DescriptionFor the last two decades there has been quite a bit of debate about whether executives receive excessive compensation and if so, how to control it. A number of countries have instituted some type of Say on Pay rules, affording shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. Much of this regulatory activity and debate is predicated on the notion that shareholder voting actually influences executive compensation for the better. Although Say on Pay continues to grow as a regulatory tool, the effectiveness of it as a mechanism to effect change remains an open and controversial question, and academic research has been inconclusive. Some prior studies find no change in the level of CEO pay around the adoption of Say on Pay in the U.S. and the U.K. (e.g., see Ferri & Maber (2013) for the U.K. and Iliev & Vitanova (2013) for the U.S.), whereas other studies provide strong evidence that Say on Pay is associated with lower CEO pay. (e.g., see Correa & Lel (2013)). The primary purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of Say on Pay by addressing an important question: Do firms alter executive compensation after the enactment of Say on Pay? I conduct a meta-analysis on the impact of Say on Pay on executive compensation, comprising prior tests derived from 29 primary studies. Impact is measured for the firm by comparing the level of executive compensation and its growth rate; pay-performance sensitivity; pay dispersion (between the CEO and other top executives); and composition of executive compensation in the pre- and post-Say on Pay periods. I find that Say on Pay does not reduce executive compensation; however it does change the composition of the compensation. These results are inconsistent with the public interest theory of regulation, which posits that regulation is implemented to improve some public good (reduce executive compensation). In addition, I construct an international comparative analysis of Say on Pay votes outlining the history of compensation, political trends, and corporate governance characteristics that led to the specific legislation in each jurisdiction in order to evaluate the impact of Say on Pay by type and find that binding votes lead to larger CEO compensation reduction.