DescriptionIs early theory of mind (ToM) fundamentally different from late ToM, in particular, is it incapable of representing false-beliefs about individuals’ identities (Buterfill & Apperly 2013)? We explore this issue by using proper names to index particular individuals. 20- to 34-month-olds and adults were tested over four pairs of Teach-and-Test trials to see if they could learn proper names from videos showing an actor who named one of two toy-animals. The first, Pointing-Teach showed the actor pointing at one of the two toy-animals and naming it, “Daxy”. In True-Belief-Teach, two new toy-animals are introduced, one is placed in a box and the other removed; the actor points to the box and says: “Mody is in here!” In False-Belief-Teach, the actor turned away and didn’t see that the boxed toy was replaced with the other one; she then turns back, points to the box and says: “Toma is in here!” The final, Common-Noun-Teach, showed the toy-animals from False-Belief-Teach and the actor said: “Toma is a wuggy!” Each Teach trial was followed by a Test trial in which two previous animals were presented and the voiceover said: “Look at [Daxy/Mody/Toma/the wuggy]!” Subjects’ eye-gaze was measured by Tobii XL-T60.Children and adults looked longer at the named animals in Pointing-Test and True-Belief-Test. However, there was no looking preference in either False-Belief-Test or Common-Noun-Test. These findings are consistent with early ToM incapability of representing false-beliefs about object identities. However, the possibility remains that the pattern of results we got is due to performance factors that future research should address.