

THE PESSIMISM OF SALLUST'S MORAL AND HISTORICAL OUTLOOK

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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This study examines each of the three works of Sallust – the *Bellum Catilinae*, the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, and the *Histories* – and attempts to reevaluate the prevailing views on Sallust's outlook on Roman history and Roman morality. Although many scholars have seen a degree of optimism in Sallust's earliest work, the *Bellum Catilinae*, and an evolution toward deeper pessimism in his last work, the *Histories*, this study presents a thorough case for seeing a consistent pessimism about Roman history and Roman morality pervading all three of his texts. By considering factors ranging from the key role given to the concept of *metus hostilis* (fear of the enemy) in his scheme of moral and historical causation, to the various manipulations of chronology, narrative order, and historical detail that his texts present to us, we may gain an enhanced recognition of the careful techniques by which Sallust constantly crafts his own unique (and pessimistic) view of Roman history and morality. Along the way, this study addresses some lingering misconceptions about Sallust's alleged political biases and philosophical sympathies in order to clear the way for an unclouded interpretation of the evidence of Sallust's texts. We shall conclude by asking what insights we might gain into the nature of Sallust's historical and moral orientation by taking into account the tumultuous socio-political

context of the Triumviral Period in which Sallust was writing, and how some of his contemporaries responded to the same tensions, concerns, and conflicts of that era.

Overall our investigation will show that, while Sallust's pessimism about Roman history and Roman morality was certainly influenced by the social and political developments of his own age, the unabating consistency and unmatched profundity of Sallustian pessimism demands that we understand Sallust on his own terms and that we recognize the many thoughtful techniques by which he gives voice to his unique perspective on Roman history.

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Chapter 1: Introduction: Approaching the Moral and Historical Outlook of Sallust

1.1: Overview

Sallust's concern with political and moral corruption in the late Republic is patent to anyone who reads his works, and has been a consistent point of reference in Sallustian scholarship.¹ While it is undeniable that corruption and civil strife are central themes in each of his three texts, scholars have come to widely divergent conclusions about many other aspects of Sallust's writings. Sallust's alleged philosophical leanings, the presence or absence of political biases behind his work, his moral outlook, even his knowledge of Greek and Latin authors, have been just some of the causes for continued debate. Moreover, in the ongoing effort to address such key issues in Sallustian studies, scholars sometimes take a cautious approach to assessing Sallust's three texts (the *Bellum Catilinae* (*BC*), the *Bellum Jugurthinum* (*BJ*), and the *Historiae* (*Hist.*))² in relation to each other, being especially wary of using the *Historiae* to further our understanding of what all three Sallustian texts share.³ Yet what these three texts share - and how Sallust

¹ A full account of the bibliography is precluded here (see further the discussion below). Sallustian views of political and moral corruption are discussed in the majority of works on Sallust, but some more detailed treatments include Levene 2000, Sklenár 1998, Mineo 1997, Heldmann 1993, De Blois 1988, La Penna 1968, Earl 1961, Syme 1964, Oppermann 1958, Vretska 1937, Schur 1936, Seel 1930, and others. For a detailed focus on the date(s) for the beginning of moral decline, see i.a. Hackl 1980, Knoche 1938 (also Dunsch 2006: 204-9 (though misinformed), Gelzer 1936 *passim*). Works focused specifically on Sallust's prologues (and/or digressions) include Dunsch 2006, Briquel 2006, Schutrumpf 1998, Conley 1981, D'Anna 1979, Tiffou 1973, Earl 1961, Leeman 1954-5, Klingner 1928.

² All citations from the *BC* and *BJ* follow the numbering of the Oxford Classical Text of Reynolds. All citations from the *Histories* follow the numbering of the fragments in Maurenbrecher 1891, but parenthetical reference is made to that of McGushin 1992/1994 as well. The abbreviations *BC*, *BJ*, and *Hist.* will in all instances refer to Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*, *Bellum Jugurthinum*, and *Historiae*.

³ e.g. Earl 1960: 104, 110. Some skepticism about working with fragmentary texts is indeed healthy (see e.g. Brunt 1980: 477-94). Yet as Gerrish 2015: 198-9 explains (citing Syme 1964: 179), Sallust's *Histories*, unlike many other fragmentary texts, has a fairly high number of overall fragments; Sallust himself is well-known through his other works, which provide a useful tool for comparative analysis; and we have extant authors who drew on Sallust's *Histories*, such as Plutarch in his biographies of *Sertorius* and others. "These factors, combined with careful philological work and appropriate caution, allow us to extract a great deal from the fragments of the *Histories*."

signals and maintains connections and continuities between them – is perhaps one of the most interesting aspect of Sallust's work and a possible key to unlocking further insights. Indeed, common themes unite all three texts and invite comparisons between individuals and events in each.⁴ Language too (especially moral discourse) is recycled by Sallust between multiple characters across all three texts in surprising and unsettling ways, such that a complex tissue of linguistic and thematic connections is presented to the reader.⁵ Each of his texts makes us question and re-evaluate what we find in the others, and thus it seems clear Sallust meant to seed his texts with a certain amount of ambivalence. In fact, it is justly observed that Sallust's work on a broad level reflects a world that perverts accepted meanings and values, and his style too is a reflection of this confused, corrupted environment.⁶

Accordingly, an important premise informing the present study is that a full and proper assessment of one Sallustian text cannot come without understanding its possible

⁴ Moreover, Sallust seems to invite comparisons between events and individuals in his narrative and events of the 40s and 30s – a fact recognized by many scholars (See e.g. the commentary of McGushin 1992 & 1994; Syme 1964; Leworowski 1994; La Penna & Funari 2015: 292 *et passim*). On this method of “analogical historiography”, Gerrish 2015 rightly observes that Sallust's historiography that the narrative is nominally about the 70s [or the Jugurthine War], but it is really about the late 40s/30s B.C. On Sallust's encoding of commentary on the present into his narratives of the past, see further Chapter 9.

⁵ Sallust's own voice, too, is often implicated in this web of shared [moralistic] discourse. For instance, just in the speech of Lepidus (*Hist.* 1.55M (48McG)), we can find echoes of Sallust's own voice but also of Memmius, L. Macer, and many of Catiline. This kind of situation obtains in the overwhelming majority of speeches and letters in Sallust's corpus. A related phenomenon is Sallust's use (as narrator) of Catonian language and moral discourse and his application of it (often with irony) to a number of different individuals (Catiline (*BC* 61 (=FRHist Cato F76), Marius (*BJ* 85), Memmius (*BJ* 31); on Sallust's use of Cato the Elder, see further Chapter 6.3).

⁶ On the degree to which Sallust's style may embody his specific worldview (or the corruption about which he writes), see O'Gorman 2007. On Sallust's style more generally, see i.a. von Albrecht 1989. The content and style of Sallust's work is also strongly informed by his experience of the political and moral environment of the “Triumviral Period” in particular (c.43-31 B.C.E.; see below, Chapter 9). The general anxiety, confusion, tenuous hope, and –as Conte calls it – “the Great Fear” of this period, as people still felt the sting of the traumatic ordeals of civil war in the 40s and even the 30s, are brought out well by many scholars. (e.g. Syme, *The Roman Revolution*. Oxford: 1939; Osgood, J. *Caesar's Legacy: Civil War and the Emergence of the Roman Empire*. Cambridge: 2006; Conte, G.B., *Latin Literature: A History*. edd. D.P. Fowler & G.W. Most. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p.250).

connections with the others. As I will argue, such an approach reveals that Sallust seems to have had, from the beginning of his literary career, a more mature and systematic view of his literary project than is usually assumed⁷; the areas of intersection and overlap in his texts therefore become the most important aspects of his work to reconsider, as they allow us to develop a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of Sallust's literary aims and moral outlook.⁸ This approach will also be useful later on in this study in attempting to develop a clearer picture of what makes Sallust's literary output as a whole "Sallustian" – that is, what might make him unique both in the Roman historiographical tradition and, more specifically, as a late Republican writer.

As some studies focus only or mainly on Sallust's two monographs, it is worth emphasizing again that Sallust's *Histories* must also form an important part of any study tackling more comprehensive issues in Sallustian scholarship. They constitute Sallust's largest, most well-received (especially in antiquity⁹), and yet least completely understood text.¹⁰ As his most mature work The *Historiae* were in many ways a culmination of

⁷ On the issue of consistency versus evolution in Sallust's outlook (moral, political, historical), see most fully Chapters 5-6.

⁸ Compare the position voiced by Connor 1977: 298 on Thucydides the artist: "The positive lesson is that Thucydides' text is often the best possible commentary on itself. De Romilly's work has stimulated our awareness of the close tie between speech and narrative and of how often similar situations recur and can be interpreted in light of each other."

⁹ Although early critics were not wholly positive (e.g. Pollio, Livy, Pompeius Trogus, Ateius Philologus), Sallust's stock steadily rose such that Martial (14.192.2), Quintilian (2.5.19; cf. 4.2.45, 10.1.32, 10.1.101), and Tacitus (Ann. 3.30.1, *rerum romanarum florentissimus auctor*) judge him best. Cf. Quint. 10.3.8: *sic scripsisse Sallustium accepimus, et sane manifestus est etiam ex opere ipso labor*. (cf. Syme 1964: 274-301, a cogent treatment of Sallust's reception.) For Sallust's subsequent favor with grammarians, see below, Section 3b.

¹⁰ On the textual history of Sallust's *Historiae* see below, section 3b. The two editions of the fragments of the *Historiae* I will reference are Maurenbrecher 1891 and McGushin 1992/1994. The primary numbering upon which I will rely is that of Maurenbrecher. McGushin's re-ordering of some of Maurenbrecher's fragments is successful in some places. For instance, Maurenbrecher thought it was Sallust's practice to put minor matters extending over multiple years in a single sequential block of narrative, when in fact he seems to have presented events within each year in their chronological order. This caused Maurenbrecher to incorrectly order some fragments (e.g. 2.71-87M, 3.1-16M). Thus

Sallust's historical outlook and literary skill. I argue that the hesitancy of some scholars to draw broader conclusions from this fragmentary text can be overcome, to some degree, by closer analysis of its relation to Sallust's two monographs, and also by a reconsideration of the place of Sallust's literary output in the broader contemporary literary landscape of the Triumviral Era (43-29 B.C.E.).¹¹ In these ways we should be able to gain new insights not only into the *Histories* themselves, but into all three of Sallust's texts – both as individual compositions and as part of a larger textual system.

Therefore, by considering the intersections between all three Sallustian texts as keys to further analysis, and taking account of as broad a range as possible of the perennially debated problems in Sallustian scholarship, this study sets out to reexamine Sallust's moral and historical outlook. The central argument maintained throughout will be that, in contrast to many previous and current views, Sallust's moral and historical pessimism does not “evolve” or deepen in any appreciable way from his first work (the *BC*) to his last (the *Histories*); rather, I will demonstrate that Sallust's pessimism is consistently deep-rooted in all three of his works, from the earliest phases of his career as a writer.¹² In what follows I shall first sketch in brief the context of previous and current work on Sallust, and then I shall proceed to outline the main stages of my own study.

McGushin's numbering, though not here adopted, is worth referencing to remind us of the necessarily ongoing nature of the editing and reconstructing of the text of the *Histories*.

¹¹ For full discussion of reading Sallust in the context of the Triumviral Period, see Chapter 9. For the temporal delineation of the “Triumviral Period” for both historical and literary purposes, see Osgood 2006: p.3 et passim. For the label of “Triumviral Literature”, see below, Chapter 1.4.

¹² On the relative order of publication of Sallust's three works, which is universally and rightly accepted to be *BC* (1st), *BJ* (2nd), and *Histories* (last), see Teuffel 1900: 361; for views of later scholars on the dates for each individual text, see further discussion at the beginning of Chapter 9.

1.2. Sallustian Scholarship

In undertaking the present study, scholarship on Sallust spanning well over a century has offered many useful and thought-provoking contributions on any number of discrete topics, and (sometimes) on Sallust's literary output as a whole. I must confine myself here to a targeted overview of relevant material.

Commentaries on Sallust's three texts of course abound, though still the most useful and accessible are those of Vretska 1976 and McGushin 1977 (on the *BC*),¹³ Koestermann 1971 and Balmaceda 2009 (on the *BJ*), and McGushin 1992/1994 (on the *Histories*).¹⁴ Balmaceda's clear and accessible commentary is notable for its salutary focus throughout on Sallust's redefinition of *virtus* and how it impacts characterization and narrative structure. The commentaries of Vretska and Koestermann are commendable above all for their detailed focus on language, style, and structure, though sometimes to the detriment of broader discussion.

Earlier in the 20th century a few particular scholarly approaches, which tended to exclude other positions more than integrate them, predominated in much of Sallustian studies. The view of Sallust as a political partisan (or pamphleteer) of Caesar and a "*popularis*" writer, formerly quite popular, had by and large been abandoned in the last decades of the 20th century.¹⁵ After the *Tendenzhypothese* began to fade, another thread

¹³ Cf. also the 2007 reprint of Ramsey's commentary (*Sallust's Bellum Catilinae*. APA Texts and Commentaries. Oxford), and his Loeb edition of 2013..

¹⁴ Funari & La Penna 2014, covering only Book One of the *Histories*, shows considerable attention to detail, but perhaps not as much original analysis as might be hoped for.

¹⁵ Among the earliest proponents of which include Schwartz 1897, Maurenbrecher 1891. Discussion of this interpretive position can be found in McGushin 1997: 22, Syme 1964: 64, Tiffou 1973: 334-5, Wiedemann 1993: 49. But cf. MacKay 1962, Miller 1975, and Zecchini 2002: 50, 53 (a rather recent revisiting of this *Tendenzhypothese*). Shimron 1967 is a more reasoned look at Sallust's earlier affiliation with Caesar and his later turn to a critical stance on Caesar by the time he started writing. On Sallust as a supposedly *popularis* writer or a mouthpiece for Caesar, see below, Chapter 3.

that was followed (and from time to time still appears) is that which searches for philosophical influences – or, in more extreme cases, philosophical affiliations – in Sallust’s texts. Although some of the more extreme efforts to assign Sallust an identity as a committed Stoic, Epicurean, or a follower of particular philosophers (especially Posidonius) may oversimplify Sallust’s intellectual positions in his works,¹⁶ the attention to Sallust’s use of authors as diverse as Plato and Posidonius, Xenophon and Isocrates, has in a way been a positive¹⁷; for, generally speaking, scholars have been all too ready to see Sallust as anything but a well-read and intellectually allusive author.¹⁸ As the course of this study will show, especially Chapters 4 and 8, Sallust surely had direct knowledge of many authors (philosophical and otherwise), even if his knowledge of others was generalized or at second hand. Moreover, in a great many of the instances which we will have occasion to mention, Sallust’s use of sources is not slavish, or a substitute for thinking, but a creative endeavor that produces new sources of meaning and emphasis in his own texts. Of particular use for bringing out the essentials of this debate are Thomas 1936, Schur 1936, Earl 1961, and Tiffou 1973, the latter of whom covers philosophy in Sallust generally, but with especial reference to the influence of Stoicism and of Posidonius.

¹⁶ E.g. Hackl 1980 (Posidonius); Thomas 1936, Schur 1936 (Plato mediated through Posidonius), Eggermann 1932 (Plato); Klingner 1928 (Posidonius), MacQueen 1981. See in more detail Chapter 4 below.

¹⁷ Cf. Dué 2000 for Sallust’s likely evocation, in his speech of Adherbal (*BJ* 14) of a particular nexus of tragic models for the “desperation speech” from Catullus to Ennius and Euripides.

¹⁸ Though cf. already Perrochat 1949 on Greek models for Sallust’s thought. For the limited literary education possessed by Sallust see e.g. Nichols 1999; Renehan 1976. Syme 1964: 67, 241, taking a more restrictive view than Perrochat, claims that Sallust was influenced by other Greek historians but that this knowledge was largely derived not from intimate direct study but from cultural and intellectual commonplaces (so too Nicols 1999: 334).

Though extended studies on Sallust were not uncommon before the mid-20th century, Syme's and Earl's comprehensive works in the early 1960s ushered in a lengthy period in which few if any extended monographs on Sallust made an impact. In fact, these books of Syme and Earl still exert a wide authority.¹⁹ More comprehensive studies of this sort on Sallust are unquestionably a current desideratum, and this study hopes to contribute to meeting this need.

Earl's 1961 monograph on Sallust cast much-needed light on Sallust's moral thought and his political ideas. Earl's efforts to define Sallust's conception of *virtus* were crucial to future studies of the concept, although in the present writer's view Earl sometimes undervalues the literary and artistic goals that underlay Sallust's presentation of historical material.²⁰ Syme's 1964 monograph, adding to the contributions of Earl, offers a synoptic view of Sallust which conveys well the unique merits (and eccentricities) of Sallust as a historian. Syme's judgment on issues of dating, historical background, and prosopographical material is to be commended, and he provides much in the way of literary insight with which later scholars must reckon.

Tiffou's 1973 study is also a noteworthy synthetic treatment of Sallust's *oeuvre*. His work has the considerable merit of focusing on an in-depth treatment of the material in Sallust's prologues (and also his digressions), and this indeed helps make sense of the material in the main narratives of each work. His comparative approach opens up many important insights on Sallustian thematics and Sallustian moral outlook. Perhaps more

¹⁹ It is difficult to say whether the authority of these works also accounts for the subsequent dearth of similar synoptic projects on Sallust, continuing at some level to the present.

²⁰ E.g. 1961: 80; cf. Earl 1965: 239. Earl's definition of *virtus* in Sallust: "...the functioning of *ingenium* to achieve *egregia facinora* and thus win *gloria* through the exercise of *bonae artes*" (Earl 1961: 16).

importantly to the present study, Tiffou's work, given its length and sustained focus on moral and philosophical themes in Sallust, is a good example of how an "evolutionist" viewpoint on Sallustian moral pessimism can be worked out in its particulars, rather than stated merely in passing, as sometimes happens. As we shall see below, the debate over the nature and consistency of Sallust's moral outlook will form the core of my study.

Sallust's structuring of his narratives is tightly linked to his efforts to characterize individuals and to convey his broader moral and historical outlook, and attention to structure in Sallust is accordingly quite warranted. Besides the extremely fine points of structure discussed in Vretska's 1976 commentary,²¹ some of the useful work on broader narrative structure of more recent years is to be noted: Wiedemann 1993 emphasizes the divisions of narrative time in the *BJ* by a progression of Roman generals and of phases in the war, and lets us see an example (one of many) of how theme and structure are intimately linked in Sallust's texts; Scanlon 1988 does much the same, skillfully identifying an extended ring structure within the *BJ* by means of which Sallust can highlight important themes (and criticisms) in the characterization of Marius and Metellus as symptomatic of broader trends in Roman behavior; Levene 1992, by rightly drawing attention to the many ways in which the *BJ* signals its incompleteness, reminds us of how many connections between past and present Sallust intentionally leaves unsaid in all his texts; Green 1993 likewise uncovers thematic resonances and historical

²¹ e.g. attention to the balancing of clausulae, and of thematic units, within individual passages, and within the prologue especially (*BC* 1-13). Cf. also the work of, among others, Leeman 1957.

allusions that link the various digressions in the *BJ* and suggest additional layers in the characterization of Jugurtha.²²

Scholarship of the last two decades on Sallust does not show as much attention specifically to the *Histories* as one would expect (perhaps partly due to reluctance see any wider value in a fragmentary text²³), though the recent works of Adler 2006, Rosenblitt 2011, 2013, & 2014, Gerrish 2015, and McAlhany 2016 represent a positive step toward redressing this need.²⁴

One particular interpretive approach to Sallust's texts (the *Histories* included) which has yielded promising results is to read Sallust's narratives about the Roman past as reflecting the political and social environment of his own day – a writing technique that

²² Less productive treatments of narrative structure and its relation to wider thematics: Briquel 2006 (*BC* 6-13 and Sallust's sources), Dunsch 2006 (*metus hostilis* in the wider structure of Sallust's texts). On the narrative and thematic divisions of the *BJ* see already, i.a., Buchner 1953, Leeman 1957.

²³ A reluctance both to valorize the evidence of the *Historiae* and to use the *Historiae* to inform one's reading of the rest of Sallust's corpus can in certain cases limit the force of conclusions reached. Earl, in his perceptive 1961 study, expresses similar hesitancy about using the *Histories*. The fragmentary nature of the text "clearly precludes any detailed examination of the relationship between the author's general ideas and his particular narrative...it is clearly impossible in the present state of the text to check in detail the application of this general view to the facts of the narrative" (Earl 1961: 104-5). When speaking of the Letter of Mithridates in *Hist.* 4.69M, he observes that Mithridates attacks the perfidy of the Romans on several occasions during that very period (between the 2nd and 3rd Punic Wars) when, according to Sallust in both monographs, the Romans acted most justly and harmoniously (*BJ* 41.2-3; cf. *BC* 10. *Hist.* 1.11M). Since this letter is a literary creation of Sallust himself, this contradiction in historical narratives, deliberately constructed as it must be, should lead us not so much to assume Sallust is building an anti-Roman discourse merely to be contradicted and ridiculed in comparison with his statements in the monographs; rather, it should lead us to consider whether Sallust is sustaining the doubts he raises elsewhere in his corpus about the zenith of Roman political and moral behavior, and about Roman imperialism in general. Likewise, despite the hesitancy of Adler 2006 to venture broader conclusions, various statements in the monographs (e.g. *BC* 36.4-38.3; *BC* 53; *BJ* 41-2, 78-9, etc: see the indirect evidence cited in Chapter 6), make likely Sallust's implicit agreement with Mithridates' critique of Roman imperialism – even if not an absolute agreement (that Sallust would have recommended taking this (or *any*) moral discourse as free of bias is of course to be doubted; his experience of the 40s and 30s would have taught him caution concerning the motives of any moral discourse).

²⁴ Adler 2006, Rosenblitt 2011, 2013 on particular speeches (following scholars like Alheid 1988). Rosenblitt 2013 may overstate her case, however, in talking about "competing voices": neither Lepidus' speech (*Hist.* 1.55M) nor the *Histories* more generally are unique in drawing attention to "competing voices" or competing discourses, or in not asserting authorial control over those voices; in fact, all three of Sallust's texts are shot through with competing discourses that constantly make us rethink the status, sources, ownership, and reliability of moral discourse. On the justifiable caution we must indeed exert in studying fragmentary texts see i.a. Yarrow 2006: 104-20; Brunt 1980.

may be termed “analogical historiography”. Although allusions to the Triumviral Period in Sallust’s narratives have been noted occasionally, Syme 1964 was important for encompassing this type of reading in more detail. More recently, the influence of the present upon narratives of the Roman past finds growing acknowledgement in Sallustian studies, from McGushin’s commentary on the *Histories*,²⁵ to the more recent strides taken in the illuminating work of Gerrish 2015.²⁶ Although writing about pregnant allusions to Sextus Pompey in the narrative of Spartacus’ Revolt in the *Histories*, her conclusions demonstrate that there is important future progress to be made not just into the *Histories*, but into all of Sallust’s texts by keeping in mind the technique of “analogical historiography.”²⁷

Any comprehensive study of Sallust must take into account his relationship to social and political developments of the Triumviral Period. Osgood’s 2006 work attempts the broader task of uncovering the experience of the Triumviral Period from the perspective not only of canonical authors like Vergil, Propertius, and Horace, but also of less well-represented Romans (soldiers, women), and even provincials. A combination of literary, historical, and material evidence furnishes a penetrating picture of the social and political context in which Sallust was writing, and of how this Triumviral context impacted the writings of both Sallust and his contemporaries. In vivid form Osgood brings out a number of the common themes and preoccupations shared by Sallust and his

²⁵ E.g. McGushin 1992: 18-19.

²⁶ Smith 2006: 57-61 is a broader acknowledgement of this process in Roman historiography, placing its origin, in fact, well before the traditional beginning of Roman historiography in the early 2nd century B.C.E.

²⁷ Adler 2006, though focused on other things, also shows Sallust frequently had in mind the application of the present to the past: the *Epistula Mithridatis*, though a strong indictment, is not meant to be unassailable, as Sallust does not pass on an opportunity to complicate this moral discourse by implicitly raising doubts about its reliability.

contemporaries, from the ceaseless cycle of civil wars, to the growth of unrestrained political ambition, to the horrors engendered by civil bloodshed, and doubt about renewal. Osgood's work offers a starting point for what must be a more comprehensive consideration of Sallust's own relationship to the milieu of the Triumviral Period. At the close of this study I attempt to address this very need, and what we shall see is that the environment of the Triumviral Period indeed exerted notable influences upon the writings and thought of Sallust as it did on many of his contemporaries (Vergil, Horace, and others), but that, for a variety of reasons, Sallust's moral and historical pessimism emerges as more unadulterated, and more unabating, than that of his contemporaries.

Amid so many and such varied contributions to the study of Sallust, what is still a rarity is a synoptic study of Sallust and of all three of his texts, a multi-pronged approach going beyond a focus on particular topics or passages and seeking to understand the broader habits and broader concerns of Sallust as a writer. The present study represents a fresh attempt to pursue such a goal, and takes as its main focus the issue of Sallust's moral and historical outlook – perhaps the fundamental factor that drives many if not most of Sallust's literary and rhetorical choices, his selection of material and sources, and his disposition of themes.

Now the central problem regarding Sallust's moral and historical outlook is whether or not his views on Roman morality remain consistent, or whether they evolve. No one would deny that Sallust is pessimistic about Roman *mores* and the decline of Roman political culture after 146 B.C.E.; the question is whether he evolved to *become* so over time, or whether this pessimism was a trait of his writing and thought from the earliest conception of his literary project. Scholarly opinion is unsurprisingly divided – though

with more voices arguing for the evolution of Sallust's views from optimism to pessimism. With regard to early Rome, both Earl and Syme remark on Sallust's consistency, but what they see is consistent *idealization* of early (i.e. pre-146) Rome, rather than consistent pessimism about that era.²⁸ My main contribution to the scholarship on Sallustian morality will be to assert that it is the latter type of consistency that is present in all three Sallustian texts: namely, a consistent *pessimism* about Roman morality from the city's very beginnings, and about Romans' inherent moral imperfection.

The use of the term "pessimism", however, should not be considered problematic in application to Sallust.²⁹ Use of the term in Sallustian studies is well-established, and reflects actual features of the narrator and the narrative, as this study will demonstrate at length.³⁰ Moreover, while Lucretius, for instance, may have a rationalistic or "realist" view of human society and justice, perhaps with hints of the cynical, Lucretius' views are not fundamentally pessimistic in the way Sallust's are; for Lucretius' main concern is not to bemoan the state of affairs but rather to urge his readers to accept it, banish fear of

²⁸ Syme 1964: 288; Earl 1961: 13-14; 106.

²⁹ The related modern idea of cynicism, though not wholly different, entails having a negative or skeptical outlook on present people and their nature, motives or sincerity. Optimism and pessimism apply to one's orientation to the future. Yet overlaps exists, and pessimism does not exclude cynicism (about the present) *per se*. One who is pessimistic about the future is likely to be cynical about present people, and vice versa; so a distrust or contempt for human nature seems common to both cynicism and pessimism (at least as they are defined today). With the ancient philosophy of Cynicism, or its renouncing of local ties to city or fellow citizens, or detachment from things held by convention to be good, the notion of pessimism used throughout this study has no deep connection. Cf. Lane 2014; Parry 2014.

³⁰ On the accepted use of the term "pessimism" in application to Sallust's moral discourse, see i.a. Osgood 2006: 262; cf. *ibid.*, 292: "While Cicero hopes that his volumes of philosophic inquiry, written in his eminently persuasive Latin, will shed light on the decline of the Republic and offer insights on how to restore it, Sallust steep himself in the corruption of the decadent state with little hope that things can improve." The substance of Sallustian pessimism, therefore, is not in question: only the correctness of the terminology (though note, i.a., Steidle 1958: 9-22 *passim*, where the term "pessimismus" is taken for granted).

death, and attain *ataraxia*.³¹ Sallust, however, does the opposite of accepting the state of society: if he accepted it (and its values), he arguably would have stayed in a political career, or at least omitted the direct critiques of political culture so common in all of his works.³² Later discussion will make clear that, by setting up a theoretical ideal of moral action (in his prefaces) and then using the narratives to demonstrate Romans' consistent failures to live up to it, Sallust clearly possesses no confidence that behavior or social conditions will be better in the future.

In any case, the term "pessimism" arguably began its vogue in Latin scholarship elsewhere, particularly in the study of Vergil. Zanker's 2011 article on the use of the term "pessimism" in Vergilian scholarship gives a useful overview of the early history of the term in English in the 19th century and how it has been applied to Vergil. The application of the term "pessimism" or "pessimistic readings" in Vergilian scholarship has in a way been a touchstone for the subsequent meaning and use of the term in scholarship on Latin literature more generally, especially since the works of the so-called "Harvard School" in the 1960s and 70s.³³

Of particular note is the concern a number of scholars have begun to show in the past few decades about the binarism and oversimplification of interpretive complexities that comes along with using terms like "optimistic" and "pessimistic" in the study of Vergil: in a multivalent text such as the *Georgics* (or *Aeneid*), the interpretive limitations

³¹ If Lucretius were pessimistic, he would have no confidence that the doctrines of Epicurus could lead us to an improved life, to pleasure or *ataraxia*.

³² e.g. *BC* 3.3-4.2, 10-13, 36.4-39.4, 53.2-6; *BJ* 3-4, 15.2, 16.2, 41-42, 73.4; *Hist.* 1.11, 12, 13, 16M.

³³ E.g. Parry 1963, Clausen 1964, Putnam 1965, R. Brooks 1953; cf. W.R. Johnson's *Darkness Visible* of 1976.

imposed by such absolute dichotomies as “optimistic” and “pessimistic” should be avoided.³⁴

These recent developments in Vergilian scholarship toward an enhanced recognition of polysemy and polyphony I do not wish to question. In Sallust’s writings too, there is much that is inherently ambivalent and built to accommodate multiple interpretations.³⁵ However, the analysis of Sallust’s moral and historical pessimism presents an exception to such an interpretive approach. For when we properly assess Sallust’s moral outlook and historical *Weltsicht* by taking account of textual evidence from across Sallust’s *corpus* from a variety of angles (literary, narratological, historical, philosophical), that broad base of evidence strongly tends toward *one* interpretation – that of pervasive and consistent pessimism – rather than suggesting inherent polysemy on this issue. It is therefore justified in Sallust’s case, as I will contend, to speak of such a pervasive and consistent pessimism in his outlook, and the central concern of the present study is to present the evidence that supports this argument. To reiterate, our use of the term “pessimism” in application to Sallust’s historical and moral outlook does not imply a denial of conflict and complexity elsewhere in his texts, and it does not bespeak any refusal on Sallust’s part to cope with a mixture of viewpoints presented within the text(s).³⁶ Instead, the present study takes as its central concern Sallust’s historical and

³⁴ See e.g. Galinsky 1996: 4. It was not uncommon into the 1940s to see an Aeneas meant to praise and promote the regime of Augustus, or an Aeneas whose Stoicising elements rob him of ordinary emotions. While this was restrictive, the next push went too far in the opposite direction (“theses were simply converted to antitheses”), whence the split between optimistic and pessimistic readings, pro-Augustan and anti-Augustan – still an oversimplification, as the text is inherently complex, polysemous.

³⁵ One need only cite the examples of Catiline’s or Jugurtha’s characters (variously interpreted as they still are), Caesar’s character, or the dispute over the degree to which Marius and his rhetoric are praised by Sallust, or censured as a corruption of a good cause (on Marius’ characterization see further Chapter 6.2, 6.4).

³⁶ Zanker 2011: 99 and Feeney 1987: 172 for useful caution on such matters.

moral perspective precisely because it is exceptional. Indeed, my main contribution will be to demonstrate that there is a persistent drive in *all* of Sallust's texts to convey a certain pessimistic outlook on Roman morality and history. Moreover his rhetorical, literary, and narratological choices will be seen consistently to affirm this broader pessimistic outlook as well as Sallust's desire to convey that outlook to his readers.³⁷

³⁷ This study is written in full awareness of the pitfalls of dealing in authorial intention, especially when it concerns the determination of meaning and motivation in isolated passages of more limited scale. However, in order to reconstruct Sallust's outlook on Roman history and Roman morality, the present study does not just analyze specific passages in detail, but also (and more importantly) considers the totality of his texts, and approaches them from historical (Chapter 9), literary (Chapters 2, 5, 6, 7, 8), and narratological perspectives (Chapters 2, 6, 7). As a result, large-scale narrative strategies and patterns, as well as broader rhetorical tendencies, come into view and form the basis for establishing conclusions about what Sallust's larger literary goals might have been – including what perspective on Roman history and Roman morality he wished to convey through his narrative.

1.3a. The Ancient Sources Used by Sallust

It may be noted in passing that Sallustian *Quellenforschung* has of course been well-exercised in trying to pinpoint the main sources Sallust used in writing each of his three works.³⁸ The certainty of Sallust having drawn on any particular source is a matter of debate (and will no doubt continue to be so), though some sources are clearly more likely than others. The aim of this section is merely to register the diversity of possible sources to orientate the reader.³⁹

Of literary sources Sisenna is mentioned expressly by Sallust as a source – albeit one of pro-Sullan bias (*BJ* 95.2); knowledge and use of Cicero's writings can be in little doubt;⁴⁰ Sulla's memoirs exerted a strong influence on the way the 80s were remembered and written⁴¹; Varro wrote much of relevance to Sallust's work, including an autobiography covering his time as legate of Pompey in Spain in the 70's, and a *de Pompeio* in three books⁴²; C. Licinius Macer, who as tribune of the plebs in 73 is given a speech by Sallust (*Hist.* 3.48M), wrote a history of Rome (of plebeian slant), and Sallust may also have known his son Licinius Calvus; how much Sallust knew of, used, and was influenced by the historical work of the Stoic Posidonius continues to generate differing opinions, and we shall consider this possibility in the course of this study (Chapter 4);

³⁸ On the ancient sources of Sallust, cf. among others Syme 1964 (followed closely in this section); McGushin 1992; Konrad 1994. I restrict myself here to those works which present these matters in overview, rather than those undertaking detailed source studies.

³⁹ Further discussion of the Roman sources listed below, and what we know about the dating and content of their writings, can be found in Cornell et al 2013 (FRHist. vol I).

⁴⁰ In *BC* 31.6 we learn Sallust had read Cicero's *Catilinarian* speeches. For his use of, e.g., the *Pro Sulla*, *de Consulatu*, or *de Consiliis Suis*, see inter alia Syme 1964: 73; FRHist I.368-79. For Sallust's knowledge of other works of Cicero, see e.g. Rosenblitt 2011: 417f (*Post Red. ad Populum* [1] and *de Nat. Deorum* [1.15, 3.5-6, 3.15] seeming certain, *De Domo Sua* also possible, citing i.a. Dyck 2004). On Sallust's knowledge of Cicero's *Philippics*, see Ledworuski 1994: 60-72.

⁴¹ cf. i.a. Lewis 1991.

⁴² On Varro's *Pius aut de Pace* and the debate over the Sallustian autobiographical details some glean from it, see further discussion below, Chapter 3.

other historians were associated with Pompey, whose use by Sallust is not clearly known: Theophanes of Miletus (with Pompey during the Mithridatic War) and L. Otacilius Pitholaus (Pompey's tutor, a freedman). The list of those who wrote during Sallust's lifetime could easily be extended⁴³, as could the number of surviving consulars and others available for questioning: Crassus,⁴⁴ C. Antonius (cos. 63, censor 42), Messalla Rufus (cos. 53), L. Cornelius Balbus (Cos suff. 40, intimate first of Pompey, later of Caesar, then Octavian), L. Calpurnius Bestia (tr.pl. 62), Atticus, L. Munatius Plancus are some of the possible sources available to Sallust.⁴⁵ But we are playing a guessing game, and as there is little certainty to be had, our arguments must not place too much weight on these matters.

⁴³ Lucullus (cos.74, perhaps wrote on the 80s), C. Asinius Pollio (wrote a history of the period 60-40 B.C.E). It is unclear whether Sallust would have known of Pollio's work, the nature of which would have been of interest to him were it available; Tanusius Geminus (cf. FRHist I.393-4 on the possibility (admittedly remote) that Sallust's account of the "First Catilinarian Conspiracy" could have been a *riposte* to that of Tanusius, who denied Catiline's involvement and posited Caesar's)

⁴⁴ From *BC* 48.9 we can gather that Sallust had at least heard Crassus speak between the years 63 and 55.

⁴⁵ A related possibility is Sallust's access to family histories and the *laudationes funebres* that would have recorded the deeds of consuls and other magistrates.

1.3b. The Transmission of the *BC*, the *BJ*, and the *Histories*

The textual history of the two monographs is a bit more fortunate than that of the *Histories*, as they come down to us in a direct MS tradition which is well discussed by Reynolds.⁴⁶ Over 500 MSS survive of the *BC* and *BJ*, divided into *mutili* (which omit *BJ* 103.2-112.3), *integri* (which include it), and *suppleti* (which supply it by a second hand). The *integri* (which date from the 10th century or later) appear to be descended from one or more *mutili*, but seem to have been supplemented by the discovery of a MS around the 10th century which contained *BJ* 103.2-112.3.⁴⁷ Overall, the textual *stemmata* for Sallust are less useful since there seems to have been so much contact between different *stirpes* and between individual codices – not just among the *mutili*, but also among the *integri*.⁴⁸

Given their current fragmentary state, and their importance to a synoptic examination of Sallust, the transmission of the text of the *Histories* is worth reviewing in its main points as well. There are roughly 530 extant fragments of the *Histories*, mostly preserved by various grammarians of late antiquity. Almost 400 of these fragments are from just the first three books.⁴⁹ For direct transmission of the *Histories* through manuscripts,

⁴⁶ On the textual transmission of the *BC* and *BJ* see the preface in Reynolds 1991, v-xxvi; also his *Texts and Transmission* (Reynolds 1983: 341-52); Teuffel 1900: 365.

⁴⁷ It could be a matter of the discovery of a few lost leaves of the archetype of the *mutili* (ω), or of a wholly independent MS. On the possible archetype for both the *mutili* and the *integri*, see also Ramsey 2013: p. liv.

⁴⁸ On contact and mixing among the *mutili*: Reynolds 1991: xii; on contact between *integri*: ibid. Later MSS, in Reynolds' view (1991: xvi), are no more reliable, given the corruption and glossing that creeps in with copying and with Sallust's already *inusitata verba*.

⁴⁹ For a general overview of the textual history of the *Historiae*, cf. McGushin 1992: 5-10; Teuffel 1900: 363; cf. also Maurenbrecher 1891: Fasc.I (Prolegomena), 1-8. Besides having much less preserved from the last two books, we do not know how much we are missing from the end of Book 5, and consequently it is unknown exactly when Sallust intended to end his *magnum opus*. Knowing this would greatly aid in interpreting the *Histories* and in coming to grips with Sallust's dominant concerns, his main literary aims, and perhaps his views on the future of the Republic. Pelling 2012 calls 67 B.C.E. "hardly his chosen terminus". Schur 1934: 222 opted for the Lex Manilia in 66; K. Bauhofer 1939: 109ff) argues for 63 and the death of Mithridates. Syme 1964: 191 reviews all of these but suggests two later dates as possibilities: 60 B.C.E. (the 1st Triumvirate), or 51/50 (based on *Hist.* 1.11M's hint at 51 B.C. as the height of Rome's *imperium*). The matter must for now be left open. Yet given that one of the pervasive themes in

however, there do exist a few crucial sources: the *Florilegium Vaticanum* (Vat.Lat. 3864), and the Fleury Manuscript (*Codex Floriacensis*).⁵⁰ First published in Italy in 1475, Vat.Lat.3864 is a collection of the speeches and letters of the *Histories* dating roughly to the 9th century C.E. but deriving from an ancient *florilegium* going back perhaps as early as the 2nd century C.E.⁵¹ The Fleury MS seems to have been written in Italy in the 5th century C.E. and then taken apart by the 7th century to be used for copying other texts.⁵² It comprises 8 total folia and its three main sections are (1) Aurelianense 192 (2) Vaticanus Reginensis Latinus 1238B (3) Berolinensis Latinus 4^o 364. The fragments preserved in the Fleury MS are on the longer side.⁵³

By the 5th c. C.E. the text of the *Histories* was less widely read, but much was to be preserved indirectly for subsequent generations in the works of grammarians, among whom Sallust's text was one of the most quoted in antiquity⁵⁴. Of these numerous grammarians, Nonius, Servius, Arusianus Messius, Aelius Donatus, and Priscian preserve the most fragments.⁵⁵ Unlike the orations and letters preserved in Vat.Lat.3864, the

all of Sallust's texts is the recurrence of civil strife, bringing Republican government to its breaking point time after time, a later date than 67 or 66 cannot be dismissed out of hand without more solid evidence and a thorough study of the matter.

⁵⁰ Other MSS of the *Historiae* worth note: the Vienna Codex (Codex P. Vindobonae Lat. 117), published in 1973 by H. Bloch and B. Bischoff (*WS* 13 (1979), 116-29) and containing fragments 1.107M (98 McG) & 1.136M (100 McG); the Rylands Papyrus III.473, first published by C.H. Roberts in 1938 and containing frg. 2.7M (2.9 McG) and frg.12 of Uncertain Reference.

⁵¹ It also contains Caesar's *de Bello Gallico*, Pliny's Letters Books 1-4, the speeches and letters from Sallust's monographs, and the *Epistulae ad Caesarem*.

⁵² Edmund Hauler was the first to decipher the palimpsests, and published the results in *Weiner Studien* between 1886 and 1931. H. Bloch reconstructs them in Bloch 1961: 59-76.

⁵³ 3.5-6M, 2.42-43M, 2.87M, 2.92-93M, 3.96-98M. Most fragments of the *Histories* are of one line or less.

⁵⁴ Sallust's critiques of Roman morality and political culture assured him a readership with early Christian writers as well (most notably Augustine), who sometimes preserve fragments of his text (See Chapter 5 for in-depth discussion of the transmission of one particularly significant fragment of the *Histories* through Augustine.)

⁵⁵ Nonius 61 fragments (most more than 1 line), Servius 119, Arusianus 106, Aelius Donatus 32, Priscian 51. For the transmission of book numbers by each grammarian see McGushin 1992, 8f.

fragments we possess from grammarians are mostly one line in length, and most are quoted because they illustrate some unique or odd feature of grammar or style.

Consequently the fragments from grammarians – at least, that is, when considered in isolation – yield little to fill out the political and historical narrative, thus making the work of literary interpretation a more delicate one. To bolster the reliability of these “grammatical” fragments, we must weigh them against the evidence from the speeches and letters in Vat.Lat.3864, as well as any other fragments of the *Historiae* coming to us from outside the grammarians – whether it be from Fronto, Gellius, Augustine, Jerome, or later historians and chronographers.⁵⁶ Comparing *all* these different types of evidence from the *Histories* against the *BC* and *BJ* should in turn be productive of even more insights into the *Histories*, in accordance with the interpretive principles of this study laid out earlier.

Although a renewed effort to make the most of the *Histories*, fragmentary though they may be, is thus of great importance, it must be noted that the focus of this study remains the desire to make the most of what we have (both of Sallust’s corpus and of the comparative evidence from his historiographical predecessors), rather than trying to focus too heavily on reconstructing what we lack.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ e.g. Ampelius, Ammianus Marcellinus, Vegetius, Macrobius, and others (by no means an exhaustive list)

⁵⁷ It is of course lamentable that Roman historiography before Sallust is fragmentary at best, if not totally lost. Comparing Sallust to his Roman predecessors, or trying to establish where Sallust innovates within the historiographical tradition, is thus inherently difficult. What evidence we lack from pre-Sallustian writers can now only be supplemented by reference to Plutarch’s Republican biographies and other later sources, e.g. Cassius Dio (late 2nd-early 3rd c. C.E.) and Appian (writing between 150 and 163 C.E.). Appian and Plutarch appear to have used Pollio’s *History* as a common source for events after 60 B.C.E. (Osgood 2006: 6). Strabo (*Historika Hypomnemata*, ca.25 B.C.E.) and Nicolaus of Damascus lived through the Triumviral Age and wrote on the late Republic. Material evidence from inscriptions, coins, and archaeology help us fill out some of the historical facts of the eras covered by Sallust in each of his works, though such material evidence cannot restore for us Sallust’s actual literary account of these events.

1.4. Chapter Outlines

The present study will consist of nine total chapters. The core argument will be laid out and elaborated upon in Chapters 5-6. The prior chapters (2-4) will allow us to establish this study's interpretive orientation toward issues such as Sallust's literary or rhetorical manipulations of narrative, (alleged) political biases, and intellectual affiliations. Most of these issues are implicitly involved in the debates on broader issues such as Sallust's moral and historical outlook, and thus Chapters 2-4 serve to lay a necessary foundation for the main arguments advanced in the later chapters.

The first issue to be addressed will be the nature of historical and chronological "inaccuracies" in Sallust, and how to interpret them (**Chapter 2**). While it is not the goal of this study to exculpate Sallust of all his errors of reporting, this chapter argues that in many cases we should first consider whether there is a literary or rhetorical motivation for a particular chronological transposition (e.g. the start of actual conspiratorial activities by Catiline, or when the *SCU* was passed in 63), or a particular characterization of persons or events (especially Marius and Metellus throughout the *BJ*). Such literary fashioning of historical and chronological data is fundamental to Sallust's historiographical technique, and not out of place in a genre which was long acknowledged as being literary in nature.

Scholars have also often found fault with the quality (and complexity) of Sallust's scheme of historical causation in that he invokes *metus hostilis* as the main causal factor in Roman history. Moreover, Sallust's consistent identification of 146 B.C.E. (the fall of Carthage and the ultimate end of *metus hostilis*) as the turning point for headlong moral decline has been criticized for ignoring the extensive historical data proving that various

sorts of corruption existed much earlier at Rome. Yet no one has clearly argued, as I shall do, that Sallust's overwhelming focus on *metus hostilis* as causal factor in Roman moral history actually reveals a sophisticated critique of Roman morality, making moral action dependent upon an external stimulus (Chapter 2.2). Later on in Chapter 6 we will have space to explore other ways in which Sallust's calculated use of 146 B.C.E., especially in the *BC*, serves as a part of a careful narrative technique that reinforces a deep pessimism about Roman morality.

We then turn to address Sallust's alleged political biases and his supposed philosophical influences. The story of Sallust's own struggles on the political scene is often called upon for various reasons, sometimes to assess whether he was a partisan of Caesar, a *popularis*, a staunch Republican, or something else entirely (**Chapter 3**). A sifting of the available evidence, balanced by analysis of important passages as well as the totality of Sallust's works, will lead us to affirm the conclusion that Sallust's writings do not display any particular political affiliation; rather, Sallust shows himself to be equally critical of *nobiles*, *plebs*, and "*popularis*" politicians alike. Separating what is ascertainable from what is conjecture, especially with biographical testimonia, will be important going forward so that we may evaluate Sallust's thought based on the textual evidence and make *that* our point of departure, rather than reconstruct it in reverse from speculated biographical detail.

Regarding possible philosophical influences upon Sallust's thought and expression (**Chapter 4**), many different philosophical debts have been traced, from Plato to Posidonius to a mix of Platonic and Stoic influence, as outlined earlier in this introduction (Chapter 1.2). Such an investigation does reveal a decent array of

philosophical and literary knowledge on Sallust's part, but much of what we can gather consists in a number of merely suggestive (and quite speculative) examples of philosophical borrowing.⁵⁸ We are left unable to ascribe one particular philosophical affiliation to Sallust. As many have observed, he is indeed eclectic in his orientation, drawing and (importantly) adapting various ideas to the context of his work as required.

Once we contextualize Sallust in these ways, a more in-depth analysis of Sallust's moral outlook will be necessary (**Chapters 5-6**). This endeavor is of the utmost importance for the study as a whole. The central argument to be made here is that, through all three of his works, Sallust does not *become* more pessimistic in his later work,⁵⁹ but rather displays a consistently deep-rooted pessimism about Roman history and Roman morality already from the earliest inception of his literary endeavor (the *BC*). This view has found surprisingly few advocates, but a convincing and thorough case will be made here for the first time.

In particular, many of those who identify an *evolution* in Sallust's moral views over the course of his three works, argue that the ostensibly idealizing excursus on early Rome in *BC* 6-9 indicates an early moral optimism on Sallust's part.⁶⁰ However, I will show that evidence from elsewhere in Sallust's corpus, both the *Histories* (**Chapter 5**) and the *BJ* (**Chapter 6.1**), indicate a deep pessimism, and even evidence from elsewhere in the *BC* points to the same conclusion (**Chapter 6.2**). Consequently, I will argue that if we consider this digression on early Rome in its immediate narrative context, we can see that

⁵⁸ It is certainly the case that, amid more definite philosophical allusions (e.g. to Plato's 7th Letter), a number of Sallust's ideas would have been drawn from well-known commonplaces. Both are present.

⁵⁹ With the turn to pessimism occurring first in the *Histories*, or first in the *BJ* – both of which views have had their supporters.

⁶⁰ For a more detailed bibliography on this issue of consistency versus evolution in Sallustian pessimism, see Chapter 5.

this ostensibly idealizing digression, in what is an otherwise pessimistic text, is actually a momentary façade employed to achieve specific aims of emphasis and characterization in the immediate context: to wit, this maneuver further highlights the unparalleled moral degeneracy of Catiline's milieu and of Catiline himself, the focal point of Sallust's entire monograph.⁶¹ As Chapter 6 will illustrate in detail, Sallust uses narrative structuring in his monographs to undermine his ostensibly idealizing discourses on Roman history, and he often uses Catonian language and moral discourse in an *ironic* way in order to reinforce the pessimism of his account in both works (**Chapter 6.3**). In light of this new take on the consistency of his moral outlook, and his techniques for conveying it, Sallust should gain some credit as at least a more careful writer than previously assumed.

A related issue that arises from the discussion of Sallust's digression on early Rome in the *BC* is Sallust's use of 146 B.C.E. as a moral turning point. It is Sallust's fulcrum for headlong moral decline in all three of his texts.⁶² Chapter 7 aims to answer the question of why Sallust in the *BC* actually employs not just the turning point of 146 B.C. for headlong moral decline, but brings in a second one: the return of Sulla from Asia Minor in 83 B.C.E. In fact, Sallust's bringing in of a second fulcrum for headlong decline merely *further*s his immediate goal in *BC* 6-13 of highlighting the unprecedented decadence of Catiline, and how his degeneracy issues directly from the headlong moral decline initiated in 146 and carried on through Sulla. Comparative analysis of moral

⁶¹ Cf. Sallust's justification of his choice of subject at *BC* 4, where Catiline's conspiracy is considered especially worthy of relation *sceleris atque periculi novitate*. Regarding the setting up of an idealizing image only to progressively undermine it, there are in fact a number of precedents and subsequent examples, from Xenophon to Statius (for which see Chapter 6.3 below).

⁶² See *BC* 10, *BJ* 41, *Hist.* 1.11M, 1.12M, 1.16M. As for a first beginning of moral decline, its absolute first appearance, Sallust (exceptionally) never gives one, and in the *Histories* it becomes clear (in *Hist.* 1.11M specifically) that for Sallust there was no first beginning of moral decline at Rome because vice was present in the city from its very beginning. On the interpretation of *Hist.* 1.11M and its implications, see further Chapter 5.

turning points in Greek and Roman historians both before and after Sallust's time, which has not hitherto been attempted to this degree, serves to corroborate that the use of multiple turning points for headlong decline had precedents before Sallust, and found acceptance after (and perhaps *because of*) Sallust.

As another example illustrative of the extent of Sallust's pessimism, **Chapter 8** sets out to explore the use of medical terminology, in particular the language of disease and contagion, to represent moral corruption. Comparison with Cicero's practice is illuminating. Cicero in his *Catilinarians* (and in his oratorical corpus more generally) provided an immediate and natural precedent for Sallust's use of such language in application to Catiline and others. What we find is that while Cicero's metaphor of moral disease holds out hope for a curative or restorative figure (namely, himself), Sallust's narrative expressly omits any mention of such a figure, and gives no indication that there is hope of remedy for the moral contagion infecting the state.

Finally, in the last main chapter (**Chapter 9**) we shall turn to consider Sallust within the context of the social, cultural, and political turmoil of the Triumviral Period, when he first picked up the pen. In particular, we will assess how his literary project fits in with the label of "Triumviral Literature", a term which Osgood has done much to flesh out.⁶³ Some space will thus be given to consideration of the literary output of his contemporaries (Vergil, Horace, and others) and how they each may reflect the changing political pressures and the uncertainties that accompanied yet another era of civil conflict. Such a window into Triumviral Literature, while by no means exhaustive, is intended to help us gain a better idea of whether (or to what degree) Sallust sets himself apart from

⁶³ On the label "Triumviral Literature" and its valences, see Osgood 2006: 4f, et passim.

his coevals in the manner in which he views and responds to the uncertainties, social upheaval, and recurring violence of the 40s and 30s B.C.E. We shall find that, while the bleak outlook of many of his contemporaries may abate in certain contexts or over time, Sallust at no point tones down his own pessimism. Thus Sallust's pessimism, while not unique in kind, was unique perhaps in degree and in some of the techniques used to express it. Sallust was unquestionably the historian of the Republic's decline and collapse.⁶⁴ Uncertainty (moral, political, economic) was endemic to the entire era in which he lived and wrote, and understanding that milieu can help us understand Sallust and his writing.⁶⁵

In the end, whatever view we take of Sallust's precise motivations for withdrawing from political life or for taking up the pen, those motivations must have been strong. For the decision to write histories of the Republic spanning from Marius and Sulla to Catiline was complex and fraught with risks, especially during the Triumviral Period. It was not contemporary history about which Sallust wrote – but, then again, it was.

⁶⁴ Syme 1964: 56; 289.

⁶⁵ While informed by knowledge of historical context, this study not a predominantly historical one; it is historical to the degree necessary to make the most informed arguments possible about the nature of Sallust's literary texts. This of course is most relevant in the final chapter (chapter 9), in discussing the Triumviral milieu in which Sallust wrote.

Chapter 2: Preliminaries to the Study of Sallust

2.1: A Brief Consideration of Sallust's Historical and Chronological

“Manipulations”

The rhetorical maneuvers in the early Rome digression at *BC* 6-9, which were alluded to in the previous chapter of this study, are by no means the only instance where Sallust manipulates historical details, or where he transposes or compresses chronology to create a starker, more black-and-white contrast for the purposes of characterization. A few prominent examples can serve to corroborate the regularity (and importance) of such tactics in his writing.¹ Indeed, though the fact still has not garnered the universal assent it deserves, the literary fashioning of historical or chronological data is an element fundamental to Sallust's historiographical methods, and it is the purpose of this chapter briefly to acknowledge this before we can properly undertake the detailed analysis of Sallust's historical and moral outlook in the remainder of this study.

Scholars have often accused Sallust of inconsistencies or errors, not giving him full credit as a literary artist operating in a genre long acknowledged to be a literary one.²

¹ While the examples given in the discussion below suffice to illustrate the ubiquity of this aspect of Sallustian narrative composition, many further examples could be produced. E.g. Earl 1961: 64 points out telescoping of time regarding Jugurtha's adoption. Numantia fell in 133 and Micipsa died in 118. Sallust first says Micipsa adopted Jugurtha *right after* Numantia (*statim*, *BJ* 9.3); yet at 9.4 he says Micipsa died “a few years” after the adoption – despite 15 years intervening between 133 and 118. At 11.6 too, we gather Jugurtha was adopted no more than 2-3 years before 118. One of these two scenarios clearly must be false. Yet Sallust's compression of these 15 years allows him to make Jugurtha's grasping, violent behavior toward Hiempsal and Adherbal after 118 seem to stem directly from his interaction with corrupt Romans at Numantia. Cf. Paul 1984 and Koestermann 1971: ad loc.

² See Quintilian 10.31: *Est enim proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutum est, et scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum, totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesentem sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii famam componitur*. Cf. Strabo 1.2.6. Yet one may also note that to Aristotle the presence or absence of meter was not the only difference between poetry (epic) and historiography: poetry tells “what could happen and is possible to happen according to either what's probable or what's inevitable.” If one put Herodotus into verse, it would still be history, because historiography deals with “what actually happened” (τὰ γενόμενα) and particular facts (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον) (*Poetics* 1451a). For a more general reactionary argument against the literary study of ancient historians, see Lendon 2009.

Seel deals with the implications of a full list of Sallustian errors.³ Earl turns his attention to the historical inaccuracies implied in Sallust's identification of 146 B.C.E. as the time at which Roman morality began to decline.⁴ Other commentators make sufficiently general critical remarks on the existence of chronological or other inconsistencies in Sallust.⁵ Explanations for such errors are usually not overly generous, and ascribe to Sallust anything from malice to "sheer ignorance and unconcern".⁶ In the more recent past Ledworuski has produced an extended study devoted to the contradictions and inaccuracies in Sallust.⁷ In general, this chapter aims to remind us that a focus purely on identifying departures from historical *realia* is not as productive of useful insights into the views which Sallust aimed to convey through his narrative.

It should be noted, however, that this study does not aim to systematically defend every one of Sallust's failings as a historian – inaccuracies, false reasoning, misinformation, and the like. Instead it simply aims to acknowledge that, while producing a reliable account of the past was certainly an important part of the ancient historian's task, the literary fashioning of a historiographical text was also central to the

³ Seel 1930: 46-53, preceded by the thorough handling – at least of the *BC* – in John, C. "Die Entstehungsgeschichte der catilinarischen Verschwörung: Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des Sallustius." *Jahrbücher für cl. Phil.* Supp. 8 (1876), 703–819.

⁴ Earl 1961: 11f, 41f. Such a task starts from the assumption, which this study does not follow, that Sallust did not think there was any moral decline before 146. See below, Chapters 5-6.

⁵ E.g. Paul 1984: 5.

⁶ A.R. Hand, *JRS* 52 (1962), p.275. Cf. F.R.D. Goodyear *CHCL* v.II 1982: p.273; Also e.g. McGushin 1977: 303, on Sempronia: "But to give a full-scale sketch, comparable with that of Catiline, to a woman who plays no recorded part in the story earlier or later was not proper historical practice. We have here a grave structural fault, indeed far the worst fault in a generally rather clumsy work."

⁷ Ledworuski 1994. See also *ibid.* p.133n97.

genre and central to how an author conveyed his meaning.⁸ The issue is succinctly discussed by Grant (1995: 42):

Obviously a historian has to select...limitation and selection are essential in the historian's task...It inevitably involves omission, shifted emphasis, personal choices of subject matter and sequence of facts, and distortion. We cannot, therefore, obtain the whole, undoctored truth from any historian, and that particularly applies to historians of the ancient world, who had quite other matters at the top of their minds. Their historiography was necessarily conditioned by their own interest and vision.⁹

An example from the realm of Thucydidean studies further elucidates the position taken in the present study. W.R. Connor speaks critically of the turning of historical inaccuracies into literary merits, and of "...saving Thucydides from his own faults by elevating him to the higher realms of philosophy and literary artistry".¹⁰ One should not, it is true, consider Sallust (or Thucydides) a better historian simply because literary techniques are employed. Nor can it be denied that there were certain limits on how far an ancient historian could veer away from accepted facts toward the paths of the fanciful, and that to cross that line (however ill-defined) was the mark of a poor historian. However, Connor's critique seems to assume that an ancient historian could only have one goal: either historical accuracy in all its senses, or simply to display literary artistry and philosophical sophistication. It was not an either-or. My study reinforces that in judging Sallust – as in judging every ancient historian – we must recognize that literary coloring, omissions, transpositions, and the like are an integral part of *every* ancient

⁸ That the mere chronicling of concrete experiences of the past must inevitably be accompanied by assumptions, judgments, generalizations, and ideology is aptly asserted by Moses Finley ("Generalizations in Ancient History", Finley 1975: 61; "Progress in Historiography", in Finley 1986: 5).

⁹ Cf. further *ibid.*: "Any piece of historical writing which has a minimum of political commitment and aims at least at some ideal, naturally attempts to establish its own interpretative approach in the reconstruction of the past, in the choice and elaboration of themes and facts, and in the organization and disposition of the narrative." Sallust, like Tacitus and others, selects, omits, and compresses for an impressionistic or dramatic effect (*ibid.*, 43, 89).

¹⁰ Connor 1977: 292-3, commenting on the work of Virginia Hunter, *Thucydides, The Artful Reporter*.

historian's tool kit. It is on this basis that we may judge the literary maneuvers of authors like Thucydides or Sallust with more equanimity.¹¹ Anyone could write a list of events and who took part in them (as Cato complained regarding the *Annales Maximi*: FRHist Cato F80 = Peter F77); what took one beyond this, and made one truly an historian, was the literary artistry woven into that account of events. Thus to the ancients, the historian and the artist came already reconciled to a large degree, as the historian was always to some degree an artist.

The account that follows will address a few representative examples from each work that illustrate Sallust's manipulation of historical or chronological detail to achieve a certain effect in his narrative.

One of Sallust's goals in portraying Marius in the *BJ* is to make Marius an *exemplum* illustrating his broader argument that the *nobilitas* at that time was *superba* and closely guarded the consulship against incursions from non-nobles. Accordingly Sallust qualifies what seems at first (*BJ* 43-45) to be a wholly positive characterization of the *nobilis* Metellus with the fault of *superbia*, and emphasizes this general fault of the nobility (*commune nobilitatis malum*, "pride, the common fault of the nobility" (*BJ* 64.1)) through the example of Metellus.

When we first encounter Metellus he is described as *acri viro et, quamquam advorso populi partium, fama tamen aequabili et inviolata* ("an energetic man and, although

¹¹ Cf Grant 1995: 88; Büchner 1960: 290ff. Badian's study on "Thucydides and the *Arkhē* of Philip" (1993: 171-85) also reveals convincingly that Thucydides uses selective omission and disinformation, as well as chronological compression, to convey a negative image of the Macedonian Perdiccas (as perfidious and unreliable) and the Thracian Sitalces (much the same), and to exonerate the Athenians of any suspicion of having been the ones to violate oaths and alliances in Macedon and Chalcidice. Cf. also Badian 1993: 79-81 on the Thucydides' general methods of strict chronological sequencing being suspended in the Pentekontaetia.

opposed to the popular factions, still of just and unsullied reputation” (*BJ* 43.1)), and Sallust judges him a *magnum et sapientem virum* (“a great and wise man” (*BJ* 45.1)).¹² Yet although he had an abundance of *virtus*, *gloria*, and other qualities good men desire (*BJ* 64.1), he is made to succumb to *superbia*, both in his dismissive insults to Marius when the latter requested leave to run for consul (*BJ* 64.2-5),¹³ and later when Marius actually wins election and the Numidian command (*BJ* 82.2-83.3):

Quibus rebus super bonum aut honestum percussus neque lacrimas tenere neque moderari linguam, vir egregius in aliis artibus nimis molliter aegritudinem pati. Quam rem alii in superbiam vortebant, alii bonum ingenium contumelia ad censum esse...nobis satis cognitum est illum magis honore Marii quam iniuria sua excruciatum...et quia stultitiae videbatur alienam rem periculo suo curare...ex Metelli voluntate bellum intactum trahi.

He was upset by this news beyond what was right and honorable and could not hold back his tears or his tongue; though an outstanding man in other qualities, he bore this grief without sufficient fortitude. Some ascribed this fact to his pride, others said his good nature had been incited by outrage...it is sufficiently established in my view that he was more tortured by the honor Marius received than by his own insult...and because it seemed foolish to attend to another man’s business at risk to himself, the war was dragged out without engagement according to Metellus’ wishes.

Sallust ignores the fact that it made military sense at the time to delay engagement with Jugurtha and Bocchus and focuses on explaining Metellus’ actions through *superbia*.¹⁴ In pursuance of one of his main themes (*quia tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est* (*BJ* 5.1)), Sallust thus bends Metellus’ characterization.¹⁵

¹² Metellus is the only individual in Sallust to be called both *agnus* and *sapiens*. Jugurtha is called *sapiens* (*BJ* 10.7), Marius *agnus* (*BJ* 92.1), but no one else both.

¹³ In reality Metellus’ insult (64.4: *saepius eadem postulanti fertur dixisse, ne festinaret abire: satis mature illum cum filio suo consulatum petiturum. Is eo tempore contubernio patris ibidem militabat. Annos natus circiter viginti*) may not have been as *superbus* as it is made out to be (Earl 1961: 73-4), or significantly different from what he had no doubt heard from others in the past.

¹⁴ Earl 1961: 75, citing the two recent and taxing campaigns fought by Metellus’ men and the need for Metellus to wait and see what the alliance with Bocchus meant for the nature of the war. Similarly Koestermann 1971: 287-90.

¹⁵ *pace* Tiffou 1973: 317, whose view is that Sallust finds no fault with Metellus in the *BJ*.

Yet that is only half of the effort. Sallust also overschematizes Marius' career and whitewashes his earlier years to make clearer his own particular interpretation of history. First of all, Marius' *virtus* from earlier in his career is exaggerated and made to be total (BJ 63.1-5) to form a contrast with his subsequent behavior¹⁶: *tamen is ad id locorum talis vir – nam postea ambitione praeceps datus est (...)* (“Despite being up till that point such a great man – for later he was driven headlong by ambition...” (BJ 63.6)). Moreover, Marius' campaigns are not given in quite as much detail as those of Metellus.¹⁷ Some things are skipped over that were important enough to mention (many towns captured, many engagements with Jugurtha, and a march of several hundred miles from Capsa to the fort on the river Muluccha).¹⁸ Sallust instead expands on two particular episodes: Capsa (89.4-91.7) and Muluccha (92.4-94.7) – both of which emphasize the role of *fortuna* in Marius' success.¹⁹ It seems likely that Sallust overschematizes Marius' earlier career and later campaigns to make clearer the point that

¹⁶ Many parts of this character sketch of Marius' early years echo the upright behavior of early Roman youths in the BC: *lubidinis et divitiarum victor, tantummodo gloriae avidus* (BJ 63.2) ~ *virtus omnia domuerat. sed gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat* (BC 7.5-6); *ubi primum aetas militiae patiens fuit, stipendiis faciundis, non Graecia facundia neque urbanis munditiis sese exercuit* (BJ 63.3) ~ *iam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat, magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant.* (BC 7.4). Regarding Marius' later behavior, *postea ambitione praeceps datus est* could be made to refer either to Marius' conduct in the civil war of the 80s (e.g. Paul 1984: 259; Kraus 1999: 228n38), or to the more immediate deterioration of Marius' conduct in the aftermath of Metellus' insult in BJ 64.2-5 (Earl 1961). A double reference could have been intended, and it works both ways. Cf. *ambitione praeceps datus est* (63.6) with *neque facto ullo neque dicto abstinere, quod modo ambitiosum foret* (64.5).

¹⁷ Earl 1961: 78-9. Noted also by Scanlon 1988: 158-9.

¹⁸ All of these engagements (except the march) are condensed into a few sentences scattered across BJ 87.1-3, 88.2-4, 89.1-3, and 92.3 (Earl: *ibid*).

¹⁹ See e.g. BJ 90.1, 92.2, 6, 93.1, 93.2, 93.4, 94.4, 94.7. His reliance on chance was foreshadowed upon his introduction at 63.1: *forte C. Mario per hostias dis supplicanti magna atque mirabilia portendi haruspex dixerat: proinde quae animo agitabat dis fretus ageret, fortunam quam saepissime experiretur, cuncta prospere eventura.* (“When C. Marius happened to be praying to the gods by offering sacrifices the haruspex had told him that great and wonderful things were to happen: accordingly he should do what he was thinking of doing, and should test his fortune as often as he can, and that all would turn out successfully.”)

Marius started out well but then let *ambitio* overcome him (the turning point being *BJ* 64.4-5); since his motivations are now *ira*, *cupido*, and *ambitio* (64.5) due to Metellus' slight, he does not bring *virtus* (sc. *animi*) into the field with him as before, and so he relies instead on *fortuna* to succeed.²⁰ This elucidates Sallust's choice to focus on two episodes that highlight the *fortuna* of Marius. Moreover this highlighting of Marius' reliance on *fortuna* falls in line with the fact that Sallust portrays the concluding stages of the war as coming down to matters of chance. For from the time Sulla arrives (95.1), the focus is not on any pitched battle to decide it all, but on negotiations with Bocchus, and Bocchus' hesitation and doubt about what to do.²¹ In such a situation, when the leader (i.e. Marius) has lost *virtus* and is not governed by it at home or on campaign, the war's outcome too might naturally be up to chance.²²

As another example of Sallust's literary manoeuvres, Syme notes of *Histories* Book 1 that, by placing Lepidus' speech against Sulla (*Hist.* 1.55M) early in Lepidus' consular year of 78 B.C.E., right after Sulla's funeral, Sallust is making a compositional move in order to produce a continuous critique of Sulla from the prologue through to 1.55M and

²⁰ G.M. Paul argues that Sallust's overemphasis (as he sees it) on Marius' *temeritas* and reliance on *fortuna* may derive from Sallust's use of a source hostile to Marius which aimed to downplay his achievements in the war – perhaps Sulla's *Commentarii* (Paul 1984: 233). We must remember the dangers of denying Sallust himself the credit for consciously choosing the tone and outlook on Marius which the Sallustian narrative conveys. Moreover, if Sallust had intended his construction of Marius in this part of his narrative to have a noticeably *different* tone or perspective from what he found in a given source, he could have altered the tone and outlook of this source where necessary to give his narrative his personal stamp.

²¹ For Bocchus' hesitation and doubt, see *BJ* 88.5, 97.2, 102.2, 15; 103.2, 108.3, 111.2, 113.1, 113.3.

²² Another way Sallust brings both Metellus and Marius in for criticism is pointed out by Scanlon 1988: 153, 155 regarding the parallel sieges of Vaga and the Muluccha fort. Metellus besieges Vaga to avenge Rome, while Marius besieges the Muluccha fort (according to Sallust) to gain glory (its use in war is made incidental, just as with his attack on Capsa: *BJ* 89.6)). Yet while Marius may show *ambitio* in his motivations, his men do not stop for booty (94.6); and while Metellus only seeks revenge, Metellus' men in attacking Vaga seem motivated to keep going largely by hope of booty (68.3, 69.2). So both men's sieges lack wholly noble motivation. In opposite ways, both show some taint - though if we are comparing just the generals Metellus gets the upper hand in *virtus* in this instance.

beyond.²³ The historicity and date of this speech is a contentious topic.²⁴ Rosenblitt, however, shows that this speech would have been most topical if delivered in 79 B.C.E., during Lepidus' consular canvass and while Sulla was at least still alive, as it attacks Sulla's dictatorship and ongoing "tyranny".²⁵ Sallust, however, places Lepidus' speech at the beginning of his consular year of 78, when Sulla had already (at the very least) relinquished all political offices and retired from public life. Sallust's moving of this speech to early 78 thus appears to be a chronological mistake. Yet Sallust appears constrained to make this move in order that Lepidus' speech may be included in his main narrative at all. For Sallust chose 78 B.C.E., following Sulla's death and funeral, as the opening point of his narrative proper in *Histories* Book One.

What does he gain, then, from being able to include Lepidus' speech in the main narrative? In his preface to *Histories* Book One, after opening with personal and methodological considerations (*Hist.* 1.1-1.6M), Sallust moves to general moral, political, and philosophical reflections (1.7-1.8M), at which time we get a first mention of the ruthless Sullan Era (1.18M).²⁶ In the following section (1.19-53M (16-46 McG)), Sallust relates in condensed form the history of the decades immediately preceding his main narrative, focusing particularly on the Social War and the Civil War of Marius and Sulla.

²³ Syme 1964: 183-4.

²⁴ See the recent and balanced treatment of Rosenblitt 2014.

²⁵ Various passages in Lepidus' speech show that it is in fact meant to refer to a time when Sulla is still actively exercising sole power: *Hist.* 1.55.1 (*tyrannidem L. Sullae*), 5 (*quae cuncta...rapta tenet*), 13 (*leges iudicia aerarium provinciae reges penes unum*), and especially 7 (*nisi forte speratis taedium iam aut pudorem tyrannidis Sullae esse et eum per scelus occupata periculosius demissurum*.)

²⁶ For the Sullan reference in this fragment see McGushin 1992: ad loc. One can view this section (1.7-1.8M) as paralleling Thucydides' *Archaeologia* (Thucy. 1.1-23). The following section (*Hist.* 1.19-53M) likewise can be viewed as mirroring the so-called *Pentekontaetia* of Thucydides 1.89-117 explaining the origins of the current conflicts.

In this section Sulla certainly received a strongly critical treatment from Sallust.²⁷ Given the way the beginning of *Histories* Book One develops, then, Syme is right to suggest that Sallust, by placing Lepidus' speech early in his consular year and thus within the time frame of his main narrative, is able to create a more continuous and sustained critique of Sulla from the early fragments of Book One up through the struggles against the Sullan oligarchy initiated by Lepidus and carried on by Sertorius and others throughout the 70s.

In the *BC* too one can point to calculated chronological and narrative manipulation by Sallust regarding events in 63 B.C.E.²⁸ According to Syme, in narrating the second meeting of the conspirators at the house of M. Porcius Laeca, the subsequent failed assassination attempt on Cicero, and the *senatus consultum ultimum*, Sallust is not so much making chronological mistakes as deceiving the reader with the arrangement of events.²⁹ For the *senatus consultum ultimum* was issued October 21, and the failed assassination attempt on Cicero took place in the early morning on November 7.³⁰ Yet in Sallust's narrative the meeting at Laeca's and the failed assassination attempt (*BC* 27.3-28.3) are placed directly *before* he relates the *SCU* (*BC* 29.1-3). Syme argues that this

²⁷ See e.g. 1.51M. One might add *Hist.* 1.58-61M (49-53 McG), which come *after* Lepidus' speech (= 1.55M) and attack Sulla's character and vices. It has even been suggested (Tiffou 1973: 307; Klingner 1928: 180) that fragments 1.58-61M fit better after *Hist.* 1.18M, the probable first time Sulla or his regime is mentioned in the *Histories*. Yet this placement of *Hist.* 1.58-61M, while it seems more reasonable, is based on the placement of 1.18M, which itself may be questioned; McGushin places 1.18M later in Book 1 as 1.43 McG, within Sallust's discussion of Sulla's retributions and his regime more generally (McGushin 1992: 108, collating views of prior editors). In any case, even if 1.58-61M are *not* to be placed earlier, near 1.18M, it is still true that fragments 1.19-53M, which surely contained incisive comments on Sulla's actions in the civil war, transition right into Lepidus' anti-Sullan speech, which in its turn serves as a doorway to further critique of Sulla and the regime he left behind.

²⁸ E.g. Syme 1964; Seel 1930: 46ff; Ledworski 1994.

²⁹ Syme 1964: 78-80

³⁰ On the passing of the *SCU*, cf. Dio 37.31; on its date, cf. Cic. *In Cat.* 1.4, 7, Asconius 6C; on the date of the failed assassination of Cicero at his door, see Cic. *In Cat.* 1.9-10.

apparent (but not actual) discrepancy arises from the fact that Sallust is knowingly interlacing two separate narrative lines here. Sallust's handling of chronology here requires some elaboration.³¹

In BC 26 Catiline stands for election in summer of 63 for the consulship of 62, and when he fails, he decides on war (*constituit bellum facere et extrema omnia experiri* (BC 26.5)).³² At 27.1 Catiline sends Manlius to Faesulae in Etruria, and others elsewhere (still soon after the elections of 63). Then, from 27.2 to 28.3 Sallust shifts to what was happening in Rome: *interea Romae multa simul moliri* ("Meanwhile at Rome many things were being devised at once" (BC 27.2)). Catiline plots against Cicero's life, readies fires throughout the city, and distributes weapons to key locations. Sallust's narrative tells us that all these actions of Catiline took place during the period from Catiline's defeat at the polls to November 6, for Sallust proceeds to say *postremo ubi multa agitantibus nihil procedit, rursus intempesta nocte coniurationis principes convocant per M. Porcium Laecam* ("finally, when he had made much effort and achieved nothing, he again called the leaders of the conspiracy together late at night at the house of M. Porcius Laeca" (BC 27.3)). This meeting took place on the night of November 6,³³ and on this occasion Catiline arranges for two men to attempt the assassination of Cicero early the next morning, on November 7.³⁴ The attempt is foiled (BC 27.3-28.3). So from BC 26 through 28.3 Sallust relates in sequence what Catiline was doing at Rome, from the elections of 63 to early on the morning of November 7.

³¹ For a visual reference of Sallust's treatment of these events, refer to Table 1.

³² On the consular elections of late July/early August 63, see also Plut. *Cic.* 14.2, 5, 6; *Cic. Mur.* 52, Dio 37.29.

³³ On the date see *Cic. In Cat.* 1.9, *Sulla* 52; previous views discussed in McGushin 1977: 171.

³⁴ *Cic. Sulla* 52; *In Cat.* 1.10

At 28.4, however, Sallust flashes back to (at least) early October,³⁵ and shifts focus to tell us what Manlius had been up to in Etruria while Catiline had been preparing and plotting in Rome.³⁶ This miniature flashback of sorts at 28.4 continues into chapter 29, where Cicero, in light of these activities of Manlius *and also* in light of the plots Catiline had been laying expressly against his own life, gets the senate to pass the *senatus consultum ultimum* on October 21.³⁷ In *BC* 30.1 we then learn that letters arrive on November 2 that confirm Manlius had taken up arms on October 27, and the Senate proceeds to send proconsuls and praetors to various parts of Italy in response (*BC* 30.3-7).

In *BC* 31.1-3 Sallust relates the terrified reactions of men and women in Rome to the passing of the *SCU* and the military preparations taken by the Senate – basically, the reaction of those in the city between October 21 and November 7. We can bound the dates to which these reactions apply because Sallust then returns, at *BC* 31.4, to the previous narrative line – namely, what Catiline was up to in Rome (*at Catilinae crudelis animus eadem simul movebat*, “But Catiline’s ruthless spirit kept at the same incitements”), taking up again at November 7 right where he had left off at 28.3. For at

³⁵ If not earlier: for at 27.1 Sallust had told us that Catiline had sent money to Manlius in Faesulae after the consular elections of late July/early August 63. So Manlius had been there at least since then. We can ignore for now the problematic fact that Sallust *also* reports in 24.2 that Manlius had already been in Etruria after the consular elections of 64. This report in 24.2 was a narrative move no doubt brought upon Sallust by the fact that he antedated the start of Catiline’s conspiratorial plotting and preparations for open revolt to 64 B.C.E. instead of placing them after the consular elections of 63. The falsity of this antedating (which had the specific goal of making Catiline’s conspiracy seem rather a symptom of the times (or of Catiline’s inherent character) than something occasioned merely by the fact of his electoral repulse in 63) has been sufficiently discussed by several scholars (e.g. McGushin 1977: 161, 169, Syme 1964: 74-5; Ledworuski 1994).

³⁶ On Manlius’ activity in Etruria at this time, see Plut. *Cic* 15 & *Crassus* 13 (the former relating Manlius’ preparations (reported by a Q. Arrius (15.3)), and both relating the anonymous letters brought to Crassus and thence conveyed to Cicero detailing an upcoming slaughter in the city).

³⁷ Cf. Plut. *Cic*. 15.4, Dio 37.31.2-3.

28.3 Sallust had related Catiline's failed assassination attempt against Cicero in the early morning hours of November 7. Now, when he returns to Catiline's doings at 31.4, we pick up again on November 7, on which day, we are told, Catiline faced a prosecution by L. Aemilius Paulus under the *Lex Plautia de vi*.³⁸

While with some effort we can disentangle these two narrative lines, at first glance Sallust's narrative order gives one the impression that the meeting at Laeca's (27.3-4) and the failed assassination of Cicero (28.3) influenced Cicero's decision to ask for the *SCU* on October 21 as much as did Manlius' movements in Etruria, when in reality the former two things did not happen until weeks after the *SCU* was passed.³⁹ Sallust explicitly adds to this mistaken impression of the order of events when he says, at *BC* 29.1 (my emphasis),

Ea cum Ciceroni nuntiarentur, incipiti malo permotus, quod neque urbem ab insidiis privato consilio longius tueri poterat, neque exercitus Manli quantus aut quo consilio foret satis compertum habebat, rem ad senatum refert.

When these events were reported to Cicero, he was greatly disturbed by the twofold peril, since he could no longer by his own private efforts protect the city against these plots, nor gain any exact information as to the size and purpose of Manlius's army; he therefore formally called the attention of the senate to the matter. (transl. J.C. Rolfe (adapted))

³⁸ For the prosecution cf. Dio 37.31.3

³⁹ Sallust fails to mention explicitly, at *BC* 29.1, the anonymous letters brought to Cicero by Crassus late on Oct. 20th which then allowed Cicero on Oct. 21st to predict that a rebellion would break out at Faesulae under Manlius on Oct. 27th and that a *caedes optimatum* was planned at Rome for Oct. 28th (cf. Plut. *Cic.* 15.1-2; *Crassus* 13; *Cic. In Cat.* 1.7). Yet one can conceivably argue that in *BC* 29.1 when Sallust says that Cicero on Oct. 21st was *incipiti malo permotus, quod neque urbem ab insidiis privato consilio longius tueri poterat*, Sallust is actually not implying Cicero passed the *SCU* in light of the failed assassination plot against himself on Nov. 7, but is merely implying that Cicero urged the passing of the *SCU* in light of the anonymous letters brought to him on Oct 20th predicting an uprising in Etruria on Oct 27th and a *caedes optimatum* in Rome on Oct. 28th. While such a view would exonerate Sallust from deceiving through distorted chronology here, it is still the case that Sallust chose to be vague, and chose to omit mention of these anonymous letters from Crassus (and their contents), which would have cleared up the confusion. I would thus maintain that Sallust has *chosen* to present his narrative in such a way that the reader could easily be led to assume that Cicero based his decision to pass the *SCU* upon the failed assassination attempt of November 7th. The possible implications of this will be explored below.

The phrase *anceps malum* suggests reference to dangers from both inside and outside the city, Catiline's plots and Manlius' preparation of armed revolt. Moreover, in the clause *quod neque urbem ab insidiis privato consilio longius tueri poterat*, one can recognize the *insidiae* Catiline had laid for Cicero earlier in the summer (26.1.2, 5.11-12), and, in *privato consilio* especially, the assassination plot of November 7th related in the previous chapter (28.1-3).⁴⁰ Thus, in addition to the sequencing of chapters 26-29, Sallust's wording here at 29.1 suggests to the reader that Cicero's action in requesting the *SCU* October 21st was linked not only to the reports of Manlius' movements, but also to the assassination attempt just narrated at 28.1-3, though other sources confirm that this attempt to murder Cicero took place well after the passing of the *SCU*. It would appear Cicero is made to look self-interested.⁴¹

In trying to explain why Sallust shaped his narrative to give the reader these impressions of the chronology of events and the order of causation, Syme dismisses the possibility that Sallust meant to disparage Cicero by making his actions appear self-interested.⁴² While it is true that Sallust omits mention of two of the main things that caused the Senate to pass the *SCU* (the anonymous letters brought by Crassus to Cicero, and Cicero's foreknowledge that Manlius planned open rebellion on October 27th),

⁴⁰ Sallust's wording in the *quod...poterat* clause is strongly suggestive of Cicero's own at *In Cat.* 1.11: *non publico me praesidio, sed privata diligentia defendi...amicorum praesidio et copiis nullo tumulto publico concitato...per me tibi obstiti*. Büchner 1960: 294 also refers Sallust's *privato consilio* to the assassination attempt of November 7.

⁴¹ McGushin 1977: 174 lists previous scholars who have tried to exculpate Sallust's incorrect ordering of these events on artistic grounds. However, while McGushin does agree Sallust need not be accused of malignant attack on Cicero by his ordering of events (see further below), he opposes Büchner by arguing that in *BC* 29.1 *ea cum Ciceroni nuntiarentur* refers only to reports of Manlius' activity, and not to the failed assassination. In support of this he points out that in 28.2 Cicero had already been notified of the assassination plot. Yet this ignores the implications of *incipiti malo permotus* – namely, that Cicero is made to appear motivated by both external and internal threats.

⁴² A view first made prominent by Schwartz 1897.

⁴³ That Cicero had foreknowledge of this we learn from *In Cat.* 1.7.

Sallust has positive things to say about the First Catilinarian Oration at *BC* 31.6,⁴⁴ and remarks on multiple occasions on the foresight and precautions Cicero wisely takes to keep the state safe.⁴⁵ In this case, Sallust's purpose in manipulating the appearance of narrative chronology is difficult to establish with certainty, but it is possible that by doing so Sallust meant to downplay the importance of Manlius' armed rebellion in contributing to the danger of the moment, thereby making Catiline stand out as the main source of danger. This would fit well with Sallust's broader efforts in the *BC* to enhance his theme and his villain, and to make his conspiracy and his decadence seem unprecedented (*sceleris atque periculi novitiate*, *BC* 4.4).⁴⁶

In a final example, several of Sallust's comments on the *mores* of the Roman army during the Jugurthine War likewise prove that whatever the dates Sallust offers in the *BC* for the first introduction of particular vices into Roman purview (*BC* 10-12), they were meant not to have absolute or universal application across all of his works, but merely to create, in that particular section of his narrative, a particular version of Roman history that suited his rhetorical purpose at the moment.⁴⁷ At *BJ* 32.2-4 Sallust relates the poor

⁴⁴ *orationem habuit luculentam atque utilem rei publicae* ("he gave a brilliant speech that was useful to the state.").

⁴⁵ Cf. *BC* 26.2 (*Neque illi [Ciceroni] tamen ad cavendum dolus aut astutiae deerant*), 28.2, the *SCU* at 29.2-3 (the passing of which Sallust does not seem to disagree with), 30.7 (*vigiliae*), 36.3 (*urbi praesidio*), 41.5 (handling the Allobroges), 43.1.10 (*optimo consuli*), 45.1, 50.3. Additionally, Sallust represents the decision to execute the conspirators as Cato's. The rumors in *BC* 48 that Cicero made L. Tarquinius accuse Crassus of involvement with Catiline need not apply to Cicero's handling of the conspiracy overall, or Sallust's judgment on his handling of it.

⁴⁶ On Sallust's other methods of highlighting the unprecedented decadence of Catiline and his connections to the headlong moral decline set in motion in 146, see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 below. As Steidle 1958: 14 rightly points out, Sallust could not sincerely have considered Catiline's conspiracy to be the most dangerous and most unexampled in Rome's history; his emphasis on this point (at *BC* 4.4, and maintained throughout the monograph) was for rhetorical effect, and Cicero's similar claims about the unparalleled danger and decadence of Catiline were necessary aspects of rhetorical emphasis during the crisis itself (cf. *In Cat.* 1.3, 5, 9, 12; 2.10; 3.24f; 4.2, 7).

⁴⁷ This is the natural deduction when we consider the discrepancies between the dates given respectively in *BC* 11-12 and the passages from the *BJ* discussed in this paragraph, as the *BJ* passages place those vices years earlier. Otherwise our deduction must be either (a) that Sallust *did* care what dates he

conduct of the Roman army left in Africa by the consul Bestia who went to Rome to hold elections in summer 111 B.C.E.: *plurima et flagitiosa facinora fecere... tanta avaritiae in animos eorum veluti tabes invaserat* (“they committed very many shameful deeds... so great was the greed that had invaded their hearts like a sickness.”). Similarly, at *BJ* 39.5 Sallust says that in 110 B.C.E. the consul Sp. Postumius Albinus could not bring his army to do anything productive because *[eos] praeter fugam soluto imperio licentia atque superbia corruperat* (“besides the defeat they had suffered, license and arrogance had corrupted them because of lack of discipline.”). At *BJ* 44.5 Sallust relates the behavior of the same army (and its camp followers) in 109 B.C.E.:

agros vastare, villas expugnare, pecoris et mancipiorum praedas certantes agere eaque mutare cum mercatoribus vino advecticio, postremo quaecumque dici aut fingi queunt ignaviae luxuriaque probra, <ea> in illo exercitu cuncta fuere et alia amplius.

They ravaged the fields, stormed country estates, in competition led off booty of beast and man and traded that booty with merchants for wine from abroad and other such things. In short, whatever disgraceful deeds arising from laziness and luxury can be expressed in words or put into action were all found in that army – and more.

These comments show that it did not take until Sulla for the army to learn luxury and *licentia* and *superbia*. This contradicts the timeline for *luxuria*’s introduction put forth by Sallust himself in *BC* 11-12, but an exact chronological framework for these vices was not Sallust’s aim to begin with. McGushin’s remarks on Sallust’s method are instructive here. (1977: 297):

Sallust’s mistakes are not errors of fact; it is chiefly a matter of chronological displacement. His concentration on the moral aspect precludes a more traditional historical narrative...and

fixed for each vice’s first appearance (and their overall order), but that he *forgot* what he had argued in his own prior work (the *BC*), thus making him a sloppy writer; or (b) that Sallust did *not* care what dates he fixed for each vice, and that the varying dates in each work are a result merely of the author’s apathy and random choice (making him at best lazy, and at worst a dishonest writer). Since, as argued in these pages, Sallust quite often has a literary purpose for manipulating chronology or historical detail, we should try to avoid considering it a foregone conclusion that such “inaccuracies” pop up in a given place simply because Sallust was lazy or was a forgetful writer.

his adherence to a method which selects, omits, re-shapes and re-emphasizes should not cause undue perturbation in the reader.⁴⁸

Likewise Syme's (Syme 1964: 150):

It is not necessary to exculpate Sallust in this indirect fashion (of chronological or geographical manipulation). Narrating transactions of warfare, Sallust was not proposing to furnish full particulars about the size of armies, precise intervals of time, or exact itineraries. That was the function of *commentarii*. Historians are selective, dramatic, impressionistic.

In examining the construction of Sallust's narrative, one can surely find cases of genuine mistakes or inaccuracy, as mentioned above, and I shall make no attempt to exonerate Sallust in such instances. However, given the frequency with which either chronological manipulations or the handling of historical details are undertaken by Sallust with a specific literary purpose, we would be well-advised, when we encounter such ostensible inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the narrative, to at least entertain the possibility that Sallust has included them to achieve a specific artistic goal in conveying his view of history.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Similarly Scanlon 1988: 169, who remarks that "selectivity and arrangement" are "entirely justified" in the historian's mind since his project is an "exposition of human motivation".

⁴⁹ Cf. McGushin 1977: 67: "We should note Sallust's tendency to express causal connections from the moral and intellectual standpoint. The basis of this is his belief that all individual acts and thoughts can be traced back to the general and explained as characteristic of mankind. Hence it is his customary mode of thinking to proceed from the general to the particular. Such a way of viewing his material determines the form of the narrative..."; cf. *ibid.* p.169: "Sallust thinks and writes in terms of cause and effect and does not necessarily give uniformity to a description of events by strict adherence to sequence of time and place. His attempt to delineate events by showing their effect upon each other invariably entails the omission of unimportant details and sometimes leads to a change in strict chronology if such change will the more effectively show the working of such influential forces."

2.2: *Metus Hostilis* in Sallust

Before we embark upon a more detailed examination of Sallust's moral discourse in the coming chapters, and how it interacts with his narrative choices, one other concept central to Sallust's literary endeavor must be addressed briefly. *Metus hostilis*, fear of the [foreign] enemy,⁵⁰ plays a central role for Sallust in determining the course of Roman history and Roman morality, yet his deployment of the concept has, I contend, been unfairly maligned as inaccurate or unsophisticated. By exploring why he deploys the concept of *metus hostilis* the way he does, we shall begin to uncover an important way in which Sallust conveys his pessimistic view of Roman moral behavior throughout his corpus.

It is clear that *metus hostilis* was a long-standing commonplace in both historiography and other genres, going back at least to the 5th c. B.C.E.⁵¹ It may be noted that Thucydides, a key influence on Sallust's language and political thought, employs the concept, but in some instances with a slightly different emphasis from Sallust.⁵² In any case, as Giusti has recently pointed out, this idea of "negative association", from which springs the specific concept of *metus hostilis*, is a largely Roman legacy to political

⁵⁰ The discussion below conceives of "fear of a foreign enemy" in the far more common meaning "our fear of them", though grammatically it could be construed "the fear of the enemy [sc. toward us]".

⁵¹ E.g. Isoc. *Paneg.* 85; Aesch. *Eum.* 517-25, 690-99; Soph. *Aj.* 1073-86; Thuc. 8.1.4; Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.26, Plato *Leg.* 3.698bf (of Persian Wars), Arstl. *Pol.* 5.1308a-b, 7.1334a; Plb. 6.18 (who may well have had in mind Cato's discourses, e.g. from his speech for the Rhodians (FRHist F87), 6.57.5; cf. later Livy 1.19.4, 39.1-2. On the occurrence of this theme in literature before Sallust, see i.a. Vretska 1976: 205-6; Earl 1961: 47f; Paul 1984: 124.

⁵² For Thucydides, fear of the enemy can actually *start* conflict and *incite* demagoguery (e.g. famously in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War – though in Thuc. 8.1.4 we have a more Sallustian application of the concept), while for Sallust it can restrain such internal conflict and rabble-rousing. On the influence of Thucydides on Sallust more generally, see Scanlon 1980 *passim*.

theory, as it is known as “Sallust’s Theorem” rather than ἔξοθεν φόβος, or Thucydides’ Theorem or Posidonius’ Theorem.⁵³

In Roman discourse, *metus hostilis* allegedly first appears through the figure of Cato.⁵⁴ In his speech in defense of the Rhodians in 167, Cato comments, in general terms, that *res secundae* often lead to a swollen sense of pride and defiance, inhibiting people from proper judgment, while *adversae res* keep people in order.⁵⁵ He goes on to say that the Rhodians themselves understood the idea of *metus hostilis* in that they did not want Rome wholly to defeat Perseus because then the Romans would have no one to fear and check their actions.⁵⁶

The idea of *metus hostilis*, and adversity as a spur to concord and right action, is clearly present in the abovementioned excerpts. Yet we must be careful of attributing actual *belief* in the concept of *metus hostilis* to Cato himself. Appian (*Pun.* 65.290-91) reports that Scipio Africanus wished to leave Carthage eternally standing as a neighbor and feared rival in order to preserve Roman discipline and avoid their growing insolent from good fortune and freedom from troubles.⁵⁷ Moreover, he claims Cato attributed this view to Africanus during his Rhodian speech as well, probably to bolster his own use of

⁵³ Giusti 2016: 40. Cf. Wood 1995. On “negative association”, see i.a. Evrigenis 2009: 6f.

⁵⁴ For other sources on the Cato-Nasica debate and the role of *metus hostilis* see Diod. 5.33.3-6, Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27, Flor. 1.31.5, App. *Lib.* 69.314-15, Augustine *CD* 1.30, Oros. 4.23.9, Zonar. 9.30.

⁵⁵ FRHist. Cato F87 (= ORF⁴ 163): *Scio solere plerisque hominibus rebus secundis atque prolixis atque prosperis animum excellere atque superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere...aduorsae res edomant et docent, quid opus siet facto. secundae res laetitia transuorsum trudere solent a recte consulendo atque intellegendo.*

⁵⁶ FRHist. Cato F88 (= ORF⁴ 164): *Atque ego quidem arbitror Rodienses noluisse nos ita depugnare, uti depugnatum est, neque regem Persen uinci. sed non Rodienses modo id noluerunt sed multos populos atque multas nationes idem noluisse arbitror; atque haut scio an partim eorum fuerint, qui non nostrae contumeliae causa id noluerint euenire, sed enim id metuere, <ne>, si nemo esset homo quem uereremur, quidquid luberet faceremus, ne sub solo imperio nostro in seruitute nostra essent, libertatis suae causa in ea sententia fuisse arbitror.* Cf. Lintott 1977: 633.

⁵⁷ ἐς Ῥωμαίων σωφρονισμόν ἐθελῆσαι γείτονα καὶ ἀντίπαλον αὐτοῖς φόβον [= *metus hostilis*] ἐς αἰὶ καταλιπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ποτε ἐξυβρίσειαν ἐν μεγέθει τύχης καὶ ἀμεριμνία.

the argument.⁵⁸ Harris argues that Appian or his source have Cato attribute the *metus hostilis* argument to Africanus because of a perception that Cato himself expressed this doctrine strongly.⁵⁹ Yet I would argue that, from the available evidence of Cato's own writings, it is unlikely Cato himself held a strong belief in *metus hostilis* as a socio-political force. For one, Valerius Maximus (7.2.3) actually ascribes this reflection to Q. Caecilius Metellus (cos. 206), not to Cato. Moreover, as Harris observes, *metus hostilis* did not quite apply in the case of the Rhodians, as they were not a powerful enemy. Even more to the point, the fact that Cato wished to spare the Rhodians was not due to a belief in the efficacy of *metus hostilis* upon Romans generally, or to a belief that sparing the Rhodians in particular would preserve a sense of *metus hostilis* for Romans; rather, Cato's argument to spare the Rhodians in the context of this speech was based upon the precedent of leniency and *miser cordia*. In the preserved fragments of the speech, Cato in fact only says that the *Rhodians* (among other nations) thought in terms of *metus hostilis*; he does not say that it was an active factor influencing the *Romans'* deliberation.⁶⁰ In the end it seems that little trust can be put in the reports of Appian that Africanus and Cato both believed in and applied to Roman thinking the doctrine of *metus hostilis*.

The idea of *metus hostilis*, in addition to being a longstanding commonplace in Greek literature, had thus been discussed in some form in Roman contexts at least by the middle of the 2nd century B.C.E. Accordingly when Scipio Nasica, according to tradition, called

⁵⁸ App. *Pun.* 65: καὶ τότε οὕτω φρονῆσαι τὸν Σκιπίωνα οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐξεῖπε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις Κάτων, ἐπιπλήττων παρωξυμμένοις κατὰ Ῥόδου. On Scipio Africanus' use of the *metus hostilis* argument see Diod 35.33.3-6.

⁵⁹ Harris 1979: 266-7.

⁶⁰ FRHist. Cato F88 (= ORF⁴ 164 = Peter F95b)

upon the *metus hostilis* argument in the debate over Carthage before the Third Punic War, he had not invented it *ex nihilo*. In Astin's view, Nasica will likely have called on several arguments, central among them being (1) delay and consideration (*nihil temere faciundum*),⁶¹ (2) The need for a *iusta causa*,⁶² (3) *metus hostilis* preserving good order and morals.⁶³ That Nasica did in reality use the argument from fear is plausible, and does fit with Polybius' account. At 36.1 Polybius had said that he would not record the dueling speeches on both sides in full detail as it does not befit a historian to always do so simply for show. He adds that he will record only what was most important and most effective of the arguments used.⁶⁴ It is therefore plausible either that Polybius mentioned the use of the *metus hostilis* argument in a missing section, or omitted it (though used) because it was not the most efficacious or important of the arguments employed.

On balance it seems most likely that Nasica called on *metus hostilis* as somewhat of a rhetorical topos, which later became elaborated in the literary tradition to become his defining position in the debate.⁶⁵ That such a process of simplification and amplification

⁶¹ Cf. Livy *Per.* 48 (on 151 B.C.E), Diod. 32.5.

⁶² Livy *Per.* 48; this is also implied in Plb. 36.2.1, 2, 4, which states that the Romans almost called off declaring war against Carthage because they disagreed about what foreign sentiment would say about their actions (πάλαι δὲ τούτου κεκυρωμένου βεβαίως ἐν ταῖς ἐκάστων γνώμαις καιρὸν ἐζήτουν ἐπιτήδειον καὶ πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός. [2] πολὺ γὰρ δὴ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐφρόντιζον Ῥωμαῖοι, καλῶς φρονοῦντες...[4] διὸ καὶ τότε περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτός διαλήψεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφερόμενοι παρ' ὀλίγον ἀπέστησαν τοῦ πολέμου.)

⁶³ Astin 1967: 276-80. Gelzer 1931 ('Nasicas Widerspruch') thinks Nasica may have used all of these. Hoffman (*Historia* IX (1960), 340-44) that *metus hostilis* was not used, and that Nasica's main focus was religious (*iusta causa*). Yet as Plb 36.2 shows, the Romans' concern was more that the *causa* was *iusta* in the eyes of allies, not of religion. Badian (*Foreign Clientelae*, 132) invokes family connections with Carthage to explain his position in the debate, but the fact that he did not descend from Africanus weakens the point.

⁶⁴ Plb. 36.1, esp. 36.1.7: οὐτε τοῖς ἱστοριογράφοις ἐμμελετᾶν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οὐδ' ἐναποδείκνυσθαι τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν [sc. οἶμαι πρέπειν], ἀλλὰ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντα καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε πολυπραγμονήσαντας διασαφεῖν, καὶ τούτων τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ πραγματικώτατα.

⁶⁵ Astin 1967: 279-80. Cf. Harris 1979: 128. The possibility that the argument of *metus hostilis* had been merely one rhetorical topos among several other arguments used in the debate over Carthage, would have broader implications for the status of *metus hostilis* in Roman society and Roman thought, and such implications will be explored further below.

occurred through the literary tradition of the debate is to be expected given the attraction of a cleanly antithetical debate between polar opposite positions – Cato arguing for destruction, Nasica for preservation of Carthage, and of *metus hostilis*, for the sake of Roman morals. The hindsight of later historians surely also made it tempting to play up the degree to which those who opposed Carthage's destruction displayed – specifically on moral issues – the uncanny prescience of a tragic warner.

That Sallust was aware of Nasica's famous position on the preservation of Carthage and used *metus hostilis* with the same logic would seem plausible. However, in one instance it has been argued that, as Nasica's goal was to check a decline already begun, one should distinguish Sallust's view of *metus hostilis* from Nasica's, which would then raise doubts about where Sallust derived the idea.⁶⁶ Yet this is only a difference if one accepts that Sallust sincerely did not feel there was any moral decline before 146, and as our analysis of the *Historiae*, the *BC*, and Sallust's use of Cato below in Chapter 6 will argue in full detail, Sallust held that Roman character betrayed signs of vice from the beginning of Roman history. I would therefore hold that Sallust did share the view (expressed by Nasica as well as by Cato himself throughout his career) that there was moral corruption to castigate already in the early 2nd century B.C.E. Sallust's familiarity with the literary and historical sources for the 2nd century, and with Cato in particular, make it difficult to imagine he was unaware of the discourse on moral corruption present already in early in the 2nd century.

Accordingly, if Sallust was in fact aware of the presence of Roman vice before 146, then the fact that he does not simply dispense with the turning point of 146/the fall of

⁶⁶ Earl 1961: 49.

Carthage and instead just discourse in all of his texts on these moral vices present well before 146, indicates just how important it was to Sallust to emphasize the influence of *metus hostilis* on Roman morality. For a focus on Carthage's destruction/146 was a perfect way to keep *metus hostilis* – which is so prominent in the discourse about 146 – in the forefront of the reader's mind. Moreover, by such an emphasis on *metus hostilis* and 146, Sallust does not so much abandon his underlying belief in Roman vice *ab initio* as he subtly reinforces it: for if the preservation of Roman morality, as Sallust's narrative tells us (*BC* 10-12, *BJ* 41-2, *Hist.* 1.7, 1.11, 1.12, 1.16M),⁶⁷ had always depended upon the presence of *metus hostilis*, the implication is that without it, Romans have no innate inclination to *virtus* that sets them above any other nation morally, nor had they ever. We will have occasion to revisit this argument below and throughout Chapter 6.

Aside from the literary tradition surrounding Nasica, another option often bruited for Sallust's source of inspiration for the *metus hostilis* idea is Posidonius. This view was given a prominent form by Klingner, and he has been followed by certain other scholars.⁶⁸ Yet there is little that can be said with certainty on the basis of extant fragments of Posidonius, nor on the basis of tracing Posidonian influences in later Greek writers such as Diodorus. The possible influences exerted upon Sallust by Posidonian historiography (and Posidonian philosophy) are considered in more detail in Chapter 4,

⁶⁷ For another example of Sallust's employment of *metus hostilis* to explain Roman behavior within the *BC* see *BC* 31.1-3. Besides *BC* 10, where it is present in all but name, we see it e.g. in *BC* 23.6 (thought the senators here unite in fear of Catiline). Cf. Steidle 1958: 17n7, who is too tentative in saying that *metus hostilis* is present in the *BC* only "im Keim"; Vretska 1976 ad *BC* 6.7 acknowledges *metus hostilis* present in early Rome in the *BC* ("...ein Regulativ, das man vom Menschen her gesehen als *metus* bezeichnen muss.")

⁶⁸ Klingner 1928: 181, 183n1. On the possibility that Rutilius Rufus was an intermediary for Posidonius' use of *metus hostilis* theory, see i.a. Strasburger 1955: 40ff, esp. 49ff; Gelzer 1931: 270-72; Peter *HRR* I² (1914): CCLX; Munzer *RE* IA.1 (1914): 1277-80; cf. W. Steidle 1958: 16-21, who presents a strong case for rejecting Klingner's arguments that the date of 146 B.C. came to Sallust via Posidonius.

but even on this broader canvass it will be found difficult to pinpoint specific instances of borrowing between the two authors. While the year 146 and the destruction of Carthage were likely a prominent feature of Posidonius' account of Roman history, there is unfortunately little concrete proof beyond this to extend the argument and establish a direct line of influence regarding *metus hostilis* between Posidonius and Sallust.

A few recent forays into the study of *metus hostilis* theory in Roman literature have expanded our understanding of its application in other genres and at different periods.⁶⁹ For instance, Jacobs examines Silius Italicus' use of *metus hostilis* and the fall of Carthage in the *Punica* as part of an effort to render his poem a symbolic reflection upon the entire course of Roman history. Silius makes the Roman defeat at Cannae in 216, rather than Carthage's destruction in 146, his first major turning point in Roman (moral) history. While a defeat for Rome, Cannae signals the shift to the eventual victory of Rome and to the defeat of Carthage at Zama. Zama itself becomes in its turn a turning point which, through intratextual allusion, is suggested to represent the beginning of Rome's *decline*, even as it represents her moment of victory.⁷⁰ In my view, Silius' account thus presents differences from Sallust: Sallust offered no "first" turning point for Roman moral decline (since it was present from the beginning), and Silius offers Cannae⁷¹; Sallust offers 146 B.C.E. as his turning point for *headlong* moral decline, and Silius offers no clear turning point for headlong decline (unless Zama be considered as

⁶⁹ For the later reception of "Sallust's Theorem", see Wood 1995; Evrigenis 2009.

⁷⁰ Jacobs 2010: 123-39. On Zama as a sign of Rome's later decline, see esp. p.138-9.

⁷¹ Silius' Cannae is admittedly a bit different as a first turning point, in that Cannae shows Roman morality already at a nadir, and thus is a turning point signaling the start of a (short) moral *recovery*. Yet it is a first moral fulcrum nonetheless.

such).⁷² Overall, what the two authors do share is the general use of *metus hostilis* (and belief in its importance for Roman morality), as well as a sense of foreboding about the future decline of Rome once it goes away. In this sense, Silius shows the degree to which the core tenets of Sallust's use of *metus hostilis* later became accepted aspects of Roman moral discourse.

Likewise Giusti uncovers in Vergil's Aeneid an interesting message about the enemy, the "Other", and *metus hostilis* that aptly fits the age of civil war in which Vergil lived and wrote.⁷³ Though he takes a different view on *metus hostilis* from Sallust, Giusti shows how Vergil nonetheless arrives at a critique of contemporary Rome through the lens of the distant past, as does Sallust.

Although Dido and the Carthaginians are strongly equated with Persians through allusions to Atossa and Aeschylus' *Persae*, the Carthaginians also manifest interesting links both with Greeks and with the Romans/Trojans themselves. Likewise the Trojans (and Aeneas) not only evince similarities with the Carthaginians and their city (*perfidia*, [Phrygian] luxury, fleeing war to found a new city in the west), but also played (from the perspective of the Greek tradition) the role of the defeated barbarian like the 5th century Persians. Thus through the blurring of identities, the whole basis for the application of *metus hostilis* is taken away – namely, negative association with an enemy who is the "Other". Like Sallust, then (though in a slightly different way), Vergil plays with how the concept of *metus hostilis* reflects poorly on contemporary Rome. To Vergil the

⁷² Zama is clearly a turning point for Silius arising from Cannae and signaling Rome's later fall. Yet it is hard to gauge if this was when morality declined *headlong*, and there is no indication of or allusion to a precise later turning point for headlong decline outside the bounds of the poem. That Silius envisioned a time of headlong decline later on in Roman history is clear from various pronouncements in the poem about future Romans' struggles with *Voluptas*, for example, but none point to specific dates.

⁷³ Giusti 2016: 37-55.

enemy/the “Other” becomes one with the Roman – an apposite image for an age ravaged by repeated civil wars and the breakdown of traditional values.

However, little attention has been given recently to elaborating our understand of Sallust’s own specific use of *metus hostilis*, whether due to a belief that it was not truly as widespread a factor in Roman political thinking as Sallust portrays it to be, or perhaps because Sallust’s application of the idea to Roman history is considered less sophisticated. It is therefore important that we acknowledge the genuinely complex and important function of the concept of *metus hostilis* in Sallust’s scheme of Roman morality.

Some argue that *metus hostilis* was not as widespread a belief in the Roman consciousness as Sallust implies. As Gruen states, *metus gallicus* was a “convenient ploy” often tossed around in Latin literature but “hard to reckon as a deep-seated fear in Roman consciousness”.⁷⁴ The same might be said about fear of Carthage, especially in the years immediately preceding the Third Punic War. Astin does hold that in the leadup to 149 the fear was real: Carthage was economically resurgent, they were rearming (allegedly⁷⁵), they supported leaders who advocated a militarily active policy against Numidia, and it was possible that Numidia, with Massinissa’s death in the near future or a conflict between his sons, could weaken.⁷⁶ Yet we must not take too far this argument on the strength of *metus hostilis* during Third Punic War, for while Roman fear (or apprehension) may not have been wholly absent, there were other possible motives such

⁷⁴ Gruen 2011: 147n5, noting that Bellen 1985 and Kremer 1994: 99-103 exaggerate the potency of this concept.

⁷⁵ Large scale re-arming is debateable. That they were willing to make incursions into Numidia and even meet them in battle does not assure a long-term plan for maintaining an expanded military (see Harris 234-40).

⁷⁶ Astin 1967: 52; 274-5

as simple inveterate hatred.⁷⁷ Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that Roman demands leading up to Third Punic War do not show a sincere effort to avoid conflict.⁷⁸ A sincere effort at avoiding the conflict would have indicated that *metus hostilis* was operative upon the Romans and that they were consciously considering it, but an aim to provoke Carthage seems implied by Rome's actual behavior.

Therefore, although it might be fair to say *metus hostilis* did at least *exist* at certain times and, as pertains to Carthage, existed between the First and Second Punic Wars, it is debatable whether it exerted a strong influence on actual foreign policy leading up to the Third Punic War – or at any other time in the 3rd or 2nd centuries for that matter. Yet judging the degree of *metus hostilis*' actual operative power as a point of fact is not our ultimate goal in this discussion. Instead, the key insight here is that Sallust's marked decision to emphasize the centrality of *metus hostilis* was intended to convey a specific yet far-reaching argument about Roman morality.⁷⁹ To wit, in consistently asserting *metus hostilis* as the overriding causal factor governing the course of Roman history and Roman morality, Sallust's intended aim was to point up the lack of innate moral

⁷⁷ Economic motives are not as likely. As Astin points out (1967: 272) the Romans did not occupy or use Carthaginian land for a while after conquering the city. This would militate against their having intended to vacate the land to make room for Roman large landowners. Yet it can also be added that, since subsequent Roman economic neglect of the site suggests that they did not have an economic motive in destroying Carthage, their demand in 149 that the Carthaginians move 10 miles inland was very likely meant not to benefit Rome economically, but rather to provoke Carthage to armed resistance. For the locality of Carthage was the wellspring of the Carthaginians' economic prosperity.

⁷⁸ As Plb. 36.2.1 makes clear (cf. App. *Lib.* 69 (end), 74 (of 149 B.C.E.), 75), the Romans had decided on joining war, and prepared for it, *long* before the decision was conveyed to the Carthaginians in 149, and were essentially just waiting for a suitable opportunity (and a *iusta causa*) (Harris 1979: 239-40). Moreover, a firm clear settlement by the Romans on the matter of boundaries between Massinissa and Carthage, if they had wanted to undertake one, would likely have resolved conflict in Africa (Astin 1967: 273). Indeed, the Romans encouraged Massinissa to attack the Carthaginians in 150 (App. *Lib.* 72). This is an illogical decision if their sincere intent was simply to settle that conflict.

⁷⁹ Indeed, if (as our discussion has shown is possible) *metus hostilis* was in reality *not* as central to Roman consciousness as Sallust implies, then Sallust's decision to *make* it overwhelmingly central in his narrative would have struck his readers all the more – and consequently made the implications of his argument for Roman morality more easily perceptible through the narrative.

superiority possessed by Romans: if Sallust makes their upright moral behavior at all periods contingent on the presence of an external factor like *metus hostilis*, then it is more clearly implied that Romans possessed no *innate* moral quality that set them above others.

Therefore Sallust's discourse on *metus hostilis* is not simply taken over without thought from Posidonius or another source; it works in conjunction with his own discourse on Roman moral history to help shatter any illusions of Roman moral exceptionalism.⁸⁰ It is thus unwarranted to consider Sallust's use of *metus hostilis* a decision evincing lack of sophistication or depth of thought. Ogilvie, for instance, commenting on Livy's preface in Book 1, considered that Sallust's theory about Roman morality (as Ogilvie himself took it: uniform virtue before 146, vice entering and growing from 146) lacked depth: "it was not a profound thesis. Sallust was not a profound thinker."⁸¹ Likewise, Tiffou has judged Sallust's deployment of the concepts of *fortuna* and *metus hostilis* as each being a fallback or *pis-aller* for when Sallust runs into insurmountable logical problems.⁸² To hold such views is to misunderstand the nature of Sallust's thesis. In Sallust's moral scheme *metus hostilis* is immensely powerful as a causal factor governing Roman history and Roman moral behavior, and even if it *appears*

⁸⁰ For a more detailed discussion of Sallust's methods of questioning inherent Roman moral superiority, see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 *passim*.

⁸¹ Ogilvie 1965: 24. He goes on to say that Livy recognized *ambitio* had always been at work from the beginning, while Sallust did not, and that Livy's omission of *ambitio* from *praef.* 10 is a criticism of Sallust. This ignores the evidence of Sallust *Hist.* 1.11M. For similar judgments on the lack of sophistication in Sallust's thought, cf. i.a. Earl 1967: 55 ("As a political thinker Sallust was incompetent, as an historian variously delinquent."), 1965: 238 ("real deficiencies...[underline] the dubiousness of Sallust's method...Sallust, clearly, was not a systematic thinker...He was, it must be faced, a bad historian."); A.R. Hand 1962: 275 ("sheer ignorance and unconcern"); Badian 1962: 465 ("Sallust...was not a deep thinker."); Goodyear 1982: 273.

⁸² Tiffou 1973: 381 (cf. 318-20). Tiffou applies the following remarks to *fortuna* and directly afterward to *metus hostilis*: "il est pour lui le refuge de son ignorance ou de son incapacité de faire joint entre sa pensée et la réalité." Similar views given by Earl 1965: 236; Sensal 2010: 475.

simple, it has complex implications. Sallust may not focus on economic factors, and social factors often seem to be given summary treatment.⁸³ Yet his decision to stick to the causal construct of *metus hostilis* so consistently, and to the exclusion of such other factors, seems calculated so that his moral scheme should have the elegant simplicity needed to convey his far-reaching thesis with clarity: Romans were always just as prone to vice as other nations, and if it were not for that one strong check on their behavior (*metus hostilis*), their inherent disposition to vice would have been constantly on display, similarly to any other nation.

Therefore, as we move ahead to re-examine the historical and moral perspective of Sallust, we must bear in mind the principles touched upon in this chapter. First, although it is not the purpose of this study to wholly absolve Sallust of historical errors or omissions, still when analyzing Sallust's narrative, we will find that it is more productive of substantial insight if we make it our first instinct to try to understand what Sallust's narrative gives us as a literary choice rather than an error of malice or ignorance. This may not always be the case, but we must consider it as an option. Second, we must keep in mind that, whatever the actual status of *metus hostilis* was in Roman foreign policy or in the general Roman consciousness, Sallust wants his readers to pay attention to the emphatic way in which he uses it, and what this usage implies for his view of Roman morality. We will begin to unravel these implications further in the coming chapters.

⁸³ One thinks, for example, of the motives of the Catilinarian conspirators, among the nobility (*BC* 17.5-6; 21.1, 4; 37.10-38.4), the Sullan veterans (*BC* 16.4, 21.4, 37.6), the *plebs* (*BC* 37.1-5, 7), and the sons of the proscribed (*BC* 37.9). It is worth noting, however, that Sallust is not alone among Greek or Roman historians in an overwhelming focus on moral explanation for political and military action, and a reduced focus on economic, social, or cultural factors. Herodotus in particular was known to have focused on the role of the individual, and individual motivation, in the course of events, and Thucydides' narrative is driven largely by the psychology of the *dēmos* and the personalities of its leaders in Athens.

Chapter 3: Sallust's Supposed Political Attachments

In attempting to gain a broader understanding of Sallust's particular interpretation of Roman politics and Roman history, the point of departure and main focus should always be a close literary analysis of Sallust's works, both individually and in the multifarious connections they exhibit with one another. However, in the attempt to construct a sweeping, all-encompassing interpretation of the nature of Sallust's *oeuvre*, and to find an aetiological key, so to speak, for Sallust's entire corpus, scholars have often tried to simplify their task by ascribing to the historian precise political and philosophical affiliations that they claim inform his writing. Such attempts to ascribe to Sallust any specific political attachments and philosophical leanings are in themselves fraught with danger, and it is the aim of these next two chapters to affirm this important point. We will see not only that Sallust's texts themselves provide scant internal evidence for any particular political attachments, but also that attempts to call upon the ancient biographical tradition about Sallust – meager and unreliable as it is – in order to provide *external* support for such political attachments are also problematic. In general, and as this study proceeds forward, we must be careful about maintaining a separation between the internal evidence from Sallust's own texts and those claims which we find in the diffuse and shaky ancient sources for Sallust's biography. Through the analysis of the next two chapters, it will become clear that Sallust the historian eludes neat political or philosophical labeling.

3.1: Sallust's Career: The Basic Framework

There is indeed not a great abundance of detail which we can use to fill out Sallust's biography and political career.¹ Jerome's *Chronicle* provides us with his date of birth (86 B.C.E.) and (still debated) date of death (35 or 34 B.C.E.).² For other information about Sallust's career there was Suetonius' treatment of historians in his *de Viris Illustribus*, and, still earlier, the no longer extant biography of Sallust by Asconius Pedianus.³ What we do know securely is that Sallust held the office of tribune of the *plebs* in 52 B.C.E.⁴; he was involved in the riots and *contiones* held in the aftermath of Clodius' murder that year⁵; he was expelled from the Senate in 50 by the censor Appius Claudius Pulcher⁶; he commanded a legion in Illyricum for Caesar in 49, and failed to relieve the defeated legate C. Antonius on the island of Curicta⁷; as praetor elect in 47 Sallust was sent by Caesar to quell mutinous troops in Campania, and barely escaped in one piece⁸; in 46 he effectively fulfilled his duties in Caesar's African campaign,⁹ and was rewarded with the governorship of Africa Nova¹⁰; later in 45 Sallust was prosecuted for extortion committed

¹ For discussion of Sallust's political career and personal life, see Allen Jr.: 1954; Syme 1964: chapter 4 passim; Earl 1966; Syme 1978; Ramsey 2013: xv-xxvii.

² See e.g. Schwabe & Warr 1900 (Teuffel): 361 for an exposition of the sometimes conflicting reports of these dates; also G.V. Sumner 1971: 270, citing *Chron. Pasch.* 1.347.11 Bonn, Jerome, *Chron.* 151a H, *Chron. Min.* 1.214 Momm.

³ See e.g. Ramsey 2013: xv.

⁴ Asconius p.37C.18-19

⁵ For more detail on Sallust's participation in the events surrounding Clodius' death and the burning of the *Curia*, see the discussion below and *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta* (ORF) 150, 152 (Malcovati).

⁶ Dio 40.63.4. His reentry to the Senate was consequent upon his appointment as praetor in 47, according to most accounts (cf. Sumner 1971: 270). However, on the possibility of a quaestorship in 48 see *Invectiva In Sall.* 5.15, 6.17; or in 49: MRR 2.274; on a possible quaestorship in 55 or 54: Sumner 1971: 270n44.

⁷ Orosius 6.15.8. On Sallust's performance under Caesar from 49 to 47, see i.a. Syme 1964: 36-8.

⁸ App. *B.C.* 2.92; Dio 42.51.1-2.

⁹ Caes. *B.Afr.* 8.3; 34.1, 3; 97.1; App. *B.C.* 2.100.

¹⁰ Caes. *B.Afr.* 97.1; App. *B.C.* 2.100; Dio 43.9.2. According to Broughton, after Caesar's African campaign, in the middle of 46, Sallust was left as pro-consular governor of Africa Nova, which means the title of proconsul supervened upon his praetorship. (Broughton 1948: 76-8)

during his time as governor in Africa, and escaped conviction.¹¹ At last, Sallust tells us that he then retired from political life to focus on writing history.¹²

Upon this basic framework a veneer of less reliable – and occasionally less flattering – information about Sallust’s political and personal life began to grow.¹³ This process had already begun within Sallust’s own lifetime. Aulus Gellius tells us that Varro in his *Pius, aut de Pace*, written some time in or after 46 B.C.E.,¹⁴ wrote how Sallust was caught *in flagrante* with Fausta, Milo’s wife, and was flogged and fined. Gellius himself points out the seeming hypocrisy of Sallust being caught in adultery, a writer of such serious prose full of censure for the immorality of others.¹⁵ We learn from Pseudo-Acro’s remark on Horace *Satires* 1.2.41 that Asconius too, in his lost “Life” of Sallust, reported the same misadventure. Moreover, controversy also surrounds the exact identification of a Sallustius, named by Horace in that same satire, who is obsessed with pursuing freedwomen.¹⁶ Slightly later, the spurious *Invectives In Ciceronem* and *In Sallustium*, which are generally agreed to have been creations of the rhetorical schools of

¹¹ Dio 43.9.2-3. Sallust’s acquittal *de repetundis* will be discussed more thoroughly below. Funaioli in *RE* s.v. “Sallustius” no.10 col.1920 reasonably has Sallust arriving back in Rome late in 45.

¹² Sall. *BC* 4.1-2; cf. *BJ* 4.3-4.

¹³ One such story that will *not* be given a more detailed treatment below is reported in Jerome’s *In Jovinianum* 1.48, derived, it seems, from Seneca’s treatise on marriage: that Sallust married Terentia after Cicero. For a clear refutation of this possibility (and also of the possibility that Sallust married Cicero’s 2nd wife Publilia before she married C. Vibius Rufus), see Syme 1978, and Treggiari 2007: 148f. Syme sums up the web of speculation well (1978: 295): “The matter might be left where it belongs. There are no facts.”

¹⁴ The date is that upheld in Whitehorne 1975: 426n7.

¹⁵ Gellius, *N.A.* 17.18: *M. Varro, in litteris atque uita fide homo multa et grauis, in libro, quem scripsit Pius aut de pace, C. Sallustium scriptorem seriae illius et seuerae orationis, in cuius historia notiones censorias fieri atque exerceri uidemus, in adulterio deprehensum ab Annio Milone loris bene caesum dicit et, cum dedisset pecuniam, dimissum.* While Whitehorne asserts (1975: 426) that we cannot be sure the story was *invented* by Varro, Gellius seems sure that it was from a specific work, and this suggests Varro did at least transmit it, even if he did not invent it. It is unlikely someone could lie about the story being from a work of Varro that was still extant for people to read if not in Gellius’ time, then at least for quite a while after Varro’s death.

¹⁶ Hor. *Sat.* 1.2.47-9: *tutior at quanto merx est in classe secunda / libertinarum dico: Sallustius in quas / non minus insanit quam qui moechatur.* See below (Section 3.2c) for further discussion of the identification of this Sallustius, and of these contradictory stories more broadly.

the early Empire, became the source of further unreliable accretion to the information on Sallust's political and personal life – though some ancient writers did seem to think the *In Ciceronem* was authentic, including Quintilian and Servius.¹⁷

It is through the use of these types of information, external to Sallust's actual writings, that a number of mistaken assumptions have persisted about the nature of Sallust's literary project and the supposed ideologies that underpin it. It is therefore the purpose of the present chapter first to re-examine the biographical (and autobiographical) material on Sallust and what previous scholars have inferred from it, in the hopes of redrawing the line between what we can and cannot securely say about Sallust's political inclinations.¹⁸ Next, through a closer examination of the *BC*, *BJ*, and the *Historiae* – and in particular of the political language and the ostensibly self-reflective sections of these texts – we will establish that Sallust's literary corpus shows us a writer aiming to take *no* side politically, a writer more focused on identifying systemic problems in Roman society and describing the corrupt behavior of *all* parties, rich or poor, no matter their political stance. The endeavor of this chapter will then carry over into the following chapter (Chapter 4), where our analysis will similarly reveal that Sallust's political and moral outlook evinces no single *philosophical* school dominating and determining his narrative of history, but rather a range of possible but not securely provable influences from various schools.

¹⁷ cf. Ramsey 2013: xxxi, citing Quint. *I.O.* 4.1.68, 9.3.89; Servius *ad Aen.* 6.623. If scholars like Quintilian and Servius accepted the authenticity of at least some of these spurious works, it is likely that they were not the only ones, and this may partly explain how the stories related in these works continued to enjoy a wide currency down to the lifetimes of, among others, Cassius Dio, and still later Lactantius (e.g. *Instit.* 2.12.12, p.157,16 Brandt), Q. Aurelius Symmachus (*Epist.* 5.68(66).2), and Macrobius (*Sat.* 3.13.9).

¹⁸ Chapter 4 will similarly re-examine evidence for Sallust's philosophical influences and establish what can and cannot be securely inferred therefrom.

3.2: Evidence from the Biographical and Autobiographical Tradition

3.2a: Sallust's Tribune

We can begin by considering what reliable information can be extracted from the ancient sources regarding Sallust's actions as tribune in the turbulent early stages of 52 B.C.E. As had happened the prior year, 52 opened without consuls due to considerable contentiousness exhibited amongst the three consular candidates of the year, T. Annius Milo (who stood with the "optimates"), Q. Metellus Scipio, and P. Plautius Hypsaesus, the latter two being "Pompeian" candidates and supported by P. Clodius as well.¹⁹ On January 18, 52 B.C.E. Clodius was killed by Milo and his posse outside Rome in a skirmish along the *Via Appia*, and his body was brought back to Rome, whereupon crowds of "the lowest of plebs and a great many slaves" gathered to mourn Clodius before his body was brought to the Forum and the tribunes gathered to address the citizens.²⁰ Sallust's role in these events starts to come through in a series of passages from Asconius. It was apparently recorded in the Senatorial Acta that Sallust spoke in *contiones* the day Clodius' body was brought back to Rome: *sunt autem contionati eo die, ut ex Actis apparet, C. Sallustius et Q. Pompeius, utrique et inimici Milonis et satis inquieti* ("Sallust and Q. Pompeius, both enemies of Milo and rather turbulent individuals, spoke in *contiones* that day, as is shown from the Proceedings of the Senate").²¹ Cicero states that there were certain men who, in trying to influence the legislation for Milo's trial, said that Milo killed Clodius, but at the bidding of Cicero himself. He then adds *me videlicet latronem et sicarium abiecti homines et perdit*

¹⁹ Asconius p.30C.26

²⁰ Asconius p.32C.28-9. Cf. Livy *Periochae* 107.

²¹ Asc. in *Mil.* 45, p.49C.6f.

descriebant (“Plainly, worthless and degenerate men were calling me a brigand and an assassin”, *Pro Mil.* 47). To this Asconius comments *Q. Pompeius Rufus et C. Sallustius tribuni fuerunt quos significat. Hi enim primi de ea lege ferenda populum hortati sunt et dixerunt a manu Milonis occisum esse Clodium, <consilio vero maioris alicuius>*.²²

Furthermore, in his general summary of the events surrounding the trial Asconius remarks *inter primos et Q. Pompeius et C. Sallustius et T. Munatius Plancus tribuni pl. inimicissimas contiones de Milone habebant, invidiosas etiam de Cicerone* [cf. *Mil.* 12], *quod Milonem tanto studio defenderet*.²³ So far, from these three notes of Asconius it seems that Sallust, like his fellow tribunes Pompeius Rufus and Plancus, spoke in incitement against Milo and Cicero not only on the day Clodius’ body was returned to Rome, but subsequently as well. That Sallust continued to speak in such contexts against Milo and Cicero is also supported by Asconius’ remark that *Q. Pompeius Rufus, C. Sallustius Crispus, T. Munatius Plancus...cotidianis contionibus suis magnam invidiam Miloni propter occisum Clodium excitarent*.²⁴

What requires explanation, however, is the fact that after the turmoil brought about by these events subsided, Sallust alone of these three tribunes was not prosecuted.²⁵ A few remarks from Asconius might help flesh this out. In the first passage above, where Asconius draws on the *Acta*, he continues by saying *videtur mihi Q. Pompeium significare; nam eius seditiosior fuit contio*.²⁶ It would seem that Pompeius Rufus’

²² Asc. in *Mil.* 47, p.49C.24f

²³ Asc. in *Mil.* p.37C.18-21.

²⁴ Asc. In *Mil.* 67, p.51C.9-11.

²⁵ Cf. Syme 1964: 33. Not only were Munatius Plancus Bursa (Plut. *Pomp.* 55.5, Cic. *ad Fam.* 7.2.2) and Pompeius Rufus (Cic. *ad Fam.* 8.1.4, Dio 40.55, Val. Max. 4.2.7) convicted, but P. Plautius Hypsaesus, consular candidate in 52, was also convicted of *ambitus*. For more on prosecutions in 52 cf. App. *B.C.* 2.24, Dio 40.52.1-3, 53, 55.

²⁶ Asc. in *Mil.* 45, p.49C.6f

actions, at least on that first day, were more intemperate than Sallust's. Likewise, although Malcovati assumes Plancus, Pompeius, *and* Sallust carried Clodius' corpse into the Forum before burning it in the Curia, the following remark from Asconius seems to exclude Sallust from involvement with these acts (Asc. *In Mil.* p32C.25f, my emphasis):

<T> Munatius Plancus, frater L. Planci oratoris, et Q. Pompeius Rufus, Syllae dictatoris ex filia nepos, tribuni pl. accurrerunt; eisque hortantibus vulgus imperitum corpus nudum ac lutatum, sicut in lecto erat positum, ut vulnera videri possent in forum detulit et in rostris posuit. ibi pro contione Plancus et Pompeius, qui competitoribus Milonis studebant, invidiam Miloni fecerunt.²⁷

If it were indeed the case that Sallust's *contiones* were less intemperate, and that he was not involved either in the conveying of Clodius' body to the Forum or the burning of the Curia, this might explain why, in Asconius' general summary of events quoted above,²⁸ a report is included to the effect that *postea Pompeius et Sallustius in suspicione fuerunt rediisse in gratiam cum Milone ac Cicerone; Plancus autem infestissime perstitit* ("afterward, Pompeius and Sallust were suspected of having reconciled with Milo and Cicero; Plancus, however, continued as hostile as ever").²⁹

At least as far as Sallust is concerned, then, this is the only evidence we have that might help to explain why he was not prosecuted for his actions as tribune – and it is only indirect and based on inference. One could of course conjecture about unknowns such as a possible relationship Sallust might have had with Caesar already in 52 which might

²⁷ Asc. *in Mil.* 12, p.42C.16f also reports the burning of the Curia and the *contiones* that preceded it, naming both Pompeius and Plancus, but not Sallust. Dio 40.55.1 too refers to the conviction of Rufus and Plancus "on account of the burning of the Senate House", but with no mention of Sallust's inclusion in this.

²⁸ Asc. *in Mil.* p.37C.18-25

²⁹ See also Asconius' remarks on *Mil.* 13 & 14, where a list of those things declared by the Senate *contra rem publicam* is provided: *Acta etiam totius illius temporis persecutus sum; in quibus cognovi pridie Kal. Mart. S. C. esse factum, P. Clodi caedem et incendium curiae et oppugnationem aedium M. Lepidi contra rem p. factam*. This step was surely taken to facilitate prosecution *de vi* on these very actions. Important to note, however, is that these were the actions in which Sallust took no apparent part. See further R.G. Lewis 2006: 249.

have kept Sallust safe, but such conjectures, constructed oftentimes based on likelihoods and on assumptions about what loyalties a familial connection should require, have nothing secure about them.³⁰ We can thus limit our discussion of Sallust's behavior as tribune to what has been said above.

³⁰ Cf. Syme 1964: 33. Syme himself has no substantive answer for how Sallust managed to avoid prosecution as tribune. The possibility that Sallust was already in early 52 a close (and important) ally of Caesar, and owed his safety at that time to him, could perhaps be inferred from the fact that Sallust's like-minded tribunician colleague Pompeius Rufus was brother of Caesar's second wife Pompeia; yet if this is so, one wonders why Caesar was able to save Sallust from prosecution, but not his own kinsman Rufus. One might answer that after Caesar had divorced Pompeia several years earlier, his relationship with Rufus suffered. Yet this is no more than unverifiable conjecture, and moreover to posit a soured relationship between Caesar and Pompeius Rufus by 52 takes away the original reason for Caesar to have shown any favor toward Sallust in the first place. This line of explanation, then, cannot yield anything of use.

3.2b: Sallust's Prosecution *de repetundis* and acquittal

We do have literary confirmation, however, that after his stint as governor of Africa Nova in 46 Sallust was prosecuted for extortion, and that he was acquitted.³¹ Beyond this basic fact, we have to be careful in our attempts to establish how exactly Sallust escaped conviction. It is usually claimed that Caesar was in some way responsible, since Sallust was indeed a partisan of Caesar at least from the outbreak of civil war in 49, if not earlier.³² However, Suetonius tells us that Caesar upheld his law on extortion strictly, depriving those convicted of senatorial rank.³³ Caesar also revised the Senate rolls, perhaps in 47, more securely in 46 and 45.³⁴ For this reason it is probably true that Sallust's prosecution did irk Caesar. He had just set up Africa Nova as a province, and was in the process of establishing his authority through administrative actions and through enforcement of his extortion legislation. It would not reflect well on Caesar to have to convict one of his followers (one moreover holding a high office) on his own law *de pecuniis repetundis*, and to have to strike him from the Senate rolls for the second time.

³¹ cf Dio 43.9.2-3: καὶ τοὺς Νομάδας λαβὼν ἕς τε τὸ ὑπήκοον ἐπήγαγε καὶ τῷ Σαλουστίῳ λόγῳ μὲν ἄργειν ἔργῳ δὲ ἄγειν τε καὶ φέρειν ἐπέτρεψεν. ἀμέλει καὶ ἐδωροδόκησε πολλὰ καὶ ἤρπασεν, ὥστε καὶ κατηγορηθῆναι <καὶ> αἰσχύνῃν ἐσχάτην ὀφλεῖν, ὅτι τοιαῦτα συγγράμματα συγγράψας καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πικρὰ περὶ τῶν ἐκκαρπούμενων τινὰς εἰπὼν οὐκ ἐμμήσατο τῷ ἔργῳ τοὺς λόγους. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀφείθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς γε ἑαυτὸν καὶ πάνυ τῇ συγγραφῇ ἐστηλοκόπησε. On the moral hypocrisy alluded to here, see below, Section 3.2d.

³² As mentioned above, the possibility that Sallust had ties to Caesar already in 52 cannot be confirmed merely on the basis that he shared the tribunate with Pompeius Rufus, who was related to Caesar's second wife. However, the college of tribunes in 52 did pass a bill allowing Caesar to stand in absentia for the consulship (Caes. *B.C.* 1.9.2, 32.3; Cic. *ad Att.* 7.1.4, 3.4, 6.2; *ad Fam.* 6.6.5; *Phil.* 2.24; Livy *Per.* 107; Suet. *Iul.* 26, 28; Plut. *Pomp.* 56; App. *B.C.* 2.25; Florus 2.13.16; Dio 40.51.2; cf. Broughton MRR II). This, at least, could have been the start of a positive relationship with Caesar, but again we lack explicit evidence of this, and it is possible that nothing could have come of this until later when war broke out in 49 and Sallust decided to join Caesar's side.

³³ Suet. *Iul.* 43.1

³⁴ Allen Jr. 1954: 7.

Two other sources together suggest that such considerations on Caesar's part may in general have been involved in Sallust's acquittal *de repetundis*. First, Dio 43.47.4, remarking on the events of 45 B.C.E., says εὐθυνομένους τε ἐπὶ δώροις τινὰς καὶ ἐξελεγχομένους γε ἀπέλυσεν, ὥστε καὶ αἰτίαν δωροδοκίας ἔχειν ("And Caesar let off some who were on trial for bribery and were being convicted, with the result that he too was charged with accepting bribes"). This passage indicates Caesar's reputation suffered for letting off certain people accused, according to Dio, of bribery. There is no mention, however, of any specific individuals, and no mention of Sallust which would indicate he was one of those to whom Dio refers. Allen Jr. brings in another passage which he feels can establish Sallust as one of those referred to in Dio 43.47.4. The Pseudo-Ciceronian *Invectiva in Sallustium* 19 alleges that to avoid some trial, Sallust agreed to pay Caesar 1,200,000 sesterces: *ne causam diceret, sestertio duodeciens cum Caesare paciscitur*. This alleged instance of collusion between Caesar and the accused Sallust would technically fit the charges of bribery against Caesar related in Dio 43.47.4. Yet the status of the *Invectiva in Sallustium* as a rhetorical exercise makes this a questionable source for reliable information about the ignominious parts of Sallust's life. In the end, what we are left with to reconstruct the precise details of Sallust's acquittal for extortion are a passage from Dio which is circumstantially suggestive but does not mention Sallust, and a rhetorical *suasoria* of dubious dependability. Sallust *was* prosecuted, he *was* (in all likelihood) guilty, and he *was* acquitted. Caesar did have a vested interest in saving Sallust from conviction, and we have circumstantial and unspecific evidence that Caesar

did similar things for certain individuals. Beyond this we cannot securely go. Sallust soon retired from political life and went into retirement with his fortunes intact.³⁵

However, we do hear from Sallust how he *felt* about this retirement. In the preface to the *BJ*, after broader moral and philosophical reflections, he turns to a discussion of the corrupt political environment at Rome in his day (*BJ* 3-4). At *BJ* 3.1 he states it is not worth seeking office because office and honor are not awarded based on *virtus*, and those who obtain office are not the more safe or honorable for having attained it.³⁶ Such sentiments seem to be informed by Sallust's own experiences (when one paints those with sufficiently broad strokes): obtaining office (tribune, praetor), almost incurring prosecution (as tribune), being expelled from the Senate, and then actually incurring prosecution (after his praetorship). He then asserts (*BJ* 3.3) that "to struggle in vain" and achieve nothing but hatred (*odium*) is "the height of madness" (*extremae dementiae*). Here too, although reaching the praetorship was no trifling achievement for a *novus homo* such as Sallust, there is a level at which he might have thought his *own* political career had been in vain – a constant struggle in which holding office did not bring him security, but in the end did bring him the resentment of others and the dishonor of a public prosecution.³⁷

³⁵ Whether Caesar's anger about the affair contributed to Sallust's decision to retire will not be explored here, nor will the suggestion that Caesar helped Sallust escape conviction for a cut of his profits from his governorship of Africa. That Caesar during the civil war exacted financial contributions from private citizens is known (cf. Nepos, *Vita Att.* 7; Welch 1996: 467), but there is no reliable way to link this general fact to the circumstances surrounding Sallust's prosecution and acquittal.

³⁶ *Verum ex iis magistratus et imperia, postremo omnis cura rerum publicarum minime mihi hac tempestate cupienda videntur, quoniam neque virtuti honor datur neque illi, quibus per fraudem iis fuit uti, tuti aut eo magis honesti sunt* (*BJ* 3.1). Compare the quite similar opinions on the undesirability of the corrupt political arena of the late Republic allegedly voiced by Atticus at Nepos *Att.* 6.1-2. Cf. also Hor. *Sat.* 1.6.15-16 (on the giving of office to unworthy men); Hor. *Epistles* 1.16.17-45; Lucretius *DRN* 5.1120-35.

³⁷ For another take on the resentment elicited by political parvenus in the Triumviral Period, see i.a. Horace *Satires* 1.6.15-16, 19-26; *Epodes* 4; Ovid, *Amores* 3.15.6 (*non modo militiae turbine factus eques*)

When Sallust then moves on to defend his decision to retire to a life of writing *res gestae*, he elaborates on what disgusted him about politics in the 40s (*BJ* 4.4):

Qui si reputaverint, et quibus ego temporibus magistratus adeptus sum [et] quales viri idem assequi nequiverint et postea quae genera hominum in senatum pervenerint, profecto existimabunt me magis merito quam ignavia iudicium animi mei mutavisse.

But if these people will ponder the time at which I achieved my magistracies and what sorts of men were unable to achieve the same, and also what type of men later entered the Senate, surely they will judge that my change of mind was justified and not due to laziness.

Regarding Sallust's comment about "what type of men later entered the Senate", Allen points to the actions of Caesar in enlarging the Senate as related, for instance, in Dio 43.47.3³⁸:

καὶ προσέτι παμπληθεῖς μὲν ἐς τὴν γερουσίαν, μηδὲν διακρίνων μήτ' εἴ τις στρατιώτης μήτ' εἴ τις ἀπελευθέρου παῖς ἦν, ἐσέγραψεν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνακοσίους τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν γενέσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς εὐπατρίδας τοὺς τε ὑπατευκότας ἢ καὶ ἀρχὴν τινα ἄρξαντας ἐγκατέλεξεν.

Furthermore, he enrolled a vast number in the Senate, making no distinction whether a man was a soldier or the son of a freedman, so that the number of them grew to nine hundred; and he enrolled many also among the patricians and among the ex-consuls and such as had held some other office. (transl. E. Cary 1927)

It seems quite likely that Sallust in *BJ* 4.4 is referring to Caesar's enlargement of the Senate with men whose qualifications were not always stellar – a fact about which we might expect Sallust to be bitter. This happened in 45, just about the time Sallust himself had finally retired from political life, perhaps just after.³⁹ Indeed, his remark, noted above, that *neque virtuti honos datur* (*BJ* 3.1) also suggests much the same concerning Sallust's bitter feelings about the men admitted to the Senate under Caesar.⁴⁰ It is also

³⁸ For those admitted to the Senate under Caesar see also Dio 43.27.2 (the indignation of others on the matter), Suet. *Iul.* 80.2 (Gauls), *Aug.* 35 (the "Orcini": freed slaves admitted to curule office by Antony on the grounds that this was in Caesar's will). Cf. Syme 1964: 230.

³⁹ For this date for Caesar's enlargement of the Senate, see Allen Jr. 1954: 9.

⁴⁰ The issue here in *BJ* 3-4 about the men now entering the Senate and the men now attaining office may be one of quality rather than social class (e.g. 3.1, 4.4); compare the particular criticisms Sallust directs at the class of *novi homines* at *BJ* 4.7-8, where their virtue is what is at issue. Yet this is not to deny

possible, however, that Sallust in both *BJ* 3.1 and 4.4 additionally had in mind the changes in the Senate and the irregularities of office-holding under Caesar's Triumviral successors. Dio 48.34 reports that Antony and Octavian admitted to the Senate (from 39) allies, soldiers, sons of freedmen, even slaves – which is, on the whole, not inaccurate,⁴¹ even if it may be exaggerated. Likewise, in the late 40s and early 30s, the regular rules of office-holding were often disregarded under the Triumvirs. Many suffect consuls, for example, were elected, and the number of other office-holders, such as praetors, also multiplied.⁴² The number of *novi homines* holding the consulate also increased dramatically, with perhaps 28 of 38 consuls from 44-33 B.C.E. being new men from various parts of Italy.⁴³ Moreover, some of these men were of more ignoble origins, and became *exempla* for later writers of great changes in fortune.⁴⁴ Based on when Sallust was composing the *BJ*, it is likely he had the actions of Caesar in mind in *BJ* 4.4. Yet the actions of the later triumvirs, whether or not they also underlie Sallust's sentiments at *BJ* 3.1 and 4.4, would in any case have reconfirmed Sallust's stated feelings on the matter.⁴⁵

that Sallust saw at least a slight correlation between the more ignoble origins of certain men now attaining office (as seen in Dio), and the (sc. moral) quality of these men.

⁴¹ See e.g. Augustus' later claim about revising the Senate rolls three times: *RG* 8.2.

⁴² On the election of suffect consuls under the authority of the triumvirs, sometimes for several years in advance, see Dio 48.32.1-3, 35.1-3. On the increase in praetorian positions, see Dio 48.43.2. On these irregularities generally, cf. Sallust *BJ* 4.7-8, and Osgood 2006: 259-60.

⁴³ Osgood 2006: 259, citing the figures of Syme 1939: 243n2. By comparison, about 80% of consuls from 151-108 and again from c.70-49 were *nobiles*, only a few percent being new men (Osgood 2006: 257-8).

⁴⁴ On men of the Triumviral Period like Ventidius, Canidius Crassus (*cos. suff.* 40), and Decidius Saxa as examples of remarkable reversal of fortune, see Seneca *Suas.* 7.3; cf. also Pliny *NH* 7.134-6; Val. Max. 6.9.9. On the rumors of slaves holding office, see e.g. Dio 48.34.5. For the many lesser military or administrative positions attained by freedmen or sons of freedmen in the Triumviral Period as well, see Treggiari 1969: 187-92.

⁴⁵ See further Osgood 2006: 258-63, and Varro, *de Vita p.R.* fr. 121 Riposati (on the frantic pursuit of office at any cost). Sumner 1971: 270 suggests that part of Sallust's bitterness arose from the fact that he himself had even reached the praetorship *suo anno*.

A final example of Sallust's broader indictment of the late 40s may be mentioned. We cited above some of Sallust's general complaints in *BJ* 3 about political life under Caesar (and the Second Triumvirate), and how office did not seem to him (based on his own personal experience) worth seeking. He broadens his attack in the next section of *BJ* 3 when he remarks (*BJ* 3.2)⁴⁶:

nam vi quidem regere patriam aut parentis, quamquam et possis et delicta corrigas, tamen importunum est, quom praesertim omnes rerum mutationes caedem, fugam, aliaque hostilia portendant.

For to rule one's country or subjects by force, although you both have the power to correct abuses, and do correct them, is nevertheless troublesome; especially since all attempts at change foreshadow murder⁴⁷, exile, and other horrors of war. (transl. Rolfe (adapted))

It is not easy to determine whether Sallust only has in mind here in *BJ* 3.2 the political environment under Caesar, in which he himself was embroiled, or whether he also refers at the same time to the slaughter (*caedes*) of the proscriptions in 43 and the mass displacement and flight of dispossessed landowners following the land confiscations in Italy starting in 41. In some ways, Sallust has produced here in *BJ* 3.2, as he does in *BJ* 4.4, an even more telling indictment of his age in that his descriptions of political unrest and violence may be applied with equal validity to multiple periods from the mid 40s to the mid 30s B.C.E.

Indeed, when compared to the statements Sallust makes about his early career in *BC* 3-4, which remain more generalized, Sallust's polemical engagement in *BJ* 3-4 with contemporary politics does seem slightly easier to relate to specific political conditions under which he was writing. It does, for instance, seem reasonable (and in my opinion

⁴⁶ For the other positions taken on who is referred to in *BJ* 3.2 (Caesar, or the "second Triumvirate") see Shimron 1967: 342n32.

⁴⁷ Given the possible Caesarian reference here, "murder" seems a more appropriate translation for *caedes* – although, given the possible reference to the proscriptions of 43 as well, one cannot discount that Sallust's aim was that *caedes* might be read *both* as "slaughter, massacre" and as "murder".

correct) to connect Caesar's actions (if not also those of Antony and Octavian) in enlarging the Senate and admitting men of varying backgrounds to Sallust's bitter remarks in *BJ* 3-4 about the nature of office-holding and the type of men now entering the Senate. Yet references to the actions of Caesar (and perhaps even to those of Antony and Octavian as well) in *BJ* 3.1, 3.2, or 4.4 can still only be a probability, not a certainty, and this is by design: as seems to be the case with all his references to contemporary events in *BC* 3-4 and *BJ* 3-4, Sallust is able to be suggestive in multiple directions without directly attacking – surely a useful approach when writing under Caesar and his successors.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Cf. i.a. Ahl 1984; Osgood 2006b. Cf. Cicero's worries about writing about his own time at Cic. *Ad Q. fr.* 3.5.1-2.

3.2c: Rumors of Sexual Impropriety

Sallust's prosecution *de repetundis* and its aftermath, however, was not the first time his actions had been subject to official sanction. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, back in 50 B.C.E. during the censorship of Appius Claudius Pulcher and L. Calpurnius Piso (Caesar's father-in-law), Sallust was actually struck from the Senate rolls by Appius Claudius.⁴⁹ Besides the possibility of a political motivation for Appius' decision,⁵⁰ some have attributed Sallust's removal to the stories, mentioned earlier, about Sallust's supposed sexual misadventures, of which two versions come down to us. First, there is the rumor that Sallust was caught in adultery with Milo's wife Fausta, flogged, fined, and released. This comes to us in Aulus Gellius 17.18, who is clear that this was found in Varro's work *Pius aut de Pace*.⁵¹ It was also reported by Asconius in his lost biography of Sallust, according to Pseudo-Acro on Horace *Satires* 1.2.41. The second rumor, in contradiction to the adultery story, claims that Sallust erred not with *matronae* but through excessive lusting after *libertinae*, or freedwomen. This version we find also in Horace *Satires* 1.2, this time in the text itself. The full context is given below (Hor. *Sat.* 1.2.37-63):

audire est operae pretium, procedere recte

37

⁴⁹ As explored above (section 3.2a) Sallust's actions as tribune perhaps did not quite merit prosecution; at the least, they did not *result in* prosecution. His tribunate is thus not reckoned as his first official penalization as a politician.

⁵⁰ Made i.a. by Syme (1964: 33), echoed i.a. by L.R. Taylor 1949: 236. Syme points out the strong Pompeian ties of Appius Claudius (married a daughter to the Younger Pompey (Cic. *ad Fam.* 3.4.2, 5.5, 10.10)), and the strong Caesarian ties of L. Piso (Caesar's father-in-law). He suggests that those who were expunged were targeted as Caesarians, including – possibly – Sallust himself. See above on his possible ties built with Caesar through passing the bill allowing him to stand *in absentia* in 52. As Dio 40.63 points out, Piso only stepped in to oppose Appius in one case: that of Curio, an important ally of Caesar at this time and later.

⁵¹ Gellius, *N.A.* 17.18: *M. Varro, in litteris atque uita fide homo multa et grauis, in libro, quem scripsit Pius aut de pace, C. Sallustium scriptorem seriae illius et seuerae orationis, in cuius historia notiones censorias fieri atque exerceri uidemus, in adulterio deprehensum ab Annio Milone loris bene caesum dicit et, cum dedisset pecuniam, dimissum.* One can imagine the irony Varro could bring out through mentioning the *notiones censorias* which Sallust exercised in his writing, then suffered himself.

qui moechis non voltis, ut omni parte laborent
 utque illis multo corrupta dolore voluptas
 atque haec rara cadat dura inter saepe pericla.
 hic se praecipitem tecto dedit, ille flagellis
 ad mortem caesus, fugiens hic decidit acrem
 praedonum in turbam, dedit hic pro corpore nummos, 43

...
 (...) 'iure' omnes: Galba negabat. 46

tutior at quanto merx est in classe secunda,
libertinarum dico — Sallustius in quas
non minus insanit quam qui moechatur. at hic si,
 qua res, qua ratio suaderet quaque modeste
 munifico esse licet, vellet bonus atque benignus
 esse, daret quantum satis esset nec sibi damno
 dedecorique foret. verum hoc se amplectitur uno,
hoc amat et laudat: 'matronam nullam ego tango', 54

...
 verum est cum mimis, est cum meretricibus, unde 58
 fama malum gravius quam res trahit. an tibi abunde
 personam satis est, non illud, quidquid ubique
 officit, evitare? bonam deperdere famam,
 rem patris oblimare malum est ubicumque. quid inter-
 est in matrona, ancilla peccesne togata?

It's worthwhile to hearken, you who wish misfortune upon adulterers, how they suffer at every turn, how their pleasure is spoilt by tremendous pain and how it rarely falls to their lot, in the midst of cruel and constant dangers. One man has hurled himself headlong from a roof, another's been scourged to death; this one, whilst making his escape, has stumbled into a fierce band of robbers; this one's paid cash to save his person... "Fair enough," said all; Galba didn't agree. But how much safer are the wares offered by the second class – freedwomen, I mean; yet Sallust is no less crazy for them than is the adulterer for others' wives. But if Sallust were prepared to be gallant and generous within the limits which his resources and reason dictated, and within which he can be bountiful without excess, he would be giving an adequate amount without bringing ruin and disgrace upon himself. But he prides himself on this one point, this is his fond boast: "I never touch a married woman."... But you *are* involved with mime actresses, you *are* involved with prostitutes, and as a result your reputation suffers more grievously than your resources. I suppose it's quite enough for you to avoid the role, without avoiding what it is that does the damage whatever the situation! To destroy your good name, to fritter away your family inheritance, is wrong in any circumstances. What difference does it make, whether your transgression involves a married woman or a toga-clad maid? (Transl. P. Michael Brown 1993)

E.P. Morris claims that the Sallustius in this poem is the historian's (grand-)nephew, who was adopted by the historian.⁵² Yet he is left wondering how this can be when in *Odes*

2.2 Horace writes a sympathetic poem to the younger Sallust. If we compare Tacitus

⁵² Morris 1939: 45.

Annals 3.30, however, it seems that one could ascribe both positive and negative qualities to the nephew. Tacitus writes that the younger Sallust was “a contrast to the manners of antiquity in his elegance and refinement, and in the sumptuousness of his wealth he was almost a voluptuary” (*diversus a veterum instituto per cultum et munditias copiaque et affluentia luxu propior*).⁵³ Yet “beneath all this was a vigorous mind, equal to the greatest labours,” and he held more favor with Augustus than any except Maecenas. On such a basis one could see the nephew as the subject both of Horace *Satires* 1.2 and *Odes* 2.2.

Yet Niall Rudd points out that the nephew might not have acquired the name “Sallustius” until after adoption, which might have been in 35 B.C.E., in which case the Sallustius referred to in *Satires* 1.2 (composed, most think, before 35, and perhaps in the early 30s) must refer to the historian.⁵⁴ Indeed, the quite young age of the nephew when Horace composed this satire may indicate Horace is referring to the historian.

However, even if we deem it more likely that the Sallustius of *Satires* 1.2 is the historian, we are left with the problem that Horace’s Sallust allegedly lusts after freedwomen and proudly claims to avoid matrons, thus directly contradicting the Varronian rumor that Sallust committed adultery with the wife of Milo. Consequently, Syme, among others, proposes rejecting the adultery story as fabricated, since it may well have been a calumnious piece of Pompeian propaganda.⁵⁵ Pompeius Lenaeus’ critique of

⁵³ Translations by Church and Brodribb 1942.

⁵⁴ Rudd 1966: 135-6. Seconded by Brown 1993: ad *Sat.* 1.2.48, and by R.G. Lewis 1988: 38. For the early date (39 or 38) sometimes given for the composition of the first two satires of Book 1, see e.g. Whitehorne 1975: 425n3

⁵⁵ Syme 1964: 280-84, seconded by B.A Marshall 1985: 183.

Sallust arose from similar motives.⁵⁶ If, however, we feel confident enough to reject the story of adultery with Milo's wife as a fabrication, we are still left with Horace's story about Sallust lusting after freedwomen. Sometimes there is a modicum of truth behind a rumor, and we cannot completely discount that this is the case with the story in Horace *Satires* 1.2, even if the story has been exaggerated.⁵⁷

In any event, it seems odd that two contradictory rumors about Sallust's supposed sexual misadventures could be created (and both gain acceptance) around the same time, especially since both would have aimed at the same purpose of tarnishing Sallust's moral reputation. It seems reasonable, given the contradiction, to infer that the two stories were not created to serve cooperatively as joint parts of a single attack, and that at least one of the two must be fabricated. While there are reasons to suspect the story alleging adultery is at least an exaggeration if not a fabrication, it is hard to substantiate fully such suspicions. All efforts, then, to make sense of the contradictory and unreliable extant evidence on Sallust's sexual improprieties leave us with little if any secure facts. Neither the fabricated nature of the Varronian story, nor even the identification of the Sallustius in *Satires* 1.2 as the historian can be securely ventured.⁵⁸ In light of such uncertainty

⁵⁶ Suet. *De Gramm.* 15: *Lenaeus, Magni Pompei libertus et pene omnium expeditionum comes, defuncto eo filiisque eius schola se sustentavit; docuitque in Carinis ad Telluris, in qua regione Pompeiorum domus fuerat, ac tanto amore erga patroni memoriam extitit, ut Sallustium historicum, quod eum oris probi, animo inverecundo scripsisset, acerbissima satyra laceraverit, lastaurum et lurconem et nebulonem popinonemque appellans, et vita scriptisque monstrosum, praeterea priscorum Catonisque verborum ineruditissimum furem.* To call Sallust a "debauchee" (if not also a "glutton and loafer and frequenter of popinae") would vaguely agree with Horace's description of excesses with freedwomen.

⁵⁷ For Lewis 1988: 38, the story in Horace *Sat.* 1.2 about Sallust lusting after freedwomen may be what is true from this tangle, but probably refers to his conduct as a young man "some twenty years earlier". As to the Varronian rumor, it may be noted that one possible event from which it might have gained traction was a lavish banquet reportedly thrown by a minor magistrate for Q. Metellus Scipio and the college of tribunes of 52, wherein upper class women were supposedly on exhibit: Val. Max. 9.1.8.

⁵⁸ Although Sallust's general affiliation with Caesar between 50 and 45 is not in doubt, one may also see indirect confirmation of this affiliation 50-45 in the fact that the Pompeians Varro and Pompeius

surrounding these rumors' veracity, one might therefore be tempted not to posit rumors of sexual impropriety as the ultimate and only cause of Sallust's expulsion from the Senate in 50 by Appius Claudius. Indeed, Dio 40.63.4, which records the expulsion, does not associate it with *any* immorality on Sallust's part,⁵⁹ and a political explanation for Appius' actions (i.e. Pompeian sympathies) cannot be discounted, at least as an underlying or additional motive.⁶⁰ Yet without more sources either to back up Dio's take on the expulsion or to confirm its political motivations, such an interpretation of the cause of Sallust's expulsion must remain in the realm of conjecture as well.

Lenaeus presented such rumors about Sallust. As stated earlier, even if Varro merely transmitted a story constructed by someone else, the fact that he transmitted it is what matters here.

⁵⁹ It should be conceded, however, that Dio does not give any reason at all for the expulsion of Sallust or others. On the other hand, one might well expect Dio to report such a provocative explanation as sexual impropriety if it were prominent in, and ostensibly supported by, the preponderance of the evidence available to him. Thus Dio's silence is perhaps not entirely to be dismissed as insignificant.

⁶⁰ On this political explanation, tied to Appius' Pompeian sympathies, see the beginning of Section 3.2c above; on the possibility of a relationship with Caesar formed through his actions during his tribunate in 52, see the start of Section 3.2b. A link between political rivalry and the spread of such rumors is suggested also in Plut. *Ant.* 9, which tells of a story that Dolabella cuckolded Pollio (in 47, he and Dolabella were trr.pl. and Pollio had opposed Dolabella's debt legislation). Also note, however, Horace *Sat.* 1.6.20-21: *ensorque moveret [sc. me] / Appius, ingenuo si non essem patre natus*, which attributes to Appius as *ensor* neither a political or moral motive, but a social one. Also, Lewis 1988: 42n48 notes that if after Clodius' death Sallust had usurped the patronage of some of Clodius' former clients around Amiternum, this may have given the censor, who was Clodius' brother, reason for ill will towards Sallust.

3.2d: Sallust's Alleged Moral Hypocrisy

Whatever might have been the truth of why Sallust was struck from the Senate rolls in 50 – whether it was immorality or his Caesarian sympathies, or a combination of the two – later sources clearly had absorbed a strong image of Sallust as a moral hypocrite. In the Dio passage mentioned earlier (section 2.2b), Dio is quick to point out the hypocrisy of Sallust's prosecution *de repetundis* (Dio 43.9.2-3):

καὶ τοὺς Νομάδας λαβὼν ἕς τε τὸ ὑπὲρκοον ἐπήγαγε καὶ τῷ Σαλουστίῳ λόγῳ μὲν ἄρχειν ἔργῳ δὲ ἄγειν τε καὶ φέρειν ἐπέτρεπεν. ἀμέλει καὶ ἐδωροδόκησε πολλὰ καὶ ἤρπασεν, ὥστε καὶ κατηγορηθῆναι <καὶ> αἰσχύνην ἐσχάτην ὀφλεῖν, ὅτι τοιαῦτα συγγράμματα συγγράψας καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πικρὰ περὶ τῶν ἐκκαρπουμένων τινὰς εἰπὼν οὐκ ἐμιμήσατο τῷ ἔργῳ τοὺς λόγους. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀφείθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος, ἀλλ' αὐτός γε ἑαυτὸν καὶ πάνυ τῇ συγγραφῇ ἐστηλοκόπησε.

And taking over the Numidians, [Caesar] reduced them to the status of subjects, and delivered them to Sallust, nominally to rule, but really to harry and plunder. At all events this officer took many bribes and confiscated much property, so that he was not only accused but incurred the deepest disgrace, inasmuch as after writing such treatises as he had, and making many bitter remarks about those who fleeced others, he did not practice what he preached. Therefore, even if he was completely exonerated by Caesar, yet in his history, as upon a tablet, the man himself has chiselled his own condemnation all too well. (transl. E. Cary 1927)

Such judgments persisted. Lactantius, writing in the late 3rd century C.E., says of Sallust *Quod quidem non fugit hominem nequam Sallustium, qui ait: 'Sed omnis nostra uis...'*. *Recte, si ita uixisset, ut locutus est. Seruiuit enim foedissimis uoluptatibus, suamque ipse sententiam uitae prauitate dissoluit (Instit. Div. 2.12.12)*. Symmachus in the late 4th century remarks *interea recuso sententiam quae rem venaticam servile ducit officium. Statuerit hoc scriptor stilum tantum probandus; nam morum eius damna non sinunt ut ab illo agundae vitae petatur auctoritas (Epist. 5.68(66).2)*. Macrobius too, with tangible sarcasm, citing *Hist. 2.70M* on the luxurious banquets of Metellus, says *haec Sallustius gravissimus alienae luxuriae obiurgator et censor*.

Now it must be admitted that among the few secure things we *can* say about Sallust's career, it seems clear he was prosecuted for extortion and was more than likely guilty. Even if his amatory escapades were fabricated, his prosecution *de repetundis* in itself would be reason enough to admit there is some basis for accusing him of moral hypocrisy. In further support of this judgment, some would point to Sallust's own words in *BJ* 3-4, where he expresses disgust about how corrupt politics had become under Caesar and then his successors, and decries the low quality of men entering the Senate in 45 and even later.

Yet even still, we should be careful not to make such an easy judgment on his moral hypocrisy. For these words from *BJ* 3-4 – and in fact the autobiographical remarks from elsewhere in Sallust's corpus as well – may not necessarily serve as unambiguous support for such a view. In fact, Sallust's remarks in the *BC* about his early political career seem an honest admission of youthful mistakes and of a change in perspective that has allowed him to see the corrupt nature of what he had involved himself in (*BC* 3.4-5):

Quae tametsi animus aspernabatur insolens malarum artium, tamen inter tanta vitia imbecilla aetas ambitione corrupta tenebatur; ac me, cum ab reliquorum malis moribus dissentirem, nihilo minus honoris cupido eadem, qua ceteros, fama atque invidia vexabat.

Although my spirit spurned these things as it was unaccustomed to wicked ways, still among so many vices my weak young age was held captive and corrupted by ambition. And although I dissented from the evil behavior of others, nonetheless my lust for office and honors troubled me with the same bad reputation and envy as it did others.

Such an admission of missteps and a recognition of his mistakes was clearly important for Sallust, for without it he could not then go on to claim for his narrative (as he does) that he was *a spe metu partibus rei publicae...liber* (*BC* 4.2). Surely he would desire to assert the same impartiality in the *BJ*, and in fact he did so later in the *Historiae*.⁶¹ While

⁶¹ *Hist.* 1.6M: *neque me divorsa pars in civilibus armis movit a vero.*

there is no admission of youthful missteps in the *BJ* to match that in the *BC*, it is possible that he felt his statement on the matter in the *BC* would cover both monographs; alternatively, he may have felt that the strictures against the contemporary regime in *BJ* 3-4 conveyed the desired sense of impartiality by presenting an historian who spared neither side in doling out criticism. Indeed, as we shall see later in this chapter, Sallust shows consistently across all his works that he is equally critical of all parties⁶² and in that sense an impartial author. Overall, then, we should be wary of making too firm a judgment even on Sallust's moral hypocrisy (or, at least, on the degree thereof); some of his misdeeds are established, but some are far from established, and his autobiographical pronouncements in the monographs incline toward establishing (if anything) Sallust's *reformed* perspective on political life and his *impartiality* toward his subject matter, an impartiality which on a broader scale we will soon see illustrated by his works as a whole.

⁶² To use an inaccurate term. See below on the lack of large-scale, coherent, long-lasting political "parties" in the Republic.

3.3: The Alleged Political Affiliations of Sallust

3.3a: Modern Views

Starting already with Mommsen, scholars have thought that Sallust was writing as a “*popularis*” – that is, that his history reflects the aims and ideology of the so-called party of the “*populares*”.⁶³ This view of Sallust’s work as *popularis* “Tendenzschrift” persisted in the work of Maurenbrecher 1891 on the fragments of Sallust’s *Histories*, where he is quick not only to imply Sallust’s moral hypocrisy, but also to assert the status of the *BC* (and, it seems, the *BJ* as well) as apologetic for Caesar and the *populares*.⁶⁴ Due partly to the strong and open criticism Sallust generally expresses for the ruling oligarchy at various points through all his works,⁶⁵ this *Tendenzhypothese* (or various

⁶³ Mommsen, *RG*³, p.195 (n29) speaks of Sallust as “einem notorischen Caesarianer”, and refers to his writing as “politische Tendenzschrift welche sich bemüht die demokratische Partei...zu Ehren zu bringen und Caesars Andenken von dem schwärzesten Fleck, der darauf haftete, zu reinigen.” The monographs, despite occasional criticism of the Roman oligarchy, “gute Parteischriften sind”. See also E. Schwartz, 1897. Paul 1984: 261 i.a. refers to this interpretation of Sallust’s works as the *Tendenzhypothese*. Drummond, in the *Fragments of the Roman Historians* (FRHist), remarks of Cicero’s *de Consiliis Suis* that scholars had for a while thought Sallust’s *BC* was written specifically to refute it, though this has been discredited (in Cornell 2013: 1.367). For other scholars who have supported such a *Tendenzhypothese* see the discussions of Syme 1964: 64, Tiffou 1973: 334-5, McDonnell 2006: 380n141.

⁶⁴ Maurenbrecher 1891: 1: “*C. Sallustius Crispus maiore aetatis parte improbe peracta ad res scribendas se contulit et quo turpior in vita fuerat ganeo lurcoque* [cf. Pompeius Lenaeus’ accusation in Suet. *de Gramm.* 15], *eo acerbior in scriptis exstitit morum censor. Neque vero partes, quas adhuc secutus erat, deseruit, immo vero Caesare etiam mortuo id egit, ut et in coniuratione Catilinaria ennaranda popularium factionem omni purgaret perduellionis crimine et in libro de Iugurthino bello conscripto optimatum inertiam, stoliditatem, corruptionem quam maxime urgeret.* cf. later Teuffel 1900: 361 for Sallust’s partiality to Caesar in the monographs. For later correctives to the notion of the *populares* as a cohesive party, and to assumptions of any “party line” among *populares*, see e.g. Seager 1972, Brunt 1988: Chapter 9 (“Factio”).

⁶⁵ Certain key passages in particular might give one the idea that Sallust’s only goal is to impugn the nobility and the ruling class: e.g. *BJ* 3-4 (already discussed above), which offer stinging critique of contemporary political culture and the sacrifices made therein of one’s *decus* and *libertas*; *BJ* 5.1-2, which establish as the motivation for the work the fact that *tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est*; *BJ* 64.1, where, in describing Metellus Numidicus, Sallust says *tamen inerat contemptor animus et superbia, commune nobilitatis malum*; *BJ* 31 and 85, the prominent speeches of the tribune C. Memmius and of Marius against the nobility; *BC* 38.1-39.3, a long condemnatory description of the political class and their behavior. We shall see shortly, however, in Section 3.3b why viewing the above passages as evidence of *popularis propaganda* shows a shocking selectivity in the use of Sallustian evidence as well as a lamentable tunnel vision. Incidentally, the evidence above also vitiates the view of Schur 1936: 76, that Sallust was basically a conservative pamphleteer writing to help re-establish a Republic led by a strong Senate: Sallust has nothing positive (and little overall) to say about the pre-Sullan Senatorial aristocracy

permutations of it) has continued to inform some interpretations of Sallust's *opus* even in more recent generations – to the detriment, I feel, of a proper appreciation of Sallust's writing.

Allen Jr. 1954 attempts to understand Sallust in his particular historical context, and argues that we can explain his survival through the proscriptions of the 40s with his fortunes intact by seeing him as a “non-political” partisan of Antony. Surely some men managed to be non-political supporters in the civil wars (one thinks of Atticus and perhaps Maecenas⁶⁶), but the evidence Allen brings forward for Sallust being a non-political partisan of Antony is open to question. In Fronto *Ad Verum Imperator* 2.1.7, we hear that Sallust wrote a speech for the Antonian general Ventidius in 38 B.C.E.⁶⁷ Even if we accept this as fact, this by itself would not indicate Sallust was a “card-carrying” Antonian, or that others would have perceived him as such. As Atticus' handling of financial affairs for several prominent men shows, one could do favors for others from behind the scenes.⁶⁸ Second, regarding the passage about a Sallustius lusting after freedwomen in Horace *Satires* 1.2.47-63, Allen infers that as Horace is a firm Augustan, his choice to lampoon Sallust must indicate that Sallust was clearly an Antonian. This implies that there was already a public rift between Octavian and Antony when Horace

(cf. *BC* 6-9; *BJ* 41-42), and equal criticism for the post-Sullan aristocracy and popular politicians from the late 2nd c. on

⁶⁶ On Atticus' ability to cultivate relationships with Caesar's associates after 49 while remaining largely an independent political advisor behind the scenes as he had done for decades, cf. Welch 1996: 450-71. Atticus' avoidance of a public career sets him apart from Maecenas in some ways, though the latter too was influential in affairs after Actium without being directly involved in politics.

⁶⁷ *Ventidius ille, postquam Parthos fudit fugavitque, ad victoria suam praedicandam orationem a C. Sallustio mutuatus est* (“That Ventidius, after he had routed the Parthians, borrowed a speech from Sallust to announce his victory”). The context of the letter here makes it clear Fronto is talking about writing letters and speeches for someone else to give. The translation of *mutuatus est* as “borrowed” is possible, but “procured” would be as well. For a discussion of opinions on how to translate *mutuatus* here, see Allen Jr. 1954: 11n33.

⁶⁸ Welch 1996: 452-3, citing, inter alia, Nepos *Vita Att.* 15.3

wrote this; however, if this satire was written in 35 this rift may have been yet to occur, and if (as is quite possible) this satire was written as early as 39 or 38, then it is even more likely it had not happened yet, thus vitiating Horace *Satires* 1.2 as evidence for Sallust being an Antonian.

Lastly, Seneca in *de Clementia* 1.10.1 lists the many followers Augustus obtained through clemency:

Ignovit abavus tuus victis; nam si non ignovisset, quibus imperasset? Sallustium et Cocceios et Deillios et totam cohortem primae admissionis ex adversariorum castris conscripsit; iam Domitios, Messalas, Asinios, Cicerones, quidquid floris erat in civitate, clementiae suae debebat.

Your great-great-grandfather spared the conquered: for whom would he have ruled, if he had not spared them? He recruited Sallust, Cocceii, Deillii, and the whole inner circle of his court from the camp of his opponents. Soon he would owe to his clemency Domitii, Messalae, Asinii, Ciceros – the whole flower of the state.

The historian's grand-nephew gets prominent mention here among those switching their support to Octavian (from Antony, it is implied). Allen assumes all these men's switches to Octavian date from around 35 – the same year in which the younger Sallust was adopted. Despite this assumption, it is not guaranteed by the context of this passage that the younger Sallustius had thus been an Antonian still at the time of his adoption (in 35). A closer look at the defections of those individuals named here by Seneca reveals a wide chronological range.

Dellius, was a commander under Antony from at least 41 B.C.E. until the very year of Actium.⁶⁹ With the *Cocceii* the situation is less clear. C. Cocceius Balbus was praetor in 42, suffect consul in 39. Broughton dates his term as governor in Greece – “under

⁶⁹ On Dellius' commands and legations under Antony, see *MRR* II.p.375 (41 B.C.E.), 389 (39), 409 (35), 413 (34), 423 (31).

Antony” – to 35.⁷⁰ M. Cocceius Nerva, brother of C. Cocceius Balbus, was *proquaestor pro praetore* in 41 under Antony, and probably took part with L. Antonius in the Perusine War.⁷¹ However Appian (*B.C.* 5.256) does tell us that Octavian pardoned M. Cocceius Nerva after Perugia (40), so this could have been the Cocceius to whom Seneca refers.⁷² L. Cocceius Nerva on the other hand seems to have been a friend to both Antony and Octavian, and there is no record of his switching sides. In 41 he was sent by Octavian to Antony shortly before the Perusine War began, and stayed with him in Phoenicia. Later he accompanied Antony to Brundisium, where he helped secure the peace of Brundisium. In 37 he was also present for the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Tarentum.⁷³ Messalla Corvinus was on the side of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, and he came to terms with Antony after the battle. Yet we see him in command of Agrippa’s fleet in 36 in Agrippa’s absence, so the date of his switch from Antony to Octavian could have been any time after Philippi and before 36.⁷⁴ C. Asinius Pollio was on Antony’s side before and after the Perusine War; he helped reconcile Antony with Octavian at Brundisium in 40, and received his appointment as governor in Macedonia from Antony afterward.⁷⁵ It is unclear how long after this he firmly joined Octavian’s camp. Seneca’s reference to *Domitios* may refer to Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was with the liberators against

⁷⁰ MRR II.407. See MRR II.386 for why it was he, not L. Cocceius Nerva, who was suffect consul in 39.

⁷¹ Kienast & Eck 2015, *Brills’s New Pauly* s.v. “Cocceius.”

⁷² M. Cocceius Nerva was probably governor of Asia 38-37, and returned in 36 to assume the consulship; he served as *quindecimvir s.f.* in 31 and 17 B.C.E. (See MRR II)

⁷³ See MRR II.p.375, 398; cf. Kienast & Eck 2015 in *Brill’s New Pauly*: s.v. “L. Cocceius Nerva”.

⁷⁴ Corvinus was next in *auctoritas* to Brutus and Cassius in the Philippi campaign (Vell. Pat. 2.71.1). Later at Actium he commanded part of Octavian’s fleet: App. *B.C.* 4.38, Plut. *Brut.* 53.2. cf. MRR II.367, 403 for sources.

⁷⁵ For sources see MRR II.372, 375, 376, 381, 387.

Dolabella and Antony through 42.⁷⁶ Pollio convinced him to side with Antony after Perusia,⁷⁷ and he was included in peace of Brundisium, later receiving the governorship of Bithynia and Pontus from Antony in 39 (through 37). In 37 he was still a partisan of Antony as his son was betrothed to a daughter of Antony and Octavia,⁷⁸ and he himself took part in Antony's Parthian campaign in 36 and was apparently back in Bithynia in 35.⁷⁹ Broughton suggests that he in fact remained in Bithynia until his consulship in 32, in which he still showed himself an Antonian partisan.⁸⁰ He defected to Octavian very shortly before the battle of Actium, and died shortly after the battle.⁸¹

From this brief consideration it is clear that some of these men switched to Octavian's camp well before 35, but some not until well *after* 35. It is at least *possible*, then, that Sallust's grand-nephew, who eventually became a valued adherent of Octavian, had remained an Antonian until after his adoption (in 35). However, such a conjectured timeline for the younger Sallust's switch can only be established as a possibility, not a certainty. What is more, no matter how far into the 30s the younger Sallust maintained an allegiance to Antony, we cannot infer the historian's Antonian affiliations from those of his grand-nephew. Brunt has convincingly demonstrated that family connections did

⁷⁶ MRR II.362, 65.

⁷⁷ MRR II.378, 82.

⁷⁸ MRR II.397

⁷⁹ MRR II.401, 407.

⁸⁰ MRR II.412, 417.

⁸¹ MRR II.421 for sources. One may also note L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54): he started with Caesar, then stood against him in 49, was captured and released, then fled to Pompey; he died at Pharsalus (MRR 2.261, 77). Also Cn. Domitius Calvinus, cos. 53 & 40: he commanded the center for Caesar at Pharsalus, then was appointed governor in Asia (MRR 2.277); he was for Antony and Octavian in 42 (2.353); in 39, he was sent by Octavian as proconsul to Spain to crush a revolt (2.388); was proconsul in Spain 39-37; triumphed July 36 (2.402). There is no mention of him after this, so we cannot know if he switched sides, or even what side he eventually took. Overall the consul of 54 does not seem a good fit for the *Domitios* Seneca has in mind, since Seneca is thinking of those joining Octavian, not Caesar. Although Calvinus' career suggests he *could* have been in Seneca's mind, we do not know enough of his moves after his triumph to say for sure if he firmly took a side for or against Octavian and when.

not absolutely determine political affiliation. Cicero did not feel that Quintus was obligated to take the same side as him in the civil wars (*ad Att.* 9.6.4). Likewise Crassus' son was an admirer of Cicero in spite of the tense formal relationship – and privately expressed enmity – that existed between Cicero and Crassus.⁸²

Therefore, if we draw on sources outside of Sallust's text, there is little we can pronounce with certainty regarding the theory that Sallust was a non-political sympathizer of Antony: it cannot be refuted, but it cannot be proven. Perhaps a broader problem with such a theory – built as it is upon debatable external evidence – is that even if Sallust did align “non-politically” with Antony in his own life, it does not leave a trace in his work. If anything, the opposite seems true, as Sallust has nothing positive to say about the Antonii in general in the *Histories* and criticizes the policies of the later triumvirs in *BJ* 3.⁸³ In short, then, such a supposed Antonian attachment has not

⁸² Brunt 1988, esp. Ch.7 (“Amicitia”), where he argues that *amicitia* could coexist with political opposition (if there was no open insult) and that men could tolerate friends attacking their political allies, or being friendly with their *inimici*. A courteous public relationship could still be maintained: e.g. Cicero and the 1st Triumvirate, despite enmity toward Crassus (p.362); even Crassus and Cicero themselves maintained public courtesies (362); Cicero spoke well of Caesar in 63 despite political opposition, and despite Cicero opposing the triumvirs, Caesar still offered him posts after 59 (*In Cat.* 4.9, *ad Att.* 2.1.6, 3.3, 18.3, 15.4f, *Prov.Cons.* 23-43); despite Caesar and Pompey growing apart, Cicero still maintained courtesies with Caesar and many of his adherents (364n49); Brutus and Cassius could still maintain outward courtesies with Antony in 44 (*ad Fam.* 11.3); likewise Scipio Aemilianus and Metellus Macedonicus (368); Cicero in *Phil.* 1 calls Antony an *amicus* even as he criticized his public policy (361); cf. p.465-6 on Tib. Gracchus' kin opposing him politically).

⁸³ See *Hist.* 3.2M ([M. Antonius Creticus] *qui orae maritimae, qua Romanum esset imperium, curator <noceat> ior piratis*); 3.3M (Creticus) (*Perdendae pecuniae genitus et vacuus a curis nisi instantibus*); 4.52M (C. Antonius Hybrida) (*fenoribus coopertus est*). For Sallust's comments on C. Antonius Hybrida in the *BC*, not biting but not complimentary, see *BC* 21.3 (where Sallust says he is *omnibus necessitatibus circumventum*, and Catiline thinks Antonius will be friendly to him), 24.1, 26.1 (Cat. thinks Antonius will bend to his will), 26.4 (where Cicero too fears Antonius will bend to Cat.'s will – a fear real enough for Cicero to make a *pactio* with Antonius to give him his *provincia* of Macedonia *ne contra rem p. sentiret*), 36.3, 56.4, 57.4, 5, 59.4 (gout prevents Antonius from taking part at battle of Pistoria); at most, Catiline thinks Antonius will bend to his will. On Hybrida's crimes and vices see also Asconius 83-84C, 88C; cf. *Comm. Petit.* 8; Caelius' remark at Quint. 4.2.123. Cf. McGushin 1977: 150, Vretska 1976: 328-9.

influenced how Sallust interpreted and narrated the decline and fall of the Republic in his works.

It is not even clear that a supposed Antonian affiliation is necessary to explain how Sallust survived the 40s with his fortunes intact. Syme has no definite answer to how Sallust managed to make it through.⁸⁴ His best guesses are that Sallust could have made a contribution to the Triumvirs financially, or that he appealed to close friends among the Triumvirs, or perhaps to Antony himself (both had served under Caesar). While searching for a definite answer here should not detain us (as one can never be had), the parallel with Atticus' experience suggests at least one plausible scenario. We learn from Nepos *Vit. Att.* 9.3-5 that Atticus lent money to Fulvia in 43, and earlier, his aid to Caesar's regime financially and literarily, helping to "'package' the dictatorship in a more traditional garb", explains his exemption from private levies.⁸⁵ It is not inconceivable that a similar situation obtained between the Triumvirs and other wealthy citizens. In Sallust's case, a financial contribution to the Triumvirs to maintain his *neutrality* therefore cannot be discounted as an explanation for his survival (with his fortunes) through the 40s, but it also cannot be more securely proven.

⁸⁴ See Syme 1964: 42

⁸⁵ Welch 1996: 468-70; cf. 464, 471.

3.3b: Sallust's Political Affiliations: Evidence from within the Sallustian Texts

Among modern theories on Sallust's supposed political attachments, the only other that has received considerable support – tacit or explicit – has been that mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3.3: namely, that Sallust was writing as a Caesarian sympathizer. This notion, which stands in the way of reaching proper conclusions about Sallust's broader goals as a writer, must be dealt with in the course of the current section because a close reading of Sallust's actual texts, rather than of external or biographical sources, is the best way definitively to refute it. In fact, by analyzing the evidence from the *BC*, the *BJ*, and the *Histories*, it will become clear not only that Sallust cannot be considered a writer of Caesarian sympathies, but more broadly that he cannot be considered a partisan of *any* side in his writing. For his work is equally critical of all: neither the aristocracy, nor the *plebs* and the politicians who support their cause are spared as Sallust narrates the political and moral decay of late Republican Rome.

That Sallust delivers on his stated promise (*BC* 4.2, *Hist.* 1.6M) of impartiality through equal censure of all parties is acknowledged by some modern scholars. Wiseman states that “Sallust's own historical *persona* was politically neutral”.⁸⁶ M.A. Robb, in her work on the terminology of “*optimates*” and “*populares*”, expresses a similar perspective: “Although it is evident that the authority of the Senate and the rights of the people are principles (or slogans) manipulated by ambitious senators, nowhere does [Sallust] suggest that one is more legitimate than the other.”⁸⁷ Syme also acknowledges that Sallust is equally critical of both sides, and speaks of a “subversive equity” in his

⁸⁶ Wiseman 2002: 300. Contra: F.R.D. Goodyear 1982: 273.

⁸⁷ Robb. 2010: 170. Cf. also C.S. Kraus 2001: 48: “Despite his service under Caesar, Sallust writes as the ‘unbiased’ historian, partisan only to a lost moral Rome.”

writing.⁸⁸ In an attempt, then, to build toward a full and convincing demonstration of Sallust's lack of political affiliations, we will begin by first considering evidence that challenges the idea of Sallust as a "*popularis*" writer – that is, evidence for a critical treatment of the *plebs* by Sallust; next we will consider evidence from within Sallust's texts that actually argues against his sympathy for either Caesar or his political heirs; and finally we will analyze several Sallustian passages that affirm the historian's equal censure of both the nobility and the *plebs*.

Regarding *popularis* bias, Paul argues that Sallust was "almost certainly" influenced by the accusations and speeches of the *Quaestio Mamilia* in how he depicted bribery's role in the beginning of the Jugurthine War.⁸⁹ To Paul, this commission would have wanted to establish that the gifts to these accused Romans from foreign clients formed part of a larger history of bribe-taking, and this aim allegedly finds expression in the prevalence of bribery in Sallust's account of the prehistory and early history of the war. Sallust himself does tell us that he knew of the tribune Memmius' many speeches (*BJ* 30.4), and this might reflect his familiarity with the details of the *quaestio*. If this is an accurate assumption about Sallust's sources, it would seem to indicate a case where Sallust draws on popular accounts in constructing his narrative.

Yet even if we accept this source conjecture, we should be wary of taking the jump to inferring Sallust was writing the *BJ* from a *popularis* angle. As Paul himself points out, the prominence of bribery among the nobility in Sallust's account of the Jugurthine War may have multiple causes that render unnecessary the assumption that he was aiming to

⁸⁸ Syme 1964: 126

⁸⁹ Paul 1984: 263.

give a *popularis* account.⁹⁰ For one, gifts from foreign kings, cities, or clients to Roman *patroni* were not uncommon, and were sometimes made public knowledge since these served as a source of social capital for the patron. This could of course provide fodder for accusations of bribery by political opponents. In Sallust's own day, too, gifts from foreign kings aiming to shore up their own position were a known occurrence, and he may have inferred that this was equally the case at the time of the Jugurthine War. Alternatively, it is also true that Sallust tends to posit moral causes for political and historical events,⁹¹ and an emphasis on corruption among the Roman nobility in the late 2nd century B.C.E. as motivating the outbreak and early course of the war would have made sense to Sallust from this perspective as well.

While such considerations may serve merely to make us cautious about positing *popularis* bias in one part of one monograph, they can be supplemented by specific passages which provide positive evidence for a generally critical attitude toward the *populus* or *plebs*. In the *BC*, after those in Rome hear that Catiline had joined Manlius' camp in Etruria, Sallust relates the preparations set in motion by the Senate, and then comments on the degree to which the "sickness" of Catiline's conspiracy had invaded the minds of the citizens.⁹² He then adds that it was not only those privy to the conspiracy who were of hostile mind, but the entire *plebs* supported Catiline in their typical eagerness for revolutionary action.⁹³ He continues (*BC* 37.2-3):

⁹⁰ Paul 1984: 261-3.

⁹¹ e.g., *BC* 10, 12-14, 36.4-5; *BJ* (bribery); *Hist.* 1.7M, 1.11M (political strife arising from innate flaws of character)

⁹² *BC* 36.4-5

⁹³ *BC* 37.1. These generalizing expressions against the populace, both in *BC* 37.1 and *BJ* 66.2, echo a common motif in the *History* of Thucydides, who often speaks of the customary ὀργή and fickleness in political decision-making displayed by a *dēmos* (Athenian, Syracusan, Corcyrean), using impersonal expressions of the type "ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος (/ὄμιλος/ὄχλος) ποιεῖν" : e.g. Thuc. 2.65.4 (cf. 8.82.1), 3.81.4,

Id adeo more suo videbatur facere. Nam semper in civitate quibus nullae opes sunt bonis invident, malos extollant, vetera odere, nova exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student, turba atque seditionibus sine cura aluntur, quoniam egestas facile habetur sine damno.

[The *plebs*] seemed to do this exactly according to their normal habit. For it is always the case that those who have no resources envy good men, exalt bad, hate established conditions, desire new ones, and are eager to alter everything out of disgust with their own condition. They support themselves during disorder and sedition without trouble, since poverty is easily maintained when there is nothing to lose.

After explaining the various (mostly selfish) motives that drove the urban *plebs* to involve themselves in the conspiracy,⁹⁴ Sallust remarks (*BC* 37.10-38.1):

Ad hoc, quicumque aliarum atque senatus partium erant, conturbari rem publicam quam minus valere ipsi malebant. (37.11) Id adeo malum multos post annos in civitatem revorterat. (38.1) Nam postquam Cn. Pompeio et M. Crasso consulibus tribunicia potestas restituta est, homines adulescentes summam potestatem nacti, quibus aetas animusque ferox erat, coepere senatum criminando plebem exagitare, dein largiundo atque pollicitando magis incendere, ita ipsi clari potentesque fieri.

In addition, whoever was of a faction opposed to the Senate preferred to throw the state into confusion rather than lose power themselves. This evil had returned to the state in earnest after many years. For after tribunician power was restored in the consulship of Pompey and Crassus, young men who were wild with a youthful spirit obtained the highest power, and by making accusations against the Senate they began to agitate the *plebs*, and then by bribery and promises inflamed them even more. That is how they became famous and powerful.

That Sallust can call the restoration of tribunician activity a *malum*, an evil, in one of the central analytical moments of his monograph speaks against the idea that he was a strong sympathizer of *popularis* politics.

In the *BJ* as well Sallust expresses similar generalizing sentiments about the populace that apply to any state, Rome included. During the war Jugurtha persuades the *principes civitatis* at Vaga to plot against the Roman garrison, and the *plebs* joins in (*BJ* 66.2, 4):

4.28.3, 6.63.2, 8.1. cf. 3.42.1. See also Virginia Hunter, 1988. "Thucydides and the Sociology of the Crowd." *CJ* 84.1: 17-30. The motif of the fickle mob was, of course, a commonplace beyond Thucydides as well, and Sallust's debt may not just be to Thucydides in this case.

⁹⁴ The motives attached to the urban *plebs* echo, with a few small adjustments, the same motives ascribed by Sallust earlier to the nobles (*BC* 14.2, 17.5, 21.4). They also share, to a lesser degree, the same motivations as the Sullan veterans: although Sullan veterans were often at odds with the rural poor from whose lands they benefitted, it seems to Sallust that they both desired a return to the chaos of that time in the hopes of more unexpected rewards (*BC* 16.4 (Sullani) || 37.6 (plebs). Cf. also *BJ* 84.4 and 86.3)

Nam volgus, uti plerumque solet et maxime Numidarum, ingenio mobili, seditiosum ac discordiosum erat, cupidum novarum rerum, quieti et otio adversum...Idem [slaughtering the Roman officers] plebes facit, pars edocti ab nobilitate, alii studio talium rerum incitati, quis acta consiliumque ignorantibus tumultus ipse et res nova satis placebant.

For the mob, as is often the case, and especially so among the Numidians, was of fickle character, seditious, prone to discord, desirous of revolution, opposed to peace and leisure...The *plebs* did the same; some were instructed to do so by the nobles, others were incited by their zeal for such actions, since, although they were ignorant of the plans, tumult itself and rebellion pleased them well enough.

Although Sallust speaks of the Numidian commons, he also applies his remarks to the populace in all other states (*uti plerumque solet*). The way in which he views the *plebs* here shows considerable consistency with his comments in the *BC*.

In another key section of the *BJ* Sallust has more to say on the Roman *plebs*. Sallust relates the establishment of the Mamilian Commission to investigate wrongdoing among those in the Senate and the army, and the pushback from those fearing conviction.⁹⁵ He then switches to the *plebs*' conduct of the *quaestio* (*BJ* 40.3, 5):

Sed plebes incredibile memoratu est quam intenta fuerit quantaque vi rogationem iusserit, magis odio nobilitatis, cui mala illa parabantur, quam cura rei publicae: tanta lubido in partibus erat...(5) Sed quaestio exercita aspere violenterque ex rumore et lubidine plebis: uti saepe nobilitatem, sic ea tempestate plebem ex secundis rebus insolentia ceperat.

But it is incredible to think how eager the *plebs* were and with what great violent force they passed the bill – more from hatred of the nobility, for whom those punishments were being readied, than from concern for the state; such great passion there was among factions...(5) But the investigation was conducted harshly and violently based on hearsay and the caprice of the *plebs*: as often happened to the nobility, so now the *plebs* became insolent because of their success.⁹⁶

There is no attempt at mitigating the criticism of the *plebs* here or justifying their actions.

This attitude carries over into the famous digression on political strife at *BJ* 41-2. There

Sallust speaks of the breakdown of harmony between the *nobilitas* and the *populus* after

⁹⁵ *BJ* 40.1-2

⁹⁶ A suggestive parallel for this passage can also be found in Thucydides, where the Athenian *dēmos* reacts to the mutilation of the city's *Hermae* and mock celebration of the Mysteries with suspicion and fear. They conduct the investigation into the affair impetuously, arresting and imprisoning even good men on the evidence of reprobates: Thuc. 6.53.2-3, 6.60; cf. 6.27-8.

Carthage fell, *metus hostilis* was removed, and wealth came pouring in. Not only did the nobility abuse their power for selfish gain, but the *populus* too began *libertatem in lubidinem vortere* (“to turn their liberty toward gratifying their desires”, *BJ* 41.5).

Everyone (no matter their faction) began to rob, pillage, and plunder for themselves, and amidst all this self-seeking the state was torn to pieces. Sallust shows no burning desire to whitewash the Gracchi either. When the Gracchi arose to challenge the unjust power of the *pauci*, they were killed, and Sallust comments *et sane Gracchis cupidine victoriae haud satis moderatus animus fuit* (“And indeed the Gracchi in their lust for victory did not have a sufficiently moderate spirit”, *BJ* 42.3). Once again Sallust shows no hesitation about censuring the behavior of the *plebs* or pointing out the flaws in their most famous champions in a pivotal excursus at the heart of his monograph.

Besides simply providing evidence against labeling Sallust a *popularis* writer, a close reading of Sallust’s texts also raises doubts that he wrote to defend Caesar, who was a *popularis* himself in the eyes of his contemporaries.⁹⁷ As we have seen, we cannot deny that Sallust in his actual public career was a political partisan of Caesar from around 50-45. However, to infer from this that he was later a Caesarian propagandist *as a writer* in his retirement is unwarranted, and moreover ignores some important textual evidence that suggests Sallust’s critical attitude toward the regime of Caesar and his political heirs. We have already had occasion to discuss the implied criticism of the political regimes of Caesar and his successors hiding in plain sight, as it were, in *BJ* 3-4.⁹⁸ To this we can add a few other notable passages.

⁹⁷ Cf. Cicero’s matter of fact *erat enim popularis, ut noras* (*ad Att.* 16.16a.3); cf. Cic. *in Cat.* 4.9 (*hanc is in re publica viam, quae popularis habetur, secutus est*)

⁹⁸ See above, Section 3.2b

To begin, one can point to the sentiment Sallust puts in the mouth of the tribune Memmius (*BJ* 31.26): *nam impune quae lubet facere, id est regem esse* (“For to do what you want with impunity is to be a king”). While general, Memmius’ statement does express a general aversion to tyrannical rule, which of course could bring to mind any of several men (Sulla, Marius, Cinna, Pompey, Caesar, or the 2nd Triumvirate).⁹⁹ Further suggestive passages arise in the *BC*, and not just in the speeches attributed by Sallust to his characters.¹⁰⁰ In various ways Caesar’s qualities in the *synkrisis* do seem to echo those of Catiline: just as Caesar is held in high esteem due to *beneficiis ac munificentia*,¹⁰¹ and achieves *gloria* by *dando sublevando ignoscendo* (*BC* 54.2, 3), so Catiline is characterized as *alieni adpetens sui profusus* (“covetous of others’ wealth and spendthrift with his own”, *BC* 5.4)¹⁰²; just as Caesar *sibi magnum imperium, exercitum, bellum novum exoptabat*, so Catiline *inmoderata, incredibilia, nimis alta semper cupiebat* (“lusted continually after things extravagant, impossible, beyond his reach”),¹⁰³ and after seeing Sulla’s example, *lubido maxuma invaserat rei publicae capiundae* in whatever way possible, as long as he achieved *regnum* (*BC* 5.5-6).¹⁰⁴ Intentional parallels (and criticism) here are not out of the realm of possibility, for on a general level it is true that Catiline and Caesar both strove for office and personal power, and that both made war

⁹⁹ On Marius’ later misconduct cf. *BJ* 63.6; on Sulla’s, *BJ* 95.4. For Lepidus’ biting attack on Sulla’s tyranny, see *Hist.* 1.55M *passim*.

¹⁰⁰ Shimron 1967: 339-42.

¹⁰¹ On the negative associations of *munificentia* in Sallust, cf. *BJ* 7.7, 103.5-6, 110.5, with McDonnell 2006: 381.

¹⁰² The line between generosity and extravagance was perhaps a fine one: cf. e.g. Vell. Pat. 1.11.5, and McDonnell 2006: 381.

¹⁰³ transl. S.A. Handford 1963. The desire for a command to display one’s martial *virtus* and achieve *gloria* was of course a traditional Roman (aristocratic) value, though it was often perverted by the time of Caesar and Catiline (cf. *BC* 10.3f: *primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere*).

¹⁰⁴ For another possible parallel, cp. Catiline’s claim in his letter to Catulus (*publicam miserorum causam pro mea consuetudine suscepti* (35.3)) to Caesar’s *miseris perfugium* (54.3).

with fellow citizens when they did not achieve what they thought they deserved – though Caesar of course with more success.¹⁰⁵ One may note, however, that Sallust is careful not to state the parallel explicitly, at least, and that he avoids attributing any desire for *regnum* to Caesar as he does to Catiline at *BC* 5.6.

Other aspects of this *synkrisis* raise the possibility of an implied criticism of Caesar. First, as the *synkrisis* is indeed a comparison, one might justifiably look to see whether Caesar or Cato is given a greater share of praise. It appears neither receives more than the other. Both are equal in *virtus* (*BC* 53.6), *magnitudo animi* (54.1), and *gloria* (54.1); in *genus*, *aetas*, *eloquentia* they are *prope aequalia* (54.1), and in all remaining qualities they are different. The fact that Caesar's qualities are listed first does not color Caesar negatively. However, placing Caesar's qualities in direct contrast to Cato's qualities, which are undoubtedly positive, may encourage the assumption that Caesar's qualities are the very opposite of these positive ones. For instance, *beneficiis ac munificentia*, not necessarily bad in itself, starts to seem so when contrasted with *integritate vitae* (54.2). The same applies to *dando sublevando ignoscundo*,¹⁰⁶ *miseris perfugium*,¹⁰⁷ *facilitas*,¹⁰⁸ and so on. Tellingly, in the last contrast of the *synkrisis* Sallust is able to sum up with

¹⁰⁵ Another possible allusion to Caesar through the person of Catiline might be hinted at in Catiline's letter to Q. Catulus, in which Sallust has Catiline put emphasis on being deprived of deserved *dignitas*: *iniuriis contumeliisque concitatus, quod fructu laboris industriaeque meae privatus statum dignitatis non obtinebam...quod non dignos homines honore honestatos videbam...spes relicuae dignitatis conservandae secutus sum.* (*BC* 35.3-4). Cf. also Catiline's emphasis in the Senate meeting in *BC* 31.7 on his patrician background (and *beneficia* toward the *plebs*), while the savior of the city is Cicero, *inquilinus civis urbis Romae*. As McDonnell 2006: 381-2 rightly points out, many of the qualities attributed to Caesar in the *synkrisis* could in theory be positive social values, but could also be used or manipulated as political catchwords which could easily be judged negatively by political enemies (e.g. *liberalitas* vs. *largitio*).

¹⁰⁶ Contrasted with *nihil largiundo*: as if the *dando* of Caesar was *largitio*.

¹⁰⁷ Contrasted with *malis pernicies*: one wonders whether Sallust suggests some overlap here between those to whom Caesar was *perfugium* and to whom Cato was a *pernicies*.

¹⁰⁸ Contrasted with Cato's *constantia*, Caesar's *facilitas* may seem to imply inconstancy, or a tendency to adapt his principles to the circumstances.

admirable *brevitas* the essence of all the differences he has outlined throughout the *synkrisis*. Speaking of Cato, he states *esse quam videri bonus malebat* (“He [Cato] preferred to *be*, rather than to *seem*, a good man”, 54.6).¹⁰⁹

In Caesar’s speech in the Senate over the fate of the conspirators, Sallust also makes an interesting decision to put into Caesar’s mouth the following discourse about how *omnia mala exempla ex rebus bonis orta sunt* (BC 51.27). After giving as examples the Thirty Tyrants in Athens and the proscriptions of Sulla, Caesar says (BC 51.35-6):

Atque ego haec non in M. Tullio neque his temporibus vereor; sed in magna civitate multa et varia ingenia sunt. Potest alio tempore, alio consule, cui item exercitus in manu sit, falsum aliquid pro vero credi. Ubi hoc exemplo per senatus decretum consul gladium eduxerit, quis illi finem statuet aut quis moderabitur?

For my part I do not fear such things from Marcus Tullius nor in these times; but in a large state there are many innate natures of different kinds. At another time, under another consul who likewise has an army to hand, it is possible something false could be believed true. When by this example the consul has by decree of the Senate drawn his sword, who will impose a limit on him or restrain him?

It is of course possible that Sallust intends an allusion to Octavian and the triumvirs, or to Caesar himself. The fact that this is put into Caesar’s own mouth, however, suggests an implied criticism of Caesar himself; if not, it is at the very least a criticism of his political heirs – which, in the view of some, would partly redound on Caesar himself in any case.¹¹⁰

One further criticism of Caesar might profitably be proposed here – though, like with all of those discussed above, it would constitute at most an implied condemnation. The majority of Sallustian scholars affirm the high likelihood of an allusion to Plato’s *Seventh*

¹⁰⁹ Interestingly, if by implication this associates Caesar with the appearance of virtue(s) rather than the reality, we have another possible parallel between Caesar and Catiline, as the latter was said by Sallust to have an *animus audax, subdolus, varius, cuius rei lubet simulator ac dissimulator* (“a mind reckless, cunning, treacherous, capable of any form of pretence or concealment” (transl. Rolfe)).

¹¹⁰ E.g. Shimron 1967: 337.

Letter in the preface of the *BC*, specifically in the section where Sallust explains his youthful missteps and his decision to retire from public life (*BC* 3.3-4.2).¹¹¹ A more detailed discussion of the *Seventh Letter* in relation to Sallust will be given below,¹¹² and for our current purposes we will focus on how criticism of Caesar may arise from alluding to the *Letter*.

Like Sallust, Cicero made use of the *Seventh Letter* on more than one occasion (Cic. *ad Att.* 9.10.2, 9.13.4). Just as Sallust equates himself with Plato through his allusion to the *Seventh Letter*, so too Cicero's use of it equates him with Plato, who attempted to remain in contact with a tyrant in the hopes of reforming him.¹¹³ Additionally, Cicero in his abovementioned letters creates an analogy between Dionysius of Syracuse and Caesar with the implication that Caesar himself is a tyrant. In *Att.* 9.10.2 Cicero feels some regret at his decision to remain in Italy in 49. He tells Atticus:

nunc emergit amor, nunc desiderium ferre non possum, nunc mihi nihil libri, nihil litterae, nihil doctrina prodest. ita dies et noctes tamquam avis illa mare prospecto, evolare cupio.

But now my affection comes to the surface, the sense of loss is unbearable; books, writing, philosophy are all to no purpose. Like Plato's bird I gaze out over the sea day and night, longing to take wings. (transl. Gildenhard 2006)

Cicero here echoes Plato *Ep.* 7.347e-348a where Plato characterizes himself as almost a prisoner to Dionysius:

Μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων ταύτη μοι βεβοηθημένον ἐγγόνει φιλοσοφία καὶ φίλοις· τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐζῶμεν ἐγὼ καὶ [348a] Διονύσιος, ἐγὼ μὲν βλέπων ἔξω, καθάπερ ὄρνις ποθῶν ποθεν ἀναπτέσθαι, ὁ δὲ διαμηχανώμενος τίνα τρόπον ἀνασοβήσοι με μηδὲν ἀποδοῦς τῶν Δίωτος·

Now up to this time I had been assisting in this way philosophy and my friends, but after this, the way I and Dionysius lived was that I gazed outside of my cage, like a bird that is longing

¹¹¹ E.g. Thomas 1936; Perrochat 1949: 49ff; Syme 1964: 244; McGushin 1977: Appx II.

¹¹² A full discussion of how this letter seems echoed in Sallust's prologue will be given below in Chapter 4.

¹¹³ Gildenhard 2006: 206.

to fly off and away, while he was scheming how he might shoo me back without paying away any of Dion's money. (transl. R.G. Bury 1966 (adapted))

Plato then adds that Dionysius pretended as if they enjoyed a friendship of equals, free of compulsion.¹¹⁴ In a letter written a few days later, Cicero implies that Caesar made similar pretences about their close friendship when it was really one coercing the other (*ad Att.* 9.13.4):

qua re ita paratus est ut, etiam si vincere non possit, quo modo tamen vinci ipse possit non videam. ego autem non tam γοητείαν huius timeo quam πειθανάγκην. 'αἱ γὰρ τῶν τυράννων δεήσεις' inquit Πλάτων 'οἷσθ' ὅτι μεμιγμένοι ἀνάγκαις.'

So his resources are such that even if he cannot win I do not see how he could be beaten. I personally do not fear his beguilements so much as his *force majeure*. “For the requests of despots,” says Plato, “have, you know, an element of compulsion.” (transl. Gildenhard 2006)

Cicero here makes allusion to the specific passage of Plato’s *Seventh Letter* at 7.329d:

τὰς δὲ τῶν τυράννων δεήσεις ἴσμεν ὅτι μεμιγμένοι ἀνάγκαις εἰσὶν. Such an implied parallel between Caesar and Dionysius would not have worked if Atticus had not been familiar with the *Seventh Letter*¹¹⁵; moreover, the parallel would have suggested itself rather readily to any of Cicero’s educated contemporaries – including Sallust – who were familiar with the *Seventh Letter*. Therefore it is possible, though not provable, that Sallust’s *own* allusion to Plato’s *Seventh Letter* in the *BC* prologue was meant not only to lend his withdrawal from politics a certain Platonic air and thus intellectual legitimacy, but also to quietly suggest that, in the corrupt environment from which he was

¹¹⁴ ὁμως δὲ ἔφαμεν ἐταῖροί γε εἶναι πρὸς πᾶσαν Σικελίαν (“nevertheless, to all of Sicily we proclaimed ourselves, at least, to be friends.”)

¹¹⁵ In fact, Cicero’s efforts to paint Caesar as a tyrant span numerous letters to Atticus, drawing not only on Plato but on other representations of Greek tyranny as well: e.g. *Att.* 7.11.1 (Plato’s Allegory of the Cave; Euripides allusions to attack Caesar); *Att.* 7.12.2 (Caesar’s potential “Phalarism”); *Att.* 7.13.4 (Allusions to divine prognostication may impugn Caesar’s violation of traditional Roman means thereof); *Att.* 7.20 (will Caesar be a Pisistratus or a Phalaris); *Att.* 9.4; *Att.* 10.8.6-7 (Reads Plato on tyrants to find solace, hope). On these letters see Gildenhard 2006.

withdrawing, Caesar could be considered as playing the role of the tyrant mirroring Dionysius.

The arguments laid out so far in this section thus allow us to distance Sallust from any accusations of writing as a *popularis* or a Caesarian propagandist. Yet Sallust's texts allow us to go further. That Sallust as a writer did not subscribe to *any* political group, and in fact tried to realize through his narrative the impartiality promised in his prologues, becomes clear through several passages across all three of his texts.

Over the course of two chapters which comprise one large digression on the political environment in late 63 B.C.E., Sallust paints a contemptuous image of both the *plebs* (*BC* 37.1-11) and the various factions of the nobility (*BC* 38.1-39.3). As mentioned earlier, in *BC* 37 Sallust attacks the typical behavior of the Roman *plebs*: always desiring unrest and revolution, hating good men and extolling the bad, and just generally preferring to make trouble whenever possible (*BC* 37.1-3). He then goes into detail on all the disdainful motivations driving the urban *plebs* to join the conspiracy¹¹⁶: general disgrace and impudence, dishonor incurred through wasting patrimony, scandalous deeds that got them expelled from their household, a desire to profit socially and financially from revolution like those in the Sullan proscriptions,¹¹⁷ public and private largesse that excited poor rural youths to flock to Rome and escape the toil of manual labor (*BC* 37.4-8). Sallust also decries the trouble caused by the restoration of the powers of the tribunes in 70 B.C.E., when tribunes began to agitate by making accusations against the Senate and making

¹¹⁶ *ii Romam sicut in sentinam confluerant (BC 37.5)*

¹¹⁷ *multi memores Sullanae victoriae, quod ex gregariis militibus alios senatores videbant, alios ita divites ut regio victu atque cultu aetatem agerent, sibi quisque, si in armis foret, ex victoria talia sperabat (BC 37.6)*

bribes and promises to incite the *plebs*. He then describes the equally self-serving reactions from the Senate (*BC* 38.2-3):

Contra eos summa ope nitebatur pleraque nobilitas senatus specie pro sua magnitudine. Namque, uti paucis verum absolvam, post illa tempora [70 B.C.E.] quicumque rem publicam agitavere honestis nominibus, alii sicuti populi iura defenderent, pars quo senatus auctoritas maxuma foret, bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant.

Against them the majority of the nobility was striving with all their might under a façade of defending the Senate but really to further their own influence. For to tell the truth briefly, after those times whoever stirred up affairs on honorable pretexts – some as if defending popular rights, others as if looking after the Senate’s authority – while feigning a concern for the common good were contending each in pursuit of his own power.

In the *Histories* too Sallust conveys the same twofold criticism for political culture after the fall of Carthage. The destruction of this city meant the permanent removal of *metus hostilis* and consequently the freedom to exercise (political) rivalries again, which led to disturbances and finally civil war in the 80s. In those civil conflicts, the *pauci potentes sub honesto patrum aut plebis nomine dominationes affectabant* (“sought political despotism under the honorable pretext of defending the nobility or the *plebs*”, *Hist.* 1.12). Just like those agitating the state *honestis nominibus* in *BC* 38.3, so here the powerful minority operates *sub honesto patrum aut plebis nomine*, with the result that neither optimate nor *popularis* political methods retained any degree of honesty. Indeed, a citizen’s worth was no longer measured by good deeds to the state because everyone was *equally* corrupt (*omnibus pariter corruptis*, *Hist.* 1.12M). Likewise in *Hist.* 1.13M Sallust remarks in more general terms that all political groups had become corrupted (*omniumque partium decus in mercedem corruptum erat*).

Not only in the *BC* and the *Histories*, but also in that pivotal political digression in the *BJ* discussed earlier in this section, Sallust assigns equal blame to both the *nobilitas* and

the *populus/plebs* for the decay of the political environment after the fall of Carthage.¹¹⁸

In *BJ* 41 Sallust relates the invasion of *lascivia* and *superbia* into Roman society after 146, and points out that the *nobilitas* and the *populus* equally contributed to the decay of political culture, the nobility through abuse of their social standing, the populace through abuse of their freedom.¹¹⁹ The state was caught in the middle of this spiraling conflict between nobility and populace, and suffered as a result. This dynamic will be embodied later in the narrative through the factious behavior of both Marius' and Metellus' supporters in the consular elections.¹²⁰

Sallust next elaborates on the nobility's excessive *potentia* and *avaritia* as illustrated by their hoarding of offices, honors, commands, and wealth (*BJ* 41.6-9).¹²¹ The Gracchi arose against these abuses in an effort to stop the suffering of the *plebs*, but they too took their political actions to excess (*BJ* 42.2). Yet Sallust circles back again to criticism of the nobility; they were indeed *noxia* (42.1), and in their efforts to suppress this challenge to their authority they acted *malo more* (42.3), letting their passions carry their reprisals to excess, and this created an even more tense political environment for the future.¹²²

¹¹⁸ On Sallust's equal censure of *plebs* and nobility in the *BJ* see i.a. Wiedemann 1993.

¹¹⁹ *Nam coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vortere.*

¹²⁰ *BJ* 73.4: *ceterum in utroque magis studia partium quam bona aut mala sua moderata*. Livy, also reflecting no doubt on the political and social conflicts of the late Republic, writes in Book 3, in a speech addressed to the Roman people in 446 B.C.E. by the consul T. Quinctius Capitolinus (Livy 3.67.6): *discordia ordinum e[st]t venenum urbis huius, patrum ac plebis certamina, dum nec nobis imperii nec vobis libertatis est modus, dum taedet vos patriciorum, nos plebeiorum magistratum*. Compare Quinctius' *dum nec nobis imperii nec vobis libertatis est modus* to Sallust's *coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vortere*.

¹²¹ To the wording in *BJ* 41.7 compare the almost identical words of Lepidus on the abuses of the nobility in *Hist.* 1.55.13, and also those of Memmius at *BJ* 31.9, 20, and those of Macer at *Hist.* 3.48.6. Clearly this "popularis" discourse was being imagined by Sallust as a tool of political struggles that could be used and re-used/re-shaped to fit various political circumstances.

¹²² See Koestermann 1971 *ad* 42.1-4 on Sallust's critique of the Gracchi, and on precedents for the sentiment *sed bono vinci satius est quam malo more iniuriam vincere*.

Sallust rounds off this important digression by affirming the general principle that in such conflicts all parties are guilty of wrongdoing (*BJ* 42.4):

Quae res plerumque magnas civitatis pessum dedit, dum alteri alteros vincere quoivis modo et victos acerbius ulcisci volunt.

Such situations generally bring states crashing down, when each group wants to defeat the other in whatever way possible and then exact vengeance against the defeated too harshly.

Even the *novi homines* are faulted as a class by Sallust for a decline in their public standards. In *BJ* 4.7-8 he claims that politicians in general try to best their forefathers now by means of wealth and expenses rather than uprightness and assiduity. *Novi*

homines are no better (*BJ* 4.7-8):

Etiam homines novi, qui antea per virtutem soliti erant nobilitatem antevenire, furtim et per latrocinia potius quam bonis artibus ad imperia et honores nituntur; proinde quasi praetura et consulatus atque alia omnia huiusce modi per se ipsa clara et magnifica sint ac non perinde habeantur ut eorum qui ea sustinent virtus est.

Even “new men”, who had previously been accustomed to surpass the nobility through virtue, strive for commands and offices through secretive action and open fraud rather than good moral qualities; accordingly it is as if the praetorship and consulship and all other such things are intrinsically illustrious and distinguished, and are not held honorable according to the virtue of those who uphold the office.

Not only does Sallust in all of his autobiographical remarks give no indication that he himself belonged among their number, but he also makes no undue efforts here to defend *novi homines* en bloc from the general moral decay. Indeed, as we have seen,¹²³ Sallust is willing to admit being taken in *himself* by this corrupt environment as a young man, so it is not surprising that he would be willing to indict the conduct of the *novi homines* more broadly as well.

Just as Sallust shows himself willing not only to criticize the Roman *plebs* but also to point out the flaws of their most notable champions, the Gracchi (*BJ* 42), so he is willing

¹²³ See Section 3.2d

to level equal criticism not only against the conduct of *novi homines* as a whole, but also against that of their most prominent exemplar in the *BJ*, Marius himself. Marius seems intended to stand out as the epitome of the capable *novus homo* who owes his position to achievement rather than birth,¹²⁴ and his conflict with the *superbus* nobleman Metellus helps bring this into relief. His speech at *BJ* 85 also seems an impressive monument to the claims of merit and experience over birth, and a defense of his own virtue against the corruption of the nobility. Yet even before this speech the monograph had already opened a window for the reader onto the decline of Marius' *virtus*; in fact, hints to the decline of his *virtus* are present already in his formal introduction in *BC* 63.¹²⁵ Sallust pointed out a *consulatus ingens cupido* that had long been a driving force in his character (*BJ* 63.2).¹²⁶ After receiving an insulting reply from Metellus to his request to be allowed leave to run for the consulate, Marius began to let himself be driven by *ambitio*, *ira*, and *cupido* (the worst advisors, as Sallust remarks¹²⁷). Sallust's comment that Marius *postea ambitione praeceptus datus est* may refer equally to the deterioration of his conduct after Metellus' insult, or to his actions in the civil wars of the 80s, or even to both.¹²⁸ In either case, it is clear that a decline is charted in Marius that began well before his famous speech in *BJ* 85. His conduct of his consular campaign against Metellus, driven as it was by *ambitio*, *ira*, and *cupido*, involved substantial mudslinging and factional strife (64.5, 65.4-5, 73.3-5). Moreover Sallust contextualizes Marius' speech itself with rather

¹²⁴ Cf. especially his character sketch at *BJ* 63.2-5.

¹²⁵ Sallust had mentioned Marius briefly, by name only, a handful of times before this, in the context of battle: *BJ* 46, 50, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60.

¹²⁶ As Sallust himself told us in *BC* 11.1 (and *BC* 7.3, 6; 9.2), *ambitio* may have the potential to be a virtue, but is a *vitium* nonetheless, with its own negative potentialities (realized in *BC* 10 e.g.)

¹²⁷ *BJ* 64.5.25-27. Compare *quae res Marium quom pro honore quem adfectabat tum contra Metellum vehementer accenderat* to Jugurtha's reaction to the insult of Hiempsal in *BJ* 11.7: *quod verbum in pectus Jugurthae altius quam quisquam ratus erat descendit*.

¹²⁸ For discussion of the reference intended in this comment see Chapter 2.1

unfavorable details. Although Marius was already *infestus nobilitati, tum vero multus atque ferox instare, singulos modo, modo universos laedere* (“but at that time he pressed his attack against them incessantly and savagely, railing now against individuals, now against the class as a whole”, *BJ* 84.1). He called this particular *contio* together *hortandi causa simul et nobilitatem, uti consueverat, exagitandi* (“to encourage [the *plebs* to enlist] and at the same time, as was his custom, to harass the nobility”, 85.5).¹²⁹

Another indication of the lack of political biases in Sallust’s writing is suggested by his use of political vocabulary. In a recent study on the use of the terms *optimates* and *popularis*, M.A. Robb argues that the antithetical relationship constructed for the two terms should be questioned; individuals could jump between the two stances on different occasions, while *popularis* shows a wide range of meanings, negative and positive, which were context-dependent.¹³⁰ Consequently “using [*popularis*] as a label for a particular kind of politics, undertaken in opposition to the Senate’s wishes, [is] highly problematic.”¹³¹ What is striking for our purposes, however, is that unlike Cicero, Livy, and other late Republican authors, Sallust does not use the term *optimas* even once,¹³² and his use of the term *popularis* is never political; instead, it only serves to signify followers, associates, or supporters.¹³³

¹²⁹ What is more, Marius’ speech itself, as Chapter 6.3 will discuss in detail, can also be seen to undermine the exemplary behavior and rhetoric of Marius through ironic echoing of the Elder Cato. For a more detailed discussion of the ways in which Sallust’s narrative is constructed to cast a critical light on the self-serving conduct of both Marius and Metellus and on the private rivalry they allow to infect the public arena, see Chapter 6.2a; cf. also Chapter 2.1.

¹³⁰ Robb 2010: 12-14; 32n119; 72-3, 91-2.

¹³¹ *ibid.*, 147.

¹³² *ibid.* 114; cf. Appx. 1.

¹³³ Robb breaks the instances of *popularis* in Sallust into what I will term “associate/supporter/follower” and “compatriots”. Under the former heading she puts *BC* 22.1, 24.1, 52.14, and under the latter *BJ* 7.1, 35.9, 48.1, 58.4, 70.2, 74.1, and 111.2. Of the latter class, I feel that *BJ* 7.1, 35.9, 48.1, 74.1, and 111.2 could just as easily be translated as “associates/supporters/followers”; *populares*

Sallust's avoidance altogether of the term *optimates* has been plausibly explained as a refusal to attribute or imply any positive qualities in the political class he saw as inept.¹³⁴ His refusal to use *popularis* in a political sense might be explicable in a few ways.¹³⁵ Robb herself prefers to refer the matter to issues of style. Because the term *popularis* had a range of meanings which only context could distinguish, it was often advisable to supply additional detail to contextualize the meaning each time the term was used. As Sallust valued *brevitas* highly, this would not suit his style. To Robb, therefore, Sallust's decision not to use *popularis* politically further confirms the inherent imprecision of the term and the fact that it did not *in itself* denote clearly a specific kind of politician or party.¹³⁶ While I would not discount this completely,¹³⁷ I find it more likely that the decision to avoid these two political labels indicates once again Sallust's desire that his narrative stay clear of perceived political biases. Further consideration of Sallust's political labeling bears out this argument as well.

Since Sallust did not use *optimas* and *popularis* as political labels, it might be asked whether Sallust employs some other term that consistently describes the behavior once associated with the label "*popularis*". The term *sediciosus*, it seems, is used by Cicero

in these instances might also be more narrowly referred to the smaller band of important supporters or associates in the immediate entourage of Jugurtha or Bocchus.

¹³⁴ Hanell 1945: 273.

¹³⁵ Robb 2010: 115, 146

¹³⁶ The usage of Velleius Paterculus may also speak to the same conclusion (Robb 2010: 116-21). Because he tried to cover a long period in brief space, we would expect him to employ standard classificatory terminology to add clarity to his narrative. It is telling that although he does talk of the chaos of the 80s (and later) in terms of groups centered around individuals (121n54), he does not use the term *popularis* at all, and *optimates* infrequently. That Velleius clearly narrates politics in terms of categories when possible but did not use 'optimates'/'populares' to describe politically conflicting parties, strongly suggests that these words were not used as common labels for clearly defined political policies or groups.

¹³⁷ My doubts about Robb's stylistic reasoning here are strengthened when one considers the fact (discussed below) that Sallust does actually opt quite often for vaguer blanket terminology or generalizing clauses to describe/label individuals or groups.

and by Sallust in a similar and consistent way to describe a specific pattern of action against the aristocratic consensus.¹³⁸ It commonly involves the “manipulation of public feeling and sympathies in order to oppose the senatorial majority” for one’s own advantage, and usually resulted in division of the citizen body and civil strife.¹³⁹ However, there is not an overwhelming number of uses of this term in Sallust’s corpus,¹⁴⁰ and, despite a few plural uses of *seditionus*, there is never a sense that the term designates a political group or faction in Sallust.

Indeed, Sallust’s general tendency when it comes to political labeling, especially of groups, is to opt for vaguer blanket terms for wrongdoers, and he often uses generalizing phrases and relative clauses, among other things. We find *quicumque*... (BC 14.2, 3¹⁴¹; BC 37.10,¹⁴² where Sallust *could have* given a label such as *popularis*, but he does not; similarly with BJ 38.3¹⁴³); *quibus*... (BC 13.2, 17.2, 21.1)¹⁴⁴; *fuere tamen cives qui*... (BC 36.4¹⁴⁵; cf. BC 39.5; BJ 8.1, 25.1, 32.3)¹⁴⁶; *illis qui*... (BJ 39.4); *quoscumque* (BC

¹³⁸ Robb 2010: 150-65; cf. Hellegouarc’h 1963: 35-7, 531. For Sallust’s use of *seditionus* and *sedition* see BC 34.2, 51.32, BJ 6.3, 37.1, 66.2, 72.1, 73.5, *Hist.* 1.55.16M, 1.77.1, 4, 7, 16M (*seditiones*: implication being Lepidus = *seditionus*), 2.78M (Fimbria causes *sedition*).

¹³⁹ Robb 2010: 162

¹⁴⁰ And in the fragmentary remains of the *Histories* there are only two uses of *seditioni*, and 5 uses of *sedition* (one in *Hist.* 1.12M, four in the speech of *Philippus*) overall. (for *dissensio* cf. *Hist.* 1.11M)

¹⁴¹ *Nam quicumque impudicus, adulter, ganeo, manu, ventre, pene bona patria laceraverat quique alienum aes grande conflaverat...*

¹⁴² *quicumque aliarum atque senatus partium erant conturbari rem publicam quam minus valere ipsi malebant.*

¹⁴³ *quicumque rem publicam agitare honestis nominibus...*

¹⁴⁴ BC 17.2: *convocat quibus maxima necessitudo et plurimum audaciae inerat*; BC 21.1: *quibus mala abunde omnia erant*

¹⁴⁵ *fuere tamen cives qui seque remque publicam obstinatis animis perditum irent.*

¹⁴⁶ BC 39.5: *fuere tamen extra coniurationem complures qui ad Catilinam initio profecti sunt*; BJ 8.1: *in exercito nostro fuere complures novi atque nobiles quibus divitiae bono honestoque potiores erant*; BJ 25.1: *fuere qui exercitum in Africam mittendum censerent et quam primum Adherbali subveniendum*; BJ 32.3: *fuere qui auro corrupti elephantos lugurthae traderent, alii perfugas vendere...*

39.6)¹⁴⁷; *reliquorum...quos* (BJ 32.2)¹⁴⁸; *eos quorum consilio Iugurtha senati decreta neglegisset* (BJ 40.1). In all such examples Sallust avoids applying a consistent label to group such individuals together, and instead supplements a general relative pronoun with descriptive details.¹⁴⁹

Sometimes all Sallust supplies is a general term that could apply to a wide range of people¹⁵⁰: *iuventutem* (BC 12.2, 13.4, 16.1, 17.6); *plurimos quousque generis homines adscivisse sibi dicitur* (24.3); *homines adulescentes* who *senatum agitando plebem exagitare* (38.1); *senatus magna pars gratia depravata* (BJ 15.2; cf. 20.1, 25.2, 27.1, 33.2: all are vague references to those corrupted by Jugurtha, who are never given a fixed political label); *pauci, quibus...* (BJ 15.3, 80.5). This is as specific as Sallust's labels usually get.¹⁵¹ This wider analysis of political labels in Sallust therefore supports the contention that his use of political terminology shows a writer trying to avoid siding with any particular political viewpoint in writing the history of the late Republic.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ *Lentulus...quoscumque moribus aut fortunis novis rebus idoneos credebat...*

¹⁴⁸ *quo facilius indicio regis Scauri et reliquorum, quos pecuniae captae arcessebat, delicta patefierent.*

¹⁴⁹ For other examples of his categorizing by description see e.g. *Hist.* 1.77.7M, on Lepidus' followers; 3.48.8M. For other instances of vague demonstrative pronouns see e.g. BC 12.5 (*hi*), BJ 85.26 (*illis*).

¹⁵⁰ On such cases see also Robb 2010: 146n195 on *boni* and *mali*. On *optimus quisque* cf. BC 2.6, 8.5, 34.2, 59.3; BJ 22.2, 92.9. On Sallust's use of *malus* see also Hellegouarc'h 1963: 526f, and 530n4 for the suggestion that the term *malus*, unlike *improbis*, remained more in the moral field than the social and political, and actually took on a Stoic sense through assimilation with the Greek term κακός.

¹⁵¹ Among other political terminology used by Sallust, one can observe his use of *factio*: BC 32, 34, 51.32, 51.40, 54.6; BJ 29, 31.1, 31.4, 31.15, 41.1, 41.6. *Factiosus*: BC 18.4 (Cn. Piso), 51.32 (Sulla, Damasippus), 54.6; BJ 8 (Romans at Numantia), 15 (M. Aem. Scaurus), 27 (Senators), 28 (Calpurnius Bestia's appointees), 77.1 (Hamilcar, of Leptis), 85.3. Cf. more generally Brunt 1988: 446-447. If there were no large, cohesive, family-oriented factions in Sallust's day, one wonders if he is using *factio* to refer to fleeting factions, or to the *pauci potentes*. It may be a bit of both: BJ 41.6, with its collocation of *factio* and *paucorum potentia/arbitrium*, seems to suggest that *factio* in Sallust is linked with the nobility and refers to the groups of a few powerful men (*pauci potentes*) who unite temporarily to influence politics. There are always a few exceptions, however: cf. BJ 8.1, where *factiosus* is used of a mixed group of *novi atque nobiles*.

¹⁵² Note the view of Scanlon 1988: 171n15: "Sallust's consistent striving for impartiality in his vocabulary of reproach coincides with his general purpose of writing a history of universal import which points up foibles and strengths common to all Romans and to men of other states." An objection to the

In the course of this discussion on political attachments, we have been able to argue not only for Sallust's lack of *popularis* bias and Caesarian attachments as a writer, but also for his equal censure of all those involved in politics in the late Republic. In light of these conclusions, it is prudent to remain aware of the distinction that must be maintained between Sallust being a Caesarian partisan in his actual political career from ca. 50-45 (which he undeniably was), and Sallust being a Caesarian propagandist as a writer (which he was not).¹⁵³ In the next chapter, we will similarly explore the complications that arise when one tries to postulate deep commitment to any one philosophical school underlying Sallust's overall literary project.

conclusions reached in this section may arise from the fact that Sallust's "redefinition" of *virtus* in his texts as based on merit instead of birth might indicate he was actually a *popularis* writer. While Sallust may have agreed with this particular aspect of popular political ideology, the evidence presented above from within Sallust's own texts about his critical attitude to *all* parties should serve to refute any assumption of overall *popularis* bias on Sallust's part.

¹⁵³ Indeed, Brunt 1988 illustrates with ample evidence that those who joined either Caesar's side or Pompey's in the civil war were not by virtue of that choice loyal adherents of those men, but that their choice was likely informed by personal reasons, desire for personal advantage, or just a calculation of what seemed safest or most prudent at that moment: p.496-7; cf. 487 (adherents of 1st triumvirate); 493 with 500n18 (Caesarians in the east siding with the Liberators after 44); 377-8 (many having conflicting claims to kinship/*amicitia* on both sides in the civil wars). One may compare the reasoning put forth by Asinius Pollio in his letter to Cicero (*ad Fam.* 10.31), where he states that, though he did not want to, necessity and circumstance drove him to Antony and Caesar's side, in order to protect himself from his enemies. His true desire, he claims, is for peace and Republican ideals. However that may be, it is clear that for men like Pollio and Sallust (non-nobles), Caesar's cause represented the best chance of advancement at the time.

Chapter 4: Sallust's Suspected Philosophical Influences

Ever since Quintilian famously stated that Sallust in his prologues *nihil ad historiam pertinentibus principiis orsus est* (“set out from beginnings that have nothing to do with history”, *Inst. Orat.* 3.8.9),¹ there has been debate regarding the possible philosophical content of Sallust's prologues and his writing in general. Scholars have argued for a range of different influences: Plato, Aristotle, Posidonius, Stoicism in general, Epicureanism, or a mix thereof.² Evidence has been sought through two main channels. Sometimes the details of Sallust's personal life and political career, as found in biographical materials like those discussed in Chapter 3, are scoured for support.³ Alternatively, appeal is made to the content of Sallust's own writings, which are analyzed to uncover connections with different philosophical schools. The following discussion will approach Sallust's suspected philosophical influences through both of these channels. First, we will examine Sallust's personal career, and especially his withdrawal from political life, and explore whether we can understand this decision in light of the experiences of his contemporaries, several of whom also withdrew (or considered withdrawing from) from political life in the 40s or 30s and based their decisions on philosophy. Next, we will proceed to address the possibility of Sallust's philosophical affiliations through analysis of Sallust's texts, taking up a few of the more prominent and

¹ Quintilian is referring to the epideictic nature of these prologues and thus he means that Sallust's prologues have little relation to history *as a genre*, rather than that they have no relation to the main narrative of Sallust's own works (the latter held by, e.g., Syme 1964: 241).

² Plato: F. Egermann 1932; Thomas 1936 (Platonic filtered through the Stoic Posidonius); MacQueen, 1981. Aristotle: Bignone, E. 1950. *Storia della Letteratura Latina*, III. Florence: 221-23. Stoicism: Schur 1936 (but Posidonius especially). Posidonius: Wagner, C. 1910. *De Sallustii Prooemiorum Fontibus*. Diss. Leipzig. Epicureanism: Syme 1964: 243 (a suggestion). A mix: Bolaffi 1938; Earl 1961: 113; McGushin 1977: 295.

³ I would also include in this first category Sallust's own autobiographical remarks in his prologues; although they technically constitute internal evidence from Sallust's own texts, they have tended to invite unwarranted extrapolations through appeals to the external biographical material on Sallust, as we have seen above in Chapter 3.2-3.3.

seemingly attractive theories for consideration. Overall our inquiry will lead us to the conclusion that Sallust may well have drawn on some general ideas from various schools, but he did not have a strong or substantial ideological commitment to any single philosophical school.

4.1: Sallust's Withdrawal from Politics in Context: Possible Philosophical Motivations

In assessing the general likelihood that Sallust's withdrawal from political life was philosophically motivated, one should consider the broader historical circumstances from 49 B.C.E. on. Certainly many in the upper classes were not keen on civil war in the first place,⁴ and we know of several prominent individuals who considered withdrawing from political life. In making such a decision, Brutus, for example, could be influenced by Platonism, Atticus by Epicureanism, Cicero by a mix of different philosophies.⁵ Cicero, for instance, frequently called upon Plato in the early years of Caesar's regime to find solace and to work out a justifiable place in the political fabric of a despotism. Gildenhard shows how Cicero positions himself as the Plato to Caesar's Dionysius, a wise adviser who might still affect a change for the better in a tyrant.⁶ Moreover, Cicero acknowledges learning in the early 70s under the Academic philosopher Philo of Larisa as well as Antiochus of Ascalon, head of the Academy. Yet at the same time Cicero also acknowledges as a teacher Diodotus the Stoic and Posidonius.⁷ His philosophical underpinnings were clearly multiple.⁸

⁴ Cf. Brunt 1988: 492-3 on the lopsided motion of Curio in December 50 that both Pompey and Caesar lay down their arms.

⁵ See Osgood 2006: 35-6. For a general treatment of defenses of "the quiet life" in Greek culture (and less so in Roman), see Brown, 2009.

⁶ All the while using tyrannical commonplaces to insult the dictator in his correspondence with Atticus. Cf. Gildenhard 2006: passim and Chapter 3.3b above.

⁷ See I.G. Kidd, 1988, comm. ad T31 (Cicero *de Nat. Deor.* 1.6). One may note that Antiochus was said to have returned to the position of the "Old Academy", but also to have emphasized unity with Peripatetics and compromise and overlap with the Stoa (cf. Stanzel 2015).

⁸ That Cicero's selection from other schools may have been to a degree conditioned by his allegiance to the New Academy matters less for our purposes than the fact that he could call on these other schools (if non-dogmatically). Cic. *ad Fam.* 9.20 suggests that Cicero was at least interested in Epicurean doctrine as well during the uncertainties of the 40s – though he also clearly had problems with it as a man of politics (e.g. *ad Fam.* 7.12, 15.16), and as a *novus homo* who had to struggle his way to the top (cf. Fish 2011: 98-101).

It comes as no surprise that an Epicurean could reject public life too in this period.⁹ Horace we know did not seek a political career as much as social advancement in the circle of Maecenas.¹⁰ Atticus stands as the most famous example of the rejection of an active political life of office-holding.¹¹ It might stand to reason that someone contemplating withdrawal from politics in this period might find the Epicurean perspective amenable. It is unlikely, however, that Sallust's retirement was motivated by a fundamental Epicurean sympathy. As Thomas points out, Sallust begins his first work by stating that all men who want to surpass the other beasts must strive *ne vitam silentio transeant, veluti pecora quae natura prona ac ventri oboedientia finxit* (BC 1.1). Such a statement, prominent and direct, seems to find fault with the Epicurean maxim *lathe biōsas*.¹²

⁹ However, not all Epicureans rejected political engagement in the late Republic. See Momigliano 1941. As he shows, many of the more prominent Epicureans were on Caesar's side in 45, though most supported moderation on Caesar's part and ended up standing for the Republic against despotism. Unlike the traditional doctrine of the school, Cassius and some others did not set store by *lathe biōsas*, and considered fighting against a tyrant reconcilable with their philosophical ideology. As Fish has argued by analysis of the writings of Philodemus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, Epicurean doctrine did allow for at least the possibility that political involvement/political power might lead to *asphaleia* and pleasure (Fish 2011: *passim*, esp. 75-6, 80-81, 84).

¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of Horace *Sat.* 1.6 as an Epicurean *recusatio* of political ambition, see below, Chapter 4.2. Yet it must be remembered that Horace was by his own admission not a die-hard Epicurean to the total exclusion of other philosophies: *Epist.* 1.1.1-19.

¹¹ See, e.g., Welch 1996. On Atticus' Epicureanism see also Cic. *de Legg.* 1.12-2, 53-4.

¹² Thomas 1936: 152-3. Cf. also BC 2.8-9, where Sallust opines that many men *dediti ventri atque somno, indocti incultique vitam sicuti peregrinantes transiere...Eorum ego vitam mortemque iuxta aestumo, quoniam de utraque siletur*. The man Sallust values, by contrast, is he who is *aliquo negotio intentus*. Moreover, in BC 2.2-3, Sallust affirms the soul is immortal. Contrast Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* (Diog. Laert. 10.124): "Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply awareness, and death is the privation of all awareness." The *Letter* continues, "a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an unlimited time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality" – a sentiment in stark contrast to Sallust's ideal of seeking immortality through *egregia facinora* and *gloria*. One could add to this that if freedom from fear is one of the most important goals in the Epicurean pursuit of *ataraxia* and pleasure, then Sallust's insistence throughout his corpus on the salutary nature of *metus hostilis* would ostensibly preclude any deep Epicurean sympathies on Sallust's part. Thomas (154, 159) suggests Sallust's motivation for retirement can be located solely within Stoic doctrine. We will explore further below the challenges with the exclusivity of this and similar claims.

This diversity of philosophical justifications for political withdrawal, not only from one individual to the next, but also, as in Cicero's case, *within* the mind of one person, suggests that no single philosophy need have been the influence in making Sallust want to retire from public life. Instead, the wider tendency toward withdrawal from politics encountered during Caesar's regime and that of his successors lets us situate Sallust's decision in a broader social and political context. Indeed, that Sallust's motivations were philosophical to any appreciable degree seems less likely when we remember Sallust's own specific experience with political ignominy in both 50 (expulsion from the Senate) and 45 (prosecution for extortion); as discussed above,¹³ this experience may have brought with it both disgrace and the displeasure of Caesar – both of which might be valid motivations for undertaking a final retirement from politics.

¹³ Chapter 3.2b

4.2: Philosophical Affiliations: The Evidence from Sallust's Own Texts

While the fact that Sallust withdrew from political life after 45 cannot by itself prove that he subscribed to a specific philosophical school, the content of his writing has provided scholars with an alternative means of trying to establish a philosophical affiliation for him – Platonic, Epicurean, or Stoic. In undertaking an examination of Sallust's texts for their philosophical content, we would do well to start from the beginning.

Thomas discusses two passages of Plato, both of which may be echoed in *BC* 1.1-2¹⁴: *Rep.* 586a-b, and *Phaedo* 80a. Sallust begins his monograph with the following ideas (*BC* 1.1-2):

Omnis homines qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus, summa ope niti decet ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri oboedientia finxit. [2] Sed nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur; alterum nobis cum dis, alterum cum beluis commune est.

All men who eagerly seek to excel other animals must strive with the utmost effort lest they pass through life in silence like cattle, which nature has made bent over and subservient to their stomachs. But all our power lies in our mind and our body: we use the mind to rule, but moreso the body to serve; the former we share in common with the gods, the latter with the beasts.

In Plato *Rep.* 586a-b, Socrates likewise comments on the distinction between man and animal (my emphasis):

οἱ ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίας δὲ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεὶ συνόντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται τε καὶ ταύτῃ πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῷ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν, οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἐγεύσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες, [586b] καὶ ἔνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὀπλαῖς ἀποκτεινύασι δι' ἀπληστίαν.

Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled

¹⁴ Thomas 1936: 145 citing Egermann 1932.

with real things, nor ever tasted stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle, grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greed kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity. (Transl. Shorey 1969)

Here we see in the phrase βοσκημάτων δίκην (“like cattle”) a direct echo of Sallust’s *veluti pecora*.¹⁵ Moreover, these cattle-like men, ignorant of wisdom and virtue, are always looking down toward the ground and bent over the table, where they feed and fill themselves like cattle (κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες). This image finds a direct parallel in Sallust’s characterization of indigent men as cattle who are *prona ac ventri oboedientia* (“bent over and slaves to their stomachs”¹⁶). The strength of the allusion to *Rep.* 586a-b is bolstered when one considers Sallust’s remarks at *BC* 2.8: *sed multi mortales, dediti ventri atque somno, indocti incultique vitam sicuti peregrinantes transiere* (“But many men, given over to their stomach and to sleep, pass through their lives unlearned and uncultured like migrants”). The reference here to the stomach links back to Plato’s εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι, while the *indocti* of Sallust echo Plato’s φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι. Additionally, in *vitam sicuti peregrinantes transiere* we see a close similarity of thought to Plato’s κάτω, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται τε καὶ ταύτη πλανῶνται διὰ βίου.

Phaedo 80a too fits into this web of Platonic allusions, specifically in *BC* 1.2.

Socrates has the following to say about the distinction between body and soul, and between the divine and earthly aspects of man:

[Socr.] ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὧσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν: καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῷ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοίον τῷ θεῷ

¹⁵ *pace* Thomas 1936: 145, who argues that the parallel is not as strong as it would have been had Sallust used a participial clause like Plato, and *pecorum more* instead of *veluti pecora*: these are the type of substitutions of grammatical forms common in imitation.

¹⁶ On ὀχεύοντες, cf. Sallust *BC* 14.2 (*quicumque manu ventre pene bona patria laceraverat*)

εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν;

[Cebes] ἔμοιγε.

[Socr.] ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν;

[Cebes] δῆλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θεῷ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.

[Socr.] When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?

[Cebes] Yes, I think so.

[Socr.] Which, then, does the soul resemble?

[Cebes] Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal.

(transl. Shorey 1969)

The distinction between body and soul at the beginning of this passage is of course paralleled in Sallust's *nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est*.¹⁷ Furthermore, just as Socrates makes one the ruling element and one the ruled (τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν), so does Sallust (*animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur*). Socrates then adds the divine–mortal distinction to that between body/ruled and soul/ruler, arguing that “the divine element” is fit to rule, the mortal to serve, and that in men the soul is akin to the divine element, the body to the mortal (ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θεῷ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ). Sallust adds the same distinction between the divine and mortal elements in man: *alterum nobis cum dis, alterum cum beluis commune est*.¹⁸ Together, then, these two passages of Plato would seem to account for the source of Sallust's ideas in *BC* 1.1-2.

Thomas, however, raises what turn out to be two notable problems which may inject a certain degree of doubt into the hypothesis Sallust meant his readers to think specifically

¹⁷ Cf. also Sallust *BJ* 2.1

¹⁸ One can also compare ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν (“rule and lead”) to *dux atque imperator vitae mortalium animus est* (“the mind/soul is the leader and commander of mortals’ lives”, *BJ* 1.3), and *animus incorruptus, aeternus, rector humani generis* (“the mind/soul, uncorrupted, eternal, is the leader of the human race”, *BJ* 2.3).

of these two passages of Plato.¹⁹ First, the distinction between man and beast, wherein man, with his gaze turned skyward, has kinship with the gods, while the beasts' quadruped gait and gaze toward the ground indicates their affinity with the earth, is a literary and philosophical commonplace – not only within Plato's works, but in many other authors, Greek and Latin, across several periods and genres. Likewise, the binary image wherein the mind (or soul) is the ruling element and the body the subservient one is also a commonplace.²⁰ When such commonplaces are used, it is hard to determine the exact source unless the allusion is rather exact. Yet in the case of the two abovementioned passages of Plato, the allusion in Sallust is indeed rather precise.

A second possible obstacle to seeing a direct allusion to Plato by Sallust arises through consideration of a passage of Cassius Dio (fr.7.30.2). In this excerpt, it seems that the same two passages of Plato – *Rep.* 586a-b and *Phaedo* 80a – are drawn upon together²¹:

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ζῷον θνητὸν οὔτ' ἄμεινον οὔτ' ἰσχυρότερον ἀνθρώπου. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷτε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κάτω κέκυφε καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀεὶ βλέπει, πράττει τε οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ τροφῆς καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἔχεται, (οὔτω καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως ἐς ταῦτα κατακέκριται), μόνον δὲ ἡμεῖς ἄνω τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ αὐτῷ ὁμιλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπερφρονοῦμεν, τοῖς δὲ δὴ θεοῖς αὐτοῖς ὡς καὶ ὁμοίοις οὖσιν ἡμῖν σύνεσμεν, ἅτε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ποιήματα αὐτῶν οὐ γήινα ἀλλ' οὐράνια²² ὄντες;

There is no mortal creature either better or stronger than man. One cannot but see that all other beings are bent over and look toward the ground, and do nothing that does not pertain to food and lusts (that is the sentence nature herself has passed upon them), and that we alone

¹⁹ Thomas 1936: 145

²⁰ On both of these distinctions as commonplaces in Plato see *Symp.* 189e-90b; *Cratyl.* 396b-c, 409c; *Tim.* 90a-c, 91e (closely echoing the βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν of *Rep.* 586a-b); *Protag.* 321c. Among other authors cf. especially Cic. *de Fin.* 5.34; Vitruv. *de Archit.* 2.1.2; Philo Judaeus, *de Plantatione* 605M, 607M; Sen. *Epist.* 65.20, 92.30, 90.19 (Posidonius explicitly stated as his source); Manilius, *Astron.* 4.896f; Juv. *Sat.* 15.142-7, Firmicus Maternus, *Astron.* 8, praef.; Isid. *Orig.* 11.5. For numerous other citations, ranging from Aristotle through to early Christian writers, see Dickerman 1909: 93-95, 96-101. See also the passages cited in Arnold 1911: 248. For the view that these ideas were commonplaces see also Perrochat 1949: 85; Büchner 1960 (*Sallust*): 116, 327; McGushin 1977: 295.

²¹ Sic Thomas 1936: 146. Cf. Dickerman 1909: 97.

²² To this formulation φυτὰ καὶ ποιήματα αὐτῶν οὐ γήινα ἀλλ' οὐράνια, see also the close echo in Plato *Tim.* 90a: τοῦτο δὲ δὴ φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἶρειν ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον.

both look upward and hold intercourse with heaven itself. Moreover we look down upon earthly things, but associate with the gods since they are similar to us: as offshoots and creations of them, we are not earthly but heavenly beings.

In this passage, which seems to be a speech by Marcus Curtius, the claim that all other creatures κάτω κέκυφε καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀεὶ βλέπει is a direct echo of Plato's κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν (*Rep.* 586a). The next idea in Dio, πράττει τε οὐδὲν ὁ μὴ τροφῆς καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἔχεται, evokes the next thought in *Rep.* 586a on animalistic appetites: καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι. Dio's speaker then adds parenthetically a reference to nature's decree, which brings in an echo of *Phaedo* 80a (ἡ φύσις προστάττει), and the remainder of the Dio passage is concerned with developing the distinction between the divine nature of man and the earthly nature of animals with which *Phaedo* 80a is generally concerned.

That both Sallust and Dio seem to allude rather specifically to the same two passages, and in a single context in each case, suggests that both authors may have gotten the idea from the same source – and not Plato. According to Thomas, this would likely be Posidonius, who is well known to be a Platonically-influenced Stoic.²³ Indeed, in the immediately following section of Dio (fr.7.30.3-4), there are additional echoes of Plato, echoes which find expression in other Stoic-influenced sources as well. For instance, Dio's speaker remarks (fr.7.30.4):

καὶ οὔτε τι πεζόν ἐστὶν ὁ μὴ τάχει καταληφθὲν ἢ ἰσχύι δαμασθὲν ἢ καὶ τέχναις τισὶ συλληφθὲν δουλούμεθα, οὔτ' ἐνυδρον οὔτ' ἀεροπόρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ βυθοῦ μὴδ' ὀρῶντες ἀνέλκομεν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μὴδὲ ἐξικνούμενοι κατασύρομεν.

²³ Thomas 1936: 150. On Posidonius' admiration for and use of Plato, see Kidd, T95, 97, 99EK; F31, 144, 148, 165B (with Kidd's commentary, p.611), and 166EK. More generally, Kidd 1988: p.156-60.

Compare Plato *Tim.* 40a: εἰσὶν δὲ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ ἕροπόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἐνυδρὸν εἶδος, πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον. Cicero echoes this image in a passage that may well draw on Posidonius²⁴; likewise Manilius.²⁵ Additionally, the idea immediately preceding the above-quoted Dio passage has a Platonic tinge to it (Dio fr.7.30.3): οὐτ' ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ θεὸς σῶμα θνητὸν ἔχων, οὔτε θεὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀσώματος. This finds a close parallel in Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* 26: *Tu vero enitere et sic habeto, non esse te mortalem, sed corpus hoc...Deum te igitur scito esse.*

We have, therefore, a fairly strong allusion in Dio to the same two passages to which Sallust seems strongly to allude. We can also detect a further nexus of Platonic ideas underlying Dio fr.7.30.2-4 and seconded in other Stoic-influenced sources – a fact which suggests the possibility of Posidonius as Dio's source.²⁶ In light of these points, a modicum of caution might reasonably be exercised over claiming a direct allusion by Sallust in *BC* 1.1-2 back to these specific passages of Plato. Yet *Rep.* 586a-b and *Phaedo* 80a do display what seem, in the present writer's view, convincing similarities of word

²⁴ Cic. *DND* 2.151: *praeterea vescimur bestiis et terrenis et aquatilibus et volantibus partim capiendo, partim alendo. Efficimus etiam domitu nostro quadripedum vectiones, quorum celeritas atque vis nobis ipsis adfert vim et celeritatem.* Cf. 2.153. Of course Cicero, having translated Plato's *Timaeus*, may also have come upon this formulation directly from Plato.

²⁵ Manil. *Astron.* 4.896f: *an cuiquam genitos, nisi caelo, credere fas est / esse homines? proiecta iacent animalia cuncta / in terra vel mersa vadis, vel in aere pendent, / omnibus una quies venter<que> Venusque voluptas, / mole valens sola corpus> cenumque per artus, / et, quia consilium non est, et lingua remissa. / unus <in> inspectus rerum viresque loquendi / ingeniumque capax variasque educitur artes / hic partus, qui cuncta regit: secessit in urbes, / edomuit terram ad fruges, animalia cepit / imposuitque viam ponto, stetit unus in arcem / erectus capitis victorque ad sidera mittit / sidereos oculos propiusque aspectat Olympum / inquitque Iovem.* Cf. vv. 876-95, and, for a Sallustian emphasis on the strength of human nature (*BJ* 1.1-2), see v.923; on the rule of reason cf. *Sall BC* 1.4, 7.5, *BJ* 1.3, 2.3 to vv.931-2. For the general image in Manilius cf. also Vergil *Geo.* 1.139f. It should be noted that those aspects in the above-cited Manilius passages that seem "Sallustian" are perhaps too general to be sourced specifically to Sallust's use of these themes. Sallust does not even echo Plato *Tim.* 40a. Thus, as with Dio 7.30.2-4, and Cicero *DND* 2.151 & *Somnium* 26, here with Manilius the common elements may have been filtered through Posidonius or another Stoic intermediary.

²⁶ For more on possible Posidonian echoes in Sallust, see below in this section.

and thought with *BC* 1.1-2 to constitute direct allusions on Sallust's part. Moreover, it is also possible that Dio has simply borrowed this pair of Platonic allusions right from Sallust himself, and thus has consciously adapted these allusions to Plato into his own text from that of Sallust. On balance, then, direct Sallustian allusion to Plato (*Rep.* 586a-b & *Phd.* 80a) is likely, but it is highly doubtful that these allusions in *BC* 1.1-2 indicate any deep adherence on Sallust's part to Platonic philosophy.

The likelihood of a direct allusion to Plato in *BC* 1.1 might be further increased, however, if one were able to identify a handful of other compelling allusions to Plato in the Sallustian corpus. In this connection, scholars have often remarked that Sallust's defense of retiring from politics in *BC* 4 draws directly on Plato's *Seventh Letter*.²⁷

Sallust gives us the following account (*BC* 3.3-4.1):

Sed ego adulescentulus initio, sicuti plerique, studio ad rem publicam latus sum ibique mihi multa advorsa fuere. Nam pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute audacia, largitio, avaritia vigeant. Quae tametsi animus aspernabatur insolens malarum artium, tamen inter tanta vitia imbecilla aetas ambitione corrupta tenebatur; ac me, cum ab reliquorum malis moribus dissentirem, nihilo minus honoris cupido eadem, qua ceteros, fama atque invidia vexabat. [4] Igitur ubi animus ex multis miseriis atque periculis requievit et mihi reliquam aetatem a re publica procul habendam decrevi...

But as a quite young man I, like many others, was at first led by my zeal into public affairs, and there I encountered many adversities. For instead of modesty, restraint, and virtue insolence, bribery, and greed flourished. Even though my spirit spurned these in its ignorance of evil practices, still amidst such great vices the weakness of my youth was corrupted by ambition and held captive; and although I dissented from the wicked ways of others, nevertheless lust for office plagued me with the same ill-repute and envy as it did others. [4] Therefore when my spirit had found rest after many miseries and dangers and I decided that I should conduct the rest of my life far from public affairs...

²⁷ On philosophical withdrawal from political life see also Plato *Rep.* 496c-97a, *Apol.* 31e, *Gorgias* 521-22 and e.g. Perrochat 1949: 49ff; F. Egermann 1932: 27ff (calling also upon Cicero *DRP* and Dicaearchus to account for the Roman tinge to Sallust's Platonic ideas throughout the prologues); MacQueen 1981; Ramsey 2013: xxxii n39. Syme 1964: 241 calls Sallust's direct use of Plato "not at all plausible". The debate over the authenticity of the Platonic *7th Letter* in particular still rages: see recently (on the side of inauthenticity) Burnyeat & Frede 2015. Resolution of this debate does not, however, directly impact my current analysis of Sallust's use of (or knowledge of) the *7th Letter*.

The experiences and sentiments which Sallust discusses here are found mirrored in

Plato's account of his early life in politics (*Ep.* 7.324-5, my emphasis):

Ep. 7.324b: νέος ἐγὼ ποτε ὡν πολλοῖς δὴ ταῦτόν ἔπαθον: ᾤθη, εἰ θᾶπτον ἑμαυτοῦ γενοίμην κύριος, ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς ἰέναι.²⁸ || *BC* 3.3: *sed ego adulescentulus initio, sicuti plerique, studio ad rem publicam latus sum.*

Ep. 7.324c-d: καὶ μοι τύχαι τινὲς τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων τοιαῖδε παρέπεσον...[Establishment of Thirty Tyrants, who invite Plato to join]... καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔπαθον ὑπὸ νεότητος: ᾤθη γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἕκ τινος ἀδίκου βίου ἐπὶ δίκαιον τρόπον ἄγοντας διοικήσιν δὴ τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε αὐτοῖς σφόδρα προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, τί πράξοιεν.²⁹ || *BC* 3.3.

Ep. 7.325a: ἃ δὴ πάντα καθορῶν [the excesses of the Thirty] καὶ εἴ τιν' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα οὐ μικρά, ἐδυσχέρανά τε καὶ ἑμαυτὸν ἐπανήγαγον ἀπὸ τῶν τότε κακῶν.³⁰ || *BC* 4.1: *Igitur ubi animus ex multis miseriis atque periculis requievit et mihi reliquam aetatem procul a re publica habendam decrevi.* cf. *BJ* 4.3: *decrevi procul a re publica aetatem agere.*

Ep. 7.325a-b: [After the Thirty overthrown] πάλιν δὲ βραδύτερον μὲν, εἴλκεν δέ με ὁμῶς ἡ [325b] περὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ ἐπιθυμία.³¹ || *BC* 3.5: *ac me, cum ab reliquorum malis moribus dissentirem, nihilo minus honoris cupido eadem, qua ceteros, fama atque invidia vexabat.* cf. *BC* 3.3: *studio ad rem publicam latus sum.*

Ep. 7.325b: ἦν οὖν καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἅτε τεταραγμένοις πολλὰ γινόμενα ἃ τις ἂν δυσχεράνειεν.³² || *BC* 3.5: *cum ab reliquorum malis moribus dissentirem.*

Ep. 7.325c: [After the execution of Socrates] σκοποῦντι δὴ μοι ταῦτά τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ τοὺς νόμους γε καὶ ἔθη, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον διεσκόπουν ἡλικίας τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθε προύβαινον, τοσοῦτω χαλεπώτερον ἐφαίνετο ὀρθῶς εἶναι μοι τὰ πολιτικὰ διοικεῖν.³³ || *BC* 3.3: *ibique mihi multa adversa fuere.* (Το σκοποῦντι...τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πολιτικά, cf. *BJ* 4.4.29-31, 4.7.)

²⁸ "When once I was young I experienced the same things as many others. I thought that as soon as I should become my own master I would immediately enter upon the public life of the city."

²⁹ "And I found that accidents of the following kind happened to befall public affairs. The feelings I then experienced, owing to my youth, were in no way surprising: for I imagined that they would administer the State by leading it out of an unjust way of life into a just way, and consequently I gave my mind to them very diligently, to see what they would do." This and the following translations from *Ep.* 7 are from R.G. Bury 1966, adapted.

³⁰ "After seeing all of these actions and others of a similar kind and gravity, I was disgusted and took myself away from the evils of those times."

³¹ "Once again, though more slowly this time, the desire to take part in public affairs dragged me back."

³² "[It was a hesitant return because] even in those times, disturbed as they were, there were many things happening which would cause one disgust."

³³ "When, therefore, I considered all this, and the type of men who were administering the affairs of State, with their laws too and their customs, the more I considered them and the more I advanced in years myself, the more difficult appeared to me the task of managing affairs of State rightly." In Plato's "the more I advanced in years", we may read "advanced in wisdom"; like Sallust, an element of growing wisdom plays into Plato's growing realization of the evil nature of political life.

Ep. 7.325d: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐν τοῖς τῶν πατέρων ἤθεσιν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διφκεῖτο... τά τε τῶν νόμων γράμματα καὶ ἔθνη διεφθείρετο καὶ ἐπεδίδου θαυμαστὸν ὅσον.³⁴
 || *BC* 3.3: *nam pro pudore...audacia, largitio, avaritia vigeat*; for Plato's contrast between ancestral customs and the corrupt conduct of current politicians cp. also *BC* 5.9: *ut paulatim immutata ex pulcherrima atque <optuma> pessuma ac flagitiosissima facta sit*; *BJ* 4.5-7: *Nam saepe ego audiui...at contra quis est omnium, his moribus, quin divitiis et sumptibus, non probitate neque industria, cum maioribus suis contendat?* *BJ* 3.1: *verum ex iis magistratus et imperia, postremo omnis cura rerum publicarum minime mihi hac tempestate cupiunda videntur.*

Ep. 7.325e: ὥστε με, τὸ πρῶτον πολλῆς μεστὸν ὄντα ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινά (|| *BC* 3.3 *initio, sicuti plerique, studio ad rem publicam latus sum*), βλέποντα εἰς ταῦτα καὶ φερόμενα ὁρῶντα πάντα πάντως (|| *BC* 2.3, *neque aliud alio ferri neque mutari ac misceri omnia cerneret*³⁵) τελευτῶντα ἱλιγγίαν.³⁶

One can note the consistency with which echoes of *BC* 3.3-4.1 appear in each section within *Ep.* 7.324a-325e. Moreover certain ideas in the letter (in *Ep.* 7.325c, 325d, and 325e) are echoed in other chapters of the *BC* prologue as well as in the prologue of the *BJ*. There is thus a strong possibility that Sallust meant to model his literary *apologia* for retirement on that of Plato in the *Seventh Letter*, thus lending his withdrawal from politics a certain Platonic air and intellectual legitimacy. Indeed, we have already noted above (Chapter 3.3b) that Cicero and Atticus, and likely other educated Romans, were certainly familiar with the *Seventh Letter*, which makes Sallust's allusion to it in *BC* 3.3-4.1 very possible. Yet an allusion to the *Seventh Letter* in his prologue(s) might have been able to serve Sallust in more ways than one. For, as noted earlier, if Cicero could use the *Seventh Letter* to accuse Caesar of tyranny through a comparison with Dionysius of Syracuse, then it is perhaps possible that Sallust too – who, as we have seen, is not

³⁴ “Since our State was no longer managed according to the customs and institutions of our forefathers...moreover, both the written laws and the customs were being corrupted, and that with surprising rapidity.”

³⁵ Cf. also *Rep.* 586a: κάτω, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται τε καὶ ταύτη πλανῶνται διὰ βίου.

³⁶ “Consequently, although at first I was filled with an ardent desire to engage in public affairs, when I considered all this and saw how things were shifting about anyhow in all directions, I finally became utterly disorientated by it all.”

hesitant to imply criticism of Caesar – meant his use of the *Seventh Letter* to imply a comparison between Caesar and Dionysius/tyranny.

Nevertheless, even if we grant that Sallust intended a direct allusion to Plato's *Seventh Letter* in *BC* 3.3-4.1, his use of the letter is so specifically tied to the rhetorical goal of ennobling his retirement that it is unlikely this allusion to Plato (nor even those in *BC* 1.1-2 to *Rep.* 586a-b & *Phd.* 80a, if they are indeed Platonic allusions) betoken any wider philosophical commitment to Platonism underlying Sallust's *BC* or his literary project as a whole.³⁷

One may also observe that, in addition to Plato's 7th *Letter*, the direct influence of Cicero's *de Officiis* 2.2-4 on Sallust's defense of withdrawal has been posited.³⁸ While some suggestive similarities seem to exist, there are a handful of fundamental differences between the perspectives of each author. Cicero as early as the mid-50s had expressed his opinion that there was effectively no [sc. free] Republic left,³⁹ and that it was time to think about turning to consolation in literature, studies, and the countryside.⁴⁰ By the time he wrote the *de Officiis* in 44 B.C.E., Cicero shows that he was never fully satisfied with this role of gentlemanly retirement, and feared many did not understand his time spent on philosophy.⁴¹ In *de Officiis* 2.3-4, Cicero explains how he only turned to

³⁷ As Cicero's case illustrates, many of those who similarly withdrew from politics in the 40s or 30s may have called upon different philosophical principles at different times, depending on what type of justification any particular circumstance seemed to call for. In this way the utilitarian nature of Sallust's use of a Platonic text to make a similar justification should not surprise. See above, Chapter 4.1.

³⁸ Osgood 2006: 290-91.

³⁹ e.g. *Att.* 4.18.2 (Oct. 54); *Q.Fr.* 3.5.4 (Oct/Nov. 54), 3.9.1-2; cf. even earlier *ad Att.* 1.16.6 (mid 61), 1.17.8, 1.18.1f, 8 (Dec. 61).

⁴⁰ On withdrawal cf. later *Ad Fam.* 6.21 (Jan 45), 4.6 (Apr 45), 5.15 (May 45), 9.2.5.

⁴¹ *de Off.* 2.2. See Cic. *ad Fam.* 9.8.2 (to Varro), where it is clear writing was a solace though not one of untempered joy. Cf. *ad Fam.* 9.3, 9.7, 9.5 and Osgood 2006: 289.

philosophy when he could no longer serve as a statesman. He was *forced* to seek the consolation of writing, which was no replacement for real statesmanship.⁴²

Yet besides Cicero's claim that he devoted much time in his youth to studying philosophy and now decided to return to it to best cast aside his hardships (and serve the state), the essence of Cicero's thought differs from that of Sallust *BC* 3.3-4.2. Sallust emphasizes how he was lured into public office as a young man, had many factors impeding his noble pursuit of public offices (*audacia, largitio, avaritia*, if not other things as well: *BC* 3.3), and was soon *corrupted* by ambition (*BC* 3.4). Cicero does not mention having any difficulties early in his public career, or being corrupted by ambition or other contemporary vices. Moreover, Sallust decides he would rather retire, and in his account of it, he actually takes the initiative in doing so. Cicero, by contrast, maintains consistently that he would always rather be in public service, and that if he is called away from the Forum, it is only unwillingly, not under his own initiative. In line with this difference in the two accounts, we may also observe that, in order to bolster his own status and authority as a writer, Sallust focuses on asserting that scholarship is *more than* the consolation prize that Cicero considered it to be; it is equivalent to the highest service one can offer the state (*BC* 3.1-2; cf. *BJ* 4.1-4). That Sallust supposedly initiates his own retirement, and ranks his literary activity as far more than a shadow of the service one

⁴² *de Off.* 2.3: *primum enim, ut stante re publica facere solebamus, in agendo plus quam in scribendo operam poneremus, deinde ipsis scriptis non ea, quae nunc, sed actiones nostras mandaremus, ut saepe fecimus. Cum autem res publica...nulla esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt forenses et senatoriae...[2.4] nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in his studiis ab initio versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime molestias posse deponi si me ad philosophiam retulissem. Cui cum multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem posteaquam honoribus inservire coepi meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat philosophiae loci, quantum superfuerat amicorum et rei publicae tempori.* Cf. *ad Fam.* 9.2.5: after his return to Italy and pardon after 49, Cicero only then starts to think he may console himself (and Varro) with the idea that they can now serve the state by *writing* Republics.

could offer in the Forum, points to a fundamentally different perspective in these two accounts. While one cannot discount that Sallust knew of this or other Ciceronian opinions on political withdrawal, it is clear that he meant to distance himself from the image Cicero paints of retirement from the public arena.⁴³

In bringing our discussion back to the established philosophical schools, we should of course note that Platonic philosophy was not the only means used to justify a withdrawal from political life. It would also be worth exploring briefly whether there is any affinity between Sallust's own decision to withdraw and the ideas expounded by Epicureanism on the disadvantages of a public career.⁴⁴

While not by any stretch a strict treatise on the principles of Epicureanism, one might consider the plea against political ambition made by Horace, who was himself influenced by Epicureanism, in *Satires* 1.6. This poem, published around 35 B.C.E. and addressed to Maecenas, centers on political ambition, and contains a personal defense by Horace of his social standing with Maecenas and his own simple life as a private citizen.⁴⁵ Horace begins by arguing that true nobility should be defined not by birth or lineage, but by upright conduct.⁴⁶ In making this argument he stops to reflect on the Roman populace as a judge of character. He claims [*populus*] *famae servit ineptus, / qui stupet in titulis et imaginibus* ("the populace in its foolishness is a slave to renown, and is dazzled by titulature and ancestor masks", *Sat.* 1.6.16-17). Sallust himself, on his own admission,

⁴³ Moreover, Sallust's presentation of political withdrawal highlights his greater pessimism about Roman morality and public life: "While Cicero hopes that his volumes of philosophic inquiry, written in his eminently persuasive Latin, will shed light on the decline of the Republic and offer insights on how to restore it, Sallust steep himself in the corruption of the decadent state with little hope that things can improve." (Osgood 2006: 292).

⁴⁴ Among other suggestions, Syme 1964: 243 also entertains the possibility that Sallust himself was an Epicurean in his own life.

⁴⁵ For general commentary on this poem see Brown 1993.

⁴⁶ Similarly Marius, *BJ* 85

was similarly overcome by lust for honor and office (*me...honoris cupido...fama atque invidia vexabat*, *BC* 3.5). Indeed, that both the more ignoble and the wealthy are enthralled by renown Horace asserts a few lines later: *sed fulgente trahit constrictos Gloria curru / non minus ignotos generosis* (“But Glory, binding them to her gleaming chariot, sweeps along the unknown no less than the well-born”, *Sat.* 1.6.23-4).⁴⁷ Horace also holds that the populace awards with office people who are unworthy of the honor: *notante iudice quo nosti, populo, qui stultus honores / saepe dat indignis* (“when assessed by the people, the judge you know, which in its stupidity often gives office to the unworthy”, *Sat.* 1.6.15-16). Likewise Sallust, who says that in political life after Caesar’s death *neque virtuti honos datur* (*BJ* 3.1).

So far, rather than eliciting any connections on the level of philosophy, *Sat.* 1.6 shows the two authors at most sharing a similar perspective on political ambition and on political virtue. Continuing in this vein, another interesting, seemingly direct connection can be detected between Horace’s socio-political situation and that of Sallust when Horace admits that, given his non-aristocratic background, the people would rather elect a nobleman than an unknown, *ensorque moveret / Appius, ingenuo si non essem patre natus* (“and Appius the censor would strike me from the Senate, if I were not born from a noble father,” *Sat.* 1.6.20-21). As we have seen, Sallust suffered expulsion from the Senate under this same Appius’ censorship in 50 B.C.E. However, Appius’ censorship was apparently recognized for its general harshness, and Horace may be alluding merely to this general quality and not necessarily to his expulsion of Sallust.⁴⁸ Only a few lines later, though, Horace makes yet another reference that is evocative of Sallust’s own

⁴⁷ See also Horace *Epist.* 1.16.17-45

⁴⁸ On the harshness of Appius’ censorship, see Cic. *ad Fam.* 8.14.4; Cf. Dio 40.63.

personal political career when he speaks about overreaching ambition in these words

(*Sat.* 1.6.24-6):

...quo tibi, Tilli,
sumere depositum clavom fierique tribuno?
invidia adcrevit, privato quae minor esset.

... What did it profit you, Tillius, to take up the laticlave that you were forced to lay aside, and become a tribune? Envy grew against you, which would have been less, if you had remained a private citizen.

The Tillius here is clearly a man of humble origins who was removed from the Senate and then regained his status as senator through holding the tribunate – though this brought him more envy than it did honor, according to Horace. Brown conjectures, based on the recent mention of Appius three lines earlier, that Tillius' removal too could be attributed to Appius Claudius in 50 B.C.E. – which would suggest another possible connection to Sallust's expulsion.⁴⁹ While of course not impossible, this conjecture cannot be securely ventured from the surrounding context. Horace is merely concerned, in vv.19-44, to expand upon the general theme of the *invidia* and prejudice that will come to those of humbler origins seeking high office, and as often in satire, here a specific example (Appius) broadens out to a general disquisition on a broader topic.

The situation of Horace's Tillius may also be made to echo Sallust's more closely if we can identify this Tillius with L. Tillius Cimber, who, it seems, later held the office of praetor. In that case, the man will have been expelled from the Senate, then have regained his senatorial status via the tribunate, and lastly have reached the praetorship. Such a *cursus* presents very rough similarities to Sallust's. There are, however, two problems: First, secure identification of Horace's Tillius with a historical figure is quite

⁴⁹ Brown 1993, ad loc.

difficult.⁵⁰ Second, although this Tillius was of humble origin, expunged from the Senate, and later held the tribunate and reached the praetorship, the order of these offices is different for Sallust, who was first tribune, *then* struck from the Senate, and then regained his senatorial status via the praetorship. While slight alterations of detail do not necessarily exclude allusion, the overall nature of the evidence is not such as to inspire great confidence that Horace means to allude implicitly to Sallust via either Appius or Tillius.

As Horace continues, however, his discussion of the drawbacks of political ambition for those of lesser birth does show a certain general affinity with Sallust's ideas on the subject – though again this is not a philosophical affinity (*Sat.* 1.6.23-44). Horace explains that any time a man of humble origins seeks to hold an important magistracy, his fellow citizens start to question his parentage and origin (27-44). As Brown notes, it was a common topic of propaganda in the 30s that Sextus Pompey was promoting slaves and freedmen to important offices.⁵¹ Sallust can attest to displeasure at similar practices during the regime of Caesar,⁵² and the faction of Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus acted similarly in restocking the Senate.⁵³ From this we can gather that in the 40s and 30s a certain number of individuals of humbler origin were in fact being elected, or being admitted to the Senate, and that this could often be thrown in someone's teeth. Such a

⁵⁰ The exact identification of this Tillius is debated. Brown 1993: 153 remarks that the scholiast identifies him as L. Tillius Cimber, an assassin of Caesar who had perhaps been pr. 45, procos. in Bithynia-Pontus 44-43, and legate under Cassius (cf. Wiseman 1973: 266). Brown and Wiseman both consider this identification of Horace's Tillius unlikely (Wiseman following Kiessling-Heinze on *Sat.* 1.6.25 and Fraenkel, *Horace*. p.102n6), suggesting instead L. Tillius Cimber as the brother of Horace's Tillius. Secure identification seems elusive here.

⁵¹ Brown 1993: 155, citing DuQuesnay 1984: 46. See Hor. *Epodes* 4.19-20, 9.9-10 on Sextus Pompey.

⁵² Sallust *BJ* 3.1, 4.4 (see discussion in Chapter 3.2b); cf. Dio 43.47.3 (soldiers and sons of freedmen), 43.27.2 (displeasure at these actions of Caesar), Suet. *Iul.* 80.2, *Aug.* 35. Though cp.

⁵³ Dio 48.34 (allies, soldiers, sons of freedmen, and slaves)

general attitude would explain why Sallust feels the need in *BJ* 4.4 to defend his superiority to those who attained office after his retirement.⁵⁴

Moreover, in outlining the disadvantages of a political career for anyone, regardless of birth, Horace strikes a note not discordant with Sallust when he says *nam mihi continuo maior quaerenda foret res atque salutandi plures* (“For straightaway I would have to acquire more wealth and greet more people at morning salutations”, *Sat.* 1.6.100-101). Sallust too, in attacking the pointlessness of political ambition in the 40s, says *tanto tamque utili labore meo nomen inertiae inponant, certe quibus maxuma industria videtur salutare plebem et conviviis gratiam quaerere* (“[who] may apply to this arduous and useful employment of mine the term idleness, certainly those who think it the height of industriousness to court the common people [at *salutatio*] and curry favor by means of banquets”, *BJ* 4.3⁵⁵). One should note, however, that the same aversion to the practice of *salutatio* of clients could be expressed by a Stoic – for example, Seneca, *Ep.* 36.1-2 – and thus does not indicate any Epicurean leanings on Sallust’s part.

On an overall assessment, we must say that although Horace’s sentiments in *Sat.* 1.6 on the drawbacks and injustices of political life are fairly concordant with those of Sallust in the prologues of the *BC* and the *BJ*, the complaints both men register – that noble and ignoble alike are in thrall to glory’s allure, that honor goes to the unworthy, that humble origin might be thrown in one’s teeth, and that one must engage in inane exercises like *convivia* and *salutationes* – were no doubt shared by many men of the political class of that period, and as such they simply indicate something of the general attitudes of the

⁵⁴ See also *BJ* 3.3 for the general drawbacks of political ambition – for anyone – in the 40s and 30s B.C.E.

⁵⁵ Transl. Ramsey 2013.

age, rather than any Epicurean attachments on the part of Sallust – who, as we have seen, had taken a rather anti-Epicurean stance at the opening of the *BC*.⁵⁶ The evidence of this particular poem on political ambition, moreover, should not be used to posit too general an affinity between the fundamental views of Horace and Sallust.⁵⁷

Likewise, suggestive (perhaps even probable) borrowings from Lucretius can be posited in Sallust's prefaces, but it is doubtful that they represent any Epicurean leanings of Sallust. In Lucretius' description of the development of kingship and its overthrow in Book 5 (kingship > mob rule > rule of law), Lucretius has the following to say about pointless, harmful political ambition in pursuit of *potentia* and *honor* (*DRN* 5.1120-35⁵⁸):

*at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentis
ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret
et placidam possent opulenti degere vitam,
nequiquam, quoniam ad summam succedere honorem
certantes iter infestum fecere viai,
et tamen e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos
invidia interdum contemptim in Tartara taetra;
invidia quoniam, ceu fulmine, summa vaporant
plerumque et quae sunt aliis magis edita cumque;
ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum
quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.
proinde sine incassum defessi sanguine sudent,
angustum per iter luctantes ambitionis...
nec magis id nunc est neque erit mox quam fuit ante.* [1135]

Still, human beings wanted to be famous and powerful so that their good fortune would stand fast on a firm foundation and they with their wealth would be able to lead a smooth life – all in vain, since struggling to advance to the height of honor they saw to it that the path of their life was filled with danger. and yet envy, like a thunderbolt, sometimes strikes and hurls them down with great scorn to bitter Tartarus, since envy, like a thunderbolt, usually sets ablaze the heights and whatever raises up higher than the rest. Thus it is much better to obey quietly than to desire supreme command over things and to rule kingdoms. Therefore let them get

⁵⁶ For such anti-Epicurean details in Sallust's prologues see the discussion above in Chapter 4.1.

⁵⁷ One observes, for example, that within the same book of *Satires*, Horace also writes a poem (*Sat.* 1.3) in which he contrasts Stoic beliefs with Epicurean doctrine – to the benefit of the latter. Horace deconstructs the Stoic belief in moral absolutes, that distinctions between good or bad, right and wrong, justice and injustice, were natural and absolute distinctions (1.3.96ff). The Epicurean view, as Horace puts it, was that justice was a matter of social contract.

⁵⁸ Cf. also *DRN* 5.1105-19, including i.a. how wealth replaced beauty and strength and ingenium as a source of honor, and *DRN* 3.59-78 for an extended discussion of *ambitio* and *avaritia* and how the pursuit of wealth leads to unnecessary fears.

exhausted and sweat blood in vain, struggling with difficulty along the narrow path of ambition...and this is not more the case, nor will it be, than it once was. (transl. in Fish 2011, 83).

Such a pursuit of power (cf. *potentis* (1120), *regere* (1130) to *BJ* 3.2 (*vi quidem regere patriam...importunum est*), as well as honor (cf. *summum honorem* (1123) to *BJ* 3.1 *magistratus et imperia...neque virtuti honos datur*; *BC* 3.4 *honoris cupido*), is criticized by Sallust at *BJ* 3 as not only pointless (cp. *nequiquam* (1123), *incassum* (1129) to *BJ* 3.3 *frustra niti*) but also mad (*extremae dementiae*).⁵⁹ Lucretius also employs the imagery of the political career as a steep path (*iter infestum fecere viai* (1124), *angustum per iter luctantes ambitionis* (1129)), which he employs elsewhere in the poem (e.g. *DRN* 2.6-13; 3.995-1002). This image is a central one in Sallust's prologues: at *BC* 11.2, Sallust says *gloriam honorem imperium bonus et ignavos aequae sibi exoptant, sed ille vera via nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit*. Similarly, at *BJ* 1.3, Sallust tells us that when the *animus* proceeds *ad gloriam virtutis via*, it is, among other things, *pollens potensque* and *clarus* – the two qualities Lucretius here claims that men seek (1120: *at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentis*).

Like Sallust (*BJ* 3.3-4), Lucretius in this passage wants the reader to see political ambition as dangerous (*infestum* (1124), *e summo...deicit ictos invidia* (1125-6)); cf. *odium quaerere* (*BJ* 3.3)), and tiring (*sine incassum defessi sanguine sudent* (1129); cf. *se fatigando* (*BJ* 3.3)). Other parallels include Lucretius' use of *regere imperio*, echoed in

⁵⁹ Sallust's depiction of pointless political ambition as *extremae dementiae* recalls strongly the passage at *DRN* 3.995-1002 where the analogy of Sisyphus is used for the man who, to his detriment, insanely keeps pursuing high offices despite repeated failures: *Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est / qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures / imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit. / nam petere imperium quod inane est nec datur umquam / atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem, / hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte / saxum quod tamen e summo iam vertice rursum / volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi*. Here cp. also Sallust's *frustra niti* to the pointless Sisyphean struggles of Lucretius' failed careerist; cp. *BJ* 3.1's *neque virtuti honos datur* to *nec datur umquam*.

Sallust's *vi quidem regere patriam* (BJ 3.2) and *imperia* (BJ 3.1), as well as an emphasis on *invidia* (which *quasi fulmen deicit*, and *vaporat*; cf. BC 3.5).⁶⁰

While it appears that Sallust has borrowed themes from Lucretius (the inane and dangerous pursuit of political power and honor; the narrow and difficult path of a political career), and even language, what we see here is an intersection of the concerns common to many writers in the middle and late first century B.C.E. As we have seen, for example, in Horace and Cicero as well, the dangers of political ambition were a common idea in contemporary discourse, voiced by many regardless of their possible philosophical leanings. Therefore, even if we cannot discount that Sallust had known these passages of Lucretius when writing his monographs, it would be misguided to make the inference that such correspondances between Sallust and Lucretius indicate any Epicurean leaning on Sallust's part.⁶¹

While Epicurean doctrine may not appear a key to Sallust's prologues or general moral outlook, many have argued that Stoicism does play a key role in Sallust's moral and political analysis. In assessing the nature and degree of Stoicism's influence on Sallust, one finds supporting evidence of both the general and the specific types. Our analysis, however, will lead to the conclusion that while Sallust may well have drawn on certain general ideas from Stoic thought (and from Posidonius in particular), nothing in his texts indicates a deep or exclusive ideological attachment to Stoicism.

⁶⁰ For further passages in Lucretius denouncing ambition and greed and political strife, see *DRN* 2.14-22, 3.59-84 (the Sallustian pair of *ambitio* and *avaritia* as causes of civil violence in pursuit of wealth). See also Epicurus *Principle Doctrines* 7, 15, 16; *Vatican Sayings* 25; *Letter to Menoeceus* 130.

⁶¹ Cf. again the rather anti-Epicurean aspects of Sallust's works mentioned at the end of the discussion of Horace *Sat.* 1.6 above.

To begin with, William Turpin has made an interesting case for the role of Stoic ideas about *exempla* in the historiography of Tacitus.⁶² Stoic doctrine assigned high value to *exempla* as a tool of admonitory ethics. Since not everyone (in fact, very few) could be a true Stoic sage, the mass of common imperfect men required an intermediate preparatory training through moral rules and precepts which would advise “appropriate acts” (*kathēkonta, officia*) based on what is in accordance to nature.⁶³ These “appropriate acts” would be imposed through persuasion, exhortation, and *exempla*.⁶⁴ Tacitus shares the Stoic view that such moral instruction can be achieved through both positive *and* negative *exempla*. Moreover Tacitus seems to share the related Stoic idea that a person did not have to be perfect to serve as a moral *exemplum*; moral insight could be derived even from the actions of someone of low class, or a foreigner, or a person of base morals.⁶⁵ This aligns with Sallust’s practice insofar as there are both positive *exempla* and numerous negative *exempla* to be discovered in his works.⁶⁶ Yet it is likely that “the Stoics were not alone in thinking that even imperfect people have much to offer each other.”⁶⁷ Turpin himself thus does not seem to judge Sallust’s use of *exempla* as

⁶² Turpin 2008.

⁶³ On the Stoic concept of *oikeiosis*, see Posidonius Fr. 160EK, 177EK. Cf. Baltzly 2014.

⁶⁴ On the importance of *persuasio*, *exhortatio*, *consolatio*, and *exempla* to Stoic ethical training see i.a. Sen. *Epist.* 95.65-67, 72; *Epist.* 6.5 (*longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla*)

⁶⁵ Turpin 2008: 360, 363-8. A belief in the equal value of such negative *exempla* for deterrence can be seen in other authors as well, e.g. Livy, *praef.* 10; Valerius Maximus *passim*; and apparently Sempronius Asellio (*Gellius* 5.18.7).

⁶⁶ Although few individuals in Sallust are unqualifiedly positive, there are certainly positive judgments passed on a handful of characters, from Cicero in the *BC* to Q. Lutatius Catulus in the *Histories* (*Hist.* 5.23M). Sallust’s negative *exempla*, however, are often crafted in a more complicated way, inasmuch as few characters can safely be called fully bad; instead, we find many characters who blend good potential and negative traits together: e.g. Catiline, Jugurtha, Marius, Metellus Numidicus (cf. *BJ* 43-5, 52 to 64, 73, 82-3), Lepidus, Spartacus, Pompey (cf. *Hist.* 2.16-17M, 3.88M, 5.20M), C. Aurelius Cotta (*Hist.* 2.42, 47M; cf. Rosenblitt 2011), Antonius Creticus (*Hist.* 3.1-3M, 4.52M).

⁶⁷ Turpin 2008: 373. Cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.103-29 for the use of *mala exempla* in Epicurean thought.

philosophically (or Stoically) motivated,⁶⁸ and there are reasons to share some of Turpin's skepticism. As Sallust himself makes abundantly clear throughout each of his works, he was writing at a time when political culture left few untainted.⁶⁹ Additionally, if Sallust (or any other author in the late Republic) was in need of *exempla* either positive or negative, the Roman literary tradition itself would have provided them in abundance, as this was a particularly Roman mode of discourse. To explain, therefore, Sallust's penchant for drawing morally complicated characters as a reflex of his alleged Stoic underpinnings would be injudicious.

To continue on the subject of Stoic ethics, the Stoic sage, the virtuous one, is not worried about how things actually play out, and is happy even if he does not attain the preferred indifferents (health, etc.) which he selects, as long as he lives rationally in accordance with the divine nature of the cosmos. For this making of rational choices in accord with nature shows one is engaged in perfecting one's nature and exercising virtue, and it is solely through exercising virtue that one achieves the good, and thus achieves true happiness.⁷⁰ Whether or not one agrees in principle with this notion, there is a related idea in Stoic thought which seems to find a parallel in Sallust's moral discourse in the prologues – namely, the self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) of the virtuous person.⁷¹ On this principle the true wise man, one whose “divine” rational faculty (*animus*) is always guiding his decisions and actions, makes himself independent of the vicissitudes of

⁶⁸ Turpin 2008: 376n77, citing Sallust's discourse in *BJ* 4.5-6 on the importance of *exempla virtutis* to great Romans of the previous generations for moral inspiration.

⁶⁹ *Omnibus pariter corruptis* (*Hist.* 1.12M; cf. 1.13). Besides the moral decline more broadly conveyed by the narrative proper in each work, cf. *BC* 10.4-6 on the precipitous decline in morality among the political class (greed, cruelty, insolence, and especially dishonesty), along with *BC* 12-13, 36.4-39.4, *BJ* 2.4-4.9, 41.1-42.5.

⁷⁰ On this notion of rational choice, and that of *autarkeia*, see Baltzly 2014.

⁷¹ Also pointed out by Goodyear 1982: 272.

fortune (or, perhaps more properly for a Stoic, Fate) which so often bring ruin on others.

Similarly, Sallust asserts the following (*BJ* 1.1-5, my emphasis):

Falso queritur de natura sua genus humanum, quod inbecilla atque aevi brevis forte potius quam virtute regatur. [2] Nam contra reputando neque maius aliud neque praestabilius invenias magisque naturae industriam hominum quam vim aut tempus deesse. [3] Sed dux atque imperator vitae mortalium animus est. Qui ubi ad gloriam virtutis via grassatur, abunde pollens potensque et clarus est neque fortuna eget, quippe quae probitatem, industriam aliasque artis bonas neque dare neque eripere cuiquam potest [4]... ubi per socordiam vires tempus ingenium diffluxere, naturae infirmitas accusatur... [5] Quod si hominibus bonarum rerum tanta cura esset, quanto studio aliena ac nihil profutura multaque etiam periculosa ac perniciosa petunt, neque regerentur magis quam regerent casus et eo magnitudinis procederent, ubi pro mortalibus gloria aeterni fierent.

It is wrong for mankind to find fault with its nature on the ground that, being weak and of short duration, that nature is controlled more by chance than by virtue. [2] On the contrary, one may discover, on reflection, that nothing is greater and more outstanding, and that it is diligence that human nature lacks rather than strength or longevity. [3] But the leader and commander of mortals' lives is the mind. And when it advances to glory by the path of virtue, it is abundantly powerful and potent, as well as illustrious, and it has no need for good luck, since luck can neither give to nor take away from any man honesty, diligence, and other good qualities. [4]...when strength, time, and talents have wasted away through indolence, the weakness of human nature stands accused...[5] But if men had as much concern for honorable enterprises as they have eagerness for pursuing what is foreign to their interests and bound to be unprofitable and often even dangerous and destructive, they would control events rather than be controlled by them, and would advance to such a degree of greatness where glory would make them eternal instead of mortal. (transl. Ramsey 2013, adapted)

At its most basic Sallust's idea – that by letting the rational mind rule and guide one by the path of virtue, one gains control of his or her life and does not suffer the blows of chance or fortune (*fors, fortuna*) – essentially matches the Stoic concept of *autarkeia* – at least in terms of freeing oneself from the buffetings of an outside force of some kind.⁷² Nor is this the only place where Sallust expresses a similar idea. In the beginning of the *BC* Sallust already had prominently established the link whereby a lack of upright conduct guided by the rational mind will leave one dangerously exposed to the ebb and flow of *fortuna* (*BC* 2.5-6): *nam imperium facile iis artibus retinetur quibus initio partum est; verum ubi pro labore desidia, pro continentia et aequitate lubido atque superbia*

⁷² See, e.g., Sen. *Ep.* 36.6: *in mores fortuna ius non habet*.

invasere, fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur (“For sovereignty is easily preserved by those same qualities by which it was obtained; but when in place of hard work, self-restraint, and justness laziness, lust, and pride invade, fortune changes in step with one’s morality.”). Likewise, Sallust reiterates later in the *BJ* preface that *animus incorruptus, aeternus, rector humani generis agit atque habet cuncta neque ipse habetur* (“the spirit, uncorrupted, eternal, guider of the human race sets in motion and controls all things, and is not itself controlled.” *BJ* 2.3⁷³). This is an interesting convergence of thought, but if Sallust were invested enough to commit to a Stoic notion of *virtus* in both of his prologues, one would like to see a more robust framework of recognizably (and specifically) Stoic elements in the prologues surrounding the above passages.⁷⁴

When one looks at the later imperial Stoic teachings of Epictetus, one could perhaps argue that it is possible to see in the structure of the first chapter of his *Handbook* (*Enchiridion*), transmitted through his pupil Arrian, the same sequence of ideas as we find in Sallust *BJ* 1-3 – including the idea of *autarkeia*. Like both Sallustian prologues, the *Handbook* begins its discussion in binary terms (*Ench.* 1.1): τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (“Of things, some are in our power, and others are not”).⁷⁵

This internal-external opposition is then expanded, and a moral element becomes apparent (*Ench.* 1.1-2):

⁷³ Transl. Ramsey 2013. Cf. also *BJ* 10.6 for the relationship between moral behavior and the flourishing of one’s state or kingdom.

⁷⁴ Yet even if Sallust had in mind the Stoic idea of *autarkeia*, we should be wary of inferring his unconditional acceptance of the concept: our discussion in Chapter 6.2 will demonstrate further that, despite the theoretical potential Sallust outlines in the prologues for humans to overcome their bodily impulses and be ruled by *animus/bonum ingenium*/reason, the actual course of his narratives in the *BC* and *BJ* shows that no Roman is really capable of attaining anything close to this ideal in practice. One may note, however, a Stoic aspect to Sallust’s conception of *virtus* in the main narratives (see below, Chapter 6.1b), in that Sallust has *virtus* open to all men, Roman and non-Roman.

⁷⁵ Cf. Epictetus *Discourses* 1.1.7-9

ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, ὄρεξις, ἔκκλησις καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμέτερα ἔργα: οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, δόξαι, ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅσα οὐχ ἡμέτερα ἔργα. [2] καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φύσει ἐλεύθερα, ἀκώλυτα, ἀπαραπόδιστα, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀσθενῆ, δοῦλα, κωλυτά, ἀλλότρια.

In our power are opinion, movement towards a thing, desire, aversion, and in a word, whatever are our own acts: not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others.

(Transl. G. Long 1890)

Clearly those things under our control – our own internal impulses and actions – are given a positive moral valuation, while those things οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν are external to the individual and dangerous because they are outside our control. This is somewhat akin to the distinction in Sallust between body and soul, and the pursuits which follow the nature of each: *sed nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur* (BC 1.2); *nam uti genus humanum conpositum ex corpore et anima est, ita res cunctae studiaque omnia nostra corporis alia, alia animi naturam secuntur* (BJ 2.1).

Additionally, the list of things not under our control given at *Ench.* 1.1 τὸ σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, δόξαι, ἀρχαί) finds a strong echo in a list at Sallust BJ 2.2: *igitur praeclara facies* [τὸ σῶμα], *magnae divitiae* [ἡ κτῆσις], *ad hoc vis corporis* [τὸ σῶμα] *et alia omnia huiusce modi brevi dilabuntur*. Shortly thereafter Sallust's discussion hits on the other two things in that list, first at BJ 3.1: *verum ex iis magistratus et imperia* [ἀρχαί], *postremo omnis cura rerum publicarum, minime mihi hac tempestate cupiunda*). The obsession with δόξαι, moreover, may be detected in BJ 3.1 (*neque virtuti honos*

datur...tuti aut eo magis honesti sunt) and in the mention of *odium* and the loss of *decus* in *BJ* 3.3-4.⁷⁶

Lastly Sallust's idea, repeated in various places in the prologues (*BJ* 1.1-5, *BJ* 2.3, *BC* 2.5-6), of making oneself independent of fortune by letting the *animus* rule finds a sort of parallel in the first chapter of the *Enchiridion* (*Ench.* 1.2-3, my emphasis):

καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φύσει ἐλεύθερα, ἀκώλυτα, ἀπαραπόδιστα, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄσθενῆ, δοῦλα, κωλυτά, ἀλλότρια. μέμνησο οὖν, [3] ὅτι, ἐὰν τὰ φύσει δοῦλα ἐλεύθερα οἰηθῇς καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἴδια, ἐμποδισθήσῃ, πενθήσεις, ταραχθήσῃ, μέμψῃ καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ σὸν μόνον οἰηθῇς σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλότριον, οὐδεὶς σε ἀναγκάσει οὐδέποτε, οὐδεὶς σε κωλύσει, οὐ μέμψῃ οὐδένα, οὐκ ἐγκαλέσεις τινί, ἄκων πράξεις οὐδὲ ἓν, οὐδεὶς σε βλάψει, ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ἔξεις, οὐδὲ γὰρ βλαβερόν τι πείσῃ.

And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others. Remember then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men: but if you think that only which is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is another's, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man, you will do nothing involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm. (Transl. G. Long)

Now it is not surprising that we would find this idea about gaining control of one's life, freeing oneself from the dictates of fortune (or Fate), featured prominently at the start of this practical handbook of moral philosophy and instruction. That we see this same general idea reflected in Sallust, however, is at the least suggestive, especially given the two additional similarities outlined above between the beginning of the *Handbook* and the prologues of the *BC* and particularly the *BJ*. It is unclear, however, what this similarity may indicate,⁷⁷ and it is still possible (perhaps probable) that the idea about freeing oneself from the dictates of *fors/fortuna* was drawn by Sallust, in the course of his

⁷⁶ Cf. *BC* 1.4: *divitiarum et formae gloria fluxa atque fragilis est* – which phrase implies *ktēsis*, *sōma*, and *doxai*.

⁷⁷ On the possibility of another later author considering Sallust a Stoic, see also below on Seneca *Ep.* 60.

education or reading, from a cultural common stock of ideas. Therefore Sallust's expression of a concept near to *autarkeia*, and the similarities observed between Sallust's prologues and the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus, cannot serve as conclusive proof of Sallust's Stoicism.⁷⁸

To take a more general look at the issue of Stoicism in Sallust, one might look at the historical context of the 40s and 30s B.C.E. in which Sallust composed his works. Of the uncertain and potentially deadly environment during the civil wars Gildenhard says "it takes a Stoic sage to face with equanimity a social environment that is utterly unpredictable."⁷⁹ While this may indeed have been the view to which practicing Stoics subscribed, it does not necessarily mean that everyone would eventually find their way to Stoicism as the only viable way to cope with the nature of the age. Indeed, as our earlier discussion showed, not everyone turned to Stoicism; some turned to Epicureanism, some to Platonism and the Academy, to cope with uncertainty and with tyranny.⁸⁰ To say, therefore, that Stoic doctrine would inevitably draw in educated Romans is different from the basic claim that Stoicism was *amenable* to coping with the troubles of that age. While Stoicism might have been in some ways the philosophy of Republican resistance during the early empire, it was not the only school of thought which played an important role in the last generations of the Republic.

Evidence from other early imperial Stoic writings might be called upon as well.

Seneca's *Epistulae Morales* are a source of numerous discussions of Stoic (and other)

⁷⁸ Again, the fact that a committed Stoic would not speak about a world ruled specifically by chance/*fortuna* must tell against the ultimate Stoic origin of Sallust's idea of making oneself independent of fortune by the exercise of *animi virtus* – even if the overlap between Sallust's concept and Stoic *autarkeia* seems suggestive.

⁷⁹ Gildenhard, 2006: 200.

⁸⁰ See above, Chapter 4.1.

philosophy, yet amidst such a glut of theorizing, it is hard to hit upon any specific ideas that echo Sallustian thought in great detail or with any consistency. For instance, in *Ep.* 14.7-10 Seneca recommends that one avoid aggravating or associating with powerful people, and that one steer clear of *odium*, *invidia* and *contemptus* – sentiments with which Sallust might agree (e.g. *BJ* 3, *BC* 4.2). Yet Seneca also advises that one avoid having things that such powerful men might want to take, and Sallust appears to have worked hard to retain a good deal of his wealth into his retirement.⁸¹ Further on in the letter, Seneca says that the wise man should not get involved in politics; at the end of the Republic, especially, it was not a matter of freedom, but merely of picking a tyrant (*Ep.* 14.12-13).⁸² Sallust, of course, agrees, but only in retrospect; many men, moreover, would have shared the same sentiment without getting involved in philosophical commitments.

In *Ep.* 19 Seneca writes about retirement again. He says one's retirement should be neither paraded nor concealed (*Neque ego suaserim tibi nomen ex otio petere, quod nec iactare debes nec abscondere, Ep.* 19.2); it should be obvious without being conspicuous (*ut otium tuum non emineat sed appareat*). Sallust may (though it is unclear) have lived up to this precept in the manner of his actual retirement; what is clear, however, is that his *written* account of his retirement was principally motivated by the need to establish

⁸¹ Compare the similar advice at *Ep.* 22.12 to which Sallust apparently did not pay heed: *Sed si propter hoc tergiversaris, ut circumspicias quantum feras tecum et quam magna pecunia instruas otium, numquam exitum invenies: nemo cum sarcinis enatat*. Here and in the analysis of Sen. *Ep.* 19 directly below, arguments from Sallust's biography are brought in – not as representing our best type of evidence, but in order to show that, even when we stretch to accommodate these letters of Seneca to Sallust's writings and thought, drawing even upon biographical information, we are still hard-pressed to establish more than a superficial and inconsistent resemblance between the themes and positions of the two authors.

⁸² *Quid tibi vis, arce Cato? iam non agitur de libertate: olim pessum data est. Quaeritur utrum Caesar an Pompeius possideat rem publicam: quid tibi cum ista contentione? nullae partes tuae sunt. Dominus eligitur: quid tua, uter vincat? potest melior vincere, non potest non peior esse qui vicerit.*

the authority of his historical persona – especially given the checkered public career he had led. The philosophical veneer which he gave to this written defense of retirement, moreover, is decidedly not Stoic, but rather drawn from Plato's *Seventh Letter*.

Later in *Ep.* 19 Seneca remarks that there will never be an end to one's desires and lust for more as one seeks ever higher offices, so the cord should be cut now (*Ep.* 19.5-6). He will express a similar sentiment in *Ep.* 36.1, when he states that it is acceptable to retire from political life before attaining every possible honor.⁸³ While we can say that such sentiments on the endless pursuit of office would have been *amenable* to Sallust after his experience in politics, that is all we can say. Sallust nowhere reproduces these two statements (*Ep.* 19.5-6; 36.1) in exact terms (though the sentiment in *BJ* 3.1&3 is close). In Horace, however, and even in Lucretius, we do find these exact sentiments.⁸⁴

Likewise Seneca's subsequent call for withdrawal from political life at *Ep.* 19.8 would at most have been amenable to Sallust in a general way, apart from any connection it had to Seneca's Stoic beliefs:

'Quomodo' inquis 'exibo?' Utcumque. Cogita quam multa temere pro pecunia, quam multa laboriose pro honore temptaveris: aliquid et pro otio audendum est, aut in ista sollicitudine procuratorum et deinde urbanorum officiorum senescendum, in tumultu ac semper novis fluctibus quos effugere nulla modestia, nulla vitae quiete contingit.

"But," you say, "how can I take my leave?" Any way you please. Reflect how many hazards you have ventured for the sake of money, and how much toil you have undertaken for a title! You must dare something to gain leisure, also, – or else grow old amid the worries of procuratorships abroad and subsequently of civil duties at home, living in turmoil and in ever fresh floods of responsibilities, which no man has ever succeeded in avoiding by unobtrusiveness or by seclusion of life. (Transl. R.M. Gummere 1917-25)

⁸³ Sen. *Ep.* 36.1: *Amicum tuum hortare ut istos magno animo contemnat qui illum obiurgant quod umbram et otium petierit, quod dignitatem suam destituerit et, cum plus consequi posset, praetulerit quietem omnibus; quam utiliter suum negotium gesserit cotidie illis ostendet.* Cf. also Sen. *Ep.* 22.4, Sall. *BJ* 4.4: *profecto existimabunt me magis merito quam ignavia iudicium animi mei mutavisse maiusque commodum ex otio meo quam ex aliorum negotiis rei publicae venturum.*

⁸⁴ E.g. Hor. *Sat.* 1.6.99-104, Lucr. *DRN* 3.995-1010.

Such calls to retirement are not rare in Seneca's letters. For instance, in *Ep.* 22.8 Seneca states (my emphasis):

Dicentur tibi ista, si operae pretium habebit perseverantia, si nihil indignum bono viro faciendum patiendumve erit; alioqui sordido se et contumelioso labore non conteret nec in negotiis erit negotii causa. Ne illud quidem quod existimas facturum eum faciet, ut ambitiosis rebus implicitus semper aestus earum ferat; sed cum viderit gravia in quibus volutatur, incerta, ancipitia, referet pedem, non vertet terga, sed sensim recedet in tutum.

Words like these will indeed be spoken to you, if only your perseverance shall have an object that is worth while, if only you will not have to do or to suffer anything unworthy of a good man; besides, a good man will not waste himself upon mean and discreditable work or be busy merely for the sake of being busy. Neither will he, as you imagine, become so involved in ambitious schemes that he will have continually to endure their ebb and flow. Nay, when he sees the dangers, uncertainties, and hazards in which he was formerly tossed about, he will withdraw, – not turning his back to the foe, but falling back little by little to a safe position.

(Transl. R.M. Gummere 1917-25)

In *sordido se et contumelioso labore non conteret*, one may find a faint echo of Sallust's claim that in his retirement will not be wasted in sloth, or *serviliis officiis intentum* (*BC* 4.1), yet Seneca is referring to time wasted in the dirty business of politics rather than farming and hunting, and so the parallel rests merely in the expression, not in the thought. To *nec in negotiis erit negotii causa* one might compare Sallust's assertion that his retirement will benefit the Republic more than the pointless political careers of many of his contemporaries (*BJ* 4.4). Yet here there is a faint echo of ideas, but none of language. As with the call to withdrawal in *Ep.* 19.8, so with the rest of *Ep.* 22.8 there seem to be no strong correspondences with Sallust in the specifics, and we can at most say that the general sentiment of withdrawal from the troubled waters of politics in *Ep.* 22.8 would have been *amenable* to Sallust after the end of his political career.

Overall, the connections which Sallust exhibits with various passages in Seneca's *Epistles* do not approach any type of specificity, and as a result any coincidence of perspectives one can claim between the two authors need not be attributed to Stoicism on Sallust's part. Indeed, Sallust's own checkered career alone, and the public disgrace he

might have faced as a result of it, could have supplied Sallust with sufficient motivation for adopting a negative view of political life and making a decision to withdraw into retirement.

The case for Posidonian influence on Sallust's moral thought and historiographical practices is perhaps more promising. Still, F.R.D. Goodyear had already noted that "we should, here as elsewhere, equally resist the current trend to discount Posidonius' influence and the earlier trend to magnify it."⁸⁵ The discussion below takes this as a salutary premise. We will begin by exploring some general philosophical concepts present in Sallust's prologues which feature also in Posidonian philosophy, and then we will proceed on to discuss aspects of Posidonian ethnography and historiography which might have influenced Sallust's own historiographical practice.

Traditionally Stoics had a monistic conception of the soul, seeing it as a single substance. The soul has different "faculties" but they are all functions of the *hēgemonikon* (rational faculty). Unlike the tri-partite soul of Platonic philosophy, Stoics commonly held that all impulses and desires arise from some function of the *hēgemonikon*. Posidonius, however, challenged certain aspects of this Chrysippean monistic view of the soul and of Chrysippus' view of the emotions as well. Although Posidonius still considered the soul to be of one substance,⁸⁶ he developed what one might call a "dualistic" view of the soul inasmuch as it was a view that recognized two general faculties of the soul, a rational and an irrational. The irrational faculty, however, was itself comprised of two faculties (*dynameis*), *epithumia* and *thumos*, making for three

⁸⁵ Goodyear 1982: 272n1.

⁸⁶ See e.g. F146 EK

overall faculties.⁸⁷ While this appears to have some affinity to Plato's concept (and Posidonius in other respects held Plato's ideas in high regard⁸⁸), it differs in that Plato saw each part of the soul as being of different substance and location.⁸⁹ Posidonius, then, mostly operates under the overarching assumption that the soul is comprised of a rational and an irrational aspect.

This dual nature of man is of course a concept to which Sallust gives prominence in his prologues. While Sallust may not say that the human *soul* is comprised of two parts, he clearly divides man himself into rational and irrational aspects:

BC 1.2: sed nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur. Alterum cum dis, alterum cum beluis commune est.

BC 1.5: sed diu magnum inter mortalis certamen fuit vine corporis an virtute animi res militaris magis procederet.

BJ 2.1-2: Nam uti genus humanum conpositum ex corpore et anima est, ita res cunctae studiaque omnia nostra corporis alia, alia animi naturam secuntur...vis corporis aliaque omnia huiusce modi brevi dilabuntur; at ingeni egregia facinora sicuti anima immortalia sunt.

Besides this dualistic concept of human nature, the prologue of the *BC* also characterizes those who focus on bodily pleasures as like animals (*veluti pecora, quae natura prona ac ventri oboedientia finxit, BC 1.1*).⁹⁰ Posidonius frequently discusses this connection between emotions and our animalistic side as well. Posidonius disagrees with

⁸⁷ e.g. F31 EK ([*to logistikon*] καθάπερ ἡνιόχῳ τινὶ τοῦ ζεύγους τῶν συντρόφων ἵππων ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ θυμοῦ), 32 EK (δείκνυσιν ἐν τῇ Περὶ παθῶν πραγματείᾳ διοικουμένους ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τριῶν δυνάμεων, ἐπιθυμητικῆς τε καὶ θυμοειδοῦς καὶ λογιστικῆς), 142 EK, 143 EK, 144 EK, 158 EK, 160 EK (= 169b EK: τριῶν οὖν τούτων ἡμῖν οἰκειώσεων ὑπαρχουσῶν φύσει, καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν νίκην διὰ τὸ θυμοειδές, πρὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ λογιστικόν), 161 EK. On the more broadly "dualistic" nature of the soul in Posidonian thought cf. F147 EK.

⁸⁸ Cf. T95 EK, T99 EK, F165b EK, F31b, d. On Posidonius' general knowledge of Plato see Kidd *Comm.* p.159.

⁸⁹ Baltzly 2014. cf. Cooper 1999: 449–84.

⁹⁰ Cf. *BC* 2.8, *BJ* 2.4

the argument of other Stoics – especially Chrysippus – that animals (and children) have no share in emotions because emotions are part of the rational faculty (*to logikon*).

Chrysippus believed the soul to be made of a single substance, which was wholly rational, and so emotions were “mistaken judgments”, corruptions of the rational soul.

Thus animals, which lack the rational faculty, and children, whose rational faculty is not yet developed, cannot have emotion.⁹¹ Posidonius, by contrast, seems to have believed that animals were governed by desire (*epithumia*) and passion (*thymos*), and that man too has these, but also *to logikon* (F33 EK). Children, according to Posidonius, have emotions as well; they “rush untaught toward pleasures” and avert themselves from pains. They rage, kick, bite, and desire to outdo other children “like some animals”.⁹²

Posidonius held (as did Plato) that humans should be molded and educated as young children in their rational *and* irrational faculties, such that the irrational “displays a proper proportion in its movements, and obedience to the commands of reason.”⁹³ In his analogy – borrowed from Plato *Phdr.* 246a 6f – Posidonius likens the rational faculty in children to a charioteer and the irrational parts to two horses, over which children eventually gain control with training, as charioteers do their horses.⁹⁴ In yet another passage Posidonius makes a distinction between the proper goals (or *oikeiōseis*, “affinities”) of the irrational faculties and those of the rational faculty (F161 EK). The latter are proper goals, and thus good, without qualification. The proper goals of the two

⁹¹ See Kidd *Comm.* p.571-3

⁹² F169a EK: ἄττει μὲν γὰρ ἀδιδάκτως ἅπαντα τὰ παιδιά πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀποστρέφεται δὲ καὶ φεύγει τοὺς πόνους. ὁρῶμεν δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ θυμούμενα καὶ λακτίζοντα καὶ δάκνοντα καὶ νικᾶν ἐθέλοντα καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν τοιούτων, ὥσπερ ἕνα τῶν ζώων, οὐδενὸς ἄθλου προβαλλομένου παρὰ τὸ νικᾶν αὐτό. All translations of Posidonius are those of Kidd 1999.

⁹³ F31c EK: χρή τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς σύμμετρον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ταῖς κινήσεσι καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου προστάγμασιν εὐπειθές. Cf. F148 EK.

⁹⁴ F31d EK. On the horse-charioteer analogy see Kidd *Comm.* p.159, 608-9, and F166 EK.

irrational faculties, however, do not have equal value to those of the rational faculty; for the goals of pleasure and power are “goals of the animal aspect of our soul”, while “wisdom and all that is good and moral together are the goals of the rational and divine aspect.”⁹⁵ If, therefore, one does not follow the divine and rational aspect, one deviates and is “swept along by what is worse and beast-like.”⁹⁶

Alongside the dualistic soul and the animal-emotion connection we find a third theme in Sallust’s prologues with a strong echo in Posidonian thought – namely, the concept that the divine rational element (*to logikon/to hēgemonikon*, or in Sallust’s case the *animus*) should rule. One should in no way be led by the irrational part of the soul (κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, F186.3).⁹⁷ In fact, Posidonius says πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ [i.e. happiness] τὸ κατὰ μηδὲν ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου τε καὶ κακοδαίμονος καὶ ἀθέου τῆς ψυχῆς (“the foremost thing in happiness is to be led in no way by the irrational and unhappy and godless part of the soul.” F187a EK). Yet there is no need to eradicate the irrational aspect of the soul. As Kidd remarks, “There is no question of eradicating this aspect...but of [a] relationship of subservience *and* obedience to the ruling (*hegemonikon*) rational aspect.”⁹⁸ Indeed Posidonius himself states, αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη παίδων παιδεία, παρασκευὴ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐπιτηδειοτάτη ᾗ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ (“This is the best education for children, a preparation of the emotional faculty of soul so that it be most conformable to the rule of the rational faculty.” F148 EK). We have already seen, moreover, how Posidonius employs the

⁹⁵ F161 EK: τὸ μὲν ἡδεσθαί τε καὶ τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν πέλας τοῦ ζωώδους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ὀρεκτά, σοφία δὲ καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλὸν ἅμα τοῦ λογικοῦ τε καὶ θείου.

⁹⁶ F187a EK: τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου...τῷ δὲ χεῖρονι καὶ ζωῶδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι.

⁹⁷ On the reliability of attributing this line to Posidonius himself see Kidd *Comm.* p.674.

⁹⁸ Kidd *Comm.* p.677. Cf. *ibid.* p.160: “Posidonius was not aiming at the eradication of the irrational elements, which have their *oikeia aretē*, but at their submission to reason.”

analogy of a charioteer controlling his two horses to describe the way in which the rational faculty should control the irrational and guide the soul's impulses (F31d EK).

Likewise Sallust avows at the outset of the *BC* *quo mihi rectius videtur ingenii quam virium opibus gloriam quaerere* ("how much more appropriate it seems to me to seek glory by the resources of the mind than by those of force", *BC* 1.2). It was also established, in Sallust's view, that *in bello plurimum ingenium posse* ("in war the abilities of the mind have greater power", *BC* 2.2).⁹⁹ The entire first chapter of the *BJ* is also a defense of the (theoretical) power of the *animus* to guide human endeavors – despite mankind's complaints about the weakness of human nature. The *animus* is the *dux atque imperator vitae mortalium*, and when it seeks glory *virtutis via* (by the path of virtue), that man will not suffer the blows of *fortuna* and will approach as close as a mortal can to the eternal glory of the divine (*BJ* 1.1-3). If, however, one gives oneself over to the pleasures of the body and of the animal-like aspect of the soul, it puts one at the mercy of the ebb and flow of events (*BJ* 1.4-5; cf. 2.4). Unlike beauty, riches, strength, and the like, *ingeni egregia facinora sicuti anima immortalia sunt* ("the outstanding deeds of the mind, like the soul itself, are immortal." *BJ* 2.2-3), and the *animus* is *aeternus, rector humani generis* (2.3).

That the three concepts discussed above feature prominently in both Posidonian thought and in the discourse of Sallust's prologues is likely of some significance. Nevertheless, no direct allusions can yet be identified in Sallust to particular extant passages in Posidonius, and this is an important limitation of any conjecture one might be inclined to make from the evidence. Indeed, a brief look at other early sources shows that

⁹⁹ Moreover, human affairs would not be so unstable if mental excellence in leaders were as great in peacetime as it is in wartime (*BC* 2.3).

there were probably several other than Posidonius in which Sallust could have found ideas about the body-mind duality, the animal-emotion connection, and the need to let the divine mind rule. Some of these other echoes are extensive, in particular Xenophon¹⁰⁰ and Aristotle.¹⁰¹ Kidd is right to advise caution against the overeager and indirect discovery of Posidonian influence through later writers who may have used him without citation¹⁰²; but even in the present case, when we are exploring connections between Sallust and attested fragments of Posidonius, we must be open to the possibility of multiple other (or additional) sources for the formation of Sallust's thought.

¹⁰⁰ See in particular Xenophon, *Hiero* 7.3-4: καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἱέρων, τούτῳ διαφέρειν ἀνὴρ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, τῷ τιμῆς ὀρέγεσθαι [BC 1.1]. ἐπεὶ σιτίοις γε καὶ ποτοῖς καὶ ὕπνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις πάντα ὁμοίως ἡδεσθαι ἔοικε τὰ ζῷα [BJ 2.2, 2.4.3]: ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ἐμφύεται οὐτ' ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις [BC 2.8-9, BJ 2.4]: οἷς δ' ἂν ἐμφύη τιμῆς τε καὶ ἐπαίνου ἔρως, οὗτοί εἰσιν ἤδη οἱ πλεῖστον μὲν τῶν βοσκημάτων διαφέροντες [BC 1.1 (surpassing animals), 1.3 (seeking gloria)], ἄνδρες δὲ καὶ οὐκέτι ἄνθρωποι μόνον νομιζόμενοι. [4] ὥστε ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰκότως δοκεῖτε ταῦτα πάντα ὑπομένειν ἃ φέρετε ἐν τῇ τυραννίδι, ἐπεὶ περ τιμᾶσθε διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὐδεμία ἀνθρωπίνη ἡδονὴ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυτέρω δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰς τιμὰς εὐφροσύνη [BC 1.4, BJ 1.5 (glory, achieved through virtue, brings one closer to the divine)]. Plato too had discussed the need to seek a life in accord with higher dictates of the soul and how this brings one closer to the gods, distances one from the animal aspect of ourselves: *Rep.* 520a-b, 496c-97a, 592a, 613a-b. For another early instance of this duality of body and mind, ruler/ruled, see Antiphon, *On Truth* fr. 87 B2 Diels (*Vorsokratiker*) (Πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ἡ γνώμη τοῦ σώματος ἡγεῖται καὶ εἰς ὑγίειαν καὶ νόσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα).

¹⁰¹ To Sallust's BC 1.1 (*praestare ceteris animalibus...veluti pecora*), cf. Aristl. *Eth.Nic.* 1.5.3 (οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ); To BJ 1.3.9 cf. *Eth.Nic.* 1.5.4 (τὰ γὰρ ἀθὼν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσσαφάρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα). As just one example of a more sustained echo (Aristotle in *Eth.Eud.* 1215b30ff-1216a), Aristotle asks what things in life would make living better than not having been born, commenting (1215b30ff) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, ἃς τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἂν εἴς προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν, μὴ παντελῶς ὢν ἀνδράποδον. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ ταύτην ποιουμένῳ τὴν αἵρεσιν οὐθὲν ἂν διενέγκειε γενέσθαι θηρίον ἢ ἄνθρωπον (cf. Sallust's *veluti pecora*). He then states sleep does not make life worth living either, because a life devoted to sleep is like death (1216a): ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καθεύδειν ἡδονήν: τί γὰρ διαφέρει καθεύδειν ἀνέγερτον ὕπνον ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν χιλίων ἢ ὅπως αὐτοῦ, ἢ ζῆν ὄντα φυτὸν; All of *Eth.Eud.* 1215b30-1216a thus echoes BC 2.8 strongly (*Sed multi mortales, dediti ventri* [*Eth. Eud.* 1215b30f] *atque somno* [1216a], *indocti incultique vitam sicuti peregrinantes transiere; quibus profecto contra naturam corpus voluptati, anima oneri fuit. Eorum ego vitam mortemque iuxta aestumo, quoniam de utraque siletur* [1216a]).

¹⁰² Kidd 1999: 2 ("The earlier methodology of 'discovering' Posidonius throughout later literature in supposed parallels and inferred echoes derived from a conjectured common source of an ubiquitous Posidonius, was dangerously subjective, and indeed led to contradictory theories.")

With this admonition in mind, we may also explore the nature of historiography in Posidonius' philosophical system. While some philosophical schools considered the arts and sciences to be anywhere from useless to propaedeutic, with Stoic views varying on the issue, Posidonius seems to have considered them tools – but essential ones – of philosophy.¹⁰³ As, for example, math was the subsience or tool to logic, or astronomy a tool of natural philosophy, so too historiography could be considered a tool of ethical philosophy and ethical instruction. As discussed earlier, in practical ethics and education Posidonius tried to close the gap between the Stoic sage and the common imperfect man. The latter needed not just logical training, but to have moral precepts imposed upon him from outside due to his inability to impose them upon himself.¹⁰⁴ Posidonius addressed this by developing a system of intermediate preparatory training, an “admonitory ethics” that relied heavily on moral precepts imposed through exhortation, persuasion, and *exempla*. Historiography, through its use of *exempla*, could therefore aid in the inculcation of Posidonius' moral and ethical philosophy.¹⁰⁵

Consequently, ethnography played an important role in Posidonian historiography (Kidd 1999: 56):

Posidonius thought that ethnography reveals the character and psychology of a people, and is a descriptive and aetiological key to their actions, and thus [to] historical explanation.

¹⁰³ Kidd *Comm.* p.363-5, citing F90 EK, 134 EK, 18 EK.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. F31 EK, where the horses (the irrational parts of the soul) must be trained to obey their master, the charioteer Reason, through the process of “irrational habituation” (ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀλόγοις τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν ἐπιστήμας οὐκ ἐγγίνεσθαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις, ἀλλὰ τούτοις μὲν τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἐξ ἐθισμού τινος ἀλόγου παραγίνεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἡνιόχοις ἐκ διδασκαλίας λογικῆς.). Sallust *BC* 6.7 seems to reflect rather well this idea of men needing moral rules imposed upon them because unable to impose them upon themselves.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Kidd 1999: 25. The Greek equivalent for the use of *exempla* was *ethologia* (Kidd 1999: 650-51). For prefaces emphasizing the moral admonitory function of history see e.g. D.S. 1.1.3-4, 37.4.1. On the possibility that Posidonius made such a statement at the beginning of his own *History*, see T80 EK, and the commentary of K. Dowden on BNJ 87 T12a (Dowden 2013).

This is true on both the individual level (through character description) as well as on the level of nations. The lengthy fragment on the brief tyranny of Athenion at Athens is a good example of such extended character portrayal applied to a relatively insignificant episode for moral illustration (F253 EK (= F36 Jac.)). Of the vivid, biting commentary on this supposed philosopher-tyrant and on the Athenian *dēmos*, Kidd remarks (1988: 886):

The choice of incident and its dramatization betrays a moralist's view of historiography, where the relation of events may for a time be sidetracked for an examination of the moral behavior which causes them.¹⁰⁶

Likewise on a national level we find Posidonius accounting for the Cimbrian invasions by appealing to their nomadic and piratical character rather than to economic or social factors (F272b EK).¹⁰⁷

With Sallust the use of character description and, on a national level, ethnography, also plays an important role in supplying the moral causation of political events.¹⁰⁸ The character sketches of Catiline and Jugurtha, and equally the *synkrisis* of Cato and Caesar, are key to an understanding of the motives of actors and the unfolding of events in each monograph, while others, such as Sempronius and the Philaeni, are included for ethical and moral coloring despite not being essential to the action of the main narrative.

Sallust's ethnography of the early inhabitants of Africa (*BJ* 17-19) as well as his

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Kidd 1988: 864, 866. Cf. also the comment of Dowden (s.v. F7 Jac.) on the role of Posidonius' depiction of the Sicilian Damophilus during the time of the First Sicilian Slave Revolt: "It is important to discern that Damophilus, though a typically colourful Poseidonian character...and though cited as the trigger for these events, in fact represents something larger. His *tryphē* ('luxurious living') is a symptom of the exponential increase in wealth in Sicily following the Carthaginian Wars...This breeds arrogantly violent forms of behaviour in the wealthy...which then in this case cascaded to others, namely the depredations by slaves and the violence of their subsequent revolt."

¹⁰⁷ Cf. also F54 EK (description of the luxurious accoutrements of the Apameans and Larisaeans on the way to war as moral *exemplum*).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Paul 1984: 263.

digression on the early inhabitants of Rome, play crucial roles in helping the reader to interpret the relationships between events and actors across both monographs.¹⁰⁹ It is, however, unlikely that Posidonius would have been the only source available to Sallust for a brand of historical writing that included ethical and ethnological descriptions as a key to historical explanation. Nevertheless, it is worth consideration as part of the totality of possible Posidonian influences on Sallust's writing.

Another principle, taken from Posidonius' philosophy of the emotions, which he applies equally at the individual and national levels, is that the root of all evil action is not external, but internal. Galen in his *de Sequela* 819-20 attacks Stoics views on the sources of moral corruption and brings in Posidonius, who also refutes the common Stoic dogma (F35c EK):

οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ Ποσειδωνίῳ δοκεῖ τὴν κακίαν ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιέναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδεμίαν ἔχουσαν ἰδίαν ρίζαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν, ὅθεν ὀρμωμένη βλαστάνει τε καὶ αὐξάνεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦναντίον· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ τῆς κακίας ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς σπέρμα... οὐ γάρ, ὥς οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φασιν, ἔξωθεν ἐπεισέρχεται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν τὸ σύμπαν τῆς κακίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεον ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσιν οἱ πονηροὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔξωθεν δ' ἔλαττον τούτων πολλῷ τὸ ἐπεισερχόμενον ἐστίν.

Posidonius does not think either that vice comes in afterwards to human beings from outside, without a root of its own in our minds, starting from which it sprouts and grows big, but the very opposite. Yes, there is a seed even of evil in our own selves... For it is not the case, as the Stoics say, that the whole source of evil comes into our minds from outside us; no, in wicked men the greater part of it is internal, and only a very minor influence has an external source.

(Transl. Kidd 1999)

That minor external influence on character and morality of which Posidonius speaks may be environment.¹¹⁰ But this, he says, is only a minor factor. As an illustration of his view

¹⁰⁹ On the important role of the “ethnographies” of the early Romans and early Africans, see the extended discussion in Chapter 6.1

¹¹⁰ See F169a-c, and esp. F, in which we learn that according to Posidonius physiognomy impacts behavior (e.g. spirited or lazy, brave or cowardly), *but at a higher level of causality so does environment*. For *pathetike kineseis* (“emotional movements”) of the soul follow from the physical state, which itself is altered in no small part by the nature of the environment.

of the internal source of evil Posidonius discusses the Celtic tribe of the Scordistae, who illogically ban the use of gold while still using (and seeking out) silver (F240 EK). Gold caused them much suffering, but they still do bad things because of silver, and they would for bronze or iron as well; it is the impious behavior that they should have forsworn, not the metals for which they committed such acts.¹¹¹

So too one could argue that in Sallust the source of evil and vice is considered to be innate. Near the start of the *Histories* Sallust notes *nobis primae dissensiones vitio humani ingeni evenere, quod inquires atque indomitum semper in certamine libertatis aut gloriae aut dominationis agit* (“The first dissensions among us arose through an innate fault of the human spirit; for, since that spirit is restless and indomitable, it always finds itself in a struggle for either liberty or glory or political domination.” *Hist.* 1.7M).¹¹² Furthermore, in recounting the progress of moral history at Rome (*Hist.* 1.11M) Sallust argues that although Roman morality was at its best between the Second and Third Punic Wars, this was not because of love of justice, but fear of the enemy; for as soon as Carthage fell morality declined more than ever. To explain his qualification “more than ever” (*maxime aucta sunt*), he adds (my emphasis):

...iniuriae validiorum et ob eas discessio plebis a patribus aliaque dissensiones *domi fuere iam inde a principio*, neque amplius quam regibus exactis, dum metus a Tarquinio et bellum grave cum Etruria positum est, aequo et modesto iure agitatum.

...The injustices of the stronger and the secession of the plebs they caused, as well as other kinds of dissension, *were present already from the beginning*, and they did not act in a reasonable and moderate way any longer than that time after the expulsion of the kings when fear of Tarquin and a serious war with Etruria were set before them.

¹¹¹ On gold and riches being a “moral indifferent”, and more of an ancillary cause, to be distinguished from the inherent seed to evil already within us, see F170 EK with Kidd *Comm.* p.629. For another way in which Posidonius saw all men as having an element of evil inherent within themselves, see F263 EK with Kidd *Comm.* p.585.

¹¹² That the *vitium humani ingeni* mentioned here is an innate fault of human nature (rather than a fault that arose and existed only at this time of the early city) is suggested by the generalizing character of the rest of the fragment (use of *semper*, present tense of *agit*).

Sallust's attitude in the immediately following fragments supports this position that vice was inherent in the Roman character from the beginning. In *Hist.* 1.12M he reports that after the fear of Carthage was removed and Romans were free to exercise their rivalries again (*simultates exercere vacuum fuit*), all kinds of civil unrest and eventually civil war erupted. The fall of Carthage in 146 B.C.E., then, was indeed a major turning point in Roman morality and Roman history,¹¹³ but in Sallust's view moral decline had begun long before, and had its origins in the innate character of the Romans.¹¹⁴ The invasion of wealth, luxury, and greed with world empire may have been an incitement to *greater* vice, as the *BC* and *BJ* often point out, but the seed from which it grew greater was always there.¹¹⁵ In taking this internal view of the origins of vice Posidonius was certainly striking out on his own,¹¹⁶ and if this is indeed the perspective which Sallust conveys on the issue, it would be suggestive, though not by itself positive evidence of influence.

In two particulars, however, there seems a closer unity between Sallustian and Posidonian historiography. Firstly, on top of the emphasis Posidonius gave to ethnography and ethical instruction via historiography, he also, like Sallust, focused great

¹¹³ Which many scholars would argue Sallust took from Posidonius himself (McGushin 1977: 295; Hackl 1980). See Steidle 1958: 18 for arguments against seeing Posidonius as *the* source for Sallust's use of 146 B.C.E. as moral turning point (some of which depend upon analysis of Diodorus (D.S. 34/35.33; 37.3-5 and the relationship of Posidonius to Polybius' use of 168 BC as moral turning point)

¹¹⁴ *Hist.* 1.16M: *ex quo tempore* [146 B.C.E.] *maiorum mores non paulatim uti antea, sed torrentis modo praecipitati* ("From that time the ancestral practices did not decline gradually as they had before, but like a torrent."). For a discussion of how the depictions of early Romans in *BC* 6-9 and early Africans in *BJ* 17-19 are woven together by Sallust to challenge Roman claims to innate moral superiority, see Chapter 6.1-2.

¹¹⁵ For a detailed argument that Sallust implies an inborn flaw in the Roman character not only in the *Histories*, but also in the *BJ* and the *BC*, see Chapter 6.1 (*BJ*), 6.2 (*BC*). For the overall argument that Sallust was consistently pessimistic about human nature and Roman history in all his works, see Chapters 5-9 *passim*.

¹¹⁶ And found few followers among Stoics after him (Kidd *Comm.* p.178).

attention on the role of luxury (*tryphē*) in the history of events.¹¹⁷ While the term only appears four times in Polybius (4.21.1, 7.1.1, 7.8.7, 34.9.15), it appears over a dozen times in just the extant portions of Posidonius. It is a factor (whether the term is used explicitly or not) in the drawing of both individuals and nations, and features as a cause of major events.¹¹⁸ While there is no doubt that Sallust aligns with Posidonius on the role of luxury in determining moral and political developments, an emphasis on the role of wealth and luxury does not assure Posidonian influence, and other authors highlight the same motif.¹¹⁹

The second notable point in which Sallust echoes a particular idea of Posidonius is the analogy Posidonius promotes between mental sickness and physical disease (F163 EK).¹²⁰ In this fragment Posidonius finds fault with Chrysippus because he created a straight analogy between mental health and sickness on the one hand, and physical health and sickness on the other, when such an analogy was impossible. The problem arises when the analogy is applied to the Stoic sage, for there is no body – not even that of the wise man himself – that is immune to sickness like the wise man’s mind is immune to *pathē* (passions), so the analogy breaks down when applied to the sage.¹²¹ The analogy *can* be used, however, for the imperfect man (*phaulos*). He is to be considered simultaneously both healthy *and* sick with regard to his mind: his mind is healthy if it is not currently affected by *pathē*, yet even in this “healthy” state his mind is still *liable to*

¹¹⁷ See Dowden, K. 2013 s.v. F8 Jac.

¹¹⁸ Individuals: F58 EK, 59 EK, 61 EK, 63 EK, 64 EK, 67.37-53 EK, 72a/b EK, 77 EK, 78 EK, 240 EK, 253 EK, F24 J. Nations: F54 EK, 57 EK, 62a/b EK, 65 EK, 71 EK, F119.3-4 Jac. Cause of major events: e.g. the Sicilian Slave War of 135 B.C.E. (F59 EK; cf. F108a-F108b Jac.).

¹¹⁹ e.g. Livy, who in his preface and throughout the first pentad makes the passion for wealth an important causal factor in the course of events (see Miles 1986)

¹²⁰ For more discussion of this analogy and how it is manifested in Sallust, see Chapter 8.

¹²¹ Kidd *Comm.* p584: “the state of perfect immunity of soul of the wise man has no counterpart in physical health.”

the “disease” of *pathē*. This corresponds to a body which is healthy but still prone to disease. Thus in Posidonius’ view the vast majority of people, even if mentally healthy (that is, not *currently* immoral), are always inherently prone to the “disease” of excessive passions or other kinds of immorality.

Similarly one frequently encounters in Sallust language which equates moral corruption with a disease. From the Catilinarian conspirators and their sympathizers, to the corrupt political behavior of nobility, “*populares*”, and *plebs*, to the behavior of whole armies or nations, Sallust paints the progress of moral decay as a plague or contagion.¹²² That Sallust may have been influenced specifically by Posidonius in this manner of describing moral decay should not be discounted, and is a distinct possibility. However, as I discuss more at length below (Chapter 8), Cicero’s speeches were a more immediate source for the analogy, and he uses it with particular prominence in the *Catilinarians*, speeches which we know Sallust read and whose subject was of direct relevance to Sallust’s own writings.

We have examined above several ways in which Posidonian historiography aligns with Sallustian historiography. In the prologues of Sallust we detected the concepts of dualism, the animal-emotion connection, and the necessity for the rational element (the *animus*) to rule man; we observed similarities between Sallust’s use of character description, *exempla*, and ethnography and Posidonius’ use of historiography as a tool for inculcating his ethical and moral philosophy; we explored the degree to which Sallust

¹²² *BJ* 24.2 (Jugurtha), 89.6 (Marius), 93.3.25 (Ligurian soldier). To groups: *BC* 10.6 (all Romans), 31.1.18 (all Romans), 36.5 (Catiline’s followers); *BJ* 13.1.20 (Adherbal + all Numidians), 14.10 (Carthaginians), 14.25 (*regnum Numidiae*), 27.3 (all Romans), 32.4 (Roman army in Africa), 35.9 (Numidians), 39.1 (Roman people), 41.9 (nobility), 84.3 (*capite censi*), *Hist.* 1.55.19M (all Romans), 1.77.9M (all Romans; or nobles?), 4.46M (*equites* and senators).

saw evil as having an internal source like Posidonius; Posidonius' emphasis on *tryphē* was then likened to Sallust's emphasis on the effects of *luxuria*; and Sallust's use of the language of disease and contagion to describe moral corruption was compared with Posidonius' own analogy of mental and physical sickness in his philosophy of the emotions. The cumulative weight of these observations might incline one to assert with certainty that Sallust drew direct influence from Posidonius for many aspects of his historical outlook and historiographical practice. It certainly seems to be the case, in my view, that Sallust was influenced by Posidonian historiography. Yet we must remember that note of caution voiced above regarding the attribution of direct influence to Posidonius (or the "discovery" of Posidonius hidden in later sources). It cannot be forgotten that in all of the suggestive parallels between Sallust and Posidonius discussed above, we find no securely attested direct allusion to Posidonius's writings by Sallust. As such, we can conclude that it is very likely that Sallust drew inspiration from Posidonius, although one cannot trace that influence with absolute certainty in specific passages in Sallust's texts.

Thus far the idea that Sallust was a Stoic writer has not found any direct confirmation, despite some general parallels with Stoic thought as remarked earlier. In particular, the prologues of Sallust's monographs have been shown to be a melting pot of diverse ideas, both Platonic and (supposedly) Stoic. The difficulty is only compounded by recalling that some of the imagery and language from *BC* 1.1-2, which has been traced to specific passages of Plato, might also have been picked up by Sallust through the Stoic Posidonius. Later judgments, for example that of Seneca, do not clarify matters. In

Seneca's discussion of the content of Sallust *BC* 1-2, Sallust's ideas seem to be framed in Stoic terms (*Ep.* 60.4, my emphasis):

Hos itaque, ut ait Sallustius, 'ventri oboedientes' animalium loco numeremus, non hominum, quosdam vero ne animalium quidem, sed mortuorum. Vivit is qui multis usui est, vivit is qui se utitur; qui vero latitant et torpent sic in domo sunt quomodo in conditivo. Horum licet in limine ipso nomen marmori inscribas: mortem suam antecesserunt.

Therefore those who, as Sallust puts it, "hearken to their bellies," should be numbered among the animals, and not among men; and certain men, indeed, should be numbered, not even among the animals, but among the dead. He really lives who is made use of by many; he really lives who makes use of himself. Those men, however, who creep into a hole and grow torpid are no better off in their homes than if they were in their tombs. Right there on the marble lintel of the house of such a man you may inscribe his name, for he has died before he is dead.
(Transl. R.M. Gummere 1917-1925)

Besides the obvious citation of Sallust's *ventri oboedientia* (*BC* 1.1), note especially Seneca's repetition of *vivit is qui*, paralleling Sallust's *is demum mihi vivere atque frui anima videtur* (*BC* 2.9). Also, in *qui vero latitant et torpent* we find a possible echo of Sallust *BJ* 2.4 (*ingenium...incultu atque socordia torpescere sinunt*), and, in *latitant*, perhaps a scornful allusion to the Epicurean maxim of *lathe biōsas*. It appears Seneca imagined Sallust as a Stoic here. Yet Seneca's reporting of Sallust *BC* 1-2 here also reminds us of Aristotle *Eth. Eud.* 1215b30-1216a, where Sallust's train of thought in *BC* 2.7-9 finds a close echo. As far as Sallust's prologues, therefore, there seems to be no dominating philosophical influence, but instead a melding of multiple influences.

Indeed, when one considers Sallust's works in their entirety, it seems clear from the investigations undertaken in this chapter that both Platonic and Stoic traditions may be at play in equal amounts, so we cannot call Sallust purely Platonic or purely Stoic. We can go further. Sallust's use of Plato, especially in constructing his account of his withdrawal from politics in *BC* 4, seems calculated and called upon to achieve the specific rhetorical goal, at that moment in the narrative, of ennobling his own retirement. Moreover we

should at least consider the possibility that the allusions to Plato in *BC* 1.1-2 may have been filtered through Posidonius. As a result, there is no indication of any deep ideological commitment to wider Platonic philosophy.

As far as the Stoic elements conjectured in Sallust, once again the *general* level of these echoes in many cases means that we cannot ascribe to Sallust a deep ideological commitment to Stoicism either. While some of the parallels of thought discussed above are quite suggestive, it seems that, as concerns Stoicism, Sallust is cherry-picking various broad ideas he may have come across in his education or reading, to use whenever it suited his immediate needs.¹²³ As McGushin argues, Sallust's use of these broad ideas "need indicate nothing more than the benefits of a general education and the wide reading of a man who prides himself on his literary pursuits (*BC* 53.2, cf. 4.2)."¹²⁴ In fact, many of the elements that seem suggestively Stoic in Sallust are broad ideas that would be at home in many writers, Stoic and not Stoic alike.¹²⁵ This remains one of the major obstacles, on any view, to those who would make Sallust a Stoic writer.

Therefore, based on our examination of Platonic, Epicurean, Stoic, and other echoes in Sallust's texts, we cannot claim that a strong attachment to any single philosophical school informs Sallust's literary project. Those seeming echoes that we do find in Sallust's texts have thus been assimilated into Sallust's own unique framework of thought, and have been adapted to convey Sallust's own particular perspectives on Roman history and Roman morality. As we begin to re-examine in detail the nature of

¹²³ Also the view of Syme 1964: 54 (mentioning also Perrochat 1949: 84, et al.)

¹²⁴ McGushin 1977: 295. Cf. the judgment of Goodyear 1982: 272, who comes down on the view that Sallust is an eclectic, stating that the Stoic elements in his work do not make Sallust a Stoic, since Epicurean elements, among others, are detectible.

¹²⁵ Cf. Syme 1964: 241: "Ethical theory and commonplaces had been transmitted by a myriad of writers [after Plato]."

Sallust's historical and moral outlook in the following chapters, it will be important to remember this so that we may attempt to understand Sallust on his own terms rather than simply as a representative of a particular political group or a particular philosophical school.

Chapter 5: The Nature and Extent of Sallust's Pessimism: Part I: The *Histories*

Sallust's moral, political, and historical attitudes have long exercised scholars. In particular, opinions have been divided over the nature of Sallust's pessimism and how it manifests itself in each of his works. In this and the next chapter, I therefore reevaluate Sallust's views on the progress of Roman history and Roman morality. In particular, I shall cast a critical eye on the ostensible evolution from early utopia to later decadence that his texts seem to describe. By identifying (and recognizing the importance of) specific literary and narrative techniques in Sallust's creation of meaning, I shall posit an alternative to so-called "evolutionist" readings of Sallustian morality and make the case that his pessimism was a feature of his thought and writing from the earliest inception of his literary career. As in previous chapters, we will profit from reading Sallust's three texts in relation to one another and by considering how trends across these texts may reveal additional important insights into the broader tenets of Sallust's historical and moral outlook.

To begin with, it is beyond question that in all three of his texts Sallust is pessimistic about the years *after* 146 B.C.E. and their rapidly declining morality and political culture. What has been more open to debate is how much pessimism Sallust shows concerning the years *before* the fall of Carthage in 146. A few scholars go as far as to argue that Sallust is optimistic about pre-146 Roman history through all three of his works, including the *Histories*.¹ The broad consensus, however, even among scholars of this "optimist" school, is that by the time he composed the *Histories* Sallust's pessimism about the pre-146 era had grown and shows itself clearly in the fragmentary remains of this work.

¹ Syme: 288 implies idealization in the *Histories*, and Earl 1961: 42 implies Sallust only tones down his optimism in the *Histories* under duress from critics.

Consequently, the most common form that the “optimist” argument takes is an “evolutionist” one – namely, that Sallust’s moral and historical outlook early on displays a level of optimism about pre-146 Rome, but that it evolves toward greater pessimism in the *Histories*, his last-published work.² Scholars in the evolutionist camp thus claim that earlier in his literary career (most notably in the *BC*) Sallust *did* sincerely hold an idealized view of earlier Roman history; in that idealized vision, a Republican system exemplified by *concordia* and *mos maiorum*, a system in which *virtus* was geared toward service of the state, supposedly prevailed *before* 146 B.C.E.,³ and only with the influx of wealth and *otium* after Carthage’s destruction in 146 did morality finally start to decline.⁴

While such an evolutionist reading has had many adherents,⁵ another slightly less common view maintains that Sallust’s moral and historical outlook does *not* evolve – in other words, it is consistently pessimistic from his first work onward.⁶ Many of those who take such a position, however, fail to go into enough detail on their stance.⁷ These next two chapters seek to remedy that, as I will put forth systematic evidence that

² Among such “evolutionist” scholars of Sallust: Klingner 1928; Seel 1930; Oppermann 1958; Schur 1936; Buchner 1960; L. De Blois 1988; Mineo 1997; Conte 1994: 241; Tiffou 1973: esp. 117, 301n54, 312, 313-46 *passim*, 579-80; D’Anna 1979; Watson 2003: 268; Adler 2006: 386n16; Dunsch 2006; Fox 2007: 264, 266; A. Zanker 2011: 87. The majority of scholars of optimist tendencies take this evolutionary view of Sallust’s moral outlook.

³ For this idealized image of pre-146 Rome: *BC* 7, 9-10; *BJ* 41.

⁴ Sallust fails to mention the destruction and plundering of Corinth in 146, which many other sources (e.g. Pliny, Florus, Orosius and others) also point to in explaining moral decline (see Chapter 7.2)

⁵ Additionally, some scholars believe that with Caesar’s death in particular Sallust lost all hope. Many who make this claim seem to belong to this camp of evolutionists (Klingner 1928: 189; cf. 167n1 (Schwartz, Baehrens 1927, i. a.); Seel 1930: 32, 77f; Buchner 1960: 90; Tiffou 1973: 576; Mineo 1997). Yet Sallust is widely agreed not to have begun writing before Caesar’s death, so that, if Sallust did lose “all hope” for the Republic after the Ides, we should see no “evolution” in his work, but rather the same level of pessimism from before he even began writing. Hence Syme, among others, sounds a note of caution about viewing Caesar’s death as the point when Sallust’s hopes were exploded (Syme 1964: 40n53).

⁶ Scholars such as Vretska 1937, 1961; Gelzer 1931: 276; Kraus 1994; Zecchini 2002: 46n11; LaPenna 1968: 110-12; Bonamente 1975.

⁷ E.g. Bonamente 1975, esp. 147-9, Zecchini 2002, LaPenna 1968 argue for consistency, but it is not clear what they think Sallust was consistent about. Cf. Koestermann 1971: 11, who says of Sallust’s pessimism that he likes to dwell on darker events and hopeless situations, and that “only seldom does his narrative bring in brighter colors, pessimism predominates.”

Sallust's view, in all three of his texts, is that Romans had *always* been predisposed to *factio*, *discordia*, and *ambitio*, and that they had never possessed an innate *virtus* which was unique and which set them apart from others as morally superior. I will show this to be the case not just in the *Histories* but also in the *BC* and *BJ*. Additionally – and partly as a consequence of viewing Romans as lacking such a native moral superiority – Sallust held that Romans were prone to “cycle” back and forth between *discordia* and *concordia*, only achieving the latter when the external stimulus of *metus hostilis*, “fear of a foreign enemy”, existed. The fact that Sallust reflects such cycling between good and bad conduct not just in the *Histories*, but also in the *BC*, is another indication that even while writing the *BC* Sallust likely had already begun to view Roman history and Roman morality in a pessimistic way.⁸ Extensive evidence from within the *BC* will be discussed below in support of this position.

That the pessimism of Sallust's historical and moral outlook applies to the earliest periods of Roman history, and also appears well-established already in his earliest work (the *BC*), will thus be the main points I aim to prove in the next two chapters. While all three texts will be analyzed in pursuance of these arguments, this task will ostensibly encounter the most resistance in the *BC*, where evolutionists have tended to locate Sallust's optimism – largely due to his digression on early Roman history at *BC* 5.9-14.1. This resistance will be overcome through reinterpretation of some key sections of the *BC* in light of the literary aims and thematic preoccupations that drive Sallust in constructing his own particular account of history.

⁸ See also Chapter 9 on repetitive and cyclical views of civil strife in the late Republic. Syme 1964: 220-222 cites examples of historical recurrence linking the Triumviral period with the Sullan era. Contemporaries may indeed have had reason to believe history repeated in cycles: Syme 1939: 250. See also Pelling in Breed et al 2010.

5.1: Pessimism in the Early Fragments of the *Histories*

Our first step as we embark upon our re-examination of Sallust's historical and moral outlook will be a general analysis of Sallust's pessimism in the *Histories* and then the *BJ*, followed by a deeper look at the ways in which this pessimism is reflected even in the *BC*. The *Histories*, Sallust's last and largest work, likely embodies his most closely-considered and preferred formulation on the nature and timing of Roman decline, but we shall see how that same outlook may also show through in his monographs.

In a fragment from early in Book 1 of the *Histories*, Romans carry the seeds of political and moral decline within them from the beginning (*Hist.* 1.7M (8 McG)):

Nobis primae dissensiones vitio humani ingenii evenere, quod inquires atque indomitum semper in certamine libertatis aut gloriae aut dominationis agit.

The first dissensions among us arose through an innate fault of the human spirit; for, since that spirit is restless and indomitable, it always finds itself in a struggle for either liberty or glory or political domination.⁹

We see that for Sallust the first dissensions among Romans occurred due to a *vitium humani ingenii*, an innate fault of the human spirit¹⁰; this helps explain the way Sallust portrays moral and political history in *Hist.* 1.11M (9-10 McG):

...Optumis autem moribus et maxuma concordia egit inter secundum atque postremum Bellum Carthaginiense <causaque * * * non amor iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metus pacis infidae fuit.> At discordia et avaritia atque ambitio et cetera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala post Carthaginis excidium maxume aucta sunt. Nam iniuriae validiorum et ob eas discessio plebis a patribus aliaque dissensiones domi fuere iam inde a principio, neque amplius quam regibus exactis, dum metus a Tarquinio et bellum grave cum Etruria positum est, aequo et modesto iure agitatum. Dein servili imperio patres plebem exercere, de vita atque tergo regio more consulere, agro pellere et ceteris expertibus soli in imperio agere. Quibus saevitiis et maxume fenore oppressa plebes, quom adsiduis bellis tributum et militiam simul toleraret, armata montem Sacrem atque Aventinum insedit tumque tribunos plebis et alia iura sibi paravit. Discordiarum et certaminis utrimque finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum.

But the Roman state acted with the best morals and greatest concord between the second and the last Punic Wars, and the cause [of this] was not love of uprightness, but fear of a

⁹ Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. For *certamen dominationis*, cf. Mithridates at *Hist.* 4.69.5, 17-18M; *BC* 38.3, *Hist.* 1.12 (below)

¹⁰ For a similar sentiment see Livy 28.23.4 (*aviditate ingenii humani*)

treacherous peace while Carthage still stood. But discord, greed, ambition, and other evils accustomed to arise in prosperity *especially* grew after Carthage's destruction. Now, I say 'especially' because the injustices of the stronger and the secession of the plebs they caused, as well as other kinds of dissension, were present already from the beginning, and they did not act in a reasonable and moderate way any longer than that time after the expulsion of the kings when fear of Tarquin and a serious war with Etruria were set before them. After that, the nobles treated the plebs with the authority of a slave master, took counsel about their lives and persons like kings, drove them from their land, and ruled alone, with everyone else excluded. Because they were overwhelmed by these acts of cruelty and violence, and most of all by debt, as they were at the same time enduring exactions and military service in constant wars, they took up arms and occupied the Sacred Mount and the Aventine. At that time they obtained for themselves tribunes of the plebs and other laws. The end of disagreements and contention on both sides was the second Punic War.

In this passage Sallust asserts that morality was best between the Second and Third Punic Wars and that the reason for this was fear of Carthage: *metus hostilis*.¹¹ Otherwise, it is inferred, human nature would naturally tend toward its innate *vitium*.¹² He then proceeds to give proof of this. *Discordia, avaritia, and ambitio* all *especially* increased (*maxume aucta sunt*) soon after Carthage fell. This word *maxume* is key, for it implies not an absolute absence of *discordia, ambitio, and avaritia* before the fall of Carthage in 146, but rather it implies those vices were present at some level before 146 and just began to show a rapid and marked increase after Carthage's destruction.¹³ Sallust felt that these

¹¹ Maurenbrecher in his edition supplied this clause (*causaque * * * non amor iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metus pacis infidae fuit*) from Augustine CD 2.18. Augustine cites the passage as follows: *in primo historiae suae libro atque ipso eius exordio fatetur...Nam cum optimis moribus...commemorasset egisse causamque huius boni non amorem iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metum pacis infidae fuisse dixisset (...)*. For further discussion of this clause and its evidential value, see below after discussion of Hist. 1.11M. Miles 1986 mentions Rome's life and death struggle with Veii as a parallel for Carthage: a long, serious struggle with an "arch enemy", with victory leading to decline in morality.

¹² Syme 1964: 182 among other scholars, fails to see that Sallust makes *concordia* here fully dependent on the presence of *metus hostilis*, and thus misses the implication that *discordia* and *factio* are therefore inherent to Romans. Augustine CD 3.16 shows a clear understanding of Sallust's implication that *concordia* was only a function of *metus hostilis*: *Ideo dicit aequo et modesto iure gestam rem publicam metu premente, non persuadente iustitia*.

¹³ pace Earl 1961: 81. Augustine CD 2.18 cites *At discordia...maxume aucta sunt* and remarks *ut intellegemus etiam antea et oriri solere et augeri* ("whence we understand that even before [sc. Carthage's destruction] those vices were accustomed to both arise and grow"). Augustine thus shows he himself understood that *maxume* implies there were *already* vices present before 146 (and perhaps even had grown over time). At CD 3.21 too Augustine says that he knows this to be what Sallust meant: *Sed quia Sallustius eo tempore ibi dixit mores optimos fuisse, propterea hoc de Asiana luxuria commemorandum putavi, ut intellegatur etiam illud a Sallustio in comparationem aliorum temporum dictum, quibus*

implications of *maxime aucta sunt* – and the word *maxime* in particular – needed some more teasing out. This is why the next sentence begins with an explanatory *nam*: “But discord and avarice and ambition...*especially* increased after Carthage’s destruction. Now, I say ‘especially’ because the injustices of the stronger and the secession of the plebs they caused, as well as other kinds of dissension, were present already from the beginning (...).”¹⁴ He continues to elaborate: even at the very beginning of the Republic, these vices were only kept at bay for the short time that fear of Tarquin and the Etruscans was present; afterward, these *iniuriae validiorum* resumed and led to plebeian secession and a “Conflict of the Orders” (what Sallust calls *discordiae et certamen utrimque*), which was only suppressed due to the outbreak of the Second Punic War (*discordiarum et certaminis utrimque finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum*).¹⁵ Yet the fact that Sallust here says there was an end (*finis*) to this discord during the Second Punic War should not mislead us into inferring an *absolute* end to discord and vice at that time. For as we read earlier in the passage, this period of *optimi mores* and *maxima concordia* was just that – a period (as shown by the phrase *inter secundum atque postremum bellum Carthaginense*), and these various vices would thus resume their advance – now torrid – as soon as Carthage fell (*At...post Carthaginis excidium maxime aucta sunt*). This

temporibus peiores utique in grauissimis discordiis mores fuerunt. In other words, Augustine says that he realizes Sallust meant the phrase *optimi mores* only in comparison to the other, less morally principled periods of Roman history before and after that “optimal” moral era *inter secundum atque postremum bellum Carthaginense*; and that he mentioned the luxury introduced by Vulso *within* that optimal era so as to make sure his readers would correctly infer that Sallust never meant for that optimal era to be considered absolutely pristine.

¹⁴ Later on in CD 2.18 Augustine a second time shows he understands these connotations of *maxime*, and that the *nam...iam inde a principio* clause explains those connotations. For after citing Sallust’s *at discordia...maxime aucta sunt* and then making the comment cited above, *ut intellegeremus...augeri*, he introduces Sallust’s *nam...iam inde a principio* by saying *unde subnectens cur hoc dixerit*, “*nam iniuriae validiorum...*” (“From there, adding the reason why he said this, he says ‘For the injustices...’”).

¹⁵ Miles 1986: 3 cites the importance in Sallust’s writing of the removal of *metus hostilis* after 146, but fails to acknowledge the fact that *metus hostilis* (its presence and removal) is a *recurring* pattern in Sallust’s view of Roman history, as this fragment shows.

should remind us that Sallust's overall idea in the fragment is one of temporary – and conditional – returns to *boni mores*, and that this *finis* refers to just another *pause* in the discord and in the advance of vices, a pause that lasts from the Second Punic War through to the conclusion of the Third in 146 B.C.E.

It should be acknowledged that the interpretation given above of Hist. 1.11M depends on taking a certain stance on problematic parts of the inherited text of this fragment. One particularly disputed section is the following clause (as printed by Reynolds): *<causaque * * * non amor iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metus pacis infidae fuit>*. This clause is transmitted by Augustine at *C.D.* 2.18 (my emphasis):

*idem tamen in primo historiae suae libro atque ipso eius exordio fatetur etiam tunc, cum ad consules a regibus esset translata res publica, post parvum intervallum iniurias validiorum et ob eas discessionem plebis a patribus aliasque in urbe dissensiones fuisse. Nam cum optimis moribus et maxima concordia populum Romanum inter secundum et postremum bellum Carthaginense commemorasset egisse causamque huius boni non amore*m* iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metum*u*m pacis infidae fuisse dixisset (...)*

Yet this same writer in the first book of his *Histories* – in fact in the very exordium itself – acknowledges that even at that time, when the government had been transferred from kings to consuls, there were, after a short interval, unjust acts committed by the powerful and defection of the people from the patricians as a result, as well as other forms of dissension in the city. For after [Sallust] related that the Roman people had conducted themselves with the best morals and greatest concord between the second and last Punic Wars, and said that the reason for this good had been not love of justice, but fear of a perfidious peace while Carthage still stood (...)

In my view, even if *huius boni* and *non amorem iustitiae* could be Augustine's gloss,¹⁶ *stante Carthagine metum pacis infidae fuisse* seems to represent Sallust's own words.¹⁷ The use of a second accusative-infinitive with *dixisset* after the accusative-infinitive with *commemorasset* suggests Augustine is aiming to make clear that he is quoting another item Sallust actually said. One might argue, however, that the sentence *at discordia...aucta sunt* follows naturally from the first sentence without the *causaque...fuit* intervening. Yet the sense of *at...aucta sunt* is not weakened by the presence of the clause *causaque...fuit*; for the *causaque...fuit* clause merely adds a *reason* for the *optimi mores* having occurred between the Second and Third Punic war. The flow of thought, still clear, would in my view run as follows: "Romans had best *mores* and most *concordia* between the Second and Third Punic War and it was because of *metus hostilis*. However, *after* Carthage's destruction *discordia*, *avaritia*, *ambitio*, and other evils *especially* grew...". Moreover, Velleius Paterculus, whom we know from elsewhere to have drawn closely from Sallust when discussing Carthage,¹⁸ echoes the *metus pacis infidae* of *Hist.* 1.11M at 1.12.6:

¹⁶ Some of the arguments, however, for the "un-Sallustian" nature of *amor* or *amor* + genitive are not unassailable: cf. Klingner 1928: 173, 174, 176. That *amor* is only used once elsewhere (compared to the more commonly used *studium*), and that *iustitia* was not used in *BC* 9.1, do not exclude their use here. Cf. Sallust's use of *iustitia* at *BC* 10.1, 6 (in same way as here). Reynolds, though he prints the disputed clause in his text of *Hist.* 1.11M, comments that the Sallustian nature of *amor iustitiae* may be doubted. Maurenbrecher, like Reynolds, prints the clause without *huius boni*, but includes *non amor iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metus pacis infidae fuit*. Ramsey's recent edition of the *Histories* (2015: 10) does not print any of the *causaque...fuit* clause in the text of the fragment, merely noting its presence in Aug. *C.D.* 2.18. Tiffou 1973: 299 thinks *causaque huius boni* was in Sallust's text but in slightly different wording. On the Sallustian nature of *huius boni*, see Dunsch 2006: 213-15.

¹⁷ See also Clausen 1947: 300-1, taking the whole clause (*causaque...fuit*) as Sallustian. Dunsch 2006 rightly reminds us that Sallust often elsewhere in his corpus pointed out the perfidy of Africans: *BC* 51.6, *BJ* 46.3, 61.5, 71.5, 74.1, 107.2, 108.3 (esp.); and more generally, not just Africans: *BC* 51.5 (Rhodians), *Hist.* 1.55.6M, 1.77.15M, *Hist. Pap.Oxyrh.* col 1b.

¹⁸ See esp. Vell. 2.1.1: *quippe remoto Carthaginis metu sublataque imperii aemula non gradu, sed praecipiti cursu a virtute descitum*, echoing both *Hist.* 1.16M and *BC* 10.1.

Hunc finem habuit Romani imperii Carthago aemula...ita per annos centum et viginti aut bellum inter eos populos aut belli praeparatio aut infida pax fuit. Neque se Roma iam terrarum orbi superato securam speravit fore, si nomen usquam stantis maneret Carthagini.

This was the end of Carthage, rival of the power of Rome...Thus for a hundred and twenty years there was either war between these peoples or preparation for war or a treacherous peace. Nor did Rome expect that she would be secure – although she had conquered the world – if the name of Carthage remained anywhere as of a city still standing. (transl. Shipley 1924, adapted)

Other reasons adduced for doubting the Sallustian nature of the clause revolve around the topicality of *metus hostilis* and how it affects the mechanics of the entire fragment. Klingner sees an importance in the fact that *BJ* 41.2 uses different wording to describe *metus hostilis*: *ante Carthaginem deletam populus et Senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rem publicam tractabant...metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat* (“For before the destruction of Carthage the people and Senate of Rome managed the state peacefully and moderately between themselves...fear of the enemy held the state in good practices.”). The variation in wording here is not as important as the fact that Sallust gives primacy of place to the concept in key points in both works. Likewise, arguments about the disruption introduced into the temporal sequence of the fragment’s sentences clash with the lack of disruption which I have claimed for the *causaque...fuit* clause above.¹⁹ Moreover, the use of *metus hostilis* later on in *Hist.* 1.11M would not constitute a grave challenge to the authenticity of Sallust’s use of it in the *causaque...fuit* clause. For the fact that Sallust two sentences later mentions *metus a Tarquinio...positum* would not render the first mention of *metus hostilis* two sentences earlier “tiresome”; referencing the same concept two sentences apart is not unreasonable, especially for a causal factor as vital to all of Sallust’s texts as *metus hostilis*. In any

¹⁹ Klingner 1928: 174 with n1. Cf. 172.

case, Sallust varies the expression of the concept in each place, and contextualizes it with details about Tarquin and Etruria.²⁰

While so far we have focused specifically on whether Augustine's citation of *causaque...fuit* might reproduce some of Sallust's original words, we can broaden out to assess the nature of Augustine's other citations of Sallust, both from the *Histories* and the monographs. He cites *Hist.* 1.16M in both *C.D.* 2.18 and 2.19, and he cites *Hist.* 1.12M at 3.17. In each of these cases, there are no visible reasons to suspect the citation wishes to distort, although certainty is of course impossible. However, it is worth noting that a good number of Augustine's citations of Sallust (from the *BC* mostly) appear accurately reported,²¹ and some even seem to offer readings that have been accepted by some modern editors over other variants.²²

As to Augustine's use of *Hist.* 1.11M in particular, we find multiple citations: At the beginning of *C.D.* 2.18, Augustine does add *in urbe* when saying *fatetur...iniurias validiorum et ob eas discessionem plebis a patribus aliasque in urbe dissensiones fuisse*. Yet Augustine will go on to cite this clause again later in 2.18 in its proper place, and in fact he seems concerned, in what follows, to reproduce the full context of the fragment for the reader, showing signs of careful reproduction of Sallust's words when he does so.

²⁰ *ibid.* Klingner also adds (1928: 176) that because *Fr.* 1.12M starts with *metus punicus* it would be that much more tiresome. We would like to know with more certainty, however, whether there was in fact anything else that originally stood between 1.11M and 1.12M.

²¹ *C.D.* 18.2 (citing *BC* 8.4), *C.D.* 9.9 (*BC* 1.2), *C.D.* 7.3 (*BC* 8.1), *C.D.* 5.12 (*BC* 7.3, 7.6, 52.19-23, 53.5, 54.6), *C.D.* 3.14 (*BC* 2.2), *C.D.* 3.10 (*BC* 2.1), *C.D.* 3.3 (*BC* 6.1), *C.D.* 3.2 (*BC* 14.1), *C.D.* 2.18, 19 (*BC* 5.9), *C.D.* 1.5 (*BC* 51.9). *BC* 6.3-5, as cited in *C.D.* 3.10, may seem an exception, in that Augustine inaccurately cites *legibus moribus agris aucta* in *BC* 6.3, but besides this one word, the rest of the lengthy passage is cited with full accuracy. In *C.D.* 1.5, Augustine tags the quotation (which is cited accurately) as being from Cato's speech instead of from Caesar's. This, however, is not so serious a fault, as the names (which he knew: cf. his citation of Cato at *C.D.* 5.12) were momentarily switched, not the content. One exception is Augustine's citation of *BC* 6.7, which may in fact have been confused.

²² Instances where Reynolds, in his Oxford edition of 1991, accepts Augustine's variants: *C.D.* 5.12 (citing *BC* 52.20, 53.5.25), *C.D.* 2.18, 19 (*BC* 5.9), *C.D.* 18.2 (*BC* 8.4 – twice), *C.D.* 3.2 (*BC* 14.1).

Besides being careful to add a verb of indirect discourse twice

(*commemorasset...dixisset*), he states *continuo subiecit idem Sallustius et ait*, then continues *unde subnectens cur hoc dixerit*: “*Nam iniuriae, inquit, ualidiorum et ob eas discessio plebis a patribus...agitatum*”. Then after explaining how *metus hostilis* was the cause of the brief period of moderate behavior after Tarquin’s expulsion, Augustine adds *adtemde itaque quid deinde contexat*: “*Dein, inquit, seruili imperio patres plebem exercere, de uita atque tergo regio more consulere...secundum bellum Punicum*.” Thus, from *nam iniuriae validiorum* through *finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum*, Augustine’s citation in 2.18 seems to reproduce Sallust verbatim without apparent alterations. He had added *in urbe* earlier in 2.18, but the significance of this is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the clause in which it is found is cited twice elsewhere (later in 2.18, and in 5.12) without *in urbe* and instead with the correct *domi [fuisse] iam inde a principio* in both cases.²³

Augustine also cites *Hist. 1.11M* at 3.17, from *dein* to *secundum bellum Punicum*, showing consistency with the wording in 2.18. He quotes *finito scilicet tempore, quo aequo iure ac modesto agitatum est, secuta sunt quae idem Sallustius breuiter explicat*: “*dein seruili imperio patres plebem exercere...secundum bellum Punicum*.” Here, he quotes verbatim the same passage, with consistency, but has *aequo iure ac modesto* instead of the *aequo ac modesto iure* or *aequo et modesto iure* of other MSS. Yet as with

²³ It may be noted that some MSS for Aug. *C.D.* 2.18 read *et alia iura sibi paravit*, which reading is shared by all MSS for *C.D.* 3.17. Others read *sibi iura*. Whether there was originally (and intentionally) a difference in how Augustine cited this phrase in each of these two passages is doubtful, and in any case such a variant, whether intentional or not, would not amount to an important alteration of meaning for the wider passage. Likewise at *C.D.* 3.17 (discussed below). Other such cases of variants that may be unintentional, inconsequential, or both: *C.D.* 18.2 (citing Sallust *BC* 8.2, *existimo* for *ego aestumo*); *C.D.* 2.18 (citing *BC* 5.9, *paulatim mutata* for *paulatim inmutata*); *C.D.* 3.21 (citing *BC* 10.1, *deleta est* for *interiit*); *C.D.* 5.12 (citing *BC* 52.21, *fecerunt* for *fecere*, & 54.6, *eo illum magis* for *eo magis illum*).

the inclusion of *in urbe* in part of *C.D.* 2.18, so too here with this phrase, the difference in citation is not so troubling, and it is in fact cited consistently as *aequo et modesto iure* at 2.18, 3.16, and 5.12 as well.²⁴

We get a fourth citation of *Hist.* 1.11M in *C.D.* 5.12 which covers a large portion of the extant fragment, from *nam iniuriae validiorum* on:

Non ita est; alioquin uera non essent, quae ipse item scribit, ea quae commemorauit in secundo libro huius operis, ubi dicit, iniurias ualidiorum et ob eas discessionem plebis a patribus aliasque dissensiones domi fuisse iam inde a principio, neque amplius aequo et modesto iure actum quam expulsis regibus, quamdiu metus a Tarquinio fuit, donec bellum graue, quod propter ipsum cum Etruria susceptum fuerat, finiretur; postea uero seruili imperio patres exercuisse plebem, regio more uerberasse, agro pepulisse et ceteris expertibus solos egisse in imperio; quarum discordiarum, dum illi dominari uellent, illi seruire nollent, finem fuisse bello Punico secundo.

It is not so; otherwise those things would not be true which Sallust himself writes, and which I have related in the second book of this work, where he says that even from the very beginning of the city there were unjust acts by the more powerful and the defection of the people from the patricians as a result, as well as other dissensions besides; and that they acted with fair and moderate authority no longer than after the kings had been expelled and as long as there was still fear of Tarquin, until the end of the serious war which had been undertaken against Etruria on his account. But afterwards the patricians oppressed the people like slaves, flogged them as the kings had done, drove them from their land, and, to the exclusion of all others, held the government in their own hands alone. The end of these discords, while the patricians wished to rule, the people were unwilling to serve, was the second Punic war. (transl. M. Dods 1887 adapted)

Here Augustine cites fr. 1.11M a bit more obliquely, referring back to a previous (full) citation of the fragment in Book Two. As a result, there are a few omitted lines (*quibus saevitiis...sibi paravit*) as well as a few alterations of the wording and word order, though not to the meaning, which I have marked out in the quotation above. In particular, *aequo et modesto iure* has been brought forward from the end of the sentence's second half to sit just after *neque amplius*. Slight changes in wording render *regibus exactis* as *expulsis regibus*, and *dum...bellum grave cum Etruria positum est* as *donec bellum grave, quod*

²⁴ The reliability of Augustine's citation at 5.12, however, must form the next topic for discussion.

propter ipsum cum Etruria susceptum fuerat. Augustine has shortened *de vita atque tergo regio more consulere* to *regio more verberasse*. The only addition made is *dum illi dominari uellent, illi seruire nollent* in the final sentence.

As stated above, since Augustine here is reporting the Sallustian fragment indirectly it should not surprise us that it is given in a somewhat abbreviated form. He aims to call readers' attention to it at this point in his work for the proof it provides of the moral corruption present among Romans from the earliest times, and he has kept all the parts essential to conveying this central meaning, and has omitted those parts whose omission would not affect that meaning. While there is a mix of direct and indirect citation in this particular instance, this should not be a reason to cast broader aspersions on the accuracy of all of Augustine's citations of Sallust.²⁵ As we have seen above, Augustine cites *Hist.* 1.11M elsewhere with consistency, and his other citations of Sallust, either from the *Histories* or the *BC*, are accurate and in some cases even provide preferable readings. In the handful of cases where variants do exist in Augustine's citations, they are inconsequential and do not bear on the sense or meaning of the cited passage. To return to *C.D.* 5.12, there are in fact several other citations of Sallust there, and apart from such minor variants there as *fecerunt* for *fecere* (*BC* 52.21), *et* for *atque* (*BC* 52.20), and *eo illum magis* for *eo magis illum* (*BC* 54.6), they are accurate²⁶: *BC* 53.2-5 is reproduced at length and accurately²⁷; a sizeable passage of Cato's speech from *BC* 52.19-23 is cited accurately (excepting those two abovementioned variants); *BC* 11.1 and 11.2 are also

²⁵ See i.a. Klingner 1928: 175. Asserting the quality of Augustinian evidence is i.a. Dunsch 2006: 213-16.

²⁶ As mentioned above, Augustine's citation of *BC* 6.7 at *C.D.* 5.12 may be confused; at any rate it is unclear whether he meant to attribute more than *annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecerunt* to Sallust.

²⁷ Two lines in *BC* 53.3 have been omitted as unessential.

accurately related. In two cases Augustine's citations in *C.D.* 5.12 even provide preferable readings (for *BC* 53.5.25 (*sui* for *sua*), *BC* 52.20 (*ita* for *ita res*)).

The overall impression one gets from this analysis, therefore, is that Augustine in practically every case seems to have taken care to reproduce Sallust's words accurately where he was able. At the very least, this examination should keep us from discounting Augustine's testimony for Sallust *Hist.* 1.11M, and particularly for the disputed *causaque...fuit* clause, as wholly unreliable. Yarrow is assuredly right to advise caution in asserting the accurate and authentic transmission of verbatim fragments which are cited for polemical or partisan purposes by the citing authority.²⁸ In such cases a modicum of doubt must always exist, and Augustine is no exception²⁹; however, in the case of this particular *causaque...fuit* clause in *Hist.* 1.11M, there is a strong and diverse assemblage of evidence suggesting the authenticity not only of the phrase's existence, but even of its wording as reported by Augustine. Meanwhile, many of the arguments raised against authenticity have yet to produce a comprehensive counterargument.

Another fragment, seconding what we have seen above in 1.11M, affirms that the old inherent conflicts were naturally were free to resume, and did, once Carthage was destroyed (*Hist.* 1.12M (12 McG)):

Postquam remoto metu Punico simultates exercere vacuum fuit, plurumae turbae seditiones et ad postremum bella civilia orta sunt, dum pauci potentes³⁰, quorum in gratiam plerique concesserant, sub honesto patrum aut plebis nomine dominationes adfectabant³¹; bonique et

²⁸ Yarrow 2006: 107. Cf. FRHist. I.16. Schanzer 2012: 169, in discussing Augustine's citation of classical authors, speaks of "strategic citations" where cited material is "twisted" and "decontextualized". The material from Sallust is not specifically called upon in her discussion, however, and it seems clear enough that Augustine's citations of Sallust need not be, as Schanzer says, a wresting of "ammunition from 'unwilling' sources". One should remember that Augustine had a vested interest in citing Sallust's testimony accurately in order to prove his arguments about moral decline at Rome well before the Christian era. For the strictness of Augustine's general practices of citation, see e.g. *C.D.* 20.5, 25.13.

²⁹ See e.g. Dunsch 2006: 215.

³⁰ Direct parallels to this language in *BC* 20.7 & 58.11 (Catiline speaking), *BJ* 31.9, 20 (Memmius tr.), 41.7 (Sallust); *Hist.* 3.48.6 (Macer tr.)

³¹ Direct parallels in *BC* 38.3, *BJ* 15.2.

mali cives appellati non ob merita in rem publicam, omnibus pariter corruptis, sed uti quisque locupletissimus et iniuria validior, quia praesentia defendebat, pro bono ducebatur.

After the fear of Carthage was removed and they were free to exercise their rivalries again, a great many disturbances, seditions, and finally civil wars arose. Meanwhile a few powerful men, to whose political influence a majority has submitted, sought political despotism under the honorable pretext of defending the nobility or the plebs. Citizens were called good or bad not on account of their deeds in service of the state, since all were equally corrupt; rather, he who was very rich and more able to cause harm was considered 'good' because he defended the status quo.

Note the phrase *postquam...simultates exercere vacuom fuit*: as soon as old enmities and quarrels *could* be fought again (i.e. once *metus hostilis* went away), the *vitium humani ingenii* dictated that they naturally were.³² Sallust goes on to provide yet more support for this argument that such vices were present *iam inde a principio* (*Hist.* 1.16M (13 McG)):

Ex quo tempore maiorum mores non paulatim ut antea, sed torrentis modo praecipitati; adeo iuventus luxu atque avaritia corrupta ut merito dicatur genitos esse qui neque ipsi habere possent res familiaris neque alios pati

From that time [146 B.C.E.] the habits of the ancestors declined not gradually as they did before, but precipitously, like a torrent. To such a degree was the youth corrupted by luxury and greed that one could justly say that they were born able neither to hold onto family resources themselves or allow others to hold onto any.

We see here that the *maiorum mores* start to decline *precipitously* after 146.³³ Yet calling 146 the turning point for *precipitous* moral decline entails that there had also been decline

³² Sallust makes even the Numidian Jugurtha aware that Romans are no different than others in this regard. Jugurtha waits until the Roman army starts to feel secure and their fear of attack dissipates, reasoning that *Romanos sicuti plerosque remoto metu laxius licentiusque futuros*. (*BJ* 87.4) The words Tacitus would later give the Caledonian chieftain Calgacus speak in general terms to the idea that true enmity (whether it be toward fellow citizens, or in this case a master) can manifest again once fear is removed (*Tac. Agr.* 32): *metus ac terror sunt infirma vincla caritatis; quae ubi removeris, qui timere desierint, odisse incipient*.

³³ That Sallust in *Hist.* 1.16M (13McG) refers to the period *soon after* the fall of Carthage when he says *Ex quo tempore...* is not explicit, but can be argued on several counts. Augustine *CD* 2.18 may imply that what we have in this fragment is chronologically prior to the Sullan era, for he cites this fragment and then adds *dicit deinde plura Sallustius de Sullae vitiis ceteraque foeditate rei publicae*. Yet what *precedes* the Sallust citation is ambiguous as to whether the fragment should refer to the immediate time after 146, to the decades following it, or to the era of civil war in the 80s. For Augustine had said *quid iam de consequenti aetate dicendum aut cogitandum arbitramur...post Carthaginis uidelicet, ut commemorauit, excidium? Quae tempora ipse Sallustius quem ad modum breuiter recolat et describat, in eius historia legi*

happening well before 146, and Sallust spells this out for us when he says *non paulatim ut antea, sed torrentis modo praecipitati*.

Thus, because in Sallust's view there was nothing inherent in the Romans, no innate *virtus*, that set them above others, it is *metus hostilis* that held the state together and kept *discordia* and *vitia* at bay – and not for long at that, as Sallust makes clear in these passages from the beginning of the *Histories*.³⁴

potest; quantis malis morum, quae secundis rebus exorta sunt, usque ad bella ciuilia demonstret esse peruentum. "Ex quo tempore", ut ait, "maiorum mores...". While Augustine's introduction here to the Sallust citation, taken by itself, cannot be proven to refer to the immediate aftermath of 146, at CD 2.19 we find Augustine citing the same Sallust passage again, prefacing it this time as follows, with clearer reference: *post deletam Carthaginem "maiorum mores..."*. This makes it likely that in his preface to the fragment in CD 2.18 Augustine took Sallust's remarks to refer not to the time of civil war in the 80s, but to the years soon after the fall of Carthage. Earl 1961: 41n6 refers it to 146, Ramsey 2015: 15 is non-committal. Vell. Pat. 2.1.1, copying very closely from Sallust, mentions the period soon after 146: *quippe remoto Carthaginis metu sublataque imperii aemula non gradu, sed praecipiti cursu a virtute descitum*. One could also argue that 1.12M and 1.16M form a complementary pair, the former discoursing on the decline of public morality, the latter on the decline of private morality, directly after 146.

³⁴ An interesting parallel to the ideas in the fragments discussed above is Tac. *Hist.* 2.38, a passage clearly drawing on Sallust (my emphasis): *Vetus ac iam pridem insita mortalibus* (cf. *Hist.* 1.7M, 1.11.13M) *potentiae cupido cum imperii magnitudine adolevit erupitque; nam rebus modicis aequalitas facile habebatur. sed ubi subacto orbe et aemulis urbibus regibusve excisis* (cf. *BC* 10.1) *securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit* (cf. *Hist.* 1.12M), *prima inter patres plebemque certamina exarsere. modo turbulentis tribuni, modo consules praevalidi, et in urbe ac foro temptamenta civilium bellorum; mox e plebe infima C. Marius et nobilium saevissimus L. Sulla victam armis libertatem in dominationem verterunt. post quos Cn. Pompeius occultior non melior, et numquam postea nisi de principatu quaesitum*. Of particular note is *vetus ac iam pridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido cum imperii magnitudine adolevit erupitque*, which, like Sallust, views ambition (and greed: *securas opes*) as natural and inherent in all men, just waiting for the right circumstances to "mature and burst forth", as Tacitus puts it.

Chapter 6: The Nature and Extent of Sallust's Pessimism, Part II: The *BJ* and *BC*

Chapter 6.1a: Pessimism in the *BJ*: Indirect Evidence

While the *Histories* has more evidence to offer on Sallust's pessimism than has been presented in the previous chapter,¹ we can already get a clear sense of the deep pessimism with which he frames that work, and his belief therein that Romans possessed no special inborn *virtus* that set them above others. The fact that Sallust did not put the Romans innately above others and viewed them as always prone to the same faults as any nation is a sign of his moral and historical pessimism, and he also voices these sentiments through his monographs.² The *BJ* is especially relevant in this respect, as it deals extensively with the characterization of non-Romans and their behavior (not always negative) in comparison with Roman behavior.³ It is to this monograph that we will now turn in our examination of Sallustian pessimism.

While the character of non-Romans in the *BJ* is, as we shall see further below, not always negative, it must be noted at the outset of our discussion that Sallust does engage in some traditional ethnographic stereotyping in the *BJ* concerning Africans in general, and Numidians in particular. In particular, *mobilitas ingenii* and *perfidia* are repeatedly ascribed both to African nations (especially Numidians) and to African individuals as an

¹ See e.g. the discussion in Chapter 9.1.

² Scanlon comments that this willingness to attribute the same innate morality to Romans as to all others, to "posit universal human motives among diverse peoples", is one of the more "universal" aspects of Sallust's writings. See Scanlon 1988: 175n51.

³ It must be noted that the following discussion will not attribute to Sallust an attempt to promote the idea of the "noble savage" (for which see, e.g., Strabo VII.3.7; App. *Pun.* 11, 71, Tac. *Germ.* 23 (Paul 223), Yarrow 2006: 333-41). As stated directly above, we will see that at most Sallust simply puts everyone on a level playing field, with Romans prone to the same vices and faults of character as other nations. (Whether certain Romans *rise above* those vices and achieve a higher level of *virtus*, then, must depend in Sallust's view on the individual (cf. *BC* 1.2-7, 2.3-9, *BJ* 1-2)). For Roman approaches to depicting the character of foreigners, see i.a. Adler 2006, 2011; Gruen 2010; Woolf 2011.

innate quality.⁴ In addition to being ascribed this fickle and treacherous nature, Jugurtha and Bocchus both emerge, through sustained characterization, as subject to constant hesitation and doubt.⁵ Sallust's own authorial remarks reinforce the hesitation, wavering, and doubt of the two men as an inherent attribute of their character, and by extension, an inherent feature of Africans more generally.⁶

One cannot deny this negative side of Sallust's discourse on African peoples. To a large degree it is part of the traditional pattern of ethnographic discourse about barbarian peoples which seeks to establish their difference and inferiority. According to Green, the strong correlation in ancient ethnography between climate and character means Africans should not be able fully to display true *virtus*: Africa is a mix of tame and wild, which would be reflected to some degree in its peoples (e.g. *BJ* 17.5-6, 18; the character of Jugurtha).⁷ However this is only one side of Sallust's ethnography, and by no means is it the dominant side. Sallust is also a literary mind, and his work has other goals to consider. Indeed, ancient ethnographic writers tended to choose their interpretive framework (usually one rather than several together) to suit their immediate rhetorical

⁴ Numidians 8 times, Bocchus 5 times, Jugurtha twice, Bomilcar once, Mauri once, Kings in general once: *BJ* 38, 46.2-4, 46.8, 54.3-4, 56.5-6, 61.3, 61.5.9-12, 66.2&4, 74.3, 88.6, 91.7, 101.6-7, 102.15, 108.3, 111.2, 112.3, 113.1. The only mentions of African *mores* that is not wholly negative is *BJ* 89.7.

⁵ For Jugurtha's hesitation and doubt (as well as growing paranoia after the failed assassination plot of Bomilcar (*BJ* 70-2)), see esp. *BJ* 25.6-7, 32.5, 62.8, **72.2**, **74.1**, 75.1, 76.1, 107.6; for Bocchus', see esp. 88.6, 97.2, 102.2&15, 103.2, **108.3**, 111.2, **113.1**, **113.3**.

⁶ See especially *BJ* 88.6, 108.3, 113.1. As for the passages on African *mobilitas ingenii* and *perfidia*, the vast majority are focalized through Sallust himself and expressed by the narrator. 111.2 (Bocchus) and 112.3 (Jugurtha) are the only two spoken by non-Romans; *BJ* 46.2-4, 61.3, and 91.7 are focalized through Metellus, though one may doubt to what degree Sallust took over exactly from a source these negative sentiments about Africans, rather than building them into his account of Metellus' thoughts himself.

⁷ Green 1993: 190. On the correlation of climate and geography with character, see Woolf 2000: 54-6, and, i.a., the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places* (12ff); cf. Posid. Fr. 49 E-K (with comm., Kidd Vol II (1988): 273). A contemporary example is Cic. *Rep.* 2.9: the overarching cause for misfortunes and revolutions in Greece is their having built cities by the corrupting sea. On the influence of the sea on the morality of a city cf. Arstl. *Pol.* 7.6, Plato *Leg.* 4.704a-705b; Dicaearchus also a possible source of Cicero here (confirmed in *Att.* 6.2.3), as seen by Zetzel 1995: 162-3.

needs.⁸ In Sallust's case, the basic project is to write about *Rome*, and he has strong opinions on the declining nature of Roman society and politics in the late Republic. As a result, we should not be surprised if Sallust's discourse on *non*-Romans is constructed in ways that help him to underscore his negative take on *Roman* politics and morality. Therefore while Sallust may have felt the need to conform somewhat to a traditional approach to the ethnography of foreign peoples, we shall see that he was just as concerned to use his depiction of non-Romans to further his views about Roman shortcomings. This side of Sallust's discourse on foreign peoples will now be examined in more detail.

Early on in the *BJ*, after a general prologue and a character sketch of Jugurtha, Sallust gives a short history of events in Numidia leading up to the conflict between Jugurtha and Adherbal and the latter's flight to Rome to argue against the envoys of Jugurtha before the Senate. After Adherbal's address to the Senate, a commission is sent out to partition Micipsa's kingdom between Adherbal and Jugurtha.⁹ At this point Sallust pauses to digress on the geography and early inhabitants of Africa (*BC* 17-19).¹⁰ While interesting in many respects, what is notable for our purposes about this digression is the way in which it is built to suggest parallels between Romans and non-Romans.¹¹ Note in the first place the way Sallust introduces the excursus (*BJ* 17.1-2): *Res postulare videtur Africae situm paucis exponere...cetera quam paucissimis absolvam* ("the situation seems

⁸ Woolf 2000: 54-6.

⁹ *BJ* 16.2

¹⁰ On this excursus on early Africa, see Scanlon 1988: passim; Green 1993.

¹¹ Scanlon 1988: 138-42, 162 points out the certain linking of Rome and Carthage in the *BJ*, but seems too ready to see all the evidence in *BJ* 17-19 as serving the Rome-Carthage parallel in particular. While part of the digression (the very end) relates to Carthage and Phoenicians, most of the evidence (which I discuss in the text below) is about other African peoples: Libyes, Gaetuli, Mauri, and Numidians.

to demand I lay forth in a few words the position of Africa...the rest I will dispose of in as few words as possible").¹² With this we may compare the way Sallust introduces his digression on early Romans in *BC* 5.9: *Res ipsa hortari videtur...supra reptere ac paucis...disserere* ("The situation seems to urge that I go back and in a few words discourse upon..."). While Sallust does introduce a few of his other digressions with more elaborate introductions, the formulations used in *BC* 5.9 and *BJ* 17.1-2 seem particularly evocative of each other.¹³ As one reads on, further correspondances become apparent between Sallust's picture of early Africans here and his picture of early Romans in the *BC*:

Africam initio habuere Gaetuli et Libyes, asperi incultique, quis cibus erat...uti pecoribus. Ii neque lege aut imperio quousquam regebantur. uagi palantes quas nox coegerat sedes habebant. (BJ 18.1)

Originally the Gaetuli and Libyans inhabited Africa, harsh and uncivilized people, whose food was...like that of cattle. They were ruled by neither the law nor the command of anyone. They roamed and wandered around and kept as their dwelling whatever night compelled them to keep.

Urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, qui Aenea duce profugi sedibus incertis vagabantur, cumque iis Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum. (BC 6.1-2)

As far as I have learned, originally the Trojans founded and inhabited Rome. With Aeneas as leader they fled and wandered with no set dwellings. With them [settled] the Aborigines, a wild race of men, without laws, without authority, free and loosely bound together.

In both passages the founding and initial habitation is given in similar terms (*initio habuere* in *BJ* 18, *habuere initio* in *BC* 6).¹⁴ Both early Africans and early Romans are

¹² Cf. 17.7.13 (*quam paucissumis dicam*)

¹³ E.g., *BJ* 79.1 (*Sed quoniam in has regiones per Leptitanorum negotia venimus, non indignum videtur egregium atque mirabile facinus duorum Carthaginiensium memorare: eam rem nos locus admonuit.*); *BJ* 5.3 (*Sed prius quam huiusce modi rei initium expedio, pauca supra repetam, quo ad cognoscendum omnia industria magis magisque in aperto sint.*); *BJ* 95.2 (*Sed quoniam nos tanti viri res admonuit, idoneum visum est de natura cultuque eius paucis dicere.*)

¹⁴ Sallust uses this same wording in introducing the digression as well: *BJ* 17.7.8 (*sed qui mortales initio Africam habuerint...*)

characterized by a lawless, nomadic existence (Africans: *asperi incultique...li neque lege aut imperio quousquam regebantur: vagi, palantes, quas nox coegerat sedes habebant.* || Romans: *sedibus incertis vagabantur...cumque iis Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum*). In this regard one is reminded of the claims to be found in some literary sources that a less than noble mix of inhabitants settled in the early city of Romulus.¹⁵ The coalescence of different peoples, natives with foreigners, also features in both accounts.¹⁶ The fact that other sources mention more than just two aboriginal peoples in Africa (Strabo 2.5.33 mentions twelve) suggests that Sallust in naming just two was aiming to create a parallel picture to that in *BC* 6.1-2.¹⁷

We also find a marked repetition of the term *brevi*. In both excurses it is used in a similar context of people coalescing and growing (as a nation), with similar language and phraseology built around it:

Incredibile memoratu est quam facile coaluerint; ita brevi multitudo divorsa atque vaga concordia civitas facta erat.

It is unbelievable to relate how easily they became one; in such a short time was heterogenous and roving multitude made into a state through concord. *BC* 6.3

Sed civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate quantum brevi creverit.

But it is incredible to relate how much the state grew in a short time once it had attained liberty. *BC* 7.3

¹⁵ For the agglomeration of immigrants, traders, merchants, laborers, slaves, and various fugitives at the early site of Rome, see Dench 2005: 2-3, 14-15, citing Florus 1.9, Plut. *Rom.* 9.2, Juvenal 8.272-5. For the presence of many resident aliens at Rome by the later regal period see e.g. Ogilvie 1965: 175.

¹⁶ If one wishes to address specifics, in Africa the two original peoples each coalesce with a different new-comer: Gaetuli with Persians to form Numidians, and Libyes with Medes and Armenians to form Mauri. In *BC* 6 there is only a general coalescence of the one native people and the one foreign people. Delving to this level of analysis gets one nowhere, however, as the important point to be proved is the shared theme in the *BC* and *BJ* of the coalescence of natives and foreigners.

¹⁷ See Green 1993: 190-91. Sallust also chooses to omit mention of Greeks and Carthaginians in his account of those foreigners who came to Africa and mixed with the natives. This, as Green notes, suggests that Sallust is concerned in this digression with giving the ethnography mainly of the lands that were being divided between Jugurtha and Adherbal. The Greeks and Carthaginians (and their territories) become the focus of the later geographical digression at *BJ* 78-9.

Sed res persarum brevi adolevit.¹⁸

But the Persian state increased in a short time.

BJ 18.11

Eaeque brevi multum auctae.¹⁹

And [the colonies of the Phoenicians] grew greatly in a short time.

BJ 19.1

In terms of conduct, both Africans and Romans eventually apply fear to compel others to accept their *imperium*.²⁰ After their nation grew in strength, the Numidians *finitumi armis aut metu sub imperium suum coegere* (“they forced their neighbors under their rule by arms or by fear”, *BJ* 18.12). Although the Romans in the early to middle Republic had exercised their rule *beneficiis quam metu* (“more by good services than by fear”, *BC* 9.5), after Carthage’s fall they too dealt with allies by force rather than justice (*BC* 12.5; cf. *Hist.* 4.69.5-9, 17).

Moreover, the Phoenicians, once they grew in prosperity and numbers, began to show *imperii cupido* in extending their reach through colonies (*BJ* 19.1). The Romans too had evinced *imperii cupido*, especially after the fall of Carthage (*BC* 10.3, 6), and to Sallust *imperii cupido* (or *ambitio*) was one of the central vices that contributed to the crises of the Republic.

Sallust is thus clearly setting up detailed parallels between Romans and Africans in these two excurses.²¹ He is using these parallels to suggest a few things: first, that

¹⁸ Cf. *BC* 51.40 (*postquam res publica adolevit et multitudine civium*)

¹⁹ Cf. *postquam res eorum civibus moribus agris satis aucta* (*BC* 6.3).

²⁰ Scanlon 1988: 138.

²¹ Another such parallel: as an accompaniment to imperial growth, the presence of a *plebs sollicitata*, or a *plebs novarum rerum avida* (*BJ* 19.1; cf. *BC* 24.4, 28.4 (*plebs...novarum rerum cupidam*), 37.2 (*plebes novarum rerum studio Catilinae incepta probabat*)). On the specific role Carthage quietly plays in the three excurses in the *BJ* – and the relevance (in Sallust’s view) of that city’s experiences to Rome’s own imperial trajectory – see further the discussion of the Philaeni Excursus later in Chapter 6.2. Scanlon 1988: 141 claims that in *BJ* 17-19 Carthage “lacks” the [moral] golden age given to Rome in the *BC* 6-9 digression. This is not certain, however: it may be implied for the reader in his mention of Numidian imperial expansion and Phoenician growth and colonization. In any case, its existence or non-existence does not

Romans are no different from other nations when it comes to humble origins and the gradual acquisition of civilized habits; second, he broaches the idea (to be developed more at length over the course of the monograph's three main digressions: 17-19, 41-2, 78-9) that the Roman *imperium* is subject to some of the same faults and abuses that plague the growth of an *imperium* among other nations. Such a humbling of Roman claims of exceptionalism will in fact turn out to be by no means an isolated endeavor on Sallust's part, as will become clear once we have looked at the other ways in which Sallust brings Romans down to the level of non-Romans.²²

One such case is Sallust's characterization of Jugurtha. Similarly to Catiline, Jugurtha gets an introductory character sketch after the prologue (*BJ* 6.1):

Qui ubi primum adolevit, pollens viribus, decora facie, sed multo maxime ingenio validus, non se luxu neque inertiae corrumpendum dedit, sed, uti mos gentis illius est, equitare iaculari; cursu cum aequalibus certare, et cum omnis gloria anteiret, omnibus tamen carus esse; ad hoc pleraque tempora in venando agere, leonem atque alias feras primus aut in primis ferire: plurimum facere, [et] minimum ipse de se loqui.

As soon as Jugurtha grew up, as he was endowed with physical strength, a handsome face, but above all with a strong intellect, he did not allow himself to be spoiled by luxury or idleness, but following the custom of that nation, he rode, he hurled the javelin, he contended with his fellows in foot-races; and although he surpassed them all in renown, he nevertheless won the love of all. Besides this, he devoted much time to the chase, he was the first or among the first to strike down the lion and other wild beasts, he distinguished himself greatly, but spoke little of his own exploits. (transl. Rolfe)

seem to matter much to Sallust amidst the wider parallel drawn between Rome and Carthage; Sallust is more concerned with skipping ahead to emphasize how the Numidians use fear to compel neighbors and where Phoenicians colonize due to *imperi cupido*.

²² Note also Sallust's description of the Numidian *volgus* at *BJ* 66.2: *Nam volgus, uti plerumque solet et maxime Numidarum, ingenio mobili, seditiosum atque discordiosum erat, cupidum novarum rerum, quieti et otio adversum*. ("For the mob, as is often the case but especially among the Numidians, was of fickle nature, seditious and prone to cause conflict, desirous of revolution, opposed to peace and leisure."). While the Numidians are especially this way, Sallust implies that even the Roman commons fit this description. Cf. *BC* 37.2-3 for a similar sentiment about the Roman *plebs* (my emphasis): *omnino cuncta plebes novarum rerum studio Catilinae incepta probabat. Id adeo more suo videbatur facere. Nam semper in civitate quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis invident, malos extollunt, vetera odere, nova exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student, turba atque seditionibus sine cura aluntur*. On the nature of the masses, cf. inter alia Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1179b4.

Sallust goes on to narrate Jugurtha's early achievements and his time among the Romans at Numantia. Many mentions are made in these chapters of the *virtus* of Jugurtha from the perspective both of Micpisa and of various Romans.²³ Moreover, Jugurtha's conduct in this introductory character sketch reminds us of that of early Roman youths from the *BC*.²⁴ As soon as these Romans were of age (*BC* 7.4-6),

in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant. Igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduus erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus: virtus omnia domuerat. Sed gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat: se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici, dum tale facinus faceret, properabat.²⁵

They learned military discipline through hard work in the camps and had desire more for fine arms and war horses than for harlots and revels. Thus to such men toil was not unfamiliar, no place harsh or steep, no armed enemy frightening in the slightest. Virtue mastered everything. But there was a very great contest for glory amongst them: each hurried to strike down the enemy, ascend the wall, and be seen doing such a deed.

Like these early Roman youths, we are told that Jugurtha avoided luxury and dedicated himself to warfare.²⁶ Granted there are a few things in the upbringing of Jugurtha, such as the focus on hunting and horseriding, upon which a young Roman of the late Republic

²³ *BJ* 6.2, 7.2, 8.1, 9.2, 9.3, 10.2, 10.8. On the appropriation by non-Romans of Roman *virtus* and other traditionally Roman qualities, cf. Tacitus' depiction of various "barbarian" leaders: Caratacus (*Ann.* 12.34), Arminius (*Ann.* 1.59, 2.15), Boudica (*Ann.* 14.35), and Calgacus (*Agr.* 30), and Gillespie's discussion of Boudica's valorization by Tacitus as a leader possessing *virtus*: Gillespie 2015: esp. 405-6, 409; and on Calgacus see i.a. Clarke 2001. Yarrow suggests that Sallust may have been influenced in his depiction of Jugurtha's virtues by Posidonius, the proof being similarities between Diodorus' account of Viriathus (*D.S.* 33.1, 7, 21), Posid. fr.169f EK, and aspects of Sallust's Jugurtha story. It should be emphasized again, however, that whereas Diodorus may have depicted Viriathus as a noble savage (Yarrow 2006: 334-6), we should hesitate, given some of the other ethnographic discourse in the *BJ* about Jugurtha, Bocchus, and other Africans mentioned above, to assert that Sallust intends to create any unambiguous noble savage.

²⁴ Earl 1961: 62.

²⁵ cf. *BC* 8.5: *ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat; optimus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis bene facta laudari quam ipse aliorum narrare malebant.*

²⁶ At *BC* 7.5, "virtue" may be the safest translation of *virtus* here because what is described in this passage, though in large part martial virtue, also touches on aspects of moral rectitude: through asserting that early Roman youths did not succumb to luxurious banqueting and carnal pleasures, Sallust implies that they possessed aspects of positive ethical *virtus* as well. The same mix of martial and ethical *virtus* applies to what we are told of Jugurtha at the beginning of *BJ* 6.1 (*multo maxime ingenio validus, non se luxu neque inertiae corrumpendum dedit*). See McDonnell 2006: 357-63, who by contrast sees less admixture of martial *virtus* and ethical *virtus* in *BC* 6-13 and in the main narrative of the *BJ*.

would not necessarily focus. Yet Scipio Aemilianus himself showed his *virtus* as a youth in fields similar to Jugurtha, since he disliked pleading and courts.²⁷ Jugurtha's evocation of the early Roman youth continues as Sallust next narrates Jugurtha's subsequent behavior at Numantia under Scipio: he quickly earned the respect of the Romans *multo labore multaque cura, praeterea modestissime parendo et saepe obviam eundo periculis*.²⁸ What is more, Jugurtha was both *proelio strenuus* and *bonus consilio*,²⁹ which seems to fulfill the ideal of the good soldier (or commander) Sallust sets out at *BC* 1.5-7.³⁰

In a broader sense, too, the war Sallust constructs in the *BJ* is on the surface one with a foreign prince (*BJ* 5.1), but the reader is made to question how "foreign" this enemy is. At Numantia Jugurtha made many friends among the Romans in Scipio's retinue,³¹ while others, both *novi homines* and *nobiles*, approached him with transformative yet insidious ideas: *Jugurthae non mediocrem animum pollicitando accendebant, si Micipsa rex occidisset, fore uti solus imperi Numidiae potiretur: in ipso maximam virtutem, Romae omnia venalia esse*.³² This chapter represents a crucial stage in Jugurtha's development, when competing forces strive to influence him, one good (Scipio), one not. Later

²⁷ Earl, 62. cf. Polybius 31.29.8-11.

²⁸ *BJ* 7.4

²⁹ *BJ* 7.5. For a possible source of this conception of boldness and rational forethought see Thuc. 2.40.3 (but cf. already *Iliad* 9.443: μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμειναι πρῆκτῆρά τε ἔργων)

³⁰ *BC* 1.5-7: *Sed diu magnum inter mortalis certamen fuit, vine corporis an virtute animi res militaris magis procederet. Nam et, prius quam incipias consulto et, ubi consulueris, mature facto opus est. Ita utrumque per se indigens alterum alterius auxilio eget.* cf. *BC* 1.2 and *BJ* 2.1-3 on the dual nature of man, body and mind (variously either *ingenium* or *animus*), and the need to let the mind rule, but the tendency to let the body take control. One may also see in Jugurtha's rise to legitimacy and power in Numidia through action (not through birth) a parallel to Marius' experience (or that experience which he claims throughout *BJ* 85). On the possibility of reading Marius as a Roman of marginal status, see Mossman 2005: 515n66.

³¹ *BJ* 7.7

³² *BJ* 8.1

developments, however, especially insults from Hiempsal (*BJ* 11.5-9),³³ drive Jugurtha toward the advice of those Romans *quibus divitiae bono honestoque potiores...clari magis quam honesti*. By the time Jugurtha receives half of Numidia via Roman arbitration and avoids the consequences of murdering his brother, it is clear that a sinister education has taken root in him from his interactions with those disreputable Romans at Numantia.³⁴ In Sallust's view of the lead-up to the Jugurthine War, then, it seems it is the Romans who have created the monster: a foreign prince is made an enemy in the Romans' own likeness, such that, in the course of this war, the Romans are brought face to face with, and must battle against, a manifestation of their own vices of greed, ambition, and ruthless self-serving violence.³⁵

As the narrative of the war wears on, Jugurtha's actions call up still other Roman resonances.³⁶ At *BJ* 49.2, before the battle at the River Muthul, Sallust reports a pre-battle speech of Jugurtha wherein, among other expected commonplaces, he urges them to be *memores pristinae virtutis*, a sentiment which echoes the Roman *nobilis* Catiline (*BC* 58.13) and Sallust himself (*BC* 60.3, 7) regarding a battle of Romans against Romans, a battle for their homeland and freedom.³⁷ Later in his description of this battle,

³³ *BJ* 11.7-9: *Quod verbum in pectus Iugurthae altius quam quisquam ratus erat descendit. Itaque ex eo tempore ira et metu anxius moliri, parare atque ea modo cum animo habere, quibus Hiempsal per dolum caperetur*. Compare this psychological turning point to that of Marius, also set off by an insult (*BJ* 64.4-5): *Quae res Marium cum pro honore quem affectabat tum contra Metellum vehementer accenderat. Ita cupidine atque ira, pessimis consultoribus, grassari; neque facto ullo neque dicto abstinere, quod modo ambitiosum foret*.

³⁴ *BJ* 20.1: *postquam diviso regno legati Africa decessere et Iugurtha, contra timorem animi praemia sceleris adeptum sese videt, certum esse ratus quod ex amicis apud Numantiam acceperat, omnia Romae venalia esse...in regnum Adherbalis animum intendit*.

³⁵ One wonders whether Jugurtha's killing of his brother would have reminded a Roman reader of the more violent aspects of their own founding mythology.

³⁶ Pace McDonnell 2006: 363n108, who argues Jugurtha no longer displays any *virtus* after becoming hostile to Rome.

³⁷ Catiline (58.13): *Quo audacius adgredimini memores pristinae virtutis*. Sallust: *Veterani pristinae virtutis memores comminus acriter instare* (60.3)...<Catilina>, *postquam fusas copias seque cum paucis*

Sallust steps back to make a comparison of the rival generals, Metellus and Jugurtha, in a sort of *synkrisis* to parallel that of Cato and Caesar in *BC* 53.2-54.6. Here, Metellus and Jugurtha are compared using terms that encourage the reader to view the character of each man through a Roman filter (*BJ* 52.1-2, my emphasis):

Eo modo inter se duo imperatores, summi viri, certabant, ipsi pares, sed opibus disparibus: nam <pro> Metello virtus militum erat, locus advorsus, Iugurthae alia omnia praeter milites opportuna.

In this way two commanders, most excellent men, vied with each other. They were equal with each other personally, but not in resources: for Metellus had the advantage in the excellence of his soldiers, the disadvantage in location; for Jugurtha everything else except his soldiers was advantageous.³⁸

Later, we encounter Jugurtha having fled to the territory of the Gaetuli, *genus hominum ferum incultumque et eo tempore ignarum nominis Romani* (*BJ* 80.1). While there, Jugurtha teaches the Gaetuli to fight like civilized people: *eorum multitudinem in unum cogit ac paulatim consuefacit ordines habere, signa sequi, imperium observare* (80.2). Here Jugurtha, the Numidian molded in Roman custom, comes to those who supposedly don't know of Roman power and influence, and teaches them the kind of military discipline for which a Roman is known.³⁹ Hints, then, recur throughout the monograph that suggest some intersection in Jugurtha between Roman and non-Roman.

However, it must be made clear that despite Sallust's efforts to suggest equivalences between Romans and non-Romans in cases like Jugurtha's, foreigners in Sallust's view

relicuom videt, memor generis atque pristinae suae virtutis in confertissimos hostes incurrit ibique pugnans confoditur (60.7). Cf. also *BJ* 97.5 (Marius' men). McDonnell 2006: 361-2 notes the more martial than ethical connotations of *virtus* in this phrase, naturally so. For Sallust, however, martial *virtus* is still one aspect of Roman *virtus*, and thus still striking for someone like Jugurtha to coopt in his own discourse – especially given that the Numidians were, as Sallust often points out, cowardly (e.g. *BJ* 54.3-4, 74.3) and of *ingenium mobile* (46.2, 56.5-6, 66.2, 4, 88.6, 91.7).

³⁸ Even if Jugurtha's men may not have *virtus militum* as Metellus' do, what concerns us here is the comparison of Jugurtha and Metellus as individuals.

³⁹ Noted also by Paul 1984 ad loc.

are still ethnically and culturally non-Roman; *that* distinction is not put into question.⁴⁰

Thus Jugurtha acting like a Roman in battle or teaching the Gaetuli to *observare imperium* does not make Jugurtha ethnically or culturally Roman. Sallust's aim, in associating Jugurtha with Roman models of conduct and *virtus*, is merely to suggest the *moral* equality of Roman and non-Roman and thus to cause a Roman reader to question the uniqueness of his own *virtus*. The same aim explains Sallust's decision to depict the early Africans as a mirror image of his early Romans in those passages which began our discussion of the *BJ* above. By leveling the moral playing field between Roman and non-Roman, Sallust is taking the rhetoric of the *novi homines* (so clearly expressed in Marius' important speech at *BJ* 85) further than most advocates of the position, who merely assert the worth of accomplished Romans not from the nobility; Sallust is asserting that *virtus* is open not just to any non-noble *Roman*, but to *anyone* who (in Earl's apt take on Sallust's notion of *virtus*) uses *bonum ingenium* to perform *egregia facinora* through *bonae artes* and thus achieve *gloria*.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Green 1993: 188 makes the interesting observation that at *BJ* 17.3, when describing the division of the continents by geographers, Sallust says that some make Africa a separate continent but others make it part of Europe, leaving Africa "teetering between independent identity and absorption into Europe." Yet it is not clear whether this possibility Sallust leaves open of Africa's intergration with Europe in geographical terms has any relationship to the moral equivalencies Sallust is suggesting between Romans and various African peoples; it may rather be a reflection of the information Sallust could have found in geographical sources. Cf. Strabo 17.3.1.

⁴¹ For this definition of Sallust's concept of *virtus*, see Earl 1961: 61 et passim. Marius (despite the later decline in his behavior after *BJ* 63) becomes the *main* focal point the the monograph for this redefinition of *virtus* as a *virtus* of achievement rather than birth, especially in his speech at *BJ* 85. McDonnell 2006, in a wide-ranging study of *virtus* in Roman culture, insists on a distinction in Sallust between martial *virtus* (predominant in the narratives) and an ethical-political *virtus* (predominant in the prologues and digressions). Martial *virtus* is indeed more common in the main narratives of the monographs (partly, no doubt, a function of the military matter discussed therein), but the separation of the two types in Sallust may be slightly overstated: martial and "ethical-political" *virtus* are combined in *BC* 7, 9, 53-4; *BJ* 43-45, 55.1, *et alias*. Moreover, besides *BC* 7.1 & 9.1 (noted by McDonnell), ethical-political *virtus* is the clear referent in the main narrative in the following places in Sallust: *BC* 12-14, 16-17, 21.4, 22, 25, 36.4-38.3; *BJ* 15.2, 15.4-5, 16.2-5, 20.1, 27.1-3, 28.1-29.2, 30.1-3, 32.1-5, 33-5, 40, 43-5, 63-4, 73-4, 82-3; *Hist.* 1.47-61M. A focus just on the term *virtus* itself (McDonnell 2006: 356-7, 360n105) seems a bit limiting, as many instances of *virtus* (whether martial or "ethical") are depicted to us without Sallust

That Sallust continues to make a concerted effort even through the later stages of the monograph to broaden the field of *virtus* to non-Romans is clear from the digression on the Carthaginian Philaeni brothers at *BJ* 78-9. A long-standing conflict over the desert borders separating the territories of Carthage and Cyrene leads the two states to make a truce and settle the dispute by sending out individuals who were to establish a boundary where the respective deputations met in the middle. The Cyrenaeans arrived late and tried to wrest the advantage back by force. When the Carthaginian Philaeni are threatened with an ultimatum, they preserve their country's borders by agreeing to be buried alive on the spot. Efforts to pinpoint a specific function for this digression (or for that matter most other digressions in Roman historiography) can lead to restrictive thinking, and it is more productive to think of it as simultaneously fulfilling several purposes: It emphasizes fraternal and civic cooperation being violated (an important theme introduced earlier through Metellus and Marius)⁴²; it serves a chronological function of covering winter 108-7 B.C.E.;⁴³ and it entertains the reader.⁴⁴ For our present purposes, however, we will focus on the way Sallust uses the Philaeni Excursus to once again illustrate *virtus* through a non-Roman.⁴⁵

employing the actual word *virtus*: e.g. *BC* 6.2 (*brevi multitudo...concordia civitas facta erat*), 6.3 (*postquam res eorum civibus moribus agris aucta*), 9.1-2 (on this passage see below Chapter 6.3); *BJ* 6.1. McDonnell's attempt to downplay the ethical side of *virtus* in these latter passages (2006: 360: "whatever ethical denotation *virtus* might have is derived from its martial nature") is not fully convincing.

⁴² Scanlon 1988: 161-5.

⁴³ So Syme: 145; Vretska 1955: 41n45.

⁴⁴ Paul 1984: 72, 198-9.

⁴⁵ Tiffou 1973: 470-71 locates the uniqueness of the Philaeni excursus in the fact that it is the first time Sallust uses a foreigner as an illustration of *virtus*. However, as we have seen, Sallust had already done this in his earlier treatment of Jugurtha. On the Philaeni see Koestermann 1971: 276-81 (though little comment on its purpose).

Scanlon's article on textual geography in the *BJ* has sufficiently shown that there is a ring structure (A1-B1-C1-C2-B2-A2) which underlies the episodes in *BJ* 43-99, and which serves as a constant means to compare Metellus and Marius and to bring both in for criticism for their partisan rivalry and perpetuation of factionalism (as well as for other faults in generalship or human nature).⁴⁶ The Philaeni digression divides the ring structure at its midpoint. Moreover its content points up a contrast with the Roman narrative immediately following. For the Carthaginian Philaeni brothers show unassailable *virtus* as individuals and total devotion to their country through self-sacrifice. By comparison, the conduct of Metellus and Marius immediately following this digression casts a negative light on both of them due to their violation of “fraternal” as well as civic cooperation and failure to show complete *virtus* (moral or martial aspects). Metellus in particular comes out poorly. We immediately hear of his reaction to Marius being voted to command the war in Numidia (*BJ* 82.2-3). He is upset “beyond what is right and honorable” (*super bonum aut honestum*). Some said this was due to his pride (*superbia*), but Sallust says he is fairly certain that Metellus was more aggrieved by Marius’ success than his own insult. Metellus’ overriding concern with partisan political rivalry over national interest gains greater clarity in what follows, for Metellus decides it “seemed foolish to attend to another man’s business at risk to himself” (*stultitiae videbatur alienam rem periculo suo curare*, 83.1), and so he lets the war drag on without

⁴⁶ A1: Skirmish at the Muthul [ch.48-54] – B1: Siege of Vaga [66-9] – C1: Capture of desert town of Thala [75-6] || **Leptis & Philaeni Digression [77-9]** || C2: Capture of desert town of Capsa [89-91] – B2: Siege of fort on Muluccha [92-4] – A2: Skirmish near Cirta [97-9]. For further subunits (e.g. winter camps, character sketches) which also fit into the ring structure, participating in their own balanced correspondances, see Scanlon 1988: 145 et passim.

issue until his command ends (83.3). Sallust makes clear that this just served to perpetuate the civil strife.

But then again, Marius too (just like Metellus) perpetuates and probably exacerbates civil strife and factionalism through insulting and agitating against the nobility upon being elected (*BJ* 84), and particularly through his speech at *BJ* 85. His behavior after the Philaeni Excursus thus continues the partisan conflict with Metellus which began in *BJ* 64.4-65 (cf. 73.3-7), and this personal feud will color his actions to come (89.6, 100.5). Scanlon aptly captures the role that chapters 80-88 play both in the larger ring structure of the work and in more immediate comparison with the Philaeni Digression (Scanlon 1988: 167):

The theme of personal interference in national affairs is made all the more reprehensible in contrast to the positive *exemplum* of the Philaeni digression. The digression is juxtaposed to the continuing Marius-Metellus feud and to the exacerbation of party strife through Marius' oration. The contrast casts implicit blame on both Metellus and Marius for maintaining civil strife.

Not only, then, does the digression illustrate a widened field of operation for *virtus* in Sallust's view, but it also helps emphasize by contrast the continued factionalism and self-interested political action plaguing Roman public affairs and compromising the *virtus* of its leaders.

One final function of the Philaeni digression worth noting here is that, besides illustrating *virtus* through non-Romans, it brings back the theme of Carthage recurrent in all three of the work's digressions, and in so doing it opens out the reader's perspective to broader reflections on the nature of the Roman state and the future of Rome's empire. The specter of Carthage lurks in the background of the work's first digression on early Africa (*BJ* 17-19), where Sallust speaks of Phoenician colonization (19.1) but passes over Carthage in particular as a topic deserving more elaborate treatment than can be given

there (19.2).⁴⁷ The second major digression, that on party strife at *BJ* 41-2, has as its central theme the rise in factionalism and license after the destruction of Carthage (41.2). When we arrive at the Philaeni Excursus, we are brought back in time before Carthage's destruction to the time of its imperial growth. When an armistice and a *sponsio* are made to settle the conflict between Carthaginian and Cyrenaeen territorial claims, the Philaeni brothers by themselves and through their own *virtus* settle the dispute to the advantage of their own country, and thus help maintain and grow Carthage's empire. This may remind the reader of Sallust's own reflections on the nature of the Roman *virtus* in *BC* 53, when he remarks "and through long reflection it became apparent to me that the eminent excellence of a few citizens had achieved all things" (*mihi multa agitantibus constabat paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse*, *BC* 53.4). The reader of the *BJ* is thus encouraged to compare the nature of Roman and Carthaginian prosperity – in particular, the type of *virtus* it took early on from their respective citizens to attain it, and what it took to maintain it. Sallust's audience of course knows that Carthage's empire had long since declined and disappeared, to give way to Rome's. Yet this very fact might lead a reader to pessimistic reflection on the possible fate of Rome's own *imperium*. Sallust himself, in the passage of the *BC* just cited, had reflected on the drastic difference between the display of *virtus* by individuals in centuries past, and the situation obtaining in his own day (*BC* 53.5):

sed postquam luxu atque desidia civitas corrupta est, rursus res publica magnitudine sui imperatorum ac magistratuum vitia sustentabat ac, sicuti † effeta parentum † multis tempestatibus haud sane quisquam Romae virtute magnus fuit.

⁴⁷ Note here as well the mention of the *Philaenon arae* at *BJ* 19.3, foreshadowing their importance later in the third major digression.

But after the state was corrupted by luxury and sloth, the commonwealth in its turn was the one sustaining by its sheer size the vices of its commanders and magistrates, and...no one emerged in a long time at Rome who was great in virtue. (*BC* 53.5).

Carthage's empire certainly suffered a drastic downfall, and given the way Roman *virtus* and Roman political culture had already decayed to its current state, Sallust's readers may wonder what fate is in store for Rome's own empire on its current trajectory.

Incidentally, the digressive chapter on the city of Leptis (*BJ* 78) that serves as a bridge to the Philaeni excursus is equally invested with the potential to trigger reflection on the current state of Roman affairs.⁴⁸ Leptis is portrayed as a city that overcame civil strife (*discordiae*) at home (in Sidon) to found an orderly, well-governed city where they enjoyed a relative independence under their own laws and customs (78.4).⁴⁹ Carthage and Cyrene too were able eventually to settle things in the story of the Philaeni. By contrast, it is implied, the fate of Rome is up in the air: they have yet to settle the current conflict in Numidia, and those reading in Sallust's day might have wondered if Rome would ever return to *concordia* and settle the ongoing civil conflicts raging in the 40s and 30s.

This final function of *BJ* 78-79, then, is by no means a small one. The broader reflections on the *imperium Romanum* which these chapters are made to inspire lead the Roman reader to greater doubt and pessimism about Rome's future. Overall, *BJ* 78-79 turns out to be central not just structurally (as mentioned above), but also in serving many roles: to stress the continued violation of *concordia* by Metellus and Marius both at home

⁴⁸ On the transitional function of the Leptis chapter, see the first sentence of chapter 79: *Sed quoniam in has regiones per Leptitanorum negotia venimus...*

⁴⁹ Scanlon 1988: 165, who also rightly notes (163) the significance of the fact that the term *discordia* is only used twice in the *BJ*: here, and in 10.6, where on his deathbed Micipsa tells his sons *concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maxime dilabuntur*.

and in the field, to further illustrate Sallust's widening of the field of *virtus* to non-Romans, and to inspire broad contemplation of the trajectory of Rome's own power.

Chapter 6.1b: Pessimism in the *BJ*: Explicit Evidence

The foregoing discussion of the *BJ*, with its focus on how Sallust shows the Romans to lack innate moral superiority over non-Romans, has touched upon some narrative strategies and modes of characterization that indirectly reveal Sallust's pessimistic attitude toward Roman morality in the monograph. There is also other, more explicit, evidence of his pessimism in the *BJ*, and we will examine this evidence before finally moving on to discuss signs of pessimism visible in the *BC*.

In the prologue to the *BJ* Sallust begins by asserting that, contrary to what many think, human nature is not wholly weak. The spirit (*animus*) has the potential to guide men to glory by the path of virtue and cause them to control circumstance rather than be controlled by it. Yet men let themselves be ruled by the pleasures and urges of the body instead, and meanwhile the *ingenium*, the best part of human nature, they let rot through laziness and disuse.⁵⁰ This exasperates Sallust, given the potential for achievement we possess through *animi virtus* and *bonum ingenium*. For Sallust, then, humans present a dual aspect: everyone has a bestial side and a more elevated one.⁵¹ As the fragments examined earlier from the *Histories* also attest, within us is thus always the potential to

⁵⁰ *BJ* 1.1-5; 2.1-4

⁵¹ On this dualist conception of the spirit see also *BC* 1.2. Echoes of Posidonian ideas in Sallust's dualistic conception of the *animus* (including the need for the rational aspect to rule us) have been discussed in Chapter 3 (e.g. Posid. Frs. 146, 149, 161, 186, 187, 31C-D (cf. Plato *Phdr.* 246a 6f)). On the dualistic idea of *animi imperio, corporis servitio etc.*, cf. already Plato *Rep.* 441e. See also Kidd 1988: 677 and Kidd 1999: 20. Posidonius in these fragments – and more clearly in Fr. 160EK – sees a rational, divine aspect of the soul, and an irrational, animal-like one (itself divided into two factors, the desire factor and the passionate factor). Each of these three “capacities” (*dynameis*) of the soul had a corresponding “affinity” (*oikeiosis*) toward which it tended to strive: the rational faculty after The Good, the desire factor after pleasure, the passionate factor after power. Only the goals of the rational factor are naturally good without qualification. All citations and translations from Posidonius are from Edelstein, L. & I.G. Kidd 1989, Kidd 1988 & 1999 unless otherwise noted.

succumb to our *vitia*.⁵² It comes down to whether an individual puts forth the effort – *industria* (*BJ* 1.2) – to overcome these lower urges and uses a *bonum ingenium* to achieve glory instead of a *malum* (or *pravom*) *ingenium*.⁵³ While these are the ideals of moral action which Sallust feels are theoretically within human reach, these early chapters already convey a sense of Sallust's frustration and disgust at the degree to which Romans (especially since the fall of Carthage, but before that as well) have fallen short of them – a sense reinforced throughout the main narrative.

After he establishes (or re-establishes) these ideas in the first two chapters, Sallust diverts himself into an excursus on contemporary political culture (*BJ* 3-4). Like the prologue and digressions of the *BC*, these chapters give some insight into the experience that may have informed Sallust's broader views of past history and of human nature.⁵⁴ Sallust asserts that the pursuit of offices and commands after Caesar's death is repugnant and pointless since *virtus* does not get its due, and there is no assurance of safety even for those who achieve their position through dishonest means.⁵⁵ To Sallust's mind one gets no real glory or *dignitas* anymore; one has to give up freedom and principle and in return merely earns the enmity of others.⁵⁶ This diatribe against contemporary political culture

⁵² *Uti genus hominum compositum ex corpore et anima est, ita res cunctae studiaque omnia nostra corporis alia, alia animi naturam secuntur.* (*BJ* 2.1). This is the same idea found at *BC* 1.2: *Nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur; alterum nobis cum dis, alterum cum beluis commune est. Quo mihi rectius ingenii quam virium opibus gloriam quaerere.* Posidonius believed, just like Sallust, that all men by their nature are liable to fall into corrupt behavior under the influence of the irrational (and animal) aspect of our spirit if we do not let our rational and divine faculty guide us. Both authors liken the rule of the desires and passions to a sickness. On Posidonius' views of emotions and ethics see further Chapter 8, on Fr. 163EK, and also Kidd 1988: 585.

⁵³ The *bonum ingenium* and *animi virtus* function rather similarly and I treat them in what follows more or less as synonyms.

⁵⁴ cf. esp. *BC* 1-5.9, 6-14.1, 36.4-39.4, 53.2-6. See Chapter 3.2

⁵⁵ *BJ* 3.1-2

⁵⁶ *BJ* 3.3-4: *Frustra autem niti neque aliud se fatigando nisi odium quaerere extremae dementiae est; nisi forte quem inhonesta et perniciose libido tenet potentiae paucorum decus atque libertatem suam gratificari.*

helps set up Sallust's defense of retiring from political life and taking up the writing of history.⁵⁷ He defends the important effect *memoria rerum gestarum* has on inspiring men to show *virtus*, and contrasts this to the corrupt behavior of contemporary Romans. Despite consistently leveling attacks against the nobility elsewhere in the monographs and the *Histories*, here he puts equal blame on *novi homines* (*BJ* 4.7-8):

Etiam homines novi, qui antea per virtutem soliti erant nobilitatem antevenire, furtim et per latrocinia potius quam bonis artibus ad imperia et honores nituntur; proinde quasi praetura et consulatus atque alia omnia huiusce modi per se ipsa clara et magnifica sint ac non perinde habeantur ut eorum qui ea sustinent virtus est.

Even new men, who had previously been accustomed to surpass the nobility through their virtue, strive after commands and offices through secret and villainous action rather than through honest practices. Accordingly it's as if the praetorship and consulate and other such offices are intrinsically illustrious and distinguished, and are not held honorable according to the virtue of those who uphold the office.

This position – that equal blame is due to both nobles and non-nobles⁵⁸ – is reiterated many times in the rest of the *BJ* and indeed becomes one of its central themes. Even Marius himself, the central *exemplum* of the capable *novus homo* earning his way by personal achievement, receives his measure of censure. Despite espousing strongly the principles of the *novi homines* in *BJ* 85, Marius' *virtus* had already largely abandoned him when, insulted by Metellus, he had let *ambitio* and *consulatus ingens cupido* overtake him (cf. *BJ* 63.2, 64.4-5).⁵⁹ *Ira*, *cupido*, and *ambitio* drive him the rest of the narrative instead of *virtus*, and in so depicting him Sallust tells us that even those who try to *superbiae nobilitatis obviam ire* (*BJ* 5.1) cannot be free from censure.

⁵⁷ See *BJ* 4.4-6, which asserts a value for history writing equal to that of doing deeds, perhaps even a greater one, if the comparison is with the politics of the 40s B.C.E.

⁵⁸ The exact terminology used by Sallust in a given passage (non-nobles, plebs, new men, etc.) matters less in Sallust's judgments than the contrast between the senatorial nobility and anyone who is not a part of it (or anyone who, while a noble, espouses the cause of the people in opposition to them). On the lack of utility of political labels like *optimates* and *populares* in Sallust and others see Robb 2010: esp. chapters 5, 7.

⁵⁹ Cf. Earl 1961: 73f. See further my discussion in Chapter 2.1.

The plebs' conduct of the *Quaestio Mamiliana* also brings home the excesses to which even they can go (*BJ* 40.3, 5):

Sed plebes incredibile memoratu est quam intenta fuerit quantaque vi rogationem iusserit, magis odio nobilitatis, quoi mala illa parabantur, quam cura rei publicae: tanta lubido in partibus erat⁶⁰...Sed quaestio exercita aspere violenterque ex rumore et lubidine plebis: uti saepe nobilitatem, sic ea tempestate plebem ex secundis rebus insolentia ceperat.⁶¹

But it is astonishing to relate how driven the *plebs* was and with what force they pushed the bill through, more through hatred of the nobility – for whom those punishments were being readied – than concern for the Commonwealth; so violent were the passions motivating the factions...But the investigation was conducted harshly and violently, based on rumor and the caprice of the plebs. As it often had the nobility, at this time insolence took hold of the plebs due to their success.

Following directly upon this report of the Mammilian Commision is one of the most well-known and incisive passages in the entire monograph, the digression on party strife in *BJ* 41-42. While I do not aim to give here a full analysis of this excursus, a few passages speak to our current topic. After the fall of Carthage in 146 party and factional strife arose due to an influx of wealth and *otium* and the falling away of *metus hostilis*. Licentiousness and arrogance emerge, and bring more trouble in their train (*BJ* 41.5):

Nam coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vortere, sibi quisque ducere trahere rapere. Ita omnia in duas partis abstracta sunt⁶², res publica, quae media fuerat, dilacerata.

For the nobility then began to turn its standing and position, the people its liberty, to the gratification of their desires, and everyone appropriated, squandered, and plundered for himself. In this way everything was split into two parts, while the Republic, which was caught in the middle, was torn apart.

⁶⁰ Cf. *BJ* 73.4, on the consular election for which Marius was standing: *Ceterum in utroque magis studia partium quam bona aut mala sua moderata*.

⁶¹ To the plebs' conduct of this *quaestio* compare Thucydides 6.53 on the *dēmos*' investigation of the affairs of the *Hermae* and the Mysteries in 415 B.C.E. They acted out of fear and suspicion of a tyrannical plot to overthrow the democracy, and so arrested good and bad citizens alike on the evidence of scoundrels, eventually executing those accused. This introduces a digression (as does *BJ* 40), in which Thucydides shows that the *dēmos* has a tendency to act violently out of suspicion and fear, and additionally is ignorant of history, since they did not realize that the harshness which had arisen in Hippias' tyranny, and which was now causing them to fear a tyrannical plot, had come about only because of the rash, suspicious, and passion-driven acts of Harmodius and Aristogeiton against Hipparchus.

⁶² On this image of the state divided into two and the metaphorical image of the "two-headed state", see e.g. Cic. *Rep.* 1.15, Varro *Vit. Pop. Rom.* fr.114 (Riposati), and Wiseman 2010.

The nobility, Sallust goes on, hoarded their power and used it to abuse the *plebs* (similarly to what the *patres* did to the *plebs* early in the Republic in *Hist.* 1.11M), and this continued until someone from the nobility – the Gracchi – emerged to fight against the nobility’s unjust power and greed. Yet this just caused *dissensio civilis*,⁶³ and amid this strife, Sallust again notes that not just the nobility, but also the popular champions, went too far: *sane Gracchis cupidine victoriae haud satis moderatus animus fuit* (“certainly the Gracchi, in their lust for victory, hardly displayed sufficient restraint”).⁶⁴ The nobility’s subsequent conduct in suppressing the Gracchi may have been excessive and caused more problems than it solved,⁶⁵ but here again Sallust stresses that both sides hold blame for the spiraling civil strife following the fall of Carthage.

We should also keep in mind that this is a viewpoint which Sallust maintains and carries over from the *BC*,⁶⁶ where he has similar judgments on the era after the restoration of tribunician rights in 70 B.C.E., when both nobility and plebs wrongfully sought personal advancement through the public cause (*BC* 38.3):

Contra eos [young men agitating against the Senate to gain power] summa ope nitebatur pleraque nobilitas senatus specie pro sua magnitudine. Namque, uti paucis verum absolvam, post illa tempora [70 B.C.E.] quicumque rem publicam agitavere honestis nominibus, alii sicuti populi iura defenderent, pars quo senatus auctoritas maxuma foret, bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant.

Against them the majority of the nobility was striving with all their might under a façade of defending the Senate but really to further their own influence. For to tell the truth briefly, after those times whoever stirred up affairs on honorable pretexts – some as if defending

⁶³ *BJ* 41.6-10

⁶⁴ *BJ* 42.2.

⁶⁵ *BJ* 42.3-4 (my emphasis): *Sed bono vinci satius est quam malo more iniuriam vincere. Igitur ea victoria nobilitas ex libidine sua usa multos mortalis ferro aut fuga extinxit plusque in relicuom sibi timoris quam potentiae addidit. Quae res plerumque magnas civitatis pessum dedit, dum alteri alteros vincere quovis modo et victos acerbius ulcisci volunt.*

⁶⁶ *pace* Klingner 1928: 166.

popular rights, others as if maximizing the Senate's authority – while feigning a concern for the common good were contending each in pursuit of his own power.⁶⁷

In the *Histories* too we can see Sallust making this same judgment about the period following 146 B.C.E. A few powerful men *sub honesto patrum aut plebis nomine dominationes affectabant*, and more generally, *omniumque partium decus in mercedem corruptum erat*.⁶⁸

Clearly, then, this is a recurrent pattern of self-serving behavior and conflict on the part of both nobility and *plebs*. How far back did Sallust think this extended? The passages above from the *BJ* make clear that for Sallust this self-serving factional behavior from *plebs* and nobility alike goes back at least to the immediate aftermath of Carthage's destruction (*BJ* 41.5), and continued into the Jugurthine War. Further, given Sallust's pronouncements in the *Histories* (e.g. *Hist.* 1.7, 11, 16M) about the early and innate nature of discord at Rome, it seems that Sallust connected this strife in the later Republic directly to the similar patterns of conflict in the early and middle Republic – the “Conflict of the Orders” he mentions in *Hist.* 1.11M.⁶⁹ In the *BC* too, Sallust's statements at *BC* 37.11 (*id adeo malum*⁷⁰ *multos post annos in civitatem revorterat*) and *BC* 39.4 (*sed ubi primum dubiis rebus novandi spes oblata est, vetus certamen animos eorum adrexit*) may refer back to the Gracchan era, but they may also indicate that Sallust

⁶⁷ cf. *BC* 37.10: *Ad hoc quicumque aliarum atque senatus partium erant conturbari rem publicam quam minus valere ipsi malebant*. On the language of *BC* 38.3, cf. *BJ* 15.2: *Fautores legatorum, praeterea senatus magna pars gratia depravata Adherbalis dicta contemnere, Iugurthae virtutem extollere laudibus; gratia, voce, denique omnibus modis pro alieno scelere et flagitio, sua quasi pro gloria, nitebantur*. For the sentiment of *BC* 38.3 cf. Isoc. *Panath.* 133; Plut. *Cic* 10.1.

⁶⁸ *Hist.* 1.12M (12 McG); 1.13M (14 McG). *Omnium* in 1.13M implies critique of all groups.

⁶⁹ E.g.: *At discordia et avaritia atque ambitio et cetera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala post Carthaginis excidium maxime aucta sunt. Nam iniuriae validiorum et ob eas discessio plebis a patribus aliaeque dissensiones domi fuere iam inde a principio...Dein servili imperio patres plebem exercere, de vita atque tergo regio more consulere, agro pellere et, ceteris expertibus, soli in imperio agere. Quibus saevitiis et maxime fenore oppressa plebes...armata montem sacrum atque Aventinum insedit.*

⁷⁰ Namely, tribunician agitation, and young nobles trying to gain political power by agitating against the Senate, engaging in “largesse”, and making big promises (*BC* 38.1)

was referring the conflicts re-emerging in the 70s back to a still earlier period of political conflict (the language is too vague to decide).

Therefore while it is certainly true that Sallust is not consistent with the time frame he implies when he uses phrases like *multos post annos* (e.g. *BJ* 9.4), it is still a distinct possibility, given the evidence presented above, that Sallust viewed these factional conflicts of the late Republic as a re-emergence of pre-existing tendencies from the beginning of Rome's history.⁷¹

So far in this Chapter we have examined the means – both indirect and more direct – by which Sallust conveys a pessimistic outlook on Roman morality and political history in the *BJ*. The degree to which Sallust's moral discourse in the *Histories* plays off of (and links into) that in the *BJ* emerges from this analysis. The *BC* is just as much a part of this constant interplay of ideas and phraseology as the other two texts, and we have already seen some examples of this above. In what follows, I will round out the argument for a consistent pessimism in Sallust by uncovering extensive evidence for an undercurrent of pessimism in the *BC*. In so doing, the challenging web of shared discourses which all three texts help to weave will come into even greater focus.

⁷¹ Cf. the *vitium humani ingenii* Sallust posits as present from the start of the Republic, and his remarks in *Hist.* 1.11M on discord, greed, and ambition, *iniuriae validiorum*, and *dissensiones* being present from the beginning. McGushin's take on the meaning of Sallust's *vetus certamen* at *BC* 39.4 does not add substantially to the discussion (McGushin 1977: ad loc). If Sallust did not see the conflicts of the 1st century BC as a continuation of earlier political conflicts *per se*, it is clear at least that he saw the moral failings of Romans in the post-146 era as a re-emergence of the same moral flaws seen *ab initio*.

Chapter 6.2: Pessimism in the *BC*

In what follows I will analyze the *BC* to expose a consistent strain of pessimism informing its central ideas and events. However, one particular passage seems to present a difficulty to extending Sallust's pessimistic outlook from the *Histories* all the way back to the *BC*. For in the heart of the *BC*'s digression on early Roman history (*BC* 5.9-14.1), early Romans seem to be prominently portrayed as innately virtuous, directing *gloriae cupido* and *ambitio* to the *respublica*.⁷² If Sallust truly had been pessimistic about early Roman morality while writing this monograph, then why this paradox? In other words, why does a seemingly idealizing image of early Rome occupy such a prominent place in a supposedly pessimistic monograph?

To answer this question, we need not revisit the evolutionary view of Sallust's moral outlook which posits a sincere original optimism in the *BC*.⁷³ As I will argue, the prevailing undercurrent of Sallust's moral sentiment in the monographs is still pessimistic, and there is indeed an approach that can account for this apparent discrepancy of moral views within the *BC* and bring this text in line with an overall 'pessimistic' reading of Sallust's historical outlook. Although Sallust's idealizing account of early Roman morality as it stands may seem to run counter to what I hold to be an otherwise pessimistic work, I argue that Sallust intentionally over-idealizes and in fact *over-schematizes* the *boni mores* of early Rome in *BC* 5.9-14.1 precisely in order to

⁷² Properly channeled *gloriae cupido*: *BC* 7.3, 7.6.26 (*gloriae certamen*), 7.6.30, 9.2 (*cives cum civibus de virtute certabant*). Positive *ambitio*: 7.6, 11.1-2. On the issue of Sallust's debt to Cato for his account of early Rome see i.a. Cornell et al. 2013 (Vol. III): 112, with Cato FRHist F63. On the possible Posidonian echoes in Sallust's portrait of early Romans, see Seneca *Epist.* 90.5-6 (~ Sallust *BC* 6.5-7). On what *virtus* means to Sallust see further below, and my discussion of McDonnell 2006 above.

⁷³ As implied, e.g., in the judgment of Goodyear 1982: 272, that the idealized image of early Rome in *BC* 6-9 is "too unquestioningly accepted" by Sallust. Cf. Osgood 2006: 306, viewing Sallust's early Rome as a straightforward, cleanly presented case of rise and fall.

achieve an immediate narrative effect in the prologue – namely, it allows him, when he comes to *BC* 10, to more sharply section off everything that happened in Roman history *after* 146 (and down to his own day) as uniquely decadent compared to everything that preceded it. 146 B.C.E. was a momentous year on any account of Roman history (with the destruction of Carthage as well as Corinth), but because of the way Sallust idealizes pre-146 Roman history in *BC* 6-9, that year becomes *the* turning point when all starts to decline precipitously.⁷⁴

So what does Sallust gain by temporarily shedding his pessimistic view in the prologue of the *BC* to create this sharper moral turning point at 146 B.C.E.? By creating a complete moral break between the pre- and post-146 Republic, Sallust is able more clearly to express the unprecedented decadence of the socio-political milieu in which Catiline's character was fostered, and consequently the unprecedented decadence of Catiline himself, to whom he immediately and seamlessly returns in *BC* 14 after the digression into earlier Roman history.⁷⁵ Indeed, if we look back, Sallust *entered in* on the digression on Roman history right after providing a character sketch of Catiline and broaching the *corrupti civitatis mores* that spurred Catiline on. As a result, the entire account of earlier Roman history in *BC* 5.9-14.1 is framed by Catiline's character and is meant to explain it and highlight it. Therefore, by briefly disguising in the digression his otherwise pessimistic view of earlier Roman history and morality, Sallust took the

⁷⁴ 146 B.C.E. as the turning point when all began to decline precipitously: *BC* 10, *BJ* 41.1-3, *Hist.* 1.16M. For more on turning points for Roman morality, see below, Chapter 7.

⁷⁵ On the correspondances between vices displayed by Catiline (*ambitio* (5.6 ~ 10.3, 5, 11.1-2), *rapina* (5.1 ~ 11.6, 12.2), lack of *fides* (16.2 ~ 10.5), *crudelitas* (16.3, 31.4), neglect of religion (15 ~ 11.7, 12.2), and dissimulation (5.4 ~ 10.5), sexual deviancy (14.7 ~ 13.3)), and those described in *BC* 10-13 after the fall of Carthage, see i.a. Ledworski 1994: 130, 133.

opportunity to enhance his theme and throw Catiline's decadence into greater relief, meeting the prologue's immediate aims of contrast and characterization.⁷⁶ As we have had occasion to see earlier (Chapter 2.1), this digression is by no means the only occasion where Sallust manipulates historical details or chronology to achieve rhetorical emphasis or specific goals of characterization. Moreover, as was remarked at the outset of this study, our analysis of Sallustian historiography should in general teach us to expect the possibility of additional layers of meaning hidden beneath the narrative façade.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ On magnifying the importance of one's theme: in oratory (Cic. In Verr. 2.3.64, 2.5.189); in historiography (Thucydides 1.1, 10-11, 14, 21, 23); cf. Cicero's expectations for such an effect in a historical monograph in *Ad Fam.* 5.12. cf. Ogilvie 1965: 23: the aim of the themes deployed in prefaces "was the rhetorical aim of winning the reader's goodwill by presenting history as something worthy of his attention, as something useful and profitable." As regards Sallust here, given the recognized practice of magnifying the importance of one's theme, and given that Catiline's position framing the beginning and end of the digression has been widely recognized, it seems a natural step to ask what Sallust does in the digression itself to enhance his main theme of Catiline.

⁷⁷ E.g. Gerrish (2015), 211: Sallust's historiography "trains his readers to interpret and interrogate the world around them, and to refuse to accept surface appearances without question." In connection with Sallust's maneuvers in *BC* 6-14, it is useful to note that Sallust is not the only one to construct an idealization just to undermine it: this was something common across genres and eras. Tuplin in Parmeggiani 2014: 226, 230 points out how Xenophon manipulates different versions of decline in the *Cyropaedia* for rhetorical reasons. His moral-historical narrative of Cyrus serves as a paradigm of excellence in *arkhe*, and he must emphasize the immediate decline of Persian *mores*, or their decline in contemporary Persia, to corroborate the validity of his Cyrus narrative. Fish 2011: 84-6 notes how, in a similar process aimed at the "therapeutic effectiveness" of his exempla, Lucretius at times stakes out an extreme position at first (sometimes leading to oversimplification of complex positions), only to provide an "out" for readers, or a softening of his position, later on (e.g. emotional reaction to prospect of death (*DRN* 3.933-4, 952-3); on political ambition (*DRN* 5.1120-30); on evils of religion (e.g. 6.75)). Gibson 2010, writing on causation in Statius, notes Statius *Theb.* 1.144-64 *seems* to say luxury did not cause the war, ancient Thebes being a simple place; but, as Gibson argues, "Statius uses the idea of a primitive Thebes to set up an idea of the past which will then be successively undermined by the deployment of anachronistic *Realien* elsewhere in the poem [e.g. 2.91; the funeral of Opheltes in Bk 6; 7.656-61; 8.564-8]...Statius thus evokes the theme of luxury causing decline...whilst at the same time suggesting that the usual patterning of the past as a remote and primitive time of austere virtue to be contrasted with the decadence of more recent times is not so straightforward after all." Tipping 2010: 34, writing on Silius Italicus, notes Silius does not say simply that Rome before the 2nd Punic War was ideal, and after was corrupt. There are signs of moral complexity even before the 2nd Punic War (cf. *Pun.* 3.575-83, 589-90). There are hints that Romans of the late 3rd c. have failed to live up to their ancestors (Regulus or further back). Yet this is to be expected: Silius needs to depict the 2nd Punic war as a war to re-acustom Romans to hardship and virtuous duty; otherwise, the plot of his poem would be morally flat and far less compelling. Thus in Silius too, moral discourse is constructed in such a way as to suit the rhetorical demands of the plot or the aims of the author. (Within Sallust's own work, moreover, it should be noted that Marius' *virtus* from earlier in his career is exaggerated and made to be total (*BJ* 63.1-5) to form a contrast with his subsequent behavior).

That Sallust's pessimism is not disavowed but merely disguised in this early Rome digression will be further corroborated when one considers how Sallust draws on Catonian influence early in the *BC* (and elsewhere) in a thorough yet often ironic fashion. This ironic engagement with Catonian moral discourse must necessarily receive its own detailed treatment later in Chapter 6.3. In the present context, a thorough discussion of other passages throughout the *BC* indicating pessimism will also help to strengthen the case for this literary maneuver on Sallust's part in *BC* 5.9-14.1.

D.C Earl in his book on the political thought of Sallust asserts that Sallust's conception of the decline of *virtus* is not stressed so much and so emphatically in the *BC* because it is "implicit in almost every line of the narrative."⁷⁸ To a degree this is indeed true, and therefore although we may get an overall sense of pessimism when we read the *BC*, it would be useful to make the evidence for this general feeling more explicit. In the very first chapter of the work Sallust tells us that all men should strive to do something worthy of glory and make *memoriam nostri quam maxime longam*. In fact, both prologues begin with the idea that humans strive for eternal glory, and that the best way to achieve this *gloria aeterna* is by using *animi virtus* or *bonum ingenium*.⁷⁹ For when one achieves great deeds using *bonum ingenium*, one is no longer in thrall to the dictates of *fortuna*.⁸⁰ Yet Sallust is careful to qualify the quest for this ideal in both *BC* 1-2 and

⁷⁸ Earl 1960: 103.

⁷⁹ e.g. *BC* 1.3, 4; 2.3, 7; *BJ* 1.3-5, 2.2.24-5, 2.4

⁸⁰ When Sallust says at *BC* 2.5 *fortuna simul cum moribus inmutatur*, he means that if one acts with moral rectitude, one essentially makes one's own fortune, while if moral behavior declines, fortune and unpredictability rule over one's life. The same sentiment is present at *BJ* 1.3: *Sed dux atque imperator vitae mortalium animus est. Qui ubi ad gloriam virtutis via grassatur, abunde pollens potensque et clarus est neque fortuna eget*. Cf. *BJ* 1.5: *quod si hominibus bonarum rerum tanta cura esset...neque regerentur magis quam regerent casus* (...). Also at *BJ* 2.3, *animus...rector humani generis agit atque habet cuncta neque ipse habetur*.

throughout *BJ* 1-2 by introducing the duality of human nature: *sed nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur; alterum nobis cum dis, alterum cum beluis commune est* (*BC* 1.2). As we have seen above, Sallust brings up this same idea of duality at the very beginning of the *BJ* as well.⁸¹ Because we are composed of both an animal and a spiritual aspect, *corpus* and *animus*, it is a constant struggle to have the *animus* guide one the right way (*virtutis via* (*BJ* 1.3), *vera via*⁸² (*BC* 11.2)). In essence, then, both of these prologues do express a recognition of the higher potential within human nature and what it can achieve, but also an equally significant pessimism about reality and about what often keeps us from such lofty achievements. As Sallust states (*BC* 2.3),

Quod si regum atque imperatorum animi virtus in pace ita ut in bello valeret, aequabilius atque constantius sese res humanae haberent neque aliud alio ferri neque mutari ac misceri omnia cerneret.

But if the excellence of the spirit was as strong for kings and commanders in peace as it in war, human affairs would be fairer and more stable and you wouldn't see things buffeted about nor would you see everything being changed up and confused.

If, then, one is not guided by *bonum ingenium*, if one shows no *animi virtus*, *fortuna simul cum moribus inmutatur*: one no longer rises above the random caprice of *fortuna* and makes his own *fortuna*, but instead becomes subject to its whims. This is a key lesson we see come up again throughout both monographs, even in the mouths of non-Romans.⁸³ The prologues prepare us for the fact that this ideal mode of conduct is often not reached or not long-employed.

⁸¹ *BJ* 2.1. For a similar idea of wicked men failing to rise above the level of the beasts, cf. Cic. *Phil.* 8.9 on the hangers-on of M. Antonius: *Atque etiam homines agrestes, si homines illi ac non pecudes potius...*

⁸² Cf. Cicero *Phil.* 1.33 (*verum iter gloriae*); *Phil.* 2.115 (*sic libidinosi, avari, facinerosi verae laudis gustatum non habent*).

⁸³ Cf. *BJ* 10.6 (Micipsa speaking to his sons): *Equidem ego vobis regnum trado firmum, si boni eritis, sin mali, inbecillum. Nam concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maximae dilabuntur*. *BC* 2.5, *BJ* 1.3, 1.5, 2.3. On the possible philosophical resonances in Sallust of freeing oneself from the dictates of *fortuna*, see Chapter 4.2

After addressing the writing of history and its merits, and then defending his political career and current retirement, he introduces Catiline (*BC* 4.5-5.8). Yet this character sketch of Catiline causes the narrator to light upon the *corrupti civitatis mores* which spurred Catiline on, and so he sets out on an excursus to explain the way the Republic used to be and how the *maiores* used to act (*BC* 5.9):

Res ipsa hortari videtur, quoniam de moribus civitatis tempus admonuit, supra repetere ac paucis instituta maiorum domi militiaeque, quo modo rem publicam habuerint quantamque reliquerint, ut paulatim inmutata ex pulcherruma atque optuma pessuma ac flagitiosissima facta sit, disserere.

My subject itself seems to encourage me – since the occasion brings to mind the morals of the state – to go back in time and discourse briefly on the institutions of our ancestors in peace and war: how they managed the Republic, how great they left it to us, and how, by gradually changing from the noblest and best state became the worst and most disgraceful.

The digression that follows runs from *BC* 5.9-14.1, and starts by recounting what Romans were like from the foundation of the city to the early Republic. *BC* 6-9 details what appears to be an idealized account of early Roman morality, both at home and abroad. The digression then turns at *BC* 10 to the great decline in morality that occurred with the fall of Carthage, and this occupies the rest of the digression until Sallust returns to Catiline and his companions in the 60s (*BC* 10-14.1). Yet even in *BC* 6, in the very chapter where he begins discussing the idyllic moral world of early Rome, there are signs of underlying pessimism and a belief that the Romans were not unique in their moral makeup. Sallust begins (*BC* 6.1)

Urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, qui Aenea duce profugi sedibus incertis vagabantur, cumque iis Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum.

As far as I have learned, originally the Trojans founded and inhabited Rome. With Aeneas as leader they fled and wandered with no set dwellings. With them [settled] the Aborigines, a wild race of men, without laws, without authority, free and loosely bound together.

The “Roman people”, so to speak, were originally Trojans and Aborigines, the latter a *genus hominum agreste, sine legibus...liberum atque solutum*. Sallust’s original Romans were thus lawless and uncivilized, and the linguistic parallels with early Africans in *BJ* 17-19, mentioned above (Chapter 6.2), only reinforce this. Sallust continues (*BC* 6.3): *postquam res eorum civibus moribus agris aucta satis prospera satisque pollens videbatur* (...). Here we are told the Romans needed to *acquire* more civilized customs and practices. The common view among Roman sources was that it was the Romans who brought civilization, law and order to others, being in no need of civilizing themselves. Sallust reminds us here that Romans at first needed it too.⁸⁴ Chapter 6 ends by describing how the original kingly power was perverted into despotism and led to a Republican government (*BC* 6.7):

Post, ubi regium imperium, quod initio conservandae libertatis atque augendae rei publicae fuerat, in superbiam dominationemque se convertit, inmutato more annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecere: eo modo minime posse putabant per licentiam inolescere animum humanum

Afterward, when kingly authority (which originally had been meant to preserve liberty and increase the commonwealth) turned into arrogance and tyranny, the Romans changed their custom and made for themselves two commanders with year-long commands; they thought that in this way the human spirit would least be able to grow haughty through the license that comes from unlimited authority.

⁸⁴ On the traditional Roman imperialist and expansionist discourse cf. inter alia Adler 2011; Adler 2006; Sidebottom 2005; Dench 2005: 90 on the *BJ* portraying the “darker side” of the Roman imperialist endeavor and Rome’s “moral, cultural, and indeed religious ‘mission’ to transform her subjects.” The view of Rome’s mission of bringing law and order, *pacique imponere morem*, is famously expressed, for instance, at *Aeneid* 6.847-53. Livy’s work too presents a contrast to what we see here in Sallust: Livy distinguishes Alexander from the Romans by means of the Romans’ superior *mores* (Livy 9.17-18). To Livy, the corruption of Alexander [over time] meant he could not have conquered the known world (or Italy) even if he wanted to, whereas Livy’s work more broadly suggests that the Romans, through their superior *mores*, had a moral right to their world-wide *imperium* (cf. e.g. Livy *praef.* 6-9).

Sallust's wording makes the Romans appear to be legislating against human nature, as if they recognized that human nature is not virtuous enough by itself, without checks and balances.⁸⁵

It indeed gives one pause that even within the idealizing portrait of early Rome in *BC* 6-9 we can pick up such signs that Romans were not any more inherently virtuous than any other people, and were subject to the same *vitia* early on as they were later after 146 B.C.E. There is also another suggestive narrative pattern within *BC* 2-13 which subtly hints that Sallust believed Romans, like all others, were prone to revert to their dissension and discord periodically through the course of history. What we find is that as the narrative progresses, good and bad conduct falls in repeating cycles. Within *BC* 2, Sallust begins with a better time, but then shifts to a time when *lubido* and ambition to rule seep in (*BC* 2.1-2):

Igitur initio reges...divorsi pars ingenium, alii corpora exercebant. Etiam tum vita hominum sine cupiditate agitabatur; sua quoque satis placebant. Postea vero quam in Asia Cyrus, in Graecia Lacedaemonii et Athenienses coepere urbis atque nationes subigere, lubidinem dominandi causam belli habere...

At first then some kings used their intellect, some their bodies. Even then men's lives were lived without passions; each man's own possessions were enough to please them. But after Cyrus in Asia, and in Greece the Spartans and Athenians, began to subject cities and nations and hold lust for rule as a [just] cause for war...

Sallust then talks about how secure and strong *imperium* can be perverted into something decadent and finally return to positive rule – another cycling from good to bad and back again (*BC* 2.3-5):

Nam imperium iis artibus retinetur quibus initio partum est; verum ubi pro labore desidia, pro continentia et aequitate lubido atque superbia invasere, fortuna simul cum moribus inmutatur. Ita imperium semper ad optimum quemque a minus bono transfertur.

⁸⁵ Cf. Hor. *Odes* 3.24.35-6. Vretska 1976 ad loc. acknowledges this way of viewing the passage, but shows an unwarranted hesitancy about suggesting Sallust too would have seen *BC* 6.7 in this way. Schur 1936: 66 does not see Sallust as ascribing the failings of the Republic to Roman character, here or elsewhere.

For power is retained by those means by which it is initially gained. But when in place of toil laziness invades, and in place of self-restraint and fairness impulse and arrogance, fortune changes in step with one's behavior. In this way power always transfers from the less good to the best.

The last sentence above (*ita...transfertur*) in a way explains how the cycle completes itself, with power that has been corrupted finding its way back to the best man.⁸⁶

The next instance comes in *BC* 6 when Sallust charts the progress of Rome from its earliest coalescence to a time when kingly power is perverted and results in the overthrow of the monarchy – again good to bad (6.1-7). The *civitas* is first formed through *concordia*, and then grows materially and morally (*res eorum civibus moribus agris aucta* (6.3-4)). Romans show no fear in facing jealous enemies and protecting their homeland with *virtus*, and kingly authority was lawful (6.4-6). Yet afterward kingly power is perverted into despotism and leads to the overthrow of the Republic (6.7).⁸⁷ *BC* 6 thus contains in itself a cycling of history from proper beginnings to the growth of vices such as *superbia*, *licentia*, and *dominatio* (or despotism), and finally back to a state of order with the establishment of Republican government.

BC 7-9 depict upright moral behavior from the beginning of the Republic to the end of the Third Punic War in 146 B.C.E. In these chapters, *cupido gloriae* is directed toward service of the state (7.3-5).⁸⁸ During this period *virtus* “overcame everything” (7.5.25-6). Then in *BC* 10 comes the next downswing, as Sallust describes the turning point of the fall of Carthage. *BC* 7-10 thus become another historical cycle (excepting *BC* 8.1-4) that

⁸⁶ Tiffou 1973: 315 observes that the way in which the *animus* grows insolent in peace in *BC* 2.4-5 assures a cycle of new conflicts to come.

⁸⁷ Like in *BC* 2 (*postea vero...*), Sallust signals this downward phase in *BC* 6-7 with *post*.

⁸⁸ See especially *BC* 7.3 (*tanta cupido gloriae incesserat*), 7.6 (*gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat: se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus faceret properabat; eas divitias, eam bonam famam magnamque nobilitatem putabant*.)

encapsulates the progress from solid civic morality and *virtus* to a major unraveling caused by the removal of the foreign enemy in 146.

Next, within *BC* 11 Sallust first defines *ambitio* and *avaritia*; he notes that originally *ambitio* had redeeming qualities: *quod tamen vitium propius virtutem erat* (11.1).

However, in accord with what he has already said about the dual nature of man, he remarks that one can seek to achieve glory, office, and commands *vera via* – that is, by use of *bonum ingenium* and *bonae artes* – or by guile and deception (11.2). The ambivalence of *ambitio* as defined here leads to the less ambivalent discussion of *avaritia*. Money, Sallust says, *quasi venenis malis inbuta corpus animumque virilem effeminat, semper infinita insatiabilis est*. This is his transition to the *avaritia* and general decadence first introduced (supposedly) by Sulla upon his return from Asia in 83 B.C.E., which occupies the rest of *BC* 11. This particular downward phase flows into *BC* 12 and through to the end of the digression on Roman history at *BC* 13.5, at which point Catiline is reintroduced into the narrative by a seamless transition. Thus the prologue does not end with a full cycle; instead, from *BC* 10 until the reintroduction of Catiline and the resumption of his main theme, Sallust's narrative of Roman history continues on a precipitous downward trajectory. To end his historical panorama in an open-ended decline is suggestive of the underlying historical outlook of the narrator.

So what do these cyclical patterns in the prologue tell us? For one thing, they suggest that Sallust, when speaking about history on a large timescale, shows an understanding of the inevitable downward course of history that (as Thucydides would say) is doomed to repeat as long as human nature remains as it is.⁸⁹ Yet despite such cyclical patterns as we

⁸⁹ Cf. the famous statement on method at Thuc. 1.22.4

have discerned beneath the surface, it must still be true that Sallust meant for the reader's first impression of chapters 6-9 on early Rome to be one of an idealized state; for that idealized image is what aids his purpose of creating a sharp dividing line between pre- and post-146 morality as argued earlier in this section. Yet *around* this idealizing narrative, and even within it once (in *BC* 6), Sallust drops subtle hints of a worldview that accepts moral imperfection and historical conflict. Therefore Sallust, showing deft literary artistry, can weave hints of an underlying pessimism even into the fabric of what on the surface was designed to show (and in fact does show) the reader an idealizing image of early Rome.

Other signs of this underlying pessimism emerge from the narrative of the *BC*. Earl points out the phrasing Sallust uses when describing the ideal early Rome in *BC* 9.1: *concordia maxuma, minuma avaritia erat*. The keyword here is *minuma*. Does this actually mean *nulla avaritia*, with *minima* used just to create a contrast with *concordia maxuma*? Or does it truly mean “a very small amount of avaritia”? While he could mean *nulla*, that is no, *avaritia*, and this would fit with the idealization of early Rome he is giving, in the absence of other examples of this connotation of *minuma* in Sallust,⁹⁰ it may be preferable to read *minuma* as “very little” – as, for example, McGushin is

⁹⁰ There are only a handful of examples in Sallust of the use of *minumus/a/um*: *BC* 6.7, 9.1, 51.13 (perh. “least of all”), 51.43; *BJ* 3.1, 6.2, 11.3, 14.15 (“least of all”), 14.22, 100.3, 102.7. In only a few of these does the meaning of the word approach *nulla* in any way, with the only clear case of “not at all” at *BC* 51.43: *Placet igitur eos dimitti et augeri exercitum Catilinae? Minume. Sed ita censeo: publicandum eorum pecunias* (“Do I then propose that they be released and Catiline’s army enlarged? Not at all. Rather this is what I advise: their money must be put up for auction...”). This is clearly a conversational usage of this word distinct from its normal usage.

inclined to do.⁹¹ This would imply that in Sallust's view as represented by the *BC*, there was still a little vice early on.

Consider also Sallust's statement at *BC* 23.5-6, where he says that the nobility were impelled to elect Cicero consul when they heard through certain channels of Catiline's conspiratorial plans. Usually, Sallust says, they would consider a *novus homo* like Cicero unworthy of the consulship, *sed ubi periculum advenit, invidia atque superbia post fuere*. Here we can see the principle of *metus hostilis* in action: despite the seeming importance of *concordia* in forming the Roman state in *BC* 6-9, *BC* 23.5-6 shows that there would not have been any if common danger did not bring *nobiles* and *novi homines* together here in *concordia* and *consensus*.⁹²

In what in some ways is the dramatic and ideological climax of the monograph, the debate in the Senate over the fate of the conspirators, Caesar gives a speech which begins with some rather philosophical sentiments about human nature which strongly echo Sallust's own discourse in the prologues of his monographs (*BC* 51.1-3):

Omnis homines, patres conscripti, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet. Haud facile animus verum providet, ubi illa officiant, neque quisquam omnium lubidini simul et usui paruit. Ubi intenderis ingenium, valet; si lubido possidet, ea dominatur, animus nihil valet.

All men, conscript fathers, who deliberate about difficult situations should be free from hatred, friendships, anger, and pity. The mind has a hard time seeing the truth when those things get in the way, nor has anyone obeyed both his passions and his best interests. When you apply your intellect, it has the power; if passions take control, they reign supreme, and the mind is not effective at all.

⁹¹ McGushin 1977: 83. McDonnell 2006: 375 likewise reads the phrase as implying slight amounts of the vice of greed in early Rome. One may compare Lucretius 5.1024-7 (my emphasis): *nec tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni / sed bona magnaue pars servabat foedera caste*. cf. *DRN* 5.1282-92.

⁹² As mentioned above (Chapter 6.2), depending on how we interpret the reference in *vetus certamen animos eorum adrexit* (39.3) – to the Gracchi, or to the earlier Conflict of the Orders – *BC* 39.3-4 may itself imply Sallust already held a checkered view of pre-146 Roman history.

Recall the very first sentence of Sallust's prologue, which begins *omnes homines qui...decet*, and which is followed in the next sentence by similar musings to Caesar's on the dual nature of human beings, body and mind. Caesar then shifts direction, saying (*BC* 51.4)

Magna mihi copia est memorandi, patres conscripti, quae reges atque populi ira aut misericordia impulsu male consuluerint. Sed ea malo dicere, quae maiores nostri contra lubidinem animi sui recte atque ordine fecere.

I can mention, conscript fathers, many examples of cases where kings and nations made bad decisions because they were driven by anger or pity. But I would rather talk about those things which our ancestors did justly and fairly against the impulse of their own spirit.

The latter sentence contains an implication that Romans had to contend with a *lubido* in their character before 146, and perhaps from quite early on. This sentiment is similar to that expressed earlier in *BC* 6.7 where the Romans themselves seemed to admit that by nature they cannot rely on themselves alone to be virtuous. There are of course complications with how we should assess the moral discourse which Sallust puts in the mouths of his characters⁹³: the specific details (as opposed to the broader argument) Sallust creates for Caesar's speech are likely not an accurate reflection of Caesar's actual words. That Caesar's speech largely serves to represent what is at stake on one side of the debate, with arguments at best vaguely reminiscent of those Caesar actually used, seems likely. At the same time, however, Sallust's own perspective may also to some degree color Caesar's speech (as it does so many other speeches across his works), and for that reason the degree to which the beginning (as well as other sections) of Caesar's speech mirrors Sallust's ideas in the first chapters of the monograph deserves further investigation in its own right.

⁹³ See i.a. Syme 1964, Adler 2006, Rosenblitt 2011, 2013.

On a broader level as well, the pessimism of the *BC* finds expression through Sallust's treatment of *virtus*, once we clarify a problem raised by D.C. Earl. Earl's careful study on the political thought of Sallust at times accuses Sallust of inconsistency, chronological inaccuracies, and negligent historical omissions.⁹⁴ While such inaccuracies or omissions do exist and one may be inclined to ascribe at least a few of them to ignorance or negligence, some of the criticisms leveled against the inconsistency of Sallust's moral outlook should be reconsidered. Rather than see Sallust as believing consistently in all three texts that Romans had always been inherently prone to moral vice, Earl argues that Sallust actually aimed to promote a consistent *idealization* of earlier Rome in all his works, and only changed this in the *Histories* under duress from critics.⁹⁵ It is from taking Sallust to be a constant idealizer in all his works that Earl has posited a contradiction in Sallust's discourse on *virtus*. For Earl recognizes that *virtus* in Sallust's main narrative (especially *BC* 10, *BJ* 41) depends on the presence of *metus hostilis*, and infers that if it takes an outside force to bring Romans to *virtus*, this is not "true" (or ideal) *virtus*. He claims that this would in turn contradict what is said of "true" or "ideal" *virtus* in the prologues of the *BC* and *BJ*, where Sallust asserts that one will become independent of *fortuna* if one lets the *animus* guide one rather than the *corpus* (*BC* 2.5, *BJ* 1.3-5, 2). According to Earl, then, "true *virtus*, in Sallust's sense or in any other view, should surely be independent of external compulsions."⁹⁶

While it is certainly the case that Sallust in the prologues (and the early Rome excursus at *BC* 6-9) presents his ideal of *virtus*, it seems that not even this ideal *virtus* is

⁹⁴ E.g. Earl 1961: 78-80, where he implies Sallust's chronological moves are not valid artistically.

⁹⁵ Earl 1961: 42.

⁹⁶ Earl 1961: 43-4.

technically free of "external compulsions" in the absolute way that Earl's theoretical criterion demands. The fact that *gloriae cupido/gloriae certamen* was displayed by early Romans, and an *ambitio* that, while directed toward service of the state, motivated each man in his own individual pursuits in war (*BC* 7.3-6, 9.2-3), would indicate that virtue was not being pursued purely for virtue's sake, but on account of separate social and psychological needs. Moreover, in Sallust's "philosophical" discourse on his ideal of *virtus* in the prologues (*BC* 2.5, *BJ* 1.3-5, 2), it was never actually implied that the display of *virtus* was free of external compulsions; rather, Sallust simply states that *if* one displayed *virtus* by using the *animus* and *bonum ingenium*, that display of *virtus* would in theory *make one* free of the external compulsions of *fortuna* – that is, one could thereafter avoid further buffeting from chance events.

Therefore, the ideal *virtus* of Sallust's prologues is not to be distinguished, as Earl claims, from the *virtus* of Romans displayed in his narratives by the total absence of "external compulsions" in the ideal. Earl's sense of a difference between these two types of *virtus* in Sallust is not to be dismissed, but simply must be explained in a slightly different way. What Sallust presents us with in the prologues and in *BC* 6-9 is indeed a theoretical ideal of moral action and moral control, and this does differ from the way *virtus* manifests itself in the rest of the narrative. Rather than putting this down to the role of "external compulsions", I would argue that Sallust in both monographs discusses an *ideal virtus* in the prologues and a more real-life, imperfect instantiation of Roman *virtus* in the rest of the narrative because he intended thereby to insinuate a disconnect between the ideal *virtus* upon which he waxes philosophical in the prologues, and the *actual* nature of Roman *virtus* as it played out in the course of Republican history after

146. His method of pointing up this disconnect can be explained by looking at what *actually* separates the ideal *virtus* of the prologues from that shown in the main narratives.

The basic aspect of Sallust's ideal is that anyone can display *virtus* if only they overcome the dictates of the body and let their *animus* lead the way to glory through *bonae artes*, and ideally one would follow this principle at all times. In this ideal, external factors such as *gloriae cupido* are not necessarily excluded; one must simply pursue them *virtutis via* (*BJ* 1.3; cf. *BC* 11.2). Indeed, the supremacy of the *animus/bonum ingenium* as guiding principle (e.g. *BC* 1.3, 2.2; *BJ* 1.3, 2.3) is the key condition for the ideal exercise of *virtus* in Sallust's view. Since man is comprised of a divine rational aspect (*animus/bonum ingenium*) as well as a bodily, irrational one, man technically has the inner potential to reach this ideal exercise of *virtus*. In Sallust's telling, however, Romans cannot ever overcome the dictates of their baser desires to fully attain this ideal.

Indeed, the disconnect between theoretical ideal and actual practice begins to take shape in the main narratives of the *BC* and *BJ* even more clearly when we consider how Sallust applies the concept of *metus hostilis* in his scheme of historical causation. We have seen earlier that Sallust emphatically foregrounds *metus hostilis* in all of his works in a way that points up how Romans were never innately virtuous, and how their *virtus* was dependent upon the presence of this wholly external factor⁹⁷: whenever *metus hostilis* was not present, Romans did not maintain their *virtus* (*Hist.* 1.11M), and especially after 146, when *metus hostilis* was permanently removed, there was no longer

⁹⁷ See Chapter 2.2

anything holding Romans to the *virtutis via*.⁹⁸ Accordingly, as we read Sallust's extended narrative of Roman history and Roman moral shortcomings, and the way he links this historical narrative with the operation of *metus hostilis*, a disconnect from his stated ideal begins to emerge, in that Romans at no point after 146 let their *virtus* and *bonum ingenium* guide their actions in any sustained or substantial way; the Romans' native *ambitio* and *gloriae cupido* are no longer tempered and properly channeled (*virtutis via*) by the presence of *metus hostilis*.⁹⁹ By constructing this disconnect between his stated ideal of *virtus* in the prologues and the more conditional *virtus* that actually exists among Romans – a *virtus* which quickly began wholly to disappear after 146 in the permanent absence of *metus hostilis* – Sallust in his monographs brings into greater relief the pessimism he feels about the inherent shortcomings of Roman moral behavior.¹⁰⁰

From the foregoing analysis, the cumulative evidence for a consistent undercurrent of pessimism throughout the *BC* seems compelling. This revised understanding of pessimism in the *BC* (and throughout his *corpus*) strengthens my contention that Sallust's idealizing portrayal of early Rome in *BC* 6-9 does not reflect a sincere or systematic desire to idealize, but rather shows Sallust implementing a literary strategy at the outset of the monograph with intent to achieve immediate aims of characterization and emphasis at that juncture. The following section will further corroborate this contention.

⁹⁸ e.g. *BC* 10, *BJ* 41, *Hist.* 1.11, 12, 16M.

⁹⁹ From this one can observe why to Sallust it was not merely the *presence* of external compulsions that made the distinction between the two types of *virtus*, but rather the *type* of external compulsion. For *Gloriae cupido* (in *BC* 7&9) was indeed a sort of external compulsion in early Rome, but had no adverse effect on Romans' proper pursuit of *virtus* until *metus hostilis* (another, more explicitly "external" compulsion) was removed.

¹⁰⁰ By comparison, if Sallust dispensed with all discussion of an ideal of conduct and were merely to narrate the adulterated *virtus* and moral shortcomings of the Romans, the latter would not stand out as being quite as exceptional or quite as worthy of reproach. For a similar reason, reference to the brave and noble deeds of one's ancestors, held up as a model and a source of potential shame if not met or exceeded (cf. e.g. *BJ* 4.5-6), often makes hortatory rhetoric in the political assembly (e.g. *Hist.* 1.55.3-5; *BJ* 85.16-17, 21-5, 38) or on the battlefield more stirring.

Chapter 6.3. A Case Study: Irony and Pessimism in Sallust's Use of Cato

It is the purpose of this section to examine the particularly strong (and to the ancients widely-acknowledged¹⁰¹) literary influences exerted upon Sallust's work by the elder Cato. Such influences, which are evident throughout Sallust's *corpus*, are especially frequent in the prologues and in the digression on early Rome, and play an important role there in defining the nature of Sallust's moral outlook. Therefore this section shall be particularly concerned with Catonian evidence on pre-Roman Italy and the beginnings of Rome itself. Although other extant fragmentary Roman historians preserve mentions of Aeneas and the Regal Period, it is only in Cato that we can find content relevant to the themes and ideas put forward by Sallust in *BC* 6-9. Moreover, given the paucity of evidence more broadly for pre-Sallustian historiography, Cato is the only author with whom we may profitably make a sustained comparison with Sallust's preface and early Rome excursus in the *BC*. The very fact of this paucity of evidence should warn us, however, of how much may be missing from the complete picture of Sallust's possible sources of influence. As such, while we explore the evidence for Sallust's undeniable and sustained engagement with Cato, we must keep in mind, as our discussion in Chapter 4 has helped to illustrate, that Sallust was capable of drawing on a variety of sources for the sentiments in his prologues, from Plato to Xenophon, Isocrates and many others.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ See e.g. Suet. *de Gramm.* 15 (*priscorum Catonisque verborum ineruditissimum furem*); Suet. Aug. 86 (= FRHist T12c); Gell. *N.A.* 2.17.7, 10.21.2, 10.26.1, FRHist Cato T22d (Fronto 56-7 = *Ad M. Caesarem et Invicem* 4.3.2-4: *frequens sectator*); Fronto *de Eloq.* 4.13.4; Quint. 8.2.29 (Lenaeus' remark); cf. FRHist Cato T19a (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2.5).

¹⁰² For the variety of sources for the generalizing concepts of the prefaces, see McGushin 1977: 30. On the superiority of man over beast, cf. i.a. Isocrates *Paneg.* 48, Xen. *Hiero* 7.3-4 (less strongly 1.5), Cyr. 3.3.19 (= *BC* 1.6-7), 7.5.83 (= *BC* 12.5), and Cic. *Rep.* 2.48.1. To *BC* 1.1's *veluti pecora...finxit*, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.11, *Hiero* 7.3-4. On man's dualistic nature (body and mind/spirit), cf. Plato *Phdr.* 80a, Isoc. *Antid.* 180, and the strong parallelism to *BC* 1.2 in Cicero *Fin.* 5.34 (*perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae corporis. Deinde id quoque videmus, et ita*

Sallust's debts to archaic diction, and to Catonian style in particular, are evident in several qualities displayed by Cato and assiduously followed by Sallust.¹⁰³ Among the most well-known are of course *brevitas*,¹⁰⁴ coordination and parataxis,¹⁰⁵ alliteration,¹⁰⁶ a

figuratum corpus, ut excellat aliis, animumque ita constitutum, ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantiam mentis, cui tota hominis natura pareat, in qua sit mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium. Iam quae corporis sunt, ea nec auctoritatem cum animi partibus comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem.). On the pursuit of eternal glory via *ingenii opibus* and *virtus* (BC 1.3-4), cf. i.a. Isocr. *ad Nicoclem* 37, *Philip* 134, *Paneg.* 76-7, 82; Xen. *Cyr.* 1.5.9-10; D.S. *prol.* 1.1-2.7, esp. 1.5, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.7 (though at 2.7 D.S. thinks history *does* succeed in *exaequando facta dictis*); Cic. *Pro Sest.* 143, *Tusc.* 1.32, *Rep.* 1.1-13, *Tusc.* 3.3, *Tusc.* 1.91 (for further discussion of Cicero's views on eternal glory here see above, Chapter 4). For BC 2.4, see Plb. 10.36.5. For BC 2.6: Plato *Rep.* 544d-e; BJ 2 ~ Plato *Rep.* 546a. One may also note echoes of Thuc. 3.82.8 throughout BC 10, and in the key ideas of BC 38.2-3 & BJ 41.5 (see Vretska 1976: 213 for other echoes of Thuc. 3.82 in Sallust); also, note the strong echo in BC 14 of Theopompus's description of Philip II's corrupt followers: FGH 115 F224 (McGushin 1977: 105, Vretska 1976: 249 with bibliography; cf. Plb 8.9.5-13, Demetrius *de Eloc.* 27, Athen. *Deipn.* 4.167b, 6.260d-61a, Cic. *Pro Sulla* 70-71). On the strong influence of the Attic orators, note also (with McGushin 1977: 80, Perrochat, *Modeles Grecs*, 68) the influence of Isoc. *Paneg.* 75-81: BC 7.6 = *Paneg.* 79, BC 9.2 (*ius bonumque...valebat*) = *Paneg.* 78, BC 9.2 (*cives...certabant*) = *Paneg.* 79&85, BC 9.3 & 9.5 = *Paneg.* 80 (though cf. already Thuc. 6.92.5, and later i.a. Cic. *off.* 2.27); cf. also BC 7.4 to Isoc. *Areop.* 48, BC 7.5-6 to Demos. *Androt.* 76, and BC 9.3 to Demos. *Olynth.* 3.25-6. Regarding Xenophon's notable influence see also BC 13.3 (= esp. Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.30, less so Xen. *Ages.* 9.3-4; cf. Vretska ad loc.). For the notoriety of the passage in Latin literature see McGushin 1977 ad loc.

¹⁰³ On Sallust's stylistic debts to Cato see i.a. Ernout 1949, E. Skard, *Sallust und seine Vorgänger* (Oslo, 1956): 75-107; Lebek, W. 1970. *Verba Prisca* (Göttingen): 291-335. It is worth observing (FRHist I.22) that since poetry was the first mode of literature at Rome, and since many of the "archaisms" that are found in the early historians had already found expression in poetry written before their time, it is not productive to distinguish between archaisms and poeticisms at that early stage (early 2nd c. B.C.E.). Likewise in studying Sallust and Livy, this distinction is not so clear.

¹⁰⁴ Quint. 2.5.19, 4.2.45, 10.1.32 (positive), 10.1.102 (positive; cf. 10.1.101); Sen. *Contr.* 9.1.13-14 (positive); Sen. *Epist.* 114.17-18 (negative); Sen. *Controv.* 9.2.26 (Livy disapproves); Gellius 3.1.6 (Favorinus: *subtilissimum brevitatis artificem*). On Cato's *brevitas* see esp. Sallust *Hist.* 1.4M; on BC 4.2 (*carptim perscribere*) and its possible Catonian reference, see Levene 2000: 172.

¹⁰⁵ See for example the commentary on Cato's speech *Pro Rhodiensibus*, FRHist Cato F87-93, and FRHist. III.122-3 on F76.

¹⁰⁶ FRHist McGushin 1977: 18. e.g. BC 4.1, 7.5, 11.4, 40.6, 59 (multiple instances); also, 7.6, 9.2, 11.2, 12.2, 13.3 53.2 54.3-4; BJ 1.5, 107; the phrase *potentia paucorum/pauci potentes*. See e.g. FRHist Cato F99, *ORF*⁴ 200.

marked preference for *atque* as a connective,¹⁰⁷ fondness for paronomasia or pairing ostensibly redundant words,¹⁰⁸ and asyndeton.¹⁰⁹

Beyond mere linguistic echoes and archaisms,¹¹⁰ however, it cannot be denied that certain aspects of Catonian thought and moral discourse are relevant to Sallust as well, and exerted influence upon Sallust's own work. From Cato's defense of writing history to his omission of magistrates' names from the bulk of his narrative,¹¹¹ there are several cases of suggestive influence between the two. In particular, Cato's well-known discourse regarding the moral decline he witnessed in his day and the ancient standards to which he looked back was a prime source from which Sallust could (and surely did) draw for his own strictures on morality.¹¹² However, some caution is in order when trying to make the jump between linguistic evocation and the sharing of ideology. For despite the undeniable (and to the ancients quite clear) sense of connection Sallust sought to evoke with the Censor through his use of archaic language and high moral tone, Sallust has not

¹⁰⁷ See FRHist commentary on F76, and F87 (5x in one sentence to start the speech). Cf also ORF⁴ Cato F185 Malc. In the *BC* Sallust shows a marked preference, in his favored phrase *luxuria atque avaritia* (and variants thereof), for the use of *atque* over *et*, a preference which, tellingly, is not as marked in his later works: *BC* 5.8, 11.5, 12.2, 25.4, 28.4, 52.7, 52.22, 53.5.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.256. For pairs of nearly synonymous words in Sallust, see McGushin 1977. See E. Skard, *S.O.* 39 (1964): 13-36 for Sallustian examples (94); cf. also Fraenkel, *Plauteinsiches im Plautus*, Berlin, 1922, 361; Hofmann, *Lat. Umgangssprache*, Heidelberg, 1926, 93. See FRHist III.122-3 on Cato's use of synonymous doublets.

¹⁰⁹ cf. FRHist Cato F97 (= F101 Peter)(asyndetic tricolon). For a notable Sallustian example, whose relevance will become clear below, see *BJ* 85.1, 3, 10 (2x), 33; 85.45 = tricolon but not asyndetic; other asyndetic tricola: 10, 18, 40.

¹¹⁰ Some general archaisms in language that may be noted from *BC* 1-13 include (with comments of McGushin 1977 and Vretska 1976 ad locc.): *verum enim vero* (2.9, 20.10), *amare potare* (11.6), *consulto/facto* (neut. abl. sg. as verbal noun – 1.6, cf. 43.3, 31.7), *tempestas* for *tempus* (7.1, and regularly in all three works), the frequentative *agitare* (2.1 et passim), words used with their archaic meanings (*tempestas* (7.1), *dolus* (26.2), *exitium* (55.6), *facinus* in a positive or neutral sense (*BC* 2.9), *supplicium* (9.2), *venenum* (11.3), *crescere* for *oriri* (10.3)).

¹¹¹ On Cato's defense of writing history in one's *otium* see FRHist Cato F2; on his omission of magistrates' names see FRHist Cato T1, 20, F131. See further the discussion later in this section.

¹¹² For Cato's discourse on moral virtue, see e.g. ORF⁴ frs 18, 58, 128-34, 144, 173-4, 200, 221-2 Malc.; *Carmen de Moribus* frs. 1-2; FRHist Cato F87; Cic. *de div.* 1.28; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.5; cf. the words attributed to Cato by Livy at the beginning of Book 34 on the repeal of the *Lex Orchia*.

assimilated Cato's own moral and ideological views in an uncomplicated way. This applies even to Sallust's clear use of Cato in the digression on early Rome in *BC* 6-13, as we shall see further below. Therefore, this case study on Cato and Sallust aims to bring out the degree to which irony informs Sallust's use of Catonian language and Catonian moral discourse. We will see that one cannot analyze Sallust's digression on early Rome, or any other part of Sallust's narrative, through assuming a straightforward carry-over of Cato's attitudes; instead, we must acknowledge how irony complicates the idealizing discourse that comes along with Catonian allusion, and how it thus reinforces Sallust's pessimism about Roman morality and history.

6.3a: Non-Ironic Uses of Cato in Sallust

First, however, it will be helpful to consider some of the ways in which Sallust draws on Cato without apparent ironic coloring. In an important and fundamentally persuasive article, Levene 2000 takes a close look at Sallust's Catonian borrowings. Despite several disputable cases of influence,¹¹³ Sallust does undeniably color his preface and his early Rome excursus with Catonian language and certain Catonian sentiments. In addition to a number of smaller scale or less conspicuous borrowings,¹¹⁴ we may review a few of the more prominent ways we see this manifest itself in earnest, both in language and thought.

In an important passage preserved from the beginning of his *Histories*, Sallust comments on the qualities possessed by his historiographical predecessors Cato and C. Fannius (*Hist.* 1.4/4aM). The comment of the citing authority, Marius Victorinus, may

¹¹³ E.g. *bene facere rei publicae* (BC 3.1; the nominalized form, *beneficium in rem p.*, is not so distant from the more common form as to mark this as a strong Catonian allusion, and Cato uses the expression just twice in extant fragments (ORF⁴ 168, 173); *res gestas populi romani* (BC 4.2); *auctor rerum* (BC 3.2); *seque remque publicam curabant* (only occurs once in extant Cato: ORF⁴ F21); BC 11.7-8 and FRHist Cato F87; *rapere trahere* as a political slogan of Cato in the 180s (little positive evidence); BC 52.4 (also echoes Athenagoras, Thuc. 6.38.4). Regarding *bene dicere* (BC 3.1), this may be taken to refer to oratory and speech, but also as a generalizing transition, and a way to create a neat antithesis between *facere* and *dicere*, deeds and the recording of deeds. Moreover, *dicere* is often used, even in Sallust, to refer to the historian's act of writing: BC 3 (2x), 8.5 (brought out through the antithesis), 18.1, 19.6; BJ 17.1, 19.2, 19.8, 30.4 (uses *scribere* and *dicere* interchangeably), 95.2 (2x), 95.2 (loqui); *Hist.* 1.58M; 2.72M. cf. Ducroux 1977: 100-03.

¹¹⁴ E.g. BC 2.1 (*igitur* not post-positive: archaic and also Catonian (McGushin 1977: 35; cf. FRHist. III.75 (citing Till, *Lingua di Catone*, 21) and FRHist Cato F20 (= Peter F28), 78 (= Peter F86)); (*de*)hortor without *ut* + subj.: BC 5.9, BJ 24.4, 31.1 = FRHist. Cato F104 (= Peter 108); BC 7.5 (*asper aut arduus*: cf. ORF F19 Malc.). For Catonian sentiment, see i.a. BC 6.7 (*insolescere e.q.s.*: Vretska 1976: 163. Cf. FRHist F87/ORF 163, and Gell. 6.3.15); BC 9.2 (*in suppliciis...parci*: common in Greek literature, but cf. also Cato *Carm. de Mor.* fr 2 (Vretska 1976: 191)); BC 10.4 & 11.3 = Cato *Carm. de Mor.* F1: *Avaritiam omnia vitia habere putabant. sumptuosus cupidus elegans ꝫvitiosus inritus qui habebatur, is laudabatur*); BC 13.1, strongly echoed at ORF⁴ F185 Malc.: *quid ea memorem quae nisi iis qui videre nemini credibilia sunt, a privatis compluribus subvorsos montis, maria constrata esse? = dicere possum quibus villae atque aedea aedificatae atque expolitae maximo opere citro atque ebore atque pavimentis Poenicis sient.* (for other sources on elite building craze in the 1st c. B.C.E. see McGushin 1977: 102).

lead one to infer that Sallust is criticizing each writer for what they lack (Mar. Vict. *Ad Cic. Rhet.* 1.20 (p.203.24 Halm)):

Namque historia et brevis esse debet in expositione et aperta et probabilis, ut Sallustius sibi omnia in Catilina attribuit, ‘quam verissime potero, paucis absolvam’ [*BC* 4.3], cum aliis historiographis singula tradidisset in libro primo historiarum: dat Catoni brevitatem, ‘Romani generis disertissimus paucis absolvit’, Fannio vero veritatem.

For history should be concise in exposition and clear and probable, all of which Sallust ascribes to himself in the *Catiline*, “I will provide a brief account, as truthfully as I can”, while he ascribes to other historians one each of these qualities in the first book of his *Histories*: he gives brevity to Cato, “The most eloquent of the Roman race narrated briefly”, but gives to Fannius truth.

However, the positive evidence for such an inference is lacking. Evidence from Cicero’s dialogues is mixed. At *de Orat.* 2.51-3, Antonius is critical of Cato’s style.¹¹⁵ So is Atticus at *Leg.* 1.6.¹¹⁶ *De Orat.* 3.135 may appear, in the person of Crassus,¹¹⁷ to voice positive views of Cato, but unlike the abovementioned passages, which are explicitly about Cato’s style, here Crassus’ concerns seems to be everything *except* style.¹¹⁸ At *Brut.* 65-7 Cicero himself does have praise for Cato’s style.¹¹⁹ Atticus counters at *Brut.* 293-4, but Cicero reaffirms at 298.¹²⁰ A general limitation of all of this evidence is, of course, that it comes from literary dialogues, where critical judgments are assigned to

¹¹⁵ *de Orat.* 2.51-3 (= FRHist Cato T5). Cato, Pictor, and Piso are among Roman authors who’ve given unadorned (*sine ornamentis*) accounts of people, places, events, and dates, like the *Annales Maximi*, and like certain early Greek writers too. Of Cato, Pictor, and Piso Antonius then says *neque tenent quibus rebus ornetur oratio*, and *et dum intellegatur quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse brevitatem*.

¹¹⁶ = FRHist Cato T6b, where Atticus says of says of Pictor, Cato, Piso, Fannius, and Vennonius that although one may have more vigor than another, the whole class of them is rather *exile* (thin).

¹¹⁷ On the idea that Crassus in some way represents Cicero’s own viewpoints, see i.a. H. Van der Blom. 2010. *Cicero’s Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer*. Oxford, p.227-30.

¹¹⁸ = FRHist Cato T14: *quid enim M. Catoni praeter hanc politissimam doctrinam transmarinam atque adventiciam defuit?...nemo apud populum fortiori, nemo melior senator, et idem facile optimus imperator; denique nihil in hac civitate temporibus illis sciri discipote potuit quod ille non cum investigarit et scierit tum etiam conscripserit*.

¹¹⁹ = FRHist Cato T16a, where Cicero states Cato’s speeches and his *Origines* are *refertae...et verbis et rebus illustribus*, and adds that *omnes oratoriae virtutes* are found in the *Origines*: *quem florem aut quod lumen eloquentiae non habent?*.

¹²⁰ 293-4 = FRHist Cato T17: Cato spoke well for his time, but *admodum impolitum et plane rudem*. Cato, *nondum suspicantem quale esset copiose et ornate dicere*, cannot be compared with Thucydides et al.

different characters each with their own agendas in furthering the dialogue. One cannot with full certainty separate the actual views of Cicero – positive or negative – from those of his characters. Therefore, it is not possible to draw on Cicero’s various statements on Cato as proof that Sallust’s own comment on Catonian *brevitas* was an implicitly negative remark. On balance, in fact, Cato’s reputation, as far as it is preserved, seems overwhelmingly positive.¹²¹ In accordance with this, one is fairly justified in taking Sallust’s comment at *Hist.* 1.4M as a praise of Cato.

Moving specifically to the *BC*, we may compare with Sallust’s defense of his decision to write history (*BC* 4; cf. *BJ* 4) that of Cato, at least as we can gather it from FRHist Cato F2: Cicero reports that Cato said at the start of his *Origines clarorum virorum atque magnorum non minus otii quam negotii rationem exstare oportere* (“that an account should be given of the leisure of great and famous men, no less than of their public business”). Cato may have given impetus to historians to give some remark *de personis* about their leisure, such as Sallust does when in *BC* 3.3-4.2 he mentions first his public career, his recoiling therefrom, and then his turning in his *otium* to the writing of history.¹²² By including a reference to lesser activities in which he refuses to spend his leisure (*BC* 4.1), Sallust essentially addresses the criteria of Cato, justifying that he is putting his *otium* to good use by writing history.¹²³ Cato may not have been the sole

¹²¹ See FRHist Cato T1, 4, 5c, 11a-c, 12e, 14a-d, 15, 18a, 19b.

¹²² See also, at FRHist III.64, where Cornell notes the possible influence on Cato of Xen. *Symp.* 1.1. Yet as he notes, Cato means more that one’s leisure should be put to good use, while Xenophon is rather saying that the leisure activities of great men are worth recording.

¹²³ For the usefulness to the state of writing history, see also *BJ* 4.1 (*in primis magno usui*), 4.2 (it has *virtus*), 4.3 (*tanto tamque utili labore meo*), 4.4 (*maiusque commodum ex otio meo quam ex aliorum negotiis rei publicae venturum*).

influence on Sallust for his programmatic defense,¹²⁴ but he was certainly one of the most prominent and authoritative.¹²⁵

When Sallust comes to argue that the *virtus* of doers of deeds is held to be only as great as the *ingenia* of writers can make it (*BC* 8.3-5), he seems again to have Cato in mind. At FRHist Cato F126 (*H.A.*[Vopisc.] *Prob.* 1.1), we are told that Sallust, Cato, Gellius all express the same sentiment, namely that *omnes omnium virtutes tantas esse quantas videri eas voluerint eorum ingenia qui unius cuiusque facta descripserint* (“that all the virtues of all men are only as great as they have been made to seem by the genius of those who have described the deeds of each one”).¹²⁶ While it appears true that the *Historia Augusta* has here conflated and mixed the language of at least three statements (Cato, Sallust, and Cn. Gellius) into one that resembles all, but precisely reports none,¹²⁷ it is misguided to see a fundamental difference in meaning between, on one hand, Sallust’s statement at *BC* 8.3-5, and on the other, whatever it is we are presented with in F126. Despite what appear superficial distinctions,¹²⁸ the thrust of both passages is still

¹²⁴ Indeed, the sentiments in *BC* 3.1-2 are rhetorical commonplaces (cf. McGushin 1977: 47, Vretska 1976: 90, *Eranos* 53 (1953): 41-60), found in historical and non-historical authors: Isocr. *Paneg.* 13, *Evag.* 6, 48, *Paneg.* 82, *Archid.* 100; *Plataicus* 4; Demos. *Epitaphios* 14, Nepos *Chabr.* 3.3, Quint. 11.1.15-17; Cf. Thuc. 2.35.2 (especially evocative of Sallust), 1.1, 1.23.1; D.S. *Prol.* 1.2.7 (via Ephorus?), D.S. 20.43.7. More remotely Plb. 1.13.11, 1.63.4f; Livy 8.4.1; Lucian *De Hist. Conscr.* 53.

¹²⁵ Increasing the likelihood that Sallust has this statement of Cato in mind is *BC* 53.1, where Sallust remarks that the younger Cato *clarus et magnus habetur*, which also echoes this same fragment. (see Levene 2000: 184).

¹²⁶ Note that no modern editions include this as a fragment (though Roth & Bormann did); instead, it is often thought to refer to what Cato said at the end of FRHist Cato F76 (of the military tribune Caedicius: that Leonidas earned great glory and fame for his deeds in statues, histories, etc., but this tribune who did same thing and saved the state got little glory or fame).

¹²⁷ See FRHist III.148-9.

¹²⁸ Sallust’s passage is about how men’s reputations depend on the *ability* of writers, while F126 makes it dependent on a writer’s *intention* or *desire* to praise them. Sallust’s passage assumes the writer *will* try his utmost to praise the deeds, and their reputation will depend solely on the writer’s ability, whereas F126 makes the writer’s intention or desire to praise play the main role; as such the writer may or may not decide to exert his whole *ingenium* to praise, and so it is in this way that men’s reputation depends on the willingness of a writer to praise.

the same, in that both are statements about how the *virtutes* and *res gestae* of men are not commemorated commensurate to their reality, but rather according to the actions of the writer who writes them up.

Moreover, I would also argue (*pace* Cornell FRHist III.147) that FRHist Cato F76 is very likely to be one of the Cato passages that both the *Historia Augusta* and Sallust had in mind.¹²⁹ For even though Cato in F76 does not explicitly state that the fragment teaches “fame of deeds depends on the historians who record them”, it suggests itself so readily from the context at the end of F76 that it hardly need have been brought out explicitly for the reader to see it in this light.¹³⁰ In sum, that Sallust in *BC* 8.3-5 was influenced by such statements of Cato (whether F126, F76, or elsewhere) is likely, even though the programmatic nature of such statements in defense of history means that we cannot rule out that Sallust had encountered other similar pronouncements as well.

With regard to the actual content of the early Rome excursus in the *BC*, a few main borrowings stand out, one of which involves Sallust’s account of the earliest inhabitants of Italy, the Aborigines. As Sallust has it, Trojans founded Rome along with the

¹²⁹ FRHist F76: *sed idem benefactum quo in loco ponas nimium interest. Leonides Laco, quidem simile apud Thermopylas fecit, propter eius uirtutes omnis Graecia gloriam atque gratiam praecipuam claritudinis inclitissimae decorauere monumentis: signis, statuis, elogiis, historiis aliisque rebus gratissimum id eius factum habuere; at tribuno militum parua laus pro factis relictis, qui idem fecerat atque rem seruauerat.*

¹³⁰ For another instance of overnice criticism, cf. FRHist III.148, *H.A.*’s comment on what Alexander says of Homer and Achilles after F126: *Homerum intellegi volens, qui Achillem tantum in virtutum studio fecit quantum ipse valebat ingenio.* The translation for this might be that [Homer] “made Achilles as great [in his striving for virtue] as he himself was outstanding in talent”. Ultimately, since one would naturally have no reason to think that Homer held back any amount of his full literary genius in his poetry, this statement conveys the same basic idea as Sallust’s, since it is saying that Achilles turned out as great as Homer’s literary talent *allowed* Achilles to turn out (he obviously couldn’t make Achilles *greater* than his own great talent). This aligns with Sallust’s focus on the writer’s ability rather than their intention/desire to praise.

Aborigines, the latter being a rather uncivilized bunch.¹³¹ Cato too discussed the role of the Aborigines in forming the populace of early Rome.¹³² Three of the more pertinent passages that speak to this are FRHist Cato F8a, 8b, and 63. Fragments 8a and 8b present summary accounts of events in Italy from Aeneas' arrival to Ascanius' death.¹³³ After the wars against Latinus and Turnus had ended, Ascanius grew jealous of the future son of Aeneas and Lavinia, and he ceded Lavinium to Lavinia, founding Alba himself; but when he died childless, he left his kingdom to this second son, Silvius, born of Trojan and Italian blood. In Cato's version, then, it seems there is some sort of attempt to reconcile two different versions: one which made Ascanius/Iulus founder of Alba and the Alban dynasty, and one which made Alba the product of an indigenous dynast.¹³⁴ What is most notable, for our purposes, about Cato's account is that it promotes a version wherein a child born of the union of Trojan and "Aborigines" (cf. F10, *OGR* 12.5-13.5: *Latinum, Aboriginum regem*) leads to the Albans and the Roman people.

This position of Cato on the mixing of Trojan and "Aboriginal" lines is corroborated in FRHist F63 (= Serv. ad *Aen.* 1.6), where we are told:

Cato in originibus hoc dicit, cuius auctoritatem Sallustius sequitur in bello Catilinae, primo Italiam tenuisse quosdam qui appellabantur Aborigines. hos postea adventu Aeneae Phrygibus iunctos Latinos uno nomine nuncupatos.

¹³¹ Sallust *BC* 6.1: *Urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, qui Aenea duce profugi sedibus incertis vagabantur, cumque iis Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum.*

¹³² See e.g. T11b ((Fronto 204: Cato related <Ab>*originum pueritias* ("the infancy of the Aborigines"); T11e (Serv. ad *Aen.* 9.603-4: says of this verse *Italiae disciplina et vita laudantur, quam et Cato in originibus et Varro in gente populi Romani commemorat*); F24 (Prisc. *GL* 2.182): Volscian land, *campestris plerumque, Aboriginum fuit*), F49 (DH 1.11.1, 1.13.2: Aborigines were Greek, according to Cato, Sempronius [Tuditanus], "and many others" (FRHist III.95)), F50-51 (Aborigines were original occupants of Reatine territory (part of longer account of Sabus, ancestor of Sabines; for disputed content of Cato's version see FRHist III.96-8)).

¹³³ 8a = Peter F11; 8b = Myth. Vat. prim. 2.100.10-15, p.110 Zorzetti/Berlioz.

¹³⁴ Ennius' version (31 Sk.), where Alba was already established when the Trojans arrived, presupposes the "native" lineage for Alban kings and thus for the Romans.

This is what Cato says in his *Origins* (his authority is followed by Sallust in *The War with Catiline*), that those who first occupied Italy were some people called Aborigines. Afterwards on the arrival of Aeneas they were united with the Phrygians, and called by the single name of Latins.

Moreover, since Sallust's dependence on Cato for the merging of Trojans and Aborigines was acknowledged, it is plausibly suggested that Cato was also the source for Sallust's description of the Aborigines as *genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum*.¹³⁵ When one considers the broader network of Catonian influences in *BC* 1-13 and elsewhere, the direct influence of Cato on *BC* 6.1 cannot be easily doubted.

McGushin, however, notes the "Sallustian" account of early man in Cicero *Inv.* 1.2 (my emphasis):

Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur et sibi victu fero vitam propagabant nec ratione animi quicquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant, nondum divinae religionis, non humani officii ratio colebatur...Ita propter errorem atque inscientiam caeca ac temeraria dominatrix animi cupiditas ad se explendam viribus corporis abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus.

It seems likely that Cicero drew here from someone like Dicaearchus, as McGushin has suggested,¹³⁶ or Posidonius, but it is also possible he was just drawing on what was already a *locis communis*, an ethnographic commonplace already present in the *zeitgeist*. A more definite establishment of Cicero's source(s) here is therefore difficult. Yet putting aside Cicero's sources, one may simply register, in relation to what has seemed a rather certain Catonian influence in Sallust *BC* 6.1, that this Cicero passage combines the ideas of *BC* 6 with those in *BC* 1.1 and 1.5-2.1 in a way that suggestively echoes Sallust's later account.

¹³⁵ FRHist III.112, citing Cato F10 (= *OGR* 12.5-13.5) where the Aborigines are a rabble armed with sticks and stones, not well-organized.

¹³⁶ McGushin 1977: ad loc, with Jordan (*Krit. Beitr.* 359).

Thus even in Sallust's description of early Romans, which demonstrates rather clear Catonian influence, we cannot rule out that Sallust had multiple other sources in mind. One factor pointing in this direction is that Cato (FRHist F49) seems to have described the Aborigines as originally Greeks.¹³⁷ One might expect, then, if Sallust drew directly upon Cato in *BC* 6, that his Aborigines too would be portrayed as Greek. Yet there is no mention in Sallust of this aspect of Cato's account. Besides the possibility that Sallust had read Cicero *Inv.* 1.2 himself, it is also possible that Sallust drew on Posidonius for his account of early Italian peoples.¹³⁸ As a Greek, Posidonius could have made the decision to suppress their Greekness to avoid belittling Greeks. Yet it is always possible Posidonius' account of early Rome was not purely his own, but a melding of earlier Roman accounts with some of his own perspective.¹³⁹ Thus, even in such a seemingly straightforward case as Cato and Sallust on the Aborigines, the trail of influence could

¹³⁷ See extended discussion in FRHist I.210-11. Some argue that Sallust's description of the Aborigines as uncivilized, lawless people means that Cato, by extension, could not have claimed they were Greek; but there is no reason Cato could not have described an early Greek population as uncivilized. In fact, doing so would not clash with Cato's view of the role of Hellenistic culture. For while Cato was not so doctrinaire as to deny Greek influence on Italian origins wholesale, FRHist I.210 agree Cato would never have accepted an idea of Greek superiority to Italian natives, or the idea that Italians became civilized only through contact with Greeks. Thus (I.211) they take the view that Cato indeed turned the traditional relationship of cultural influence around by emphasizing the Greek origins of the Aborigines (F49) and suggesting they were uncivilized (F10), only becoming so through contact with the Romans' ancestors the Trojans.

¹³⁸ For a suggestive set of correspondances between Sallust *BC* 6 and Posidonius on early man, see Sen. *Epist.* 90.4 (*Sed primi mortalium quique ex his geniti naturam incorrupti sequebantur eundem habebant et ducem et legem, commissi melioris arbitrio* [= *BC* 9.1]...*Animo itaque rector eligebatur* [cf. *BJ* 1.3, 2.3]), 90.5 (*penes sapientes fuisse regnum Posidonius iudicat* [*BC* 6.6.7-9]...*fortitudo pericula arcebat, beneficentia augebat ornabatque subiectos* [*BC* 6.5.3-5]), 90.6 (*Sed postquam subrepentibus vitiis in tyrannidem regna conversa sunt, opus esse legibus coepit* [*BC* 6.7.11-14]). For Posidonius as a source of Sallust's thought, see above, Chapter 4; Hackl 1980 passim, Klingner 1928: 184 (citing Sen. *Epist.* 90). For a detailed list of scholars who support or oppose a general Posidonian derivation for Sallust's whole excursus, see McGushin 1977: 68-9.

¹³⁹ As some scholars (Klingner 1928; Strasburger (*JRS* 1955), 40ff, esp. 49ff; Gelzer (*Kl. Schr.* ii.48) remark, certain aspects of Posidonius' historical perspective (e.g. *metus hostilis*), or his raw material, could have been obtained through Rutilius Rufus.

lead us in multiple directions and likely does not lead in just one.¹⁴⁰ We should, however, still be confident in positing the strong influence of Cato in this case, even if it is not the only voice to be heard.

In addition to Sallust borrowing from Cato in his discussion of the role of the Aborigines, we may also consider the fact that, in the entire excursus from *BC* 6-13, the only names mentioned are Aeneas and Sulla, and that no one at all is named between Aeneas (6.1) and Sulla (11.4).¹⁴¹ He does not name the kings either in 6.3 (*civibus* [= Romulus] *moribus* [= Numa] *agris* [= Tullus] *satis aucta*) or in his description of the expulsion of the kings later in *BC* 6.7.¹⁴² His focus is on the *populus Romanus* as actor. Some have compared this feature of Sallust's account to the fact that Cato was said to have excluded the names of magistrates from his narrative.¹⁴³ It seems Cato did this in order to emphasize a concept of public duty, and that men held their command through being elected to serve by the Roman people; as such any victories or fame were won as servants of the *populus Romanus*. The common soldier, moreover, was just as important as the commander. The *populus Romanus* was the hero of the *Origines*.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Indeed the background to *BC* 6.1-2 (and 6.6-7) can be complicated still further: Sallust's description of the Aborigines is echoed (as Vretska 1976: 149 notes) by Isocr. *Antid.* 254. Likewise Cic. *de Orat.* 1.33 (which Sallust could have known). Cicero *Rep.* 1.62, 2.45, 47 must also be reckoned as an equally possible influence upon *BC* 6.7 (Egermann 1932: 73). Other similar ideas (though less strikingly so): Cic. *Off.* 1.12, 1.50. Cicero at *Rep.* 1.38 remarks that such ideas are commonplace.

¹⁴¹ In addition, a general lack of specificity in regard to events and dates can be observed in *BC* 6-13.

¹⁴² Cf. Vretska 1976: 152.

¹⁴³ FRHist Cato T1 (= Nepos *Cato* 3.4): *atque horum bellorum duces non nominavit, sed sine nominibus res notavit*; T20 (= Pliny *NH* 8.11): *certe Cato, cum imperatorum nomina annalibus detraxerit*.... For the possibility that Cato did not *completely* omit names from his narrative, but rather named commanders and major magistrates just at the beginning of a year or a campaign, see FRHist I.215. Certainly his own name would have been mentioned in connection with his own speeches which were inserted into the work.

¹⁴⁴ Discussion in FRHist I.215-16.

That Sallust draws on Cato elsewhere in the excursus, and in *BC* 6 in particular, might suggest Cato's own practice has in this case too influenced Sallust.¹⁴⁵ However, there are some arguments against seeing Cato as the exclusive influence on this aspect of Sallust's narrative in *BC* 6-13. For one, Sallust in *BC* 6-9 is chiefly concerned with emphasizing patterns of moral behavior over time rather than with naming specific people, and this itself may largely explain his lack of specific names and dates. In addition, elsewhere Sallust in fact expresses an opposite ideological position on the issue from Cato. For in *BC* 53.4 Sallust tells us that, after considerable reflection, he had come to the conclusion that the virtue of a few great men achieved all the great things that came to Rome in the past, whereas Cato tended to make the *populus Romanus* the chief mover in Roman history. Cic. *Rep.* 2.1-2 reinforces the difference between Sallust and Cato on this issue¹⁴⁶:

is dicere solebat ob hanc causam praestare nostrae civitatis statum ceteris civitatibus, quod in illis singuli fuissent fere quorum suam quisque rem publicam constituisset legibus atque institutis suis, ut Cretum Minos, Lacedaemoniorum Lycurgus... nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio sed multorum, nec una hominis vita sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus. nam neque ullum ingenium tantum extitisse dicebat, ut quem res nulla fugeret quisquam aliquando fuisset, neque cuncta ingenia conlata in unum tantum posse uno tempore providere, ut omnia complecterentur sine rerum usu ac vetustate.

He used to say that the constitution of our city is superior to other cities for this reason, that in their case there had usually been individuals each of whom set up his commonwealth with his own laws and institutions, as Minos did for Crete, Lycurgus for the Spartans...our commonwealth, on the other hand, was established by the intelligence not of one man, but of many, not in one man's lifetime, but over several centuries and ages. For, he would say, there had never existed human intelligence so great that there might have been someone at some

¹⁴⁵ With one Cato fragment, however, FRHist F117, an allusion by Sallust specifically to Cato's Italian pre-history cannot be vouchsafed. FRHist III.145 points out the seeming echo, in Cato's *eodem convenae complures ex agro accessitavere, eo res eorum auxit*, of Sallust *BC* 6.2-3: *convenere...res eorum...aucta*. But doubt arises, for there is no reference to Romulus or early Rome in the Cato fragment, and it could have been about any city (or at least Italian city) from any time (*pace* Levene 2000: 176). Cornell et al. at FRHist note the skepticism of previous editors, Krause and Bormann. However, regardless of the time or place to which F117 referred, it is still quite likely an intentional evocation of Cato – we just cannot say with certainty that it is an evocation of Cato's account of early Rome in particular.

¹⁴⁶ Sallust may be more focused on the military field, Cato on the political and legal, but the discourse is in both cases still that of how Rome became great.

time whom nothing would escape, nor could the combined intelligence of all great minds at a single moment of time make sufficient provision to take account of everything, without experience of affairs over a long period of time. (transl. Cornell et al. 2013)

Furthermore Cato, given the length and central concerns of his work, likely went into more detail on the pre-history of Italic peoples and the early history of Rome than Sallust, who only devotes a single page. Indeed, given the limited compass within which Sallust was working in the monograph, it would be natural to leave out details and names and opt for something more general, which in any case would suit his desire to emphasize the development of moral action, tracing back for the reader how Catiline and his corrupt milieu came about.

Thus, Sallust's own creative choices, and the demands of the monograph form, should perhaps be supposed to be the main determinant in the anonymity of the excursus. Nevertheless, Sallust must have been aware that writing anonymously like this helped to set up his work in a Catonian mold early on, encouraging readers to evaluate his narrative along Catonian lines. Sallust surely intended this effect. Indeed, as our discussion thus far has shown, Sallust clearly lends a strong Catonian color to his narrative throughout *BC* 1-13 through a number of different stylistic and thematic echoes of Cato that seem straightforward in intention. However, we also have to keep in mind the broader picture of Sallustian irony. Over the course of the entire work, his use of Catonian language and other Catonian allusion causes some ironic juxtapositions, and the Catonian framing of his narrative consequently begins to take on an ironic tone, undermining the authority of the censor's discourse to describe and rein in the behavior seen in Sallust's own day.

6.3b: Ironic Uses of Cato in Sallust

One particular instance of the irony with which Sallust actually deploys the discourse of archaic Roman virtue, and the discourse of Cato in particular, may serve by way of introduction. FRHist Cato F76 (= Peter F83) is an account of the exploits of a military tribune, Quintus Caedicius, during the First Punic War.¹⁴⁷ Surrounded by the enemy, he volunteers himself to lead four hundred men in a suicidal charge against the foe so that the rest of the army can escape to safety. All his men perished, but he survived and was recovered from the carnage.¹⁴⁸ Linguistically, there are a number of features in the fragment as a whole which Sallust himself displays at times, from asyndeton, to lack of subordination, to the use of *atque*, to redundancy and synonymous pairs of words.¹⁴⁹

As regards the content, we may bring in for comparison Sallust's Catiline. Throughout the *BC* Sallust presents us in Catiline with a complicated, and in some ways heroic, character. That heroism, of course, is perverted through its application to conspiracy against the Republic, although his rhetoric (seen in his speech (*BC* 20) and letter to Catulus (*BC* 35)) sounds traditional. In the very last battle, and the speeches leading up to it, Sallust portrays Catiline as speaking about ancient virtue, freedom, and valor.¹⁵⁰ That such rhetoric on Catiline's part struck a note of moral irony seems likely. I

¹⁴⁷ Other accounts of this event: Livy 22.60.11, Florus 1.18.12-13 (name = Calpurnius Flamma), Ampel. 20.5, *vir. ill.* 39, Frontinus *Strat.* 1.5.15, 4.5.10. Cf. also the actions of P. Decius Mus (m.trib. 343), perhaps a doublet: Livy 7.34-7, Cic. *Div.* 1.51, Frontinus *Strat.* 1.5.14, 4.5.9.

¹⁴⁸ See esp. F76.19: *cum saucius multifariam ibi factus esset, tamen volnus capiti nullum evenit, eumque inter mortuos defatigatum vulneribus atque, quod sanguen eius defluserat, cognovere. Eum sustulere, isque convaluit, saepeque postilla operam reipublicae fortem atque strenuam perhibuit illoque facto, quod illos milites subduxit, exercitum ceterum servavit.*

¹⁴⁹ Pairs of synonymous words: *fraudi et pernicie*; *ad occursandum pugnandumque*; *imperes hortorisque* (all occur in the indirectly reported section, but must represent a general aspect of Cato's narrative here).

¹⁵⁰ Valor (*fortis*, but mostly *audacia*): *BC* 58.1 (2x), 58.2, 7, 8, 12, 15, 17, 19; virtue (especially in the phrase *memores pristinae virtutis*): 58.2, 12, 19, 21, cf. 60.3, 7; *libertas*: 58.8, 11.

would argue that this sense of irony is further expanded by Sallust when we see Catiline lay dying on the battlefield in *BC* 61.4. For this scene appears to be a close echo of the selfless actions of Caedicius to “save the state” in Cato F76, and as such it enhances the irony of Catiline’s actions and their implications for the Republic.¹⁵¹ Both men are found among the dead, still breathing; *volneribus* are mentioned in both; there is mention of recognition of the man, and mention of facial recognition in particular.¹⁵²

Heightening this irony at the end of the *BC* is a particular linguistic echo of Cato. In the directly transmitted section of F76 Cato uses the term *strenuus* (*operam rei publicae fortem atque strenuam*), and it appears again at F76.13 (*strenuissimos*). Sallust uses *strenuissimus quisque* in 61.7, and Catiline himself says *neque ex ignavo strenuom neque fortem ex timido* at 58.1. It appears, in fact, that Cato often used *strenuus* (and *fortis atque strenuus*) in his writing.¹⁵³ Sallust’s frequent use of *strenuus* (or *bonus atque*

¹⁵¹ In addition to those aspects to be mentioned below, one may also note the recurrence of Catiline’s emphasis on *audacia* in F76.12, and the similarity of Caedicius’ devotional proclamation (*si alium...neminem reperis, me licet ad hoc periculum utare e.q.s.*) to Catiline’s promise to his men at *BC* 20.16: *vel imperatore vel milite me utimini: neque animus neque corpus a vobis aberit*. Another aspect of irony in this final scene may perhaps be detected in Sallust’s words *fuere item qui inimicos suos cognoscerent*, by which Sallust “da a entender que eran muy pocos los enemigos, como si quisiera decir ‘hubo quien tuvo la suerte de encontrar algún enemigo entre tantos cadáveres’” (“[he] implies that there were very few enemies, as if he wanted to say ‘there were those who were lucky enough to find some enemy among so many corpses’” (Cascón Dorado 2010: 67, my emphasis).

¹⁵² Found among the dead, still breathing: *eumque inter mortuos defatigatum volneribus atque, quod sanguen eius defluserat, cognovere. Eum sustulere...* (F76), *Catilina vero longe a suis inter hostium cadavera repertus est paululum etiam spirans* (*BC* 61.4). Wounds: *cum saucius multifariam ibi factus esset, tamen volnus capiti nullum evenit...defatigatum volneribus* (F76), *ibique pugnans confoditur...omnes tamen advorsis volneribus conciderant*. (*BC* 60.7, 61.3). Recognition, esp. with regard to face: *tamen volnus capiti nullum evenit, eumque inter mortuos...cognovere* (F76), *tum vero cerneret...inter hostium cadavera [Cat.] repertus est paululum etiam spirans ferociamque animi, quam habuerat vivus, in voltu retinens...Multi autem, qui e castris visundi aut spoliandi gratia processerant, volventes hostilia cadavera amicum alii, pars hospitem aut cognatum reperiebant; fuere item, qui inimicos suos cognoscerent* (*BC* 61.1, 4, 8).

¹⁵³ FRHist III.87: a “typically Catonian combination of words”, citing Till, *Lingua di Catone*, 56. Other examples in Cato = *ORF*⁴ F18 Malc. (*bonis atque strenuis*), *de Agr.* 4 (*viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi*); *ORF*⁴ F35 Malc. (*strenue*).

strenuus or *fortis atque strenuus*), both here and elsewhere, thus corroborates the sense that he is deliberately evoking an effect.¹⁵⁴

Such clear stylistic evocations of Cato like we see here in Sallust's use of [*bonus/fortis et*] *strenuus* bring up a further question. Can we see Sallust as appealing with genuine nostalgia to an ancient standard of virtue through such repeated borrowings from archaic language more generally, and Catonian language in particular? We must recall the caution advised earlier in this section about making a simple jump between linguistic evocation and ideological imitation. Sallust does pursue archaism, and he does pursue a certain Catonian ethos through his use of both *brevitas* and Catonian language and phrases; but to say that this represents a sincere desire to reproduce ancient virtue by means of his style of discourse misunderstands the nature of Sallust's moral discourse and how it relates to his style.¹⁵⁵ Sallust's terse, abrupt (rightly viewed by Seneca), inconcinnous style is meant to reflect a tense and chaotic world.¹⁵⁶ Feldherr views the matter more along the lines I propose in my discussion of Sallustian irony and pessimism.¹⁵⁷ He remarks that Sallust's use of archaic diction makes the reader view civil war from a "pre-lapsarian perspective", but that this is meant to produce an irony: one reads the archaic diction, and the talk of revolutionaries being *pristinae virtutis memores*, and Catiline's heroic actions,¹⁵⁸ but then one sees how perverted this all

¹⁵⁴ *BC* 20.7, 60.4 (Cat. speaking, acting); *BJ* 7.5 (*et proelio strenuus erat et bonus consilio*); 22.3 ((Jug.) *quo plura bene atque strenue fecisset, eo animum suum iniuriam minus tolerare*); 67.2 (in battle); 85.46, 50; 107.1 (Sulla pre-battle exhortation); *Hist.* 1.9M (*maximus ducibus, fortibus strenuisque ministris*); *Hist.* 4.7 (*quo cupidius in ore ducis se quisque bonum et strenum ostentantes*). similar: *BC* 51.16 (*D. Silanum, virum fortem atque strenuum*); 54.6 (*sed [Cato] cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore...*); 58.1 (*neque ex ignavo strenuom neque fortem ex timido*); 61.7 (*nam strenuissimus quisque aut occiderat...*).

¹⁵⁵ E.g. O'Gorman 2007: 382, who makes the assumption too readily.

¹⁵⁶ On the type of influence Thucydides exerts upon Sallustian style and tone, see briefly below.

¹⁵⁷ Feldherr 2007: 388.

¹⁵⁸ Esp. *BC* 58.1; 60.4, 7; 61.4. Cf. *BC* 5.1-5, *BC* 35.

appears when occurring in a civil war and when attributed to a revolutionary conspirator against the state.

This type of Sallustian irony shows itself quite clearly in a few ways within *BC* 6-13. One may note, for instance, the ambivalence injected into the idealizing section in *BC* 9 through Sallust's choice of T. Manlius Torquatus as an *exemplum* of ancient courage and obedience.¹⁵⁹ Sallust also alludes indirectly to Catonian values in his defense of his *otium* at *BC* 4.1. Sallust claims that when he decided to retire from the grief and danger of political life, *non fuit consilium socordia atque desidia bonum otium conterere, neque vero agrum colundo aut venando, serviliis officiis intentum, aetatem agere* ("it was not my plan to waste my valuable leisure through sloth and laziness, nor to pass time focused on servile employments of farming or hunting."). There have been several interpretations of this statement, some alleging that the reference is only to the excessive industrial-level farming of the super rich in Sallust's own day¹⁶⁰; yet Sallust bases the persuasiveness of his apologetics in *BC* 4 not on a comparison with contemporary trends, but on one with long-established Roman (or Greco-Roman) norms – especially those of political withdrawal and the useful employment of leisure.¹⁶¹ Thus there seems here to be some level of polemical positioning vis-à-vis the Catonian virtue of the agricultural aristocrat, and this shows Sallust is not imitating and endorsing wholesale a framework of Catonian virtue.

¹⁵⁹ See Levene 2000: 177: "at best morally complex, and at worst entirely unacceptable". This *exemplum* will come back into play later, again in an unnerving way, in the speech of Cato (*BC* 52.30-31).

¹⁶⁰ See Levene 2000: 174n23 for Cato's associations with agriculture in later Republican writers, and discussion of previous interpretations of Sallust's meaning here in *BC* 4.1.

¹⁶¹ See above, this section, on FRHist Cato F2, and Chapter 4 on Plato's Seventh Letter as a model in *BC* 3.3-4.1.

In a more significant way, Sallust even challenges the very authority of his own idealizing image of early Rome through the way he makes his moral discourse in *BC* 1-13 interact with Cato's. As this case study has already sufficiently illustrated, Sallust frequently imparts a Catonian flavor to the language (and in certain places the thought) of *BC* 1-13, and so the reader, already conditioned to read Sallust's "Archaeology" in Catonian terms, would have had no trouble in calling to mind the quite opposite moral perspective held by Cato. According to that Catonian point of view, Romans already in the early 2nd century B.C.E. were displaying the same types of moral degeneracy as Sallust noted in the era *after* 146, and Cato famously railed against the luxury he observed in his own day.¹⁶² Sallust, however, as we know, claims in the *BC* (6-9) that the period prior to 146 appears to have been morally pristine. One option, given this situation, is to assume that Sallust did intend to assert a straightforwardly idealized picture of pre-146 Rome in *BC* 6-9, but that he simply neglected through inadvertence the conflicting evidence of Cato's writings. Yet Sallust shows detailed acquaintance with Catonian evidence elsewhere in *BC* 1-13. Another, perhaps preferable option, one must explore is that Sallust had another aim in mind here, and that it was in fact his own idealizing image of early Rome that was the object of his subtle prodding. Indeed, I have argued earlier in this Chapter (Section 6.2) that there are reasons to think that Sallust's depiction of early Rome in *BC* 6-13 is not as idealizing as it appears at first sight, and that it takes its particular form for other immediate reasons. Consequently, I would argue that by purveying a rather *non*-Catonian idealized picture of pre-146 Roman morality through a discourse that in many ways *imitates* Cato's, Sallust aims to remind his readers of

¹⁶² For Cato's discourse on contemporary morality, see Levene 2000: 175n27 for sources.

Cato's own moral discourse, and through that reminder to subtly lead them to question the idealizing rhetoric which his own excursus conveys.¹⁶³

What drives home still further the irony of Sallust's engagement with Cato in *BC* 6-13 is the fact that Sallust's choice of the fall of Carthage as the turning point for headlong moral decline (*BC* 10) implicitly challenges Cato's own approach to morality and Cato's own political actions. For Cato himself had famously urged the destruction of Carthage as the best policy for the Republic. Sallust's positioning of Carthage as the headlong turning point in all three works, not just the *BC*, strongly suggests that Cato, despite a long crusade throughout his life to uphold morality, ended up being wrong in the most important way in his political and moral discourse regarding Carthage.

Another rich example of Sallustian irony in handling Cato is the debate between Caesar and Cato, followed by the famous *synkrisis* (*BC* 51-54). One of the more interesting aspects of Caesar's speech is the degree to which he evokes the elder Cato. Like Cato in his speech for the Rhodians, Caesar here argues for leniency and delaying deliberations, and in fact his mention of the Rhodian case at *BC* 51.5 links the two situations still more directly. The Censor in his speech for the Rhodians had argued that one should not punish intention,¹⁶⁴ and while Caesar does not argue this explicitly, his basic position against execution implies the same leniency toward those who have not yet actually committed any positive actions in their rebellion. Cato the Younger, by contrast, argues they must punish intention, and cannot wait until after the deed (*BC* 52.3-4).¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Cf. Levene 2000: 180.

¹⁶⁴ *FRHist* Cato F105 (speech against Galba), and F90-92 (*Pro Rhod.*).

¹⁶⁵ In advocating this Cato is made to echo the Syracusan demagogue Athenagoras at Thuc. 6.38.4 – a close echo, in fact, since what Athenagoras has in mind is a situation of internal revolution to overthrow Syracuse's government, just like the Catilinarian conspiracy threatened at Rome.

Caesar also makes the argument for following precedent and avoiding bad precedent (51.17, 25-36), and in doing so echoes Diodotus at Thuc. 3.47, whereas Cato at 52.18 argues that the harsher you are, the less eager for subversive action they will be – just as Cleon did at Thuc. 3.37.2, 3.39.5, 7. By this account, Caesar has thus far echoed the Censor, and now Diodotus, while the younger Cato has echoed the demagogues Athenagoras and Cleon. Such alignments should support restraint in assuming Sallust uncomplicatedly backs Cato's arguments over Caesar's.

Additionally, Caesar makes much of the *Leges Porciae* (51.21-24, 39-40) as part of his argument for following legal precedent. Other echoes of the Censor dot the speech.¹⁶⁶ His speech ends with appeal to the *maiores* and their *virtus atque sapientia*, but Cato's speech ends with a similar appeal – on the opposite argument that *supplicium sumundum* is *mos maiorum*.

Yet the younger Cato, in addition to some echoes from other sources,¹⁶⁷ also displays his fair share of borrowing from the Censor, though arguably not to the same degree as

¹⁶⁶ BC 51.16: *virum fortem atque strenuom*; BC 51.33: *vas aut vestimentum* = Cato *orat.* fr. 174 Malc. (= Gell. 13.24 = Cato *De Sumptu Suo*): *neque mihi aedificatio neque vasum neque vestimentum ullum est manupretiosum neque pretiosus servus neque ancilla*. Another possible Catonian phrase at BC 51.36.15 can be compared to Cic. *Cato Mai. de Sen.* 68: Cicero has Cato use *incerta pro certis, falsa pro veris*; Caesar here says *potest alio tempore...falsum aliquid pro vero credi*. As Syme notes, Caesar also makes philosophical arguments at 51.20, something that one could more expect from the younger Cato. One should not neglect the fact that Caesar often echoes Sallust's own discourse: 51.1 = BC 1.1 (but also echoes Thuc. 3.42.1, and esp. Demos. *Chers.* 1); 51.3 = BC 1.5-6, and BC 1.2; 51.2-3 (*lubidini simul et usui...lubido posset...contra lubidinem animi sui*) echoes BJ 1.4.11-12; 51.4 = BC 1.6-2.1; 51.12 = BC 2.8 (though it is a *locus communis*: Pind. *Pyth.* 11.29-30, Demos. *Aristog.* 2.3, Xen. *Ages.* 5.6); 51.27 = BC 2.6; 51.38.25-6 = BC 54.6; 51.42 = Thucydides' Nicias 6.10 fin.)

¹⁶⁷ Catiline (52.5 = 20.12, 52.5.30 = 20.14); Marius (*capessite rem p.* = BJ 85.47); Sallust (52.9 = 53.3, but also Cic. *Har. Resp.* 60, Isoc. *Areop.* 20, *Panath.* 131, Plut. *Alcib.* 16.3, esp. *Solon* 15.2-3. As such one cannot be sure Sallust intended a clear and exclusive allusion to himself here); 52.21-23 (reflects Sallustian moral discourse generally); 52.30-31 (= BC 9.4 on Torquatus); 52.20 (slight echo of Demos. *Phil* 3.40. McGushin 1977: 263). Other sentiments in Cato's speech, being commonplaces, find sufficiently wide echo and need little comment here.

Caesar.¹⁶⁸ Both men, however, seem to be equally lacking when we come to the *synkrisis*, where once again the elder Cato suggestively emerges.¹⁶⁹ In the *synkrisis* Sallust implicitly dissociates and fragments the *virtus* of the elder Cato, who combined the martial, the political, and intellectual virtues. He divides the Censor's qualities between Caesar and the younger Cato. The fact that the Censor's *severitas* is ascribed by Cicero to the younger Cato in *Mur.* 66 (as it is by Sallust at *BC* 54.2), must be weighed against the fact that the Elder Cato's other qualities of *commoditas* and *facilitas* (*Mur.* 66) are given by Sallust to Caesar (*BC* 54.2, 3). Likewise, Cicero says of the Censor in *Mur.* 32 *quo quidem in bello virtus enituit egregia M. Catonis, proavi tui*, and it is Caesar who seems to be assigned this trait at *BC* 54.4. In other ways Caesar and Cato are found to fall *equally* short of the ancient virtue. The most prominent virtues of each man (*mansuetudo* and *misericordia* for Caesar, *severitas* for Cato) in *BC* 54.2 are not present in the *Archaeologia*, nor is justice (*iustitia, aequitas*: *BC* 9.3, 10.1), a key quality in the *Archaeologia*, assigned to either man. In this way neither is shown to be the true heir to the ancient virtue described therein.¹⁷⁰ No one fully measures up to the ancient virtue anymore, and those early Roman traits that they do exhibit are fragmented between the two men.

¹⁶⁸ 52.4 = Veget. *de Re Milit.* 1.13; 52.7 = Livy 34.4.1-2 (Cato on his moral crusade, and the enemies it has made him. See Levene 2000: 184); 52.8 = Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 8.9 (an ironic reversal: Censor pardons all but himself, Ygr Cato holds everyone to his own high standard, pardoning none: Caesar in the *synkrisis* resembles the Censor more closely in this particular); 52.12 (*sint sane*) = FRHist Cato F93; rest of *BC* 52.12 = ORF⁴ F224 (Levene 2000: 183n59).

¹⁶⁹ In the discussion of the *synkrisis* below I follow the account of Levene 2000: 181-2. Cf. Batstone 1990.

¹⁷⁰ Those traits which they *do* share with the early Romans in *BC* 6-9 include, *beneficiis* (6.5), *ignoscundo*, and *labor* (7.4-6)(Caesar), as well as desire to shine in war and gain *laus* by war (Caesar). Cato shares with them *innocentia, pudor*, and desire to *certare de virtute*.

There are important implications to draw from this analysis of the debate and the *synkrisis*. Levene brings out well how the outcome of the debate reinforces Sallustian pessimism through a paradox of history.¹⁷¹ In spite of his numerous echoes of his ancestor, the younger Cato perpetuates a dangerous repetition of history by following the Censor in his one biggest mistake – namely, taking his *severitas* too far and urging destruction over mercy toward the enemy. Just as the threat of Carthage united Romans and moderated their behavior, so too did the Catilinarians. In Sallust's mind, annihilation of this threat, while seemingly productive, will lead to the resumption of moral decline just as had happened after the fall of Carthage which was advocated by the elder Cato. Though the advocacy of both Catos thus had portentous and unintended consequences for Roman morality and political history, the younger Cato also set a dangerous precedent (killing citizens without trial, pushing the limits of consular authority), which Caesar argued against doing, and thus he set in motion what would be the death not only of the Republic but also of himself. For Caesar would later avail himself of this very precedent,¹⁷² in the process becoming Cato's nemesis and the cause of his destruction. Sallust, then, sees a rather grim repetition of Roman mistakes in the *BC* and in the actions of the younger Cato, and in fact an intensification of those mistakes.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Levene 2000: 188, 90-92.

¹⁷² Which is not to say it had not been there earlier, in the persons of Sulla and Pompey.

¹⁷³ It could be noted that in *ORF*⁴ F195 Malc. Cato, discussing Carthage, says that those who prepare for war so that when they wish they might attack, are already *hostes*, *tametsi nondum armis agat*. So Cato took the stance, not only in favor of *not* punishing intention (*Pro Rhod.*, *Chr. Galbam*), but also the stance of punishing before a revolt happened. However this does not weaken the associations between Caesar's speech and Cato's speech *Pro Rhodiensibus*, and in fact it only serves to reinforce the younger Cato's mistake: for the reader, aware that Cato famously took the one stance, and also the other, can now come to realize that the younger Cato has followed his ancestor in the wrong instance, repeating what turned out to be the famously mistaken stance of *severitas* regarding Carthage.

A final instructive instance of irony with Cato's influence emerges from the speech of Marius in the *BJ* (*BJ* 85). We have already illustrated earlier in this chapter how Sallust draws Marius as echoing the upright early Roman youths in his introductory character sketch at *BJ* 63.1-4 (see above section 5.2), so the fact that Marius ironically contrasts with Cato in his climactic speech fits the pattern of contrasts Sallust has been preparing. A similar concern with a discourse of *novi homines* asserting a virtue of action rather than birth links the two men as well.¹⁷⁴

The speech itself begins with an echo of the opening of Cato's *Pro Rhodiensibus* (FRHist Cato F87 = *ORF*⁴ Cato F163):

Scio ego, Quirites, plerosque non isdem artibus imperium a vobis petere et, postquam adepti sunt, gerere: primo industrios supplices modicos esse, dein per ignaviam et superbiam aetatem agere. (*BJ* 85.1)

Scio solere plerisque hominibus rebus secundis atque prolixis atque prosperis animum excellere atque superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere. (FRHist F87)

The use of *scio*, along with *plerique* anchors the echo (*scio ego, Quirites, plerosque* || *scio solere plerisque*),¹⁷⁵ but one may note also the mention of *superbia*, and the use of tricolon. In Marius' words in 85.3 (*omnia curare et ea agere inter invidos occursantis factiosos*) one may hear Cato's *video hac tempestate concucurrisse omnes adversarios*.¹⁷⁶ As Marius introduces his claims to *labor*, we are told (85.7) *ita ad hoc aetatis a pueritia fui, uti omnis labores et pericula consueta habeam*. Cato may also be heard here,

¹⁷⁴ See Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 11.2; Paul 1984: 209. For the proving of one's worth by reference to one's *virtus, innocentia*, etc, see Cato's speech *De Suis Virtutibus Contra [L.] Thermum*, and discussion of *BJ* 85.7 below. Cf also Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *BJ* 85.12 (*scio ego, Quirites*), and, on Cato's side, FRHist Cato F1 (Pliny *NH* pref. 30); *ORF* Cato F122.

¹⁷⁶ *ORF* F123. Cf. Paul 208. For another possible, though faint, Catonian phrase, cf. 85.3 (*neque me fallit quantum...sustineam*) to Cato *ORF* 21 (Koestermann 1971: ad loc). Cf. also 85.5 (*omnia ora in me convorsa esse*) with Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 19.1, 6, as well as Cic. *In Cat.* 4.1 (Koestermann 1971: 296).

similarly defending himself.¹⁷⁷ The parallel would become more perceptible owing to the fact that, in his character sketch at *BJ* 63.2-3, Marius' devotion to rather Catonian values is elaborated (*industria, probitas, militiae magna scientia, animus belli ingens domi modicus...non Graeca facundia neque urbanis munditiis sese exercuit*). In the very next sentence (*BJ* 85.8) Marius continues the Catonian evocation, emphasizing his devotion to the people and the fact that, as Cato held, all honors stem from them.¹⁷⁸

As he begins to compare himself – his qualifications, and his *virtus* – to the *nobility*, Marius sarcastically calls up for comparison one of the unworthy nobles “of ancient stock” (*veteris prosapiae*), echoing a phrase preserved from the *Origines* by Nonius (67M = F21 Peter): *veteres prosapia*.¹⁷⁹ This comparison continues at great length, emphasizing the failures of the nobility to live up to their ancestors' virtue (though Marius himself has). Marius employs an old tactic of popular rhetoric, saying (85.30) *non possum fidei causa imagines...maiorum meorum ostentare, at...cicatrices advorso corpore*. Cato, according to the tradition, was assigned similar claims about battle scars, even from a young age.¹⁸⁰ The contrast to the nobility continues in 85.32, with another reference (seconding *BJ* 63.3) to Marius' aversion to learning Greek literature (*neque litteras Graecas didici: parum placebat eas discere, quippe quae ad virtutem doctoribus nihil profuerant*). Although Cato's attitude to Greek literature, and Greek culture more

¹⁷⁷ Cato *ORF* F128 Malc.: *ego iam a principio in parsimonia atque in duritia atque industria omnem adulescentiam meam abstinui agro colendo, saxis Sabinis, silicibus repastinandis atque conserendis*. One may also compare Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 1.3.

¹⁷⁸ *Quae ante vestra beneficia gratuito faciebam, ea uti accepta mercede deseram, non est consilium, Quirites*. This closely echoes the sentiment of Cato *ORF* 93 (*nam periniurium siet, cum mihi ob eos mores, quos prius habui, honos detur, ubi datus est, tum uti eos mutem atque alii modi sim.*). For the dependence on the *populus* for one's office and honors, cf. *FRHist* I.215-16.

¹⁷⁹ Noted by Koestermann 1971: 298, who cites Cic. *Tim.* 39 as proof that such a phrase was outmoded by Cicero's day and thus a marked usage.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Plut. *Mar.* 9.2, *Cat. Mai.* 1.5; Paul 1984: 212.

generally, was certainly complex,¹⁸¹ this image certainly existed to some degree about Cato as well.¹⁸² As Paul notes, the Roman martial values that Marius by contrast represents, and his fair conduct as general, are also Catonian.¹⁸³

An unmistakably Catonian claim about luxury follows in *BJ* 85.39, where Marius buffets criticism of his lack of refinement in dining, saying *parum scite convivium exorno neque histrionem ullum neque pluris preti coqui quam vilicum habeo*. One may compare Cato's self-defense in his *De Sumptu Suo* (*ORF* F174).¹⁸⁴ Marius' mention of a *vilicus* strengthens the allusion here by recalling one who owns an estate and the concomitant concerns of a man like Cato.¹⁸⁵ As Marius' speech comes to an end, in his addressing of the situation with the war, he remarks that the army in Africa is *magis strenuos quam*

¹⁸¹ It is likely that Cato was not inflexibly dogmatic in denying Greeks a role in the early establishment of Italian cities, nor on Roman culture. However, he did aim to temper the influence of Greek culture on Roman mores (cf. Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 23), and to remind Romans that Greek culture or values should be considered inferior to traditional Roman values and should not inform changes in Roman *mores*. See discussion in FRHist I.209f.

¹⁸² Plut. *Marius* 2, 6; *Cat. Mai.* 20.3-4, 22. (9.3 = Cato actually using Greek literature). To Marius' pronouncements against eloquence generally (85.26), and Greek literature in particular, one may cf. Sempronius Asellio F10 Peter (FRHist F10): *Facta sua spectare oportere, non dicta, si minus facundiosa essent*, which Popma thought came from Marius' speech – though see skepticism of FRHist ad loc. As regards his *Origines* in particular, Nepos said they lacked *doctrina* – which could be a reference to Cato's lack of formal rhetorical and philosophical training, or to a "lack of learned discussion or a failure to name other literary authors" (Astin, *Cato*, 223). It is, however, not likely that Cato had failed to read widely for his *Origines*, and he indeed did have an acquaintance with some of the Greek classics, and had criticized the bare nature and content of the *Annales Maximi* (*Orig.* F77 Peter). Such a statement, then, may refer to Cato's lack of philosophizing in the work, and his failure to write according to Greek rhetorical training. On balance, then, it is likely that in his writings, at least, Cato followed his own dictum of *illorum litteras inspicere, non perdiscere* (Pliny *NH* 29.14). See further discussion in FRHist I.209f.

¹⁸³ *BJ* 85.33-4 (...*hostem ferire, praesidia agitare*...*His ego praeceptis milites hortabor, neque illos arte colam, me opulenter, neque gloriam meam, laborem illorum faciam. Hoc est utile, hoc civile imperium*). Cf. Cato in Spain, Livy 34.18.3-5: *sed in consule ea uis animi atque ingenii fuit ut omnia maxima minimaque per se adiret atque ageret, nec cogitaret modo imperaretque quae in rem essent sed pleraque ipse per se transigeret, nec in quemquam omnium grauius seueriusque quam in semet ipsum imperium exerceret, parsimonia et uigiliis et labore cum ultimis militum certaret*. cf. Paul 1984: 213; Koestermann 1971: ad loc.

¹⁸⁴ *neque mihi aedificatio neque vasum neque vestimentum ullum est manupretiosum neque pretiosus servus neque ancilla. si quid est quod utar, utor; si non est, egeo*. On cooks see also *Carm. de Mor.* 2 (Gell. 9.2.5): *equos carius quam coquos emebant*. Koestermann 1971 fails to note a Catonian allusion regarding *coquos*.

¹⁸⁵ *Vilicus* and *coquere* are common terms in Cato's *de Agr.*

felix (85.46) – utilizing what we’ve established earlier to be a Catonian Lieblingswort (cf. 85.50). As noted above in discussing FRHist Cat F76 (Caedicius), the devotional sentiment of Caedicius is reflective of Catiline, but also of Marius.¹⁸⁶

Although other possible echoes certainly exist,¹⁸⁷ those outlined above serve to illustrate the consistently Catonian element injected into Marius’ speech, prepared for already in *BJ* 63. The abovementioned evocations are seemingly straightforward, but when one thinks about the context of Marius’ speech, and the character of Marius more generally, ironic contrast begins to emerge. Marius’ focus on himself in 85.4 (*mihi spes omnes in memet sitae*), while reflective of the rhetoric of new men, is also strikingly anti-Catonian, when one considers the latter’s emphasis on the *populus Romanus* as hero, and source of honor and glory.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, at *BJ* 114.4 Sallust reinforces the irony of Marius putting all hope in himself; for when faced with the threat from the Gallic tribes, the state itself puts all its hopes in Marius as well: *et ea tempestate spes atque opes civitatis in illo sitae*.¹⁸⁹ With this remark Sallust calls the reader’s mind back to his own statement in the *BC* on what he thought had brought success to the Republic: *paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse* (*BC* 53.4). As this passage shows, Sallust was convinced that, contrary to what Cato had thought, it was the virtue of a few individuals that brought success to the state. This may have been simply Sallust’s own

¹⁸⁶ Cf. F76 (*si alium...neminem reperis, me licet ad hoc periculum utare e.q.s*) to *BJ* 85.47 (*Egomet in agmine aut in proelio consultor idem et socius periculi vobiscum adero, meque vosque in omnibus rebus iuxta geram*).

¹⁸⁷ E.g. 85.40 echoes Cato *ORF* 206 Malc.: *atque ego a maioribus memoria sic accepi*. Marius’ mention of *munditias mulieribus* recalls L. Valerius’ words in the speech, Livy 34.7.9, which he opposed to Cato on *Lex Orchia*. One may also compare the concerns about luxury visible in Cato FRHist F87 (*Pro Rhod.*) and Livy 34.4, to *BJ* 84.43 (*luxuria et ignavia*). Such echoes are not definite, but only suggestive in the flush of other Catonian allusions.

¹⁸⁸ See FRHist Cato F131.

¹⁸⁹ Koestermann 1971 does not discuss Marius’ use of this phrase, and its relation to *BJ* 114.4.

general reflection, but in the *BJ* this general reflection finds specific application not only in the sentiments voiced by Marius, but also (as Sallust narrates) in the senate's opinion concerning Marius. This is, of course, a dangerous development in political culture, as Sallust alludes to both in the ominous and destructive course Marius' later career would take (*BJ* 63.6), and in the later career of Sulla (*BJ* 95.4).¹⁹⁰ Such echoes of the later civil wars haunt the hopes put in Marius by the Senate at the end of the monograph. For Sallust, then, the actions of a few great men had decided the course of Roman history, but it does not appear that he thought this had been a good thing for Rome. Sallust has managed not just to undercut Cato's perspective on this issue, but also to express a pronounced pessimism about it.¹⁹¹

In short, as far as historical *exempla* go, Marius was not a great choice to carry the mantle of Catonian values, and the reader of Marius' words would surely be jarred at the ironic juxtaposition Sallust has created. The speech of Marius, as well as the *BC*'s "Archaeology" and the Caesar-Cato debate discussed above, should therefore serve as sufficient proof not only of the depth of Sallust's engagement with Catonian language and thought, but also the irony with which he often deploys it, an irony which sometimes helps to point up Sallust's own pessimism about Roman morality and the course of Roman history through reversal of Catonian principles.¹⁹² As we have seen, Cato was far

¹⁹⁰ (63.6) *tamen is ad id locorum talis vir – nam postea ambitione praeceps datus est...;* (95.4): *nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere.*

¹⁹¹ The degree to which this pessimism about a few great men being responsible for the course of Roman history grew out of his experience of the civil wars of Caesar and Pompey, and then the renewed conflicts of the Triumviral Period, is a question that will be addressed more directly in Chapter 9.

¹⁹² e.g. through Marius' speech and hopes; through the *BC*'s early Rome excursus, framed in Catonian terms but with a strong and ironic emphasis on the fall of Carthage as turning point for headlong decline, as discussed above.

from the only literary source from which Sallust drew strong inspiration, yet Cato was possibly the strongest influence among Latin writers that we can perceive upon Sallust.¹⁹³

By way of recapitulation, we have set forth two main arguments in this chapter: First, we explored the ways in which Sallust's pessimism concerning Roman history and Roman morality can be found in all three texts, even the *BC*. I have also expounded what I believe to be Sallust's reason for ostensibly modifying that pessimism through the façade of an idealizing account of early Rome at *BC* 6-9. A consideration of the manner in which Sallust engages with – and undercuts – the influence of Cato also serves to reinforce these main arguments. Sallust emerges from this analysis as an author for whom the literary shaping of historical narrative, in furtherance of his own chosen themes and his own interpretation of Roman history, is of the utmost importance.

Yet by examining the date (or dates) Sallust chooses for a moral turning point, this chapter's main arguments can be augmented still further. For Sallust certainly emphasizes the unparalleled decadence of Catiline and his age by manipulating his historical digression in the *BC* to idealize earlier Roman history; yet we will soon see that his choice of moral turning point(s) too feeds into these very attempts to throw Catiline's

¹⁹³ As far as Greek sources, one of course cannot underestimate the critical influence exerted upon Sallust by Thucydides. Both men experienced political disappointment, and wrote of a world turned seemingly upside down (morally, politically, socially) by unceasing violence and political in-fighting. The abrupt, sometimes poetic language, and the intense, emotional engagement with events which Thucydides developed in narrating the history of his times offered Sallust a ready model for his own historiographical project, in both language and thought (see i.a. Syme 1964: 56; Connor 1977: 291. Contra: Paul 1984: 31). Other Thucydidean echoes in *BC* 1-13 (not to speak of those on *BC* 38, 51-2, and elsewhere): *BC* 3.2 (Thuc. 2.35.2), 6.5 (= Pericles at 2.40.2), 9.5 (Diodotus), 10.3-6 (= Thuc. 3.82.4, 8), 12.1 (contra Thuc. 2.40.1). Yet, as mentioned in regard to *metus hostilis*, Sallustian thought is not always an imitation of Thucydidean, and we shall see this in other respects in Chapter 8 in regard to the diagnostic value of history.

socio-political milieu into starker relief next to all of prior history. This forms the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 7: Moral Turning Points and Literary Fashioning

7.1: The Moral Turning Point as a Literary Tool in *BC* 11-12

In that crucial passage of the *Histories*, 1.11M, Sallust identifies the central moral turning point as the fall of Carthage in 146 B.C.E.¹ This is corroborated by *Hist.* 1.12M (*postquam remoto metu Punico simultates exercere vacuum fuit, plurimae turbae, seditiones, et ad postremum bella civilia orta sunt...*), and by *Hist.* 1.16M (*ex quo tempore maiorum mores non paulatim ut antea, sed torrentis modo praecipitati*).² In fact, we find that all three Sallustian texts share 146 B.C.E. as the moral turning point.³ However, as I have argued above (Chapter 5.1), dissension and vices according to Sallust had appeared well before 146 – *iam inde a principio*, in fact (*Hist.* 1.11M). For Sallust then, 146 B.C.E. is when things first went *praeceps* – that is, when things went horribly wrong, snowballed, went into headlong decline. In *BC* 10 Sallust details the ways in which the fall of Carthage brought about a precipitous change in morality:

Sed ubi labore atque iustitia res publica crevit, reges magni bello domiti, nationes ferae et populi ingentes vi subacti, Carthago, aemula imperi Romani, ab stirpe interiit, cuncta maria terraeque patebant, saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit...iis otium divitiaeque, optanda alias, oneri miseriaeque fuere. Igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperii cupido crevit: ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere. Namque avaritia fidem, probitatem ceterasque artis bonas subvortit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit. Ambitio multos mortalis falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore, aliud in lingua promptum habere, amicitias inimicitiasque non ex re, sed ex commodo aestumare magisque voltum quam ingenium bonum habere. Haec primo paulatim crescere, interdum vindicari; post, ubi contagio quasi pestilentia invasit, civitas inmutata, imperium ex iustissimo atque optumo crudele intolerandumque factum.

But when the Republic had grown through hard work and justice, when great kings had been conquered in war, and wild nations and mighty peoples subdued by armed force, when Carthage, rival of Rome's power, died root and branch and all seas and lands were laying

¹ *At discordia et avaritia atque ambitio et cetera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala post Carthaginis excidium maxime aucta sunt.* (*Hist.* 1.11.9-11M)

² For further discussion of *Hist.* 1.16M and the historical period referred to therein, see above, Chapter 5.1.

³ Gelzer 1931: 276 remarks on 146 being used as the turning point in all three texts, with a different emphasis each time.

open before them [sc. the Romans], Fortune began to grow harsh and throw everything into confusion...to the Romans leisure and riches, to be desired at other times, were a source of burden and grief. Thus first a lust for money, then for commands grew: these were essentially the source of all evils. For greed undermined fidelity, integrity, and other virtuous practices; in place of these it taught arrogance, cruelty, the neglect of the gods, and to consider everything up for sale. Ambition forced many men to become dishonest, to have one thing hidden inside, another ready on the tongue, to value friendships and enmities not according to the facts but according to how it might most benefit themselves, and to have a face more honest than their inner nature. These things at first grew gradually, and at times were punished; afterward, when this disease had spread like a pestilence, the state was changed and the power of Rome, instead of being most just and best, became cruel and intolerable.

Similarly, in *BJ* 41.1-5 the fall of Carthage and the permanent removal of *metus hostilis* is the turning point of *headlong* moral decline:

Ceterum mos partium et factionum ac deinde omnium malarum artium paucis ante annis Romae ortus est otio atque abundantia earum rerum, quae prima mortales ducunt. Nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rem publicam tractabant, neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter civis erat: metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Sed ubi illa formido mentibus decessit, scilicet ea, quae res secundae amant, lascivia atque superbia incessere. Ita quod in adversis rebus optaverant otium, postquam adepti sunt, asperius acerbiusque fuit. Namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in libidinem vortere, sibi quisque ducere trahere rapere. Ita omnia in duas partis abstracta sunt, res publica, quae media fuerat, dilacerata

But the custom of political groupings and factions and later of all wicked practices originated at Rome a few years earlier [sc. than the Jugurthine War] because of peace and an abundance of those things which mortals regard most highly. For before the destruction of Carthage the people and the Senate peacefully and moderately managed the Republic together, and there was no struggle for glory or despotism between citizens⁴: fear of the enemy kept the state in good practices. But when that fear departed from their minds, those vices which tend to come with prosperity, wantonness and arrogance, of course entered. Thus the leisure they had wished for in their adversity was crueler and more bitter than the adversity itself. For the nobility then began to turn its standing and position, the people its liberty, to the gratification of their desires, and everyone appropriated, squandered, and plundered for himself. In this way everything was split into two parts, while the Republic, which was caught in the middle, was torn apart.

Notice the recurrence of certain key ideas in both passages: disorder and unrest after 146 (*saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit; omnia abstracta...dilacerata*); the unexpected

⁴ Contrast what Sallust says at *BC* 7.6.26 (*sed gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos erat*) and *BC* 9.2 (*cives cum civibus de virtute certabant*). As to the latter passage one can concede such a struggle could be salutary. As to *BC* 7.6, one may forgive Sallust for using *gloriae certamen* in a positive connotation in *BC* 7.6 while using it with a negative connotation here at *BJ* 41.2. The expression in itself is ambiguous, and when only used twice, the supposed inconsistency of usage seems more acute.

trouble coming from *otium* (*otium divitiaeque optanda alias, oneri miseriaeque fuere; ita quod in adversis rebus optaverant otium, postquam adepti sunt, asperius acerbisque fuit*); the influx of greed and luxury (*primo pecuniae, deinde imperii cupido crevit; lascivia...incessere*)⁵; and the imagery of disease and contagion to describe the progression of vice (*Haec primo paulatim crescere, interdum vindicari. post, ubi contagio quasi pestilentia invasit, civitas inmutata; ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo modestiaque invadere, polluere et vastare omnia...quoad semet ipsa praecipitavit*). To judge, then, from *Hist.* 1.11-12M, *BC* 10, and *BJ* 41-2 (all of which are crucial prologue or digression passages), it was the *permanent* removal of *metus hostilis* in 146 which was the cause of the headlong moral decline. The nature of its removal in 146 is clearly conceived of by Sallust as something different from the many instances earlier in the Republic, when *metus hostilis* periodically ceased and led to lapses in *concordia* and general rectitude until a foreign enemy inevitably threatened again.⁶

It is therefore clear that in Sallust's view 146 B.C.E. was a big turning point in that it was *the* point when Roman moral decline first went *praeceps*, or headlong. Yet in *BC* 11-12 Sallust presents us with another turning point for Roman moral decline, after having just discoursed at length on the importance of the fall of Carthage. In *BC* 11 he

⁵ Cf. also *BJ* 41.9: *ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo modestiaque invadere, polluere et vastare omnia*.

⁶ This, of course being the pattern described by Sallust in *Hist.* 1.11M. It is ubiquitous in Livy. Solely in the first pentad the following instances of this pattern are found (by no means an exhaustive list): Livy 1.19.4, 2.24.4, 2.32.6, 2.39.7 (*externus timor, maximum concordiae vinculum*), 2.42.3, 2.53.1, 2.54.2, 2.63.2, 2.64.1-2, 3.9.1, 3.10.8, 3.16.4, 3.26, 3.30.1, 3.38.5-6, 3.65.6-7, 3.66.2-3, 5.7.1, 5.18.9-12. Cf. Miles 1986: passim. There are, of course, a few exceptions to this pattern in Livy 1-5, where, for instance, under threat of a foreign enemy Roman soldiers purposely perform poorly in the field because of the resentment and conflict going on at home over tribunician legislation and patrician (or consular) excesses (e.g. Livy 2.44, 2.59, cf. 3.69.2, 4.1.4-6). Cf 3.38-8-9, where the *plebs* are grateful for foreign attack, as it gives a chance for a return of some practices of a free state. These, however, are all exceptions which prove the rule.

begins with remarks on *ambitio* and *avaritia*, the two main vices that grew out of control after 146. *Ambitio*, Sallust says, can be a good thing if used the right way (that is, *vera via*, using *bonae artes*), but leads bad men to use deceit and trickery. He then addresses *avaritia*, which is wholly bad.⁷ He claims that *luxuria* and *avaritia* made their first appearance in Sulla's army in Asia during the 80s, and that they then invaded the youth at Rome (*BC* 11.4-12.2, my emphasis)⁸:

Sed postquam L. Sulla armis recepta re publica bonis initiis malos eventus habuit, rapere omnes, trahere, domum alius, alius agros cupere, neque modum neque modestiam victores habere, foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere. Huc adcedebat, quod L. Sulla exercitum, quem in Asia ductaverat, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat. Loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliverant. Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare potare, signa, tabulas pictas, vasa caelata mirari, ea privatim et publice rapere, delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere...Postquam divitiae honori esse coepere et eas gloria, imperium, potentia sequebatur, hebescere virtus...Igitur ex divitiis iuventutem luxuria atque avaritia cum superbia invasere...

But after Sulla recovered the Republic by force and, despite a good start, brought things to a bad end, everyone robbed and pillaged, one man lusted after a house, another after lands. The victors possessed neither moderation nor restraint, and committed vile and cruel deeds against fellow citizens. In addition Sulla, contrary to the practice of the ancestors treated the army he led in Asia luxuriously and with too much munificence. The pleasant, pleasurable lands they enjoyed in their free time easily softened the warlike spirits of the soldiers. It was there that the army of the Roman people first became accustomed to indulge in women and wine, to admire statues, paintings, and engraved wares, to plunder these privately and in public, to despoil sanctuaries, to pollute everything sacred and secular alike...After riches began to be a source of honor and to lead to glory, military command, and political power, virtue began to lose its edge...therefore from riches luxury and greed invaded the youth along with arrogance...

Taken in isolation, this passage might seem at first glance to cast doubt on 146 B.C.E being in Sallust's view the major moral fulcrum. Indeed, I argued above (Chapter 6.2) that Sallust's idealization of pre-146 Roman history in *BC* 6-9 was a whitewashing

⁷ Cf. Pliny the Elder's judgment on great riches (*NH* 33.137): *quae, malum, amentia est id in vita cupere, quod aut et servis contigerit aut ne in regibus quidem invenerit finem!*

⁸ For Sulla's return from Asia and initiation of civil war and proscriptions as the start of a period of precipitous decline in Roman *fides* toward allies and just provincial administration, see e.g. Cicero *Off.* 2.27 (*sensim hanc disciplinam et consuetudinem iam antea minuebamur, post vero Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus.*)

strategy, and that he aimed thereby to create a sharp moral dividing line precisely at 146 in order to throw into greater relief the unprecedented decadence of the succeeding era – the era in which Catiline himself grew to maturity. Yet such a downdating of the major moral fulcrum in *BC* 11-12 – just a single chapter after he discussed 146 B.C.E. and its far-reaching effects – might seem to challenge the idea that Sallust in fact wanted 146 B.C.E. to stand out as the major moral dividing line. As it turns out, however, 146 B.C.E. remains Sallust’s watershed moment for Roman morality⁹: far from questioning Sallust’s strategy of whitewashing pre-146 history to highlight Catiline’s degeneracy, this second turning point at *BC* 11-12 actually aids Sallust in carrying out that strategy. By introducing this “Sullan” turning point directly after positing 146 as the main moral fulcrum, Sallust’s narrative in *BC* 10-12 builds up an image of a *continuous period* of headlong decline. This period is punctuated at its beginning by the main trigger of headlong decline, the fall of Carthage, and it is made to extend down through Sulla’s return from Asia in 83 – the exact time, as it happens, when Catiline is first on record committing heinous deeds under Sulla’s regime.¹⁰ Therefore this second, “Sullan” turning point actually *enhances* Sallust’s rhetorical goal of whitewashing pre-146 Roman history to stress the unparalleled decadence of the *post*-146 era, and it further strengthens his case that Catiline himself directly issues from this unbroken tradition of headlong moral descent begun in 146.¹¹

⁹ *pace* Klingner 1928: 186, who sees Sulla’s behavior as the real headlong moral turning point.

¹⁰ On Catiline’s earlier career up until his return from his praetorship in 66, see the brief sketch in Dyck 2008: 1-4. Cf. also Münzer *RE* IIA 2.1688 (s.v. Sergius); Asconius 85, 89C; for his service under Cn. Pompeius Strabo during the Social War in 89 B.C.E. cf. ILS 8888 & Mattingly 1975: 262-6. On his alleged murder of his own brother (and putting him on the list of the proscribed) see Plut. *Cic.* 10.2, *Sulla* 32.2; on the murder of his brother-in-law cf. *Comm. Petit.* 9.

¹¹ Syme 1964: 77 expresses a similar view of Catiline as the symbolic scion of Sullan violence. Also cf. how Cicero discusses rapacious governors (Verres and the like) learning from their experience under Sulla to plunder and sell the property of *boni viri* (*Off.* 2.27).

Given this argument about a second “Sullan” moral fulcrum, a question naturally arises of how we are to interpret all the *avaritia* and *ambitio* shown by various Romans in the *BJ*, as well as the luxurious way in which the Roman army is maintained in certain passages (e.g. *BJ* 28.4-29, 32.3-4, 44.1-5). For all of these things took place decades *before* Sulla commanded his army in Asia, and therefore seem to contradict Sallust’s claim in *BC* 11-12 that luxury and other unruly and decadent behavior first came from Sulla’s army in Asia. Yet rather than ascribe this apparent contradiction to carelessness in composition, we must weigh it against the fact (as argued above, Chapter 6.1-6.3) that all three Sallustian texts, in different ways, strongly express a core belief that Roman morality was never innately superior, and that Romans had always been subject to vice and dissension. If we keep this central tenet of Sallust’s moral outlook in mind, then the fact that he claims Sulla in *BC* 11 as a second originator (as it were) of luxury and other vices and then fails to reiterate this claim anywhere later in the *BJ* and the *Historiae*, serves simply as an illustration of Sallust’s willingness to modify historical details in one particular place (here, the *BC* prologue) when it suits his immediate rhetorical goals.¹²

It becomes clear, then, that Sallust has put much effort into fashioning his narrative in the *BC* to enhance his chosen theme of Catiline and his exceptional vices. Through the employment of two moral turning points in his review of Roman history, Sallust achieves a specific narrative goal in the immediate context by enhancing the depravity of Catiline and linking his unparalleled decadence to the wider unparalleled decadence set into headlong motion in 146 and continued by Sulla. Yet as much as we might accept Sallust’s literary move (or its effectiveness) here in the beginning of the *BC*, we must

¹² On Sallust’s rhetorical manipulations of history and chronology see further Chapter 2.1 above.

remind ourselves again that Sallust's use of a second, "Sullan" turning point in the *BC* does not challenge the position of 146 B.C.E. as the watershed moment of headlong moral decline throughout Sallust's corpus. The cumulative evidence of all three works, as laid out at the start of this section, confirms that Sallust's consistent belief was that the fall of Carthage was *the* moment that triggered headlong moral decline.

7.2 Multiple Moral Turning Points: A Comparative Perspective

Yet even though it is salutary to remind ourselves that Carthage's destruction stands in all three texts as Sallust's central moral turning point, the moment that sparked unchecked headlong decline, we have yet to address one fundamental question raised by Sallust's use of turning points: namely, does the practice of other historians with regard to turning points reveal Sallust's two turning points as an instance of historiographical solecism? A comparative perspective will reveal that there were, in fact, precedents in prior historians for Sallust's use of multiple moral turning points. Moreover, the fact that this usage was also picked up by several prominent writers *after* Sallust suggests that Sallust's use of multiple turning points was considered an acceptable literary convention by many of his contemporaries and successors.

We begin with Polybius. A methodological caveat, however, is in order regarding my treatment of the evidence of Polybius, and it should be taken to apply equally to every author discussed in this section. My analysis does not deny historical evidence which suggests actual moral decline before the time at which Polybius claims it began; rather, my analysis acknowledges that Polybius' account has a literary – or at least moral – aspect to it which governs the presentation of material. Therefore my focus remains on what Polybius himself tells us, and what that in turn reveals about Polybius.¹³

¹³ Similarly, as regards Sallust, Earl 1961: 49-50, and Lintott 1977: *passim* are not wrong that the evidence for a *gradual* moral decline throughout the 2nd century is substantial – which would seem to be a contradiction to Sallust's placing the beginning of *praeceps* decline in 146 B.C.E. But, as my methodology has consistently emphasized up to this point, if we are studying Sallust the literary author, we should not focus exclusively on establishing the raw historical facts and using them to show how far Sallust got it wrong. Rather, our main goal is to ask why Sallust wrote the past the way he did.

Several remarks attest to Polybius' ideas about Roman decline.¹⁴ In attempting to locate a moral turning point, however, a starting point can be Polybius' claim in Book One that at the time of the First Punic War both the Romans and the Carthaginians were "still at that time uncorrupted in their customs and institutions" (αὐτά τε τὰ πολιτεύματα κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἀκμὴν ἀκέραια μὲν ἦν τοῖς ἔθισμοις (1.13.12). We also learn later, in 6.56, that at the time to which Polybius' constitutional analysis ostensibly applies – namely the time of the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C.E. – the Romans were, as a nation, still uncorrupted in terms of handling money (6.56.1-2, 14-15):

καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τοὺς χρηματισμοὺς ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα βελτίω παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἐστὶν ἢ παρὰ Καρχηδονίοις. παρ' οἷς μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν τῶν ἀνηκόντων πρὸς κέρδος, παρ' οἷς δ' [i.e. Romans] οὐδὲν αἰσχίον τοῦ δωροδοκεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν μὴ καθηκόντων...παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ πρεσβείας πολὺ τι πλῆθος χρημάτων χειρίζοντες δι' αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν ὄρκον πίστεως τηροῦσι τὸ καθήκον. καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις σπάνιόν ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν ἀπεχόμενον ἄνδρα τῶν δημοσίων καὶ καθαρεύοντα περὶ ταῦτα: παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις σπάνιόν ἐστι τὸ λαβεῖν τινα πεφωραμένον ἐπὶ τοιαύτῃ πράξει.

Again, the Roman laws and customs concerning money transactions are superior to those of Carthage. In the latter country no activity which results in a profit is seen as a cause for reproach, but to the Romans nothing is more disgraceful than to receive bribes or to seek gain by improper means...Among the Romans, on the other hand, their magistrates handle large sums of money and scrupulously perform their duty because they have given their word on oath. Among other nations it is a rare phenomenon to find a man who keeps his hands off public funds and whose record is clean in this respect, while among the Romans it is quite the exception to find a man who has been detected in such conduct. (Transl. I. Scott-Kilvert)

So how long after this did things first go wrong? In 18.35 Polybius says that in earlier times no Roman would have accepted a bribe,¹⁵ but that the same is not true in his day:

¹⁴ For a thorough and well-argued account of Polybius' ideas on Roman government and decline, see F.W. Walbank & C.O. Brink. 1954. My discussion of Polybian moral decline derives much of use from theirs.

¹⁵ It may appear a contradiction that Polybius in the passage just cited (6.56.1-2, 14-15) says that some few individual Romans at the time of Cannae *did* succumb to unscrupulous monetary practices, while at 18.35 he says that before around 200 B.C.E. *no* Roman did so (cf. Lintott 1977: 629). However, we must keep in mind that our discussion of turning points, as well as that of Polybius, are both concerned with broad trends of moral behavior, and not individual cases of moral lapse, which are to be expected. Both 6.56 and 18.35 are speaking about the *general* Roman *mores*. Moreover, in 18.35 Polybius is more immediately concerned with establishing a moral turning point; as such, one can argue that by speaking in more absolute terms in 18.35 about Roman *mores* before ca. 200, Polybius enhances the sense of a moral

ἐγὼ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀνωτέρω χρόνους καὶ κοινὴν ἂν ποιούμενος ἀπόφασιν ἐθάρρησα περὶ πάντων Ῥωμαίων εἰπεῖν ὥς οὐδὲν ἂν πράττειν τοιοῦτον, λέγω δὲ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς διαποντίοις αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρῆσαι πολέμοις, ἕως ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐθῶν καὶ νομίμων ἔμενον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς νῦν καιροῖς περὶ πάντων μὲν οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαιμι τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν.

If I had been speaking of earlier times, and expressing what was generally true, I would have ventured to say concerning all Romans that they would do no such thing – I mean before they took in hand wars across the seas and while they stayed true to their own customs and practices. But in current times I would not venture to say this of all Romans.

The phrase which Polybius uses to delimit those “earlier times”, πρότερον ἢ τοῖς διαποντίοις αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρῆσαι πολέμοις, indicates that in Polybius’ view morality reached its first major turning point after Rome began overseas wars in Greece and the East – in other words, around 200 B.C.E.¹⁶

Other passages aid us in identifying a second turning point in Polybius. A few statements will help to establish that Polybius saw some decline in moral standards by his own time (from the 160s onward). We just saw in 18.35 how in Polybius’ view not all

turning point. On this view, 6.56.14-15 is *explicit* in not excluding the possibility of infrequent individual cases of corruption, and the more absolute moral dividing line presented in 18.35 is a circumstantial adjustment made to enhance the clarity (and persuasiveness) of the turning point for the reader – not unlike the sort of circumstantial adjustments in the use of turning points we have noted in Sallust above.

¹⁶ Although Rome was involved in conflicts across the Adriatic before this, particularly in Illyria, Polybius most likely has in mind the 2nd Macedonian War (200-197) and the 1st Syrian War (192-89) in particular among overseas wars. As noted above in this section (Chapter 7.2), one insistent upon comparing Polybius’ claims for turning points to actual historical evidence could cite a few other prominent events slightly before these “overseas wars”. For example, the capture of Syracuse in 211 B.C.E. and its plundering by Marcellus’ army was “the first really massive influx of works of Greek art into Rome and gave enormous impetus to the Hellenization of Roman taste in the arts.” (Pollitt 1986: 153; echoing Plut. *Marcellus* 21.1-2). Elder Romans blamed Marcellus for bringing the envy of the gods upon Rome by bringing statues (of gods, etc.) into the city, and already complained of the beginnings of pointless *otium* taken up with trivial things (Plut. *Marc.* 21.4-5; cf. Pollitt 1986: 159, and Cato in Livy 34.4-5). Cic. *II. Verr.* 4.120-23, however, indicts Verres by claiming Marcellus’ supposed restraint in plundering – seconded by Livy 25.40.1, but disputed by Plb. 9.10.2. The capture of Tarentum by Fabius Maximus in 209 was also significant. Livy 27.16.17 says the haul of treasure almost equaled that from Syracuse. Despite Plutarch’s claim that Fabius only took money and valuables (Plut. *Marc.* 21), Strabo 6.278 and Pliny *NH* 34.40 tell us that Fabius dedicated the great Heracles by Lysippus on the Capitol (cf. Pollitt 1986: 154). Moreover, one seeking general instances of greed or vice predating 200 but omitted by Polybius can find plenty: e.g. the donatives distributed by victorious generals to troops or the *plebs* – and plebeian agitation over not getting enough – had long been a common occurrence, from Vulso, Glabrio and other early 2nd c. commanders, back to C. Duillius in 259 and even to Camillus after Veii’s defeat (Livy 5.20-1, 26.8, 32.8-9; Lintott 1977: 629-30 with full sources).

Romans in his day were proof against bribery like those living during the First and Second Punic Wars. Similarly, amid a larger portrait of the virtues of the younger Scipio (31.25-30), Polybius remarks at 31.26.9 on the difference between the young Scipio and all other Romans in handling financial matters:

τοῦτο δὲ πανταχῇ μὲν ἂν εἰκότως φαίνοιτο καλόν, ἐν δὲ Ῥώμῃ καὶ θαυμαστόν: ἀπλῶς γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδενὶ δίδωσι τῶν ἰδίων ὑπαρχόντων ἐκὼν οὐδέν.

This behavior [of Scipio] would reasonably appear noble anywhere, but in Rome it was amazing; for, simply put, no one willingly gifts to anyone any part of his private property.¹⁷

In Polybius' own day, then, Romans were not, as Sallust put it, *pecuniae liberales* like they were earlier in their history (cf. *BC* 7.6).

We get a more definite sense of a second turning point in Polybius when we consider two further passages. In the first, Polybius lays down a broad principle which clearly links the attainment of conquest and zenith (ὑπεροχή καὶ δυναστεία ἀδήριτον) with the beginning of widespread moral decline in a state¹⁸ (6.57.1-6):

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πᾶσι τοῖς οὕσιν ὑπόκειται φθορὰ καὶ μεταβολὴ σχεδὸν οὐ προσδεῖ λόγων: ἱκανὴ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκη παραστήσαι τὴν τοιαύτην πίστιν. (2) δυεῖν δὲ τρόπων ὄντων, καθ' οὓς φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε πᾶν γένος πολιτείας, τοῦ μὲν ἔξωθεν, τοῦ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς φυομένου... (5) ὅταν γὰρ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους διωσαμένη πολιτεία μετὰ ταῦτα εἰς ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον ἀφίκηται, φανερόν ὡς εἰσοικιζομένης εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν βίους γίνεσθαι πολυτελεστέρους, τοὺς δ' ἄνδρας φιλονεικοτέρους τοῦ δέοντος περὶ τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιβολάς. (6) ὣν προβαινόντων ἐπὶ πλεον ἄρξει μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἢ φιλαρχία καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀδοξίας ὄνειδος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ περὶ τοὺς βίους ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτέλεια.

The fact, then, that all existing things are subject to decay is a proposition which scarcely requires proof, since the inexorable course of nature is sufficient to impose it on us. Every

¹⁷ Cf. Scipio's goal set out by Polybius in 31.25.9: ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ χρήματα μεγαλοψυχία καὶ καθαρότητι διενεγκεῖν τῶν ἄλλων.

¹⁸ Cf. Plb. 29.21. For the connection between conquest/zenith and widespread moral decline outside Polybius, see the discussion of Florus 1.34.18 below in this Section; *FRHist* Cato F87 (*scio solere plerisque hominibus rebus secundis atque prolixis atque prosperis animum excellere atque superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere.*); Cato Fr. 122 *ORF*². See also Livy 22.22.19 (*graves superbosque in rebus secundis*), 28.24.6 (*iam ante licentia ex diutino, ut fit, otio conlecta*). Both Livian passages, incidentally, are about foreigners (Carthaginians and Spaniards respectively), which reinforces the universality of the principle. In application to Romans cf. Livy 2.52.2 (*ex copia deinde otioque* [cf. Sall. *BC* 10.2] *lascivire rursus animi, et pristina mala, postquam foris deerant, domi quaerere*), 34.3 (Cato in defense of *Lex Oppia*).

kind of state, we may say, is liable to decline from two sources, the one being external, and the other due to its own internal revolution...When a state, after warding off many great perils, achieves supremacy and uncontested sovereignty, it is evident that under the influence of long-established prosperity life will become more luxurious, and among the citizens themselves rivalry for office and in other spheres of activity will become fiercer than it should. As these symptoms become more marked, the craving for office and the sense of humiliation which obscurity imposes, together with the spread of ostentation and extravagance, will start a period of general deterioration. (Transl. Ian Scott-Kilvert)

Note also how in Polybius' scheme *luxuria* (τοὺς μὲν βίους γίνεσθαι πολυτελεστέρους) and *ambitio* (τοὺς δ' ἄνδρας φιλονεικοτέρους τοῦ δέοντος περί τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιβολάς) in particular begin to run rampant after world conquest and extended peace. Sallust too will emphasize the steep rise in *luxuria* and *ambitio* attendant upon world conquest in *BC* 10.2-3.¹⁹

This theoretical principle finds practical application in Polybius' views on what happened to Roman morality after their contact with Macedon following the defeat of King Perseus at Pydna in 168 B.C.E. (31.25.2-7 (my emphasis)):

πρώτη δέ τις ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ καὶ ζῆλος τῶν καλῶν τὸ τὴν ἐπὶ σωφροσύνη δόξαν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ παραδραμεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τοὺς κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ὑπάρχοντας. (3) ὢν δὲ μέγας οὗτος καὶ δυσέφικτος ὁ στέφανος εὐθήρατος ἦν κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὁρμὴν τῶν πλείστων. (4) οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἐρωμένους τῶν νέων, οἱ δ' εἰς ἐταίρας ἐξεκέχυντο, πολλοὶ δ' εἰς ἀκροάματα καὶ πότους καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις πολυτέλειαν, ταχέως ἤρπακότες ἐν τῷ Περσικῷ πολέμῳ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐχέρειαν... (5α) ἐφ' οἷς καὶ Μάρκος ἀγανακτῶν εἶπε ποτε πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὅτι μάλιστ' ἂν κατίδοιεν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον προκοπὴν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων, ὅταν πωλούμενοι πλείον εὐρίσκωσιν οἱ μὲν εὐπρεπεῖς παῖδες τῶν ἀγρῶν, τὰ δὲ κεράμια τοῦ ταρίχου τῶν ζευγηλατῶν. (6) συνέβη δὲ τὴν παρούσαν αἵρεσιν οἷον ἐκλάμψαι κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λεγομένους καιροὺς πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ καταλυθείσης τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας δοκεῖν ἀδύρῃτον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐξουσίαν, (7) ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἐπίφασιν γενέσθαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περὶ τε τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν βίους καὶ περὶ τὰ κοινά, τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας μετακομισθέντων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην χορηγίων.

Now the first manifestation of Scipio's desire to lead a noble life was his gaining a reputation for self-discipline, and in this respect rising above the standards observed by his

¹⁹ Note especially *iis otium divitiae, optanda alias, oneri miseriaeque fuere. igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere.* (*BC* 10.3). Care must be taken, however, not to infer from these shared themes that Polybius also held the same view on *metus hostilis* as Sallust does. As Walbank and Brink 1954: 103-5 show, citing Plb. 6.18.5-8, Polybius "believed in the system" when it came to *metus hostilis*: when *metus hostilis* was removed, the Roman mixed constitution would adapt and adjust and reach equilibrium amongst its parts, rather than falling apart in the absence of an external motivator.

contemporaries. This is a high and normally difficult aspiration, but at that time it was easy enough because of the deterioration of morals among the great majority. Some young men squandered their energies on love affairs with boys, others with courtesans, others again upon musical entertainments and banquets and the extravagant expenses that go with them. For in the course of the war against Perseus and the Macedonians they had quickly acquired the luxurious habits of the Greeks in this direction...It was in this context that Cato once declared in a public speech that anybody could see the Republic was going downhill when a pretty boy could cost more than a plot of land and jars of fish more than ploughmen. It happened that the current luxurious conduct became particularly visible at this time; the reason was first of all the belief that after the destruction of the Macedonian kingdom the universal supremacy of Rome had been established beyond dispute, and secondly the fact that after the riches of Macedon had been transported to Rome there followed a prodigious display of wealth and splendor both in public life and in private. (transl. I. Scott-Kilvert (adapted))

Thus while Polybius sees a decline in moral standards *beginning* with Rome's overseas wars around 200 B.C.E., here following 168 B.C.E. he sees a second moral turning point, at which moral decline sped up.²⁰ Choice language in 31.25 confirms this. After the war against Perseus and his defeat, the Romans *quickly* acquired decadent habits (ταχέως ἡρπακότες...εὐχέρειαν (31.25.4)), and their luxurious behavior became *especially* visible, or shone forth, at this time (τὴν παροῦσαν αἵρεσιν οἷον ἐκλάμψαι (31.25.6)). Moreover according to Polybius there was, after Pydna and in Scipio's youth, a "deterioration of morals among the great majority" (διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὁρμὴν τῶν πλείστων (31.25.3)). Hence we have in Polybius two moral turning points: one which set the ball rolling, and another which was more the moment when precipitous decline began. While disagreeing with Sallust on the specific timing (and the beginning) of decline, Polybius certainly

²⁰ On Perseus' defeat as a turning point see Plb. 3.1.9, 4.1-3, 12, 5.1-6. Polybius would have had some justification for marking the defeat of Perseus as the turning point for precipitous decline. On the triumph of Aem. Paullus, which drained Macedon of its riches, see Plut. *Aem. Paullus* 32-4; Livy 45.33-34; Pliny *NH* 33.56 (permanent relief at this time of the annual *tributum*). Paullus is said to have hired the famous Greek painter Metrodorus to paint for his triumphal procession (Pliny *NH* 35.135). Metrodorus was perhaps the first Greek artist to paint Roman subjects for a Roman patron (Pollitt 1986: 155).

shares with Sallust a view on what *caused* moral decline (*luxuria, avaritia, ambitio* all attendant on conquest),²¹ and shares the use of multiple turning points.²²

In regard to the aforementioned Polybian evidence (6.57, 31.25), one may note as well that some interpret it to suggest that Polybius would *not* have envisioned a second turning point as I have proposed above, one where moral decline sped up immediately after 168 B.C.E. A.E. Astin would have us recall that Polybius emphasizes at 6.18 how the Roman *μικτή*, if faced with the removal of *metus hostilis* (or faced with any other internal bother for that matter), would in a sense self-regulate and eventually find equilibrium again, thus perpetuating itself for an extended period. In theory then, Rome would not immediately succumb to moral decline as soon as it reached unchallenged supremacy, but would enjoy a period of prosperity.²³ Such a period of prosperity after gaining uncontested sovereignty seems to be implied in 6.57, where Polybius says that the growth of extravagance and luxury would set in inevitably, but only *after* a long period of prosperity during which the *μικτή* would be preserved: φανερόν ὥς εἰσοικιζομένης εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας (“it is evident that under the influence of long-established prosperity [life will become more luxurious]”, 6.57.5).

However, Polybius is discussing a theoretical model in Book Six, and in 31.25, when he has to apply this model to the *actual* events he himself so closely observed following the Roman victory at Pydna, Polybius records no such period of steady prosperity (cf. esp. *ταχέως* ἡρπακότες...εὐχέρειαν (31.25.4)), instead showing us an immediate moral

²¹ See especially *BC* 10.1-3; 11.4-8.

²² On the possibility that Polybius also viewed the fall of Carthage as a turning point, see the discussion between Polybius and Scipio Aemilianus at Carthage in *Plb.* 38.21.1-3 (cf. Levick 1982: 53). The fragmentary nature of this section of the work makes further certainty elusive.

²³ Astin 1967: 355-56. Walbank 1970: 744-5 also, looking solely at *Plb.* 6.57, argues that Polybius imagined an interval of considerable duration between attainment of uncontested sovereignty and the beginning of moral decline.

decline after world empire was attained at Pydna. The evidence, therefore, may seem to present multiple answers to where Polybius stood on this question – whether the *μικτή* would continue on in prosperity for a long time, or immediately begin to succumb to the impact of moral degeneration. One could reasonably infer, however, that in forming his ultimate view of the question, a man of the analytical and practical acumen of Polybius would have given ample consideration to the actual historic, world-changing events surrounding the defeat of Perseus – events, moreover, in which he had a personal involvement.²⁴

In cautioning against the objectivity of the turning points posited by Polybius, Astin also points out that Polybius writes about the moral shortcomings of contemporary Romans in 31.25 in a context closely linked to Scipio Aemilianus, and that he elaborates on these shortcomings because one of his main goals in this passage is to highlight the virtues of Aemilianus against his peers. Indeed, in 18.35 and 31.26, which Astin does not cite, the moral faults of contemporary Romans are likewise brought up in contexts related to Scipio Aemilianus. Now if Polybius were the only source attesting to the degeneration of morals between 168 and 146, one could more easily believe that he is mentioning these negative moral developments primarily as a foil to Scipio. Yet we know that manifestations of moral decline in these years are claimed in a number of other sources.²⁵ In my view it is therefore more likely that Polybius aimed to accomplish two ends at once in these three passages: he locates a second (more precipitous) period of moral decline

²⁴ For the idea that Polybius moved away from a rigid constitutional formalism or idealism over time, cf. Schur 1936: 64, 70.

²⁵ Cf. e.g. Piso FRHist F36 (Vulso), F40 (154 B.C.E.) (both discussed below); Livy 39.6 (Vulso). For the actual historical evidence of corruption, influx of luxury, and moral decline before 146 (and before 200 B.C.E.), see Lintott 1977: 630-31 et passim.

beginning after Pydna while simultaneously managing to highlight the *virtus* of Scipio by placing it in opposition to such developments.²⁶ In short, despite some ambivalence in Polybius' claims about the period of prosperity enjoyed by the Roman μικτή, our overall analysis of Polybius' use of moral turning points remains defensible.

The historian L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi also attests to the tendency to include multiple moral turning points.²⁷ Pliny, during his discussion of bronze, says the following about Piso (*NH* 34.14 = *FRHist* Piso F36):

nam triclinia aerata abacosque et monopodia Cn. Manlium Asia devicta primum invexisse triumpho suo, quem duxit anno urbis dlxvii [187 B.C.E.], L. Piso auctor est...

For Lucius Piso attests that dining couches decorated with bronze, sideboards, and one-legged tables were first introduced by Gnaeus Manlius, after the conquest of Asia, in his triumph, which he held in the 567th year of the city. (transl. Pobjoy 2013)

Here Piso attests to Manlius Vulso's triumph over the Galatians in 187 B.C.E. as a turning point in luxury at Rome. In addition, Pobjoy suggests that Livy's phrase to describe Vulso's triumph, *luxuriae peregrinae origo* (Livy 39.6.3), may originally have been taken from Piso's account as well; for Livy's list of luxury items first introduced with Vulso's triumph is very similar to that in Pliny 34.14, which suggests Livy used Piso closely as a source on Vulso.²⁸ Livy could have had other sources on Vulso's triumph, but if the source for his phrase *luxuriae peregrinae origo* was Piso, then it seems possible

²⁶ Polybius in 31.25 does not have to do any special pleading to make Scipio stand out from his peers. The downward trend in morality was not such as could be denied wholesale, and Polybius merely helps his point by placing his discussion of Scipio as an immediate contrast to these trends.

²⁷ In citing fragmentary historians, unless otherwise indicated I follow the text of T.J. Cornell et al 2013 (abbreviated *FRHist*).

²⁸ Livy 39.6.7: *ii primum lectos aeratos, vestem stragulam pretiosam, plagulas et alia textilia, et quae tum magnificae suppellectilis habebantur, monopodia et abacos Romam advexerunt*. See fuller discussion below.

to argue that Vulso's triumph was the first moral turning point in Piso's history as well.

Unfortunately, without more of Piso's *Annales* this can be only speculative.²⁹

Elsewhere in Pliny, however, we hear more from Piso (*NH* 17.244 = *FRHist* Piso F40):

nec non et Romae in Capitolio in ara Iovis bello Persei enata palma victoria triumphosque portendit. Hac tempestatibus prostrata eodem loco ficus enata est M. Messalae et C. Cassi censorum lustrum, a quo tempore pudicitiam subversam Piso gravis auctor prodidit.

Moreover, at Rome on the altar of Jupiter on the Capitol there sprang up a palm tree during the war against Perseus, portending victory and triumphs. After this had been laid low by storms, a fig tree sprang up on the same spot during the lustrum of the censors Marcus Messala and Caius Cassius. Piso, a weighty author, claimed that from that time forward chastity was undermined. (transl. Pobjoy)

In a passage dealing with portents related to trees, Pliny goes from a portentous fig tree to the subversion of chastity. Forsythe argues that this refers specifically to the poisonings of L. Postumius Albinus and Claudius Asellus by their wives (*Livy per.* 48). Another event, however, of which Piso might be thinking in his assignment of a moral turning point to 154 B.C.E. was the attempt by the censors to propose and erect the first permanent stone theater at Rome, which to some might have served as a place for, and invitation to, democratic or subversive assembly, and perhaps also as a place for licentious and unchaste behavior (hence *pudicitiam subversam?*).³⁰ Scipio Nasica

²⁹ Likewise, we cannot say whether Piso meant to make a connection between the consequences of Vulso's triumph and the subsequent Bacchanalian Affair in 186 (*FRHist* III.213).

³⁰ It is worth noting, however, the multiple valences one can attribute to this theater, depending on one's perspective. The censors who proposed it may in fact have meant to *preserve* political morality by their proposal. For allowing a permanent theatre would mean magistrates themselves would have to put less money into holding games, and thus might gain less political capital out of doing so. (One may compare the censors' removal, in 158, of statues of officeholders around the Forum which had not been set up by order of the people or Senate, see *FRHist* Piso F39 (= Pliny *NH* 34.30), and the removal of statues and shields from the temple of Jupiter by the censors of 179, perhaps to discourage private exploitation of public spaces (*Livy* 40.51.3; Forsythe 1994: 404)). As for Scipio Nasica the consul, rather than acting to preserve general Roman moral toughness, he may have been acting out of a desire to preserve the individual aristocrat's right of self-assertion for political gain when he ordered the theater demolished (as Winsor

Corculum as consul persuaded the Senate to demolish it, and his stated grounds seem to have been that seats at *ludi* would undermine the hardiness of the populace.³¹ If this theater was in fact the inspiration for Piso's judgment, its demolition soon after construction apparently did not in Piso's view cancel the negative influence on morality it had set in motion.³² This may explain Piso's use of the phrase *a quo tempore*, which, as Pobjoy notes, suggests that Piso is also marking out 154 as beginning a *period* of decline to follow.³³

Livy, like Piso, also makes Vulso's army and his triumph a moral turning point – the beginning, he claims, of foreign luxury at Rome³⁴ (Livy 39.6.6-7):

neque ea sola infamiae erant, quae in provincia procul ab oculis facta narrabantur, sed ea etiam magis quae in militibus eius cotidie aspiciebantur. (7) luxuriae enim peregrinae origo ab exercitu Asiatico invecta in urbem est. ii primum lectos aeratos, vestem stragulam pretiosam, plagulas et alia textilia, et quae tum magnificae suppellectilis habebantur, monopodia et abacos Romam advexerunt.

Nor was this only a matter of unfavourable report of what was said to have happened in the province, far from their eyes, but still more of what was apparent every day among his soldiers. For the beginnings of foreign luxury were introduced into the City by the army from Asia. They for the first time imported into Rome couches of bronze, valuable robes for coverlets, tapestries and other products of the loom, and what at that time was considered luxurious furniture —tables with one pedestal and sideboards. (transl. E.T. Sage)

Leach notes, other factors such as family pride in the nearby Temple of Magna Mater dedicated by his father could have played a role as well). See Winsor Leach 2004: 102-3; FRHist III.217.

³¹ Astin 1967: 48n1. Sources on Nasica's opposition: Livy *Per.* 48, Oros. 4.21.4, Val. Max. 2.4.2, Vell.Pat. 1.15.3, Aug. *CD* 1.31, App. *BC* 1.28.

³² Pobjoy in Cornell et al 2013 (Vol. III): 218 commenting on Piso F40.

³³ Pobjoy in Cornell et al 2013 (Vol. III): 218. The view that Piso in FRHist F40 was attributing *pudicitia*'s subversion *directly and solely* to the growth of the *figus* on the altar of Jupiter on the Capitol seems an unlikely causality. A *figus* may have had some symbolic resonance of luxury as compared to other trees or plants, and it is possible Piso was thus making a symbolic connection (cf. Cato bringing a fig into the Senate to convince Rome to declare war on Carthage, Pliny *NH* 15.74-6), but most likely he also meant to refer to one or more specific events from ca. 154 as turning points in *pudicitia*, such as those suggested above.

³⁴ For other similar displays of foreign wealth in Rome from around this time (and earlier), which Livy does not mention, see Lintott 1977:629-31, and the discussion of "wars across the seas" in Polybius above. On the growth of luxury in this era see Cato *Frs.* 96, 146 *ORF*².

Livy goes on to describe other convivial and musical entertainments which made banquets more elaborate, and the increased regard in which slave cooks were held.³⁵ Livy then qualifies this in an important statement, saying *vix tamen illa, quae tum conspiciebantur, semina erant future luxuriae* (“But those things which were then being observed were hardly but the seeds of luxury yet to come.” 39.6.9). This remark implies a later intensification of luxury, if not an actual second turning point. If Livy did have a second turning point in mind some time in the second century B.C.E. we cannot ascertain it with certainty, as his history as we have it breaks off after 167 B.C.E.³⁶ One other possibility is that in *vix...future luxuriae* Livy is not referring to a turning point several decades later, but rather is looking ahead merely to the following chapters – and the following year – where he describes the Bacchanalian Affair. In relating a litany of clandestine activities, Livy writes (39.8):

cum unum animos incendissent et nox et mixti feminis mares, aetatis tenerae maioribus, discrimen omne pudoris exstinxissent, corruptelae primum omnis generis fieri coeptae, cum ad id quisque, quo natura pronioris libidinis esset, paratam uoluptatem haberet. nec unum genus noxae, stupra promiscua ingenuorum feminarumque erant, sed falsi testes, falsa signa testamentaque et indicia ex eadem officina exhibant: uenena indidem intestinaeque caedes.

When wine had inflamed their minds, and night and the mingling of males with females, youth with age, had destroyed every sentiment of modesty, all varieties of corruption first began to be practised, since each one had at hand the pleasure answering to that to which his

³⁵ Livy 39.6.8: *tunc psalteriae sambucistriaeque et convivalia alia ludorum oblectamenta addita epulis*. According to Macrobius *Sat.* III.14.6-7, Piso’s contemporary Scipio Aemilianus had spoken out against the *psalterion* and *sambuca* with their dances in a speech against the proposal of Ti. Gracchus concerning Pergamum, and Livy apparently noted the shared tenor and theme of Piso’s and Aemilianus’ discourses against Asiatic influence (cf. Lintott 1977: 628). Livy also inserted a speech of Cn. Manlius Vulso himself at 38.17, not too long before the report in 39.6, in which Vulso himself speaks about the effeminizing affect of being exposed to foreign (Asiatic) soft lands.

³⁶ An examination of the *Periochae* of Livy from roughly the Second Punic War through the Sullan Civil Wars yields no strong indication from the epitomator that would reflect Livy’s own sentiments about certain ignoble events or actions that to him might have constituted a second moral turning point. On the basis, it seems, of the *Periochae*, Levick suggested that Livy took 146 as a major turning point, since the 50 books preceeding the fall of Carthage treated Roman expansion, and those following the fall of Carthage focused more on the internal problems of Rome (Levick 1982: 53). While intriguing, there is little opportunity to further confirm or refute this idea through the remaining evidence.

nature was more inclined. There was not one form of vice alone, the promiscuous matings of free men and women, but perjured witnesses, forged seals and wills and evidence, all issued from this same workshop: likewise poisonings and secret murders. (transl. E.T. Sage)

While this remains a possibility, the metaphor implied in *vix...semina erant futurae luxuriae* suggests a longer gestation than one year and so a reference to something later than the Bacchanalian Affair. If so, then Livy can with more certainty be said to be thinking in terms of multiple moral turning points.³⁷

Separate from his citations of Piso's views, Pliny himself introduces multiple moral turning points elsewhere in his *Naturalis Historia* as well. In Book 33, after discussing instances of frugality and luxury in silver plate, the development of silver couches and other fashions, and the taste for particular artists' work in silver, Pliny mentions in succession a number of key events (*NH* 33.148-50):

Asia primum devicta luxuriam misit in Italiam,³⁸ siquidem L. Scipio in triumpho transtulit argenti caelati pondo mille et CCCC et vasorum aureorum pondo MD. [anno conditae urbis DLXV]. at eadem Asia donata multo etiam gravius adflixit mores, inutiliorque victoria illa hereditas Attalo rege mortuo fuit. (149) tum enim haec emendi Romae in auctionibus regiis verecundia exempta est urbis anno DCXXII, mediis LVII annis erudita civitate amare etiam, non solum admirari, opulentiam externam, immenso et Achaicae victoriae momento ad

³⁷ Another passage that seems to indicate a turning point is Livy 25.40.2, where he says of the capture of Syracuse in 211 *inde primum initium mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaeque huius sacra profanaque omnia vulgo spoliandi factum*. This, however, may not be meant as a turning point in general morality, but merely a (first) turning point in the lust for Greek art. So far in our discussion we have been focusing on the tipping points in *overall* moral conduct. Therefore such a turning point does not belie Livy's use of Vulso as first general turning point. Livy 25.40.2 and other isolated examples from later in the 2nd c. (see e.g. Livy 42.3.1: stripping of tiles from temple of Juno Lacinia in 173; 45.28.2: Mummius' despoiling the Temple of Aesculapius in Epidaurus in 146 (Lintott 1977: 629n21)) cannot by themselves account for the far greater (and more dangerous) future luxury Livy refers to in his portentous phrase *vix tamen illa, quae tum conspiciebantur, semina erant future luxuriae*. On similar isolated examples of "firsts" too specific to be diagnostic of the general moral trends under discussion here, see e.g. Pliny *NH* 33.57 (gold *laquearia*); Pliny *NH* 33.146 (with 9.39, 33.144).

³⁸ For similar wording cf. Pliny *NH* 34.34: *mirumque mihi videtur, cum statuarum origo tam vetus Italiae sit, lignea potius aut fictilia deorum simulacra in delubris dicata usque ad devictam Asiam, unde luxuria*. Also Pliny 13.24: *certum est Antiocho rege Asiaque devictis, urbis anno DLXV, P. Licinium Crassum L. Iulium Caesarem censores edixisse ne quis venderet unguenta exotica*. Given the shared phraseology in these three passages, Pliny may well have drawn directly on Piso for the wording of this clause about luxury originating from the conquest of Asia: cf. Piso *FRHist* F36, above: *Asia devicta primum invexisse...*

inpellendos mores,³⁹ quae et ipsa in hoc intervallo anno urbis DCVIII parta signa et tabulas pictas invexit. (150) ne quid deesset, pariter quoque luxuria nata est et Carthago sublata, ita congruentibus fatiis, ut et liberet amplecti vitia et liceret.

It was the conquest of Asia that first sent luxury into Italy, since Lucius Scipio, in his triumphal procession, paraded one thousand four hundred pounds of engraved silver, with golden vessels weighing one thousand five hundred pounds. This took place in the year of our City 565 [189 B.C.E.]. But the bequest of that same Asia afflicted Roman morality even more severely, and this inheritance from the passing of King Attalus was even more disadvantageous than that victory of Scipio in its results. For at that time the shame about buying things at the king's auctions in Rome was removed. This took place in the year of the City 622 [133 B.C.E.], the people having learned, during the fifty-seven years that had intervened, to even covet, not just admire, foreign opulence. And with a great impulsion from victory over Achaea toward overthrowing morality that city [Corinth] which itself came into our hands during this interval, in the year of the City 608 [146 B.C.E.], brought into Rome both statues and paintings. And so that nothing might be lacking, at the same time as the birth of luxury, Carthage was also destroyed, the fates aligning in such a way that people began both to want to embrace vice and to be allowed to.

Pliny, like Polybius, locates the first turning point for moral decline at the beginning of the 2nd century B.C.E. with Rome's military involvement in Greece and Asia, but unlike Piso and Livy, who both cite Manlius Vulso's army and his triumph, Pliny cites the triumph of L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus (cos. 190, triumph 189, *ludi* 185) over Antiochus III.⁴⁰ His second turning point in this passage is the bequest of Pergamum by

³⁹ Cf. the similar language Pliny uses elsewhere to describe the victories of various other commanders and the specific luxuries they introduced (NH 37.12): *Victoria tamen illa Pompei primum ad margaritas gemmasque mores inclinavit, sicut L. Scipionis et Cn. Manli ad caelatum argentum et vestes Attalicas et triclinia aerata, sicut L. Mummi ad Corinthia et tabulas pictas* ("But it was this conquest by Pompeius Magnus that first introduced so general a taste for pearls and precious stones; just as the victories gained by L. Scipio and Gnaeus Manlius had first turned the public attention to chased silver, Attalic tissues, and banquetting-couches decorated with bronze; and the conquests of L. Mummius had brought Corinthian bronzes and pictures into notice." (transl. Bostock & Riley 1855)).

⁴⁰ For Asiaticus' triumph see also Livy 37.59, 39.6.7, 39.22.10, Pliny NH 13.24, Cic. *Pro Rab. Post.* 27. At Pliny NH 33.138 we hear that the Roman people by 186 now had the money to throw around to make voluntary contributions toward helping Asiaticus' games: *populus Romanus stipem spargere coepit* ["began to spray their cash around"] *Sp. Postumo Q. Marcio consulibus; tanta abundantia pecuniae erat, ut eam conferret L. Scipioni, ex qua is ludos fecit.* (transl. in Kay 2013: 139). As to Pliny's choice of Asiaticus' triumph as 1st turning point when Livy and Piso chose Vulso's, a case could be made for either, and in fact still other triumphs (laden with foreign spoils) are recorded from these years which equally could have been chosen: e.g. Titus Quinctius Flamininus in 194 for his victories in the Second Macedonian War (Livy 32.16.17, 34.52); Cato's in 194 from Spain (Livy 34.46); M. Fulvius Nobilior in 187 after sacking Ambracia (Plb. 31.30.9, Livy 39.5, 39.27). Those of Scipio Nasica over the Boii (191), Acilius Glabrio (for his victory over Antiochus at Thermopylae in 191: Livy 37.57), and others whose resplendence is less certain could be noted as well.

Attalus III in 133 B.C.E., and, like Polybius's second turning point (168 B.C.), this one signals the beginning of more precipitous moral decline.

Yet what especially strikes one is that, in the order of narration, Pliny has skipped over the events of 146 to get to this turning point. He does proceed to tack on the capture of Corinth in the next sentence and the impetus toward moral decline it brought, but the subsequent mention of Carthage one sentence later in 33.150 is not as forceful as one might expect. Indeed, Pliny seems to mention it in a way that reduces its significance as a cause of moral decline. He states not that the fall of Carthage was the (or even a) prime cause of moral decline, but merely that it happened to occur at the same time that luxury arose, and gave Romans an excuse to indulge in it and the leisure to do so.

Compared to Carthage's destruction, then, the capture of Corinth seems to have been more impactful in Pliny's mind – though it remains hard to be sure whether he thought Corinth had an equal, greater, or lesser impact than the bequest of Attalus III. In narrative terms, the fact that Pliny goes from the triumph of Asiaticus, the first moral fulcrum, right to the bequest of Pergamum in 133 B.C.E., a turning point of headlong decline, and skips over Corinth (and Carthage) to do so, might suggest that to Pliny the bequest of Attalus was the more important turning point for headlong decline. However, one could argue that the bequest follows Asiaticus' triumph in the narrative order because they are linked by the theme of Asia (*Asia primum devicta luxuriam misit in Italiam...at eadem Asia donata multo etiam gravius adflixit mores*), which gives the narrative a better flow.⁴¹

⁴¹ Cf. Earl 1961: 44, who implies that Pliny in this passage meant to give a sequential list of steadily increasing moral decline – a view which is not supported by my analysis.

Thus the tangle of moral turning points in *NH* 33.148-50 does not yield a clear hierarchy in every aspect. However what *is* clear is that Pliny seems to think that Scipio Asiaticus' triumph was the start of moral decline, the first moral fulcrum. Beyond that, the passage suggests (not without ambiguity) that despite what the fall of Carthage did in giving Romans the freedom to pursue this luxury, it was the bequest of Attalus III (and, perhaps to a certain degree, the capture of Corinth) which had a more acute impact on speeding up moral decline.

Additionally, the fact that Pliny assigns – in relative terms – a greater importance to Corinth's fall than to Carthage's in the onset of headlong decline likely reflects his recurrent interests in art and the arts in the *Naturalis Historia*. Indeed, the capture of Corinth “flooded Rome with more Greek art than ever before,” even more than the fall of Syracuse or Tarentum, or the defeat of Perseus.⁴² We also have Strabo's remarks on the capture of Corinth and the quantity of art obtained therefrom (Strabo 8.6.23):

Πολύβιος δὲ τὰ συμβάντα περὶ τὴν ἄλωσιν ἐν οἴκτου μέρει λέγων προστίθησι καὶ τὴν στρατιωτικὴν ὀλιγορίαν τὴν περὶ τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα. φησὶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν παρὼν ἐρριμμένους πίνακας ἐπ' ἐδάφους, πεττεύοντας δὲ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπὶ τούτων... σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναθημάτων τῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ ἄριστα ἐντεῦθεν ἀφίχθαι: τινὰ δὲ καὶ αἱ κύκλω τῆς Ῥώμης πόλεις ἔσχον.

Polybius, who speaks in a tone of pity of the events connected with the capture of Corinth, goes on to speak of the disregard shown by the army for the works of art and votive offerings; for he says that he was present and saw paintings that had been flung to the ground and saw the soldiers playing dice on these... And I may almost say that the most and best of the other dedicatory offerings at Rome came from there; and the cities in the neighborhood of Rome also obtained some. (transl. H.L. Jones 1924)

⁴² Pollitt 1986: 158. For other, earlier, examples of the plundering of Greek art in Pliny, see *NH* 7.214 (Valerius Messalla and the *horologium* of Catana), 34.13 (Camillus and the bronze doors from Veii), 34.34 (statues from Volsinii) (with Lintott 1977: 629). Such earlier examples, being isolated, individual cases, do not challenge the watershed status Pliny assigns to Corinth as a broader turning point in art looting.

Moreover, after his victories against the Achaean League and then at Corinth under L. Mummius, Metellus Macedonicus was said to have brought to Rome in 146 the famous “Granicus Monument” of Alexander the Great crafted by Lysippus, “perhaps the most influential battle monument in all of ancient art”,⁴³ and set it up in the Porticus Metelli which he was then constructing on the Campus Martius. Here Metellus built also the first marble temples in Rome,⁴⁴ hiring the Greek Hermodorus to design it (Vitr. 3.2.5) and the well-known Timarchides and his sons as sculptors (Pliny *NH* 36.35).

Thus Pliny is well justified in choosing to emphasize the capture of Corinth over that of Carthage as a turning point for headlong decline, at least from the perspective of his interest in the amount of physical items of luxury that poured into Rome in such a short time.⁴⁵ Likewise, Sallust’s focus on the fall of Carthage and his omission of any mention of Corinth can be equally well understood on the basis of Sallust’s own preoccupations in discussing Roman history and moral turning points. In particular, Sallust’s belief in the importance of *metus hostilis* in governing shifts in Roman morality led him to emphasize Carthage’s destruction, since in 146 *metus hostilis*, the *maximum concordiae vinculum*, as Livy calls it, was permanently removed.

In the broad stretch of Pliny’s work we find still other passages to complicate our understanding of how Pliny employs moral turning points. Our analysis of *NH* 33.148-50 above has just shown that the hierarchy of importance Pliny creates for various turning points in that passage is complex and not clear in every respect. One fact which we did

⁴³ Pollitt 1986: 41.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 158. Cf. Vell. Pat. 1.11.5.

⁴⁵ On the strong impact of the destruction of Corinth see (in addition to Strabo 8.6.23) Plb. 38.3; Juv. *Sat.* 11.100f. More thorough exploration of Pliny’s precise reasons for putting yet greater value on Attalus’ bequest (tax-farming, buying foreign, regal luxuries?) as a headlong moral turning point must be reserved for elsewhere.

establish, however, is that Pliny clearly marks out a turning point to signify the *start* of moral decline (Asiaticus' triumph), and another (the bequest of Pergamum; also, to a degree, Corinth's destruction) to mark out the beginning of precipitous moral decline. These general conclusions are not challenged by what we find Pliny saying in other passages. A particular passage in Book 37, however, adds yet another layer of complexity to Pliny's overall treatment of turning points. For in *NH* 37.12-17 Pliny, who had already in *NH* 33.148-50 given the reader a turning point (arguably two) for the start of headlong moral decline, adds yet another (37.12, my emphasis):

Victoria tamen illa Pompei primum ad margaritas gemmasque *mores inclinavit*, sicut L. Scipionis et Cn. Manli ad caelatum argentum et vestes Attalicas et triclina aerata, sicut L. Mummi ad Corinthia et tabulas pictas

But it was this conquest by Pompeius Magnus that first introduced so general a taste for pearls and precious stones; just as the victories, gained by L. Scipio and Cneius Manlius, had first turned the public attention to chased silver, Attalic tissues, and banquetting-couches decorated with bronze; and the conquests of L. Mummius had brought Corinthian bronzes and pictures into notice. (transl. Bostock & Riley)

After enumerating the unprecedented scale of luxury items Pompey brought back in his triumph in 61 B.C.E., Pliny continues (37.14-15, 17):

erat et imago Cn. Pompei e margaritis, illo relicino honore grata, illius probi oris⁴⁶ venerandique per cunctas gentes, ficta ex margaritis, ita severitate victa et veriore luxuriae triumpho! [15] numquam profecto inter illos viros durasset cognomen Magni, si prima victoria sic triumphasset! e margaritis, Magne, tam prodiga re et feminis reperta, quae gerere te fas non sit, fieri tuos voltus? sic te pretiosum videri? non ergo illa tua similior est imago, quam Pyrenaei iugis inposuisti?...[17] tolerabiliorem tamen causam fecit C. principis, qui super cetera muliebria soccos induebat e margaritis, aut Neronis principis, qui scepra et personas et cubilia viatoria unionibus construebat. quin immo etiam ius videmur perdidisse corripiendi gemmata potoria et varia suppellectilis genera, anulos translucetes. quae enim non luxuria innocentior existimari possit?

There was a likeness also in pearls of Pompeius himself, his noble countenance, with the hair thrown back from the forehead, delighting the eye. Yes, I say, those honest features, so venerated throughout all nations, were here displayed in pearls! the severity of our ancient manners being thus subdued, and the display being more the triumph of luxury than the triumph of conquest. [15] Never, most assuredly, would Pompeius have so long maintained his surname of "Magnus" among the men of that day, if on the occasion of his first conquest his triumph had been such as this. Thy portrait in pearls, O Magnus! those resources of prodigality, that have been discovered for the sake of females only! Thy portrait in pearls, refinements in luxury, which the Roman laws would not have allowed thee to wear even! And was it in this way that thy value must be appreciated? Would not that trophy have given a more truthful likeness of thee which thou hadst erst erected upon the Pyrenæan mountain heights?...[17] He has

⁴⁶ Cf. Sall. *Hist.* 2.16M

rendered, however, comparatively excusable the Emperor Caius, who, in addition to other feminine luxuries, used to wear shoes adorned with pearls; as also the Emperor Nero, who used to adorn his sceptres with masks worked in pearls, and had the couches, destined for his pleasures, made of the same costly materials. Nay, we have no longer any right, it would seem, to censure the employment of drinking-cups adorned with precious stones, of various other articles in daily use that are similarly enriched, and of rings that sparkle with gems: for what species of luxury can there be thought of, that was not more innocent in its results than this on the part of Pompeius? (transl. Bostock & Riley)

When this passage is read in its entirety, it is rather clear that in Pliny's view Pompey's triumph in 61 B.C.E., upon his return from his eastern conquests, constitutes a *second* turning point for headlong moral decline. The bequest of Attalus III over 70 years earlier had in Pliny's view started the decline on a precipitous path; Pompey's triumph in 61, and the luxury he brought back, added to this precipitous decline with previously unseen types of luxuries. Indeed, the language of 37.12 (*victoria tamen illa Pompei primum ad margaritas gemmasque mores inclinavit*) echoes Pliny's description of the headlong decline set in motion by the plundering of Corinth in 33.149 (*inmenso et Achaicae victoriae momento ad inpellendos mores*). That Pompey's triumph fits into that scheme of turning points from *NH* 33.148-50 explored above is also suggested by the way Pliny at *NH* 37.12 clearly links the damage done to morality by Pompeian luxuries to that previously done by the luxuries introduced to Rome by L. Scipio and Vulso, then by Mummius from Corinth. Furthermore, one can infer the passionate, perhaps desperate tone of Pliny's reflection at 37.12-17 by the fact that he apostrophizes Pompey in rebuke of his luxurious display (*e margaritis, Magne, tam prodiga re et feminis reperta, quae gerere te fas non sit, fieri tuos voltus?*).⁴⁷

The reader is made abundantly aware already in *NH* 33.148-50 of Pliny's willingness to call upon more than one – and in fact several – moral turning points when expounding

⁴⁷ Note also the implications of effeminization in these words. Cf. Sallust *BC* 11.3 (*avaritia effeminizes the animus*), 13.3.7.

upon historical and cultural developments. The fact that *NH* 37.12-17 adds yet another turning point to the total is thus not where the primary value of this latter passage lies. Rather, the most significant insight we gain from *NH* 37.12-17 is that in the course of his work Pliny chooses to call upon *two* turning points that caused precipitous moral decline, one occurring significantly before the other in historical sequence.⁴⁸ For all their examples illustrating the use of two turning points in general,⁴⁹ none of the authors so far examined in this section have provided a parallel specifically to Sallust's naming of two separate turning points for *headlong* decline in *BC* 10-12. With Pliny's narrative at *NH* 37.12-17 we now have such a direct parallel.⁵⁰ In the case of Sallust, we argued earlier that his use of a second "Sullan" turning point for headlong decline, just one chapter after naming the fall of Carthage as the fulcrum for headlong moral decline (*BC* 10), was undertaken with specific narrative goals in mind: naming a second "Sullan" turning point for headlong decline helped Sallust more strongly to link the unprecedented moral degeneration that followed upon Carthage's fall to Sulla's return from Asia in the 80s, the time when Catiline's violent and criminal career began.⁵¹ Catiline's depravity is thereby enhanced as he is portrayed as the direct inheritor of a tradition of unparalleled moral decay stretching from the fall of Carthage through to Sulla. What specific aim or aims Pliny had in mind in naming two different catalysts for headlong moral decay, is unclear. Pliny's close paralleling of this Sallustian practice on headlong moral turning points,

⁴⁸ I.e. (1) Bequest of Pergamum in 133 (and Capture of Corinth) (2) Conquests and Triumph of Pompey in 61

⁴⁹ Often, one that begins the moral decline, one that sets it on a headlong decline (Polybius, Livy, Florus (see below); perhaps Piso)

⁵⁰ For another, see discussion below of Florus 1.34, 1.47.

⁵¹ See Chapter 6.2 above.

however, should attest to the acceptance among later writers of Sallust's literary maneuver as within the bounds of historiographical practice.

Florus too conceives of two stages of decline, and two moral fulcrums, though his are in closer proximity to each other. He says of Corinth (1.32):

Quasi saeculum illud eversionibus urbium curreret, ita Carthagini ruinam statim Corinthos excepit, Achaiae caput, Graeciae decus, inter duo maria, Ionium et Aegaeum, quasi spectaculo exposita.

As though that age ran its course by the destruction of cities, the destruction of Carthage was immediately followed by that of Corinth, the capital of Achaea, the glory of Greece, set for all men to behold between the Ionian and Aegean seas. (transl. E.S. Forster)

Florus continues in the next chapter (1.33):

Ut Carthaginem Corinthos, ita Corinthon Numantia secuta est; nec deinde orbe toto quidquam intactum armis fuit. Post illa duo clarissimarum urbium incendia late atque passim, nec per vices, sed simul pariter quasi unum undique bellum fuit; prorsus ut illae, quasi agitantibus ventis, diffudisse quaedam belli incendia orbe toto viderentur.

As the fate of Corinth followed upon that of Carthage, so the fate of Numantia followed upon that of Corinth; and thereafter not a single place in the whole world was left unassailed by the arms of Rome. After the burning of these two famous cities, a single war was waged far and wide everywhere at once, and not merely against one nation after another; so that it seemed as if these two cities, as by the action of winds, had scattered the flames of war over the whole world. (transl. E.S. Forster)

In this passage, the destructions of Carthage and Corinth (*illa duo clarissimarum urbium incendia*) together seem to constitute the first major turning point, at least in terms of Roman foreign relations and military affairs; nothing is said of Roman morality. Though Numantia is mentioned, the focus is still on these two cities. What Florus appears to be saying in 1.33 is that by the time Numantia's fate too was intimated, it was clear to all that the burning of Carthage and Corinth had spread the *belli incendia orbe toto*, starting one big war (*late atque passim, nec per vices, sed simul pariter quasi unum undique bellum*).

In the next chapter (1.34), after providing background on prior Roman operations in Spain during the second century, Florus moves to narrate the course of the Numantine War (which he had broached already in 1.33). After relating the noble end of the Numantines in an unjust war,⁵² Florus steps back to pronounce a judgment on the course of Roman history and Roman morality (1.34.19):

Hactenus populus Romanus pulcher, egregius, pius, sanctus atque magnificus: reliqua saeculi, ut grandia aeque, ita vel magis turbida et foeda, crescentibus cum ipsa magnitudine imperii vitiis⁵³; adeo ut, si quis hanc tertiam eius aetatem transmarinam, quam ducentorum annorum fecimus, dividat, centum hoc priores, quibus Africam, Macedoniam, Siciliam, Hispaniam domuit, aureos, sicut poetae canunt, iure meritoque fateatur, centum sequentes ferreos plane et cruentos et si quid inmanius; quippe qui Iugurthinis, Cimbricis, Mithridaticis, Parthis, piraticis bellis, Gallicis atque Germanicis, quibus caelum ipsum gloria ascendit, Gracchanas Drusianasque caedes, ad hoc servilia bella miscuerint et, ne quid turpitudini desit, gladiatoria. Denique in se ipse conversus Marianis atque Sullanis, novissime Pompei et Caesaris manibus, quasi per rabiem et furorem—nefas!—semet ipse laceravit.

Hitherto the Roman people had been noble, illustrious, dutiful, upright and high-minded; the rest of this period, though equally grand, was more troubled and disgraceful as their vices grew in step with the size of their empire; so much so that, if one were to subdivide this third age, which saw conquests beyond the seas and to which we have allotted two hundred years, he would reasonably and justly admit that the first hundred years, during which they subdued Africa, Macedonia, Sicily and Spain, might be named, in the language of the poets, golden, and the following hundred years an age of iron and bloodshed or whatever is still more atrocious. For these years included not only the Jugurthine, Cimbrian, Mithridatic, Parthian and piratical wars, and the wars in Gaul and Germany (when the glory of Rome rose to the very heavens), but the murders of the Gracchi and Drusus, and also the wars against the slaves, and also (that nothing might be wanting to their infamy) those against the gladiators. Lastly, the Romans, turning upon themselves, as though in madness and fury, rent themselves to pieces — oh dreadful deed! — by the hands of the Marian and Sullan parties, and finally by those of Pompeius and Caesar. (transl. E.S. Forster (adapted))

Although Florus had stated in 1.33 that the fates of Carthage and Corinth began a worldwide blaze of war, the subsequent fall of Numantia in 133 B.C.E., as related here in 1.34.19, is made to stand as a *separate* turning point, one that, from a moral standpoint, was more important than the falls of Corinth and Carthage. Indeed, Florus emphasizes

⁵² Cf. 1.34: *Non temere, si fateri licet, illius causa belli iniustior.*

⁵³ In Florus' *crescentibus cum ipsa magnitudine imperii vitiis*, we see echoed Polybius' view (Plb. 6.57.1-6, 31.25, cited above) that decline is immediately attendant upon the attainment of world dominion and the height of prosperity.

throughout this passage that the fall of Numantia was productive specifically of moral degeneration – something which he had not mentioned earlier in regard to Carthage or Corinth as turning points. Moreover, when Florus here divides the eras of Roman history according to morality, he classes the fall of Carthage and Corinth within a 100-year era which he considers still to be morally “golden” (*aureos*), whereas everything after the fall of Numantia is classed within another 100-year era which he describes as “of iron and bloodshed and whatever is still more atrocious” (*ferreos plane et cruentos et si quid inmanius*).

The fall of Numantia, then, constitutes Florus’ turning point of headlong *moral* decline, and he structures the passage to explicitly highlight Numantia’s position as turning point; in particular: *Hactenus populus romanus pulcher, egregius, pius, sanctus atque magnificus*: “up until this point” – that is, the fall of Numantia. *Reliqua saeculi, ut grandia aequae, ita vel magis turbida et foeda, crescentibus cum ipsa magnitudine imperii vitiis*: “the rest of this period, though equally grand, was more troubled and disgraceful as their vices grew in step with the size of their empire”. As *hactenus...reliqua saeculi* shows, Numantia is the fulcrum, and after it falls, a sudden shift in morality occurs: those good moral qualities are lost, and vices are gained. Thus Florus’ detailed compartmentalization of Roman history into two century-long stages, one of honorable foreign wars (which he later calls *iusta illa et pia cum exteris gentibus bella* (1.34)), and one of horrible civil wars (later called *illa civium scelera turpesque et impias pugnas* (1.34)), is schematic, but clear in intention, with Numantia serving to divide the two and to signal the beginning of headlong moral decline.

In addition to these passages where he signals different turning points of precipitous decline (Corinth/Carthage for military/foreign relations (1.32-33), Numantia for morality (1.34)), Florus brings Book 1 to a close at 1.47 by introducing a slightly different scheme of turning points, one that not only marks out a *first beginning* for moral decline (which he had not done before), but also uses a turning point for headlong decline that is different from those in 1.32-34. At 1.47.1 he restates his prior moral division of the *aetas transmarina* into two century-long halves (*aurei/ferrei*). He groups Carthage, Corinth, Numantia, and the bequest of Attalus in 133 B.C.E. all together in a list of watershed events which he does not qualify or rank in any way (except chronologically).⁵⁴ Later in this chapter (1.47.7) he states that the very first turning point for moral decline was the conquest of Syria (meaning the war with Antiochus). The wording which follows this statement rather clearly marks the bequest of Pergamum as a fulcrum of headlong moral decline:

Quae enim res alia civiles furores peperit quam nimiae felicitates? Syria prima nos victa corruptit, mox Asiatica Pergameni regis hereditas. Illae opes atque divitiae adfixere saeculi mores, mersamque vitiis suis quasi sentina rem publicam pessum dedere.

For what else but excessive good fortune produces the fury of civil conflict? The conquest of Syria first corrupted us, soon afterward the inheritance of Asia from Pergamum's king. Those resources and riches left an imprint upon the morals of the age and sank the state, drowned in its own vices as if in a cesspool.

While an explanation – literary or other – would seem required for Florus' provision here of a different headlong turning point than in 1.34, what is more important to note here is that Florus again resorts to speaking in terms of two turning points – in this case, a first beginning and then a later fulcrum of headlong moral decline. 1.47, therefore, further

⁵⁴ Florus 1.47.1f: *Postremi centum, quos a Carthaginis, Corinthi Numantiaeque excidiis et Attali regis Asiatica hereditate deduximus in Caesarem et Pompeium secutumque hos, de quo dicemus, Augustum, ut claritate rerum bellicarum magnifici, ita domesticis cladibus miseri et erubescendi.*

strengthens the view that using two turning points was a common way of engaging with this type of moral discourse.

To sum up, the fall of Carthage, while an important turning point, is not a major *moral* fulcrum for Florus, nor is it the point of precipitous moral decline. It was not the fulcrum of headlong moral decline for Polybius either, nor was it for the Elder Pliny.⁵⁵ In any case, Florus marks the course of Roman history with two or more turning points, and in this he continues the pattern seen in all the other authors examined above.⁵⁶ Together, the practice of these several authors should serve to show above all that Sallust's choice to employ two turning points in the early part of one of his monographs should not have struck any reader as shocking.

This section's comparative view of turning points in other authors has established Sallust's inclusion of a second turning in a proper context, so that it can now be seen as a literary technique that had both prior precedents and found later acceptance. Since it has been shown that Sallust had literary and narratological reasons for including that second "Sullan" turning point, as discussed above,⁵⁷ we can now begin to dispel a particular notion of previous scholars who have thought that Sallust had a fixed scheme for the introduction of certain vices at certain times into the Roman sphere. Scholars such as

⁵⁵ The cases of Piso and Livy are harder to judge, as we lack the text that would give us their judgments on that era.

⁵⁶ See the chart of turning points in Table 2. A fuller study of turning points outside of Sallust could draw on still other authors. Among later writers, Pompeius Trogus notably asserts that the war against Antiochus III did *not* corrupt the Romans, who consciously kept away from luxury (Justin 31.8.9); Trogus later seems to identify the bequest of Pergamum as the headlong turning point (Justin 36.4.12). Orosius conceived of something like a two-part turning point in discussing the events of the 2nd century B.C.E., as the destruction of Carthage and Numantia *together* form a fulcrum (*Carthagine Numantiaque deleta moritur apud Romanos utilis de prouisione conlatio et oritur infamis de ambitione contentio* (5.8.2); cf. 4.23.9). Augustine *CD* 3.21, while not mentioning two turning points (though Vulso's introduction of luxury may be meant as a turning point), affirms Sallust's view that 146 was when morality declined *praeceps*.

⁵⁷ See above, Chapter 7.1

Earl and later Conley have shared the assumption that Sallust had a definite causal and chronological scheme in mind for the introduction of *luxuria*, *avaritia*, and *ambitio*.⁵⁸

According to Earl, there was first a period prior to 146 of *minuma avaritia*, which he derives from *BC* 9.1 (*concordia maxuma, minuma avaritia erat*). *Ambitio* in Earl's view was not present in this first stage. Second came a period of *ambitio magis* (that is, mostly *ambitio*) based on *BC* 11.1, where Sallust says *ambitio* was the first to "torment men's minds" (*primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat*). Next, after 146 came a period when *avaritia* becomes predominant over *ambitio*. This is supposed to have happened "certainly by the time of the Gracchi".⁵⁹ Lastly, after Sulla *luxuria* then enters (*BC* 11.4-8).

Issues begin to arise with such schemes. Besides mentioning *Hist.* 1.11M once, Earl does not avail himself of any other passages from the *Histories* in constructing his stages of decline; there are important passages that do not appear to factor into his analysis. For example, *Hist.* 1.16M says that with 146 B.C.E. the youth became *luxu atque avaritia corrupta*, so on the evidence of this passage, *luxuria* clearly dates back at least to 146 for Sallust, not to Sulla's Asian campaign.⁶⁰ This fragment also shows one can be more exact in pointing out when Sallust thought *avaritia* was introduced, rather than saying "certainly by the time of the Gracchi". *Hist.* 1.11.10M too is more specific in regard to *avaritia*, as it states that *avaritia* grew greatly due to the fall of Carthage rather than due to the Gracchi.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Conley 1981: passim. Earl 1961: 14-16. This assumption has not to my knowledge been explicitly challenged.

⁵⁹ Earl 1961: 15

⁶⁰ *BJ* 41.3.8 mentions *lascivia* creeping in after 146 as well – a related vice.

⁶¹ Additionally, Conley is correct in pointing out that Sallust has *luxuria* and *avaritia* invading at the same time in *BC* 12.2, not in succession as Earl's scheme would suggest.

Moreover, to posit a period at first of *minuma avaritia* during which there was no *ambitio* does not take account of the *gloriae cupido* and the *gloriae certamen* between citizens which Sallust mentions in *BC* 7.3 and 7.6. *Gloriae cupido* and *gloriae certamen* are indicative of an ambition for glory. Though here it seems directed at the good of the state, it is still *ambitio*, and as Sallust is quick to say of *ambitio*, it is *propius virtutem* (“almost *virtus*”), but is still a *vitium* (*BC* 11.1).

Such are the difficulties one encounters with attempting to posit a fixed scheme for Sallust’s introduction of vices. There is, however, another apparent contradiction in Sallust’s moral chronology which some have attempted to reconcile.⁶² For in *BC* 10.3 Sallust says *avaritia* came first (*igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit*), while at 11.1 he seems to have *ambitio* first (*sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat*). According to Earl, Sallust at *BC* 11.1 is not saying *ambitio* came first overall, but only that it was the first to “torment men’s minds”. It is unclear, however, why Sallust would jump from general chronological ordering of vices in *BC* 10 to ordering them according to such a specific criterion in *BC* 11.1. It is possible that *primo magis ambitio...animos hominum exercebat* is simply *variatio*, another way to state the general idea “*ambitio* was the first to affect men’s moral integrity/corrupt them.” Nipperdey’s attempt at transposition at 10.3 to make it read *primo imperi, deinde pecuniae cupido crevit* is another attempt at reconciliation which, as we shall see presently, is unnecessary as it ignores Sallust’s literary goals and narrative strategies.

Conley 1981 represents one attempt to rectify Earl’s general scheme, seeing in the attempt a salutary exercise. Conley posits just two stages: *ambitio magis* (from 146 to

⁶² Some call it “simply careless writing” (McGushin 1977: 91).

Sulla), and *luxuria atque avaritia* (which *start* with Sulla and enter at the same time, as shown by *BC* 12.2).⁶³ This scheme too encounters challenges. *BC* 10.4, *BJ* 41.9.21-22, *Hist.* 1.11.10M and 1.16M all say *avaritia* was present already right after 146, while *Hist.* 1.16M, as we have seen, tells us *luxuria* too was present right after 146 – all of which challenges Conley’s two-stage scheme.⁶⁴

Conley’s argument attempts to save his two-stage theory on a technicality. When at *BC* 11.1 Sallust says *primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat*, Conley takes the use of *animos* to mean that this statement applies specifically to *people* who were motivated by *ambitio*. By contrast, in regard to *avaritia* Sallust says at *BJ* 41.9 *cum potentia avaritia sine modo modestiaque invadere, polluere et vastare omnia* (“with power unbounded, immoderate greed invaded, and corrupted and laid waste to everything.”). From the use of *omnia*, Conley argues Sallust is referring here merely to the “things” upon which *avaritia* had an effect, not the people. Accordingly *BJ* 41, which talks about the period right after 146, implies that *avaritia* affected mainly “things” at that stage, while few *people* were affected – members of the *nobilitas* predominantly. By this logic, the period when *avaritia* dominated *people* would have to wait until the Sullan Age (*BC* 12.2, Conley’s second stage: *luxuria atque avaritia*).⁶⁵

Yet it is difficult to envision what concrete objects or “things” greed could pollute and lay waste (roads? temples? statues?). If we conjecture that Sallust had in mind a “thing” like the consulate or the Senate, these are not at their core “things”, but are made up of individual people; so the target of *avaritia*’s ravages in any case comes back to

⁶³ For *luxuria* as entering only with Sulla’s return from Asia, see also Minyard 1985: 5n2.

⁶⁴ The passage at *Hist.* 1.11.10M, in fact, implies that *avaritia* was present *well before* 146, and at that time (after 146) merely *grew greatly*.

⁶⁵ Conley 1981: 381

people. To say, moreover, that in the years soon after 146 *avaritia* was not strong in Sallust's view because it only affected a small class of people, mainly of the nobility, neglects the nature of Sallust's moral discourse. For while the nobility does indeed make up only a small percentage of Romans, they are without question the focus of Sallust's moral history, and despite being numerically limited, they are the subject of Sallust's moral discussion not just *BJ* 41-42 but also in much of the rest of his *corpus*.⁶⁶

One other solution to this scheme of the introduction of vices can be tested. If one reads the perfect tense of *BC* 10.3's *crevit* (*primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit*) against 11.1 (*sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia...exercebat*), it is possible to argue that in *BC* 10 Sallust is thinking just of the timeline of what happened *after* 146, so that *after* 146 it was *avaritia* that grew rampant first, then *ambitio*, whereas *BC* 11.1, with its *sed primo*, speaks of the entire span of pre-146 Roman history, and thus indicates that in Sallust's view *ambitio* entered first *overall* – though a more innocuous form, as he says.

If we are to order the vices, this might be another possibility.⁶⁷ But should we order them at all? *BC* 11.1 says *primo magis ambitio quam avaritia*, which suggests both were present from the beginning and that it was just matter of degree, there being more *ambitio* at first. So even if *ambitio* had a greater share at first, it is implied that there had always

⁶⁶ Among the few things he attributes to the *plebs* or others outside the nobility are a selfish desire to agitate the state to gain power (*BC* 38) and turning their liberty toward gratifying their selfish desires (*BJ* 41, 66.2; *BC* 37). Cf. *Hist.* 3.98 (66 McG) on slave bands' base behavior.

⁶⁷ One would have to explain, however, how it could be reasonable for *ambitio* to precede *avaritia* overall (*BC* 11.1), but for *ambitio* to follow *avaritia* in growing uncontrollably after 146 (*BC* 10). Why the order of causality should reverse after 146 (or why *ambitio* should suddenly weaken in strength after 146 and not at least keep step with *avaritia*) would need explanation. To the suggestion of Tiffou 1973: 303 that the difference arises from Sallust thinking in terms of *avaritia*'s "destructive power" in *BC* 10, but thinking chronologically in *BC* 11.1, it may be objected that *BC* 10.3 is just as clearly concerned with chronology as *BC* 11.1 (cf. *primo...deinde*.)

been overlap.⁶⁸ To Sallust, then, it seems it was always a matter of degree, and not of one vice following the other in neat succession.⁶⁹

This discussion reminds us that it is not productive to try to force into a consistent scheme the dates for the emergence of particular vices according to Sallust. Such an enterprise perpetuates a misunderstanding of the nature of Sallust's literary priorities by implying that he was trying to create an exact chronological succession of causal factors that should apply across his entire corpus.⁷⁰ We should not expect him to be exact in such matters.⁷¹ Even today we know it is nearly impossible to delimit where and when a

⁶⁸ This same implication arises from *BC* 9.1 (on Rome in the early/middle Republic): *concordia maxuma, minuma avaritia erat* – where Sallust states that *avaritia* was in fact around early in Rome's history, even if in quite small amounts (seconded by McDonnell 2006: 375). As to Sallust's use of the phrase *magis quam* here at *BC* 11.1, and whether it means "more than" or "rather than", an examination of all of Sallust's other uses of the phrase indicates that both meanings are equally common. *Magis quam* definitely meaning "rather than" (8x): *BC* 8.1, 10.5, *BJ* 4.4, 33.4, 98.1, *Hist. incert. sedis.* 9.1, 1.77.3M, 4.69.13M. *Magis quam* definitely meaning "more than" (9x): *BJ* 20.5, 31.18, 35.7, 54.7, 60.1, 82.3, 89.6, 92.2, 98.1. *Magis quam* more likely meaning "rather than" (11x): *BC* 6.5.5, 20.15, 48.5, 51.6, 52.4, *BJ* 1.2, 35.9, 66.3, *Hist.* 1.77.17M, 4.43M, *incert. sedis* 25M. *Magis quam* more likely meaning "more than" (15x): *BC* 9.5, 17.5, 48.2, *BJ* 14.5, 15.1, 40.3, 55.5, 57.1, 73.4, 74.3, 85.46, 97.5, 101.7, 108.3, 111.1. Instances where *Magis quam* could equally well mean either (15x): *BC* 7.4, **9.1**, **11.1**, 14.7, 51.5, 51.7, *BJ* 8.1, 14.22, 20.3, 31.20, 45.3, 54.4, 58.1, 90.1, *Hist.* 2.85M. Though a few instances might be interpreted differently than I have done, the data still shows that the clear cut examples are the fewest (perhaps 17): Besides the perhaps 26 instances leaning toward one meaning without definitely excluding the other, the 15 wholly ambivalent examples lying right in the middle reinforce how often Sallust does not clearly distinguish the two meanings (17 total "clear" examples" versus 41 wholly or slightly ambivalent examples).

⁶⁹ We are reminded once again of *Hist.* 1.11M, where Sallust asserts vices were present from the start, and merely grew in degree after 146: *at discordia et avaritia atque ambitio et cetera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala post Carthaginis excidium maxime aucta sunt. Nam iniuriae validiorum et ob eas discessio plebis a patribus aliaque dissensiones domi fuere iam inde a principio...*

⁷⁰ One may compare the process drawn by Cicero for a particular context at *Pro Rosc. Amer.* 75: *In urbe luxuries creatur, ex luxuria existat avaritia necesse est, ex avaritia erumpat audacia, inde omnia scelera ac maleficia gignuntur; (vita autem haec rustica quam tu agrestem vocas parsimoniae, diligentiae, iustitiae magistra est).*

⁷¹ Besides the circumstantial adjustments to the narrative of Roman moral history made by Polybius between Plb. 6.56.1-2, 14-15 and Plb. 18.35 (discussed above), one may compare Xenophon's lack of concern with precise historical sequencing of vices and turning points in the *Cyropaedia*: as Tuplin 2014 observes, since Xenophon has built up a "quasi-historical narrative which provides a paradigm of excellence in *arkhē*" (226), he sets out to prove that contemporary Persian *mores* have declined and that after Cyrus everything took a turn for the worse: "the two stages of decline [dissension following immediately upon Cyrus' death; the subversion of good habits into their opposite characteristic of contemporary Persia] exist for rhetorical reasons, not historical ones, and it is no surprise that they cannot be tied down." (230)

moral quality first appeared. Sallust would have been capable of realizing that too.⁷²

Therefore, while we can be certain that Sallust had an interest in when moral decline in general *first* happened, and when moral decline in general first *got out of control*, he does not seem to have thought it vital that he pin the beginnings of specific vices to exact dates and places that were consistent across all his texts, nor that he create an exact sequential order of causation among those vices. To be sure, he does attach dates or (what seems like) an order to particular vices (especially *luxuria*, *avaritia*, and *ambitio*) in a number of passages in the *BC* and *BJ*, as we have seen (e.g. *BC* 10, 11, 12; perhaps *BC* 2.2; *BC* 38.1-3; *BJ* 41.2-3). But in the case of the moral discourse in *BC* 10-11, as in many other cases, the exact dates and exact order offered in a given passage are often influenced by the immediate aims Sallust has set for himself in that passage; in other words, certain details of his moral discourse in a given passage are often adjusted to help further the artistic goals of that particular passage, whether those goals involve achieving a precise characterization of an individual (e.g. Catiline or Marius), giving a certain coloring to a political or military affair, or conveying a broader interpretation of historical trends.⁷³

This approach of Sallust to the composition of history is the origin of some of the seeming inconsistencies in the dates Sallust gives for turning points or for the introduction of particular vices over the course of his three works.

⁷² On the ordering of vices causally for specific rhetorical reasons in a given context, see e.g. Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 75.

⁷³ This is not to imply that local effects motivate every decision Sallust makes in narrating; but Sallust will likely have approached the composition of key sections of his discourse on Roman history and moral behavior with a rough idea of what views he wanted to convey through his narrative. If, as has been shown, Sallust was capable of deploying literary structures and rhetorical techniques stretching over wide swaths of his narrative (see e.g. the discussion of *BC* 6-13 in Chapter 6.2, and the discussion of a sustained narrative ring structure centered around Marius and Metellus in the *BJ* in Chapter 6.1a), then it is likely that he was capable of providing some consistent scheme for the introduction/progression of vices in his texts if he has desired one.

Sallust's literary priorities, then, were always at play when he wrote. The "scientific historian" at times takes a back seat so that Sallust can employ various narrative and literary devices that help make his work a vessel for communicating his own moral and political reading of the late Republic and Triumviral Era.

Chapter 8: Disease, Contagion, and the Body Politic: Where is the Doctor?

While Sallust draws on many literary tropes to help color his view of history, I will focus here on that of the body politic, a prominent trope which in its own way serves to communicate Sallust's moral outlook whenever it appears in his texts. In particular, I will focus on the frequent use Sallust makes of medical imagery and of the language of disease and contagion to describe immorality and immoral individuals within the state.¹ Such language and imagery, at least in historiography, can be found prominently as early as Thucydides in his account of the plague at Athens and its effects on morality.² Not surprisingly, there were precedents for its use in other genres as well. In philosophy, for example, we find Posidonius calling upon metaphorical language of disease to explain the operation of emotions, an understanding of which was vital to his exposition of

¹ The metaphor of "the two-headed state" is another aspect of this language of the body politic. Catiline famously invoked the idea (Cic. *Pro Mur.* 51), and it appears in Sallust (*BJ* 41.5) and various other authors of the late Republic: e.g. Cic. *DRP* 1.31, *Pro Mil.* 26 (= Sallust *BJ* 41.5), *Pro Cluent.* 146; Varro *de Vit. Pop. Rom.* fr.114 Riposati (*bicipitem civitatem fecit* [C. Gracchus]); Livy 2.32-3 (Menenius Agrippa's extensive body politic allegory). See Wiseman 2010.

² For the plague at Athens and the general lawlessness that ensued, see Thucy. 2.47-55; Cf. Thucydides' description of the breakdown in language and morality in the civil war at Corcyra, 3.69-85. Osgood 2006: 307-8 recognizes Sallust's deployment of the disease metaphor for moral decay and its influence from Thucydides, but without further elaboration. The Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places*, treating of the relationship between man and his environment, likewise has a Thucydidean approach: by knowing the physical environment of a city, the stars and seasons, one can predict which diseases will come, and their nature, and will be prepared to treat them (cf. *Airs* 2, 11, 24 with Thuc. 1.22.4, 2.48.3). While Sallust may have been influenced by Thucydides' description of the plague, we shall see below that Sallust's take on it is more pessimistic, for Thucydides at least saw a heuristic value in his description of the plague for diagnosing future outbreaks and perhaps mitigating (if not curing) them, while Sallust saw no hope for future amelioration of what was "plaguing" Roman society.

ethical and moral philosophy.³ Even after Sallust the continued ubiquity of this trope in the literature of the Augustan Age is sufficiently illustrated by the language of Livy.⁴

While not denying the possible influence of historiographical or perhaps even other prior traditions on Sallust's metaphorical language of disease and the body politic, it is highly probable that Cicero's *Catilinarians* – being a more immediate source and of the highest topical relevance to Sallust's project – elicited a direct engagement and response from Sallust in this particular. Therefore, while metaphors of the body politic are common in other late Republican writers as well, I will argue that Sallust drew particular inspiration for this trope from the way Cicero used the terminology of disease and contagion to describe Catiline's conspiracy, and from the way Cicero positioned himself, by contrast, as the healer of the *res publica*. An important difference, however, will become apparent in the way Sallust uses this trope: whereas in the *Catilinarians* Cicero

³ For medical language see Posidonius Fr.163EK passim (see discussion later in this chapter), Fr. 169.106-7. For the centrality of the emotions to ethical philosophy cf. Fr. 30EK, 150a EK. Still earlier Plato draws on medical language: *Rep.* 470c, 554c, 556e3-9, *Protag.* 322d, *Soph.* 228a, *Tim.* 89a-d. Cf. Hdt. 5.28. On the biological pattern in the "life" of a state, see Sallust *BC* 53.5 and i.a. *Plb.* 6.4.11-13, 9.11-14, 51.4, 57; Florus *Epit.* Book 1 *praef.* For further examples of the medical analogy see Vretska 1976: I.218. Kidd 1999: 24 astutely notes that Greek employs the same word for disease and excessive emotion, namely, *pathos*.

⁴ See e.g. Livy 1.15, 2.23, 2.32-3 (Menenius Agrippa's famous body politic metaphor), 2.44 (*sedition*), 2.52.3 (*tribuni plebem agitare suo veneno, agraria lege*), 3.20, 3.67.6 (conflict of the orders = *venenum urbis*), 4.30, 5.5.12 (Cf. Cic. *In Cat.* 1.31), 5.6.11 (...*ut seditionibus primum urbs Romana, deinde velut ex contagione castra impleantur*)(= 5.12.7), 24.2.8 (*unus uelut morbus inuaserat omnes Italiae ciuitates...*), 28.29.3 (*insanistis profecto, milites, nec maior in corpus meum vis morbi quam in vestras mentes invasit*), 34.4.1-4 (Cato), 42.5.7 (...*et contagione* [sc. *seditionis*] *velut tabes in Perrhaebiam quoque id pervaserat malum* (civil war due to debt in Greece)). Among other treatments of plague relevant to Sallust's are those of Lucretius 6.1090-1286 (itself drawing on Thucydides; cf. McGushin 1994: 81 for Sallust's possible use of Lucretius for his depiction of plague at Cyzicus in *Hist.* 3.38-9M (25-6 McG)) and Vergil *Geo.* 3.478-566. In Vergil, plague is clearly a metaphor for civil strife, which becomes progressively clearer: [452-6] – the need to uncover the *ulcer/vitium* and cut it away with steel, though the *pastor* refuses to lay *medicas manus* on the wound, praying instead to the gods; [470-77] – the plague (civil strife) mows down not just individuals but the whole race (of cattle), leaving lands untenanted (echo of land confiscations of late 40s?); [478-514] – the plague's effect on various animals, especially horses, ending in an image of self-destructive autophagy that makes the metaphor even clearer; [559-66] – finally we're told of leather and plague-ridden fleeces that cannot be used, and how man, donning these, transfers the infection to the human world, thereby literalizing the metaphor most clearly.

offers himself in the role of the physician or healer of the state's ills, there is no comparable figure of the healer to be found in Sallust's three works. The extent of Sallust's pessimism is again suggested by this omission, for in Sallust moral decay progresses through the state systematically like a disease through a patient, and indeed like a plague, but nowhere does he suggest that there might be someone who could heal the patient in the long run and save her, so to speak, from a bitter demise.

A search in the PHI Latin corpus for all forms of the words *morbus*, *pestis*, *purgare*, *sanare*, *medicus*, *contagio*, *tabes*, *rabies*, and *remedium* in extant Ciceronian oratory shows how frequently Cicero called upon these metaphors of plague and disease.⁵ When all metaphorical instances of this language are considered, one finds that in the great majority of cases Cicero applies this disease metaphor to describe dangerous and immoral individuals as opposed to the general failings of a whole class of people (Catiline's followers being one exception⁶). Indeed, individuals like Verres, Catiline, Clodius, and Antony loom large in Cicero's extant speeches, and are often equated with disease and plague. By far the most common appellation applied to these individuals (and to all others) is *pestis* (a plague).⁷ In Ciceronian usage an individual termed a *pestis* is often

⁵ The following results include only metaphorical uses; literal uses are omitted. The results are also incomplete in that Cicero's epistolary and philosophical output have not been included in the tabulation: *Pro Rosc. Am.* 154, *Pro Quinctio* 9, *Div. in Caec.* 70, *In Verr.* 2.1.91, 96; 2.3.64, 125, 152; 2.4.1, 29 (same use as 2.4.1); 2.5.6, 7, 121, 183; *Pro Cluent.* 41, 57, 67 & 95 (if metaphorical), 193, 201; *De Lege Agr.* 1.26; *Pro Rab. Perd.* 2; *Pro Mur.* 52, 78, 85 (all three about Catiline); *Pro Sulla* 6, 28, 53, 76; *Pro Flacco* 102; *Post Red. ad Pop.* 4, 15; *Post Red. in Sen.* 3, 9, 17; *de Domo Sua* 2, 5, 12, 14, 24, 26, 72, 85, ?99, 108, ?144 (most = *pestis*, applied to Clodius); *de Harusp. Resp.* 4, 6, 50; *Pro Sestio* 33, 39, 43, 51, 55, 65, 78, 83, 114, 135; *In Vatin.* 6, 18, 25, 33; *de Prov. Cons.* 3, 13; *In Pis.* 3, 27, 56; *Pro Plancio* 98; *Pro Scauro* 36, ?43; *Pro Mil.* 33, 40, 68, 88; *Pro Marc.* 23-5; *Phil.* 2.51, 115; 3.3, ?5; 4.3, 7; 5.18, 43; 6.6; 7.27; 8.9, 15 (body politic metaphor); 10.9, 11, 23; 11.8, 21; 13.19, ?25; 14.4, 20.

⁶ On Catiline's followers as representing a wider trend, see *In Cat.* 1.30, 31; 2.11; *Mur.* 78; *Sulla* 28, 53.

⁷ For Verres as *pestis*, see *In Verr.* 2.1.96, 2.3.64, 125; Catiline as *pestis*: *In Cat.* 1.11, 1.30; 2.2; *Mur.* 52, 85, *Sulla* 76; *Post Red. in Sen.* 3, 17; Clodius as *pestis*: *de Domo Sua* 2, 5, 26, 72, 85, 99, 144; *Sest.*

portrayed as a source of (moral) infection for others,⁸ or else (more rarely) just stands alone as an infected element of the body politic needing to be removed.

In the *Catilinarians* in particular, Cicero calls upon these medical metaphors heavily. Twelve metaphorical uses of medical imagery occur in these four speeches, all but two of them coming in the *First* and *Second Catilinarians*.⁹ Cicero portrays Catiline as a plague (*pestis*) that needs to be removed from the city (i.e. the “body politic”) along with the other conspirators, who form part of the sickness as well. He tells Catiline *educ tecum etiam omnes tuos, si minus, quam plurimos; purga urbem* (“lead out with yourself all your men, or, if not all, as many as possible; purge the city¹⁰ [sc. of this disease]” (*In Cat.* 1.10)). Later Cicero expands the metaphor of disease in the body politic at length (my emphasis):

Hoc autem uno interfecto intellego hanc rei publicae pestem paulisper reprimi, non in perpetuum comprimi posse. Quodsi se eiecerit secumque suos eduxerit et eodem ceteros undique collectos naufragos adgregarit, extinguetur atque delebitur non modo haec tam adulta rei publicae pestis, verum etiam stirps ac semen malorum omnium.

I well know that if this one man is killed, this plague upon the state can be curbed for a short while, but cannot be repressed forever. But if he throws himself out and brings his men with him, and amasses to that same place the rest of the shipwrecked men he’s gathered from all over, then not only will this plague of the Republic, which has advanced so far, be stamped out and obliterated, but also the root and seed of all trouble.¹¹ (*In Cat.* 1.30)

Quodsi ex tanto latrocinio iste unus tolletur, videbimur fortasse ad breve quoddam tempus cura et metu esse relevati, periculum autem residebit et erit inclusum penitus in venis atque in

33, 39, 65, 78, 83, 135; *In Vat.* 6?, 18?, 25?, 33; *Mil.* 33, 40, 88; Antony as *pestis*: *Phil.* 2.55?, 3.3, 3.5, 4.3, 4.7, 5.18, 5.43, 6.6, 7.27, 8.15, 14.4.

⁸ E.g. those following Clodius, *De Domo Sua* 108: *qui aliqua se contagione praedae, societatis, emptionis contaminaverunt* (“those who caught the infection of plundering, partnership, and buying anything and polluted themselves”)

⁹ *In Cat.* 1.10, 11, 30, 31; 2.1, 2, 6, 11 (twice), 17; 3.15; 4.2.

¹⁰ Dyck 2008 ad loc argues that Cicero’s analogy intends hygienic, not medical, connotations, and refers the reader to *In Cat.* 1.12.8-9 where Cicero says *exhaurietur ex urbe tuorum comitum magna et pernicio sentina rei publicae*. In my view, however, the distinction btw plague and contagion on the one hand and filth on the other (as represented in the term *sentina*) is too fine, and in the end, is unnecessary.

¹¹ The metaphorical language in this passage mixes the language of plague (*pestis, reprimi*) and of planting/growth, which adds to the sense of the in-grown and stubborn nature of the “plague” Catiline’s conspiracy.

visceribus rei publicae. Ut saepe homines aegri morbo gravi cum aestu febrigue iactantur, si aquam gelidam biberunt, primo relevari videntur, deinde multo gravius vehementiusque adfluctantur, sic hic morbus, qui est in re publica, relevatus istius poena vehementius reliquis vivis ingravescet.

If just this one man is removed from such a large band of robbers, we will perhaps appear to have been relieved for some short period from anxiety and fear, but the danger will remain and be lodged deep within the veins and vital parts of the Republic. Just as men sick with a serious illness and tossed about by a burning fever, if they drink cold water¹², often appear at first to be relieved, but then become more seriously and violently ill than before, so this sickness which is in our state, if it is relieved by the punishment of this one man, will get much more serious since the rest of them will still be alive. (*In Cat.* 1.31)

Once Catiline did leave Rome for Manlius' camp in Etruria, Cicero could boast *quae*

[Roma] *quidem mihi laetari videtur, quoniam tantem pestem evomuerit forasque*

proiecerit ("It seems to me Rome can rejoice, since she has vomited out and expelled this

great pestilence." (*In Cat.* 2.2)).¹³ Yet Cicero will not let the Senate (*In Cat.* 1) or the

people (*In Cat.* 2) forget that he himself, that physician of the Republic, was applying his

healing powers to cure the state: *Quos si meus consulatus, quoniam sanare non potest,*

sustulerit ("But if my consulship will have succeeded in removing those men, since it has

not been able to cure them¹⁴..." (*In Cat.* 2.11)); *quae sanari poterunt, quacumque ratione*

sanabo, quae resecanda erunt, non patiar ad perniciem civitatis manere ("What can be

healed, I will heal in whatever way I can; what will have to be cut away,¹⁵ I will not

¹² The onset and treatment of thirst during a fever is discussed i.a. by Celsus *de Medicina* 3.6.1 (cf. Dyck 2008: 120).

¹³ Cf. *In Cat.* 2.1 (*abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit*). For vomiting upon the ingestion of something harmful see Celsus *de Medicina* 1.3.17-19 (Dyck 2008: 129)

¹⁴ Dyck 2008 ad loc. cites Demosthenes *On the Crown* 324 as a parallel for using of *sanare* in the double meaning of "cure" and "bring to reason": εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἔχουσιν ἀνιάτως, τούτους μὲν αὐτοὺς καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐξώλεις καὶ προώλεις ἐν γῇ καὶ θαλάττῃ ποιήσατε. More generally, Demosthenes too makes heavy use of medical language and images of disease for political corruption in his political speeches (e.g. *Olynthiac* 2.14, 21; 3.33; *Chers.* 36, 46; *Phil.* 1.3, 11; 3.12, 29, 39, 50; 4.46-9; *On the Crown* 45, 62, 198, 243, 324; *de Fals. Leg.* 259, 262) – thus in many ways providing a prominent precedent for Cicero's usage. See in general Wooten 1979: *passim*, and p.157n1 for prior work on Demosthenes' use of medical language.

¹⁵ For the origin of this term in arboriculture and its subsequent application to surgery see Dyck 2008 ad loc. Cf. Cato *de Agr.* 47. On Cicero's use of *resecare* and *sanare* see Att. 1.18.2; Att. 2.1.7 (*exsecare*). cf. Att. 4.3.3 (*diaeta/chirurgia*).

suffer to remain and cause the destruction of the Republic.” (*In Cat.* 2.11)). Like a good doctor, he seeks not the destruction, but the healing, of the patient (*In Cat.* 2.17):

Quos quidem ego, si ullo modo fieri possit, non tam ulcisci studeo quam sanare sibi ipsos...Exponam enim vobis, Quirites, ex quibus generibus hominum istae copiae comparentur; deinde singulis medicinam consilii atque orationis meae, si quam potero, adferam.

If at all possible, I do not want to punish these offenders but heal them...I will show you, gentlemen, the various types of men from whom their ranks are filled. And then I will apply to each in turn the medicine of my counsel and my speech, as much of it as I can.¹⁶
(transl. M. Grant 1973 (adapted))

Cicero’s use of such medical metaphors, and of terms for disease (*morbus*, *pestis*), in the *Catilinarians* represents but a small sample of all such uses in his oratory, but here in the *Catilinarians* we see him employing it systematically to build a particular image (of himself and of Catiline) that spans multiple speeches and multiple audiences.¹⁷

Now, as noted earlier, Cicero, in using this aspect of the trope of the body politic throughout his entire oratorical corpus, seems to have been by no means an exception among late Republican writers. Nonetheless, given that Cicero’s speeches against Catiline were quite well-known¹⁸ and that Sallust chose to write a historical monograph

¹⁶ For further application of the doctor-patient metaphor, see *In Cat.* 3.15 (*ut ex tanta coniuratione tantaque hac multitudine domesticorum hostium novem hominum perditissimorum poena re publica conservata reliquorum mentes sanari posse arbitrantur*), *In Cat.* 4.2 (*multa meo quodam dolore in vestro timore sanavi*). cf. *Cic. ad Att.* 1.18.2, 2.1.7 for the application of the doctor-patient metaphor (*sanare* – *re/exsecare*) to a social context. On the particular imagery of cutting away the diseased portion to save the rest (seen above in *In Cat.* 2.11 (2x); 3.15), see Aranita 2009: 45, who notes Cicero’s usage and compares Livy’s (*Livy* 28.26.2).

¹⁷ Cf. *Pro Mur.* 52, 78, 85 (all three about Catiline as well). Leff 1973 uses what he calls “redemptive identification” in the *Catilinarians* to account for all aspects of the *Catilinarians* – Cicero’s persona, his changing tones, his characterization of Catiline, and every broad and specific rhetorical tactic he employs, including his use of medical language – under the umbrella of a theory of society-wide guilt and scapegoating behavior that cleanses all other members of society of their feelings of guilt or perceived association with iniquity. Yet the application of his abstract theory to the specifics of the situation is unclear (e.g. is this “guilt” that of all Romans, or that of the upper classes only? Is Cicero merely picking up on this and crafting his rhetoric to appeal to it, or is the guilt solely felt/acted upon by Cicero?). In any case, all of these varied aspects of the *Catilinarians* can be accounted for without reference to Leff’s argument.

¹⁸ A point proven by Sallust’s statement at *BC* 31.6: *Tum vero M. Tullius consul...orationem habuit luculentam atque utilem rei publicae, quam postea scriptam edidit*. On Sallust’s knowledge of Cicero’s

on Catiline's conspiracy, it is reasonable to expect Sallust to have engaged with (and to have responded to) Cicero's treatment of Catiline – both its language and its content. This, I contend, is just what we see Sallust doing through his own use of the trope of the body politic and the language of disease and contagion.

It seems to have been recognized even in antiquity that Sallust, like Cicero, made frequent use of the trope of the body politic, and of the language of disease and contagion in particular. Festus, for instance, cites Sallust *Historiae* 4.46M (41McG) (*qui quidem mos uti tabes in urbem coniectus* ("This practice [judicial corruption] was cast upon the city like a wasting disease")) and remarks (359.2M): *tabem eam, quae faceret tabescere, apud antiquos usurpatum, Sallustius quoque frequenter* ("Tabes, the thing that causes a wasting away [or consumption, putrefaction], was employed by ancient writers, frequently by Sallust as well"). Sallust calls upon the language of disease in all three of his works to describe the corruption of behavior and thought, often employing a wider range of terminology than Cicero (who seems to favor the term *pestis*). Moreover, while Cicero applies such language most always to individuals, who are termed a *pestis*, Sallust applies it more often to groups (the *plebs*, the nobility, the followers of Catiline from the countryside, etc.).¹⁹ In those Sallustian examples where a group is the diseased subject,

writings see inter alia Syme 1964: 73; FRHist I.368-79; Vretska 1976: 37, 43, 54, 61, 66; 264-6 (noting similar characterizations at *Leg Agr.* 2.13, *de Harus. Resp.* 2 (Clodius), *Orator* 74, *de Off.* 1.128, *Tusc.* 3.26: I would add also *In Cat.* 3.13 (of Catiline's followers). Rosenblitt 2011: 417f notes Sallust's clear engagement with Cicero's rhetoric in *Post Red. ad Populum* [1] and with his whitewashed depiction of C. Cotta in *de Nat. Deorum* [1.15, 3.5-6, 3.15], with echoes of *De Domo Sua* also possible - citing i.a. Dyck 2004). See Ledworski 1994: 60-72 on Sallust's knowledge of Cicero's *Philippics*. On Cicero's publication of his consular speeches cf. *Cic. Ad Att.* 2.1.3 (ca. June 3, 60).

¹⁹ Instances where Sallust applies the terminology to individuals: *BJ* 24.2 (Jugurtha), 89.6 (Marius), 93.3.25 (Ligurian soldier). To groups: *BC* 10.6 (all Romans), 31.1.18 (all Romans), 36.5 (Catiline's followers); *BJ* 13.1.20 (Adherbal + all Numidians), 14.10 (Carthaginians), 14.25 (*regnum Numidiae*), 27.3 (all Romans), 32.4 (Roman army in Africa), 35.9 (Numidians), 39.1 (Roman people), 41.9 (nobility), 84.3 (*capite censi*), *Hist.* 1.55.19M (all Romans), 1.77.9M (all Romans; or nobles?), 4.46M (equites and senators).

the source of the infection or “disease”, so to speak, is never explicitly stated to be a person, and it is only implied to be a person in two cases (out of about 20 total)(*BJ* 27.3, 32.4); instead, Sallust focuses on the action of some concrete thing, like a moral vice (e.g. *avaritia*), “infecting” the behavior of these groups. This stands in stark contrast to Cicero’s use of plague language noted above. The following examples give one a good sense of the range of Sallust’s unique usage:

Post, ubi contagio quasi pestilentia invasit, civitas inmutata, imperium ex iustissimo atque optumo crudele intolerandumque factum.

Later, when the infection fell upon the state like a pestilence, the state was changed, and its rule went from being the most just and the best to being harsh and intolerable. (*BC* 10.6)

Namque duobus senati decretis ex tanta multitudine neque praemio inductus coniurationem patefecerat neque ex castris Catilinae quisquam omnium discesserat: tanta vis morbi atque uti tabes plerosque civium animos invaserat.

For despite the two decrees of the Senate, not one person from so great a multitude [sc. of Catiline’s followers] either disclosed the conspiracy after being induced by a reward, or departed from Catiline’s camp: such a powerful sickness had attacked a great many of the citizens’ minds like a consuming disease. (*BC* 36.5)

[Jugurtha], quem tanta lubido extinguendi me invasit

[Jugurtha], whom such a great lust has invaded for stamping me out. (*BJ* 24.2)

Tanta vis avaritiae in animos eorum [the Roman army in Numidia] veluti tabes invaserat.

So powerful a greed had invaded their hearts, just like a consuming disease. (*BJ* 32.4)

Sed ea res [Marius losing popular support] frustra sperata: tanta lubido cum Mario eundi plerosque invaserat.

But that was hoped for in vain: so great a passion for going with Marius had invaded the majority of them. (*BJ* 84.3)

Eius [sc. Capsa] potiundi Marium maxima cupido invaserat.

A very great passion for capturing Capsa invaded Marius. (*BJ* 89.6)

Satis illa fuerint quae rabie contracta toleravimus, manus conserentis inter se Romanos exercitus et arma ab externis in nosmet convorsa.

What we endured when we were infected with madness was enough – Roman armies clashing with each other in battle, and weapons turned from away from external enemies and against ourselves. (Hist. 1.55.19M)

Ut animadvortatis neu patiamini licentiam scelerum quasi rabiem ad integros contactu procedere.

That you take notice and not suffer that the license to do evil spreads like a madness to the unaffected by contact. (Hist. 1.77.9M)

As these examples show, Sallust often explicitly includes a term of disease (*contagio*, *pestilentia*, *morbus*, *tabes*, *rabies*, *contactus*), but sometimes he omits any such term and just includes a reference to a particular vice (e.g. *avaritia*) within the construction.²⁰

Although there are ten examples that omit such explicit disease terminology (*BC* 31.1.18, *BJ* 13.1.20, 24.2, 27.3, 35.9, 39.1, 41.9, 84.3, 89.6), it is fairly clear that these ten too are meant to have a medical tinge to them just like the examples cited above that *do* exhibit such terminology. For in these ten examples, although there are no explicit terms like *morbus*, *pestis*, and the like, the medical analogy is implied by the use of the verb *invadere*, which helps position these ten examples in the same semantic field as the others.²¹ The medical connotations possible with *invadere* are clearly indicated in the TLL entry for the word: “s.v. 1. *uim admouendo incurrere, adoriri*; 2. *de accessu*

²⁰ Of the examples above, *BJ* 24.2, 84.3, & 89.6 omit specific disease terms in this way, referencing some moral vice instead. Other examples of the medical metaphor that omit such terms for disease include *BC* 31.1.18 (*ex summa laetitia atque lascivia...repente omnis tristitia invasit*), *BJ* 13.1.20 (*Adherbalem...metus invadit*), 27.3 (*tanta vis gratiae atque pecuniae regis erat*), 35.9 (*veritus ne reliquos popularis metus invaderet parendi sibi*), 39.1 (*sed ubi ea Romae conperta sunt [ie Aul. Albinus' defeat], metus atque maeror civitatem invasere*), 41.9 (*ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo modestiaque invadere, polluere et vastare omnia*).

²¹ Of all of these ten examples that omit explicit disease terms, only *BJ* 27.3 does not include a form of *invadere*. It does, however, include the basic structure of the *tanta* [vis] ___ *erat/invasit* construction which is common to a number of the Sallustian passages that clearly employ the medical metaphor (e.g. *BC* 36.5 *tanta vis morbi atque uti tabes plerosque civium animos invaserat*; *BJ* 32.4 *tanta vis avaritiae in animos eorum veluti tabes invaserat*; 84.3 *tanta libido cum Mario eundi plerosque invaserat*; cf. 89.6 *Eius [sc.Capsa] potiundi Marium maxima cupido invaserat*). As Woodman 2006: 315 notes (also noted by Aranita 2009: 39), constructions like this, using *vis*, or more specifically [*tanta*] *vis morbi* of madness, render *vis* almost a technical term for disease. Cf. i.a. Livy 28.29.3: *vis morbi...in vestras mentes invasit*; Livy 3.47.4.

morborem et affectuum animi.”²² If we take *invadere* to be indicative of the medical metaphor, then other examples could perhaps added of Sallust’s use of disease terminology for moral discourse: *BC* 2.5, 5.6, and 12.2.²³

It seems clear, then, that in all of these examples from Sallust, whether or not an explicit disease term is included, concepts like *cupido pecuniae/imperii* (*BC* 10.3), *licentia scelerum* (*Hist.* 1.77.9.26), *lubido* (*BJ* 24.2), *gratia* and *pecunia* (*BJ* 27.3), *potentia* and *avaritia* (*BJ* 41.9), *lubido cum Mario eundi* (*BJ* 84.3), *potiundi cupido* (*BJ* 89.6), or *rabies* (*Hist.* 1.55.19M) are being conceptualized as moral diseases or sicknesses that “invade” individuals or large groups.

Yet amidst all of this moral sickness spreading through the Republic, Sallust has chosen to omit any mention of a doctor, someone who might heal the state of the sickness, or at least expel it. In the *BC* there is of course Cicero, who is given credit for vigilance and planning (30.7, 36.3, 41.5; cf. 44.1, 45.2), and for capturing and uncovering the conspirators in the city (48.2). Yet the text ends with a mix of closure and uncertainty as regards the effects of the conspiracy (*BC* 61.9): *ita varie per omnem exercitum laetitia maeror, luctus atque gaudia agitabantur* (“Thus through the whole army emotions shifted between exultation and grief, lament and joy”). Moreover some of Sallust’s central moral discourse highlights systemic and still worsening issues of political

²² Cf. also Plautus *Asin.* 55 (*sed eum morbus invasit gravis*); *Trinn.* 28 (*nam hic nimium morbus mores invasit bonos*); Varro *Vit. Pop. Rom.* fr. 121 Riposati = Nonnus 499 M (*tanta porro inuasit cupiditas honorum plerisque, ut uel caelum ruere, dummodo magistratum adipiscantur, exoptent*)(cf. fr. 123 Rip. (= Non. 117M)); Livy 5.13.2 (*dulcedo invasit proximis comitiis tribunorum militum plebeios creandi*)

²³ *BC* 2.5 (*verum ubi pro labore desidia, pro continentia et aequitate lubido atque superbia invasere*), 5.6 (*hunc post dominationem L. Sullae lubido maxuma invaserat rei publicae capiundae*), 12.2 (*igitur ex divitiis iuventutem luxuria atque avaritia cum superbia invasere*). For instances of Sallust’s use of *invadere* in a military rather than a medical sense, see: *BJ* 20.7 (*neque eo magis cupido Iugurthae minuebatur, quippe qui totum eius regnum animo iam invaserat* (a mix of milit. and metaph)), 21.2, 35.9 (of *metus*); 49.3, 97.3, 98.1, 101.4, 101.6; *Hist.* 2.95M, 4.76M, 5.1-2M.

ambition, greed, and luxury (e.g. *BC* 10, 12-13, 37-9, 53), and the agrarian issues that induced many outside the city to take up arms with Catiline were still unresolved years later when civil war again erupted.²⁴ These same factors prove that, for all its moral vigor, the moral discourse of Cato at *BC* 52 was also ultimately not, in Sallust's view, a source of remedy for the systemic ailments of the Republic.

In the *BJ* the tribune Memmius (along with C. Mamilius Limetanus) does help bring about the investigation of wrongdoing in the *quaestio Mamilia* (*BJ* 27.2, 30.3, 32.1, 40.1), but the success of this is short-lived. Marius comes into the narrative as a figure who, to use Sallust's words, might be able *superbiae nobilitatis obviam ire*. Yet, as we have seen earlier (Chapter 2), Sallust portrays Marius as following a downward course from ostensible standard-bearer for the *novi homines* to someone corrupted by *ira*, *cupido*, and *ambitio* (*BJ* 63.5, 64.4-5).

Indeed Sallust's historiography at its core leads one ineluctably to the conclusion that, contrary to Cicero's assertions, there is no cure for the sicknesses afflicting the Republic.²⁵ For one, the Romans innately suffer from discord, ambition, and greed, just like any other nation (*Hist* 1.7, 1.11M). In Sallust's view these tendencies were then compounded by the consequences of world conquest – namely, the growth of luxury and

²⁴ On lingering agrarian issues see Osgood 2006: 47. As late as early 60 B.C.E. the Senate tasked the praetor C. Octavius with putting down runaway slaves around Thurii on his way to his province of Macedonia. These were apparently leftovers from Spartacus' and Catiline's rebellions who had joined together (Brennan 2000: 433, 534).

²⁵ Contrary also, as we have mentioned, to the view of Thucydides on the heuristic value of history (e.g. Thuc. 1.22.4, 2.48.3). Contrast too the judgment of Wooten 1979: 160 on the function of Demosthenes' medical language, which is not unlike Cicero's: "Demosthenes makes the same causative distinction that the doctors made...By showing the Athenians what was the true cause of their distress and by relating it to the medical imagery used elsewhere in his speeches, he hoped to show them that they also could be cured." Tiffou (1973: 320, 350) also takes the opposite view on Sallust from that I propose above – though no clear and detailed line of reasoning is presented in support of his view.

otium (e.g. *BC* 10, *BJ* 41, *Hist.* 1.11M). Whether it is the Jugurthine War, the Catilinarian Conspiracy, or the tumultuous decade from 78-67, Sallust shows us the recurrence – and worsening – of what had always been there. In his last work one might hope for someone like Sertorius, or Pompey, to take up the mantle of being a restorer of order to the Republic, but this is a fleeting glimmer of hope; for in Pompey we are given hints of Sulla,²⁶ and, looking ahead, some of Caesar and Octavian.²⁷ The hindsight with which Sallust writes tells us much here. Sallust's use of the trope of the body politic, and the way he responds to Cicero in his use of medical metaphors, thus reinforces the essence of Sallust's deep pessimism running through all of his texts.

Although in general my practice has been to avoid making claims about Sallust's philosophical or political influences that pretend to excessive certainty, in the case of Sallust's use of this particular trope it seems fitting to end this chapter's analysis by referring our attention back to Posidonius fr. 163EK. Here Posidonius considers the use of the medical analogy to describe the operation of the emotions and of the rational and irrational faculties of the soul. Interestingly, just as Sallust's use of medical language reinforces his pessimism about human nature and our successful pursuit of *virtus*, this fragment reveals Posidonius' own views on human nature and its fallibility, which turn out to be not dissimilar from those of Sallust.

²⁶ With Sulla's ability to dissimulate (*BJ* 95.3: *ad simulanda <ac dissimulanda> omnia altitudo ingenii incredibilis*) compare Sallust's description of Pompey (*Hist.* 2.16): *oris probi, animi inverecundo*. Cf. also *Hist.* 5.20: *quibus de causis Sullam dictatorem uni sibi descendere equo, assurgere sella, caput aperire solitum*; and *Hist.* 5.21: *Spe<ciem et> celebritatem nominis intellego timentem* (Gabinus speaking about Pompey). Echoing this fragment cf. Cassius Dio 36.24.5-6; 25-29 (Pompey's deferent speech and Gabinus' reply), and Cic. *Ad Att.* 4.15.7: *Pompeius fremit, queritur, Scauro studet, sed utrum fronte an mente dubitatur*.

²⁷ On echoes of the "Second" Triumvirate and its members in Sallust, see Chapter 9. Cf. *BC* 51.36, *BJ* 3. On Pompey foreshadowing Octavian, see Gerrish 2015.

In Fr. 163EK, Posidonius takes issue with Chrysippus' use of the analogy of the sick man to explain various states of mind not just of imperfect men (φαῦλοι), but also of the ideal wise man. Chrysippus, it is argued, created a straight analogy between psychic and physical health when that was impossible, because the "state of perfect immunity of soul of the wise man has no counterpart in physical health."²⁸ In other words, there is no body that is immune to sickness like the wise man's mind is to emotions/*pathe*. Chrysippus, though, "made a straight analogy between medicine and philosophy, health and moral sanity, and therefore a comparison without qualification between physical and mental cures."²⁹ When Kidd steps back to consider the implications of Posidonius' argument, we gain insight into what might have been a possible influence on Sallust's own views of human nature (Kidd 1988: 585):

The fragment also displays Posidonius' concern, typical of much of the later Stoa, with the facts of the common human situation. The vast majority, if not all of us, are φαῦλοι (line 39).³⁰ The majority of mankind are not sick but healthy, but falling more or less easily into

²⁸ Kidd 1988: 584.

²⁹ Kidd 1988: 585.

³⁰ The relevant line from the fragment (τὰς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ φαύλων τοῖς ἐπὶ σμικρᾷ προφάσει νοσοῦσι, "the minds of the majority, who are imperfect, are like bodies sick at a slight cause" Galen *de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 5.2.9) is actually from the section where Galen criticizes Posidonius' position (though Galen makes a few mistaken inferences about Posidonius' ideas here: see Kidd 1988: 584-5) and develops what Posidonius meant in more detail. However, Galen's wording here does follow the thought of Posidonius. That Posidonius himself believed most men were imperfect and prone to the mental "sickness" of emotion and passion, can be ascertained from earlier in the same fragment when Galen directly quotes Posidonius' words in two instances (my emphasis): (5.2.5) ἀλλὰ δικαιότερον εἶναι προσεικάζειν τὰς τῶν φαύλων ψυχὰς ἥτοι τῇ σωματικῇ ὑγιείᾳ ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπωτον εἰς νόσον (οὕτω γὰρ ὠνόμασεν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος) ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ νόσῳ ("No, he said, it was more correct to liken the minds of imperfect men 'either to physical health with its proneness to disease' (that was Posidonius' nomenclature), 'or to disease itself'". Cf. 5.2.7: λέγει γοῦν ὧδε κατὰ λέξιν· "διὸ καὶ ἡ νόσος τῆς ψυχῆς ἔοικεν οὐχ ὥς ὁ Χρύσιππος ὑπέιληφε... ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχικὴ νόσος ἥτοι σωματικῇ ὑγιείᾳ ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπωτον εἰς τὴν νόσον ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ νόσῳ" ("At least he says the following, and I quote him: 'For this reason too sickness of the mind is not like, as Chrysippus had assumed... mental sickness is rather like either physical health with its proneness to disease, or to disease itself.'")(Transl. Kidd). Both passages attest to Posidonius' belief that the minds of the majority, because they are not always free from emotion and passion, are like bodies prone to sickness. Such views were vital to Posidonius' general ethical and moral philosophy, as seen e.g. in Fr. 30EK: "He [P.] writes these very words: 'I believe that the examination of things good and evil, and that of ends, and that of virtues, all depend on the correct examination of emotions'". And Fr. 150a: "Posidonius says that instruction on the virtues and on the end is also tied to this [sc. the study of emotions], and that in short all the doctrines of ethical philosophy are bound as if by a single cord to the knowledge of the powers [or faculties] of the soul..."(Transl. Kidd).

sickness to which we are all liable from our constitution. This is the factual position, which Chrysippus tends to ignore (T83; Galen, 403.5-10M).

A broad principle of Sallustian moral thought finds a parallel here, namely, that all men by their nature, not being perfect, are liable to fall into corrupt behavior under the influence of the irrational (and animal) aspect of our spirit, if we do not let our rational and divine faculty control us – a condition which can be likened (as it is by *both* Posidonius and Sallust) to the onset of disease. One is reminded in particular of Sallust's remarks on the innate moral failings of all men, including Romans, at *Hist.* 1.7M (*nobis primae dissensiones vitio humani ingenii evenere...*) and 1.11M (*At discordia et avaritia atque ambitio et cetera...mala post Carthaginis excidium maxume aucta sunt. Nam iniuriae validiorum et ob eas discessio plebis a patribus aliaeque dissensiones domi fuere iam inde a principio*), and in addition our analysis of pessimism in the *BJ* uncovered various ways in which Sallust questions the innate moral superiority of Romans.³¹

Again, whether these general beliefs of Posidonius on the emotions and on human behavior actually did influence Sallust's own historical and moral perspective (and particularly his view of human fallability), we cannot say with certainty; discussion of this particular fragment is meant merely to point out one possible source (no doubt among many), which, if he had knowledge of it, would have been amenable to Sallust in either establishing or confirming his approach to this particular trope.

³¹ See above, Chapter 6.1 (e.g. comparison of early Africans and early Romans; the characterization of Jugurtha in relation to Romans; Sallust's own statements about *virtus* and the *animus* in the prologue of the *BJ*)

Chapter 9: The Triumviral Context of Sallustian Historiography

The main goal of this study has been to explore the nature of Sallust's moral outlook and his perspective on Roman history, and to establish that Sallust uses several techniques, both direct and indirect, to convey a consistent pessimism about Roman behavior in the *BC*, the *BJ*, and the *Histories*. The present chapter aims both to reflect upon and to contextualize the discussion already sketched in previous chapters, hopefully bringing us to a fuller understanding of why Sallust writes the way he does about Roman history and Roman morality. In pursuit of this, I will explore below some aspects of the social and political context of the Triumviral Period in which Sallust was writing, and how this Triumviral context impacted the writings of both Sallust and his contemporaries.

Although we will see that the social and political turmoil of the Triumviral age undoubtedly exerted an important influence upon Sallust's historical outlook and his pessimism about Roman history, the goal of this chapter is not to use Sallust's Triumviral environment as a cover-all explanation for the nature of Sallust's historiography. Indeed, our discussion in previous chapters should remind us that Sallust's historical and moral outlook likely took shape through a confluence of several factors whose relative influence is not easy to measure with exactness or to deny outright (Sallust's own public career; his association and interaction with Pompey, Caesar, Clodius, and others; philosophical ideas or commonplaces encountered in his education or reading; the influence of generic conventions and his historiographical predecessors).

With this caveat in mind, the present chapter, after a few preliminary considerations, will fall into two main parts: in the first, we will undertake a brief survey of the passages in Sallust's texts which are most commonly considered allusions to events or people of

the Triumviral Period (c.43-35 B.C.E.¹). It will become clear that Sallustian historiography was meant to be highly allusive, and that it was meant to encourage a critical consideration of the actions and the public image of the triumvirs Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus.² It is indeed the case that “the *Histories* are nominally about the 70s, but they are *about* the Triumviral period.”³ We will see that this principle is also applicable to Sallust’s monographs.

In the second part of the chapter, we will survey a selection of the more prominent authors and works from the Triumviral Era and ask to what degree they may reveal broader trends of optimism or pessimism about contemporary Rome, or about Roman morality more generally. Through this comparative survey, a number of themes and preoccupations will emerge that were shared between Sallust and his contemporaries, from the endless repetition of civil war, to the harsh and fickle rule of Fortune, to the growth of political ambition, to the horrors of civil strife at home. Such shared preoccupations confirm that Sallust’s moral and historical outlook was indeed influenced to some degree by the socio-political milieu of the late Republic.

At the same time, however, a comparison with the earlier conclusions of this study will also allow us to discern that Sallust’s pessimism about Roman morality and history is more unadulterated, more unconditional than that of others who wrote into the later Triumviral Period (especially after 36). Indeed, Osgood notes that, after the Battle of

¹ While the Triumviral Period is commonly dated from the death of Cicero to Actium in 31 B.C.E., Sallust’s estimated date of death imposes an obvious limit on contemporary allusions in his texts, and should also be kept in mind when considering why Sallust maintains a pessimistic outlook through his latest text (the *Histories*) while others writing (and publishing) in the late 30s and after Actium show some signs of hope mixed among bleak reflections about civil war.

² This method of Sallust’s writing is usefully referred to by Gerrish (2015: 197, 211) as “analogical historiography”. On this method in Sallust see McGushin 1992: 18-19. On the inevitability and naturalness of retrojection and analogical historiography in the Roman annalistic tradition, see Oakley 1997: 86-8, 482.

³ Gerrish 2015: 196-7.

Naulochus in September 36 B.C.E., as Octavian and his associates began to undertake tangible improvements to the city of Rome and its infrastructure, taxed so intensely by civil wars and conflict with Sextus Pompey, Latin literature starts “to sound notes of victory more than mourn loss; the circle traced by Fortune's wheel was being transmuted into the line of a triumphal procession. Octavian was weaving around himself a teleological history that freed Romans from the aimless repetition of civil war.”⁴ Sallust seems not to have lived long enough to see or absorb much – or rather any – of this sense of promise.

Yet Osgood also rightly qualifies the abovementioned picture of the hopes taking root in Triumviral Era literature by pointing out that works like Vergil's *Georgics*, completed after Actium but composed throughout the 30s, and Horace's *Epodes*, completed in 30 but begun several years earlier, still evoke the horrors of the entire Triumviral period rather prominently. This seems in fact to be true of much of the literature of the Triumviral Era: though the reality around them might have been slowly changing after Naulochus, strong expressions of uncertainty, pessimism, or the horrors of civil war continued well after 36. And although many people in Rome and Italy may have had increased reasons for hope, which began to manifest more in literature as well,⁵ it remained the case for the whole course of the 30s – and even somewhat after Actium – that such glimmers of promise did not completely blot out the uncertainties, fears, and memories of horrid civil strife that characterized the Triumviral Age as a whole. As a

⁴ Osgood 2006: 347.

⁵ E.g., in Horace's *Epodes*, *Epode* 1 illustrates aspects of Actium-era propaganda on Octavian's side manifesting within the *Epodes* collection, as does *Epode* 9; Vergil's *Eclogue* 4, composed closer to the early 30s, is an earlier example of a sense of promise; cf. also *Georgics* 2.136-76 (the *Laudes Italiae*), and *Georgics* 3.1-48. For discussion see Osgood 2006: 357-8, 383, 400-1.

result we can speak of certain themes being common to the entire period from 44-31, for both Sallust and his contemporaries: the horrors of civil war, displacement, murder, famine, decay of political morality, rise of ambition and avarice, uncertainty about the future, doubt about renewal. These are the themes which we shall explore in both Sallust and his contemporaries below.

If, as will become clear in the course of the chapter, Sallust's historiographical method included the encoding of perspectives on the present into his narratives about the past, a few preliminary matters would reward brief consideration here: the dates of composition (as exact as allowable) of Sallust's works, and the stated as well as possible underlying motives for his choice of subject in each work. As I will argue, scholars have not seen clearly enough that Sallust's motives for selecting each respective subject certainly did include their relevance to the social and political developments of the Triumviral Period.

Regarding the dating of Sallust's texts, there is agreement that the *BC* was his first text, followed by the *BJ*, and finally the *Histories*.⁶ A certain level of general consensus places the composition of the *BC* between 42 and 41, the *BJ* between 41 and 40, and the *Histories* between 39 and his death.⁷ For the *BC* in particular, a common *terminus post*

⁶ See e.g. *BJ* 95.2 (*neque alio loco de Sullae rebus dicturi sumus*), which has been seen as proof that Sallust had not started the *Histories* when the *BJ* was written. cf Paul 1984, McGushin 1977, 1992.

⁷ The relative order of the works not being in question: see Chapter 1. For the alternate view that a first draft of the *BC* was written ca. 50 BC, to help exculpate Caesar from involvement in the Catilinarian Conspiracy at a crucial time in his career while also bolstering Sallust's own case for readmission to the Senate, see i.a. MacKay 1962: 185-192, who sees *BC* 4.2.16-17 as evidence of Sallust returning after 44 BC to finish what he had started (p.190). That Sallust was a political pamphleteer of Caesar, and also that the work was written before the civil war, are no longer popular propositions (though cf. Zecchini 2002: 50, 53). For further discussion of the dating of Sallust's works see Funaioli in *RE* s.v. "Sallustius" no 10, col.1921; Paul 1984: 2 (placing the *BJ* around 41-40, overlapping with the Perusine War).

quem is Caesar's death.⁸ For a more definite date of composition, the view of Syme that the *BC* was begun in 42 and not finished until probably late 41, is followed by most subsequent commentators.⁹ Ledworuski appeals to the influence of Cicero to establish this same date of composition, claiming that notable echoes of Cicero's *Philippics* in Sallust's *BC* mean Sallust likely started composing after their publication, and likely after Cicero's death.¹⁰ A date during 42 and 41 for composition and publication of the *BC* is thus likely. It is surely misleading, therefore, to argue that the *BC* (or the *BJ*) must have been published before the formation of the second Triumvirate on the grounds that Sallust could not have gotten away with criticizing the triumvirs after that. For as we saw earlier (Chapter 3) and will see further in Section 1 of the present chapter, Sallust's methods of directly critiquing contemporary conditions are designed to be sufficiently vague while remaining clear in intention, and his use of "analogical historiography", enlisting past events to indirectly critique contemporary individuals or events, has been sufficiently documented by modern scholars.

We may move to consider Sallust's motives for his choice of subject in each work. It is clear that the subject of the *BC* is the conspiracy of Catiline. Sallust's motives for writing on this particular theme are a bit harder to ascertain with certainty. His stated motive is *id facinus in primis memorabile existumo sceleris atque periculi novitate* ("that deed was especially worthy of remembrance for the novelty both of the crime and of the danger it posed."). While it may be true that an internal political revolution was not so

⁸ McGushin 1977: 6; Ledworuski 1994: 61.

⁹ Syme 1964: 128 (who notes previous scholars who placed the composition during Cicero's lifetime). Cf. McGushin 1977: 7; Ledworuski 1994: 70-71; Osgood 2006: 261.

¹⁰ Ledworuski 1994: 64, 70-71. She also claims (61) that Cicero's *Consilia* could not have influenced Sallust's decision to write the *BC* since the *Consilia*, if published at all, were probably not published until 42 at the earliest, possibly 41.

common at Rome as in Greece, it is probably reasonable to question the assertion that Catiline's conspiracy was the *most* dangerous development at Rome in the 1st century B.C.E.¹¹ Additional motives may be inferred.¹² As a subject for his first foray into historiography, it is possible that Sallust saw Catiline as a good choice since he had Cicero's detailed accounts upon which he could draw.¹³ In addition, it seems clear – and generally agreed – that Sallust's treatment of Cicero himself in the monograph is not negative, but fairly balanced.¹⁴ Accordingly we must rule out his having written the *BC* as a polemical counter to Cicero's version of events. If Sallust had decided upon the monograph form before he chose his topic (though this of course cannot be known), then an episode like the Catilinarian Conspiracy would have lent itself well to the limited space and the demands of dramatic unity and focus that a monograph demanded, as seen in Cicero's letter on the matter to Luceius (*Ad Fam.* 5.12).¹⁵

Besides invoking the influence of contemporary accounts or the monograph form to explain Sallust's choice of Catiline's conspiracy, we cannot neglect to ask why the very character of Catiline and of his plot seemed to Sallust, as he wrote in the Triumviral Age,

¹¹ Steidle, for example, remarks that Sallust must have been aware of the speciousness of this claim and, like Cicero, makes Catiline's conspiracy the worst and most dangerous for rhetorical emphasis (cf. Cic. *In Cat.* 3.24f; *In Cat.* 1.3, 5, 9, 12; 2.10; 4.2, 7)(Steidle 1958: 14).

¹² Cf. MacKay 1962: 185: "if Sallust had ulterior motives he may have thought them best served by being left unexpressed."

¹³ The view of Ledworski 1994: 69.

¹⁴ For instance, one may note that in 63 Cicero had caused some popular resentment by (a) his stance on Rullan Land Law (b) his refusal of a proposal to restore rights to sons of the proscribed (c) his defense of Rabirius. More importantly with Rabirius, his trial called into question the legality of using the *senatus consultum ultimum* for violence, thus impugning Cicero's actions in 63. All of these could have been pointed out by Sallust to hold Cicero responsible for increasing the popular unrest that fueled the conspiracy of Catiline (or simply because they reflect poorly on Cicero). He mentions none of them. He also omits to look ahead to 62 to mention the attacks on Cicero's consulship by the tribunes Metellus Nepos and Calpurnius Bestia.

¹⁵ Tiffou 1973: 310 too readily explains Sallust's choice of the monograph form in his first works by reference to his supposed immaturity as a historian, and insecurity in his craft. Cf. Syme 1964: 188 on the monographs as a "beneficial apprenticeship". Surely a writer will improve with time, but with Sallust the case may be overstated. As previous chapters have demonstrated, Sallust deploys the monograph form deftly and employs rhetorical and narratological strategies with equal care in both works.

fitting themes in and of themselves. The Catilinarian Conspiracy was indeed an apt subject because of the themes of late-Republican decline that it could foreground: it allowed him to describe, through the person of Catiline, the endless recurrence of civil war, how civil strife begets further civil strife – especially so since Catiline clearly emerges as a creature nourished by the turbulence of the Sullan Age, an epiphenomenon of that earlier era of civil violence. The links back to the Civil Wars of Marius and Sulla are not insignificant in this regard. Indeed, at the end of the *BC* Catiline, whose character was corrupted during his time serving Sulla's cause (*BC* 5.2, 6-8), is made by Sallust to carry the Marian *aquila* from the latter's Cimbrian Campaign (*BC* 59.3). This further links the current civil unrest back to Marius and Sulla – though it muddles things even more, as the Sullan Catiline now fights under Marian standards for his own *dignitas*. These connections to the Sullan and Marian conflict also help to hint ahead to the themes and people introduced in the *BJ*. In fact the way Sallust leaves off the *BC*, with the bittersweet victory of the Republic's forces at Pistoria (*BC* 61.5-9), resembles the sort of *varia victoria* that was to be an important feature of the *BJ* (and one of Sallust's main stated reasons for writing it (*BJ* 5.1)).

Sallust would therefore have been satisfied with his choice of subject in the *BC* for multiple reasons. Moreover, to continue the narrative beyond 63 would have risked losing the focus he so carefully places on Catiline and the events of the conspiracy, and would have imperiled the monograph form itself. No doubt there were many noteworthy and related events that followed 63 BC and which might have been of particular interest

to Sallust as he composed the *BC*.¹⁶ More directly too, there were still vestiges of rebels from Spartacus' and Catiline's revolts in south Italy, with which C. Octavius (praet. 61) dealt early in 60 B.C.E. on his way to govern Macedon.¹⁷ Despite all these related events, Sallust still decided to tie off the *BC* with Catiline's death. Even granting the likely "limiting" influence of the monograph form on this decision, it seems clear that Catiline's death in battle itself must have held some central significance to Sallust which merited placing it as the closing scene of the work. Looking to events contemporary with Sallust's writing, one might infer that the battles of Forum Gallorum (14 April 43) and Mutina (21 April 43), as well as that of Philippi in October 42, formed a significant parallel for the battle of citizens against citizens at the end of Sallust's *BC*.¹⁸ Allusion to either of these battles lacks definite proof, but the final battle at Pistoria was significant for Sallust in a symbolic way as well. Ending with Catiline dying on the battlefield, with matters up in the air (what Pompey would do, what Caesar's next moves would be, how Cicero would be treated for his actions afterward), avoids a sense of closure and leaves

¹⁶ Events after the defeat of Catiline at Pistoria that Sallust precludes himself from describing (for sources see Broughton *MRR* II): [62] Metellus Nepos and L. Calpurnius Bestia (tr.pl. 62) attacking Cicero's actions as consul; Nepos causing a riot with his bill to have Pompey come back and be given command against remaining Catilinarians (a bill Caesar supported); Caesar being stripped of his praetorship for his actions in that riot; Caesar defending the Numidian prince Masintha against Hiempsal (Suet. *Iul.* 71); C. Pomptinus (praet. 63, gov. of Transalpine Gaul 62-61) putting down revolt of Allobroges – who apparently had not gotten what they wanted from cooperating with the Romans during Catiline's conspiracy; [61] Pompey's demobilization of his forces upon return to Italy in 61; The Bona Dea scandal and Pompey's assertion of the Senate's authority on the matter. Certain omitted events before the period of Sallust's main narration, but technically within the period of 65-63 covered in the monograph, are also worth noting: [65] Caesar's restoring of the statues of Marius to the Capitol in 65 (Vell. 2.43.4; Suet. *Iul.* 11; Plut. *Caes.* 6.1-4); [64] Cato working in *cooperation* with Caesar, *iudex* in charge of the *quaestio de sicariis* in 64, to bring to justice Sullan supporters (cf. Suet. *Iul.* 11; Dio 37.10.2; Ascon. 90-91C); [63] the battle over the Rullan Land Bill; Labienus (tr.pl. 63) prosecuting Rabirius – which would have called into question the use of the *senatus consultum ultimum* by Cicero.

¹⁷ See Suet. *Aug.* 3.1 and Brennan 2000: 433, 452n108, 534n73.

¹⁸ For Forum Gallorum and Mutina, where both of the consuls of 43 were lost and armies shifted allegiance, see Osgood 2006: 54-56. On the ironic echoes of Cato FRHist Cato F76 in this final battle of Catiline, echoes which also seem to contribute greatly to this final scene's significance, see above, Chapter 6.3.

the situation confused. This reproduces well the character of the period from 63 to the late 40s, a period in which a tangle of opposing political forces were liable to clash at some point and cause a renewal of past horrors, and when widespread agrarian issues remained unresolved and were likely to be used again as weapons. In short, Sallust gives us a parting image of no progress, just more uncertainty – an image that fits well with the preoccupations of many early in the Triumviral Period.

Moving now to Sallust's motives for writing about the Jugurthine War, we are again provided explicit reasons by Sallust himself (*BJ* 5.1): *quia magnum et atrox variaque victoria fuit, dehinc quia tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviae itum est* ("because it was extensive and fierce and of shifting victory, and also because it was then for the first time that the arrogance of the nobility was challenged.").¹⁹ It was certainly an affair which saw victory mixed with setbacks on both sides. His claim to narrate the struggle to break the stranglehold of the traditional nobility upon officeholding, riches, and much else is well borne out in his narrative – not just in the central importance of Marius, but also by the way in which Metellus serves as his foil, and how other members of the nobility are exposed as incompetent or corrupt.²⁰

Besides Sallust's explicitly stated motives, it might be argued that other motives must be posited if we are to justify the fact that Sallust chose to skip the crucial developments of the Gracchan Era, the Social War, and the Civil War between Marius and Sulla in

¹⁹ On the term *atrox* and possible inspiration from Hellenistic historiography's search for pathetic elements and *ta deina*, see Paul 1984: 20; cf. Dué 2000: passim; Plb 2.56.8, Plut. *Them.* 32. Changes of fortune (*varia victoria*) also feature in Hellenistic historiography, and Sallust surely benefitted from utilizing such elements in the monographs.

²⁰ One thinks, for example, of M. Aemilius Scaurus (*BJ* 15.4, 25.4, 28.4, 29.2, 30.2, 32.1, 40.4), Calpurnius Bestia (cos. 111: *BJ* 28.4-5, 29.1, 30.1, 85.16), Sp. Albinus (cos. 110: *BJ* 35.2, 36.3, 85.16), Aulus Albinus (37.3-39.1). For the narrative patterning and ring structures employed by Sallust to bring the conflict between Marius and Metellus (and especially their faults) into relief, see above, Chapter 6.1a.

order to narrate the war with Jugurtha. It is possible that predecessors (Sisenna or others) had in Sallust's view treated those other events sufficiently. However, more positive reasons for Sallust's choice of the Jugurthine War may be ventured. The war with Jugurtha in fact opened up to Sallust a nexus of issues which could be made to have arisen from this one war. First are problems in leadership, in particular the encroachment of political and partisan rivalry upon public duty. Such a corruption of leadership arose from both *superbia nobilitatis* (*BJ* 64.1, 82.3, 83.1) and the excesses of popular politics and the *plebs* (e.g. *BJ* 40; Marius). Leadership has with reason been identified as perhaps the main underlying issue to which Sallust meant to bring attention in the work; one can cite the extensive ring structure in *BJ* 48-99 which contrasts the two commanders, Marius and Metellus, and emphasizes their political rivalry and respective shortcomings.²¹ As Scanlon observes, "The ostensible subject of the narrative in chapters 48-99 is mostly the conflict with Jugurtha, and only in part the political rivalry between Romans. But in fact the political rivalry implied in the very antithetical selection and arrangement of military campaigns suggests that the political theme is the overriding one."²² Accordingly the Jugurthine War allowed Sallust more generally to point up the ineffectual governing of the empire by the elite and their general corruption (seen in the emphasis on bribery in Rome and in the field in the early stages of the war). The importance of these latter themes to Sallust is shown by their continued role in the *Histories*.

²¹ **A1**: Skirmish at the Muthul [ch.48-54] – **B1**: Siege of Vaga [66-9] – **C1**: Capture of desert town of Thala [75-6] || Leptis & Philaeni Digression [77-9] || **C2**: Capture of desert town of Capsa [89-91] – **B2**: Siege of fort on Muluccha [92-4] – **A2**: Skirmish near Cirta [97-9]. For further subunits (e.g. winter camps, character sketches) which also fit into the ring structure, participating in their own balanced correspondences, see Scanlon 1988: 145ff.

²² Scanlon 1988: 168.

Although in writing about the Jugurthine War Sallust chose not to narrate directly the civil wars between Marius and Sulla, the *BJ* did still give Sallust a chance to allude to the later civil strife between Marius and Sulla and imply something of a judgment upon it. He places the beginnings of both Marius' and Sulla's careers during this war (and they actually cooperate later on in the war), but he also alludes through *praeteritio* to the later outbreak of civil strife between the two men – personal rivalry and ambition impinging upon public service (*BJ* 63.6, 95.4). Moreover, the personal rivalry of Marius and Metellus, as mentioned above, gives Sallust a chance to render indirect critique upon the later conflict of Marius and Sulla.²³

It is fitting, then, that Sallust makes his view known in his preface that the war with Jugurtha was of *varia victoria*: not only was the victory achieved through a mix of setback and success, but it was also a "mixed victory" in the sense that it exacerbated civil conflict and partisanship at home. This emphasis on *varia victoria* ends up aligning the ending of the *BJ* rather closely with that of the *BC* as well: just as the *BC* ends with a *varia victoria* that mixes grief and joy, so too the *BJ* ends with a victory that has mixed implications of hope and despair.²⁴

In the *Histories* Sallust takes as his themes the fallout from the Sullan Regime as manifested in continued civil wars, and the continued decline of Roman aristocratic government in managing the empire. In *Histories* Book 1 Sallust again avoids detailed treatment of the Sullan Era, but he actually does treat the Social War and Sullan Civil

²³ One may observe that in the *BC* Sallust explores one later outgrowth of the civil wars of Marius and Sulla, and in the *BJ* he goes back in time to record the first seeds of that conflict, though again not the conflict itself.

²⁴ At the end of the *BJ* not only does civil war between Marius and Sulla loom, but with his last words Sallust also adds the dark irony that in 105 B.C.E. the state (naively) put all its hopes for salvation in the hands of Marius (*spes atque opes civitatis in illo sitae*, *BJ* 114.4).

Wars in his own *Pentekontaetia* (*Hist.* 1.19-53M (16-46 McG)). Yet his main focus concerns the years 78-67 B.C.E. His choice of this period, which conveniently brings events down almost to the earliest point mentioned in the *BC* (*BC* 18), offered the highest possible concentration of parallels for the violent civil unrest, social disruption, and political turbulence endemic to the Triumviral Period in which he was writing. As stated above, the “analogical historiography” of Sallust could find some of its strongest expressions in the material covered in the *Histories*, allowing Sallust to pursue his goal “to undercut the public image projected by the triumvirs and to challenge their pretense of a legal government and a restored *res publica*.”²⁵

The degree to which Sallust’s contemporary milieu influenced his choice of subjects should become clear from the foregoing discussion. In what follows, we will turn our attention to those passages in each of Sallust’s texts which have been considered allusions to events or persons in the Triumviral Period.

²⁵ Gerrish 2015: 193.

9.1: Suggested Allusions to the Triumviral Period in Sallust's Texts

Now that we have explored some of Sallust's possible motives for his choice of subjects and seen how contemporary events could inspire those choices, we might more fruitfully explore some of the passages in Sallust said to be deliberate echoes of contemporary events. In Chapter 3 we discussed the attacks Sallust makes on the corrupt contemporary political scene in the prefaces to the *BC* and the *BJ*.²⁶ These are both direct and also generalized. At *BC* 3.3-5, Sallust recounts his own youthful forays into politics, derailed by a culture of corrupt civic values. His judgments on the political scene of his youth (*pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute audacia, largitio, avaritia vigeant* (3.3); *malae artes; inter tanta vitia imbecilla aetas ambitione corrupta tenebatur* (3.4); *ab reliquorum malis moribus dissentirem*), while incisive, are sweeping criticisms of an entire political culture, far from an attack on particular individuals or policies.

Sallust's attack on decaying morality elicits slightly more specific contemporary references in the preface of the *BJ*, but here too Sallust maintains a safe level of generality in his polemical references to conditions in the Triumviral Period. In *BJ* 3.1 Sallust refers both to his own experience and to the time at which he writes (c. 41-40 B.C.E.) when he says that it is not worth seeking office because office and honor are not awarded based on *virtus*, and those who obtain office are not the more safe or honorable for having attained it.²⁷ Moreover, "to struggle in vain" and achieve nothing but hatred (*odium*) is "the height of madness" (*extremae dementiae*; *BJ* 3.3). Such talk of *odium* is

²⁶ *BC* 3-4; *BJ* 3-4. See discussion in Chapter 3.3b.

²⁷ *Verum ex iis magistratus et imperia, postremo omnis cura rerum publicarum minime mihi hac tempestate cupienda videntur, quoniam neque virtuti honor datur neque illi, quibus per fraudem iis fuit uti, tuti aut eo magis honesti sunt* (*BJ* 3.1).

quite apposite both for Sallust's own political experience and that of the many resented "upstarts" or equestrian parvenus who were increasingly attaining office under Caesar and especially the triumvirs.²⁸ In *BJ* 3.2 Sallust might have in mind the occurrence of political violence and exile in general, but a specific reference point is likely intended – whether the political conditions under Caesar (under which he himself took part in politics), or the triumviral proscriptions and land confiscations from 43-40 B.C.E.²⁹ We also observed that when Sallust at *BJ* 4.4 refers with bitterness to the kinds of men now entering the Senate compared to when he himself had attained office, there is a strong critical allusion to Caesar's enlargement of the Senate with men of sometimes questionable qualifications – if not also to the similar actions of Octavian and Antony in the early 30s.³⁰

The polemics in both prefaces, however, all remain usefully generalized in the sense that one cannot firmly identify *specific* individual targets, and some are even crafted so as to be applicable to multiple points in time (e.g. critiques of ruling by force in *BJ* 3.2, or low-quality men entering the Senate in *BJ* 4.4). What these diatribes against

²⁸ See e.g. Sallust *BJ* 4.7-8 (*homines novi...antea per virtutem...furtim ac per latrocinia potius quam bonis artibus ad imperia et honores nituntur*), *BJ* 85; Horace *Epodes* 4, *Satires* 1.5.51-70 (Sarmentus the former slave), 1.6.17-26, 45ff (Tillius, his own parvenu status); cf. Gellius 15.4.4 (on Ventidius) and the "whirlwind knights" of Ovid *Amores* 3.15.6. For general discussion of upstart equestrians in the Triumviral Age, see Osgood 2006: 272-88, Syme 1939: 243n2.

²⁹ *BJ* 3.2: *nam vi quidem regere patriam aut parentis, quamquam et possis et delicta corrigas, tamen importunum est, quom praesertim omnes rerum mutationes caedem, fugam, aliaque hostilia portendant*. ("For to rule one's country or subjects by force, although you both have the power to correct abuses, and do correct them, is nevertheless troublesome; especially since all attempts at change foreshadow murder, exile, and other horrors of war.")

³⁰ (*BJ* 4.4): *Qui si reputaverint, et quibus ego temporibus magistratus adeptus sum [et] quales viri idem assequi nequiverint et postea quae genera hominum in senatum pervenerint, profecto existimabunt me magis merito quam ignavia iudicium animi mei mutavisse* ("But if these people will ponder the time at which I achieved my magistracies and what sorts of men were unable to achieve the same, and also what type of men later entered the Senate, surely they will judge that my change of mind was justified and not due to laziness."). Cf. Dio 43.27.2, 43.47.3, Suet. *Iul.* 80.2, *Aug.* 35. On the triumvirs' stocking of the Senate cf. Dio 48.34, Augustus *RG* 8.2.

contemporary politics in *BC* 3-4 and *BJ* 3-4 show, then, is that Sallust is able to be suggestive in multiple directions without explicitly attacking.

By attacking contemporary conditions in his prologues but framing those attacks in generalized terms, Sallust displays an approach similar to authors of the Triumviral Era writing in the late 40s and throughout the 30s. Although Sallust did not live to see Actium or have to write in a post-Actium environment, Vergil and Horace did, and in the *Georgics* and *Epodes* (which, significantly, were composed *through* the 30s but published after Actium) they each deal with the horrors of civil war in a fashion not wholly dissimilar from Sallust: as we will see further in the next section, these horrors are often recalled by Vergil and Horace in bleak detail, but criticisms and laments are kept general, largely avoiding direct attack on Octavian or other individuals.³¹ Osgood gives expression in the following terms to the intellectual environment of those Roman authors of the Triumviral Age who lived to write both before and after Actium, but his conclusions apply equally to other Triumviral authors – Sallust included:

Italians and provincials never buried this past; it was always a part of their present. It had to be, it justified the autocratic form of government which they accepted. The memory of civil war could protect future generations from ever having to suffer it again. At the same time, to go too closely into the details of how it unfolded threatened to revive the political disputes that it had settled. (Osgood 2006: 403)

For those triumviral authors who continued writing after Actium such as Vergil and Horace, the motivation to aid in the smooth acceptance and continuance of peace through

³¹ Cf. also Hor. *Satires* 1.5 for the caution Horace had to exercise around Maecenas and Augustus' retinue. The poem generally tries to emphasize the friendship of the dynasts and their partisans, even if they are at times *aversos amicos* (1.5.29). Horace also passes over the delicate political issues that occasioned the summit, preferring to show the amicable interactions among all involved. Indeed, Horace's eye ailment is quite convenient: he cannot see any of the details of the possible quarrels between the two sides and is "blind" to politics and judging political disputes (Osgood 2006: 250).

Octavian was real,³² but the pressures weighing upon those writing earlier in the period – Sallust included – were not negligible either.

In addition to his prologues, however, the main narratives of Sallust's works also establish subtle links with events and persons of the Triumviral Period through "analogical historiography". He uses this tried-and-true method quite effectively.³³ Some of the more prominent examples of this technique occur in the *Histories*. In a recent article Gerrish has admirably demonstrated the allusions to Sextus Pompey in the narrative of Spartacus' slave revolt in the *Histories*.³⁴ The tradition on Sextus, influenced by Octavian himself, was negative into the imperial period, depicting him as a pirate and rogue adventurer.³⁵ Sallust's view of Sextus may have been slightly different. In a digression on Sicilian geography in the narrative of Spartacus' revolt, he uses Scylla to evoke Sextus.³⁶ By doing so Sallust suggests that, just as the threat to Rome posed by Spartacus was more serious than the ruling class let on, and was at first dismissed, so too the threat to the Republic posed by Sextus is real, despite Octavian's downplaying it.³⁷ The outcome of the Spartacus rebellion is also a way for Sallust to suggest caution: the

³² Propaganda of the late 30s about Antony, Cleopatra, and Egypt was meant not just to incite Italians to united support for the war, but to "ensure a finality to the peace that followed" (Osgood 2006: 357; cf. *ibid.* 357-64, 367-8, 382-3 for discussion of the pro-Augustan narratives about the war against Antony and "the barbarian east" emerging in *Epodes* 1 & 9 and in Vergil *Georgics* 2.136f (the *Laudes Italiae*), and see further below, Chapter 9 Section 2.).

³³ On the rhetorical technique of critiquing the actions of tyrants by attacking someone else for similar misdeeds, see Demetrius *De Elocutione* 292: Δύναίτο δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐτέρως σχηματίζειν, οἷον οὕτως· ἐπειδὴ ἀηδῶς ἀκούουσιν οἱ δυνάσται καὶ δυνάστιδες τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμαρτήματα, παραινούντες αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας ἐροῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἥτοι ἐτέρους ψέζομέν τινας τὰ ὅμοια πεποιηκότας, οἷον πρὸς Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον κατὰ Φαλάριδος τοῦ τυράννου ἐροῦμεν καὶ τῆς Φαλάριδος ἀποτομίας· ἢ ἐπαινέσόμεθα τινας Διονυσίῳ τὰ ἐναντία πεποιηκότας, οἷον Γέλωνα ἢ Ἰέρωνα, ὅτι πατράσιν ἐώκεσαν τῆς Σικελίας καὶ διδασκάλους· καὶ γὰρ νουθετεῖται ἀκούων ἅμα καὶ οὐ λοιδορεῖται καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖ τῷ Γέλωνι ἐπαινουμένῳ καὶ ἐπαίνου ὀρέγεται καὶ οὕτως.

³⁴ *Hist.* 4.26-8M (22-24 McG). See Gerrish 2015.

³⁵ Besides Augustus *RG* 25, see Appian *B.Civ.* 5.86-7, 110, 112; Horace *Epode* 9.7-10. On slaves in Sextus' forces, see Appian *B.Civ.* 5.72, Dio 48.19.

³⁶ See *RRC* 511/2, 511/4 for imagery of Scylla on the Sicilian coinage of Sextus.

³⁷ Gerrish 2015: 193-217 *passim*.

Spartacus revolt helped catapult Pompey into unprecedented *imperium* and individual political power, and victory over Sextus might mean the same for Octavian, which to Sallust would bode just as poorly for the state as had Pompey's rise to sole power.³⁸

That Pompey's career (obtaining unprecedented commands and triumphs, and doing so under age) was seen by Sallust as an analogue for Octavian is quite possible. At *Hist.* 3.48.23M (3.34 McG), the tribune Licinius Macer says, speaking to the people, *mihi quidem satis spectatum est Pompeium, tantae gloriae adulescentem, malle principem volentibus vobis* [i.e. the *plebs*] *quam illis* [i.e. the Senate] *dominationis socium* ("It's clear enough to me, at least, that Pompey, a young man who's won such great glory, prefers to be the leading man in the state with your consent than to be a partner in their despotism").³⁹ In this passage too Octavian might be seen in the youthful Pompey. Moreover, during the time Sallust was writing the *Histories* the Triumvirate had marginalized Lepidus,⁴⁰ and Antony's failed Parthian campaign may have already been news at Rome.⁴¹ In such an environment Octavian too might seem to be emerging as the principal player for power at Rome.

In the turbulent years between Caesar's death and Octavian's victory at Actium, uncertainty, weariness with civil war, and pessimism about the immediate future were common sentiments.⁴² Sallust makes for his readers a poignant connection with such

³⁸ Gerrish 2015: 211. Cf. *Hist.* 2.17M (*modestus ad alia omnia nisi ad dominationem*), 3.88M (84 McG), 3.89M (85 McG.); Vell. Pat. 2.29.3; Cic. *Ad Att.* 7.7.7, 8.11.2, 9.10.2, 10.7.1.

³⁹ transl. McGushin 1992 (adapted)

⁴⁰ See Dio 49.12.2-4, Appian *B. Civ.* 5.126; Dio 48.22.2 (Lepidus' name left out of triumvirs' decrees), and the documents from Octavian to Aphrodisias discussed in J.M. Reynolds 1982, esp. no.'s 8.1, 8.27. See also Reynolds, Roueché, & Bodard 2007.

⁴¹ Cf. Dio 49.32.1-2, and Osgood 2006: 305-6.

⁴² See e.g. Osgood 2006: 5, 135; On weariness with civil war, and pessimism about the near future, see i.a. Horace *Epode* 7, 16; Vergil *Ecl.* 1.70-72, 9.11-13; *Geo.* 1.464f, 489-97, 501-2, 505-14; Cf. *Dirae* 42-51, 76-85 et passim, with Osgood 2006: 154. On Cicero's letters of 44-43 B.C.E. see the discussion of

sentiments in his narrative of Sertorius' revolt in the *Histories*. In a recent article McAlhany has re-examined the treatment of the Blessed Isles in the works of Sallust, Horace, and Plutarch's *Life of Sertorius*.⁴³ Rebuffed from Spain in 81 by C. Annius,⁴⁴ and then from Africa, Sertorius finds himself at the mouth of the Baetis, where he is met, according to Plutarch (*Sert.* 8.1) by men recently returned from the Atlantic, who describe for him the Isles of the Blessed (*Sert.* 8.2-3). Hearing their description of this place Sertorius wishes to flee there and escape the horrors of civil war.⁴⁵ Yet beyond this the accounts of Plutarch and Sallust diverge. Sallust does not spend more than a few sentences on the Isles of the Blessed because he is not concerned with locating them as real places on the map of the known world.⁴⁶ They are a legendary place, and he accordingly treats them as a literary conceit and places them (with echoes of Hesiod and

Osgood 2006: 28-43; see further *Ad Fam.* 6.21 (Jan. 45), 10.1 (Sept. 44) 12.22 (Sept. 44), 4.5 (Serv. Sulpicius Rufus writing to Cicero in 46). On the potential despotism of Pompey or Caesar: Cic. *Ad Att.* 7.7.7, 8.11.2, 9.10.2, 10.7.1. Earlier reflections of Cicero on the bleak present or future of the Republic: *Ad Att.* 4.18.2 (54), *Ad Q.Fr.* 3.5 (late 54), *Ad Fam.* 2.5 (mid 53). Cf. also the discussion of the theoretical lack of a Republic in Cic. *Rep.* Books 2-3, as reported by Augustine *Civ. Dei* 2.21 (*non iam uitiosam, sicut pridie fuerat disputatum, sed, sicut ratio ex illis definitionibus conexa docuisset, omnino nullam esse rem publicam... Quando ergo res publica Romana talis erat, qualem illam describit Sallustius, non iam pessima ac flagitiosissima, sicut ipse ait, sed omnino nulla erat secundum istam rationem.*), and the discussion in *Rep.* 5 fr.1-2 (directly following in Aug. *Civ. Dei* 2.21): *Nostra uero aetas cum rem publicam sicut picturam accepisset egregiam, sed euanescentem uetustate, non modo eam coloribus isdem quibus fuerat renouare neglexit, sed ne id quidem curauit, ut formam saltem eius et extrema tamquam linimenta seruaret. Quid enim manet ex antiquis moribus... quos ita obliuione obsoletos uidemus, ut non modo non colantur, sed iam ignorentur? Nam de uiris quid dicam? Mores enim ipsi interierunt uirorum penuria* [cf. Sall *BC* 53.5]... *Nostris enim uitibus, non casu aliquo, rem publicam uerbo retinemus, re ipsa uero iam pridem amisimus* [cf. Sall. *BC* 52.11]).

⁴³ McAlhany 2016.

⁴⁴ Cf. Sallust *Hist.* 1.97-99M.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Sert.* 9.1: ταῦθ' ὁ Σεργώριος ἀκούσας ἔρωτα θαυμαστὸν ἔσχεν οἰκῆσαι τὰς νήσους καὶ ζῆν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, τυραννίδος ἀπαλλαγείς καὶ πολέμων ἀπαύστων. Cf. Sallust *Hist.* 1.102M: *traditur fugam in Oceani longinqua agitauisse*.

⁴⁶ *Hist.* 1.100-103M (90-93 McG). 1.100M: *Quas duas insulas propinquas inter se et decem <milia> stadium a Gadibus sitas constat suoapte ingenio alimenta mortalibus gignere*. 1.101M (Serv. ad. *Aen.* 5.735): *Secundum philosophos Elysium est insulae fortunatae, quas ait Sallustius inclitas esse Homeri carminibus*. 1.102M: *traditur fugam in Oceani longinqua agitauisse*. 1.103M: *more humanae cupidinis ignara visendi*.

Homer) beyond the boundaries of known world.⁴⁷ Plutarch, however, sees them as part of real geography, which is why he takes time to give an excursus which oddly melds a scientific description of their location and climate with an account of their more fantastic features. His source for the additional (scientific) information was perhaps Posidonius.⁴⁸ Now, this distinction between what the Isles are conceived to be in Plutarch and Sallust (real and legendary respectively) greatly impacts the meaning of Sertorius' choice in Plutarch and in Sallust. In Plutarch, Sertorius has a real option for escape from civil war, which makes his choice not to flee a choice in line with Roman values of civic commitment. In Sallust, however, he wistfully dreams about escape from civil war, but in fact does not have a realistic opportunity to do so.⁴⁹ Sallust's version is calculated to convey the pessimism so common to the Triumviral chaos of the early-mid 30s B.C.E., when the escape from civil war seemed an unattainable fantasy.⁵⁰

In ostensible contrast to Sallust's account, his contemporary Horace in *Epode* 16 treats the Blessed Isles, like Plutarch, as a real place, and the speaker makes a serious proposal for the citizens (or the better part of them, 16.15, 37) to flee there to escape civil

⁴⁷ With *in Oceani longinqua* (*Hist.* 1.102M (92 McG)), cf. Hes. *Erga* 167-73, esp. 169 (ἐς πείρατα γαίης), 171 (ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι παρ' Ὀκεανὸν βαθυδίνην). Cf. also *Ody.* 4.563-8. Although this Homeric passage describes the Elysian Fields, it mentions a location at world's end (563: ἀλλὰ σ' ἐς Ἠλύσιον πεδίου καὶ πείρατα γαίης) and proximal to Ocean (567-8), like Sallust's and Hesiod's Blessed Isles. Sallust at *Hist.* 1.101M had mentioned that the Blessed Isles were famously described in Homer, so if he was alluding to *Ody.* 4.563-8 in 1.101M, his reference was not strictly accurate, but the traditions portraying Elysium and the Blessed Isles had been conflated well before Sallust and Plutarch (By Hesiod's time if not soon after) and so even though Sallust may have been thinking of a Homeric passage about Elysium, it was in practical terms not so problematic to the effectiveness of Sallust's point (cf. McAlhany 2016: 67; cf. 64-5).

⁴⁸ McAlhany 2016: 64-5, esp. 65n24. Posidonius uses Libya as geographical marker, the outer boundary of the inhabited world (Frs 201, 249 EK), and not Gades as Sallust does, while in F49.146 (from his *On Ocean*) he discusses the circumnavigation of Libya. Paralleling Plutarch's focus on the winds affecting the Isles is Posidonius F137a17-18, which discusses at length the different winds.

⁴⁹ McAlhany 2016: 69-70.

⁵⁰ For a similar sentiment see Hirtius' remark at *BG* 8 (praef.): *usque ad exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem nullum videmus, sed vitae Caesaris.*

war (16.15-22, 35-41). His weariness with civil war is clear (16.1-14), but the fact that there is at least a hope of escape represents a modicum of optimism. However, it is possible that in the very seriousness and enthusiasm of this proposal Horace intends the reader to sense some sarcasm and an underlying pessimism about the future prospects of the Roman state. This more pessimistic reading of *Epode* 16 has some support.⁵¹

Besides the ambiguity of the term *vates* at the poem's end, the example of the Phocaeans used by the speaker is actually a misleading parallel that partially distorts the actual nature of the escape proposed in the poem.⁵² Similarly, the term *secunda fuga* in the poem's final line, while perhaps neutral, may also remind readers of how in the 30s B.C.E. they had recently experienced a second set of civil wars, and a second set of confiscations and proscriptions.⁵³ More generally, against the poem's effort to see exile and flight from one's city as something that represents *pietas* (v.66) or *virtus* (v.39), prior examples of abandoning the site of Rome had elicited consistently negative reactions.⁵⁴ We see, then, in Horace and Sallust, two contemporary writers who use the Blessed Isles to express similar pessimism about the impossibility of escaping from civil war: both mention the Blessed Isles as a place of peace free from civil conflict, only to reject (each in his respective way) the possibility of their being an attainable option.

⁵¹ Watson 2003: 479 observes that this poem is a "veritable counsel of despair", and that "one of the few things upon which all critics of *Epode* 16 are agreed is the exceeding bleakness of its message". For discussion of the varying views of Horace's meaning in the poem see Watson 2003: 485.

⁵² The Phocaeans had famously abandoned their city altogether to perpetuate their political independence and avoid falling under foreign (Persian) control, whereas the Romans in Horace's poem would be fleeing a state that was being destroyed internally by its own inhabitants (the *impia devoti sanguinis aetas* of v.9) and was already past fixing. See Watson 2003: 480.

⁵³ Thus McAlhany 2016: 73.

⁵⁴ Watson 2003: 480-81, citing i.a. Livy 5.49-55 (abandoning Rome after the Gallic sack of the city), 22.53.5 (Romans fleeing the city after Cannae), and the rumor that Caesar wished to transfer the seat of power to Alexandria (Suet. *Caes.* 79.3, Nicol. *Damasc. vit. Aug.* 20).

Sallust might seem to make further references to the rule of the triumvirs when he supplies both Catiline's speeches in the *BC* and that of Lepidus in the *Histories* with attacks on the rule of the few – in Lepidus' case, Sulla, in Catiline's, the closed power bloc of the *pauci potentes*.⁵⁵ Catiline tells his followers (*BC* 20.7-8):

Nam postquam res publica in paucorum potentium ius atque dicionem concessit, semper illis reges tetrarchae vectigales esse, populi nationes stipendia pendere; ceteri omnes, strenui boni, nobiles atque ignobiles, vulgus fuimus sine gratia, sine auctoritate, iis obnoxii quibus, si res publica valeret, formidini essemus. [8] Itaque omnis gratia, potentia, honos, divitiae apud illos sunt aut ubi illi volunt: nobis reliquere pericula, repulsas, iudicia, egestatem.

For ever since the state fell under the jurisdiction and sway of a few powerful men, it is always to them that kings and petty rulers are tributary, to them peoples and nations pay taxes. All the rest of us, energetic, good, nobles as well as nobodies, have been a common herd, without influence, without prestige, subservient to those to whom, if the state were healthy, we should be an object of dread. [8] Accordingly, all influence, power, office, and wealth are in their hands, or wherever those individuals wish them to be; to us they have left threats of prosecution, defeats in elections, convictions, and poverty. (transl. Ramsey 2013)

Similarly Sallust has Lepidus urge the Roman people to action *ne spolia vestra penes illos sint* ("lest your rewards remain in the hands of those men", *Hist.* 1.55.7M), and recites all the things currently controlled by Sulla: *leges iudicia aerarium provinciae reges penes unum, denique necis civium et vitae licentia* ("the laws, the courts, the treasury, the provinces, the tributary monarchs are all under one man's control, not to mention the license to decide the life and death of citizens", *Hist.* 1.55.13M). The control of revenues, client kings, political office, and life and death would certainly describe the

⁵⁵ That Sallust makes the same allusions to triumviral conditions through the speeches of both Catiline and Lepidus is not as surprising when one considers other ways in which Lepidus and Catiline are connected by Sallust. At *Hist.* 1.77.17M, L. Marcius Philippus' marked use of Cicero's famous *quousque tandem...patiemiini*, which Sallust also puts in the mouth of Catiline himself at *BC* 20.9, suggests Lepidus' and Catiline's revolts were similar (*vos autem, patres conscripti, quo usque cunctando rem publicam intutam patiemiini...?* Cf. McGushin 1992: 143.) Philippus' *perge qua coeptasti* (*Hist.* 1.77.16M) also reminds one of Cic. *In Cat.* 1.10.7, *Quae cum ita sint, Catilina, perge quo coepisti*). This impression is increased by Philippus' description of Lepidus' *satellites* at *Hist.* 1.77.7.15-18, which echoes Sallust's image of Catiline's followers at *BC* 5.7.7-8, 14.3.25. Note also that Sallust takes time out of his limited narrative of the Sullan Civil Wars to mention Catiline's role therein, at *Hist.* 1.44-6M (36/37/46McG).

conditions under the second triumvirate as well as (or better than) it would Sulla's dictatorship or the 60s B.C.E.⁵⁶

Such polemics against the *pauci potentes*, generalized though they may seem, are admittedly not uncommon in Sallust's works. Indeed, Memmius' speech at *BJ* 31, and the tribune Macer's at *Hist.* 3.48M (3.34McG), register quite similar attacks, as does Sallust himself as narrator.⁵⁷ The pervasiveness of these polemics against oligarchy and political *dominatio*, and the sharing of the discourse across multiple works and multiple speakers, only adds to the sense that Sallust is using such polemics to make a broader point about the innate nature of the *vitia* in the Roman character, *vitia* which manifest in repetitions of the civil strife of the past.

⁵⁶ Noted by McGushin 1992: 19. Besides the similarities between Catiline's and Lepidus' revolts brought out by Sallust through the speech of Philippus (*Hist.* 1.77M), other shared sentiments between Catiline's speech(es) and the oration of Lepidus deepen the parallelism: *Hist.* 1.55.11 (*Populus Romanus...ne servilia quidem alimenta relicua habet*) ~ *BC* 20.11 (*quis...tolerare potest illis divitias superare quas profundant in extruendo mari...nobis rem familiarem etiam ad necessaria deesse? ...nobis larem familiarem nusquam ullum esse?*); *Hist.* 1.55.15 (*estne viris relicui aliquid quam solvere iniuriam aut mori per virtutem?...neque quisquam extremam necessitatem [i.e. mortem] nihil ausus nisi muliebri ingenio expectat*) ~ *BC* 20.13 (*denique quid relicui habemus praeter miseram animam?*), 20.9.9 (*nonne emori per virtutem praestat quam vitam...per dedecus amittere?*), 20.11 (*etenim quis mortalium, quoi virile ingenium est, tolerare potest...*), and 58.21.2 (*cavete ne inulti animam amittatis, neu capti potius sicuti pecora trucidamini quam virorum more pugnantes cruentam atque luctuosam victoriam hostibus relinquatis*).

⁵⁷ Besides the considerable parallelisms between Catiline and Lepidus themselves, the words and polemics of these two men admit many other echoing voices. To *BC* 20.7 compare (a) *BJ* 31.20 (Memmius: *regna provinciae leges iura iudicia bella atque paces, postremo divina et humana omnia penes paucos erant* [~ *Hist.* 1.55.7]), (b) *Hist.* 3.48.6 (Macer: *itaque omnes concessere iam in paucorum dominationem*), (c) *BC* 39.2 (Sallust: *postquam Cn. Pompeium ad bellum...missus est, plebis opes inminutae paucorum potentia crevit*), *BJ* 41.7 (Sallust: *paucorum arbitrio belli domique agitabatur; penes eosdem etc...cum paucis diripiebant.*), *Hist.* 1.12M (Sallust: *dum pauci potentes, quorum in gratiam plerique concesserant, sub honesto patrum aut plebis nomine dominationes adfectabant.*). To *Hist.* 1.55.13M (*leges iudicia aerarium provinciae reges penes unum*) & *BC* 20.7 (*semper illis reges tetrarchae etc.*), compare (a) *BJ* 31.20 (Memmius: *regna provinciae leges iura iudicia bella atque paces, postremo divina et humana omnia penes paucos erant*), (b) *BJ* 31.9 (Memmius: *taciti indignabamini aerarium expilari, reges et populos liberos paucis nobilibus vectigal pendere, penes eosdem et summam gloriam et maximas divitias esse*), (c) *BJ* 41.7 (Sallust: *penes eosdem aerarium provinciae magistratus gloriae triumphique erant*), (d) *Hist.* 3.48.6 (*...in paucorum dominationem, qui per militare nomen aerarium exercitus regna provincias occupare et arcem habent ex spoliis vestris*). Cf. also *BC* 20.11 & *Hist.* 1.55.11 to *Hist.* 3.48.19 (*qui [quinis modis] profecto non amplius possunt alimentis carceris*). The preceding considers only those ideas or phrases which both Catiline and Lepidus share: the speeches of Catiline and Lepidus individually each contain additional echoes of other speakers which they may not share mutually.

In one such repetition of past events, Sallust narrates in *Hist.* 2.45M (2.42 McG) the riots that took place in 75 B.C.E. due to a grain shortage, in which the consuls L. Octavius and C. Aurelius Cotta were attacked with stones and had to flee.⁵⁸ In 40 B.C.E. (or early 39) a very similar riot broke out, in which Octavian was also stoned, along with M. Antonius, both men having to flee to the latter's house.⁵⁹

Less certain is whether Sallust has a contemporary reference point in mind when his Lepidus describes Sulla as *scaevus iste Romulus* ("that crooked Romulus", *Hist.* 1.55.5). Both Caesar and Octavian could be linked to Romulus in certain ways, for instance Caesar's statue in the temple of Quirinus.⁶⁰ Octavian, when he entered Rome in 43 and obtained the consulship, was said to have observed the same omen of 12 vultures as Romulus had seen upon founding the city,⁶¹ and later on, in 27 B.C.E., a proposal (not accepted) was made to give Octavian the title of Romulus.⁶² The associations with Romulus are diffuse for both men, however, and one cannot reach any further certainty about a possible reference to Caesar or Augustus in *Hist.* 1.55.5.

Stepping back into broader trends, the extraordinary powers wielded by individual commanders such as Octavian, Caesar, and others before them was indeed of much interest to Sallust in his analysis of the political problems of the Republic. In the

⁵⁸ Historical background to this incident is discussed by McGushin 1992: 208-210. In 75, as in 40, one of the causes of the grain shortage was piratical activity.

⁵⁹ See App. *B. Civ.* 5.67-8, Dio 48.31.5-6. See Osgood 2006: 205, 237. Both before the treaty of Brundisium (Sept. 40 B.C.E.), and before the treaty of Misenum (Spring 39 B.C.E.) Sextus caused flare-ups in the shortage of grain through his naval activity. This would of course re-occur from 38 on as Sextus regained control of the seas for the time being (cf. App. *B. Civ.* 5.88; Dio 48.47-8).

⁶⁰ Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.45.2 (May 45): eum σύνναον Quirino malo quam Saluti. Noted by Syme 1964: 237-8. McGushin 192: 115 on the association of Sulla with Romulus.

⁶¹ See Suet. *Aug.* 95, Dio 46.46.2-3.

⁶² Suet. *Aug.* 7. For the burning of the hut of Romulus in 38 B.C.E. see Dio 48.43.4 (but also 54.29.8 (12 B.C.E.)).

Histories multiple mentions are made of armies recruited at private expense by individuals.⁶³ L. Marcius Philippus at *Hist.* 1.77.22M says of Lepidus *quoniam <M> Lepidus exercitum privato consilio paratum cum pessimis et hostibus rei publicae contra huius ordinis auctoritatem ad urbem ducit...* (“Since Lepidus is leading an army obtained at his own private expense, with the worst enemies of the Republic, against the authority of this order...”). McGushin, considering the inaccuracy of Philippus’ claim about the private and illegal nature of Lepidus’ army (cf. 1.77.7M), thinks a parallel may be intended with Octavian in 43 B.C.⁶⁴ He would certainly make prominent his provision of an army from his private resources later on in his *Res Gestae*.⁶⁵

Other instances of privately provisioned armies dot the *Histories*. Pompey at *Hist.* 2.98.4M (82 McG), in his letter to the Senate from Spain at the end of 75 B.C.E., remarks that at the start of the war *nomine modo imperii a vobis accepto diebus quadraginta exercitum paravi*. Interestingly, just as the claim of Philippus about Lepidus’ army may be distorted, so too Sallust here has Pompey bend the truth to claim he raised his army on his own. Plutarch reminds us that Pompey had held the army with which he fought Lepidus, refusing to disband until he was sent to Spain to aid Metellus against Sertorius.⁶⁶

⁶³ One may also note Cic. *Ad Att.* 7.11.1 (early 49), of Caesar: *atque haec ait omnia facere se dignitatis causa. ubi est autem dignitas nisi ubi honestas? honestum igitur habere exercitum nullo publico consilio, occupare urbis civium quo facilius sit aditus ad patriam*, χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς, φυγάδων καθόδους, *sescenta alia scelera moliri*, 'τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὥστ' ἔχειν τυραννίδα'?

⁶⁴ McGushin 1992: 147, *pace* Pasoli GIF 22.3 (1970): 65-70.

⁶⁵ At the very beginning of the *RG* (1) Augustus claims *annos undeviginti natus exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi, per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi*. Compare also Cicero *Phil.* 3.5 (*qua peste privato consilio rem publicam—neque enim fieri potuit aliter—Caesar liberavit*), 3.14 (*sceleratus Caesar, Brutus nefarius qui contra consulem privato consilio exercitus comparaverunt...quis est qui eum hostem non existimet quem qui armis persequantur conservatores rei publicae iudicentur?*); *Phil.* 14.4 (*Caesar, cum exercitu per se comparato cum primum his pestibus rem publicam liberasset, ne quid postea sceleris oreretur profectus est ad eundem Brutum liberandum vicitque dolorem aliquem domesticum patriae caritate*).

⁶⁶ Plutarch *Pompey* 17.3, with McGushin 1992: 244. Pompey had, of course, amassed an army *privato consilio* earlier, in 83, to support Sulla in his civil war (*Livy Per.* 85, *Vell. Pat.* 2.29.1, *Plut. Pomp.* 6).

In dealing with the rebellion of Spartacus in 72, the Senate also appointed Crassus to command, and Crassus seems to have recruited 6 legions *privato consilio* to supplement the forces of Gellius and Lentulus (*Hist.* 4.21M (17 McG)).⁶⁷

In perhaps the most interesting example of this theme in Sallust, Caesar himself in *BC* 51.25-36 discusses how certain good actions may still set bad precedents for the future, and he brings up the rule of the Thirty at Athens and the actions of Damasippus under Sulla. He continues (51.35-36):

Atque ego haec non in M. Tullio neque his temporibus vereor; sed in magna civitate multa et varia ingenia sunt. [36] Potest alio tempore, alio consule, cui item exercitus in manu sit, falsum aliquid pro vero credi. Ubi hoc exemplo per senatus decretum consul gladium eduxerit, quis illi finem statuet aut quis moderabitur?

For my own part, I fear nothing of this kind in Marcus Tullius or in these circumstances; but in a great community of citizens there are many different natures. It is possible for something false to be believed true at another time, when someone else is consul who may likewise have an army under his control. When the consul, on the basis of this precedent, shall draw the sword in obedience to the Senate's decree, who will limit or who will restrain him? (Trans. Ramsey 2013).

Vretska takes the reference in 51.36 to be to Octavian himself.⁶⁸ Aside from overnice considerations of what *per senatus decretum* might mean, *alio consule, cui item exercitus in manu sit* could encompass an army raised *privato consilio* as well as an official one, and *falsum aliquid pro vero credi* was likely written so as to encompass multiple interpretations, which accords with Sallust's practice as discussed above, of making his references to the triumvirs recognizable but sufficiently general. As Levene has noted, by design no single event perfectly matches Sallust's wording, even though it seems precise. A few possible examples of the killing of Roman citizens without trial may be at

⁶⁷ See McGushin 1994: 146, and for the nature of Crassus' *imperium*, Brennan 2000: 433-4.

⁶⁸ Vretska 1976: 552, following Seel 1948, Pöschl 1970, and Syme 1964. Cf. also McGushin 1977: 253.

play, including Octavian's role in the proscriptions under the *Lex Titia* of 43.⁶⁹ This would then be more a cumulative indictment of the era from ca. 49-41, suggestive but simultaneously elusive.

Other allusions have been suggested. The topicality of Parthian affairs to the late 40s and early 30s has been pointed out, because of Caesar's planned expedition, the Parthian incursions into Syria and Judea in 41/40, and (later) Antony's failed campaign in 36.⁷⁰ One may find, for instance, in the speech of Mithridates to the Parthian king some reflections of recent developments. Mithridates argues that the Romans are likely to launch an unprovoked attack in their rapacious thirst for power (*Hist.* 4.69.17-21):

An ignoras Romanos, postquam ad occidentem pergentibus finem Oceanus fecit, arma huc convortisse, neque quicquam a principio nisi raptum habere, domum coniuges agros imperium?...pestes conditos orbis terrarum...[20] Romani arma in omnis habent, acerrume in eos quibus victis spolia maxuma sunt; audendo et fallundo et bella ex bellis serendo magni facti.

Or are you unaware that the Romans, after Ocean set a boundary for them as they proceeded west, have turned their arms this way, and that from the beginning of their city have held nothing except by stealing it, including their homes, their wives, their lands, and their empire?...Destined to be a plague upon the whole world...[20] The Romans show a hostile front to all men, most keenly against those who, once, defeated, yield the greatest spoils. By daring and deceit and sowing one war after another have they become great.

His claim about Roman attack eventually materialized in the invasion of Crassus in 53, a fact of which Sallust's readers would have been conscious. Moreover, given the exactions and suffering in Syria at the hands of Cassius and now (from 41) of Antony,

⁶⁹ Levene 2000: 189-90. Other possible references include the *SCU* of 48 to kill Milo and Caelius for riots in support of debt relief (Caes. *B.Civ.* 3.21-2; Dio 42.22.1-25.3, Cic. *Ad Fam.* 8.17, Vell. Pat. 2.68.1-3, Livy *Per.* 111, Orosius 6.3.25; cf. *MRR* II), or that of 47 to have Antony, acting as Caesar's *magister equitum*, kill Dolabella and his supporters over his debt legislation (Livy *Per.* 113, Plut. *Ant.* 9.1-2, [Caes.] *Bell. Alex.* 65.1, Dio 42.29-33; see also Cic. *ad Att.* 11.10.2, 12.4, 16.1, 23.3; *Phil.* 11.14, 13.2, 13.25 (sources in *MRR* II s.v. 47 B.C.)). It is also possible that Sallust thought of M. Antonius in this passage, and Cic. *Phil.* 5.20 seems a natural model on which Sallust could have drawn: after Antony came into the Senate with *agmine quadrato*, Cicero asks *cum autem semel gladium scelere imbuisset, nulla res ei finem caedendi nisi defatigatio et satietas attulisset*.

⁷⁰ For the suggestion see Syme 1964: 222. On the topicality of the letter of Mithridates to the Triumviral Period, see also McGushin 1994: 179.

many in Syria by the early 30s would likely have agreed with Mithridates' naming of the Romans as *latrones gentium* (Hist. 4.67.22M).⁷¹ Unfortunately, given the fragmentary state of *Histories* Books 4 and 5, there is little additional data which we can bring to bear on the question of how Sallust gave voice to contemporary troubles with Parthia.

There are other passages more vague in reference and thus more difficult to analyze,⁷² but the foregoing discussion has sufficiently shown that from his first work to his last, Sallust narrated the events of the past with an eye on the present. In this sense there is some truth to the claim that his narratives are “nominally” about the past, “but they are *about* the Triumviral Period.”⁷³ Osgood has observed that the Latin literature of the Triumviral Period “does not merely reflect lived experience: it also helps people give shape to their perceptions of historical events. [It] lets one see some of the patterns and forms Romans living through the triumvirate conferred upon their experience.”⁷⁴ In the next section we will look at a selection of writings from some of these authors of the Triumviral Age, with particular attention upon how they respond to the horrors of civil war, and to the uncertainty and fear that pervade these years. We shall analyze various expressions of pessimism – either about human nature and morality, or about the course of Roman history – and consider to what degree these sentiments resemble the pessimistic outlook of Sallust himself. It will become apparent that a number of common

⁷¹ Osgood 2006: 187. For exactions in the east (Syria, Judaea, Rhodes, Lycia) by the Liberators see Osgood 2006: 89-92.

⁷² E.g. Hist. 1.55.5 (on the similarity of Lepidus' revolt to the Perusine War of 41/40 BC; see Dio 48.14.3-6, Osgood 2006: 162-4, 172 with sources). Cp. BJ 41.8 on the post-146 era (*parentes aut parvi liberi militum, uti quisque potentiori confinis erat, sedibus pellebantur*) to Hist. 1.55.12.21-22 on the Sullan era (*plebis innoxiae patrias sedes occupavere pauci satellites mercedem scelerum*), which also evokes the land confiscations in Italy in 41. Hist. 1.51M (42 McG).

⁷³ Gerrish 2015: 197.

⁷⁴ Osgood 2006: 5.

preoccupations link together the authors writing between 43 and 31. It is of course difficult to compare what Sallust is doing in historiography with the poetic expressions (and poetic posturings) we find in authors like Vergil, Horace, and Propertius; however, there is a notable degree of shared perspectives between Sallust and such authors on topics like civil war, the rule of Fortune, and the Roman character.⁷⁵ We shall explore what these shared themes and shared preoccupations tell us about the nature of Sallust's moral and historical perspective, and about the nature of his historiography more generally.

⁷⁵ Though generic considerations do in some cases influence the treatment of certain themes, a mitigating factor here is that these themes are not isolated to one poem, but are found across numerous poems and works in each of the authors we shall consider – a point which speaks to some level of shared concerns between Sallust and other triumviral authors that transcends generic lines. Indeed, the themes we shall touch upon below, including the blows of Fortune, weariness with civil war, repetition of civil war, and others, occur with a unique frequency in Triumviral literature, which again indicates their deep impact on the minds of many in that period.

Chapter 9.2: Reactions to the Triumviral Age Among Sallust's Contemporaries

In Roman authors of the Triumviral Period there are a number of references, some more direct than others, to the key battles that shaped the civil wars, from Forum Gallorum/Mutina⁷⁶ to Philippi⁷⁷ to Perusia⁷⁸ to Naulochus⁷⁹ and ultimately Actium⁸⁰. The accompanying outcries against civil violence in such poems tend not to dwell for long on the details of specific events, but are short and sharp with personal agony over the broader tides sweeping them up.⁸¹ Indeed, it is these broader tides of civil war, and in

⁷⁶ E.g. Prop. 2.1.27. On the historical events surrounding Forum Gallorum and Mutina see Cic. *Ad Fam.* 10.30 (S. Sulpicius Galba narrates the battle to Cicero), *Ad Brut.* 1.6.2, App. *B.Civ.* 3.48, Plut. *Ant.* 17.1, Suet. *Aug.* 10; Osgood 2006: 54-56. Cf. *Ad Fam.* 10.33.1 (Pollio to Cicero, June 43) on the *vastitas Italiae* after Mutina, with Koestermann 1971: 34 (contra Paul 1984: 22-3, who sees this phase in Sallust *BJ* 5.2 as a reference only to the immediate aftermath of Sulla's proscriptions).

⁷⁷ Verg. *Geo.* 1.489-97; Hor. *Odes* 2.7, *Epist.* 2.2.41-51. On the course of the battle see App. *B.Civ.* 4.101-112, Plut. *Brut.* 34-53, Dio 47.37-49; Rice Holmes 1928: 82-88.

⁷⁸ Prop. 1.21, 1.22; cf. Prop. 2.1.29. On the conflict see Appian 5.30f, Dio 48.4f; On the end of the conflict see App. *B.Civ.* 5.48-9, Dio 48.14.3-6.

⁷⁹ E.g. Hor. *Epode* 9.1-10. On the historical events surrounding Naulochus see App. 5.110-22; Suet. *Aug.* 22; Dio 49.8-11; cf. *RG* 4.1.

⁸⁰ E.g. Vergil *Geo.* 2.136-76, 3.1-48; Hor. *Epodes* 1, 9, *Sat.* 2.6.51-8; cf. Prop. 2.1.31-4, 2.15.41-6, 2.16.37-40, 2.34.61-4, 3.11, 4.6.37-68. Post-Actian accounts began to turn the battle into a more decisive, dramatic encounter, a clash with a "barbarian" east (see discussion in Osgood 2006: 357, 370f, 383) and indeed "the foundation myth of the new order" (Syme 1939: 355; cf. Zanker 1988: 79-100; Gurval 1995; Watson 2003: 310-17). Even if the content of Vergil's or Horace's poems were not directly ordered, their impulse toward promoting early Augustan ideology is clear (Osgood 2006: 383). On the historical events surrounding Actium, see Plut. *Ant.* 61-68, Dio 50.15-35, with discussion of their relative merits in Osgood 2006: 373.

⁸¹ E.g. Verg. *Geo.* 1.489-501 (*ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis / Romanas acies iterum uidere Philippi; / nec fuit indignum superis bis sanguine nostro / Emathiam et latos Haemi pinguescere campos / ...satis iam pridem sanguine nostro / Laomedontaeae luimus periuria Troiae; / ...ubi fas uersum atque nefas: tot bella per orbem, / tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro / dignus honos, squalent abductis arua colonis, / et curuae rigidum falces conflantur in ensem / ...uicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes / arma ferunt; saeuit toto Mars impius orbe...*); Hor. *Odes* 2.7.9-16 (*Tecum Philippos et celerem fugam / sensi relicta non bene parmula, / cum fracta virtus et minaces / turpe solum tetigere mento; / sed...te rursus in bellum resorbens / unda fretis tulit aestuosus.*), *Epist.* 2.2.41-8 (*Dura sed emouere loco me tempora grato / ciuilibusque rudem belli tulit aestus in arma etc.*); Prop. 1.21, 1.22 (both reflect more specifically on the Perusine War, but his lament is broad: 1.21 conveys the horrors of civil war that separate families; 1.22, by the feigned ignorance of Propertius' longtime friend about where Propertius was from or where Asisium was, sets up an opportunity for Propertius to describe Perusia and the battleground of civil war, giving a somber, tragic feel to what would otherwise be a wispy reminiscence of his hometown. On this unsolicited somber close to his *Monobiblos* Osgood (2006: 170) remarks "Like the first poem of Book 4 [4.1.127-34, on confiscations at Asisium; cf. *Dirae* v.45], the *Cynthia*...establishes a narrator who is scarred by civil war". Cf. Prop. 2.1.27-36 (a list of conflicts supposedly covered by P.: *nam quotiens Mutinam aut civilia busta Philippos* [cf. 1.22] */ aut canerem Siculae classica bella fugae, / eversosque focos antiquae gentis Etruscae* [=Perusia?], */ et Ptolomaei litora capta Phari, / aut canerem Aegyptum et Nilum, cum attractus*

particular the prospects for civil war's recurrence, that seem to solicit concern from a wide range of Triumviral authors. The cyclical recurrence of history would have suggested itself in this age on a number of counts.⁸² As there were in the early 70s, so again in the late 40s there were Lepidi and Bruti waging war around Mutina⁸³; one could note, in both eras, the rallying of the Senate (by L. Marcius Philippus and Cicero respectively) to send against a rogue general (Lepidus cos. 78, M. Antonius in 43) a man who refused to relinquish his army until awarded his due (Pompey (a command in Spain), Octavian (consular power)).⁸⁴ Likewise, many could rightly have wondered, after experiencing the land confiscations of Octavian in 41 and 40, if Antony would repeat the example of Sulla when he returned from east in the late 40s (or at any point in the 30s).

Sallust himself is alive to the idea of civil war's recurrence, as we have seen above in the examples of "analogical historiography" from the *Histories* and also the monographs. Moreover, we have observed how in Sallust's account of early Rome in *BC* 2-13 one may discern narrative units cycling between concord and good conduct on the one hand, and discord and political immorality on the other.⁸⁵

in urbem / septem captivis debilis ibat aquis, / aut regum auratis circumdata colla catenis, / Actiaque in Sacra currere rostra Via; / te mea Musa illis semper contexeret armis, / et sumpta et posita pace fidele caput). For a discussion of Vergil *Eclogues* 1 & 9, see below on land confiscations.

⁸² Syme 1964: 250 remarks "There was fair evidence at hand to confirm the deeply rooted belief, held among the learned and vulgar alike, that history repeated itself in cyclical revolutions." On the Etruscan concept of *saecula* see Santangelo 2013: 115-27. The influence of this idea on contemporary conceptions of Roman history is "elusive" (ibid., 117). That the 9th of 10 Etruscan *saecula* ended after Caesar's death, and the 10th, signalling the beginning of the end of the Etruscan people, began in the Triumviral Period, may seem fitting, but the implications for Sallust's concept of cyclical recurrence (or those of other Roman authors) are unclear. Cf. Serv. ad *Ecl.* 9.46; Varro in Cens. *de Die Natali* 17.6, 14-15.

⁸³ For the following examples see Syme 1964: 218-220, and *MRR* II. M. Brutus, father of M. Brutus the tyrannicide, as an ally of Lepidus in Cisalpine Gaul was killed in 77 B.C near Mutina. In 43, at Mutina, D. Iunius Brutus Albinus, son of the cos. of 77 (D. Iunius Brutus), was besieged at Mutina and forced to surrender before being pardoned by Octavian.

⁸⁴ As Philippus would urge the passing of the *senatus consultum ultimum* against Lepidus (cf. Sallust *Hist.* 1.55.22), so Cicero would fight for action to be taken against Antony in 44 and 43.

⁸⁵ Cycles between good/bad: *BC* 2.1-2; 2.3-5; 6.1-7; 7-9 vs. 10-13. See above, Chapter 6.2 for fuller discussion.

The *BC* suggests some other instances of the recurrent or cyclical nature of Roman civil strife. As the monograph wears on, we see that many of Catiline's followers in the countryside are veterans of Sulla looking for a renewal of their fortunes (*BC* 16.4, 28.4), that many among the urban *plebs* support his efforts in the hope of earning a fortune (*BC* 37.6), and that even the sons of the proscribed who had lost land and rights were looking to join his cause (*BC* 37.9). Moreover, as discussed earlier in this chapter, in the climactic final battle at Pistoria the Sullan Catiline now fights under Marian standards for his own *dignitas* (59.3; cf. 58.12, 60.7). The violence of the Sullan era thus reasserts itself here with Catiline – though in such a way that one can almost dispense with all talk of Marian and Sullan factions: Catiline, with his revolutionary movement encompassing Sullan veterans, sons of the proscribed, ambitious *equites*, urban *plebs* and disgraced aristocrats, transcends factional distinctions to represent in a purer form the greed, ambition, and rampant bloodshed of civil war coursing through all of Roman society.

In addition, the very ending of the *BC* is left open, allowing for the possibility to think ahead to what would follow. For the monograph comes to an end with Catiline dying on the battlefield, though not yet dead, *paululum etiam spirans ferociamque animi quam habuerat vivos in voltu retinens* (“still breathing just a bit, and his face showing the ferocity of his spirit which he had while alive”, *BC* 61.4). Just as the ending of the *BJ*, with the hopes of the entire state ominously (or ironically) placed on the shoulders of Marius, forces the reader to think ahead to the chaos that would follow for Rome, so too the ending of the *BC* seems calculated to remain open-ended. That Catiline does not die in the text may symbolize for Sallust how the unrest animating Catiline's conspiracy had

not immediately died out, and how some of the underlying grievances which occasioned the rebellion were to crop up again during the Triumviral Period.⁸⁶

The importance of Faesulae in Sallust's narrative of Catiline's conspiracy (*BC* 24.2, 27.1, 30.1, 3, 59.3) also bids the reader to think of events in Etruria both prior and subsequent to the narrative of Catiline. For the war around Perugia in 41-40 B.C.E. emerged as a struggle of Octavian's forces (and his veterans) against the dispossessed civilians of Etruria over whether the recent land confiscations should be rectified. Yet Sulla too had confiscated land in Etruria, and imposed various penalties, leading to an uprising at Faesulae in 78.⁸⁷ A wider uprising in Etruria took shape from this, led by Lepidus. To Sallust, such unrest as was raised in 63 was a recurrence of conflicts that had begun decades earlier, and would arise again decades after Catiline.⁸⁸

Closely linked with the concept of recurrent civil strife is the motif of ancestral curse or bloodguilt, especially that stemming from the killing of Remus by Romulus.⁸⁹ The

⁸⁶ See e.g. the agitation over debt relief measures in 48 and 47 (*MRR* II s.v. 48, 47 BC, Milo & Dolabella); on the uprising around Perugia of the rural populations affected by land confiscations see Appian *B.Civ.* 5.12-49, Dio 48.3-14, Livy *Per.* 125-6, Vell. Pat. 2.74.2-4, Plut. *Ant.* 28, 30, and Osgood 2006: 159-61 for discussion of modern views on the conflict. On the suppression of remnants from Spartacus' and Catiline's rebellions in 60 B.C.E., see Suet. *Aug.* 3.1 and Brennan 2000: 433, 452n108, 534n73. On the spilling over of Catiline's followers into those of Clodius, see Cic. *de Domo* 13, 72, 75; *Sest.* 28, 95, *Pis.* 11, 15-16, 23; *Mil.* 37, *Cael.* 10-14; *Ad Att.* 1.14.5, 1.13.3, with the discussion of Lewis 1988: 31-32. Later, Cicero in his *Philippics* likens Antony to Catiline and speaks of the 20 years between them (*Phil.* 6.17, 12.24). Antony is revealed by Cicero as either *more* dangerous (*Phil.* 2.1, 13.22) or *less* dangerous (*Phil.* 2.118, 4.15) than Catiline, depending on what Cicero is trying to argue in a given context: either to deepen Antony's criminality, lessen it, or simply to reaffirm the positive legacy of his actions as consul in 63. Cf. Ledworski 1994: 63ff).

⁸⁷ Cf. Sallust *Hist.* 1.65M (57 McG), 1.67M (59 McG); App. *B.Civ.* 1.107; Exuperantius 36-7Z; McGushin 1992: 128-9.

⁸⁸ For a further example of repeated events in Sallust's *BC* – the repetition by the younger Cato in 63 B.C.E. of his ancestor's mistake – see above, Chapter 6.3 on Catonian influences in Sallust: in both cases, by arguing for the destruction of the enemy (Carthage, Catiline), who, while a threat to Roman security, also galvanized Roman morality and concord, each man unwittingly opens the door for a relapse in morality and concord among citizens.

⁸⁹ For the concept of the ancestral or inherited curse hanging over or polluting families or whole cities, as well as the related concept of repeating the original crime, see the discussion in Watson 2003: 282-3, Watson 1991: 7, 24.

cycle of civil strife experienced by Romans “damns the race to reenact in internecine conflict the crime of Romulus.”⁹⁰ In Horace’s view, for instance, Romans are locked into a “never-ending cycle of internal *stasis*” which has recently manifested itself quite strongly.⁹¹ Not only is yet another age now being worn down by civil war (*altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas*, *Epode* 16.1), but the current age is bound to pay for the crime of their ancestor(s) by reliving the same crimes, thereby becoming *impia* themselves.⁹² In *Epode* 7, likely written about 39-37 B.C.E.,⁹³ Horace laments the rekindling of civil strife:

Quo, quo scelesti ruitis? aut cur dexteris
 aptantur enses conditi?
 parumne campis atque Neptuno super
 fusum est Latini sanguinis,
 non ut superbas invidae Karthaginis 5
 Romanus arces ureret,
 intactus aut Britannus ut descenderet
 sacra catenatus via,
 sed ut Secundum vota Parthorum sua
 Urbs haec periret dextera? 10
 neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus
 umquam nisi in dispar feris.
 furorne caecos an rapit vis acrior
 an culpa? responsum date.
 tacent et albus ora pallor inficit 15
 mentesque percussae stupent.
 sic est: acerba fata Romanos agunt
 scelusque fraternae necis,
 ut inmeritis fluxit in terram Remi
 sacer nepotibus cruor. 20

Where, impious men, where are you rushing? Why are those swords so lately sheathed being grasped in your right hands? Has too little Roman blood been spilled over the fields, and over Neptune’s waves? – and not so that a Roman could burn the proud towers of an envious Carthage, or so that unassailed Britons might proceed down the Via Sacra in chains, but so that, according to the prayers of the Parthians, this city might fall by its own hand. This has

⁹⁰ Watson 2003: 269. Cf. *ibid.*, 283: “...the cycle of internecine strife into which the Romans are locked by Romulus’ murder of Remus”.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, 269.

⁹² *Epode* 16.9, *impia perdemus devoti sanguinis aetas*. Cf. *Odes* 1.35.34; 3.23.10; Vergil *Geo.* 1.468 (*impia aeternam timuerunt saecula noctem*).

⁹³ On the dating of this poem see the discussion of Watson 2003: 169-71.

never even been the custom among wolves or lions⁹⁴ – unless against another type of wild beast. Does blind frenzy drive you, or some fiercer power, or some wrongdoing? Answer me! They're silent: a ghostly pallor dyes their faces, their downcast minds are dazed. Yes, that's it: a bitter destiny drives on the Romans, and the guilt of fraternal slaughter, from the time when the blood of innocent Remus poured on the ground, bringing a curse upon his descendants. (Transl. A.S. Kline 2005, adapted)

In this “deeply pessimistic document”, the poet (or his speaker) harangues the *scelesti cives*, taking them to task for their conduct, and eventually puts it down not to an irrational blind furor or an irresistible, numinous force from on high, but rather to a certain wrongdoing – more specifically the reenactment of an ancestral crime of fratricide that the Romans are cursed to repeat. One can compare Vergil's bleak picture of the spread of civil war in *Georgics* Book 1. With an emphasis on the recurrence of civil war, Vergil notes (*Geo.* 1.489-92):

ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis
Romanas acies iterum uidere Philippi;
nec fuit indignum superis bis sanguine nostro
Emathiam et latos Haemi pinguescere campos

Thus Philippi saw once again Roman armies clash with each other, equally matched; and the gods did not deem it unfitting twice to paint Emathia and the wide plains of Haemus with our blood.

After painting a picture of the grim signs of civil war's destruction wrought upon the land, impossible to bury (493-7), the poet continues with a perceptible weariness *satis iam pridem sanguine nostro Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae* (“We long ago paid sufficiently with our blood for the perjury of Trojan Laomedon.”, 1.501-2). Yet unlike Horace, Vergil seems here to at least hold out hope for an end to the ancestral curse.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ On the characterization of the slaughter of kin as worse than beastly behavior, see i.a. Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 150, and earlier precedents such as Aeschylus' comparisons of the Erinyes to wild beasts in *Eum.* 131-2, 193-4, 644, and Athena's comparison of civil war to cock-fighting (*Eum.* 861-3)(cf. Dufallo 2007: 139).

⁹⁵ *Geo.* 1.488-501: *di patrii Indigetes et Romule Vestaque mater / quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia seruas, / hunc saltem euerso iuuenem succurrere saeclo / ne prohibete....* (Cf. *Geo.* 1.121-4, 145-6 (*labor omnia vincit / improbus*), 199-200, where Vergil claims the natural degeneration of the physical

Horace thus conveys a sharper pessimism about the ability of Romans to escape their impious behavior.

It bears repeating, however, that the *Epodes* were written over several years and published as a collection likely after Actium, and we should take this into consideration in our reading even of the “political” *Epodes* (e.g. 7, 16):

Epode 7 was written in 39-37 and was retained in the published collection as a salutary reminder of the fate from which Octavian had saved the Roman state, and as a tacit admission that the poet’s stark pessimism of those years needed qualification in the light of subsequent events. In other words, *Epode* 7 was designed in the context of the *Epode* book to be read from a *Doppelperspektive*, both as a document of its own time, and from a revisionary viewpoint following Octavian’s military successes at Actium and Alexandria. (Watson 2003: 270)

Such expressions of pessimism as Horace gives us through *Epode* 7, or even *Epode* 16, can therefore be taken both as sincere testaments to their times of composition, and as expressions repurposed to a new set of poetic criteria after Actium.

The emphasis on the ancestral curse upon the Romans returns later in the *Odes* as well.⁹⁶ Other instances, broadly speaking, of cyclical views of time and history survive from the Triumviral Period, such as the Vergil’s *Eclogue* 4, where the poet narrates the imminent return of a Golden Age via a gradual process of retracing the ages of man.

world can be temporarily halted by the *labor* of the farmer). Moreover, as Watson (2003: 284) points out, Horace in *Epode* 7 by opting for the version of the Remus legend in which Remus is blameless, opted for what was a more rarely attested variant (Cic. *de Off.* 3.40f). For a later echo of the opening of *Epode* 7 cf. *Aen.* 5.670-71: *quis furor iste novus? quo nunc, quo tenditis? inquit / heu miserae cives?*” (a harangue also spoken after the outbreak of *tumultus* amongst citizens).

⁹⁶ *Odes* 1.2.20-24, 29-30 (*Audiet civis acuisse ferrum, / quo graves Persae melius perirent, / audiet pugnas vitio parentum / rara iuventus... Cui dabit partis scelus expiandi / Iuppiter?*); 1.35.33-7 (*Heu heu, cicatricum et sceleris pudet / fratrumque. Quid nos dura refugimus / aetas, quid intactum nefasti / liquimus? Unde manum iuventus / metu deorum continuit?*); 2.1.4-5, 29-35 (*arma / nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus... Quis non Latino sanguine pinguior / campus sepulcris impia proelia / testatur auditumque Medis / Hesperiae sonitum ruinae? / Qui gurges aut quae flumina lugubris / ignara belli? Quod mare Dauniae / non decoloravere caedes? / Quae caret ora cruore nostro?*); 3.6 *passim*, esp. 1-4, 17-20, 45-8 (*pace* Quinn 1980: 256, who sees a more tempered pessimism: the current generation may not be responsible for the crimes of their ancestors, but, as v.45-8 makes clear, the current generation will not soon escape the moral decline set in motion by the *delicta maiorum*).

Although the ages seem like they will start anew (*magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo*, *Ecl.* 4.5), the course of the poem seems to chart a circling back from the current Age of Iron (v. 8-9) to a Golden Age, which will come in stages: Pollio's consulship will be the *inception* of this soon-to-come Golden Age, when the announced child (v.7-8) will arrive.⁹⁷ During his boyhood, the Age of Iron will give way as certain signs of progress manifest themselves (v.26-30), but there will still be some traces of the ancient sin (*Pauca tamen suberunt priscae vestigia fraudis*, v.31) – sailing, building city walls, farming, a second *Argo*, *atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles* (36). In essence, the Heroic Age will be repeated in the course of the journey back to a Golden Age. These traces of ancient sin, however, will be banished once the child reaches manhood.⁹⁸ Indeed, the dominant sentiment of the poem is one of promise: allegorically, the boy and the peace of Brundisium of spring 40 B.C.E. are parallel symbols: both were born in Pollio's consulship, both will keep growing to full size until society reaps a full-fledged Golden Age. The securing of this peace, and of a Golden Age, takes time just like the maturation of the child.⁹⁹ At any rate, the *Fourth Eclogue* is notable for its calling up of these same themes of ancestral crime and cyclical history, even if the overall outlook of the poem tends more toward optimism.¹⁰⁰

Yet already a generation before the poets of the Triumviral Period put the idea of ancestral bloodguilt to dramatic use, Cicero had provided a clear example of the power of

⁹⁷ On the likely identity of the boy as the coming child from the recent union of Antony and Octavia, see Osgood 2006: 196 with discussion of some alternate views.

⁹⁸ On the novelty of this progression (and reversal) of the Ages of Man see Osgood 2006: 195.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 197.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. later Verg *Aen.* 6.832-3 (*ne, pueri, ne tanta animis adsuescite bella / neu patriae validas in viscera vertite viris*). Besides the almost proleptic civil war between Italians and Trojans in the poem, Dido's curse on Trojans (4.607-29) sets a precedent for that of Remus (Dufallo 2007: 104).

this concept in oratory. In Cicero's view, there had been five civil wars, all in his own time: Sulla in 88, Marius and Cinna against Octavius in 87, Sulla upon his return to Italy in 83, Caesar against Pompey, the current one against Antony.¹⁰¹ Putting aside the issue of how Cicero is defining civil war here, as opposed to civil disturbances, it is clear that he saw a recurrent pattern in the last few generations. He gives dramatic life to this recurrent strife in multiple speeches by describing the actions of individuals as driven by the Furies, thereby signifying evil transmitted from an earlier generation to a later one, a continued bloodthirsty vengeance that will perpetuate itself in civil violence.¹⁰² In *Pro Rosc. Am.* 67, Cicero bolsters the case for Roscius' innocence by saying Roscius does not resemble those driven mad by Furies¹⁰³ But in the rest of the speech, Cicero draws on this imagery to paint a picture of Rome threatened by unbounded violence, Roscius hounded by bloodthirsty, Fury-like enemies.¹⁰⁴ In the peroration (148, 154), Cicero urges the judges to put an end to the cycle of violence that has put the entire state in danger.

Similarly, in the *Pro Sulla*, the Furies impel the Catilinarian conspirators *non ad perficiendum scelus, sed ad luendas rei publicae poenas* ("not to commit a crime, but to expiate the wrongdoings of the Republic", *Pro Sulla* 76). This eruption of violence

¹⁰¹ Cic. *Phil.* 8.7-8.

¹⁰² Cf. Horace, *Epode* 5.92, and later Vergil *Aen.* 7.324f, where the Fury Allecto incites a proto-civil war between Trojans and Italians, with the discussion of Dufallo 2007: 36-52.

¹⁰³ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 67: *nolite enim putare, quem ad modum in fabulis saepenumero videtis, eos qui aliquid impie scelerateque commiserint agitari et perterreri Furiarum taedis ardentibus. Sua quemque fraus et suus terror maxime vexat, suum quemque scelus agitat amentiaque adficit, suae malae cogitationes conscientiaeque animi terrent; hae sunt impiis adsiduae domesticaeque Furiae quae dies noctesque parentium poenas a consceleratissimis filiis repetant.* Cicero here likely draws upon Aeschines *Tim.* 190-91: μη γὰρ οἶεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰς τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ θεῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἀσελγείας γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ τοὺς ἡσεβηκότας, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις, Ποινὰς ἐλαύνειν καὶ κολάζειν δασὶν ἡμμέναις: ἀλλ' αἱ προπετεῖς τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναὶ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἱκανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, ταῦτα πληροὶ τὰ ληστήρια, ταῦτ' εἰς τὸν ἐπακτροκέλητα ἐμβιβάζει, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ Ποινῇ, ταῦτα παρακελεύεται σφάττειν τοὺς πολίτας, ὑπηρετεῖν τοῖς τυράννοις, συγκαταλύειν τὸν δῆμον.

¹⁰⁴ Chrysogonus as driven by consciousness of his *nefas*: *Rosc. Amer.* 6; Chrysogonus as himself a Fury seeking Roscius' blood: *ibid.*, 150.

Cicero imagines as an outbreak of plague or illness upon the state. Yet this outbreak of violence is also punishment, and means of expiation, for the state's past internecine crimes. Once again, a tragic construction of inherited crime brings out the repetitive or recurring nature of Rome's civil strife.

The *In Pisonem* continues this imagery of inherited crime and vengeance by depicting Piso and Clodius as Furies of Catiline seeking out Cicero for revenge (*Pis.* 8, 16, 21, 26; cf. 91). Piso is also driven by Furies – or Fury-like madness – himself.¹⁰⁵

In addition to the rhetorical positioning that such language allows Cicero vis-à-vis his clients and his enemies in these speeches,¹⁰⁶ it is possible that Cicero invokes such imagery in order to resist the “cosmic tragedy” being put in motion by political enemies, and to prevent Roman history from becoming its own unending tragedy motivated by the curses of the dead. If so, this was a type of critical discourse that, in spite of its continued life in Roman poetry, would not be as amenable to the political climate soon to emerge under Augustus' rule.¹⁰⁷

These two related concepts – cyclical or recurrent history, and ancestral crime – thus had a considerable influence upon the way some Romans during the civil conflicts of the

¹⁰⁵ *Pis.* fr.3 Clark (*Perturbatio istum mentis et quaedam scelerum offusa caligo et ardentes Furiarum faces excitaverunt*); *Pis.* 47 (reproducing *Rosc. Amer.* 67): *Nolite enim ita putare, patres conscripti, ut in scaena videtis, homines consceleratos impulsu deorum terreri furialibus taedis ardentibus; sua quemque fraus, suum facinus, suum scelus, sua audacia de sanitate ac mente deturbat; hae sunt impiorum furiae, hae flammae, hae faces. Ego te non vaecordem, non furiosum, non mente captum, non tragico illo Oreste aut Athamante dementiorem putem.* On Clodius himself as a Fury, see also *Cic. de Domo Sua* 102; *Harus. Resp.* 39; *Sest.* 33, 39, 117; in *Vat.* 33, 40; *Mil.* 8. Cf. also *Cic. In Verr.* II.1.7, II.5.113 (*Poenae, Furiae, di patrii* as avenging deities of Verres' victims)

¹⁰⁶ E.g. in the *Pro Rosc. Am.*: “In expatiating...upon parricide, Cicero not only seeks to dismiss the possibility of guilt in the case of his client but also magnifies an atmosphere of abhorrence for the very acts and traits he imputes to Roscius' enemies. The latter...are far more likely to be harried by the Furies of bad conscience than the man they accuse.” (Dufallo 2007: 41-2).

¹⁰⁷ See Dufallo 2007: 51-2. Cf. Syme 1939: 440-75.

late Republic and Triumviral Era thought about the past and future. Ideas of ancestral crime and repeated civil conflict would continue to occupy the minds of poets throughout the Augustan Age.¹⁰⁸ Sallust himself does not explain the origin and continuance of Roman vice by invoking the idea of an ancestral curse or the vengeance of the Furies; for him, as we have seen, there were inherent flaws in the Roman character from the city's beginnings, tempered occasionally by the presence of *metus hostilis*, which brought *concordia* and moral discipline.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, what links Sallust and contemporaries such as Horace and Vergil is that all saw Roman civil strife as part of a recurrent pattern or cycle which was bound to repeat. Pessimism about the immediate future, and about the possibility of an end to this cycle of civil wars, was thus a common preoccupation during the 40s and 30s – even if it was more occasional in some authors and more deep-seated in others (such as Sallust himself). Although expressions of promise regarding the restoration of order would soon grow more frequent in the months and years after Sallust's own death, the horrors of the recent civil wars, and the prospect of their recurrence, could not completely be forgotten.¹¹⁰

Indeed, one may consider how the trauma of the land confiscations of 41-40 B.C.E. found lasting testaments throughout the Triumviral Period in the laments of Vergil,

¹⁰⁸ Compare, e.g., Propertius' calculated references to Remus instead of Romulus: 2.1.23 ([*non ego Titanas canerem...*] *regnave prima Remi*), 3.9.50 (*caeso moenia firma Remo*), 4.1.9-10, 50 (*qua gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit olim: unus erat fratrum maxima regna focus...Aventino rura pianda Remo*), 4.6.80 (*Reddat signa Remi*). Cf. also Tib. 2.5.24 (*moenia, consorti non habitanda Remo*), and Verg. *Geo.* 2.533 (*hanc olim ueteres uitam coluere Sabini, / hanc Remus et frater*); and Prop. 3.11.36: *tollet nulla dies hanc tibi, Roma, notam* (Pompey's death in Egypt/civil war), and the end of Apollo's address to Augustus at Prop. 4.6: *quam [urbem] nisi defendes, murorum Romulus augur / ire Palatinas non bene uidit ausis* ("Unless you defend the city, Romulus auguring the foundation of Rome's walls misread the flight of birds from the Palatine").

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Hist.* 1.7M, 1.11, 12, 16M, and Chapters 5-6 above for full discussion.

¹¹⁰ See above, and Osgood 2006: 403.

Horace, and Propertius. In *Eclogue* 1 Vergil presents an account of Meliboeus' conversation with Tityrus, full of distress, loss, and resignation.¹¹¹ It is likely Meliboeus here only experienced land confiscation, not proscription, but it amounted to much the same, for many of those who experienced confiscation also fled, some ending up with Sextus Pompey.¹¹² At any rate, Tityrus was until recently a slave, and when traveling to Rome to ensure the safety of his owner's estate and thus his own *peculium*, he had been manumitted (v.27f; 40-45). The poem opens by prompting the reader to wonder why Meliboeus is in exile from his land, but not Tityrus.¹¹³ Meliboeus sees everything in chaos (*undique totis / usque adeo turbatur agris*, v.11-12) – quite uncharacteristic for bucolic. After hearing about Tityrus' encounter with the god-like youth at Rome (v. 6, 7, 41), Meliboeus laments that his exile will take him beyond the borders of the Roman world (v.64-6), beyond the traditional boundaries of pastoral as well.¹¹⁴ Meliboeus' disgust with the general situation comes through strongly (v.67-72):

en unquam patrios longo post tempore finis
 pauperis et tuguri congestum caespitem culmen,
 post aliquot, mea regna, videns mirabor aristas?
 impius haec tam culta novalia miles habebit,
 barbarus has segetes. en quo discordia civis
 produxit miseros!¹¹⁵ His nos consevimus agros!

Will I, after a long absence, ever see the boundaries of my fatherland and the turf-clad roof of my humble cottage? Will I ever look in amazement upon a few ears of corn, once my

¹¹¹ On the immediate popularity of Vergil's poetry (both on stage and elsewhere), marking it as representative of its age, see Osgood 2006: 126.

¹¹² Cf. App. *B.Civ.* 4.85; Vell. Pat. 2.77.2.

¹¹³ *Ecl.* 1.1-5 (Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi / silvestrem tenui Musam meditaris avena; / nos patriae fines et dulcia linquimus arva. / nos patriam fugimus; tu, Tityre, lentus in umbra / formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas).

¹¹⁴ Osgood 2006: 119. Moreover, Meliboeus here seems not to be the only one forced to consider this course (v. 64 *ibimus*).

¹¹⁵ On this line cf. Hor. *Epode* 7.1: *quo, quo scelesti ruitis* (cf. 7.13 *furor ne caecos an rapit...*), but also Prop. 1.22.5 (on Perusine Wars): *cum Romana suos egit discordia cives*; Prop. 3.13.60: *frangitur ipsa suis Roma superba bonis*. Cf. *Geo.* 2.496: *infidos agitans discordia fratres*, 2.503-4: *ruuntque in ferrum*; still later *Aen* 5. 670-71: *quis furor iste novus? quo nunc, quo tenditis, inquit, heu, miserae cives?*

kingdom? An impious soldier will possess this well-cultivated land, a barbarous soldier these crops. Ah, look to what lengths discord has driven citizens! For *these* men we've sown our fields!

Here Meliboeus reflects with some outrage upon coming back to his land after a long absence, during which a cruel, negligent soldier occupied it and brought it near to ruin.¹¹⁶ A sense of loss and resignation rounds off the poem.¹¹⁷

Similar sentiments are expressed in *Eclogue* 9, where Moeris, driven off his land, laments the harsh rule of Fortune (*Ecl.* 9.2-6):

O Lycida, uiui pervenimus, advena nostri
(quod nunquam veriti sumus) ut possessor agelli
diceret: "Haec mea sunt; veteres migrate coloni."
Nunc victi, tristes, quoniam fors omnia versat,
hos illi (quod nec vertat bene!) mittimus haedos.

O Lycidas, we have lived to see the day – an evil never dreamed – when a strange new holder of our little farm could say: "This is mine; be gone, old tenants!" Now, defeated and sorrowful, since Chance rules all, we send him these kids – our curse go with them! (Transl. Fairclough 1916 adapted)

Lycidas had heard that Menalcas, with his shepherd's song, had won Moeris' petition with the land commissioners, but Moeris puts the record straight, emphasizing how little impact their song has.¹¹⁸ Lycidas is unsettled by this: poetry and song was a form of *solacia* for them,¹¹⁹ which is perhaps symbolic of how lamentable a condition obtained in society at large. As Moeris makes clear, Mantua suffered because nearby Cremona,

¹¹⁶ Cf. *Geo.* 1.507 (*squalent abductis arua colonis*)

¹¹⁷ *Ecl.* 1.74-8. Line 74 (*ite meae, felix quondam pecus, ite capellae*), with its echo of the final lines of the 10th *Eclogue*, retrospectively adds to the somber close of the poem.

¹¹⁸ 9.7-13, esp. 11-13: *Audieras, et fama fuit; sed carmina tantum / nostra ualent, Lycida, tela inter Martia, quantum / Chaonias dicunt aquila ueniente columbas* ("You had indeed heard, and that was the rumor. But amid the weapons of war, Lycidas, our songs have as much power as they say Chaonian doves when the eagle comes."). This imagery would also have reminded one of the standard and military eagle processing out toward the establishment of a colony, which the dispossessed would have had occasion to witness (cf. discussion in Osgood 2006: 137). On the powerlessness of their song, see also 9.51-4: (Moeris) *Omnia fert aetas, animum quoque; saepe ego longos / cantando puerum memini me condere soles: / nunc oblita mihi tot carmina, uox quoque Moerim / iam fugit ipsa.*

¹¹⁹ 9.17-20, esp. 17-8: *Heu! Tua nobis / paene simul tecum solacia rapta, Menalca?* ("Alas! was the solace of your songs, Menalcas, almost torn from us, along with yourself?")

whose land had been assigned to veterans, ran out of plots, and the consequent encroachment into Mantuan territory led to his current predicament (v.26-9).¹²⁰

The disheartened state of Vergil's interlocutors is capped by Lycidas' mention of Caesar's comet, which they had seen a few years earlier and taken as a harbinger of prosperity. Their expectations have since been shattered. This story of optimism turned to despair stands as a central feature of the poem's message, typical not just of Vergil's experience, but surely to many of his readers as well, especially those who lived near the veteran colonies.¹²¹ As Meliboeus had remarked in *Eclogue* 1 on his own dispossession, perhaps Moeris here should have known better than to raise his hopes prematurely during this era.¹²²

Such outcries do indeed find kindred sentiment in Sallust, who not only criticizes soldiers for thinking anything was honorable for a price (*BJ* 86.3), but also the elite for ejecting from their lands the families of soldiers who lived adjacent to the coveted property of the wealthy (*BJ* 41.7-8). Sallust was therefore quite normal in expressing a general exasperation and disgust at the actions both of the Triumvirs and of their soldiers in the late 40s.¹²³

¹²⁰ 9.26-9: *Immo haec quae Varo, necdum perfecta, canebat: / "Vare, tuom nomen, superet modo Mantua nobis, / Mantua uae miserae nimium uicina Cremonae, / cantantes sublime ferent ad sidera cycni."* On Mantua's confiscations see *Geo.* 2.198 (*et qualem infelix amisit Mantua campum*). On the unfair incursions of the land commissioners (Oct. Musa, Alfenus Varus), see Serv. Dan. ad *Ecl.* 9.8, 9.10.

¹²¹ Cf. Osgood 2006: 135-6, and Serv. Dan. ad *Ecl.* 9.46.

¹²² *Ecl.* 1.16-17: *saepe malum hoc nobis, si mens non laeva fuisset, / de caelo tactas memini praedicere quercus.* (on the Caesarian metaphor of the lightning bolt see J.A. Rosner-Siegel 1983: passim).

¹²³ Cf. Osgood 2006: 162-4, and above, Chapter 9.1 for Sallust's awareness of the parallels between the Perusine War/land confiscations on one hand, and the actions of Sulla and Etruria's subsequent revolt under Lepidus on the other. In reaction to the above-mentioned themes of *Eclogues* 1&9 (exile, *discordia*, *impius miles*), cf. *Dirae* 82-85: *o male deuoti, praetorum crimina, agelli, / tuque inimica tui semper Discordia ciuis, / exsul ego indemnatu egens mea rura reliqui, / miles ut accipiat funesti praemia belli?*

Horace too has a story to tell of the loss of family land, both his own¹²⁴ and that of the interlocutor Ofellus in *Satires* 2.2 – though in this poem we find something approaching a hopeful outlook. Ofellus’ advice is that hunger makes simple fare tasty, and that excessive dainties are unnecessary (*Sat.* 2.2.1-52). A mean between two extremes is to be sought – like that Ofellus had found – to balance one’s health and fortune (2.2.53-88). Ofellus, whom we learn had been turned out of his land and now works it as a *colonus* (v.114-15; cf. Moeris in *Ecl.* 9.5-6), then speaks his advice directly, advising how he copes with the uncertainty of the future and the blows of Fortune (*Sat.* 2.2.107-11):

...uterne
ad casus dubios fidet sibi certius? hic qui
pluribus adsuerit mentem corpusque superbum,
an qui contentus parvo metuensque futuri
in pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello?

Who has more trust in themselves in uncertain conditions? He who has accustomed a mind and fastidious body to a multitude, or he who, content with a small amount and fearful of the future, prepares in peaceful times the things appropriate for war?

Like the wise, hard-working ant who stores up now in anticipation of future crisis, Horace advocates a course for weathering uncertainty and misfortune – a fitting example of the shifting and uncertain environment after the Treaties of Brundisium (Sept. 40 B.C.E.) and Misenum (spring 39).¹²⁵ This was a period of “cautious tiptoeing”, and by then “misfortune seemed a given.”¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Briefly at *Epist.* 2.2.49-52: *unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi / decisis humilem pennis inopemque paterni / et laris et fundi, paupertas impulit audax / ut versus facerem...*

¹²⁵ Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.32-40: *sicut / parvola—nam exemplo est—magni formica laboris / ore trahit quodcumque potest atque addit acervo / quem struit, haud ignara ac non incauta futuri. / quae, simul inuersum contristat Aquarius annum, / non usquam prorpit et illis utitur ante / quaesitis sapiens, cum te neque fervidus aestus / demoveat lucro neque hiems, ignis mare ferrum, / nil obstat tibi, dum ne sit te ditior alter.* On the renewed tensions and unrest following the Treaty of Brundisium: App. *B.Civ.* 5.67, 69-74, Dio 48.31; following the pact of Misenum and the renewal of warfare with Sextus: App. 5.77-80, Dio 48.45-6, Plut. *Ant.* 32, Livy, *Per.* 127, and Horace *Epodes* 7.1f, 16.1f.

¹²⁶ Osgood 2006: 207.

The climax of Ofellus' speech calls attention to tumult in Roman society, expulsion of citizens from their land, and the constant shifts in fortune of the Triumviral Period, but he ends with a call to oppose a strong front to such adversity (*Sat.* 2.2.126-36):

'saeviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus:	126
quantum hinc inminuet? quanto aut ego parcius aut vos,	
o pueri, nitiuistis, ut huc novus incola venit?	
nam propriae telluris erum natura nec illum	
nec me nec quemquam statuit: nos expulit ille,	130
illum aut nequities aut vafri inscitia iuris,	
postremum expellet certe vivacior heres.	
nunc ager Umbreni sub nomine, nuper Ofelli	
dictus, erit nulli proprius, sed cedet in usum	
nunc mihi, nunc alii. quocirca vivite fortes	135
fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus.'	

"Let Fortune run wild¹²⁷, let her incite new tumult: How much can she take from our current state? How much worse off have I or you been, my sons, since this new landlord arrived? Nature makes neither him nor me nor anyone the true owner of the land: he expelled us, and either incompetence will expel him, or lack of knowledge of the subtle laws, or in the end by a more long-lived heir. Today the farm's in Umbrenus' name, recently it was Ofellus', no one will truly own it, but it will be worked now by me, now another. So live bravely and oppose a courageous heart to misfortune."

Unlike Moeris in *Eclogue* 9, who says *Fors omnia versat* (9.5), curses his new landlord (9.6), and seems downcast by the confiscation, Ofellus, though he may lament, seems able to cope and move on due to his philosophical outlook: he does not fool himself about the permanence of material goods, he is prepared for Fortune's blows, and is confident Fortune itself will put the new owner in his place. *Fors* may indeed turn everything about, but he is ready – an aspirational message for contemporaries searching for ways to cope themselves.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Cf. Sallust *BC* 10.1 (*saevire Fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit*). For other "Sallustian" language in *Satires* 2.2, see *Sat.* 2.2.77-9 (~ *BC* 1.2, *BJ* 1.1-3, 2.1-3 (mind-body/divine-human dualities)), 103-4 (~ *BC* 12.3-4). In reality what we see is a sharing of commonplace themes rather than any direct borrowing in either direction.

¹²⁸ On the subtle effort to place Ofellus' speech at *Sat.* 2.2.126f as a response to the words of Moeris in *Eclogue* 9, see Osgood 2006: 218.

Thus *Eclogues* 1 & 9, on one hand, and *Satires* 2.2 on the other, give voice with equal validity to the sense of uncertainty, violence, loss, and dislocation experienced by many in the Triumviral Period. Unlike the *First* and *Ninth Eclogues* (and unlike Horace's *Epodes* 7 & 16, among other poems¹²⁹), where pessimism finds little attenuation, *Satires* 2.2, with its image of resilience against the blows of Fortune, is perhaps better classed among those Triumviral texts which display the first hints of hope in a bleak and chaotic era.¹³⁰

Amidst all the various forms of suffering experienced in the Triumviral Period, it should come as no surprise that causes were sought. Some blamed unscrupulous soldiers,¹³¹ many others invoked the rule of a cruel and capricious Fortune. Indeed, a preoccupation with changes in Fortune was common to the Triumviral Period more broadly.

After Philippi a number of Republicans, choosing to surrender, were faced with the urge to find justification for their decision. Messalla Corvinus, for example, after a prominent position among the Liberators' forces, is said to have come to terms with Antony, appealing to the pressure of Fortune.¹³² Likewise Lepidus, the soon-to-be

¹²⁹ One could of course add others, e.g. Propertius, who in Prop. 4.1 has the astrologer Horos tell of Propertius' own youth, including the confiscation of his family's land (4.1.127-30: *ossaue legisti non illa aetate legenda / patris et in tenuis cogeris ipse lares: / nam tua cum multi uersarent rura iuuenci, / abstulit excultas pertica tristis opes*. On the surveyor's *pertica*, see e.g. *Dirae* 45 (*pertica...impia*), *RRC* 525.2-4). Asisi itself had lost land due to its proximity to Hispellum, a veteran colony settled by Octavian (see Osgood 2006: 157, 165).

¹³⁰ Of course, Horace's *Epodes* as a collection also would fall (along with Vergil's *Georgics*) into the class of Triumviral literature which mixes pessimism with a sense of promise, and which merits being read from a "Doppelperspektive" (Watson 2003: 270).

¹³¹ Sources criticizing and assigning blame to soldiers in the Triumviral Period: App. *B.Civ.* 5.13 & Nepos *Eum.* 8.2 (soldiers' taking more than assigned, not obeying commanders); *Ecl.* 1.67-74; Sall. *BJ* 86.3;. Such evidence must be balanced by that produced by the soldiers themselves: cf. *ILLRP* 497 (= *ILS* 2225); *CIL* 9.1616 (discussion in Osgood, citing esp. the epigraphic evidence collected in Keppie 1983, 2000).

¹³² App. *B.Civ.* 4.38, Vell. Pat. 2.71.1.

Triumvir, commander of Caesarian armies in Hispania Citerior and southern Gaul, wrote in May of 43 to the Senate justifying his decision to go over to Antony's camp, claiming that Fortune had wrested the decision (whether to show his loyalty to the Senate) from his hands.¹³³ Vergil's Moeris felt that *Fors omnia versat* ("Chance turns everything about", *Ecl.* 9.5). Horace similarly discussed giving in to the irresistible power of events when reflecting upon his service at Philippi and that of his friends: the tide of civil war swept them up, bearing them along on a sea of chance and uncertainty.¹³⁴ Indeed, the rule of Fortune had almost become a law of nature in the Triumviral Period (Hor. *Sat.* 2.2.129-30).¹³⁵

This is not to say, however, that some did not find ways to cope. Ofellus (and Horace) had considered strategies for battling these turbulent years. Atticus too had served as a notable example of the ability to weather the storm, even to avoid it altogether. Not unlike Sallust, Atticus had survived the Triumviral Period and the proscriptions with his fortunes intact, through helping friends on both sides and by scrupulous avoidance both of greed and of deep involvement in the Forum. To Nepos,

¹³³ Cic. *ad Fam.* 10.35.1, after having professed loyalty to the Senate (in *ad Fam.* 10.34, 34a). Others had already suspected his loyalties and seen discontent in his troops earlier that year: *ad Fam.* 10.31.4, 10.9.2, 10.11, 10.15.3)(cf. Osgood 2006: 57-8; Shackleton Bailey 1977 ad locc.)

¹³⁴ Hor. *Odes.* 2.7.13-16 (*sed me per hostis Mercurius celer / denso paventem sustulit aere, / te rursus in bellum resorbens / unda fretis tulit aestuosis*); *Epist.* 2.2.46-7 (*Dura sed emouere loco me tempora grato / ciuilisque rudem belli tulit aestus in arma*); *Sat.* 2.2.126f (*saeviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus / nam propriae telluris erum natura nec illum / nec me nec quemquam statuit: nos expulit ille, / illum aut nequities aut vafri inscitia iuris*).

¹³⁵ Cf. Osgood 2006: 207, 402: Italy and Rome were "abandoned by the gods, hounded by arbitrary rule, and locked into a sinister cycle of civil war that one apparently had to accept as inevitable. It is, once again, a world ruled only by Fortune"... "It was, above all, this perpetual uncertainty of what would happen next – the sense that a capricious Fortune ruled the world – that made life so unbearable, down to Actium and just beyond." On fickle Fortune see also Nepos *Att.* 6.1 (*civilibus fluctibus committere*), 10.1-2.

Atticus was a rare example of the idea that a man's character is what shapes his own Fortune.¹³⁶

Yet what do we make of the fact that the view of *fortuna* in Nepos' *Atticus* also emerges as one of Sallust's main principles in his prefaces: that man, through right exercise of his *ingenium* and *virtus*, can make himself independent of Fortune (*BC* 1.2-3, 2.2 (cf. 11.2); *BJ* 1.3, 2.3)? It might appear that Sallust is taking a more optimistic view toward *virtus* and the rule of Fortune, then, compared to Vergil or even Horace (who in *Epist.* 2.2.41-8 opines that Fortune's buffeting cannot be avoided, and in *Sat.* 2.2.126f holds the same – though there it can be survived nobly). We must remember, however, that Sallust uses his discourse on the ideal of *virtus* in the prefaces of the monographs to set up a bathetic contrast with the flaws and shortcomings in the real-life exercise of Roman *virtus* seen in his narrative, where the moral character of Romans does not (and cannot) live up to the theoretical ideals laid out in the prefaces.¹³⁷ Therefore, if we leave aside Sallust's own – admittedly exceptional – survival of the Triumviral Age with his fortunes intact, and focus on what picture *his texts* give us, what we see is actually not an equivalent of the optimistic outlook modeled by Nepos' Atticus, but a pessimistic view of the reality of Roman *virtus* and its inability to overcome the violent dictates of Fortune that had become so common in the turbulence of the 1st century B.C.E., and in Sallust's generation in particular. Sallust therefore aligns more closely with the less hopeful, pessimistic view of several Triumviral Era sources on the ultimately insuperable rule of *Fortuna*. As Sallust himself states, *sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur; ea res*

¹³⁶ See esp. *Nep. Att.* 19.1 (*suos cuique mores plerumque conciliare fortunam*), and 11.6: *sui cuique mores fingunt fortunam hominibus*. On the disappearance in the years of civil war of the belief that man makes his own fortune, see Osgood 2006: 222.

¹³⁷ For extended discussion see Chapter 6.

cunctas ex libidine magis quam ex vero celebrat obscuratque (“But in truth Fortune dominates everything. It brings fame or obscurity to our affairs more according to its own whim than according to what is truly deserved.” *BC* 8.1). While this statement may to some degree have been determined by the discourse in that chapter on what accounted for the lack of great writers among the earlier Romans, it nonetheless aptly reflects the sentiments, for example, of Moeris (*Fors omnia versat*) and others that we have explored above.¹³⁸ In his narrative, Sallust shows this rule of Fortune to be unfortunately rather widespread in his age, since the power of the guiding hand of *virtus* to direct human affairs has diminished so much, weakened by generations of moral decay.

In surveying some of the responses to the Triumviral Period recorded by Sallust’s contemporaries, it becomes clear that certain themes and concerns were common to many writing in the 40s and 30s B.C.E., and to many Romans broadly speaking: the atrocious violence against kin committed in so many battles over these decades; the uncertainty and fear about the present and immediate future; a feeling that civil violence was repeating itself and bound to cycle back around again in the future; a sense of anger and loss instilled by years of continuous taxing, famines, blockades, and land confiscations; a preoccupation with the blows of Fortune and the sense that a cruel Fortune controls all things. Sallust himself gives voice to all of these themes as well. Moreover his treatment of some of these themes, passionate and critical, can seem sufficiently generalized (e.g.

¹³⁸ See also, e.g. S. Sulpicius Rufus’ letter to Cicero in 45, echoing Sallust *BC* 8.1 (*ad Fam.* 4.12.1: *Etsi scio non iucundissimum me nuntium vobis allaturum, tamen, quoniam casus et natura in nobis dominantur, visum est faciendum, ut, quoquo modo res se haberet, vos certiores facerem*). Santangelo 2013: 183-4 affirms that Fortuna plays a marginal role in Sallust’s causative scheme of Roman decline in the *BC* – in other words, Fortuna is not a major *cause* for historical change, but merely an epiphenomenon (cf. esp. *BC* 2.5-6 (*fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur* etc.), 10.6).

proscriptions,¹³⁹ or land confiscations¹⁴⁰), as are many of the laments of civil war and its horrors discussed above from Vergil, Horace, and Propertius.

Vergil, Horace, Propertius, and others do show a certain pessimism about the current state of Roman society, and where it is headed. At times, the *Epodes* of Horace or the *Georgics* of Vergil seem quite committed to this view.¹⁴¹ Yet these were works composed over an extended period and published after Actium. Like other literature published soon after Actium, they reflect a complex and often inextricable mix of a sense of promise about the new settlement, and an inability to forget about either the horrors of the immediate past or their own recent pessimism – which, in a salutary way, was difficult fully to eradicate. As I suggested at the outset of this chapter, the course of events in the 30s B.C.E. fell out in such a way that Sallust could not have had a chance to experience many of these signs of promise before his own death. One cannot know with certainty, of course, how Sallust might have reacted in his writing to the developments leading up to Actium and to the years immediately following the battle, if he had lived down to that time. It is entirely possible, however, that Sallust would have seen nothing but a façade of constitutionalism or liberty in the new regime. This would in fact fit with the pervasive and unabated pessimism of Sallust's extant writings for which this study has thus far been arguing.

However, we would perhaps be well-served to emphasize that about which we can be more certain: the texts Sallust does leave us demonstrate, as this study maintains, that in his lifetime and for as long as he composed history, Sallust held to a pessimistic outlook

¹³⁹ *BJ* 3; though cf. *Hist.* 1.18M (43 McG), 1.31M (35 McG), 1.44M (36 McG), 1.47M (38 McG)).

¹⁴⁰ *BJ* 41.7-8; cf. *Hist.* 1.11M, cf. *Hist.* 1.55.12M

¹⁴¹ e.g. *Geo.* 1.463-541, 2.458-542 (a call to avoid all the insane vices that lead to corrupt city life and civil war).

on Roman morality and on the course of Roman history, past and future. Moreover, unlike the momentary (though often strong) pessimism on Roman history and society we find in the other authors of the Triumviral Period, the pessimistic views of Sallust are across his corpus consistently worked into a literary and rhetorical frame – terse, tense, and powerful – that delivers one of the most resounding critiques of late Republican Rome to survive.

Epilogue

Sallust's texts by design seem to invite readers to probe and challenge their own preconceived views of Roman history and Roman society. The process of reading Sallust is sometimes a taxing one, and his texts are often deceptively complex the more one reads; yet the process is always rich and rewarding. To comprehend the full range and depth of Sallust's meaning, one often must look both backwards and forwards, considering the present in terms of the past, and the past in terms of the present. One must also, whenever possible, attempt to analyze Sallust not through isolated snippets, nor through isolating one text from the others; rather, many further insights can be obtained by reading the *BJ* in light of the *BC*, and the *Histories* in light of both monographs. Meaning is often created and renegotiated *across* his works, which leads us to adjust and deepen our readings both of the prior text(s) and the later. Yet reading in this unitary way also allows us to see important continuities spanning all of Sallust's texts, and in particular, I have argued that this is crucial for a proper understanding of Sallust's (pessimistic) outlook on Roman morality and Roman history.

Indeed, the central question of this study has been how to understand the nature of Sallust's moral and historical pessimism, and whether we should posit an evolution toward greater pessimism after the *BC* (in which some idealization of earlier Roman history seems visible, especially in the prologue and in the digression on early Rome). Through careful analysis of Sallust's narrative techniques and literary allusions in the early portions of the *BC*, and through close readings of that text and how its moral discourse relates to that in the *BJ* and the *Histories*, I demonstrated that we should not accept the discourse in the *BC* as straightforwardly idealizing, but rather as undercutting

any apparent optimism about Roman morality and confirming a steady undercurrent of pessimism that was present from the earliest inception of Sallust's literary career. Sallust was alive to the essential continuity of Roman character and Roman moral flaws throughout Roman history, and we see this reflected in a deeply pessimistic outlook on Roman morality and history that is consistent across all three of his texts.

As a result, this study has attempted to uncover the rhetorical and narrative techniques which Sallust employs in each of his texts to convey this particular view of Roman history. Though at times his methods of critiquing Roman behavior are seemingly quite direct, at other times we are able to discern Sallust employing thoughtful, subtle, and sustained techniques which help to corroborate the nature and extent of his pessimism. Sallust's narrative is sometimes criticized for inaccuracies, yet we have sufficiently shown that in many cases his manipulation of chronology, narrative time, or historical details can have important effects in a given context, helping Sallust convey a particular characterization (for example of Catiline in the *BC*, or Marius in the *BJ*), or to emphasize a particular aspect of his (pessimistic) moral outlook (for example, his use of *metus hostilis* to highlight Romans' lack of innate moral superiority).

Many more examples could be named, but the image that emerges by studying such techniques is of a Sallust who, rather than being a careless or shallow writer, takes great care with how he selects and arranges his material. Moreover, the fact that Sallust was capable of skillfully deploying literary allusion as well as the range of literary techniques discussed in the course of this study should serve as further evidence of how capable Sallust was of conveying his consistent pessimism across all of his texts with subtlety and also with power.

There is much in the study of Sallust that remains unknowable, due to the fragmentary nature of the *Histories*, the loss of most of Sallust's historiographical predecessors and sources, and also due to Sallust's own numerous ambiguities, which sometimes are difficult fully to unravel. Yet the unitary view of Sallust which this study promotes has earned us many important insights into key aspects of Sallust's writings (moral outlook and otherwise), and promises more in the future.

Indeed, the lines of investigation opened up in the present study offer room for further development. Though fragmentary, the *Histories* can offer still more insights into our research on Sallust's moral and historical outlook: close philological work on the speeches as well as the extant portions of the narrative, combined with an attention to the use of both literary models and contemporary allusions, has recently yielded important accessions to our understanding of this text, for example in the work of Rosenblitt (2011, 2013, 2014), McAlhany 2016, Gerrish 2015, and others.

The question of which authors (Greek or Roman) exerted a discernable influence upon Sallust's writings of course remains an open question, and one difficult or impossible to ever resolve in its totality. Yet our discussion of Sallust's use of the Elder Cato and his engagement with certain writings of Cicero (in some places probable, in others extremely likely), demonstrates how important such investigations – undertaken with the proper caution – can be in enhancing our understanding of Sallust's goals in a given text. As such, one area for further investigation lies in how Sallust's own writings might have been influenced by (or might have responded to) the extant writings of Caesar. Likewise, it is highly probable that a more extensive investigation of the ways in which Sallust responds to various works of Cicero (rhetorical and also philosophical) will

yield new insights and help refine those that have already been reached – both in the present study (see e.g. Chapter 8) and in the work of many other scholars.

There are in fact numerous avenues, great and small, by which the investigations opened up in this study may be pursued and refined. Indeed, it is essential for the study of Sallust that we continue to seek new ways to improve our understanding of his historical outlook and his views on Roman morality, since these two related aspects exert such a strong and wide-ranging influence on the form and content of his works. It is hoped that the present study may represent a start in what I believe to be a promising direction.

Table 1: Sallust's Chronology of Events of the Catilinarian Conspiracy in 63 B.C.E.

Chapter(s)	Event	Date
<i>BC 26.3</i>	Cat. fails at elections, <i>constituit bellum facere et extrema omnia experiri</i>	Late July-early Aug. 63
<i>BC 27.1</i>	Cat. sends Manlius to Faesulae, and others elsewhere. [a]	btw. consular elections & Nov. 6 (outside Rome)
<i>BC 27.2</i>	Meanwhile (<i>interea</i>) Cat. plots against Cicero's life, readies fires throughout Rome, distributes armed men in city. (no progress)	btw. consular elections & Nov. 6 (in Rome)
<i>BC 27.3-4</i>	Cat. calls conspirators together again (at house of M. Porcius Laeca), plans to assassinate Cicero at his house at dawn.	night of Nov. 6 [b]
<i>BC 28.1-3</i>	The assassins fail to gain access to Cicero (who was forewarned), so the <i>insidiae</i> fails.	dawn of Nov. 7 [c]
<i>BC 28.4</i>	Meanwhile (<i>interea</i> – i.e. while Cat. had been preparing and plotting in Rome between the elections and Nov. 7), Manlius rouses <i>plebs</i> , Sullani in Etruria.	btw. consular elections and mid-Oct.
<i>BC 29.1-3</i>	Cicero receives reports of these actions of Manlius in Etruria, and in light of both these reports <i>and</i> the <i>insidiae</i> occurring in Rome (<i>incipiti malo permotus</i>), decides to consult Senate, gets SCU passed	Oct. 21 [d]
<i>BC 30.1</i>	L. Saenius reads in Senate letters brought from Faesulae, confirming Manlius had taken up arms on Oct. 27.	ca. Nov. 2 nd .
<i>BC 30.3-7</i>	Senate sends proconsuls and praetors to various parts of Italy in response to the reports	btw. Nov. 2 and 6 th ?
<i>BC 31.1-3</i>	Terrified reactions of those in Rome to the <i>SCU</i> and to Senate's military preparations taken between Oct. 21 & Nov. 7	btw. Oct. 21 & Nov. 7
<i>BC 31.4-9</i>	Picking up from <i>BC 28.3</i> , Sallust returns to what Cat. was up to in Rome on Nov. 7: attending Senate where Cicero gave his <i>First Catilinarian</i> .	Nov. 7 (day)

*Events bordered in bold indicate Sallust relating in sequence what Catiline was doing at Rome from the consular elections (summer 63) down to November 7th.

* Events bordered in jagged lines constitute a small flashback, wherein Sallust leaves Catiline's activities and goes back to relate Manlius' actions in Etruria (from summer 63 to mid-Oct.) and the reactions thereto of Cicero and the Senate between Oct. 21 and Nov. 7.

[a] Leaving aside the problem that Sallust had reported in *BC* 24.2 that Manlius had already been in Etruria in summer 64 soon after Catiline's defeat in the consular elections of 64. The broader issue is, of course, that Sallust in his overall presentation of the conspiracy has gone against the known chronology by transferring the beginnings of the conspiracy to 64 (e.g. Catiline's 1st *domestica contio* at *BC* 17.2-6, 20-21 is put in 64 instead of shortly before the consular elections in summer 63 (cf. Cic. *Mur.* 50-1); Catiline sends arms and money throughout Italy and solicits women to incite slaves and win over high-ranking husbands in summer 64 (*BC* 24.2-4)). Other transposed items exist in Sallust's account – for instance, in *BC* 31.9 he has reported Catiline's famous reply in the Senate (...*incendium meum ruina extingam*) as having taken place after Cicero's *First Catilinarian* on November 7th instead of shortly before the consular elections in summer 63 (cf. Cic. *Mur.* 51).

[b] Cf. Cic. *In Cat.* 1.9, *Sulla* 52.

[c] Cf. Cic. *In Cat.* 1.10.

[d] Cf. Plut. *Cic.* 15.4, Dio 37.31.2-3. Sallust at *BC* 29.1 omits to mention the involvement of Crassus in bringing to Cicero late on Oct. 20th some anonymous letters which allowed Cicero on Oct. 21st to predict that a rebellion would break out at Faesulae under Manlius on Oct. 27th and that a *caedes optimatum* was planned at Rome for Oct. 28th (cf. Plut. *Cic.* 15.1-2; *Crassus* 13; Cic. *In Cat.* 1.7).

Table 2

Author	First Beginnings of Moral Decline	Beginning of Headlong Moral Decline	Comparison to Sallust's Usage
Polybius	ca. 200*: When Rome undertook overseas wars in the east (Plb. 18.35)	(a) 168: Defeat of Perseus. (Plb. 31.25.2-7, 31.26.9; cf. Plb. 18.35, Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 32-4; Livy 45.33-34, Pliny <i>NH</i> 35.135) (b) 146? 38.21.1-3: Plb + Sc. <i>Aem.</i> discuss fall of Carthage: so Plb recognizes 146 as a TP? Maybe, but a <u>moral</u> one? (Levick 1982: 53)	- Different date from Sallust for both TP's. - Same <i>causes</i> of decline as Sallust (luxury, <i>otium</i> , political ambition)
Piso Frugi	187: Triumph of Manlius Vulso over Galatia (Pliny <i>NH</i> 34.14 = <i>FRHist</i> Piso F36; cf. Livy 39.6.3)	154: consular poisonings? Permanent Stone Theater? (<i>NH</i> 17.244 = <i>FRHist</i> Piso F40)	- Different date for both TP's - Cause of headlong decline unclear - Like Sallust (<i>BC</i> 11), ascribes moral decline to an army in the east.
Sallust ("S.")	None: vice <i>iam inde a principio</i> (<i>Hist.</i> 1.7, 11, 12, 16M; cf. Chapter 6.2-3 on the <i>BC</i> and the <i>BJ</i>)	(a) 146: fall of Carthage, permanent removal of <i>metus hostilis</i> (<i>BC</i> 10, <i>BJ</i> 41, <i>Hist.</i> 1.11-12M) (b ¹) late 80s: Sulla's army in Asia (<i>BC</i> 11.4-13.5) (b ²) Death of Tib. Gracchus? (<i>Hist.</i> 1.17M (Aug. <i>Civ. Dei</i> 2.21); cf. Vell. Pat. 2.3.3) (b ³) Cyrus, Athens/Sparta? (<i>BC</i> 2.2)	- 146 is the clear start of headlong moral decline, and most important TP in S. - Sulla's return from Asia in <i>BC</i> 11 seems a secondary spur for the <i>continuation</i> (and perhaps slight intensification?) of headlong decline, not the <i>beginning</i> of headlong decline (This might also be the role of Tiberius' death (133, <i>Hist.</i> 1.17M) – if it <i>was</i> a TP for S.). - <i>BC</i> 2.2 may be a TP in the moral history of <i>humanity</i> (for <i>lubido dominandi</i>), may fill in S's view of general human nature, but has <i>indirect</i> rel. to Roman history: S's story of early Rome starts fresh at <i>BC</i> 6, and well before Cyrus et al.
Livy	187: Conduct of Vulso's army, and his triumph (Livy 39.6.6-7) (on " <i>luxuria peregrina</i> ", cf. 7.2.4, 13 on introduction of theater to Rome)	<u>date uncertain</u> : (cf. Livy 39.6.9: <i>vix tamen illa, quae tum conspiciebantur, semina erant future luxuriae</i>).	- Different date for first TP. - 2 nd TP may refer to 186 (Bacchanalian Affair), or many years later. Levick 1982: 53 argues for why Livy saw 146 as moral TP (perhaps with merit?) - Like Sallust (<i>BC</i> 11), ascribes moral decline to an army in the east.
Pompeius Trogus	? (Justin 31.8.9: war w/Antiochus did <i>not</i> corrupt Romans: they consciously kept away from luxury)	133: bequest of Pergamum by Attalus III (Just. 36.4.12)	
Velleius Paterculus		146: (a) fall of Carthage (moral) (2.1: <i>Potentiae Romanorum prior Scipio viam aperuerat, luxuriae posterior aperuit: quippe remoto Carthaginis metu sublataque imperii aemula non gradu, sed praecipiti cursu a virtute descitum, ad vitia transcursum.</i>) (b) 146: Metellus Macedonicus' marble temple & statues (1.11.5: <i>hic idem primus omnium Romae aedem ex marmore in iis ipsis monumentis molitus vel magnificentiae vel luxuriae princeps fuit</i>)	1.11.5: Met. was 1 st to build a marble temple and was (a) "the most eminent/distinguished in either magnanimity or in luxury", or (b) "the 1 st [temporal] in either magn. or lux." If <i>princeps</i> is temporal (sic. Hellegouarc'h), this would be a 2 nd TP for headlong decline in Velleius. (A "starting point" for <i>magnificentia</i> seems intentionally odd, such that, if <i>princeps</i> is temporal, the <i>vel...vel</i> leaves little doubt which of the two Met. was "first" in).

Pliny the Elder	189: Triumph of L. Scipio over Antiochus (Pliny <i>NH</i> 33.148, 34.34; cf. Livy 37.59, 39.6.7; Pliny <i>NH</i> 33.138)	(a ₁) <u>146</u> : fall of Corinth, acquisition of its art (<i>NH</i> 33.149) (a ₂) <u>146</u> : fall of Carthage (<i>NH</i> 33.150) (a ₃) <u>133</u> : bequest of Pergamene kingdom (<i>NH</i> 33.148) (b) <u>61</u> : Pompey's triumph (<i>NH</i> 37.12-17)	- Like Sallust, 146 a moment of headlong moral decline. However, 133 is given equal (if not greater) importance for headlong moral decline. - Corinth more important to Pliny for headlong decline than Carthage due to his interest in art. - Like Sallust, Florus, a 2 nd TP for <i>headlong</i> moral decline (Pompey) employed. - <i>NH</i> 33.148, 34.34, 13.24 point to borrowing from Piso's account of luxury first coming from the conquest of Asia (early 2 nd c. BC)
Florus	? - No first beginnings in 1.33, 1.34 - A first beginning <i>is</i> given in 1.47.1-2: the conquest of Syria in <u>1st Syrian War</u> .	(a) [Military] <u>146</u> (falls of Carthage and Corinth "spread the blaze of war over the whole world") (Flor. 1.33; cf. 1.32) (b) [Moral] <u>133</u> : Fall of Numantia (Flor. 1.34.19), or Attalid Bequest (1.47.7) (c) <u>Flor. 1.47.1-2</u> : again restates his division into aetas transmarina etc., and subdiv. of that into a prior 100 years (aurei) and subseq. 100 (ferrei). He grps Carth, Corinth, Numantia, Attalus all tog., but that's only bc it's a summ. sentence; BUT, later (1.47.7) he states that the first TP for moral decline was "the conq. of Syria" (i.e. 1 st Syr. War?), and soon after the Attalid bequest: <i>Syria prima nos victa corripit, mox Asiatica Pergameni regis hereditas. Illae opes atque divitiae adfixere saeculi mores, mersamque vitiis suis quasi sentina rem publicam pessum dedere</i>	- Like Sallust, Pliny, multiple TP's for <i>headlong</i> decline. - Causal relationship between fall of Numantia and moral decline not explained. Connection merely observed. - 1.47.1, 7 may display different TP's from earlier in Bk 1, but he sticks to using 2 – which speaks further to 2 TP's being common mode of conceiving of TP's. <u>1.47 also shows Florus, like Sallust, changing and adapting his choice of headlong TP in different parts of his text: in 1.32-34, Carthage/Corinth (milit.), then Numantia (moral), but at 1.47 it's Pergamene bequest (moral).</u> (Some may attribute this to use of a diff source, but in this passage he is merely summing up his work in his own words, so his TP's here are chosen by himself)
Others: Orosius	?	<u>146/133</u> : Carthage and Numantia (Oros. 5.8.2; cf. 4.23.9-11)	- Like Sallust, TP of headlong decline includes 2 separate dates
Augustine	? <u>187</u> : Vulso's triumph (<i>C.D.</i> 3.21)	<u>146</u> : Affirming Sallust's view (<i>C.D.</i> 3.21)	- Vulso's triumph called the first time Asian luxury invaded Rome. Prob. drew the details of his acct via Orosius from Livy.

* All dates are B.C.E.

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