A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE RISK FACTORS FOR RADICALIZATION: PERCEIVED ISLAMOPHOBIA, IDENTITY CRISIS, AND POOR INTEGRATION

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

A Cross-national Study of the Relationships among the Risk Factors for Radicalization: Perceived Islamophobia, Identity Crisis, and Poor Integration

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Existing literature on radicalization leading to violent extremism covers a wide range of issues and areas of concern, including theories and models of radicalization and the radicalization process, as well as triggers, catalysts, and risk factors for the emergence of radicalization. Scholars have identified various risk factors that influence the likelihood of violent radicalization. However, a review of literature on radicalization reveals that there is a lack of thorough analysis of how major risk factors relate to each other. The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationships between major risk factors for radicalization by combining them in a single model. Three risk factors were selected for this study: perceived Islamophobia, poor integration, and identity crisis. These risk factors are critical for understanding the early stages of the radicalization process of Muslim individuals who live in Western societies.

This study utilized a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design, employing both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Data was collected using a
survey of 180 Turkish-Americans and 118 Turkish-Canadians and interviews with 10 opinion leaders. The researcher proposed four hypotheses to investigate the relationships between the three aforementioned risk factors and used Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to test these hypotheses. The results showed that both perceived Islamophobia and poor integration were predictors of identity crisis in both samples. No significant relationship was observed between perceived Islamophobia and poor integration. The results also revealed some differences between the two samples. Perceived Islamophobia was significantly higher for the sample of Turkish-Americans. Additionally, higher perceived Islamophobia among Turkish-Americans predicted weaker identification with the host country. On the other hand, stronger religious identification among Turkish-Canadians predicted lower levels of integration.

It is necessary to emphasize that this study did not explore whether the participants did or did not adopt radical ideologies. Rather, the researcher focused on the relationships among the risk factors that might make Muslim minorities more vulnerable to radicalization. The study concluded that it is important to take measures to counter Islamophobia and to facilitate the integration of Muslim minorities in order to lessen the likelihood that they will experience an identity crisis.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The radicalization of Muslims has become a focal point of research since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The development of extreme behaviors among members of minority groups poses a security threat to society, even when it does not lead to terrorism, as it results in polarization and intercultural tension (Staun, 2008). Consequently, the potential risk of the radicalization of Muslim minorities has become one of the most significant security concerns in Western countries.

The process of radicalization is a complex phenomenon that is determined by a combination of social, economic, ideological, theological, and personal factors. Current literature points out various risk factors and root causes of radicalization, such as relative deprivation (Murshed & Pavan, 2011); discrimination, racism, and Islamophobia (Rahimullah, Larmar, & Abdalla, 2013); identity crisis (Choudhury, 2007); poor socio-economic and political integration (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009); a lack of knowledge about Islam (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010); and feelings of humiliation (Saurette, 2005). Some underlying mechanisms characterize the association between these risk factors and radicalization. The literature mostly emphasizes identity crisis as the main risk factor for radicalization, and other factors seem somehow related to identity crisis as well.

For instance, the literature argues that perceived Islamophobia is a risk factor for radicalization because it causes identity crisis, which in turn increases the likelihood of radicalization (Choudhury, 2007). Research indicates that high levels of perceived discrimination can predict more cases of identity crisis (Ward &
Leong, 2000). Sageman (2004) also highlights the problem of identity crisis as an important outcome of Islamophobia and argues that encountering Islamophobia may cause identity crisis and may eventually lead Muslims away from the mainstream. Additionally, failing to integrate into society also provokes identity crisis and alienation among young Muslims in Western countries, which may result in radicalization (d’Appolonia, 2011). However, the underlying mechanism of the relationship between perceived Islamophobia and identity conflict is not clear, nor is how poor integration plays a role in this mechanism.

Research shows that group-based rejection has an influence on the identity formation of minorities. The Rejection-Identification Model (RIM) (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999) suggests that perceived discrimination predicts higher levels of in-group identification. According to this model, derived from Social Identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1989), individuals increase their connection with an in-group as a response to discrimination. On the other hand, the Rejection-Disidentification Model (RDIM) (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009) argues that individuals in minority groups decrease their national identification in order to cope with perceived discrimination. Various forms of religious stigma may trigger a religious identity threat, and in order to cope with such an identity threat, stigmatized groups are more likely to decrease their identification with their host nation (Kunst, Tajamal, Ulleberg, & Sam, 2012). Kunst et al.’s (2012) study showed that perceived Islamophobia negatively predicted national engagement of Norwegian-Pakistani immigrants. Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) found that perceived
group rejection was associated with decreased national identification and increased religious identification among Turkish-Dutch Muslim participants. In a similar vein, Matrinovic and Verkuyten (2012) found a positive relationship between perceived discrimination and religious identification in a sample of Turkish Muslims from Germany and Netherlands. Foner and Alba (2008) argued that religion could facilitate the adaptation of some minorities to their host society. Therefore, as Kunst et al. (2012) suggested, strengthening religious identity may help immigrants to cope with religious stigma (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010).

Other studies have demonstrated that perceived discrimination influences acculturation orientations of minorities (Berry & Sabatier, 2010; Te Lindert, Korzilius, Van de Vijver, Kroon, & Arends-Tóth, 2008). Acculturation orientation is based on the extent to which immigrants are in contact with the out-group and to what extent they want to maintain their own cultures (Berry and Sabatier, 2010). Perceived discrimination is one of the antecedent conditions of the acculturation process (Celenk & Van de Vijver, 2011). Berry (1997) identified four acculturation strategies: assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separation. He suggested that acculturation has two aspects: intercultural contact and cultural maintenance. Robinson (2009) argued that immigrants who perceive discrimination prefer a separation strategy rather than that of integration or assimilation.

On the other hand, various research studies reveal a relationship between identity and acculturation orientations (Badea, Jetten, Iyer, & Er-rafiy, 2011;
Nesdale, 2002; Nesdale & Mak, 2000; Safdar, Calvez, & Lewis, 2012). While some studies treat national or ethnic identification as an outcome of acculturation attitudes (e.g., Nesdale & Mak 2000; Nesdale, 2002), others show that national or ethnic identification can predict acculturation attitudes (Badea et al., 2011; Safdar et al., 2012). Badea et al. (2011) found that national identification positively predicts the endorsement of assimilation and integration, and negatively predicts the endorsement of separation. On the other hand, ethnic identification was positively associated with integration and separation, while negatively associated with assimilation. Choudhury (2011) argued that an increased emphasis on religious identity can contribute to integration. However, the impact of religious identity on acculturation orientations is underemphasized in the literature.

In sum, it can be argued that the risk factors for radicalization – perceived Islamophobia, identity crisis, and poor integration – are interrelated. It is important to investigate these relationships in order to better understand the radicalization process. Studies on acculturation orientations and identity formation of minorities mostly focus on perceived ethnic discrimination and its effect on ethnic and national identification. However, the impact of perceived Islamophobia on the identity formation of Muslims who live in the West has been neglected (Kunst et al., 2012). On the other hand, the effects of perceived Islamophobia on acculturation orientations have not yet been fully explored in the literature. It is important to research the extent to which perceived Islamophobia affects the acculturation attitudes and identity formation of Muslim minorities. This study will test these relationships using a sample of Turkish immigrants living in North
Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to understand the mechanisms underlying associations between three risk factors for radicalization. Given the existing literature, the researcher aimed to investigate the relationships between these risk factors with the goal of improving the overall understanding of the factors that affect identity crisis, considered one of the most important root causes of radicalization, as well as the extent to which perceived Islamophobia and poor integration play a role on the likelihood of experiencing an identity crisis. The study also aimed to explore how these mechanisms differ between two Western societies: the United States and Canada. To investigate these mechanisms, the researcher tested the associations among perceived Islamophobia, national identification, religious identification, integration, and identity conflict in a sample of Turkish immigrants living in the United States and Canada.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Data was collected for this study by employing two methods: a survey of Turkish immigrants and interviews with the representatives of Turkish organizations in the United States and Canada. Two research questions guided the study:

RQ1. What are the relationships among the risk factors for radicalization (perceived Islamophobia, integration, and identity crisis)?

RQ2. How do these relationships differ between the United States and Canada?
Based on the research questions, the following hypotheses were tested:

H.1. Perceived Islamophobia is positively associated with religious identification, but it is negatively associated with national identification. Those who perceive higher levels of Islamophobia are more likely to identify themselves with religious in-groups and less likely to identify themselves with national out-groups.

H.2. National identification is positively associated with integration. Those who identify themselves with a national out-group are more likely to integrate into the host society.

H.3. Integration is negatively associated with identity crisis. In other words, those who cannot integrate into the host society are more likely to experience an identity crisis.

H.4. Perceived Islamophobia is positively associated with identity crisis. Those who perceive higher levels of Islamophobia are more likely to experience an identity crisis.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Radicalization

In short, radicalization refers to “the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs” (Borum, 2011, p. 9) and can be both violent and non-violent in nature. More broadly, it is viewed as a process of change (Al-Lami, 2008) or a personal and political transformation (Christmann, 2012). According to Veldhuis and Staun (2009), radicalization in its violent form is “the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal” (p. 9). Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsbrough (2006) distinguish radicalization from violent extremism. They argue that violent extremists are always radicals; however, radicals are rarely violent. They view radicalization as a “community anger and frustration” (p.42).

According to the United Kingdom’s strategy for countering international terrorism, radicalization refers to “the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups” (HM Government, 2009, p. 82). This definition creates a link between radicalization and terrorism. However, Briggs et al. (2006) stress that while they are not intrinsically linked, they can create opportunities for each other. Veldhuis and Staun (2009) argue that the process of radicalization can result in various outcomes, with terrorism being the worst possible outcome among all others, but nonviolent forms being possible as well.

Additionally, proposed models of radicalization in the literature (e.g., Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2008; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004) identify the stages and phases of the radicalization process. In the process
of radicalization, “individuals – usually young people – are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward extreme views” (RCMP, 2009, p. 1). Each radicalization model has its own approach to the process of radicalization and highlights certain root causes and facilitators. The New York Police Department’s (NYPD) (2007) four-stage radicalization process and Wiktorowicz’s (2004) model emphasize identity-related issues, whereas Moghaddam's (2005) and Borum’s (2003) models stress the factor of relative deprivation. On the other hand, moral outrage is the prominent factor leading to radicalization according to Sageman's (2008) model.

**Radicalization Models**

In the literature, a number of studies identify distinct models of the radicalization process. Among the various models in the literature, five models have been chosen for review here (see Table 2.1 below): the NYPD’s (2007) Four-Stage Radicalization Process, Wiktorowicz’s (2004) al-Muhajiroun model, Borum’s (2003) Four-Stage Model Of The Terrorist Mindset, Moghaddam’s (2005) Staircase To Terrorism, and Sageman's (2008) Four Prongs model. Although they have similarities, each model proposes its own pathway to radicalization.

**The NYPD’s four-stage radicalization process.**

The NYPD's (Silber & Bhatt, 2007) report on the radicalization process is based on in-depth analysis of al-Qaeda influenced terrorist attacks or thwarted plots conducted in the United States and abroad. The NYPD's radicalization process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007) is composed of four stages; (1) Pre-Radicalization, (2) Self-Identification, (3) Indoctrination, and (4) Jihadization.
Table 2.1. Models of Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Stages / Recurrent Phases</th>
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| The NYPD's Four-Stage Radicalization Process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007) | (1) Pre-Radicalization  
(2) Self-Identification  
(3) Indoctrination  
(4) Jihadization |
(2) Religious seeking  
(3) Frame alignment  
(4) Socialization |
(2) Comparison  
(3) Attribution  
(4) Reaction |
| Moghaddam's (2005) Staircase to the Terrorist Act | (1) Perceived options to fight unfair treatment  
(2) Displacement of aggression  
(3) Moral engagement  
(4) Solidification of categorical Thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organization  
(5) The terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms |
| Sageman's (2008) Four Prongs Model         | (1) Moral outrage  
(2) Interpretation of the world in a specific way  
(3) Resonance with personal experience  
(4) Mobilization through networks |


The first stage of the NYPD’s model is pre-radicalization and is related to social, environmental, and psychological factors that make people more vulnerable.
to Jihadist messages (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The authors argued that people who are more vulnerable to radical messages share some common characteristics. For instance, regarding environmental factors, those vulnerable to radical messages generally live in communities that are isolated from others (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Their age, gender, and social status are also similar. They tend to be 15 to 35 years old, male, and students who come from a middle class family (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Self-identification is the second stage at which time people begin to explore Salafi-Jihadist ideology (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). In this stage of the radicalization process, people re-create their identity by drawing on a Jihadist worldview and join an extremist group (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Political crises can lead to this stage. For instance, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been found to be a leading catalyst for identity seeking through a Jihadist lens (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

In the indoctrination stage, people completely adopt the Jihadist ideology and believe that militant jihad is a required action (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). According to the authors, this worldview justifies the use of violence against anyone who is not of the same mind as them, including non-Muslims and moderate Muslims. These people generally have feelings of anger against all others (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

In the fourth and final stage of the radicalization process, jihadization, people become members of a cluster and ready themselves for terrorist activities (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). In this stage, radicalized clusters begin to plan terrorist attacks. The authors argued that those people also travel abroad and join with
other jihadists in conflict regions such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan. They train and keep themselves ready for jihad (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

The NYPD’s proposed four-stage radicalization process is based on the analysis of five cases in the United States (Lackawanna, Portland, Northern Virginia, Herald Square Subway, and the al-Muhajiroun Two) and six cases abroad (Madrid's 2004 attack, London's 2005 attack, Amsterdam's Hofstad Group, Australia's Operation Pendennis, and The Toronto 18). There are some remarkable similarities between the cases. Some of the findings of the report indicate that (Silber & Bhatt, 2007):

- There is a notable consistency in the trajectory of each plot, although different circumstances surround each case and there are noted distinctions among the cases in terms of the evident stage of radicalization process. This means that the course and potential outcomes for each case are predictable.

- Contrary to popular belief, the main triggers of radicalization process are not feelings of revenge, desperation, or oppression. The most common cause of radicalization are identity issues. Individuals who are not able to successfully integrate into society and who look for an identity are typically found themselves in radical groups.

- Muslim-Americans are more resistant, but not completely immune, to being radicalized.

- A fully-radicalized individual will not always be a terrorist. However, even if one does not become a terrorist, he or she is still a threat to society.
**Wiktorowicz’s al-Muhajiroun model.**

Wiktorowicz developed his model based on his fieldwork on al-Muhajiroun, a UK-based transnational Islamic movement. Wiktorowicz (2004) identified four key processes that lead a person to join a radical group: cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization.

Cognitive opening is the first process in which “an individual becomes receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 1). According to Wiktorowicz, (2004), a trigger event can produce a cognitive opening, and triggers for cognitive opening include an economic crisis, such as losing a job; a social crisis, such as sense of humiliation; a political crisis, such as repression or torture; or a personal crisis, such as a death in the family.

Religious seeking is the second process at which time “the individual seeks meaning through a religious idiom” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 1). In this process, a person is in a search for “some satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve his discontent” (Lofland & Stark, 1965, p. 868). Radical groups can come into play at this stage and persuade religious seekers that the ideology of the movement provides the best solution to resolving their discontent (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

The third process is frame alignment, at which time “the public representation proffered by the radical group ‘makes sense’ to the seeker and attracts his or her initial interest” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 1). According to Wiktorowicz, “only when there is ‘frame alignment’ between individual and movement interpretive orientations is recruitment and mobilization possible. That
is, the movement’s schemata must resonate with an individual’s own interpretive framework to facilitate participation” (p.5).

Socialization is the final process in which “the individual experiences religious lessons and activities that facilitate indoctrination, identity-construction, and value changes” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 1). Once an individual passes through the first three steps, the socialization process can take place, and, the individual internalizes the movement’s ideology and becomes a member (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

**Borum’s Pathway to Radicalization.**

Borum (2003) proposed a pathway comprised of four stages that frame the process of developing radical ideas. In the first stage, an individual identifies his or her condition as undesirable. Social or economic deprivation may lead to grievances. The individual believes his or her condition is “not right” (Borum, 2003).

In the second stage of Borum’s (2003) model, individuals consider their undesirable condition as unjust. Borum (2003) argued that deprived individuals may feel a sense of resentment and injustice, and inequalities among individuals, communities, or countries prompt individuals to compare their conditions with others. This comparison leads to the feeling of injustice, and they believe that their conditions are “not fair” (Borum, 2003).

In the third stage, Borum (2003) argued that individuals hold a group responsible for their unjust conditions; they identify potential targets on which to blame injustice. Aggrieved individuals or groups direct their anger towards identified targets, and believe that their unjust conditions are the fault of these
targeted individuals, groups, policies, and/or nations (Borum, 2003).

In the final stage, individuals describe their targets as “bad”, this ascription helps them to justify violence (Borum, 2003). The author argued that since the person or group is responsible for their undesired and unjust conditions, aggressions towards them become easier and justifiable. In this stage, individuals develop negative stereotypes about the target group and deem it as “evil” (Borum, 2003).

**Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism.**

Moghadam (2005) uses the metaphor of a narrowing staircase to describe the psychological processes leading to terrorism. His staircase model has six floors, which span from the ground floor and to the fifth floor. Engaging in a terrorist act is the final step on the staircase.

According to Moghadam’s (2005) model, the vast majority of people occupy the ground floor. Feelings of relative deprivation, fairness, frustration, and shame are dominant on this floor. Moghadam (2005) points out that perceived injustice is the main factor that characterizes this floor. He highlights the role of the international mass media in fueling feelings of deprivation among vast populations. He argued that people in relatively deprived countries compare their lifestyles with those in affluent and democratic countries. In order to find a solution, some people on the ground floor who perceive injustice climb to the first floor (Moghadam 2005).

Moghadam’s (2005) argued that achieving greater justice and improving their conditions are the main goals of the individuals who reach the first floor, and on this floor, individuals seek out options to fight unfair treatment. According to this
model two factors determine whether individuals will stay on the first floor: social mobility and procedural justice. If there are doors open to talented individuals to rise in the social hierarchy, they are less likely to attempt non-normative actions. Additionally, if individuals believe that they can participate in decision-making process and have opportunities for voicing options, they are more likely to support authorities. Those who cannot rise in the social hierarchy and feel excluded in decision-making process blame others and climb to the second floor (Moghadam 2005).

Moghadam (2005) claimed that those who reached the second floor experience anger and frustration. On this floor, individuals target their aggression on those they blame for their deprivation (Moghadam, 2005). At this point, Western countries, especially the United States, usually become the target of the individuals on the second floor, and radical groups and their leaders play a role in aggressively targeting perceived enemies (Moghadam, 2005). Those who are ready to physically channel their aggression climb to the third floor (Moghadam 2005).

According to Moghadam (2005), on the third floor, individuals begin to justify terrorism and engage with the morality of terrorist organizations. He argued that individuals on this floor are dedicated to changing the world by any means possible, including terrorism. Terrorist organizations have their own morality that justifies all means possible in order to create their ideal society (Moghadam, 2005). He claimed that since terrorist organizations are illegal in nature, individuals affiliated with these organizations live in isolation and secrecy – they develop parallel, secret lives. Those who are ready to be recruited as active terrorists climb
to the fourth floor (Moghadam 2005).

Moghadam’s (2005) model proposed that the fourth floor represents the point at which individuals are recruited by terrorist organizations. At this stage, new recruits internalize the methods and goals of the organization, and develop an “us vs. them” viewpoint and believe that being a terrorist is a legitimate means to reach an ideal end (Moghadam 2005). Once an individual reaches this floor, it is almost impossible to exit alive (Moghadam 2005).

This model suggested that those who reach the top floor label everyone outside of the terrorist organization to which they belong as enemies, even innocent civilians. Furthermore, they categorize civilians as external to their group and justify killing them. These individuals are now fully motivated and psychologically prepared to commit terrorism (Moghadam 2005).

**Sageman's Four Prongs Model.**

Sageman’s (2008) proposed process of radicalization does not distinguish distinct stages of radicalization, but rather identifies recurrent phases that are not sequential. His model includes four prongs: a sense of moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization through networks.

A sense of moral outrage is the first factor that Sageman (2008) identifies as fostering radicalization. Sageman argued (2008) that perceived moral violations, like the killing of Muslims in conflict areas like Bosnia, Palestine, and Chechnya or the invasion of Muslim populated countries, like Iraq and Afghanistan, provoke a sense of moral outrage among young Muslims. Another factor is the
way individuals interpret the world. Those who interpret this sense of moral outrage as an attack on Islam by Western countries are more prone to radicalization (Sageman, 2008). The third factor is resonance with personal experience. Perceived discrimination, anti-Muslim bias in the community, relative deprivation, unemployment, and idleness are personal experiences that may lead to radicalization (Sageman, 2008). The first three factors can be considered “cognitive”, whereas the fourth factor, mobilization through networks, is a “situational factor” (King & Taylor, 2011, 608). Mobilization can occur through face-to-face interactions as well as online. Since the internet has the ability to reach more people, online radicalization has taken the place of face-to-face radicalization (King & Taylor, 2011).

**Risk Factors for Radicalization**

There are many factors that lead some Muslims to take pathways towards radicalization. In the literature, relative deprivation (Murshed & Pavan, 2011), racism and Islamophobia (Rahimullah et al., 2013), foreign occupations in Muslim countries, Western support for oppressive regimes (Pape, 2006), identity crisis (Choudhury, 2007; d’ Appollonia, 2011), poor socio-economic and political integration (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009), limited knowledge of Islam (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010), and feelings of humiliation (Saurette, 2005) are argued to be root causes and facilitators of radicalization. The following discussion focuses on three risk factors: perceived Islamophobia, poor integration, and identity-related issues.
Perceived Islamophobia.

Perceived or real discrimination and feelings of humiliation are considered in the literature to be risk factors for radicalization (see Bizina & Gray, 2014; MPAC, 2007; Staun, 2008; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). As a result of discrimination, Muslims in Western societies may feel that their social identity is under threat (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Such perceptions may induce anger and aggression, which sometimes lead to violence against other groups (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). The NYPD’s radicalization model stresses the role of discrimination in the radicalization process. Discrimination is considered a trigger factor for beginning to explore extremist thoughts (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). It may lead to cognitive opening for radical thoughts (Wiktorowicz, 2004). As Briggs et al. (2006) argued, discrimination provides fertile ground for terrorist organizations to recruit new members.

According to 2003 Home Office Citizenship survey, the sense of belonging to Britain is mainly affected by perceptions about discrimination (Choudhury, 2007). Veldhuis and Staun (2009) suggested that discrimination is a serious threat to the integration of Muslims in the West because it hinders integration. A sense of alienation and discrimination discourages Muslims from integrating into their host country, which in turn make them more vulnerable to extremism (Beutel, 2007). Since perceived Islamophobia and discrimination can hinder identification with the host nationality and integration, they can induce identity crisis. As Choudhury (2007) pointed out, they are important underlying causes of identity crisis, which further facilitates the process of radicalization.
Islamophobia.

The term “Islamophobia” was coined in the late 1980s (Stolz, 2005) to identify anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments, discourses, behaviors, and policies (Ciftci, 2012). It refers to “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims” (Bleich, 2012, p. 1581), but also includes action-oriented elements, such as discrimination and violence (Stolz, 2005). Although attitudes toward Muslims in the West have never been preponderantly positive, negative attitudes were exacerbated following the 9/11 attacks (Sirin et al., 2008). Islamophobia has become increasingly discussed in the literature and widely used in the media since September 11, 2001 (Stolz, 2005). Although it cannot be considered to be a product of the events of 9/11 (Ciftci, 2012), these terrorist attacks weakened the already negative image of Muslims in Western countries, and triggered the rise of Islamophobia.

According to 1997 report of the Runnymede Trust, titled “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”, “Islamophobia refers to unfounded hostility towards Islam. It refers also to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs” (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.4). Following this definition, many others have appeared in the literature. According to Stolz’s (2005) definition, which is commonly used in the literature, “Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups, and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes. It may have emotional, cognitive, evaluative, as well as action-oriented elements (e.g. discrimination, violence)” (p. 548). Bleich (2011) presented
a simpler definition: “Indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims” (p. 1582). Even though the term combines the words “Islam” and “phobia,” definitions of the term usually do not reflect a fear of Islam. Definitions are generally focused on negative attitudes about Muslims.

On the other hand, some argue that the current form of Islamophobia can be considered racism. According to Werbner (2005), Islamophobia is “a form of differentialist racism” (p. 8). For Kalin (2011), “Islamophobia has become a form of racism because it targets a group of people and incites hatred against them on the basis of their religion beliefs, cultural traditions, and ethnic backgrounds... The old racism based on biological inferiority resurfaces as ethnic, cultural, and religious racism” (p. 11).

Islamophobia is a contested term, and there is no widely accepted definition yet (Bleich, 2011). According to Helbling (2014), “it is unclear whether Islamophobia stands for negative attitudes toward a group of people – and thus a concept comparable to those of prejudice and xenophobia – or reflects a critical and reflexive position toward Islam” (p. 5). Sometimes the borders between Islamophobia and other forms of prejudice are blurred (Helbling, 2014). Cesari (2011) noted that, particularly in Europe, “Islamophobia overlaps with other forms of discrimination, such as xenophobia, anti-immigration policies, political discourses, and rejection of cultural differences” (p. 24). She further stated:

The term Islamophobia is contested because it is often imprecisely applied to very diverse phenomena, ranging from xenophobia to antiterrorism. It groups together all kind of different forms of discourse, speech, and acts by suggesting that they all emanate from an ideological core, which is an irrational fear (phobia) of Islam. (Cesari, 2011, p. 21).
Islamophobic acts can take various forms: “verbal and physical attacks on Muslim individuals… suspicion, staring, hazing, mockery, rejection, stigmatizing… outright discrimination… indirect discrimination, hate speech, or denial of access to goods and services” (Elorza, 2004, as cited in Kalin, 2011, p. 9). Discrimination against Muslims is one of the most common forms of Islamophobia. Runnymede Trust’s report (1997) emphasized discrimination against Muslims as a consequence of Islamophobia by defining it as “an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims, which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination” (Cashmore & Cashmore 2004, p. 215).

Since 9/11, Islamophobia, which is a form of intolerance and discrimination (Kalin, 2011), has continued to affect Muslims’ daily lives in Western societies. They became targets of racial profiling, harassment, hate crimes, and discriminatory practices (d’Appolonia & Reich, 2010). Pew Research’s 2007 study on Muslim-Americans shows that discrimination is seen by Muslim-Americans to be the biggest problem they face. Fifty-three percent of all U.S. Muslims believe that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States since 9/11.

How the 9/11 events affect attitudes toward Muslims in the West is another contested issue. Some scholars found short-term impacts. Panagopoulos (2006) analyzed different surveys about American attitudes on Islam and Muslims and found the sharpest movement in opinion dynamics in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; however, he also observed that opinion levels stabilized in the long term. A report on Islamophobia released by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia (EUMC) examined discrimination and racism against Muslims in 15 EU member countries and found that Islamic communities have become targets of increased hostility since 9/11 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). This report documented short-term effects of the 9/11 attacks, since it was published in 2002. On the other hand, Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner (2009) observed that American opinions of Muslims did not change much after 9/11. Although some surveys found that the 9/11 attacks led to a short disruption, attitudes toward Muslims and Islam returned their pre-9/11 level in the long term (Kalkan et al., 2009). Additionally, Gallup's 2001 and 2002 surveys showed that the level of trust Americans have in Arabs living in the United States has not changed after the 9/11 attacks for most Americans (Panagopoulos, 2006).

**Islamophobia in the West.**

Kalin (2011) argued that multiculturalism has reached its limits in the debate over Islam in Western societies. He argued that this debate is driven by secular-liberal views that came from the European Enlightenment. He added that since Western modernization privatizes religion and favors individual choice as the sole basis of one’s actions, Islamic culture – which determines Muslims’ thoughts and behavior – is considered an oppressive force. Thus, in general, the secular and political context in the Europe does not accommodate Islam (Kalin, 2011).

The context and the level of Islamophobia differs between Europe and North America. In Europe, where anti-immigrant sentiment transforms into Islamophobia, Muslim immigration is considered to be associated with an increase in the potential for terrorism (Cesari, 2009). Some extreme right-wing parties, such as The French
National Front, adopted anti-Muslim electoral strategies that associate Islam with terrorism (Cesari, 2009). According to Pew Research's 2006 survey, 20% of British respondents, 18% of German respondents, 20% of French respondents, and 41% of Spanish respondents believe that most or many Muslims in their countries support Islamic extremists. Comparably, 19% of Americans share the same belief. However, Canadians are less likely to support this belief according to Environics Research Group 2006 survey. Only 13% of Canadians respondents believe that most or many Canadian Muslims support Islamic extremists (Environics Research Group, 2006). Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of those who believe that “most” or “many” Muslims in respective countries support Islamic extremists such as al-Qaeda.

**Figure 2.1.** Public Opinion on Muslim Support to Islamic Extremists by 2006

![Graph showing public opinion](image)


On the other hand, to a poll conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011) in eight European countries (Great Britain, Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Poland, and Hungary) showed that
(see Figure 2.2 below) around 30% of people believe that many Muslims perceive terrorists as heroes, and a significant number of people (from 17% in Germany to 30% in Hungary) believe that the majority of Muslims find terrorism justifiable.

The same poll also reported that from 46% to 62% of people in the eight countries listed above think that Islam is a religion of intolerance (see Figure 2.2). Additionally, 46% of German respondents, 44% of British respondents, and 36% of French respondents believe that there are too many Muslims in their countries. The results of the mentioned surveys show that around 20% of Europeans associate Islam with terrorism (Zick et al., 2011).

The media in many European countries plays a role in spreading discriminatory bias against Muslims and religious stigmatization (Monshipouri, 2009). In this context, a cartoon published in a newspaper in Netherlands, which portrayed the prophet Mohammed as a bomb-carrying terrorist, led to an unrest among Muslims not only in Europe, but also in many Muslim countries (Monshipouri, 2009). Such caricatures shape public perceptions unfavorably and fuel sentiments of suspicion and mistrust (Perry & Poynting, 2006). However, as Pew 2006 Global Attitudes Survey indicated, many Westerners do not believe that such acts represent Western disrespect for Islam that spurred the conflict. Pew 2006 Global Attitudes Survey reported that 60% of respondents in the United States, 67% in France, 62% in Germany, and 59% in Great Britain blame Muslim intolerance for the controversy over these cartoons (Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2006).
On the other hand, research showed that the coverage of Muslims in the media plays a key role in shaping the opinions about Muslims that Western people, who generally have limited knowledge of Islam, hold. Since the media has the ability to frame the public discourse, it is an important actor that nurtures Islamophobia (Ogan, Willnat, Pennington & Bashir, 2014). Unfortunately, the images of Muslims presented by the media are generally negative; Muslims are portrayed as evil and warlike (Perry & Poynting, 2006). The negative image of Islam in the media has led media consumers to believe that Islam promotes terrorism, and violence is acceptable to Muslims (Ismael & Measor, 2003).

When it comes to the United States, research showed that there has been an increase in negative attitudes toward Muslims following 9/11. Prejudice against
Muslims was reinforced by reactionary governmental policies (Sirin et al., 2008). After the 9/11 attacks, it has become “natural” for many Americans to associate Muslims with terrorism (Cole, 2007). According to ABC’s surveys from 2001 to 2003, more Americans have a generally favorable opinion of Islam than those who have unfavorable opinion (ABC News/Washington Post, 2010, see Figure 2.3 below). However, this trend seemed to reverse in a 2006 survey (Panagopoulos, 2006). The favorability of Muslims in the United States has decreased from 47% in 2001 to 37% in 2010 (ABC News/Washington Post, 2010).

**Figure 2.3. Attitudes towards Muslims in the United States**

![Figure 2.3](image)

*Note. Adapted from “Views of Islam” by ABC News/Washington Post 2010.*

According to a 2006 Gallup poll, 51% of American respondents believed that Muslims are not loyal to the United States, 39% support the requirement that Muslims in the United States carry special identity card, and 25% do not want a Muslim neighbor (Cainkar, 2009). Many Americans believe that Muslims in the United States condone terrorism and they are concerned that allowing Muslim
immigration to their country may lead to an increase in terrorist acts (Smith, 2009). According to the Pew 2006 Global Attitude poll, 46% of Americans were “very concerned” and 33% are “somewhat concerned” about the rise of Islamic extremism in the world. Additionally, Wirthlin Worldwide’s 2001 survey showed that 40% of Americans believe that the 9/11 attacks on the United States represent the true teaching of Islam. Harris International’s 2002 survey also found similar results: 39% of Americans share mentioned belief (Panagopoulos, 2006). However, ABC’s surveys reported that Americans generally do not think that Islam encourages violence (see Figure 2.4 below): 57% in 2002, 46% in 2003, and 54% in 2006 believe that Islam is a peaceful religion (ABC News/Washington Post, 2010).

According to Wirthlin Worldwide’s 2001 survey, 83% of Americans believe that immigration laws in the United States should be tightened to restrict the number of immigrants who enter the United States from Muslim countries. Similarly, Harris International’s 2002 survey indicated that 76% support the restrictions on Muslim immigration (Panagopoulos, 2006).

With regard to Canada, the outstanding feature of Canadian society is that immigrants comprise a large share of its population, and the percentage is increasing every year (Hanniman, 2008). Multiculturalism was officially adopted in Canada in 1978 (Van Oudenhoven, Ward, & Masgoret, 2006). Nineteen percent of the Canadian population was born overseas (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). It is estimated that by 2017, almost one of five Canadians will be a member of a non-Caucasian minority group (Hanniman, 2008). Furthermore, the Muslim percentage of the Canadian population has been on the rise (Hanniman, 2008). According to
2001 census data, there were 600,000 Muslims in Canada, and they were accounted for approximately 2% of the Canadian population (Perry & Poynting, 2006). A more recent 2011 National Household Survey showed that the Muslim population in Canada has since increased to over one million, comprising 3% of the total population (NHS, 2011).

Figure 2.4. Americans’ Perceptions of Islam

The 9/11 attacks led to a backlash and resulted in significant consequences for Muslims in Canada (Hanniman, 2008), just as it did in the United States. As Perry and Poynting (2006) stressed, anti-Muslim violence rose in Canada after 9/11. They underscored the role of the media and state's practices in exacerbating Islamophobia in the country, stating, “negative media portrayals, together with discriminatory rhetoric, policy and practices at the level of the state, create an enabling environment that signals the legitimacy of public hostility toward Muslim
According to Environics 2006 survey, almost 60% of Canadians feel that a terrorist attack in Canada by Canadian Muslims is likely in the future. Sixty-two percent of Canadians believe that the sense of Islamic identity in Canada is growing, and 56% of those people believe this not to be in Canada’s best interests.

Those Canadians who see a growing sense of Islamic identity in Canada as being negative for the country mainly worry about poor treatment of women (36%) and violence (30%) (Environics Research Group, 2006). Most Europeans share this common concern regarding Muslim attitudes toward women. Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s 2011 poll (Zick et al., 2011) showed that about 80% of British, French, German, and Dutch respondents believe that Muslim attitudes toward women contradict their values. Additionally, according to Pew Research’s 2005 survey, 78% of French respondents, 54% of German respondents, 43% of Spanish respondents, and 29% of British respondents believed that the ban on Muslim headscarves is a good idea. However, in Canada, 36% of respondents supported this ban (Environics Research Group, 2006).

**Perceptions of Islamophobia among Muslim immigrants in the West.**

As Phinney et al. (2006) argued, immigrants typically face varying degrees of discrimination in their country of settlement. Experiences of discrimination result from “their cultural and behavioral differences from the dominant culture, the past history of groups in contact, and negative attitudes toward immigration generally, based on the assumption that immigrants threaten jobs of citizens and are a burden on social services” (Phinney et al., 2006, p. 82).
Law-abiding Muslims in the West are anxious about the increase in anti-Muslim sentiments (Smith, 2009). Many Muslim-Americans identify prejudice against Islam as the main problem they face while living in the United States (Smith, 2009). According to Pew Research's Muslim American survey (2007), 25% of Muslim Americans reported that they have experienced discrimination in the United States. They perceived that they have been targeted and excluded by the United States government since 9/11. Soon after the attacks, there was a sense among American Muslims that they no longer had the basic human rights guaranteed to other citizens (Hussain, 2011). Reactionary government policies damage Muslims' trust in governments. According to Pew Research Center’s 2007 study, more than half of the Muslims in the United States believe that the government singles out Muslims for extra surveillance and monitoring. Few Muslim-Americans view the United States' counterterrorism strategy as a sincere effort to reduce terrorism (Pew Research Center, 2007). European Muslims also suffer because of government policies. As Monshipouri (2009) stated, many Muslim immigrants in Europe do not trust the political parties, justice systems, and law enforcement agencies of their host societies.

On the other hand, Canadian Muslims Environics Institute’s survey (Environics Research Group, 2006) on Canadian Muslims showed that 77% of Canadian Muslims believe that the treatment of Muslims in Canada is better than other Western countries. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s 2011 survey showed that 71% of Muslim-Canadians report satisfaction with Canada (Leuprecht & Winn, 2011), whereas Pew Research's Muslim-Americans survey (Pew Research
Center, 2007) showed that 38% of Muslim-Americans reported satisfaction with the United States. A high proportion of Canadian Muslims sees hostility toward them as being marginal in their host society (Pew Research Center, 2007). Despite this observation, according to Environics Institute's survey, 31% of Canadian Muslims reported that they had a bad experience due to their race, ethnicity, or religion in the last two years prior to the survey date. Only 12% of Canadian Muslims reported discrimination against immigrants as their least favorite thing about Canada; even the cold weather (24%) was seen as a more annoying issue than discrimination. However, this does not mean they do not worry about discrimination. The same survey also demonstrated that 62% of Canadian Muslims expressed concern about the future of Muslims in Canada. Moreover, 66% of those respondents reported that they are worried about discrimination. Additionally, 38% of Canadian Muslims thought that anti-terrorism legislation that passed shortly after the 9/11 attacks infringed upon civil rights (Envoronics Research Group, 2006).

Perceived discrimination may strengthen one's ethnic identity and weaken national identity (Phinney et al., 2006). The Rejection-Identification model (Brancombe et al., 1999) and the Rejection-Disidentification model (Jasinskaja-Lahtti et al., 2009), both of which are discussed in detail below, show the relationship between perceived rejection and identity formation of minorities. These models indicate that perceived rejection from host society increases in-group identification and decreases national out-group identification. Furthermore, perceived discrimination is shown to affect immigrants' acculturation attitudes.
Berry et al. (2006b) researched immigrant youth's identity formation and acculturation attitudes in 13 countries. They found that perceived discrimination is negatively related to participants' involvement in broader society, as it is significantly associated with attitudes towards separation and marginalization. Their research showed that those who perceive discrimination are more likely to separate from the larger society or marginalize.

**Identity-related issues.**

According to the NYPD’s radicalization model (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), identity issues are the most common cause of radicalization. When those who are looking for an identity encounter with an “extremist incubators,” which are different places in which extremist groups disseminate their thoughts, they may start establishing a new jihadist identity and find themselves in extremist groups (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Of course, there are many other possible outcomes of identity seeking besides radicalization. However, these individuals are more vulnerable to radicalization (Choudhury, 2007). Similarly, Wictoriwicz’s (2004) interviews with members of al-Muhajeroun revealed that prior to their engagement with a terrorist group; these individuals had experienced an identity crisis that escalated on account of perceived discrimination.

According to NYPD’s model, identity issues can also be the result of political conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria. The model suggested that these conflicts may trigger moral outrage, especially among young Muslims, which in turn causes an identity crisis. Those who experience an identity crisis and look for an Islamic response to these political
conflicts are more likely to establish a new identity shaped by radical views (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Rahimullah, Larmar, and Abdalla (2013) argued that Muslim identification might also be linked to radicalization, stating that, “Identification leads to strong attachment with other Muslims, and when combined with Muslim suffering and altruistic intentions, can elicit efforts to defend or protest Muslim suffering. Both phenomena can manifest in violent acts of terrorism” (p. 22). However, defending or protesting Muslim suffering can also be expressed in other forms apart from terrorism. There are many Muslim advocacy networks and NGOs that protest Muslim suffering peacefully. It is not fair to say those who have a strong attachment with Islam tend to radicalize. However, identity crises can be predictors of radicalization, as pointed out in the literature.

**Social identity.**

Identifying with a group has significant consequences on one's social behavior (Jackson & Smith, 1999). Social identity is defined by Tajfel (1981) as “that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that group membership” (p. 255). Ethnic identity, which is defined as identification with one's ethnic group, and national identity, or one's identification with larger society, are two dimensions of an individual's social identity (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). They can vary independently and do not necessarily conflict with each other (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). Depending on the situation, their correlation may be positive, negative, or zero (Jasinskaja-Lahti
Early research usually took a one-dimensional approach to the relationship between national and ethnic identities. This approach suggested that two identities cannot be combined with each other, and they are negatively correlated: when one identity is stronger, the other is necessarily weak (Verkuyt
ten & Thijs, 2002). However, recent research has taken a two-dimensional approach, which suggests that these two identities can vary independently from each other. According to the two-dimensional model (see Berry et al., 2006b), strong national and ethnic identities indicate a bicultural identity, whereas weak national and ethnic identities indicate alienation (Phinney et al., 2006). The correlation between two identities may also be negative, showing only one strong identification (Berry et al., 2006a).

Some immigrants develop a bicultural identity, which combines both ethnic and national identities. They perceive group membership as integrated and overlapping (Wiley, 2013). According to Berry’s acculturation model (1990), which will be explained in further detail below, a positive correlation between national and ethnic identities indicates biculturalism (Sirin et al., 2008), with biculturals being those who “have experienced and internalized more than one culture” (Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002, p.493).

National and ethnic identities tend to be negatively correlated in Europe (see, for example, Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). However, Berry et al.’s “International Comparative Study of Ethnocultural Youth (ICSEY)” project showed that in the United States and Canada there is a positive correlation between national and ethnic identities. A positive correlation indicates the likelihood of being bicultural.
(Phinney et al., 2006). Their findings also supported the findings of Verkuyten and Yildiz's (2007) study. They found negative correlations in seven European countries (France, Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden) – only the UK was found to be exceptional. They argued that “settler societies,” or societies with a long history of immigration – such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom – favor biculturalism.

According to Kalin (2011), Muslims are usually accused of regarding themselves as Muslims before their host national identities; they are considered to have low commitment to democracy, human rights, and their adopted country’s constitution due to their religious affiliation. Their religious identity is usually seen as an obstacle to abiding by the laws of their host country (Kalin, 2011). However, contrary to this prejudice, Muslims show commitment to the host society where they live. Environics’ 2006 survey showed that 94% of Muslim-Canadians express pride in being Canadian, stating that they are very (73%) or somewhat (21%) proud to be Canadian. Surprisingly, the results are even higher than the results of general population: 93% of Canadians overall are proud to be Canadians. According to Environics’ 2006 survey on Muslims and multiculturalism in Canada, 72% of Canadian Muslims believe that Muslims in Canada have at least a “fairly strong” sense of Islamic identity. Additionally, 69% think that there is a growing sense of Islamic identity, and 85% of those respondents believe that this is good for Canada (Environics Research Group, 2006).

On the other hand, one of the consequences of perceived discrimination is that it leads to identity crisis (Ward & Leong, 2000). Habermas (1975) identified
two types of identity crises: “legitimation crisis” and “motivation crisis.” According to Baumeister, Shapiro, and Tice (1985), while a motivation crisis is characterized by an identity deficit, a legitimation crisis is more related to an identity conflict. They defined identity conflict as:

“the problem of the multiply defined self whose definitions have become incompatible. It is characterized by severe difficulty in reconciling the demands that follow from diverse commitments, the situation makes it impossible to choose and act consistently with all the person's values and goals” (Baumeister, Shapiro, and Tice, 1985, p. 408).

In terms of the causes of identity conflict, they argued that, “the essential precondition for the identity conflict is the status of having a strong personal (and presumably emotional) commitment to two distinct identity components that become incompatible” (p. 412). Leong and Ward (2000) explored identity conflict in sojourners. They stated that since the sojourners are expected to conform to cultures, values, attitudes, and behaviors of their host societies, they might experience identity conflict when these prescribed commitments are incompatible with those of their own culture of origin. Leong and Ward's study found that greater perceived discrimination is associated with increased identity conflict.

**Rejection-Identification Model.**

Two models in the literature explain the relationship between perceived rejection from larger society and identity formation of minorities. The first of these is the Rejection-Identification Model (Branscombe et al., 1999). In social psychology, several theoretical perspectives aim to explain coping strategies that employed by disadvantaged groups when they face identity threats (Kunst et al., 2012). Prejudice and discrimination are considered by minorities to be threatening:
“Discrimination on the part of the mainstream represents a threat to one’s group identity because it implies that the culture as a whole devalues that group membership” (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001, p. 1205). Since experiencing prejudice and feeling rejected or excluded may damage the self-esteem of devalued groups (Branscombe et al., 1999), coping mechanisms were considered helpful in the literature for protecting self-esteem and well-being. One strategy to cope with identity threats is to make an “attribution to prejudice” (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991). According to Schmitt and Branscombe (2002), “an attribution to prejudice explains a negative event as the result of someone's bias against one's category membership” (p. 168). However, this strategy is not a long-term strategy and is useful only when coping with a single instance of prejudicial treatment (Branscombe et al., 1999).

Another strategy is disengaging self-esteem and withdrawing efforts from identity-threatened domains (Major & O'Brien, 2005). According to Major and O'Brien (2005), stigmatized individuals may cope with identity threats by dis-identifying with domains in which they are unfairly treated or negatively stereotyped. However, employing this strategy prevents stigmatized individuals to succeed in those domains (Major & O'Brien, 2005).

The Rejection-Identification model (RIM) proposed by Branscombe et al. (1999) suggests that perceived discrimination damages well-being, but members of stigmatized groups can offset the negative effects of prejudice by identifying more closely with their group (Major & O'Brien, 2005). They argued that increasing identification with the in-group when one feels rejected could be a better coping
strategy:

When devalued group members believe that acceptance and fair treatment by a more powerful group is improbable, identifying with the lower status in-group may be the best possible strategy for feeling accepted and enhancing psychological well-being. In other words, if one cannot gain acceptance in the group with much of society's power and prestige, the most adaptive response might be to increase one's investment in one's own group, or to 'love the one you're with.' (Branscombe et al., 1999, p. 137).

RIM argues that, “Despite the devaluation that results from minority group membership, positive self-esteem can be restored by feelings of inclusion within the in-group” (Ramos et al. 2008, p. 643). RIM consists of three main hypotheses: 1) perceived discrimination encourages minority group identification, 2) perceived discrimination damages psychological well-being, and 3) minority group identification improves well-being (Schmitt, Branscombe & Spears, 2003). This model proposes that while perceived discrimination has a direct, negative effect on well-being, it also has an indirect positive effect, which is mediated by minority group identification (Schmitt, Branscombe & Spears, 2003).

RIM is tested and supported by a number of studies (Branscombe et al., 1999; Garstka, Branscombe, Hummert, & Schmitt, 2004; Giamo, Schmitt, & Outten, 2012; Ramos et al., 2013; Ramos, Cassidy, Reicher, & Haslam, 2012; Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002; Schmitt et al., 2003). These studies found positive relationships between perceived discrimination and in-group identification. Branscombe et al. (1999) examined the maintenance of well-being among African Americans. They found that attributions to prejudice for future hypothetical situations and perceived past experience with prejudice increase identification with one's minority group. Their study also showed that minority
group identification enhances personal and collective well-being. Their findings support their hypothesis that making attributions to prejudice has a direct negative effect on well-being, but minority group identification would mediate this relationship, and has a positive effect on both personal and collective well-being.

Gartska et al. (2004) tested RIM by examining the consequences of perceived age discrimination for well-being. They found a negative correlation between perceived age discrimination and well-being among older adults. However, they also found that increased group identification alleviates this negative effect. Giamo et al. (2012) tested RIM in a sample of multiracial people. Their findings, which are consistent with RIM, indicated that those who perceive discrimination are more likely to identify strongly with other multiracial individuals. Ramos et al. (2012) examined RIM within a longitudinal perspective. Their study of a cohort of international students showed that perceptions of discrimination caused minority group identification. Schmitt et al. (2003) also investigated the relationship between perceptions of rejection and minority group identification with a sample of international students. They found that perceptions of rejection encouraged identification with other international students. In another study, Schmitt et al. (2002) researched perceived discrimination against women and found that increasing identification with women as a group is a preferred coping strategy.

There are several critiques of RIM. One of the main critiques is the causal direction of the relationship between perceptions of prejudice and minority group identification. According to RIM, minority group identification is an outcome of
perceived discrimination. However, Major, Quinton, and McCoy (2002) stated that the reverse direction may also occur – minority group identification can be an antecedent of perceived discrimination. They argued that correlational studies on RIM have some methodological limitations. Firstly, they argued that subjective perceptions of discrimination are confounded with objective exposure to discrimination in these studies. Exposure to negative treatment should be distinguished from arguing such treatment to be a result of discrimination (Major et al., 2002). The second limitation that they argued is that the questions about discrimination are framed in a way that may bias responses. They believed that in the studies on RIM, researchers usually ask people if they feel like a victim. Such questions may bias responses of participants about psychological outcomes (Major et al., 2002). Thirdly, they believed that individual differences may inflate the correlation between perceived discrimination and well-being. Therefore, some dispositional variables should also be assessed (Major et al., 2002).

Ramos et al. (2012) also explored causal relationships and criticized the ways in which the topic has been addressed in the literature. They argued that the findings of such research could not be used to rule out a recursive relationship. Additionally, they believe that a longitudinal research design is the best approach to find a causal relationship between perceived discrimination and minority group identification (Ramos et al., 2012). Furthermore, Jasinkaja-Lahti et al. (2009) criticized the findings on the relationship between perceived discrimination and well-being. They cited Bourguignon et al.’s (2006) research, which showed that group discrimination, unlike personal discrimination, may protect well-being
because it allows people to realize that there are other people with them in their plight (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009).

**Rejection-Disidentification Model.**

The Rejection-Disidentification Model (RDIM) was proposed by Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim (2009) in a longitudinal study of the effects of perceived ethnic discrimination on the ethnic and national identification of Russian-speaking migrants in Finland. The main argument of RDIM is that perceived discrimination causes national disidentification, which, in turn, increases negative attitudes towards the national out-group (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). Unlike RIM, RDIM does not ignore national identification.

The RDIM is partially derived from the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003), which suggests that maintaining a favorable group identity is related to people’s perceptions of procedural fairness they experience in a group (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). In the same vein, RDIM postulates that since discrimination by broader society is considered by minorities to be unfair treatment, minorities are discouraged from identifying with the national out-group when they perceive discrimination (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). Earlier studies also proposed similar assumptions asserted by this model. For instance, Phinney et al. (2006) suggested that when immigrants perceive that they are viewed negatively by others, they are more likely to reject being part of the larger society. They also argued that perceptions of discrimination weaken ties to the national out-group.

As Wiley (2013) suggests, national disidentification is “an active separation from the host society” (p.376) and “a rejection of the national group.” (p.377)
Group-based rejection from the national out-group is argued to lead to national disidentification in RDIM. Even before RDIM, studies showed a negative correlation between group-based rejection and national identification (see Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Besides this correlation, RDIM proposed that group-based rejection also has a negative effect on attitudes toward national out-group, and this effect is mediated by national disidentification (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009).

Wiley (2013) investigated the effect of perceived group-based rejection by national out-groups on the national identification of Latino immigrants in the United States. His research indicated that perceived group-based rejection is related to stronger disidentification with the United States among Latino immigrants. In another study, Badea et al. (2011) found that perceived French rejection negatively affected French identification of Romanians and Moroccan immigrants in France.

Poor integration.

Failure to integrate is one of the factors that facilitates radicalization (see, for example, Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Radicalized people are usually among those that could not successfully integrate into society (Mueller, 2006). According to d’ Appollonia (2011), failing to integrate into society creates identity crisis and alienation among young Muslims in Western countries. These young Muslims who feel alienated are more vulnerable to radical messages than those who can successfully integrate into the society in which they live, and Jihadism may become a way of reasserting their identity (d’ Appollonia, 2011). She added that Muslim civic engagement in society is an important countermeasure effort. Civic
integration helps young Muslims to stay away from engaging in violent activities:
“The civic integration of young Muslims should be improved as a way to restrain their sense of political impotence and limit the number of those who believe that the violence is the only option” (d’ Appollonia, 2011, p. 131).

As Mueller (2006) stated, the radicalization process starts with individuals who are second-generation U.S. citizen, or converts to Islam, and who become angry with their government. According to Mueller (2006), they are usually among those who could not integrate into society, and they are more likely to join extremist groups. He added that once they join, they may start to adopt extremist ideology, which encourages violence, and they become isolated from the society. He stated that after they become a member of these extremist groups, they begin engaging in terrorist activities and finally become a terrorist. This radicalization process can take place in mosques, prisons, or on the internet (Mueller, 2006).

**Acculturation attitudes.**

The concept of acculturation refers to “the changes that groups and individuals undergo when they come into contact with another culture” (Williams & Berry, 1991, p. 633). According to the earliest definitions of acculturation, “acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups” (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1935, pp. 145–146). Gans (1999) defined it as “the newcomers’ adoption of the culture, that is, the behavior patterns or practices, values, rules, symbols, and so forth, of the host society (or rather an overly
homogenized and reified conception of it)” (p. 162). On the other hand, acculturation attitudes refer to “the ways people prefer to live in intercultural contact situations” (J. S. Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006, p. 73).

Three distinct models of acculturation exist in the literature: the unidirectional/unilinear model, the bipolar/bilinear model, and the bidimensional/bidirectional model. The unidirectional model describes acculturation as moving away from old culture and adopting and assimilating into the host culture (Organista, Marin, & Chun, 2009). However, this model ignores bicultural identities. On the other hand, the bilinear model (Szapocznik & Kurtines, 1980) suggests that immigrants do not necessarily have to give up their culture of origin, but rather can become acculturated while maintaining their own culture. The conceptual framework of this model consists of two extremities on a single continuum, with the midpoint indicating biculturalism (Jae-Pil Ha, Hums, & Greenwell, 2014). The main criticism of this model is that it assumes that strong ethnic and national identities cannot coexist together. According to Nguyen and von Eye (2002), “a strengthening of one culture does not require a weakening of the other” (p. 203). According to unidirectional and bipolar models, acculturation is a linear process. However, as Phinney (1996) argued, “acculturation is not a linear process, with individuals ranging from unacculturated to assimilated, but rather a multidimensional process that includes one’s orientation to both one’s ethnic culture and the larger society and possibly to other ethnic cultures as well” (p. 922).

Berry (1990, 1997) proposed an alternative model to the unidirectional and bipolar models. He suggested that adaptation to a host society and maintaining
the culture of origin are independent of each other – identifying strongly with original culture does not necessarily weaken the adoption of a host culture. His model does not view acculturation as a linear process. Berry’s (1997) bidimensional model based on two questions: 1) “Is it considered to be of value to maintain one's identity and characteristics?” (p.10), and 2) “Is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with larger society?” (p.10). The first question refers to the maintenance of culture of origin, whereas the second question refers to relations with host society. Based on the answers to these questions, four acculturation strategies can be distinguished: integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization.

According to Berry’s model, when individuals are only interested in maintaining relations with the host society, an assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast to an assimilation strategy, when individuals desire to maintain their original culture and wish to avoid interacting with larger society, a separation strategy is defined. When it is important for an individual to maintain both original culture and to have positive relations with the larger society, then an integration strategy is defined. Finally, when individuals show little involvement in maintaining their culture of origin and little interest in having relations with larger society, a marginalization strategy is defined (Berry, 1997).

According to Phinney et al (2006), both immigrants and the broader host society have attitudes concerning acculturation. As they argued, the acceptance of cultural diversity by the larger society is termed multiculturalism. When assimilation is the preferred strategy of dominant group, it is the melting pot. When
separation is enforced by the host society, it is called segregation. Finally, when marginalization is imposed by the host society, it is exclusion (Phinney et al., 2006).

Although some surveys (e.g., Environics, 2006; Pew Research, 2006) showed that people in Western countries believe that Muslims want to remain distinct rather than integrate into host societies, contrary to public belief, Muslims usually tend to integrate. Environics Institute’s survey (2006) on Canadian Muslims showed that 55% of participants believe that Muslims in Canada are more interested in integrating into Canada society than remaining apart. Pew Research's 2006 study also showed that 78% of Muslims in France, 53% of Muslims in Spain, and 41% of Muslims in Great Britain see their fellow Muslims as wishing to adopt their host country’s customs and way of life. Among all countries in the survey, only in Germany was it found that more Muslims believed that their fellow Muslims want to remain distinct (52%) rather than integrate (30%).

The “Melting pot” is one of the main approaches to immigration in the United States. However, many argue that the philosophy of this approach is essentially assimilationist in practice (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). Pew Research’s Muslim-American survey (2007) indicated that many Muslims in the United States are highly assimilated into American society. Forty-three percent of Muslim-Americans believe that Muslims should adopt American customs. On the other hand, 63% think that being a devout Muslim and living in American society do not conflict with each other.

Even though Muslims want to adopt their host country’s way of life, most of them (65% according to Environics’ 2006 survey in Canada) believe that they
should also be free to maintain their religious and cultural practices. The results showed that, at least in Canada, Muslims favor integration rather than assimilation as an acculturation strategy. The mentioned survey indicated that 61% of Canadian Muslims expressed strong enthusiasm for cross-cultural learning. They believe that contacting with other cultures is enriching. Consequently, one can argue that they are open for interaction with other groups, and separation or marginalization are not preferred strategies for them. On the other hand, 70% of Canadian Muslims who want to adopt Canadian customs believe that Muslims in Canada have at least a fairly strong sense (21% have very strong sense and 49% have a fairly strong sense) of Islamic identity, whereas 77% of those who want to be distinct believe that fellow Muslims have at least a fairly strong sense (33% have very strong sense and 44% have fairly strong sense) of Islamic identity (Environics Research Group, 2006).

When it comes to acculturation attitudes of Turkish immigrants, Berry et al.'s (2006) ICSEY project showed that integration is the most strongly supported acculturation attitude among Turkish immigrants in six European countries, followed by separation. Assimilation is rated third, whereas marginalization is the least supported acculturation attitude.

Some research sees perceived discrimination as an outcome of the acculturation process, while others see it as a cause and treat it as a predictor variable (Berry et al., 2006). According to Berry et al. (2006), when immigrants feel that they are viewed negatively by the members of the host country, they become reluctant to be part of the larger society. Consequently, they would prefer
separation or marginalization rather than assimilation or integration (Berry et al., 2006b). According to Badea et al. (2011), rejection by the host society is an important predictor of acculturation attitudes:

...intergroup perceptions shape immigrants preferred interaction goals with the host society. Specifically, rejection should lower identification with the host society. In turn, lower identification should (a) reduce the extent to which immigrants will seek proximity to the host society (i.e. integration and assimilation), and (b) increase the extent to which they would want to ‘stick to their own’ (i.e. separation from the host society). (Badea et al., 2011, p. 587).

National and in-group identification can also be predictors of acculturation attitudes. Badea et al.’s (2011) study indicated that increased identification with the host society (national identification) is positively associated with integration and assimilation and is negatively associated with separation. On the other hand, their study found that stronger identification with the in-group (ethnic identification) is positively associated with integration and separation and is negatively associated with assimilation. Safdar et al.’s (2012) findings supported Badea et al.’s study. They researched the acculturation of Indian and Russian immigrants in Canada and found that those who reported a strong ethnic identity had positive attitudes toward integration into Canadian society. Furthermore, their study showed that those who reported a weaker ethnic identity were more likely to endorse an assimilation strategy. In a previous study, Safdar, Lay, and Struthers (2003) researched acculturation attitudes of Iranian immigrants in Canada. They found that connectedness to the culture of origin was positively associated with separation strategy and negatively associated with assimilation strategy.
Turkish Immigrants in the United States and Canada

According to U.S. Census Bureau 2008-2012 American Community Survey, almost 160,000 people identified themselves as Turkish-Americans. However, some estimates indicate that there are around 350,000 to 500,000 Turkish-Americans living in the United States (Kaya, 2009). Today, the majority of Turkish-Americans live in metropolitan areas – a large percentage live in the tri-state area of New York (Kaya, 2009).

Three major waves of Turkish immigration to the United States are identified in the literature (Kaya, 2004; Karpat, 2006). The first wave of immigrants came to the United States during the period between 1820 and 1920 (Kaya, 2004). The US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reported that almost 300,000 immigrants came to the United States. However, the first wave of immigrants included not only ethnic Turks, but also other ethnic groups, such as Armenians and Greeks who carried Ottoman passports (Kaya, 2009). These early Turkish immigrants mostly assimilated or they returned to Turkey after World War I, thus disappearing as an ethnic group (Karpat, 2006).

The second wave of Turkish immigrants to the United States began in the early 1950s and lasted through the 1970s (Karpat, 2006). As a result of the increased partnership between Turkey and the United States through the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's membership in NATO, immigration to the United States from Turkey accelerated during this period (Kaya, 2009). Karpat (2006) distinguished the characteristics of second wave immigrants from the first wave immigrants. He argued that the second wave of immigration was “more of a ‘brain drain’ than a
mass movement” (p. 171). For him, although their total number was far below that of first wave immigrants, their impact was greater. They established professional and cultural associations. Some of them became well-known figures. They had the ability to interact with American elites. They identified themselves mostly as Turks rather than Muslims. However, because there were fewer, they could not establish communities characterized as being Turkish (Karpat, 2006).

As Kaya (2004) stated, the last wave of immigration began in the mid-1980s. After 1990s, due to the developments in transportation and Turkish government’s policies toward openness, immigration accelerated (Kaya, 2004). Kaya (2004) argued that the third wave of immigrants were more diverse than those came in the early waves. The final group of immigrants included professionals, workers, students, and businessmen (Kaya, 2004). Whereas the second wave of immigrants identified themselves as “Westernized Turks,” those came in the third wave identified themselves as “modern Muslim Turks” (Karpat, 2006, p. 173). Unlike the first wave, they were successful in creating their own communities (Karpat, 2006).

According to Kaya (2004), Turkish-Americans tend to disassociate themselves with other Muslim groups, especially Arabs. They argue that their interpretation and practice of Islam is different from other groups, and believe that they are more modern, peaceful, and tolerant (Kaya, 2004). As Kaya (2004) suggested Turkish Americans think that Arabs are responsible for the negative image of Muslims in the United States. They emphasize their Americanness and they assert that Turks had nothing to do with 9/11 events (Kaya, 2007). As Kaya
(2004) stated, “They are Muslim yet they claim their differences and promote Turkishness. They are viewed as Middle Easterners yet they assert their Europeanness as well as their Muslimness. They are seen as outsiders yet they profess their Americanness” (Kaya, 2004, p. 295).

Canada is also another country of destination for Turkish immigrants. According to National Household Survey, there were 55,430 people living in Canada who claimed to have Turkish origin by 2011. Of the total Turkish population in Canada, 36,300 Turkish-Canadians are first generation; 15,820 are second generation; and 3,315 are third generation immigrants. Turks began to immigrate to Canada after World War II to seek better economic and educational opportunities (Ozcurumez, 2009).

As Ozcurumuez (2009) stated, the first wave of immigrants from Turkey came to Canada in the period between 1960 and 1970. He added that most of them were skilled professionals and students. After 1980s, immigration from Turkey diversified and included skilled workers, investors, asylum seekers, and those who arrived for family reunification (Ozcurumez, 2009). They settled in major cities, such as Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, where they could find more job opportunities (Ozcurumez, 2009). The Canada 2011 National Household Survey showed that immigration from Turkey to Canada has steadily increased since the 1970s (NHS, 2011).
Summary

Different definitions of radicalization agree that radicalization is a gradual process (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Various driving factors facilitate this process. Identity crisis, perceived discrimination, Islamophobia – which is a form of discrimination – and racism, relative deprivation, and poor integration are considered as among the most significant risk factors for radicalization. Radicalization models usually focus on the identity crisis as the main risk factor for radicalization. Other risk factors seem somehow related to identity crisis. Giving the existing literature, a path model was developed that explains the relationship between perceived Islamophobia, national identification, and religious identification as two parts of social identity, poor integration and identity crisis. This model aims to understand which factors increase the likelihood of experiencing identity crisis.
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This study utilized a mixed-methods approach, applying both quantitative and qualitative analyses. As defined by Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, and Hanson (2003), “a mixed methods study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research” (p. 212). According to Creswell and Clark (2011, p.5), in mixed-methods research, the researcher:

- “collects and analyzes persuasively and rigorously both qualitative and quantitative data (based on research questions);
- mixes (or integrates or links) the two forms of data concurrently by combining them (or merging them), sequentially by having one build on the other, or embedding one within the other;
- gives priority to one or to both forms of data (in terms of what the research emphasizes);
- uses these procedures in a single study or in multiple phases of a program of a study;
- frames these procedures within philosophical worldviews and theoretical lenses; and
- combines the procedures into specific research designs that direct the plan for conducting the study.”

Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) identified five rationales for mixed-
methods research design: triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation, and expansion. A mixed-method study can confirm and corroborate the results of each research method through triangulation (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) pointed out that triangulation is viewed as one of the theoretical starting points for a mixed-methods approach, which is further explained in the following:

…triangulation refers to the designed use of multiple methods, with offsetting or counteracting biases, in investigations of the same phenomenon in order to strengthen the validity of inquiry results. The core premise of triangulation as a design strategy is that all methods have inherent biases and limitations, so use of only one method to assess a given phenomenon will inevitably yield biased and limited results. However, when two or more methods that have offsetting biases are used to assess a given phenomenon, and the results of these methods converge or corroborate one another, then the validity of inquiry findings is enhanced. (Greene et al., 1989, p. 256).

Greene et al. (1989) also distinguish between complementarity, which refers to seeking “elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification of the results from one method with the results from the other method” (p. 259), and development, or using “the results from one method to help develop or inform the other method” (p. 259). As Greene et al. argued, a mixed-methods approach can be also utilized for the purpose of “initiation,” meaning it can initiate a discovery of a paradox or the emergence of new perspectives. Finally, a mixed-methods approach can be used for the purpose of “expansion,” which occurs when a researcher broadens the range of inquiry (Greene et al., 1989).
**Figure 3.1.** Visual model for sequential explanatory mixed-methods procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Product</th>
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<td>Cross-sectional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Data screening</td>
<td>Descriptive statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEM (Structural Equation Modeling) Analysis</td>
<td>Factor analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qualitative Data Collection</td>
<td>Individual semi-structured interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coding and thematic analysis</td>
<td>Codes and themes</td>
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<td>NVivo 10 qualitative software</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of Entire Analysis</td>
<td>Interpretation of the meaning of quantitative and qualitative results</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Adapted from Montgomery, P., Forchuk, C., Duncan, C., Rose, D., Bailey, P. H., & Veluri, R. (2008).*
According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), designing mixed-methods research is based on decisions regarding paradigm emphasis and the order of employing methods. In other words, in terms of paradigm emphasis, a researcher can stress either the qualitative or the quantitative methods of the study, or can give equal status to both types (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Concerning the order of employed methods, a researcher can conduct two phases concurrently or sequentially (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

For this study, the researcher used a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design. This approach begins with the researcher conducting a quantitative phase followed by the implementation of a qualitative phase in order to more deeply explore and explain the initial, quantitative results (Creswell & Clark, 2011). For this study, the researcher believed that a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design fit the research questions best.

In accordance with the sequential explanatory mixed-methods approach, the researcher first collected quantitative data. The data was then analyzed. After analyzing the quantitative data, the researcher collected qualitative data, which was subsequently analyzed. Finally, the researcher interpreted the entire analysis. Figure 3.1 (see above) shows the visual model for sequential explanatory mixed-methods procedure that was employed in this research.

For the quantitative part of the research, the researcher developed a path model to predict the relationship among perceived Islamophobia, national and
religious identification, integration, and identity crisis in a sample of Turkish immigrants living in the United States and Canada using survey data. For the qualitative part of the research, the researcher conducted interviews to gain in-depth understanding of the differences and similarities between Turkish Immigrants in the United States and Turkish Immigrants in Canada in terms of the level of and relationship between perceived Islamophobia, identity formation, and integration.

Figure 3.2. Path Model for the Proposed Study

Based on the literature review, a path model was developed to understand the relationship between variables (see Figure 3.2 above). In Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), a directional arrow indicates a hypothesized causal direction (Lei & Wu, 2007). There are “exogenous variables” and “endogenous variables” instead of independent and dependent variables in SEM. The exogenous variable
is the variable that “has paths coming from it and none leading to it” (Norman & Streiner, 2003, p. 158). It is a source variable and analogous to an independent variable (Lei & Wu, 2007). On the other hand, the endogenous variable is the variable that “has at least one path leading to it” (Norman & Streiner, 2003, p. 158). It is a result variable and analogous to a dependent variable (Lei & Wu, 2007). In the model developed for this study, perceived Islamophobia was the exogenous (independent) variable. Other variables in the model were endogenous outcome (dependent) variables, specifically identity crisis. National identification, religious identification, and integration were also mediator variables.

**Phase 1: Quantitative Study**

Quantitative research is a type of research that involves the statistical analysis of quantitative (numeric) data (Remler & Ryzin, 2010). According to Schutt (2006), quantitative methods include “methods such as surveys and experiments that record variation in social life in terms of categories that vary in amount” (p. 17). This study employed a survey instrument in order to examine the relationship between the study variables.

**Population and sample.**

The target population of this study was Turkish immigrants living in the United States and Canada. Randomization was not practical for this study; however, the researcher took necessary measures to avoid bias. The respondents were selected using convenience sampling, which is also known as availability sampling and “refers to a situation in which a researcher takes advantages of a natural gathering or easy access to people they can recruit into a study” (Remler
For the quantitative part of the study, the researcher recruited participants online and from various Turkish immigrant organizations. A link to an online survey was shared on Turkish professional, student, or social groups on Facebook. The members of Turkish immigrant organizations were also invited to participate in a paper-based survey. Finally, the researcher used his personal network to reach participants. In total, 298 Turkish immigrants living in the United States and Canada participated in the study. Chapter 4 provides detailed demographic information about the participants.

**Data collection.**

The data for the quantitative phase was collected through a survey. Using surveys is a common method to collect quantitative data, which “provides a quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that population” (Creswell, 2014, p. 155) and was considered by the researcher to be the most appropriate method for collecting quantitative data for this study. For the purpose of this study, a cross-sectional survey was employed by means of a self-administered questionnaire, which is a questionnaire designed to be completed by a respondent without intervention by the researcher (Wolf, 2008). The data was gathered from Turkish immigrants living in the United States and Canada. As explained above, data was collected via online and paper surveys. A link to the online survey was sent to participants through various public email groups and Facebook groups, while the paper survey was distributed by the researcher to willing participants.
Measures.

The survey employed in this study for quantitative data collection consisted of 27 Likert-type items and demographic questions. Survey items were measured on a five-point (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither disagree nor agree, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree) strength-of-agreement scale. Some items were negatively worded – marked with an asterisk – and these were reverse coded.

Exogenous (independent) variables.

Perceived Islamophobia.

To measure perceived Islamophobia, this study adapted a 12-item scale developed by Kunst et al. (2013). The original scale had three sub-scales (general fear, fear of Islamization, and Islamophobia in the media). The scale was modified for use in United States and Canadian contexts, with two of the original items removed by the researcher. The resulting, modified 10-item scale included the following: six items measuring “general fear” two items measuring “fear of Islamization”, and two items measuring “Islamophobia in the media”. Three items were negatively worded and marked with an asterisk. The survey was coded so that a higher score indicated more strongly perceived Islamophobia. The modified version of the scale was as follows:

1. Many Americans/Canadians avoid Muslims.
2. Americans/Canadians are suspicious of Muslims.
3. In general, Americans/Canadians trust Muslims.*
4. Overall, only few Americans/Canadians are afraid of Islam.*
5. Most Americans/Canadians feel safe among Muslims.*

6. Many Americans/Canadians get nervous in the presence of Muslims.

7. Many Americans/Canadians fear an “Islamization” of the United States/Canada.

8. A lot of Americans/Canadians consider Islam a threat to American/Canadian values.

9. American/Canadian media always presents Muslims as dangerous people.

10. American/Canadian media spreads a lot of fear of Muslims and Islam.

**Endogenous outcome (dependent) variables.**

*Identity crisis.*

Identity crisis was measured using Ward, Stuart, and Kus’ (2011) identity conflict scale. The original scale had 20 items. Only six items from the scale were adopted for inclusion in the questionnaire, and the scale was coded so that a higher score indicated a strong identity conflict. The items were as follows:

1. I have difficulties fitting into the wider society because of my cultural background.

2. I sometimes do not know where I belong.

3. I experience conflict over my identity.

4. I find it impossible to be part of both my cultural group and the wider society.

5. I am uncertain about my values and beliefs.

6. I am sometimes confused about who I really am.

**Endogenous mediator variables.**

*Religious identification.*

The study adopted Verkuyten’s (2007) religious identification scale. The original scale included six items. The researcher modified this scale by removing
one item. The scale was coded so that a higher score indicated a strong religious identification. The scale was as follows:

1. My Muslim identity is an important part of my self.
2. I identify strongly with Muslims.
3. I feel a strong attachment to Muslims.
4. I am proud of my Islamic background.
5. I feel a strong sense of belonging to Islam.

*National identification.*

National Identification was measured using a four-item adopted from Verkuyten (2007). The scale was modified for use in United States and Canadian contexts. It was coded so that a higher score indicated a strong national identification. The items in the scale were as follows:

1. I identify with American/Canadian people.
2. I feel that I am an American/Canadian.
3. I feel connected to the United States/Canada.
4. Being American/Canadian is an important part of how I see myself.

*Integration.*

Acculturation attitudes of study participants were measured using a 2-item scale adapted from Sam and Berry (1995), which was modified by the researcher for use in United States and Canadian contexts. The original scale was developed by Sam and Berry (1995) to measure four different acculturation attitudes: integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization. For the purpose of this study, only the questions addressing integration were used. The scale was as
follows:

1. The relationship I have with Americans/Canadians is as good as the one I have with my co-nationals.

2. I like just as much to be together with Americans/Canadians as with my co-nationals.

Data analysis.

For the quantitative part of the study, the researcher employed Structural Equation Model (SEM) analysis. SEM is an extension of multiple regression and relies on path diagrams to visualize the relationships between variables (Norman & Streiner, 2003). As Ullman (2006) stated:

“Diagrams are fundamental to SEM because they allow the researcher to diagram the hypothesized set of relations—the model. The diagrams are helpful in clarifying a researcher’s ideas about the relations among variables. There is a one to one correspondence between the diagrams and the equations needed for the analysis” (p. 36).

Employing SEM analyses allowed the researcher to ascertain the causal links between variables, since it is useful for examining relationships between variables and the fit of the data to proposed path models. The researcher applied maximum likelihood path analysis to test hypotheses. Prior to running the path analysis, the descriptive statistics and correlations were computed for all variables, and goodness-of-fit indices were tested.

For this study, the researcher developed a model that depicted the relationship between perceived Islamophobia, national identification, religious identification, identity crisis, and integration. The model was designed to show: 1) the direct effects of perceived Islamophobia on national identification, religious
identification, and identity crisis; 2) the direct effect of national identification and religious identification on integration; and 3) the effects integration on identity crisis. The researcher used STATA 14 to carry out SEM analysis.

Reliability and validity.

To increase the validity and reliability of the study, previously used scales were adapted and used. Taking questions from previous studies is referred to as using standardized questions or replicating questions (Remler & Ryzin, 2010). Adopting previously used scales increased the content validity of the study. Cronbach's alpha values were computed to measure the level of internal consistency and reliability of each scale. The fit of the data to the proposed model was examined by testing the goodness-of-fit indices. The researcher also conducted a pilot survey to increase the reliability and validity of the survey instrument. As Rothgeb (2008) stated, “pilot tests are ‘dress rehearsals’ of full survey operations that are implemented to determine whether problems exist that need to be addressed prior to putting the production survey in the field” (p. 584). The pilot study was an internal pilot study, meaning that the respondents in the pilot study were the first participants in the main study.

Phase 2: Qualitative Study

According to Creswell (2014), “qualitative research is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 246). Qualitative methods “such as participant observation, intensive interviewing, and focus groups that are designed to capture social life as participants experience it… rely on written or spoken words or observations that
do not have a direct numerical interpretation” (Schutt, 2006, p.17). The motive for qualitative research is often exploration (Schutt, 2006). This study employed interviews in order to explore how risk factors for radicalization interrelated with each other.

**Population and sample.**

The respondents were selected using purposive sampling, which is defined as “a nonprobability sampling method in which elements are selected for a purpose, usually because of their unique position” (Schutt, 2006, p.29). For the qualitative part of the study, the researcher conducted interviews with opinion leaders, or, in broad terms, “a person who influences the opinions of others” (DeVito, 1986, p.213). An opinion leader is “usually regarded as an expert in one specific subject or in issues that are closely related” (Weimann, 1994, p. 84). The researcher interviewed 10 opinion leaders (six from the United States and four from Canada), including leaders of Turkish community organizations, imams, and well-known individuals in the community. All ten participants were male.

**Data collection.**

For the qualitative part of the study, semi-structured face-to-face and phone interviews were conducted. Interviews are a basic and common tool in qualitative research that include open-ended questions (Remler & Ryzin, 2010). In this manner, they differ from surveys and allow people to respond in their own words (Remler & Ryzin, 2010). An interview can be either unstructured or semi-structured. Unstructured interviews have no pre-determined set of interview questions, whereas in semi-structured interviews, there are interview guides that
normally include a set of open-ended questions (Remler & Ryzin, 2010). Creswell (2014) outlined some advantages of interviewing:

- Interviews are useful when researcher cannot observe participants directly;
- Interview participants can provide historical information; and
- The researcher can control the line of questioning.

On the other hand, Creswell (2003, p. 186) also identified some limitations of interviews:

- They provide indirect information that is filtered through the views of participants;
- Responses may be biased because of the presence of the researcher; and
- Participants may not be equally perceptive and articulate.

For this study, the questions were designed to understand participant perceptions of Islamophobia and their co-nationals' identity formation and level of integration. The qualitative data was collected after the completion of the quantitative phase of the study and was used to better analyze the results of the quantitative research.

**Data analysis.**

To analyze the qualitative data, the researcher followed the steps identified by Creswell (2003, p.191-195):

- Step 1. Organize and prepare the data for analysis: transcribing interviews, sorting and arranging the data.
- Step 2. Read through all the data: obtaining a general sense of the information.
- Step 3. Begin detailed analysis with a coding process: taking data into categories, labeling those categories with a term.

- Step 4. Use the coding process to generate a description of the settings or people as well as categories or themes for analysis: detailed rendering of information about people, places, or events; using the coding to generate themes or categories.

- Step 5. Advance how the description and themes will be represented in the qualitative narrative: using a narrative passage to convey the findings of the analysis.

- Step 6. A final step in data analysis involves making interpretation or meaning of the data.

The text data was obtained from the interviews and coded and analyzed using NVivo 10 software, which is a computer program that stores and organizes qualitative data in electronic form and creates visual images of the data in the form of graphs and models (Remler & Ryzin, 2010).

**Credibility and validity.**

Creswell and Miller (2000) defined validity as “how accurately the account represents participant's realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them” (p. 124). Validity is seen as a strength of qualitative inquiry (Creswell, 2003). Creswell and Miller identified several procedures to validate the accuracy of findings. These procedures are triangulation, disconfirming evidence, researcher reflexivity, member checking, prolonged engagement in the field, collaboration, the audit trail, thick and rich description, and peer debriefing. In order to establish
credibility and validity, the researcher allowed participants to read the data and interpretations so that they could confirm the credibility and validity of the information. The researcher also recruited an external auditor to review the study.
CHAPTER 4. QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive Statistics

A total of 298 Turkish immigrants living in the United States and Canada participated in this study, most of whom were recruited online. These participants participated in a self-administered online survey that was shared via the Facebook pages of Turkish professional, student, and social groups. Others were recruited through Turkish immigrant organizations and the researcher’s personal network.

Table 4.1 (below) displays the results for the characteristics of participants. Regarding the sample of immigrants residing in the United States, 180 Turkish immigrants responded the questionnaire. The majority of the participants were males, who represented approximately 69.8% (125) of the sample, while 30.2% (54) were female. The age of the US-based sample ranged from 18–29 years of age to a group of individuals self-identified as 60 years of age or older (1=18–29, 2=30–39, 3=40–49, 4=50–59, 5=60 or older). Among the 180 participants, 42.2% (76) were in the “30–39” year old age group, which constituted the majority of the participants, followed by 30% (54) who identified as being in the “18–29” age group, 19.5% (35) in the “40–49” age group, 13 participants (7.2%) in the “50–59” age group, and finally 2 participants (1.1%) in the “60 years or older” age group.

Four different levels were designated to measure the length of residence of participants (1= Less than 5 years, 2= 5-9 years 3= 10-14 years, 4= More than 15 years). This question was answered by 177 participants. The majority of these respondents, 41.2% (73) reported having resided in the United States at the time of the survey for less than five years, followed by 21.5% (38) of the participants
who reported having resided in the United States for more than 10 years and less than 15 years, 19.2% (34) of the participants for more than 5 years and less than 10 years, and, finally, 18.1% (32) of the participants for more than 15 years.

Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Demographic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>Percentages (p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male = 1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female = 2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29 = 1</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 = 2</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 = 3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 = 4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 or older = 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 years = 1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 9 years = 2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 14 years = 3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 years or more = 4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school= 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school = 2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate's degree = 3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree = 4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Degree = 5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $20,000 = 1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000-$34,999 = 2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000-$49,999 = 3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000-$74,999 = 4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000-$99,999 = 5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000-$149,999 = 6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $150,000= 7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researcher designated five education level groups ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = Less than High School Degree, 2 = High School Degree, 3 = Associate Degree,
of the US-based participants had a graduate degree and 35.5% (64) of the participants reported having completed a bachelor’s degree. The total income of the participants ranged from “less than $20,000” to “more than 150,000.” Around 24.8% (44) of those who answered the question reported a salary range of “$50,000–$74,999,” followed by 20.3% (36) of respondents who reported “$20,000–$34,999.”

A total of 118 Turkish immigrants residing in Canada responded to the questionnaire. The majority of the participants were males, who represented approximately 61% (72) of the sample, while females accounted for 39% (46) of the sample. Among the 118 participants, 36.4% (43) were in the “30–39” years old age group, followed by 25.4% (30) in the “40–49” age group, 21.2% (25) in the “18–29” age group, 13.6% (16) in the “50–59” age group, and finally 3.4% (4) in the “60 years or older” age group.

Among the 117 participants who answered the question regarding the length of time they had resided in Canada, the majority – 32.5% (38) of the sample reporting having resided in Canada for more than ten years, followed by 26.5% (31) of the participants for more than five years and less than ten years, and, finally, 23.1% (27) of the participants reported having resided in Canada for less than five years. Regarding education, the results indicated that 43.2% (51) of the participants held a bachelor’s degree and 22.9% (27) of the participants had a graduate degree. With respect to income level, 28.9% (33) of those who answered to this question reported incomes in the “$35,000–$49,999” range, and participants
who reported income levels in the “$50,000–$74,999” range and the “$75,000–$99,999” range each made up 15.8 (18) of the sample.

Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Index Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index Variables</th>
<th>Mean US</th>
<th>Std. Dev. US</th>
<th>Range US</th>
<th>Mean CA</th>
<th>Std. Dev. CA</th>
<th>Range CA</th>
<th>Skewness US</th>
<th>Kurtosis US</th>
<th>Skewness CA</th>
<th>Kurtosis CA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Islamophobia</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.6-5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.56*</td>
<td>.46*</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identification</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>-.88*</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1.73*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Crisis</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1-3.5</td>
<td>1.27*</td>
<td>.59*</td>
<td>5.67*</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.15*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. US: United States, CA: Canada; *p<.05

Table 4.2 (above) displays the results concerning the descriptive statistics for the index variables. As seen, Perceived Islamophobia ranged from 1.6 to 5 in the United States sample with a mean of 3.03 (SD: 0.72), which was positively skewed. National Identification had a mean of 2.73 (SD: 0.87) and was normally distributed, whereas Religious Identification had a mean of 3.63 (SD: 1.24) and negatively skewed. They both ranged from 1 to 5. Identity Crisis had a relatively lower mean than the other variables (M: 1.90, SD: 0.71), was positively skewed, and ranged from 1 to 5. Integration had a mean among of 3.28 (SD: 1.00).

In the Canadian sample, Perceived Islamophobia ranged from 1 to 4.6 with a mean of 2.60 (SD: 0.75), which was positively skewed. Mean values of National Identification and Religious Identification were close to each other – 3.12 (SD: 0.85) and 3.14 (SD: 1.35) respectively. They both ranged from 1 to 5. Identity Crisis had a relatively lower mean than other variables (M: 1.78, SD: 0.60), was positively skewed.
skewed, and ranged from 1 to 3.5. Integration had a mean of 3.47 (SD: 1.00).

**Factor Analysis and Scale Reliability Testing**

The data consisted of five scales with 27 five-point Likert-type questions and 5 demographic questions. The names of the variables are displayed in Table 4.3. The “Perceived Islamophobia Scale” had a total of 10 items. The first six items were related to “General Fear,” followed by two items related to “Fear of Islamization,” and the final two items related to “Islamophobia in Media.” Three items in the “General Fear” sub-scale were reverse coded. There were two items to measure integration, four items to measure national identification, five items to measure religious identification, and, finally, six items on the identity crisis scale.

Prior to factor analysis, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) values were calculated to measure sampling adequacy. According to Kaiser (1974) values from 0.00 to 0.49 are “unacceptable”, 0.50 to 0.59 are “miserable”, 0.60 to 0.69 are “mediocre”, 0.70 to 0.79 are “middling”, 0.80 to 0.89 are “meritorious”, and 0.90 to 1.00 are “marvelous”. KMO values for each scale of the survey were acceptable. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was also performed prior to factor analysis in order to test the homogeneity of the variances. This test calculates the overall significance of all correlations within a correlation matrix (Stamatis, 2012). Finally, scale reliability of the items was tested using Cronbach’s alpha to assess the internal reliability of scales. An alpha value that is close to 1 indicates greater reliability. An acceptable minimum value standard is usually 0.70; however, a cut-off value of 0.60 is also acceptable.
### Table 4.3. Indicator and Demographic Variables Used in This Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDU</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCOME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived</strong></td>
<td><strong>Islamophobia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLGF1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many Americans avoid Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLGF2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Americans are suspicious of Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLGF3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>In general, Americans trust Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLGF4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall, only few Americans are afraid of Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLGF5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most Americans feel safe among Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLGF6</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many Americans get nervous in the presence of Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLFI1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many Americans fear an “Islamization” of the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLFI2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>A lot of Americans consider Islam a threat to American values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLM1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>American media always presents Muslims as dangerous people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLM2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>American media spreads a lot of fear of Muslims and Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National</strong></td>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATID1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I identify with American people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATID2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I feel that I am an American.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATID3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I feel connected to the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATID4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Being American is an important part of how I see myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious</strong></td>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELID1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>My Muslim identity is an important part of my self.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELID2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I identify strongly with Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELID3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I feel a strong attachment to Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELID4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I am proud of my Islamic background.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELID5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I feel a strong sense of belonging to Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Crisis</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDCONF1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I have difficulties fitting into the wider society because of my cultural background.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDCONF2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I sometimes do not know where I belong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDCONF3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I experience conflict over my identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDCONF4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I find it impossible to be part of both my cultural group and the wider society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDCONF5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I am uncertain about my values and beliefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDCONF6</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I am sometimes confused about who I really am.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTEG1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>The relationship I have with Americans is as good as the one I have with my co-nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTEG2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>I like just as much to be together with Americans as with my co-nationals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Bold items were reverse coded. The items in the table are only for the US sample.
Table 4.4. Factor Loadings of the Survey Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US  CA</td>
<td>US  CA</td>
<td>US  CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived</td>
<td>ISLGF1</td>
<td>.78  .82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>ISLGF2</td>
<td>.77  .83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISLGF3</td>
<td>.68  .64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISLGF5</td>
<td>.58  .35</td>
<td>3.61  3.56</td>
<td>.84  .86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISLGF6</td>
<td>.64  .75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISLF1</td>
<td>.55  .69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISLF2</td>
<td>.69  .80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>NATID1</td>
<td>.76  .73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATID2</td>
<td>.83  .82</td>
<td>2.22  2.33</td>
<td>.83  .86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATID3</td>
<td>.70  .77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATID4</td>
<td>.69  .73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>RELID1</td>
<td>.92  .96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>RELID2</td>
<td>.87  .93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RELID3</td>
<td>.87  .92</td>
<td>4.05  4.32</td>
<td>.95  .97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RELID4</td>
<td>.91  .91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RELID5</td>
<td>.92  .92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Crisis</td>
<td>IDCONF1</td>
<td>.38  .44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDCONF2</td>
<td>.72  .75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDCONF3</td>
<td>.88  .83</td>
<td>3.11  2.85</td>
<td>.84  .82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDCONF4</td>
<td>.60  .60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDCONF5</td>
<td>.80  .69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDCONF6</td>
<td>.81  .76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>INTEG1</td>
<td>.80  .79</td>
<td>1.28  1.26</td>
<td>.85  .84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTEG2</td>
<td>.80  .79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. US: United States, CA: Canada

After examining the internal reliability of scales, the researcher conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for each scale. Eigenvalues greater than 1 were considered as significant. After conducting EFA, factor loads were rotated to get a clearer pattern. Varimax rotation, which produces orthogonal factors, was used for this purpose. Factor analysis and scale reliability tests were applied to the following scales: Perceived Islamophobia Scale, National Identification Scale, Religious
Identification Scale, Identity Crisis Scale, and Acculturation Attitudes scale. Finally, composite scores were created by taking the mean of the items in each scale. Table 4.4 (above) displays factor loadings of the items and eigenvalues, as well as alpha scores of the scales.

**Perceived Islamophobia Scale (PIS).**

The Perceived Islamophobia Scale (PIS) was adapted from Kunst et al.’s (2013) study, and consists of ten items. In the United States sample, the overall KMO score was 0.78. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (45) = 865.250$, $p<0.001$. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.85. Based on eigenvalues, EFA yielded a two-factor solution. Only two items (ISLM1 and ISLM2) were excluded from the first factor. For the Canadian sample, the KMO overall score was 0.76. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (45) = 645.802$, $p<0.001$. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.86. The EFA test resulted in one factor with an eigenvalue higher than one, which explained 72% of the total variance. However, the item “Overall, only few Canadians are afraid of Islam” (ISLGF4) has a very low factor loading of 0.20, which is under the cut-off value. The items ISLM1, ISLM2, and ISLGF4 were removed from the scales. ISLM1 and ISLM2 were removed to create a single factor structure, and ISLGF4 was removed due to its low factor loading.

After removing the three items noted above from the scale, the remaining seven items were loaded on one factor in both samples. For the final version of the scale, the overall KMO score was 0.79 in the United States sample. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (21) = 544.760$, $p<0.001$. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.84. For the Canadian sample, the overall KMO score was 0.79. Bartlett’s test of
sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (21) = 433.999$, and Cronbach’s alpha was 0.86. Moreover, according to collinearity diagnostics, there were no evidence of multicollinearity in either sample. Correlation of the items are presented in Table 4.5 and 4.6.

**Table 4.5. Correlation of the Items (Perceived Islamophobia) – United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ISLGF1</th>
<th>ISLGF2</th>
<th>ISLGF3</th>
<th>ISLGF5</th>
<th>ISLGF6</th>
<th>ISLFI1</th>
<th>ISLFI2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF2</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF3</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF5</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF6</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLFI1</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLFI2</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.6. Correlation of the Items (Perceived Islamophobia) - Canada**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ISLGF1</th>
<th>ISLGF2</th>
<th>ISLGF3</th>
<th>ISLGF5</th>
<th>ISLGF6</th>
<th>ISLFI1</th>
<th>ISLFI2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF2</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF3</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF5</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLGF6</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLFI1</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLFI2</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Identification Scale (NIS).**

The National Identification Scale (NIS) had four items. The overall KMO score for the United States sample was 0.73. The data were deemed adequate for purposes of conducting factor analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (6) = 312.281$, $p<0.001$. Cronbach’s alpha value was 0.83. Based on the eigenvalues, all factors loaded on one factor. After the rotation, the items’ loadings
ranged between 0.69 and 0.83. For the Canadian sample, the overall KMO score was 0.81, which indicated a good score. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, \( \chi^2(6) = 201.406, p<0.001 \). Cronbach’s alpha value was 0.86. The EFA test resulted in one factor with an eigenvalue higher than one. After the rotation, the items' loadings ranged between 0.73 and 0.82. Additionally, the VIF scores of the items in both samples were all under 10, which indicated that there was no problem with multicollinearity. Table 4.7 and 4.8 indicate the correlation of the items.

**Table 4.7.** Correlation of the Items (National Identification) – United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATID1</th>
<th>NATID2</th>
<th>NATID3</th>
<th>NATID4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATID1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATID2</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATID3</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATID4</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.8.** Correlation of the Items (National Identification) – Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATID1</th>
<th>NATID2</th>
<th>NATID3</th>
<th>NATID4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATID1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATID2</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATID3</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATID4</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Religious Identification Scale (RIS).**

Scale reliability tests and factor analysis were conducted to examine the 5-item Religious Identification Scale (RIS). For the United States sample, the KMO value was 0.86, which was considerably high, thus demonstrating the appropriateness of the items for factor analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, \( \chi^2(10) = 1004.033, p<0.001 \). According to EFA, all items loaded on one factor. Cronbach’s alpha value of the scale was 0.95, which is close to 1. There
was no evidence of multicollinearity. For the Canadian sample, the overall KMO score was 0.90. The data were deemed adequate for conducting factor analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (10) = 753.171$, $p<0.001$. The EFA test resulted in one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one. Cronbach’s alpha value of the scale was considerably high with a value of around 0.97. Based on the collinearity diagnostics, there was no evidence of multicollinearity. Correlation of the items are presented in Table 4.9 and 4.10.

**Table 4.9.** Correlation of the Items (Religious Identification) – United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RELID1</th>
<th>RELID2</th>
<th>RELID3</th>
<th>RELID4</th>
<th>RELID5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELID1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID2</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID3</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID4</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID5</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.10.** Correlation of the Items (Religious Identification) - Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RELID1</th>
<th>RELID2</th>
<th>RELID3</th>
<th>RELID4</th>
<th>RELID5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELID1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID2</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID3</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID4</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELID5</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Identity Crisis Scale (ICS).**

The questionnaire distributed to the participants had six items to measure identity crisis. For the United States sample, the overall KMO score was 0.74. The data were thus deemed adequate for conducting factor analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (15) = 625.233$, $p<0.001$. Cronbach’s alpha value was 0.84. EFA resulted in one factor with an eigenvalue higher than one. For the
Canadian sample, the overall KMO score was 0.73, which demonstrated the appropriateness of the items for factor analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (15) = 311.045, p<0.001$. Cronbach’s alpha value was 0.82. All of the items loaded on one factor. There was no evidence of multicollinearity for either sample. Table 4.11 and 4.12 indicate the correlation of the items.

**Table 4.11. Correlation of the Items (Identity Crisis) – United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IDCONF1</th>
<th>IDCONF2</th>
<th>IDCONF3</th>
<th>IDCONF4</th>
<th>IDCONF5</th>
<th>IDCONF6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF2</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF3</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF4</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF5</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF6</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.12. Correlation of the Items (Identity Crisis) - Canada**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IDCONF1</th>
<th>IDCONF2</th>
<th>IDCONF3</th>
<th>IDCONF4</th>
<th>IDCONF5</th>
<th>IDCONF6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF2</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF3</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF4</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF5</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDCONF6</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Integration scale.**

The Integration strategy subscale had two items with an overall KMO value of 0.50, which was poor but adequate, for both samples. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant in both samples, $\chi^2 (1) = 136.838, p<0.001$ for the United States sample and $\chi^2 (1) = 86.967, p<0.001$ for the Canadian sample. Cronbach’s alpha value was 0.85 for the United States sample and 0.84 for the United States sample. EFA resulted in one factor solution for both samples. There was no evidence of
multicollinearity for either sample. Correlation of the items are presented in Table 4.13 and 4.14.

**Table 4.13.** Correlation of the Items (Integration) – United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INTEG1</th>
<th>INTEG2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTEG1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEG2</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.14.** Correlation of the Items (Integration) - Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INTEG1</th>
<th>INTEG2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTEG1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEG2</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cross-National Comparison Test**

An independent t-test of the two samples (see Table 4.15 below) indicated that perceived Islamophobia was significantly higher in the United States ($M = 3.03$, $SE = .05$) than in Canada ($M = 2.59$, $SE = .07$), $t (296) = 4.99$, $p<.001$. In other words, the results indicate that Turkish immigrants living in the United States perceive more Islamophobia than those living in Canada. Results also showed that National Identification was significantly weaker among Turkish-Americans ($M = 2.73$, $SE = .06$) than Turkish-Canadians ($M = 3.12$, $SE = .08$), $t (296) = -3.78$, $p<.001$. On the other hand, Religious Identification was significantly stronger among Turkish-Americans ($M = 3.63$, $SE = .09$) than Turkish-Canadians ($M = 3.14$, $SE = .12$), $t (296) = 3.23$, $p<.001$. Identity crisis, however, was not significantly different between the two samples, $t (296) = 1.47$, $p = .184$. When it came to acculturation attitudes, the attitudes towards Integration were not significantly different between the two samples, $t (295) = -1.52$, $p = .130$. 
Gender and income were not significantly different between two samples, $t(295) = -1.57, p = .116$ and $t(289) = -.26, p = .798$, respectively. However, the average age of the United States sample ($M = 2.07, SE = .07$) was significantly lower than the average age of Canadian sample ($M = 2.42, SE = .10$), $t(296) = -2.91, p<.01$. The results revealed that the United States sample ($M = 4.08, SE = .07$) was more educated than the Canadian sample ($M = 3.63, SE = .11$), $t(296) = 3.63, p<.001$. On the other hand, the average length of residence was lower in the United States sample ($M = 2.16, SE = .09$) than in Canada ($M = 2.45, SE = .10$), $t(292) = -2.19, p<.05$.

Table 4.15. Independent Two-sample T-test with Equal Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>US N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>CA N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.(two-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Islamophobia</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>-3.78</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Crisis</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-2.19</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. US: United States, CA: Canada
Bivariate Analysis

The results in Table 4.16 (below) indicate that Perceived Islamophobia was negatively correlated with National Identification ($r = -0.18$, $p<.05$) and positively correlated with Identity crisis ($r = 0.19$, $p<.05$) and Gender ($r = 0.23$, $p<.01$) in the United States sample. The results revealed that females are more likely to perceive Islamophobia. National Identification was positively and strongly associated with Integration ($r = 0.51$, $p<.001$), Age ($r = 0.26$, $p<.001$), and Length of Residence ($r = 0.28$, $p<.001$), and moderately associated with Income ($r = 0.23$, $p<.01$). On the other hand, National Identification was negatively associated with Religious Identification ($r = -0.30$, $p<.001$). Religious Identification was also negatively correlated with Integration ($r = -0.27$, $p<.001$), Gender ($r = -0.29$, $p<.001$), Education ($r = -0.17$, $p<.05$), and Income ($r = -0.25$, $p<.001$). The results show that Identity Crisis was negatively associated with Integration ($r = -0.15$, $p<.05$) and Age ($r = -0.22$, $p<.01$). Integration was positively correlated with Length of Residence ($r = 0.17$, $p<.05$) as well as Income ($r = 0.18$, $p<.05$).
### Table 4.16. Correlation Matrix (United States)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Length of Residence</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Identity Conflict</th>
<th>Religious Identification</th>
<th>National Identification</th>
<th>Perceived Islamophobia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.89**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.279***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.517***</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.206**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.517***</td>
<td>0.206**</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Conflict</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>-0.22**</td>
<td>-0.203**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identification</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.278***</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Islamophobia</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *\(p<.05\), **\(p<.001\), ***\(p<0.001\).
The results for the Canadian sample are displayed in Table 4.17 below. For this sample, Perceived Islamophobia correlated only with Identity Crisis ($r = .26$, $p<.01$). National Identification was positively and strongly associated with Integration ($r = .37$, $p<.001$) and weakly associated with Education ($r = -.23$, $p<.05$). It was found to be negatively associated with Religious Identification ($r = -.20$, $p<.01$). The results further revealed that Religious Identification was negatively correlated with Integration ($r = -.31$, $p<.001$) and Education. It had a moderate positive correlation with Length of Residence ($r = .25$, $p<.01$). There was a moderately negative correlation between Identity Crisis and Integration ($r = .25$, $p<.01$). Finally, Integration had also a positive correlation with Age ($r = .19$, $p<.05$).
Table 4.17: Correlation Matrix (Canada)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Perceived Islamophobia</th>
<th>National Identification</th>
<th>Religious Identification</th>
<th>Identity Conflict</th>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Length of Residence</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Islamophobia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identification</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.205**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Conflict</td>
<td>0.257**</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>0.368***</td>
<td>-0.310***</td>
<td>-0.250**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.1211</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.183*</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.250**</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>0.195*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.227*</td>
<td>-0.277**</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.195*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.190*</td>
<td>0.279**</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Path Analysis

The model that was developed for this study examines the relationship between Islamophobia, National Identification, Religious Identification, Integration, and Identity Crisis. Using structural equation modeling for path models allowed the researcher to ascertain the path coefficients between variables in the hypothesized path model and examine the causal relationship between them. Typically, path models contain three types of variables: exogenous variables, endogenous mediator variables, and endogenous outcome variables. Exogenous variables are the independent variables that are not dependent on any other variables in a model (Acock, 2013). On the other hand, endogenous variables are dependent variables that are explained by the model (Acock, 2013). The difference between endogenous outcome variables and endogenous mediator variables is that endogenous outcome variables are dependent variables with respect to all other variables in a model, while endogenous mediator variables are dependent with respect to some variables in a model and independent with respect to other variables (Acock, 2013).

In this study, a hypothesized path model was tested separately using a sample of Turkish immigrants living in the United States and another sample of Turkish immigrants living in Canada. The path model was based on theoretical predictions. In the literature review chapter, the researcher examined the relationships between the variables in the model. Models were tested using maximum likelihood procedure.

In the hypothesized path model, Islamophobia is the exogenous
(independent) variable. It was not explained by the model; it was the predictor variable. Identity Crisis was the endogenous outcome variable. It is explained by the model and dependent with respect to perceived Islamophobia and integration in the model. On the other hand, National Identification and Religious Identification were endogenous mediator variables. They are dependent with respect to Islamophobia and independent with respect to Integration. Integration is also an endogenous mediator variable, as it is dependent with respect to National Identification and Religious Identification and independent with respect to Identity Crisis.

The procedure used to test the path model consisted of several steps. First, path coefficients were computed and standardized coefficients were reported. According to a general guideline about the effect size, a standardized path coefficient with a value less than .30 indicates a “small effect,” a value between .30 and .50 indicates a “medium effect,” and a value greater than .50 indicates a “large effect” (Cohen, 1988). Second, goodness of fit indices were reported. To analyze the data fit, chi-square values, Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) were tested. A CFI score that is close to 1 indicates a very good fit, with 0.90 generally accepted as a cut-off point. A RMSEA score that is less than 0.05 indicates a very good fit, but 0.08 is accepted as a cut-off point. Equation-level goodness of fit statistics ($R^2$), which reveals the quantity of variance that was explained for each endogenous variable (Acock, 2013), were also computed and reported.

For the United States sample, SEM analysis (see figure 4.1 below) indicated
that Islamophobia was a significant predictor of National Identification ($\beta = -0.17$, $p<0.05$) and Identity Crisis ($\beta = 0.18$, $p<0.01$). However, Islamophobia was not significantly related to Religious Identification ($\beta = -0.11$, $p = 0.14$). In the proposed path model, Islamophobia decreases national identification and increases identity crisis. On the other hand, it does not have any significant direct, indirect, or total effect on integration at the 95% confidence interval. These results are reported in Table 4.18 below.

Table 4.18. Standardized Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Predictor Variables on Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor (bold) and Outcome Variable</th>
<th>Direct Effect</th>
<th>Indirect Effect</th>
<th>Total Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Islamophobia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identification</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Crisis</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Crisis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Crisis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Crisis</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$

The results also show that National Identification had a significant direct positive effect on Integration ($\beta = 0.48$, $p<0.001$) and an indirect negative effect on
Identity Crisis ($\beta = -0.07, p<.001$). A significant, negative correlation was found between National Identification and Religious Identification ($\beta = -0.33, p<0.001$). Furthermore, Religious Identification was not a significant predictor of integration ($\beta = -0.13, p=.056$). Finally, Integration had significant direct negative effect on Identity Crisis ($\beta = -0.14, p<.05$).

Results reveal that the hypothesized model fit the data ($\chi^2(2)=1.24 \ p=0.54$, RMSEA: 0.000, CFI: 1.000, TLI: 1.044). Significant chi-square means that the model fails to account for covariances among the variables (Acock, 2013). In this model, the chi-square was not significant, so it can be concluded that all variances and covariances implied by this model matched the observed variances and covariances in the data. However, the chi-square value was less than the model df, so the model “overfit.” The score of root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) was far below the cut-off value of 0.08. Comparative fit index (CFI) is “normed” so that it ranges between 0 and 1. However, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) is “nonnormed” so that it can be larger than 1 or below than 0. For this study, the CFI score of 1.000 and the TLI score of 1.044 indicated a good fit.
For the Canadian sample, SEM analysis indicated that Islamophobia was a significant predictor of only Identity Crisis ($\beta = .24, p<.01$). Islamophobia was not significantly related to National Identification ($\beta = -.07, p=.45$), Religious Identification ($\beta = .04, p = .67$), or Integration ($\beta = -.08, p = .32$). The model indicated that Islamophobia did not have any significant direct effects, indirect effect, or total effects on National Identification, Religious Identification, or Integration.

The results, as depicted in Figure 4.2 below, show that National Identification had a significant direct positive effect on Integration ($\beta = .31, p<.001$) and an indirect negative effect on Identity Crisis ($\beta = -.07, p<.001$). It was also found that Religious Identification was a significant predictor of Integration ($\beta = -.25, p<.01$). There was a significant negative correlation between National Identification and Religious Identification ($\beta = -.21, p<.05$). Integration had
significant direct negative effect on Identity Crisis ($\beta = -0.23$, $p<0.01$).

**Figure 4.2.** Path Model for the Proposed Study (Canada)

![Path Model](image)

*Note.* Path coefficients are standardized.

Goodness of fit indices revealed that Model-3 fit the data ($\chi^2(2)=0.23$, $p=0.89$, RMSEA: 0.000, CFI: 1.000, TLI: 1.237). The Chi-square was not significant. According to goodness-of-fit indices, the model and the data had good fits for both models.

**Hypothesis Testing**

**Hypothesis 1.**

The first hypothesis stated: “Perceived Islamophobia is positively associated with religious identification, but it is negatively associated with national identification.” This hypothesis includes two sub-hypotheses:

**H.1.a.** *Perceived Islamophobia is associated with decreased national*
identification. For the United States sample, analysis of the path model revealed that there was a significant negative relationship between perceived Islamophobia and National Identification ($\beta = -0.17, p<0.05$). Thus, greater perceived Islamophobia predicted decreased National Identification. The effect size was small. Hypothesis 1.a was accepted for the United States sample. On the other hand, in the Canadian sample, no significant relationship was found between perceived Islamophobia and National Identification ($\beta = -0.07, p=0.45$). Thus, Hypothesis 1.a was rejected for the Canadian sample.

**H.1.b. Perceived Islamophobia is associated with increased religious identification.** For the United States sample, no significant relationship was found between perceived Islamophobia and Religious Identification ($\beta = -0.11, p = 0.14$). Thus, hypothesis 1.b was rejected for this sample. Similarly, no significant relationship was found between perceived Islamophobia and Religious Identification ($\beta = 0.07, p = 0.43$) in the Canadian sample. Thus, Hypothesis 1.b was also rejected in the Canadian sample.

**Hypothesis 2.**

The second hypothesis stated: “National identification is positively associated with integration.” This hypothesis was accepted for both samples. For the United States sample, the results also showed that National Identification had a significant direct positive effect on Integration ($\beta = 0.48, p<0.001$). For the Canadian sample, the results revealed that National Identification also had a significant direct positive effect on Integration ($\beta = 0.31, p<0.001$).
Hypothesis 3.

The third hypothesis stated: “Integration is negatively associated with identity crisis.” This hypothesis was also accepted for both samples. For the United States sample, Integration had a significant direct negative effect on Identity Crisis ($\beta = -0.14$, $p<.05$). Similarly, in the Canadian sample, Integration was negatively associated with Identity Crisis ($\beta = -0.23$, $p<.01$).

Hypothesis 4.

The fourth hypothesis stated: “Perceived Islamophobia is positively associated with identity crisis.” For the United States sample, SEM analysis indicated that perceived Islamophobia was a significant predictor of Identity Crisis ($\beta = 0.18$, $p<.01$). For the Canadian sample, perceived Islamophobia also had a significant direct positive effect on Identity Crisis ($\beta = 0.24$, $p<.01$). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was accepted for both samples.
CHAPTER 5. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

Findings on Islamophobia

Perceived Islamophobia, as discussed in previous chapters, can trigger an identity crisis (Sageman, 2004). It is also identified as a factor that puts Muslim individuals at risk of radicalization (Rahimullah et al., 2013). The researcher conducted interviews to explore perceptions about Islamophobia and to better understand the relationship between perceived Islamophobia, integration, and identity crisis. As described in Chapter 3, the researcher conducted interviews with 10 opinion leaders from the United States and Canada. Interview participants were asked about their understanding and perceptions of Islamophobia, as well as their experiences with it. Based on their responses, the researcher attempted to provide a general overview of perceived Islamophobia among Turkish-Americans and Turkish-Canadians.

The interviews revealed that perceived Islamophobia among Turkish immigrants both in the United States and in Canada is modest. Although Turkish immigrants in these countries perceive some level of Islamophobia, they do not see it as the biggest problem they face. They mostly see their respective countries as welcoming societies for Muslims. They usually mentioned the terms “misperception” and “prejudice” when defining Islamophobia. Most participants believe that a misunderstanding of Islam is the main driving factor for Islamophobia. One participant stressed:

Islamophobia is not based on real knowledge of Islam. It is based on what people have been taught about Islam. They have been taught that Islam is a backward and violent religion, and it mandates believers to perpetrate
violence against non-believers. Fear of Islam and Muslims is built upon misinformation about or misperceptions of Islam. (PUS-6)

Another participant emphasized the restriction of rights and liberties that should be enjoyed by Muslims just like all other citizens. Islamophobia is regarded as a kind of infringement on such rights and liberties. This participant defined Islamophobia as follows: “Islamophobia refers to the unequal treatment of Muslims on the basis of prejudice. It is the infringement of Muslims’ fundamental rights and liberties. It is a situation in which Muslims are being treated as second-class citizens” (PCA-2).

When it comes to experiences of Islamophobia, participants highlighted two important points. The first one was about the effects of 9/11 on their lives, and the second was about the fact that women experience more Islamophobia than men. Most of them believe that 9/11 only had short-term effects. Some revealed that they experienced some degree of backlash following 9/11 for a short time, but after the shock of the events had passed, life returned to normal. A few participants believe that 9/11 was a turning point in relations between Muslims and United States society, and it continues to affect their daily lives. A participant shared an experience of a Muslim in his community:

Before 9/11, Muslims in this country did not hesitate to use Muslim names. However, after 9/11, I saw that many Muslims began using American names. Once I asked a truck driver why he changed his name. He told me that his real name was Mustafa, but he used Mike instead of his original name. He said that he had to wait for hours when he submitted documents with the name “Mustafa” on papers, but he had to wait only minutes when he submitted the same documents with the name of “Mike.” That was the reason why he changed his name. (PUS-2)

The same participant emphasized that Muslims in his community expressed
that they had almost no problem before 9/11, and the United States was heaven for Muslims. They declared that they began having problems in United States society after these tragic events occurred. This is consistent with several other studies of Muslim experiences in the wake of 9/11. For example, Maira’s (2004) study on South Asian Muslim youth in the United States after 9/11 revealed that Muslims in the United States had to deal with many problems, such as fear of surveillance and deportation, demonization of Islam, and scapegoating of Muslims. She found that many people in these communities felt under siege in the days following 9/11. In the same vein, Franjie’s (2012) study of Arab-Canadians showed that they felt that they were victims of racial and religious targeting and stigmatism after 9/11.

Interviews revealed that the likelihood of experiencing Islamophobia depended on socioeconomic class. Interview participants that reported being in contact with upper class Muslims said that they and their connections did not face severe Islamophobia or backlash right after 9/11. Lower class Muslim immigrants, on the other hand, were more likely to experience an Islamophobic event.

In professional settings, the likelihood of facing discrimination becomes even rarer. Typically, there are enough rules in place in work environments to protect employees from discrimination; however, this does not mean that these environments are free of discrimination. Ibish and Stewart’s (2003) study showed that over 800 cases of employment discrimination were reported in the first year following the 9/11 attacks, which was four times that of previous years. To give an example of employment discrimination, a participant shared the experience of his
wife, who is a physician and wears a headscarf:

My wife applied for a medical residency program at a university. After that, she received a letter indicating that she was shortlisted and invited for a lunch at the university. Meanwhile, she received emails, which stated that she met the requirements and had wonderful qualifications. She truly believed that her application would be accepted and went to that lunch as if she was going to meet her new workmates. Everything was wonderful until she met with the director. She said that the director was extremely surprised when she first met him. He did not expect to see a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf. A few days after the lunch, she received another letter saying that her application was rejected. She was very disappointed and almost sure that her application was rejected just because she is a Muslim. (PUS-6)

The same participant added that he and his wife became targets of discrimination several times after the 9/11 attacks. He said that he experienced discrimination and hate crimes especially when he was with his wife. He expressed that he cannot be identified as a Muslim by his appearance, but his wife can easily be identified because of her headscarf. He recounted that they were living in a Midwestern state when 9/11 happened and soon after the events, some young American college students insulted him and his wife saying “go back to your cave.” Then they moved to a Northeastern state to a rental house in 2002. However, they moved out of that house a month after they moved in because they found a better one. Some Turkish college students working in a pizzeria moved into the house they initially rented after they moved out. Their neighbors became suspicious because a Muslim family moved into the house, then moved out after a month, and later some young people moved in. They called the police believing that the house was being used as a terrorist cell, and the police came to investigate what was going on. He explained that many Americans were deeply perturbed and skeptical during the period of time following 9/11.
According to a study of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Research Institute (Ibish & Stewart, 2003), in the first nine weeks following 9/11, over 700 hate crimes were directed at individuals believed to be Arab or Muslim in the United States. By contrast, there were only 33 anti-Islamic hate crime offenses in 2000, according to the FBI’s records (Kaplan, 2006). Hate crimes decreased in 2002, compared to 2001. One hundred and sixty-five violent incidents were reported from January 1, 2002 to October 11, 2002 (Ibish & Stewart, 2003).

PUS-6 shared another experience with Islamophobia. He and his wife moved to another state in 2009. They had a neighbor who was unemployed for a long time because he could not find a job. This interview participant said that his neighbor was jealous of him, since both he and his wife, as immigrants, had good jobs. His neighbor began calling him “nasty Pakistani,” thereby insulting him without knowing his origin. On one occasion, he recorded his neighbor’s verbal abuse and sued him. He obtained a restraining order from the court. He explained that the judge told his neighbor, “You are not going to look into his eyes. If he ever comes and says you looked into his eyes, I am going to put you in prison.” He was very impressed after he saw that laws in the United States protect anyone and everyone that is subjected to discrimination. At that point, he understood that even though they may encounter Islamophobia in broader society was possible, they could feel safe, as there were also laws to protect them.

Another participant (PUS-3) emphasized the diversity in the United States. He believed that diversity matters in the United States, and one can see how diversity is encouraged in all aspects of life. He expressed that United States’
policies on diversity make it, to some extent, easier for Muslims to live there without fear of being discriminated.

Participant PUS-2 confirmed that women who wear headscarves are more likely to experience Islamophobia than men because of their appearance. Since Turkish men do not have traditional clothes like Arabs, and mostly do not grow a beard, it is difficult to discern whether they are Muslims. However, wearing a headscarf makes it easy to be identified as a Muslim. He said that his child does not want to be picked up from school by her mother, since some other students began calling her terrorist just because her mother covers her head. He also revealed that he suggested to his wife that she not go out on the anniversary of 9/11, as she may encounter Islamophobia. Another participant from Canada reported that while his wife was walking outside, a Canadian woman told her that she did not have to cover her head because Canada is a free country. Furthermore, this woman told his wife that her rights could be defended if she was being forced to cover her head. This experience demonstrates the common belief among Western, non-Muslim people that Muslim women are oppressed.

Those participants who perceived a lower incidence of Islamophobia in the respective countries where they reside believed that Islamophobia is common mostly among low-educated people who learn everything from the media and do not research or read any real information about Islam and Muslims. Participant PUS-4 explained that Turkish immigrants to the United States are mostly well-educated people who have professional jobs. Hence, they are generally around other well-educated people. This explains why they do not perceive a higher
degree of Islamophobia. He also said that since there are a considerable number of Muslim immigrants in the United States, especially on the East and West Coasts, Americans become more used to living around Muslims. He added that he has prayed many times at public rest areas while traveling where he can be easily seen by others. He said that neither he nor his friends have never gotten any reactions while they were praying. Another participant from Canada (PCA-1) expressed that the level of Islamophobia changes from place to place. He said that in the cities where there are considerable immigrant population, Muslims are less likely to face discrimination. He revealed that they could worship in public parks without any worry in Toronto, but they could not do the same in less urban areas. On the other hand, some participants have positive experiences. One participant shared his experience, as follows:

I started working in a factory when I first immigrated to the United States (more than forty years ago). Sometimes I skipped lunch to pray. I found it was convenient to perform *salāat* [ritual prayers of Islam] in an engine room. One day when I was praying in that room, my supervisor came in and asked me what I was doing. I told him that I was praying to God. Then he asked me why I chose that room. I told him that I did not want to disturb others. He told me that praying is not something disturbing and took me to the copy room. Then he told me that I could pray in that room, which was cleaner than the engine room, and told me that I should let him know if someone says anything pejorative. (PUS-5)

Most Americans’ knowledge about Islam and Muslims is substantially based on media reports (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007). Thus, the image of Islam in the minds of non-Muslims is predominantly shaped by the media. According to Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2007), the stereotypical depiction of a Muslim male as violent and female as oppressed in the American media is the principal complaint among Muslims. Nacos and Torres-Reyna's research (2007) was conducted two years
after 9/11 and showed that about 77% of American Muslims believe that the American media is unfair in their portrayal of Muslims. According to Edward Said (2015), covering Islam in the media is a one-sided activity. Consequently, the portrayal of Muslims in the media could be quite different from reality. Similarly, Canadian media also makes the same mistake by equating Islam with terrorism (Ismael & Measor, 2003). Canadian Muslims also have concerns about media representations, and believe that common media images of Muslims in Canada are Islamophobic and do not accurately represent Muslims (Sharify-Funk, 2009). Consequently, Canadian Muslims construct their identities defensively, contrasting to the image portrayed in the media (Sharify-Funk, 2009). Almost all of the participants believe that media exacerbates Islamophobia. The coverage of Islam and Muslims in the Western media is the main concern about Islamophobia among the participants. They believe that the portrayal of Muslims in the media is usually negative and stereotypical, and that moderate peaceful Muslims, who constitute the vast majority of all Muslims, receive too little media coverage. A participant revealed his concern about the media as follows:

I think the way the media reports news about Muslims is provocative. In the news, Muslims are always associated with violence. The media does not cover positive actions taken by Muslims and Muslim organizations. All the news related to Muslims is about terrorism, violence, and conflict…The media’s coverage of Muslims can be defined as provocative because it may lead people to be more aggressive towards Muslims. (PUS-2)

Some participants emphasized the media’s double standard. They believe that the media is unfair when it comes to reporting about Muslims. They agree that the media is deliberately stereotyping Muslims, representing them as aggressive. What hurts the participants most is that the media blames the religion itself solely
on account of the wrongdoings of some marginal extremists. PUS-2 expressed this double standard, stating:

When a Muslim commits a crime, the whole religion is labeled brutal and Muslims are associated with violence. However, when a non-Muslim Western person does something wrong, he or she is labeled as mentally ill or a lone wolf. (PUS-2)

There is an ongoing debate in the Muslim world about whether and, if so, how Islam should be reinterpreted to facilitate Muslims' adaptation to modern life. Zaman (2010) examined the views of modern Islamic scholars about “Islam and modernity.” His study revealed that many Islamic scholars believe in the necessity of bringing Islam and modernity together. Those scholars believe that learning secular sciences does not undermine Islam, and rather that this is even necessary to enable Muslims to live in modern conditions (Zaman, 2010). Many participants believe that Muslims cannot successfully adapt to modern life. One suggested:

Today’s Muslims try to practice Islam as it was practiced hundreds of years ago. Many Muslims cannot adapt to the modern world. They think that being a Muslim is only about wearing traditional clothing and growing a beard. Islam is a universal religion. It is a religion for all times, for all places. It is compatible with today’s world. If Muslims want to gain acceptance in Western countries, we should adopt the modern way of life without sacrificing our religion. (PCA-1)

Opinion leaders that participated in this study also highlighted ignorance as a major problem that the Muslim world faces today. Participants believe that many Muslims are ignorant – even of their own religion and that is why they misrepresent Islam. Self-criticism by Muslim scholars also stresses this point. Fatoohi (2004) stated that one of the most important reasons for the distorted image of Islam in the West is ignorance on behalf of Muslims about their own religion. According to him, the actions that some Muslims take and the ideas they adopt under the name of
Islam have nothing to do with Islam. However, these misconstrued ideas and actions are unfairly associated with Islam by the Western world, which creates fertile ground for Islamophobia (Fatoohi, 2004). For many scholars, violent extremism is based on misinterpretations of Islam. For instance, a lack of knowledge and false interpretations of Islam are considered root causes of radicalization. Radical Muslims mostly have Salafi-Jihadist ideology. Homegrown networks in the United States are mainly motivated by Salafi interpretation of Islam (Vidino, 2009). According to moderate Muslims, this ideology is a misinterpretation and misapplication of Islam (Fadl, 2007). Educating others about “true Islam” is seen as a solution by many Muslims.

Other actions taken by some Muslims also reflect ignorance. For example, one participant criticized the reactions of the Muslim world against a small church’s plan to burn the copy of the Quran:

Impulsive behavior by Muslims also helps Islamophobia to persist. Sometimes Muslims react suddenly, which is very meaningless and foolish. For example, a pastor of a church here in the United States said that he was going to burn the Quran on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. As a reaction to this plan, many Muslims participated in violent demonstrations all over the world. Such violent behavior incites hostility among Western people. We should react wisely and prudently. (PUS-6)

Most of the participants were well aware of the common problems and issues that Muslims have to deal with. Surprisingly, they blame Muslims more than they blame Westerners for the presence of Islamophobia. They pointed out that Muslims should handle these issues, above all to convince people that Islam is not something to fear. One participant revealed:

I do not put all the blame on the Western world. Yes, they do make some mistakes, but Muslims are mainly responsible for Islamophobia. We have
failed to represent Islam correctly. Western people’s mistake is not to investigate the truth what they have heard about Muslims before accusing them. But, again…we should correct our mistakes first and increase our efforts to better represent Islam in real life. (PCA-1)

Another surprising finding from the interviews is that many opinion leaders believe that the level of Islamophobia is higher in Turkey, which is a Muslim country, than it is in the United States or Canada. A participant from the United States said, "Racist and Islamophobic individuals can be found in almost all societies. Look at the Muslim world! Racism and even Islamophobia is greater in Turkey than it is in the United States" (PUS-2). Participants who were practicing Muslims reported having difficulties in Turkey before they immigrated, especially those who immigrated to United States more than ten years ago.

Turkey is a secular country; however, Turkey’s understanding of secularity is peculiar. Secularism, or the separation of the state and religion, in Turkey is rather different than it is in other secular countries. For many years, the practice of secularism in Turkey has mainly been expressed as the state control of religion (Orhan, 2013) because it is considered as the only way to block religion’s effect on political life (Tank, 2005). The Republic of Turkey was founded on the premise of adopting Westernization as its primary goal (Tank, 2005). The founders of the Republic aimed at severing ties with its Ottoman and Muslim past, since Islam was viewed as a feature that distinguished the nation from the West (Tank, 2005). Thus, a new understanding of secularism was created, which was authoritarian and undemocratic, that further created a monopoly over the interpretation of and control over Islam (Karakas, 2007). For instance, there was a ban on the wearing of headscarves by students and professors on university campuses and by
government employees in any public building. Turkish immigrants in the United States and Canada enjoy the freedom of dressing according to their religious beliefs. One participant explained that, “Turkey was an Islamophobic country in the past. People insulted women who wore headscarves, telling them to ‘go to Saudi Arabia.’ This kind of harassment is less common in Canada” (PCA-4). Not only women but also men can be subject to discrimination. This same participant further explained: “Once I went to a hotel in a touristic city. The receptionist refused to give me a room just because I had a beard” (PCA-4). Many participants also believe that tolerance for other religions is much too limited in Turkey. One explained that, “Non-Muslims are more alienated in Turkey than Muslims are in the United States” (PUS-2). They believe that the United States and Canada are among the best countries for Muslims to practice their religion freely.

**Findings on Acculturation Orientations**

As emphasized in the previous chapters, one’s acculturation orientation is based on one’s willingness to maintain his/her culture of origin while engaging with the host society (Berry, 1997). The majority of interview participants believe that although integration is the preferred acculturation strategy among Turkish immigrants, they usually end up assimilating. They reported that the adoption of an attitude of marginalization was very rare. With respect to separation, they expressed that this type of acculturation orientation is common among certain groups, especially lower socioeconomic classes.

One participant (PUS-1) expressed that most of the Turkish immigrants who came to the United States more than 20 years ago voluntarily assimilated into
United States society. However, those who came within the last 20 years chose integration rather than assimilation. Another participant (PUS-2) acknowledged that in some places, there are groups of Turkish immigrants who live as if they are not living in the United States, but rather in Turkey. He admitted that they are, to some extent, separated from American society and removed from U.S. politics. He further added that, “They watch Turkish news; they are affected by political divisions in Turkey, and they are divided into different cliques. They can't even unite within their own small community.” PUS-6 stated that acculturation attitudes depend on where one lives in the country. He noted that when a Turkish immigrant lives in a city where there are a considerable number of Turkish immigrants, he or she might separate from American society. He spoke about Turkish immigrants living in Paterson, New Jersey. Some of these immigrants do not even need to learn English because they can live there without speaking a single word of English. However, those who live in other places have to speak English.

PCA-4 argued that education level is an important predictor for acculturation attitudes. He claimed that well-educated immigrants can more easily integrate into broader society compared to their less educated counterparts. He believes that well-educated immigrants are more capable of learning a foreign language, which is important for integration. Another factor that influences acculturation attitudes are the reasons one has for immigrating. One participant noted:

The motivation behind the migration of earlier Turkish immigrants to the United States was to earn money and then return to Turkey. This motivation hindered their integration into United States society because they did not come to this country to stay permanently. That is why there is no Turkish cemetery in this country. Most of the mosques are former churches, which were converted to mosques. Turkish immigrants have not even built a
mosque from scratch for many years. However, after spending years in this country, most immigrants changed their minds. (PUS-2)

A participant from Canada (PCA-1) expressed that socioeconomic background is an important factor that affects one's acculturation orientation. He explained that less educated immigrants from the working class could neither integrate into Canadian society nor maintain their culture of origin. On the other hand, he argued that educated immigrants from higher socioeconomic strata could choose either integration or assimilation depending on their degree of loyalty to their culture of origin. He added that those who adore and glorify the Western world assimilate readily, give Canadian names to their children, and do not teach Turkish to them. PCA-2 also argued that assimilation is inevitable for many Turkish immigrants. He claimed that those who do not have strong bonds with their culture of origin tend to assimilate. Participant PUS-3 gave an example of how one community fully assimilated and then over time disappeared in the United States:

I heard there was a mosque in Brooklyn that was open only two days a year. It provided services only during religious festivals. I waited for the next festival and went to that mosque. The mosque was first built in 1907 by Tatar Muslims that came from Poland. There were only five old couples in the mosque. One part of the mosque was converted into a museum that exhibited the photos of the Tatar Muslim community and some traditional objects that belonged to that community. There were photos even from 1930s. You can see them wearing their traditional clothes – conical hats, harness boots, loose robes – and taking photos together. You can see the changes in the photos. You can see how they changed by the 1950s, 1960s, and later on. They had a religious leader who died at the end of 1980. At that point, they completely broke off their relations with the mosque. Now only a handful people remain who stay loyal to their traditions and culture of origin. (PUS-3)

According to PUS-5, young people belonging to the first wave of Turkish immigrants fully assimilated, whereas older people separated from American
society. The second wave of immigrants tried to adopt to American society, but at the same time maintained their culture of origin. They built mosques and established cultural organizations in order to maintain the ties between young people and the Turkish community. The third wave of Turkish immigrants was far more successful at integrating into American society without assimilating or separating. Another participant (PUS-3) emphasized the importance of maintaining the Turkish language in order to prevent full assimilation:

The first generation of immigrants kept their language, but their children preferred to speak English. The second generation could speak Turkish but did not teach Turkish to their children. Hence, Turkish, as a language, almost disappeared by the third generation. Language is important for staying connected to a culture. As they forgot their language, they forgot their ancestors’ culture too. (PUS-3)

Saroglou and Mathijsen’s (2007) study the degree of religiousness of European Muslims on their collective identities and acculturation orientations showed that greater religiousness predicted attachment to the culture of origin. Participant PUS-3 highlighted the role of religion in keeping a community together:

Religion is an important common ground for a community that helps protect the culture. There is no religious education in schools, and the youth is not interested in mosques. Kids go to mosques to attend weekend schools with their parents’ encouragement. As they grow up and start secondary school, they break their bonds with the mosque. Furthermore, as they start high school, they begin loosening their bonds with their families, and finally they completely break away from the community after going to college. We cannot seem to create an environment in which the young generation maintains their ties with the community. (PUS-3)

According to PUS-3, mosques are not attractive to young Muslims. He believes that since mosques cannot play a significant role in increasing young Turkish-Americans’ attachment to their culture of origin, the best way to achieve healthy integration and prevent assimilation is by establishing youth centers in the
community. He added:

What young people want is a place where they can have fun, play sports, listen to music, and be social. They cannot do any of these things in a mosque. As a result, they go to other places to have fun. The community has expectations from Imams to teach our children our culture and Islam, and keep them away from extremism. However, Turkish Imams are government officials who come from Turkey for a specific time of service and are not familiar with the young generation in this country. The community itself tries to handle this issue by encouraging young ones to study Islam either in Turkey or in the United States, and then be assigned as Imams in the mosques, but the young people do not have any interest in this. The best way to uphold the loyalty of the young people to the community is to transform the community in a way that can address their needs. I think youth centers where they can learn their culture, traditions, and religion, but at the same time can have fun, watch movies, listen to music, and play sports, are the best alternatives to mosques in today's conditions. (PUS-3)

PCA-3 stressed another important point. He explained that since the Muslim identity of Turkish-Canadians does not make them feel vulnerable, they do not hesitate to interact with broader society, which, in turn, facilitates and expedites assimilation. He further stated that in Europe people feel that their Muslim identity is threatened, and they feel forced to assimilate. Consequently, they develop defense mechanisms against assimilation. In Canada, Turks send their children to Canadian schools without having any concerns. They do not believe that the Canadian government or society forces them to assimilate. Because they feel their children are safe, they let them have more freedom. As a result, their children are more likely to assimilate. However, in Europe, Turks are very concerned about their children. They force them to learn Turkish and to stay connected to their culture of origin. In sum, as PCA-3 articulated, when the host society forces immigrants to assimilate, they are less likely to assimilate.

Another participant (PUS-4) underscored the importance of openness for
successful integration. He compared the Turkish community with the Arab community and declared that the Arab community is more inward-oriented, whereas the Turkish community is more outward-oriented. He discussed the schools managed by the Arab community, explaining that “these schools are not open to American public…they only serve the Arab community. These schools create doubts in the minds of Americans. They are not aware of what is going on behind the walls.” On the other hand, he argued that Turkish schools are open to anyone from any race, any ethnicity, or any religion. He believed that the Turkish community is more inclined towards integration than the Arab community is. He claimed that Turkish-Americans do not hesitate to interact with American society for fear of assimilation.

Various factors can influence the acculturation orientations of immigrants. Research shows that acculturation orientations are associated with perceived discrimination (Berry & Sabatier, 2010; Celenk & Van de Vijver, 2011; Te Lindert et al., 2008) and self-identification (Badea et al., 2011; Nesdale, 2002; Nesdale & Mak, 2000; Safdar, Calvez, & Lewis, 2012). The results of the interviews suggest that perceived Islamophobia is not strongly associated with the acculturation orientations of the majority of Turkish-Americans who participated in this study. Most of the participants believe that the influence of the Islamophobia on acculturation is very limited, if it has any influence at all. One of the participants (PUS-3) stated that some Muslim immigrants who experienced repression either from their own government or from the governments of other countries feared repression after the 9/11 attacks. He mentioned Bosnian immigrants who came to
the United States after the Bosnian war, noting:

Bosnians believed that they were repressed and targeted just because they were Muslims. They immigrated to the United States in order to escape repression and war. However, it took them a long time to get over this fear. They did not band together with their co-nationals, as they thought they might be arrested. They did not even build a mosque for a long time. After the 9/11 attacks, they were scared. They thought that they would be targeted in the United States just as they were in Bosnia. However, the next generation did not share this fear because they did not have such experiences.

On the other hand, PUS-2 believed that Islamophobia encourages assimilation. According to him, those who do not practice their religion, do not have enough knowledge about it, and/or cannot defend Islam when it is questioned usually hide their beliefs, or sometimes give up their religion. Consequently, they move away from their own culture and assimilate. But, he thought that Islamophobia also encourages integration. He claimed that perceived Islamophobia encourages the integration of those who care about their religion and want to show others that Muslims are peaceful people. He added that faithful Muslims cannot hide their religion because they feel an identity conflict when they try to do so. They choose to introduce themselves as “good Muslims” to society and want to set good examples. He shared an experience:

We organized an event at our mosque called “Giving Tuesday” and collected donations. Then we went to an American charity organization and gave all the donations to them. They were very surprised; they did not expect to receive a donation from a mosque. My community launched this initiative in order to show that they are a part of American society and want to contribute to this society as Muslims. (PUS-2)

PUS-4 claimed that Islamophobia did not affect Turkish immigrants’ acculturation attitudes. He explained that a Turkish-American’s lifestyle and style of dress are very similar to those of an American. Hence, Turkish immigrants do
not feel rejected by society. PUS-5 agreed that Islamophobia had almost no effect on the integration of Turkish immigrants. He believed that they can practice their religion freely in the United State and that there are almost no obstacles to be overcome. On the other hand, PUS-6 had a different opinion. He believed Islamophobia to have a strong influence on acculturation attitudes. He said that he would be more integrated into American society and he would feel more American if 9/11 had never happened.

**Findings on Identity Formation**

In previous chapters, it was mentioned that perceived group-based discrimination influences the identity formation of minorities (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). Identifying with a group has important consequences on one's social behavior (Jackson & Smith, 1999), including acculturation preferences (Badea et al., 2011; Safdar et al., 2012). The researcher asked participants about the identity formation of Turkish-Americans and Turkish-Canadians and the factors that affect this formation.

A participant from the United States (PUS-1) argued that Turkish immigrants that came to the United States over 20 years ago introduce themselves with their Turkish identity. According to him, those immigrants mostly have secular backgrounds, and they tried to avoid being known as Muslims. However, he added, those who immigrated to the United States in the last 20 years do not hesitate to reveal their Muslim identity. They introduce themselves both Turkish and Muslim. PUS-2 also confirmed that immigrants from conservative backgrounds bring their Muslim identity to forefront, whereas those from backgrounds that are more
secular primarily identify themselves as Turks rather than Muslims.

Religious conversion is very rare among Turkish immigrants. As PUS-4 stressed, it is not at all common that a Turkish-American would hide his or her Muslim identity because of shame or fear. However, he argued that some third-generation Turkish-Americans chose to renounce even their Turkish identity. He added that they completely assimilated and identified themselves as Americans. According to PUS-2, some of those immigrants report that when they are asked about their religion, they state they do not have one. However, it does not necessarily mean that US-born Turkish-Americans broke all their connections with their culture of origin. PUS-5 emphasized that many third generation immigrants still are sympathetic towards Turkey.

PUS-2 also argued that, after the 9/11 attacks, Turkish Americans tried to isolate themselves from the Arab community and rather highlighted their Europeanness. PUS-6 believed that Turkish-Americans look down on Arab culture: “You can see many Arabs in Turkish restaurants. Even though Arabs have better restaurants, it is very rare that you can see any Turk in an Arab restaurant.” He suggested that although Turks claim that Turkey is not a part of the Middle East, many Americans believe that Turkey is a Middle Eastern country. While there are various ethnic groups within the Muslim world, PUS-4 emphasized that these different ethnic groups are separated from each other in the United States. Each group has its own community and its own mosques, schools, and organizations. Each group wants to be acknowledged as having their own ethnic identity. However, there is a common misconception among Americans that all Muslims are
Arabs. Pew Research Center’s report in 2009 showed that only 20% of the global Muslim population is in the Middle East and North Africa, thus underscoring the fact is that less than 20% of Muslims are from Arab origin. PUS-4 argued that Turks, in general, are strongly nationalist; Turkish immigrants in the West identify themselves primarily as Turks and secondly as Muslims because they do not want to be associated with Arabs.

Most of the participants stressed that US-born Turkish-Americans usually identify themselves first as Americans and second as Turks. PUS-5 gave an example, which illustrates such identity preference:

My children were not born in the United States, but my nephews were born here. I asked my nephews which team they would support if there were a soccer match between Turkey and another country. They said they would support Turkey. Then I asked them which team they would support if the match were between Turkey and the United States. They answered that they would support the United States. (PUS-5)

In the same vein, PCA-3 expressed that once Turkish-Canadians obtain Canadian citizenship, they start feeling more Canadian and use Canadian passports rather than their Turkish passports, even when they go on pilgrimage. Conversely, as PUS-6 emphasized, those Turks who prefer to separate themselves from American culture resist their children’s inclination toward assimilation. They do not want their US-born children to say, “I am an American.”

Most of the participants believe that Islamophobia does not affect the identity formation of Turkish-Americans in general. Some of them believe that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had some influence over the identity formation of Turkish-Americans in the short term, but in the long term that influence disappeared. PUS-6 stated that since Muslim Americans are generally well educated, they could
easily overcome the negative effects of Islamophobia. He stressed that they were organized and created advocacy networks against Islamophobia. He compared Muslims in the United States with those in Europe, and said that Muslims in Europe could not organized to advocate for themselves because they were not as educated as Muslims in the United States. On the other hand, a few participants believed that Islamophobia, to some extent, has changed how people identify themselves. PUS-6 revealed:

I do not feel comfortable disclosing my Muslim identity. I believed that I should prove myself first before telling others that I am Muslim. For instance, I have proved myself in my job. My colleagues like me and know me as a good person who helps others. Now I feel free to reveal my religion, and I feel free to pray when we are in the same room. However, I would not do that the first few years that I had this job because I would afraid of not getting tenure….When my colleagues realized that I am Muslim, they began thinking that I am an exception. (PUS-6)

A participant from Canada (PCA-1) noted that Muslim Canadians are afraid of being associated with terrorist groups. He expressed that although Canada is a multicultural society, Muslims worry about being identified as terrorists because of their appearance. On the other hand, PCA-2 thought that this concern was more related to a lack of self-confidence. He noted that if a Muslim has enough knowledge about his or her religion and feels confident, s/he could advocate on his/her own behalf and tell others about the distinction between mainstream Islam and extremist ideologies. He argued that a Muslim with confidence, indeed, has nothing to worry about and are less likely to experience an identity crisis. Another participant from the United States shared his experience about the effects of Islamophobia on identity conflict:

My son applied to a Gift and Talented Program, as his teacher suggested.
He fulfilled all the requirements, and he passed the IQ test. He spent three days in the school. Everything was going well. However, on the last day, they said that they rejected our application. According to the procedures as published on their website, those students whose application was not accepted have the right to know why their application was rejected. Therefore, I inquired about the reason they rejected our application. They did not give me an answer, and I saw that they changed the procedures on the website the very next day. According to the new procedures, they were not required to reveal the reasons for not accepting an application. Since it was a private school, I could not accuse them of discrimination. My son asked me why he could not enroll in the school. I told him that he might be rejected because of his Muslim identity, as he has a Muslim name. Then he said, “Now I am wondering if I should remain a Muslim.” He thought that his Muslim identity limited his opportunities in the United States. I realized that if one is subject to discrimination, cannot find a job, or forced to quit his or her job just because of his or her Muslim identity, this person could experience an identity crisis. (PUS-6)

Participants reported that having an identity crisis is very rare among Turkish immigrants in the United States and Canada. Some participants from the United States believe that perceiving Islamophobia may trigger an identity crisis. They provided some examples of how perceived group-based discrimination can affect the identity formation of Turkish-Americans. On the other hand, none of the participants from Canada claim that perceived Islamophobia influences the likelihood of having an identity crisis. Furthermore, they do not agree that perceived Islamophobia has any influence on the identity formation of Turkish-Canadians.
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Overview and Objective of the Study

This dissertation, which drew on over six months of field research with Muslim immigrants and Muslim opinion leaders in the United States and Canada, examined factors that lead to the radicalization of Muslim immigrants in Western societies and the relationships between them. The purpose of this study was to understand the underlying mechanisms of the associations among three risk factors for radicalization highlighted in the literature: poor integration, identity crisis, and perceived Islamophobia. The researcher tested the relationships between perceived Islamophobia, national identification, religious identification, integration, and identity conflict.

Given the existing literature, the researcher aimed to understand the hypothesized causality between the examined risk factors for radicalization. Testing these relationships was argued to improve the understanding of the factors that affect identity crisis, which is considered one of the most important root causes of radicalization, and the extent that perceived Islamophobia and poor integration play a role in identity crisis. The study also aimed to explore how these mechanisms differ between two Western societies: the United States and Canada. To investigate these mechanisms, the researcher tested the associations among and between perceived Islamophobia, national identification, religious identification, integration, and identity conflict in a sample of Muslim immigrants living in the United States and Canada.

The researcher tested the four following hypotheses:
1. Perceived Islamophobia is positively associated with religious identification, but it is negatively associated with national identification. Those who perceive higher levels of Islamophobia are more likely to identify themselves with religious in-group and less likely to identify themselves with national out-group.

2. National identification is positively associated with integration. Those who identify themselves with national out-group are more likely to integrate into the host society.

3. Integration is negatively associated with identity crisis. Those who cannot integrate into the host society are more likely to experience an identity crisis.

4. Perceived Islamophobia is positively associated with identity crisis. Those who perceive higher levels of Islamophobia are more likely to experience an identity crisis.

For this study, the researcher employed a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design. For the quantitative part of the study, the researcher conducted a survey completed by 298 individuals. For the qualitative part of the study, the researcher interviewed 10 Muslim opinion leaders. The interviews permitted the researcher to more deeply investigate identity formation, acculturation attitudes, and perceptions about Islamophobia of Muslim immigrants in Western societies.

**Major Findings**

The first major finding of the quantitative part of the study was that perceived Islamophobia was a significant predictor of identity crisis in both countries (β = .18, p<.01 in the United States sample and β = .24, p<.01 in the Canadian sample).
The results showed that perceived Islamophobia had a direct positive effect on identity conflict. This finding supported the fourth hypothesis of this study (see above). The results also revealed that the association between perceived Islamophobia and identity crisis was stronger in Canada than it was in the United States.

The second major finding of the study was that poor integration was also a significant predictor of identity crisis in both countries. The results showed that those who reported greater integration are less likely to experience an identity crisis (β = -.14, p<.05 in United States sample and β = -.23, p<.01 in Canadian sample). Therefore, poor integration predicted a higher likelihood of an identity crisis. This finding supported the third hypothesis of this study (see above). The association between poor integration and identity crisis was stronger in Canada than it was in the United States.

The results of the quantitative part of the study also revealed that two predictors – perceived Islamophobia and poor integration – are not significantly associated with each other in either country. The study could not find any significant relationship between perceived Islamophobia and integration (β = .02 in United States sample and β = -.08 in Canadian sample).

The researcher also tested the Rejection-Identification Model (RIM) (Branscombe et al., 1999) and Rejection-Disidentification Model (RDIM) (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009) models. In accordance with these models, this study hypothesized that the relationship between perceived Islamophobia and religious identification would be positive and the relationship between perceived
Islamaphobia and national identification would be negative (see Hypothesis 1 above). The results showed that perceived Islamophobia predicted lower national identification in the United States case, as perceived Islamophobia was found to have a significant, albeit small, effect on national identification ($\beta = -.17$, $p<.05$) in the sample of Turkish-Americans. However, no significant relationship was found between these study variables in the Canadian sample. The RDIM model was supported by the findings from the United States sample only. On the other hand, the results did not support the RIM model. There was no significant relationship between perceived Islamophobia and religious identification for either the United States or Canadian samples. The first hypothesis of the study was thus partly accepted.

Another major finding of this study was that there was a significant positive relationship between national identification and integration. Greater national identification predicted greater integration both for the United States ($\beta = .48$, $p<.001$) and Canadian ($\beta = .31$, $p<.001$) samples. These results supported the second hypothesis of this study (see above). On the other hand, a significant negative relationship was found between religious identification and integration in the Canadian sample ($\beta = -.25$, $p<.01$), but this was not the case for the United States sample.

Finally, the study found significant negative association between national identification and religious identification in both samples. In other words, those who identify themselves as Americans were less likely to identify themselves as Muslims. The association between national identification and religious
identification was stronger among Turkish-Americans ($\beta = -.33, p<.001$) than it was among Turkish-Canadians ($\beta = -.21, p<.05$).

The qualitative part of the study revealed very interesting and surprising findings. Interviews showed that perceptions of Islamophobia were not widespread among Turkish immigrants in both the United States and Canada. Only a few participants believed that Muslims are still suffering from the 9/11 backlash. Many others believed that the events of 9/11 only had short-term effects. They claimed that although Muslims experienced discrimination and hate crimes in the wake of 9/11, life returned to normal for Muslim immigrants after the shock of the events had passed. Some participants even reported that they experienced much higher degrees of Islamophobia in Turkey than they have in the United States or Canada, depending on where they now reside.

On the other hand, participants reported that the acculturation attitudes among Turkish immigrants have changed over time. They have concerns about the increased assimilation of Turkish youth in both countries. Interestingly, some participants reported that immigrants in North America did not develop defense mechanisms against assimilation because there has been little to no pressure on immigrants to assimilate. They believed that the lack of such pressure on immigrants led them to assimilate easily and, furthermore, believed that Turkish immigrants both in the United States and in Canada are more likely to assimilate than those in Europe, where immigrants are more pressured to assimilate. They also believed that education level and socioeconomic background are important predictors for acculturation attitudes. Regarding integration, the interviews
revealed that Islamophobia did not have a considerable negative effect on integration. Some participants even reported that perceived Islamophobia encouraged the integration of some immigrants who were eager to show others that Muslims are peaceful and a part of this society.

Among those participants who were US born, most stressed that they identify as Americans first and Turks second. The same was true for the Canadian-born participants in the study. The majority of the participants believed that Islamophobia did not affect the identity formation of Turkish Americans in general. Only a few participants thought that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Islamophobia had some influence on the identity formation of Turkish Americans in the short term. They claimed that Muslim immigrants in North America are generally well educated, so that they could easily overcome the negative effects of Islamophobia. Moreover, they were able to organize advocacy networks against Islamophobia. Participants reported that having identity crisis is very rare among Turkish immigrants both in the United States and in Canada.

**Discussion**

This study had two research questions: 1) What are the relationships among the risk factors for radicalization (perceived Islamophobia, integration, and identity crisis)? and 2) How do these relationships differ between the United States and Canada? Based on these research questions, the researcher tested four hypotheses.

The first hypothesis was that perceived Islamophobia is positively associated with religious identification and negatively associated with national
identification. This hypothesis claimed that those who perceive higher levels of Islamophobia are more likely to identify themselves with religious in-groups and less likely to identify themselves with national out-groups. This hypothesis was based on RIM and RDIM. RIM (Branscombe et al., 1999) suggests that perceived discrimination increases the level of in-group identification. This model proposed that when individuals perceive discrimination from an out-group, they increase their connection with the in-group in response to discrimination. Prejudice and discrimination threaten the group identity of minorities (Jetten et al., 2001). They develop strategies to cope with identity threats. Branscombe et al. (1999) suggested that increasing identification with an in-group when feeling rejected is an effective coping strategy as it can restore positive self-esteem among minorities.

The first part of the first hypothesis tested RIM. The researcher investigated whether perceived Islamophobia was positively associated with religious identification. The results did not find any significant relationship between perceived Islamophobia and religious identification. Hence, the results did not support the RIM model. Several studies have tested this model. The findings of some studies supported the model (e.g., Giamo, Schmitt, & Outten, 2012; Ramos, Cassidy, Reicher, & Haslam, 2012), whereas others did not (e.g., Jasinkaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Kunst et al., 2012). Jasinkaja-Lahti et al. (2009) provided several explanations as to why their results did not support RIM. First, in-group identification was already very high in their sample (M=4.32 on a 5 point scale). They argued that since those minorities had already very strongly identified
themselves with their in-groups, increasing their in-group identification would bring few benefits. Second, those immigrants might see their disadvantages as temporary. Third, being a consistent target of discrimination might discourage them from increasing their identification with the in-group because they did not see any option for future emancipation.

The results of Kunst et al.'s (2012) study on the effects of Islamophobia on the identity formation of Muslim minorities also did not support RIM. They conducted their research on a sample of Norwegian-Pakistanis and German-Turks. They argued that those minorities probably considered increasing their already high religious identity as risky because the host society might perceive such an increase as a shift towards radicalization. Another explanation the authors suggested was that those minorities might see their religious identity as a barrier to achieving national acceptance; hence, they decreased their religious identification as a response to perceived discrimination in order to become citizens of the German nation.

The researcher expected to find results conforming to RIM. However, the findings were similar to those of Kunst et al (2012). In the present study, religious identities were not found to be very high in either sample (M= 3.63 for the United States sample and M=3.14 for the Canadian sample on a 5 point scale). Hence, Jasinkaja-Lahti et al.’s (2009) explanation was not consistent with the results of the present study. The researcher agreed with Kunst et al.’s (2012) explanations: both Turkish-Americans and Turkish-Canadians probably did not see increasing religious identity as an option, since they did not want to be labeled as radicals.
They probably thought that identifying strongly with Muslims might jeopardize their immigrant status and their integration into the host society.

The second part of the first hypothesis tested RDIM. The researcher investigated whether perceived Islamophobia was negatively associated with national identification. The results differed between the sample of Turkish-Americans and the sample of Turkish-Canadians and showed that perceived Islamophobia predicted lower national identification in the sample of Turkish-Americans ($\beta = -.17, p<.05$). This result was consistent with RDIM and past research (e.g. Badea et al., 2011; Jaskinska-Lahti et al., 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; Wiley 2013). However, the researcher could not find any significant relationship between perceived Islamophobia and national identification in the sample of Turkish-Canadians.

Kunst et al.'s (2012) study also tested RDIM. They could not find a significant relationship between perceived Islamophobia and national identification in a sample of Norwegian-Pakistanis. Their explanation was that Norwegian-Pakistanis did not consider national disidentification as an option because they reported having high national identity and belonging to the Norwegian nation was very important for them. The results of this current study indicated that national identification is higher among Turkish-Canadians ($M=3.12$) than Turkish-Americans ($M=2.73$). The results, therefore, showed that Turkish-Canadians attributed a higher value to belonging to Canada than Turkish-Americans did in the United States. Perceived Islamophobia did not affect national identification of Turkish-Canadians, probably because identifying themselves with Canadians is
something very important to them.

The second hypothesis claimed that those who identify themselves with a national out-group are more likely to integrate into the host society. The results from both samples supported this hypothesis. These results were not surprising, and they are consistent with past research (e.g., Badea et al. 2011). The results showed that one’s identification with the host society encourages integration. The researcher also tested whether religious identification was associated with integration. To the knowledge of the researcher, few studies in the literature analyze the association between religious identification and integration. As Choudhury (2011) argued, increased emphasis on religious identity can contribute to integration. However, the results of this current study did not support Choudhury’s assumption. The researcher found a negative association between these variables in the sample of Turkish-Canadians. This result indicated that integration was less preferable among Turkish-Canadians reporting a higher religious identification.

The third hypothesis posited a negative relationship between integration and identity crisis. This hypothesis was based on several studies focused on the relationship between integration and identity issues. Failing to integrate into society creates an identity crisis especially among young Muslims in Western countries (d’Appollonia, 2011). The findings indicated that poor integration was a predictor of identity crisis, as the results of both samples revealed a negative relationship between identity crisis and integration. Those who could successfully integrate into the host society were less likely to experience an identity crisis in both countries.
The relationship was stronger in Canada (β = -.23, p<.01) than it was in the United States (β = -.14, p<.05). The level of integration was higher among Turkish-Canadian participants (M=3.28 in the Turkish-American sample, M=3.47 in the Turkish-Canadian sample). The results also revealed a lower incidence of identity crisis among Turkish-Canadian participants (M=1.90 in Turkish-American sample, M=1.78 in Turkish-Canadian sample). Besides, Turkish-Canadians reported higher national identification and lower religious identification than Turkish-Americans did. The results suggested that Turkish immigrants who live in Canada were more eager to integrate into the host society and were prouder of being a part of their country of residence than those who live in the United States. The reason why the relationship between integration and identity crisis was stronger in Canada might be that immigrants in Canada feel more connected to the host society, which in turn, prevents them from experiencing an identity crisis.

The final hypothesis suggested that the relationship between perceived Islamophobia and the likelihood of identity crisis is positive. As Choudhury (2007) argued, those who are in search of an identity are more vulnerable to radicalization, and they are more likely to encounter “extremist incubators,” which is defined by Silber and Bhatt (2007) as places where extremist groups disseminate their radical ideas. The results of Wictoriwicz’s (2004) study on the radicalization process of the members of the al-Muhajeroun terrorist organization supported identity crisis as a risk factor for radicalization. He found that members of the organization had experienced an identity crisis prior to their engagement with the terrorist group. Research indicates that high levels of perceived
discrimination can predict higher risks for experiencing an identity crisis (Ward & Leong, 2000). In a similar vein, Sageman (2004) claimed that those who experience Islamophobia are more likely to experience an identity crisis.

The results of the study supported the fourth hypothesis. SEM analysis indicated that perceived Islamophobia had a significant direct positive effect on identity crisis in both samples. Results showed that the relationship was stronger for the sample of Turkish-Canadians ($\beta = .24$, $p<.01$) than it was for the sample of Turkish-Americans ($\beta = .18$, $p<.01$). Taken together with other results, this finding suggested that Turkish immigrants in Canada who perceive high levels of Islamophobia or who could not integrate into Canadian society might have difficulties in identifying with both Canadians and Turks.

The model for this study did not include the demographic variables. However, the researcher investigated how controlling age, gender, length of residency, income and education changes the relationship between variables. Each models includes eight paths, and controlling these variables affect the significance of only one path and only in the United States sample. After controlling these variables, the relationship between integration and identity crisis became insignificant in the United States sample.

Findings from the qualitative component of the study partly supported the findings from the quantitative component. First, participants in the qualitative study expressed that emerging Islamophobia, in general, did not affect the acculturation preferences of Turkish immigrants. Opinion leaders believed that Turkish immigrants did not choose separation or marginalization as a response to
Islamophobia. Conversely, they argued, many immigrants aimed at increasing their integration into the host society in order to gain acceptance. Second, participants from Canada had different views than the participants from the United States on the effect of perceived Islamophobia on identity crisis. Participants from the United States stated that some Turkish immigrants in the United States experienced an identity crisis as a result of Islamophobia and backlash after the 9/11 attacks. However, contrary to the findings from the United States sample, participants from Canada expressed that Islamophobia did not trigger an identity crisis among Turkish immigrants in Canada. Additionally, although participants from United States emphasized that gender, education level, and income affect perceptions of Islamophobia, quantitative data revealed gender to be the only significant predictor of perceived Islamophobia. As opinion leaders claimed, women perceive higher degrees of Islamophobia than men do in the United States.

**Strength and Limitations**

There are many advantages of utilizing a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design, which include the following (Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell & Clark, 2011):

- It has a straightforward nature and easy to implement because two methods are conducted in separate stages. This type of design does not require a research team; single researchers can conduct this design.

- It is easy to describe and report. It can be reported in two distinct phases, and a researcher can bring the results together.

- It allows researchers to explore further quantitative findings through
qualitative analysis.

On the other hand, the main weakness of this design was that it requires a lengthy amount of time to complete the two separate phases (Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell & Clark, 2011). In this study, the researcher first conducted the quantitative phase. Based on what was learned from this phase, the second, qualitative phase was conducted. Adding the second phase increased the strength of this study.

The sample was limited to Turkish immigrants for several reasons. First, Turks are non-Arab Muslims, and the researcher assumed that they do not generally face ethnic or racial discrimination due to their dissimilarity with Arabs. This study distinguished between ethnic and religious discrimination and focused on religious identification rather than ethnic identification. Studying Turkish immigrants was expected to be helpful to the researcher in terms of better examining how perceived Islamophobia affects national and religious identification. On the other hand, a study on Turkish immigrants in Germany (Kunst et al., 2012), where there is substantial pressure on immigrants to culturally assimilate, showed that perceived Islamophobia led the participants to decrease their religious identity contrary to the authors’ hypothesis and RIM. Kunst et al. (2012) interpreted the results as indicating that Turkish immigrants may see their religious identity as a barrier when integrating into German society, and thus decrease their identification with religion in order be more accepted by German society. The researcher aimed to focus on the same origin group (Turkish immigrants) to ascertain whether there was a difference in the North American
context. Studies showed that (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van De Vijver, 2003) integration is the preferred acculturation strategy among Turkish immigrants. Kaya (2004) argued that second generation Turkish immigrants in the United States assert their American identity – Turkishness does not come before Americanness for them. Studying Turkish immigrants can help to show whether Islamophobia can negatively affect a community for which integration is normally easier. Another reason why Turkish immigrants were chosen was that they were more accessible for the researcher.

The insider position of the researcher may also present a limitation because it carries potential bias. Another limitation of this study is that although there were methodological justifications for choosing Turkish immigrants as subjects of inquiry, this study’s generalizability to other Muslim minorities is limited.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this study was to understand the relationships among some of the major risk factors for radicalization. The researcher tested several hypotheses drawn from the literature. This study aimed at combining three risk factors – perceived Islamophobia, poor integration, and identity crisis – in a model, investigating the relationships among these factors, and comparing the results of samples from two Western countries. The findings indicated that perceived Islamophobia and poor integration were significant predictors of identity crisis. However, contrary to the researcher’s expectations, the results did not support any relationship between perceived Islamophobia and integration.

Two main differences were revealed from the samples of Turkish-Americans
and Turkish-Canadians. The first concerned the effect of perceived Islamophobia on identification with the host country. In the sample of Turkish-Americans, perceived Islamophobia predicted lower national identification. However, there was no significant relationship for the sample of Turkish-Canadians. The second difference concerned the effect of religious identification on integration. While religion identification had no significant effect on integration for the sample of Turkish-Americans, it had a negative effect for the sample of Turkish-Canadians.

The United States and Canada are among the top most welcoming countries for immigrants, they both have diverse immigrant populations, and the immigrants in these countries enjoy strong anti-discrimination policies. Besides their similarities, the United States and Canada also have differences regarding immigration policies. The researcher expected to find a relatively higher degree of perceived Islamophobia in the United States, because the United States has experienced serious terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamic groups, which might form a basis for higher level of Islamophobia. The results supported this assumption. When the researcher collected the data for this study, the presidential campaigns had not yet started in the United States. Additionally, the debate over admitting Syrian refugees was not as contentious as it is today. The difference between the policies regarding Syrian refugees in the US and Canada as well as the Islamophobic rhetoric in American presidential campaign might have affected the results if the data would have collected after the debate over Syrian refugees and immigration laws started.

As a policy recommendation, further attention should be given by the
Canadian government to facilitate the integration of immigrants who feel strongly attached to their Muslim identity. Additionally, both the United States and Canadian governments should develop policies to mitigate Islamophobia and improve the integration of Muslim minorities into the respective societies in order to encourage healthy identity formation. This study suggested that decreased perceived Islamophobia and increased integration with host society could minimize the likelihood of experiencing an identity crisis, which in turn, may lessen the vulnerability of Muslim immigrants to radicalization.
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