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(GRAND OLD) PARTY CRASHERS: THE EFFECTS OF REPUBLICAN ATYPICAL  
ISSUE ADVOCACY AND CROSS-PRESSURE FRAMING ON PARTY OPINION  
CHANGE

By

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And approved by

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## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

(Grand Old) Party Crashers: The Effects of Republican Atypical Issue Advocacy and

Cross-Pressure Framing on Party Opinion Change

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Traditionally, the Republican Party has taken hardline conservative stances on a variety of social issues. But some Republican elites, organizations, and highly engaged partisans are acting as “atypical issue advocates,” promoting issue positions within areas that challenge and outright oppose the stances held by the GOP’s platform, politicians, and base. Republican atypical issue advocates moreover purposely frame their messages in a way that sets them apart from other organizations and political actors that support these same causes. Unlike their advocacy counterparts, Republican atypical issue advocates employ a rhetorical strategy tailored solely to their own party, using frames that intentionally create an environment of cognitive dissonance by juxtaposing accepted Republican party affiliation and value orientations with more progressive issue positions. These cross-pressure frames may have a unique potential to resonate with their target audience of fellow Republicans and conservatives and influence attitudes on social issues where opinion has thus far seemed virtually immovable.

My dissertation project strives to shed light on the work of Republican atypical advocates and this unique framing device that they employ, assessing what effect – if any – this type of cross-pressure framing has on Republican attitudes regarding issues normally opposed by the party and its platform. I specifically follow the issue of same-sex marriage throughout this project, using case studies and elite interviews with Republican atypical issue advocacy organizations and elites; a comparative content analysis of press releases from two of the top pro-LGBT advocacy organizations, one affiliated with the Democratic Party and one with the Republican Party; and an original survey experiment with a national sample of Republicans to assess the presence, purpose, content, and impact of these frames.

I find support that Republican atypical issue advocates 1) do indeed aim their work predominantly at members of their own party and 2) use accepted party rhetoric that diverges from the language used by their advocacy counterparts in order to frame their arguments. I also find evidence through my original survey experiment that these cross-pressure frames evoking Republican Party affiliation and values resonate more with their target audience than frames evoking Democratic Party affiliation and values; Republicans are less likely to oppose – and are more accepting of – atypical issue stances under these cross-pressure frames than they are under stereotypical rival party frames. My dissertation thus expands the literature on the capabilities and limitations of new kinds of framing, frame resonance, and opinion formation in cross-pressure environments. This study also contributes to furthering an understanding of the battles inherent to framing and reframing, as well as both issue and political party evolution in the face of a changing electorate.

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## **Dedication**

*For Mom and Dad*

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## Chapter 1

### Widening the Tent? An introduction to Republican Atypical Issue Advocacy and Cross-Pressure Framing

*“The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”*

*- Speaker Unknown<sup>1</sup>*

After yet another devastating loss in the 2012 presidential election, Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Priebus commissioned an internal review of the Republican Party. Priebus tapped a select committee to focus on what went wrong in 2012, how to implement successful electoral strategies for the future, and how to “grow” the Republican Party, in general. What resulted was the “Growth & Opportunity Project,” a candid “self-critique” of the GOP’s “ideological cul-de-sac,” infamously dubbed by many as the “autopsy report” (Edsall 2013; Wheaton and Shear 2013). In its quest to widen the GOP’s proverbial “tent,” the project emphasized the need for modified messaging, tone, and outreach tactics in order to be more inclusive to a broader range of voters – and, in turn, garner more votes from these groups – specifically with minorities, women, and young adults. Its glossy yet frank argument echoed the “80/20” rule of their lauded Republican hero President Ronald Reagan<sup>2</sup>, cautioning that the future of the GOP would be bleak if the Party did not widen its tent:

It is time to smartly change course, modernize the Party, and learn once again how to appeal to more people, including those who share some but not all of our conservative

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<sup>1</sup> This quotation is used by the Republican National Committee’s Growth & Opportunity Project select committee at the start of their one-year “check-up” on progress with their original report’s recommendations. The statement is most often attributed to Albert Einstein, as the progress report states, but it has actually had a much more mysterious past, and it is not very likely that Einstein actually said this. The statement’s originator remains a mystery.

<sup>2</sup> Reagan famously stated, “Someone who agrees with me 80 percent of the time is my 80 percent friend, not my 20 percent enemy” (see Fiorina and Abrams 2012).

principles. [...] The Republican Party needs to stop talking to itself. We have become expert in how to provide ideological reinforcement to like-minded people, but devastatingly we have lost the ability to be persuasive with, or welcoming to, those who do not agree with us on every issue. (Republican National Committee 2014, 4-5)

The report highlighted individual strategies for a number of targeted voting blocs – including Hispanics, Asian and Pacific Islander Americans, African Americans, women, and young adults – pointing to the necessity to make these inroads especially in the face of a changing American electorate, both in terms of an increasingly minority electorate and generational replacement.

The project's recommendations for fostering better interaction with the Hispanic community centered around having a "tolerant" and "respectful" tone on immigration and other related issues; developing positive solutions for "comprehensive immigration reform"; including more Hispanic individuals on staff, as committee members, and as surrogates; recruiting more Hispanic Republicans to serve in office; and reaching out and partnering with Hispanic media and other Hispanic organizations. In a statement that rings eerily true for the 2016 election cycle just as it did in 2012, the report warned, "If Hispanic Americans hear that the GOP doesn't want them in the United States, they won't pay attention to our next sentence" (15). Overviews of GOP relationships with other minority groups like Asians, Pacific Islanders, and African Americans and recommendations for expanding GOP presence within each of these communities paralleled the report's strategies for courting Hispanic voters.

In regard to women voters, the report did not refute the Party's alleged "women problem"; far from it, it stressed the need for the GOP to improve its negative image among women and pointed to the devastating electoral ramifications that occurred in 2012 when the party failed to do so (19). Much like minority voting blocs, the report

again placed a focus on tone and descriptive representation, urging improvement of GOP “branding” with women through more pro-women mass level messaging and increasing women’s presence in elite level leadership roles. Yet the report was vague when it came to the particulars of women’s issues; there was no direct mention of the issues that were at the forefront of the 2012 “war on women,” such as reproductive rights or contraception. Instead of suggesting actual changes to current GOP policy positions, the report encouraged Republicans to emphasize how the Party’s policies and principles “address[ed] the concerns of women voters,” as well as develop responses to Democrats’ attacks that highlighted the opposing party’s anti-women policies. “Our candidates, spokespeople and staff need to use language that addresses concerns that are on women’s minds to let them know we are fighting for them,” one recommendation states (20). To gain with women, the Party needed to “make a better effort at listening [...] [and] directing their policy proposals at what they learn[ed]” (21).

To round out its demographic goals, the report additionally made a plea for attracting younger members. Much like with women voters, Democrats overwhelmingly won over the youth vote in 2012 (Robillard 2012). The report described the GOP’s image with young voters as old and out of touch, citing President Barack Obama’s “cool” factor and his campaign’s embrace of millennials as responsible for the large 2012 youth turnout that worked overwhelmingly in Obama’s favor (Republican National Committee 2014, 21). But it was not just a younger generation of politicians that the GOP would need to close the gap with young voters and seem hip, again; after all, as the report pointed out, they already had that in elected officials like “Marco Rubio, Paul Ryan, Kelly Ayotte, and Bobby Jindal” (21). The report emphasized a need for the GOP to

recognize young adults' embrace of certain important social issues – a subtle yet pointed nod to the rapidly changing LGBT movement:

On messaging, we must change our tone — especially on certain social issues that are turning off young voters. In every session with young voters, social issues were at the forefront of the discussion; many see them as the civil rights issues of our time. We must be a party that is welcoming and inclusive for all voters.

Yet recommendations for pursuing the youth vote did not address dealing with any of these civil rights issues head on – only that Republicans should promote “forward-looking, positive policy proposals that unite young voters” (22). A larger focus was given to recruiting millennial surrogates, candidates, and representatives; increasing digital efforts in accordance with young voters' preferences for social media and other forms of technology; establishing a network of celebrities supportive of GOP efforts who millennials would find appealing; expanding GOP presence in millennial-targeted media, such as *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report*<sup>3</sup>; and furthering outreach on college campuses and with college organizations.

Besides the veiled reference within the context of the youth vote, the report never mentioned LGBT issues like same-sex marriage with any depth or even by name. It only stated that the Party needed to generally be more inclusive toward “gay Americans” as part of a larger list of demographic groups, mentioning the word “gay” four times throughout the entire report, three of which were in the context of a repeated sentiment. Nevertheless, it was the first official Republican document to mention “gay Americans” in a positive light. It was a marked shift from how the Party historically handled the marginalized community, as well as a critical milestone in the internal struggle over culture wars that had been brewing within the GOP in recent years.

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<sup>3</sup> As of this writing, *The Daily Show* has a new, much younger host after Jon Stewart's departure, and *The Colbert Report* is completely off the air.

## **Shock and Awe ... and Little Growth**

The Growth & Opportunity Project garnered some praise for its “surprisingly bold” and candid stance on many of the GOP’s “liabilities” (Anderson 2014; Edsall 2013). Some called the report “unprecedented,” “comprehensive,” “astonishingly frank,” and an “extraordinary public acknowledgment of internal discord and vulnerability” (Anderson 2014; Edsall 2013; Franke-Ruta 2013). But the endeavor was met with plenty of criticism as well and drew ire from both sides of the aisle. Those on the right saw it as dangerously straying too far from the most fundamental pillars of conservatism and Republicanism, outright ignoring the Religious Right both in terms of the importance of its voters and core issue stances to the party (Coppins 2013). Those on the left saw it as a hollow ploy to gain electoral votes that dealt not with the serious problems regarding the party’s actual policies but rather placed blame on how these policies are conveyed and discussed (Rosenthal 2013).<sup>4</sup>

The report’s one-year “check-up” was met with more mixed reviews and increased skepticism; some likened progress on the project’s original initiatives to an unkept New Year’s resolution (Anderson 2014). Steps had been taken according to what the report originally laid out the year before, but there were still many more to go in arguably some of the report’s most pressing areas. While the committee’s brief addendum for 2014 touted advancements in modified electoral strategies, analytical

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<sup>4</sup> Republican political commentator and former George W. Bush speechwriter David Frum also expressed displeasure that the report focused more on what he called “packaging” instead of “product,” much like commentators on the left did (Frum 2013). But much like commentators on the right, Frum also took issue with the one policy prescription that the report did make – immigration reform – as straying too far from the party’s core principles. Despite his personal disagreements with the initiative, however, he applauded the report in general for the strides it made towards improved communication, organization, technology, and practices.

research, technology, and regional infrastructure, little meaningful outreach to targeted voting blocs like minorities, women, and young adults had been done in actuality throughout the previous year. The party's focus on the Affordable Care Act, its 2013 electoral victory with Gov. Chris Christie in the blue state of New Jersey,<sup>5</sup> and the proverbial GOP wave that overtook Congress in the 2014 midterm elections all created what some called a "false positive" that effectively halted conversation on what the original report identified to be the party's biggest weaknesses and areas in need of improvement (Anderson 2014).

In the years that have followed, the Party has seemingly moved even farther away from the project's original goals. The 2016 election cycle has embodied a complete reversal of the Growth & Opportunity Project's mission. In an unpredictable Republican primary season where entrepreneur, reality television star, and alleged billionaire Donald Trump became the Republican presidential nominee, the once-applauded project has been deemed – to borrow from Trump's expressions – a "loser" (Cillizza 2016). HBO *Last Week Tonight* host John Oliver referenced the 2013 report in his critique of the 2016 Republican National Convention, contrasting the report and the inclusivity it strived for with the GOP's seeming acceptance of Trump's abrasive campaigning style and policy proposals – which have included repeatedly racist (Kristof 2016) and sexist comments (Cohen 2016), a wish to ban all Muslims from entering the country (Diamond 2016), and his proposal to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexican border in order to crack down on illegal immigration (Preston, Rappeport, and Ritchel 2016). At first a sliver of hope, the 2016 election cycle turned the Growth & Opportunity Project into a farce.

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<sup>5</sup> Republican David Jolly also narrowly won in a March 2014 special election for Florida's 13<sup>th</sup> district.



Yet even before Trump's unexpected rise, issues at the core of the Growth & Opportunity Project – like immigration, LGBT rights, and women's reproductive health – have continued to drive a sizable wedge between Democrats and Republicans despite 2013 efforts to “broaden the tent.” An overwhelming majority of Republicans in Congress continue to oppose a pathway to citizenship, same-sex marriage, and abortion. Only a few Republican elites have publicly supported and actively advocated in favor of these issues – usually because of personal identity or experience, or out of electoral necessity depending upon the ideology and demography of their constituents.

Among the Republican electorate, none of these issues break 50 percent support on average (Silver 2014).<sup>6</sup> A majority of Republicans are in favor of a pathway to citizenship only if certain requirements are met, but without such stipulations, Republicans are mostly opposed. Republicans have moreover expressed strong anti-immigrant attitudes on a variety of related matters in the wake of Trump's candidacy, with Trump supporters being the most vocally anti-immigrant (Pew Research Center 2016b; Public Religion Research Institute 2015). And while a majority of Americans are in favor of same-sex marriage, which the Supreme Court effectively legalized in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, Republican still mostly oppose it: unlike virtually every other group, their views have changed little over the past decade, with only a third of Republicans currently expressing support (Pew Research Center 2016c). Republicans have also long been against reproductive issues like abortion; unlike Democrats and independents, a majority of Republicans believe that abortion should be illegal in all cases. Republicans are furthermore the least likely of any key demographic to identify as

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<sup>6</sup> Much like the effect that question wording and context effects have on respondents, in general, the degree to which Republicans express support or opposition for these policies fluctuates based on how the question is asked and what details are provided.

“pro-choice” and the most likely to identify as “pro-life,” as well as less likely to support employer-covered contraception (Saad 2014).

A pathway to citizenship, same-sex marriage, and abortion were moreover expressly opposed by the GOP in both the 2012 and 2016 Republican Party Platforms. The latter has been labeled as the most conservative platform yet – a sharp move to the right inspired in part by Trump and also by a large contingency of Ted Cruz delegates, known for their strict adherence to conservatism and vehement opposition to a variety of social issues (Peters 2016). In terms of immigration, the 2016 platform advocated building a wall on the southern border and applying “special scrutiny” to immigrants who seek entry into the United States. It also opposed amnesty for “illegal aliens” – using this more pejorative label instead of the “illegal immigrants” terminology used in 2012 – as well as painted illegal immigration as a dangerous threat to the country, condemning “sanctuary cities” and demanding harsher penalties and deportation for “criminal aliens.”

The platform was especially harsh when it came to LGBT issues. It condemned Supreme Court rulings like *Windsor* and *Obergefell* that paved the way for same-sex marriage legalization nationwide and reaffirmed the Party’s definition of marriage as “between one man and one woman.” The platform also included a somewhat veiled criticism of transgender rights, chastising the Obama administration’s “unconstitutional expansion into areas beyond those specifically enumerated,” like restroom and locker room policies (16, 35).

As for reproductive issues, the platform once again denounced abortion in no uncertain terms: “we assert the sanctity of human life and affirm that the unborn child has a fundamental right to life which cannot be infringed” (13). It called for a human life

amendment to the Constitution and a clarification of the Fourteenth Amendment that ensures its application to children before they are born. The platform furthermore condemned the use of any public funding for abortion or the selling of fetal body parts, specifically calling out Planned Parenthood as a culprit. It also praised judges, bills in Congress, and state legislation that promoted the “sanctity of innocent human life,” chastising Democrats for their “extreme” and “limitless support for abortion” that the platform deemed was “dramatically out of step with the American people” (13-14).

### **The Who, Why, and How of the GOP’s Atypical Advocacy Movements**

At both the elite and mass level, then, it is clear that the Republican Party has not only ignored the lessons of the Growth & Opportunity report but also is actively fanning the flames of the culture wars. Yet in spite of this pervasive negativity throughout the party, support for these divisive cultural issues like immigration, LGBT rights, and reproductive health lie at the heart of small but budding attitudinal revolutions within the party led by some Republicans who are aiming to change the GOP from within. Even before the Republican Party’s post-2012 soul-searching, certain GOP elites, interest groups, and activists have been trying to turn the Republican tide on these issues for years. These select GOP party elites, organizations, and highly engaged partisans have acted as “atypical issue advocates”<sup>7</sup> – going against the grain of their party to promote issue positions within areas that challenge and outright oppose the typical stances beheld

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<sup>7</sup> Going forward, “atypical issue advocate” will be used as a term only to describe such advocates within the Republican Party. While the term may be used in other contexts outside of GOP members, that is not the focus of the present research and will therefore not be used to reference anyone outside of the Republican Party unless otherwise specified.

by their party platform and the majority of their party's politicians and base in the electorate.

While the positions of these Republican atypical issue advocates are seemingly more in line with their Democratic opposition, they do not alter their partisanship or ideology but instead continue to fiercely identify as Republican, as well as conservative; they see no disconnect between the issue positions for which they advocate and their political belief system. Republican atypical issue advocates moreover use their existing partisanship and ideology as a framework for precisely why they are taking a separate position from the rest of the party, employing the party's own rhetoric and beheld values as support for the stances they take. It is a type of activism that puts them in the minority within their own party, seemingly creating a mismatch – a cognitive dissonance – between their political identity and the positions that they take. On its face, it is an irrational act (Downs 1957; Olson 1965). Yet for these advocates, their uphill battle to stay and fight in a party that rejects everything they stand for makes sense. It is, for some, a fight for self-interest on an issue that hits close to home; for others, a fight for the right side of history and what they perceive to be in the Party's best interest electorally; and for others still, a fight based on strict adherence to what they believe is the true interpretation of conservatism from which the rest of the Party has strayed.

For the Republican atypical issue advocates who fight for something to which they are personally connected, they are motivated by and act out of self-interest for the marginalization of this group. For example, some of the strongest Republican support for immigration reform over the years has come from members of Congress who identify as Hispanic or Latino: Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (FL), Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL), Rep.

Raul Labrador (ID), and – at one point – Sen. Marco Rubio (FL). Former Republican presidential candidate and Florida Governor Jeb Bush, whose wife is Mexican and whose children are thus half-Mexican, was an advocate for immigration reform for a long period of time prior to his presidential run; in 2014, he famously argued that many immigrants come to the United States illegally out of an “act of love” in order to provide for their families and should thus be treated differently than those who come here illegally and commit actual felonies (O’Keefe 2014). Republican-led organizations have formed around the issue, as well. The Café con Leche Republicans and Republicans for Immigration Reform<sup>8</sup>, for example, were groups formed by and made up of mainly Hispanic Republicans or Republicans with close ties to the immigrant population.

Likewise, among the small number of past and present Republican officeholders who publicly support pro-choice policies for women, most are women themselves. This list includes former Republican Sen. Olympia Snowe (ME), as well as current Republican Sen. Susan Collins (ME), Sen. Lisa Murkowski (AK), Rep. Lynn Jenkins (KS), and Rep. Shelley Moore Capito (WV). Pro-choice Republican organizations have also been founded predominantly by women. The PAC Republicans for Choice was established in 1989 by businesswoman, entrepreneur, and Republican operative Ann Stone (Toner 1990); the group does not appear to be currently active. Though no longer in operation, either, the It’s My Party Too PAC (IMP-PAC) was formed by former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman in the early 2000s. Planned Parenthood had a specific campaign for pro-choice Republicans, as well. But perhaps the most well known and the most active of these women-led organizations is Republican Majority for Choice – both a

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<sup>8</sup> While their website and social media accounts are still live, Republicans for Immigration Reform no longer appears to be operational, not providing an update on any platform since 2014.

national women-led pro-choice Republican advocacy organization, as well as a PAC in partnership with WISH (Women in the House and Senate) List that funds pro-choice and women Republican candidates. Republican Majority for Choice is currently chaired by Republicans Candace Straight and Susan Bevan.

In the case of LGBT issues, and same-sex marriage specifically, former George W. Bush campaign manager and RNC Chairman Ken Mehlman's own coming out as gay in 2010 was the catalyst for his involvement into the leading Republican advocate for LGBT rights, same-sex marriage legalization, and the greater acceptance of the LGBT community by the Republican Party. Sen. Rob Portman's (R-OH) reversal in favor of same-sex marriage stemmed from his own son coming out as gay in 2013, marking the first Republican currently holding a high-level office to publicly express support (Peters 2013); similarly, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen's child came out as a transgender man and is now an active LGBT advocate (Lavender 2014). Pro-LGBT Republican organizations have been led by LGBT Republicans, as well – such as the Log Cabin Republicans and (the now defunct) GOProud. Many members within each of these organizations moreover identify as part of the LGBT community. Log Cabin Republicans President Gregory T. Angelo and GOProud founders Jimmy LaSalvia and Chris Barron all openly identify as gay.

Just as important to their own self-interest and their interest in the GOP's longevity, Republican atypical issue advocates are motivated to challenge the Party's status quo on issues like immigration, abortion, and same-sex marriage in order to widen the tent for the purpose of electoral gains that sustain the Party's future – both within particular geographical regions as well as on a broader national scale. Shifting demographics and growing Hispanic populations in certain districts have influenced a

number of representatives in California, Florida, and New York to back some version of immigration reform. As for women's reproductive issues and LGBT issues, Republican support at both the elite and mass level has also been correlated with geographical ideology, with those residing in or elected to more ideologically liberal areas more likely to support topics surrounding women's reproduction like contraception and abortion, as well as LGBT rights including same-sex marriage legalization. It is no coincidence that many Republican atypical advocates either hold office in these aforementioned states or that Republican atypical advocacy organizations are headquartered and have their strongest chapters in these areas – like New York, New Jersey, Maine, Florida, Ohio, Illinois, California, and Washington, D.C. Therefore, in the spirit of one of the goals of the Growth & Opportunity Project, Republican atypical issue advocates are motivated to take these stances for the sake of the Party, making a calculated challenge to the GOP status quo for potential electoral gain and sustainability of the GOP brand.

A final motivation for Republican atypical issue advocates is based on pure principle. These advocates believe that they are the true disciples of Republicanism and conservatism, taking stances in their view that correspond better to their partisanship and ideology than the current positions espoused by the rest of the GOP. Atypical issue advocates reason that their support upholds such core Republican and conservative ideals as individual freedom and personal liberty, the stability of family and marriage, Christian teachings, the right to privacy, limited government, and economic opportunity and capitalism. They therefore argue that their advocacy of citizenship, women's reproductive rights, and LGBT issues perfectly fits with many of the fiscal, social, moral, structural, and constitutional values of conservatism and Republicanism. In contrast, they

deem the rest of the GOP as unfaithful to the party's partisan and ideological underpinnings, as well as its roots in abolitionism, emancipation, and President Abraham Lincoln, believing that the GOP's current stances will only continue to move the Party in the wrong direction.

But perhaps the most fascinating aspect of Republican atypical issue advocacy is how those involved talk about their issue positions. The language that atypical issue advocates use to advocate for immigration, LGBT rights, and women's reproductive health sets them apart from other advocates – whether non-partisan, Democrat, liberal, or even their fellow Republicans and conservatives who advocate for opposing stances – in their same line of work; their messaging is distinct, meant for a particular purpose and a particular kind of person. These advocates express their support by framing their arguments not in the same context as their advocacy counterparts but rather around the very core Republican and conservative values that their own party already holds dear – the same values upon which the Party was founded, the same values touted by the GOP in talking points and routine party rhetoric, and the same values Republicans use to explain their stances on a variety of issues. When used by Republican atypical issue advocates, these Republican and conservative value frames create a cross-pressure environment where value orientation and party issue position – two heuristics each individually powerful in their own right – seemingly do not match. It is a case of cognitive dissonance: traditionally conservative values are being used to frame support for more progressive issue positions, ones which have been expressly opposed by the Republican Party and its platform.



This cross-pressure framing sets the messaging tactics of Republican atypical issue advocates apart from all others working within these issue areas. For example, advocates of the LGBT movement have typically referenced values like equality, fairness, and civil rights in their arguments in favor of LGBT issues like same-sex marriage; “marriage equality,” for example, has become widely used as a positive term to describe marriage legalization for same-sex couples. But Republican atypical issue advocates do not speak in these terms. Instead, pro-LGBT Republicans use core conservative values like freedom, privacy, and limited government to support their arguments in favor of same-sex marriage; as a counter to “marriage equality,” many LGBT-friendly Republicans have instead used the term the “freedom to marry.” Pro-choice Republicans have likewise used rhetoric such as “reproductive freedom” or “reproductive autonomy” instead of phrases like a “woman’s right to choose.” Immigrant-friendly Republicans have stressed Republican values like personal responsibility, freedom, the free market, and family values; Café Con Leche, for example, frames immigrants as “New Americans” in its mission statement, welcoming them to the “big tent” that is the GOP. It is clear, then, that Republican atypical issue advocates have a similar objective as their advocacy counterparts who fight for the same issue positions but achieve it through different rhetorical means. They use certain kinds of language with purpose, encasing their arguments within accepted terminology that their party already understands and trusts.

### **Differential Acceptance, Cross Pressure Framing, and Internal Party Evolution**

But what is the point of this intentional word play? Why “freedom” instead of “equality”? “Autonomy” instead of “choice”? Republican opinion has not been on the side of citizenship, LGBT rights, or reproductive choice in the past several election cycles, so why do Republican atypical issue advocates still try to change it when others have failed to do so? These advocates try because, unlike their counterparts outside of the GOP, they know that existing advocacy work has not spoken the language that Republicans want to hear and to which they respond best: their own. “Marriage equality” and civil rights framing significantly improved support for LGBT issues among Democrats and independents in recent years, but it has done little to boost support among Republicans – precisely because these are not the terms Republicans use to discuss their positions and beliefs. The question then becomes the following: would Republicans be more accepting of an issue they oppose if the argument in favor of it was framed within their own partisan terms, moving opinion where it was once thought immovable?

Partisanship is a powerful cue in opinion formation (e.g. Zaller 1992; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Cohen 2003). Always in search of cognitive consistency, individuals are motivated to reject messages and issue positions that do not align with their existing affiliations and beliefs; this is especially true when it comes to affiliations and beliefs like partisanship, ideology, and values (Chong and Druckman 2007). Thus, Republicans may respond differently to an argument than Democrats or independents based on the considerations that the argument evokes. If the argument evokes considerations that are associated with their opponents across the aisle, Republicans will be more likely to reject it; if the argument instead references considerations in line with GOP philosophy and

conservatism, Republicans will be more likely to accept it. This differential frame acceptance means that a frame can influence individuals differently based on individual-level moderators like partisanship and ideology. Therefore, in order to move certain segments of the population that appear immovable under existing frame(s), political actors need to reframe the debate in terms more acceptable to that group.

Atypical issue advocates attempt to do exactly this on issues like citizenship, same-sex marriage, and reproductive choice, and they do it by creating cross-pressure arguments that juxtaposes accepted Republican and conservative value orientations with issue positions that challenge current GOP stances. Partisanship, ideology, and value orientations each have strong and significant individual impacts on frame acceptance, acting as heuristics or cues in the opinion formation process. But it is unclear as of yet what happens when we combine these elements and make them salient factors in an argument that challenges preexisting, known, and deep-seated party positions that are the exact opposite of what is being advocated. The impact of frame content has been previously discussed in the framing literature but is still ripe for further investigation. A deeper study into what frames – if any – can move immovable segments is important, especially given a rapidly changing electorate and political parties' perennial need to both maintain and expand their bases.

The effort put forth by Republican atypical issue advocates is important. While such an investigation is seemingly narrow in focus, these advocates play a crucial role in the future of the political party system: recognizing a changing electorate, they are attempting to widen the tent by launching a civil war over those issues they believe will bring the GOP into the 21<sup>st</sup> century and ensure its electoral longevity. Understanding the

rhetorical strategies of atypical issue advocates touches upon our understanding of multiple key aspects of the political process: the uphill battle of intra-party activism and lobbying for unaccepted issue positions, the future of party opinion and policy change, as well as the ever-evolving game of coalition incorporation, realignment, and expansion (see, e.g., Karol 2009). The unique work of these atypical issue advocates exemplifies the important role framing – both its capabilities and limitations – plays in connecting each of these facets.

### **Study Objectives and Case Selection**

The following research strives to shed light on who Republican atypical advocates are targeting, what rhetorical strategies they are employing in their advocacy work, and what effect – if any – this distinct type of cross-pressure framing has on Republican attitudes regarding issues normally opposed by the party and its platform. I argue that Republican atypical issue advocates are purposely framing their messages in a way that sets them apart from other organizations and political actors that support these same causes. Unlike their advocacy counterparts, Republican atypical issue advocates intentionally create an environment of conflicting cues for their target audience of fellow partisans, using frames that juxtapose accepted partisanship and value orientations with atypical issue positions that challenge their own party's status quo. These cross-pressure frames may have a unique potential to influence attitudes among their target audience – Republicans and conservatives – who were once thought of as virtually immovable on these issues.

Given the exploratory nature of this large research task, the following chapters will use the case of same-sex marriage to explore Republican atypical issue advocacy, followed by some preliminary exploration into another issue indirectly touched upon by the Growth & Opportunity Project report – reproductive rights. Same-sex marriage serves as the focal point for a variety of reasons. First of all, as part of the larger issue of LGBT rights, it has been at the forefront of politics and the culture wars for over a decade. It is moreover a topic especially salient to and overwhelmingly supported by younger generations – a coveted demographic for the GOP that spans all genders and racial and ethnic backgrounds. Young Republicans, in particular, are also already on the side of LGBT rights and are at odds with the party’s current LGBT-related stances. Over half of Republican and Republican-leaning millennials support same-sex marriage (Pew Research Center 2016).

Furthermore, organized LGBT advocacy within the GOP<sup>9</sup> has arguably one of the longest continuous existences of all the targeted issues and demographic groups mentioned in the 2013 report. The issue also has the largest quantity of visible political actors involved; a number of pro-LGBT Republican groups have formed and a number of pro-LGBT Republican individuals have come out in support of same-sex marriage and the LGBT community in the past several years, especially given the rapid evolution of public opinion and both state and nationwide policy. The continued and very public presence of pro-LGBT Republicans enables me to better systematically assess the rhetorical framework that they use and will present a useful comparison point in my conclusion as I speculate why other issues that challenge the party do not have a comparative public presence.

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<sup>9</sup> The Log Cabin Republicans was established in 1977.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, same-sex marriage presents an ideal case of atypical issue advocacy given the issue's trajectory in the past fifteen years. When the issue first entered the spotlight, it was opposed by Republicans, Democrats, and independents alike across the board<sup>10</sup>; the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act received overwhelming support from both parties in Congress and was signed into law by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat. But by 2013, 50 percent of all U.S. adults supported same-sex marriage; half of Democrats had already supported the issue by 2008, and independents followed by 2011 (Pew Research Center 2016). Republican attitudes on same-sex marriage have remained stagnant, however, unswayed by numerous advocacy campaigns, a near-universal rebranding of the issue as "marriage equality," state-by-state legalization akin to a domino effect, and a number of landmark Supreme Court cases that eventually legalized marriage for same-sex couples at the federal level. This disparity in party movement on LGBT rights (particularly same-sex marriage) makes the issue truly unique: unlike other issues on which the parties have completely switched positions over time, opinion change on this issue has only occurred among Democrats and independents, spurred by pro-LGBT activists' alignment with the Democratic Party and increasing support from Democratic incumbents (Karol 2012). The issue therefore serves as a sort of natural experiment in differential frame acceptance and is especially useful to study given its salience – both in general and in terms of Republican atypical issue advocacy – in the 2016 election cycle.

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<sup>10</sup> Opposition varied in degree, however. In 2001, just 21 percent of Republicans supported same-sex marriage, compared to 43 percent of Democrats and independents.

## **Chapter Breakdown**

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical basis for my dissertation, which is rooted in the framing literature and its intersection with two powerful heuristics – partisanship and values. Republican atypical issue advocates’ usage of cross-pressure frames is a unique rhetorical strategy that poses particularly timely research questions with implications for party competition and evolution: can reframing previously rejected issue stances within the context of accepted partisan identity and values move intra-party opinion (for purposes here, Republican attitudes) toward greater acceptance? In order to investigate this, I first review the state of the literature on framing theory and framing effects, focusing on the capabilities and limitations of frames to influence expressed attitudes – including individual-level moderators, source cues, and environments involving multiple and competing frames. I also provide an overview of the values literature and the important role that values can play in framing. This is important to the research at hand, given that Republican atypical issue advocates make a point to emphasize how their issue positions embody core Republican values that have already been accepted by the party and have been used to defend other Republican-owned issues.

I next build a theory of cross-pressure framing, particularly within the context of Republican atypical issue advocacy. I conclude with hypotheses that address who these Republican atypical issue advocates are attempting to target, what they are trying to do, how they are doing it, and to what – if any – effect. Specifically in regard to cross-pressure frames – Republican atypical issue advocates’ primary tool – I make predictions about how cross-pressure frames work in comparison to 1) advocacy frames that do not evoke accepted values and partisanship to frame atypical issue stances, 2) advocacy

frames that evoke the “wrong values,” and 3) advocacy frames that evoke both the partisanship, values, and issue stances of the rival party.

Chapter 3 begins to explore the objectives, strategies, and tactics of Republican atypical advocacy through case studies and in-depth interviews with senior officials from two of the most prominent pro-LGBT Republican organizations, The Log Cabin Republicans and GOProud. Each organization has a unique history of advocating on behalf of LGBT rights within the Republican Party, particularly during some of the most critical years of the LGBT movement within the past decade. The two serve as a useful comparison to one another, especially given their similarities and differences that have led them down very different paths within the GOP: GOProud eventually met its demise in 2014, and one of its founders has become a vocal opponent of the Republican Party, while Log Cabin has arguably received increased attention and made some strides within the party yet continues to grapple with balancing partisanship and social identity throughout the 2016 election cycle.

An investigation of both of these organizations points to the bigger picture of Republican atypical issue advocates’ distinct work – namely who these advocates target, why they are fighting a seemingly uphill battle, and how they uniquely choose to frame their arguments. Case studies and interviews allow me to directly study the motives, goals, and rhetorical tools of Republican atypical issue advocates from the primary sources themselves. Analysis in this chapter confirms that Republican atypical issue advocates are indeed specifically and deliberately targeting their fellow partisans in order to gain support for their cause(s) within the party and are intentionally framing their arguments within the context of accepted Republican values in order to do it.



Chapter 4 presents a systematic analysis of the rhetoric that Republican atypical advocates use to support and discuss their causes, compared to that used by their advocacy counterparts outside of the GOP. Because of their intended audience and goals, as investigated in Chapter 3, I predict that Republican atypical issue advocates are more likely to use their own party's values than those values of the opposing side – i.e., values that can be construed as more Democratic or liberal – to frame support for their causes. Likewise, I predict Republican atypical issue advocates are unique in this mission compared to those who advocate for the same issues but are not affiliated with the GOP; Republican atypical issue advocates will be more likely to use their own party's values, while same-issue advocates outside the GOP will be less likely to do so.

To investigate this particular hypothesis, I once again use the Log Cabin Republicans as an example of atypical issue advocacy. I content analyze their mission statement and all 320 press releases available publicly on their official website in order to measure the frequency with which they employ certain words and concepts in their communications. I repeat this content analysis with a sample of press releases by the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the oldest and largest LGBT rights organization in the country. Analysis shows that Log Cabin is indeed more likely to use a number of Republican and conservative values in its communications – both in relation to a number of traditionally Democratic and liberal values and in relation to the Human Rights Campaign. HRC, on the other hand, almost exclusively uses Democratic and liberal values like “equality,” “rights,” “fairness,” and “discrimination.”

Chapter 5 presents the results of two virtually identical survey experiments conducted on separate nationwide samples of Republican and Republican-leaning adults

at two different time points – one in the week leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Obergefell v. Hodges* and one in the week following it. In both versions, Republican respondents randomly received one of six different mock articles in which the speaker’s partisanship and the evoked value used to frame same-sex marriage support were manipulated. The cross-pressure frames in the experiments mimicked real-life frames used by Republican pro-LGBT advocates, as determined in Chapters 2 and 3; these frames used a variety of accepted Republican values in support of same-sex marriage and attributed this support to a Republican speaker. In the experiment, the cross-pressure frames were compared to three other conditions: a control condition, in which neither the speaker nor evoked value were affiliated with one political party or the other; a treatment in which the speaker was identified as Republican but used a Democratic value to advocate for same-sex marriage; and a left-leaning treatment that attributed support to a Democratic speaker who used a Democratic value. The survey experiments test what effects – if any – these cross-pressure frames have on Republican attitudes toward same-sex marriage in comparison to more typical advocacy frames. Beyond support for same-sex marriage, respondents were also asked about *Obergefell*, the Republican Party platform, and the 2016 presidential election, as well as a series of manipulation checks to determine how much of a role the frames played in their resulting expressed attitudes.

Republican atypical advocacy framing indeed appears to have an effect on Republican attitudes in the way it is intended: those respondents assigned to cross-pressure frames where their own political identity matched the frame’s speaker and the corresponding evoked value were less likely to express opposition toward same-sex marriage than those under a frame that referenced a Democratic speaker and Democratic

value. Similar patterns emerged for questions regarding the Supreme Court's decision in *Obergefell* and the Republican Party platform. The influence of cross-pressure frames is moderated by the timing of the *Obergefell* decision, however, with different Republican values encouraging greater acceptance at different time points. There is also some evidence that matched partisanship alone – regardless of the evoked value's partisan leaning in the frame – has the ability to shift Republican attitudes, pointing once again to the power of partisan cues like so many studies before it.

Chapter 6 concludes my investigation into Republican atypical issue advocacy, as assessed through the issue of same-sex marriage. I review my findings thus far, and importantly address my overarching theory's application to other issue areas. I also discuss the research's limitations and paths for future investigation. I furthermore place Republican atypical issue advocacy within the context of the 2016 presidential election, speculating on what the current election cycle may mean for the future success of both this type of advocacy work and the Republican Party itself. Even if Republican atypical issue advocacy works in theory, the future of this work is nevertheless unclear as atypical advocacy organizations disappear, individual advocates leave the party, and as those who remain are often marked by their left-leaning counterparts as ineffective or as partisan panderers.

### **Attempting to Break the Cycle of Insanity**

At a time when the Republican Party's failure seems imminent as it faces the stark reality of needing to court new voting blocs and stay relevant or “die,”<sup>11</sup> it is important to

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<sup>11</sup> The GOP faces both a potential literal and figurative death as its base grows older without the support of younger voters to replenish it and as the party grows increasingly out of touch with the electorate on a

investigate these distinct efforts by GOP advocates to evoke attitudinal shifts among fellow Republicans and conservatives. These advocates face an uphill battle unlike any of their counterparts, fighting for both their party and their cause. In order to evoke internal party change, they do not simply repeat the existing advocacy frames of their left-leaning counterparts, whose rhetoric has already been rejected by Republicans and conservatives; atypical advocates instead challenge current GOP positions on social issues by using frames that intentionally play to existing partisan predispositions and accepted partisan value orientations. In other words, they speak the language that resonates most with their fellow partisans in hope of providing them with new – yet familiar – considerations by which to judge the social issue at hand. While this investigation is seemingly narrow, it nonetheless has real implications for the future of party competition and evolution. As partisans are increasingly motivated to reject information incongruent to their preexisting beliefs, and as existing frames that challenge these beliefs – especially on social issues that are deeply rooted in long-held values – become too familiar and stale, issue and party evolution can only stem from alternative types of messaging like cross-pressure frames.

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variety of issues (Illing 2015; McGraw 2015). A number of articles throughout the 2016 election cycle have predicted the death of the Republican Party, as did allegedly President George W. Bush (e.g. Beauchamp 2016; Blake 2016; McElvaine 2016).

## Chapter 2

### (Grand) Old Party Values, New Party Positions: The Intersection of Issue Framing, Values, and Partisan Cues in Cross-Pressure Frame Environments

*“Framing effects are a liability only if individuals never develop a basis for discriminating among frames and remain constantly vulnerable to changing representations of issues. As noted above, resistance to framing is also problematic if it means that individuals cannot recognize and accept good arguments for changing their preferences. If debate cannot introduce new considerations in people’s minds, but can only serve to remind them of their existing values, then persuasion through the exchange of information is impossible. Deliberation is pointless.”*

*- Chong and Druckman 2007, 120*

Republican atypical issue advocacy, as laid out in the introductory chapter, embodies some essential lessons about communication and party competition. Contrary to the myth that parties are stable and position change is glacial, parties are relative and context dependent. The only constant for parties is change, and while “the *appearance* of consistency is an asset,” parties must continually adopt new positions for their own well-being and advancement (Karol 2009, 189). Because of this, understanding how parties use rhetorical frames to manage their respective coalitions has significant implications for future electoral competition, party development, and issue evolution (Karol 2009). The relative stability of individual level partisanship moreover means that parties must implement communication strategies that resonate with their base even as what the party itself represents changes. Republican atypical issue advocates recognize the necessity of this delicate balance. In order to encourage the party to alter its positions on certain social issues, these advocates thus frame their arguments using accepted party rhetoric as a way to maintain a guise of consistency – even as they challenge the status quo.

The issue of Republican atypical issue advocacy and its usage of cross-pressure frames draws upon many different literatures, but at the heart of this research question is

a lesson in rhetorical strategies, particularly the capabilities and limitations of new kinds of framing effects that may become more prevalent as parties continue to compete and evolve. Unlike their counterparts on either side of the issue, Republican atypical issue advocates purposely create an environment of conflicting cues to evoke intraparty opinion change, using frames that juxtapose accepted partisanship and value orientations with atypical issue positions that challenge their own party's status quo. The theoretical basis for my dissertation is therefore rooted in the framing literature and its intersection with two powerful heuristics – partisanship and values. A fresh look at how frame acceptance is influenced by the presence and absence of these cues is an important next step in a line of work that has tried to keep up with the ever-evolving realities of party competition.

### **By Any Other Frame**

#### *An overview of Framing Theory*

The concept of framing is essential to understanding public opinion, yet its exact definition has often proved elusive in the face of multiple interpretations (Chong 1993; Druckman 2001; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). At a basic level, a frame acts as an interpretive lens through which an issue can be depicted, provoking a different set of considerations depending on the perspective it portrays (Chong 1993; Druckman 2001; Goffman 1974). “It is the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104). Frames thus play a fundamental role in opinion formation (Chong 1993, 870) and in politics as citizens, politicians, and the press continually construct and encounter various

and competing interpretations of their “political and social realities” (Matthes 2012, 250). In other words, frames pervade the everyday political process. While frames are sometimes negatively associated with “spin” and “deception” for portraying an issue in a particular way that may benefit certain beliefs and goals, they are in actuality quite often “necessary” and “invaluable tools” that can condense complex issues into something more accessible and comprehensible (Scheufele and Tewsbury 2007, 12).

Framing theory spans multiple disciplines, and its precise meaning can vary depending upon the field. The psychological origins of framing are rooted predominantly in equivalency logic, exemplified by the experimental work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984; also see Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1987).<sup>12</sup> The frames in these studies are “logically equivalent (but not transparently equivalent) statements of a problem [that] lead decision makers to choose different options” (Rabin 1998, 36). In equivalency framing, also known as “valence” frames, only how the information in the frames is portrayed changes – not the information itself (Druckman 2004). “From a rationality perspective, the frames should not matter” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 114). But despite the material invariance in outcomes, this change in wording (as opposed to meaning) in each of the frames still has an impact on subsequent attitudes, showing the

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<sup>12</sup> A classic example is Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian disease problem, in which stating the number of potential lives saved by a program to combat the disease has a dramatically different impact on resulting preferences than a second frame that portrays identical information but instead portrays it as the number of lives that would potentially be lost. Even though the outcome would be the same, respondents are much more averse to risk in the former frame than they are in the latter. Quattrone and Tversky (1988) similarly show a clear change in resulting opinions for a scenario when simply varying whether a particular program would leave 10 percent of the workforce unemployed versus employing 90 percent of the workforce; despite these numbers representing the same outcome, respondents interpret and assess the situation quite differently. In general, equivalency frames do not necessarily produce equivalent attitudes as psychological interpretation of risk, loss, ratios, relationships, and reference points take a stronger hold on individuals’ attitudes than rational interpretation of identical outcomes.

limitations of human rationality due to individual error, judgment, emotion, memory, and cognitive capabilities.

Other disciplines like sociology, political science, and political communications use a modified definition more applicable to politics and the ambiguity that can accompany political and social issues. Rooted in the work of Goffman (1974), this version of framing focuses on the need to organize and interpret experiences in a way that provides meaning and structure to one's surroundings (Scheufele and Tewsbury 2007, 11; Matthes 2012). Known as "issue" or "emphasis" framing, these types of frames share some commonality with equivalency frames yet possess one very key difference:

Like equivalency framing effects, emphasis framing effects work by causing individuals to focus on certain aspects or characterizations of an issue or problem instead of others. However, unlike equivalency framing effects, the frames in communication for emphasis framing effects are not logically identical ways of making the same statement; rather, the frames focus on different potentially relevant considerations (Druckman 2001, 230).

Framing in this sense flourishes because of the reality that individuals possess incomplete information and thus provide imperfect and often uninformed opinions; any differences in the content, accessibility, or importance of the information at hand may prompt individuals to draw upon, weight, or alter their own considerations in different ways and in turn cause them to express different attitudes at different times on the same subject.

The general concept of framing can be broken down into two main processes – one on a more internal level and the other, a more external level. The former revolves around the individual level process of framing and the internal, psychological mechanisms that are at work (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104; see also Iyengar 1991, Zaller 1992, Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Nelson et al. 1997; Price & Tewksbury 1997; Gross 2000; Brewer 2001). This is commonly referred to as a "frame in thought" or an



“individual frame” – the set of one’s available, accessible, and applicable considerations retrieved from memory that affect their subsequent evaluation on an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007, 105; Goffman; see also Scheufele and Tewsbury 2007). Even a small change in how the issue is conveyed can alter what “interpretive schemas” or “frameworks” are activated, what considerations the individual draws upon to evaluate the issue, and how the individual interprets what the issue is fundamentally about given the particularities of the frame (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104; Goffman 1974, 24; Scheufele and Tewsbury 2007). Chong and Druckman provide a clear example of a frame in thought using the oft-referenced situation of a hate group’s right to hold a rally:

For example, if an individual believes that free speech dominates all other considerations in deciding whether a hate group has the right to rally, that individual’s frame in thought is free speech. If, instead, he or she gives consideration to free speech, public safety, and the effect of the rally on the community’s reputation, then his or her frame in thought consists of this mix of considerations (105-6).

These different schemas, and the salience of and weight given to certain considerations over others, evoked by the frame thus may cause the respondent to have a different resulting preference or response than he or she would have under an alternate version (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Tversky and Kahneman 1981).

The emphasis on accessibility and weighting in individual frames originally separated the theoretical underpinnings of framing from the process of persuasion. Framing puts the focus on how the respondent uses and deliberates between different considerations that have been activated by the frame as the ultimate cause of opinion change, while persuasion is instead about an actual change in belief content (Entman 2007; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). The key to framing is thus the measure of belief importance – one consideration is more important in a particular situation than

another – instead of the actual act of convincing the individual one way or the other. Over time, however, this distinction has become more relaxed and lines have been blurred. Framing has been shown to work not just through accessibility of and deliberation on existing information but also through the introduction of brand new information as well (Chong and Druckman 2007; Chong and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2005).

The more external process revolves around the outward, actual presentation of a frame – what Chong and Druckman (2007) call a “frame in communication” or “media frame”:

A frame in a communication “organizes everyday reality” (Tuchman 1978, p. 193) by providing “meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, p. 143; 1989) and promoting “particular definitions and interpretations of political issues” (Shah et al. 2002, p. 343). (106)

These types of frames are evident in how figures and groups like politicians, organized interests, and the media use “words, images, phrases, and presentation styles to convey their message” (100). They serve as a “bridge” between “elite discourse [...] and popular comprehension” by simplifying and organizing the issue into a term or concept that the average individual can more easily understand and providing meaning to it (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). These frames are also context dependent: they can differ from issue to issue and within a single issue, as well as over time.

Implementers of these frames are moreover purposely selective in the information they present and how they organize it – which has an impact on citizens’ own frames in thought, resulting attitudes, and behaviors (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). This process by which frames in communication influence individuals is called a framing effect (Chong and Druckman 2007). Studies on frames in communication and framing effects – into which this dissertation also fits – have abounded over the years. This line of work

includes analysis of frames in communication within the context of free speech (Sniderman and Theriault 2004), affirmative action (Gamson and Modigliani 1987), welfare reform (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Iyengar 1991), social security (Arnold et al. 1998), racial equality (Kinder and Sanders 1990), and many others.

Frames are especially plentiful when it comes to issues like immigration, reproductive rights, and same-sex marriage. These fiercely debated social issues, which have multiple facets prone to subjectivity and on which individuals hold a wide range of viewpoints, have been continually framed and reframed in various ways by their supporters and opponents. The repetition, strength, and “loudness” of these issue frames moreover have made them intertwined with the issues themselves. When talking about immigration, numerous frames have attempted to define immigrants’ identity and status in the United States. Framing immigrants themselves as “aliens” versus “illegal” versus “undocumented” has an impact on subsequent attitudes towards them (Lakoff 2007; Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn 2011; Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes 2013). Similarly, frames that go beyond labeling and instead emphasize broader concerns regarding immigration also have an impact on public opinion – such as economic and safety threat frames used by opponents, or civil rights, racial profiling, and earned citizenship frames used by supporters (Brader, Valentino, Suhay 2008; Fryberg, Stephens, Covarrubias, Markus, Carter, Laiduc, and Salido 2012).

The issue of women’s reproductive rights has also been discussed over the years through various lenses, producing some of the most well known frames in politics that have become synonymous with the issue itself. Those in support of abortion label themselves as “pro-choice,” framing the issue as one in which a woman has the “right to

choose” and to have autonomy over her own body. Opponents, on the other hand, argue a “pro-life” stance, focusing more on the morality of abortion, a child’s “right to life,” and equating abortion to murder (see Andsager 2000; McCaffrey and Keys 2000).

Likewise, same-sex marriage has been associated with a variety of impassioned frames that have defined arguments both for and against the issue (Tadlock, Gordon, and Popp 2007). Much like immigration and abortion, same-sex marriage proponents have framed the issue in terms of basic human rights and equality, whereas the issue’s detractors have used frames that characterize same-sex marriage as immoral and a violation of centuries of tradition and religious beliefs (Brewer 2002; Brewer 2003; Brewer 2008).

On a micro level, different frames regarding each of these aforementioned issues may sway individual attitudes one way or another – sometimes quite easily and in contradictory ways. This relates to the more internal, individual level processes associated with frames in thought, as well as how individual actors form various frames in communication. Yet on a macro level, frames are much less volatile and difficult to change over time. Accepted interpretations of many of the issues mentioned above are repeatedly used in the media and public discourse as organizational tools through which the media and political actors “package” messages for their intended audiences (Gamson and Modigliani 1987). This makes it difficult and rare for competing interests to reframe the debate in a way that challenges the accepted lenses through which these issues are viewed (see Baumgartner et al. 2009). Yet this is precisely what Republican atypical issue advocates attempt to do – both in regard to macro level frames used by their own party, as well as by their rival party. Whether their reframing efforts work remains to be seen, however.

### *Accounting for Individual Moderators in Framing Effects*

Individual-level factors play a role in framing effects, as well, acting as moderators of frame acceptance. Frames are not necessarily accepted by everyone – either to the same degree or at all. Individual characteristics such as values, partisanship, and ideology can have an impact on how one interprets a frame, decreasing the likelihood of accepting a frame that does not match with their own predispositions. Alternatively, a frame is more likely to be accepted if it aligns with and activates an individual’s already-held beliefs or identity (Chong and Druckman 2007, 111). This is called “frame resonance” (also see Nelson, Lecheler, Schuck, and de Vreese 2012; Chong 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Schemer, Wirth, and Matthes 2012). Moderating factors include individual-level knowledge – though there is debate whether it weakens or strengthens framing effects (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Kinder and Sanders 1990; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Nelson et al. 1997, Slothuus 2005; also see Miller and Krosnick 2000) – as well as the credibility of the frame’s source (Druckman 2001; Miller and Krosnick 2000), the availability of further information in addition to the frame, the ability to deliberate with others (Druckman and Nelson 2003), and the other frames to which an individual is exposed (Chong and Druckman 2007).

### *The Particular Potency of Partisan Source Cues*

Political elites have a significant influence over public opinion. They can inform and educate – as well as manipulate – the public by acting as a heuristic or cue for individuals to form consistent judgments on a variety of issues (Zaller 1992). Ideally,

political elites help to make the processing of information easier and provide ideological coherence for a mass public that largely lacks crystalized belief systems (Converse 1964). Frames are an integral part of this top-down model of public opinion as political elites make certain issues more salient than others, as well as attempt to convince public opinion – or at least segments of the public – to support one side over the other. Political elites especially play to “the partisan and ideological leanings of [their] audience” in order to “maxim[ize] appeal among their [...] allies” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 111; Nelson et al. 2012). Individuals, in turn, respond accordingly and take cues from their fellow partisans, using party cues as cognitive time-savers; if an individual’s chosen political party or representatives of the individual’s chosen party support a certain policy, it is likely the individual will also support it (Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Carsey and Layman 2006; Gilens and Murakawa 2002; Kam 2005; Mondak 1993; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Zaller 1992). Hence, findings of strong correlations between political attitudes and partisanship have abounded (see Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960). Karol (2009; 2012), for example, chronicles the influence of political elites over public opinion among the parties’ respective bases on the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage – two key issues of Republican atypical advocacy – citing large elite influence as the reason for sustained divisions in public opinion in each of these areas.

Increasingly, studies have explored just how powerful partisan identity and party cues are when it comes to frame acceptance. Cohen (2003) shows that partisan affiliation does indeed have superior influence over both individual ideology and policy content in framing welfare reform policy: if the respondent’s party was said to endorse the policy in the frame, so did the respondent. Matched partisanship between respondent and the

frame's identified political party moreover superseded any inconsistencies between the frame's specified party and policy content; in other words, respondents who identified as Democrat and liberal were supportive of Democratic welfare policy even when framed as a harsh reform program, while respondents who identified as Republican and conservative were supportive of Republican policy even when framed as a generous reform program. In fact, respondents were more likely to support their party's policy in these mismatched scenarios than they were in frames where the party promoted an expected policy position.<sup>13</sup> In each case, respondents furthermore did not attribute their attitudes to any partisan influence but rather their own evaluation. The acceptance of these "expectation-violating messages" – and respondents' blindness to partisan influence – therefore has a number of implications for the power that political parties can yield over public opinion, or at least the opinion of their fellow partisans, acting as a heuristic that can redefine meaning and beliefs (811). Cohen's findings are especially important for the research question at hand, given how Republican atypical issue advocates rely on and frame their advocacy within the context of partisanship and partisan-owned values in order to change existing partisan beliefs on certain issues.

Slothhus and colleagues have also repeatedly investigated the role of political parties in framing, putting parties first and foremost and exploring their interaction with frames like few have done before them. In their research, parties provide an incredibly important cue. Citizens are more likely to respond to a frame sponsored by the political party for whom they voted, most evident with "issues at the center of party conflict" and strongest among those most politically aware (Slothhus and de Vreese 2010, 642).

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<sup>13</sup> In the absence of party cues, respondents evaluated the policy according to the frame's content and judged it against their own ideological beliefs as would be expected.

Slothhus attributes this to motivated reasoning: citizens are motivated to “pay closer attention to frame content and assess it more favorably when it is sponsored by a party they favor” and “discount, simply ignore, or even engage in counterarguing” if it is sponsored by a party they oppose (632).

Parties can also help citizens achieve greater consistency between their values and attitudes by signaling which values are important to which issues (Petersen, Slothhus, and Togeby 2010). Parties do not have absolute freedom of persuasion, however. Citizens do not always follow parties if party frames do not fit with citizens’ preexisting beliefs (Slothhus and de Vreese 2010). Political elites are therefore constrained in how much they can influence public opinion, even among its most loyal supporters, and must make sure to develop frames that resonate with their electorates. This, too, directly relates to my research endeavor at hand. Republican atypical issue advocates use their own partisan identity as a signal to fellow Republicans that they can be trusted and that their beliefs are consistent with party principles. Nevertheless, the capabilities of atypical advocates might be limited if fellow partisans do not see such atypical issue positions as congruent with the rest of the party – even in the face of shared partisanship and value orientations.

### *Multiple and Competing Frames*

Frames furthermore rarely exist alone; instead, frames are constantly in competition. Though the framing literature often treats issues as isolated and one-sided, frames used in real political battles by opposing parties and ideological sides are in fact numerous and disputable; unlike the artificial situations created in many framing



experiments, frames do not exist in a vacuum in the real world (Chong and Druckman 2013; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). These frames are moreover accessible and accepted to varying degrees. Yet as Chong and Druckman (2007) argue, “the voluminous literature on framing effects has ignored perhaps the typical framing situation in which competing sides promote alternative interpretations” (104).

It is not only the strength or persuasiveness of the frame, but also the context in which the frame is received that determines the frame’s overall impact (107). Some have argued that recognizing and studying this competition better mirrors real world possibilities of frame resistance and rejection in the face of multiple frames, making frames less influential on the political process than they have appeared to be in isolated studies. Others have asserted, however, that unequal content and implementation of competing frames allows for some frames to have much greater influence on politics than others (Chong and Druckman 2007; Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Brewer and Gross 2005; Pan and Kosicki 2001; Chong and Wilinsky-Nahmias 2003). Those frames that are comparatively the “loudest” – in other words, repeated with the most frequency – and strongest in their content compared to their competition are more likely to be accepted by individuals, though to different extents based on moderating individual level factors such as those previously mentioned (Chong and Druckman 2007).

Originally lacking in the framing literature, studies have begun to incorporate direct tests of competitive framing (e.g. Andsager 2000; Brewer 2008; Brewer and Gross 2005; Wise and Brewer 2010). This dissertation builds upon existing work and the concept of competitive framing by analyzing a uniquely competitive situation: competition of issue frames within one’s own party. The cross-pressure frames used by

Republican atypical issue advocates are in direct competition with the frames the Republican Party uses to express its established oppositional stances on a variety of social issues. Atypical advocacy frames attempt to strengthen counterarguments by combating oppositional GOP frames using the party's own rhetoric, recognizing that traditional advocacy arguments invoking typically Democratic and liberal values are perceived as weak among Republicans and conservatives. The question remains just how "loud" and "strong" these atypical advocacy frames are, especially in the face of "louder" issue frames on both sides of the aisle that have grown stronger over time and have been widely used and reinforced in public discourse.

The cross-pressure nature of the frame furthermore provokes competition within the frame itself, joining together a number of competing cues that signal allegiance to different parties and in turn purposely create an atmosphere of cognitive dissonance. How Republicans react to this type of frame given the multiple levels of competition involved bears further investigation – whether they accept the frame by coping with the disparities and shifts their own views or reject the frame by lessening the importance of cues normally important to their decision making process. As Cohen argues, "attitude change may constitute a less painful route to dissonance reduction" (821).

## **The Value of Studying Values**

### *Defining Values and Their Role in Political Attitudes*

Values are "the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events" (Schwartz 1992, 1). One of the definitive theories on this subject is Schwartz's value construct, which details six principles of basic values:

1) “values are beliefs,” 2) “values refer to desirable goals,” 3) values are more general, “transcend[ing] specific actions and situations,” 4) values serve as – an often unconscious – set of “standards or criteria,” 5) values are ranked by individuals and placed in a hierarchy of importance, and 6) “the relative importance of multiple values guides [individuals’ subsequent attitudes and] actions” (Schwartz 2007, 3; see also Schwartz 1992, Schwartz 1996). He defines ten universal values, each distinct in the motivation it expresses, that capture the full range of human experience across all cultures: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. These values can be collapsed into two larger dimensions that pit openness to change values with conservation values and self-transcendence values with self-enhancement values. The distinctions in these values and overarching themes help individuals to identify “trade-offs,” make choices, and organize the world around them (Schwartz 2007, 4).

The connection between basic, personal values and politics is logical then. Many scholars argue that values lie at the core of politics and are a crucial part of opinion formation, acting as perhaps a better reflection of beliefs than partisan or especially ideological preferences (Feldman 1988; Feldman and Zaller 1992). Values, often thought of as systems instead of in “isolation,” are far fewer in number than attitudes yet greater in number than ideology (Feldman 2003, 479). They have the ability to “reduc[e] the complexity of political judgments and for creating consistency among attitudes,” acting as an organizational structure upon which attitudes and even ideology are based (Feldman 2003, 479). They are furthermore assumed to be a “relatively stable” foundation for attitudes and evaluations than simple unidimensional ideology, which most people lack

and which many have deemed a poor measure for the basis of attitudes (Converse 1964; Conover and Feldman 1981; Feldman 2003; Rokeach 1973). Values in fact may underlie ideology itself (Feldman 2003).

At the same time, values are complicated and their stability and exogeneity have frequently come into question. The meaning of particular values and their application is “open to interpretation” and can “transcend specific situations” (Bem 1970; Brewer 2001, 45; Feldman 1988, 2003; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Rokeach 1968, 1973; Schemer, Wirth, and Matthes 2012; Schwartz 1996, 2007). Their fluidity in definition means that the same value can be construed in different ways in accordance with one’s own preferences. Feldman (2003) points out an important example with the value of freedom: “For a capitalist, freedom is the absence of coercion, particularly from the government. For a socialist, freedom is being able to accomplish your goals, and this may require government efforts to remove barriers like poverty and racism” (493). Values may furthermore change over time and be context dependent, as well as be the effect of the very things – i.e. partisanship and attitudes – that they are supposed to cause (Goren 2005).

Not only are values politicized, but they can also be political. Just like the ownership of certain issues (see Petrocik 1996), political parties have what Petersen et al. (2010) call “value reputations” that are formed based on the values and issues the parties have each defended; “as parties compete over time, such reputations are reinforced” (534). In American politics, the Democratic Party is typically associated with “egalitarian values” like equality, while the Republican Party is typically associated with “individualistic values” like freedom and personal responsibility (Hart 2000; Ladd &

Lipset 1980; Nelson and Garst 2005). Schwartz (2007) similarly found that different value items in his basic human values battery predicted candidate vote choice and ideological self-placement: traditionalism, conformity, and stimulation<sup>14</sup> were associated more with Republican candidates and conservatism, while universalism and self-direction were associated more with Democratic candidates and liberal beliefs. The positions that political parties take thus signal to citizens “what set of values they should use to respond,” helping them form opinions “that correspond more accurately to their values than they would have been able to reach on their own” (Petersen et al. 2010). Likewise, individuals typically side with issues and candidates that promote the values they favor most (Nelson and Garst 2005, 490; see also Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder 1998). Values have therefore become intertwined not only with politics but also with political identity; political actors use the personal nature of values to “signify” partisan leanings, “establish community with audience members,” and encourage recognition of “political similarities and differences with other citizens” (Nelson and Garst 2005, 490-1).

### *Value Framing and Partisan Messaging*

When frames include value-laden messages, they connect values to issues with “an evaluative implication: it presents one position on an issue as being right (and others as wrong) by linking that position to a specific core value” (Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, and Waring 1990; Brewer 2001, 46; Chong & Druckman 2007; Shah, Domke, and Wackman 1996). Value frames are present both at the individual level as frames in thought and on a larger scale as frames in communication. Like any other type of frame, value frames have the capability of directly influencing the individual in the “direction

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<sup>14</sup> Stimulation is a significant predictor of liberalism in Schwartz’s model of ideological self-placement.

advocated by the frame” (Brewer 2001). But value frames can also work more “subtly” by “chang[ing] the underlying structure of opinion” through invoking and connecting the issue to the given value and allowing for the individual to make a judgment based upon this (Brewer 2001, 47; Brewer 2002; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Value frames moreover resonate most among individuals when they evoke values that match an individual’s preexisting value orientations – what Schemer, Wirth, and Matthes (2012) call a “framing resonance effect.” “If a communicator can effectively frame an issue as especially relevant to a particular value, he or she might sway the attitudes of those who place high personal priority on that value” (Nelson and Garst 2005, 490). Value frames are just as likely to be rejected, on the other hand, if the values the frame evokes do not correspond with an individual’s underlying value orientations (Brewer 2002).

Political actors, messages, issues, and policies are particularly powerful when framed within the context of values (Schemer, Wirth, and Matthes 2012; Shah, Domke, and Wackman 1996; Shen and Edwards 2005). Attaching values to political issues acts like a prompt, enabling better comprehension of the issue at hand and “activat[ing]” value orientations that function as more readily accessible cues for the individual to use in the decision making process (Schemer, Wirth, and Matthes 2012, 335; Domke, Shah, and Wackman 1998; Shah, Domke, and Wackman 1996; Shen and Edwards 2005; Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, and Waring 1990; Domke, Shah, and Wackman 1998). Partisan rhetoric and debate, candidates, and policies constantly draw upon and employ value-laden frames. Usage of these value frames has been increasingly investigated in the literature. Tested examples include abortion (Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, and Waring 1990), candidates’ stances on health care (Shah, Domke, and Wackman 1996),

civil liberties (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997), gay rights (Brewer 2002, 2003), welfare policy (Shen and Edwards 2005), and immigration (Schemer, Wirth, and Matthes 2012) among others.

The additional layer of partisanship has often been taken for granted or assessed after the fact in studies of value framing (e.g. Schemer, Wirth, and Matthes 2012). For example, experiments by Brewer (2001) and Brewer and Gross (2005) test counterframes by using the same values to frame both support and opposition toward the same issue and, in one instance, attribute these frames to partisan sources. Other studies do just the opposite and focus on partisanship, referencing values only in passing and as an obvious and intrinsic part to partisan frames without needing to be analyzed as its own entity (e.g. Arceneaux 2007; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). The works that put partisanship at the forefront of study stress the important reality that partisan battles and value frames do not occur in isolation from one another but rather go hand in hand (Nelson and Garst 2005). These studies moreover recognize the importance of manipulating different combinations of partisan and value cues to assess “expectancy confirmations” (party and values evoked match) and “violations” (party and values evoked do not match) (492).

Nelson and Garst (2005) find that values encourage effortful processing and are persuasive cues, but their effects are moderated by the partisanship of both the frame’s speaker and the respondent, as well as expectations that referenced values and stated partisanship in the frame match. Contrary to more passive processing theories (Zaller 1992), respondents did not automatically reject frames from the rival party due to partisanship alone but rather did so when the rival party “evoked the ‘wrong’ values” (510). As Nelson and Garst state in reference to this rejection, “In an era of sinking trust

in our leaders, when nearly every move a politician makes is portrayed as cynically self-interested, language that strikes of insincere pandering will not sit well with many citizens” (511). Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby (2010) likewise explore the interplay of partisanship and values, though party values in this experiment are conveyed indirectly by partisan reputations and meant to guide respondents in choosing issue positions consistent with their own value orientations.

These previous studies represent different instances of cross-pressure framing when it comes to the manipulation and interplay of partisanship, values, and issue positions, but none quite capture the dynamics of current Republican atypical issue advocacy. First of all, the issues evaluated in many of the prior studies – whether assessing values alone, partisanship alone, or values and partisanship combined – deal either with issues in the abstract, that are of low salience, or that are mostly “novel” on which divisions in opinion are not yet clear or solidified. Chong and Druckman (2007) briefly mention the idea of cross-pressure framing and its potential to shift attitudes on newer issues:

[...] Even those with firm values are susceptible to framing on new issues that have yet to acquire a settled interpretation. Elite frames aim to appeal to the partisan and ideological leanings of the audience. President Bush’s argument that the current social security program is unfair to minorities is an example of an argument designed to connect a conservative Republican policy to a liberal value in order to expand support for the policy. A committed liberal Democrat who believes that government policy should reduce racial inequality may experience cross-pressures between his belief in equality and his partisanship. (111-2)

Only Arceneaux uses the highly salient issue of abortion in his experiment and finds that Republicans, no matter their level of political awareness, punish their party’s candidate for taking a “counter-stereotypical position” – in other words, expressed a pro-choice stance. None of these studies have addressed instances of cross-pressure frames that



simultaneously assess partisanship, evoked value, and expressed position on a highly salient issue – a very real situation given the electoral importance of salient issues, a changing electorate, and the need for political parties (the Republican Party, in this case) to reassess coalition management for future electoral gains.

Second, none of the prior studies investigate the current juxtaposition at the center of my dissertation. They have addressed a mismatch between speaker partisanship and evoked value in the frame (Nelson and Garst 2005), a mismatch between respondent partisanship and respondent values and those specified in the frame (Nelson and Garst 2005), a mismatch between candidate partisanship and expressed issue stance (Arceneaux 2007), and a mismatch between partisanship and policy supported (Cohen 2003).

Republican atypical issue advocates are doing something different, however. They are playing by party rules and using the party's values vernacular, but they are taking, in Arceneaux's words, "counter-stereotypical positions" – or, in Nelson and Garst's words, they are violating issue position expectations – by advocating for positions on highly salient issues that the GOP expressly opposes. The question remains whether this integral new piece of the puzzle is enough to sway attitudes among their target audience of fellow Republicans.

Lastly, Republican atypical issue advocates have created a unique kind of frame that sets them apart and uses a different set of values than both typical advocates and typical opponents (who usually belong to their same party) on the same issues. A similar example would be if atypical issue advocates on the Democratic side evoked their partisanship and values affiliated with the Democratic Party, like fairness, to go against a position the Democrats "own," like welfare. The lessons about framing that can be

learned from atypical advocates are therefore different from those of their counterparts: they are not simply using the opposition's values to reframe the debate, nor are they fully coopting arguments being made by other advocates who support the issue. Their value-laden advocacy arguments are unique, simultaneously acting as new evaluative dimensions in their application to the issue at hand yet also familiar and already accepted and accessible as part of the party lexicon.

## **Hypotheses**

In their quest to realign the party, Republican atypical issue advocates are (1) attempting to change attitudes on certain social issues (2) within their own party (3) by using frames that evoke their own party's language and reasoning (4) that may have a unique potential to influence attitudes once thought immovable. While studies of advocacy efforts in each of these issue areas already abound, they have focused solely on the traditional efforts of Democratic and liberal supporters versus Republican and conservative detractors. No known studies exist that systematically investigate either Republican atypical issue advocacy or these advocates' cross-pressure usage of their own partisan values to reframe the debate and challenge their own party's current issue stances. The following hypotheses lay out exploratory and testable predictions about the inner workings of atypical issue advocacy – specifically within the Republican Party in regard to same-sex marriage, as the following chapters will detail – that address who these advocates are attempting to target, what they are trying to do, how they are doing it, and what – if any – effect their cross-pressure frames have on Republican attitudes.

### *Who?*

In the past few decades, certain social issues – like same-sex marriage, women’s reproductive choice, and a pathway to citizenship – have found significantly more support within the Democratic Party than within the Republican Party. Democrats have come to “own” these issues (Petrocik 1996), as exemplified by the explicit inclusion of them in the 2012 – and most recently, the 2016 – Democratic National Platform. The Republican Party, on the other hand, has expressly opposed these issues in their platforms; their 2016 platform was widely condemned as the harshest yet regarding LGBT rights, women’s reproductive choice, and immigration (Peters 2016).

Such partisan division has undoubtedly influenced advocacy work and movements within each of these issue areas. Many of the major advocacy groups and movements supporting these issues have been affiliated in some way with the Democratic Party over the years or – even if purportedly non-partisan – have framed their arguments within the context of more Democrat-owned principles like equality and civil rights, such as the Human Rights Campaign (see Karol 2012). In turn, these advocacy movements have had positive effects on public opinion – most notably, the exponential increase in support for same-sex marriage in recent years – but these effects have been limited to Democrats and independents (Pew Research Center 2016). While advocacy movements have claimed to be all-inclusive no matter partisan affiliation, the way in which they frame their advocacy is not. Advocates’ connection with and support from Democrats and ideological liberals makes reception of their advocacy by Republicans and conservatives unlikely, motivating Republicans and conservatives to reject them and their messages as partisan and incongruent with their own beliefs.

Republican atypical issue advocates who fight in support of same-sex marriage, women's reproductive rights, and citizenship take this partisan division and Democratic ownership of support into account. Unlike their advocacy counterparts within these issue areas who do not claim to intentionally court any particular group, Republican atypical issue advocates tailor their messages to a specific segment of the population – their own partisans. They furthermore make this intention publicly known, hoping that their emphasis on their own party affiliation will gain them credibility and kinship within the GOP and will encourage greater favor among fellow Republicans and conservatives for issues that Democrats and even independents already support. Case studies and in-depth interviews in Chapter 3 and content analysis in Chapter 4 make clear that Republican atypical issue advocates specifically aim their advocacy efforts at members of their own party, attempting to change opinion from within. Whether they hope to persuade Republicans at the elite level, those in the mass public, or both, Republican atypical advocates have a focused mission unlike any other advocate within their issue area.

*H1: Atypical issue advocates are more likely to target their advocacy efforts specifically at members of their own political party than members of other political parties or the mass public as a whole.*

*What? And how?*

In order to successfully advocate for these issue stances within their own party, Republican atypical issue advocates have employed rhetorical tactics that are unique to their intra-party mission. Given that individuals respond differently to frame content based on such individual-level factors as partisanship, Republican atypical issue advocates use party cues – in particular, accepted party values like freedom and limited

government – to frame their stances on issues that challenge the party status quo. Their atypical advocacy arguments emphasize how the issues neatly fit with many of the fiscal, social, moral, structural, and constitutional values of Republicanism and conservatism, reframing support for each of these topics as a Republican issue. It is thus with this type of rhetoric – not the typical equality and rights-based rhetoric used by other advocates within the same issue areas – that Republican atypical issue advocates have promoted acceptance of same-sex marriage, immigration reform, and women’s reproductive health among their fellow partisans. Again, Chapters 3 and 4 will shed light on the distinct rhetoric that Republican atypical advocates employ in order to make their case on issues that the party has typically been against; this will be apparent through how atypical advocates discuss their mission and the issues they promote, as well as the language and messaging used in the official publications that I content analyze.

*H2: Atypical issue advocates are more likely to frame their arguments using values already accepted by their own party than values commonly associated with its rival party.*

*To what, if any, effect?*

Perhaps most important is whether or not this atypical issue advocacy has any impact at all. No matter how passionately Republican atypical advocates may campaign for certain issues, no one may be listening – or, if they are, they may not care and instead resort to their preexisting beliefs. What makes Republican atypical issue advocacy worth studying is whether the distinctness of their frames has the desired effect on Republican attitudes of greater acceptance. If these frames do, this has notable implications both for the practicalities of electoral politics and party competition, as well as theoretical

ramifications regarding party position change and the overall ability for citizens to deliberate in the face of quality arguments. If these frames do not have an effect, then it would mean just the opposite.

A few definitions would serve useful before proceeding further with this section. A *match* between respondent partisanship, speaker partisanship, evoked value, and/or issue stance is akin to how Nelson and Garst (2005) use the term in their own study: two or more of these orientations are congruent with one another and align with expectations of how they should relate. A *mismatch* signifies just the opposite. A *cross-pressure frame* occurs when one or more orientations in the frame does not “match” the respondent’s preexisting orientations – whether it be partisan affiliation, evoked value “owned” by the party with which the respondent identifies, or the issue position taken by the speaker. This particular type of frame pits political (party) and social identity (values) cues against atypical issue stances that challenge the party’s status quo, purposely creating an environment of cognitive dissonance. But instead of dismissing the cognitively dissonant information, such frames are meant to compel the opposed individual to reevaluate the issue by using already accepted and deeply rooted partisan values as new evaluative dimensions in arguments that challenge existing partisan positions.

As previously stated, cross-pressure frames may have one or more orientations that do not match with one another or with the respondent’s own orientations. Therefore, to clarify what precise type of cross-pressure frame is being implemented in the hypotheses below, each cross-pressure frame will be preceded by what orientations are causing the cross-pressure – in other words, what orientations between party, value, and

issue position do not match in the scenario. A match between speaker and respondent partisanship will be specified separately and thus any presumed match between the respondent and other orientations in the frame can be deduced from there.<sup>15</sup> When speaker partisanship and evoked value match but the issue position does not, this will be labeled as an *issue cross-pressure frame*. For example, a frame that references a Republican speaker using a Republican value in support of a typically Democratic issue position (like support for same-sex marriage) would be an issue cross-pressure frame. When speaker partisanship does not match either the evoked value or the issue position, this will be labeled as a *value-issue cross-pressure frame*. For example, a frame that references a Republican speaker using a Democratic value in support of a typically Democratic issue position would be a value-issue cross-pressure frame. Resulting attitudes would then vary depending on whether or not there was a match between the partisanship of the speaker in the frame and the partisanship of the recipient of the frame.

In the case where respondent partisanship does not match speaker partisanship but all three orientations of the frame match one another, this is labeled as a *rival frame* for purposes of this dissertation. A rival frame works exactly like a typical issue frame; none of the cues referenced in the frame conflict with one another and thus any cognitive dissonance caused by the frame is avoided. Clearly, the mismatch between respondent partisanship and speaker partisanship should motivate the respondent to reject the frame since its content relies upon orientations associated with the respondent's rival party. For

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<sup>15</sup> Unlike partisanship, respondent value orientation is assessed in a broader fashion in accordance with Schwartz's value construct; this will be further explained and analyzed in Chapter 5. This value construct was used in place of measuring the direct values used in the frames in order not to prime respondents on these values prior to the frames, as well as to acknowledge Feldman's (2003) critique that too many political science studies on values rely on measuring only the values that are of direct interest in the study instead of a broader system. Issue position is only assessed after the frame is received.

example, a frame that references a Democratic speaker using a Democratic value in support of a typically Democratic issue position would be a rival party frame.

In my original survey experiment testing cross-pressure frames on Republican same-sex marriage attitudes in Chapter 5, I include three issue cross-pressure frames, in which a Republican speaker in each frame uses a particular Republican value to advocate in favor of same-sex marriage (an issue position normally espoused by Democrats). Therefore, in each of these three frames, there is a match between respondent and speaker partisanship, as well as between speaker partisanship and evoked value in the frame. These three frames are compared to a control condition – which has no speaker partisanship specified and a vague consensus value (Brewer and Gross 2005) to support same-sex marriage – as well as a rival party frame (Democratic speaker, value, and position) and a value-issue cross-pressure frame (Republican speaker but Democratic value and position). The following hypotheses make predictions about how issue cross-pressure frames affect attitudes – in this case, attitudes of Republicans regarding the issue of same-sex marriage. These types of frames will make salient two powerful cues – political identity and value orientation – and thus may have the potential to dampen negative feelings typically associated with the issue among this group. I base predictions below upon movement in opposition rather than movement in support. In prior studies of the effects of cross-pressure frames on Republican attitudes regarding same-sex marriage (Koning and Redlawsk 2012; Koning and Redlawsk 2013), Republicans were not necessarily more likely to support same-sex marriage in the face of cross-pressure frames but were instead less likely to oppose it and thus shifted more toward the middle on the issue.



*H3a: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to oppose the issue than those in the control condition.*

*H3b: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to oppose the issue than those under the rival party frame.*

*H3c: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to oppose the issue than those under the value-issue cross-pressure frame.*

Again due to the power of partisanship and value orientation, I predict similar patterns when it comes to Republican respondent ratings of satisfaction with the June 2015 Supreme Court decision in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, which effectively legalized same-sex marriage nationwide, as well as agreement with the Supreme Court's majority in *Obergefell* that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marriage:

*H4a: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and less likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those in the control condition.*

*H4b: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and less likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those under the rival party frame.*

*H4c: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and less likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those under the value-issue cross-pressure frame.*

I furthermore predict that Republican respondents assigned to issue cross-pressure frames will be less likely to believe the Republican Party opposes same-sex marriage in its current party platform, less likely to agree with the Party's stance on same-sex marriage once told what it is, and less likely to think the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election. Like the previous hypotheses, these predictions stem from the potency of partisanship and value orientation cues. If a Republican respondent is given an article in which a Republican speaker uses a Republican value to support same-sex marriage, the respondent may believe the party now supports the issue based off of the received frame. Even when told the party's actual position, the strength of the cues present in the frame may make the respondent less likely to agree with the party's true position. Furthermore, while same-sex marriage has typically been seen as an important wedge issue for the Republican Party in order to court and maintain social conservatives, the cognitive dissonance caused by cross-pressure frames may encourage Republican respondents to not place as much importance on an issue the party has typically used to create an electoral divide.

*H5a: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to believe their own party platform opposes the issue, less likely to agree with the platform once told what the party's stance is, and less likely to believe the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election than those in the control condition.*

*H5b: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure are less likely to believe their own party platform opposes the issue, less likely to agree with the platform once told what the party's stance is, and less likely to believe the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election than those under the rival party frame.*

*H5c: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, as well as a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to believe their own party platform opposes the issue, less likely to agree with the platform once told what the party's stance is, and less likely to believe the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election than those under the value-issue cross-pressure frame.*

In the original survey experiment analyzed in Chapter 5, a sixth of Republican respondents are randomly assigned to a value-issue cross-pressure frame, in which a Republican speaker evokes the Democratic-owned value of equality in support of same-sex marriage (a typically Democratic position). This scenario pits the powerful cue of partisanship against a powerful value orientation that has framed the entire same-sex marriage debate on the left, in conjunction with a typically Democratic issue position. Such a mismatch that leans toward Democratic orientations may provoke greater confusion than simply the issue cross-pressure frames, despite a match still existing between respondent and speaker partisanship. This type of frame may therefore be weaker in suppressing negative attitudes toward same-sex marriage and other related questions than the issue cross-pressure frames but stronger than the control condition and rival party frame due to partisanship match. In other words, it will act like an issue cross-pressure frame against the control condition and rival party frame, but when pitted against an actual issue cross-pressure frame (matched partisanship and value but atypical issue position), it will act like just the opposite:

*H6a: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to oppose the issue than those in the control condition.*

*H6b: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value,*

*respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are more likely to oppose the issue than those under issue cross-pressure frames.*

*H6c: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to oppose the issue than those under issue rival party frames.*

These value-issue cross-pressure frames will produce similar results when it comes to Republican respondent ratings of satisfaction with the Supreme Court decision in *Obergefell*, as well as agreement with the majority in *Obergefell* that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marriage:

*H7a: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and less likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those in the control condition.*

*H7b: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are more likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and more likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those under issue cross-pressure frames.*

*H7c: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and less likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those under issue rival party frames.*

Finally, Republican respondents may be confused by the conflicting cues in the value-issue cross-pressure frame when it comes to guessing the GOP platform's current stance on same-sex marriage, agreeing with the stance once informed of what it is, and assessing the importance of same-sex marriage when it comes to the party's chances of winning in 2016. While the power of matched political identity between respondent and

speaker is strong, this type of frame's usage of a Democratic value and issue position may affect attitudes differently based on what other frame it is compared to – whether that be the control condition, one of the issue cross-pressure frames, or the rival party frame.

*H8a: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to believe their own party platform opposes the issue, less likely to agree with the platform once told what the party's stance is, and less likely to believe the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election than those in the control condition.*

*H8b: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are more likely to believe their own party platform opposes the issue, more likely to agree with the platform once told what the party's stance is, and more likely to believe the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election than those under issue cross-pressure frames.*

*H8c: When there is a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is not a match between speaker partisanship and partisan leaning of evoked value, respondents under value-issue cross-pressure frames are less likely to believe their own party platform opposes the issue, less likely to agree with the platform once told what the party's stance is, and less likely to believe the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election than those under issue rival party frames.*

Lastly, a rival party frame will have the most negative impact on Republican support for same-sex marriage. All three orientations in this frame – speaker partisanship, evoked value, and issue position – are affiliated with the Democratic Party. This triple Democratic match will thus motivate Republican respondents to fully reject the frame more than any other, reinforcing attitudes that are more in line with the Republican Party's typical stance on same-sex marriage. I predict the rival party frame will have a greater negative impact than even the control condition, the only relationship not yet addressed in the previous hypotheses:

*H9a: When there is not a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is a match between speaker partisanship, partisan leaning of evoked value, and issue position, respondents under the rival party frame are more likely to oppose the issue than those in the control condition.*

*H9b: When there is not a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is a match between speaker partisanship, partisan leaning of evoked value, and issue position, respondents under the rival party frame are more likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and more likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those in the control condition.*

*H9c: When there is not a match between speaker and respondent partisanship, but there is a match between speaker partisanship, partisan leaning of evoked value, and issue position, respondents under the rival party frame are as or more likely to believe their own party platform opposes the issue, more likely to agree with the platform once told what the party's stance is, and more likely to believe the issue is important to the 2016 presidential election than those in the control condition.*

### **Why Cross-Pressure Frames Matter**

In the excerpt referenced at the beginning of the chapter, Chong and Druckman (2007) importantly caution against framing effects' two extremes, both of which would be harmful to democracy. Complete and continual acceptance of all frames without appropriately discriminating means citizens would lack any real attitudes whatsoever and would be "constantly vulnerable" to any type of persuasion. In contrast, complete rejection of all frames means citizens would be so rigid in their beliefs and so motivated to uphold their preexisting viewpoints that they would be unwavering in the face of any new considerations. Cross-pressure frames ideally fall in the middle of this spectrum, simultaneously provoking proper caution and scrutiny yet opening the possibility for new considerations based on already accepted partisan and value cues. Though they challenge preexisting beliefs, they are delivered within a context of trusted orientations, embodying

the type of deliberation and debate Chong and Druckman call for “to raise the quality of public opinion” (121).

These types of frames moreover capture a very real rhetorical strategy employed by Republican atypical advocates. By courting a specific audience and using cross-pressure frames that combine accepted and unaccepted cues, these advocates have a narrowly focused and perhaps seemingly impossible goal – to encourage attitudinal shifts within the Republican Party on the issues for which they advocate. But their approach to doing so is novel, not reflected in any other advocacy movements on issues of the same kind, and it is perhaps this distinctiveness in the rhetorical tools they use that just might move opinions within a segment of the population thought to be immovable. Cross-pressure frames can thus serve a real purpose in the process of party development and evolution as a way to internally induce opinion and party position change. This is especially important on matters like LGBT rights, immigration, and reproductive choice, where the Republican Party may have to incorporate new coalitions on entrenched issues to be competitive in future elections as the electorate grows more liberal and more diverse. To begin an investigation into cross-pressure framing effects and their usage by Republican atypical issue advocates specifically within the LGBT movement, the next chapter introduces two of the most well-known Republican pro-LGBT advocacy organizations – GOProud and the Log Cabin Republicans. Through an overview of each organization’s history and an in-depth interview with each of their senior officials, the chapter provides insight into Republican atypical advocates’ mission, objectives, and the rhetorical tools they use to frame their advocacy.

### Chapter 3

#### A Tale of Two Gay Republican Groups: An Exploration Into the Log Cabin Republicans and GOProud Through Case Studies and Elite Interviews

*“[...] To anyone who has reservations [about legalising gay marriage], I say: Yes, it's about equality, but it's also about something else: commitment. Conservatives believe in the ties that bind us; that society is stronger when we make vows to each other and support each other. So I don't support gay marriage despite being a Conservative. I support gay marriage because I'm a Conservative.”*

- David Cameron, former British Prime Minister (2011)

*“Some misperceive the issue of marriage equality as exclusively progressive. Yet what could be more conservative than support for more freedom and less government? And what freedom is more basic than the right to marry the person you love? Smaller, less intrusive government surely includes an individual deciding whom to marry. Allowing civil marriage for same-sex couples will cultivate community stability, encourage fidelity and commitment, and foster family values.”*

- Ken Mehlman (2012)

#### **The Right's History with the “Right Side of History”**

While the Growth and Opportunity Project report lacks much regarding the party's stance on LGBT issues, particularly same-sex marriage, the topic has played an integral part in the internal war currently being waged within the party. Republicans have historically been opposed to same-sex marriage at both the elite and mass level since the issue first entered the political spotlight. This opposition has created rigid dividing lines and a large opinion gap between the two major political parties especially within the last decade or more. While Republicans were not alone in their belief originally, with the vast majority of Americans opposed to same-sex marriage throughout the 1970s and 1980s, they now remain – along with conservatives and those who are most religious – as some of the few groups still mostly opposed to the issue; support among most other groups has considerably grown across the nation, precipitously so in



the last few years (Baunach 2012). This difference in opinion on same-sex marriage between the two parties became most visible in the lead-up to the 2004 presidential election as George W. Bush's campaign mobilized social conservatives over their opposition to the issue through anti-gay ballot initiatives in multiple states (Brewer and Wilcox 2005). The hot button issue continued to drive a large cultural wedge between the parties ever since, with the GOP being synonymous with opposition.<sup>16</sup> Even in light of multiple landmark Supreme Court decisions, with the most recent effectively making same-sex marriage legal nationwide, only 33 percent of Republicans say they support same-sex marriage, compared to 55 percent overall (Pew Research Center 2016c).

Over the past few years, however, Republican advocates have been “coming out” in support for same-sex marriage at a growing rate. Some proponents have proved to be quite a surprise due to their traditionally conservative reputations<sup>17</sup>; others have been openly ardent supporters all along.<sup>18</sup> Even former House Speaker Newt Gingrich admitted the need for the GOP to accept and deal with the “reality” of same-sex marriage in the aftermath of the 2012 election (The Washington Times 2012, Lochhead 2013). More recently, Senator Rob Portman's (R-OH) announcement of support for same-sex marriage, a position reversal due mainly to his own son being gay, marked the first Republican currently in a high-level office to publicly express support (Peters 2013).

Two top Republicans from the Bush administration have especially led the charge in the last several years. A shock to both Republicans and Democrats alike, Ted Olson –

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<sup>16</sup> Most recently, the Republican Party rejected same-sex marriage and defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman in their 2012 party platform; the Republican National Committee reaffirmed these sentiments in an April 2013 resolution during their spring meeting (Republican Platform Committee 2012; Sullivan 2013b).

<sup>17</sup> The list includes former Vice President Dick Cheney, former First Lady Laura Bush, and former Secretary of State Colin Powell.

<sup>18</sup> These more well-known advocates include Meghan McCain, Herbert Hoover's great-granddaughter Margaret Hoover, San Diego Mayor Jerry Sanders, and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg.

former United States Solicitor General to President George W. Bush – decided to take up the task of defending same-sex marriage against California’s Proposition 8 in the 2010 case of *Perry v. Schwarzenegger*. Yet to Olson, his position was completely congruent with his conservative values and beliefs about individual freedom, community, and acceptance and in line with “basic American principles” like equality and the inalienability of certain human rights (Olson 2010; Totenberg 2010). Three years later, Olson once again led the case against Proposition 8 as the United States Supreme Court heard the case as one of two dealing with same-sex marriage during the 2012-2013 term.

As Ted Olson has played a leading role on the courtroom’s stage, it is former George W. Bush campaign manager and RNC Chairman Ken Mehlman who has been the mastermind both in front of and behind the scenes. Mehlman announced he was gay in the summer of 2010 and has been actively and openly advocating legalization of same-sex marriage ever since, while simultaneously working in private with numerous prominent Republicans to gain their support for the issue. Mehlman has played an integral role in such legislative successes as the 2011 victory in New York State, appears frequently at fundraisers and speaking engagements in support of same-sex marriage, and formed “Project Right Side” to promote research advocating gay and lesbian issues (Project Right Side 2012; Jacobs 2011). In line with the conservative advocacy argument used by others, Mehlman has been able to successfully court conservative donors and sway Republican elites by framing the issue as promoting core conservative principles. As Mehlman states, adopting a phrase from former British Prime Minister David Cameron, he fights for same-sex marriage “because [he is] a conservativ[e], not in spite of it” (Geidner 2013).

### **An Overview of Organized Atypical LGBT Advocacy Within the GOP**

Against the background of the GOP's internal struggle with LGBT rights, a number of official pro-LGBT organizations have formed within the party – by Republicans, for Republicans – to varying degrees of success. Some groups have had a much longer history than others, while some arose just within the past several years as the issue of same-sex marriage entered the national spotlight. These organizations may differ in terms of their outreach efforts and activities, elite versus electorate focus, membership goals, and statewide versus national presence, but they all share the same key purpose and strategy: a desire to shift opinion within the Republican Party on LGBT issues by showing how LGBT rights are consistent with Republican and conservative values. This mission moreover sets them apart from other LGBT advocacy organizations, which have established close ties with the Democratic Party and use the language of the left to promote their cause (Karol 2012). These pro-LGBT Republican organizations recognize this distinction in mission, and while some have embraced and worked with their left-leaning advocacy counterparts, other groups have had an outright hostile relationship with them.

There are a number of pro-LGBT Republican organizations that should be highlighted here, albeit briefly. For example, Project Right Side (PRS), a 501(c)(4) non-profit organization founded by Ken Mehlman in 2012, promotes research advocating gay and lesbian issues and how these issues embody conservative principles (Bolcer 2012; Jacobs 2011; Project Right Side 2016). The organization provides a large amount of public opinion data on LGBT rights and has both praised and targeted Republican

politicians for their stances on LGBT issues. It has also served as a vehicle for promoting Mehlman's own advocacy work, most notably the amicus brief signed by more than 100 Republicans that Mehlman filed with the U.S. Supreme Court against Proposition 8 (Stolberg 2013, Johnson 2013).

Also founded in 2012, American Unity PAC is a Super PAC started and chiefly funded by hedge fund billionaire Paul E. Singer – inspired by Singer's own son, Andrew, who is gay (American Unity PAC). The Super PAC is classified as a Republican/conservative group that focuses “exclusively on protecting and promoting candidates for U.S. House and U.S. Senate who support freedom for all Americans, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity” (American Unity PAC; Center for Responsive Politics 2016). The organization's financial assistance to LGBT-friendly candidates is meant to help these candidates combat any well-funded groups who attack them on their stances on LGBT issues. The group mainly runs political advertisements in various states to support chosen candidates, as well as encourages its network of donors to protect LGBT-friendly Republican seats that are at risk (Schouten 2014). American Unity PAC also has a sister organization, founded in 2013, called the American Unity Fund – a 501(c)(4) non-profit that promotes same-sex marriage and other LGBT issues within the Republican Party (American Unity Fund). American Unity Fund has predominantly lobbied state legislatures on same-sex marriage legislation. Now with Margaret Hoover at its helm, the group most recently recruited delegates for the 2016 Republican National Convention and took the same-sex marriage fight to the floor to remove language pertaining to its opposition in the party platform. Unfortunately, it did not succeed: the 2016 Republican platform was deemed the most anti-LGBT platform

ever in GOP history. Despite platform failures, American Unity Fund still made headlines during the 2016 Republican National Convention with its “Big Tent Brunch” featuring Caitlyn Jenner, co-sponsored by the Log Cabin Republicans.

Freedom to Marry was founded a decade earlier than both PRS and American Unity, but its connection to influencing Republicans and conservatives is more recent (Freedom to Marry 2016). Freedom to Marry actually officially shut its doors soon after same-sex marriage effectively became legal nationwide after *Obergefell*, but prior to the 2015 Supreme Court ruling, it was a national, bipartisan organization that placed a major focus on recruiting conservatives – especially young conservatives – in support of same-sex marriage through Republican-focused campaigns and Republican elite endorsements. Freedom to Marry actively employed Republicans on its team and frames its very name in the context of the cherished Republican value of freedom.<sup>19</sup> It also launched the Young Conservatives for the Freedom to Marry campaign, which included young conservative notables like S.E. Cupp, Meghan McCain, and Margaret Hoover. With Freedom to Marry officially closed, the American Unity Fund has now picked up this particular campaign as it continues to try and “reform the platform” – an endeavor started by the Young Conservatives campaign in 2014 to replace current marriage language with something less restrictive and more accepting.

Finally, perhaps the two most recognized Republican pro-gay rights organizations are the Log Cabin Republicans and the (now defunct) GOProud (Log Cabin Republicans

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<sup>19</sup> Likewise, the Respect for Marriage Coalition is not affiliated with any particular party, yet features prominent conservative voices who advocate for the issue and made headlines last year for utilizing public comments from top Republicans expressing their support for same-sex marriage in a television advertisement that aired around the same time as Mehlman’s amicus brief (Liptak 2013). The Respect for Marriage Coalition is a partnership of more than 100 civil rights, faith, health, labor, business, legal, LGBT, student, and women’s organizations, co-chaired by Freedom to Marry and the Human Rights Campaign.

2016). Log Cabin is the oldest of its kind and served as the catalyst for forming GOProud in 2009 (LaSalvia 2015). While the other aforementioned groups have predominantly worked with elites, these two groups have arguably done some of the most public (and publicized) grassroots-level work on LGBT issues within the Republican Party. Given their interconnectedness and – at times – friction, the groups’ involved histories, public activism and presence, and wealth of publicly available materials make them ideal candidates for more in-depth study (Shapiro 2012).

The two groups also provide an interesting contrast to one another, one that is perhaps telling as to why Log Cabin has survived and GOProud has not despite similar missions, as well as the future direction and success of such groups within the GOP. What follows is a brief history of both organizations and an interview with each of their senior members in order to learn more about the motives, goals, and strategies of pro-LGBT Republican organizations. Log Cabin and GOProud each provide unique, fascinating studies, but they share – along with the other aforementioned groups – a common objective exclusive to their type of advocacy: to turn opinions on LGBT issues around specifically within the Republican Party by using the very same values and principles that the party already holds dear.

Historical overviews of each organization were pieced together from the groups’ websites, other published materials, any press articles, and the interviews I conducted that are discussed later in this chapter. Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured format in which I prompted the interview subject with pre-written questions from a script but also allowed for the subject to elaborate where desired and to guide content. Using the same format and prompts in each interview enabled me to both gain an “inside look”

and test my preliminary hypothesis regarding atypical advocates' distinct rhetorical strategies. Each interview was conducted by telephone, lasting approximately one hour. (See Appendix A for full set of interview questions.)

## **The Best of Times: The Log Cabin Republicans**

### *A Brief History*

The Log Cabin Republicans, the first and oldest of its kind, has been advocating for gay rights within the Republican Party long before any of the individual advocates mentioned above (Log Cabin 2016). The Log Cabin Republicans named themselves as such to pay tribute to the Republican Party's founder and first president, Abraham Lincoln – who himself was born in a log cabin.<sup>20</sup> The group hoped to embody in their name the historical roots of the party, its role in emancipation and civil rights under Lincoln, and the party's founding principles of liberty and equality. The organization spread nationally, now boasting 48 chapters in 25 states, as well as the District of Columbia. It claims to have tens of thousands of members across all 50 states, but the extent of member participation is unknown. Membership appears to center around monetary donations, seemingly relying more on “armchair activism” than regularly publicized member activities beyond its annual fundraising dinner. In addition to gay and lesbian conservatives and their conservative allies, the organization now includes individuals belonging to the rest of the LGBT acronym, as it advocates for those who are bisexual and transgender as well – a sign, according to one member, of how far the group has come in the fight for inclusivity and truly “expanding the tent” for all. Log Cabin's

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<sup>20</sup> Their first choice, “the Lincoln Club,” had already been taken (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

praise of and affiliation with Caitlyn Jenner is a prime example of the group's expansion beyond just the "L" and "G" of LGBT rights.

In general, Log Cabin now tackles a number of issues nearly 40 years after its founding, including marriage, anti-bullying issues and employment discrimination toward the LGBT community. The group continues to lobby for LGBT-related issues to Republicans and – perhaps most importantly – *as* Republicans. They point to such successes as far back as defeating the Briggs Initiative<sup>21</sup> to more recent accomplishments like "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT)<sup>22</sup> and securing Republican votes for the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)<sup>23</sup> as evidence of the progress they are making within the party. Yet as much as it brands itself a strong advocate for LGBT issues, Log Cabin is just as or perhaps even more passionate about the "bread and butter" issues of the Republican Party – like lower taxes and spending, choice in health care, defense, Second Amendment rights, and opposition to the Iran Deal, offering a unique perspective within the party as to why members of the LGBT community should take more conservative stances and side with the GOP on these issues (Log Cabin Republicans 2016; Log Cabin Republicans Senior Member 2016).

The organization's main activities include continual lobbying both at the state and federal level, party candidate endorsements, and social events, such as their annual Spirit

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<sup>21</sup> Also known as California Proposition 6, the Briggs Initiative was introduced by California State Senator John Briggs to be put on the November ballot in 1978. The initiative would have prohibited gay and lesbian individuals from teaching in schools and would have fired any teachers who supported homosexuality. Harvey Milk, an openly gay politician in San Francisco, is cited as one of the leaders in getting the Briggs Initiative defeated at the ballot box (Lichtenstein 1978; Harvey Milk Foundation).

<sup>22</sup> Signed into law by President Clinton in 1993, DADT banned gay and lesbian individuals from openly serving in the military. President Obama signed legislation repealing DADT in 2010, though the repeal did not immediately go into effect given built-in stipulations that evidence was needed that the repeal would not harm the military before proceeding (Stolberg 2010).

<sup>23</sup> ENDA is a piece of congressional legislation that prohibits discrimination in the workplace based on gender or sexual orientation identity. The 2013 version passed the Senate but has yet to pass in the House (O'Keefe 2013).



of Lincoln Dinner that brings together LGBT conservatives and their allies within the Republican Party (Log Cabin Republicans Senior Member 2016). Log Cabin defines itself first and foremost as a grassroots organization, driven largely by passionate volunteers and donors across the country. While they certainly lobby and interact with elites, the organization is not solely focused on changing elite opinion but rather influencing elite opinion from the bottom up (Log Cabin Republicans Senior Member 2016).

The Log Cabin Republicans originated in California in 1977 when a number of gay Republicans banded together to defeat the Briggs Initiative.<sup>24</sup> The referendum looked like it would pass, until Ronald Reagan – at that time, a former governor of California on the verge of mounting his 1980 campaign for president of the United States – came out against it (Log Cabin Republicans 2016; Mason 2014). At least that is how Log Cabin tells it. In truth, Reagan appears to have been one of many who fought against the Briggs Initiative, most instrumental among them being openly gay San Francisco politician Harvey Milk. Reagan did write a searing editorial in the *Los Angeles Herald Examiner* speaking out against the referendum, and his opposition is still noted to this day. Voters ended up rejecting the Briggs initiative by more than one million votes, and the first chapter of the Log Cabin Republicans was officially formed in California (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

In the decades after the Briggs Initiative defeat, the Log Cabin Republicans dealt with a number of challenges to their cause throughout five Republican administrations. Gay Republicans worked “behind the scenes in Washington” during the Reagan years, as

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<sup>24</sup> In my in-depth interview with a senior member of the Log Cabin Republicans, the member describes the issue as akin to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” against which the Log Cabin Republicans also fought within the last decade (Log Cabin Republicans Senior Member 2016).

Log Cabin puts it, and some in quite powerful positions, but Reagan's overall record on LGBT rights remains debatable. Despite his op-ed against the Briggs Initiative a few years prior and his close family friendships with gay individuals influenced by his days in Hollywood, Reagan's presidency is indelibly linked to a much criticized and delayed response to the AIDS crisis and a catering to the religious right (Kaiser 2016).

Log Cabin describes the 1990s as a mixture of setbacks and triumphs within the Republican Party, citing Pat Buchanan's "culture war" speech at the 1992 Republican Convention as the start of the culture wars and the catalyst for George H.W. Bush's reelection defeat (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). Yet the organization claims that Buchanan also reinvigorated their mission; during this time, they established their national office in D.C. During the Clinton years, Log Cabin actively began to educate fellow partisans on the issues affecting the gay and lesbian community, receiving a string of endorsements from (predominantly Northeastern) governors and mayors. Progress for the group during this decade did not extend to the 1996 presidential election, during which Republican presidential nominee Bob Dole initially rejected a \$500 donation on behalf of Log Cabin (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

Then came George W. Bush. Log Cabin describes Bush's campaign as promising to gay Republicans at first: he avoided anti-gay rhetoric, met with gay conservatives, and had many gay individuals in prominent positions throughout the administration – including Ken Mehlman, though he had not come out yet at the time. Bush also promoted tolerance and acceptance through policy, continuing an executive order of the Clinton administration that prevented discrimination against gay and lesbian federal

workers, providing benefits to gay and lesbian individuals whose partners perished on September 11<sup>th</sup>, and budgeted an unprecedented amount to address AIDS globally.

But the 2004 presidential election changed all of that. On the heels of the U.S. Supreme Court striking down anti-sodomy laws and a Massachusetts ruling in favor of same-sex marriage, a large backlash from social conservatives began around 2003. After a string of “controversial [anti-gay] nominations to the federal bench, Bush formally declared his support for the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) in 2004 (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). Log Cabin saw this as a direct assault on Republican values and principles and thus embarked upon a campaign that included polling, print media, lobbying efforts, grassroots mobilization, and the group’s first ever television ad to combat the proposed marriage amendment. The amendment eventually lost in both the U.S. House and Senate.

In the election cycles that followed, Log Cabin supported John McCain in 2008 – McCain not only voted down but also spoke out against the FMA a few years earlier – and Mitt Romney in 2012 (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). The latter endorsement came in spite of Romney’s support of a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage and his opposition to both repealing DADT and to the Employment Non-Discrimination Act. Log Cabin instead valued Romney’s stances on economic issues over the differences they had with the nominee (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

In 2010, Log Cabin led a vigorous campaign against DADT, acting as a driving force in getting it repealed by lobbying Congress, conferring with the Department of Defense, and filing a lawsuit in federal court (O’Keefe 2010; Schwartz 2010). In the case of *Log Cabin Republicans v. United States of America*, DADT was initially ruled to be in

violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, but the Department of Justice requested a stay of the injunction, as the Obama administration preferred an end to the policy through legislative channels instead. Eventually, Congress repealed DADT in 2011. The process specified by the repeal act centered around a report that needed to be issued by the Pentagon and for the repeal to be approved by President Barack Obama, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time before proceeding with lifting the ban. DADT ended on September 20, 2011 (Bumiller 2011; Log Cabin Republicans 2016). Log Cabin cites their own lobbying efforts in getting 23 Republicans to vote for the repeal and sees their initial lawsuit as critical to urging a lame duck Congress to pursue legislative action (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

The Log Cabin Republicans have waged a balanced and cautious battle throughout the years when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage. As shown through content analysis in Chapter 4, Log Cabin has generally appeared on the surface as more reactive than proactive on this issue, applauding *United States v. Windsor* in 2013 and *Obergefell v. Hodges* in 2015 but launching little in the way of any public campaigns, as they did with DADT (Log Cabin Republicans 2016; Log Cabin Republicans 2016). Only with *Obergefell* did the organization tout an amicus brief submitted by their non-partisan sister think tank, the Liberty Education Forum, which was formally supported by numerous leaders in the Log Cabin community (Brief for the Liberty Education Forum as Amicus Curiae). The amicus brief had an impact: Reagan appointee Justice Anthony Kennedy cited it in the majority opinion (*Obergefell v. Hodges*).

Most recently, the organization has taken an active and visible role during 2016. Despite opposition to their presence in previous years, Log Cabin was accepted as a

sponsor at the 2016 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC); this was the first time Log Cabin was an official CPAC sponsor in ten years, though there is some speculation that this was the first time ever for the organization (Johnson 2016).<sup>25</sup> Beyond CPAC, the organization has actively shown loyalty to the Republican Party and conservative brand by publicly fighting against Democratic issue positions and the Democrats, in general. They have also embraced their newest – and perhaps highest profile – member, Caitlyn Jenner, with open arms and abundant praise within the last year (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). Log Cabin has figuratively and literally made Jenner their “poster woman,” banking on her publicized transition, decades of fame, and her allegiance to the Republican Party as a way to expand conversation about LGBT rights – especially beyond the “L” and “G” – and further promote the logic behind their cause (Ring 2015).

Log Cabin also maintained an active and vocal presence throughout the 2016 presidential primary season. Though the group made no official candidate endorsement during this time, it made its feelings on several of the candidates known, whether directly or indirectly, through a mix of both positive and negative public statements (Johnson 2015).<sup>26</sup> Its most complicated relationship, as documented through press releases and in the media, has been with presumptive nominee Donald Trump. Log Cabin’s approach to Trump throughout 2016 has at times been one of cautious optimism and, at others,

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<sup>25</sup> Log Cabin had previously tried to become a sponsor in 2015 but was refused by the American Conservative Union (ACU), prompting a large media backlash and a no-holds-barred statement from Log Cabin National Executive Director Gregory T. Angelo that “LCR is actively being prohibited from sponsoring CPAC” because “the organizers of CPAC do not feel gay people can be conservative [...]”. The ACU eventually gave Angelo a last minute speaking spot in 2015 to quell the controversy, and Log Cabin was allowed to become a the following year – without any accompanied criticism or controversy (Johnson 2016; Log Cabin 2016).

<sup>26</sup> When Bobby Jindal dropped out, Angelo’s entire statement was simply, “Good.”

outright disapproval, with a general air of ambiguity filling the moments in between (Johnson 2016; Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

Initially, Trump appeared to be a glimmer of hope for the organization, with Log Cabin president Gregory T. Angelo calling him “one of the best, if not the best, pro-gay Republican candidates to ever run for the presidency” (Allen 2016). Angelo told the press:

Putting everything else aside – and with Donald Trump that can be a herculean, if not impossible task – there is no other Republican presidential candidate in history who in total has attended a same-sex wedding, supported amending the Civil Rights Act to include sexual orientation non-discrimination, given tens of thousands of dollars to LGBT charities, including nonprofits caring for gay men with HIV/AIDS, and formally recognized that transgender discrimination exists. In fact, I don’t believe a GOP presidential candidate has ever used the word ‘transgender,’ which would be another historic first. (Flanagan 2016)

But Trump continually sent mixed signals on LGBT rights throughout the primary season. Log Cabin wrote a letter to Trump requesting a meeting in November 2015 that went unanswered by Trump’s staff (Moody and Rosen 2016). Trump claimed to accept the Supreme Court’s ruling on marriage, calling it a “dead” issue despite his personal disagreement, only to soon after accept an endorsement from evangelical leader and Liberty University president Jerry Falwell, Jr., and assure crowds in Iowa that he would put “certain judges on the bench” to reverse the very same marriage ruling that he had previously said he supported (Browning 2015; Costa and Johnson 2016; Broverman 2016).<sup>27</sup>

But in yet other surprising twists, Trump sided with the LGBT community when a transgender bathroom law passed in North Carolina and similar bills surfaced in other

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<sup>27</sup> Trump did a similar flip in statements on Kim Davis, the Kentucky clerk that would not provide marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 2015, claiming at the Values Voter Summit that he had always sided with her – the complete opposite of a statement he made on the subject a few weeks earlier (Signorile 2015).

state legislatures, stating that “people should use whatever bathroom they feel is appropriate.” When pressed by Matt Lauer on NBC’s “Today” show if Caitlyn Jenner could use any bathroom she chooses, Trump agreed that he would be fine with it, prompting Jenner to video herself heading into Trump Tower for the restroom and thanking Trump for his support (Zaru 2016). Trump has also frequently parted ways with the Republican Party platform regarding LGBT rights when he has felt like it, such as in his speeches on the Orlando Pulse nightclub shooting massacre. Trump was one of the very few Republicans – if not the only one to do so expressly – who highlighted the fact that the tragedy was an act against the LGBT community (Lang 2016).<sup>28</sup> In his speech about it, he stated:

Our nation stands together in solidarity with the members of Orlando's LGBT community. They have been through something that nobody could ever experience. A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub, not only because he wanted to kill Americans, but because he wanted to execute gay and lesbian citizens because of their sexual orientation. It's a strike at the heart and soul of who we are as nation. It's an assault on the ability of free people to live their lives, love who they want and express their identity. (Beckwith 2016)

At the same time, Trump continued to express his desire to ban all Muslims from entering the United States in statements about the Orlando terror attack – which Log Cabin condemned, despite the group’s citing of radical Islamic terrorism as the reason for the massacre. “It is definitely wrong to conflate all Muslims with the actions of this individual,” President Gregory T. Angelo stated in reference to Orlando shooter Omar Mateen, upholding Log Cabin’s initial criticism of Trump’s Muslim ban from months earlier (Epstein 2016). Just a few weeks after the shooting, despite seemingly standing in solidarity with the LGBT community in the wake of the tragedy, Trump’s campaign

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<sup>28</sup> The Republican National Committee in fact cut out language that recognized the LGBT community in the final version of their official statement on the Orlando shooting (Lang 2016).

ramped up efforts to unite social conservatives in the Republican base, meeting with 400 evangelical leaders to discuss family values (Dias 2016).

Log Cabin's responses to the Republican nominee have paralleled these ups and downs. After its cautiously optimistic tone regarding the possibility of a Trump presidency early on in the primary season, the group called Trump out months later to clarify exactly where he stood on same-sex marriage, publishing a critical press release accompanied by a video that compiled various instances of Trump's flip-flopping on the issue (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). Log Cabin then remained eerily quiet when Trump exceeded the delegate count needed to clinch the Republican nomination in May.<sup>29</sup> At the time of this writing, Log Cabin had not yet made a decision on whether they would endorse Trump at all and was surveying its membership on whether or not the group should (Log Cabin 2016).<sup>30</sup> The last time they did not endorse a Republican presidential nominee was in 2004 for President George W. Bush's reelection due to Bush's proposal to constitutionally ban same-sex marriage (Johnson 2016).

But even in spite of any hesitation about the current state of the Republican Party, the Log Cabin Republicans remained loyal to the latter half of their namesake throughout the primaries. While individual instances of gay Republican individuals abandoning the party or siding with Hillary Clinton surfaced in the news this election season, Log Cabin doubled down against the Democratic frontrunner, releasing a scathing video in time for the Iowa Caucus that depicted Clinton's evolution on same-sex marriage and LGBT rights as politically convenient and too little, too late (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

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<sup>29</sup> Instead, Log Cabin's last published release of the official primary season was a rather somber statement on John Kasich's suspension of his campaign – a candidate they considered LGBT-friendly (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

<sup>30</sup> The membership survey also doubled as a fundraising ploy, stressing that only dues-paying members could take the survey and "have [their] say."



Members of the organization have continued to speak out against Clinton's record on issues both directly and indirectly related to LGBT rights, proclaiming Trump – despite his many missteps – as the true LGBT advocate (Moody and Rosen 2016).

### *A Member's Inside Look*

Public records and news articles tell us only so much about an organization's motives, strategies, and goals. In-depth elite interviews can provide further insight and a view from the inside about why and how an organization does what it does (Leech 2002). I interviewed a senior member of the Log Cabin Republicans to learn more about the organization – including its history, purpose, objectives, routines, and tactics - and his experiences. The interview was on background, so I will proceed with referring to the subject as a “senior member” of the organization and will not use direct quotations. The interview took place over the telephone on June 7, 2016, at the end of the presidential primary season; Donald Trump was already expected to be the Republican nominee for several weeks by this point.

The interview provided an inside look into Log Cabin, but it also doubled as a sort of advertisement or pitch for the group, its causes, and successes. Especially in the midst of the 2016 election cycle, the senior member was continually on message and cautious to ever go too far in condemning the party of which Log Cabin so desperately wants to be part. But any polish or gloss on the story of Log Cabin did not hinder the quality and kind of information obtained from the interview. Even without much detail divulged about any of Log Cabin's weaknesses and failures, the interview itself acted as an ideal

venue for assessing the way in which these advocates frame LGBT issues in relation to conservatism and the Republican Party.

The senior Log Cabin member said that the juxtaposition between his partisanship and advocacy work on LGBT issues is something he is asked often about, but he sees no disparity between the two (Log Cabin Republicans Senior Member 2016). He saw no conflict between being an out, gay man and identifying as a registered Republican and ideological conservative, arguing that his support for same-sex marriage is precisely in line with values that the party espouses, such as commonsense conservatism, strength in the family unit, and the GOP's big tent philosophy. A particular issue or identity – whether sexual or political orientation – does not define me at all times, whether inside or outside of the voting booth, he explained. Nor does his support for LGBT issues preclude him from taking more conservative issues on non-LGBT matters, vehemently siding with the GOP on lower taxes, healthcare, and the Iran Deal.

Exactly who LOG CABIN is trying to target with its advocacy work is also an important question. The senior member initially responded that the organization is all-inclusive and not necessarily based on party lines – though the majority of positions Log Cabin advocates for are typically ideologically center right. Upon further investigation, and with further pressing in the interview, it became clear that the group – as advertised on their website – is meant predominantly, if not wholly, for LGBT Republicans and conservatives and their allies. Thus, LOG CABIN's primary goal in terms of audience is twofold. It strives to reach LGBT and allied individuals who already identify as Republican to let them know that there is a group within the GOP supporting LGBT matters. At the same time, it also tries to convince other Republicans that these LGBT

conservatives and their allies abide by the same principles, care about the same core issues, and take most of the same issue positions as the rest of the GOP. As the member stated, Log Cabin strives to break the stereotype of what it means to be a Republican – not only in terms of sexual orientation but also gender identity, income, faith, race, and ethnicity.

He moreover emphasized that their advocacy does not necessarily shut out Democrats and members of the LGBT community not already in the Republican Party: LOG CABIN likes to make the case that if members of the LGBT community put all of their faith into a single party without hearing out the other side, then they are destined to be taken advantage of by that party and completely ignored by the other. The group has no enemies, the senior member stressed – just potential future allies. In reality, however, the enemy is apparent: Democrats. Log Cabin does not actively recruit Democratic allies or lobby Democratic legislators; on the contrary, Log Cabin – as a way of proving its mission is a model of ideal Republican behavior – frequently admonishes Democrats on those issues most important to the GOP, as well as on LGBT issues specifically whenever it is able.

When it comes to recruiting Republicans and conservatives not yet supportive of LGBT issues, the senior member explained that the key to Log Cabin's advocacy strategy is to first relate to those Republicans on the things they have in common and then use that as a jumping off point as to why they should come around on the LGBT issues with which they originally disagreed. A typical pitch to a fellow partisan not yet supportive of LGBT rights, he explains, can start with pointing out how Log Cabin supports about 95 percent of what the GOP supports, listing all the conservative issue positions the group

takes, and then tying those same principles as to why strong conservatives and Republicans should support same-sex marriage. The goal, he said, is to change hearts and minds but to do it in a way that is respectful and starts from a common ground. He provided the example of explaining Log Cabin's cause to conservative commentator Larry Kudlow. Kudlow was so influenced by the message that he became an advocate for Log Cabin's inclusion in the GOP's big tent and spoke out against sex-based discrimination (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

It is not only a matter of who Log Cabin targets but also how they target them. Log Cabin displays a unique rhetorical strategy in its published materials, using buzzwords like "freedom," "limited government," and other Republican and conservative values to appeal to their particular audience (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). The usage of this language embodies the organization's "we are one of you" type of strategy, assuring fellow Republicans – whether current or future ally – that they espouse Republican and conservative principles and that those same principles are completely in line with LGBT rights like marriage. These types of words were certainly in the senior member's vocabulary during our discussion: he connected support for LGBT rights with the GOP's "big tent"<sup>31</sup> philosophy, commonsense conservatism, and the "golden rule." The member singled out the last one, the "golden rule," as a frame they have used to talk about non-discrimination because of its particular and distinct appeal – due to its religious undertones – with Republicans as opposed to Democrats. Yet this particular value is not present in any of their press releases. The history of using the "golden rule" has

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<sup>31</sup> The application of "big tent" to the Republican Party is most famously associated with Lee Atwater's usage of it (Brady 1997). The phrase was referenced in coverage of the 2013 Growth & Opportunity Project report, but it was not used once in the report's actual text (Curtis 2013; Linkins and Wing 2013; Pathe 2013; Curtis 2015).

moreover crossed party lines in recent years. Originally used by Ken Mehlman in his quest to legalize same-sex marriage, President Obama – in consultation with Mehlman – coopted the value in 2012 when he announced his evolution on the issue and came out in support of it; Obama has continued to apply the value to other LGBT issues, like transgender rights (Becker 2014; Gibson 2012; Brydum 2016).

As for other key words and frames, the senior Log Cabin member also stressed the importance of freedom, expressing that it was a great word to use. The member stated that the gay right has been much more likely to emphasize this particular value when it comes to LGBT issues than the gay left. He described freedom as the value at the heart of issues like same-sex marriage, non-discrimination in the workplace, and anti-bullying. As will be made apparent in Chapter 4, Log Cabin's published materials echo this sentiment. Yet, he was also adamant about maintaining a balance between these freedoms and religious freedom – something, according to the member, that has been portrayed as just the opposite of LGBT-friendly and as anti-gay by the left.

The member pointed to a bill in the Utah state Legislature in 2015 that brought together a Republican governor and supermajority in the legislature with leaders of the LGBT community, including Log Cabin. Both sides worked together to achieve legislation, which was eventually signed into law, that paired LGBT nondiscrimination policies with what the senior member deemed as reasonable exclusions for religious entities and their affiliates (Dobner 2015; Log Cabin Republicans 2016). The senior member took pride in this collaboration and, in general, Log Cabin President Gregory T. Angelo has expressed the organization's support for "reasonable religious accommodations in non-discrimination laws" (Delvecchio 2015). This stance puts Log

Cabin at odds with most other LGBT advocates. Yet Log Cabin continues to walk a fine line on the issue, like it does with most LGBT matters. Log Cabin voiced their opposition to advancement of the First Amendment Defense Act by Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah) in July 2016, stating that the bill did not seek any compromise between “religious liberty and equality for LGBT Americans” and that it would instead only bring “needless litigation and unintended consequences” (Johnson 2016).<sup>32</sup>

During our interview, the senior member surprisingly pointed to one other value as vital to the Republican Party and to Log Cabin’s cause that seemingly did not fit the general rhetorical pattern – equality. As discussed in Chapter 2, equality has been a value typically associated with the Democratic Party; prior research (Koning and Redlawsk 2013) moreover has found this value to not be effective among Republicans in encouraging greater support for marriage. Yet the senior Log Cabin member mentioned equality early and often throughout our discussion, branding the marriage issue as “marriage equality” a number of times. This was not by mistake. When I asked about this, the member argued that equality for all was first and foremost a Republican value and a founding principle of the GOP, harkening back to Abraham Lincoln and emancipation. Everyone thinks that the Democrats lead on equality, but they really don’t, the member argued. As will be seen in Chapter 4, Log Cabin regularly references equality in its publications. Given previous studies that assess the non-effects of “equality” on Republican attitudes toward same-sex marriage, Log Cabin’s tactic of referencing equality is questionable.

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<sup>32</sup> In true LOG CABIN fashion, however, the organization sent a letter separate from the other 70 coalitions that contacted Chaffetz over the bill. Angelo argued that the organization had its own reasons to oppose the bill and wanted to show that opposition was not only coming from the left but also from organizations such as his on the right.

In our interview, the senior member also made a point to differentiate this recruitment and messaging approach of what he calls the “gay right” from that of the “gay left.” The gay right, the member explained, has always been a movement about assimilation: LGBT individuals are no worse or no better than their homosexual counterparts – they simply want the same rights and responsibilities. The senior member described the gay left as built on the opposite philosophy, something that has actually been a point of contention between LOG CABIN and organizations like the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) throughout their respective histories. Instead of assimilation, the member described the gay left as fighting for the celebration of uniqueness and sexual liberation. The member in fact referenced marriage as a flashpoint for the two movements. The last thing the gay left wanted was marriage equality, the member argued, citing marriage as the very type of institution that the gay left set out to destroy. The member described marriage as something Log Cabin always espoused because it completely fit with conservative philosophy and principles – the right to live in dignity, have a committed monogamous relationship, strengthen the family unit, and tax benefits.

I asked the member about how he viewed Log Cabin’s relationship with the majority of the Republican Party – what I phrased as the “mainstream.” He said that the relationship depends on how you defined “mainstream,” explaining that those within the party who Log Cabin interacts with are very accepting of LGBT rights but that Log Cabin will never be able to win over social conservatives, who the member deemed as at the fringe yet powerful. But the member pointed to CPAC 2016 as a sign of progress, calling the response to their first official time as a co-sponsor overwhelmingly positive – especially from straight allies and millennials, who see no disconnect between LGBT

rights and conservatism; the member claims that many attendees even thanked them for being there. The senior member moreover did not feel Log Cabin was alone in its mission, claiming that there are many affinity organizations within the Republican Party fighting in valuable ways based on what the intersection of their identity and partisanship means to them, such as Black Republicans, women Republicans, Muslim Republicans, and Jewish Republicans. Yet the member did not specify any of these organizations by name.

As for the 2016 presidential election, the member did not necessarily hold anything back about his party's (at the time) presumptive nominee, Donald Trump, but at the same time he was diplomatic and cautious – as has been the strategy of Log Cabin as a whole throughout the election cycle. He reiterated what Log Cabin had already said publicly about Trump, calling him the quantifiably most pro-gay Republican candidate the party has ever had ... as long as you put his stances on everything else aside. He elaborated that Trump is a complex figure, and his seeming support of LGBT rights alone does not necessarily make him a worthy candidate. The senior member pointed to Trump's remarks toward Muslims, saying that Log Cabin fights for equality for all Americans – not just the LGBT community – and thus such comments are unacceptable. If people are prioritizing LGBT issues, they may vote for Trump, the member said, but if they are prioritizing other issues they may not. At the time of this interview, the member was not sure whether or not Log Cabin would even make an official endorsement.

In terms of the 2016 party platform, the member hoped that certain language specifying marriage as a union between a man and a woman would be removed; as he said, less is more in this case. While some Log Cabin members and straight allies were



delegates and would certainly be fighting against any anti-LGBT language in the platform, the member did express concern for the number of delegates recruited by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX). These Cruz delegates espouse anti-LGBT views and, according to the member, were already organizing to add mentions regarding transgender bathroom usage to the platform. Sure enough, the senior member was right – the 2016 platform was the most anti-LGBT platform ever (Johnson 2016; Bendery 2016). Log Cabin President Gregory T. Angelo called the platform “the most anti-LGBT platform in the Party’s 162-year history” (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). Yet despite obstacles within the GOP, the member nevertheless saw hope, again pointing to the generational divide within the party as a possible key to resolving differences on LGBT issues and rejecting anti-LGBT language in future platforms. If a change does not happen this election cycle, he predicted the platform would evolve in coming elections in large part due to the party’s millennial members, who he described as sick and tired of the GOP’s obsession with social issues.

In total, the interview, much like Log Cabin’s public presence, epitomized the organization’s distinctive mission, strategy, and practices: a careful balance between Republican loyalty and support for pro-LGBT positions, a never-ending delicate dance of assimilation yet simultaneously urging for gradual change. The senior member’s message was always on point, always polished, and always hopeful of present and future relations between Log Cabin and the GOP. This balance is accompanied by a clear condemnation for Democrats and the left – including Log Cabin’s own counterparts across the aisle that advocate for the same LGBT-related issues they do. The Democrats are, first and foremost, the enemy, and in the eyes of Log Cabin, the left is not the

stalwart advocate of LGBT rights that everyone believes. Yes, the Democrats are in a good place on LGBT rights right now, but they only recognized marriage equality in their party platform in 2012, the senior member explained; he cautioned, let's not pretend that the Democratic Party has always been the champion for the LGBT community. The member pointed to both Obama and Clinton's evolution on same-sex marriage occurring only within the last few years, contrasting it with former Cheney's public support more than a decade earlier. In fact, the member viewed much of the support on the Democratic side with skepticism, dismissing it as politically convenient and accompanied by much less risk than what any Republicans – like Portman – have faced when embracing the issue. If one's opinion is driven exclusively by public opinion polling and as political tactic to demonize the other side instead of by deep personal conviction, it's very easy for opinion to change back, the member asserted. The member painted this type of support as untrustworthy, preferring support on LGBT issues from those who have deeply thought about and struggled with the issues and have truly evolved on them; these kinds of supporters, he said, are trustworthy and strong in their convictions – and these are the kinds Log Cabin hopes to continue to foster and maintain.

The senior member sounded hopeful about Log Cabin's future and the future of LGBT rights, in general. Whether through messaging, lobbying, electoral ramifications, or simply generational replacement, the member saw a path for further progress within the Republican Party, and Log Cabin's philosophy is that this path is through balance – not increasing polarization. We have an opportunity right now to light a torch that takes us out of the cave of the culture wars, the member said. Despite little substantive progress since the Growth & Opportunity Project, and perhaps even further regression for

the party during the 2016 election cycle, Log Cabin nevertheless believes a torch can still be lit, and they are trying to strike the match to do so – ever so carefully.

## **The Worst of Times: GOProud**

### *A Brief History*

An account of the Log Cabin Republicans is not complete without addressing the trajectory of the other prominent Republican gay rights organization born out of it in the last ten years. GOProud was the rebellious counterpart to Log Cabin, arising during a low point for the parent organization and quickly becoming more masterful than Log Cabin at promoting gay politics within the Republican Party – at least, for a time.

Following Barack Obama's historic win in 2008, GOProud founder and former executive director Jimmy LaSalvia recounts a severely weakened Log Cabin – in tremendous debt, losing members, and laying off its entire staff by 2009. With the White House about to change hands, the group was without an executive director; the executive director resigned after the 2008 presidential election, leaving Log Cabin seemingly out of business, as LaSalvia tells it, and deserting gay conservatives without representation in Washington (LaSalvia 2015, 44).

Around this time, LaSalvia, along with political consultant Chris Barron, began to hatch an idea to start a new organization focused on reclaiming a voice for gay conservatives but done in a different way from Log Cabin, learning from Log Cabin's past mistake and done the way that LaSalvia and Barron had always wanted to do

things.<sup>33</sup> The roots of GOProud began to take shape: LaSalvia and Barron released their first public statement praising the election of Michael Steele as RNC chairman and his desire for a more inclusive and diverse GOP, and the two began to amass increased attention from both fellow gay conservatives and the media. LaSalvia and Barron set out to create an organization that set itself apart from what Log Cabin had embodied, mainly in terms of: 1) expanding its policy goals outside of the “traditionally liberal policies” of gay rights, 2) including not only gay conservatives but also straight conservative allies in its target audience, and 3) fundamentally changing the “us versus them” mentality between the conservative and gay rights movements to show that the two were in fact capable. Above all, the founders wanted to be much more than just another “gay marriage group”; instead, they advocated for conservative policies and stances on federal-level issues – whether or not they were part of the LGBT agenda – from the viewpoint of gay conservatives.<sup>34</sup> Choosing federal-level issues was in part due to financial constraints but also a conscious effort to stay away from the issue of marriage and other LGBT matters, except when it came to federal questions brought up by DOMA and DADT. In fact, the issue of marriage itself was not on GOProud’s agenda in the first three years of its existence. It was through this overarching strategy to focus on the *conservative* agenda – a strategy Log Cabin seemed to emulate at times in more recent years – that LaSalvia and Barron hoped to quiet and then completely eradicate opposition to homosexuality within the Republican Party (48).

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<sup>33</sup> Before its purported collapse in late 2008/early 2009, LaSalvia and Barron – both working for Log Cabin Republicans at the time – had each interviewed to take over as executive director. Neither got the job, and according to LaSalvia, Log Cabin instead decided to let go of all full-time staff (LaSalvia 2015, 49).

GOProud officially launched on Tax Day, April 15, 2009, to promote the idea that gay individuals hated taxes just as much as other conservatives. Much like the rising Tea Party movement at the time, GOProud was anti-establishment, anti-spending, and all about reducing the size and power of government.<sup>35</sup> Coincidentally enough, Log Cabin was also planning an event in D.C. around the same time as GOProud's inaugural Tax Day moment. A rivalry between the two groups ensued and persisted throughout GOProud's tenure – a symbol of how different their missions, leadership, and strategies were despite having the similar end goal of greater gay acceptance among Republicans and conservatives.

Whereas Log Cabin was depicted as the gay Republican group of the party's mainstream – the ultimate insiders – GOProud was just the opposite. The group was bold, loud, and flashy, aligning itself with the Tea Party fringe and befriending the likes of Ann Coulter and Andrew Breitbart. It was unlike Log Cabin and certainly unlike any gay rights activists on the left; for example, one of the first things GOProud did to show it was a team player among its fellow conservatives was advocate for a pro-gun amendment to be attached to the 2009 hate crimes bill, support that was highly criticized by the gay left but that LaSalvia credits with the GOP leadership killing an anti-same-sex marriage amendment attached to the same bill.<sup>36</sup>

GOProud was also an attention getter: LaSalvia remembers being stars of the conservative movement during GOProud's heyday, the go-to source on the gay conservative perspective for the media. And there was perhaps no bigger moment in the spotlight for the group than when it first became a cosponsor of CPAC in 2010. LaSalvia

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<sup>35</sup> GOProud considered itself a friend of the Tea Party (LaSalvia 2015, 52).

<sup>36</sup> The amendment failed, but the bill ultimately passed (Shapiro 2012).

saw their ability to cosponsor CPAC as the ultimate achievement, despite the hefty cost and GOProud's dwindling finances: "Nothing else we could have done that year would demonstrate that we were part of the team as effectively as being a cosponsor of CPAC" (53). The group had garnered a lot of press leading up to the conference and became well known amidst the controversy over its attendance, but once at the conference itself, GOProud initially flew under the radar: "[...] the anti-gay right didn't see us as a real threat. They saw us as a small group, with no money and no influence [...] with a sad little booth [and] a few dedicated volunteers" (55). In fact, one speaker's opening remarks even praised the American Conservative Union (ACU) for welcoming GOProud to CPAC. But this seeming peace at the conference suddenly changed when Ryan Sorba, chairman of the California Young Americans for Freedom and author of *The "Born Gay" Hoax*, took to the main stage to criticize the ACU's acceptance of GOProud and the group's presence. Sorba was booed – by a room of conservatives, no less – and ignited a firestorm in GOProud's favor. GOProud immediately began to receive donations online, and reporters flocked to their booth to discuss the events of that day. One particular reporter led GOProud's founders to its first major donor – hedge fund manager Paul Singer.

GOProud's star was rapidly gaining credibility in the conservative movement, following up their CPAC showing with successful fundraising events like "Homocon"<sup>37</sup> – a night featuring Ann Coulter.<sup>38</sup> GOProud also became the first ever gay rights organization to produce a negative campaign ad against Democratic candidates. LaSalvia

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<sup>37</sup> LaSalvia writes in his book that "homocon" was a derogatory nickname that gay liberals called gay conservatives. He and Barron decided to use it for the name of their event as a way to empower and reclaim the word (59).

<sup>38</sup> At the time, Ann Coulter deemed herself the "Judy Garland" of the gay right (LaSalvia 2015).

furthermore claims that GOProud played a role in the repeal of DADT, privately meeting with the White House to strategize how to get more Republican senators on board.

Things began to take a turn for GOProud approaching CPAC 2011. A number of CPAC sponsors began to boycott because of GOProud, including The Heritage Foundation. LaSalvia writes that GOProud had to stay away from CPAC planning meetings and keep a low profile, describing it as “humiliating to agree to be treated differently from all the other sponsors, simply because we were gay” (74). But GOProud played by CPAC’s rules in hopes of reaping long term benefits despite the debacle playing out in the press; instead of going to the media themselves, LaSalvia and Barron beefed up their conservative credentials, met with conservative groups who had concerns about their mission, gave pro-life speeches, and reemphasized that GOProud did not take a stand on marriage beyond that it should be left up to the states. But then the CPAC debacle became a front-page story in the *New York Times* (Eckholm 2011). The two founders were soon all over the press defending the conservative movement and a major storyline of that year’s conference.

GOProud had a bigger presence at CPAC 2011, complete with major investments in both GOProud and the ACU from Singer.<sup>39</sup> Despite its CPAC 2011 successes, however, animosity toward GOProud once again began to surface among CPAC’s anti-gay sponsors – fueled by Barron’s earlier comments to the media that one of the ACU members was a “nasty bigot,” which anti-gay sponsors pointed to as bad behavior and

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<sup>39</sup> GOProud held a “big gay 80s dance party” hosted by its new friend and ally Andrew Breitbart. Breitbart was a major advocate of inclusiveness within the party and the conservative movement, claiming that conservative history was being made that night at the sold-out GOProud-sponsored bash. To top it off, GOProud was responsible for recruiting Donald Trump – then rumored to be contemplating a presidential run – for his first ever political speech on the CPAC main stage on the conference’s last day.

grounds for banning (LaSalvia 2015). GOProud was kicked out of CPAC 2012.<sup>40</sup> The 2012 presidential primary season only made things worse for GOProud. The group was still garnering a lot of press attention, had stabilized its finances, and was still hosting events, but almost all of the GOP candidates were socially conservative, and though GOProud increasingly lent support to the Romney campaign, the campaign kept its distance. GOProud also had a few more verbal slipups throughout the year that got them further into hot water.<sup>41</sup>

While GOProud tried to prove itself as a major supporter of Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election, the campaign continued to ignore the organization. GOProud attended the Republican National Convention that year and held another successful “Homocon”-style event, but their “team player” strategy did not gain them anything with the Romney campaign and Republican National Committee. The organization lost steam: Barron left day to day operations, first only partially to consult for New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson’s 2012 presidential campaign and then permanently after the election; finances were once again running low, as Singer started his own American Unity PAC and took his funding along with it; and the Democratic Party had accepted marriage equality as part of its platform, followed a few months later by President Obama officially coming out in support of same-sex marriage. This last point was especially damaging to GOProud’s message, completely obliterating their major talking point that while Republicans and Democrats differ on gay rights, both sides officially opposed

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<sup>40</sup> LaSalvia and Barron found out GOProud had been kicked out of CPAC that year through a reporter when asked for comment (90).

<sup>41</sup> LaSalvia was overheard calling 2012 presidential candidate and Minnesota Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann’s husband an “ex-gay,” and both he and Barron were accused of outing Rick Perry’s pollster Tony Fabrizio as gay over Fabrizio’s role in making Perry’s homophobic “Strong” ad; Breitbart resigned from the GOProud council after the latter occurred, disapproving of the outing.



same-sex marriage. LaSalvia had a shining moment as a speaker on a panel about inclusiveness and diversity at CPAC 2013, despite GOProud itself officially being banned from sponsoring. Despite the extremely positive reception and press coverage of LaSalvia's speech as part of that panel, however, GOProud's founders – drained from a years-long uphill battle within their own party – saw no path forward due to a GOP they perceived as too reluctant to modernize.

In April 2013, LaSalvia and Barron announced that they were giving up the day-to-day operations of GOProud and soon after ended up leaving the board, as well. GOProud burned bright but fast, its downfall causing just as big of a splash as when it first came on to the scene.<sup>42</sup> While Log Cabin had come back onto the scene by this point, GOProud's dissolution was symbolic of the Republican Party's major cultural problems and continued lack of tolerance and diversity – quite the opposite of its big tent philosophy. In early 2014, LaSalvia left the Republican Party entirely in a very public parting of ways and changed his voter registration to Independent.

### *A Founder's Inside Look*

I interviewed Jimmy LaSalvia to gain more insight into GOProud's time in the spotlight, mainly regarding how the organization employed particular rhetorical strategies to frame their mission and issue stances in order to influence their target audience of fellow Republicans and conservatives. The interview was on the record, so LaSalvia's name is used with permission; LaSalvia permitted the conversation to be audio recorded. The interview took place over the telephone on June 8, 2016.

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<sup>42</sup> GOProud's collapse was documented widely in the press, a public spat broke out between its founders and the new leadership, and the organization was dissolved soon after (Brydum 2014; Mak 2014; Schaeffer 2014).

LaSalvia was one of the most preeminent gay Republicans within the conservative movement until a couple of years ago. This is quite a reversal for him after spending most of his life as a Republican – registering at 18 years old, becoming president of his chapter of the College Republicans, and working on various Republican campaigns. He was a consummate team player, perhaps to a fault as seen by the trajectory of GOProud. Now, LaSalvia is an active advocate who speaks out against the GOP’s resistance to diversity:

[...] There is a large segment of the conservative movement and the Republican Party who are uncomfortable with people who are culturally different from them. And it’s not to say that they don’t like gay people or black people or Hispanic people as long as you conform completely culturally. And it’s that discomfort with cultural diversity that led me to believe that there just is no hope for the Republican Party because our modern America is a very culturally diverse America. We are not the straight, white, Christian, 1950s America anymore. But there are some – and unfortunately, they are powerful and there are more than there should be – Americans in the Republican Party, especially, who reject that cultural diversity and want to remain culturally in the past.

LaSalvia was passionate and candid in our interview, no longer needing to be a salesman for the gay right and instead taking to task the organizations, individuals, and the party he felt had wronged him. It was a complete reversal from the Log Cabin member interview. LaSalvia (and the nonexistent GOProud) had nothing to lose and everything to gain since he was no longer fighting to change hearts and minds within the GOP; in fact, LaSalvia has once again been in the spotlight in the past year but this time as the prominent gay Republican who left a “hopeless” party and now supports Hillary Clinton.

Understanding the relationship between Log Cabin and GOProud is integral to understanding GOProud’s tactics and goals. As LaSalvia explains it, GOProud wanted to pursue a similar mission with their new group but in a different way. Moreover, Log Cabin and GOProud supporters were often the same individuals – Log Cabin members

were just as conservative as GOProud members – but Log Cabin was part of the traditional gay rights coalition, acting more like the unions and pro-choice groups that made up the traditional coalition of the left:

They [Log Cabin] hadn't done enough to show that they weren't *them*. Log Cabin had always only focused on issues that directly affected gay people explicitly, and they did it in a way that the argument was framed by the left. We did it in an argument that was framed from a conservative perspective but we also had a much broader agenda so we could demonstrate our common ground with conservatives.

LaSalvia explained that the two groups also differed in terms of their target audience. For LaSalvia, GOProud was very much more a grassroots operation of the conservative movement, much like the Tea Party; LaSalvia argued that the real energy and passion within the party was at the grassroots level, so it was most important to cater to the grassroots level first – not lobby elected officials as Log Cabin did. “[...] The truth is, no politician changes their mind on a controversial cultural issue if their base isn't there yet,” LaSalvia stated. GOProud's logic was that, by winning over the base first, leaders could eventually come out in support of LGBT rights without fear of political retribution from their electorate. LaSalvia did not take his audience for granted, either:

We understood that audience, and that was our target. And they weren't ready for 'I support gay marriage'; they were back at 'is gay a choice?' [...] I like to say we were teaching remedial reading, trying to catch up people reading at a first grade level with the rest of their classmates who were about to graduate. And the problem is, America graduated before they were ready.

LaSalvia recounted how GOProud was hardcore conservative and anti-establishment, putting its energy into promoting a conservative agenda and how conservative principles benefited gay individuals. LGBT issues were purposely not at the core of the organization's mission:

[...] The goal [was] changing the atmosphere, the culture on the right. Not [...] changing people's policy positions, even though that would result eventually,”

LaSalvia said. “[Our focus] was to show that gay conservatives are engaged and ‘we’re on your side, grassroots conservatives,’ ‘we’re on your team.’ If all we did was talk about something that no one else was involved in, then how could we show that we were on the team?”

This team player spirit was at the heart of their mission. GOProud strived to prove that gay individuals were engaged and on the side of conservatives and Republicans, sometimes to the point where they seemingly tolerated and did not engage with certain individuals or certain things that were said in order to show that they were still a part of the team and extremely conscious of their audience. The group stuck to federal level matters – whatever was the priority on the national stage that day – and passionately advocated for core Republican issues like tax reform, limited government, and foreign policy. GOProud moreover tried to purposely avoid the marriage debate during its first three years in existence, as well as held back on debates over hate crime legislation and federal anti-discrimination.<sup>43</sup> Even as similar campaigns – like Young Conservatives for the Freedom to Marry – launched soon after Obama came out in support of the issue, LaSalvia said that it was still not the time to do so on the right – especially given the 2012 presidential campaign that was currently taking place. Thus, to be a team player as LaSalvia puts it, GOProud continued to not make marriage a priority at the time.

GOProud’s strategy and chosen agenda did not go without criticism. “We had a joke in our office that gay conservatives ‘take it from both ends,’” LaSalvia joked. On the right, GOProud dealt with critics, skeptics, those who tolerated them being gay but did not want them to showcase it, and those who flat out ignored them; on the left,

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<sup>43</sup> LaSalvia said he and GOProud did not outright oppose the hate crimes and anti-discrimination legislation, but from a practical standpoint, he did not believe it to be a priority over DADT and relationship recognition. He especially believed anti-discrimination laws would hinder the marriage fight and that marriage should come first. LaSalvia points to the backlash today over same-sex marriage legalization in regard to certain services claiming religious freedom as to the reason why he thought achieving marriage was so much more important at the time.

GOProud was attacked as a traitor to the LGBT cause, constantly and publicly at war with LGBT advocates across the aisle. “We [...] had to fight the gay left publicly in order to prove to our audience that we were one of them, not part of that coalition of the left,” LaSalvia explained regarding GOProud’s battles with the gay left. GOProud was especially attacked by those on the left for having misplaced issue priorities and for their late defense of the marriage issue. But again, LaSalvia points to an intentional strategy: GOProud first had to act like a team player in order to court an audience on the right that would eventually be amenable to discussing these sorts of issues, and then the group would be able to approach marriage. LaSalvia recalled:

I can remember getting attacked like you wouldn't believe when I was on TV talking about civil marriage for gay couples, and everyone said called me a Johnny-Come-Lately, like I had never been involved in that before. You know? And I was like, well, wait a second. Everybody is talking about it. That is the issue now. It wasn't before. We were doing other things to get ready for this moment. We were developing an audience on the right to get ready for this moment to talk about civil marriage for gay couples. They weren't ready before. And it's because we were talking about other things and showing gay people on their team that now I can talk about gay marriage.

GOProud also used distinct rhetorical devices in order to implement their strategy.

“I know that other organizations have had the resources to do polling and focus groups.

To know what works and what doesn't. We never had that,” La Salvia remembered.

“We were conservatives, and we just knew [the language].” La Salvia pointed directly to the usage of the term “equality” as an example, saying that he and Barron knew using a message of equality would “fall flat” among conservatives: “[...] Conservatism doesn't guarantee equality. It guarantees equal opportunity. Not necessarily an equal outcome. And so we knew in our guts that using words like that wasn't the best way to reach our audience.” Above all, LaSalvia said they wanted to be authentic and use language that

was culturally from the right, like “freedom,” “liberty,” and “limited government. As part of their team player strategy, they did not want to use predictable language that classified them as just another gay group.

Like Log Cabin, GOProud put itself up to a herculean task by trying to prove its own worth within its own party while separating itself from fellow LGBT advocates across the aisle – made even more difficult due to the GOProud’s particular firebrand persona. Even before GOProud’s collapse, LaSalvia saw signs that their efforts would not pay off in the end: there were the seemingly simple things, like when Breitbart told them an invitation to Homocon was “too gay,” or when fellow conservatives continually urged the group to “fit in more” and keep a low profile; there were the times where they swallowed their pride and tolerated comments for the good of the team, like friend Ann Coulter’s anti-gay – and especially anti-marriage – remarks; and then there was the tortuous 2012 primary season followed by the flat-out snub by the Romney campaign, who completely disregarded any attempt GOProud made to support the presidential nominee.

LaSalvia remembers one particularly telling moment in 2013, soon after GOProud began to take a stand on marriage and before LaSalvia and Barron left daily GOProud operations. LaSalvia was about to appear on MSNBC when “all hell had broken loose” – unbeknownst to him, an amicus brief organized by Ken Mehlman with hundreds of Republican signatures had just been submitted to the Court in support of the respondents in *Hollingsworth v. Perry*. La Salvia and GOProud had no idea and were not consulted. For LaSalvia, it was a “very telling moment”: GOProud had been left out of this coordination between the Democrat-affiliated Human Rights Campaign with the

mainstream, establishment wing of the Republican Party – a wing that LaSalvia argued did not control the party anymore. He recalls a conversation he had about it while appearing on Rachel Maddow: “Is there anyone taking this seriously? Because none of these people are conservative,” he remembers her saying. It was yet another sign to LaSalvia that the establishment didn’t “get it” when it came to the trajectory of opinion on marriage within the Republican Party. Despite the amount of press LaSalvia did as the go-to gay conservative following the amicus brief, the instance also served as a painful reminder of how ostracized GOProud was by all other factions both inside and outside of their party.

“Who wants to wake up in the morning and fight every day? Who wants to go to bed every night pissed?” LaSalvia asked, recounting how he felt near the end of GOProud. He was out of heart and energy, mentally and emotionally drained. After leaving GOProud, LaSalvia said it was difficult to find work: on the right, he was “the gay guy,” and on the left, he was “the Tea Party guy.” As a fiscally conservative yet socially modern American,<sup>44</sup> he felt he did not have a home anymore within the Republican Party. When LaSalvia publicly renounced the GOP in 2014, he declared that there was “no hope” – the namesake of his recent book – for his former party. “I think it’s too late for the Republican Party,” he said. “I kept trying as long as I could see the culture was still evolving. But we’re way past the tipping point.” LaSalvia asserts that the GOP has become obsessed with a warped view of American exceptionalism that only values a “straight, white, Christian, red, white, and blue America,” which has fueled the

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<sup>44</sup> LaSalvia’s latest endeavor – aptly titled *Normal Nation* – centers on these culturally modern, fiscal conservatives, who he deems as “normal.”

party's inability to live in the reality of a culturally modern society. And for LaSalvia, culture is what it is all about:

You can't defend the rejection of a multi-cultural America when that's the reality. [...] It doesn't matter how good your tax plan is or your foreign policy is because voters aren't quite sure when you decide to live in reality and when you decide not to [...] if you're not living in reality culturally. A bigot with a good tax plan is still a bigot.

While LaSalvia believes GOProud made some minor breakthroughs within the party in the past few years – for example, he gives GOProud credit for creating the right atmosphere for Rob Portman to come out in support of same-sex marriage without retribution – he is not optimistic for those Republican and conservative LGBT advocates left in the fight. In regard to Log Cabin's continued existence, LaSalvia is skeptical, claiming that the organization is simply smoke and mirrors now, mainly playing out in D.C. and California,<sup>45</sup> and that the establishment wing of the party they are trying to target just does not exist any longer. He likewise has sympathy for any Republican and conservative advocates who are attempting to change the party platform for 2016, believing – at least in this election – the platform is not a fight that LGBT advocates on the right can win. “‘Cultural Neanderthals’ have always prioritized the platform, and they continue to do that this year,” LaSalvia said. “Plus, Donald Trump is trying to convince the Republicans that he's a conservative. So the nominee is not going to push on any of those things.” LaSalvia speculated that removal of the marriage language is a possibility since the fight is over, but with the current debate over religious freedom and

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<sup>45</sup> Log Cabin has publicly disputed these claims, but the information President Gregory T. Angelo has revealed has been vague. As Delvecchio (2015) writes:

Angelo respond[ed] in an email that since he took over in 2013, “our rolls have grown, donations have increased, and our finances are in the best shape they’ve been in nearly a decade.” Contrary information is “pure speculation,” he writes. LOG CABIN membership numbers cannot be verified; Angelo did not respond to a request to describe “a standard by which you determine if someone is a ‘member,’ ” citing only the “well over 40,000 people in our database.”



transgender bathroom usage, he would not be surprised if something new regarding these areas would be included. As it turns out, LaSalvia was right.

LaSalvia predicts the GOP will get “creamed” in November, strongly believing that this election will be about, more than anything else, culture and two contrasting visions of America – “one that includes everybody, and one that doesn't.” LaSalvia, believe it or not, thinks that Clinton may be the candidate with the right message this year. His public support for Clinton is evident through his social media accounts and website. And he’s not alone. He recounted several anecdotes of gay Republicans leaving the party in the past few years, especially in the wake of the “autopsy report” – a document he cautiously praises as the first published Republican material to reference gay individuals in a non-negative way – due to the persistence of institutional and coalitional problems within the GOP. He also cited a recent Whitman Insight Strategies study from May 2016 that found only 16 percent of LGBT voters would vote for Trump, versus 84 percent who say they would vote for Clinton (Johnson 2016).

As for the Donald Trump phenomenon this election cycle, LaSalvia – referring back to his remedial reading analogy – described the Republican nominee as a “second grade reader” when it came to LGBT rights: Trump is a bit better than the rest of the party but not by much. “There are going to be gays for Trump,” LaSalvia noted, pointing to his former GOProud partner and now major Trump supporter, Chris Barron. But LaSalvia also cautioned that Trump’s gestures to the LGBT community will not automatically get this group on his side: “For most gay people, maybe Donald Trump isn’t going to be out there beating the drum against gays, but we’re no strangers to having our lives used as political pawns. And we know what it’s like. So when we hear him

going after Mexicans or Muslims or anybody else, I mean ... whether we empathize with those people or not, that's the type of politics that's been directed at us. And so we reject that type of politics." With or without Trump, LaSalvia believed the GOP's coalition is untenable. As he says, "If the ultimate goal of a political party is to win the White House and you can't do it with your untenable coalition, then what's the point?"

### **Advocating from Inside the GOP: A "Far, Far Better"<sup>46</sup> LGBT Advocacy Strategy?**

While Log Cabin Republicans and GOProud diverge in terms of their trajectories, long-term success, and outcomes, they have always shared a commonality in their objectives and goals – one also shared by other pro-LGBT Republican organizations in existence. Despite differences in the way each organization is run and even what type of Republicans it aims to cater to, the general audience and rhetorical strategy employed – a unique blend of Republican buzzwords with pro-LGBT positions – is similar. Other pro-LGBT Republican organizations have done the same. I interviewed pollsters Alex Lundry and James Dozier about this, who were both polling consultants for Project Right Side (PRS). Each interview was done via telephone and audio recorded with permission; I spoke with Lundry on March 23, 2016, and Dozier on March 30, 2016 (Dozier 2016; Lundry 2016). Neither Lundry nor Dozier are currently working on polling research for PRS anymore, but PRS remains active, and Lundry and Dozier continue to work within the realm of Republican polling; Dozier particularly continues to work on research projects that attempt to move Republican attitudes on a variety of atypical issues.

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<sup>46</sup> In line with the chapter's Dickensian play on words, this phrase pays homage to the last line of *A Tale of Two Cities*.

Though Project Right Side's audience still involves the Republican Party, it is less about grassroots efforts and accumulating members; instead, it mainly targets influential GOP members like party leaders, decision makers, donors, elected officials, operatives, and punditry. Dozier described PRS as sort of safe space for these influential Republicans, acting as a trusted right of center resource where they can learn about LGBT issues, ask questions, and hopefully at least find common middle ground, as well as allow those members already supportive of LGBT issues to become more vocal without repercussions. And PRS knows that they will not be successful with everyone. As Dozier pointed, "You're not trying to change the whole party; you're trying to change enough of the party."

Even though PRS targets Republicans at the elite level, their messaging tactics are strikingly similar to Log Cabin and GOProud. Lundry described the group's primary objective as showing how same-sex marriage (as well as other LGBT issues) is consistent with Republican principles. He took me through Project Right Side's thought process on how best to formulate a pro-LGBT message with Republicans:

So how do we talk about this? I think, first of all, the notion that if we are conservatives, then marriage is something that we value. That we value the institution of marriage. That shouldn't we allow people to have freedom to enter into those same sort of institutions that we have – that we straight heterosexual men have the ability to do? And so, there's this notion of, if we value this institution, we should focus on it. Also, this notion that people should be *free*: when people are in love, they should be free to enter into the arrangement. [...] Freedom means freedom for everybody, including gays and lesbians. [...] Why bother talking about marriage equality when we can talk about the freedom to marry? When we can talk about following the Golden Rule? [...] If we are going to be speaking to Republicans, let's use their language and the words they prefer.

Lundry also pointed to the persuasive power among Republicans of Christian values, like the golden rule, and the idea of smaller government and keeping out of individuals' private lives.

Dozier provided similar insight into Project Right Side's messaging strategy. According to Dozier, PRS' overall mission is to make progressive issues like LGBT rights relatable to Republicans by using rhetoric that resemble the way Republicans talk; this helps to create a safe space for Republicans to evolve and express support, as well provides Republicans with the proper tools to talk about these issues with others. Dozier explained how PRS emphasizes a common values platform when talking about same-sex marriage and other LGBT rights, highlighting things that all people can relate to and thus humanizing the issues:

At the end of the day, you don't get married to someone because of the social security benefit. [...] It's about love and commitment. It's about having the right to marry the person that you love, which is a fundamental right that everyone should be able to experience. To take care of that person. To have a family. To honor the commitment that marriage stands for. And treating your neighbor like you would want to be treated.

And Dozier, like Lundry, also stressed the importance of using Republican values like freedom, liberty, family, and especially the golden rule when talking to their target audience about these subjects – for example, framing marriage as the “freedom to marry” instead of the left's language of “marriage equality.” “It's just kind of the difference of meeting them [Republicans] where they're at and kind of breaking things down to the very basics of ... ‘everyone should have the freedom to marry the person they love,’” Dozier reasoned. “If we can use messages and messengers that comport with their worldview, that makes it easier to move the message forward.”

Lundry said it is difficult to objectively measure the impact PRS has had, and some influential GOP members simply do not buy it, but he also pointed to the amicus brief – which PRS spearheaded under the leadership of Ken Mehlman – and the decreased attention to same-sex marriage within the party as markers of success.<sup>47</sup> Just like with Log Cabin and especially GOProud, however, Lundry and Dozier did admit that building support among Republican influentials can be a challenge, especially given certain Republicans’ pushback about the geographical variation in acceptance of same-sex marriage and the need to secure their seats and get through primaries that are much farther right than general elections. But Lundry and Dozier insist that finding a common ground – a seemingly recurring phrase among Republican atypical issue advocates – on LGBT issues is vital for Republicans to do out of electoral necessity. Dozier argued that demographics and the next generation are not on the GOP’s side when it comes to LGBT issues and that the party cannot be completely opposed across the board. And by the same token, the LGBT movement needs Republican support just as much as Republicans need to align with LGBT rights for electoral gain. As Dozier emphasized:

For any effort that’s serious about making significant change or passing significant legislation, they have to be talking to Republicans. [...] For any of these what we might call “progressive issues” to be successful, you need to have an authentic GOP strategy. You need to have real Republicans engaged at the table on these issues.

It is clear from these case studies and interviews, then, that there is preliminary support for my initial two hypotheses. First, Republican atypical issue advocates do in fact specifically target their advocacy work at their own partisans – in other words, fellow Republicans and conservatives (*HI*). They may focus on different subgroups within this target audience – elites versus grassroots, mainstream versus conservative – and this

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<sup>47</sup> Lundry did point out, however, that talking out against same-sex marriage has now mostly been replaced by the issue of religious freedom.

different subgroup focus may explain the divergent paths of certain advocacy groups like Log Cabin and GOProud, but in the end, Republican atypical advocacy work is intended first and foremost, if not solely, for those within their party.

As the perhaps the most public face of Republican LGBT advocacy right now, Log Cabin claims to welcome any and all individuals to their cause. This across-the-aisle openness and unwillingness to make enemies is understandable, but the organization has a much narrower audience in reality given its rhetorical strategies, routine activities, issue stances, and history. This becomes even clearer – at least at the elite level – looking at their lobbying and donation records: in no year on record has Log Cabin ever donated to a Democratic candidate, member of Congress, or PAC (Center for Responsive Politics 2016). Therefore, both behind the scenes and in the spotlight, Republican atypical issue advocacy groups attempt to court members of their own party more than Democrats or anyone else. As seen with both Log Cabin and GOProud, Republican atypical advocates do this by continually trying to prove to their fellow partisans that they are “one of them,” and a “team player,” displaying model Republican behavior by passionately fighting not only for LGBT rights but also Republican-owned issues and positions. Therefore, these case studies and interviews confirm *H1*.

In regard to my second hypothesis (*H2*), Republican atypical issue advocates do in fact use the party’s own accepted language and values to frame support for LGBT issues stances and how other issues can affect the LGBT community. This is moreover the very same language they use to frame their support for other typical Republican positions. For advocates like the senior Log Cabin member and LaSalvia, this is simply ingrained in the way they talk about the issues, their political identity as Republicans, and

their social identity as gay. The connection to them is completely logical; they support LGBT issues *because* they are conservative and Republican and support conservative and Republican values – not in spite of their politics.

But again the two groups diverge in their interpretation of what exactly classifies as Republican and conservative language, particularly what values. LaSalvia, as well as Lundry and Dozier, best fit my original expectations here – mainly in their rejection of “marriage equality” as a phrase, in particular, and “equality” as a value, in general. Given the value’s affiliation with Democratic Party principles and very public usage by those advocacy organizations affiliated with the Democratic Party, as well as prior research showing its non-effects on Republican attitudes (Koning and Redlawsk 2013), I expected Republican pro-LGBT advocates to not use this type of language to frame their causes. The senior Log Cabin member was the only one who did not conform to expectations, but again this is due to a difference in meaning; to him, equality was not a Democratic value but rather a Republican value that harkened back to the party’s founding and role in emancipation. In reality, Log Cabin’s co-opting of “equality” may again be due to the delicate balance it tries to maintain between being a part of the LGBT advocacy community – something GOProud was never concerned about – and the GOP. It may also be due in part to the growing acceptance of “marriage equality” as the common phrase to describe same-sex marriage nowadays – though this growth may not be taking place among the very audience that Log Cabin is trying to target.

Nevertheless, the case studies and interviews in this chapter provide confirmation for *H2*. These organizations and advocates frame their support for LGBT issue positions using what they deem is accepted, owned, and accessible language used by conservatives

and the Republican Party. Whether these frames are based on gut feeling and interpretation (like Log Cabin and LaSalvia at GOProud) or tested results (like with Lundry and Dozier at PRS), Republican atypical issue advocates are attempting to change Republican attitudes on LGBT rights through shared partisan kinship both in focus and words – something no other pro-LGBT advocacy group is doing. Chapter 4 will continue to confirm these two hypotheses but this time more quantitatively through content analysis.



## APPENDIX A

### SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

*[Obtain consent; verify that interview subject has no questions and understands their rights to confidentiality. Verify that they permit audiotaping the interview.]*

#### PI Needs to Record:

- 1.) Date interview completed
  - 2.) Day interview completed
  - 3.) Beginning time of interview
  - 4.) Ending time of interview
  - 5.) Length of interview
- 
- 1.) [If part of an organization] Tell me a little bit about your organization [advocacy work].
    - a. How would you classify your organization?
    - b. What does the organization do?
    - c. How would you describe your [organization's] purpose/mission?
  
  - 2.) What specific issues within [particular issue area] do(es) you [the organization] focus on?
    - a. Could you list them for me?

- 3.) What are some of the ways in which you(r) [organization] try [tries] to get this message across to its intended audience(s)?
- Do you use particular strategies or tactics? If so, what?
  - How do you talk about these issues with your intended audience? What type of language do you use? Why do you use it?
  - Can you provide me with some examples of how you talk about?
  - Do you make a conscious effort to brand yourself [yourselves] and to talk about your advocacy in a particular way?
  - Is using this type of language in your argument important? Why?
- 4.) What are some typical activities you(r) [organization] take(s) part in to promote your mission for this issue(s)?
- Could you list for me all of the different types of advocacy activities you(r) [organization] have (has) undertaken?
- 5.) Could you elaborate on *who* you(r) [organization] is trying to reach with its message(s)?
- How much time is dedicated to trying to reach out to policymakers?
  - How much time is dedicated to trying to reach out to citizens?
  - Are you trying to target one group with your messaging more than another?
- 6.) How does the organization view its relationship with ...

- a. Other organizations promoting the same causes/issues?
- b. The Republican Party?
  - i. Do(es) you [your organization] consciously identify as Republican in its advocacy work and messaging? Why?
- c. The Democratic Party?
- d. How do(es) you [your organization] set yourself [itself] apart from other(s) [organizations] doing similar work?

7.) What are the ultimate goals of the organization?

- a. What are you trying to make happen?
- b. Are you trying to evoke change? What are you trying to change?
- c. What would you consider as accomplishments thus far?

8.) Who else would you recommend that I speak to who is also involved in advocacy work for this issue? What other Republicans or Republican groups, in particular?

Thank you so much for your time. Please do not hesitate to contact me with future questions or concerns about the project. If you have any additional insight you'd like to share or persons with whom you think I should talk, please contact me at any time.

Demographic Info to Record:

Name

Sex

Race/ethnicity

Age

Title

Organization affiliation

Registered party affiliation

## Chapter 4

### Words, Words, Words<sup>48</sup>: A Comparative Content Analysis of Value Frames Between the Log Cabin Republicans and the Human Rights Campaign

*“Log Cabin Republicans are LGBT Republicans and allies who support equality under the law for all, free markets, individual liberty, limited government, and a strong national defense.”*

*- Log Cabin Republicans Mission Statement*

*“The Human Rights Campaign and the Human Rights Campaign Foundation together serve as America's largest civil rights organization working to achieve LGBTQ equality. By inspiring and engaging individuals and communities, HRC strives to end discrimination against LGBTQ people and realize a world that achieves fundamental fairness and equality for all.”*

*- Human Rights Campaign Mission Statement*

While case studies and interviews provided an in-depth look into the history, beliefs, motives, and philosophies of some of these Republican atypical advocacy organizations, an analysis of public statements and other published materials help to better understand 1) who these organizations are attempting to target; 2) what are their particular objectives and goals; and 3) if and how they use rhetorical strategies like word choice and framing in their advocacy work. Republican atypical issue advocates appear to be using a distinct rhetorical strategy to not so subtly court a very particular audience (their own partisans), encouraging a connection between the very values that define the Republican Party and LGBT rights. For example, Project Right Side's (2016) “About Us” page roots LGBT rights in conservative philosophy and freedom:

[...] The work of Project Right Side is based on the conservative philosophy that public policy ought to promote freedom for everyone, treat all American citizens equally under the law and reinforce the fundamental values like family, work, commitment, and responsibility. We believe these principals should apply without regard to a person's race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

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<sup>48</sup> This takes a page from a master of words, William Shakespeare himself – The Bard. The famous line comes from *Hamlet*.

The American Unity Fund (2016) frames its mission statement in much the same way:

The mission of American Unity Fund [...] is freedom. We are dedicated to advancing the cause of freedom for LGBT Americans by making the conservative case that freedom truly means freedom for everyone. Republicans believe strongly in the American Dream. Too often government serves as an obstacle to prosperity for millions of Americans – confiscating their wealth with escalating taxes, strangling their businesses with burdensome regulations and undermining our economy with unsustainable spending and increasing uncertainty. For Americans who happen to be LGBT, it goes one step farther, denying them the same rights and responsibilities extended to every other taxpaying family. We believe the American Dream belongs to all of us, regardless of our sexual orientation or gender identity.

These groups therefore tailor their messages to their fellow partisans in a way that makes them distinct from their advocacy counterparts across the aisle. This disparity in framing tactics is abundantly evident when comparing the Log Cabin Republicans and the Human Rights Campaign due to both organizations' regular public press releases that cover a variety of LGBT and non-LGBT issues.

To systematically dissect and analyze this advocacy rhetoric, I conducted a content analysis of key words and concepts used in press releases published on the official websites for both the Log Cabin Republicans and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC). Log Cabin was selected to represent the Republican atypical advocacy side first and foremost because it is the “nation’s original and largest [and now only] organization representing gay conservatives and allies.” The organization was also selected for analysis due to its continued, visible, and public activism, as well as its abundant availability of all press releases dating back to 2010. The other pro-LGBT Republican groups referenced in Chapter 3, in contrast, are either now defunct – like GOProud, whose website is no longer accessible – have more of an elite level focus, or mainly

PACs, providing little in terms of regular public discourse or propaganda; none of this allows for systematic or sufficient analysis of public documentation.

The Human Rights Campaign was selected as the analytical counterpart to Log Cabin, first and foremost, because it similarly bills itself as the oldest and “largest civil rights organization working to achieve equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Americans.” Just as important, the Human Rights Campaign serves as a useful comparison to Log Cabin because of its opposite partisan leanings: though HRC does not overtly advertise a political affiliation – unlike Log Cabin, which explicitly affiliates itself with the Republican Party in its mission statement – HRC is classified as “liberal” by the Center for Responsive Politics (2016) and has donated almost entirely to Democratic candidates each election cycle (see also Karol 2012). HRC moreover is consistently the largest PAC contributor of all gay and lesbian rights and issues groups each election cycle, providing more money to Democratic candidates than any other PAC in its industry (Center for Responsive Politics 2016). Log Cabin and HRC therefore complement each other as the two organizations – each from an opposite side of the political spectrum – with longer histories of advocacy on LGBT issues than any of their counterparts on either side of the aisle. The two groups have even occasionally had a dialogue with one another over the years, at times cooperative (Movement Advancement Project et al. 2012) and, at other times, contentious (Log Cabin Republicans 2016).

### **Content Analysis Procedure**

I content analyzed both the mission statements and publicly available press releases published by both the Log Cabin Republicans and the Human Rights Campaign

using a “manual-holistic” approach (Matthes 2007).<sup>49</sup> The mission statements were pulled from the introductory website pages for each organization (Human Rights Campaign 2016; Log Cabin Republicans 2016). I content analyzed press releases for each organization listed under their press release or media page, beginning with the first press release publicly available on their respective websites through their last press releases posted in 2015; note that all releases and public statements under these sections are written by the organizations themselves and not by third party media outlets reporting on either organization. For the Log Cabin Republicans, the time period under study includes all publicly available press releases on their website from May 25, 2010 to December 11, 2015; during this time, they published a total of 320 press releases on their website. All 320 releases were analyzed. For the Human Rights Campaign, this includes all publicly available press releases on their website from January 4, 2010 to December 21, 2015; during this time, they published a total of 1,837 press releases on their website. Due to the volume of HRC releases, and its purpose to serve as a point of comparison only, I randomly sampled 300 HRC releases in total from the past six years, which were chosen using a random number generation formula.<sup>50</sup>

For each press release, I recorded and coded the following: the press release headline and release date; the overall topic; whether the release discussed a LGBT-related issue, in general; whether the release at least mentioned the issue of marriage, in particular; whether the release praised or criticized either political party; and any recurring words, phrases, and themes used to frame their advocacy. For this last

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<sup>49</sup> As Matthes states, “The essence of this method is that frames are coded as holistic variables in a quantitative content analysis, whether inductively or deductively” (2007, 7).

<sup>50</sup> Each release of the 1,837 total releases was assigned a random number through the Excel “RAND” function; from there, 300 releases were randomly selected to analyze via an Excel formula .



component, the text of each release was evaluated by manually conducting keyword searches for each of my selected words, phrases, and themes chosen as described below. I then read through each release in its entirety in order to confirm that each word or phrase I recorded was used in the context most appropriate for my research – for example, making sure the word “right” was used to convey human entitlement rather than physical direction or correctness. I also read through releases in order to study and absorb messaging tactics in order to replicate them in the subsequent survey framing experiment.

I determined a list of words and phrases to include in the search through a mix of inductive and deductive methods (Matthes 2007). I began the investigation with a predetermined list of words and phrases to search for based on interviews with Republican atypical issue advocates, publicly available materials from both organizations, corresponding media on both of these organizations, and long established, known partisan values, tenets, and themes. In addition, I also sampled several press releases from both organizations to openly and actively explore any value words and phrases I had not previously accounted for on my originally defined list to add them to my search before I began coding. I then coded the number of mentions of each word, phrase, or theme on the search list. For each word or phrase, all derivations of that word or phrase counted toward the word or phrase’s total mentions per release. For example, mentions of “unequal” or “equality” counted toward the total number of mentions of the term “equality;” usage of “inclusive,” “inclusivity,” or “inclusiveness” likewise all counted as mentions of “inclusion.” Mentions of broader ideas and phrases like “big tent” and “electoral gains” were coded based more upon context rather than an exact

word-for-word match; for example, electoral gains may have been represented by text that discussed Republicans needing to win future elections or the threat of Republican losses if they did not support LGBT rights.

I grouped the words and phrases that I was searching for into three distinct categories based on existing literature that explores the partisan roots of these values and concepts, as well as my own predictions of whether and how often they will be used in the press releases by each organization: 1) terms affiliated with rhetoric of the Democratic Party, liberals, and the left (Brewer 2008; Feldman 1988; Karol 2012); 2) those terms that have a history with the Republican Party, conservatives, and the right (Hart 2000; Lad and Lipset 1980; Nelson and Garst 2005); and 3) those terms for which I did not find any definitive partisan leaning in the literature or are used equally – though likely interpreted in different fashions – by partisans and ideologues across the spectrum. A breakdown of key value words and themes into these three categories can be found in Table 4.1.

[INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE]

What follows for each organization, then, is an analysis of its mission statement, press release topics, and press release key value words and themes. Investigation of mission statements and press release topic range will bolster Hypotheses 1 and 2, providing further context about what Republican atypical issue advocates are doing and who they are targeting. The key value word and phrase search will contribute specifically to Hypothesis 2: Log Cabin will be more likely to use words and themes associated with the Republican Party, conservatism, and the right, while HRC will be more likely to use words and themes associated with the Democratic Party, liberalism,

and the left. Ultimately, this content analysis will assist me in creating testable frames that mimic atypical advocacy rhetoric for my original survey experiment in Chapter 5.

## **The Log Cabin Republicans**

### *Introductory and Mission Statements*

Log Cabin’s introductory page immediately reveals its distinct target audience, motives, strategies, and goals. Under their “About Us” and “Why We Exist” sections, Log Cabin specifies that it represent a particular type of individual and that their work is focused on provoking a particular type of change: they represent “gay conservatives,” “LGBT Republicans,” and their “allies,” and they “wor[k] from inside the Party – educating other Republicans about gay and lesbian issues” and existing as “a voice for GOP values among members of the gay and lesbian community” (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). They see themselves as the Republican counterpart to the majority of gay and lesbian activism to date, which has – whether intentionally or not – focused on advocating for gay and lesbian inclusivity and issues mainly within the Democratic Party.

Text about the Log Cabin Republicans’ mission, beliefs, objectives, and history references “equality” and “fairness”; much like the elite interview with the senior Log Cabin member, usage of this more left-leaning terminology was unexpected. Yet Log Cabin’s text also extensively uses Republican principles and conservative values such as “freedom,” “personal responsibility,” and “limited government” to frame the organization’s purpose and identity:

We are loyal Republicans. We believe in limited government, strong national defense, free markets, low taxes, personal responsibility, and individual liberty. Log Cabin Republicans represents an important part of the American family – taxpaying, hard working people who proudly believe in this nation’s greatness. We also believe all

Americans have the right to liberty and equality. We believe equality for LGBT Americans is in the finest tradition of the Republican Party. We educate our Party about why inclusion wins. Opposing gay and lesbian equality is inconsistent with the GOP's core principles of smaller government and personal freedom.

Compared to other LGBT activists, Log Cabin is unique in how they use these Republican and conservative values to support their advocacy efforts. The organization additionally invokes some of the most revered Republican heroes as actual or would-be supporters of the LGBT cause and what it stands for, citing Ronald Reagan and his opposition to the Briggs Initiative while governor of California and Abraham Lincoln's issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, the ultimate symbol of equality and freedom.

### *Release topics*

Before proceeding with analysis of value words and themes, it is important to explore the range of topics covered since such decisions in what to cover further illuminate how Republican atypical issue advocates communicate with – and what they communicate to – their target audience of fellow partisans. Log Cabin's unique approach to LGBT advocacy is abundantly clear in the organization's press releases. The group largely speaks to, for, and about Republicans, straddling a fine line – especially in its earliest statements – between acting as model members of their party and carefully pressing for significant (yet incremental) attitudinal and policy change within it. Eighty-three percent of the 320 press releases studied here addressed LGBT-related issues or matters in some form. LGBT-related releases were always meticulously worded to reflect the organization's overarching theme – how pro-LGBT stances are completely consistent with fundamental Republican and conservative principles – as they often simultaneously challenged the status quo.

The remaining 17 percent of releases made no mention of LGBT issues at all, instead focusing on other topics on which Log Cabin vehemently upheld traditional Republican positions – like the economy, taxes, the federal budget, the debt ceiling, and Obamacare. This 17 percent also included a number of political endorsements, self-promotion, general admonishment of Democrats, and election discussion. Notably, Log Cabin’s non-LGBT releases also included a statement against Trump’s Muslim immigration ban from December 2015, one of a handful of times Log Cabin has so forcefully spoken out against someone affiliated with its own party. A breakdown of all release topics can be seen in Table 4.2.

[INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE]

Of all releases between 2010 and 2015, the Log Cabin Republicans published the most statements about “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) – a reflection of their involvement in its repeal through their lawsuit, *Log Cabin Republicans v. United States*, filed in California federal court (Log Cabin Republicans 2016). The legislation was the main focus of 18 percent of all releases during this time period. DADT was the first and most prominent LGBT-related issue tackled by the Log Cabin Republicans, embodying the perfect blend of LGBT rights and Republican patriotism; no other LGBT issue received as much attention, though marriage was a close second. Statements on DADT were also highly concentrated, with virtually all of them published between 2010 and 2011. In their first year of publicly available releases on their site, DADT made up 59 percent of all releases, but by 2012, Log Cabin’s repeal campaign tapered off. 2013 was the only other year during which Log Cabin released a statement on DADT, this time

celebrating the anniversary of DADT’s repeal. A breakdown of each release topic by year and each year by release topic can be found in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.

[INSERT TABLES 4.3 and 4.4 HERE]

Releases on DADT were blatant rallying calls for the issue that clearly stated Log Cabin’s opposition, emphasizing their progress on the lawsuit and their three-pronged approach to defeating it, admonishing anyone – whether Republican or Democrat – who wanted the law upheld. Yet even in their criticism, Log Cabin was still three times as likely to find fault with Democrats than they were with Republicans; almost half of all DADT releases contained some type of criticism directed toward Democrats, while just 15 percent condemned Republicans. Fourteen percent of all DADT releases even praised Republicans on the issue, whereas not a single release condoned actions on the issue by the opposing party. A breakdown of all release topics by praise and criticism

[INSERT TABLES 4.5 HERE]

Marriage, on the other hand, was the primary topic of 14 percent of all releases (45 in total); 31 percent of all releases at least mentioned something pertaining to marriage, even if marriage was not the main topic. Marriage was most prevalent as a release topic from 2011 to 2013, coinciding with the Supreme Court’s ruling in *United States v. Windsor* and *Hollingsworth v. Perry*. While just 2 percent of all releases in 2010 and 13 percent in 2011 focused on marriage, 22 percent of all releases in 2012 and 25 percent of all releases in 2013 did the same; hence, half or more of all releases made at least some mention of marriage in 2012 and 2013. But the number of releases dedicated to addressing marriage once again sharply declined in the years that followed. Just 13 percent of all releases in 2014 and 13 percent of all releases in 2015 focused on marriage,

despite the timing of *Obergefell v. Hodges* – though a quarter of releases at least mentioned marriage in each of these years, even if it was not the main subject.

[INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE]

Marriage was a much more precarious issue for Log Cabin to tackle, given deep seeded opposition within the Republican Party – especially among social conservatives– that could not be explained away with patriotism. Unlike DADT, the Log Cabin Republicans did not head up or advertise their own campaign to legalize marriage. Even as support increased across the country and legalization seemed inevitable (and subsequently became reality), Log Cabin discussed marriage predominantly within the context of responding to occurrences of related state legislation or legalization and to the comments and actions of others. Log Cabin released a number of statements congratulating various states as they legalized same-sex marriage, even applauding Governor Chris Christie (R-NJ) specifically – who appeared to be a Log Cabin favorite over the years – on withdrawing a state appeal against a court ruling that made same-sex marriage legal within New Jersey.<sup>51</sup> Log Cabin also complimented and congratulated prominent Republicans who voiced support for the issue in various marriage-related releases and statements, commending fellow Republicans like Newt Gingrich, Chairman Pat Brady, Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH), Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL), Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME). This abundance of within-party praise is evident by the partisan breakdown in assigned praise and criticism by Log Cabin on the issue of marriage. Seventy-six percent of all marriage-focused releases praised Republicans or

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<sup>51</sup> Incidentally, an earlier press release urging Christie to not act upon the veto he promised on same-sex marriage state legislation that passed both the state assembly and senate in 2012 did not even criticize the governor. Instead, Executive Director R. Clark Cooper stated, “Governor Christie, be the leader Republicans know you to be. Choose to be on the right side of history. Please sign this bill.”

the Republican Party, while just 13 percent criticized fellow partisans; Log Cabin did not commend Democrats in a single marriage-focused release, on the other hand, and in fact faulted Democrats on something to do with marriage 13 percent of the time.

The group also occasionally commented on the Supreme Court's dealings with marriage during the five-year span under study: Log Cabin asked the Court in 2012 to repeal DOMA and critiqued DOMA more generally a handful of times; it congratulated the Court in 2013 on *United States v. Windsor*, declaring the ruling a "victory of conservative principles and admonishment of government overreach" yet stating that they were "not done yet" in taking "the conservative case for marriage to Republicans across the nation"; and in 2015, they promoted their own amicus brief in partnership with their sister think tank, the Liberty Education Forum, and celebrated the subsequent ruling of *Obergefell v. Hodges* (Brief of the Liberty Education Forum as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 2015). Yet Log Cabin's celebration in the wake of *Obergefell* was subdued, as immediately evident by their release titled, "Log Cabin Republicans Response to Supreme Court Marriage Decision" (Log Cabin Republicans 2016):

Today the Supreme Court of the United States finally recognized what Log Cabin Republicans has long advocated for: the constitutional right of committed same-sex couples to engage in civil marriage partnerships," Log Cabin Republicans National Executive Director Gregory T. Angelo stated. "At hand lies a tremendous opportunity for healing on all sides: Log Cabin Republicans encourages marriage equality advocates to resist the temptation of being 'sore winners' and respecting others who may not yet be at a place of acceptance; and opponents of marriage equality who can light a way out of the LGBT culture wars by recognizing that civil marriage for committed same-sex couples is no threat to any straight couple's marriage, family, or faith. This is a watershed moment for the LGBT rights movement — one that had its genesis on the center-right — and Log Cabin Republicans congratulates our allied organizations, grassroots Chapter Leaders, and — especially — those committed same-sex couples who moved national sentiment on marriage equality so far, so fast simply by living their lives in quiet dignity.



Log Cabin conveyed a similar tone on an open conference call for members and supporters immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in *Obergefell*. National Executive Director Gregory T. Angelo again stressed that supporters must “resist being spoiled winners,” “respect those not yet in a place of acceptance,” and “educate and advocate rather than admonish,” cautioning that just because someone is opposed to same-sex marriage does not make them a “bigot.” Angelo also implemented familiar rhetorical strategies akin to the Log Cabin website, emphasizing that the ruling upheld freedom of speech – one of the pillars of conservatism – and would in no way threaten religious liberties. Angelo concluded by calling for common ground and a coming together on both LGBT issues and religious liberties.

In terms of the exact words Log Cabin used to refer to marriage during the five-year period, the organization implemented various labels. “Same-sex marriage,” a neutral term often used in discourse on the subject, was used the least – 12 times in all releases; in other words, the phrase “same-sex marriage” was included in just 4 percent of all Log Cabin releases and in just 12 percent of releases that even mentioned the issue of marriage. Twenty-two releases – 7 percent of all releases and 22 percent of marriage-focused releases – described the issue as “civil marriage,” a more cautious term often used by Republican and conservative advocates to distinguish between the civil ceremonies for which they were advocating and religious ceremonies. The term “freedom to marry” – a phrase that grew in usage as an alternative to “marriage equality” out of efforts mainly by Freedom to Marry, as well as a number of Republicans and conservative advocates – is referenced in 38 releases, representing 12 percent of all press releases and 38 percent of marriage-focused releases. Yet it is the term “marriage

equality” that is surprisingly used the most by Log Cabin during this five-year span of releases, almost as much as the “civil marriage” and “freedom to marry” terms combined. As discussed in Chapter 3, this finding goes against original expectations for Hypothesis 2 since equality is typically classified as a Republican value.

“Marriage equality” – originating as a pro same-sex marriage frame that played on the more left-leaning value of equality and equal rights – became an increasingly common term to describe the issue in the years leading up to *Obergefell v. Hodges* and ultimately became a universally accepted way of describing it; Google Trends patterns show “marriage equality” as far and away the search term of choice when it comes to the issue, a pattern that began in June 2011 and skyrocketed in 2013 and again in 2015 leading up to the corresponding Supreme Court cases (Google Trends 2016). Log Cabin used the term “marriage equality” in 53 releases – 17 percent of all releases and 54 percent of marriage-focused releases – during the time under study. While Log Cabin’s decision to use this seemingly liberal terminology is initially surprising, it nevertheless fits with the group’s own view of conservatism, one that has always included – in Log Cabin’s view – equality as a beheld Republican value rooted in Abraham Lincoln’s issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. Therefore, to Log Cabin, they are not so much co-opting a liberal value but rather capitalizing on a value already prevalent in same-sex marriage discourse that they furthermore perceive as rooted in Republican history.

Beyond DADT and marriage, Log Cabin addressed several other issues and topics in its press releases. They often promoted their own organization, functions, and council elections, which made up 14 percent of all releases. They also published a number of

pieces on the 2012 election, as well as made political endorsements (all in favor of Republicans). Notably, the main focus of 4 percent of all releases was direct criticism aimed at a particular Republican; the main focus of 2 percent of all releases was direct criticism aimed at a particular Democrat.<sup>52</sup> Releases also touched upon the budget, discrimination that predominantly addressed issues in the workplace (namely the Employment Non-Discrimination Act), and taxes.

Regardless of the release topic, Log Cabin furthermore frequently praised and admonished both parties throughout its releases, even if not the main focus of the piece. The partisan slant of who they decided to commend and condemn is evident, deliberate, and in line with their mission and purpose as an organization; it again exemplifies the delicate balance Log Cabin has maintained as a LGBT rights group by and for Republicans. Across all releases, 50 percent contained some sort of praise for a Republican figure, the Republican Party, or a Republican-affiliated individual or group. Eighteen percent of all releases, on the other hand, contained some sort of Republican-directed criticism; most of these critical releases were about the 2012 election. Thirty-eight percent of all releases containing Republican-directed criticism moreover also simultaneously contained some sort of Republican-directed praise.

In sharp contrast, just one Log Cabin release gave any type of praise to Democrats – a release on the capture of Osama bin Laden. Even this singular moment of praise was minor, compared to the more extensive praise Log Cabin gave to the George W. Bush administration for the takedown in the same release. Log Cabin instead directly

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<sup>52</sup> These topic codes are separate from the previously mentioned partisan praise and admonishment mention coding, which was coded for every release. These topic codes are used when the entirety of the release is dedicated to praising or admonishing Republicans or Democrats, instead of just mentioning as part of a larger issue.

condemned Democrats, the Democratic Party, and especially the Obama administration in 27 percent of all releases – mostly regarding DADT, the 2012 election, the federal budget, taxes, Obamacare, and even marriage. Log Cabin thus purposely employed an appraisal strategy that mostly commended Republicans but chastised Democrats – a portrayal at odds with the reality of LGBT support within each party yet deftly plays to what Log Cabin’s target audience of fellow Republicans wants to hear.

### *Key word and phrase search*

When it comes to the text of each one of these releases, Log Cabin uses a rhetorical strategy – similar to its mission statement – that mainly employs framing and word choice centered around Republican and conservative values, principles, and ideas. A keyword breakdown can be found in Table 4.6. Yet much like with the framing of marriage, some form of “equality” was the most referenced value of all – mentioned 285 times in 127 different releases – 40 percent of all releases. Once again, this defies expectations. This usage is undoubtedly interconnected with the number of times Log Cabin specifically used the term “marriage equality” within their releases to describe marriage between same-sex couples: 71 percent of marriage-related releases use the word “equality” at least once. The value is also referenced at least once in 45 percent of all LGBT-related releases but only 13 percent of all non-LGBT related releases. Likewise, among all releases that mention “equality” at least once, 25 percent of releases focus on marriage.

[INSERT TABLE 4.6 HERE]

But abundant mentions are not the case when it comes to other left-leaning values like “discrimination” and “fairness.” While Log Cabin does not shy away from using these terms in their release text, they are employed to a far lesser extent. Some form of the word “discrimination” is featured in 19 percent of all releases, 21 percent of LGBT-specific releases, and 19 percent of marriage-specific releases. Releases having to do with discrimination – to no surprise – reference the word 100 percent of the time.<sup>53</sup> Yet when it comes to marriage, only 11 percent of releases that address this topic reference “discrimination.” Among all releases that mention “discrimination” at least once, 21 percent focus on DADT – one of the few values for which mentions were not concentrated among marriage releases. A breakdown of all release topics by keyword and all keywords by release topic can be found in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.

[INSERT TABLE 4.7 AND TABLE 4.8 HERE]

Similarly, some form of the word “fairness” is featured in 8 percent of all releases, 10 percent of LGBT-specific releases, and 7 percent of marriage-specific releases. Releases about taxes (40 percent mention the word at least once) and about LGBT issues in the workplace (33 percent mention the word at least once) are more likely to mention the value than other types of releases. Likewise, across all releases that mention “fairness” at least once, 15 percent focus on taxes and 11 percent focus on the workplace; the value is actually most prevalent in releases about self-promotion, however, with 30 percent of all “fairness” mentions included in self-promotional releases.

While Log Cabin’s releases did include mentions of some left-leaning values, they also heavily and frequently drew upon an array of Republican and conservative

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<sup>53</sup> It should be noted here, however, that only 4 percent of all releases were classified as addressing discrimination.

values to frame their arguments and create a consistent messaging strategy no matter the issue or purpose of the release. The word “freedom” was the second most used value after “equality,” employed 216 times in 109 different press releases – 34 percent of all releases. Thirty-eight percent of releases pertaining specifically to LGBT issues evoked some mention of freedom, as did 53 percent of releases focused on marriage. This important relationship between “freedom” and discussing the issue of marriage is apparent when we look at it from yet another angle: among all releases that mention freedom at least once, 22 percent are focused on marriage. This is similar to the usage of “equality” in marriage-specific releases. “Freedom” was also mentioned at least once in releases about organizational promotion (21 percent), DADT (15 percent), and political endorsements (10 percent).

“Conservative” was the next most used word, mentioned at least once in 30 percent of all releases. Similar to “freedom,” the word “conservative” was referenced at least once in 32 percent of all LGBT-related releases and 49 percent of all releases specifically about marriage. “Constitution” came in third, overall: some form of the word was used in a quarter of all releases. Nineteen percent of all marriage releases also mentioned something related to the “constitution” or “constitutionality” at least once. Yet when looking across all releases, mention of the constitution is actually most prevalent in DADT releases; 54 percent of releases that mention something about the constitution are about DADT. Other value-laden words and phrases like “family,” “liberty,” “individualism,” and “limited government” were mentioned at least once in 13 to 18 percent of all releases. Mentions of these words moreover were all most likely to appear in marriage-related releases. Any reference to the “First Amendment” –

mentioned at least once in 13 percent of all releases – was made overwhelmingly in DADT-related releases, while any reference to being “inclusive” – which was included in 18 percent of all releases – was most likely used when promoting the organization itself.

There were also broader Republican and conservative themes throughout the releases – not so much particular words but rather ideas like “personal responsibility,” the Republican Party’s “big tent philosophy,” and how adopting pro-LGBT stances would be a winning strategy for the party for future elections. All three ideas were most prevalent in self-promotional releases. The specific theme of electoral gains was prevalent in a number of releases, mentioned 129 separate times across 61 – or 19 percent of – releases. Thirty percent of all releases referencing electoral benefits were about Log Cabin itself, 20 percent were about the 2012 election, and 15 percent were about marriage.

Throughout all of its published materials, Log Cabin thus employs a certain style of rhetoric, using a number of words, phrases, and frames that embodied Republican and conservative values and principles. While the organization most frequently uses the more left-leaning value of equality – though Log Cabin considers “equality” a Republican value, as well, according to my interview with its senior member – it intentionally also references Republican ideas like freedom, conservatism, constitutionalism, and individual rights, repeatedly framing both LGBT-related and non-LGBT issues within this context. Importantly, many of these Republican and conservative values and themes are most prevalent in Log Cabin releases about marriage. By using these Republican values and themes, Log Cabin attempted to speak to its target audience of Republicans and conservatives in their own language.

## **The Human Rights Campaign**

### *Introductory and Mission Statements*

By comparison, the Human Rights Campaign takes a very different rhetorical approach in their published materials. On its “About Us” page, the organization describes itself as the “largest civil rights organization working to achieve equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Americans” (Human Rights Campaign 2016). It does not specify a particular audience and instead implies a much broader membership and set of goals: “By inspiring and engaging individuals and communities, HRC strives to end discrimination against LGBT people and realize a world that achieves fundamental fairness and equality for all.” Whereas the Log Cabin Republicans’ own name specifies a partisan affiliation, HRC’s name touts its inclusivity: through its advocacy on behalf of LGBT people, the organization strives to secure the same rights for everyone. HRC’s mission statement and other introductory text furthermore uses terminology that calls upon principles fundamental to the Democratic Party and liberalism, continually referencing words like “equality,” “discrimination,” and “fairness”; unlike Log Cabin, HRC does not reference any values previously classified as Republican or conservative in their introductory or mission sections on their website.

### *Release Topics*

As seen in Table 4.2, HRC focused entirely on LGBT issues in the sample of releases that were analyzed. Whereas 17 percent of Log Cabin’s releases made no mention of LGBT issues and instead reinforced unrelated Republican positions, virtually all HRC issues addressed the organization’s main cause of LGBT rights in some way,



with half of all releases mentioning marriage, specifically. In fact, marriage was the main topic of 33 percent of HRC releases under study, as well as the only topic with a substantial number of releases published about it compared to all other issues and items that HRC discussed. Many of the marriage-related releases dealt with legislation, individual state legalization, and related HRC campaigns. HRC's release on the day of the *Obergefell* ruling, for example, struck a decidedly different – and much more celebratory tone – than did Log Cabin's release on the same day about the same subject, applauding the ruling and highlighting the need to continue the fight for total equality beyond marriage:

Today's ruling makes perfectly clear that there is no legal or moral justification for standing in the path of marriage equality. Couples from Mississippi to North Dakota to Texas shouldn't have to wait even a moment longer to be treated equally under the law," said HRC president Chad Griffin. "State officials across the country must act swiftly to ensure that every obstacle to obtaining a marriage license is removed. To do anything less is a shameful attempt to cement their state on the wrong side of history. But what's clear today is that our work isn't done until every discriminatory law in this nation is wiped away. The time has come in this country for comprehensive federal LGBT non-discrimination protections. We now have to work harder than ever before to make sure LGBT Americans cannot be fired, evicted or denied services simply on the basis of the marriage license that they fought so hard to achieve.

In general, nearly one fifth or more of all HRC releases were dedicated to marriage each year, yet much like Log Cabin, some years were more likely to address the issue than others. HRC was most likely to dedicate releases to marriage from 2011-2014, producing more than double the number of marriage-focused releases than they did in either 2010 or 2015. The rise and fall of marriage occupying release content paralleled that of Log Cabin's – most likely due to the numerous cases of state legalization that took place during this time period and the lead up to the Supreme Court cases for *Windsor* and *Hollingsworth*.

[INSERT TABLE 4.9 and TABLE 4.10 HERE]

HRC also notably highlighted celebrities in these releases, mostly as part of their Americans for Marriage Equality campaign. This reliance upon famous personalities is a stark contrast to the complete absence of celebrity involvement in Log Cabin releases and parallels the differences in visibility of celebrity involvement in the Democratic and Republican parties, in general. As for mentions of political figures in marriage-related releases, HRC kept it to a minimum on both sides of the aisle, though still favored Democrats to a greater degree: 16 percent of marriage-related releases praised Democrats, and not a single release admonished Democrats, whereas only 5 percent of marriage-related releases praised Republicans and 11 percent admonished them. A breakdown of party praise and admonishment by all release topics can be seen in Table 4.11.

[INSERT TABLE 4.11 HERE]

In terms of how HRC described the issue of marriage, the organization most frequently used the term “marriage equality,” employing this phrase in 69 percent of all releases. Its abundant usage is due, in part, to a fact sheet HRC began to attach to every press release entitled “5 Things to Know About LGBT Issues,” which highlighted the June 2015 “marriage equality” Supreme Court ruling. HRC also often referred to marriage using the more neutral phrase “same-sex marriage,” featured in 51 percent of all releases. As for the terms “civil marriage” and the “freedom to marry,” however, HRC employed each term just 2 percent of the time throughout the six-year span. Usage of the latter, in particular, was mostly connected with HRC’s partnership with Freedom to

Marry; HRC utilized the “freedom” language of their partnering organization in any releases about their joint ventures.

Beyond the issue of marriage, HRC covered a variety of topics in its releases, though all to a much lesser extent than its foremost concern. Releases dealing with some type of discrimination – mainly about various pieces of legislation – made up 7 percent of all releases. Relatedly, 7 percent of releases dealt with LGBT employment, workplace regulations, and related legislation. Five percent discussed – and condemned – instances of hate speech, crimes, and acts toward the LGBT community, and another 5 percent discussed general efforts toward and matters involving equality. HRC also dedicated a handful of releases to religious matters such as Pope Francis’ visit and the religious freedom debate that grew in the wake of *Obergefell*, as well as education, transgender issues, coming out, gay adoption, the Boy Scouts, immigration, and reparative therapy.

While HRC and Log Cabin covered some of the same topics during a similar time span, the groups did so to different degrees. The disparity in marriage coverage is stark: HRC was more than twice as likely as Log Cabin to publish marriage-focused releases. HRC was also more likely than Log Cabin to focus on issues regarding discrimination, especially in the workplace; while Log Cabin did cover discrimination and LGBT workplace issues, specifically dedicating a few releases to the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, these topics were not as prevalent as others. DADT, on the other hand, is a rare instance where Log Cabin had more extensive coverage. Given Log Cabin’s direct involvement with fighting for DADT’s repeal, it was the group’s most covered issue – 18 percent of all of its releases, compared to only 4 percent of all HRC

releases. Log Cabin was also more likely than HRC to self-promote and to cover various election cycles.

Each group also covered a set of unique topics that the other did not. Log Cabin focused mostly on election cycles, endorsements, and both praising and chastising Republicans and especially Democrats alike. Electoral matters, political endorsements, and even within-party praise were low priorities in the HRC releases sampled. Log Cabin also dedicated releases to important Republican issues like the federal budget, taxes, international relations, the economy, and gun issues – topics never covered by HRC throughout the six-year timespan. In fact, the only other LGBT-related issues that Log Cabin covered beyond marriage and DADT were HIV and AIDS and the Violence Against Women Act – both of which were covered by HRC to a similar extent. HRC, on the other hand, covered a much wider range of issues that virtually all fit directly within its mission of furthering LGBT rights; a number of these issues were never addressed by Log Cabin.

This disparity in topics undoubtedly stems from Log Cabin's unique mission of furthering LGBT causes within a resistant party. Unlike HRC, Log Cabin cannot readily or forcefully tackle issues like transgender rights and the discriminatory nature of religious freedom policies due to the potential backlash it would face from Republicans and the subsequent damage it would do to Log Cabin being increasingly accepted within the party's "tent." Instead, Log Cabin is forced to adhere to a delicate balance of convincing fellow Republicans that the group is on their side, while simultaneously trying to gradually push Republican views on LGBT issues toward greater acceptance. Log Cabin's range of non-LGBT topics echoes what LaSalvia and the senior Log Cabin

member described as their respective organizations' strategies in Chapter 3: first show that you are a team player and support almost everything that the GOP supports; then show how Republican positions benefit LGBT individuals; and then gradually tie those same principles that underlie other Republican stances to LGBT issues once you have won their trust and they are ready to hear you. Therefore, for Log Cabin, publishing releases on elections, endorsements, and even praise of fellow GOP members all fits with the group's goal of subtly, cautiously, and respectfully reshaping LGBT attitudes from the inside.

In sharp contrast, while HRC claims no official partisan affiliation, it regularly sides with Democratic stances and partners with Democratic politicians, as well as adopts Democratic language. HRC can vigorously advocate and push for a wide range of LGBT-related issues beyond marriage precisely because its mission and causes are already accepted and embraced by the political party with which it affiliates most. Thus, HRC does not need to excessively praise every incremental step toward equality taken by Democrats or aggressively attack Republicans at every opportunity as a sign of Democratic solidarity because the group is already part of the Democratic team.

#### *Key word and phrase search*

When it comes to comparing the text of HRC releases to those of Log Cabin, the two organizations are once again distinct. As seen in Table 4.12, HRC relies almost exclusively on language that emphasizes Democratic values: all releases except one use some form of the word "equality" at least once, as do all releases focused on marriage. Some form of the word itself is referenced 1,724 times throughout all 300 releases. This

is no doubt due in large part to HRC’s reliance on the phrase “marriage equality” to describe same-sex marriage. Among all releases where “equality” is mentioned at least once, 33 percent of them are about marriage – more than triple the percentage for any other topic. Likewise, among marriage-specific releases only, “equality” was evoked 100 percent of the time. In fact, “equality” was referenced 100 percent within virtually every release topic, with the exception of DADT – where it was referenced in 92 percent of DADT releases.

[INSERT TABLE 4.12 HERE]

Similarly, “right” or “rights” was referenced 1,077 times, used at least once in 99 percent of all releases as well.<sup>54</sup> Like equality, the value was referenced in 100 percent of virtually every kind of release. “Discrimination” follows a similar pattern: some form of the word was mentioned at least once in 95 percent of all sampled releases, with the exception of election-focused releases. Like the other two values, it was mentioned 90 to 100 percent of the time in most releases – except for election-related ones, where it was mentioned 83 percent of the time, and self-promotional releases, where it was mentioned 85 percent of the time. Finally, “fairness” was also a very prevalent term, employed to only a slightly lesser extent: 77 percent of releases referenced something about “fairness,” as did 82 percent of marriage-specific releases. Over six in ten releases no matter the topic referenced “fairness.”

[INSERT TABLE 4.13 AND TABLE 4.14 HERE]

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<sup>54</sup> Given that the word “rights” is also a part of HRC’s name, every mention of “Human Rights Campaign,” as well as other proper names of campaigns, organizations, and bills, was not included in the keyword counts in order to not bias the results toward proper nouns. Instead, the keyword counts are meant to reflect the values and reasoning used to justify their advocacy. The same stipulations were applied to content analysis for the Log Cabin Republicans where appropriate.

What was noticeably absent from HRC’s releases was any regular usage of more conservative or Republican terminology, values, and ideas to support their advocacy, as Log Cabin had done. While over half of HRC releases included something about “individuals,” mentions of this term were simply used to describe members of the LGBT community and not – as Log Cabin had used the word – to emphasize the value of individualism, self-reliance, and independence. Usage of other Republican-affiliated values and principles like freedom, liberty, and personal responsibility were less frequent. Freedom, for example, was mentioned at least once in only 13 percent of all releases, in 13 percent of LGBT-related releases, and in 10 percent of marriage-specific releases. In total, some form of the word was used 65 times in 38 different press releases. Liberty and personal responsibility were mentioned in 2 and 3 percent of all releases, respectively.

There were only a handful of mentions of the words “conservative” – mostly in a negative context – as well as anything about the First Amendment or electoral gains that could be made by supporting LGBT rights. Just 2 percent of all releases referenced each of these themes. Not a single release mentioned anything to do with limited government or big tent philosophy. This is in direct contrast to Log Cabin, in which 10 percent or more of all releases included each of these words and themes.

Each organization thus predominantly relied upon a different set of values to frame their advocacy, with their rhetorical choices reflecting the party with which they affiliate most. Only Log Cabin’s frequent usage of “equality” was surprising, given the value’s association with the Democratic Party and liberalism, but this may be due to both the widely accepted term of “marriage equality” and the group’s own interpretation of

partisan ownership over the value; whether co-opting “equality” as a Republican value is a good strategy or not still remains to be seen, however. Log Cabin furthermore tempered usage of traditional (left-leaning) pro-LGBT terminology with accepted language of the right tailored to its target audience; references to “freedom” and “conservative” combined – the next two words used most often throughout Log Cabin releases – surpass mentions of equality. Log Cabin also used a wider variety of values when discussing LGBT issues, with no single value dominating throughout.

While HRC used multiple values in its text to support LGBT issues as well, it mostly repeatedly emphasized concepts like equality, rights, and discrimination in almost every single release included within the sample. The group’s communications were furthermore largely devoid of any references to Republican-affiliated values and themes, specifically lacking mentions of ideas like “limited government,” “electoral gains,” and others that were used so prevalently by Log Cabin. Unlike Log Cabin, HRC acted as a typical LGBT advocate, able to rely on traditional pro-LGBT advocacy frames because they already matched the beliefs and principles of the party with which HRC affiliated most. HRC therefore had no need to see Republican and conservative themes and frames; it had enough allies and support already without them.

[TABLE X.7 HERE]

### **The Differing Rhetoric of Dueling Amicus Briefs**

A brief look at the content of legal documents submitted by Log Cabin and HRC further illustrates how the organizations diverge in terms of the language they use and how they frame LGBT issues. In the months leading up to *Obergefell v. Hodges* in 2015,



both Log Cabin’s sister think tank, Liberty Education Forum (LEF), and HRC submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in support of the petitioners (Brief of the Liberty Education Forum as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 2015; Brief of the Human Rights Campaign as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 2015). While the intent and end goal were similar (both wanted a same-sex marriage victory), the two organizations had very different bases for their arguments – much like how Log Cabin and HRC diverged in their chosen topics, content, rhetoric, and framing devices in the previously analyzed press releases. For LEF, the case was about freedom of speech as expressed through campaign finance laws – more specifically, political contributions. LEF argued that an individual’s First Amendment right to make a political contribution was being prevented for those in same-sex relationships who were not allowed to marry because they did not receive – as married couples do – “spousal exemption” when it came to contribution limits. As LEF stated:

Respondents’ same-sex marriage prohibitions, when viewed together with their campaign finance laws, result in similarly situated couples having unequal rights to engage in the political process through political contributions. A state’s differential treatment with regard to core First Amendment rights violates the Fourteenth Amendment. (4)

LEF further argued that this right to make a political contribution should not differ based on the resident state of the donor or recipient, effectively advocating for the recognition of same-sex marriages in other states.

LEF moreover had specific justices in mind when submitting the brief – namely, Justices Scalia and Thomas. Liberty Education Forum and Log Cabin Republicans National Executive Director Gregory T. Angelo made this intention explicit in a public statement upon the brief’s submission to the court:

No two Justices on the Supreme Court have been more vocal about their opposition to curtailments of the First Amendment that exist because of restrictions on campaign contributions than Justices Scalia and Thomas. In states that ban marriage equality, straight couples literally have twice the freedom of speech as their same-sex counterparts. While we hope this argument resonates with all nine members of the Supreme Court, our amicus brief, formally filed with the Supreme Court last week, was prepared with the express purpose of appealing to the conservative wing of the Court by expressing the very real and quantifiable limits to the First Amendment that exist because of marriage equality bans. (The Liberty Education Forum 2015)

Again, much like Log Cabin's communications, LEF's brief was intended for a select audience and tailored its support arguments to the preferences of that audience.

HRC, on the other hand, took a much different approach with its amicus brief, which they dubbed "The People's Brief."<sup>55</sup> The organization argued that it was time to change the oppressive, discriminatory, and exclusionary laws that have worked against LGBT individuals in the past, especially given increasing acceptance and recognition of the LGBT community in recent years. In citing the Court's own text in overruling *Bowers v. Hardwick*, HRC wrote, "[Times] can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress" (2). HRC further asserted that, as found in *Windsor*, "gay people have dignity" and anti-LGBT laws and policies took away this dignity, which was supposed to be constitutionally guaranteed and respected equally under the law. Such anti-LGBT laws were thus unconstitutional because they were "inconsistent with the principles of due process and equal protection guaranteed to all Americans by the Constitution" (6).

The differing arguments featured in the amicus briefs are further evidence of the distinct messaging strategies and audience goals employed by pro-LGBT Republican advocates like Log Cabin compared to more mainstream, left-leaning advocates, like

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<sup>55</sup> HRC hand delivered its amicus brief, with help from HRC member and plaintiff Jim Obergefell, on March 6, 2015; the brief had 207,551 signatures – more than any other amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court ever.

HRC. Much like Log Cabin, LEF drew on issues important to Republicans, whereas HRC framed its argument within the traditionally used context of equality. The distinction is important, showing that their differing rhetorical strategies are used not only on the mass public but also with political elites. HRC's tactics are meant to capture a majority through a tried and true message of equality – whether it is of the electorate or the bench. Log Cabin, on the other hand, is not interested in the majority; it is only interested in convincing the seemingly invincible – in this instance, some of the most conservative justices on the Supreme Court – by using this group's own words and beliefs against them and their current issue positions.

### **Different Means to the Same End**

In sum, content analysis shows that even though Log Cabin and HRC both advocate for LGBT rights – including the right for same-sex couples to marry – they do so in different ways that are meant for different audiences. While Log Cabin has not – contrary to my original hypothesis – shied away from evoking the value of “equality” in its advocacy arguments, it also uniquely uses a number of other values and themes that are rooted in Republicanism and conservatism, foremost among them being freedom; the latter is more in line with what I originally predicted. This type of GOP-friendly language pervades virtually every single release studied during the five-year timespan. Log Cabin furthermore attempts to create kinship with its target audience through tactics that make a clear distinction between ally and enemy: they chastise Democrats at every turn possible, praise fellow Republicans for even the most incremental of steps toward LGBT acceptance, and endorse Republican candidates even with reservations over LGBT

issues. The group also addresses issues (like taxes and Obamacare) and utilizes particular themes (like future electoral gains and big tent philosophy) that resonate most with their fellow partisans. All of this being said, Log Cabin also ever so carefully challenges the party's status quo, calling out anti-LGBT Republicans and Republican actions, as well as warning about the negative electoral ramifications if the party does not undergo an attitudinal shift on LGBT issues.

These same tactics are not reflected in HRC's rhetoric. Unlike Log Cabin, the group rarely uses values affiliated with Republicanism or conservatism. HRC instead overwhelmingly relies on values like equality, discrimination, and fairness – which are all commonly associated with the Democratic Party – to frame pro-LGBT stances on a variety of issues. HRC moreover almost exclusively deals with LGBT-related issues and has an obvious slant toward favoring Democrats. In general, its releases preach to the already converted, the ones who are almost there, and the ones who are still able to evolve on the issue given that they are not motivated to reject either HRC's partisan leanings or value-laden arguments. As shown through its releases, HRC can push the LGBT envelope precisely because it is affiliated with an institution – the Democratic Party – that supports it and its cause. And when there is a related victory, HRC can fully celebrate it without worrying about being perceived by its base as “spoiled winners.”

Now that I have systematically analyzed the distinct kinds of frames used by Republican pro-LGBT advocates and have shown them to be different from those used by other pro-LGBT advocates, I can test what – if any – effects these frames actually have on Republican attitudes in the mass public. The chapter that follows details an original survey experiment that I conducted assessing the impact of these atypical

advocacy frames on a nationwide sample of Republicans. The experiment investigates the cross pressure environment that atypical advocacy frames create between partisan identity, evoked value orientation, and atypical issue position and measures whether this juxtaposition can successfully shift Republican mass opinion where traditional pro-LGBT frames about equality have failed.

**Table 4.1**  
**Content Analysis Keyword Search Terms**

<b>Democratic/liberal</b>	<b>Unaffiliated</b>	<b>Republican/conservative</b>
Discrimination	Constitution/constitutional	Freedom
Equality	Economy	Limited Government
Fairness	Electoral gains	Conservative
Rights	Family	Liberty
	First Amendment	Individual/individualism
	Inclusive	Personal responsibility
	Jobs	Big tent
	Taxes	
	Values	

**Table 4.2**  
**Log Cabin Republicans and Human Rights Campaign: Release Topic Comparison**

<b>Release Topic</b>	<b>Log Cabin % of All Releases</b>	<b>HRC % of All Releases</b>
DADT	18%	4%
Self-promotion	15%	4%
Marriage	14%	33%
Election	10%	2%
2010 Election	(1%)	-
2012 Election	(8%)	-
2014 Election	(1%)	-
2016 Election	(1%)	-
Admonishment	6%	2%
Democrat/Democratic Party admonishment	(3%)	-
Republican/Republican Party admonishment	(4%)	-
Political endorsement	5%	2%
International Relations	3%	-
Budget	3%	-
Taxes	3%	-
Within-party praise	3%	2%
Workplace	3%	7%
Education	2%	3%
Campaign finances	1%	
CPAC	1%	-
Debt ceiling	1%	-
Discrimination	1%	7%
Economy	1%	-
Gun issues	1%	-

HIV/AIDS	1%	<1%
LGBT advocacy admonishment	1%	-
Military	1%	-
Obamacare	1%	-
Religion	1%	4%
State of the Union	1%	-
Unemployment	1%	-
Violence Against Women Act	1%	1%
Health	<1%	2%
Religious freedom	<1%	4%
Reparative therapy	<1%	1%
Olympics	<1%	<1%
Adoption	-	2%
Boy Scouts	-	1%
Coming out	-	1%
Domestic partnerships	-	2%
Equality	-	5%
General praise	-	2%
Hate speech, crimes, and acts	-	5%
Immigration	-	1%
Transgender issues	-	3%

**Table 4.3**  
**Log Cabin Republicans: Release Topic by Year**

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
2010 election	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2012 election	0%	12%	25%	0%	0%	0%
2014 election	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%
2016 election	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%
Budget	0%	9%	3%	0%	0%	0%
Campaign finance	0%	0%	0%	9%	0%	0%
CPAC	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	7%
DADT	59%	22%	3%	2%	0%	0%
Debt ceiling	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Dem admonishment	0%	1%	5%	2%	10%	0%
Discrimination	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%
Education	3%	2%	0%	2%	3%	0%
GOP admonishment	5%	2%	3%	7%	10%	0%
GOP praise	2%	4%	2%	5%	0%	3%
Gun issues	2%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Health	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%
HIV/AIDS	3%	1%	0%	0%	3%	0%
International Relations	2%	3%	2%	7%	3%	7%
LGBT advocate admonishment	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Marriage	2%	13%	22%	25%	13%	13%
Military	0%	1%	3%	0%	0%	0%
Obamacare	2%	1%	0%	2%	0%	3%
Olympics	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Political endorsement	5%	3%	8%	2%	10%	7%
Religion	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%
Religious freedom	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%
Reparative Therapy	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Self-promotion	9%	13%	13%	14%	23%	29%
SOTU	0%	0%	0%	2%	3%	0%
Taxes	3%	3%	3%	5%	0%	3%
Unemployment	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
VAWA	0%	0%	3%	5%	0%	0%
Workplace	0%	3%	2%	5%	10%	0%



**Table 4.4**  
**Log Cabin Republicans: Year by Release Topic**

	2010 election	2012 election	2014 election	2016 election	Budget	DADT	Dem admonishment	Workplace	Education	GOP admonishment	GOP praise	Marriage	International Relations	Political endorsement	Self-promotion	Taxes
<b>2010</b>	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	59%	0%	0%	33%	23%	11%	2%	9%	18%	11%	20%
<b>2011</b>	0%	42%	0%	0%	82%	36%	13%	33%	33%	15%	44%	27%	27%	18%	26%	30%
<b>2012</b>	0%	58%	0%	0%	18%	3%	38%	11%	0%	15%	11%	29%	9%	29%	17%	20%
<b>2013</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	13%	22%	17%	23%	22%	24%	27%	6%	13%	20%
<b>2014</b>	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	38%	33%	17%	23%	0%	9%	9%	18%	15%	0%
<b>2015</b>	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	11%	9%	18%	12%	19%	10%

Release topic category included only if above 1 percent of all total releases. Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.

**Table 4.5**  
**Log Cabin Republicans: Party Praise and Admonishment by Release Topic**

	2010 election	2012 election	2014 election	2016 election	Budget	DADT	Dem admonishment	Workplace	Education	GOP admonishment	GOP praise	Marriage	International Relations	Political endorsement	Self-promotion	Taxes
<b>GOP Praise</b>	50%	69%	100%	0%	46%	15%	50%	78%	83%	8%	89%	76%	55%	100%	45%	60%
<b>GOP Criticism</b>	0%	65%	100%	25%	9%	14%	0%	11%	0%	100%	0%	13%	0%	6%	9%	0%
<b>Dem Praise</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Dem Criticism</b>	0%	31%	50%	0%	73%	49%	100%	11%	17%	0%	11%	13%	18%	6%	2%	50%

Release topic category included only if above 1 percent of all total releases. Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.

**Table 4.6**  
**Log Cabin Republicans: Press Release Keyword Count and Percentage**

<b>Value Keyword</b>	<b>Total Mentions Count</b>	<b>Number of Releases Mentioned</b>	<b>Percentage of Releases Mentioned</b>
Equality	285	127	40%
Freedom	216	109	34%
Conservative	184	96	30%
Constitution/constitutional	165	81	25%
Right/rights	155	78	24%
Discrimination	91	61	19%
Electoral gains	129	61	19%
Inclusive	88	59	18%
Limited government	72	57	18%
Liberty	81	51	16%
Family	84	45	14%
Taxes	122	44	14%
First amendment	47	42	13%
Individual/individualism	73	40	13%
Values	47	38	12%
Fairness	32	27	8%
Personal responsibility	27	25	8%
Big tent	37	22	7%
Economy	26	20	6%
Jobs	14	12	4%

“Number of releases mentioned” and “percentage of releases mentioned” calculated as mentioned at least once in the release.

**Table 4.7**  
**Log Cabin Republicans: Release Topic by Keyword**

	Equality	Freedom	Conservative	Constitution	Right/rights	Discrimination	Electoral gains	Inclusive	Limited gov.	Liberty
<b>DADT</b>	2%	15%	3%	54%	17%	21%	0%	0%	2%	4%
<b>Self-promotion</b>	23%	21%	22%	9%	18%	13%	30%	42%	25%	22%
<b>Marriage</b>	25%	22%	23%	19%	18%	8%	15%	9%	25%	33%
<b>2012 election</b>	11%	8%	10%	6%	8%	7%	20%	10%	11%	12%
<b>Political endors.</b>	8%	10%	10%	0%	8%	10%	12%	10%	12%	10%
<b>GOP admonish.</b>	5%	2%	3%	1%	4%	3%	8%	2%	5%	4%
<b>Inter. Relations</b>	2%	1%	1%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Budget</b>	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%
<b>Taxes</b>	3%	1%	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	4%	4%
<b>Workplace</b>	2%	3%	0%	0%	4%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>GOP praise</b>	2%	3%	6%	0%	0%	2%	5%	12%	4%	2%
<b>Dem admonish.</b>	3%	2%	2%	3%	5%	7%	2%	2%	0%	2%
<b>Education</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	2%	2%	2%
<b>2016 election</b>	2%	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%	0%	2%	0%	2%
<b>Discrimination</b>	2%	1%	2%	0%	3%	7%	2%	3%	0%	2%
<b>2010 election</b>	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
<b>2014 election</b>	2%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	2%	2%	0%

Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.

**Table 4.8**  
**Log Cabin Republicans: Keyword by Release Topic**

	<b>DADT</b>	<b>Self-promot.</b>	<b>Marriage</b>	<b>2012 election</b>	<b>Pol. endors.</b>	<b>GOP admon.</b>	<b>Inter. Relations</b>	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Taxes</b>	<b>Workplace</b>
<b>Equality</b>	3%	62%	71%	54%	59%	46%	18%	0%	40%	33%
<b>Freedom</b>	27%	49%	53%	35%	65%	15%	9%	9%	10%	33%
<b>Conservative</b>	5%	45%	49%	38%	59%	23%	9%	9%	30%	0%
<b>Constitution</b>	75%	15%	33%	19%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Right/rights</b>	22%	30%	31%	23%	35%	23%	27%	0%	0%	33%
<b>Discrimination</b>	22%	17%	11%	15%	35%	15%	0%	0%	10%	44%
<b>Electoral Gains</b>	0%	38%	20%	46%	41%	38%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Inclusive</b>	0%	53%	11%	23%	35%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Limited Government</b>	2%	30%	31%	23%	41%	23%	0%	18%	20%	0%
<b>Liberty</b>	3%	23%	38%	23%	29%	15%	0%	0%	20%	0%
<b>Family</b>	3%	13%	36%	23%	0%	15%	18%	36%	0%	11%
<b>Taxes</b>	2%	15%	9%	4%	35%	0%	27%	45%	80%	0%
<b>First Amendment</b>	59%	4%	2%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Individualism</b>	0%	21%	27%	19%	29%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Values</b>	3%	34%	16%	12%	18%	15%	9%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Fairness</b>	2%	17%	4%	8%	12%	0%	0%	0%	40%	33%
<b>Personal responsibility</b>	0%	17%	9%	12%	29%	0%	0%	0%	10%	0%
<b>Big Tent</b>	0%	26%	2%	8%	12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Economy</b>	0%	0%	4%	0%	18%	8%	18%	45%	20%	11%
<b>Jobs</b>	2%	0%	4%	0%	6%	8%	0%	18%	10%	11%

Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.

**Table 4.9**  
**Human Rights Campaign: Release Topic by Year**

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Admonishment</b>	0%	8%	0%	2%	0%	3%
<b>Adoption</b>	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%	4%
<b>Boy Scouts</b>	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	1%
<b>Coming out</b>	0%	0%	2%	2%	4%	0%
<b>DADT</b>	25%	4%	0%	2%	0%	0%
<b>Dem Praise</b>	3%	0%	8%	0%	0%	1%
<b>Discrimination</b>	6%	4%	2%	5%	4%	16%
<b>Domestic Partnerships</b>	3%	4%	2%	0%	0%	1%
<b>Education</b>	3%	2%	4%	5%	6%	1%
<b>Election</b>	3%	0%	6%	0%	2%	1%
<b>Endorsement</b>	6%	2%	2%	0%	2%	0%
<b>Equality</b>	0%	4%	2%	5%	6%	9%
<b>Hate speech, crimes, and acts</b>	6%	10%	2%	2%	4%	7%
<b>Health</b>	6%	4%	2%	2%	2%	0%
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%
<b>Immigration</b>	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%	1%
<b>Marriage</b>	19%	44%	47%	37%	38%	16%
<b>Olympics</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%
<b>Praise</b>	0%	0%	2%	5%	2%	3%
<b>Religion</b>	3%	2%	4%	5%	2%	6%
<b>Religious Freedom</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	11%
<b>Reparative Therapy</b>	0%	0%	2%	0%	2%	1%
<b>Self-promotion</b>	0%	6%	2%	10%	4%	4%
<b>Transgender</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	6%
<b>VAWA</b>	0%	0%	4%	2%	0%	0%
<b>Workplace</b>	11%	6%	4%	7%	8%	7%

**Table 4.10**  
**Human Rights Campaign: Year by Release Topic**

	Admonishment	Adoption	DADT	Dem Praise	Discrimination	Domestic Partnerships	Education	Election	Endorsement	Equality	Hate speech, crimes, and acts	Health	Marriage	Praise	Religion	Religious Freedom	Self-promotion	Transgender	Workplace
<b>2010</b>	0%	33%	75%	17%	10%	20%	10%	17%	40%	0%	13%	29%	7%	0%	9%	0%	0%	0%	19%
<b>2011</b>	57%	0%	17%	0%	10%	40%	10%	0%	20%	14%	31%	29%	22%	0%	9%	0%	23%	0%	14%
<b>2012</b>	0%	17%	0%	67%	5%	20%	20%	50%	20%	7%	6%	14%	24%	17%	18%	0%	8%	0%	10%
<b>2013</b>	14%	0%	8%	0%	10%	0%	20%	0%	0%	14%	6%	14%	15%	33%	18%	0%	31%	0%	14%
<b>2014</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%	0%	30%	17%	20%	21%	13%	14%	20%	17%	9%	27%	15%	50%	19%
<b>2015</b>	29%	50%	0%	17%	55%	20%	10%	17%	0%	43%	31%	0%	11%	33%	36%	73%	23%	50%	24%

Release topic category included only if above 1 percent of all total releases. Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.

**Table 4.11**  
**Human Rights Campaign: Party Praise and Admonishment by Release Topic**

	Admonishment	Adoption	DADT	Dem Praise	Discrimination	Domestic partnerships	Education	Election	Endorsement	Equality	Hate speech, crimes, and acts	Health	Marriage	Praise	Religion	Religious freedom	Self-promotion	Transgender issues	Workplace
<b>GOP Praise</b>	0%	17%	25%	0%	20%	20%	10%	0%	0%	14%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	9%	0%	0%	14%
<b>GOP Criticism</b>	57%	17%	0%	0%	25%	0%	0%	67%	40%	0%	13%	0%	11%	0%	0%	18%	0%	25%	14%
<b>Dem Praise</b>	0%	17%	42%	100%	30%	40%	20%	50%	100%	14%	0%	43%	16%	0%	0%	0%	15%	0%	24%
<b>Dem Criticism</b>	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%

Release topic category included only if above 1 percent of all total releases. Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.



**Table 4.12**  
**Human Rights Campaign: Press Release Keyword Count and Percentage**

<b>Value Keyword</b>	<b>Total Mentions Count</b>	<b>Number of Releases Mentioned</b>	<b>Percentage of Releases Mentioned</b>
Equality	1724	298	99%
Right/rights	1079	296	99%
Discrimination	1077	286	95%
Fairness	308	231	77%
Constitution/constitutional	255	164	55%
Individual/individualism	195	154	51%
Family	261	119	40%
Inclusive	154	59	20%
Values	57	39	13%
Freedom	65	38	13%
Jobs	49	34	11%
Economy	31	21	7%
Taxes	41	12	4%
Liberty	12	10	3%
Personal responsibility	8	7	2%
Conservative	11	6	2%
First Amendment	6	6	2%
Electoral gains	15	6	2%
Limited government	0	0	-
Big tent	0	0	-

“Number of releases mentioned” and “percentage of releases mentioned” calculated as mentioned at least once in the release.

**Table 4.13**  
**Human Rights Campaign: Release Topic by Keyword**

	<b>Equality</b>	<b>Right/rights</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Fairness</b>	<b>Constitution</b>	<b>Individualism</b>	<b>Family</b>	<b>Inclusive</b>	<b>Values</b>	<b>Freedom</b>
<b>Marriage</b>	33%	33%	32%	35%	34%	25%	34%	3%	28%	26%
<b>Workplace</b>	7%	7%	7%	8%	7%	9%	7%	17%	8%	5%
<b>Discrimination</b>	7%	7%	7%	7%	10%	10%	7%	14%	13%	18%
<b>Hate speech, crimes, acts</b>	5%	5%	6%	5%	5%	6%	5%	0%	5%	5%
<b>Equality</b>	5%	5%	5%	4%	5%	6%	5%	10%	3%	11%
<b>Self promotion</b>	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	4%	10%	5%	3%
<b>DADT</b>	4%	4%	4%	4%	0%	0%	2%	0%	3%	3%
<b>Religion</b>	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	6%	9%	10%	8%
<b>Religious freedom</b>	4%	4%	4%	4%	7%	7%	3%	2%	5%	13%
<b>Education</b>	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	3%	9%	5%	3%
<b>Transgender</b>	3%	3%	3%	2%	4%	4%	2%	2%	0%	3%
<b>Admonishment</b>	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%	2%	0%	0%
<b>Health</b>	2%	2%	2%	3%	1%	3%	6%	5%	3%	0%
<b>Adoption</b>	2%	2%	2%	1%	3%	3%	4%	3%	3%	0%
<b>Democratic Praise</b>	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%
<b>Election</b>	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	0%	5%	0%
<b>Praise</b>	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Domestic partnerships</b>	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%	0%	3%	0%
<b>Endorsement</b>	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	3%	0%	0%	0%

Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.

**Table 4.14**  
**Human Rights Campaign: Keyword by Release Topic**

	<b>Marriage</b>	<b>Workplace</b>	<b>Discrimination</b>	<b>Hate speech/crime/act</b>	<b>Equality</b>	<b>Self-promotion</b>	<b>DADT</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Religious freedom</b>	<b>Education</b>
<b>Equality</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	92%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Rights</b>	99%	95%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Discrim.</b>	93%	100%	100%	100%	93%	85%	100%	91%	100%	90%
<b>Fairness</b>	82%	90%	85%	69%	64%	69%	83%	73%	73%	70%
<b>Constit.</b>	56%	52%	80%	50%	57%	54%	0%	64%	100%	40%
<b>Individ.</b>	39%	67%	75%	56%	64%	62%	0%	73%	100%	40%
<b>Family</b>	41%	38%	40%	38%	43%	38%	17%	64%	27%	30%
<b>Inclus.</b>	2%	48%	40%	0%	43%	46%	0%	45%	9%	50%
<b>Values</b>	11%	14%	25%	13%	7%	15%	8%	36%	18%	20%
<b>Free</b>	10%	10%	35%	13%	29%	8%	8%	27%	45%	10%
<b>Jobs</b>	4%	33%	30%	6%	14%	0%	25%	18%	9%	30%
<b>Econ.</b>	4%	14%	20%	0%	0%	15%	0%	0%	36%	0%
<b>Taxes</b>	7%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Liberty</b>	2%	10%	5%	6%	0%	0%	0%	9%	18%	0%
<b>Prsn res.</b>	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	18%	0%	0%
<b>Consrv.</b>	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Amd.</b>	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	27%	10%
<b>Gains</b>	2%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Columns represent the percentage of each keyword being mentioned at least once.

## Chapter 5

### The Effects of Cross-Pressure Frames on Republican Same-Sex Marriage Attitudes Pre and Post *Obergefell v. Hodges*

*“I do not understand why it is the government[’s] business at all. People have the freedom to do as they wish in this country as long as they aren’t hurting someone else. In general it[’]s none of their business and should not have to be approved by anyone. I wa[s] surprised at the Republican comments, traditionally they oppose it, but I complete[l]y agree with the comments that a family is a very central Republican philosophy. And happy some Republicans seem to favor same sex marriage now. I believe everyone should have the right to be happy.”*

*- Republican respondent, pre-Obergefell decision*

*“The article focused [on] First Amendment rights. This should be secondary to the fact that [the] Supreme Court broke the law by changing and creating their own law with all of this.”*

*- Republican respondent, post-Obergefell decision*

While interviews and content analysis assist in understanding why and how atypical Republican advocates advocate in favor of same-sex marriage, these methods provide little insight into the impact – if any – that their usage of cross-pressure framing has on public opinion, particularly on their target audience of fellow Republicans and conservatives. Republicans and conservatives at the mass level are, after all, at least part of their advocacy equation, as I discovered through interviews. But these efforts do not necessarily mean their fellow partisans are listening. To test what, if any, effect atypical Republican advocates’ pro-same-sex marriage frames have on their intended audience, I conducted a national online survey of self-identified Republican and Republican leaning-adults that included a framing experiment assessing the most common pro-same-sex marriage frames used by atypical Republican advocates, as determined through the

aforementioned interviews with select advocates and content analysis of their publicly available materials.

### **Why the Experimental Method**

A survey experiment is an ideal way to test if there is a causal relationship between the cross-pressure frames and any movement in subsequent attitudes on same-sex marriage and other related questions. In general, experiments provide the ability to assess causality because of the control that they afford due to random assignment. If both observed and unobserved variables are controlled for due to each subject having an equal chance at being assigned to an experimental condition, thus producing similar groups or cells within the experiment, then we can be confident that the main dependent variable under study does indeed affect the independent variable; in other words, the cause comes before the effect, and the relationship is not spurious or explained through another variable (Morton and Williams 2010; Mutz 2011, 9). Experimental control, also known as internal validity, can have its weaknesses, however: experiments are typically a tradeoff between control in the laboratory and generalizability to the outside world. Ideally, experimental findings should remain true in real life, yet they are often lacking in external validity due to issues like experimental demand, small or non-diverse samples, unrealistic laboratory conditions, or the inability to hold true with other populations or across time (Christensen 2000). For example, student subject pools – an oft-used sample for experiments – have been frequently criticized as not generalizable enough to the general population due to “less-crystallized attitudes, less-formulated senses of self,

stronger cognitive skills, stronger tendencies to comply with authority, and more unstable peer group relationships” (Sears 1986, 515).

Survey experiments attempt to rectify this tradeoff, combining the internal validity and control of experimental designs done in the laboratory with the external validity of randomly drawn, larger, and more diverse samples that reflect the population (Mutz 2011). Mutz calls the survey experiment a “hybrid,” using “the power of random assignment to establish unbiased causal inferences” with “randomly selected, representative samples of the target population of interest” (1, 3). This arguably gives surveys an advantage over other experimental methods. Survey experiments use larger, more diverse samples that reflect the general population instead of subject pools; have greater statistical power due to these larger sample sizes and are thus able to detect smaller effects; allow for more detailed study of particular segments of the population; and encourage and enable researchers to assess causality through experimental manipulations, as well as test more complex designs than what other experimental methods are able to handle (10-18).

Yet just like any other design, survey experiments also have weaknesses. While they are arguably unmatched in their ability to balance internal and external validity, there are concerns about modes of delivery: particularly for in person and online surveys, experimenters may lose some control of the subject’s environment due to inattention or possible presence of external stimuli that may affect subsequent attitudes. Much like other experimental designs, the effects of survey experiments may also be fleeting and artificial – especially if the stimuli are brief and/or a singular exposure, isolated from exposure to competing messages and other distractions, and bolstered by knowledge

subjects may or may not normally encounter in the real world (Barabas and Jerit 2010; Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007; Kinder 2007; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Therefore, survey experiments may still inflate any signs of causality despite all of its promising features as a superior experimental design, and the ability to generalize such results to the outside world continues to be a concern. Even within the survey experiment design itself, single exposure to stimuli may not have a significant impact on subjects, given subjects' prior exposure in the real world to competing messages that are potentially stronger and louder – especially on issues like same-sex marriage, in which competing frames have been embedded on each side of the debate (and political aisle) for years. Any evidence of framing effects – particularly attempts to reframe salient and deep-seated issues – can be rare, take time, and may only appear after repeated exposure (see Baumgartner et al. 2009; Druckman and Nelson 2003).

Nevertheless, I proceed with a survey experiment because it affords me to test a number of complex relationships between various conditions on a large, diversified sample within a specific subset of the population (Republicans); it furthermore enables me to assess more subtle effects, given the difficulty in moving opinions on same-sex marriage within this group, which I would not be able to do as easily in other experimental settings. The survey experiment thus allows me to begin to systematically assess whether or not Republican atypical advocates' usage of cross-pressure frames have an effect on their target audience of fellow Republicans and conservatives. The discovery of any causal relationships between the frames and resulting attitudes will provide preliminary evidence that cross-pressure frames may indeed have an impact

where existing frames have yet to move opinions among this target population – especially given that the single-exposure treatments will act as a strict test of cross-pressure framing effects.

### **Study Design**

Participants were recruited using an online panel from Survey Sampling International, Inc., which also administered the survey online. Data collection took place through the online platform Qualtrics. The survey was executed at two different, yet close together, time points in late June and early July 2015 in order to capture attitudes on same-sex marriage surrounding the timing of the U.S. Supreme Court decision's on *Obergefell v. Hodges*. The first half of the sample was recruited and surveyed prior to the Court's decision from June 17 through June 19, 2015. The actual decision was announced on June 26, 2015. The other half was recruited and surveyed soon after the decision from July 1 to July 7, 2015. Conducting the same survey experiment both prior to and immediately after *Obergefell* served as an additional natural experiment to the survey experiment itself, allowing me to assess if and how attitudes both overall and within each condition of the survey experiment shifted due to the Supreme Court's decision. Both survey samples were comprised of adults who identified as Republican or leaning Republican, both through Survey Sampling International's own screening process and in my survey's initial screener questions; those who did not identify as either were terminated from the survey.



All respondents who were permitted to continue were then asked some preliminary demographic questions.<sup>56</sup> The experimental portion consisted of a between-subjects design that tested different value-laden conflicting cue frames in support of same-sex marriage. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of six different conditions: a control condition in which an unidentified speaker with no specified partisan affiliation advocated in favor of same-sex marriage using a very broad values-based argument; one of three different treatments in which the speaker, identified as a Republican, framed support for same-sex marriage within the context of either individual freedom, limited government, or strengthening the family unit; a treatment in which the speaker, identified as a Democrat, framed support for same-sex marriage within the context of equal rights; and a treatment in which the speaker, identified as a Republican, framed support for same-sex marriage within the context of equal rights.

The first two paragraphs of text, which remain identical in every condition, were pieced together from actual news articles.<sup>57</sup> The manipulated portions of text in each version of the article were formulated from actual speeches, editorials, and other published materials by real Democratic and Republican advocates; text for the conservative frames, in particular, was also based off of my interviews with atypical Republican advocates and content analysis of their organizations' websites, press releases, and public speeches. All versions of the mock article were approximately the

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<sup>56</sup> This was followed by an initial battery that asked about their adherence to several broad values, modeled after the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz 2007). Most framing studies have only selectively tested a few certain values, let alone tested general adherence to multiple values (Feldman 2003, 489). This Schwartz values battery allowed for testing the influence of a broad array of pre-existing value orientations that were not explicitly politically charged prior to the frames. This values battery had no impact on the survey experiments, however, and thus has been excluded from all analysis.

<sup>57</sup> Actual news articles used to develop the experiment's mock articles include *Associated Press* articles by Mark Sherman (2015) and an NPR article by Nina Totenberg (2015).

same length, though there is some variation in word count due to particular phrasing unique to each frame that mimicked existing publications, speeches, and advocate statements. (See Appendix A for all survey question text and the full set of stimuli shown exactly as displayed to respondents.)

As the focus here is assessing the distinct nature of atypical Republican advocacy rhetoric, three of the treatments mimic this messaging by each employing a commonly used Republican value by Republican LGBT advocates to frame support for same-sex marriage; these values were determined by the previous chapter's interviews with the senior Log Cabin official and GOProud founder Jimmy LaSalvia, as well as content analysis of Log Cabin's mission statement and press releases. These frames embody a type of cross-pressure framing and will hereafter be referred to as either "issue cross-pressure frames" or "Republican value frames."

The final two treatments test the strength of the most common liberal value used to frame same-sex marriage – equality. Each of these last two conditions features virtually identical text, but the partisanship of the speaker is varied: one condition (the rival party frame) attributes the featured quote to a Democrat and references Democratic advocates, while the other (the value-issue cross-pressure frame) attributes the same exact quote to a Republican and references Republican advocates. The Democrat equality frame is meant to mimic the type of same-sex marriage advocacy that has been most prevalent in real life, that Republicans have most likely come in contact with before, and that they have continued to seemingly reject given their majority opposition toward the issue despite numerous "marriage equality" campaigns. The Republican equality frame, on the other hand, juxtaposes the evoked liberal value with a supportive Republican

speaker in order to isolate the effect of the speaker's partisanship; it is also a type of cross-pressure frame where neither the value evoked or issue used match the referenced partisanship ("value-issue cross-pressure frame"). This acts as a test to parse out whether any observed positive shifts in Republican attitudes are due to the speaker's Republican affiliation matched with the usage of a beheld Republican value or whether they are due purely to the speaker's partisanship, which acts as a heuristic for credibility, regardless of the value evoked. Table 5.1 breaks down the manipulations within each of the different stimuli and their respective word counts below.

[INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE]

Each of the conditions were expressed through a short mock article about same-sex marriage, disguised as a recent piece from the *Associated Press* in order to enhance the external validity of the text. The headline for each version of the article was kept constant, with the exception of 1) the moniker used to describe same-sex marriage, which varied in accordance with the value-based argument in the proceeding text, 2) the group advocating in favor of same-sex marriage, and 3) the specified timing in relation to *Obergefell v. Hodges*. Each article began with the same brief overview – either that the Supreme Court was about to make an historic decision or that the Court just announced an historic decision pertaining to same-sex marriage. Only the partisanship of the unidentified political leaders mentioned in the opening paragraphs varies based upon the subsequent frame, with the control group leaving partisanship unspecified. The various frames are employed within the statement given by an unidentified speaker, whose partisanship is also varied according to the context of the frame. In each treatment, the speaker uses a value-based argument in support of same-sex marriage, declares this

value-based advocacy argument as consistent with his or her partisan and/or ideological identity, and either urges the Supreme Court to rule in favor of same-sex marriage (if in the pre-decision version) or supports the Supreme Court's recent decision to effectively make it legal nationwide (if in the post-decision version).

After reading the article, respondents were asked to express their support for same-sex marriage on a 7-point scale from "strongly oppose" to "strongly support" – the primary dependent variable of this study. Respondents were then asked on a 7-point scale – from "very dissatisfied" to "very satisfied" – how they would feel if the Supreme Court's decision effectively made same-sex marriage legal nationwide; wording for those asked after the Supreme Court's decision were asked how they felt about the actual verdict. The extent to which certain factors – such as the details of the article, the respondent's prior beliefs, what other partisans believed, and the respondent's own experiences with gay and lesbian people – contributed to same-sex marriage attitudes were also assessed, followed by manipulation checks that tested the respondent's assessment of the frame's strength, the speaker's credibility, how closely the respondent read the article, and the respondent's verbatim recall of the text and a summary of their thoughts while reading it. Finally, respondents were asked about the Republican Party's official platform position on same-sex marriage, whether or not the GOP should maintain this position, and how important LGBT issues would be to the 2016 presidential election.

The following analysis will be broken down into three parts: the pre-decision survey, which took place immediately before the Supreme Court announced its decision in *Obergefell v. Hodges*; the post-decision survey, which took place immediately after the decision was announced; and the two surveys combined to create a larger sample for

more in-depth analysis. For each part, I will perform various analyses and statistical tests on each of the key dependent variables. I will address throughout how these findings fit with my original hypotheses and speculate on the patterns I observe, placing them within the context of *Obergefell*.

## **Pre-Decision Survey**

### *Sample Demographics*

The pre-decision Republican sample is an adequate representation of Republicans nationwide, with some exceptions. Compared to a 2015 Pew Research Center in-depth report on partisan affiliation, the pre-decision sample here is skewed more toward women, whereas Pew found that those who identify as Republican or lean Republican are more likely to be men (Pew Research Center 2015). This is a consequence of the online survey modality, in general, and SSI's online panel, in particular, which is roughly 60 percent women and 40 percent men – both overall and specifically among those who identify as Republican (see Pew Research Center 2016a). Both the online sample and Pew find Republicans and those who lean Republican tend to be older; the online sample has an especially large number of respondents who are age 65 and older. In terms of race, while Republicans, in general, are typically mostly white, the online sample is comprised almost entirely of white respondents – a common issue with most online surveys. As for educational level, the online sample was slightly better educated, containing less Republican and Republican-leaning respondents with up to a high school diploma and more respondents with at least some college. A demographic comparison between my online sample and the Pew sample can be seen in Table 5.2.

[INSERT TABLE 5.2 HERE]

Despite demographic discrepancies between the online sample here and the nationally representative Pew study, the sample maintained a suitable balance in terms of strength of partisanship and ideology. Sufficient variance in both variables, or even a sample skewed toward stronger partisanship and conservatism, is particularly important in this study to mitigate the possibility that any framing effects may be attributable to weaker partisan strength or more liberal ideological beliefs. Over half of respondents in this sample classified themselves as “strong” Republicans, and most said that they were somewhat or very conservative.

Respondents in the online pre-decision sample were also asked about their ideological position on economic issues and social issues separately, given arguments that ideology is not necessarily unidimensional (Feldman 2003). Respondents were slightly more ideologically conservative economically, but ideological placement was similar in both issue areas. Religion and contact with gay and lesbian individuals are also important factors in attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Forty-two percent attend religious services almost every week or more, while 58 percent attend once a month or less. In terms of familiarity with gay and lesbian individuals, 35 percent of respondents said they have a gay family member, 69 percent said they have a gay friend, and 27 percent said they know a gay coworker. See Table 5.3 for a breakdown by each of these demographics and characteristics.<sup>58</sup>

[INSERT TABLE 5.3 HERE]

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<sup>58</sup> The Pew Research Center study did not have a point of comparison for any of these additional demographics discussed.

As can be seen in Table 5.4, respondents were randomly assigned across the six different conditions in similar numbers. The demographic breakdowns within each condition are fairly balanced, as well, with the exception of gender. Specifically, the limited government frame has a higher percentage of men than women than any other condition (57 percent men to 43 percent women), as well as the only condition to have a majority of men receive the frame; in all other cases, the majority of respondents who received the condition were women. A series of randomization checks shows that there is no significant difference in assignment by a variety of key demographics, however, including gender. Therefore, I can be confident that individual-level characteristics did not impact assignment – and potentially, any subsequent findings – and that the conditions were randomly assigned across the entire sample. Nevertheless, I will address the anomaly of gender in subsequent analysis to make certain that the uneven distribution is accounted for in the treatment results.

[INSERT TABLE 5.4 HERE]

#### *Assessing the stimuli's external validity*

Before proceeding with analysis, it is important to first review how the stimuli performed. If the stimuli were not perceived as believable, then I would not be able to have much faith in any observed effects being directly caused by the frames. Overall, respondents claimed the article had limited influence on their stated opinion toward same-sex marriage: on a 7-point scale, with 1 meaning “did not contribute at all” and 7 meaning “contributed a great deal,” 26 percent rated the article’s contribution to their attitude on same-sex marriage as a 1, and another 22 percent rated it a 2 or 3. Twenty

percent rated the article's contribution to their support a 4 ("neither"), while 32 percent rated it a 5 or higher.<sup>59</sup>

Yet respondents held somewhat positive views about the validity of the articles themselves. Forty percent of respondents rated their given article a 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale assessing strength of argument, with 1 meaning "not strong at all" and 5 "extremely strong"; another 31 percent gave a middle rating of 3. Respondents gave the article's strength a mean rating of 3.10. Likewise, 37 percent gave a 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale assessing the credibility of the speaker in the article, with 1 meaning "not credible at all" and 5 meaning "extremely credible"; another 39 percent gave a rating of 3. Respondents also gave a mean rating of 3.14 to the speaker's credibility. Moreover, almost all respondents read the article with at least some degree of closeness. 73 percent rated how closely they read the article as either a 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale, and another 20 percent rated it as a 3. Respondents gave their own attention to the article a mean rating of 3.96.

There is some variation in the perceived strength and credibility across the different conditions. Respondents generally thought the three Republican value frames were, on average, stronger and that the Republican speaker featured within each of these frames was more credible than either the control condition or the Democrat equality frame. While this imbalance would initially seem like cause for concern, given that unequally perceived stimuli could lead to distorted results, partisanship may be the main reason for any disparity in ratings. Respondents – being Republicans themselves – rated

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<sup>59</sup> Respondents generally give similar ratings on this to all of the conditions, with the exception of the freedom frame: when broken out by condition, 40 percent rate the freedom frame's contribution to their own views as a 5, 6, or 7. The freedom frame, as well as the family frame, are the only conditions for which less than half of respondents rate the article's contribution as a 1, 2, or 3. Respondents claimed they were even less likely to be influenced by what other Republicans or Democrats. Unsurprisingly, it was respondents' own interactions and experiences with gays and lesbians, and especially their own personal prior beliefs, that they claimed had the most impact on their expressed attitudes.



the articles with Republican speakers higher than those articles that featured a speaker whose partisanship was not specified or who was a Democrat. Differences in perception may therefore be a simple byproduct of partisanship acting as a source cue and a heuristic.

These large discrepancies were not as visible for respondent attention, however. Respondents gave similar ratings no matter what condition they received when it came to how closely they read the article. Ratings ranged from a mean of 3.85 in the Republican equality frame to 4.11 in the freedom frame. These relatively high ratings ease concern that any resulting attitudinal differences between the frames may be due to disparities in how thoroughly respondents read the article based on the assigned condition. A full breakdown of ratings for each of these manipulation checks, both overall and by each frame, can be viewed in Table 5.5.

[INSERT TABLE 5.5 HERE]

#### *Overall Same-Sex Marriage Support*

All respondents were asked to rate their level of support for same-sex marriage immediately after reading their randomly assigned article. A plurality of respondents – 36 percent – gave a rating of 1 (“strongly oppose”), regardless of their assigned condition; another 16 percent rated their views as a 2 or 3, evenly divided between the two ratings. Fourteen percent said they were somewhere in the middle on the scale. A combined 35 percent – accounting for those who gave a rating of 5, 6, or 7 – held more positive views, though just 12 percent gave the highest rating of 7 (“strongly support”).

Across the entire pre-decision sample, respondents' opposition toward same-sex marriage thus resembled Republican sentiment on the issue nationwide.

But the plurality opposition – both across the entire sample and within each condition – does not mean that the cross pressure frames had no impact at all. In fact, there were some notable variations in ratings of support for same-sex marriage between the different frames – both in comparison to the control and to one another. Looking at each individual condition, those in the control group were the most opposed: on a 7-point scale, 47 percent rated their support as 1 “strongly oppose,” 12 percent said they neither supported nor opposed same-sex marriage, and just 13 percent gave a rating of 7 “strongly support” – a 34-point gap between the scale's two endpoints.

Respondents assigned to the three atypical conservative frames, on the other hand, were least likely to “strongly oppose” same-sex marriage: 31 percent rated their level of support as “1” in each of these three conditions. These three conditions triggered some of the most indecisiveness among respondents, as indicated by a response of 4 “neither” support nor oppose, as well as some of the strongest support and the narrowest gaps between combined support and opposition. Only the Republican equality frame rivaled the conservative conditions in support: while respondents were slightly more likely to strongly oppose the Republican equality frame than the other conservative frames, they also showed the most support in this condition and the least indecisiveness out of all the conditions. The freedom frame, on the other hand, is notable for producing the most indecision: 23 percent of respondents assigned to this condition rated their support as 4 “neither,” more than any other condition.

The attitudes expressed by those respondents given the Democratic equality frame are somewhat mixed: the frame provoked slightly stronger opposition than the other conservative frames but the same amount as in its counterpart, the Republican equality frame. The Democratic equality frame also interestingly provokes the most 7 ratings out of all the conditions: 15 percent of respondents given this frame rate their support as the highest point of the scale. A complete breakdown of support ratings – both overall and within each frame – can be viewed in Table 5.6.

[INSERT TABLE 5.6 HERE]

Collapsing the scale into three points provides further clarity, where those who responded a 1, 2, or 3 on the original 7-point scale are combined to represent “oppose,” 4 continues to represent “neither,” and those who responded a 5, 6, or 7 on the original scale represent “support.” Table 5.7 presents breakdowns both overall and by each frame of this modified 3-point support scale. In this version, those in the control group express the most combined opposition toward same-sex marriage (58 percent), whereas those assigned the freedom frame express the least combined opposition of all assigned conditions (41 percent). The freedom and limited government frames are the only two conditions in which less than half of respondents express some level of opposition. Respondents assigned the Republican equality, limited government, and freedom frames show the largest combined support – at 39 percent, 38 percent, and 36 percent, respectively. In contrast, combined support is lowest among those in the control group, at 30 percent. Respondents assigned to the Democratic equality frame show the second lowest combined support despite having the highest number of respondents who

specifically gave a 7 rating: 32 percent of respondents given this frame express some level of support.

[INSERT TABLE 5.7 HERE]

The varying impacts of these conditions allude to some sort of effect on expressed support for same-sex marriage based on partisanship of the advocacy group and speaker and the value-based cue featured in the preceding article. This must be tested, however, to assess whether differences are statistically significant or simply by chance. I therefore performed an analysis of variance. The overall model for the effect of the assigned condition on expressed support for same-sex marriage was not statistically significant ( $F(5, 719)=.779, p=.473$ ), but the LSD post-hoc test showed some notable differences between the various conditions. Those who received the freedom frame are more likely to support same-sex marriage than those in the control group ( $p<.10$ ). The estimated marginal means are depicted in Figure 5.1.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.1 HERE]

As assessed through the aforementioned series of manipulation checks, not all respondents paid close attention to the article, however. Three percent claimed to have not read the article closely at all, rating their attention to the article a “1” on a 5-point attention scale; another 4 percent of respondents rated their attention a “2.” I therefore omitted these respondents from the sample in order to analyze only those who stated that they read the article at least somewhat closely (a rating of 3 or higher); 52 respondents were removed, resulting in a new total of 668 respondents. The six conditions were still properly randomized across key demographics after the removal of these respondents

since those who were inattentive to the stimuli were originally dispersed among all six conditions. A comparison to the original sample can be seen in Table 5.8.

[INSERT TABLE 5.8 HERE]

When these respondents are filtered out, an analysis of variance shows that the overall model remains insignificant ( $F(5, 667)=.912, p=.473$ ), but LSD post-hoc tests do imply some significant differences between conditions. Those who received the freedom frame ( $p<.10$ ) or the Republican equality frame ( $p<.10$ ) were more likely to support same-sex marriage over those in the control group. When an interaction term for gender<sup>60</sup> is included to mitigate the gender imbalance in the limited government frame, the overall model, like the others, is insignificant ( $F(11, 667)=.957, p=.484$ ); once again, respondents in the freedom and Republican equality frames were more likely to express support than those in the control group ( $p<.10$ ). When the model is rerun with an interaction term for education – dichotomized into those with some college or less versus those who have graduated college or higher – it is significant overall ( $F(11, 647)=1.929, p<.05$ ), as is the interaction term specifically within the model ( $p<.05$ ). Respondents in the freedom and Republican equality frames are once again significantly more likely to support same-sex marriage than those in the control group ( $p<.10$ ).<sup>61</sup>

[INSERT FIGURES 5.2 THROUGH 5.4 HERE]

Caution must be taken using LSD post-hoc tests, however – both in this current analysis and subsequent analyses throughout the chapter. Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) test is a much less stringent test than Tukey or Scheffe, for example,

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<sup>60</sup> For this and all subsequent analyses in this chapter, gender is coded as 0 “female” 1 “male.”

<sup>61</sup> Several models were run assessing interactions between the frames and various key demographic variables such as strength of partisanship, ideology, age, and religion, as well as with manipulation checks that assessed strength of article, credibility of speaker, and closeness of attention; each of these variables was interacted in its own separate model with the frames. None of these overall models were significant.

and is not necessarily designed for multiple comparisons; because the LSD test is based on the assumption that a single t-test is being performed, it underrepresents the true alpha level. When other post-hoc tests are used in the above analyses, there are no significant effects between the conditions; in particular, the freedom and Republican equality frames lose their significance in comparison to the control group. Yet there are weaknesses and limitations to these more stringent tests, as well, that may not make them ideal in this circumstance – particularly their lower statistical power. Especially given that any framing effect would be expected to be small in this kind of an experiment, and the somewhat small cell size per condition, other post-hoc tests may overcorrect and may lead to Type II errors. Therefore, the LSD post-hoc test provides flexibility and ample statistical power for initial investigation. Nevertheless, while the LSD post-hoc test will continue to be used throughout this chapter, its assumptions required and present vulnerabilities in this study are amply recognized.

Given that I hypothesize about certain relationships between my various conditions, I can alternatively analyze the data by performing a one-way analysis of variance with planned contrasts. When the combined strength of all three Republican value frames is assessed against the control group, the Republican value frames combined do in fact have a statistically significant and positive effect over the control ( $p < .10$ ). The Republican equality frame and the freedom frame alone also have statistically significant and positive impacts over the control condition ( $p < .10$ ).<sup>62</sup> Much like the previous ANOVA analysis, planned contrasts similarly show that respondents assigned to the freedom frame or Republican equality frame are more likely to give higher ratings of support for same-sex marriage than those in the control group.

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<sup>62</sup> The ANOVAs and planned contrasts for this question assume equal variances.

While assessing differences in means provide one statistical interpretation of significance, it is important to further investigate the substantive importance of the movement between the various points on the scale – specifically any shifts away from opposition. In order to do this, I performed a logistic regression on a dichotomized version of the support variable across the entire sample, in which respondents who answered 1, 2, or 3 on the original 7-point support scale were collapsed into combined opposition and recoded as 0, and respondents who rated their support 4 (“neither”) or higher were collapsed into an “other” category recoded as 1 to signify any shift toward indecision or support. I dichotomize the variable in this manner – and continue to do so with other related measures – to specifically observe how the frames may induce a shift away from opposition, even if this shift does not automatically translate into support but rather somewhere in between. This choice in operationalization is backed by my findings in the collapsed 3-point scale for each condition, which shows most of the movement taking place between some level of “oppose” and “neither,” as well as past studies that have assessed the effects of cross-pressure frames on Republicans’ same-sex marriage attitudes (Koning and Redlawsk 2012).

A logistic regression analysis was performed with support as the dependent variable and the assigned conditions as independent variables, using the control condition as the out-group. The overall model in Table 5.9 is not significant ( $-2LL=990.613$ , omnibus chi-square=7.247,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.203$ ), and the independent variables account for only 1.0 percent to 1.3 percent of the variance. A total of 720 cases were analyzed. The logistic regression made only a minor improvement in prediction, accurately classifying 54.2 percent of all cases, with 70.3 percent of “oppose” cases correctly predicted but just

37.4 percent of “other” cases. Yet when looking at each of the conditions as predictor variables, the freedom frame has a statistically significant and positive effect in comparison to the control condition ( $p < .05$ ). In other words, those under the freedom frame have a 58.26 percent chance of rating their same-sex marriage support a 4 or higher (“neither support nor oppose” and above), whereas those in the control condition have a 41.44 percent chance of doing the same.

Given that a handful of respondents did not closely read the articles, I reran the logistic regression analysis with these inattentive respondents filtered out from the sample. Similar results emerge. The overall model, also featured in Table 5.9, is not significant ( $-2LL=918.716$ , omnibus chi-square=7.329,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.197$ ), and the independent variables account for only 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent of the variance. A total of 668 cases were analyzed this time. The logistic regression again made only a minor improvement in prediction, accurately classifying 54.2 percent of all cases, those this time 53 percent of “oppose” cases were correctly predicted and 55.4 percent of “other” cases.

When looking at each of the conditions as predictor variables, the freedom frame once again has a statistically significant and positive effect in comparison to the control condition ( $p < .05$ ). Those under the freedom frame have a 58.93 percent chance of rating their same-sex marriage support a 4 or higher (“neither support nor oppose” and above), whereas those in the control condition have a 42.45 percent chance of doing the same. The freedom frame loses significance when gender is added to the model as an interaction with condition assignment, though the interaction between gender and the freedom frame ( $p < .10$ ), as well as between gender and the Republican equality frame



( $p < .10$ ), are significant; the overall model, however, is not ( $-2LL = 911.599$ , omnibus chi-square = 14.445,  $df = 11$ ,  $p = .209$ ).

[INSERT TABLE 5.9 HERE]

In the week preceding the Supreme Court's decision, then, the cross-pressure frames seem to have some effect on attitudes toward same-sex marriage – though the effect is limited. The freedom frame and Republican equality frame, in particular, are the only frames that have a statistically significant and positive impact on Republican attitudes over the control condition. While the freedom frame technically does not produce the highest percentage of support, respondents assigned to this frame importantly give the highest mean support rating, are least likely to oppose same-sex marriage, and are most likely to express that their opinion lies somewhere in between.

These findings therefore validate Hypothesis 3a, in which I predicted respondents in issue cross-pressure frames to be less opposed to same-sex marriage than those in the control condition; this also validates Hypothesis 6a, in which I predicted that respondents in value-issue cross-pressure frames (Republican speaker, Democratic value) would be less likely to oppose the issue than those in the control condition, pointing to the potency of partisan cues alone. My findings do not, however, support Hypotheses 3b (and therefore its mirror, Hypothesis 6b) and 3c, in which I predicted respondents in issue cross-pressure frames to also be less opposed to same-sex marriage than those in which “equality” was evoked, regardless of speaker. Nor does my analysis support any significant differences between the rival party frame and any of the other frames (Hypotheses 6c and 9a). While the lack of significant differences between the Democratic equality frame and any other condition is surprising, support under this frame

nevertheless has the second lowest mean. Given the Democratic equality frame's prevalence in real life, perhaps respondents were not as negative as expected because of their familiarity with it; they may have considered the issue settled and this frame owned by those across the aisle. Instead, they expressed almost the same rating of support as respondents in most of the other frames. It was instead the ambiguity of the control condition that had a significant and negative impact on opinion.

### *The Potential Impact of Obergefell v. Hodges*

I also asked a series of additional questions following the initial same-sex marriage support question in order to investigate other dimensions of the issue and the pending Supreme Court decision.<sup>63</sup> Expressed support is strongly correlated with views on the upcoming ruling. There is a significant and positive correlation between expressed support and satisfaction with a possible ruling in favor of same-sex marriage ( $r=.828$ ,  $N=649$ ,  $p<.001$ ), as well as agreement that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right ( $r=.801$ ,  $N=649$ ,  $p<.001$ ). The two Supreme Court-related questions are also highly correlated with one another ( $r=.781$ ,  $N=649$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Therefore, we would expect similar distributions and framing effects in these two Supreme Court-related questions as we saw in the original issue support question.

Opposition toward the issue persisted when asked directly about the upcoming ruling. On a 7-point scale, with 1 meaning the respondent would be “very dissatisfied” and 7 meaning they would be “very satisfied” if the Supreme Court ruled same-sex marriage as constitutional, 50 percent rated their level of satisfaction a 1, 2, or 3. Nineteen percent rated their satisfaction as 4 (“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied”), and 32

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<sup>63</sup> Previously defined inattentive respondents have been disregarded in the following analysis.

percent gave a rating of 5 or higher; the mean rating was 3.45. Likewise, when respondents were asked to disregard personal beliefs and rate how much they agreed that the U.S. Constitution gives same-sex couples the constitutional right to marry – the issue at the center of *Obergefell v. Hodges* – ratings paralleled the satisfaction question. On a 7-point scale, with 1 meaning “strongly disagree” and 7 meaning “strongly agree,” 47 percent expressed some level of disagreement (a rating of 1, 2, or 3), 18 percent were somewhere in the middle (a rating of 4), and 35 percent expressed some level of agreement (a rating of 5, 6, or 7). Similar to the previous satisfaction question, the mean rating for the constitutional right question is 3.51.

Just like with direct support, there is variation by assigned condition in responses to both Supreme Court-related questions. In terms of satisfaction with the Supreme Court if it effectively made same-sex marriage legal nationwide, those respondents in the control group displayed the most dissatisfaction: 58 percent give a rating of 1, 2, or 3, compared to 27 percent who give a rating of 5, 6, or 7. About half of respondents in all of the other frames expressed some level of dissatisfaction (1, 2, or 3). The freedom frame once again provoked the most positive ratings and the least negative, with respondents under this frame nearly split between the two sides: 40 percent expressed some level of dissatisfaction, while 38 percent expressed some level of satisfaction. Table 5.10 shows this breakdown for the satisfaction question.

[INSERT TABLE 5.10 HERE]

Performing an analysis of variance on the satisfaction scale further proves the strength of the freedom frame. While the model is not significant overall ( $F(5, 648)=1.206, p=.305$ ), the LSD post-hoc test once again shows that the freedom frame has

a significant and positive impact on satisfaction over the control condition ( $p<.05$ ), as well as over the Democratic equality frame ( $p<.10$ ). Estimated marginal means for the satisfaction question are displayed in Figure 5.5.<sup>64</sup>

[INSERT FIGURE 5.5 HERE]

Again, I can also analyze this question by performing a one-way analysis of variance with planned contrasts. All three Republican value frames combined once again have a statistically significant and positive effect over the control ( $p<.10$ ), as does the freedom frame alone ( $p<.05$ ).<sup>65</sup> No other contrast is significant for the satisfaction question.

In the logistic regression analysis seen in Table 5.11, the overall satisfaction model is once again insignificant ( $-2LL=892.423$ , omnibus chi-square=7.243,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.203$ ), but the freedom frame has a significant and positive impact over the control condition ( $p<.05$ ).<sup>66</sup> When we look at predicted probabilities in this model for satisfaction with a pro-same-sex marriage ruling, respondents act much like they do in the support question: those under the freedom frame have a 59.63 percent chance of rating their satisfaction a 4 or higher (“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” and above), whereas those in the control condition have a 41.75 percent chance of doing the same. Adding in gender does not make the model significant ( $-2LL=886.639$ , omnibus chi-square=13.027,  $df=11$ ,  $p=.292$ ); only the Republican equality frame’s interaction with gender is significant in this version ( $p<.10$ ).

[INSERT TABLE 5.11 HERE]

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<sup>64</sup> Including an interaction for gender does not change this. Gender itself is insignificant.

<sup>65</sup> The ANOVAs and planned contrasts for this question assume equal variances.

<sup>66</sup> Once again, the dependent variable – satisfaction with a possible pro-same-sex marriage ruling – is dichotomized into “oppose” and “other”

When respondents are asked to put aside personal feelings and rate how much they agree that the U.S. Constitution gives same-sex couples the legal right to marry, those in the control group are again the most negative: 55 percent express some level of disagreement (a rating of 1, 2, or 3), while 31 percent express some level of agreement (a rating of 5, 6, or 7). Those assigned the freedom frame are once again mostly split, with 39 percent expressing some level of disagreement, the lowest across all conditions, and 39 percent expressing some level of agreement, the highest across all conditions. Table 5.12 shows this breakdown for the agreement scale.

[INSERT TABLE 5.12 HERE]

An analysis of variance produces another insignificant model overall, but again, the LSD post-hoc test shows the freedom frame to have a significant and positive impact over the control condition ( $p < .05$ ), as well as the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .05$ ). The family frame also has a significant and positive effect over the control condition ( $p < .10$ ), as does the Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ). Estimated marginal means for the agreement question are displayed in Figure 5.6. When an interaction with gender is added to the model, the model is significant this time ( $F(11, 648) = 1.609, p < .10$ ), as is gender and the condition assignment separately ( $p < .10$ ). There is a notable jump in support among male respondents, in particular, under the freedom frame: men in this frame give a mean support rating of 4.12, compared to a rating of 2.7 among those under the control group. Estimated marginal means by gender are displayed in figure 5.7. Planned contrasts once again show some significant and positive effects for all three Republican value frames combined ( $p < .05$ ), as well as the freedom frame alone ( $p < .05$ )

and the Republican equality frame alone ( $p < .10$ ), over the control group.<sup>67</sup> No other contrasts are significant.

[INSERT FIGURES 5.6 AND 5.7 HERE]

In a logistic regression analysis on a dichotomized version of agreement (“disagreed” versus “other”), the overall model is once again insignificant ( $-2LL=889.506$ , omnibus chi-square=8.311,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.14$ ); see Table 5.13. This time, however, both the freedom frame ( $p < .05$ ) and the family frame ( $p < .10$ ) have significant and positive impacts over the control condition. When we look at predicted probabilities in this model for agreement that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, respondents again act much like they do when asked about overall support and satisfaction with the Supreme Court: those under the freedom frame have a 60.55 percent chance and those under the family frame have a 57.75 percent chance of rating their level of agreement a 4 or higher (“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” and above), whereas those in the control condition have a 44.66 percent chance of doing the same. When gender is added to the model, the overall model becomes significant ( $-2LL=877.354$ , omnibus chi-square=20.462,  $df=11$ ,  $p < .05$ ), and interactions between gender and the freedom frame ( $p < .10$ ), as well as gender and the Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ), are significant; gender by itself is also significant ( $p < .10$ ). This model is shown in Table 5.14.

[INSERT TABLES 5.13 AND 5.14 HERE]

Once again, support for my hypotheses regarding the pending Supreme Court ruling and the constitutionality of the issue is mixed. Much like with the initial same-sex marriage support question, hypotheses regarding the relationship between issue cross-pressure frames (Republican speaker, Republican value) and the control group are

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<sup>67</sup> The ANOVAs and planned contrasts for this question assume equal variances.

confirmed: those respondents assigned to the former are less likely to express dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling on the issue and less likely to disagree on the constitutionality of the issue than those assigned to the latter (Hypothesis 4a). There is also some evidence for Hypothesis 4b, which hypothesized that issue cross-pressure frames will produce less disagreement and dissatisfaction than rival party frames. But these findings about *Obergefell* and the issue's constitutionality fail to reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 4c (significant differences between issue cross-pressure frames and value-issue cross-pressure frames). As for the frame featuring a Republican speaker evoking a Democratic value, there is some support for Hypothesis 7a (significant differences in comparison to the control condition) but not 7b (compared to issue cross-pressure frames) or 7c (compared to the rival party frame). There is no support for Hypothesis 9b, which predicted a significant difference between the Democratic equality frame and the control condition. Thus, the same general pattern emerges as it does with support, with the only noticeable and seemingly significant effects emerging between cross-pressure frames and the control group.

#### *Views on the Republican Party Platform and 2016*

Respondents were then asked about same-sex marriage within the context of the Republican Party platform and the 2016 presidential election. The initial same-sex marriage support question is not as strongly correlated with these questions as it was with the Supreme Court questions. Support is negatively correlated with knowing the party platform's stance on same-sex marriage ( $r = -.231$ ,  $N = 648$ ,  $p < .001$ ); there is a stronger negative correlation between overall support and agreement that the GOP should

maintain their current platform stance ( $r = -.694$ ,  $N = 648$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Support is not significantly correlated with how important respondents think the issue of same-sex marriage is to the GOP's chances of winning in the 2016 election, however ( $p = .828$ ).

When asked where the Republican Party currently stands in order to assess the respondent's own knowledge about the platform, 55 percent correctly answered that the Republican Party currently takes an oppositional stance toward same-sex marriage in its platform, 21 percent incorrectly guessed that the GOP supported it, and 24 percent were unsure. Again, however, the frames matter. As seen in Table 5.15, those respondents assigned the Republican equality frame were most likely to guess incorrectly: 30 percent of this group thought the Republican Party platform supported same-sex marriage, as did 29 percent of those given the freedom frame. In contrast, just 9 percent each in the control group and the Democratic equality frame thought the same. Respondents assigned to these latter two frames were instead most likely to guess correctly that the GOP platform explicitly opposed same-sex marriage (60 percent and 71 percent, respectively), while those given the Republican equality frame (at 42 percent) were the least likely.

[INSERT TABLE 5.15 HERE]

Respondents were then asked to rate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that the Republican Party should maintain their current position on same-sex marriage when they adopt a new party platform in 2016, with 1 meaning "strongly disagree" and 7 meaning "strongly agree." Forty-three percent rated their level of agreement as a 7, and another 22 percent gave a rating of 5 or 6; 21 percent, on the other hand, rated their level of agreement anywhere from 1 to 3. The mean rating for this question is 5.11.



As shown in Table 5.16, a pattern does emerge where agreement with the platform is lower in the Republican value frames, as well as in the Republican equality frame, than it is among those in the control group or Democratic equality frame. Yet this does not mean that the Republican value frames are thus associated with more support; respondents are somewhat consistent across stimuli in how much they disagree with the platform, with combined disagreement never reaching above 25 percent in any condition. Those assigned Republican value frames instead were more likely to give ratings in the middle of the scale when it came to agreement with the party platform.

[INSERT TABLE 5.16 HERE]

When an analysis of variance is performed for this question, only the family frame has a significant and positive impact compared to the control group in the LSD post-hoc test ( $p < .10$ ); see Figure 5.7 for the estimated marginal means.<sup>68</sup> In a one-way ANOVA with planned contrasts, only the combined version of all three Republican value frames has a significant effect compared to the control group, and this time, the effect is negative ( $p < .10$ ); in other words, those assigned to any Republican value frame are less likely than those assigned to the control group that the GOP should keep its current party platform stance on same-sex marriage.<sup>69</sup>

As shown in Table 5.17, the overall model for a logistic regression analysis on a dichotomized version of the platform agreement scale is once again insignificant ( $-2LL=837.426$ , omnibus chi-square=5.557,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.352$ ). This time, the limited government frame ( $p < .10$ ) has a significant and positive impact over the control

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<sup>68</sup> I reran the model with an interaction between frame assignment and several key demographic variables, each in a separate model, including gender. The overall model was significant only when partisanship strength, overall ideology, or ideology on social issues was included but neither frame assignment nor the interaction term was significant in any of these cases.

<sup>69</sup> The ANOVAs and planned contrasts for this question assume equal variances.

condition; respondents under this frame have a 39.13 percent chance of being in the middle about or disagreeing at some level with the party platform (a rating of 1, 2, 3, or 4), whereas those in the control condition have a 28.16 percent chance of feeling the same. When an interaction with gender is added to the model, both the freedom frame ( $p<.05$ ) and family frame ( $p<.10$ ) interacted with gender become significant, as does gender alone ( $p<.10$ ) – but none of the conditions are significant by themselves, nor is the overall model ( $-2LL=828.938$ , omnibus chi-square=14.045,  $df=11$ ,  $p=.230$ ).

[INSERT FIGURE 5.7 HERE]

[INSERT TABLE 5.17 HERE]

Finally, respondents saw the issue of same-sex marriage as important to the GOP's overall chances of winning in the 2016 presidential election. Looking at each scale point separately, with 1 meaning “extremely unimportant” and 7 meaning “extremely important,” a plurality of respondents – 29 percent – said the issue would be neither unimportant nor important to 2016. A combined 56 percent gave the issue's importance a rating of 5 or higher, while just 15 percent believed the issue would play an unimportant role (a rating of 1, 2, or 3). The mean rating was 4.69; a breakdown can be seen in Table 5.18.

[INSERT TABLE 5.18 HERE]

When assessing importance by condition, those in the freedom frame are least likely to say the issue will be unimportant to 2016 (12 percent) and are some of the most likely to feel in between (31 percent). Respondents given the family and Democratic equality frames are most likely, on the other hand, to believe the issue will be of extreme importance, at 61 and 62 percent, respectively. An analysis of variance does not show

any significant differences between any of the conditions or overall for this question, however; likewise, a one-way ANOVA with contrasts does not show any significant relationships among the various planned comparisons. A logistic regression model on a dichotomized version of importance also does not produce any significant results (see Table 5.19 for results). Adding an interaction with gender to the logistic regression model makes the family frame significant ( $p < .10$ ), as well as gender by itself ( $p < .05$ ); the overall model is not significant, however ( $-2LL = 533.952$ , omnibus chi-square = 16.647,  $df = 11$ ,  $p = .119$ ).

[INSERT TABLE 5.19 HERE]

In total, results are once again mixed. There is some confirmation for Hypothesis 5a given evidence of significant differences between the issue-cross pressure frames (Republican speaker, Republican values) and the control condition when it comes to disagreeing with the Republican Party platform; those in the former are less likely to agree than those in the latter, though different statistical tests show different frames gaining significance over the control. There is no evidence for Hypotheses 5b and 5c (or Hypothesis 7b), however, which made predictions about the remaining relationships between the issue cross-pressure frames and the rival party frame, as well as the value-issue cross-pressure frame. Due to a lack of significance among any of the other pairings, I cannot reject the null hypothesis for Hypotheses 8a, 8c, and 9c.

#### *Pre-Decision Survey Conclusions*

This series of questions in the pre-decision survey was meant to dissect attitudes toward same-sex marriage from various angles, including general support for the issue

and contextualizing feelings toward the issue within the current events of the Supreme Court's pending decision on *Obergefell v. Hodges* and the 2016 election. When each of these measures was analyzed in relation to the stimuli, the frames acted as expected: the control group and Democratic equality frame typically provoked more negativity within each of these measures, while the three Republican value frames, and even the Republican equality frame, suppressed it. While the Republican equality frame, in particular, was virtually identical to the Democrat equality frame, it was the difference in the advocating group's and speaker's partisanship featured in each article that was most likely at the root of the frames' differing effects. This is a testament to the power of partisan cues, even when matched with a value that is usually used by the other side to defend the issue at hand.

Yet it was the freedom frame that proved to be most powerful of all in suppressing negativity and even spurring greater acceptance and tolerance of same-sex marriage, continually having some sort of statistically significant impact over the control group and a larger substantive impact than the other frames in most cases. The family frame also had some limited influence when it came to agreement with whether or not same-sex marriage is a constitutional right and, along with the limited government frame, whether the GOP should maintain its current party position.

Results must be interpreted with caution, however; any significant effects are small and do not explain much of the variance in any of the models. Therefore, while there is certainly some movement between the different conditions in the expected directions, it is important to recognize the limitations in these models – both in terms of statistically significant differences and substantively significant differences. Only a

handful of my original hypotheses were confirmed, and even where movement occurs between conditions – whether statistically significant or not – it is typically only within one degree on the scale. The limited and mixed findings point to the difficulty in moving opinion, especially in a one-time experiment and especially given the louder, stronger, and more repetitive frames in the real world on the issue of same-sex marriage.

## **Post-Decision Survey**

### *Sample Demographics*

The post- decision Republican sample was skewed even more toward women than the pre-decision sample: 59 percent of respondents were women, and 41 percent were men. This gender balance is an even greater departure from the Pew sample of Republicans, where men make up a solid majority. But once again, this distribution is not abnormal, given the typical gender breakdown of SSI's panel. The post-decision sample was younger than the pre-decision sample, which skewed somewhat older, but in fact more closely resembled the Pew Sample: 25 percent of respondents in the post-decision sample were between 18 and 34 years old, 17 percent were between 35 and 49 years old, 28 percent were between 50 and 64 years old, and 30 percent were 65 years or older. Eighty-eight percent of this sample was white; 12 percent identified as something else. In terms of education, 20 percent had a high school diploma or less, 37 percent completed some college, 28 percent had a college degree, and 15 percent did some type of graduate study. Much like the pre-decision sample, the post-decision sample was slightly better educated than those in the Pew study, containing less Republican and Republican-leaning respondents with up to a high school diploma and more respondents

with at least some college. The post-decision sample demographics can be viewed in Table 5.20, alongside the pre-decision sample and Pew demographics.

[INSERT TABLE 5.20 HERE]

Despite some demographic discrepancies between the post-decision sample here and both the pre-decision and nationally representative Pew samples, the majority of respondents in the post-decision sample were strong Republicans (55 percent), and most considered themselves somewhat (34 percent) or very conservative (37 percent).

Respondents were also asked separately about their ideological position on economic issues and social issues. Like the pre-decision sample, respondents in the post-decision study were slightly more ideologically conservative economically (71 percent) than socially (64 percent), but ideological placement was similar in both issue areas; less than ten percent of the sample identified as “liberal” or “very liberal” on either issue area.

The post-decision sample was also similar to the pre-decision sample in terms of religion: 47 percent attended religious services almost every week or more, while 53 percent attended once a month or less. A plurality of respondents said they were Protestant; 41 percent of Catholics and Protestants considered themselves evangelical Christians. In terms of familiarity with gay and lesbian individuals, 35 percent of respondents said they have a gay family member, 71 percent said they have a gay friend, and 24 percent said they know a gay coworker. See Table 5.21 for a breakdown by each of these demographics.

[INSERT TABLE 5.21 HERE]

As can be seen in Table 5.22, respondents were once again randomly assigned across the six different conditions, in similar numbers to the pre-decision survey. The

demographic breakdowns within each condition are fairly balanced, as well, with the exception – once again – of gender in the limited government frame.<sup>70</sup> A series of randomization checks shows that there is no significant difference in assignment by a variety of key demographics, including no significant differences by gender, however. Therefore, I can be confident that individual-level characteristics did not impact assignment – and potentially, any subsequent findings – and that the conditions were truly randomly assigned across the entire post-decision sample. Once again, though, precautions will be taken by including gender as an interaction term in all subsequent models of the post-decision survey data.

[TABLE 5.22 HERE]

#### *Assessing the stimuli's external validity*

Before proceeding with the post-decision analysis, it is important to assess how the stimuli performed in the post-decision survey – both on its own and in comparison to the pre-decision survey. This time, respondents were slightly less likely than they were in the pre-decision survey to claim the article had some influence on their stated opinion toward same-sex marriage: on a 7-point scale, with 1 meaning “did not contribute at all” and 7 meaning “contributed a great deal,” 32 percent rated the article’s contribution to their attitude on same-sex marriage as “1”, and another 21 percent rated it a 2 or 3. Nineteen percent rated the article’s contribution to their support a 4 (“neither”), while 28 percent rated it a 5 or higher.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> The gender imbalance is not due to any visible programming error in the Qualtrics version of either the pre or post-decision survey. No other demographic shows this kind of disparity across conditions.

<sup>71</sup> Again, respondents claimed they were even less likely to be influenced by what other Republicans or Democrats believed. Even the impact of the recent Supreme Court ruling on attitudes was lukewarm at

Yet respondents once again held somewhat positive views about the validity of the articles themselves, giving similar ratings as they did in the pre-decision survey. As seen in Table 5.23, 38 percent of respondents rated their given article a 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale assessing strength of argument, with 1 meaning “not strong at all” and 5 “extremely strong”; another 30 percent gave a middle rating of 3. Respondents gave the article’s strength a mean rating of 3.03. Likewise, 39 percent gave a rating of 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale assessing the credibility of the speaker in the article, with 1 meaning “not credible at all” and 5 meaning “extremely credible”; another 36 percent gave a rating of 3. Respondents gave a mean rating of 3.14 to the speaker’s credibility. A large majority of respondents also read the article with at least some degree of closeness. 71 percent rated how closely they read the article as either a 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale, and another 21 percent rated it as a 3. Respondents gave their own attention to the article a mean rating of 3.92, similar to what the mean rating given by respondents in the pre-decision survey.

There again is some variation in the perceived strength and credibility across the different conditions, but this time the within-subject patterns do not resemble the pre-decision survey. Post-decision respondents generally thought the limited government and family frames were, on average, stronger and that the Republican speaker featured within each of these frames was more credible. Interestingly, the freedom frame was one of the weakest and least credible frames among post-decision respondents. Unlike in the pre-decision survey, these discrepancies were also apparent for respondent attention. While post-decision respondents across all conditions mostly paid attention when reading the

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best: 54 percent of respondents rated its contribution a 1, 2, or 3, with 37 percent in this segment specifically saying it did not contribute at all, and 31 percent gave a rating of 5, 6, or 7, with just 11 percent specifically saying it contributed a great deal. Respondents’ own interactions and experiences with gays and lesbians and especially their own personal prior beliefs once again played the largest roles in their expressed attitudes.



article, respondents assigned the limited government frame especially did so (mean=4.10), as did those under the family frame (mean=3.99) and even the Republican equality frame (mean=3.96) and control condition (3.93). Those assigned to the freedom frame (mean=3.86) and Democratic equality frame (mean=3.70), however, claimed they paid less attention to reading the article. Thus in each of these external validity measures, respondents in the Democratic equality frame, followed by the freedom frame, gave the lowest assessments – an especially surprising reversal for the latter, which was considered the strongest, most credible, and most closely read article in the pre-decision survey.

[INSERT TABLE 5.23 HERE]

#### *Overall Same-Sex Marriage Support*

Just as in the pre-decision survey, post-decision respondents were asked to rate their level of support for same-sex marriage immediately after reading their randomly assigned article. Across all conditions, a plurality of respondents – again, 36 percent – rated their support as “1” (“strongly oppose”); another 16 percent rated their support as a 2 or 3. Thirteen percent said they were somewhere in the middle. A combined 35 percent – accounting for those who gave a rating of 5, 6, or 7 – held more positive views, with 15 percent giving the highest rating of 7 (“strongly support”). Overall, then, respondents in the post-decision survey resembled those in the pre-decision survey – most opposed same-sex marriage at some level – but post-decision respondents were slightly less opposed than their pre-decision counterparts. A breakdown of support can be seen in Table 5.24.

[INSERT TABLE 5.24 HERE]

Despite this opposition, there were once again some notable variations in rating support for same-sex marriage between the different frames. Looking within each condition, respondents assigned to the control group were actually not the most opposed this time. On a 7-point scale, 36 percent rated their support as 1 (“strongly oppose”), 12 percent gave a rating of 4 (“neither support nor oppose”), and 17 percent gave a rating of 7 (“strongly support”); this translates into a 19-point gap between the scale’s two endpoints, a smaller difference than the 34-point gap in the pre-decision survey. The Democratic equality frame instead produces the lowest support among post-decision respondents: 59 percent given this frame rate their support as a 1, 2, or 3, 17 percent give a middle rating of 4, and 24 percent give a rating of 4, 5, or 6. The frame also produces the largest gap in ratings, with 41 percent rating their attitude as 1 (“strongly oppose”) and just 8 percent rating their attitude as a 7 (“strongly support”).

Out of the remaining frames, the limited government frame provoked the least opposition and most support this time: 27 percent gave a rating of 1 at the one extreme, while 19 percent gave a rating of 7 at the other extreme, just an 8-point gap between the two endpoints. Collapsing the scale into three points to provide further clarity (see Table 5.25), the limited government frame is the only condition where support edges out opposition – 44 percent combined support to 42 percent combined opposition, with 15 percent in the middle.<sup>72</sup> The family frame shows a similar pattern, where 36 percent of respondents gave a rating of 1 (a combined 53 percent opposed), and 19 percent gave a rating of 7 (a combined 41 percent supported). Respondents assigned the Republican

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<sup>72</sup> Like in the pre-decision survey, those who responded a 1, 2, or 3 on the original 7-point scale were combined to represent “oppose,” 4 continued to represent “neither,” and those who responded a 5, 6, or 7 on the original scale represented “support.”

equality frame likewise showed a slight increase in support over both the control condition and Democratic equality frame: 37 percent give a rating of 1 (50 percent combined opposition), and 17 percent give a rating of 7 (38 percent combined support).

The freedom frame acted differently this time, however, not performing the way it did in the pre-decision survey. The freedom frame had the largest impact in the pre-decision survey, but in the post-decision survey, the freedom frame actually produced the highest opposition out of all of the Republican value frames, as well as in comparison to the control condition; 38 percent rated their attitude toward same-sex marriage a 1, with a combined 54 percent saying they were opposed. Respondents assigned the freedom frame were also the least likely – besides those in the Democratic equality frame – to support same-sex marriage: just 11 percent rated their support a 7, with combined support totaling 28 percent. Hence, the freedom frame had less of a positive impact than it did in the pre-decision survey, provoking more opposition and less support than it did with the pre-decision sample.

[INSERT TABLE 5.25 HERE]

The varying impacts of these post-decision survey conditions on support for same-sex marriage must be tested, however, to assess whether differences are statistically significant or simply by chance. I therefore performed an analysis of variance. The overall model for the effect of the condition on support was statistically significant this time ( $F(5, 728)=2.697, p<.05$ ), meaning that the condition received did have an impact on the same-sex marriage attitude scale. Further investigation with LSD post-hoc tests showed differences between the frames, as well. Those who received the Democratic equality frame were less likely to support same-sex marriage than those under virtually

any other condition ( $p < .05$ ), including the control group, but with the exception of the freedom frame. Those who received the limited government frame were also more likely to support same-sex marriage than those in the freedom frame ( $p < .05$ ). Tukey's test similarly shows that the limited government frame has a significant and positive effect on same-sex marriage support in comparison to the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .05$ ). The estimates marginal means are displayed in Figure 5.8.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.8 HERE]

As assessed through a series of manipulation checks in the post-decision survey, there were once again respondents who did not pay close attention to their assigned article. Seven percent rated their attention to the article as either a 1 ("not closely at all") or 2. I therefore omitted these respondents from the sample; the six conditions were still properly randomized across key demographics after taking these inattentive respondents out of the sample. When an ANOVA was performed on the attentive subsample, the overall model was statistically significant ( $F(5, 674) = 2.028, p < .10$ ).<sup>73</sup> The estimated marginal means for this revised model are displayed in Figure 5.9. The LSD post-hoc test shows that respondents in the Democratic equality frame were less likely to support same-sex marriage than those in the control group and limited government frame ( $p < .05$ ), as well as the Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ). Those given the limited government frame were also more likely to support same-sex marriage than those in the freedom frame ( $p < .05$ ). Tukey's test similarly shows that the limited government frame again has a significant and positive impact over the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .10$ ). When gender is included within the model, the model is not significant ( $F(11, 674) = 1.347$ ,

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<sup>73</sup> When an interaction for gender is added into the model, the overall model is insignificant, as is gender by itself and the interaction between the two variables; the frame assignment variable is significant, however ( $p < .10$ ).

$p=.194$ ), but frame assignment is ( $p<.10$ ). Under the LSD post-hoc test, respondents in the Democratic equality frame are less likely to express support than those in the control group ( $p<.05$ ), limited government frame ( $p<.01$ ), and Republican equality frame ( $p<.10$ ). Under Tukey's test, respondents in the limited government are more likely to express support than those in the Democratic equality frame ( $p<.10$ ).

[INSERT FIGURE 5.9 HERE]

The limited government frame thus had the biggest impact on increasing support for same-sex marriage post-*Obergefell*. Post-decision support was furthermore the lowest in the Democratic equality frame – a difference from the pre-decision survey, where those in the control group showed the least support. In the post-decision survey, the control group actually outperformed the individual freedom frame, which had been the frame that provoked the most support pre-decision.

I can also test the effects of the frames through a one-way analysis of variance and planned contrasts.<sup>74</sup> The three Republican value frames combined have a significant and positive impact over the Democratic equality frame when it comes to same-sex marriage support ( $p<.05$ ). The contrast between the limited government frame specifically and the Democratic equality frame is significant, as well: respondents assigned to the former are more likely to support same-sex marriage than those under the latter ( $p<.01$ ). The Republican equality frame also induces greater support than the Democratic equality frame ( $p<.10$ ).

It is again important to move beyond an assessment of differences in means and further investigate the movement between the various points on the scale within the post-decision survey. In order to do this, I performed a logistic regression on a dichotomized

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<sup>74</sup> This model does not assume equal variances.

version of the post-decision support variable across the entire sample.<sup>75</sup> Using the Democratic equality frame as the out-group this time given its lower ratings compared to all other conditions, the overall model in Table 5.27 is not significant ( $-2LL=1000.786$ , omnibus chi-square=7.771,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.169$ ), and the independent variables account for only 1.1 percent to 1.4 percent of the variance. A total of 728 cases were analyzed. The logistic regression made only a minor improvement in prediction, accurately classifying 54.3 percent of all cases, with 72.3 percent of “oppose” cases correctly predicted but just 35.1 percent of “other” cases.

[INSERT TABLE 5.27 HERE]

Yet when looking at each of the conditions as predictor variables, the limited government frame has a statistically significant and positive effect in comparison to the control condition ( $p<.01$ ). Those under the limited government frame have a 58.26 percent chance of rating their same-sex marriage support a 4 or higher (“neither support nor oppose” and above), whereas those in the Democratic equality frame have a 41.18 percent chance of doing the same.

Once again taking into account the handful of respondents who did not closely read the articles, I reran the logistic regression analysis with these inattentive respondents filtered out of the sample. Similar results emerge. The overall model is not significant ( $-2LL=929.763$ , omnibus chi-square=5.914,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.315$ ), and the independent variables account for only 0.9 percent to 1.2 percent of the variance. A total of 675 cases were

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<sup>75</sup> Just like in the pre-decision survey, post-decision respondents who answered 1, 2, or 3 on the original 7-point support scale were collapsed into combined opposition and recoded as 0, and respondents who rated their support 4 (“neither”) or higher were collapsed into an “other” category recoded as 1 to signify any shift toward indecision or support. I dichotomize the variable in this manner – and continue to do so with other related measures – to specifically observe how the frames may induce a shift away from opposition, even if this shift does not automatically translate into support but rather somewhere in between.

analyzed this time. The logistic regression again made only a minor improvement in prediction, accurately classifying 53.9 percent of all cases; this time 55.4 percent of “oppose” cases were correctly predicted and 52.5 percent of “other” cases.

When looking at each of the conditions as predictor variables, the limited government frame once again has a statistically significant and positive effect in comparison to the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .05$ ). Those under the limited government frame have a 58.56 percent chance of rating their same-sex marriage support a 4 or higher (“neither support nor oppose” and above), whereas those in the Democratic equality frame have a 43.80 percent chance of doing the same.<sup>76</sup>

In the week following the Supreme Court’s decision, then, the limited government frame seems to be particularly effective in inducing greater support – or at least, less opposition – toward same-sex marriage. Respondents in the limited government frame are more likely than any other group – besides those in the family frame – to give the highest rating of 7 on the support scale. They likewise express the highest combined support of any condition and the least opposition – both combined opposition and giving a rating of 1 (“strongly oppose”). The post-decision limited government frame is notably the only frame in either the pre-decision or post-decision survey to produce more support than opposition in the collapsed 3-point version of the scale.

The Democratic equality frame, on the other hand, appears to provoke even stronger negative reactions than either it or the control condition did in the pre-decision survey. Respondents in this frame give the lowest mean rating, are more likely than any other group to give a rating of 1, least likely than any other to give a rating of 7, and show

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<sup>76</sup> When gender is included in the model, the overall model is not significant, nor is gender or the interaction between gender and frame assignment. The limited government frame by itself continues to have a significant and positive effect compared to the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .10$ ).

the greatest combined opposition and least combined support. The differences in what post-decision frames provoke the most and least support are therefore a departure from the pre-decision survey, where the freedom frame produced the most positive attitudes and the control condition produced the most negative. Speculation about the differing frame impacts pre versus post-decision will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.

In terms of my original hypotheses, the post-decision survey provides some support for my predictions about same-sex marriage attitudes. Hypothesis 3b can once again be confirmed, given greater support in the cross-pressure frames than in the rival party frame (i.e. the Democratic equality frame). Depending on the type of analysis performed, the control group and Republican equality frame also produce higher support than the Democratic equality frame, lending some evidence for Hypotheses 6c and 9a. None of the other hypotheses regarding same-sex marriage attitudes and the relationships between different conditions can be confirmed, however. There are no significant differences between the cross-pressure frames and the control condition (Hypotheses 3a, 3c, 6a, and 6c).

### *The Impact of Obergefell v. Hodges*

Just like the pre-decision survey, the post-decision survey included a series of additional questions following the initial same-sex marriage support question in order to investigate other dimensions of the issue and the recent Supreme Court decision.<sup>77</sup>

Expressed support was once again strongly correlated with views on the recent ruling.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Previously defined inattentive respondents have once again been disregarded in all subsequent analyses.

<sup>78</sup> Incidentally, most had read or heard at least something about the ruling. When asked how much they had read or heard about it, 46 percent said a lot, and 39 percent said some; 14 percent said a little, and just 2 percent said nothing at all.



There was a significant and positive correlation between expressed support and satisfaction with the Supreme Court ruling ( $r=.885$ ,  $N=658$ ,  $p<.001$ ), as well as agreement that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right ( $r=.787$ ,  $N=658$ ,  $p<.001$ ). The two Supreme Court-related questions are also highly correlated with one another ( $r=.826$ ,  $N=658$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Therefore, I would again expect similar distributions and framing effects in these two Supreme Court-related questions as we saw in the original issue support question.

As can be seen in Table 5.28, opposition toward the issue persisted when asked directly about the recent ruling. On a 7-point scale, with 1 meaning the respondent was “very dissatisfied” and 7 meaning they were “very satisfied” that the Supreme Court ruled same-sex marriage as constitutional, 51 percent rated their level of satisfaction a 1, 2, or 3 – almost unchanged from the pre-decision survey. Fifteen percent rated their satisfaction as 4 (“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied”), and 34 percent gave a rating of 5 or higher; the mean rating was 3.37, somewhat less than what it was in the pre-decision survey. Likewise, when respondents were asked to disregard personal beliefs and rate how much they agreed that the U.S. Constitution gives same-sex couples the constitutional right to marry – the issue at the center of *Obergefell v. Hodges* – ratings paralleled the satisfaction question, as well as the pre-decision version of the constitutional right to marry question. On a 7-point scale, with 1 meaning “strongly disagree” and 7 meaning “strongly agree,” 46 percent expressed some level of disagreement (a rating of 1, 2, or 3), 15 percent were somewhere in the middle (a rating of 4), and 39 percent expressed some level of agreement (a rating of 5, 6, or 7). Similar

to the previous satisfaction question, the mean rating for the constitutional right question is 3.64, slightly higher than the mean rating in the pre-decision survey.

[INSERT TABLE 5.28 HERE]

Just like with direct support, there is variation by assigned condition in responses to both Supreme Court-related questions. In terms of satisfaction with the Supreme Court decision, those respondents in the Democratic equality frame once again displayed the most dissatisfaction: 58 percent give a rating of 1, 2, or 3, compared to 26 percent who give a rating of 5, 6, or 7. The freedom frame surprisingly produced the second highest combined dissatisfaction, with 56 percent in this condition giving a rating of 1, 2, or 3. The limited government frame, on the other hand, spurred the most satisfaction – as well as the least dissatisfaction – within the pre-decision sample: 42 percent gave a rating of 4, 5, or 6 in this condition, while 43 percent gave a rating of 1, 2, or 3.

Performing an analysis of variance on the satisfaction scale further proves the strength of the limited government frame in the post-decision survey. This time, the overall model is significant ( $F(5, 658)=2.238, p<.05$ ), and an LSD post-hoc test shows that the limited government frame has a significant and positive impact on satisfaction over both the Democratic equality frame ( $p<.05$ ), as well as over the freedom frame ( $p<.01$ ). Tukey's test similarly shows that those in the limited government frame are significantly more likely to be satisfied than those in the freedom frame ( $p<.10$ ). Estimated marginal means are displayed in Figure 5.10.<sup>79</sup> Performing a one-way ANOVA with planned contrasts, the three Republican value frames combined have a

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<sup>79</sup> When gender is included, the overall model is not significant, but frame assignment is significant ( $p<.10$ ).

significant and positive impact over the Democratic equality frame when it comes to satisfaction with the ruling ( $p < .10$ ), as does the limited government frame alone ( $p < .05$ ).

[INSERT FIGURE 5.10 HERE]

In a logistic regression analysis with a dichotomized version of satisfaction as the dependent variable, the overall model is once again insignificant ( $-2LL=903.593$ , omnibus chi-square=8.370,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.137$ ); the model is displayed in Table 5.29. The limited government frame has a significant and positive impact over the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .05$ ), however, as does the Republican equality frame ( $p < .05$ ). When we look at predicted probabilities in this model for satisfaction with a pro-same-sex marriage ruling, respondents act much like they do in the support question: those under the limited government frame have a 57.01 percent chance of rating their satisfaction a 4 or higher (“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” and above) and those under the Republican equality frame have a 55.23 percent chance, whereas those in the Democratic equality frame have a 41.88 percent chance of doing the same. When gender is added to the model, the overall model is insignificant ( $-2LL=897.137$ , omnibus chi-square=14.825,  $df=11$ ,  $p=.191$ ), but the limited government frame ( $p < .05$ ), family frame ( $p < .10$ ), and Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ) all have a significant and positive effect compared to the Democratic equality frame. The interaction between gender and the family frame is also significant ( $p < .10$ ).

[INSERT TABLE 5.29 HERE]

When post-decision respondents are asked the extent to which they agree that the U.S. Constitution gives same-sex couples the legal right to marry, respondents in almost every condition are more likely to disagree than agree (see Table 5.30). The exception is

the limited government frame, where a plurality – 44 percent – actually agree that the Constitution guarantees that right (a rating of 5, 6, or 7); 39 percent under this frame disagree (a rating of 1, 2, or 3). The Democratic equality frame and the freedom frame, on the other hand, provoke the greatest disagreement (48 percent and 50 percent, respectively) and, likewise, the least agreement (33 percent and 34 percent, respectively). The estimated marginal means for this question are shown in Figure 5.11. An analysis of variance produces another insignificant model; this time, post-hoc tests do not show any statistical differences between the frames. In a logistic regression analysis with a dichotomized version of satisfaction as the dependent variable, the overall model is once again insignificant ( $-2LL=905.140$ , omnibus chi-square= $2.928$ ,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.711$ ), as are any differences between the frames.<sup>80</sup> Yet planned contrasts do show some key relationships to be statistically significant for this question: both the Republican value frames combined and the Republican equality frame alone produce higher levels of agreement with marriage as a constitutional right than the Democratic equality frame ( $p<.10$ ).<sup>81</sup>

[INSERT TABLE 5.30 HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.11 HERE]

In terms of hypotheses, there is only some support in the post-decision survey for my original predictions regarding questions about the Supreme Court ruling. In the various models ran on satisfaction with the ruling, there is evidence that respondents in the cross-pressure frames – particularly the limited government frame and Republican equality frame – were more likely to express satisfaction than those in the Democratic equality frame (Hypotheses 4b and H7c). Yet cross-pressure frames were also found to

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<sup>80</sup> Adding gender to either model does not change results.

<sup>81</sup> This particular model assumes equal variances.

be significantly different from one another, namely the limited government frame from the freedom frame, which was not originally predicted. In addition, there is no evidence for any of my hypotheses when it comes to agreement that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, except when looking at planned contrasts, which shows significant relationships between the Democratic equality frame and both the Republican equality frame and the Republican value frames combined.

### *Views on the Republican Party Platform and 2016*

Like in the pre-decision survey, post-decision respondents were asked about same-sex marriage within the context of the Republican Party platform and the 2016 presidential election. The initial same-sex marriage support question is not as strongly correlated with these questions as it was with the Supreme Court questions. Support is negatively correlated with knowing the party platform's stance on same-sex marriage ( $r = -.167$ ,  $N=657$ ,  $p < .001$ ); there is a stronger negative correlation between overall support and agreement that the GOP should maintain their current platform stance ( $r = -.663$ ,  $N=657$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Support is not significantly correlated with how important respondents think the issue of same-sex marriage is to the GOP's chances of winning in the 2016 election, however ( $p = .445$ ).

When asked where the Republican Party currently stands in order to assess the respondent's own knowledge about the platform, 54 percent correctly answered that the Republican Party currently takes an oppositional stance toward same-sex marriage in its platform, 22 percent incorrectly guessed that the GOP supported it, and 24 percent were unsure – virtually identical to the pre-decision survey (see Table 5.31). Again, however,

the frames matter: about a quarter of respondents assigned to each of the Republican value frames and the Republican equality frame guessed incorrectly. In contrast, 16 percent in the control group and just 11 percent in the Democratic equality frame thought the same. Respondents assigned to these latter two frames were instead most likely to guess correctly that the GOP platform explicitly opposed same-sex marriage (58 percent and 60 percent, respectively).

[INSERT TABLE 5.31 HERE]

Respondents were then asked to rate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that the Republican Party should maintain their current position on same-sex marriage when they adopt a new party platform in 2016, with 1 meaning “strongly disagree” and 7 meaning “strongly agree.” As seen in Table 5.32, 43 percent rated their level of agreement as a 7, and another 20 percent gave a rating of 5 or 6; 23 percent, on the other hand, rated their level of agreement anywhere from 1 to 3. The mean rating for this question is 5.12. Estimated marginal means for this question can be found in Figure 5.12. These numbers differed little from the pre-decision survey. The extent to which respondents agree with the Republican Party platform is similar across conditions, a pattern also found in the pre-decision survey; only those in the limited government and Republican equality frames show slightly more disagreement and slightly less agreement.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.12 HERE]

When an analysis of variance is performed for this question, the overall model is insignificant ( $F(5, 656)=0.8, p=.55$ ). As can be seen in Table 5.33, the LSD post-hoc test shows only the Republican equality frame to be different from the Democratic equality

frame ( $p < .10$ ).<sup>82</sup> Planned contrasts in a one-way ANOVA are all insignificant, as well. A logistic regression model, dichotomizing agreement with the platform into “agreed” and “other,” similarly does not produce any significant effects. When gender is added to the model, the overall model remains insignificant ( $-2LL=856.325$ , omnibus chi-square=8.374,  $df=11$ ,  $p=.679$ ), but the Republican equality frame has a significant and positive effect compared to the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .10$ ).

[INSERT TABLE 5.33 HERE]

Finally, looking at each scale point separately, with 1 meaning “extremely unimportant” and 7 meaning “extremely important,” a plurality of respondents – 26 percent – said the issue of same-sex marriage would be neither unimportant nor important to the GOP’s overall chances of winning in the 2016 presidential election (see Table 5.34). A combined 60 percent gave the issue’s importance a rating of 5 or higher, while just 14 percent believed the issue would play an unimportant role (a rating of 1, 2, or 3). The mean rating was 4.93. These results are very similar to the pre-decision survey.

[INSERT TABLE 5.34 HERE]

When assessing importance by condition, the limited government frame once again has an effect: these respondents are least likely to say the issue will be unimportant to 2016 (8 percent) and are most likely to say it will be important (66 percent). In contrast, those respondents under the freedom frame are most likely to say it will be unimportant (22 percent) and least likely to say it will be important (51 percent). When an analysis of variance is performed, the overall model is not significant ( $F(5, 656)=1.784$ ,  $p=.114$ ) but there are some significant differences between frames: according to LSD post-hoc tests, respondents given the freedom frame are less likely to

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<sup>82</sup> Adding gender into the model does not change results.

think the issue is important to 2016 than those in the control group ( $p < .05$ ), limited government frame ( $p < .05$ ), family frame ( $p < .05$ ), or Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ). Including gender in the model makes the overall model significant ( $F(11, 656) = 1.587$ ,  $p < .10$ ); frame assignment ( $p < .10$ ) and gender ( $p < .05$ ) each on its own are significant, as well. In the LSD post-hoc test, the freedom frame once again has a significant and negative impact on importance compared to all other frames, except the Democratic equality frame. Estimated marginal means by gender are shown in Figure 5.13. Planned contrasts in a one-way ANOVA do not show any significant relationships, however.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.13 HERE]

As seen in Table 5.34, a logistic regression model on a dichotomized version of importance is significant overall ( $-2LL = 518.386$ , omnibus chi-square = 10.166,  $df = 5$ ,  $p < .10$ ); both the frame assignment overall ( $p < .10$ ) and the freedom frame ( $p < .05$ ) are also significant. Those under the freedom frame have a 77.48 percent chance of rating same-sex marriage's importance as a 4 or higher ("neither unimportant nor important" and above), whereas those in the Democratic equality frame have an 88.55 percent chance of doing the same.<sup>83</sup>

[INSERT FIGURE 5.34 HERE]

Relating these findings back to my original hypotheses, there is no evidence for Hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c when it comes to agreement with the platform; the cross-pressure frames containing Republican values do not have a significant impact over any of the other types of frames in this question. There is some support for Hypothesis 8c: respondents in the Republican equality frame are less likely to agree with maintaining the

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<sup>83</sup> The overall model is insignificant, as is the freedom frame, when gender and an interaction between gender and frame assignment are added.



party platform than those under the Democratic equality frame. I cannot reject the null hypothesis for relationships between the Republican equality frame and the Republican value frames or the control group, however (8a and 8b).

In terms of how important respondents believe the issue is to 2016, there is some support for Hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c in this question: depending on the model, the freedom frame is significantly different from the control group, the Democratic equality frame, and the Republican equality frame. The freedom frame is also significantly different from fellow Republican value frames, however, which was not predicted. Again, findings for this particular question also do not allow me to reject the null hypothesis for Hypotheses 8a, 8b, 8c, and 9c.

#### *Post-Decision Survey Conclusions*

The post-decision survey marks a noticeable departure from the pre-decision survey: despite containing virtually the same stimuli and follow-up questions, post-decision respondents differed from pre-decision respondents in their responses to the stimuli and how the stimuli primed them on other same-sex marriage related attitudes. Post-decision, the limited government frame – not the freedom frame, as in the pre-decision survey – prevailed as the most powerful of all the conditions in suppressing negativity and even spurring greater acceptance and tolerance of same-sex marriage. The limited government frame frequently had a statistically significant impact over the Democratic equality frame and a larger substantive impact than the other frames in most cases – particularly when it came to same-sex marriage support, satisfaction with the Supreme Court ruling, and agreement that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right.

The Democratic equality frame, on the other hand, provoked the most negative reactions in each of these instances – more so than the control group and often more so than it did in the pre-decisions survey. The freedom frame also often, surprisingly, induced more negativity and less acceptance – a complete reversal from the pre-decision survey.

Respondents' adverse reaction to the value of freedom in the pre-decision survey is striking, especially given the value's prominence in Republican pro-LGBT advocacy rhetoric and the similarities in the samples drawn for these two experiments. Instead, these differences may stem from the Supreme Court decision itself. The word "freedom" – or alternatively, "free" – was used 15 times in the majority opinion and was a key part of the Court's argument in favor of same-sex marriage (*Obergefell v. Hodges* 2015).

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that the right of same-sex couples to marry is a fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Acknowledging changing times, he asserted:

The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. (11)

Freedom was also heavily referenced in dissenting opinions – a combined total of 59 times by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas.<sup>84</sup> The three justices – as well as Justice Alito – viewed the majority opinion as undemocratic and condemned the Court for acting in a legislative capacity. Chief Justice Roberts referenced freedom, in particular, by arguing that same-sex couples are free to live their lives together under the law as it currently stands – not "condemned to live in loneliness" by it (17-18), as the majority opinion claimed – and that states are "free to expand marriage to include same-

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<sup>84</sup> While Justice Alito's dissent echoed similar arguments, he did not explicitly use the term "freedom," nor did he make any mention of religious freedom.

sex couples, or to retain the historical definition” as they choose (2). He furthermore argued that the majority’s classification of marriage as a fundamental right is not enumerated in the First Amendment, like freedom of speech or religion:

Today’s decision, for example, creates serious questions about religious liberty. Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority— actually spelled out in the Constitution. (27)

Justice Scalia’s dissent similarly explained exactly what enumerated freedoms were at stake, emphasizing that people should have the freedom to govern themselves, not be governed by an unelected body<sup>85</sup>:

This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves. [...] A system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy. (2)

Justice Thomas also condemned the majority’s interpretation of liberty and elaborated on the threat that the decision posed to religious freedom:

Aside from undermining the political processes that protect our liberty, the majority’s decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect. [...] Had the majority allowed the definition of marriage to be left to the political process – as the Constitution requires – the People could have considered the religious liberty implications of deviating from the traditional definition as part of their deliberative process. Instead, the majority’s decision short-circuits that process, with potentially ruinous consequences for religious liberty.

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<sup>85</sup> Scalia notably also points out how marriage is actually the opposite of the type of freedom the majority of the Court claims it to be:

Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly incoherent. The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”<sup>23</sup> (Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and spirituality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if intimacy is, one would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie. Expression, sure enough, *is* a freedom, but anyone in a long-lasting marriage will attest that that happy state constricts, rather than expands, what one can prudently say.) (7-8)

Therefore, freedom was a prevalent concept not only in the majority opinion but also in the dissenting opinions. Respondents in the post-decision survey who were exposed to the majority and/or dissenting opinions – 84 percent said they read or heard at least something about the decision – were thus presented with new considerations as to how freedom relates to same-sex marriage. The majority, made up of what is considered to be the more liberal end of the court, used freedom in a positive context intertwined with equal rights, protection, and generational change. In contrast, those who dissented – the more conservative justices of the court – rebuked the majority’s definition of freedom and argued in favor only of those freedoms enumerated in the Constitution; their focus on religious freedom, in particular, set up a direct conflict with the issue of same-sex marriage for those who feel the it goes against their religious beliefs. The freedom frame in the experiment, then, may very well not have had the same effect in the post-decision survey as it did in the pre-decision survey given these new considerations regarding the existing value.

Differences between the pre and post-decision surveys may have furthermore been due to news stories and media accounts not directly about the *Obergefell* opinion that took place during the period between when the decision was announced and when the post-decision survey was conducted. Immediately following the Supreme Court’s pro-same-sex marriage ruling on June 26, 2015, a number of 2016 Republican presidential hopefuls came out against it, many of whom included within their statements the need to protect religious freedom and religious liberty (Topaz 2015). *Obergefell* thus thrust religious freedom back into the spotlight, and within days, Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis made national headlines for refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex

couples in Kentucky based on her own personal religious objections; judges and clerks in other states took similar action or resigned, asserting a First Amendment right to freedom of religion and speech (Galofaro and Beam 2015; McLaughlin 2015). Coincidentally, Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act – a controversial law that purportedly allows individuals and businesses to practice their religious beliefs without burden, though many say is targeted at permitting refusal of service to LGBT individuals – went into effect July 1 (Bochnowski 2015). The value of freedom was thus quickly coopted from same-sex marriage proponents on the right by same-sex marriage detractors on the same side of the political and ideological aisle.

### **Pre and Post-Decision Combined Analysis**

In order to gain a clearer picture of what occurred both within and across both survey experiments, I combined the samples from the pre and post-decision surveys.<sup>86</sup> The combined sample demographics are featured in Table 5.35. As I readdress each main dependent variable in the survey now using the combined data, I will perform a series of logistic regression models that focus both on the experimental condition assigned, as well as the timing of the respondent’s participation (i.e., either before or after the Supreme Court decision). The purpose here is twofold: combining the surveys allows for me to test the effects of the survey experiment on a much larger sample (virtually double the size), as well as observe whether the timing of the survey influenced respondent attitudes in different ways.

[INSERT TABLE 5.35 HERE]

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<sup>86</sup> Some Republican SSI panelists did in fact take the survey twice – once in the pre-decision survey, and once in the post-decision survey. Only one of their completed surveys was retained for purposes of this analysis, selected randomly with a random number generator.

### *Combined Same-sex Marriage Support*

Much like within each survey individually, respondents across all conditions were more likely to oppose same-sex marriage at some level than support it: just 36 percent of respondents across all conditions expressed some level of support. Support for same-sex marriage in the combined sample was lowest in the control group (39 percent gave a rating of 1, and 52 percent gave a rating of 1, 2, or 3) and the Democratic equality frame (37 percent gave a rating of 1, and 53 percent gave a rating of 1, 2, or 3).<sup>87</sup> Combined support was higher in the cross-pressure frames, with the exception of the freedom frame; about four in ten respondents assigned to the limited government, family, or Republican equality frame rated their support a 5, 6, or 7, though less than one in five in each case gave the highest rating. The freedom frame's lack of effects in the post-decision survey is evident in the combined sample: across both pre and post-decision respondents, those under the freedom frame were the most in the middle on same-sex marriage (21 percent), but they were also some of the least supportive – a far cry from the pre-decision survey alone. A breakdown of support among the combined sample is shown in Table 5.36. Mean support overall and by condition is shown in Figure 5.14.

[INSERT TABLE 5.36 HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.14 HERE]

I can first test if the effects of these frames are significant, much like how I did in the pre and post-decision surveys separately. When I perform a one-way ANOVA, planned contrasts show that the three Republican values combined do in act have a

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<sup>87</sup> Attentive respondents are used in this analysis. Attentive respondents are those who rated how closely they read their assigned article as a 3 or higher. All subsequent analyses of the combined data will use attentive respondents.

statistically significant and positive effect over the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .05$ ); a contrast between the combined values and the control group is not, however. The limited government frame by itself also has a significant and positive effect over the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .01$ ), as does the Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ).<sup>88</sup>

I can additionally test the impact of the timing of the experiments on the frames through a logistic regression analysis on same-sex marriage support within the combined sample. An initial model including only the frames and using the Democratic equality frame as the out-group<sup>89</sup> is not significant overall, but the freedom frame ( $p < .10$ ) and limited government frame ( $p < .10$ ) are individually. When a variable indicating whether the respondent took the survey before or after the Supreme Court decision is added, these results do not change. Only the freedom frame retains significance when an interaction term between frame assignment and timing of survey participation is also included, but again, the overall model is not significant. When the combined pre/post-decision model is rerun with a number of key demographic variables<sup>90</sup> in addition to frame assignment and timing of participation, the overall model is significant ( $p < .001$ ), and the independent variables account for 24.3 percent to 32.5 percent of the variance. A total of 996 cases were analyzed. The logistic regression made a notable improvement in prediction, accurately classifying 71.4 percent of all cases, with 69 percent of “oppose” cases correctly predicted and 73.3 percent of “other” cases.

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<sup>88</sup> Equal variances are not assumed here.

<sup>89</sup> Like in the post-decision survey, the Democratic equality frame once again acts as the out group in this analysis, unlike in the pre-decision survey where the control group serves as the out group. This is because, just like in the post-decision survey separately, respondents in the combined sample are most negative in the Democratic equality frame.

<sup>90</sup> These control variables include: gender, age, race, education, ideology, strength of partisanship, religious affiliation, frequency of religious service attendance, and whether the respondent had a gay or lesbian family member, friend, or coworker.

My key predictor variable – frame assignment – is significant in this latest model ( $p < .05$ ). Specifically, the freedom frame ( $p < .01$ ), the limited government frame ( $p < .05$ ), and the Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ) all have a significant and positive impact on same-sex marriage attitudes relative to the Democratic equality frame. Age, education, ideology, partisan strength, religious affiliation, and frequency of religious attendance are also all significant factors, as well. Whether the respondent took the survey before or after the *Obergefell* decision has no effect on their support. When its interaction with assigned condition is added to the full model, only the freedom frame continues to be significant among the conditions ( $p < .05$ ); none of the interaction terms obtain significance. The models are shown in Table 5.37.

[INSERT TABLE 5.37 HERE]

Thus, depending on the model, there is evidence that respondents in cross-pressure frames are significantly more likely to express support for same-sex marriage than those assigned to the Democratic equality frame – supporting both Hypotheses 3b (in reference to Republican value frames) and 6c (in reference to the Republican equality frame). While the freedom frame was more powerful in the pre-decision survey and the limited government frame was more powerful in the post-decision survey, there is some evidence here that both are more influential than the traditional equality frame when the two survey samples are combined. As for whether the respondent took the survey before or after the *Obergefell* decision, timing did not seem to have an impact in any model of support - surprising, given how different cross-pressure frames induced the most support at different time points.



*The Combined Impact of Obergefell v. Hodges*

Regarding satisfaction with the Supreme Court ruling, 37 percent of the combined sample rated their feelings as 1 “very dissatisfied,” with half of all respondents expressing some level of dissatisfaction. Just 14 percent were at the other extreme regarding the ruling, giving a rating of 7 “very satisfied”; about a third said they were satisfied at some level. Seventeen percent gave a middle rating of 4. Again, respondents were slightly more dissatisfied in the control condition and the Democratic equality frame than they were in the cross-pressure frames. A breakdown of satisfaction overall and by frame is shown in Table 5.38; mean satisfaction is shown in Figure 5.15.

[INSERT TABLE 5.38 HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.15 HERE]

I can initially perform a one-way ANOVA on the combined sample. Planned contrasts show, once again, that the three Republican value frames combined have a significant and positive influence over the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .10$ ), as does the limited government frame alone ( $p < .05$ ).<sup>91</sup> I can also once again run a variety of logistic regression models to test the effects of the cross-pressure frames on their own, in relation to the timing variable, and within a full model that includes various demographic variables. When I include only condition assignment and timing in the model, nothing is significant; only the interaction between the control condition and timing of survey participation is significant when an interaction term between the two variables is included. In a full model including demographics but no interaction term between timing and condition assignment, the model itself is significant ( $p < .001$ ). Moreover, the freedom frame ( $p < .05$ ) and Republican equality frame ( $p < .10$ ) have a significant and

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<sup>91</sup> Equal variances are not assumed.

positive impact on satisfaction compared to the Democratic equality frame. The freedom frame retains its significance in the expected direction ( $p < .10$ ) when an interaction between condition assignment and timing is added to the full model (see Table 5.39).

[INSERT TABLE 5.39 HERE]

As seen in Table 5.40, agreement that marriage is a constitutional right produces similar results as the ruling satisfaction question. Thirty-three percent gave a rating of 1 “strongly disagree” – almost half expressed some level of disagreement – while 15 percent took the opposite extreme, with less than four in ten expressing any level of agreement. Once again, respondents in the cross-pressure frames were more likely to agree that marriage is a constitutional right, while those in the control group and the Democratic equality frame were most likely to disagree. Mean agreement, both overall and by frame, is shown in Figure 5.16.

[INSERT TABLE 5.40 HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.16 HERE]

Planned contrasts again show that those assigned to any of the Republican value frames are more likely to agree that marriage is a constitutional right than those assigned to the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .10$ ). Likewise, those assigned to the Republican equality frame are more likely to agree than those under the Democratic equality frame ( $p < .10$ ). When a logistic regression is run including only condition assigned and timing of survey participation, the model is not significant and produces no significant results. Yet when a full demographic model, including a timing variable, is run, the overall model is significant ( $p < .001$ ), though none of my key predictor variables are. The freedom frame regains significance in the expected direction when an interaction between timing

and assigned condition is added to the full model ( $p < .05$ ). Logistic regression models of agreement with marriage as a constitutional right can be seen in Table 5.41.

[INSERT TABLE 5.41 HERE]

Therefore, significance once again depends on how the model is built. There is some evidence that cross-pressure frames – especially the freedom frame – have a significant and positive impact over the Democratic equality frame when it comes to satisfaction with the Supreme Court ruling and agreement that marriage is a constitutional right. In particular, the freedom frame and Republican equality frame are significantly more likely to increase satisfaction ratings compared to the Democratic equality frame. This finding corroborates Hypotheses 4b and 7c. When it comes to agreement with marriage as a constitutional right, however, only the freedom frame has a significant effect; I can thus only reject the null hypothesis for 4b for this question.

These combined results reflect some of the patterns that emerged in the pre and post-decision surveys separately – mainly, the effects of the freedom frame on ruling satisfaction and the little to no effect that any of the cross-pressure frames have on opinions toward marriage as a constitutional right. In terms of timing of survey participation, the satisfaction question is the only one thus far to show a significant interaction between timing and an experimental condition, albeit the control group; this is logical, given the large mean increase in agreement between the pre-decision and post-decision survey.

*Combined Views on the Republican Party Platform and 2016*

Finally, when it comes to agreement with maintaining the Republican Party platform's stance on same-sex marriage, most Republicans wanted to keep it the way it is: 43 percent rated their agreement with maintaining it a 7 "strongly agree," and another 12 percent gave a rating of 6. Just 23 percent expressed some level of disagreement with the platform (see Table 5.42). This is similar to results in the pre and post-decision surveys when assessed separately. Agreement to maintain the platform varies little by assigned condition, with the exception of the limited government frame; respondents under this frame were least likely to agree that the party should maintain its platform stance on same-sex marriage. Mean agreement for this question, both overall and by frame, can be found in Figure 5.17.

[INSERT TABLE 5.42 HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 5.17 HERE]

Planned contrasts in a one-way ANOVA show no significance for those relationships originally predicted on the question of agreement with the current platform, though relationships mostly move in expected directions. A logistic regression model that includes only the assigned condition and the timing variable is not significant, either with or without an interaction term between the two variables included. On the other hand, a full model including demographics – but not the interaction term – is significant ( $p < .01$ ). Within the full model, the limited government frame ( $p < .10$ ) has a significant and positive impact over the Democratic equality frame, as does the Republican equality frame in the expected direction ( $p < .10$ ); the timing variable is not significant. When an

interaction between assigned condition and timing is included, the limited government frame retains its significance ( $p<.10$ ). These models can be found in Table 5.43.

[INSERT TABLE 5.43 HERE]

When assessing how important the issue of same-sex marriage will be to the GOP's chances of winning the 2016 election, over half of respondents believed the issue would be important at some level, with almost the same percentage rating its importance a 5, 6, or 7. Just 14 percent said it would be unimportant to the election (see Table 5.44). As seen in the pre and post-decision surveys separately, views varied little no matter what condition was received. Mean importance overall and by condition is shown in Figure 5.18.

[INSERT FIGURE 5.18 HERE]

The lack of variation by condition is evident in statistical analyses. Again, none of the planned contrasts are significant in a one-way ANOVA. When a logistic regression model is run on issue importance including only the assigned condition and the timing variable, the model is not significant, nor is any of the variables; the same occurs when an interaction term between the two main variables is included. A full model including demographics – but not the timing interaction variable – is significant ( $p<.01$ ), but none of the key predictors are. When an interaction between assigned condition and timing is included in the full model, only the interaction between the freedom frame and timing variable is significant among the key predictor variables ( $p<.10$ ); this indicates that respondents under the freedom frame were less likely to assign importance to the issue in the post-decision survey than they were in the pre-decision

survey compared to those respondents in the Democratic equality frame. Models are shown in Table 5.45.

[INSERT TABLES 5.44 AND 5.45 HERE]

Again, we see some limited support for significant effects among the key predictor variables in these models of agreement with the party platform's stance on same-sex marriage and the importance of the issue to the 2016 election. Much like when the surveys are assessed separately, there is some indication that the cross-pressure frames are effective, providing evidence for Hypotheses H5b and H8c; the combined platform agreement model with full demographics shows significant effects for the limited government frame and Republican equality frame in the expected direction. As for the issue importance model, however, the only significant predictor variable is an interaction term. Therefore, as seen within each survey individually, the cross-pressure frames had some impact on attitudes about the Republican Party platform but virtually no impact on perceived importance of the issue in the upcoming election. No matter the timing of their participation or assigned condition, respondents largely agreed with the party platform's stance and mostly believed the issue would play an important role in the GOP's chances of winning in 2016.

### **The Verdict on Cross-Pressure Framing**

Cross-pressure frames attempt to move opinion within segments where it has seemingly been immovable on positions that are deeply ingrained within the political parties. It is therefore no surprise that the cross-pressure frames in this experiment have only a limited impact on Republican attitudes related to same-sex marriage. These

frames have a herculean task. The issue they are meant to effect is by no means new, nor is it an issue on which individuals have not yet taken sides; in fact, far from it.

Republicans have persisted in their opposition toward same-sex marriage as others have evolved – rapidly so – toward greater acceptance, and advocacy frames thus far have made little difference to this segment of the electorate. While cross-pressure frames are meant to spur greater acceptance of the issue by acting as new considerations cloaked in accepted partisan values, Republicans may see this coopting of party values as false; some respondents said as much in their open-ended responses. Chong and Druckman’s (2007) words reminding of the limitations of framing ring true here: “Individuals who hold strong attitudes are least susceptible to new information, most likely to counterargue against contrary information, and most likely to recognize information consistent with their prior beliefs” (120).

The effects of cross-pressure frames in these experiments are moreover not always direct or consistent but rather subtle and context dependent. Which exact frames are most influential, at least as determined by these two studies, initially seemed to have depended to some extent on whether the respondent took the survey before or after the *Obergefell* decision was announced. Pre-*Obergefell*, the freedom frame appeared to have the most positive effect on attitudes, while the limited government frame claimed this spot in the week after the decision was announced. When the samples are combined, however, timing was found not to be a statistically significant factor.

In addition, each cross-pressure frame’s respective ability to affect attitudes depends on how the data is parsed and how frame assignment and individual-level factors like demographics interact with one another. Different frames become significant

depending on how the dependent variable is operationalized and whether or not interaction terms between experimental assignment and other variables are included. Furthermore, different cross-pressure frames have differing effects based on what is being asked. While a variety of cross-pressure frames have an influence on support for same-sex marriage, whether individually or combined, the influence of multiple cross-pressure frames dwindles within other questions by comparison and is nonexistent when it comes to assessing the importance of same-sex marriage to the GOP's chances in 2016.

Finally, this experiment is susceptible to many of the weaknesses of experimental design, in general, and survey experiments, in particular. My sample is derived from an opt-in panel, which may mean that the Republicans in my sample are different from a random sample of Republicans in real life and thus may react differently to the stimuli – whether because of demographic disparities in who is more likely to participate in online surveys, the survey's essentially opt-in nature, respondent interest in the subject matter, or a combination of such factors. I moreover have a relatively small number of Republicans per cell, despite my large sample size overall, because of the number of conditions in my experiment, which may prevent my ability to observe subtle effects; the ability to study small effects is especially important to my study given the difficulty that accompanies reframing and changing attitudes on deep-seated issues. Issues may also stem from the frames themselves: the frames may have not been realistic enough or strong enough, which in turn may have affected the robustness of my results. This is certainly an issue given the single exposure nature of the experiment. A single article may not have been strong enough to shift attitudes, and if it did, any effects may not have



been long lasting given the extremely competitive real world environment of same-sex marriage advocacy frames.

Nevertheless, even the limited movement observed in the above analysis points to some type of substantive framing effect under cross-pressure conditions, especially when classic Republican values like freedom and limited government are evoked, and especially in comparison to the more traditional equality-laden frame used by advocates of the left. Even a reference to partisanship alone, mismatched with a Democratic value, influences attitudes on occasion compared to the frame's Democratic counterpart – a testament to the role of partisanship as a powerful cue in and of itself. Given that respondents read a single article fabricating a political official's support for same-sex marriage surrounding the Supreme Court decision, these cross-pressure framing effects are notable. After all, framing effects can be fleeting, especially in experimental situations like this (see Druckman and Nelson 2003), and are especially susceptible to the comparative strength and frequency of competing frames in real life – including equality frames in support of same-sex marriage on the left, as well as anti-same-sex marriage frames on the right. The fact that cross-pressure frames made a statistically significant difference on attitudes at all is an important finding in this preliminary experimental investigation. Cross-pressure frames may not completely reverse opinions, but they importantly are sometimes able to move Republicans toward greater acceptance and tolerance, which can be just as valuable to dispersing internal party conflict on the issue as gaining straightforward allies (see Schattschneider 1960; Kollman 1998).

**Table 5.1**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Breakdown of Conditions, Manipulations, and Word Counts**

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Partisanship of Speaker</b>	<b>Value Evoked</b>	<b>Word Count</b>
<b>Control</b>	Unspecified partisanship	American values	258
<b>Conservative value frame</b>	Republican	Individual freedom	270
<b>Conservative value frame</b>	Republican	Limited government	262
<b>Conservative value frame</b>	Republican	Strength of family	272
<b>Liberal value frame</b>	Democrat	Equal rights	271
<b>Liberal value frame</b>	Republican	Equal rights	278

**Table 5.2**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Sample Demographics**

		<b>SSI Republican Sample</b>	<b>Pew Republican Sample</b>
Gender			
	Men	47%	56%
	Women	53%	44%
Age*			
	18-34	19%	19%
	35-49	17%	20%
	50-64	31%	40%
	65+	32%	21%
Race			
	White	88%	72%
	Other	12%	28%
Education			
	HS or Less	18%	29%
	Some College	41%	30%
	College Grad	29%	27%
	Grad Work	12%	14%

Source: Pew Research Center 2014 Surveys.

Both SSI and Pew Republican samples composed of Republican and Republican-leaning adults combined.

\*Pew uses a slightly different age breakdown: ages 18-33, 34-49, 50-68, and 69-86.

**Table 5.3**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Sample Characteristics**

	<b>SSI Republican Sample</b>
Strength of Partisanship	
Strong	52%
Not very strong	44%
Leaning	4%
Ideology	
Very liberal	4%
Somewhat liberal	3%
Somewhere in between	23%
Somewhat conservative	35%
Very conservative	35%
Economic Issue Ideology	
Very liberal	1%
Somewhat liberal	3%
Somewhere in between	24%
Somewhat conservative	43%
Very conservative	28%
Social Issue Ideology	
Very liberal	1%
Somewhat liberal	5%
Somewhere in between	30%
Somewhat conservative	37%
Very conservative	27%
Religion	
Catholic	28%
Protestant	46%
Jewish/something else	26%
Evangelical	40%
Frequency of Religious Attendance	
At least once/week	29%
Almost every week	13%
About once/month	8%
Seldom	30%
Never	20%

Republican sample composed of both Republican and Republican-leaning adults combined.

**Table 5.4**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Sample Demographics by Experimental Condition**

	CON.	FREE	LIM GOV.	FAM.	EQUAL (D)	EQUAL (R)
Count	112	115	126	131	110	127
Percent	16%	16%	17%	18%	15%	18%
Gender						
Man	41%	46%	57%	47%	46%	44%
Woman	59%	54%	43%	53%	54%	56%
Age						
18-34	18%	17%	19%	27%	16%	20%
35-49	13%	23%	17%	17%	19%	14%
50-64	29%	27%	27%	34%	37%	31%
65+	40%	34%	37%	22%	27%	35%
Race						
White	92%	88%	90%	82%	88%	92%
Other	8%	13%	10%	18%	12%	8%
Strength						
Strong	60%	46%	56%	48%	50%	54%
Not very	37%	50%	41%	46%	47%	41%
Lean	4%	4%	3%	6%	3%	5%
Ideology						
V. liberal	3%	4%	2%	7%	4%	2%
Smwht lib	5%	5%	1%	3%	3%	1%
In between	23%	20%	21%	24%	23%	30%
Smwht con.	25%	37%	38%	38%	35%	35%
Very con.	44%	36%	39%	28%	36%	32%

**Table 5.5**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Manipulation Checks Overall and by Experimental Condition**

	ALL	CONTROL	FREEDOM	LIM GOV.	FAMILY	EQUAL (D)	EQUAL (R)
<b>Strength</b>							
1	14%	21%	9%	10%	9%	20%	15%
2	16%	20%	10%	15%	20%	19%	12%
3	31%	32%	34%	33%	30%	26%	30%
4	26%	14%	31%	28%	25%	27%	28%
5	14%	14%	16%	14%	16%	8%	15%
Mean	3.10	2.79	3.35	3.22	3.19	2.85	3.17
<b>Credibility</b>							
1	11%	14%	7%	8%	8%	19%	11%
2	13%	15%	10%	17%	13%	11%	11%
3	39%	42%	40%	36%	41%	38%	36%
4	26%	20%	30%	26%	27%	25%	26%
5	12%	8%	13%	13%	12%	7%	16%
Mean	3.14	2.92	3.33	3.19	3.23	2.90	3.24
<b>Attention</b>							
1	3%	2%	0%	2%	4%	4%	6%
2	5%	3%	3%	5%	5%	6%	6%
3	20%	23%	22%	22%	21%	16%	18%
4	39%	39%	37%	41%	37%	40%	37%
5	34%	34%	38%	31%	33%	35%	33%
Mean	3.96	4.01	4.11	3.95	3.91	3.96	3.85

Strength scale: 1 = "not strong at all," 5 = "extremely strong"

Credibility scale: 1 = "not credible at all," 5 = "extremely credible"

Attention scale: 1 = "not closely at all," 5 = "extremely closely"

**Table 5.6**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support Ratings Scale Overall and by Frame**


	<b>Oppose</b>				<b>Support</b>		
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
ALL	36%	8%	8%	14%	12%	11%	12%
Control	47%	6%	5%	12%	7%	10%	13%
Individual freedom	31%	4%	6%	23%	14%	12%	10%
Limited government	31%	10%	8%	14%	13%	15%	10%
Strength of family	31%	10%	11%	12%	15%	9%	11%
Equality (Democrat)	38%	6%	9%	15%	8%	10%	14%
Equality (Republican)	38%	8%	6%	9%	13%	11%	15%

Support scale: 1 = "strongly oppose," 7 = "strongly support"

**Table 5.7**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support Overall and by Frame**  
**Collapsed 3-Point Scale**

	<b>Oppose</b>	<b>Neither</b>	<b>Support</b>
<b>All</b>	52%	14%	35%
<b>Control</b>	58%	12%	30%
<b>Individual freedom</b>	41%	23%	36%
<b>Limited government</b>	49%	14%	38%
<b>Strength of family</b>	52%	12%	35%
<b>Equality (Democrat)</b>	53%	15%	32%
<b>Equality (Republican)</b>	52%	9%	39%


**Figure 5.1**  
**Pre-*Obergefell* Decision Same-Sex Marriage Support Estimated Marginal Means**  
**(All Respondents)**




**Table 5.8**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: All Respondents vs. Attentive Respondents**

	<b>ALL RESPONDENTS</b> <b>(1-5 on 5-pt scale)</b>		<b>ATTENTIVE</b> <b>RESPONDENTS</b> <b>(3+ on 5-pt scale)</b>	
Frame	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Control	112	16%	106	16%
Individual freedom	115	16%	112	17%
Limited government	126	17%	118	18%
Strength of family	131	18%	120	18%
Equality (Democrat)	110	15%	100	15%
Equality (Republican)	127	18%	112	17%
Total N	720	100%	668	100%


**FIGURE 5.2**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support Estimated Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**FIGURE 5.3**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support by Gender Estimated Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**FIGURE 5.4**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support by Education Level Estimated Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**





**Table 5.9**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Same-Sex Marriage Support**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	<b>Pre. Prob.</b>	<b>CI 95%</b>	
<b>All respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Condition				.41441		
Freedom	0.679**	0.270	1.972	.58261	1.162	3.348
Limited Government	0.409	0.262	1.506	.51587	.900	2.519
Family	0.269	0.260	1.309	.48092	.786	2.180
Equality (Dem)	0.200	0.271	1.221	.46364	.717	2.079
Equality (GOP)	0.267	0.262	1.306	.48031	.781	2.183
Constant	-0.042	0.075	0.959			
Total cases			720			
-2 Log Likelihood	990.613					
<b>Attentive respondents</b>						
Control				.42453		
Freedom	0.665**	0.275	1.945	.58929	1.135	3.333
Limited Government	0.372	0.269	1.451	.51695	0.856	2.46
Family	0.271	0.268	1.311	.49167	0.775	2.218
Equality (Dem)	0.104	0.281	1.109	.45000	0.639	1.924
Equality (GOP)	0.376	0.273	1.456	.51786	0.853	2.485
Constant	-0.006	0.078	0.994			
Total cases			668			
-2 Log Likelihood	918.716					


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.10**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Satisfaction with a Possible Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Ratings**  
**Scale Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Dissatisfied</b>					<b>Satisfied</b>	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
ALL	34%	7%	9%	19%	7%	11%	13%
Control	45%	7%	7%	15%	3%	9%	16%
Individual freedom	28%	4%	9%	22%	8%	17%	13%
Limited government	31%	8%	12%	18%	8%	15%	8%
Strength of family	29%	8%	11%	18%	11%	6%	16%
Equality (Democrat)	39%	7%	5%	18%	8%	9%	13%
Equality (Republican)	34%	8%	6%	20%	5%	12%	15%

Satisfaction scale: 1 = "very dissatisfied," 7 = "very satisfied"

**Figure 5.5**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Satisfaction with a Possible Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Estimated Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.11**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with a Possible Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Ruling**

	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	Pre. Prob.	CI 95%	
<b>Attentive respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Condition				.41748		
Freedom	0.723**	0.279	2.061	.59633	1.192	3.564
Limited Government	0.281	0.273	1.324	.48696	0.775	2.263
Family	0.402	0.273	1.495	.51724	0.876	2.552
Equality (Dem)	0.271	0.285	1.312	.48454	0.75	2.293
Equality (GOP)	0.388	0.277	1.474	.51376	0.857	2.537
Constant	0.011	0.079	1.011			
Total cases			649			
-2 Log Likelihood	892.423					


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.12**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry Ratings**  
**Scale Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**


	Disagree			Agree			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	32%	9%	6%	18%	11%	11%	13%
Control	45%	9%	2%	14%	7%	13%	12%
Individual freedom	25%	7%	7%	21%	11%	11%	17%
Limited government	29%	13%	7%	20%	10%	12%	10%
Strength of family	29%	7%	6%	22%	14%	10%	13%
Equality (Democrat)	37%	10%	6%	14%	11%	10%	10%
Equality (Republican)	29%	8%	8%	17%	12%	13%	13%

Disagreement scale: 1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”

**Figure 5.6**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry Estimated**  
**Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**Figure 5.7**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry by Gender**  
**Estimated Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.13**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Agreement with Constitutionally Provided**  
**Right to Marry**

	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	Pre. Prob.	CI 95%	
<b>Attentive respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Condition				.4466		
Freedom	0.643**	0.279	1.902	.6055	1.101	3.284
Limited Government	0.267	0.272	1.306	.51304	0.766	2.226
Family	0.527*	0.273	1.694	.57759	0.992	2.894
Equality (Dem)	0.07	0.284	1.072	.46392	0.614	1.871
Equality (GOP)	0.38	0.276	1.462	.54128	0.851	2.512
Constant	0.1	0.079	1.105			
Total cases			649			
-2 Log Likelihood	889.506					

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.14**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Agreement with Constitutionally Provided**  
**Right to Marry (w/ Gender Interaction)**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	<b>CI 95%</b>	
				<b>Lower</b>	<b>Upper</b>
<b>Attentive respondents</b>					
Condition					
Freedom	0.223	0.368	1.25	0.607	2.573
Limited Government	0.416	0.391	1.515	0.705	3.258
Family	0.258	0.359	1.294	0.64	2.616
Equality (Dem)	0.094	0.374	1.098	0.528	2.286
Equality (GOP)	-0.029	0.361	0.972	0.479	1.972
Gender	-0.331**	0.162	0.718	0.522	0.987
Condition x Gender					
Freedom x Gender	1.06*	0.577	2.886	0.932	8.935
Lim Gov. x Gender	0.045	0.572	1.046	0.341	3.21
Family x Gender	0.739	0.566	2.094	0.691	6.345
Eq (Dem) x Gender	0.077	0.593	1.08	0.338	3.456
Eq (GOP) x Gender	1.047*	0.572	2.85	0.928	8.751
Constant	0.256**	0.11	1.291		
Total cases			649		
-2 Log Likelihood	877.354				

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .


**Table 5.15**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Republican Party Platform Stance on Same-Sex Marriage (Attentive**  
**Respondents)**

	<b>Support</b>	<b>Oppose</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
<b>All</b>	21%	55%	24%
<b>Control</b>	9%	60%	31%
<b>Individual freedom</b>	29%	52%	18%
<b>Limited government</b>	20%	55%	25%
<b>Strength of family</b>	24%	53%	23%
<b>Equality (Democrat)</b>	9%	71%	20%
<b>Equality (Republican)</b>	30%	42%	28%

**Table 5.16**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party Platform Stance**  
**(Attentive Respondents)**

	Disagree				Agree		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	10%	6%	5%	14%	9%	12%	43%
Control	11%	10%	1%	7%	5%	9%	58%
Individual freedom	10%	4%	8%	16%	12%	12%	39%
Limited government	8%	9%	4%	19%	9%	12%	40%
Strength of family	13%	3%	7%	16%	13%	11%	37%
Equality (Democrat)	7%	7%	5%	10%	9%	16%	45%
Equality (Republican)	13%	6%	5%	16%	8%	15%	39%

**Figure 5.7**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party Platform Stance**  
**Estimated Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.17**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party Platform Stance**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	<b>Pre. Prob.</b>	<b>CI 95%</b>	
<b>Attentive respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Condition				.28155		
Freedom	0.431	0.295	1.539	.37615	0.863	2.744
Limited Government	0.495*	0.291	1.64	.39130	0.928	2.9
Family	0.458	0.291	1.581	.38261	0.894	2.798
Equality (Dem)	0.085	0.312	1.088	.29897	0.591	2.005
Equality (GOP)	0.47	0.295	1.6	.38532	0.898	2.849
Constant	-0.614	0.083	0.541			
Total cases			648			
-2 Log Likelihood	837.426					

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.18**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Issue's Importance to GOP 2016 Electoral Chances (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Unimportant</b>				<b>Important</b>		
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
ALL	4%	6%	5%	29%	23%	17%	16%
Control	8%	8%	3%	34%	18%	14%	17%
Individual freedom	5%	6%	2%	31%	25%	18%	14%
Limited government	3%	7%	6%	35%	18%	12%	19%
Strength of family	4%	4%	6%	25%	30%	15%	17%
Equality (Democrat)	4%	5%	6%	23%	25%	21%	17%
Equality (Republican)	4%	5%	7%	27%	20%	24%	14%

**Table 5.19**  
**Pre-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Same-Sex Marriage Issue's Importance to GOP 2016 Electoral Chances**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	<b>Pre. Prob.</b>	<b>CI 95%</b>	
<b>Attentive respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Control				.81553		
Freedom	0.513	0.39	1.67	.88073	0.778	3.585
Limited Government	0.198	0.361	1.219	.84348	0.601	2.474
Family	0.336	0.37	1.4	.86087	0.677	2.892
Equality (Dem)	0.212	0.379	1.237	.84536	0.589	2.597
Equality (GOP)	0.202	0.366	1.224	.84404	0.597	2.51
Constant	1.73	0.11	5.641			
Total cases			648			
-2 Log Likelihood	548.649					

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.20**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Sample Demographics and Sample Comparison**

	SSI Pre-Decision Republican Sample Demographics	SSI Post-Decision Republican Sample Demographics	Pew Republican Sample Demographics
Gender			
Men	47%	41%	56%
Women	53%	59%	44%
Age*			
18-34	19%	25%	19%
35-49	17%	17%	20%
50-64	31%	28%	40%
65+	32%	30%	21%
Race			
White	88%	88%	72%
Other	12%	12%	28%
Education			
HS or Less	18%	20%	29%
Some College	41%	37%	30%
College Grad	29%	28%	27%
Grad Work	12%	15%	14%

Source: Pew Research Center 2014 Surveys.

Both SSI and Pew Republican samples composed of Republican and Republican-leaning adults combined.

\*Pew uses a slightly different age breakdown: ages 18-33, 34-49, 50-68, and 69-86.

**Table 5.21**  
**SSI Post-Decision Republican Sample Demographics Continued**

	SSI Republican Sample
Strength of Partisanship	
Strong	55%
Not very strong	42%
Leaning	3%
Ideology	
Very liberal	4%
Somewhat liberal	2%
Somewhere in between	23%
Somewhat conservative	34%
Very conservative	37%
Economic Issue Ideology	
Very liberal	2%
Somewhat liberal	5%
Somewhere in between	28%
Somewhat conservative	36%
Very conservative	28%
Social Issue Ideology	
Very liberal	2%
Somewhat liberal	5%



	Somewhere in between	28%
	Somewhat conservative	36%
	Very conservative	28%
Religion		
	Catholic	27%
	Protestant	45%
	Jewish/something else	28%
	Evangelical	41%
Frequency of Religious Attendance		
	At least once/week	33%
	Almost every week	13%
	About once/month	8%
	Seldom	29%
	Never	16%

Republican sample composed of both Republican and Republican-leaning adults combined.

**Table 5.22**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Sample Demographics by Experimental Condition**

	CON.	FREE	LIM GOV.	FAM.	EQUAL (D)	EQUAL (R)
Count	121	115	115	130	136	113
Percent	17%	16%	16%	18%	19%	15%
Gender						
Man	38%	39%	50%	42%	43%	37%
Woman	62%	61%	50%	59%	57%	63%
Age						
18-34	28%	24%	27%	24%	26%	23%
35-49	17%	16%	18%	18%	18%	15%
50-64	22%	32%	30%	33%	27%	23%
65+	33%	29%	25%	25%	29%	39%
Race						
White	87%	87%	87%	86%	88%	92%
Other	13%	14%	14%	14%	12%	8%
Education						
HS or less	13%	23%	21%	18%	20%	22%
Some college	42%	38%	37%	37%	37%	34%
College grad	28%	25%	29%	29%	28%	28%
Grad work	17%	14%	14%	16%	16%	16%
Strength						
Strong	58%	54%	52%	50%	56%	58%
Not very	40%	44%	44%	45%	40%	40%
Leaning	3%	3%	4%	5%	4%	3%
Ideology						
V. liberal	7%	1%	5%	6%	2%	3%
Smwht lib	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%	4%
In between	19%	22%	27%	21%	24%	23%
Smwht con.	37%	37%	33%	33%	34%	31%
Very con.	36%	40%	32%	39%	37%	40%

**Table 5.23**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Manipulation Checks Overall and by Experimental Condition**

	ALL	CONTROL	FREEDOM	LIM GOV.	FAMILY	EQUAL (D)	EQUAL (R)
Strength							
1	16%	18%	18%	7%	16%	21%	18%
2	15%	15%	22%	12%	6%	22%	14%
3	30%	27%	28%	32%	31%	35%	27%
4	25%	22%	25%	32%	31%	15%	29%
5	13%	17%	8%	17%	16%	7%	12%
Mean	3.03	3.06	2.83	3.39	3.24	2.66	3.04
Credibility							
1	11%	9%	11%	5%	14%	16%	13%
2	14%	15%	19%	11%	9%	17%	12%
3	36%	33%	35%	35%	33%	44%	35%
4	27%	31%	26%	36%	31%	15%	25%
5	12%	12%	9%	13%	14%	8%	15%
Mean	3.14	3.22	3.04	3.40	3.22	2.83	3.17
Attention							
1	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	7%	3%
2	4%	6%	5%	1%	5%	4%	3%
3	21%	18%	26%	14%	20%	27%	22%
4	40%	41%	35%	49%	41%	35%	42%
5	31%	32%	31%	33%	33%	27%	31%
Mean	3.92	3.93	3.86	4.10	3.99	3.70	3.96

Strength scale: 1 = "not strong at all," 5 = "extremely strong"

Credibility scale: 1 = "not credible at all," 5 = "extremely credible"

Attention scale: 1 = "not closely at all," 5 = "extremely closely"


**Table 5.24**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support Overall and by Frame**

	Oppose					Support	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	36%	8%	7%	13%	9%	11%	15%
Control	36%	6%	10%	12%	7%	13%	17%
Individual freedom	38%	9%	7%	18%	8%	10%	11%
Limited government	27%	8%	7%	15%	9%	16%	19%
Strength of family	36%	10%	6%	6%	11%	11%	19%
Equality (Democrat)	41%	10%	7%	17%	9%	7%	8%
Equality (Republican)	37%	6%	6%	12%	9%	12%	17%

**Table 5.25**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support Overall and by Frame**  
**Collapsed 3-Point Scale**

	<b>Oppose</b>	<b>Neither</b>	<b>Support</b>
<b>ALL</b>	52%	13%	35%
<b>Control</b>	51%	12%	37%
<b>Individual freedom</b>	54%	18%	28%
<b>Limited government</b>	42%	15%	44%
<b>Strength of family</b>	53%	6%	41%
<b>Equality (Democrat)</b>	59%	17%	24%
<b>Equality (Republican)</b>	50%	12%	38%


**Figure 5.8**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Mean Support Estimated Marginal Means (All Respondents)**



**Table 5.26**  
**Post-Decision Survey: All Respondents vs. Attentive Respondents**

	<b>ALL RESPONDENTS</b> <b>(1-5 on 5-pt scale)</b>		<b>ATTENTIVE</b> <b>RESPONDENTS</b> <b>(3+ on 5-pt scale)</b>	
<b>Frame</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Control</b>	121	17%	110	16%
<b>Individual freedom</b>	115	16%	105	16%
<b>Limited government</b>	115	16%	111	16%
<b>Strength of family</b>	130	18%	121	18%
<b>Equality (Democrat)</b>	136	19%	121	18%
<b>Equality (Republican)</b>	113	15%	107	16%
<b>Total N</b>	730	100%	675	100%

**Figure 5.9**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Mean Support Estimated Marginal Means**  
**(Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.27**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Same-Sex Marriage Support**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	<b>Pre. Prob.</b>	<b>CI 95%</b>	
<b>All respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Condition				.41176		
Control	0.307	0.252	1.359	.48760	0.83	2.227
Freedom	0.216	0.256	1.241	.46491	0.751	2.051
Limited Government	0.69	0.257	1.994	.58261	1.205	3.301
Family	0.248	0.248	1.282	.47287	0.788	2.083
Equality (GOP)	0.374	0.256	1.454	.50442	0.88	2.404
Constant	-0.051	0.075	0.951			
Total cases			744			
-2 Log Likelihood	1000.786					
<b>Attentive respondents</b>						
Condition				.43802		
Control	0.358	0.265	1.431	.52727	0.852	2.404
Freedom	0.192	0.268	1.212	.48571	0.717	2.048
Limited Government	0.595**	0.266	1.813	.58559	1.077	3.053
Family	0.167	0.258	1.181	.47934	0.712	1.959
Equality (GOP)	0.343	0.267	1.409	.52336	0.836	2.375
Constant	0.027	0.077	1.027			
Total cases			675			
-2 Log Likelihood	929.763					


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.28**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Satisfaction with Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Ratings Scale**  
**(Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Dissatisfied</b>					<b>Satisfied</b>	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
ALL	39%	7%	5%	15%	9%	11%	14%
Control	37%	7%	6%	11%	10%	15%	15%
Individual freedom	43%	8%	6%	23%	6%	7%	8%
Limited government	31%	7%	6%	15%	14%	11%	17%
Strength of family	42%	6%	6%	10%	9%	8%	20%
Equality (Democrat)	43%	9%	6%	16%	6%	11%	9%
Equality (Republican)	39%	5%	1%	17%	9%	15%	14%

Satisfaction scale: 1 = "very dissatisfied," 7 = "very satisfied"

**Figure 5.10**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Satisfaction with Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Estimated**  
**Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.29**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Pro-Same-Sex Marriage**  
**Ruling**

	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	Pre. Prob.	CI 95%	
<b>Attentive respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Condition				.41880		
Control	0.365	0.269	1.44	.50926	0.851	2.438
Freedom	0.074	0.273	1.077	.43689	0.63	1.839
Limited Government	0.61**	0.271	1.84	.57009	1.083	3.128
Family	0.192	0.263	1.212	.46610	0.724	2.029
Equality (GOP)	0.538	0.271	1.713	.55238	1.006	2.915
Constant	-0.031	0.079	0.969			
Total cases			658			
-2 Log Likelihood	903.593					


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.30**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry Ratings**  
**Scale (Attentive Respondents)**

	Disagree				Agree		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	34%	7%	5%	15%	9%	14%	17%
Control	34%	7%	4%	13%	8%	16%	18%
Individual freedom	35%	12%	3%	17%	7%	13%	15%
Limited government	29%	6%	5%	17%	13%	15%	16%
Strength of family	35%	7%	7%	13%	8%	11%	20%
Equality (Democrat)	35%	10%	3%	19%	10%	12%	11%
Equality (Republican)	36%	3%	7%	11%	9%	15%	20%

Disagreement scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 7 = "strongly agree"

**Figure 5.11**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry Estimated**  
**Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.31**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Republican Party Platform Stance on Same-Sex Marriage (Attentive Respondents)**


	Support	Oppose	Don't Know
All	22%	54%	24%
Control	16%	58%	26%
Individual freedom	26%	54%	19%
Limited government	25%	51%	23%
Strength of family	26%	52%	22%
Equality (Democrat)	11%	64%	25%
Equality (Republican)	27%	46%	28%

**Table 5.32**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party Platform Stance (Attentive Respondents)**

	Disagree				Agree		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	10%	6%	6%	14%	7%	13%	43%
Control	12%	3%	8%	11%	8%	9%	48%
Individual freedom	13%	3%	7%	14%	7%	13%	45%
Limited government	7%	14%	5%	15%	8%	12%	39%
Strength of family	12%	2%	8%	14%	8%	9%	48%
Equality (Democrat)	6%	8%	4%	15%	6%	21%	40%
Equality (Republican)	13%	9%	6%	15%	8%	11%	38%

Disagreement scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 7 = "strongly agree"

**Figure 5.12**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party Platform Stance**  
**Estimated Marginal Means (Attentive Respondents)**





**Table 5.33**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Agreement with Maintaining Republican**  
**Party Platform Stance (w/ Gender Interaction)**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	<b>CI 95%</b>	
<b>Attentive respondents</b>				<b>Lower</b>	<b>Upper</b>
Condition					
Control	0.199	0.365	1.221	0.597	2.497
Freedom	0.183	0.372	1.201	0.579	2.492
Limited Government	0.55	0.378	1.733	0.826	3.634
Family	0.449	0.36	1.567	0.774	3.173
Equality (GOP)	0.684*	0.36	1.982	0.979	4.016
Gender	-0.195	0.167	0.823	0.593	1.142
Condition x Gender					
Freedom x Gender	-0.387	0.579	0.679	0.218	2.112
Lim Gov. x Gender	-0.15	0.577	0.86	0.278	2.667
Family x Gender	-0.558	0.56	0.572	0.191	1.715
Eq (Dem) x Gender	-0.924	0.568	0.397	0.131	1.207
Eq (GOP) x Gender	-0.72	0.574	0.487	0.158	1.497
Constant	-0.461	0.105	0.63	0.597	2.497
Total cases			657		
-2 Log Likelihood	856.325				


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.34**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Issue's Importance to GOP 2016 Electoral**  
**Chances (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Unimportant</b>				<b>Important</b>		
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
ALL	4%	4%	6%	27%	22%	17%	21%
Control	4%	4%	8%	20%	17%	25%	22%
Individual freedom	6%	6%	11%	27%	23%	10%	18%
Limited government	1%	5%	3%	25%	28%	19%	20%
Strength of family	6%	1%	6%	26%	17%	18%	26%
Equality (Democrat)	2%	3%	5%	35%	22%	17%	16%
Equality (Republican)	5%	5%	5%	25%	24%	11%	26%

Importance scale: 1 = "extremely unimportant," 7 = "extremely important"

**Figure 5.13**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Same-Sex Marriage Issue's Importance to**  
**GOP 2016 Electoral Chances by Gender Estimated Marginal Means**  
**(Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.34**  
**Post-Decision Survey: Logistic Regression on Same-Sex Marriage Issue's Importance to**  
**GOP 2016 Electoral Chances**

	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	Pre. Prob.	CI 95%	
<b>Attentive respondents</b>					Lower	Upper
Condition				.89655		
Control	-0.482	0.403	0.618	.84259	0.28	1.362
Freedom	-0.913**	0.386	0.401	.77670	0.188	0.855
Limited Government	0.228	0.463	1.256	.91589	0.507	3.113
Family	-0.233	0.411	0.792	.46364	0.354	1.775
Equality (GOP)	-0.368	0.413	0.692	.85714	0.308	1.556
Constant	1.865	0.117	6.456			
Total cases			648			
-2 Log Likelihood	518.386					

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.35**  
**Combined Survey: Sample Demographics**

		<b>Attentive Respondents</b>
Gender		
	Men	44%
	Women	56%
Age*		
	18-34	22%
	35-49	17%
	50-64	29%
	65+	32%
Race		
	White	88%
	Other	12%
Education		
	HS or Less	18%
	Some College	39%
	College Grad	29%
	Grad Work	14%
Strength of Partisanship		
	Strong	53%
	Not very strong	44%
	Leaning	4%
Ideology		
	Very liberal	4%
	Somewhat liberal	2%
	Somewhere in between	24%
	Somewhat conservative	34%
	Very conservative	36%
Economic Issue Ideology		
	Very liberal	1%
	Somewhat liberal	3%
	Somewhere in between	26%
	Somewhat conservative	41%
	Very conservative	28%
Social Issue Ideology		
	Very liberal	2%
	Somewhat liberal	5%
	Somewhere in between	30%
	Somewhat conservative	36%
	Very conservative	27%
Religion		
	Catholic	28%
	Protestant	46%
	Jewish/something else	27%
	Evangelical	40%
Frequency of Religious Attendance		
	At least once/week	31%
	Almost every week	14%
	About once/month	8%


Seldom/never	48%
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**Table 5.36**  
**Combined Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Support Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**

	Oppose				Support		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	34%	8%	8%	14%	10%	12%	14%
Control	39%	5%	8%	13%	8%	12%	15%
Individual freedom	32%	7%	7%	21%	11%	12%	11%
Limited government	27%	9%	9%	14%	11%	16%	15%
Strength of family	33%	10%	10%	10%	12%	10%	16%
Equality (Democrat)	37%	8%	8%	15%	9%	9%	12%
Equality (Republican)	34%	8%	7%	12%	11%	13%	16%

Support scale: 1 = “strongly oppose,” 7 = “strongly support”

**Figure 5.14**  
**Combined Survey: Mean Same-Sex Marriage Support Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.37**  
**Combined Survey: Logistic Regression on Same-Sex Marriage Support (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Frames Only</b>	<b>Frames + Time</b>	<b>Frames + Time Interaction</b>	<b>Full Demos</b>	<b>Full Demos + Time Interaction</b>
Condition					
Control	0.07	0.071	-0.178	0.382	0.158
Freedom	0.339*	0.342*	0.499*	0.847***	1.116**
Limited Government	0.376*	0.378*	0.165	0.635**	0.517
Family	0.077	0.079	0.055	0.234	0.176
Equality (GOP)	0.198	0.2	0.129	0.434*	0.37
Pre/post- <i>Obergefell</i>		0.034	0.031	0.179	0.175
Condition x Pre/post					
Control x Pre/post			0.472		0.416
Freedom x Pre/post			-0.342		-0.597
Lim. Gov. x Pre/post			0.423		0.243
Family x Pre/Post			0.037		0.115
Eq (GOP) x Pre/Post			0.13		0.123
Gender (1=male)				-0.006	-0.012
Age					
18-34				1.05***	1.052***
35-49				0.198	0.181
50-64				0.111	0.111
Race (1=white)				0.152	0.146
Education					
Some college				0.405*	0.400*
College grad				0.471**	0.452*
Graduate work				0.428	0.425
Ideology					
Moderate				-0.773*	-0.748*
Conservative				-2.228**	-2.21***
GOP strength				-0.31*	-0.291*
Religion					
Catholic				0.606***	0.578***
Protestant				-0.284	-0.311
Jewish				0.398	0.361
Religious attendance				1.088***	1.102***
Gay family member				0.273	0.274
Gay friend				0.267	0.267
Gay coworker				0.185	0.236
Constant	0.018	0.001	0.002	-0.945**	-0.994**
Total cases	1243	1243	1243	996	996
-2 Log Likelihood	1716.940	1716.853	1711.183	1094.724	1090.262
Model chi-square	6.126	6.214	11.884	277.515	281.977

df=	5	6	11	24	29
Correctly classified:	53.2%	53.2%	53.7%	71.4%	72.6%


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.38**  
**Combined Survey: Satisfaction with a Possible Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**

	Dissatisfied				Satisfied		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	37%	7%	7%	17%	8%	11%	14%
Control	41%	6%	7%	14%	7%	12%	14%
Individual freedom	34%	6%	8%	23%	6%	13%	10%
Limited government	30%	7%	9%	17%	11%	13%	13%
Strength of family	36%	7%	8%	14%	10%	7%	19%
Equality (Democrat)	41%	7%	6%	16%	8%	10%	12%
Equality (Republican)	37%	7%	4%	19%	7%	13%	13%

Satisfaction scale: 1 = "very dissatisfied," 7 = "very satisfied"

**Figure 5.15**  
**Combined Survey: Mean Satisfaction with a Possible Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.39**  
**Combined Survey: Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with a Possible Pro-Same-Sex**  
**Marriage Ruling (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Frames Only</b>	<b>Frames + Time</b>	<b>Frames + Time Interaction</b>	<b>Full Demos</b>	<b>Full Demos + Time Interaction</b>
Condition					
Control	0.002	0.001	-0.383	0.071	-0.361
Freedom	0.256	0.254	0.444	0.516**	0.721*
Limited Government	0.289	0.287	-0.034	0.37	0.106
Family	0.108	0.107	0.116	0.026	-0.07
Equality (GOP)	0.273	0.271	0.042	0.435*	0.118
Pre/post- <i>Obergefell</i>		-0.032	-0.034	0.062	0.055
Condition x Pre/post					
Control x Pre/post			0.723*		0.809
Freedom x Pre/post			-0.419		-0.494
Lim. Gov. x Pre/post			0.639		0.525
Family x Pre/Post			-0.036		0.188
Eq (GOP) x Pre/Post			0.445		0.63
Gender (1=male)				0.098	0.095
Age					
18-34				0.969***	0.971***
35-49				0.630***	0.609***
50-64				0.248	0.249
Race (1=white)				-0.099	-0.105
Education					
Some college				0.238	0.234
College grad				0.279	0.266
Graduate work				0.258	0.272
Ideology					
Moderate				-1.089**	-1.032**
Conservative				-2.283***	-2.247***
GOP strength				-0.508***	-0.489***
Religion					
Catholic				0.676***	0.648***
Protestant				-0.137	-0.176
Jewish				0.499	0.433
Religious attendance				0.936***	0.955***
Gay family member				0.221	0.225
Gay friend				0.43**	0.433**
Gay coworker				0.024	0.082
Constant	-0.009	0.007	0.008	-0.473	-0.539
Total cases	1213	1213	1213	996	996
-2 Log Likelihood	1676.972	1676.892	1664.574	1118.479	1109.765
Model chi-square	4.583	4.662	16.981	257.624	266.338

df=	5	6	11	24	29
Correctly classified:	52.9%	52.9%	54.8%	70.3%	70.5%


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.40**  
**Combined Survey: Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry Ratings Scale**  
**Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**

	Disagree				Agree		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	33%	9%	5%	16%	10%	13%	15%
Control	40%	9%	3%	13%	8%	14%	15%
Individual freedom	29%	10%	6%	19%	8%	12%	16%
Limited government	28%	10%	6%	18%	11%	13%	13%
Strength of family	32%	7%	6%	18%	11%	10%	17%
Equality (Democrat)	36%	11%	4%	16%	11%	12%	11%
Equality (Republican)	32%	6%	8%	13%	10%	15%	15%

Disagreement scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 7 = "strongly agree"

**Figure 5.16**  
**Combined Survey: Mean Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry**  
**Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**





**Table 5.41**  
**Combined Survey: Logistic Regression on Agreement with Constitutionally Provided Right to Marry (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Frames Only</b>	<b>Frames + Time</b>	<b>Frames + Time Interaction</b>	<b>Full Demos</b>	<b>Full Demos + Time Interaction</b>
Condition					
Control	-0.04	-0.038	-0.206	-0.043	-0.105
Freedom	0.216	0.222	0.534	0.379	0.776**
Limited Government	0.223	0.229	0.094	0.167	0.088
Family	0.186	0.19	0.471	0.064	0.364
Equality (GOP)	0.17	0.175	0.249	0.18	0.228
Pre/post- <i>Obergefell</i>		0.09	0.092	0.161	0.155
Condition x Pre/post					
Control x Pre/post			0.327		0.104
Freedom x Pre/post			-0.628		-0.848
Lim. Gov. x Pre/post			0.302		0.18
Family x Pre/Post			-0.547		-0.568
Eq (GOP) x Pre/Post			-0.137		-0.088
Gender (1=male)				-0.224	-0.225
Age					
18-34				1.081***	1.069***
35-49				0.53**	0.506**
50-64				0.098	0.09
Race (1=white)				0.075	0.062
Education					
Some college				0.186	0.186
College grad				0.372	0.368
Graduate work				0.395	0.404
Ideology					
Moderate				-1.406***	-1.371***
Conservative				-2.175***	-2.143***
GOP strength				-0.633***	-0.618***
Religion					
Catholic				0.629***	0.598***
Protestant				-0.208	-0.231
Jewish				0.291	0.29
Religious attendance				0.87***	0.884***
Gay family member				0.41**	0.416**
Gay friend				0.062	0.054
Gay coworker				-0.021	0.029
Constant	0.126**	0.081	0.078	-0.08	-0.112
Total cases					
	1213	1213	1213	996	996
-2 Log Likelihood	1673.373	1672.770	1662.381	1132.695	1126.163
Model chi-square	3.31	3.914	14.303	229.426	235.958

df=	5	6	11	24	29
Correctly classified:	53.5%	54.8%	54.9%	68.8%	69.7%


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.42**  
**Combined Survey: Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party Platform Stance**  
**(Attentive Respondents)**

	Disagree				Agree		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	11%	6%	6%	14%	9%	12%	43%
Control	12%	5%	5%	10%	7%	10%	53%
Individual freedom	12%	3%	8%	14%	9%	12%	42%
Limited government	8%	12%	4%	17%	9%	12%	38%
Strength of family	13%	2%	7%	15%	10%	10%	42%
Equality (Democrat)	7%	8%	5%	12%	8%	16%	44%
Equality (Republican)	13%	7%	5%	15%	8%	13%	38%

Disagreement scale: 1 = "strongly disagree," 7 = "strongly agree"

**Figure 5.17**  
**Combined Survey: Mean Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party Platform Stance**  
**Overall and by Frame (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.43**  
**Combined Survey: Logistic Regression on Agreement with Maintaining Republican Party**  
**Platform Stance (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Frames Only</b>	<b>Frames + Time</b>	<b>Frames + Time Interaction</b>	<b>Full Demos</b>	<b>Full Demos + Time Interaction</b>
Condition					
Control	-0.062	-0.06	-0.145	0.267	-0.033
Freedom	0.188	0.193	0.368	0.263	0.608
Limited Government	0.343*	0.347*	0.395	0.254*	0.688*
Family	0.208	0.211	0.41	0.261	0.598
Equality (GOP)	0.331	0.335	0.377	0.256*	0.451
Pre/post- <i>Obergefell</i>		0.067	0.074	0.148	0.231
Condition x Pre/post					
Control x Pre/post			0.161		0.065
Freedom x Pre/post			-0.345		-0.507
Lim. Gov. x Pre/post			-0.08		-0.376
Family x Pre/Post			-0.383		-0.457
Eq (GOP) x Pre/Post			-0.069		0.029
Gender (1=male)				0.155	-0.176
Age					
18-34				0.215	0.194
35-49				0.23	0.006
50-64				0.194	-0.017
Race (1=white)				0.243	0.203
Education					
Some college				0.215	0.15
College grad				0.235	-0.036
Graduate work				0.267	0.354
Ideology					
Moderate				0.317**	0.796**
Conservative				0.294	-0.219
GOP strength				0.155***	-0.548***
Religion					
Catholic				0.204	0.280*
Protestant				0.192	-0.168
Jewish				0.545	0.523
Religious attendance				0.155***	1.111***
Gay family member				0.167***	0.584***
Gay friend				0.180***	0.633***
Gay coworker				0.179*	0.341*
Constant	-0.556***	-0.59***	-0.597	0.433***	-2.659***
Total cases	1211	1211	1211	995	995
-2 Log Likelihood	1584.097	1583.786	1581.315	1119.513	1116.815
Model chi-square	6.406	6.717	9.188	206.67	209.367

df=	5	6	11	24	29
Correctly classified:	63.4%	63.4%	63.4%	70.5%	71.2%


\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5.44**  
**Combined Survey: Same-Sex Marriage Issue's Importance to GOP 2016 Electoral Chances**  
**(Attentive Respondents)**

	Unimportant				Important		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ALL	4%	5%	5%	28%	22%	17%	19%
Control	6%	6%	5%	28%	16%	20%	20%
Individual freedom	5%	6%	6%	29%	22%	15%	17%
Limited government	1%	6%	4%	30%	23%	16%	20%
Strength of family	4%	3%	5%	27%	25%	15%	21%
Equality (Democrat)	3%	4%	6%	27%	24%	20%	16%
Equality (Republican)	5%	5%	6%	25%	23%	17%	19%

Importance scale: 1 = "extremely unimportant," 7 = "extremely important"

**Figure 5.18**  
**Combined Survey: Mean Issue Importance to GOP 2016 Electoral Chances Overall and by**  
**Frame (Attentive Respondents)**



**Table 5.45**  
**Combined Survey: Logistic Regression on Same-Sex Marriage Issue's Importance to GOP**  
**2016 Electoral Chances (Attentive Respondents)**

	<b>Frames Only</b>	<b>Frames + Time</b>	<b>Frames + Time Interaction</b>	<b>Full Demos</b>	<b>Full Demos + Time Interaction</b>
Condition					
Control	-0.226	-0.223	-0.225	-0.199	-0.274
Freedom	-0.317	-0.311	0.325	-0.251	0.321
Limited Government	0.113	0.119	0.06	0.193	0.034
Family	0.112	0.115	0.204	-0.002	-0.033
Equality (GOP)	-0.17	-0.165	0.015	-0.158	0.108
Pre/post- <i>Obergefell</i>		0.096	0.126	-0.012	0.015
Condition x Pre/post					
Control x Pre/post			0.016		0.142
Freedom x Pre/post			-1.198		-1.116*
Lim. Gov. x Pre/post			0.195		0.428
Family x Pre/Post			-0.173		0.056
Eq (GOP) x Pre/Post			-0.362		-0.536
Gender (1=male)				-0.304	-0.32
Age					
18-34				0.581*	0.577*
35-49				0.618**	0.613**
50-64				-0.018	-0.016
Race (1=white)				0.084	0.065
Education					
Some college				0.062	0.057
College grad				-0.111	-0.148
Graduate work				-0.095	-0.116
Ideology					
Moderate				-0.011*	0.0360*
Conservative				-0.86**	-0.817**
GOP strength				-0.498	-0.476
Religion					
Catholic				0.144	0.093
Protestant				0.154	0.142
Jewish				1.284	1.294
Religious attendance				-0.535***	-0.541***
Gay family member				0.124	0.123
Gay friend				-0.405*	-0.43*
Gay coworker				-0.457**	-0.379*
Constant	1.791***	1.743***	1.742	4.06***	4.073***
Total cases	1211	1211	1211	996	996
-2 Log Likelihood	992.741	992.402	984.356	771.436	764.040
Model chi-square	4.137	4.476	12.523	58.713	66.109

df=	5	6	11	24	29
Correctly classified:	85.6%	85.6%	85.6%	85.3%	85.1%

*\*p<.10, \*\*p<.05, \*\*\*p<.01.*

**APPENDIX A**  
**SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PRE/POST *OBERGEFELL* DECISION SURVEY**  
**EXPERIMENT**

<b>Consent Screen 1</b>
-------------------------

Thank you for choosing to participate in this study. The survey is part of an academic research project conducted by Ashley Koning, a PhD candidate in the Political Science Department at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. Your participation should take about ten minutes. We are asking approximately 1,000 adults living in the United States to participate.

We are interested in your thoughts on some political issues. We will first ask you some questions about descriptions of different types of people and then ask you to read a short article that has been in the news recently. The article will be followed by a set of questions about the issue addressed in the article.

If you agree to participate, your answers will be confidential; that is, we will not release your individual answers to anyone, but we may report your responses combined with those of others. In any case, your own responses will be held in confidence. Your participation is voluntary, you may end at any time, and you may skip questions you do not want to answer. This survey is an assessment of political attitudes and does not involve any foreseeable risks.

Please click NEXT.

**Consent Screen 2**

Selecting YES gives your consent for us to use your responses in our study. If you do not wish to participate, please select NO. CLICK NEXT when you have selected your answer.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact myself at 848-932-8940 or via email at [akoning@rutgers.edu](mailto:akoning@rutgers.edu). You may also contact David Redlawsk, Ph.D., at 848-932-8504 or via email at [Redlawsk@rutgers.edu](mailto:Redlawsk@rutgers.edu).

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, please contact an IRB Administrator at the Rutgers University, Arts and Sciences IRB:

Institutional Review Board

Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey

Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200

335 George Street, 3rd Floor

New Brunswick, NJ 08901

Phone: 732.235.9806

Email: [humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu](mailto:humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu)



**No Consent**

Thank you for participating in our study. Now that your participation is over, if you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact Ashley Koning at 848-932-8940 or via email at [akoning@rutgers.edu](mailto:akoning@rutgers.edu). You may also contact David Redlawsk, Ph.D., at 848-932-8504 or via email at [redlawsk@rutgers.edu](mailto:redlawsk@rutgers.edu).

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Phone: 732.235.9806

Email: [humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu](mailto:humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu).

Click NEXT to end the survey.

**DEMOGRAPHICS PART 1**

First, let's start off with a few questions about yourself.

QD1 In what year were you born?

**[DROPDOWN MENU; IF RESPONDENT CHOOSES LESS THAN 18,  
TERMINATE AND SKIP TO AGE TERMINATION STATEMENT]**

***[AGE TERMINATION STATEMENT]***

*Thank you for participating in our study. We are only interviewing those who are 18 years or older at this time.*

*Now that your participation is over, if you have any questions, you may contact Ashley Koning at 848-932-8940 or via email at [akoning@rutgers.edu](mailto:akoning@rutgers.edu). You may also contact David Redlawsk, Ph.D., at 848-932-8504 or via email at [redlawsk@rutgers.edu](mailto:redlawsk@rutgers.edu).*

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*Email: [humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu](mailto:humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu).*

*Click NEXT to end the survey.*

QD4 Are you a ... ?

- 1 Male
- 2 Female

QD2 In politics today, do you consider yourself a ... ?

- 1 Democrat → **TERMINATE**
- 2 Republican
- 3 Independent → **SKIP TO QD3**
- 4 Something else → **SKIP TO QD3**

QD2A Would you call yourself a strong **[DEMOCRAT/REPUBLICAN]** or a not very strong **[DEMOCRAT/REPUBLICAN]**?

- 1 Strong → **SKIP TO Q1**
- 2 Not very strong → **SKIP TO Q1**

QD3 Would you say that you lean toward the Democrats, the Republicans, or neither party?

- |   |            |                          |
|---|------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Democrat   | → TERMINATE, SKIP TO QX2 |
| 2 | Republican |                          |
| 3 | Neither    | → TERMINATE, SKIP TO QX2 |
| 8 | Don't Know | → TERMINATE, SKIP TO QX2 |

**[PARTISANSHIP TERMINATION DEBRIEF]**

QX2 *Thank you for participating in our study. Our goal is to understand how different ways of framing political issues affect public opinion among Republicans and those leaning Republican, in particular. Therefore, we are only interviewing those who identify as Republican or lean Republican at this time.*

*Now that your participation is over, if you have any questions, you may contact Ashley Koning at 848-932-8940 or via email at [akoning@rutgers.edu](mailto:akoning@rutgers.edu). You may also contact David Redlawsk, Ph.D., at 848-932-8504 or via email at [Redlawsk@rutgers.edu](mailto:Redlawsk@rutgers.edu).*

*If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the administrator of the Rutgers Institutional Review Board:*

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<p><b>SCHWARTZ ANES “PVQ” VALUES QUESTIONS</b></p>
--

Q1     Now we are going to describe some people. For each, please answer how much the person is or is not like you.

**[MATCH GENDER OF QUESTION TO RESPONDENT GENDER IN**

**QD4]**

**[ROTATE A- J]**

**[UNIVERSALISM]**

- A      “(He/she) thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. (He/She) believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.”

[SECURITY]

- B      “It is important to (him/her) to live in secure surroundings. (He/She) avoids anything that might endanger (his/her) safety.”

[STIMULATION]

- C      “(He/She) looks for adventures and likes to take risks. (He/She) wants to have an exciting life.”

[TRADITION]

- D      “Tradition is important to (him/her). (He/She) tries to follow the customs handed down by (his/her) religion or (his/her) family.”

[HEDONISM]

- E      “(He/She) seeks every chance (he/she) can to have fun. It is important to (him/her) to do things that give (him/her) pleasure.”

[CONFORMITY]

- F      “(He/She) believes that people should do what they’re told. (He/She) thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.”

[ACHIEVEMENT]

- G      “Being very successful is important to (him/her). (He/She) hopes people will recognize (his/her) achievements.”

[BENEVOLENCE]

H “It is very important to (him/her) to help the people around (him/her).  
(He/She) wants to care for their well-being.”

[POWER]

I “It is important to (him/her) to be in charge and tell others what to do.  
(He/She) wants people to do what (he/she) says.”

[SELF-DIRECTION]

J “It is important to (him/her) to make (his/her) own decisions about what  
(he/she) does. (He/She) likes to be free and not depend on others.”

- 1 Very much like you
- 2 Like you
- 3 Somewhat like you
- 4 A little like you
- 5 Not like you
- 6 Not like you at all

<b>EXPERIMENT</b>
-------------------

**[1/6 to VERSION A, 1/6 to VERSION B, 1/6 to VERSION C, 1/6 to VERSION D,  
1/6 to VERSION E, 1/6 VERSION to VERSION F; BLOCK ON PARTISANSHIP  
INCLUDING LEANERS]**

Now for an issue about which there has been much discussion lately – same-sex marriage. Please read the following recent news article. Afterward, you will be asked to answer some questions about what you read.



Pre-Decision: Version A

## TOP LEADERS VOICE SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AHEAD OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

**AP** By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS June 2, 2015, 9:16 A.M. E.D.T.



Washington (AP) -- The Supreme Court heard historic arguments in cases this past April that could make same-sex marriage the law of the land. And now top officials in Washington are speaking out in support ahead of the decision.

April's arguments offered the first public indication of where the justices stand in the dispute over whether bans on same-sex marriage are constitutional, and if they are, whether those states with bans may refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages performed where they are legal.



Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

With the Supreme Court's decision expected later this month, many prominent lawmakers, operatives, and consultants have been increasingly coming out in support of same-sex marriage. Their justification? Some of the very same principles upon which this country was founded.

"As an American, I believe in and value the basic tenets of our democracy," stated one official. "We as a nation thrive most when all can prosper within this democracy and have the same opportunity to strive for and live out the American dream – no matter who we are, or where we're from, or what we look like, or who we love.

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, each individual should be able to pursue their own dream to love and marry whomever they choose. What could be more central to the idea of America than that? I urge the Supreme Court to rule in favor of making same-sex marriage legal nationwide and giving everyone in this country a fair chance at that great American dream precisely because of what I value."

Pre-Decision: Version B


## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM TO MARRY AHEAD OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

**AP** By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS June 2, 2015, 9:16 A.M. E.D.T.



Washington (AP) -- The Supreme Court heard historic arguments in cases this past April that could make same-sex marriage the law of the land. And now top Republicans in Washington are speaking out in support ahead of the decision.

April's arguments offered the first public indication of where the justices stand in the dispute over whether bans on same-sex marriage are constitutional, and if they are, whether those states with bans may refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages performed where they are legal.



With the Supreme Court's decision expected later this month, many prominent Republican and conservative lawmakers, operatives, and consultants have been increasingly coming out in support of same-sex marriage. Their justification? Some of the very same principles upon which their own party was founded.

"As a conservative, I believe in and value the Constitution's protection of basic individual rights like liberty and freedom," stated one Republican. "We as Republicans need to embrace our legacy as the party of Lincoln, and the very reason why our party was founded, making sure that when we promote freedom, it means freedom for everyone."

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, if we really believe each individual is endowed by their creator with the right to pursue happiness, they should also have the right to be free to love and marry whomever they choose. What could be more central to core conservative ideals like our First Amendment freedoms than that? I urge the Supreme Court to rule in favor of the freedom to marry as a constitutional right precisely because of what I value, not in spite of it."

Pre-Decision: Version C


## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR PRIVACY, LIMITED GOVERNMENT ROLE IN MARRIAGE AHEAD OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

**AP** By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS June 2, 2015, 9:16 A.M. E.D.T.



Washington (AP) -- The Supreme Court heard historic arguments in cases this past April that could make same-sex marriage the law of the land. And now top Republicans in Washington are speaking out in support ahead of the decision.

April's arguments offered the first public indication of where the justices stand in the dispute over whether bans on same-sex marriage are constitutional, and if they are, whether those states with bans may refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages performed where they are legal.



Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

With the Supreme Court's decision expected later this month, many prominent Republican and conservative lawmakers, operatives, and consultants have been increasingly coming out in support of same-sex marriage. Their justification? Some of the very same principles upon which their own party was founded.

"As a conservative, I believe in and value an individual's right to privacy, personal responsibility, and a small government that has no place in people's private lives," stated one Republican. "We as Republicans need to remember the words of Ronald Reagan: 'Man is not free unless Government is limited.'"

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, we cannot allow government – already too involved in Americans' lives – to stand in the way of an individual's most personal, fundamental right to choose who to love and marry. What could be more central to core conservative ideals like smaller government and limiting the authority of the state than that? I urge the Supreme Court to rule against government intrusion in private, personal decisions like marriage precisely because of what I value, not in spite of it."

Pre-Decision: Version D

## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR COMMITTED SAME-SEX FAMILIES AHEAD OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Washington (AP) -- The Supreme Court heard historic arguments in cases this past April that could make same-sex marriage the law of the land. And now top Republicans in Washington are speaking out in support ahead of the decision.

April's arguments offered the first public indication of where the justices stand in the dispute over whether bans on same-sex marriage are constitutional, and if they are, whether those states with bans may refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages performed where they are legal.



Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

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"As a conservative, I believe in marriage and family as the cornerstones of our society," stated one Republican. "They promote stability, strength, protection, responsibility, and commitment, creating a loving and secure household for the children within them. And we as Republicans should continue to support these important social institutions – but we must do so for all marriages and all families, regardless of how they look or how they are made.

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, each individual should be able to commit to and start a family with whomever they choose to love and marry. What could be more central to core conservative ideals like promoting marriage and strengthening the family unit than that? I urge the Supreme Court to rule in favor of committed same-sex couples and their families precisely because of what I value, not in spite of it."

Pre-Decision: Version E



## TOP DEMOCRATS VOICE SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY AHEAD OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

With the Supreme Court's decision expected later this month, many prominent Democratic lawmakers, operatives, and consultants have been increasingly coming out in support of same-sex marriage. Their justification? Some of the very same principles upon which their own party was founded.

"As a Democrat, I believe in equal rights, equal opportunity, and equal protection from discrimination and unfair treatment for all – no matter if they are straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender," stated one Democrat. "We cannot deny anyone their fundamental civil rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment simply because of their sexual orientation.

"So when it comes to the issue of marriage equality, all individuals should have the same basic human right to love and marry whomever they choose without exclusion or denial of justice. America is ready: now is the time to address the most important civil rights issue of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Love is love, and it cannot wait any longer. What could be more central to core democratic ideals like fairness and equality than that? I urge the Supreme Court to rule in favor of marriage equality precisely because of what I value."

Pre-Decision: Version F

## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY AHEAD OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

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[END SPLIT SAMPLE]

Post-Decision: Version A

## TOP LEADERS VOICE SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE FOLLOWING U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, many prominent lawmakers, operatives, and consultants have been increasingly coming out in support of same-sex marriage. Their justification? Some of the very same principles upon which this country was founded.

"As an American, I believe in and value the basic tenets of our democracy," stated one official. "We as a nation thrive most when all can prosper within this democracy and have the same opportunity to strive for and live out the American dream – no matter who we are, or where we're from, or what we look like, or who we love.

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, each individual should be able to pursue their own dream to love and marry whomever they choose. What could be more central to the idea of America than that? I applaud the Supreme Court ruling in favor of making same-sex marriage legal nationwide and giving everyone in this country a fair chance at that great American dream precisely because of what I value."

Post-Decision: Version B

## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM TO MARRY FOLLOWING U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, many prominent Republican and conservative lawmakers, operatives, and consultants have been increasingly coming out in support of same-sex marriage. Their justification? Some of the very same principles upon which their own party was founded.

"As a conservative, I believe in and value the Constitution's protection of basic individual rights like liberty and freedom," stated one Republican. "We as Republicans need to embrace our legacy as the party of Lincoln, and the very reason why our party was founded, making sure that when we promote freedom, it means freedom for everyone."

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, if we really believe each individual is endowed by their creator with the right to pursue happiness, they should also have the right to be free to love and marry whomever they choose. What could be more central to core conservative ideals like our First Amendment freedoms than that? I applaud the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the freedom to marry as a constitutional right precisely because of what I value, not in spite of it."



Post-Decision: Version C

## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR PRIVACY, LIMITED GOVERNMENT ROLE IN MARRIAGE FOLLOWING U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

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"As a conservative, I believe in and value an individual's right to privacy, personal responsibility, and a small government that has no place in people's private lives," stated one Republican. "We as Republicans need to remember the words of Ronald Reagan: 'Man is not free unless Government is limited.'"

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, we cannot allow government – already too involved in Americans' lives – to stand in the way of an individual's most personal, fundamental right to choose who to love and marry. What could be more central to core conservative ideals like smaller government and limiting the authority of the state than that? I applaud the Supreme Court ruling against government intrusion in private, personal decisions like marriage precisely because of what I value, not in spite of it."

Post-Decision: Version D

## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR COMMITTED SAME-SEX FAMILIES FOLLOWING U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

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"As a conservative, I believe in marriage and family as the cornerstones of our society," stated one Republican. "They promote stability, strength, protection, responsibility, and commitment, creating a loving and secure household for the children within them. And we as Republicans should continue to support these important social institutions – but we must do so for all marriages and all families, regardless of how they look or how they are made.

"So when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, each individual should be able to commit to and start a family with whomever they choose to love and marry. What could be more central to core conservative ideals like promoting marriage and strengthening the family unit than that? I applaud the Supreme Court ruling in favor of committed same-sex couples and their families precisely because of what I value, not in spite of it."

Post-Decision: Version E

## TOP DEMOCRATS VOICE SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY FOLLOWING U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Jacquelyn Martin, AP Photo

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"As a Democrat, I believe in equal rights, equal opportunity, and equal protection from discrimination and unfair treatment for all – no matter if they are straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender," stated one Democrat. "We cannot deny anyone their fundamental civil rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment simply because of their sexual orientation.

"So when it comes to the issue of marriage equality, all individuals should have the same basic human right to love and marry whomever they choose without exclusion or denial of justice. America is ready: now is the time to address the most important civil rights issue of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Love is love, and it cannot wait any longer. What could be more central to core democratic ideals like fairness and equality than that? I applaud the Supreme Court ruling in favor of marriage equality precisely because of what I value."

Post-Decision: Version F

## TOP REPUBLICANS VOICE SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY FOLLOWING U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION

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[END SPLIT SAMPLE]

**[ASK ALL]**

Q2 Now that you have read the article, what is your position on same-sex marriage?

Please rate the extent to which you support or oppose same-sex marriage on the scale below, with “1” meaning you “strongly oppose” same-sex marriage and “7” meaning you “strongly support” same-sex marriage.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
Strongly			Neither			Strongly
oppose						support

Q3 Thinking about the article you just read, please rate the STRENGTH of the argument in the article, with “1” meaning “not strong at all” and “5” meaning “extremely strong”:

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Not strong				Extremely
at all				strong

Q4 Thinking about the article you just read, please rate the CREDIBILITY of the person quoted in the article, with “1” meaning “not credible at all” and “5” meaning “extremely credible”:

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Not				Extremely
credible at				credible
all				

Q5 Thinking about the article you just read, please rate how CLOSELY you read the article, with “1” meaning “not closely at all” and “5” meaning “extremely closely”:

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Not closely				Extremely
at all				closely

Q6 Please rate the extent to which each of the following factors contributed to your attitude toward same-sex marriage, with “1” meaning it “did not contribute at all” and “7” meaning it “contributed a great deal”:

**[RANDOMIZE ORDER]**

- A What other Democrats believe
- B The specific details of the article you just read
- C What other Republicans believe
- D Your own background and/or experience with gays and lesbians

E Your own prior beliefs

**[POST-DECISION SURVEY ONLY]**

F The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding same-sex marriage

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Did not							Contributed
contribute							a great deal
at all							

Q7 To the best of your ability, briefly list exactly what things went through your mind about same-sex marriage as you were reading the article.

**[OPEN-ENDED]**

Q8 And what reason(s) did the speaker in the article give as to why they support same-sex marriage? To the best of your ability, please briefly state the reason(s).

**[OPEN-ENDED]**

Q9

**[Pre-decision]**

If the U.S. Supreme Court decides that state laws banning same-sex couples from marrying are not constitutional, which would effectively make same-sex marriage

legal nationwide, how would you personally feel about the decision? Please rate the extent to which you would be satisfied or dissatisfied about the decision on the scale below, with “1” meaning you would be “very dissatisfied” and “7” meaning you would be “very satisfied.”

**[Post-decision]**

Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that state laws banning same-sex couples from marrying are not constitutional, effectively making same-sex marriage legal nationwide, how do you personally feel about the decision? Please rate the extent to which you are satisfied or dissatisfied about the decision on the scale below, with “1” meaning you are “very dissatisfied” and “7” meaning you are “very satisfied.”

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
Very			Neither			Very
dissatisfied						satisfied

**Q10** Regardless of how you personally feel about the issue, to what extent do you agree or disagree that the U.S. Constitution gives same-sex couples the legal right to marry? Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree on the scale below, with “1” meaning you “strongly disagree” and “7” meaning you “strongly agree.”



<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
Strongly			Neither			Strongly
disagree						agree

Q11 To the best of your knowledge, what is the Republican Party's position on same-sex marriage, as specified in their current party platform? Does the Republican Party support or oppose same-sex marriage?

- 1 Support
- 2 Oppose
- 3 Don't know

Q12 The Republican Party platform currently defines marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Do you agree or disagree that the Republican Party should maintain their current position on same-sex marriage when they adopt a new party platform in 2016? Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree on the scale below, with "1" meaning you "strongly disagree" and "7" meaning you "strongly agree."

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
Strongly			Neither			Strongly
disagree						agree

Q13 How important do you think the issue of same-sex marriage is to the Republican Party's overall chances of winning the 2016 presidential election? Please rate the extent to which it is important or unimportant on the scale below, with "1" meaning "extremely unimportant" and "7" meaning "extremely important."

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
Extremely			Neither			Extremely
unimportant						important

<b>DEMOGRAPHICS PART 2</b>
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Finally, just a few more questions about you to help us better understand the results.

QD5 Do you consider yourself to be ... ?

- 1 Liberal
- 2 Conservative
- 3 Somewhere in between

QD5A Would you say you are ... ?

- 1 Very [LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE]

2      Somewhat **[LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE]**

QD6A Thinking specifically about social issues, would you say your views on social issues are ... ?

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Very	Conservative	Moderate	Liberal	Very
conservative				liberal

QD6B Thinking specifically about economic issues, would you say your views on economic issues are ... ?

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Very	Conservative	Moderate	Liberal	Very
conservative				liberal

QD7 In which state do you currently reside?

**[DROP-DOWN MENU]**

QD8 What is the highest level of school or degree you have completed?

1      Some high school

- 2 High school graduate, high school diploma, or equivalent
- 3 Vocational/technical school
- 4 Some college
- 6 Associate degree (usually two years of college)
- 7 Bachelor's degree (usually four years of college)
- 8 Graduate work (including a master's degree, law/medical school, or PhD)

QD9 What is your religion?

- 1 Catholic → **ASK QD10**
- 2 Protestant → **ASK QD10**
- 3 Jewish
- 4 Muslim
- 5 Some other religion
- 6 Atheist
- 7 Agnostic
- 8 Don't Know

**[ASK ONLY IF QD9 = 1,2]**

QD10 Would you describe yourself as a born again or evangelical Christian?

- 1 Yes

2 No

QD11 How often do you attend church, synagogue, or other worship services?

- 1 At least once a week
- 2 Almost every week
- 3 About once a month
- 4 Seldom
- 5 Never

QD12 Please select all that apply to your racial/ethnic background:

- 1 American Indian or Alaska Native
- 2 Asian
- 3 Black or African American
- 4 Hispanic or Latino
- 5 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- 7 White or Caucasian
- 8 Other

QD13 Are you ... ?

- 1 Single

- 2 In a committed relationship
- 3 Married
- 4 Widowed
- 5 Divorced
- 6 Separated

QD14 Last year - that is, in 2014 - what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes? Please choose from the categories below.

- 1 Less than \$25,000
- 2 25 to under \$50,000
- 3 50 to under \$75,000
- 4 75 to under \$100,000
- 5 100 to under \$150,000
- 6 \$150,000 or more
- 7 Don't know

QD15 Do you personally know someone who is gay or lesbian? Please check all that apply.

- 1 A family member
- 2 A friend
- 3 A coworker

<b>DEBRIEF</b>
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*Thank you for participating in our study. Our goal is to understand how different ways of framing the issue of same-sex marriage affect public opinion. To study this, we did a survey experiment here, where you were randomly assigned one of five different made-up news articles to read. The articles themselves were based on current events, existing news articles about the issue, and real advocacy arguments that have been used to frame support for same-sex marriage. The primary difference in each article was the argument the elected official used to justify their support for same-sex marriage.*

*You were then asked a series of questions related to the issue of same-sex marriage to assess whether the information in the version of the made-up news article you received affected your subsequent attitudes on other questions. There were no right or wrong answers to the questions we asked.*

*Now that your participation is over, if you have any questions, you may contact Ashley Koning at 848-932-8940 or via email at [akoning@rutgers.edu](mailto:akoning@rutgers.edu). You may also contact David Redlawsk, Ph.D., at 848-932-8504 or via email at [Redlawsk@rutgers.edu](mailto:Redlawsk@rutgers.edu).*

*If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the administrator of the Rutgers Institutional Review Board:*

*Institutional Review Board*

*Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey*

*Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200*

*335 George Street, 3rd Floor*

*New Brunswick, NJ 08901*

*Phone: 732.235.9806*

*Email: [humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu](mailto:humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu)*



## Chapter 6

### Is the Tent Collapsing? The Role of Republican Atypical Issue Advocacy and Cross-Pressure Framing in the 2016 Presidential Election and Beyond

*“Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”*

*- Winston Churchill<sup>92</sup>*

#### Stagnation and Lost Opportunity

On July 11, 2016, Rachel Hoff, the first ever openly gay member on the Republican Party platform committee, made an impassioned and tearful personal appeal in support of an amendment she proposed to the 2016 Republican Party platform on behalf of American Unity Fund’s Platform Reform Campaign:

We are your daughters, we are your sons, your friends, your neighbors, your colleagues, the couple that sits next to you in church. And one day when I am ready to marry the woman I love, I hope it will be me. Freedom means freedom for everyone, including gays and lesbians, who should have the freedom to enter into relationships and receive the same protections as heterosexual couples. [...] In high school, I chose to be a Republican. My parents are not Republican, so I wasn’t born this way. I chose to be a Republican because I believe in the same principles that you do – freedom, individual liberty, and limited government. I’m here, 15 years later, still in this great party, despite the hurtful rhetoric and stances on these issues. And all I ask today is that you include me, and those like me, and not exclude us, by simply acknowledging that thoughtful Republicans represent multiple views on the definition of marriage.

The amendment – which Hoff cautiously read right before her moving plea above – was carefully worded, reinforcing the sanctity and value of marriage while also acknowledging same-sex couples and the diverse viewpoints on same-sex marriage within the Republican Party.<sup>93</sup> The moment had all the makings of a turning point for the GOP on an issue that had seemingly been settled within the past year both through public opinion and the Supreme Court, but Hoff’s amendment did not prevail; it was defeated by

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<sup>92</sup> This quote is often attributed to Winston Churchill, but it is debatable whether this is the exact quote he used. The statement is actually derived from a similar sentiment expressed by George Santayana.

<sup>93</sup> The full amendment can be read here on American Unity Fund’s site:  
<http://americanunityfund.com/platformreform/>.

the platform committee 82-30. The millennial defense analyst made national headlines in the wake of the failed amendment, becoming a symbol of just how far the 2016 platform had moved to the right and how out of touch it was with society as a whole, including young voters within the Republican Party. Disheartened, Hoff considered leaving the GOP in the aftermath, but as she told *Out Magazine*, “I have decided I’m not leaving. I think leaving would concede defeat to people who never want our party to evolve into a more inclusive party” (Lambert 2016).

In general, the 2016 Republican Party platform and its harsh rhetoric on a variety of social issues were emblematic of larger problems within the GOP; the platform, much like the party itself, was out of touch and spearheaded by an ultraconservative wing. As noted in my interviews, and by Hoff herself in the media, the party platform committee was comprised of some of the most conservative delegates within the party – delegates for whom the platform was of the utmost importance. Hoff alleged that the initial 2016 platform draft was much more LGBT-friendly, but pro-LGBT amendments – which acknowledged a more inclusive marriage definition, included the LGBT community as victims of “violence and extremism,” and recognized the LGBT community as the victims of the Orlando shooting massacre – were struck down by “family values” stalwarts (Lavers 2016).

The platform moreover was a far cry from the 2013 Growth and Opportunity Project – both of which, incidentally, were under the command of RNC Chairman Reince Preibus. Whereas the autopsy report was frank about the party’s failures and what needed to be done to ensure future electoral success, the 2016 platform was a sign of the party regressing even further from where it was just a few years ago and from where the

rest of public opinion is now. The nomination of Donald Trump, the far-right turn of the 2016 GOP platform, and the party's poor performance among the very voting blocs they had hoped to target for electoral gains have relegated the Growth & Opportunity report to an anomaly in recent GOP history. The report's lessons from 2012 have either been too quickly forgotten or not learned well enough the first time, as the current election cycle epitomizes the very definition of insanity – repeating the same strategy and expecting different results – that the report promised the GOP would no longer entertain.

### **Room for Hope and Change in the Tent?**

For multiple election cycles now, Republican atypical issue advocates have been trying to break the GOP's self-implied cycle of insanity. These advocates have hoped to change the direction of the Republican Party from the inside by launching a civil war over social issues with positions that challenge their party's status quo. Republican atypical issue advocates have not done this by using the traditional advocacy arguments of the left, however. Instead, they frame their support within the language of their fellow partisans on the right, using the same value-laden rhetoric that their party already accepts and that has proven effective in other issue areas that the GOP is considered to "own." Therefore, what Republican atypical issue advocates do is distinct: they target a specific audience using a specific rhetorical strategy that is different from that of their left-leaning counterparts. Their narrowly focused efforts are for a very specific purpose – to provoke attitudinal change within the Republican Party.

But have these advocates been successful, or is their civil war more a civil disagreement that has fallen on deaf ears? My dissertation attempted to investigate the

effectiveness of Republican atypical issue advocacy. In each chapter, I strived to build a case and systematically determine whether their distinct strategy of reframing previously rejected issue stances within the context of accepted partisan identity and values can move intra-party opinion toward greater acceptance. I began my investigation in chapter 2 by reviewing the existing framing literature, rooting the theoretical foundation for my project in the intersection between competitive framing, values, and partisan cues. Republican atypical issue advocates' framing strategy is unique in that it purposely creates an environment of cognitive dissonance in order to provoke opinion change. Their distinct way of framing calls into question the capabilities and limitations of frame resonance, competitive framing, multiple frame environments, and source cues, exploring new dimensions of framing not yet addressed in the literature but nonetheless important as political parties continue to compete and evolve. At the end of Chapter 2, I proposed a theory of cross-pressure framing that built upon existing research and made predictions about the unique effects cross-pressure frames may have in comparison to 1) advocacy frames that evoke the wrong partisan values, as well as 2) advocacy frames that evoke the partisanship, values, and issue stances of the rival party. In general, I predicted that respondents assigned to cross-pressure frames featuring Republican speakers and Republican values would be more likely to accept atypical issue positions than those in other conditions – especially compared to frames that referenced Democratic speakers and values, as seen in current real life examples of advocacy work.

In chapter 3, I investigated who Republican atypical issue advocates are targeting and what rhetorical tactics they are using through case studies of two of the most well-known Republican pro-LGBT organizations, the Log Cabin Republicans and GOProud,

as well as in-depth interviews with these group's senior members. The case studies provided context about each organization's history, both within the Republican Party and within the LGBT movement. The case studies also served as a noteworthy comparison to one another, given each group's differing advocacy styles and trajectories within the GOP. The different choices each group has made and their diverging paths within the party point to possible reasons why one group continues to exist and the other does not. In-depth interviews in this chapter allowed me to learn about the objectives and strategies of these organizations directly from primary sources. Specifically, I was able to get a sense for the type of language Republican atypical advocates used in regular discourse to speak about their causes. This chapter confirmed my hypothesis that Republican atypical issue advocates do indeed target their advocacy work to a particular audience – fellow Republicans and conservatives. They furthermore intentionally frame their arguments within the context of accepted Republican values.

In chapter 4, I set out to systematically prove that Republican atypical issue advocates use distinct rhetorical strategies that set them apart from their left-leaning counterparts. I predicted that Republican atypical issue advocates tailor their advocacy messages to their target audience of fellow Republicans and conservatives by using value-laden language already accepted by their party. Once again using the Log Cabin Republicans as my example organization, I content analyzed the organization's press releases from 2010 through 2015 for key value words and ideas employed in their communications, as determined through my case studies and elite interviews in Chapter 3. As a point of comparison, I also analyzed a sample of press releases from the Human

Rights Campaign, the oldest and largest LGBT rights organization in the country, from this same time period.

My findings confirmed my hypothesis that Republican atypical issue advocates are unique in their word choice, mainly framing their arguments within the context of Republican principles and themes tailored for their target audience of fellow partisans. During the five-year time span, Log Cabin was indeed more likely to reference an array of Republican-affiliated values and ideas than they were Democratic ones, whereas the Human Rights Campaign almost exclusively employed Democratic values like “equality,” “rights,” “fairness,” and “discrimination;” the Human Rights Campaign in fact used some form of the words “equality” and “rights” in almost every single release. Yet, in an unexpected challenge to my hypothesis, Log Cabin’s single most cited value was also “equality.” While Log Cabin used the value to a much lesser extent than the Human Rights Campaign, the Republican group’s coopting of “equality” is nevertheless notable and seemingly goes against their overarching partisan strategy, which may have possible implications for message resonance and acceptance with its targeted audience – an audience which has incidentally rejected the “marriage equality” frame for the past several years.

In chapter 5, I conducted an original survey experiment with a nationwide sample of Republicans to assess what effect, if any, these cross-pressure frames used by atypical issue advocates have on mass opinion. I furthermore fielded the same exact experiment at two different time points, each with a different Republican sample – one immediately preceding the *Obergefell v. Hodges* decision and one immediately following it. At both time points, respondents were assigned to one of six mock articles in which an elected

official expresses support for same-sex marriage, manipulating partisanship ascribed to the speaker and supporting value evoked in the text. The six experimental conditions included a control group in which the speaker's partisanship was not identified and a vague, consensus value was used; three separate issue cross-pressure frames where a Republican speaker used a Republican value to support same-sex marriage; one value-issue cross-pressure frame where a Republican speaker used the Democratic value of "equality" to support same-sex marriage; and one rival party frame where a Democratic speaker used the Democratic value of "equality" to support same-sex marriage.

I found support – albeit limited – for my series of hypotheses regarding relationships between the different frames. As predicted, the control group and Democratic equality frame generally provoked greater negativity on questions about personal same-sex marriage support, the Supreme Court ruling, the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, and the Republican Party platform; in contrast, the cross-pressure frames – which included all three Republican value frames, as well as the Republican equality frame – frequently suppressed opposition and spurred greater tolerance. Effects also initially appeared to depend on timing: in the pre-decision survey, those respondents assigned to the freedom frame were especially more positive than others, while in the post-decision survey, the limited government frame provoked the most acceptance. Statistical analyses on the combined sample from both time points do not show any significant effects based on timing of survey participation, however. But these tests do show persistent significant effects in the expected direction for certain cross-pressure frames – mainly, the freedom and limited government frames – even when a full set of demographics is included within the model.

### **One is the Loneliest Number? Applying Cross-Pressure Framing to Other Issues**

The findings of this initial investigation into Republican atypical issue advocacy therefore indicate that atypical advocates 1) focus their efforts predominantly on their own fellow partisans, 2) replace existing advocacy frames for their cause with language already accepted by their own party, and 3) can provoke attitudinal change among fellow partisans when employing these cross-pressure frames. But as is too often the case with framing studies, this project only tested a single exposure frame within a single issue area. To bolster the power of my theory regarding Republican atypical issue advocacy through cross-pressure framing, I would need to investigate other issue areas to compare advocates' motives, goals, and rhetorical strategies to see if similar patterns between these areas emerge.

Preliminary investigation into one such issue – women's reproductive rights – thus far corroborates my theory. In in-depth telephone interviews with the National Board Chairs of Republican Majority for Choice, I heard many of the same objectives, themes, and tactics emerge as I did in my investigation of Republican pro-LGBT advocacy (Bevan 2016; Rose-Ferguson 2016; Straight 2016). Much like Republican atypical LGBT advocates, these atypical pro-choice advocates specifically target their messages to fellow Republicans and conservatives and use Republican values and themes – such as fiscal conservatism, autonomy, limited government, and the right to privacy – to frame their arguments. Interviews alluded to some key differences between the two intraparty movements, however. First, while Log Cabin has been accompanied by a handful of other organizations that do what they do within the Republican Party, Majority



for Choice is virtually alone in their fight. Some groups have simply integrated themselves with Majority for Choice instead of standing on their own, but the issue does not have the same physical number of atypical advocates on the right as the LGBT movement does. Majority for Choice has also had less visibility in the public eye and less publicly known involvement within the party; much of their work is instead done behind closed doors with elected officials in order to find common ground on reproductive issues, but because of this, it is difficult to assess just how successful they have actually been. And while access to safe and legal abortion is still a part of its mission, the group has admitted a bit of defeat on this top issue within the past decade, making their advocacy in recent years more about finding ground on other reproductive choices like contraception, education, and family planning. All of these differences point to the influence of the advocacy issue itself as an important mediating factor in cross-pressure frame and atypical advocacy success.

Moving beyond existing Republican atypical issue advocacy organizations, the theory can and should be tested in other issue areas that could potentially spur similar atypical advocacy movements. This should include, first and foremost, testing cross-pressure frames about immigration, given the issue's prominence in the 2013 autopsy report and now in the 2016 presidential election. While atypical advocacy groups have arisen over the years, they have mostly disbanded or become inactive. A deeper exploration into this issue is nevertheless needed, given deep divides on immigration attitudes within the Republican Party. Another area to explore is climate change and energy. Dozier has in fact already done work on this issue. In our interview, he

explained how messages about energy independence, economic advantages, and national security moved Republican attitudes on clean energy solutions (Dozier 2016).

Finally, future work should also explore how Democrats fit into this theory – both in terms of their reactions to Republican atypical advocacy frames, as well as their own instances of atypical issue advocacy within the party, even if hypothetical. The one-sided nature of this work is too address a very real phenomenon in the current political environment regarding the present and future of the GOP on social issues; Democrats have mostly been on the side of public opinion on these issues and have mostly been victorious with these targeted voting blocs, not needing atypical advocacy efforts since mainstream advocacy efforts are already affiliated with the party. Yet testing the effects of various cross-pressure frames on partisans beyond only Republicans is key to further exploring issues of frame resonance and deliberation.

### **The Capabilities and Limitations of Cross-Pressure Framing**

The inherent difficulty with framing, whether talking about frames at the micro or macro level, is that sometimes it does not work. At the very least, it takes time. Framing effects are not necessarily apparent after a single exposure; individuals need time to process them and accept them, if they accept them at all. My original survey experiment in Chapter 5 is therefore a difficult test of atypical advocates' usage of cross-pressure framing. Respondents' single exposure to their assigned frame in the study may have undercut the potential for any framing effects to occur because sometimes frames need repeated encounters in order to be accepted or in order to change attitudes; this may be why only minimal effects were observed in my survey experiments. If framing does

indeed take time, then a single survey experiment will not effectively capture the gradual opinion change that may be caused by atypical advocates' usage of these rhetorical tools in real life. On the other hand, my experiment may have temporarily inflated any framing effects because of the frames' prominent position within the experimental text; making only a single frame immediately available and accessible to respondents may have moved considerations related to that frame above everything else in respondents' attitude formation process. In both of these cases, any framing effects – whether understated or overstated – found in the experiment run a risk of being artificial because of the fleeting nature in which they were tested, as well as their relative isolation from any other messages within the text. In reality, individuals are repeatedly exposed to multiple and competing frames, with some frames being perceived as louder and stronger than others. Individuals can also be selective about which frames they pay attention to, influenced by their preexisting orientations and identities.

As for the success of these cross-pressure frames in the aggregate, Republican atypical issue advocates have an uphill battle. Attempts to *reframe* issue debates – as is seemingly the goal of Republican atypical issue advocates – are especially challenging and rare, particularly so when it comes to deep-seated and partisan issues like same-sex marriage. As Baumgartner et al. (2009) state, “Anyone can push a new frame,” but as their research describes, that does not mean the frame will be successful (172). In their study of 98 policy issues over a four-year period, Baumgartner et al. found that only a single issue was completely reframed with success. Many of the barriers they mention to successful reframing preclude Republican atypical advocacy from advancing, both because of members within their own party and members across the aisle. Republican

atypical issue advocates lack allies and connections to broader coalitions, both within the Republican Party and within their advocacy issue's network; their credibility is questioned by both sides due to the precarious nature of their competing identities; they have seemingly limited finances to pursue grand scale efforts, an issue which has in fact been the catalyst for some of these organizations to close up shop; and they are fighting a colossal status quo and opposition within their target advocacy audience (the Republican Party) that cannot be easily quelled. Republican atypical issue advocates have thus set forth a very difficult – perhaps improbable – mission for themselves. While their unique usage of cross-pressure frames may have some sway with Republican attitudes in theory and within my experiment, the numerous obstacles and competition these advocates face from all sides make the chances of reframing certain social issues seem slim.

### **Is it Time to Leave the Party?**

The 2016 election cycle has made it especially tough for Republican atypical issue advocates, as the issues for which they advocate become pawns in electoral discourse. Whether it is Hoff's platform experience, Log Cabin's continual struggle for acceptance, or LaSalvia's total abandonment of the party he first joined at age 18, Republican atypical issue advocacy is – to say the least – a challenging undertaking. In the midst of the 2016 presidential election, and speaking to various Republican atypical issue advocates at various points throughout the cycle, there is a sense of frustration among them with the Republican Party. For some, this frustration, in particular, stems from the role within the past year of Donald Trump as its standard bearer. These feelings

are of course not unanimous; GOProud's Chris Barron has led the charge among "gays for Trump" (Moody and Rosen 2016), yet Barron seems to be in the minority.

Throughout the 2016 election cycle, Trump has brought to the forefront many of the causes represented by these atypical advocacy movements – including LGBT rights, abortion, and especially immigration – and not necessarily in a good light. This has sparked consequences among notable Republican atypical issue advocates. LaSalvia, once the leading gay voice of the conservative right, has left the party and is actively supporting Hillary Clinton. Prominent pro-choice Republican Sen. Susan Collins (ME) wrote an editorial in *The Washington Post* criticizing Trump; she, too, will be voting for Hillary Clinton (Collins 2016). And now former U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez – a former Bush administration official, as well as on the Board of Directors of the now defunct Republicans for Immigration Reform – has "put the party aside" and declared allegiance to Hillary Clinton, as well, citing her superior economic policies, experience, and her support of free trade (Kopan 2016).

But the increasing challenge of Republican atypical issue advocacy has not arisen solely because of Trump and the 2016 election. Even before 2016, Republican atypical issue advocates have struggled for their voices to be heard – even in the best of times where progress seemed most promising. For example, in our interview, LaSalvia pointed to the GOP's hesitancy to directly include gay and lesbian individuals as a sought after voting bloc in the 2013 Growth & Opportunity report:

Interestingly, while [the report] went through and talked about the need to reach out to all these different groups – all these different groups! – they couldn't say, we need to reach out to gay voters. Gay voters make up more of the electorate than some other groups, and certainly, it's a demographic group that transcends all demographics. So when you talk to gay voters, you are talking to every Hispanic family ... every Asian family ... because every American family has a gay person in it. That showed me

more than anything the problem with the coalition. While we can see we need to do more to reach out to these different colors, we still can't say we need to reach out to LGBT voters because that will cause backlash among our base.

As for other Republican atypical advocates and organizations, the number of groups that disbanded or disappeared long before the 2016 primaries in and of itself points to the continual struggle for survival within the party. This was clear, too, in my interviews with advocates: they had few references of who else to talk to when asked, especially when it came to formal Republican advocacy organizations doing something similar to what they did, and the groups they did mention had either eased away from the fight or had left the fight altogether. Dozier specifically pointed to this problem in our interview, citing how atypical advocates on the right focus only on their own work, whereas progressive advocacy groups on the left have figured out how to link issues together and see themselves as a broader community. This broader sense of community helps them to ideally create coalitions, get recognition, and get things done.

At times, it seems as if Republican atypical advocates are unwanted guests – both by their party and by their cause. Log Cabin, the group at the center of this dissertation, has arguably been on shaky ground for a while. *The Advocate* wrote about Log Cabins “uncertain future” back in August 2015, questioning its abilities – and desire – to combat “religious freedom restoration acts” being proposed by fellow Republicans now that the fight for marriage was effectively over (Delvecchio 2015). Even as Log Cabin continues to make headlines throughout the 2016 election cycle – few other Republican atypical advocacy groups can say the same – there is an air of mystery that surrounds the group about how successful they will truly be in pushing the intraparty envelope going forward. Some, like columnist Dan Savage, are not hopeful at all: Savage wrote a scathing critique

of Log Cabin in July 2016 that gained traction in LGBT news circles, slamming the group as a fraud that only further promotes the GOP's bigotry (Savage 2016). His stinging rebuke is a powerful reminder that many of these groups are perceived more as sellouts than salvation by those outside of the Republican Party; those inside the party, on the other hand, view them simply as Democrats in Republican clothing.

The Republican atypical issue advocates who have remained in the fight – including Log Cabin, Republican Majority for Choice, and others – have attempted to find what a few of them call “common ground” with their fellow Republicans. They have worked hard to recruit, support, and donate to Republican candidates, attend Republican and conservative functions, and reinforce Republican issue stances not related to their own advocacy work. In fact, this has sometimes caused Republican atypical advocates to outright oppose the issue stances of other Republican atypical advocates; Republicans for Immigration reform, for example, used to advertise that it was pro-life. The effort put in to being a team player and establishing kinship with fellow partisans goes so far sometimes that Republican atypical issue advocates are put in a position where they cannot even defend – at least with any conviction – their own causes, as has occurred. Instances of this within GOProud and Log Cabin abounded.

As the Republican Party stands at a crossroads in 2016, adaptation to a changing electorate – and simply catching up to public opinion – seems crucial to ensure future electoral success and longevity. Republican atypical issue advocates have long been sending this message, and their message is more important than ever before. Yet despite the 2013 autopsy report, the GOP's willingness to adapt has been especially unclear in the 2016 election cycle; any efforts to court particular voting blocs and modify messaging

have been dead on arrival. With the tent appearing smaller than ever, it may be time for Republican atypical issue advocates to head home – not in spite of being conservative, but because of it.



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