TRUTH AND JUSTICE VERSUS INTERDEPENDENCE:

COMPETING MODES OF RECONCILIATION

THE CASE OF MALUKU, INDONESIA

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Truth and Justice versus Interdependence: Competing Modes of Reconciliation

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Truth and justice has been applauded as *the* way to move on from a violent past. Yet,

some postconflict societies managed to do so without the presence, or effective

presence, of truth commissions and/or human rights trials. The question is why and

how. I approach the question by looking at the case of Maluku, Indonesia, where post-

communal conflict reconciliation processes took the interdependence path. Looking into

the various meanings that Malukans assign to the term *rekonsiliasi*, as well as at the

sites where interdependence is practiced: (1) ceremonial, (2) neighborhood, (3)

functional-quotidian, and (4) narrative, I argue that three conditions, combined, allowed

Malukans to opt for interdependence instead of truth and justice: (1) *provokator*

narratives, (2) the idea that everyone is complicit, and (3) memories of peace, of being

basudara. I also argue that interdependence work through three mechanisms: (1)

emphasizing on social roles rather than religious identity, (2) providing space to

symbolically display apologies and forgiveness and (3) creating focal points for peace.

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scholar I want to be, for believing in me more than I believe in myself, for being the excellent graduate-student-support-person, and for being cool about me not being able to be half the graduate-student-support-person you deserve to have. Thank you for keeping me sane and grounded, for taking care of me when I was not able to do so, and for your love. I love you.

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The Puzzle

Truth commissions and trials have been applauded as *the* way to move on from a violent past. Yet, some postconflict societies manage to move toward reconciliation without the presence, or the effective presence, of these institutions. The question is why and how.

I approach this question by looking at the case of Maluku, Indonesia, where reconciliation takes a distinct path: **interdependence**. My interest in Maluku intensified during my first visit to the province in 2002, where I was struck by the resentment that locals held against the term *rekonsiliasi*[1] while at the same time amazed by their aspirations and actions, which, in my view, reflected the very essence of reconciliation. This inspires me to study "everyday reconciliation" in Maluku – that is, reconciliation as vernacular practices, reconciliation as understood and lived at the day-to-day basis by people in Maluku.

Believing that reconciliation has different meanings to different people, and that a good study of reconciliation needs to take these meanings seriously, I take on an interpretive, emic,[2] approach. I examine why and how Malukans can bypass truth- and justice- seeking institutions in their efforts to build solid and constructive foundations

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[1] This is the bahasa Indonesia term for "reconciliation".

[2] When taking an emic (instead of an etic) approach, a researcher tries to understand a phenomenon through the viewpoints of the research subjects. Here, prior theories and assumptions are put aside to allow participants and data "speak for themselves" and to let themes, patterns, and concepts emerge. For further discussions on emic and etic perspectives, see Headland, Pike, & Harris, 1990, Willis, 2007, Yin, 2010, and http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=qualitative&pageid=icb.page340911

for reconciliation. More specifically, I wish to identify the *conditions* under which the interdependence path can work and the *mechanisms* involved.

My research shall contribute to the study of reconciliation in at least four ways. First, to a body of literature that is dominated by, and champions, truth commissions and trials, my study seeks to explain why and how interdependence can serve as an equally viable path toward reconciliation. Second, its emic approach allows for a more nuanced picture of reconciliation, one that potentially encourages refinement in conceptualizing and measuring reconciliation. Third, while many research evoke reconciliation processes that follow regime change (*i.e.* South Africa, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Argentina), my work brings attention to reconciliation processes that follow communal violence. Given the likelihood of communal violence to recur, and keeping in mind that it is fought between people who had intimate relationships, understanding how former enemies could resume and sustain their roles as relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, and service providers is very crucial to community-level peace. Fourth, it shall suggest ideas as to how the international community can better support local reconciliation initiatives – which may include some degrees of humility and some measures of restraint from imposing a generic formal transitional justice toolkit. More generally, my research shall contribute to the studies of "why peace takes place", heavily outnumbered by studies of "why conflict occurs". I believe that if we want peace, we need to know more about peace.

Map 1: Indonesia

Modified from: http://www.undp.or.id/general/maps/Map_Indonesia_Plain.jpg

Map 2: Maluku

Modified from: http://www.oocities.org/ambon67/pics/west_seram.jpg

Map 3: Ambon Island

Modified from: http://www.oocities.org/ambon67/noframe/ambon_map2k.htm

In the remainder of this chapter, I present a brief background to the case study, lay out the conceptual building blocks of an approach centered on interdependence, and introduce the subsequent chapters within this dissertation.

A Snippet of the Maluku Case

January 1999 saw the beginning of violent communal clashes between Christians and Muslims in Maluku. In this study, the term "Christian" denotes followers of the Protestant faith,[3] and is selected over "Protestant" to remain close to the vernaculars in Maluku, where Protestants are referred to as "Kristen" and Catholics as "Katolik". Over 2,000 incidents of communal violence were recorded between January 13, 1999 and February 13, 2002 (ViCIS, cited in Barron, Azca, & Susdinarjanti, 2012), the day representatives of both parties signed a truce known as the Malino II Declaration. The conflict led to segregation of Christians and Muslims, where, in nearly all villages, members of the minority faith group were forced to flee. It also led to a severe disruption of freedom of movement, where Christians were confined in Christian quarters and Muslims were confined in Muslim quarters. It claimed over 6,000 deaths, over 7,000 injured people, and the destruction of nearly 29,000 buildings (ViCis, cited in Barron, Azka, & Susdinarjanti, 2012), as well as caused the displacement of over 500,000 people (ICG, 2000). Additionally, 39 incidents of communal violence took place after Malino II, altogether claiming the lives of 367 people (Barron, Azka, & Susdinarjanti,

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[3] Most Protestants in Maluku are followers of Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM – Maluku Protestant Church). Traditionally part of the Dutch Reformed Church, GPM adheres to Calvinism.

2012). Most of them happened shortly after the signing of the truce, but the most notable were those of 2004 and 2011.

In Maluku, efforts toward reconciliation relied neither on truth commissions nor on trials. Although a fact finding mission was launched by Indonesia's National Commission of Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia – Komnas HAM),[4] its report only glosses over some general information that have anyway been publically known and is not in any way a full record of the various narratives surrounding the Maluku conflict. And although over 850 arrests were made by 2000, trials could not be held because personnel of the legal system had fled and prisons had broken down (ICG, cited in Braithwaite & Dunn, 2010, p. 158-159). Even after the legal system was restored, trials of several leaders of Christian and Muslim organizations were held in regular criminal courts, not in special human rights trials. Moreover, such processes were not extended to ordinary members of the societies despite their involvement in the violent events. In other words, the processes of healing and "moving forward" were neither based on truth nor justice: there are neither official accounts of "who did what to whom where when and how" nor official decisions on "who pays what to whom where when and how[5]". Instead, they exemplify what this study denotes as the interdependence approach. These include rebuilding of churches and mosques; facilitatation of the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs); attempts to restore the

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[4] On January 14, 2000, Komnas HAM formed a Commission for Human Rights Violation Investigation and Mediation in Maluku (Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia dan Mediasi di Maluku).

[5] I use this phrase to cover a wide range of justice procedures, including, but not limited to, paying compensation, serving time in prison, and being banned from certain privileges.

trade, transportation, and health systems; return of child soldiers to school; promotion

of peace journalism; engagement in income-generating activities; organization of art

events; and so on – all done in a collaborative manner between Christians and Muslims.

Interdependence: Some Conceptual Building Blocks

The literature does not say very much about interdependence, compared to its

coverage of other paths of reconciliation.[6] The following subsections offer ideas on the

four Ws (what, who, where, and when) concerning interdependence, from which I draw

my argument and arrange this dissertation.

What is interdependence? What this study refers to as interdependence is the

path to reconciliation that John Paul Lederach (1997), Johan Galtung (2001), and

contributors to Antonia Chayes and Martha Minow's (2003) edited volume refer to as

peace, *joint reconstruction*, and *coexistence*, respectively. The literature suggests that

this path to reconciliation is anchored in the notion that former enemies have a

common, connected future (Lederach, 1997, p. 29), is motivated by pragmatic needs

rather than moral imperatives (Gardner Feldman, 1999), is less costly than resolving

conflicts through formal (legal) procedures (Smith, 1989, p. 386), makes it too costly

"both in political and human terms, for conflict to be carried out by violent means"

(Ackermann, 1994, p. 245), and whose essence is a series of narrative shifts from "since

we are enemies, hostility is the only option" to "since we are one and we need each

other, hostility would definitively be foolish" (Sluzki, 2010, p. 59-62).

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[6] Chapter 2 provides a literature review on reconciliation.

Building upon Lily Gardner Feldman's (1999) notion that interdependence is motivated by pragmatic, rather than moral, imperatives, I specify that one strong driving force for interdependence is the need to restore "normalcy." Throughout my study, I came across plentiful narratives on the urgency of restoring the systems that the conflict had distorted: health, education, transportation, sanitation, agriculture, fishery, security, governance, and communication systems, to name a few. Mothers insist that children – child-soldiers included – should be able to return to school, customers demand unrestricted access to all traditional markets and all shops within and beyond the segregation lines, traders stress the importance of reopening their supply lines and of reestablishing clienteles from both the Christian and Muslim sides, drivers of public transportation are eager to reopen cross-village routes, workers need the banks to run again so that they can withdraw their monthly salary, doctors emphasize that both communities should have access to all medical facilities, religious leaders see it important that churches and mosques return to their function as places of worship and not be used as war-mobilization centers, youths are restless about not having enough music and sports events they could attend to, and so on. They are adamant about recovering "life before the 1999 clash" and the motive for this goes beyond moral imperatives of living harmoniously: it is mainly grounded in practical needs to go on with a decent life. They understand that central to restoring such systems is ending spatial segregation and reinstating freedom of movement, which themselves are contingent upon reestablishing and sustaining Christian-Muslim cooperation.

By underlining Malukans' strong desires for normalcy, I do not mean to downplay the desires for truth- and/or justice- seeking in Maluku. They, too, are robust. Nevertheless, the desires for normalcy and the desires for truth and justice seem to be at odds with each other. Truth and justice, together with amnesty and lustration,[7] are paths of reconciliation that underline actors' involvements in the past violence. For these paths to work – that is, for public records on past atrocities, retribution and restitution schemas, official pardons, and bans to enter political offices to be issued – it is necessary to accurately identify who the perpetrators and the victims are. Such "singling out" is seen as counterproductive to restoring normalcy through interdependence, which hinges on collectiveness, on parties willing to collaborate with each other.

Here, an emic approach is useful in understanding how Malukans settle the tensions between desires for normalcy and the desires for truth and justice.[8] Since restoring normalcy is considered to be more pressing time-wise, the pursuit of truth is predominantly carried out at the macro (national-provincial) level and geared toward identifying the grand scenario of the Maluku conflict and the outside actors masterminding it, rather that singling out at the micro (community) level who did what to whom where when and how. Similarly, the pursuit of justice is geared toward

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[7] While the literature champions the truth and justice paths of reconciliation, it recognizes the utility of amnesty and lustration in bringing about reconciliation. All these are discussed in in a greater detail in Chapter 2.

[8] Other studies that highlight local pursuit of truth and justice include those of by Heonik Kwon (2006), Birgit Braeuchler (2009), and Alexander Laban Hinton (2010).

demanding that the masterminds of the conflict be held accountable, rather than settling among ordinary people on who pays what to whom where when and how.

This is not to say that truth and justice paths of reconciliation are absent at the community level. As numerous interviews confirm, interdependence-based activities have elements of revealing the truth and observing justice. Upon developing a certain level of rapport, those taking part in these activities disclose their involvement in the conflict – perhaps not the entire story, but enough to demonstrate complicity. Each person understands that revealing some truth makes him/her vulnerable and this act of displaying vulnerability generates trust from others. Each person also knows that it is only just that he/she now carries a burden to help repair the damages brought about by the conflict as well as to ensure that no further communal violence take place in Maluku. Here, truth is revealed in a limited manner (only to a specific group of people with the specific purpose of trust building) and justice is observed in a future-oriented manner (based on an understanding that strict adherence to legal justice would put everyone behind bars and that everyone holds a responsibility to repair damages and to prevent further violence). Such observance of truth and justice is considered to be most suited to the need to restore normalcy in Maluku. This seems to be in line with the *evolutionary psychology forgiveness model* (Long & Brecke, 2003, discussed in a greater detail in the next chapter), where a successful reconciliation is preceded by some acknowledgements of the harm, redefinition of victim-perpetrator identities, partial justice (the willingness to abandon revenge), and establishment of new relationships.

My observation suggests that the robustness of the desires for restoring normalcy over the desires for pursuing "blunt" truth and justice has to do with the vivid memories Malukans have of their pre-conflict life, which is laden with harmonious intergroup relations. In hundreds of interviews, both that of mine and those done for the Ambon Database Pilot Study and Ambon Database,[9] Malukans talk enthusiastically about celebrating Christmas and Idul Fitri[10] with members of the other faith group, about how close they were with their childhood friends and colleagues despite their religious difference, and about how, historically, Christians and Muslims in Maluku are *basudara* (bond as "siblings"). They see the 1999 communal conflict as an exception, rather than the norm, to centuries of intergroup relations. Here, the Malukan experience stands out from cases such as in South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland, where violence and animosity had sustained over generations, hence blurring memories and repertoires of normalcy and of civilized relations between contending parties.

Who are the key actors? The convention of referring to a conflict by juxtaposing the names of the two (or more) parties involved – *i.e.* Hindu-Muslim riots in India, Hutu-Tutsi killings in Rwanda, and Sinhalese-Tamil violence in Sri Lanka – tend to encourage an image where, throughout the conflict, everyone who belongs to one group takes issues with everyone who belongs to the other(s). While it is reasonable to expect that

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[9] Ambon Database Pilot Study and Ambon Database were put together by Samsu Rizal Panggabean and Ashutosh Varshney and funded by the Ford Foundation. A more detailed explanation about these databases is provided in the methods section.
[10] Idul Fitri marks the end of the fasting month, Ramadhan. It is the most celebrated Muslim holiday in Indonesia.

educated readers are aware that such referral exemplifies a simplification and blurs the diverse and dynamic stances within each group, an explicit recognition of subjects who never or who no longer subscribe to an "all us *versus* all them" logic remains crucial.

Surely, the Maluku conflict is not "all-Christians" *versus* "all-Muslims". Written and oral accounts of Christian-Muslim cooperation amidst communal clashes are amply available. A careful attention to these accounts is important, not only in recognizing the spectrum of attitudes within each group, but also in identifying the early and/or key actors of reconciliation. It is not coincidental that those who refused the "us *versus* them" divides since the beginning of the conflict are the earliest proponents of reconciliation. And, it is not surprising that those who used to subscribe to the "us *versus* them" divides become skillful advocates of reconciliation once they renounce such mindset. Their personal experience of switching their outlook toward "the other", from hostile attitudes to friendly ones, allows them to come up with effective methods to persuade their co-religionists to embrace reconciliation.

In Maluku, most, if not all, attempts to initiate the interdependence path of reconciliation capitalize on pre-conflict intergroup camaraderie among friends, relatives, neighbors, colleagues, and classmates. They start with a few Christians, or Muslims, reaching out to members of the other faith group whom they have developed rapport with before 1999 to jointly facilitate *perjumpaan* (encounters). Over time, the encounters expand in terms of frequency, intensity, and the number of people involved. Consistent to the *contact hypothesis* (Allport, 1954) and *intergroup contact theory* (Pettigrew, 1998) they generate space for deconstructing stereotypes, checking rumors,

learning other "versions" of past events, *etc.*, as well as for developing *realistic empathy* (White, 1984) among Christians and Muslims. Sustained by *superordinate goals* (Sherif, 1958) to restore normalcy, they allow for *identity change* (Kelman, 2004), that is, from an identity of Christianity that is centered at the negation of Muslimhood and an identity of Muslimhood that is centered at the negation of Christianity, to an identity of Malukans. Bringing in theories on social capital and communal conflicts, it is plausible to say that while *bridging civic associations* (Putnam, 2000; Varshney, 2002) seem to have failed to prevent the Malukan communal conflict, they play a crucial role in fostering reconciliation through the interdependence path.

Arguably, one's decisions to follow, not follow, and stop following the "us *versus them*" divides are quite personal. As shown throughout the remaining chapters of this dissertation, an emic approach allow for more rounded analyses on these decisions. This, plus a *strategy* a*djustment* stance (Kubik, 2014) – which is discussed in the next chapter – helps show that Malukans take the interdependence path to reconciliation because they see it fitting to their understanding of the world, rather than because they have failed to create truth commissions and human rights trials.

Where does interdependence-based reconciliation take place? Upon carefully looking at reconciliation practices in Maluku, this study introduces four sites where interdependence takes place: ceremonial, neighborhood, functional-quotidian, and narrative. Activities at the ceremonial site bring together those who are perceived as influential and as representations of certain groups within the society. The Search Conference for Maluku, the series of BakuBae workshops, and the Malino II meeting fall

under this category, as they aimed at facilitating dialogues among prominent religious leaders and community leaders of Maluku. Activities at the neighborhood site bring together Christians and Muslims who live, or used to live, in the same village, as well as those who are bound by *pela* and/or *gandong*.[11] These include, but are not limited to, initiatives that led to the return of residents who had fled their villages during the heat of the conflict, collective labor to rebuild houses, churches, and mosques, as well as gatherings among residents who stayed in the village and former-residents who relocated to others. Activities at the functional-quotidian site utilize the specific training, skills, occupation, and networks attached to groups of colleagues or peers. Some examples include doctors establishing health centers at Christian-Muslim borders, bloggers and photographers spreading images of positive intergroup relations, and youths organizing various art events that widen intergroup encounters. Meanwhile, at the narrative site are novels and movies that offer ways to frame the communal conflict.

When does reconciliation happen? It is common to think of reconciliation as a postconflict process and therefore locate it at the end of a conflict timeline. However, as practices in Maluku suggest, people perform interdependence-based reconciliation activities throughout the conflict timeline. Just a couple of months into the Maluku conflict, Christians and Muslims had started to meet secretly to exchange food, amenities, as well as information regarding security. On the other hand, it is also possible that reconciliation does not happen even after the violence has ended for quite

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[11] *Pela* and *gandong* are part of *adat* (ethnic-based customary rules). *Pela* is about intervillage alliances, while *gandong* is about coming from the same line of ancestors. More detailed explanations on *pela* and *gandong* are provided in chapter 4.

some time – as in situations where some displaced persons prefer to relocate than to return, although they have been guaranteed security and provided material resources.

It is important to note that, whether it happens early or later on the conflict timeline, reconciliation only takes place after locating culpability. Various reconciliation practices suggest that before the truth commissions, trials, amnesty plans, and/or lustration schemas are established, the idea of which party should be held responsible has been widely shared: the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Hutu administration in Rwanda, the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the military dictatorship in Argentina, the Canadian government (in the case against the first nation), the Australian government (in the case against Aborigins), and so on. In other words, the truth- and justice- seeking procedures, as well as the mercy- and vet- seeking procedures, are not there to determine which party committed past wrongs, which party pays for its wrongdoings, which party apologizes for its wrongs, or which party is banned from political offices, but to work on the details on who within the party needs to be singled out as perpetrators and be held accountable. This idea that culpability is, or needs, to be located prior to the reconciliation process is important to this study in the sense that it helps explain the turning point when individuals in Maluku started to embrace reconciliation. My interviews confirm that most people only embrace the idea of reconciliation upon realizing that their black-and-white viewpoint of "they are the perpetrators and we are the victims" does not fit the reality and that a third party, known as *provokator* (provocateur), is the ultimate culprit. This idea of *provokator*s masterminding the Maluku conflict also helps settle the tensions mentioned earlier, between desires for

normalcy and desires for truth and justice. It allowed Malukans to take a dual approach: naked truth and legal justice for *provokator*s, limited truth and future oriented justice for lay people.

In sum, this study puts forward the idea that, in Maluku, the interdependence path of reconciliation is driven by the practical need to restore "normalcy," which is contingent upon reestablishing and sustaining Christian-Muslim cooperation. This pursuit of normalcy modifies, but does not cancel out, the pursuit of truth and justice in Maluku. Those who never subscribed to, or had renounced, the "all us *versus* all them" divide play a key role in facilitating Christian-Muslim encounters, and do so through their pre-conflict intergroup networks. Interdependence-based activities are performed at the ceremonial, functional-quotidian, neighborhood and narrative sites. They take place throughout the conflict timeline, upon establishing a realization that the other faith group is not the party to be blamed for the conflict.

Outline of the Dissertation

Earlier in this chapter, I have posted my research questions: under what *conditions* can societies rely on interdependence – thus can afford bypassing truth- and justice- seeking institutions – in their effort to build solid and constructive foundations for reconciliation, and what are the *mechanisms* underpinning the interdependence approach to reconciliation? I have also presented a brief background to the Maluku conflict and put forward some conceptual building blocks. To close this first chapter, I sketch out how this dissertation is organized.

Chapter 2 provides a literature review on reconciliation. It suggests (1) that reconciliation is about relationships and moving on from the violent past, (2) that the literature champions the truth and justice paths of reconciliation, and (3) that an emic approach is needed to better understand reconciliation. Subsequently, Chapter 3 introduces the dissertation's hypotheses, details the research methods, and clarifies the scope of the arguments.

Chapter 4 elaborates on the Maluku conflict. It starts with a brief account on the conflict – on what had happened and what scholars think caused and sustained the conflict. Then, it explores some themes that are central to the study – *provokator*, complicity, and memory of peace. Meanwhile, Chapter 5 digs into the various meanings that Malukans attach to *rekonsiliasi* over time.

Chapters 6-9 elaborate on interdepence-based reconciliation in these respective sites: ceremonial, neighborhood, functional-quotidian, and narrative. Chapter 6 analyzes the Search Conference for Maluku, the BakuBae workshops, and the Malino II meeting, where Christian and Muslim leaders met. Chapter 7 looks at Christian-Muslim relations in a village that remained intact throughout the conflict, in villages where IDPs managed to return, as well as in villages where IDPs preferred to relocate elsewhere. It also looks at Christian-Muslim relations among villages that are bind by *pela* and *gandong*. Chapter 8 examines intergroup collaborations in various sectors, including trade, health, media, youth, and religion. Meanwhile, Chapter 9 delves into movies and novels that incorporate themes related to the Maluku conflict.

Chapter 10 concludes the study. It presents a summary and the findings of the study. Looking at the communal tensions in Maluku in 2004 and 2011 as well as drawing from the insights I gained from my 2002 and 2014 visit to Ambon, it offers a reading on what have come out of the Maluku conflict and interdependence-based reconciliation activities. It also suggests ideas for future research and practices on reconciliation.

Chapter 2 – Reconciliation: A Literature Review

Reconciliation is a subject of inquiry in various disciplines including, but not limited to, Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology, Theology, International Law, and Peace Studies. Also, it has increasingly taken a more central position in the studies of democratic consolidation (Kritz, 1995; Kubik & Linch, 2006; Popovski & Serrano, 2012; Serrano, 2012; Pettai & Pettai, 2015). Reconciliation has been studied in many ways. As outlined by Audrey Chapman (2009), scholars' approaches to reconciliation vary according to the (1) levels of analysis: interpersonal (Fischer, 2001; Galtung, 2001; Lederach, 2001; Stover & Weinstein, 2004), intergroup/community (Staub & Pearlman, 2001; van der Merwe, 2001), national unity, nation building, institution building (Gibson, 2004), international (Long & Brecke, 2003), (2) disciplines or fields: theology (Chapman & Spong, 2003; Muller-Fahrenholz, 1997; Tutu, 1999), ethics and philosophy (Ericson, 2002), social-psychological (Fischer, 2001; Lederach, 1997), (3) degree: thick (Amstutz, 2005; Chapman & van der Merwe, 2008; Tutu, 1999), minimalist (Bhargava, 2000; Gibson, 2004), as well as (4) transmission: bottom-up (Fischer, 2001), intercommunal and political dimension (Ackerman, 1994; Kriesberg, 2001).

From this rich literature, I make three observations. First, while definitions of reconciliation vary, there seems to be a consensus among scholars that reconciliation is about (1) relationships and (2) moving away from a violent past. Second, postconflict settings where subjects do not take on the truth- and/or justice- paths of reconciliation are often regarded as cases where reconciliation do not take place or take place in a suboptimum manner. Third, while many studies of reconciliation do take the locality of

the contexts seriously, most of them do not take reconciliation as vernacular practices and do not invest in deciphering what reconciliation means to the subjects.

This chapter discusses the above observations in a greater detail. It highlights that the studies and practices of reconciliation within the last two decades seem to have instilled a notion of reconciliation as "grand projects with sophisticated and standardized toolkits". While this notion may be founded on some solid grounds, it carries a danger of overlooking day-to-day processes at the grass-root level, such as that of in Maluku, which embodies the essence of reconciliation – restoring or improving relationships and moving away from the violent past.

On Relationships and on Moving Away from the Violent Past

Obviously, there is no single way to conceptualize reconciliation. Nevertheless, scholars seem to agree that reconciliation deals with (1) relationships and with (2) moving away from the violent past.

Lederach argues that reconciliation is first and foremost about relationships. It is "built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship", instead of separating or limiting affiliations between them (Lederach, 1997, p. 26). Similarly, Louis Kriesberg (2007) sees reconciliation as "the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic groups ... the process of moving toward a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship" (p. 2). Andrew Schaap (cited in Cole, 2007b) builds upon Hannah Arendt's idea that reconciliation is not about restoring

previous relationships, but initiating new ones, and asserts that "a reconciliatory moment is not construed as a final shared understanding or convergence of world views, but as a disclosure of a world in common from diverse and possibly irreconcilable perspectives" (p. 5). To Priscilla Hayner (2002), reconciliation "implies building or rebuilding relationships today that are not haunted by the conflicts and hatreds of yesterday" (p. 161), while to Michael Semple (2009) it refers to a "nonviolent, political engagement with or between conflicting parties with the intent of rendering possible and then establishing a peaceful relationship between them" (p.1). It is important to note that, as pointed by Birgit Braeuchler (2009b), the relationships at the heart of reconciliation processes include that of "interpersonal, between individuals and communities, among communities, between communities and the state, among states, and … between the human and non-human world that share a common cosmology" (p. 3), to which I will add another dimension: between individuals and the state.

Taking on a social psychological perspective, Herbert C. Kelman (2004) goes further to suggest that the essence of reconciliation lies on the subjects' change of identity in relation to one another. Here, subjects take on a new collective identity that is not centered on the negation of the other or even develop a common, transcendent identity alongside their group's particularistic identity (Kelman, 2004, p. 119).

Other conceptualizations focus on marking-off the present (and future) from the violent past. Galtung (2001) illustrates reconciliation as closure plus healing, "closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities, healing in the sense of being rehabilitated" (p. 4). It is a process where, in order to move on, victims seek release from trauma and

perpetrators seek release from guilt. Similarly, Kader Asmal, *et.al.* (cited in Hayner,

2002) mention that reconciliation, "in its rich and meaningful sense, is thus a real closing

of the ledger book of the past... an end of the divisive cycle of accusation, denial, and

counter-accusation" (p. 162). Meanwhile, John Borneman (2002) underlines that

reconciliation is not permanent peace or harmony, but

> a project of departure from violence… [T]o reconcile, different subjects must
> agree only 'to render no longer opposed', which means sharing a present…
> [which] requires both to create a 'sense of ending'—a radical break or rupture
> from existing relations—and to create a 'sense of beginning'—a departure into
> new relations of affinity marked not by cyclical violence but by trust and care. (p.
> 282)

> The emphasis on "relationships" and "moving away from the violent past"

indicates a normative position that, despite what had happened, members of a society

are expected (1) to continue to live and work together,[12] instead of opting for a more

segregated social, political, and economic arrangement – *i.e.* partition, as well as (2) to

renounce their animosities and commitment to violence. In addition, from a peace and

conflict studies perspective, such emphasis puts reconciliation in the domain of attitude,

as opposed to the other two aspects of the conflict triangle (Galtung, 1996): behavior

and contradiction.[13] This means that reconciliation should be separated from processes

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[12] More demandingly, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Abdul Aziz Said, and Lakshitha S. Prelis
(2001, p. 340) accentuate that reconciliation "has more transformative connotations
than the term coexistence". To David Crocker (2000a), "simple co-existence" is the
minimum degree of reconciliation, with "democratic reciprocity" and "comprehensive
reconstruction of social bonds" as the next levels.

[13] Attitude covers the cognitive, emotive, and conative processes (Ramsbotham 2010, p.
45) which bridges contradiction (actual or perceived incompatibility due to scarcity,
diverse identity, or change, *i.e.* unemployment, unequal political access, and poverty) to
behavior (the strategies individuals apply in conflict *i.e.* coercion, avoidance, and
cooperation).

that exclusively aim at mitigating violent behavior (*i.e.* cease fire) and from those that

exclusively aim at resolving the incompatibility at the core of the conflict (*i.e.*

negotiation and mediation). Such behavior- and contradiction- oriented processes may

facilitate reconciliation, but are not reconciliation itself. Even after the violent episodes

of a conflict have stopped, members of a conflict party may remain reluctant to

renounce the animosities they have toward members of the other party, let alone

rebuild intergroup harmony. Similarly, the resolution of the underlying issues in a

conflict does not automatically translate into animosity-free-renewed-relationships. On

the other hand, reconciliation can take place even when the problems underlying the

conflict have not been resolved.

One major challenge I find in the study of reconciliation is coming up with the

most appropriate measurement. Both relationships and a degree of removal from

violent past are difficult to measure: what is the best way to measure relationships

between members of previously warring parties and what is the best way to measure a

move away from the violent past?

Some studies assess whether or not a society is reconciled by looking at whether

or not violence relapses.[14] This raises a couple of problems. First, non-relapse of violent

behavior does not necessarily reflect a reconciled *attitude*. People may choose to refrain

from violence even if they still fear, distrust, or hate the other side. Non-relapse of

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[14] One example is William J. Long and Peter Brecke's (2003) study, which compares
successful and unsuccessful reconciliation by looking at cases where such processes
have restored order (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Mozambique, South Africa,
and Honduras) and has failed to restore order (Colombia, Yemen, Chad).

violence can indeed be a good indication for the success of a negotiated settlement,[15] but might not be the best for measuring reconciliation. Second, even if non-relapse of violence does reflect a reconciled attitude, how long does this "peace" have to hold to accurately mark reconciliation? Does a major outbreak of violence after ten years of peace indicate an unsuccessful reconciliation? Should this outbreak of violence be declared separate from the previous one and the decade of peace used as a measurement of a successful reconciliation? Does the presence of small scale isolated violent incidents nullify the notion of reconciliation?

Meanwhile, other studies measure the extent of reconciliation by assessing the strategies of bringing about reconciliation. In other words, instead of looking at relationships and renouncement of animosities and violence, the studies appraise whether a truth commission is able to meet its mandate, a trial meets its objectives, and so on. In addition to being too technical,[16] such measurement overlooks the gap between macro/state-level post-violence intervention and the micro/individual-level experience of violence (Pouligny, Chesterman, & Schnabel, 2007b).

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[15] William Stanley and David Holiday (2002) do not fully agree with this. In their study on Guatemala, they point out that ending the violence was never the ultimate goal of the settlement, as fighting had stopped before before the agreement was signed. What is more important is to see if the settlement is able to serve as a foundation of a working democracy, which in turn should help manage the underlying causes of conflict, including inequality and indigenous/ethnic rights.

[16] Beatrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman, and Albrecht Schnabel (2007b) stress that such interventions are mostly premised on Western health models, infrastructures, and institutions – not necessarily attentive to the local actors' cultural strategies for surviving and understanding mass violence, especially their ways of dealing with death, mourning, and suffering.

The case of South Africa lends a good example. Its reconciliation processes have

been applauded as a big success and have been used as model for facilitating

reconciliation in other parts of the world. This perception of success is largely due to the

fact that there had been no major relapse to violence and that the South African Truth

and Reconciliation Commission had managed to fulfill its mandate. However, Adam

Ashforth's (2005) study finds that lower class South Africans tend to regard the

Commission as failing to precisely pinpoint the systemic origins of people's suffering.

This causes spiritual insecurity, which in turn, led people to the use of witchcraft. They

believe that witchcraft is able to provide plausible answers to questions about the

meaning of misfortune (poverty, death, illness, suffering, *etc*.) – "answers people can

live with and work with" (Ashforth, 2005, p. 311).

With those in mind, I am cautious about analyzing the degree of reconciliation in

Maluku, as well as about appraising the success of the various reconciliation activities

discussed in this study. I focus more on the conditions that allow for reconciliation

activities to take place as well as the mechanisms that underpin them. I do, however,

report on the subjects' thoughts on what they see as successful and unsuccessful with

regards to the reconciliation activities they are involved in. My assessment on the depth

of reconciliation in Maluku, which heavily relies on subjects' insights and has a number

of caveats, is presented at the end of this dissertation.

Approaches to Reconciliation

Galtung (2001) warns that nobody has a solid idea as to how reconciliation can

be successfully achieved, given that it is "a theme with deep psychological, social,

theological, philosophical, and profoundly human roots" (p. 4). Indeed, the literature

exhibits diverse and sometimes contrasting ideas as to how people and groups

reconcile.

Perhaps, the most generic and widely cited framework is that of Lederach's

(1997, p. 29). It suggests that reconciliation can be attained through carefully selecting

from and combining (1) truth, (2) justice, (3) mercy, and (4) peace. In short, truth is

about acknowledging the wrongdoings and the damages; justice is about making things

right through punishment, compensation, rehabilitation, *etc*.; mercy is about acceptance

and/or forgiveness; while peace covers interdependence, unity, harmony, and well-

being. Quite similar to Lederach's is Kriesberg's (2001, p. 60) idea that the paths to

reconciliation include (1) truth, (2) justice, (3) remorse and forgiveness, and (4)

individual and group safety and security.

David Crocker's and Galtung's frameworks cover all of the above four

components in more elaborate ways. Crocker (cited in Cole, 2007b, p. 7) proposes the

following categorization of tasks: (1) public fact/truth-finding, (2) official

acknowledgement, (3) reparation or restitution, (4) official apology, (5) public gestures

of commemoration, (6) public deliberation, (7) institutional reform, and (8)

establishment of the rule of law. Meanwhile, Galtung's (2001, p. 4-19) includes (1)

historical or truth commission approach, (2) theatrical or re-living approach, (3) judicial

or punishment approach, (4) reparation or restitution approach, (5) apology or

forgiveness approach, (6) theological or penitence approach, (7) joint sorrow or healing

approach, (8) joint reconstruction approach, (9) joint conflict resolution approach, (10)

co-dependent organization or karma approach, (11) exculpatory approach, and (12) *ho'o*

ponopono, a Polynesian ritual which combines the other eleven approaches. Of

Galtung's 12 approaches, the only one that does not fall neatly into Lederach's and

Kriesberg's categorization is the exculpatory approach. Here, parties to a conflict put the

blame on outer conditions or a third party. They see that cultural factors and/or

structural deficits out there, or a third actor, had forced them to perpetrate and endure

violence (Galtung, 2005, p. 222). More than mere intellectual exercises, Crocker's and

Galtung's elaborations allow researchers to distinguish, for example, cases where

victims are given compensations while perpetrators are not tried and punished,[17] from

cases where perpetrators are declared guilty but no reparation is given to victims[18] –

which under Lederach's and Kriesberg's categorization would both fall into the justice

approach. Finally, there is also lustration, where people involved in past human rights

abuses are banned from holding public offices.

It is clear that the literature is dominated by, and champions, two approaches:

truth and justice. Mercy approach is sometimes favored, but only when combined with

truth, when combined with justice, or when practiced within a limited scope. Post-

conflict processes short of these formal procedures are usually treated as cases where

no reconciliation takes place – where the troublesome past is dealt through forgetting,

through nurturing a national amnesia. Or, such processes are treated as cases where

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[17] The Japanese government provided compensation to those in Southeast Asia who were forced to serve as comfort women to Japanese soldiers during World War II, but evades the pressures to extend public apology.
[18] Due to limited resources, not all Tutsi victims received compensation, although the *gacaca* village courts decisively declared Hutu perpetrators as guilty.

reconciliation takes place in a suboptimal manner, thus likely to impose a serious

challenge to democracy and to long-term peace.

     Truth, justice, and mercy. Scholars and practitioners seem to agree that

transitional justice, which is "delicately" designed to meet demands for justice without

endangering the ongoing political transformations,[19] is *the* way to move on from the

violent past. It seeks recognition for victims and promotes possibilities for peace,

reconciliation, and democracy. Its procedures include reparation programs, gender

justice, security sector reform, and memorialization efforts, but the most popular ones

are truth commissions and criminal prosecution.

     Kevin Avruch (2010, p. 34) notes that more than 25 truth commissions have been

established since 1974. These commissions vary according to their duration, the

issuance of their report, their mandates and the scope of their work, as well as the

recognition they command,[20] but are mostly created by the national governments of the

countries in question[21] (Avruch, 2010, p. 34-35; Avruch & Vejarano, 2002, p. 37).

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[19] International Center for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org

[20] Duration-wise, the truth commissions completed their mandate within 6 to 24 months; with regards of their report, some commissions got disbanded before they completed a report (as in Bolivia and Equador), some managed to complete their report but never got them issued publically (as in Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Philippines), some got their report issued in a greatly censored version (as in Haiti), and some got their reports widely and fully published (as in South Africa and Argentina); as for their mandates and scope of work, some commissions had very limited mandate (*i.e.* only accounting for deaths and not for torture, as in Chile), some focused on the search for truth (as in Peru and Yugoslavia), while some underscored that the search for truth is part of a greater ambition for reconciliation (as in South Africa); on their reputation, some commissions were able to command wide respect for their work (as in South Africa and Argentina), while others were seen as being relatively compromised (as in Chile), as unwilling response to international pressure (as in Uganda 1974), or as a manifesto to disparage the previous regime and legitimize the new one (as in Chad)

Truth facilitates reconciliation through establishing facticity (Hayner, 2002; Henderson, 2000; Ignatieff, 1996), acknowledgements of past wrongs and validation of painful experiences (Hayner, 2002; Lederach, 1997), and collective memories (Avruch, 2010; Hayner, 2002). In terms of establishing facticity, reports issued by truth commissions cut down the numbers of lies that can be spread out unchallenged in the public discourse (Ignatieff, 1996) and prevent public amnesia (Henderson, 2000). Such reports, which record the crimes of a previous regime, or simply of a violent past, might only be appreciated in the distant future (Hayner, 2002).

In terms of acknowledging past wrongs and validating painful experiences, Hayner (2002) stresses that truth commissions are victim-centered – thus are not the same to, nor can replace, trials, which tend to be perpetrator oriented. Many victims consider the commission's findings and reports as "first sign of acknowledgement by any state body that their claims are credible and that the atrocities were wrong" (Hayner, 2002, p. 16). It helps them balance the need to remember and to forget, as well as facilitates the need "to slowly learn to trust the government, the police, and

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(Avruch 2010, p. 34-35). Siri Gloppen (2005, p. 28) adds that in terms of amnesty, the variation goes from provision of blanket amnesty, conditional amnesty (*i.e.* upon disclosure of facts), no amnesty, to prosecution, whereas on the nature of the hearings, some are done in secret, some recorded with camera, some in public, and some widely publicized.

[21] These include truth commissions in South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Zimbabwe, Chile, Chad, Germany, Haiti, Nigeria, Philippines, Uganda, Brasil, East Timor, Ethiopia, and Honduras – others were established by international organizations such as the United Nations (as in El Salvador) or by nongovernmental organizations (as in Rwanda and Paraguay) (Avruch & Vejarano 2002, p. 37).

armed forces, and to gain confidence in the freedom to speak freely and mourn openly"

(Hayner, 2002, p. 4).

In terms of establishing collective memories, Avruch (2010) highlights that the

most daunting task is the "construction of social dialogue and restorative truths" (p. 38),

as the forensic and often competing personal truths needed to be (re-)framed into a

more harmonious social and restorative truth. Here, Kelman (2004) argues that

reconciliation is not about agreeing upon one version of history, but "require[s]

admitting the other's truth into one's own narrative" (p. 123). Similarly, Jan Kubik and

Amy Linch (2006) suggest that a harmonious collective memory is not necessarily one

where each member of the society shares the same set of memories (mnemonic

hegemony), but also one where several memory domains coexist peacefully (mnemonic

pillarization), or where separate memory domains share a minimal set of mnemonic

fundamentals (mnemonic reconciliation). What is important is that no mnemonic

warriors challenge the sets of collective narratives about the past.[22]

Siri Gloppen (2005) offers a couple of cautions with regards to truth-seeking

mechanisms. First, the processes of establishing the truth may lead to tensions and

divisions. Second, conditional amnesty schemas, where amnesty is extended upon

disclosure of facts "seem prone to let the big fish off lightly, while many foot soldiers

will pay the price of exposure and public shaming" (Gloppen, 2005, p. 34). Third, truth

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[22] Kubik and Linch (2006, p. 26) highlight the importance of having a harmonious state of collective memory. They argue that a fractured one will lead to a political regime with weak legitimacy and to a weak reconciliation. They further argue that mnemonic reconciliation, which is most conducive to democratic consolidation, is difficult to achieve without the state's backing. This idea is further developed in Bernhard and Kubik, 2014.

may have a healing power at the individual level, but not at a national level (Gloppen, 2005, p. 35). Fourth, truth commissions can be seen as a form of vengeance, a tool for new regimes to discredit former regimes and current opponents (Gloppen, 2005, p. 35). Fifth, the presence of truth is usually coupled with the absence of repentance. Here, Gloppen (2005) argues that "public apologies – even without full disclosure – are more likely to lead to reconciliation than truth without contrition" (p. 36).

Kathryn Sikkink (2012) notes that between 1979 and 2004, 51 new and/or transitional countries carried out at least one transitional human rights trial. She points at *justice cascade*, a trend where domestic, regional, and international institutions are increasingly willing to hold human rights trials. This shift from "immunity" or from "state accountability" toward "individual criminal accountability"[23] has been accompanied by the construction of various judicial tools that allows for prosecution at a foreign or international court should domestic courts be unable or unwilling to perform human rights trials.[24]

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[23] Sikkink (2012) notes that prior to WWII no state officials had been held accountable for human rights violation. Shortly after WWII, partly due to the shock brought about by the Holocaust, efforts were made to promote human rights, which resulted in a trend where the state as a whole is held accountable for human rights abuses and is expected to remedy the situation. By the 1980s, the trend moved toward convicting state officials involved in the human rights violations. She called these three trends as the "impunity model", "state accountability model", and "individual criminal accountability model".

[24] Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter (2010) contend that the justice cascade argument is overstated. They show that while the number of trials might have increased over time, the rate of accountability has not. In addition, the number of amnesties has not decreased significantly.

Justice facilitates reconciliation by rectifying the wrong (Lederach, 1997) and

deterring future abuses (Domingo, 2012). More specifically, Pilar Domingo (2012)

suggests:

> Trials provide victims and relatives with a sense of justice and catharsis with
> regard to their suffering through the act of punishment and retribution; they
> represent another form of public and official confirmation of the facts; they
> advance the objective of deterrence in that they establish the message that
> perpetrators will be held to account; they have the advantage of separating
> individual responsibility for the crimes from collective guilt[.] (p. 47-48)

Here, Gloppen (2005, p. 26) reminds that in some cases trials pose an immediate

security threat, which endangers the whole reconciliation process. As there seems to be

a consensus that it is more important to know what had happened, to rectify the harm

suffered by victims (restitution), and to prevent future violation of human rights

(prospective justice) than to punish perpetrators (retributive justice), it is important to

think of justice mechanisms other than trials (Gloppen, 2005, 27).

Meanwhile, Alexander Laban Hinton (2010a) warns that since justice is often

assumed as something transcendent and universal, researchers tend to overlook "the

ways in which justice is experienced, perceived, conceptualized, transacted, and

produced in various localities" (p. 1). He (2010 a, p. 17) underlines that justice is always

enmeshed with locality and that critical on-the ground-realities, including social

structure, local knowledge, complex histories, and assumptons that underlie endeavors

for justice, need to be seriously taken into account.

Amnesty, on its own, is not a prudent tool to address the violent past as it sends

a message that the abuses can be deemed as acceptable given the specific

circumstances in the past, and that certain circumstances in the future might deem

abuses as acceptable. Indeed, Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter's (2010)

large-N study[25] suggests that amnesties, trials, and truth commissions alone do not have

a statistically significant and positive effect in diminishing human rights abuses and in

advancing democracy. They advocate for *justice balance*, that is, the adoption of both

amnesty and trial in a balanced way. In the scenario of regime collapse, amnesty and

trial should be adopted simultaneously. Here, amnesty limits the number and scope of

trials without undermining them. Meanwhile, when the transition is negotiated, the two

should be sequenced – amnesty should be adopted prior to trials in order to prevent

spoilers' backlash. Olsen *et.al.*'s study also suggests that this amnesty-trial balance

works well with or without adding truth commissions to the mix.

　　Later on, the three scholars collaborated with Geoff Dancy, Bridget Marchesi,

and Kathryn Sikkink (henceforth Dancy, *et.al*., 2013) and used a bigger dataset. Among

others, they argue that the best strategy would be to combine trials with partial

amnesty. By partial amnesty, they refer to a study by Francesca Lessa and Payne (2012),

which states that national amnesty laws need to comply with international standards

while being open to procedures such as plea bargaining, state witnesses, *etc*., widening

the chances that human rights and democracy agendas can be pursued simultaneously.

　　Meanwhile, Lederach (1997, p. 28-31) proposes the following combinations:

truth-mercy and justice-peace. He (1997) maintains that the truth-mercy combination

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[25] Olsen, Payne, and Reiter's study introduced a trend of analyzing transitional justice in a quantitative manner. Various datasets have since been produced and combined, including the Transitional Justice Database (University of Wisconsin-Madison), the Human Rights Trials Database (University of Minnesota), and the Amnesty and Pardon Database (Ulster University).

validates and embraces the "concerns for exposing what has happened and for letting go in favor of renewed relationship" (p. 31), while the justice-peace combination holds together the need to redress the wrong with "the envisioning of a common, connected future" (p. 31).

Alternatively, William J. Long and Peter Brecke (2003) propose a four-phase *evolutionary psychology forgiveness model* of reconciliation. In a way, it incorporates all four of Lederach's paths: truth, justice, mercy, and peace. The first phase is acknowledging the harm, which can be done through truth telling. The second phase is about redefining social identities, where parties to the conflict reframe their views of themselves and others in order to move away from victim-perpetrator identities. The third phase underlines the need for partial justice. "Partial" signifies that "retribution to a wrong must be less than total" (Long & Brecke, 2003, p. 30), otherwise parties to the conflict will forever be trapped in the cycle of revenge. Lastly, the fourth phase calls for establishing new relationships, marked by forgiveness as well as, "at a minimum, mutual affiliation, coexistence, mutual toleration, and respect" (Long & Brecke, 2003, p. 30).

Interdependence: peace, joint reconstruction, coexistence. I find that the processes in Maluku fall under Lederach's path of *peace* and Galtung's path of *joint reconstruction* and that they share the idea behind the *coexistence* projects discussed in Chayes and Minow's edited volume. I use the term *interdependence* to bolster the notion that the parties' lives are very much intertwined in various levels and aspects, that the only way to move on with life is to do it together.

As stated by Lederach (1997, p. 29), peace is a pathway to reconciliation that underlines interdependence, well-being, and security. Central to this is the idea that former enemies have a common, connected future. Here, day-to-day arrangements in all aspects of life – education, health, transportation, security, economy, *etc.* – which have been distorted or segregated throughout the conflict are restored in ways that bolsters the interdependence between members of all groups.

Galtung (2005) stresses that in joint reconstruction what matters more is not the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, but "the togetherness at work; reflecting on the mad destruction, shoulder-to-shoulder and mind-to-mind" (p. 230). It sends out a message that within the adversary groups there are forces that "count toward depolarization", that is, those who meet "to construct, not to destruct" (Galtung, 2005, p. 230). In a way, handing out reconstruction tasks to third parties can be considered missing out on creating avenues for reconciliation.

Meanwhile, in their discussions of coexistence projects, contributors to Chayes and Minow's edited volume identify the activities or areas as to where interdependence or joint reconstruction can be encouraged. These include the promotion of social services (education, health care, arts, and sports), income-generating activities (rebuilding infrastructure, economic development, and agriculture), joint dispute resolution, and trauma healing (Afzali & Colleton, 2003, p. 5-15).

Only a few other scholars take interdependence as a viable strategy towards reconciliation. Among them are Alice Ackermann (1994), Lily Gardner Feldman (1999), Daniel Smith (1989) and Carlos Sluzki (2010). Building upon Gardner Feldman's earlier

work, Ackermann (1994) shows how reconciliation between France and (West) Germany was not merely based on the need to break the historically rooted animosities between the two countries, but more on the necessity of realizing practical needs. These include France's need to enhance its national security and Germany's need for political and moral rehabilitation, as well as for a wider room for political maneuvering (Ackermann, 1994, p. 231). Here, reconciliation is pursued through building extensive economic, political, social, cultural, and security linkages, both at the governmental and societal levels, to "make it too costly, both in political and human terms, for conflict to be carried out by violent means" (Ackermann, 1994, p. 245).

More specifically, Gardner Feldman (1999) elaborates that history, institutions, leadership, and the international context determine whether reconciliation processes will be dominated by moral imperative or by pragmatic interests. Comparing Germany's reconciliation policies toward France, Israel, Poland, and the Czech Republic, she finds that history "presses less heavily and less obtrusively" (Gardner Feldman, 1999, p. 356) in Franco-German and German-Polish relations than in German-Israeli and German-Czech, allowing for a more pragmatic approach and for a higher level of reconciliation. In the former cases, history is not forgotten, but is treated as productive irritants that should be confronted continuously while fostering cooperation in the various aspects – security, border controls, economy, education, science, art, politics, *etc*. (Gardner Feldman, 2008).

Meanwhile, Smith (1989) observes *sulha*, a Palestinian reconciliation ritual. Although it involves elements of justice and mercy, *sulha* is centered at the principle of

interdependence, at the realization that parties to a conflict "live together in some form of socio-political relationship that is ongoing and continuous" (Smith, 1989, p. 386). *Sulha*'s mediation processes and reparation schemes are "not geared toward 'simple justice' but social reintegration" (Smith, 1989, p. 394). Building upon William Felstiner's (1975) idea of "avoidance cost", Smith (1989, p. 386) suggests that resolving conflicts through more formal (legal) procedures involves higher emotional, familial, and material costs than though a process that aims at restoring peace and membership in a unit, such as *sulha*.

Sluzki (2010) talks of interdependence as one of the six stages between open conflict and reconciliation, each of them

> characterized by set of narratives or dominant themes, that is, by the stories that people tell about the situation (who are the "good guys and bad guys", who has noble and who has ignoble intentions, the ultimate motivations and hidden intents of others, etc.). (p. 65)

Table 1 summarizes the narratives that dominate each of the six stages. Sluzki (2010) argues that reconciliation is about moving progressively from one narrative to another, "from stories of victimization to stories of evolution and empowerment" (p. 65). Such move is especially challenging because "stories become entrenched over time, anchored in (and anchoring) individual and collective identities" (Sluzki, 2010, p. 65).

Sluzki's study shows how reconciliation is anchored in the realization that day-to-day arrangements can only be restored by working together. Here, integration is attractive to all parties because it (1) enhances predictability, meaning that planning can be performed with a certain degree of certainty, (2) it increases civility, and (3) promotes personal and relational well-being (Sluzki, 2010, p. 63).

Table 1: Narratives and Emotions in the Stages between Open Conflict and Reconciliation

Stage	Narrative	Emotion
Confrontation	"Hostility is the only option"	Contempt, hostility, elation
Truce	"We are ready for hostile acts when needed"	Resentment, anger
Collaboration	"Hostilities are a fall-back option"	Ambivalence
Cooperation	"Hostilities would be a major disadvantage"	Cautious empathy
Interdependence	"We need each other. Hostility would be definitively foolish"	Acceptance of the past, cautious trust
Integration	"We are one"	Solidarity, friendly trust

Source: Sluzki, 2010, p. 59-62

How exactly do enemies turn into "partners"? The field of Psychology offers some insights. Gordon Allport (1954) argues that contact allows people from different groups to overcome prejudice and hostility. Four conditions lead to optimal contact: equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and authority support (Allport, 1954). Furthermore, Allport (1954) suggests that contact has generalizing effects, where one extends her/his evaluation of a member of an outgroup to other members of that outgroup. Thomas F. Pettigrew (1998) develops Allport's contact hypothesis by adding a fifth condition: the contact must present subjects with the opportunity to become friends. He (1998) specifies four processes of change facilitated by intergroup contact: (1) learning about the outgroup, where new information generated through intergroup contact corrects negative views of the outgroup, (2) changing behavior, where intergroup interaction serves as a benign form of behavior modification and is often followed by attitude change, (3) generating affective ties, where intergroup contact reduces anxiety, nurtures empathy, and build friendships, and (4) ingroup reappraisal where intergroup contact reveals that ingroup norms and customs are not the only ways to navigate around the social world, which in turn leads

to a less provincial wiew of the outgroups. This intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998) also elaborates on the types and sequence of generalization: (1) decategorization, where at the beginning of the intergroup contact, subjects categorize each other *not* as a member of the outgroup, but as people with similar interests, status, or occupation – which potentially leads to subjects liking each other, (2) salient categorization, where at the next stage of intergroup contact, subjects categorize each other as representative of the outgroup – which extends the positive feelings toward an individual outgroup to the outgroup, and (3) recategorization, where subjects within intergroup contact develop an inclusive category among them – which obscures the "we" and "them" boundary. Pettigrew (1998, p. 75) notes that "progression through these three stages of categorization is not automatic, and recategorization into a single group often will not be attained."

Ralph K. White (1954) argues that even when it is difficult for parties to a conflict to sympathize with each other, it is possible to weave realistic empathy among them – that is, a state of understanding the thoughts and feelings of the other party, of how the conflict looks from the other's perspective.[26] Muzafer Sherif (1958) suggests that superordinate goals, "goals which are compelling and highly appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict but which cannot be attained by the resources and energies of the groups separately" (p. 349-350) effectively reduce intergroup conflict.

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[26] White (1954) distinguishes between sympathy and empathy. The former is the emotive state of "feeling with others", the latter is a cognitive state of "understanding the feelings and thoughts of others". He argues that while it is difficult for them to sympathize with each other, parties to a conflict can indeed realistically empathize with each other and that such empathy is amongst the first step to conflict resolution.

Here, it is useful to return to Kelman's (2004) conceptualization of reconciliation as identity change. While this change may go as far as adopting a common, transcendent identity alongside one's group identity, what is necessary is that the change includes removing the negation of the other, where "each party revise its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other" (Kelman, 2004, p. 119). Kelman (2004) suggests that this identity change involves five steps: (1) mutual acknowledgement of the other's nationhood and humanity, (2) development of a common moral basis for peace, (3) confrontation with history, (4) acknowledgement of responsibility, and (5) establishment of patterns and institutional mechanisms of cooperation.

My interviews, discussions, and observations lead me to believe that Christians and Muslims in Maluku are fully aware of their common, connected future. To most of them, moving forward as separate entities is unforeseeable. Based on this realization, reinforced by vivid memories of centuries of intergroup harmony, it was not that difficult for Malukans to embrace the more practical side of reconciliation, that is, the need, the superordinate goal, to restore normalcy, to restore the various aspects of their intertwined life. They become more and more conscious of the high cost of violence, the high cost of avoidance, as well as the attractions of integration, which includes certainty, civility, and well-being. Fortunately, since the beginning of the communal clashes, there are enough forces within each group that willingly serve as agents of depolarization, and over time, these forces grow in numbers. As more intergroup encounters take place, prejudices are reduced, friendships are formed

and/or strengthened, realistic empathies are developed, and identities are changed in a way that implies a degree of acceptance of the other's identity.

Emic Approach: Locals as Strategy Adjustors

Central to this study is a belief that reconciliation means different things to different people and that these meanings need to be attended to seriously. To understand what reconciliation is to Malukans, on top of applying an emic approach, this study takes on the *strategy adjustment* stand from the study of political transition.

The basic premise of the strategy adjustment stance is that people are capable of, and indeed have always been, fixing themselves – and by extension, fixing or creating informal, semiformal, or formal institutions – as strategies to cope with change (Kubik, 2014). This is a critique of the two dominant approaches in transitology: social adjustment and institutional adjustment. They locate the sources of problems in political transitions in the people or in the institutions and accordingly prescribe fixing the people to fit the indispensible institutions or fixing the institutions to fit the people (Kubik, 2014).

The literature on reconciliation seems to mirror the social adjustment *versus* institutional adjustment debates. In examining cases where reconciliation appears to be a challenging task, some scholars pinpoint the source of the problem in the people: (1) their unreadiness to let go of the past (Arthur, 1999; Shriver Jr., 1999) or (2) their adherence to the culture of impunity. Others fault the institution: (1) the selection, design and sequence of the reconciliation program (*i.e.* Amstutz, 2005; Biggar, 2001b; Forsberg, 2001; Hayner, 2002; Minow, 2001; Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010; Semple,

2009), (2) the incompatibility of the institutions to the local contexts (Ashforth, 2005; van der Merwe, 2001; Hinton 2010), (3) the legitimacy of the actors running the reconciliation program (Asmal, 1992), or (4) weak leadership (Bargal & Sivan, 2004). While some of these studies try to look at interactions between people and institutions, most of them do not treat reconciliation as vernacular practices. And although some studies attend to local contexts, they tend to focus on how the local context should inform the selection, sequencing, and design of available institutional templates (Babo-Soares, 2005; Honwana, 2005; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Skaar, 2005) – truth commissions, trials, and compensation schemas – or on how locals respond to such institutions, instead of exploring how locals develop their own strategies to face the problems as they understood them.

Taking a strategy adjustment stance, this study sees the adoption of interdependence path – instead of truth or justice approaches – in Maluku as enactments of people's vernacular visions of their worlds. In other words, it does not see what is going on in Maluku as a result of people's failure to establish truth- or justice- seeking institutions nor the failure of state and community institutions to cater to people's need for truth or justice, but as strategies that are actively and carefully devised from within the subjects' worlds, according to their understanding of their problems.

A couple of caveats should be made. First, reconciliation can be a byproduct or unintended consequence of something else, not necessarily planned for. Second, the absence of reconciliation programs at the national or official political level does not

necessarily mean that there are no reconciliatory efforts at the community and

individual levels. Third, what looks like oblivion from outsiders' eyes might actually be

the locals' active way of letting go while restoring a meaningful memory of the violent

past. Here, Veena Das' (2006) and Paul Ricoeur' (2006) works offer useful insights.

In her ethnographic study on post-Partition India-Pakistan, Das (2006) concluded that

life is often recovered through the descent of macrolevel violence into ordinary, day-to-

day, life. What matters is how memories of violence are folded into daily relations –

actively lived through various practices and gestures, which sometimes includes silence.

Das (2006, p. 7) presents this as a critique that, in most post violence settings, life is not

necessarily recovered through some grand gestures in the realm of the transcendent, as

proponents of truth commissions and trials hope to offer.

In a similar vain, Paul Ricoeur (2006, cited in de Brito & Whitehead, 2012)

introduces the idea of "happy forgetting." This form of forgetting should not be

dismissed as an escape or omission, as it is "memory work" that can serve as a basis for

reconciliation. It is not amnesia but

> rather a process of mourning, a "working through" the past, such that traumatic
> memories are not just understood but accepted. This kind of forgetting
> (mourning embodied) is what permits reconciliation and the formation of "happy
> memories" (those that are useful to move towards a positive future) and of an
> "appeased memory" in which things are remembered without anger or
> prejudice… [Ricoeur] suggests that what is important in such memories is not
> that they are factually precise but that they are exemplary – they are useful for
> future generations (de Brito & Whitehead, 2012, p. 456).

Again, the absence of truth- or justice-seeking institutions in Maluku cannot be

construed as oblivion. Malukans do actively engage in activities that intentionally or

unintentionally promote intergroup relations and signify a break from the violent past,

mostly in the form of joint reconstruction. I see these programs as active enactments of people's common vision of their world. They are neither mere responses to the absence of truth- or justice-seeking institutions, nor reflections of people's incapacity to form and uphold such institutions. These are strategies specifically devised in order to answer specific sets of problems that are entrenched in specific vernacular worlds, thus best studied from within the very worlds they are created in and for.

Religious identities play a crucial role in defining these worlds. As Chapters 4-9 show, one's faith predetermines, among others, her/his access to politics and the range of employments open to her/him. As Gerry van Klinken (2001) suggests, "We now need to stress that being Protestant or Muslim is … a state that roots a person in an exclusive life world; viewed from inside that world, the other – either Protestant or Muslim – is perceived as enemy" (p. 12). To this, I add two things. First, while I agree that the views from within each of the worlds are exclusive, I see them as not necessarily exclusionary – that is, the attitudes and behaviors that follow one's typical Christian or Muslim world view may be that of peace and tolerance. Second, the intersection of religion with ethnicity, class, age, gender, and urban-rural divide should not be overlooked.

Towards Interdependence

The literature on reconciliation captures enourmous developments in the study and the worldwide practice of reconciliation, especially during the last two decades. Three observations stand out. First, reconciliation is about relationships and moving on from the violent past. Second, truth- and justice- seeking mechanisms are championed over other paths of reconciliation, including the interdependence path. Third, universal

apparoaches to reconciliation are privileged, while there is a need to take an emic

approach – that is, to take reconciliation as vernacular practices and understand them

from within the subjects' cultural worlds. In general, what comes out of these works,

perhaps unintentionally, is a focus on grand procedures with sophisticated, standardized

toolkits.[27] Such approach would most likely fail to take cases such as Maluku seriously.

The above is especially true since Malukans themselves do not really attach the

term *rekonsiliasi* to the various activities they do to restore Christian-Muslim

relationships and to move on from their violent past. Indeed, as elaborated in Chapter 5,

there was a period when Malukans resented the term *rekonsiliasi*. Nevertheless, the

fact remains that since early on Malukans do design and take part in activities to restore

Christian-Muslim relationships and to move on from the violent past – as detailed in

Chapters 6-9. Despite relatively minor intergroup clashes in 2004 and 2011, it can be

said with a degree of certainty that reconciliation has taken and is taking place in

Maluku.

Reconciliation processes in Maluku take the path of interdependence. It is

grounded in the awareness among Christians and Muslims there that they have a

common connected future, that moving forward as separate entities is unforeseeable.

This makes it relatively easier for Malukans to embrace the more practical side of

reconciliation – that is, the need, the superordinate goal, to restore normalcy, to restore

the various aspects (health, education, security, *etc*.) of their intertwined life. Consious

of this intertwined life, Malukans understand the high cost of violence, the high cost of

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[27] Of course, there are exceptions, like the works of Braeuchler (2009) and Hinton (2010).

avoidance, as well as the attractions of intergration – which includes certainty, civility, and well-being. As Christian-Muslim encounters become more intensive, prejudice is reduced, friendship are formed and/or strengthened, and identities are changed in a way that does not include negation of the other.

It should be understood that the interdependence path is selected not out of the failure to adopt truth- and/or justice-seeking paths of reconciliation. Employing an emic approach and a strategy adjustment stance, this study asserts that the various interdependence-based activities in Maluku are strategies that are actively and carefully devised by Malukans themselves based on their understanding of their problems. Just because there are no functioning truth commission and human rights trials, the case of Maluku should not be relegated into a case where reconciliation does not take place – as oblivion. In addition, it should not be seen as a case where truth and justice are ignored altogether. As seen in the Chapters 6-9, truth and justice are "folded" into the various interdependence-based activities.

Chapter 3 – Hypotheses, Methods, and Scope

Having laid some conceptual building blocks on interdependence in Chapter 1 and a review of the literature in Chapter 2, in this chapter, I present my hypotheses, detail my methods, and explicate the scope of my argument.

Hypotheses

Here I restate my research questions: under what conditions can societies rely on interdependence – thus can afford bypassing truth- and justice- seeking institutions – in their effort to build solid and constructive foundations for reconciliation, and what are the mechanisms underpinning the interdependence approach to reconciliation?

I argue that three conditions make it possible for Christians and Muslims in Maluku to pursue reconciliation through interdependence – without any effective truth commissions or trials. First, they came to adopt a relatively shared narrative that the past violence was a third party's (*provokator*) fault and that future violence can be prevented by dealing with rumors more prudently. Thus, they do not need to rely on truth commissions nor on trials to establish a collective memory and to envision a collective future. Second, they came to realize that neither party is exclusively the perpetrator or exclusively the victim. The realization that everyone – including their co-religionists and perhaps themselves – is complicit deters people from demanding for the creation of truth commissions and trials. Third, people's memories of peace and intergroup cooperation are vivid. This makes it relatively easier for them to be fully aware of their common, connected future and to embark upon what Sluzki (2010) calls shift of narrative – from "since we are enemies, hostility is the only option" to "since we

are one and we need each other, hostility would definitively be foolish." Their high regard for their memories of peace makes it costly for them to opt for truth commissions and trials, as these methods necessitates singling out perpetrators and victims. At a more practical level, these memories provide them with repertoires on how to live harmoniously with members of the other faith group.

The mechanisms as to how interdependence leads to reconciliation are threefold. First, it allows people to emphasize their social role rather than their affinity with a certain religion. This distancing from religious identities, however small and/or symbolic it is, makes it easier for people to rebuild relationships and to embark upon identity change. Second, it provides avenues whereby people can symbolically display their apologies and forgiveness. In such situations where everyone prefers to keep her/his complicity in the conflict rather private, people need a public space where they can demonstrate remorse symbolically. Third, it creates focal points for peace. The notion that "I know that you know that I am sorry" and "you know that I know that you are sorry" generates mutual guarantees that neither party wishes to carry on violent activities and seek revenge.

Table 2: Research Questions and Hypotheses

X ⟶ Y

truth ⟶

justice ⟶

H1a, H1b, H1c   **interdependence** ⟶

H2a, H2b, H2c

Reconciliation

RQ 1:   Under what conditions does a society take the interdependence path of reconciliation (thus bypassing truth- and justice- seeking procedures)?

H1a: Shared narratives on the past (in Maluku: the *provokator* narratives) and the envisioned future enable a society to take the interdependence path of reconciliation. Mnemonic warriors do NOT challenge such narratives during the process.

(Societies with no such shared narratives are more likely to opt for having a truth commission or trials to adjudicate on which narratives are to be adopted by the society.)

H1b: A shared idea that everyone is complicit in the past violence allows a society to take the interdependence path of reconciliation.

(Societies whose members draw a clear-cut perpetrator-victim divide among them are more likely to choose to have a truth commission or trials to assure that the atrocities done by "others" do not stay unnoticed and/or unpunished.)

H1c: Vivid memories of peace allow a society to take the interdependence path of reconciliation.

(Societies with none or limited repertoires of living together harmoniously do not find having a truth commission or trials as costly options.)[28]

RQ2:   What are the mechanisms underpinning the interdependence path of reconciliation?

H2a: Interdependence allows people to emphasize on their social role rather than the identity that marks their affinity to a party in the past violence.

H2b: Interdependence provides space for people to display their apologies and forgiveness symbolically.

H2c: Interdependence creates focal points for peace.

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[28] One way to test the counterfactuals is to look at other cases of communal violence in Indonesia that also took place around the fall of the New Order regime but did not end up with interdependence-based reconciliation. The cases of Northern Ireland and India may also be useful.

Methods

Since the different parts of this research have different objectives, I employ a

multi-method approach. To test whether or not the three conditions lead to

interdependence-based reconciliation activities, I treat Maluku as a type I case study

(Gerring, 2004).[29] Here, I look at the periods (1) before and after the *provokator*

narrative is adopted, (2) before and after the idea that everyone is complicit is

internalized, as well as (3) before and after the memories of peace are framed in a way

that supports reconciliation. The data for this come from my 2002 field notes, the 2003-

2004 Ambon Database Pilot Study, the 2004 Ambon Database, secondary sources, as

well as semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group discussions I conducted in

2014 and 2015.

Subsequently, to uncover the mechanisms as to how the interdependence path

moves people toward reconciliation, I apply process tracing of the various activities

done in the ceremonial, functional-quotidian, neighborhood, and narrative sites. For

this, I collect data through semi-structured in-depth interviews, focus group discussions,

secondary sources, and participant observation.

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[29] Initially, I planned to conduct cross-case comparisons (statistical analysis) among
villages in Maluku. For the independent variables, I planned to utilize the Ambon
Database which records whether or not respondents adopt the *provokator* narrative,
whether or not they think that everyone is complicit, as well as whether or not they
have vivid memories of intergroup peace. For the dependent variable, I planned to
conduct interviews with community leaders to see if IDPs have returned to their home
village (a proxy for reconciliation) or not (a proxy for no reconciliation). However, my
fieldwork in January 2014 and July-August 2014 suggests that the return or relocation of
IDPs does not reflect reconciled or not reconciled attitudes (details are discussed in
chapter 7).

Ethnography, relying on participant observation, is central to my attempt to understand the web of meanings that Malukans attach to their identities and actions (including that of participating or not participating in reconciliation activities), which may or may not have changed throughout the conflict. Findings from the participant observation inform my interpretation of the data gathered through semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, as well as my interpretation of the Ambon Database Pilot Study, the Ambon Database, and the various secondary sources.

Finally, to get a more explicit sense of what *rekonsiliasi* means to Malukans, I employ ordinary language analysis. Following Frederic Schaffer's (1998) ordinary language analysis, I started with judgment questions like "is there reconciliation where you live now" and "is reconciliation good or bad" and ended with direct questions like "to you, what is reconciliation". Respondents' answers to the above questions took me by surprise. Most respondents did not provide a straight "yes", "no" or "maybe" to the closed-questions. They also did not provide a definition-like answer to such a direct question as "to you, what is reconciliation". Instead, as discussed in Chapter 5, respondents elaborated on the conditions for reconciliation, the indicators of a reconciled society, and the procedures as to how reconciliation should or should not take place.

As indicated above, a huge proportion of the data used in this study are generated through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions I conducted in 2014 and 2015. These include interviews and discussions that were carried out during my field work in Ambon, Maluku, on January 18-30, 2014 and on July 23-August 7, 2014,

as well as interviews that were carried out through telephone, e-mail, and Facebook

messaging in 2013, 2014, and 2015.[30] In total, I conducted seven focus group discussions

and 57 interviews. Most respondents were involved in two sites of interdependence

(ceremonial and functional-quotidian sites, ceremonial and neighborhood sites, or

functional-quotidian and neighborhood sites). I managed to have a balanced number of

Christian and Muslim respondents, and slightly over half of them are women. On

building initial contacts in Ambon, I relied on the network of peace advocates I came

across during my previous Maluku-related work.[31]

Other sources of data that are important to this study are the Ambon Database

Pilot Study and the Ambon Database, which were constructed by Ashutosh Varshney

and Samsu Rizal Panggabean with funding from the Ford Foundation. It was part of a

larger research on "Can Civil Society Moderate Ethnic/Communal Conflict?" that

compares six cities in Indonesia. Data collection for Ambon Database Pilot Study was

done between October 2003 and February 2004, while data collection for Ambon

Database was done between April and October 2004. The former surveyed 80 Christian

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[30] For some respondents, doing an interview through Facebook messenger is more convenient (than *via* e-mail) since it can be done through mobile phone. First, in Maluku, it is easier to access the internet through cellular data than through cable data. Second, having the interview mediated by mobile phones (instead of PCs) gives respondents more flexibility in terms of where and when to have the interview.

[31] As indicated earlier, my first visit to Maluku took place in 2002. At that time, I assisted in INGO staff training and in a semi-formal meeting of Malukan community leaders. Later that year, I assisted in a research on peacebuilding project in Maluku as well as transcribed the audio records of the Health as a Bridge to Peace (HBP) workshops in Maluku and helped prepared the HBP reports. In 2004-2007, I assisted in compiling and translating the survey responses that became the base for the Ambon Database. I also served as a facilitator in a Youth Camp for Peace that led to the creation of Maluku Peace Generation and helped organize various Yogyakarta-based workshops, which involved resource persons from Maluku.

respondents and 80 Muslim respondents, while the later surveyed 120 Christian

respondents and 120 Muslim respondents, yielding a total of 400 respondents. These

respondents live in predominantly Christian villages, mixed Christian-Muslim villages,

predominantly Muslim villages, and exclusively Muslim villages (see Table 3).

Table 3: Number of Respondents of Ambon Database Pilot Study and Ambon Database

Villages	Database	Christian	Muslim	Total
Predominantly Christian villages: Amantelu, Hatiwe Besar, Karang Panjang, Lateri, Latta, Suli, Waai, Waihoka, Wainitu	Ambon Database P.S.[a]	30	30	60
	Ambon Database	50	50	100
Mixed Christian-Muslim villages: Nania, Nusaniwe, Pandan Kasturi, Tial, Wayame	Ambon Database P.S.	20	20	40
	Ambon Database	20	13	33
Predominantly Muslim villages: Batu Merah, Hatiwe Kecil, Hila, Hitu, Hitu Lama, Laha, Poka, Silale	Ambon Database P.S.	30	30	60
	Ambon Database	50	19	69
Exclusively Muslim villages: Morella, Tulehu	Ambon Database P.S.	0	0	0
	Ambon Database	0	38	38
	Total	200	200	400

Source: Ambon Database Pilot Study and Ambon Database
[a] : Ambon Database P.S. refers to Ambon Database Pilot Study

Since I helped compile and translate the survey responses that made up the

Ambon Database, as well as helped liaise with the local researchers who conducted the

surveys, I have been familiar with it since 2004. While the focus of the survey was on

intergroup relations, many of its open-ended questions led to responses that are

relevant to this study on reconciliation. The question on what had caused the Maluku

conflict, for example, brought up answers that included commentaries on *provokator*s.

Meanwhile, responses to questions on Christian-Muslim relations in the 1970s and

1980s are laden with memories of intergroup peace.

The above data, as well as those gathered through secondary sources, would have not mean much without insights on the context and dynamics in Maluku that allows for the data to be properly interpreted. Here, ethnography proves invaluable. Believing in the utility of participant observation, I arranged for my field trip schedules to cover the dates of January 19, 2014, which marks 15 years since the beginning of the Maluku conflict, as well as July 28, 2014, which was Idul Fitri holiday, the fiteenth Idul Fitri since the one that was marred by the communal clash that set off the Maluku conflict. Through witnessing and, to a certain extent, taking part in a Christian-Muslim peace celebration (Festival Orang Basudara), exactly 15 years after the first spark of violence as well as a Christian-Muslim observance of centuries-long Idul Fitri customs (which was disrupted by the conflict), I gained priceless insights on current Christian-Muslim relations. In my 2014 visits, I was able to travel freely and easily between Christian and Muslim quarters, to hold meetings in a non-secretive manner, and to hang out at the streets of Ambon past midnight, which was not the case in my 2002 visit. These first hand experiences of such contrast situations allow me to better appreciate the efforts that Malukans have put toward peace and reconciliation.

Scope

Bearing in mind that a case study looks into a single unit "for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units" (Gerring, 2004, p. 342), this study on reconciliation in Maluku aims to shed light on similar cases. Here, I try to clarify the applicability of my findings to other cases.

First and foremost, it is important to look at what kind of conflict the Maluku conflict was. It was a communal conflict fought among locals, not a civil war where the state was a party to the conflict (the state's involvement was indirect, as discussed in the subsequent chapter). It was a conflict characterized by the use of religious sentiments as mobilization tools, not a conflict centered on demands for self-determination. It was a localized conflict, which took place only within a province far away from the state's capital. It was fought by locals, who due to the conflict were for some time forced to live under some sort of spatial segregation, but knew that they would have to continue to live together. It was relatively short, where the first incident that started off the conflict and the truce that stopped the intensive fights were just over three years apart.

Secondly, it is important to look into the context of the Maluku conflict. It took place shortly after a regime change, where the state and its apparatus were weak – but not one where the outgoing regime was a (direct) party to the conflict. It took place amidst the nation's transition to democracy, where uncertainty was very high and political positions were suddenly open for grabs. It took place amidst violent conflicts in other parts of Indonesia, those of communal nature (*i.e.* Christian-Muslim in Poso, Dayak-Madura several cities in Kalimantan, and anti-Tionghoa in several cities across the country), seccession (*i.e.* Aceh, East Timor, and Papua), and economic based (*i.e.* agrarian and industrial conflicts) – although it also took place amidst communal, Christian-Muslim, peace in most places throughout Indonesia.

Third, it is important to look at postconflict initiatives in Maluku. Despite being a local conflict, international presence was relatively high in Maluku, with various UN agencies and many international NGOs setting offices in the province, and Malukan diaspora in Netherlands keeping a close eye on the conflict. Many of the international actors in Maluku made sure that Malukans were exposed to the idea of reconciliation through truth commissions and/or tribunals. While fact-finding teams were commissioned – by the state, by universities, and by NGOs – and some trials were held, reconciliation in Maluku heavily relied on the interdependence path.

With those in mind, it seems that the applicability of this study's findings is rather narrow. Although a number of cases came to mind, there seems to be quite some limits to how the findings apply. Take the case of Nothern Ireland, for example. While it has a strong communal, Catholic-Protestant, component, it also has a very strong political, power-sharring element, as well as strong state involvement. Thus, while it is tempting to test the vivid memory of peace hypothesis (H1c) on the Northern Ireland case (given that the conflict has gone for generations, most likely obscuring any memories of Catholic-Protestant cooperation), it might not be very suitable to do so. On the other hand, one can propose a counterfactual, that should the Maluku conflict continue to escalate and/or Malukans fail to embark upon reconciliation process, the Maluku conflict may sustain over generations and be marked by strict segregation as in Northern Ireland.

Or take the Hindu-Muslim violence in India. While it is communal in nature and takes place only in some cities and not in others, it has a repetitive/episodic/ongoing

character, making it less comparable to Maluku. On the other hand, one can also test if this repetitiveness has to do with the parties' failure to reconcile the first time around – if failure to adopt a common narrative about the past (*i.e.* attributing the violence to political entrepreneurs making electoral bids – H1a), failure to acknowledge that both sides are complicit in the violence (H1b), and/or failure to capitalize on memories of peace (H1c) helps explain the recurring nature of the violence.

Perhaps, the "safest" is to apply this study's findings to other communal violence that took place across Indonesia around the same time as the Maluku conflict. They share the same macro-political context and communal nature, but vary in their experience regarding reconciliation.

Towards Interdependence

In this chapter, I argue that interdependence in Maluku was possible due to the combined presence of three factors: shared narratives on the past and future – more spesifically the adoption of *provokator* narratives (H1a), an awareness that everyone is complicit (H1b), and vivid memories of peace (H1c). I also argue that interdependence work through the following mechanisms: emphasizing social role rather than religious identity (H2a), providing avenues to symbolically display remorse and forgiveness (H2b), and (H2c) creating focal points for peace. To test these hypotheses, as well as to understand what reconciliation means to Malukans, I employ a multi-method approach: treat Maluku as a type I case study, conduct process tracing, and perform ordinary language analysis. It is likely that the applicability of the hypotheses is quite narrow, that they only hold up in communal conflict settings similar to Maluku.

Chapter 4 – The Maluku Conflict

The term "Maluku conflict" begs explanation. Maluku is the group of islands located at the eastern part of Indonesia, known to many as the Spice Islands. These islands used to constitute a single province – also named Maluku – until the Indonesian government carved a new one out of this archipelago on October 4, 1999. Since then, people refer to the two distinct administrative entities as Maluku and North Maluku (Maluku Utara). Scholars too, caught up with this development and study the conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku separately.

I use the term "Maluku conflict" to refer to communal violence that took place in the islands that make up the post-1999 Province of Maluku. My work mostly covers reconciliation activities in the island of Ambon, where the town of Ambon – the capital of Maluku – is located. It is on this island that the communal violence started and taken most if its toll. Maluku's population was 1,286,075 in 1999, 1,205,539 in 2000, and 1,533,506 in 2010.[32]

This chapter offers a sketch on the Maluku conflict and lays out the scholarly explanations of the conflict. Then it discusses how the notions of *provokator*, complicity, and memories of peace play into the conflict and open the way to interdependence-based reconciliation.

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[32] These demographic data was released by Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik). I cited the data for 1999 from Panggabean (2004, p. 417) and took the data for 2000 and 2010 from Statistik Indonesia's website (www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&id_subyek=12). For 1999, Statistik Indonesia reports that the population of Maluku was 2,086,516, but this number includes the population of North Maluku, which became a separate province later that year.

What Happened

Various accounts trace the Maluku conflict back to a fight between a Christian of

Maluku origin and a Muslim migrant[33] near the border of Batumerah and Mardika,

respectively a predominantly Muslim and a predominantly Christian village, on the

afternoon of January 19, 1999.[34] Since the date coincides with Idul Fitri, the day where

Muslims celebrate the end of the Ramadhan fasting season, this incident is often

referred to as *Idul Fitri berdarah* – bloody Idul Fitri.

The narrative that the conflict took people by surprise is amply found in my

interviews, in the Ambon Database Pilot Study and Ambon Database, as well as in

scholarly reports (Adam, 2010; Bertrand, 2002; Braithwaite *et.al., 20*10; Brown *et.al.*,

2005; van Klinken, 2001; van Klinken, 2007). Respondents noted that while fights

between Christian and Muslim youths happen from time to time, they never lasted

more than a day, were localized events that never spilled over to neighboring villages,

were based on some simple misunderstandings rather than malicious intents or

religious fervor, and were not deadly. At the very first, people did not take the youth

fight in Batumerah-Mardika seriously, thinking that it will be over in a matter of hours.

They only started to do so upon noticing that some buildings got burned, that some

private homes got attacked, that the opposing groups wore distinct attributes –

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[33] Some suggest that the fight was between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger (Brown, *et.al.* 2005; Braithwaite & Dunn, 2010), while others suggest that it was between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim thug, because the former refused to pay protection money to the later (Pinontoan 2014; Fofid 2014; Rijoly 2014).
[34] Braithwaite & Dunn (2010, p. 156) suggest that the first fight happened on January 13, 1999 in Dobo, a small town located on the Aru Islands, far southeast of Ambon.

Christians red headbands and Muslims white ones, and that religious slogans were being

cried out during the fights.

> It is really confusing to me why out of a sudden Christians and Muslims could despise each other to the extent that interreligious riots could happen (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Christian village of Latta, male, 45 years old – Ambon Database).

> Before 1999, there have been no interreligious riots in our neighborhood. There was a fight though, but it was between Muslims. The conflict in 1999 just happened suddenly, forcing us to leave our village (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Silale, male, 74 years old – Ambon Database).

> The January 19, 1999 riot happened in a sudden, out of the blue. It was beyond comprehension, as Christian-Muslim relations have been very good, especially between those with *pela* and *gandong* ties (Muslim, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Hitu Lama, male, 43 years old – Ambon Database).

> Suddenly, while celebrating Idul Fitri on January 19, 1999, we were attacked by Christians (Muslim, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Christian village of Lateri, female, 51 years old – Ambon Database).

The violence spread quickly, not only throughout the island of Ambon, but also

to at least 14 other islands in Maluku (Braithwaite & Dunn, 2010, p. 156). This rapid

contagion effect has a lot to do with rumors spreading in Christian villages that Muslims

in downtown Ambon have burnt down the Silo Church and attacked Christians as well as

rumors spreading in Muslim villages that Christians in downtown Ambon have burnt

down the Al Fatah Mosque and attacked Muslims. On top of that, many security

personnel were on Idul Fitri leave, adding strain to the already weak, understaffed, and

ill-equipped security forces.

> On January 19, 1999, we, residents of Morella, heard that the Al Fatah Mosque was set on fire by Christians who reside in downtown Ambon. We immediately felt that it was our calling, our duty, to defend Muslims in downtown Ambon

who had been attacked by Christians… The security forces should arrest those who spread this rumor, as it has allowed the violence to spread widely (Muslim, Ambonese, resident of the exclusively Muslim village of Morella, male, 48 years old – Ambon Database).

Van Klinken (2007, p. 89-90) divides violence in Maluku into five episodes: the first started out in Batumerah-Mardika on January 19, 1999 and lasted until May 1999, the second broke out in the middle-class suburb of Poka on July 24, 1999 and lasted until early 2000, the third began in April 2000 as Muslim militias arrived in Ambon, the fourth consisted of sporadic fighting that lasted until the signing of Malino II on February 2002, whereas the fifth took place after Malino II and was marked by mysterious bombings and shootings instead of massed attacks (see Table 4). He (2001, p. 4) reports that the second episode of violence came as an even bigger surprise to the members of the more educated middle class, and tore down their optimism that reconciliation is possible. Meanwhile, Graham Brown, Christopher Wilson and Suprayoga Hadi (2005, p. 16) mention that from mid-2000 onward, the Maluku conflict became militarized – it saw a greater involvement of security forces on both sides of the conflict, a significant influx of Muslim fighters from across Indonesia, as well as a weaponry-shift from handmade weapons and bombs into professional weapons of unknown provenance (Brown, *et.al.*, 2005, p. 16). Greg Fealy (2001) notes that in late April 2000, about 3,000 members of Laskar Jihad (Jihadi Troops, henceforth LJ)[35] arrived in Maluku and that over time the number of LJ fighters in Maluku grew to 6,000.

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[35] ICG (2002) writes that LJ was formed in early 2000 by Java-based radical Muslim clerics as a reaction to a massacre by Christians over 400 Muslims in North Maluku that took place in the end of 1999. On January 7, 2000, a massive rally at Jakarta's main square (Lapangan Merdeka) demanded that the government save the Muslims of

Table 4: Episodes of the Maluku Conflict

Episode	Time
1	January 19, 1999 – May 1999
2	July 24, 1999 – early 2000
3	April 2000 – end of 2001
4	End of 2001 - February 2002 (Malino II)
5	post-Malino II

Source: van Klinken 2007, p. 89-90

As noted in the first chapter, the 2000-plus incidents of communal violence over the course of three years claimed over 6,000 deaths, over 7,000 injured people, nearly 29,000 buildings (ViCIS, cited in Barron, Azca, & Susdinarjanti, 2012), as well as over 500,000 displaced people (ICG, 2000). After physical casualties, the most visible damage is the spatial segregation between the two communities. Nearly all villages became exclusively Christian or exclusively Muslim, turning roads, harbors, wells, beaches, markets, and everything public within the villages' boundaries into "Christian" or "Muslim". Freedom of movement became severely disrupted. Up to 2002, upon arriving at Pattimura airport in the island of Ambon, one would need to either take the red (Christian) or white (Muslim) route to their final destination. These routes include not only roads that exclusively traverse Christian or Muslim villages, but also speed boat lines connecting one Christian harbor to another as well as one Muslim harbor to another. When entering the island of Ambon by ship, Christians take the Pelni[36] line via Kupang, a predominantly Christian town in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur,

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Maluku from being slaughtered and called for *jihad* (holy war). This led to the creation of the Communication Forum of the *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah* (Congregation of the Followers of the Prophet), which established Laskar Jihad. It quickly registered volunteers to fight in Maluku, provided military training, and sent troops to Maluku.

[36] Pelni, or Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia, is the national sea transportation company.

whereas Muslims take the Pelni line via Makassar, a predominantly Muslim town in the province of South Sulawesi (van Klinken, 2001, p. 5). This spatial segregation was quickly followed by segregation and distortion of various services. Individual members of the security forces sided with their co-religionists, media workers reported from Christian or Muslim areas only, healthworkers served only in areas belonging to their faith group, schools and universities were attended only by students and teachers from one group, and so on. More detailed accounts of these segregated services are presented in Chapter 8, as prelude to reconciliation activities done in the functional-quotidian site.

It is very important to emphasize that, in spite of the level of destruction and segregation that people had to endure, not everyone got drawn into the violence. A handful of people chose to offer protection (temporary housing, safe passage, *etc.*) to those from the other faith, initiate reconstruction programs, take part in interfaith neighborhood watch initiatives, reach out to the other community in order to verify rumors, take care of houses and lands owned by neighbors who had to flee, flee out from Maluku, enrol their children to schools and universities outside Maluku to prevent these children from being recruited as combatants, or simply do nothing harmful. Unfortunately, "narratives of peace" based on these actions are less circulated than "narratives of violence". Local efforts to mainstream these narratives of peace are discussed in Chapter 9.

Map 4: Christian, Muslim, and Mixed Areas in Ambon Island Prior to 1999

Why It Happened and Sustained

There are at least four groups of explanations of the Maluku conflict: Jakarta-centered conspiracy theories, state failure, elite mobilization, and displacement. All four share an assumption that the conflict has roots in some structural factors: politicization of religion, demographic shifts, and democratization.

Table 5: Scholarly Explanations of the Maluku Conflict

Scholars	Explanation
Bertrand (2002)	• Unresolved questions over principles of the nation – Islamist *versus* secular aspirations • Institutions that reinforce rather than defuse group identities – patrimonial relations under authoritarian rule • Rapid democratic transition
Brown *et.al.* (2005, p. xi-xii)	*Structural causes:* • Weakened traditional social structures • Horizontal inequalities • Legacy of the New Order *Proximate causes:* • Indonesia's economic crisis • Decentralization and democratization *Main factors in the escalation of the conflict:* • Partisanship of security forces and militias • Biased media and disinformation • Cycles of revenges
Braithwaite and Dunn (2010, p. 181-186)	*Structural factors:* • Colonialism • Soeharto's re-engineering of the governance of local communities • Muslim immigration *Proximate factors:* • Asian economic crisis • Failure of security forces to take control at the first sign of conflict • Town-level electoral incentives • Media reporting • Illegal logging
Aditjondro (2001)	Military's agendas
Panggabean	State's failure to use repression tools at hand to deter further disturbance of

(2014a)	public order
Van Klinken (2001; 2007)	Communal contenders – electoral competitions among local elites, which relied on mobilization of young unemployed men who socialize along religious lines and are dependent on religious patronage
Adam (2010)	Communal violence provides opportunities to settle private disputes over access to space
Sidel (2008)	• Displacement of anxieties led to the outbreak of violence • Spatial displacement promoted the spread and de-escalation of violence

Any careful observer of Maluku would not fail to notice that politicization of religion is nothing new in the region. Religion has served as the basis for patron-client relationships since the Dutch colonial era. Regarded as more trustworthy, Malukan Christians were recruited to serve the colonial bureaucracy and army, leaving their Muslim counterparts marginalized. This practice of favoring Christians over Muslims when it comes to civil service positions carried on to Indonesia's New Order era under Soeharto. Facing political adversaries hailing from *santri*s (more educated, political, pious, and purist Muslims), the New Order needed to draw support from *abangan*s[37] (lay, casual Muslims who are opened to combining the teachings of Islam with that of Hindu and indigenous beliefs) and Christians (Catholics included). In other words, the New Order consented to a continued Christian domination in Malukan politics and economy because it needed to secure the loyalty of this group.[38]

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[37] See Clifford Geertz's (1960) *The Religion of Java* for an elaborated account of *santri* and *abangan*.

[38] Since Indonesia's independence in 1945, there has been a constant struggle as to whether the Indonesian state should be secular ("nationalist", in Indonesian vernacular) or based on Islam. In return of safeguarding the secular nature of the Indonesian state from Islamist aspirations, the New Order secured the loyalty of Christians.

However, since the late 1980s, the New Order began to also seek support from

*santri*s. Among others, it founded ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia –

Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), allowed for the establishment of Islamic

banks, and relaxed restrictions on girls and women wearing headscarves in schools and

offices (Bertrand, 2002, p. 67-68). It was clear that over a relatively short period of time,

more and more affiliates of ICMI were appointed into strategic positions in the

presidential cabinet, the ministries, the legislative,[39] and the local government. Maluku

did not escape this "*Islamisasi*" (Islamization) of bureaucracy. It saw the first non-

military Ambonese Muslim ever to ascend to the governor seat in 1992,[40] Akib

Latuconsina, as well as his attempts to rectify the past imbalances in terms of allocations

of political and economic resources by appointing Muslims to the most vital and

lucrative positions (Bertrand, 2002; Brown *et.al.*, 2005; van Klinken, 2001). When Akib's

successor, Saleh Latuconsina, also a Muslim, appointed a Catholic deputy governor and

a Catholic provincial secretary, Protestant elites sensed that they have been frozen out

from the top three positions in the province (van Klinken, 2001, p. 19). While the

Christians were concerned about their future, Muslims complained that Christians were

being defensive of their privilege (van Klinken, 2001, p. 18).

The importance of having a stronghold in the civil service is highlighted by van

Klinken: "if in Java it is perhaps possible to get rich without being close to the

bureaucracy, the same is not true in Maluku" (2001, p. 18). With 33% of its population in

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[39] Under the New Order, some seats in the parliament were reserved for those appointed by Soeharto.
[40] Previously, the Malukan governor seat had been reserved for Christian military officers. Akib was ICMI's secretary in Maluku.

civil service, Maluku is "bureaucrat heavy" (van Klinken, 2007, p. 90). Here, P.M.

Laksono (cited in Sidel, 2008) elaborates

> Civil servants are the backbone of [Malukan] urban society. By the end of the 1980s nearly all the rupiah flowing into the district came from civil service salaries. Almost no rupiah came in outside the government budget. Agriculture is just subsistence. There is practically no export… The big fishing trawlers … are Taiwanese and pay their money to Jakarta. The whole of society depends on the state – even if only as a labourer at a school building site. (p. 57)

Another structural change initiated in the 1980s was the growth of Muslim

percentage in the Malukan population. Panggabean (2004) summarizes:

> The Muslim population in Maluku increased from slightly less than 50 percent of the total in 1971 to nearly 60 percent by 1999. During the same period, the Christian population declined from about 47 percent to roughly 40 percent. The impact of immigration is clearly evident in the increase of nonnative Muslims, from about 5 percent of the total Maluku population in 1971 to more than 14 percent in 1995, with that trend continuing. A substantial proportion of these immigrants came from South Sulawesi, and most of them were ethnically Buton, Bugis, or Makassar. (p. 418)

Excluding the data for North Maluku, and accounting for the deaths and

displacements since the January 1999 incident, Brown *et.al*. (2005, p. 9) show that by

2000, the Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic ratio was 49.1 to 42.5 to 7.7. Contributing to

this growth of Muslim percentage in the population was a massive influx of migration

from Sulawesi and Java. In addition to feeling pushed out from civil service, Christians

felt they could not compete with Muslim migrants from Sulawesi, who have increasingly

taken control of local commerce (Bertrand, 2002, p. 72). In a context where

"Islamization" of the bureaucracy was apparent, suspicions that the central government

was also conducting "Islamization" of the population through its transmigration policies

grew. In fact, as Jacques Bertrand (2002, p. 73) shows, migration to Maluku was mostly

spontaneous, had occurred over a long period of time, and most migrants were of

Sulawesi origin – particularly of Buton, Bugis, and Makassar ethnicity – and the more

recent government-sponsored migration from Java saw people settling in the islands of

Buru, Seram, and part of Halmahera (North Maluku), rather than in Ambon.

The last but equally significant structural factor underlying the Maluku conflict

was Indonesia's transition to democracy following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998.

Political channels that had been confined into three electoral machines were suddenly

opened wide, giving way to the creation of nearly 100 political parties. Political seats

that had been filled through appointments rather than elections were suddenly up for

grabs. Executive and legislative powers that had been concentrated in Jakarta were

suddenly decentralized to the provincial and district levels. The military that had been in

the center of Indonesian politics was being pushed back to the barracks. The transition

to democracy took a rapid pace and significantly raised the level of uncertainty

regarding how the "new game" was going to be played and how it would play out.

Given the above background, some scholars suggest that the various violent

incidents that took place in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto, including the Maluku

conflict, were orchestrated by the military elites. They see this as the military's way to

regain the prominent place it had held during the New Order era (Aditjondro, 2001). The

logic is that, with such massive security disturbances, the civilian government would be

inclined to turn to the military, allocate more funds for military operations, declare

some areas as military emergency zones, keep intact the "territorial command" system

that had been heavily criticized for its immense intrusion to civilian life, leave alone

military-owned businesses, and/or turn a blind eye to the military's past human rights

abuses.

This conspiracy theory finds some support in the fact that, in early January 1999,

more than 100 Malukan gang members who had long resided in Jakarta were sent back

to Ambon after their involvement in the Ketapang riots.[41] These young men were

members of Pemuda Pancasila, "a military-controlled youth movement used for shady

business deals as well as to intimidate oppositionists" (van Klinken, 2007, p. 97). There

were reports that the situation on the vessels that carried these gang members was

tense, and that these young toughs held separate quarters throughout the ride

(Pinontoan, 2014). The arrival of these gang members raised anxiety among Malukan

locals. Calling for vigilance, the governor held coordination meetings with

representatives of religious organizations and urged mosques to install telephones so

that they can always get the latest news[42] (van Klinken, 2007, p. 97). Those who see that

the conflict was orchestrated by Jakarta tend to believe that the gang members were

sent to Maluku to incite communal violence.

Van Klinken (2001) refutes Jakarta-centric explanations of the conflict by fleshing

out the state's poor capacity in fulfilling its basic protective role, suggesting an even

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[41] The riots in the Jakartan suburb of Ketapang started out as fights between Christian
and Muslim gang members. When the media reported the incident as Christian
Ambonese gang members beating Muslims and damaging a mosque, Muslim Ambonese
gang members responded by destroying 21 churches and some Christian schools
(Braithwaite & Dunn 2010, p. 152).
[42] Being part of a hierarchical institution, churches in Maluku were well connected with
each other. This stands in contrast to mosques in Maluku, which are community based
and non-centralized. Many of them are "not well connected to any communication
network" (van Klinken 2007, 97).

poorer capacity to mastermind communal clashes of such magnitude. He notes that the

military was short on cash and was suffering public relations nightmares due to its heavy

involvement in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua, thus had no interest in "stirring up trouble

in a non-strategic area like Maluku" (van Klinken, 2001, p. 8). He maintains that it makes

more sense to see the military's involvement as a result of Malukan elites pulling their

influence over their Jakarta connections than the other way around.

This notion of state failure is also supported by the fact that the state was not

able to command enough discipline from its security apparatus – police and military

officers were occasionally found fighting side-by-side with their co-religionists, in full

uniform and armor. Local police officers, mainly Christians, were deemed responsible

for killing Muslims (mostly non-Malukans), whereas military officers, mainly non-

Malukan Muslims, were accounted for Christian deaths (Braithwaite *et.al.*, 2010, p. 18).

John Braithwaite *et.al.* (2010) suggest that, deprived of effective protection from

the state, each community resorted to illegitimate means to provide security for

themselves, from forming militias to making weapons. Unsurprisingly, these

communities easily got caught up in security dilemmas – in reciprocal thoughts that

unless they attack the other community first, the other community will attack them

(Braithwaite *et.al.*, 2010, p. 18). To a certain extent, the community's need for private

security fitted well with the needs of unemployed young men – including those who had

just returned from Jakarta – for some social standing. As Jeroen Adam's (2010, p. 44)

study indicates, by serving as the community's protector, the young men gained status

as local heroes, enhancing their popularity among girls and securing provisions of free

meals and "cigarette money".

Panggabean (2014a) provides a more detailed account on the state's failure to

provide security. His study pairs Ambon with Manado, a town on Sulawesi Island with

similar socio-economic and demographic make-up to that of Ambon. He finds that while

the local government in Manado proactively reached out to religious leaders and

organizations to prevent intergroup misunderstanding, suspicions, and violence, the

local government in Ambon did not do such things. Its poor mishandlings of nonviolent

protests as well as violent incidents in Batu Gajah and in Hative Besar,[43] raised the

doubts among Malukans about the capacity, impartiality, and professionalism of the

local state apparatus. Ultimately, when it failed to contain a simple fight between two

young men in Batu Merah-Mardika, to clarify rumors that the Silo Church and the Al

Fatah Mosque have been burnt, as well as to properly respond to the burning of the

Silale Church – all taking place on January 19, 1999 – people saw that the local

government could no longer provide protection, and therefore switched their coping

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[43] Panggabean (2014a) points at the peaceful demonstrations between September and November 1999. Some of them demanded that the local government appoint Malukans to fill in teaching vacancies in schools all over Maluku as well as appoint a Malukan to head the local Education Department (instead of hiring people from Java), while others demanded that the military stay away from politics. Some of the anti-military protests ended up with violent clashes between students and state apparatus, including the Batu Gajah incident. Since the demonstrations were mostly organized by students of Pattimura University (a state owned university which *civitas academica* were mainly Christian) and supported by students of Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku (UKIM), to a certain extent, the antistate protests got a "Christians *versus* the state" framing. On December 13, 1998, a fight between a military officer and a local youth at a dance party in the predominantly Muslim neighborhood of Wailete was followed by an attack from residents of the predominantly Christian village of Hative Besar.

strategy from nonviolence to violence. In other words, Panggabean argues that, during the critical immediate hours after the fight in Batu Merah-Mardika, the state failed to use the repression tools at hand to deter further disturbances of public order, hence shattering the quotidian Christian-Muslim relations that have anyway started to deteriorate.

Brown *et.al.* (2005, p. 20) offer a different account on state's failure. They argue that the centralistic nature of the New Order had thwarted the Malukan government from developing local conflict resolution mechanisms and skills. They also point at how the replacement of Malukan indigenous village system into a nation-wide Java-centric model of *desa* had distorted *pela* and *gandong*. *Pela* is the centuries-old pact of mutual help and defense between two Christian villages or between a Christian village and a Muslim one, while *gandong* is a notion of coming from the same ancestor. Based on why the alliance is formed, there are three kinds of *pela*. *Pela keras* is formed in response to a major event, like war or natural disasters, *pela gandong* is formed because of genealogical ties, while *pela tempat sirih* is formed following a minor event and is usually established to facilitate trade relations (Bartels, 1985). Here, Braithwaite and Dunn (2010, p. 173) suggest that the reason as to why *pela* did not really prevented the communal violence was because migrant communities were not integrated into *pela* and that "while villages tended to be attacked by nearby villages, their *pela* partners tended to be [located –dk] far away".

Meanwhile, van Klinken (2001) puts forward a "communal contender" explanation of the Maluku conflict. According to this theory, local elites, who saw the

coming election as their "make or break" point, mobilized unemployed young men who

had been socialized along religious lines and considered family, village, and religious

patrons as their only avenue to get jobs. He supports this argument by pointing at "the

suddenness with which communal fighting broke out just as elections were around the

corner" (van Klinken, 2001, p. 17) and the fact that throughout the campaign period and

the election day there were no major violent incidents, suggesting some "degree of elite

control – perhaps an agreement to suspend conflict and play by the rules" (van Klinken,

2001, p. 22). He (2001, p. 20-21) maintains that among the militant figures in both sides

of the conflict were leaders of political parties – from the Christian side, these include

the local chair and the local secretary of PDI-P, as well as a Golkar delegate in the

previous provincial assembly, whereas from the Muslim side, these include the local

chair and an activist of PBB, the local chair of MKGR, as well as the local chair of PAN.[44]

He mentions how, "the fighting men from Kudamati and Mardika on the Protestant side,

or from Batumerah and Galunggung on the Muslim side, could well have been the same

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[44] In 1973, the New Order merged secular political parties into PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Indonesian Democratic Party) and Islamic political parties into PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – United Development Party). Between 1973 and 1998, elections in Indonesia saw only 3 participants: PDI, PPP, and Golkar (Golongan Karya – Functional Groups, the New Order's electoral machine). PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan – Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) was established in 1993, as a protest to the New Order's intervention in PDI's convention. PDI-P is led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia's first president, Soekarno. PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang – Moon and Star Party) and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional – National Mandate Party) were founded after the fall of the New Order. MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong) was one of Golkar's underbow organization, which transformed itself into a political party after the fall of the New Order.

young men that parties relied on to spread their messages ahead of the election" (van

Klinken 2001, p. 20).

The fourth group of explanation centers at the notion that displacement is the

cause, rather than the effect, of the violence. John Sidel (2008) points at two types of

displacement: displacement of anxieties and spatial displacement. He argues that

displacement of anxieties led to the outbreak of violence, whereas spatial displacement

promoted the spread and, later, the de-escalation of violence. Here, anxieties refers to

the uneasiness brought about by the uncertainty of open political competition as well as

the shifting religious boundaries, identities, and hierarchies that used to be "confined

and channeled… within the state's coercive and ideological apparatuses" (Sidel, 2008, p.

31). Instead of being directed toward the state or one's own religious group,[45] these

anxieties were displaced toward the other faith group. This, in turn, led to the forced

physical/spatial displacement of "religious others" (Sidel, 2008, p. 45). These spatial

displacements, where Christians were driven out from Muslim and mixed villages and

where Muslims were driven out from Christian and mixed villages, spread the violence.

Not only that violence spread from one Malukan village to another, but the Maluku

conflict itself was seen as a spill-over effect of religious fights in Ketapang and Kupang,

and seen as potentially spilling over to other regions (Sidel, 2008, p. 47). In the end,

however, these spatial displacements, which produced new boundaries, identities, and

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[45] Sidel (2008, p. 42-43) identifies competitions between purist and moderates within GPM (Gereja Protestant Maluku – Maluku Protestant Church), among Protestant denominations (GPM, the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and churches with evangelical and Pentecostal character), and between Islamic associations such as Muhammadiyah and Al Khaira'at.

hierarchies, reduced the urgency of interreligious violence and led to the de-escalation of the conflict.

Similarly, Adam (2010) contends that people actively took part in the communal fights so that they could drive people out of their village and take over the space that was left behind – "in rural areas this space is mainly used for agricultural purposes, in urban areas space is used to engage in informal economic activities such as transport" (p. 40). He presents three case studies. The first illustrates how a Christian minority of 120 households was expelled from a land, which according to the Indonesian administration is part of the village of Keitetu, but according to *adat* belonged to the village of Hila – both predominantly Muslim villages. People from Hila – and none from Keitetu – drove out the Christian families, destroyed their crops, and took over the land. The second case study demonstrates how two Muslim villages, Liang and Tulehu, acted differently toward their neighboring Christian village of Waai. In the early episode of the conflict, Muslims of Liang attacked Waai, while their fellow Muslims from Tulehu maintained peaceful relations with Waai – to the extent that people from Tulehu warned the Christians of Waai about the offensive from Liang ahead of time so that Christians could flee. In the later episode of the conflict, Muslims from both villages attacked Waai, but these acts of violence were interpreted differently by the Christians. They saw the fight with Liang as originating in competing land claims, and the fight with Tulehu as a result of LJ's pressure and intimidation over its co-religionists in Tulehu. This interpretation was sustained by the fact that villagers of Liang seized the lands that were left behind by Christians of Waai; villagers of Tulehu made no such attempts.

Lastly, Adam's third case study shows how contestation over space also took place in urban settings. It points at how unemployed and marginalized young Christian men in the town of Ambon took over all *becak* (pedicab) that were left behind by the minority Muslims.

What is especially useful in Adam's study are the insights concerning the locals' agency – that they are not passively mobilized by elites. He also clarifies that the Maluku conflict is not a story of all-Christians against all-Muslims. He admits though, that access to space is not the root cause of the conflict, and that other personal motives for taking part in violence exist, such as revenge and enhancing one's sense of dignity (Adam, 2010, p. 44-45).

Table 6: Popular Explanation to the Maluku Conflict

What caused the Maluku conflict?	Number of Christian respondents	Number of Muslim respondents	Total
Politicization of religion	14	15	29
Religious fanaticism and radicalization	23	0	23
Social envy and discrimination	8	13	21
Provocation and influences from outside Maluku	18	2	20
Others	2	18	20
Do not know	8	37	45
No answer	47	35	82
Total	120	120	240

Source: Ambon Database

To a certain extent, the varied scholarly analyses mirror the local perceptions. The Ambon Database shows that, when asked to explain why the Maluku conflict took place (open-ended question), respondents point out at politicization of religion, religious fanaticism and radicalization, social envy and discrimination, as well as

provocation and influences from outside Maluku (see Table 6). It is interesting that about half of the respondents chose to not answer the question or said they do not know.

Christians and Muslims in Maluku have very different narratives on the conflict. Given that the first communal clashes took place on Idul Fitri, most Muslims got caught up in a victimhood mentality and put the blame on Christians. This accusation was mainly grounded and sustained by three factors. First, Muslims saw their Christian neighbors, Christians from neighboring villages, or strangers who wear Christian attributes and sing Christian songs take part in the early attacks against Muslims. Second, as the conflict entered the second phase, Muslims saw that Christians were indeed mobilizing and that churches facilitated this – a development that also took place at the Muslim side. Third, on June 2000, a Christian by the name of Alex Manuputty declared the creation of Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Maluku Sovereign Front – FKM), and Muslims saw this as a revival of Republik Maluku Selatan (South Maluku Republic – RMS)[46] by Christians. All of the sudden, many Muslims subscribe to the idea that all Christians support RMS. To these Muslims, the Christians did not only betray the *basudara* ethics, but also the Republic of Indonesia. At this stage, old grudges, like rumors of "*Kristenisasi*" (Christianization) and centuries-long Christian domination, especially in bureaucracy, intensify Muslims' animosity against Christians. Relying on this narrative of victimization, Malukan Muslims appealed to their coreligionists

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[46] In the 1950s, a secessionist movement under the name Republik Maluku Selatan was founded. A significant proportion of its armed wing consisted of Ambonese Christians who served as soldiers in the Dutch colonial army. The movement, however, had support from within the Christian and Muslim population.

throughout Indonesia. Among others, this became a pretext for LJ to enter and stay in Maluku. LJ claims that its mission in Maluku, first and foremost, is to defend fellow Muslims who have been slaughtered by Christians and have received no protection from the (local) government.

On the Christian side, there is a strong feeling of hurt, that is, from being falsely accused of having started the conflict and having supported RMS. Many Christians link the arrival of militant LJ fighters to developments that have taken place in Maluku in the last decades: Islamization of the bureaucracy and heightened sense of religiousness amongst Muslims (*pengajian*[47] events had become more frequent, more Muslims enroll their children to Qur'an reading courses, more Muslims perform daily prayers, more Muslim women wear *hijab*, less Muslims attend Christmas and Christian wedding celebrations at churches, and so on – Ambon Database). Altogether, these lead to a suspicion that somewhere on the Muslim side, there is a plan to systematically Islamize the country, to make Indonesia an Islamic state, and that blaming Malukan Christians for the 1999 violence is part of this grand design. While Muslims appeal to coreligionists in Indonesia, Christians appeal to coreligionists outside Indonesia, especially through church networks and familial ties with Malukan *diaspora* in the Netherland, reinforcing the Muslim assumption of RMS revival.

Of course, not all Christians and not all Muslims subscribe to such narratives. The point is that on both sides, there is a victimhood narrative, of being on the defense.

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[47] *Pengajian* is a Muslim gathering where a preacher discusses religious matters and Qur'an teachings.

Provokator

One dominant theme surrounding the Maluku conflict is that of *provokator*. One

cannot escape the stories of

Christian provocateurs arriving on motorbikes to shout false or exaggerated
rumours of Muslim carnage, urging Christians not to be cowards, and … [about]
Muslim provocateurs … arriving on motorcycles to shout false rumours (such as
that a mosque was on fire, while in fact a pile of tyres had been lit behind it to
give the appearance of it being alight) (Braithwaite & Dunn, 2010, p. 153).

One respondent explained to me another "mode" of provocation, underlining

how easy it is to get people riled up.

You just have to have 1,000 rupiah [10 USD cents – dk]. You go to a public phone
and use a 500 rupiah coin to make a call to house in a Christian village – any
house, just pick any number. Say that you want to speak to this person – just
mention any name that comes up to your mind. The one who answers your call
will say that you dialed the wrong number. You politely apologize for the
mistake, casually say that you just wanted to let the person you intended to
speak to know that Christians or a church in some predominantly Muslim village
have been attacked, and politely end the conversation. You do the same thing
with your other 500 rupiah coin to a household in a Muslim village. In no time,
you get yourself some fights (Interview, January 29, 2014).

The blaming of *provokator* is not exclusive to Maluku, but is widely found in

other violent incidents across Indonesia, including that of between students and

security forces in numerous demonstrations leading to the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The

term itself invokes at least three ideas – outsiders, orchestration, and elusiveness. First,

it puts forward a perception that violence was not initiated by members of the

respective local communities. Braithwaite and Dunn (2010, p. 42) consider this

perception a disturbing lie, given that locals committed most atrocities. However,

numerous accounts in the Ambon Database and the interviews I held support the idea

of a certain degree of "foreignness" in the attacks.

All of this was the doing of outsiders who used religion to destroy Maluku. Both Muslims and Christians in our neighborhood were surprised to hear that Muslims and Christians in downtown Ambon have attacked each other. Those who came to attack Hative Kecil were outsiders. We do not know any of them (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Hative Kecil, male, 58 years old – Ambon Database).

One thing I know is that the Christians who attacked us [Muslim residents of Waihoka – dk] were not our Waihokan neighbors. They were not from our village (Muslim, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Christian village of Waihoka, female, 57 years old – Ambon Database).

Second, it indicates that the entire conflict has been meticulously planned. Such notion opens space for narratives of victimization, of people being helplessly drawn into enduring *and* committing violence.

You can easily tell from the way they move, run, duck, roll on the ground, and use weapons that they have been especially trained for combat. You have no choice but to defend yourself with everything you have got (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Christian village of Waai, female, mid-20s – Interview, August 6, 2014).

All of a sudden, a mob of people came to attack our neighborhood. Given that the attacks happened in many places almost at the same time, it seems like they have been carefully planned (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Silale, female, 40 years old – Ambon Database).

Third, it allows for an obscure identification of the person(s) ultimately responsible for the violence, making it convenient for parties to use the term to implicate any third party of their (dis-)likings, even when no substantiated proof exists. Those subscribing to Jakarta-centric conspiracy theories are likely to attach the *provokator* label to ex-Pemuda Pancasila gang members or to undercover security personnel. Those leaning toward elite mobilization accounts are likely to attach the term to unemployed young men who operated under the patronage of political party

activists. Meanwhile, others simply attach this label to outside militias, *i.e.* those

affiliated to LJ or to RMS.

Van Klinken (2001, p. 17) finds that Malukan elites resort to *provokator*

explanations much more than lay people. However, the Ambon Database and my

interviews suggest that such explanation is also amply employed at the grass roots level.

While Table 6 shows that (only) 20 of the 240 respondents pointed at *provokator*s when

asked about what caused the Maluku conflict, nearly all respondents provided

commentaries on the important role that *provokator*s have in the conflict. Some

respondents underline that while the cause of the conflict was politicization of religion

by elites, the tool for instigating the fights was *provokator*. Some stress that radicalized

mindsets are easy targets for *provokator*s. Others suggest that *provokator*s played with

people's social envies against members of the other faith group – provoking them "to

make right something that is unjust". More specifically, Eric Meinema's M.A. thesis

(2012) points out that *provokator* explanations are popular among youths in Ambon. He

(2012, p. 58-59) suggests that it makes sense for these youths to blame outsiders

because (1) it allows them to uphold their views that without outside pressure, Chistian-

Muslim relation in Ambon is harmonious and (2) their alternative would be to blame

members of the other faith group, which can only lead to further suspicions and

tensions.

Who exactly the above *provokator*s were remains contested. So does the

identity of the actors who hired the *provokator*s, as well as their motives. This is the

point where advocates of truth and justice are likely to call for investigative committees.

They work under the assumption that people need to first know "who did what to whom where when and how" so that they can formulate the proper ways to deal with the past – establishing historical records, holding trials, extending amnesties, *etc*. – and move on to a reconciled future. In such view, helping people uncover *provokator*s is central to the works of reconciliation.

The problem with the above perspective is that it assumes that Malukans resorted to *provokator* narratives because they were not able to precisely pinpoint culpability to a certain agent. I suggest the opposite. In my view, the development of *provokator* narratives signifies people's ability to cast the blame precisely the way they wanted it: to an unidentifiable third party mastermind.[48] By locating the ultimate blame to outsiders, Christians and Muslims free themselves from endless queries on which among them was (the more) guilty. By underlining the orchestrated nature of the conflict, the members of the two communities free themselves from being held responsible for the acts of violence they had indeed committed throughout the conflict. And, by portraying the guilty actor as elusive, they free themselves from having to present substantiated evidence incriminating a certain actor, as well as from having to answer to that certain actor's objection of being accused.

Here I trace how *provokator* narratives developed in Maluku. As a *term* that has been widely used since before the fall of the New Order, "*provokator*" may have been adopted immediately after the first violent incident broke out in Maluku. Yet, as a *narrative* that locates culpability to an elusive third party mastermind, "*provokator*" is

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[48] This is in line with Charles Tilly's (2008) idea that central to the construction of collective memories is the need to assign credit and blame.

only constructed later. Before embracing *provokator* narratives, people adamantly hung on to the narratives of blaming the other community – the Christians or the Muslims. During this phase, even when they claimed that the communal violence was incited by *provokator*s, people deemed the other community as being responsible for the *provokator*s' acts. As discussed in the following chapters, intergroup encounters play an important role in allowing Christians and Muslims to embrace the *provokator* narratives. Here, they start to undergo identity change (Kelman, 2004), from "we are victims, they are perpetrators" to "we are victims of *provokator*'s wrongdoing, just as they are victims of *provokator*'s wrongdoing." In other words, they take on a new identity that accommodates the identity of the other, that is, an identity that does not deny the victimhood claim of the other.

What do the *provokator* narratives mean to this study of reconciliation? First, they signify people's readiness to embark upon reconciliation activities. As argued in the first chapter, the process of locating culpability takes place prior to reconciliation activities, instead of being a result of those activities. Christians and Muslims in Maluku would have not been willing to move toward reconciliation without first having the mindset that the other party is not guilty, that the ultimate culpability lays outside them, and that both are victims to the conflict. Second, such narratives provide a shared account of what had happened, allowing Malukans to not have to rely to truth commissions and or trials to establish one. Third, they allow people to redirect demands for truth and justice: what was previously directed toward each other is now directed to

a third party; what was sought for to take place at the local (community) level is now sought for to take place at the macro (national) level.

Complicity

I highly doubt that my respondents in Maluku are familiar with the slogan (and movie title) "Suppose They Gave a War and Nobody Came". However, this saying always comes to my mind when I hear respondents' accounts about their complicity in the conflict. While putting the ultimate blame on outside mastermind(s), nearly all respondents admit – explicitly or implicitly – that despite provocations from outside actors, the Maluku conflict could not have happened if the locals, Christians and Muslims alike, decided to not participate. The reasons for jumping into the conflict vary widely, but some common themes include self-defense, defending co-religionists in other villages, defending one's religion (especially upon hearing that a church or mosque has been burnt down), solidarity and peer pressure, revenge, being forced to, and making use of a suddenly-opened-opportunity to settle feud against the other.

> I was one of those who supplied food in the battlefield, with Laskar Jihad. I learned how to assemble and disassemble weapons from Mujahidins who fought in Afghanistan… I was a victim to the conflict and was not familiar with the constellation of the conflict. At that time, if we refused to learn [about assembling and disassembling weapons – dk] and refused to join Laskar Jihad, we may be seen as traitors (Interview, January 20, 2015).

> To some youth, the opportunity to hold weapons and fight at the frontline to defend their group pumps up patriotism and courage – and these sentiments are contagious. Indeed, to some teenagers, [participation in – dk] the conflict became a rite of passage, an initiation to adulthood… (Rijoly, 2014, p. 329).

> When the conflict started in 1999, he [a Christian – dk] initially took great effort and risk to make sure that some of his Muslim friends that were visiting a Christian area could make it back to their neighborhoods safely. Later, when his

own community was attacked several times, he decided to help to protect his neighborhood and also became involved in the fighting (Meinema, 2012, p. 113).

> Our village was attacked by people from several other villages… Pain and revenge prompted us to launch pay-back-attacks against one of those villages. We started organizing preparatory meetings to make sure we have enough manpower and weaponry. Upon realizing the strength of our village, I reluctantly offered to lead the attack. I told people that I know a lot about that one village we were going to attack and they agreed that I should lead the attack. Why did I offer to lead this attack? Because my children, grand children, and relatives resided in that village. I wanted to have control of the decisions on which entry point to take, on the exit route, on how long we would attack that village [so I can warn my relatives in that village and somehow ensure their safety – dk]… (Muslim man, cited in Laksono 2003, p. 15-16).

Complicity comes in many forms. The most obvious is of course direct participation in the fighting, rioting, looting, burning and killing. Fighting at the frontline is not reserved for men – children and women participated too. Some 2,000-4,000 children have been recruited as *agas* or *linggis* – the local terms for, respectively Christian and Muslim child soldiers (Spyer, 2002, p. 9). Meanwhile,

> …women who directly participated in the fighting equipped themselves with traditional weapons like machete and arrows, self-assembled fire-arms, and/or weapons that belonged to military or police officers. They make molotov bombs, collect sulfur from matches and store them in bottles. Other forms of involvement include preparing food for fighters or collecting stones that will be used in the fight. When I had to seek refuge in another village back in 2001, I witnessed how each household in that village were asked to contribute some amount of matches-sulfur each night (Soselisa, 2009, p. 2).

It is important to note that there are many ways as to how one involves her/himself in the Maluku conflict. Some religious leaders have reportedly called for members of the congregation to take part in attacks, asked for donations and used them to equip fighters with adequate weaponries, lead the prayer at "sending troops away" ceremonies, convey speech of hate, and so on – while citing verses from the holy

book to justify the acts. Some parents commanded their children to enlist themselves as fighters. Others joined the neighborhood watch, guarded check points at the village borders (checking passerby's IDs, *etc.*), spy on the other group, prepare weapons (sharpen knives and machete, soak ropes and pieces of cloth into kerosene, *etc.*), or give donations to fighters. Even acts of omission can be seen as complicity: not challenging stereotypes that others have, not actively checking if a rumor is true, letting unchecked rumors spread, not persuading people to renounce their participation in violence, not countering hatred speech, and so on.

As more and more Christian-Muslim encounters took place, Malukans started to rethink their reasons for participating in the conflict. Upon learning that members of the other group were also suffering – mourning their loved ones, displaced from their villages, lost their properties, living in fear of prolonged violence, and so on – they started to refrain and/or disengage from violent acts against members of the other group. Consistent to the intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998), new information about the outgroup and changed behavior toward them nurtured friendship, which in turn led to a more positive view of the other. Moreover, they developed realistic empathy (White, 1984), allowing people to accept the other side of the coin that they, too, were perpetrators of violence. Such realistic empathy enabled people to see that whichever justifications they had for participating in the conflict – defense, revenge, honor, *etc.* – also applied to members of the other faith group. They became able to see the damages they had caused others. Previously, they saw these as achievements, as glory they had brought to their group. Here, they undego an identity change (Kelman,

2004) from "we are victims, they are perpetrators" to "they did wrong things to us, just

as we did wrong things to them". This new identity accommodates the other group's

claim of being harmed by one's own group.

> So we decided to visit their [Muslim – dk] IDP shelter. We were surprised to learn that they, too, were suffering like us. We learned that they got kicked out of their village because of their religion. We learned that their houses were burnt down and their family members were killed in front of their eyes. We realized that they share our experience. They, too, are victims like us. Their people [Muslims – dk] did bad things to us, our people [Christians – dk] did bad things to them. We are the same (Christian woman, Interview, August 2014).

> As I got to know other [Christian – dk] petty-traders operating in this area, I heard stories of Christians being attacked by Muslim mobs. I learned about their fear of the LJ fighters, of being harassed at check-points guarded by Muslims, of losing another family member. I could see why they would try to arm themselves. After all, that was the reason why we armed ourselves – we were afraid of Laskar Kristus and RMS and we were afraid of being attacked (Muslim man, Interview, August 2014).

> I thought I was doing the right thing – right by my religion, right by my family. Then I heard their [Muslim – dk] stories. I started thinking that I would have done exactly what they have done if I were faced with the same circumstances. Then it became clear to me what should have been clear from the beginning: aren't we all just the same? We are both right and both guilty (Christian man, Interview, July 2014).

> Both [Christians and Muslims – dk] are guilty of one thing and one thing only: being stupid. We were stupid enough to get provoked to kill one another. We [Muslims – dk] were as stupid as them [Christian – dk], they were as stupid as us (Muslim woman, Interview, July 2014).

This new realization that everyone is complicit prompted Malukans to rethink

their demands for justice. While they believe that people should be held accountable for

their wrongdoings, they came to think about the "practicability" of pursuing legal

justice. They saw that such pursuant would put everyone, including members of their

own group, or even themselves behind bars. They also saw that it would lead to endless

legal battles between members of the different group, which may make it difficult to

move on together from the past.

> Malukans know that if they pursue the legal justice path, they will end up imprisoning everyone. They understand the absurdity of this. They also understand the impracticality of this, as many who were involved in the violence now hold important positions in the society: religious leaders, local parliamentarians, and so on. You think these people would agree to go to prison without a fight? No. You think their followers would not do anything against the legal actions? No. Malukans understand that such thing may lead to instability (Interview, December 2013).

> Look, if we [Muslim – dk] submit a case against the Christians who burned down our village, and Christians submit a case against Muslims who burned down their village, this will trigger a chain reaction where everyone sues members of the other group. This is dangerous. One thing is that it may lead to revenge and retaliation, and we can forget all the peace that we have achieved. Another is that we will be continuously reminded of how they have done us wrong, making it difficult for all of us to put all the misery behind. Outsiders come to Maluku and tell us that only by pursuing justice, we can move on from the past. I tell you, if we drag along this Christian-Muslim divide, we are being unjust to the next generation. The only way they can live in peace is if we start and continue living in peace now (Interview, January 2014).

> What does it mean for reconciliation? First, the idea that everyone, including

one's self and his/her family members and friends, had somewhat taken part in some of

the violent incidents in Maluku discourage people from wanting the truth to be fully

revealed and justice to be fully pursued. Nobody likes the idea of being implicated with

and punished for his/her involvement in the conflict, especially since they believe the

rationale behind their acts were "not malicious", such as self defense, defending one's

religion, solidarity, avenging a (perceived) crime or injustice, or being under duress.

Second, upon acknowledging their own involvements in the conflict as well as the

motives behind them, people were able to see that the acts committed (or omitted) by

the other party were as non-malicious as theirs. With this in mind, the notion of letting

go of the other party's "wrongdoings" became more acceptable, especially since demands for those acts to be exposed and prosecuted may lead to similar demands from the other party. Third, people understand that strict pursuant of justice would put everyone behind bars and such scenario is ridiculous. Fourth, people realize that many among those who had played important role in past violence now hold prominent social political positions in the community, local parliament, and local government and are widely revered. They see that pursuing comprehensive truth and justice is, if not impossible, prone to causing social political instability (see also Braithwaite, *et.al.*, 2010 and van Klinken, 2014).

In short, the idea that everyone is complicit deters people from pursuing demand for truth and justice, or at least reorients their idea of truth and justice. They no longer demand passionately for truth commissions and trials against "the other". Any demands for such procedures are then redirected toward third parties: the state, the military, Jakarta-based elites, *etc*.

Memories of Peace

In most, if not all, conversations I had about the Maluku conflict, Malukans would reminisce about Christian-Muslim harmony, about being *basudara*. Such memories of interreligious peace are amply represented in oral and written accounts of the conflict, including in the Ambon Database Pilot Study (2003-2004) and Ambon Database (2004).

> I interacted closely with Muslims in this neighborhood. We helped each other. Whenever they had parties, we always got invited. We also invited them to our family celebrations, like weddings, baptisms, birthdays, graduations. We think of

them as family members (Christian, Kisarese, resident of the predominantly Christian neighborhood of Talake, male, 75 years old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

We had very good relations, especially with our most direct neighbors. We think of them as our own siblings. We often ate together, our children played together, and everything ran harmoniously. Indeed, when we built a mosque in this neighborhood, Christians in this village helped (Muslim, Butonese, resident of the predominantly Christian village of Waihoka, female, 39 years old – Ambon Database).

Christian-Muslim relations were very good. We helped each other prepare religious celebrations and then celebrate together. We visited each other, Muslims visited us during Christmas and Christians visited Muslims during Idul Fitri. We played ball together, we attended village parties together. We were indeed very close (Muslim, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Hitu Lama, male, 38 years old – Ambon Database).

Some of my colleagues were Christian. We had really good relationships. We used to exchange presents during Christmas and Idul Fitri (Muslim, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Hitu Lama, female, 41 years old – Ambon Database).

We were very close to each other. We always helped each other prepare religious events. During MTQ [Qur'an reading competition – dk], they [Muslims – dk] asked us [Christians – dk] to be organizers. Likewise, in Christmas celebrations at the village, we asked Muslims to be organizers... [In addition – dk], Muslims and Christians used to clean the church and mosque together (Christian, Malukan, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Poka, male, 47 years old – Ambon Database).

During those days, we lived very harmoniously. Everything ran well and orderly. On Sundays, our Christian neighbors attended church services without any disturbance. Likewise, Muslims were also free to practice their religious rituals. We respect each other (Muslim, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim neighborhood of Laha, male, 86 years old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

When giving examples about intergroup harmony, many respondents point at celebrating religious holidays together and sharing meals. These two forms of inter-religious sociability indeed signify a high level of rapport. Attending, or even helping organize, other religions' celebrations signifies one's rejection of the more purist

teachings of religion, which forbid its adherents to take part in such events and to enter

other religions' places of worship[49]. Meanwhile, sharing meals is a sign of mutual

approval – that is, Muslims trusting that their Christian neighbors or friends would not

serve food that is not *halal* and Christians feeling honored that their Muslim neighbors

or friends acknowledge the effort they put into providing *halal* food.

Table 7: Christian-Muslim Interactions at the Neighborhood

Questions	Christian		Muslim	
	% of "Yes"	n valid	% of "Yes"	n valid[50]
Do you have neighbors whose religion is different to yours?	100	120	55.83	120
Do you and those neighbors visit each other?	97.48	119	94.03	67
Do you attend wedding ceremonies hosted by those neighbors?	96.64	119	59.70	67
Do you visit each other during religious, *adat*, holiday, or harvest celebrations?	99.16	119	61.19	67
Do you attend funerals hosted by those neighbors?	88.67	120	67.16	67
Do you attend their family celebrations?	95.83	120	98.51	67
Do you go out to eat with individuals whose religion is different to yours?	61.67	120	28.79	66
When you were little, did you play with children whose religion is different to yours?	76.67	120	95.52	67
Do your children play with other children whose religion is different to yours?	93.33	105	94.55	55

Source: Panggabean (forthcoming, p. 140-141)

[49] This is especially true among Muslims, following the heightened sense of Islamic identity throughout Indonesia since early 1990s.
[50] Panggabean notes that nearly half of the 120 Muslim respondents live in villages that are exclusively or predominantly inhabited by Muslims, thus not having any Christian and/or Catholic neighbors. This is why the number of valid responses (n valid) from Muslim respondents is significantly lower than that of Christians.

Table 7, compiled by Panggabean (forthcoming), shows that less than 30% of

Ambon Database's Muslim respondents go out to eat with Christians while slightly more

than 60% of Christian respondents go out to eat with Muslims. It also shows that sharing

a meal is the least performed intergroup interaction by both Christian and Muslim

respondents. Meanwhile, the forms of intergroup activities that are performed by

significantly less Muslims than Christians are attending weddings, religious celebrations,

and funerals – activities that require Muslims to enter a church or follow through a

Christian prayer.

While there is space for improvement, the pre-1999 conflict Christian-Muslim

relations seem to be"very good" according to most respondents of the Ambon Database

(see table 8).

Table 8: How were Christian-Muslim relations prior to the 1999 conflict? [51]

Answers	Christian (n valid = 120)		Muslim (n valid = 86)[52]	
	Respondents	% n valid	Respondents	% n valid
Very good	120	100	74	86.05
Good	0	0	0	0
Normal	0	0	9	10.46
Bad	0	0	3	3.49
Very bad	0	0	0	0

Source: Ambon Database

In addition to providing examples of intergroup harmony, many respondents

explicated how they are genealogically related to some people from the other faith

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[51] Respondents were given an open question on how Christian-Muslim relations in their village were prior to the 1999 conflict. Almost all the answers have the phrases "very good", "good", or "normal". Other answers have a more negative tone. Accordingly, I coded the answers into "very good", "good", "normal", "bad", and "very bad.
[52] Thirty-four of the 120 Muslim respondents never had any Christian neighbors and colleagues.

group. They underline that the term *basudara* is not just about being "sociological siblings", but is rooted at the notion that all Malukans share the same ancestor.[53] They gave details on the *gandong* ties that bind many Christians and Muslims in Maluku (*i.e.* Christians from Amahusu with Muslims from Laha, Christians from Waai with Muslims from Morella, Christians from Lateri with Muslims from Mamala, and Christians from Ouw with Muslims from Seith). Respondents from Kei Islands in Maluku Tenggara District recited the *adat* principle of *ain ni ain manut mehe ni tilur, wuut ain mehe ni ngifun*, which emphasizes the one-ness of Keians, who see themselves as "eggs from the same fish and the same bird", thus having the same obligations under *larwul ngabal*, their *adat* law. Meanwhile, some respondents illustrated the ties through folklores. These include the story that all Malukans originated from Mount Nunusaku at the western part of Seram Island;[54] the story of seven siblings from Seram Island who went separate ways and set up three villages in Ambon Island (Tial, Tulehu, Asilulu), a village at the coast of Seram Island (Laimu), a village in Nusalaut Island (Sila), a village in Saparua Island (Paperu, also known as Tounusa), and a village in Haruku Island (Hulaliu) – the union of these seven villages is often referred to as *Silatupatih*;[55] the story about three siblings from Seram Island who went separate ways – the descendants of the

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[53] There are abundant narratives about how all Malukans are *basudara*. These accounts of the past are nevertheless not limitless. As argued by Arjun Appadurai's (1981), they have to meet four dimensions – authority, continuity, depth, and interdependence – to be credible. These dimensions "governs the terms of the debate concerning the past", making the past "infinitely susceptible to contemporary invention" (Appadurai, 1981, p. 217).

[54] See Bartels, 1980, 2003, and 2009.

[55] Sila, Paperu, and Hulaliu are predominantly Christian villages, while Tial, Tulehu, Asilulu, and Laimu are predominantly Muslim villages.

youngest settled in Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, and Nusalaut Islands, while descendants of the other two became what is known as *Pata Siwa* and *Pata Lima*;[56] as well as the story about three siblings from Teluti village in Seram Island, two of them decided to sail away and eventually set up Batu Merah village and Ema village in Ambon Island.[57]

Why had such vibrant intergroup relations, vivid in people's memories, failed to prevent the occurrence of the Maluku communal violence in the first place? Here, it is important to emphasis that having lived together for centuries, Christians and Muslims have both memories of peace and "memories of animosity" toward each other. The latter include recollections of being discriminated against, of being marginalized, of losing privileges and entitlements, as well as of feeling betrayed. On the Muslim side, these grew mostly from seeing how Christians seem to fill up the bureaucracy and to be given the gubernatorial and mayoral offices since the Dutch era up to early 1990s, from perceptions that Universitas Pattimura, despite being a state university, seems to hire and admit more Christians, from the idea that (all) Christians seem to support RMS, as well as from suspicions that Christians have been proselytizing. On the Christian side, these grew mostly from their observation that since early 1990s, top political positions seem to be reserved for Muslims, from seeing how Muslims, especially Muslim migrants seem to dominate the trade and informal economy sectors, from noting that back then RMS was co-established by Christians and Muslims, as well as from witnessing a seemingly heightened sense of religiousness among Muslims in Maluku and throughout

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[56] Some oral and written accounts tend to simplify the *Pata Siwa* and *Pata Lima* divide into Christian-Muslim divide, which is not entirely accurate.

[57] Batu Merah is a predominantly Muslim villahge, whereas Ema is a predominantly Christian village.

Indonesia. In addition, personal stories about being aggrieved by members of the other faith group get passed through generations, along with stereotypes and rumors.

In some of the cases that my respondents shared with me, memories of animosity seem to have more to do with how certain events have been interpreted, rather than with the factuality of the events themselves. One example is on conversions that took place centuries ago, where a number of village leaders declared that everyone in the respective village would convert from Islam to Christianity. Some respondents construed this as a selfless act to appease the Dutch administration so that the other villages be "left in peace" and be allowed to keep their Islamic faith. Others do not see this as a sacrifice and instead consider it as a form of weakness, as a shameful failure to stay true to and to defend their religion. Here, one respondent underlines how selective people are with regards to the memories they cling on to, "People [from neighboring Muslim villages – dk] say that Waai used to be a Muslim village before Christianity came to Maluku. The question is, before Islam came to Maluku, which religion did Waai [and the neighboring Muslim villages – dk] adhere to?" (Interview, January 29, 2015).

Here, it is safe to say that throughout their lives, Malukans construct memories of peace and memories of animosities based on their understanding of what they witnessed themselves and of what their ancestors have witnessed and passed on to them. Which ones are more salient may be different from one time to another and may be susceptible to engineering by others. It seems that to some people, survival instinct, the act of witnessing communal violence against one's own group, or spirited calls for justice by revered religious or community leaders may, at certain moments, blur their

memories of peace and bolster their memories of animosity and lead to participation in communal violence. To others, memories of animosity, regardless of how pervasive they are or how pervasively they have been endorsed to people's minds, seem to not prompt participation in communal violence.

Just as how memories of animosity do not necessarily lead to participation in violence, memories of peace do not automatically endorse reconciliation. Looking at the interviews and chats I had with my respondents, as well as at responses in the Ambon Database, it seems that there are at least two ways to frame memories of peace. The first is a rather somber one, where people contrast the harmonious relations of the past and the deadly conflict. To some, the switch from amity to hostility is beyond comprehension – how could this happen, what went wrong? To others, it rouses some guilty feeling – what would our ancestors say if they saw this and what are we going to pass on to the next generation? To others, such contrast incites the feeling of anger and betrayal – how could *they do this to us* given how close we used to be? Meanwhile, the second frame is a hopeful one. To some, it installs a belief that the conflict was an exception – not the norm – meaning that intergroup relations will turn good again. To others, it provides repertoires for present and future Christian-Muslim relations. Such frame facilitates an identity change (Kelman, 2004), where the pride of "we are Malukans, we are *basudara*" are reinvigorated and made more salient than "I am a Christian/Muslim." Here, Malukans did not need to invent a new common, transcendent identity, but re-utilize a collective identity they have been using for centuries.

What does it mean for reconciliation? First, the memories peace, especially of having *basudara, pela*, *gandong*, and *ain ni ain* ties, serve as constant reminders to Christians and Muslims in Maluku that their lives are intertwined, which in turn lay the grounds for the interdependence path of reconciliation. They invoke a realization that the only way to move forward – to restore normalcy and to overcome animosity – is to do it together. Second, the fact that Malukans hold their memories of peace so dearly makes it costly for them to embark on truth- and/or justice- seeking procedures, which necessitates singling out victims and perpetrators. Third, memories of peace exhibit time-tested habits, customs, rituals, and such, which provide repertoires for post-communal violence intergroup relations in Maluku. Here, Maluku stands out from cases where violence had taken place for generations, such as in pre-1995 South Africa and in Northern Ireland, where repertoires of intergroup collaboration may be scarce or even not present. Fourth, even when practices and memories of intergroup civic engagements (Varshney, 2002) seem to have failed to prevent communal violence, they still serve as valuable assets to intergroup reconciliation. For this to happen, constant engineering is required, that is, to frame memories of peace in ways that makes it costly for Malukans to opt for violence or for going separate ways (*i.e.* a more strict Christian-Muslim segregation).

Towards Interdependence

Most, if not all, accounts surrounding the onset of the Maluku conflict point at how the conflict took people by surprise. While fights between Christian and Muslim youths had happened from time to time, they were localized events, were not inspired

by religious fervor, and were certainly not deadly. The 2000-plus incidents of communal

violence that took place since January 19, 1999 were clearly something else. The various

scholarly explanations to the Maluku conflict can be grouped into four: Jakarta-centered

conspiracy theories, state failure, elite mobilization, and displacement. To a certain

extent, they mirror popular explanations as to why the conflict took place.

While parties to the Maluku conflict have opposing outlooks on the conflict,

three themes link their narratives: *provokator*, complicity, and memories of peace –

especially those of *basudara* ethics. They came to the fore as more and more Christian-

Muslim encounters took place. These encounters, discussed in further details in

Chapters 6-9, took place among people with equal status (delegates, neighbors,

colleagues, friends, *etc*.), were motivated by a superordinate goal (Sherif, 1958) to

restore normalcy, sustained and were sustained by intergroup cooperation (joint

reconstruction programs, *etc*.), and eventually gained support from community and

religious leaders – close to what the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) identify as

optimum contact. The encounters allowed Malukans to undergo four changes described

by the intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew, 1998). First, they provided new

information, which then corrected negative views about the other group. People started

to realize that members of the other group were also suffering, that the suffering was

inflicted by one's own group, that both groups are victims, and that the ultimate

culpability lies with a third party. Second, they endorsed a change of behavior, where

people started to refrain or disengage from acts of violence and to take part in various

intergroup activities aimed at restoring "life before 1999." Third, they began nurturing

realistic empathy (White, 1984) and friendship. People started to understand why

members of the other group participated in violence and realized that they were similar

to why members of their own group resorted to violence. They became aware that they,

too, were perpetrators of violence, and that everyone is complicit. With this in mind, it

became easier for people to let go of the past. Fourth, they urged people to reappraise

their views about the others – to stop seeing the other group as the enemy and to once

again see them as *basudara*. While the encounters were interpersonal, they had the

effects of reducing prejudices at the societal level. This took place through the processes

of decategorization, salient categorization, and recategorization. Decategorization is

about seing one's counterparts in intergroup encounters as neighbors, colleagues,

fellow-mothers, *etc*. instead of as Christians or Muslims – a process that usually leads to

people liking each other. Salient categorization is about affirming that the counterparts

one had grown to like can be either Christian or Muslim, and that the positive qualities

these counterparts have can also be found in other Christians or Muslims. Lastly,

recategorization is about making the "Malukan" and "*basudara*" identities much more

salient than that of "Christian" and "Muslim." All these allowed for an identity change

(Kelman, 2004), from "we are victims, they are perpetrators" to "we are victims of

porvokator's wrongdoings, just as they are victims of *provokator*'s wrongdoing", "they

did wrong things to us, just as we did wrong things to us", and "we are Malukans, we

are *basudara*".

The cultural salience of the three mutually reinforcing themes (*provokator*,

complicity, memories of peace) constitutes a mechanism that helps to explain why

Malukans opted for interdependence over truth- and/or justice approaches to reconciliation. The *provokator* narratives allow Malukans to pinpoint the ultimate blame for the conflict exactly where they wanted it to be, that is, elusive third parties – making void the need need for truth- and/or- justice seeking procedures. The idea that everyone is complicit – including themselves and their coreligionists – deter them from adopting truth- and/or justice- seeking toolkits. Meanwhile, deliberately revived memories of peace provide them with reasons and repertoires for restoring intergroup harmony via bottom-up, organic mechanisms, while making formal truth- and/or justice- seeking formulas less appealing.

With those in mind, I argue that interdependence is selected over other paths of reconciliation because Malukans consider it to be the most suited to the world they live in. The next chapter explores insights from within this world, looking at what *rekonsiliasi* means to Malukans and how they are performed at the day-to-day basis.

Chapter 5 – *Rekonsiliasi* in Maluku

As stated earlier, this study is based on an assumption that reconciliation means different things to different people and that taking these meanings seriously would yield better understandings and explanations of why and how reconciliation takes place. After looking at other scholars' findings about reconciliation in Maluku, this chapter explores the meanings that Malukans attach to *rekonsiliasi*. It seems to be rather difficult to get subjects to provide a straightforward definition of the term *rekonsiliasi*. They prefer to elaborate on the conditions for reconciliation or the indicators of a reconciled society or the procedures that reconciliation should follow.

What Scholars Say

As pointed out by Mary Zurbuchen (2005), Indonesia's transition to democracy has opened up space for democratization of history – that is, space for ordinary Indonesians to voice what the violent past means to them and to come to terms with such atrocious past. Unfortunately, only a handful of scholars have written about reconciliation in Indonesia – or the lack of it. Moreover, most of them tend to focus on processes related to the 1965 massacre[58] and do not delve into the meanings that subjects attach to *rekonsiliasi*.

Amongst the first to conduct a survey on this topic are Hilmar Farid and Rikardo Simarmatra (2004). Their extensive study maps out five kinds of transitional justice

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[58] On September 30, 1965, a number of military commanders were assassinated. This became a pretext for Soeharto to take over the state and transfer most of the political power from civilians to the military. Systematic violence took place throughout the country and throughout Soeharto's reign, including the killing of hundred thousands of people during his first years in power.

initiatives: (1) truth-seeking mechanisms, (2) prosecutions, (3) legal and institutional reform, (4) reparations and rehabilitation, and (5) reconciliation. It covers initiatives that deal with various political and communal violence in Indonesia, including the 1965 massacres, killings, tortures, and forced disappearances throughout the New Order era, the 1997 anti-Chinese riots, the Aceh and the Papuan counterinsurgency measures, the East Timor massacres, as well as the Poso, Central Kalimantan, and Maluku conflicts. Among their conclusions is that most civil society organizations are skeptical about the Indonesian state's willingness to fully engage in genuine reconciliation processes and therefore prefer to organize reconciliation-related activities on their own, without the government's involvement.

It is interesting that Farid and Simarmatra treat reconciliation as a category alongside truth-seeking mechanisms, prosecutions, *etc*. instead of as an umbrella for those categories. While they do not provide a definition for reconciliation, their report reveals several ways the term is understood in Indonesia. Political elites and military commanders consider reconciliation as leaders (1) establishing among themselves new arrangements on how to move forward to the Reformasi era, and/or (2) paying a certain amount of compensation to families of victims to keep them from pursuing legal actions and framing this as an Islamic practice of *islah*[59] (Farid & Simarmatra, 2004, p. vii-ix, 27). The latter view on reconciliation prompts support groups to offer socioeconomic programs to victims and their families so that they could resist the pressure of accepting monetary compensation without the disclosure of truth (Farid & Simarmatra, 2004, p.

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[59] In Indonesia, the Arabic term "*islah*" is understood as making peace after a fight or argument.

36). Meanwhile, among NGOs, reconciliation is: (1) a viable option when parties to a conflict are unified in rejecting the atrocious past and in restoring victims' dignity, (2) often confounded with conflict resolution and peacebuilding, (3) seen as an act that leads to dismissing the government's role in past violence, especially given that the state denies its complicity and that there are no perpetrators for the victims to confront, (4) considered as loosing its momentum as elites who were involved in past abuses are able to hold on to power, or (5) is contingent on the disclosure of truth and/or prosecution of perpetrators (Farid & Simarmatra, 2004, p. 27, 56, 63, 73).

Braithwaite, *et.al.* (2010) refer to postconflict processes in Indonesia, including that in Maluku, as non-truth and *gotong royong* (communal work) reconciliation. While acknowledging that such model works, they suggest that the incorporation of truth would provide a more solid foundation for the future and that the incorporation of truth and of justice altogether would be better still (Braithwaite, *et.al.*, 2010, p. 44). Similarly, van Klinken (2014) advocates for some truth seeking procedures. He (2014, p. 4) notes that people in Maluku consider truth as a taboo because they think it may (1) disrupt the currently restored social harmony between Christians and Muslims, (2) destroy the reputation of key institutions such as religion, customs, state, *etc.*, as well as (3) bring back traumas. According to him, these are the three reasons that give rise to a false conception of history and to a culture of impunity. Short of a truth commission, people could, in van Klinken's opinion, resort to day-to-day story telling, where they listen to stories "from the other side" with an open heart (2014, p. 7-8).

Panggabean (2014b) reminds us that the absence of truth is not equal to nurturing public amnesia or to oblivion. In post communal conflict settings like Maluku, where disclosing the naked truth can indeed disrupt intergroup relations, avoiding topics, agendas, and symbols that potentially irritates "the other" is an active form of practicing gag rules, politics of omission, strategic self-censorship, self-denying ordinances, or the positive use of negative liberty (Panggabean, 2014b, p. 390-391). To make sure that the omissions do not turn into oblivion, they need to be coupled with acts that bridge intergroup divides and strengthen intergroup cooperation (Panggabean, 2014b, p. 392). Meanwhile, Braeuchler (2009b) stresses that despite the absence of formal truth or justice infrastructures, numerous reconciliation initiatives are present at the grassroots level throughout Indonesia. They take various forms, including restorative performances that are anchored in local understandings of the conflict and may be coupled with *adat* mechanisms.

What Subjects Say

It is clear from the case of Maluku that the meanings of reconciliation not only vary from one person to another, but also over time. During my first visit to Maluku in 2002, the term *rekonsiliasi* was highly resented, whereas during my latest visit there, in 2014, it was no longer begrudged and was often used positively. In general, there are four groups of narratives surrounding *rekonsiliasi*: (1) rejection of *rekonsiliasi*, (2) conditions for *rekonsiliasi*, (3) indicators of *rekonsiliasi*, and (4) procedures of *rekonsiliasi*.

Rejection of *rekonsiliasi*. In 2002, just before leaving for Maluku, I was cautioned

by my colleages not to use the word *rekonsiliasi* throughout my visit. They told me that

it almost always irritates locals and that its use by an outsider would likely result in the

outsider being seen as an insensitive, inconsiderate person, making it difficult for

researcher-resource person/respondent/subject trust-building. Despite this knowledge,

I was still surprised by the level of resentment that Malukans have toward the term –

even the very people whose aspirations and actions reflected the very essence of

reconciliation resented "*rekonsiliasi*." I remember how NGO workers, community

leaders, and religious leaders who, in the workshops I co-facilitated, jointly designed

action plans to foster Christian-Muslim relations and deal with the violent past, firmly

rejected *rekonsiliasi*. "Reconciling with them means betraying our family members

whom they have killed," said one participant. Another one cried, "There is no way we

could reconcile with them after what they did to us, especially as they never see what

they did to us was wrong." "Reconciliation? You mean going back to living together as if

nothing had happened? No way!" said another participant. "I have no problems

interacting and working with them. But reconciling is a whole different matter," another

participant said firmly. The partipants of these workshops – Christian and Muslims – had

very good rapport with each other, talked passionately about peacebuilding, and had no

problem with the term *damai* (peace), yet they were really agitated by *rekonsiliasi*.

In the early years of the Maluku conflict, *rekonsiliasi* was seen as an act of

betrayal. Individuals who reached out to "the other" were indeed labeled as Judas, sell-

outs (*bisa dibeli/dibayar*), traitors (*pengkhianat*), converts (*pindah agama*), spies (*mata-*

mata), human-headed snakes (*ular berkepala manusia*), apostates (*murtad*), and *halal darahnya* (someone whose blood is permissible by Islamic law to be spilled).

Accordingly, Christian-Muslim interactions those days were very limited and conducted in a secretive manner. As discussed in the next chapter, some individuals kept their involvements in the BakuBae movement as a secret from their coreligionists and some participants of the BakuBae movement and Malino II meeting got harassed by their coreligionists upon their return to their village. Rev. Jacky shared a story of being questioned by his coreligionists after being seen having a meeting with Muslim leaders. He told me that he had to conceal the peacebuilding nature of the meeting and convince his coreligionists that the meeting was to "feel out" the Muslims and gather information on how stong the Muslims were combat-wise (Interview, 2014).

Conditions for *rekonsiliasi*. Over time, more and more Malukans became open to both the term and idea of reconciliation. One reason for this was that more and more Malukans got exposed to the more formal definitions and paths (truth, justice, mercy) of reconciliation through various peacebuilding training and workshops. Commentaries such as "reconciliation is not the same as forgetting", "forgive but not forget", "restorative, not retributive, justice", and "truth heals" are found in daily conversations and in interviews with Malukans.

Slowly, *rekonsiliasi* was no longer seen as an act of betrayal, but as something contingent on other factors. In other words, *rekonsiliasi* was no longer seen as totally unthinkable, but as something the parties may be willing to consider and work upon, should their counterparts be willing to meet specific requirements. In the months and

years after the Malino II meeting (February 2002), two notions on *rekonsiliasi* stood out.

The first is that *rekonsiliasi* has to be *organik* – that is, genuinely established at the

grassroots level, not imposed from above (not imposed by the national government, the

provincial government, or religious leaders). The second is that *rekonsiliasi* has to be

preceded by perpetrators asking for forgiveness. Several interviews recorded in the

Ambon Database illustrate this:

> Do not expect too much from the elites. Throughout the conflict, they did not
> play much role [in preventing violence – dk]. What is needed is to raise people's
> awareness. Let reconciliation develop genuinely, not engineered (Christian,
> Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Batu Merah, male,
> 68 years old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

> I think, in order to deescalate the violence, Christians should admit that they
> indeed planned the conflict and apologize to Muslims. The reconciliation we
> currently have [post-Malino II – dk] is just temporary. Once the security
> apparatus [that were deployed from other provinces to help stabilize Maluku –
> dk] are pulled out [from Maluku – dk], frictions can lead into full-blown violence
> (Muslim, Butonese, resident of the mixed village of Nusaniwe, female, 44 years
> old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

Indicators of *rekonsiliasi*. During my 2014 visits to Maluku, I again asked around

what reconciliation means to people. I no longer find notions of *rekonsiliasi* being

attached to the requirement that "the other" group apologizes to one's group. On the

one hand, the absence of such notions may be an outcome of the adoption of

provokator narratives and the realization that everyone is complicit. On the other hand,

it may be that such notions are still around, but are no longer talked about openly,

especially with those outside one's inner circles. I do find, however, that the idea that

rekonsiliasi needs to be *organik* was still quite robust.

Upon asking around what *rekonsiliasi* means, instead of getting straightforward definitions from my respondents, I received indicator-like answers. Most answers go along the line of: reconciliation is when Christians and Muslims are back to the *basudara* state. Upon further questions and answers, it became clear that "back to the *basudara* state" goes beyond the notion of restored harmonious interactions. It also includes a norm regulating how present and future problems should be managed among them. This suggest a sober realization among Malukans that, as entities who live together, they have and will have quite some issues to be resolved – power sharing, discrimination, radicalization, demography shifts, post-conflict reconstruction, revitalization of *adat*, land ownership, displacement, corruption, unemployment, *etc*. – and that these issues needed to be resolved within certain repertoires deemed appropriate among "siblings."

Some respondents take the opposite view, stressing that reconciliation cannot be achieved without resolving the matters listed above. They are concerned that leaving such problems unresolved opens up the chances for future violent disputes.

Some other respondents put forward the idea that, in Maluku, reconciliation is achieved when people can return to their pre-1999 home village. They see this as a solid proof that Christians and Muslims no longer hate, fear, and distrust each other.

According to another group, reconciliation is when there are no more desires and acts of revenge and violence among Christians and Muslims. Those who come up with this answer are proud of the fact that Malukans were able to apply self-restraint following the 2004, 2011, and 2014 incidents, preventing the escalation of those events.

Meanwhile, a group of young people suggests that *rekonsiliasi* is achieved when

people can talk openly about the past, and even have a good sense of humor about it.

> Reconciliation? Well, the other day, after organizing that peace event, we all
> [Christian and Muslim organizers of the event – dk] hung out together. At one
> point, we started reminiscing about the conflict that took place when we were
> about nine years of age. One said, "Yes, I remember you. You taped your mom's
> baking pans to your legs, arms, and chest, thinking that doing so would make you
> invincible. Instead, it made it difficult for you to duck, squat, and run – thus,
> making yourself an easy target for us. Hahaha." Another said, "They made me
> carry some bombs to school. They said someone would fetch the bombs there. I
> was so scared that the bombs would explode on me, so I walked to school very
> slowly that day. I arrived at school looking very pale and all sweaty that the
> teacher sent me home immediately. So I right away had to take another
> torturous walk carrying those bombs. Poor me. Hahaha." Another one said, "I
> was the smallest boy around. Therefore, the villagemen tasked me to sneak
> behind enemy lines, stretching out a long piece of rope that had been soaked in
> kerosene. Unfortunately, some stupid guy lighted the rope before I could return
> to my village. Yeah, go on – I know you want to laugh at me." Perhaps, the fact
> that we could talk about this openly, at ease, and with humor – without the
> intention and any fear of hurting the other – shows that we have reached
> reconciliation? (Young Muslim man, Interview, January 26, 2014).

Procedures of *rekonsiliasi*. The last group of responses elaborates on the

procedures that reconciliation should or should not follow. Most respondents underline

that reconciliation does not come out of "sitting together to make peace". They reject

the idea that formal procedures, such as the government-sponsored fact finding

commission, campaign, mediation, and the Malino II meeting, were the ones to be

credited for reconciliation in Maluku. They emphasize that reconciliation needs to be

organik – that is, genuinely and meaningfully cultivated by Christians and Muslims in

Maluku instead of a result of government's, elites', or other third party's orchestration.

> Indonesians outside Maluku think that reconciliation in Maluku is brought by the
> Malino II meeting. Guess what? We, Malukans, know that the real reason why
> we have moved closer toward peace, toward reconciliation, was because we
> have become tired of fighting and suffering. They [elites – dk] can meet as many

times as they want, but if we [lay people – dk] are still into fighting, things would not have been improved (Interview, August 30, 2014).

It is not about sitting together to resolve the issues or about explicitly asking for forgiveness. It is about how how we carry ourselves in public space. It is about our conduct. It should all show that we are living the *basudara* ethics. If you see the others behaving that way, you know that they have no bad intentions toward you, you know that you have no reasons to despise or be suspicious of them, and you know you must reciprocate (Interview, July 24, 2014).

Tell me, who am I supposed to sit together, make peace, and reconcile with? The Christians who came to attack my village? I do not know them – I have never seen them before and would probably never see them again. The Christians who reside in my village? Some of them offered protection to my fellow Muslim neighbors, some of them fled, some of them did nothing out of fear – I have never had any problems with them and do not have any problems with them. Christian leaders and preachers whose hate words I came across through pamphlets, radios, and such? Well, they may be persuaded to sit together with Muslim leaders and preachers, but not with me – I am just a regular citizen. Christians in general? Now that freedom of movement has been reinstated, every other person I meet on the street is a Christian. Do you expect me to sit with each of them? I do not think so (Muslim woman, Interview, January 28, 2014).

Let peace come from the bottom up, genuinely. I do not approve formal reconciliation efforts because they can be easily influenced by groups who have [political – dk] interest. For example, during the 1999 conflict, people performed *makan patita* [an *adat* ritual where people from different social groupings share meal – it is supposed to symbolize friendship – dk] but clashes still took place just hours afterwards (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Silale, male, 31 years old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

We met a lot amidst the conflict. We tried to create reconciliation. We organized joint gatherings like discussions, bazaars, and flee markets (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the mixed village of Nusaniwe, female, 66 years old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

The next thing to do is to continue reconciliation efforts [that were taken in Malino – dk]. I personally worry about entering Muslim areas, although it has become safer to do so. On the other hand, Muslims see to be freer to enter Christian areas (Christian, Ambonese, resident of the predominantly Christian village of Wainitu, male, 33 years old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

Meanwhile, quite a few respondents believe that the reason why there have

been positive developments toward reconciliation is the peace economy. As explained

by some of my respondents and mirrored by some responses in the Ambon Database

Pilot Study:

> It is all about money. The government approached and paid off the warlords by putting them in charge of some [postconflict – dk] construction project – roads, buildings, water lines, and so on. Each project was worth billions of rupiahs and the warlords just could not say no to that. Now that the warlords have become businessmen, they support peace. You see, at the peak of the conflict, you needed to pay lots of security money to be able to move people and goods from one place to another. As the warlords have become businessmen, who want their billion-rupiah-projects to run smoothly without high overhead [security – dk] cost, you can count on them to be advocates of peace (Personal communication, August 2, 2014).

> With *pemekaran* [dissolving big districts into smaller ones – dk], the government creates more political seats, both in the executive [mayors, vice mayors, and district staff – dk] and legislative [district-level parliaments – dk]. Those who used to wage war against the others are now sitting nicely enjoying political and economic power (Focus Group Discussion, August 2, 2014).

> Reconciliation has to be genuine, not engineered. I prefer utilizing the economic sector and sports [to holding formal reconciliation meetings – dk] in order to prevent the relapse of Christian-Muslim clashes (Christian, Saparuan, resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Batu Merah, male, 30 years old – Ambon Database Pilot Study).

Rev. Jacky, who is one of the main peace activists in Maluku, uses the terms

menganyam tikar pandan (making a colorful woven straw mat) and *makan bubur panas*

(eating hot porridge) to illustrate how reconciliation is brought about.

> It is like making a colorful woven mat. You do it by interlocking the differently colored straws in a way that they hold and support each other. This means that, for reconciliation to take place, you need to bring together and interlock the various Christian and Muslim networks. It is also like eating hot porridge. You cannot just scoop a spoonful of porridge from the middle of the bowl and put it in your mouth – you will burn your tongue. Instead, you need to scoop out the porridge from the sides of your bowl and only gradually move to the middle. This

means that those who wants to work on reconciliation need to be very cautious, in the sense that they need to first deal with trivial peripheral issues, and only very slowly touch upon more substantive, more central, and more sensitive issues (Interview, January 2014).

Agency, Truth, and Justice

Of course, not all responses to the question of what *rekonsiliasi* is fall neatly into the four groups of responses identified above. Some examples include:

A friend saw the guys who set his house in fire. One of them was his neighbor, and he knows that the neighbor knows that he knows. The friend understood that the neighbor just got into the heat of the moment and/or saw an outlet for some grudges that the neighbor had against him. So he did not confront the neighbor and he carried on treating the neighbor as usual – as a good neighbor. The neighbor reciprocated. My friend said that the neighbor has never verbally apologized, but the neighbor's gestures and everything express remorse (Personal communication, January 20, 2014).

I do not know. In general, my Muslim colleagues and I are on good terms. But since the conflict, we never had office gatherings at my house anymore. My Muslim colleagues are nervous about having to eat meals that I prepare. I cannot understand this. Long before the conflict, we were used to having parties at my place and they know that I know how to prepare *halal* food. So, at one level, Christians and Muslims have reconciliation. At another level, they have become a bit estranged to one another (Christian woman, Personal communication, August 7, 2014).

While there is quite a variety of what *rekonsiliasi* means in Maluku, it is clear to me that these accounts highlight the agency of Malukans, in the sense that *rekonsiliasi* is an action of *their* choice. It is about choosing to surrender to one's fatigue of fighting, choosing to adhere to the *basudara* ethics, choosing to not take revenge on "the other"s' wrongdoings, choosing to disclose and to joke about his/her own complicity in the conflict, choosing to drop demands for verbal exchanges of apologies, choosing to accept the shortcomings of friends from the other faith group, and so on.

I then inquired on whether knowing the truth, getting justice (through a court), and being offered apologies are important to them. On truth, most respondents have a dual approach. When it comes to revealing the involvement of the government and the military, respondents say that such thing is very important for the healing process in Maluku. However, when it comes to formally exposing how each person in Maluku is involved in the conflict, respondents say that such thing poses a risk of revisiting trauma and deepening divides within the society. It is interesting though that into every other interview and into every group discussion respondents weaved in a statement about her or his complicity in the conflict. After further observations, it occurred to me that such disclosure holds a certain purpose. Upon developing a certain level of rapport with members of the other group, one opens up about her/his past position or involvement in the conflict – be it just a simple statement of "I felt a strong vengeance against you all." By doing so, she/he puts her/himself into a vulnerable position and by displaying a will to put her/himself into such a vulnerable position, she/he generates trust from others.

On justice, respondents have a similarly dual approach: they are adamant about putting government or military officials to trial, but not keen on bringing lay people – their neighbors, their colleagues, themselves – into the legal process. Many respondents mention that such kind of justice would put everyone behind bars, including those who were just children when the conflict took place. Their ideas of more suited forms of justice include divine justice ("Let us leave it to God to decide what would be just"), intergenerational justice ("We owe it to our children and grand children to make things

right"), and restorative justice ("I am going to study hard and be a health worker when I

grow up, so that I could help preserve life" – says an ex-child soldier). Meanwhile, on

forgiveness, respondents underline that actions speak louder than words.

> I think the fact that we are back together, interacting with one another at work,
> in the neighborhood, at public places, says it all. We would not be able to do that
> if we have vengeance against each other. I cannot say 'I forgive you' to every
> Muslim I meet, as much as I do not expect every Muslim I meet to say to me 'I
> forgive you'. That would be weird (Interview, August 24, 2014).

Efrem Silubun (2003) offers a reading of the truth and justice mechanisms within

ken sa faak, the concept of reconciliation shared by people of Kei Islands in Maluku. He

contrasts them with the notion of truth and justice underpinning "Western" models of

reconciliation. He (2003, p. 116) explains that at the center of *ken sa faak* is a realization

that parties to the conflict are both wrong and both right. In *ken sa faak*, truth is about

acknowledging one's own fault as well as the other's righteousness (Silubun, 2003, p.

124). Truth is not about investigating and creating a record on what had happened, but

about sincerely taking some part of the blame and sincerely admitting that the others

had some justified reasons behind their actions. Meanwhile, justice is about acting upon

those acknowledgements in ways stipulated by *larwul ngabal*, Kei's *adat* law. Justice

does not come from imposing the law (punishment and such) upon people but from

people's willingness to act according to their realization of what they did wrong

(Silubun, 2003. p. 128).

Toward Interdependence

In the early 2000s, the term *rekonsiliasi* was widely despised by Malukans, as it

invokes the idea of turning one's head away from the atrocious past, of not taking issues

with the wrongdoings of the other group, of betraying one's own group. Over time,

Malukans became more open to the term and the idea of *rekonsiliasi*. In the months and

years following the Malino II meeting, *rekonsiliasi* was no longer seen as something

unthinkable, but as something contingent upon some conditions – mostly apologies

from perpetrators to victims. In the last couple of years, *rekonsiliasi* was no longer seen

as dependent on prepetrators displaying their remorse. Most likely, this has to do with

the adoption of *provokator* narratives and the realization that everyone is complicit in

the conflict.

When asked what *rekonsiliasi* means to them, respondents prefer to point at

indicators and procedures of reconciliation, rather than to provide straightforward

definitions. These include returning to a *basudara* status, returning to pre-1999

geographical arrangements, absence of desires for, and acts of, revenge, as well as the

cultivation of genuine and meaningful reconciliation that is *organik*, not a result of

negotiations among elites.

The various accounts that Malukans shared to me as well as in the Ambon

Database Pilot Study and Ambon Database show the interplay between the

interdependence, truth, and justice paths of reconciliation. The constant references

made to the *basudara* status and to the need for reconciliation to be *organik* reflect an

understanding among Malukans that reconciliation hinges on the interdependence

between Christians and Muslims. This, however, does not mean that truth and justice

are considered unimportant. The resentments toward "*rekonsiliasi*" as well as the

demands for certain conditions to be fulfilled prior to reconciliation indicate desires for

justice and truth. When the resentments and demands were no longer present, the desires for justice and truth were directed toward third parties: the government, the military, *provokator*s – not toward Christians and Muslims of Maluku. This shows that the adoption of interdependence path cannot be equated to ignoring truth and justice – they are not "either/or" although they may seem so.

The various accounts of *rekonsiliasi* found throughout this study indicate that the agency of specific actors needs to be carefully studied in order to achieve a better understanding of the whole process. The actors stress that reconciliation is about choosing to surrender to her/his tiredness of fighthing "the other", choosing to return to the *basudara* ethics, choosing to refrain from commiting violence and taking revenge, choosing to carefully and selectively disclose her/his involvement in the conflict, choosing to drop conditions for reconciliation, choosing to reach out to "the other" although it may endanger her/his life, choosing to take part in joint Christian-Muslim activities, choosing to become a healthworker when one grows up, choosing to not call out on a neighbor who participated in a violent act against one's self, and so on, despite the absence of formal reconciliation institutions (truth commissions and/or human rights trials) that compel and reward Malukans to take such actions. In other words, the actions that Malukans take to restore relationships between Muslims and Christians and to move on, away from the violent past are not based on recommendations or orders from formal reconciliation institutions, but are choices that Malukans made at the day-to-day level, based on their understanding of what is going on in their world. These actions, which hinge on interdependence, are performed in four sites: ceremonial,

neighborhood, functional-quotidian, and narrative, and are respectively discussed in

Chapters 6-9.

Chapter 6 – Ceremonial Site

It is important to start with a disclaimer that having parties to a conflict sit together in meetings, negotiations, or mediations and reach an agreement is *not* synonymous to reconciliation. Bringing back Galtung's conflict triangle discussed in Chapter 2, reconciliation is an *attitude*, whereas a meeting, a negotiation, and a mediation are forms of *behavior*, aimed at reaching an agreement as to how to resolve a *contradiction*. Here, presence of a (peace) agreement does not necessarily reflect a reconciled attitude, and absence of such agreement also does not automatically reflect a non-reconciled attitude.

This chapter explores a site of reconciliation where those who are considered as influential representatives of the stakeholders in the conflict come together in a rather formal setting. Upon providing brief illustrations of the processes that took place in the Search Conference for Maluku, BakuBae movement, and Malino II meeting, the chapter discusses how they laid ground for interdependence-based reconciliation.

Search Conference for Maluku

This conference, which was held on March 2000, was the first to bring together representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities since the outbreak of the Maluku conflict. It was attended by more than 50 participants and was jointly organized by The British Council and the Center for Security and Peace Studies of Gadjah Mada University (CSPS-UGM). For security reasons and to enable more relaxed Christian-Muslim exchanges, the conference was held outside of Maluku: in Bali, a top vacation destination island in Indonesia, whose population is predominantly Hindu.

Participants and facilitators whom I interviewed recall that the first couple of days of the conference were tense. Christian and Muslim participants flew in to Bali in separate air carriers, refused to share a hotel room with "the other", and did not mingle. Among their comments were "Are you crazy to want to put me in the same room with those who have killed my community?" and "Do you really expect me to be friendly, smile along, and pretend that they did nothing wrong?" (Panggabean – Interview, November 2013). One participant, Rev. Jacky Manuputty (2014b, p. 357), writes that the in-group out-group atmosphere was strong and the participants looked at each other full of suspicion. Arifah Rahmawati, one of the facilitators, remembers that only a few participants showed up at the evening programs, including at the screening of The Wajir Story documentary film[60] (Interview, November 2013).

Concerned about the lack of rapport among participants, Rev. Jacky suggested that the facilitators hire a musician to play Malukan songs. At lunchtime at the third day of the conference, a musician played Malukan songs on the piano. When the musician played the song *Gandong*, some participants asked him to stop, as the song was too painful to endure and it was deemed inappropriate to play such a song on siblinghood amidst the shattered Christian-Muslim relations. Although the musician switched to other Malukan songs, participants' restlessness grew as the songs rekindled their *basudara* feelings. Some participants started to cry, others started to sing along the

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[60] The film follows women's effort to end interclan conflicts in Wajir, Kenya. Facilitators of the Search Conference for Maluku thought that peace initiatives shown in the documentary could be inspirational to Malukans.

melody, and all these melted the intergroup tensions away (Manuputty, 2014b, p. 357-

358).

Since then, the conference proceeded in a much friendlier mood. The facilitators

asked participants to envision the Maluku they want to have in 2007. Then, the

facilitators asked participants to work in groups and develop plans and

recommendations on the following sectors: (1) business, (2) politics, security,

governance, and legal, (3) IDP and victim rehabilitation, (4) socio-cultural, (5) religious,

as well as (6) education, women, children, and media. At the end of the conference,

they agreed upon 12 needs: (1) to create an independent investigation team for Maluku,

(2) to enhance the military's and the police's professionalism, (3) to encourage students

and youths of Maluku to come together in a similar conference, (4) of specialized

training, (5) to revitalize marketplaces, including through providing security guarantees

so that Chinese-descent traders can safely return to Ambon and through providing

decent sea transportation, (6) of trauma centers for children, (7) to stop the violence

and enhance security, (8) to establish working groups where participants of the Search

Conference will serve as coordinators, (9) to clarify the rejections that have been raised

by several communities of the security officers posted in their villages, (10) to reveal

who the *provokator*s were, (11) to empower existing groups and forums in Maluku, and

(12) to enhance coordination among groups in Ambon, including NGOs. One important

reason as to why the conference managed to provide space for Christians and Muslims

to work together was perhaps the avoidance of exploring the causes of the conflict. The

facilitators focused on participants' envisioned future for Maluku and ways to achieve that future.

BakuBae Movement

In Malukan, *bakubae* means returning to amicable relations after a fight. It is only fitting that the term is used to name a movement aimed at restoring intergroup relations in Maluku. BakuBae started off with three workshops: August 2000 in Jakarta, October 2000 in Bali, and December 2000 in Yogyakarta. Its other activities include polling, facilitating profession/occupation-based meetings, campaigns, as well as audiences with leaders of formal religious and state institutions.

The first meeting in Jakarta brought together six Christians and six Muslims and went on for more than 20 days. A Muslim participant underlines that the event should not be thought of as a peace meeting, as those who reach out to the other party to make peace while the conflict is still escalating are seen as traitors and could lose their life (Malik, 2003, p. 17). Ichsan Malik (2003, p. 17-18), who facilitated the meeting, wrote that participants were suspicious of each other, that they could not hide their anger and vengeance, and that on many occasions they engaged in heated debates involving rude words. The biggest point of contention was, obviously, the cause of the conflict. Muslim participants held strongly to their belief that the Christians started the conflict – that is, by killing Muslims on their most festive holiday, Idul Fitri. Christians defended themselves by saying that most Christians spend the Islamic holiday visiting their Muslim neighbors, relatives, friends, and colleagues, so there is no way the Christians had started our the conflict (Malik, 2003, p. 18). Only at the second week of

the meeting that participants were able to agree that the conflict was a result of religious politicization by military and civilian elites. Together, they drafted a position paper and handed the paper to Indonesia's president, Abdurrahman Wahid, on August 27, 2000, in a private meeting (Malik, 2003, p. 19). They also agreed to conduct polling throughout Ambon Island to see if people supported the idea of stopping the violence. 1,520 Christians and 1,320 Muslims participated in the polling and 58% of them agreed that something needed to be done to stop the Maluku conflict, although they warned that the police and military cannot be trusted to lead such processes, as they had been taking sides in the conflict (Malik, 2003, p. 20).

As the poll indicated support for ending the conflict, participants and facilitators decided to organize a second workshop, which brought together 20 Christians and 20 Muslims, which include *raja*s,[61] local priests and *ulama*s, as well as local warlords. There, they decided to adopt the name BakuBae and proclaimed that the aim of the meeting was to explore ways to stop the violence – *not* to make peace. Among the topics discussed in the meeting were the number of casualties (each faith group has its own estimates), the involvement of the military and the police, as well as the need to conduct another polling to gather aspirations on education, economy, and health sectors (Malik, 2003, p. 21).

The third meeting was attended by 50 Christians and 50 Muslims. Again, participants disputed passionately what and who caused the conflict. Another point of contention was on whether BakuBae should continue its secretive back-channel nature

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[61] In Maluku, the head of *adat* villages are given the title "*raja*".

or to go public. Those who were against going public were afraid to be seen as traitors

by their respective communities, while those who were for the idea argued that, as

indicated by the two polls, there was a quite strong public support for ending violence.

In the end, participants decided to publicly announce the BakuBae initiative through a

press conference (Malik, 2003, p. 22-23). As anticipated, quite a few people in the

movement got shun by their community – someone got his house burn, someone had

stones thrown to his house, some others had to go to hiding, some others resigned from

BakuBae, and others were mentioned in a *fatwa* that she/he should be punished for

working with the other side (Malik, 2003, p. 25).

Following the above workshops, the BakuBae movement tried to engage more

and more "moderates." It supported a series of peace journalism workshop organized

by Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI), facilitated intergroup encounters for Ambon-based

university students, set up a meeting for religious leaders, arranged gatherings for

academics, encouraged lawyers to charge the state for allowing such massive violence

to take place, as well as organized a workshop for *raja*s (Malik, 2003, p. 25-28).

BakuBae launched a series of campaigns through posters, banners, stickers and

public meetings. Its representatives met with Malukans residing outside Maluku – in

Surabaya, Ujungpandang, Palu, and Manado – including people displaced due to the

conflict. They also went to give a presentation in front of the European Parliament in

Brussels as well as in front of state and societal institutions in the Netherlands, to clarify

that what was going on in Maluku was not a religious, but a social conflict in which

religious sentiments were manipulated. Such clarifications – both for domestic and

international audiences – were crucial, as people outside Maluku sent a significant

amount of aid to their co-religionists in Maluku, some of which was used to finance the

conflict (Malik, 2003, p. 23-34). BakuBae also held audiences with the formal actors in

Maluku: the Malukan Protestant Church, the Catholic Diocese, the leaders of Badan

Immarat Muslim Maluku (BIMM), the Malukan governor, rectors of Pattimura

University, STAIN, UKIM, Darussalam University, and STIA, as well as the military leader

(Malik, 2003, p. 29-31).

Malino II Meeting

Sponsored by the Coordinating Minister for Economic and Industrial Affairs,

Jusuf Kalla, Malino II had the highest profile of all Christian-Muslim meetings. The

meeting itself took place on February 11-12, 2002, but was preceded by several

exploratory consultations. As with the Search Conference and the BakuBae meetings,

participants refused to see Malino II as a peace process. They insisted that what they

aimed for was *merely* the termination of violence, not peace.

On January 16, 2002, Kalla's team met separately with 150 representatives of the

Christian and Catholic community and 150 representatives of the Muslim community. In

both sessions, participants aired their anger against the other party, using rude words at

times. However, they also signaled that they were tired of fighting (Ernas, 2006, p. 90).

Other sets of separate meetings with smaller groups of Christians-Catholics and smaller

groups of Muslims followed to further identify the agendas that should be discussed by

the two parties. Representatives of both parties were asked to put together a

delegation that would meet in a mediation process and to reach out to their respective

communities to gain the necessary support for ending the conflict.

On February 5-7, 2002, the delegates – 35 Christians-Catholics and 35 Muslims –

attended a preliminary meeting in Makassar. Again, Kalla met separately with the

parties. Among others, they agreed to end the conflict through negotiation, as well as to

have the government uphold the law, facilitate the return of displaced people, restore

the economy and the infrastructure, resolve the rivalry between the military and the

police, and establish a fact finding team (Ernas, 2006, p. 97). The most contentious issue

at this stage was whether such organizations as LJ and FKM/RMS should be allowed to

stay and operate in Maluku (Ernas, 2005, p. 97-98).

On February 11, 2002, the first day of the main meeting in Malino, Kalla met

separately with the delegates. Among others, the Muslim delegation demanded for an

investigation on the January 19, 1999 incident, raised their objection on the views that

LJ has been a source of public disturbance, and demanded for an investigation on the

involvement of FKM/RMS in Maluku. Meanwhile, the issues raised by the Christian

delegation included the need for investigating the root cause of the January 19, 1999

incident, the objection toward the hurtful stigma that all Christians are RMS supporters,

as well as the need for returning LJ fighters to their hometown. Apart from those issues,

both delegations shared similar views on other issues, including IDPs, governance, and

the need to end the violence.

On day two, the delegations sat in the same room. Despite the delegates having disagreements on LJ and RMS issues, the meeting was civil and ran smoothly. After some lobbying, the delegations agreed upon 11 points:[62]

1. To end all conflicts and disputes.
2. To abide by due process of law enforcement fairly, faithfully, honestly, and impartially, supported by the communities, with an understanding that security officers were also committed to carry out their duties in a professional manner.
3. To reject and oppose all kinds of separatist activities that might threaten the unity and sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, including the support for the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS).
4. That as citizens of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the people of Maluku have the right to live and work legally and fairly anywhere in the Republic of Indonesia nationwide, and others have the right to love and work in Maluku, as long as they respect local culture and law, and maintain order.
5. To ban and disarm illegal armed organizations, groups, or militias, in accordance with existing law. Outside parties that disturb the peace in the Maluku will be expelled.
6. To establish an independent national investigation team to investigate among other things, the tragic incident on January 19, 1999; organizations including the Maluku Sovereign Front, the Republic of South Maluku, the Christian Republic of South Moluccas, Laskar Jihad, Laskar Kristus; the practice of coercive conversion; and human rights violations.
7. To call for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes, and the return of their property.
8. To rehabilitate social, economic, and public infrastructures, particularly educational, health, religious, and housing facilities, with support from the Indonesian government.
9. That the maintenance of law and order depends on the military and the police coordinating their efforts and pursuing their mission with firmness and resolve; and that the proper functioning of the security services requires reorganization and reequipping of some units and facilities.
10. That to ensure good relations and harmony among all communities and religions in Maluku, all evangelical activities must respect the diversity of its peoples and acknowledge the local culture.
11. That to support the rehabilitation of Pattimura University for the common good, recruitment of staff and students should be transparent, based on the principle of fairness and a commitment to maintaining quality standards.

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[62] Cited from Panggabean, 2004, p. 426-427.

Upon returning to Maluku, those who participated in the Malino II meeting had the daunting task of selling the agreement to their respective communities. Some of the delegates were labeled as traitors and sell-outs as well as received death threats, endured physical attacks, and had their properties destroyed.

Towards Interdependence

A number of things stand out from the above meetings. First, the initial hours, sessions, or days of the meetings were filled with animosity, as participants faulted members of the other community for inciting the communal violence. Many participants aired their refusal to even think of peace and reconciliation, unless everyone in the room came up with a clear account on what had happened – and by this they meant confessions or third party findings regarding the other community's wrongdoings. They contend that it would be impossible to offer forgiveness to a party that does not genuinely ask for it and has not renounced its commitment to hurt them. Each side was convinced of their victimhood, as well as of the other community's mischievousness. Each demanded a thorough investigation to prove the other's culpability. Both delegations put a lot of effort into making it clear to everyone that the meetings were not "for peace".

Second, although they were not willing to let go of the past, participants understood that in order to move forward they needed to work some issues out together. These include IDPs, health, education, media, trauma healing, infrastructure, radicalization, security, and governance issues – all of which are dependent on ending the violence and reestablishing freedom of movement. This reflects an understanding of

a common connected future, a commitment to prioritize practical needs of restoring normalcy over moral standards of truth and justice, as well as an understanding that it would be too costly to proceed with violence – all of which are important foundations for the interdependence path of reconciliation.

Third, although representatives of both groups could agree on a number of matters, some issues remained contentious. These included the causes of conflict, the presence of LJ, and the activities of RMS. The underlying message is clear: neither party accepts the blame for the conflict. The Muslims were certain that they were victims, as the first offensive was launched during their most festive holiday. They felt betrayed, that after all those decades of living together harmoniously, the Christians could do this to them. Meanwhile, the Christians were equally sure that they had nothing to do with masterminding the conflict. Indeed, they felt deeply hurt that, after all those decades of living together harmoniously, they were accused of being capable of orchestrating such massive level of violence and being indiscriminately labeled as RMS. Here, memories of peace brought out a somber mood, as they were contrasted to the post-1999 state of Christian-Muslim relations. On the other hand, at times when it was difficult for participants to continue working with the other, memories of peace helped lift the spirit. Bringing in Malukan songs into the event, identifying the *pela*, *gandong*, ethnic, and professional ties that one may have with members of the other delegation, as well as bringing up key words such as *basudara, bakubae, bakudapa,* and *masohi* into the meetings reinforces the realization that the lives of Christians and Muslims in Maluku have been and will always be intertwined.

Fourth, the meetings saw a shift of mindset among participants, from a "we are victims, they are perpetrators" point of view into a "we are victims of *provokator*'s wrongdoings, just as they are victims of *provokator*'s wrongdoings" outlook. After painfully forcing themselves to listen to the other side's version of the story – mostly in multiple encounters – participants were slowly able to see that their side was not the sole-victim and the other was not the sole-perpetrator. They started to realize that everyone is a victim. Both sides are still adamant about investigating what really happened in January 1999, but their target is more to uncover the *provokator*s who masterminded the whole thing, rather than to find proof that the other faith group, as a whole, was to be blamed. Their ideas of who the *provokator*s may be include Jakarta elites, military elites, local elites, a tiny fraction within the Christian community which does not represent the entire Christian community in Maluku, or a tiny fraction with the Muslim community, which does not represent the entire Muslim community in Maluku.

Fifth, as they started to adopt *provokator* narratives, participants realized that detailed investigations on what had happened would implicate everyone to the violence – by commission and/or omission. This plays an important role in them preferring the interdependence path to reconciliation more than having truth commissions and trials.

Sixth, participants fully realized that peace – let alone reconciliation – is not desirable by their respective communities as it dismisses the atrocities done by the other and the suffering endured by their community. Any act construed as involving an intention to make peace with the other side was seen as betrayal. Therefore, upon their return to Maluku, participants framed their message in a way that underlines the

pragmatic needs of working together with the other in order to restore normalcy rather than the moral stance of forgiving or not forgiving the other.

Seventh, the wider society tended to be skeptical about the activities performed in the ceremonial site, as they seemed to not be producing *organik* reconciliation. While this skepticism is understandable, it should be noted that activities in the ceremonial site, especially Malino II, sustain those performed in other sites. At the very least, they tied down the national government's hands in the sense that they obligated the government to commit a huge amount of money and manpower for restoring order, reconstructing houses and infrastructures, as well as facilitating IDP return or relocation. While Malino II is more of a peacemaking and peacebuilding process – not a reconciliation process *per se* – its provisions help remove threats that may possibly derail reconciliation.

Chapter 7 – Neighborhood Site

Where do you live? *What is your marga* (family name)? These two are perhaps the most telling questions when making new acquaintances in Maluku. By knowing which village a person comes from, one can have a pretty good indication on which religion the person follows, as well as on whether any *pela* or *gandong* relations exist between the persons in conversation. Subsequently, by knowing the person's *marga*, one gets the confirmation needed. Such quick identification is possible due to century-long spatial arrangements, where residents of most villages are predominantly Christian or predominantly Muslim. Only relatively few villages are "mixed", in the sense that they have more or less a balanced number of Christian and Muslim residents.

In a way, Malukans grew up internalizing a mental map of Christian areas, Muslim areas, and mixed areas, as well as of *pela* and *gandong* configurations that bond villages and *marga*. It is important to stress that, up to the onset of the conflict, this mental map is a neutral one: Malukans felt safe to travel to any other villages. It is also important to underline that the desire to know someone's village and *marga* – hence, her/his religion, *pela*, and *gandong* affinities – has no discriminatory intentions. The belief is that, by knowing the other person's identities, one can provide a more appropriate service, conduct, or treatment. For example, upon knowing the religion of a new acquaintance, one could refrain from scheduling future meetings during church hours or Friday prayers, and/or could take steps to adhere to the new acquaintance's dietary restrictions (*i.e.* lent fasting, Ramadan fasting, and *halal* food). Also, upon knowing that the stranger stranded in one's village is a *gandong*, she/he would offer the

stranger to stay overnight at her/his house. Here, the assistance is extended not merely out of humanitarian motives, but more out of an *adat* duty – happily and proudly fulfilled.

With these in mind, this study treats the neighborhood site of interdependence as one that covers not only relationships among those who have lived, or have remained to live, together, but also that of among those whose villages are bound by *pela* or *gandong*. After presenting some data on displacement in Maluku, this chapter provides brief illustrations on Christian-Muslim relationships in three types of villages: one that remained intact during the conflict, those where some or all of its residents got displaced and managed to return, as well as those where some of its residents got displaced and did not return. Then, it discusses a number of *adat* mechanisms, including *pela* and *gandong*, in restoring Christian-Muslim relationships that broke down during the conflict.

Displacement in Maluku

As indicated in Chapter 1, the communal clashes in Maluku have prompted the flight of many Christians from predominantly Muslim villages, of many Muslims from predominantly Christian villages, as well as of many Christians and Muslims from mixed villages. In some villages, residents fled after their village – or more particularly, members of a certain faith group residing in their village – got attacked. In others, residents fled as a precautionary measure – *i.e.* upon hearing rumors that their village is targeted by "rioters", upon receiving actual threats and ultimatums from residents of

neighboring villages, and upon losing confidence that they and their neighbors would be able to withstand attacks from "outsiders".

Compiling accurate data on the displacement brought about by the Maluku conflict has proven to be a daunting task, especially throughout the first couple of years of the conflict. First, as the conflict continued and escalated, the occurrence of displacement and the number of displaced people added up quite rapidly, sometimes on a daily basis. Second, while it was somewhat possible to keep track of the number of people in IDP shelters, it was rather impossible to tally how many people seek refuge in their second residence or in the house of their relatives and friends inside or outside of Maluku. Third, data collection and sharing was made difficult by the lack of freedom of movement throughout Maluku, especially in Ambon Island.

In December 2000, ICG reported that about 500,000 people have been displaced by the Maluku conflict. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) noted that most of these IDPs were displaced within the province and about 160,000 of them fled to other provinces. Table 9 presents a breakdown of the displacement figures in Maluku per August 2000. It shows that the number of IDPs in Ambon Island alone was estimated at 149,834. IDMC (2001) reported that they were "sheltered in 138 camps, 88 Christian (30,500 IDPs), 47 Moslem (10,000 IDPs) and 3 mixed camps (23,500 IDPs)" (p. 77). Map 6 shows where some of the shelters were spread throughout Ambon Island, as well as where some of the villages that are featured in the next sections (Wayame, Nania, Poka, Rumah Tiga, and Waai) are situated.

Table 9: Displacement Figures in Maluku per August 2000[a]

IDPs seeking refuge before January 25, 2000		
District/City		Number of IDPs
Ambon		49,054
Maluku Tengah		25,490
Maluku Tenggara		33,642
IDPs seeking refuge since January 25, 2000		
District/City	Location	Number of IDPs
Ambon	Tantui, Galala, Waai	32,500
	Benteng, Kuda Mati, Air Salobar	26,150
	Kusu-Kusu	7,530
	Ema, Kilang, Naku	28,150
Ambon - Maluku Tengah[b]	Alang, Lilibooy, Hattu, Laha, Watusori, Wailawa, Hatiwe Besar	6,450
Maluku Tengah	Masohi, Waipia, and nearby locations	31,398
Buru[c]	Namlea, Leksula, and nearby locations	10,347
Maluku Tenggara	Saumlaki	10,317
	Total for Ambon Island	149,834
	Grand Total	261,028

Source: WFP, cited in IDMC, 2001

[a] : All data in this table were taken from a table in IDMC's 2001 report, which was credited to WFP's report, dated July 31- August 24, 2000. I reformatted the table for clarity purposes. The original table notes that IDP data from Haruku Island and Kei Islands were not included.

[b] : The locations pointed out in this row are situated around the border of Ambon and Maluku Tengah.

[c] : Up to October 1999, Buru was part of Maluku Tengah.

IDMC estimated that in 2002, the number of IDPs in Maluku had risen to 332,578 and quoted OCHA that 145,328 of them were taking shelter in Ambon Island (IDMC, 2002). In the subsequent year, the number of the remaining IDPs in Maluku was about 202,783, around 160,000 of them in Ambon Island (IDMC, 2003b). It is important to note that although the number of IDPs had started to drop since 2003, the new violence in 2004 and 2011 respectively displaced about 10,000 and 3,000 persons (IDMC, 2004;

IDMC, 2011). Quoting Mercy Corps and Hivos, the only two remaining INGOs conducting

programs on behalf of IDPs in Maluku, IDMC (2011) stated that in 2010, about 6,000

households, or roughly 30,000 individuals, are still displaced and that in Ambon and

Seram Islands alone, 2,500 households still dwelled in temporary housings.

Map 6: Displacement Figures in Ambon Island mid 2000[a]

1. Halong ~ 11,000
(Christians and Muslims from all over –
largest IDP camp in Ambon Island)
2. Ambon City ~5,000
(Muslims from Ambon City and Christians
from Ambon City, other parts of Ambon
Island, Seram Island, and Buru Island,
altogether dispersed among the following
shelters: Karang Panjang sports complex
~300, Wisma Atlit ~700, Dekarnas ~150,
Belakang Soya ~1,000, THR ~1,000, Ruko Batu
Merah ~2,000)

3. Air Besar ~ 4,500
(Christians from
Hunuth, Nania, and
Negeri Lama and
Muslims from Tantui
and Galala)
4. Passo ~4,500
(Christians from
Waai, Poka, Rumah
Tiga, and Wailela)
5. Suli ~8,000
(Muslims from
Ambon City and
Christians from
Benteng Karang)
6. Soya ~2,500
(Christians from
Karang Panjang,
Ahuru Air Besar)
7. Hatalai ~4,500
(Christians from
Karang Panjang,
Benteng, Buru Island
and Seram Island)

8. Tuni ~400
(Christians from Kuda Mati, Mangga Dua, and Kampung Kolam)
9. Mahia ~700
(Christians from Kuda Mati, Mangga Dua, and Kampung Kolam)
10. Kusu-Kusu ~1,000
(Christians from Kuda Mati, Mangga Dua, and Kampung Kolam)

Source: WFP, cited in IDMC, 2001
[a] : This map is modified from a map in IDMC's 2001 report, which was credited to WFP's report,
dated July 31- August 24, 2000. All data on displacement (location and number of IDPs) are
taken from the aforementioned map. I reformatted the table for clarity purposes, as well as
to indicate the location of the villages featured in the remaining of this chapter.

According to IDMC (2011), most IDPs "returned home in the months or years following Malino II [2002 – dk], while some settled elsewhere in the province or integrated locally" (p. 3). However, nearly all of my respondents had the sense the IDPs who relocated outnumbered those who return.

No Exodus, No Return

Only one mixed village in Ambon Island remained intact throughout the Maluku conflict: Wayame. Central to its success is an in-group policing mechanism (Fearon and Laitin, 1996) led by a group of residents, Tim 20 (Team 20).[63] This team of ten Christians and ten Muslim was in charge of making all Wayame residents comply with four rules:

1. Christian and Muslim residents of Wayame are forbidden to attack each other. Should a Christian resident disobey this rule, Christian members of Tim 20 will severely punish this Christian. Should a Muslim resident disobey this rule, Muslim members of Tim 20 will severely punish this Muslim.
2. Christian and Muslim residents of Wayame are forbidden to use religious symbols, including *Acang* and *Obet*[64] attributes as well as religious door signs. Any noncompliance, especially on *Acang* and *Obet* attributes will be severely punished.
3. All Wayame residents are forbidden to take part in intergroup clashes inside and outside Wayame. Should any resident disobey the rule, she/he will have to leave the village and her/his body will not be buried in Wayame.
4. All Wayame residents are forbidden to make any kind of weapons, as well as to sell and consume alcohol. Any noncompliance will be severely punished. (Pariela, 2008, p. 193-194)

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[63] Other scholars attributed Wayame's success to other factors. Tony Pariela (2008) points at civic engagement as preserved social capital while Sumanto Al Qurtuby (2013) and Utami Sandyarani (2014) credit religious peacebuilding.

[64] *Acang* and *Obet* is a local way of saying Hasan and Robert, two names that are distinctively Muslim and Christian. These terms are used to denote Muslims and Christians in a rather negative, or at least, divisive way.

Tony Pariela[65] (2008) notes that members of Tim 20 endured endless challenges. They had to take the difficult decision of denying two Wayame residents, a Christian and a Muslim, burial in the village, as they got involved in fights outside the village. They had to firmly punish their coreligionists who, upon being drunk, uttered religious slurs against the other faith group. They had to perform regular patrols in the village borders and the marketplace to ensure that outsiders behave according to Wayame norms. They had to determinedly turn down requests from neighboring villages for safe passage through Wayame on the way to attack other villages while consistently provide protections to residents of other villages who seek refuge in Wayame. They had to frequently organize public meetings for Wayame residents to ensure that residents do not subscribe to unchecked rumors and/or put forward exclusionary religious sentiments. They repeatedly had to affirm to their co-religionists from outside the village that they would stick with their Wayame neighbors and not follow directives from the Maranatha Church and Al Fatah Mosque. Wayame residents who are not members of Tim 20 also faced constant challenges. Every time they interacted with coreligionists from other villages, they had to endure comments such as "Just wait and see. They will betray and attack you". Residents of Wayame were very aware that the safety of their village depended on their ability to refrain from being provoked (*tidak terprovokasi*) by, not only rumors and unknown third parties, but also their coreligionists from other villages.

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[65] Tony Pariela is a resident of Wayame, who has written a dissertation on why and how Wayame remained peaceful throughout the conflict. He was also a member of the Christian delegation to Malino II meeting.

Those residing outside Wayame, as well as some scholars, skeptically note that the reason as to why Wayame remained intact had more to do with the fact that the village hosts one of the the island's biggest state-owned petrol facilities and that the village is located nearby a military compound – making it too costly for the state to "let Wayame fall". I find such comments as failing to fully appreciate the agency of Wayame residents, who have worked hard to preserve peace. In addition, they fail to take note that other villages where state-owned petrol facilities and/or military compounds existed got torn apart by the conflict.

Outside Ambon Island, a few mixed villages also remained intact throughout the Maluku conflict. One of them is Waraka village on Seram Island, whose Christian and Catholic residents took up the duty to guard the village's mosque and whose Muslim residents assumed the responsibility to protect the village's church (Kompas Berbagi, 2014).

Exodus, Return

In Ambon Island, villages whose displaced residents were relocated elsewhere outnumber villages whose displaced residents were able to return. Security guarantee plays a crucial role in facilitating such return. In all cases, IDPs could not return without security guarantee from their neighbors who are members of the other faith (however, as the next section shows, there are quite some cases where IDPs decided to not return although they have been provided security guarantee by members of the other group). Another factor related to security guarantee is the presence or absence of state security apparatuses and non-state militias (LJ fighters included).

Economic incentives also play an important role. In the case of Nania, the village administration had made it clear that the government monetary compensation would be disbursed *only* to those who decided to return[66]. Meanwhile, in the case of Waai, the government's decision to provide compensation for the loss endured by Waai residents when their plantations were used by the neighboring Liang residents helped seal the return plan.

Another factor at play is the sense of collectiveness. In some cases, this comes from familial or *gandong* ties between those who left and those who remained in the village. In other cases, this comes from an understanding among members of the faith group who had fled their village together and shared the same IDP camps that the "right" way to return is to do it together.

Lastly, a number of interviews reveal that one strong reason for return is that people have nowhere else to go:

> Some people had relatives living in other villages in Ambon [Island – dk] whom they could go to. Some were in possession of a second house in Ambon [Island – dk]. Some [migrants – dk] had the option of returning to their family home outside Ambon. Others had the money to rent houses in other villages where they could then be part of the majority or send their family away from the province – sending them to school or something like that. People like me did not have such luxury. That village where I lost everything was my only option. I had to somehow return (Muslim, resident of a mixed village, female – Interview 2014).

In the remainder of the section I describe return processes in Nania, Poka, Rumah Tiga, and Waai – four of the ten villages which I visited and where I conducted interviews. Prior to the conflict, Nania was a mixed village, Poka was a predominantly

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[66] In many cases, the village administration disbursed the government aid to all families that were part of their jurisdiction, regardless of their decision to return or relocate.

Muslim village, Rumah Tiga was a predominantly Christian village, and Waai was an almost exclusively Christian village. During the conflict, these four villages were abandoned by both their Christian and Muslim residents, regardless of their faith group's majority/minority status in the village. After the conflict, Rumah Tiga became a mixed village, while the other three villages retained their demographic composition. In all cases, *provokator* narratives and memories of peace facilitated IDP return.

Nania. Nania is a mixed village, which first got hit by the conflict on January 20-21, 1999 (HRW, 1999). I had the honor to interview Marthinus Pattinasarany (Christian, male) and Jaenab Lessy (Muslim, female), the head and secretary of Nania respectively.[67]

Marthinus and Jaenab explained to me that as the violence spread to their village, Nania's Christian residents fled to Passo, while their Muslim neighbors fled to Waiheru. Only in 2003 that they started to explore the possibilities of living together again in Nania. What sustained this process were prevalent notions that Christians and Muslims of Nania have no problem with each other, that the conflict was not between them, and that it was brought about by *provokator*s.

The village leadership created Tim 12 (team 12), which consisted of six Christians and six Muslims. Its main task was to facilitate the return of *all* Nania residents. Marthinus recalled that most people had security concerns, such as whether members of the other faith group were really willing to renounce violence and forego revenge,

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[67] Unless stated otherwise, most data in this subsection were collected during an interview with Marthinus Pattinasarany and Jaenab Lessy on August 5, 2014. The Ambon Database as well as discussions with friends who worked in Nania provided background information for my understanding of events in the village.

whether everyone would be able to practice self-restraint upon encountering rumors, whether they would be able to withstand attackers from outside the village, as well as who would guarantee the safety of those who agreed to return to Nania. To address these concerns, Tim 12 encouraged residents to agree upon a number of things, including (1) the practice of self-restraint in face of provocation, (2) a commitment to not get involved in Christian-Muslim violence outside of Nania, (3) that everyone should be able and be allowed to return, and (4) that the government's *bantuan bangunan rumah* (monetary aid for rebuilding houses – BBR) will only be distributed to those who decided to return. The return processes took place between 2003 and 2005, where Christians and Muslims helped each other rebuild the village infrastructures, including the public cemetery and the church.

Jaenab expressed pride that the village administration managed to have all Nania residents return to their homes, that nobody opted for relocating to other villages that are populated exclusively by Christians or by Muslims. She recalls that back in 2003, Nania IDPs longed to be reunited with their neighbors whom they had peacefully lived side-by-side with for a very long time. She underlines that peace in Nania is *organik* – that is, genuinely nurtured by Nania residents, not a result of the government's instruction or coercion. This is why in 2007 Nania was declared as a model village by the government.

Poka. Poka is a predominantly Muslim village, which together with the neighboring Rumah Tiga village, hosts Pattimura University, student boarding homes, as

well as middle-class housing, including residences belonging to lecturers of the

University. There, I interviewed the head of Poka and Erlin, a Muslim housewife.[68]

Poka got hit by the conflict in mid-1999 and mid-2000, where houses and

buildings belonging to Pattimura University got burned. Both its Christian and Muslim

residents fled the village. Given the strong presence of LJ around Poka, return was much

more difficult for Christians than for Muslims. As stated by Erlin, as early as 2001, quite a

few Muslims have started to return. They felt safe to do so as there were no Christians

residing in the village. Only in 2004 that the village administration was able to hold

series of meetings with Poka's religious and community leaders on facilitating IDP

return. It was agreed upon that those who have returned to Poka (mostly Muslims)

would provide security guarantee and fetch others who have not returned (mostly

Christians). Given that interreligious marriage has been widely practiced in Poka, it was

not difficult to find siblings adhering to different faiths, and these familial ties played a

crucial part in convincing residents to return. Both the head of Poka and Erlin assert that

these familial ties matter more than government's directives and incentives. Other

important incentives for Christians to return, according to Erlin, were their land and

plantations, which have been and continue to be, important sources of livelihood.

The return process was celebrated in an event that Erlin calls *Islam panggil*

pulang (Muslims calling [Christians – dk] to come home). Those who have returned to

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[68] Data in this subsection were mainly collected during an interview with the head of
Poka and Erlin on August 5, 2014. The Ambon Database as well as a number of
discussions with friends who worked in Poka and other friends who resided in the
neighboring village of Rumah Tiga provided background information for my
understanding of events in Poka.

Poka fetched their neighbors and escorted them into the village with *hadrat* music and a long piece of *kain gandong* (a traditional piece of cloth that symbolizes siblinghood) that was wrapped around uniting everyone who attended the procession. The head of Poka estimates that by 2005, about 80% residents have returned. Erlin qualifies that among those who did not dare to return are those who took part in the violence. Both the head of the village and Erlin point that Poka residents worked together to restore the water and drainage system as well as the village roads.

Poka's return to pre-conflict spatial arrangement was tested in September 2011. Worried that the tensions in downtown Ambon on September 11, 2011 would spread throughout the island like that of the January 19, 1999 incidents, Christian residents of Poka fled to the Christian villages of Lateri and Passo. A week later, upon feeling confident that the tensions would not escalate into full-blown violence, they returned to Poka. The head of Poka opined that the flight of Christian residents does not reflect a lack of trust toward their Muslim neighbors, but was more of a precautionary measure against attacks from outsiders. Here, the *provokator* narratives played a dual role. On the one hand, the understanding that the conflict was not between Christians and Muslims of Poka allowed for the return of Poka residents from both communities. On the other hand, the notion that the violence was premeditated by outside actors with good combat skills triggered anxiety that Poka residents might not be able to defend their village.

Rumah Tiga. Rumah Tiga was a predominantly Christian village, which due to the conflict became a mixed-village. There, I was received by the village secretary, Michael.[69] He estimates that before the conflict, Rumah Tiga has a composition of 70% Christian and 30% Muslim. After the conflict, the composition became 50:50.

Its Muslim minority started to leave their houses in mid-1999, as they felt unsafe among their Christian neighbors. Most of them fled to Kota Jawa (a Muslim neighborhood at one end of Rumah Tiga village that borders Wayame) or to their family's home in Sulawesi. Meanwhile, Christian residents left the village around mid 2000, especially as LJ gained its stronghold around the neighboring Poka village. Some of them, especially those from the middle class, moved to their secondary residence or rented a house in downtown Ambon or in predominantly Christian villages, while others fled to IDP camps. As in Poka, the flight of Christians and the presence of LJ had encouraged a few Muslims to return to Rumah Tiga as early as 2001.

In 2004, the government encouraged Rumah Tiga's religious and community leaders to explore the possibilities for IDP return. Michael, the village secretary, recalls that what motivated people to return was the fact that they got bored of living in IDP camps and grew tired of the conflict – not the government's security guarantee. Unfortunately, violence broke out again in April 2004, and deterred people's plans to return.

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[69] Data in this subsection were mainly collected during an interview with Michael on August 6, 2014. A number of discussions with friends who resided in Rumah Tiga provided background information for my understanding of events in the village.

The return process only began again in February 2005. This time, Muslims were determined to make sure that Christians return. Michael, who is Christian, underlines that his Muslim *gandong*s persuaded him to return and that his Christian fellows were also approached by their Muslim *gandong*s. The Muslims iterated to the Christians that there have never been any problems between them, that the conflict was set up by *provokator*s, and that it was time to reclaim their pre-conflict life together. Moreover, the Muslims offered security guarantees, promising to stand up against LJ fighters should these fighters harass the Christians.

Michael estimates that at the time of the interview (August 6, 2014), around 80% IDPs have returned to Rumah Tiga. Those who did not return include those who have managed to secure comfortable housing elsewhere.

Waai.[70] Waai is a predominantly Christian village surrounded by the sea, a mountain, and two Muslim villages: Tulehu and Liang. It was a priviledge for me to be able to conduct an interview with Rev. Diaene Akyuwen and a former female child-combatant.

As Waai got destroyed in a joint Tulehu, Liang, and LJ offensive, its Christian residents fled to Passo IDP camp – some through the sea and others through the mountain and jungle. Rev. Diaene noted that when the government asked Waai Christians what it would take for them to agree to return to Waai, the Christians answered: security guarantees, especially from neighboring Tulehu and Liang. The

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[70] Data in this section were mainly collected through interviews with a former female child-combatant on August 6, 2014 and Rev. Diaene Akyuwen on August 7, 2014. The Ambon Database and a number of discussions with former residents of Waai provided background information for my understanding of events in Waai.

government then facilitated a series of talks between religious and community leaders of Waai, Tulehu, and Liang. Among the points agreed upon were: (1) Tulehu and Liang guarantee the safe return of Waai residents, (2) the government pays a certain amount of money to compensate for Tulehu and Liang residents using and harvesting from the plantations left behind by Waai residents, and (3) the government would not rebuild houses in Waai, but only provide construction materials and allow Waai residents to rebuild their own houses.

The return to Waai officially started in October 25, 2003. Residents of the Muslim village of Morella, came to assist Waai Christians as the two villages are bound in *pela*. They built temporary shelters and kitchens for Waai Christians to use throughout the reconstruction processes, prepared meals, and helped rebuild houses.

Exodus, No Return

While the act of returning to one's village, especially for those living in mixed villages, reflects pro-reconciliation attitudes, the act of not returning cannot be seen simply as a reflection of anti-reconciliation attitudes. Numerous interviews reveal that people have multiple and varied reasons for not returning.

Quite a number of respondents mention that while they would be happy to return and live together again with their former neighbors who follow the other faith, they decided against it. This is because they fear they and their neighbors would not be able to withstand pressure from outside the village, especially in the absence of competent and impartial state apparatus.

> I have no problems with my Christian former neighbors. In fact, I returned to Waringin for a while and was happy to be reunited with them. When another

clash took place and spread to Waringin, I immediately fled again. My Christian neighbors did offer protection, but I understand that such action would put them in harm – they would be accused of being a traitor to their group and could face death. That was when I decided to never return to Waringin. You know, Waringin has been hit by several violent clashes, and none of them were between its Christian and Muslim residents. It was always outsiders who come and attack us. So this is what residents do: upon learning that a clash is about to spread to Waringin, everyone, Christians and Muslims alike, would flee. First, it might be difficult to know early enough if the ones coming are targeting Christians or Muslims – you do not want to take a chance. Second, if the attackers are your co-religionists, you don't want to get pressured to join the attack by helping them hunt down your neighbors. Third, if the attackers are those from the other faith group, on top of not wanting to risk your own life, you would not want to risk your neighbors' life. Look, I really have nothing against my former neighbors. I come visit them in Waringin every now and then. I just cannot afford fleeing and fleeing again every time something bad happens in Waringin. I am tired of the possibilities of rebuilding my house again and again after attackers burn it down. So, I decided to take the government's compensation money and build a house in the Muslim area of Kebun Cengkih (Muslim, female – Interview 2014).

Having faith in your former neighbors is one thing. But risking your life and your family by returning to your village is another. You know, you can still maintain good relationships with your former neighbors even if you relocate somewhere else (Interview, January 2014).

Another important factoring hindering return is property take-over. In some villages, houses and land that were left behind when their owners fled were taken over, either by their neighbors or by the government, and repurposed for hosting IDPs. Adam's (2009) study of the Batu Merah/Kayu Tiga case provides an excellent example. He writes that in 2006, about 500 of the around 700 Christian households of the predominantly Muslim village of Batu Merah resettled at Kayu Tiga, a neighborhood at the predominantly Christian village of Soya. These families had fled Batu Merah in February 1999 – about 200 households went to the IDP camp in the Christian village of Karang Panjang while the remaining were dispersed all over the region before ending up in Kayu Tiga (Adam, 2009, p. 140-141). Adam stresses that these families cannot return

to Batu Merah because their houses and land are already occupied by Muslims who fled from predominantly Christian villages and seek refuge in Batu Merah.

A number of respondents share similar stories. A resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Silale mentions that the row where his Christian neighbors lived got burned during the conflict and that the Christian families fled to the next island. Then, the government built houses over the ruins and allowed Muslims who had fled from predominantly Christian villages to Silale to use them. The respondent also mentions that his former Christian neighbors still come to visit Silale one in a while, especially during the Muslim festivity of Idul Fitri (Interview, August 2014).

A new resident of the predominantly Christian neighborhood of Amahusu explains that the house his family is living in at the moment used to belong to a Muslim family. What happened was that Christians from the neighboring predominantly Christian village of Kudamati had threatened the Muslims residing in Amahusu: leave or die. It was agreed among Amahusu residents that the Christians would safely escort their Muslim neighbors out the village. The houses that the Muslims left behind were then used by Christians who have fled to Amahusu from predominantly Muslim neighborhoods. The Muslims were given monetary compensations, while the new Christian residents were provided with house and land certificate (Interview, August 2014).

Pela and *Gandong*

As some critics point out, *pela* and *gandong* ties have failed to prevent the breakdown of order in Maluku. A number of respondents highlight that despite *adat*'s

ability to sustain throughout centuries, its mechanisms had failed to adapt to the more

recent demographic makeup brought about by in-migration. By this, they mean that

pela and *gandong* have failed to include migrants from outside Maluku, including those

from Buton, Bugis, Makassar, and Java. Other respondents point at the fact that many of

the *pela-* or *gandong-* partnering villages are located far away from each other – many

of them are even situated at different islands. Given the wide and rapid spread of the

Maluku conflict, it was difficult for the *pela* and *gandong* partners to protect one

another. Another limitation is that each *pela* and *gandong* tie only binds several villages,

instead of encompassing all villages in Maluku. On top of all the reasons above,

respondents underlined how *adat* has increasingly lost its relevance, especially since the

1970s, that is, when the Indonesian government introduced a more centralized and

uniformed concept and structure of villages and when religious institutions – both on

the Christian and Muslim sides – became keen on purifying religious teachings from

adat. These respondents' insights mirror Bartels' (2003) and Braeuchler's (2012c)

findings.[71]

On the other hand, some respondents defended *pela* and *gandong* by saying

that they played a role in discouraging participation in violence targeted at certain

villages. As elaborated by Yusran Laitupa:

> I do not think that *pela* and *gandong* have broken down – well, at least not
> completely. I observed that many people refused to participate in an attack
> against a village that he/she has *pela* and/or *gandong* relations. Even the

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[71] Bartels (2003) elaborated on the Church's attempts to get rid of *adat* teachings that contradict the Bible as well as on attempts on the Muslim side to mainstream "Islamic universalism over ethnic parochialism". Meanwhile, Braeuchler (2012c, p. 101) noted that the so-called ethnic conflicts tend to involve attempts to "purify" culture.

naughtiest young man from Amahusu, for example, would refuse to participate in an attack against Laha, given the *adat* ties between the two villages. Even if he – perhaps due to peer pressure – tagged along the trip to Laha, he would not commit any destruction in Laha. He will just watch silently. The same goes between residents of Batu Merah and Passo (Interview, 2014).

While there are mixed opinions on the role of *pela* and *gandong* in preventing the onset of the Maluku conflict, there seems to be a consensus that these and other *adat* mechanisms are crucial to Christian-Muslim relations in postconflict Maluku. As discussed below, such mechanisms facilitated the return of IDPs, provided the materials and manpower needed for reconstructing houses and places or worship, as well as highlighted the interdependence between Christians and Muslims and helped restore the belief that Christians and Muslims can live together harmoniously.

Braeuchler (2009c) provides an excellent account from Haruku Island (an island part of Maluku which neighbors Ambon Island) of how *gandong* ties facilitated the return of Kariu residents to their *adat* land. On February 1999, residents of the Muslim village of Pelauw, assisted by their allies from other Muslim villages attacked the Christian village of Kariu. Pelauw is part of the centuries-old Hatuhaha union, which consists of four Muslim villages – Pelauw, Kabau, Kailolo, and Rohomoni – and one Christian village, Hulaliu.[72] Meanwhile, Kariu has *gandong* ties with the Christian villages of Aboru and Booi, as well as the Muslim village of Hualoi. Kariu residents fled to the Christian villages of Hulaliu and Aboru, as well as received assistance (food and clothes) from the residents of the Muslim village of Hualoi. Hualoi, the Muslim *gandong* of Kariu,

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[72] Braeuchler (2009c, p. 103) notes that the Christian village of Hulaliu used to be a Muslim one. When the Dutch colonial power tried to convert villages of the Hatuhaha union into Christianity, Hulalui residents gave in and did so as a sacrifice so that the other Muslim villages would be left alone by the Dutch.

as well as Hulalui, the Christian member of the Hatuhaha union, assumed the role of

protectors and supporters to Kariu, as well as mediators between Kariu and its Muslim

counterparts (Braeuchler, 2009c, p. 108).

On October 2003, it was decided in a meeting of all *raja*s from Haruku Island that

residents of Kariu should return to their home, their *adat* land. A team for facilitating

this return, which membership includes representatives of Pelauw, was soon

established. This was followed by a laborious process of cleaning the devastated site of

Kariu, which was jointly performed by residents of Pelauw and other Hatuhaha villages

as well as Kariu IDPs. On June 2005, a formal return ceremony was held.

> Representatives of the *gandong* villages Aboru, Booi, and Hualoi had come… to
> pick up the Kariu refugees and accompany them back to their *adat* land... People
> from Hualoi were explicitly asked to wear their traditional Muslim clothes, in a
> gesture of reconciliation and solidarity for the Muslim neighbors of Kariu. The
> first stop was in Hulaliu… Kariu and Hualoi people officially thanked Hulaliu for
> sheltering Kariu refugees… After that, the journey continued and the crowd
> entered Ori (*dusun* Pelauw) and finally got to the Kariu border. Following the
> example of the 1930s, the lord of the land… of Kariu ceremonially 'opened the
> door' of Kariu by cutting young coconut leaves put up at the village border. In
> Kariu, the Hatuhaha… union was already waiting to receive Kariu back in a tent
> that was erected where the former *baileo* [*adat* house] had been… Pelauw had
> prepared food, so everybody could join in *makan patita*, that is, the traditional
> way of putting food on a long table and then enjoying it together during
> communal ceremonies (Braeuchler, 2009c, p. 107-108).

Braeuchler (2009c) notes that the ceremony was a re-enactment of a process

that took place centuries ago, of Kariu people moving from the mountains to the beach

where Hatuhaha people had been living. She underlines that this re-enactment was

wisely selected over a religious (Christian) procession, which had the potential of

alienating Kariu's Muslim neighbors.

As Maluku entered the postconflict phase, many villages evoke *adat* in its reconstruction processes. As illustrated earlier, when they rebuilt their houses and church, residents of the predominantly Christian village of Waai received assistance, mostly in the form of labor, from their *pela* partner, the predominantly Muslim village of Morella. Other examples include the reconstruction of a mosque in the predominantly Muslim village of Batu Merah in 2007, the renovation of a mosque in the predominantly Muslim village of Kailolo in Haruku Island in 2009, and the construction of a church in the predominantly Christian village of Tuhaha in Saparua Island in January 2015. The first one was assisted by residents of Batu Merah's *pela* partner, the predominantly Christian village of Passo, who provided the *tiang alif* (main pole). The second was assisted by residents of Kailolo's *pela* partner, the predominantly Christian village of Tihulale from Seram Island. Meanwhile, the third was assisted by Tuhaha's *pela* partner, the predominantly Muslim village of Rohomoni, Haruku Island, which provided one of the church's poles.

Throughout the postconflict phase in Maluku, Christian and Muslim villages that are bond by *pela* or *gandong* have organized various events to strengthen their relations, including *panas pela*, *makan patita*, and *halal bi halal*. *Panas pela* is an *adat* ritual aimed at reminding *pela* partners of their ties and obligations toward each other. In 2005, residents of the predominantly Christian village of Ouw in Saparua Island hosted *panas pela* for their *gandong* "older sibling", the residents of the predominantly Muslim village of Seith from Ambon Island. In 2009, Tihulale and Kailolo held *panas pela* to reinforce the *pela* oath they took 78 years before, when Tihulale provided the wood

needed for the construction of Kailolo's mosque and Kailolo provided the tiles for

Tihulale's church. In 2009, residents of the predominantly Christian villages of Soya and

Waai convened *panas pela* with the residents of the predominantly Muslim village of

Morella. In 2010, residents of the predominantly Christian village of Halong and the

predominantly Muslim village of Hitu Lama organized *panas pela* in front of the World

Peace Gong at Ambon City's main square. In a similar spirit, residents of the seven

Silatupatih villages – the predominantly Christian villages of Sila, Paperu, and Hulaliu, as

well as the predominantly Muslim villages of Tial, Tulehu, Asilulu, and Laimu – held *halal*

bi halal, a form of Idul Fitri celebration, in 2011. Meanwhile, in February 2015, residents

of Passo and Batu Merah shared meals during a *makan patita* event.

In the Kei Islands, Christians and Muslims performed an *adat* cleansing ceremony

and *vehe belan*. The cleansing ceremony was done at Siran Siryen, the birthplace of

larwul ngabal, Kei's *adat* law, in October 1999. Meanwhile, *vehe belan* took place in

February 2000. Here, residents of Langgur-Wearlilir visited residents of Tual. The former

acted as representatives of the entire Kei's Christian community and the latter acted as

representatives of the entire Kei's Muslim community. In both events, *larwul ngabal*

was read out loud and residents took an oath to never again participate in acts of

violence against members of the other faith group. These *adat* rituals effectively ended

intergroup clashes in Kei as early as 2000 – in Ambon, the violence dragged on until

2002.

The above *adat* practices are important in so many ways. Firstly, they support

people's immediate needs, such as to return to one's village as well as to rebuild houses

and places of worship. Secondly, they serve as a reminder of the centuries-long interdependent lives between Christians and Muslims in Maluku. In turn, this refreshes cultural scripts for future interfaith collaborations and helps restore the belief that adherents of different religions can indeed trust each other and live together harmoniously. Third, they signify a commitment to put *adat*-based solidarity before religious solidarity. Malukans believe that such dedication is important amidst the nationwide trend of religious purification and is a key to preventing the recurrence of communal clashes along religion lines to re-occur. Fourth, they generate security guarantees. The awareness that the residents of a certain village are one's "siblings" or are "siblings" to one's coreligionists is likely to deter one from participating into violence against that village. Fifth, they open up space for expressing remorse. In situations where it is rather difficult to trace back and apologize to the persons whom one had harmed years ago, the possibility to "repay it forward" becomes invaluable. As elaborated by a resident of the predominantly Muslim village of Morella, assisting Christians in his *pela* village of Waai was an important act of taking responsibility for his participation in the riots in downtown Ambon in early 1999. Back then, he thought he was defending his coreligionist in downtown Ambon from being slaughtered by Christians. Sixth, they create focal point for peace. Everyone knows that taking part in interreligious *adat* events means that one does not have, or no longer have, negative feelings toward followers of the other faith. Considering (1) that everyone is seen as complicit in the conflict, (2) that it is rather impractical to express remorse and offer repair to every single party whom one have harmed during the conflict, and (3) that

everyone knows what participation in interreligious *adat* events mean, *adat*

mechanisms establish an understanding that "I know that you know that I am sorry" and

"you know that I know that I am sorry".

As discussed earlier in this section, *pela* and *gandong* have some limitations: (1)

they do not include migrants, (2) the villages they bind are far away from each other, (3)

they do not encompass all villages throughout Maluku, and (4) they, as part of *adat*,

have increasingly lost their relevance in the modern world. *Raja*s in Maluku have met in

various settings – all-Maluku, intraisland, intracity, or interneighbors – to try to address

these issues. Among the early attempts to facilitate meetings among *raja*s were those of

by Go-East, a Jakarta-based NGO, which brought together *raja*s from both Maluku and

North Maluku provinces in 2001 and those of by Bakubae and Universitas Pattimura,

which organized a gathering for Ambon-based *raja*s in 2002 and 2003. The meeting in

2001 was held in Langgur, Kei Island, where violent interreligious clashes were swiftly

terminated through *adat* mechanisms. Meanwhile the 2002 and 2003 meetings were

held respectively in Bogor (Java) and Ambon City.

The outcomes of the numerous *raja* meetings include commitments among *raja*s

to take a bigger role in prevention and resolution of intervillage conflicts. In terms of

conflict prevention, *raja*s can restrain residents of her/his village from participating in

attacks against other villages, contain disputes, actively clarify rumors, rekindle *adat* ties

among *pela* and *gandong* partners, as well as instill a stronger *adat* identity among

residents of her/his village relative to religious identity. Meanwhile, in terms of conflict

resolution, *raja*s can mediate or arbitrate disputes as well as point at the various *adat*-

based resolutions that parties can choose from. These open space for disputes between residents of non-*pela* and non-*gandong* neighboring villages to be settled in *adat* manner, which means that they do not have to rely on state institutions (*i.e.* the police and court, which people tend to see as corrupt and/or inefficient) and on vigilante justice, which in turn, narrow the possibilities of interpersonal disputes becoming communal clashes.

Towards Interdependence

It is safe to say that neighborhood is *the* site where most of the communal clashes took place. While places of worship, schools, business areas, and police or military buildings have also been targeted, most attacks were directed at neighborhoods. Most incidents are usually talked and written about by referring to the villages involved. The vernacular expressions of "people from village A have attacked village B" or "village C have fallen" sustain this point of view. Throughout my interaction with Malukans since 2002, I came across phrases such as "*orang Liang dan Tulehu su serang Waai*" (Liang and Tulehu residents have attacked the village of Waai), "*waktu Poka jatuh, …*" (when the village of Poka fell [into the hands of rioters], …), "orang Kudamati su turun" (people [fighters] from the village of Kudamati have come down [from their village to approach their target]).

In other words, neighborhood is *the* site where provocation took place, where decisions to participate in violence were made, and where longstanding practices of intergroup harmony were put to test. With this in mind, at the very early stage of this dissertation project, I assumed that neighborhood would also be *the* site where

reconciliation is most prominent. My early research design was to compare villages

where IDPs managed to return and where IDPs had to relocate elsewhere (respectively

as proxies to cases where reconciliation takes place and cases where reconciliation did

not happen). However, my later interviews and field visit indicate that IDPs' actions of

returning or relocating are not simple reflections of whether or not former neighbors

have reconciled. Many things are at play, including security guarantees against outside

parties and property issues.

In retrospect, people are able to see that the information that got them and

their neighbors riled up were just false rumors. The Ambon Database Pilot Study and

Ambon Database record a lot of anger toward *provokator*s. To some people, such

provokator narratives restore or confirm their confidence toward their neighbors, thus

facilitate the return of IDPs. However, to others, the very same notion that the clashes

were meticulously masterminded by an elusive third party deters IDPs' return. They

tend to believe that security guarantees among former neighbors would not prevail

against premeditated attacks from outside.

Most of the most painful memories regarding the conflict are also located in the

neighborhood site – memories of losing loved ones, of being physically hurt, or seeing

one's house burned or looted, of having to flee, of seeing a neighbor or acquaintance

participating in acts of violence against one's group, *etc*. While most of the pain

remains, the *provokator* narratives help one see that people's complicity were based on

some survival instinct, prompted by the heat of the moment, motivated by revenge, or

guided by misinformation, rather than by pure malice. For some respondents, such

understanding helps provide self-restraint from revenge, offers some sense of closure, and may spark forgiveness.

Here, memories of peace motivate former neighbors to work together toward IDP return. It also provides behavioral scripts for Christian-Muslim relations, even in cases where return do not take place, *i.e.* visiting each other during religious holidays. Various *adat* mechanisms, especially *pela* and *gandong* enrich these memories of peace.

It should be noted that participation in reconstruction processes, as well as in *adat* events, allowed individuals to undergo identity-change from "Christians" or "Muslims" to "fellow-residents of village X" or "fellow Malukans". It also provided space to display their remorse regarding their complicity in the past violence, athough there may be gaps between where or toward whom the violence was directed and where or toward whom the repair is given. Nevertheless, the shared understanding of what such participation means is enough to generate a focal point for peace – that is, the notion that "I know that you know that I am sorry" and "you know that I know that you are sorry", which in turn sustain security guarantee among members of the different faith.

Chapter 8 – Functional-quotidian Site

While the neighborhood site is *the* site where the conflict took place, the functional-quotidian site is *the* site where most reconciliation initiatives started. Here, Christians and Muslims engage in various activities that rely on the specific skills, training, and/or identities they have due to their social role, profession or hobby. Many such collaborative activities were initiated in order to restore normalcy and only later they were modified to foster reconciliation. However, some are from the beginning deliberately designed to open encounters between Christians and Muslims.

Infrastructures and Services

As spatial segregation consolidated and freedom of movement got disrupted, many public areas got distorted, including that of trade, transportation, sanitation, health, education, and banking. The restoration of these sectors was contingent on Christian-Muslim cooperation and was mostly grounded in practical needs – such as to get food, to have safe passages to school or workplace, to seek medical attention, and to earn a bit of living – instead of the ideals of reliving interreligious harmony.

In the trade sector, spatial segregation "locked in" some resources in Christian areas and others in Muslim areas. Given that most Muslim villages are located along the coastlines and that main harbors are located in Muslim areas, food was abundant in Muslim neighborhoods and in Muslim IDP camps. Fish could be easily harvested while vegetables and spices could be easily transported from Seram Island. Rice was especially abundant in Muslim IDP camps as it was easy to secure them from INGOs. The opposite is true for Christian areas: fish and vegetables were scarce and were sold at four to six

times the price of that of in Muslim areas. By contrast, sugar, flour, milk, cooking oil,

rice, and non-food items were easily available in Christian areas. Although most of these

goods were transported from factories in Java to the main harbor in a Muslim area of

Ambon, they were not directly distributed in Muslim areas. From the harbor, they

immediately got transported to Indonesian-Chinese merchants living in the Christian

areas. Accordingly, these goods were rather scarce in Muslim areas. An easy way to

think about the divide is to think of *barang pasar* (items sold in traditional markets) and

barang toko (items sold in convenience stores), respectively "locked" in Muslim and

Christian areas (Lakembe, Interview 2014).

Another thing that was scarce in Muslim quarters, especially in Muslim IDP

camps, was money. One reason is that most banks were located in Christian areas. But a

more significant reason was that businesses in Muslim areas had lost their Christian

customers who make up about half of their total customers.

To overcome this scarcity – and later on, to make some living out of it – some

people started to meet up in border areas to exchange goods. Many of them would

coordinate beforehand *via* telephone on which goods to bring and on which border area

to meet. A former trader mentions that what was high in demand among Christians was

fish and vegetable, while what was highly desired among Muslims was *sopi* –

traditionally fermented liquor (Interview, January 28, 2014).

At the early phase of the conflict, these exchanges were conducted in a secretive

manner. This was because being seen with or working with "the other" could easily lead

up to being labeled as a traitor. Eventually, the "impromptu markets" grew in size and

number, and their existence became widely known. Among the "safe" places to hold

transactions include areas around RST (Rumah Sakit Tentara – Army Hospital), SMP 2 (a

junior high school), Hotel Amans, and Lampu Lima at Passo. Transactions also took place

on sea, where Christians and Muslims exchange their goods while standing or sitting on

top of their speedboat (Interview, January 28, 2014).

While they help overcome scarcity and bring down prices, not everyone is fond

of these transactions. LJ fighters, for example, repeatedly warned and threatened

Muslim to not trade with Christians. "They [LJ fighters – dk] came to me and said that it

[trading with Christians – dk] is *haram*, but I still went. They came again and said that

they would kill me if I go on doing it, but I still went. To me, this was about feeding my

family and was none of their business," a former Muslim trader explains (Interview,

January 28, 2014). His wife, who sells mineral water and food at the harbor, adds,

> We had lots and lots of rice at the IDP camp, and it was very easy to come by
> vegetable and fish. The problem was that we did not have money. We needed
> money to get stuff, and the only way to get money in a dignified manner was to
> work – that is, to engage in petty trading. We heard they [unknown parties – dk]
> tried to shut down the transactions that took place on the sea by opening fire
> toward the traders' speedboats. I do not think it would deter any traders. We
> really need to keep doing what we do [trading – dk] because we need to survive
> (Interview, January 28, 2014).

Over time, these transactions became more meaningful encounter points for

Christians and Muslims. In addition to exchanging goods, people exchanged information

(security updates, IDP conditions, rumor checking, *etc.*) and build rapport (trust building

and stereotype deconstructing included).

Another thing that helped overcome scarcity was coordination between

Christian and Muslim truck drivers. As Fery, a businessman whose company unloads

goods from the ship and transport them throughout Ambon, explained

> I have many workers, those who unload goods at the docks and those who drive
> trucks to deliver the goods around – well, about 60 Christians and 100 Muslims.
> We made some arrangements so that the Christians would drive the trucks as
> they pass Christian villages and Muslims would do the driving as the trucks pass
> Muslim villages. It was a high-cost operation, as it was run and maintained by
> two systems. It was needed though. My trucks carried rice, wheat, instant
> noodles, and many other things including cement and asphalt, many of them
> made it to the 'impromptu markets' (Interview, August 6, 2014).

Another initiative that also capitalized on cooperation between Christian and

Muslim drivers was the UNICEF's sanitation program. UNICEF provided six trucks: four

for collecting garbage and two for draining septic tanks. Since Ambon only has one final

waste disposal (located in the Muslim area), the program had to rely on drivers'

intergroup collaboration to collect garbage, drain septic tanks, and drive trucks in-and-

out Christian and Muslim territories (Laitupa, Interview, July 30, 2014).

In the health sector, spatial segregation limited people's access to hospitals and

clinics. Since Christians were not able to enter Muslim areas, some of them would have

to cover longer distance to seek medical attention in another Christian village instead of

going to a nearby health facility at a neighboring Muslim village. The same goes *vice*

versa – some Muslims would have to travel further to get medical care. Intergroup

resentment exacerbates this problem. Often, patients refused to be treated by

healthworkers who were not their co-religionists. They even refused blood transfusion

when they could not tell for sure if the blood would be from a coreligionist. Other

problems in the health sector include scarcity of medicines, medical equipments, and

blood supply, as well as safe passages for health workers and equipments (Interview, Rahmawati 2014).

A number of organizations helped restore the health sector, including MSF, IMC, ICMC and WHO. Their interventions ranged from bringing in medical supplies, providing ambulance and ambulatory health care, to bringing in international doctors and Hindu doctors from Bali. One program that was specifically designed to link the health sector to peacebuilding was Health as the Bridge for Peace (HBP), organized by WHO in partnership with the Center for Security and Peace Studies of Gadjah Mada University (CSPS UGM). It aimed at empowering healthworkers at performing peacebuilding roles.

Through series of workshops, about 50 healthworkers and administrators in Maluku Health Office were asked to identify the distortions in the health sector and to design programs to overcome them. In HBP early sessions, healthworkers confided in each other the fear, suspicion, and anger they held against "the other". Amongst the ideas they came up with were: the facilitation of reconciliation among healthworkers, building clinics in border and/or neutral areas accessible to members of all faith group, asking security apparatus to provide safe passages to health facilities, pairing-up Christian and Muslim doctors, and offering mobile transborder health services. They saw establishing clinics in border and/or neutral areas as tackling two problems at once: limited access to health facilities and limited interactions between Christians and Muslims.

Media and Public Information

Eriyanto (2003) provides a detailed study of the media's role in the Maluku

conflict. He traces how Suara Maluku (which was until 1999 the only Ambon-based

newspaper), Televisi Republik Indonesia (the state owned, public broadcasting television

network – TVRI), Radio Republik Indonesia (the state owned radio network – RRI), and

Antara News (Indonesia's news agency), whose offices were located in Christian

quarters, were impacted by the conflict. Eriyanto writes that as spatial segregation

solidified, it became difficult for Christian reporters to enter Muslim quarters and for

Muslim reporters to enter Christian quarters, including where their office was located. It

was decided that reporters would only cover news within their group's quarters, that

Muslim reporters of Suara Maluku would fax their stories to their office, and that

reporters of TVRI and RRI would meet up every afternoon at a neutral area so that

Muslim reporters could hand over their videos and cassettes to their Christian

colleagues who would then pass them to the office (Eriyanto, 2003, p. 25-26).

Unfortunately, these arrangements could only last for a couple of months.

Muslim reporters of Suara Maluku set up their own newspaper, Ambon Ekspress. Given

that Suara Maluku and Ambon Express only had, respectively, Christian reporters and

Muslim reporters, they could only cover stories from the Christian or the Muslim

community. It should be noted though, that up until mid 2000, both newspaper

maintained a neutral language on the conflict. They avoided words like "Christian-

Muslim conflict" (and instead cite village names, *i.e.* fights between "residents of Batu

Merah and Mardika"), refused to quote statements containing accusations that the

conflict was brought by Christians or by Muslims, and developed frames that the conflict

was brought by outsiders (Eriyanto, 2003, p. 32-33). Nevertheless, the arrival of LJ

fighters, the escalation of the conflict, and the hardening of religious identities in mid-

2000 changed the tone of journalistic reports in Maluku. Both Suara Maluku and Ambon

Ekspress were forced by their coreligionists to adopt more forceful language against

"the other". Failure to report the finest details of the other's malicious acts and to

attribute a language appropriate to such crime could be seen as an act of betrayal

(Eriyanto, 2003, p. 34-35). Newer media outlets followed the trend of adopting a partial

stance in the conflict.

It was against this background that training of peace journalism were launched,

including one on January 2000 in Ambon, one on February 2001 in Bogor (a city one

hour drive away from Jakarta), and another one on May 2001 in Palu and Poso (Sulawesi

Island[73]). These training sessions took place in a very cordial atmosphere (Fofid, 2014;

Pinontoan, 2014; Umahuk, 2014). As a follow up to these sessions, a Maluku Media

Center (MMC) was established. Equipped with facilities such as computers, printers, and

facsimile machines, MMC was designed as a clearing house where Christian and Muslim

journalists could meet, exchange information, and discuss strategies on how to

mainstream peace journalism.

Another factor contributing to the distortion in the media sector was the way

that Jakarta-based media had been portraying the Maluku conflict. As Rudi (Fofid, 2014,

p. 26-27) illustrates, at the immediate aftermath of the first communal clash, many

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[73] Internationally, "Sulawesi" is known as "Celebes".

Ambon-based journalists got their hands tied with rescuing themselves and their families, as well as with volunteering in IDP camps. Thus, most news on the Maluku conflict, many of them inaccurate, were dispatched from Jakarta. These include a mix-up that the initial fight was between Christian thug and a Muslim driver (not a Christian driver and a Muslim thug, as it was), that RMS flags were displayed at Gunung Nona, that pregnant women were attacked to the extent that the babies were cut out from the mothers' wombs, and that the ex-Ambonese mayor was masterminding the conflict and had fled to the Netherlands (Fofid, 2014, p. 27-28). During the Bogor training, Maluku journalists aired their objections on the way Jakarta wrote about Ambon, which they found contributing to public panic and anger.

Zairin Salampessy, an Ambon-based senior journalist, notes that even up to now, Jakarta-based media are not always mindful in their reporting of Maluku. Whenever a tension arises in Maluku, the Jakarta-based media seem to prefer the word *rusuh* (riot) that has an "indiscriminate mass violence" connotation than *ricuh*, *ribut,* or *perkelahian* (disturbance, dispute, fight) which has a more "contained, limited, under control" connotation. They, too, tend be fast in releasing numbers of participants or casualties, even before Ambon journalists were able to confirm those (Interview, January 26, 2014). Realizing Jakarta's appetite for "gory" news, Zairin and his colleagues at Maluku Photography Club (MPC) had stopped taking photos of violent incidents in Maluku, hoping that it would limit the chances for the media to generate unnecessary anxiety related to innacurate reporting on Maluku.

MPC's membership is diverse, not only religiously, but also ethnically and occupationally. Among its members are journalists, priests, police officers, students, civil servants, *etc*. Its activities are geared toward documenting Christian-Muslim cooperation, facilitating interreligious encounters, and defending freedom of movement. At the immediate aftermath of the 2011 disturbance, for example, MPC held photo hunting sessions, during which its members, Christians and Muslims, visited several Christian and Muslim villages. They did this to spread the message that disturbances only disrupt freedom of movement if people let them. MPC also holds photo-shoot sessions in religious buildings, with members of the other faith posing as models (a Christian girl serves as a photo model in a photo shoot session in front of a mosque, and a Muslim girl serves as a photo model in a photo shoot session in front of a church). It documents various peace, *adat*, religious, and interreligious events, as well as day-to-day activities that reflect Christian-Muslim cooperation. In one of MPC's photo exhibitions, I particularly admired a photo of two women sitting next to another selling their goods – one wore a Muslim headscarf and one wore traditional Christian-Maluku attire, as well as a photo of Muslim youths standing in front of the church to greet Christians who are about to join a Christmas mass service.

The idea that regular civilians – not only journalists – can take part in correcting the distortion of information in and about Maluku is shared by Maluku's blogger community. Almascatie (Interview, August 7, 2014) expressed his concern that, up to 2009, every time the words "Ambon" or "Maluku" were typed into Google search bar, the drop bar would suggest phrases such as *kerusuhan Ambon* (Ambon riot), *tragedi*

Ambon (Ambon tragedy), *Maluku berdarah* (bloody Maluku), and such. He and his

fellow bloggers became motivated to fill up the cyber word with positive images about

Ambon and Maluku. They wrote enthusiastically about tourism, history, *adat* and other

aspects of life in Ambon and Maluku.

Throughout the processes, the bloggers facilitated intergroup encounters, both

virtual and face-to-face, including a series of training for new bloggers. These

encounters allowed Christians and Muslims to discuss social and political issues, listen to

stories different to the versions they were familiar with, and simply have more friends

coming from a different religious background. Almascatie recalls that in some of the

early virtual and face-to-face encounters, suspicion and reluctance were in the air.

Nevertheless, as they managed to deconstruct the mindset that the members of the

other faith were responsible for the conflict, those sentiments were replaced by

camaraderie (Interview, August 7, 2014).

Women Movements

While women actively take part in the activities discussed in the previous and

subsequent sections and chapters, it is important to dedicate a separate section on how

and why women's role in reconciliation is crucial. This section follows Gerakan

Perempuan Peduli (Concerned Women's Movement – GPP) and Lembaga

Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak (Institute for Women and Children Empowerment

– LAPPAN), two of the most respected women movements in Ambon. GPP was

established in August 1999, while LAPPAN was formed later.

Both movements are rooted in a belief that women hold a high stake in restoring

normalcy, and are therefore *the* driving force for peace and reconciliation. Rev.

Margaretha Hendriks Ririmasse (Rev. Etha) of GPP says that women wanted the war to

stop so that children could travel to school safely, could attend school regularly, and not

get recruited as combatants. Meanwhile, Othe Patty (Mama Othe), who is involved both

in GPP and LAPPAN, underlines that freedom of movement is particularly important for

women, as they need to be able to go to the market and get staples at normal prices.

They note that women hold these concerns dearly because they are the ones who give

birth, bring children up, feed the family and hold the family together. Rev. Etha asserts,

> Those who fought at the frontline were mostly men. Women, especially during
> the early phase of the conflict, were not interested in fighting. They are tired of
> learning at a daily basis that someone they know had died or got hurt because of
> the fighting.

> Meanwhile, Mama Othe exclaims,

> Men do not mind feeding themselves and their children instant noodle and plain
> rice every day. They are happy to consume whatever is available at the IDP
> camps, things we get from aid organizations. As mothers, we do not have the
> heart to feed our family just that. We want our children to eat normally, to have
> vegetables and fish with their rice.

As I have already shown in this dissertation, the first step of breaking the barrier

is the most difficult. In separate occasions, Rev. Etha and Sister Brigitta Renyaan

explained to me that everyone who attended GPP's first meeting were tense and were

suspicious of the other's intentions. This meeting was held at the Governor's house,

facilitated by the Governor's wife, Icha, and the Vice Governor, Paula Renyaan – the

former a Muslim, the latter a Catholic. Ten women from both sides attended this

meeting. They did not mingle and sat rather separately – Christians at one side of the

room and Muslims at the other. Yet, they agreed that women have to do something to stop the fighting, as there is nothing to gain from it. At the end of the meeting they agreed on two things. First is that they would hold a peace campaign and the second is that they would meet regularly at the Governor's office.

In the peace campaign, GPP members gave out green ribbons with "Stop Violence" written on them to people walking by downtown Ambon. Throughout the process, they initiated small talks, asking people how their lives got affected by the conflict and if they would be willing to support peace. Meanwhile, in the meetings at the Governor's office, GPP members listened to each other's stories on how the conflict has torn their lives apart. Eventually, each member realized that everyone had lost at least one family member, had been forced to endure poor living conditions, and had been dealing with fear, anger, vengeance, and grief. This is the turning point where they started seeing everyone as a victim of the conflict rather than themselves and their co-religionists as victim-only and the other as perpetrator-only. Over time, the number of women attending these meetings grew.

Mama Othe's first attempt to break the segregation was also not easy. Having been forced to move out from the Muslim village of Batumerah to the Christian IDP camp of Wisma Atlit, her access to the traditional market got cut off. A couple of months into the segregation, she phoned some Muslim youths in Batumerah to ask if they would be willing to escort her and other Christian mothers to shop for fish and vegetables at the traditional market. The youngsters of Batumerah agreed almost instantly, given that Mama Othe was their neighbor whom they know very well.

However, it took some time for the other Christian mothers to collect their courage to trespass the Christian-Muslim border. It was their love for their family, their wish to put nutritious food on the dining table, which overcame their fear of their lives. Upon learning that it works, more and more Christian mothers joined this "shopping escort" system, making it "normal" for Christians to shop at Muslim markets and for Muslim vendors to have Christian buyers.

Then, with GPP, Mama Othe arranged numerous transborder excursions. She brought 20 Muslim women to Wisma Atlit to see how life was in the Christian IDP camp. She asked her Muslim guests not to take their headscarves off throughout the visit and asked her Christian fellows to not harass the visitors. "If any of you want to kill them, you should kill me first," she said. She went on, "You should keep in mind that if these women do not get home safely, their families will seek vengeance. They may attack us or Christians in other villages. Then we would feel compelled to respond. And so on. You will be guilty of starting a big mess." Through these transborder excursions, Mama Othe wanted to make the point that it is possible to provide safe passages to others and that such visits allow women to realize that both communities live under poor conditions. She believes that trust and solidarity would serve as a strong foundation for intergroup cooperation and women empowerment.

Following these successful attempts to break the barriers, women came up with more extensive and ambitious programs to restore normalcy. GPP came up with a peace statement "Cetusan Hati Perempuan" (Women's Voice), calling for the disarmament of civilians and the return of child soldiers to school. GPP members met with the Governor,

local parliamentarians, the Army Commander, and male community leaders to ask for

support. Then, they visited militia commanders in Christian and Muslim villages to

demand that *agas* and *linggis* are demobilized at ones. This did not go easy, but over

time, GPP managed to take hundreds of *agas* and *linggis* back to school. GPP also

provided scholarships to ensure that these youngsters could stay enrolled in schools,

narrowing the chances that they fall out from school and get re-recruited as fighters.

Between 1999 and 2002, GPP organized numerous joint events for Christian and Muslim

young ex-combatants, including art and trauma healing sessions. In these events, the

youngsters spontaneously exchanged their contact details – address and phone

numbers – and agreed to meet up sometime soon.

GPP then organized several rounds of live-in workshops, where people from

Christian and Muslim villages come to share a living space for a couple of days. The

program was named "Closing the Gap", and was aimed at providing a safe place for

Christians and Muslims to exchange stories and at deconstructing the "enemy image"

they had attached to "the other". The first event was attended by 30 women, the

second by 50 women plus a handful of male community leaders, whereas the next

rounds were attended by men, women, and youths. Rev. Etha recalls that at the first

night, participants could not sleep. Most of them were afraid of getting ambushed and

killed by "the other". Only after some ice breaking sessions, which involved touching,

singing, and story telling, participants began seeing each others as trustworthy friends.

Helena Rijoly (2014), who participated in the first workshop, writes that throughout the

story telling sessions, participants were not allowed to interrupt and to judge each

other. "These are precious moments. The moment we stop victimizing ourselves and pointing fingers at others, we can see that they, too, suffer just like us. It feels liberating, especially because, apparently, we are all victims" (Rijoly, 2014, p. 338).

While GPP's activities were aimed to directly intervene with the conflict, LAPPAN's programs were designed to work with women in a more sustainable manner. GPP's last activity took place in 2002, whereas LAPPAN is still working with women groups up to the time I interviewed its representatives in July 2014. Mama Othe mentioned that LAPPAN partners up with women groups across the Maluku archipelago – its partners in Ambon Island include women from the villages of Seri, Waihaong, Waringin, Kayu Tiga, Ahuru, Lordes Air Besar, Waikoka, Amahusu, and Waiheru. Each group has about 20 members and works around the issues of domestic violence, women and children rights, access to public information, and family welfare. Here, LAPPAN empowers women so that they know what to do should they encounter domestic violence, how to get their and their children's rights fulfilled, and what to make out of their access to public information (*i.e.* how they can benefit from the newly ratified Village Law). In addition, LAPPAN provides non-collateral loan for members of the women group so that they can start small-scale economic activities, such as petty trading. LAPPAN also works with children from the aforementioned villages. Hand in hand with the Faculty of Psychology, Universitas Indonesia, LAPPAN organizes poetry, drawing, dance, story telling, drama, and play activities for children to facilitate trauma healing.

Although most of LAPPAN's activities are village-based, some are specifically designed to further Christian-Muslim interactions. When arranging intergroup meetings, LAPPAN deliberately makes it so that Christian women and children would have to enter Muslim areas and vice versa. Women from the host village would meet with their colleagues at the Christian-Muslim border and escort them to the meeting venue and back. Mama Othe recalls instances where participants were scared to death to trespass the border, were nervous, speechless, or praying for their safety throughout the meeting, or were amazed to see or be in a church or a mosque for the first time. GPP and LAPPAN believe that women distribute messages of peace more effectively than men. Rev. Etha stresses that women are natural caregivers, who instinctively understand the importance of peace and therefore works passionately to convince others of the need to restore normalcy. Meanwhile, Mama Othe argues, "If you convey a [peace] message to men, the message stops with them. They may discuss it in coffee houses, but it stops there and never gets relayed to family members at home. If you convey the message to women, you know for sure that the message will be extended to their husband, children, and neighbors."

All ten of the former NGO staff members whom I had a focus group discussion with supported this view. Sandra Lakembe pointed out that men do not care as much as women about restoring normalcy. "As long as there is food on the table, they are happy," she says. Yusran Laitupa added that men would prefer enjoying each other's company at coffee houses than to engage in community work. He noted, "When women

get money, they spend it on family needs. When men get money, they spend it at coffee

houses, on cigarette, and sometimes for gambling."

Mery Ngamelubun (2003), an activist from the Kei Islands in Maluku, points out

two reasons why women hold a crucial role in peacebuilding and reconciliation. First,

women serve as hubs connecting various familial, neighborhood, societal, and *adat*

networks. Second, women hold a special status under *larwul ngabal*, Kei's *adat* law –

hurting women is a prohibited and punishable act. Ngamelubun elaborates that

throughout the peak of the conflict, many women in Kei Islands dared to trespass spatial

segregation and enter villages which residents are members of the other faith. They did

so to deliver food and medicine (especially to IDPs, to relatives, and those whose access

to food and health service had been cut off), to volunteer (as cooks, paramedics,

caregivers, *etc*.), to collect information (on deaths, injuries, displacements, and

destructions, on humanitarian needs, on rumors, *etc*.), and to set up impromptu

markets (Ngamelubun 2003, p. 145-150). They felt safe to do so because they knew who

in those villages to contact, to work with, and to ask for security guarantee, and they

knew that people will think twice before hurting them.

Youth

One daunting consequence of spatial segregation is that most Ambonese youth

had grown up in Christian-only or Muslim-only neighborhoods and attended Christian-

only or Muslim-only schools. This means that many of them have had, and may continue

to have, very limited chances to interact with their peers from the other faith group.

This is even more likely for those who then pursued higher education in Christian

institutions, such as Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku (UKIM) and Sekolah Tinggi

Agama Kristen Protestan Negeri Ambon, or in Muslim institutions, such as Institut

Agama Islam Negeri Ambon Institut Agama Islam Negeri Ambon (Ambon State Islamic

Institute, the biggest Islamic university in Ambon – IAIN Ambon) and Universitas

Darussalam.

Lenny, a Muslim mother, told me that her child has never seen dogs and pigs,

except in books and television shows. She also shared with me that her niece/nephew

had asked her what a Christian looks like (Interview, 2014). Meanwhile, Lusi, a Christian

mother, encountered serious questions from her preschooler son when he found an old

photo of her wearing a headscarf. Lusi explained to him that during the peak of the

conflict, she needed to wear a headscarf every time she attends interfaith events held in

Muslim quarters – both for security reasons and to show respect toward her Muslim

colleagues. Lusi's son did not immediately accept Lusi's explanation and for a while

faulted his mother for "being a Muslim" (Interview, 2014).

Irfan, a young Muslim man, elaborated on how it was to grow up during the

conflict:

> Even when you grow up in a conflict area like Ambon, you want the same things
> like teenagers everywhere. You want to be able to go to music concerts, race
> with your motorbike, play basketball, find out where the girl you are having a
> crush on lives, pay that girl of your dreams a visit at her house, and so on – you
> know, those simple things mean a lot to young people. The thing was, there was
> no concert in Ambon, there was no appropriate racetrack in Ambon, there was
> only one basketball field in downtown Ambon – which belongs to a school in
> rivalry with yours, and there was no total freedom of movement. So, what do
> you do? You make those things yourself (Interview, July 25, 2014).

Epen and Lenny, owners of Pasir Putih Café, shared the youths' concern on the absence of music events since 1999. In a discussion with them and a group of youths[74], I learned that between 2005 and 2006, Pasir Putih Café collaborated with Christian and Muslim youths to organize several music events, including a charity night for the 2004 Aceh (Indian Oecan) tsunami, a bi-weekly "Saturday Night Event," two rock festivals, and a New Year's concert. All events were packed. The group of friends that were present in the discussion noted that in addition to providing much-longed-for entertainment, the music events allowed for intergroup collaborations (among organizers), intergroup encounters (among organizers and audiences), as well as helped reclaimed the sense of safety in public spaces (some of the SNEs were held in the open air, on one of the busiest streets in Ambon).

Another series of events reinforced those collaborations and encounters: TrotoArt. The name reflects a spin on *trotoar*, which is the Indonesian word for "sidewalks". As the name suggests, the event takes place on the sidewalk, in front of the busiest shopping mall in Ambon. The first of this series took place in August 2012, whereas the latest, TrotoArt 13, took place on January 2015. TrotoArt features music, poetry, drama, and dance performances, some of which are re-recorded for a fund-raising album. Victor Latupeirisa, one of TrotoArt's initiators, explained that the cost of organizing one TrotoArt event is about 2,500,000-3,000,000 Indonesian Rupiah (about

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[74] I had the pleasure of spending an evening at Pasir Putih Café on July 25, 2014 with a group of friends who have been active in promoting intergroup activities for youth as well as with the café owners. They reminisced about the events they organized back in mid-2000 and shared a lot of insights that were very useful for this dissertation project. Within the following weeks and months, I conducted separate interviews and group discussions with these youths.

USD 250-300) and is covered by a group of friends, Christians and Muslims, who put

their personal money together (Interview, February 2015). TrotoArt has always been

opened for public free-of-charge and usually attracts 300-350 audiences. One TrotoArt

event, which collaborated with the Save Aru campaign attracted about 800 audiences.

The young people behind TrotoArt shared that it does not really matter for them to put

aside some money for TrotoArt without getting any revenues from it. For them, what is

important is that young people can hang out and enjoy music and other forms of art

together. The performers in TrotoArt, too, are happy to perform *pro-bono*.

Most of the young people organizing TrotoArt have also been active in Akademi

Berbagi (Academy for Sharing), Ramadhan Berbagi (Sharing during Ramadhan), and Save

Aru campaign. Akademi Berbagi is a series of event where youths serve as resource

persons to other youths on specific topics. The first Akademi Berbagi took place on

March 2010. Its topic was social media management, where youths discussed the ways

to build social movements through Facebook, Twitter, and such. The topics covered in

the subsequent meetings include creative writing, scholarship hunting, and the creative

commons. Ramadhan Berbagi is a yearly event that started in 2010, where Christians

and Muslims youths share a breaking-the-Ramadhan-fast meal with orphans.

Meanwhile, Save Aru is a campaign to stop the government's and the business' plan to

convert 500,000 hectares of forest – home to endangered birds – into sugar cane

plantation. This network of friends also played an important role in organizing other

peace and charity events, including Festival Orang Basudara (Festival of Brothers and

Sisters – commemorating the first spark of the Maluku conflict), Solidarity Night for

Gaza, as well as fundraising for victims of Rokatenda eruption, Gamalama eruption and

Jalan Baru (a neighborhood in downtown Ambon) fire. They are also well linked to other

youth-led activities such as Maluku Baronda and Malukupedia. Maluku Baronda is

aimed at deconstructing people's association of Maluku as a "home of conflicts" by

inviting people to visit the beautiful province. Every 15th of the month, they bring it on

Twitter to promote Maluku tourism. It also organizes "hands-on" activities, such as

historical walks, snorkeling trips, and island clean-ups. Meanwhile, Malukupedia is a

project that invites Malukans to submit entries on the various aspects of Maluku.

Other intergroup interactions among youths take more "fluid" format. A number

of young men from both communities meet regularly to have motorbike races, young

fans of the Italian soccer team, Juventus, meet regularly to watch their team play on TV

and to play *futsal*,[75] hip-hop enthusiasts find each other in Maluku Hip-Hop Community,

and so on. In response to the 2011 tensions, a handful of youths volunteered for Badati,

a series of activities aimed at preventing the escalation of the tensions. Here, groups of

Christian and Muslim youths traversed all around Ambon to visit the checkpoints that

each neighborhood had set up at its border. The youth brought coffee and snacks for

those guarding the village and spent some time with them discussing security and peace

concerns. In addition to building rapport, these visits helped set up links for checking

rumors.

Erik Meinema (2012) identified four strategies that Ambonese youths took to

help build peace: (1) get in touch with each other, (2) engage in "provoking" peace, (3)

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[75] *Futsal* is indoor soccer.

show you care, and (4) use your imagination. "Getting in touch with each other" means

setting up direct personal contacts among Christian and Muslim individuals, which in

turn facilitate intergroup friendship and help reduce tensions and suspicions toward

"the other" (Meinema, 2012, p. 101). Meinema highlights a number of responses he

received from participants of Badati.

> When I was giving the coffee in the Christian area, I felt that my trust for the Christians started to grow. Because they welcomed me as a Muslim. So my fear when I entered the Christian area was starting to vanish (Lela, a young Muslim woman – Interview, Meinema, 2012, p. 100).

> Another rumor is that the Laskar Jihad had already gathered in Kebun Cengkeh. And they [Christian friends of Sammy - dk] called Adhi [a Muslim friend of Sammy - dk] to check it, and it turns out that it is not true, even though it already spread out widely in the Christian community. If the rumors had not been clarified, it would have triggered many preparations by the Christians... because the Laskar Jihad are identified with war. So the Christians must prepare everything to confront the Laskar Jihad. They must start to guard the borders [of Christian neighborhoods - em]. And if people go to the border while preparing to go to battle, it would be very easy to make war (Sammy, a young Christian man – Interview, Meinema, 2012, p. 99).

> My interviews yield similar responses:

> As we [Christian and Muslim volunteers – dk] delivered coffee and snacks from one checkpoint to another, we got to know other [Christian and Muslim – dk] youths. Together we prove that there is really no problem between Christians and Muslims, that all the fear and suspicions are 'just in our head'. The moment we start to share a conversation, a cup of coffee, and some food, all are gone (Elsye, coordinator of Badati – Interview, 2014).

> There are trust issues... You can say people are traumatized by the conflict... A number of times, I ask my [fellow Muslim – dk] friends at IAIN Ambon to attend events organized by Christian friends at UKIM. I always get these questions: 'Will they provide us food that is *halal*?' 'Will it be safe for us, Muslims, to be among Christians in a Christian quarter?'... [But – dk] once direct interactions are established, we [young people – dk] can look back at the conflict and make fun of it and of our reactions toward it (Rifky, a young Muslim man, Interview 2014 and 2015).

"Provoking peace" refers to the method of countering actions whose goal is to provoke intergroup clashes. As most of the provocations come in the form of rumors (*i.e.* that a church or a mosque has been burnt down, that members of the other religious group have been mobilizing, and that fighters from outside Maluku have come to support their coreligionists), Ambonese youths saw that the best way to counter them was to check the rumors and widely spread clarifications for the respective rumors through text messages, social media, and face-to-face interaction. Here, Badati specifically assigned Christian volunteers to cover Christian quarters and Muslim volunteers to cover Muslim quarters.

"Show you care" refers to joint efforts by Christian and Muslim youths to help address social issues faced by Christian and Muslim communities. Meinema (2012, p. 106) points at how Badati volunteers organize English courses for children in IDP camps. The first course was done separately for Christian and Muslim children, but the subsequent courses had children from both faith groups sit together. At the beginning, parents hesitated allowing their children attend mixed-classes taught by a mixed group of volunteers. Eventually, the parents gave their consent.

The various activities mentioned earlier, such as Ramadhan Berbagi and fundraising for Jalan Baru fire, fall into the "show you care" strategy identified by Meinema. They enhance intergroup collaboration and interaction among volunteers, among beneficiaries, and between volunteers and beneficieries, as well as model to the wider community how Christians and Muslims can work amicably.

> Something funny happened at the previous Ramadhan Berbagi. After breaking their fasting, Muslim participants did *Maghrib* prayer together. The Christian

children, who have never seen a Muslim prayer, watched attentively. At the end of the prayer, the Christian children clapped their hands cheerfully, as if they have just enjoyed a concert. They did not know what to do and how to behave in such a situation. They just wanted to express that they are happy to have the chance to witness this (Almascatie, Interview, August 2014).

Lastly, "use your imagination" underlines the need for creative outlets of Christian-Muslim collaboration. Meinema (2012) points at various music, festival, theater, photography events in Ambon. He (2012, p. 107) quotes a respondent who asserts that creativity should be combined with care, that art events should help address social issues.

It is clear that a handful of youth-based activities in Maluku are especially designed to enhance Christian-Muslim encounters. However, my interviews with youths who are involved in the more recent intergroup activities yield that such careful design is no longer necessary. Febryantie Apituley, the president of Pattimura University's English Debating Club (EDC), mentioned that the club's recruitment process does not take one's religious background into consideration, not even for the noble reason of ensuring equal representation of the major religions in Maluku. Formed in 2011, EDC's active members consist of nine Christians and four Muslims (Interview, 2014). Waty Sohilauw, the former president of the Ambon Chapter of Juventus Club Indonesia (henceforth JCI Chapter Ambon) shared that when the club was founded in 2011, the founders never envisioned it as a means to promote reconciliation. They just wanted to be able to do the same things that youths outside Maluku were able to do, like being a member of a football fan club. While she is happy that JCI Ambon's reach in both Christian and Muslim communities has made people consider the club as an agent of

reconciliation, Waty emphasizes that her club never takes religion as a consideration in recruitment and program design. She adds,"If every activity always takes religion into consideration, Ambon will forever remain as a region which [still – dk] needs reconciliation, not one that is already peaceful and safe [and already reconciled – dk]" (Interview, 2014). Victor, who is active in TrotoArt and other youth activities in Ambon, explicated that nowadays, religion is no longer a problem: by merely hanging out with a hobby community, youths can easily make new friends from the other faith group (Interview, 2015). Here, Rifky Hussein, a young Ambon-based movie director, sees that challenge is no longer in opening Christian-Muslim encounters but in ensuring that these encounters become meaningful (Interview, 2015).

Religious Peacebuilding

While almost everyone in Maluku agrees that religion is not the root cause of the Maluku conflict, religious leaders in Maluku believe that something needs to be done in terms of people's "day-to-day theology."[76] This section discusses the works of religious leaders and organizations in (1) conveying peaceful interpretations of the Bible and the Qur'an, (2) stopping acts of violence done in the name of God, as well as (3) initiating and widening interreligious interactions.

Given that religious verses were used to mobilize fighters, religious leaders felt the urge to bolster peaceful verses and peaceful interpretation of verses. Here, Rev. Jacky Manuputty (Interview, January 20, 2014) refers to John 10: 10b, underlining that to follow Jesus is to preserve life – that is, to stop killing and hurting others. Similarly,

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[76] This very term of "day-to-day theology" came up in four of the interviews I held with religious leaders in Maluku.

Rev. I.W.J. Hendriks stresses that to be pro-life is to transform one's theology to fit with

the principles of nonviolence, to convey messages of nonaggression, to refrain from

seeking vengeance, and to support the justice system (Sandyarani, 2014, p. 52).

Meanwhile, Ust. Abidin Wakano (Interview, January 27, 2014) points at the opening

phrase of the Qur'an, which praises God as the most gracious and the most merciful.

This phrase, he argues, should instill an image of a loving and compassionate God, not

one that is vengeful. Then, he refers to Al Maun 1-5 about helping others in need and

being thoughtful in prayers, as well as to Al Maidah 5-8 about postponing judgment and

being just (Sandyarani, 2014, p. 52-53).

To Rev. Etha (Interview, January 30, 2014), it is not enough to convey peaceful

messages from the holy books – one needs to go further as to convey ideas of

inclusivity. She sees that people have a triumphalistic view when it comes to religion,

where people believe that their own religion is the most or only righteous one. Her

strategy to overcome this is to develop themes such as "God is good to everyone" and

"God also loves people of other faiths – so it is our duty to work with them", as well as

to offer peaceful and feminist readings of the bible to her congregations and her

students at the university.

Meanwhile, to Hasbullah Toisutta (Speech, January 20, 2014), the rector of IAIN

Ambon suggests that one should think or her/himself as Malukan first and Muslim [or

Christian – dk] later. In *Carita Orang Basudara*,[77] Hasbullah writes about his efforts to

use Friday sermons in Al Fatah Mosque to convey messages of peace (Toisuta, 2014, p.

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[77] *Carita Orang Basudara* is an edited volume and is discussed in further details in chapter 7.

152-158). He realized that as the Maluku conflict escalated, sermons in Al Fatah became hate-laden, especially after the arrival of LJ fighters. In a Friday in 1999, Hasbullah delivered a sermon on the need for weaving tolerance and pluralism. After the sermon, he was approached by the Al Fatah Imam, the Governor of Maluku, and the Head of Maluku Police, all commending him for his exemplary speech. They find Hasbullah's speech as refreshing amidst Friday sermons that incite hate against Christians. In 2001, Hasbullah was supposed to deliver another speech at the Friday prayers in Al Fatah. However, just before he approached the stage, he was stopped by LJ followers, telling him that someone from LJ would take his place. Not wanting to cause a scene, Hasbullah yielded. It turned out that LJ has been blocking pro-peace persons to deliver speeches in Al Fatah. Later that year, LJ attempted again to block Hasbullah from holding the Friday sermon in Al Fatah. This time, Hasbullah and the Al Fatah Imam came prepared and refused to grant LJ its wish.

In addition to spreading messages of peace and inclusivity, religious leaders take direct actions in stopping violence. Rev. Joop Noya for instance, refused to hand over donation money to his superior, upon knowing that it would be used to purchase ammunitions, while Rev. Non Watimory went to the frontline to stop the masses from burning the parliament office (Lakembe, Interview, January 21, 2014).

Religious leaders also hold an important role in initiating and widening Christian-Muslim interactions, including through their involvements in events and movements outside their church or mosque. As illustrated earlier, Rev. Etha and Sister Brigitta are

amongst the founders of GPP, while Rev. Jacky and Ust. Abidin play a central role in the Peace Provocateur movement.

Through Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku (Maluku Interfaith Institution – henceforth LAIM), religious leaders develop programs to convey peaceful religious teachings, stop violence, and further interfaith relations. Established in 2001, it has the full support of the Christian, Muslim, and Catholic formal bodies in Maluku, respectively Gereja Protestan Maluku (Maluku Protestant Church – henceforth GPM), Majelis Ulama Indonesia cabang Maluku (the Maluku branch of the Indonesian Council of Ulama – henceforth MUI Maluku), and Diocese of Amboina. LAIM sees itself not as a melting pot, but rather as a salad bowl – where each religion does not lose its essence, where each stands uniquely and is respected equally (Sandyarani, 2014, p. 50). In its early years, it provided a safe place for peace-minded religious leaders to work together in an otherwise hostile situation for them to even meet up, where being with "the other" can be easily interpreted by members of their congregation as an act of betrayal.

Among LAIM's programs were peace sermons and transborder live-in experiences. The peace sermon program started in 2003 and went on for 20 series, each involving around 30 religious leaders and youths from all sides (Manuputty, Interview, July 25, 2014). Here, participants discuss issues such as the environment, domestic violence, education, and alcoholism, and accordingly draft sermons that would be conveyed in their respective place of worship. The discussion encouraged exchanges of ideas among people of different faiths, provided chances to learn about other religions' perspective, provide a venue for writing sermons on social, rather than religious, issues,

as well as fostered positive relationship among people who otherwise would not have known each other due to the spatial segregation.

Meanwhile, the live-in program started in 2006 and was repeated three times (Manuputty, Interview, July 25, 2014). In the first round, 48 student-priests were sent to live with Muslim or Catholic families in Muslim villages of Waihaong, Ahuru, Air Kuning, Waiheru, Leihitu, and others. At first, participants were scared of the image of "sleeping with the enemy" (Sandyarani, 2014, p. 59), but then they wished that the live-in program could be extended for a couple of more days. The second round of the program involved youth from various Malukan islands, where, for example, Christian youths from Seram Island went to live with Muslim families in Ambon Island while Muslim youths from Ambon Island went to live with Christian families in Seram (Sandyarani, 2014, p. 59). The third round involved 40 teachers and was documented through the movie Provokator Damai (discussed in Chapter 9).

At this point, it is crucial to note that being a religious leader and working for peace does not go together naturally – religious leaders need to make a conscious choice to work for peace. Throughout the conflict, especially on its early phase, a handful of religious leaders – both from within and outside Maluku – promoted hatred, encouraged vengeance, as well as offered prayers and blessings to fighters. While many have been religious peacebuilders since the onset of the conflict, some only switched to this role later.

Towards Interdependence

A number of things stand out from interdependence-based activities in the functional-quotidian site. First, the early encounters in this site seem to be more relaxed than that of in the ceremonial site. This may have to do with the fact that people set up the encounters themselves, in a voluntary manner, involving those whom they already have rapport with prior to the conflict. This is in contrast to that of at the ceremonial site where representatives of Christians and Muslims were brought together by a third party to attend meetings that were organized by the the respective third party. This meant that participants of activities at the ceremonial site have almost no control on whom they will be interacting with and what the meeting agenda would be.

Secondly, it seems that activities at the functional-quotidian site come more naturally to people compared to that of in other sites. Perhaps, this has to do with the fact that people are "simply" performing their "usual" activities as traders, health workers, journalists, mothers, artists, and so on – activities that they have been familiar with and have enjoyed engaging in since before the conflict. This stands in contrast to that of in the ceremonial site, where people perform their activities as (representatives of) Christians and Muslims – a state of mind that they were rather unfamiliar with and find as a burden.

Thirdly, their performances as healthworkers, journalists, mothers, artists, and so on, allow people to detach themselves – even if just a little – from their identities as Christians and Muslims. This enables them to easily embark upon an identity change, *i.e.* from victim-perpetrator relations to trader-costumer, doctor-patient, reporter-

interviewee, parent-to-parent, colleague-to-colleague relations, as well as from

Christian-Muslim relations to Malukan-Malukan relations.

Fourth, most of the early Christian-Muslim encounters above were initiated by

people who have been friends, neighbors, or colleagues since before 1999; people who

share memories of intergroup peace. While the outbreak of the Maluku conflict seems

to refute theories that bridging civic engagements help prevent and moderate ethnic

conflict (Varshney, 2002), it can be argued that such civic engagements play an

important role in restoring normalcy and fostering reconciliation. If this is true, the

question is, what is the fate of Maluku's next generation, who, due to spatial

segregation, lack the bridging civic engagements their predecessors have?

Fifth, initiatives in this site show how resourceful people are in utilizing their

occupations, social roles, and/or hobby to enhance Christian-Muslim encounters and

collaborations. For example, aware of the *provokator* narratives, youths, religious

leaders, journalists, and bloggers block negative provocations (rumors, excessive

coverage of violence, *etc*.) and "provoke peace".

Sixth, some respondents shared that taking part in activities that fall into the

functional-quotidian site helps them make peace with themselves. While their

complicity in communal violence mostly took place at the neighborhood site, they

sometimes find it difficult or inadequate to express remorse and/or contribute to repair

at the neighborhood site. In some cases, the respondents do not or no longer live in the

same village as the one(s) he/she aggrieved. In other cases, the aggrieved persons have

died or went away without a trace. Given the difficulties of expressing remorse directly

to the aggrieved persons in their respective neighborhoods, respondents chose to express them through intergroup activities at the functional-quotidian site.

Seventh, activities in the functional-quotidian site show that, although peace can be engineered (provoked!), in many cases, peace comes as an unintended consequence of something else, *i.e.* efforts to restore normalcy.

Eight, while it is clear that individuals are skillful in utilizing their professions and hobbies to enhance Christian-Muslim relations, there is a growing question on whether such "peace engineering" is still necessary nowadays. There is a concern among young people that as long as Malukans still find it necessary to tiptoe around the issue of religion, to "bridge" Christians and Muslims, and to ensure equal representation among them, Maluku will remain to be a "postconflict region", not a "peaceful region".

Chapter 9 – Narrative Site

More than a decade after the Maluku conflict, a number of books and movies offer interpretations of the conflict and reconciliation processes in Maluku. Based on thorough research and/or taking a documentary-method, the books and movies not only reflect the writers' and directors' personal points of view. They also capture the experience and insights shared by many Malukans.

This chapter explores how ideas and practices of reconciliation, especially those based on interdependence, are woven into publications and films. After briefly introducing the main plot and the making process of three books and four movies, this chapter discusses their recurring themes, highlighting the aspects that relates to interdependence-based reconciliation.

Carita Orang Basudara (2014)

The title of this long (404 pages) publication says a lot. At the surface level, the word *carita* refers to both the noun and verb of story and storytelling, while phrase *orang basudara* means people who are bond as siblings. At a deeper level, as noted by the editors of *Carita Orang Basudara* (*COB*), *carita* serves as a medium for imparting testimonials and advices, while *orang basudara* evokes the spirit of love, solidarity, and interdependence (Manuputty, *et.al.*, 2014, p. v). *COB* compiles personal reflections on Christian-Muslim relations before and during the conflict. It consists of 26 stories written by 25 Malukans – journalists, religious leaders, artists, activists, academicians, and politicians.

The stories in *COB* invite readers to the contributors' world, offering insights to what they felt, thought, and did – or to be more exact, what they chose to feel, think, and do. On the one hand, the stories reveal something private and personal. On the other hand, they appeal to something familiar to Malukans, that is, collective memories and experiences surrounding the conflict.

The making of *COB* took nearly seven years. It started in 2007 when the editors asked a number of people to contribute a chapter for the project. I learned from the interviews and/or chats I had with 12 of the 25 *COB* contributors that the process of writing down their accounts of Christian-Muslim relations before and during the conflict was not easy. A number of contributors mention that it was emotionally draining, which at times, forced them to take several extended pauses from writing. Some contributors highlight the framing and self-censorship process of deciding what to, what to not, and how to share. Meanwhile, few contributors state that they had reservations about participating in *COB*, noting that it should instead compile the accounts of "ordinary" people in the street, marketplace, *etc.*, not privileged Malukan educated middle-class.

> It took me three months to finish my piece. Every time I started to write, I also started to cry [and had to stop writing – dk]. Every time Embong [one of *COB*'s editor – dk] asked for my piece, I pulled myself together and started writing again – and had to stop again. It was tough to dig into memories that have been buried deep down. But when it was done, I felt so relieved (Dino Umahuk, Interview, January 24, 2015).

> The writing process makes me think and reflect a lot. It is not easy to decide on which angle to take. There are issues that are still 'raw' enough to discuss… I think carefully about the words I use, trying to see it from the readers' point of view… [The whole process – dk] took about 4-5 months… It was difficult emotionally (Helena Rijoly-Matakupan, Interview, January 24, 2015).

My personal healing strategy is to write… so when I wrote for that book, I quite enjoyed the process. Sadness and thankfulness were the two dominant things I felt [while writing for *COB* – dk]. I was sad because I got reminded of my parents' sacrifice throughout those difficult times, I was at the same time thankful as I realized that all [my parents' sacrifice – dk] was not for nothing… I did start feeling worried at the end of my writing process. I started to realize that many people will read my piece. This means that people I know and strangers alike would know about the story of my life. But that is exactly the point, so that others can learn from our experience… Honestly, I feel that I am a stronger person now as I managed to overcome those situations. Writing about them helps me see myself and the world more clearly (Wessly Johannes, Interview, January 24, 2015)

There are stories that I leave out. Some of them are just too sensitive that it could trigger new [intergroup – dk] resentments. Some of them involve individuals or organizations – exposing them could be dangerous. Some of them are just too gory. There are indeed many events that should remain unknown to the public (Interview, January 24, 2015).

I think it is more important to get the stories of ordinary people, like women who continued trading in the markets, men who continued their transportation services, men who continued working in the harbors, *etc*. People like me did not really do anything (Sandra Lakembe, Personal communication, 2014).

COB was finally launched on January 19, 2014 during *Festival Orang Basudara*, which commemorates 15 years of the first spark of the communal violence. It was jointly published by LAIM and Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi Yayasan Paramadina (The Center for Religion and Democracy Studies affiliated to the Paramadina Foundation – PUSAD Paramadina). One thousand copies of *COB* were printed and distributed for free.[78] At the moment, the Australian National University is in the process of publishing the English edition of *COB*.

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[78] The printing process was funded by The Asia Foundation. 500 books were distributed by LAIM and another 500 by PUSAD (Rafsadi, Interview, January 24, 2015).

Cahaya Dari Timur: Beta Maluku (2014)

The movie *Cahaya Dari Timur: Beta Maluku* (Light from the East: I am Maluku –

henceforth *Beta Maluku*) is inspired by the life of Sani Tawainella, a former football

(soccer) player from Maluku. It was released on June 19, 2014 and won the Best Picture

in the Indonesian Film Festival later that year.

The movie tells the story of Sani, a Muslim motorcycle-taxi driver, who uses

football as a medium for peace. Throughout the heat of the conflict, he provided

football training for boys in his exclusively Muslim village of Tulehu, hoping that it would

keep the boys from being drawn into communal clashes with the neighboring Christian

village. As the conflict deescalated, Sani, who was a semi-pro football player himself,

served as a co-trainer for a newly-formed-high-school-football-team in the

predominantly Christian village of Passo, which was preparing for a provincial-level

tournament. His co-coach, Yosef, a Christian teacher, spotted the team's need for two

extra players and welcomed two Muslim boys from Tulehu to join the Passo team.

Eventually, both the Tulehu and Passo teams made it to the final. Sani was then asked to

prepare a team to represent Maluku in a national-level football tournament for under-

15. He accepted the job, took Yosef as a co-coach, recruited most of the Muslim boys

from the Tulehu team and two Christian boys from the Passo team, and trained the

team. As some boys got caught up with memories of interreligious hatred and with

intragroup solidarity, the team-building process became shaky – it cost the team terrible

defeats at the initial group-stage matches. At one point, Sani stresses to the team that

the word Maluku does not only refer to a place but also to a genealogy, to where they

all came from and where they all head to. In an iconic scene, he affirms, "Because I am

Maluku. I am not Tulehu. I am not Passo. I am not Islam, nor am I Christian." Then, he

asked the boys one by one, "Who are you?" Each of them answered, "Beta Maluku."

Eventually, this interfaith camaraderie allowed Maluku to win the tournament.

Irfan Ramly, an Ambonese who wrote *Beta Maluku*'s scenario, told me that the

movie displays various collective memories that Malukans have about the conflict.

Although the movie project was initially built around Sani Tawainella's life story, Irfan

redesigned the characters and dialogues in a way that incorporates other people's views

about the conflict and about peace. "I always tell people that the movie represents

everyone in Maluku. It underlines what everyone thinks, that is, to live peacefully and to

live better" (Ramly, Interview, January 22, 2015).

Jalan Lain ke Tulehu (2014)

Like *Beta Maluku*, this novel, whose title translates into "Another Way to

Tulehu", is also inspired by the life of Sani Tawainella, takes the setting of Tulehu, and

partly engages with football. The main difference is that *Beta Maluku* takes an insider

(Malukan) perspective, while *Jalan Lain ke Tulehu* takes an outsider (Javanese)

perspective. Football is central to the former and is a less dominating theme in the later.

The book follows the journey of Gentur, a Muslim Javanese reporter for a

Japanese media outlet, to Ambon mid-2000. It did not take Gentur too long to learn

how heavily segregated the island and services were, as well as how contentious the

issue of identity was. On several occasions, he almost got killed for having the "wrong"

religion, *i.e.* when he took the Christian route to Ambon on board a Christian ship, when

he passed a Christian check-point, and when his speedboat got ambushed by Christian

fighters. Every time, a Christian saved him. Along the way, he picked up a number of

survival tactics, which included staying away from Christian routes and territories,

leaving his Indonesian ID card (which states one's religion) at home, and identifying as a

Buddhist (he has a lotus tattoo, which makes his disguise as a Buddhist credible).

At first, Gentur stayed in downtown Ambon with Frans, his Christian friend. As the

conflict escalated, Frans escorted Gentur to Tulehu and asked him to stay put in that

Muslim village. Gentur became good friends with his host, Said, a former football player

who became a motorcycle-taxi driver and organizes football training for boys. He quickly

learned that Tulehu has a strong football culture: many of its middle-aged and senior

residents were member of Indonesia's national football team, regular football training

could be used for distracting young men from wanting to take part in communal clashes,

and some of its residents dared to travel to the neighboring Christian village just to be

able to watch the live television broadcast of Euro Cup matches at Frans' house, where

many of Frans' fellow Christian neighbors come to watch the match. Gentur's

exploration of Ambon, of Christian-Muslim relations, and of the football culture

intertwines with his memories of Eva Maria, his girlfriend, who, because of her identity

as a Christian female with Chinese-descend, got raped and killed during the anti-Chinese

riots in Jakarta. One particular memory that haunted Gentur was his advice to Eva Maria

to identify as a Muslim when faced with dead-or-alive situations – an advice that

eventually did not work. Towards the end of the book, Gentur, who was caught by

members of a Christian militia, honestly stated that he is a Muslim. Although he was

ready to die – that is, ready to be reunited with Eva Maria – Gentur got saved by one of the Christian militia leaders.

Zen RS, the writer, underlines that politics of memory play an important role in peace and conflict in Maluku (Interview, January 29, 2015). Throughout the novel, he weaves in the notion that good and bad memories regarding "the other" have been edited, dramatized, framed, or re-written to serve peace or conflict purposes. Accordingly, he suggests that peacebuilding efforts in Maluku should include "memory works", that is, to turn the omnipresent narratives of people being tired of fighting and of people grieving over their loses into motivations for preventing future violence.

Provokator Damai (2013)

This 22 minutes documentary film won the Eagle Awards, a prestigious nation-wide competition for documentaries. It follows Heny Liklikwati, a Christian woman, and Muhammad Yusuf L., a Muslim man, who took part in LAIM's live-in program (see Chapter 8). With other participants, Heny and Yusuf attended a preparatory meeting co-facilitated by Rev. Jacky and Ust. Abidin. There, they shared their fears about living with a family from the other faith group in a village predominantly inhabited by "the other". Some participants mentioned that they were afraid they would be killed, held hostage, rejected, or offered food that violate their religious dietary restrictions by their host community, or would not be able to comfortably observe their daily prayers. Then, Ust. Abidin escorted Heny to a Muslim household in the Muslim neighborhood of Wakasihu, while Rev. Jacky escorted Yusuf to a Christian household in the Christian neighborhood of Hatu. Both Heny and Yusuf had never set foot on, respectively, Wakasihu and Hatu.

To Heny's and Yusuf's own surprise, the fear they had had about "living with the other"
immediately disappeared the moment they were introduced to their host. Just like any
regular introduction between Malukans, the guest and host exchanged information
about where they come from and which family name they bear as well as explored
possible *pela* and *gandong* relations. The documentary shows how Heny and Yusuf
comfortably shared meals with their host, observed their prayers, strolled down the
neighborhood, as well as participated in their host's daily activities (harvesting
vegetables from the field, catching fish in the sea, and cooking). It also pictures Heny
confessing to her hosts about the fear she had, Yusuf singing together with his hosts, the
hosts feeling happy that they got the chance to relive the typical Malukan Christian-
Muslim *basudara* practice, as well as parties getting drawn into sentimental goodbyes,
promising that they will remain in contact. All these tie back to the statements made by
Rev. Jacky and Ust. Abidin at the beginning of the film on how the conflict had
implanted an enemy image toward people belonging to the other faith group,
estranging Christians and Muslims from each other. The film ends with images of Heny
conveying message of interreligious tolerance in front of her students and Yusuf
introducing a group of Christians performing Islamic song in front of Muslim audiences.

Rifky Husain, the director of *Provokator Damai*, explained to me that spatial
segregation in Ambon had turned genuine encounters between Christians and Muslims
into luxury (Interview, January 20, 2014). He mentioned that facilitating encounters is
one thing, and deciding what to make out of the encounters is another. He sees that
Malukans are currently trying to figure out what to make out of these encounters and

points at the Christians and Muslims who utilize such encounters to perform their hobby – photography, music, and such.

Merah Saga (2014)

This nine minutes film is also made by Rifky. Like *Provokator Damai*, *Merah Saga* (meaning: togetherness) sheds light at efforts to break Christian-Muslim segregation. It won the 2014 Ahmad Wahib Award, a completion featuring essays, blogs, and movies on tolerance.

The film opens with Ayu's memories of having to witness communal violence when she was still a kindergartener. It follows Ayu, a Catholic girl, hanging out with other members of the *Merah Saga* theater club, which she considers as her new family. Despite coming from different religious backgrounds, this group of friends facilitates each other in observing religious prayers. In one scene, Ayu reminds her Muslim male friend to not miss the Friday prayer. Ayu explains that her friends refrain from holding *Merah Saga* meetings on Sundays so that she could attend church services. She also points out that she and her Christian friends fast with their Muslim friends during Ramadan. Ayu believes that Christians should not only mingle with Christians and that Muslims should not only mingle with Muslims. She stresses that mutual respect is the key to interreligious friendship. *Merah Saga* closes with shots from the 2014's commemoration of the International Day of Peace (September 21) in Ambon's main square. Youths and artists from both faiths enjoyed each other's company, sang songs together and conveyed messages of peace.

Rifky explains that he is in the process of developing *Merah Saga* into a "full movie", with 3 additional characters. All characters were children who grew up during the conflict, some of them got directly involved in the clashes. As the format will be *cinema verite*, he will not have much control on what the characters will do and in which direction the story will go. Nevertheless, he expresses his wish to dig into aspects of trauma as well as political and economic aspects of the conflict.

Hiti Hiti Hala Hala (2012)

This ten minutes documentary highlights the efforts of several young people in Ambon to promote Christian-Muslim encounters while addressing other social issues. There, Muhammad Burhanudin Borut from Ambon Bergerak (Ambon on the move) argues for the need to enhance opportunities for various youth communities in Ambon to work together. Then, Irfandi discloses how his community, Bengkel Seni Embun (Dew art workshop), would use traditional dances, songs, and poems to illustrate the communal conflict and reconciliation processes in Maluku. Franz Nendissa explains that rappers under Molukka Hiphop Community are passionate about incorporating aspects of Malukan culture into their work. Jandri shares how Ambon Band Community serves as a hub to many bands and how it continues to organize musical events despite limited resource. Almascatie elaborates that Arumbai, the blogger community he heads, has been trying to load the internet up with positive images of Maluku. He finds this important, given that Google tends to suggest phrases like "*kerusuhan Ambon*" (Ambon riots) and "*tragedi Ambon*" (Ambon tragedies) when the word "Ambon" is typed into its search bar. Indam Dewi's Maluku Baronda community calls for people to explore the

beauty of Maluku. In addition to promoting Maluku's tourism, it organizes beach clean-up events. Menamoria Radio invites its listeners to learn more about Maluku. Lastly, Pierre Ajawaila introduces Malukupedia, a collective oral history project, where people share and discuss Maluku's history – both the ancient and the more recent. While collecting historical records is important, Malukupedia emphasizes on facilitating intergenerational and interreligious interactions. At the end of the film, the director, Victor Latupeirissa shows a list of communities that also contributes to widening space for Christian-Muslim encounters, including Gunung Mimpi, Akber Ambon, Maluku Photo Club, Maluku Satu Media, Pardidoe, Maluku Manise, Molucca B-Boying Freestyle, Ambon Break Dance Crew.

Victor recalls that up to 2010, it was still difficult for Christian and Muslim youths to get together (Interview, January 31, 2014). He points out that the main challenges for intergroup encounters among youths were geographical segregation and lack of venues that cater to youth's needs, such as music studios. He admits that other factors such as anger, fear, and suspicion toward "the other" may also deter youths from reaching out to their peers from the other faith group. He shares that back in 2007 he started to visit Studio 99, a music studio located in a Muslim village. His Christian friends warned him that something bad may happen, but he kept going to the studio, as he really wanted to hang out with peers who share the same interest in music. He said that although it was awkward at the beginning, soon enough he made lots of Muslim friends. Victor finds it it important to document early initiatives to facilitate intergroup encounters, so that the

younger generations do not take for granted the ease of meeting and collaborating with their peers from the other faith group they enjoy nowadays.

Kei: Kutemukan Cinta di Tengah Perang (2013)

While the novels and films discussed so far are centered on Ambon, this novel takes Kei, a group of islands located at the southeastern part of the Maluku province, as its main setting. Erni Aladjai (2013, p. vii), the writer, notes that Kei was among the last region that got hit by the communal violence and was among the first to embark upon reconciliation, thanks to its population's adherence to *adat* procedures.

Kei: Kutemukan Cinta di Tengah Perang (henceforth *Kei*) tells the love story between Namira and Sala, a Muslim girl and a Christian boy, whose fate intertwined as they seek for refuge amidst communal clashes in Kei. In various instances, they witness random acts of kindness between Christians, Catholics, and Muslims. Throughout the book, readers learn about Kei's *adat*, which stand above religious and other divides. For the people of Kei, there are no Christians, no Catholics, and no Muslims – just Keians. Throughout generations, there have been so many interreligious marriages among Keians. This makes it difficult for Keians to hate "people of the other faith", as these people are related to them by blood or by marriage. The book also highlights how women hold a special status in the Keian society, which enables them to lead humanitarian, peacemaking, and reconciliation activities. It shows how women were allowed to trespass segregation lines to deliver food, clothes, and medicine to IDPs as well as to collect information on missing people. Furthermore, the novel underlines how women stood at the front line and utilize *adat* mechanisms to stop attacks.

I was surprised to learn from Erni that she has never set foot to Maluku. She wrote the entire novel based on her library research as well as discussions and interviews she had with those who lived and/or worked in Maluku, especially in Kei Island. A number of Ambonese youths thought that the novel was convincing and was nicely written – an assessment I share.

Towards Interdependence

While their main plot and angle differ, the publications and films discussed in this section share some themes: (1) agencies of peace, (2) encounters and sites of interdependence, (3) communal peace is the norm, and (4) role of religion.

Arguably, the most important theme in such publications and films is peace, its agents, and methods of building it. Each underlines that it *is* possible to choose peace over violence. *COB* contributors point at people refusing to subscribe to the "us *versus* them" narrative, people offering protection to those from the other religion (Fofid, 2014, p. 22; Lakembe, 2014, p. 291; Rijoly, 2014, p. 350; Salampessy, 2014, p. 49; Sangaji, 2014, p. 263), and people urging family members not to avenge one's death (Lakembe, 2014, p. 288). Similarly, the protagonists in *Beta Maluku*, *Jalan Lain ke Tulehu*, and *Kei* were depicted as those who refuse to take on an all-Christian *versus* all-Muslim narrative and those who deliberately offer protection to those from "the other" group. All the above are done within a context where it was dangerous to take those actions – one can be easily labeled as a traitor. Meanwhile, the protagonists in *Provokator Damai*, *Merah Saga*, and *Hiti Hiti Hala Hala* made conscious decisions to

break through segregation lines despite the comfort of just mingling with those from one's own faith group.

Furthermore, the publications and films suggest that individuals can contribute to fostering Christian-Muslim encounters, especially in the functional-quotidian site of interdependence. As can be seen above, *Hiti Hiti Hala Hala*, *Merah Saga*, *Beta Maluku*, and *Jalan Lain ke Tulehu* exemplify how theater, music, blogging, tourism, radio broadcasting, oral history, and football opens up space for interfaith encounters. Here, *COB* contributors point at relief programs (Silitonga, 2014, p. 308), peace journalism (Fofid, 2014, p. 33-34; Pesiwarissa, 2014, p. 84; Pinontoan, 2014, p. 69-71; Salampessy, 2014, p. 52-53; Tunny, 2014, p. 117; Umahuk, 2014, p. 101-102), photography (Syaranamual, 2014, p. 283), and joint sermon writing among priests and *ustadz*s (Manuputty, 2014c, p. 149). *Kei* and *Provokator Damai* touch upon encounters on the neighborhood site. *Kei* shows how displaced Christians and Muslims shared shelters and supported each other, as well as shows how *adat* prevented a clash between two neighboring villages. Meanwhile, *Provokator Damai* displays how members of "the other group" could enter and comfortably live-in one's village.

The publications and films discussed in this chapter suggest that agencies of peace and efforts to enhance intergroup encounters are rooted in a belief that intergroup peace is the norm of the centuries-long Christian-Muslim relations in Maluku – and that communal violence is an exception. They repeatedly invoke the terms *basudara*, *pela*, *gandong*, *larwul ngabal* as well as various forms of intergroup cooperation. Contributors to *COB* share memories of pre-1999 Christian-Muslim

harmony, of a church and a mosque built next to one another (Fofid, 2014, p. 15), of

Christian and Muslim neighbors looking after each other (Salampessy, 2014, p. 39-40),

of *pela* and *gandong* relations and rituals (Manuputty, 2014c, p. 149; Maspaitella, 2014,

p. 182; Rijoly, 2014, p. 331-332; Salampessy, 2014, p. 56-57; Tawainela, 2014, p. 227;

Wakano, 2014, p. 208), of Christians and Muslims jointly celebrating Idul Fitri, Idul Adha,

Christmas, and Easter (Lakembe, 2014, p. 288; Salampessy, 2014, p. 40-41; Soisa, 2014,

p. 352), as well as of family gatherings being attended by Christian and Muslim relatives

(Pesiwarissa, 2014, p. 79-80; Tawainela, 2014, p. 227-228). Subjects in *Provokator Damai*

reminisce about the special relations their family and village have with families and

villages affiliated to the other faith group. In *Kei*, the writer repeatedly points at the

centuries-long *sasi* ritual that binds Christian and Muslims as well as at the protagonists'

belief that such *adat* procedure would soon end the intergroup violence and reunite

Keians. In *Beta Maluku*, there are conversations about the near future, when things will

be back to normal and when reconciliation is reached. *Merah Saga* states that Malukans

have lived in harmony since before Abrahamic religions entered the region. While the

1999 violence brought about *krisis perjumpaan* (encounter crisis), the time has come for

Christians and Muslims to end the intergroup segregation. Similarly, *Hiti Hiti Hala Hala*

underlines that Ambon youths need to start opening up space for Christian-Muslim

encounters.

The publications and films hint at the roles that religions should play. In *Beta*

Maluku, a priest handed to Sani some money that he collected from his congregation to

help pay for the Maluku football team's trip to Jakarta. Also, *Beta Maluku* had scenes

where churches and mosques utilize their far-reaching loudspeaker to provide the

community some live report on the final match of the football tournament. In *Kei*, a

church and a private home of a priest were turned into shelters for displaced Christians

and Muslims, while a mosque conveys messages of peace through its far-reaching

loudspeaker. *Provokator Damai* highlights how religious leaders team up to organize

live-in programs. Meanwhile, religious leaders who contributed to *COB* express that

religion should serve as a moral ground for peace.

It is interesting that none of the publications and films emphasizes the need to

find out what really happened – who started the conflict, how it escalated, and such. As

indicated above, contributors to *COB* thought that some stories or details are best left

unknown to the public, as they may serve as new grounds for intergroup resentment.

Meanwhile, in *Beta Maluku*, there was a scene where Sani doubt that even time can tell

who did what to whom.

> There is already too much pain in our lives – because of war, because of anger,
> because of an appetite [for fighting – dk], because of a desire to prevail over 'the
> other'. I provided you with football training because I wanted you all to have
> good memories [of your childhood – dk], not just memories of bombs, shootings,
> tears, and death. I believe that time will not allow us to figure who was wrong
> and who was right [in the conflict – dk]. I just believe that we have to have a
> better life. (line from *Cahaya Dari Timur: Beta Maluku* movie)

When I asked Irfan about what he means by "a better life," he answered that everyone

in Maluku whose life had been touched by the conflict has to openly admit what have

happened in the past, without blaming "the other" and justifying his/herself. By "openly

admit," he does not mean in a formal procedure such as truth commissions, but through

gestures and jokes that are weaved into day-to-day conversations (Interview, January

27, 2015). Similarly, Rifky mentioned that the idea of identifying who was wrong and who was right is obsolete. He maintained that what needs to be understood by everyone is that everyone is a victim (Interview, January 26, 2015). Likewise, Victor suggested that there are other themes surrounding the Maluku conflict that are more interesting to "open" to the public through documentaries. These include the price spike of food staples during the conflict, the difficulties of getting food and kerosene (a significant number of households in Indonesia uses kerosene stoves) throughout the conflict, and the fact that prior to the conflict no Christians in Ambon worked as pedicab and motorbike-taxis drivers (Interview, January 31, 2015).

Taking a slightly different stance, Erni suggests that it may be useful to share official investigative reports of the violent incidents in Kei with Keians. She believes that there are really no problems between Christians and Muslims in Kei, who have managed to live side-by-side for centuries. The narrative locating the origin of problems elsewhere and assigning blame to outside agents (*i.e. provokator*, state apparatus) needs to become a part of the Keian culture, in order to neutralize any remaining thoughts among them that what took place in 1999 was a religious war (instead of a social political economical conflict that uses religion as a mobilization tool). Nevertheless, in *Kei*, Erni spoke more of the need to return to the Keian wisdom of *ken sa faak*, which emphasizes that "I was wrong, you were also wrong; I was right, you were also right" rather than the need to publically share existing investigative reports on the past violence (Interview, January 22, 2015).

Meanwhile, Zen believes that no comprehensive peace can take place without justice. However, he admits that, sadly, any attempts for establishing a truth commission and tribunals on the Maluku conflict are likely to prompt some actors to spoil the peace. Therefore, he sees it more realistic to pursue truth and justice through *adat* mechanisms (Interview, February 3, 2015).

At this point, it is safe to conclude that what is salient at the narrative site is an idea of reconciliation that is based on interdependence, not one that is driven by truth and/or justice. All Malukan writers and filmmakers featured in this chapter are quite adamant that "complete truth" and "comprehensive justice" are not the ways to go forward in Maluku. Only the two non-Malukan writers, Erni and Zen, advocated for instituting some official truth and justice procedures.

Chapter 10 – Conclusion

This dissertation project came out of my admiration towards the efforts taken by Christians and Muslims in postconflict Maluku to rebuild intergroup relations and to move on from the violent past. It is based on an assumption that the interdependence path to reconciliation that Malukans take works. The question is why and how. Believing that reconciliation has different meanings to different people, and that a good study of reconciliation needs to take these contextualized meanings seriously, it deals with the above questions through an interpretive, emic, approach.

I argue that the conditions allowing Malukans to take the interdependence path to reconciliation are: (1) the adoption of *provokator* narratives, (2) the idea that everyone is complicit, and (3) vivid memories of peace, of being *basudara*. I also argue that the following mechanisms are involved: (1) interdependence allow individuals to emphasize on their social roles rather than on their religious identity, (2) interdependence provide space for individuals to display their apologies and forgiveness symbolically, and (3) interdependence creates focal points for peace.

After reviewing the findings presented in the earlier chapters, I share some insights from my 2014 visit to Ambon. Looking at the communal tensions in Maluku in 2004, 2011, and 2014, I offer a reading on the effects of the Maluku conflict and interdependence-based reconciliation activities. Lastly, I offer ideas for future research and practices on reconciliation.

Review of Findings

Also referred to as *peace*, *joint reconstruction*, and *coexistence*, interdependence is a path to reconciliation that capitalizes on the awareness among the conflict parties that their lives are intertwined. Here, parties are motivated by pragmatic needs to restore normalcy and are aware that the only way to do so is to do it together. They realize that the cost of violence and of going separate ways is too high. As the case of Maluku attests, interdependence works. In Chapter 1, I laid out some conceptual building blocks of my approach, focusing on the what, who, where, and when of interdependence.

Unfortunately, the literature has not taken the method of interdependence seriously. There are three main conclusions of my literature review provided in Chapter 2. First, reconciliation is about relationships and about moving on from the violent past. Second, the literature champions truth and justice seeking paths of reconciliation. Third, there is little effort in studying reconciliation from within the subjects' world – that is, through an emic approach.[79] While the study and practice of reconciliation have gained importance in the last couple of decades, people have not paid enough attention to such postconflict sites as Maluku, where the celebrated toolkits of truth commission and trials are absent. Without a commitment to understand the processes in Maluku from within the subjects' viewpoint, it is easy to relegate them as cases where reconciliation does not take place. Based on the conceptual building blocks offered in Chapter 1 and the literature review in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I presented my

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[79] Brauechler (2009) and Hinton (2010) are notable exceptions.

hypotheses as well as detailed the combinations of methods I used to test my hypotheses and collect data. I clarified the scope of applicability of my findings as well.

In Chapter 4, after providing an introduction to the Maluku conflict, I discussed the three conditions that underpin interdependence. The first is the adoption of *provokator* narratives, which puts the ultimate blame for the conflict on an elusive third party mastermind. By locating the ultimate blame to outsiders, Christians and Muslims free themselves from endless queries about which among them was (the more) guilty. By construing the conflict as externally orchestrated, the members of the two communities free themselves from being held responsible for the acts of violence they had indeed committed throughout the conflict. And, by portraying the guilty actor as elusive, they free themselves from having to present substantiated evidence incriminating a specific actor, as well as from having to answer to that certain actor's objection of being accused. Without such agreement on where the ultimate culpability lies, it is rather impossible that Christians and Muslims in Maluku would embark upon reconciliation. Here, proponents of truth and justice approaches are likely to assume that Malukans resorted to such narratives because they were not able to precisely pinpoint culpability to a certain agent, and would accordingly call for investigations. I suggest the opposite. I contend that the development of provokator narratives signifies people's ability to cast the blame precisely the way they wanted it: to an unidentifiable third party mastermind.

The second is the idea that everyone is complicit in the conflict, either by commission, by omission, or both. This deters people from pursuing demands for truth

and justice, or at least reorients their idea of truth and justice. They no longer argue

passionately for truth commissions and trials against "the other." Any demands for such

procedures are then redirected toward third parties: the state, the military, Jakarta-

based elites, *etc*. While proponents of truth and justice approaches find it crucial to

delineate between perpetrators and victims, Malukans find it more fitting to

acknowledge that everyone is both a perpretrator and a victim.

The third condition is cultivation of memories of peace. The longstanding cultural

scripts and practices of *basudara, pela*, *gandong*, *masohi*, *larwul ngabal*, and so on,

serve as constant reminders for Christians and Muslims in Maluku that their lives are

intertwined. They prompt the realization that the only way to move forward is to do it

the way they have always done it: together. These scripts remind people that peace is

the norm and violence is the exception in the centuries-long Christian-Muslim relations

in Maluku. More practically, they point out at habits, customs, rituals, and such, which

have been tested by time and provide repertoires for intergroup relations. Even when

such forms of intergroup civic engagements (Varshney, 2002) seem to have failed to

prevent communal violence, they still serve as valuable assets of/for intergroup

reconciliation. Where advocates of truth and justice argue that truth commissions and

trials are necessary to create a shared understanding of the past and future, Malukans

have the privilege of "simply" resorting to a cultural script they are already familiar to.

These three conditions came to fore as more and more Christian-Muslim

encounters took place. As the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) and intergroup contact

theory (Pettigrew, 1998) suggest, these encounters reduced prejudice and facilitated

friendships. They also allowed Christians and Muslims to develop realistic empathy

toward each other (White, 1984). The superordinate goal (Sherif, 1958) of restoring

normalcy sustained the encounters. Ultimately, they made it possible for Malukans to

embark upon an identity change (Kelman, 2004) from "we are victims, they are

perpetrators" to "we are victims of *provokator*'s wrongdoings, just as they are victims of

provokator's wrongdoing", "they did wrong things to us, just as we did wrong things to

us", and "we are Malukans, we are *basudara*".

It is important to keep in mind that the Maluku conflict is intercommunal.

Perhaps, this is one of the reasons why the ideas of truth and justice in postconflict

Maluku are different to those in other studies of reconciliation – most of them looking

at the aftermath of civil war, authoritarian regime, apartheid, or interstate war. Also,

factors that contributed to peacemaking and peacebuilding, *i.e.* the signing of the

Malino II truce, the promotion of peace economy, as well as the opening of new

legistative and executive positions (due to the creation of a new province, new districts

and new subdistricts), help remove the threats that may derail reconciliation (warlords,

mnemonic warriors, *etc.*).

In chapter 5, I laid out the various ways reconciliation is understood in Maluku.

In the early 2000s, the term *rekonsiliasi* was widely despised and rejected, as it invokes

the idea of turning one's head away from the atrocious past, of not taking issues with

the wrongdoings of the other group, and of betraying one's own group. In the months

and years following the 2002 Malino II meeting, reconciliation was no longer rejected

altogether, but seen as contingent on whether "the other" display their

acknowledgement and remorse for their past wrongdoings. Meanwhile, in the last couple of years, the idea that *rekonsiliasi* depends on "the other" displaying their remorse has been increasingly challenged. Most likely, this has to do with the adoption of *provokator* narratives and the realization that everyone is complicit in the conflict. However, when asked what *rekonsiliasi* means, respondents tend to recite indicators and procedures of reconciliation instead of providing straightforward definitions. These include returning to a *basudara* status, returning to pre-1999 geographical arrangements, absence of desires for, and acts of, revenge, as well as the cultivation of genuine and meaningful reconciliation that is *organik*, not a result of negotiations among elites.

Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 map out the sites where interdependence is designed and practiced: ceremonial, neighborhood, functional-quotidian, and narrative. The ceremonial site, discussed in Chapter 6, is where those who are considered influential and as representing the stakeholders in the conflict come together in a rather formal setting. Here, memories of peace, including those invoked through music, helped transform animosities and mutual rejection into willingness to listen to each other, to suspend some judgments, and to work together. In turn, this allows both parties to switch from a "victim *versus* perpetrator" point of view into an "all-victim" outlook, shifting the ultimate blame to *provokator*s. As they start to adopt *provokator* narratives, both parties realized that detailed investigations on what had happened would reveal that everyone is complicit – by commission and/or omission. This plays an important

role in stopping demands for (comprehensive) truth and justice, shaping and reinforcing

Malukan's preference for the interdependence path.

Looking at the neighborhood site, Chapter 7 explores relationships among those

who have lived, or have remained to live, together, as well as relationships among those

who are bound by *pela* and *gandong*. To some people, the *provokator* narratives restore

or reaffirm their confidence toward their neighbors, thus facilitate the return of IDPs. To

others, the very same notion that the clashes were meticulously masterminded by an

elusive third party deters IDPs' return. Here, IDPs tend to believe that security

guarantees among former neighbors would not prevail against premeditated attacks

from outside. The *provokator* narratives also help one sees that people's complicity

were based on some survival instinct, prompted by the heat of the moment, motivated

by revenge, or guided by misinformation, rather than by pure malice. To some

respondents, such understanding enable self-restraint from revenge, offer some sense

of closure, and/or spark forgiveness. Here, memories of peace provide repertoires on

how former neighbors resume their lives together. What is important to stress here is

that "no IDP return" cannot be automatically equated to "no reconciliation". In addition

to the lack or absence of security guarantee, another factor that hinders return is

property issue.

As elaborated in Chapter 8, the functional-quotidian site covers intergroup

activities that mainly rely on the specific skills, training, and/or identities that people

have due to their profession or hobby. Mostly, intergroup initiatives in this site come

from those who have had close relations since before 1999 and share memories of

peace. Aware of the *provokator* narratives, individuals who are engaged in this site block

negative provocations and "provoke peace." Some of them take part in the initiatives in

this site to redeem themselves for their complicity in the neighborhood level violence.

The narrative site, which is portrayed in Chapter 9, point at how ideas and

practices of reconciliation, especially those that are based on interdependence, are

woven into publications and movies. The books and films send a strong message about

memories of peace and *basudara* ethics. They highlight agencies of peace, underlining

that it is possible to choose peace amidst the peak of the conflict. They also put forward

the idea that people's complicity in the violence was not based on malicious intents, but

survival, revenge, and such. More subtly, the books and films suggest that truth

commissions and tribunals are *not* the way to go, as they may open up old wounds and

trigger new intergroup resentment. They emphasize how everyone is a victim. Through

such emphasis, they weave in *provokator* narratives and endorse a return to *basudara*

ethics.

It is important to keep in mind that in Maluku, the adoption of interdependence

path – instead of truth or justice approaches – should be understood as enactments of

Malukans' vernacular visions of their worlds. This means that interdependence is chosen

because it makes more sense than creating a truth commission or human rights trials,

not because the community and state are incapable of establishing such truth- and/or

justice- seeking institutions. Given the collective adoption of *provokator* narratives,

everyone's complicity, as well as an awareness of the highly intertwined past and future

of Christian and Muslim communities in Maluku, truth commissions and/or human

rights trials are just not desirable.

Table 10 summarizes how the three conditions for interdependence play out at

the four sites of interdependence, providing illustrations for the mechanisms involved.

First, interdependence-based activities call for individuals to perform their roles as

neighbors, professionals, mothers, artists, members of the *basudara* community,

Malukans, and so on, allowing the individuals to not identify themselves as Christians or

Muslims at war. Such identity change (Kelman, 2004) is easiest at the functional-

quotidian site, relatively easy at the neighborhood site, and most difficult at the

ceremonial site. Indeed, individuals enter the ceremonial site bearing the status as

representatives of the Christian or Muslim community, which to a certain degree

reasserts one's religious affinity. At the very least, the ceremonial site facilitates a shift

from a "we are victims, they are perpetrators" divide to a "we are victims of

provokator's wrongdoings, just as they are victims of *provokator*'s wrongdoings"

outlook.

Second, participation in interdependence-based activities signals a degree of

remorse and willingness to forgive, as it is difficult to imagine that those who still hold

animosities toward "the other" would participate in such activities. This signaling

function is especially important given the "riot" and "mob violence" characteristic of

many of the communal clashes in Maluku, which makes it "near to impossible" to

actually identify, reconnect with, and apologize to the very individuals whom one have

attacked years ago. By openly taking part in formal Christian-Muslim meetings at the

ceremonial site, in collective labor to repair houses, infrastructures, and places of

workship, as well as in *adat* rituals at the neighborhood site, and in intergroup activities

at the functional-quotidian site, individuals display gestures letting go of the violent

past. It should be noted that there may be a mismatch between the site where one

participated in violence and where one engages in interdependence-based activities. For

example, an individual who participated in an attack against "the other" in village A

decided to help repair the houses and place of worship of "the other" in village B and/or

to partner-up with members of "the other" faith group in restoring the health sector.

Rather than hindering reconciliation, such mismatch seems to open up more avenues

for reconciliation.

Third, interdependence-based activities lead to the creation of focal points of

peace. Everyone seems to know what participation in interdependence-based activities

means: it generates an understanding that "I know that you know that I am sorry" and

"you know that I know that you are sorry". In turn, it fosters security guarantee in the

sense that everyone knows that "the other" is not interested in prolonging the violence.

Through the case of Maluku, this study proves that interdependence works. It

also makes a case that interdependence can be as viable as truth commissions and trials

in bringing about reconciliation, especially when it is selected by the subjects

themselves based on their reading of the postconflict world they live in.

Table 10: Summary of findings

	Provokator narratives	Understanding that everyone is complicit	Memories of peace
Ceremonial Site	• allow parties attending the formal meetings to switch from a "victim *versus* perpetrator" point of view into an "all-victim" outlook	• stop demands for (comprehensive) truth and justice	• transform animosities and mutual rejection into willingness to listen to each other, to suspend judgment, and to work together
Neighborhood Site	• help restore or reaffirm confidence toward neighbors, thus leading to IDPs' return • induce a belief that security guarantees among former neighbors would not prevail against premeditated attacks from outside, thus deterring IDPs' return	• nurture an "understanding" that participation in conflict were based on some survival instinct, prompted by the heat of the moment, motivated by revenge, or guided by misinformation, rather than by pure malice, thus enabling self-restraint from revenge, offer some sense of closure, and/or spark forgiveness	• provide repertoires on how former neighbors resume their lives together • allow individuals to undergo identity change from "Christians" or "Muslims" to "residents of village X" or "Malukans"
Functional-Quotidian Site	• foster the need to block negative provocations • inspire peace-provoking initiatives	• help redeem involvement in past violence	• provide bases for setting up and widening intergroup encounters • allow individuals to perform activities as "professionals" or "hobby-enthusiasts" rather than as "Christians" or "Muslims"
Narrative Site	• endorse a return to *basudara* ethics	• nurture an "understanding" that participation in conflict were based on some survival instinct, prompted by the heat of the moment, motivated by revenge, or guided by misinformation, rather than by pure malice, thus suggesting that truth and justice are not the way to move forward	• highlight peace agency, that choosing peace amidst the peak of conflict is possible

The Long and Winding Road to Reconciliation

The Malukan journey to reconciliation has not been easy. As various interviews suggest, there are the sticky issues of trauma, overcoming distrust, reaching out to others, displacement, and such. In addition, there is a hanging notion that there may be "forces out there" betting on Malukans (or even provoking them) to fall back to repertoires of violence.

As I compare the visits I made in 2002 and 2014, I realize the huge achievements that Malukans had made in terms of restoring security, freedom of movement, services, Christian-Muslim encounters, *etc*. Back in 2002, I would have not been able to traverse Christian and Muslim quarters had I not been escorted in an INGO's car. In 2014, I could easily travel to Christian and Muslim villages by public transportation, safely walk alone at the streets of Ambon at night, and comfortably meet with respondents in public places. In 2002, I was advised to never reveal my religious identity – be it through my clothing, words, and gestures. In 2014, such concealment was no longer necessary. What happened in between?

Between the signing of Malino II Declaration in February 2002 and the time I wrap up my dissertation in January 2015, there are (only!) two notable incidents of communal violence, which respectively started in April 25, 2004 and September 11, 2011. The former was triggered by a celebration of FKM's anniversary, while the latter was set off by suspicions and rumors surrounding the death of a Muslim motorcycle-taxi driver *en route* from a Christian neighborhood. To me, the most crucial difference between the two is that in the latter, a sizeable number of Christian and Muslims

stepped up to defend the hard-fought intergroup peace in Maluku. Many of them did so

by practicing self-restraint and refusing to participate in violence. Others take more

active stances through networks like Badati and Provokator Damai. Amongst their most

important work was to check rumors (*i.e.* that a certain church or mosque has burnt

down) and publicize clarifications (*i.e.* taking photographic proofs that the church or

mosque at question is unharmed and send them out through short messaging and social

media). Another thing they did to prevent the conflict from escalating was to correct

Jakarta-based media coverage that had reported a higher number of deaths and

destruction of buildings (including places of worship) and to consciously use the words

ricuh (disturbance) than *rusuh* (riot).

Although things have returned to normal, Provokator Damai continues

"provoking" peace. In a video (2013), one of its founders, Rev. Jacky, explains that in

(post)conflict areas such as Maluku, one cannot simply wait for peace to eventually

come – one must push for it to happen. He asserts that some degree of provocation is

needed because quite a few people do not have the courage to publically say they want

peace, let alone openly work for peace. He points out that provoking for peace starts

with building intergroup friendships, facilitating people to do intergroup peacework

though their profession or hobby, as well as making these intergroup friendships and

peacework publically known, in hope that more and more people would get inspired to

join and/or replicate the activities.

I had the privilege to spend time with many individuals who were affiliated with

the Provokator Damai and Badati networks. I joined them celebrate Festival Orang

Basudara (FOB) in January 2014 and observe Idul Fitri in July 2014. Throughout FOB, which was held to commemorate the day when the 1999 Batu Merah-Mardika incident took place, I was amazed by the various displays of Christian-Muslim collaboration: the organization of the event, a parade, Maluku Photography Club's photo exhibition, traditional dances, the launching of *COB*, a group of Christian young men playing the church trumpets in the tune of *shalawat* Nabi (a praise to Prophet Muhammad), and a *hadrat-totobuang* tournament. Many people in the audience shared my amazement, in the sense that it was also their first time seeing such collaborations, especially that of *hadrat-totobuang*. The former musical instrument is usually only played in Muslim quarters and the latter only played in Christian quarters.

At that moment, I gained a deeper understanding of the phrase "enhancing Christian-Muslim encounters". While encounters between Christian and Muslim community leaders, Christian and Muslim neighbors, as well as Christians and Muslims who share the same profession or hobby are getting more frequent and meaningful, there are parts of the society that may remain socially segregated should nobody facilitate, incentivize, or force them to get out of their village, their comfort zone, their "microcosmos". Here, the *hadrat-totobuang* tournament provided a reason for musicians in Christian villages to reach out to musicians in Muslim villages, and *vice versa*, to learn about the other instrument and together explore how the two musical instruments can be played together harmoniously. These pre-tournament practice sessions allowed people to travel to quarters "belonging" to the other faith group, which they have never visited and may never need or want to visit to. During these

visits, processes other than music rehearsal take place: deconstruction of stereotypes and fear of "the other", making friends, sharing meal, and so on. Moreover, during the tournament itself, musicians (and their family members who came along to support their loved ones) had the chance to interact with each other. While waiting for the jury's decision, the musicians had jam sessions with those they only met for the first time and learned to play "the musical instrument of the other". The member of the audience blended together with the musicians, dancing and making rhythmical handclaps through the music. Rev. Jacky told me that the juries deliberately "took their time" in making their decisions so that the musicians, supporters, and audience had more time to enjoy each other's company (Interview, January 2014).

Later that year, I celebrated Idul Fitri in Ambon. I joined a group of Christian and Muslim friends visit a number of Muslim friends. While such practice of paying visits to Muslim friends is a centuries-long tradition, it got disrupted by the conflict as Christians did not feel safe to enter Muslim villages and had only resumed visiting in the last couple of years. Seeing many people comfortably (re-)observing this tradition, traversing the streets of Ambon and hanging out until pass midnight, I could not help to not feel hopeful about reconciliation in Maluku, especially given what had happened the night before.

On the 2014 Idul Fitri Eve, government officials organized an Idul Fitri celebration at the intersection nearby Al Fatah Mosque. Right after the celebration, six to eight groups of 20-30 young Muslims from various predominantly Muslim villages did a motorbike and open truck convoy to Al Fatah Mosque. Each group wore distinct Islamic

attributes, some with *keffiyeh* (checkered-pattern scarf invoking Palestinian clothing), some with T-shirts that have the words "Gaza", "Palestina", "Al Qaida", "ISIS", "Muslim", or "Islam" printed on them, some with T-shirts and banners with Arabic writings printed on them, and some with ISIS flag. The police tried to block their access to Al Fatah Mosque and urged the young people to return to their village. Eventually, the police let them pass, fearing that the young people would get angry and express their anger somewhere else (*i.e.* a Christian village they would have to pass by on their way home). I did not know what to make of these scenes. The group of friends – Christians and Muslims – I was hanging out with around Al Fatah quarter that night helped me make sense of the situation. They point out that the various Muslim groups were somewhat in competition against each other, trying to show off how Islamic they are. Many of them know nothing about ISIS (this was a couple of days before the ISIS recruitment video was spread world-wide) and only know very little about Palestina and Gaza (only that Muslims are suffering there). As I talked to the young people that joined the convoys, they mentioned that the T-shirts were given to them for free and that they agreed to wear them because the T-shirts had "cool colors and designs" and because they wanted to be part of their village's "team." The next day, I learned that these convoys did not lead to much trouble, except that one group got into "stone-throwing fights" with Christians whose village they passed by.

I also learned, however, that at the same night some fights happened in the village of Seith. The Jakarta-based media (television and online newspapers) were already reporting it under the headline "Riots again in Ambon", prompting my family

members in Java to check on my wellbeing. Here, I got the chance to observe more

closely "peace provoking" in action. I followed through Twitter and other media

Malukan journalists and activists who were effectively providing corrections to the

various errors spread by Jakarta: the number of casualties, the location of the incident

(which is not in Ambon City, but in another part of Maluku), the nature of the incident

(local fight/disturbance instead of a widespread riot), and the cause of the incident

(drunken youths fighting against each other, not religious animosities).

Here I return to the point that has been made by many scholars and

practitioners, that reconciliation is an ongoing process, where constant learning and

adapting of new strategies are needed. While there are still unresolved issues in

Maluku, *i.e.* spatial segregation, displacement, and occasional intensifying of religious

sentiments, to name a few, there is enough people and communities who are willing

and skilled in making sure that their fellow Malukans do not resort to repertoires of

violence. The responses to the 2004 disturbance were much better than to the 1999-

2002 incidents of communal violence, the responses to the 2011 disturbance were

much better than to the 2004 disturbance, and the responses to the 2014 disturbance

were much better than to the 2011 disturbance. It is safe to conclude that Malukans

have reached a certain level of skill and confidence in effectively responding to, and in

improving responses to, potential threats to their interdependent life.[80]

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[80] On Idul Fitri day, July 17, 2015, a dispute between a Christian congregation and Muslims who were observing prayers took place in Tolikara, Papua Province. It escalated to the extent that some people got shot by the police and petty-shops and a *mushalla* (Islamic place of worship that is smaller than a mosque) got burned. Through social media, many of my Malukan friends and acquaintances called for restrain and peace.

Still, there are a number of things to watch out for. These include the

sustainability of the *provokator* narrative, of the mutual acknowledgement of complicity

in the conflict, and of the engineering of the *basudara* sentiments, as well as effective

organizing for maintaining amicable (future) Christian-Muslim encounters. They lend

themselves as future research agendas.

Future Sites for Study

This study has shown how and why interdependence worked in Maluku. It has

provided evidence that interdependence is a viable path to reconciliation. In doing so, it

sheds light to a number of issues that may be of importance to practitioners and

researchers working on reconciliation, especially those who follow the processes in

Maluku closely.

Durability of *provokator* narrative. Reconciliation in Maluku hinges on the idea

that the ultimate culpability lies outside the Christian and Muslim communities. Without

such exculpatory element, it is likely that Christians and Muslims in Maluku be caught in

an endless blame game. The question is how durable is this narrative? On the one hand,

it is not unsubstantiated. Most Malukans have first hand accounts on the "foreigness" of

the attacks as well as on how they or people in their inner circle had fallen into

provocations to participate in violence upon hearing false rumors. On the other hand,

this is something that conflict entrepreneurs can "easily" manipulate. An in-depth study

on the *provokator* narrative would reveal the mnemonic struggles and warriors (Kubik &

They urged people to learn from the Malukan experience that intergroup violence in the
name of religion does not bring any glory and only results in devastation.

Linch, 2006; Kubik & Bernhard, 2014) at play at various levels/segments of the society[81],

identify the alternative/contending narratives as well as the nuances within the

provokator narrative, and shed light on the conditions supportive to mnemonic

hegemony, mnemonic pillarization, or mnemonic reconciliation. Insights from such

studies are useful for informing (political) decisions on how to best "institutionalize" the

provokator narrative – or when and how to stop overrelying on it and/or replace it with

something else. Should school textbooks mention that *provokator*s were the ultimate

culprits of the Maluku conflict? What should teachers and parents say when confronted

with the question of who these *provokator*s were? How should the authorities respond

to (future) contending narratives? These are all practical questions that would benefit

from careful studies.

   Continuous acknowledgement of mutual complicity. While the ultimate blame

is put on the *provokator*s' shoulders, Malukan do realize that they have contributed to

the conflict – by commission or omission, willingly or reluctantly. This is amply

acknowledged in public speeches, religious sermons, works of art, and daily

conversations. It serves as a reminder that *provokator*s alone do not cause intergroup

clashes, that people need to practice restrain amidst intergroup tensions, and that

people need to actively defuse the tools used by *provokator*s, such as rumors. It also

sends the message, especially to the younger generations, that "they were only as bad

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[81] While they share the *provokator* narrative, I assume that individuals from the different levels and segments within the Malukan society – elites, grass-roots, present generation, future generations, combatants, non-combatants, Christians, Muslims, non-Christians and non-Muslims, IDPs, non IDPs, *etc.* – have varying ideas on the details of this narrative.

as us", preventing future desires for revenge. More subtly, as suggested in the earlier chapters, it reflects how Malukans pursue truth and justice in ways they deem appropriate to their specific context. A more detailed study is needed to examine how the accounts of complicity are displayed and institutionalized at the various levels/segments of the society and how these accounts change over time (if they do). Such a study would also provide illustrations on how quests for truth and justice can be, and are, pursued differently in different (non-Western) cultures.

Constant engineering of *basudara* sentiments. Having lived side-by-side for centuries, Christians and Muslims have both memories of intergroup peace and memories of intergroup animosities. Under what conditions do memories of peace and memories of animosities support intergroup peace? Under what conditions do they encourage participation in intergroup violence? What are the best strategies to turn memories of animosities into "productive irritants" (Gardner Feldman, 2008)? How should these memories be institutionalized and passed to the next generations? What resources from the past (Appadurai, 1981) are available? Studies centering on these themes would be useful for policy-making.

Christian-Muslim encounters. As elaborated in various parts of this dissertation, intergroup encounters played a crucial part in bringing about the conditions that allowed for reconciliation to take place. I suggest that stakeholders should continue to facilitate such encounters, especially among the younger generations who throughout the peak of the conflict had missed out on opportunities to mingle with peers from the other group. A follow up study is needed to identify the kinds of encounters that

effectively build "bridging civic associations" (Varshney, 2002), reduce prejudice (Allport, 1954), foster friendships (Pettigrew, 1998), and develop realistic empathy (White, 1984) as well as the kinds of superordinate goals (Sherif, 1958) that could sustain such encounters.

Managing the saliency of various identities. Many respondents have underlined the importance to envigorating *adat*. They believe that Malukans should put their *adat* identity before their religious identity in order to prevent the recurrence of Christian-Muslim clashes. While I agree that *adat* needs to be revitalized, I am cautious about making *adat the* main identity marker. One reason is that it may foster new ingroup-outgroup divisions (*i.e.* between migrants and non-migrants, among the various sub-ethnic groupings in Maluku, *etc.*) that lend themselves to politicization and mobilization by conflict entrepreneurs. At this point, it is important that the local government and civil society continuously manage the saliency of various identities in Maluku – religious, *adat*, political affiliation, socio-economic status, *etc*. To provide insights on how best to do so, a thorough study on identity politics in Maluku is needed.

Role of outsiders. While Malukans have been up, front, and center in the reconciliation processs, it is important to acknowledge the roles of outsiders in facilitating activities that led to reconciliation. Indonesian activists, academics, and religious leaders from outside Maluku had engaged in tremendous efforts to bring together Christians and Muslims of Maluku, including the organization of Search Conference for Maluku and BakuBae movement. Also, Indonesia-based and international NGOs had designed their programs in ways that necessitate Christian-

Muslim encounters. A study on the roles of these actors would yield valuable lessons for future postconflict interventions, especially in facilitating reconciliation.

Electoral cycles. In the last presidential election, Malukan voters were divided according to religious lines – most Christians voted for Joko Widodo whereas most Muslims voted for Prabowo Subianto.[82] Here, it is important to return to van Klinken's (2001; 2007) analyses of communal contenders, which attributes the cause of the Maluku conflict to electoral competitions among elites that relied on mobilization of young unemployed men. As political divisions and religious cleavages coincide, what needs to be done to prevent intergroup violence? This policy-related question needs to be explored in a detailed study.

Perimbangan: **politics of numbers**. Many respondents, mostly Christians, have complained about *perimbangan* (balancing). They are disconcerted about a claim, mostly voiced by Muslims, that the Malino II Declaration instructed for balancing the number of Christians and Muslims in offices, schools, and other public institutions. They believe that when a recruitment system is not based on merit – but on politics of numbers – the quality of institutions and services will decline. As the "euphoria" of peace and reconciliation subside, the issue of *perimbangan* will gain saliency and may

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[82] My Malukan friends explained to me that during the early phase of the campaign, Joko Widodo was the stronger candidate, both among Christian and Muslim voters. At the latter stage of the campaign, many Muslims in Maluku got swayed by false rumors about Joko Widodo being a Christian, a bastard son, and a Tionghoa (an Indonesian of Chinese descend) and ended up supporting Prabowo Subianto. The election result for Maluku was 443,040 votes for Joko Widodo and 433,981 for Prabowo Subianto (source: Indonesian Election Commision's website: http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/PPWP_-_Nasional_Rekapitulasi_2014_-_New_-_Final_2014_07_22.pdf). This campaign strategy of presenting Joko Widodo as a non-Muslim Tionghoa bastard son was seen throughout Indonesia and in social media.

cause intergroup tensions. A study is needed to explore creative ways to meet both the demand (mostly from the Muslim side) for deeper inclusion into the system and the demand (mostly from the Christian side) for maintaining a quality-oriented system.

Voice. This study has made serious efforts to include the voices of women, youth, and lay people ("non gate-keepers"). Nevertheless, some serious limitations remain: this study is quite Ambon-centric and it lacks the perspectives of non-Christian and non-Muslim Malukans, including, but not limited to the Tionghoa, Buddhist, Hindu, and animist communities.

Path dependence. This study has established that the *provokator* narrative enabled Christians and Muslims in Maluku to take on interdependence-based reconciliation processes. Future research may benefit from taking a closer look at whether the adoption of *provokator* narrative have "locked" Malukans into taking the interdependence path of reconciliation, making it costly to switch to other paths of reconciliation.

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