IMPLICIT GENDER STEREOTYPES AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLE: THE MODERATING ROLE OF GENDER AND POWER ROLE

By

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THESIS ABSTRACT

Implicit Gender Stereotypes at the Negotiation Table: The Moderating Role of Gender and Power Role by MADELIENE ALGER

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Although some progress has been made over the years, women still earn less than men. Research suggests wage negotiations may be a contributing factor in this pay gap, as men tend to negotiate higher salaries for themselves than women (Mazei et al., 2015). Gender stereotypes that associate men with effective negotiator traits may account for this disparity through stereotype threat and stereotype lift. Negotiator role may also be a contributing factor in that role can provide power to the negotiator. The current study investigated how an individual's own implicit stereotypes interact with gender and negotiator role to predict negotiation outcomes in distributive and integrative contexts. It was hypothesized that implicit stereotypes that associate men with success at the bargaining table would increase men's performance but hinder women's. It is also predicted that this will especially be the case for male recruiters, as well as salary negotiation outcomes. One hundred forty students participated in a two-phase study that involved a computer task that measured implicit stereotypes and then followed by a mock negotiation task. Although our results overall were not statistically significant, the observed trends support our prediction that male's implicit stereotypes would increase

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their overall performance. These findings have implications for providing a clearer understanding of the mechanisms that drive the negotiation gender gap, which is important in taking steps toward reducing the gender gap in negotiations.

Keywords: gender, stereotypes, power, negotiation

Introduction

While some progress has been made in closing the gender wage gap, women still earn less than men in nearly every occupation and at every level of the hierarchy. On average, women in the US make 75% of their male counterparts' salary (World Economic Forum, 2015). In formulating possible explanations for this persistent gender gap, research has increasingly examined gender differences in negotiations, as women tend to negotiate lower salaries for themselves than men. In fact, a recent meta-analysis has shown that on average, men outperform women in economic negotiation outcomes (Mazei et al., 2015).

There are several contextual and individual factors that may contribute to men's relative success at the bargaining table. For example, gender stereotypes may play a role in the negotiation gender gap. Gender stereotypes generally associate men with strength, rationality, and assertiveness, and women with emotionality, weakness, and being accommodating (Kray & Thompson, 2005). The issue lies in that traits associated with effective negotiators are stereotypically masculine, whereas traits associated with ineffective negotiators are stereotypically feminine. Moreover, research on stereotype threat in negotiations has shown that women were more likely to underperform when these stereotypes were activated (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). However, although we know that activating gender stereotypes can affect negotiation performance, little is known about the extent to which negotiators' own, naturally varying levels of gender stereotypes predict negotiation outcomes.

Besides individual factors, contextual factors may also help predict negotiation outcomes, such as the power available to a negotiator. Various sources of power exist in negotiations, including the role of the negotiator. Generally, in negotiations between a recruiter and job candidate, the role of recruiter is more powerful, which in turn leads to enhanced performance (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). The current research seeks to investigate how the power role and negotiators' level of gender stereotyping individually and interactively predict the negotiation performance of men and women.

Stereotypes and their effect on performance

Stereotypes are cognitive constructions which contain our beliefs about certain social groups. An inherent premise of stereotyping is the assumption that all members of a certain group (out-group) share the same traits and characteristics (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991). According to dual-process models (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), stereotypes may fall on a continuum between a controlled (explicit) pole and an automatic (implicit) pole. Explicit stereotypes are beliefs about other groups which are overtly expressed or publicly stated by an individual (Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2006). Explicit stereotypes are easier to control as the individual is consciously aware of them. As such, explicit stereotypes may be more vulnerable to social desirability concerns – individuals may not declare their negative thoughts towards other groups because of fear of being disliked. One way to overcome social desirability concerns is to investigate implicit stereotypes, which tend to be more automatic and operate outside of one's conscious awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). They are formed based on one's experience, and are learned associations between various qualities and social categories. Research suggests that a disconnect may exist between explicit and implicit stereotypes (Latu et al., 2011). For example, at the explicit level women were more likely to be associated with competent manager traits

compared to men. However, at the implicit level, the pattern of associations was reversed, such that women were more likely to be associated with *incompetent* manager traits compared to men.

When looking at the predictive power of explicit and implicit stereotypes, implicit stereotypes tend to be better predictors of outcomes compared to explicit stereotypes, possibly because implicit stereotypes bypass social desirability. For example, implicit stereotypes can predict the decisions and discriminatory behaviors of the person holding these biases (Latu et al., 2011; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Williams, Paluck, & Spencer -Rodgers, 2010), but also the performance of women who are the targets of these biases (Latu, Mast, & Stewart, 2015). Moreover, in a recent study on gender stereotypes and job interview performance, female job applicants' own implicit gender stereotypes directly influenced how applicants performed, which is consistent with the literature on stereotype threat in that mere awareness that a stereotype exists can impair performance (Latu et al., 2015). Notably, Latu et al. (2015) found that female job applicant's implicit gender stereotypes did not predict their self-evaluations of performance, but directly and exclusively predicted their performance as evaluated by external raters. This implies that women may not be aware of their own negative implicit stereotypes or how they influenced their behavior (Latu et al., 2015).

Overall, previous research thus suggests that implicit stereotypes are important predictors of outcomes for women in social interaction. The current study plans to extend this research by focusing on implicit stereotypes as predictors of *negotiation performance*. Why are gender stereotypes relevant to negotiations? As it stands, many stereotypically masculine traits are considered to be typical of a successful negotiator

(strong, dominant, assertive, and rational) while many stereotypically feminine traits are considered ineffective (weak, submissive, accommodating, emotional) in negotiations. Kray and Thompson (2005) theorized that the gender difference in bargaining success may stem from implicit theories about what it takes to be a successful negotiator. Drawing from the role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), this mismatch between successful negotiator stereotypes and feminine stereotypes poses a potential threat for women who aim to succeed at the bargaining table, as feminine traits are considered incompatible with effective negotiators. As such, these stereotypes may be negatively related to women's performance in negotiations.

Stereotype Threat. Research has shown that being aware of negative stereotypes of one's in-group performance in a given domain can hinder performance, a phenomenon known as stereotype threat (Steele, 1997). Stereotype threat is the fear that an individual feels when they are in a situation that may confirm the negative stereotype about their ingroup. This threat may impair their performance in that situation, thus confirming the stereotype (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). In addition, even if the individual does not believe the stereotype about their in-group, the very knowledge that the stereotype exists will produce the effect (Steele, 1997).

The effect that negative gender stereotypes have on women's performance in male-dominated domains has been documented across various contexts. Consistent with Steele and Aronson's early work on racial stereotype threat on test performance, women who were primed with gender showed decreased performance on math tests (Doyle & Voyer, 2016; Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Spencer et al., 1999), due to the stereotype that women are bad at math. This effect has been found in workplace situations as well. One

study found that women exposed to advertisements depicting women in stereotypical roles (e.g. homecoming queen) less likely to choose a leadership role in a subsequent task (Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005). In a hypothetical executive decision-making task (Bergeron, Block, & Echtenkamp, 2006), women who performed the task under stereotype threat showed a decrease in performance in terms of both quality and quantity of decisions made.

Stereotype threat has also impaired women's performance in negotiations. In a direct test of the activation of gender stereotypes on negotiation performance, it was revealed that men and women perform at a similar level in a baseline negotiation, but men outperformed women when the negotiation was framed as a "diagnostic" test of their actual capability (Kray et al., 2001). When stereotypes were activated, the manner in which they were activated had an impact on how men and women responded. When the stereotypically masculine traits linked to effective negotiation were activated on an explicit level, women exhibited stereotype reactance such that they outperformed men. However, when the stereotypes were implicitly activated, women's performance suffered and they underperformed (Kray et al., 2001; Tellhed & Björklund, 2011). In another study, participants were told that effective negotiators possessed certain skills that were either stereotypically feminine or masculine. Female negotiators who were instructed that feminine traits led to success tended to negotiate more profitable agreements for themselves than did their male counterparts (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002). While these findings add to our current understanding of the role of stereotype threat in negotiations, they only focus on the effects of stereotype activation on negotiation performance. In the present study, we will move past situational activation of stereotypes

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to examine how naturally varying levels of one person's own implicit gender-negotiator associations can predict negotiation outcomes in an actual face to face negotiation. Drawing from the stereotype threat literature, it is predicted that women's negative gender-negotiation implicit associations will predict lower performance in an actual negotiation.

Stereotype Lift. Awareness of stereotypes may also have positive effects on performance. An individual may experience a performance boost due to an awareness that an out-group is negatively stereotyped (Walton & Cohen, 2003). For example, men may enjoy a boost in their math test performance as a result of increased awareness of negative stereotypes about women in math. As with stereotype threat, this has been examined in various contexts, most frequently with test differences (Walton & Cohen, 2003). A meta-analysis on stereotype lift found that when stereotypes were activated on an implicit level, those not in the out-group experienced a boost, but when the stereotypes were activated on an explicit level, the effect disappeared (Walton & Cohen, 2003). This lends support to the importance of understanding the automatic or implicit nature of stereotypes and their effect on performance of both targets and non-targets of biases. One study investigated the differential effects of both stereotype threat and lift between gender on math performance and produced mixed findings (Johnson, Barnard-Brak, Saxon, & Johnson, 2012). Participants took a math test in either a neutral, stereotype lift, or stereotype threat condition. In the stereotype lift condition, male participants were told that men were expected to do better than women, whereas female participants were told that women were expected to do better than men. In the stereotype threat condition, male participants were told that men were expected to do worse than women, whereas female

participants were told that women were expected to do worse than men. Men performed better on the math tests under the stereotype threat condition than under the stereotype lift condition, while women performed better under stereotype lift than stereotype threat (Johnson et al., 2012). The findings for women are consistent with previous literature, but the findings for men only underscore the lack of research in how stereotypes affect men.

Overall, this literature suggests that stereotypes that associate men with successful negotiators may differently affect men and women in negotiations. The present study investigates how the stereotypes of both interaction partners predict their performance at the bargaining table. Drawing from the stereotype threat and lift literature, it is predicted that due to the gender negotiation stereotype that associates men with effective negotiation, these stereotypes may impair women's performance but boost men's performance.

Negotiation Dynamics

What other factors may influence success at the bargaining table? Previous studies have indicated that exuding dominance can increase one's success in a negotiation, giving dominance a pivotal role at the bargaining table (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). In negotiations, expressing dominance can increase a negotiator's ability to claim value (Belkin, Kurtzberg, & Naquin, 2013). Data suggests negotiators who are powerful or seem powerful are more assertive, and are more likely to make the initial offer, which has been shown to increase the negotiator's outcome (Thompson et al., 2010). Although power and dominance can be dispositional traits, they can also be related to situational factors, such as a person's status, or role, which can therein serve as relative power (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Pinkley et al., 1994; Thompson et al., 2010). In this context, power

is defined as control over resources and outcomes. For example, in employment negotiations, recruiters are generally more powerful than candidates, and as a result tend to negotiate better outcomes for themselves compared to candidates (Pinkley et al., 1994). The present study aims to investigate how the power role predicts outcomes, but also how it interacts with negotiators' stereotypes to predict negotiation outcomes.

In addition to negotiator role, the type of negotiation influences how one must navigate the interaction. There are zero-sum (distributive) negotiations, in which partner's gains are the other one's losses. This type of negotiation is very competitive, which would be less likely to facilitate collaboration. The other type of negotiation is a non-zero-sum (integrative), in which negotiating parties' aggregate gains and losses can be less than or more than zero. In this type of negotiation, the two partners have some common interest but also opposing interests, which facilitates a more cooperative strategy to be used to bring the most gains to both sides.

Previous research has investigated the role of stereotypes on these two different types of negotiations and found that the way a person responds to a stereotype, depends on the manner in which was activated in addition to the type of negotiation (Kray, Reb, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004). Kray and colleagues (2004) found that when female stereotypic traits were explicitly linked to success, the negotiations became more integrative. This research suggests that distributive negotiations are more role congruent with male negotiators due to the competitive nature of the task, while integrative negotiations are more role congruent for females due to the cooperative nature of the task. A recent study examined the influence of power via negotiator role on both stereotype threat and lift, and found that role power had a greater effect on performance than the thinking that the task was diagnostic of ability (Kang, Galinsky, Kray, & Shirako, 2015). This study highlighted that if a stigmatized person is put into a low power position in that same context, it severely decreases performance. On the other hand, when a person who is not stigmatized is put into a high power role, the boost or lift they receive is significantly increased (Kang et al., 2015). This literature suggests that for female negotiators in the low power role of candidate, performance would be significantly hindered, while for male negotiators in the high power role of recruiter, performance would significantly increase. The current research investigated how power interacts with stereotypes and gender to predict performance in both integrative and distributive negotiations.

The Current Study

The goal of the current research is to examine how implicit gender stereotypes, power role, and gender predict negotiation outcomes. This research is novel because we investigated how these factors interact in an actual face-to-face negotiation, which has not been done to date.

The present research question was addressed in a two-phase study. In the first phase, participants' implicit stereotypes were measured using a sequential priming task on the computer. In the second phase, participants were randomly assigned negotiator roles and then negotiated on several issues including salary (distributive), bonus (integrative), and vacation days (integrative). Negotiator performance was measured according to the amount of points accumulated based on the negotiated agreement.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Implicit stereotypes that associate men with effective negotiator traits will predict higher outcomes for men and lower outcomes for women. Drawing from the stereotype threat literature (Kray et al., 2001), as well the literature on gender stereotypes in job interviews (Latu et al., 2015), female negotiators holding negative implicit stereotypes about female negotiators are expected to perform poorly. Drawing from the literature on stereotype lift (Walton & Cohen, 2003), it is predicted that male negotiators' performance will benefit from holding the implicit stereotype that men are more effective negotiators than women.

Hypothesis 2: If implicit stereotypes that associate men with effective negotiator traits increase performance for men and hinder performance for women, this will especially be the case for male *recruiters*, as it is the more powerful role and the stereotypes would fit the role. As previously stated, power can boost one's performance in a negotiation (Belkin et al., 2013; Pinkley et al., 1994; Thompson et al., 2010). However, as recent research suggests, the effect of role-power in negotiation outcomes is contingent on the level of stereotype lift or threat felt by the negotiator. Specifically, men experience greater stereotype threat effects when in high power roles, but women experience more detrimental stereotype threat effects when in low power roles (Kang et al., 2015). As such, we propose that predictive effect of implicit stereotypes in negotiations will be moderated by both gender and power role, such that implicit stereotypes would predict higher performance especially for men in the recruiter role.

Hypothesis 3: We hypothesized that implicit gender stereotypes will predict higher outcomes for men and lower outcomes for women, especially for salary. Salary is

a distributive (zero-sum) issue requiring more competitiveness and aggressiveness, which are stereotypically masculine traits. Integrative or non-zero sum negotiations require more cooperation and accommodation, which are stereotypically feminine traits. (Kray et al., 2004; Mazei et al., 2015). Therefore, it stands to reason the predicted pattern (men receiving a performance boost from implicit stereotypes associating men with effective negotiator traits will negotiate higher outcomes) will be stronger for salary versus bonus or vacation.

Method

Participants and design

Participants were 140 students (39 males and 101 females) enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Rutgers University-Camden who volunteered as one means to fulfill a course requirement. Participants were run in groups of two and were randomly assigned to either a recruiter or a candidate role, forming either mixed-sex or same-sex dyads. Data from three dyads was missing, which resulted in a final sample of n = 134.

Procedure

After signing informed consent, participants were informed that they would be participating in two different studies, one composed of a language task that would be completed on the computer and another one that involved a mock negotiation. The tasks were completed in different rooms, to emphasize the idea that the two tasks were parts of different studies and thus minimize participants' suspicion about the connection between the two.

In the first phase, participants completed a response-time task (Sequential Priming Task) designed to measure implicit gender-negotiation stereotypes. In the second phase, participants were asked to take part in a mock negotiation. After the computer task was completed, participants were randomly assigned the role of either recruiter or candidate. They were then invited to sit at a conference table where they prepared their negotiation strategy. The experimenter then described the task to the participants, giving general instruction as well as role specific instruction. More specifically, the experimenter explained that the candidate has just been hired as a marketing manager and will negotiate for salary, starting bonus, vacation days, and location. The experimenter then explained to the recruiter that he or she has just hired this person, and must negotiate in the interest of their company. The participants were instructed that their goal is to earn as many points as possible using their individual "Pay-Off Schedule" (see Appendix E, F). The participants also received written instructions and the pay-off schedule, as well as scrap paper for taking notes.

The experimenter instructed them to take ten minutes to prepare. Participants were advised not to share their "Pay-Off Schedule" with one another. After ten minutes, the experimenter returned and instructed the participants that they may begin the actual negotiation. Participants were told to let the experimenter know when they had reached an agreement and signed the employment contract. Afterwards participants answered questions about their negotiation experience, and finally they were thanked and debriefed.

Materials and measures

Implicit gender stereotypes. Negotiators' implicit gender stereotypes were measured using a sequential priming task adapted from the Successful Manager Implicit Association Test (Latu et al., 2011). This task measures participants' implicit associations between gender and positive negotiator traits (strong, dominant, assertive, rational, active, effective) and negative negotiator traits (weak, submissive, accommodating, emotional, passive, ineffective). The task is composed of 96 trials divided into two blocks. Each trial starts with a fixation point in the middle of the screen, followed by a prime denoting either a male or female name, or the name of a type of building (e.g., house and cabin). The prime remains on the screen for 250 ms, after which it is replaced by a trait—either a positive or a negative negotiator trait or a positive or negative building trait (e.g., spacious and leaky). Participants' task is to press one of the two keyboard keys to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, if the trait described a person or a building. Response times are measured in milliseconds.

For analyses, mean response times for categorizing positive and negative negotiator traits after being primed with male and female names were computed. We eliminated response times that were three standard deviations above and below the mean and logtransformed the remaining response times in order to normalize the distribution of values. The final score was computed by subtracting the average response time to stereotypeconsistent trials (male-good negotiator; female-bad negotiator) from those to stereotypeinconsistent trials (male- bad negotiator; female- good negotiator). If participants more strongly associate men with good negotiators and women with bad negotiators (stereotype-consistent) compared to men with bad negotiators and women with good negotiators (stereotype-inconsistent), they should be faster to respond to the consistent compared to the inconsistent trials. Thus, higher numbers denote stronger men-good negotiator, women-bad negotiator associations. Mean and standard deviations for male and female negotiators are reported in Table 1.

Negotiation task. The negotiation task was modeled after Pinkley and colleagues (1994). The task was a mock negotiation in which the candidate was asked to take the role of a newly hired marketing manager, whereas the recruiter was asked to take the role of a human resources manager. The Negotiator Instructions, Pay-Off Schedule, and Strategy Suggestions that each participant received are available in Appendix A-F. Each

participant's goal was to get the highest number of points, which are reflected in the Pay-Off Schedule.

The negotiation included four topics: salary, signing bonus, vacation days, and location. Each possible outcome was associated with a number of points. As visible in the pay-off schedule (Appendix E, F), the number of points varies for each negotiator role, depending on which items would be more important to each role. The items that needed to be negotiated fell into two categories. Salary was a distributive (zero-sum) issue, such that the more one partner gained, the more the other one lost. This set-up was highly competitive, as one negotiator's gains were the other's losses. Starting bonus and vacation days were, together, integrative (non-zero sum) issues. As the pay-off schedule suggests, getting more vacation days got the candidate more points, whereas giving the candidate a lower signing bonus got the recruiter more points. This set-up offered negotiators the possibility to engage in an integrative negotiation in which they collaborated to find a solution which was beneficial for both. After participants reached an agreement on all topics, they filled out and signed an employment contract, similar to a real-world wage negotiation.

Negotiation Performance. To measure negotiation outcome, the participants were instructed to fill out an employment contract (see Appendix G) once an agreement had been reached. For both the recruiter and candidate, the highest number of points they could earn in total was 2000. For salary, the total number of points that could be earned was 800 for both negotiators. For bonus, the total possible points for the recruiter was 600 and for the candidate the total was 400. For vacation days, the total possible points for the recruiter was for the recruiter was 400, and for the candidate was 600 (see Appendix H).

For each of the negotiated issues, the total number of points was broken down by five levels on a range. Salary had the highest number of points for both roles, but the point ranges were exactly opposite, making it a distributive issue. Bonus and vacation had different total possible points for both roles, making them integrative issues. For the recruiter, bonus carried more importance than vacation and vice versa for the candidate.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Means, standard deviations, and correlations between key study variables are presented in Table 1. Males negotiated higher salaries than females, but this difference fell short of statistical significance, t(132) = 1.59, p = .12.

To account for the dyadic nature of the data, we used Kenny's Actor-Interdependence Model (Cook & Kenny, 2005), which is designed to analyze data in a dyadic design. In the context of our design, this model allowed us to investigate whether recruiters' and candidates' implicit gender stereotypes independently and /or interactively predicted negotiation performance.

As a preliminary step, we investigated whether the recruiter and candidate scores were independent for each predictor (implicit gender stereotypes). Given that the members of the dyads were distinguishable, meaning each dyad member had a role that was not interchangeable, such that one was the recruiter and one was the candidate, we computed a Pearson correlation coefficient to assess independence of dyad members. According to Kenny's model, if scores are correlated, then they are nonindependent and the dyad is the unit of analysis. If dyad scores do not significantly correlate, they are said to be independent and the unit of analysis can be the person. Analyses showed recruiters' and candidates' implicit stereotype scores were independent, r = .07, p = .59. As such, we used the individual person as the level of analysis in subsequent analyses. Mixed model analyses were also conducted and results were consistent with the analyses at the individual level, but we report the latter because results at the individual level are more powerful.

Overall Performance

The first hypothesis predicted implicit stereotypes that associate men with effective negotiator traits will predict higher outcomes for men and lower outcomes for women. Additionally, the second hypothesis predicted this would especially be the case for male recruiters.

To test these hypotheses, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis to test the main and interactive effects of implicit gender stereotypes, gender, and role on total negotiation performance score. Before conducting the analyses, the continuous predictor variable (implicit stereotyping score) was mean centered and the categorical variables were dummy coded: sex (0 = male; 1 = female), and role (0 = candidate; 1 =recruiter). Three interaction terms were then computed for all possible two-way interactions (implicit stereotypes × role, implicit stereotypes × sex, sex × role). A threeway interaction term was also computed (implicit stereotypes × sex × role).

In the first regression step, all three main effects were entered: implicit gender stereotypes (mean centered), gender (dummy coded: 0 = male; 1 = female), and role (dummy coded: 0 = candidate; 1 = recruiter). In the second step, the three two-way interactions terms were added. In the final step of the regression the three-way interaction term was added. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between all predictor variables for male and female negotiators are presented in Table 1.

As shown on the left side of Table 2, results for main effects and interactions were nonsignificant. However, the hypothesized interaction between gender and implicit stereotypes showed a trend toward significance. Consistent with Aiken and West's (1991) method, we probed this interaction by computing the hierarchical multiple regression a second time with reversed dummy codes for sex (0 = female; male = 1). Results indicated that for male negotiators, there was a near significant relationship between their implicit stereotype scores and their overall performance, such that the higher their implicit stereotype scores, the better they negotiated overall, $b^* = .32$, p = .05. For women, this relationship was much smaller and not significant $b^* = .01$, p = .94. Therefore, marginal support was found for Hypothesis 1. The three-way interaction predicted by the second hypothesis was nonsignificant, $b^* = .22$, p = .40. Thus, results for total score were not supportive of Hypothesis 2.

Salary

Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to investigate the hypothesis that implicit gender stereotypes would predict higher outcomes for men and lower outcomes for women, especially for salary. The hierarchical multiple regression model used to predict total score was repeated, but was modified to predict salary instead of total score.

In the first regression step, all three main effects were entered: implicit gender stereotypes (mean centered), gender (dummy coded: 0 = male; 1 = female), and role (dummy coded: 0 = candidate; 1 = recruiter). In the second step, the three two-way interactions terms were added. In the final step of the regression the three-way interaction term was added.

The results from this hierarchical multiple regression are presented on the right side of Table 2. The two-way interaction between sex and implicit stereotypes was not significant, $b^* = -.15$, p = .35. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Discussion

The goal of the present study was to investigate how an individual's own implicit gender stereotypes interact with gender and role to predict negotiation outcomes. Our findings did not reveal any statistically significant effects in relation to the study aim. However, our predicted interaction of gender and implicit stereotypes was marginally significant. It was predicted that high implicit gender stereotypes that associate men with effective negotiator traits would boost male negotiators' performance and hinder females' performance. This interaction was found to be trending towards significance, such that high implicit stereotype scores predicted better overall performance for male negotiators, but not for female negotiators. We also predicted that this would especially be the case for male recruiters, and that this pattern would be particularly strong in salary negotiations, but our findings did not support these predictions.

Our finding that implicit stereotypes led to better performance for men, but not for women lends further support to the growing body of research documenting the effects of stereotypes on performance. Consistent with the literature on stereotype lift, male negotiators with high implicit gender stereotypes that associated men with effective negotiation and women with ineffective negotiation may have experienced a performance boost (Walton & Cohen, 2003). On the other hand, implicit gender negotiation stereotypes may have hindered female negotiators' performance due to stereotype threat (Steele, 1997). Therefore, it is possible that implicit gender stereotypes have an effect on negotiation performance.

One alternative explanation may be that for men, knowledge of gender negotiation stereotype may have led to an increase in self-efficacy, which is the selfperception about one's ability to perform successfully in a given domain (Franceschini, Galli, Chiesi, & Primi, 2014; Walton & Cohen, 2003). Previous research shows that self-efficacy can explain a boost in performance, but only in situations in which stereotypes are explicitly activated because cognitions of self-efficacy occur on a conscious level (Franceschini et al., 2014). In the current study, we did not explicitly activate stereotypes, so we believe the observed findings are in fact due to stereotype lift, not an increase in self-efficacy.

Despite finding support for our first hypothesis, the power role of recruiter did not have a significant effect, nor did the type of negotiation. The results for power role are inconsistent with previous research, which has found that the role of recruiter versus candidate is inherently more powerful (Pinkley et al., 1994). One possible explanation is that the students in our sample did not view the recruiters as inherently more powerful. Pinkley et al. (1994) suggested that the participants in their study may have perceived the recruiter as more powerful than the candidate due to the fact that they were M.B.A. students. Given that our sample was undergraduates and may not have the same amount of exposure to the working world as M.B.A. students, the inherent power attached to the role of recruiter may not have been salient. The results for salary are inconsistent with previous research that has indicated men fare better than women in distributive negotiations as they are more competitive and fit the male stereotype (Kray et al., 2004). One possible explanation is that the distributive issue was not as inherently competitive as we predicted. Pinkley and colleagues (1994) suggested that a "settlement bias" exists in negotiations in which in some situations, negotiators may accept a poor outcome, just to reach an agreement. In the current study, participants may have placed a greater

importance on reaching a settlement than the points they accumulated, which in turn made the competitive nature of the distributive issue disappear. Another possibility is that the salary amounts we included in the negotiation task were not realistic for the students. In our negotiation task, the salary amounts ranged from \$30,000 to \$50,000, which may not have reflected enough variability. In addition, students may have perceived these amounts to be too low for the position the marketing manager position, which in turn may have decreased competition.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study utilized a human subject pool from a university. While many students are employed while in college, most have not been employed in fields in which skills such as negotiation are necessary. Therefore, one possibility is that this experiment may have been the participants' first exposure to negotiation. The negotiation task was designed to account for this by assigning point values to the issues, making it a game of sorts. While this may decrease the applicability to real life negotiation situations where no payoff schedule with set boundaries is provided, the design helps examine the underlying mechanics of success at the bargaining table. Given the overall lack of experience, this possibly resulted in participants viewing the task as more of a game and less of a real-world negotiation. This would decrease the likelihood that the negotiator role would impact a felt sense of power, and would decrease the likelihood that the type of negotiation would impact the negotiator's strategy. Our task was modeled after the task used by Pinkley and colleagues (1994), but this original study had a sample of M.B.A. students, who may have had the skills and experience necessary to ensure a realworld level of involvement in the task. Future research should test the current study's

predictions with a sample of M.B.A. students, as the results may be more applicable to the working world.

Another possible limitation is the small sample size. Future research should increase the sample size and investigate if the aforementioned trend increases to significance. In addition, our sample was predominantly female, (n = 101) which may have influenced the results. While the current study hypotheses pertained to an individual's own implicit gender stereotypes in predicting their negotiation performance future research should investigate the current negotiation task specifically with mixed sex dyads. Consistent with our findings, Kray et al. (2001) found that implicit activation of stereotypes leading to differences in performance were limited to mixed-sex dyads, such that no differences were observed in same-sex dyads. Dyads in the current study are primarily same-sex dyads (72%), which may have had an effect on the role of implicit gender stereotypes. According to Kray and Thompson (2005), gender stereotypes may play a larger role in negotiations with mixed-sex dyads rather than same-sex dyads due to the enhanced salience of gender. Future research could examine if the level of a negotiator's implicit gender stereotypes only has a discernable impact when in a mixedgender dyad.

Another possible limitation may be lack of involvement in the negotiation task. Students participated in the study as a means to fulfill a course requirement and may not have had any other motivation for participation. The negotiation task was videotaped, so further analyses should investigate level of participant involvement in the task. For example, several nonverbal behaviors could be coded based on videotapes in order to infer involvement (e.g. hand gestures, eye contact). Contrary to our study, research on stereotypes in negotiations has largely activated stereotypes either explicitly or implicitly prior to the measurement of stereotypes (Kray et al., 2001; Kray et al., 2004). Given our non-significant findings, future research should investigate whether the effect of stereotypes would be impacted by the explicit or implicit activation of stereotypes activating stereotypes can subjects has a major effect on results.

In conclusion, we found support for the hypothesis high implicit stereotypes that associate men with effective negotiator skills lead to better performance for men, but not for women. The findings from this study provide additional evidence to the existing literature that implicit gender stereotypes can affect an individual's performance in a given domain. Given the results of the present study, future research should concentrate on the investigation of the mechanisms driving the relationship between implicit gender stereotypes and performance. Taken together, this information can be used to help further our understanding of the persistent gender pay gap and what issues continue to drive the problem.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Study Variables for Male and Female

Participants

	Male Negotia	itors $(n = 39)$	Female Negoti	ators ($n = 101$)	_	Correl	ations	
Variable	М	SD	М	SD	1	2	3	4
1. Implicit Stereotypes	0.009	0.065	-0.004	0.059		047	.415*	.219
2. Role	0.385	0.493	0.545	0.500	.037		186	297
3. Total Score	1088.460	369.292	1052.530	305.258	.005	061		.708**
4. Salary	437.840	181.585	385.570	166.452	.012	282**	.690**	

Note. Intercorrelations of study variables for male negotiators are presented above the

diagonal, and intercorrelations for female negotiators are presented below the diagonal.

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 2

Summary of Two Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses for Implicit Gender

		Negotiatio	on Outcome	
-	Total	Score	Sa	lary
Predictor	ΔR^2	β	ΔR^2	β
Step 1	.03		.11	
Implicit Stereotypes		.13		.08
Sex ^{<i>a</i>}		02		10
Role ^b		08		29
Step 2	.02		.01	
Implicit Stereotypes × Sex		25		15
Implicit Stereotypes × Role		.03		10
$Sex \times Role$		12		.03
Step 3	.01		.02	
Implicit Stereotypes \times Sex \times Role		22		38
Total R^2	.05		.13	
n	134		134	

Stereotypes, Gender, and Negotiator Role Predicting Negotiation Performance

Note. ^{*a*} Male is coded as 0 and female as 1. ^{*b*} Candidate is coded as 0 and recruiter as 1.

**p* < .05.

Appendices

Appendix A: Recruiter Instruction Sheet

Negotiator Instructions: Recruiter

Whether we like it or not, we are all negotiators. We negotiate with friends where to go out, with family members about where to go on vacation, with professors and teachers about grades and deadlines. Today we would like you to use the same negotiation skills you use in everyday life to negotiate in a fictitious workplace situation.

We would like to ask you to play the role of a recruiter (Human Resources representative) who is negotiating with a new employee who was recently offered a marketing manager position at a national company. Your task is to negotiate with the candidate a start-up package, which involves the salary, signing bonus (a one-time bonus given when signing the contract), vacation days, and the location of your work.

Your goal is to reach an agreement with the other person on all four issues. You should strive to reach the best possible agreement for yourself. Basically, THE MORE POINTS YOU EARN, THE BETTER FOR YOU. In fact, your employer will evaluate you and assign you a raise based on the points you get in this negotiation.

Use the PAY-OFF SCHEDULE on the next page to see what type of agreement earns you the most/least points. When you look at the pay-off schedule, notice that each issue is listed separately. Along the left-hand side under each issue are five different agreement options. The number of points you will receive for agreeing to that level of the issue is in the right hand column. As a negotiator, you and the other party may match any of the five levels for each of the four issues. Thus, there are a huge number of potential agreements.

You should note that each issue has a different degree of importance to you, as indicated by the magnitude of the number of points you could gain or lose by settling at that point on the issue. For example, you can earn more points by negotiating the ideal salary compared to the ideal signing bonus. You will have 20 minutes to reach agreement on all four issues. When you have reached an agreement, please fill in together the employment contract on the table.

Please become very familiar with your PAY-OFF SCHEDULE. Feel free to make notes or write on these materials. The highest possible number of points you can obtain in this negotiation is 2,000 and the lowest possible number of points is 0. These possible point totals were calculated by adding up the highest number of points for each of the four issues and the lowest number of points for each of the four issues:

Issue	Lowest number of possible	Highest number of possible
	points you could earn	points you could earn
Salary	0	800
Signing Bonus	0	600
Vacation Days	0	400
Location	0	200
Total	0	2000

Appendix B: Candidate Instruction Sheet

Negotiator Instructions: Candidate

Whether we like it or not, we are all negotiators. We negotiate with friends where to go out, with family members about where to go on vacation, with professors and teachers about grades and deadlines. Today we would like you to use the same negotiation skills you use in everyday life to negotiate in a fictitious workplace situation.

We would like to ask you to play the role of a candidate who was just offered a job as a marketing manager at a national company. Your task is to negotiate with the recruiter a start-up package, which involves the salary, signing bonus (a one-time bonus given when signing the contract), vacation days, and the location of your work.

Your goal is to reach an agreement with the other person on all four issues. You should strive to reach the best possible agreement for yourself. Basically, THE MORE POINTS YOU EARN, THE BETTER FOR YOU. Use the PAY-OFF SCHEDULE on the next page to see what type of agreement earns you the most/least points.

When you look at the pay-off schedule, notice that each issue is listed separately. Along the left-hand side under each issue are five different agreement options. The number of points you will receive for agreeing to that level of the issue is in the right hand column. As a negotiator, you and the other party may match any of the five levels for each of the four issues. Thus, there are a huge number of potential agreements.

You should note that each issue has a different degree of importance to you, as indicated by the magnitude of the number of points you could gain or lose by settling at that point on the issue. For example, you can earn more points by negotiating your ideal salary compared to your ideal number of vacation days. You will have 20 minutes to reach agreement on all four issues. When you have reached an agreement, please fill in together the employment contract on the table.

Please become very familiar with your PAY-OFF SCHEDULE. Feel free to make notes or write on these materials. The highest possible number of points you can obtain in this negotiation is 2,000 and the lowest possible number of points is 0. These possible point totals were calculated by adding up the highest number of points for each of the four issues and the lowest number of points for each of the four issues:

Issue	Lowest number of possible	Highest number of possible
	points you could earn	points you could earn
Salary	0	800
Vacation Days	0	600
Signing Bonus	0	400
Location	0	200
Total	0	2000

Appendix C: Recruiter Suggestion Sheet

Negotiation Suggestions Recruiter

1. Start by reiterating the position being offered (Marketing Manager).

2. Decide on and make an initial salary offer. It is usually the recruiter's role to make the initial offer. Remember, the more you get for the company (eg. You give a lower salary, lower bonus, etc.), the better you will be evaluated.

3. Use the other issues such as signing bonus, vacation days, and location to help you get what you want. You can negotiate for all these issues as a package. Know which of these issues will bring you the most and least points and use that information in your negotiation.

4. When requesting what you want, you can emphasize:

- a. The strengths of the company
- b. The limitations imposed by the company
- c. The possibility of choosing other candidates

Appendix D: Candidate Suggestion Sheet

Negotiation Suggestions Candidate

1. It is usually the recruiter who makes an initial salary offer so be prepared to respond to his/her initial offer with a counter-offer. Think ahead of time what is your "ideal" salary as well as the "minimum" that you would be willing to accept.

2. If the recruiter is not making you an initial salary offer, have a salary request prepared.

3. Use the other issues such as signing bonus, vacation days, and location to help you get what you want. You can negotiate for all these issues as a package. Know which of these issues will bring you the most and least points and use that information in your negotiation.

- 4. When requesting what you want, you can emphasize:
- a. Your strengths for the company
- b. Your actual needs which, if not fulfilled, may cost the company
- c. The possibility of choosing an alternative company

Appendix E: Pay-Off Schedule Sheet for Recruiters

RECRUITER PAY-OFF SCHEDULE

SALARY	<u>POINTS</u>
\$ 50,000	0
\$ 45,000	200
\$ 40, 000	400
\$ 35,000	600
\$ 30, 000	800

<u>SIGNING BONUS</u>	<u>POINTS</u>
10%	0
8 %	150
6 %	300
4 %	450
2 %	600

VACATION DAYS PO	<u>DINTS</u>
30 days	0
25 days	100
20 days	200
15 days	300
10 days	400

Philadelphia 20)0
New York 15	50
Boston 10)0
Chicago S	50
Atlanta	0

Do not let the other negotiator see your Pay-Off Schedule.

Appendix F: Pay-Off Schedule Sheet for Candidates

CANDIDATE PAY-OFF SCHEDULE

SALARY	<u>POINTS</u>
\$ 50,000	800
\$ 45,000	600
\$ 40,000	400
\$ 35,000	200
\$ 30,000	0

VACATION DAYS	<u>POINTS</u>
30 days	600
25 days	450
20 days	300
15 days	150
10 days	0

<u>SIGNING BONUS</u>	<u>POINTS</u>
10%	400
8 %	300
6 %	200
4 %	100
2 %	0

LOCATION	<u>POINTS</u>
Philadelphia	200
New York	150
Boston	100
Chicago	50
Atlanta	0

Do not let the other negotiator see your Pay-Off Schedule.

Appendix G: Participant Employment Contract

Participant numbers _____ and _____

Negotiation Date	
Negotiation Start Time:	
Negotiation End Time:	

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

We have reached an agreement on all four issues: YES _____ NO _____

Please circle the outcomes that reflect your agreements in this negotiation:

SALARY	\$50K	\$45K	\$40K	\$35K	\$30K	(dollars)
VACATION	30	25	20	15	10	(days)
BONUS	10	8	6	4	2	(percent)
LOCATION	Philadelphia	New York	Boston	Chicago	Atlanta	(city)

Please sign this agreement

RECRUITER:

CANDIDATE: _____

Issue	Recruiter Points	Candidate Points	
Salary			
\$50,000	0	800	
\$45,000	200	600	
\$40,000	400	400	
\$35,000	600	200	
\$30,000	800	0	
Starting Bonus			
10%	0	400	
8%	150	300	
6%	300	200	
4%	450	100	
2%	600	0	
Vacation Days			
30	0	600	
25	100	450	
20	200	300	
15	300	150	
10	400	0	

Appendix H: Summary of Pay-Off Schedules for Study Variables

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