MASS MOVEMENTS AND PROTEST POLICING IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION WITHIN THE CONTEXTS OF ARAB UPRISING: A CASE STUDY IN DIYARBAKIR ONE OF THE MOST CONFLICTED PROVINCE OF TURKEY

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Mass Movements and Protest Policing In The Era Of Globalization Within The Contexts Of Arab Uprising: A Case Study In Diyarbakir One Of The Most Conflicted Province Of Turkey

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ABSTRACT

This case study aimed to examine the interaction between social movements and protest policing in Diyarbakir province within the context of the dynamics of a globalized social mass movement, the Arab Uprising, and its influence on local mass movements and counter protest policing implementations.

From a more detailed perspective, this research, first examines the background, inspiration and variations between a global social mass movement, the Arab Uprising, and a locally inspired one, the Kurdish Uprising attempts.

Second, this study evaluated prevalent and appropriate police or military interventions in the recent history that focused on the kinds of model and styles of protest policing that security forces have developed and developed after responding to threatening social mass protests that ended with severe injuries and deaths in the name of maintaining public peace and order.

Third, this case study was intended to better understand the characteristics of the existed mass movements and riots in Diyarbakir, located in the southeastern part of Turkey, which has a long history of civil unrest. It sought to understand whether the dynamics of these protests-sometimes violent and sometimes peaceful- were reflections of anger that derived from past state policies (such as unplanned mandatory displacements of the villages and residents) or something else.

Fourth, to achieve its goal, the study examined 2136 social mass events that existed within the borders of Diyarbakir in order to determine the number of Anti-Riot officers and needed vehicles to be deployed in social mass events in order to end any social mass demonstrations in peace. Additionally, it scrutinized the correlation between
terrorist activities and legal social mass events; the influence of selected politicians on the frequency, quantity and violence of social mass events; the outcome of prohibiting social mass events; and the emotional factors on the quantity, frequency and the degree of violence in social mass events that existed within the borders of Diyarbakir.

Fifth, the case study surveyed 538 Anti-riot officers who were first responders in efforts to deal with social mass events and interviewed 20 experts who were accountable to the Police Commissioner or the Governor in order to provide explanations for the factors that provoke troublemakers to commit violent actions; the importance of negotiation with organizers in order to end mass activities in peace; the impact of the media and remarks of the authorities concerning social mass movements; the perception of the anti-riot forces about protest policing models and styles, job satisfaction, and social mass movements and activists; the inspiration of the Arab Uprising on the attempted Kurdish Uprising; suitable training programs for security forces dealing with social mass movements; the existence of risk assessment studies; the correlation between terrorist activities and democratic social mass events that existed within the border of Diyarbakir province.

The outcome of this study may assist decision makers, government agencies and security organizations to better understand the characteristics, potential, and aims of riots and other social mass movements; illuminate dynamics that generate societal disturbances to protest collectively; identify factors that urge activists to committing violent actions; promote risk assessment strategies and training programs that will help the law enforcement authorities to develop an appropriate form of protest policing that is believed to support public peace and order and facilitates demonstrators’ rights to
organize and participate in social mass events; and develop protest policing policies and philosophy for further mass movement control strategies for the good of the society.
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my lovely daughter Huma Erinc Ercan,

and my dear son Eyyup Hakan Ercan
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CHAPTER: 1 DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

Introduction

Globalization has become a buzzword over the last three decades. It may have used in early times but became a common word only recently. This English word, has been translated into many languages and has been embraced rapidly by a large number of the world’s population.

Some may criticize globalization as an eroding transnational power that threatens cultures, languages, and local people while others interpret it as a win-win opportunity. But what is certain is the tremendous improvement provided by the instruments of globalization in very recent decades. Sophisticated developments in Information and Communication Technologies; improvements in transportation of goods, people, and knowledge; and the erosion of borders have sealed the concept of the term globalization in this recent age.

This chapter will define, in short, an expanded version of globalization in order to provide a good grounding for the coming chapters and to help assess the dynamics that prepared societies to rise up against brutal regimes and long-term ruling autocrats.

Defining Globalization

Globalization is emphasized by Sassen as a late surfacing development in our recent history and defined as “the emergent epoch” \(^1\); Langhorne points to the term

globalizations as “the digital age”\(^2\); and Roseau defines it as the “epochal transformation”\(^3\). However, for Naom Chomsky globalization is “simply international integration”\(^4\).

It is not only globalization per se, but its products that have caused changes in politics, environment, economics and social life that are described relatively as either good or bad or what takes world’s attention. If it comes to the question what the main engine of this phenomenon is, the answer would absolutely be ‘innovation and change’ which makes its products popular, and gives extraordinary power to its possessors. If that power has reached the state power, its effect is still a question that policymakers, academics, and commentators are asking. Although Globalization may have not destroyed the sovereignty of the state to some extent, it has eroded the power one or the other way especially in countries governed by autocrats and monarchs. Globalization has generated multinational organizations, encouraged entrepreneurships, improved the role civil society, and advanced the skill and knowledge of personal initiatives of contemporary humankind.

However, it may not have had created the same momentum as other positive developments have done in the last century. Unfortunately, considerable side effects of those developments are not small enough to be ignored. Whereas globalization eased the

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flow of goods, information, transportation, and services and became a source of prosperity, on the other hand it eased the transition of diseases and spread insecurities at the same time. Whether the balance of the scale remains even or indicates signs of profit or loss varies from region to region, state to state, company to company, and individual to individual.

Some may see globalization, as a ‘win-win’ opportunity scenario where everyone in the world society benefits; some may see it in point of view of ‘haves and have-nots’ that widens inequalities in social life; others may define it as the erosion of borders and the end of the nation-state; and others may interpret it as the ‘hegemony of capitalism’ that will bring the world to the end.

In its nature, globalization is a phenomenon that ignores boundaries and aims to connect to needed sources wherever they are located. The Levi Institute of the State University of New York explains: “globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology” that has effects not only on economics, politics, environment and security, but also on culture, human prosperity and physical well-being.

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According to Scholte, global relations are different from international or transnational relations. Whereas “transnational relations are usually conceived as transactions across state borders” and “international relations are inter-territorial relations, global relations are trans and supra-territorial relations.”\(^{10}\) He argues that this should not be misunderstood as ignorance of territorialism, in contrast, “contemporary globalization has been closely connected with certain forms of reterritorialization like the rise of micro-nationalist politics, urbanization and the growth of globally connected cities, and the proliferation of offshore arrangements”\(^ {11}\) and adds that “perhaps the most striking reterritorialization to accompany recent globalization has been regionalization”\(^ {12}\).

Mostly, five general conceptions are distinguished: globalization as internationalization; globalization as liberalization; globalization as universalization; globalization as westernization; and globalization as recapitalization with the spread of transplanetary social connection. It is argued that the first four definitions are largely redundant. Only the last notion gives ‘globalization’ a distinctive meaning—and at the same time identifies a key contemporary historical development. In the remainder of the book, therefore, globalization refers to the advent and spread of what are alternately called ‘global’, ‘transplanetary’, ‘transworld’ and in certain respects also ‘supraterриториаl’ social spaces. Global and territorial spaces coexist and interrelate in complex fashions\(^ {13}\): “The spread of transplanetary relations has stimulated a growing role in regulation for

\(^{11}\) Ibid p.76
\(^{12}\) Ibid. P.77
substate, suprastate and nonstate agencies. In this way, large-scale globalization during contemporary history has helped to open an era of polycentrism, with multiscalar and diffuse governance.”  

While globalization widens and touches almost everything so does the scope of security. Security should not be understood only in terms of military security, but also as economic, travel, health, crime, social order, state, public, and infrastructure. Since globalization eased to permit the flow of goods, people, and currency the number of threats have increased simultaneously. Stanly Hoffmann indicates “the (September 11) attacks also showed that, for all of its accomplishments, globalization makes an awful form of violence easily accessible to hopeless fanatics. Terrorism is the bloody link between interstate relations and global society”.  

The emergence of transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Qaida and IS is a painful example of this reality. They use the social media actively for the use of propaganda, recruitment, and support.

In regard to maintaining security and prevent threats, there are some explanation to be made. The state is the ultimate authority that is responsible for the security and prosperity of its citizens’ and itself. Intervention of other entities within the country will cause micro level instability or upgrade it at the macro level to chaos.

Most importantly, at the ‘national level’, the state should calculate every possibility of threats and be able to prepare, prevent and respond effectively to such

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14 Ibid p.4

intimidations and recover against their destructive outcomes. In order to exercise these schemes, Brunschot and Kennedy cite that the authorities have to have power—the ability to access to resources which will bring about the ability to reduce the negative aspects of the threat—and knowledge. Those are the central features of security implementations.\textsuperscript{16}

In any cases where the security is involved, whether it is globalization related or localized; identifying the threat, maintaining power and knowledge will produce peace and security in the heart of the public, which will contribute to an accurate response and recovery process.

\textbf{Democracy and Globalization}

Many commentators have celebrated globalization as an occasion of unprecedented democratization. However, following the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy spread to more states than ever (Huntington); the military were ousted in Latin America and Asia; apartheid ceased in South Africa; multiparty politics, free and fair elections to representative institutions, and legal guaranties of civil rights have become the worldwide norms of national governments; electronic communications have given citizens access to unprecedented speeds; telephone, e-mail, radio, and television have allowed citizens to relay their views to governing authorities as never before and construct social ties with likeminded people; and governments feel themselves under the supervision of the public as never before. Electronic communications have also enabled

civil society activists across the planet to exchange in their views and to coordinate their strategies in advancing global democratic campaigns and progressive social change.  

In contrast to destroying or reducing the security of democracy, globalization helps to maintain peace and democracy. Telecommunications, the internet, and satellite broadcasting are technological entities that bring transparency and knowledge, which help civil society to be aware of what is happening outside and inside of their restricted boundaries.

Ferguson and Mansbach claims that as in cultural homogenization, it is exaggerated that globalization is not the source of democratic deficit problems around the world. “In much of the developing world, some parochial ethnic, racial, religious, or regional group controls the organs of government at the expense of other groups and uses government institutions to exploit and control groups other than themselves.” For instance, after the end of the Cold War many new countries inspired democracy with ambitious goals at the beginning, but later on the desire of power, as Huntington points out “every previous democratic wave has been followed by partial retreat.”

However, intermediary and supranational structures that are equally proximate to any states, maintaining neutral position in international arena and aiming to sustain global or regional peace and security have a crucial role to play in oppressing authoritarian and undemocratic governments. For example, the United Nations, as a supranational organization, has been conducting peacekeeping operations in conflicted regions since

1951. NATO’s intervention in Serbia to stop a massacre is another example of the success of international institutions in maintaining security and peace.

**Globalization, Civil Society and Social Media**

It is no wonder that globalization has empowered the civil society locally and globally. World politics are no more under the monopoly of states, and as Hoffman argues, citizens of the world became more unruly than before, considering their relationships with governments. Ferguson and Mansbach emphasize this process by stating “we are seeing the emergence of new authority structures and the growing importance of new forms of “governance” as well as an extensive cast of violent and destabilizing “sovereign-free actors,” as in earlier epochs.” The activities of Greenpeace can be described within this argument.

Such global actors played an important role in gathering world’s attention, in affecting the public’s perception and in urging governments to decide in favor of the majority. The ban of Shell’s Brent Spar platform disposal into the deep sea level is an important success that Greenpeace was able to make operable worldwide.

Social movement campaigns consist of variety of tactics and strategies to protect society’s interest. Although Institutionalized NGOs actively work heavily in global

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environmental governance, in their nature, social mass movements are able to try to increase the mutual awareness of the problems around the global world. 21

Once civil society becomes aware of any issues that relate to the society, especially in industrialized countries, which are also the main player, they first urge scientists to uncover any given problem and publicize the problem to get the public’s and government’s attention. Later on, it becomes an authority pushing the government to act or at least press the authorities to convince the public on the issues.

However, in the case of authoritarian regimes these may differ from those in democratic countries. Repression, intimidation, censorship of the regime, and lack of freedom prevent the appearance of social mass movements in terms of quantity and growth.

As Goodwin and Jasper state, “a social movement is a collective, organized, sustained, and noninstitutional challenge to authorities, power-holders, or cultural beliefs and practices.” But, a revolutionary movement is defined as “a social movement that seeks, at minimum, to overthrow the government or state, and perhaps to change the economy and key institutions of the entire society.” 22

Throughout history people have complained about the issues they dislike. In ancient times societal opposition by the people was brutal and aimed to overthrow their rulers. However, the response of the authorities was accepted as a riot against the

authority and they intervened the same way, which was often brutal and merciless. However, in the modern times, social upheavals are represented by strikes, rallies, sit-ins, pickets, and are mostly presented by labor movements aimed to higher union recognition, wages, and working conditions.

Though, protests in the beginning of the 21st century expanded their range to the global level, gatherings and protests against Bretton Woods Institutions and their policies escalated national and local social mass movements to a supranational level. Transnational mass movements with the products of globalizations brought a different dimension to the history of social mass movements. Protests in Seattle and Geneva were two of the most well-known transnational mass events that succeeded in gathering a million activists in one city.

The main supplement in enhancing the popularity of transnational mass movements came with the emergence of private TV channels and their satellite providers. “In a fragmented world, moreover, opposition crisis are often subject to contagion effects. Through global television, publics in restless countries may observe upheavals elsewhere in the world and subsequently emulate them. The fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1998-90 is illustrative in this respect.”

However, the real revolution in ICT came with the appearance of social media that provided a net to bind everybody who is willing to bypass the censorship of the state control. The first outcome of the social media movement that shook the authorities

prevailed with the Green Revolution, protesting the presidential elections in Iran in 2009. People communicated through blogs in order to share their grievances, and to find a common ground and mobilize.

The next and more effective social media impact was observing during the Arab Uprising that disrupted Middle Eastern and North African countries in one or another way. This movement, later expanded its realm worldwide, and inspired student movements, and other social mass movements, even in developed countries. With the help of the social media locals possessed a multilayered and horizontal network that not only made them aware of what was going on the globe, but also gave the opportunity to network through the products of globalization in order to connect with like-minded people to create a powerful common voice.

In this respect, As Rosenau states, globalization may made “distant proximate” and Ferguson and Mansbach quoted from Okwui Enwezor: “Globalization means the terrible nearness of distant places.” Nonetheless, after all of these developments globalization may have generated a proportion of happy people on the globe; unfortunately, there is also a considerable rate of discontented, unemployed, poor, and unhappy proportion of world population. However, along with bad governance, those people were able to use a recently prevailed tool of globalization that was absent until our recent history to connect with same minded, voice their grievances loudly, find a

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common ground and act in unison to make the change they have longed for many years. This too is social media.

**Technological Uptrend and Globalization**

Space has been rearranged by virtue of communication and transportation changes, identities have shifted and time is being compressed in many ways. The number of computer systems connected to the Internet burgeoned from 213 in 1981 to 313,000 in 1990, 170 million in 1999, 430 million in 2000, and 1.39 billion in 2007 (222 million of these users are from the U.S., which constitutes 16% of world users). The worldwide rate of Internet users increased to 16.10% in 2010 compared with the users of 2009. This increase scored to 11.70% in 2011 with 2,272,463,038 users. 25

However, as of January 2015, while the total world population was 7.210 billion with the rate of 53% for urbanization, active Internet users numbered 3.010 billion with a penetration rate of 42% and active social media accounts numbered 1.685 billion with a penetration rate of 23% according to Simon Kemp. 26

Another important tool of globalization is constituted by computer-centered interactive technology, which has “facilitated multiscalar transactions and simultaneous interconnectivity among those largely confined to a locality.” 27


Nevertheless, the e-mail alerting system of Amnesty International is an example of how local victims of human rights abuses can contact them rapidly and can be helped to safety in respect to globally affective institutions across the border. However, Bhagwati states that “the technology of Internet and CNN, as Robert Putnam has explained to us, has accelerated our move to “bowling alone”, gluing us to our TV sets and shifting us steadily out of civic participation, so that the innermost circle has become the outermost one.”\textsuperscript{28} (Bhagwati, p.19)

In terms of security, the unstoppable speed of developing technology gave birth to unimaginable benefits for humanity and opportunities to crime organizations as well. A self-propagating e-mail virus, ILOVEYOU, affected 80 percent of U.S. corporations and nearly 100,000 servers in Europe and was developed by a Filipino programmer in 2000. A recent failure of the World Bank, which has 185 nation members and deals with more than $25 billion a year, was attacked many times by hackers. But the last one was very successful and as a result: at least 18 servers and bank’s most sensitive systems were raided by outsiders at least six times in one year. Interestingly enough, the IP addresses originated in Macao/China.

The effects is technology having on virtual aspects on global affairs is a two edged phenomena; some are positive and some negative, but very rapid changes are evident nonetheless. For instance, while the Internet is able to provide a common base for evil people on the one hand, on the other hand it fosters a live connection opportunity to

connect family members from one part of the world to the other part instantly. Moreover, while it generates an environment for hackers to commit crimes, on the other hand it helps people to transfer pocket money from one continent to the other.

Although, Interpol, which has operated as a global governance agency to pursue criminals since 1923 and the Financial Action Force (FATF) that has been working on countering money laundering with multinational organizations since 1989 are aiming to counter such crimes, it is hard to say that global agencies are effective in fighting against criminals that are able to operate at any corner of the world. Nor only global precautions to terminate threats in Information Technologies (IT) but also local initiatives are essential for an effective solution.

**Summary**

The world is continuously undergoing an adaptive and changing process. The multilayer connections; transnational flow of goods, information, and knowledge; and the immunities provided by nation-states to private enterprise have triumphed in recent decades and have been described as the process of ‘Globalization’. Many world presidents, academicians, and commentators described this unpreventable change as the “New World Order”, indicating that things today are no longer the same as they were several decades ago.

As Ferguson (2006) states, Globalization has changed whatever it has touched. No wonder that ‘Globalization’ has served in many contexts for humanity along with nursing the potential for misuse, overconsumption, and threatening the boundaries of nation-states. Nonetheless, as outlined in a Turkish saying “the rose comes with thorns”. The rose refers to the benefits of globalization and the thorns refer to misinterpretation or
undesired outcomes of globalization. For instance, neo-liberalists argue that their roadmap will bring freedom, peace, democracy, and prosperity by extending worldwide liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and fiscal control, however, the anti-globalization movement opposes the view that a laissez-faire world economy will bring nothing more than poverty, inequality, cultural destruction, environmental degradation, conflict and democratic deficit which means insecurity for culture, economy, health, environment, citizens, and national security.

Liberalism and neo-liberalism may ignore the state and force the bulldozing of the boundaries of states and may also diminish the role of this in the name of prosperity. But as many academicians emphasize it is not the fault of globalization, rather it is the weakness and failure of policy makers, bad governance and poor implementation that can cause misuse, exploitation, overuse, and unconscious consumption of resources or alter national values.

The revolution of globalization caused the end of colonialism, brought down the Berlin Wall, collapsed the Soviet Union, enhanced member-states to the UN from 51 to 192, increased the number of international organization, boosted the importance of civil society, and the power of NGOs. Moreover, the erosion of states’ boundaries, the transparency of strict governance, and the emergence of transnational private sector expansions were aligned with the same dynamic, which is the rise of globalization.

Although from time to time some signs of de-globalization have appeared as a reaction against globalization, these can be eliminated via ‘knowledge and power’ as Kennedy and Brunschot point out in their work. They are the tools that can diminish or end the threat of globalization and de-globalization, which usually dispatches extremism,
radicalism, or protectionism. Therefore, Ferguson claims that the problem we face are not due to globalization itself, but to bad governance.

Some sovereign states were able to take advantage of this epochal change while others were caught unprepared or were inadequate to compete. On the one hand, the unavoidable power of globalization urged developed and developing states to become more transparent, accountable and democratic. On the other hand, this New World Order became a threatening power for weak, fragile, and repressive states.

The economic power of the private and transnational organizations provided an environment for society to bypass state censorship and connect with and learn from people beyond their borders. States that were able to adapt to this epochal change were able to convince their nationals. But states that ignored the impact of globalization upon the society were not able to merge the gap between the disconnected nationals and their rulers or governments. With the help of the products developed in this the age of globalization, the discontented majority found a common ground for connecting, interacting, and voicing their demands in a more powerful way than before. The Green Revolution in Iran might the first example reflecting the power of the social media, but the Arab Uprising was the most powerful social mass movement that has toppled fragile states.

It should not be forgotten though that, although the role of the state is being modified or reshaped by globalization, states still are the key player in the national and international arena and should consider the emergence of globalization as a stimulant that helps these developments to adapt and be used in to the benefit of their nationals and their existence. In this sense, Parag Khanna was right when he cited ‘Hobbes and Darwin’ who
argued that “no single power will dominate others; rather the most adaptive system will prevail.”

CHAPTER 2: THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL MASS PROTESTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROTEST POLICING STRATEGIES IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES

Introduction

It is certain that the implementation of models and styles of protest policing varies from country to country, agency to agency, and depends on the nature of the mass event. Therefore, there is no universality or monopoly in any styles or models of protest policing. Rather, legislative and executive authorities are the main actors formalizing these models and styles of protest policing. Usually such modifications and changes coexist with intense social mass events that have captured the attention of the whole society.

In this respect, this chapter will emphasize the role of the main actors in social mass demonstrations and underline the emerging protest policing models and styles developed in response in some democratic countries; highlight the interaction among the main actors that effect protest policing; underline styles of protest policing implemented by security forces; stress the weight of understanding the determined crowds, calculate their aims and estimate their potential; and the internal factors affecting the course of social mass demonstrations.

Additionally, this chapter will examine the existing types, styles, and models of protest policing in mass events recommended by practitioners and academics in order to provide a broader viewpoint for governmental institutions and law enforcement organizations dealing with social mass demonstrations and to provide a durable analogy in assessing protest policing implementations of the Anti-Riot Unit of Diyarbakir Police Department while intervening in social mass protests that influenced the Arab Uprising.

The Interrelation Among the Actors of Social Mass Events and the Emergence of Protest Policing Models

Although social movements were quite popular in the era of the Great Depression, after WWII, and in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, a lack of theoretical and empirical studies on this topic was evident. This might explain why academics and authorities were subsequently encouraged to work in this area. Many commentators working on this field agree that an explosion of empirical and theoretical works on collective and social movements coexisted in the decade of 1980s.

In this literature, when discussing the concept of a sovereign nation, the state authority, the rule of law, the public and the police or military are usually the main players that are mentioned. However, whether the nation is ruled by a democracy, by tyranny, or by the rule of law depends on the balance of the relationship among these four entities. Although, the three main actors should serve and act for the good of the one, which is the public, unfortunately any uncontrolled power transition among them may easily cause the destruction of the harmony among these actors that will in turn change the definition of the regime. Thus, if the balance inclines too heavily to one side, the
entire structure may collapse and the state may become a habitat of insecurity for its nationals.

If the state powers become dominant then tyranny and state terror may come to the fore, such as in the Middle East. But, if the legislative branch of power becomes dominant than an oligarchic system may appear that might interrupt the harmony among the three pillars mentioned above, which could disrupt the private lives of citizens during that period of time. Moreover, if the police or military become dominant then democracy and freedom of speech could be in danger, and this might result in the frustration and intimidation of citizens.

Thus the balance among these main players should always be maintained and controlled by the actors of the nation’s collective mind to serve and maintain democracy. In a democratic state system, the public is the main player. The system should thus facilitate and urge the public to take part in the system. People should have the right to express their demands, feelings or objections to the governing authority. This reflection of expression is, nowadays, made possible either through the use of media or sometimes through mass gatherings of the public who want to voice their demands in a stronger way. The more people gather, the more the legislative and executive authorities will have no options other than to listen to the voices of the people.

However, in such cases instead of the state the law enforcement organizations become the interlocutors to the public. Although seen as an extension of the state and a defender of the status quo by activists, the police could be determined to be the foremost defenders of the system and the protest of subordinates could follow as a “natural
consequence of structures of inequality”.\textsuperscript{30} In this respect riots are regarded not as a practice of prodemocracy, but rather as a fundamental threat to the political and social order.\textsuperscript{31}

The concept of respecting human rights, increasing the rule of Law, and supporting civil liberation furthered states to move towards a more democratized level. Experiencing and leading the institutionalization era, Britain was one of the most important states to experiment in confronting its harsh social divisions and in handling political clashes in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century. During this period, police in Britain, were employing a low profile and legalistic of intervention and a relatively tolerant approach to policing, with the minimal use of force. While the British police were employing the previously explained level of intervention, their contemporary colleagues on the European continent were maintaining an opposite style and model of protest policing, which was a repressive and intolerant style of protest policing.\textsuperscript{32}

The European style and model of protest policing was repressive and in some cases brutal, diffused, or artisanal. The reason why European protest policing possessed less tolerant characteristics, some may say harsh characteristics, came from its past policing culture history. The continental model of policing was designed in line with the


“French tradition of a “king’s police”, that is, a state police dependent on and under strict control of the central government, charged with a very wide range of tasks, and originally standing as a synonym for the interior state administration.”³³

This characteristic of the police on the continent was reflected in the streets where crowds were demanding more liberty, employment, and respect for individual rights. However, such demands were often confronted with brutal, intolerant, and more repressive ways, not evident with Britain. Therefore, the protest policing style executed by the London Metropolitan Police, according to Tony Bunyan ³⁴, was accused by contemporary colleagues of being weak and the police were said to be behaving like scarecrows during mass events.

However, protest policing models in many countries came after destructive social mass disturbance had affected almost the whole country. Thus measures taken by the main actors representing the power of the state defined the boundaries of the security forces in policing protests. Thus, the emergence of protest policing models and examples of these models are cited afterwards.

**The Escalated Force Model and Protest Policing Development in Italy**

The first model of protest policing was thus the ‘escalated force’ that required the style of protest policing to be: brutal, repressive, unrepresentative, illegal, artisanal, high

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visibility, anonymous, adversarial, confrontational, repressive, diffused, reactive, rigid, informal, and intolerant. The characteristics of this model caused the law enforcement agencies to perceive a perception of working and acting in the name of and for the state rather than in the name of and for the citizens, which does not represent a democratic policing model in democratic states. A significant example of the unbalanced power shift to the executive power and its outcome would be the protest policing development witnessed in Italy.

Protest policing in Italy during the Mussolini regime is an excellent example of the escalated use of force. It was under the pressure and influence of fascism and had a stricter and more brutal root style compared with its contemporaries in democratized countries in Europe. To maintain public order, similar to France, two types of law enforcements were responsible, the carabinieri and the national state police. During Mussolini’s fascist regime, the carabinieri, as a branch of the armed forces, were appointed to suppress any opposing threats. In this manner and philosophical context, this organization was deployed under the questura (provincial police headquarters) who were involved in social movements.

The state police, too, were conditioned like the carabinieri by a fascist past and vision. This vision and past caused both of the law enforcement units to act in the name of the state instead of for the public. “Even before fascism, the Italian police were known more for being the police of the government in a political sense than for effective crime

control”. Interestingly, in order to sustain general public order, instead of developing new methods and strategies and modernizing the organization, the police were canalized to fulfill this duty by observation and surveillance, which is mostly used in communist regimes.

However, during the pro and post-WWII period, Italy suffered from poverty, unemployment, and low wages that spurred people to express their demands and discontent via demonstrations and protests that, to the contrary, reinforced two characteristics of protest policing in the state police, centralization and militarization. Centralization and militarization are at the same time the sources that facilitate harsh interventions to control protest events.

According to Herbert Reiter, the lack of appropriate training, the political support and legislation helped the police sustain their brutal style of protest policing. However, as a panacea, this weakness was to be covered by an increase of the personnel. Not only was the ruling government mistrusted demonstration in 1940s, but also the police. Strict state repression was implemented on demonstrators. They were suppressed by surveillance at, during and after the demonstrations, and they were imprisoned, interrogated, and labeled in order to intimidate and prevent them from further participations in social mass protests.

In the mid-1940s, the density and frequency of the demonstrations increased and


37 ibid
so did the style of intervention. In response, the police increased the use of heavy equipment and introduced armored cars mounted with machine guns, mimicking the army in response to provoked violent reactions. A heavy confrontation between them and union and trade leaders prevented such implementations until the termination of the grand coalition that had embraced an antifascist view.

The end of the antifascist government “provided a clear signal for the completion of the move toward a “cold civil war tactics” in the public order intervention of the police”\(^{38}\) in the summer of 1947. Afterwards, a resistance movement against trade unions and working-class movements made a public appearance. Furthermore, in 1948, prior to the national election, a civil war was speculated among the public and the government that especially provoked the police, intelligence units and carabinieri. That rumor forced law enforcement units to protect governmental and political party buildings, radio stations, and hot spots that were crucial for the ordinary life.\(^{39}\)

Reiter (1998) states that in three years, from 1944 to 1948, the Italian police began a level of intervention that employed “cold civil war tactics” that required the deployment of army-like heavy armors and machine guns, strict central control, and impressive surveillance. In the end, police within the political structure were seen as the


\(^{39}\) Ibid.
enemy of the working class and an apparatus of the Christian Democratic government.  

When della Porta (1995) compared protest policing in Germany and Italy from 1960s to the 1990s, protest policing in Italy was described by her as more repressive, brutal, sometimes illegal and artisanal than in Germany. Moreover, the effort Germany had spent in protest policing is not to be overlooked, but rather, appreciated.

Negotiated Management Model and Protest Policing Improvements In the United States

As mentioned before, severe social unrest became evident in many democratic countries due to the ignition of change. Progress in protest policing in the United States is one of the best examples of this in terms of considering the public and working with care with the needed institutions.

It is believed that the protest policing that occurred in the 1960s compared with those of the 1980s and 1990s in the United States of America could be characterized as inverse. While the protest policing that took place in the 1960s was heavily dependent on the “escalation of force”, in the 1980s and 1990s it was dependent on “negotiated management”. Some instances of the use of escalated force style in protest policing implemented by the police and military in the United States were: the student protests at Kent University in May 1970 and the Birmingham civil rights campaign in May 1963.

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Confrontations at both events were rigid and still in peoples’ memory. For instance, the intervention by the National Guards in the response to the students at the antiwar demonstrations in Ohio (Kent University) erupted in protests on more than 1,250 campuses after four deaths were incurred. Following the assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968, 125 urban riots occurred in overall.42

A series of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations were organized by the National Mobilization Committee called MOBE to generate a public pressure on the state in order to end the war. In this context, actions were taken in Washington D.C., New York, Chicago and San Francisco. In one of those demonstrations the organizing committee was able to gather about 100,000 demonstrators and later, was able to urge about 35,000 people to march to Pentagon. This civil disobedience movement ended up with almost 800 arrests.

Although, MOBE called the nation to carry out a mass demonstration, in order to protest the 1968 Democratic National Convention in which President Johnson was a nominee for second term of presidency, the anticipation that the then major Richard J. Daley would take forceful preventive measures by highly deployed police officers to prevent the rally intimidated demonstrators and only 10,000 participants were able to gather. The reason for this disappointment was the use of escalated force, which was the primary philosophy of the protest police at that time.

After the mass movements ended up in a tragic way in the United States in the

1960s and 1970s examining riots and demonstrations and doing something about this became one of America’s most important issues because action was needed be taken by the state authorities to lower the tensions nationwide. To achieve this aim, McPhail, Scheingruber and McCarthy\textsuperscript{43} claim that between 1967 and 1970, three National Commissions were appointed in order to examine the riots and lay out sustainable policies to solve further problems that may have existed and to convince the public of the benefit of these.

The National (Kerner) Commission on Civil Disorder was established after the riots in Detroit, New Jersey, New York, and Michigan, in 1967. Twenty-four riots were investigated and half of them were believed to be initiated by the way the police confronted the riots. This suggests that dealing with riots should not be placed solely in the hands of police-rather public officials such as the governor and mayor are other players that should be involved in preparing the police and in guiding them towards appropriate interventions. Moreover, the report also points out that only minimum force should be applied if necessary to control a situation effectively. The use of unbalanced power and inessential interventions is believed to be a source of violence. \textsuperscript{44}

In 1968, the second commission, the National (Eisenhower) Commission on the Causes Prevention of Violence was founded after Martin Luther King’s assassination and following the urban riots that occurred afterwards. It had a broader scope than the Kerner


\textsuperscript{44} Kerner. (1968). \textit{Report of the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders}. New York: Dutton.
Report. The report recalls that the individual right to protest was similar to the Brokdorf decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court taken in 1985—and was protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, the necessity for negotiation was underlined and encouraged. Negotiation is accepted as a way of avoiding or at least minimizing the unnecessary use of force. In addition, the repressive use of force was seen as an unwise tactic that is acknowledged as magnifying turmoil rather than in maintaining public order.

The third commission, the National (Scranton) Commission on Campus Unrest was established after the demonstrations and killing of four individuals on May 4 in 1970 on campus of the Kent University. “Even if the guardsmen faced danger, it was not a danger that called for lethal force. The 61 shots over the period of 13 seconds by 28 guardsmen certainly cannot be justified. Apparently, no order to fire was given, and there was inadequate fire control discipline on Blanket Hill.” The report further stated that “the Kent State tragedy must mark the last time that, as a matter of course, loaded rifles are issued to guardsmen confronting student demonstrators.” Even though deadly force is the last solution to call on, violent protests should be responded to with a just and firm response.

Consequently, during the 1960s, harsh protest-policing styles were implemented that resulted in shootings and killings. However, in the context of policy maker and

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47 ibid
public, protest policing became a ‘hot pan’ in the hand of the authority. Necessarily, styles and models of protest policing were scrutinized and it was concluded, modernizing the police either by equipment, training and legislation was needed. That is why, although during the anti-globalization protests in 1999, 2000 and 2001, the number of the demonstrators was changing between 100,000 and 500,000, fortunately, no one was killed.

One of the limitations of the approach used above was that it was based on a common ground of protest policing, but one that lacked a “national public order policy” that could be implemented by all the country’s police agencies. For instance, although the police in Washington D.C. could handle mass protests consisting of 500,000 people easily, police in Seattle struggled excessively without achieving peace and safety. Experience is transferable if there are common grounds. Otherwise there is no obligation to share training programs and experience with another police organization from another state.

In European nations, including Turkey, police organizations are structured heavily on a national base. An officer in Istanbul, in which demonstrations have a softer characteristic, but are large in terms of in numbers of attendees, has the option and opportunity to work and experience other types of demonstrations, for example in Diyarbakir, in which the characteristics of demonstrations are more violent and aggressive, but smaller in number compared to demonstrations in Istanbul.

A monopoly in training and model and style in protest policing helps authorities to confront deadly riots in a safer manner. However, after the commissions and other authorities detected this gap, the Department of Justice asked the United States Army
Military Police to introduce a civil disturbance orientation course to maintain a common and modernized training program.

This program was designed to train police officials for riot control tasks. The school was based in Fort Gordon, Georgia. The course (CDOC later changed to SEADOC) was thought between 1968 and 1975 in Georgia. After the school had to move to Alabama it continued for three more years. In both periods the school was successful in diffusing protest-policing practices. “SEADOC I was organized around four general and related phases of civil disturbance control planning and operations: (1) prevention, (2) preparation, (3) control, and (4) after-action.”

The control phase was based on the presentation of force and a balance of escalating use of force, which is expected to disperse gatherings, protect the innocents, and result in the arrest the offenders.

The course entitled SEADOC II, which was named after the school moved to Alabama, was a program that shifted from a control-based training strategy to a more tolerant, flexible, selective and negotiation based training style of protest policing under the recommendations of both reports, the National (Kerner) Commission on Civil Disorder and the National (Eisenhower) Commission on the Causes Prevention of Violence.


In addition, measures were taken in the legislature and these constitute one of the main pillars in protest policing policies. Because of the concern of maintaining public order, the United States legislators undertook at least nine court decisions between 1970 and 1982, in order to protect and put in operation the First Amendment.  

To strengthen this assumption, “increasingly larger protest events at local, state and national levels require authorities to form coalitions of multiple law enforcement agencies whose personnel come to events with diverse training, equipment and experience.” Otherwise, deploying inexperienced officers for protest policing will cause serious problems of coordination and control, not only in controlling the masses, but also in controlling the force of a riot.

Eventually, the ‘negotiated management’ model of protest policing necessitated the following protest policing styles: soft, selective, legal, identifiable, preventive, representative, flexible, low visibility, formal, professional, tolerant, cooperative, and consensual. McPhail, Scheingruber, and McCarthy (1998) claimed that the police practices and policies in the United States, in the 1960s, were characterized by ‘escalated force’, but those of the 1980s and 1990s were formed by ‘negotiated management’. There are five dimensions of protest policing that law enforcement reached as a conclusion after a period of experimenting with important mass events in the United States:

“1. The extent of police concern with the First Amendment Rights of protesters, and police obligations to respect and protect those rights, 
2. The extent of the police tolerance for community disruption,


50 Ibid, p 49-69.
51 Ibid, p.8
52 Ibid, p 49-69.
3. The nature of communication between police and demonstrators,
4. The extent and the manner of arrests as a method of managing demonstrators, and
5. The extent and the manner of using force in lieu of or in conjunction with arrests in order to control demonstrators.”

Consequently, the North American Countries’, the United States and Canada, introduced the second model of protest policing to the literature, which is the ‘negotiated management’ model that started in 1980s. After the implementation of this model in the field—which was also urged by three Commissions, and deployed by the then United States Presidents to analyze the deadly mass movements that occurred between 1967 and 1970- no casualty caused by law enforcements was reported as a result of mass demonstrations and protests. This model was adopted by many other law enforcement agencies worldwide shortly after it was implemented in the US. However, after the dimension of national protests increased its boundaries to a transnational level, such as protests against in Seattle and Geneva, the negotiated management model became inadequate and fostered the need of a third model, the ‘deterrent’ model, which has a persuasive characteristic in protest policing.


Deterrent Model

The third model, the ‘deterrent model’ of protest policing, came to the fore after the emergence of the previously mentioned transnational protests. The failure in confronting such global mass demonstrations in Seattle in December 1999, in Gothenburg in June 2001, and in Geneva in 2001 caused protest policing agencies to evaluate their strategies and learn from mistakes in order to avoid further failures. These failures and globally inspired mass protests caused policy makers and practitioners to further reevaluate their models and styles in confronting mass demonstrations. This reevaluation and its outcome required law enforcement agencies exhibit the deterrent model of protest policing, which was criticized by commentators as U-turn in protest policing (Geary, 1985). The transformation was directed toward an information and intelligence-led, visible, deterrent-as defined by Waddington and King as ‘exclusionary fortress-oriented policing’ and by Noakes and Gillham as ‘selective incapacitation’-negotiation based, and technology supported protest policing style.

Additionally, Marx claims that engineering of the physical and social environments may help to produce buffer zones, such as fences or separate zones and technological developments, such as CCTV monitoring, may help to keep possible violent protestors, supporters of rival soccer teams or social movements apart, and this will lessen the need for arrests and the degree of public unrest.55

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Moreover, Chan (1996) asserts that a prospective improvement of a protest-policing model should “involve change in police knowledge in different levels of the organization, also consistent with the literature on police culture and organizational change.”

A Constructive Case of Building an Affirmative Sample of Protest Policing Knowledge

Germany is an excellent case to be evaluated in terms of presenting an affirmative example of compatible work among the main players and building a steady structure of protest policing models and styles. Therefore, the evolution of protest policing in Germany is worth examining in light of the collaboration of the legislative initiation and the support of the executive pillar that changed the philosophy of protest policing and that interested the whole nation.

In Germany, the protest policing model and styles were akin to the French model and styles. Police assumed a paramilitary posture and were generally acting on behalf of the state. At that time, mass protests were not seen as threats solely to the public order, but also to the government. The period of 1960-1970 was significant in the history of mass social movements where the Marxist and Socialist ideologies were being spread around the World.

The police in Germany at that time saw mass street movements as ‘Stoerung der Offentlichen Ordnung’ meaning as a ‘disturbing threat to the public’ and this understanding did not change until the reformist “Neue Linie” (new line) initiative. This initiative examined the philosophical question of whether the German Police should be serving the state or the people. The transition of these parameters moved back and forward until the Brokdorf decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court taken in 1985. Until, then, the German Policing had the characteristics of a paramilitary style, that seemed to stem from the Latin style of policing, and the police were called “Staatpolizei”, meaning “State Police”. 57

Die Staatpolizei were designated to protect the state, and in some cases the government, against threatening social movements that were accepted as potential causes of anarchy. This police philosophy required a strong stance while confronting such so called “threats”. In contrast, a retreat of the police would be interpreted as a weakening of the state sovereignty. Neither the police nor the government would be happy with such an accusation. The then deployed police officers identified themselves with the state authority and equated the state authority with the authority of the police. (Reference)

The mission of the “Neue Linie” was not accomplished until the Brokdorf Decision in 1985, however. The German Federal Court decided that the police should not follow the interests of the state while confronting the mass social movements, rather it

became the police’s duty to protect the peoples’ rights to demonstrate. Instead of 
Staatpolizei protest policing a police philosophy of Buergerpolizei meaning “Citizen 
Police” was the imperative adopted. “Die Burgerpolizei” concept aimed to have the 
police serve the interests of the citizens instead of the state, as their primary duty. By 
completing this transition, Germany switched from a repressive to a more tolerant and 
soft protest policing style.\(^58\)

According to Winter\(^59\) the Buergerpolizisten did not visualize themselves as an 
extension of the government, “but rather of the Constitution and the republic. “To serve 
the people rather than the state” is the motto underlying this philosophy, which originated 
in the Anglo-Saxon police tradition”\(^60\) In sum, citizens were not perceived as objects of 
political change in the Buergerpolizei, rather the subject of this.

Solely, introducing some judicial changes did not satisfy the Germans, however, 
because modernizing the organizational structure and support of technological equipment 
was necessary for carrying out the activities of the Bereitschaftspolizei (riot police). This 
gap was filled by the Ministers of the Interior who ran a program called “Programm fuer 
die innere Sicherheit”, meaning the Program for Internal Security, in 1972. These 
developments gave the police an opportunity to become modernized, and well-equipped,

Germany, 1960-1990. Policing protest: The control of mass demonstrations in Western 
democracies, 188-212.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

Western democracies (Vol. 6): U of Minnesota Press. p.190
and they were supported financially and expanded in number.

Youth protests in the years of 1980-1982, the success of Social Democrats in elections, demonstrations against building nuclear power plants, and the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor were waves that escalated the degree of violence, and so, increased clashes with police. All of these developments brought the police under scrutiny again and this ended with a discussion of the Neue Polizeiphilosophie (*new police philosophy*). This term was first discussed, in 1987, by Kurt Gintzel and Hermann Moeller and published in Der Spiegel and caused a controversy that lasted for a decade. It was believed that the police philosophy might serve as a mediator not only for resolving crises among the police, but also for unifying the police, and removing the pressure emanating from daily politics.  

Martin Winter states that a police philosophy works “as a remedy on the part of the police to counteract the complaining power of the sensitized public, both as a mean of strengthening police “self-confidence” and as an argument aid in the face of public criticism.” It is also argued by Winter that “the shift in police philosophy from a *Statepolizei* toward a *Burgerpolizei* is manifested in policing philosophy by an extension of tolerance toward unconventional forms of protest.”

In terms of results, as mentioned previously, protest policing in democratic countries went through a difficult and painful journey to arrive at a model of protest policing.
policing that on the one hand respects citizens’ right of free speech and demonstration, and on the other hand maintains public order and the state’s sovereignty. However, WWI, the Great Depression, and WWII caused many problems that made the public suffer in a very severe way. Poverty, unemployment, low wages, repression, coercion and no respect for human rights and free speech became public grievances. In addition to that, the misuse of the socialist ideology urged people to pour onto the streets and express their demands and discontent by criticizing the state’s governance.

Although Max Weber argued police act or serve as an armed instrument of the political power, they have shifted from that approach to a Burgerpolizei (citizen police) model over the course of time. The models and styles of protest policing are separated by many academics and examined separately. However, it appears it would be more appropriate to evaluate them together since the model and styles are implemented together in the field.

During the administration of law enforcement agencies by inexperienced and intolerant executives in the 1960s, in order to maintain public order, police and army interventions were brutal and unprofessional. This caused causalities, intimidation, and distrust against the state. During this period of time, and up until the end of the 1970s, the model of ‘escalated force’ was applied. Police in many countries supported the philosophy of harsh intervention and had perceptions they were acting in the name of the state, because of past examples, such as in Italy, France and Germany.

**Protest Policing Styles**

While policing national and international protests has a deep history it is less studied empirically. Although there is a suggestion that this is virgin territory to
researchers, when scrutinized, reports of the density of mass demonstrations and protests heavily coexist over the following period of time: the industrial revolution, the great depression, post-WWII, the 1960-1970’s, the period of 1989-2000, and the Arab Spring. All of those vital stages have a general feature. They are based on collectively bargaining. Collective bargaining is the way in which masses express their discontent or place their demands in solidarity on those in charge by gathering under one umbrella.

However, when the leftist movements around the World became generally effective in terms of student and labor movements under the umbrella of collective bargaining, in the late 1960s, some may have thought that the world was apparently undergoing some form of deep transformation and this would create disorder in their daily lives. Della Porta describes that time period as follows:

“American civil right and antiwar movements, the Mai 1968 revolt in France, students’ protests in Germany, Britain, or Mexico, the worker-student coalition of the 1969 “Hot Autumn” in Italy, the pro-democracy mobilization in locations as diverse as Francoist Madrid and communist Prague, the growth of critical Catholicism from South America to Rome, the early signs of the women’s and environmental movements that would shape the new politics of the 1970s: all these phenomena-and many more-suggested that deep changes were in the making.”

The dramatically changes in the social mass demonstrations urged policing of protests to change in parallel. While attaining such a transformation Della Porta and

Reiter (1998) state that protest policing or the way the police handle protest events should be determined according to several factors, with the first level as follows:

1. The organizational structure of the police,
2. The configuration of the prevailing political rule,
3. The opinion of the public,
4. The occupational culture of the police,
5. The relationship with protesters, and

And on the second level involves:

1. The level of police knowledge,

The level of police knowledge, considered as the main mediating variable between action and structure, is explained as “the police’s perception of their role and of the external reality”\(^{66}\), which shapes police’s behavior on the scene. As considered by Della Porta, this represents the input of public opinion, the governments’ point of view, the police agency’s culture, and the interaction with the masses, which transforms into police knowledge and also determines the style of protest policing. However, instead of “police knowledge”, Martin Winter underlines the term of “police philosophy” in his article “Police Philosophy and Protest Policing in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1960-1990” published in 1998.

Within the ‘police knowledge’ or ‘police philosophy’ Della Porta and Reiter


\(^{66}\) Ibid, p. 22
(1998) categorize the styles of protest policing implemented during mass events as:

- Professional versus artisanal (signify the level of “preparation”) Brutal versus soft (referring to the degree of the use of force)
- Confrontational versus consensual (referring to the desire of communication with the demonstrators)
- Repressive versus tolerant (referring to the degree of prohibited behaviors)
- Rigid versus flexible (signifying the option of “adaptability”)
- Illegal versus legal (referring to the obedience to the law)
- Diffused versus selective (referring to the number repressed groups, however, selectiveness seems to be the last trend in protest policing by differentiating troublemakers and violent rioters from other demonstrators)
- Reactive versus preventive (signifying the “timing” of the law enforcement’s intervention)
- Formal versus informal (referring to the degree of formalization of the rules of the game)

In addition to the styles that Della Port and Reiter describe, Marx (1998) claims five additional protest policing styles, in terms of democratic policing that should be considered in protest policing:

- Representative versus unrepresentative police (refers to the degree to which police are representative of those protest)

2-High or low visibility of police and demonstrators actions (refers to the demonstrators as well as presence of mass media)
3-Identifiable versus anonymous police and demonstrators (refers to the ease of identifying particular individuals)
4-Administrative procedures for reviewing police behavior and means for citizens to express grievances (present or absent and fair or unfair)
5-Cooperative versus adversarial demonstrators (refers to the degree of cooperation/provocation from protesters)\textsuperscript{68}

Finally, in order to reach an ideal protest policing philosophy Gary T. Marx stated that the police should base their ethos in policing protests on the following seven points:

“1-Police are servants of the law, not the private arms of whoever happens to be in power…
2-The law and policy are being extended to tactics that had once been ignored and unregulated...
3-The law must be viewed flexibly and a broad pragmatic view of the likely consequences of police action needs to be taken, rather than moralistic or political view based on police attitudes toward demonstrators and their goals or on whether or not the law is violated…
4-The primary goal of police in conventional crowd situation is to manage them to see that they do not get out of hand. Police may serve as mediators and interpreters…
5-There is an emphasis on prevention rather than on responding after the fact…
6-There should be a “coproduction of order” involving a decentralized and delegated reliance on citizens to mobilize the law and to control themselves and others, rather than relying exclusively on external and imposed state agents to do this…
7-There is an emphasis on science and technology involving (a) relatively dispassionate intelligence gathering and analysis and (b) efforts to engineer physical and social environments…”\textsuperscript{69}

Evaluating the Internal Factors Effecting the Course of Social Mass Demonstrations

Della Porta and Reiter (1998) claimed that the police’s perception of protest policing is influenced by the external factors, including the organizational characteristics of the police, impact of political power, the intervention, public opinion, and police institutional culture which also characterizes at the same time the police knowledge that shapes the nature of protest policing on the field.\(^\text{70}\)

Studying protest policing in Germany, Winter (1998) focused on two parameters that are effective in solving issues related to protest policing. The first is the term ‘protest diagnosis’ that refers to a police assessment of the protestors’ action pattern and motives. The second is the ‘police philosophy’ that refers to the police’s perception and their executive’s knowledge that determines the method and style to be implemented on the ground.\(^\text{71}\)

However, Waddington (1998) who studied protest policing in Britain drew attention to ‘institutionalization’ as a factor as this affects both parties, the police and the protestors themselves. He believed the style of protest policing was contingent on the


in institutional context where it took place. Institutionalization of the police referred to their organizational structure and perceptions about the protestors. However, institutionalization of the protestors signified the protestors’ collectivity in term of bargaining power and organizational structure, which could help police to identify a representative from the masses for purposes of negotiations and to help protestors to end their right to demonstrate collectively and in peace. Besides, as quoted from the work of Critchely (1998) “the trend toward the institutionalization of peaceful protest is consistent with the longer British tradition in which no one was killed under such circumstances between 1917 and 1974.”

According to Fillieule and Jobard (1998), there are three main stimuli that influence the style of intervention in protest policing, which are: the government, law enforcement, and protestors. To understand the actual policing styles, they argued that each mass demonstration should be analyzed as a three-way interaction among the three main players and determiner in mass events, which are the demonstrators, civil authorities and law enforcements. Related to this, the demands of the political authorities, the perceptions of the police officers, and the characteristics of the masses should be taken equally seriously. Without diagnosing the perceptions of the officers and determining the tensions and emotions of the protestors a confrontation may possibly

result in an undesired outcome. In cases of such uncertainties, as observed in Diyarbakir, keeping a fair distance between both the police units and protestors will minimize violence against both individual and public property.

However, McCarty, McPhail, and Crist (1995) see the relationship among the three factors, legal environment, public order policy, and political environment as the determining causes of the model and style of protest policing.⁷⁴

In addition, Marx (1998) highlighted the need for democratic policing in democratic societies and emphasized the role of the ‘police ethos or philosophy’ as an important factor in social control.⁷⁵ A desired form of social control is achieved through having a good relationship between the police and the law, effective communication between all parties, respect for human dignity, the idea of citizenship, and the ability to conduct a comprehensive analysis supported by sophisticated technology. He furthers outlines seven ideal police actions that frame the ‘police ethos’ in protest policing. Later on, he redefined the five styles of protest policing associated with democratic policing that are explained above.

Lastly, McPhail, Scheingruber, and McCarthy (1998) framed the action of protest policing in the United States using five dimensions, that included respectively, the first

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amendment rights, tolerance for community disruption, communication, the extent and manner of any arrest, and the extent and manner of using force.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{The Importance of Training and Equipment in Protest Policing}

Confronting 10,000 angry people that have no certain direction with 300 riot officers is not an easy task. If the officers panic and don’t have the right knowledge, they may intervene without negotiation by using tear gas and water cannons and cause the angry mass to turn into a violent crowd that can cause massive damage and a possible deadly riot. However, being well equipped and trained will give the law enforcement personnel confidence and pose a professional stance that will strengthen the leader’s hand for successful negotiations. Moreover, “of course, the development of a democratic policing ethos is not without contradictions, challenges, risks, and trade-offs relative to other models. There is no free lunch. There are instead optimal solutions that must be continually given changing conditions and strategic actors.”\textsuperscript{77}


Skilled Leadership in Protest Policing

Furthermore, even if rank and file officers are well equipped and trained the lack of the knowledge of police executive’s in protest policing can easily cause a disaster. Therefore, as is the practice in France, police executives should go through some courses or training programs to acquire experience and become informed as to how to administer law enforcement to officers during social mass events and how to negotiate with activists. It is the leader who directs and orchestrates the game.

Maintaining Control of Both the Police and Protestors

What has been observed over one and a half-years in Diyarbakir, in more than 50 mass demonstrations, protests, and riots, is that police should not lose control of the intervention and they should apply the degree of force very carefully. This situation is similar to considering a double-edged sword. The reason for that is applying not only too much but also not too little force than needed, which is crucial in averting a catastrophe.

The Role of Government

It is obvious that the government can place massive pressure on the police. Max Weber as quoted by Fillieule and Jobard (1998) stated that police were accepted as an armed tool of political power.78 Moreover, Della Porta and Reiter (1998) claimed that the

“police force will fulfill demands by the government, even without regard for their correspondence with democratic rights.” The government is seen as the sole player in confronting the protestors in the name of defending the state sovereignty. At the same time, whoever represents the state also has the power to adjust the degree of coercion used in any police intervention during mass events. On the other hand, while the main target in mass protests is the government, it has the ability to lessen the tensions of the masses through its remarks.

**Learning from Failures**

Failure brings together not only defeat, but also revolution. The momentum of determined progress in democratic countries is a product of such a philosophy and has provided a means of success for the protest policing culture. That is, if policy makers, legislators, and most importantly the police had not had the intense motivation to learn from their failures in confronting mass demonstrations, the models and styles of protest policing would have been brutal in spite of tolerant approaches, artisanal in spite of professional strategies, and the police would have described themselves as Staatpolizei instead of Burgerpolizei. “The police show a capacity to learn. Changes and learning processes of the police are initiated by an analysis of problematic public order

interventions, that is, the police learn by analyzing their failures.” If this did not occur, the police would have become a target of harsh accusations that may have resulted in displacement or discharges or possibly in arrests. Furthermore, none of the superiors would have liked to have undergone any investigation or be downgraded.

**Considering Bystanders**

Bystanders possess the potential to change the scope and dimension of a present and upcoming protest. As an example, a brutal police intervention to a mass demonstration that is about food and work may justify not only the protest but may also justify the use of violence against the state and the ruling government. If the intervention is fair and the police exhibit a pose of tolerance and passion against violent demonstrators, bystanders may display an attitude of pro-law enforcement and may affect the further demonstration by less participation, and hence a possible lessening of violence related activities. Observations have shown, if the demonstrators fail to gather a certain momentum during the demonstration, there is a reduced possibility of transforming a peaceful demonstration into a violent protest. However, if bystanders do not support the style of the police intervention then it is possible to observe their support and even their attendance which could make the situation for security forces worse.

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The potential for violent protests is related to the numbers of attendees in any crowd. Thus, not only the police conduct risk assessment, but also the organization that organizes the event and especially the rioters. Similarly, rioters who intend to commit violence, as in committing a crime, will assess the risk and possibility of being caught. If there is no possibility of disappearing in the crowd, they may defer.

**Buffer Zone**

Many researchers working on protest policing have a common agreement that there should be certain distance observed between the police and demonstrators. However, this distance may vary from incident to incident, from country to country, and as well as in relation to the characteristics of the mass movement. While this distance is determined in France by the use of tear gas, and cannot be more than the range of water cannons, in other European countries the distance determined is a smoke screen. However, this distance in Diyarbakir, in contrast to the European cities and even Istanbul, should not be less than the range of fireworks and stoning. In Diyarbakir, stones are the main weapons of rioters.

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Reconsideration of Visibility

The presence of riot police should be considered carefully. While the presence of this mass force may sometimes play and serve as a catalyst in provoking or escalating the tensions of the protesters and may end in a battle, on the other hand, this presence of force, can also be used as a stimulus to reduce and minimize the intention of violent protestors. It should be considered as a strategy in maintaining order while giving a safe space to the protesters who are performing their democratic rights. Waddington states that confronting demonstrators without any need would be an invitation for trouble. However, keeping the riot force invisible in holding centers (on large demonstration) or in vehicles and shadowing the demonstration is a way to insure security and avoid possible unrest.

Negotiation

Waddington claims “the principle method of securing compliance was through negotiation with the organizer of the protest.” Gary T. Marx describes an anecdote in his article, Some Reflection on the Democratic Policing of Demonstrations, that existed between him and a police commander who was on duty during the police violence that occurred during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, in which President Johnson was believed to be a nominee and that was put forth by the National Mobilization

Committee called MOBE, for a second term of presidency. The commander was in favor of presenting a low profile by listening to the demonstrators, negotiating with the organizers, and ignoring minor violations. He believed that instead of considering the protection of symbols or properties these should not be more important than protecting lives. “He believed that demonstrations could actively help create, rather than undermine, political stability (at least relative to not permitting or responding violent to them).”\(^{84}\) Besides, “protecting the right to protest against the political order is defined as the best way to protect it—least if the political order is broadly defined to involve a set of democratic principles, rather than the particular persons or groups in power.”\(^{85}\)

**Mass Events have Memory**

Each mass protest should not be expected to be a single event that starts and ends on the same day, rather mass events can possibility have a longer duration and often stand out as a ‘constant memory’ that will influence the law enforcement strategies at all mass events in the future. Therefore, mass events in a certain location only represents one feature in a chain of features that should be considered as a whole, not as a single event. The purpose of the gatherings may change, for example, while people may celebrate Women’s Day on one day, on another day people may protest a policy of the


government, but the actors are usually the same, at least in Diyarbakir. Therefore, leaders who orchestrate the protest policing should consider mass events in a location as a whole. They should cogitate about how to build trust between the law enforcement personnel and representatives of the protestors. The police should also expend an effort to keep their words. Otherwise, it would be naïve to believe, for instance: ‘we need to get rid of this challenge and don’t worry about the next one’. As observed u until the present, in the context of Diyarbakir, mutual trust is an important dimension in maintaining a successful negotiation process.

Avoiding Massive Use of Power

The numbers of deployed officers in police protest management strategies should also have a direct relationship to the possible quantity of protestors. The police should avoid the over-deployment and over-use of force. While deploying an improper number of officers is likely to cause public disorder, however, a balanced use of force insures the ability to secure public order. Any tendency toward the massive unbalanced use of power is an invitation for the escalation of violence and negative reactions from both the authorities and the public. When Opp and Roehl (1990) surveyed protesters and asked whether police repression prevented them from participating in further protests or not, the response was striking:

“Our respondents reported that: police actions do not deter them from taking part in demonstrations; they are not afraid to take part in subsequent demonstrations; while they would advise a previously arrested friend to take part in less dangerous actions; they would go with that friend to the next demonstration; and they would encourage the friend to keep up his/her involvement. Further, they report they now feel more obliged than ever to take action against nuclear power; they have supported others to become active now more than ever; and that they themselves
will participate in demonstrations now more than ever to demonstrate that I won’t just accept such police actions."\textsuperscript{86}

In addition, Marx argued that “in asking how best to maintain order and minimize harm (whether material or symbolic/political), police may conclude that rigidly enforcing the law through use of overwhelming force will be counterproductive, whether in the short or long run.”\textsuperscript{87}

**Media**

The media is an important catalyzer in escalating protestors’ violent action (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998) and in decreasing police’s brutal actions.\textsuperscript{88} The protestors accept the media as a tool that makes their voice heard nationally and even globally and as a witness that records illegal police interventions. It is believed that the media acts as a spokesperson for both sides and sometimes follows an autonomous logic. But what is expected from the media is neutrality. Although this is not the case in undemocratic regimes, in democratic countries the neutrality of the media should be maintained constitutionally to minimize speculative news.

**Risk Assessment**

In democratic and modern countries, while on the one hand, demonstrations are encouraged; on the other hand the security of the public should be sustained as well. In


\textsuperscript{88} ibid.
such environments, the masses may evolve and in parallel, so should the law enforcement strategies. The law enforcement approaches should not be static in development rather they should be dynamic and proactive. Protestors in recent decades have had the ability to observe social mass events worldwide through the dynamics of globalization and reach their counterparts all around the world. They may be inspired by each other and continue to protest on the streets with new techniques and strategies. Therefore, law enforcement agencies should carry out risk assessment studies and develop new strategies in order to fulfill their duty in peace and safety. Scenarios, drills and training strategies should vary in space and time to prepare law enforcement officers for dealing with the worst case scenarios in the name of maintaining public security for the people.

**Social Networking**

The World Wide Web has a feature that embodies an ability to cross borders simultaneously. Nowadays, the Internet provides a different type of worldwide communication, and social networking has become a nightmare and threat for undemocratic and a stimulus for democratic regimes. It has become an instrument and common ground for those who are interested in gaining collective bargaining power. For instance, Matt Kapko claims that fifteen most popular social networks reached an amount of 6,804 billion monthly active users in 2015 worldwide.\(^8^9\) It seems that authoritarian

regimes may be able to suppress the media, but they may fail to block social networking systems that communicate through ITs, the Internet and GSM operators.

An excellent instance would be the Egyptian Revolution that overthrew a dictatorship with the help of social networking technologies used by determined groups generating a common ground and the intention to change the repressive regime. Therefore, many commentators and academics named the Egyptian Revolution as the Twitter Revolution. Although the Egyptian Government blocked the Internet, it was not able to block a Blackberry application that provided a different type of communication. However, in terms of maintaining public order it is an obligation of the state to be aware of potential threats. In this context, intelligence and technology-led protest policing would be appropriate in terms of assessing risk and in an effort not to confront the uncertain instead of the certain.

**Emotion and Legitimate Reason**

Demonstrations are commonly organized in order to increase the potential for creating a collective unit that can have more bargaining power with the authorities, whether this is the government or any other organization. However, to be able to gather as many supporters as possible, the demonstration should have a ‘legitimate’ and ‘justified’ cause, such as low wages, unemployment or increase in food prices. Since, what threatens ‘A’ may easily threaten ‘B’ as well in the course of time, it is the emotion of fear that threatens ‘B’ to have the possible grievance of ‘A’. This emotion makes the discontent related to the issue popular and even gets the support from bystanders and people who are not actively affected.
Any social action taken by the discontented masses can be described as a potential threat by law enforcement agencies. These actions have the potential to turn into violent mass protests and the likelihood of gaining support from bystanders and the public. In such cases, as indicated by Marx (1998), in his conversation with a police commander from Chicago during the Democratic Convention in 1968 where MOBE organized a mass protest, he believed that the protection of symbols or properties should not be more important than protecting lives.

In such incidents, which have a tendency to garner the attention of the majority, law enforcement agencies should thus be very careful, because in demonstrations that are based on legitimate and justifiable reasons, a brutal or intolerant intervention will turn discontent into anger and hatred, and initiate a violent riot. Masses should be considered in the same way as volcanoes in that you never know when and in what degree they are going to erupt or as Elizabeth Whitmore and Maureen Wilson define this as ‘seeds of fire’ that you never know how and where it will reproduce a following fire. It is law enforcements’ duty to assess the risk, canalize the challenge, and take counter measures, either posing a strong stance or keeping a safe distance in order to maintain control and make sure that the event ends without any damage.

**Summary**

The journey of protest policing in the time tunnel has shown various stages. This started with a structure and mentality of being King’s Police and operating in the name of the state for the state until the late 1970s, which was defined as ‘escalated force’ model of protest policing. Later on, this model of brutal and intolerant protest policing changed to
a soft and consensual model of protest policing after measures taken in response of protests existed in the United States in 1980s and was named as ‘negotiated management’ model. Although, a switch from Staatpolizei philosophy to a Buergerpolizei was appreciated after 1980s and in 1990s, it became insufficient at the beginning of the millennium where transnational social mass protests against Bretton Woods Institutions prevailed. Law enforcement agencies adopted another model of protest policing which is depended on selection, persuasion, intelligence, barrier and deterrence. More interestingly, all of these models emerged after dramatic social mass disorders and the need to take countermeasures in order to provide a more contemporaneous, sufficient and humanitarian model or style of protest policing.

Democratic countries were able to succeed in overcoming insufficient implementations in protest policing with the collaboration of the main actors; namely the authority, legislation and law enforcement. Far from suppression and state terror, accountability is an effective instrument for democratic countries and urging security forces to exhibit an ethos of soft, tolerant, selective, preventive, consensual, and flexible style of protest policing is more helpful than not.

However, repressive states still insist on implementing the escalated force model of protest policing in confronting social mass movements, protests and even in the context of friendly demonstrations. Along with the recent global financial crisis, the sharp decrease in oil prices and drop in numbers of jobs and the situation in the MENA countries, however, fostered a sense of hopelessness for the future for their citizens, especially among the high rate of unemployed, discontented and hopeless youth, who were easily urged to act and protest against bad governance. This group that benefited
from globalization, were able to represent themselves as a powerful collective bargaining unit as a result.

Additionally, authorities should always consider that the initial entity that can confront masses is the law enforcement. On the other hand, ineffective models and styles of protest policing implemented in the instance of social mass events can easily inflame the public and cause a social uprising that pushes the country into a state of chaos. Therefore, law enforcement agencies in protest policing should always be changing and open to new developments and a step ahead of the protestors in terms of benefiting from technological developments, and progress in training and strategies to maintain public peace and security are the most sufficient ways to do this without causing any casualties or severe injuries.

Eventually, after scrutinizing the evolution of protest policing in various countries, it is seems certain that developing and implementing modern and democratic protest policing models and styles require more effort, time and passion than expected. Performing a tolerant style instead of a repressive one; following a consensual style rather than a controversial one; implementing a soft style rather than a brutal one; choosing a selective style rather than a diffused one; preferring a preventive style rather than a reactive one; executing a professional style rather than a artisanal one; or adopting a flexible style rather than a rigid one is always a tough and challenging choice but the most satisfying one in democratic countries.

In sum, evaluating mass protests and protest policing in democratic countries can be summarized as follows:
• Law enforcement agencies have gained valuable experiences that have stemmed from their historical roots. By taking lessons from acute failures in confrontations and interventions in mass protests, law enforcement agencies with the support of the ‘political will’ have kept open the opportunity to evolve their own structures and philosophies.

• Under the superiority of the ruling authorities, protest policing possessed a model of ‘escalated force’ until the late 1970s that gave less space to the liberty of ordinary citizens. Later on, in the late 1970’s, this model was changed to ‘negotiated management’ after failures made in anti-war student protests in Ohio and the assassination of Martin Luther King that erupted in more than 120 urban riots and brutal interventions in the US. Since negotiated management has been employed as a focal point in mass events, almost no killings have occurred in the United States. ‘Negotiated management’ as outlined by the Eisenhower Commission is the accepted way of avoiding or at least minimizing the unnecessary use of force.

• In their study conducted in France Fillieule and Jobard\textsuperscript{90}, as in the United States, came to the conclusion that the major weapon of the police when dealing with mass events is negotiation with the organizers, rather than implementing repressive or legalistic responses.

• Over the course of time, police embraced a police philosophy of primarily serving the people—as described by the German as Buergerpolizei—rather than the state, which means citizens were not perceived as the object of political change, rather the subject of it.

• Developments were seen not only in protest policing, but also in the characteristics of mass events. The discovery of the power of ‘collective action’ became a mighty tool in bargaining with the authority in power. The more the public gathered and discovered strategies in collective bargaining, the more law enforcement had to develop counter-strategies.

• The perceptions of the police and protestors have not been the only factors that determining the degree of coercion but also, as Fillieule and Jobard claim, the civil authority is another actor that has a role in determining the outcome of mass protests.

• The massive use of force, unbalanced power, and non-essential interventions are believed to be the sources that trigger protestors to commit violent activities.

• Necessarily, styles and models of protest policing were scrutinized and this was followed by the modernization of the police through better equipment, training and legislation. A variety of training models and styles in protest policing will help authorities confront deadly riots in a safer manner.

Finally, all studies examined in this chapter have shown that fundamental changes in policing protests came after acute incidents. For instance, “Changes and learning processes of the police are initiated by an analysis of problematic public order
interventions, that is, the police learn by analyzing their failures.\textsuperscript{91} (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p.30) Moreover, the will of the authorities and juridical support are the other essential components to generate a sufficient and sustainable protest policing philosophy.

CHAPTER 3: THE SOCIAL MASS MOVEMENT THEORY AND THE EMOTIONAL EFFECT

Introduction

This chapter, firstly, aims to scrutinize the Arab Uprising under the structure of the Social Movement Theory. Secondly, it aims to uncover the dynamics that urged the Egyptian society to upraise against the repressive regime without considering their lives. Thirdly, it will examine the impact of emotional incidents on demonstrators’ behavior during the Egyptian Revolution. Fourthly, this chapter will define the triggering factors that urged the society to flow into streets and upraise against their repressive authoritarian leaders or regimes without considering of being shot to death or prisoned. Lastly, it will assess the role of the law enforcement in the social uprisings.

Social Movement Theory

The Arab Uprising started in Tunisia and concluded with; the overthrow of the Tunisian Government and the exile of President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011; the end of the Egyptian government with the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011; and the collapse of the Libyan government on August 23, 2011 and the killing of President Moammar Gadhafi. Along with the transformation in these countries, protests in Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Oman, Morocco, Kuwait and Syria threatened the states and autocrats more than eevere. However, governments that were open to considering citizens’ voice and demands accepted constitutional amendments and frank changes in the way they governed, which provided those states to accomplish change with less damage.
The Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, had to sign an agreement transferring his executive power to Vice President Abdu Rabu Mansur Hadi after his 33-year reign. Jordan’s King Abdullah II approved new constitutional amendments on September 30, 2011 to improve the new electoral process and provide more balance among governmental institutions along with promising some political reforms.

Other monarchs were able to provide new jobs, increase in wages, and make concessions for conciliation and peace. Rami G. Khouri who is the director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut responded to the question “Do you see a qualitative difference in the legitimacy of Arab republics versus Arab monarchies?”, which was furthered by the editor of the Cairo Review. His response was, “My hunch is there is a little difference. Of course, republics over the years have become like monarchies trying to pass incumbency to their sons, and did so in some cases. Monarchies tend to be more sensitive to people’s complaints” and furthers “If it’s in the nature of royalty, or simply they understand that because they are not elected, that people have to accept them, they have to actually earn their legitimacy by serving the people.”

This was the case during the social unrests in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Morocco compared with other MENA countries ruled by autocrats.

Although, MENA countries were fostering potential social unrests over many

decades, uprisings and contradictory attempts were suppressed brutally by regimes or dictators. Opponents were deprived of networks and communication. Media was censored and monopolized by those regimes and people had to consent to their destiny.

However, with the developments that the tools of the era of globalization generated, such as social media, nationals were able for the first time to connect among peers, organizations, and like-minded individual freely and without 100 percent of state control. Social media became the key to the distinctions between the failed social attempts of the prior revolts and the successful Arab Spring.

Moreover, social media became the weapon of social movements that were not able to develop until the Green Revolution in Iran and most importantly the Arab Uprising in the MENA countries transformed into a snowball against the regime that threatened to destroy power. By witnessing the conclusions of the Arab Uprising, people realized the power of the society can have in becoming uniting on the same grounds and in voicing their demands together. The Social Movement Theory examines the catalysts that bring people to gather around the same purpose and to strengthen their nets in the name of voicing their demands and reaching their goals in unity.

**Social movement theory and the influence of social media on the Arab Uprising**

According to Charles Tilly (2011), political struggle can be explained in three forms, namely, protest, collective action, and contention. “Protest” is defined as the popular consciousness manifested in street politics; or the “collective action” exists when a population has a common or shared interest and organize activities in the aim of that
interest; “contention” contains “claim making”, where a part demands certain forms of action that will also affect other parties’ interests. 93

The Social Movement Theory claims that communities with dense connections are more likely to reflect greater use of collective actions that those with leaner ties. Individuals who are requited to the social movement are believed to possess more social ties compared with those who are already in the social movement. 94 To understand the reasons why participants feel obligated to participate in social movements, the authors focused their attention on social ties that play an important role in participation in social movements. 959697 They claim that strong social ties, are stronger among family members, peers, neighbors, and friends. Plus, dense social ties among members in networks often play an important role in facilitating an initial request to take part in a social movement. Therefore, social ties are claimed as being effective in lessening uncertainties about being involved in activities, or convincing people to join mobilization efforts. Moreover, social ties are believed to encourage and facilitate participation in social movements and mass events.98

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95 ibid
Moreover, McAdam and Paulsen claim that psychological and attitudinal explanations of individual participation are weak for alternative microstructural explanations. “Without structural factors that expose the individual to participation opportunities or pull them into activity, the individual will remain inactive”\(^{99}\) and emphasize two sources of the link between the social movement activity and potential recruit: membership in organizations and interpersonal ties.

Strong or dense interpersonal ties on the one hand are believed to encourage the extension of an invitation to participate and on the other hand ease the uncertainty of mobilization. However, as another microstructural factor, membership in organizations is defined as an extension of interpersonal social tie. “Acquaintances made in the formal setting of the organization form elaborate structures of interpersonal ties.” \(^{100}\)

McAdam and Paulsen also claim that people who hold memberships in several organizations compared with those who have no or few memberships have a stronger sense of efficacy. “Certainly, the empirical evidence linking individuals or organizational ties to movement participation appears to be stronger than the simple association between either psychological attributes or attitudes and individual activism.” \(^{101}\)

However, although strong social ties are more effective in recruitment, McAdam and Paulsen state that weak social ties are not as effective in recruiting people but are important in communication and extending information and messages of social

\(^{99}\) Ibid, p.644  
\(^{100}\) Ibid  
organizations across diffuse networks. “Ties are less important as conduits of information than as sources of social influence.” “And the stronger the tie, the stronger the influence exerted on the social influence.” 102

McAdam and Paulsen assert that while the membership system in organizations assists the formation of increased interpersonal bonds, “thus individuals belonging to certain groups are more frequently targeted for recruitment by movement organizers over unaffiliated individuals.” 103

Tilly and Wood add another factor that encourages people to participate in social movements, which are the increase in numbers and connections. “Increases in numbers and connections expand the pool of people that could, in principal, join, support, or at least attend to a social movement campaign.” 104

During the research in Diyarbakir City, experts on terrorist organizations and domestic security claimed that such organizations aim to encourage not only recruited individuals but also sympathizers to participate in demonstrations, protests and other social mass events. This strategy is expected to help such organizations first of all to keep their recruits warm and active; secondly, being in the news; and thirdly, by bringing sympathizers and security personnel face to face and letting them clash with the security forces might cause sympathizers to become recruits or at least to embrace the movement.

102 Ibid p.655
103 Ibid.
McAdam and Tarrow and Tilly also argue that if certain mechanisms are proven to operate in social movements in similar ways across various settings, they are more likely to be significant causal factors in the trajectory of social mass movements. It is also emphasized that negotiation or in another word bargaining and “boundary deactivation” can help in starting a talk between an organization or movement leaders and government officials, which in turn, can increase the numbers of participants and expand the range of efficiency of the movement. Moreover, talks between two parties means “I care about you and your demand,” which will give legitimacy to the movement and to the participants, as well, unless it turns into a violent mass event.

The Role of Social media in Social Movement Mobilization and Democracy

In recent years, while social media was not popular, useful, and reachable by the society as in the present time, social movements were weak in organizing and mobilizing masses. However, with the developments of social media instruments, social movements have found a useful ground to operate their ideologies and thoughts more powerfully than ever before. The lack of access between people and social movements is accepted as an impediment for the democratization process. Thus, social media plays a significant role in facilitating connection between people and social mass movements. Tilly and Wood emphasize the relation of social movement and democracy by stating “In fact, as of 2008 most of the world’s people still lacked access to social movements as a way to voice

popular claims.”  


In terms of widening social mass events, equalization of resources and connections will help to increase the likelihood that people and groups having common interests or grievances to join with others from other social settings. This was the case during the Egyptian revolution. Demonstrations were not organized by a certain sect, ethnic or class, rather, people gathered around the same reason, freedom for every Egyptian.

Contrary to the Egyptian Revolution, although the social mass uprisings Bahrain and Yemen were started by people from every tribe, sect, and ethnicity, in the course of time, the nature of the demonstrators turned into a single entity, the Shia Uprising. This became an uprising mobilized by Shiite rebels, which strengthened the hands of the government. The regime was able to manage the protests by declaring the demonstrators were Shiite rebels and were organized by external figures, which gave the regime the chance to disband and eventually fragment the protests.

Tilly and Wood also claim, that “processes that promote democratization also promote formation and proliferation of social movements” and assert “because each of

its (democratization) elements—regularity, breadth, equality, consultation, and protection—contributes to social movement activity."\textsuperscript{108}

On the other hand, Tilly claims that the rise of authoritarian regimes in Italy, Spain, Germany and the Soviet Union caused the disappearance of social movements (Tilly, Charles, and Lesley J. Wood. 2009) which was the case prior to the Arab Uprising. In contrast, “Democratization commonly fosters creation of crucial institutions that in their turn independently promote social movement mobilization." \textsuperscript{109}

Eventually, the first social movement that that was empowered by social media and became a regime-threaten was the Green Revolution in Iran, which occurred after the presidential election in 2009. Blogs, twitter, Facebook and YouTube played an important role after Ahmadinejad received 62 percent of the popular votes and his opponent Mir-Hossein Mousavi collected only 32 percent of the votes.

As soon as the results were announced supporters of Mousavi started a campaign via social media tools with the slogan: “Where is my vote?” and “Increases in numbers and connections expand the pool of people that could, in principal, join, support, or at least attend to a social movement campaign.” \textsuperscript{110}

In terms of emphasizing whether social media has a positive or negative impact on social movement mobilization, Freedman (2009) claims that the Internet has the capacity to escalate the levels of civil society. \textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, p.136
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid p.139
On the other hand, James Warycha believes that “Ultimately, what I found was that when civil society increases in a state, typically in spite of government, religion, or other factors, that state also saw an improvement in its democratic practice”\(^{112}\) However, his claim about the Internet differs in religion centric states. “It can safely be assumed that the Internet does not actually have a great effect on the development of civil society in religious states. Still, it is obvious that the Internet can play a positive role in development.” \(^{113}\)

Furthermore, Melissa Lerner (2010) states that the Internet’s provision of information is not enough to generate sufficient community ties and social capital to move social movement toward democratization. “Rather, increased access to online information by the public, combined with the often unregulated ability to publish a wide variety of information, can actually lead to an oversupply of confusing, inaccurate and distracting information.”\(^{114}\)

Beyond that, Morozov, in his piece in The Guardian, rather than other tools, arouses attention on the social movement’s will and grievances that play an important determining factor in urging a society to rise up against the unjust implementations of the dominators. Therefore, he states “the grievances that pushed protesters into the streets are a response to events and conditions that matter to the protesters.”


\(^{114}\) Lerner, M. Y. (2010). Connecting the actual with the virtual: The Internet and social movement theory in the Muslim world—The cases of Iran and Egypt. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 30*(4), 555-574.
deserve far more attention than the tools by which they chose to organize“\textsuperscript{115}

Moreover, the study of Wolfsfeld et al. \textsuperscript{116} underlines that, even though the use of social media increased during the protests, this does not reflect the real impact of social media. So you need to look at the country’s political context as well. Social media are shown to be useful tools not a necessity. To advocate for this argument, the study compares the Green Revolution in 2009 in Iran, and the Tunisian Revolution. During the presidential election, although it was called the “Twitter Revolution”, there were approximately 8,600 registered Twitter users out of 70 million people. On the other hand, the self-immolation of Bouazizi was uploaded into YouTube and Facebook but didn’t spark the Revolution until it was picked up and broadcasted world-wide by Al-Jazeera and watched by millions.

Consequently, the proliferation and high-speed progress in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) generated the “new media”, satellite and internet-based social media enabled individuals to surpass monopolized information, state owned televisions and media, and barriers built by authoritarian regimes and to communicate, organize and share images and videos from the scene instantly. This opportunity also encourages individuals who have weak bonds with movements and may fear to speak out against the regime in public.


In addition, it should not be disregarded that social media, as seen during the
Green Revolution and Arab Spring period, can also serve authorities as a countermeasure
instrument to track activists, movements, and organizations. Censoring websites,
disabling mobile phone services, and slowing Internet connectivity are some methods that
can be used by authorities. Dewey et al., cited from Roland and Rohozinsky (2010), state
that the US Department asked Twitter, during the Green Revolution, to delay an upgrade
that would interrupt the service, which may prevent the world accessing information from
Iran.117

There is Much More Beyond Social Media

Although, social media played an important role in organizing, informing, and
mobilizing social movement organizations and getting the publics’ attention, it is
believed that the real heroes behind the Egyptian Revolution were civil society
organizations, for instance worker unions, human right groups, and education groups.
Therefore, Catherine O’Donnell believes that “although social media did not cause the
upheaval in North Africa, they altered the capacity of citizens to affect domestic politics.
Online activists created a virtual ecology of civil society, debating contentious issues that
could not be discussed in public.” She asserts, that governmental countermeasures taken
against social uprising in Egypt recoiled and incited more public activism. “People who
were isolated by efforts to shut down the Internet, mostly middle-class Egyptians, may

media on social unrest in the Arab Spring. *International Policy Program.* p.13
have gone to the streets when they could no longer follow the unrest through social media, Howard said.”

Moreover, although scholars and commentators emphasized the fact that organizational and interpersonal ties are strong instruments that facilitate recruiting individuals in social movements and ease participation in social movements, on the one hand, social media fosters an important role in organizing movements, sharing information and helps voice their demands not only locally but also nationally and internationally.

However, this study focused on another factor, that has the potential to provoke people’s emotions and fill them with anger and hatred and that affects only organized or interpersonally tied individuals. but also non-members and non-affiliated individuals into streets and squares instantly. This medium would be the “emotional factor”, which was observed during the Arab Uprising and was also witnessed during the social mass movements in Diyarbakir, where the case study was conducted.

**Emotion**

Not only are social media or social ties effective on drawing people onto the streets, but another catalyzer which is essential in social mass events that should be considered by security forces is the emotional factor. The emotional factor shelters the deathblow of the social movement. This potential strength, which is based on a “common

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reasoning” or “common ground” helps to finalize the social unrest in a revolution or resolution. It is the emotional factor that touches peoples’ feelings and sensations and generates a tsunami affect that flood people into streets and squares.

Moreover, the emotional factor fosters a dynamic that has the potential to cause a transformation in feelings and faiths and gives courage to people to ignore their fears and rise against their repressive opponents, whatever it may cost. In this case the responsibility of law enforcement during social mass events is extremely important. Such cases have a “double edged sword” effect. If the balance of the use of power may be used wisely and right, the law enforcement would be able prevent a social mass event from transforming into an uprising. However, the opposite state of intervention, such as insufficient deployment of officers and equipment and false protest policing styles may heighten the tensions of the masses and transform a friendly event into violent unrest. Thus, the minority can turn into majority, which is not a desired development not only for the law enforcement, but also for the governing authorities.

During the social mass events in the MENA countries, unbalanced brutal interventions of security forces, irritating and insulting speeches expressed by political leaders, and most importantly broadcasted recorded killings of innocent victims became the sources of emotional factors that caused even regular people to lose control pour into streets to protest without caring much about being injured or even killed by security forces. For instance, Nabil Fahmy, a former Ambassador to the United States, explains that the involvement of his son with eight or nine friends in demonstrations was the first turning point for him. However, the second turning point that forced him to participate in those demonstrations was clarified by him, that “the day when the hooligans went into
Tahrir Square on horses and camels and had a pitched battle that was broadcast on television. Watching peaceful demonstrators battled hooligans for twelve hours with no one intervening, which for me, was just simply a shock.” He continues, “At that point, I thought, “How could we, as a generation with this set of values, hand over a country to the younger generation?” After observing this touching incident he states, “That’s really the moment I decided that I cannot remain just a passive supporter of the objectives of the demonstrators.” An emotional incident, such as unjust implementations employed on innocent people, especially knowing that his son is among those demonstrators rushed an educated bureaucrat, former Ambassador to the United States, out to protest against the regime and support activists. Without such an emotional scene he might have stayed at home and watched the developments on television like watching an existing movie. But it was the emotional factor that urged an educated blue collar worker to rush into the streets and take part in an uprising against the regime and his long-time ruling President that he had served for many years. 119

**Emotional Factor and Unbalanced Power**

The source of emotion that often casues crowds to lose control and rise against the regime is the high number of killings by state representatives, which are usually the security forces. Therefore, it is crucial to recall the number of protestors killed in MENA

counties to evaluate the impact of emotional activities upon the scale of social mass protests.

The numbers of demonstrators killed during social mass protests in Oil Exporting Countries are respectively 29 in Bahrain, 24 in Saudi Arabia and 2 in Oman. No killing was reported during protests in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Deaths during mass events in Developing Oil Exporting Countries are 25,000 in Libya, 2,700 in Syria (until now about 450,000), 40 in Iraq (until now about 20,000), 2,000 in Yemen, 12 in Iran, and 8 in Algeria. The case in Oil Importing Countries was 846 in Egypt, 300 in Tunisia, 6 in Morocco, 3 in Jordan, and no killings were found to exist in Lebanon during the social mass protests.

Most studies indicate that unjust governmental politics, ethnical or sectarian discriminations, and poor living standards were the main factors behind the generation of the Arab Unrest. However, the main reflection of mass uprisings came after self-immolation of a young street vendor in Tunisia and the killing of a young Egyptian under police custody that were broadcasted on satellite TVs and social media. In addition the baiting of pro-government and plain dressed groups on camels and horses in Tharir Square is another example of inciting the tension of the society and in turn resulted in triggering people to rise up against the regime and its authorities. Therefore, considering emotions and their impacts is essential in studying social mass movements.

If possible, social mass movements are eager to incite emotions in order to obtain the public’s attention, gain support, and keep sympathizers aligned with the organization. According to Goodwin and Jasper, being less visible compared with other tasks of the movement causes scholars of contentious politics studying social mass movements to
overlook emotional factors.\textsuperscript{120} However, they also state “in order to attract and retain participants and to pursue a movement’s agenda, activists continually need to mobilize affective states and emotions that mesh with the movement’s political objectives and tactics, and suppress those that do the opposite.” They also claim that “to grasp the sources of political action and the various forms it takes requires attending to the emotion work in which activists and others engage.” \textsuperscript{121}

Although emotions are less visible compared with other operations of movements, the reality of the operation of the emotional dynamics and processes is that they do not operate in isolation and should not be neglected.\textsuperscript{122} Perhaps, it is for that reason that ACT UP, which is a non-partisan group of individuals, discovered the power of emotion and how to generate support in order to end the AIDS crisis successfully. Contingently, the song “We Are a Gentle, Angry People” became popular during mass events of ACT UP in NY and easily drew the attention of the American people.

\textbf{Emotion Management}

Robert Benford argues that social movement analyses have unwittingly neglected an important social movement resource, which is emotion. Defined also as “a vital social movement resource”, emotions are an instrument for movement actors that can be used to produce, orchestrate and strategically guide the movement to reach their collective

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid p.254
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid p.255
goals.  

Sidney Tarrow claims, “the culture of collective action is built on frames and emotions oriented toward mobilizing people.” He also states, “symbols are taken selectively by movement leaders from a cultural reservoir and combined with action-oriented beliefs in order to navigate strategically.” and continues, that “most important, they are given an emotional valence aimed at converting passivity into action.”

In order to point out the importance of managing emotion Goodwin and Jasper claim that political activists use emotions in favor of movements good and cause. They also have the potential to prevent movements from undesired outcomes. “At their planning meetings and at protest events themselves, activists often work hard at generating such emotions as outrage, excitement, joy, guilt, hope for the future, solidarity, and/or commitment to the cause.” In this regard, emotion management is valuable in mitigating fear and overcoming depression, desperateness, and boredom. Social movements may also use emotion management in order to calm down uncontrolled behavior of their activists that may damage movements’ reputation or legality.

However, the case of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia generated a common reflection that turned the public against the government and especially President Ben Ali.

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126 Ibid p.259
The tragic death of a young street vendor who worked to support his family touched the public’s feelings and emotion, and became the spark of the destroying Arab Uprising.

Besides, counter measures were taken late and were too far removed to induce the public to mitigate their objections. Instead of mitigating the public’s tension, late responses and arrogant expressions made by the head of both states escalated the anger of hatred of their nationals. The statements of Mohamed’s mother are worth considering in order to evaluate the value of emotional factors. She claimed that the reason why her son killed himself was not poverty but he had been humiliated, which hurt his pride. Moreover, the late visit made by President Ben Ali, which came ten days later after her son was taken to the hospital and the late connection with his family are other causes that were too late for both, to save her son and Ben Ali’s presidency. 127

Such nationwide incidents that draw the attentions of the society should be taken seriously and dealt with care. Thus, it is believed that “public sense of shared grievance and potential for change can develop rapidly.” 128 The outcome of touching cases such as brutal interventions of law enforcements and killings of innocent people are incidents that touch public’s emotion, which can mitigate fear and generate courage to rise against repressive authorities and regimes.

With the help of the social media, social mass movements became able to organize the discontented masses, disseminate public’s grievances, identify goals, built

solidarity, and mobilize individuals who share common ground. The success of the social mass movement depends on the nature of the basic discontent, plus the motivation, and goal as far as having a common ground to gain the support of the majority. Unfortunately, fragmented social mass movements are open to manipulation and external trajectories, which will foster the termination of the social movement in time.

**Trigger Factor**

Emotional factors prepare the society for social mass responses; however, it is the triggering factor that breaks the camel’s back and that pours the masses into the streets to voice their objections as a whole and demand a desired change. In addition, speeches made by leaders whether honest or not have also influence the public’s emotions and feelings.

Unfair governmental policies and interventions are also factors than can activate the public’s emotion. The shutting down of the Internet and social media in Egypt caused such a reflection by the society. “People who were isolated by efforts to shut down the Internet, mostly middle-class Egyptians, may have gone to the streets when they could no longer follow the unrest through social media, Howard said.”

Another example of an emotional situation that triggered a change in society existed when TVs broadcasted the pro-regime toughs rushing into Tahrir Square on camels and horses and beating demonstrators for hours. This scene, in response, triggered

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not only opponents but also regime-supporting people to attend and support the demonstration in Tahrir Square.

The video of the self-immolation of Bouazizi in Tunisia also had a triggering effect on the discontented society. Thousands of people demonstrated against government’s policies, unfair implementations, corruption, and repressive regime regulations. Along with incorrect interventions implemented by the security forces the killing of protestors generated a tsunami wave, which destroyed the legitimacy of many regimes, governments, and leaders mainly in the MENA countries.

The fall of the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali are good examples of the results of ignoring, underestimating, and underrating the society. Alaa Al Aswany, an Egyptian novelist, explained during an interview conducted by Scott MacLeod who was the managing director of the Cairo Review in February 16, 2011 on how Mubarak underrated the public and tried later to gain their trust in his speeches.

In order to emphasize the magnitude of the effect generated the correlation between social media and emotional showed the potential for this effect during the Egyptian Uprising, Idle and Nunns (2011) where it claimed that “the tweets were instant, and so emotional and exciting that anyone following them felt an intense personal connection to what was happening in Tahrir.”

Crisis Communicative Strategies Modelling

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Having observed mass movements in Diyarbakir, the study found that leaders and organizers of mass movements mostly aim to talk with the person who possesses the highest rank. Depending on the place and content, the masses desire to be noticed and listened to either by the leaders of law enforcement who supervise officers during the mass event. It is acknowledged by the social mass movements and even spontaneously gathered crowds that the Governor or the head of the government is the ultimate authority that has the power to allow, the organization to carry out their activity, or to prevent it. Therefore, the statements and the speeches of the authority are carefully considered by the public or parties interested in the mass event.

Scholars like Ahlam Alharbi urge us to consider the speeches of Ben Ali and Mubarak posted during the uprisings announced to the public and international intentions. Ahlam Alharbi evaluated the last three speeches made by two former presidents, before living presidency, through the scope of crisis communicative strategies (CCs) modeling. As Alharbi cites from Howell and Miller, crisis communicative strategies refer to the dialogue between the organization or the person involved and the public.\textsuperscript{132}

Benoit’s (1997, 2004) defines crisis communication as “discourse to protect and restore the image or reputation of organizations, and examines strategies including denial, evasion of responsibility, corrective actions, and apology that can be effective for image restoration after a crisis” \textsuperscript{133} \textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid p.572
Moreover, Levine indicates, “the best practice of crisis communications is designed to maintain public confidence and [to minimize] damage suffered”\(^\text{135}\). Hence, it is important that crises are quickly responded to by the parties who are involved because “the public will quickly begin to look for a trusted and consistent source of information”\(^\text{136} \text{ 137}\). On the other hand, Coombs (1998) explains that crisis communicative strategies (CCSs) are methods used to protect the image and the reputation during a crisis. CCSs are the responses that the organization or the person who is involved reflects in case of any crisis.\(^\text{138} \text{ 139}\)

In this regard, any crisis has the potential to effect the reputation, credibility, image or existence of any organization, institution, person or even the state. The social self-immolation of Bouazizi in Tunisia and the killing of Said in Egypt caused the presidents of both countries to face the most critical and powerful social uprisings they have never seen before. While Ben Ali’s confrontation with the public came after ten days of the beginning of the uprising, it was believed this was too late. On the other hand, Mubarak’s speech to the public came three days after the beginning of the social uprising. “During these two crises, which resulted in a number of injuries and deaths, both

presidents coincidently delivered three speeches in efforts to try to manage and end the protests before they were unseated.”

Crisis Communicative Strategies

The Study of Alharbi (2012) scrutinizes the last three speeches of both presidents by using Commb’s (1995) crisis communicative strategies model, which fosters five strategies and sub-strategies. The five main strategies are: denial, distance, ingratiation, mortification, and suffering. “Denial”, claims there is no crisis or the fault does not belong to organization (Attack, clarification, and intimidation); “distance”, accepts the crisis, however, it tries to weaken the link between the crisis and organization (Excuse and justification); on the other hand, “ingratiation” seeks to gain public approval of the organization (transcendence, bolstering, and praising others); “mortification” refers to the efforts represented to gain forgiveness for the organization (repentance, rectification, and remediation); and “suffering” shows the organization as a victim of the crisis.

Besides, according to Coombs the type of crisis, the veracity of the evidence, the damage and the history of performance are the four main factors influencing the choice of the crisis strategy and the public’s attitude relies heavily on and produces a crisis type matrix with two dimensions of crisis: external and/or internal, and

140 Ibid p.572
143 ibid
unintentional and/or intentional.\textsuperscript{144}

Regarding the frames employed in these speeches, the study identifies two frames: the logical frame vs. the emotional frame. Alharbi showed that both presidents applied the emotional framing pattern in their three speeches. However, he states that there are significant differences between the two speakers.\textsuperscript{145}

According to Alharbi\textsuperscript{146}, regarding the language of the speeches, Ben Ali used classic Arabic in his first two speeches and Tunisian Arabic in his third, last speech. On the other hand, Mubarak used classic Arabic in his three speeches.

**CCSs of Mubarak vs. Ben Ali**

Lukaszewski\textsuperscript{147} states “The most challenging part of crisis communication management is reacting - with the right response – quickly.” Such a “quick and prompt response helps in representing the party involved as being in control, which, in turn, entails credibility.\textsuperscript{148} It should be quick, open, consistent, and informative because “[the] first impressions are everlasting and must be handled with care”.\textsuperscript{149} Unfortunately, Ben Ali’s initial response to the public came ten days after the crisis existed. As for Mubarak,


\textsuperscript{145} Ibid

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid p. 580


his speech to the public came three days after the crisis. As Lukaszewski \textsuperscript{150} state, “[n]on-behavior or inappropriate behavior leads to spin, not communication.”

In terms of using an emotional or logical frame in their speeches, Ben Ali employed six strategies in his three speeches, while Mubarak utilized nine strategies in his three speeches. \textsuperscript{151} While Mubarak used at least four strategies in each speech and all of them were gradually emotional, on the contrary, Ben Ali’s speeches are considered less emotional, especially the first one. However, while the logical framing pattern is evaluated as significant, this decreased in the final speeches of both presidents. Alharbi \textsuperscript{152} claims that instead of pursuing a number of strategies, both presidents should have used the mortification strategy in order to restore their images.

In utilizing the intimidation pattern (4%), which is considered as highly violent, keeping the emotional framing to the minimum caused Ben Ali to fail in showing his people that he is a credible president and able to manage the crisis. Instead of restoring his image, the use of this strategy apparently caused him more damage. “By way of contrast, Mubarak may, to some extent, illustrate more credibility than Ben Ali by responding in three days with a speech in which the emotional framing pattern, amongst the three, was the most prevailing.” \textsuperscript{153}

Another successful strategy in such cases, asserted by Coombs (1995) and Alharbi

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid p. 582
(2012), is rectification, which was used particularly in the second speeches of both presidents. “The rectification strategy has compromised 60% of all the strategies employed by Ben Ali and 68% of Mubarak’s speeches.”\textsuperscript{154} This mortification strategy of rectification is believed to has “served as a multi-strategic to provide solutions, admit indirectly the existence of the crisis, and the involvement of both former presidents, and to ask for forgiveness in an implicit manner”\textsuperscript{155} (Ahlam Alharbi, Content Analysis of Crisis Communicative strategies: Tunisian Protest vs. anti-Mubarak protest, “International Journal of Human Science”, Volume:9 Issues:2 Year: 2012, p.583) This strategy is believed to have helped both presidents to show their nationals their intention to solve the crisis and to avoid the country being involved in such a crisis in the future, which would also protect their legitimacy.

Although both the presidents used the remediation strategy by expressing their sympathy for people who died during the protests and their family and admitting wrong protest policing strategies and implementations, they were not able to keep their promises to take legal action against brutal army and police incidents.

However, Alaa Al Aswany, an Egyptian novelist who possesses some best-selling works of fiction, interviewed by the Cairo Review Managing Editor Scott MacLeod on February 16, 2012, pointed out the contradiction of Mubarak’s speeches and responses to the public in the following statement:\textsuperscript{156}

“Yes, eighteen days. In the first speech of Mubarak, he tried to blackmail the Egyptians

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid p. 583
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid p.583
emotionally, saying “I defended this land and I will die [in this country].” There were many parents and many other people who became really confused... the next day, the regime sent the thugs [into the square] and people were killed. So the influence of the speech was erased in a half hour. You can’t say you are the father of Egyptians and at the same time send thugs. Two people were shot to death next to me on January 28. The next speech, the people were really angry. He was very arrogant, like I don’t care about you. People raised their shoes [an Arab gesture of disrespect]. You could see female and male shoes everywhere.**157

Although, people were convinced by Mubarak’s touching speech, the incident existed of sending the pro-regime thugs on camels and horses beating and shooting people, which was contrary to what occurred the day before, became proof of insincerity and played on people’s emotions. This humiliating incident ended with the death of two people and stimulated people to arrive at the decision that “Enough is enough”.

Retrieved from Coombs 158, Alharbi 159 claims that, distance, denial, and suffering strategies are effective in influencing the public’s opinion regarding the crisis. However, mortification and ingratiation strategies are especially effective in replacing the negative impression with a positive one. Alharbi states that, instead of changing public opinion, both presidents preferred to replace the negative feelings in their speeches with more positive ones. Namely, both presidents employed ingratiation and mortification in their three speeches “(Ben Ali- 30%, 38%, and 27%, Mubarak- 26%, 50%, and 63% respectively) more frequently than the other three strategies, i.e., denial, distance, and suffering (Ben Ali- 13%, 18%, and 3%, whereas Mubarak- 2%, 6%, and 6%
respectively).”

At the end, both were unable to control the crises and more importantly to protect their image and regimes. If they could have successfully changed the public opinion, they may have been more successful.\textsuperscript{160}

**The Role of the Law Security Forces During the Arab Uprising**

**The statue of the Army and Police**

Professionalism in protest policing is a safe harbor for law enforcement. Considering the balance of power in police interventions during mass protests should be accepted as a double-edged sword. While the use of repressive power can cause undesired consequences, such as death on both sides, on the other hand insufficient power and a lack of needed equipment can cause a loss of control in mass demonstrations that might result in public disorder or violent and destructive activities.

Information (intelligence) gathering, sufficiency (personnel and equipment), punctuality, and professionalism are features that should be considered by law enforcement that deal with mass events. Having the right information; deploying a sufficient number of personnel and adequate equipment; being at the right place at the right time; and professionalism in terms of training and the way and strategy in performing a task are the features that will help in protest policing in order to end events in peace and security.

However, blaming only the police or the army would be a deficient argument. Designed and framed through the guidance and directives of the governing figures, law

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid p.584
enforcement institutions prefer the model and styles of protest policing to maintain public order. Within this perspective police and army interventions to counter the demonstrations in Morocco, Oman, Lebanon, and Jordan are much more successful compared with the interventions existed in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria.

Interventions deployed by security forces in Morocco, Oman, Lebanon and Jordan designed by their authorities were softer and employed with cared. During the Arab Uprising period no killings were reported in Lebanon, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. Two deaths were reported in Oman, three in Jordan and six in Morocco. Yet, the number of people killed during the uprising in Egypt was reported as 846 \(^{161}\) and until now 4,300+ were killed, in Tunisia about 300\(^{162}\) were killed, and in Libya about 25,000.\(^{163}\) In order to exemplify an incorrect and repressive security force intervention during the Arab Uprising protests, a news report announced by Al Jazeera English stated that “the forces who remained were “thugs” loyal to Gaddafi, Moftah said, and they fired high-caliber ammunition at the protestors. Security forces reportedly opened fire at a funeral in the eastern, coastal city on Saturday, killing at least 15 people and injuring scores more.”\(^{164}\) Several thousand were killed in six months until Gaddafi’s death. Syrian government responded demonstrators with artillery and tanks. As of October 2015, BBC reports that


more than 250,000 Syrians have lost their lives and more than 11 million people have been forced from their homes.\textsuperscript{165}

Governments, authorities and especially the law enforcement organizations should consider this statement “death during social mass movements would turn into a form of ‘blood revenge’ or ‘vendetta’. On the other hand, the impotency of the security forces can cause circumstances that are irreversible. In this regard, the story of occupation of Midan Al-Tahrir (Liberation Square) is worth examining in this manner. In order to organize and mobilize people living in poor areas, activists focused on twenty locations to generate fast-moving demonstrations directing the city center. This strategy helped demonstrators “overwhelm the police through the force of numbers and courage, protestors occupied the Square despite tear gas, rock throwing, sticks and water cannon being used against them.”\textsuperscript{166} This situation should be read by the security forces as if the forces that are doing protest policing should have the needed personnel in quantity and quality along with the adequate equipment. Otherwise, the lack of personnel, right equipment, and experience will cause risky protests and brutal interventions that in turn increase the tensions of the demonstrators and that may also end in violent actions.

The Value Of Conscious Officers In Social Mass Events

Some researchers who study protest policing claim that the causes of repressive confrontations against protestors should be investigated in consideration of the extent of

the mass movement’s level of threat to the interests of the elites. In order to arrive at an explanation of repressive interventions in protest policing, in their study Earl and Soule suggest that by far, the dominant explanation for repression generally, and protest policing specifically, is the “threat approach.”

However, larger threats to political elites are explained as groups that use non-institutional and confrontational tactics, groups that are pursuing revolutionary or radical goals, group with multiple targets or goals, countercultural groups, groups that have the potential of large and high level movements of mobilization, and groups with multiple targets or goals. On the other hand, Earl and Soule assert that some scholar argue the “weakness” approach is the determiner that causes state’s decision in using repressions in responding mass movements, which means that the states will have repressive attempts only they can defeat. Therefore, Duvall and Stohl argue that weaker groups are vulnerable targets for opportunist state power. Earl and Soule claim that “protests that include or are primarily composed of marginalized groups, such as radical and ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and poor may be less able to resist repression and/or less able to retaliate politically against repressors.” They also state that “protests with

fewer or no social movement organizations (SMOs) present would be relatively “weaker”. Moreover, Wisler and Giugni find an inverse relationship between the level of repression and the level of media coverage. During protests that existed in Diyarbakir, the participation of Members of Parliament (MP) and attendance of the media played an important role in increasing the participants’ demonstrations.

In terms of police institutional and organizational characteristics, Lundman 1980; Skolnick 1966) claimed that institutional characteristics have distinguishing impacts on shaping police agencies and officers how to perform their duties. (Earl and Soule 2010, p.147) In terms of institutional structure, recruited officers are most likely influenced during their training and education in police academies that embraces a state-centric general duty concept, which is acted out during performing police tasks. However, the organizational structure in protest policing varies across regional and local police agencies, which may have impact on protest control.

To explain the protest policing style and methods that cause the allocation of repression, Earl and Soule (2006) centered their study on police characteristics, and institutional and organizational factors, which they called the police-centered or blue approach. At the same time, they described the factors that structure protest policing.

176 Ibid p. 147
The main drivers of institutional knowledge are the philosophy of maintaining public order and enforcing law, which is common in almost all police agencies across the world. On the other hand, organizational knowledge varies in terms of place, incident, type of activists, and police supervisors. The blue approach argues that while elites may be concerned about more diffuse threats, like the articulation of revolutionary goals by a movement or protest group, the police on the other hand are more concerned with situational threats, which indicates that they may lose control of a masses or community.

In this regard, Earl and Soule argue that the presence of counterdemonstrators should first of all increase the likelihood of police presence and secondly, increase the likelihood of police action. However, threats to political elites should be responded to in presence of counterdemonstrators, which will show that average citizens support them to keep their credibility.

Moreover, while provocative actions demonstrated by a crowd require, for sure, an appropriate amount of police presence, on the other hand, as the Kerner Commission points out, the use of missile throwing was an important indicator that turned the demonstrations into rioting mobs. This was also the case in Diyarbakir. Stone or Molotov cocktail throwing was accepted as a starter of police intervention during social mass protests in Diyarbakir province while this research was being conducted.

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178 Ibid p. 149

179 Ibid p. 150

In terms of the organizational level of influence, Earl and Soule\textsuperscript{181} stated that concerns about differences between police departments, levels of professionalism, size, and organizational structure are important to note. Staffing levels are determined by the organizational effects. “Departments with larger staffs will be able to devote more police-hours to the control of protest without compromising other police functions (i.e., patrol and emergency response), and that these departments will have more tactical options available for protest policing because of higher staffing levels.”

**Summary**

Social movement theory is helpful in explaining how individuals bind social ties in social movement organization and and how individuals mobilize themselves to forward their demands to the authorities in order to overcome collective grievances and problems. The framework of social movement theory in this study was expected to help the researcher understand the cause and motivation that drove individuals into the streets and squares to become involved in social mass events in MENA countries that were highly effected during the Arab Uprising, and which might provide important outcomes not only for governments, but also for law enforcement organizations and policy makers.

While the use of social media tools in the Gulf countries was very high but lower in other MENA countries such as Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, there is no correlation between successful social unrests and high potential for social media usage. What is certain, social media facilitates communication, mobilization, and organizing events but not necessary

tools for implementation of protest movements and achieving the goal of the movements or regime change. But the lack of social media ties, where people had no opportunity, satellite TVs played an important role to fill this gap and broadcast local events and incidents to the national and international concerns. In addition, in poor countries like Yemen, this gap was filled by tight tribal ties, which was another alternative powerful instrument that can be harnessed to help people rise up against autocrats in the name of freedom and change.

While social mass movements are able to use social media and traditional media effectively, the same opportunity can also serve the state’s authorities. However, authorities should pick their words carefully during a period of social unrest, if they want to mitigate the tensions of the public. False strategies during public expressions on the one hand are open to be misused by organizers and on the other hand can easily trigger people to exhibit violent activities, such as in the last three speeches of Mubarak and Ben Ali.

Moreover, as social movement theory explains, strong social ties (such as political, ideological, peer, and family ties) were more effective in protest participation and reaching the goals of the movements. Moreover, by broadcasting live brutal police interventions and dispersing touching images, stellite TVs and social media became instruments that extended the ties of social mass movements even to neutral people. This virtual tie was effective in sharing grievances, demands, and feelings that generated an emotional bond within the society. Eventually, emotional ties produced an environment that turned even neutral people into fearless activists and they poured into the streets to support the protestors against their dictators.
The unbalanced or brutal security force interventions that caused the death of participants should be accepted as the sources of the emergence of emotional factors that potentially triggered not only sympathizers, but also neutral people to flow into the streets and express their objection, regardless of the cost of the response.

Without a magnitude presence on the streets, the most brutal security force interventions existed in countries where most killings occurred, such as in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. These countries were, as expected, the most affected countries among the MENA countries.

If the number of participants is high, the authorities will consider the masses more seriously, and listen to their demands. The strongest weapon of these movements is building their demands on the basis of the common interest of the public. If grievances outweigh benefits as a factor, the proportion of the population that will the support participation in social movements will increase, unless they maintain a common ground and avoid committing violent and unacceptable activities.

Consequently, although Mubarak used more strategies in his speeches compared with Ben Ali, both were unable to protect their regime and position. The reason can be defined as follows; first of all their apology and admission of brutal army and police intervention came too late and secondly and most importantly they did not keep their promises and thirdly the contradiction between their promises and actions prevented them from using the strategy of emotion to change the opinion of the public.
SOCIAL MEDIA IN MENA COUNTRIES

Introduction

The world has always been in a state of change. Not only in terms of the environment, but also in terms of its social and technology means. This present transition may differ in speed and extent compared with the past. With the arrival of Globalization, this change escalated its momentum extremely rapidly. Accordingly, some commentators claims that the developments and innovations that have existed in the last century are greater than they have been at any other time in history. Progress in transportation changed into a dizzying form that permits distances to shrink and transportation of goods from anywhere to its buyers and in a faster mode than ever before. It has also eased the conditions of life and changed the world into a village. Moreover, sophisticated expansions in information technologies and communications transformed the world into a live television; the flow of information became very effective and instantaneous, and with the continental connection of fiber optics and improvements of satellite technology billions of diverse currencies are transferred by touching a small button. While all of these developments and changes in every field have generated the ability to serve humankind and our world, on the other hand, irrevocable damages can occur if these tools are placed into the hands of persons with unconscious or ulterior motives and these could become became irreversible.

Furthermore, globalization, along with its instruments, eased the not life conditions not only in the society, but it also served social mass movements favorably by introducing smart phones and sophisticated tools as new social media tools. For the first time, Twitter,
blogs and Facebook generated an important dynamism during the period of the “Green Revolution” in Iran that had existed after the contentious 2009 presidential elections. Not only was the strict Iranian regime surprised at how the tools of social media played such a tremendous role in organizing, communicating and mobilizing the discontented society, but also the rest of the world. Therefore, many commentators believed the use of social media during the Green Revolution became the main tool of power of the Arab Uprising one year later. Eventually, social mass movements around the world discovered the impact of the social media during the Green Revolution.

In other parts of the region, the Middle East and North African Regions had been hot beds of contention during the 20th century in terms of public order and power clashes. Although, assassinations, riots and uprisings were always among the options used against regimes, the lack of sophisticated Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) was a missing instrument that could provide the discontented majority a private, instant and cost-free communication approach to pave their road. This opportunity made the Arab Uprising significant compared with prior social mass upheavals.

Additionally, the success of the social uprising during the Arab Spring was not limited only to MENA countries, as Anupama Deconiya claims, inspired by this movement, students protested against high university fees in the UK and Chile; occupying financial centers in the US and Europe, recalling images of the 1960s; and, turned the anti-rape
protest into anti-corruption movement in India.\textsuperscript{182}

However, not only the role of the social media during the Arab Uprising is worthy of study, but also the factors that lead to the support of the majority of the public and their desire to participate in the social unrests and the background that motivated the discontented, unhappy, angry, and deprived society to flow into the streets and squares. But this chapter will remain limited to describing the evaluation of the social media instruments during the Arab Spring.

In this respect, this chapter aims firstly to evaluate the flame that started social mass protests that found a common ground for the society to voice their grievances and demands on the streets during the Arab Uprising. Secondly, it will present the opportunity that one of the tools of globalization, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT), had in serving the civil societies in MENA countries during the Arab Spring.

**Background**

Ahlam Alharbi describes the source of the problems in MENA countries as “the protests were a result of typical Middle Eastern problems, namely high unemployment, food inflation, corruption, lack of freedom of speech, and poor living conditions.”\textsuperscript{183}


Followed by a series of protests, marches, rallies, and strikes, that started right after the self-immolation of Mahmood Bouazizi, people demanded freedom of speech, social justice, and the end of tyranny and corruption.

Besides, autocrats are usually selfish and do not worry much about citizens. Like the domino effect, such an arrogant demeanor represented by the highest authority will unfortunately, immediately be modeled by the civil servant at any level. Even an officer, who possesses the lowest rank, may act like he or she is the only person who represents the state. In such countries, the state and the head of the state are viewed as holy figures that no one can even criticize. Moreover, whoever represents them feels equally powerful and unfortunately, there is no need for them to be accountable.

The self-immolation of 26 year-old Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, in December 17, 2010 and the killing of 28 year-old Khaled Said, a young Egyptian tortured to death in public by two police officers were the most significant triggering incidents that initiated a social reaction and spread to the Middle Eastern and North African countries very quickly. This social uprising ended in these countries in three ways, either in overthrowing the rulers and their regime in macro-level authoritarian states, or compelling the government to revise their constitution in the favor of citizens’ rights and urging monarchies to undertake democratic reforms, or coerce the authorities to take political, social and economic measurements at the micro-level in repressive states.

Although such social unrests existed in the past on many occasions they were not as effective as the social mass movements during the Arab Uprising. The difference was that the Arab Uprising included Information and Communication Technologies that were available. Also, this process was described as a technological and digital revolution, where
social media influenced not only the authoritarian regimes, but also the democratic regimes as well, in one way or the other.

The potential of social media was first, effectively observed during the Green revolution, after the 2008 presidential election in Iran. Others termed this movement the Green Wave and others termed it the Sea of Green. Protests started on the night of June 12, 2009 after Ahmadinejad was elected with 62.63% of the vote and continued for six months. Protests were the largest demonstrations since the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution. However, one year later, the Arab Spring came to the fore and bulldozed the MENA countries in one or another degree. Many commentators and academicians explained the difference between the Arab Uprising and other social uprisings in terms of the active use of social media tools, such as twitter, blogs, Facebook and other smart phone applications.

Unfortunately, social media per se are insufficient for forging a social movement into a revolution. This process may require some other supplementary factors to bind discontented people from all parts of the public and various social mass movement organizations and to rally round the same ground, such as those related to political and economic deadlocks. Yet, within the context of social reactions, there is no doubt that social media facilitates communication among people locally, nationally and even internationally without worrying about distance and time. With these features, social media helped the activists to organize, coordinate, and mobilize the masses. At the same time, it provided the social masses with the opportunity to introduce themselves, and achieve their aims and intentions among the international community and helped them to broadcasts the brutal or harsh security force interventions instantly to public’s attention and call for support during the Arab Uprising.
A report prepared by Stanford University under the title of “The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring” and conducted by Taylor Dewey, Juliane Kaden, Miriam Marks, Shun Matsushima, and Beijing Zhu, investigated the influence of social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs and other social media outlets, upon social unrest during the Arab Uprising. The study was based on a qualitative and quantitative form of research designs. Some countries in MENA, namely: Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Yemen, were chosen to evaluate the impacts of social media upon the social unrest under the point of social movement theory and the findings of the study stated respectively were that the external political and economic shocks and internal instability, such as rising food prices and high unemployment rate are crucial drivers of social unrests; there is no consistent correlation between social media and successful mass protest; organizational ties were found more effective than social media, which coincides with the social movement theory; while social media generates advantages to social mass organizations, on the other hand it may serve the authorities in the realm of tracking down dissidents for negative purposes; social media are believed to have helped in increasing participation of members of civil societies in protests during the Arab Uprising; given that social media generated international support where local media was weak or controlled by authorities.¹⁸⁴

The Egyptian Revolution was also called “the Twitter Revolution”. Esraa Adbel

Fattah known as “Facebook Girl” organized people through the Al Jazeera Forum and Facebook to refuse to celebrate Police Day and used social media, Facebook and Twitter, actively during the 18 days it was used to provide coverage from the Tahrir Square. “I think this social media had a great role. We used this tool to organize people, to prepare what to say, when to move, when to stop… We encouraged them to join us in the street.”

Amr Khaled, a populist Muslim preacher from Egypt asked the youth what their dream was, he got 1.4 million replies. This shows how popular the social media was among young people in 2011. In addition he claims “I was in Tahrir Square supporting youth through my Facebook page. More than two million youth followed us on this page.”

Moreover, Alaa Al Aswany, the author of the acclaimed The Yacoubian Building and other best-selling works of fiction, “Forty thousand bloggers called for the manifestations. It came at the right time. The whole of Egypt was waiting for any stimulus, and they provided the stimulus.” And Aida Seif El-Dawla, the cofounder of the El Nadim Center for the Egyptian Association Against Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and of the Egyptian Association Against Torture states, “Once bloggers got involved and started posting videos on the Internet, the whole issue took on a whole

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187 Ibid. p.73
different dimension.” 189

Nabil Fahmi asserts “the tank on the street was less effective than mobile phones and Facebook.”190 However, according to the former executive editor of the Beirut Daily Star and former editor-in-chief of the Jordan Times Rami G. Khouri “There is no doubt that Facebook and YouTube and blogging and websites played a catalytic role in some places. But the real digital factors mobilizing human beings were cell phones and Al Jazeera television.” 191

Consequently, political and socioeconomic factors stated by academicians and authors are among other factors that should not be neglected, as they have the potential to be the source of any social unrest. Usually, however, this needs a catalyzer, which can be described as the last straw that cause the public to lost control and pour into streets and squares. The last straw that triggered potential discontented societies differs from country to country. The triggering factor has an emotional potential to touch public’s feelings, as seen in Bouazzi case in Tunisia and Said case in Egypt. Social media served people to see and even feel brutal interventions, killings and inhuman implementations exhibited by the security forces instantly.

**The Augmentation of Social Media**

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The widening of the Internet and generation of sophisticated mobile phones increases the accessibility to the net and provides a live connection opportunity to every corner of the country. To emphasize the contribution of social media, Hussein Elkhafaifi stated that “In the 21st century, the revolution may not be televised – but it likely will be tweeted, blogged, texted and organized on Facebook, recent experience suggests.” It is certain that Facebook, twitter, and blogs played an important role during the period of the Arab Spring. People using social media instruments via mobile phones provided more accurate and up-to-date information to the public. The use of social media helped “People who shared interest in democracy built extensive social networks and organized political action. Social media became a critical part of the toolkit for greater freedom.”

Another important advantage that social media provided was that it provided a cost-effective opportunity in communication. A smart phone was enough to connect, organize and share information, images, videos, and thoughts with other parties everywhere without considering any payment. “After analyzing more than 3 million tweets, gigabytes of YouTube content and thousands of blog posts, a new study finds that social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring.”

Moreover, as Catherine O’Donnell cites from a piece by Philip Howard, “Although social media did not cause the upheaval in North Africa, they altered the capacity of citizens to affect domestic politics. Online activists created a virtual ecology

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193 Ibid
of civil society, debating contentious issues that could not be discussed in public.”

In addition, intelligence services usually use informers to access information within organizations especially in authoritarian countries. However, smartphone applications provide vast opportunities and various ways of bypassing the state’s control over nationals. Mobile phones and the Internet serve as the golden plate of freedom of communication and information sharing. People can become aware of almost every event locally, nationally and internationally by using smartphone applications.

Besides providing society with an important advantage in organizing and mobilizing social mass movements, there is also a concern about social media about being tracked through social media applications that may result in ill treatment and imprisonment. Therefore, governments used social media as a counter measure, in terms of misguiding public’s perception and tracking down activists and their mobilization. Bahraini and Iranian authorities were successful in terms of turning the disadvantages of social media to advantage.

Cited from Ian Bremer, Dewey et al., and from Regan to Obama, US presidents have argued, “the long-term survival of authoritarian states depends on their ability to control the flow of information within and cross their borders.” Iran did not allow the secure version of Facebook in order to use Facebook photos to track activists.

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and even arrest them. Dewey et al. argued that Syria was the first state that openly hosted a group of hacker that worked for the government and the author continues by stating that “we are entering a new era, in which social media has the potential to influence the course of nations to either become more democratic or more entrenched autocracies.”

However, there were still many locations in the MENA countries where the use of social media is not popular and where the support of the traditional media is required. In those places where correspondents were not able to penetrate, traditional media filled the gap. Therefore, Al-Jazeera was helpful in broadcasting local incidents to the international attentions during the Arab Uprising.197 Furthermore, Nehad Ismail claims, “The Arab Spring would not have been possible without Al Jazeera.” 198

As Philip Howard states, although social media was not the main factor that generated the upheaval in MENA countries, “they altered the capacity of citizens to affect domestic politics. Online activists created a virtual ecology of civil society, debating contentious issues that could not be discussed in public.”199

**Access to Electricity, Fixed Line and Mobile Phone Subscribers, and Internet Users**

In order to comprehend the scale and the role of social media during the Arab Uprising, it is essential to examine the instruments of social media. First of all, electricity


is the sine qua non to connect the world. The table below shows that other than Yemen, people of MENA countries had access to the electricity over than 90%, in 2010 and 2011. In Yemen, access to electricity in 2010 was 39.6%. Yet, instead of using social networking instruments to organize and mobilize people, tribal connections and loyalty filled this gap and fostered collective behavior, and there was no need for a catalyzer such as social media, to organize the society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Access to Electricity (% of Population)</th>
<th>Fixed Line &amp; Mobile Phone Subscribers</th>
<th>Internet Users Per 100 People</th>
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<tr>
<td>Oil Exporters (GCC countries)</td>
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<td>1 Bahrain</td>
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<td>143.4</td>
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<td>2 Kuwait</td>
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<td>3 Oman</td>
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<td>4 Qatar</td>
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<td>5 Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Developing Oil Exporters</td>
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<td>1 Algeria</td>
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<td>2 Iran</td>
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<td>4 Libya</td>
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<td>5 Syrian Arab Republic</td>
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<td>6 Yemen</td>
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<td>Oil Importers</td>
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<td>112.9</td>
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<td>5 Tunisia</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>116.7</td>
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Table 4-1 Electricity, Fixed Line and Mobile Phone, and Internet Indicators of MENA Countries

In terms of evaluating Internet usage in MENA countries; almost one third had access to the Internet in 2010. While the world population in 2010 was 6,916,183,480,
the number of Internet users was 2,034,259,369, which mean that 29.41% of the world’s population was acquainted with the Internet. This ratio was 48.7% in GCC countries, 12.7% in Developing Oil Exporting, and 36.9% in Oil Importing MENA countries. In addition, the average of fixed line and mobile phone subscribers was 183.8% in GCC countries, 93.6% in Developing Oil Exporting countries, and 104.7% in Oil Importing MENA countries in 2010.

In 2010, Saudi Arabia had the highest rate of fixed line and mobile phone subscribers with the rate of 204.5% followed by Libya with 200.8%, Oman with 174.5%, Kuwait with 150.4%, and the United Arab Emirate with 147% per 100 people whereas the rate was in Yemen 53.3%, in Syria 73.2%, in Iraq 80.7%, in Lebanon 85.3%, and in Algeria 96.3%. Tunisia and Egypt were two counties that were not within both country groups that possess the highest and the lowest rate of fixed line and mobile phone subscribers. Besides, in 2010, their ratio was not lower that 100% for per one hundred people. Consequently, in the beginning of the first quarter of 2011 leaders of both countries had to step down. The other suffering country, Libya, was within the country group that had the highest fixed line and mobile phone subscribers’ rate. After all, social media had the ground in MENA countries to be affective enough, except in Yemen (53.3% in 2010).

However, in terms of Internet users per one hundred people, countries with the highest rate, in 2010, respectively were Qatar with 69%, the United Arab Emirates with 68%, Kuwait with 61.4%, and Morocco with 52%. On the other hand, the county group

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that includes the MENA countries with the lowest Internet users rate consists of Iraq with 2.5%, Yemen 12.4%, Algeria with 12.5%, Libya with 14%, and Iran with 14.7%.

In terms of results, Tunisia and Egypt were not among those MENA countries that possessed the highest and lowest rate of Internet users. Although Libya, on the one hand, had the second highest fixed line and mobile phone subscribers with the rate of 200.8 per one hundred people in 2010, on the other hand it had the third lowest Internet users rate of MENA countries which means communication was highly dependent on mobile phones and fixed lines rather than the Internet. Moreover, having a high rate of fixed line and mobile phone subscribers or Internet users rate does not verify that the social media is the primary factor that influences the transition of social movements into a revolution per se, but it was a helpful and an important tool in organizing social mass events, coordinating mobilization of movements, and generating communication opportunities among local, national, and international activists to raise peoples’ attention.

**Blogs**

Blogs became popular tools used by politicians, news services, and political consultants especially by 2004. Every 7.4 seconds a new blog is created; every day about 12,000 new blogs are created; and close to 2,750,000 new blogs are made every day.  

In order to show the popularity and usage of blogs, the number of blogs worldwide in October 2008 was 78.7 million and increased respectively to 127 million in

October 2009, to 148.5 million in October 2010, and to 173 million in October 2011. This number reached to 246.6 million in July 2015. 202

A good example of using blogs to garner the public’s attention and organize them to make their voices heard, is the Green Revolution, where an anti-Ahmadinejad movement blog was used to foster their opinions and generate a social mass movement, and this continued for six months in order to support Musavi to be reelected. Societies, politicians, and activists discovered the power of social media during this social unrest period in Iran and this was motivated on blogs. This social movement is believed by many commentators to be the originator of the social upheaval of the Arab Spring.

According to Catherina O’Donnell, “political discussion in blogs presaged the turn of popular opinion in both Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, conversations about liberty, democracy and revolution on blogs and on Twitter often immediately preceded mass protests.” She also claims that blogs increased from five percent, one month before, to twenty percent the day the Tunisian Leader, Ben Ali, had to resign. “Subsequently, the primary topic for Tunisian blogs was “revolution” until a public rally of at least 100,000 people eventually forced the old regimes remaining leaders to relinquish power.” 203

**Facebook**

Mark Zuckerberg founded Facebook, when he was studying at Harvard University. He launched Facebook in February 2004. The social networking system was

202 ibid

extended to the other member Universities of the Ivy League and became facebook.com in August 2005.

It is claimed that smartphone users check Facebook fourteen times a day, every minute 1.8 million new “likes” are made on Facebook, 27% of upstream web traffic is comprised of Facebook photos and videos uploading via cellphones. 204 In 2014, “654 million people use Facebook on mobile on a daily basis, an increase from 609 million last quarter. 1.32 billion people log on to Facebook at least once each month, an increase from 1.28 billion last quarter.” Moreover, “The average Facebook user spends 40 minutes a day on the platform.” 205

At the end of 2010 the number of Facebook users was about 600 million with 250 million added new users. In 2011, this number increased to 800 million users. 206 In 2010, “58% of mom bloggers say Facebook is a more effective traffic driver than it was a year ago.” 207 Furthermore, according to Goldman Sachs, Facebook reached a value of $50 billion. 208

Twitter

Twitter supports 35 languages and there are 316 million monthly active twitter users. 500 million tweets are sent per day, 80% of twitter active users are on mobile, and 77% of accounts are located outside the U.S. 209

In 2010, 100 million new accounts were added to Twitter and 50 million Tweets were sent per day. By March 14, 2011, after 3 years, 2 months and 1 day twitter scored the billionth Tweet. In 2011 the average number of sent Tweets was 140 million and the account numbers reached to 225 million. By the time Michael Jackson died, June 25, 2009, 456 tweets were sent per second, which was a record at that time.

Moreover, 572,000 new accounts were created on March 12, 2011 and a 182% increase in the number of mobile users over the year 2010 was recorded. 210

As said by Catherine O’Donnell “Twitter provides a window into the broader world of digital conversations, many of which probably involved cell phones to send text, pictures or voice messages.”211 She continues, “In Tunisia, for example, less than 20 percent of the population uses social media, but almost everyone has access to a mobile phone.” 212

It is recorded that during the week before Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak resigned, the total rate of tweets about political change in Egypt ballooned from 2,300 a

209 About Twitter. (03/24/2015). Retrieved from https://about.twitter.com/tr/company
212 ibid
day to 230,000 a day and the top 23 videos featured about protests and political videos featuring protests and political reports received nearly 5.5 million views.  

Twitter is believed to provide a wide range of digital conversation especially through smartphones by providing the opportunity to send texts, videos, or pictures anonymously. Tanya Gupta claims, “Wherever democracy is absent or weak, for example in a dictatorship or a monarchy, there could be a high price to pay for any open expressed dissension. Twitter allows anonymity for those who push for transparency and democracy.” Social movements used certain hashtags in different countries to get peoples’ attention and support. For instance, in Tunisia #SidiBouzid, in Egypt #Jan25, in Libya #Feb17, in Saudi Arabia #Mar20”, and Bahrain #Feb14 became the most popular hashtags.

**YouTube**

About 4 billion videos are viewed on YouTube per day, 6 billion hours of video watch exist per month, and one billion average of videos are watched on YouTube per day. In 2010, about 2 billion videos were watched per day on YouTube and 35 hours of videos were uploaded every minute on YouTube. However, the average of uploaded videos per minute increased to 48 hours in 2011.

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Megan O’Neill claims the influence of YouTube under the title of “Five Ways YouTube Has Changed the World” in a document published on November 8, 2010. She stated that Chad Hurley, Steve Chen and Jawad Karim who founded YouTube in 2005 may not have predicted how they would change the world with their product. “YouTube has revolutionized everything from entertainment to education, opened new doors for talented individuals looking to be discovered, and brought people together from all over the globe.” She claims that by providing the opportunity to discover and travel the world with a single click, YouTube has made the world smaller. When a video of Justin Bieber was uploaded by his mother, he may not have known he would become a pop icon, which is a good example of how YouTube helps people get discovered. She continues that, YouTube offers a platform for spreading truth and inciting change.

YouTube provides people around the globe an opportunity where people can post videos to show the world; what is going on in locations people may never have the chance to visit; and these can bypass repressive governmental censorship to show the world the reality on the ground. YouTube has revolutionized entertainment. Now, YouTube can be watched not only on computers from the office or home, but anywhere access to the Internet is possible, for example via smartphones. YouTube has also revolutionized education. For instance, “Through the ‘Khan Academy’ Khan offers over 1,400 tutorials, teaching about everything from math and finance, to physics,

chemistry and biology.”

The self-immolation of Bouazizi and protests during his funeral were recorded and circulated through YouTube in Tunisia and beyond. Those videos and initial protests that followed became the precursors of the manifestation of the revolutionary Arab Uprising movement.

Moreover, satellite TV’s, especially Al Jazeera played an important role in broadcasting incidents and news instantly from local places to capture the worlds’ attention. Its courage is worthy of commendation.

**TV and Satellite**

Malcolm Ritter claims there are about 1,100 active private and government owned satellites in orbit, and about 2,600 that no longer work. The first satellite was launched by Russia, Sputnik 1, in 1957 and the oldest satellite that is still in orbit was launched in 1958.

It became commonly acknowledged that social media played an important role in efforts to organize, mobilize and finalize the process of social unrest in some MENA countries. Many interpret the Arab Uprising as the revolution of twitter or Facebook. However, others find this definition to be exaggerated and inconclusive and state that “the ‘demonstration effect’ which drove protest from Tunisia into Libya and Egypt and

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then on into the Gulf was powered by an older form of technology, satellite television.” They believe that without Al Jazeera and other Arab satellites TVs revolution in Tunisia and Egypt would not have happened. “Broadly comparable to the Sawat al-Arab radio station under Nasser, Al Jazeera and other Arab satellite stations played a key role in recreating a region-wide Arab public sphere, which amplified the demonstration effect of Ben Ali’s departure.”

The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project “supports this conclusion with its findings that the majority of Egyptians are not online. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of the total population do not use the internet.” The findings of the study “point to social media’s important role in spreading information, but do not necessarily indicate that social media was a mobilizing force in the uprisings.”

In this respect, Nehad Ismail too believes that “the Arab Spring would not have been possible without Al Jazeera.” He also asserts that with some help of NATO, Al Jazeera has succeeded in bringing down the 42 years old regime of Kaddafi that spread fear and torture, with an amalgamation of unexplained disappearances of opponents, death squads, and assassinations.

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It was believed by some that Al Jazeera urged the Arab youth into the Street to demonstrate and demand for freedom and promoted the fall of the absolute tyrants. “Al Jazeera made full use of the social media and accepted feeds from individual protesters who took footage on their mobile phones, Twitter feeds and Face book postings.” 224

Statistics have shown that there is a greater demand in recent time for productions and applications of Information and Communication Technologies. Entrepreneurs who highly depend on the Internet and smart phone technologies are gradually in increasing competition to improve the Internet and smart phones software in efforts to gain new costumers and not to lose their constant ones. As of January 2015, the total world population was 7.210 billion with the rate of 53% urbanization. Active Internet users were 3.010 billion with the penetration rate of 42% and active social media accounts were 1.685 billion with the penetration rate of 23% according to Simon Kemp. 225

However, the worldwide rate of Internet users increased 16.10% in 2010, compared with the users of 2009. In 2011, another increase of 11.70% was declared when reaching the number of 2,272,463,038 users. 226

Having said that, a study conducted in 2011 by the University of Washington entitled with “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?” shows that social media, via Twitter, played a vital role during the revolutionary movements in Tunisia and Egypt. After creating a database of information

224 ibid
collected from Twitter, analyzing more than 3 million Tweets based on keywords used, and tracking which countries thousands of individuals tweeted from during the revolutions, the authors said “for the first time we have evidence confirming social media’s critical role in the Arab Spring”. 227

People living in the MENA region found themselves in a wide range of conversation opportunities and easily discovered the options social media provided during the Arab Uprising. This instrument of communication was missing in social mass movements that existed before the 21st century. Since the power of the social media was recognized, activists found a spark of hope and believed that they had a chance to reach their goal, which was freedom of speech, justice, equal rights, human rights, prosperity, jobs, and hope. “People throughout the region were drawn into an extended conversation about social uprising. The success of demands for political change in Egypt and Tunisia led individuals in other countries to pick up the conversation.” 228

Internet communities were defined similar to civil society groups, especially in repressive environments where governments ban mass social events. Social media is believed to have helped increase participation of members of civil societies in protests during the Arab Uprising. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the use of Internet and social media tools were not only for the benefit of activists or protestors, but

it also had a double-edged sword effect that gave the authorities the ability to track activists, organizations, and their movements as well.

Moreover, the BBC’s Middle East correspondent Kevin Connolly claims that the use of social media was limited largely to well-educated and multilingual liberal elites. “Those secular liberals after all were trounced at the ballot box in Egypt. Satellite TV remains more important in countries where many people can’t read and write and don’t have access to the Internet.” In this respect, satellite TV’s were able to fill the gap where people were not able to connect to the Internet or do not possess any smart phones.

In terms of connecting to beyond the borders of the country and having the support of the international actors, satellite TV’s played an important role. Simon Cottle mentioned this feature of CIT’s by stating that “International news media, in turn, including Al Jazeera, have distributed the flood of disturbing scenes and reports of the uprisings now easily accessed via Google’s YouTube and boomeranged them back into the countries concerned.”

Beside, many commentators believe that Al Jazeera, played an unique role in disseminating local incidents not only to the local and national listener, but also captured the attention of the rest of the world where there were satellite dishes. In 2011, the ratio of Internet users per 100 people in Yemen was 14.9% and fixed line and mobile phone subscribers per 100 people was 54.7% where these numbers in Saudi Arabia was 47.5%

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and 210.1%. This outcome does not necessarily show that social media is a sine qua non for a revolution. Nehad Ismail\(^\text{231}\) claims, “the Arab Spring would not have been possible without Al Jazeera.” For instance, while the use of social media tools in the Gulf countries was very high and lower in other MENA countries such as Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, there has been no correlation observed between successful social unrests and high potential of social media usage proven. What is certain, is that social media facilitates communication, mobilization, and the organization of mass events.

**Summary**

Social media alone was not the only factor causing regime changes during the Arab Spring. But, there is no doubt, it was a helpful instrument in providing likeminded discontented people with a voice to speak the same language, organize, and to mobilize without the censorship of government during the Arab Uprisings in different MENA countries. However, backed with anger and hatred against governments’ and leaders’ corruptions; unjust implementations; and deprived of good living standards, social media became a tool to inform societies, share happiness and sadness, and bargain collectively against repressive regimes to a greater extent than ever before.

Although authoritarian regimes in the pre-social media era were able to control, repress, and even manipulate incidents and stories that existed in civil society through the stated controlled traditional media instruments, like newspapers, radio and TV, social

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media helped to bypass this form of control and net secure connections.

Finally, the new era of communication that generated the social media platform from the instruments of globalization, provided opportunities to people to break the chains and barriers of those regimes that surrounded the society. Therefore, regimes now have to pay more effort to convince the society instead of using methods of repression, censorship and perception management.
CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL MASS MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY AND THE PERCEPTION OF EXPERTS ON SOCIAL MASS MOVEMENTS

Introduction

The global financial crisis that started in the US in 2007 not only caused individuals’ significant economic losses, but also degradation in the various countries’ economy around the world. The rate of unemployed people rose along with the food prices and inflation. The decline in crude oil prices affected oil-exporting countries where their nationals were highly dependent on subsidies gained from oil sales. Moreover, the youth population in MENA countries was the proportion that was affected mostly by the global financial crisis. “All these factors suggest that specific measures and solutions are needed for youth as a highly vulnerable group most profoundly affected by economic and social development.”

Because the researcher was studying the Arab Uprising and its impact on Diyarbakir province, the statistics of 2010 and 2011 are mainly considered in this study. Turkey had a population of 72.1 million people in 2010. While the absolute poverty line in Turkey for per person was 4 US Dollars in Turkey, only 5% of the population was working per a day under this rate. However, the population of Egypt who work for under 4 US Dollars per a day was 64.7% in 2010. Moreover, Turkey ranks 56th with a score of 4.4, and Egypt ranks 98 with a score of 3.1 in terms of corruption index.

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In terms of democracy rankings, Turkey was leveled to 56 and defined as hybrid while Egypt was defined as autocratic with the rank of 138 according to the democracy index of The Economist Intelligence Unit.  

However, the population of Diyarbakir in 2011 of 1,570,973 (TUIK), ranked 12th; the growth of the population 27.09%, a rank of 13; the literacy rate 89.35%, with a rank of 76; and an unemployment rate of 13.5%, rank 16 (2010). The most crowded population among the age of 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44 was the ratio of 12.22% children between 10-14. The population of this age period consisted of 192,007 children and 98,086 of them were males and 93,921 were females.

The global financial crises produced a chain reaction of social and economic discontents in one way or another in almost every country and almost every person was affected over the course of the time. While poor countries struggled mostly with economic disputes, wealthy countries struggled with political issues.

However, before investigating the social mass events in the City of Diyarbakir City, this chapter will provide a short overview of social mass protests that have existed in the recent history of Turkey that will provide a useful context for understanding how fragile a society can become in terms of social mass reactions.

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The present study reports on the perceptions of 20 experts who were active supervision officers and negotiated with leaders of social mass movements during social mass events in a qualitative research design by using NVIVO software.

Methodology

In this chapter, the researcher firstly evaluates the recent, but important social mass movements that have existed in Turkey and the City of Diyarbakir in order to provide an adequate viewpoint for comprehending the social mass movement culture and policing protests in the research field. Later on, the researcher provides the results of this component of the research.

In order to conduct the interviews a qualitative research design using NVINO software was implemented to analyse the responses of selected subjects. The target group of interviewees consisted of 20 subjects. This target group was composed of high ranking police officers that were experts in domestic security or in anti-riot tasks and lead officers who were deployed in mass movements and rallies. In order to increase the reliability of the interview outcomes instead of interviewing 50% of the target group, the study included 100% of these individuals to increase the number to 20. Ten would be less reliable compared with 20.

Twenty experts on mass movements and police interventions were interviewed in order to evaluate the polices’ perceptions about the topic of social mass movements and the activists in Diyarbakir, the preferred styles and models of protest policing in Diyarbakir, the police philosophy dealing with mass events, the trust between police supervisors and leaders of organizations, the factors that trigger violent actions, the role of intelligence before and during mass protests, factors that cause repressive
interventions, the role of MPs in mass demonstrations, the importance of communication systems used by activists to inform and mobilize their supporters, the function of the media in provoking masses, the role of speeches in escalating and reducing mass reactions, the impact of prohibiting mass events, the relationship between terrorist activities and mass demonstrations, the role of emotions on violent activities, the influence of the Arab Spring on the attempted Kurdish Uprising, the possible escalation of nationalist thinking among youth, the possibility of an ethnic riot in Diyarbakir province, the existence of risk assessment strategies against any mass uprising, and the needed training programs for law enforcement in order to respond with successful interventions without risking any lives during possible mass uprisings.

Only indirect benefits to the practice and knowledge of the governmental institutions and law enforcement dealing with mass movements, demonstrations, activities and threats whether regionally or locally were expected. The findings, including the policies and research implications of this study are believed to be able to help the authorities that deal with mass activities to better diagnose, understand and deal with social mass events in a more secure and peaceful approach.

In order to perform the interviews in an unbiased manner, increase the validity of the study and keep the study anonymous, instead of the researcher himself, the principal investigator was a person with a police background, a civilian person who did not posses any police rank and did not work for the Diyarbakir Police Department but was familiar with doing research and was preferred as the secondary investigator to conduct the interviews. This person was Dr. Oguzhan Demir who obtained the ORSP Certificate and
was a Teaching Assistant who taught at the School of Security Science in Ankara at that time.

The interviews took place in the subjects’ offices. Numbers were used to code each interview without asking subjects their name, rank, gender or any other identifying clues. Participants were not asked any question that may have hinted at their identity. To protect officers from any disciplinary investigations, in case of criticizing their authorities, the identity of the subjects will be kept anonymous by giving each subject a different code instead of asking any identical hints about their ID or title. Therefore, there were no foreseeable direct or indirect risks or direct benefits to the participants because nothing about the identity of the subjects was asked. They were given a code that started from 001 to differentiate the subjects from each other. To make the interviewee comfortable and assure her or him that the interview would be kept private, she or he were informed that at any moment of the interview process they were free to stop or cancel the interview whenever he or she felt unsafe or inconvenienced. Dr. Demir did not use any voice recording devices. He only took written notes during the interviews to document the subjects’ responses. He consulted with the principal investigator in person whenever he needed to during the interview process.

After, subjects were interviewed, Dr. Demir transcribed his notes and saved them in a Microsoft Word file that was password protected. All the data he collected was submitted to me through “dropbox”, which was accessible only to my advisor Dr. Kennedy, to myself (PI), if asked, to Rutgers IRB office and to Dr. Demir himself (until he uploaded all the data to dropbox). This process was also declared to subjects in order to let them know that their responses would be kept anonymous and consent forms
approved by the Rutgers IRB office were provided to the subjects at the same time. All data are being kept until my research is officially approved by Rutgers University.

Dr. Demir conducted the interviews with the key informants (senior officers of the domestic security and anti-riot unites) who were charged with domestic security and law enforcements and who had experience dealing actively with mass activities in Diyarbakir province in Turkey. By interviewing 20 experts who were in charge of policing protests, the study aimed to comprehend the perception of officers in charge of policing protests in the context of social mass movements and activists participating in social mass events in their district; which is the model and style of protest policing they preferred; whether or not they believed that there was a potential for any deadly revolt akin to the Arab Uprising in this part of Turkey; if they believed in the importance of negotiating before, during, and after mass events with the leaders of demonstrators or not; if there was an emergency plan for social mass uprisings were they aware of this; whether they carried out risk assessments or not; and how they described themselves, either as State Police or Public Police? The interviews took approximately 30 minutes.

Moreover, in order to analyse the responses of the subjects, a qualitative form of research design was used to try to gain a better understanding of the perception of the senior officers who lead and administer the deployed officers during mass events and interventions. Twenty police supervisors were interviewed and their comments were evaluated and analyzed through NVIVO. NVIVO, is software program that supports qualitative research and is designed to organize and analyse interviews, articles, social media and open-ended survey responses. This software was used to analyse the responses
of twenty senior officers who lead other officers during mass events by detailing the responses to the following research questions:

- How affective was the Arab Uprising in influencing the social mass events in Diyarbakir Province, what were the differences between both movements and why did the Kurdish Uprising end in failure?

- What triggered activists to expose themselves to violent actions during mass events?

- Did the terrorist organization have any influences on street protests in order to control and escalate mass events and disorder in Diyarbakir Province?

- Is there any correlation between the terrorist activities and social mass events in Diyarbakir Province?

- Have there been any changes in protest policing philosophy and model and styles of controlling mass demonstrations by Diyarbakir Police Department in the course of time in Diyarbakir Province?

- Has the style and methods of protest policing had any influence on protestors such as exposure to violent actions?

- How should law enforcement agencies approach social mass events while securing demonstrators’ rights and maintaining public order?

- What is the perception of senior officers and plain officers about risk assessment?

- How to minimize the proportion of accompanying violent actions by demonstrators?

- Are there any risk assessment strategies in place in order to respond to any deadly riot?
What are the critical points to suggest that governmental institutions can carry out in order to maintain peace and security in the public realm?

**Turkey and Social Mass Uprisings**

**Gezi Park Protests**

According to the Hurriyet Daily News: on Oct. 31, 2012 the government announced a controversial renovation plan called “Taksim pedestrianization project” for the city center, which initiated the closure of roads heading to the heart of the city. However, on November 8, 2012 the Mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş, “announced that a shopping mall could be built in place of Gezi Park, the former location of the Artillery Barracks, which had been demolished in 1940 and there were plans to rebuild this as part of a renovation project.”

Known as the lungs of Istanbul, Gezi Park is the only green area that people can rest and spend some time in. When people heard about the news and Major’s announcement to build a shopping center at the site of Gezi park and had starting cutting trees down, a group of activists from Taksim Solidarity, on May 27, 2013 voiced criticism of the renovation plans and gathered in Gezi Park to show their objection about the plan.

On May 28, 2013, a member of the Parliament blocked the bulldozers in “using his parliamentary immunity, and had police removed their barricades surrounding Gezi

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Park, saying they did not have legal permission to cut down the trees.”

Later on, the security forces moved in and tried to disperse demonstrators. During this police intervention a “woman in red” was teargased by a police officer, which later becomes the poster child of the events, capturing the excessive use of police force during dispersing gathered crowd.

The next day, on May 29, 2013 the Prime Minister stated the following about the third bridge contraction that produced protests during the kick-off ceremony for this “Whatever they do, we have made up our minds and will do it.” Photographs of the protesters reading books to the police officers standing guard at Gezi Park were widespread.”

On May 30, 2013, the day after the speech of Prime Minister, the “Police staged another operation at dawn”, in order to disperse the crowd. An officer burned down the tents of the protesters, attracting more fury from the country.”

Burning the tents of activists became the tipping point that triggered not only opponents of the government but also pro-government people. MP Sureyya Onder appeared again to stop demolition vehicles. Moreover, for a major gathering at the park, the activists made a call through one of the blessings of the globalization age, the social media. In the evening, the number reached 10,000 people at Gezi Park.

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238 Ibid

The biggest dawn operation existed on May 31, 2013 and police dispersed hundreds of activists by using tear gas and water cannons. Activists set up barricades around the park to stop police interventions. At 10 a.m., the Taksim Platform made a press statement ended with 100’s of injured including three reporters, Ahmet Şık from Birgün, Emrah Gürel from the Hürriyet Daily News, and Osman Orsal from Reuters. Police intervention to another sit-in protest existed at 1 p.m. at Taksim Square which caused a major gathering in the city center in the evening through the calls social media. Later on, by 8 p.m. an “estimated 100,000 people were in the Beyoğlu district, but police blocked roads leading to the square with barriers, trying to disperse the crowds with gas and water.”

In a short time protests spread to other districts of Istanbul and beyond. At around 3 a.m. on June 1, the dimensions of the protests changed dramatically from the center of the whole city of Istanbul and hundreds started from Asian side crossing the Bosphorus Bridge to the European side. Others supported protests from their houses; some flipped their house lights on and off; and others banged pots and pans to demonstrate their objection of cutting trees in order to build a shopping mall instead.

Although, the Prime Minister expressed on June 1, 2013 that a shopping mall was not certain, the protests had spread already to 40 cities with hundreds of thousands of people. Police blocked roads to Taksim Square from all directions left the square and the

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[^240] Ibid
\end{itemize}
park back the protesters. However, clashes continued in many districts of Istanbul, especially in Besiktas, the nearest district to Dolmabahce Palace and Taksim. The aim of the protestors in Besiktas was actually the office of the Prime Ministry Office. Clashes escalated and police forces became inadequate in point of numbers. A clever move was made by the police who delivered the Riot Police by ships from the Anatolian side to the European side of Marmara See to overcome the barricaded roads by protestors and reach the Prime Ministry Office before protestors did. After a successful intervention the anti-riot unit prevented protestors to reach the office of prime Minister.

Protests spread all over the country through social media applications, TV’s, and Internet. “Interior Minister Muammer Güler said 1,730 people had been detained in 235 protests held in 67 cities.242

On June 3, 2013, a turning point happened when the Besiktas football team’s fan group, Çarşı, agreed with the police to a “truce” the district of Besiktas became calm, but Ankara, İzmir and Antakya continued staging heavy protests.243

Although Mr. Arinc announced that 60 protesters and 244 police had been injured during clashes. The Turkish Doctors’ Union (TTB) declared the injured people as 4,177 additions to the deaths of Cömert and Ayvalıtaş.

In İzmir, 29 people were detained for things they had written on Twitter.

On June 5, 2013 Deputy Prime Minister Arinc met again with six representatives

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243 Ibid
from the Taksim Solidarity group, doctors announced that Ethem Sarsılı, another 
protestor, was brain dead. Conflicts continued in Ankara, Rize, and Tunceli. “In Istanbul, 
protestors marked the holy Muslim night of Lailat al–Mi’raj with several activities, 
including a call on no consummation of alcohol at the Park.”

On June 6, 2013, unfortunately, a police supervisor died as a result of a fall from a 
bridge during policing protests in the southern province of Adana. “Prime Minister 
refused to back down, saying the Artillery Barracks will be built no matter what. The 
harsh speech caused a severe drop in Turkey's stock exchange.”

On June 7, 2013 thousands of AKP supporters welcomed the Prime Minister on 
his arrival from a four-day Africa visit at the Ataturk Airport. “Erdogan did not back 
down, blamed artists for provoking the protests.”

On June 9, 2013, a massive gathering existed in Taksim Square while the Prime 
Minister gave six separate speeches in Ankara, Adana, and Mersin. That night, Ankara 
and Adana witnessed heavy clashes between protesters and police.

The Prime Minister gave a speech at the Ankara Airport "Don't you see this? How 
can you attack my police? There are those who side with those swearing against the 
prime minister of this country. We are going to show patience, but patience has a limit as 
well."

244 Ibid
246 Ibid
247 Ibid
248 Ibid
On June 10, 2013, the protestors clashed with police in Ankara, close to Kuğulu Park as they were wishing to march toward Kızılay Square. TOMAs, water cannons, were used to prevent protestors entering Kizilay Square. The target in Kizilay was actually the Office of the Prime Minister. The Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arınc declared that the Prime Minister would meet representatives of the movement on June 12. However, the Prime Minister vowed to take stronger action against the protestors “underlining that they would no longer tolerate massive rallies in Turkey, saying, “We will not only terminate these incidents, we will be on these terrorists’ back in the frame of law. No one will get away with what they did.”

After this decisive discourse of the Prime Minister on June 11, 2013 the anti-riot group got the message and entered Taksim Square with a large number of officers after a ten-day crackdown that began when the movement started. “Police used tear gas and water cannons throughout the clashes, which lasted all day and well into the night. The Istanbul governor called on the Gezi protesters to return home, saying he could no longer could guarantee their safety.”

The Prime Minister met with eleven representatives of the protestors on June 12, 2013 and raised the possibility of leaving the decision of the demolition of Gezi Park to the people via a referendum. One June 13, 2013, the Prime Minister met surprisingly for the second time with the protestors, known as the Taksim Solidarity Platform. “The

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250 Ibid
meeting resulted in a government statement saying it would comply with a court decision suspending the demolition of Gezi Park.”  

On June 15, 2013 for the first time a crowded heavy police force was able to occupy Taksim Square instead of protestors and this ended the days-long occupation of the park. “All tents and placards belonging to the protesters were seized and destroyed by construction vehicles. The police began to stand guard at Taksim Square to prevent any gathering there.”

Later on the Prime Minister addressed hundreds of thousands of supporters in a massive gathering in Istanbul, showing the support for the government. After that, the police were able to prevent protesters from entering Taksim Square and Gezi Park and to control the protest in Istanbul. It was also reported that “A group of people with batons in hand attacked the main opposition Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) provincial branch building in Şişhane, breaking the windows with stones, while two CHP deputies, Binnaz Toprak and Melda Onur, were inside.”

On June 18, 2013, the police started to detain several people in raids at their homes in Ankara and Istanbul. One of the detained person was the Davide Martello who played piano at Taksim Square in support of the Gezi Park protests. The police released him on the same day.

On June 20, 2013, police in Izmir raided the tents set up in Gundogdu Square and

251 Ibid
253 Ibid
detained about 30 protestors. A woman in a bikini inspired by a performance artist's solo act joined protesters in Taksim Square on June 20 decided to support the protest in a new form of civil disobedience.  

Consequently, on June 23, 2013, the Ministry of Interior declared that in 79 out of 81 cities, 2.5 million people participate in Gezi Part demonstration and close to 4,900 people were detained. Moreover, on June 24, 2013, the Prime Minister congratulated the police in his speech made during the graduation ceremony at Police Academy in Ankara, because of their brave and heroic work during the Gezi Park mass protests.

In sum, the news of building a shopping mall in place of the Gezi Park, burning tents of activists, the speech of the highest authority, the effective use of social media, early and severe police interventions, and deaths are critical factors that occurred during the Gezi Park protests.

The more the protests increased and veered towards at a threatening level, the more the escalation of the use of the force by the police was observed. Another reason that increased the use of force was the scarcity of the police in numbers and equipment. Working for ten days without going home is another factor that coerced officers’ patience, which at the end caused repressive interventions. However, the newspaper, Gazete Vatan, claims that unorganized protestors and no denial from Istanbul Municipality about the intentions of replacing Gezi Park with a Shopping Mall were the

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reasons for the enlargement of the mass events and for turning them into an uprising.  

On the other hand the orders for managing the incident were given to the Chief of the Town with little support of the anti-riot forces. However, after the verdant supervisor was not able to avert the clash between construction workers and protestors tear gas was used to disperse the assault.

However, the vast numbers of gathered protestors, the homogeneity of the crowd, and the scarcity of an adequate number of police officers and needed equipment was among the factors that caused the police to be called upon to control the mass protest. In addition, the burning of the tents of the activists was another action that triggered the society to support the protestors.

Although at the beginning of the protest the reaction of the society was based on a reasonable objection and supported by all parts of the society, even by pro-government participants, later on the color of the protest changed into protests led by anti-state organizations. This was the turning point where the protest shifted from having a common ground into separatist mass protests and was actually the start of the end.

The common ground was the objection to the cutting of trees and the destruction of Gezi Park in order to build a shopping center. This was a very pure, innocent, and friendly demand. However, since violent groups and terrorist organizations emerged and became the prominent figures of the protests the direction of the events deviated from its original purpose, which in turn caused the loss of its legitimacy and common ground.


ibid
where its power came from. This major change turned this social mass movement into protests of violent groups, terrorist organizations, and crime organizations, which in response became the only stand that empowered the hand of the authorities and security forces had to escalate their use of force. Eventually, after June 30, 2013 the threat of the protests fell behind the agenda and the trial period began.

In the end, according to the Turkish Human Rights Institution Report in October 2014, between May 28 and September 06 in 80 cities out of 81, 3 million 611 thousand demonstrators participated in 5532 mass events of Gezi Park protests. (The Turkish Human Rights Institution Report in October 2014). One police lieutenant and eleven protestors were killed during the Gezi Park Protests.258 697 police officers and more than 8,000 people were wounded. 5,513 people were detained 148 of them were arrested. 1,500 tier gas cartridges and 3,000 tons of water were used at the eighteenth days of the Gezi Parki protests.259

In addition, between May 29 and June 03, under that hash tags of #direngeziparki, #occupygezi, and #direnankara 2013 8.49 million messages were sent through social media, which shows the role of the social media in the Gezi Parki protests.260

Prime Minister Erdogan declared that the damage of Gezi Park mass protests cost Turkey over 100 million Turkish Lira.\textsuperscript{261} Moreover, Deputy Prime Minister Babacan claimed on June 18, 2013 that because of the insecure environment the Gezi Park Protest caused, 1.3 billion dollars of cash went out of the country.\textsuperscript{262}

Tarik Yilmaz calculates the damage Gezi Park protests caused respectively included an: increase in interest rates, from 5 to 7; escalation in dollar rate from 1.79 to 1.90; and a damage worth 50 billion Turkish Lira (26 billion US Dollars) in the stock market.\textsuperscript{263}

Finally, Suleyman Yasar, a former Deputy President to the Privatization Institution, argued that if Turkey did not have such a strong economy, the Gezi Part protests may have caused the collapse of the government.\textsuperscript{264}

Kobani Protests When IS start bombing Kobani, a strategic Syrian city next to the border of Turkey, also called as Ayn El Arab, in which Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, and Armenians lived together, the HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtas called Prime Minister Davutoglu to make a statement that should call people to use their common sense in order to lower the tensions of the Kurds who had relatives on the other side of the border. HDP and Barzani asked the Turkish Government to allow Pesmerge use of the Turkish borders

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{261} ‘Gezi’ zararı 100 milyon TL. (06/19/2013). \textit{Hurriyet Gazetesi}. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gezi-zarari-100-milyon-tl-23538232
\item\textsuperscript{262} ‘Gezi’nin piyasalara maliyeti 1.3 milyar dolar’. (06/18/2013). \textit{NTV News}. Retrieved from http://www.ntv.com.tr/ekonomi/gezinin-piyasalara-maliyeti-1-3-milyar-dolar,orqipVbqTEW5RzVR1jvRZg
\item\textsuperscript{263} Yılmaz, T. (06/11/2013). Gezi PArkının Maliyeti 4 Milyar. \textit{NTV News}. Retrieved from http://manset.at/gezi/sthash.g7TOE1KO.dpuf
\end{itemize}
to support YPG militants in terms of personnel and equipment to rescue Kobani from IS invasion.

On October 05, 2014, Sezgin Tanrikulu from the CHP and a Member to the Parliament visited the Turkish border at the closest point to Kobani and stated that IS was about to undertake a massacre in Kobani if Turkey did not provide support in terms of humanitarian aid and military equipment.\(^\text{265}\)

However, after a call from the HDP and its Co-Chair Demirtas who called for demonstrations, demonstrations turned into protests and protests turned into clashes with security forces. Uprisings mushroomed instantly in towns and cities of Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia such as in Batman, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Aydiyaman, Siirt, Mus, Tunceli, Van, Gaziantep, Sirnak, Hakkari, Agri, Mersin, Kocaeli, Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul.

On October 07, 2014 a curfew was announced in the towns of Mardin, namely Dargecit, Derik, Nusaybin, Kiziltepe, Omerli, Mazidagi, Savur, and Ercis, the town of Van city and Kurtalan, and the town of Siirt city. Other than these places a curfew was declared in four more cities.

Moreover, the main triggering factor was the message that the HDP dispersed under the title of “emergency call” indicating that “the situation in Kobane was at a critical level. In order to protest the IS attacks and the embargo of the AKP government on Kabane, the people were encouraged to enter the streets and support the protestors who were already on the streets.” (Diken “Turkiye, Kobani icin ayakta” 7 Ekim 2014)

Protests erupted very rapidly and turned into violent uprisings in about thirty cities. The message was accepted as if the Kurds were being killed next to our border and no one was extending their hand to rescue them from the massacres of IS. This motivation touched people’s emotions and common sense, which in turn caused them to blame the government and become involved in hatred and violent reflections.

Protests and clashes were not limited to Turkey. Protests spread to European cities and erupted on the streets of German cities of Nurnberg, Essen, Stuttgart, Manheim, Hagen, and Frankfurt; to the city of Bern in Sweden; to the cities of Paris and Salzburg in France; and to the city of Vienna in Austria.

The Interior Minister Ala stated, "Violence will be met with violence. This irrational attitude should immediately be abandoned and [the protesters] should withdraw from the streets,"

In Diyarbakir city, twelve people were killed during protests and five of them were members of HUD-PAR who were delivering aid for poor people. The PKK sympathizers killed them brutally; because of them seeming like IS members due to their having beards. Five in Gaziantep city, nine in Mardin and seven in Bingol were among the cities that had more than a few losses. Some 400 Kurdish protesters were reported to have fought with a similar numbers of radical Muslims in Germany. The German Police separated demonstrators by police firing water cannon. The same clash existed between Yezidi Kurds and ethnic Chechens in the town of Celle in Lower Saxony


\[267\] Ibid
Unfortunately, the Kobani Protest, also called as the Protests of October 6-7, resulted in 46 deaths and 682 wounded, and 323 people were arrested in one week. (IHD’den Kobani Eylemleri Raporu: 46 Kisi Oldu, 682 Kisi Yaralandi, 323 Kisi Tutuklandi: Baskahaber.org.14 Ekim 2014) According to the Minister of the Interior the protests spread into 35 cities. Two police officers died and 139 officers wounded during interventions. Yet, protests started during an unexpected period of time, coexisted with the assignment period of officers and the four-day holiday time. These occasions generated a weak link in the process of maintaining peace and public security. In many cities, the police possessed less TOMAs, water cannons, than needed. One TOMA, water cannon is believed to equal 100 riot officers in terms of dispersing violent groups.

Otherwise, in order to narrow the gap that the absence of the TOMAs left, the pressure that the protestors placed on law enforcement was mostly ended by escalating the use of force through protest policing, which even employed the use of firearms. Trying to fill this gap with regular officers and/or other inadequate instruments and vehicles would not help to overcome the violent protest in a peaceful and safe way. What is needed in this case, is a sufficient number of riot officers relative to the possible number of demonstrators, enough water cannons, and professional styles and methods of protest policing. If there is the possibility of using firearms by the protestors, then armed water cannons and personnel carriers should be replaced instead of riot police and detention and arrests will be more effective than not in mitigating such uprising–like violent protests. The opposite approaches can easily cause serious injuries and even deaths.

Social Mass Movements in Diyarbakir Province
Socio-demography of Diyarbakir City:

There was a decade, between 1990 and 2000, during which the Eastern part of Turkey had suffered from terrorism, repression and socio-economic disadvantages. Villages were evacuated due to either efforts in fighting terrorism or escaping from terrorism. Diyarbakir City was one of those cities that were highly affected by such evacuations. Having a population of 1.5 million, Diyarbakir City was the most crowded city in the Eastern part of Turkey. It had been suffering from migration to the hilt. In 20 years the number of residents in the city center increased from 275,000 to 1,000,000 in 2008. It is mentioned that 2,077 families had moved during that period from villages to Diyarbakir City suburbs.

Data showed 53 per cent of the population consisted of young people under the age of 18. The number of unemployed was estimated to be 30 per cent; 60 percent of the population lives below the minimum wage, meaning that they earn two dollars per day; and 18.1 percent of families have at least one child eligible for school, they are not being sent to school.

According to a study conducted by Sarmaşık Derneği ve Yerel Gündem 21 in five districts, 51.6% of the migrants said that the reason for migration was attributable to security concerns because of the clash between the army and terrorist organizations, 30.5% put forward economic reason, 14.6% for better education, and 3.3% explained they moved for other reasons.

Crime in Diyarbakir City:

Of course, after such a mass migration from places where people were born, and grew up, and had good memories to change to living in an unfamiliar city center, caused
negative life standards, low wages and unemployment. Such serious social problems can cause the creation of an unhappy population filled with hatred not only against the state but also the public. An indication of that unhappiness has triumphed in the growth of the DTP, a party that supports Kurdish separation, which is close to the terrorist organization PKK, which increased its votes from 40% in 2004 to 66% in March 2009 while the rate of support of the then and current governing party AKP decreased.

The Kurdish population is the largest non-Turkic ethnic group in Turkey. Kurds are mostly populated in Eastern Anatolia. Although the number of the Kurdish population is uncertain, there is a changing number between 10-15 million. Nonetheless, Diyarbakir is the second city, after Istanbul, which inhabits the largest Kurdish proportion in Turkey. Therefore, its importance is considered not only by the state, but also by international nongovernmental organizations, the terrorist organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and Turkish Hezbollah as well. The PKK views this city as ‘the capital of Kurdistan’ and the state considers this location as geostrategic and has one of its main military compounds based here. This location is close to Iran, Iraq, and Syria. On the other hand, NGOs are focusing on this city because of the ongoing ethic conflict and propaganda of the PKK.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the worst point about Diyarbakir has been that the terrorist ideology of the PKK has tried to play a role in representing and fighting for the whole Kurdish population in the name of having a Kurdish identity. There is no doubt that not only this city, but also the whole eastern part of Turkey is struggling with issues such as unemployment, lack of education, and scarcity of contemporary living standards. Unfortunately, the PKK is benefiting from those negative realities and is making them the
keystone of its propaganda that is used to recruit new members. However, instead of asking for the rights of those people in a democratic way, the PKK is using the most brutal and uncivilized way of doing this by killing and intimidating innocent people in the name of fighting for the rights of the Kurdish population. Alas, the conflict has cost Turkey the loss of more than 40,000 citizens’ lives and over $60 billion since 1984.

**The Influence of PKK in the South-eastern part of Turkey**

Diyarbakir is an ancient city located in Southeastern Turkey, and is one of the cities where the Kurdish population is dominant. Considering different resources, 90-95 percent of 1,500,000 people living in Diyarbakir are Kurdish. Since the artificial conflict started in the 1980s and extended to recent times, the population soared from 350,000 to 1,500,000. Along with this high density of migration from villages to the city, unemployment, job shortages, and increases in crime have been witnessed. Mostly having large families varying from two to ten members is considered as the main source of increasing unemployment and crime rates. Unfortunately, there is a correlation between socioeconomic standards and terrorism. As the socioeconomic standards of the residents worsen, the opportunities for terrorism increase.

When unemployment or low income makes it hard to support the crowded family and sustain the education of the children, people start to blame the state. Not only regular people, but also actors that are waiting to profit from the existing situation see the state as the main subject to blame. Therefore, those actors, the terrorists, are highly active in the suburban parts of the city of Diyarbakir, where the density of the migrant population is high, and the income of the families is low. In such places, terrorists use every single
opportunity that arises to advance their cause. The regulations of the state, the ill-
treatment of civil servants, the lack of education, and the shortage of job opportunities are
the main propaganda tools that the PKK has been using since the inception of its
existence.

To some degree, the PKK has a better propaganda regimen than many other
organizations and institutions, at both the national and international level. This
organization exaggerates every incident and reflects it to the national and international
organizations from its point of view in a very professional way. In this sense,
telecommunication tools became highly attractive for terrorist organizations in ordered to
recruit new members, to widen its propaganda campaign from local to global, and to
legitimize its activities.

There are many national and international organizations that the PKK has
convinced. Moreover, human rights organizations are used effectively to bring the
Kurdish Conflict to an international level. There are lawyers, academics, and social mass
movements that represent the PKK in the society and international human rights
organizations systematically and successfully. The internet, radio, and TV broadcasting
systems are used very efficiently for propaganda. For instance, social media applications
and satellite TVs are effectively used to advertise the PKK; its members and operations;
and to encourage youth to widen its range of recruitment.

Radio and TV shows are put on the air for the same reason. Although a large
sector of the population does not have an Internet connection, they do have satellite
broadcasting to fill this gap. More importantly, the bases of those communication
instruments do not need to be located within the national boundaries. Globalization is
helping entities to operate without the permission of any authority. For instance, although the broadcasting of the ROJ TV was threatening the interest of the Turkish State while supporting the activity of PKK, nothing could be done to stop the mentioned TV channel broadcasting from Denmark and provoking PKK members and sympathizers after 14 members of the PKK were killed. However, diplomatic talks worked in time.

**ROJ TV**

ROJ TV was a satellite TV channel that broadcasted from Denmark in two languages; Turkish and Kurdish and more importantly it was the successor of MED TV. According to different resources, MED TV was established first in London, but was banned with its three separate breaches in 1999 by British regulators Independent Television Commission because their broadcasts were judged to be likely to encourage or provoke crime or lead to disorder. Later on, this channel started to broadcast from Belgium with the name of MEDYA TV transmitted through a satellite uplink from France. Nonetheless, the French authorities due to its having this relationship with the PKK, abrogated its license in 2004. Unfortunately, Denmark embraced this channel with the changed name of ROJ TV. Despite some diplomatic efforts, the Danish authorities avoided shutting down the existing satellite transmissions of this channel.

In contrast to Danish authorities, the German Interior Ministry declared ROJ TV as a mouthpiece of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), but this was outlawed in Germany because of its method of encouraging viewers to become guerrillas. (Deutsche Welle) As a result, its facilities based in Wuppertal, were dissolved.

**Social Mass Protests Existed in the City Of Diyarbakir**
The killing of Vedat Aydin and his Funeral Ceremony on July 07, 1991

Vedat Adyin was the Chairman of HEP to Diyarbakir City. Three persons who were acting in a similar manner to the police on Friday, July 5, 1991 took him from his home. After two days he was found dead and his body was left under a bridge close to the city border of Elazig on July 07, 1991. He was beaten, tortured and shot. The Minister of the Interior condemned his death and promised to find his killer. Unfortunately, that summer was described as the escalation period of the assassinations in the Eastern and Southeastern part of Turkey. This period of uncertainty caused the emergence of Turkish-Hezbollah as well.

However, before the killing of Vedat Aydin the region was affected by assassinations that reached a number of 200 unsolved crimes. Such an unsafe environment caused social disturbances and high tensions. Before the killing of Aydin, offices of leftist newspapers and some commentators cars were bombed. The situation was, as if, the society was prepared for a chaotic period of social unrest. Nonetheless, the killing of a well-known person in Diyarbakir was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Since the September 12 Military Coup in 1980 no social reaction and mass protests were seen until the killing of Aydin.

Aydin was taken from the graveyard where unidentified person were buried. He was buried in this graveyard because no ID was on him when he was found. However, people took him from this graveyard located in Meden County and brought him to the city center of Diyarbakir. The attendance at Aydin’s funeral ceremony was higher than expected. This condition made the authorities worry. Therefore, strict precautions were taken to prevent any social unrest. The motorcade was barricaded and military personnel,
police and Special Forces were deployed on checkpoints. The city was closed to travelers in order to maintain their participation after the funeral ceremony. The funeral ceremony was held in the Sumer Mosque, which is located at the city center of Diyarbakir City. About 50,000 people gathered for the ceremony. When the cortege passed through the city wall and arrived at the Mardin Gate Police Station, civil dressed people carrying gunshot fired at people who were in the funeral cortege and continued for five minutes. The cortege of close to 30,000 people arrived to the graveyard in four hours, which is a distance that takes at most about half an hour.

However, after Aydin was buried, the Chairman of the HE Party announced that he had talked to the Governor and got his word that everybody would go home safely. But they should also leave in common sense manner. However, when people started leaving the graveyard guns were fired, people were tear gassed and the crowd shouted. Members of Parliament and journalists were beaten and tear gassed as well. The incident ended with the deaths of seven people and 800 wounded people.

The Deputy Commissioner Nurdan Akcay reported that in such cases law enforcement organizations should work with care and harmony and communicate with due precaution and within the rules of confidentiality. This confession means that there was no control and coordination among security forces along with communication problems, which generated a state of vulnerable field situations open to provocation and misuse. Army Major Cem Ersever, who was assassinated later, claimed that about one

269 Ibid
hundred armed provocateurs consisting of confessors from the PKK were cursing Vedat Aydin and shouting at the cortege. But with the order of Commissioner Ramazan Er the police prevented those people from coming face to face with the cortege. Cem Ersever also stated that after this incident some of the MP’s, members of the HEP resigned because of threatening repression. He summarized the whole incident by stating “you massacre the funeral ceremony in order to make masses come together and then you find the opportunity to intimidate them”270

The then security forces adopted this strategy as an appropriate way of combating terrorism. Unfortunately, the resignation of some MP’s from the party was seen as evidence of the success of this strategy.

However, if the masses reach at a level that they believe that there is nothing more left to lose, except their lives, it will be impossible to resist and remain against such a power. Such a common solidarity fosters tremendous power, and has toppled regimes like in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and become the nightmare of many other autocratic regimes.

Hossam Badrawi, a former member of the Egyptian parliament and a member of Hosni Mubarak’s party, who was at the same time a professor of medicine, was asked for the reason that led to January 25 Revolution, he stated that “It was the accumulation. I think it’s the human integrity and the human rights, more than anything else…I think it was humiliation. I call it chronic anger, a chronic state of anger.” He continues, “In medicine, the chronic situation, you get adapted to the pain until it becomes acute. The acute exacerbation made the chronic anger emerge. Part of it was, in my opinion, the way

the state was dealing with the people, humiliating them in everyday activities.”

If the situation elevates the dissatisfaction and anger to a certain point such as hopelessness and to the level where people believe that there is nothing more left to lose, this is the stage where people get adapted and suffer acute pain and will have no more fear, such as the case of the man in China who challenged a tank in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and revolted against the ultimate power.

**The Ignition of ‘Diyarbakir March 2006’ Riot**

Moreover, since the second half of the twentieth century, the world has witnessed tremendous changes because of the evolution and revolution of globalization. Globalization, through its features; high-speed transportation, highly developed communication technologies, and rocketing computer technology has urged every existing reality to be reevaluated whether the outcome is good or bad. In this respect, even poor people living in the suburbs and villages of Diyarbakir have been benefiting from those developments. Satellite dishes are mushrooming from the top of houses. Through satellite dishes people of this region are easily connected to the world. Even people who live in remote places where there is no electricity access were using car batteries to watch TV. Rosenanu describes this situation as ‘distant proximate’. It is a significant example of how globalization has spread worldwide, urged human beings creativity, and changed the far off places to become close. However, while the features of

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globalization are mostly serving for good purposes on the one hand, on the other hand they are also open to be misused at the same time.  

Having said that, on 24 March 2006 a battle between the Turkish army and the PKK terrorist group members that existed in the mountainous region of Diyarbakir and this resulted in the deaths of 14 PKK members. Four of them were Diyarbakir born. One day later the Brussels-based and PKK-sponsored ROJ-TV broadcasted a message that provoked people living in that region by saying 'they wanted people to show solidarity with the people in Diyarbakir, and to close their shops, participate in the funeral, and to protest the killing of those PKK members’ (Bar Human Rights Report).

While the ROJ TV was provoking people to attend the funeral ceremony of the PKK members, on the other hand, members and sympathizers of the PKK were distributing memos to make people attend the funeral ceremony. With such methods of communication, the organization made sure that no one was left out.

The rumors about the use of chemicals touched people’s emotion. “In the four days between the killing and the funerals, rumors abounded that chemical weapons had been used by the military.” There was no response or explanation condemning this rumor, however “The families of the dead, together with the Imams who washed the bodies in preparation for their burial, reported them to be covered in burns, but with no visible bullet holes.” As a result, “According to the Mayor of Diyarbakir, the suspected use of chemical weapons which the government failed to deny until 29 March 2006 ‘increased the tension in the city. It inflamed people’.”

274 ibid
275 ibid
On the day of the funeral, on March 28, 2006, Governor Ala claimed that “demonstrations were started by a crowd of 2,500 to three thousand individuals, mainly consisting of children.” However, this number was determined by the AKP (the ruling party) to range from 5,000 to 10,000. But the DTP (a legal and pro-PKK party) claimed the number of participants to be 100,000. However, the most shocking point of this mass event was the misuse of the children manipulated by the PKK. Children constitutes 90 percent of the participants.

The Bar Human Rights Report claimed that “whatever the number, it is clear that the majority of those in attendance were doing so either as a show of solidarity with the families of these four men from Diyarbakir and/or in response to a PKK-coordinated effort to generally protest the killings.”

Following the funeral ceremony, young demonstrators walked approximately 500 meters toward the center of the city holding banners—they were protesting against the state and the government—by carrying posters of the PKK leader and flags of the PKK and so-called Kurdistan. After 500 meters, the group starts to use stones, sticks, and Molotov Cocktails against the police force that wanted to stop them and stoned open shops. The riots continued for four days and ended on the night of March 31, 2006.

On Friday March 29, the Prime Minister made a television statement stating that “all necessary action would be taken to quell the protests, irrespective of whether women or children were involved. If you cry tomorrow, it will be in vain. The security forces will intervene against the pawns of terrorism, no matter if they are children or women.

Everybody should realize that.  

Instantly, Special Forces were deployed from Ankara to the City of Diyarbakir.

This revolt was the largest since the funeral ceremony of Aydin in 1991. Shops were closed during that period. Those that were opened were burned, stoned and looted. Houses of police officers and army personnel were attacked and in response the law enforcement escalated the use of power. This incident also increased ethnic tension between Kurds and Turks.

In sum, according to the Governorship of Diyarbakir:

- Ten individuals were killed (one of the was eight years old)
- 508 civilians (272) and law enrolment officers (236) were wounded,
- 703 were taken to custody,
- Over 640,000 YTL (more than ½ million US Dollar) was paid for 627 assaults made by rioters by the government for property damage.

The Kurdish Opening

On October 09, 2009, the Interior Minister Besir Atalay met with representatives of civil society organizations in Diyarbakir for a breakfast meeting in order to initiate the government's "Kurdish Opening". This title later on will change into "Democratic Opening" and then into the “Solution Process” that aimed “to stop Turkey's Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) violence and eradicate the underlying problems of local Kurds in

Ibid
these countries to make it easier to return to normal life.” Specifying the government efforts to work with all sections of society for "Kurdish opening" initiative, Interior Minister Besir Atalay said "the responsibility falls to everyone who are rational and reasonable." However, this period of negotiation and talks ceased with the statement of the President after the PKK killed two police officers brutally in their home in July 22, 2015. He stated that it is impossible to continue negotiating with people who aim to destroy our national unity and brotherhood on a TV channel on July 28, 2015.

The positive reflection of the initiation of the Kurdish Opening was observed clearly on the streets of the city of Diyarbakir in 2009 in terms of the number of organized mass events, and the use of violence and arrests. In the following year, in 2010 the same enthusiasm and policy was continued by the government in order to meet on the same grounds and to find a solution to the Kurdish Problem and bridge a link between the East and West.

This intention and enthusiasm could easily be observed in the city of Diyarbakir and other neighboring cities where the Kurdish population is high. However, this development was exploited by the terrorist organization the PKK to take advantage of this development in terms of stocking explosives and firearms, legitimizing its existence,

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and representing itself as the leading organization that represents not the terrorist organization but but the whole of the Kurdish population.

Along with the convenient environment, the BDP was able to influence and empower social mass movements, organizations, and neutral Kurds in the City of Diyarbakir and neighboring cities. This policy, the Kurdish Opening, actually generated a safe environment, that the regular people in this region were longing for more than thirty years.

As a result, this safe environment instigated a high level of participation in by social mass organizations, and events and activities in Eastern part of Turkey in 2009. Neither the Governorship nor the Ministry of Interior prohibited any social mass events in 2009 and 2010. Therefore, the average participants in social mass events in 2009 were 867 and in 2010 this number was 719.

**Tahrir Square and Tent Initiatives in Diyarbakir Province**

Saygi Ozturk, states that the former head of Intelligence Department alleged that Ocalan, the leader of the terrorist organization the PKK, gave orders to start the revolutionary war of the Kurdish People, and to establish defensive forces to defend Kurdish People against the State’s institutions, and set.282 Altan Tan, the then BDP member and later MP, to propound the same argument. 283

282 https://derinstrateji.wordpress.com/author/dssteknoloji/page/809/
The success in occupying the Tahrir Square in Egypt, urged the mass movements in East and South-eastern Anatolia especially in Diyarbakir to imitate and apply the same strategy in setting up tents under the name of civil disobedience. The tent organizations were named the “Democratic Solution Tents”. The organization learned rapidly and the communication among them was close. Therefore, once a tactic works it will mushroom in every place where they think this is effective. Examples of these tents were not only set up in the eastern part of Turkey but also in metropolis areas such as Izmir, Istanbul, and Antalya.

Most of the main movements in the region were organized or at least supported by the political party, the BDP, now known as the HDP, which has a link to the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. The initiative of setting tents in cities’ that were known to be popular places was another action imitated and tested with the support of the BDP.

At the beginning, organizations started by setting up tents in neighbourhoods. When the initiative found ground and worked towards gathering people, then Dagkapi Square as ordered by Ocalan became the main target of the organization. He ordered his followers to occupy and change Dagkapi Square into Tahrir Square. This order evolved into action on April 08, 2011. Yet, with very appropriate and cautious police countermeasures of interventions, such a massive pressure organized by the BDP and supported by affiliated participants was overcome by the Diyarbakir Police Department.

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It should be considered that social mass movements are always on a search to discover effective mass activities. As with the ‘Tent Instalment’ the initiatives the organization wanted to apply involved a new strategy to counter police barricades. Construction vehicles, diggers and bulldozers were collected and a plan was put in action by the municipalities of Diyarbakir to break the police barricade and march to the prison in order to support continuing hunger strikes in prisons. Because of this effective police intervention none of the construction vehicles were able to move from their locations. However, another initiative started in Cizre, a town of Sirnak City, where, in order to prevent police forces from entering their neighbourhood, trenches were dug. This trench strategy started after the PKK’s youth association YPG-H had declared self-governance in four neighbourhoods in October 6-7, 2014.285

After this initiative was tested and improved, the same tactic was dispersed to towns and cities. One of these places was the district of Sur, which is known as the centre of Diyarbakir. In this respect, trenches were dug in the neighbourhood of Sur right after the Kobani Protests October 07, 2014, which shows the speed and hierarchy of the organization.286

As a result, ditches, trenches and barricades mushroomed after the Kobani Protests in every neighbourhood where the PKK and its followers believed they were in power. Trenches and barricades were booby-trapped in order to keep security forces

away. Unfortunately, barricades and tranches remained from July 25, 2015 until the first police special force operation in February 2016. If security forces would have successfully prevented or dissipated the first dug trench instantly, trench digging initiatives may not have become so popular and hard to terminate.

As a result, the BDP members effectively used the ‘Tent Instalment’ initiative inspired from the Arab Uprising strategies. Tent Installment strategy that provided MP nominees from the BDP cost-free offices. These tents were used for social mass activities, as a platform for press releases, and as a place to organize social and political mass events. Moreover, these tents became schools for the PKK members and sympathizers where they could disseminate their ideology. In addition, clashes existed between the security forces and people who tried to install tents and that fact was misused by the organization to show the public they were oppressed by state repression in order to gain public sympathy.

Evaluating the Perception of Experts Dealing With Social Mass Movements in Diyarbakir City

Applied Models of Intervention During Mass Demonstrations

Three worldwide common models of protest policing were the subject of the present inquiry, namely the Escalated Force, the Negotiated Management, and the Deterrent Models. The Escalated Force Model was used in the 1960s in the United States and on the European Continent and refers to the presence and use of hard power, batons,

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and tear gas in order to disperse crowds and maintain public peace and order. The Negotiated Management Model, started in the 1980s, and refers to the use of negotiations in order to understand the aim, target and demands of the masses on an effort to meet on a common ground and conclude the event in peace and safety. The Deterrent Model grounds its ideas on their being the presence of sufficient personnel, equipment, barriers, and adequate distance that is needed to deter activists using violent activities. This model of protest policing has recently been used by some riot police forces in European and developed countries.

The preferred model of protest policing by experts during social mass demonstrations and protests, favoured by 75% of the experts, is the ‘Negotiated Management Model’ and 25% prefer the ‘Deterrent Model’ in situations where there is sufficient personnel and equipment. During the field observation, a study showed that without consulting the head of the anti-riot force the negotiation became inadequate. The number of anti-riot officers, their stance, capacity, and mobilization ability; and presence of adequate equipment empowers the hand of the negotiator, which is then highly considered by the masses. Almost 90% of experts accept this argument. Otherwise, it has been observed that negotiator will not be taken into consideration, not only by the crowd but also by leaders of the organizations.

The Police Philosophy Referred by the Law Dealing with Mass Events

All subjects agreed, 100%, being a member of the ‘State’s Police’ force is more prominent than being a member of the ‘Citizens’ Police’ force according to the law. However, some of the experts stated that committing violent actions by protestors is a
factor that enforces anti-riot officers to prefer being ‘State’s Police’ than being ‘Citizens’ Police’.

**Trust Between Police Supervisors and Leaders of Organizations During Negotiations**

Study results showed 90% of the subjects believed that after reaching an agreement the leaders of the organized masses will keep their words. After asking, if there was mutual trust between the police negotiators and the leaders of the mass movements in Diyarbakir, while 65% of the experts claimed that they did not believe that there is a mutual trust, 35% of them thought that there was mutual trust between the police negotiators and leaders of the organizations, because they know each other and meet almost every week on the streets during mass events. Therefore they have no choice other than to trust each other.

However, during the mass demonstrations it was observed that although the leaders of the crowd, mostly MPs members from BDP, were able to meet with the police supervisor on a common ground, the youth who could be defined as having the potential to commit violent activities were usually the group that started stoning police officers, which usually became the trigger that started the police intervention.

Over a period of three-years of observing the mass events in Diyarbakir, the data indicated that 90% of the interventions started following the commitment of violent actions within the masses, such as stoning, throwing Molotov Cocktails, handmade explosives supported with nails, balls, or marbles. Therefore, some of the experts stated that even if you might trust the leaders of social mass movements, you cannot trust the group that hides behind the power of the crowd.
On the other hand, 70% believed that negotiation works at any level of mass demonstrations, before, during and after. But, 30% did not agree with the idea that negotiation works at any level of mass demonstrations.

**The Role of Intelligence in Social Mass Demonstrations**

Information is a fundamental form of power for the law enforcement members before and during mass demonstrations. Otherwise law enforcement personnel feel like they are confronting unknown rivals in unknown places. In this respect, 100% of the experts believed in the importance of intelligence and information gathering. If the police can estimate the numbers of the crowd, the aims and target of the organization, and the existence of violent groups and their materials, such as Molotov cocktails, hand made IED, fireworks, or fire arms, the law enforcement personnel will be able to deploy a sufficient number of anti-riot force officers and the needed equipment in terms of armed vehicles and water cannons. Moreover, the law enforcement personnel will have time to evaluate the information and provide a safer and more appropriate strategy that can be used to minimize the threat and also to control the tension of the officers, which will help to deal with the masses in a safer and more peaceful manner in efforts to maintain public peace and order.

Handling what is known is easier, safer and better than dealing with the unknown. This is what the intelligence units are supposed to do. The experts who participated in this study were pleased with the information the intelligence service provided before and during the social mass demonstrations and protests in Diyarbakir city.
The Impact of the Presence of the Anti-Riot Force

The presence of the plain officers or especially civilian officers does not heighten the tensions of the angry masses as much as when they see the anti-riot forces. Because the ordinary force that can threaten, restrict, seize and prevent the mobility of the violent group is the anti-riot force, people in this region have the ability to throw stones a far distance with a good aim and power. A stone can become a very powerful weapon in the hand of a talented person. Once protestors start throwing stones or Molotov cocktails or hand made explosives, officers other than the anti-riot officers will look immediately for a place to hide or escape from the incoming threat. The main forces that can affectively respond to such violent groups are the anti-riot officers because of their equipment and capability to organize and intervene as effectively as possible in social mass uprisings.

Therefore the number of available anti-riot officers is important during mass demonstrations. If the number is low the crowd can think that they can easily surpass the police barricade and even give them a lesson. However, if the number is proportional with the numbers of the crowd, and people who have the potentially to commit violent actions, this will usually waive such an action. In this respect, although 100% of the experts thought that the presence of the anti-riot force would trigger emotional mass demonstrations, the group that is apt to commit violent actions, at the same time, 100% of them do not believe that without deploying anti-riot officers, in Diyarbakir a group consisting of 1,000 demonstrators would not gather and rally in peace.

One of the subjects explained that reactions in this region are fast and spread widely. Even a fight on the street between two people can easily turn into a clan fight.
The Need of Tear Gas and Water Cannons

Tear gas might be forbidden in many western countries. However, in Turkey, according to the law, tear gas is considered as one of the stages of implying the escalation of power. In order to maintain public peace and safety law enforcement is allowed and even ordered to use the stages of use of power. First of all, man craft, then handcuff, baton, tear gas, water cannon, and lastly fire arms are stages that should be followed by the security forces to maintain public peace and order.

When asked about the need of the tear gas in mass unrests, 100% of the experts stated that the existence of water cannon and tear gas is essential in mass events. Before using tear gas and water cannon, 100% of the experts indicated that they considered the elderly, women, and children. Ones the stoning starts or Molotov cocktails are thrown at the police, water cannons can be used first to give a signal, and can target an empty site whether this is the front of the crowd or an empty place, or to warn the crowd to disperse. This action gives time to the elderly, women and children to separate from the violent group. Then, tear gas and water cannons can intervene to disperse the violent groups. This was the tactic observed between 2011 and 2013 in mass events in Diyarbakir.

When the survey asked the experts what the most determining factor that can change the course of protest and intervention was, 55% pointed to the police leader who is responsible for maintaining public peace and security during mass events; 35% said it was the leader of the organization; and 10% pointed out other authorities. Subjects who pointed out the police leader as the most determining factor that can change the course of the protest policing believed police leaders on the scene are those who can order the officers to either start the intervention or to wait. In order to implement an adequate task,
the deployed police leader in mass events should be a talented and experienced one. Otherwise, a false order at a wrong time may cause heavy injuries or even causalities that may threaten the chair of the Police Commissioner and even the Governor who governs the city.

A Task without Intervention

The study also investigated if officers in Diyarbakır intervened in many social mass unrests during their four-year period of compulsory service in Eastern part of Turkey were happy when having to intervene in mass protests and disperse people. Because, the media usually blames the police for using an unbalanced source of power and incommensurable use of force, those experts were asked whether a task that ends without police intervention made them happy or not? 100% said, yes. Thus, tear gassing the masses, hydro blasting people with water cannons, and chasing activist is not a task that police supervisors are happy with.

The Impact of the Media in Provoking Masses

100% of the experts believed that the media has an impact in provoking social mass movements and people. The call made by Roj TV in March 2006, started a social unrest in Diyarbakır after the army killed 14 PKK members. Four of them were buried in Diyarbakır. According to the provocation of the Roj TV, shops were closed and thousands of demonstrators participated in the funeral ceremony. This unrest became the largest demonstration after the funeral ceremony of Vedat Aydin in Diyarbakır City in 1991.
After the funeral ceremony, a group of youth started to mobilize around the city center, clash with the police and destroy shops that were open. This social unrest continued for four days and resulted in the deaths of ten people.

The Impact of the Statements Made by the Government in Mediating or Escalating the Tensions of Mass Demonstrations

During mass demonstrations the leader of the organization aims to make their voice heard by the highest authority. Although they talk to the supervisor of the law enforcement agency or negotiator, they actually target camcorders that shoot the negotiations and the events. This tactic on the one hand helps to make their voice heard by the public and the highest authority of the state. On the other hand, it facilitates a cost-free advertisement of their organization.

However, 90% of the subjects believed that the statements and press releases from the highest authority of the state or city have an impact on escalating or mitigating the tensions of the social mass movements. 10% of them did not agree with this statement.

Factors that Causes Repressive Police Interventions

Lack of resources (personnel, equipment, tear gas and vehicles), and experience was seen as the main factors that cause repressive police interventions. Another reason that causes police repressive intervention is is the existence of violent activities (the use of simple handmade explosives, stoning, and fireworks) exhibited by violent groups within masses. The law gives the security forces permission for this and can also order groups to defuse their actions and arrest individuals who endangers the public, assaults
law enforcement officers, and private and governmental buildings. The law even allows officers to shoot a criminal who uses Molotov cocktails and handmade explosives. Even so, none of the activists who used Molotov cocktails and handmade explosives were shot in Diyarbakir City according to police data.

In terms of results, 90% of the interviewed subjects claimed that the degree of violent actions introduced by the Rioters is the stimulus that adjusts the degree of police repression. 10% of them thought that repressive police intervention arose due to some officers’ intolerance for the social mass movements that occurred in Diyarbakir City.

In addition, one of the subjects claimed that 80% of the mass events in Diyarbakir City was linked, in one or the other way, to the terrorist organization, the PKK. Therefore, police were seen by those social mass organizations as an organization that represents the state. Thus, hatred of the state turned to hatred of the police. In this respect, the police were stoned, Molotov cocktails were used and they were exposed to improvised explosive devices (IED). Such cruel actions cause officers to feel unsafe and threatened, which in response triggered intolerant interventions by some officers.

Fear, anxiety and sometimes hopelessness can increase tension and stress and that situation can generate a tendency towards the police use of repressive behaviors. However, it is clear that having the right equipment (non-combustible uniform, bulletproof vest and helmet) provides confidence and causes less fear.

Moreover, it is obvious that insufficiency and suffering urges institutions to find new solutions. After terrorist groups within the masses started using Simple Hand-made Explosives and sometimes firearms the Anti-Riot Unit of Diyarbakir founded the ZMT (Armored Intervention Team). Team members of this office took first aid, small
firearms, rifle, personal protection, and tactical courses to be eligible to intervene in risky places where the anti-riot officers on foot should not go. The ZMT team was found to be 100% effective in such cases and places where the power blackout existed. Two armored vehicles of the ZMT teams and one TOMA (water cannon) was seen as the most affect way to intervene in the violent mass events in which violent groups used Molotov cocktails and hand made explosives.

In addition, some of the subjects claimed that without consulting the thoughts of the head of the anti-riot force, the negotiation became deficient, because the anti-riot force constitute the center of power in the negotiation process, when the masses have the potential to commit violent actions. On the other hand, sufficient personnel, adequate equipment and vehicles were the sources of patience, and tolerance and the Deterrent Model of protest policing, which is the most secure and effective model of protest policing was used.

The Outcome of Reinforcing Police Officer from Other Cities

In large social mass demonstrations the number of officers from the local police organization may not be sufficient for the task. In such cases, this need can be met by other police organizations. With the approval of the Ministry of Interior, officers can be deployed from one city to the other. However, there is a threat that needs to be taken in consideration. In order to investigate this issue, the question forwarded during the interview was: Do you see reinforcement from other cities useful compared with the personnel from your city? The response of 100% of the subjects was “no”. Although they are seen as supportive forces, local police do not deploy them in critical points or in
the center of the intervention; rather they prefer to protect governmental and critical premises independently.

The Importance of Communication Systems Used to Inform and Mobilize Their Supporters

100% of the subjects believed that the PKK members and sympathisers have a tight communication network. Social media is used affectively by the youth. Where there are problems with IT, people are informed by assigned members chosen by the organization who can then carry out face-to-face communications, which are sometimes more effective than other communication instruments. Another effective communication method used for gathering people for mass events is the sound system built into the election buses of the BDP. Those vehicles were effective in informing people who were not using social media and had no other way to receive information. The organization tries hard not to miss any one who may support them.

The Impact of Prohibiting Mass Events

95% of the subjects believed that “prohibiting mass events” has an impact on demonstrators in committing violent actions. 5% of the respondents claimed prohibiting social mass events does not have any impact on demonstrators in committing violent actions. However, in order to lower the risk of an uprising, the authorities should be able to convince the local people via TV channels, social media and sound systems. On the other hand the authority that decides to prohibit any social mass events should have an acceptable and convincing reason for justifying the prohibition. Otherwise in any emotional mass demonstration the PKK or an affiliated organization can easily misuse
people’s emotion and urge them to come into the streets and disobey the prohibition, which can cause clashes with the security forces.

This strategy was implemented by the Governor who founded the reason for prohibiting a mass event on the acceptable ground that the BDP wanted to organize in the city centre of Diyarbakir City. The reason for the prohibition was announced via the media, and sound vehicles in the Turkish language and for the first time in Kurdish by police vehicles. With the participation from other cities and outer towns and villages the organization was able to gather only about 8,500 protestors. 87 protestors were arrested and 27 officers were wounded in this uprising.

Although, people were invited to participate in this uprising, by using the right communication tools and strategies along with successful and tactical protest policing, the people of Diyarbakir were convinced and most importantly none of the protestors and officers were killed, which is an important outcome in such harsh clashes between masses and anti-riot officers.

Clashes with the security forces are the most desired result that the terrorist organizations longs for. Thus, any arrest will help them to recruit new members and train them in prison, because prisoners are mostly kept in large rooms rather than single cells in Turkey. Moreover, any casualty is used for propaganda purposes. When a dead terrorist arrives to the city, BDP members and some other NGO’s close to the PKK, always want to exhibit the funeral in the main streets of the city instead of directly delivering the body to the funeral home or morgue.
The Impact of Capturing and Detaining Demonstrators

The study examined if capturing, interment and detention have any impacts on demonstrators to force them to avoid committing violent actions. 100% of the subjects claimed that capturing, detaining, or arresting has an influence in promoting avoidance and in terminating violent social mass activities. Thus, no one is eager to be captured and sent to jail. Life is sweet.

Moreover, one of the subjects claimed the impact of capturing people who organized, supported, and mobilized the masses in Diyarbakir was the KCK, which is a branch of the PKK that also organizes events in the urban areas. After the KCK/TM members were captured, the structure fell far behind in organizing the mass events and protests against the government and the state. This lack of support continued only until the aftermath of Uludere on December 28, 2011, in which 35 people were killed by an airstrike close to the border. 288

The Role of Emotion on Violent Activities

100% of the subjects believed that emotional events have the potential to provoke social movements. Media, the PKK or political organizations can easily misuse emotional incidents. For instance, in the case of a PKK member who was killed, the funeral ceremony is announced via media, handouts, and vehicles that have a sound system to inform people that are not familiar with social media are used. By implementing the right

policy and proper security strategies the organization was not able to collect 1,000 individuals compared with prior mass organization that could easily collect 5,000 individuals. However, after the Uludere aftermath, the PKK, NGOs, and BDP found a handle to grab and used this emotional scene to justify mass protests against the state and government. Therefore, authorities should explain such incidents clearly to convince local people about such circumstances, and law enforcement should be advised to secure critical locations and observe and control mass events at an appropriate distance, if the events are not prohibited.

The Influence of the Arab Spring on the Attempted Kurdish Uprising

After the success in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya the PKK and BDP attempted to imitate such an uprising in the Eastern cities of Anatolia where they were most effective. Tent initiatives were the most preferred method. Although 90% of the subjects claimed that they have observed attempts of the Kurdish Uprising to be similar to those in Egypt, the dynamics of the social mass in both countries differ from each other in terms of democracy, socio-economic indicators, social and human rights. There might be a potential to riot, but there is no reasonable justification for actually carrying this out. Yet, 10% of respondents states that they do not believe in such a possibility.

The Possible Escalation of Nationalist Thinking Among The Youth

It was observed that 95% of the experts surveyed claimed that there has been a dramatic increase in nationalist thinking among youth in this part of Turkey. One of the subjects claimed that nationalist thinking or having a nationalist ideology is one of the
most effective factors influencing recruitment for the PKK. Another stated that you can see rarely a reflection of nationalist thinking and hatred among senior and middle-aged people in this region. But I cannot say that it is the same for the youth in this region. There is a sharp increase in nationalist thinking among the youth.

One of the subjects claimed that in order to overcome such nationalist hatred, the government and governmental institutions should immediately develop projects to convince this part of the society to show that all of us are in the same boat. If the boat sinks all of us will drown with that boat. And so, there is only one homeland for all of us. For instance, by programing a twinning project, middle or high school students could be sent for a short visit elsewhere to help them better understand the environment, culture and concerns, and happiness of others. Such activities will help the youth to understand that we have a lot in common and we are a part of a whole. This is expected to serve towards developing our solidarity and unification.

The Possibility of an Ethnic Riot in Diyarbakir Province

90% of the experts surveyed argued that it is impossible to exist in the context of an uprising like that in Egypt in Diyarbakir Province. However, 10% believe in such a possibility in Diyarbakir Province. 95% of the experts argued that the Arab Uprising and the attempted Kurdish Uprising differ in terms of ethnicity, discrimination issues, civil rights and economic inequality situations. One of the subjects states that although the PKK wanted to take advantage of the Arab Uprising trend, it was not possible to get the support of the whole community. Some people I talked before said that in 1980’s we
couldn’t even get close to the police. But now, we talk with the police like friends (in 2012).

**Correlation Between Democratization and the Frequency and Quantity of Demonstrations**

The study subjects wondered if there is a positive impact of democratization relative to the frequency and quantity of peaceful demonstrations. The responses of the experts were 50% yes and 50% no. While some of them claimed that if people get used to voicing their grievances and demands in democratic ways they would drift from committing violent actions, some others argued that the more freedom the more credibility the terrorist organization would gain. Since the PKK is exploiting the goodwill of the public, pro-Kurdish acquisitions will be credited to the PKK instead of the government or state. The PKK dictates to the local people that if it wasn’t for the PKK none of the Kurds would be able even to speak in their mother tongue. Therefore, 95% of the subjects believe that the social mass movements that exist in Diyarbakir City are politics centered, not social or other purpose oriented.

**The Existence of Direct or Inversely Proportional Relationship Between Terrorist Activities and Mass Events**

However, when the experts were asked if there is any direct or inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and mass events, 95% claimed that there is an inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and mass events in Diyarbakir City. One of the subjects stated, the determining factor seems to be the seasons. In wintertime terrorists hide in the mountains until the layers of snow disappear
and spring arrives. During that time social mass movements in the city were more active than any terrorists. However, with the beginning of the spring the situation became reversed.

However, 5% of the respondents thought there is no such relationship and stated that although this hypothesis works in democratic countries or democratic societies it does not work here, because mass events here are 90% PKK (terrorism) related and the sympathizers simply follow its order. He continued by stating that the more crowded the mass protest is, the more powerful they feel. This power urges them to stone or use Molotov cocktail against the police, governmental institutions and shopkeepers who don't obey and don't pay extortion money to the PKK.

On the other hand, in analyzing police data of social mass events in 2009 until 2013 one can see a gradual rise in social mass events. At the same time, a parallel escalation in terrorist activities within the urban areas, exclusive from mass events, is seen through police data. Hanging illegal posters on bridges and buildings, explosions, and using Molotov Cocktails and handmade explosives on governmental institutions and shops that are defined as the enemy as are those who deny paying extortion money to the PKK terrorist organization. All these actions are defined as terrorist activities according to the law. In this context, 65 terrorist activities were recorded in 2009, 120 in 2010, 367 in 2011, and 363 in 2012. A parallel growth is seen in the numbers participating in social mass events that took place in the City of Diyarbakir.

However, these numbers may change in the rural areas where the PKK members can be identified by their clothing and automatic machineguns. Ambushes, road bombings, and suicide bombings may have a different inclination in the studied years,
which may substantiate the result found in the interviews with experts of social mass movements.

Consequently, there is a direct proportional relationship between social mass events and terrorist activities in the urban areas, but an inversely proportional relationship between social mass movements and terrorist activities in the countryside. On the other hand, some experts claim that this relationship exists just because of guidance of the PKK terrorist organization. This is because the organization does not want to leave any opportunity gap in its activities, in order to keep and increase recruitments; and to demonstrate its existence; in order to stay active in the political arena.

The Existence of Risk Assessment Strategies Against any Mass Uprising

Although 80% of the subjects believe that there are risk assessment practices to prevent any possible ethnic riot, 85% of the experts thought that there was supposed to be an emergency response plan against any uprising-like the social mass events. But, 95% of the subjects did not think that law enforcement agencies were aware of what to do in case of any ethnic riot and did not believe that those agencies would be able to act conjointly. Moreover, 95% of the subjects complained that no scenario, drill or trainings were implemented to prepare all governmental institutions to respond to any mass uprising in the Diyarbakir province. It was shown that 70% of the subjects stated that at least the team commander should be aware of any emergency plan, while 20% of them claimed that at least the deputy chief should be aware of the emergency plan and 10% stated that all officers should be informed about the emergency plans in order to respond rapidly and effectively to maintain public peace and order in this region.
**Coordination among Governmental Institutions In case of any Riot**

The majority of the subjects, 95%, did not believe that in the case of an uprising, without the support of the majority of the residents in Diyarbakir City, the institutions would not be able to coordinate and act in harmony and peacefully control the crowd such as in any instantaneous uprising, because no drills or scenarios were carried out together ahead of time. Such drills and scenarios are helpful in detecting any missing points and shortages and enabling officers to respond effectively with care and safety. Otherwise, without experience, drills, sufficient personnel and equipment and intelligence security forces would have to respond to abrupt social mass unrest with unbalanced repression that that may cause serious injuries and even deaths. That is, unprepared security forces will have to fill the gap generated by the absence of intelligence, experience, training, and sufficiency in order to control disorder. Only 5% of respondents believed that those institutions might respond in unison.

**The Disorder in Syria its Role On Terrorist Activities in Diyarbakir**

In order to better understand whether an internally conflicted country has any negative impact in terms of terrorism and crime on its neighbouring countries or not, 100% of experts pointed out that the disorder in Syria has resulted in having an important impact on the escalation of terrorist activities in the South-Eastern part of Turkey in terms of trafficking firearms, explosives, and attracting PKK members.
Recommendations Made By Experts In Social Mass Events

- The anti-riot unit should have at least 1500 personnel for a city that has a population of 1.5 million.

- We should be ready first mentally and then physically for the worst case, which is an ethnic riot in this region.

- Research on training programs is needed in order to serve maintaining public order and peace, because insufficient or false interventions will provoke people in this fragile location.

- The personnel deployed in such locations should be trained and well motivated. If they do not sacrifice their time, effort, and energy it might be impossible to change the past negative impressions of the citizens living in this region. Law enforcement is seen as an extension of the state’s power. Therefore, the police should be more cautious and tolerant in order to change the perception of third parties from an anti-state perception to a pro-state perception. The opposite will be in favor of the PKK and related organizations.

- Officers deployed here are not happy. Some extra advantages should be provided to civil servants assigned to this part of Turkey in order to motivate them.

- The state should open its heart to the public and civil servants should be honest and tolerant.

- Prejudice is a problem that not only officers in the Anti-riot Unit should overcome but also other civil servants as well.

- Education and unemployment are the most important problems of this region that needs to be solved immediately.
• The education system here is very problematic and students are politicized.

• Standardization in legislation is needed and every gap should be filled because there are some uncertainties that cause problems in social mass events.

• The population in Diyarbakir is about 1.5 million. I don't think that BDP represents the Kurds. If they would have represented the Kurds adequately even 5,000 anti-riot officers would not be able to maintain public order and safety in this city. We maintain here public order with 600 anti-riot officers which means the terrorist organization does not represent Kurds.

• The state should gain the trust and confidence of the public.

• Unemployment is a tremendous problem here.

• Almost fifty percent of the teachers here are politicized. In order to safeguard the children from politics and misguidance, a rotation system like in police organization is needed for the Education Ministry as well.

• We need a constant and stable system.

• The reflection of wealthy people and needy desperate people differs, people who have much to lose and people who have nothing to lose.

• The side that is able to get public’s support will be the winner of the day. My aim is to obtain the regard and support of the public. Otherwise, by using inappropriate interventions we will support violent mass organizations indirectly, in terms of recruitment and support.

Limitations
The study has some limitations in this part of the research. Although, assured of anonymous consent forms and no subjects' IDs were requested, subjects may still have had concerns about implemented protest policing strategies designed by their supervisors.

The second limitation was the limitation of the outcome of the study that may be valid only in this region of Turkey. A monopoly in protest policing nationally may not be possible and needs to be studied.

Finally, the duration of the assignment and the experience at the Anti-Riot Unit in the City of Diyarbakir may have impacted the responses of the subjects. Because being exposed to violent mass protests or not caused a disparity in responses of officers as analyzed in chapter seven.

**Strengths**

First of all, the study is unique in Turkey and offers decision makers and security forces ideas on how to handle social mass protests in order to prevent social mass demonstrations turning into a social mass uprising nationally.

Secondly, the subjects who were interviewed had the experience of deployment in more than 1,000 social mass events organized in the City of Diyarbakir.

Finally, the primary researcher had experience in the social mass demonstrations and managed close to 1,000 officers for three years in Turkey’s most conflicted province in terms of the density and quantity of social mass demonstrations. In addition to his academic background, field experience provides him a broader viewpoint and analytic skill in the realm of policing protests.

**Summary**
Diyarbakır has always been strategic to many civilizations. With its high population, critical location, rich soil, and favorable climate conditions Diyarbakır is still and will be of importance to different interest groups. Any social mass movement that wants to organize an event in the Southeastern part of Turkey would prefer Diyarbakır city.

In this context, it is impossible to hear that a weekend has passed without any social mass event organized by the BDP or BDP supporting NGOs. Therefore, massive mass demonstrations in Diyarbakır are considered as precarious and should be dealt with cautiously by the authorities and especially by the security forces.

However, the dense Kurdish population and undesired past implementations caused law enforcement organizations to act wisely and with due precaution. Therefore, the most threatening issue in this region is the possibility of an ethnic riot. However, the study has shown that even though there is a potential for such an ethnic riot, prudent and beneficial state policies, attentive and just military and police interventions in social mass events, and economic support are the key instruments for protecting this region from such a social mass disorder.
CHAPTER 6: THE ASSESSMENT OF POLICE DATA ABOUT SOCIAL MASS MOVEMENTS IN THE CITY OF DIYARBAKIR

Introduction

In order to base this study on an unbiased and sustainable ground, collectively; first of all, a qualitative research design was used in the previous chapter to assess the perceptions of the police supervisors leading officers during social mass events in order to comprehend the interaction between the law enforcement agencies and demonstrators in Diyarbakir Province; secondly, a quantitative research design is used in this chapter to evaluate police data obtained from the Diyarbakir Police Department in order to calculate the relationship among violent mass activities, protest policing methods and styles, and external factors that impact the course of social mass demonstrations and finally, in the next chapter another quantitative research design is used in order to evaluate the perception of anti-riot officers on the field and the potential, characteristics and risk of social mass events in the City of Diyarbakir.

In order to conduct this research, according to the law, the Governor of the City is the authority that is able to allow for any interviews and surveys to be conducted and any data procurement. Therefore, a letter that is signed by the Head of the Diyarbakir Police Department and approved by the Governor of Diyarbakir Province was provided to allow us to access police data, conduct interviews with police supervisors and survey plain officers of the Anti-Riot Unit.

In this part of the study, a secondary data analysis is analyzed. The collected police data contains 2136 various cases that occurred between the year of 2009 and the first half of 2013 as provided by the Police Department of Diyarbakır. These cases were organized
according to their titles, the date of cases, the number of participants, permitted or prohibited gatherings, press releases, funeral ceremonies, sit-ins, participation of elected political figures, tent installments and any existence of police intervention.

It is expected this chapter would provide a valuable explanation as to the factors that increase participation in social mass events, the dynamics that generate an environment for troublemakers to commit violent activities, the impact of elected individuals on the increase of participation in mass events and violent activities, and tent installment initiatives inspired from the Egyptian Revolution, and the reasons urging security forces to escalate the use of force.

In addition, this chapter also evaluates correlations between mass movements and terrorist activities; between democratic protest policing and violent mass events; and violent mass events and repressive police interventions.

All of these indications are expected to assist decision makers and security forces in terms of maintaining public peace and order in a fragile region of Turkey and in similar locations across the globe.

**Methodology**

With the approval of the Governorship the research aimed to scrutinize the data of social mass events between 2009 and the second half of 2013 in order to evaluate the impact of the Arab Uprising upon the social mass events and protest policing policies in the City of Diyarbakir. A softer and tolerant attitude was observed in 2009 and 2010 in terms of policing protests and peaceful demonstrations due to the Democratic Initiative Process and later named as Kurdish Opening, however, in 2011 a shift to violent mass protests in response to repressive protest policing became dominant; after the killings of
twelve soldiers by the terrorist organization PKK, 2012 was declared by the terrorist organization as the “Final Year” meaning “the matter of life or death”; and due to talks and the intention of these to end the conflict, 2013 became another peaceful year.

Likewise, each topic in this section is treated and calculated separately from the raw data provided by the Diyarbakir Police Department. For instance, to evaluate the impact of the elected political figures on social mass events, the study compares the data of social mass events that elected individuals participated in or did not participate in. This comparison shows us how effective they were in increasing the participation of the society.

It was expected that the data analysis procedure would bring to light the factors that trigger demonstrators to commit violent actions during mass events; find a correlation between demonstrations and terrorist activities, if any; evaluate the impact of political figures on urging troublemakers to commit violent activities; determine the influence of prohibiting mass events on violent protests; calculate the influence of emotionality of the event on the number of participants and existence of violent activities; analyze the inspiration of the Arab Uprising upon the attempted Kurdish Uprising; gauge the reason for the escalating the use of force by the law enforcement agencies; and estimate the deployment of the ideal proportion of Anti-Riot Officers compared with the estimated number of activists in order to maintain public peace and security.

Considerable Social Mass Events Existed In the City of Diyarbakir
The Influential Social Mass Movements Existed in 2009 and 2010 in the City of Diyarbakir

The Kurdish Opening Initiative, which was announced by the Interior Minister Besir Atalay on October 09, 2009, gave hope to people living in the East and South Eastern part of Turkey. Governmental institutions became more tolerant and accountable compared with the law enforcement deployed in 1980’s and 1990’s. However, this environment consolidated the existence of the political party DTP (Democratic Public Party), which was later changed to BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) and before the 2015 election to HDP (Public’s Democratic Party) with a broader targeted society from many ethnic groups, sects, and ideologies in terms of gaining voters from every part of the society.

Later on this name would change from the Kurdish Opening to the "Democratic Opening" and then to the “Solution Process” that aimed “to stop Turkey's Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) violence and eradicate the underlying problems of local Kurds in these countries to make it easier to return to normal life.”

In terms of results, no prohibited social mass events were recorded in 2009 and in 2010, in the city if Diyarbakir, which in total reaches about 950 events (sit-ins, press

289

releases, funeral, demonstrations, and rally). Interestingly, parallel to the rise in social mass activities, a rise of terrorist activities other than social mass events was seen while analyzing the police data.

In 2009, the recorded number of social mass events was 424, in 2010, 424, in 2011, 486 and in 2012, 539. On the other hand, a rise in activities defined by the law as “terrorist activities”, such as hanging illegal posters on bridges and buildings, using Molotov Cocktails, explosion, bombing governmental institutions and shops with handmade explosive and armed assaults, was seen as well. In this context, 67 terrorist activities were recorded in 2009, 120 in 2010, 368 in 2011, and 469 in 2012. A twofold increase compared with the earlier year was observed for every following year.

**The KCK Trials**

The first Kurdistan Union of Societies/Turkey Parliament (KCK/TM) operation started on April 14, 2009 after the Supreme Court decided to close the Democratic Society Party (DTP). However, the members of this party complained to the Minister of Interior that the KCK/TM, which is the pillar of PKK and that played an administrative role in this organization, had been preventing the DTP to pursue its politics on a legal ground. The first operation of the KCK/TM members was conducted in April 14, 2009 and ended with the arrest of 51 members.
The second police operation was executed in June 17, 2009 with the arrest of 11 members and the third operation was conducted in September 11, 2009 with the arrest of 10 members of KCK/TM.290

Although between the first and third KCK/TM operations 170 mass events had been organized and none of them were prohibited, only four mass events ended with violent activities by protestors. Data showed 2.35% of the events were violent, while the average violent mass event over a period of 53 months was 5.40%. This means that the operations of the KCK/TM, the administrative pillar of the organization, had an important impact on the dramatic drop in violent mass events in the City of Diyarbakir.

However, when the court procedure started in January 2011 and the campaigns of the election begun, a tight program of awaking its sympathisers started to be employed. The first trail started on January 13, 2011. On that day, the political party BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), the successor of the DTP, organized a meeting in Diyarbakir City. The organization was able to gather about 12,000 people at the city centre. The purpose of this meeting was declared to minimize the repression on the Kurdish language. However, after the meeting, the crowd started walking to the court where the trial of the arrested KCK/TM members was proceeding.

The municipality and the court are next to each other. The angry crowd stopped in front of the Municipality. By the way, the Mayor of Diyarbakir was a member of the BDP. When the crowd tried to break the barriers, the police had formed, hundreds of

Molotov cocktails rained from the municipality building on police officers. Although, the clash between the crowd and police continued for hours, protesters were not allowed to break police barriers and interrupt the trial. The justification that provoked the crowd was announced to be that the detainees were not allowed to defend themselves in their mother tongue, in Kurdish. At the end of the day, 6 protesters were arrested and 4 police officers were wounded.

The pressure of the BDP and social mass movements on the court to allow detainees to defend themselves in Kurdish continued until January 31, 2013. After the court provided translators for the detainees, the clashes on the streets diminished and the challenge continued in the courtrooms.²⁹¹

**The Veto Decision of the High Election Commission**

Another factor that increased the tensions in Diyarbakır City in 2011 was the decision of the YSK (The High Election Commission) when it declared on March 14, 2011 that 12 people were not eligible to be nominated for the election of Members to the Parliament.²⁹² After the objection to this decision was readdressed, the High Election Commission accepted the objection of seven nominees and allowed them to run for MP in April 2011.²⁹³ However, starting from March 14, 2011 until April 21, 2011, in 39 days, 45 mass events were organized in the city of Diyarbakır and 11 of them were violent.

This means that until the second decision of the commission was declared, emotionality triggered violent reactions and raised the average of violent mass events to 24.44% in this period of time while the average for a period of 53 months was 5.40%.

Eventually, in 39 days emotionality caused a rise of 452.59% in violent mass events during the period of prohibited BDP nominees. An estimated number of 140,825 people participated in social mass protests in 39 days and with an average of 3,129.44 participants for each social mass event.

**Parliament Election of Jun 12, 2011**

The election campaigns started at the beginning of the year of 2011. Along with the motivation of the Arab Spring, nominees of the BDP declared to participate in this election as independent nominees by opening campaign offices in every neighbourhood, which automatically required a flow of partisans and mass events. In order to keep the backing of its supporters such organizations always generate reasons and events. One of the experts stated that once the masses lose connection with the organization and get used to a relaxed and friendly environment it will be hard for the organization to bring the masses to the previous level, unless a extraordinary incident happens. The inspiration of the Arab Spring and speed of the election campaigns generated a momentum that caused the participation of a wide population of the public. People participated in mass events in the first half of 2011 and the participation of participants in the second half of the year doubled, moreover, it was higher than the total number of participants of 2009 and 2010.

Setting up tents, imitated from the Egyptian Revolution, was a very supportive strategy in keeping the masses in touch and warm. The members of the BDP used this strategy effectively the waves of the Arab Spring. Events, such as press releases, funeral
ceremonies, demonstrations, or sit-in protests were organized to gather supporters. After the events ended crowds were encouraged by organizations to march until places where tents were installed were available.

As a result, although the BDP was not able to initiate a Kurdish Uprising, it was able to gain a momentum in activating supporters, which in turn succeeded in sending five congressmen to parliament.

The Prominent Incidents that Affected Mass Events in 2011

After 13 soldiers coming almost from every region of Turkey, were killed on July 14, 2011 in Silvan, which is a town of Diyarbakir City, the government started a determined program to fight against the terrorist organization PKK. The army conducted armed operations in the rural area and the police within the border of the urban area.

An effective war on terrorism had been started and was followed by the security forces. Usually, in clashes against security forces, young members of the PKK were pushed to the front lines by their team leaders to combat with soldiers or police officers. Therefore, it was those young people who died in clashes between security forces and terrorists. However, during this period of decisive war on terrorism, regional commanders of the terrorist organization started to die during those armed clashes. The numbers of the PKK members in the rural areas dropped to their lowest numbers than ever before and most importantly, the PKK was no longer effective in recruiting young members. While there was no repression on the activities of social mass movements and could demonstrate and protest without any prohibition, no place was left for armed terrorists. Only two events among 486 events were prohibited in 2011.
Due to application of the correct methods in fighting against terrorism, even legal social movements lost their cogency to call and bring people to gather and protest. However, this situation continued only until the bombing in Uludere on December 28, 2011 that caused the deaths of 35 citizens.

As a consequence of the incidents, existing methods, such as the tent instalment strategy, was followed in response to the political party, and this increased the number of participants to the highest level compared with the years of 2009, 2010, and 2012.

**Hunger Strikes Started on December 12, 2012**

The decisive war against the PKK started after 13 soldiers were killed by the PKK in July 14, 2011 and this continued to have an impact on social mass events in 2012 as well. The BDP and other NGO’s were not effective in mobilizing the masses because of the lack of ability to convince the public of Diyarbakir to warrant their support. The police data supports this reality by showing that during the first half of 2012 the lowest number of participants took part in mass events in the City of Diyarbakir, when the time periods between 2009 and the first half of 2013 are considered.

However, in terms of mobilizing masses in Diyarbakir city and in the region, the BDP and PKK misused the public’s sensibility and started an emotional movement, including hunger strikes in prisons. Some politicians got wind of a rumour that Ocalan was insulated and his living condition had worsened. Along with this justification, members of the organization started a hunger strike on September 12, 2012 in order to improve Ocalan’s conditions in prison. Hunger strikes continued for 67 days until Ocalan ordered PKK members to stop this movement of the hunger strike on December 18, 2012.
The motivation of protests outside the prisons was that “Kurds are dying of hunger in prisons”. This announcement triggered the emotions of the family members of the prisoners and their relatives. With the support of elected MPs and municipality members the protest found a common ground and momentum in the City of Diyarbakir and nearby. During the period of protests 12 violent mass events were recorded in Diyarbakir. Members of the BDP and the Parliament took part in 9 violent mass events out of the 12, which means that elected MPs were involved in 75% of those violent mass events. Instead of mitigating violent actions, a dramatic increase in committing violent actions is recorded during the prison protests in the second half of 2012. In total, 447 prisoners participated in the hunger strikes in prisons.\(^{294}\)

Moreover, in 2012, while the average of participants in each mass event, other than the hunger strike period, was 355.25, during the period of hunger strikes the average rose to 605.32 participants for each mass event.

**Evaluating Existed Social Mass Events from Recorded Police Data**

The recorded police data of four and a half years is also examined in this research. This research scanned 2,163-recorded incidents with a participation of 1,900, 424 individuals in mass events in the City of Diyarbakir, one of the most impacted cities of Turkey in terms of systematized social mass events.

From the beginning of 2009 until June 2013, 424 incidents with 367,765 participants in 2009 (70,000 of Nevruz participants included), 424 incidents with 304,891 participants in 2010 (100,000 of Nevruz participants included), 486 incidents with 442,175 participants in 2011 (95,000 of Nevruz participants included), 539 incidents with 260,538 participants in 2012 (forbidden/prohibited Nevruz 22,000), and 290 incidents with 525,010 participants (Nevruz with 240,000 of participants included) are estimated to have occurred.

In 2009 the average number per event was 867.37, in 2010 per event it was 718.78 participants, in 2011 per event it was 909.82 participants, in 2012 per event it was 483.37 participants, and for the first five months of the year of 2013 the average for each event was 1.401. However, the factor that escalated the average of the events is Nevruz Festivals. In estimated number of participants in Nevruz Festivals in 2009 was 70,000, in 2010 100,000 participants, in 2011 95,000 participants, in 2012 22,000, and in 2013 240,000 participants were recorded according to the police data. The Nevruz celebrations in 2012 were prohibited because they coincided with the Martyrs’ Day of Canakkale, which is respected by the whole population of Turkey, because among the fallen soldiers are martyrs from every city and ethnicity. In excluding the Nevruz Celebration participants from the total, the average number of participants in each event is shown to be 703.93 in 2009, 484.07 in 2010, 715.82 in 2011, 443.37 in 2012 and 572.95 in 2013.

In addition, the number seems to decrease only in 2013 since the monthly distribution of the number of events shows that more events occur in the first half of the year. For example, 69% of all events in a year occur in the first half of a year
Violent Mass Protests in Funeral Ceremonies

The number of participants in funeral ceremonies of PKK members in 2009 was 3,500 and 8 of those ceremonies were violent with no arrest being made. In 2010, violent activities involved in funerals increased to 21 with the participation of 13,060 people with 1 arrest. In 2011, violent funeral ceremonies increased in number to 44 with a participation rate of 135,580 with 42 arrests.

Consequently, year-by-year an increase in participation in violent funeral ceremonies and arrests in those events can be shown.

Mass Rally, Press Releases, and Mass Marches

The study also shows that in terms of frequency, the most preferred type of social event was ‘Press Releases’ in Diyarbakir City over the period of 2009 and 2012. In 2009, the number of recorded press releases was 520 with no arrests; in 2010 the number of press releases decreased to 509 and with no arrest; and in 2011 the number rose to 474 with 50 arrests because of the involvement in violent actions.

However, in terms of examining the number of participants in mass rallies the data shows that 201,400 people participated in 2009; 217,500 people in 2010; and 343,200 people in 2011.

The highest number of press releases was recorded in 2009 when the Kurdish Opening became popular and people were having high expectations. However, in the following years this number decreased gradually. While participation in social mass events in 2010 and 2012 was lower than in 2009, with the support of events such as the inspiration of the Arab Uprising, the period of election campaigns, and tent setting organizations the
number of participants in 2011 increased to the highest number especially compared with the years of 2009, 2010, 2012, and the first half of 2013.

Furthermore, driving factors in 2012 were more emotionally bases, and which could touch people’s sensibility and in turn increase the participation in mass events. The Uludere Aftermath and Hunger Strikes initiated by PKK members in prisons were issues that the BDP and PKK use effectively to gain supporters.

However, the strategy implemented by the BDP and social mass movements differs in 2013 compared with the previous years. For instance, the Nevruz festival was the most crowded festival celebrated by more people than ever before. Although police data imply 240,000 people gathered during this festival, others claimed that this number was about 300,000 and according to the BDP the number was about one million. Moreover, in terms of looking for the reason that increased the number of participants, the study shows that while there were no forbidden mass event in years of 2009, 2010 and the first month of 2013, two mass events were prohibited in 2011 and 15 in 2012. The killing of 13 soldiers by the PKK in 2012 pushed the state authorities to fight against the PKK more effectively and give no tolerance to social mass movements that had a connection with the PKK or their related organizations. Therefore, if an event had the potential to bother the whole society, it was the Governor who was allowed to prohibit such events at the local level, but if many cities were in danger then the Minister of the Interior was allowed to prohibit such events.

The prohibited Nevruz Festival in 2012 was one of those prohibited events. Actually, it was not prohibited but postponed for two days. Despite this, elected MPs, members to BDP, insisted on celebrating the Nevruz Festival on March 18, 2012, which
coexists with Martyrs’ Day. The law enforcement worked hard to implement this prohibition. When clashes between protestors and police escalated to a perilous level, in order to prevent serious clashes, the Governor of Diyarbakir allowed the crowd to go to the field and celebrate the festival. This day was kept in the memories of the local people.

When the Nevruz Festival of 2013 was allowed, interestingly at 10am the festival reached its highest number in terms of participation. Usually, the highest number of participants was reached at noontime in the previous years. However, 2013 was different. Experts interpreted this reflection as a reaction generated from the previous prohibited Nevruz Festival. This was possibly due to the success of emotional management by the organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prohibited Event</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Nonviolent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8 (53.33%)</td>
<td>7 (46.66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-1 The number of Prohibited Social Mass Events

The Quantity of Social Mass Events That Elected BDP Members Participated in Diyarbakir City

The data revealed elected individuals of the BDP participated in 32.54% of mass events organized in 2009; 18.86% of mass events existed in 2010; 23.66% mass events
organized in 2011; 27.27% mass events occurred in 2012; and 18.62% mass events existed in the first five months of 2013.

The Impact Of The Elected Individuals On Mass Demonstrations

Social mass events in Diyarbakir and neighboring cities were highly pro-BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) driven, which is determined as being related to PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The data showed the participation of elected person either had an impact on the number of participants or on the numbers of violent participants committing violence activities.

In 2009, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 343, with the participation of elected members of BDP the average number of participants rose to 1,890.50. The variation was 1547.5 and the impact was a 451.16 percent increase.

In 2010, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 281.92, with the participation of elected members of BDP the average number of participants rose to 2,602. The variation was 2,302.08 and the impact was 822.95 percent.

In 2011, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 419.59, with the participation of elected members of the BDP the average number of participants rose to 2,490. The variation was 2,070.41 and the impact was a 493.43 percent increase.

In 2012, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 289, with the participation of elected members of the BDP the
average number of participants rose to 998.50. The variation was 709.50 and the impact was a 245.50 percent increase.

However, in the first half of 2013, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 841, with the participation of elected members of the BDP the average number of participants rose to 5,838. The variation was 4,997 and the impact was a 594.12 percent increase.

The impact of the elected BDP members in increasing the number of participants in 2009 was 1547.5 (451.16%); in 2010 2,302.08 (822.95%); in 2011 2,070.41 (493.43); in 2011 709.50 (245.50%); and in period of the first five months of 2013 the impact was 4,997 (594.12%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Event</th>
<th>Events Without Elected Politicians</th>
<th>Events With Elected Politicians</th>
<th>Percentage of Events With Elected Politicians Involved</th>
<th>Average Participants of Events Without Elected Politicians</th>
<th>Average Participants of Events With Elected Politicians</th>
<th>Difference Because of Elected Politicians</th>
<th>Effect of Elected Politicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>32.54%</td>
<td>1,890.50</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>1547.5</td>
<td>451.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18.86%</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>281.92</td>
<td>2,320.08</td>
<td>822.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>23.66%</td>
<td>2,49</td>
<td>419.59</td>
<td>2,070.41</td>
<td>493.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
<td>998.5</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>709.5</td>
<td>245.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>54 (5 Months)</td>
<td>18.62%</td>
<td>5,838</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>4,997</td>
<td>594.12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-2 The Impact of the Elected Politicians on Participation in Social Mass Events

**The Correlation Between Elected Individuals and Violent Mass Events**

The study data showed that the elected BDP members had a considerable positive impact on the participation of individuals. However, in terms of the role of the elected
politicians on urging activists to commit violent activities, the study shows that among 12 violent mass events the elected individuals were involved in 6 of them in 2009. In 2010, they participated in 12 violent mass events among 22. In 2011, the number rose to 28 violent activities among 48. In 2012, the number of violet mass events that elected people participated in dropped to 12 among 25 violent mass events. However, in the first five months of 2013, the number of involved violent mass events was 7 among 10 total violent mass events.

In sum, elected BDP members participated in 50% of violated mass events that existed in 2009; in 2010 the rate rose to 54.54%; in 2011 to 58.33%; in 2012 the rate decreased to 48%; and in the first five months period of 2013, the rate increased to 70%.

As a result, instead of mitigating violent activities that occur in social mass events, elected people have an impact because they may urge demonstrators to commit violent activities and they may help to increase the number of participants in social mass events in the city of Diyarbakir.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Violent Mass Events</th>
<th>Violent Events Elected Politicians Participated</th>
<th>Percentage of Violent Mass Events E. Pol. Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>58.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-3 The Impact of the Elected Politicians on Violent Social Mass Events
The Impact of Prohibition on Violent Mass Events

In 2009 and 2010 during the period of talks about the Kurdish Opening, no social mass events were prohibited. In Turkey, the law allows Governors to decide on whether to prohibit mass events in order to keep public peace and security. However, the Minister of Interior is the only authority that can prohibit social mass events in the case of any possibility of widening social unrest for more than one city. In 2011, the Governorship of Diyarbakir prohibited two events. One of them ended in violent activities and the other in peaceful activities. However, in 2012 the number of prohibited mass events rose to 15, while seven of them, 46.66%, ended in peace and eight of them did not. That is, 53.33% of the prohibited social mass occasions turned into violent mass events. In addition, no prohibited mass events were recorded in the first five months of 2013.

In terms of evaluating the impact of prohibiting mass events on violent mass activities, 53.33% of these ended in violence and 46.66% in peace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prohibited Events</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Nonviolent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>8 (53.33%)</td>
<td>7 (46.66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-4 The Correlation Between Prohibited Social Mass Events and Violent Protests

The Ideal Proportion of Anti-Riot Officers Compare With the Crowd

While not applicable to every social mass event, what is certain is that the characteristics of social mass movement differ from city to city or from region to region in
Turkey. For instance, while the characteristics of the social mass movements in Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir and Hakkari, from four regions of Turkey, differ from each other, in parallel, the characteristics of the anti-riot officers from those cities differ as well in terms of their experiences, manner, methods, and styles of protest policing.

The more the city falls to the Eastern part of Turkey, the greater the level of risk and threat. For instance, while the anti-riot unit in Izmir, a city that is located in the western part of the country, mostly needs water cannons, teargas and especially adequate numbers of officers and a training program highly dependent on acting in unison, the situation in Hakkari, located in Eastern border of Turkey, is totally different. The need here is mostly related to armed vehicles, a large amount of tear gas, bulletproof vests and helmets and a robust communication system along with a training program other than standard collective intervention styles and methods. In addition to regular coursework; first aid, Martial arts, small and automatic firearms training programs are essential for anti-riot officers in this part of the country because the characteristics of the activists totally differs from those in the Western part of Turkey. Handmade Explosive and firearms are part of social mass events in this region.

Besides, the number of officers assigned to the anti-riot unit of the Diyarbakir Police Department was 601 in 2010, 558 in 2011, 684 in 2012, and 750 in 2013, respectively. However, in order to investigate whether a sufficient number of anti-riot officers were deployed in social mass events, 82-recorded violent mass events from the police data base of the Diyarbakir Police Department were examined.

In the mentioned 82 violent mass events an estimated 662,800 participants were recorded. In order to maintain public peace and safety in Diyarbakir City, in total 35,807
anti-riot officers were deployed in those 82 mass events. This correlation means for 18.51 participants only ‘one’ officer was deployed. In another words, compared with the participants, the deployment rate of anti-riot officers in violent social mass events was 5.40 per 100 protestors.

It is certain that the number of wounded and killed protestors and officers reflects the severity of clashes between law enforcement and protestors in social mass protests. In 2009 the number of wounded officers was 44; in 2010 this number decreased to 22 wounded officers; in 2011 the number of wounded officers increased to 97; in 2012 to 67; and in the first five months of 2013 to 76. The number of wounded officers, actually, is enough to describe the concentration of social mass events and protest policing imposed in Diyarbakir City.

Moreover, 100% of the experts in social mass movements claimed that if the proportion of deployed anti-riot officers is not lower than it should be, there are at least two threats. One is that; if the number of anti-riot officers is lower than it should be compared with the number of the crowd, militant or assaultive individuals among the masses are more likely to commit violent actions. On the other hand, the second threat is that; in order to mitigate the pressure of the violent crowd that is proportionally higher than deployed officers it is more likely that officers will have to escalate the use of force in order to control harsh social mass unrests.

However, if there are a sufficient number of anti-riot officers, violent militants may not find the courage and availability to commit violent actions due to the higher chances of being caught and arrested. On the other hand, if officers realize that they are crowded
enough compared with demonstrators, repressive interventions might not be employed as the option, because they will not feel threatened or deficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Events</th>
<th>Total of Participants</th>
<th>Deployed Anti-Riot Officers</th>
<th>Per Anti-Riot Officers Number of Protestors</th>
<th>Anti-riot Officers per 100 Protestors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>662,800</td>
<td>35,807</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td>5.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-5 The Needed Percentage of Anti-Riot Officers Compared With The Number of Protestors in Risky Social Mass Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of S. Mass Events</th>
<th>Violent Mass Events</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>In First 6 Months of the Year</th>
<th>Second Half of the Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
<td>221 / 2</td>
<td>203 / 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.18%</td>
<td>228 / 3</td>
<td>196 / 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9.87%</td>
<td>233 / 28</td>
<td>253 / 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.63%</td>
<td>254 / 6</td>
<td>285 / 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.44%</td>
<td>290 / 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2163</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
<td><strong>Average 5.40%</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-6 The Correlation Between Violent and Non-violent Social Mass Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Recorded Number of Deployed Officers</th>
<th>Number of Violent Mass Events</th>
<th>Detained Number of Protestors</th>
<th>Percentage of Violent Mass Events (%)</th>
<th>Number of Events (Caused Injured Officers)</th>
<th>Number of Injured Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>18.71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 <strong>2011</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-7 Violent Social Mass Events and Number of Injured Officers
Tent Instalment

Of the 13 tent installment events that existed in Diyarbakir City, five of these events had Parliament members from the BDP that participated. The tent installment initiatives were inspired from the tent settlements in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, which became the symbol of the Egyptian Revolution.

Most movements in the region were organized or at least supported by the political party BDP, now the HDP, which has a link to the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. The initiative of setting up tents in cities’ known to be popular places was another action imitated and tested with the support of BDP. At the beginning, organizations started with setting up tents in neighbourhoods. When the initiation project found ground and worked well for gathering people, Ocalan targeted the city’s main square, the Dagkapi Square to set up a tent there and to turn it into a Tahrir Square. Saygi Ozturk and Altan Tan pointed out this argument as well.

This strategy was effectively used by the BDP during the election period of 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Events</th>
<th>Events Elected Politicians Did Not Participated</th>
<th>Events Elected Politicians Participated</th>
<th>Percentage of Events Elected Politicians Involved</th>
<th>Average of Participants in Events With Elected Politicians</th>
<th>Average of Participants in Events Without Elected Politicians</th>
<th>Difference Because of Elected Politicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>32.54%</td>
<td>1,890.50</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>1547.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18.86%</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>281.92</td>
<td>2,320.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>23.66%</td>
<td>2,49</td>
<td>149.59</td>
<td>2,070.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
<td>998.5</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>709.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>54 (5 Month)</td>
<td>18.62%</td>
<td>5,838</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>4,997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-8 The Impact of Elected Politicians on The Participation of Demonstrators in Social Mass Events
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Events</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Average of Participants in Each Event</th>
<th>Average of Participants in Each Event Nevruz Festivals excluded</th>
<th>Number of Participants In Nevruz Festival</th>
<th>Huda-Par</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>367,765</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>304,765</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>442,175</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>260,538</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>22,000 (Prohibited)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>525,010</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9 Social Mass Events and Nevruz Celebrations

Limitations

First of all, although the rough data was valuable data that was prepared with care and sensitivity, there was a general problem during efforts directed towards estimating the numbers of a crowd, especially during changeable periods where the number of participants in social mass events change over time until the event ends. Moreover, the number was estimated by some long-serving officers and declared to the police supervisor who made the final decision about the numbers and recorded this quantity. Therefore, the numbers of participants recorded in the data might not be the exact number, but a close one.

Secondly, the data set may have been problematic in representing the impact of intangible factors such as emotions that caused increases in the participation of people to demonstrate or protest.

Strengths

The study researcher spent much time examining the dataset of 2163 events and did this very carefully in order to obtain robust results.
Secondly, it is a unique study in its field. There is no previous study that estimates the proportion of needed officers to control and end protests that is in favor of both the authorities and participants. The study has shown that an insufficient deployment of officers is a factor that increases the possibility of protesters committing violent activities in the Turkish province of Diyarbakir.

**Summary**

After scrutinizing 2136 social mass events that took place within 53 months, from January 2009 to June 2013, the study data showed that;

- Emotionality has a positive impact on increasing participation in social mass events and this dynamic was used by the BDP during the hunger strikes; after the veto decision of the High Election Commission about the BDP nominees; and after the killing of 35 people in Uludere during an airstrike.

- There is a significant relationship between the prohibition of mass events by the authorities and violence mass protests. But it is certain that 53.33% of the prohibited mass protests ended with violence activities.

- Legitimate detentions have a positive impact on the mitigation of social mass riots. But emotional incidents such as brutal police intervention and killings, in contrast, have an impact in terms of increasing the extent and severity of protest.

- The participation of elected BDP members had an increasing impact on citizens to participate in social mass events.

- Instead of mitigating violent activities in social mass events, the elected BDP members had an impact on increasing the numbers of violent mass activities during social mass events within the borders of Diyarbakir City.
- Compared with the participants, the deployed rate of anti-riot officers in violent social mass events was 5.40 per 100 protestors, which should be considered in light of the fact that ‘in order to mitigate violent mass event, at least per 100 demonstrators 10 anti-riot officer should be deployed in order to deter troublemaker from committing violent activities.
CHAPTER 7: ASSESSING THE PERCEPTION OF ANTI-RIOT OFFICERS AND CRITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS DEALING WITH SOCIAL MASS DEMONSTRATIONS

Introduction

In this part of the research the aim was to comprehend the perception of the officers of the Anti-Riot Unit who are the first and foremost officers that confront, control and respond to the masses in social mass events. For instance, not only the number of officers deployed to a task or the equipment of officers, but also the model and style of protest policing they prefer has an important impact on the behaviour of demonstrators in terms of urging or turning troublemakers committing violent activities.

Moreover, the research aimed to examine whether the impact of being involved in violent mass events influenced an officers’ perceptions or not. The study also aimed to evaluate the perceptions of anti-riot officers on their preferred philosophy in protest policing; how the officers described themselves, as State’s or Citizens’ police; the importance of information gathering in social mass events; the relationship between terrorist activities and social mass events; the impact of emotionality on violent mass event; the impact of the media on violent mass events; the influence of remarks made by the government; risk assessment studies; the reasons for repressive police interventions; the influence of the Arab Uprising on the Kurdish Uprising; and the needed police trainings in protest policing in such a risky city.

In sum, it was expected this chapter would provide a wide view of the perceptions of Anti-Riot officers who control and respond to social mass events, and which would help
decision makers and security organizations to develop desired protest policing methods, styles and policies to maintain public order in peace and security.

Methodology

A simple random sampling method was used to select subjects from the list of officers who accepted invitations to participate in this study. The first group of subjects consisted of 449 anti-riot officers, out of 900, who were deployed at least one year before the 2011 Parliamentary Elections held in June 2011, and the second group consisted of 89 anti-riot officers, out of 200 officers, who were assigned to the Diyarbakir Police Department after the Parliamentary Elections were held in 2011. Odd numbers were selected from the list.

The difference between the first and second group was the number of demonstrations they were deployed in, the crowd that intervened, and the violent mass events they had experienced. The first group of officers who worked between July 2010 and July 2011 in Diyarbakir City intervened in social and political 429 mass events in which 427,653 demonstrators participated. 40 of those mass events were deemed to be violent thematically.

However, the second group of officers, which consisted of anti-riot officers who were assigned to the Diyarbakir Police Department after the Parliamentary Elections were involved in lesser mass events with fewer participants and less violent mass events. They were deployed in 253 social mass events with a number of 125,813 participants and 20 violent mass events according to the police data. Consequently, the first group witnessed more crowded and violent mass events than the second group.
In order to implement the survey and interviews in an unbiased manner, and to increase the validity of the study and keep the study anonymous, instead of the principal investigator, myself, a civilian person who did not possess any police rank and did not work for the Diyarbakir Police Department but was familiar with doing research was preferred as the secondary investigator to conduct the interviews and survey. Dr. Oguzhan Demir who obtained the ORSP Certificate, was a Teaching Assistant and taught at the School of Security Science in Ankara at that time.

Participating to the survey and interviews absolutely depended on the participants’ consent. The answers of interviewees and surveys were not disclosed to anyone and will remain anonymous. Participation in the research and answering any question of the interview was voluntary. In any phase of the interview, participants were informed that they had the right to stop and cancel the interview at any time they felt uncomfortable or unsafe. These measures were also mentioned in the consent forms.

This method was expected to help subjects to feel more secure, confidential and at ease. Dr. Demir gave each participant a different code instead of asking for any name or identification information. He did not use any voice recording devices. Instead, he took notes and saved them in a Microsoft Word file and uploaded all collected data to a secure website, to “dropbox” without keeping or sharing them with anybody else. All collected data were handled in a confidential manner. This process was also explained to participants as well. All interview and survey data were kept until the research was officially approved by Rutgers University. The Institutional Review Board, Dr. Kennedy, Dr. Demir and myself were the only parties that were allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. The initial results were only shared with the dissertation advisor whose contact
information was addressed above. All study data will be kept until the prescribed time period that is required by Rutgers University.

There was no foreseeable direct or indirect risks or direct benefits to the participants because nothing about the identity of the subjects was asked. Only codes were used to differentiate the subjects while conducting the interviews and surveys. Otherwise, officers may have had the possibility to face disciplinary investigation in case of criticizing their supervisors or the government. To prevent the study and the participants from such risks, Dr. Demir will gave every participant a different code and took notes during interviews, instead of using voice-recording devices.

Only indirect benefits to the practice and knowledge of the governmental institutions and officers, who deal with mass movement activities and threats whether regionally or locally, were expected. The findings, policies and research implications of this study were believed to be helpful for those authorities that deal with mass activities, so they could better diagnose, understand and deal with social mass events using a more secure and peaceful approach.

By surveying the officers who deal with mass activities, the study wanted to better understand whether being exposed to violent mass protests has any impact on officers toward escalating the use of force during mass events; and to better comprehend whether they see themselves obligated to protect the interests of the state or the public, while intervening in mass protests; and to understand if they saw the potential of any unrest they experienced to be akin to the Arab Uprising in this region. The survey took approximately 20 minutes.
The survey structure consisted of 43 questions. There were five options to each response, which were respectively: a) Strongly Disagree, b) Disagree, c) Undecided, d) Agree, and e) Strongly agree. However, in order to emphasize the perceptions of officers more clearly, the study categorized the options of “strongly disagree” and “disagree” as “negative”; the undecided option stay as “undecided”; and “agree” and “strongly agree” as “positive” to provide a more clear outcome.

Moreover, the responses of the first group, the anti-riot officers who were subjected to more violent mass events compared with the second group, and who were also from the anti-riot unit but intervened in fewer violent mass events were analyzed separately. The questions were used to provide the researcher with data concerning the perceptions of the officers as a whole, and which the researcher was especially interested in.

**Results of the Survey**

**State’s Police Citizens’ Police**

In order to evaluate the perceptions of the anti-riot officers who deal with social mass events in the City of Diyarbakir these officers were asked whether they saw themselves as State’s Police or Citizens’ Police. This question aimed to determine the officers’ police philosophy as defined by Della Porta (…).

The first question was “I see myself as Citizens’ Police (Buergerpolizei).” In response, among the first group, who were officers assigned before the Parliament Elections held in June 2011, 46.6% of them defined themselves as Citizens’ Police, 14.6% were undecided, and 38.7% of them disagreed. On the other hand, in the second group, among those officers who intervened in fewer violent mass events, 65.8% of them
defined themselves as Citizens’ Police, while 16.5% were undecided, and 15.7% of them were negative about describing themselves as Citizens’ Police.

However, when the second question was put forth which stated “I see myself as a State Police (Staatpolizei)”, 74.5% of the first group agreed with this statement, 13.9% of them were undecided, and 11.7% of them disagreed with this statement. However, the responses of the second group of officers were higher than expected, and 82.6% of them agreed with the statement, while 10.3% of them disagreed, and 13.8% of them were undecided.

However, when the study asked (Q3) if the perception of being whether a State’s Police of Citizens’ Police depended on the characteristics of the demonstrators or not, among the responses of the first group, the more experienced group, 46.6% of them agreed with the statement, while 12.2% of them were neutral, and 33.6% of them disagreed. On the other hand, the ratios among the second group were, that while 54.2% of them agreed with the statement, 10.1% of them were undecided, and 23.8% of them disagreed with the statement.
Table 7-1 Questionnaire Results Part 1

When the study asked (Q38) officers how they perceived their colleagues’ feelings when confronting mass demonstrations, 86.8% of the total number of subjects believed that their colleagues posed in a manner of being a State’s Police officer in protest policing during mass events in Diyarbakir City.

When asked (Q39) which one he or she would prefer, 69.3% of the first group chose State’s Police while 30.7% of them preferred to be Citizen’s Police. In the second group, 53.3% of them preferred to belong to the State’s Police while 46.7% of them preferred to be Citizens’ Police.
In total, 66.6% of the subjects preferred to be State’s Police instead of being Citizens’ Police.

In terms of results, officers who experienced more social mass events and violent mass events were less nervous, more experienced, tolerant, and prudent, and exhibited more evidence of a State’s Police centric type of police knowledge compared with the second group subjects. Yet, the less experienced officers were more Citizens’ Police centric than experienced officers. Therefore, duties that are most likely to end in violence and need effective interventions and are important in terms of maintaining public peace and order should be given to experienced officers.

But, for tasks that need more Citizens’ Police centric protest policing it is recommended to deploy officers who are less exposed to violent mass assaults, because officers that believe in the Citizens’ Police philosophy are more likely to safeguard friendly demonstrations, rather than being eager to disperse the crowd.

**Deploying Officers From Other Cities**

Deploying officers from other cities depends on the possible magnitude of the threat generating by the mass unrests. However, sometimes, such a request can become routine in many police departments, which is an undesired situation by attached unassigned officers from other cities. On the other hand, being deployed to an unknown place and with a different profile of masses can heighten the tensions and lower the tolerance of the recruited officers, especially if they come from a city where social mass events are friendlier and free of risk.
During this study, I witnessed how a guest officer became severely depressed when exposed to harsh attacks from protestors. He was sent back to his department. However, in such worrying interventions, guest officers are prone to use excessive power. Therefore, guest officers should be deployed to protect hot points instead of being deployed into the center of violent interventions.

When offers were asked (Q27) if deploying officers from other cities is a helpful strategy in protest policing or not; the responses of 43.6% of the first group were positive, while 18.8% of them were neutral, and 37.5% of them were negative. This contrasted with the 48.8% of the second group who agreed on this strategy, and where 16.3% were undecided, and 35.1% disagreed.

**Police Leadership**

While 85.1% of the first group believed in the importance of leadership in dealing with social mass events, this response increased to 91.1% in the second group. The less experienced group compared with the first group was more dependent on the police leader during social mass events (Q37).

In total, 86.2% of the subjects believed in the importance of leadership during social mass events, while 13.8% disregarded the importance of leadership.

**Implemented Models of Protest Policing in Diyarbakir City**

There are various types of social mass movements that must be considered in terms of implementing adequate protest policing models and styles. Social mass movements in Diyarbakir City are mostly politically oriented and they have the
remarkable potential of supporters. The characteristics of social mass movements in Diyarbakir City vary from other parts of Turkey in terms of demonstration culture and are in a constant flux. Moreover, the protest tactics are similar to living organisms and are in a state of constant change, in which the responses need to change so the best protest policing models and styles can be used conjunctly. Otherwise, failure of the law enforcement bodies to maintain public peace and security would be an unavoidable reality.

In this regard, there are three emerging models of protest policing, which are: the Escalated Force Model, the Negotiated Management Model, and the Deterrent Model. The Escalated Force Model was used in the 1960s in the United States and European Continent and depends on the use of force without the selectivity of troublemakers. The second model is the Negotiated Management Model that emerged in the 1980s in the US and European Continent and prefers to understand the aims and demands of the demonstrators and to find a way to solve the problem with negotiations. The third model emerged when transnational mass movements arose in the beginning of 2000s, and is called the Deterrent Model, which is highly dependent on information gathering; intelligence; negotiations; the use of technology; the use of barriers; considering distance and more importantly, visibility of massive forces; and adequate intervention vehicles.
Table 7-2 Questionnaire Results Part 2

However, when the study examined (Q43) the model of protest policing implemented in Diyarbakir City, 60.3% of the officers selected the Negotiated
Management approach as preferable, while 28.5% of them chose the Deterrent Model, and 11.2% of them selected the Escalated Force Model.

When the research asked (Q41) about the entity that should be safeguarded, 78.6% preferred the State, 17.1% selected demonstrators, and 4.3% chose the government.

In sum, it is obvious that the perceptions of the anti-riot officers’ in Diyarbakir Police Department were in favor of protecting first and foremost the State and then to safeguard the demonstrators. On the other hand, they preferred to implement the Negotiated Management Model of Protest Policing, instead of the Escalated Use of Force model, which is highly old fashioned and questionable in terms of human dignity.

**Police Interventions**

When the study searched (Q40) for the most effective determinant that informed the style and model of the preferred police intervention; 32.3% of the officers selected the Government, while 28.8% of them chose their supervisors, 27.6% of them decided based on the behavior of the demonstrators, and 6.6% selected the Governor.

76.5% of the anti-riot officers believed that the police should act in a democratic manner and should protect the rights of the demonstrators when policing protests. However, 93.7% of second group officers who were not exposed to highly violent mass events, agreed with the statement (Q5). But, the ratio decreased in the first group to 72.9%.

Instead of dispersing the whole crowd, 85.1% of the second group believed that the police should be selective and defuse violent activists and troublemakers apart from
the whole mass. This ratio in the first group was 74.7% while it increased to 85.1% in the second group (Q 6).

**Information Gathering**

Data showed 86.6% of the officers believed that information gathering, and intelligence, is important in protest policing because, instead of struggling with unknown issues, confronting known opponents is always a preferred option in protest policing (Q12).

Information gathering is helpful in determining the profile, intention, aim, and potential of the threat, which in turn helps to deploy the needed number of personnel, an adequate number of intervention vehicles, and to implement the right methods of protest policing. Otherwise, in case of there being an inadequate number of personnel and intervention vehicles in mass events in Diyarbakir City, a peaceful event may easily turn into a violent mass event and officers might be exposed to harsh violent attacks which may also justify the use of escalated force and sometimes the unbalanced use of force that may cause deaths or serious injuries.

**The Role Anti-Riot Police**

It was found that 92.5% of the second group believed that the anti-riot police have an important role to play in this province, but the rate in the first group was 81.3% (Q 7).

However, only 38.1% of the officers believed that the anti-riot unit in Diyarbakir was well equipped and supported in numbers, while 42.8% of them disagreed with this thought, and 19.2% were undecided (Q8).
Only 15.7% of the officers believed they were viewed with the appropriate amount of importance they felt they deserved, which is an important circumstance that should be considered relevant in the future, and 69.2% did not believe that the anti-riot police are perceived with the degree of importance they felt they deserved. 69.6% of the first group seemed to indicate they were more pessimistic compared with the 47.5% of the second group (Q9).

**Considering the Emotionality of Masses**

In terms of maintaining a safe and peaceful protest, the study examined whether the emotions and the perceptions of the protestors should be considered or not. While 46.9% of the first group agreed and 36.5% disagreed on this argument, in the second group, 62.5% of them were positive, and 21.3% of them were negative.

However, the gap between the negative perceptions of the two groups, of 15.2%, shows that the experienced officers considered emotional factors more relevant than the less experienced group (Q 23).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>First Group</th>
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<th>Second Group</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I believe that the riot police unit has an important role for this province in terms of maintaining public order.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 4.90% 2= Disagree 6.50% 3= Undecided 5.40% 4= Agree 25.80% 5= Strongly agree 57.30% 1= Strongly disagree 4.90% 2= Disagree 6.50% 3= Undecided 5.40% 4= Agree 25.80% 5= Strongly agree 57.30%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20% 1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>I believe that riot police in Diyarbakır are well equipped and supported in number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>I think that riot police are given the importance they deserve by the authorities.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 43.30% 2= Disagree 26.30% 3= Undecided 14.20% 4= Agree 31.50% 5= Strongly agree 3.80% 1= Strongly disagree 43.30% 2= Disagree 26.30% 3= Undecided 14.20% 4= Agree 31.50% 5= Strongly agree 3.80%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20% 1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>I think that the emotions and perceptions of the protestors should be considered in order to maintain a safe and peaceful protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>I think that a distance between the demonstrators and the riot force should be kept in order not to increase violence.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 6.60% 2= Disagree 10.50% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 49.30% 5= Strongly agree 24.80% 1= Strongly disagree 6.60% 2= Disagree 10.50% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 49.30% 5= Strongly agree 24.80%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20% 1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>I think the police presence at mass gatherings should be massive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>I think that the traditional and social media have ability to misuse events and issues in order to escalate demonstrators’ tension and encourage violent actions.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 2.80% 2= Disagree 4.00% 3= Undecided 38.00% 4= Agree 32.40% 5= Strongly agree 22.80% 1= Strongly disagree 2.80% 2= Disagree 4.00% 3= Undecided 38.00% 4= Agree 32.40% 5= Strongly agree 22.80%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20% 1= Strongly disagree 1.90% 2= Disagree 4.70% 3= Undecided 8.80% 4= Agree 50.40% 5= Strongly agree 34.20%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>I think that confronting an organized mass gathering is easier than an anonymous or unorganized mass situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7- 3 Questionnaire Results Part 3
Results showed 76.1% of the officers believed that a distance between the demonstrators and the riot force should be kept in order not to urge the activists to commit violent activities. 15.5% of the respondents disregarded this question, and 8.4% of them were undecided (Q 24).

In order to prevent the masses from committing violent activities and to maintain public safety, 95.1% of the second group and 88.1% of the first group believed that in massive mass gatherings, the presence of the police should be massive as well. A weak presence of the police may urge troublemakers to commit violent activities, which needs police intervention. Hence, intervening and dispersing the masses may provoke clashes between participants and police forces that may easily cause injuries and undesired circumstances (Q 29).

The Role of the Traditional and Social Media on Social Mass Events

Here, 84.8% of the officers believed that the media have the ability to misuse events and issues in order to escalate demonstrators’ tension and encourage them to commit violent activities. Only 10% of them believed that the media has no such impact on social mass events and 5.1% of them were undecided (Q 30).

Intervening Anonymous and Organized Social Mass Events

This data showed 45.5% of the first and 60.3% of the second group considered that confronting an organized mass gathering is easier than confronting an anonymous or spontaneously gathered crowd. However, 33.4% of the first group and 29.5% of the second group disagreed with this argument (Q36).
Repressive Intervention

The responses of the officers to the question about whether the presence of well-organized and heavily equipped anti-riot officers has any impact during mass events on activists’ tendency of demonstrating violent actions or not, showed, 72.6% of the first group and 78.8% of the second group believed that the presence of a well-organized and heavily equipped anti-riot force had no triggering effect on activists who are potentially open to exhibit violent actions (Q 13). In total, 73.7% of all officers disagreed and 19.1% of them agreed with the argument, while 7.2% of them were undecided. This outcome means that 73.7% of the anti-riot officers believe that being sufficient and well equipped, instead of provoking violent activities such a presence will force troublemakers to avoid such tendencies.

Deploying enough geared and well-equipped anti-riot officers and needed vehicles, such armed and water cannons has a dissuasive impact on demonstrators who have tendency towards committing violent activities. Someone who knows that there is no gap or place to escape to from the police after committing any violent activities, will give up committing any crime. The presence of adequate numbers of officers and mass intervention vehicles has a positive impact on maintaining public peace and security.

Data revealed that 81.1% of the officers believed that deploying enough well-equipped anti-riot officers and needed vehicles, such armed vehicles and water cannons, could mitigate and prevent any violent tendency of potential troublemakers (Q 14).
<table>
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<th>#</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>First Group</th>
<th>Second Group</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>I believe that a massive presence of well-organized and heavily equipped Riot Police has an impact on the escalation of violent tendency of the demonstrators.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 39.20%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 33.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 3.60%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 5.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>I believe that a massive presence of well-organized and heavily equipped Riot Police has an impact on the mitigation and prevention of violent tendency of the demonstrators.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 31.20%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 26.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 1.30%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 6.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>I think that a softer, more tolerant protest policing style in intervention could mitigate the violent behavior of the rioters.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 31.20%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 26.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 8.80%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 32.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>I think that remarks of the government through media broadcasting would be more effective in reducing the violent behavior of the rioters compared with the styles implemented in</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 15.40%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 22.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 8.80%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 17.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Considering the interventions, I see myself as tolerant.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 6.90%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 16.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 3.80%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 15.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Considering the interventions, I see myself as tough.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 22.90%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 38.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 17.50%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 62.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>I think repressive interventions will have positive impacts on preventing violent activities.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 5.20%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 11.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 2.50%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 17.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>I think repressive interventions will provoke demonstrators to commit violent actions.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 24.30%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 37.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree 17.50%</td>
<td>2= Disagree 33.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7- 4 Questionnaire Results Part 4
Part 4 showed 57.8% of the first group and 59.5% of the second group believed that a softer and more tolerant protest policing intervention style does not mitigate the violent behavior of the rioters, while 21.6% of the first group and 21.5% of the second group believed that softer and a more tolerant protest policing style has an impact on mitigating any violent behaviors by the troublemakers (Q 15).

Whether remarks of the government through media broadcasting are more effective in reducing the violent behavior of the rioters compared with the styles implemented in protest policing or not, 35.4% disagreed, and 28.2% were undecided, and 36.3% of them agreed with this statement. In sum, the results indicate that government remarks are more effective than any form of implementing styles and models of protest policing (Q 16).

Regarding tolerance, 57.3% of the first group and 68.4% of the second group saw themselves as tolerant during interventions and 19.9% of the first group and 10.1% of the second group saw themselves as tough during interventions in mass events. In total, 59.3% of the anti-riot officers saw themselves as tolerant, while 18.1% of them saw themselves as tough during police interventions in mass events (Q 17) (Q 18).

In terms of repression, 66.9% of the officers believed that repressive interventions have positive impacts on preventing violent activities, 17.7% of them disagreed, however, and 15.4% of them were undecided (Q 25).

In terms of provoking demonstrators, 59.8% of the officers believed that repressive interventions do not provoke demonstrators to commit violent actions. However, 22.0% of them believed that repressive interventions do provoke demonstrators to commit violent actions and 18.3% of them were undecided (Q 26).
Mutual Trust in Negotiations

Regarding trust, 30.1% of the officers believed that there is mutual trust between the police and demonstrators during negotiations in mass events in Diyarbakir. However, 44.8% of them do not believe in the existence of such mutual trust, and 25.0% of them were undecided (Q 11).

On the other hand, 56.4% of the officers found negotiating with the demonstrators helpful in order to maintain security and peace on the streets. Yet, 28.6% of them disagreed, and 15.1% of them were undecided (Q 10).

Terrorist Activities and Violent Actions

Regarding relationships, 42.9% of the officers did not believe that there was an inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and violent protests. Only 24.1% of them believed that there was such a relationship, and 32.9% of them, which is a high proportion, were undecided (Q 20).

Perception the Anti-Riot Unit in Diyarbakir City

In the context of work perceptions, 63.3% of the first group and 83.8% of the second group were happy to work in the anti-riot unit, while 17.4% of the first and 8.8% of the second group were unhappy working in the anti-riot unit. In total, 67.0% of the officers were satisfied, 17.2% were undecided, and 15.9% of them were unhappy (Q 19).

Interventions in Violent and Illegal Mass Events

While 41.4% of the first group and 48.8% of the second group claimed that they cared about bystanders and public sympathy before, during and after intervening protests, 36.6% of the first group and 28.8% of the second group did not care. Yet, 20.0% of the first and 22.5% of the second group were undecided about this argument. However, in
total, 42.8% of the officers were positive, 35.1% of them were negative, and 22.1 of them were neutral about caring bystanders and the public’s perception before, during, and after police interventions (Q 34).

However, during the research in Diyarbakir City, it was observed in some interventions that occurred in the context of mass protests, that a wrong or unbalanced use of force easily triggered bystanders and even people who watched the interventions from their apartments resorted to throwing books, shoes, or other materials found in their balconies.

Therefore, law enforcement officers should care about the perceptions of the third parties during social mass events because; among the activists there might be relatives or people they know or at least they may accept the crowd as their fellow-townsman. In such cases, observing people they know being exposed to the unbalanced use of power by the security force will cause a variety of emotional reactions.
However, while the proportion of the officers who care during and after police interventions about third parties, this belief changes if activists commit violent activities, such as throwing stones, Molotov Cocktails, or use fireworks against officers, and throw hand-made explosives. Here, 43.5% of the officers claimed that their belief would change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>First Group</th>
<th><strong>Scale</strong></th>
<th><strong>Percent</strong></th>
<th>Second Group</th>
<th><strong>Scale</strong></th>
<th><strong>Percent</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I believe that there is a mutual trust during negotiations between the police and demonstrators in Diyarbakir.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>21.10%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>19.00%</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>24.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>I find negotiating with the demonstrators helpful in order to maintain security and peace on the streets.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>15.60%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>14.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>I think that there is an inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and violent protests.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>18.20%</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>21.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>I feel happy to work in the riot police force.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>10.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>I care about bystanders and public sympathy before, during and after intervening protests.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>10.20%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>8.80%</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>26.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>If the protest has a potential for violence, my above consideration may be changed.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>11.10%</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>5.10%</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-5 Questionnaire Results Part 5

However, while the proportion of the officers who care during and after police interventions about third parties, this belief changes if activists commit violent activities, such as throwing stones, Molotov Cocktails, or use fireworks against officers, and throw hand-made explosives. Here, 43.5% of the officers claimed that their belief would change
in such cases, while 28.4% of them were undecided, and 28.2% of them believed that their perceptions would not change (Q 35).

**Risk Assessment**

The study examined if officers dealing with social mass movements are aware of any emergency plan. In this regard, 81.2% of respondents were not aware of any emergency plan (Q 42 a). However, 66.4% of the officers who were aware of any emergency plan did not know what to do during any cases of emergency (Q 42 b).

**Diyarbakir and the Possible Arab Uprising**

While 53.8% of the first group and 46.3% of the second group were pessimistic about seeing a constant nonviolent, safe and peaceful culture of demonstrations occurring in the near future in Diyarbakir province, only 19.9% of the first group and 36.3% of the second group officers were optimistic. The difference between two groups was due to the perception of the officers who had been in Diyarbakir for long time, thus witnessing more mass events, more crowded demonstrations, and more violent uprisings compared with the newly assigned officers (Q 31).

In terms of global influences, 53.2% of the first group and 52.5% of the second group of officers believed that global mass movements inspired demonstrators in Diyarbakir. While 33.5% of the first group and 22.5% of the second group of officers did not agree with the statement that global mass movements had inspired demonstrators in Diyarbakir, 13.3% of the first group and 25.0% of the second group were undecided. The reason why the undecided ratio of the second group is almost double that of the first group might be due to having less experience (Q 32).
Other data showed 46.4% of the first group and 50.1% of the second group of anti-riot officers did not think that an Arab Spring-like revolution is possible in the southeastern
part of Turkey. Approximately 28.5% of the first group and 28.8% of the second group of anti-riot officers did not agree with this argument. Yet, 25.1% of the first group and 21.3% of the second group of officers were undecided (Q 33).

As well, 45.2% of the first group and 35.0% of the second group of officers thought that all of the participants attending mass protests in Diyarbakir were guilty. Another 36.6% of the first group and 45.1% of the second group disagreed with the argument. However, 18.2% of the first group and 20.0% of the second group of officers were undecided (Q 21).

Regarding demonstrations, 52.6% of the first group and 70.1% of the second group of officers thought that the right to demonstrate was a constitutional right to be safeguarded, while 25.9% of the first group and 20.0% of the second group disagreed with this statement. However, 21.5% of the first group and 10.0% of the second group of officers were undecided. One reason causing the first group of officer to be undecided may have stemmed from the density of the mass events and the concentration of interventions in the context of violent mass events (Q 22).

**Anti-Riot Police Training**

As to whether the anti-riot unit should follow a training program similar to paramilitary organization or not; the responses to the question by the longstanding officers differed from those of newcomers. While 51.1% of the first group and 40.0% of the second group disagreed with this argument, 33.4% of the first group and 50.0% of the second group agreed with that claim (Q 28).
In total, 49.6% of the anti-riot officers disagreed and 36.3% of them agreed with the argument that the anti-riot police should follow a paramilitary-like training program. But, 14.1% of them were undecided.

**Limitations**

Despite making considerable efforts to keep the survey anonymous, officers may still have had concerns about confidentiality, which may have affected their answers.

Secondly, due to the dissimilarity of the sites deployed, characteristics of masses dealt with, and the tendency of the masses toward violent activities, there might be no monopoly in training, type of protest policing model and style, and use of equipment. Therefore, decision makers and security organizations dealing with social mass movements and events may evaluate results of this part of the study after assessing the resemblance in its characteristics to social mass movements, equipment and numbers of anti-riot officers needed in their cities.

**Strengths**

The survey included not only multiple-choice to response but also provided to subjects to include any thought or opinion about the issues mentioned in the survey questions.

Secondly, surveying a high number of officers who had experienced a wide range of social mass events makes this study unique.

**Summary**

After surveying 449 officers who were working for several years in the anti-riot unit and had worked before the June 2011 elections and 89 officers who were assigned
after the June 2011 elections and were less exposed to violent mass events study has shown that;

- Officers who were exposed to violent mass protests had a tendency to prefer a State’s Police centered protest policing philosophy compared with the second group who were less exposed to violent mass events who preferred a Citizens’ Police centered protest policing philosophy.

- While 93.7% of the officers who were not exposed to highly violent mass events (second group) believed that police should act in democratic manner while policing protest, only 72.9% of the first group, officer who were exposed to violent mass events claimed that the police should exhibit democratic manner during protests policing.

- Instead of dispersing the whole crowd, 85.1% of the second group believed that the police should be selective and defuse violent activists and troublemakers apart from the whole mass.

- Another important indication is that, in terms of maintaining a safe and peaceful mass demonstration, only 46.9% of the first group believed that the emotions and perception of the protestors should be considered, this ratio increased in the second group that were not exposed to violent mass events to 62.5%.

- Anti-riot officers preferred the Negotiated Management Model of protest policing.

- 95.1% of the second group and 88.1% of the first group believed that in massive mass gathering the presence of the police should be massive as well.

- Officers saw the Government as the most effective factor in determining the model and style of protest policing in police interventions.
• 84.8% of the officers believed that the media have the ability to misuse events and issues in order to escalate demonstrators’ tension and encourage them to commit violent activities.

• 81.1% of the officers believed that deploying enough and well-quipped anti-riot officers and needed vehicles, such armed and water cannons, can have an impact on mitigating and preventing the violent tendencies of potential troublemakers.

• However, 66.9% of the total officers believed that repressive interventions would have positive impacts on preventing violent activities. Moreover, 52.6% of the first group and 70.1% of the second group of officers thought that the right to demonstrate is a constitutional right to be safeguarded.

• While 30.1% of the officers believe that there is mutual trust between the police and demonstrators during negotiations in mass events in Diyarbakir, 44.8% them do not believe in existence of such a mutual trust between the police and demonstrators.

• 41.4% of the first group and 48.8% of the second group claimed that they cared about bystanders and public sympathy before, during and after intervening protests.

• While 81.2% of the officers claimed that they were not aware of any emergency plan, 66.4% of the officers who claimed that they were aware of any emergency plans did not know what to do during any emergency.

• 53.2% of the first group and 52.5% of the second group of officers believed that global mass movements inspire the social mass movements in Diyarbakir City.

• 46.4% of the first and 50.1% of the second group of anti-riot officers did not think that an Arab Spring-like revolution was possible in the Southeastern part of Turkey.
• Finally, 63.3% of the first group and 83.8% of the second group were happy working at the anti-riot unit.
CHAPTER 8: THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING TRAINING PROGRAMS

Introduction

Training is as important as having a sufficient number of personnel and adequate equipment in protest policing. It is the training and drills that prepare the anti-riot force to respond and control crowds even uncertain threats in social mass upheavals with care and in a peaceful way. Otherwise, equipment in the hands of unprepared and untrained officers may easily cause serious injuries and even deaths as seen in many MENA countries during the so called Arab Spring. Considering armed vehicles, teargas ammunition, cartridges, high-pressure water cannons, baton, and at the last stage firearms among the types of equipment that the anti-riot units use, individuals may easily estimate the outcomes of false, unbalanced and inaccurate police interventions in policing social mass protests.

Dealing with social mass protests should be considered like dealing with fire. If the security forces are able to respond, control and extinguish the fire lit by the discontented public with care and professionalism, they should be considered as having achieved an outstanding achievement in favor of the public, government, the Governor who is responsible for the public safety, and the law enforcement organization. Unfortunately, the opposite, can easily foster an environment for serious injuries and deaths that in turn, may undoubtedly generate social protests and even riots that may threaten the existence of the governments, authorities and most important the peace and security of the society.

In this context, this chapter will specify need for and development of necessary training programs for security forces that are assigned to maintain public peace and order.
The Development of Protest Policing

Protest policing in democratic countries went through a difficult and painful journey to arrive at a desired style and model that on the one hand respects citizens’ rights of free speech and demonstration, and maintains public order and the state’s sovereignty on the other hand.

The first model of protest policing was thus the ‘escalated force’ model that required the style of protest policing to be: brutal, repressive, unrepresentative, illegal, artisanal, high visibility, anonymous, adversarial, confrontational, repressive, diffused, reactive, rigid, informal, and intolerant. The characteristics of this model caused the law enforcement agencies to perceive a perception of working and acting in the name of and for the state rather than in the name of and for the citizens, which does not represent a democratic policing model in democratic states. This model was implemented in the 1960s.

However, the North American Countries’, the United States and Canada, introduced the second model of protest policing to the literature, which is the ‘negotiated management’ model that started in 1980s. After the implementation of this model in the field-which was also urged by three Commissions, and deployed by the then United States Presidents to analyze the deadly mass movements that occurred between 1967 and 1970- no casualty caused by law enforcement strategies was reported as a result of mass demonstrations and protests.

This model was adopted shortly after by many other law enforcement agencies worldwide. However, after the transnational protests started as a result of the Seattle
Protest, the negotiated management model became inadequate and generated a third model, the ‘deterrent’ model, which has a persuasive characteristic in protest policing.

The ‘negotiated management’ model of protest policing necessitated the following protest policing styles: soft, selective, legal, identifiable, preventive, representative, flexible, low visibility, formal, professional, tolerant, cooperative, and consensual.

The third model, the ‘deterrent model’ of protest policing, came to the fore after the emergence of the previously mentioned transnational protests. The failure in confronting such global mass demonstrations in Seattle in December 1999, in Gothenburg in June 2001, and in Genoa in 2001 caused protest policing agencies to evaluate their strategies and learn from their mistakes in order to avoid further failures.

In sum, all of these models emerged after tragic incidents that threatened public peace and security. The transition from State’s Police to Citizens’ Police came after the Brokdorf decision in Germany in 1985. The transition from the escalated use of force to negotiated management came after three commissions formed by US presidents in order to evaluate protest policing existed after the assassination of Martin Luther King and the killing in 1968 and student protests at Kent University in 1970. However, after the transnational protests started as a result of the Seattle Protest, the negotiated management model became inadequate and generated a third model, the ‘deterrent’ model, which has a persuasive characteristic in protest policing.

All studies examined in this study have shown that change comes after acute incidents. For instance, “Changes and learning processes of the police are initiated by an
analysis of problematic public order interventions, that is, the police learn by analyzing their failures” (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998).

Since the dynamics, characteristics, and motivations of social mass movements are consistently changing, institutions and organizations that are responsible for maintaining public peace and security should able to change respectively. As claimed by Chan (1996), a prospective improvement of a protest-policing model should “involve change in police knowledge at different levels of the organization, also consistent with the literature on police culture and organizational change.”

Intuitional changes may need time and develop slowly and gradually. Because of its wide range of interest, these progressions need legislative and political supports. But a monopoly in protest policing models and styles and training programs can provide assistance in mobilizing anti-riot officers from city to city and help to develop a rapid adaptation process of these nationally.

A monopoly in training and models and styles of protest policing will help authorities to confront deadly riots in a safer manner. However, organizational changes can be made by local departments rapidly and instantly in accordance with the tactics employed by local mass movements.

Organizational Change and the Need for Improving Training Programs

Tactics of protests are like living organisms and are in a constant change, which in response conjunctly needs changes in protest policing models and styles. Otherwise, failure of law enforcement organizations in maintaining public peace and security is unavoidable.
The anti-riot unit of Diyarbakir Police Department successfully followed a constant developmental process in providing appropriate training programs and styles for protest policing. However, in terms of whether the anti-riot unit should follow a training program similar to paramilitary organizations or not; the perception of the officers was negative, with these officers preferring positive options. While 51.1% of the first group and 40.0% of the second group disagreed with this argument, 33.4% of the first group and 50.0% of the second group agreed with the claim. In total, 49.6% of the anti-riot officers disagreed and 36.3% of them agreed about this argument. As well, 14.1% were undecided. The reason for such a perception may have derived from the reluctance to pursue the efforts that the training demands. Conversely, 90% of the supervisors of the anti-riot police units were in favor of following a paramilitary-like training program.

While not applicable to every social mass event, what is certain is that the characteristics of social mass movement differ from city to city or from region to region in Turkey. Therefore, security forces that deal with social mass events should always be in state of researching excellence in light of these constant changes when developing alternative protest policing styles. For instance, while the characteristics of the social mass movements in Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir and Hakkari, from four regions of Turkey, differ, in parallel, the characteristics of the anti-riot officers from those cities differ as well in terms of their experience, manner, and methods and styles of protest policing.

When the location of the city lies in the Eastern part of Turkey, the level of risk and threat escalates. While the anti-riot unit in Izmir, a city that is located in the western part of the country, mostly needs water cannons, tear gas and especially adequate
numbers of officers, training programs for this unit need training programs that depend highly on acting in unison. However, when considering the anti-riot unit in the eastern part of Turkey, such as Hakkari, the need is mostly related to armed vehicles, a large amount of tear gas, bulletproof vests and helmets and a robust communication system. Along with a training program other than collective intervention styles and methods, importance should be given to firearm trainings and courses such as first aid and martial arts.

When the tactics, styles and equipment of the anti-riot unit became insufficient, an immediate organizational change is essential. The anti-riot unit of the Diyarbakir Police Department provided its officers 35 different courses in order to help them adapt to the developed tactics and tools of the protestors. First aid, the use of tear gas rifle, the use of armed vehicles, personal protection, intervention models, the use of gas masks, the use of small arms, the use of rifles, and escaping from an ambush are some of the courses provided to the personnel.

For instance, in 2010, after protestors started to use handmade explosives, the stance of personnel and armed vehicles switched in risky mass events. Armed vehicles were placed between the activists and officers to protect personnel from fireworks, stones, Molotov cocktails, and handmade explosives.

**Dividing Anti-Riot Groups into Small Teams**

Another style was developed to capture criminals in risky situations within the troubled groups.
Usually, the anti-riot units act in unity. Therefore, they are cumbersome and act slowly in interventions. Though, they are always in the front lines they have to position themselves between plain officers and the rioters due to nature of the intervention equipment, such as shields, OC spray, helmets, gas masks, teargas rifles, and other related equipment.

In order to easily overcome the sluggish movement of the anti-riot officers, as the closest unit to the troublemakers in interventions, the head of the anti-riot force developed a style for overcoming that obstacle. The group consisted of 20 anti-riot officers. During a stoning, the 20 officers built a roof with shields to protect themselves from stones and other materials. This strategy, on the one hand, caused the officers not to lose ground, on the other hand, it protected other officers behind them. This is usually how officers defend themselves.

However, the tactic developed by the head of the anti-riot unit caused fragmenting of the roof into four pieces when they were attacked as a target. From the point of view of the violent activist, the dispersing of this target into four pieces first of all astounded the attackers, and secondly, it increased the possibility of being caught by the dispersed officers. Instead of waiting, attacking and capturing became very effective in dispersing violent activists and capturing people who committed violent activities. However, in order to exhibit an effective style of intervention, officers had to work for two weeks in order to act in unison, and to be effective, safe, and fast.

The small team, as mentioned before, consists of five officers. The officer in the front holds the shield. The second officer depending on whether they are left handed or right handed, holds the tear gas rifle, which has a shooting range of 50 meters. The third
officer holds the other side of the second person, with a plastic bullet rifle, which has a range of 50 meters. The first, second and the third officers are placed behind the shield in a position of a triangle. The other two officers stay behind this triangle. When looking from the front, activists will see only a shield, but won’t know how many officers are behind this. The members of this small team hold on to each other by their belts, which is the equilibrium point of the officers. This tactic prevents the team from dissolving and falling to the ground.

One of the team leaders stated that in such a case, when attackers saw how rapidly the team dissolved and attacked, they got shocked and dropped whatever they had in their hands and started to run as if he or she was running for his or her life. This tactic was very effective in intervening in violent mass protests in the City of Diyarbakir.

**Tracking System**

In Diyarbakir, although the clashes with the police start at one point, the range of violence can easily become widespread and dispersed to every neighborhood. In such cases, police are obligated to protect many sites and people from the attackers. Therefore, teams from the anti-riot have to be deployed at every point where the masses are gathered. However, in such situations it is impossible to manage for instance 20 teams, 20 water blasting vehicles, and 20 armed personnel carriers in the whole city. In order to track the personnel and vehicles a tracking system was developed. A small signal sending device was developed to help track all vehicles and personnel from a smartphone, by whoever was allowed to have this by the administration.
This system, first of all, prevented the waste of personnel. Instead of sending a team from one side of the city to the other side, the head of the unit became able to send the closest team via the tracking system. Secondly, the system helped to determine if the personnel were stable or on the move. Thirdly, it helped to calculate the number of the personnel at the scene and to evaluate if they needed support or not after knowing the number of the protestors. In order to track and mobilize officers during interventions a GPS system was implemented.

This GPS system was helpful and used effectively. Mobilizing more than 20 teams and 40 vehicles on smartphones doubled the success rate of protest policing and provided secure intervention opportunities in order to maintain public peace and security.

**Armed Vehicle Intervention**

Another development came after protestors started to use firearms during mass events in 2011. The organization used armed vehicles along with water cannon vehicles instead of sending personnel into risky places. This team was called an Armed Intervention Team. First of all they were equipped with what was needed, such as bulletproof vests, bulletproof helmets, modified shields, tear gas rifles, paintball guns, handcuffs, small firearms, batons, flashlights and so on. Later on they went through a period of courses, first aid, personal protection, small arms, rifle, and intervention training in unison. The team was very effective in dispersing violent groups and capturing activists who committed violent actions.
The head of the anti-riot unit developed another tactic to maintain public peace and security in Diyarbakir City when the BDP members called for an uprising during a prohibited mass protest on July 14, 2012.

The city was divided into security cycles. Officers reinforced by those from other cities were deployed in protecting hot spots like governmental and private buildings that are important to the public. Security forces were deployed in three cycles around the center demonstrators aimed to reach. All three cycles prevented activists from entering the prohibited area. This strategy used close protection techniques in order to protect VIPs from external threats. Like the previous strategies, this strategy became an important for maintaining public peace and security.

Another strategy that supported the success of this assignment was the transferring of power to commanding supervisors. Usually the head of the unit is the only person who possesses and employs their power during interventions. Having the authority to use one’s initiative, first of all gave commanders the opportunity to intervene instantly, and prevented nonessential communications, and assured the wise use of mass intervention vehicles.

Close to 10,000 protestors were forced to enter the city center. But with the exception of the elected members of Parliament, no one was able to reach the targeted point. The strategy of the security cycles developed by the head of the anti-riot unit worked well. Eighty-seven activists were captured and 27 police officers were wounded during the events. Fortunately, no one was killed during this riot.
Buddy up Armed Personnel Carriers with Water Cannons

Violent protests in Diyarbakir City are common. However, when the intensity of violence increases and involves the use of Molotov cocktails and handmade explosive, sending infantry to intervene will be highly risky and may cause serious injuries. In such cases combining two armed intervention teams with one bulletproof water cannon is the best way to disperse such violent groups. Otherwise clashes will continue to prevail with no end in sight. The reason for combining the three vehicles can be explained as follows; first, sending one water cannon alone or sending two armed intervention teams alone would be tactics that could highly endanger the officers’ lives. Send, rioters may burn armed vehicles and entrap water cannons if they see them operating singly. But sending one water cannon accompanied with two armed intervention teams will threaten the rioters and will be able to disperse the crowd, because rioters know that the armed vehicle team can easily get out of the vehicle and capture any or all of them. The possibility of being captured is an important perception and this type of intervention intimidates rioters.

Providing the Needed number of Anti-Riot Officers

Providing adequate equipment is another factor that police departments should consider. Training on the one hand will cause self-confidence and on the other hand give officers the opportunity to learn how to effectively use the equipment during interventions. Otherwise, insufficient number of officers and the false use of tear gas or water cannon may cause damage rather than benefits. In the case of there being an insufficient number of officers, it will be hard to maintain public order and keep control
in mass events, officers will have the tendency to escalate the use of power. And the escalation of power may cause serious injuries and event deaths.

In order to investigate the sufficient number of anti-riot officers to be deployed in social mass events, 82-recorded violent mass events from police data of Diyarbakir Police Department were examined. First of all, the number of officers assigned to the anti-riot unit of Diyarbakir Police Department was respectively, 601 in 2010, 558 in 2011, 684 in 2012, and 750 in 2013. In the mentioned 82 violent mass events an estimation of 662,800 participants are recorded. In order to maintain public peace and safety in Diyarbakir City, in total 35,807 anti-riot officers were deployed in those 82 mass events. This correlation means that for 18.51 participants only one officer was deployed. In another word, compared with the participants, the deployed rate of anti-riot officers in violent social mass events was 5.40%.

Moreover, the number of anti-riot officers; their stance, capacity, and mobilization in unity; and adequate equipment will empower the hand of the negotiator during bargaining with masses and their leaders. %90 of the experts accepted this argument. Otherwise, it has been observed that negotiator will not be taken into consideration by masses and leaders of the organizations. Besides, the lack of sufficient equipment is believed to encourage activists that have the intention to commit violent activities.

However, while 38.1% of the officers working at the anti-riot unit of Diyarbakir Police Department believe that the anti-riot unit in Diyarbakir is well equipped and supported in numbers; 42.8% of them do not believe that they are well equipped; and 19.2% of them were undecided.
Unfortunately, only 15.7% of the anti-riot officers believed that they were deemed to be as important as they felt they were deserved to be recognized as such by the authorities; 69.2% of them believed that they were not given the feedback they deserved; and 15.1% of them were undecided. Nevertheless, 67% of the anti-riot officers claimed that they were happy to work at the ant-riot unit while 15.9% of them stated they were unhappy, and 17.2% were undecided.

**The Need of Trainings, Drills and Scenarios**

The most threatening incidents that could occur in the City of Diyarbakir is first of all terrorist attacks and a possible ethnic riot. However, in order to prevent terrorist attacks in the city and around the city, the intelligence unit is responsible for gathering information and informing related institutions and units. But preventing the city from social mass event is the responsibility of the anti-riot unit.

This task in such a vulnerable location should be considered and dealt with care and professionalism. A false order or intervention can easily turn a social mass activity into a social disorder in such a community with tight connections and tribal ties.

Therefore commanders and officers working at the anti-riot unit should consider the following issues;

- Commanders and officer should first be ready both mentally and then physically for the worst case scenario, which is an ethnic riot in this region. Officers who are assigned to the city should be considered experienced officers after and he or she should have completed at least one year of service. Because every demonstration, protest, remembrance, celebration, or political activity has its own characteristics,
experienced personnel and special equipment may be are needed The factors affecting success of any operation depend on, the equipment used and available, the number of officers, the type and numbers of vehicles, which differ depending on type of gathering, such as the remembrance of the capture of the PKK leader and the celebration of International Women’s Day. While violent mass events are more likely to occur on remembrance day events related to Ocalan’s capture, this possibility decreases in celebrations of the International Women’s Day. Therefore, an officer has to work for at least one year to be considered as experienced for this part of Turkey.

- Research on training programs is a further need in efforts to maintain public order and peace, because insufficient or poorly designed interventions will possibly provoke people in this fragile location. Officers who are assigned to the Diyarbakir Police Department should be trained and oriented for at least one to two months separately from the current officers. They should be trained and commanded by experienced team leaders.

- The personnel deployed in such locations should be trained and well-motivated. If they do not sacrifice their time, effort, and energy it might be impossible to change the past negative impressions of the citizens living in this region. Law enforcement is seen as an extension of the state’s power.

- A monopoly in the training and models and styles of protest policing helps authorities to confront deadly riots in a safer manner, because, a lack of monopoly in training nationally, causes problems in protest policing in unison. For instance, during this research I observed a violent mass event. Where Molotov cocktails,
fireworks, and stones were used against police officers. After the police started to disperse the crowd troops deployed from other cities that had never been involved in such violent mass events ran out of tear gas in a short time. Inexperience and fear caused them to run out of tear gas agents. This situation itself may not mean too much for bystanders or anyone who watched the incident, but the risky point is that if there is no longer any tear gas supplement or supplies, what would officers do to repel the threat? They cannot use the same methods the protestors do. They will automatically grasp their firearms, which is very risky for everybody who is close to the event. Therefore, a monopoly in training will provide the opportunity to make sure even unknown places and characteristics of mass movements are familiar to every officer.

- Lack of personnel, equipment, tear gas agents, and the strength of the violence committed by the rioters are among the main dynamics that urge the security forces to escalate to use of power. Such an escalation can easily generate disturbing outcomes, which are the death of any person, whether rioter, security officer, or bystander or serious injuries. Death in mass events should be considered as bloodletting, which in turn may urge relatives, friends, or organizations affiliated with the casualty to seek revenge. If the security forces expose brutality during such killings, as in the Egyptian case, it will catalyze emotions and hatred in the public’s perception, which may trigger the majority of the society and even turn friendly events to an uprising. Therefore, officers should be trained and equipped well in order to avoid such threatening incidents.
• In this sense, while 90% of the experts believed that anti-riot officers should follow a paramilitary-like firm training program, on the other hand only 36.3% of the officers agreed with the need for such a training program.

• Risk assessment studies should be considered and executed by authorities and police supervisors. Although 80% of the subjects believed that there are risk assessment strategies for countering a possible ethnic riot, 85% of the experts thought that there is supposed to be an emergency response plan against such a uprising-as social mass events. However, 95% of the subjects did not believe that law enforcement agencies are aware of what to do in case of any ethnic riot and do not believe that those agencies would be able to act conjointly.

• Moreover, 95% of the subjects complained that no scenario, drill or trainings were implemented to prepare all governmental institutions to respond to any mass uprising in Diyarbakir province. As well, 70% of the subjects stated that at least the team commander should be aware of any emergency plans. Almost 20% claimed that at least the deputy chief should be aware of any emergency plans and 10% stated all officers should be informed about any emergency plans in order to respond rapidly and affectively in efforts to to maintain public peace and order in any mass uprising.

The Needed Training Programs For Law Enforcement
• The riot-unit should become a regional force in terms of equipment, numbers and training, not only to serve in social mass events, but also in natural disasters.

• Armored Vehicle Team training should become widespread in the region.

• It is essential to provide a program in the context of the needs in this region, because the masses differ in demonstration culture.

• Changes in legislation are needed and the Anti-Riot Units in this region should follow additional firearms training program as well regular strategies.

• Quarters and training complexes are needed, because self-confidence comes after being well trained and well equipped.

• Scenarios and drills are needed to envision shortages.

• Experience is important.

• Constant training programs should be used to lay down and follow plans.

• Professionalism should be the philosophy of the anti-riot force.

• Stress management and police leadership courses are essential.

• Negotiation courses are important for supervisors.

• Effective use of equipment is possible through training, drills and scenarios.

• Trainings that support collective defense and attack approaches are essential

• Firearms Tactical Training

• Trainings about understanding mass psychology.

• The best training is experience in the field.

• A focus on tactical firearms and surviving ambush trainings are essential in risky cities and should be implemented through the use of scenarios.
Stress-control studies are essential for anti-riot officers.

For newcomers, orientation training is fundamental.

There is a circulation of officers every two years in anti-riot unit. I think we need to find a way to keep professional officers in place for an appropriate period of time with sufficient payment.

A tight training schedule is essential for officers assigned to this region because mistakes are not acceptable here. It is a risky place.

The anti-riot trainings should start in the Police Academy and the officers assigned to this region should not circulate over such a short time period.

Summary

As evaluated in developed countries, acute measures are taken after acute social aftermaths. Unfortunately, policy makers and the judiciary have taken countermeasures after a social chaos has occurred, which should be considered as a late response. Instead, listening to the demands and priorities firsthand and acting as responsible institutions, organizations, and professionals will help to foresee the threat and take measures to contain it before it became acute and irreversible.

The study has shown that the characteristics of demonstrators and their level of threats in Turkey vary from region to region and even from city to city. On this basis the training program, styles and methods of policing protests should change and be adaptive to new developments in order to respond and control social mass protests that can be considered as the opening to Pandora’s box in terms of peace and security.
• Secondly, although plain officers who make their initial; with demonstrators are mostly against following a paramilitary training program, their supervisors are in favor of following such a tough training agenda.

• Thirdly, a unilateral desire of security force organizations to change and adapt to the recent tactics and materials used by protestors is inadequate to sustain a secure and robust protests policing approach. Therefore, in addition to the will and demands of the security forces, the support of policy makers and legislation is a must in order to provide an efficient and safe form of protest policing. For instance, after terrorists attacked a public bus with Molotov cocktails and a young lady was killed, the Supreme Court approved the penalty of a person who used Molotov cocktail and charged them with 12 years in prison and defined the Molotov cocktail as a weapon. This case caused as sharp decrease in the use of Molotov cocktails that threatened not only security forces but also shopkeepers and people who argue against the terrorist organization, the PKK, as explained by experts during the conducted interviews.

• Fourthly, before deploying newly assigned anti-riot officers to social mass events organized in the city, they should attend a series of orientation courses and trainings. Otherwise, a bad reputation of rioters in the city of Diyarbakir mass can cause a hasty, unmeasured, and excess use of unbalanced power in police interventions that are not desired, not only by protestors, but also by police supervisors, the Governor, and the Government.

• Fifthly, security organizations should be in a constant state of change because social mass movements are not stable in terms of providing new tactics and tools to overcome police barricades.
Sixthly, the police data has shown that in 82 violent mass events the average of deployed officers was 5.4 per 100 demonstrators. In another word, per 18.51 demonstrators only one antiriot officer was deployed. This should be increased in order to minimize the opportunity to deter violent mass events and to have them conclude in peace in the city of Diyarbakir.

Seventh, it is understood that there is a lack of risk assessment studies, drills, scenarios, and unsatisfactory correlation with other security organization in terms of responding to an ethnical riot in the city of Diyarbakir.

Lastly, a monopoly in basic national training programs should be considered by the Turkish National Police in order to be helpful for anti-riot officers in case of being recruited for critical social mass events in other cities.
CHAPTER 9: ANALYSES AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

MENA countries have been fostering potential social unrests for many decades. In return, repressive regimes have suppressed such mass revolts, uprisings and contradictory attempts brutally. Opponents have been deprived of network and communication links, media has been censored and monopolized, and contrarians were arrested and even sentenced to the death penalty. But with the help of the social media, the course of events during the Arab Uprising went differently compared with social mass uprisings that existed before.

The ignition of the Arab Uprising started in Tunisia, and was expanded by determined societies with the help of social media instruments and concluded with the overthrow of the Tunisian Government and exile of President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in January 14, 2011; the toppling of the Egyptian government and resignation of President Hosni Mubarak in February 11, 2011; the end of the Libyan government in August 23, 2011 and the killing of President Moammar Gadhafi; civil war in Syria and Yemen; and social disorder in many MENA countries. Along with the transformation in these countries, protests in Algeria, Iraq, Oman, Morocco, and Kuwait threatened the regimes never than before.

Countries in MENA had not experienced such a destructive wave before and were not prepared how to respond. There have been three categories of states observed in terms of responding to the Arab Upheavals. The first group of states ignored and refused citizens’ demands and ended up with the fall of the government, namely, Tunisia and Egypt. The second group is comprised of states that ignored their citizens’ grievances and...
responded with brutal and repressive interventions that turned the country into civil war, as Libya, Syria and Yemen. The third group consisted of states that considered its citizens’ grievances and responded immediately in providing constitutional revisions, socioeconomic improvements or political reforms, such as in Oman, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Algeria.

Eventually, with its harmony of harboring different ethnicities, religions, sects, classes, and economic disparities along with different types of regimes and political struggles MENA countries remained in a state of flux. In an uncovered and transparent age, leaders who were able to listen to the demands of the majority and sacrifice their power and respond in time with convincing strategies, were able to mitigate the tensions of the discontented masses and were able to overcome the destructive effects of the Arab Uprising with minimal losses. Yet, autocrats who were not able to calculate the power of the discontented majority, and disregarded the grievances of their nationals, prepared not only their own end, but also the end of their regimes.

Though, the wave of the Arab Spring was not limited to the countries in the MENA, it also inspired social mass movements in the other parts of the world. Student movements in South America, Wall Street protests, and the occupation of Bretton Woods Institutions in Europe were some other mass protests inspired by the Arab Spring. This worldwide effective social mass movement strategy has also encouraged some NGOs and PKK to become sympathizers in the highly Kurdish populated Diyarbakir City.

By imitating the effective tent installment strategy that existed in the Square of Tahrir these movements in East and Southeast Turkey initiated a series of social mass demonstrations under the name of the Kurdish Uprising. In this context, the study
examined 2163 social mass movements and events that existed in the City of Diyarbakir, and interviewed twenty experts in policing protests, and surveyed 577 anti-riot officers from the Diyarbakir Police Department. Furthermore, the study aimed to find reliable answers to better understand the impact of the Arab Uprising on the attempted Kurdish Uprising; the relationship between social mass movements and law enforcement; protest policing knowledge; the perception of the Anti-Riot officers who are the central responders in any social disorder; the dynamics that turn democratic demonstrations into revolts; the factors that urge troublemakers to commit violent actions during mass demonstrations; and the relationship between terrorist organizations and social mass events that existed in the City of Diyarbakir.

**Global Interaction**

The sophisticated development of information technology enables movements to learn rapidly about other social mass movements in terms of useful and desirable methods, tools, and tactics that might prove favorable to their interests. This was observed while this study was gathering data on social mass events in the City of Diyarbakir. For instance, paint was used to stop water cannons and armed vehicles; fireworks were used to defeat anti-riot officers; and civil resistance was implemented to obtain the attention of both the media and the government.

In terms of evaluating the impact of global mass movements on a local area, the study found that 53.2% of the first group and 52.5% of the second group of anti-riot officers in Diyarbakir Police Department believed that the demonstrators in Diyarbakir imitated the tactics and methods used by mass movements in different countries. However, 33.5% of the first group and 22.5% of the second group officers did not agree
with the statement that global mass movements have inspired demonstrators in
Diyarbakir, while 13.3% of the first group and 25.0% of the second group were
undecided. The reason why the undecided ratio of the second group was almost double
that of the first group might be due to them having less experience.

The Impact of the Arab Spring On Social Mass Events Existed In The City Of
Diyarbakir

The majority of social mass movements in this region are usually organized or at
least supported by the political party BDP, now renamed the HDP, which has tight links to
the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. The initiative of setting up tents in cities’ known
to be popular places and public squares was another action adopted from the Egyptian
Revolution and tested with the support of BDP. At the beginning, organizations started with
setting tents in every neighbourhood of the City of Diyarbakir. When the initiative found
ground and worked well for gathering people, Ocalan targeted the city’s main square, the
Dagkapi Square to set up a tent and turn it into Tahrir Square. Saygi Ozturk and Altan Tan
pointed out this argument as well. This strategy was effectively used by the BDP during the
election period of 2011.

Thirteen recorded tent installment events existed in Diyarbakir City, while in five
of these events, Parliament Members from the BDP participated. Tent installment
organizations were inspired from the tent settlements in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt,
which became the symbol of the Egyptian Revolution and were used effectively during
the election period of 2011.
Although 90% of the subjects claimed that they had observed some activities of the Kurdish Uprising were similar to those in Egypt, the dynamics of the social mass movements in both countries differ from each other in terms of democracy, socio-economic indicators, social and human rights. There might be a potential to riot but there is no reasonable justification. However, 10% of the respondents stated that they did not believe in such a possibility. Moreover, 95% of them argued that the Arab Uprising and the attempted Kurdish Uprising differed in terms of ethnic discrimination, democracy indications, civil rights and economic inequality.

In terms of evaluating the perspectives of the officers of a possible Arab Spring-like revolution in this region, 46.4% of the first group and 50.1% of the second group of anti-riot officers stated that they believed that there was a potential for an Arab Spring-like revolution in the Southeastern part of Turkey. But, 28.5% of the first and 28.8% of the second group of anti-riot officers did not agree with this argument while 25.1% of the first group of officers and 21.3% of the second group of officers were undecided.

Moreover, the study examined whether social mass movements in this region learned about or at least imitated other social mass movements globally. Data showed 53.2% of the first group and 52.5% of the second group of officers believed that global mass movements had such an effect on demonstrators in Diyarbakir City. In addition, 33.5% of the first group and 22.5% of the second group of officers did not agree with the statement and 13.3% of the first group and 25.0% of the second group were undecided. The reason why the undecided ratio of the second group was almost double that of the first group might be due to them having less experience in terms of the strategies and methods used by the troublemakers.
The Possibility of Any Ethnic Uprising in the City of Diyarbakir

With a majority of Kurdish population living in this region, the study examined whether there was any potential for an ethnic riot or not, which should be considered as the most sensitive issue by governmental institutions and especially by the security forces. Here, 90% of the experts argued that such an option was improbable. Only 10% of them believed in such a possibility in Diyarbakir Province. In addition, 95% of the experts argued that the Arab Uprising and the attempted Kurdish Uprising differed in terms of factors such as freedom, civil rights and economic inequality. One of the subjects stated that although the PKK wanted to take advantage of the Arab Uprising trend, it was not possible to base the movement on any common ground and obtain the support of the whole community. Some people I talked before the study said that in the 1980’s we couldn’t even get close to the police. But now, we talk with the police like friends (in 2012). This is a sign of police success in gaining public’s confidence.

Furthermore, in the case of any ethnic riots, 80% of the experts said they believed in the existence of risk assessment strategies in order to respond to such a social upheaval. However, 81.2% of the anti-riot officers claimed that they were not aware of any emergency plan and 66.4% of the officers who were aware of any emergency plan did not know what to do during any cases of emergency.

The Impact Of The Disorder In Syria On Terrorist Activities In Turkey

In order to evaluate the impact of the internally conflicted neighbouring country, Syria, on terrorist activities in the cities close to the Syrian border, the study survey asked the experts if they had realized any impact on terrorist activities around the city. Here,
100% of them pointed out that the disorder in Syria has had an important impact on terrorist activities in the South Eastern part of Turkey in terms of smuggling firearms and explosives and trafficking PKK members.

**Comparing Egypt and Turkey In Terms Of Social Vulnerability And Reasoning Of Revolt**

In 2010, while Turkey had a population of 72.1 million, the population of Egypt was 78.1 million. In terms of an economic point of view; while Turkey possessed an amount of 731.1 billion US dollars GDP and $9,980 GDP Per Capita, Egypt possessed 219 billion US dollars GDP and $2,804 GDP Per Capita. The inflation rate of Turkey was 6% but Egypt possessed an inflation rate of 11.3%. Though, while the unemployment rate of Egypt was lower than Turkey’s with a rate of 9.9 compared with 11.9, the rate of unemployed youth differed with a variation of 4.6%. While the rate of unemployed youth in Turkey was 21.7% in 2010, the rate of unemployed youth in Egypt was 26.3%.

However, the more significant difference between two countries was the gap of the poverty rate. While the percent of the population of Egypt that works for under $4 per a day was 64.7%, this rate in Turkey was only 5%.

While access to electricity, which is a must in order to connect Information Technologies, as well as living standards was similar, the rate of mobile phone subscribers of Egypt was higher that subscribers in Turkey, 91% to 83.8%. However, the rate of Internet users in both countries differed. While the rate of Internet users in Turkey was 40%, in Egypt it was 31.4%.

In addition, in terms of democracy, the democracy index of the Economist
Intelligence Unit ranked Egypt at the 138th level and described it as authoritarian; the same index ranks Turkey at the level of 89 and described it as hybrid. On the other hand, the World Band ranked Egypt in the Corruption Perception Index in the MENA Data Report to the level of 98, while Turkey possessed the rank of 56.

Consequently, the Turkish population was far more advantaged compared with the Egyptian population in terms of the GDP per capita, poverty rate, youth unemployment, democracy, and freedom. Although Turkey had a close population to Egypt in 2010; Turkey was more democratic, less corrupt, more prosperous and able to provide more jobs compared to Egypt.

In sum, the Egyptian society had more variables that can impact discontent and complaints. They were able to justify their gathering, find a common ground, and bargain collectively to find a solution. But, the situation in Turkey was better and there was no reason for the majority to justify an Arab-Uprising-like Kurdish Revolt in the City of Diyarbakir where the majority of the population consists of Kurds. Therefore, although many attempts were initiated under the name of “Serhildan”, meaning, “Revolt”, all of them remained small and confined within the local boundaries.

However, to evaluate the scale of legitimacy of the attempted Kurdish Uprising in the Southeastern region of Turkey it is valuable to examine the socioeconomic indicators of Diyarbakir. The statistics of the 1,570,973 (TUIK) that populated City of Diyarbakir in 2011 were as follows: the growth of the population was 27.09%, ranked 13; literacy rate was 89.35%, ranked 76; and the unemployment rate was 13.5%, ranked 16 (2010). The most dense age group was identified by the ratio of 12.22%, or children between 10 and 14. The population of this age group consisted of 192,007 children. 98,086 of them were
male and 93,921 of them were female.\textsuperscript{295}

All of these indications show that there were no justified financial or material reasons for the public to pour into the streets and riot against the state or government. In addition, no brutal police intervention, torture, and humiliation was evident in the City of Diyarbakir that caused the society to gather on a common ground and start a collective bargaining process. Kurds can speak their language freely, purchase property everywhere, merchandise in every city, become employees of governmental institutions, police officers, judges, prosecutors, soldiers, generals, MPs, Ministers, and even the President of Turkey. However, the situation in Egypt was very different. People had a lot to complain about, and less hope.

As well, Diyarbakir has always been a city of importance to politicians, organizations, social mass movements, NGOs, legal and illegal organizations. Therefore, this city has witnessed and will continue to witness social changes, incidents, and developments. The killing of Vedat Aydin in 1991, social mass unrests in 2006, Tent Installment Initiatives in 2011, Gezi Park protests in 2012, Kobani protests in 2014, and Sur occupation in 2016 are events that caused the security forces and the government to fall on hard times. However, despite the struggles of the police, they tried their best to avoid brutal massacres; and their prudent approaches and those exhibited by the state authorities; digressed the social mass movements from their initial cause of meeting on

\textsuperscript{295} Retrieved on January 08, 2016 from \texttt{http://www.karacadag.org.tr/ContentDownload/Istatistiklerle-Diyarbakir-2012.pdf}
the same grounds. When the public who mitigated their participation in mass protests, almost across the whole country, the violent movements finally, it disappeared.

As a result, there was no such an environment where common movements could be based on discontent, grievances, and demands and the organizers could not attain their goal. The struggle may have dissipated and turned into sorrow and sadness, but a high level of discontent was not justified, nor was it supported by the whole society, thus it was impossible to generate the seeds of a different approach, because, in response, if the authorities become able to reflect and show the society a generally accepted social objection about the movement, the common voice of the majority may turn into a demand or voice of a certain group, sect, ethnicity or ideology and won’t be able to find the desired ground and will dissolve over a period of time, if no critical mistakes are made during the intervention period by the authorities.

**Democratization and Social Mass Movements**

Tactics of protests are like living organisms and are in a constant change, which in turn require response changes in protest policing models and styles conjunctly.

Tilly claims that the rise of authoritarian regimes in Italy, Spain, Germany and the Soviet Union caused the disappearance of social movements, which was the case prior to the Arab Uprising. However, in an environment in which there is lack of transparency, democracy, and media, respect for human rights, brutality and repression, these events are more likely to arise. Therefore, standardization in legislation is needed and every gap should be filled in terms of preventing uncertainties that may cause problems in policing protests.
The present research has shown that 76.5% of the anti-riot officers who were interviewed believed that the police should act in a democratic manner while handling demonstrations and protecting the rights of the demonstrators. However, while 93.7% of the officers who were not exposed to highly violate mass events, agreed with the statement, the percentage of officers who have intervened in many violent mass events was 72.9%.

Instead of dispersing the whole crowd, 85.1% of the second group, the newcomers, preferred the police to be selective and defuse violent activists and troublemakers apart from the whole mass. However, this ratio in the first group decreased to 74.7%. In total, 76.6% of the officers agreed and 16.1% of them disagreed with this statement, while 7.4% of them were undecided.

However, when the study examined if there was a positive impact of democratization on the frequency and quantity of peaceful demonstrations, the responses of the experts were 50% yes and 50% no.

Consequently, being exposed to violent mass events, unfortunately, caused the first group of subjects to deviate from democratic protest policing. Another variable that supports this argument is when the anti-riot officers were asked whether they saw all of the participants attending in mass protests in Diyarbakir as guilty or not, 35.0% of the second group of officers who were less exposed to violent activities such as stoned, being exposed to Molotov cocktails, fireworks, and handmade explosives believed that all of the participants attending in mass protests in Diyarbakir were guilty, the rate increased to 45.2% in the first group of anti-riot officers who had had a long tenure in this City.
Social Mass Events In The City Of Diyarbakir

The study also showed that in terms of frequency, the most preferred social mass events were the “Press Releases” that existed in Diyarbakir City over the time period of this research. The highest number of press releases between 2009 and 2013 was recorded in 2009 when the Kurdish Opening was started by the government and found an acceptable ground by the public. However, this time period also fostered a profitable environment for the BDP in terms of organizing social mass organizations and disseminating its further promises. Therefore, the highest number of recorded press releases reached 520 in 2009 and ended without violence and no arrests; in 2010, the number decreased to 509 and no arrest was recorded either; but in 2011, although the number decreased to 474 violent activities, 50 arrests occurred. The years of 2009 and 2010 coincided with the Solution Process that was led by the government. But in addition to the waves of the Arab Uprising and the departure of the General Elections, an increase in social mass events, participation in mass events, and violent actions captures our attention. After peaceful two years, 50 arrests in social mass events is a considerable number.

Nonetheless, events such as the attempts of turning Dagkapi Square into Tahriri Square inspired from the Arab Uprising, the extended period of the election campaign, and social mass events organized to protest the veto decision of the High Election Commission about some BDP nominees were some significant driving factors that increased the number of participants in 2011, especially in the first half of the year.
Furthermore, the most eminent incidents of 2012 were more emotionally centered, able to touch people’s sensibility and increase participation in mass events. The peace talks were interrupted after the PKK members killed 13 soldiers in the countryside of Diyarbakir. Military and police operations that started in response to this tragic incident, were highly accepted by the public. Even the BDP party had difficulties in gathering participants in social mass events until the aftermath of Uludere, in which 35 individuals in an airstrike were killed and this turned the situation around. People started to once again fill the squares and streets. This emotional incident along with the Hunger Strikes protests that were initiated by the PKK members in prisons in the late 2012 helped the social mass movements to attain a momentum that was similar to that of the previous years. But this time, social mass movements came to the stage with a more powerful instrument, “Kurds are being killed”. Consequently, the highest participation rate ever before reached occurred several months later in the Nevruz Celebrations. According to the officials there were 240,000 people, but others mentioned a number of 300,000 and some claimed about one million participants. This was a reflection of the emotional incidents that existed several months before and during the prohibited Nevruz Celebrations in 2012. Therefore, the highest number of social mass events in terms of quantity was recorded in 2012 as 539 in 365 days. However, the support by the public was significantly low until the Uludere Aftermath and Hunger Strikes with an average of 483.37 participants per social mass event compared with an average of the previous year of 909.82 per event. Data showed that 100% of the subjects claimed that close to 95% of the social mass movements that existed in Diyarbakir City were politically centered and not socially oriented or designed for other purposes.
The Perception of Anti-Riot Officers Intervene in Mass Events

It was shown that 45.2% of the first group and 35.0% of the second group of officers thought that all of the participants attending mass protests in Diyarbakir were guilty. But, 36.6% of the first group and 45.1% of the second group disagreed. However, 18.2% of the first group and 20.0% of the second group of officers were undecided.

Moreover, 52.6% of the first group and 70.1% of the second group of officers thought that the right to demonstrate was a constitutional right to be safeguarded. Almost 25.9% of the first group and 20.0% of the second group disagreed with this statement. Yet, 21.5% on the first group and 10.0% of the second group of officers were undecided. The reason that caused the first group of officers to be undecided may have been due to the density of the mass events and the high numbers intervening in the violent mass events.

While 53.8% of the first group and 46.3% of the second group were pessimistic about seeing a constant nonviolent, safe and peaceful culture of demonstrations occurring in the near future in Diyarbakir province, only 19.9% of the first group and 36.3% of the second group officers were optimistic. The difference between the two groups was possibly due to the perceptions of the officers who had been stationed in Diyarbakir for long time, witnessed more mass events, intervened in more crowded demonstrations, and were exposed to more violent uprisings compared with the newly assigned officers.

The Possible Escalation of Nationalist Thinking among the Youth
95% of the experts claimed that there was a dramatic increase in nationalist thinking among the youth in this part of Turkey. One of the subjects claimed that nationalist thinking or ideology is one of the most effective methods of recruitment for the PKK.

**Correlation Between Democratization and The Frequency and Quantity Of Demonstrations**

The study examined if there would be a positive impact of democratization on the frequency and quantity of peaceful demonstrations. The responses of the experts were 50% yes and 50% no. However, 76.5% of the total number of anti-riot officers believed that the police should act in a democratic manner and should protect the rights of the demonstrators during policing protests. In terms of comparing the experienced and newcomers, 93.7% of the second group of officers who were less exposed to highly violent mass events, agreed with the statement. But, this ratio decreased in the first group of anti-riot officers to 72.9%.

**The Impact of the Elected Individuals On Mass Demonstrations**

Social mass events in Diyarbakir and neighboring cities were highly pro-BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) driven, which is determined as being related to the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The study showed that the participation of elected persons has an impact both on increasing the numbers of participants and the numbers of troublemakers in committing violent activities.

In 2009, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 343, with the participation of elected members of the BDP the
average number of participants rose to 1,890.5. The variation was 1547.5 and the impact was a 451.16% increase.

In 2010, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 281.92, with the participation of elected members of the BDP, the average number of participants rose to 2,602. The variation was 2,302.08 and the impact was an 822.95% increase.

In 2011, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 419.59, with the participation of elected members of the BDP the average number of participants rose to 2,490. The variation was 2,070.41 and the impact was a 493.43% increase.

In 2012, while the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people was 289, with the participation of elected members of BDP the average number of participants rose to 998.50. The variation was 709.50 and the impact was a 245.50% increase. Decisive police and military operations against the PKK after the terrorist organization killed 13 soldiers in the rural side of Diyarbakir, decreased participation in social mass events.

However, after a peace talk was held in the first half of 2013, the average number of participants for each mass event without elected people increased to 841, with the participation of elected members of the BDP the average number of participants rose to 5,838. The variation was 4,997 and the impact was a 594.12% increase.

This means that the elected BDP members had a tremendous impact on increasing the numbers of participants in social mass events that existed in the City of Diyarbakir.
The Correlation Between Elected Individuals and Violent Mass Events

The study showed that elected individuals of the BDP were very active in participating in social mass events that existed in the City of Diyarbakir. The BDP members participated in 32.54% of mass events organized in 2009; 18.86% of mass events that existed in 2010; 23.66% of mass events that were organized in 2011; 27.27% of mass events that occurred in 2012; and 18.62% of mass events that existed in the first five months of 2013.

In terms of examining the correlation between elected individuals and violent mass events, the study showed that elected BDP members participated in 50% of violent social mass events that existed in 2009; the ratio rose in 2010 to 54.54%, in 2011 to 58.33%; this proportion decreased in 2012 to 48%; and rose again in the first five months of 2013, to 70%.

As a result, instead of mitigating violent activities in social mass events, the study showed that the elected officials of the BDP had an impact in terms of causing or urging troublemakers and PKK affiliated individuals to find an environment in which to commit violent activities within the borders of Diyarbakir City.

In terms of results, instead of mitigating violent activities in social mass events, elected officials can impact demonstrators by urging them to commit violent activities and by increasing the number of participants in social mass events in the city of Diyarbakir.
The Correlation Between Terrorist Activities and Violent Protests

When the experts were asked if there was any direct or inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and mass events, 95% of them claimed that there is an inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and mass events in Diyarbakir. One of the subjects stated, “The determining factor seems to be the seasons. In wintertime terrorists hide in the mountains until the layer of snow is gone and the spring comes. During the wintertime urban organizations fill the gap left by terrorist activities and become more active compared with the summer time. But with the beginning of the spring, terrorists become active in the rural areas.” However, 5% of them who thought there was no such a relationship stated, “Although this hypothesis does not work here, because mass events here are 90% PKK (terrorist organization) related and the sympathizers just follow the orders that come from the leaders.” He continued “the more crowded the mass event is, the more powerful they will feel. This power urges them to stone or use other ways of committing violence against the police, governmental institutions and shopkeepers who don't obey and don't pay extortion money to the PKK.”

However, 42.9% of the anti-riot officers did not believe that there was an inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and violent protests. Only 24.1% of them believed that there is such a relationship, and 32.9% of them, which is a high proportion, were undecided. This high rate of undecided respondents may stem from the concentration of social mass events in the city. They may not be informed about terrorist activities that exist in the countryside compared with the experts who are ranked officers in the police department.
On the other hand, when analyzing the police data of social mass events in 2009 until 2013, a gradual rise in social mass events is observed. At the same time, a parallel escalation in terrorist activities within the urban areas, exclusive from mass events, is seen through the police data. Hanging illegal posters on bridges and buildings, explosions, and using Molotov Cocktails and handmade explosives on governmental institutions and shops are defined as terrorist activities according to the law. In this respect, a twofold increase is seen in 2010 compared with the year of 2009. A threefold increase is seen in the year 2011 compared with the year 2010 and a 1% decrease in 2012 was found compared with the year 2011. All of these actions were defined as terrorist activities according to the law. In this content, 65 terrorist activities were recorded in 2009, 120 in 2010, 367 in 2011, and 363 in 2012. A parallel growth is seen in the participation rates in social mass events that existed in the City of Diyarbakir.

However, these numbers may change in the rural areas where PKK members can be identified by their clothing and automatic machineguns. Ambushes, road bombings, and suicide bombings may have a different inclination in the studied years, which may substantiate the result found in interviews with experts of social mass movements.

Consequently, there is a direct proportional relationship between social mass events and terrorist activities in the urban areas, but an inversely proportional relationship between social mass movements and terrorist activities in the countryside. On the other hand, some experts claim that this relationship exists just because of the guidance of the terrorist organization the PKK. Because the organization does not want to leave any gap open by missing activities, in order to keep and increase the number of recruitments; they want to show off their existence; and remain in the political arena.
Considering Emotionality in Social Mass Events

Emotionality has the power to make discontent popular and to gain support from bystanders and even from people who do not have had any interest in participating in any social mass event. The Mohamed Bouazizi case in Tunisia and Khaled Said case in Egypt were two touching incidents that affected the majority of the society. Mohamed Bouazizi, in Tunisia, went to the local municipality to seek recourse after a policewoman slapped him and his fruit cart was destroyed. Later on, after being humiliated and not finding anyone who would listen to him and give him any hope, he rushed with anger to the government building and set himself on fire and was taken to hospital, on December 17, 2010. Images and videos of Bouazizi were shared via social media but became more common after being picked up by Al-Jazeera and were then disseminated worldwide. Bouazizi became the icon of the Tunisian Revolution and more importantly the spark of the Arab Uprising. The case of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia generated a common reflection that turned the public against the government and especially President Ben Ali. The incident touched the public’s feelings and emotions, which led to the dynamics of mass movements.

Eventually, the deaths of Bouazizi and killing of Said became the triggering factors that urged angry, hopeless and discontented youth in both countries to revolt against their regimes and authorities. They became the significant player who shouldered the social unrests in their countries and transformed them into revolutions.
The emotional factor, fosters a dynamic that has the potential to cause transformation in feelings and faiths and give courage to people to ignore their fears and rise against their repressive opponents, whatever it may cost. The emotional factor shelters the deathblow of the social movement. This potential strength, which is based on a “common reasoning” or “common ground” helps to finalize the social unrest in a revolution or resolution. It is the emotional factor that touches peoples’ feelings and sensations and generates a tsunami affect that raises people against mighty dictators.

In order to emphasize the magnitude generated from the correlation between social media and emotion potential during the Egyptian Uprising, Idle and Nunns (2011) claim that “the tweets were instant, and so emotional and exciting that anyone following them felt an intense personal connection to what was happening in Tahrir.”

Emotional factors are effective in heightening the quantity and violent activities in social mass events. For instance, while the average number of participants in each mass event was 355.25 in the City of Diyarbakir, during the period of hunger strikes the average of participants rose to 605.32 participants for each mass event.

Moreover, the veto decision of the High Election Commission is another emotional reaction that triggered 45 mass events in 39 days. Eleven of those mass events were violent mass protests. Until the second decision of the commission that declared that seven nominees were eligible to participate in the parliamentary election, the BDP turned

this incident into an emotional reflection that triggered violent reactions and raised the average of the violent mass events to 24.44 per cent during this period of time, while the average number of violent mass events in 53 months was 5.40 per cent.

Overall, in 39 days emotionality caused a rise of 452.59% in violent mass events during the period of prohibited BDP nominees. As well, 140,825 people participated in social mass protests in 39 days with an average of 3,129.44 participants for each social mass event, while the average of four and a half years was 878.58 participant for each social mass event.

The number of participants in funeral ceremonies for PKK members in 2009 was 3,500 and 8 of those ceremonies were defined as violent, but with no arrests. In 2010, violent activities in funeral ceremonies increased to 21 with the participation of 13,060 people and with one arrest. In 2011, violent funeral ceremonies of PKK members increased to 44 with the participation of 135,580 individuals and this resulted in 42 arrests. Consequently, year-by-year an increase in participation in violent funeral ceremonies, and arrests in those events has been realized.

In terms of maintaining a safe and peaceful protest, the researcher examined whether the emotions and perceptions of the protestors should be considered or not. While 46.9% of the first group agreed and 36.5% disagreed with this argument, 62.5% of the second group agreed and only 21.3% of them opposed this impression.

Although 100% of the experts thought that in emotional mass demonstrations, the presence of the anti-riot force would trigger the group that was apt to commit violent actions, all of them, again, thought that without deploying anti-riot officers in social mass events that included 1,000 demonstrators this would not end in peace in Diyarbakir City.
without assaulting or damaging governmental buildings or rival individuals. In addition, 100% of the subjects believed that emotional events have the potential to provoke social movements. The media, the PKK or related political organizations were able to easily abuse emotional incidents.

In addition, the tragic incident, the killing of 13 soldiers in Silvan by the PKK, caused a reactance that diminished the support and participation of organized mass events in Diyarbakir and neighbouring cities. After this tragic incident the state’s determined military operations began and this found legitimate acceptance not only by citizens of the Western part of Turkey, but also citizens of the South and South-eastern part of Turkey. During this period a sharp decrease was observed in social mass events in Diyarbakir because soldiers were represented by almost every region of Turkey and ethnicity. Two were from Adana, one from Hatay, two from Gaziantep and from each cities of Giresun, Konya, Samsun, Zonguldak, Bursa, Agri, Tekirdag, and Sanliurfa one soldier was killed by the PKK.

While 316,362 individuals participated in social mass events in the first half of 2011, the participation in social mass events dropped to 125,813 in the second half of the year after the Silvan aftermath existed. An expert of social mass events claimed that after the Silvan aftermath, BDP member to the Parliament were not able to gather supporters in Diyarbakir City, until the Uludere incident existed on December 28, 2011, which resulted in the deaths of 35 Kurdish citizens during an airstrike close to the Iraqi border. This tragic incident caused another emotional momentum, which caused a social hatred and reaction that poured not only young people into streets, but also elderly, women, and children.
The Disadvantages of Late Responses In Social Mass Reactions

Nevertheless, countries with repressive autocrats such as Mubarak, Ben Ali, Gaddafi, and Assad ignored their nationals’ voices, demands, and discontents. They responded to protests harshly and brutally and generated a state of sorrow, tears and death of their people. Unfortunately, by their arrogant behavior and by ignoring their nationals, Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar Gadhafi ended their regimes. It took Ben Ali two weeks to visit Bouazizi in hospital. Mubarak blamed and blackmailed him even in his final speeches.

Eleven days after the initiation of the uprising, on December 28, 2010, President Ben Ali declared a statement through media. He used an intimidating style and declared that people who participate in violent action would be punished. Later on, in order to take some counter actions, he dismissed two governors, including the Governor of Sidi Bu Zeyd, and three ministers. Protests continued for about a month. Consequently, after 219 people died, Ben Ali had to leave the country on January 14, 2011.

These leaders did not assess the risk they faced. If they had responded to the threat in the right way, responded on time, and provided hope and change they may have had a chance to stay still in power. This is because retreat and scarification from power followed with sincere policy adaptations and implementations, has helped many rulers, especially monarchs.

Negotiation
In addition, some of the subjects claimed that without consulting the thoughts of the head of the anti-riot force, negotiations would become deficient, because the anti-riot force holds the power to negotiate, and is strongly considered by the masses to have the potential to commit violent actions.

During the field observation, the researcher observed that without consulting the head of the anti-riot force, the negotiations could become inadequate. The number of anti-riot officers; their stance, capacity, and mobilization ability; and adequate equipment are the components that empower the hand of the negotiator. Therefore 90% of the experts accepted this argument. Otherwise, it has been observed that crowds and their leaders will not take that negotiator into consideration.

Moreover, 90% of the subjects believed that after reaching an agreement with the leaders of the organization, masses will keep their words. After asking if there is a mutual trust between the police negotiators and the leaders of the mass movements in Diyarbakir City, 65% of the experts claimed during their interviews that they do not believe that there is a mutual trust, while 35% of them thought that there is mutual trust between the police negotiators and the leaders of the organizations, because they know each other and meet almost every week on the streets during mass events. Therefore, they have no choice other than to trust each other. Moreover, 70% believed that negotiations work at any level of the mass demonstrations, before, during and after. But, 30% of them do not agree with the idea that negotiations work at any level of mass demonstrations.

Moreover, 30.1% of the officers believed that there is a mutual trust between the police and demonstrators during negotiations in mass events in Diyarbakir, while 44.8% did not believe in the existence of such a mutual trust between the police and the leaders of
mass organizations. But 25.0% of them were undecided. However, on the other hand, 56.4% of the officers found negotiating with the demonstrators helpful in order to maintain peace and security on the streets. Yet, 28.6% of them disagreed, and 15.1% of them were undecided.

**The Significance of Social Ties In Social Mass Movements**

Social movement theory claims that communities with dense connections are more likely to reflect collective actions compared with those with thinner ties. 100% of the experts believed that PKK members and sympathisers have a tight communication network. They use social media and the Internet actively; satellite dishes are found on almost all houses in this region; and neighborhoods are shared and assigned to militias. In this case, it is almost impossible to miss any one in the event there is a call for participation in a social mass event.

During this present research study in Diyarbakir, experts on terrorist organizations and domestic security claimed that such organizations aim to encourage not only recruited individuals, but also sympathizers to participate in demonstrations, protests and other social mass events. This strategy is expected to help such organizations first of all, to keep their recruits warm and active; secondly, it draws the attention of television channels and being in the news; and thirdly, by bringing sympathizers and security personnel face to face and letting them clash with the security forces might cause sympathizers to become recruiters or at least embrace the movement.

**The Impact Of The Remarks Of The Authorities On Social Mass Demonstrations**
In Turkey, the government is seen as the sole player in confronting protestors in the name of defending the state sovereignty by the majority of the public. At the same time, it is believed that whoever represents the state also has the power to adjust the degree of coercion used in any police intervention during mass events. Moreover, since the main target in mass protests is usually the government, it is also believed that it is again the government that has the ability to lessen the tensions of the masses through its remarks. In this study, 90% of the subjects believed that the statements and press releases made by the highest authority of the state or city have an impact on escalating or mitigating the tensions of social mass protests, but 10% did not agree with this statement.

**The Impact Of The Media In Provoking Masses**

The proliferation and high-speed progress in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) generated the “new media”, satellite and internet-based social media; and provided individuals with the ability to surpass monopolized information sources, state owned televisions and media, and barriers build by authoritarian regimes; and to communicate, organize and share images and videos from the scene instantly. This opportunity encourages even individuals who have had a weak bond with movements and may have feared to speak out against the regime in public, communicate, organize and mobilize on a common ground for a common purpose. The Egyptians owe their success to keeping their activities and mobilizations on a common route that the majority of the public believed in. Regimes that were able to divide social mass movements from the common ground by differentiating or demonizing some of the movements became able to control and mitigate social revolts.
The media is an important catalyst in escalating protestors’ violent action (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998). In this study, 100% of the interviewed experts believed that the media do have an impact in provoking social mass movements as well as the public. For instance, the call made by Roj TV in March 2006 started a period of social unrest in Diyarbakir after the army killed 14 PKK members and caused an unrest period that continued for four days, caused the deaths of ten individuals, over four hundred civilians and police officers were injured, and damage of property costs were close to a half million US dollars.

As well, 84.8% of the surveyed anti-riot officers believed that the media have the ability to misuse events and issues in order to escalate demonstrators’ tension and encourage them to commit violent activities. Only 10% of them believed that the media have no such impact on social mass events and 5.1% were undecided.

**The Background Of Violent Mass Events And Repressive Police Interventions**

Officers who experienced more social mass events in terms of quantity and confronting violent mass activities were less nervous, more experienced, and prudent. They possessed a State’s Police centric philosophy compared with officers who were less experienced and less exposed to violent mass events. This can be interpreted as; officers who are less experienced and less exposed to violent protests feel more Citizens’ Police centric than the experienced group. Therefore, duties that are most likely to end in violence and need affective interventions should be given to experienced officers in terms of maintaining public peace and order. But, for tasks that need more Citizens’ Police centric protest policing knowledge, it is recommended that officers who were less
exposed to violent mass assaults should be deployed. This is because officers that believe in the Citizens’ Police Philosophy are more likely to safeguard friendly demonstrations, rather than being eager to disperse the crowd.

Eventually, all interviewed subjects, 100%, agreed on the fact that being a State’s Police officer is more prominent than being a Citizens’ Police officer according to the law, which determines the institutional point of view. Interestingly, as some of the experts stated, often after being exposed to violent activities by protestors, this may change the knowledge of officers who believe in the prominence of the Citizens’ Police to the State’s Police.

Moreover, 100% of the experts on social mass movements claimed that if the proportion of deployed anti-riot officers is lower than it should be, there are at least two threats. One is that, if the number of anti-riot officers is lower than it should be compared with the numbers of the crowd, militants, or assaultive individuals are more likely to commit violent actions. On the other hand, the second threat is that in order to mitigate the pressure of the violent crowd that is proportionally higher than officers, too much force is more likely to heighten the level of imbalanced forces. However, in the case of deploying a sufficient number of anti-riot officers, violent activists may not find the courage and availability to commit violent actions due to the possibility of being caught or arrested. On the other hand, if officers realize that they are crowded enough compared with demonstrators, repressive interventions might not be the option, because they will not feel threatened and deficient.

Nonetheless, 90% of the interviewed subjects claimed that the degree of violent actions introduced by the rioters is the stimulus that adjusts the degree of police
repression. In contrast, 10% thought that repressive police interventions stem from some officers’ intolerance against social mass movements in the City of Diyarbakir. One of the subjects claimed that 80% of the mass events in Diyarbakir City are linked, in one or the other way to the terrorist organization of the PKK. Therefore, the police are seen by those organizations as an organization that represents the state. Thus, hatred towards the state turns to hatred towards the police. In this respect, police are stoned, Molotov cocktails are thrown at them and they are exposed to improvised explosive devices (IED). Such cruel actions cause officers to feel unsafe and threatened, which in response triggers intolerant interventions by some officers. Fear, anxiety and sometimes hopelessness increase the tension and stress that generates repressive behaviors. Additionally, it is also certain that right equipment (for instance, non-combustible uniform, bulletproof west and helmet) increases confidence and lessens fear.

It was further observed that 57.8% of the first group and 59.5% of the second group believed that a softer and more tolerant protest policing style in intervention did not mitigate the violent behavior of the rioters, while 21.6% of the first group and 21.5% of the second group believed that a softer and more tolerant protest policing style has an impact on mitigating the violent behavior of the troublemakers.

It was also found that 66.9% of the officers believed that repressive interventions would have positive impacts on preventing violent activities, 17.7% of them disagreed, however, and 15.4% of them were undecided.

In addition, 59.8% of the officers believed that repressive police interventions do not provoke demonstrators to commit violent actions. However, 22.0% of them believed
that repressive interventions provoke demonstrators to commit violent actions and 18.3% of them are undecided.

**A Task without Intervention**

Finally, when experts during the interviews were asked whether a task that ends without police intervention makes you happy or not? 100% of them said, yes. Thus, tear gassing masses, hydro blasting people with water cannons, and chasing activists is not a task that police supervisors are happy with.

**Risk Assessment**

Although 80% of the experts believed that there are risk assessment strategies for a possible ethnic riot, 85% of them thought that there was supposed to be an emergency response plan against uprisings-like social mass events. But, 95% of the subjects did not think that law enforcement agencies were aware of what to do in case of any ethnic riot and did not believe that those agencies would be able to act conjointly. Moreover, 95% of the experts complained that no scenario, drill or trainings were implemented to prepare all governmental institutions to respond to any mass uprisings in Diyarbakir province. It was found that 70% of the subjects stated that at least the team commander should be aware of emergency plans, 20% claimed that at least the deputy chief should be aware of emergency plans, and 10% stated that all officers should be informed about the emergency plans in order to respond rapidly and effectively to maintain public peace and order in any mass uprising.

The majority of the subjects, 95%, did not believe that in the case of an uprising supported by the majority of the resident in Diyarbakir City, the institutions would be
able to coordinate and act in harmony and control if such an uprising occurred instantly, because no drills or scenarios were practiced simultaneously. Such drills and scenarios are helpful in detecting the missing points and shortages and help officers to respond effectively with care and safety. Otherwise, without experience, drills, sufficient personnel and equipment and intelligence, the security forces will have to respond abruptly to social mass unrests with unbalanced repression that will cause serious injuries and even deaths. Because, unprepared security forces will have to fill the gap generated by the absence of intelligence, experience, unified actions, and sufficiency, they will act in a repressive manner in order to control disorder. Only 5% of them believed that those institutions that are in charge of this issue would respond in unison.

In addition, the researcher examined the perceptions of the anti-riot officers dealing with social mass movements to establish if they were aware of any emergency plan or not. It was found that 81.2% of them were not aware of any emergency plan. However, 66.4% of the officers who were aware of any emergency plans did not know what to do during any case of emergency.

The law enforcement approaches should not be static in terms of training programs; methods and styles of protest policing; and development, rather they should be dynamic because social mass movements and other organizations in recent decades have had the ability to observe worldwide developments through the dynamics of globalization and to reach their counterparts all around the world. They may be inspired by each other and continue to protest on the streets with new techniques and strategies. Therefore, law enforcement agencies should carry out risk assessment research and develop new strategies in order to fulfill their duties, as expected in democratic countries in order to
maintain public peace and security. Scenarios, drills and training strategies should vary in space and time to prepare law enforcement officers in dealing with the worst case scenarios in the name of maintaining public peace and security for the people.

**Protest Policing**

Protest policing in democratic countries went through a difficult and painful journey to arrive at a model of protest policing that on the one hand respects citizens’ right of free speech and demonstration, and on the other hand maintains public order and the state’s sovereignty.

The secret of successful protest policing in democratic states appears to depend on the quantity of the experienced confrontations and interventions.

**Leadership in Social Mass Protests**

In their study conducted in France, Fillieule and Jobard (1998) came to the conclusion that the strategy of the protestors, the polices’ perceptions, plus the directives of the political authority are the main forces that shape the style and model of intervention. In addition, the major weapon of the police dealing with mass events is negotiation with the organizers, rather than implementing repressive or legalistic responses.

According to Fillieule and Jobard (1998), there are three main stimuli that influence the style of intervention in protest policing, which are: the government, law enforcement, and protestors. To understand the actual policing styles, they argue that each mass demonstration should be analyzed as a three-way interaction among the three main players and determinants in mass events, which are the demonstrators, civil authorities and law enforcements. Related to this, the demands of the political authorities,
the perceptions of the police officers, and the characteristics of the masses should be

taken equally serious.

To evaluate this argument the researcher asked the respondents about which factor
they believed was more effective in determining the style of police intervention, the police,
the supervisor, the governor, the government, demonstrators, or others? It was shown that
4.7% of the total officers selected the option “others”, 6.6% of them selected the Governor,
27.6% of them choose demonstrators, while 28.8% of them preferred the Supervisors, and
32.3% selected the Government as the main actors in determining the style of police
intervention.

**Perception of the Anti-Riot Unit in Diyarbakir City**

In terms of perceptions, 63.3% of the first group and 83.8% of the second group were
happy to work in the anti-riot unit in Diyarbakir City, while 17.4% of the first and 8.8%
of the second group were unhappy working at the anti-riot unit. In total, 67.0% of the
officers were satisfied, 17.2% undecided, and 15.9% were unhappy.

In addition, 59.3% of the anti-riot officers saw themselves as tolerant while 18.1%
of them saw themselves as tough during police interventions in mass events.

More importantly when experts who supervised officers during mass events were
asked whether a task that ends without police intervention made them happy or
not,100%said, yes. Thus, tear gassing masses, hydro blasting people with water cannons,
and chasing activists is not a task that police supervisors are happy with. But in terms of
maintaining public peace and security they believe that there should be no gap left for
criminals, troublemakers and provocateurs that commit violent activities.
Keeping the Balance of Sufficient Number of Officers and Needed Mass Intervention Vehicles with the Quantity and Toughness of Activists

The number of the anti-riot officers is important during mass demonstrations. Insufficient number of anti-riot officers and Mass Intervention Vehicles compared with the number of protestors will generate the thought in the protestors mind that they can easily surpass the police barricades and can even provide them with a tough lesson. However, if the number is proportional to the numbers of the crowd, people who have the potential to commit violent actions will usually postpone or waive such an action. In this respect, although 100% of the experts thought that the presence of the anti-riot force would trigger an emotional mass demonstration in a group who is apt to commit violent actions, at the same time, 100% of them did not believe that without deploying anti-riot officers in a social mass event that consists of 1,000 demonstrators in Diyarbakir, that the gathering, act, or rally will end in peace and security.

The Police Philosophy of the Officers Dealing with Social Mass Movements İn The Diyarbakir Police Department

Tactics of protests are like living organisms and are in a constant change, and thus responses need changes in models and styles of protest policing conjunctly. Otherwise, the failure of law enforcement in maintaining public peace and security will be an unavoidable circumstance.
It is obvious that the perceptions of the anti-riot officers’ in Diyarbakir Police Department are to first and foremost protect the State, with a rate of 78.6% and then to safeguard the demonstrators. The rate that was attained for the preferred Negotiated Management Model in protest policing during social mass events was 60.3%, while 11.2% of the experts selected the Escalated Use of Force model, which is a highly old fashioned and questionable model of protest policing in terms of human dignity and public respect. Similar to the choice of the anti-riot force, 75% of the experts that were responsible in leading security forces in social mass events in the City of Diyarbakir preferred the Negotiated Management Model, while 25% chose the Deterrent Model of Protest Policing.

To scrutinize the police philosophy and perceptions of the officers from the Diyarbakir Police Department, several further questions were posed. In response to these questions, 66.4% of the anti-riot unit preferred to be State’s Police while 33.6% of them preferred to be Citizens’ Police. While 69.3% of officers from the first group, the experienced officers, saw themselves as State’s Police and 30.7% as Citizens” Police, 53.3% of the less experienced officers saw themselves as State’s Police and 46.7% as Citizens’ Police.

Moreover, when the study asked officers how they perceived their colleagues feelings when confronting mass demonstrations, 86.8% of the total number of subjects believed that their colleagues followed the philosophy of the State’s Police in dealing in social mass events that existed in Diyarbakir City, while 12.4% of them believed that their colleagues saw themselves as Citizens’ Police during policing protests in social mass events in the city of Diyarbakir.
Results also showed, dealing with harsh and violent mass events causes officers to believe in safeguarding the state and defining themselves as State’s Police; and to believe that most of the demonstrators in the City of Diyarbakir are affiliated with the terrorist organization the PKK; and profile protestors as potential criminals.

**The Importance Of Evaluating The Sufficient Number Of Personnel And Equipment**

In terms of evaluating the deployment of the right proportion of anti-riot officers compared with the rate of participants, the study examined 82-recorded violent social mass events. In these social mass events, 44 officers were wounded in 2009; in 2010, this number decreased to 22; in 2011, the number of wounded officers increased to 97; in 2012 drop to 67; and in the first five months of 2013 it escalated to 76. The number of wounded officers, actually, describes the intensity and severity of the social mass events in Diyarbakir City.

However, in the aforementioned 82 mass events an estimated 662,800 participants took place in social mass events. In order to maintain public peace and safety in Diyarbakir City, a total of 35,807 anti-riot officers were deployed in those 82 social mass events. This correlation means that for every 18.51 participants only one officer was deployed. In another word, compared with the participants, the deployed rate of anti-riot officers was 5.40 per 100 protestors, which means in order to maintain public peace and order and mitigate violent mass events, the police organization should try to increase the rate of its anti-riot officers above 5.40% compared with 100% of protestors.
On the other hand, sufficient personnel, adequate equipment and vehicles are the sources of patience, and tolerance and the Deterrent Model of protest policing, which is the most secure and effective model of protest policing. Yet, this needs more equipment, personnel, and professionalism, which means greater costs, patience and effort.

Moreover, if the proportion of deployed anti-riot officers is lower than it should be, compared with the numbers of the crowd, 100% of the experts in social mass movements believe that there will be an increase in both, the tendency toward committing violent activities by protestors and correspondingly an escalation of the use of force by the security forces. While an insufficient number of anti-riot officers and mass intervention vehicles will encourage activists who have the potential to commit violent activities, on the other hand, it will cause officers to feel anxious, which in turn will force officers to overlook maintaining the balanced use of force. However, in the opposite situation, the deployment of sufficient officers and equipment, will mostly discourage violent militants from committing violent actions due to the risk of being caught or arrested. On the other hand, if officers realize that they are sufficiently numerous and well equipped compared with the demonstrators, repressive interventions might not be the option, because they will not feel threatened or deficient. At this level, experienced police supervisors who are responsible for orchestrating the mission are obligated to use this power with care in order to maintain peace and order.

Therefore, in order to prevent the masses from committing violent activities and maintaining public safety, 95.1% of the second group and 88.1% of the first group believed that in massive mass gatherings the presence of the police should be massive as
well. A weak presence of the police may urge troublemakers to commit violent activities, which in response needs police intervention and the natural use of force.

In addition, 45.5% of the first group and 60.3% of the second group considered that confronting an organized mass gathering is easier than an anonymous or unorganized mass situation, while 33.4% of the first group and 29.5% of the second group disagreed.

Moreover, 81.1% of the officers believed that deploying enough and well-equipped anti-riot officers and needed vehicles, such as bulletproof vehicles and water cannons, have an impact on mitigating and preventing the violent tendency of potential troublemakers. 8.9% of them disagreed and 9.9% of them were undecided. 8.9% of them disagreed and 9.9% of them were undecided. They believed that someone who knows that there is no gap or place to escape from after committing any violent activities will hesitate to commit any type of crime. Therefore, deploying adequate number of officers and mass intervention vehicles has a positive impact on maintaining public peace and security.

Consequently, security organizations policing protests should have the needed personnel in quantity and quality along with the adequate equipment to maintain public peace and order. Otherwise, the lack of personnel, right equipment, and experience will cause risky protests and in turn brutal interventions that may need persuasive explanations made by authorities to decrease the tension of the public.

**Considering The Perception Of The Anti-Riot Officers And Activists In Social Mass Demonstrations**
Without carefully diagnosing the perceptions of the officers and determining the tensions and emotions of the protestors a confrontation may possibly result in an undesired outcome. In the case of such uncertainties, as observed in Diyarbakir, keeping a fair distance between both the police units and protestors will minimize violence against both individuals and public property. In such situations, security officers should keep their distance and use their presence as a sign to show that the police are here and will not intervene unless the protestors commit violent actions. Officers should be informed about the event, the profile of the activists, and their tendency toward committing violent actions. For instance, securing hot spots and keeping a fair distance between security forces and crowds gathered for funeral ceremonies of terrorists might be helpful in maintaining public peace and security, in unorganized and spontaneously gathered crowds. Standing next to them will also possibly be useful for controlling the crowd and preventing them from committing any violent activities.

Furthermore, training and experience will help police supervisors to estimate the course of events and from the method and style of the protest policing to conclude the event in peace and security. Otherwise, even if the rank and file officers are well equipped and trained, the lack of appropriate knowledge by the police executive can easily cause a disaster during policing mass protests because of the unknown characteristics of the demonstrations that varies from city to city. Therefore, as is the practice in France, police executives should go through some courses or programs to acquire experience and become informed as to how to administer law enforcement officers and how to negotiate with activists. It is the leader who directs and orchestrates the game.
Moreover, blaming only the police or the army would be a deficient argument. In important social mass events, the guidance and directives of the governing figures design the model and style of protest policing. Within this perspective police and army interventions in the demonstrations in Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan are much more successful compared with the interventions existed in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria.

Interventions deployed by the security forces in Morocco, Lebanon, Oman and Jordan designed by their authorities were softer and employed with cared. Unfortunately, it is the authority that designed the level of intervention. During the Arab Uprising period no killing was reported in Lebanon. Two deaths were reported in Oman, three deaths in Jordan and six in Morocco compared with 300 deaths in Tunisia, 849 in Egypt, and about 2,000 in Yemen during mass protests in 2011.

**Considering Triggering Factors In Social Mass Events**

Political and socioeconomic factors are stated by academicians and authors to be among other factors that should not be neglected, because they have the potential to be the source of social unrest. Usually, unrest needs a catalyzer, which can be described as the last straw that cause the public to lost control and pour into streets and squares. The last straw that triggered the public’s feelings became the images and video footages of Bouazzi’s self-immolation and the killing of Said by police officers. Broadcasted images and video footages on social media triggered the majority of the public to meet on the same ground and rise up against the unjust governmental policies, repression and inhuman implementations exhibited by the security forces.
Emotional factors prepared the society for social mass responses; however, it is the triggering factor that breaks the camel’s back and draws the masses into the streets to voice their objections as a whole and as a cause for a desired change. The spark or the trigger, actually, is a catalyzer that reflects emotional, rather than logical behavior. At that level, fear is gone and mass behavior takes over.

Therefore, the authorities and security forces should consider social mass protests with care and caution. Deaths in social mass events should be considered as the root of a blood vengeance approach that will always be kept in the memory of the movements. Therefore, the most important issue in protest policing is abstaining from brutal interventions that may cause any killing from both parties and that may trigger unstoppable crowds.

Thus, prudent approaches by governing figures and most importantly the deployment of a sufficient number of anti-riot officers and adequate intervention vehicles are the life saving realities in social mass events. The opposite will change the balance of power between the security forces and protestors that may cause a tendency toward the use of repressive police intervention and assurance of violent protest in critical mass events.

**The Determining Factors That Drive The Limits Of Police Interventions**

The perceptions of the police and protestors are not the only factors that determine the degree of coercion but also, as Fillieule and Jobard claim, the civil authority is another actor that has a role in determining the outcome of mass protests. In terms of determining the most effective factor that determines the style of police intervention, the study asked officers to select one of the factors among options. In this respect, 32.3% of
the officers selected the Government as the strongest factor that determines the style of police intervention. Yet, 28.8% of the experts chose their supervisors, while 27.6% selected the behavior of the demonstrators as the determining factor in urging the security forces to prefer the style of policing protests.

**Considering Third Parties during Police Interventions**

Although those three actors appear physically, as the main players in the social arena, there is also another indicator that should be seriously considered when assessing risk in the context of mass events, and these are the bystanders. While 41.4% of the first group and 48.8% of the second group claimed that they care about bystanders and public sympathy before, during and after intervening protests, 36.6% of the first group and 28.8% of the second group did not care. Yet, 20.0% of the first group and 22.5% of the second group were undecided about this argument. However, in total, 42.8% of the officers were positive, while 35.1% of them were negative, and 22.1% of them were neutral about caring bystanders and the publics’ perception before, during, and after police interventions.

During this research in Diyarbakir City, it was observed in some police interventions that an incorrect or unbalanced use of force can easily trigger bystanders and can even turn people who watch the event from their apartments to became a part of the event and to start to throw books, shoes, or other materials found on their balconies at police vehicles and even at the officers. Therefore, law enforcement officers should be careful about the perceptions of third parties during social mass events because; among the activists there might be relatives or people they know or at least they may accept as
their fellow-townsman. Observing people they know being exposed to the unbalanced use of power by the security forces mostly causes emotional reactions. Besides, 43.5% of the officers who claimed that although they considered the third parties during and after police interventions, they asserted that their belief changed when activists committed violent activities, such as throwing stones, Molotov Cocktails, using fireworks against officers, and throwing hand made explosives. In this regard, 28.4% of them were undecided, and 28.2% of them believed that their perceptions would not change.

In addition, when the researcher asked the experts what the most determining factor was with respect to changing the course of the protests and interventions, 55% pointed to the police leader who is responsible for maintaining public peace and security during mass events. A further 35% of them pointed to the leader of the mass organization, and 10% pointed to other authorities’ claims or directives.

**Leadership in Protest Policing**

While 85.1% of the first group believed in the importance of leadership in dealing with social mass events, this response increased to 91.1% with the second group which was less experienced compared with the first group in dealing with social mass events. The less experienced group believed more in the importance of the leadership compared with the first group during social mass events. In total, 86.2% of the subjects believed in the importance of leadership during social mass events, while 13.8% disregarded the importance of the leadership.

**The Consequences of Prohibiting Social Mass Events**
In terms of evaluating the outcome of prohibited social mass events, the study scrutinized the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and the first half of 2013. No prohibition in the years of 2009, 2010, and first half of 2013 was recorded. Yet, only two events were prohibited in 2011. One of them ended with violence and one not. In 2012, 15 social mass events were prohibited in which 8 of them were violent and 7 of them were nonviolent and in the first half of 2013 only one event was prohibited that was nonviolent. Overall, while 46.66% of the prohibited social mass events ended in peace, 53.33% of them ended with violence.

In prohibited social mass events, while protestors aim to overcome the prohibition, on the other hand, security officers feel obligated to make sure order is maintained. Such circumstances urge officers toward a tendency to employ their knowledge of the State’s Police-centric protest policing, which means repressive interventions are highly possible in order to maintain public peace and order.

During the period when the Solution Process was being conducted by the government, it was undesirable to hold any event and events were prohibited. In 2011, the Governorship of Diyarbakir prohibited only two events. One of them ended in violent activities and the other in peace. However, after the PKK broke the ceasefire agreement, the prohibited mass events rose in number to 15 in 2012. While seven of them, or 46.66%, ended in peace, eight of them, or 53.33%, turned into violent mass events. But in the first half of 2013, when talks started again, there was no record of any prohibited mass event. Interviewed experts also verified this result while 95% of them stated that “prohibiting mass events” had an influence or impacted demonstrators to commit violent
actions. A further 5% claimed prohibiting social mass events does not have any impact on demonstrators in committing violent actions.

**The Importance of Information Gathering And Intelligence**

Information (intelligence), sufficiency (personnel and equipment), punctuality, and professionalism are features that should be considered by law enforcement organizations that deal with social mass events. Having the right information; deploying a sufficient number of personnel and with adequate equipment; occupying the right place at the right time; and performing professionalism in terms of training and the approach and strategy in implementing a task are the features that will help in protest policing from the start to the end to maintain public peace and security.

At the start of the planning phase, intelligence will help to determine the possible characteristics of the demonstration and the probability of violence, if any, and its dimension. This phase is actually a risk assessment strategy that will help to turn the uncertainty to certainty as much as possible. This will also help to develop alternative strategies, deploy sufficient number of officers and vehicles to maintain the control of mass events.

In this respect, 86.6% of the anti-riot officers believed that information gathering, and intelligence, is important in protest policing because, instead of struggling with unknown threats, confronting the known is always the preferred option in policing protests. Therefore, information gathering is helpful in determining the profile, intention,
aim, and potential of the masses, which in turn will help to end the event in peace and security.

In addition, 100% of the interviewed experts believed in the importance of intelligence. If the police can guess the extent of the crowd; the aim and target of the organization; and the possibility of the violent group and types of material they may use, such as Molotov cocktails, handmade IED, fireworks, or fire arms, the law enforcement organization will be able to deploy a sufficient number of the anti-riot forces and the equipment needed in terms of armed vehicles and water cannons.

The Impact of Capturing and Detaining Troublemakers In Violent Mass Protests

The study examined if capturing, interment and detention have any impacts on demonstrators to prevent them from avoiding or committing violent actions. 100% of the subjects claimed that capturing, detaining, or arresting has a positive impact on avoidance and termination of violent activities intended by activists because no one is eager to be captured and send to jail. Life is sweet.

Although between the first and third KCK/TM operations 170 mass events had been organized and none of them were prohibited, only four mass events ended with violent activities by protestors. While overall, the average number of violent mass events in 53 months in the City of Diyarbakir was recorded as 5.40%, during the period of KCK/TM operations the average number of violent thematic events decreased sharply to 2.35%. This means that the operations of the KCK/TM, the administrative pillar of the organization, had an important impact and dramatically steep drop in violent mass events in the City of Diyarbakir.
The Need of Providing Teargas And Water-Cannons In Social Mass Events

The study also examined if the police believed in the need for possessing tear gas or not. When asked about the need for tear gas in mass unrests, 00% of the experts stated that the existence of water cannon and tear gas was essential in mass events. Before using tear gas and water cannons, 100% of the experts indicated that they considered the elderly, women, and children. Once the stoning starts or Molotov cocktails are thrown to the police, water cannon first gives a sign, which is an angel targeting an empty place whether front of the crowd or an empty place, to warn the crowd to disperse. This action gives time to the elderly, women and children to separate from the violent group. Then, tear gas and water cannon intervene to disperse the violent group. This was the tactic observed between 2011 and 2013 in Diyarbakir. Otherwise, the alternative of tear gas and water cannon is using baton, which is more humiliating.

Evaluating The Reinforcement of The Officers From Other Cities

In order to search whether subjects see deploying officers from other cities is useful during massive mass demonstrations or not, compared with the personnel from their city, the response of 100% of the experts during their interviews was “no”. Instead, they demanded more recruitment to the anti-riot unit. In terms of taking responsibility and embracing the job, recruited permanent officers believed they would be more successful in terms of accountability, reliability and efficiency.

However, 44.6% of anti-riot officers believed that deploying officers from another city for a mass event in their district would be a helpful strategy, while 37.1% of them did
not believe in deploying officers from another city as a helpful strategy for a mass event in their city, and 16.3% were undecided.

Consequently, although the local police see other officers deployed from other organizations as supportive forces, they believe that should not be deployed in critical points or in the center of the interventions. Therefore, they are mostly deployed in protecting buildings that should be protected from protestors.

**The Significances of Training and Experience For Anti-Riot Forces**

Experience is transferable if there is a sufficient environment and common interest in terms of training, intervention styles, and protest policing strategies. Otherwise there is no obligation to share training programs and experience with another police organization from another department.

Centralization and militarization are at the same time the sources that facilitate harsh interventions to control protest events (Reiter, 1998)\(^{297}\). According to Herbert Reiter, the lack of appropriate training, the political support and legislation will cause the police to sustain their brutal style of protest policing. However, as a panacea, this weakness had to be covered by an increase of the personnel in the previous decades.

Consequently, during the 1960s, harsh protest-policing styles were resulted in shootings and killings of protestors in the United States and other Developed States. Unfortunately, decisive implementations come after severe aftermaths. However, in the

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context of policy maker and public administration, protest policing became a ‘hot pan’ in the hand of the authorities. Necessarily, styles and models of protest policing were scrutinized and concluded in deciding to modernize the police in terms of equipment, training and legislation under the control and guidance of the executive and legislative pillars supported with SEADOC I and SEADOC II protest policing programs. That is why, although during the anti-globalization protests in 1999, 2000 and 2001, the number of the demonstrators was changing between 100,000 and 500,000, fortunately, no one was killed.

Necessarily, after styles and models of protest policing were scrutinized and followed by the modernization of the police through better equipment, training and legislation, a monopoly in training and model and style in protest policing helped authorities to confront deadly riots in a safer manner.

Finally, all studies examined in this chapter have shown that change comes after acute incidents. Moreover, it is obvious that insufficiency and suffer urge institutions to find new solutions. For instance, after terrorists groups within masses started using Simple Hand-made Explosive and sometimes firearms, the Anti-Riot Unit of Diyarbakir founded the ZMT (Armored Intervention Team). Team members of this office went through several trainings. They were well equipped and had to take took first aid, small firearms, rifle, personal protection, and tactical courses to be allegeable to intervene in risky tasks where anti-riot officers on foot should not go. ZMT team was found 100% affective in such cases and places where power blackout exists because militias cut the power before committing any crime. Two armored vehicles of ZMT teams buddied with one armed TOMA (water cannon) were the most effective team to intervene in violent
mass events where officers on foot should not enter. Because it is highly possible to confront with Molotov cocktails and handmade explosives used by violent groups, in this case water cannon is very helpful to extinguish the fire. However, deploying only water cannons is insufficient as well. In such case activists aim to flatten the tire of the water cannons and inactivate them. Therefore, to prevent activists from such attempts the ZMT should be able to mobilize quickly and apprehend activists committed violent actions. This mobilization ability causes troublemakers to fear being arrested, which in turn forces them to avoid any crime or at least disperse from the scene.

If policy makers, legislators, and most importantly the police do not have an intense motivation to learn from their failures in confronting mass demonstrations, the models and styles of protest policing would have been brutal in spite of tolerant approaches, artisanal in spite of professional strategies, and the police would have described themselves as State’s Police instead of Citizens’ Police.

The Anti-Riot Officers should be ready first mentally and then physically for the worst case scenario, which is an ethnic riot in this region. Therefore, research on training programs is a strong need in order to serve and maintain public order and peace, because insufficient or poorly designed interventions will provoke people in such fragile locations.

The personnel deployed in such locations should be trained and well-motivated. If they do not sacrifice their time, effort, and energy it might be impossible to change the past negative impressions about the security forces of the citizens living in this region. Law enforcement is seen as an extension of state’s power.
A monopoly in training will help security forces to readily adopt strategic models and styles of protest policing even in hosted cities.

While not applicable to every social mass event, what is certain is that the characteristics of the social mass movement differ from city to city or from region to region in Turkey. For instance, while the characteristics of the social mass movements from four regions of Turkey, in Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir and Hakkari, differ from each other, the model and styles of protest policing in those cities differ in parallel in terms of the degree of policing experience, mannerisms, and equipment. Where the city falls to the Eastern part of Turkey, the level of risk and threat escalates jointly. In contrast, the anti-riot unit in Izmir, a city that is located in the western part of the country, mostly needs water cannons, tear gas and especially adequate number of officers and a training program highly dependent on developing officers acting in unison. However, when considering the anti-riot unit in the eastern part of Turkey, such as Hakkari, the need is mostly related to armed vehicles, a large amount of tear gas, bulletproof wests and helmets and robust communication system. Therefore, in addition to basic training programs of collective intervention styles and methods officer in this location should be given importance to firearm trainings and courses like first aid and martial arts as well.

However, anti-riot officers in Diyarbakir should have a training program that combines developing skills in both personal protection and collective actions. In the case of a social uprising in such a city, the anti-riot police force is the only police unit that can stop and control massive masses. While Special Forces are trained to shoot and defuse targets, other units will be insufficient without sufficient equipment and mass control.
training. The only police force that would be able to intervene in such a mass upheaval is the anti-riot unit.

One of the experts stated that once the stoning by protestors starts you couldn’t see any police force other than the anti-riot officers because without them it is impossible to maintain public order and secure innocent nationals. Although 92.5% of the second group of anti-riot officers believed that they have an important role to play in this province, this rate in the first group decreased to 81.3%. Nonetheless, only 38.1% of the officers believed that the anti-riot unit in Diyarbakir was well equipped and supported in numbers. Only 15.7% of the officers believed that they were viewed with the importance they deserved, which is an important circumstance that should be considered.

When it came to the question as to whether the anti-riot police should have a training program akin to a paramilitary training program or not, 49.6% of respondents were reluctant, while only 36.4% were positive about following a paramilitary-like tough training program, and 14.1% of them were undecided.

The reason why demonstrations inspired from the Arab Uprising in Iran ended early is because of experiences gained during the Green revolution in 2009 and the strict measures taken by the regime. As Naysan Rafati states, “a combination of internal weaknesses within the movement compounded by a robust and uncompromising response from the government against the opposition and its leadership has seemingly quieted the voices of dissent.”

Additionally, professionalism in protest policing is a safe harbor for law enforcement. Considering the balance of power in police interventions during mass protests, should be accepted as a double-edged sword. While the use of repressive power can cause undesired consequences, such as deaths on both sides, on the other hand insufficient power and lack of needed equipment can cause the loss of control in mass demonstrations that might result in public disorder or violence and destructive activities.

Therefore, law enforcement approaches should not be static in adapting to changes the protestors have developed, rather they should be dynamic. Protestors in recent decades have had the ability to observe their counterparts worldwide through the dynamics of globalization and develop their structures and methods of activities. They may be inspired by each other and continue to protest on the streets with new techniques and strategies. Therefore, law enforcement agencies should carry out risk assessment research, develop new strategies, and the skills of the officers through training so they can fulfill their duties successfully. Scenarios, drills and training strategies should vary in space and time to prepare law enforcement officers for the worst case scenarios in order to maintain public peace and security.

**Recommendations Made By Subjects**

Some recommendations made by experts and officers were verbalized as follows:

- The population in Diyarbakir is about 1.5 million. I don't think that BDP represents the Kurds. If they would have been representing the Kurds, then we would not be able to maintain public order and safety even with 5,000 assigned anti-riot officers.
• Education and unemployment are the most important problems of this region that need to be solved immediately.

• The education system here is very problematic and students are politicized.

• The majority of the teachers are politicized. In order to safeguard the children from politics and misguidance, a rotation system like that in police organizations is needed for the Education Ministry as well.

• Unemployment is a tremendous problem here.

• The reflection of wealthy people and needy desperate people differs. People who have much to lose and people who have nothing to lose.

• The state should open its heart to the public and civil servants should be kind, professional and tolerant.

• The state should gain the trust and confidence of the public.

• The anti-riot unit should have at least 1500 personnel for a city of 1.5 million populations.

• Prejudice is a problem that the officers in the Anti-riot Unit should overcome.

• The side that is able to get public’s support will be the winner of the day. My aim is to obtain the regard and support of the public. Otherwise, with false interventions we will support violent mass organizations indirectly, in terms of public support and recruitment.

• Officers deployed here are not happy. The government should provide some extra opportunities and benefits to motivate civil servants in this region.

• We need a constant and stable system.
Conclusion

People who revolt are often the unhappy majority and they do this either in terms of creating a political, social or economic disturbance. Egypt was one of the best examples of such a discontented society that found a common ground that was justified and supported by the majority of the society. Repressive police interventions, unjust political and governmental implementations, corruption, economic depressions, no respect for human rights and the law, and no hope for youth in the future were the dynamics that prepared the passion of the Arab Spring.

However, it was the social media that made the difference between the recent Arab Uprising and previous social mass upheavals that existed before the 1990s in the Middle Eastern and North African countries. Social media and the Satellite Channels became the tools that stimulated the motivation of the unhappy majority by broadcasting the triggering factors instantly, such as the brutal interventions implemented by the security forces; the humiliating remarks made by leaders and most importantly the heroic saga generated by society against repression, bullets and tanks.

Consequently, although a political party in Diyarbakir promoted masses to organize and invoke a Kurdish Uprising that imitated the Arab Spring, with the help of careful governmental implementations, prudent and professional protest policing methods and styles exhibited by the police forces and the lack of the discontented majority the attempted Kurdish Uprising was unable to find an environment in which to base its cause, and to grow and prevail.
REFERENCES


About Twitter. (03/24/2015). Retrieved from https://about.twitter.com/tr/company


APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Anonymous Data Collection Consent Forms of the Research Project

CONSENT FORM

FOR ANONYMOUS DATA COLLECTION (INTERVIEW)

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Demez Ercan, who is a PhD Student in the Global Affairs Department at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to determine whether the causes and impacts of a global mass movement can influence local mass movements and whether the way of interference in mass events, chosen by the law enforcement, has any impacts on activists to trigger or prevent any acts of violence. Moreover, as a senior officer who is in charge during mass events, this study is interested in your perception about existed social mass events and implemented models and styles of protest policing between 2009 and 2013. After accepting to participate in this study, the interview is expected to take approximately 30 minutes.

First of all, I would like to inform you that the Governor of Diyarbakir has given a signed document that permits us to conduct and allows you to participate in this study. Moreover, for your assurance, this research will be conducted within the context of anonymity. Anonymous means that I will record no information about you that could identify you. There will be no linkage between your identity and your response in the research. This means that I will not record your voice, name, address, phone number, date of birth, gender, etc., and even not ask to sign the form in order to save you from any possible disciplinary investigations in case of criticizing your authorities. Moreover, according to the law, here is no risk in talking about the conditions of using tier gas, water cannon, and baton charge, which is defined by the law as the “gradually use of force”. However, you would be given a copy of the consent form in order to indicate that you are informed about the study, given permission by the Governorship, and possible risk and benefits of participating in this study. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be assigned a
random code number that will be used to differentiate each interviewee. There will be no way to link your responses back to you. Therefore, data collection is anonymous.

The research team and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept for three years.

By keeping the study anonymous, there is no foreseeable risk in participating in this study. In addition, you may receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study.

Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the interview without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact at
demezercan@yahoo.com or 0505 821 4440. You can also contact the Chair of this research, Dr. Leslie W. Kennedy, at lefkennedy@gmail.com or 001 862 250 0769.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the IRB Administrator at Rutgers University:

Institutional Review Board
Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey
Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200
335 George Street, 3rd Floor
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
Phone: 732-235-9806
Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

Please retain a copy of this form for your records. By participating in the above stated procedures, then you agree to participation in this study.

I Agree:………………………….. I Do Not Agree:………………………………..
CONSENT FORM

FOR ANONYMOUS DATA COLLECTION (SURVEY)

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Demez Ercan, who is a PhD Student in the Global Affairs Department at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to determine whether the causes and impacts of a global mass movement can influence local mass movements and whether the way of interference in mass events, chosen by the law enforcement, has any impacts on activists to trigger or prevent any acts of violence. Moreover, as a senior officer who is in charge during mass events, this study is interested in your perception about existed social mass events and implemented models and styles of protest policing between 2009 and 2013. After accepting to participate in this study, the survey is expected to take approximately 30 minutes.

First of all, I would like to inform you that the Governor of Diyarbakir has given a signed document that permits us to conduct and allows you to participate in this study. Moreover, for your assurance, this research will be conducted within the context of anonymity. Anonymous means that I will record no information about you that could identify you. There will be no linkage between your identity and your response in the research. This means that I will not record your voice, name, address, phone number, date of birth, gender, etc., and even not ask to sign the form in order to save you from any possible disciplinary investigations in case of criticizing your authorities. Moreover, according to the law, here is no risk in talking about the conditions of using tear gas, water cannon, and baton charge, which is defined by the law as the “gradually use of force”. However, you would be given a copy of the consent form in order to indicate that you are informed about the study, given permission by the Governorship, and possible risk and benefits of participating in this study. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be assigned a random code number that will be used to differentiate each surveyee. There will be no way to link your responses back to you. Therefore, data collection is anonymous.

The research team and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept for three years.
By keeping the study anonymous, there is no foreseeable risk in participating in this study. In addition, you may receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study.

Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the survey without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact at demezercan@yahoo.com or 0505 821 4440. You can also contact the Chair of this research, Dr. Leslie W. Kennedy, at lefkennedy@gmail.com or 001 862 250 0769.

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Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

Please retain a copy of this form for your records. By participating in the above stated procedures, then you agree to participation in this study.

I Agree:………………………….. I Do Not Agree:………………………………..
# APPENDIX B: Questionnaire and Interview Questions of the Research Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>First Group</th>
<th>Second Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I see myself as Buergerpolizei (Citizens’ Police).</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>I see myself as Staatpolizei (State Police)</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>My perception about myself being a State Police or Citizens’ Police</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>depends on the characteristics of the mass demonstration I am facing.</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4. I do not have any perception about myself, I just follow orders</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>coming from above.</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>The police should act in a democratic manner and handle demonstrations</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>as a whole by protecting their rights of demonstration</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>The police need to be selective and determine the actions of violent</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>activists and troublemakers apart from the whole</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>Question</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>I believe that the riot police unit has an important role for this province in terms of maintaining public order.</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>I think riot police in Diyarbakir are well equipped and supported in number.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>I think that riot police are given the importance they deserve by the authorities.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>I find negotiating with the demonstrators helpful in order to maintain security and peace on the streets.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>I believe that there is a mutual trust during negotiations between the police and demonstrators in Diyarbakir.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>I believe that information gathering is important for protest policing.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>I believe that a massive presence of well-organized and heavily equipped Riot Police has an impact on the mitigation of violent tendency of the demonstrators.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>and prevention of violent tendency of the demonstrators.</td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td>I think that a softer, more tolerant protest policing style in intervention could mitigate the violent behavior of the rioters.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>I think that remarks of the government through media broadcasting would be more effective in reducing the violent behavior of the rioters compared with the styles implemented in protest policing.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>Considering the interventions, I see myself as tolerant.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>Considering the interventions, I see myself as tough.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>I feel happy to work in the riot police force.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>I think that there is an inversely proportional relationship between terrorist activities and violent protests.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>I think that all of the participants attending in mass protests in Diyarbakir are guilty.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>I think that the right to demonstrate is a constitutional right.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>I believe that the emotions and perceptions of the protestors should be considered in order to maintain a safe and peaceful protest.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>I think that a distance between the demonstrators and the riot force should be kept in order not to increase violence.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>I think repressive interventions will have positive impacts on preventing violent activities.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>I think repressive interventions will provoke demonstrators to commit violent actions.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>I believe that deploying officers from other cities is a helpful strategy in protest policing.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>I think that the riot police should have a characteristic of paramilitary structure within the context of training and operation.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>I think the police presence at mass gatherings should be massive.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>I think that the traditional and social media have ability to misuse events and issues in order to escalate demonstrators’ tension and encourage violent actions.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>I see a constant nonviolent, safe and peaceful culture of demonstrations occurring in Diyarbakir province in the near future.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>I believe that global mass movements inspire demonstrators in Diyarbakir.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>I do not think that an Arab Spring-like revolution is possible in the southeastern part of Turkey.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>I care about bystanders and public sympathy before, during and after intervening protests.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>If the protest has a potential for violence, my above consideration may be changed.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>I think that confronting an organized mass gathering is easier than an anonymous or unorganized mass situation.</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1= Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
<td>2= Disagree</td>
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<td>3= Undecided</td>
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<td>4= Agree</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
<td>5= Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>How important is leadership in handling mass events?</td>
<td>1= Not important at all</td>
<td>1= Not important at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2= Somehow important</td>
<td>2= Somehow important</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3= Undecided</td>
<td>3= Undecided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1= Buergerpolizei (Citizens’ Police)</td>
<td>1= Buergerpolizei (Citizens’ Police)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2= Staatpolizei (State Police)</td>
<td>2= Staatpolizei (State Police)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

38. What type of protest policing philosophy is perceived among your colleagues confronting mass demonstrations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1= Buergerpolizei (Citizens’ Police)</th>
<th>1= Buergerpolizei (Citizens’ Police)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2= Staatpolizei (State Police)</td>
<td>2= Staatpolizei (State Police)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

39. Which one you would prefer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1= Buergerpolizei (Citizens’ Police)</th>
<th>1= Buergerpolizei (Citizens’ Police)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2= Staatpolizei (State Police)</td>
<td>2= Staatpolizei (State Police)</td>
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</table>

40. Which factor is more effective in determining the style of police intervention?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1= the superiors</th>
<th>1= the superiors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2= the governor</td>
<td>2= the governor</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3= the government</td>
<td>3= the government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4= the demonstrators</td>
<td>4= the demonstrators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5= others (specify)</td>
<td>5= others (specify)</td>
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</table>

41. What should the law enforcement deployed in mass demonstrations protect and serve primarily?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1= Strongly disagree</th>
<th>1= Strongly disagree</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2= Government</td>
<td>2= Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3= People who demonstrate</td>
<td>3= People who demonstrate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42a. Are you aware of any emergency plans?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1= Yes</th>
<th>1= Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2= No</td>
<td>2= No</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

42b. If yes, do you know what you have to do?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1= Yes</th>
<th>1= Yes</th>
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<tr>
<td>2= No</td>
<td>2= No</td>
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</table>

43. What model of protest policing is being implemented in Diyarbakir?

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1= Escalated Force Model</th>
<th>1= Escalated Force Model</th>
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<tr>
<td>2= Negotiated Management Model</td>
<td>2= Negotiated Management Model</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3= Deterrent Model</td>
<td>3= Deterrent Model</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview Questions for the Police Executives Who are in Charge during Mass Events:

Research Title: Mass Movements and Protest Policing in the Era of Globalization within the Contexts of Arab Uprising: A Case Study in Diyarbakir One of the Most Conflicted Provinces of Turkey

QUESTIONS

About Law Enforcement:

• Is there a certain style or model of protest policing implemented in Diyarbakir during protests? (Explanation of Policing Models: (1) escalated use of force, (2) negotiated management, (3) deterrent model (or measured interference model)

• What type of protest policing philosophy, “Staatpolizei” or “Burgerpolizei”, is recommended by the legislation? And, what is the protest policing philosophy of Diyarbakir Police in confronting social mass movements?

• Do you believe that after reaching an agreement with the police, will the organizers of the demonstration keep their words? And, do you think that both sides trust each other?

• Do you believe that, in Diyarbakir, negotiation between the law enforcement and organizers of social mass events is workable at any level (before, during, and after) of mass demonstrations?

• To what extent is intelligence important in mass social movements and how does it work? Do you believe in gathering information and sharing them with related police units? Why?

• Do you think that the presence of the riot force triggers the tensions of the demonstrators to commit violent actions? Do you think that a demonstration of 1,000 people in Diyarbakir will end up in peace without deploying the riot force? On your opinion, what kind of influence has the proximity of the riot police on protestors? And do you believe that demonstrators assess risk?
• Do you think that the use of tear-gas and water cannon are essential in interventions? Why do you wait for a while, instead of interfering instantly after the mass has committed crime? And do you differentiate the elderly, women and children among the mass while interfering?

• What is the most determining factor that can change the course of the protest? And why?

• What do you think causes repressive interventions by the law enforcement? Is it police’s intolerance approach, provocation that stemmed from demonstrators or other factors? And, does a task that ends up without intervention makes you happy?

**About Activists:**

• What kind of communication system and methods do activists in this region use in order to inform and gather supporters? (Social network applications, media, brochure, sound system on vehicles, face to face…)

• In your point of view, what kind of impact has the media on mass demonstrations? Does it have the potential to provoke or mediate the mass?

• Do you think that the expression and statements of the government has any weight on the probability of committing violence by the demonstrators during mass demonstrations?

• Do you think that prohibiting social mass events has any influence or impacts on demonstrators in order to commit violent activities or riot-like movements? In order to perform such an order, what kind of requirement does the law enforcement need in Diyarbakir Province? (Personnel, watercannon or such) What is your suggestion about reinforcement from other cities? Do you thing that reinforcement meets your need? And, what are the citizens living in this region more afraid of, the law enforcement or the PKK (terrorist organization)?

• In your opinion, what is the reason that urges protestors to commit violence activities in social mass events? (Economic inequalities, unemployment, poverty, relative deprivation, crowded family, illiteracy, hate that stemmed from forced emigration lived in the past, emotional reasons such as burial service of PKK members, just following the organizations orders, or nationalist beliefs?)

• Is there any correlation between democratization and the frequency and quantity of demonstrations existed in this region? Will it be appropriate if we say that the more democracy is adopted as a whole, the higher becomes the frequency and quantity of mass events and the lesser violent action in mass demonstrations?
• Is there, any direct proportion or inversely proportional relation between mass events and terrorist activities in this region?

• In your point of view do capturing, internment, and detention have any impacts upon demonstrators to hesitate to participate in social mass events or to commit violent activities? (such as, the KCK operation and the conviction of a person who used a Molotov Cocktail in Van Province and was convicted for 12 years which was approved by the Supreme Court of Appeal).

• How do you comment the Uludere aftermath? How do the PKK and its political supporter paraphrase this tragic event? And how did this event affected social mass movements? Besides, does emotional event has the potential to provoke social mass activities?

**About Arab Spring:**

• Are there any influences of Arab Spring observed on the size and frequency of mass events existed in Diyarbakir in 2011? Do you believe that the same unrest can occur any time on this part of Turkey? Why?

• Do you agree with the idea that the reason that the attempt of the so-called Kurdish Uprising failed in Turkey and did not end like in Egypt and Tunisia is because it differs from the Arab Uprising in terms of ethnic discrimination, religious discrimination, freedom, civil rights and economic inequality?

• Is there any style or models duplicated globally from other mass events and applied by the violent protestors in Diyarbakir while confronting the police (such as using Molotov Cocktails, fireworks, paint, slings, guns, bulldozers, or tents)?

• How does the instability in your neighboring country, Syria, affect the social mass movements and terrorist activities in the region you live?

• Do you believe that nationalist feelings of the youth living in this region have increased in the last decades?

• Is there, any potential and tendency to provoke an ethnic riot in Diyarbakir? Why? What should be done to prevent such a disruptive event?

**About Risk Assessment:**

• Do you believe that emergency response plan exist for any possible riot activities for Diyarbakir province? And who is supposed to be aware of these plans? In your
opinion, what is the most threatening risk that should be considered for Diyarbakir Province (terrorism, social mass movements or street crimes)?

- Are every law enforcement agencies and units aware of what to do in any deadly ethnic riot? And, do you think that they are able to coordinate in such a case?

- In order to prepare all governmental agencies and units against a possible ethnic riot what kind of measures are taken?

- Moreover, what kind of training schedule does the riot police need to be prepared for such a social mass clash?

Last Thoughts:

- Anything you care to add?
APPENDIX C: IRB Approvals of the Study

Attachment-4 (For Interview)

CONSENT FORM
FOR ANONYMOUS DATA COLLECTION

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Deniz Ergon, who is a PhD Student in the Global Affairs Department at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to determine the causes and impacts of a global mass movement. It can influence local mass movements and whether the way of interference in mass events, chosen by the law enforcement, has any impacts on activists to trigger or prevent any acts of violence. Moreover, as a senior officer who is in charge during mass events, this study is interested in your perception about existing social mass events and implemented models and styles of protest policing between 2009 and 2013. After accepting to participate in this study, the interview is expected to take approximately 30 minutes.

First of all, I would like to inform you that the Governor of Diyarbakir has given a signed document that permits us to conduct and allows you to participate in this study. Moreover, for your assurance, this research will be conducted within the context of anonymity. Anonymous means that I will record no information about you that could identify you. There will be no linkage between your identity and your response in the research. This means that I will not record your voice, name, address, phone number, date of birth, gender, etc., and even not ask to sign the form in order to save you from any possible disciplinary investigations in case of criticizing your authorities. Moreover, according to the law, here is no risk in talking about the conditions of using tear gas, water cannon, and baton charge, which is defined by the law as the “gradually use of force”. However, you would be given a copy of the consent form in order to indicate that you are informed about the study, given permission by the Governorship, and possible risk and benefits of participating in this study. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be assigned a random code number that will be used to differentiate each interviewee. There will be no way to link your responses back to you. Therefore, data collection is anonymous.

The research team and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept for three years.

By keeping the study anonymous, there is no foreseeable risk in participating in this study. In addition, you may receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study.

Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the interview without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact me at demezercan@yahoo.com or 0505 821 4440. You can also contact the Chair of this research, Dr. Leslie W. Kennedy, at leskennedy@gmail.com or 609 862 250 0769.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the IRB Administrator at Rutgers University:

Institutional Review Board
Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey
Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200
335 George Street, 3rd Floor
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
Phone: 732-235-9806
Email: humantemsSubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

Expires: May 06, 2015
Approved by: Rutgers IRB

Form Version 2014a
Rutgers University Institutional Review Board, Human Subjects Research.
Print Date: 5/15/2015
Page 34 of 68
Consent Form for Survey

RUTGERS
THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY

Attachment-4 (For Survey)

CONSENT FORM
FOR ANONYMOUS DATA COLLECTION

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Demez Ercan, who is a PhD Student in the Global Affairs Department at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to determine whether the causes and impacts of a global mass movement can influence local mass movements and whether the way of interference in mass events, chosen by the law enforcement, has any impacts on activists to trigger or prevent any acts of violence. Moreover, as a senior officer who is in charge during mass events, this study is interested in your perception about existing social mass events and implemented models and styles of protest policing between 2009 and 2013. After accepting to participate in this study, the survey is expected to take approximately 30 minutes.

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Phone: 732-235-9806
Email: humansubjects@osp.rutgers.edu

EXPIRES
MAY 06 2015
Approved by the
Rutgers IRB

APPROVED
MAY 07 2015
Approved by the
Rutgers IRB