

TOLERATING EUROPE: INTEGRATION WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Tolerating Europe: Integration without Identification

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Popular opinion holds that the European Union has reached the limits of its integration capacity. Despite major advances made in integration, little progress seems to have been made in creating a common European community. Many feel this spells the end of the European Union. In this project, I argue that in fact, the situation is not as dire as it appears. The European Union has significant political legitimacy, and its population in fact tolerates its governance well. This legitimacy says more about the future of the European Union than affective identification. I show the importance of political legitimacy as opposed to affective identity in three empirical chapters. The first examines the determinants of support for European control of specific policy areas, and shows that different factors determine support for European control of different policies. The second presents the results of a survey experiment showing that framing certain issues in terms of costs and benefits can shift opinions on policy control. Finally, I present a case study of the Eurozone financial crisis, showing that despite precipitous drops in indicators of affective identity, the EU is still the most desired actor when discussing solving the crisis, and most Europeans support continued integration as a result of the crisis. The future of the European Union is more positive than both popular opinion and most scholarship would believe.

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Dedication

To my husband, for his unwavering support and sacrifice over the last five years.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Decades ago, Jacques Delors observed, “*On ne tombe pas amoureux du marché unique* (One does not fall in love with a single market).” Delors correctly made the point that the single market itself does not inspire citizens to transfer their affections to the supranational level. Politicians, pundits, and columnists have often predicted the end of Europe during various crises in recent decades. Eurosclerosis, the sovereign debt crisis of 2008, several stages of enlargement, various recalcitrant member states: if one believes the media, the European Union would appear to be constantly on the brink of collapse. Headlines both before and after the financial crisis have included “The End of Europe”; “Europe Isn’t Working”; “Will Europe Ever Work?”; “What’s Wrong with Europe”; “The Decline and Fall of Europe”; “Old Europe Unprepared for New Battles”; and “Is Europe Dying?”.¹

But in fact, the EU has survived all these crises, and come through most of them stronger than before. Why is this, and how? Over the last several decades, the European Union has made unprecedented advances in integration, giving it a great deal

¹Steven Hill, *Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

more power and scope. It has taken on a more powerful role in many areas of policy traditionally controlled by the national government. Many scholars have suggested that the future of the European project is jeopardized by the failure of citizens' shared sense of 'European identity' to increase along with increases in EU powers. These scholars assume that to be sustainable, the transfer of power to the EU level must be supported by a robust sense of common identity among European Union citizens. According to survey data, identification with Europe remains low and has never increased significantly, suggesting to some that the thin basis of European identity may be insufficient to support the EU's growing power. Without such common identity, some wonder, what could lead citizens to support the ongoing increase in the EU's powers?

For the last twenty years, Eurobarometer questions about whether the respondent feels more attached to their national or European identities have been used to measure the growth of European identity. The results have barely changed since 1992, meaning no increase has been observed in the existing low levels of identification with Europe. These observations about public opinion have led to dire predictions about whether further advances of power will be permitted by the European public, and debates about whether the EU has reached the limit of its integration capacity.² Will the European Union be able to integrate further? What level of identification is necessary for integration to move forward, and is it possible to achieve it? This pessimistic outlook seems to imply that further integration in Europe will be extremely difficult without further movement in identification.

²Lars-Erik Cederman, *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Dimension*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Andrew Moravcsik, "Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality", in *The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union*, eds. Kalypso Nicoladis and Robert Howe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

But it is difficult to square this gloomy perspective with developments in the EU over the past three decades, namely the fact that European integration has ‘deepened’ so significantly in the absence of any increase in common identity. Since 1987, the EU has passed the Single European Act to complete a common market, and later created a common currency, the euro. It has increased regional aid to southern member states. It has created freedom of movement, allowing Europeans to live and vote in other member states. It has begun cooperating on issues like immigration and asylum, and removed border controls between most EU member states with the Schengen agreement. It has made huge steps on regulation of areas such as the environment, employment, and discrimination. How was the European Union able to acquire significantly more power in so many areas without seeing an increase in identification? This project will address that very question.

Perhaps whether one “feels” European is not the only dimension of identity that scholars of European identity should be examining: perhaps there is more to the creation of a European community than symbols and nationalism. This project posits that if we want to understand what has allowed such a drastic increase in power, researchers should be examining the legitimacy of the supranational government—specifically, the kind of trust that leads a citizen to accept the EU as the actor in a particular policy area—rather than identity. This will show a great deal more about whether citizens feel linked to the European project than measuring their overt responses to whether they feel European. In order to understand what creates a feeling of European legitimacy, one must understand what leads an individual citizen to view the European Union governing in a given policy area as tolerable. Essentially, this project will argue that policies are adopted by elites, which leads to either passive acceptance (in the early days of the “permissive consensus”), or an analysis of

efficiency, which ends with tolerance of the power transfer, creating legitimacy for European governance.

While many scholars have examined the legitimacy of European governance, it has often been operationalized as general regime support. Existing literature has focused on dependent variables like belief that membership in the EU is a good thing, or belief that the country has benefited overall. This project will show, however, that different characteristics and variables predict support for different policy areas. The European Union is a system with diffuse governing powers, and public opinion varies on which policies it supports. It is important that this project contends that it is the concept of tolerance is key to explaining the legitimacy of European governance, rather than affective identity, and that it is particularly important to understand different levels of tolerance in different policy areas. I will be using the concept of tolerance to define acceptance of European governance in a particular policy area, the dependent variable for this study. This project contends that a shift in power through elite bargaining will thus lead to a shift in public opinion about European legitimacy in a particular policy area. Eurobarometer data over the past two decades on several policy areas tells an interesting tale. On policies like common security and defense, environmental protection, currency, foreign policy, and immigration policy, public support for more support for European control has increased over time³ Policies that tended more toward supporting national control, such as education and social welfare, have continued to crystallize as pro-national control.

³The sole exceptions are countries that acceded in 2004, who begin their tenure in the EU with extremely high support for European control of policies, and then fall over time to a smaller majority that still supports European control. This could be due to improvement in the functioning of the national governments of 2004 entrant countries over time.

As the EU has become more involved in more areas of public policy, the benefits of coordinated action have become clearer to EU citizens. Thus, their preferences for EU control on areas where there could be potential cost efficiencies have become more defined. Additionally, the EU is arguably better able to act in certain areas when it has more power—for example, economic and financial policy. Evidence that the European public’s opinions on issues have any role in power transfers is sketchy at best. In fact, some of the areas in which the European public most supports a power transfer (police, defense, security) are areas where national governments are particularly reluctant to integrate. Thus, the national governments seem to be actively blocking the expressed preferences of the European public, and the public’s role in power transfers becomes irrelevant. Instead of examining the public’s role in creating power transfers, this project will be examining how power transfers lead to the European public’s increased acceptance of the European Union’s legitimacy in a particular policy area.⁴

While much has been written on both the issue of the lack of affective identity in the EU, and the legitimacy of its governance, the two literatures tend to talk past each other. The former, focusing on the idea that the EU lacks a *demos* and a popular identity, which it cannot integrate further without, performs largely qualitative studies. The latter, which focuses on quantitative predictors, highlights European legitimacy. This project will attempt to bridge these two literatures using multimethod empirical work.

⁴Franklin and Wlezien (1997) demonstrate that the European public does tend to adjust its preferences on unification after changes in policy, but I have found little evidence thus far that the reverse is true.

1.1 Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 2 presents the concept of tolerance of European governance to explain the EU's 'deepening'. Much literature on European identity uses the traditional Eurobarometer survey question measuring support for further integration as a measure of European identity, or questions asking whether the respondent feels more French than European, or more European than French. This often leads to conclusions that European identity is underdeveloped. This project posits that in order to explain the lack of change in identification with Europe over time, it is more appropriate to examine legitimacy over various policy areas. Legitimacy is truly found in tolerating the supranational institutions control over a policy area traditionally controlled by the national government, and it is important to examine unique policy areas rather than general regime support. A European populace will share projects and goals, and thus share costs and benefits alike. This creates much more interdependence and identification that is independent of trust or support for integration.

Chapter 3 summarizes empirical analyses using public opinion data from the Eurobarometer survey. This chapter attempts to isolate the determinants of individual-level public opinion, as well as examining national context. Typically, these preferences tend toward sole national control for issues like education and social welfare, and supranational responsibility for the environment, science, and energy policy; immigration and asylum policies; and foreign and security policy. Economic policy tends to vary with national context. Newer member states tend toward more supranational preferences on education and welfare as well. This chapter hypothesizes that citizens make decisions about competence areas instrumentally. They wish the EU would take over policies where it saves money to share costs between countries. The European public recognizes that regarding issues that cross national borders, such as

the environment, defense policy, and immigration, it makes sense to have supranational control. Analysis shows that different characteristics predict support for European control of different policy areas and that the characteristics that affect support for these policies are often based on the benefits that can be found from supranational control of those policies.

Chapter 4 presents the results of a survey experiment conducted in July 2015 using subjects in the United Kingdom, through Google Consumer Surveys. This experiment focused on prompts framed to prime respondents to think about either national or supranational concerns. It then observed whether the framing affected their responses. Randomized prompts led respondents to consider cost efficiency or national sovereignty in either environmental policy or defense policy, addressing the hypotheses in Chapter 3 that citizens make decisions about policy responsibility based on rational concerns. Finally they were asked whether they thought the EU or national governments should handle that policy area. The results show that European respondents can be manipulated to support national or EU level responsibility in different areas of governance based on the concerns they are primed to consider.

Chapter 5 presents a case study of the financial crisis beginning in 2008. How did it affect trust in the European Union and support for integration? How did it affect policy competence in economic policy? The expectation is that trust in the European Union and support for integration have dropped. Surprisingly, though, the EU is still the desired actor for handling the financial crisis, and most economic policy in general. While there is variation in national context based on experiences in the crisis, this case study links the various theoretical contributions of this project. Europeans show a preference for the EU as an actor in the financial crisis because the nations of the eurozone are already financially linked. Thus, it is logical for them to look to European institutions to solve a European problem. While support for integration

and trust in the EU collapsed, the EU is still the preferred actor. This indicates there is more to the European community than our traditional conceptions based on affective identity—as identified by Harteveld et al, legitimacy is even more important than identification and citizens may support increasing EU authority in a salient policy area even as their broader support for and trust in the EU declines.⁵ Additionally, it has been shown by George and Gabel and Whitten that worsening economic conditions promote further support for integration, which makes gloomy predictions about the future of the EU after the crisis seem ungrounded.⁶ Greece and Germany are used as case studies to further examine conclusions found in the aggregate data.

Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes this study's main findings. In this chapter, the project's contributions to the field of European identity are discussed. European citizens' preference for the European Union to take action on a particular issue signifies more about their trust in and support for the European Union than any standard measures, and it is important to examine different policy areas in this undertaking. Literature that says the EU cannot move forward without further identification does not currently speak to literature that examines regime support. Therefore, determining what factors lead a citizen to choose the EU as the preferred actor for a particular policy can give more information about European identity than the standard survey questions scholars have used in the past.

⁵Eelco Harteveld, Tom van der Meer, Catherine de Vries, "In Europe we trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union", *European Union Politics* 14.4 (2013): 542-565.

⁶Stephen George. *Politics and policy-making in the European Community*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Matthew Gabel and Guy Whitten, "Economic conditions, economic perceptions, and public support for European integration", *Political Behavior*, 19.1 (1997): 81-96.

A robust common identity is not necessary for integration; affective identification is not necessary for support. The EU's true base of support can be found through tolerance of its governance. This project will explore the idea that Europeans understand positive externalities and cost-sharing. They support EU control of policy in areas where it is cost-effective to do so, and in areas where they feel the EU can be more efficient than their national government. Through this lens, we can understand how the EU has managed to continue integration with significant success despite the stagnation of identification with Europe and despite drastic drops in support during the recent financial crisis.

Chapter 2

Defining Tolerance

In recent years, the European Union has taken over several areas of policy traditionally confined to the national government, making huge strides in integration. To scholars, however, the future of the European project has seemed in jeopardy, due to an apparent stagnation of identity. According to Duchesne and Frogner, identification with Europe did not increase significantly in three decades between the 1960s and 1990s, despite drastic changes throughout this period. Eurobarometer data shows that this trend has continued in the subsequent decades.¹ Traditionally, many scholars have seen such an affective identity as necessary for continued integration. This chapter will focus on how one can reconcile this disparity through utilizing the concept of tolerance of European governance, and emphasizing the idea that different policy areas require different variables to examine support. I will argue that through creating more shared projects and functionality, European citizens acceptance of EU governance increases. EU citizens recognize the burden-sharing and positive externalities that result from transferring certain public policies to the supranational levels. This tolerance transforms citizens identification and allows them to become more ‘pro-European’, although their affective identity may not change. I will show that public opinion data finds little evidence for the crisis of legitimacy many attribute to the European Union. Over time, support for having certain policies at the European level has actually grown, despite a lack of increase in identification.

¹Sophie Duchesne and Andre-Paul Frogner, “Is There a European Identity?” in *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*, eds. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); Eurobarometer data 1992-2014.

In this project, **tolerance** will be defined as acceptance of the power transfer from the national to the supranational entity. While tolerance requires acceptance of such transfers as a bare minimum, some citizens may do more than accept—they may positively prefer power transfers to the supranational entity. The **legitimacy** of governance by a particular level of government derives from citizens' belief that such governance is able to satisfy their needs efficiently and effectively. Tolerance is a product of legitimacy—acceptance of the power transfer because citizens find the level of government in question to be capable of effectively and efficiently satisfying basic needs.

I hypothesize that confusion over who is responsible leads a European citizen to consider a comparative analysis between perceived capabilities of the levels of government (as described in Schneider et al 2010). In other words, does the citizen currently think his national government or the European government is functioning better? This is in turn followed by instrumental calculations about which level of government could best and most efficiently deal with the policy area. With an appropriate policy area, this chain can lead to tolerance of a power transfer. Different characteristics may predict whether a particular individual sees something as being in their interest, or not. Eurobarometer data over the past two decades on several policy areas shows that supranational control of policies where economies of scale play a role have more support than policies that would not benefit from economies of scale. Citizens are aware of what policy areas create fiscal efficiency, and take this into account when tolerating power transfer to the supranational entity.²

²Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "Who supports global economic engagement? The sources of preferences in American foreign economic policy," *International Organizations*, 65.1 (2011): 37-68; Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "The choice of multilateralism: foreign aid and American foreign policy", *The Review of International Organizations*, 8.3 (2013): 313-341; Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "The domestic politics of foreign aid: American legislators and the politics of donor countries," *Economics and Politics*, 22.2 (2010): 200-232; Richard Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends:

Most literature on affective identity in Europe uses the traditional Eurobarometer survey question measuring support for further integration as a measure of European identity, or questions asking whether the respondent feels more French than European, or more European than French. This often leads to conclusions that European identity is underdeveloped, and literature on regime support often does not address this idea. This project posits that to better explain the success of European integration despite the lack of identification, we must look to legitimacy. Legitimacy can be found in tolerance and acceptance of the supranational institutions control over a particular policy area traditionally controlled by the national government. A European populace will share projects and goals, and thus share costs and benefits alike. This creates much more interdependence and identification that is unrelated to trust or support for integration. Focusing on legitimacy and tolerance of the supranational government explains the increase in integration despite a lack of identification.

2.1 Weaknesses of European Identity in Current Scholarship

One particular Eurobarometer question has been included in the survey since 1992, asking respondents “In the near future, will you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and then European, European and then [nationality], or European only?” Responses show little change over the last several decades: very few think of themselves as solely or primarily European, but the number of those who exhibit a secondary identification with Europe is greater than the number of those who identify as solely national. Another question uses essentially the same formulation, but in the present: “Do you feel British only, British and European, European and British or

US public opinion and the use of military force, 1981-2005”, *International Security*, 30.1 (2005): 140-177; Jeffrey Timmons, “The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services”, *World Politics*, 57.4 (2005): 530-567.

European only?” Other scholarly work equates support for further European integration with a European identity—a problematic formulation at best. Yet another question asks “Generally speaking, do you think that our country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing/a bad thing/neither good nor bad/don’t know?” The advantage of these questions is that they have been asked consistently over time, and a great deal of data is available about respondents’ answers. On the other hand, not only are the questions themselves problematic, but the fact that these varied concepts are often equated with European identity in scholarly work is even more troubling. Additionally, if we accept Duchesne and Frogner’s conclusion as true, and examine recent Eurobarometer data, this means measures of European identity have not changed or increased significantly since the initial inception of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Other scholars have brought up the problems with these measures—namely, Bruter and Caporaso & Kim.³ Both of these articles recommend a dual approach to identity. For Bruter, this distinction is between civic and cultural identity. Civic identity is defined as the extent to which Europeans feel they are “citizens of a European political system”, whether they identify with European political institutions, and feel that European laws and rules have an impact on their daily lives.⁴ Bruter observes that Habermas refers to this as “constitutional patriotism”. Europeans can feel attached to the EU as a political project independently of whether they feel a commonality with other EU citizens. Cultural identity, on the other hand, focuses on just such a

³Michael Bruter, “Winning hearts and minds for Europe: the impact of news and symbols on civic and cultural identity,” *Comparative Political Studies* December (2003); Michael Bruter. *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*. (New York, Palgrave, 2005); James Caporaso and Min-hyung Kim. “The Dual Nature of European Identity: Subjective Awareness and Coherence” *Journal of European Public Policy* 16: 1(2005).

⁴Bruter, “Winning hearts and minds for Europe,” 1155.

feeling—do EU citizens feel closer to fellow Europeans than non-Europeans? If Europeans feel they have a common heritage, common history, and common values, they feel a cultural identity. These two faces of identity can be completely independent. Bruter believes that these identities vary over time and can be manipulated by symbols or the media—but the different identities react to different stimuli. Based on his experiment, he believes that the EU has a limited amount of political legitimacy. This project will contest that assertion—tolerance of EU governance in fact shows that the EU has a great deal of political legitimacy among European citizens. While many academics and pundits claim the European Union is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy, due to a perceived democratic deficit, public opinion sees the European Union as legitimate.

For Caporaso & Kim, the division is between subjective identity and coherence. Subjective identity can be defined as communal feelings—“shared feelings about the we-group, shared values, and common mental frames.”⁵ Coherence, rather, “has to do with how the parts of the group fit together in some orderly ensemble, how the group works together to solve problems, and how interdependent its parts are.”⁶ They argue that identity clearly has both an internal and an external aspect. As evidence of coherence, they point out the ever-increasing intra-EU trade and investment, as well as a convergence in levels of national inflation and unemployment, which they attribute in part to regulatory harmonization (this article was written before the economic crisis of 2008, which has since led to drastically different national contexts).

These scholars have also identified some of the problems with the Eurobarometer questions about European identity. For one, many of the questions are ‘forced-choice’

⁵Caporaso and Kim, “The Dual Nature of European Identity”, 21.

⁶Ibid

in nature: identity is presented as a zero-sum game. If you are more European, you are less Dutch or German. A great deal of research has shown that humans can hold multiple identities at different levels of salience depending on the context. Identity is not a zero-sum game, but a marble cake, as Thomas Risse puts it.⁷ Much scholarship (beginning with Ernst Haas in 1958) holds that it is absolutely possible for Europeans to hold multiple identities. One can be European, German, Bavarian, a woman, etc. The identity that becomes most prominent, however, depends on the context in which it is invoked. In other words, each identity is salient in different contexts.⁸ This finding makes the Eurobarometer approach to identity troublesome. Does it adequately and accurately capture European feeling? Or does it merely capture whatever identity is most salient at the moment the question is asked?

Secondly, some of the questions ask a respondent to predict their future attitudes on whether they will feel more or less European. Asking a respondent to assume the future requires a level of clairvoyance unavailable to most European citizens. Current events, personal events, and other unforeseen circumstances could change how a respondent feels in the future. None of this knowledge is available to them at the time of the survey. How can we judge the current success of integration on unsupported opinions of the future? Thus, the most popular questions asked to determine whether citizens of Europe identify with a European community are both highly problematic and do not expand our perception of identity a great deal.

Caporaso and Kim identify the very problem that this dissertation will address, saying “There are surprisingly high levels of support for Community decision-making,

⁷Thomas Risse. “Neo-functionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration”. *Journal of European Public Policy* 12 (2005).

⁸Thomas Risse. “The euro between national and European identity”. *Journal of European Public Policy* 10:4 (2003).

far in excess of what one would predict from levels of identity”.⁹ They go on to say, “Our limited effort suggests that the EU is increasing its performative powers and that its performance has had an effect on the attitudes and behavior of its member states and peoples, if not on European identity”.¹⁰ In this statement, Caporaso and Kim identify the disconnect between support for EU policymaking and identifying as European, and why this is problematic. This project will further address the disconnect between these two bodies of literature, and also focus on highlighting particular policy areas.

2.2 Neo-functionalism

If current scholarship does not adequately address the puzzle of advances in European integration, where to turn next? In order to examine scholarship on support for the European Union that are grounded more in legitimacy as opposed to affective identity, we can turn to neo-functionalism. An early theory of European integration was pioneered by Ernst Haas, one of the great scholars of the European Union. He points out that “The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist and trade unionist advanced the movement—not the politician, the scholar, the poet, or the writer.”¹¹ Haas wished to identify the fact that the EU was never a project of idealists, but rather a practical endeavor designed around economic benefits, saying, “The decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it rests on the perception of interests and on the articulation of specific values on the part of existing political actors”.¹² Despite the modern-day creation of symbols like a European flag, a European national anthem, and other symbols of European citizenship, Haas insists that

⁹Caporaso and Kim, “The dual nature of European identity”, 39

¹⁰Caporaso and Kim, “The dual nature of European identity”, 40.

¹¹Ernst Haas. *The Uniting of Europe*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

¹²Ibid

it was not idealistic thoughts about a “United States of Europe” that led to the creation of the ECSC, and thus the EU: it was practical economics.

The main contention of neo-functionalism is that a community will learn to think beyond the nation through a pattern of cooperation on various issues—one cooperates in order to maximize the potential gains.¹³ International actors engage in cooperation based on their interests, and further integration follows whether they intend it or not: a *Gesellschaft* becomes a *Gemeinschaft*. Individual citizens feel loyalty toward those agencies that perform crucial government functions, and are capable of loyalty towards more than one system. Through the legitimation of shared projects and shared roles, loyalty follows. For Haas, this was the desired end-state of European community.

How does this desirable state occur? One method was through spillover. Spillover occurs when there are unintended consequences from giving national powers to a supra-national entity, which then leads to greater integration out of necessity. His student Philippe Schmitter summarizes this viewpoint by saying,

under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority to the regional organizations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will ‘spill-over’ into political integration.

¹³Ernst Haas. *Beyond the Nation-State*. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964).

Through spillover, eventually a more federal and integrated Europe would come into being, Haas believed.¹⁴

Neo-functionalism is still used today as a theory of integration, but is less utilized as a theory of identity. Both Karl Deutsch, another founder of European integration studies, and Ernst Haas identify European identity as a crucial part of integration—each identify collective identification with institutions beyond those of the nation-state as extremely important.¹⁵ Haas says that one of the ways that actors acquire new loyalties is as a byproduct of otherwise instrumental behavior toward another end in European integration. Later in his career, Haas abandoned the talk of identity for talk of legitimacy and authority transfer. His theory of holding multiple identities without competition would later inspire those such as Thomas Risse, however.¹⁶

The most interesting contention Haas makes is the association with instrumental goals that will later lead to shifting loyalties. This project holds that this contention is still true today. Shared projects, viewed positively by the European people, lead to familiarity and acceptance, which creates loyalty. The positive externalities and efficiencies of cost-sharing create a positive outlook for the people of the European Union. Haas does not specify a timeline for how long this can take, though. While he speaks approvingly of Deutsch's community-building ideas, he does not take community-building and identification necessarily on as a specific criterion of integration himself, choosing to focus more on loyalty. His emphasis is on how instrumental goals can

¹⁴Philippe Schmitter. "Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neoneo-functionalism". *Journal of European Public Policy* 12:2 (2005), 257.

¹⁵Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, eds. *Nation-building*. (New York, Atherton Press, 1957).; Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*.

¹⁶Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Marilyn B. Brewer. *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

lead to loyalties shifting as part of a spillover effect. When these instrumental goals are viewed positively by the people, tolerance and acceptance can be achieved. In this project, I will show that Haas's beliefs about European identification are in fact, borne out by public opinion data. Support for Europe is more functionally based than many modern scholars believe.

2.2.1 Neo-functionalism in Public Opinion

While the functionalist theory mainly focused on interest group relations, survey data shows that European citizens today still share this rationalist mentality. They tend to identify further power-sharing as a function of citizenship. Eurobarometer 79.5 asked Europeans to identify something that would most enhance their feeling of being a European citizen. 41% stated that a harmonized European social welfare system would accomplish this goal—by far the most popular response. This group, supporting a policy change, was significantly larger than the one supporting a symbolic measure, such as a European identity card. When asked what the most important element of European identity was, the plurality response (42%) was the single currency, followed by democratic values—again, a concrete policy as the most salient element. Culture ranked a distant fourth on the list. Europeans see the EU as symbolized by its most far-reaching and well-known common project—the euro. This is especially interesting due to the euro's current unpopularity. While academic study has focused on measures of attachment and identification to measure the “European-ness” of the EU population, the data shows that feelings of citizenship in Europe are linked to concrete policies rather than symbols.

This data indicates that things that make Europeans feel European have more to do with concrete policies that distribute specific benefits as opposed to symbols. Culture is less important for legitimacy than the idea of further merging areas of national competence. Is “identity” still the most relevant dependent variable to examine when we conceptualize the reason European integration has deepened so much in recent decades? Perhaps symbols and identity will become more relevant as governance in the European Union is more established. Currently, however, it seems that member state citizens think of the EU as Haas did: associated most with its political and economic projects, rather than with an idealistic sense of the EU as a greater community. While many believe that the European Union is experiencing a crisis of democracy, public opinion data show that Europeans do find the EU legitimate, and believe its political initiatives are worth advancing. The theory of neo-functionalism can remain relevant today in explaining the puzzle of integration without identification.

2.3 European Identity as Legitimacy

Scholarship in the EU has often focused in recent years on the idea of a democratic deficit and a lack of legitimacy within the European Union.¹⁷ While some feel the Treaty of Lisbon has assuaged many of these concerns, others argue that the EU is still primarily an elite-driven project. They say that Europeans do not necessarily feel that their voices are represented, or that they have any decision-making power. Turnout in European Parliament elections is extraordinarily low, and some scholars argue that voting in EP elections is little more than a protest vote against the national government in many cases. The EU began as a project of elites, and perhaps

¹⁷Andrew Moravcsik. “Is There a Democratic Deficit in World Politics?” *Government and Opposition*. 39:2 (2004).; Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix. Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44 (3): 2006.

it still is. But if this were true, Europeans would not necessarily view European governance as legitimate, nor would they feel that they are European citizens as well as citizens of their member states. Public opinion data shows that the European Union is seen as legitimate despite the alleged democratic deficit. Much work has been done over the years, both to isolate the definition of political legitimacy and determine its sources. Any discussion of legitimacy in governance must, of course, begin with the work of Weber.

2.3.1 The Weberian Typology

What is legitimacy? The study of legitimacy in social science dates back to Max Weber and his three-fold typology of traditional, charismatic, or rational authority.¹⁸ Weber identifies the rule of law as a key legitimating process during the consolidation of power. Since the European Union does not have the collective history for a traditional leader, or the concentration of leadership in a single person for charismatic authority, in this typology its best chances lie in the rational-legal realm. Many scholars focus on the idea that “for authorities to perform effectively, those in power must convince everyone else that they ‘deserve’ to rule and make decisions”.¹⁹ Those in the populace obey a decision because they believe it is entitled to be obeyed based on the processes by which it was made. It is generally agreed upon that without legitimacy, some other type of exercise of power will be necessary to have decisions obeyed. It is easier, however, to rule when the population generally feels the government deserves to make such decisions. Later scholarship regarding legitimacy has focused on several dimensions. Among them are procedural requirements, psychology, public opinion, and consent.

¹⁸Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

¹⁹Tom Tyler, “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation”, *Annual Review of Psychology* 57 (2006): 375-400.

2.3.2 Procedural Legitimacy

Some past scholars, such as Robert Dahl, have focused on procedural requirements or policy outputs for the provision of political legitimacy. This more traditional approach focuses on characteristics like accountability, effectiveness, and fairness. When discussing the source of legitimacy, Christoph Meyer refers to Scharpf's input and output legitimation—"democratic input is based on the notion that political legitimacy is derived from the free will of the people", while the output is based on actual performance and provision of services.²⁰ Seymour Lipset distinguishes between legitimacy and effectiveness—effectiveness meaning how well political systems actually perform. This distinction is often glossed over in literature on European integration, which equates perceived effectiveness with support for integration. This project will focus on effective governance leading to tolerance—output legitimacy.

A strong literature in social psychology highlights the idea that authorities and institutions are seen as more legitimate when their authority is exercised through procedures that the population sees as being fair.²¹ This literature, on procedural justice, emphasizes that if the institution or authority is seen as more legitimate, their decisions are more willingly accepted. Effective democratic governance is strongly tied to such acceptance. Why is such procedural justice so important to legitimacy? Many theorists attribute this to the desire to belong to a group, based in social identity theory. Some citizens may want to choose the EU group over their national group because it is more prestigious, for example.

²⁰Christoph Meyer, "Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union's Communication Deficit", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37.4 (1999): 617-639.

²¹Ibid 379.

In another look at the psychology of procedural legitimacy, Beetham describes three dimensions of legitimacy, saying that power is legitimate when it conforms to established rules; the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate; and there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation.²² He emphasizes that legitimacy is a continuum, not an “all or nothing” concept, and also argues that legitimacy can be confirmed over time as a self-perpetuating phenomenon through the processes it creates. While the procedural perspective is certainly important, solely examining objective effectiveness does not tell the full story. The powerful mediating factor of public opinion, discussed below, can drastically affect legitimacy.

2.3.3 Socially Derived Legitimacy

A different psychological perspective focuses less on procedure and more on social perception. This school of thought offers the view that legitimacy is the moral basis of social interaction, and therefore people act against their own interests when their obligations are activated by an authority. Therefore, legitimization can be defined as the process of accepting EU governance where previously the idea of giving up sovereignty was unacceptable. It is also observed that this process of legitimation moves faster when the change is more congruent with a person or group’s existing interests and preferences. This theory could be particularly interesting when examining various populations within the EU and differing support for integration.

A more modern approach focuses on the importance of public opinion in whether government is considered legitimate. Seymour Lipset defines legitimacy as “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political

²²David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

institutions are the most appropriate ones for society”.²³ Lipset describes legitimacy as “affective and evaluative”, seen as legitimate or not depending on how well the values of the political system match with those of a given group, or the population at large.²⁴ He observes that prolonged effectiveness may serve to legitimate a regime, but that finding a way to mitigate conflicts between groups is also critically important. Since the European Union is a combination of nations who do not always agree on the way to proceed, this is quite relevant.

Landy and Teles define legitimacy as “that attribute of political institutions which generates ongoing, active consent for a pattern of rule”.²⁵ They describe tolerance of government as consent to be governed by such a regime. Without consent, a regime cannot survive. Landy and Teles identify four sources of legitimacy, including time and constitutional stability, efficiency calculations, responsiveness to the public, and common nationalism.²⁶ Time and constitutional stability refer to the expectations citizens create when the rules remain the same over time—an unchanging system will create trust. Efficiency can create legitimacy due to the expectation that governments will be competent—bad government can cause the removal of consent, or a lack of tolerance. Responsiveness refers to the idea that a regime should respond to public opinion, and common nationalism to the idea of “how the collectivity related to other, usually distant, collectivities”.²⁷ All four of these factors contribute to the creation of consent, and thus legitimacy.

²³Seymour Lipset. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Extended Edition*. (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981): 64.

²⁴Seymour Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”, *The American Political Science Review*, 53.1 (1959): 69-105.

²⁵Marc Landy and Steven Teles, “Beyond Devolution: From Subsidiarity to Mutuality”, in *The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union*, eds. Kalypso Nicoladis and Robert Howe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 417.

²⁶Landy and Teles, “Beyond Devolution”.

²⁷Ibid

The most relevant sources of legitimacy for this project are the first two. Public responsiveness does not tend to affect policy in the EU. By public responsiveness, I refer to the idea that the government reacts to public opinion changes by altering public policy. Common nationalism has not been developed throughout the last few decades. Thus, I focus only on examining the first two causes. Time and constitutional stability are certainly pertinent for the early decades of the EU (known as the permissive consensus), when policy changes were conducted largely in private deals among elites. Europeans simply got used to a well-run government that developed and expanded its powers over time. In today's EU, however, efficiency calculations are substantially more important, and it is this idea which this project will examine more closely. I will describe this process in more detail later on. "People consent to governments that they find useful and resist those that are persistently incapable of satisfying basic civic needs," Landy and Teles write.²⁸

Ted Gurr states that "government can be considered legitimate insofar as its subjects regard it as proper and deserving of support."²⁹ This is exactly the concept this project will examine. Has the EU succeeded in convincing its citizens that its institutions are appropriate ones for governance? This will be the measure of its success. It is my contention in this project that they have indeed succeeded in doing so in many areas—the population of the European Union accepts its decisions as fair and abides by its rules—but that support is often differentiated by the particular policy area in question. **In this project, legitimacy will be defined as "government which the citizens find deserving of support because it satisfies basic needs efficiently and effectively". Tolerance is a result of legitimacy—acceptance of the power transfer because citizens find the government in question to be**

²⁸Ibid 417

²⁹Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

capable of effectively and efficiently satisfying basic needs. Therefore, by the standards set by social scientists, EU governance is — as I will demonstrate below— seen as legitimate by the European public.

2.3.4 Trust, Legitimacy, and the European Union

A significant literature in studies of the European Union has focused on explaining the legitimacy of the EU, and specifically general regime support.³⁰ As far back as 1970, Ronald Inglehart examined the effect of education and social class on support for greater integration, finding that higher socioeconomic status and greater levels of education increased support for the EU. The work of Matthew Gabel is well-known on this topic, including that of his article with Harvey Palmer, which finds that individual support for the EU is related to national interests on both security

³⁰Ronald Inglehart, “Cognitive mobilization and European identity”, *Comparative Politics* 3.1, 1970; Matthew Gabel and Harvey Palmer, “Understanding variation in public support for European integration,” *European Journal of Political Research* 27.1 (1995): 3-19; Matthew Gabel and Guy Whitten, “Economic conditions, economic perceptions, and public support for the European Union”, 19.1 (1997): 81-96; Matthew Gabel, *Interests and integration: Market liberalization, public opinion, and the European Union*, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998); Matthew Gabel, “Public support for European integration: a test of five theories”, *Journal of Politics* 60.1 (1998), 333-354 ; Christopher Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert, “Economic benefits and support for membership in the EU: a cross-national analysis,” *Journal of Public Policy*, 15.3 (1996): 231-249; Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton, “Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration”, *International Organizations* 47.4 (1993): 507-534 ; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration?” *Political Science and Politics* 37.3 (2004): 415-420; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Calculation, community, and cues: public opinion on European integration,” *European Union Politics* 6.4 (2005): 419-443; Lauren McLaren, *Identity, Interests, and Attitudes toward European Integration*. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; Adam P. Brinegar, Seth K. Jolly, and Herbert Kitschelt, “Varieties of capitalism and political divides over European integration,” in *European Integration and Political Conflict* eds. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004); Juan Diez de Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003).

and trade, and their own potential to benefit from open markets; Gabel does a significant amount of other work examining the effect of such utilitarian interests on support for the EU. Using data from the 1990s and earlier, he finds that utilitarian explanations are significantly stronger than others. Other work shows that those in net donor member countries are less likely to support integration than those in net recipient countries. Hooghe and Marks examine both affective and utilitarian arguments, and find that both are relevant in explaining variation in regime support. Lauren McLaren focuses on immigration policy to highlight the relevance of utilitarian explanations in support for the EU. Sanchez-Cuenca examines the terrain from a different perspective—are those who feel their national governments are ineffective more likely to support the EU? He finds that those with more corrupt national governments and less well-developed welfare states are more likely to support the EU.

A recent article published by Eelco Harteveld, Tom van der Meer, and Catherine de Vries discusses the possible sources of trust in the European Union.³¹ Using trust as a proxy for the legitimacy of the European Union, they test three theories: the logic of rationality (evaluation of the EU based on its merits and its performance), identity (emotional attachment to the EU), and extrapolation (whether a citizen trusts their national government is predictive of whether they trust the EU). The logic of identity is found to be extremely weak compared to the other two theories—they observe, in fact, that identity is “at best weakly related to trust in the EU... emotional attachment is not necessarily a requirement for the diffuse support for—and consequently the legitimacy of—the EU.” Emotional attachment does not predict trust in the European Union. This article drives the point home that Europeans do not prioritize affective concerns when they develop opinions about the legitimacy of the European Union.

³¹Harteveld et al, “In Europe we trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the EU”.

A recent book by Sara Hobolt and James Tilley addresses the relationship between performance and legitimacy in the European Union. They find, through an original survey, that performance matters for trust. Individuals who hold the EU responsible for certain areas show a stronger relationship between performance in those areas and trust. “The legitimacy of EU institutions is dependent on performance and on the extent to which people credit or blame those institutions for good and bad performance”, they write. The European Union derives legitimacy from its capacity, which in turn derives from evaluations of its performance. Thus, this work shows that the legitimacy that leads to tolerance is based on performance. Hobolt and Tilley’s work emphasizes the crucial point: that the European legitimacy crisis many believe in is simply not borne out by public opinion data.³²

Literature dealing with regime support has addressed it in several ways through both individual and nationally based explanations. The one aspect all have in common, however, is that they focus on general regime support. They often combine aspects of questions about whether membership in the EU is a good thing or a bad thing, along with questions about the desired speed of future integration. But what if support for different policy areas is determined by different factors? Perhaps one’s utilitarian interests toward European control of immigration policy are not the same as one’s utilitarian interests in terms of defense policy. In this project, I examine support for European integration based on different policy areas, and apply different predictors to each area to test this theory.

³²Sara Hobolt and James Tilley, *Blaming Europe? Responsibility without Accountability in the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

2.4 Data on European Policy Preferences

While academic study has focused on measures of attachment and identification to measure the “European-ness” of the EU population, even Europeans do not view the European Union in this way. Culture is less important than the idea of further merging areas of national competence. Is “identity” still the most relevant dependent variable to examine when we question why European integration has moved forward so successfully? As literature focusing on regime support discusses, we can better explain successful integration through legitimacy, as opposed to affective concerns. We also see here that the European Union does have a good deal of political legitimacy. Respondents treat it as a serious contender for joint governance. They take lawsuits to its courts, obey its laws, and accept its policy leadership. When examining the question of whether European integration can continue to move forward, it is critical to understand the differences between support for different policy areas.

The Eurobarometer has also asked questions regarding respondents’ preferences on joint or national policy control in various policy areas for the last two decades. When examining several of these policy areas, it is clear that policy preferences have crystallized over time and are becoming stronger. On issues like the environment, currency, foreign policy, immigration, and security/defense policy, the number of respondents that support EU control have increased over time. On issues like education and social welfare, the number of those who support national control has also increased. But on most important issues, EU involvement is preferred by a majority. This is particularly interesting given the large numbers who support common foreign and defense policy, an area into which the EU has not ventured as of yet. The important fact to take away from this brief survey of data is that support for the European Union’s involvement in public policy has increased over time, in nearly all areas under study. Legitimacy is a growing issue within Europe, and this data highlights that

Europeans have a growing perception that the EU taking over policy areas from national governments is, in fact, legitimate. I argue that this will lead to further identification with Europe.

Below, I present several graphs of Eurobarometer data to show evolution in attitudes toward policy control over time. While each of these trends are reflected on a national level, I will not present graphs for each member state here for reasons of space. Most of the graphs cover a period from the mid-1990s until the recent present. Figures 2.1-2.7 are below. In Figure 2.1, it is clear that Europeans prefer joint action between levels of government when it comes to environmental policy, and have consistently since the 1980s. In fact, when the question wording was changed to indicate exclusive control by the European Union, this also received significant support. In Figure 2.2, the same trend is visible with defense policy—notably, support for EU control has increased significantly over time, particularly in the post-9/11 era. In Figure 2.3, it is clear that joint action on foreign policy also receives high levels of support, and has consistently for some time. Figure 2.4, showing data on health and social welfare, reflects the opposite trend—a significant preference for national control that has increased slightly over time. We see the same in Figure 2.5 with education policy. Figure 2.6, showing data on currency policy, reflects a trend for joint control over currency policy that begins well before the advent of the euro. Figure 2.7, on immigration policy, shows the same; however, both of these policy areas in particular reflect significant national variation.

Figure 2.1: For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union? Protection of the environment




Figure 2.2: For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union? Defense




Figure 2.3: For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union? Foreign policy




Figure 2.4: For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union? Health and social welfare




Figure 2.5: For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union? Education






Figure 2.6: For each of the following areas, do you think decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union? Currency





This project argues that the reason there is a debate over the future of European integration is because these two literatures are talking past each other. The aforementioned recent article by Harteveld et al discusses the fact that identity and trust are weakly related, while legitimacy and trust show a stronger relationship. “Emotional attachment is not necessarily a requirement for the diffuse support for—and consequently the legitimacy of—the European Union,” they say.³³ In a later chapter, I will show exactly how weak the relationship between the legitimacy of the European Union and other typically referenced indicators of support can be. A decade earlier, Kalypso Nicolaidis writes that “the glue that binds the EU together is not a shared identity; it is, rather, shared projects and objectives”.³⁴ The European Union is based on political foundations, not idealistic ones. Concerns with legitimacy are best addressed through considering whether Europeans accept European governance

³³Harteveld et al, “In Europe We Trust? Exploring Three Logics of Trust in the European Union”.

³⁴Kalypso Nicolaidis. “We, the peoples of Europe”. *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2004.

in traditionally national arenas, and through identifying different support for different policy areas.

2.5 Tolerating Europe

The main contention in this project is that European identity is not a useful concept through which to explain the successful deepening of European integration in recent decades. I will be using the concept of “tolerance” to define acceptance of European governance in a particular policy area. **Tolerance is defined as acceptance of the power transfer from the national to the supranational entity—at minimum, acceptance, and maximum, a preference for the supranational entity.** For example, the Spanish public would likely not find it acceptable for Greece to determine their environmental policy—the Greek government has no legitimacy in Spain. However, the Spanish population does find it acceptable for the European Union to determine their environmental policy, because the European Union has legitimacy in Spain. Thus, the Spanish population tolerates European governance. If EU governance is accepted, it shows that the European Union has earned legitimacy in a particular policy area. Legitimacy thus leads to tolerance.

2.5.1 Sources of Tolerance

Where does tolerance come from? As mentioned above, acceptance of power transfers must come from legitimacy. This project theorizes that policy change orchestrated by European Union elites leads to a comparative analysis between perceived capabilities of the levels of government, which is in turn followed by instrumental calculations about which level of government should best deal with the policy area. This chain of

events can lead to acceptance of a power transfer.³⁵ I also hypothesize that since citizens calculate their preferences based on instrumental criteria, they are most likely to support policies which benefit from cost-sharing. I will explain this process in greater detail.

Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley's research on multilateralism in international relations may shed some light on the subject. When determining why governments choose multilateralism, they believe that states trade some control and sovereignty over policy for greater burden-sharing. While this theory refers to states as a unitary actor rather than examining public opinion, the article also examines hypotheses about public opinion using survey data. It finds that there is support for multilateralism, which grows stronger as the public's preferences on policy align with those of the multilateral institution in question. The members of the public supporting multilateralism actively cite burden-sharing as a reason for their position. States thus gain a coordinated policy that pools resources—the problem of collective action is solved.³⁶ This shows that citizens also realize the potential benefits of cost-sharing. Richard Eichenberg comes to a similar conclusion when examining public opinion on American military actions—multilateralism finds support for the same reason of burden-sharing; he cites other surveys of Europeans and Americans that find burden-sharing to be an important factor in public opinion on the decision to make foreign policy multilateral as opposed to unilateral.³⁷ Other work by Milner shows that countries may opt to use multilateral institutions for certain policies (in this example, foreign

³⁵Saundra Schneider, William Jacoby, Daniel Lewis, "Public Opinion toward Intergovernmental Responsibilities".

³⁶Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "Who supports global economic engagement? The sources of preferences in American foreign economic policy,"; Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "The choice of multilateralism: foreign aid and American foreign policy"; Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "The domestic politics of foreign aid: American legislators and the politics of donor countries."

³⁷Richard Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force, 1981-2005."

aid) to give citizens greater confidence in how their money is being spent. This aligns with literature on the European Union, showing that overall European citizens find European institutions more trustworthy than their national institutions.

The literature on fiscal federalism also addresses whether citizens are aware of potential positive externalities. Significant evidence shows that they are aware of basic self-interest and the benefits of cost-sharing. For example, Timmons shows that voluntary compliance with taxes is higher when citizens receive public goods and services they value, and the effect is exacerbated among sub-national governments.³⁸ In addition, other work has examined the idea of egotropic versus sociotropic voting, or whether voting comes from another source altogether. Many scholars who study American politics argue that Americans vote based on collective economic outcome rather than personal economic outcomes.³⁹ Their assessment of aggregate economic wellbeing was based on their perception of changes in the national economy, not personal events. Europeans likely have the same sociotropic sense in politics, as they share many other voting characteristics with Americans. Indeed, Europeans tend to be better informed politically than Americans, making their perceptions of the national economic situation likely to be more accurate.

2.5.2 Public Rationality

Looking at this collected literature, it is clear that the public has awareness of positive externalities and the benefits of cost-sharing. Thus, they can reasonably make decisions about the policies they want controlled by the supranational level. It is also

³⁸Jeffrey Timmons, “The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services”.

³⁹Larry Bartels, *Unequal Democracy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Donald Kinder and Roderick Kiewiet, “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 23 (1979): 495-527.

clear from the literature that voters can reasonably assess how capable various levels of government are, although this is more difficult for them in a federal system. When citizens of the European Union evaluate the European Union as being effective in a particular policy area, and feel it is rational for the European Union to control that policy area, they tolerate European control of the formerly national policy area. Even if they are not affectively attached to the European Union, if they feel that the European Union can perform its job effectively and that there are instrumental reasons to prefer supranational governance, they will accept European policy.

Thus, it is established that there is evidence in the literature for the public's ability to determine whether a level of government is effective, and the public's ability to distinguish positive externalities. But one major debate in the literature still remains. While the public is able to make rational decisions, do they in fact do so? What is the major underpinning of public opinion-self-interest or values?

2.5.3 Symbolic Politics vs. Self-Interested Voting

Is public opinion based on self-interest? While traditionally, the conflict in this literature has been described as whether people vote in a manner that is self-interested or values-based, I believe that this does not account for the significant variation in findings in the literature. Thus, I will discuss scholarship in this field as being divided into three categories: pocketbook, sociotropic, and symbolic. Pocketbook voting focuses on the idea that public opinion is shaped based on individual self-interest. Sociotropic voting is based on the idea that individual opinion is shaped based on collective good as well as individual good. Symbolic politics holds that public opinion is not at all shaped by self-interest, but rather is formed by values that are independent of any rational concerns, either individual or collective.

2.5.4 Pocketbook Voting: Self-Interest

In the literature on pocketbook voting, individuals vote and form public opinion based on individual self-interest. It is generally found in one of two situations: public policy opinions or vote choice. Opinions on public policy have often been identified as a situation where individuals support a particular policy based on their pocketbook. For example, self-interest has been shown to have an impact on support for the Vietnam War—those less likely to be in immediate danger of the draft were more supportive of the war effort.⁴⁰ Another study shows that while typically low-income Americans participate less politically, this effect is reversed for low-income seniors; the more dependent they are on government programs, the more political participation one can expect.⁴¹ Self-interest has also been shown to play a role in policies that involve racial tensions (school busing), smoking, gun control, and education policy.⁴² Chong et al. argue that the important question is when self-interest matters, not whether it matters, and that it is more likely to be important in policy formation when individuals recognize that they have a stake in a policy. In sum, people are more likely to hold opinions based on self-interest when the implications of a policy are clear, or they have been primed to think about their self-interest.⁴³ This work and others like

⁴⁰Daniel E. Bergan, “The Draft Lottery and Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War”, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73.2 (2009): 379-384.

⁴¹Andrea Louise Campbell, “Self-Interest, Social Security, and the Distinctive Participation Patterns of Senior Citizens”, *American Political Science Review* 96.3 (2002): 565-574.

⁴²Richard Dixon, Roger Lowery, Diane Levy, Kenneth Ferraro, “Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Policies: A Replication and Extension”, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 55.2 (1991): 241-254; Kent Tedin, “Self-Interest, Symbolic Values, and the Financial Equalization of the Public Schools,” *Journal of Politics*, 56.3 (1994): 628-649; Robin Wolpert and James Gimpel, “Self-Interest, Symbolic Politics, and Public Attitudes toward Gun Control,” *Political Behavior* 20.3 (1998): 241-262; William Crano, “Vested Interest, Symbolic Politics, and Attitude-Behavior Consistency,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72.3 (1997): 485-491.

⁴³Dennis Chong, Jack Citrin, and Patricia Conley, “When Self-Interest Matters”, *Political Psychology* 22.3 (2001): 541-570.

it establish that self-interest plays a very important role in opinion formation.

Vote choice plays a role in self-interested politics as well as in public policy. Voters will select a party or a candidate based on their economic interests, social class, or economic situation. For example, income level and economic self-interest has been shown to inform vote choice in New Zealand elections.⁴⁴ In England, Johnson et al. show that voters punish incumbent parties based on local unemployment, even if national economic conditions had improved.⁴⁵ In this body of literature, people vote based on the personal impact they foresee. Self-interest therefore not only affects opinions but also vote choice. In England, Johnson et al. show that voters punish incumbent parties based on local unemployment, even if national economic conditions had improved.

2.5.5 Sociotropic Voting

In other literature, self-interested voting is certainly a factor, but sociotropic voting also plays a role—in other words, people are self-interested on behalf of what is good for their community, rather than solely focusing on what is good for themselves as individuals. For example, in terms of vote choice, individuals will focus on state or national economic contexts when choosing whether or not to support the incumbent party, rather than just their local economic situation.⁴⁶ They will even ignore personal economic concerns in favor of larger-scale economic measures, or prioritize

⁴⁴Michael Allen and Sik Hung Ng, “Self-Interest, Economic Beliefs, and Political Party Preference in New Zealand,” *Political Psychology* 21.2 (2000): 323-345.

⁴⁵Ron Johnston et al, “Local Context, Retrospective Economic Evaluations, and Voting: The 1997 General Election in England and Wales”, *Political Behavior* 22.2 (2000): 121-143.

⁴⁶John Books and Charles Prysby, “Contextual Effects on Retrospective Economic Evaluations: The Impact of the State and Local Economy”, *Political Behavior* 21.1 (1999) : 1-16.

macroeconomic measures above personal situations.⁴⁷ Many social scientists suggest that these forms of sociotropic voting are inspired by the media, or created through other sources of public information.⁴⁸ Burden and Mughan show that not only does the national economy matter for presidential approval in the United States, but the international economy does as well.⁴⁹ They also note, like Chong et al., that self-interest in vote choice and attitudes are strongly influenced by framing and priming. Duch and Stevenson show that individual voters are sufficiently informed about the economy to make informed choices, in line with my argument in Chapter 3, which emphasizes that voters choose the EU based on economic decision-making.

Others, such as Carolyn Funk, argue that voters are influenced both by self-interest and societal interest, and incorporate both considerations when evaluating public policy proposals. Citizens are more willing to sacrifice when that sacrifice involves giving more benefits to others, as opposed to cutting off benefits to themselves; but they do have a developed sense of societal interest, and will under certain conditions prioritize collective wellbeing over personal wellbeing. Funk argues, contrary to several other scholars, that it is not necessary to frame to induce concern for society as a whole.⁵⁰ This idea is also evidenced in work on old age policies, such as those by Huddy et al.

⁴⁷Donald Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting"; Gregory Markus, "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis", *American Journal of Political Science*, 32.1 (1988): 137-154.

⁴⁸Raymond Duch, Harvey Palmer, and Christopher Anderson, "Heterogeneity in Perceptions of National Economic Conditions," *American Journal of Political Science*, 44.4 (2000): 635-652.

⁴⁹Barry Burden and Anthony Mughan, "The International Economy and Presidential Approval," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 67 (2003): 555-578.

⁵⁰Carolyn Funk, "The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and Societal Interest in Public Opinion," *Political Research Quarterly*, 53.1 (2000): 37-62.; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1960); Edward S. Greenberg, "Black Children and the Political System," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34.3 (1970): 333-345; David Marsh, "Political Socialization: the Implicit Assumptions Questioned,"

Support for old age policies is based on compassion, particularly on perceived financial need—non-elderly respondents who view the elderly as financially needy are more likely to support policies to assist them.

2.5.6 Symbolic Politics

Other political scientists argue that vote choice and attitudes are not, in fact, conditioned by self-interest or societal interest—but by values that are created early in life and are far more stable.⁵¹ Symbolic attitudes develop through socialization, created through a child's environment, and thus associations created in childhood can have lasting effects into adulthood. Thus, symbolic values are considered to be stable and consistent, as opposed to nonsymbolic attitudes. They are also assumed to create a worldview by which we assimilate new information as well as categorize beliefs about old information. Sears proposes a hierarchy of political attitudes that ranges in order from symbolic to nonsymbolic: party identification; ideological orientation; attitudes toward social groups; attitude on racial policy issues; attitudes on other policy issues; attitudes about trust in government.⁵² Since the publication of *The American Voter*, political scientists have believed that party identification is one of the most consistent attitudes an individual can hold over time.⁵³

British Journal of Political Science, 1.4 (1971): 453-465; William R. Schonfeld, "The Focus of Political Socialization Research: An Evaluation," *World Politics* 23.3 (1971): 544-578; Duane Alwin, Ronald Cohen, and Theodore Newcomb, *Political Attitudes over the Lifespan* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992).

⁵¹D.J. Harper, "Accounting for Poverty: From attribution to discourse", *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 6(1996):249-265; J. Plamenatz, *Ideology*, (London, Macmillan, 1971); E. Scarbrough, *Political ideology and voting* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1984).

⁵²David Sears, "The Persistence of Early Political Predispositions: The Roles of Attitude Object and Life Stage." In L. Wheeler and P. Shaver (Eds.) *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 4 (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1983).

⁵³Campbell et al 1960; Philip Converse, *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics* In David E. Apter (Ed.) *Ideology and discontent* (New York, Free Press, 1964).

Symbolic values are generally assumed to be much more consistent across time than other attitudes, since they are formed so early in life. Studies have concluded that people find comfort in values because they give everyday life a sense of coherence, even when these values seem to go against their material interests—as opposed to self-interest, which can change over one’s life.⁵⁴ Sears et al. look for self-interest effects on four major public policy issues and find that self-interest measures had little effect, but symbolic attitudes such as party identification or racial prejudice had much stronger effects on respondents. Many other longitudinal studies also show that symbolic attitudes are more stable over time.⁵⁵

Some scholars, such as David Sears, argue that survey literature does not find self-interest effects as often as does experimental literature, and that self-interest is more temporary and fleeting, while values are lasting, due to the differences in which types of studies find certain effects.⁵⁶ Sears and Lau write that the influence of self-interest

⁵⁴Dennis Chong and Anna-Maria Marshall, “When morality and economics collide (or not) in a Texas community”, *Political Behavior* 21.2 (1999) 91-121; David Rankin, “Identities, Interests, and Imports”, *Political Behavior* 23 (December) 2001: 353-376.

⁵⁵Richard Lau and Caroline Heldman, “Self-Interest, Symbolic Attitudes, and Support for Public Policy: A Multilevel Analysis”. *Political Psychology* 30 (2009): 513-537; David Sears, Richard Lau, Tom Tyler, and Harris Allen, “Self-interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting,” *American Political Science Review* 74(1980): 670-684; David Sears, Carl Hensler, and Leslie Speer, “Whites’ Opposition to Busing: Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?”, *American Political Science Review* 73.2 (1979): 369-384.;David Sears and Carolyn Funk, “The limited effect of economic self-interest on the political attitudes of the mass public,” *Journal of Behavioral Economics*, 19.3 (1990): 247-271; David Sears and Carolyn Funk, “The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes” in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York, Academic Press, 1991)

⁵⁶David O.Sears, “The Impact of Self-interest on Attitudes-A Symbolic Politics Perspective on Differences between Survey and Experimental Findings: Comment on Crano (1997)”, *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 72.3(1997) 492-496

is a result of “item-order artifacts” rather than actual attitudes and preferences—merely a result of methodology and survey administration, rather than reflecting a stable attitude that can be measured repeatedly.⁵⁷ Other studies, such as Krosnick 1991, argue the opposite— that perhaps symbolic attitudes are not as stable as many believe, and it is merely the difference in questions asked that makes them appear more stable. It is particularly important to emphasize, though, that self-interest and recognition of societal interest cannot be ignored.

Voters are sufficiently competent to recognize self-interest as well as what will serve the common good, and it is this principle on which my argument is based. In this section, I have presented evidence that the public can determine the benefits of cost-sharing, and discussed literature showing that public opinion is at least in part based on self-interest and rational considerations. But how does this relate to the European Union? I argue that the public within the European Union is capable of determining whether EU governance benefits them and their countries as a whole. Thus, public support for certain policies in the EU is based on whether people in the EU feel that supranational control of such policies will benefit them.

The European Union was conceived and designed as a political and economic project, based on common interests, not necessarily common values. While some dreamed of the cultural and historic linkages between the states, this was not the root motivation

⁵⁷David Sears and Richard Lau, “Inducing Apparently Self-Interested Political Preferences,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 27.2 (1983): 223-252; David Sears, Richard Lau, Tom Tyler, and Harris Allen, “Self-interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting,”; Richard Lau, Thad Brown, and David Sears, “Self-interest and civilians’ attitudes toward the Vietnam War.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42.4 (1978): 464-482; David Sears and Donald R. Kinder. *Racial tension and voting in Los Angeles*. Vol. 156. Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, 1971.

of the undertaking that began with the European Coal and Steel Community. The community that grew from this organization was designed with the intention of controlling the German war machine, as well as providing economic benefits for member states. The focus in recent scholarship on European identity, and the gloomy predictions that arise therein, obscures the original purpose of the European project. Identity, while an interesting ideal for which to strive as a European people, should not necessarily be the desirable end-state for the EU, nor should it be the measure by which we explain successful integration. We can better explain the puzzle of integration without identification by going back to the source of the EU: aligning political and economic interests to better serve its members. Has the population accepted this alignment of policies and interests? By this measure, we can explain integration without identification.

2.5.7 Measuring Tolerance

How will this project measure tolerance? Tolerance can be judged on governance preferences for specific policy areas. The Eurobarometer has questions ranging back over two decades on who citizens prefer to govern in a specific area. By examining whether citizens prefer national or joint governance in a given policy area, and how those preferences change over time, we can see whether Europeans tolerate supra-national governance. Christopher Wlezien proposes a thermostatic model to show the relationship between public policy and public opinion. According to this model, publics react to policy change, and governments react in turn to changing policy preferences by the public.⁵⁸ He has applied this model both to the United States and to

⁵⁸Christopher Wlezien. "The public as thermostat: Dynamics of preferences for spending". *American Journal of Political Science* 39:4 (1995); Christopher Wlezien. "Patterns of representation: Dynamics of public preferences and policy". *Journal of Politics* 66:1 (2004); Christopher Wlezien and Stuart Soroka. "Opinion-policy dynamics: Public preferences and public expenditures in the United Kingdom". *British Journal of Political Science* 35:4 (2005); Christopher Wlezien and Stuart Soroka. "Federalism and public responsiveness to policy." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 41:1 (2011).;

seventeen OECD countries.⁵⁹ Franklin and Wlezien show that the European public does adjust its preferences on unification to reflect policy changes.⁶⁰ This body of literature shows that there must be changes in public opinion among EU member states that reflect changes in public policy by the supranational government. Thus, the oft-touted unchanging identification with Europe is again shown to be a poor measure.

2.5.8 Public Opinion

Initial examination of the data shows that policies that come under European governance, such as currency and immigration, tend to be subject to even further approval by the populace. In the period under study by the Eurobarometer survey, huge changes occurred in European governance. The Schengen Area, one of the EU's most well-known accomplishments, came into effect in 1995, and incorporated into European Union law as of 1999. This treaty (signed in 1985) allows the abolition of border checks at the common borders of all signatories. This treaty obviously calls into play issues like immigration and asylum, because it allows free movement within the borders of the agreement. Since 1992, more and more Europeans have wished for the EU to take over asylum and immigration policies. In some countries, the increase has been as much as 20%. The same phenomenon has occurred for currency policy. The 1990s and early 2000s showed the European Union taking a much larger role in currency. While the purpose of the union has arguably always been economic, the euro was an entirely new step in this direction. A multinational currency union is unprecedented in world affairs. How did public opinion in the eurozone react to this? The eurozone countries became even more supportive of European policy—with an

Christopher Wlezien and Stuart Soroka. "Political Institutions and the Opinion-Policy Link". *West European Politics* 35:6 (2012) ; etc.

⁵⁹Wlezien and Soroka, "Political Institutions and the Opinion-Policy Link", 2012.

⁶⁰Marc Franklin and Christopher Wlezien. "The Responsive Public: Issue salience, policy change, and preferences for European unification". *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9:3 (1997).

equivalent increase of nearly 20% in some countries. Implementing a currency policy helped increase support for European governance. Thus, the suggested conceptualization of tolerance can be measured and operationalized through acceptance of European governance and feelings about legitimacy of supranational control of given policy areas.

While the main puzzle of this project involves the phenomenon of integration without identification, the idea that legitimacy instead of affective concerns determines identification gives rise to several other questions. What makes an individual go through the specific cost and benefit calculus in his head and allow European power to supersede that of his national government? Are there specific combinations of values and opinions that make an individual more likely to tolerate European governance? How has this process been affected by the recent financial crisis in the eurozone? These questions in turn lead to subhypotheses about the determinants of public opinion on power transfer. Further, I hypothesize that priming a survey respondent to think in terms of the benefits of supranational control will lead them to support it. If cost and economies of scale are a concern for citizens, one should be able to make this factor more salient for voters through priming and framing. I will examine these issues using statistical analysis and a survey experiment.

Eurobarometer data over the past two decades on several policy areas tells an interesting tale. Policies like common security and defense, environmental protection, currency, foreign policy, and immigration policy have gained more support for European control over time. The sole exceptions are countries that acceded in 2004, who begin their tenure in the EU with extremely pro-European respondents, and then fall over time to a smaller majority that still supports European control. This could be due to improvement in the functioning of the national governments of 2004 entrant countries over time. Policies that tended more toward supporting national control, such

as education and social welfare, have continued to crystallize as pro-national control. Further, I hypothesize that priming a survey respondent to think in terms of the benefits of supranational control will lead them to support it. If cost and economies of scale are a concern for citizens, one should be able to make this factor more salient for voters through priming and framing. I will examine these issues using statistical analysis and a survey experiment.

This study will also examine the global recession and how it has affected trust in the EU. The recent financial crisis beginning in 2008 had disastrous effects on the eurozone. How did it affect trust in the European Union and support for integration? How did it affect policy competence in economic policy? Based on initial examination of the data, however, the expectation is that trust in the European Union and support for integration have dropped. Despite this, the EU is still the desired actor for handling the financial crisis, and most economic policy in general. While there is variation in national context based on experiences in the crisis, I will link the theoretical contributions of this project. Europeans show a preference for the EU as an actor in the financial crisis because the nations of the eurozone are already financially linked. Thus, it is logical for them to look to European institutions to solve a European problem. Additionally, this study will show that European identity can signify more than the traditional survey questions used to measure it. While support for integration and trust in the EU collapsed, the EU is still the preferred actor. This indicates there is more to the European community than our traditional conceptions.

2.6 Contribution

In order to truly evaluate the success of the European Union, we need to better understand what should be measured. Identification simply cannot explain the puzzle

of such significant advancements in integration but legitimacy and tolerance can, particularly when one differentiates between policy areas. The European Union, while later presented as accomplishing peace and harmony across the continent, began with a substantive focus on producing economic and trade benefits. Thus, in order to show whether it has been successful, we must look to legitimacy of different policy areas to find the determinants of public support for the EU. Examining how many feel European, or identify with the EU on an emotional level, will not explain the success of recent decades, and examining generalized regime support will not entirely do the job either.

What we must do to get a more accurate sense of the success of the European project is examine its intended results: supranational governance in political and economic areas. Europeans increasingly find European governance of many issues legitimate, and occasionally preferable to national governance. This is a phenomenon to be celebrated, rather than obscured by naysaying about identity and nationality. The European Union is an undertaking of historic proportions. The world has never seen the likes of a supranational community with such power and such legitimacy. Despite grumbles over the alleged democratic deficit, what began as an elite project now depends on public opinion for its success. Public opinion has adjusted remarkably to the EU. It only grows more and more legitimated as time goes by. If history shows anything, the EU is likely to take over even more policy areas in future. By examining the EU's success in governance and legitimacy, we also see its success in community-building. As Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch both emphasize, loyalty to the EU will come as a byproduct of more pragmatic and instrumental actions. The EU is building its own communities, and quite successfully.

Chapter 3

The Determinants of Preferences on EU Policy Transfer

This chapter will examine the types of policies for which Europeans support supranational control, and the reasons why they do so. I will address the determinants of public opinion on power transfers between the EU and the national government. Typically, in recent years the European public's preferences tend toward sole national control for issues like education and social welfare, and supranational responsibility for the environment, science, and energy policy; immigration and asylum policies; and foreign and security policy, while economic policy tends to vary with national context. I hypothesize that citizens make decisions about competence areas instrumentally. They wish the EU would take over policies where it saves money to share costs between countries. The European public recognizes that regarding issues that cross national borders, such as the environment, defense policy, and immigration, it is more efficient to have supranational control because resources can be shared. I will argue that the European public is rational, and focuses on economies of scale or other efficiencies produced through combining resources. It cannot be concluded that the European public is merely being guided by the preferences of elites, as in several areas public preferences differ from established policy.

There is significant evidence for an instrumental view by the public in the literature.¹ There is also evidence that people tend to favor or oppose policies in general depending on their instrumental views. This is particularly true with immigration policy.² Additionally, some work has shown the impact of communitarian, altruistic values on pro-EU policies.³ Europeans tend to be better informed politically than Americans. As the federalism literature observes, most publics tend to respond to elite policy changes.⁴ Hooghe shows that elite preferences in European governance tend strongly towards cost-sharing.⁵ Since the public is heavily influenced by elite preferences, it

¹Lieven De Winter and Marc Sywnedegouw, "The scope of EU government", in *Political representation and legitimacy in the EU*, eds. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 47-73; Liesbet Hooghe, "Europe divided? Elites vs. public opinion on European integration", *European Union Politics*, 4.3 (2003): 281-304; Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Shaun Bowler, "To know it is to love it? Satisfaction with democracy in the EU", *Comparative Political Studies* 36.3 (2003): 271-292; Leonard Ray, "Don't Rock the Boat: Expectations, Fears, and Opposition to EU Level Policy Making". In *European Integration and Political Conflict*, eds. Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5161; Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers, "Political versus Instrumental Euroskepticism: mapping skepticism in European countries and regions", *European Union Politics* 6.2 (2005): 223-242; Harald Schoen, "Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies on Foreign Affairs and Defense", *European Union Politics*, 9.1 (2008): 5-29; John Garry and James Tilley, "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes towards the EU", 10.3 (2009): 361-379.

²Claes De Vreese and Hajo Boomgaarden, "Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration", *European Union Politics*, 6.1 (2005): 59-82; Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, "The politics of European Union immigration policy: institutions, salience, and harmonization", *Policy Studies Journal*, 32.1 (2004): 145-165; John Sides and Jack Citrin, "European opinion about immigration: the role of identities, interests, and information", *British Journal of Political Science*, 37.3 (2007): 477-504.

³Michael Bechtel, Jens Hainmueller, Yotam Margalit. "Sharing the pain : Explaining public opinion toward international financial bailouts?" April 2012.

⁴Christopher Wlezien, "Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy".

⁵Hooghe, "Europe divided? Elites vs. public opinion on European integration"

follows through Wlezien's work that the public will also support EU control of policies that permit cost-sharing or economies of scale, while supporting national control of policies that maintain national culture, or policies where economies of scale are not necessarily beneficial (though in some fields, such as immigration policy, these two considerations may occasionally be in conflict). In recently admitted member states, dissatisfaction with government services tends to be higher.⁶ For these states, EU control provides more efficiency and better structure, and thus is preferable to national control.

Milner and Tingley show that states will trade some control and sovereignty over policy for greater burden-sharing. Their work finds that support for multilateralism grows stronger as the public's preferences on policy align with those of the multilateral institution in question. The members of the public supporting multilateralism actively cite burden-sharing as a reason for their position.⁷ This shows that citizens also realize the potential benefits of combining resources. Eichenberg comes to a similar conclusion when examining public opinion on American military actions—multilateralism finds support for the same reason of burden-sharing; he cites other surveys of Europeans and Americans that find burden-sharing to be an important factor in public opinion on the decision to make foreign policy multilateral as opposed to unilateral.⁸ Other work by Milner shows that countries may opt to use multilateral institutions for certain policies (in this example, foreign aid) to give citizens greater confidence in how their money is being spent. This aligns with literature on

⁶Eurobarometer

⁷Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "Who supports global economic engagement? The sources of preferences in American foreign economic policy"; Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "The choice of multilateralism: foreign aid and American foreign policy"; Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, "The domestic politics of foreign aid: American legislators and the politics of donor countries".

⁸Richard Eichenberg, "Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force, 1981-2005".

the European Union, showing that overall European citizens find European institutions more trustworthy than their national institutions.

The literature on fiscal federalism also addresses whether citizens are aware of potential positive externalities. Significant evidence shows that they are aware of basic self-interest and the benefits of cost-sharing. For example, Timmons shows that voluntary compliance with taxes is higher when citizens receive public goods and services they value, and the effect is exacerbated among sub-national governments.⁹ In addition, other work has examined the idea of egotropic versus sociotropic voting, or whether voting comes from another source altogether. Many scholars who study American politics argue that Americans vote based on collective economic outcome rather than personal economic outcomes.¹⁰ Voters' assessment of aggregate economic wellbeing was based on their perception of changes in the national economy, not personal events. Europeans share many other voting characteristics with Americans and the publics of other advanced democracies and are likely to have the same sociotropic sense when it comes to politics. Indeed, Europeans tend to be better informed politically than Americans, making their perceptions of the national economic situation likely to be more accurate.

In the past, many have argued that there is a universal explanation for why Europeans feel a certain way about the European Union and processes of integration as a whole—focusing on utilitarian considerations, or affective identity. I have already elaborated on the first problem with this approach in the previous chapter—treating

⁹Jeffrey Timmons, "The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services".

¹⁰Larry Bartels, *Unequal Democracy*; Donald Kinder and Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting."

generalized support for integration or identification with the European Union as equivalent with political legitimacy. Instead, I will examine the determinants of support for further integration regarding specific policy areas.

The second problem is the tendency to treat support for all policies as equivalent. My argument is that EU citizens decide what policies they feel should be controlled at the EU level through rational decision-making. Thus, the determinants of these preferences may be different for different policies. My contribution to this literature is the idea that perhaps different combinations of values predict support for different policy areas. Different constellations of characteristics can be predictors of support for economic policy as opposed to social welfare policy. This is an extremely important distinction. Previous literature assesses only generalized support for European integration, and only rarely touches on specific policies. In this chapter, I will examine several of the most important public policy areas in Europe—and identify the particular determinants predicting support for each one.

3.1 Federalism and Policy Preferences

3.1.1 Public Opinion and European Integration

Literature on public opinion on European integration can be divided into three main areas, as shown by Hooghe and Marks.¹¹ They identify these three subfields as calculation, community, and cues. The calculation field examines rational and instrumental calculations of the benefits of EU membership—it is from here that this project

¹¹Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration”, *European Union Politics*, 6.4 (2005): 419-443.

forms its hypotheses, through a modern extension of functionalist ideology. The literature focuses on how European citizens perceive the EU as benefiting them.¹² There are several ways this can occur. One field examines individual costs, and how citizens with different occupations respond to European integration. These scholars theorize that those with blue-collar jobs who are most hurt by increased capital mobility will support integration less than those with white-collar jobs who may benefit financially from free movement. Another looks at sociotropic benefits to the country itself—is the country a net recipient of European funds, or a net donor? Those in net recipient countries will support integration more than those in net donor nations, according to those with this viewpoint. Yet another avenue regards confidence in economic future (both personal and national). Those who feel more confident will be more likely to support further integration. These viewpoints inform this project's hypotheses that Europeans calculate benefits from the EU when making decisions on power transfers.

The work of Matthew Gabel has heavily influenced this field. Gabel and Whitten, in work examining what economic indicators create support for European integration, find that subjective economic perceptions are key to integration support—whether or not the subjective economic perceptions are correct is immaterial. If an individual

¹²Matthew Gabel and Harvey Palmer, "Understanding variation in public support for European integration", *European Journal of Political Research* 27.1 (1995): 3-19; Matthew Gabel and Guy Whitten, "Economic conditions, economic perceptions, and public support for the European Union", 19.1 (1997): 81-96; Matthew Gabel, *Interests and integration: Market liberalization, public opinion, and the European Union*, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998); Matthew Gabel, "Public support for European integration: a test of five theories", *Journal of Politics* 60.1 (1998), 333-354 ; Christopher Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert, "Economic benefits and support for membership in the EU: a cross-national analysis," *Journal of Public Policy*, 15.3 (1996): 231-249; Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton, "Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration", *International Organizations* 47.4 (1993): 507-534.

perceives that the economy is performing well, they are more likely to support integration.¹³ In another work, Gabel tests five theories of European integration—finding that affective theories focusing on values are less effective at explaining support for integration than those focusing on utilitarianism and partisanship.¹⁴ Gabel and Anderson attempt to map the structure of voter preferences on EU policy, using four potential models. While they create a two-dimensional theory, the major takeaway point for this project is that the organization of voter preferences on EU policy is, in fact, systematic.¹⁵ While Gabel’s work uses data from before the euro was created, and focuses heavily on individual interests, it provides some useful insights for this project.

Some literature focuses on political factors, such as satisfaction with national political systems. According to Kumlin dissatisfaction with national public services has a negative effect on trust in the EU.¹⁶ Schoen shows that support for common policies such as common defense is driven by domain-specific evaluations of EU performance.¹⁷ Harteveld et al show that the logic of extrapolation is the strongest explanation for EU trust—trust in the EU is an extension of national trust and has little to do with the EU itself.¹⁸

¹³Matthew Gabel and Guy Whitten, “Economic conditions, economic perceptions, and public support for European integration”.

¹⁴Matthew Gabel, “Public support for European integration: An empirical test of five theories”

¹⁵Matthew Gabel and Christopher Andersen, “The structure of citizen attitudes and the European political space”, *Comparative Political Studies* 35.8 (2002): 893-913

¹⁶Staffan Kumlin, “Blaming Europe? Exploring the variable of national public service dissatisfaction on EU trust,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 19.5 (2009): 408-420

¹⁷Harold Schoen, “Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence”

¹⁸Harteveld et al 2013

The community field focuses on the social identity theory which this project attempts to refute. Do Europeans support integration because of a strong fellow-feeling with other members of the EU? Many scholars observe that those who have exclusive national feelings tend to support the EU less.¹⁹ Several scholars have studied this within the lens of immigration policy: those with anti-immigration sentiment feel less supportive of integration.²⁰ On the other hand, some show that a regional attachment can facilitate support for integration by creating important identities apart from the national identity.²¹ Others observe that the longer a country is a member, the more its citizens trust citizens of other EU member states.²² Thomas Risse presents three models of multiple identities: either identity is a zero-sum game and European identity will replace the national identity; identities are tiered in a layer-cake model; or they are less orderly, in a marble-cake model. He personally supports the marble-cake

¹⁹Lauren McLaren, “Public support for the European Union: cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?” *Journal of Politics* 64.2 (2002): 551-566; Lauren McLaren, *Identity, interests, and attitudes in European integration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2006); Lauren McLaren, “Explaining mass-level Euroskepticism: identity, interests, and institutional distrust”, *Acta Politica*, 42, (2007): 223-251; Lauren McLaren, “Explaining opposition to Turkish membership to the EU”, *European Union Politics*, 8.2 (2007): 251-278, Lauren McLaren, “The cultural divide in Europe: migration, multiculturalism, and political trust”, *World Politics*, 64.2 (2012): 199-241.

²⁰Claes De Vreese and Hajo Boomgaarden, “Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration”; Adam Luedtke, “European Integration, Public Opinion, and Immigration Policy: Testing the Impact of National Identity”, *European Union Politics*, 6.1 (2005): 83-112.

²¹Mwita Chacha, “Regional attachment and support for European integration”, *European Union Politics*, 14.2 (2013): 206-227.

²²Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Steven Weldon, “A crisis of integration? The development of transnational dyadic trust in the EU, 1954-2004”, *European Union Politics* 52.4 (2013): 457-482.

model of multiple, blended identities.²³ The central debate in this field is whether national identity can undermine or support European integration, and whether there is a common European identity. This project will establish that this body of literature is not particularly relevant to studying the causes of the expansion of European integration.

The third subfield is cues. As Hooghe and Marks put it, “the premise of cue theory is that underlying values and interests need to be primed to become politically salient”.²⁴ Who does the priming? National media, political parties, and other elites are typically the leaders of public opinion. Hobolt, Tilley, and Wittrock found that British citizens only listen to cues from national officials, ignoring those from the EU.²⁵ Respondents whose national identity is primed are more likely to oppose immigration, or European integration, for example.²⁶ This cueing can take several forms: many citizens will use national government as a proxy to decide whether they support the EU.²⁷ Political parties are the strongest cueing agents, and most citizens will

²³Thomas Risse, “Nationalism and collective identities: Europe versus the nation-state”, *Developments in West European Politics*, eds. Paul Heywood, Erik Jones, and Martin Rhodes, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Thomas Risse, “The euro between national and European identity”; Juan Diez Medrano and Paula Gutierrez, “Nested identities: national and European identity in Spain”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24.5 (2001): 753-778.

²⁴Hooghe and Marks “Calculation, community, and cues”.

²⁵Sara Hobolt, James Tilley, and Jill Wittrock, “Listening to the government: How information shapes responsibility attributions”, *Political Behavior* 35.1 (2013): 153-174.

²⁶Paul Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, Markus Prior. “Predisposing factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities”. *American Political Science Review* (2004): 35-49.

²⁷Christopher Anderson, “Parties, party systems, and satisfaction with democratic performance in the new Europe”, *Political Studies* 46.3 (1998): 572-588; Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, “The Political Basis for Support for European Integration”, *European Union Politics* 1.2 (2000): 147-171; Robert Rohrschneider, “The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-Wide Government”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46.2 (2002): 463-475, Leonard Ray, “Reconsidering the Link between

follow their party's position on European integration, particularly in national contexts where there is disagreement among elites.²⁸

3.1.2 Multi-Level Governance

Literature on multi-level governance focusing on the United States and Canada is plentiful. One major point in the literature is that citizens of multi-level systems tend to find responsibility attribution confusing. This is clear in the United States, Canada, Spain, and other nations as well.²⁹ This makes it more difficult for citizens to vote and apply issue positions to their vote choice, since it is more confusing who is responsible for what. Citizens only tend to link issue attitudes to vote choice if the issue attitudes are highly accessible. They are in general unable to hold the different levels of government accountable for outcomes. De Vries, Edwards, and Tillman took this link to the EU level, and found the same results.³⁰ As a multi-level system of governance, EU voters may find who is responsible for what policy areas confusing,

Incumbent Support and pro-EU opinion", *European Union Politics*, 4.3 (2003): 259-279.

²⁸Leonard Ray, "When parties matter: The conditional influence of party positions on voter opinions about European integration", *Journal of Politics* 65.4 (2003):978-994; Marco Steenbergen and David Scott, "Contesting Europe? The salience of European integration as a party issue", in *European Integration and Political Conflict*, eds. Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²⁹Christopher Anderson, "The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of democratic accountability", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10 (2007): 271-296; ; Kevin Arce-neaux, "Does Federalism weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?" *Publius*, 35.2 (2003): 297-311; Fred Cutler, "Government responsibility and electoral accountability in federalism," *Publius* 34.2 (2004): 19-38; Fred Cutler, "Whodunnit? Voters and responsibility in Canadian federalism", *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 41.3 (2008): 627-654; Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³⁰Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, and Erik Tillman, "Clarity of responsibility beyond the pocketbook: how political institutions condition EU issue voting", *Comparative Political Studies* 44.3 (2012): 339-363.

particularly in countries that already have strong federal systems.

It is also critical to examine the branch of the literature that looks at citizens' preferred responsibilities under a federal system, since what European citizens will tolerate in their multi-level system is a major focus of this project. A great deal of work has been done on the American federal state—it is clear that over time, American trust in the national government has fallen, while trust in local and state governments has increased. They feel that the federal government gives them the most for their money, however.³¹ Schneider et al found that Americans wished all levels of government to do more.³² Public opinion, though, corresponds closely to what levels of government currently have what responsibilities. Opinions about what levels of government should be involved also depend on partisanship. Wlezien's thermostat model of public opinion and public policy shows that publics do react to policy change, and governments can choose to react in turn to changing policy preferences by the public.³³ He has applied this model both to the United States and to

³¹Richard Cole and John Kincaid "Public Opinion and American Federalism: Perspectives on Taxes, Spending, and TrustAn ACIR Update," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 30 (Winter/Spring 2000): 189-201; Richard Cole and John Kincaid, "Changing Public Attitudes on Power and Taxation in the American Federal System," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 31:3 (Summer 2001): 205-214, 2001; Richard Cole and John Kincaid, "Public Opinion on Issues of U.S. Federalism in 2005: End of the Post-2001 Pro-Federal Surge?" *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 35 (Winter 2005): 169-185; Richard Cole and John Kincaid, "Public Opinion on U.S. Federal and Intergovernmental Issues in 2006: Continuity and Change," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 36 (Summer 2006): 443-459, etc.

³²Schneider et al 2010.

³³Christopher Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending"; Christopher Wlezien, "Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy"; Christopher Wlezien and Stuart Soroka, "Opinion-Policy Dynamics: Public Preferences and Public Expenditure in the UK"; Christopher Wlezien and Stuart Soroka, "Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy" ; Christopher Wlezien and Stuart Soroka, "Political Institutions and the Opinion-Policy Link".

seventeen OECD countries.³⁴ Franklin and Wlezien show that the European public does adjust its preferences on unification to reflect policy changes.³⁵ This body of literature shows that changes in public opinion among EU member states do reflect changes in public policy by the supranational government, and that populations in federal systems tend to feel the highest level of government is most cost-efficient. But when do these changes occur? Clifford Carrubba offers one explanation. In the “policy mood” argument, he shows that the public will only inform itself about issues when the policy choice made by the government is outside an acceptable zone.³⁶ In fact, in a later article focusing on defense policy, he establishes that there may be multiple dimensions for policy support.³⁷ It is not just one explanation, but a combination of characteristics that may predict support for a European policy. It is this idea that I choose to take further in this work. Thus, the oft-touted unchanging identification with Europe is again shown to be a poor measure, and as the next section will demonstrate, there is evidence that citizens made decisions about policy support rationally.

3.2 Data on Policy Preferences

In the last chapter, I presented data on the areas in which European citizens prefer EU control versus national control. Here, I summarize again those policy areas and a suggested rationale as to why Europeans feel this way in particular. These facts go contrary to established literature, particularly Dalton & Eichenberg, who state

³⁴Christopher Wlezien and Stuart Soroka 2012

³⁵Mark Franklin and Christopher Wlezien, “The Responsive Public: Issue Salience, Policy Change, and Preferences for European Unification”.

³⁶Clifford Carrubba, “The electoral connection in EU politics”, *Journal of Politics*, 63.1 (2001): 141-158.

³⁷Clifford Carrubba and Anand Singh, “A decision theoretic model of public opinion: guns, butter, and European common defense”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 48.2 (2004): 218-231.

that EU citizens will oppose EU intervention in “high” politics, but not “low” politics.³⁸ In point of fact, the data shows us nearly the mirror image of this story. I will present four hypotheses about the state of public opinion on various policy areas before beginning my analysis of what might predict these opinions.

H1a: Europeans are more likely to prefer EU control in economic policy areas, such as unemployment, debt reduction, and regional aid.

The common market and other economic integration policies have made European economies significantly more interdependent than ever before—as we saw in the recent global financial crisis. Many European governments no longer have the ability to regulate their own monetary policy, due to the euro. Thus, Europeans prefer that a shared fate be regulated by shared bodies in the supranational government.

H1b: Europeans are more likely to prefer EU control in policy areas related to controlling and defending their common border, such as counter-terrorism policy, defense policy, and immigration policy.

Due to the Schengen agreement and other policies that deal with free movement, Europeans have freedom to travel and settle across the EU. This policy change has led to many issues with immigration, illegal border-crossing, asylum, terrorism, and police. Europeans recognize that having free internal movement and common external

³⁸Russell Dalton and Richard Eichenberg, “Citizen support for policy integration”, *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, (1998): 250-282.

borders means it is more efficient to share the costs and pool resources related to immigration policy and border control.

H1c: Europeans are more likely to prefer European control on environmental issues.

The EU has been a leader on environmental issues for decades. In large part, this is because of phenomena like carbon leakage. Due to the shared rivers that run through many European nations, the shared airspace, and close proximity of member states to each other, a shared environmental policy is paramount for success. If German businesses pollute the Rhine as it runs into the Netherlands, it does not matter what policies the Dutch have about water pollution for their own businesses. European citizens recognize this crucial fact, and thus support supranational control.

H1d: Europeans continue to prefer national control on areas that deal with social redistribution and education.

In areas that deal with social redistribution or education, there are less convincing economic reasons to relinquish national control and conflicts over the distributional consequences of centralizing authority will be great. Thus, discussions will be more contentious and the benefits from economies of scale are reduced.

The data shows that H1a, H1b, H1c, and H1d are borne out. While there are specific national differences based on current events, overall trends within the EU support these hypotheses. Figures 2.1 through 2.7, which can be referred to in Chapter 2,

confirm these hypotheses. Figure 2.1 demonstrates that Europeans have consistently preferred joint action between levels of government when it comes to environmental policy for nearly three decades. Figure 2.2 shows that support for EU control of defense policy is a majority, and has increased significantly over time. Figure 2.3 shows that joint action on foreign policy also receives high levels of support. Thus, hypotheses H1b and H1c are shown to be correct. Figure 2.4 displays data about preferences on health and social welfare, and shows a strong preference for national control that is increasing over time. We see the same in Figure 2.5 with education policy; both of these figures confirm hypothesis H1d. Figure 2.6 shows an established preference for joint control over currency policy, confirming H1a as well.

3.3 Hypotheses

In the previous section, I discussed my hypotheses about the state of current public opinion toward governance in the EU. As mentioned before, my project puts forward the theory that citizens make decisions about preferred competence areas instrumentally. They prefer the EU to take over policies that would benefit from economies of scale. Now that I have assessed where public opinion will most likely fall in each area, what variables predict a particular individual's opinion on governance of a policy area? To this end, I present my next set of hypotheses, which focus on the *determinants* of opinion on governance of particular public policies. For each policy area, I have a series of hypotheses dealing with various independent variables. These independent variables express specific interests and concerns held by individuals that should make them more likely to support supranational control of a particular policy area.

To test these hypotheses, I used the data set from Eurobarometer 76.3, Fall 2011, the most recent Eurobarometer that contained all the variables of interest. In this questionnaire, respondents were asked if they preferred joint or national control on 11 different policy areas: taxation, fighting unemployment, terrorism, defense and foreign policy, immigration, pensions, the environment, social welfare, agriculture, support for specific regions, and debt reduction. I believe that previous work does not take enough of a nuanced approach to determining the causes of preferences on multilevel governance. There may be different characteristics that predict why an individual prefers EU control on environmental issues versus defense issues. I try to isolate the particular determinants of preferences on each issue in this chapter.³⁹

In this chapter, I will focus on economic and monetary policy, immigration policy, environmental policy, defense policy, and social welfare policy. These are issues that cover the spectrum of “high” and “low” politics, and address a diverse array of public policy problems which vary in the extent to which centralization at the EU level would generate efficiency benefits. I will present various combinations of political and demographic characteristics that will predict the likelihood of preferring EU control of a given policy area. These characteristics emphasize particular interests and orientations that make support of supranational control in that individual’s best interest.

I hypothesize that Europeans will prefer that the EU control economic and monetary policy as opposed to their national governments if they do not trust their own governments to do so, and thus may feel that the EU is the way to economic success. Also, preferring EU control in the financial crisis shows a trust in European leadership and a belief that the EU has a legitimate right to deal with such events.

³⁹Where relevant, I have utilized the terminology used in Eurobarometer survey questions.

Younger people are more familiar with the euro and economic and monetary union, leading me to believe that they will not wish a disruption in the system they have known for much of their lives. Those who lean left tend to favor the EU more than those who lean right, and in general those who embrace a more collectivist mindset may be more open to supranational control of the economy. This series of characteristics will predict preference for EU control of economic and monetary policy.

H2a: The more that Europeans view their national economic situation as being on the wrong track, the more they will prefer EU control over economic and monetary policy.

H2b: The more that Europeans support EU control in the recent financial crisis, the more they will prefer EU control of economic and monetary policy.

H2c: The younger they are, the more Europeans will prefer EU control of economic and monetary policy.

H2d: The more left-leaning politically they are, the more Europeans will prefer EU control of economic and monetary policy.

H2e: The more that they embrace a collectivist mindset (openness to other cultures, living or working abroad, and supporting social redistribution, for example), the more

*Europeans will prefer EU control of economic and monetary policy.*⁴⁰

Other literature has shown that national identity is a strong predictor of whether a European citizen will support EU control of immigration policy.⁴¹ National identity acts as a buffer against support for unified immigration policies. Additionally, typically those who feel pressured economically will oppose more open immigration policies—which would likely occur should the supranational government control immigration and asylum policy. Finally, border countries in the EU are likely to be most vulnerable to illegal immigration in particular, and many may feel they should not be solely responsible for the influx. Those who feel more pride in the EU and feel a stronger connection with it will be more likely to support European control of immigration policy, which is associated with more open borders and sharing the burden of asylum and immigration. Also, those who have personally lived and/or worked in another European country will be more likely to support EU control of immigration, as they have personally reaped the benefits of more open borders.

H3a: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of immigration policy if they reside in a member state on the external border of the EU (defined as Greece, Spain, Italy, France, and Portugal).

H3b: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of immigration policy if they are living in a household that is not struggling economically.

⁴⁰Simon Hix and Bjorn Hoyland, *The Political System of the European Union* (New York, Palgrave, 2011).

⁴¹Adam Luedtke, “European integration, public opinion, and immigration policy: testing the impact of national identity”; Lauren McLaren, *Identity, Interests, and Attitudes to European Integration*.

H3c: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of immigration policy if they state they have multiple identities.

H3d: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of immigration policy if they feel that the EU symbolizes cultural diversity.

Supranational control of environmental policy has been popular throughout the history of the European Union. I hypothesize that concern for the future will make one more concerned with the environment—only those who put value on the future and the state of the environment in future generations will be concerned with the environment. Also, those who are more educated are typically more likely to be concerned with the environment, as are those who are leftist.

H4a: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of environmental policy the more they are concerned about the future.

H4b: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of environmental policy the higher their education levels.

H4c: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of environmental policy the more oriented left they are politically.

I hypothesize that Europeans who are more concerned about the future and believe defense is important will believe there is safety in numbers and that it is in their interest to partner with other countries to achieve a better defense policy. Also, trusting EU institutions will help them feel it is rational and better for the EU to lead these defense policies.

H5a: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of defense policy the more they are concerned about the future.

H5b: Europeans will be more likely to support EU control of defense policy the more likely they are to believe defense is important on a national level.

H5c: The more Europeans trust EU institutions, they more likely they are to prefer EU control of defense policy.

I hypothesize that Europeans who believe the EU cares about them will support EU control of social welfare policy. These people will also trust their national governments less, believing external intervention is necessary from the EU, and support the EU expanding its budget to pay for such policies. They will tend to have more collectivist values than those who support national control of social welfare policy.

H6a: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of social welfare policy the more left-leaning they are politically.

H6b: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of social welfare policy the more likely they are to believe they count in the EU.

H6c: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of social welfare policy the more likely they are to want the EU to have a bigger budget.

H6d: Europeans will be more likely to prefer EU control of social welfare policy the more likely they are to believe national policy is going in the wrong direction.

Each of these sets of hypotheses focuses on the individual determinants of support for European control of a particular policy area. These models will show that different characteristics and viewpoints predict support for each policy area, rather than certain variables predicting generalized support for the European project, which has been the approach in previous literature. I emphasize the value of differentiating what types of determinants predict support for different policies, and show that these values reflect the interests and concerns of individuals throughout the EU.

3.4 Methods

The dependent variable for the models in this chapter focuses on levels of governance of different policy areas. There are five dependent variables, one for each model. Each dependent variable focuses on the policy area mentioned in the hypothesis—economic/monetary policy, immigration policy, environmental policy, defense policy, and social welfare policy. Respondents were asked whether governance of each area should be shared

with the EU, or exclusively national. The dependent variable is thus binary, so I performed a series of random-effects logit models.⁴²

Each model was run with two different data sets. I used the Eurobarometer 66.1 from 2006 and Eurobarometer 76.3 from 2011. This accounts for different points in time both before and during the financial crisis, to make sure that results are not dramatically altered by the events of the crisis—Eurobarometer 66.1 acts as a robustness check, although the primary focus of this chapter is on the more recent data. This strategy also allows the inclusion of a variety of different special questionnaires in addition to standard trend questions, addressing both the financial crisis and multi-level governance. First, I created a general model to test all five dependent variables against; then, each dependent variable was tested using a customized model based on the above hypotheses; then, each dependent variable was tested on the other four models. All these analyses were performed on both 2011 and 2006 data.

Independent variables were differentiated by policy area, but all focused on characteristics and values that would make an individual more likely to support European control of various policy areas. Control variables were consistent with past literature—age, a squared measure of age, a scale measure of EU knowledge, gender, left/right self-placement and a squared measure of it, whether the country in question was post-Communist, and whether the country in question had received a bailout from the EU during the recent crisis. Below is a table of summary statistics for variables used in all models, in both 2011 and 2006.

⁴²In certain cases in the 2006 data, the random-effects logit models would not converge appropriately; here standard logit is used.

Table 3.1: Summary statistics, 2011

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Views on control of economic and monetary policy	0.715	0.451	0	1	26243
Views on control of immigration policy	0.593	0.491	0	1	25866
Views on control of environmental policy	0.672	0.47	0	1	25982
Views on control of defense policy	0.665	0.472	0	1	25706
Views on control of social welfare policy	0.31	0.462	0	1	25981
Believe EU is going in a positive direction	0.668	0.832	0	2	24400
National economic situation	2.008	0.812	0	3	26351
Trust EU	0.434	0.496	0	1	23956
Concern about future of EU	1.548	0.734	0	3	25104
EU symbolizes economic prosperity	0.133	0.339	0	1	26594
EU should be primary actor in financial crisis	2.246	1.509	0	4	21150
Trust national government	0.303	0.46	0	1	25273
Open to enlargement	0.441	0.497	0	1	23781
Lives in border country	0.198	0.398	0	1	26594
EU symbolizes cultural diversity	0.185	0.389	0	1	26594
EU symbolizes frontier control	0.151	0.358	0	1	26594
Household struggling financially	1.404	0.781	0	3	26128
Defense is important national issue	0.012	0.107	0	1	13353
Trust EP	0.53	0.499	0	1	23310
Trust ECB	0.505	0.5	0	1	21956
Believe your voice counts in EU	0.294	0.455	0	1	24666
Believe EU should have larger budget	0.402	0.49	0	1	22391
Gender	0.533	0.499	0	1	26594
Linear age	0	18.037	-33.565	48.435	26594
Age squared	17.392	12.493	1	36	26594
Education	2.247	0.866	0	4	26230
Knowledge of EU	2.318	0.59	1	3	26594
Postcommunist country	0.404	0.491	0	1	26594
Country receiving EU bailout	0.152	0.359	0	1	26594
Western Europe	0.304	0.46	0	1	26594

Table 3.2: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Views on economic and monetary policy	0.692	0.462	0	1	26008
Views on immigration policy	0.576	0.494	0	1	25526
Views on environmental policy	0.627	0.484	0	1	25788
Views on defense policy	0.657	0.475	0	1	25423
Views on social policy	0.309	0.462	0	1	25868
Believes EU is going in a positive direction	1.154	0.864	0	2	22795
National economic situation	1.501	0.781	0	3	25919
Trust EU	0.598	0.49	0	1	22982
Concern about future of EU	0.932	0.755	0	2	25208
EU symbolizes economic prosperity	0.66	0.474	0	1	22793
Supports introduction of euro	0.266	0.442	0	1	26647
Open to further enlargement	0.930	0.256	0	1	24985
EU symbolizes tolerance	0.174	0.379	0	1	26647
Has studied or worked abroad	0.445	0.497	0	1	22862
Pro-globalization	0.529	0.499	0	1	21001
More equality	2.855	0.869	1	4	24942
Membership in EU good or bad thing	1.402	0.733	0	2	23877
Feels like citizen of EU	0.97	0.912	0	2	26077
Border country	0.194	0.396	0	1	26647
Proud to be nationality	0.884	0.32	0	1	26073
Proud to be European	0.644	0.479	0	1	25362
Household financial situation	1.057	0.658	0	2	26050
Feels they hold multiple identities	0.736	0.727	0	2	26077
Pessimistic about future of EU	1.613	0.649	0	2	26491
Defense is an important national issue	0.023	0.151	0	1	26647
Trust EU	0.598	0.49	0	1	22982
Trust European Parliament	0.688	0.463	0	1	22209
Trust European Court of Justice	0.724	0.447	0	1	20163
Voice counts in the EU	0.382	0.486	0	1	24161
Nation going in right direction	0.975	0.887	0	2	25190
Gender	0.569	0.495	0	1	26647
Linear age	0	18.338	-32.87	50.13	26647
Age squared	2627.817	1814.866	225	9604	26647
Education	2.527	0.88	0	4	26291
Knowledge	4.282	2.015	1	10	26249
Postcommunist	0.405	0.491	0	1	26647
Left right self-placement linear	0	2.207	-4.438	4.562	20912
Left/Right Placementsq	10.161	6.534	1	25	20912

I will provide one example of the regression equation for a model from 2011.

$$\begin{aligned}
 Pr(Economicandmonetarypolicy = 1) = & F(\beta_0 + \beta_{nateconsit}Nationaleconomicsituation + \beta_{EU\symbolizesecon} \\
 & \beta_{trustnat}trustnat + \beta_{openenlrg}Opentofurtherenlargement + \beta_{ageG} \\
 & \beta_{Gender}Gender + \beta_{Knowledge}Knowledge + \beta_{Education}Education + \\
 & \beta_{bailout}bailout)
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{3.1}$$

3.5 Results

Before examining different models for each dependent variable, it was necessary to show that these models are needed. Thus, I first created a more generalized model through which I examined each dependent variable. Before examining the hypotheses presented above, I will show that my individualized models have more explanatory power than using the same, one-size-fits-all model for each dependent variable. In all discussions of marginal effects, variables are held at their means.

This generalized model included some popular predictors in the literature on EU public support. Feelings about the direction of the EU were included to gauge a more generalized support for the European project; national economic situation to determine satisfaction with national government; trust in the EU as a placeholder for some more typical affective identity questions which were not asked in this iteration of Eurobarometer; and Gender, age, a squared measure of age, and Education as common demographic indicators of EU support. In all discussions of marginal effects, it is assumed that the random effect is zero.

Below, I present the results for each dependent variable with this generalized model. In the figure below, I show the results for economic and monetary policy. In this model, national economic situation, Gender, Educationation, and the squared measure of age are not significant. Believing the EU is going in the right direction increases support for EU control, as does trusting the EU, and being younger. In the next figure, results for immigration policy show that Gender, national economic situation, Educationation level, and age are not significant. Again, believing the EU is going in the right direction increases support for control of immigration policy, while many typical demographic predictors do not seem to have an effect.

In the next figure, results for environmental policy show that again Gender and age are not significant; national economic situation is also not significant. In this case, higher levels of Educationation increase support significantly. In the model for defense policy, national economic situation, Gender, age, and Educationation are not significant. Believing the EU is going in the right direction increases support. In the model for social policy, national economic situation, age, and Educationation are not significant. Here, being male appears to decrease support, while believing the EU is going in the right direction increases it.

It is clear to see that while there are some commonalities, the models do not work at the same level of accuracy for every policy area. The value of the r-squared for each model varies somewhat, and different variables are significant in each model. This is why I propose providing different models for each policy area which include variables more customized to that policy. In this project, I argue that people are making decisions about whether to support the EU controlling different policy areas based on the benefits of having the EU control that policy area. These potential benefits are likely

Table 3.3: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.224**	(0.045)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.265**	(0.045)
National economic situation rather good	-0.156	(0.114)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.245*	(0.116)
National economic situation very bad	-0.208 [†]	(0.120)
Trust EU	0.600**	(0.037)
Male	-0.043	(0.032)
Linear age	-0.015**	(0.004)
Age squared	0.012*	(0.005)
Education less than high school	-0.141	(0.194)
Education high school only	0.107	(0.194)
Education more than high school	0.356 [†]	(0.195)
Education still studying	0.220	(0.209)
Belgium	0.497**	(0.112)
The Netherlands	0.611**	(0.118)
West Germany	0.687**	(0.123)
Italy	0.302**	(0.116)
Luxembourg	0.575**	(0.151)
Denmark	-0.496**	(0.106)
Ireland	0.713**	(0.121)
country==9	-0.643**	(0.105)
Northern Ireland	-0.235	(0.154)
Greece	0.181 [†]	(0.107)
Spain	0.412**	(0.111)
Portugal	0.472**	(0.118)
East Germany	0.387**	(0.139)
Finland	-0.652**	(0.106)
Sweden	-0.119	(0.111)
Austria	-0.332**	(0.107)
Cyprus	1.114**	(0.169)
Czech Republic	-0.423**	(0.104)
Estonia	-0.116	(0.111)
Hungary	0.253*	(0.111)
Latvia	0.726**	(0.124)
Lithuania	0.792**	(0.127)
Malta	1.046**	(0.178)
Poland	0.241*	(0.114)
Slovakia	-0.060	(0.107)
Slovenia	-0.320**	(0.104)
Bulgaria	0.249*	(0.123)
Romania	-0.024	(0.114)
Intercept	0.378	(0.253)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-3.802**	(1.453)
N	21966	
Log-likelihood	-12180.298	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	1487.817	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.4: Hypothesis 2 Overall Model 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0419***	(0.0081)
EU going in the right direction	0.0497***	(0.0082)
National economic situation rather good	-0.0308	(0.0228)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.048*	(0.023)
National economic situation very bad	-0.0411	(0.0241)
Trust EU	0.1139***	(0.0068)
Male	-0.0084	(0.0061)
Linear age	-0.0029***	(0.0007)
Age squared	0.0023*	(0.001)
Education less than high school	-0.028	(0.0392)
Education high school only	0.0207	(0.0373)
Education more than high school	0.0667	(0.0351)
Education still studying	0.0408	(0.0367)
Belgium	0.0857***	(0.0169)
The Netherlands	0.1022***	(0.0165)
West Germany	0.1124***	(0.0164)
Italy	0.0546**	(0.0194)
Luxembourg	0.0964***	(0.0213)
Denmark	-0.1056***	(0.0244)
Ireland	0.1157***	(0.0159)
UK	-0.1402***	(0.0249)
Northern Ireland	-0.0479	(0.0329)
Greece	0.0337	(0.0192)
Spain	0.0724***	(0.0175)
Portugal	0.0816***	(0.0179)
East Germany	0.0682**	(0.022)
Finland	-0.1421***	(0.0251)
Sweden	-0.0237	(0.0227)
Austria	-0.0687**	(0.0236)
Cyprus	0.1603***	(0.0164)
Czech Republic	-0.089***	(0.0236)
Estonia	-0.023	(0.0226)
Hungary	0.0463*	(0.019)
Latvia	0.1176***	(0.0161)
Lithuania	0.1259***	(0.0159)
Malta	0.1531***	(0.018)
Poland	0.0441*	(0.0197)
Slovakia	-0.0118	(0.0212)
Slovenia	-0.0662**	(0.0228)
Bulgaria	0.0455*	(0.0212)
Romania	-0.0047	(0.0224)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.5: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.282**	(0.042)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.322**	(0.041)
National economic situation rather good	0.038	(0.098)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.007	(0.101)
National economic situation very bad	0.040	(0.105)
Trust EU	0.442**	(0.034)
Male	0.001	(0.030)
Linear age	-0.003	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.003	(0.005)
Education less than high school	-0.054	(0.191)
Education high school only	0.102	(0.191)
Education more than high school	0.337 [†]	(0.191)
Education still studying	0.006	(0.203)
Belgium	-0.151	(0.108)
The Netherlands	-0.722**	(0.107)
West Germany	-0.223 [†]	(0.114)
Italy	0.214 [†]	(0.120)
Luxembourg	-0.655**	(0.131)
Denmark	-1.383**	(0.107)
Ireland	-0.899**	(0.110)
country==9	-1.660**	(0.111)
Northern Ireland	-1.307**	(0.157)
Greece	-0.870**	(0.106)
Spain	-0.072	(0.110)
Portugal	-0.283*	(0.115)
East Germany	-0.243 [†]	(0.134)
Finland	-2.082**	(0.114)
Sweden	-1.345**	(0.111)
Austria	-1.690**	(0.112)
Cyprus	-0.239 [†]	(0.134)
Czech Republic	-0.877**	(0.106)
Estonia	-1.464**	(0.110)
Hungary	-0.324**	(0.109)
Latvia	-0.387**	(0.111)
Lithuania	-0.349**	(0.112)
Malta	0.553**	(0.166)
Poland	-0.141	(0.113)
Slovakia	-0.219*	(0.109)
Slovenia	-0.280**	(0.107)
Bulgaria	0.283*	(0.129)
Romania	-0.132	(0.117)
Intercept	0.591*	(0.245)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-3.215**	(0.777)
N21759		
Log-likelihood	-13428.822	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	2036.882	

Table 3.6: Hypothesis 3 Overall Model 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0662***	(0.0096)
EU going in the right direction	0.0758***	(0.0095)
National economic situation rather good	0.0092	(0.0234)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.0017	(0.0243)
National economic situation very bad	0.0095	(0.0252)
Trust EU	0.1052***	(0.008)
Male	0.0003	(0.0072)
Linear age	-0.0006	(0.0009)
Age squared	-0.0007	(0.0012)
Education less than high school	-0.0131	(0.0462)
Education high school only	0.0245	(0.0457)
Education more than high school	0.0796	(0.0444)
Education still studying	0.0014	(0.0486)
Belgium	-0.0368	(0.0264)
The Netherlands	-0.1782***	(0.0261)
West Germany	-0.0545	(0.0283)
Italy	0.0503	(0.0275)
Luxembourg	-0.162***	(0.0323)
Denmark	-0.3286***	(0.0221)
Ireland	-0.2209***	(0.026)
UK	-0.3818***	(0.0202)
Northern Ireland	-0.3116***	(0.0325)
Greece	-0.2142***	(0.0252)
Spain	-0.0173	(0.0267)
Portugal	-0.0693*	(0.0285)
East Germany	-0.0595	(0.0331)
Finland	-0.4508***	(0.0165)
Sweden	-0.3208***	(0.023)
Austria	-0.3873***	(0.02)
Cyprus	-0.0585	(0.0332)
Czech Republic	-0.2158***	(0.0253)
Estonia	-0.3447***	(0.0217)
Hungary	-0.0796**	(0.0271)
Latvia	-0.0954**	(0.0276)
Lithuania	-0.0858**	(0.0279)
Malta	0.1233***	(0.0335)
Poland	-0.0344	(0.0279)
Slovakia	-0.0535*	(0.0269)
Slovenia	-0.0686*	(0.0267)
Bulgaria	0.0659*	(0.029)
Romania	-0.0321	(0.0287)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.7: Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Views on environmental policy		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.169**	(0.043)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.205**	(0.043)
National economic situation rather good	0.108	(0.110)
National economic situation rather bad	0.172	(0.113)
National economic situation very bad	0.200 [†]	(0.116)
Trust EU	0.453**	(0.035)
Male	-0.027	(0.030)
Linear age	-0.004	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.004	(0.005)
Education less than high school	0.287	(0.189)
Education high school only	0.445*	(0.188)
Education more than high school	0.809**	(0.189)
Education still studying	0.740**	(0.202)
Belgium	-0.005	(0.115)
The Netherlands	0.141	(0.120)
West Germany	0.873**	(0.139)
Italy	-0.546**	(0.117)
Luxembourg	0.013	(0.146)
Denmark	-0.083	(0.118)
Ireland	-0.901**	(0.113)
country==9	-1.030**	(0.110)
Northern Ireland	-0.631**	(0.158)
Greece	-0.601**	(0.110)
Spain	0.033	(0.117)
Portugal	-0.520**	(0.117)
East Germany	0.924**	(0.169)
Finland	-0.993**	(0.110)
Sweden	-0.072	(0.119)
Austria	-0.721**	(0.112)
Cyprus	0.388*	(0.157)
Czech Republic	-0.519**	(0.111)
Estonia	-1.040**	(0.112)
Hungary	-0.349**	(0.113)
Latvia	-0.784**	(0.112)
Lithuania	-0.816**	(0.113)
Malta	-1.044**	(0.141)
Poland	-0.584**	(0.114)
Slovakia	-0.618**	(0.110)
Slovenia	-0.858**	(0.109)
Bulgaria	-0.754**	(0.118)
Romania	-1.157**	(0.114)
Intercept	0.327	(0.249)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-3.602**	(1.085)
N21813		
Log-likelihood	-12978.291	
χ ² ₍₄₁₎	1334.032	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.8: Hypothesis 4 Overall Model 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0353***	(0.0087)
EU going in the right direction	0.0431***	(0.0087)
National economic situation rather good	0.0229	(0.0232)
National economic situation rather bad	0.0367	(0.0238)
National economic situation very bad	0.0422	(0.0241)
Trust EU	0.0957***	(0.0073)
Male	-0.0058	(0.0065)
Linear age	-0.0008	(0.0008)
Age squared	-0.0008	(0.0011)
Education less than high school	0.0592	(0.0373)
Education high school only	0.0941*	(0.0392)
Education more than high school	0.1615***	(0.0347)
Education still studying	0.1376***	(0.0315)
Belgium	-0.0011	(0.0247)
The Netherlands	0.0293	(0.0245)
West Germany	0.1549***	(0.0193)
Italy	-0.1262***	(0.0284)
Luxembourg	0.0028	(0.0312)
Denmark	-0.018	(0.026)
Ireland	-0.2141***	(0.0278)
UK	-0.2459***	(0.0269)
Northern Ireland	-0.1476***	(0.0391)
Greece	-0.1397***	(0.0268)
Spain	0.0069	(0.0247)
Portugal	-0.12***	(0.0284)
East Germany	0.1605***	(0.0223)
Finland	-0.2367***	(0.0271)
Sweden	-0.0157	(0.0262)
Austria	-0.1693***	(0.0275)
Cyprus	0.0769**	(0.0284)
Czech Republic	-0.1196***	(0.0268)
Estonia	-0.2486***	(0.0274)
Hungary	-0.0789**	(0.0266)
Latvia	-0.185***	(0.0278)
Lithuania	-0.1929***	(0.0279)
Malta	-0.2502***	(0.0346)
Poland	-0.1355***	(0.0278)
Slovakia	-0.1438***	(0.027)
Slovenia	-0.2034***	(0.0268)
Bulgaria	-0.1778***	(0.0293)
Romania	-0.2773***	(0.0276)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.9: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.191**	(0.043)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.230**	(0.043)
National economic situation rather good	0.046	(0.103)
National economic situation rather bad	0.086	(0.106)
National economic situation very bad	0.070	(0.110)
Trust EU	0.513**	(0.035)
Male	-0.007	(0.031)
Linear age	-0.003	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.001	(0.005)
Education less than high school	-0.207	(0.197)
Education high school only	-0.047	(0.197)
Education more than high school	0.041	(0.198)
Education still studying	-0.122	(0.209)
Belgium	-0.043	(0.116)
The Netherlands	-0.788**	(0.111)
West Germany	0.107	(0.124)
Italy	-0.176	(0.122)
Luxembourg	0.285 [†]	(0.156)
Denmark	-0.851**	(0.111)
Ireland	-0.661**	(0.115)
country==9	-1.646**	(0.112)
Northern Ireland	-1.227**	(0.155)
Greece	-0.899**	(0.109)
Spain	0.061	(0.119)
Portugal	-0.670**	(0.117)
East Germany	0.212	(0.149)
Finland	-2.536**	(0.120)
Sweden	-1.425**	(0.113)
Austria	-0.922**	(0.112)
Cyprus	-0.438**	(0.137)
Czech Republic	-0.214 [†]	(0.115)
Estonia	-0.424**	(0.117)
Hungary	-0.398**	(0.114)
Latvia	-0.199 [†]	(0.119)
Lithuania	-0.132	(0.121)
Malta	0.254	(0.169)
Poland	-0.568**	(0.115)
Slovakia	-0.042	(0.118)
Slovenia	-0.317**	(0.113)
Bulgaria	-0.413**	(0.124)
Romania	-0.672**	(0.117)
Intercept	0.974**	(0.253)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-11.044	(18.060)
N		
21661		
Log-likelihood		
-12657.277		
$\chi^2_{(41)}$		
2024.538		

Table 3.10: Hypothesis 5 Overall Model 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0409***	(0.009)
EU going in the right direction	0.0493***	(0.009)
National economic situation rather good	0.0099	(0.0224)
National economic situation rather bad	0.0188	(0.023)
National economic situation very bad	0.0153	(0.0238)
Trust EU	0.1109***	(0.0075)
Male	-0.0014	(0.0067)
Linear age	-0.0007	(0.0008)
Age squared	-0.0003	(0.0011)
Education less than high school	-0.0465	(0.0451)
Education high school only	-0.0104	(0.0433)
Education more than high school	0.0089	(0.043)
Education still studying	-0.0272	(0.0475)
Belgium	-0.0096	(0.0257)
The Netherlands	-0.1882***	(0.0275)
West Germany	0.023	(0.0262)
Italy	-0.0396	(0.0281)
Luxembourg	0.0593	(0.0306)
Denmark	-0.2039***	(0.0277)
Ireland	-0.1568***	(0.0285)
UK	-0.3898***	(0.0235)
Northern Ireland	-0.2962***	(0.0366)
Greece	-0.2157***	(0.027)
Spain	0.0133	(0.0255)
Portugal	-0.1591***	(0.0291)
East Germany	0.0448	(0.0301)
Finland	-0.5434***	(0.0161)
Sweden	-0.3414***	(0.0255)
Austria	-0.2213***	(0.0278)
Cyprus	-0.1021**	(0.0335)
Czech Republic	-0.0485	(0.0267)
Estonia	-0.0984**	(0.0284)
Hungary	-0.0921**	(0.0275)
Latvia	-0.0448	(0.0276)
Lithuania	-0.0295	(0.0276)
Malta	0.053	(0.0336)
Poland	-0.1338***	(0.0283)
Slovakia	-0.0092	(0.0261)
Slovenia	-0.0727**	(0.0269)
Bulgaria	-0.0957**	(0.03)
Romania	-0.1595***	(0.0292)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.11: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.135**	(0.042)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.288**	(0.042)
National economic situation rather good	-0.044	(0.109)
National economic situation rather bad	0.012	(0.111)
National economic situation very bad	0.040	(0.115)
Trust EU	0.346**	(0.035)
Male	-0.122**	(0.031)
Linear age	-0.005	(0.004)
Age squared	0.000	(0.005)
Education less than high school	0.025	(0.212)
Education high school only	0.065	(0.211)
Education more than high school	0.153	(0.212)
Education still studying	0.200	(0.223)
Belgium	0.253*	(0.114)
The Netherlands	-0.142	(0.123)
West Germany	0.662**	(0.120)
Italy	0.984**	(0.117)
Luxembourg	0.140	(0.146)
Denmark	-0.861**	(0.141)
Ireland	-0.173	(0.129)
country==9	-0.019	(0.125)
Northern Ireland	0.200	(0.177)
Greece	0.823**	(0.112)
Spain	0.576**	(0.116)
Portugal	1.128**	(0.119)
East Germany	0.167	(0.148)
Finland	-0.936**	(0.146)
Sweden	-0.906**	(0.147)
Austria	-0.219†	(0.128)
Cyprus	1.620**	(0.134)
Czech Republic	0.483**	(0.115)
Estonia	0.557**	(0.116)
Hungary	1.172**	(0.112)
Latvia	1.070**	(0.113)
Lithuania	1.190**	(0.113)
Malta	-0.013	(0.161)
Poland	0.862**	(0.115)
Slovakia	0.946**	(0.111)
Slovenia	0.473**	(0.114)
Bulgaria	0.824**	(0.118)
Romania	0.646**	(0.117)
Intercept	-1.574**	(0.270)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-5.674	(9.050)
N21802		
Log-likelihood	-12397.569	
χ²(41)	1666.413	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.12: Hypothesis 6 Overall Model 2011

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0281**	(0.009)
EU going in the right direction	0.0604***	(0.009)
National economic situation rather good	-0.009	(0.022)
National economic situation rather bad	0.0025	(0.0227)
National economic situation very bad	0.0082	(0.0236)
Trust EU	0.0712***	(0.0073)
Male	-0.0248***	(0.0063)
Linear age	-0.001	(0.0008)
Age squared	-0.0001	(0.0011)
Education less than high school	0.0052	(0.0435)
Education high school only	0.0133	(0.0433)
Education more than high school	0.0315	(0.0443)
Education still studying	0.0423	(0.0486)
Belgium	0.0541*	(0.0255)
The Netherlands	-0.0282	(0.0236)
West Germany	0.1499***	(0.0291)
Italy	0.2296***	(0.029)
Luxembourg	0.0293	(0.0315)
Denmark	-0.1437***	(0.0182)
Ireland	-0.034	(0.0245)
UK	-0.0038	(0.0252)
Northern Ireland	0.0425	(0.0389)
Greece	0.1892***	(0.0277)
Spain	0.1292***	(0.0277)
Portugal	0.2653***	(0.0291)
East Germany	0.0351	(0.0322)
Finland	-0.1532***	(0.018)
Sweden	-0.1496***	(0.0184)
Austria	-0.0427	(0.0238)
Cyprus	0.3826***	(0.0298)
Czech Republic	0.1068***	(0.027)
Estonia	0.1246***	(0.0278)
Hungary	0.2757***	(0.0274)
Latvia	0.2507***	(0.0279)
Lithuania	0.2803***	(0.0277)
Malta	-0.0026	(0.0328)
Poland	0.1993***	(0.0283)
Slovakia	0.2198***	(0.0275)
Slovenia	0.1046***	(0.0268)
Bulgaria	0.1901***	(0.0292)
Romania	0.1462***	(0.0285)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

to be different for different policies.

After having presented the results from this generalized model, I will now show that models created with individual policies in mind have more explanatory power and more potential for future research. My first analysis used the most recent data which included my variables of interest, from 2011. Variables about left/right self-placement were not available in this data set.

Table 3.13: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
National economic situation rather good	-0.151	(0.121)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.216 †	(0.124)
National economic situation very bad	-0.161	(0.130)
US should act in crisis	0.763 **	(0.077)
G20 should act in crisis	0.782 **	(0.053)
IMF should act in crisis	0.789 **	(0.054)
EU should act in crisis	0.979 **	(0.051)
Trust national government	0.118 **	(0.042)
Open to enlargement==1	0.396 **	(0.038)
Linear age	-0.014 **	(0.004)
Age squared	0.013 *	(0.006)
Male	-0.015	(0.036)
Knowledge==2	0.080	(0.090)
Knowledge==3	0.206 *	(0.092)
Education less than high school	0.165	(0.242)
Education high school only	0.327	(0.241)
Education more than high school	0.520 *	(0.241)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.13 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education still studying	0.491 †	(0.254)
Postcommunist	0.712 *	(0.302)
bailout	0.497 *	(0.245)
west	0.205	(0.260)
Belgium	0.358 **	(0.119)
The Netherlands	0.442 **	(0.125)
West Germany	0.808 **	(0.138)
Italy	0.194	(0.129)
Luxembourg	0.371 *	(0.164)
Denmark	-0.629 **	(0.112)
Ireland	0.347	(0.264)
country==9	-0.469 †	(0.278)
Northern Ireland	-0.043	(0.304)
Greece	-0.237	(0.269)
Spain	-0.029	(0.265)
Portugal	-0.119	(0.273)
East Germany	0.395 **	(0.152)
Finland	-0.580 *	(0.281)
Sweden	0.060	(0.282)
Austria	-0.080	(0.126)
Cyprus	1.102 **	(0.315)
Czech Republic	-1.108 **	(0.341)
Estonia	-0.592 †	(0.343)
Hungary	-0.379	(0.344)
Latvia	0.177	(0.349)
Lithuania	0.375	(0.352)
Malta	0.520	(0.376)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.13 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Poland	-0.471	(0.346)
Slovakia	-0.797 *	(0.342)
Slovenia	-0.805 *	(0.344)
Bulgaria	-0.287	(0.349)
Romania	-0.411	(0.345)
Intercept	-0.607	(0.404)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-5.044	(6.073)
N		18433
Log-likelihood		-9844.919
$\chi^2_{(49)}$		1325.114

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Above, we see the regression results from H2, which focused on EU economic policy. In this analysis, variables indicating a collectivist orientation were limited. While national economic situation went in the reverse direction as expected, it appeared to not be significant. Believing the EU should control the crisis was significant, as was trust in national government. Higher Knowledge and Education increased support for the EU controlling economic and monetary policy. This may indicate an overall tendency toward trust or distrust of government and institutions, rather than what some literature has indicated as a replacement of national institutions with European institutions when national institutions are not trusted. Notably, an examination of marginal effects shows that respondents in countries that received bailout funds are very likely to want the EU to control economic and monetary policy. These

Table 3.14: Hypothesis 2 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
National economic situation rather good	-0.0284	(0.0231)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.0402	(0.0234)
National economic situation very bad	-0.0303	(0.0248)
US should act in crisis	0.1171***	(0.0094)
G20 should act in crisis	0.1285***	(0.0076)
IMF should act in crisis	0.1274***	(0.0075)
EU should act in crisis	0.1616***	(0.0073)
Trust EU	0.0216**	(0.0076)
Open to enlargement_1	0.0725***	(0.0069)
Linear age	-0.0026**	(0.0008)
Age squared	0.0025*	(0.0011)
Male	-0.0027	(0.0066)
Knowledge_2	0.0147	(0.0166)
Knowledge_3	0.0376*	(0.0167)
Education less than high school	0.0295	(0.042)
Education high school only	0.0597	(0.0435)
Education more than high school	0.0914*	(0.0401)
Education still studying	0.081*	(0.0369)
Postcommunist country	0.126*	(0.0511)
Country received bailout funds	0.0831*	(0.0367)
Western Europe	0.0372	(0.0461)
Belgium	0.0605**	(0.0182)
The Netherlands	0.073***	(0.0182)
West Germany	0.1206***	(0.0159)
Italy	0.0342	(0.0216)
Luxembourg	0.0622*	(0.0247)
Denmark	-0.1318***	(0.0259)
Ireland	0.0587	(0.0405)
UK	-0.0957	(0.0617)
Northern Ireland	-0.008	(0.0574)
Greece	-0.0461	(0.0551)
Spain	-0.0053	(0.0497)
Portugal	-0.0226	(0.0532)
East Germany	0.0658**	(0.0225)
Finland	-0.1204	(0.0641)
Sweden	0.011	(0.0506)
Austria	-0.015	(0.0241)
Cyprus	0.1494***	(0.0287)
Czech Republic	-0.2472**	(0.0841)
Estonia	-0.1235	(0.0787)
Hungary	-0.076	(0.074)
Latvia	0.0312	(0.059)
Lithuania	0.063	(0.0533)
Malta	0.0835	(0.0513)
Poland	-0.0961	(0.0769)
Slovakia	-0.1713*	(0.0818)
Slovenia	-0.1737*	(0.0827)
Bulgaria	-0.0566	(0.073)
Romania	-0.0829	(0.0751)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

results reflect several ideasone, that a generalized orientation toward trust in government will make an individual think it is in their interest to trust further forms of government; two, that those who receive bailout money do not want to bite the hand that feeds them, so to speak; and three, that those who are more Educationated and likely pay more attention to the issues believe the EU is the best level of government to handle such policy.

Table 3.15: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Border country ==1	0.274 †	(0.149)
Household financial situation rather good	-0.087 †	(0.051)
Household financial situation rather bad	-0.210 **	(0.057)
Household financial situation very bad	-0.239 **	(0.069)
Linear age	-0.002	(0.003)
Age squared	-0.004	(0.004)
Male	0.031	(0.028)
Knowledge==2	0.242 **	(0.059)
Knowledge==3	0.411 **	(0.062)
Education less than high school	-0.106	(0.170)
Education high school only	0.052	(0.170)
Education more than high school	0.243	(0.171)
Education still studying	0.042	(0.181)
Postcommunist	0.739 **	(0.183)
bailout	0.191	(0.158)
Belgium	0.130	(0.175)
The Netherlands	-0.427 *	(0.176)
West Germany	-0.007	(0.176)
Italy	0.338 **	(0.108)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.15 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Luxembourg	-0.507	**	(0.168)
Denmark	-1.113	**	(0.177)
Ireland	-0.801	**	(0.266)
country==9	-1.505	**	(0.177)
Northern Ireland	-0.994	**	(0.208)
Greece	-1.030	**	(0.183)
Spain	-0.283		(0.183)
Portugal	-0.342	†	(0.186)
East Germany	-0.077		(0.188)
Finland	-1.804	**	(0.179)
Sweden	-1.056	**	(0.176)
Austria	-1.382	**	(0.179)
Cyprus	-0.011		(0.189)
Czech Republic	-1.260	**	(0.244)
Estonia	-1.780	**	(0.244)
Hungary	-0.662	**	(0.245)
Latvia	-0.749	**	(0.245)
Lithuania	-0.651	**	(0.245)
Malta	0.150		(0.262)
Poland	-0.501	*	(0.247)
Slovakia	-0.649	**	(0.245)
Slovenia	-0.731	**	(0.245)
Bulgaria	0.040		(0.250)
Romania	-0.426	†	(0.247)
Intercept	0.486	†	(0.258)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.15 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-8.775 †	(4.906)
N	25126	
Log-likelihood	-15672.414	
$\chi^2_{(43)}$	2310.615	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

H3, on immigration policy, is also generally supported. In particular, living in a country on the EUs external Border country results in an increase in support for EU control of immigration policy, which is strong evidence for my argument. Living in a Border country means you bear the brunt of most immigration to the continent of Europe, both legal and illegal, and thus citizens of those countries would wish to disperse such an encumbrance through supranational control rather than have that burden fall on them alone. Living in a post-communist country also has a strong effect. This may reflect greater support in general among post-communist countries for EU control of most policy areas, but also shows a trust in European governance. As one would expect from the literature, having a worse financial situation in ones household makes a respondent less likely to support EU control of immigration policy. More Knowledge about the EU increases support, however.

Table 3.17: Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Views on environmental policy		
EU future fairly optimistic	0.106	(0.077)
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.17 – *Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.209	**	(0.079)
EU future very pessimistic	-0.774	**	(0.088)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.157	**	(0.041)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.167	**	(0.041)
Education less than high school	0.308		(0.189)
Education high school only	0.450	*	(0.189)
Education more than high school	0.753	**	(0.189)
Education still studying	0.730	**	(0.201)
Linear age	-0.006		(0.004)
Age squared	-0.001		(0.005)
Male	-0.021		(0.030)
Knowledge==2	-0.024		(0.071)
Knowledge==3	0.154	*	(0.073)
Postcommunist	0.157		(0.212)
bailout	0.196		(0.164)
Belgium	-0.097		(0.113)
The Netherlands	0.100		(0.118)
West Germany	0.713	**	(0.132)
Italy	-0.602	**	(0.113)
Luxembourg	-0.211		(0.140)
Denmark	-0.190		(0.116)
Ireland	-1.230	**	(0.189)
country==9	-1.072	**	(0.109)
Northern Ireland	-0.640	**	(0.160)
Greece	-0.787	**	(0.194)
Spain	-0.254		(0.195)
Portugal	-0.693	**	(0.198)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.17 – *Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
East Germany	0.792 **	(0.161)
Finland	-1.058 **	(0.107)
Sweden	-0.171	(0.113)
Austria	-0.833 **	(0.108)
Cyprus	0.386 *	(0.154)
Czech Republic	-0.620 **	(0.238)
Estonia	-1.184 **	(0.237)
Hungary	-0.383	(0.239)
Latvia	-0.991 **	(0.238)
Lithuania	-0.957 **	(0.238)
Malta	-1.383 **	(0.250)
Poland	-0.801 **	(0.239)
Slovakia	-0.766 **	(0.237)
Slovenia	-1.067 **	(0.237)
Bulgaria	-0.901 **	(0.241)
Romania	-1.347 **	(0.239)
Intercept	0.776 **	(0.244)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-3.738 **	(1.196)
N	22760	
Log-likelihood	-13415.508	
$\chi^2_{(44)}$	1513.06	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.16: Hypothesis 3 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Border country country_1	0.0644	(0.0345)
Household financial situation rather good	-0.0208	(0.0123)
Household financial situation rather bad	-0.0508***	(0.0139)
Household financial situation very bad	-0.0582**	(0.0172)
Linear age	-0.0006	(0.0008)
Age squared	-0.0009	(0.0011)
Male	0.0074	(0.0066)
Knowledge_2	0.0582***	(0.0143)
Knowledge_3	0.0974***	(0.0144)
Education less than high school	-0.0256	(0.0412)
Education high school only	0.0125	(0.0407)
Education more than high school	0.0576	(0.0399)
Education still studying	0.01	(0.0432)
Postcommunist country	0.1728***	(0.0414)
Country received bailout funds	0.0452	(0.0366)
Belgium	0.0308	(0.0408)
The Netherlands	-0.1052*	(0.0438)
West Germany	-0.0018	(0.0423)
Italy	0.078**	(0.0237)
Luxembourg	-0.1252**	(0.0417)
Denmark	-0.2705***	(0.04)
Ireland	-0.1975**	(0.0642)
UK	-0.3531***	(0.0349)
Northern Ireland	-0.2431***	(0.048)
Greece	-0.2517***	(0.0423)
Spain	-0.0692	(0.0454)
Portugal	-0.084	(0.0463)
East Germany	-0.0185	(0.0457)
Finland	-0.4074***	(0.0308)
Sweden	-0.2578***	(0.0405)
Austria	-0.3284***	(0.0369)
Cyprus	-0.0027	(0.0454)
Czech Republic	-0.303***	(0.0525)
Estonia	-0.4034***	(0.042)
Hungary	-0.1635**	(0.0603)
Latvia	-0.1849**	(0.0596)
Lithuania	-0.1607**	(0.0604)
Malta	0.0353	(0.0607)
Poland	-0.1236*	(0.0614)
Slovakia	-0.1604**	(0.0604)
Slovenia	-0.1804**	(0.0598)
Bulgaria	0.0096	(0.0595)
Romania	-0.1049	(0.0615)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.18: Hypothesis 4 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.0226	(0.0162)
EU future fairly Pessimistic about future of EU	-0.0449**	(0.0171)
EU future very Pessimistic about future of EU	-0.1798***	(0.0216)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0328***	(0.0085)
EU going in the right direction	0.035***	(0.0084)
Education less than high school	0.0629	(0.0369)
Education high school only	0.0945*	(0.0391)
Education more than high school	0.1501***	(0.035)
Education still studying	0.135***	(0.0313)
Linear age	-0.0012	(0.0008)
Age squared	-0.0003	(0.001)
Male	-0.0044	(0.0064)
Knowledge_2	-0.005	(0.0151)
Knowledge_3	0.0325*	(0.0154)
Postcommunist country	0.0333	(0.0446)
Country received bailout funds	0.0405	(0.0329)
Belgium	-0.021	(0.0249)
The Netherlands	0.0209	(0.0242)
West Germany	0.1305***	(0.02)
Italy	-0.1395***	(0.0278)
Luxembourg	-0.0466	(0.032)
Denmark	-0.0417	(0.0262)
Ireland	-0.2941***	(0.0454)
UK	-0.2558***	(0.0267)
Northern Ireland	-0.1494***	(0.0395)
Greece	-0.1849***	(0.0481)
Spain	-0.0564	(0.0449)
Portugal	-0.1621**	(0.049)
East Germany	0.1411***	(0.0228)
Finland	-0.2521***	(0.0262)
Sweden	-0.0375	(0.0255)
Austria	-0.1965***	(0.0269)
Cyprus	0.0758**	(0.0277)
Czech Republic	-0.1438*	(0.0583)
Estonia	-0.283***	(0.0574)
Hungary	-0.0866	(0.0567)
Latvia	-0.2358***	(0.0588)
Lithuania	-0.2274***	(0.0589)
Malta	-0.3311***	(0.0579)
Poland	-0.1886**	(0.0594)
Slovakia	-0.1799**	(0.0588)
Slovenia	-0.2543***	(0.0583)
Bulgaria	-0.2135***	(0.0598)
Romania	-0.3221***	(0.056)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

H4, dealing with environmental policy, is somewhat supported. Education has a very strong effect, as increased Education increases support. As environmental policy is a more scientific issue, this seems logical the more Educationated are more concerned about the environment. Those who are optimistic about the future of the EU support EU control of the environment over those who are Pessimistic about future of EU, in reverse of my expectations. It seems that variables about the future of the EU are not necessarily an appropriate proxy for optimism or pessimism about the future in general. While the results here are somewhat confused, this reflects the fact that instrumental logic about environmental policy can be differentiated depending on an individuals perspective.

Table 3.19: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
EU future fairly optimistic	0.038	(0.119)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.226 †	(0.124)
EU future very pessimistic	-0.790 **	(0.141)
Defense important national issue	-0.259	(0.206)
Trust EU	0.270 **	(0.066)
Trust European Parliament	0.079	(0.072)
Trust European Central Bank	0.137 *	(0.066)
Linear age	-0.005	(0.006)
Age squared	-0.003	(0.008)
Male	0.022	(0.047)
Knowledge==2	-0.182	(0.125)
Knowledge==3	-0.110	(0.128)
Education less than high school	0.127	(0.278)
Education high school only	0.157	(0.278)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.19 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education more than high school	0.237	(0.280)
Education still studying	0.016	(0.300)
Postcommunist	1.076 **	(0.405)
bailout	0.102	(0.268)
Belgium	-0.169	(0.179)
The Netherlands	-0.827 **	(0.173)
West Germany	-0.142	(0.185)
Italy	-0.388 *	(0.188)
Luxembourg	0.081	(0.238)
Denmark	-1.140 **	(0.174)
Ireland	-0.978 **	(0.308)
country==9	-1.837 **	(0.183)
Northern Ireland	-1.286 **	(0.233)
Greece	-1.098 **	(0.311)
Spain	-0.213	(0.314)
Portugal	-0.747 *	(0.318)
East Germany	0.198	(0.225)
Finland	-2.676 **	(0.184)
Sweden	-1.745 **	(0.171)
Austria	-1.018 **	(0.172)
Cyprus	-0.578 **	(0.215)
Czech Republic	-1.267 **	(0.439)
Estonia	-1.498 **	(0.444)
Hungary	-1.536 **	(0.440)
Latvia	-1.391 **	(0.443)
Lithuania	-1.331 **	(0.443)
Malta	-0.597	(0.507)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.19 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Poland	-1.844	**	(0.443)
Slovakia	-1.217	**	(0.442)
Slovenia	-1.535	**	(0.440)
Bulgaria	-1.674	**	(0.446)
Romania	-2.020	**	(0.442)
Intercept	1.354	**	(0.371)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u			
Intercept	-3.300	†	(1.950)
N	9635		
Log-likelihood	-5552.919		
$\chi^2_{(46)}$	839.084		

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

H5, on defense policy, is also somewhat supported. Here as in the previous model, I appear to have misspecified a proxy for optimism and pessimism in general. While I hoped that feelings about the future of the EU could act as such a proxy, again feelings about the future of the EU are the reverse of my expectations, and those who are optimistic about the future of the EU support EU control of defense policy at a rate higher than those who are Pessimistic about future of EU about the future of the EU. I had expected that those who feared the future might support safety in numbers. This result may have to do with the fact that defense policy as yet is not really controlled at the EU level, and only those who believe the EU will survive this crisis and move forward in a more positive manner can believe it will remain strong enough to control defense policy in the future. Believing defense was important on a national level was not significant in this model, showing that national control and

Table 3.20: Hypothesis 5 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.0083	(0.0259)
EU future fairly Pessimistic about future of EU	-0.0497	(0.0275)
EU future very Pessimistic about future of EU	-0.1861***	(0.0345)
Defense important national issue_1	-0.0588	(0.0484)
Trust_EU_1	0.0584***	(0.0141)
Trust_EP_1	0.0172	(0.0157)
Trust_ECB_1	0.0299*	(0.0144)
Linear age	-0.001	(0.0012)
Age squared	-0.0005	(0.0017)
Male	0.0047	(0.0103)
Knowledge_2	-0.0394	(0.027)
Knowledge_3	-0.024	(0.028)
Education less than high school	0.0272	(0.0586)
Education high school only	0.0341	(0.0601)
Education more than high school	0.0507	(0.0588)
Education still studying	0.0036	(0.065)
Postcommunist country	0.2207**	(0.0771)
Country received bailout funds	0.0219	(0.0569)
Belgium	-0.0378	(0.041)
The Netherlands	-0.1972***	(0.0429)
West Germany	-0.0316	(0.0421)
Italy	-0.0893*	(0.0452)
Luxembourg	0.0175	(0.0503)
Denmark	-0.2743***	(0.0421)
Ireland	-0.2349**	(0.076)
UK	-0.4285***	(0.0357)
Northern Ireland	-0.3097***	(0.0545)
Greece	-0.2637***	(0.0755)
Spain	-0.0479	(0.0728)
Portugal	-0.1774*	(0.0789)
East Germany	0.0416	(0.0454)
Finland	-0.5631***	(0.0232)
Sweden	-0.4103***	(0.035)
Austria	-0.2446***	(0.0421)
Cyprus	-0.1358*	(0.0532)
Czech Republic	-0.3045**	(0.1037)
Estonia	-0.3576***	(0.0984)
Hungary	-0.3659***	(0.0967)
Latvia	-0.3335**	(0.1014)
Lithuania	-0.3198**	(0.1029)
Malta	-0.1407	(0.1258)
Poland	-0.4298***	(0.0862)
Slovakia	-0.2926**	(0.1053)
Slovenia	-0.3658***	(0.0969)
Bulgaria	-0.3955***	(0.093)
Romania	-0.4628***	(0.0793)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

EU control are not necessarily interchangeable proxies. While support for individual EU institutions like the EP were significant on their own, when added into the full model, they lost their significance in favor of variables like support of the EU in general. I had expected support for some more popular EU institutions to outweigh support for the EU itself, but this turned out to not be the case. I hypothesize that this is because none of the current institutions in the EU actually control EU defense policy. European defense is as yet a hypothetical idea, although one that has strong support from the public. Notably, the control variable for post-communist countries was significant, and this increased support—perhaps reflecting security concerns about Russia which would no doubt be augmented in more recent data.

Table 3.21: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.320 **	(0.039)
EU should have bigger budget_1	0.269 **	(0.036)
Trust national government	-0.069 †	(0.040)
Open to enlargement==1	0.392 **	(0.036)
Linear age	-0.002	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.004	(0.006)
Male	-0.138 **	(0.034)
Knowledge==2	0.024	(0.092)
Knowledge==3	-0.033	(0.094)
Education less than high school	0.013	(0.259)
Education high school only	-0.028	(0.258)
Education more than high school	0.048	(0.258)
Education still studying	0.143	(0.268)
Postcommunist	0.429 †	(0.259)
bailout	0.057	(0.267)
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.21 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
west	0.318	(0.250)
south	0.295	(0.226)
Belgium	0.217 †	(0.118)
The Netherlands	-0.141	(0.128)
West Germany	0.661 **	(0.122)
Italy	0.708 **	(0.257)
Luxembourg	0.181	(0.157)
Denmark	-0.849 **	(0.146)
Ireland	0.034	(0.275)
country==9	0.236	(0.275)
Northern Ireland	0.558 †	(0.300)
Greece	0.782 **	(0.256)
Spain	0.481 †	(0.255)
Portugal	1.041 **	(0.258)
East Germany	0.185	(0.155)
Finland	-0.549 †	(0.288)
Sweden	-0.606 *	(0.283)
Austria	-0.077	(0.133)
Cyprus	2.059 **	(0.288)
Czech Republic	0.477	(0.292)
Estonia	0.596 *	(0.292)
Hungary	0.997 **	(0.292)
Latvia	1.096 **	(0.291)
Lithuania	1.133 **	(0.294)
Malta	-0.177	(0.332)
Poland	0.664 *	(0.293)
Slovakia	0.863 **	(0.290)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.21 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Slovenia	0.375		(0.292)
Bulgaria	0.896	**	(0.297)
Romania	0.568	†	(0.296)
Intercept	-1.859	**	(0.391)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u			
Intercept	-3.080	**	(0.893)
N	19003		
Log-likelihood	-10725.648		
$\chi^2_{(45)}$	1521.193		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%			

H6, social welfare policy, is an interesting hypothesis to examine because most Europeans do not support European control of this area. This hypothesis is largely supported. Those who are open to enlargement tend to support EU control significantly more than those who do not, as well as those who feel their voices count in the EU—this could reflect a more general collectivist orientation. Respondents from post-communist countries also show significantly higher levels of support, reflecting a lack of fiscal strength in their national governments that could result in increased support for the EU. In other words, those who believe they stand to gain more from European control of redistributive policies support it.

Overall, it is clear that the analysis shows a significantly utilitarian bent to respondents' analysis of the EU. The situation in a respondent's country of residence, their particular levels of Education, collectivist thinking, Knowledge, and age reflected

Table 3.22: Hypothesis 6 2011 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
My voice counts in the EU_1	0.0665***	(0.0083)
EU should have bigger budget_1	0.0553***	(0.0075)
Trust EU	-0.014	(0.0081)
Open to Enlargement_1	0.0802***	(0.0075)
Linear age	-0.0003	(0.0008)
Age squared	-0.0009	(0.0012)
Male	-0.028***	(0.0069)
Knowledge_2	0.0048	(0.0187)
Knowledge_3	-0.0066	(0.0191)
Education less than high school	0.0027	(0.0526)
Education high school only	-0.0057	(0.0522)
Education more than high school	0.0098	(0.0528)
Education still studying	0.0297	(0.0571)
Postcommunist country	0.0887	(0.0544)
Country received bailout funds	0.0117	(0.0552)
Western Europe	0.066	(0.0529)
Southern Europe	0.0623	(0.0495)
Belgium	0.0459	(0.0259)
The Netherlands	-0.0277	(0.0244)
West Germany	0.149***	(0.0297)
Italy	0.1608*	(0.063)
Luxembourg	0.0381	(0.0341)
Denmark	-0.1413***	(0.019)
Ireland	0.0068	(0.0564)
UK	0.05	(0.0606)
Northern Ireland	0.1249	(0.0722)
Greece	0.1785**	(0.0628)
Spain	0.1061	(0.0601)
Portugal	0.2432***	(0.064)
East Germany	0.0388	(0.0336)
Finland	-0.0985*	(0.0447)
Sweden	-0.1073*	(0.0426)
Austria	-0.0153	(0.0262)
Cyprus	0.4733***	(0.0543)
Czech Republic	0.105	(0.0685)
Estonia	0.1334	(0.0703)
Hungary	0.2318**	(0.0723)
Latvia	0.2562***	(0.0718)
Lithuania	0.2659***	(0.0724)
Malta	-0.0344	(0.0621)
Poland	0.1498*	(0.0711)
Slovakia	0.1984**	(0.0717)
Slovenia	0.0812	(0.067)
Bulgaria	0.2074**	(0.0739)
Romania	0.1269	(0.0711)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

differences in support levels for supranational control of various policies. This analysis not only goes toward proving my argument, but creates questions for those who believe the financial crisis has weakened support for the EU, which will be further addressed in Chapter 5.

To ensure that the financial crisis has not significantly biased my results, I also analyzed data from 2006. I performed the same analysis in 2006, with the overall model coming before the individualized models. Results of both types of models are presented below. Just as in 2011, the one-size-fits-all model has varying degrees of fit and different variables flicker back and forth into significance. Thus, I turned to the more customized models.

Table 3.23: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.166**	(0.046)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.312**	(0.045)
National economic situation rather good	0.066	(0.072)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.038	(0.078)
National economic situation very bad	-0.332**	(0.091)
Trust EU	0.545**	(0.040)
Male	-0.237**	(0.033)
Age	0.009	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000 [†]	(0.000)
Education less than high school	0.380 [†]	(0.204)
Education high school only	0.578**	(0.205)
Education more than high school	0.747**	(0.203)
Education still studying	0.865**	(0.217)
Belgium	0.907**	(0.109)
The Netherlands	1.331**	(0.121)
West Germany	0.767**	(0.108)
Italy	0.456**	(0.109)
Luxembourg	1.186**	(0.147)
Denmark	0.420**	(0.118)
Ireland	0.965**	(0.129)
UK	0.150	(0.112)
Northern Ireland	1.185**	(0.192)
Greece	0.929**	(0.107)
Spain	0.724**	(0.118)
Portugal	1.153**	(0.122)
East Germany	0.674**	(0.132)
Finland	0.252*	(0.107)
Sweden	0.741**	(0.114)
Austria	0.267*	(0.106)
Cyprus	1.918**	(0.191)
Czech Republic	0.177 [†]	(0.103)
Estonia	0.512**	(0.119)
Hungary	1.032**	(0.117)
Latvia	1.234**	(0.122)
Lithuania	1.297**	(0.133)
Malta	1.662**	(0.174)
Poland	1.225**	(0.126)
Slovakia	0.709**	(0.111)
Slovenia	0.595**	(0.109)
Bulgaria	0.972**	(0.128)
Romania	0.899**	(0.119)
Intercept	-0.585*	(0.278)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-3.087 [†]	(1.745)
N	19955	
Log-likelihood	-11373.493	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	1032.563	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.24: Hypothesis 2 Overall Model Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0328***	(0.0089)
EU going in the right direction	0.0628***	(0.009)
National economic situation rather good	0.0133	(0.0144)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.0077	(0.0158)
National economic situation very bad	-0.0708**	(0.0204)
Trust EU	0.1125***	(0.0083)
Male	-0.0476***	(0.0066)
Linear age	0.0018	(0.0012)
Age squared	0	(0)
Education less than high school	0.0718*	(0.0358)
Education high school only	0.1077**	(0.0348)
Education more than high school	0.1527***	(0.0418)
Education still studying	0.1457***	(0.0293)
Belgium	0.148***	(0.0136)
The Netherlands	0.1935***	(0.0112)
West Germany	0.1294***	(0.0146)
Italy	0.0831***	(0.0176)
Luxembourg	0.1766***	(0.0145)
Denmark	0.0772***	(0.0195)
Ireland	0.1539***	(0.0151)
UK	0.0294	(0.0211)
Northern Ireland	0.1751***	(0.0186)
Greece	0.151***	(0.0132)
Spain	0.1231***	(0.0162)
Portugal	0.1749***	(0.0126)
East Germany	0.1155***	(0.0186)
Finland	0.0481*	(0.0192)
Sweden	0.1257***	(0.0156)
Austria	0.0509**	(0.019)
Cyprus	0.2311***	(0.0106)
Czech Republic	0.0344	(0.0193)
Estonia	0.0919***	(0.0186)
Hungary	0.1621***	(0.0132)
Latvia	0.1835***	(0.012)
Lithuania	0.1889***	(0.0123)
Malta	0.2153***	(0.0118)
Poland	0.1824***	(0.0123)
Slovakia	0.1215***	(0.0155)
Slovenia	0.105***	(0.0164)
Bulgaria	0.1545***	(0.0149)
Romania	0.1462***	(0.0147)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 * * *p<0.001

Table 3.25: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.314**	(0.046)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.456**	(0.045)
National economic situation rather good	0.078	(0.067)
National economic situation rather bad	0.033	(0.074)
National economic situation very bad	-0.110	(0.088)
Trust EU	0.465**	(0.040)
Male	-0.058 [†]	(0.032)
Age	0.007	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000*	(0.000)
Education less than high school	0.044	(0.210)
Education high school only	0.109	(0.210)
Education more than high school	0.305	(0.209)
Education still studying	0.096	(0.220)
Belgium	-0.010	(0.109)
The Netherlands	-0.517**	(0.111)
West Germany	-0.453**	(0.108)
Italy	0.111	(0.115)
Luxembourg	-0.947**	(0.135)
Denmark	-1.045**	(0.122)
Ireland	-0.967**	(0.123)
UK	-1.371**	(0.126)
Northern Ireland	-0.718**	(0.172)
Greece	-0.638**	(0.106)
Spain	0.273*	(0.124)
Portugal	-0.285*	(0.117)
East Germany	-0.314*	(0.132)
Finland	-2.086**	(0.134)
Sweden	-1.850**	(0.131)
Austria	-1.219**	(0.116)
Cyprus	-0.134	(0.145)
Czech Republic	-0.457**	(0.108)
Estonia	-1.463**	(0.125)
Hungary	0.033	(0.115)
Latvia	-0.495**	(0.113)
Lithuania	-0.074	(0.122)
Malta	0.469**	(0.159)
Poland	0.129	(0.121)
Slovakia	-0.142	(0.112)
Slovenia	-0.190 [†]	(0.111)
Bulgaria	-0.176	(0.125)
Romania	-0.083	(0.119)
Intercept	0.412	(0.280)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-2.958	(2.697)
N 19701		
Log-likelihood	-12116.026	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	714.301	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.26: Hypothesis 3 Overall Model 2006 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0745***	(0.0107)
EU going in the right direction	0.1097***	(0.0107)
National economic situation rather good	0.0189	(0.0162)
National economic situation rather bad	0.0081	(0.0178)
National economic situation very bad	-0.0267	(0.0215)
Trust EU	0.1131***	(0.0097)
Male	-0.0139	(0.0077)
Linear age	0.0017	(0.0014)
Age squared	0*	(0)
Education less than high school	0.0106	(0.0504)
Education high school only	0.0263	(0.0502)
Education more than high school	0.0738	(0.0506)
Education still studying	0.023	(0.0525)
Belgium	-0.0025	(0.0263)
The Netherlands	-0.1281***	(0.0275)
West Germany	-0.1121***	(0.0269)
Italy	0.0265	(0.0273)
Luxembourg	-0.232***	(0.0313)
Denmark	-0.2546***	(0.0278)
Ireland	-0.2368***	(0.0284)
UK	-0.3244***	(0.0257)
Northern Ireland	-0.1776***	(0.0418)
Greece	-0.158***	(0.026)
Spain	0.0643*	(0.0282)
Portugal	-0.0701*	(0.0291)
East Germany	-0.0774*	(0.0329)
Finland	-0.4478***	(0.0195)
Sweden	-0.4113***	(0.0215)
Austria	-0.2932***	(0.025)
Cyprus	-0.0329	(0.0356)
Czech Republic	-0.113***	(0.0268)
Estonia	-0.3424***	(0.0246)
Hungary	0.008	(0.0277)
Latvia	-0.1227***	(0.0281)
Lithuania	-0.018	(0.0299)
Malta	0.1074**	(0.0337)
Poland	0.0309	(0.0286)
Slovakia	-0.0348	(0.0276)
Slovenia	-0.0467	(0.0276)
Bulgaria	-0.043	(0.0308)
Romania	-0.0203	(0.0292)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.27: Figure 3.1: Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Feels EU is going in a positive direction	0.091**	(0.020)
National economic situation	-0.077**	(0.020)
Trust EU	0.408**	(0.036)
Gender	-0.144**	(0.030)
Linear age	0.021**	(0.005)
Age squared	0.000**	(0.000)
Education	0.128**	(0.020)
Intercept	0.726**	(0.133)
<hr/>		
N	19854	
Log-likelihood	-12751.162	
$\chi^2_{(7)}$	480.842	
<hr/>		
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.28: Hypothesis 4 Overall Model 2006 Marginal Effects

	Coef. (Std Err.)
Feels EU is going in a positive direction = 0	0.0210136 *** (0.00461)
National economic situation = 0	-0.017648*** (0.00453)
Do Not Trust the EU	0.0946965 *** (0.0083)
Female	- 0.0331568*** (0.00692)
Age linear = 0	0.0049205 *** (0.00105)
Age squared = 0	-0.0000566*** (0.00001)
Educationation = 0	0.0295499*** (0.047)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table 3.29: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.264**	(0.046)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.378**	(0.044)
National economic situation rather good	0.196**	(0.068)
National economic situation rather bad	0.231**	(0.075)
National economic situation very bad	0.037	(0.089)
Trust EU	0.488**	(0.039)
Male	-0.007	(0.033)
Age	-0.007	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Education less than high school	-0.175	(0.215)
Education high school only	-0.067	(0.215)
Education more than high school	0.003	(0.214)
Education still studying	-0.148	(0.226)
Belgium	-0.040	(0.116)
The Netherlands	-0.873**	(0.113)
West Germany	-0.128	(0.115)
Italy	-0.122	(0.120)
Luxembourg	-0.165	(0.144)
Denmark	-0.836**	(0.121)
Ireland	-0.807**	(0.124)
UK	-1.573**	(0.120)
Northern Ireland	-0.502**	(0.180)
Greece	-0.878**	(0.108)
Spain	-0.163	(0.127)
Portugal	-0.496**	(0.121)
East Germany	-0.379**	(0.138)
Finland	-2.488**	(0.123)
Sweden	-1.769**	(0.118)
Austria	-0.867**	(0.112)
Cyprus	-0.123	(0.155)
Czech Republic	-0.238*	(0.115)
Estonia	-0.241 [†]	(0.129)
Hungary	0.078	(0.125)
Latvia	-0.305*	(0.120)
Lithuania	-0.140	(0.130)
Malta	0.379*	(0.176)
Poland	-0.219 [†]	(0.124)
Slovakia	-0.024	(0.122)
Slovenia	-0.577**	(0.114)
Bulgaria	-0.650**	(0.126)
Romania	-0.550**	(0.120)
Intercept	0.555 [†]	(0.287)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-7.540 [†]	(4.132)
N		
	19685	
Log-likelihood	-11424.637	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	2034.349	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.30: Hypothesis 5 Overall Model 2006 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0566***	(0.0096)
EU going in the right direction	0.0831***	(0.0096)
National economic situation rather good	0.0432**	(0.0149)
National economic situation rather bad	0.0503**	(0.0161)
National economic situation very bad	0.0081	(0.0193)
Trust EU	0.1092***	(0.0087)
Male	-0.0015	(0.0072)
Linear age	-0.0015	(0.0013)
Age squared	0	(0)
Education less than high school	-0.0395	(0.0493)
Education high school only	-0.0149	(0.0481)
Education more than high school	0.0006	(0.0472)
Education still studying	-0.0334	(0.0518)
Belgium	-0.0088	(0.0259)
The Netherlands	-0.2099***	(0.028)
West Germany	-0.0288	(0.0264)
Italy	-0.0274	(0.0275)
Luxembourg	-0.0374	(0.0333)
Denmark	-0.2009***	(0.0301)
Ireland	-0.1937***	(0.0309)
UK	-0.3741***	(0.0257)
Northern Ireland	-0.1183**	(0.0445)
Greece	-0.2108***	(0.0268)
Spain	-0.0368	(0.0293)
Portugal	-0.1166***	(0.0298)
East Germany	-0.0882**	(0.0334)
Finland	-0.5356***	(0.0168)
Sweden	-0.4145***	(0.0235)
Austria	-0.2085***	(0.0278)
Cyprus	-0.0276	(0.0354)
Czech Republic	-0.0542*	(0.027)
Estonia	-0.055	(0.0304)
Hungary	0.017	(0.0269)
Latvia	-0.0701*	(0.0286)
Lithuania	-0.0316	(0.0298)
Malta	0.0779*	(0.0333)
Poland	-0.05	(0.0291)
Slovakia	-0.0054	(0.0271)
Slovenia	-0.1364***	(0.0281)
Bulgaria	-0.1547***	(0.0312)
Romania	-0.1299***	(0.0297)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.31: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.158**	(0.052)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.296**	(0.050)
National economic situation rather good	-0.086	(0.081)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.012	(0.086)
National economic situation very bad	-0.170 [†]	(0.101)
Trust EU	0.363**	(0.045)
Male	-0.122**	(0.035)
Age	-0.023**	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000**	(0.000)
Education less than high school	0.040	(0.233)
Education high school only	0.125	(0.233)
Education more than high school	0.125	(0.232)
Education still studying	-0.002	(0.244)
Belgium	0.252*	(0.121)
The Netherlands	-0.284*	(0.135)
West Germany	0.204	(0.126)
Italy	0.915**	(0.128)
Luxembourg	0.020	(0.157)
Denmark	-1.140**	(0.168)
Ireland	0.004	(0.139)
UK	-0.075	(0.140)
Northern Ireland	0.754**	(0.189)
Greece	1.207**	(0.126)
Spain	0.649**	(0.131)
Portugal	0.795**	(0.132)
East Germany	0.101	(0.155)
Finland	-1.018**	(0.156)
Sweden	-1.177**	(0.169)
Austria	0.093	(0.127)
Cyprus	2.187**	(0.183)
Czech Republic	0.319**	(0.121)
Estonia	0.611**	(0.132)
Hungary	0.671**	(0.127)
Latvia	0.937**	(0.128)
Lithuania	1.228**	(0.137)
Malta	0.610**	(0.158)
Poland	0.896**	(0.130)
Slovakia	0.008	(0.126)
Slovenia	0.200	(0.123)
Bulgaria	0.314*	(0.134)
Romania	0.722**	(0.128)
Intercept	-2.049**	(0.323)
Equation 2 : Insg2u		
Intercept	-1.153 [†]	(0.700)
N		
	19860	
Log-likelihood	-11364.455	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	487.705	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.32: Hypothesis 6 Overall Model 2006 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.0323**	(0.0109)
EU going in the right direction	0.0596***	(0.0099)
National economic situation rather good	-0.0172	(0.0163)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.0024	(0.0173)
National economic situation very bad	-0.0332	(0.0189)
Trust EU	0.0717***	(0.0084)
Male	-0.0245***	(0.007)
Linear age	-0.0047***	(0.0013)
Age squared	0**	(0)
Education less than high school	0.0081	(0.0474)
Education high school only	0.0255	(0.0483)
Education more than high school	0.0251	(0.0463)
Education still studying	-0.0005	(0.0489)
Belgium	0.0532*	(0.0266)
The Netherlands	-0.0536*	(0.0239)
West Germany	0.0426	(0.0272)
Italy	0.2106***	(0.031)
Luxembourg	0.004	(0.0319)
Denmark	-0.1734***	(0.0174)
Ireland	0.0008	(0.0279)
UK	-0.0148	(0.0273)
Northern Ireland	0.1718***	(0.0464)
Greece	0.282***	(0.0299)
Spain	0.1455***	(0.0313)
Portugal	0.1811***	(0.0319)
East Germany	0.0207	(0.0324)
Finland	-0.1602***	(0.0177)
Sweden	-0.1769***	(0.017)
Austria	0.0191	(0.0265)
Cyprus	0.4971***	(0.0332)
Czech Republic	0.0679*	(0.027)
Estonia	0.1363***	(0.0314)
Hungary	0.1506***	(0.0304)
Latvia	0.216***	(0.031)
Lithuania	0.2882***	(0.0325)
Malta	0.1365***	(0.0379)
Poland	0.2059***	(0.0314)
Slovakia	0.0016	(0.0254)
Slovenia	0.0417	(0.0265)
Bulgaria	0.0669*	(0.0299)
Romania	0.1632***	(0.0308)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.33: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
National economic situation rather good	0.034	(0.082)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.080	(0.092)
National economic situation very bad	-0.334 **	(0.115)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.185 **	(0.050)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.170 **	(0.059)
Open to enlargement==1	0.767 **	(0.091)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	0.029	(0.051)
Lived or worked abroad	0.019	(0.044)
Pro-globalization	0.340 **	(0.046)
More equality: disagree	0.075	(0.082)
More equality: agree	-0.020	(0.079)
More equality: strongly agree	-0.110	(0.084)
Age	-0.003	(0.007)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	-0.175 **	(0.042)
Knowledge==2	0.178	(0.111)
Knowledge==3	0.265 *	(0.104)
Knowledge==4	0.345 **	(0.106)
Knowledge==5	0.315 **	(0.104)
Knowledge==6	0.448 **	(0.113)
Knowledge==7	0.466 **	(0.117)
Knowledge==8	0.516 **	(0.135)
Knowledge==9	0.140	(0.192)
Knowledge==10	0.638 **	(0.229)
Education less than high school	0.227	(0.300)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.33 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education high school only	0.333	(0.300)
Education more than high school	0.505 †	(0.300)
Education still studying	0.644 *	(0.315)
Post-Communist country	-0.339	(0.344)
Left/right self-placement	0.039	(0.032)
Left/right placement squared	-0.018	(0.011)
Belgium	0.822 **	(0.129)
The Netherlands	1.235 **	(0.150)
West Germany	0.648 **	(0.126)
Italy	0.445 **	(0.135)
Luxembourg	1.234 **	(0.189)
Denmark	0.252 †	(0.133)
Ireland	1.409 **	(0.185)
UK	0.179	(0.129)
Northern Ireland	1.416 **	(0.245)
Greece	1.107 **	(0.141)
Spain	0.760 **	(0.155)
Portugal	1.272 **	(0.159)
East Germany	0.715 **	(0.148)
Finland	0.026	(0.120)
Sweden	0.597 **	(0.129)
Austria	0.342 **	(0.127)
Cyprus	2.007 **	(0.253)
Czech Republic	0.592	(0.362)
Estonia	0.936 *	(0.373)
Hungary	1.778 **	(0.380)
Latvia	1.575 **	(0.377)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.33 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Lithuania	1.739	**	(0.396)
Malta	2.665	**	(0.459)
Poland	1.530	**	(0.380)
Slovakia	1.062	**	(0.367)
Slovenia	1.128	**	(0.371)
Slovenia	0.000		(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000		(0.000)
Intercept	-1.308	**	(0.422)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u			
Intercept	-1.449		(1.142)
N			14403
Log-likelihood			-8202.201
$\chi^2_{(57)}$			288.948
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%			

Table 3.34: Hypothesis 2 2006 Marginal Effects

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
National economic situation rather good	0.0066	(0.0162)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.016	(0.0184)
National economic situation very bad	-0.0698 **	(0.0251)
Future will be same	0.0363 ***	(0.0096)
Future will be better	0.0328 **	(0.011)
Open to Enlargement_1	0.171 ***	(0.021)
EU symbolizes toleranceimportant	0.0057	(0.01)
Worked abroad	0.0038	(0.0086)
Pro globalization	0.0674 ***	(0.0087)
More equality: agree	0.0148	(0.016)
More equality: disagree	-0.0039	(0.0156)
More equality: strongly agree	-0.0219	(0.0171)
Linear age	-0.0005	(0.0015)
Age squared	0	(0)
Male	-0.0344 ***	(0.0081)
Knowledge_2	0.0339	(0.0203)
Knowledge_3	0.0501 **	(0.0187)
Knowledge	0.0643 ***	(0.0184)
Knowledge	0.0594 **	(0.0185)
Knowledge	0.0813 ***	(0.0184)
Knowledge	0.0837 ***	(0.0187)
Knowledge	0.0905 ***	(0.0204)
Knowledge	0.0267	(0.0355)
Knowledge	0.107 **	(0.0314)
Education less than high school	0.043	(0.0542)
Education high school only	0.0626	(0.0537)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 * * *p<0.001

Table 3.34 – *Hypothesis 2 2006 Marginal Effects - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Education more than high school	0.1012		(0.0608)
Education still studying	0.1107	*	(0.0459)
Postcommunist country	-0.0687		(0.0714)
Linear left/right placement	0.0077		(0.0064)
Left/right placement squared	-0.0035		(0.0022)
Belgium	0.1336	***	(0.0157)
The Netherlands	0.18	***	(0.0135)
West Germany	0.1099	***	(0.0173)
Italy	0.0791	***	(0.0211)
Luxembourg	0.1755	***	(0.0164)
Denmark	0.047	*	(0.0234)
Ireland	0.1917	***	(0.0141)
UK	0.0338		(0.0234)
Northern Ireland	0.1895	***	(0.0184)
Greece	0.1664	***	(0.0137)
Spain	0.1239	***	(0.0195)
Portugal	0.181	***	(0.0135)
East Germany	0.1182	***	(0.0192)
Finland	0.005		(0.0234)
Sweden	0.1027	***	(0.0184)
Austria	0.0623	**	(0.0211)
Cyprus	0.2272	***	(0.0121)
Czech Republic	0.102		(0.0531)
Estonia	0.1459	**	(0.043)
Hungary	0.2208	***	(0.024)
Latvia	0.2066	***	(0.0276)
Lithuania	0.2142	***	(0.0243)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.34 – *Hypothesis 2 2006 Marginal Effects - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Malta	0.2506	***	(0.0137)
Poland	0.2021	***	(0.0283)
Slovakia	0.1614	***	(0.0397)
Slovenia	0.1678	***	(0.0379)

Significance levels : * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.35: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, 2006

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Border country ==1	0.083	(0.199)
Proud to be Nationality	-0.337 **	(0.055)
Proud to be European	0.432 **	(0.041)
Household financial situation rather good	0.145 **	(0.045)
Household financial situation rather bad	0.203 **	(0.053)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	0.068	(0.042)
Feels they hold multiple identities==1	0.293 **	(0.040)
Feels they hold multiple identities==2	0.463 **	(0.052)
Left/right self-placement	0.012	(0.026)
Left/right placement squared	-0.013	(0.009)
Age	0.003	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	0.008	(0.033)
Knowledge==2	0.134	(0.084)
Knowledge==3	0.115	(0.079)
Knowledge==4	0.154 †	(0.080)
Knowledge==5	0.147 †	(0.078)
Knowledge==6	0.180 *	(0.085)
Knowledge==7	0.203 *	(0.089)
Knowledge==8	0.263 *	(0.104)
Knowledge==9	0.070	(0.161)
Knowledge==10	0.384 *	(0.177)
Education less than high school	-0.145	(0.214)
Education high school only	-0.149	(0.215)
Education more than high school	-0.005	(0.215)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.35 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, 2006 - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education still studying	-0.216	(0.227)
Post-Communist country	-0.028	(0.275)
Belgium	0.150	(0.220)
The Netherlands	-0.311	(0.222)
West Germany	-0.372 †	(0.224)
Italy	0.268 *	(0.122)
Luxembourg	-0.895 **	(0.217)
Denmark	-0.910 **	(0.224)
Ireland	-0.491 *	(0.227)
UK	-1.058 **	(0.226)
Northern Ireland	-0.299	(0.262)
Greece	-0.403 **	(0.111)
Spain	0.445 **	(0.127)
Portugal	-0.086	(0.117)
East Germany	-0.071	(0.235)
Finland	-1.908 **	(0.231)
Sweden	-1.601 **	(0.227)
Austria	-0.933 **	(0.226)
Cyprus	0.612 *	(0.252)
Czech Republic	-0.042	(0.340)
Estonia	-1.068 **	(0.344)
Hungary	0.435	(0.345)
Latvia	-0.122	(0.342)
Lithuania	0.250	(0.348)
Malta	0.887 *	(0.365)
Poland	0.378	(0.345)
Slovakia	0.217	(0.342)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.35 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, 2006 - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovenia	0.313	(0.344)
Bulgaria	0.237	(0.346)
Romania	0.286	(0.348)
Intercept	0.483	(0.362)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-3.199 †	(1.836)
N	18631	
Log-likelihood	-11548.206	
$\chi^2_{(55)}$	1305.119	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.36: Hypothesis 3 2006 Overall Model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Border country country_1	0.0201	(0.0483)
Proud to be nationality	-0.0802 ***	(0.0127)
Proud to be European	0.1061 ***	(0.0101)
Household financial situation rather good	0.0355 **	(0.0109)
Household financial situation rather bad	0.0492 ***	(0.0127)
EU symbolizes toleranceimportant	0.0165	(0.0102)
Feels multiple identities sometimes	0.0712 ***	(0.0096)
Feels multiple identities often	0.1097 ***	(0.0119)
Linear left/right placement	0.003	(0.0063)
Left/right placement squared	-0.0033	(0.0021)
Linear age	0.0007	(0.0015)
Age squared	0	(0)
Male	0.002	(0.008)
Knowledge_2	0.0324	(0.0201)
Knowledge_3	0.028	(0.019)
Knowledge	0.0372	(0.0191)
Knowledge	0.0356	(0.0188)
Knowledge	0.0434 *	(0.0203)
Knowledge	0.049 *	(0.0211)
Knowledge	0.0628 **	(0.0241)
Knowledge	0.0169	(0.0389)
Knowledge	0.0903 *	(0.0394)
Educationation less than high school	-0.0356	(0.053)
Educationation high school only	-0.0365	(0.0531)
Educationation more than high school	-0.0013	(0.0524)
Educationation still studying	-0.0533	(0.0566)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.36 – *Hypothesis 3 2006 Overall Mode, 2006 - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Postcommunistmunist country	-0.0068	(0.0672)
Belgium	0.0363	(0.0524)
The Netherlands	-0.0771	(0.0555)
West Germany	-0.0924	(0.0558)
Italy	0.0639 *	(0.0284)
Luxembourg	-0.2194 ***	(0.0502)
Denmark	-0.223 ***	(0.0519)
Ireland	-0.122 *	(0.0562)
UK	-0.2566 ***	(0.0501)
Northern Ireland	-0.0742	(0.0655)
Greece	-0.1001 ***	(0.0277)
Spain	0.1038 ***	(0.0279)
Portugal	-0.021	(0.0288)
East Germany	-0.0173	(0.0579)
Finland	-0.4164 ***	(0.035)
Sweden	-0.3662 ***	(0.0407)
Austria	-0.2282 ***	(0.052)
Cyprus	0.139 **	(0.0517)
Czech Republic	-0.0103	(0.0836)
Estonia	-0.2586 **	(0.0759)
Hungary	0.1017	(0.0762)
Latvia	-0.03	(0.0847)
Lithuania	0.0598	(0.0808)
Malta	0.1923 **	(0.066)
Poland	0.0889	(0.0774)
Slovakia	0.0521	(0.0802)
Slovenia	0.0743	(0.0788)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.36 – *Hypothesis 3 2006 Overall Mode, 2006 - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Bulgaria	0.0566	(0.0808)
Romania	0.0682	(0.0801)
Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 * * *p<0.001		

Table 3.37: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Views on environmental policy		
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	0.247 †	(0.136)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.340 *	(0.135)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.648 **	(0.144)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.953 **	(0.187)
Age	0.024 *	(0.010)
Age squared	0.000 **	(0.000)
Male	-0.063	(0.062)
Knowledge==2	0.926 **	(0.234)
Knowledge==3	1.225 **	(0.269)
Knowledge==4	1.496 **	(0.311)
Knowledge==5	1.358 **	(0.288)
Knowledge==6	1.613 **	(0.333)
Knowledge==7	1.758 **	(0.359)
Knowledge==8	1.747 **	(0.371)
Knowledge==9	1.631 **	(0.419)
Knowledge==10	2.193 **	(0.511)
Post-Communist country	0.425	(0.529)
Left/right self-placement	0.076	(0.050)
Left/right placement squared	-0.032 †	(0.017)
Belgium	-0.253	(0.212)
The Netherlands	0.133	(0.212)
West Germany	0.466 *	(0.231)
Italy	-1.345 **	(0.328)
Luxembourg	-1.099 **	(0.323)
Denmark	-0.807 **	(0.251)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.37 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Ireland	-1.635	**	(0.370)
UK	-1.219	**	(0.306)
Northern Ireland	0.007		(0.343)
Greece	-0.831	**	(0.260)
Spain	-0.809	**	(0.271)
Portugal	-1.308	**	(0.322)
East Germany	0.467	†	(0.275)
Finland	-1.799	**	(0.383)
Sweden	-0.633	**	(0.237)
Austria	-2.207	**	(0.448)
Cyprus	0.161		(0.316)
Czech Republic	-1.376	*	(0.611)
Estonia	-1.913	**	(0.664)
Hungary	-0.196		(0.573)
Latvia	-2.466	**	(0.717)
Lithuania	-1.793	**	(0.658)
Malta	-1.361	*	(0.641)
Poland	-0.959		(0.591)
Slovakia	-2.102	**	(0.675)
Slovenia	-2.261	**	(0.695)
Bulgaria	-2.616	**	(0.740)
Romania	-1.872	**	(0.660)
Intercept	1.244	**	(0.433)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.37 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	1.832 **	(0.526)
N		18086
Log-likelihood		-11206.052
$\chi^2_{(47)}$		29.959
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.38: Hypothesis 4 2006 Overall Model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Future will be same	0.0419*	(0.021)
Future will be better	0.0627**	(0.0235)
EU going neither right nor wrong direction	0.1034***	(0.0126)
EU going in the right direction	0.1654***	(0.0163)
Linear age	0.0043**	(0.0016)
Age squared	-0.0001***	(0)
Male	-0.0111	(0.0108)
Knowledge_2	0.1313***	(0.018)
Knowledge_3	0.1704***	(0.0164)
Knowledge	0.1986***	(0.0151)
Knowledge	0.1925***	(0.0169)
Knowledge	0.2006***	(0.0146)
Knowledge	0.2045***	(0.0149)
Knowledge	0.1922***	(0.0162)
Knowledge	0.1772***	(0.0201)
Knowledge	0.201***	(0.0223)
Postcommunistmunist country	0.0729	(0.087)
Linear left/right placement	0.0134	(0.0085)
Left/right placement squared	-0.0057*	(0.0029)
Belgium	-0.0476	(0.0412)
The Netherlands	0.0227	(0.035)
West Germany	0.0729*	(0.0296)
Italy	-0.3007***	(0.0695)
Luxembourg	-0.2409**	(0.0711)
Denmark	-0.1684**	(0.0521)
Ireland	-0.3715***	(0.0768)
UK	-0.2692***	(0.0645)
Northern Ireland	0.0013	(0.0604)
Greece	-0.1744**	(0.0546)
Spain	-0.1697**	(0.0579)
Portugal	-0.2913***	(0.0682)
East Germany	0.0727*	(0.0354)
Finland	-0.4088***	(0.077)
Sweden	-0.1283**	(0.049)
Austria	-0.498***	(0.084)
Cyprus	0.0272	(0.051)
Czech Republic	-0.3064*	(0.1439)
Estonia	-0.4361**	(0.1429)
Hungary	-0.0365	(0.111)
Latvia	-0.5482***	(0.1277)
Lithuania	-0.4096**	(0.1461)
Malta	-0.3065*	(0.1535)
Poland	-0.2057	(0.1397)
Slovakia	-0.476**	(0.1377)
Slovenia	-0.5093***	(0.1341)
Bulgaria	-0.5743***	(0.123)
Romania	-0.427**	(0.1438)
Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001		

Table 3.39: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	0.227 **	(0.082)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.234 **	(0.088)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.046	(0.063)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.072	(0.063)
Defense important national issue	-0.281 *	(0.112)
Trust EU	0.326 **	(0.048)
Trust European Parliament	0.457 **	(0.056)
Trust European Court of Justice	0.208 **	(0.056)
Age squared	0.000 **	(0.000)
Male	-0.037	(0.039)
Knowledge==2	0.252 *	(0.112)
Knowledge==3	0.306 **	(0.104)
Knowledge==4	0.301 **	(0.105)
Knowledge==5	0.257 *	(0.102)
Knowledge==6	0.179 †	(0.108)
Knowledge==7	0.233 *	(0.112)
Knowledge==8	0.260 *	(0.125)
Knowledge==9	0.170	(0.182)
Knowledge==10	0.121	(0.200)
Education less than high school	-0.479	(0.305)
Education high school only	-0.502 †	(0.305)
Education more than high school	-0.447	(0.304)
Education still studying	-0.560 †	(0.313)
Post-Communist country	0.053	(0.356)
Left/right placement squared	0.005 †	(0.003)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.39 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Belgium	-0.059		(0.132)
The Netherlands	-0.860	**	(0.129)
West Germany	-0.086		(0.133)
Italy	-0.113		(0.152)
Luxembourg	-0.198		(0.169)
Denmark	-0.969	**	(0.128)
Ireland	-0.817	**	(0.148)
UK	-1.538	**	(0.141)
Northern Ireland	-0.374		(0.230)
Greece	-0.777	**	(0.128)
Spain	-0.018		(0.159)
Portugal	-0.574	**	(0.142)
East Germany	-0.276	†	(0.155)
Finland	-2.568	**	(0.141)
Sweden	-1.812	**	(0.130)
Austria	-0.818	**	(0.132)
Cyprus	0.052		(0.197)
Czech Republic	-0.216		(0.379)
Estonia	-0.178		(0.388)
Hungary	0.145		(0.388)
Latvia	-0.162		(0.385)
Lithuania	-0.173		(0.393)
Malta	0.490		(0.432)
Poland	-0.185		(0.386)
Slovakia	-0.007		(0.381)
Slovenia	-0.516		(0.380)
Bulgaria	-0.584		(0.387)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.39 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Romania	-0.530	(0.386)
Intercept	0.650 †	(0.340)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-3.913 **	(1.229)
N		14192
Log-likelihood		-8186.798
$\chi^2_{(53)}$		1600.553

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.40: Hypothesis 5 2006 Overall Model

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Future will be same	0.0495	**	(0.0174)
Future will be better	0.0532	**	(0.0203)
Future will be same	0.0103		(0.0142)
Future will be better	0.0161		(0.0139)
Defense important national issue_1	-0.0653	*	(0.0268)
Trust_EU_1	0.0737	***	(0.0108)
Trust_EP_1	0.1045	***	(0.013)
Trust ECJ	0.0473	***	(0.0128)
Age squared	0	***	(0)
Male	-0.0082		(0.0087)
Knowledge_2	0.0543	*	(0.0232)
Knowledge_3	0.0658	**	(0.0215)
Knowledge	0.0648	**	(0.0217)
Knowledge	0.056	*	(0.0217)
Knowledge	0.0391		(0.023)
Knowledge	0.0505	*	(0.0234)
Knowledge	0.0558	*	(0.0256)
Knowledge	0.037		(0.0384)
Knowledge	0.0264		(0.0428)
Educationation less than high school	-0.1122		(0.0739)
Educationation high school only	-0.1166		(0.0729)
Educationation more than high school	-0.0983		(0.0655)
Educationation still studying	-0.1327		(0.0771)
Postcommunistmunist country	0.0117		(0.0791)
Left/right placement squared	0.0012		(0.0007)
Belgium	-0.0133		(0.0301)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.40 – *Hypothesis 5 2006 Overall Model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
The Netherlands	-0.2076 ***	(0.0316)
West Germany	-0.0194	(0.0305)
Italy	-0.0256	(0.0351)
Luxembourg	-0.0456	(0.0398)
Denmark	-0.2345 ***	(0.0311)
Ireland	-0.1973 ***	(0.0366)
UK	-0.3664 ***	(0.0303)
Northern Ireland	-0.0878	(0.0561)
Greece	-0.1869 ***	(0.0316)
Spain	-0.0041	(0.0358)
Portugal	-0.1367 ***	(0.0352)
East Germany	-0.0641	(0.0371)
Finland	-0.5439 ***	(0.0187)
Sweden	-0.4227 ***	(0.0254)
Austria	-0.1972 ***	(0.0325)
Cyprus	0.0116	(0.0432)
Czech Republic	-0.0497	(0.0891)
Estonia	-0.0408	(0.091)
Hungary	0.0318	(0.0825)
Latvia	-0.037	(0.09)
Lithuania	-0.0397	(0.0922)
Malta	0.0999	(0.0787)
Poland	-0.0424	(0.0905)
Slovakia	-0.0015	(0.0853)
Slovenia	-0.1223	(0.0935)
Bulgaria	-0.1396	(0.0959)
Romania	-0.126	(0.0952)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.41: Hypothesis 6, Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.377 **	(0.049)
Nation going in neither right nor wrong direction	0.088	(0.058)
Nation going in right direction	0.049	(0.050)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	-0.077	(0.054)
Lived or worked abroad	0.152 **	(0.045)
Pro-globalization	0.221 **	(0.046)
More equality: disagree	0.041	(0.087)
More equality: agree	0.133	(0.084)
More equality: strongly agree	0.195 *	(0.088)
Age	-0.040 **	(0.008)
Age squared	0.000 **	(0.000)
Male	-0.055	(0.042)
Knowledge==2	0.194	(0.126)
Knowledge==3	0.231 †	(0.118)
Knowledge==4	0.278 *	(0.119)
Knowledge==5	0.378 **	(0.117)
Knowledge==6	0.400 **	(0.123)
Knowledge==7	0.382 **	(0.127)
Knowledge==8	0.360 *	(0.143)
Knowledge==9	0.490 *	(0.207)
Knowledge==10	0.625 **	(0.220)
Education less than high school	-0.039	(0.307)
Education high school only	0.010	(0.308)
Education more than high school	-0.056	(0.307)
Education still studying	-0.293	(0.320)
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.41 – *Hypothesis 6, Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Postcommunist country	0.801 *	(0.352)
Left/right self-placement	-0.027	(0.033)
Left/right placement squared	0.003	(0.011)
Belgium	0.182	(0.131)
The Netherlands	-0.374 **	(0.143)
West Germany	0.110	(0.137)
Italy	0.860 **	(0.151)
Luxembourg	0.129	(0.174)
Denmark	-1.002 **	(0.164)
Ireland	0.131	(0.159)
UK	0.050	(0.146)
Northern Ireland	0.668 **	(0.204)
Greece	1.332 **	(0.146)
Spain	0.722 **	(0.155)
Portugal	0.835 **	(0.149)
East Germany	0.157	(0.162)
Finland	-0.948 **	(0.164)
Sweden	-1.445 **	(0.183)
Austria	0.045	(0.144)
Cyprus	2.032 **	(0.214)
Czech Republic	-0.345	(0.372)
Estonia	-0.059	(0.377)
Hungary	0.088	(0.375)
Latvia	0.324	(0.373)
Lithuania	0.505	(0.386)
Malta	-0.408	(0.397)
Poland	0.092	(0.376)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.41 – *Hypothesis 6, Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovakia	-0.756 *	(0.375)
Slovenia	-0.563	(0.376)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	-2.879 **	(0.439)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-1.371	(0.989)
N	14113	
Log-likelihood	-7731.5	
$\chi^2_{(54)}$	379.862	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.42: Hypothesis 6, Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Voice counts in EU	0.0722 ***	(0.009)
Nation going in neither right nor wrong direction	0.0168	(0.0113)
Nation going in right direction	0.0093	(0.0094)
EU symbolizes toleranceimportant	-0.0144	(0.01)
Worked abroad	0.0288 **	(0.0085)
Pro globalization	0.0416 ***	(0.0084)
More equality: agree	0.0078	(0.0166)
More equality: disagree	0.0253	(0.0159)
More equality: strongly agree	0.0377 *	(0.0175)
Linear age	-0.0076 ***	(0.0014)
Age squared	0.0001 ***	(0)
Male	-0.0105	(0.008)
Knowledge_2	0.038	(0.0256)
Knowledge_3	0.0453	(0.0239)
Knowledge	0.0548 *	(0.0243)
Knowledge	0.075 **	(0.024)
Knowledge	0.0808 **	(0.0262)
Knowledge	0.0773 **	(0.0272)
Knowledge	0.0731 *	(0.0307)
Knowledge	0.1027 *	(0.047)
Knowledge	0.1341 *	(0.0518)
Educationation less than high school	-0.0072	(0.0571)
Educationation high school only	0.0018	(0.0583)
Educationation more than high school	-0.0106	(0.0582)
Educationation still studying	-0.052	(0.0529)
Postcommunistmunist country	0.1611 *	(0.0741)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.42 – *Hypothesis 6, Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Linear left/right placement	-0.0051		(0.0063)
Left/right placement squared	0.0006		(0.0021)
Belgium	0.0358		(0.0266)
The Netherlands	-0.0646	**	(0.0222)
West Germany	0.0212		(0.0271)
Italy	0.1898	***	(0.0362)
Luxembourg	0.0252		(0.0349)
Denmark	-0.147	***	(0.0171)
Ireland	0.0255		(0.0318)
UK	0.0096		(0.0283)
Northern Ireland	0.1442	**	(0.0484)
Greece	0.305	***	(0.0345)
Spain	0.1565	***	(0.0366)
Portugal	0.1836	***	(0.0356)
East Germany	0.0308		(0.0328)
Finland	-0.1411	***	(0.0179)
Sweden	-0.1885	***	(0.0142)
Austria	0.0085		(0.0277)
Cyprus	0.4674	***	(0.0431)
Czech Republic	-0.0601		(0.0592)
Estonia	-0.0109		(0.0692)
Hungary	0.017		(0.0735)
Latvia	0.0655		(0.0802)
Lithuania	0.1059		(0.0881)
Malta	-0.0693		(0.0598)
Poland	0.0178		(0.0739)
Slovakia	-0.1181	*	(0.0466)

Significance levels : * p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.42 – *Hypothesis 6, Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovenia	-0.0924	(0.0524)

Significance levels : * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

I performed the same analysis in 2006, with the overall model coming before the individualized models. Results of both types of models are presented below. Just as in 2011, the one-size-fits-all model has varying degrees of fit and different variables flicker back and forth into significance. Thus, I turned to the more customized models. H2 is somewhat weaker in 2006 than in 2011, in particular with reference to the variables about national economic situation and future of the EU. Perhaps before the financial crisis, respondents were less utilitarian about the economy, since the consequences of interdependence were less clear. Openness to enlargement and globalization are still strong predictors. H3 shows much the same results as in 2011, although we have additional variables to examine that are related to multiple identities. Pride in one's country and in the EU, as well as expressing multiple identities, all go in the expected direction with fairly significant effects, as does identifying as left on the political spectrum. Once again, a poor household financial situation decreases support for supranational immigration policy.

H4 also shows similar results to 2011 data. Knowledge about the EU has a large effect, as well as Education—clearly in the case of environmental policy, more Knowledge leads to a decision that supranational governance is more appropriate. Once again, respondents in post-communist countries do not support EU control. In H5, there are some notable differences. With the exception of the ECJ, trust in specific EU institutions does increase support for an EU defense policy. Living in a post-communist country again significantly increases support. Finally, examining H6, social welfare policy—again, many of the results from 2011 are echoed. Here, however, opinions on the direction of the respondent's country become irrelevant, and variables focusing on a collectivist orientation have more explanatory value. The young and the more moderate politically are more likely to support supranational social welfare, as are the less Educated.

In the appendix, I have provided goodness of fit tables which compare overall models to more customized models using AIC and BIC values (as these models are not nested). In nearly every case, the customized models outperform the overall models. As I mentioned before, r-squared values are different across models and different independent variables become significant or change signs depending on the dependent variable. Thus, there is certainly an argument to be made that different models are required for different dependent variables.

3.6 Discussion

While some specific variables leave a bit to be desired in terms of their utility as proxies, it is clear that the hypotheses have significant merit. First, the idea that different predictors affect different policies is clearly shown to be true. Different characteristics become important with support for different policies. Past literature has largely ignored the differentiated views of integration in certain policy areas in favor of focusing on views toward overall support of integration. Europeans could report opposition to European integration when asked the typical Eurobarometer battery when they do in fact support integration on a number of specific policy issues. Secondly, the characteristics that affect these policies are by and large based on the benefits that can be found from supranational control of those policies. For example, post-Communist countries by and large are very supportive of EU control over most policy areas—with the important exception of the environment (which happens to be one of the most popular areas for supranational control). Why? This may reflect the decades-old struggle between developed and developing countries over environmental standards. Economically struggling countries that received bailout funds are more likely to support EU control of social welfare policy, among others—showing that they believe the EU is more capable of providing support than their national governments, and that they wish to continue the beneficial redistributive relationship

currently occurring in the EU.

This chapter shows, first, that Europeans do understand the benefits of economics of scale and burden-sharing, and assign their preferences to policies where it is more efficient to do so. Secondly, it shows that the particular determinants of their preferences reflect the personal interest and combination of values a particular individual may have to support either national or supranational control of a particular policy area. Some of the proxy variables, however, are imperfect. In the next chapter, I will show through a survey experiment that considering the rational implications of assigning a policy area to supranational control make respondents more likely to support it.

3.7 Appendix

3.7.1 Survey Questions Used: Eurobarometer 66.1, September 2006

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?

Crime

Economic situation

Rising prices/inflation

Taxation

Unemployment

Terrorism

Defence/Foreign Affairs

Housing

Immigration

Healthcare system

The Educational system

Pensions

The environment

Energy

Other

None

DK

For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly within the EU?

Taxation

Tackling unemployment

Fighting terrorism

Defence and foreign affairs

Immigration

Pensions

Protecting the environment

Social welfare

Agriculture and fishery

Support for regions facing economic difficulties

REducationing public debt

How old are you?

Gender

How old were you when you stopped full-time Educationation?

How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy; The situation of the European economy; The situation of the economy in the world; Your personal job situation; The financial situation of your household; The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)

Very good

Rather good

Rather bad

Very bad

DK

What does the EU mean to you personally?

Economic prosperity

Cultural diversity

Social protection

Not enough control at external Border country s

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The (NATIONALITY) Government; The European Union.

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years.

For

Against

DK

A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro

For

Against

DK

Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly Pessimistic about future of EU or very Pessimistic about future of EU about the future of the EU?

Very optimistic

Fairly optimistic

Fairly Pessimistic about future of EU

Very Pessimistic about future of EU

DK

At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in?

(OUR COUNTRY)

The European Union

For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Parliament; The European Commission; The Council of the European Union; The European Central Bank

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

DK

For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false: The EU currently consists of 27 Member States; The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each Member State; Switzerland is a member of the EU.

True

False

DK

With which of the following two statements do you most agree?

The EU should have greater financial means given its political objectives

The EU's political objectives do not justify an increase in the Union's budget

Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree; My voice counts in the EU.

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

DK

And in the following list, what are three most important values for you personally?

Tolerance

Do you ever think of yourself as not only (NATIONALITY) but European? Does that happen often, sometimes, or never?

Often

Sometimes

Never

DK

Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, or not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY)?

Very proud

Fairly proud

Not very proud

Not at all proud

DK

Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, or not at all proud to be European?

Very proud

Fairly proud

Not very proud

Not at all proud

DK

For each of the following achievements of the European Union, could you tell me whether you have benefited from it or not. Working or studying in another EU country.

Yes

No

DK

Which of the following two propositions is the one that is closest to your opinion with regard to globalisation?

Globalisation represents a good opportunity for (NATIONALITY) companies thanks to the opening-up of markets

Globalisation represents a threat to employment or companies in (OUR COUNTRY)

DK

For each of the following propositions, tell me if you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or totally disagree. We need more equality and justice even if that means less freedom for the individual.

Totally agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Totally disagree

DK

In political matters people talk of the left” and the right”. How would you place your views on this scale?

Left-1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10-Right

What is your current occupation?

Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working

Student

Unemployed, temporarily not working
Retired or unable to work due to illness
Self-employed
Farmer
Fisherman
Professional
Owner of a shop, craftsman, other self-employed person
Business proprietor
Employed professional
General management
Middle management
Employed position, working mainly at a desk
Employed position, not at a desk but in a service job
Supervisor
Skilled manual worker
Other unskilled manual worker, servant
Never did any paid work

3.7.2 Survey Questions Used: Eurobarometer 76.3, November 2011

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?

Crime
Economic situation
Rising prices/inflation
Taxation
Unemployment
Terrorism
Defence/Foreign Affairs

Housing

Immigration

Healthcare system

The Educational system

Pensions

The environment

Energy

Other

Done

DK

For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the
(NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly within the EU?

Taxation

Tackling unemployment

Fighting terrorism

Defence and foreign affairs

Immigration

Pensions

Protecting the environment

Social welfare

Agriculture and fishery

Support for regions facing economic difficulties

REducationing public debt

Generally speaking, do you think our country's membership in the EU is a good or
bad thing?

A good thing

A bad thing

Neither good nor bad

DK

How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy; The situation of the European economy; The situation of the economy in the world; Your personal job situation; The financial situation of your household; The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)

Very good

Rather good

Rather bad

Very bad

DK

What does the EU mean to you personally?

Economic prosperity

Cultural diversity

Social protection

Not enough control at external Border country s

In your opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?

The (NATIONALITY) Government

The European Union

The United States

The G20

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Other

None

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The (NATIONALITY) Government; The European Union.

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years.

For

Against

DK

Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly Pessimistic about future of EU or very Pessimistic about future of EU about the future of the EU?

Very optimistic

Fairly optimistic

Fairly Pessimistic about future of EU

Very Pessimistic about future of EU

DK

At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in?

(OUR COUNTRY)

The European Union

For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Parliament; The European Commission; The Council of the European Union; The European Central Bank

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

DK

For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false: The EU currently consists of 27 Member States; The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each Member State; Switzerland is a member of the EU.

True

False

DK

With which of the following two statements do you most agree?

The EU should have greater financial means given its political objectives

The EU's political objectives do not justify an increase in the Union's budget

Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree; My voice counts in the EU.

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

DK

How old are you?

Gender

How old were you when you stopped full-time Educationation?

What is your current occupation?

Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working

Student

Unemployed, temporarily not working

Retired or unable to work due to illness

Self-employed

Farmer

Fisherman

Professional

Owner of a shop, craftsman, other self-employed person

Business proprietor

Employed professional

General management

Middle management

Employed position, working mainly at a desk

Employed position, not at a desk but in a service job

Supervisor

Skilled manual worker

Other unskilled manual worker, servant

Never did any paid work

3.7.3 Goodness of Fit 2011 Models

3.7.4 Goodness of Fit 2006 Models

3.7.5 Head-to-Head Model Comparisons

Table 3.43: Hypothesis 2

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 25268.19	25332.17
Custom model = 20328.09	20437.6

Table 3.44: Hypothesis 3

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 28692.92	28756.82
Custom model = 32765.64	20437.6

Table 3.45: Hypothesis 4

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 26959.84	27023.76
Custom model = 27770.69	27851.02

Table 3.46: Hypothesis 5

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 27051.57	27115.43
Custom model = 11861.3	11954.55

Table 3.47: Hypothesis 6

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 26133.32	26197.24
Custom model = 22149.01	22258.94

Table 3.48: Hypothesis 2

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 23413.15	23476.36
Custom model = 15789.16	15939.83

Table 3.49: Hypothesis 3

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 25686	25749.11
Custom model = 22228.51	22360.46

Table 3.50: Hypothesis 4

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 25518.32	25581.49
Custom model = 20790.29	20882.99

Table 3.51: Hypothesis 5

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 24314.7	24377.8
Custom model = 16213.24	16318.26

Table 3.52: Hypothesis 6

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 23941.74	24004.91
Custom model = 16277.34	16398.17

Table 3.53: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy, H3 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
Border country ==1	-0.042	(0.167)
Household financial situation rather good	-0.091 [†]	(0.055)
Household financial situation rather bad	-0.174**	(0.061)
Household financial situation very bad	-0.342**	(0.073)
Linear age	-0.008**	(0.003)
Age squared	0.003	(0.004)
Gender	-0.041	(0.029)
Knowledge	0.213**	(0.026)
Education	0.193**	(0.021)
Postcommunist	0.664**	(0.213)
bailout	0.542**	(0.179)
Belgium	0.531**	(0.191)
The Netherlands	0.598**	(0.196)
West Germany	0.694**	(0.195)
Italy	0.357**	(0.102)
Luxembourg	0.460*	(0.188)
Denmark	-0.501**	(0.190)
Ireland	0.123	(0.293)
country==9	-0.811**	(0.188)
Northern Ireland	-0.349	(0.219)
Greece	-0.317	(0.203)
Spain	-0.109	(0.201)
Portugal	0.100	(0.206)
East Germany	0.385 [†]	(0.206)
Finland	-0.646**	(0.190)
Sweden	-0.081	(0.191)
Austria	-0.326 [†]	(0.191)
Cyprus	0.959**	(0.218)
Czech Republic	-1.012**	(0.269)
Estonia	-0.612*	(0.269)
Hungary	-0.265	(0.271)
Latvia	0.154	(0.274)
Lithuania	0.304	(0.276)
Malta	0.307	(0.286)
Poland	-0.306	(0.272)
Slovakia	-0.665*	(0.270)
Slovenia	-0.965**	(0.269)
Bulgaria	-0.119	(0.273)
Romania	-0.534*	(0.271)
Intercept	-0.043	(0.214)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-10.768	(6.753)
<hr/>		
N	25473	
Log-likelihood	-14421.381	
$\chi^2_{(39)}$	1408.868	
<hr/>		
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.54: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy,
H4 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
EU future fairly optimistic	0.058	(0.085)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.407 **	(0.087)
EU future very pessimistic	-1.011 **	(0.095)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.185 **	(0.044)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.240 **	(0.044)
Education less than high school	-0.056	(0.193)
Education high school only	0.167	(0.192)
Education more than high school	0.363 †	(0.193)
Education still studying	0.295	(0.206)
Linear age	-0.014 **	(0.004)
Age squared	0.011 *	(0.005)
Gender	-0.034	(0.031)
Knowledge	0.112 **	(0.028)
Postcommunist	0.676 **	(0.239)
bailout	0.445 *	(0.180)
Belgium	0.487 **	(0.110)
The Netherlands	0.629 **	(0.114)
West Germany	0.709 **	(0.116)
Italy	0.312 **	(0.112)
Luxembourg	0.490 **	(0.143)
Denmark	-0.546 **	(0.103)
Ireland	0.166	(0.204)
country==9	-0.684 **	(0.103)
Northern Ireland	-0.318 *	(0.155)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.54 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy, H4 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Greece	-0.219		(0.206)
Spain	-0.088		(0.204)
Portugal	0.127		(0.212)
East Germany	0.431	**	(0.132)
Finland	-0.602	**	(0.101)
Sweden	-0.083		(0.104)
Austria	-0.328	**	(0.103)
Cyprus	1.098	**	(0.161)
Czech Republic	-0.996	**	(0.259)
Estonia	-0.708	**	(0.260)
Hungary	-0.223		(0.262)
Latvia	0.094		(0.267)
Lithuania	0.145		(0.267)
Malta	0.338		(0.290)
Poland	-0.470	†	(0.263)
Slovakia	-0.691	**	(0.260)
Slovenia	-1.007	**	(0.260)
Bulgaria	-0.411		(0.266)
Romania	-0.718	**	(0.263)
Intercept	0.365		(0.246)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u			
Intercept	-7.585		(5.071)
N	22926		
Log-likelihood	-12560.955		
$\chi^2_{(43)}$	1773.759		
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%

Table 3.55: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy, H5 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
EU future fairly optimistic	-0.005	(0.128)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.352**	(0.132)
EU future very pessimistic	-0.804**	(0.147)
Defense important national issue	-0.077	(0.214)
Trust EU	0.349**	(0.067)
Trust European Parliament	0.150*	(0.073)
Trust European Central Bank	0.124 [†]	(0.067)
Linear age	-0.014*	(0.005)
Age squared	0.012	(0.008)
Gender	0.029	(0.048)
Knowledge	0.029	(0.044)
Education	0.121**	(0.034)
Postcommunist	0.430	(0.384)
bailout	0.246	(0.281)
Belgium	0.388*	(0.170)
The Netherlands	0.608**	(0.180)
West Germany	0.486**	(0.177)
Italy	0.170	(0.178)
Luxembourg	0.398 [†]	(0.221)
Denmark	-0.624**	(0.162)
Ireland	0.516	(0.323)
country==9	-0.557**	(0.165)
Northern Ireland	-0.059	(0.230)
Greece	-0.048	(0.317)
Spain	0.036	(0.314)
Portugal	0.216	(0.325)
East Germany	0.313	(0.201)
Finland	-0.706**	(0.158)
Sweden	-0.113	(0.161)
Austria	-0.283 [†]	(0.160)
Cyprus	1.153**	(0.265)
Czech Republic	-0.829*	(0.412)
Estonia	-0.482	(0.417)
Hungary	-0.068	(0.417)
Latvia	0.296	(0.426)
Lithuania	0.317	(0.427)
Malta	0.697	(0.495)
Poland	-0.362	(0.420)
Slovakia	-0.473	(0.414)
Slovenia	-0.846*	(0.414)
Bulgaria	-0.235	(0.425)
Romania	-0.639	(0.419)
Intercept	0.285	(0.250)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-5.075	(11.677)
N	9738	
Log-likelihood	-5341.906	
$\chi^2_{(42)}$	645.764	

Table 3.56: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy, H6 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.247**	(0.041)
EU should have bigger budget_1	0.319**	(0.038)
Trust national government	0.169**	(0.040)
Open to enlargement==1	0.354**	(0.037)
Linear age	-0.010*	(0.004)
Age squared	0.007	(0.005)
Gender	-0.035	(0.034)
Knowledge	0.118**	(0.031)
Education	0.156**	(0.024)
Postcommunist	0.502 [†]	(0.286)
bailout	0.417	(0.276)
west	0.210	(0.254)
south	0.024	(0.248)
Belgium	0.510**	(0.115)
The Netherlands	0.625**	(0.122)
West Germany	0.746**	(0.124)
Italy	0.270	(0.275)
Luxembourg	0.545**	(0.160)
Denmark	-0.413**	(0.109)
Ireland	0.464	(0.295)
country==9	-0.500 [†]	(0.272)
Northern Ireland	-0.003	(0.294)
Greece	-0.139	(0.282)
Spain	0.106	(0.282)
Portugal	0.046	(0.285)
East Germany	0.339*	(0.140)
Finland	-0.447	(0.273)
Sweden	0.152	(0.273)
Austria	-0.197 [†]	(0.111)
Cyprus	1.467**	(0.323)
Czech Republic	-0.655*	(0.323)
Estonia	-0.252	(0.326)
Hungary	-0.091	(0.327)
Latvia	0.517	(0.330)
Lithuania	0.664*	(0.337)
Malta	1.019*	(0.413)
Poland	-0.137	(0.329)
Slovakia	-0.350	(0.324)
Slovenia	-0.593 [†]	(0.325)
Bulgaria	0.041	(0.336)
Romania	-0.355	(0.331)
Intercept	-0.486 [†]	(0.292)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-5.933	(9.494)
N		
		19109
Log-likelihood		-10618.767
$\chi^2_{(41)}$		1227.886
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.57: Hypothesis 2 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 24462.64	24782.53
Custom model = 19788.82	20156.45
H3 model = 28924.76	29258.72
H4 model = 25211.91	25573.71
H5 model = 10771.81	11087.9
H6 model = 21323.53	21661.42

Table 3.58: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, H2 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
National economic situation rather good	0.010	(0.103)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.054	(0.107)
National economic situation very bad	-0.024	(0.113)
US should act in crisis	0.448 **	(0.071)
G20 should act in crisis	0.654 **	(0.050)
IMF should act in crisis	0.643 **	(0.052)
EU should act in crisis	0.863 **	(0.048)
Trust national government	0.082 *	(0.038)
Open to enlargement==1	0.456 **	(0.035)
Linear age	0.004	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.006	(0.005)
Gender	0.063 †	(0.033)
Knowledge	0.174 **	(0.030)
Education	0.099 **	(0.023)
Postcommunist	0.679 **	(0.247)
bailout	0.468 *	(0.212)
west	0.385 †	(0.223)
Belgium	-0.317 **	(0.113)
The Netherlands	-0.814 **	(0.113)
West Germany	-0.230 †	(0.123)
Italy	-0.033	(0.130)
Luxembourg	-0.861 **	(0.143)
Denmark	-1.527 **	(0.113)
Ireland	-1.072 **	(0.220)
country==9	-1.363 **	(0.247)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.58 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, H2 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Northern Ireland	-0.990 **	(0.273)
Greece	-1.102 **	(0.227)
Spain	-0.279	(0.226)
Portugal	-0.693 **	(0.230)
East Germany	-0.464 **	(0.141)
Finland	-1.877 **	(0.251)
Sweden	-1.089 **	(0.248)
Austria	-1.758 **	(0.126)
Cyprus	-0.042	(0.264)
Czech Republic	-1.325 **	(0.285)
Estonia	-1.777 **	(0.286)
Hungary	-0.765 **	(0.287)
Latvia	-0.702 *	(0.287)
Lithuania	-0.780 **	(0.288)
Malta	0.219	(0.320)
Poland	-0.718 *	(0.290)
Slovakia	-0.726 *	(0.286)
Slovenia	-0.646 *	(0.290)
Bulgaria	-0.090	(0.297)
Romania	-0.378	(0.290)
Intercept	-0.516 †	(0.288)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-5.119	(6.166)
N	18308	
Log-likelihood	-11067.147	
$\chi^2_{(45)}$	1868.007	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.58 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, H2 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient			(Std. Err.)
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	

Table 3.59: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, H4 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
EU future fairly optimistic	-0.079	(0.078)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.505 **	(0.080)
EU future very pessimistic	-1.007 **	(0.090)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.213 **	(0.040)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.244 **	(0.040)
Education less than high school	-0.153	(0.192)
Education high school only	-0.029	(0.191)
Education more than high school	0.144	(0.191)
Education still studying	-0.138	(0.202)
Linear age	-0.003	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.002	(0.005)
Gender	0.019	(0.029)
Knowledge	0.133 **	(0.027)
Postcommunist	0.580 **	(0.198)
bailout	0.238	(0.149)
Belgium	-0.183 †	(0.105)
The Netherlands	-0.703 **	(0.103)
West Germany	-0.299 **	(0.107)
Italy	0.201 †	(0.116)
Luxembourg	-0.752 **	(0.126)
Denmark	-1.460 **	(0.104)
Ireland	-1.224 **	(0.176)
country==9	-1.694 **	(0.109)
Northern Ireland	-1.303 **	(0.155)
Greece	-1.079 **	(0.179)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.59 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, H4 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Spain	-0.409	*	(0.179)
Portugal	-0.456	*	(0.185)
East Germany	-0.329	**	(0.125)
Finland	-2.069	**	(0.109)
Sweden	-1.335	**	(0.103)
Austria	-1.757	**	(0.108)
Cyprus	-0.281	*	(0.130)
Czech Republic	-1.367	**	(0.222)
Estonia	-2.004	**	(0.223)
Hungary	-0.728	**	(0.224)
Latvia	-0.971	**	(0.224)
Lithuania	-0.901	**	(0.224)
Malta	-0.040		(0.252)
Poland	-0.809	**	(0.226)
Slovakia	-0.783	**	(0.223)
Slovenia	-0.888	**	(0.224)
Bulgaria	-0.255		(0.233)
Romania	-0.756	**	(0.227)
Intercept	0.994	**	(0.242)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u			
Intercept	-5.442		(6.543)
N	22711		
Log-likelihood	-13873.589		
$\chi^2_{(43)}$	2274.582		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%			
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%			

Table 3.60: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, H5 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
EU future fairly optimistic	-0.145	(0.118)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.483**	(0.123)
EU future very pessimistic	-0.976**	(0.140)
Defense important national issue	-0.298	(0.202)
Trust EU	0.197**	(0.063)
Trust European Parliament	0.152*	(0.070)
Trust European Central Bank	0.144*	(0.064)
Linear age	0.006	(0.005)
Age squared	-0.012	(0.007)
Gender	0.063	(0.046)
Knowledge	0.088*	(0.042)
Education	0.096**	(0.033)
Postcommunist	0.716*	(0.346)
bailout	0.108	(0.243)
Belgium	-0.253	(0.170)
The Netherlands	-0.983**	(0.167)
West Germany	-0.428*	(0.173)
Italy	-0.175	(0.185)
Luxembourg	-0.744**	(0.203)
Denmark	-1.694**	(0.170)
Ireland	-1.290**	(0.287)
country==9	-1.748**	(0.181)
Northern Ireland	-1.377**	(0.234)
Greece	-1.047**	(0.288)
Spain	-0.383	(0.288)
Portugal	-0.489 [†]	(0.294)
East Germany	-0.346 [†]	(0.202)
Finland	-2.310**	(0.176)
Sweden	-1.565**	(0.167)
Austria	-1.939**	(0.174)
Cyprus	-0.473*	(0.210)
Czech Republic	-1.642**	(0.381)
Estonia	-2.408**	(0.386)
Hungary	-1.030**	(0.384)
Latvia	-1.090**	(0.386)
Lithuania	-1.133**	(0.386)
Malta	-0.222	(0.451)
Poland	-1.076**	(0.389)
Slovakia	-1.036**	(0.384)
Slovenia	-1.258**	(0.383)
Bulgaria	-0.776*	(0.395)
Romania	-1.159**	(0.389)
Intercept	1.067**	(0.245)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-2.217**	(0.678)
N	9666	
Log-likelihood	-5907.809	
$\chi^2_{(42)}$	873.386	

Table 3.61: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy, H6 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.259**	(0.038)
EU should have bigger budget_1	0.319**	(0.035)
Trust national government	0.042	(0.038)
Open to enlargement==1	0.457**	(0.035)
Linear age	0.004	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.009†	(0.005)
Gender	0.018	(0.032)
Knowledge	0.173**	(0.030)
Education	0.100**	(0.022)
Postcommunist	0.669**	(0.244)
bailout	0.431†	(0.239)
west	0.242	(0.222)
south	0.087	(0.211)
Belgium	-0.228*	(0.110)
The Netherlands	-0.687**	(0.110)
West Germany	-0.194†	(0.115)
Italy	0.013	(0.245)
Luxembourg	-0.692**	(0.140)
Denmark	-1.357**	(0.111)
Ireland	-1.180**	(0.251)
country==9	-1.478**	(0.245)
Northern Ireland	-1.071**	(0.267)
Greece	-1.270**	(0.241)
Spain	-0.457†	(0.242)
Portugal	-0.703**	(0.245)
East Germany	-0.395**	(0.135)
Finland	-1.816**	(0.248)
Sweden	-1.119**	(0.243)
Austria	-1.763**	(0.117)
Cyprus	-0.200	(0.263)
Czech Republic	-1.222**	(0.283)
Estonia	-1.818**	(0.285)
Hungary	-0.906**	(0.286)
Latvia	-0.696*	(0.285)
Lithuania	-0.782**	(0.289)
Malta	0.155	(0.352)
Poland	-0.847**	(0.288)
Slovakia	-0.698*	(0.285)
Slovenia	-0.787**	(0.285)
Bulgaria	-0.071	(0.301)
Romania	-0.640*	(0.293)
Intercept	-0.090	(0.262)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-5.346	(7.500)
N 18994		
Log-likelihood		-11688.194
$\chi^2_{(41)}$		1807.326
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.62: Hypothesis 3 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 26984.27	27303.78
Custom model = 31456.11	31789.5
H2 model = 22228.29	22595.6
H4 model = 27837.18	28198.55
H5 model = 11903.62	12219.38
H6 model = 23462.39	23800.02

Table 3.63: Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy by H2

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Views on environmental policy		
National economic situation rather good	0.044	(0.118)
National economic situation rather bad	0.123	(0.121)
National economic situation very bad	0.125	(0.126)
US should act in crisis	0.588 **	(0.072)
G20 should act in crisis	0.785 **	(0.051)
IMF should act in crisis	0.804 **	(0.053)
EU should act in crisis	0.899 **	(0.048)
Trust national government	0.095 *	(0.040)
Open to enlargement==1	0.259 **	(0.036)
Linear age	-0.003	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.002	(0.005)
Gender	0.022	(0.034)
Knowledge	0.171 **	(0.031)
Education	0.212 **	(0.024)
Postcommunist	0.136	(0.266)
bailout	0.497 *	(0.237)
west	0.329	(0.254)
Belgium	-0.141	(0.121)
The Netherlands	0.038	(0.128)
West Germany	0.891 **	(0.153)
Italy	-0.721 **	(0.127)
Luxembourg	-0.188	(0.159)
Denmark	-0.230 †	(0.123)
Ireland	-1.198 **	(0.243)
country==9	-0.613 *	(0.275)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.63 – *Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy by H2 - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Northern Ireland	-0.284		(0.301)
Greece	-0.769	**	(0.252)
Spain	-0.166		(0.250)
Portugal	-0.834	**	(0.253)
East Germany	0.820	**	(0.180)
Finland	-0.826	**	(0.278)
Sweden	0.253		(0.281)
Austria	-0.675	**	(0.128)
Cyprus	0.662	*	(0.306)
Czech Republic	-0.468		(0.304)
Estonia	-0.812	**	(0.304)
Hungary	-0.274		(0.305)
Latvia	-0.654	*	(0.304)
Lithuania	-0.750	*	(0.304)
Malta	-1.024	**	(0.318)
Poland	-0.520	†	(0.306)
Slovakia	-0.641	*	(0.303)
Slovenia	-0.665	*	(0.306)
Bulgaria	-0.542	†	(0.308)
Romania	-0.839	**	(0.305)
Intercept	-0.730	*	(0.320)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u			
Intercept	-3.271	**	(0.977)
N	18348		
Log-likelihood	-10609.595		
$\chi^2_{(45)}$	1321.148		

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.63 – *Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy by H2 - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient			(Std. Err.)
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	

Table 3.64: Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy, H3 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Views on environmental policy		
Border country ==1	-0.066	(0.160)
Household financial situation rather good	0.004	(0.055)
Household financial situation rather bad	-0.100 [†]	(0.061)
Household financial situation very bad	-0.190**	(0.072)
Linear age	-0.002	(0.003)
Age squared	-0.006	(0.004)
Gender	-0.011	(0.028)
Knowledge	0.187**	(0.025)
Education	0.213**	(0.020)
Postcommunist	0.250	(0.198)
bailout	0.314 [†]	(0.168)
Belgium	-0.102	(0.187)
The Netherlands	0.023	(0.193)
West Germany	0.733**	(0.200)
Italy	-0.420**	(0.105)
Luxembourg	-0.212	(0.182)
Denmark	-0.154	(0.192)
Ireland	-1.275**	(0.279)
country==9	-1.218**	(0.186)
Northern Ireland	-0.761**	(0.218)
Greece	-0.879**	(0.195)
Spain	-0.302	(0.195)
Portugal	-0.688**	(0.196)
East Germany	0.669**	(0.218)
Finland	-1.099**	(0.187)
Sweden	-0.210	(0.190)
Austria	-0.869**	(0.189)
Cyprus	0.182	(0.209)
Czech Republic	-0.810**	(0.259)
Estonia	-1.187**	(0.258)
Hungary	-0.508 [†]	(0.260)
Latvia	-1.017**	(0.259)
Lithuania	-0.928**	(0.259)
Malta	-1.454**	(0.265)
Poland	-0.761**	(0.260)
Slovakia	-0.889**	(0.259)
Slovenia	-1.171**	(0.259)
Bulgaria	-0.757**	(0.260)
Romania	-1.291**	(0.259)
Intercept	0.503*	(0.210)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-4.164**	(1.545)
N 25231		
Log-likelihood	-15171.748	
$\chi^2_{(39)}$	1322.747	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.65: Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy, H5 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Views on environmental policy		
EU future fairly optimistic	0.083	(0.115)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.074	(0.120)
EU future very pessimistic	-0.615**	(0.136)
Defense important national issue	-0.110	(0.209)
Trust EU	0.159*	(0.065)
Trust European Parliament	0.216**	(0.073)
Trust European Central Bank	0.131*	(0.067)
Linear age	-0.005	(0.005)
Age squared	0.001	(0.007)
Gender	0.020	(0.047)
Knowledge	0.128**	(0.043)
Education	0.185**	(0.033)
Postcommunist	0.201	(0.360)
bailout	-0.071	(0.259)
Belgium	-0.181	(0.184)
The Netherlands	-0.072	(0.191)
West Germany	0.567**	(0.213)
Italy	-0.998**	(0.185)
Luxembourg	-0.238	(0.230)
Denmark	-0.383*	(0.189)
Ireland	-1.157**	(0.302)
country==9	-1.163**	(0.180)
Northern Ireland	-0.710**	(0.242)
Greece	-0.756*	(0.305)
Spain	-0.320	(0.305)
Portugal	-0.508	(0.311)
East Germany	0.596*	(0.249)
Finland	-1.278**	(0.173)
Sweden	-0.378*	(0.182)
Austria	-1.026**	(0.175)
Cyprus	0.062	(0.243)
Czech Republic	-0.908*	(0.397)
Estonia	-1.503**	(0.399)
Hungary	-0.791*	(0.399)
Latvia	-1.119**	(0.400)
Lithuania	-1.518**	(0.398)
Malta	-1.521**	(0.428)
Poland	-1.078**	(0.402)
Slovakia	-1.115**	(0.397)
Slovenia	-1.338**	(0.397)
Bulgaria	-1.155**	(0.404)
Romania	-1.666**	(0.401)
Intercept	0.573*	(0.250)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-2.477**	(0.825)
N	9680	
Log-likelihood	-5679.676	
$\chi^2_{(42)}$	630.947	

Table 3.66: Hypothesis 4: Environmental Policy, H6 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Views on environmental policy		
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.141**	(0.039)
EU should have bigger budget_1	0.160**	(0.036)
Trust national government	0.071 [†]	(0.039)
Open to enlargement==1	0.273**	(0.036)
Linear age	-0.001	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.006	(0.005)
Gender	-0.009	(0.032)
Knowledge	0.173**	(0.030)
Education	0.232**	(0.023)
Postcommunist	0.120	(0.266)
bailout	0.539*	(0.262)
west	0.207	(0.249)
south	-0.258	(0.221)
Belgium	-0.091	(0.117)
The Netherlands	0.113	(0.125)
West Germany	0.730**	(0.140)
Italy	-0.377	(0.251)
Luxembourg	-0.115	(0.155)
Denmark	-0.105	(0.122)
Ireland	-1.414**	(0.263)
country==9	-0.826**	(0.269)
Northern Ireland	-0.375	(0.293)
Greece	-0.756**	(0.264)
Spain	-0.055	(0.265)
Portugal	-0.640*	(0.266)
East Germany	0.834**	(0.174)
Finland	-0.845**	(0.271)
Sweden	0.046	(0.272)
Austria	-0.819**	(0.116)
Cyprus	0.595*	(0.303)
Czech Republic	-0.415	(0.303)
Estonia	-0.871**	(0.303)
Hungary	-0.384	(0.305)
Latvia	-0.685*	(0.303)
Lithuania	-0.770*	(0.306)
Malta	-1.112**	(0.329)
Poland	-0.582 [†]	(0.306)
Slovakia	-0.565 [†]	(0.303)
Slovenia	-0.826**	(0.303)
Bulgaria	-0.624*	(0.311)
Romania	-1.121**	(0.308)
Intercept	-0.028	(0.287)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-4.454	(3.014)
N	19019	
Log-likelihood	-11350.565	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	1074.619	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.67: Hypothesis 4 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 26059.03	26378.64
Custom model = 26927.02	27288.5
H2 model = 21313.19	21680.6
H3 model = 30425.5	30759.06
H5 model = 11447.35	11763.18
H6 model = 22787.13	23124.82

Table 3.68: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy, H2 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
National economic situation rather good	0.004	(0.109)
National economic situation rather bad	0.042	(0.113)
National economic situation very bad	0.011	(0.118)
US should act in crisis	0.572 **	(0.074)
G20 should act in crisis	0.646 **	(0.051)
IMF should act in crisis	0.674 **	(0.053)
EU should act in crisis	0.846 **	(0.048)
Trust national government	-0.026	(0.040)
Open to enlargement==1	0.340 **	(0.037)
Linear age	0.000	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.003	(0.005)
Gender	0.032	(0.034)
Knowledge	0.094 **	(0.031)
Education	0.040 †	(0.024)
Postcommunist	0.966 **	(0.275)
bailout	0.286	(0.222)
west	0.316	(0.239)
Belgium	-0.224 †	(0.123)
The Netherlands	-0.971 **	(0.119)
West Germany	-0.007	(0.136)
Italy	-0.530 **	(0.133)
Luxembourg	0.073	(0.169)
Denmark	-1.045 **	(0.118)
Ireland	-0.735 **	(0.246)
country==9	-1.475 **	(0.263)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.68 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy, H2 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Northern Ireland	-1.212 **	(0.286)
Greece	-1.109 **	(0.253)
Spain	-0.143	(0.254)
Portugal	-0.920 **	(0.255)
East Germany	-0.010	(0.159)
Finland	-2.416 **	(0.269)
Sweden	-1.223 **	(0.264)
Austria	-0.839 **	(0.129)
Cyprus	-0.146	(0.283)
Czech Republic	-1.061 **	(0.326)
Estonia	-1.072 **	(0.326)
Hungary	-1.233 **	(0.326)
Latvia	-0.861 **	(0.328)
Lithuania	-0.899 **	(0.329)
Malta	-0.409	(0.354)
Poland	-1.411 **	(0.328)
Slovakia	-0.933 **	(0.327)
Slovenia	-1.021 **	(0.330)
Bulgaria	-1.172 **	(0.330)
Romania	-1.289 **	(0.327)
Intercept	0.154	(0.307)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-11.911	(18.220)
N	18250	
Log-likelihood	-10379.196	
$\chi^2_{(45)}$	1922.529	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.68 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy, H2 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient			(Std. Err.)
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	

Table 3.69: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy, H3 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
Border country ==1	-0.049	(0.162)
Household financial situation rather good	-0.055	(0.053)
Household financial situation rather bad	-0.157**	(0.060)
Household financial situation very bad	-0.283**	(0.071)
Linear age	-0.002	(0.003)
Age squared	-0.004	(0.004)
Gender	0.000	(0.029)
Knowledge	0.138**	(0.025)
Education	0.067**	(0.020)
Postcommunist	0.989**	(0.210)
bailout	0.218	(0.168)
Belgium	-0.047	(0.189)
The Netherlands	-0.873**	(0.189)
West Germany	-0.047	(0.192)
Italy	-0.117	(0.109)
Luxembourg	0.076	(0.189)
Denmark	-0.875**	(0.190)
Ireland	-0.931**	(0.280)
country==9	-1.810**	(0.188)
Northern Ireland	-1.377**	(0.218)
Greece	-1.138**	(0.194)
Spain	-0.217	(0.196)
Portugal	-0.796**	(0.196)
East Germany	0.068	(0.208)
Finland	-2.601**	(0.194)
Sweden	-1.506**	(0.189)
Austria	-0.999**	(0.190)
Cyprus	-0.486*	(0.201)
Czech Republic	-1.128**	(0.273)
Estonia	-1.226**	(0.272)
Hungary	-1.273**	(0.273)
Latvia	-1.132**	(0.273)
Lithuania	-0.989**	(0.274)
Malta	-0.654*	(0.288)
Poland	-1.436**	(0.273)
Slovakia	-1.001**	(0.274)
Slovenia	-1.323**	(0.273)
Bulgaria	-1.190**	(0.274)
Romania	-1.533**	(0.272)
Intercept	0.962**	(0.212)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-8.726*	(4.032)
N 24970		
Log-likelihood	-14751.355	
$\chi^2_{(39)}$	2015.777	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.70: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy, H4 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
EU future fairly optimistic	-0.051	(0.082)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.492 **	(0.084)
EU future very pessimistic	-1.099 **	(0.093)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.157 **	(0.042)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.134 **	(0.042)
Education less than high school	-0.219	(0.199)
Education high school only	-0.069	(0.199)
Education more than high school	-0.024	(0.200)
Education still studying	-0.158	(0.211)
Linear age	-0.005	(0.004)
Age squared	0.002	(0.005)
Gender	0.004	(0.030)
Knowledge	0.073 **	(0.028)
Postcommunist	0.906 **	(0.230)
bailout	0.103	(0.165)
Belgium	-0.085	(0.115)
The Netherlands	-0.869 **	(0.108)
West Germany	0.004	(0.119)
Italy	-0.222 †	(0.119)
Luxembourg	0.062	(0.149)
Denmark	-0.975 **	(0.110)
Ireland	-0.907 **	(0.192)
country==9	-1.708 **	(0.111)
Northern Ireland	-1.310 **	(0.156)
Greece	-1.011 **	(0.195)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.70 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy, H4 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Spain	-0.165		(0.198)
Portugal	-0.764	**	(0.200)
East Germany	0.121		(0.142)
Finland	-2.600	**	(0.116)
Sweden	-1.531	**	(0.107)
Austria	-0.975	**	(0.109)
Cyprus	-0.420	**	(0.136)
Czech Republic	-1.043	**	(0.256)
Estonia	-1.291	**	(0.256)
Hungary	-1.223	**	(0.255)
Latvia	-1.127	**	(0.257)
Lithuania	-1.095	**	(0.257)
Malta	-0.606	*	(0.282)
Poland	-1.579	**	(0.256)
Slovakia	-0.904	**	(0.257)
Slovenia	-1.276	**	(0.256)
Bulgaria	-1.273	**	(0.259)
Romania	-1.638	**	(0.257)
Intercept	1.483	**	(0.253)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u			
Intercept	-8.851	†	(4.811)
N			
22603			
Log-likelihood			
-13035.496			
$\chi^2_{(43)}$			
2262.175			
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%			
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%			

Table 3.71: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy, H6 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.193**	(0.039)
EU should have bigger budget_1	0.289**	(0.037)
Trust national government	-0.013	(0.039)
Open to enlargement==1	0.356**	(0.036)
Linear age	0.002	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.007	(0.005)
Gender	0.017	(0.033)
Knowledge	0.095**	(0.031)
Education	0.056*	(0.023)
Postcommunist	1.008**	(0.280)
bailout	0.148	(0.252)
west	0.221	(0.237)
south	0.173	(0.237)
Belgium	-0.040	(0.119)
The Netherlands	-0.790**	(0.115)
West Germany	0.008	(0.125)
Italy	-0.472†	(0.268)
Luxembourg	0.187	(0.164)
Denmark	-0.838**	(0.115)
Ireland	-0.595*	(0.275)
country==9	-1.519**	(0.259)
Northern Ireland	-1.111**	(0.280)
Greece	-1.168**	(0.274)
Spain	-0.148	(0.277)
Portugal	-0.802**	(0.277)
East Germany	0.091	(0.151)
Finland	-2.300**	(0.264)
Sweden	-1.241**	(0.258)
Austria	-0.884**	(0.116)
Cyprus	-0.124	(0.281)
Czech Republic	-0.951**	(0.328)
Estonia	-1.076**	(0.328)
Hungary	-1.269**	(0.329)
Latvia	-0.859**	(0.329)
Lithuania	-0.770*	(0.334)
Malta	-0.642†	(0.375)
Poland	-1.520**	(0.329)
Slovakia	-0.815*	(0.329)
Slovenia	-1.145**	(0.328)
Bulgaria	-1.195**	(0.335)
Romania	-1.444**	(0.333)
Intercept	0.516†	(0.278)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-9.571	(6.122)
N	18933	
Log-likelihood	-11058.269	
$\chi^2_{(41)}$	1781.495	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.72: Hypothesis 5 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 25410.98	25730.31
Custom model = 11202.25	11517.87
H2 model = 26160.99	26522.15
H3 model =20852.39	21219.55
H4 model = 29584.71	29917.85
H6 model =22202.54	22540.03

Table 3.73: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy, H2 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
National economic situation rather good	-0.148	(0.114)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.131	(0.117)
National economic situation very bad	-0.169	(0.122)
US should act in crisis	0.677 **	(0.076)
G20 should act in crisis	0.593 **	(0.056)
IMF should act in crisis	0.632 **	(0.058)
EU should act in crisis	0.895 **	(0.052)
Trust national government	-0.012	(0.041)
Open to enlargement==1	0.401 **	(0.036)
Linear age	-0.007 †	(0.004)
Age squared	0.006	(0.005)
Gender	-0.137 **	(0.034)
Knowledge	-0.009	(0.032)
Education	0.042 †	(0.024)
Postcommunist	0.509 *	(0.254)
bailout	0.367	(0.235)
west	0.499 *	(0.254)
Belgium	0.123	(0.119)
The Netherlands	-0.188	(0.126)
West Germany	0.575 **	(0.127)
Italy	0.932 **	(0.124)
Luxembourg	0.057	(0.156)
Denmark	-0.918 **	(0.144)
Ireland	-0.199	(0.249)
country==9	0.484 †	(0.279)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.73 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy, H2 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Northern Ireland	0.546 †	(0.309)
Greece	0.990 **	(0.247)
Spain	0.584 *	(0.244)
Portugal	1.101 **	(0.248)
East Germany	0.115	(0.155)
Finland	-0.589 *	(0.295)
Sweden	-0.520 †	(0.290)
Austria	-0.062	(0.141)
Cyprus	2.061 **	(0.290)
Czech Republic	0.383	(0.289)
Estonia	0.547 †	(0.290)
Hungary	1.037 **	(0.288)
Latvia	1.094 **	(0.289)
Lithuania	1.118 **	(0.289)
Malta	-0.164	(0.316)
Poland	0.730 *	(0.290)
Slovakia	0.842 **	(0.288)
Slovenia	0.438	(0.291)
Bulgaria	0.822 **	(0.292)
Romania	0.686 *	(0.291)
Intercept	-2.427 **	(0.322)
Equation 2 : lnsg2u		
Intercept	-9.299	(6.885)
N	18342	
Log-likelihood	-10273.712	
$\chi^2_{(45)}$	1796.069	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.73 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy, H2 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient			(Std. Err.)
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%	

Table 3.74: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy, H3 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
Border country ==1	0.235	(0.161)
Household financial situation rather good	-0.106 [†]	(0.060)
Household financial situation rather bad	-0.110 [†]	(0.065)
Household financial situation very bad	-0.025	(0.076)
Linear age	-0.004	(0.003)
Age squared	-0.001	(0.005)
Gender	-0.145**	(0.029)
Knowledge	0.019	(0.025)
Education	0.090**	(0.020)
Postcommunist	0.606**	(0.184)
bailout	-0.013	(0.173)
Belgium	0.456*	(0.186)
The Netherlands	0.063	(0.193)
West Germany	0.781**	(0.188)
Italy	0.935**	(0.104)
Luxembourg	0.220	(0.183)
Denmark	-0.671**	(0.205)
Ireland	0.019	(0.292)
country==9	0.044	(0.193)
Northern Ireland	0.441 [†]	(0.228)
Greece	0.791**	(0.199)
Spain	0.508*	(0.197)
Portugal	1.213**	(0.199)
East Germany	0.276	(0.206)
Finland	-0.762**	(0.208)
Sweden	-0.765**	(0.207)
Austria	-0.004	(0.197)
Cyprus	1.752**	(0.198)
Czech Republic	0.091	(0.251)
Estonia	0.304	(0.250)
Hungary	0.827**	(0.250)
Latvia	0.749**	(0.250)
Lithuania	0.893**	(0.250)
Malta	-0.461 [†]	(0.267)
Poland	0.518*	(0.251)
Slovakia	0.635*	(0.250)
Slovenia	0.141	(0.251)
Bulgaria	0.657**	(0.251)
Romania	0.335	(0.251)
Intercept	-1.576**	(0.214)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-10.524*	(5.010)
N	25230	
Log-likelihood	-14524.804	
$\chi^2_{(39)}$	1829.869	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.75: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy, H4 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
EU future fairly optimistic	-0.274 **	(0.072)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.682 **	(0.075)
EU future very pessimistic	-0.908 **	(0.089)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.097 *	(0.041)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.209 **	(0.040)
Education less than high school	0.066	(0.213)
Education high school only	0.095	(0.213)
Education more than high school	0.161	(0.213)
Education still studying	0.204	(0.223)
Linear age	-0.005	(0.004)
Age squared	0.001	(0.005)
Gender	-0.116 **	(0.031)
Knowledge	-0.049 †	(0.028)
Postcommunist	0.566 **	(0.193)
bailout	0.054	(0.160)
Belgium	0.180	(0.112)
The Netherlands	-0.168	(0.118)
West Germany	0.534 **	(0.112)
Italy	0.910 **	(0.112)
Luxembourg	0.051	(0.140)
Denmark	-1.011 **	(0.138)
Ireland	-0.270	(0.193)
country==9	-0.076	(0.122)
Northern Ireland	0.175	(0.173)
Greece	0.802 **	(0.190)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.75 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy, H4 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Spain	0.440 *	(0.189)
Portugal	1.088 **	(0.194)
East Germany	0.078	(0.139)
Finland	-0.992 **	(0.140)
Sweden	-1.023 **	(0.140)
Austria	-0.293 *	(0.124)
Cyprus	1.584 **	(0.130)
Czech Republic	-0.062	(0.221)
Estonia	0.020	(0.221)
Hungary	0.680 **	(0.220)
Latvia	0.477 *	(0.220)
Lithuania	0.594 **	(0.220)
Malta	-0.805 **	(0.249)
Poland	0.186	(0.221)
Slovakia	0.427 †	(0.219)
Slovenia	-0.097	(0.221)
Bulgaria	0.297	(0.222)
Romania	0.047	(0.222)
Intercept	-0.799 **	(0.262)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-6.511	(4.739)
N	22747	
Log-likelihood	-12924.423	
$\chi^2_{(43)}$	1925.212	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.76: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy, H6 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
EU future fairly optimistic	-0.258*	(0.108)
EU future fairly pessimistic	-0.564**	(0.115)
EU future very pessimistic	-0.761**	(0.138)
Defense important national issue	-0.214	(0.216)
Trust EU	0.170**	(0.065)
Trust European Parliament	0.074	(0.075)
Trust European Central Bank	0.121 [†]	(0.068)
Linear age	-0.003	(0.005)
Age squared	-0.005	(0.008)
Gender	-0.084 [†]	(0.048)
Knowledge	-0.089*	(0.044)
Education	0.014	(0.034)
Postcommunist	0.490	(0.333)
bailout	-0.017	(0.253)
Belgium	0.246	(0.173)
The Netherlands	-0.246	(0.186)
West Germany	0.469**	(0.177)
Italy	0.794**	(0.181)
Luxembourg	-0.024	(0.220)
Denmark	-1.003**	(0.213)
Ireland	-0.176	(0.304)
country==9	-0.072	(0.198)
Northern Ireland	0.141	(0.261)
Greece	0.934**	(0.297)
Spain	0.347	(0.295)
Portugal	1.125**	(0.301)
East Germany	0.061	(0.222)
Finland	-1.207**	(0.225)
Sweden	-1.090**	(0.217)
Austria	-0.217	(0.188)
Cyprus	1.565**	(0.207)
Czech Republic	-0.047	(0.371)
Estonia	-0.052	(0.374)
Hungary	0.639 [†]	(0.370)
Latvia	0.522	(0.372)
Lithuania	0.717 [†]	(0.371)
Malta	-0.450	(0.416)
Poland	0.236	(0.374)
Slovakia	0.368	(0.370)
Slovenia	0.019	(0.372)
Bulgaria	0.323	(0.375)
Romania	-0.040	(0.374)
Intercept	-0.705**	(0.250)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-2.766*	(1.191)
N	9681	
Log-likelihood	-5472.427	
$\chi^2_{(42)}$	682.512	

3.7.6 2006 Head-to-Head Models

Table 3.77: Hypothesis 6 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 24875.68	25195.27
Custom model = 21541.6	21879.25
H2 model = 20641.42	21008.82
H3 model = 29131.61	29465.18
H4 model = 25938.85	26300.29
H5 model = 11032.85	11348.68

Table 3.78: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy,
H3 model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
Border country ==1	-0.019	(0.221)
Proud to be Nationality	-0.224 **	(0.057)
Proud to be European	0.469 **	(0.043)
Household financial situation rather good	0.159 **	(0.046)
Household financial situation rather bad	0.210 **	(0.055)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	0.048	(0.044)
Feels they hold multiple identities==1	0.258 **	(0.041)
Feels they hold multiple identities==2	0.396 **	(0.056)
Left/right self-placement	0.049 †	(0.027)
Left/right placement squared	-0.020 *	(0.009)
Age	0.002	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	-0.147 **	(0.035)
Knowledge==2	0.241 **	(0.083)
Knowledge==3	0.362 **	(0.078)
Knowledge==4	0.404 **	(0.080)
Knowledge==5	0.379 **	(0.078)
Knowledge==6	0.442 **	(0.086)
Knowledge==7	0.468 **	(0.092)
Knowledge==8	0.505 **	(0.109)
Knowledge==9	0.137	(0.166)
Knowledge==10	0.377 *	(0.182)
Education less than high school	0.322	(0.211)
Education high school only	0.413 †	(0.212)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.78 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy, H3 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Education more than high school	0.585	**	(0.212)
Education still studying	0.698	**	(0.227)
Post-Communist country	-0.187		(0.296)
Belgium	0.879	**	(0.238)
The Netherlands	1.486	**	(0.248)
West Germany	0.694	**	(0.243)
Italy	0.442	**	(0.115)
Luxembourg	1.113	**	(0.242)
Denmark	0.408	†	(0.242)
Ireland	1.361	**	(0.253)
UK	0.339		(0.242)
Northern Ireland	1.465	**	(0.293)
Greece	1.001	**	(0.117)
Spain	0.880	**	(0.123)
Portugal	1.206	**	(0.124)
East Germany	0.729	**	(0.254)
Finland	0.170		(0.242)
Sweden	0.776	**	(0.243)
Austria	0.445	†	(0.244)
Cyprus	2.335	**	(0.306)
Czech Republic	0.546		(0.363)
Estonia	1.065	**	(0.368)
Hungary	1.512	**	(0.371)
Latvia	1.587	**	(0.370)
Lithuania	1.793	**	(0.377)
Malta	2.008	**	(0.396)
Poland	1.421	**	(0.370)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.78 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy, H3 model - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovakia	0.988 **	(0.365)
Slovenia	1.035 **	(0.367)
Bulgaria	1.230 **	(0.370)
Romania	1.144 **	(0.371)
Intercept	-0.865 *	(0.375)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-3.010	(2.102)
N		18893
Log-likelihood		-10791.287
$\chi^2_{(55)}$		819.307
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.79: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy			
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	0.238	**	(0.072)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.311	**	(0.068)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.298	**	(0.048)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.551	**	(0.045)
Age	0.000		(0.006)
Age squared	0.000		(0.000)
Male	-0.171	**	(0.035)
Knowledge==2	0.318	**	(0.091)
Knowledge==3	0.426	**	(0.086)
Knowledge==4	0.485	**	(0.087)
Knowledge==5	0.486	**	(0.085)
Knowledge==6	0.573	**	(0.092)
Knowledge==7	0.630	**	(0.098)
Knowledge==8	0.670	**	(0.113)
Knowledge==9	0.360	*	(0.167)
Knowledge==10	0.592	**	(0.186)
Education less than high school	0.321		(0.223)
Education high school only	0.463	*	(0.224)
Education more than high school	0.655	**	(0.223)
Education still studying	0.752	**	(0.239)
Post-Communist country	-0.115		(0.295)
Left/right self-placement	0.029		(0.028)
Left/right placement squared	-0.013		(0.009)
Belgium	0.878	**	(0.113)
The Netherlands	1.324	**	(0.124)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.79 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
West Germany	0.708 **	(0.111)
Italy	0.455 **	(0.117)
Luxembourg	1.139 **	(0.153)
Denmark	0.416 **	(0.109)
Ireland	1.131 **	(0.135)
UK	0.152	(0.110)
Northern Ireland	1.280 **	(0.201)
Greece	0.919 **	(0.119)
Spain	0.811 **	(0.127)
Portugal	1.102 **	(0.130)
East Germany	0.617 **	(0.132)
Finland	0.173	(0.106)
Sweden	0.657 **	(0.112)
Austria	0.326 **	(0.107)
Cyprus	2.144 **	(0.235)
Czech Republic	0.310	(0.312)
Estonia	0.659 *	(0.319)
Hungary	1.420 **	(0.324)
Latvia	1.266 **	(0.321)
Lithuania	1.413 **	(0.331)
Malta	1.974 **	(0.362)
Poland	1.320 **	(0.322)
Slovakia	0.813 **	(0.315)
Slovenia	0.785 *	(0.317)
Bulgaria	1.053 **	(0.325)
Romania	0.981 **	(0.322)
Intercept	-1.192 **	(0.316)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.79 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-2.891	(2.678)
N		17977
Log-likelihood		-10319.141
$\chi^2_{(51)}$		559.325
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.80: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy		
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	0.244 **	(0.082)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.262 **	(0.088)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.052	(0.064)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.015	(0.063)
Defense important national issue	0.137	(0.122)
Trust EU	0.368 **	(0.048)
Trust European Parliament	0.358 **	(0.056)
Trust European Court of Justice	0.377 **	(0.054)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	-0.226 **	(0.039)
Knowledge==2	0.088	(0.110)
Knowledge==3	0.098	(0.102)
Knowledge==4	0.140	(0.103)
Knowledge==5	0.152	(0.100)
Knowledge==6	0.253 *	(0.107)
Knowledge==7	0.239 *	(0.112)
Knowledge==8	0.267 *	(0.126)
Knowledge==9	0.075	(0.183)
Knowledge==10	0.271	(0.206)
Education less than high school	0.408	(0.273)
Education high school only	0.517 †	(0.274)
Education more than high school	0.686 *	(0.272)
Education still studying	0.702 *	(0.284)
Post-Communist country	-0.354	(0.356)
Left/right placement squared	-0.005	(0.003)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.80 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Belgium	0.846	**	(0.123)
The Netherlands	1.312	**	(0.134)
West Germany	0.697	**	(0.122)
Italy	0.383	**	(0.136)
Luxembourg	0.965	**	(0.167)
Denmark	0.326	**	(0.120)
Ireland	1.007	**	(0.155)
UK	0.277	*	(0.129)
Northern Ireland	1.323	**	(0.253)
Greece	0.840	**	(0.124)
Spain	0.783	**	(0.145)
Portugal	1.036	**	(0.141)
East Germany	0.685	**	(0.147)
Finland	0.165		(0.119)
Sweden	0.646	**	(0.123)
Austria	0.307	*	(0.123)
Cyprus	1.916	**	(0.234)
Czech Republic	0.509		(0.374)
Estonia	0.963	*	(0.383)
Hungary	1.490	**	(0.384)
Latvia	1.699	**	(0.387)
Lithuania	1.673	**	(0.397)
Malta	2.496	**	(0.456)
Poland	1.583	**	(0.387)
Slovakia	1.086	**	(0.376)
Slovenia	0.991	**	(0.378)
Bulgaria	1.011	**	(0.386)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.80 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Romania	1.185 **	(0.386)
Intercept	-1.346 **	(0.310)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-7.057	(7.880)
N		14339
Log-likelihood		-8035.512
$\chi^2_{(53)}$		1171.846
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.81: Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Economic and monetary policy			
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.343	**	(0.044)
Nation going in neither right nor wrong direction	0.141	**	(0.054)
Nation going in right direction	0.232	**	(0.046)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	-0.006		(0.049)
Lived or worked abroad	0.032		(0.042)
Pro-globalization	0.296	**	(0.042)
More equality: disagree	0.121		(0.079)
More equality: agree	0.051		(0.076)
More equality: strongly agree	-0.068		(0.080)
Age	0.001		(0.007)
Age squared	0.000		(0.000)
Male	-0.174	**	(0.040)
Knowledge==2	0.227	*	(0.105)
Knowledge==3	0.340	**	(0.098)
Knowledge==4	0.395	**	(0.099)
Knowledge==5	0.387	**	(0.097)
Knowledge==6	0.484	**	(0.105)
Knowledge==7	0.503	**	(0.110)
Knowledge==8	0.552	**	(0.128)
Knowledge==9	0.111		(0.186)
Knowledge==10	0.612	**	(0.218)
Education less than high school	0.410		(0.275)
Education high school only	0.537	†	(0.276)
Education more than high school	0.711	**	(0.275)
Education still studying	0.881	**	(0.290)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.81 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Post-Communist country	-0.336		(0.344)
Left/right self-placement	0.055	†	(0.031)
Left/right placement squared	-0.024	*	(0.011)
Belgium	0.921	**	(0.117)
The Netherlands	1.336	**	(0.132)
West Germany	0.740	**	(0.118)
Italy	0.505	**	(0.131)
Luxembourg	1.226	**	(0.172)
Denmark	0.383	**	(0.117)
Ireland	1.491	**	(0.165)
UK	0.275	*	(0.120)
Northern Ireland	1.359	**	(0.211)
Greece	1.068	**	(0.124)
Spain	0.897	**	(0.144)
Portugal	1.089	**	(0.138)
East Germany	0.776	**	(0.140)
Finland	0.232	*	(0.113)
Sweden	0.738	**	(0.117)
Austria	0.432	**	(0.122)
Cyprus	2.026	**	(0.232)
Czech Republic	0.718	*	(0.361)
Estonia	1.137	**	(0.369)
Hungary	1.717	**	(0.371)
Latvia	1.686	**	(0.369)
Lithuania	1.862	**	(0.391)
Malta	2.480	**	(0.429)
Poland	1.580	**	(0.372)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.81 – *Hypothesis 2: Economic and Monetary Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovakia	1.147 **	(0.364)
Slovenia	1.231 **	(0.366)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.036 **	(0.376)
Equation 2 : Insig2u		
Intercept	-3.117	(2.098)
N	14163	
Log-likelihood	-8124.906	
$\chi^2_{(54)}$	701.112	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.82: Hypothesis 2 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 22832.99	23172.74
Custom model = 16522.4	16969.34
H3 model = 21696.57	22143.83
H4 model = 20744.28	21157.51
H5 model = 16181.02	16597.42
H6 model = 16361.81	16785.08

Table 3.83: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
National economic situation rather good	0.060	(0.074)
National economic situation rather bad	-0.040	(0.083)
National economic situation very bad	-0.199 †	(0.103)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.212 **	(0.045)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.224 **	(0.053)
Open to enlargement==1	0.408 **	(0.080)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	0.072	(0.047)
Lived or worked abroad	0.111 **	(0.039)
Pro-globalization	0.325 **	(0.039)
More equality: disagree	0.057	(0.073)
More equality: agree	0.156 *	(0.071)
More equality: strongly agree	0.075	(0.076)
Age	0.005	(0.007)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	0.043	(0.037)
Knowledge==2	0.225 *	(0.105)
Knowledge==3	0.207 *	(0.099)
Knowledge==4	0.255 *	(0.099)
Knowledge==5	0.342 **	(0.097)
Knowledge==6	0.428 **	(0.104)
Knowledge==7	0.460 **	(0.107)
Knowledge==8	0.577 **	(0.121)
Knowledge==9	0.435 *	(0.179)
Knowledge==10	0.847 **	(0.204)
Education less than high school	-0.269	(0.288)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.83 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education high school only	-0.282	(0.288)
Education more than high school	-0.043	(0.287)
Education still studying	-0.256	(0.299)
Post-Communist country	-0.235	(0.317)
Left/right self-placement	0.041	(0.029)
Left/right placement squared	-0.026 **	(0.010)
Belgium	-0.017	(0.117)
The Netherlands	-0.768 **	(0.119)
West Germany	-0.527 **	(0.115)
Italy	0.068	(0.133)
Luxembourg	-1.042 **	(0.151)
Denmark	-1.219 **	(0.126)
Ireland	-0.650 **	(0.141)
UK	-1.311 **	(0.127)
Northern Ireland	-0.627 **	(0.189)
Greece	-0.357 **	(0.118)
Spain	0.406 **	(0.153)
Portugal	-0.206	(0.132)
East Germany	-0.197	(0.136)
Finland	-2.124 **	(0.127)
Sweden	-1.946 **	(0.123)
Austria	-1.252 **	(0.122)
Cyprus	0.244	(0.180)
Czech Republic	-0.168	(0.335)
Estonia	-1.299 **	(0.342)
Hungary	0.622 †	(0.342)
Latvia	-0.277	(0.338)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.83 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Lithuania	-0.017	(0.350)
Malta	0.743 *	(0.374)
Poland	0.334	(0.344)
Slovakia	0.099	(0.337)
Slovenia	0.149	(0.340)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	0.238	(0.392)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-3.945 **	(1.405)
N	14295	
Log-likelihood	-8933.639	
$\chi^2_{(57)}$	1421.909	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.84: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	0.104	(0.070)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.179 **	(0.066)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.416 **	(0.047)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.643 **	(0.042)
Age	0.008	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000 *	(0.000)
Male	-0.017	(0.033)
Knowledge==2	0.290 **	(0.091)
Knowledge==3	0.282 **	(0.085)
Knowledge==4	0.327 **	(0.086)
Knowledge==5	0.351 **	(0.084)
Knowledge==6	0.426 **	(0.090)
Knowledge==7	0.474 **	(0.094)
Knowledge==8	0.545 **	(0.108)
Knowledge==9	0.352 *	(0.162)
Knowledge==10	0.711 **	(0.179)
Education less than high school	-0.060	(0.225)
Education high school only	-0.026	(0.226)
Education more than high school	0.164	(0.225)
Education still studying	-0.063	(0.238)
Post-Communist country	-0.142	(0.275)
Left/right self-placement	0.008	(0.026)
Left/right placement squared	-0.011	(0.009)
Belgium	0.059	(0.110)
The Netherlands	-0.544 **	(0.107)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.84 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
West Germany	-0.482 **	(0.108)
Italy	0.145	(0.123)
Luxembourg	-0.957 **	(0.136)
Denmark	-1.033 **	(0.110)
Ireland	-0.827 **	(0.119)
UK	-1.338 **	(0.119)
Northern Ireland	-0.681 **	(0.174)
Greece	-0.542 **	(0.112)
Spain	0.260 *	(0.129)
Portugal	-0.197	(0.121)
East Germany	-0.284 *	(0.130)
Finland	-2.037 **	(0.124)
Sweden	-1.858 **	(0.119)
Austria	-1.149 **	(0.111)
Cyprus	0.184	(0.168)
Czech Republic	-0.269	(0.294)
Estonia	-1.351 **	(0.300)
Hungary	0.366	(0.301)
Latvia	-0.347	(0.297)
Lithuania	-0.043	(0.304)
Malta	0.804 *	(0.328)
Poland	0.310	(0.300)
Slovakia	0.012	(0.296)
Slovenia	0.045	(0.299)
Bulgaria	-0.056	(0.303)
Romania	0.130	(0.303)
Intercept	0.309	(0.312)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.84 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-3.202 †	(1.936)
N	17751	
Log-likelihood	-11030.57	
$\chi^2_{(51)}$	1186.59	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.85: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	0.132 †	(0.080)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.143 †	(0.086)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.104 †	(0.061)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.181 **	(0.061)
Defense important national issue	0.016	(0.112)
Trust EU	0.332 **	(0.046)
Trust European Parliament	0.410 **	(0.055)
Trust European Court of Justice	0.246 **	(0.054)
Age squared	0.000 **	(0.000)
Male	-0.048	(0.038)
Knowledge==2	0.222 *	(0.110)
Knowledge==3	0.111	(0.102)
Knowledge==4	0.156	(0.103)
Knowledge==5	0.168 †	(0.100)
Knowledge==6	0.221 *	(0.106)
Knowledge==7	0.241 *	(0.109)
Knowledge==8	0.341 **	(0.122)
Knowledge==9	0.254	(0.179)
Knowledge==10	0.519 **	(0.199)
Education less than high school	-0.205	(0.281)
Education high school only	-0.139	(0.281)
Education more than high school	0.020	(0.280)
Education still studying	-0.296	(0.289)
Post-Communist country	-0.089	(0.341)
Left/right placement squared	-0.010 **	(0.003)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.85 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Belgium	-0.013		(0.124)
The Netherlands	-0.524	**	(0.124)
West Germany	-0.515	**	(0.123)
Italy	0.056		(0.144)
Luxembourg	-1.023	**	(0.155)
Denmark	-1.066	**	(0.123)
Ireland	-0.879	**	(0.141)
UK	-1.265	**	(0.140)
Northern Ireland	-0.479	*	(0.221)
Greece	-0.539	**	(0.123)
Spain	0.240		(0.151)
Portugal	-0.263	†	(0.137)
East Germany	-0.186		(0.148)
Finland	-2.087	**	(0.138)
Sweden	-1.855	**	(0.133)
Austria	-1.175	**	(0.128)
Cyprus	0.173		(0.182)
Czech Republic	-0.265		(0.361)
Estonia	-1.345	**	(0.368)
Hungary	0.205		(0.369)
Latvia	-0.374		(0.366)
Lithuania	-0.078		(0.374)
Malta	0.454		(0.398)
Poland	0.179		(0.369)
Slovakia	-0.009		(0.363)
Slovenia	0.027		(0.365)
Bulgaria	0.031		(0.373)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.85 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Romania	0.235	(0.373)
Intercept	0.068	(0.317)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-3.220 †	(1.851)
N	14208	
Log-likelihood	-8729.870	
$\chi^2_{(53)}$	1158.609	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.86: Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : euimmpol		
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.370	** (0.040)
Nation going in neither right nor wrong direction	0.135	** (0.052)
Nation going in right direction	0.217	** (0.044)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	0.097	* (0.047)
Lived or worked abroad	0.109	** (0.040)
Pro-globalization	0.301	** (0.040)
More equality: disagree	0.069	(0.073)
More equality: agree	0.182	* (0.071)
More equality: strongly agree	0.058	(0.076)
Age	0.004	(0.007)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	0.042	(0.037)
Knowledge==2	0.349	** (0.105)
Knowledge==3	0.304	** (0.098)
Knowledge==4	0.340	** (0.099)
Knowledge==5	0.409	** (0.097)
Knowledge==6	0.468	** (0.103)
Knowledge==7	0.488	** (0.107)
Knowledge==8	0.593	** (0.122)
Knowledge==9	0.398	* (0.182)
Knowledge==10	0.881	** (0.204)
Education less than high school	-0.188	(0.277)
Education high school only	-0.156	(0.278)
Education more than high school	0.045	(0.277)
Education still studying	-0.162	(0.289)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.86 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Post-Communist country	-0.185		(0.328)
Left/right self-placement	0.045		(0.029)
Left/right placement squared	-0.028	**	(0.010)
Belgium	0.048		(0.115)
The Netherlands	-0.684	**	(0.116)
West Germany	-0.425	**	(0.116)
Italy	0.176		(0.137)
Luxembourg	-1.088	**	(0.149)
Denmark	-1.092	**	(0.116)
Ireland	-0.585	**	(0.136)
UK	-1.208	**	(0.124)
Northern Ireland	-0.616	**	(0.183)
Greece	-0.338	**	(0.117)
Spain	0.556	**	(0.151)
Portugal	-0.233	†	(0.130)
East Germany	-0.131		(0.138)
Finland	-1.990	**	(0.124)
Sweden	-1.826	**	(0.120)
Austria	-1.123	**	(0.122)
Cyprus	0.297		(0.181)
Czech Republic	-0.110		(0.345)
Estonia	-1.138	**	(0.352)
Hungary	0.459		(0.351)
Latvia	-0.200		(0.348)
Lithuania	0.063		(0.362)
Malta	0.701	†	(0.380)
Poland	0.344		(0.353)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.86 – *Hypothesis 3: Immigration Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovakia	0.123	(0.347)
Slovenia	0.217	(0.349)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	0.263	(0.371)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-6.883	(5.685)
N	14059	
Log-likelihood	-8747.945	
$\chi^2_{(54)}$	1532.094	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.87: Hypothesis 3 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 24318.05	24657.25
Custom model = 23210.41	23656.87
H2 model = 17985.28	18431.77
H4 model =22167.14	22579.7
H5 model = 17569.74	17985.63
H6 model =17607.89	18030.75

Table 3.88: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
National economic situation rather good	0.185 *	(0.074)
National economic situation rather bad	0.253 **	(0.085)
National economic situation very bad	0.000	(0.106)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.163 **	(0.047)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.189 **	(0.055)
Open to enlargement==1	0.557 **	(0.079)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	-0.005	(0.049)
Lived or worked abroad	0.153 **	(0.041)
Pro-globalization	0.324 **	(0.041)
More equality: disagree	0.195 **	(0.075)
More equality: agree	0.276 **	(0.072)
More equality: strongly agree	0.238 **	(0.077)
Age	-0.018 **	(0.007)
Age squared	0.000 †	(0.000)
Male	0.029	(0.039)
Knowledge==2	0.187 †	(0.108)
Knowledge==3	0.343 **	(0.101)
Knowledge==4	0.330 **	(0.102)
Knowledge==5	0.302 **	(0.100)
Knowledge==6	0.293 **	(0.106)
Knowledge==7	0.371 **	(0.110)
Knowledge==8	0.410 **	(0.125)
Knowledge==9	0.121	(0.183)
Knowledge==10	0.276	(0.203)
Education less than high school	-0.557 †	(0.312)
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.88 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education high school only	-0.503	(0.313)
Education more than high school	-0.433	(0.312)
Education still studying	-0.643 *	(0.324)
Post-Communist country	-0.560 †	(0.325)
Left/right self-placement	0.093 **	(0.031)
Left/right placement squared	-0.024 *	(0.010)
Belgium	-0.013	(0.125)
The Netherlands	-0.955 **	(0.123)
West Germany	-0.175	(0.124)
Italy	-0.156	(0.140)
Luxembourg	-0.133	(0.165)
Denmark	-0.947 **	(0.130)
Ireland	-0.506 **	(0.149)
UK	-1.551 **	(0.130)
Northern Ireland	-0.546 **	(0.197)
Greece	-0.589 **	(0.124)
Spain	0.109	(0.159)
Portugal	-0.445 **	(0.138)
East Germany	-0.299 *	(0.143)
Finland	-2.499 **	(0.132)
Sweden	-1.753 **	(0.123)
Austria	-0.804 **	(0.126)
Cyprus	-0.027	(0.187)
Czech Republic	0.328	(0.346)
Estonia	0.402	(0.355)
Hungary	1.027 **	(0.355)
Latvia	0.472	(0.351)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.88 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Lithuania	0.371	(0.363)
Malta	1.080 **	(0.398)
Poland	0.370	(0.353)
Slovakia	0.582 †	(0.349)
Slovenia	0.129	(0.348)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	-0.007	(0.417)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-7.513	(6.625)
N	14265	
Log-likelihood	-8320.959	
$\chi^2_{(57)}$	1546.561	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significancia levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.89: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
Border country ==1	-0.023	(0.216)
Proud to be Nationality	-0.241 **	(0.057)
Proud to be European	0.499 **	(0.042)
Household financial situation rather good	0.156 **	(0.046)
Household financial situation rather bad	0.207 **	(0.055)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	-0.023	(0.043)
Feels they hold multiple identities==1	0.181 **	(0.041)
Feels they hold multiple identities==2	0.214 **	(0.054)
Left/right self-placement	0.098 **	(0.027)
Left/right placement squared	-0.025 **	(0.009)
Age	-0.010 †	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	0.040	(0.034)
Knowledge==2	0.180 *	(0.085)
Knowledge==3	0.332 **	(0.080)
Knowledge==4	0.316 **	(0.081)
Knowledge==5	0.250 **	(0.080)
Knowledge==6	0.176 *	(0.086)
Knowledge==7	0.223 *	(0.091)
Knowledge==8	0.264 *	(0.106)
Knowledge==9	0.039	(0.163)
Knowledge==10	0.174	(0.177)
Education less than high school	-0.250	(0.225)
Education high school only	-0.221	(0.226)
Education more than high school	-0.179	(0.225)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.89 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education still studying	-0.321	(0.239)
Post-Communist country	-0.365	(0.280)
Belgium	0.007	(0.238)
The Netherlands	-0.778 **	(0.239)
West Germany	-0.089	(0.242)
Italy	0.014	(0.129)
Luxembourg	-0.118	(0.238)
Denmark	-0.952 **	(0.240)
Ireland	-0.574 *	(0.244)
UK	-1.416 **	(0.240)
Northern Ireland	-0.351	(0.279)
Greece	-0.651 **	(0.115)
Spain	0.077	(0.133)
Portugal	-0.287 *	(0.122)
East Germany	-0.246	(0.252)
Finland	-2.532 **	(0.245)
Sweden	-1.704 **	(0.240)
Austria	-0.767 **	(0.242)
Cyprus	0.211	(0.268)
Czech Republic	0.316	(0.355)
Estonia	0.493	(0.360)
Hungary	0.767 *	(0.361)
Latvia	0.431	(0.357)
Lithuania	0.464	(0.362)
Malta	0.988 *	(0.385)
Poland	0.274	(0.357)
Slovakia	0.566	(0.357)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.89 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovenia	-0.023	(0.356)
Bulgaria	0.160	(0.359)
Romania	-0.102	(0.359)
Intercept	0.832 *	(0.382)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-6.583 †	(3.523)
N	18599	
Log-likelihood	-10814.263	
$\chi^2_{(55)}$	1957.462	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.90: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol		
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	0.212 **	(0.072)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.255 **	(0.067)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==1	0.332 **	(0.047)
Believes EU is going in a positive direction==2	0.550 **	(0.042)
Age	-0.009	(0.006)
Age squared	0.000	(0.000)
Male	0.027	(0.035)
Knowledge==2	0.274 **	(0.093)
Knowledge==3	0.448 **	(0.087)
Knowledge==4	0.447 **	(0.087)
Knowledge==5	0.406 **	(0.085)
Knowledge==6	0.347 **	(0.091)
Knowledge==7	0.443 **	(0.095)
Knowledge==8	0.444 **	(0.109)
Knowledge==9	0.195	(0.164)
Knowledge==10	0.418 *	(0.180)
Education less than high school	-0.335	(0.239)
Education high school only	-0.302	(0.239)
Education more than high school	-0.232	(0.238)
Education still studying	-0.342	(0.252)
Post-Communist country	-0.369	(0.280)
Left/right self-placement	0.069 *	(0.027)
Left/right placement squared	-0.014	(0.009)
Belgium	0.000	(0.118)
The Netherlands	-0.895 **	(0.111)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.90 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
West Germany	-0.106	(0.117)
Italy	-0.049	(0.129)
Luxembourg	-0.068	(0.149)
Denmark	-0.956 **	(0.112)
Ireland	-0.710 **	(0.125)
UK	-1.602 **	(0.118)
Northern Ireland	-0.481 **	(0.181)
Greece	-0.750 **	(0.116)
Spain	-0.097	(0.133)
Portugal	-0.397 **	(0.126)
East Germany	-0.358 **	(0.137)
Finland	-2.530 **	(0.124)
Sweden	-1.808 **	(0.114)
Austria	-0.847 **	(0.113)
Cyprus	-0.034	(0.175)
Czech Republic	0.179	(0.302)
Estonia	0.174	(0.308)
Hungary	0.764 *	(0.311)
Latvia	0.224	(0.306)
Lithuania	0.158	(0.312)
Malta	0.802 *	(0.340)
Poland	0.172	(0.306)
Slovakia	0.448	(0.305)
Slovenia	-0.157	(0.304)
Bulgaria	-0.110	(0.308)
Romania	-0.098	(0.307)
Intercept	0.571 †	(0.326)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.90 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-6.541 †	(3.473)
N	17711	
Log-likelihood	-10348.32	
$\chi^2_{(51)}$	1786.762	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.91: Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy

Variable	Coefficient		(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eudefpol			
Voice counts in the EU==1	0.320	**	(0.042)
Nation going in neither right nor wrong direction	0.116	*	(0.054)
Nation going in right direction	0.133	**	(0.045)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	0.002		(0.049)
Lived or worked abroad	0.143	**	(0.041)
Pro-globalization	0.321	**	(0.041)
More equality: disagree	0.222	**	(0.074)
More equality: agree	0.315	**	(0.071)
More equality: strongly agree	0.242	**	(0.076)
Age	-0.008		(0.006)
Age squared	0.000		(0.000)
Gender	0.034		(0.039)
Political Knowledge of EU	0.015		(0.010)
Post-Communist country	-0.519		(0.335)
Left/right self-placement	0.097	**	(0.030)
Left/right placement squared	-0.025	*	(0.010)
Belgium	-0.001		(0.123)
The Netherlands	-0.958	**	(0.120)
West Germany	-0.131		(0.125)
Italy	-0.158		(0.142)
Luxembourg	-0.230		(0.162)
Denmark	-1.011	**	(0.119)
Ireland	-0.547	**	(0.144)
UK	-1.559	**	(0.127)
Northern Ireland	-0.560	**	(0.189)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.91 – *Hypothesis 5: Defense Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Greece	-0.628 **	(0.122)
Spain	0.148	(0.154)
Portugal	-0.531 **	(0.132)
East Germany	-0.247 †	(0.144)
Finland	-2.427 **	(0.128)
Sweden	-1.688 **	(0.120)
Austria	-0.746 **	(0.126)
Cyprus	0.031	(0.190)
Czech Republic	0.379	(0.356)
Estonia	0.447	(0.364)
Hungary	0.895 *	(0.364)
Latvia	0.563	(0.361)
Lithuania	0.369	(0.373)
Malta	0.976 *	(0.400)
Poland	0.357	(0.362)
Slovakia	0.635 †	(0.359)
Slovenia	0.151	(0.357)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	0.575 **	(0.221)
Equation 2 : ln _{sig2u}		
Intercept	-8.149	(6.090)
N	14181	
Log-likelihood	-8316.700	
$\chi^2_{(42)}$	1530.022	
Significance levels :	† : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%	
Significance levels :	† : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%	

Table 3.92: Hypothesis 5 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 22935.27	23274.44
Custom model = 16483.6	16899.42
H2 model = 16759.92	17206.29
H3 model =21742.53	22188.89
H4 model = 20802.64	21215.08
H6 model =16721.4	17054.02

Table 3.93: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
National economic situation rather good	-0.093	(0.088)
National economic situation rather bad	0.006	(0.096)
National economic situation very bad	-0.140	(0.116)
EU future fairly optimistic	0.021	(0.049)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.100 †	(0.057)
Open to enlargement==1	0.484 **	(0.096)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	-0.071	(0.052)
Lived or worked abroad	0.165 **	(0.043)
Pro-globalization	0.267 **	(0.043)
More equality: disagree	0.039	(0.083)
More equality: agree	0.109	(0.080)
More equality: strongly agree	0.165 †	(0.085)
Age	-0.038 **	(0.007)
Age squared	0.000 **	(0.000)
Male	-0.057	(0.040)
Knowledge==2	0.181	(0.121)
Knowledge==3	0.239 *	(0.114)
Knowledge==4	0.308 **	(0.114)
Knowledge==5	0.384 **	(0.112)
Knowledge==6	0.426 **	(0.118)
Knowledge==7	0.422 **	(0.121)
Knowledge==8	0.421 **	(0.136)
Knowledge==9	0.578 **	(0.195)
Knowledge==10	0.664 **	(0.210)
Education less than high school	-0.319	(0.300)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.93 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education high school only	-0.255	(0.300)
Education more than high school	-0.315	(0.299)
Education still studying	-0.566 †	(0.312)
Post-Communist country	0.726 *	(0.322)
Left/right self-placement	-0.022	(0.032)
Left/right placement squared	0.002	(0.011)
Belgium	0.138	(0.127)
The Netherlands	-0.460 **	(0.140)
West Germany	0.073	(0.130)
Italy	0.688 **	(0.138)
Luxembourg	0.088	(0.171)
Denmark	-1.075 **	(0.165)
Ireland	-0.006	(0.159)
UK	0.006	(0.143)
Northern Ireland	0.701 **	(0.196)
Greece	1.194 **	(0.130)
Spain	0.575 **	(0.148)
Portugal	0.682 **	(0.140)
East Germany	0.023	(0.154)
Finland	-1.017 **	(0.160)
Sweden	-1.468 **	(0.175)
Austria	0.028	(0.136)
Cyprus	1.844 **	(0.186)
Czech Republic	-0.442	(0.343)
Estonia	-0.190	(0.349)
Hungary	0.088	(0.347)
Latvia	0.135	(0.345)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.93 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Lithuania	0.416	(0.354)
Malta	-0.284	(0.370)
Poland	0.049	(0.347)
Slovakia	-0.856 *	(0.346)
Slovenia	-0.581 †	(0.348)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Slovenia	0.000	(0.000)
Intercept	-2.680 **	(0.427)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-2.984	(2.283)
N	14352	
Log-likelihood	-7896.243	
$\chi^2_{(57)}$	773.151	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.94: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
Border country ==1	0.511	(0.392)
Proud to be Nationality	-0.667 **	(0.223)
Proud to be European	0.750 **	(0.236)
Household financial situation rather good	0.132	(0.094)
Household financial situation rather bad	0.308 *	(0.135)
EU symbolizes tolerance==1	-0.152 †	(0.092)
Feels they hold multiple identities==1	0.372 **	(0.135)
Feels they hold multiple identities==2	0.808 **	(0.259)
Left/right self-placement	-0.053	(0.051)
Left/right placement squared	0.013	(0.017)
Age	-0.058 **	(0.020)
Age squared	0.000 **	(0.000)
Male	-0.081	(0.067)
Knowledge==2	0.167	(0.173)
Knowledge==3	0.255	(0.173)
Knowledge==4	0.406 *	(0.198)
Knowledge==5	0.397 *	(0.194)
Knowledge==6	0.384 †	(0.202)
Knowledge==7	0.400 †	(0.210)
Knowledge==8	0.295	(0.218)
Knowledge==9	0.480	(0.338)
Knowledge==10	0.775 *	(0.395)
Education less than high school	-0.081	(0.409)
Education high school only	-0.060	(0.410)
Education more than high school	-0.132	(0.411)
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.94 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Education still studying	-0.477	(0.454)
Post-Communist country	1.016 †	(0.585)
Belgium	0.803 †	(0.467)
The Netherlands	0.067	(0.416)
West Germany	0.754	(0.469)
Italy	1.395 **	(0.472)
Luxembourg	0.382	(0.421)
Denmark	-1.212 *	(0.557)
Ireland	0.744	(0.474)
UK	0.588	(0.450)
Northern Ireland	1.948 **	(0.752)
Greece	2.203 **	(0.694)
Spain	0.886 *	(0.348)
Portugal	1.552 **	(0.513)
East Germany	0.692	(0.483)
Finland	-1.249 *	(0.564)
Sweden	-1.478 *	(0.607)
Austria	0.766	(0.474)
Cyprus	4.429 **	(1.399)
Czech Republic	0.257	(0.623)
Estonia	0.762	(0.662)
Hungary	0.959	(0.684)
Latvia	1.517 *	(0.766)
Lithuania	2.003 *	(0.865)
Malta	0.788	(0.686)
Poland	1.113	(0.702)
Slovakia	-0.460	(0.637)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.94 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Slovenia	0.081	(0.625)
Bulgaria	0.473	(0.641)
Romania	1.049	(0.698)
Intercept	-4.654 **	(1.546)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	1.798 *	(0.886)
N	18789	
Log-likelihood	-10445.385	
$\chi^2_{(55)}$	11.519	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

Table 3.95: Hypothesis 6: Social Policy

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : eusocpol		
Pessimistic about future of EU==1	-0.043	(0.088)
Pessimistic about future of EU==2	0.109	(0.094)
EU future fairly optimistic	-0.092	(0.068)
EU future fairly pessimistic	0.046	(0.066)
Defense important national issue	-0.011	(0.125)
Trust EU	0.245 **	(0.058)
Trust European Parliament	0.265 **	(0.068)
Trust European Court of Justice	0.129 *	(0.064)
Age squared	0.000 **	(0.000)
Male	-0.096 *	(0.043)
Knowledge==2	0.254 †	(0.131)
Knowledge==3	0.221 †	(0.122)
Knowledge==4	0.326 **	(0.125)
Knowledge==5	0.374 **	(0.123)
Knowledge==6	0.355 **	(0.129)
Knowledge==7	0.314 *	(0.131)
Knowledge==8	0.335 *	(0.144)
Knowledge==9	0.531 **	(0.203)
Knowledge==10	0.686 **	(0.221)
Education less than high school	-0.090	(0.304)
Education high school only	-0.108	(0.305)
Education more than high school	-0.156	(0.304)
Education still studying	-0.225	(0.314)
Post-Communist country	0.829 *	(0.369)
Left/right placement squared	-0.002	(0.003)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.95 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Belgium	0.186	(0.139)
The Netherlands	-0.289 †	(0.151)
West Germany	0.191	(0.142)
Italy	0.894 **	(0.176)
Luxembourg	0.011	(0.180)
Denmark	-1.161 **	(0.189)
Ireland	0.020	(0.161)
UK	-0.051	(0.162)
Northern Ireland	0.940 **	(0.251)
Greece	1.216 **	(0.184)
Spain	0.614 **	(0.166)
Portugal	0.757 **	(0.166)
East Germany	0.175	(0.169)
Finland	-1.013 **	(0.186)
Sweden	-1.382 **	(0.205)
Austria	0.117	(0.145)
Cyprus	2.029 **	(0.287)
Czech Republic	-0.555	(0.388)
Estonia	-0.183	(0.389)
Hungary	-0.048	(0.388)
Latvia	0.236	(0.387)
Lithuania	0.547	(0.397)
Malta	-0.415	(0.414)
Poland	0.023	(0.387)
Slovakia	-0.782 *	(0.393)
Slovenia	-0.639	(0.392)
Bulgaria	-0.481	(0.396)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.95 – *Hypothesis 6: Social Policy - Continued from previous page*

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Romania	-0.129	(0.389)
Intercept	-1.636 **	(0.385)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	-1.482	(2.357)
N	14276	
Log-likelihood	-7950.076	
$\chi^2_{(53)}$	120.162	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.96: Hypothesis 6 Goodness of Fit

	AIC. BIC.
Overall model = 22814.91	23154.46
Custom model = 15575	15998.07
H2 model = 15910.49	16357.21
H3 model =21004.77	21451.71
H4 model = 20802.64	21215.08
H5 model =16010.15	16426.3

Chapter 4

Experimental Evidence

My larger project asks how the European Union has achieved so much integration without a concurrent increase in ‘European identity’ among the citizens of EU member states. Most scholarship predicts a dire future for the European Union, claiming it cannot move forward without first creating some type of European citizenry, in which the population sees itself— at least in substantial part— as sharing a common ‘European’ identity. Yet to date, the EU has succeeded in taking major steps forward in integration without citizens experiencing a significant increase in European identity. How has the European Union “deepened” to such an extent without creating a demos? I hypothesize that this is because the European Union has become politically legitimate, despite a lack of affective identification. Legitimacy leads to acceptance of the power transfer from the national to the supranational entity. If EU governance is accepted, it shows that the European Union has earned legitimacy in a particular policy area but it is important to differentiate between policy areas when examining legitimacy. While in a previous chapter I looked at trends in Eurobarometer data to highlight the role of political legitimacy and rationality, I will now examine these concerns through another lens by assessing experimental evidence.

In this chapter, I present the results of a survey experiment, administered through Google Consumer Surveys. Respondents received one of six randomized prompts that emphasized either loss of sovereignty or potential cost efficiencies in two issue areas: defense policy and environmental policy. The survey asked whether respondents think

the EU or their national government should handle that policy area. If my hypothesis is correct, considering these frames would have made respondents more likely to support a particular level of governance in a policy area than they would be without such framing—shifting their opinions based on the rationality and effectiveness of making a certain policy supranational or national. This survey will help me show that EU citizens prize rational concerns above affective identity when they consider their dual identities. In this era of gloomy predictions for the future of Europe, it is important to remember that the European Union was founded with the goal of pursuing economic benefits for its members—a material goal rather than an emotional one. The European Union is based on a stronger foundation than the vagaries of public feeling.

4.1 Hypotheses

To assess my argument, I conducted a survey experiment using the Google Consumer Surveys platform. Respondents were drawn in a random opt-in convenience sample from respondents in the United Kingdom using Google on Tuesday, July 21, 2015. Google states that they attract a “validated, representative sample of respondent... we allocate users according to the demographic spread of internet population data in each country.” It is important to note, however, that their demographics are inferred (this will be discussed further at the end of the chapter), and that an online sample by nature has a harder time representing the lowest income sectors of the population. Six separate surveys were fielded, one for each treatment condition; respondents were unable to take more than one survey, so the treatments were randomized. Thus, each respondent received one treatment condition, which either dealt with defense or environmental policy. Each survey aimed to attract 90 respondents. The total dataset comprises 584 respondents, and the data is roughly evenly distributed between conditions.

I hypothesize that when respondents are primed to consider either rational concerns (such as economies of scale and efficiencies of cost under supranational policy) or national sovereignty, they will shift their opinions on whether the national or supranational government should control a particular policy area. Europeans consider issues of governance rationally and are capable of recognizing the benefits inherent in control by particular levels of government; therefore, they should be able to recognize their own interests as presented to them in the experimental prompts. Respondents were provided with one of two frames, one based around national sovereignty and one based around the cost efficiency of supranational policy. A control group received neutral information.

Prompts focused on one of two issues, creating six possible conditions. The two issues used in the questionnaire were environmental policy and defense policy. Environmental policy is an area over which the EU has long exercised a significant amount of control, and in general they receive a great deal of public support to do so. Recent Eurobarometer data for the United Kingdom, however, show more mixed support, with support for EU or joint control and national control running about even. Thus, this is a good issue to examine, with few potential ceiling effects.¹ Defense policy brings up other interesting issues. While the EU has not typically had a great deal of control in this area in the past, the aggregate European public strongly supports supranational control of defense policy. Given recent events in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine, defense policy is a relevant and topical issue to examine.

¹Ceiling effects refer to the phenomenon where the level of a dependent variable is so high that an independent variable can no longer have a significant effect.

H1: The control group will reflect population norms from Eurobarometer on whether national or supranational government should control the specific policy areas in the prompts.


This hypothesis will ensure the sample is representative.

H2: The group primed to consider cost efficiency will have a higher proportion of respondents who support supranational control.

H3: The group primed to consider national sovereignty will have a higher proportion of respondents who support national control of a policy area.

4.2 Results

The results of this experiment were successful with regards to environmental policy. All three hypotheses were borne out and results were shown to be statistically significant. The table below presents the numbers on each hypothesis. Prompt 1 represents the treatment that focused on cost efficiency. This prompt informed readers of the benefits involved in joint environmental policy, due to shared natural resources and the interdependence created by the common market. Prompt 2 represents the treatment focusing on national sovereignty, which emphasized differences between nations and potential threats to the domestic economy. Prompt 3 shows the results for the control treatment, which focused on factual information about environmental policy.



	(1)
	EUNAT
1b.Condition1	0
	(.)
2.Condition1	-0.0854
	(-0.76)
_cons	0.824***
	(9.88)
<i>N</i>	202

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	(1)
	EUNAT
1b.Condition2	0
	(.)
2.Condition2	0.128
	(1.14)
_cons	0.611***
	(7.32)
<i>N</i>	201

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

It is clear from this graph that all three hypotheses were borne out. Respondents who received the control treatment supported supranational and national control in nearly equal numbers, which is consistent with recent Eurobarometer data in the United Kingdom. Those who received the prompt focusing on cost efficiencies of joint environmental policy supported the EU's control in significantly larger numbers, while the reverse was true for those who received the prompt emphasizing national sovereignty.


Respondents were also asked whether the EU governed effectively. Only 10% of respondents who supported national control felt it did so, while nearly half of those who supported supranational control agreed with this statement. When asked about the effectiveness of the national government, the reverse pattern appears—about 40% of those who supported national control find the British government effective, while only 18% of those who support EU control do so. Additionally, respondents were asked about different issues and whether the EU should have most of the control over them. The issues which received the strongest support for EU control by far were immigration and the environment; defense would be a distant third. Education, healthcare and social welfare, and foreign policy found little support among the British population. The latter makes them markedly different from most of the EU.

When it comes to national identification, the sample sizes in this data are so small for most options it is difficult to come to a reasonable conclusion. Most British respondents do identify strongly with their nationality, and few prioritize their European identity in any way. This finding is borne out by past Eurobarometer surveys. Therefore, it is difficult to say that national identity has any significant bearing on feelings about European governance in the United Kingdom, since general identification with

Europe among the British population is so low.

While demographics were limited due to the nature of Google Consumer Surveys and its analytic process, some conclusions can be drawn. Women tended to be more supportive of EU policy control than men. The young were the most supportive of EU control as well, and those over 25 were far more likely to feel exclusively British. In general, demographic crosstabs did not show much variance by treatment condition. This is stronger evidence for my argument that Europeans have sociotropic concerns when making policy responsibility decisions. Rather than individual-level predictors, which have typically been highlighted as predictors of attitudes about the EU, citizens here are considering information they have been given and thinking sociotropically about the benefits to their country as a whole.

In terms of defense policy, the results were a bit more mixed, but I believe this is due to cultural factors, which will be elaborated on shortly. The initial results are presented in the table below. It is easy to see that results were very similar across prompts, despite the differences in the treatments. Most British people want defense controlled at the national level, but it is certainly a highly divisive issue. There was no statistically significant effect across prompts, however.



	(1)
	EUNAT
1b.Condition4	0
	(.)
2.Condition4	-0.0254
	(-0.24)
_cons	0.611***
	(8.16)
N	189

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	(1)
	EUNAT
1b.Condition5	0
	(.)
2.Condition5	-0.0460
	(-0.44)
_cons	0.631***
	(8.74)
<i>N</i>	197

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

When looking at other variables in the study, it is clear that those who support EU or joint control of defense policy are more likely to believe the EU governs effectively, and this difference is statistically significant. Those who support national control are only slightly more likely to say the British government is effective, and the difference is not statistically significant. Again, the environment and immigration are the most popular issues for the EU to control. 61% of those who supported national control of defense policy think the EU should not control any issues at all, while this was only true for 43% of those who supported national control of environmental policy. Again, it is difficult to say that national identity has any substantive effect, since sample sizes are so small and the vast majority of British people identify solely with their nationality.

In terms of demographics, the same caveats apply here. Women are more likely to support national control of defense than men—the opposite of the finding in environmental policy. Age seemed to have less of a consistent effect. Again, the

young were most likely to have a European identity in any form, and to feel that EU governance was effective. We see similar consistency across treatments in the second issue—demographics do not appear to be the driving force behind these results.

In sum, those exposed to the first prompt, which focused on cost efficiency, did not have increased support for EU control of defense policy. Why were the prompts not as effective for defense policy, when an effect was so clearly present in prompts using environmental policy? I would put forward that attitudes are more hardened regarding defense policy due to historical and cultural reasons. Great Britain has long been an isolated island nation. The citizens of the United Kingdom are proud of their national sovereignty, and the storied past of the British Empire is not far gone. In recent world conflicts, such as that in Syria, Great Britain has shown itself reluctant to engage. I believe it is the cultural specificities surrounding the issue of defense policy that provoked such results. The British are particularly sensitive to issues of national sovereignty, and what issue comes closer to the heart of such a construct than defense? Using the issue of defense was nearly a proxy for the heart of the issue: national sovereignty concerns. Cost efficiency is simply less of a concern here even when respondents are primed to consider it. Additionally, other survey questions showed that the British are far less supportive of a cooperative foreign policy than the citizenry of the European Union as a whole.² Historically, the UK has rejected any proposal of joint European defense or an EU military, and it seems unlikely that this will change. Thus, attitudes toward the environment are more able to be swayed than attitudes about defense in an extremely anti-EU country.

²Eurobarometer data

4.3 Limitations

While this study is an important piece of my argument, it does have limitations. For example, it is not a fully representative sample. While Google Consumer Surveys does their best to filter a representative sample through their understanding of inferred demographics, the sample is only representative of the Internet-using population on a particular day. Thus, the results are not fully generalizable and limited in their applicability beyond this sample. Additionally, the demographics in this sample are inferred using Google’s algorithms based on browsing behavior, and are not available for part of the sample. This absence makes analysis based on demographic variables (typically popular control variables in public opinion analysis) limited. In particular, information on income, an important variable in analysis of EU public opinion, is scarce. The fact that the survey is Internet-based also reduces the amount of low-income respondents in the survey. The length of the questionnaire was curtailed, as were the length of passages in the question.³ With a longer questionnaire and longer treatment passages, perhaps effects would have been more pronounced or covariates more apparent. Additionally, due to cost, the sample size is smaller than optimal.

Finally, the study is limited because the sample consists of solely British respondents. There are 28 member states in the European Union, of which United Kingdom is merely one—and certainly far from the most representative of European opinion at that. I would argue, however, that this simply makes the implications of my results stronger. The United Kingdom is well known as highly Euroskeptic. The term “Brexit” appears in the media nearly as often as “Grexit”, and the prime minister has called for a referendum on EU membership, to take place next year. If the

³The questionnaire can be found in an appendix to this chapter.

experiment produced an effect in a country that is so strongly anti-Europe, the effect might be even more pronounced in a country with more average views on European governance. Respondents in countries that are more open to European control of public policy would be more receptive to the information in the prompts, and thus effects might be still larger in a survey that included more countries.

4.4 Implications

This survey experiment can be considered a pilot study, pointing the way for future studies addressing representative samples in all EU countries. Future work would also employ longer and more detailed prompts, which were not possible on the Google Consumer Surveys interface, as well as a longer survey in general with more covariates.

What is clear, however, is that this survey provides some evidence for the idea that Europeans can be swayed to think rationally about the European Union. The United Kingdom is famously home to one of the most Euroskeptic populations within the EU—and yet on a major policy issue, pronounced effects were found when subjects were exposed to treatments that prompted them to consider the greater efficiency of EU control over an issue. In other words, this experiment suggests that even in the Euroskeptic UK, support for greater EU authority over particular policy areas can increase significantly when the population is reminded of the greater cost efficiency of granting authority to the EU. Moreover, given that the prompts were framed in terms of costs and benefits on a national level rather than the individual level, the findings suggest that citizens are capable of focusing on sociotropic concerns rather than simply individual benefits. If opinions on EU authority change in the UK when respondents are primed to think about the rational consequences of policy decisions, we might expect even stronger effects in countries that typically display greater

support for the EU.

This analysis emphasizes the main point of this project—belief in the EU's capable and effective governing abilities, as well as an understanding of cost efficiencies, are important to citizens when trusting them with policy competence; and different policy areas create different patterns of regime support. This experiment shows that even with the most Euroskeptic country in the Union, it is possible to change public opinion on an issue that is critical to the EU's policy competence through highlighting issues of rational costs either from the European or national perspective. Rational concerns were shown to outweigh both issues of identification and individual demographic characteristics. Thus, this chapter provides evidence for the idea that European citizens make decisions based on sociotropic economic concerns, and that these concerns are different based on the policy area.

Table 4.1: Environment Condition Demographics

	Demographic. Categories Number.
Gender	Male 39.7
Gender	Female 37.6
Gender	Missing 22.7
Age	18-24 12.3
Age	25-34 16.1
Age	35-44 15.1
Age	45-54 16.7
Age	55-64 8.5
Age	65+ 4.4
Age	Missing 26.7

Table 4.2: Defense Condition Demographics

	Demographic. Categories Number.
Gender	Male 40.4
Gender	Female 35.2
Gender	Missing 24.4
Age	18-24 9.5
Age	25-34 15.7
Age	35-44 21.2
Age	45-54 12.3
Age	55-64 8.5
Age	65+ 4.4
Age	Missing 28.1

Chapter 5

The Eurozone Crisis

The recent financial crisis beginning in 2008 had disastrous effects on the Eurozone, and many felt it would augur the death of the Union altogether. Talk of a “Brexite”, “Grexit”, the end of the euro currency, and criticism of the “PIIGS” countries dominated the media. Hundreds of gloomy predictions were made, but – at least for the time being — both the euro and the Union have survived their greatest test to date. The question many are asking, however, is whether they survived it unscathed. Does the European Union retain the level of public support it enjoyed for integration before the crisis, or has the crisis diminished public support? Have Europeans had enough of the “United States of Europe” experiment?

This chapter presents a case study of the Eurozone financial crisis and how it has affected trust in the EU and support for integration. How did it affect the preferred allocation of authority in economic policy? Based on popular perceptions, the expectation of many observers is that trust in the European Union and support for integration have dropped. At least on the surface, the data suggests that the EU is still the desired actor for handling the financial crisis, and most economic and monetary policy in general. Additionally, for the majority of the time during the financial crisis, in nearly every member state, the EU government was still seen by the public as more trustworthy than most national governments. While some measures of public support have gone down, actual support for the EU’s role in economic policy and Eurozone governance has not suffered the same fate. This

distinction is key when assessing how the crisis has affected the Union.


While there is variation in national context based on experiences in the crisis, this case study of a critical recent event links to the theoretical contributions of this project. Europeans show a preference for the EU as an actor in the financial crisis because the nations of the Eurozone are already financially linked. Thus, citizens understand that it is too difficult for individual governments to manage the Eurozone independently. European institutions must take action in order to solve a European problem. There is also evidence in the literature that the attributions of responsibility for economic problems between province and nation can be contrary to expectations—provincial incumbents can be held accountable for national economic conditions.¹ Through this evidence, the literature shows that the population does not necessarily blame the level of government one would expect. Although one might believe that the European public blames the EU government and thus would no longer trust it with economic policy, literature shows that it is possible for the public to attribute responsibility to a different level of government, or simply to still believe that the EU is the best actor to handle the crisis.

While typical questions asking about support for integration and trust in the EU saw sharp declines, the EU is still the preferred actor in the financial crisis, and in many other policy areas. This indicates there is more to the European community than our traditional conceptions based on affective identity—as identified by Harteveld et al, legitimacy in the sense of public support for an EU role in a given policy area may be more important than a sense of identification with the EU.² Citizens don't need to 'feel European' in order to support an EU role in governance. Below, I present a

¹Francois Gelineau and Eric Belanger, "Electoral accountability in a federal system: national and provincial economic voting in Canada", *Publius* 35.3 (2005): 407-424.

²Harteveld et al 2013.

chart, by country, of trust in the EU from 2006 to 2015. It is clear to see that in nearly every member state, trust in the EU has significantly dropped. Many treat this as a key factor in the supposed doom of the EU—but in this chapter, I will show that despite drops in indicators of identification, the EU is still the preferred actor in the crisis.



In the remainder of this chapter, I will give a brief history of the financial crisis, before briefly discussing relevant literature. I will then present hypotheses about the effect of the financial crisis on public support for the EU, before showing empirical results. I will close the chapter by discussing the implications of these results within the context of the larger project.

5.1 The European Financial Crisis and the EU's response

Before I can assess public reactions to the crisis, it is important to briefly summarize events, and discuss what steps the EU took as a result. The Eurozone crisis was rooted in the greater global financial crisis in 2008. This chain of events began with the subprime mortgage crisis, the collapse of American firm Lehman Brothers and the American recession, which in turn caused uncertainty in European markets. In 2009, the crisis crossed the Atlantic to Europe, when the incoming Greek government announced that their 2009 deficit was much higher than anticipated and would top 12% of GDP. This led to credit rating downgrades, and a plan by the Greek government on how to reduce the deficit. These measures largely focused on austerity. In April 2010, Greece requested a bailout from the EU and the IMF. Austerity measures imposed as part of the bailout package agreed upon for Greece caused riots and strikes throughout the country, while Ireland, Spain, and Portugal faced credit downgrades.³

In November Ireland began talks for their own bailout with the EU and IMF. In the meantime, French president Nicolas Sarkozy and German chancellor Angela Merkel were hammering out a deal to create the European Stability Mechanism, which would address future crises. By the spring of 2011, the cycle of credit downgrades and then a request for bailout had spread to Portugal. By fall, France and Italy were struggling. At this time, Jean-Claude Trichet's term as president of the European

³BBC. "Timeline: The unfolding Eurozone crisis". <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13856580>; Erik Jones, "Output legitimacy and the global financial crisis: perceptions matter", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47.5 (2009): 1085-1105; Philip R. Lane, "The European Sovereign Debt Crisis", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26.3(2012): 49-68; Vivien A. Schmidt, "The European Union's Eurozone crisis and what (not) to do about it", *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 17.1 (2010), 199-210.

Central Bank ended, and he was replaced by Mario Draghi. In a speech before the European Parliament, he encouraged a “new fiscal compact” which would contain new fiscal rules, and help the EU move toward a true economic union.

But several member state economies were still struggling, including Spain, which requested assistance propping up the banking sector in summer 2012. Cyprus followed with a bailout request. Mario Draghi declared that the European Central Bank would do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro”, encouraging the markets. Spain and Portugal were given an extra year to correct their deficits. In 2013, the ECB continued to cut interest rates in order to aid recovery. By 2014, the cycle of bailout and credit rating downgrades appeared to have halted, but recovery remained slow. Political fallout from austerity had consequences. The January 2015 Greek parliamentary elections resulted in a majority for the radical leftist, anti-austerity party Syriza. This situation is creating instability within the EU, as markets tumble due to the risk of insecurity and France and Germany desperately try to regain the upper hand.

Events of the last few months have confirmed fears that Syriza prime minister Alexis Tsipras will refuse to adhere to austerity guidelines set by the troika who loaned Greece bailout money, and potentially leave the euro. After negotiations for a new bailout deal failed in June, Greece defaulted on a payment for its IMF loan. Tsipras announced a referendum on the proposed austerity measures to be held in early July 2015. The referendum was highly controversial, but it appeared that public opinion went against the bailout. Capital controls were introduced, and many feared Grexit was imminent. After weeks of tense negotiations, a third bailout was agreed upon, and the Greek parliament approved the package (including further austerity measures) in August 2015.

During the recession and crisis, several new measures were put into place to stabilize the European economy—new institutions created and new treaties signed. In 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created—a temporary crisis resolution fund of up to 500 billion euros that would eventually provide assistance to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. The ECB began to purchase sovereign debt as well. In July 2011, member states signed the first treaty creating the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—a permanent crisis resolution institution to replace the temporary EFSF, which would later serve both Spain and Cyprus, and respond to any new requests by member state governments. The EFSF and ESM are both authorized to provide loans, purchase debt, act on a precautionary basis and intervene in secondary markets, although the EFSF will begin curtailing operations beyond receiving loan repayments in 2015. Creating the ESM was clearly a huge step further in economic integration.

Simultaneously, a legislative agenda was pursued to advance economic integration. The European Commission made several proposals in 2010 to shore up economic governance and the framework for prevention of excessive debt. Options that would create further integration, such as Eurobonds, were also discussed (but rejected by Sarkozy and Merkel). In early 2012, all member states except the UK and the Czech Republic sign a “fiscal compact” (the Treaty on Stability, Convergence, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union). The TSCG, a stricter version of the Stability and Growth Pact, requires member state governments to create a self-correcting mechanism to ensure national budgets be in balance or surplus (a deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP), and to ensure compliance with structural deficits that vary depending on the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio. It provides regulations for governments to attempt to reduce debt, creates an automatic correction mechanism; and encourages economic policy coordination among member state

governments. By summer, the European Commission was making further recommendations to increase economic and monetary union—these recommendations included a banking union, integrated supervision, and common deposit insurance. By late 2014, Euro-area countries had agreed to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single Resolution Mechanism for banks, allowing the ECB to supervise banks in Eurozone countries. By 2015, the European Union (and particularly the Eurozone countries) had made vast strides in economic and monetary integration as a result of the euro crisis.

In this chapter, I will ask whether these moves were made with the support of the majority of the European public. Since the EU has taken such significant steps toward furthering economic integration in order to keep the euro together, this raises the question of whether or not the public supported these measures. Did the public support the EU taking on a bigger role in economic governance in order to save the euro?

5.2 Literature

Although there is not a great deal of literature dealing with public opinion and legitimacy in the financial crisis, a few pieces have been written. Many focus on the need for the European Union to acquire more legitimacy, or the reasons for Euroskepticism, or the potential for furthered multilevel governance. Most of the post-financial crisis literature, however, highlights the crisis in integration, and the EU's two options: further union, or the end of the euro. These policy-oriented pieces do not discuss legitimacy, but instead make recommendations, and I will not spend time on them here.⁴

⁴Martin Hellwig, *Quo vadis Europa? European monetary union between crisis and reform*,” The Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, No 2011, 12; Marshall Auerbeck, A

Erik Jones uses Scharpf's output-oriented legitimation to support my theory of "legitimation based on interests rather than identities".⁵ He argues that European economic and monetary union is dependent on output-oriented legitimation. Since the average citizen often has difficulty perceiving where their interests lie in terms of the euro and economic integration, however, they will judge whether EMU is legitimate based on how they perceive its functioning. If the euro seems to be working, they will see it as legitimate. Jones believes that the ECB is here held prisoner to public opinion—no matter how well it performs, it cannot convince the public that economic integration is a good thing in times of crisis. While Jones makes an excellent argument, his article was written in 2009, before the financial crisis truly took hold. Shifts in public opinion later in the recession belie his conclusions. Felix Roth similarly observes in 2009 that trust in the EU has been lost throughout the European financial crisis.⁶ I will establish, however, that legitimacy—not trust—is the most important factor in determining whether the EU has successfully dealt with the crisis. And while trust in the EU has declined, its legitimacy has remained undiminished, or even increased to higher levels than before the crisis.

Scharpf himself writes in 2012 to echo these conclusions, that the EU can only be legitimated through output. "In other words, it must depend on the belief that the common good of the community is better served by authorities that are not under the direct control of parliaments and governments exposed to electoral accountability

United States of Europe or full exit from the euro?," *International Journal of Political Economy*, 39.4 (2010):87-102; Paul De Grauwe, *The governance of a fragile Eurozone*, CEPS Working Document 2011.

⁵Erik Jones, "Output legitimacy and the global financial crisis: perceptions matter".

⁶Felix Roth, "The effect of the financial crisis on systemic trust", *Intereconomics* 44.4 (2009): 203-208.

and the temptations of partisan politics”, he tells us.⁷ I will argue that he is correct—legitimation through feeling that integration is in one’s interest is the true way the EU will find support and legitimacy for supranational governance.

It has been shown by George and Gabel & Whitten that worsening economic conditions can promote further support for integration—among both elites and the public.⁸ George Ross’s work addresses the opinions of European elites during the recent crisis. Elites believe that hard times and inconsistent periods of integration are not unusual—there have been several crises and bumps in the road throughout the EU’s history, and integration has proceeded at different speeds at different times. But they point out that during the current crisis, things in the EU actually were functioning well, as evidenced by the “massive policy activity all around”.⁹ Naysayers are not acknowledging reality, say these elites. The crisis actually helped the EU move further on the path of integration.

Serrichio et al. argue that while Euroskepticism has increased during the financial crisis, economic factors have not been the cause of changes in public opinion.¹⁰ While he finds that the countries hit hardest by the poor economy have seen the most increases in Euroskepticism, he shows that Euroskepticism is related to holding exclusive national identity as well as confidence in national political systems. Those

⁷Fritz Scharpf, “Legitimacy intermediation in the multilevel European polity and its collapse in the euro crisis”, MPIfG Discussion Paper, No 12/6 (2012).

⁸Stephen George. *Politics and policy-making in the European Community*; Matthew Gabel and Guy Whitten, “Economic conditions, economic perceptions, and public support for European integration”

⁹George, *Politics and policy-making in the European Community*.

¹⁰Fabio Serrichio, Myrto Tsakatika, and Lucia Quaglia, “Euroskepticism and the global financial crisis”, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51.1 (2013): 51-64.

who hold exclusively national identities are much more likely to be Euroskeptic, while confidence in national political institutions shows a negative correlation with Euroskepticism (although the effect of national political systems markedly decreases during the crisis). It is typical in the literature for an economic crisis to increase feelings of xenophobia, so the first result is consistent with the traditional literature.

The second result from Serrichio et al, however, shows that while initially (in 2007) confidence in national political systems is negatively correlated with Euroskepticism, this effect has drastically decreased by 2010. As the crisis went on, Euroskepticism became less related to a trade-off between the supranational and the national. The authors believe that this change is due to an increased EU role in solving the crisis in more recent years. European citizens may have recognized the beginnings of this successful crisis management, and seen that different levels of government were not necessarily in competition. While the causal factors are postulation, the paper does show that economic factors did not cause a retrenchment in support for the EU, and any increase in Euroskepticism was not related directly to the economic crisis.

Most recently, Kuhn and Stoeckel find that support for economic governance and support for European integration are not the same.¹¹ They examine a few of the typical factors that predict support for European integration, and find that they do not necessarily predict support for economic governance in the crisis (their analysis utilizes Eurobarometer data from 2011). This work brings up an important distinction that I also seek to address in this project—the difference between support for generalized European governance and support for specific policy areas.

¹¹Theresa Kuhn and Florian Stoeckel, “When European integration becomes costly: the euro crisis and public support for European economic governance”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21.4 (2014): 624-641.

5.3 Hypotheses

I will present several hypotheses in this chapter. I will present evidence supporting the first three hypotheses drawn from Eurobarometer data collected during the financial crisis. I will show that most Europeans want the EU to take charge of dealing with the financial crisis, despite decreased measures of affective identification.

H1: A majority of Europeans want the EU to take charge of solving the financial crisis.

H2: Trust for European institutions will be higher than trust for national institutions.

H3: Identification with the EU will have decreased from pre-financial crisis levels.

I will present evidence supporting the following set of hypotheses through statistical modeling to show correlations between support for the EU controlling the resolution of the financial crisis and other relevant factors.

H4A: Support for the EU solving the financial crisis as opposed to a national government will increase when the respondent believes their national government is going in the wrong direction.

H4B: Support for the EU solving the financial crisis as opposed to a national government will increase with belief that the economy is an important political issue.

H4C: Support for the EU solving the financial crisis as opposed to a national government will increase as trust in EU institutions increases and trust in national institutions decreases.

H4D: Support for the EU solving the financial crisis as opposed to a national government will increase with positive expectations of the future.

H4E: Support for the EU solving the financial crisis as opposed to a national government will increase with positive expectations of the future.

If my hypotheses are proved correct, it will show important truths about the European Union and legitimacy. The severity of the financial crisis has been a critical test for the health of the union. If its citizens still trust it enough to wish it to solve the financial crisis, this shows an important truth. Despite decreased identification with the EU, European citizens still feel the EU is legitimate enough to be trusted with the financial future of the EU.

5.4 Public Opinion About the EU During the Financial Crisis

If the media is to be believed, the financial crisis augured the beginning of the end for the EU—a blow from which the union would never recover. One would thus expect that Europeans would feel less confident in the EU, and would begin to cleave to the relative safety and security of their national governments. Public opinion data shows that this is not the case, however. Since the financial crisis began, Europeans have by and large believed that the EU was responsible for solving the crisis, rather than their national governments, or any other organizations that have been suggested. Public opinion data with such results would show that the European public trust the EU and believe it is capable of taking effective action to solve a crisis. This result indicates that the EU has a great deal of popular legitimacy. When the worst crisis in decades hits Europe, people look to a trusted and legitimate governing body to solve such a problem.

The graph below (Figure 5.2) traces data from Eurobarometer surveys from 2009-2014. These surveys asked respondents which group was best able to take effective action against the effects of the financial and economic crisis. Responses included the national government, the EU, the United States, the G8/G20, and the IMF. The two consistent leaders of the pack were the EU and the national government. While there is a close margin between the two at times, it is clear that over the last 5 years, the EU is the consistently favored actor by the European public. A plurality of the EU public (between one-quarter and one-third, with numbers steadily increasing) sees them as being best able to take effective action. This phrasing is critical. The question does not ask which actor the respondent prefers take action, or which they identify most with. It asks which actor they believe can take most *effective* action. The fact that the most common answer to this question is the EU speaks volumes about the future of this organization. While H1's stipulation

of a majority is not quite supported, the EU is consistently the top-ranked response, with a plurality of the votes, over five years of survey data. Figure 5.3 shows a breakdown by member state, which helps draw another important conclusion—in most member states, the percentage supporting EU action has actually increased over time.

Figure 5.2: Group best able to take effective action against the financial crisis, Eurobarometer 2009-2015





Figure 5.3
EU most effective actor
in financial crisis
Eurobarometer data 2009-2014



Hypothesis 2 compares trust of European institutions and the EU itself to trust in national institutions (specifically, parliaments) and governments, beginning in 2006 (before the financial crisis began). I hypothesized that trust in the EU and its institutions would be higher than trust in national governments and parliaments. While overall trust in both the EU and trust in national governments is declining in the wake of the crisis, the EU consistently outperforms national governments by a significant margin, as does the European Parliament when compared to national parliaments. This is shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, below.

What does this result tell us? Individuals in Europe trust the EU more than they trust their national government, in large numbers. The overall numbers on trust dropped during the heights of the crisis, but now is remaining steady and even beginning to show signs of climbing again. This tells us that again, the EU is seen as trustworthy and competent to a significantly higher degree than national governments. Europeans are confident in the European Union, which is also reflected in the H1 result. Thus, we can also accept H2 based on this data.

Figure 5.4: Trust in European and national governments, Eurobarometer 2009-2015






Figure 5.5: Trust in European and national parliaments, Eurobarometer 2009-2014



Examining H3 is somewhat more difficult, as questions about attachment to the EU are asked inconsistently through the years. The questions asked most consistently

deal with whether membership in the EU is a good or bad thing, and whether membership in the EU has benefited the respondent's home country. One can see from Figure 5.6 below that during and after the crisis, positive responses to both of these questions have decreased slightly, although they are beginning to climb again. Fewer people find membership in the EU to be a good thing, and fewer people feel their country has benefited from being a member of the EU.



While each of these results are interesting on their own, in concert they tell a fascinating story. Citizens of the EU are less likely to feel that joining the EU has benefited their country specifically, and are less likely to say it is a good thing their country is a member. But they are more likely to say they trust the EU (and the European Parliament) than their national government and parliaments, and believe strongly that it will act effectively to solve the financial crisis. In fact, even as trust in the EU has declined over the course of the crisis, the number of people who feel it would be most effective in solving the financial crisis increases, and the number of those saying it is beneficial to their countries to be a member is beginning to grow

again. This is a telling image.

Trust can be considered one measure of affective identification with the EU. The fact that as it declines during the crisis and its aftermath, while a measure of political legitimacy (preference of European control in the crisis) truly shows the importance of issues of governance when looking at the success of the EU. While many have predicted that the crisis means the end of the EU, it seems that the opposite is the case. The euro crisis has allowed the European Union to take steps toward expanding its governance that a few years ago were unimaginable. There is precedent for this phenomenon throughout world history—in crisis, governments can become more powerful through necessity. Rather than public rejection, which one would expect, in fact, even more EU citizens feel confident in European governance, even as they trust their own national governments less.

5.5 Factors Influencing Support for EU Governance in Crisis

Chapter 3 highlighted the particular factors influencing overall support for European governance in various policy areas. This section will examine the factors that influence support for European governance in the financial crisis, using multilevel models and data from Eurobarometers 75.3 and 81.4, from 2011 and 2014, respectively. The dependent variable will be the question dealt with in Figure 1, asking which entity would be the most effective in the financial crisis. Independent variables will include whether membership in the EU is a good or bad thing, whether the country has benefited from being a member of the EU (the former two in 2011 analysis only), trust in institutions both national and European, whether the respondent feels like an EU citizen, assessment of whether the EU is going in the right or wrong direction, future expectations, whether the economy is an important issue to the respondent, a dummy variable for countries that have received bailout

funds, and standard demographic variables. These independent variables capture both affective identity variables and those that deal with more utilitarian interests.

Table 5.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
mostcapable2	0.552	0.497	12796
Membership in EU good or bad thing	1.293	0.762	25909
Membership in EU benefited country	0.619	0.486	24149
Trust national government	0.377	0.485	29830
Trust EU	0.517	0.5	28430
Country going right or wrong direction	0.793	0.882	30231
EU going in right or wrong direction	1.003	0.887	28078
Economy important national issue	0.382	0.486	15671
Future expectations	0.954	0.999	31010
bailout	0.152	0.359	31767
Left/Right Placement	5.417	2.241	25154
Education	26.746	24.218	31189
age	2.733	1.695	31769
Occupation	7.775	5.628	31769
Financial difficulties in household	1.383	0.733	31191

A likelihood-ratio test reveals that the 2011 model explains a significant amount of variance. There was a significant correlation between both benefiting from EU membership and believing EU membership was a good thing and supporting EU control in the crisis. Trust in national government had a positive correlation, indicating that increased trust in national governments lowers the likelihood that respondents will choose the EU as their preferred actor in the crisis. The reverse was true of trust in the EU—increased trust in the EU made respondents more likely to choose the EU as the preferred actor.

Future expectations and having received bailout money were not significant. Political orientation, Educationation, financial difficulties, and occupation were also not significant (as in the Kuhn & Stoeckel paper), while age was—younger respondents

Table 5.2: Eurobarometer 75.3 2011

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : mostcapable2		
Membership in EU good thing	0.753**	(0.202)
Benefited from being member of EU	0.842**	(0.243)
Trust national government	-1.088**	(0.286)
Trust EU	1.114**	(0.295)
Belgium	1.008*	(0.393)
The Netherlands	0.370	(0.355)
Germany	0.645†	(0.369)
Italy	1.273**	(0.455)
Luxembourg	1.537**	(0.534)
Denmark	-0.640†	(0.374)
Ireland	0.011	(0.314)
Great Britain	-1.906**	(0.579)
Northern Ireland	-1.450*	(0.621)
Greece	2.090**	(0.602)
Spain	0.679†	(0.359)
Portugal	1.681**	(0.531)
Finland	1.390**	(0.475)
Sweden	-1.356**	(0.455)
Austria	0.873*	(0.387)
Cyprus	0.636	(0.407)
Czech Republic	2.320**	(0.721)
Estonia	2.042**	(0.601)
Hungary	1.649**	(0.528)
Latvia	1.606**	(0.529)
Lithuania	1.621**	(0.529)
Malta	-0.509	(0.393)
Poland	1.420**	(0.474)
Slovakia	1.784**	(0.549)
Slovenia	1.471**	(0.496)
Bulgaria	1.250**	(0.456)
Romania	-0.286	(0.313)
Intercept	-1.867**	(0.519)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u		
Intercept	2.021**	(0.679)
N	9143	
Log-likelihood	-5543.751	
$\chi^2_{(32)}$	16.49	
Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%		

were more likely to support the EU as their preferred actor. The 2014 analysis showed similar results. Additional analysis showed that support for various crisis measures listed in the 2011 data set predicted support for European governance in the financial crisis. This indicates that trust in the EU is important when choosing the EU to be the most effective actor in the financial crisis, as well as belief in its efficaciousness and capability. Simply believing that the EU is an effective actor reduces the need for affective identification.

Table 5.3: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
mostcapable2	0.581	0.493	12678
Trust national government	0.329	0.47	27636
Trust EU	0.409	0.492	25642
Country going right or wrong direction	0.847	0.875	27766
EU going in right or wrong direction	0.950	0.858	25208
Feels like citizen of EU	1.802	0.977	27727
Economy important national issue	0.367	0.482	28004
Future expectations	0.992	1	28795
bailout	0.162	0.368	29015
Left/Right Placement	5.246	2.195	23596
Education	2.279	0.858	28615
age	2.995	1.826	29030
Occupation	4.919	2.176	29030
Financial difficulties in household	1.491	0.696	28667
class	5.482	1.547	28196

5.6 Case Studies: Greece and Germany

Arguably, Greece and Germany have been at odds for the entire European financial crisis. Greece has been cast in the role of the child who has done wrong and needs to be disciplined, while Germany acts as if it were the responsible parent who doles out consequences (through austerity). Many public opinion polls show that Greeks overwhelmingly oppose austerity. Yet, they still want Greece to remain in the Eurozone and in the European Union. Meanwhile the average Johann on a German street feels resentful about their tax money going to support “lazy”, “irresponsible”

Table 5.4: Eurobarometer 81.4, 2014

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : national government		
Trust national government	0.202**	(0.065)
Trust EU	-0.601**	(0.063)
Country going right or wrong direction	0.120**	(0.039)
EU going in right or wrong direction	-0.251**	(0.038)
Feels like citizen of EU	-0.466**	(0.030)
Economy important national issue	-0.169**	(0.052)
Future expectations	-0.076**	(0.026)
bailout	-0.166	(0.231)
Left/Right Placement	0.021 [†]	(0.012)
Education	-0.141**	(0.035)
age	0.039*	(0.017)
Occupation	0.012	(0.012)
Financial difficulties in household	-0.128**	(0.043)
class	0.026	(0.020)
Belgium	-0.183	(0.168)
The Netherlands	-0.145	(0.191)
Germany	0.073	(0.178)
Italy	-0.163	(0.192)
Luxembourg	-0.835**	(0.261)
Denmark	0.383*	(0.181)
Ireland	0.205	(0.276)
Great Britain	1.323**	(0.194)
Northern Ireland	1.373**	(0.293)
Greece	0.249	(0.280)
Spain	0.401	(0.277)
Spain	-0.016	(0.285)
Germany	0.292	(0.211)
Finland	-0.168	(0.189)
Sweden	0.025	(0.171)
Austria	0.254	(0.175)
Cyprus	-0.436	(0.336)
Czech Republic	0.067	(0.222)
Estonia	-0.139	(0.236)
Hungary	0.521**	(0.161)
Latvia	-0.121	(0.190)
Lithuania	-0.714**	(0.209)
Malta	0.274	(0.228)
Poland	0.146	(0.194)
Slovakia	-0.346 [†]	(0.181)
Slovenia	-0.164	(0.183)
Bulgaria	-0.518**	(0.195)
Romania	1.020**	(0.170)
Croatia	-0.636**	(0.193)
Intercept	0.935**	(0.201)
Equation 2 : EU		
N	8036	
Log-likelihood	-4754.429	
$\chi^2_{(43)}$	1274.176	

Greeks.¹² All bailouts and negotiations are entirely an elite project and the question of public support is a contentious one. Thus, Greece and Germany are excellent case studies through which to take this study further. Do the conclusions above still hold true when examining what are purportedly the two most extreme positions in the EU? I will present results both through descriptive statistics and regression analysis.

First, let us look at some questions asked consistently throughout the crisis to see trends over time. Figure 5.9, below, shows the percentage of respondents who had a positive image of the EU between 2009 and 2014. One can see that when asked for a visceral, immediate emotional reaction to the EU, many Greeks had negative reactions, which dip precipitously after 2009. The German reaction is more moderate, but still not particularly positive. Many Greeks (and many Germans) had a negative view of the EU at this point.

¹²Bechtel et al 2014, “Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts”; Elizabeth Whitman, “Greek Crisis: Germans React, Question Longevity And Sustainability Of European Bailout Deal”, International Business Times, July 13, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.com/greek-crisis-germans-react-question-longevity-sustainability-european-bailout-deal-2006299>; Pew Research Center, “European Unity on the Rocks: Greeks and Germans at Polar Opposites”, May 29, 2012, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/29/european-unity-on-the-rocks/>.






Figure 5.10 shows us the results of answers to a different question. Several Eurobarometer surveys during the crisis have asked a battery of questions regarding different measures that could be used to solve the crisis. The results displayed in this graph are those for a question that asks whether EU countries should work together more in the face of the crisis. One would expect, given the publicity, that both Germans (tired of giving their money to irresponsible Southern Europeans) and Greeks (tired of Brussels ordering them to make spending cuts, tax increases and painful structural reforms) would give a negative response to this question. Instead, we see a result that is exactly the opposite. Figure 6 displays consistent results from 2009-2013 showing that the vast majority of respondents in both countries feel that countries in the EU should work together even more than they have before.



In Figure 5.11, we return to a question that deals with affective identity. This graph examines data on feelings of European citizenship. Here, we can see that Germans are much more likely to say they feel they are citizens of Europe than Greeks. Less than half of Greeks feel they are citizens of Europe, and this number has vacillated between 40 and 50 percent throughout the crisis. In contrast, close to 80% of Germans feel they are European citizens. This figure emphasizes Greek feelings of isolation when they think of the EU in affective terms—but here we begin to see that identifying with the EU does not mean Greek citizens don't feel the EU is effective in the crisis.



Figures 5.12 and 5.13 isolate the question of who is the most capable actor in the financial crisis. Germans seem to side with the rest of the EU in their consistent feeling that the EU is the best person to act here. The Greeks are all over the proverbial map even in this brief period. The EU does eke out a victory for the majority of the time, in particular the worst years of the crisis in the middle of the graph.

Figure 5.10: Who would be the most effective actor in the financial crisis? (Greece) Eurobarometer, 2009-2015






Figure 5.13: Who would be the most effective actor in the financial crisis? (Germany) Eurobarometer, 2009-2015




Finally, we will examine measures of national and European trust in government, as in H2. It is clear from Figure 5.14 that Greeks trust Europe far more than their

national government, and it is also clear that this trust has fallen sharply throughout the course of the financial crisis. Trust of the national government even falls into the single digits between 2012 and 2013. While trust in any form of government is low, European trust is significantly higher than national trust in Greece. The story is a bit more complicated in Germany, where national trust does begin to exceed trust in the European government, but both levels are inconsistent over time.

**Figure 5.14: Trust in government
vs. trust in EU (Greece)
Eurobarometer 2009-2014**



**Figure 5.15: Trust in government
vs. trust in EU (Germany)
Eurobarometer 2009-2014**



To summarize what these figures tell us, measures of the emotional, affective responses to Europe do not fare well. The numbers of those who had a positive image

of the EU are dropping precipitously in both countries, and have been since 2009. Additionally, very few Greeks identify as citizens of Europe, especially compared to Germans. While both countries tend to trust the European government more than their own, trust has been dropping over time. The financial crisis has certainly had a deep effect on affective identification with Europe. But how much does this matter? The most capable actor in the financial crisis is still fairly consistently reflected as the EU. Both Greeks and Germans respond in overwhelming numbers that countries in the EU need to work together more as a result of the crisis. While Greeks do not feel they are European citizens, they have a negative image of the EU, and trust it less than they did before the crisis, most of the time they still choose it as the most effective actor in the financial crisis. Most significantly, nearly 90% of Greeks believe that the countries of the EU should work together more. One would expect a result that is quite the opposite, based on the portrayal of the Greek experience during the crisis. Thus, we see again that feeling European is not necessarily crucial to finding European governance legitimate and thinking it is productive and beneficial.

Next, we will examine some other data from 2011 that reveals interesting truths about how Greeks see the European Union in the advent of the financial crisis. This data was collected after Greece had already received two bailouts from the EU, in exchange for unpopular austerity measures. Eurobarometer 75.3 asks a battery of questions about various “crisis measures”, including greater EU regulation of financial services, more EU supervision of financial activity, stronger economic policy coordination between member states, closer EU supervision of public money used to rescue financial institutions, and stronger coordination of economic and financial policy among the euro area. For each measure requiring greater EU involvement, 80-90% agree they should be put into place. Additionally, a plurality feel the EU is the best placed actor to regulate financial markets. 84% feel the EU should take a stronger role in developing rules for global financial markets. In Eurobarometer 76.3 taken later that same year, 64% of Greeks report that they feel the crisis is better

mitigated when European countries work together as opposed to their country working individually.

These data provide even more evidence that affective identification with Europe and finding European governance effective are unrelated. Despite drop-off of most common feeling with the EU, most Greeks want greater European involvement in financial and monetary policy. They feel the EU should take an even stronger role in governance, and that EU countries would benefit from working together even more. This is at the same time that they express a lack of European citizenship, a lack of trust in the EU as an institution, and a negative image of the European Union. In other words, while they do not identify with Europe, they still find it an effective system of governance—they find it legitimate. This distinction is key to assessing the future of the European Union.

5.7 Discussion

This analysis underscores the main point of this project with reference to an important event ongoing in the European Union. Affective identity is less important than belief in the EU's capable and effective governing abilities when trusting them with policy competence. Despite a decrease in most indicators of affective identity, Europeans still want the EU in control of the financial crisis—even the embattled Greeks and Germans. They find European governance legitimate and so they support EU control.

5.8 Appendix

5.8.1 Eurobarometer 75.3, 2011

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?

Crime

Economic situation

Rising prices/inflation

Taxation

Unemployment

Terrorism

Defence/Foreign Affairs

Housing

Immigration

Healthcare system

The Educationational system

Pensions

The environment

Energy

Other

Done

DK

How old are you?

Gender

How old were you when you stopped full-time Educationation?

How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy; The situation of the European economy; The situation of the economy in the world; Your personal job situation; The financial situation of your household; The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)

Very good

Rather good

Rather bad

Very bad

DK

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The (NATIONALITY) Government; The European Union.

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly Pessimistic about future of EU or very Pessimistic about future of EU about the future of the EU?

Very optimistic

Fairly optimistic

Fairly Pessimistic about future of EU

Very Pessimistic about future of EU

DK

At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in? (OUR COUNTRY); The European Union.

The right direction

The wrong direction

DK

In your opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?

The (NATIONALITY) Government

The European Union

The United States

The G20

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Other

None

Generally speaking, do you think our country's membership in the EU is a good or bad thing?

A good thing

A bad thing

Neither good nor bad

DK

Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) would benefit or not from being a member of the EU?

Would benefit

Would not benefit

DK

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?

Crime

Economic situation

Rising prices/inflation

Taxation

Unemployment

Terrorism

Defence/Foreign Affairs

Housing

Immigration

Healthcare system

The Educational system

Pensions

The environment

Energy

Other

None

DK

What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...? Your life in general; The economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY); The financial situation of our household; The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY); Your personal job situation; The

economic situation in the EU; The economic situation in the world.

Better

Worse

Same

DK

How old are you?

Gender

How old were you when you stopped full-time Educationation?

What is your current occupation?

Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working

Student

Unemployed, temporarily not working

Retired or unable to work due to illness

Self-employed

Farmer

Fisherman

Professional

Owner of a shop, craftsman, other self-employed person

Business proprietor

Employed professional

General management

Middle management

Employed position, working mainly at a desk

Employed position, not at a desk but in a service job

Supervisor

Skilled manual worker

Other unskilled manual worker, servant

Never did any paid work

5.8.2 Eurobarometer 81.4, 2014

For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion; You feel you are a citizen of the EU

Yes, definitely

Yes, to some extent

No, not really

No, definitely not

DK

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?

Crime

Economic situation

Rising prices/inflation

Taxation

Unemployment

Terrorism

Defence/Foreign Affairs

Housing

Immigration

Healthcare system

The Educational system

Pensions

The environment

Energy

Other

Done

DK

How old are you?

Gender

How old were you when you stopped full-time Education?

How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy; The situation of the European economy; The situation of the economy in the world; Your personal job situation; The financial situation of your household; The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)

Very good

Rather good

Rather bad

Very bad

DK

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The (NATIONALITY) Government; The European Union.

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly Pessimistic about future of EU or very Pessimistic about future of EU about the future of the EU?

Very optimistic

Fairly optimistic

Fairly Pessimistic about future of EU

Very Pessimistic about future of EU

DK

At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in? (OUR COUNTRY); The European Union.

The right direction

The wrong direction

DK

In your opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?

The (NATIONALITY) Government

The European Union

The United States

The G20

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Other

None

Generally speaking, do you think our country's membership in the EU is a good or bad thing?

A good thing

A bad thing

Neither good nor bad

DK

Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) would benefit or not from being a member of the EU?

Would benefit

Would not benefit

DK

What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?

Crime

Economic situation

Rising prices/inflation

Taxation

Unemployment

Terrorism

Defence/Foreign Affairs

Housing

Immigration

Healthcare system

The Educationational system

Pensions

The environment

Energy

Other

None

DK

What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...? Your life in general; The economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY); The financial situation of our household; The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY); Your personal job situation; The economic situation in the EU; The economic situation in the world.

Better

Worse

Same

DK

How old are you?

Gender

How old were you when you stopped full-time Educationation?

What is your current occupation?

Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current occupation, not working

Student

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Professional

Owner of a shop, craftsman, other self-employed person

Business proprietor

Employed professional

General management

Middle management

Employed position, working mainly at a desk

Employed position, not at a desk but in a service job

Supervisor

Skilled manual worker

Other unskilled manual worker, servant

Never did any paid work

Chapter 6

Conclusions

While the debate about affective identity and utilitarian concerns has raged throughout the history of European public opinion, much literature has shown that Europeans are more likely to make decisions about supporting EU control of policy areas based on rational benefits than affective identity. Despite a lack of increase in identification with Europe, the EU has consistently managed to expand its powers over time. How has this been accomplished? Many assume that in order to create power transfer, there must be a common identity among EU citizens. In this project, I have shown that this may not be the case, and discussed examining legitimacy instead of affective identity, creating a conversation between these two literatures. The EU is capable of expanding further because it has political legitimacy. Do Europeans feel that the EU is a competent actor? Do they even feel that they or their nations will receive greater economic benefit from EU control of particular policies? Answering these questions will show significantly more about public support for EU control of particular policy areas.

Tolerance represents acceptance of European governance in a particular area. Chapter 2 examines this concept in more depth, along with the idea of legitimacy. European citizens understand rational decision-making, and make instrumental calculations about which level of government could best and most efficiently deal with the policy area. Eurobarometer data over the past two decades on several policy areas shows that supranational control of policies where economies of scale play a role

have more support than policies that would not benefit from economies of scale. It concludes that there is evidence to show that citizens are aware of what policy areas create fiscal efficiency, and take this into account when tolerating power transfer to the supranational entity. Thus, there is more to examine when it comes to measuring the success of the EU than just whether people express that they “feel European”. Significantly, it is also important to differentiate this support by policy area, rather than examining general regime support, as is the current norm in the literature.

Chapter 3 delves into the predictors of support for EU control of different policies. I posit that while previous literature has classed the determinants of EU support in one group, in reality there are different determinants and predictors for different policy areas. This is because support for EU control is based on economic concerns. I show that different characteristics are important when determining support for different policies, and the characteristics that affect them are based on the benefits that could be accrued from EU support of such a policy. Europeans do understand the benefits of economics of scale and burden-sharing, and assign their preferences to policies where it is more efficient to do so.

Chapter 4 presents the results of a survey experiment which provides evidence for the idea that Europeans can be swayed to think rationally about the European Union. In this study, British respondents were given randomized prompts that focused on the cost efficiency of either supranational or national policy control of two different policy areas. While the results for defense policy were mixed, the results for environmental policy were clearly in line with my hypotheses. Respondents who were shown the prompt emphasizing the cost efficiency of supranational control were more likely to be pro-EU control, while the reverse was true for those who received a prompt emphasizing the economic threat of EU control. The United Kingdom is famously home to one of the most Euroskeptic populations within the EU and yet on a major

policy issue, pronounced effects were found. If this is the case in Great Britain, there would arguably be a larger effect in countries with more pro-European populations. This experiment provided evidence for the idea that Europeans do think rationally about the EU and sociotropically at that. Again, though, this thought process is differentiated by policy area.

Chapter 5 used the recent Eurozone crisis as a case study to discuss European public opinion on supranational policy control. Through analysis of Eurobarometer data, this chapter showed that Europeans have consistently preferred European control of the financial crisis. While indicators of affective identity have gone down, Europeans still trust the EU more than their national government and prefer EU governance of the crisis. Case studies of Greece and Germany individually further emphasize this point. The financial crisis is a vehicle to show again that European identity is less important to EU support than belief in the EU's capable and effective governing abilities. Despite a decrease in most indicators of affective identity, Europeans still want the EU in control of the financial crisis.

This project gives a different perspective on the factors that affect support for EU policy control. While this literature is substantial, this project differs in several key ways. First, it creates a conversation between mostly qualitative literature concerned with the future of EU due to a lack of affective identity, and mostly quantitative literature focusing on regime support. The multimethod approach in this project allows these two literatures to mingle, and shows that the EU can in fact continue to integrate without further development of identity due to its significant political legitimacy.

Secondly, this project presents the idea of different predictors for control of different policies. Most work on support for the EU focuses on the question whether people feel European, or on generalized support for integration. This project puts forward the idea that different individual characteristics can predict support for different policy areas. One particular combination of characteristics could create support for EU control of defense policy, but not necessarily environmental policy. The idea of looking at different characteristics to predict support for different policy areas is one that is underserved in the literature.

These conclusions have great implications for the future of the EU. The Union is far from doomed. In fact, it has a bright future ahead. Having recently undergone a great expansion of its powers during the crisis, it has more ability than ever before to change the lives of Europeans—and indeed, one could argue the crisis is potent evidence for what happens when Europeans do not work together enough. The data presented in Chapter 5 certainly shows that many in the EU feel that member states should work together more, not less, as a result of the crisis. Many signs point to the EU continuing to expand its powers in the future.

Should the EU continue to succeed, this obviously has huge implications both for Europe and the world. A supranational entity the likes of the EU has rarely been seen before. If the EU is to move out of the crisis successfully, further union in the financial sector must be necessary. And with recent events on the world stage in countries such as Libya and Ukraine, the possibility of joint defense is continually raised. While the British may not support such an endeavor, many of their fellow Europeans do. The doomed future many media outlets predict, constantly referring to Grexit and Brexit, seems unlikely to occur.

It is not enough to examine general regime support. The EU is a diffuse organization with many policy competences, and Europe is a complicated federal system. The citizens of Europe do understand their national and individual interests, and make decisions about support for different policy areas based on these interests. In future, creating a research agenda based on different policy areas is crucial to truly understanding support for further European integration.

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