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theses

The central question that underlies this dissertation is what role does grounding (or metaphysical explanation) play in metanormative inquiry? In the first part of the dissertation, I argue that normative non-naturalism – the view that normative facts are entirely of their own kind and that countenancing such facts is incompatible with a purely scientific worldview – is compatible with the claim that all the normative facts are fully grounded in the natural facts. Not only does this show that normative non-naturalists can explain all the metaphysically necessary connections between the natural and the normative, but it also shows that, contrary to what many metaphysicians and metaethicists claim, the naturalism versus non-naturalism debate in metaethics is not about grounding. But in the rest of the dissertation, I argue that the best explanation of the differences between normative reasons in the practical and epistemic domains is that what grounds (or metaphysically explains) some fact’s being a normative reason is very different between the two domains. This suggests, then, that grounding has an important role to play elsewhere in our metanormative theorizing – namely, in explaining the difference between practical and epistemic normativity.

ETD_7486

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

by Stephanie Leary

doi:10.7282/T39S1TBM

ETD doctoral

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