VOICE ACTIVATED FEMINISM: IMMURED WOMEN AND THE SOUNDS OF GENDER PLAY

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THESIS ABSTRACT

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The space of confinement provides intimate grounds for identity play. In particular, immured women acquire a deeply close experience of sound and voice in small quarters, granting them opportunities to challenge, query, and trouble the boundaries of gender identity. Stemming from the documented history of medieval anchoresses, a Hegelian architecture of confinement is investigated through the lenses of material feminism and sound theory. An introductory history of medieval anchoresses is given, as well as scholarship regarding female spirituality in the medieval era. Medieval anchoress Julian of Norwich and the Ancrene Wisse provide evidence of sound experience in confinement, while the life of Christina Markyate establishes grounds for choosing enclosure. In using the literary texts of Jane Eyre, A Room of One’s Own, and Antigone, and through application of Julia Kristeva’s abjection and Jeffrey Cohen’s post-humanism, boundaries of the enclosure are investigated and subsequently destabilized, making room for gender inquiry.
I. Introduction

Language is a constraint, particularly when it comes to marginalized groups. We try to generate new words to fit the elasticity of our existence, or what we think existence is in a particular moment. In conversation, we may play with language and revel in the temporariness of our verbal output, but this playfulness is not always matched by our dictionary thumping. Some words never seem to go away, such as the word spinster: an unmarried, single woman (OED). When spinster first made its appearance, it was an innocuous term, used to define the legal status of a woman as “unmarried,” equal to the statuses wife or widow. However, after the 17th century, the term took a turn for the derogatory: “a woman still unmarried; esp. one beyond the usual age for marriage, an old maid” (2b). The OED fails to expand on what is meant by “still” (as in “still unmarried”) or at what age a woman usually marries, but ambiguities aside, the desire and ability to collect and contain these dangerous, unmarried single women proves that not much has changed in the past 300 years or so.

In light of the long history of categorical linguistic confinement, Kate Bolick dissects the capture of these still-unmarried women in her recent book, Spinster. “Whom to marry, and when will it happen,” Bolick writes, are “two questions [that] define every woman’s existence, regardless of where she was raised or what religion she does or doesn’t practice” (1). Bolick wants to understand why this is still a question being asked and why women are still considered dangerous when unwed: “These dual contingencies govern her until they’re answered,” Bolick argues, “even if the answers are nobody and never” (1).
I point to Bolick here as a recent piece of writing (published in 2015) that harkens back to that 18th century recapitulation of the term spinster and to highlight that there was a time when women were not so harshly categorized. The medieval anchoress, and those in her community, were not working under such mean-spirited language conditions. In fact, her experience was in direct opposition to definition 2b. Her sensual experience and its robust opportunity for exploration makes the issue of enclosure an intriguing starting point. A spatio-temporal jump to a pre-“spinster” era where worldly women were living under deeply essentialist biases, but where immured women were not. There is a de-essentializing feature to the anchorhold that allows women—and men—to worship through the female body as a means of accessing deep devotion to God and where the discussion around the body cannot happen without corporeal understanding. To experience God through female spirituality is not to “think like a girl,” but to engineer a system of experience that channels the physicality of the female body into an abstractly devout moment. The desire to talk about bodies as being essentially the same is a stylized language of conceit we use to avoid the messy business of sex, flesh, blood, and guts. The distance of literature—with its pristine white paper and neatly inked letters—makes this a convenient method of discussion. However, this project rejects that neatness by suggesting the text is not hiding a body, but that a body made the text. And in the particular case of this work, that a body confined to a single, sealed room tells stories rooted in close corporeality. This closeness is most evident in the pre-spinster days of the medieval anchoress, who chose an overwhelming intimate and sensual physical experience to move closer to the ultimate abstraction: God.
For medieval anchoresses and anchorites, the favored route to God’s love was found in the anchorhold experience. An anchorhold, and thus its enclosed inhabitant, was in the town church or cathedral, where it was culturally and geographically captured and stabilized, removing mobility to enhance a system of self-control. “A primary goal of the male or female anchorite was to control the inner life, based on extensive self-scrutiny and self-knowledge,” as Elizabeth Robertson notes in *Early English Devotional Prose and the Female Audience* (24). The enclosure thus required a tolerance like no other ascetic devotion in its geographic limitations, for both men and women. However, unlike men, women were not given the option to roam, as in male hermits, “because they [women] supposedly needed protection” (24). Applauded and revered, perhaps even a bit fetishized, the anchoress was deemed by the church to be tough enough and holy enough to withstand constant communion with God, in trusted isolation. Unlike the space of, say, Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s confined patient in *The Yellow Wallpaper* or Antigone’s punishment at the behest of Kreon, the anchoress shuns contact with the outside world not out of fear, weakness, or punishment, but out of strength and fortitude, predating Charlotte Bronte’s Jane, in *Jane Eyre*, and Virginia Woolf’s narrator, in *A Room of One’s Own*. The anchoress—and her followers—will not only intimately endure herself, body and mind, in this closed space, but will have the added test of windows to the outside word, where even the slightest glance could lead to sin. Not an easy life, or even an easy temporary location change, the question of “why” always seems unsatisfactorily answered.

Bolick’s sentiment of “whom to marry” might play a role in the choice to be
enclosed. Women’s legal power, whether single or married, ranged from little to none, while the very real threat of dying in childbirth hung overhead (Robertson, *Early English Devotional* 17). Christina Markyate’s experience also offers answers to this question. A secular life for Christina means marriage to an abusive suitor, while spiritual marriage to Christ offers safety from this terrible betrothal. And while Christina’s path to religious acceptance was littered with obstacles, Robertson remarks that anchoresses suffering similarly challenges “must have felt that the strength of their vocations outweighed both the difficulties they faced in establishing an anchorhold and the difficulties they endured within in it” (*Early English Devotional* 28). Given Christina’s history, it seems strange, then, that no one asks of a medieval woman if her marriage was achieved by force, considering there is history and data on resisted matchmaking, but rather often question if women were forced into enclosure—the answer to which is no, there is no history to support forced enclosure.

But it cannot be this simple: running away from bad suitors, that is. Young women did have another choice: the convent, which was an easily accessed route, considering not everyone could make the eremitic cut, which involved an approval process with high-level holy men questioning and interviewing the candidate. Something about cell-life was appealing to medieval women, so much so that more women signed on for the experience than men (Warren 20). I believe there is something happening in this space more than simply an alternative to marriage or even devotion to God—would not convent life suffice for both? The anchorhold itself must hold a more satisfying answer.

Confined women fill real spaces. They have weight, dimension, smells,
temperature—a sensual minefield. And it is in these close, sometimes dark, sometimes uncanny spaces that require exploration. To dislocate the woman from her embodied ground is to only reinforce her walls of enclosure. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman set about to bring discourse back to the body and away from “the body,” noting “in the last twenty years, nearly all of the work in this area has been confined to the analysis of discourses about the body” (3). Discourses such as the gaze offer the security of distance—much like the sense of sight. What is over there remains over there, whereas the sense of hearing and the physicality of sound squash the distance between Other and I. “We need a way to talk about the materiality of the body as itself an active, sometimes recalcitrant force,” explain Alaimo and Hekman, “Women have bodies; these bodies have pain as well as pleasure…We need a way to talk about these bodies and the materiality they inhabit” (4). Somewhere in the range of pleasure and pain, sometimes at opposing extremes, enclosed women exist and in existing, refuse the limitations of their enclosure.

Medieval anchoresses are the written foundation for the experiences of confined women, in predating the negative associations with female, self-selected isolation. By examining the writing of and about enclosed women, a record of the female body emerges—an elastic, leaking body marking and violating limits. It is the particular sound of her voice in confinement, those utterances made in a self-reflected dialectic, that embody the embeddedness of her existence and challenge the division between herspace and not-herspace, and thus call into question the very female identity she knew and the female identity she experiences, making a material playground to test gender theory.
II. Popular Enclosure: Medieval Anchoresses

Ann Warren traces the relatively popular anchoress position to early and holy physical absence, where “the anchorite had escaped into the wilderness, his life a symbol of the desert ideal of early Christianity” (14). England’s eremitic population had its start in the desert, where future-saints removed themselves from society to roam in harsh conditions in the name of Christian salvation. Removal is crucial to the development of the anchoritic life: removing oneself is of greater import than the space to which one removed, so that regardless of the location, the desire was always removal-from, rather than removal-to. This acceptance of isolated, secular distance motivated a devotion to worship to be unmatched by any other religious devotee. Choosing this life “implied a culture in consonance with his [the anchorite’s] views, one that both sanctioned individual religious experience as an ideal…and also encourage[d] it by responding to its demands” (15). It is the responses to these demands that never allowed the anchorite to be fully disconnected from the world—which only made him or her that much more devout, that much closer to God, and that much holier, through exposure to and rejection of the world-at-large.

Reliant on the support of the townspeople, an anchoress required food, clothing, servants, and more to maintain her solitary lifestyle. This was an economy of salvation: serving the anchoress (providing food, water, and other needs) meant entry into her prayers. Her prayers were stronger than others and “patrons earned heavenly credits with their support of recluses” (Warren 16). What makes this system of exchange so interesting is that, primarily, the anchoress was “only occasionally a nun before she
entered the anchorhold” (22)—that is, not all anchoresses came from convents. Some were former laywomen, endowed via enclosure with a special connection to God, greater even than those of male non-reclused clerics: “They who were despised in the world as insignificant are, after their enclosure, venerated and loved as excellent and strong” (97). Is it any wonder that so many of society’s “despised” and “insignificant”—that is, women—were drawn to the anchorhold.

According to data presented by Warren (20), anchoresses consistently outnumbered anchorites for centuries in England (12th century: 48 women to 30 men; 13th century: 123 women to 37 men; 14th century: 96 women to 41 men; 15th century: 110 women to 66 men; 16th century: 37 women to 27 men). Warren attributes these disparate numbers to England’s lack of choices for women (21). “England remained in the thirteenth century a citadel of orthodoxy,” Warren notes, “a society whose religious needs were accommodated in traditional ways” (21). Later, Warren expands on the roles of the anchorite for both men and women, citing a commonality in roles and duties in service to the community. However, Warren sidesteps direct blows to gender-based bias in her history in two ways: (1) her reporting glosses over instances of variance with little commentary and (2) as Elizabeth Robertson argues, there exited a medieval concept of female spirituality that likely played a significant role in women choosing immurement. While the former may be attributed to the business of editing and revising, Warren’s ability to neutralize difference is interesting: “In the opening remarks of his letter, Aelred attacked the gossiping anchoress, already a stereotype in 1160 and one of his prime concerns” (108). Aelred’s letter goes on to describe the anchoress as “dissolved with
raucous laughter, which like a drug that has the sweetness of drink, is then diffused throughout her whole body”’” (as cited in Warren 108). Warren’s inclusion of this letter implies a greater interest in the dangerous speech of the anchoress than her male anchorite counterpart, establishing difference based on gender. Following Aelred’s letter, Warren records the *Ancrene Riwle* admonishing anchoresses to not “chat with her visitors [or] setting herself up as a scholar” (108). Yet Warren avoids quantifying Aelred’s letter as anything other than data, regardless of historical evidence supporting a gender bias. Julian of Norwich will rattle this very idea by not only conversing with visitors, as Margery Kempe records in her own writing, but will also use the anchorhold as a room of scholarship and intellectual contemplation. That Julian stands in defiance of these criticisms speaks to established differences in the gendered anchorite/anchoress experience.

A. Female Spirituality

The *Ancrene Wisse* capitalizes the gendered experience between anchorites and anchoresses by providing the anchoress a “guide appropriate to her circumstances” which was “influenced by contemporary views of female sexuality” (Robertson, *Early English Devotional* 45). Robertson moves this idea into a new light, arguing that while such an analysis [as in Warren’s work] provides a general answer to the question of why English women found anchoritism an attractive form of the religious life, it fails to consider the particular issue of how gender may have influenced such choices. (15)

In applying a gender-based lens to Warren’s detailed work, Robertson is able to move
beyond a traditional, short-sighted analysis and illuminate how, in thirteenth-century
England, “a woman’s choice to become an anchoress was governed not only by the
strength of her spiritual vocation, but also the limited number and restricted nature of
other options available to women in both religious and secular life” (15). Considering the
range of restrictions set upon women in post-Conquest England, Robertson asserts that a
“religious life was an obvious choice…It was a socially acceptable alternative, and
women could be controlled with the patriarchal system” (21). With what little power they
did hold, women could choose a Christian life over marriage and/or widowhood because
Christianity “offer[ed] women a place. Women were celebrated as handmaidens of the
Lord. Thus, to a certain extent, as nuns, women possessed an authority they lacked in
secular life” (21), all the while adhering to the expectations of a patriarchal society. The
place offered to women appears to provide an illusion of freedom in choice—“I choose
this life in Christ”—yet, considering alternatives, it is difficult to quantify that freedom.

The question still remains: Why move into an anchorhold if life as a nun offered a
place of choice? Robertson suggest an answer: Convent life was less-than ideal.

Post-Conquest English nunneries were small and poor…The Norman
Conquest also reduced the power and influence of the abbesses…Formerly
autonomous communities of nuns were now under the control of the
bishop and were subject to frequent visitations. (23)

Indeed, work in the convent also rivaled that of life as a secular woman, with hard-labor
and daily temptations to sin always within reach. A convent would not provide “privacy,
autonomy, and a chance for intellectual development” (23), as offered in the anchorhold
—or in Virginia Woolf’s terms, “a room of one’s own.” And although learning Latin texts
was possible in the convent through recitation of Latinate works, “the level of learning required to master these simple texts was rudimentary compared to the level of learning expected of nuns in the earlier periods” (22), with education instead focusing on crafts and domestic duties. Removing these barriers—a communal obligation to labor and a framework of domestic expectations—the anchoress was able to devote more time and energy to her reading and education than her convent counterpart.

Robertson is cautious, however, in characterizing the anchorhold as a “positive option for women” (23). She reminds readers that this was a “place defined and strictly controlled by men, and anchoresses were subject to frequent visits from priests and bishops” (24). “The limited Latin training offered to a post-Conquest woman within the anchorhold also limited her intellectual freedom” (24), so that the space without, in essence, always defined the space within the anchorhold. “Finally, an anchoress’s intellectual inquiries were also conditioned by her Christianity” (24), re-asking the “quantity of freedom” question. Limiting mobility and activity may not be a sight of liberation, but as Robertson notes “despite its limitations” the anchorhold may have “offered a haven to women” (24). It is within this haven, then, that I suggest the anchoress could explore those limitations and experience her self as woman in deeply sensuous ways on the pleasure-and-pain range of her body.

B. Julian of Norwich

Robertson’s argument is appealing in light of the historical data available on Julian of Norwich, a 14th-15th century anchoress and author of *Revelations of Divine*
Love, in which she shares her story of visions and devotion, as well as her personal testimony of Christianity. Literate and Latinate, Julian’s visions take place prior to her immurement, after a period of “bodily sickness” sent by God, for which she received last rites in anticipation of death (44). But Julian did not die; she lived and choose to spend her life in constant devotion as an anchoress in the town of Norwich, England. In the ultimate identity shedding, the woman we know as Julian took her name from the church of St. Julian’s and the town of Norwich, leaving behind her previous identity, yet bringing the records of her bodily experiences with her into the anchorhold.

Once confined, Julian seems to have used the anchorhold as means of philosophical pondering. “The showings,” writes Georgia Ronan Crampton, “reach deeply into what it means to be a human being, which for her [Julian] is to be a creature created by God living in Christendom” (3), and were produced during “a long concentration upon the visions” (2) made possible by her time in contemplative confinement. When paired with Roberton’s demonstration of a feminine spirituality, Julian’s history illustrates a powerful space for women and for gender inquiry.

C. Sensual Devotion

Sensuality and the keen experience of the senses is what defines female Christian devotees. Sensual perceptions are important for the anchoress because “woman’s experience of spirituality was thus inevitably intertwined with the experiences of the body” (Robertson, Early English Devotional 39). Robertson explains that “union with Christ occurs not as an allegory of the ascent of the mind to God, but as the concretized
erotic experience, one that redeems her fleshliness and her excess moisture through orgasm” (“Medieval Medical” 153). This is the same, sensuous, fleshy body that fills her anchorhold, a series of interconnected senses and emotions and responses, inescapable day in and day out. It also rejects modern predilection toward “body” discourse, as the devotion is made complete through and in the material body, creating an embedded embodiment.

We see this in Julian’s graphic vision portraits. In book 4 of her revelations, Julian describes her vision of Christ bleeding in sensuous detail, developing a full picture, heavy with spiritual veracity:

And all the time that God was showing in spiritual sight what I have just described, the bodily sight of the plentiful bleeding from Christ’s head remained. The great drops of fell down from under the crown of thorns like pills, as though they had come out of the veins; and as they came out they were dark red, for the blood was very thick; and as it spread it was bright red; and when it reached the brows it vanished, and yet the bleeding continued until many things were seen and understood. The beauty and vividness of the blood are like nothing but itself. It is as plentiful as the drops of water which fall from the eaves after a heavy shower of rain, drops which fall so thickly that no human mind can number them. As for the roundness of the drops, they were like herring scales as they spread on the forehead. These three things occurred to me at the time: pills for roundness as the blood came out; herring scales as it spread on the forehead, for roundness; drops from the eaves, for innumerable plenty. This showing was a live and vivid, horrifying and awe-inspiring, sweet and lovely. (50-51)

In Robertson’s words, Julian describes a “concretized erotic experience.” Julian’s vocabulary is based on very real, concrete things—pills, blood, drops of water, eaves, herring scales—that culminate in a strong “live and vivid, horrifying and awe-inspiring, sweet and lovely” abstract response in the last line. There is a buildup of concrete
materiality that culminates into mental transaction and into spiritual takeaways (“three things occurred to me”), something Julian is careful to always delineate. And although Julian does not indicate a physical climax as a result of this vision, she does note it “gave me most happiness and the strongest sense of spiritual safety” (51), implying separate pre- and post-vision emotional states, the latter of which appeals to a sense of euphoria. The mid-vision state rests in the sensuous body and a materiality through which post-vision happiness is made possible.

Julian’s vision experience is extended further in the long text to capitalize on the contemplative offering of confinement. She revisits her visions in the final paragraph of book 7, theorizing God’s intentions:

The showing, made to whomever God may choose, plainly teaches the same thing as our faith, revealed and explained with many secret details which belong to it and which it is glorious to know. And when the showing, which is given at a moment in time, is hidden and past, then the faith lasts by the grace of the Holy Ghost until our life’s end. And thus what the showing reveals is nothing other than the faith, neither more nor less, as may be seen from the meaning our Lord conveys in it by the time it is completed. (52).

In refusing to become worshipped in her own right, Julian deflects any individual or significant attachment to this or any vision by opening the field to include “whomever God may choose.” But in her deflecting, Julian is also very aware of her identity and body. She is a woman reporting her private experiences with God to an audience culturally uncomfortable with a strong female voice. In this closing paragraph, Julian appears to wrestle with her femaleness, her specialness, and the outside world’s perception of her, as the last line reminds readers that these showings are “nothing other
than faith.” Ignore the body that experienced the showing, Julian asks, ignore the sensual vehicle that made it possible.

Ignoring the body, no matter Julian’s requests, is difficult to do. As Robertson points out, there was the belief “that a woman must experience spirituality through the body; moreover, she can overcome the body only through the physical and mental resources determined by her female nature” (Early English Devotional 43). The idea that a woman “must experience spirituality through the body” is a fascinating glimpse into the expectations of female devotees. Outside of the anchorhold, a woman is restricted by her physical form, yet in her relationship to Christ, her body is the very vehicle that makes him accessible and her redeemable:

The biological parity between blood, sweat, tears, milk, and urine meant that a woman’s contemplation of Christ’s blood was contemplation of her own blood, and further that her tears were equivalent to Christ’s blood. The suffering body of Christ thus allowed a woman not only to pity Christ but to identify in him her own perceived suffering body. (Robertson, “Medieval Medical” 149)

Julian’s blood vision in the above passage intimately marries into Robertson’s contemplation concept. There is no need to connect tears to blood when for Julian, and other women, menstruation produced a monthly encounter with blood. The matrix is thus more directly linked: blood to blood. No intermediate stop is needed or step jumped, Julian knows blood in a way that men may not. This connection to blood, the body, and bodily spirituality is traced back to that woman who started it all, Eve: “Because Eve was associated with matter, she also became linked with sense perception” (Robertson, Early English Devotional 37). Woman, then, in her bodily spirituality, is capable of
instantaneous response to devotion: she can feel in her body the spiritual force of her words and is encouraged to speak and absorb in an unending cycle.

D. Most Sensuous Eve

It seems important to zoom in on Eve for moment: a sinning non-virgin, who is the vaginal mother to humankind. It is Eve who is seen naked in the garden; it is Eve in naked conversation with Satan; it is Eve who takes the first bite (chew, swallow, digestion) of the apple; and it is Eve who had sex (with Adam) and gave birth to her children. Her senses (touching, tasting, hearing, seeing, smelling) connect her to her children (i.e., humankind) and to God. This is not so for Mary, mother of Jesus. As Robertson clarifies, “Mary is not defined by her body…she cannot help women overcome the problems of their femininity; rather, she offers a model for behavior that can only mitigate rather than alter that essential nature” (39). But Robertson rejects the transcendence-through-virginity path dictated by the likes of Jerome, who preached that “as long as woman is for birth and children, she is different from man as body is from soul. But if she wishes to serve Christ more than the world, then she will cease to be a woman and will be called a man” (“Medieval Medical” 148). No, Robertson argues, woman does not need to become a man, rather far from offering women an escape from their femininity, actually, [the contemplative life] offered them [women] the opportunity to explore and even celebrate those very traits of femininity that were outlined in the medical texts. Because women were viewed—and perhaps indeed viewed themselves—as trapped inescapably in a body designated and even disparaged as female, sexuality and notions of the female body became central issues for women in pursuit of the contemplative life. (148-9)
It is difficult to argue that some 600 years later, women do not still feel trapped by their bodies. And if current headlines of rape and other acts of bodily violence against women are any indication, woman still has a long way to go to feeling that her body is not a trap. A woman’s body in the world is still, in many cultures, a target. But to shy away from that violence and its physical contact and wounds would, as Alaimo and Hekman argue, seem to only support those who harm her and use discourse to talk around her experience. It is then the female body and its subsequent devotion which permits spirituality as “expressed not only through the body…but also through those parts and activities of the body that are understood specifically or ‘essentially’ female” (Robertson 149). Achieving spiritual connection to God, in essence, requires the female form, where moisture, the physical, the flesh, could be adopted as meditative concerns for men as well, but because the very nature of the male soul was perceived as separate from the body, these meditations were only a part of a progress, an ascent to God that ultimately transcended the flesh. (149)

Accessing God pivoted on corporeal biology, making it a crucial aspect not just to spiritual devotion, but to devotional reality. The liquid, fleshy stuff of the body are not weaknesses, but rather tools for devotion—and in some ways, use Julia Kristeva’s abjection policy to connect with the invisible world.

E. Abject Devotion

Robertson’s discussion of female spirituality is overall quite clean. Thus Kristeva’s abjection of seeping and oozing fluids picks up where Robertson leaves off. To be in a woman’s body is to experience these gross, grimy moments that tap into the
suffering of Christ. Those “tears,” that “blood,” that “milk” are what, for many women, confined them to their bodies as too emotional, too weepy, too weak, or too pregnant. The very things, the very “fluids” (in Kristeva’s term) that made life difficult as a regular woman make her an excellent spiritual vehicle through challenging the division between holy and not-holy in the anchorhold. “These body fluids,” Kristeva writes, “…this shit are what life withstands…I am at the border of my condition as a living being” (3). Borders, in the stone-walled enclosure, thus begin to breakdown. Kristeva argues that “it is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (4). Tears, blood, urine, feces, vomit, and sweat would be a constant in the confined space, but also be in and of that space. Tears fall to the floor, urine splashes on the wall, sweat drips on the altar—the architecture becomes imbued with these pieces of the anchoress. Where her body ends is no longer relegated to her flesh, but as the objects consume her, she no longer is an other to the material building. It is a grisly, stinky, slimy unity. Kristeva marks this moment as when “no longer I who expel, ‘I’ is expelled” (4). On the one hand, this grotesquely/beautifully captures the embodiment of subjectivity. On the other hand, woman is more than her liquid contents, so that to assume “I” has escaped leaves room for another “I” to possibly enter. Ceding corporeal ground, by leaking fluids, gives the enclosed woman space to ingest and digest a self-reflected subjectivity that exists no where else. As a woman alive, those fluids will be purged continually until she dies, managing an unending cycle of exit—entry, which draws into the fray the immurement ceremony itself: Death rites.
F. Captured: Dead or Alive

Before the fluids start to flow, before her “I” leaks, the anchoress must be declared dead. Once deemed financially stable and devout and sturdy enough (i.e., alive and well) to handle the ascetic life, she began the process of immurement (i.e., death). Historically, the actual practice of enclosure ceremonies varied, “but all concluded with the sealing of the door” (Warren 92) to the outside world. And “after the mass the recluse is conducted into [her]his reclusorium while the entourage chants antiphons and psalms drawn from the Office of the Dead” (98). The anchoress witnesses her last rites; she is aware of her aliveness and deadness in a singular moment. Warren notes that rite of enclosure “heralded the beginning of a new life for the postulant…The alteration of self, which the rite both acknowledged and produced, would be wholly internal, not social” (95). At the geographical site of her enclosure and death, her physical body hosts the alteration of self, a transition, as she “enter[s] into a liminal phase, a threshold existence in which [s]he would continue for the remainder of [her]his life” (95). Does a marginalized body, as that of a woman, really move from one liminal space into another? Kristeva offers a way to consider liminal jumping:

In that compelling, raw, insolent thing in the morgue’s full sunlight, in that thing that no longer matches and therefore no longer signifies anything, I behold the breaking down of a world that has erased its borders: fainting away…. Abject. It is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object. (4)

In building walls to the outside world, the borders are broken down, and as Warren claims, the enclosed human is “denied individuality, sexuality, rank, money, will, and speech—psychologically [s]he became a nonperson rather than a new person” (95).
Considering the level of liberty women held in England at this time (or any time), I question the transition Warren heralds. What shift in identity could there be from nonperson to “nonperson.” Instead, I propose that this is not the transition from “nonperson” to “new person” but rather an awakening of sorts, or given room to grow into the person that always was there but was always stunted by gender ideology. A new person would have new experiences, new data to use. But as we saw in Julian of Norwich, who left her name at the door, she brought with her pre-anchorhold revelations, just as confined women bring with them all those years in and of the world, including laws and expectations. These impressions would be impossible to simply shed at the threshold. As Caroline Walker Bynum argues,

women who lived in the world … and women who converted as adults differed from nuns raised in convents by having a sharper sense of male/female differences, a sense of “the female” closer to the negative stereotype found in misogynist clerical tradition. (27)

Being a woman is not forgotten upon enclosure, but instead is heightened. It is in that anchorhold that the anchoress plays in an unchartered space, and although monitored to an extent, it is a space that largely remains her own dictate. As Bynum points out, “women’s most elaborate self-images were either female (‘mother’ to spiritual children, ‘bride’ of Christ) or androgynous (‘child’ to a God who was mother as well as father, ‘judge’ and ‘nurse’ to the souls in their keeping)” (28), images that would have been familiar or at least starting points of familiarity to develop into more elaborate schemes. Furthermore, “religious women,” Bynum writes, “felt no necessity to acquire metaphorical maleness in the course of their spiritual journey” (28). It is within this
anchorhold, I argue, that in experiencing herself fully, as a nonperson/person, the anchoress—and women in confinement, whether spiritual or otherwise—is in an alluring—frightening position to challenge her gendered identity. And that in closing her off from the World, revised liminal-woman vistas are within reach through her sensual experiences.

III. Literary Enclosure

The anchoress experience lays the foundation for many literary depictions of confined women. Many of the rituals and moments are paralleled, if not simply replicated ad infinitum. Looking at sound, specifically, in the enclosure poses some intriguing questions and mysteries. Conversations with the self are truly encounters with one’s own self-consciousness—a self-consciousness that, for women like Julian of Norwich or Antigone, would qualify as DOE—dead on enclosure. These are women who are never expected, or never expect to, leave their cells. In other instances, female characters like Jane Eyre or the narrator of The Yellow Wallpaper, scrape into new layers of self-consciousness, courtesy of contemplation. And in and around all of these spaces, there is talk, chatter, noise, and conversation taking place in and around the cell, permeating walls, shaking floors, and even moving the body. The unstoppability of sound makes it a fun tool for diving into the strangeness of confinement.

A. Confined Architecture

Because the sound in this experiment takes place inside and outside constructed
spaces, it seems imperative to give that space a framework. In his *Philosophy of Fine Art*, G. W. F. Hegel attempts to theorize the makeup of space, in terms of architecture and human’s activity of space making. Hassanaly Ladha, whose work proposes to recenter misconceptions of Hegel back to their context, notes that architecture is “where the materialized limit serves as a means for an external end—an ‘enclosure,’” for instance” (18). Hegel uses the construction of architecture, in particular of churches and cathedrals, to establish a limit service.

Hegel maps columns as supportive to a structure, particularly in the task of breadth-making, while the buildup between columns is the work of wall construction and thus enclosure, offering an immediate material limit: there is a wall in my vision. In limiting views into the landscape, in contrast to a classical columned structure, enclosure seeks to truncate sight, and thereby capture the soul for work in the space with the Spirit. “Christian worship,” specifically for Hegel, “is an *exaltation* of the soul above the limitations of natural existence and a reconciliation of the individual with God” (91). Leaving views open to Nature implies that Nature is as good as God, or even more beautiful than God—which would be a mistake if a building’s purpose is to elevate the soul. Architecture’s function, Hegel writes, is to “build up external Nature as an environment which emanates from Spirit itself” (29). Nature, it seems, is shuffled out of Hegel’s architecture and the Spirit is found in the humanmade space (in the human and its performance), not in the natural space. For Hegel, then, the limits are important; that to achieve Spirit, the building of a wall (as done by a human) stops Nature from getting in and distracting a person. And its job, then as Building, is not to support itself, but to
support the human, thus rendering the building no longer self-subsistent. I point back 
Kristeva’s “I”/not-“I” here to argue Hegel’s premise of building-for-human, in that the 
building and its human occupant (in this case) refuse to abide by the limits set in 
construction. Thus the building is rendered less object for human work, but rather a 
cooperative machine, of sorts, where human and material bolster production in 
conjunction. This cooperative machine is much like Jeffrey Cohen’s identity machine, 
built “to emphasize that the body, medieval and postmodern, becomes through these 
[Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring machines] combinatory movements nonhuman, 
transformed via generative boundary-breaking flux into unprecedented hybridities” (xiii). 
By acknowledging relationships between things and bodies, Cohen captures the body’s 
placement in architecture, where in concert with material objects, an exchange occurs 
between human and nonhuman. Cohen calls this a “boundary-breaking flux” more than 
tinged with the fluids of Kristeva’s abjection; however, for Cohen the seepage is not so 
one-sided, as Kristeva’s model proposes. Here, Cohen offers a merger of “unprecedented 
hybridities,” where each body and each space-of-objects affects the other and generates 
an entirely new binary to be mingled and thus, identity making. The walled building then 
serves as a unity of devices for subjectivity through a negation of the exterior. Windows 
were used by the anchoresses to remove waste and receive food; they were also used as 
the source of betterment, as the constant temptation and rejection of the secular world. 
Jane Eyre uses the lock on her door to keep herself in, as much as to keep Mr. Rochester 
aout, to uncover her strength for leaving Thornfield. Woolf sees the “room of one’s own” 
as a department of development for a female Shakespeare or Milton.
Utility of the structure as a whole affects the contained, as well, for both good (above) and bad. While the anchoresses, Woolf, and Jane self-select confinement, those women who do not choose enclosure suffer dearly. Using terms like “caged” or even “imprisoned” would be a mistake here. These words signify bars, cages, or spaces that do geographically stabilize an inhabitant, but do not record exterior sensory deprivation. Enclosure, as Hegel notes, is the buildup of walls between support columns. Like the classical structures, cages—for as limiting as they are—provide more other sensory access than the enclosure, which is why the enclosed woman is not easily labeled “prisoner” or “imprisoned,” as there is a sensory-limiting buildup reducing access to the outside. So when Bertha laughs loudly from her hidden room of Thornfield, she is seeking and defying the boundaries of her confinement. Antigone’s song signals a lamentable call to the end of her womanness at the sentence of her imprisonment.

Hegel’s architecture seems to divide the space into a Human—Nature binary, attributing the structure and its interior to Human and what lies outside the end of the limit as Nature. Such amorphous spaces trouble Hegel, noted in his disparaging description of the architecture of the Middle Ages, where he uses nature-based language:

If we step into the interior of a cathedral of the Middle Ages we have brought before us not so much the stability and mechanical purpose of supporting piers and a vault that rests upon it [i.e., the ideal as work of human]. We are rather reminded of the arches of a forest, whose rows of trees incline with their branches to one another and form an enclosure by this means [i.e., Nature made not by human]. (94)

For Hegel, construction of the Middle Ages church drew from Nature, in its arches and canopies, and brought that design plan into the building—destroying the separation
architecture should produce in wall-building. The Spirit, which needs human intervention, cannot work here. The Spirit is easily confused, perhaps, and may think it is still outdoors, thus never achieving transcendence or human betterment. What Hegel fails to acknowledge, however, is that there is another binary (or range) enacted through architecture: nature—Nature.

Forgetting, or perhaps simply ignoring, the nature inside—the human body and its biology and physiology—Hegel assumes that a severance of Nature is as simple as building a wall. For Elizabeth Grosz, in her book, Architecture from the Outside, the realness of nature within confinement is limitless—signaling a break from what Hegel sees as limitation. “The limits of possible spaces,” Grosz writes, “are the limits of possible modes of corporeality” (33). It is through the body and its biology that Grosz finds the erasure—or perhaps, absence—of limits, noting the body’s “pliability is a measure of the infinite plasticity of the spatiotemporal universe in which it is housed and through which bodies become real, are lived, and have effects” (33). Finding no escape from Nature/nature, it seems that the body no matter where it may be contained, suffers distinct and untenable links to the outside. It is a boundary made to be breached, in that the boundary must be established from without, before it can be startled. Grosz gives the example of a phantom limb, as testimony to the “pliability and fluidity of what is usually considered inert” (i.e., the body; 34). “The biological body exists for the subject only through the mediation of a series of images or representations of the body” (34): to know my body is to know its external representatives, which I must bring into my body before I can push against its limits.
The externalization of representation is imperative for the woman, as so much of her biological body is channeled to develop her identity. As Robertson explained earlier, identification with Eve is contingent on sensuality. And as Eve continues to be the marker of woman—rather than the unwomanly Virgin Mary—there is an entangled border that refuses simplicity or even commonality. The messiness of this borderland troubles Hegel’s neat and clean architecture.

Hegel shies away from blurry borders. Definition of space between Nature and Interior is necessary for Spirit. To feel as though one is in a forest of trees—to be confused, to have a phantom body moment where place and space are misaligned with corporeality—does not allow the Spirit to fully transcend. Therefore, it is Gothic architecture—where “walls mount up freely and independently,” where nature is not the source, but the overlay (94)—that appeals to Hegel’s system. Hegel asserts that Gothic architects pulled from Human sources rather than Nature for their buildings; “we do not actually assert that Gothic architecture has accepted trees and woods for the actual exemplar of its forms” (95). There is no mistaking location when stepping into a Gothic cathedral; the dividing line is clear: This is a space built by human. And whatever nature-like elements are present were not built into the structure or sourced for the design, but placed on the structure post-building.

Perhaps Hegel is right. Perhaps humans do their best work when not distracted by big “n” Nature—all that beauty and majesty can be overwhelming. But Hegel’s subscription to Nature is problematic on two planes: (1) in miscalculating corporeality as somehow not natural and (2) in rejecting materiality.
Early in his discussion of architecture, Hegel dismisses those material natural elements used in construction:

This contrast of original material [stone, mud, wood, etc.] is no doubt of importance... We may, however, entirely set aside the distinction as a purely subordinate aspect of the matter rather referable to what is accidental and empirical, and devote our attention to a point of more importance. (27)

Anthropocentrizing building and rejecting those elements that make that building possible, I argue, position Hegel in a dangerous stance, overly confident of human ability to bring nature under its will, forgetting that sand makes for a poor foundation or that wood rots. There is something supremely chest-thumping about Hegel’s construction—something Kristeva might leak all over.

Ladha’s focus on the Egyptian pyramids (as per Hegel’s example) characterizes the buildings “as a material division enclose is not spirit, but departed spirit—a body bereft of mind” (19). Inside the pyramid, a corpse sits, in the “shell” and as symbol of the “shell” the human body is for the spirit, thus “the dead maintains its relation to the living” (20) as that enduring symbol of life, death, and spirit. Ladha explains that “while the pyramids and the death both become ‘independent’ symbols, they remain architecturally and linguistically entangled: as an enclosure of the negative, each depends on its physical position ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the other” (20). I am not sure if Hegel would favor Ladha’s use of “entangled” to describe his system; his binaries are set up upon as bouncing what-is and what-is-not, rarely crashing what is to what-is-not. So while I take issue with Ladha’s use of “entangled” here, I do find the mapping done to brighten what is a shady, mysterious structure: By removing a corpse from sight, “what has already departed” (20),
offers a service to society. What is dead is no longer alive and thus no longer will engage or needs to engage in the world. “By materializing the binary,” that is the “barrier between inside and outside” (20), Ladha argues that Hegel finds “the pyramids reveal not only the negative but also the power of the negative to subvert its defining binary” (20). I am not sure such subversion is theoretically sound.

So much of Hegel’s construction is based on human response, an anthropocentrized and hierarchical vision of the world. The pyramids, made of unimportant stuff, are now given the power to subvert themselves. If Hegel’s architecture were based in a materialist analysis, Ladha’s conclusion may apply, but Hegel never lets the buildings dictate their intention; human has built them and thus determines their duties. Yes, looking at a funeral building stores the dead body and, simultaneously, reminds the living of the dead, Hegel never gives the interior life, leaving any work of defiance to a one-sided, human-determined, exterior plane. For women in confinement, then, in Hegel’s building code, they remain reminding objects of what must be confined: the dead—or a woman, in this case. His study confirms and supports marginalization of non-dominant groups.

Furthermore, all the Spirit that Hegel wanted to foster and protect inside are mute in the pyramids where no Spirit is housed. The contents are dead and merely the remains of a Spirit vessel. Ladha ignores the liveness in this body—just as Hegel does—and proposes a one-sided double negation: the limiter sets the limit, thus setting a limit for that which is limited. Hegel writes, “the limit is simple negation or the first negation, while the other is, at the same time, the negation of the negation” (as cited in Ladha 21).
Rather than a simple binary structure, Hegel produces a manifold mapping, where there is a subject, a limit, and an other, that requires a self-consciousness to identify the layers: I am here; this is my endpoint; that is other. No matter what side the self-consciousness exists, however, the difference cannot be known by the other. The only way to define difference, according to Hegel and Ladha, is through materiality—a wall. Ladha states that “difference itself has no exact sensual corollary” (21), but is this true? Is difference not largely based in the sensuous activities of I see other, I hear other, I taste other, I smell other, and I touch other? Difference, in fact, seems tremendously based in sensual experience, perhaps making material walls unnecessary; instead, Ladha argues that “the pyramid is the sensory manifestation of the limit” (22)—but only for the living. For the dead, there is no limit, or sensory manifestation of a limit.

B. Herspace

Virginia Woolf entertains the limits of the dead and living in A Room of One’s Own, while Hegel is preoccupied with the life on the outside of architecture. Swapping Hegel’s schema, she puts life on the inside and silence—or death—on the outside. “When I ask you to earn money and have a room of your own,” Woolf explains to her readers, “I am asking you to live in the presence of reality, an invigorating life, it would appear, whether one can impart it or not” (110). It is not on the outside that woman will find “invigorating life”; that life is relegated and required to take place in a herspace, under her-funds, much like those anchoresses of the medieval era. Woolf writes,

For my belief is that if we live another century or so…and have five
hundred a year each of us and rooms of our own; if we have the habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think; if we escape a little from the common sitting room and see human beings not always in their relation to each other but in relation to reality; and the sky, too, and the trees or whatever it may be in themselves …if we face the fact, for it is a fact, that there is no arm to cling to, but that we go alone and our relation is to the world of reality and not only the world of men and women, then the opportunity will come and the dead poet who was Shakespeare’s sister will but on the body which she has so often laid down. (114).

Reminiscent of Grosz’s phantom limb of corporeality, Woolf rejects the “arm to cling to,” noting what that felt like, what security that may offer, but also the inevitable death it also brings. Instead, she proposes a life inside, where “we go alone and our relation is to the world of reality,” where realness, what with its grossness, messiness, confusedness, and corporeality, silences the world that mandates the attributes of Man and Woman. Woolf locates the empowerment in embodiment in enclosure. To the outside world, the woman inside must be dead, unproductive even (certainly unreproductive, since she is alone); but that is based on Hegel’s architecture, which centralizes the self-consciousness on a side of the enclosure. Enclosure, rather than being the only sensory manifestation of the limit, is a sensory manifestation of a limit: one of many layers of difference identity. More than that, a limit to the dead means that limit only has one plane of limitation: that face to the outside. The interior space that exists on the other side of the wall (in the case of the pyramids, the corpse and its locale) is full of stuff—alive and non-alive—that exist in the space of negation. And in Woolf’s case, it contains the seeds of poets, authors, and artists, dormant until given the necessary room to grow.

It is in contradiction to this liveness that so many men dictate the space of women. Like the interior space of the pyramid and its environs, it seems standard to assume the
enclosure space is unlively. Bob Hasenfratz writes that anchorholds as “structures of wood and stone restricted and controlled not only the movement of the anchorites body but obstructed and channeled her bodily senses” (2). Hasenfratz assumes that the bodily senses to be received are wanted, that the noises and even smells of the exterior are missed by the woman inside, seeing interior space as only restriction, controlled by the material “structures of wood and stone.” When Hasenfratz labels the anchorhold as a dead space, the opportunity to witness an invisible self-consciousness, with constant sensation is lost. Because she is invisible, it seems safer to assume a limitation and restriction as a negation of all that is good. Hasenfratz notably considers enclosures “sites of danger” due to their contents: women. He concludes that “like…the female body… (in the eyes of medieval theorists), the cell could never become a closed, finished structure, but remained a provisional and dangerous territory” (19). Hasenfratz does not back down from the danger of anchoress cells, but instead sets about analyzing the architecture of the space, separate from the woman inside it. As he describes the space, a silent nonperson develops, in a space dictated by “unidirectional” sacred flows (13), writing that the “Ancrene Wisse argues against much speech at all, preferring a kind of quasi-monastic silence” (14). Hazenfratz is unwilling, it seems, to view the enclosed space as partnership or relationship between woman and architecture. To use Hegel’s formula, the walls have enclosed and thus separated woman from the world; the negation here is exteriorly one-sided. Instead of Hasenfratz’s dead, silent building, these women were making noise and absorbing sound, in a manifold directional sensorial space.
C. Can You Hear Me Now?

That shortsightedness of other self-consciousnesses perhaps allows a third facet of consideration to challenge Hegel’s binary architecture: that is, the permeation of the sound experience. While certainly the visual confrontation of a wall signifies a limit or difference and may be visually restricting and limiting, sound travels through that same wall, irreverently shedding any allegiance to the preservation of simple difference. The momentariness of sound, “which inevitably disappears precisely at the point of and in virtue of becoming externality” (Hegel 343), is a difficult act to catch for those not present or near, thus requiring closeness and dependent on proximity. Unlike sight, which allows for greater perceptive distance,

Tones are unable to do this [be in our actual existence] …The fundamental task of music will therefore consist in giving a resonant reflection, not to objectivity in its ordinary material sense, but to the mode and modifications under which the most intimate self of the soul, from the point of view of its subjective life and ideality, is essentially moved. (342)

The subjectivity of sound and its place-needs mean that to capture a sound is to experience an ephemeral thing, non-transferrable. (And in this instance, it seems key to point out this is not a matter of recording—which also requires proximity—but rather the moment as an act of speech or music. The being-in-the-moment that provides sensory access to something that will never be and can never be experienced again, even with a recording.) The resonant reflection is meant to expose the inner life, through its ephemeral qualities. Reflection, according to Don Ihde, follows this trajectory

(a) Human —(b)—> (c) World
(c) World ---(b’)—> (a) Human
noting the dashed line is a reflection back from the world to the person (36). “Reflection (b’) is a special mode of (b) [intense involvement] as self-awareness of the primary experience” (36). Ihde argues that in order to know myself, I must receive an “indirect…reflection from the world” (36). Aurality provides an instantaneous form of b’ via shrinking the world into a confined space and through direct conversation, so that the indirect reflection is available: conversing with other women, feeling the sound of their voices, becomes a bodily “experience of experience” (37). Ihde writes that a “reflective experience retains the essential shape of intentionality as experience of—and implies that my own self-knowledge remains essentially hidden” (37). Sound, and for Hegel, music, is set to find that which is hidden and make it known to the self, which makes that time spent in enclosed isolation an opportunity to not simply exist, but to expose an existence of truth. “A sonic sensibility,” Salome Voegelin writes, “reveals the invisible mobility below the surface of a visual world and challenges its certain position, not to show a better place but to reveal what this world is made of, to question its singular actuality and to hear other possibilities that are probable, too” (3).

Sound, in the confined space, could mirror the sonic qualities of music. As Bissera Pentcheva notes in an acoustic study of the Hagia Sophia, “reverberant acoustics…transform the human voice into an emanation, no longer focused on the intelligibility of words, but on their sensual perceptions” (105). In some ways, the enclosed woman loses her voice—or at least the recognizable and patriarchal language she brought with her into the space—making unintelligible emanation into “sensual perceptions.” Michel de Certeau notes that “there is…no such ‘pure’ voice, because it is always determined by a
system (whether social, familial, or other) and codified by a way of receiving it” (132), yet if we consider the reverberations of sound in a small space, its shortened bounce distance, perhaps its muffling or echo, the systemic code falls apart, thus becoming “an assault on the structures and codes of messages” (Uebel 351).

D. Laughing and Other Noisy Chatter

In her feminist classic, Helene Cixous writes of the “laugh of the Medusa,” that quiet-shattering expulsion from the head/mouth of a woman. She argues that writing, for woman, is a bodily act—much like the feminine spirituality Robertson outlined above, a action inseparable from and activated by the female body. Woman, Cixous writes, “seiz[es] the occasion to speak, hence her shattering entry into history” and that “by taking up the challenge of speech...women will confirm women in a place other than that which is reserved in and by the symbolic, that is, in a place other than silence” (Cixous 880-1). There should be, for Cixous, a jarring disruption when woman makes herself known, and Bertha Rochester does just that in Jane Eyre.

At Thornfield Hall, Jane's first encounter with Bertha is through her laugh, a “curious laugh; distinct, formal, mirthless” (91). Bertha's laugh does not stop at Jane's ears, rather “in a clamorous peal” it “seemed to wake an echo in every lonely chamber; though it originated in but one, and I could have pointed out the door whence the accents issued” (91). Jane has lost sight of Mrs. Fairfax at this moment and has managed to find her way through a dark corridor by touching and groping the space. “I lingered in the passage to which this led,” Jane writes, “separating the front and back rooms of the third
story: narrow, low, and dim, with only one little window at the far end, and looking, with its two rows of small black doors all shut, like a corridor in some Bluebeard's castle” (91). Both Jane and Bertha at this moment are specifically aware of the physical limits to their respective spaces. Each knows the material limitations Thornfield uses to contain them—but it is Bertha, captive of Mr. Rochester, who violates the limit first. Her loud, strange laughter fills those spaces she cannot inhabit, unlike Jane who remains free to roam those rooms with her body.

When Jane hears the laughter, she knows that it is not a sound she made, she also calculates that this is not a sound made by Mrs. Fairfax, as she calls to her to confirm the sound: “‘Mrs. Fairfax!’ I called out… ‘Did you hear that loud laugh? Who is it?’” (91). Mrs. Fairfax willingly writes the laughter off as the playful noise of servants Leah and Grace. As proof, Grace is called out of her room, seen as “a woman of between thirty and forty; a set, square-made figure, red-haired, and with a hard, plain face: any apparition less romantic or less ghostly could scarcely be conceived” (91). As a woman not yet confined—at least, not as Bertha is or as Jane will find later—Jane does not recognize the voice of a confined woman. It is a story she is unfamiliar with, a history unknowable to her to this point. She accepts that Grace was the laughing voice because she has no marker to hold against it. Furthermore, Jane must have expected to see a woman, although no female characteristic is specified, because she is not surprised by Grace's gender—her body, yes, since she assumed only a ghost could make that laugh—but so satisfied with the attribution to Grace that Jane went contentedly to dinner.

Although Jane accepts that Grace is Bertha, Jane does not accept that the voice is
in her head. The sound, she notes, is locatable—its source is not hidden from her (Idhe 138). She does not confuse the laughter with an inner speech, thus requiring an other. Jane must know and expect to see visual confirmation of human attached to the laughter. In not recognizing the sounds puts Jane at a crossroads: either (1) schizophrenia or (2) identification of an Other (Idhe 139). Because Jane has proved a trustworthy narrator to this point (she completed school, found employment, writes in a clear manner), the reader trusts Jane’s senses. When Jane says there is another person at Thornfield, then the reader knows there is another person at Thornfield.

Bertha, thus, achieves successful breach in her laugh. She has broken through the limit of her confinement, and in doing so, troubles Jane. Without this moment of worry, Jane may have had little sympathy later for Bertha’s situation.

Grace, too, succumbs to the laugh. Her face is now a voice that is not hers. To Jane, Grace’s identity is warbled, thus throwing Grace into an exterior identity crisis. Bronte gives little of Grace’s history, but what is made clear is that she is guard to Bertha and held in similar captivity then with her patient. Her voice is also not to be heard outside the space of the enclosure, as Mrs. Fairfax admonishes, “‘Too much noise, Grace’…Grace curseyed silently and went in” (91). Her presence is unwelcome as the confusing noisemaker, who sends her terrifying voice throughout the manor.

Yet, this is not Grace. Grace sits outside the limit of Bertha’s limit—and so Jane stands outside Grace’s limit. The lovely double negation Hegel so painstakingly charted crushes here as the weight of negation builds. When Hegel sets up the architecture of the material world, interiors and exteriors, he did so in light of self-consciousness; that self-
consciousness experiences a wall, with little regard for what lies on the other side.

Certainly what is out of sight may not be available for the self-conscious being to experience—but what happens when what is on the other side makes noise.

Sound dissects the thing that sets apart the self-conscious from the other side, as Salome Voegelin argues, “the invisible mobility of sound shows the nonideal as a subjective ideality that is contingent and full of doubt. It reveals the tentative and fragile communality of this material conception and introduces alternative relationships between humans and the world as things thinging in complex equivalence” (1). Voegelin goes on to explain,

Sonic material is the groundlessness of our concrete experience that does not negate the visible but reveals its limits by opening its depth, which we inhabit in listening and in which we share not through preconceptions but in its experience, its duration, its expanse: fragile and tentative private lifeworlds meeting the possibility of others in the formlessness of sound that reveals the deformed nature of forms. (87)

To refuse the physical barriers set by man (and in some cases, nature), sound proposes a supplemental opportunity for sensory perception. What is seen has a sound, and to experience the sound of that thing exposes the limitations of sight and the sensual range of the thing. Staring at a wall limits the experience and questions the mediacy of the experience: for if the wall cannot be fully experienced and thus mediated by the self-consciousness, is the experience simply immediate? So it becomes the duty of sound and its listeners to reply to the “fragile and tentative” barriers that Hegel carefully constructed to separate one from an other.
E. Sound Wins

The appeal of sound over other senses is based on the indiscriminate nature of sonic expression. What is heard by one may be felt by another—and even what is heard by one may not be heard by another. Ears and language are not required, promoting the embodied nature of those ever-present, ever-unstopable soundwaves. In this way, the opportunity of sound, and specifically in the context of this project, for women, is in its deeply physical affects and its objective permeation.

Studies have shown that the female voice elicits different responses when compared to a male voice in certain situations. In a study on fetal response to the voices of fathers and mothers, Grace Lee and Barbara Kisilevsky found that while in utero, a father’s voice affected the fetus more often than the mother’s; however, at birth, babies favored the mother’s voice over the father’s and a stranger’s voice, confirming previous research (10). Another study by Alexandra Webb et al. found “that exposure to maternal sounds may provide newborns with the auditory fitness necessary to shape the brain for hearing and language development” (3152). A study in fertility “found the voices of naturally cycling females recorded during a high fertility phase were rated as more attractive and produced the greatest increase in galvanic skin response” (Shoup-Knox 386). But fertility and pregnancy are not the only sonic moments, as research by P. S. Weston et al. points out,

using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that discrete sites in non-primary auditory cortex are differentially activated by male and female voices, with female voices consistently evoking greater activation in the upper bank of the superior temporal sulcus and posterior superior temporal plane…These results demonstrate that male and female voices
are represented as distinct auditory objects in the human brain, with the mechanism for gender discrimination being a gender-dependent activation-level cue in non-primary auditory cortex. (208)

In getting to the material feminism discussed at the beginning of this work, reaching to science seems imperative and dangerous. Perhaps with some relief, studies in transgender communication therapy are struggling through these murky waters, as Adrienne Hancock et al. note, “Results…demonstrate that gender-related differences in language use for these two contexts are limited, and that any relationship of language to perceptions of gender and femininity is complex and multivariate. This information calls into question the utility of training key language features in transgender communication therapy” (315).

As startling as biology and physiology may be to feminists, to ignore the difference would only serve to maintain the path of “discourse” exposed by material feminism. So instead, a dive into those murky waters is needed, to search for the bottom, to find the limits—if they exist—and cause trouble. The battleground here will be in the body of woman. “When considered a finite object,” as woman’s body usually is, Cohen writes,

the body tends to be analyzed only to discover a pregiven essence, a stability of being: how do its pieces fit together into a coherent whole? … When bodies become sites of possibility, however, they are necessarily dispersed into something larger, something mutable and dynamic, a structure of alliance and becoming. (xiii)

Like Cohen, the site of disturbance is the body—but more specifically the bodies of those women in confinement and how they use those bodies to make and absorb sound.
F. Sound and Bodies

The highest form of art in Hegel’s schema is music, which finally annihilates not merely one form of spatial dimension, but the conditions of Space entirely, which is completely withdrawn into the ideality of soul-life, both in its aspect of conscious life and in that of its external expression. (340)

The ability for music, or in this case, sound, to “annihilate” is something science has shown time and again (see Michael Namorato’s “A Case History of Acoustics in Warfare”). And, of course, the classic party trick of using voice (via amplitude and frequency) to break a wine glass. For Hegel, music exceeds the limits of space, so to must sound transcend not only space, but also the body. Sound “annihilates” the distance between subject (body) and object (thing) in a mutual experiment. Both subject and object receive the soundwaves, defying the limit of flesh. Hegel goes on to note that “sensuous material surrenders…[and is] placed in motion but is so essentially affected by that motion that every portion of the coherent bodily substance not merely changes its position, but also is reacted upon and reacts upon the previous condition” (340-1). That “sensuous material” is the human body of senses, of course, given over to the will of sonic possibility. Yet, there seems no room for the non-sensuous, those objects that sound traveled through to get to the body, in Hegel’s music. Like the anthropocentrizing of architecture, here Hegel does the same with music, as if humans only experience sound, or that a self-consciousness can only experience the truth of music.

As an early example of the material influence of sound, the Ancrene Wisse depicts the annihilating quality of sound through speech of the anchoress in her enclosure. The
Ancrene Wisse author has instructed the enclosed woman to not silently think her prayers, but to engage her voice and body, in concert, to achieve devotional success. So detailed are the instructions that the first duties are explained movement-by-movement, sound-by-sound:

When you first get up, cross yourself and say, *In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen.* And begin *Come creator Spirit* right away with eyes and hands lifted toward heaven, bowing forward on your knees on the bed; and in this way say the whole hymn, with the versicle *Send forth your Spirit,* and the prayer, *God who taught the hearts of the faithful.* After this, while putting on your shoes and clothing yourself, say *Our Father* [i.e., the Lord’s Prayer], *I believe* [i.e., the Apostles’ Creed], and *Jesus Christ, Son of the living God, have mercy on us; you who deigned to be born of a virgin, have mercy on us*—keep saying this prayer until you are fully dressed. Keep this prayer much in use and often in your mouth whenever you can, sitting or standing. (53)

The truncated prayers in this passage indicate that the anchoress has memorized—or should have memorized—these devotions, which is understandable considering the work required: praying aloud while getting dressed would prove difficult with the added task of reading a book of devotions. Thus, the book is eliminated once memorization happens, stripping the anchoress to her body and voice. Each spoken component, then, accompanies a body movement, so that the two become intertwined, in turn, condensing the space between voice and body. By making noise, the anchoress is also vibrating the material walls of her anchorhold, altering the self-consciousnesses on the outside that she is inside, is alive, and is even woman. Her voice recognizable as feminine, defies the very architecture built to contain her, allowing her a channel to the world.

The ability to recognize the sound of the female voice is, for Cixous, a promising moment. “Listen to a woman speak,” Cixous urges,
She doesn’t *speak*, she throws her trembling body forward; she let’s go of herself, she flies; all of her passes into her voice, and it’s with her body that she vitally supports the “logic” of her speech…she physically materializes what she’s thinking; she signifies it with her body. (881)

Speech through physicality and materiality is more than a signification process; it becomes a history-making campaign. There is a trigger of recognition, whether consciously or unconsciously made, when a woman hears a woman’s voice. That woman’s voice rings in her ears.

G. Tell Me a Story: Aurality

The cycle/recycling of sound was so important to the medieval era, in particular, for aurality—or the reading aloud of texts to a group of listeners—which was the favored way to consume texts. As Joyce Coleman notes, a typical group reading “might have commented on the author’s skill, might have recognized sources and evaluated the new interpretation” (76), with debate and discussion key components to the experience. Reading in silent solitude was not the ideal; even in the anchorhold, where it is expected, women were reading their rules out loud and even teaching their female servants. As the anchoress reads aloud the rule to her women, she brings the voice of woman to the *Ancrene Wisse* and other male-written texts. The enclosure fills with the sounds of her voice, moving into the ears of her female companions. Those women may, in turn, have questions or responses to the reading, thus generating more female voices—a continued exchange that builds and amplifies what it means to read and sound like a woman.

Bursting with feminine sounds, the noises would begin to push against the physical limits
of the space, seeping out through the walls, windows, and cracks to an outside world dominated by man’s voice. Cixous proposes a similar system, whereby “there always remains in woman the force which produces/is produced by the other—in particular, the other woman” (881).

Antigone provides a glimpse of the consequences of woman’s voice return by not-woman. Prior to her entombment, Antigone sings on stage, according to stage directions. Her song, however, is not well-received, as she sings in conversation with a Chorus of “elderly citizens, men of stature and importance” (117). The Chorus waivers between admonishment and pity, but overwhelmingly the former rules. Antigone is left to lament her pending death, which is posed to her as a choice: suicide or slow-death in a rocky tomb.

Much of Antigone’s song centers on the loss of her rites to marriage (specifically to Haiman, Kreon’s son): “I have no share of marriage/Rites,” she bemoans (90), comparing her tomb to a bridal chamber and seeing her death as an expulsion from her woman-centered identity. As a woman, Antigone “expected to remain primarily in the house, and to be concerned with the rearing of children and the management of domestic affairs” (117), but she will experience none of that. As much as her lament is about the loss of this identity, it also becomes a challenge to a biased, binary system, especially when performed on stage. It is as though she stops being a woman when the tomb is sealed: when all those feminine characteristics of wifehood and motherhood are voided, as well as her roll as sister (the reason she is even in this situation) and daughter (as her parents are dead). Antigone has lost all of the markers of social female identity.
A BBC-recorded staging of *Antigone* offers a performative illustration of Antigone’s identity crisis, with a Chorus composed of the elder citizens mentioned earlier, all in dark suits, all White males with white/gray hair. They speak as one voice and as singular voices, vacillating between the two. Antigone, a brunette, with long hair, a youthful face, and dressed in a white costume, stands in stark contrast to the Chorus. In one scene, as Antigone speaks, the Chorus closes around her in a circle, where they respond to her laments, assaulting her from all sides with their voices. In another scene, Antigone is herded by these men, who stand in a pivoting line, pushing her toward her end; she is herded off stage to her tomb. Hegel seemed so easily to identify architecture as thingness; yet, for Antigone, the enclosed tomb seems like no location change at all considering the men that trap and herd her. Certainly rocks have a certain weight and permanence, but these men have clearly trapped Antigone with their bodies and voices; she cannot escape them on the stage—except by exiting the stage to enter the cave.

The Chorus’s strophe and antistrophe establish two sides, and Antigone belongs to neither, creating a ping-pong effect. Back and forth, moving from one side of the stage to the other—yet, Antigone is never in sync with their movement. She moves on her own, between and surrounded by the sounds of their shuffling feet, rustling clothes, and male voices. This staging puts Antigone in a strange, third space—one she has pondered in her songs, as well. She calls herself “neither living among those/who are alive, nor/Dwelling as a corpse/Among corpses, having/No home with either/The living or the dead” (92). Once the entrance is sealed, Antigone is left with a female body and a canceled womanhood: she is unable to wed, bear children, or maintain a household; in that
moment of loss her identity is changed from woman to *not*-woman. Further distancing her from her woman identity, her tomb sits outside the walls of the city; she has lost the identity *city*-woman, too. Expelled for being a loyal *sister*-woman to a place that recategorizes her as *not*-woman, *not*-sister, *not*-wife, *not*-mother, but *never*-man, Antigone’s identity is negated under a patriarchal architecture. She will also be expelled from the play and stage and, therefore, from the view of the audience. All that remains of Antigone are the echoes of her voice that could still be bouncing around the theater, making it difficult to pinpoint exactly where Antigone is or has gone or is going.

Antigone hangs herself with the robes she wore upon entering the cell. But what happens before her suicide in the tomb, we do not know. Sophocles does not show us the inside of the cell, or even take us to see her hanging body. Like Hegel, Sophocles allows only one self-consciousness to process architecture—and that would never be Antigone, who has undergone a castration of sorts. It is a male messenger who brings news of her death to the Chorus: Antigone is circumscribed once again by the city’s men.

The visual correspondence of Antigone and Chorus in conversation makes the sound of inner conversations invisible. Hegel’s limits arise once again, to keep viewers from that interior space of the mind, where conversations with the self take place. However, that invisibility is not to be assumed fruitless or simplistic. Idhe writes:

I “hear” inner speech differently than I “hear” other forms of auditory imagination…when I turn to inner speech itself, although I recognize clearly that it does not appear as “like” the voice of another, I find it hard to grasp directly. I “catch it” from the fringe; it seems to evade objectification. (139)

This is not the stuff of non-linguistic images or thoughts that pop into the mind. This
speech is a conversation with the self, rather than an other, “of being my thinking” (Ihde 139). It is this awareness of the self in conversation with the self that leads Jane Eyre to confidently reject and leave Rochester and his proposal of bigamy. Jane answers Bolick’s marriage question with resolve, but it took distance and solitude to reach that resolution.

Jane the narrator recalls her time locked in her room:

I shut myself in, fastened the bolt that none might intrude, and proceeded—not to weep, not to mourn, I was yet too calm for that, but—mechanically to take off the wedding dress and replace it by the stuff gown I had worn yesterday, as I thought, for the last time. (252)

Using indirect discourse, Jane tells herself “for the last time” as she changes out of her wedding dress back into the Jane that was yesterday. In removing those wedding clothes, Jane sheds the woman she thought she would be today—married as Mrs. Rochester. She revises her space so that she may control her emotions and her thoughts. “And now I thought: till now I had only heard, seen, moved—followed up and down where I was led or dragged—watched event rush on event, disclosure open beyond disclosure: but now, I thought” (252). Trapped in a body moveable from here to there, at the whim of an other, she was not subject out there; merely an object to Mr. Rochester. In here, behind the locked-door, Jane regains her subjectivity and thus, calculates her identity going forward.

To do this calculation, Jane must talk to herself:

The morning had been a quiet morning enough—all except the brief scene with the lunatic: the transaction in the church had not been noisy; there was no explosion of passion, no loud altercation, no dispute, no defiance or challenge, no tears, no sobs: a few words had been spoken, a calmly pronounced objection to the marriage made; some stern, short questions put by Mr. Rochester; answers, explanations given, evidence adduced; an open admission of the truth had been uttered by my master; then the living proof had been seen: the intruders were gone, and all was over. (252)
Once again, Jane engages in indirect discourse to process the day, evident in backshifted verb tenses (“had not been noisy”; “had been spoken”; “had been uttered”; “had been seen”), as well as the listing of items (“no explosion of passion, no loud altercation, no dispute, no defiance or challenge, no tears, no sobs”) and the use of descriptive language (“quiet enough”). Jane is speaking to herself. Ihde notes that inner speech “retains some isomorphisim with spoken voice which also presents itself as coming not from elsewhere. Rather,” he writes, “my voice in its self-presence is felt bodily” (139). By Jane conversing with herself, we are to understand that her voice is a bodily-felt moment. She is moved by her own words, like the anchoresses described earlier. Jane goes on:

I was in my own room as usual—just myself, without obvious change: nothing had smitten me, or scathed me, or maimed me. And yet, where was the Jane Eyre of yesterday?—where was her life?—where were her prospects? (252)

Taking stock of her physicality, Jane recognizes that her body has remained the same—it is whole, intact, without physical mark. Yet it is the interior of that body that has been altered—so unknown to her that she refers to herself in the third person: “where was the Jane Eyre of yesterday.”

The singular chatter in a “room of one’s own” allows, as Voegelin explains, “the hearing of myself in the social context of a room, my soundscape, a position and its consequence, which these words are trying to reflect on and share” (1). Through this isolation and its conversation, Jane builds the confidence to leave Thornfield, and specifically remove herself from Rochester’s sight: “from his presence I must go” (253). Sight suddenly becomes the sense of betrayal, where nothing was as it looked: from the
“scene with the lunatic” (252) to Jane’s assumption that her “view must be hateful to him” (253). She bemoans vision, “Oh, how blind had been my eyes! How weak my conduct!” (253), connecting the failure of her sight with the failure of her discretion.

Following her realization, Jane begins to disconnect her body from her femaleness by (1) rejecting Rochester’s proposal of marriage (“Mr. Rochester, I will not be yours” [269]), (2) leaving the safety of a man’s home for an uncertain life on the road (“The great gates were closed and locked; but a wicket in one of them was only latched. Through it I departed: it, too, I shut; and now I was out of Thornfield” [273], and (3) choosing solitude over shame (“‘I care for myself. The more solitary, the more friendless, the more unsustained I am, the more I will respect myself’” (270). Her refusal to be defined by her relationship to a man makes her less of a woman. Her former status as object in Thornfield has been replaced with subject in concert with Thornfield, for it is in communion with the architecture of that space where Jane separated her embodied identity from the gendered identity performance that simply did not suit her. Rochester laments Jane’s de-feminized state,

‘Whatever I do with its [Jane’s] cage, I cannot get at it—the savage, beautiful creature! If I tear, if I rend the slight prison, my outrage will only let the captive loose. Conqueror I might be of the house; but the inmate would escape to heaven before I could call myself possessor of its clay dwelling-place.’ (271)

Jane sees herself as free through her rejection of patriarchal feminine expectations, activated through her embodied conversation; Rochester recognizes that Jane is no longer penetrable as woman, having lost a proscribed femininity. Rochester terms Jane a “savage” similar to the description of Bertha. Both women defy the norms of
their sex—however different those means and processes may be.

IV. Conclusion

Eliminating the noise of oppressors should never require building walls and setting up isolation, hiding away the other behind a material limit or a death sentence. This is not just a practice that existed in times past or in the safety of fiction; Radiolab recently produced a podcast investigating the experience of Cuban misfits in the 1980’s who “created a revolution within a revolution, going into exile without ever leaving home…who sentenced themselves to death and set themselves free” (“Los Frikos”). After voluntarily injecting themselves with HIV, the government labeled those infected as dangerous and removed them from society to controlled colonies, where they were given freedoms those not confined only dreamed of. An embodiment project should not seek to answer questions like “is confinement okay” but “what is happening in there.” Confinement is not, as some may argue, a “freedom from” as Elizabeth Grosz argues, but rather “freedom to” (“Feminism, Materialism, and Freedom” 141). Grosz concedes that freedom is linked to the body’s capacity for movement and thus it's multiple possibilities of action. Freedom is not an accomplishment granted by the grace or good will of the other but is attained only through the struggle with matter, the struggle of bodies to become more than they are, a struggle that occurs not only on the level of the individual but also of the species. (152)

Enclosure brings into close contact identity and the body and materiality, questioning the core of subjectivity, and the origins of that identity in the world. And as science and
technology continue to capture and collect data about our invisible materiality, that core of subjectivity will ebb and flow. Gender identity, as part of our social construction and all that waterfalls from there, poses unique and even contentious dichotomies, particularly regarding the body and “the body.” Rather than pick a side, this project suggests rangework—to understand one through the other, but also to shake the very binary-structure that mainstream culture uses to scaffold identity.


