

# HEIGHTENED OTHERNESS AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM

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## **ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION**

# **Heightened Otherness and Domestic Terrorism**

**by Caitlin Roxanne Scuderi**

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Research on the relationship between economic discrimination and terrorism has been inconclusive; theory and empirics support claims of both a positive and a negative relationship. This research attempts to further clarify the relationship by admitting that the relationship is conditional and, therefore, affected by other variables, one of which is group concentration. I argue that group concentration has an effect on the experience of discrimination in terms of the access to and cost of knowledge of the “other” group: the lower the group concentration, the lower the cost of information pertaining to the “other” group and, therefore, the easier it is to make more reliable comparisons. In these scenarios, the experience of discrimination becomes more salient and more likely to precipitate calls for domestic terrorism. Conversely, where group concentration is high, the cost of information in regards to the “other” group is also high, distorting the experience of discrimination, and subsequently muffling any calls for domestic terrorism. I use data from the Global Terrorism Database and the Minorities at Risk project to create a series of interaction terms to test the conditionality of the relationship of certain discriminatory policies and group concentration on domestic terrorism incidences. This research finds that when discrimination is high and group concentration is low, domestic terrorism does, indeed, increase. Robustness checks are run with alternate measures of discrimination from both the Ethnic

Power Relations Dataset and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project.

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Last, I am grateful to my colleagues both within and outside of the Political Science department. The graduate student community has been an integral part of my progress through the program and an excuse to momentarily take my mind off of work. Thank you very much to my friends for working with me these past few years.

## Dedication

To my family and friends for their unwavering support and encouragement over the years.

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## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

Attacks in Turkey by Kurdish nationals identifying with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) have steadily increased since 2009 (see Figure 1.1). Although the relationship between the Turkish state and its Kurdish population has been tenuous and riddled with difficulties from the time the state was created in 1921, this recent uptick in domestic terrorist activity is important to take stock of for the very reason that it seems to defy logic.




Figure 1.1: PKK Attacks in Turkey, 1995-2013

In late 2009, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan launched what came to be called the Kurdish Opening. This comprehensive approach to end the conflict with the Kurdish population included the granting of more cultural rights to Kurds, including allowing for Kurdish prayers in Kurdish mosques and officially changing the Turkish name of some Kurdish cities back to their original Kurdish versions. Perhaps the two most significant actions included in the plan were allowing Kurdish language classes to be taught in schools, and ultimately, a proposal for a constitutional amendment that would remove the ethnic component of Turkish citizenship.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See: “The Kurdish Opening in Turkey: Origins and Future?” at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “Turkey’s PKK peace plan delayed” at BBC News

Granting more civil rights and extending more civil liberties, in this sense, would effectively create a sense of equality by decreasing discrimination against the ethnic minority group. In fact, there is a significant amount of research focusing just on this relationship, which convincingly supports the notion that discrimination in the right circumstances can increase domestic terrorism (for instance: Piazza 2011, 2012; Burgoon 2006). Based on this and given the social and political climate in Turkey during this given time period, we should expect a decrease in acts of domestic terrorism committed by the PKK against the state. Instead we see the opposite. How could this be? If efforts were being made to revise discriminatory policies and to effectively extend rights to the ethnic minority group, why would the violent faction of the Kurds increase the amounts of terrorist attacks waged against the state?

A simple answer could be that the more violent faction of the PKK is attempting to spoil the progress toward peace. “Spoiling” is a strategic logic terrorist organizations use to persuade the enemy (in this instance, the state) that the moderates in the terrorist organization are weaker than the extremists, and therefore, shouldn’t be trusted in peace negotiations (Kydd and Walter 2006). Indeed, when 34 PKK extremists were granted amnesty by the Turkish government and allowed back into the country, they delivered incendiary speeches calling for continued support of the PKK and made further demands of the Turkish government.<sup>2</sup>

While spoiling can be used to explain at least some of the increase in terrorist activity following the announcement of the Kurdish Opening, it cannot explain all of it. As a strategy, spoiling is meant to further the cause (real or perceived, as determined by the extremists running the spoiling strategy) of the terrorist organization and it does this by signaling to the enemy that the negotiators from the terrorist organization cannot be

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<sup>2</sup>See: “‘Kurdish Opening’ Closed Shut” in Foreign Policy

trusted, and by signaling to the larger audience that the terrorist organization is a real threat to national security. Importantly, the Kurdish Opening was not part of negotiations. Indeed, as part of the larger Unity and Fraternity Project, the Kurdish Opening (or Kurdish Initiative as it's formally called) was pursued by the Turkish government with the aim of improving the democratic standards of the state, and so was absent of any formal negotiations with Kurdish moderates. In this sense, by providing more democratic rights to Kurds in Turkey, the initiative did not diminish or directly oppose any other demands of the PKK. Strategically, then, violence perpetuated by the PKK against the state would in fact be counter productive to achieving the group's aims. In sum, spoiling might explain some of the increase in terrorism in Turkey following the Kurdish Opening, but certainly not all of it.

So how else can we account for the increase in terrorism? An important part of this puzzle has to do with migration. The majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey traditionally lives in the east and southeast. However, in recent years, more and more Kurdish people have been migrating west, specifically toward Istanbul (see Figures 1.2 through 1.4). Since 2007, yearly counts on population movements have been taken, taking into account both current residence and registry at birth. Between 2007 and 2012, there were two significant trends: first, the number of Kurds born in 21 provinces in the east and southeast increased by 11 percent, higher than the increase of 5.5 percent in other regions of Turkey. Second, at the end of 2007, 44 of percent of people registered in the 21 east and southeastern provinces were not residing there. This rate increased by the end of 2012 to 47 percent.<sup>3</sup> This implies a shift in demographics summed up largely as increasing numbers of Kurds moving westward.

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<sup>3</sup>See: "Kurds still migrating to western Turkish cities" in Hurriyet Daily News






Figure 1.2: In Migration Rates 2010-2011




Figure 1.3: Out Migration Rates 2010-2011




Figure 1.4: Net Migration Rates 2010-2011

Why does migration matter? The movement of Kurds westward effectively works to integrate this minority population into the majority population. By gaining more access to the majority population through this process, these Kurds are able to see and experience much more vividly the discrimination that has been, and in many cases still is in place. When Kurds move westward, they tend to settle in close proximity with the new “local” Kurdish population (Celik 2005, Mills 2005, Secor 2004). Despite the insulating effects of living within close-proximity of their co-ethnics, I argue in this research that the integration within the larger community precipitates an awareness of the discrimination facing their group, which can be a precondition for domestic terrorism.

The most convincing recent research has shown us that certain discriminatory policies can have a positive relationship with domestic terrorism. What we haven’t analyzed yet, however, is how group concentration fits into this equation. This research aims to analyze how group concentration affects domestic terrorism in the presence of discrimination.

## 1.1 The Study of Domestic Terrorism

A dearth of scholarly research on terrorism began to quickly be filled following the September 11 attacks. Works by Bruce Hoffman, Mia Bloom, Erika Chenoweth, and Martha Crenshaw, among others, helped to explain what many policy analysts, media reporters, and scholars alike largely considered an anomaly up to that point.<sup>4</sup> Research has focused primarily on identifying the causes of terrorism. Much effort has been put into understanding Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism that can come from this. Due in large part to the nature of the September 11 attacks, a lot of work has revolved around better understanding transnational terrorism (see, for example, Hoffman et al. 2013; and Piazza 2013).

While this work has been illuminating and undeniably beneficial for policy makers and researchers, alike, the focus on transnational terrorism, and primarily on the violence that is bred from Islamic fundamentalism, has meant that domestic terrorism has largely been ignored. Domestic terrorism is important to study for the very fact that domestic terrorism is much more prevalent than transnational terrorism (See Figure 1.5).

For instance, between 2006 and 2012 the Global Terrorism Database coded 11,147 terrorist attacks as logistically domestic, compared to 796, which were identified as logistically international (START 2013). As the landscape of warfare continues to shift away from international war and toward a stronger concentration on intranational war, the study of terrorism - specifically domestic terrorism - will be even more salient.

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<sup>4</sup>International terrorism was considered anomalous prior to the September 11 attacks in the sense that it was primarily confined to the developing world and rarely affected powerful, industrialized countries. Indeed, the Palestinian Liberation Organization had been using international terrorism since the hijacking of an Israeli El Al commercial flight traveling from Rome to Tel Aviv in 1968 (Hoffman 2006).




Figure 1.5: International versus Domestic Terrorist Attacks Over Time

## 1.2 Discrimination

Much of the work on the effects of discrimination on terrorism is at least slightly contradictory. Despite the fact that media outlets and public decision makers have in the past pointed squarely at the results of discrimination - namely inequality - as precipitants to acts of terrorism, the research backing these claims is spotty. While it seems intuitive that inequality should lead to acts of violence, if not other forms of public demonstration, research shows us that this relationship is not as direct as we want to assume. What we know is that the mere presence of inequality in a society does not directly lead to terrorism. Instead, what seems to matter is the kind of discrimination that is happening and the perceived differences caused by that discrimination. For example, research by Piazza (2012) finds that economic discrimination, compared to other forms of discrimination, is

more predictive of the discriminated group's engagement in terrorism. Gurr's concept of relative deprivation (1970) is an important tool to better understand why there seems to exist this disparity in the effects of different types of discrimination. Relative Deprivation Theory contends that the perception of deprivation affects the expression of violence (Gurr 1970). Specifically, if a group perceives a large disparity between the resources it is receiving compared to the resources another group is receiving, members of the lower resource group might be more likely to result to violence. Where the perception of deprivation is low or nonexistent, the propensity toward violence will subsequently be lower, too.

In this way, Relative Deprivation Theory can help us to understand why some types of discrimination have an effect on domestic terrorism while others do not; discrimination will have no effect on violence in general and terrorism in specific where the perception of the discrimination by the discriminated group is low. Conversely, where a group perceives a high level of discrimination, the propensity toward violence and terrorism will be higher.

### 1.3 Group Concentration

Inquiry into the relationship between group concentration and terrorism is surprisingly lacking. I say *surprising* because the effect of group concentration on terrorism seems like a logical extension of Relative Deprivation Theory; just as beliefs, cultural norms, and ideologies affect one's perception of his or her group's status, the perception of the "other" group ultimately matters, too. The perception of the other group is certainly affected by the same variables that affect the perception of the "self" group, but is also significantly affected, I believe, by the level of concentration.

For instance, a group that is discriminated against and is highly concentrated to the point that it is insulated from the majority population might not have enough information (due to limited exposure and interactions) to perceive itself as "discriminated against."

Ultimately, the perception of the “other” group defines the group in question, so if their is limited exposure or access to the majority group, opportunities to gain information about the status of the other group will be slimmer compared to situations where the minority is more integrated into the majority population.

## 1.4 Scope of the Inquiry

Discrimination can be experienced and perpetuated by a wide range of groups established along a multitude of cleavage lines. This research is solely concerned with the discrimination experienced by distinct, sub-state ethnopolitical groups. Focusing on these types of “out-groups” is necessary for this research, for two primary reasons: first, the theory of relative deprivation lends itself nicely to group-level analysis; and, second, there are a wide range of ethnopolitical groups across countries, which provides a good level of variation in this research.<sup>5</sup>

Similarly, group concentration occurs for many reasons and to a wide variety of individuals and groups. This research is concerned with the group concentration of these out groups in comparison to the larger majority group.

As outlined above, this dissertation focuses on domestic terrorism. I am interested not just in how discrimination affects domestic terrorism or just in how group concentration affects domestic terrorism, but how both of these factors interact and affect domestic terrorism. I understand this interaction effect as “heightened otherness,” a term meant to indicate a moderate range of segregation combined with a moderate range of discrimination.

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<sup>5</sup>Further research should look into the interaction effect between gender identity and ethnopolitical group identity. Women around the world are discriminated against in, still, a very systematic way. Parsing out gender from larger out-groups can provide further explanatory power. I will revisit this in the conclusions chapter.

## 1.5 Potential Gains and Organization of this Research

The ephemeral and long-term gains of this research project include both adding and helping to further develop the literature on terrorism studies. As mentioned before, work on domestic terrorism is lacking in comparison to work on transnational terrorism. In that respect, because my work focuses exclusively on domestic terrorism, it will help to fill that gap. Furthermore, empirical research on group concentration and how it affects a group's propensity toward terrorism is extremely limited. Last, it is safe to say that work seeking to illuminate causal factors linked to political violence can be beneficial for policy and decision makers. Specifically, if my research yields that the interaction of discrimination and group concentration has a relationship with domestic terrorism, policy makers can investigate, design, and implement strategies to mitigate this effect.

Tangentially, this research can be beneficial for the current state of American race-relations. Given that African Americans are a distinct ethnopolitical group, and if we understand the latest wave of violence resulting from the deaths of black men as politically motivated, better understanding the role of group concentration in instilling feelings of "otherness" can help to provide solutions moving forward. On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, was shot and killed by Darren Wilson, a white police officer, in the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson.<sup>6</sup> From the 2000 U.S. Census, St. Louis was the fourth most segregated metropolitan area for African Americans, behind Milwaukee-Waukesha, Detroit, Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, and before Newark (Iceland et al. 2002).<sup>7</sup> While discrimination is institutionally prohibited in the United States, experiences and

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<sup>6</sup>See New York Times article "What Happened in Ferguson?" by Larry Buchanan, Ford Fessenden, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Haeyoun Park, Alicia Parlapiano, Archie Tse, Time Wallace, Derek Watkins, and Karen Yourish.

<sup>7</sup>It is important to point out that segregation, in the American context, entails a level of group concentration. In this sense, group concentration is implicit when talking about segregation in American.

feelings of it are still reported today. It can be quite likely that group concentration has a role to play.

After the introductory material developed here, Chapter 2 is a literature review where I address previous literature and explain how my theory and hypotheses begin to extend the work that has been done thus far. Chapter 3 details the theory behind my investigation. In this chapter, I define key terms and lay out both my guiding theory and hypotheses. Chapter 4 is my methodology chapter and it is here where I explain my choice of data sources, outline the processes I follow, and present my results. Last, chapter 5 includes the conclusions and potential extensions of these conclusions.



## Chapter 2

### Review of Literature

In this chapter, I review the empirical research that addresses the relationship, if any, between heightened otherness (both discrimination and group concentration) and terrorism. I first examine the relatively sparse literature on discrimination, group concentration, and terrorism. I then follow this with a brief review of the predictors of domestic terrorism.

#### 2.1 Tests of Heightened Otherness and Terrorism

There is a small but growing empirical literature on discrimination and terrorism and group concentration and terrorism. However, there is no modern test of the relationship that measures the interaction of discrimination and group concentration on domestic terrorism. I begin with several studies that directly relate discrimination and terrorism.

Since the September 11 attacks, political leaders and media outlets, alike, have been quick to label poverty - which can be considered a specific effect of economic discrimination - as a precipitant to terrorism. In his speech at the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, President Bush very blatantly pointed to poverty as his target: “Many here today have devoted their lives to the fight against global poverty, and you know the stakes. We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.”<sup>1</sup> More than a decade later, in his speech at the National Defense University,

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<sup>1</sup>See: President Bush’s Speech in Monterrey, Mexico, from PBS Newshour

President Obama, again, pointed to poverty: “So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism...We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolved deep-rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred.”<sup>2</sup>

Presidents Bush and Obama are separated by years, world climates, and political ideologies, but still publicly renounced poverty and positioned it as correlated to participation in political violence. In line with this rhetoric, a lot of research on the relationship between discrimination and terrorism has focused on poverty and the propensity of impoverished individuals to participate in terrorism.

Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find little evidence linking poverty or education to participation in terrorism. In fact, they found that members of the militant wing of Hezbollah and Palestinian suicide bombers were at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and to have a relatively high level of education, as they were to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged and uneducated. To explain why this might be so, the researchers hypothesize that terrorism resembles a violent form of political engagement. With this assumption, more educated people from privileged backgrounds are more likely to participate in politics. This supports the researchers’ view that participation in terrorism is a political choice, and not an economic phenomenon. Additionally, terrorist organizations may prefer more educated individuals.

In one of his earlier pieces on the relationship between discrimination and political violence, Piazza (2006) looks further into the role of poverty in terrorism. Contrary to what many policymakers, media outlets, and scholars have said before, Piazza found that there is no significant relationship between economic development and terrorism. More salient than economic development, population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state

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<sup>2</sup>See: Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, from the White House

repression, and the structure of party politics are found to be predictors of terrorism.

With a case study, Piazza (2009) turns to India to attempt to get at the potential causal mechanism linking economic development and terrorism. India makes a good case for observation, he argues, because of its wide array of states ranging in economic development and the wide spread of levels of terrorist activity. Piazza finds that more than economic underdevelopment, poorly managed political conflicts affect terrorism. While poverty can certainly be a part of political conflict, in making these conflicts more intractable, it only affects terrorism via political conflict, and not on its own.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also find that discrimination has little explanatory power when it comes to the onset of civil wars. Historically, we accepted that significant and chronic grievances, caused by types of institutionalized discrimination, led to the formation of rebel groups necessary to instigate a civil war. The researchers, however, found very weak relationships between variables representing grievance, such as high inequality and a lack of political rights, and rebellion. Instead, Collier and Hoeffler found a strong relationship between greed, or economic opportunity, and rebellion. In this sense, the researchers conclude, we can understand rebellion as greed-motivated. Implicit in this conclusion, is that there is a strategic logic to participate in rebellion. This aspect of Collier and Hoeffler's findings will be further discussed in the "Predictors of Domestic Terrorism" section below.

Berrebi (2007) tests the relationship between discrimination and terrorism by looking specifically at the Palestinian case. By qualitatively analyzing the backgrounds of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members, Berrebi concludes that on the individual level, both higher standards of living and higher levels of education are actually positively associated with participation in Hamas and PIJ. With regard to education, Berrebi concludes that it is not the years of education that matter, but rather the content of the education. The positive relationship between economic wealth and terrorism might have

to do with the ability to buy more and improved weapons. If this is, in fact, the case, Berrebi suggests that policy makers focus more on the use of economic wealth to suppress terrorism.

These works, among others, point to a weak, absence of, or no relationship between discrimination and terrorism. Another school of thought, however, makes a strong case for a positive relationship between discrimination and terrorism.

The same research by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) mentioned above includes a cross-country analysis to test what they call “a Robin Hood model of terrorism;” that is, the postulation that economic circumstances matter for terrorism if relatively well off people from poor countries are subsequent participants in international terrorism. Using data from International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) and the U.S. State Department’s annual list of significant international terrorist attacks, the researchers find that the poorest countries spawn the most terrorists.

Focusing on social welfare programs specifically, Burgoon (2006) effectively shifts the debate over terrorism revolving around economic conditions. Burgoon finds that social welfare policies including social security, unemployment, and health and education spending, work to mitigate any negative economic conditions and can thereby diminish incentives to commit terrorism. He concludes that countries with more generous welfare provisions can be expected to suffer from less total terrorism on their soil, and will have fewer citizens who perpetuate terrorism.

The most convincing work on the relationship between discrimination and terrorism includes different measures of discrimination and takes the group suffering from discrimination into account. For example, Caprioli and Trumbore (2003) find that states with higher levels of both economic and political discrimination against ethnic minorities are more likely to engage violently in international disputes. They see their statistical findings

as supportive of the theory that domestic ethnic inequality is sustained by intolerance and a hierarchical organization, which both translate into a world-view that necessarily places some states as superior to others. This entails that states marked by higher domestic ethnic inequality are more likely to be violent during interstate disputes as they project this inequality and hierarchy into the international arena. While these findings don't speak directly to domestic terrorism, they do show that there seems to exist a relationship between discrimination and propensities toward violence, albeit on the state side.

More compelling is Piazza's later work. Focusing specifically on the discrimination facing minority groups, Piazza (2011) finds that countries that permit their minority communities to be afflicted by economic discrimination make themselves more vulnerable to domestic terrorism in a substantive way. While the overall economic development of a country does matter when it comes to terrorism, the effect is much smaller than that of the economic status of a country's minority groups.

Delving deeper into the relationship between the discrimination of minority groups and domestic terrorism, Piazza (2012) tests the effects of four types of discrimination: socioeconomic, political, religious, and linguistic. Overall, he finds that discrimination against minority groups is positively related with higher levels of terrorist attacks. When parsing out different types of discrimination, however, Piazza finds that economic discrimination, and to a lesser degree political discrimination have a statistically significant positive effect on domestic terrorism.

Choi and Piazza (2014) look at the relationship from a different perspective, and instead of focusing on the presence of discrimination, look at the presence of ethnic populations excluded from political power. They find that countries with these populations are more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks and to suffer from terrorism-induced casualties.

In sum, the most focused work on the relationship between discrimination and terrorism identifies a positive relationship. Most important to take away: the group being discriminated against matters, and; economic discrimination seems to have the strongest effect on domestic terrorism.

Very little work has been done on the relationship between group concentration and terrorism. Most of the work on group concentration revolves broadly around ethnicity, immigration, and assimilation. For instance, Phillips (2006) looks at three former textile towns in northern Britain to assess the reasons behind what appeared to be the self-segregation of British Muslims. Looking deeper into the relationships of these British Muslims and the surrounding white British population, Phillips concludes that the apparent self-segregation has less to do with an inherent dislike of the larger white population. Instead, Phillips actually identifies an interest and willingness among the British Muslims to live beyond the areas traditionally associated with their communities, so long as they do not feel threatened by the majority community. Very similarly, Walter (1985) concludes that the ethnic clustering that occurred in Luton, England was the result not strictly of ethnic identity, but more specifically of cultural characteristics, notably church affiliation.

Although the majority of work on group concentration deals almost exclusively with assimilation and the resultant cultural tensions, scholars focusing on American immigration have highlighted a potential connection to violence (or the avoidance of violence). Portes and Zhou (1993) first introduced the idea of segmented assimilation, or the role that social context plays in determining the outcomes of the children of immigrants. Specifically, they brought up the idea of “downward assimilation;” the notion that some children of immigrants were developing “reactive” identities that subsequently locked them in a cycle of poverty. Scholars responding to Portes and Zhou have primarily focused on the outcomes of downward assimilation: poor educational outcomes (Haller et al. 2011; Hirschman

2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Schmidt 2001); incarceration (Rumbaut 2005); or poor occupation/labor market outcomes (Waldinger and Feliciano 2004).

The most relevant work done on downward assimilation, in terms of this dissertation, addresses the specific outcome of violence. Examining two disadvantaged neighborhoods in Los Angeles, Rendon (2015) finds that young men (second-generation Latino immigrants) who stepped outside of their neighborhoods, interacted with Whites, and experienced explicit or subtle forms of discrimination were the most likely to have a “reactive” identity. Martinez et al. (2004) similarly examine two communities (although this time they are larger cities - Miami and San Diego) to analyze how immigrant communities cope with assimilation pressures. The researchers find downward assimilation results in chronic economic deprivation in both cities and drug-related violence in San Diego. The research on downward assimilation, although applied specifically to the American experience, approximates what I am trying to get at in this research in terms of the effect of segregation on terrorism.

Some of the most convincing work on group concentration is theoretical in nature. In a broader discussion of epistemology, Hardin (1998) points to the economic costs of knowledge. Because it is less costly, in terms of displacing other knowledge, to acquire knowledge that agrees with or complements what we already know, we tend to select knowledge that reinforces our beliefs. This helps to explain the spread of extremist beliefs. Most importantly, Hardin notes how separation and isolation can affect knowledge. Intuitively, because separation and isolation mean that a group is not exposed to accurate knowledge of others, extremist knowledge is allowed to flourish unchallenged: “The hostility of an isolated extremist group may flow more from this skewing of its members’ beliefs than from genuine opposition to the larger society or some other groups”(11).

Other work on group concentration comes from studies on hate crime. Glaeser (2005)

finds that hatred can be a useful tool for politicians when spreading hate-creating stories helps to discredit opponents and simultaneously bolster the politician or group relaying the hate stories. Based on this strategic logic argument (and similar to Hardin’s general theory), hatred declines when there is a private incentive to learn the truth. This private incentive can be born out of interactions with the out-group. Glaeser points to the race relations in the United States, anti-Semitism in Europe, and anti-Americanism in the Middle East to demonstrate his theory.

Of course, one of the most well-known works on group concentration comes from Tilly (1978). Tilly argues (in response to Gurr’s work on relative deprivation) that mobilization has an important role to play in collective action. This type of group mobilization around a political cause can be facilitated by group concentration. Indeed, for ideas, thoughts, and decisions to be shared, there *must* be a level of group concentration.

The most recent work on group concentration and terrorism comes from Choi and Piazza (2014) and specifically looks at the effect of internally displaced populations and suicide terrorism. Using statistical analyses, the researchers find a strong relationship between IDPs and suicide terrorism. They also explore some potential causal mechanisms linking the two variables. Their analysis supports the notion that human rights violations are a significant and substantive mediator between IDPs and suicide attacks.

In sum, the work on group concentration and terrorism is severely lacking, but the most recent statistical analyses build on a strong theoretical foundation and are, hopefully, a harbinger of future work.

In addition to the literature on discrimination, group concentration, and terrorism, there is also relevant literature on cleavages, ethnic fragmentation, and civil war onset that lends itself to my hypotheses. Specifically, the work of Selway (2010) and Gubler and Selway (2012) puts forth that what matters when it comes to predicting the onset of civil



war, specifically, is not the presence of cleavages, but how multiple cleavages in a society are structurally related to each other. Cross-cuttingness, or cleavages that do not align, but that cut across each other, is negatively associated with both civil war onset (Selway 2010) and mobilization (Gubler and Selway 2012).

Based on the literature mentioned above, there does appear to be some support for a significant relationship between certain types of discrimination and terrorism. Certainly, however, further and deeper analysis is needed to flesh out the parameters of this relationship. Additionally, the relative lack of literature on group concentration and terrorism sheds light on the utility of further examination of this connection. Importantly, the work on the structural relationship between cleavages within a society indicates that mobilization and the subsequent propensity toward political violence are affected by the degree of otherness experienced by a group. In the next section, I will briefly review the predictors of domestic terrorism.

## **2.2 Predictors of Domestic Terrorism**

Much work has been done on the predictors of terrorism. This is especially true considering the post-9/11 research on terrorism. Despite the amount of work that has been done in this subject area, the results are largely inconclusive. In general, work on predictors of terrorism can be grouped into three, sometimes overlapping categories. The first focuses on Gurr's Relative Deprivation Theory. Researchers investigating these types of predictors tend to focus on economic disparity and/or resource access. A second category focuses on regime type and how certain regime institutions or practices can affect terrorism. Finally, much work on the predictors of terrorism focuses on the strategic logic of this particular type of violence and subsequently points to contextual factors that make terrorism more and less attractive.

Gurr's (1970) work on relative deprivation laid the groundwork for all subsequent research focusing on the relationship between economic discrimination and political violence. Building on the psychological factors pushing violence, Gurr points to frustration and the aggression associated with that frustration as a critical precipitant of violence. Relative deprivation is the specific kind of frustration based on the discrepancy between an individual's value expectations and value capabilities. In other words, frustration can result when there is tension between an individual's reality and what that individual feels she should be able to achieve. The more intense and prolonged these feelings of frustration are, the more likely that individual will turn to aggression.

Although theoretically intuitive, Gurr's work has been heavily debated as later researchers have struggled to find a statistically significant link between relative deprivation, poverty, or economic discrimination and terrorism. For instance, Abadie (2004) finds no significant relationship between economic development and terrorism. Instead, he identifies a non-monotonic relationship between political freedom and terrorism: countries on both the high and low ends of the political freedom spectrum are less prone to terrorism than those falling in the middle. This explains, he concludes, the temporary increases in terrorism experienced during transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes.

On the other hand, Caruso and Schneider (2011) find that Gurr's relative deprivation theory has traction: looking at 12 Eastern European countries between 1994 and 2007, the researchers find that the larger the set of economic opportunities for an individual, the lower the likelihood that he or she will be willing to be involved in terrorist activities. In this sense, opportunity costs very clearly matter.

As mentioned above, Piazza (2011) reevaluates the inconclusive findings relating to economic discrimination and terrorism. What matters, he concludes, is the economic discrimination faced by a domestic minority group; when a country has a minority group

suffering from economic discrimination, it is significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorism. Conversely, a country without minority groups or without minority groups experiencing economic discrimination is significantly less likely to suffer from domestic terrorism. In his later work, he continues the focus on domestic minority groups, but looks closer at different types of discrimination. Economic discrimination faced by domestic minority groups, he finds, has a positive statistically significant effect on domestic terrorism (Piazza 2012).

As a bridge linking the relative deprivation arguments with those pointing to the relevance of political regime structure, Nasir et al. (2011) consider both sets of predictors and concludes that both are positively linked to terrorism: economic conditions, specifically income disparity, were found to be a major cause of terrorism in South Asian countries. At the same time, however, political structure was also found to have an impact on terrorism; populations suffering from political discrimination and repression were more likely to be involved in terrorist activities.

Looking beyond regime type, Findley and Young (2011) identify certain institutions as predictive of terrorist activity. The authors argue that institutions can convey something about credible commitments by the government, and so the establishment and regulation of these institutions indicates a government's true intentions. They focus on independent judiciaries and argue that without these, government officials cannot be expected to restrain themselves from future violations of human rights (given that human rights violations are related to terrorism). In this way, independent judiciaries dissuade terrorists by serving as a kind of credible commitment mechanism for the government. Because of this, independent judiciaries provide less incentive for the use of terrorism.

In a similar way, Aksoy et al. (2012) look beyond regime type and point to specific institutions as determinants of terrorism. This more nuanced approach yields intuitive

results: terrorist organizations are more likely to emerge in places where political mobilization - particularly opposition political mobilization - is present and where there is no elected legislature. In this sense, Aksoy et al. conclude that we should not be looking at regime type, per se, when we are looking at terrorism, but at the institutions that comprise these regimes and how they encourage or discourage terrorism.

Savun and Phillips (2009) reassess the tenuous and inconclusive relationship between democratic regimes and terrorism. The positive relationship between democracy and terrorism is theoretically founded on the conception that certain characteristics of democracies provide fertile ground for the development and use of terrorism. Empirically, however, there is a difference between the predictive effect of democracy on transnational versus domestic terrorism; although there is a positive relationship between democracy and the former variable, the researchers find no statistically significant relationship between democracy and the latter variable. To explain the divergence, the researchers point to foreign policy and conclude that it is not regime type, per se, that determines terrorism, but that country's foreign policy. States that exhibit a particular type of behavior toward the external environment elicit higher transnational terrorism responses. Specifically, involvement in international crises, alliance ties with the United States, and intervention in civil wars particularly increase a state's vulnerability to transnational terrorism.

Pape (2003) sets the standard for elucidating the strategic logic behind suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism is not used solely for religious reasons and suicide terrorists are not unique or substantially different from any other individual. Instead, suicide terrorism is a tactic strategically chosen by groups and individuals volunteer as suicide terrorists within these groups with the same motivations that would encourage members of other groups to volunteer for less volatile missions. Pape substantiates his claims by comparing terrorist organizations' classification of effectiveness of suicide attacks and the count of suicide

attacks around the world between 1980 and 2001. He concludes that suicide terrorism is especially effective when used in liberal democracies to coerce the administrations to grant significant concessions.

Abrahms (2012) takes another look at the strategic logic argument. Analyzing 125 violent substate campaigns, Abrahms concludes that terrorist campaigns against civilians are not successful in terms of coercing the government to comply with the organization's demands. Guerilla campaigns, Abrahms determines, are significantly more effective compared to terrorist campaigns. The strategic logic argument is flawed, Abrahms argues, because it is a flawed communication strategy; media coverage of terrorist events seldom articulates the group's political demands. This is problematic because without clearly articulating their outcome goals, the terrorist organization has little coercion power over the government.

Keller (2012) touches on a specific aspect of the strategic logic approach to causes of terrorism; she argues that at low conflict levels, ethnic groups have different (and greater) incentives to use terrorism, compared to non-ethnic rebel groups. Keller argues that at low levels of conflict, ethnic rebel groups will strategically decide to use terrorism, more than non-ethnic rebel groups, for the reason that they can more easily identify the target members. At higher levels of conflict, however, the costs of using terrorism against the target increases significantly, making ethnic rebel groups less likely to use terrorism.

Kydd and Walter (2006) point to specific tactics used in terrorism to highlight the strategic benefits of this type of violence. Their argument describes terrorism as a costly signal that is necessary to achieve political gains because the actors using this type of violence have no political access or resources to achieve their goals. Terrorist organizations are typically weak actors, in comparison, and so are not capable of making credible threats. Without the capacity to threaten, terrorist organizations must display publicly just how far

they are willing to go to obtain the goals they desire. The strategy goes deeper than just rationalizing the use of terrorism, though. Kydd and Walter provide five principal strategic logics of costly signaling that terrorist organizations use in their campaigns: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. Each of these different strategies, the authors suggest, can be used by terrorist organizations to achieve different goals.

As mentioned above, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also touch upon the strategic logic of participating in violence, more generally, and rebellion specifically. The researchers found that an important factor influencing opportunity for rebellion was the *cost* of rebellion. Their findings demonstrated that male secondary education enrollment, per capita income, and the national growth rate all statistically significantly reduce conflict risk. They argue that because these things are proxies for earnings foregone in rebellion, the relationship demonstrates a cost-benefit calculus.

It can be strategically beneficial, Plumper and Neumayer (2010) argue, for terrorist organizations to target foreign nationals of the foreign allies of their home country. This is based on the idea that if a terrorist organization's goal is to overthrow their government, then attacking foreign nationals of countries that support their home government chips away at that support. To test their theory, Plumper and Neumayer analyze international alliances (as proxies for international support) against the targets of international terrorist attacks. They find that attacks foreign nationals is particularly attractive if the ally is militarily more powerful than the home country.

To conclude, the majority of the work on predictors of terrorism can be grouped into three categories: those focusing on relative deprivation, those focusing on regime type and political institutions, and those focusing on terrorism as following a strategic logic.

### **2.3 Current Focus**

The focus of the current study is to examine whether terrorism is related to heightened otherness. That is, I test whether group concentration modifies or conditions the effect of discrimination on domestic terrorism. This line of inquiry naturally builds off of the statistical work done on the relationship between discrimination and terrorism, and the theoretical (and small amount of statistical) work that points to a relationship between group concentration and political mobilization. I turn now to my chapter on theory, in which I elucidate the relationship between my variables of interest.

## Chapter 3

### Theoretical Development

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an in-depth examination of the relationship between types of discrimination, group concentration, and domestic terrorism. I examine the distribution of domestic terrorism and discrimination and group concentration at the country-level using a modified theoretical framework. This framework is based especially on the work of Ted Gurr and was later modified by Robert Pape, Martha Crenshaw, and James Piazza.

In brief, at the macro-level, country-years with minority ethnopolitical groups facing discrimination will experience increased incidences of domestic terrorism when those groups are less concentrated and more integrated into the larger majority population. This is based off of two assumptions, one statistically tested and one that has not yet been thoroughly examined: 1) discrimination against a minority group can be a precondition for domestic violence committed by that group against the majority group; and 2) for discrimination to have an effect, members of the minority ethnic group must be aware of the discrimination and awareness is significantly affected by integration into the majority population. More specifically, when a minority group is completely concentrated and, therefore, isolated from the majority group, discrimination could be present even at high levels without the minority group knowing about it. Conversely, at low levels of concentration, members of the minority group will be dispersed and more integrated into the majority population so that the presence of discrimination can be experienced. In sum, we should see an increase



in domestic terrorism incidences when an ethnopolitical minority group is discriminated against and characterized by low group concentration.

Facing this political climate and without de facto pathways to political revision and change, these minority groups might seek other avenues to elicit political change favoring their specific group. When protests don't evoke change and lone actor attacks don't gain traction in the media, minority groups will turn to terrorism as a rational choice and effective tool to provoke institutional change. In this sense, the interaction of discrimination and group concentration can be predictive of domestic terrorism.




Figure 3.1: Causal Model: From Discrimination X Segregation to Domestic Terrorism Attacks

In this chapter, I will review how terrorism and discrimination and group concentration are defined in this study. I will also review the reasons that have been given in the literature for expecting a relationship between discrimination, group concentration, and terrorism as well as the criticisms of this relationship that have been discussed in the literature. Further, I will discuss the macro-level theoretical framework. I turn now to the definition of terrorism.

### 3.1 Definition of Terrorism

A good theory of terrorism necessarily requires not just a thorough conceptualization of the term, but also a promise that the term can be empirically applied. This task is especially problematic given the fact that the term “terrorism” is used professionally and colloquially in so many different ways and to describe so many widely varying forms of violence. In line with this is Laqueur’s claim that “a comprehensive definition of terrorism... does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future. To argue that terrorism cannot be studied without such a definition is manifestly absurd” (1977, p.5).

Laqueur might be right in his conclusion that an exhaustive definition for terrorism doesn’t yet exist, however, putting forth that the definition of terrorism should be accepted as implicit, however, is problematic. From an empirical standpoint, it is incredibly important to invest time in elucidating what is meant by key concepts. This is especially the case in research designed to include systematic tests of a theory; in order to avoid miscategorization or miscalculation between independent observers, a definition that can universally be applied to empirical cases is necessary. In regards to the study of terrorism, this point cannot be emphasized enough. Definitions of terrorism and the consequent findings they prompt can be incredibly divergent. For example, some scholars take an action-based approach to defining terrorism; that is, they see terrorism as a particular

act of violence, and code it accordingly (Dugan and LaFree 2012). Problematic in this approach is that it becomes difficult to differentiate acts of terrorism from other types of warfare. In an attempt to control for this, other scholars take an actor-based approach to terrorism. This approach accepts all incidents from a terrorist actor as terrorism, regardless of the intention, target, or result of those incidents. Simultaneously, by including only those acts committed by terrorist actors, any terrorism-like incident from a non-terrorist actor is not included (De La Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012). Still another way of identifying terrorism is by assessing the ethical choices driving the actors. The idea here is that because “terrorism” is almost universally used as a pejorative term, the decision process of the actors driving the actions must then be morally repugnant (Asal 2012). In sum, there exists a wide range of discrepancy when it comes to very specifically conceptualizing and operationalizing terrorism. If researchers are not dedicated to very deliberately defining and measuring terrorism, results can be inconclusive or even conflicting.

With the aim to avoid this kind of obscurantism, I define terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (Dugan and LaFree 2012). Despite the clarity of this definition, there are instances where terrorism can be conflated with violence of another type. To distinguish between terrorism and other types of violence, I put forth that three additional attributes must be present: the act must be aimed at achieving a specific goal (political, religious, social, or economic); there must be evidence that the act was intended to send a kind of message to a larger audience beyond the directly affected victims, and; the action must not be part of a larger war effort.

### 3.2 Definition of Discrimination

Despite the amount of work that has been done on the link between discrimination and violence, very little effort has been put into directly defining discrimination. This is either due to the intuitive nature of discrimination - the I-know-it-when-I-see-it phenomenon - or the difficulty in providing a definitive and inclusive definition for the term.

To avoid uncertainty in my findings and to simultaneously preserve the integrity of future replication, I define discrimination as an act that either enforces or reinforces social exclusion and in doing so, fosters a sense of otherness among the afflicted individuals or group members. Importantly, discrimination is limiting; to be discriminatory, something must limit access or deny perceptions of equality.

### 3.3 Definition of Group Concentration

Unlike discrimination, on which there is significant research, group concentration has rarely been studied in the field of international relations and only marginally in the field of comparative politics. Most of what we know about group concentration comes from geography and demographic studies. This renders it difficult to understand, in terms of politics, because it has been studied as an empirical reality and not used as a variable, *per se*.

In this research, I understand group concentration as either something that is self-selected or imposed from the outside. When individuals of the same group seemingly choose to live together, we understand this as self-selective group concentration. Conversely, when individuals of the same group are intentionally pushed to specific areas, we understand this as imposed or forced group concentration. Importantly, both scenarios represent vastly different realities; groups that self-select concentration might very likely have a different relationship or experience with the state than those who are forced by the government

into concentrated living. Despite this difference in reasons behind group concentration, for the purposes of this research, I am conflating both perceptions: group concentration is the characteristic of close-proximity living of a unique and specific group apart from the majority population done intentionally either by members' choosing, or by government action. I choose not to investigate the causal mechanisms behind group concentration in this study and only the effects of that concentration.

### **3.4 Definition of Heightened Otherness**

The primary focus of this research is to determine the effects of what I call heightened otherness on domestic terrorism. Heightened otherness is not necessarily an intuitive term; it is not common among political scientists or even among scholars of terrorism. Why would I choose to use a relatively new and unused term in this research, then? The simple answer is what is alluded to above: while there exists research on the relationship between types of discrimination and terrorism, there is a lack of research on group concentration and terrorism. This is likely because measuring group concentration has proven difficult due to the lack of consensus on the term's conceptualization. In political science generally, and in terrorism studies specifically, it has been assumed that increases in group concentration lead to increases in terrorism (this is because of the role of group concentration in fostering political mobilization). However, the title of this dissertation is not simply group concentration and terrorism; I have chosen the term heightened otherness intentionally. Heightened otherness is a term used not only to capture the presence of group concentration, but also discrimination against a group. This is an incredibly important point for the theoretical footing of this research: low group concentration or the presence of discrimination on their own, might not necessarily increase terrorism. What matters, is how each variable affects the other. For example, discrimination against a group might be high, but

because group concentration is also high, the effect of that discrimination is silenced. In other words, because the group being discriminated against is highly insulated from the rest of society, it is difficult for group members to develop a strong perception of being discriminated against. This is precisely because the group is concentrated away from the majority population and so members do not have the opportunities or capacity to interact with the majority group, a step necessary to even begin to perceive policy differences.

Conceptually speaking, I understand heightened otherness as the presence of both high discrimination and low group concentration on a specified and distinct group. Statistically speaking, heightened otherness is the interaction effect of group concentration combined with discrimination.

### **3.5 Connecting Heightened Otherness and Terrorism**

Of obvious interest to this research is the relationship between heightened otherness and terrorism. How does heightened otherness affect terrorism, if at all, and what is the magnitude of that impact? I propose in this research that heightened otherness increases domestic terrorism when discrimination is high and group concentration is low. Discrimination is a type of grievance, or a shared experience around which political action can crystallize. Importantly, for discrimination to precipitate domestic terrorism, there must be an absence of effective political pathways that those being discriminated against can pursue for institutionalized, long-term change. Without pathways for political change, the relative cost of participating in domestic terrorism drops significantly, inspiring individuals to engage.

Discrimination, however, is only a precondition for domestic terrorism, and so, on its own, might not have any effect on domestic terrorism incidences. What matters, I argue, is access to information regarding discrimination. This can come in many forms, one of which, is group concentration. The higher concentrated the group, the more isolated it is

from the majority population. In these cases, the cost of information is high. Conversely, the lower concentrated the group, the more integrated its members are in the majority population. This integration lowers the cost of information and subsequently, group members can become intimately aware of differences in institutionalized and/or systemic treatment.

In sum, when discrimination is high and group concentration is low, I expect domestic terrorism incidences to increase. Importantly, because the acts of discrimination and group concentration definitionally have to do with a government or ruling body, we can assume that the group being acted upon (in this research, a domestic minority group) does not have access to the government and so cannot institutionally or formally change the status quo. This situation leaves group members face to face with terrorism, something that looks increasingly attractive as access to *de jure* change becomes increasingly restrictive.

### 3.6 Challenges to Heightened Otherness and Terrorism

The heightened otherness-and-terrorism nexus is not theoretically unchallenged. The first set of critiques comes from those who see no relationship, or a negative relationship between types of discrimination and terrorism (Piazza 2009, 2006; Berrebi, 2007; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Theoretically, this can make sense. To understand this, we should parse out different types of discrimination. Beginning with economic discrimination, if groups are restricted when it comes to economic benefit, they might not be able to fund expensive or wide scale terrorism attacks. In this sense, economic discrimination could be understood to decrease terrorism. Cultural, linguistic, and religious discrimination might be understood to force assimilation and thus, to eliminate the group's "different" status. In this sense, these types of discrimination can be understood to decrease terrorism, too.

A second set of critiques sees a positive relationship between group concentration and

terrorism. If group concentration can foster political mobilization, and if political mobilization is necessary for political action - specifically costly political action - then the likelihood of increased terrorism attacks resulting from increased group concentration would make sense.

In sum, it is not hard to create and believe a theoretical foundation that results in a relationship between heightened otherness and terrorism that varies what is theorized in this dissertation. In fact, this may very well be a finding of this research.

### 3.7 Heightened Otherness Model

Building on what is above, I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between heightened otherness and domestic terrorism when discrimination is high and group concentration is low. This assumption is based on the results and conclusions of previous work. Research on discrimination against minority groups and propensities toward terrorism rely heavily on the assumption that the discrimination of minority groups produces and reinforces a sense of “otherness,” or an identity shared among the group members and distinct from the majority population. The cultivation of the group identity is critical to defining and making salient grievances among the group members. Crenshaw (1981), Ross (1993), and Piazza (2011) explicitly depict marginalization and grievance as a critical ingredient for terrorist group formation and activity.

Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) serve as an example of the role of discrimination in the fomentation of terrorist ideology. Typically classified as a “separatist” terrorist group, the LTTE formed as a result of systemic discrimination ranging from employment and the use of language to freedoms of speech and assembly.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See “Tamils want an end to Sri Lanka discrimination after election” by Jason Burke in *The Guardian* (April 2010).



The link between discrimination and domestic terrorism is measured in my first hypothesis:

*H1: Country-years with minority groups experiencing high discrimination will be more likely to experience more domestic terrorism attacks.*

What hasn't been so rigorously tested or analyzed in this relationship, however, is the role of group concentration in predicting domestic terrorism. From Tilly's (1978) original research on mobilization, high group concentration can foster mobilization around specific political causes. I agree with Tilly's theory and assume that in the absence of discrimination, highly concentrated ethnopolitical groups can more easily come to consensus regarding their desires and intentions. When these groups have a negative perception of their state or larger governing body, they can quickly determine their group opinion and act on it, if they so desire.

Importantly, and as it relates to domestic terrorism, these groups characterized by high concentration are also more likely to express extremist ideologies. From Hardin's (1999) theory on group isolation, extremist ideologies can flourish in groups that are highly insulated from the majority population. This is particularly true when these groups are headed by malevolent elites: by creating and disseminating hyperbolic rhetoric about the majority population, these elites keep their group members in line (by instilling a fear of the other group) and simultaneously reinforce their positions within the community (by being the arbiter of the "truth"). Some terrorism (although, importantly not all) is built on extremist ideology, and this is the type of domestic terrorism that we should expect to increase in these environments.

*H2: Country-years with minority groups characterized by high group concentration will be faced with more domestic terrorism incidences.*

My third hypothesis decisively departs from the second. Tilly's work on mobilization is

important when it comes to explaining political activity, but what hasn't been so rigorously tested or analyzed in this relationship, however, is the role of group concentration in predicting domestic terrorism, specifically. While I agree with Tilly that highly concentrated groups might be better able to share experiences and determine the consensus necessary for widespread political violence like revolution, I theorize that when it comes to lowering the cost of information regarding discrimination and inspiring smaller-scale (yet still violent) political activity, lower group concentration is more predictive.

The main focus of this research is the effect of both discrimination and group concentration on a minority group. I hypothesize that the interaction term I am calling heightened otherness will be positively and linearly related with domestic terrorism. More specifically, I assume that when discrimination is high, the minority groups experiencing it will have a collective grievance on which to act. Simultaneously, when group concentration is low, these same members have access to situations exposing them to just how differently they and their coethnics are being treated in comparison to the majority group. In this sense, the interaction of the two terms "heightens" the experience of discrimination and subsequently renders their grievances that much more salient.

*H3: Country-years with minority groups experiencing high discrimination and characterized by low concentration will be faced with more domestic terrorism incidences.*

In sum, I am expecting to find a linear, positive relationship between discrimination and terrorism, group concentration and terrorism, and heightened otherness and terrorism. Regarding the effects of the interaction terms in this research, I am expecting to find that high discrimination interacted with low group concentration will result in increases in domestic terrorism.

## Chapter 4

### Empirical Analysis

This chapter discusses the methodology used to test the relationship between heightened otherness and domestic terrorism. I will describe the data I use and provide theoretical justifications for using this data. I will present and analyze the sources from which the data are culled and then outline my analytic strategies. Finally, I will present the results of these estimation strategies.

#### 4.1 Data

In this research I am attempting to assess the relationship between domestic terrorism and discrimination and segregation singly, and combined. My dependent variable is domestic terrorism incidences. My independent variables are measures of discrimination: economic, political, and cultural; and group concentration. A detailed breakdown of the variables used in this analysis can be seen in Table 4.1.

##### 4.1.1 Dependent Variable

I use one dependent variable throughout my analysis: domestic terrorism incidences. I am interested in domestic terrorism, compared to transnational terrorism, for the very reason that I am measuring certain state-level government policies of discrimination that would not affect populations outside state borders. In other words, because I am interested in the

effect of government policies on their own populations, including transnational terrorism incidences in my analysis would likely distort my results.

My dependent variable is drawn from the Global Terrorism Database, maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD is the continuation of a project begun by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS), a private security agency. PGIS collected information on terrorism incidents between 1970 and 1997. START began to digitize these handwritten records in 2005 and with the help of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS) began to continue data collection beyond 1997. Today, START staff have integrated and synthesized data collected across the entire 1970-2012 time span and continue collecting data moving forward.

#### **4.1.2 Strengths of GTD**

The strengths of the GTD are many. First, the GTD is free and easily accessible. Researchers can download the entire dataset or can select subdatasets to download based on specific selection criteria (such as country, perpetrator, etc.).

Additionally, the GTD's data collection and coding methodology is incredibly effective. GTD researchers and research assistants at START review between 12,000 and 16,000 articles and identify between 600 and 1,200 terrorism incidents each month. These media reports come from the Metabase Application Programming Interface (API) and are supplemented with articles downloaded from the Open Source Center. Natural language processing and machine learning techniques subsequently filter through these reports removing duplicates and erroneous articles. What remains is handed to six coding teams each staffed with a particular domain of the GTD Codebook: location, perpetrators, targets, weapons and tactics, casualties and consequences, and general information. This filtering

strategy and the subsequent handing off to specialized teams means that the GTD staff has the resources and capacity to very accurately analyze large amounts of information while minimizing the potential for error. This is a huge strength of the GTD.

Perhaps the most ontologically important strength of the GTD is its definition of terrorism and inclusion criteria. The GTD defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." In other words, for events to be included in the GTD database, they must be intentional, entail some level of violence or the threat of violence, and the perpetrators must be sub-state actors. In addition to satisfying this definition, incidents must also demonstrate at least two of three additional criteria: the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; there must be evidence of intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to an audience beyond the immediate victims, and/or; the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. The last three criteria can be used as filters by the researcher to either limit or expand their data. Giving the researcher the reigns over what to include, as part of the definition of terrorism is an incredibly useful asset of the database and likely its largest strength.

#### **4.1.3 Weaknesses of GTD**

Despite the strengths of the GTD, there are specific weaknesses that deserve mentioning. First, data from the year 1993 is missing. These data were lost prior to START's compilation of the GTD and although several efforts have been made to recollect these incidents from original news sources, the data collected at this point is still only estimated to represent 15 percent of the terrorism incidents that happened that year. To prevent researchers from misinterpreting the low count of terrorism incidents in 1993 as the real count, all

events from 1993 have been excluded from the database.

Just as the biggest strength of the GTD is ontological in nature, so too, is its biggest weakness. The GTD harvests information from media reports. Although these reports are from a wide and growing range of sources, the reality remains that if an act of terrorism occurs and no media report it, it is counted as if it never happened. In this sense, media reports effectively *create* terrorism incidents. This means that the GTD is not able to produce the *real* count of terrorism incidences.

#### 4.1.4 Independent Variables

I use two different types of independent variables in my analysis: measures of discrimination and measures of segregation. In terms of discrimination, I am interested in analyzing the effects of economic, political, and cultural discrimination. These three iterations of discrimination are imperative to analyze because they each and all can reinforce the feelings of “otherness” that this research is concerned with. For example, if a law prohibits someone from speaking his or her language in public places while other individuals in the community are allowed to speak their (different) language, feelings of being different or distinct from the other group can grow. The same logic applies to economic and political discrimination and is why the inclusion of these variables is necessary for this research.

Group concentration is what I am primarily interested in measuring in this research and so it is necessary that I include a measure of it in these estimation strategies. Group concentration measures a group’s spatial distribution within a country-year and represents, I argue, access to information for comparison to the majority group.

I am primarily interested in the effect of the interaction term “heightened otherness” on domestic terrorism incidents. I create this interaction term by multiplying my measures of discrimination by my measure of group concentration. Why include an interaction term

when I am already including its constitutive terms in my analysis? The reason for this is that I am measuring a conditional relationship; I hypothesize that the strategic decision to participate in domestic terrorism is conditional upon both the level of discrimination and the level of group concentration. This is distinct from hypothesizing that the strategic decision to participate in domestic terrorism is related to discrimination and/or group concentration. Indeed, including an interaction term in my analysis implies that I assume a conditional relationship. In other words, I assume that discrimination increases terrorism when group concentration is either high or low, for different reasons.

These independent variables are drawn from the Minorities at Risk database (MAR). MAR is part of the Minorities at Risk Project, begun by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986 and based at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). The main focus of the project is to collect qualitative and quantitative information relating to minority “at risk” populations. These ethnopolitical groups have populations of at least 500,000, collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discriminatory treatment, and collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of self-defined interests.

#### **4.1.5 Strengths of MAR**

MAR includes four phases of data collection ranging from 1945-2000. This wide range of data provides ample ground for identifying trends and envisioning policy solutions aimed at ameliorating the “at risk” status of groups. Most importantly, this type of database is increasingly important for the very reason that ethnicity in specific and group identity in general are gaining more traction and importance in a global community that is shifting its focus away from the nation state as a form of political organization and toward alternatives, such as unions (European Union), regions (South East Asia), and ethnic groups (Kurds). The biggest strength of the MAR database is its utility to state administrators seeking to

better understand the status of minority-at-risk groups.

#### **4.1.6 Weaknesses of MAR**

There are two primary weaknesses of the MAR database. First, data collection has been irregular between the phases and largely determined by the availability of funding. Without steady funding, the creation and maintenance of a large and effective group of researchers to collect and code material is difficult. Additionally, because of the break up of the phases of collection, there are substantial changes between Phase I and Phase IV. Specifically, some groups either gain or lose their “at risk” status over time, removing them from or adding them to the database. Additionally, some indicators have changed over time. While an effort has been made to mark very clearly to outside users where these changes have been made and what old indicators’ new versions are, there still exist gaps.

A bigger weakness, however, is the project’s reliance on “relativity.” Specifically, group discrimination and bias exist relative to other groups within the same country. This can lead to serious analytical issues. For instance, a MAR group in a country without the right to vote would be coded as experiencing political discrimination only if the majority group in the country had the right to vote (if the majority group did not have the right to vote, no relative discrimination would be experienced by the MAR group and it would be coded as not experiencing political discrimination). Thus, because the MAR database measures relative discrimination and bias, it should not be understood to represent the absolute conditions experienced by MAR groups.

#### **4.1.7 Control Variables**

In addition to my dependent and independent variables, it is critical that I include a range of controls in my analysis. These variables are: gross national income (GNI), population,



area, and three additional measures from Polity IV: the number of years the current regime has been in power, the degree of executive branch constraint, and the level of political participation.

All of these variables are important to include in this analysis for the very reason that their effects on domestic terrorism are not obvious *a priori*. For example, I include GNI as a control because it is unclear in which direction it affects terrorism. On the one hand, richer countries might be perceived as more attractive targets for terrorists because a terror event would likely create more attention. Likewise, terrorists in these countries might have more access to resources that might not be available in less rich countries. On the other hand, richer countries have stronger police and intelligence agencies and so may be able to better prevent terrorism even before it happens. In this sense, the impact of GNI is not clear. The logic supporting my inclusion of GNI is similar to that supporting my choice of population and area.

The controls I pull from Polity IV are all some measure of political freedom. The relationship between political freedom and terrorism is also ambiguous *a priori*. Repressive states could foster terrorism: where there is no opportunity for political participation, terrorism might be viewed as the only option to elicit political change. Similarly, repressive states could prevent terrorism by stamping out all opportunities for mobilization and idea sharing. Free states could likewise foster terrorism by serving as an attractive target for terrorists precisely because they have a free press that might very likely report on the attack regardless if it disparages the country's national security practices. On the other side of the coin, these countries might be less likely to foster terrorism because there are a multitude of other alternatives to pursue to elicit real political change.

Table 4.1: Variables, Operationalizations, and Sources

Variable Name	Operationalization	Source
attacks	Number of incidents of domestic terrorism occurring in a country in a given year.	Global Terrorism Database (2013)
ecdis	Economic Discrimination Index 0 No discrimination 1 Historical neglect/Remedial policies 2 Historical neglect/No remedial policies 3 Social exclusion/Neutral policies 4 Restrictive policies	Minorities at Risk Project (2012)
poldis	Political Discrimination Index 0 No discrimination 1 Neglect/Remedial policies 2 Neglect/No remedial policies 3 Social exclusion/Neutral policy	Minorities at Risk Project (2012)
cultural_index <sup>1</sup>	Cultural Restrictions Index 0 No restrictions ... 22 Activity sharply restricted	Minorities at Risk Project (2012)
groupcon <sup>2</sup>	Groups Spatial Distribution 0 Low concentration 1 High concentration	Minorities at Risk Project (2012)
lnGNI	Natural log of gross national income per capita in US dollars at current prices.	United Nations Statistical Division (2013)
lnPopulation	Natural log of national mid-year population.	US Census Bureau International Database 2013
DURABLE	Number of years current political regime in country has been in place.	Polity IV (2011)
XCONST	Number of constraints on the chief executive.	Polity IV (2011)
PARCOMP	Competitiveness of political participation.	Policy IV (2011)

<sup>1</sup>This variable is not pulled directly from the MAR Database, but instead, is an additive index I created comprised of all the measures of cultural discrimination

<sup>2</sup>I recoded this variable and changed it from its original, categorical form, to binary.

## 4.2 Estimation Strategy

My unit of analysis is the country-year. To begin to analyze my data, I first needed to reconfigure the GTD and MAR databases so that they could be merged together on the country-year. In GTD, I selected only those observations that were coded as domestically logistic. I then collapsed the data so that I could have a count of terrorist attacks per each country-year.

The MAR database required more work. Unlike GTD, the MAR database is structured by the minority-at-risk group. Precisely because the database is organized in this manner, there exist country-years without minority-at-risk groups (which would mean that the independent variables would all be zeros) and country-years with multiple minority-at-risk groups. To get around this, I first dropped all the observations without a minority-at-risk group present so that the database would be comprised solely of country-years with minority-at-risk groups. I then collapsed each independent variable by the country-year using the maximum value of that independent variable. There is an important theoretical reason for my decision to use the highest level of the independent variables measuring discrimination and segregation (compared to using the average or minimum values): I argue that these variables reflect the upper limit of the types of policies and practices that societal norms present within the state will allow. This is also consistent with the methodology employed by Piazza 2012, Lai 2007, and Caprioli and Trumbore 2003. Finally, I created an additive index variable representing cultural discrimination and comprised of each and all of the cultural discrimination indicators included in the MAR dataset.

I similarly reconfigured each dataset containing a control variable so that they were organized by the country-year and finally merged all the data together. All independent variables are lagged one period. This, of course, helps to capture delayed effects of changes in the predictors and further helps to parse out direction of causation. Summary statistics

can be seen in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Attacks	25.337	57.176	1	536	832
Economic Discrimination	2.718	1.133	0	4	614
Political Discrimination	2.993	1.170	0	4	611
Cultural Discrimination Index	3.877	4.458	0	22	423
Group Concentration	0.8411	0.3657	0	1	831
Durable (Polity IV)	23.281	35.741	0	194	828
Executive Constraint (Polity IV)	4.816	2.125	1	7	764
Political Participation (Polity IV)	3.240	1.349	0	5	764
Log Gross National Income	24.231	2.248	18.772	30.082	758
Log Population	16.998	1.370	13.270	20.930	792

#### 4.2.1 Correlation

All of the types of minority group discrimination and group concentration are correlated with one another but to different degrees. Table 4.3 presents results of Pearson's  $r$  correlation coefficients for the variables of interest.

Table 4.3: Correlation Coefficients

	ecdis	poldis	cultural_index	groupcon
ecdis		0.5669 (0.0000)	0.2614 (0.0000)	0.1303 (0.0012)
poldis	0.5669 (0.0000)		0.3102 (0.0000)	0.1449 (0.0003)
cultural_index	0.2614 (0.000)	0.3102 (0.000)		0.1577 (0.0011)
groupcon	0.1303 (0.0012)	0.1449 (0.0003)	0.1577 (0.0011)	

The fact that these variables are, by and large, correlates of one another should not be surprising nor significant when it comes to interpreting the results of this research. Theoretically, it makes sense that minority at risk groups in countries are frequently afflicted

by multiple types of discrimination, which might in turn, affect each other; a group facing political discrimination would also likely suffer from constrained economic opportunities and cultural restrictions and the presence of these might influence further restraints on the group. Additionally, it can be surmised that a minority group in a country facing discrimination would seek out communities comprised of their ethnic group or kin for residence and business to mitigate (at least to a small extent) some of the discrimination imposed by the state and majority population. In sum, I admit that there is a degree of correlation among my independent variables of interest, but because of its nonuniform nature, don't understand this level of correlation as a significant complication in the interpretation of my results. More importantly, because these variables will not be used in models together, there is no risk of overinflating the standard errors of the models, and/or underestimating the significance of each predictor.

#### 4.2.2 Creating Interaction Terms

Based on the theory developed in earlier chapters, the relationship between discrimination and group concentration is multiplicative, and not additive. These relationships are significantly different. Take, for example, the following equation:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \varepsilon$$

In this equation, Y is the response variable, which is affected by X and Z independently. The implication of this relationship is the assumption that neither X nor Z affect the other when it comes to each variable's effect on the outcome variable. More specifically to this case, if discrimination and segregation have an independent relationship with each other, variance in one of the predictor variables (either X or Z ) would not change the marginal effects of the other predictor variable on domestic terrorism.

A multiplicative relationship, however, would have different results. Take for example, the following equation:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ + \varepsilon$$

Similar to the equation above,  $Y$  represents the outcome variable, which is affected by both  $X$  and  $Z$ . What is important to note in this equation, however, is the third beta term, which is the multiplicative effect of both independent variables of interest. Again, it makes sense to insert an interaction term in this analysis because I am assuming that the relationship between discrimination and domestic terrorism is different at different levels of group concentration. In this sense, group concentration can be understood as a *conditioning* variable.<sup>3</sup> The inclusion of an interaction term is necessary to test this theory because it is a conditional theory (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

Importantly, adding an interaction term to a model drastically changes the interpretation of all of the coefficients. Without the inclusion of the interaction term, the coefficient of  $X$  would be interpreted as the unconditional marginal effect of discrimination on domestic terrorism. But the interaction means that the effect of discrimination on terrorism is different for different values of group concentration (because it is conditioned by group concentration).

Applying the ideas substantiating interaction terms to the guiding theory of this research, discrimination does, indeed, have an effect on domestic terrorism, but only when group concentration is present at certain values. More clearly, when group concentration is at its minimum the effect of discrimination on domestic terrorism will be high.

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<sup>3</sup>Although I define the variable group concentration as the *conditioning* variable in this equation, interaction equations are inherently symmetrical (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007; Berry, Golder, Milton 2012). As such, while this research is focused on the conditioning effect of group concentration on discrimination's effect on terrorism, by the same logic presented here, discrimination conditions group concentration's effect on terrorism.

### 4.3 Results

To test the relationship between my variables, I employ a series of negative binomial regressions. I choose this estimation process because my outcome variable, terrorist attacks, is a count variable, can never be a negative value, and is unevenly distributed spatially and temporally. Employing ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions would be inadequate as these models assume that values are normally distributed around the expected value and can take any real value, including positive and negative values.

The first model is bivariate negative binomial regressions. The second model is additive containing one measure of discrimination and group concentration. Following this, I introduced the interaction term in the third model, and for the final model, added in control variables. The results of these models can be seen in tables 4.4 through 4.6.

Table 4.4: Economic Discrimination Models

	1	2	3	4
Economic Discrimination	0.093 (1.76)	0.085 (0.052)	0.243* (0.11)	0.193 (0.14)
Group Concentration		0.333** (0.153)	0.858* (0.35)	1.022* (0.41)
Economic Discrimination x Group Concentration			-0.205 (0.13)	-0.198 (0.15)
lnGNI				0.040 (0.04)
lnPopulation				-0.135 (0.08)
DURABLE				-0.003 (0.00)
XCONST				0.383*** (0.05)
PARCOMP				-0.504 (0.09)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				



In a bivariate negative binomial regression, economic discrimination has a positive, but not statistically significant effect on domestic terrorism. The effect of economic discrimination decreases once group concentration is added, as seen in the second model. It remains, however, insignificant. The addition of the interaction term to the equation decreases the significance of the effect of group concentration, but simultaneously lends a level of statistical significant explanatory power to economic discrimination. The interaction term, itself, is negative and insignificant. The final model replicates these effects for group concentration and the interaction term, but also takes away the level of statistical significance the variable economic discrimination had in the previous model. In sum, models utilizing economic discrimination as a primary explanatory variable do not produce substantive statistically significant results for either the measure of discrimination or the interaction term.

Table 4.5: Political Discrimination Models

	1	2	3	4
Political Discrimination	0.049 (4.57)	0.052 (0.053)	0.588*** (0.12)	0.452*** (0.12)
Group Concentration		0.276* (0.134)	2.393*** (0.41)	2.154*** (0.43)
Political Discrimination x Group Concentration			-0.661*** (0.13)	-0.545*** (0.14)
lnGNI				0.024 (0.04)
lnPopulation				-0.157* (0.07)
DURABLE				-0.003 (0.00)
XCONST				0.368*** (0.05)
PARCOMP				-0.466*** (0.09)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				

Similar to the models including economic discrimination, political discrimination has a small, positive, not statistically significant effect on domestic terrorism in the bivariate negative binomial regression. The addition of group concentration, too, yields similar results: group concentration has statistically significant explanatory power, but political discrimination does not. These models deviate from those including economic discrimination, however, beginning with model three. When an interaction term was created comprised of political discrimination and group concentration and added to the equation, every explanatory variable subsequently had statistically significant effects at the 0.001 level. As control variables were added, all three primary variables of interest maintained their statistical significance.

Table 4.6: Cultural Discrimination Models

	1	2	3	4
Cultural Discrimination	0.016 (1.23)	0.015 (0.013)	0.173* (0.08)	0.117 (0.08)
Group Concentration		0.438** (0.189)	1.102*** (0.29)	0.963** (0.30)
Cultural Discrimination x Group Concentration			-0.206** (0.08)	-0.131 (0.09)
lnGNI				0.069 (0.05)
lnPopulation				-0.206* (0.10)
DURABLE				-0.001 (0.00)
XCONST				0.354*** (0.07)
PARCOMP				-0.543 (0.11)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				

Cultural discrimination, as an explanatory variable, had an even smaller effect on domestic terrorism than economic discrimination. In the bivariate negative binomial regression, cultural discrimination had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on domestic terrorism. When group concentration was added in, although it (like in all of the previous models) had statistical significance, cultural discrimination still did not. When the interaction term was added in the third model, every explanatory variable had statistical significance, but at varying levels. Finally, when all of the control variables were added in, both the interaction term and cultural discrimination lost their statistical significance.

Based on these data, I do not find strong support for hypothesis one, the postulation that minority groups facing discrimination will be more likely to commit acts of domestic terrorism. Economic and cultural discrimination have positive statistical significance in the third model, but only at the 0.05 level. Political discrimination has a stronger, positive statistically significant effect on terrorist attacks, but only in models three and four. I do find support for hypothesis 2, the expectation that higher concentrated minority groups will be more likely to commit acts of domestic terrorism; group concentration, in every model is positive and retains statistical significance.

In regards to my third hypothesis, the postulation that minority groups experiencing “heightened otherness” will be more likely to commit acts of domestic terrorism, the models with the interaction term comprised of political discrimination and group concentration show the strongest effect. Importantly, because the variable of interest is an interaction term, its sign in the results table doesn’t accurately explain its effect on domestic terrorism. To better understand the substantive effect of this new term, I computed marginal effects (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Buis 2010; Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012). These results can be seen in table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Marginal Effects: Political Discrimination x Group Concentration

	Coef. (Std Err.)
Group Concentration = 0	0.452*** (0.124)
Group Concentration = 1	-0.092 (0.063)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

When group concentration is dichotomized so that “0” represents lower values of concentration and “1” represents higher values of concentration, the effects of group concentration on political discrimination’s effect on domestic terrorism is strongest at the lower levels of group concentration. This effect can be seen in figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects: Political Discrimination x Group Concentration

Based on these results, the conditioning effect of “group concentration” on the measure of political discrimination is strongest at the lower levels of group concentration. More specifically: heightened otherness has a positive effect on domestic terrorism when political discrimination is high and group concentration is low.

#### 4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis

The primary finding of this research is that heightened otherness has a positive effect on domestic terrorism when political discrimination is high and group concentration is low. Before measuring the effect of group concentration on political discrimination, I

dichotomized it, changing it from its original categorical form with four response categories, to binary form. This can be seen in table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Group Concentration Coding - Original Dichotomization

New Form	Original Form
0 = Low Concentration	0 = Widely dispersed
	1 = Primarily urban or minority in one region
1 = High Concentration	2 = Majority in one region, others dispersed
	3 = Concentrated in one region

It is important, however, to test whether dichotomizing the variable in this way is the most accurate in terms of capturing the effect of group concentration on political discrimination. To do this, I recoded the variable “groupcon” in two additional ways and ran marginal effects on these new codings. For the first check, I recoded the conditioning variable so that “0” only represented one original category, “Widely dispersed.” I then ran two negative binomial regressions with the new variable and subsequent interaction term: model 1 includes the additive effects of political discrimination, group concentration, and the new interaction term; model 2 includes the original additive model and all of the control variables. The new coding and results of this first sensitivity check can be seen in tables 4.9 through 4.11 and figure 4.2.

Table 4.9: Group Concentration Coding - Sensitivity Check 1

New Form	Original Form
0 = Low Concentration	0 = Widely dispersed
1 = High Concentration	1 = Primarily urban or minority in one region
	2 = Majority in one region, others dispersed
	3 = Concentrated in one region



Table 4.10: Sensitivity 1: Political Discrimination x Group Concentration

	1	2
Group Concentration	2.349** (0.78)	3.349*** (0.85)
Political Discrimination	0.407 (0.28)	0.796* (0.32)
Political Discrimination x Group Concentration	-0.381 (0.28)	-0.839** (0.32)
lnGNI		0.019 (0.04)
lnPopulation		-0.132 (0.08)
DURABLE		-0.004* (0.00)
XCONST		0.378*** (0.05)
PARCOMP		-0.466*** (0.09)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table 4.11: Sensitivity 1: Marginal Effects

	Coef. (Std Err.)
Group Concentration = 0	0.796*** (0.317)
Group Concentration = 1	-0.042 (0.058)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001




Figure 4.2: Sensitivity Check 1

From these data, we can see that, again, group concentration has a statistically significant effect on political discrimination, but only at the lowest level of group concentration. There is no statistically significant effect of group concentration on political discrimination at “high concentration.”

I ran one additional sensitivity check to exhaust all the possible codings of “groupcon.” The new coding of the variable, the results table of two models (one additive, and one including the additive results along with control variables), marginal effects, and a figure demonstrating these marginal effects can be seen in tables 4.12 through 4.14 and figure 4.3.

Table 4.12: Group Concentration Coding - Sensitivity Check 2

New Form	Original Form
0 = Low Concentration	0 = Widely dispersed
	1 = Primarily urban or minority in one region
	2 = Majority in one region, others dispersed
1 = High Concentration	3 = Concentrated in one region

Table 4.13: Sensitivity 2: Political Discrimination x Group Concentration

	1	2
Group Concentration	1.669*** (0.37)	1.773*** (0.43)
Political Discrimination	0.422*** (0.11)	0.419** (0.13)
Political Discrimination x Group Concentration	-0.475*** (0.12)	-0.515*** (0.15)
lnGNI		0.022 (0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.132 (0.08)
DURABLE		-0.003 (0.00)
XCONST		0.353*** (0.05)
PARCOMP		-0.446*** (0.09)

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table 4.14: Sensitivity 2: Marginal Effects

	Coef. (Std Err.)
Group Concentration = 0	0.419*** (0.131)
Group Concentration = 1	-0.095 (0.064)

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001




Figure 4.3: Sensitivity Check 2

Based on these results, no matter how group concentration is coded, so long as the original response category “concentrated in one region (3)” is excluded from the “low concentration” group, the effects of group concentration on political discrimination are statistically significant. To recapitulate the main findings of this research: country-years with minority ethno-political groups suffering from discrimination and characterized by low concentration will experience higher levels of domestic terrorism attacks.

### 4.3.2 Dichotomizing Political Discrimination

Another way to test the sensitivity of the relationship presented in this research is to dichotomize the variable measuring political discrimination. This was the only discrimination variable composing an interaction term that demonstrated statistical significance, therefore, it will be the only variable tested for sensitivity in this way. The recoding of the political discrimination variable and the results of four models can be seen in tables 4.15 and 4.16. Model one contains the bivariate negative binomial regression results. Model two contains additive results. Model three introduces the new interaction term, and model four adds control variables.

Table 4.15: Political Discrimination Coding

New Form	Original Form
0 = Low Discrimination	0 = No discrimination
	1 = Neglect/Remedial policies
	2 = Neglect/No remedial policies
1 = High Discrimination	3 = Social exclusion/Neutral policy
	4 = Exclusion/Repressive policy

Table 4.16: Models with Dichotomized Political Discrimination

	1	2	3	4
Political Discrimination	0.314*	0.339**	1.373***	1.440***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.29)	(0.33)
Group Concentration		0.388*	1.280***	1.583***
		(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.29)
Political Discrimination x Group Concentration			-1.234***	-1.428***
			(0.32)	(0.36)
lnGNI				0.048
				(0.04)
lnPopulation				-0.178*
				(0.08)
DURABLE				-0.003
				(0.00)
XCONST				0.368***
				(0.05)
PARCOMP				-0.466***
				(0.09)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Similar to the estimations maintaining the original coding of political discrimination, these results show that the new interaction term has statistical significance. I ran marginal effects on the new interaction term to test whether it maintains the same relationship as the original interaction term comprised of political discrimination and group concentration. The results can be seen in table 4.17 and figure 4.4 below.

Table 4.17: Marginal Effects: Dichotomized Political Discrimination

	Coef. (Std Err.)
Group Concentration = 0	1.439*** (0.32)
Group Concentration = 1	0.011 (0.14)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	




Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects: Dichotomized Political Discrimination

These results mimic the primary findings of this research, that heightened otherness increases domestic terrorism when political discrimination is high and group concentration is low. I ran the same two sensitivity checks used above to capture the effects of different dichotomizations of group concentration on the newly dichotomized political discrimination variable. The results are in tables 4.18 through 4.20 and figure 4.5.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>The first sensitivity check produced multicollinear results. For that reason, those results are not presented here.



Table 4.18: Group Concentration Coding - Sensitivity Check 2b

New Form	Original Form
0 = Low Concentration	0 = Widely dispersed
	1 = Primarily urban or minority in one region
	2 = Majority in one region, others dispersed
1 = High Concentration	3 = Concentrated in one region

Table 4.19: Sensitivity 2b: Political Discrimination x Group Concentration

	1	2
Group Concentration	0.889*** (0.23)	1.126*** (0.26)
Political Discrimination	0.967*** (0.24)	1.119*** (0.28)
Political Discrimination x Group Concentration	-0.841** (0.29)	-1.162*** (0.32)
lnGNI		0.039 (0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.146 (0.08)
DURABLE		-0.003 (0.00)
XCONST		0.350*** (0.05)
PARCOMP		-0.431*** (0.09)

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Table 4.20: Sensitivity 2b: Marginal Effects

	Coef. (Std Err.)
Group Concentration = 0	1.119*** (0.275)
Group Concentration = 1	-0.043 (0.158)

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001




Figure 4.5: Sensitivity Check 2b

Reiterating the primary findings of this research, when the variable measuring political discrimination is dichotomized to capture the broader effects of “high” and “low” discrimination, the effect of heightened otherness on domestic terrorism remains the same: heightened otherness increases domestic terrorism when political discrimination is high and group concentration is low.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>I checked for robustness by running my original bivariate and models with controls as ordinary least squares regressions. In addition to my original discrimination variables, I have used similar variables from the Ethnic Power Relations and Cingranelli-Richards datasets in the same models outlined above. These results can be seen in the Appendix.

## Chapter 5

### Conclusions

#### 5.1 Hypotheses

This research aims to address three distinct but related hypotheses.

*H1: Country-years with minority groups experiencing high discrimination will be more likely to experience more domestic terrorism attacks.*

The data and analyses used in this research do not substantiate my first hypothesis. When run in bivariate negative binomial regressions, no measures of discrimination were statistically significant. To no surprise, after adding in controls one at a time, the measures of discrimination remained statistically insignificant in the models.

There are several, equally convincing and somewhat related reasons why the relationship between discrimination and terrorism is not causal. First: grievances are not the same in quality or effect as expectations (Regan and Norton 2005). Grievances are a measure of inequality, which can be judged relative to others in a society. Expectations, on the other hand, are a function of relative deprivation and the psychological processes that signal one's expectations are not being met.

Second, grievances are likely a necessary but not sufficient condition for the precipitation of organized internal conflict (Tarrow 1994, Lichbach 1990, DeNardo 1985, Tilly 1978). This argument has crystalized through the years as more researchers point to the importance of mobilization when it comes to predicting conflict. Mobilization potential, not just the

presence of discrimination (or another form of grievance), is the key to unrest and is determined by the ability to marshal resources.

Third, leadership matters and most likely directly affects mobilization potential (Gurr 2000). If opportunity is the lock to open the door to conflict, effective leadership is type of key necessary to open the door.

Beyond these alternative theories elucidating the relationship between discrimination and terrorism, there are also methodological issues worth mentioning. First, although the two primary datasets used in this research are the best approximations of what I am trying to measure, they do not truly capture what this hypothesis aims to measure: the effects of discrimination on a minority group's probability to wage terrorism strikes. This is because the two datasets have two different units of analysis; while MAR focuses on the minority group, GTD focuses on the terrorist attack. It cannot be concluded based on these data that the the presence of a discriminated against minority group within a country is the group in that country waging terrorist attacks.

To further demonstrate this potential pitfall in the data, we can take a brief turn toward Turkey and the United States. From MAR data, Turkey has two qualifying "Minority at Risk" groups: Kurds and Roma. The United States has four: African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Native Hawaiians.

Are these necessarily the groups waging domestic terrorist attacks within these countries, though? From the GTD data, in the United States since 1970, terrorist attacks have been committed by left-wing militants (169), anti-abortion activists (168), and individuals (160). The Weather Underground, a left-wing militant group, perpetuated many acts of extremist violence between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s.<sup>1</sup> Importantly, though,

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<sup>1</sup>Although there were certainly other left-wing militant groups in the United States during this time period, none was as active in terms of perpetuating acts of terror as the Weather Underground.

the Weather Underground contained members who do not fall into the above-mentioned “Minority at Risk” groups in the United States.

Anti-abortion violence has steadily escalated since the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision making abortion legal. Since 1977, eight women’s health care providers have been murdered. Importantly, in each of these cases, the murderer has been a white male.<sup>2</sup> Although data are hard to find on the overall demographics of members of anti-abortion groups, consensus holds that these groups are comprised primarily of white Christians.

Individual, or “lone wolf” or “lone actor” offender attacks are a consistent threat in the United States (Deloughery et al. 2013). These perpetrators compose a vast swath of United States’s demographics and some do, indeed, come from the designated “Minority at Risk” groups. For important theoretical reasons, however, the perpetrators of these crimes don’t necessarily *matter* in terms of this research, which is oriented toward not an individual’s perception of relative deprivation and discrimination, but the psycho-social phenomena that occur within a group setting.

In sum, only a small percentage of terrorist attacks in the United States have been perpetuated by discriminated against at risk groups. The Turkish case is slightly different. Recall that the country has two “Minority at Risk” groups: Kurds and Roma. Terrorism in the country has been perpetuated largely by one group: the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Between 1970 and 2013, the group perpetrated 1,209 domestic attacks in Turkey (the next highest frequency group committing terrorism in Turkey is Dev Sol with 237 attacks during the same time frame). Unlike the US examples, the PKK fits quite nicely with the theory guiding not just the first hypothesis, but also the larger research agenda in this dissertation: the PKK wages terrorism against the state of Turkey precisely because its members believe the discrimination against the Kurdish population in Turkey is unjust.

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<sup>2</sup>See the National Abortion Federation’s Violence and Disruption Statistics.

*H2: Country-years with minority groups characterized by high group concentration will be faced with more domestic terrorism incidences.*

In regards to this second hypothesis, my data and analyses are supportive: group concentration is positive and statistically significantly related to domestic terrorism. This means that less concentrated groups (more dispersed groups) would be less likely to turn to terrorism in comparison to more concentrated groups. The reasons for this have to do with “othering” and political mobilization. Group concentration facilitates “othering” for the very reason that a highly concentrated group has access to homogenous and what I’ll call “second-hand” information. Individuals in a highly concentrated group interact only with members of that group. In this way, consensus can be bred among the group members. This is important to consider when it comes to consensus regarding the status of the group, which is based on the group’s perception of the status of the “other” group. Because the group’s information in relation to the other group is “second-hand,” or not directly from the other group, but rather based on the perceptions of the minority group, it might not be factually true. Indeed, it is relational. Elites in the minority group might likely find it in their benefit to emphasize the differences between the groups and one way to do this, as Hardin theorizes, is to proselytize extremist ideology.<sup>3</sup>

In conjunction with “othering,” group concentration also fosters political mobilization. A more highly concentrated group undoubtedly interacts more and the individuals comprising the group likely more frequently discuss the status quo. The closer proximity and more frequent access of individuals to each other in these groups means that political mobilization will be easier, in comparison to a more dispersed group with individuals who might not have opportunities to interact, commiserate, and brainstorm ideas with each

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<sup>3</sup>Elites of minority groups have an incentive to create and/or perpetuate hyperbole as it relates to the dominant group (Hardin 2002). This helps to bolster the minority group around the elite(s) and ensures continued support.

other.

Although there is no statistical work on the relationship between group concentration and terrorism, there are important contributions that substantiate my theory. In addition to Hardin's theory, the ethnic segregation model lends my hypothesis a substantial amount of leverage. This theory hypothesizes that ethnic political mobilization occurs when group members are concentrated in low-status occupations apart from the rest of the majority population (Hechter 1975). Being concentrated into low-status occupations subsequently makes group members perceive that their life chances are fewer than those of other ethnic groups.

While this research isn't concerned with occupational concentration, per se, the effects of this type of group concentration should be similar to the effects of physical group concentration; a clear and perceived delineation from the majority group(s) resulting in more consensus building opportunities within the minority group absent of input from the majority group.

*H3: Country-years with minority groups experiencing high discrimination and characterized by low concentration will be faced with more domestic terrorism incidences.*

The data used in this analysis support this hypothesis. Groups facing discrimination and characterized by low concentration are more likely to commit acts of domestic terrorism. This relationship might be based on the theoretical assumptions outlined in detail in chapter 3. To recapitulate: the effect of discrimination on domestic terrorism is conditioned by group concentration. Systematic, as well as feelings of discrimination can inculcate sentiments of relative deprivation. The magnitude of relative deprivation is dependent on the level of discrimination: low discrimination will decrease feelings of relative deprivation while high levels of discrimination will increase feeling of relative deprivation.

Because relative deprivation is *relative*, it is dependent on information of the majority

group. Access to that information is affected by levels of group concentration: low levels of concentration will increase access to information about the majority group while high levels of concentration will decrease access to information about the majority group.

Taken together, low levels of concentration and moderate levels of discrimination <sup>4</sup> are where we observe the highest levels of domestic terrorism.

This research tested multiple types of both discrimination and segregation. The interaction effect was strongest between political discrimination and group concentration. The strong effect of political discrimination on domestic terrorism resonates with earlier work done on the effect of political exclusion and civil war, rebellions, and mass political violence (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Bonneuil and Ariat 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Most recently, Choi and Piazza (2014) argue that in situations where ethnic minority groups are politically excluded, terrorism is actually a more viable reaction because it is more cost effective than civil war. After running a series of different models and employing different measures of terrorism, they find that when people are excluded from state power due to their ethnic background, they are more likely to resort to domestic terrorism.

Unlike research substantiating the relationship between political discrimination and domestic terrorism, research is lacking on the relationship between group concentration and domestic terrorism. The most promising work focuses on diverse ethnic groups in large American cities and finds that predisposition to a *reactive* identity depends, in part, on integration with the majority group (Rendon 2015; Portes and Zhou 1993). More work certainly needs to be done on group concentration given its strong and consistent effect on domestic terrorism.

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<sup>4</sup>Discrimination at the highest levels is repression and it is likely that in a repressive environment, despite being aware of the discrimination facing a specific group, members of that group will not have opportunities to act in any way.



## 5.2 The Experience of Kurds in Turkey

The Kurdish experience in Turkey serves as an existence proof for this research. Following the establishment of the Turkish state in the early 1920s, nationalism took precedence over ethnic differences in the hopes to create a strong, unified state. Turkish leaders saw to it that everyone was classified as a Turk in some respect. Because of this, Kurds living in Turkey weren't referred to as Kurds, but as "mountain Turks." To further the assimilation process, the Turkish government forbid Kurds from using their language and wearing their traditional clothes while simultaneously encouraging their migration from traditionally-Kurdish provinces in the south east to larger cities in the west.<sup>5</sup>

As the decades passed, tensions mounted between the Kurdish and Turkish populations. In 1978, Abdullah Ocalan formed the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) to advocate for independence for the Kurdish population in Turkey. Citing Turkish repression of Kurdish culture, language, and economic opportunities, the PKK began its armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984.

In the early 1990s, conflict in the south east resulted in Kurdish towns being destroyed. As a result, approximately one to four million Kurds were forced to migrate westward.<sup>6</sup> These internally displaced Kurds migrated primarily to Izmir, Istanbul, and Ankara.<sup>7</sup>

Following this wave of forced migration, Kurds continued to move westward in pursuit of economic opportunities and simultaneously faced backlash from local Turkish populations. As the "Kurdish Opening" began to be implemented across the state in 2009, Turkish nationalists spoke out against the policies. Representatives from the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey and the Kurdish Studies Network said that a "culture of violence," and

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<sup>5</sup>See Washington Post archive article "Who Are the Kurds?"

<sup>6</sup>See Minority Rights Group International "State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011."

<sup>7</sup>See Department of State's "Turkey" from *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*.

“tense ethnic relations,” subsequently developed.<sup>8</sup>

The integration of Kurds into the larger Turkish population has led to increased feelings of discrimination. Zeynep Gambetti and Joost Jongerden relied on Kurdish informants while researching their book on the Kurdish population in Turkey and found that while both first- and second- generation Kurdish migrants described facing discrimination because of their identity, it was only the second-generation informants who perceived the wider effects of this discrimination (the first-generation informants only associated the discrimination they faced with things specifically related to their Kurdish identities like the clothes they wear or the language they speak). This younger generation pointed to the discrimination they faced in public spaces like schools, hospitals, and workplaces as examples of being discriminated against strictly because they were Kurdish and not necessarily associated with the residual state policy.

In this way, moving westward and integrating more into the majority population exposed the Kurds to more and varied discrimination. The Kurds’ increasing experiences with discrimination as they integrated into the larger majority population is similar to the Latino experience in Los Angeles, California. From his research on immigrant communities, Rendon (2015) found that Latinos living in hypersegregated neighborhoods (distinctly segregated from the White population) understood discrimination only in the abstract. “They knew discrimination was ‘out there’ but with minimal interaction with Whites, the majority could not point to incidents where they felt they were directly or blatantly discriminated” (Rendon 2015; 174). The experience of discrimination moved from the abstract to the real when Latinos were put in situations where they were integrated with the larger White community. Specifically, Rendon profiles young Latino men who attended university and

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<sup>8</sup>See Refworld’s “Turkey: Situation of Kurds in western cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Konya and Mersin; resettlement to these cities (2009 - May 2012).”

began to interact with Whites for the first time. These men were able to recount specific incidences of discrimination against them.

In Rendon's research (2015) Latinos developed "reactive" identities when they integrated into the larger White population and experienced discrimination. This means that their original abstract ideas of discrimination were crystallized and in response, these young men developed adversarial outlooks and opinions concerning the White population.

In a similar way, Kurds in Turkey who integrate into the larger majority population are subject to discrimination and liable to develop adversarial opinions regarding the Turkish state and its majority population. In 2011, Abdullah Demirbas, the mayor of the municipality of Sur in Diyarbakir province (a mainly Kurdish province in south east Turkey) was among the defendants on trial for membership in an illegal pan-Kurdish organization. Immediately, human rights defendants pointed to the blurry distinction between legal, political activity and illegal terrorism. Highlighting possible negative reactions, Demirbas stated in an interview with *The Guardian* that he feared that the repression of political activity would decrease confidence in politics and lead to more violence: "A state that wants to end violence should widen the political sphere as much as possible, so that people who used to feel compelled to use armed force will turn to dialogue instead."<sup>9</sup> Demirbas's evidence of his hypothesis is close to home: after being arrested and sentenced to two years and six months in jail in 2009 for saying "a soldier's and a guerilla's mother's tears are the same color" Demirbas's son joined the PKK.

The story of Demirbas's son's decision to join the PKK is demonstrative of the effects of heightened otherness on domestic terrorism. Specifically in Demirbas's case, his relatively prestigious role as a mayor meant that he was not isolated from the majority population but instead, frequently interacted with Turks. Concurrently, his political right of assembly

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<sup>9</sup>See *The Guardian* "Kurds in Turkey: arrests and violence threaten to radicalise a generation."

was being threatened, and for a marginalized ethnopolitical population already facing both institutionalized and the vestiges of formerly institutionalized discrimination, this act of further repression by the Turkish government coalesced into a young man assuming an extremely adversarial outlook.

### 5.3 Limitations

There are several important limitations to this research. First, I have used only one measure of concentration. This is limiting in that it indicates that my substantive results are not robust. Having other alternative measures of this important variable would be a better test of my theory. Furthermore, the variable for group concentration comes from the MAR dataset. Again, this limits the robustness of my substantive findings in that the problems associated with the MAR dataset characterize this variable.

In addition to these variable-level limitations, there is also a significant problem with the alignment of the two primary datasets used to test the theory in this research. As was mentioned above in connection to the findings relating to the first hypothesis, while the MAR dataset measures discriminations against specific minority-at-risk groups, the GTD dataset, as I have configured it, measures discreetly the amount of terrorist attacks within a given country-year. This can likely mean that the groups being discriminated against are committing the acts of terrorism; or, that terrorism is being perpetuated by different domestic groups.

Last, I have not included a substantive qualitative assessment in this research. Although my presentation of the Turkish case serves as an existence proof, it is not based on significant time in the field or first-hand narratives. A substantive qualitative assessment of specific ethnopolitical groups could shed some insight on the causal mechanisms linking discrimination and segregation to domestic terrorism. Simultaneously, qualitative studies

could help to ameliorate some of the uncertainty inherent in the connecting the MAR and GTD datasets, as mentioned above.

## 5.4 Policy Implications

Research on terrorism has significant national security policy implications. While much of the latest research has revolved around the balance between national security and civil liberties (Deflem and McDonough 2015; Best et al. 2012), there a growing body of research on counterterrorism policy development and assessment (Mueller and Stewart 2014; Nohrstedt and Hansen 2010).

The findings of this research can help to inform effective counterterrorism policy moving forward. To ameliorate its domestic terrorist threat, a government can do either of the following two things: 1) combat group concentration in the absence of political discrimination; or, 2) encourage group concentration in the presence of political discrimination.

## 5.5 Conclusions in Regards to Future Research

The statistically significant relationship between heightened otherness and domestic terrorism sheds light several important issues. First, *concentration matters*. When it comes to terrorism, we are still learning. We know about terrorism as a strategy (the *what*): terrorism is used to elicit political change when there are no other avenues to pursue; terrorism is costly and relies heavily on audience costs. What we still don't know much about, and what this research seeks to address, is the root of terrorism (the *why*): under what conditions does terrorism grow; or, using Martha Crenshaw's framework, what are the *preconditions* for terrorism? This research points strongly to the role of group concentration as an important precondition for domestic terrorism. The use of terrorism as a strategy requires the existence of a significant distance between groups. We've looked to

discrimination in the past to explain where some theoretical distance between groups can arise from, but the explanatory power of discrimination on terrorism is contradictory and spotty, at best. Indeed, I agree that discrimination is an important variable to measure when it comes to explaining chasms between groups; by its very nature, discrimination depends on the existence of difference, relativity, and the “other” group.

Equally, if not more important, however, is the role of geographical distance between groups. The idea that group concentration has an effect on intergroup relations is intuitive, but has not been statistically analyzed. When we talk about group concentration and geographical information, we most frequently refer to maps. This is an important practice. Indeed, maps convey important information and should, I argue, be used more frequently in political methodology to illustrate relationships, if not correlations. For instance, to illustrate the relationship between discrimination and domestic terrorism, we can compare two maps created with geocoded events. The maps below illustrate a correlation that is substantiated by the statistical work in this research. The first map contains geocoded terrorist attacks waged by the PKK in Turkey in 2012 (Figure 5.1). Darker spots indicate a higher frequency of attacks and lighter spots the reverse.




Figure 5.1: PKK Attacks in Turkey, 2012

The second map represents discrimination in Turkey in 2011 (Figure 5.2). Here I have used unemployment rate as a proxy for discrimination and geocoded the rates by province (the lowest level of geocoding I can derive given the data).




Figure 5.2: Unemployment Rate by Province in Turkey, 2011

With a quick side-by-side comparison, there seems to be overlap (correlation is probably too strong of a word to use here) between our measure of discrimination and domestic terrorist attacks. When we combine the geocoded data and create a composite map (Figure 5.3), we can more directly see the relationship between province-level unemployment rates and domestic terrorist attacks .






Figure 5.3: Composite Map: PKK Attacks 2012 + Unemployment Rates 2011

A more accurate representation of the relationship I am interested in would include a measure of group concentration. Specifically in this case, I would geocode the concentration of Kurds across Turkey. While this demographic information isn't available (to my knowledge and at this point in time), common knowledge tells us that most Kurds live in Southeastern Anatolia with a significant amount residing in Istanbul. Roughly speaking, this corresponds with the “overlap” areas in the composite map.

In sum, maps do and can contribute a lot to political methodology, especially as we start to understand the significance of geography in relation to terrorism. Again, it's important to reiterate that geographic information systems (GIS) does not supplant statistical analyses when it comes to demonstrating predictive relationships. At this point in time, statistical analyses are far more sophisticated in terms of this. Nonetheless, GIS offers a new perspective and utility when it comes to analyzing terrorism and its predictors.

This idea, that group concentration as a variable needs to be included in more analyses

of terrorism, brings me to my second suggestion, that group concentration needs to be further parsed out. In this research, group concentration has predictive power. This could be due to two things: either group concentration *is* predictive of domestic terrorism, or we need better and more measures of this variable. Developing truer and more atomistic measures of group concentration would undoubtedly lend itself to further research in this field.

Third, while this research looks at the effects of group concentration on domestic terrorism, it doesn't take into account a significant mitigating factor: Internet access. If group concentration affects access to information by determining its cost (the higher the level of group concentration, the higher the cost of information regarding the "other" group, and vice versa), then Internet access can be understood as an across the board price deflator. Costs of attaining information don't only include time to traverse the distance between groups, but also language barriers, appearance barriers, and other cultural barriers in general. Because the Internet doesn't take into account who its user is in comparison to other users, all of these costs are significantly dropped.

The spread of Internet access isn't necessarily a way to peace, however. Glaeser (2005) argues that changes in communication technologies, historically, have increased levels of hatred.<sup>10</sup> He points to the spread of cheap newsprint in the late nineteenth century as a factor helping to explain the spread of both anti-Semitism and anti-Black hatred in Europe and the United States, respectively. In a similar way, Post et al. (2014) point to the Internet as playing a significant in radicalizing lone wolf terrorists.

Last, as briefly mentioned in the introduction, gender should be analyzed as a conditioning variable in the relationship between discrimination and domestic terrorism. Women

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<sup>10</sup>Glaeser (2005) also explains that these same advances can decrease levels of hatred by making access to the truth less costly.

are systematically discriminated against around the world, specifically when it comes to earnings. In an analysis of 25 European countries, Schafer and Gottschall (2015) found that there exists a substantial wage gap for full-time employees across industries. The variation between countries is linked to trade unions and the relationship between pay bargaining strategies and minimum wage policies.

Although women aren't traditionally thought of as terrorists, the proportion of women both in terrorist organizations and committing terrorist attacks is increasing (Sutten 2009). Especially in heavily patriarchal societies, women can be influenced to participate in terrorism by their male family members, to avenge a sense of familiar dishonor, or to transform their identities as victims of sexual violence into something more contextually meaningful (Sutten 2009).<sup>11</sup> In addition, the roles traditionally ascribed to women in many societies - as caretakers, mothers, and nurturers - positions them to be especially supportive and protective of the very values that define ethnopolitical groups and that subsequently serve as a cause for these groups to be discriminated against. Importantly, and in terms of terrorism's strategic logic, female terrorists - specifically female suicide bombers - garner more media attention and subsequently help to recruit more numbers to the terrorist organization's cause (Bloom 2011).

These things together - more measures of group concentration and incorporating GIS into our methodology, controlling for the spread of and access to the Internet, and adding gender to the equation - should be taken into account in future research.

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<sup>11</sup>It should be noted that ascribing women's participation in terrorism risks denying them their agency. There are very likely instances where women deliberately chose to participate in terrorism for personal convictions. Parsing out women's choice to participate in terrorism from the coercion of women to participate in terrorism is another step that should be made as research of this ilk progresses.

## Chapter 6

### Appendix

#### 6.1 OLS Models

Below are the results tables of the models containing interaction terms run in ordinary least squares estimations. Tables 6.1 through 6.3 contain the interaction terms comprised of economic, political, and cultural discrimination and group concentration.

Table 6.1: OLS: Economic Discrimination Models

	1	2
Group Concentration	12.293 (10.83)	20.010 (13.73)
Economic Discrimination	3.598 (3.60)	3.831 (4.59)
Economic Discrimination x Group Concentration	-2.757 (4.01)	-4.508 (4.99)
lnGNI		1.376 (1.41)
lnPopulation		-3.894 (2.29)
DURABLE		-0.052 (0.06)
XCONST		7.230*** (1.50)
PARCOMP		-8.674*** (2.42)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.2: OLS: Political Discrimination Models

	1	2
Group Concentration	29.224* (12.15)	37.375** (13.99)
Political Discrimination	7.624* (3.75)	8.515* (4.24)
Political Discrimination x Group Concentration	-8.490* (4.11)	-10.215* (4.64)
lnGNI		1.275 (1.40)
lnPopulation		-4.361 (2.30)
DURABLE		-0.043 (0.06)
XCONST		7.267*** (1.48)
PARCOMP		-8.702*** (2.41)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.3: OLS: Cultural Discrimination Models

	1	2
Group Concentration	10.572 (7.19)	16.914* (8.28)
Cultural Discrimination	1.706 (1.72)	1.812 (2.11)
Cultural Discrimination x Group Concentration	-1.419 (1.78)	-2.709 (2.19)
lnGNI		1.850 (1.59)
lnPopulation		-4.623 (2.66)
DURABLE		-0.011 (0.06)
XCONST		6.753*** (1.72)
PARCOMP		-10.082*** (2.86)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

These results echo the findings from the negative binomial models in that “Interaction 2,” political discrimination x group concentration, is the only variable with any statistical

significance.

## 6.2 Ethnic Power Relations Data

Besides the Minorities at Risk database, two other important databases aim to operationalize and measure types of discrimination. The Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) contains variables measuring access to executive power (Wimmer et al. 2009). The variables “discpop,” or the percentage of discriminated population for each country-year, and “pwrlpop,” the percentage of powerless population for each country-year are the closest estimates to what this research is attempting to measure. Descriptions of each variable are in Tables 6.4.<sup>1</sup>

Table 6.4: Variables and Operationalizations - Ethnic Power Relations (2013)

Variable	Operationalization
Discriminated Population (lagdiscpop)	The percentage of the discriminated population for each country-year
Powerless Population (lagpwrlpop)	The percentage of the powerless population for each country-year

I ran these new variables in the same models used in the body of this dissertation. Model one contains the results of a bivariate negative binomial regression. Model two contains the results of an additive model. Model three introduces the interaction term, and model four includes control variables. The results of these models can be seen in tables 6.5 and 6.6 below.

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<sup>1</sup>Like the variables used from the MAR dataset, I lagged these variables one year to test for causality.

Table 6.5: Discriminated Percentage of Population with Controls

	1	2	3	4
Discriminated Population	-1.587*** (0.36)	-1.665*** (0.36)	-2.952** (1.00)	-3.252** (1.17)
Group Concentration		0.496*** (0.14)	0.446** (0.15)	0.558** (0.19)
Discriminated Population x Group Concentration			1.430 (1.07)	2.038 (1.26)
lnGNI				-0.015 (0.04)
lnPopulation				-0.174* (0.07)
DURABLE				-0.005** (0.00)
XCONST				0.391*** (0.04)
PARCOMP				-0.445*** (0.08)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Although the interaction term in these models doesn't provide any statistically significant explanatory power, the results are interesting, nonetheless. The effect of discriminated population on domestic terrorism is statistically significant across all models, but interestingly, the effect is negative. This means that as the size of the discriminated population increases, domestic terrorism *decreases*.

A plausible explanation for this has to do with how EPR codes discriminated populations. From the codebook: "Group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power" (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Coding discrimination objectively is more indicative of repression. The type of discrimination the MAR dataset measures, on the other hand, measures discrimination subjectively, that is, there doesn't necessarily have to be institutionalized discriminatory policies in place for a group to be coded as "discriminated against."



Table 6.6: Powerless Percentage of Population with Controls

	1	2	3	4
Powerless Population	0.139 (0.32)	0.103 (0.31)	-0.498 (0.46)	-1.436* (0.71)
Group Concentration		0.454** (0.14)	0.355* (0.16)	0.468* (0.19)
Powerless Population x Group Concentration			0.938 (0.60)	1.849* (0.81)
lnGNI				-0.011 (0.04)
lnPopulation				-0.178* (0.07)
DURABLE				-0.005** (0.00)
XCONST				0.382*** (0.04)
PARCOMP				-0.406*** (0.08)

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Neither the variable “powerless population” nor the interaction term comprised of the primary variables hold consistent statistical significance in these models. Similar to the models containing the discriminated population variable, powerless population, in the latter two models, has a negative relationship with domestic terrorism. This means that as the powerless population increases, domestic terrorism decreases. Again, this could be due to how EPR has coded powerless populations. A group is coded as powerless when “Elite representatives hold no political power at the national or regional levels without being explicitly discriminated against” (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). An operationalization like this is doesn’t provide much in the way of clarity; based on this operationalization, there are two possible ways a population can be coded as powerless: 1) the group has no elite representatives holding political power; or, 2) the group has elite representatives holding political power, but are discriminated against. If the powerless population variable indeed captures groups with access to institutionalized political offices, then this variable deviates from the guiding theory of this research. To recapitulate, a group must be discriminated against *and* not have legitimate access to political change before it turns to domestic terrorism.

### 6.3 The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project

Like the Ethnic Power Relations data, variables from the CIRI dataset measure government respect for human rights (Cingranelli et al. 2014). Fourteen of the indicators from this dataset serve as good approximations of types of discrimination this research is aiming to measure. I’ve used these variables as measures of discrimination and run the same models detailed in the body of this research.<sup>2</sup> Descriptions of the variables and the results of

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<sup>2</sup>Like the variables from MAR and EPR, I lagged these measures of discrimination to control for reverse causation.

bivariate negative binomial regressions can be seen in tables 6.7 through 6.10.<sup>3</sup>

Table 6.7: Variables and Operationalizations - CIRI (2011)

Variable	Operationalization
Freedom of Assembly and Association (assn)	0-2 Severely restricted to unrestricted
Freedom of Domestic Movement (dommov)	0-2 Severely restricted to unrestricted
Electoral Self-Determination (elecsd)	0-2 Severely restricted political participation and/or unfair elections to unrestricted participation and fair elections
Freedom of Foreign Movement (formov)	0-2 Severely restricted to unrestricted
Freedom of Speech (speech)	0-2 Complete government censorship to no government censorship
Torture (tort)	0-2 Practiced frequently to have not occurred
Extrajudicial Killing (kill)	0-2 Practiced frequently to have not occurred
Political Imprisonment (polpris)	0-2 Many people are imprisoned because of their political, religious, or other beliefs to no people are imprisoned because of their beliefs
Disappearance (disap)	0-2 Frequent disappearances to no disappearances
Physical Integrity Rights Index (physint)	0-8 No government respect for rights to full government respect for rights <sup>4</sup>
Women's Economic Rights (wecon)	0-3 No economic rights for women to economic rights for women are guaranteed by law
Women's Political Rights (wopol)	0-3 No political rights for women are guaranteed by law to political equality is guaranteed by law
Women's Social Rights (wosoc)	0-3 No social rights under the law to all of women's social rights are guaranteed by law
Workers' Rights (worker)	0-2 Severely restricted to fully protected

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<sup>3</sup>Because I pulled so many variables from the CIRI data base, I only ran subsequent models on those that in the previous model demonstrated statistical significance. This was to minimize the amount of unnecessary tests. This means that these results tables, unlike the ones above and in the body of this dissertation, are formatted slightly differently.

<sup>4</sup>This is an additive index comprised of the torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators.

Table 6.8: Bivariate Regression Results - CIRI

	1	2	3	4	5
Freedom of Assembly and Association	-0.123 (0.064)				
Freedom of Domestic Movement		-0.229*** (0.0716)			
Electoral Self Determination			-0.199*** (0.068)		
Freedom of Foreign Movement				-0.262*** (0.080)	
Freedom of Speech					-0.157** (0.078)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.9: Bivariate Regression Results - CIRI, cont.

	1	2	3	4	5
Torture	0.138 (0.076)				
Extrajudicial Killing		-0.151 (0.081)			
Political Imprisonment			-0.196*** (0.071)		
Disappearance				-0.101 (0.093)	
Physical Integrity Rights Index					-0.031 (0.026)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.10: Bivariate Regression Results - CIRI, cont.

	1	2	3	4
Women's Economic Rights	0.076 (0.110)			
Women's Political Rights		0.280*** (0.090)		
Women's Social Rights			0.024 (0.085)	
Worker's Rights				-0.189*** (0.068)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Seven of the original fourteen variables hold statistical significance in the bivariate models. I added in control variables to see if their statistical significance held. The results can be see in tables 6.11 through 6.17.

Table 6.11: Freedom of Domestic Movement with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Freedom of Domestic Movement	-0.324***	-0.223*	-0.233*	-0.021	0.002
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)
lnGNI	-0.075**	0.008	-0.001	-0.055	-0.004
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.169*	-0.167*	-0.141	-0.236**
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
DURABLE			0.002	-0.007*	-0.009**
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
XCONST				0.240***	0.362***
				(0.04)	(0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.392***
					(0.09)

\*p<0.05;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

\*\*p<0.01;

Table 6.12: Electoral Self-Determination with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Electoral Self-Determination	-0.294***	-0.184*	-0.186*	-0.074	-0.016
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
lnGNI	-0.078**	0.015	0.012	-0.061	0.008
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
lnPopulation		-0.178*	-0.176*	-0.121	-0.245**
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
DURABLE			0.000	-0.007*	-0.009**
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
XCONST				0.228***	0.358***
				(0.04)	(0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.420***
					(0.09)

\*p<0.05;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

\*\*p<0.01;

Table 6.13: Freedom of Foreign Movement with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Freedom of Foreign Movement	-0.339*** (0.09)	-0.222* (0.10)	-0.243* (0.10)	0.113 (0.12)	0.159 (0.12)
lnGNI	-0.075** (0.03)	0.016 (0.05)	0.006 (0.05)	-0.025 (0.05)	0.031 (0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.185* (0.08)	-0.181* (0.08)	-0.182* (0.08)	-0.284*** (0.08)
DURABLE			0.002 (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)
XCONST				0.253*** (0.04)	0.380*** (0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.402*** (0.09)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.14: Freedom of Speech with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Freedom of Speech	-0.287*** (0.09)	-0.129 (0.11)	-0.132 (0.11)	0.030 (0.12)	0.065 (0.12)
lnGNI	-0.071* (0.03)	0.041 (0.05)	0.038 (0.05)	-0.027 (0.06)	0.032 (0.06)
lnPopulation		-0.218** (0.08)	-0.215* (0.08)	-0.171 (0.09)	-0.281** (0.09)
DURABLE			0.000 (0.00)	-0.008* (0.00)	-0.009*** (0.00)
XCONST				0.233*** (0.04)	0.363*** (0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.424*** (0.09)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.15: Political Imprisonment with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Political Imprisonment	-0.369*** (0.08)	-0.270** (0.09)	-0.274** (0.09)	-0.094 (0.10)	-0.078 (0.10)
lnGNI	-0.100*** (0.03)	-0.013 (0.05)	-0.016 (0.05)	-0.062 (0.05)	-0.009 (0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.158* (0.08)	-0.155 (0.08)	-0.126 (0.08)	-0.225** (0.08)
DURABLE			-0.000 (0.00)	-0.007* (0.00)	-0.009** (0.00)
XCONST				0.218*** (0.04)	0.349*** (0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.420*** (0.09)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.16: Women's Political Rights with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Women's Political Rights	0.201* (0.10)	0.446*** (0.10)	0.443*** (0.10)	0.383*** (0.11)	0.426*** (0.11)
lnGNI	-0.032 (0.03)	0.177*** (0.04)	0.175*** (0.05)	0.051 (0.05)	0.112* (0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.432*** (0.07)	-0.429*** (0.07)	-0.290*** (0.08)	-0.403*** (0.08)
DURABLE			-0.000 (0.00)	-0.007* (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)
XCONST				0.217*** (0.04)	0.356*** (0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.450*** (0.09)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Table 6.17: Workers' Rights with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Workers' Rights	-0.305*** (0.07)	-0.214* (0.08)	-0.216* (0.09)	-0.113 (0.09)	-0.059 (0.09)
lnGNI	-0.079** (0.03)	0.014 (0.05)	0.011 (0.05)	-0.067 (0.05)	-0.004 (0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.182* (0.08)	-0.181* (0.08)	-0.114 (0.08)	-0.229** (0.08)
DURABLE			0.001 (0.00)	-0.007* (0.00)	-0.009** (0.00)
XCONST				0.222*** (0.04)	0.352*** (0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.415*** (0.09)

\*p<0.05;      \*\*p<0.01;  
\*\*\*p<0.001

Although several of these variables hold statistical significance across many models (“dommov,” “elecsd,” “formov,” “polpris,” and “wopol”), the indicator for women’s political rights (“wopol”) is the only variable with statistical significance across all five models. What is most interesting about this indicator, is that it has the reverse relationship than what this research would predict: as women are guaranteed more political rights, domestic terrorism *increases*. This relationship, however, is likely due to the confounding variable of democratization. The institutionalization of women’s political rights can be an indicator of a larger democratization process, which is often marked by violence; once the new portodemocratic institutions solidify, parties that anticipate losing an election should engage in violence either before immediately following elections (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Fearon 1998; Kalyvas 2000). This violence can and does include domestic terrorism.

I created an interaction term with the variable for women’s political rights and group concentration from the MAR dataset to test the third hypothesis in this research. The results of the models including them can be seen in table 6.18.



Table 6.18: Women's Political Rights x Group Concentration with Controls

	1	2	3	4	5
Group Concentration	-0.026 (0.41)	-0.147 (0.39)	-0.179 (0.39)	-0.466 (0.41)	0.044 (0.41)
Women's Political Rights	-0.093 (0.23)	0.054 (0.22)	0.040 (0.22)	-0.246 (0.23)	0.031 (0.23)
Women's Political Rights x Group Concentration	0.333 (0.25)	0.450 (0.24)	0.461 (0.24)	0.723** (0.25)	0.473 (0.25)
lnGNI	-0.015 (0.03)	0.201*** (0.05)	0.197*** (0.05)	0.070 (0.05)	0.150** (0.05)
lnPopulation		-0.454*** (0.07)	-0.451*** (0.07)	-0.318*** (0.08)	-0.446*** (0.08)
DURABLE			-0.000 (0.00)	-0.007* (0.00)	-0.009** (0.00)
XCONST				0.231*** (0.04)	0.377*** (0.05)
PARCOMP					-0.475*** (0.09)

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

The new interaction term does not show consistent statistical significance across the models and so does not substantiate my third hypothesis. In general, though, these data do support my first hypothesis, that discrimination has a positive relationship with domestic terrorism. The variables measuring freedoms of assembly and association, movement, electoral self-determination, and of speech all demonstrated that as these freedoms increase, domestic terrorism decreases. The indicators of extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and workers' rights demonstrate the same relationship. Measures of women's rights all demonstrate a positive relationship with domestic terrorism. As mentioned above, however, these rights might be a symptom of a larger democratizing process, which is typically characterized by increases in political violence in general, and domestic terrorism in specific. The measure of torture also has a positive relationship with domestic terrorism. Torture is not a symptom of democratization, but *is* a type of repression. Similar to the conclusions of the EPR data, repression is not what this research aims to measure.

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