Description
TitleUnited States use of cyberweapons
Date Created2018
Other Date2018-01 (degree)
Extent1 online resource (xvi, 496 p. : ill.)
DescriptionIn 2010, the Pentagon defined cyberspace as an area of warfare joining land, sea, air, and space as fair game for military action. At the time, the U.S. was focused on defending itself against cyberattacks from China and Russia; the countries they deem to be the biggest cyber threats. But, it was later revealed that China and Russia were also involved in offensive cyberwarfare, or the use of cyberweapons, to attack other countries. While cyberwarfare is not a new concern, the offensive strategy of cyberwarfare, specifically the deployment of cyberweapons, is a relatively new and important phenomenon. In this dissertation, I have used a three-prong approach to address the central question: under which conditions is the United States likely to deploy a cyberweapon in a first strike? My hypotheses are that in order for the U.S. to deploy a cyberweapon in a first strike: the target country has to be a perceived adversary that poses a threat; the target has to be in an area that is hard to access by other methods; the cyberweapon may be deployed in order to minimize collateral damage; the cyberweapon may be deployed to prevent or end a war. First, I empirically tested what I classified as 13 cases where the U.S. used or debated about using an offensive cyberweapon from 2001 – 2016. The cases were Stuxnet, Iraq (2007), Shotgiant (2007), Quantum (2008), Turbine (2010), Nitro Zeus, Libya (2011), Pakistan (2011), Syria, North Korea (2014), ISIS (2016), Russia (2016), and Iraq (2003). Next, I employed the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy-decision making to reconstruct the decision-making process for each case study. Then, I conducted 22 confidential, semi-structured interviews to gather information about these case studies as well as further insights about the decision-making process behind deploying a cyberweapon. My findings are that some key conditions affecting deployment were indeed threat, access and collateral damage. My research also appeared to reveal that the authorization process for deployment is similar to that for a nuclear strike process, although the decision-making process cannot be generalized.
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
Noteby Vijai T. Singh
Genretheses, ETD doctoral
Languageeng
CollectionGraduate School - Newark Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.