,” Croghan wrote Colonel Henry Bouquet, “Butt I aShure you I am of opinion itt will Nott be Long before we Shall have Some broyles with them.” Croghan had used masterful arguments to persuade the Old Northwest Indians that their jealousies and suspicions of the British were “Rong & ill grounded,” but his arguments had “Not Made that Impression on there Minds.”

Given the Old Northwest Indians’ smoldering resentment against Amherst’s egregiously wrongheaded frugality policy, how could Croghan remain in the Indian Department? “I don’t chuse to be beging aternaly for such necessarys as is wanted to carry on the ser-vice, nor will I supert itt at my own expence,” he wrote Bouquet on 4 February 1763.

When orders from Amherst reached him two days later, he dispatched messengers to Indian villages to announce that Great Britain and France had achieved a preliminary peace agreement in November 1762. According to the terms France had ceded its North Amer-

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ican territories to Great Britain. How could France transfer Indian lands to Great Britain? the Indian villagers wondered. The villages’ chiefs had neither given France the right to transfer Indian lands to Great Britain nor given Great Britain the right to accept the lands. Why did France or Great Britain presume proprietary rights in North America? Predicting a worsening of British-Indian relations, Croghan decided to resign from the Indian Department and sail to London to recover his prewar trade losses. On 19 March he wrote Bouquet of his decision and iterated it thus eleven days later: “I Wrote you Lately with Respect to My going out of y’ Service & flater My Self that My Resignation will be Readily Excepted as I Can Can [sic] See Very Letle ocation Now for an Agent of Indian affairs in those parts.” Nevertheless he did his job, writing Amherst that Old Northwest Indians construed France’s territorial cessions to Britain as grounds for war. “Whatever idle notions they [the Old Northwest Indians] may entertain, in regard to the cessions made by the French Crown, can be of very little consequence,” Amherst wrote back on 10 May.32

Needing a break from the king’s service, Croghan entrusted western Indian affairs to his assistant Thomas McKee and rode to Philadelphia to go on extravagant shopping sprees. During one of the sprees he bought a diamond ring he could not have afforded just a few years before. Now he had cash because merchant-speculators David Franks and William

32 For ill-effects of Amherst’s frugality policy see Croghan to Bouquet, 8 Jan. 1763, HBP, 6:139-140; for “I don’t chuse” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 195; for Amherst’s orders to Croghan see Wainwright, ed., entry, [Oct. 1760], “Croghan’s Journal, 1755-1763” PMHB, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct. 1947): 436; see also entry, 14 Feb. 1763, “Diary of James Kenney,” HSP; for reaction of Old Northwest Indian villagers see Calloway, Shawnees and the War for America, 33; for Croghan’s proposed trip to London see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 195; for Croghan’s 19 March 1762 letter to Bouquet see fn, HBP, 6:171; for “I Wrote you” see Croghan to Bouquet, 30 Mar. 1763, ibid., 6:170; for “Whatever idle notions” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 196; for like sentiments see Amherst to Johnson, 3 Apr. 1763, SWJP, 10:648-649; see also Amherst to Johnson, 29 May 1763, ibid., 10:689.
Plumstead had paid him £500 as partial payment for lands he and a business partner, Colonel William Clapham, had developed, and because Governor Hamilton had paid him £1,000 for several Bedford County tracts after Proprietor Thomas Penns’ agents divulged their intentions to found a town at “Bedford Settlement.” The deals were as nothing compared to his deal with merchant Daniel Clark and lawyer William Peters. Clark was Croghan’s cousin and Liverpool-born Peters was Secretary of the Land Office—the job once held by his younger brother Richard. William Peters expedited the deal, which transferred to him and Clark 30,000 Cumberland County acres on 2 June. Clark and Peters were to make a down payment of £1,000, pay Croghan £17 10s. per hundred acres, pay £2,000 in twelve months, and pay the balance within one year of making land surveys.33

The sale of the Cumberland County acres would haunt Croghan for the rest of his life, however. Proprietor Thomas Penn had sanctioned Croghan’s ownership of the acres so that Croghan could sell them and use the sale proceeds to reimburse Richard Hockley for losses resulting from his partnership with Croghan and Trent. Ironically Croghan had finagled more than two thousand of the acres from Hockley by promising him £2,000 from the sale proceeds. Rather than being true to his word Croghan used the additional acres— reputedly excellent—to attract buyers Daniel Clark and William Peters. Later, Clark and Peters accounted their purchase worthless because the acres lay on mountain slopes or at nadirs of ravines. Worse, Croghan pocketed the £1,000 down payment and claimed he had mistakenly sold Hockley’s acres, even though he had resold the selfsame acres to other buyers. Naturally Hockley resorted to legal measures to force Croghan to pay him the £2,000.34

33 For deals see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 196-197.
34 For land deals see ibid., 197.
On the very day that Daniel Clark and William Peters bought the Cumberland County acres, Croghan left for Pittsburgh on the well-grooved wagon road that he had first taken after his arrival in Philadelphia in 1742. He had heard that western Indians had burned Croghan Hall, besieged Fort Pitt, and murdered Colonel Clapham on a tract Croghan had sold him. The Great Wagon Road brought Croghan to Lancaster, where he paused to apprise Edward Shippen of an Indian uprising that Amherst could have prevented if he had heeded his advice or his mentor’s. He rode to Carlisle via Harris’ Ferry, where he received intelligence. On 8 June he wrote Colonel Henry Bouquet that “ye Delaways have all Declaired Against us, as you have known My opinion on this head Some Time Ago I Need Say Nothing Now on ye Subject as itt will Nott Bear Laffing att as useal by him [Amherst].” Next day Bouquet wrote Amherst of the intelligence. On 11 June, Croghan wrote Bouquet that “the other Nations will join the Delawares if they prove Successful against the small out Posts and then no Doubt they will fall upon the Frontiers with out they meet a Sufficient Check Soon.” With Bouquet’s 9 June dispatch in hand Amherst wrote Bouquet next day that the Indian uprising inconvenienced him while he awaited orders for troop movements. Amherst issued orders for Major John Campbell to march two companies west to retake posts and for Bouquet to relieve Fort Pitt. On 14 June, Bouquet ordered Croghan to Fort Pitt “to procure Intelligences of the real Causes of this War, & the designs of the Enemy.”

Croghan rode to Shippensburg and saw panic in its street and so acted to restore order. At his own expense he raised and equipped a twenty-five-man militia company for aban-

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doned Fort Lyttelton and hired pioneers to escort munitions from Fort Loudoun to Fort Bedford. His decisive and selfless actions earned not just the praise of Amherst, but the gratitude of the provincial government, whose penurious commissioners even compensated him for out-of-pocket expenses. By 14 June he had reached Fort Bedford and found that its captain and seven-man garrison could do little for the hundred families cowering in and around it. He sprang into action. “His company,” Captain Lewis Ourry wrote Bouquet, “as you may well imagine is a great relief to me as his generosity has been to many a starving family.” A mile away sat charred and vulnerable Croghan Hall. On 30 June a party of western warriors attacked fifteen men who were mowing its fields. The party scalped two of the men. Two days later at Fort Bedford an express reported that western warriors had captured Forts Venango, LeBoeuf, and Presque Isle. There was as yet no news of Fort Pitt or Fort Ligonier, but nearly everyone at Fort Bedford supposed that each might fall, too. Croghan later estimated that in the uprising’s first four months western warriors had burned nine forts, killed and captured two thousand soldiers and civilians, harried thousands of civilians from their homes, and plundered goods worth £100,000 from traders. Perhaps he thought that his fears and woes paled in comparison with those of his fellows.36

Despite his decisive and selfless actions Croghan took criticism. Quakers blamed him for the Indian uprising, for instance. His settlements on the Youghiogheny and Allegheny Rivers, Quakers charged, had caused the western warriors to take up their tomahawks

36 For panic at Shippensburgh see Pennsylvania Gazette, 30 Jun. 1763; for Croghan’s activities at Shippensburgh see Croghan to Bouquet, 11 Jun. 1763, HBP, 6:218-219; for Croghan’s 14 Jun. 1763 arrival at Fort Bedford see Ourry to Amherst, 17 Jun. 1763, ibid., 6:250; for warrior attacks around Fort Bedford see Pennsylvania Gazette, 30 Jun. 1763; for “His company” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 198; see also Volwiler, George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 165; for warrior attack on Croghan Hall see Pennsylvania Journal, 7 Jul. 1763; for express see Croghan to Johnson, SWJP, 10:727-728; for Croghan’s estimate see Joseph Hunter to James Hunter, 3 Jul. and 24 Jul. 1763, Society Coll., HSP.
against British subjects. But he knew better. The hostility of the formerly amenable Delawares galled him. “I wish,” he wrote Bouquet on 17 June, “ye Quakers Maint find that thire Interfearing with Indian afairs May have Don More hurt to his Majestys Indian Interest & given them a greater Dislike to his Trupes than any Setlments that I or any other pople have Made there[.]” Meanwhile Daniel Clark and William Peters questioned his sale of Cumberland County acres to them. Why did Croghan consummate the sale when he knew that western Indians seething over British encroachments of their lands intended to attack frontier forts and settlements? He answered his critics with reasoned arguments. Would he have stocked or improved Croghan Hall if he thought western Indians intended to burn it? Would he have spent £2,500 to improve the property he held jointly with Colonel William Clapham if he thought western Indians intended to destroy it? To appease Clark and Peters, he proposed to nullify his sale to them.37

Theodorus Swaine Drage alleged that Croghan resorted to chicanery when he lost revenue because of the Indian uprising, but actually Drage proved incorrect about Croghan’s financial well-being. On 1 August, Croghan sold old friend and former trading partner Robert Callender fifteen tracts containing some 6,850 acres for £2,000. Upon signing the contract Callender made a down payment of £800 so that Croghan would have the cash in hand. Still, Croghan had disobeyed Bouquet’s orders by not accompanying British regulars from Fort Bedford on 26 July. He had excused himself from the march on grounds of ill-health and, more important, of superfluousness. Being a negotiator, and not a warrior, he argued, he was not essential to Bouquet or his regulars. These were not his real reasons for disobeying Bouquet’s order, however. He had made big plans for himself,

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plans that involved a voyage to England to recover his prewar losses to the French, the Canadians, and their Indian allies.\(^{38}\)

Despite disobeying Bouquet’s order Croghan had furthered Great Britain’s conquest of the Old Northwest (now Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin) in three significant ways. First he had assisted Major Robert Rogers and General Robert Monckton in garrisoning Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit after the fall of New France (Canada) on 8 September 1760. When the garrison had lowered the fort’s French flag and raised the Union Jack, it had claimed \textit{de jure} proprietorship of Michigan for Great Britain. Second he had assisted the British officers who had made garrison changeovers that had claimed \textit{de jure} proprietorship at other spots in the Old Northwest. Third he had implemented Colonel Henry Bouquet’s policy of establishing intercultural trade in the Old Northwest. In replacing French trade with British trade he and Bouquet had claimed \textit{de facto} proprietorship of the Old Northwest for Great Britain though Sir William Johnson had overlaid the establishment of British trade in the Old Northwest with a veneer of altruism. In Johnson’s opinion the Indians of the Old Northwest would improve materially, intellectually, and spiritually \textit{because of} British incursions into the region. British officers and traders would arm, clothe, and provision the Indians, who had been self-sufficient and independent for centuries. The British colonial governments would send ministers and teachers to live among the Indians and “civilize” them and thus make them manageable. In other words Johnson claimed \textit{moral} proprietorship. What Johnson did not articulate was that one day rapacious British society would simply overwhelm Old Northwest Indian society.

\(^{38}\) For land deal and for excuse see Wainwright, \textit{George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat}, 199-200.
Figure 9 Untitled and typically vague eighteenth-century map of Croghan’s lands near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Figure 10 Pickawillany and the Old Northwest, from Thomas Kitchin’s *A New Map of the British Empire in Nth. America, Drawn from the Latest Authorities* (c. 1782)
Courtesy of the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan
Figure 11 From Wainwright, Nicholas B., *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 263
Figure 12 Indian Pictographs on Treaty consummated at Johnson Hall on 13 July 1765
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Figure 13 Chart of Old Northwest Indian tribes, from Croghan’s 1766 Journal, Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Figure 14 Croghan’s onetime rental property as it is today in Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Courtesy of the author
Figure 15 From Wainwright, Nicholas B., *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 280
Figure 16 Samuel Wharton’s Architectural Plans for Proposed Vandalia Gubernatorial Mansion
Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania
About mid-August 1763 George Croghan left Fort Bedford for Philadelphia to attend to personal finances because Sir Jeffrey Amherst had forbidden him to negotiate with any hostile western Indians until the army had vanquished all. “Indeed,” Amherst had said, “their total extirpation is scarce sufficient atonement for the bloody and inhuman deeds they have committed.” How many campaigns would be necessary to achieve “total extirpation”? Unwilling to abide the murderous and pompous Briton who had rendered him superfluous, Croghan had decided to pursue self-interest. Once he entered Philadelphia, he sought merchants who had lost pelts and goods to the enemy, his aim being to enlist their sympathies in recovering his losses, but the merchants persuaded him to exploit his truck with Sir William Johnson to recover theirs as well. Croghan advised their penman, David Franks, who over the next two weeks drafted a petition soliciting Johnson for aid. Croghan also charmed their spokesman, Samuel Wharton, the business partner of John Baynton and George Morgan. Croghan was “as friendly & communicative As any Man can be,” Wharton wrote Baynton. Croghan bartered with Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan for trade goods and left for Johnson Hall. The goods cost him just a few “border lands.”

Upon his arrival on 12 September, Croghan entreated Johnson for leave to sail to London to attend to personal matters, but lacking authority to grant it, Johnson referred him to Commander-in-chief Jeffrey Amherst. En route to Amherst’s headquarters in New York City, Croghan sent Johnson an offer of Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan trade goods

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in exchange for aid to Philadelphia’s suffering merchants. At Amherst’s headquarters on 25 September, Croghan entreated Amherst for leave, but Amherst sneered he “wold as Soon give his Consent To a Battalians going home as parting” with him, “which brought on an altercation & Warm Dispute” that ended abruptly when Croghan exited the room. Amherst wrote Colonel Henry Bouquet, “If his Presence ever was of any Consequence in the Department he filled, it certainly is so at this present time.” Yet actually there was nothing for Croghan to do out west precisely because of Amherst’s western policy.²

Acrimony ensued. On 26 September, Croghan sent Amherst a follow-up explaining his predicament (fidelity to duty prevented recovery of losses), yet next day Amherst balked at granting leave. Only when Croghan resigned on 28 September did Amherst confront him with these reasons: Croghan would be “Wantedy hear Soon” and the ministry would deem his going to England “very od[d].” Croghan retorted that he could go to and from England twice before Amherst “wold be able to Chestise y[e]. Westren Indians So as to Re-store Tranquilaty to his Majestys Subjects on y[e]. frontier on any Durable Foundation and that this Defection of them Nations from his Majestys Intrest Might abeen Easeyr pre-vented then they Can be Now Subjected with y[e]. five Trupes.” Amherst shrugged off the insult and reinstated him. “I know Many pople will think I am Wrong,” Croghan wrote Bouquet, “Butt had I Contineued I Could be of No More Service then I have been this Eighteen Months past w[h] was None Ataul, as No Regard was had to any intiligence I Sent No More then to my opinion.” Ironically Amherst granted himself leave to sail to Lon-don, where he stayed for good. “What universal cries of joy and what bumpers of Madei-ra are drunk to his prompt departure,” Captain Simeon Ecuyer wrote Bouquet on 20 No-

² For Croghan’s meeting with Johnson see Johnson to Amherst, 14 Sept. 1763, DRCNY, 7:552; for Croghan’s offer to Johnson see “From George Croghan Etc.,” SWJP, 4:272; for “wold as Soon give” see Croghan to Johnson, 28 Sept. 1763, ibid., 10:825-826; for “If his Presence” see Amherst to Bouquet, 25 Sept. 1763, HBP, 6:398.
vember. Ecuyer of course used to toast Amherst during meetings of the Monday evening club at Fort Pitt.³

Croghan appeased such persistent creditors as William Buchanan and Barnabas Hughes and booked sail on the Britannia, in which Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan owned an interest. He returned to Johnson Hall in November and reviewed Indian affairs with Johnson. Amherst’s western policy had caused Pontiac’s Rebellion, which had caused the Board of Trade to solicit advice on reorganizing the Indian Department. Hence Johnson and Croghan planned additions to staff, annual gifts to western Indians, and a boundary to check the westward advance of British settlement. Croghan helped Johnson to compose a letter calling for restitution for Croghan, and Johnson commissioned Croghan to submit the letter with their plan to the Board of Trade, but neither the letter nor the plan articulated the cause of departmental mismanagement—military control. They had advised Amherst to keep peace by periodic gifts of necessities to western Indians, but he had disregarded the advice on grounds that gifts were costly, unnecessary, and counterproductive. Johnson ordered Croghan to convince the Board Trade of the necessity of gifting western Indians with goods and of separating the Indian Department from the army. Croghan was going to London to plead his case for restitution after all—under cover of official business.⁴

Johnson gave Croghan two letters of introduction. One letter was for Secretary of State George Montagu, the former head of the Board of Trade; the other was for Thomas Pownall, the former governor of Massachusetts and an expert on colonial affairs. The latter

³ For Croghan’s follow-up see Croghan to Amherst, 26 Sept. 1763, SWJP, 10:823-825; for “Much Wanted here Soon,” “very od,” and “wold be able” see Croghan to Johnson, 28 Sept. 1763, ibid., 10:826; for “I know many poole” see Croghan to Bouquet, 11 Oct. 1763, HBP, 6:431; for “What universal cries” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 202.

⁴ For appeasement of Buchanan and Hughes see Shippen to Warder, 25 Oct. 1763, Shippen Letter Book, APS; for solicitation of Johnson’s advice see Lords of Trade to Johnson, 5 Aug. 1763, ibid., DRCNY, 7:535-536; for Johnson and Croghan’s plan see Johnson to Lords of Trade, 13 Nov. 1763, ibid., 7:578-581.
advanced Croghan’s “efforts to obtain compensation for losses incurred in the service” and “patent for lands bought in 1749.” Johnson figured that Pownall would patronize Croghan when Croghan petitioned the Crown both for restitution and for legitimization of his 200,000-acre “purchase” from the Onondaga Council on 2 August 1749. Crown legitimization would enable Croghan to transfer his ownership rights from the acres at Pittsburgh to like acres in the Mohawk Valley, where he could live near his mentor.5

Croghan rode to Philadelphia and met several suffering merchants in the Indian Queen on Chestnut Street on 7 December. The merchants, who had lost goods and pelts to the enemy in 1754 or 1763, tasked him and a Londoner, David Franks’ brother Moses, with petitioning the Crown for restitution. Two of the suffering merchants, Samuel Wharton and William Trent, had drafted a memorial by 12 December and tasked Croghan with delivering it to the Board of Trade. Wharton, Trent, and other suffering merchants tasked Croghan and Franks with delivering like memorials to Lord Halifax and General Robert Monckton and with delivering plaintive letters to Amherst, the Penns, and London merchants. The merchant group that tasked Croghan and Franks provided £200 for expenses and pledged five percent of all restitution. Before he embarked for London, Croghan attended to personal matters. He sold proprietary agents 2,165 Bedford County acres for £2,000 and met the new governor, John Penn, who afterward wrote his uncle, Proprietor Thomas Penn, that Croghan was “a sensible, intelligent man.” Croghan authorized his half-brother, Thomas Ward, to buy a New Jersey copper mine in both their names, arranged education and board for Ward’s daughter “Suky,” and gave her “pew money” so that she could attend Anglican services regularly. His final beneficent act before he emb-

5 For Johnson’s letter to Halifax see Johnson to Earl of Halifax, 19 Nov. 1763, SWJP, 4:248-250; for Johnson’s letter to Pownall see “From George Croghan Etc.,” ibid., 4:255; for petition see “Memorial of George Croghan,” [8 Jun. 1764], Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 16, HSP.
barked for London was to accept several friends’ letters for delivery. Now he felt good about himself and the voyage.⁶

On 22 December the Britannia set sail, navigating the ice-clogged Delaware River for two days before docking at New Castle, Delaware, where Samuel Wharton detained her as he finalized her manifest. After three days he discharged her. She cleared the icy Delaware Bay in two days and made the Atlantic. Despite blustery rain she sailed smoothly across the Atlantic until 9:00 a.m. on 25 January 1764, when her captain, Thomas Tillett, having lost his bearings, sounded the depths. At 8:00 p.m. a sailor espied a faint southerly flicker, which the captain thought marked the rocks of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly in southwest England. He put about his ship and ran her back a great distance before inferring that a ship was emitting the flicker. He resumed his course. At noon next day he signed a passing Dutch ship to fix his position. Her captain signed back that Ushant (Île d’Ouessant), an island off the Brittany coast in northwest France, was only eight leagues west, but Tillett, accounting the calculation erroneous, disregarded it. At midnight a gale blew. Two hours later Tillett lay to his ship. He held his position until noon, when a sailor or cried out that the ship was running aground. With difficulty Tillett wore the ship and steered her toward England, but in late afternoon ferocious winds battered her and nearly drove her into rocks. To their profound relief, the crew then espied Plymouth, the ancient

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⁶ For Croghan’s meeting with suffering merchants see “Proceedings of a Meeting of Traders,” 7 Dec. 1763, SWJP, 4:264-271; for Croghan’s tasks see “Merchants to Moses Franks and George Croghan,” 12 Dec. 1763, ibid., 4:267-270; for Wharton and Trent’s memorial see “A Memorial of Merchants,” 12 Dec. 1763, ibid., 4:270-271; for “a sensible, intelligent man” see John Penn to Thomas Penn, 18 Dec. 1763, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 9:212, HSP; for Croghan’s sale of Bedford acres see Croghan’s deed to Peters and Lardner, 19 Dec. 1763, Penn Mss., Deed Box, 1760-1801, HSP; for Croghan and Ward’s purchase of New Jersey mine see insert, Diary, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 24, HSP; see also “Articles of Agreement between G. Reamer and Messrs. Ward and Croghan,” ibid., Box 203, Folder 9, HSP; see also “Memorandum of an Agreement Made by the Parties Concerned in the Mine,” ibid., Box 23, Folder 9, HSP.
seaport in Devon on the southwest coast of England, only to realize a few hours later that in fact they were approaching Guernsey Island off the coast of Normandy in northwest France. The Dutch captain had been correct, after all. They were north of Ushant, and they were mortified.7

Roaring winds and mountainous waves drove the Britannia toward Guernsey Island’s rocks. Her hitherto intrepid captain despaired while Croghan and other passengers urged him to do his duty and leave fate to Providence. In the dreadful evening and stormy day the leaderless ship smashed the rocks seven times yet somehow escaped destruction. As darkness fell, her spent crew perceived a reef between Guernsey Island and the Normandy coast. Passengers banded with the crew to steady her throughout the cold, black night, and although she shaved several rocks, she cleared the reef. In the day the crew kept her steady and dropped two anchors at 7:00 p.m., when her captain issued a distress call that no coastal Frenchmen heeded though she was in sight of land. The storm unleashed its final fury, starting one anchor cable, snapping the other, and driving the ship shoreward.

Late next morning the captain and his crew lowered longboats into frigid water, and then, having abandoned most of their personal and professional effects, joined the passengers in the longboats and rowed ashore. Drenched, shivering, clutching few effects, thanking the merciful Lord that they were alive, the captain, crew, and passengers watched helplessly as the wave-tossed ship shattered on jagged rocks ten minutes later. Perhaps Croghan, having escaped the ship with all his papers, was the most thankful survivor of all.8

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8 For voyage see entries, 28-29 Jan. 1764, Diary, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 24, HSP; see also Wainwright, “Voyage to England, 1763-1764,” “Ship-
Hundreds of salvagers—local rabble, really—swarmed the survivors. A few salvagers uttered congratulations before scouring flotsam. A few escorted the survivors—including Colonel George Armstrong of the Cumberland County militia and Lieutenant James McDonald of a British regiment that had repelled Pontiac-led western Indians at Détroit—to an absentee aristocrat’s estate, where two visitors, a priest and his curate, counseled them on “every thing.” McDonald, homebound to retire at half pay, translated French for Captain Tillett and helped him recover cargo that had washed ashore. The survivors and the salvagers rented horses and hired guides. On 30 January the party rode north. Over the next six days the party passed through villages and towns and saw not only magnificent churches, abbeys, artworks, and tombs, but affecting poverty as well. On 7 February the party halted in a village at the mouth of the Seine River and engaged a sloop bound for Portsmouth, England. The sloop, exploiting favorable winds, reached Portsmouth in just twenty hours. The party disembarked and Croghan left for London. He arrived on 11 February and acclimated himself. In only two days he began to line up official support for his mentor’s plan for overhauling the Indian Department, to deliver memorials and letters, and to apprise relevant addressees. Lords Hillsborough and Halifax tentatively approved the plan, while the others—ex-Massachusetts Governor Thomas Pownall, Proprietor Thomas Penn, and Generals Robert Monckton and Daniel Webb—heaped scorn upon Jeffrey Amherst, whom they blamed for mismanagement of the Indian Department. Gratified, Croghan anticipated the successful and expeditious completion of his mission.9

9 For party’s journey and for “everything” see entries, 29-31 Jan. 1764, 1-7 Feb. 1764, Diary, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 24, HSP; see also Wainwright, “Voyage to England, 1763-1764,” “Shipwreck of the Britannia, 1764,” PMHB, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan. 1949): 87-91; for Croghan’s visits with addressees see Croghan to Johnson, 24 Feb. 1764, SWJP, 4:339-341; see also Croghan to Gentlemen, 17 Feb. 1764, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan
Croghan possessed a small notebook that Lieutenant John Ormsby Donnellan had given him in early August 1763 at Fort Pitt. The notebook contained handwritten advice about finding lodgings in London and contacting personages. Following the advice, he lodged at Golden Cross Tavern, then at Lancaster Court, where he engaged a domestic. To present himself, he replaced wardrobe lost with the Britannia. White worsted breeches, silk hose and garters, a velvet suit, a green coat, a scarlet coat with a crimson waistcoat—he bought these and buttons, lace, ribbon, and gold binding, too. But his formal mien did not help him fare well in London. "Tho I have been hear a Month Nothing has been Don Respecting North America," he wrote Sir William Johnson on 10 March 1764. "The people hear spend thire time in Nothing butt abuseing one a Nother & Striveing who shall be in power with a view to serve themselves & thire frends, and neglect y° publck. Itt was butt yesterday that your State of Indian Affairs was Read off att the Board of Trade tho I delivcred itt y° 13th of Last Month." The Board of Trade had been debating the fate of English political journalist John Wilkes, who had been arrested for sedition after editorializing against King George III’s speech endorsing the 1763 Paris Peace Treaty that had ended the Seven Years’ War. The treaty hadbegat a royal proclamation that had fixed a line in North America between Indian hunting grounds in the west and British colonies in the east. But in the opinion of Croghan and his mentor the boundary line it was ill-drawn.10

By 14 April the Board of Trade had neither granted Croghan an audience nor reviewed his mentor’s departmental reorganization plan. "I Shall attend them when they Sitt & Do

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10 For Donnellan’s handwritten advice to Croghan see “To [George Croghan] which may be of use to a Stranger on his First Arrival in London & on other Parts of England,” 15 Apr. 1763, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 24, HSP; see also Wainwright, “Voyage to England, 1763-1764,” “Advice to a Stranger in London, 1763,” PMHB, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan. 1949): 85-87; for “The peple hear” see Croghan to Johnson, 10 Mar. 1764, SWJP, 4:362.
Every thing in My Power to Explain ye Nesesity of Takeing the Most Speedy Meshers to Send you Instructions Independant of any Militory officer,” he wrote his mentor. Eight weeks passed before the Board of Trade heard him and reviewed the plan, but next day it heard him again. It debated merits for a week. On 15 June it proposed a plan with a five-percent “duty” on the Indian trade and three additional deputies in the northern district of the Indian Department and two in the southern. Both the northern superintendent and the southern—Johnson and John Stuart respectively—were to hire the deputies at £300 per year and to keep an interpreter, a smith, and commissaries at official trading posts. Appointed by the Board of Trade, the commissaries were to supervise intercultural trade so as to curtail its most egregious abuses. The superintendents were to use £7,000 per year to gift Indians with goods and cover expenses. The Board of Trade sent its plan to Johnson, Stuart, and colonial governors for criticism, yet did not address Pontiac’s Rebellion. “They Make very Light of ye. Indian Warr. and give very Little attension to ye. affairs of ye. Colenys in Gineral,” Croghan wrote Johnson on 12 July. Finally the Board of Trade directed Amherst to provide trade goods for Johnson. If largess did not end the rebellion, it reasoned, a military expedition would. His mission completed, Croghan advised prominent Londoners about speculative opportunities in New York, helped Thomas Penn address provincial issues, bought gifts for some friends, and filled orders for others.11

11 For “I Shall attend” see Croghan to Johnson, 14 Apr. 1764, SWJP, 4:397; for Board of Trade’s review of plan and hearing of Croghan see K. H. Ledward, ed., Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Vol. 12 (Institute of Historical Research, 1936), entry, 7 Jun. 1764, fo. 257; for Board of Trade’s second hearing of Croghan see ibid., Vol. 12, entry, 8 Jun. 1764, fo. 258, fo. 259, fo. 260; for Board of Trade’s plan and dispatch for criticism see ibid., Vol. 12, entry, 15 Jun. 1764, fo. 276, fo. 277; see also Peter Marshall, “Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy, 1764-1768,” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Apr. 1971): 1-3; see also “Observations of Superintendent John Stuart and Governor James Grant of East Florida on the Proposed Plan of 1764 for the Future Management of Indian Affairs,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Jul. 1915): 815-831; for five-percent “duty” see Croghan to Gage, 5 Apr. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 50, UMCL; for “They Make very Light” see Croghan to Johnson, 12 Jul. 1764, SWJP, 4:462-464; for gifts and orders see account entries, Diary, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 24, HSP.
About mid-September 1764 Croghan sailed from Falmouth for New York City. During the rather calm voyage he might have pondered his mission like this: It had been a personal failure but a professional triumph. He had failed to persuade the Board of Trade to restitute him or the suffering merchants or to grant him the 200,000 acres in New York’s Mohawk Valley, yet he had convinced it to adopt his mentor’s plan for overhauling the Indian Department and to reconsider the Proclamation line. Besides founding three new British colonies in North America—Quebec, East Florida, and West Florida—the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 had fixed the Allegheny Mountains as the line between Indian hunting grounds in the west and British colonies in the east. On 9 March 1764 he had convinced Lord Halifax of the propriety of moving the line so as to encompass Ohio and its Indian trade. With Halifax’s encouragement he had convinced the Board of Trade to consider the same. There was “Talk of Setling a Coleny from ye Mouth of the Ohio to ye Ilonais,” he had informed Johnson after filling ministerial minds with vivid images of prodigal bounty. Taken with the imagery, Lord Hillsborough had boasted that he himself would settle Britons in Ohio should the line be moved west. Emboldened, Croghan had proposed settling Illinois to secure the west and its fur trade, but the Board of Trade had ignored the proposal. That the Board of Trade had adopted his proposal of a five-percent “duty” on the Indian trade in the west had delighted him because the duty would enable the Board of Trade to deliver his department from the army’s clutches.12

12 For Croghan’s disembarkation in New York City see Boston Evening-Post, 29 Oct. 1764; for land grant petition see Clotworthy Upton to Croghan, 11 Jan. 1764, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 25, HSP; see also “Memorial of George Croghan,” [8 Jun. 1764], Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 16, HSP; for failure to obtain land grant see K. H. Ledward, ed., Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations, Vol. 12, entry, 15 Jun. 1764, fo. 278; for Croghan’s proposal to remove Proclamation line west see unnamed document, Board of Trade, 1764, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 4, HSP; for “Talk of Setling” see Croghan to Johnson, 10 Mar. 1764, SWJP, 4:363; see also Board of Trade Papers, Plantations General, 19:306, HSP; for five-percent duty see Croghan to Gage, 5 Apr. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 50, UMCL.
Of course Croghan could not have foreseen what lay ahead for him or his associates in the speculative venture. In 1774 William Knox, a participant in the ministerial decisions to adopt the new plan for administration of Indian affairs in North America and to tax the Indian trade, wrote this in hindsight: “The events of the following year [1765] were fatal to this plan; for it was not then judged expedient to lay the tax, and consequently the expense could not be defrayed without an additional charge upon the American contingencies, which were thought to be sufficiently burdened already. This was the reason that so large a part of the ceded territories in America was left without government . . . .” In fact parliamentary legislation known as the Stamp Act imposed the “additional charge” on the colonists to defray the costs of maintaining the empire. The “additional charge” fomented the American Revolution. Ungoverned ceded territories created not only opportunities for land speculation, but also pretexts for mischief.13

After disembarking at New York City, Croghan went directly to Johnson Hall. He gifted Mistress Molly with goods and delivered gifts to friends, too. When he reported for duty, he took credit for the departmental reorganization plan, not only because he had convinced the Board of Trade to accept it, but because the Board of Trade had incorporated his input. Although Parliament had not yet approved the plan, he acted as if Parliament had approved it, for he messaged assistant Alexander McKee to disregard military authority henceforth. Colonel Henry Bouquet intercepted the message and wrote General Thomas Gage thus on 22 December 1764: “It is so disagreeable to have any thing to do with savages, that every officer in the army must think himself happy to have no further

concern with them, tho’, at the same time, one can not but regret that powers of so great importance to this country should in this instance have been trusted to a man so illiterate, imprudent, and ill bred, who subverts to particular purposes the wise views of the Government, and begins his functions by a ridiculous display of his own importance.”

A military expedition against Détroit Indians had failed miserably earlier in the year, as had a diplomatic mission to them and a second expedition against them, so that Bouquet had begun to organize a third expedition. Johnson ordered Croghan west to help him, but Croghan disobeyed the order once Samuel Wharton invited him to Philadelphia. Perhaps to defy Bouquet or to imitate London’s leading lights or to reward himself for his success in London, Croghan bought a four-and-a-half-acre estate in the city’s Northern Liberties district for $900 and named it Monckton Hall in honor of the general. The estate boasted a two-story, Georgian-style brick house on Poplar Lane off Second Street. On each of its flanks rose a smaller yet symmetrical brick building in like style. One had a kitchen, the other a stable. Beyond the buildings were vegetable gardens and flower gardens, fields of timothy and clover, fruit trees, and two wells. Croghan fitted his house for dreams—carpeting it, furnishing it with fine mahogany chairs, tables, desks, and commodes, adorning it with bookcases, backgammon tables, a clock, and a spinet, stocking it with linen, blankets, and candlesticks. In fact fourteen chairs sported green damask upholstery. Croghan equipped the kitchen with basins, tankards, cutlery, utensils, tableware, and china, stocked it with food, beer, wine, and spirits, and then decided to build a fourth building to hold this trio of purchases—a sturdy wagon, a fashionable post chaise, and a fancy carriage.

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14 For Croghan’s message to McKee and “It is so disagreeable” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 209-210.

15 For Monckton Hall see Pennsylvania Gazette, 5 Jul. 1764; for Croghan’s purchases see “George Croghan in Account with Baynton Wharton & Morgan,” 9 Feb. 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 3, HSP; see also accounting entries, Cadwalader Family Papers.
Croghan bought most of the items through Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan because of his friendship with Samuel Wharton, who lodged him as he readied his estate for occupancy. At his lodgings Croghan mused about restitution. The Board of Trade had restituted no suffering merchants, so he reasoned that his only option was to appeal to the enemy for restitution—that is to say, to the western Indians themselves—in the form of land. The Board of Trade had accepted his proposal to redraw the 1763 Proclamation line farther west. Once it had redrawn the line, the Board of Trade would open new territory to settlement. Suffering merchants like him and Wharton needed only to persuade Indian landowners to grant them lands in the territory before settlers entered it. Musings about restitution cheered Morgan, but those about the fur trade in Illinois, which Great Britain had won from France during the French and Indian War, excited his enthusiasm for profit. Illinois was bountiful country where a colony would be founded one day and where in the meantime fortunes could be made in the fur trade. Croghan guessed that a yearly haul in beaver furs alone might yield £100,000 sterling, for instance. In his view the only obstacles to certain riches were these: British regulars had yet to relieve the Fort Chartres garrison and prejudicial Canadian traders still controlled the fur trade in the Old Northwest.16

Croghan schemed to capture the Illinois fur trade and presented his scheme to Samuel Wharton, who anticipated the opportunity to implement it. In November the opportunity arrived in the form of a truce. Colonel Henry Bouquet’s military expedition had intimidated the western Indians into accepting a truce as prelude to a treaty with Sir William Johnson. Believing that peace, however tentative, was conducive to trade, Croghan and

16 For Croghan’s musings about restitution see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 211-212; for desire for restitution in the form of land see Wharton to Franklin, 27 May 1765, BFP, 12:141.
two pals, Robert Field and Robert Callender, formed a trading partnership with Wharton and his partners, John Baynton and George Morgan. The six men pooled goods worth £20,000 and signed a patent entitling Croghan to a quarter-share of profits even though he vowed to forgo his quarter-share and be a silent partner because of a Crown prohibition on the participation of imperial agents in the Indian trade. He would buy price-inflated goods from the trading partnership for $20,000 and then transport them to Fort Pitt and from thence to Fort Chartres and trade them for beaver pelts. Actually the so-called silent partner was “the first spring & mover of this adventure” according to Morgan.17

Croghan went to New York City to convince General Thomas Gage to occupy Illinois. A force could leave New Orleans for Illinois in early 1765, but Gage hesitated to order it out after officers like Colonel Bouquet warned that so small a force could not defeat stiff Indian resistance. The situation so distressed Gage that Croghan proposed using his “best endeavours with the Natives . . . to obtain their consent to His Majesty’s Troops, peaceably, possessing that Country. Which proposition he cheerfully accepted off.” So did Bouquet and Sir William Johnson. Preferring parley to battle in this instance, Bouquet wrote Gage that Croghan was “the fittest Person in America to transact that Business.” Gage credited Croghan with £2,000 New York currency and ordered him to Philadelphia to buy presents for the western Indians and to send receipts to Johnson. Gage assigned Croghan a traveling companion, Lieutenant Alexander Fraser of the 77th regiment. By early January 1765 Croghan and Fraser had entered Philadelphia.18

17 For partnership and “the first spring” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 212; for Croghan’s being a disinterested silent partner see Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan to Croghan, 21 Feb. 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 3, HSP; see also Photostat, Samuel Wharton to Croghan, 21 Feb. 1765, ibid., Box 199, Folder 24, HSP.

18 For Bouquets’ concerns see Bouquet to Gage, 30 Nov. 1764, IHC, 10:366-387; for “best endeavours” see Croghan to Franklin, 12 Dec. 1765, BFP, 12:396; for Johnson’s approval of Croghan’s mission see Johnson to Gage, 18 Dec. 1764, SWJP, 4:625; see also Johnson to Croghan, 18 Dec. 1764, ibid., 11:509-510; see al-
Croghan overextended his credit for familial and personal gain. He bought goods from his cousin, Thomas Smallman, for instance. Ohio Shawnees had captured Smallman and held him in captivity for eighteen months before releasing him to Colonel Bouquet in November. Smallman had gone to Philadelphia, but he had found no means of support. By early January Smallman’s situation had changed little, so that Croghan paid his bills and helped him form Thomas Smallman & Company. Croghan bought goods worth £2,650 from the company, but in doing so exceeded his credit limit by £650. He bought goods worth £1121.8.3 from Robert Field & Company and goods worth £1,900 from Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan, too. Governor John Penn correctly inferred that Croghan was using his professional status as “a Cover for a private Concern” (his clandestine trading partnership with Field, Callender, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan). Croghan created the illusion of propriety by convincing Bouquet to grant him an official pass to carry the goods to Fort Pitt under Crown auspices though trade regulations promulgated by Sir William Johnson himself on 16 January 1765 empowered only colonial governors like Penn to grant such passes for trade at posts in the Old Northwest. Croghan designated all the goods Crown goods yet intended to trade a goodly number in behalf of his clandestine partnership. After all, he stood to make a quarter of all its profits despite his protestations to the contrary.19


19 For goods see Johnson to Gage, 9 Mar. 1765, *SWJP*, 11:625; see also Croghan to Johnson, 12 Mar. 1765, *ibid.*, 11:633-634; see also Accounts, 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 197, Folder 24, HSP; see also Accounts, 1765, ibid., Box 197, Folder 25, HSP; for goods and their carriage see “Account of George Croghan,” [18 Feb. 1765], *SWJP*, 11: 579-580; for “a Cover for” see John Penn to Johnson, 21 Mar. 1765, *ibid.*, 11:644; for Johnson’s “Orders for Regulation of Trade,” 16 Jan. 1765, see *ibid.*, 11:535-536; for storage of all goods at Fort Pitt see Croghan to Johnson, 18 Feb. 1765, *ibid.*, 11:577; see also Bouquet to Gage, 10 Apr. 1765, GPAS, Vol. 33, UMCL.
Besides buying trade goods on army credit Croghan inspected ore from his New Jersey copper mine, speculated in real estate with old friend and army engineer Harry Gordon, and engaged in a selfless activity, a fund-raising drive for the Anglican Church. On 23 January he, Lieutenant Fraser, and Thomas Smallman departed Philadelphia. They took the Great Wagon Road west. They halted in Lancaster so that Croghan could meet his daughter Susannah’s suitor, a British officer who was stationed there. That Lieutenant Augustine Prevost belonged to a notable military family likely impressed Croghan, for Prevost wed fifteen-year-old Susannah in an Anglican ceremony just two months later. Croghan generously extended his daughter credit, which she promptly exceeded to buy her trousseau, thereby proving that she was a chip off the old block. He and his traveling companions next went to Carlisle, where he rented sixty-five packhorses to transport the goods to Fort Pitt—he charged the army £272 for the rentals though he had exceeded his credit by £3,671.8.3—and helped a contingent of the suffering traders to compose a memorial that petitioned Sir William Johnson to demand lands “proportionate to their Losses” from the western Indians who had stolen their furs and goods in the spring of 1763. The undersigned included Robert Callender, Thomas Smallman & Company, and Baynton & Wharton. By 25 February, Croghan and his traveling companions had entered winter-ravaged Fort Bedford. In almost no time he bought and distributed a thousand pounds of flour among its “pour pople,” rejoined his companions, and exited the fort with them. The group entered Fort Pitt three days later. Theirs was the first pack train in weeks to traverse the snowy Allegheny Mountains.20
Croghan directed his assistant, Alexander McKee, to invite hostile Ohio Delawares and Shawnees to a Fort Pitt conference and to tell them to bring furs. Croghan aimed to trade stock for the furs, but a catastrophe intervened. Robert Callender had shipped stock by wagon to an upper Cumberland County settlement for reshipment to Croghan by pack train. En route to Croghan the pack train met with misfortune when a barrel broke and spilled its contents, whose import was obvious to pioneers as far away as Virginia and Maryland: Philadelphia merchants were shipping scalping knives—the very symbols of cruel savagery—to hostile warriors. Virginia and Maryland pioneers hurried north to join locals in exacting retribution. In early March the gang, encouraged by sympathetic local magistrates, overtook Callender’s next pack train near Sidling Hill. The gang shot at the drivers, killed four horses, burned goods, spirited prized undamaged goods like kegs of powder and rum to Fort Loudoun, and then closed Forbes Road to carriage.  

Suspecting malfeasance, General Gage withheld bill payments until Croghan justified them, but instead of owning up Croghan equivocated, making excuse that he had encouraged Callender & Company to convey the goods to Fort Pitt for the good of the service once Governor John Penn had opened the Ohio trade to Pennsylvania Indian traders. “I have No Concerns in Trade with any Body Nor has Nott had Since before Gineral Bradocks aRivel in this Cuntry,” Croghan wrote Gage on 12 May 1765. His accounts were just and his intentions true. As regards his expenditures, he had simply misunderstood Gage, who had accounted £2,000 New York currency sufficient to cover all incurred ex-

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21 For catastrophe see Nathan McCulloch to Croghan, 7 Mar. 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 35, HSP; see also John Armstrong to [Croghan], 26 Mar. 1765, ibid., Box 201, Folder 2, HSP; see also Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 21 Mar. 1765; see also Johnson to Gage, 3 Apr. 1765, SWJP, 11:664-665; see also Johnson to John Penn, 3 Apr. 1765, ibid., 11:666; see also Gage to Johnson, 15 Apr. 1765, ibid., 4:717-718; see also Wharton to Partners, 15 Mar. 1765, Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan Papers, PSA; see also Wharton to Partners, 2 Apr. 1765, Ferdinand J. Dreer Autograph Coll., HSP.
penses. Although Croghan vowed to be frugal henceforth, Gage distrusted him. “Had he thought proper to have followed his Instructions, and made use of Colonel Bouquet’s Permit to get up his Presents, which would if necessary have procured him Escort at every Post, no Accident could have happened,” Gage wrote Sir William Johnson. “Instead of this, He takes upon himself to enter into Leagues with Traders to carry up Goods in a Clandestine Manner under Cover of the Business he was employed in of going to the Illinois; contrary to orders, and contrary to the Laws of the Province.” Of course Croghan was participating in a clandestine trading partnership that contrary to his orders and provincial law operated on the western frontiers under the cover of official business.22

Gage queried the principals. Robert Callender said that “all the Goods destroyed were Croghan’s” and “all [the goods] now in Fort Loudoun,” to the amount of £15,000, whereas Samuel Wharton said that Croghan “had no concern in the Goods, but only promised Him that if he got up to Fort-Pitt, that he would purchase such Goods as he should want for the Illinois, of him, preferable to others.” Sir William Johnson said that Croghan sent him a bill for “goods bought of Smallman and Field.” Gage acquired contradictory evidence. He sent a bill to Philadelphia “to make Enquirys” and was “told in Answer, that there is no such Person as Smallman a Trader in Philadelphia.” Upon further inquiry he learned that Smallman had lately gone with his cousin to Fort Pitt. Finally John Baynton said that “Croghan had goods of them [Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan] to the amount of £1,900. and upwards.” Nothing added up. “This is rare Confusion and all that can at present be seen is, that Mr. Croghan thought to take advantage of his Employment, to be first at the market and to make his Business an Affair of Trade, instead of Carrying on the

22 For Gage’s refusal to pay bills see Gage to Johnson, 15 Apr. 1765, SWJP, 4:718; for good of service see Croghan to Harry Garden, 7 May 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 28, HSP; for “I have No” see Croghan to Gage, 12 May 1765, ibid., Box 201, Folder 26, HSP; for “Had he thought” see Gage to Johnson, 15 Apr. 1765, SWJP, 4:717.
Service,” Gage wrote Johnson. “He has sent for very considerable Numbers of Indians to meet him at Fort-Pitt, instead of a Number of Chiefs sufficient for the Purpose of the Illinois. That must have been for the sake of Trade only, and he has been loosing his Time there, instead of setting off.” Given his deplorable record of malfeasance in Pennsylvania, how would Croghan act when he got to Illinois?23

Sir William Johnson attempted to exonerate Croghan by examining Samuel Wharton and messaging his findings to Gage. When Johnson “examined” Wharton “closely & repeatedly” about the goods, Wharton assured him that Croghan “had not the least Interest in, or concern with the Goods, but that they were intended to remain at Fort Pitt till the Illinois was in our possession.” After citing a Croghan-penned letter evincing “a verry different Stile from that of an Interested Person,” Johnson recommended that Gage’s charge of malfeasance be “examined into in a proper manner.” Johnson also asked Gage to express his sentiments on the matter. “I own he always Appeared to me in a verry different light, nor did he ever give me the smallest reason to suspect him of such a procedure, this I am persuaded of, that I should find it a difficult task to find a Man at all calculated for the Employment who Would for so long a time support as disinterest a Character, but where such Charges are made, I think it best that all possible Proofs be collected, & that he may be brought to answer for Himself.”24

Despite Johnson’s efforts in his behalf Croghan vowed to resign from the service once he completed his mission to Illinois. Perhaps his vow was a ploy to force General Gage to pay his bills. Perhaps it was an admission of guilt. In any case he awaited the hostile

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23 For “all the Goods destroyed” and “had no concern” see Gage to Johnson, 15 Apr. 1765, SWJP, 4:717-718; for Croghan’s trading partners’ statements see Wharton to Partners, 15 Mar. 1765, Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan Papers, PSA; see also Wharton to Partners, 2 Apr. 1765, Ferdinand J. Dreer Autograph Coll., HSP.
24 For quotations see Johnson to Gage, 27 Apr. 1765, SWJP, 11:704.
Ohio Delaware and Shawnee invitees to his conference too long for Lieutenant Fraser, who departed for Illinois himself. In Illinois, Fraser told Ottawa war chief Pontiac that Croghan had made peace with hostile Ohio Delawares and Shawnees at Fort Pitt (Croghan had not) and would make peace with him as well. The peace overture did little to counter Canadian traders who had prejudiced Indians against him, so that he fled Illinois. Meanwhile Croghan met five hundred or so hostile Ohio Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo chiefs and warriors at Fort Pitt from 8 to 11 May 1765 and persuaded the chiefs not only to appoint deputies to accompany him to Illinois, but to meet Sir William Johnson to finalize peace as well. Showing good faith, the Shawnee chiefs released captives to him. Elated, he messaged Governor John Penn of the accord, which inspired the governor to open the Indian trade by proclamation on 4 June. Illinois was still up for grabs, however.

In June a British peace delegation traveled up the Mississippi River to Illinois and gifted Indians with goods until anti-British sentiment flamed by Canadian traders caused it to flee. The next delegation to Illinois thus assumed import. Its purpose, as Croghan stated in his journal, was “to obtain possession of the important Posts” with “the Indians consent.” Occupation by “consent” was still conquest.25

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25 For ploy see Wharton to Partners, 6 Jul. 1765, Baynton, Morgan, & Wharton Papers, PSA; for Croghan’s delays and Fraser’s departure see Gage to Johnson, 15 Apr. 1765, SWJP, 4:718; see also “George Croghan, Esq’rs. Journal of Transactions with the Indians at Fort Pitt,” MPCP, 9:251; for Fraser and Croghan see Pennsylvania Gazette, 8, 15, 22 Aug. 1765; see also Boston Post-Boy & Advertiser, 26 Aug. 1765; see also New-Hampshire Gazette and Historical Chronicle, 16, 30 Aug. 1765; see also Newport Mercury, 26 Aug. 1765; see also Georgia Gazette, 26 Sept. 1765; for conference see MPCP, 9:256-264; for conference summary see Croghan to Bouquet, 12 May 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 28, HSP; see also Gage to Croghan, 25 May 1765, ibid., Box 202, Folder 7, HSP; for Shawnees’ release of captives see “List of the Prisoners deliver’d up by the Shawanese Nation of Indians at Fort Pitt the 10th May 1765,” GPAS, Vol. 36, UMCL; see also New-York Mercury, 19, 26 Aug. 1765; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 19 Sept. 1765; for accord see Croghan to Gage, 12 May 1765, GPAS, Vol. 36, UMCL; see also Croghan to John Penn, 12 May 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 28, HSP; see also Connecticut Courant, 21 Jul. 1766; for “A Proclamation” see MPCP, 9:264-266; for Governor Penn’s opening of trade see Gage to Croghan, 22 May 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 7, HSP; see also “Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Ohio Indians,” DRCNY, 7:750; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 6 Jun. 1765; for peace delegation see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 219;
Four days after the Fort Pitt conference two goods-laden bateaux started toward Illinois via the Ohio River. In them were Croghan, his servants, his cousin Thomas Smallman, and a former Détroit surgeon, Dr. George Anthon. Next day the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo deputies joined the party, which shortly thereafter saw large game (buffalo, bear, and deer) and small (turkey) in lush landscapes. On 20 May, Croghan messaged Canadian traders on the Scioto River to join him at its mouth and thence to accompany him “to their own country and take the Oath of Allegiance to His Britannic Majesty as they were now become his subjects, and had no right to trade there without Licence.” They joined the party at the designated spot in the evening on 26 May. Four days later the enlarged party passed the Great Miami River and encamped in the evening near a spot where “Elephants bones are found.” Early next morning the party footed toward “the great Lick four miles or so from the river’s west bank,” traversed woods, then “came into a large Road” that buffaloes had “beaten spacious enough for two Waggons to go abreast.” The path led “straight into the Lick,” at whose edge the party beheld “vast quantities of these bones lying about 5, or six feet under ground” and found “two Ivory tusks about Six Feet long.” The party took a tusk, returned to the bateaux, and headed downriver.26

The party passed the Kentucky River and on 6 June reached the mouth of the Wabash River, which today forms the Indiana-Illinois border. The party glided downriver another six miles before making camp. Next day Croghan sent two Indian deputies overland with a message to Fort Chartres and speeches to its local Indians. The message and speeches announced both his purpose and the peace between Great Britain and the Ohio Shawnees,

26 For “to their own country” see entry 20 May [1765], “The Private Journal of George Croghan Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; for “Elephants bones are found” see entry, 28 May [1765], ibid., Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; for “came into” and “vast quantities” see entry, 31 May [1765], ibid., Box 204, Folder 6, HSP.
Delawares, and Mingos. Sadly, a servant “went into the Woods and lost himself,” and at daybreak on 8 June eighty Kickapoo and Maskoutin warriors raided the camp, killing two servants and three Shawnee deputies, wounding colonists, plundering bateaux. “I got the Stroke of a Hatchet on the Head, but my Scull being pretty thick, the hatchet would not enter, so You may See a thick Scull is of Service on some Occasions,” Croghan remarked facetiously of the incident a month later. A wounded Shawnee deputy threatened Shawnee revenge, and the threat so “alarmed” the raiders that they made one excuse that the French “had spirited them up” and another that the English and their southern Indian allies were coming “to take their Country from them, and to enslave them.” After dividing plunder the raiders headed their captives—colonists all—toward their village, Ouiatenon, near present-day Lafayette, Indiana.27

The captors took their captives more than a hundred miles before halting on 15 June at Vincennes, a Canadian trading village of some ninety families. In his journal Croghan recorded his observations about the environment. There were large herds of buffalo and deer. There were bear and turkey. There were meadows and woods, springs and creeks, flatlands and bottomlands. For a while he “suffered extremely by reason of the excessive heat of the weather, and scarcity of water: the little runs, and springs being dried up.” As for the “inhabitants” of Vincennes, they were “Idle lazy people_a parcel of Renegadoes from Canada and much worse than Indians.” They “took a secret pleasure” in his misfortune and exchanged trifles for such “valuable plunder” as his equipage and specie, for ex-

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27 For Kentucky River see entry, 31 May [1765], “The Private Journal of George Croghan Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; for encampment and “went into the Woods” see entries, 6, 7 Jun, [1765], ibid., Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; for raid see entry, 8 Jun. [1765], ibid., Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; see also Croghan to Johnson, 12 Jul. 1765, SWJP, 11:837-838; see also Connecticut Courant, 26 Aug. 1765; for “I got the Stroke” see Croghan to Murray, 12 Jul. 1765, SWJP, 11:841; for “alarmed” and “spirited them up” and “to take their Country” see entry, 8 Jun. [1765], “The Private Journal of George Croghan Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 6, HSP.
ample. He valued the former at £150 and the latter at £421. On 16 June he managed to get traders to extend him enough credit to outfit the other captives for the journey’s final leg. Next day the final leg began. En route he recorded this: “Here now is no woods to be seen, and the Country appears like an Ocean__ the Ground exceedingly rich and partly over-grown with wild hemp, The Lands well watered, and full of Buffeloes Deer Bears, and all kind of wild Game.” On 23 June the captors headed their captives into Ouiatenon. Croghan reckoned that captors and captives had covered two hundred and ten miles.28

Villagers rebuked the captors because Croghan was a longtime friend. Chastened, the captors dressed his wound. When he bribed them with sixty-four gallons of rum he managed to buy, they still held him captive. They released him only after the arrival of a Fort Chartres message urging his release, but there was a more compelling reason for them to do so. During their 8 June raid on the Wabash River encampment, they had killed a few of the Ohio Shawnee deputies who were accompanying Croghan west. To escape certain reprisal, the captors entreated Croghan to mediate between them and the Ohio Shawnees. When he pledged mediation, they pledged aid. With their aid he reconciled their tribes (the Kickapoos and the Mascoutins) and the other three Wabash tribes (the Weas, the Piankashaws, and the Miamis) to the British occupation of Illinois, whereupon Pontiac himself messaged his interest in establishing cordial relations with Great Britain. Croghan met his “old acquaintance” as well as the diplomats of four Illinois nations at Ouiatenon in July and formalized the British takeover of French forts in Illinois. Afterward, he mes-

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saged Fort Pitt to send a goodly number of regulars to occupy Fort Chartres, but Fort
Pitt’s commander, Captain William Murray, sent just one company, with orders to hold
the fort until the 34th Regiment arrived. Having achieved his professional goal of reconcil-
ing the Illinois tribes to the British occupation of Illinois, Croghan redirected his ener-
gies toward achieving his private goal of obtaining restitution in the form of land. Now
he, Samuel Wharton, and other suffering merchants could negotiate with the reconciled
Illinois tribes for land. Thus far, hostile Illinois and Ohio Indians had been amenable to
change. Would hostile Détroit Indians be amenable to change as well?29

Croghan departed for Détroit with Pontiac and formerly hostile Illinois chiefs. En route
he liberated captives. At Détroit on 17 August he met five hundred chiefs and warriors of
ten Michigan nations. To show goodwill, the chiefs released captives to him and either
confirmed or made peace with Great Britain. As for Pontiac, he declared that he and Cro-
ghan had made peace en route to Détroit. Pleased with Croghan’s direction of the confer-
ence, Lieutenant Colonel John Campbell, the British commander at Détroit, wrote Gener-
al Gage that peace prevailed out west because of Croghan’s “great care & attention.” Yet
Croghan attributed his success to two related factors: The first factor was the peace that
he had negotiated with the Ohio Shawnees at Fort Pitt in May; the second was the joint
Kickapoo-Maskoutin raid on his Wabash River encampment in Illinois in June. The raid-
ers had killed a few of the Ohio Shawnee diplomats who were accompanying him west.
Fear of Ohio Shawnee reprisal had motivated the raiders to entreat him to mediate be-

29 For villagers’ rebuke and Croghan’s release see Croghan to Johnson, 12 Jul. 1765, SWJP, 11:836-842;
for captors’ fears, Croghan’s promise, and Croghan’s achievement of mission goal see “An Indian Con-
gress,” 13 Jul. 1765, ibid., 11:847-850; see also Croghan to Murray, 12 Jul. 1765, GPAS, Vol. 39, UMCL;
see also Croghan to McKee, 13 Jul. 1765, ibid., Vol. 40, UMCL; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 26 Sept.
1765; see also New-York Mercury, 30 Sept. 1765; see also New-York Gazette, 27 Jan. 1766; see also Boston
Post-Boy & Advertiser, 7 Oct. 1765; see also Boston Evening-Post, 7 Oct. 1765; see also Massachusetts
Gazette, 10 Oct. 1765; see also Calloway, The Shawnees and the War for America, 40.
tween them and the Ohio Shawnees. Now his peacemaking exploits filled colonial newspaper columns. Readers praised his pluck and army officers his acumen. The praise of civilians and soldiers alike marked the highpoint of his public career. Still, the raid had played as great a role in facilitating peace in Illinois as his own acumen and skill had.³⁰

Croghan, his surviving traveling companions, and four voyageurs paddled a birch canoe from Détroit on 26 September. Soon they parted. About 7 November, Croghan entered Fort Johnson. Susannah, having traveled up the Hudson River from her husband’s Albany post, greeted her father with open arms and fussed over him until Sir William Johnson called him to a meeting. Johnson told him that the Board of Trade had not submitted its plan to Parliament, so the Northern Department remained under army sway. Johnson ordered him to New York City to convince General Gage to reorganize the department according to Johnson’s plan. After the meeting Croghan left for New York City. En route he fretted about an accusation arising from the destruction of the pack train in March and charging that he had issued illegal passes to Indian traders so they could convey private goods to Fort Pitt under Crown auspices. Colonel Henry Bouquet had made the accusation before going to Pensacola in present-day northwest Florida, where he succumbed to

³⁰ For conference see entry, 17 Aug. 1765, “The Private Journal of George Croghan Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; see also Croghan to Gage, 17 Aug. 1765, GPAS, Vol. 40, UMCL; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 14 Oct. 1765; for “great care & attention” see Campbell to Gage, 11 Sept. 1765, ibid., Vol. 42, UMCL; for reasons for success see Croghan to William Murray, 12 Jul. 1765, ibid., Vol. 39, UMCL; for reports of Croghan’s doings—his departures, arrivals, or exploits—see New-York Mercury, 19, 26 Aug. 1765, 30 Sept. 1765; see also New-York Gazette, 2 Dec. 1765; see also see also Boston Post-Boy & Advertiser, 18 Nov. 1765; see also New Hampshire Gazette and Historical Chronicle, 16 Aug. 1765; see also Connecticut Courant, 26 Aug. 1765; see also ibid., 30 Aug. 1765; see also Newport Mercury, 26 Aug. 1765; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 15 Aug. 1765, 7 Nov. 1765, 15 May 1766; see also Georgia Gazette, 26 Sept., 10 Oct. 1765; for British officer’s praise see Gage to Henry Seymour Conway, 23 Sept. 1765, IHC, 11:86; see also James MacDonald to Johnson, 24 Jul. 1765, SWJP, 11:867-868; for British colonial’s praise see Thomas Hutchins to Johnson, 31 Aug. 1765, ibid., 11:919-920; for Pennsylvania Assembly’s praise see Newport Mercury, 2 Jun. 1766.
yellow fever. Despite his death the accusation lingered, gnawing Croghan because it diminished his diplomatic success and tarnished his reputation. At Gage’s headquarters he was whisked into a room where his resignation sat on a table. Interrupting a staff meeting to enter the room, Gage hugged him, thanked him for his service to king and country, and invited him to dinner, but Croghan declined the invite, saying that dinner was impossible, inasmuch as Gage believed him guilty of malfeasance.\(^3\)

Gage tried to ease Croghan of his worries. Gage was willing to forget both incident and accusation and urged Croghan to do likewise, but Croghan could not, claiming he was innocent. Was he a reputed moneymaker? he asked the twenty senior officers present. Although each said no, his reputation had been just that in his early years in the Ohio trade. He produced a Bouquet-penned letter that he construed to be a request to pass off traders’ goods as Crown goods, but that actually was an order to designate as Crown goods only those goods he bought at Fort Pitt. Throwing up his hands, Gage exclaimed, “Oh! My God! What is all this? Mr. Croghan you are the most injured man.” The senior officers praised him, but he had acted illegally during the incident and was guilty of malfeasance,

for his accounts in the Cadwalader Collection at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania reveal that he flouted provincial and bureaucratic prohibitions against intercultural trade. Gage required expertise in Indian affairs, so he made no formal charge against Croghan,

\(^3\) For Croghan’s departure from Détroit see entry, 26 Sept. 1765, “The Private Journal of George Croghan Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 6, HSP; for Croghan’s arrival at Fort Johnson see “Journal of Indian Affairs,” [26-31 Oct. 1765], SWJP, 11:962; for Johnson’ absence at Fort Johnson see Croghan to Johnson, 9 Nov. 1765, ibid., 11:964; for Croghan’s arrival at Gage’s headquarters and for Gage’s invitation to dinner see Croghan to Johnson, 18 Nov. 1765, ibid., 11:967; for egregious example of illicit trade in 1765 see Photostat of “An Acc’ of Expences attending the Transporting, Pressing, Packing, of Ninety Nine packs of Furrs from De- troit to Quebeck in the year 1765 belonging to Col’. Croghan and Cap’ Callender, 8 Oct. 1767,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; for Bouquet’s will, which directs Croghan to transfer a 200-acre tract to one Thomas Willing, see Lothrop Withington, “Pennsylvania Gleanings in England,” \(PMHB\), Vol. 32, No. 2 (1908): 217; for meeting in Gage’s headquarters see Wainwright, \textit{George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat}, 224-225.
who figured he would not have to deal with Gage once Parliament enacted the proposed tax on the Indian trade. Hence Croghan agreed to dine with Gage next day, then exited the room. In the streets agitators protested the Stamp Act, but Croghan did not grasp the protest’s significance—that New Yorkers, like aggrieved colonials in the other colonies, had become averse to taxes of any kind. Croghan clung to the notion that his tax on the Indian trade would raise enough revenue to maintain the Indian Department independent of the British army.32

Over dinner next day Gage and Croghan broached “the Subject of ye. Robery on ye. frontiers of Pennsylvaine.” Croghan asked, “Who ware ye. persons that Espersed” on his “Carrector”? Gage revealed no names but said he had not cast the first aspersion. “To Satisfye himself of ye. Truth of them,” he had ordered Colonel John Reed “to Examine into them.” Upon reading Reed’s report Gage had concluded that Croghan “had been Much Wrongd. in Every thing that was Layd.” to the accusation. Although aspersions had been “Made by Nott one butt Many of the first pople in Philla.,” Gage reasoned “that Ev-erything they Wrote him Respecting that Transaction was Lyes to Suport thire Demd. par-ty Rags and that they had for Some Time Imposd. on him.” Gage had informed Governor John Penn and Chief Justice William Allen of Pennsylvania that he “was aquainted with ye. Imposision they had putt on him in the Strongest Terms wth. he fancyd. wold Nott be very agreeable to them.” Since then, they had examined Croghan’s accounts and found them just. To Croghan’s delight, Gage seemed “very well plesd. with the Maner Maters is Setled with ye. Westren Indians.”33

32 For meeting and for “Oh! My God!” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 224-225; for colonials’ aversion to taxes see Cadwallader Colden to Henry S. Conway, 9 Nov. 1765, DRCNY, 7:67.
33 For quotations see Croghan to Johnson, 18 Nov. 1765, SWJP, 11:967-968; for Gage’s orders to Reed see Gage to Reed, n.d., IHC, 11:375.
Croghan, accompanied by visitor Samuel Wharton, departed for Philadelphia. En route he and Wharton met Governor William Franklin in Burlington, New Jersey, their purpose to convince William to join their land speculation venture and to peruse letters written by his father Benjamin for signs of ministerial sentiment about the Indian Department. They opined that the occupation of Illinois would establish peace wherein they, and William, if he joined the venture, could buy choice lands before British settlers entered the territory. William expressed interest but insisted that the venture ought not to invest in lands in Illinois until the Crown had established provisional territorial government. After the meeting Croghan and Wharton continued to Philadelphia, where Wharton assigned clerks the task of transcribing Croghan’s Illinois journal or rather of producing two versions of it—one version for the official record, the other for potential investors. Croghan sent copies of both versions to two likely investors in London, provincial agent Benjamin Franklin and Proprietor Thomas Penn. His intent was to involve Franklin and Penn in promoting British settlement in Illinois so that he, they, Wharton, and Franklin’s illegitimate son William might make a fortune in land speculation.34 Yet the formerly clandestine trading partnership of Croghan, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan preoccupied Philadelphia to the point where Croghan felt compelled to exonerate himself. Sensing that General Gage distrusted him, Croghan collected exculpatory depositions and spoke of resigning from the king’s service. One deposition featured a 21 February 1765 letter from Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan. Although the letter disclosed his disinterest in the trading partnership, Croghan informed Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan

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34 For Croghan’s arguments see William Franklin to Benjamin Franklin, 17 Dec. 1765, BFP, 12:403-406; for Croghan and Wharton’s arrival in Philadelphia see Pennsylvania Gazette, 28 Nov. 1765; see also New-York Gazette, 2 Dec. 1766; see also Boston Evening-Post, 9 Dec. 1765; for Croghan’s arguments and two versions of Croghan’s journal see Croghan to Benjamin Franklin, 12 Dec. 1765, BFP, 12:396; for two versions of Croghan’s journal see Croghan to Benjamin Franklin, 25 Feb. 1766, ibid., 13:171-173.
that Gage would require him to swear that he was not a member of the partnership. To satisfy Gage and public curiosity, Croghan withdrew from the partnership, which had already lost Robert Field and Robert Callender to retirement. “By this means,” Croghan wrote Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, “I shall regain his confidence, & be sent again to the Illinois with unlimited credit & instructions, where I will make good more than all my promises, & do engage upon my honour, & therefore [I] desire you will take care to send forward a large quantity of Indian goods for I will take all you have at one sweep.” His talk of resignation was insincere because he intended to use his position as cover while he scouted Illinois for purchasable lands for himself and for Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan out of a sense of obligation to them.35

Croghan shrewdly persuaded men of incompatible politics to join his Illinois venture. Former provincial commissioners Joseph Galloway and John Hughes, for instance, opposed his politics, yet he persuaded them to join his venture by feigning anger at Governor John Penn and Chief Justice William Allen over the accusation of collusion with Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan. To win proprietary opponents, he bragged that he had persuaded both General Thomas Gage and Sir William Johnson to look favorably on anti-proprietary assemblymen even though he himself had opposed them. Meanwhile Gal- loway persuaded the Pennsylvania Assembly to draft an address that thanked Gage for pacifying the Illinois Indians and praising Croghan for “his extensive Influence and Weight with the Natives.” Croghan had persuaded proprietary opponents Galloway and Hughes to join the venture, and yet he did not shun Governor John Penn or Provincial Secretary Richard Peters or their political allies and placemen. Indeed Croghan offered to locate

35 For preoccupation see John Johnston to Johnson, 13 Mar. 1766, SWJP, 12:43; for Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan letter to Croghan see Photostat of Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan to Croghan, 21 Feb. 1765, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; for “By this means” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 226-227.
choice Illinois lands for Governor John Penn if and when the Board of Trade reset the western boundary line in North America. Croghan also offered to do likewise for Proprietor Thomas Penn.\(^36\)

By late December 1765 Fort Chartres required an Indian agent. Hence General Gage petitioned Croghan to dispatch Thomas Smallman. Gage wanted Smallman for the job because Croghan had expressed a desire to resign from the service. Croghan intended to go himself to further his venture, however. At Johnson Hall he got Sir William Johnson to join his venture and write the Board of Trade that French land rights in Illinois might be the “foundation for a Valuable Colony in that Country.” Johnson vowed to order Croghan to Illinois to “enquire into the French Bounds & property” but conceded that such an order required the general’s approval because the army still dominated the Indian Department. Naturally Johnson ordered Croghan to meet Gage. During a February 1766 meeting in New York City, Croghan argued for following up his diplomatic successes of the past year and for establishing a British settlement at Fort Chartres. Gage accepted the arguments but opined that the key to conquering Illinois was the fur trade and that an ex-fur trader like Croghan was the best man to supervise it. Unaware that Croghan was using diplomacy as cover for private enterprise, Gage offered him the mission. Croghan accepted it and left for Philadelphia.\(^37\)

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\(^36\) For ruse see William Franklin to Benjamin Franklin, 30 Apr. 1766, \textit{IHC}, 11:221; for accusation of collusion see Thomas Penn to William Allen, 6 Jun. 1766, Penn Letter Book, 9:19, HSP; for address and for “his extensive Influence” see \textit{PA}, 8\textsuperscript{th} ser., 5855, 5858; for offer to locate choice Illinois lands for John Penn see John Penn to [Thomas Penn], 15 Dec. 1765, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 10:23, HSP; for like offer to Thomas Penn see Croghan to Thomas Penn, Penn Letter Book, 9:29-31, HSP. “Most of the public men of the eastern colonies, such as Washington, Henry, and Franklin, at one time or another entered into some ‘get-rich-quick’ scheme for exploiting and colonizing the west,” writes historian C. W. Alvord, “and the shares of every company for promoting settlement west of the [Appalachian] mountains found a ready market.” See C. W. Alvord, “Virginia and the West: An Interpretation,” \textit{The Mississippi Valley Historical Review}, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jun. 1916): 21.

\(^37\) For “foundation for a Valuable Colony” see Johnson to Lords of Trade, 31 Jan. 1766, \textit{DRCNY}, 7:808; for “enquire into” see Johnson to Croghan, 28 Mar. 1766, \textit{SWJP}, 5:120; for Johnson’s support of scheme see
As per orders from Gage, Johnson meantime appointed commissaries to western forts. Among his appointees were Alexander McKee and Edward Coles, who were to supervise trade at Forts Pitt and Chartres respectively. Croghan arranged for Pontiac to meet Johnson at Oswego in June and schemed with his business partners to obtain restitution in the form of a land grant, but the scheme was impractical because the Crown had yet to open lands west of the Alleghenies to settlement. Still, there was hope. Having said “one half of England is now land mad and everybody there has thire eyes fixt on this country,” Croghan wrote provincial agent Benjamin Franklin about the wisdom of resetting the western boundary so as to push Indians westward and open lands for settlement and speculation. Franklin, seeing economic opportunity in shifting the western boundary, not only joined the venture but promoted it tirelessly in London while the ministry reviewed a memorial drafted by his son William. The memorial set forth several reasons to colonize Illinois. The king could buy a tract and establish civil society on it with the help of “a company of gentlemen of character & fortune.” For a grant of a million or more acres the company in return would choose the tract and settle two thousand British Protestants on it. Moreover the memorial contained this clause: “Let the first governor be a person experienced in the management of Indian affairs, & who has given proofs of his influence with the savages.” William probably had Croghan in mind.38

In Philadelphia, Croghan improved Monckton Hall. He set two bird fountains and built a rabbit “park.” He hired a gardener and bought two African slaves to assist the gardener.

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38 For activities of Gage, Johnson, and Croghan see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 229-230; for scheming see Joseph Wharton, et al., to Johnson, 6 Jun. 1766, SWJP, 5:240-241; for quotations see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 230; for inspiration for pamphlet see William Franklin to Benjamin Franklin, 30 Apr. 1766, BFP, 13:254.
He hired a Mrs. Yeates to oversee household maids. Yet he was troubled. His next mission required a Crown gift, so he spent £3,445 at Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan, which shipped the gift to its Pittsburgh store. Calling the sum exorbitant, General Gage refused to pay the bill. When Croghan then threatened to resign from the service, Gage relented, but Croghan remained miffed. His salary was £200 per year and he had not been paid for goods General Stanwix had ordered him to buy in 1756. He had lost goods worth £1,500 in the 1765 Wabash River raid and suffered financial losses for king and country, notably goods worth £1,450 as he was carrying out orders from General Amherst. On his second 1766 journey to Illinois, he ignored Sir William Johnson’s explicit instructions to spend within limits imposed by Gage and broke his promise of frugality to Gage. Away from his overlords, he followed the dictates of his conscience and so incurred huge expenses.39

The harsh reality was that land-grabbing colonists followed the dictates of their consciences, too. At Fort Pitt on 22 May, Croghan found scores of distraught Ohio Indians whose kin and friends had been murdered by settlers in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Neither the Virginia government nor the Pennsylvania had addressed the murders or would

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39 For alterations see Photostat, [Alterations to Monckton Hall, Phila, in 1766, 1767, or 1768], Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 199, Folder 7, HSP; for rabbit park see Accounts with William Henry, 7 May-29 Dec. 1766, 3 Jan.-12 Feb. 1767, ibid., Box 198, Folder 1, HSP; for other alteration and adornment details see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 230-231; for storage of goods at Fort Pitt, Gage’s refusal to pay Croghan’s expenses with Crown money, and Croghan’s losses under Stanwix and Amherst see Croghan to [Gage], 23 Mar. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 50, UMCL; for storage of goods at Fort Pitt see Croghan to Gage, 1 May 1766, ibid., Vol. 51, UMCL; see also [Gage] to Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan, 3 May 1766, ibid., Vol. 51, UMCL; see also Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan to Gage, 7 May 1766, ibid., Vol. 51, UMCL; for Gage’s opinion of sum as exorbitant see Gage to Johnson, 7 Apr. 1766, SWJP, 12:68; see also Croghan to Gage, 1 May 1766, GPAS, Vol. 51, UMCL; for Gage’s refusal to pay expenses with Crown money and Croghan’s threat to resign from service see Gage to Croghan, 3 May 1766, GPAS, Vol. 51, UMCL; for Croghan’s losses under Stanwix and Amherst and Gage’s displeasure over exorbitant expenses see Gage to Johnson, 23 Mar. 1766, ibid., Vol. 50, UMCL; see also [Gage] to Croghan, 24 Apr. 1766, ibid., Vol. 50, UMCL; for Johnson’s instructions to Croghan see Johnson to Gage, 17 Apr. 1766, SWJP, 12:74; see also “Instructions for George Croghan,” 20 Apr. 1766, ibid., 12:80-82; for expense limitations imposed by Gage see “Instructions to George Croghan,” 16 Apr. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 50, UMCL; for Croghan’s promise to adhere to expense limitations see Croghan to Gage, 5 Apr. 1766, ibid., Vol. 50, UMCL; see also Croghan to Gage, 20 Apr. 1766, ibid., Vol. 50, UMCL; for Croghan’s huge expenditures see Gage to Johnson, 5 Oct. 1766, SWJP, 5:386; see also [Gage] to Murray, 6 Oct. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 58, UMCL.
ever address them to the satisfaction of the grieving and aggrieved Ohio Indians. “No Jury in any of our Frontier Counties will ever condemn a man for killing an Indian,” Pennsylvania governor John Penn wrote Proprietor Thomas Penn. “They do not consider it in the light of murder, but as a meritorious act.” So long as prejudiced and belligerent colonists or immigrants inhabited Indians’ lands in increasing numbers there would likely be intercultural conflict. To Sir William Johnson, Croghan complained that on the frontiers “Soveren Lord the Mobb Seem to Rule.” Unappeased, the Ohio Indians would likely exact revenge. Thus Croghan held conferences with them and appeased them in their way. When he had concluded the last conference, he wrote General Gage that illegal westward expansion might spark a war with them. Doubtless, Croghan thought otherwise about legal westward expansion even if the outcome (conquest) would be the same for them.40

On 18 June thirteen large bateaux commanded by Croghan departed Fort Pitt on the rain-swollen Ohio River. Two bateaux carried the Crown gift and supplies for Fort Chartres. Other bateaux carried George Morgan, Dr. George Anthon, Andrew Montour, Captain Harry Gordon and his ensign Thomas Hutchins, Shawnee chiefs, and ninety Seneca warriors who were going south to war against ancient enemies. Under orders from General Gage, Gordon was to chart the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans. Morgan controlled goods worth £8,000. The goods supplemented those Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan had shipped Fort Chartres in March. Morgan expected to do more than supply

40 For colonists’ belligerency see Croghan to Johnson, 17 Jun. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 53, UMCL; see also Johnson to Secretary Conway, 28 Jun. 1766, DRCNY, 7:836; for “No Jury” see John Penn to [Thomas Penn], 12 Sept. 1766, Penn Mss., Official Correspondence, 10:84, HSP; for “Soveren Lord” see Croghan to Johnson, 18 Apr. 1766, SWIP, 5:182; for conferences and appeasement see Croghan to Gage, 15 Jun. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 52, UMCL; see also Gordon to [Gage], 15 Jun. 1766, ibid., Vol. 52, UMCL; see also Croghan to Gage, 17 Jun. 1766, ibid., Vol. 52, UMCL; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 10 Jul. 1766; see also New-York Gazette, 14 Jul. 1766; see also New-York Mercury, 14 Jul. 1766.
Fort Chartres, however. He expected not only to trade with Indian and Canadian traders but to sell the Crown gift as well. To realize his expectations, he and his business partners invested £75,000 in 1766. Croghan promised Morgan that he would buy at Crown expense all the goods under Morgan’s control and all those Morgan’s firm had shipped Fort Chartres in March.41

On 29 June 1766, about 366 miles south of Fort Pitt, Croghan ordered his expedition ashore at the mouth of the Scioto River. There he met the aggrieved Shawnees. During the meeting he dissuaded the Shawnees from avenging the murders at his encampment on the Wabash River in 1765 and presented goods he had bought from George Morgan for £1,800. In return for the goods the Shawnees revealed that Canadian traders had incited some Illinois warriors to attack his current expedition at the mouth of the Wabash River. Because of the revelation Croghan dispatched Indian messengers overland to assure the war chiefs that his mission was peaceable. His evident mastery of Indian diplomacy impressed both Morgan and Captain Gordon. “He can appear highly pleased when most chagrined and show the greatest indifference when most pleased,” Morgan wrote his wife admiringly. The expedition journeyed warily down the Ohio River yet halted at the Great Lick so that Croghan could collect mastodon tusks and bones—elephant tusks and bones to him. At the mouth of the Wabash River, about 1,000 miles south of Fort Pitt, the expedition encamped on an island for purposes of defense, but no Illinois Indian war party attacked the position. On 7 August the expedition entered the muddy Mississippi River.

41 For departure on swollen Ohio see Gordon to Gage, 8 Jul. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 54, UMCL; for Shawnees and Senecas see Croghan to Gage, 15 Jun. 1766, ibid., Vol. 52, UMCL; see also Croghan to Gage, 17 Jun. 1766, ibid., Vol. 52, UMCL; for others see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 233; see also entry, 18 Jun. [1766], “Gordon’s Journal, May 8, 1766-December 6, 1766,” IHC, 11:291; see also Gordon to Gage, 8 Jul. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 54, UMCL; for Gordon’s orders see [Gage] to Gordon, 9 May 1766, ibid., Vol. 51, UMCL; for expectations of Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan see Max Savelle, George Morgan, Colony Builder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 37.
The expedition struggled upriver, covering more than a hundred difficult miles before reaching Fort Chartres on 20 August.\footnote{For mileage estimate see entry, 29 Jun. [1766], “Gordon’s Journal, May 8, 1766-December 6, 1766,” \textit{IHC}, 11:291; for Croghan’s dissuasion of Shawnees and gift to them see Croghan to Gage, 6 Jul. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 54, UMCL; see also enclosed “Congress held by Mr. Croghan with the Shawanese Indians, Scioto River, Jun. 1766,” ibid., Vol. 54, UMCL; see also Gordon to Gage, 8 Jul. 1766, ibid., Vol. 54, UMCL; for Shawnees’ warning of attack see Croghan to Gage, 17 Jun. 1760, GPAS, Vol. 53, UMCL; for “He can appear” see Morgan to his wife, 29 Jun. 8 Jul. 1766, \textit{IHC}, 11:315-316; for expedition’s Great Lick encampment and collection of tusks and bones see entry, 16 Jul. [1766], “Gordon’s Journal, May 8, 1766-December 6, 1766,” \textit{IHC}, 11:293; for expedition’s island encampment see \textit{ibid.}, 11:294; for expedition’s arrival at Fort Chartres see Croghan to Gage, 10 Sept. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 57, UMCL.}

The fort was weak. Only fifty of its two hundred men were fit for duty due to malaria, and they failed to protect Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan’s agent or to prevent Canadians from trading illegally on British soil. To make Illinois safe for British traders, Croghan held a conference at Kaskaskia, a nearby Indian village where Mingo, Shawnee, Delaware, Huron, and Illinois diplomats were gathered. He mediated between the Shawnee diplomats and unnamed Illinois diplomats (probably Kickapoos and Maskoutins) before setting up another conference at Fort Chartres. At the Fort Chartres conference, which occurred from 25 to 26 August 1766, he convinced the chiefs and warriors of eight Illinois nations that Canadian traders had lied to them about British intentions. He also concluded a peace that opened Illinois to British traders. For the thousand Indians present—chiefs, warriors, and their families—he bought goods worth £1,200 from George Morgan and presented them to confirm the peace. In his official report he stated that the Illinois Indians would grant tracts to British subjects who paid fairly for the tracts and that Canadian traders often crossed the Mississippi River from its west bank to trade with Indians on British soil. He recommended the strategic placement of army posts to end the illicit trade. Soon after the Fort Chartres conference he contracted malaria, which prostrated him, so that instead of returning overland to Fort Pitt he joined Captain Gordon’s party on
an arduous downriver voyage. Gordon, Croghan, and their parties entered New Orleans in mid-October. After six weeks Gordon and his ensign, Thomas Hutchins, departed for home, but malaria obliged Croghan and his party to seek quarters in New Orleans. They stayed at Felix Sicard’s until Croghan felt well enough to travel.43

France had ceded New Orleans, an entrepôt of the French fur trade, to Spain in 1762, but when Spanish Governor Antonio de Ulloa led a detachment into New Orleans to relieve the French garrison, he faced strong anti-Spanish sentiment and retreated to a small fort at the mouth of the Mississippi. Croghan befriended Spaniards and Frenchmen alike while he recovered from malaria. He promised to buy two London-made gold watches for the governor and involved himself in an import-export business with Bartholomew Macnamara and one Dr. Challon. Accompanied by friends like Dr. George Anthon, Dr. Challon, and Lieutenant Hunter Sedgwick, late of the Fort Chartres garrison, Croghan set sail in December on the brig Sally bound for New York City. He had paid passage for his friends and paid the freight for ten thousand gallons of Dr. Challon’s molasses. En route to New York City he might have contemplated his Illinois diplomatic success thus: He had indeed reconciled the Illinois Indians to the presence of the British military in their country and laid the groundwork for intercultural trade and land deals in Illinois. Yet he did not know that the British ministry not only had scrapped its plan for reorganizing the Indian Department, but had decided as well against colonizing Illinois. He did not know either that Lord Shelburne had proposed a plan to transfer oversight of the western Indian trade to the colonial governments. Put another way, unbeknownst to him, everything was falling apart. What would he do when he did know? Where would he go to realize his

43 For malaria-weakened garrison, conference details, purchase of goods, statements about land purchases and illicit trade, and contraction of malaria see Croghan to Johnson, 10 Sept. 1766, IHC, 11:372-373; see also Croghan to Gage, 10 Sept. 1766, GPAS, Vol. 57, UMCL.
dream of fabulous wealth? Would he be able to trade with the Indians? Would he be able to speculate in land? What would he do?44

In 1775 The History of the American Indians was published in London. Its author was James Adair, who like Croghan was an Irish immigrant who had become an Indian trader. Besides dedicating the book to Croghan and two others, Adair acknowledged that Great Britain and her colonies were indebted to Croghan, who in 1766 alone had given her and her colonies “more real service in a few months, than all our late southern commissioners of Indian affairs could possibly have done in ages.” Adair had asked Croghan about the perils and plights of his 1766 mission to Illinois, and Croghan had replied in measured fashion. Performing his duties, “acting the part of a beloved man with the swan’s wing, white pipe, and white beads, for the general good” of his nation and “its red neighbours,” Croghan had had “no leisure to think of any personal dangers that might befall a well-meaning peacemaker.” His reply was like that of an Indian orator—measured and metaphorical. In his years on the frontiers of North America he had become something other than an Irish immigrant: He had become an American. Yet he had also become a new kind of conqueror, one who employed the conventions of intercultural diplomacy against the very Indians with whom he made peace. That is to say, he employed their diplomatic conventions to soften up not only them for conquest but the continental interior as well.45

44 For promise of gold watches see Antonio de Villoa, 11 Oct. 1767, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 27, HSP; for Felix Sicard’s bill for lodgings see “To Alexander Colden Etc.,” SWJP, 5:422; for Dobson see [Croghan] to [Dobson], 29 Nov. 1766, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 15, HSP; for Dobson’s bill see Croghan to Gage, 29 Nov. 1766, ibid., Box 198, Folder 2, HSP; see also [Croghan] to [Dobson], 29 Nov. 1766, ibid., Box 204, Folder 15, HSP; for provisions for voyage see Croghan’s Accout with Bartholomew Macnamara, ibid., Box 198, Folder 3, HSP; for policy changes see Shelburne to Gage, 11 Dec. 1766, IHC, 11:456; see also Peter Marshall, “Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy, 1764-1768,” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Apr. 1971): 12-13.

Chapter 11: Inveterate Opportunist

The Sally docked in unseasonably busy New York harbor on Saturday afternoon, 10 January 1767. The New-York Gazette reported that among the passengers who disembarked with Captain Peter Dobson were “Col. George Croghan, one of the Superintendents of Indian Affairs, and several other Gentlemen, who went by way of Pittsburgh to the Illinois, to make Peace with the Southern Indians, which ‘tis said having happily effected, they went down the Mississippi to New Orleans.” Straightaway Croghan and his friends went to George Burns’ Broadway Tavern for dinner, wine, and sangria. On Monday he and Samuel Wharton met General Thomas Gage. In behalf of Wharton, who sought to contract with the army to provision Fort Chartres, Croghan advised Gage to hold Illinois for colonization, which would generate revenue for the Crown. Countering that the cost of holding Illinois far outweighed the advantages, Gage rejected the advice and withheld Wharton’s contract. Dejected, Croghan sent a copy of his official report to colonial agent Benjamin Franklin, who gave it to Lord Shelburne. “You have doubtless render’d great Service to Government by your Negociations among the Indians,” Franklin wrote Croghan on 14 April. “I take every Opportunity of mentioning it, and I hope you may in time obtain some suitable Reward.”

Croghan tarried for three weeks before he presented his account to General Gage, who upon perusal criticized its extravagances. The criticism irked Croghan. What did Gage

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1 For “Col. George Croghan” see New-York Gazette, 15 Jan. 1767; for like coverage of Croghan’s arrival in New York see New-York Mercury, 12 Jan., 2 Feb. 1767; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 15 Jan., 5 Feb. 1767; see also Newport Mercury, 12 Jan. 1767; see also Boston Evening-Post, 2 Feb. 1767; for Dobson see [Croghan] to [Dobson], 29 Nov. 1766, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 15, HSP; see also Croghan to Gage, ibid., Box 198, Folder 2, HSP; for tavern bill see account with George Burns, ibid., Box 198, Folder 1, HSP; for Wharton’s desire to provision Fort Chartres see Croghan to Gage, 12 Jan. 1767, Shelburne Papers, 48:9, UMCL; for Croghan’s recommendation and Gage’s rejection of it see Croghan to Franklin, 27 Jan. 1767, BFP, 14:12-16; see also Gage to Johnson, 28 Jan. 1767, DHNY, 2:836-837; for “You have” see Franklin to Croghan, 14 Apr. 1767, BFP, 14:121.
know about frontier diplomacy or its costs? Unable to abide such ignorance anymore and in spite of Sir William Johnson’s appeal to reconsider, Croghan announced his retirement from the king’s service. “I have for the last time advised him to think farther about it,” Johnson wrote Gage, “and indeed I should be at some loss if he pursued his inclinations.” Croghan was adamant, for Gage had refused to recompense him for private losses in the line of duty. Besides, this question occupied him: What should he do with the curios he had collected on his 1766 journey west? He settled on gifts. He shipped Johnson head-dresses and mandrake (likely mayapple) and the Reverend Thomas Barton of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, garfish and elk horns. He boxed fossils (two tusks, some pronged teeth, a jawbone with two pronged teeth) for Lord Shelburne and fossils (four tusks, a vertebra, three pronged teeth) for Benjamin Franklin. He acquainted Shelburne and Franklin with the fossils by letters dated 16 January 1767. Bringing the boxes with him though he still suffered from malaria, he did not report to Johnson Hall, but instead went, accompanied by friends, to his estate in Philadelphia to recover. On 7 February he shipped the boxes to London. Their contents would spark an international sensation.²

In the 19 October 1767 issue of the Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, one “G. W.,” a newspaperman who had examined the fossils in New York City, quoted Croghan’s journal: “Some of the Tusks which we carried away, were above a Fathom in

² For expenses see “Croghan’s Account of Expenses on Journey to the Illinois,” 22 Feb. 1767, IHC, 2:511; see also “Account of George Croghan,” [22 Feb. 1767], SWJP, 7:264-265; for “I have” see Johnson to Gage, 29 Jan. 1767, DHNY, 2:238-239; for exotica for Barton see Thomas Penn to Reverend Barton, 17 Jun. 1767, Penn Correspondence, 9:133, HSP; see also Thomas Penn to Reverend Barton, 20 Jul. 1768, ibid., 9:271-272, HSP; for exotica for Johnson see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 240; for fossils for Shelburne and Franklin see “List of Fossils Sent by George Croghan to the Earl of Shelburne and Benjamin Franklin,” 7 Feb. 1767, BFP, 14:25-29; for letter to Shelburne about fossils see Croghan to Shelburne, 16 Jan. 1767, Shelburne Papers, 48:10, UMCL; for Croghan’s arrival in Philadelphia see Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, 2 Feb. 1767; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 12 Feb. 1767; see also New-York Gazette, 16 Feb., 23 Feb. 1767; see also New-York Journal, 12 Feb. 1767; see also New-York Mercury, 16 Feb. 1767; see also Boston Post-Boy, 2 Mar. 1767; see also Massachusetts Gazette, 5 Mar. 1767; see also Connecticut Courant, 16 Feb. 1767. Croghan wrote another letter about the fossils and sent it to Franklin, but today the letter is lost.
Length, and Two Hundred Pounds Weight—the Grinders and lesser Teeth seemed a good deal petrified.” Opining that the teeth had belonged to elephants, he challenged readers and newspapermen to explain why the elephants had vanished from the Americas. In the next issue of the weekly he presented a reader’s request for more details and conjectured that elephants had migrated from Asia to North America and from North America to the other Americas. The evidence for his conjecture was the fossilized teeth. In the 19 November issue of the weekly he reported that “several Gentlemen, who had the Opportunity of seeing Ivory Tusks in Africa, and elsewhere, pronounced these, Elephants Teeth.”

Benjamin Franklin wrote Croghan on 5 August 1767 to thank him for the “elephants’ tusks and grinders,” which were puzzling “on many accounts.” No colonist had seen a live elephant in North America. No North American Indian tradition evoked elephants. Why had so many elephants died at Big Bone Lick and so few elephant fossils been discovered at other spots in the Americas? The tusks resembled those of the African or the Asiatic elephant in form and texture, yet the “grinders” were unique as they were “full of knobs” like those of a carnivorous animal, whereas the teeth of the modern herbivorous elephant were “almost smooth.” Yet there was no other tusked animal to which the teeth might belong. “It is remarkable, that elephants now inhabit naturally only hot countries where there is no winter, and yet these remains are found in winter country,” Franklin observed. Elephant fossils were found in Siberia when rivers overflowed their banks, yet Siberia was wintrier than the Ohio River “country” where Croghan had found the fossils.

It appeared “as if the earth had anciently been in another position, and the climates differently placed from what they are at the present.” Franklin had entered the colonial debate on the origins of the North American elephant.⁴

On 26 November 1767 Franklin’s friend Peter Collinson read a scholarly paper before the Royal Society during the first exhibition of the fossils in London. Collinson credited Croghan with the discovery and preservation of the fossils and conjectured that the tusks had belonged to elephants and that the teeth had not. The teeth were the “pronged teeth of some vast animal” but resembled no teeth of “any great animal yet known.” Because no living elephants or like animals had “ever been seen or heard of in all America” since Europeans first arrived, it was unlikely that elephants or like animals had been “brought” to North America from Africa or Asia or had “inhabited” the Ohio River “country” where Croghan had found the fossils. North American winters were just too cold for elephants or like animals to survive. Although Collinson could not account for elephant fossils in North America, he could account for those found on the banks of the Ob River in Siberia. In ancient times the biblical deluge had drowned the elephants and then driven their carcasses northward from their habitat in Asia. When the waters subsided, they deposited the carcasses where fossils were now found. In closing, Collinson challenged his audience to account for elephant fossils in North America. Before the Royal Society a few weeks later he read another scholarly paper, wherein he concluded that the fossilized teeth Croghan had found on the Ohio River had belonged either to “another species of elephant, not yet known” or to “some vast animal” with elephantine tusks and “large grinders peculiar to that species, being different in size and shape from any other animal yet known.” The different species of elephant or the vast animal had been herbivorous.

⁴ For quotations see Franklin to Croghan, 5 Aug. 1767, BFP, 14:221-222.
because it had been “designed for the biting and breaking off of the branches of trees and shrubs for its sustenance.” Franklin later adopted this view.5

The English anatomist William Hunter compared and contrasted the fossils in the Croghan collection with those preserved in the Tower of London and reported his findings to the Royal Society on 25 February 1768. The American fossils were not elephant remains but rather the remains of a distinct species that he called “the American incognitum” and believed carnivorous, a species whose “whole generation” was “probably extinct.” This was a revolutionary idea on both sides of the Atlantic because it was hard for anyone—even scientists—to believe that either God or Nature would have created a species that could not cope with its environment. In his Notes on the State of Virginia (1787) Thomas Jefferson, for example, stated, “Such is the oeconomy of nature, that no instance can be produced of her having permitted any one race of her animals to become extinct; or her having formed any link in her great work so weak as to be broken.” In the last volume of his Natural History (1749-1767), French naturalist Georges Buffon cited Croghan and his fossils, which were deposited in the British Museum in 1768. Thirty years later French naturalist Georges Cuvier established that the fossils of elephant-like animals of different continents represented distinct forms of extinct species. To the animals represented by Croghan’s 1767 find he gave the name mastodontes, which today is mastodon. A mastodon was not a mammoth, which once inhabited Siberia and North America. The correct name for mastodon is mammut and for the Croghan mastodon Mammut americanum.6

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6 For “the American incognitum” see fn. 5, BFP, 14:27; for “Such is the oeconomy” see Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (London, 1787), 83; for citation see Buffon, Natural History, General and Particular,
Croghan hosted a parade of partygoers at Monckton Hall while he recovered fully from malaria: Dr. Challon, Dr. George Anthon, Edward Ward, Hunter Sedgwick, Captain Norman MacLeod of the Indian Department—Croghan called MacLeod’s bride “Dear Little Helen of Greece”—merchants, statesmen, speculators, and pioneers. He bought fancy chairs and upholstered them with green damask. He repaired worn backgammon tables. He bought decanters, glasses, casters, cruets, spirits, and port and stocked his spacious cellar with hogsheads of rum, casks of Madeira, and cases of claret. He probably got the cases of claret from his friend and ex-business associate Bartholomew Macnamara of New Orleans. He bought beef and mutton and veal and chicken and pork and butter and bread. Doubtless, his proclivity for indulging in purine substances (alcoholic beverages) and flesh (animal proteins) caused his debilitating gout attacks. “That old English Hospitality once so much & so justly boasted of, has taken refuge in Monchton Hall, and retired to live with cordial unfeigned Friendship under the same happy Roof,” Sedgwick wrote him before sailing to England. “Farewell! my worthy Friend, Time place, prosperity or Adversity shall never make me forget thy many Virtues.”  

Between parties Croghan sent Proprietor Thomas Penn a report about his 1766 western mission and inquired about the statuses of his petition for twenty thousand acres in New


7 For Croghan’s parties and partygoers and for “Dear Little Helen of Greece” see Croghan to Johnson, 23 Feb. 1767, IHJ, 11:513-514; for Croghan’s purchase of chairs and for Croghan’s repairs to backgammon tables see account with Benjamin Randolph, n.d., Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 198, Folder 6, HSP; for Croghan’s new chairs and new upholstery see account with Plunket Fleeson, n.d., ibid., Box 198, Folder 6, HSP; for Croghan’s food purchases, etc., see account with William Henry, 7 May 1766-12 Feb. 1767, ibid., Box 198, Folder 1, HSP; see also Croghan’s accounts with other merchants for 1767, ibid., Box 198, Folders 1-3, 6, 10, HSP; for Croghan’s expression of thanks for previous shipment of claret from New Orleans see Croghan to Macnamara, 19 Mar. 1768, ibid., Box 201, Folder 29, HSP; for “That old English Hospitality” see Hunter Sedgwick to Croghan, 10 Jun. 1767, ibid., Box 203, Folder 16, HSP.
York and his memorial for remuneration for losses. Croghan entreated Penn for a forty thousand-acre grant of the tract Penn would surely annex when the Crown reset the western boundary line in North America. Rather than promising to grant Croghan land, however, Penn acted in his behalf after learning that the Crown had granted him just ten thousand acres in New York. Penn petitioned the secretary of state for American affairs for ten thousand more acres for Croghan. The petition succeeded.8

In March 1767 Croghan traveled to Johnson Hall to be initiated into the Masonic Lodge founded by his mentor in the previous year. He bought Masonic-emblazoned glasses, but his initiation was either the highlight or the lowlight of the only Masonic meeting he ever attended. Johnson persuaded him to withdraw his resignation from the king’s service and Gage to give him £1,732, which covered half of his estimated £3,364 in losses in the line of duty. Inspired by his mentor’s founding of Johnstown—a nearby village of more than a hundred settlers—Croghan hatched a scheme based on proven stratagems to circumvent law, which permitted only the governor to buy or grant Indian lands and limited the size of grants to one thousand acres. One stratagem had a speculator buy lands from Indians and fudge the deeds. Another stratagem called for a speculator to form a dummy company of a ninety-nine hires (or straw men) and to apply for a grant of 100,000 acres. When the governor granted the acres, the hires would quit the company, thus leaving the acres to the speculator who had hired them. Now and then a governor would buy Indian lands for favored persons. Such actions of course were illegal.9

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8 For Croghan’s report to Penn and for Penn’s petition for additional 10,000 acres for Croghan see Thomas Penn to Croghan, 11 Apr. 1767, Penn Correspondence, 9:107, HSP; see also Thomas Penn to Croghan, 12 Sept. 1767, ibid., 9:118, HSP; see also Thomas Penn to William Allen, 19 May 1767, ibid., 9:188, HSP; see also Thomas Penn to Croghan, 9 Jan. 1768, ibid., 9:213, HSP; see also Thomas Penn to John Penn, 13 May 1768, ibid., 9:253, HSP.

9 For Croghan’s Masonic initiation see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 242; for Croghan’s withdrawal of resignation and for Johnson’s request for compensation for Croghan see Johnson to
Croghan devised a stratagem to exploit his status. He would apply to Governor Henry Moore for permission to buy Indian land. When Moore granted permission, Croghan would dicker with the Indian landowners over price. When the Indian landowners set a reasonable price, Moore would buy the land with Croghan’s money and the land would be surveyed and patented in Croghan’s name. Before Croghan could realize his scheme, however, Sir William Johnson ordered him to Fort Pitt to thwart an Indian rebellion over illegal settlement and trade. While settlers violated provincial law by encroaching upon Indian lands, Indian traders violated the Board of Trade’s restrictive policy by trading at Indian villages. Lacking real authority, the Fort Pitt commissary, for example, could not coerce errant traders to trade at Fort Pitt only. Croghan arrived on 24 May. Soon he met the local chiefs and promised that Sir William Johnson and General Gage would redress their grievances. When his promise assuaged the chiefs’ villages, he left for Philadelphia, where Governor John Penn queried him about the Indians who were to accompany surveyors Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon on their expedition to determine the boundary between Pennsylvania and Maryland. “It would be very difficult to manage this business without his assistance,” Governor Penn wrote Joseph Shippen on 17 June.10

Croghan went to New York City and petitioned Governor Moore on 27 June for forty thousand acres between Lakes Otsego and Canandaigua. According to the petition Croghan possessed a deed signed by the acres’ former owners. He and thirty-nine business

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10 For Croghan’s stratagem see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 243; for illegal settlement, illegal trade, and Indian threat of rebellion see Johnson to Gage, 1 Apr. 1767, *DHNY*, 2:843-845; for Croghan’s departure for Fort Pitt see *Georgia Gazette*, 29 Jul. 1767; for Croghan’s promise to Indians at Fort Pitt see Croghan to Gage, 3 Jun. 1767, GPAS, Vol. 65, UMCL; for “It would be” see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 244.
partners, long-time Pennsylvania friends, would present them to Governor Moore. Once the former landowners, Indians all, verified their previous sale, Croghan and his business partners would “buy” the acres from Moore. On 6 July, satisfied with the petition, Moore licensed him and his business partners to “buy” the acres from him after he had bought them from the Indian landowners. Croghan went to Johnson Hall and found his mentor suffering from a damaged thigh that had pained him since 1761, when a musket ball had lodged in the thigh during the Battle of Lake George. Now the simple act of mounting a horse was excruciatingly difficult for him. In August he visited recently discovered Lebanon Springs in present-day Columbia County, New York, in the hopes that its allegedly curative waters would ease his pain. Croghan accompanied him there.\(^{11}\)

The respite ended when this rumor forced them to act: The Senecas and twelve western tribes were to meet on Shawnee ground to decide whether to form a united front against the British. Johnson would go west to forestall the conference and Croghan farther west—to Détroit, in fact—to do likewise. Croghan boarded an Albany sloop for a six-day run to New York City. He met General Gage, who ordered him to ascertain the intentions of Détroit Indians and create goodwill by delivering two Détroit warriors jailed for murdering a colonist. Gage also ordered Croghan to Michilimackinac to deliver orders recalling Major Robert Rogers for misbehavior. Going west via Philadelphia, Croghan met Samuel Wharton and talked of circumstances. The Crown had not reset the western boundary line, and they had not obtained a land grant to cover their losses in the Indian trade. They hatched a scheme to force the Crown’s hand. They would represent the rumored Indian

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rebellion as the stirrings of a broader conflict that the Crown could forestall by buying a large tract from western tribes and resetting the western boundary line to encompass it. The tract could be the divide between colonial settlements and Indian hunting grounds.12

Croghan and Wharton advised friends and business partners, including William Franklin and Sir William Johnson, to write influential Englishmen about the necessity of resetting the western boundary line to stop the Indian rebellion. While proprietary supporters wrote Thomas Penn, their opponents wrote Benjamin Franklin. On receipt of the letters Penn and Franklin made cases to Lord Shelburne, who might be sympathetic because he had lately recommended that the Board of Trade found a colony in Illinois and shift management of the Indian trade from the Indian Department to the colonies. To buttress his recommendation, Shelburne had cited Croghan-penned letters. Franklin gave Shelburne letters from Joseph Galloway and Samuel Wharton as well as more letters from Croghan. All of the letters reported that western tribes expected to see a new western boundary line and to receive payments for any lands they ceded and that if the western tribes did not see these things happen there would be war. The reports surprised Shelburne, who conveyed the letters to the Board of Trade, which on 23 December 1767 recommended that a new western boundary line be run “to prevent the fatal Consequences of an Indian War that seems at present to threaten the Middle Colonies.”13

12 For rumor see Johnson to Gage, 6 Sept. 1767, DHNY, 2:863; see also Croghan to Johnson, SWJP, 5:700-702; for missions see Croghan to Franklin, 2 Oct. 1767, BFP, 14:271; for sloop and Gage’s orders see Croghan to Johnson, 14 Sept. 1767, SWJP, 5:676-677; for Philadelphia meeting see Wharton to Franklin, BFP, 14:257-260; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 245.
13 For friends and business partners see Croghan to Johnson, 1 Mar. 1768, SWJP, 5:700-702; for necessity of resetting western boundary line to avoid Indian rebellion see Croghan to Penn, 1 Oct. 1767, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 28, HSP; see also Wharton to Franklin, 30 Sept. 1767, BFP, 14:257-260; see also Johnson to Shleburne, [Oct. 1767], DRCNY, 7:985-986; for Penn’s case see Thomas Penn to John Penn, Penn Correspondence, 12 Dec. 1767, 9:200-201, HSP; for Franklin’s case, contents of letters, and conveyance of letters from Croghan, Galloway, and Wharton see Benjamin Franklin to William Franklin, 25 Nov. 1767, BFP, 14:324; for “to prevent” see “Extract from a Report of the Lords of Trade to the Earl of Shelburne, 1767,” 23 Dec. 1767, PA, 1st ser., 4:281.
The activities of Croghan, Wharton, and their colonial business partners were typical of members of colonial land speculation companies between 1763 and 1775. Colonial merchants like Wharton funded such companies internally, while wealthy and influential men in England funded them externally and supported them politically. Because political support in London was as necessary to profitable land speculation in North America as money, enterprising colonial speculators like Croghan and Wharton would persuade agents, business partners, and especially statesmen to try to interest politically important men in England in specific land schemes in the hopes that these men might obtain the Crown’s blessing in the form of a land grant. While their business partners were trying to obtain Crown approval for individual land schemes, schemers like Croghan and Wharton would take “positive action” on the claims: They would “buy” land from Indians and survey it quickly, then move small groups of settlers to its best spots and found villages and trading posts on the spots. The final step was necessary because “squatters’ rights” were a factor in determining ownership of contested lands. Any land speculation companies that maintained ownership rights would benefit from squatters’ improvements.14

While his friends and business partners tried to get British officials to reset the western boundary line, Croghan journeyed west. He reached Fort Pitt on 16 October and learned from Indians that an intertribal conference on Shawnee ground had been postponed until the spring. He stayed a week at Croghan Hall, which he had rebuilt after rebellious Indians had burned it in 1763. En route to Détroit he met village chiefs to ascertain their sentiments. At Détroit he reconciled differences between its commissary and Indian traders and privately met Indian chiefs to ascertain their sentiments. The chiefs were glad to see

him but suppressed their sentiments, so there was little for him to do. Bidding goodbye to Dr. Anthon, who had resumed his practice at Détroit, Croghan left for Monckton Hall in Philadelphia. He arrived there in early January 1768.\textsuperscript{15}

On 6 January 1768 the Pennsylvania Assembly debated the issue of frontier unrest. Who was to blame? Speaker Joseph Galloway blamed Governor John Penn, but both proprietary supporters and opponents blamed squatters. The Assembly summoned Croghan for “further Intelligence concerning the present Dissatisfaction of the Indians, and the Number of Settlers on the unpurchased lands about Redstone Creek and Cheat River.” Before the Assembly next day he stated that “there were about three Hundred White men there” and the Senecas had forgotten neither the murders of Conestoga Indians at Lancaster nor the encroachment of Conestoga Indian lands nor the provincial government’s indifference toward the crimes. Murder and encroachment—these were the reasons why the Senecas were attempting to form a united front against the British. A new western boundary line would prevent future murder and encroachment. Next day the Assembly resolved to instruct its London agents “to solicit Orders from the Crown for establishing a Boundary between the Colonies and the Indians.” The Assembly passed a law making settlement of Indian land a capital crime for everyone except Croghan, whose service to the king and rapport with Pennsylvania’s Indians had earned him the exception and even permission to enlarge his lands.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} For postponement of intertribal conference see Croghan to Gage, 18 Oct. 1767, GPAS, Vol. 71, UMCL; see also Croghan to Johnson, [18 Oct. 1767], SWJP, 5:736-738; for Croghan’s Détroit activities see Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, 28 Dec. 1767; for Croghan’s arrival in Philadelphia see Pennsylvania Gazette, 7 Jan. 1768; see also New-York Gazette, 11 Jan. 1768.

\textsuperscript{16} For “further Intelligence” and for “there were about” see PA, 8\textsuperscript{th} ser., 7:6077, 6079; for coverage of Croghan’s 7 February 1768 statements before Pennsylvania Assembly see Pennsylvania Gazette, 25 Feb. 1768;
Croghan went to New York City and petitioned Governor Henry Moore for the right to survey the Otsego tract when Moore bought it in May. Moore granted Croghan the right and bought the tract with money Croghan gave him, and Croghan got the tract surveyed even as events forced him to do his job. “I find the General has still the same fears of a ruper this spring with the Indians,” he wrote Sire William Johnson on 2 February, “& I have nott endaverd to lesen them, butt he seems much embarisssed as if he did nott know what to do.” General Gage reinforced the western forts, but they could not quell a widespread Indian rebellion inflamed by German immigrant Frederick Stump and his German servant, John Ironcutter. Stump had settled in Pennsylvania at present-day Middleburg, which sits east of the Appalachians. Like many farmers Stump doubled as a rum-seller. In January a party of six Indian customers (a Seneca man, three Mahican men, and two Indian women) had become disorderly. To quiet them, Stump and Ironcutter had murdered them. The murderers had then gone to the Indians’ camp and murdered another woman, two girls, and a small child. Stump had scalped his victims and even taken a victim’s hair and ears. For Ohio Indians, he had thus turned drunken murders into a war declaration. In due time authorities had apprehended him and jailed him in Carlisle, where he had awaited extradition to Philadelphia for trial until a mob of local sympathizers fearful of the precedent-setting trial had sprung him. The incident had combined with settlers’ incursions west of the Appalachians to outrage Iroquois as well as Ohio Indians and raise a war rumor that had compelled many settlers to flee the western frontier. Unable to defuse the crisis, the Pennsylvania Assembly summoned Croghan to Philadelphia.17

for “to solicit Orders” and for laws see PA, 8th ser., 7:6082, 6105, 6115-6117; for laws see Pennsylvania Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, 29 Feb. 1768; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 3 Mar. 1768.

17 For grant of survey warrant see New York (Colony) Council: Calendar of Council Minutes, 1668-1783, 533; for “I find” see Croghan to Johnson, 2 Feb. 1768, SWJP, 6:91-92; for Stump incident see Croghan to Johnson, 7 Feb. 1768, ibid., 6:96-97; see also Indian Proceedings, Congress with the Six Nations, Chero-
Croghan made the trip despite worsening rheumatism. When he advised the Pennsylvania Assembly to fund condolences, it appropriated £2,500 for the Indian Department. Sir William Johnson apportioned £1,300 for condoling with Iroquois and £1,200 for condoling with Ohio Indians awaiting Croghan at Pittsburgh in hopes of getting an explanation for the murders. Johnson had yet to order Croghan west with a condolence gift, so Croghan attended to personal matters. Expecting to move into a house on his Otsego tract, he rented Monckton Hall. He satisfied creditors who had taken him to court in the last year for payment. In June 1767 alone his lawyer, Joseph Galloway, defended him three times in court. In December he satisfied a 2 May 1766 mortgage to Thomas Wharton for £500 Pennsylvania money, bought two lots of fourteen acres, promptly mortgaged four acres to William Franklin, and suffered a devastating £1,000 judgment for a fifteen-year-old Ohio Company bond. Richard Peters and Daniel Clark demanded their money back once judges ruled that twenty-five of forty tracts he had sold them in 1763 were unfit for sale. Richard Hockley demanded the £2,000 he had guaranteed Hockley as part of the transaction. William Buchanan and Barnabas Hughes demanded more than £3,000 that was due them after judges rejected his argument that he was not liable for debt incurred by Thomas Smallman. He appealed to Samuel Wharton’s brother Thomas for help in February 1768. Thomas, having lent him money two years earlier, endorsed his nine bills of exchange with a London merchant for £625 sterling.18

18 For rheumatism and trip to Philadelphia see Croghan to Johnson, [7 Feb. 1768]. SWJP, 6:96; for appropriation and its apportionment see Johnson to Croghan, 5 Mar. 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll.
In March, Croghan lived large, forgetting his financial woes long enough to celebrate St. Patrick’s Day with the Royal Regiment of Ireland, which had arrived from Ireland and taken quarters at the Second Street barrack. To his delight but to the distress of Quaker merchants, the rollicking regiment fired several celebratory volleys over the popular Coffee House. In the evening he and thirty regimental officers dined on beef and claret at Peg Muller’s while he toasted Sir William Johnson and the Iroquois. Next evening he treated the officers to dinner at Centre Hall near the race track. His bill listed charges for forty bottles of wine, broken glasses, and punch. Throughout the evening he carried in his pocket two dispatches from Sir William Johnson. The dispatches, dated 5 March 1768, contained instructions for the Fort Pitt conference and news of preliminary Crown approval of a new western boundary. According to the instructions, he was to buy goods worth £1,200, condole with Ohio Indians, assuage their “Resentment,” present the goods in a “Publick Manner,” and give assurances that the provincial government would apprehend the culprits and punish them in accordance with law. He was also to tell the Indians that the provincial government would pass laws “to prevent all Acts of Cruelty and Injustice for the Future” and that Johnson was condoling with the Iroquois.¹⁹

¹⁹ For dinner bill see “Con‘t Croghans Bill of Entertainment,” 19 Mar. 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; for “Resentment,” “Publick Manner,” and “to prevent” see “Instructions for George Croghan Esq’,” 5 Mar. 1768, ibid., Box 202, Folder
Croghan went west via Chester, where he met select Philadelphians for the purpose of forming a clandestine syndicate for acquiring the restitution rights of Indian traders who had suffered losses in 1763. The select included Samuel Wharton, Thomas Wharton, and Joseph Galloway, who was the speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly. Biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright theorizes that Galloway’s presence necessitated the “out-of-town rendezvous” because public men like Galloway preferred to “to keep their connection with this group of speculators quiet.” An express rider from Carlisle appeared at the meeting —how secret could the meeting have been if he went to Philadelphia to find Croghan and was told to go to Chester?—with this news: The Cumberland County pioneers who had discovered the contraband scalping knives in 1763 and recently sprung murderous Frederick Stump from jail were threatening not just to prevent Croghan from meeting Ohio Indians at Fort Pitt, but to kill him if they caught him. “Should those Lawless People persist in their Intentions and Col. Croghan be cut off,” Thomas Wharton wrote Benjamin Franklin, “it will be One of the Most fatal strokes that can happen to those Governments [the colonies] as there is no Person besides Himself whom the Indians to the Westward have full confidence in and a War will in all probability immediately follow.”

Croghan wrote the commander of the Philadelphia garrison for an escort from Lancaster. The commander sent the escort, which upon arrival at Lancaster found that Croghan

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32. HSP; see also Johnson to Croghan, 5 Mar. 1768, SWJP, 6:136-137; see also Croghan to Johnson, 18 Mar. 1768, ibid., 6:161-162; for preliminary Crown approval see Johnson to Croghan, 5 Mar. 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 32, HSP; see also New-York Gazette, 16 May 1768.

20 For Croghan’s departure see New-York Gazette, 4 Apr. 1768; see also Georgia Gazette, 4 May 1768; see also Providence Gazette and Country Journal, 9 Apr. 1768; for Wainwright’s theory, “out-of-town rendezvous,” and “to keep their connection” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 251; for express rider’s message see [Croghan] to Lt. Col. Joseph Wilkins, late Mar. 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 29, HSP; see also [ ] to Croghan, n.d., GPAS, Vol. 75, UMCL; for threat see Pennsylvania Gazette, 12 May 1768; see also New-York Gazette, 9 May 1768; for “Should those lawless people” see Thomas Wharton to Benjamin Franklin, 29 Mar. 1768, BFP, 15:88.
had departed for Fort Pitt to prevent a rumored intertribal conference. Croghan made the journey without incident and invited a large number of Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, and other chiefs and warriors to Fort Pitt for conferences. Weeks later they arrived in force, some eleven hundred in all. During public conferences and private meetings from 1 to 9 May 1768 he consoled with them and settled every issue between them and the provincial government but one, the encroachment of their lands. He displayed his diplomatic acumen and skill when he reconciled the Shawnees, who demanded that the British stop navigating the Ohio River and destroy their forts. The display impressed the provincial commissioners and British officers whom he had invited to observe his conduct in hopes that they might dispel rumors of his pursuit of self-interest at provincial expense. After the conference the commissioners submitted their observations to the Pennsylvania Gazette, which printed this: “We are assured that Mr. CROGHAN discovered the greatest Knowledge and Address in the Management of the Indians on this Occasion, and gave Proofs not only of his Attachment to his Majesty['s] Service in general, but the most sincere and earnest Desire to promote the particular Interest and Welfare of this Province.” General Gage stated the timely consummation of the “treaty” averted an “Indian War.”

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21 For Croghan’s request for escort see Croghan to Wilkins, 20 Mar. 1768, GPAS, Vol. 75, UMCL; for likelihood of incident see Croghan to John Penn, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 29, HSP; see also Wilkins to Gage, 1 Mar. 1768, GPAS, Vol. 75, UMCL; for dispatch of escort see Wilkins to Gage, 20 Mar. 1768, ibid., Vol. 75, UMCL; see also reverse side, dated 21 Mar. 1768, ibid., Vol. 75, UMCL; see also Wilkins to Croghan, 21 Mar. 1768, ibid., Vol. 75, UMCL; see also Wilkins to Gage, 25 Mar. 1768, ibid., Vol. 75, UMCL; for Croghan’s arrival at Fort Pitt see New-York Journal, 5 May 1768; for Indians’ arrival at Fort Pitt see Pennsylvania Gazette, 28 Apr. 1768; see also New-York Gazette, 2 May 1768; see also Massachusetts Gazette, 5 May 1768; see also Connecticut Journal and New-Haven Post-Boy, 6 May 1768; for conference minutes see Neville B. Craig, ed., The Olden Time . . ., 1:351-369; for summary of conference see New-York Gazette, 6 Jun. 1768; for rumor about Croghan see Penn to Peters, 11 Jun. 1768, Penn Correspondence, 9:270, HSP; for provincial commissioners see Pennsylvania Gazette, 7 Apr. 1768; see also New-York Gazette, 11 Apr. 1768; see also Connecticut Journal and New-Haven Post-Boy, 15 Apr. 1768; for provincial commissioners and conference summary see Boston Chronicle, 6 Jun. 1768; for conference summary and “We are assured” see Pennsylvania Gazette, 2 Jun. 1768; see also New-York Gazette, 6 Jun. 1768; see also Connecticut Journal and New-Haven Post-Boy, 17 Jun. 1768; see also Providence Gazette and Country Journal, 18 Jun. 1768; see also Georgia Gazette, 10 Aug. 1768; for conference summary and observer’s opinion see Croghan to Thomas Wharton,
To further his own interests and those of partners William Franklin, Joseph Galloway, and Thomas Wharton, Croghan went to Johnson Hall in early June to witness Governor Moore’s purchases of a 40,000-acre Otsego tract though Sir William Johnson was away. With a £3,000 loan from a group of Burlington, New Jersey, speculators, Croghan bought the tract for his partners in return for his sale of another purchase located southwest of the Otsego tract. The Burlington Company included William Franklin. Croghan then bought lands for British army officers and New York land speculators in the likely cession even though he knew legal ownership of the lands depended entirely on the Crown’s resetting of the western boundary line. Now Croghan joined Sir William Johnson in New London on Long Island Sound in southeastern Connecticut. To recover from a “violent disorder of the Bowels” and “severe pains from his old Wound,” Johnson had gone there on 24 April. He and Croghan pondered more than infirmities of middle age. While the Board of Trade had rejected their proposal to plant a colony in Illinois, Lord Hillsborough had superseded their imperial ally, Lord Shelburne, in a newly created position, Secretary of State for the Colonies. The ministry had ordered a reduction of forts in the Old Northwest and divested the revenue-consuming Indian Department of its authority over the Indian trade. Henceforth the Indian Department would be a diplomatic agency operating on a small budget. More important was this: The ministry had decided to reset the western boundary line. Anticipating that the new line would open vast western lands for speculation and settlement, Johnson had already negotiated a treaty with the appropriate Indian chiefs, who had agreed to abide the new line and all payments for lands they ceded.22

7 May 1768, PMHB, Vol. 15 (1891): 430; for observer’s opinion see New-York Journal, 16 May 1768; see also New-Hampshire Gazette and Historical Chronicle, 10 Jun. 1768; for “Indian War” see Gage to Hillsborough, 18 June 1768, IHC, 16:323-324.

22 For Croghan’s purchase of 40,000-acre Otsego tract see Volwiler, “George Croghan and the Development of Central New York, 1763-1800,” The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Associa-
The treaty benefited the “suffering traders” of 1763, the Pennsylvania merchant-traders who since 1764 had been petitioning the ministry for restitution in the form of a grant of Indian land. Croghan formed them into the Indiana Company, which issued them shares commensurate with their losses, which amounted to about £86,000. Although Croghan and William Franklin had suffered no losses in 1763—they had not even been traders—the company issued them shares for pertinent reasons. Besides owning half of Thomas Smallman’s losses to the enemy in 1763, Croghan, for example, had lost £2,250 in improvements to Croghan Hall when Pontiac’s “rebels” had burned it. Although he had rebuilt it and sold it to fellow investors Joseph Galloway and Thomas Wharton, he had not recouped his loss. The company was one thing; the grant was another. The “stockholders” had given William Trent their rights to restitution for thirty to fifty percent of the value of their “shares” once he won the Crown grant. Trent had transferred their rights to John Hughes, who had held them in trust for this secret syndicate: John Baynton, Samuel Wharton, George Morgan, Robert Callender, William Franklin, Trent, and Croghan. Callender had owned a half-share and Croghan a share and a half. Croghan had promised to give his share and a half to Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan, then reneged, giving his share and a half instead to syndicate spokesman Wharton. The deal had offended Baynton and Morgan, whose firm was in receivership because it had fared poorly after entering the Illinois trade upon Croghan’s advice. Croghan meantime had lent syndicate attorney Trent £1,319 for obtaining the Crown grant. In short, former “shareholder” Croghan was acting as the company’s “banker” and therefore had a stake in the company.23
Of course the get-rich scheme depended on the willingness of Indians to sell lands once the Crown set the new western boundary line. Croghan, Wharton, and Trent turned to Sir William Johnson for assurances of just that in June 1768, at a meeting on Fisher’s Island at the eastern end of Long Island Sound and at a meeting in a tavern at the mouth of New London harbor. At each meeting Johnson vowed to make the “sales” happen. Croghan and Wharton accompanied Johnson to Lebanon Springs for respite. By mid-July, Johnson was back at Johnson Hall and Croghan at his Lake Otsego tract. While Johnson attended to official business, Croghan attended to his Otsego tract and invited his daughter Susannah and her family to settle it after convincing her husband Augustine to sell his army commission. Croghan hired surveyor Christopher Yates to survey the tract in April, but when its forty thousand acres proved inadequate to his needs, he rehired Yates to aggrandize it in September. When Yates completed the job, he gave Croghan survey maps delineating more than 100,000 acres. Although Croghan had not patented the acres, he improved them. He hired laborers to clear twenty acres at the Susquehanna’s outlet, and he hired carpenters to build a house at the spot, too. He directed his wagoner, “Young Groot,” to wagon food and supplies to the site where Susannah’s house was rising and to boat food and supplies to the site where his house was rising. Things were going swimmingly for Croghan, his daughter, her husband, and their family.  

24 For Johnson’s assurances at meetings see Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 22 Jun. 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 29, HSP; for New London meeting see Boston News-Letter, 30 Jun. 1768; see also Postscript to the Boston News-Letter, 30 Jun. 1768; see also New-Hampshire Gazette and Historical Chronicle, 1 Jul. 1768; see also New-York Journal, 9 Jul. 1768; for Augustine Prevost’s sale of military commission see Prevost to Col. Maitland, received 12 Oct. 1767, GPAS, Vol. 71, UMCL; for Augustine Prevost’s tract see Johnson to Croghan, 29 Feb. 1768, SWJP, 6:123; for Croghan’s land surveys see bills for 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 198, Folder 12, HSP; for Croghan’s land-clearing see “Articles of Agreement” between Croghan and Robert McKain and James Bowles of Cherry Valley, 3 Aug. 1768, ibid., Box 198, Folder 13,
In a bateau Croghan likely accompanied Sir William Johnson and New Jersey Governor William Franklin up the Mohawk River to Fort Stanwix in late September 1768 for an intercultural conference, but Johnson did not open the conference—his largest ever—until 24 October, for Iroquois, Shawnee, and other Indian invitees trickled in. There is little of substance in the minutes because Johnson conducted his real business privately with Iroquois chiefs and colonial speculators. He presented the chiefs goods and cash, for which they granted William Trent and his “suffering” associates a 2.5 million-acre swath of Iroquois hunting ground south of the Ohio River in what are now West Virginia and eastern Kentucky, released a captive, publicly ceded vast tracts in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to the Crown, and accepted a new western boundary line that traced tramontane frontiers from northern New York to the Tennessee River. Signed on 5 November 1768, the treaty featured two so-called Indian-initiated conditions. The first condition required the Crown to validate all land sales in ceded areas, like the “Indiana Grant” to Trent and his associates. The second required the Crown to grant Croghan ceded land if the Penns appropriated his 200,000-acre, Pittsburgh-area “purchase” from the Iroquois in 1749. But upon reviewing the treaty the Board of Trade censured Johnson for incorporating private conditions into it. In short, the lobbying efforts of the Indiana Company, and of Samuel Wharton, had succeeded. So had Johnson’s and Croghan’s efforts to further the company’s interests and their own. Trent, for one, appreciated their “uncommon Kindness.”

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By this time Croghan had assumed costly familial duties and accumulated huge debts. One of his familial duties was the maintenance of William Croghan at the Indian Queen. William was the son of Croghan’s Dublin agent, Nicholas Croghan. The shared surname likely means that George and Nicholas were relatives. So does this: George apprenticed William to New York and Albany merchants Thomas and John Shipboy. Meanwhile the huge debts were due or overdue. Croghan paid some with borrowed money and borrowed money to pay others, ignored some loans and defaulted on others, always anticipating the fortune he would make in land speculation, when he would have the wherewithal to pay his debts and live as a squire on Lake Otsego. Inexplicably, he bought fourteen acres adjoining Monckton Hall in Philadelphia and mortgaged the enlarged estate and a few New York lands to New Jersey Governor William Franklin for £1,800. Franklin was a member of a recent syndicate of Croghan, John Baynton, Samuel Wharton, George Morgan, and others. At Croghan’s insistence its “lawyer,” William Trent, prepared to voyage to London with Wharton to obtain royal confirmation of their grant. Croghan, Baynton, and Morgan financed the trip. Although he was the trip’s greatest financial contributor, Croghan managed to support Trent’s wife Sarah while Trent was away. Croghan managed to appease his most persistent creditors in December 1768 and January 1769, too.\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{26}\) For William Croghan’s apprenticeship see Nicholas Croghan to [George Croghan], 17 Jul. 1769, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 29, HSP; for recent syndicate and funding see “Articles of Agreement between Lieutenant-Governor William Franklin, George Croghan, John Baynton, George Morgan, Robert Callender of the one part, and William Trent and Samuel Wharton of the second part,” 30 Dec. 1768, Etting Coll., No. 40, Ohio Company, Vol. 1, Folder 56, HSP; for Croghan’s support of Sarah Trent see payments to John Shipboy, 3, 12 Apr. 1769, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 198, Folder 16, HSP; for Croghan’s appeasement of persistent creditors see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 260.
Croghan returned to New York in late January 1769 and accompanied Governor Moore and two speculators, a husband and his wife, to Johnson Hall. By accompanying Moore there Croghan fulfilled his commitment to him. By validating Croghan’s previous land purchases from the Iroquois, Moore honored his promise to Croghan. A few weeks later Croghan petitioned Moore for 100,000 Lake Otsego acres and acres Croghan held in the names of three men including Alexander McKee. The petition for the latter was a ruse, for the three men had agreed to turn over the lands to him. To further his petition for the 100,000 Lake Otsego acres, he formed a speculative company whose sixty stockholders included wealthy and influential New Yorkers—four Fondas, four Phillipses, four Quakenbushes, four Vroomans, and one Van Rensselaer. He had recruited them to add political and aristocratic muscle to his petition because originally he had petitioned Moore for 40,000 acres only. Moore had granted the original petition. If he validated the additional 60,000 acres and the acres held in the names of McKee and the others, Croghan had only to survey and patent the acres to fulfill the colony’s requirements for legal ownership.²⁷

Croghan returned to Philadelphia to settle his affairs so that he could move to his Lake Otsego estate in New York, but he discovered that he could not settle his affairs so long as financial issues engaged his energies and consumed his time. William Buchanan and other creditors sued him in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over the Thomas Smallman debacle, but as usual he appeased them. To Buchanan, for example, he gave two bonds. A Dr. John Morgan cosigned one of the bonds in the amount of £1,000. To convince him to cosign the bond, Croghan presented a mortgage for four thousand New York acres and estimated their worth at £4,000 though their real value was £400. Dr. Morgan accepted

²⁷ For Croghan’s return to New York see Daniel Campbell to Johnson, 6 Feb. 1769, SWJP, 6:618-619; for land grants in New York see New York (Colony) Council: Calendar of Council Minutes, 1668-1783, 540-541.
the mortgage, so Buchanan accepted the bonds and Croghan likely avoided debtors’ prison. Despite being cash-strapped he seized an economic opportunity when the provincial government opened Pittsburgh-area lands for purchase. Several times he applied to buy some for speculation, and then he concentrated on settling his affairs. He hired servants and sent them to his Lake Otsego estate, which he called “Croghan’s Forest.” He offered the use of Monckton Hall to Samuel Wharton’s wife and bought £1,000-worth of goods from the mercantile firm of Barnard and Michael Gratz for use in appeasing Indians, and then he left for his Lake Otsego estate.28

En route Croghan visited his daughter Susannah and her children, who lived in a simple log cabin that her husband Augustine and hired laborers had built after clearing sixteen of ten-thousand acres Croghan had given him. Croghan went by bateau to his estate, which rose among white pines at the southwestern tip of Lake Otsego, which teemed with trout, salmon, pike, pickerel, and shad. Deer and bear roamed the surrounding hills in search of food. Now and then geese wheeled overhead, filling the air with honks. In other words there was food above and about his estate, hearty food that enabled him not only to enjoy the simple yet satisfying pleasures of hearth and home, but also to recapture a semblance of his glorious early years at Pennsborough Plantation on Conedoguinet Creek in Pennsylvania. He entertained Iroquois at “Croghan’s Forest” as lavishly as he had once entertained Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos at Pennsborough Plantation. One day, several Mohawks literally followed the Susquehanna River from Oghquago to his front door and

28 For Croghan’s letter to arbitrators in case of Buchanan v. Smallman see “George Croghan to William Fisher, Samuel Shoemaker, Thomas Wharton, Edward Penington, and Benjamin Fuller,” 22 Dec. 1768, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 28, HSP; for bond between Croghan and Buchanan see George Croghan’s account with Buchanan & Hughes, 26 Dec. 1768, ibid., Box 198, Folder 11, HSP; for bond between Croghan and Morgan see John Morgan to Croghan, 31 Jan. 1770, ibid., Box 203, Folder 2, HSP; see also John Morgan to Croghan, 9 Nov. 1773, ibid., Box 203, Folder 2, HSP; for Wharton’s wife and purchase from Gratz firm see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 261-262.
demanded that he honor a bond he had given them for their lands. One of the Mohawks was Anglican convert Joseph Brant, who was born in 1743, which was the year after Croghan had emigrated from Dublin to Philadelphia. In 1761 Sir William Johnson had arranged for Brant to be educated at Moor’s Indian Charity School in Lebanon, Connecticut. In late 1779 Brant would marry Croghan’s mixed-lineage daughter Catharine, whose Mohawk name was Adonwentishon.29

Croghan hired tradesmen, laborers, and servants. Most were New Yorkers, but eight—five laborers, a bricklayer, a gardener, and a pregnant dairymaid—were Irish whom merchant Nicholas Croghan transported from Dublin. The gardener and dairymaid were husband and wife, so George sent them east to “be an aditision to the frutfull Johnson Hall.” Nicholas could not fill George’s order for a bagpiper because “a good piper” was “heard to be got at present.” Gradually the tradesmen, laborers, and servants shaped the estate. Two houses and five (or six) outbuildings rose from cleared ground, so delighting George that he planned to build a sawmill and a gristmill, to bridge the Susquehanna, and to build a road to Kaatskill on the Hudson River. The main house was made of logs yet boasted papered walls and andirons, shovels, and tongs at its six fireplaces. Damask covered the kitchen table, whose place settings boasted ivory-handled forks and knives. As George had once ordered food, drink, utensils, and furnishings from Philadelphia merchants for Monckton Hall, so he ordered the like from Albany merchants for Croghan’s Forest. Before long, windows had panes, doors brass locks, rooms chairs, bedrooms chamber pots, and the kitchen housewares. Closets held sundry articles of apparel and two dozen pairs of men’s shoes. Storage held barrels of pork, rum, and sugar, hogsheads of tobacco and

29 For ten thousand acres see Croghan to Johnson, 8 Apr. 1770, SWJP, 7:528; for gift of acres to Augustine Prevost see Photostat, deed, 2 Mar. 1770, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; for Catharine’s marriage to Brant see Kelsay, Joseph Brant, 276.
oysters, casks of oakum and sherry, kegs of raisins, and jars of tea, coffee, and chocolate. 30

Croghan transformed Croghan’s Forest into a facsimile of Pennsborough Plantation. It had a barnyard where hands slopped hogs and fields where hands grew New World and Old World crops and grazed cows, bulls, oxen, and sheep. He was not living so sumptuously as Sir William Johnson, but he was living well, and that was enough for him. In fact, when Johnson appointed him justice of the peace, Croghan respectfully declined the appointment, saying that he had not the least interest in serving the public “in any Station whatsoever.” “[When I] form’d My plan for Setleing in [Otsego],” he wrote Johnson on 8 April 1770, “itt was with a Viwe of retirement & [my] ambition was to become a Sim- [ple farmer in] yf. Niborhood where I Might [have the] plesher of Visiting yf. honor onst in . . . Months for I ashure you I have N[ot a] Viwe to Richess or honours.” A “Voilant fitt of yf. Gout” hobbled him for all but about three weeks of the summer. During his few gout-free weeks he supervised the surveyors who marked the new western boundary line between New York and Indian hunting grounds. When a painful foot dislocation exacerbated his fiery toe, he lay interminably in bed, elevating his afflicted foot to ease the pain as he read letters written by Samuel Wharton and William Trent in London. By October he was fully recovered. 31

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30 For mention of general property improvements see Pennsylvania Gazette, 21 Jun., 26 Jul. 1770; see also New-York Gazette and Weekly Mercury, 27 Aug. 1770; for indentured servants see Nicholas Croghan to [George Croghan], Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 29, HSP; see also “A List of the Peoples Names, and the Cost Nicholas Croghan was at in getting and Shipping them,” n.d., unnamed document, n.d., “Bounty to the undernam’d Servants to buy Necesaries,” n.d., ibid., Box 201, Folder 29, HSP; for “be an adition” see Croghan to Johnson, 23 Sept. 1769, SWJP, 7:188; for contract laborers see Croghan to Fonda, 9 May 1769, C. E. French Coll., Massachusetts Historical Society; for buildings and building plans see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 264.

31 For “in any Station whatsoever,” “form’d My plan,” gout, and Wharton letters see Croghan to Johnson, 8 Apr. 1770, SWJP, 7:529; for “Voilant fitt of yf. Gout” and for surveyors see Croghan to Johnson, 8 Aug. 1769, ibid., 7:77; for survey, surveyors, and twenty days on job see Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 21 Jun. 1769, PMHB, 15 (1891): 430-431; for severity of gout attack and confinement to bedroom see Croghan to
From the letters Croghan learned that after several delays and despite great expense and the best efforts of Benjamin Franklin in their behalf Wharton and Trent had failed to win Lord Hillsborough’s confirmation of the so-called Iroquois-initiated conditions that Sir William Johnson had incorporated into the Fort Stanwix treaty. In fact Hillsborough had rejected them outright, opining that they were the private conditions of a public matter. Having consulted his solicitor and Franklin, Trent was “thoroughly convinced That all the Time, la[bor], and Expence” that he and Wharton had “been at” was “wholly lost” and they would be “plunged into inevitable Ruin.” Yet what most distressed Trent and Wharton was that they had “involved” their “Wives Children and Friends in it” and thus would reduce the “Familys to Penury and Want” unless Croghan exerted himself in their behalf. To “procure success,” Croghan needed to apply all his “Might and Influence” to “perfecting the Indian Grants.” Well before Trent had embarked for London, Croghan had assured him that “if any Objections were started on this side the Water, and that if it should Even be found necessary,” he “would bring over two from Each of the Six Nations” or “do any Thing else that might be thought necessary to accomplish this important Affair, and bring it to a happy Conclusion.” Wharton, too, believed that he himself would “pine away the Remainder” of his days “in Mortification Beggary and Contempt” if the Crown did not confirm the private land grants. He trusted that Croghan and Johnson would not abandon him “to Despair.”

Thomas Wharton, 18 July 1769, PMHB, 15 (1891): 431; for recovery from gout, for severe pain of foot dislocation, and for Wharton letters see Croghan to Johnson, 10 Aug. 1769, SWJP, 7:92; for letters from Wharton and Trent see Croghan to Johnson, 8 Apr. 1770, ibid., 528; for recovery from gout see Johnson to Gage, ibid., 7:221.

32 For bad news see Croghan to Johnson, 21 Aug. 1769, SWJP, 7:113-114; for delays, expense, and bad news see Wharton to Croghan, 3 Apr. 1769, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; see also Wharton to Croghan, 18 May 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; see also WS [Samuel Wharton] to Croghan, 18 May 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 34, HSP; see also WS to Croghan, 27 May 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 34, HSP; see also WS to Croghan, 28 May 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 34, HSP; see also WS to Croghan, 28 May 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; see
The gout attack and foot dislocation forced Croghan to travel by wagon to Johnson Hall to seek his mentor’s help in winning Crown confirmation of the Fort Stanwix treaty provisions that authorized the Iroquois land grants. Figuring that the Crown would relent so as to avoid an intercultural war, Croghan asked Johnson to depict the Iroquois thus in correspondence with the ministry: The Crown’s rejection of the provisions had so angered the Iroquois that they were apt to war against Britain. But regretful of having exceeded his authority in incorporating the provisions into the treaty in the first place, Johnson refrained now from misrepresenting Iroquois sentiment about them. In fact, to right his relationship with the Crown, he held a treaty with the Iroquois from 15 to 23 July 1770 at German Flats, a treaty confirming all terms of the Fort Stanwix treaty save those relating to the private land grants. In a letter to Samuel Wharton, Croghan likened Johnson to Dr. Slop, who was a choleric character in Laurence Sterne’s popular eighteenth-century novel, *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman*. Clearly, Johnson’s restraint in the matter upset Croghan, who desperately needed Crown confirmation of the land grants so that he could sell his shares in them to pay his many debts. In the 21 April 1769 issue of the *New London Gazette*, for instance, he had even advertised the sale of fifty thousand acres in lots of one, two, and three hundred acres though as yet there had been no Crown confirmation of any of the land grants. In fact the advertisement had attracted sixty New England families for settlement of a 23,000-acre township in the fall. The total price for

also [Samuel] Wharton to Croghan, 13 Jun. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 24, HSP; see also [Samuel] Wharton to Croghan, 16 Jun. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 24, HSP; see also [Samuel] Wharton to Croghan 12 Aug. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; see also [Samuel Wharton] to Croghan, 12 Aug. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; see also [Samuel Wharton] to Croghan, 13 Aug. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; see also Trent to Croghan, 10 Jun. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 24, HSP; see also Trent to Croghan, 10 Jun. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; see also Trent to Croghan, 11 Jun. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; see also Trent to Croghan, 13 Jun. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 24, HSP; see also Trent to Croghan, 10 Aug. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 24, HSP; see also Trent to Croghan, 10 Aug. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; for “thoroughly convinced” see Trent to Croghan, 11 Jun. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; for “pine away” see WS [Samuel Wharton] to Croghan, 28 May 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP.
the lots was £4,600. The scheme was testament not only to his desperation but also to his deceptiveness.  

William Gamble was probably an investor in Croghan and Wharton’s latest speculative scheme, for he wrote a lengthy “memorandum relative to Persons residing in the Country and other Matters.” Presumably, those “Persons” were New Englanders who were going to settle in New York and make him rich. They needed seasonal clothing and outerwear and bedtime, household, and equestrian articles, and with New York currency could buy such “imported ready made.” They needed “Necessary Articles in a Family exclusive of Common Food,” like fruits, nuts, grains, legumes, spices, herbs, vegetables, condiments, sweeteners, drinks, cheeses, fats, pickled seafood, and dried seafood. Their families also needed medicinals such as oils, spirits, creams, preparations, plasters, balsams, ointments, barks, sulfates, and roots. Self-sufficiency required “business” articles like indigo, fustic, cochineal, turpentine, and soap. Self-defense, -sufficiency, and -amusement required articles like muskets, pistols, swords, animal traps, fishing equipment, backgammon tables, and playing cards. Besides familial books like a London dispensatory, a gardener’s dictionary, and a good cookery, the persons needed essential household items like furniture, tablecloths, and other coverings. Gamble listed the furniture and coverings and proffered this advice: “Never make use of any Brass or Copper utensil[s] in cooking if possible—Iron or Tin tea kettles are best.” He listed basic farm, smithy, and carpentry tools, too.  

Gamble devised a “scheme” for an eight-volume illustrated universal dictionary (or encyclopedia) for home use—just the thing for ambitious frontier parents and their children.

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33 For minutes of German Flats treaty see DRCNY, 7:227-244; for Croghan’s letter referencing Tristram Shandy see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 266; for advertisement see New London Gazette, 21 Apr. 1769; for Croghan’s expectation see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 266.

34 For New Englanders’ needs and for Gamble’s quotations see William Gamble, 1769, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 8, HSP.
According to the “scheme” the encyclopedia would contain the “substance of all human knowledge, and Inspired Revelation.” Presumably he shared the “scheme” with the semi-literate Croghan, for it is the Croghan papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. If Gamble did share it with Croghan, he did so in vain, for New Englanders never arrived in New York. The turn caused Croghan to fall into a funk. If Samuel Wharton and William Trent did not succeed in obtaining Crown confirmation of the Iroquois land grants, then Croghan would be in even worse financial shape than he already was. In fact, Croghan had Governor Henry Moore and Attorney General John Tabor Kempe to thank for keeping his hope of obtaining royal approval alive. Earlier in the year the New York Council, deeming the land grants illegal, had refused to endorse them, but Moore, who anticipated profiting from the patent fees, and Kempe, who anticipated profiting from the land grants, had pressured the Council to overturn its decision.35

Top government and military officials followed a hard-line regarding the Iroquois land grants, however. Lord Hillsborough wrote Governor Moore, “I trust, no countenance or attention either has been or will be given to any application for those lands [that Iroquois chiefs ceded to the Crown in the Fort Stanwix treaty], either upon the ground of private agreements with Indians, contrary to the directions of the Proclamation of 1763, and not warranted by any orders from His Majesty or upon pretence of orders from His Maj[esty in Council].” General Thomas Gage wrote Sir William Johnson that when complaints of the land grants reached London, the Crown would “absolutely and totally reject the Exceptions Mentioned in the [Fort Stanwix] Treaty.” Given such sentiments, Governor Moore, greedy for the patents, warned Croghan that he must patent the tracts quickly or risk los-

35 For “scheme” and “substance of all human knowledge” see ibid., Box 202, Folder 8, HSP; for decision and its overturn see John Wetherhead to Johnson, 18 Mar. 1769, SWJP, 6:649-650.
ing them. A few weeks later, Moore died and was succeeded by an octogenarian, Cadwalader Colden. Croghan correctly reasoned that Colden would be as greedy for patent fees as his predecessor had been. New York law entitled the governor to a fee of £12 for each 1,000-acre grant, the surveyor general to a fee of £5, and the secretary to a fee of £4. New York law entitled the attorney general to a fee of £3 for each grantee, too.36

Croghan needed £5,561.10 to patent four of his tracts—227,000 acres in all—but since he held only £561.10, he coaxed £5,000 from Albany and New York City merchants who drew bills against Samuel Wharton’s account and sent them to Wharton, who was in London. Croghan insisted that Wharton could pay the bills when in fact Wharton could not even cover his London expenses and had written Croghan for £200. Croghan reasoned that Wharton could raise enough cash to pay the bills by mortgaging or selling Croghan’s Ohio tracts to London speculators, but the London speculators whom Wharton approached showed no interest in the tracts. In November 1769 Croghan went to New York City to patent his tracts, but being cash-strapped, he resorted to the modus operandi that had worked so well and so often for him in like situations in the past: He charmed greedy, gullible, ambitious, compassionate, or sympathetic officials into accepting bonds. So Governor Cadwalader Colden, his son Surveyor General Alexander Colden, Attorney General John Tabor Kempe, and Secretary Goldsbrow Banyar “joined the army of Croghan’s creditors,” writes biographer Nicholas B. Wainwright. Croghan wrote Sir William Johnson that he was delayed “on Acound of them percheses w[h]. was Made att Fort Stanwix w[h]. throu the asistence of Governor Colden & M[r]. Bayaner I gott all Setled & Secur[d]. w[h]. I blive Wold Never a been don had I Nott gott Down att y[c]. Time I Did &

36 For “I trust” see Hillsborough to Moore, 13 May 1769, DRCNY, 7:165; for “absolutely and totally reject” see Gage to Johnson, 23 Jul. 1769, SWJP, 6:66; for Croghan’s reasoning see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 267; for land patent fees to governor and others see ibid., In. 17, p. 267.
Governor Colden Come into the administration.” Johnson ordered Croghan to Fort Pitt
to assuage Indian fears of surprise attack, but suffering from the gout, Croghan petitioned
General Thomas Gage for permission to order assistant Alexander McKee there in his
stead. After receiving permission Croghan instructed McKee to tell the Indians that he
would meet them in the spring. Croghan sent McKee on his way.37

Croghan confined himself to his lodgings to recover from the gout. Visitor John Weth-
erhead wrote Sir William Johnson thus: “He bears [the gout] like [a] Lamb and instead
of Swearing like a Trooper as Some Reprobates would do under Such Intolerable Pains—
He, on the Contrary Poor Soul, does nothing but pray and talk about the Sufferings of the
Inner Man, [of] which He thinks far more than those of the Body—the poor Gentleman
has sometimes a few Qualms about the Tricks of his Youth, which Now [and then] come
out with heavy Sighs & Groans—in Short it woud [do you] a world of good to hear him
talk when perchance a T[winge] catches him by the great Toe.” The sentiments indicate
that Croghan had developed the faith to endure physical and mental pain. His newfound
devotion showed itself in his involvement in Anglican affairs. To Johnson, for example,
he sent a recommendation in behalf of an Irish immigrant, Reverend William Andrews,
for parish work in Johnstown and missionary work among the Mohawks. Croghan hoped
Johnson would excuse his “Liberty,” for although he loved the Church of England “very
well,” he knew that he “ought Nott to Medle with Church Maters.” Yet of Andrews he
wrote thus: “I think he is Modest Young Man & one w[h] you May bring up To answer the

37 For Wharton’s receipt of bills in London see Wharton to Croghan, 6 Dec. 1769, Cadwalader Family Pa-
pers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; for Wharton’s lack of cash see
Trent to Croghan, 5 Dec. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 35, HSP; for Wharton’s request for £200 to cover ex-
penses see Wharton to Croghan, 12 Aug. 1769, ibid., Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; for Croghan’s bond (mort-
gage) to Kempe see Croghan to Kempe, 6 Dec. 1769, ibid., Box 202, Folder 33, HSP; for “joined the ar-
my” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 268; for “Ocationed on Account” see Cro-
ghan to Johnson, 22 Dec. 1769, SWJP, 7:314; for fears of surprise attack see Pennsylvania Gazette, 17
Aug. 1769; for instructions to McKee see Croghan to Johnson, 16 Nov. 1769, DRCNY, 6:420.
Discription of Such a Won as you formerly Chose only he had No Wife But that want your honour No Doubt Soon Suply him with the fruitfull Loanes of your Estate.” The “fruitfull Loanes” were in fact complaisant Mohawk maidens with whom Johnson or his men indulged themselves. Perhaps Croghan found faith to assuage his growing fears of death and eternal damnation. After all, he was a gouty middle-aged man whose wronged creditors and wrecked partners were legion.38

In early December 1769 Croghan quit New York City to appease persistent creditors. Among the creditors who pounced on him when he entered Philadelphia were longtime creditors William Buchanan and Richard Hockley. Croghan owed not only Buchanan, Hockley, and others—including business associates like John Baynton, Samuel Wharton, and George Morgan—£15,000, but also the Ohio Company, which had won a judgment against him. When a gout attack invalidated him, he confined himself to his bedroom in Monckton Hall, where creditors harassed him regularly. Despite his inflamed, throbbing toe, he charmed his creditors into accepting promises of payment and wrote Sir William Johnson that he had “partly Setled” his affairs in Philadelphia and hoped to leave the city “[for] Ever in about a fortnight & Return to yê. banks of Ottsago.” Of course he did not intend to pay the debts, and as soon as he felt well enough to travel, he lit out for Otsego. Henceforth Baynton would refer to him as “abracadabra.”39

February and March 1770 were difficult months for Croghan, for New York was no haven from creditors. Needing cash, he mortgaged a tract to William Franklin and another to Goldsbrow Banyar, but lost the latter to William Peters, who won a judgment against

38 For “He bears” see John Wetherhead to Johnson, 5 Mar. 1770, SWJP, 7:388; for “Liberty,” “very well,” “ought Nott,” and “I think” see Croghan to Johnson, 16 Nov. 1769, DHNY, 419-420.
39 For debts to Buchanan and to Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan see Baynton to Abel James, 20 Feb. 1770, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PSA; for debt to Hockley see Baynton to Abel James, 3 Jan. 1770, ibid., PSA; for instructions to McKee, gout attack, and “partly Setled” see Croghan to Johnson, 22 Dec. 1769, SWJP, 7:314-315; for “abracadabra” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 269.
him for £5,739. The Crown awarded him 18,000-acre Belvidere Township as a reward for his wartime services, but the patent fees amounted to £448, a sum that was more than he could afford. He charmed New York officials into accepting bonds in lieu of cash and portrayed himself as a victim when bills he had drawn against Samuel Wharton’s account arrived for payment. He told friends that he had given Samuel Wharton the money to pay the bills but Wharton had used the money to conduct his negotiations in London. Friends and Iroquois frequented Croghan’s Forest, but creditors did, too. Joseph Brant demanded final payment for Mohawk land sales. Philadelphia’s Michael Gratz and Albany’s Thomas Shipboy demanded immediate payment. Lawsuit-minded John Morton presented bills up to £5,000 and demanded immediate payment. Despite a painful flare-up of gout Croghan appeased him with a bond and so avoided litigation.\footnote{For arrival of Croghan’s bills see Croghan to Johnson, 10 May 1770, \textit{SWJP}, 7:650-651; for Croghan’s mortgage to Franklin see \textit{New-York Journal}, 16 Mar. 1775; see also Julius Goebel, Jr., et al., eds., \textit{The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary}, 5 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964-1980), 4:83; see also Goebel, et al., eds., \textit{ibid.}, Doc. No. 14, 4:116; for Brant demand and for Gratz demand see Wainwright, \textit{George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat}, 271; for Shipboy demand and Morton demand see Daniel Claus to Johnson, 28 Apr. 1770, \textit{SWJP}, 7:608; for frequent visitors to Croghan’s Forest and for Croghan’s feebleness see Croghan to Johnson, 17 Mar. 1770, \textit{ibid.}, 7:487.}

Besides debt Croghan worried about his Pittsburgh lands and his health. He wrote Sir William Johnson that “there is No beter Land in Amerrica Nor Even plesent & helthey a Climett & Nothing Can prevent its Imedeat Settlem\'t. Butt an Indian Broyle with the western Nations w'h. I am Extreamly afrage will Soon Take place[.]” Fear of war caused him to decide to go to Fort Pitt to “Dispose of Some Goods” and to “Sell Some valueable Improvem\'st” before the “Disturbance” breaks out. He would do these things in ten days and then visit Warm Springs in Virginia (present-day West Virginia) to improve his health. He would travel by water—down the Susquehanna to the Juniata and down the Juniata to Bedford County. He would accomplish the final leg of the journey by land on a good
wagon road, but because he could not ride a horse, he would travel by chaise to Warm Springs. If its mineral waters did not improve his health, he expected “Nothing butt to be a Criple for Life.”

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41 For “there is No beter,” “Dispose of Some Goods,” “Sell Some valueable Improvem”,,” and “Disturbance broke out,” see Croghan to Johnson, 10 May 1770, SWJP, 7:651, 653; for journey to Warm Springs and “Nothing butt” see Croghan to Johnson, 3 May 1770, ibid., 7:632.
George Croghan entered Croghan Hall on 2 July 1770, intending to stay for a week, or just long enough, as he supposed, to prevent an intercultural war, but personal business prolonged his stay. There were his local landholdings, which might generate income in his declining years. If he stayed, he could oversee them. There were persistent creditors in New York and Pennsylvania. If he stayed, he could elude them. And there would be speculative action farther west if Samuel Wharton obtained the royal grant. If Croghan stayed, he would be close to the action. He did his duty, learning the true cause of intercultural tensions lay in the east, not in the west. Outraged by the 1767 Townshend Acts, merchants from Massachusetts to Georgia had organized a joint boycott of British goods to force repeal of the legislation. The boycott had drastically reduced imports but forced Indian traders to trade what was on hand—rum, mostly—for skins and furs. Mayhem ensued. Drunken Indians murdered one another; panicky settlers murdered drink-emboldened Indians who approached them for any reason; vengeful warriors targeted Virginians on Monongahela tributaries Redstone Creek and Cheat River. War did seem imminent.¹

To the relief of new Fort Pitt commander Charles Edmonstone, Croghan consulted local Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo chiefs. When they complained of the detrimental effects of “Spiritous liquors,” he assured them that the trade in liquor resulted not from the maliciousness of provincial Indian traders, but from the concerted effort of eastern merchants to boycott imports from Great Britain. In return for his candor the chiefs revealed their intention to attend a war council on the Scioto River in August. Although he was unable

¹ For Croghan’s arrival see Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 10 Jul. 1770, GPAS, Vol. 93, UMCL; see also entry, 2 Jul. 1770, “Journal, Indian Conference, Pittsburg[h], 1770,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 11, HSP; for potentials for speculation and arrest see Baynton to Croghan, 21 Jul. 1770, ibid., Box 201, Folder 3, HSP; for trade in rum and for murders see Croghan to Gage, 13 Jul. 1770, GPAS, Vol. 93, UMCL.
to dissuade them from attending it, he was able to persuade them to promise to meet him before they went west. In early August they honored that promise by meeting him at Fort Pitt. When they complained of the encroachment of their lands and of the spirituous liquors in intercultural trade, he appeased them. To General Thomas Gage, he opined that their complaints were indeed legitimate, for “every Farmer” was “a Sutler” and every Indian trader a conveyer of “little else but Rum,” a practice that caused “disputes & quarrels” between “Indians and his Majestys Subjects.” If the colonies did not act to curtail the trade in spirituous liquors, they would find themselves at war with the Ohio Indians.²

Captain Edmonstone wrote General Gage that Croghan “has been Indefatigable in En-deavouring to quiet the minds of the different Tribes of Indians about this and I dar venture to Say, that we are Indebted to him, for the present tranquility.” Yet Croghan had coaxed out of chatty “Mohiccon John” intelligence indicating several tribes were uniting against Great Britain. Iroquois diplomats had complained to western and southern tribes about British theft of Iroquois lands, so the tribes, fearful of losing their lands, had buried old conflicts with the Iroquois and now were awaiting Iroquois warriors for joint attacks on western British forts in spring 1771. Croghan invited several Ohio chiefs to a session. When they arrived, they complained of the ill-effects of colonial encroachments of their lands, complained too of the increase of spirituous liquors in intercultural trade, and then divulged that the Senecas and the Cherokees had called the Scioto war council. In return for such candor he addressed the chiefs’ complaints. The chiefs thus renewed their ties

² For trade in liquor and for Scioto conference see Croghan to Gage, 13 Jul. 1770, GPAS, Vol. 93, UMCL; for “Spirituous liquors” and for Fort Pitt conference see entries 4, 5 Jul. 1770, “Journal, Indian Conference, Pittsburg[h], 1770,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 3, HSP; for Fort Pitt conference see “Proceedings of Mr. Croghan, deputy Indian agent, with the Indians at Fort Pitt,” GPAS, Vol. 94, UMCL; for “every Farmer” see Croghan to Gage, 8 Aug. 1770, ibid., Vol. 94, UMCL; see also entries 1, 2 Aug. 1770, “Journal, Indian Conference, Pittsburg[h], 1770,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 3, HSP.
with Britain and left for the Scioto River, their intent to prevent the joint attacks against the western forts. They succeeded.  

In the fall Croghan learned how the Fort Pitt conference might benefit him. In London, Samuel Wharton met nobles and influential commoners and found “a Disposition among them to have Estates in America.” He played on their hopes, oft meeting them, proposing “a Plan to them, to become purchasers of a Large Tract On the Ohio, within the Cession made by the Six Nations to the King,” persuading them to petition the Crown for a grant to take in the proposed Indiana tract and Croghan’s 1749 “purchase,” persuading them to form a land speculation company with him and colonists like Croghan. Expecting the Crown to reject his poorly supported Indiana proposal, Wharton deemed the petition the only means for him and Croghan to fulfill their dreams of speculative wealth. He and his associates met the Treasury Board, which set the “Consideration Money” at £10,460.7 sterling, but Prime Minister Augustus FitzRoy, the third duke of Grafton, resigned after just two years in office, forcing Wharton to wait five months before the Treasury Board set a quitrent of two shillings per one hundred acres of cultivable land. In May 1770, facing “a Petition against us, from Colonel [Hugh] Mercer, in behalf of the moribund Ohio Company,” Wharton incorporated the Ohio Company “into Ours, by being admitted as Partners to two Shares, of Ours.” That newer company was the Grand Ohio Company, which Wharton had formed on 27 December 1769 from remnants of two failing companies to which he had belonged—the Indiana Company and the Walpole Associates. Mercer, shares in hand, withdrew his petition, and the ministry recessed for the winter.

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3 For “has been Indefatigable” see Edmonstone to Gage, 11 Aug. 1770, GPAS, Vol. 94, UMCL; for united Indian front see Croghan to Gage, 20 Sept. 1770, ibid., Vol. 96, UMCL; for Fort Pitt conference see Edmonstone to [Gage], 24 Apr. 1771, ibid., Vol. 102, UMCL.
4 For quotations see Wharton to Croghan, 4 Sept. 1770, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 31, HSP; for formation of Grand Ohio Company and for deal
Wharton expected to win royal approval of the petition in the winter or the spring even if the ministry changed, for he and his associates had “secured as much Interest, among the Outs, as with the Ins.” Yet the key to winning royal approval of the petition was not in London, but near Pittsburgh, in the form of Croghan, whom the Grand Ohio Company charged with intercultural peacemaking. After all, there would be no reason to speculate if potential parcel-buyers feared westward migration. For Croghan, however, the responsibility was not as oppressive as the mounting weight of legal judgment and debt. When the Supreme Court of New York found for plaintiff John Morton in October, more New York creditors threatened legal action if Croghan did not return to pay up. Dr. John Morgan wondered why Croghan never answered his inquiries about delinquency. New Jersey Governor William Franklin regretted not only that he had lent Croghan money but that he had bought from Croghan a share in the Otsego tract at the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty, too. Exasperated Pennsylvania creditors sued Croghan in Lancaster, in Bedford, in Carlisle, and in Philadelphia. Michael Gratz wished that he had never met Croghan. George Morgan blamed Croghan for Baynton, Wharton, & Morgan’s losses in the Illinois venture.

To raise money to pay debts, Croghan put up for sale the 200,000 Pittsburgh-area acres he had “purchased” from the Onondaga Council in 1749. At Croghan Hall he opened a

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with Mercer see Peter Marshall, “Lord Hillsborough, Samuel Wharton and the Ohio Grant, 1769-1775,” *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 80, No. 37 (Oct. 1965), 722-723; see also James Donald Anderson, “Vandalia: The First West Virginia?,” *West Virginia History*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Summer 1979): 377-378. 5 For “secure as much Interest” see Wharton to Croghan, 4 Sept. 1770, ibid., Box 203, Folder 31, HSP; for Morton see Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat*, 275; for Dr. John Morgan see John Morgan to Croghan, 20 Jul. 1770, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 2, HSP; see also John Morgan to Croghan, Jan. 1770, ibid., Box 203, Folder 2, HSP; see also John Morgan to Croghan 31 Jan. 1770, ibid., Box 203, Folder 2, HSP; see also John Morgan to Croghan, 10 Jun. 1770, ibid., Box 203, Folder 2, HSP; see also John Morgan to Croghan, 2 Feb. 1771, ibid., Box 203, Folder 2, HSP; for William Franklin see William Franklin to Trent, 14 Jan. 1771, New Jersey Archives, 1st ser., 31 vols. (Newark: New Jersey State Library: Archives and History Bureau, 1880-1923), 10:227-228; for Michael Gratz see Michael Gratz to Barnard Gratz, 6 Jul. 1779, McAllister Coll., LCP; for George Morgan see George Morgan to Croghan, 7 Aug., 1773, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 1, HSP.
land (or real estate) office and staffed it with salesmen who sold tracts to Fort Pitt’s garrison and Philadelphia investors. The tracts, ranging from two hundred to twenty thousand acres, piqued the interest of land speculators as far away as Virginia and Maryland. Over dinner at Fort Pitt’s officers’ club on the night of 18 October 1770 Virginia’s own George Washington, for instance, expressed interest in buying a parcel. Next day over lunch at Croghan Hall, Croghan offered to sell him a fifteen-thousand-acre tract for £750 sterling. When Washington expressed interest in buying the tract, Croghan offered to sell his stake in Vandalia, the colony that the Grand Ohio Company had proposed to found on its future royal grant and named after Queen Charlotte, who was said to have descended from the Vandals. Either Samuel Wharton or Hugh Mercer, who lived now in Virginia, would be Vandalia’s first governor. Croghan did his best to conjure vivid images of Vandalia, but Washington declined to buy the stake in it, saying that he had to see its lay himself before he could take the financial risk. Yet Croghan acted as if Washington not only had promised to buy the stake in Vandalia, but had bought the fifteen-thousand-acre tract as well.

“I am likely to sell another tract to Coll. Washington and his friends,” he wrote Joseph Wharton, Jr. “If I do that, I expect to have one good nights rest before Christmas, which is more than I have had for eight months past I assure you.”

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6 For land office see Robert Lettis Hooper Jr. to Sir William Johnson, 9 Feb. 1771, SWJP, 7:1132; for claim to 200,000 Pittsburgh-area acres see “Indenture, 1770,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 17, HSP; for land sales see “Nº. 1 Conveyance of two ranger’s Officers Rights, 1970,” ibid., Box 204, Folder 17, HSP; see also “Nº. 2 Conveyance of the Rights of Captains of Rangers, to Lands in virtue of the Kings Proclamation,” n.d., ibid., Box 204, Folder 17, HSP; see also “[Edward] Ward’s and [Dorsey] Pentecost’s Applications, Fort Pitt,” 10 Dec. 1771, ibid., Box 204, Folder 17, HSP; for Washington’s arrival at Fort Pitt and dinner and lunch with Croghan see entries, Wed., 17 [Oct. 1770], Thurs., 18 [Oct. 1770], Fri., 19 [Oct. 1770], GWD, 1:410-412; for name of proposed colony see Thomas Wharton to Croghan, 18 Jun. 1773, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 33, HSP; for Croghan’s expectation that Samuel Wharton or Hugh Mercer would be Vandalia’s governor see Jonathan Boucher to Washington, 18 Aug. 1770, GWPCS, 8:367; for “I am likely” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 277. In 1760 Hugh Mercer moved from the vicinity of present-day Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, to Fredericksburg, Virginia. Vandalia was ini-
Washington and his party canoed down the Ohio River and saw likely Vandalia lands. Deeming the lands desirable but dangerous, he did not buy the stake in Vandalia. When his land agent, William Crawford, advised him to pass on the 15,000-acre Pittsburgh-area tract, Washington informed Croghan there was no deal. The news piqued Croghan, who accused Washington of using him to locate good lands and then buying them instead of his tract. There was truth in the accusation, for Crawford had scouted good lands without disclosing his interest in them. Had Crawford done so, Croghan would have added them to his 1749 “purchase” from the Onondaga Council and sold them to Washington. Crawford himself had seen Croghan survey choice unclaimed lands so that they fell within his 1749 “purchase.” Washington rejected the deal for another reason. Was Croghan’s 1749 “purchase” even legitimate? If Proprietor Thomas Penn determined that it fell within his province, he would invalidate it, and his invalidation would void any and all sales of its parcels. Out of spite Croghan later claimed one of Washington’s lands for himself.  

Croghan had been trying to legitimize his 1749 “purchase” from the Onondaga Council since 23 March 1754, when he had first argued that it lay beyond Pennsylvania. His continual efforts in this regard succeeded only in offending provincial bureaucrats. On 24 June 1771, for example, James Tilghman, the secretary of the land office, warned him...
that he was “not only undervaluing the Right of the Proprietors of Pennsylvania to the
lands beyond the Laurel Hill” (a ridge of the Alleghenies in southwestern Pennsylvania),
but “claiming the same and selling them to any body who will purchase.” For Tilghman,
the maneuver was extraordinary, because Croghan “had expressed great Regard for the
Interest of the Proprietors” and “taken up a good deal of Land under them in those parts.”
Did Croghan know the extent of Pennsylvania’s western boundary though it had not yet
been surveyed? Did Croghan know his pronouncements blocked legitimate settlement?
Did Croghan consider “how agreeable it may be to the principles of Justice to take Peo-
pies money for Lands thus circumstanced”? Croghan countered with his usual argument
but added that he could “point out the many hardships the People labour under from the
conduct of the Proprietors Servants, who are, in some respects, all little Proprietaries, cut-
ting up the Country as they please and when any one complains of their iniquitous pro-
ceedings, one & all cry out such a Person is an Enemy to the Proprietary Interest.”

There was truth in Croghan’s reply. Since the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty provincial offi-
cials had been extending their jurisdiction beyond the Allegheny Mountains. The process
entailed the creation of Bedford County in southwestern Pennsylvania on 9 March 1771.
For duplicitous land speculators like Croghan, its accompanying public officers were the
very faces of oppression—justice of the peace, sheriff, constable, tax collector, surveyor.
A fastidious surveyor could ruin any deal, for instance. Reckoning that Pennsylvania’s
western boundary fell twenty miles short of Pittsburgh, Croghan directed his servants to
intimidate the Bedford constable and tax collector and proclaimed new settlers fools if

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8 For Croghan’s argument see Croghan to Peters, 23 Mar. 1754, PA, 1st ser., 2:132-133; for “not only un-
dervaluing,” “had expressed great Regard,” “how agreeable it may be” see Tilghman to Croghan, 24 Jun.
1771, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 23, HSP; for
Tilghman’s opinion see also Crawford to Washington, 2 Aug. 1771, GWPCS, 8:513; for like opinion see
Crawford to Tilghman PA, 1st ser., 4:424-425; for “point out the many hardships” see Croghan to Tilgh-
man, 20 Aug. 1771, Peters Papers, Part II, 7:73, HSP.
they paid taxes before the boundary was fixed, though he denied doing so to Arthur St. Clair, the ex-army officer who was now the Penns’ western agent. Following his example and advice, new settlers petitioned the Bedford court for stays. The petition argued that lands west of Laurel Hill lay beyond Pennsylvania. Settlers favoring Virginia jurisdiction inaugurated a movement to sue the Penns for gross injustice, but the movement faltered, demonstrating that Croghan’s influence on the local populace went only so far. Still, in 1767, Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon had discontinued their survey of the Pennsylvania-Virginia boundary, so the proprietorship of Pittsburgh was up for grabs.9

Over the next few years Croghan skirted the edges of propriety to achieve solvency. He surveyed and sold tracts for the Grand Ohio Company though Samuel Wharton had not yet obtained the royal grant. He claimed 100,000 acres by authority of 772 Indiana Company shares Thomas Smallman had transferred him. Although he owned just 23,852 of the acres, he put up for sale all 100,000. While he informed most creditors that he would have the wherewithal to pay up once Wharton obtained either the royal grant or the royal confirmation of Vandalia, he borrowed £11,839 from one creditor, the affable Philadelphia merchant Barnard Gratz, to improve a few Pittsburgh-area lands, yet pleaded financial hardship to another, the impatient governor of New Jersey, William Franklin. When provincial officials threatened to jail him for his long-overdue debt to Richard Hockley, he got Joseph Wharton, Jr., to loan him more than £2,000 for collateral. Joseph rued the loan when the collateral proved worthless. Occasionally, news that Samuel Wharton was close to obtaining the royal grant or the royal confirmation of Vandalia reached Croghan

Hall, but news that one thing or another had gone awry soon followed. By mid-summer 1771 Lord Hillsborough’s opposition to the Vandalia petition caused Wharton to instruct Croghan to force its approval by obtaining and forwarding supportive petitions from the western settlers themselves—at company cost, if need be. ¹⁰

Wharton devised this scheme to force the ministry’s hand: Croghan was to provoke a phony crisis that the ministry would resolve by establishing Vandalia, which would be bounded by the Ohio River, the Kentucky River, a future line running 90° south to the Cumberland Gap, and a future line running northeast from the Cumberland Gap to Fort Pitt. Upon obtaining the western petitions Croghan did write a very provocative letter on 2 November, one that Wharton could use to spur receptive ministers to act on Vandalia.

“Nott Less than Five thousand Famly’s of his Majestys Subjects have Seated themselves Down in an ungovernable Manner,” the letter read. “Dally Incrasing,” the families acted “Inconsistant with the Good of his Majestys Gineral Intrest in this Cuntry, that, its Sufi- scnt only to alarm all his Majestys Subjects on ye Fronteers of the Suthren Colenys, who have Felt the affects of an Indian Warr [the French and Indian War], w’ is two Recent in thire Memery to be Forgotten, and wh Must Soon Break out Again and phaps with More Vilance.” Croghan “allways imagin’d the Designe of Goverment in Making a boundry with the Indian Nations, & ye King purchissing a Great part of ye Land East of [the 1763 proclamation line], & others his Subjects Likewise purchissing the Residue, was Intended to prevent the Fatel affects of His Majestys Subjects [on the western Indians.]” In short,

¹⁰ For land sales see “[Edward] Ward’s and [Dorsey] Pentecost’s Applications,” 10 Dec. 1771, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 204, Folder 17, HSP; for acreage issue see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 279; for Lord Hillsborough’s opposition to Vandalia petition, for estimate of number of western settlers, and for coverage of costs of Croghan’s getting petitions of western settlers see Trent and Samuel Wharton to Croghan, 21 Jul. 1771, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; for Hillsborough’s opposition and for Wharton’s request for western petitions see Marshall, “Lord Hillsborough, Samuel Wharton and the Ohio Grant, 1769-1775,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 317 (Oct. 1965): 725-728.
only the establishment of a vast western colony like Vandalia could curtail the abuse of Indian rights.\textsuperscript{11}

Croghan then interpreted recent frontier events in terms of proprietorship and diligence:

Making Incrochments into Indians Cuntry which Heretofore Gave Rise to the Frequent quarrels, that hapend\textsuperscript{d} between his Majestys Subjects and those Independant Nations, the Indians Naturly an honest pople hospatble and puntial to thire Ingagem\textsuperscript{e}, & have Ever Sho\textsuperscript{d} a Willingness to Sell part of thire property to his Majestys Subjects to aComedate them with Lands on Moderate Terms, as ye\textsuperscript{e} Subjects Incrase\textsuperscript{d} in Numbers, Butt thire thire pride will Nott Sufer them to Give up any part of thire property without thire Consent and a Moderate Compensa\textsuperscript{tion} paid to them this is thire Idea of publick Justice & Good Fath & when they find No Cair Taken by us, to Mantain that feath w\textsuperscript{h} they Concave [conceive] to be absolutely Necesery to the premoting paice & Tranqility between his Majestys Subjects & them, they Growe Impesant & Jalous and as they are in those cases Rash & inconsidreat Seldom Considering Consequences when they See themselves Neglected & thire Nebour the Six Nations & Cherrokees anully Taken Notice of [by northern and southern superintendents Sir William Johnson and John Stuart respectively] I think the Consequences May be Dread Full to his Majestys Subjects on the Wide & Extensive Fronteers of the Southern Colonys, they have for three years past Sence ye\textsuperscript{e} Traty of Fort Stanwix Seen Vast Numbers of pople Setling on ye\textsuperscript{e} East Side of the ohio River & Filling up that Cuntry without any Kind of Regulararity, Butt Every person Setling where he places [pleases] and ye\textsuperscript{e} Strongest Driveing the Weakest from thire Litle, and Burning one an others houses, w\textsuperscript{h} you will is Every Day the Case, \& so that the Indians by think we shall Soon Drive them from thire Vilidges on ye\textsuperscript{e} West Side ye\textsuperscript{e} boundry Made in the Most Soleme Maner att Fort Stanwix w\textsuperscript{h} you will See by the Copy of a Speech w\textsuperscript{h} I have Inclos\textsuperscript{d} to M\textsuperscript{f} Walpole, w\textsuperscript{h} a deputation of the Western Nations has Taken Down the Cuntry to ye Governor of pensylvaine ___ Maryland & Verginia to be Transmited to his Majesty[.]

At his expense he had tried to keep peace, but poor imperial oversight had allowed intercultural relations to deteriorate to a point where he felt compelled to resign from the service. Only colonization could (1) keep intercultural peace, (2) protect intercultural property, (3) extend the king’s North American dominion in orderly fashion, (4) extract raw materials for British manufacturing, and (5) defend the eastern colonies against Spanish

\textsuperscript{11} For map of Vandalia see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 280; for Samuel Wharton’s scheme see Trent and Wharton to Croghan, 21 Jul. 1771, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; for quotations see [Croghan] to [Samuel Wharton], 2 Nov. 1771, ibid., Box 201, Folder 31, HSP.
or French invasion from the west. “Butt this is Diping into politicks above my understanding,” he conceded. “I shall Leve ye Consideration of itt to those whose province itt is to Force Great Events[.] I write on publick Grounds therefore you May Rely on what I have Wrote to be the Real[.] State of things hear att present[.]”

Almost every statement in the letter save the one about his resignation from the service was questionable. Even his reason for resigning was questionable. He was resigning not because intercultural relations in the west had deteriorated, but rather because he intended to pursue Grand Ohio Company interests on a full-time basis. “I have resigned my appointment as it was absolutely necessary I should do so to secure yr brothers success,” he wrote Thomas Wharton. And his success he might have added. He notified Sir William Johnson, who on 19 September 1771 apprised General Thomas Gage of his “request of being dismissed from his Office, representing the great Charge it is likely to be to him & the Impossibility of his Continuing without enlarging his allowance.” On 2 November, Croghan notified Gage, who replied that the service would miss “so old and experienced a servant.” On 22 May 1772 Johnson stipulated that Croghan was to resume his duties once he sorted out his financial problems. Johnson appointed Croghan’s capable assistant, Alexander McKee, deputy agent pro tempore, but kept Croghan on call because the western Indians preferred to negotiate with him.13

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12 For block and text quotations see [Croghan] to [Samuel Wharton], 2 Nov. 1771, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 31, HSP. Of course Croghan was guilty of like transgressions. For instance, his 1749 “purchase” of Pittsburgh-area Iroquois land was illegal, and therefore his sales of its parcels were illegal, too.

13 For “I have resigned” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 282; for notification to see Johnson to Gage, 19 Sept. 1771, SWJP, 8:262; for notification to Gage see Croghan to Gage, 2 Nov. 1771, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 31, HSP; for “so old and experienced a servant” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 282; for Johnson’s reluctance to permit Croghan to resign see Johnson to Turbutt Francis, 6 Nov. 1771, SWJP, 308; for Johnson’s appointment of McKee and for Croghan’s being on call see Johnson to Gage, 20 May 1772, ibid., 8:491.
In the letter Croghan cited the Proclamation of 1763 for good reason: It had transformed proprietorship and policy. Before 1763 a variety of British colonists—from individual yeomen to speculative groups, from whole towns to colonial governments—bought Indian lands, while an analogous variety of Indians—from individual landowners to small landowning groups, from large villages to whole tribes or nations—sold Indian lands. As the French and Indian War drew to a close in 1763, the British government transformed its relationship with Indians. “From 1763 on, land purchasing became a task performed exclusively by colonial governments, in the name of the Crown, and land selling became a task reserved to tribes,” writes lawyer-historian Stuart Banner. “Indian land sales were transformed from contracts into treaties—from transactions between private parties into transactions between sovereigns.” The letter contained distorted facts and outright lies meant to deceive the British government so that it would confirm Vandalia, whose lands, Croghan claimed, lay outside Pennsylvania. If his claim proved legitimate, the Grand Ohio Company would purchase western lands not from the Pennsylvania government, but from the western chiefs themselves under royal auspices. That is to say, during treaties.¹⁴

A civilian, Croghan labored to recover the glory of Pennsborough Plantation. He built a trading post at Croghan Hall, partnered with Thomas Smallman, and bought goods from Philadelphia merchants Barnard and Michael Gratz. He entrusted the trading post to his clerk, John Campbell, who oversaw the 1,600-acre farm as well. Freed from the day-to-

day management of his farm and trading post, Croghan raised funds to discharge debts. When liens stymied the sale of his Philadelphia estate for £2,000 in 1772, he turned to his New York lands for financial salvation, figuring their sale would yield £5,170, yet rather than selling the lands himself, or entrusting their sale to his land agents, he gave the likeable Gratz brothers the job. They failed to sell any lands in 1772 or 1773, but he regretted neither his faith in them nor his decision to sell. That son-in-law Augustine Prevost had put his Otsego tract up for sale in August 1770 and moved his wife and children to Croghan’s Forest in the winter of 1771-1772 had eased the decision to sell.15

Between 1772 and 1773 gout attacks crippled Croghan, so that he could not go to Lake Otsego or to Philadelphia or to Pittsburgh. During one attack he could not even go from room to room in his house, but he could and did lie in bed, his inflamed toe elevated, his inflamed hand immobilized. He felt fortunate whenever anything diverted him from the pain—the arrival of thirty queries about Indians, for instance. Scots historian William Robertson, researching his History of America (1777), had posed the queries and sent them to a Virginia correspondent, Alex White, who had sent them to Croghan in summer 1773. The queries ranged from Indian anatomy to Indian culture, and Croghan answered

all of them with idiosyncratic flair. Some answers related factual information, and others proffered judgments. To Robertson’s thirtieth and final question, “Has the rise of Spirituous liquors, and the Communication of the small Pox been as fatal to them [Indians] as is commonly Said?” he wrote this, his longest and most revealing, answer:

Speritous liquers [are] the Ruin of thire Naturall Morals, w\(^b\). is Ginerally a Dis-position to honesty hospitality and Fair Daling its Likewise hurtful To Trade & Commerce, aMongst them Yett y\(^c\). Traders Carry itt to them, as itt May be Sup-posed with No very honist Intension, itt Likewise Makes them break thire pub-lick Jugaments [judgments] with us, oftener then I blive they otherwise wold, & prevents them from Imbraseing the Cristian Religion, as to the Small pox, its very Fatel to them and allways will be, Till they become Civelised, as Till then they Cant be brought to keep themselves Warm, and aDopt Such Meshurs as is Nesesary in that Disorder thire Savige Dispision appear only in action att Warr, & when Intoxicated with Liquer fer y\(^c\). Last they oblidg\(^d\) to the Europians[.]

These were the judgments of a conflicted man. On the one hand he praised Indian culture and on the other he blamed his own culture for corrupting it with spirituous liquors that inhibited intercultural trade (or rather his profit-making). Indians were naturally moral, but when they were inebriated, they not only broke treaties, they rejected Western “civil-ization” itself, though they knew they could reduce their number of smallpox fatalities by embracing it. Drink unleashed the savage side of Indian nature, too, the wanton side that retarded settlement. Croghan of course drank spirituous liquors with Indians at his home and on the road. His judgments implied that superior if corrupt British society could im-prove Indian society by supplanting it. Put another way, Indians ought to be conquered for their own good. Thus Croghan claimed moral proprietorship or rather an excuse for profiting off Indians through intercultural trade and land sales.\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\) For gout attacks see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 283; for thirtieth question and block quotation see Alex White to [Croghan], 30 Aug. 1773, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 38, HSP; for Croghan’s support of “civilizing” imperative see Patrick Griffin, Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 37-40, 88, 156, 255.
During this period Croghan’s mood swung from sadness to euphoria. About 22 January 1772 Croghan received the distressing news that a Seneca had murdered Andrew Montour at home. Montour was buried near Fort Pitt. According to Major Isaac Hamilton “a great Number of Indians attended the Funeral,” and some warriors “beg’d a Few Gallons of Rum to drown their Sorrows for the Loss of their Friend.” On orders from the London high command, General Thomas Gage relieved the Fort Pitt garrison in fall 1772, yet he permitted Croghan to use its best building for his own purposes, which coincided nicely with Britain’s imperial interests because intercultural trade had proved the effective forefront of conquest over the years. Croghan instructed his departmental successor, Thomas McKee, to visit the principal local villages to announce the relief of Fort Pitt as a clear if belated declaration of Britain’s peaceable intent toward local Indians. McKee, too, was permitted to use a fort house for his quarters. In winter 1772-1773 Croghan received this good news from Thomas Wharton: The Privy Council had overruled Lord Hillsborough and approved Vandalia; his successor, William Legge, the second earl of Dartmouth, had ordered that western Indians be informed of its approval. The news buoyed Croghan. 17

Royal approval of Vandalia spurred Samuel Wharton into action. He issued Croghan one share of the Grand Ohio Company’s seventy-two stock shares. Croghan figured the share entitled him to 417,000 acres, the choicest of which he could divide into hundred-acre parcels and sell for £10 sterling each. The parcels totaled 360,000 acres, so he stood to profit handsomely from their sale. By 3 February 1773 Wharton was performing a dif-

17 For “a great Number” see Isaac Hamilton to [Gage], 22 Jan. 1772, GPAS, Vol. 109, UMCL; for Croghan’s instructions to McKee see Croghan to Gage, 21 Sept. 1772, ibid., UMCL; for Croghan’s use of Fort Pitt’s best building and house see Gage to Croghan, 21 Oct. 1723, ibid., UMCL; see also McKee to Gage, 21 Sept. 1772, ibid., UMCL; for news of Privy Council’s approval of Vandalia see Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 23 Dec. 1772, PMHB, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1891): 432-434; see also Lewis, The Indiana Company, 120; see also Marshall, “Lord Hillsborough, Samuel Wharton and the Ohio Grant, 1769-1775,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 317 (Oct. 1965): 735.
ferent sort of calculus that was consistent with his lofty new station, governor of Vandalia. From his London perch he instructed Croghan to buy for him “Two of the best Houses in Pittsburgh” or, if the deals were impossible to consummate, to build for him a stylish mansion on the Monongahela River. “I propose this House, only as a temporary One, until We fix on a convenient Spot, for our Capital,” he explained. “But I would nevertheless, have the House finished, in such manner, as that it would be decent, and comfortable; __ fit to receive the Furniture, I shall send from hence.” His advice to Croghan was this: “Keep up your Spirits my Friend! __ you will soon be, not only rich, But a publick, respectable Man.”18

Croghan advised Wharton that neither he nor Wharton could make a penny off the royal grant if the Grand Ohio Company did not negotiate with Ohio Indians on their terms. Wharton advised his London associates likewise, and he and they procured a speech for the Indians. Lord Chamberlain Francis Seymour-Conway, the earl of Hertford, wrote the speech according to this directive from Prime Minister Thomas Walpole himself: It was to be prelude to intercultural land sales. Wharton mailed Croghan the speech but warned to keep it secret from Sir William Johnson and General Thomas Gage. In May, June, and July 1773 Croghan met Ohio Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, and other chiefs and according to their diplomatic conventions delivered the speech, which announced the colony on the Ohio River and its ostensible purpose of supervising intercultural trade justly. Governor Samuel Wharton was to present the Ohio chiefs a preliminary gift at Croghan Hall in the fall, but when they arrived there in the fall, they found neither Wharton nor the gift, for the royal grant was languishing in bureaucratic limbo in London. King George III had

18 For quotations see Wharton to Croghan, 3 Feb. 1773, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 31, HSP.
approved it, but the Board of Trade had taken nine months to draw up a charter for the Grand Ohio Company. Moreover, the king’s advisers had yet to ratify the grant.\(^{19}\)

On 15 October 1773 Croghan wrote Thomas Wharton that Chippewa, Ottawa, Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo chiefs—a hundred in all—were “eating up everything” he had stored for winter use. He begged Wharton for goods worth £2,000 and for £500 in cash to help him survive the winter, but when Wharton shipped no goods and just £160 in cash, Croghan reached into his own pocket to satisfy the diplomatic demands and biological needs of the chiefs and their entourages. He also borrowed money or pawned valuables. In November he reconciled the chiefs to Vandalia and announced the spring arrival of its governor. His expenditures for gifts and provisions for four hundred Indians in summer and fall 1773 totaled £1,365.10.6. He reckoned that only ministerial approval of the Grand Ohio Company charter would justify the expenditures, yet doubted that the charter would be approved. “I thought every thing wold a been finished & the officers of the colony here before this time,” he wrote Barnard Gratz on 27 December; “however, I hope it will take place this winter or layd aside intierely.” He was disgruntled and getting desperate. On 21 October his 100-acre and 350-acre properties in Bedford County had been sold at public auction for nonpayment of taxes, and on 30 November his 200-acre Cumberland County property had been likewise sold too for nonpayment of taxes.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{19}\) For intercultural conference see Wainwright, *George Croghan: George Croghan*, 285; for expenses see entry, 25 May 1773, and entry, 15 Jul. 1773, “The Vandalia Company D’s. to George Croghan for Sundry expences made on an Indian Treaty held at Fort Pitt by Orders from the Honorable Thomas Walpole Esq’. and Sam’ Wharton Esq’,” 1773-1774, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 33, HSP; for delay see Samuel Wharton to Croghan, 3 Nov. 1773, ibid., Box 203, Folder 33, HSP.

\(^{20}\) For Shawnee chiefs see “A Speech of the Shawanese 25th Sept. 1773 Delivered by the Cornstalk in presence of Sundry other of the Headmen and Some Traders, directed to Mr. Croghan,” Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 29, HSP; for Mingo, Wyandot, Ottawa, and Delaware chiefs see “At a Meeting with a Number of Six Nation, Ottawas and Delaware Cheifs. Octr. 7th 1773,” ibid., Box 202, Folder 29, HSP; for out-of-pocket expenses see entries, 12, 30 Oct. 1773, and entries, 1, 15 Nov. 1773, “The Vandalia Company D’s. to George Croghan for Sundry expences made on an
Another disgruntled doubter, Virginia Governor John Murray, fourth earl of Dunmore, exploited the bureaucratic obfuscation and delay. In summer 1773 he went to Pittsburgh to enlist Croghan’s aid. He probably colluded with Croghan, given these two facts: He recognized Croghan’s 1749 “purchase” from the Onondaga Council and designated Croghan crony John Connolly as western agent. Born in Lancaster, educated in Philadelphia, Dr. Connolly—for whom Croghan had “known Affection” according to John Baynton—had explored the Old Northwest for ten years. Acting for Lord Dunmore and Croghan, Connolly claimed Pittsburgh for Virginia in January 1774, called up Virginia militia to strengthen the claim, and announced his intention to petition the House of Burgesses for county status. The militia occupied Fort Pitt, which he renamed Fort Dunmore. He set up the county magistracy, which included Croghan’s cousin, Thomas Smallman. His appointees as justices of the peace included Croghan and Croghan’s half-brother, Edward Ward. Was Croghan’s appointment a reward for getting Dunmore to seize Pittsburgh and found Virginia’s newest county, West Augusta? Gossips in Philadelphia wondered.21

Their gossip held a scintilla of fact. “Mr. Croghan’s emissaries (and it is astonishing how many he has either duped or seduced to embrace his measures are continually irritat-

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21 For proof of collusion see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 286-287; see also entry, 22 Nov. [1770], GWD, 1:447-448; for “known Affection” see [Baynton] to Croghan, 12 May 1770, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 3, HSP; for Connolly’s actions see Connolly to Washington, 1 May 1774, GWPCS, 10:43; for actions of Connolly and Virginia militia see Aeneas Mackay to Gov. [John] Penn, 4 Apr. 1774, PA, 1st ser., 4:484; see also Aeneas Mackay to Gov. [John] Penn, 5 May 1774, ibid., 4:494-495; see also Jack M. Sosin, “The British Indian Department and Dunmore’s War,” VMHB, Vol. 74, No. 1, Part 1 (Jan. 1966): 43-44; for Connolly’s claim see “Extract of a Letter from the Earl of Dunmore to the Earl of Dartmouth, 1774,” 2 Apr. 1774, GWPCS, 4:483; for “Fort Dunmore” see Dunmore to [Connolly], 20 Jun. 1774, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 4, HSP; for Connolly’s appointments see Aeneas Mackay to St. Clair, 11 Jan. 1774, SCP, 1:272-273; see also [Samuel Wharton] to Croghan, 4 May 1774, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 32, HSP; for Philadelphia gossip see Francis Wade to Sir William Johnson, 6 Mar. 1774, SWJP, 8:1063-1064.
ing them [settlers] against Pennsylvania, and assuring them they are not within its limits,”
Arthur St. Clair wrote Joseph Shippen on 25 February 1774, “so that unless Lord Dun-
more does formally recede from what he has undertaken in this country, it will be next to
impossible to exercise the civil authority.” Croghan used revolutionary rationale to justi-
fy his actions. “I have been long convinced that Fort Pitt and its dependancies was within
the limits of Pennsylvania, and no less Convinced that the Laws of that Province could
have no force or power beyond its limits,” he wrote David Sample on 4 April 1774, “yet
as I have allways considered any law better than no law, I have Countenanced the Law of
that Province hitherto by pleading to some actions brought against me, and being Bail to
others, tho’ at the same time I have allways denied the Jurisdiction by not paying the
Taxes, as in that case my liberty and Property was in as much danger as all the rest of my
fellow Subjects in the Colonies have thought theirs, by submitting to a tax lay’d on them
by the British parliament, and which they have allways withstood.” Since Virginia had
extended its jurisdiction to the forks “by raising the Militia & appointing Civil Officers,”
he could “no longer Countenance” the laws of Pennsylvania “by pleading to any actions
brought against” him. He could tolerate actions brought against him by Virginia, howev-
er. If any colony had “a Right to extend their Laws to this Country,” it was Virginia, “till
his Majesty’s pleasure” was known. Croghan had become a revolutionary of sorts.22

After he recovered from the gout attacks that had inflamed his hands and feet for two
months, Croghan wrote Lord Dunmore about West Augusta and the pursuit of self-inter-
est. Connolly had ordered militia and settlers “of this part of the Colony” to apply to him
“for the Lands” so that Croghan could dispatch Virginia surveyor “M’r Lewis” to survey

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22 For “Mr. Croghan’s emissaries” see St. Clair to Joseph Shippen, 25 Feb. 1774, SCP, 1:284-285; for “I
have been long” and “by raising the Militia” see Croghan to David Sample, 4 Apr. 1774, PA, 1st ser., 4:483.
the lands so that Dunmore could “give Grants for them.” Croghan was taking “this early opportunity” to apply to Dunmore so that Lewis could survey his “property in this part of the Country.” Croghan was “ready to comply with the Terms of the Colony” and to have his “Property put on Quit rent as the rest of his Majesty’s Subjects.” He had “purchased” it from the Onondaga Council in 1749 and increased its value by improving it. At the Fort Stanwix treaty of 1768 Iroquois chiefs had confirmed the “purchase” before a delegation of Virginia diplomats. Pleased by the treaty, King George III had confirmed the purchase in 1769. (In truth George III had not confirmed the “purchase,” but Croghan was not one to let facts distort a self-serving narrative.) About that time the proprietors “set up their Claim to this part of the Country, which they had denyed allways before, and begune to make incroachments on his majesty’s Territories, purchased by Sir William Johnson, for the king at the above mentioned Treaty, and sold large quantities far beyond even their claims, and amongst the rest a great part of my little Property.” His real point was this: He stood to profit handsomely from Virginia’s supplanting of Ohio Indians.23

He rationalized his position thus: “The People who thus purchased of Mr. [Thomas] Penns Agents, made forcible entry’s on my Lands, by which means I have been deprived [of] the use of my property, and had no means of Relief or expectations, till the Colony of Virginia should extend their Jurisdiction, or his Majesty should grant a new Colony; I have often had thoughts of applying to the Colony of Virginia for Redress, but was of opinion I could not with propriety, till the Laws of the Colony were put in force here, a stop put to the incroachments of Pennsylvania.” Croghan asked Dunmore to redress his grievance “by directing Mr. Lewis” or another “to lay off” his lands “agreeable to the lim-

its” of his “Title from the natives Proprietors,” so that the “invaders” of his property might “be convinced” that they had “no Right by any purchase made from Pennsylv[a] or otherways.” But the proprietors rallied, citing their proprietary rights in the west, claiming what historian David Day calls de jure proprietorship. When Pennsylmania and Virginia government officials clashed over transmontane jurisdiction (or de jure and de facto proprietorship), chaos ensued, enabling Connolly to wield almost pasha-like power and to tyrannize his onetime creditor, Croghan, even though Croghan had once saved him from debtors’ prison. It was unfortunate for Croghan when there was no one to save his lands in Tryon County, New York, when on 4 May 1774 a sheriff announced their public sale at auction to satisfy a lawsuit brought by mortgagee William Peters.\(^24\)

While Virginia and Pennsylvania officials conflicted with one another over jurisdictional rights, settlers—especially Virginians—murdered Shawnees and other local Indians who opposed them. The Shawnees retaliated, repulsing a Virginia party in April and alleging Croghan had told them “to kill all Virginians they could find on the [Ohio] River & rob & whip the Pennsylvanians.” Croghan met Delaware and Mingo chiefs in early May and messaged Shawnee chiefs to protect Indian traders in their midst. Despite villages’ anger Shawnee chief Cornstalk provided escort for Indian traders. So Croghan averted an inter-cultural war, promoted the public good (peace and trade) and his self-interest (peace and trade), and enraged settlers who accused him of siding with the Indians. Had the settlers

the chance, they might have murdered him, for Dunmore and Connolly stoked them, for selfish reasons only: Dunmore, to force Indians from lands he coveted; Connolly, to be a man of weight. When Arthur St. Clair went to assess the problem, he found panicky settlers, so he authorized Croghan to raise a militia company of a hundred men. Queried by Connolly about the militia company, Croghan replied, “I have Subscribed with a Number of Gentlemen boath of Virginia & pensylvaine to hier a Number of Men to Reconiter & Scout a Long y^e River ohio Towards Ligonier in order to protect our Fellow Subjects from Flying Down the Cuntry in as itt aperes that a Gineral panick has Sase^d the whole Cuntry[.] I have Likewise hier^d a fwe men to Live with Myself hear & protect My property in Case there Should be any danger & I presume Every Subject has a Right to Do so[.]”

The militia company prevented evacuation and supported intercultural trade, yet Connolly and his allies saw it not as a defender of life, trade, and property, but as a threat to his authority. “The truth is,” Croghan wrote St. Clair on 4 June 1774, “they fond this

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25 For land contest see “Copy of a Speech Sent From the Dallaways Munces and Mohickens by a Deputation of those Nations living on Ohio to the Governors of pensylvaine Maryland & Verginia,” n.d., Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 29, HSP; see also unnamed document. 1 May 1774, ibid., Box 202, Folder 29, HSP; see also Dunmore to [Connolly], 20 Jun. 1774, ibid., Box 202, Folder 4, HSP; see also Gilbert Simpson to Washington, 4 May 1774, GWPCS, 10:45-46; see also Connolly to Washington, 7 Jun. 1774, ibid., 10:87-88; see also Connolly to Washington, 28 May 1774[4], ibid., 10:72-74; see also Pennsylvania Gazette, 2 Oct. 1776; for “to kill all Virginians” see [John Floyd to William Preston], 26 Apr. 1774, Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., Documentary History of Dunmore’s War, 1774 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), 7; for settlers’ fears see Pennsylvania Gazette, 8 Jun. 1774; see also New-York Gazette and Weekly Mercury, 23 Jun. 1774; for Croghan’s meeting Delawares and Mingos see Croghan to Connolly and McKee, 4 May 1774, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 33, HSP; see also Croghan to Connolly and McKee, 5 May 1774, ibid., Box 201, Folder 33, HSP; for Croghan’s messages to Shawnees see “Extract of a Journal of the United Brethren’s Mission to Muskingum, 1774,” entry, 15 May 1774, PA, 1st ser., 4:496-497; for sentiments of settlers and for possibility of murder see Francis Wade to Johnson, 6 Mar. 1774, SWIP, 8:1065; for Cornstalk’s response see “A Speech of the Shawnees to Alex Mackee, 1774, Directed to George Croghan, Esq’, & the Commandant at Pittsburg Capt’n Connolly,” 20 May 1774, PA, 1st ser., 4:497-498; for Shawnee envoy see Aeneas Mackay to St. Clair, 17 Jun. 1774, SCP, 1:312; for Dunmore’s 7 May 1774 response to Mingos and Delawares see Lord Dunmore to [Mingos and Delawares], 29 May 1774, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 4, HSP; for St. Clair’s arrival see St. Clair to John Penn, 29 May 1774, SCP, 1:297; for Croghan’s formation of militia company see Photostat, Connolly to Croghan, 2 Jun. 1774, Cadwalder Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; for “I have Subscribed” see Croghan to Connolly, 3 Jun. 1774, ibid., Box 201, Folder 32, HSP; for Croghan’s defense of public good and pursuit of self-interest see [Croghan?] to Cresap, n.d., ibid., Box 201, Folder 32, HSP.
Diferances Likely to be made up by ye Indians, & find that Nothing butt Misrepresenting our Meshure & Drawing on a fresh Dispute between the Government of Pensylvania & Virginia Can keep this man in Comm'd hear, wherefore I have Determin’d to go to Williamsburge myself & Represent the State of the Cuntry as Soon as I hear ye Event of our Last Mesedges to ye Shawnas by ye Deputys.” Connolly ordered a militia party to Croghan Hall, where Croghan gave its officer a list of his home guard, which included family and a neighbor’s servants. The home guard presented no threat, but Connolly, knowing Croghan blamed him for the rupture in intercultural relations, alerted George Washington thus: Croghan was “specious,” his Williamsburg, Virginia, business being “not for the publick good, but to answer private, & ungenerous design,” his “principle View” being “to endeavour to secure his Indian Grant in Virginia” because the “great Government Scheme” had been “blown over.” He might “impose & carry points,” but if the House of Burgesses heeded him, he would “involve the Colony in trouble, & difficulties, nothing to his credit.” Washington, then, must impede every move Croghan might make.26

Most locals judged Croghan differently. Aeneas Mackay, for one, wrote Pennsylvania Governor John Penn, “Mr. Croghan, who has been grossely abused by our Bashaw [Connolly] lately, is gone to Williamsburgh to Represent every Part of his conduct to the Gover’ and Council in its true light, altho’ others Doubts, I am very Certain, Mr. Croghan is earnest and sincere Respecting that intention, for he joins the Rest of the Inhabitants, in Charging all our present Calamity to the Doctors act.” Croghan broke off his trip when he heard that locals assumed he had fled Pittsburgh. At Croghan Hall a few days later he greeted traders whom three Shawnee chiefs had escorted to Pittsburgh, but Connolly, in-

26 For “The truth is” see Croghan to St. Clair, 4 Jun. 1774, PA, 1st ser., 4:508; for Croghan’s home guard list see Croghan to Connolly, [Jun. 1774], Cadwalder Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 33, HSP; for “specious” and “impose & carry points” see Connolly to Washington, 7 Jun. 1774, GWPCS, 10:87.
stead of praising the chiefs, ordered forty militiamen to arrest or kill them. The chiefs escaped to safe ground across the Allegheny after settlers tipped them off. The militiamen lit out in pursuit, crossed the river, caught up, and shot a chief. Appalled by the senseless violence, the traders composed a memorial and sent it to Governor Penn. Dated 25 June 1774, it accused Connolly of fomenting intercultural conflict to enhance the power of his tyrannical government. Intercultural conflict jeopardized the traders’ lives and fortunes.27

Because he had no provincial or imperial present to give the Indians and no provincial or imperial instructions to guide him, Croghan improvised ad hoc solutions to intercultural problems throughout the summer. He dipped into his savings to buy a present and relied on his experience to guide him. At Croghan Hall he met Delaware and Mingo chiefs and consoled with them and gifted them with goods at his own expense. He made peace overtures to Cornplanter and to other Shawnee chiefs who acted hospitably toward Indian traders. “Whatever may be Mr. Croghan’s real views, I am certain he is hearty in promising the general tranquility of the country; indeed, he is indefatigable in endeavoring to make up the breaches, and does, I believe, see his mistake in opposing the interests of your Government; and I doubt not but a very little attention would render him as serviceable as ever,” St. Clair wrote Pennsylvania Governor John Penn. “Real friendship you must not expect, for, by his interest alone he is regulated, yet he may be useful, as by and by you will probably want to make another purchase.” Self-interest might rule him, but

27 For “Mr. Croghan, who has been” see Aeneas Mackay to John Penn, 14 Jun. 1774, PA, 1st ser., 4:517; for like sentiments see anonymous letter, New-York Journal, 19 Jun., 14 Jul. 1774; for Croghan’s return to Croghan Hall see St. Clair to John Penn, 22 Jun. 1774, PA, 1st ser., 4:523-524; for shooting see “Petition of Inhabitants of Pittsburgh, 1774,” 25 Jun. 1774, ibid., 4:526-527; see also “Deposition of Arthur St. Clair, 1774,” ibid., 4:582-583; for shooting and its immediate aftermath see Mackay to St. Clair, 17 Jun. 1774, SCP, 1:312; see also James Tilghman to St. Clair, 20 Jun. 1774, ibid., 1:313-314; see also St. Clair to John Penn, 22 Jun. 1774, ibid., 1:314-316; for traders’ memorial and related statement see St. Clair to John Penn, 26 Jun. 1774, ibid., 1:317-319.; for excerpts of anonymous account of incidents see Pennsylvania Gazette, 24 Jun. 1774; for anonymous accounts see ibid., 6 Jul. 1774.
he ruled no settlers as if he were an Eastern potentate and alienated no Indians even if his
goal was to enrich himself by settling colonists in Indian Ohio. For example, he opened a
meeting with a Delaware chief thus: “I now speake to you as a friend, to Both Parties,
your Nation and the English, and not by any particular Authority.” To maintain peace, he
influenced Delaware succession to his liking and befriended Mingo leader Guyasuta.28

Croghan could not appease the Shawnees, so he attempted to limit hostilities. He urged
the provincial government to negotiate a settlement, but the provincial government, pre-
occupied with mounting resistance to parliamentary taxation, sent wampum and a speech.
At Croghan Hall he delivered the speech and presented the wampum yet could not sway
the Shawnee chiefs and so did something uncharacteristic: He appealed to remnants of a
former diplomatic rival, the Friendly Association, for help. The remnants balked at helping him, but hearing of his plight, Philadelphia stockholders in the Grand Ohio Company
sent fifty thousand wampum beads, which he considered using for selfish purposes as he
had been stretching his finances to accommodate Indians who were frequenting Croghan
Hall. In August, Iroquois messengers reported Sir William Johnson’s July death. Mean-
time a sheriff had put up for sale Croghan’s New York lands. Although Johnson’s death
had depressed their value, they had sold for a princely £4,840. He aimed to use the sum
to pay his debts until the sheriff absconded with some of the proceeds. When others of
them went uncollected, Croghan received just £900.29

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28 For “Whatever may be” see St Clair to John Penn, 22 Jun. 1774, SCP, 1:315-316; for “I now speake” see
“Indian Speeches, &c., 1774,” PA, 1st ser., 4:554; for Delawares and Mingos see Gage to Johnson, 14 Oct.
1772, SW/JP, 8:616; see also “Meeting between Kayaghstoea [Guyasuta] and William Johnson, on Ohio R,”
5-15 Jan. 1774, GPAS, Vol. 115, UMCL. Croghan participated unofficially in the meeting.
29 For remnants see Thomas Wharton to Croghan, 28 Aug. 1774, Cadwalder Family Papers, Coll. 1454,
Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 34, HSP; for Johnson’s death see St. Clair to John Penn,
SCP, 1:338; for land sales see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 292.
News of a ministerial intent to recognize Vandalia buoyed Croghan though he knew violent colonial reactions against parliamentary taxation—the destruction of royal property in the Gaspee incident and of mercantile property in the Boston Tea Party, for instance—preoccupied the ministry. News-transmitter Samuel Wharton doubted the ministry, for he evoked a three-year-old scheme for purchasing Indian lands sans ministerial recognition when he shipped Croghan goods to realize the scheme. Instead of being stored in the west, the goods were stored on the East Coast, for Lord Dunmore’s War (1774) made all westward shipment precarious. Wharton shipped more goods from London. The goods, worth £4,000 to £5,000, included elegant furniture for his future Pittsburgh gubernatorial mansion. The goods were stored on the East Coast, at Georgetown, to be exact. Wharton did not know that Croghan had secretly purchased from Indian chiefs a 1.5-million-acre tract for £6,000 or that the deal had stipulated that Croghan could not settle the tract for fifteen years or until its one-time Indian owners vacated it for better hunting ground.

In September 1774 Lord Dunmore went to Pittsburgh to organize a force to defeat the belligerent Shawnees because the House of Burgesses had refused his request for militia. As he organized the force, he paused to query Croghan about Dr. John Connolly’s accusation that Croghan had not only incited Shawnees to murder Virginia settlers, but aided Pennsylvania against Virginia in the transmontane jurisdictional dispute, too. In reply, Croghan demolished the accusation, so Dunmore, needing help in managing the Ohio In-

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dians then in Pittsburgh, made this deal: He would name Croghan a Virginia magistrate and provide legal title for all the lands Croghan had bought from Indians over the years in exchange for Croghan’s promise to support Virginia in the region. Afterward, Dunmore marched his force from Pittsburgh. A land speculator who witnessed the spectacle wrote a friend, “Stocks ought to rise.” Although Dunmore campaigned victoriously in the region, Colonel Andrew Lewis of Augusta County won the decisive Battle of Point Pleasant (or Battle of Kanawha) at the mouth of the Great Kanawha River in present-day West Virginia on 10 October 1774. Some eight miles from the main Shawnee town, near present-day Circleville, Ohio, Dunmore negotiated a favorable treaty for Virginia, one wherein vanquished Shawnee chief Cornstalk yielded all Shawnee territory south of the Ohio River.\(^\text{31}\)

Afterward, Dunmore led his force back to Pittsburgh. He stationed seventy men at Fort Dunmore (formerly Fort Pitt) before he departed for Williamsburg, Virginia. When he arrived there, he attempted to secure Augusta County by moving its court from Staunton to Pittsburgh and by establishing Croghan to preside at the court’s sessions. On 16 May 1775 twenty-eight Pittsburgh patriots formed a committee of correspondence for Augusta County. Headed by Croghan, the committee resolved to raise a militia and to support the Massachusetts patriots who had fought British regulars at Lexington and Concord on 18 April 1775. In “Hanna’s Town” in newly formed Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania,

\(^{31}\) For Connolly’s accusation see Dunmore to Croghan, 14 Sept. 1774, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 202, Folder 4, HSP; for Connolly’s accusation and Croghan’s reply see [Croghan] to [Dunmore], [Sept. 1774], ibid., Box 201, Folder 33, HSP; see also [Croghan] to Dunmore, 15 Sept. 1774, ibid., Box 201, Folder 33, HSP; for Dunmore’s deal see James Corbett David, *Dunmore’s New World: The Extraordinary Life of a Royal Governor in Revolutionary America—*with Jacobites, Counterfeitors, Shipwrecks, Scalping, Indian Politics, Runaway Slaves, and Two Illegal Royal Weddings* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 87; for “Stocks ought to rise,” see Alexander Ross to Matthew Ridley, 16 Sept. 1774, Ferdinand J. Dreer Autograph Collection, HSP; for Dunmore’s campaign and its aftermath see John E. Selby, *The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783* (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988), 17; see also David, *Dunmore’s New World*, 88-90.
patriots formed a rival committee. The geographical-jurisdictional divide was Laurel Hill: To its west was Augusta County and to its east Westmoreland. “We have nothing but musters & committees all over the country, and everything seems to be running into the greatest confusion,” Arthur St. Clair wrote Governor John Penn on 25 May.32

Besides notifying the Continental Congress that Dunmore had roiled the backcountry, the Augusta County committee of correspondence endorsed John Connolly’s call for an intercultural conference to ratify a supplement to Dunmore’s treaty with Cornstalk. Dunmore himself needed to attend the conference for it to be consequential, but facing rebellion in Williamsburg, he assigned Connolly the task. The conference nearly went awry when a twenty-man gang led by a sheriff of rival Westmoreland County “took Major Connolly about midnight, and carried him as far as Ligonier the very night before we were to have the talk with the Indians [Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingos].” The committee persuaded the gang to release him and so the conference began on 19 June 1775. When it produced the supplement, which reestablished Pennsylvania jurisdiction at Pittsburgh, Connolly disbanded the Fort Dunmore garrison and departed Pittsburgh for Williamsburg, where he learned that Dunmore had taken refuge aboard a British warship. Connolly boarded the ship and never returned to Pittsburgh.33

Croghan read a letter from Samuel Wharton on 12 July. Forwarded from Georgetown by William Trent, it suggested that if ministerial validation of the royal grant proved impos-

sible, there was the Indiana grant, whose title was “good, lawful and sufficient” according to a “sound” barrister at Westminster Hall. Wharton, needing millions more acres, had sent Trent from London to Pittsburgh to aggrandize the Indiana grant for a London-based speculative syndicate that had designated two shares for Croghan. Trent was to joinCroghan “in endeavouring, immediately, to accomplish the Purchase,” which Croghan had “so positively” declared he “could make.” Because of the “declaration” Wharton had devised “a Plan of Purchase” and “procured the great Cargo for it, Now lying in Maryland.” If Croghan failed to make the purchase, Wharton would “be injured, beyond all Description.” Wharton iterated that Croghan ought to make the purchase immediately, for pending parliamentary legislation called the Quebec Act would “declare all Purchases of the Natives made, after that Act, by private Persons, illegal & void.” Croghan ought to make the deal secretly, too, for Sir William Johnson’s successor, Guy Johnson, might employ the Six Nations to counteract it.34

Croghan read a companion letter from William Trent. Dated 22 June 1775, it asked whether Croghan had bought the acres. On 13 July, Croghan replied that he had not because of bureaucratic delay in London and “yé Trubles between England and America.” He did offer to sell Trent and Wharton part of the “Small Tract” (1.5 million acres) he and four friends had bought from Indians in 1774, but did not disclose that three days earlier he had bought a six-million-acre tract at the Allegheny’s headwaters for twelve thousand Spanish dollars. For Guyasuta and other Mingo sellers the tract requited Croghan for “the great justice and integrity of the said George Croghan, used and exercised by him toward the Six Nations and their allies in all his publick and private conduct and

transactions.” Croghan sold a fifth of the acres to Virginia speculator Thomas Walker for five thousand Spanish dollars and transferred others to creditors. He promised Wharton that he would aggrandize the Indiana grant in spring 1776, but made the promise before learning there would be no ministerial validation of transmontane land purchases from Indians. Wharton urged him to use stakes in future purchases to bribe eight members of the Continental Congress into validating deeds, but the scheme went for naught because the American Revolutionary War focused congressional attention on pressing matters.35

Croghan fretted. In spring 1775 he had attempted to liquidate £24,000 in debts. Arguing that his transmontane lands lay beyond Pennsylvania’s future western boundary, he had entrusted 45,498-acres to creditors. He had also marketed his Lake Otsego tracts, save Croghan’s Forest, which he had kept for his son-in-law, Augustine Prevost, but because Otsego had been the locale of devastating Tory raids, the tracts were unsalable. When Croghan had tried to profit from the tracts through shady deals, he had betrayed his true character to his dupes. He had mortgaged forty thousand of the acres to Loyalist William Franklin, twenty thousand of the same acres to Thomas Wharton, and nearly all the acres to other parties. “On the whole,” Wharton had written James Duane on 18 March 1775, “I must say this affair wears a very disagreeable aspect.” Wharton had been kind. William Franklin had not been so kind about a different affair. He had sued Croghan not on-

35 For “ye Trubles” see Croghan to Trent, 13 Jul. 1775, Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 363; for “the great justice” see Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 296; for sale and conveyance see Thomas Walker to Croghan, 22 Jul. 1777, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 203, Folder 28, HSP; for promise see [Croghan] to [Samuel Wharton], 14 Nov. 1775, ibid., Box 201, Folder 34, HSP; for assurances see William Murray to Michael Gratz, 15 Sept. 1773, Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Paper, 461-462; see also [Samuel Wharton], Plain Facts: being an Examination into the Rights of Indian Nations (Philadelphia, 1781), 102-103; see also [Samuel Wharton], View of the Title to Indiana (Philadelphia, 1775), 24; for bribery see Samuel Wharton to Thomas Wharton, 7 Aug. 1775, Wharton Family Papers, Coll. 708 A, Vol. 29, Ser. 1, Correspondence, HSP.
ly for outstanding mortgage payments dating back to 10 March 1770, but for legal title to the mortgaged lands as well.  

In summer 1775 Croghan journeyed to Berkeley Warm Springs in Virginia (now West Virginia) to assuage his achy joints and heal his boil-inflamed back, but when the waters did neither, he returned to Pittsburgh and saw that Virginia commissioners were lending their expertise to congressional commissioners who were conducting a conference with Shawnee chiefs. The presence of the Virginia commissioners miffed him. Heretofore he had been the master of all Pittsburgh intercultural negotiations; now he was an outsider. Although his joints ached and his boil oozed, he joined William Trent, George Morgan, and six other men in opening a land (real estate) office to parcel the Indiana land grant. His partners judged the grant sound because he had obtained it from the rightful Indian landowners at the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty, but neither the congressional commissioners nor the Virginia had validated the land grant at the Pittsburgh conference. Ultimately Virginia blocked his attempt to obtain authoritative recognition of the grant, and the Continental Congress organized an Indian Department that appointed not him but Indian trader Richard Butler as its Pittsburgh agent. Swallowing his pride, he advised Butler about British influence on Old Northwest tribes. He also advised the tribes to be neutral. 

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Croghan still influenced Indian affairs. On 27 October 1775 he called a meeting of his committee of correspondence to review a charge against William Trent. The charge held that Trent, while he was in London, had accepted £40 from Lord North “‘to see the Indians cut our throats.’” The committee examined documents presented by Trent and so not only exculpated him of the charge, which had appeared in a Maryland newspaper, but authorized him to sue its author, too. About winter 1776 Croghan called a meeting of his committee to review allegations against his departmental successor, Alexander McKee. The allegations held that McKee was a traitor. The evidence against McKee was slim—he had received a dispatch from Fort Niagara’s Loyalist commander—but in April 1776 the committee nevertheless forced him to pledge allegiance to the Patriot cause and to accept “parole” in Pittsburgh. When the committee learned of Richard Butler’s intent to retire from active duty, it recommended Croghan for the job, but the job went instead to his former business partner, George Morgan, who sought not him but McKee for advice on Indian affairs. Gouty and dispirited, Croghan visited Berkeley Warm Springs in summer 1777 with Barnard and Simon Gratz, who buoyed him as he recuperated. When he felt better, he went to Williamsburg at their expense to obtain Virginia recognition of his land sale to them. He failed, then returned to Pittsburgh with dispatches from Virginia Governor Patrick Henry to Fort Pitt’s new commander, General Edward Hand, who had bought land from Croghan once. The dispatches alleged a plot hatched by Pittsburgh turncoats. General Hand arrested suspects like Alexander McKee, George Morgan, and Simon Girty and ordered Thomas Smallman to relinquish papers. The arrests exacerbated local tensions. So too did an incident near Croghan Hall on 24 August 1777, when either a Wyandot war party or a Chippewa war party wounded a colonist.38

38 For Trent affair and “‘to see the Indians’” see Pennsylvania Evening Post, 30 Nov. 1775; for McKee af-
Croghan himself fell under suspicion because of his past associations with McKee and Morgan, his past service to the Crown, his reputation for shady dealing, his son-in-law’s rank in the British army, and his recent support of Trent. To avoid arrest, he fled to Philadelphia with his clerk John Campbell and servant James Forrest. The three men resided at Monckton Hall, where a gout attack so invalided Croghan that he could not flee when a British army commanded by General William Howe occupied the city. After stationing the bulk of the army at outlying Germantown, Howe ordered Croghan to his headquarters and queried him about his role in the Augusta County committee of correspondence and in neutralizing western Indians. Afterward Howe billeted Croghan with a two-man guard and ordered Monckton Hall occupied. In his billet Croghan could hear the pop of musket fire and the boom of cannon fire on 4 October 1777, when General George Washington’s force of Continentals and militiamen surprised Howe’s troops at Germantown. Howe won the battle and ordered construction of entrenchment from the Schuylkill River to the Delaware. The task entailed torching twenty-seven mansions, including Monckton Hall, which Croghan had named in honor of General Robert Monckton, whom Croghan had thought would replace General Jeffreys Amherst during the French and Indian War.39

39 For causes of suspicion, for meeting with Howe, and for billeting with soldiers see [Croghan] to Thomas Walker, 23 Jul. 1778, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 34, HSP; see also VMHB, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1908): 54-55; for British troops’ burning of Monckton Hall see G[eorge]. W. Prevost to Thomas Cadwalader, 20 May 1805, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, George Croghan Papers, Box 200, Folder 2, HSP.
In the winter Croghan forwent merriment with the occupiers after Mayor Joseph Gallo-
way, a Tory, had related that General Howe had seethed with jealousy upon receiving a
dispatch attributing the neutrality of western Indians to Croghan. Just before the army
evacuated the city in early June 1778, Howe ordered Croghan to join prisoners-of-war
aboard a cart. Anxious about his fate, Croghan wrote an acquaintance, James Robertson,
formerly of the 55th Foot, to intercede in his behalf. The major general obliged, and Cro-
ghan was paroled. Croghan found lodgings on Fourth Street near Spruce, but a week lat-
er the state government issued a proclamation proscribing him and frontier pals Alexan-
der McKee and Simon Girty. On 17 June the Pennsylvania Packet published the procla-
mination, which accused all of high treason: They had “knowingly and willingly aided and
assisted the enemies of this State, and of the United States of America, by having joined
their armies at Philadelphia.” But the state government ignored exculpatory facts. Howe
had billeted Croghan for being a rebel, for example. Only chance—the arrival of Robert-
son—had prevented Croghan from suffering the fate of a captured rebel. On 17 June the
Pennsylvania Gazette published a different version of the proclamation, one stating that
Croghan and his frontier pals “shall suffer such pains and penalties, and undergo all such
forfeitures as persons attainted of High Treason ought to do.”

A gout attack confined Croghan to his lodgings, where in a moment of mental clarity he
surmised that his support of Virginia in the transmontane jurisdictional dispute had occa-
sioned the accusation against him. He summoned Chief Justice Thomas McKean to his
bedside, then convinced him of the falsity of the accusation, whereupon Plunket Fleeson,
who years before had upholstered some of Monckton Hall’s chairs with green damask,

40 For Galloway and proscription see [Croghan] to Thomas Walker, 23 Jul. 1778, Cadwalader Family Pa-
pers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 34, HSP; for “knowingly and willingly” see Pennsylvania Packet, 17 Jun. 1778; for “shall suffer” see Pennsylvania Gazette, 17 Jun. 1778.
administered the oath of allegiance. Although Croghan possessed “a pass to go where” he pleased, he stayed put to “See what they” had “against” him “and Try if they wont Restore” his “Carractor in one of thire papers as they” had “Taken itt away.” Staying was a gamble, for a jury might find for the state. On 12 November he went to court, but when no one appeared “to shew Cause to the Contrary,” Chief Justice McKean discharged him. Croghan then boarded his refurbished carriage and traveled west to winter in Lancaster.41

Croghan stayed in Lancaster despite learning that squatters had occupied Croghan Hall. If he went to Pittsburgh, he might suffer the fate either of his clerk, John Campbell, or of his cousin, Thomas Smallman. General Hand had arrested Campbell for treason and according to rumor shot Smallman. When the rumor proved false, Croghan advised Smallman to write him no more letters because they might be intercepted. Having little to do, Croghan attended to his finances and suffered. He mortgaged Croghan Hall to Lancaster merchant Joseph Simon. “I have no sheets here, please send me some, & some scarlet flannel,” he wrote Barnard Gratz on 24 December 1778. “It snows fast here.” Besides sending money for buying sheets Barnard and his brother Michael sent oysters and herring and then extinguished the large debt he had owed Shippen & Lawrence since 1750. Utilizing their political connections, the brothers prevented his arrest when a creditor sued him for £806 in the Court of Common Pleas in Lancaster. Paying his travel and lodging expenses, they went with him to Williamsburg, Virginia, so he could validate his claims to Indian lands in Virginia. The Gratz brothers were not wholly beneficent, however. The House of Burgesses had summoned all claimants to Indian lands in Virginia.

41 For oath of allegiance see Photostat, Oath of Allegiance, 16 Jul. 1778, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 199, Folder 24, HSP; see also Oath of Allegiance, 16 Jul. 1778, ibid., Box 204, Folder 21, HSP; for “a pass to go where” see [Croghan] to Thomas Walker, 23 Jul. 1778, ibid., Box 201, Folder 34, HSP; for discharge see Oath of Allegiance, 3 Dec. 1778, ibid., Box 204, Folder 21, HSP; for carriage see Cornal Croucklon to Joseph Stride, 27 Jul. 1778, ibid., Box 199, Folder 6, HSP.
The Gratz brothers had become claimants when Croghan deeded them acreage in 1775. Barnard presented the House of Burgesses a memorial that argued for validation of Croghan’s (and so their) title while William Trent did likewise for the Indiana Company, but the House of Burgesses rejected each memorial’s argument on the grounds that the Indian titles were illegitimate. In November 1779 Barnard presented the Houses of Burgesses another memorial, but its argument, too, failed to move the burgesses. In late September, Barnard had tried a different tack, petitioning the Pennsylvania House of Representatives for validation of Croghan’s title to the 1749 Iroquois land “grant” so he and his brother could gain legal title to some of its acres.42

Dejected, Croghan went to Lancaster, where gout invalided him. He sent and received few letters since the war hampered mail. Major William Croghan of a Virginia regiment of the Continental army did inquire about his welfare, as did Thomas Smallman. Daughter Susannah Prevost worried about her “honoured Parent.” “We [she and her husband] are distressed beyond expression, at the painful incertitude we are in on your account,” she wrote him. “I mean, least you should want that assistance which your age and the unhappy times must reduce you to.” A “Bill of Exchange” for £60 arrived with the letter. She was right to be solicitous, for he was wintering in a house with no chimney, buying furniture on credit, and begging friends for help. He wrote Michael Gratz that he had “Not a Doller” to pay the furniture debt or to buy food at market. Michael and his broth-

er Barnard sent him money, but it did not cover every expense. Croghan had never paid his servant James Forrest, for instance. Croghan begged the Gratz brothers to send money so he could “gett rid of this raskel,” but it is likely that they sent none, for newly married Forrest continued in his employ, in hopes of receiving unpaid wages and more.43

In May 1780 Croghan moved to Philadelphia but soon took lodgings outside the city in Moyamensing Township. While Croghan lodged there, Michael Gratz extinguished Croghan’s debts to Lancaster creditors. Months later the provincial government set the province’s western boundary, which took in his western lands, but being too infirm to petition the Continental Congress for authentication of his claims or those of the Indiana Company, he asked William Trent and Samuel Wharton to act in his stead. Over the next two years his only involvement in their endeavors was to testify in behalf of the Illinois and Wabash companies. On 3 October he thanked creditor Barnard Gratz for his “politeness in Visiting” him “Several Times” since returning from Virginia and requested Barnard to “Make a Setlement” with him. When that was “Don,” he promised Barnard “ye Choise of Every thing” in his “posesion for Security,” for as he had often said since Barnard’s return “ye. Time you know Flys Fast away & a Life of Suspence is ye. Most Disagreeable Life in ye. Wareld [world] to Me.” On 20 October, to extinguish debt, Croghan transfer-

red Joseph Wharton a tract north of the Ohio River for “One Spanish Milled Silver Dollar.” Over the next year and a half a congressional committee heard the presentations of Trent and Samuel Wharton and concluded that lands bought by Croghan and the Indiana Company were “made bona fide for a valuable consideration, according to the then usage and custom of purchasing lands from the Indians.” Should Great Britain cede the lands to the states, Congress ought to title the lands to Croghan and the Indiana Company. Needing cash, Croghan on 14 March 1781 advertised a six-acre property on Second Street for rent. The property had a carriage house, a stable, a garden, and five or six acres.44

In the winter or spring of 1782 Croghan rented a room in a boarding house in another Philadelphia suburb, Passyunk, but he was hard-pressed to pay the rent. He had sold or mortgaged his lands in New York and Pennsylvania to pay his debts and obtained tardy congressional recognition of his western lands so he could derive no income from them.

In the spring he received news that a congressional committee had disallowed the claims of the Grand Ohio Company and other companies. On 12 June, bedridden by rheumatoid arthritis, he wrote his will, which left virtually his entire estate to his daughter Susannah Prevost and named the following its executors: Barnard and Michael Gratz of Philadel-

phia, Thomas Smallman and William Powell of Pittsburgh, and Copper Smith and James Innes of Washington County. Beside Croghan sat a chest containing papers that included a twelve-year-old letter written by John Baynton, whose short life ended in financial ruin in part because of his business ties with him. “I am very glad your Negotiations with the Indians have been attended with their wonted Success,” the forgiving Baynton had written him. “Your Merit in that way will always command Respect.” Baynton proved prophetic, for Croghan is remembered today largely for his intercultural negotiations. In his heyday Croghan had cheated death three times, but like every mortal he could not cheat it indefinitely, and on 31 August 1782 it claimed him. His unpaid yet loyal gardener, Jacob Sele, transported his body to St. Peter’s Anglican Church on Third and Pine Streets in Philadelphia for interment. The newspapers that once reported his many deeds ignored his death and interment. His grave bore just a makeshift marker, yet his final indignity was this: On 22 February 1783 Sheriff William Will, by writ of levari facias, advertised the public auction of his Second Street rental property. Save for family, friends, and litigants, Croghan might have been entirely forgotten.45

45 For congressional disallowance see Journals of Congress, and of the United States In Congress Assembled, For the Year 1781, 7:360-367; see also Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14-18; for executors see “Last Will & Testament of George Croghan, dec’d,” 16 Apr. 1812 [written 12 Jun 1782], Coll. 1040, Provincial Council Records, 1681-1823, Folder 1803-1823, HSP; see also “Summons for Execution of Will of George Croghan,” 10 Jun. 1786, McAllister Coll., Gratz-Franks-Simon Papers, 1752-1831, McA Mss 011, Ser. 1, Barnard and Michael Gratz Papers, Box 2, LCP; for “I am very glad” see Baynton to [Croghan], 5 Sept. 1770, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 201, Folder 3, HSP; for Croghan’s significance see Volwiler, George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 334-335; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 1; for Croghan’s death see Croghan Estate, Ferdinand J. Dreer Autograph Coll., HSP; see also Swetnam, “Where Did George Croghan Die?” The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Jan. 1972): 55-63; for Jacob Sele see W. J. Valles to Thomas Cadwalader, 10 May 1806, Cadwalader Family Papers, Coll. 1454, Ser. 4, George Croghan Papers, Box 200, Folder 2, HSP; for auction of Monckton Hall see Independent Gazetteer, 22, 25 Feb. 1783; see also Pennsylvania Packet, 22 Feb. 1783.
Epilogue

George Croghan was not Daniel Boone, whose memory benefited from a contemporary mythologer, one John Filson, whose book, *The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke and an Essay towards the Topography, and Natural History of that Important Country* (1784), was an elaborate real-estate promotional brochure designed to attract easterners and Europeans to Kentucky with the sort of description Croghan himself penned in the 1760s to woo prospective settlers to the Old Northwest. The book’s appendix featured a long narrative entitled “The Adventures of Col. Daniel Boon.” For modern mythologists Eva M. Thury and Margaret K. Devinney the narrative is “a literary dramatization of a hero’s immersion in the elemental violence of the wilderness and his consequent emergence as the founder of a nascent imperial republic.” In it Filson created “an archetypal hero of the American frontier,” an American icon that appeared “innumerable times under other names and in other guises—in literature, the popular arts, and folklore—as the man who made the wilderness safe for democracy.” The narrative was popular even in early nineteenth-century Britain. Lord Byron, for instance, cited the narrative in his satiric poem *Don Juan* (1819). Translated into French and German, the narrative also gripped Continental readers. Although Croghan “made” the wilderness in western Pennsylvania, central New York, and the Old Northwest “safe” for democracy, he had no Filson to immortalize him. What, then, is his legacy? How is it to be judged?¹

A good place to begin is his lineage. Croghan fathered a daughter in each of the worlds he straddled. His daughter Susannah by his unknown wife of European ethnicity inherited his estate of crushing debts, questionable deeds, and disputed properties. She died at

home near Philadelphia on 24 December 1790 at age forty and was buried in the cemetery of the Saint James Protestant Episcopal Church in Evansburg, Pennsylvania. She was survived by her variously posted husband of twenty-five years, Augustine Prevost, who had resigned his commission from the British army shortly after the American Revolutionary War so that he could authenticate his wife’s inherited deeds and properties. The endeavor occupied him for years and proved fruitless. After Susannah died, he moved to New York and remarried. His second wife bore twelve children, but most of them died young. He himself died at home in Greenville, New York, on 17 January 1821. Eight of his twelve children with Susannah had preceded him in death. Six had died young. Two, Captain James Prevost and Lieutenant Henry Prevost, both of the British army, had been killed in battle in Portugal in 1811. Of course four had survived. George Prevost (1767-1840) attained the rank of major in the British army before he retired to the New York countryside. Lieutenant Colonel John Prevost was lost at sea in 1822 or thereabout while he was in the British army. Louisa Prevost (1783-1842) married a Mr. Palmer and bore a son who became a minister. Susannah Prevost, who never married, died in 1857. Long before his own death Augustine Prevost assigned sons George and John the task of authenticating their mother’s inherited deeds and properties. Like their father’s endeavors, their endeavors proved fruitless.

The daughter whom Croghan fathered by his Mohawk “wife” was of course Catherine. When her father died on 31 August 1782, the handsome Catherine, whose Mohawk name

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2 For Susannah and her family see Reverend Evelyn Bartow, Bartow Genealogy, Supplement (Baltimore, 1879), 232-33; see also Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat, 307, fn 17; see also Wainwright, “Turmoil at Pittsburgh: Diary of Augustine Prevost, 1774,” PMHB, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Apr. 1961), 116; for attempt by George Prevost to settle claims against George Croghan’s estate see Philadelphia’s General Advertiser, 25 Jul. 1804. Some of George Croghan’s Pennsylvania properties were advertised for sheriff’s sale. See Carlisle Gazette and the Western Repository of Knowledge, 11, 18, 25 Jul. 1792, 1, 15, 29 Aug. 1792, 17 Apr. 1793; see also Carlisle Gazette, 24 Apr. 1793.
was *Adonwentishon*, which meant “The Trembling World,” was aged twenty-three years yet already a commanding presence among New York’s Mohawks. Her father had been both a trusted Mohawk ally and an honorary member of the Onondaga Council, and her mother, probably deceased, was the daughter of Mohawk chief Nickus, but her birthright extended beyond her parents, for her uncle had been Johannes *Tekarihoga*, the head chief of the Mohawks. “In some respects Catharine Croghan enjoyed even more prestige than her uncle,” writes historian Isabel Thompson Kelsay. By virtue of her blue blood, for instance, Catherine had exercised her right to choose his successor when he had died during the American Revolutionary War. By custom she had limited her choices to her matrilineal relatives, who had included her maternal uncle, her maternal cousin, and her brother. Relatives of both lines had probably advised her, but the final choice had been hers alone. A Mohawk council had ratified her choice because it was her indisputable birthright. To say that her world trembled a little in her presence is not to exaggerate. The *Tekarihoga* willingly accepted her advice while the mass of ordinary Mohawks willingly accepted his (and therefore her) authority and the other five Iroquois nations willingly accepted his input during intertribal councils. Because Catherine had exerted influence over her choice, which had been her elder half-brother Henry, she had exerted influence over her people, but perhaps more important for her and her people was her marriage to a twice-widowed warrior in the winter of 1780 when she was twenty years old.³

Joseph Brant was thirty-six years old when he married Catherine Croghan or *Tekarihoga*. His Mohawk name was *Thayendanegea*, which meant “Two Sticks of Wood Bound Together.” Educated, Christian, the stout, younger half-brother of Sir William Johnson’s

³ For Catherine Croghan, for meaning of her Mohawk name *Adonwentishon*, for “In some respects,” and for Catherine’s choice of successor see Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*, 128, 274-277, 281.
Mohawk “wife” Molly, he was a natural ally of Great Britain. During the American Revolutionary War he attained the status of war chief and in that capacity led mixed Mohawk and Loyalist sorties that so devastated New York’s frontiers the local Patriots dubbed him “Monster Brant.” After the war New Yorkers accused him of war crimes, but the accusation proved false. Since most Iroquois felt as he did—unwelcome in postwar New York—he petitioned the Crown to make good on its oft-promised reward for wartime loyalty. When the Crown did make good on its promise, granting the Iroquois a large tract in upper Canada, many Iroquois emigrated there. On the tract he founded the Mohawk village of Oshweken, which meant “Little Oswego” or “New Oswego,” but the village became better-known as “Brant’s Town.” The Canadian governor later awarded him a 3,500-acre tract on Burlington Bay (now Hamilton Harbor) at the western end of Lake Ontario. After relocating his wife and children there about 1802, Brant built a mansion modeled on Fort Johnson. On 24 November 1807 he died at home. Catherine had mothered both his children by a previous marriage and born seven children with him. One of the seven was Elizabeth, who married William Johnson Kerr, the grandson of Sir William Johnson and Molly Brant. In 1832 Catherine named her son John as Tekarihoga. When a cholera epidemic claimed him two years later, she named Elizabeth’s toddler William as Tekarihoga. Catherine acted as his regent until she herself died on 24 November 1837, thirty years to the day after her husband Joseph. Two of their children had died years before.4

Besides his daughters George Croghan brought forth cause for dispute. In Pennsylvania v. Simms (1791), for example, the fifth circuit court of Washington County, Pennsylvania, adjudicated a long-standing dispute over one of his Pittsburgh-area land sales. In

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4 For Joseph Brant, for his marriage to Catherine Croghan, for meaning of his Mohawk name Thayendanegea, for his children by previous marriage and by Catherine, for his widowed wife Catherine’s choices, and for deaths of two of his children see Kelsay, ibid, 40, 43, 279-280, 528, 658, 280, 563-565.
an unspecified year (actually 1749) Croghan accepted an Iroquois “land grant” having no “operation” in Pennsylvania. The “land grant” was in Washington County, over which the colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia claimed jurisdiction. On an unspecified day in an unspecified year Croghan sold a parcel of the land grant to Alexander Ross, who on 24 August 1775 Ross sold the parcel to Charles Simms for two bonds (or mortgages). One bond was for £478 and the other for £239. One was payable in two years from the date of the contract and the other in three. Here the case gets convoluted. In 1779 Virginia passed a law voiding all Indian land grants within its jurisdiction, yet under a bill of attainder issued by the Pennsylvania legislature to enforce its law against traitors, local agents acting in behalf of Pennsylvania confiscated Ross’ property and attempted to collect on the bonds by “attaching” or confiscating Simms’ property in Washington County, the property for which Simms had granted the bonds. The fifth circuit court judge suggested that Simms should release title to Pennsylvania. Simms agreed to do so, but Pennsylvania wanted the money. The judge instructed the jury to weigh the following: (1) If Simms and Ross intended to buy or sell legal title, the jury should find for Simms because there was no legal title and no consideration for the contract to buy or sell; (2) If Simms and Ross intended to buy or sell equitable title (or the right to use the property), the jury should find for Pennsylvania and Simms should pay the value of the bonds but keep the property even though he had no title. The jury found for Simms. That is to say, Virginia law applied to the property, and Croghan, who had claimed the title under the 1749 Iroquois “land grant,” had not possessed legal title to the property that he had sold Ross.5

5 For details of Pennsylvania v. Simms (1791) see Reports of Cases in the County Courts of the Fifth Circuit, . . . (Philadelphia, 1800), 9-10. In Parr v. Jones (1793) the fifth circuit court of Washington County adjudicated a long-standing dispute over improved land within the cession western Indians had made to Pennsylvania during the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty. The case recited all claimants, including George Cro-
Two similar cases adjudicated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved properties once owned by Croghan. In *Lessee of Gratz v. Ewalt* (1809) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed an 1805 Allegheny circuit court decision. Before 1761 Indians (the Iroquois) had “granted” Croghan Pittsburgh-area lands. Jonathan Plummer claimed that he held equitable interest in the lands because Croghan had accepted them while acting as Plummer’s trustee. In 1771 Plummer mortgaged a parcel to Henry Heath but in 1783 defaulted on the mortgage, so that Heath obtained a judgment against him. To pay the judgment, the sheriff sold the parcel to one Ewalt, though nine years earlier one of Croghan’s creditors had obtained a judgment against Croghan, so that the parcel had been sold at a sheriff’s sale to a Gratz. In short (Barnard) Gratz and Ewalt had bought the same parcel. In 1783 Gratz’s lessee (the plaintiff) sued to eject Ewalt (the defendant) from the parcel. In its deliberations the jury reasoned that Plummer could mortgage the parcel since Croghan had given him equitable estate in it. The jury found for Ewalt. In *Lessee of Cox v. Cromwell* (1810) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a similar circuit court decision. In 1754 Croghan sold a Pittsburgh-area parcel to Casper Devebach, who assigned it to the defendant, one Cromwell. Croghan had obtained the parcel from Indians (the Iroquois) by “land grant” (in 1749). The plaintiff, a lessee of Cox, bought the same parcel from two unidentified men. The defendant’s claim rested upon the plaintiff’s abandonment of the parcel. The jury found for the defendant; therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the circuit court’s verdict and granted a new trial.6

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6 For details of *Lessee of Gratz v. Ewalt* (1809) see *Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1810), 2:95-105; for details of *Lessee of Cox v. Cromwell* (1810) see *Reports
Croghan’s litigious legacy entwined persons and properties in New York as well as Pennsylvania. From 22 February 1783 to 2 February 1785 the Pennsylvania Packet advertised a sheriff’s sale of three thousand of the 100,000 acres that once comprised his Otsego tract in New York. On 5, 12, and 19 April 1786 the Pennsylvania Gazette advertised a private sale of forty thousand Otsego acres by shopkeepers William Cooper and Andrew Craig of Burlington, New Jersey, but advertised too this caveat on 3 May: The acres, “involved in disputes and in a lawsuit in chancery now depending at New York,” might “prove an expensive job to hasty purchasers.” From 14 November 1787 to 28 June 1790 the Pennsylvania Packet advertised a sheriff’s sale of Croghan’s 183-acre tract in present-day Fayette County in southwestern Pennsylvania. From 21 November to 18 December 1788 the New-York Packet advertised a 7 January 1789 sheriff’s sale of Otsego parcels “formerly sold by writs of venditioni exponas against the lands and tenements of George Croghan, and purchased by sundry persons whose estates have since become forfeited to the people of this state.” On 12 June 1795 and for the next fifteen years the Otsego Herald advertised the public auctions of Otsego acres at the courthouse in Cooperstown, New York. On 23 February 1811 and for years thereafter the Cooperstown Feder-alist did likewise. Believing that Croghan’s heirs would evict them from the lands that they had improved and that Indians (the Iroquois) had “granted” Croghan at the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty, the residents of Allegheny and Beaver Counties in western Pennsylvania petitioned the Pennsylvania House of Representatives for stays in 1805.7

7 For advertisement of sheriff’s sale of three thousand Otsego acres see Pennsylvania Packet, 22 Feb. 1783, 29 Sept. 1784, 1, 5, 6, 12, 26 Jan., 2 Feb. 1785; for advertisement of private sale of forty thousand Otsego acres see Pennsylvania Gazette, 5, 12, 19 Apr. 1786; for caveat see ibid., 3 May 1786; for advertisement of sheriff’s sale of 183-acre Pennsylvania tract see Pennsylvania Packet, 14 Nov. 1787, 28 Jul. 1789, 1, 4, 8,
Controversy engulfed the Otsego tract upon Croghan’s death on 31 August 1782. Croghan had financed the acquisition in part by a loan from the Burlington Company, which had been comprised of merchants in Philadelphia and New Jersey. New Jersey Governor William Franklin had acted as middleman in the transaction and as guarantor of the loan. Upon Croghan’s death Alexander Hamilton represented Philadelphia merchant and Croghan creditor Abel James, who attempted to assert the rights of the Burlington Company against Otsego parcels that had been mortgaged to secure Franklin at the time of the loan, but by 1785 Cooper and Craig had acquired the Burlington Company’s rights. In a *scire facias* proceeding Hamilton revived an old judgment obtained by Franklin against Croghan, whereupon Cooper and Craig bought thousands of Otsego acres at a sheriff’s sale held in contempt of an injunction of the Court of Chancery. Aaron Burr, who represented Croghan’s heirs and creditors, had secured the injunction. Cooper managed to retain the acres, developed some of them, and founded Cooperstown on others. However, Franklin was not notified of the *scire facias* proceeding though he held five of the ten shares of the Burlington Company. For years thereafter he charged fraud—first because of the revived judgment against Croghan and second because of the sale of Otsego acres in accordance with *fieri facias.*

In *Prevost v. Gratz* (1821) the United States Supreme Court resolved a long-standing dispute over New York acreage. In Pennsylvania in 1812 Croghan’s grandson, George...
Prevost, sued in equity against the heirs of Barnard and Michael Gratz. The suit asked for the following: (1) a declaration that a trust existed between Croghan and Michael Gratz with respect to 9,000 New York acres and that the trust was still in force with respect to the value of the acres; (2) a Gratz heirs’ account of the profits from the sale of the 9,000 acres and payment of the profits with interest to the Croghan estate; and (3) a declaration that a trust existed with respect to 1,600 acres bought by Simon Gratz at a sheriff’s sale in 1800, Gratz being the assignee of a judgment obtained on a bond held against Croghan by one William McIlvane. The case went to a Pennsylvania Circuit Court, which found against Prevost on counts one and three but for Prevost on count two, as there had been a trust until 1795, when Michael Gratz sold the 9,000 acres. That is, Prevost was entitled to the profits with interest from the sale. Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which decided that there had been a trust with respect to the 9,000 acres but that the trust had ended in 1775. The Supreme Court thus overruled the Pennsylvania Circuit Court’s ruling concerning count two, the one that entitled Prevost to an account of the profits from the 1795 sale of the acres. In short, Prevost lost the entire case.9

What, then, is the legacy of George Croghan? It is a mixed one, indeed. His daughters, their husbands, and their progeny amount to a positive part of his legacy, yet the lawsuits amount to a negative one. His claims of de jure and de facto proprietorships in Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and the Old Northwest amount to a positive part of his legacy, too, but only in the eyes of eighteenth-century pioneers or modern Eurocentric historians, for the claims spearheaded the supplanting of Indian populations. In Pennsylvania,

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for example, he and other pioneers expanded Pittsburgh and founded Cumberland County, yet both the city and the county supplanted Indian populations. At a Mingo village at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River on Lake Erie in Ohio, he established a trading post that would become pioneer Cleveland. Deep in Miami country he established a trading post that incited a great war between France and Great Britain for the foreign proprietorship of the North American interior—at the expense of the Indian inhabitants, of course. In New York, he founded pioneer Belvidere Township and laid the groundwork for the founding of Cooperstown, which supplanted a Mohawk village. In Virginia, he was a magistrate in a county claimed by Pennsylvania. In their boundary dispute Virginia and Pennsylvania disregarded local Indians’ proprietary interests. He won his fame by negotiating intercultural peace on his era’s situational frontiers, yet each peace softened Indian lands for conquest. After his death his reputation receded as utterly as those situational frontiers. He was, then, a man of his time, the era when conflicted pioneers like him and Daniel Boone set the example for Euro-American and European intrusions into trans-Appalachia, the ephemeral era of intercultural trade and diplomacy before the expansive United States of America began to supplant whole Indian populations in the North American interior. He claimed moral proprietorship, too, for he argued that pioneers’ intrusions were for the Indians’ own good. Since he claimed de jure, de facto, and moral proprietorship for himself, for pioneers, for colonies, and for Great Britain, he was a conqueror. In sum, he did not merely abet the historical process of conquest, but rather spearheaded it.10

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