TO BUILD OR CULTIVATE:
REBEL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Rebel governance appears to provide some of the raw materials necessary for democratization. Despite this, rebel governance does not appear to uniformly produce more democratic governance in the wake of civil wars. To address this, I develop a theory which predicts that rebels who cultivate political consciousness among their charges by eliciting input into their own administration contribute to postwar democratization. To test the theory, I adapt a rebel governance framework which emphasizes outputs—rather than the structures which produce them—and applied this framework to a novel dataset of 79 civil wars which ended between 1980 and 2006. I then test the theory using regression and proportional hazard models as well as by examining four cases in greater detail. These quantitative models show that feedback mechanisms—regular points of interaction between governor and governed—correlate with more democratic governance after civil wars and accelerate democratic transitions. The case studies confirm that building consciousness contributes to postwar democratic transition. These results suggest that regular interactions between rebels and civilians is an important factor in determining whether a state emerges from a civil war with more democratic governance than the status quo ante.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The Salvadoran Civil War was one best remembered for two things. The first is the irregular and brutal violence unleashed upon El Salvador’s civilian population. The second is the functional representative democracy that emerged rapidly upon the war’s conclusion. This second trait has made the case a favorite of political scientists, especially those concerned with postwar democratization, and with good reason. El Salvador’s strikingly illiberal belligerent parties emerged from a brutal civil war as political parties in a functional liberal democracy. While greeted as a piece of unexpected good news in the wake of the Cold War’s end, perhaps it was less of an exceptional case than one might expect.

El Salvador’s FMLN rebels had built an impressive array of governance structures during the conflict, but they were not unique in this. Nepalese Maoists developed similarly impressive governance structures as well. Nepal also experienced a democratization event in the wake of the conflict in spite of the illiberality of both rebel and incumbent. This seems to present as a connection worth examining, but two points of data do not a trend make. Zachary Cherian Mampilly’s research demonstrated that rebel governance was not a terribly uncommon phenomenon in civil wars\(^1\) but its postwar impact is less well established.

Its connection to postwar democratization is especially tenuous. There are dozens of cases where rebels prove themselves to be adequate wartime governors without democratizing after the war ends. For instance, Angola’s UNITA rebels some of the most

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impressive governance structures of any rebel group he examined. And yet, Angola did not democratize in the wake of its civil war. Clearly then, it takes more than administrative skill to produce a democratization in the wake of a civil war.

**Rebel Governance**

In some ways the notion that rebels would bother governing at all defies reason, but some rebel factions have used their controlled territories for exactly this purpose. Zachariah Cherian Mampilly has spent a great deal of time chronicling this phenomenon, arguing that rebel governance, in some cases absent any external support, can be quite robust. From the outside, this can seem curious. After all, why would a rebel army choose to spend scarce resources on something that does not directly aid their war effort, especially given the fact that if that effort fails, the group may well cease to exist? Mampilly argues that the answer lies in the utility of appropriating state responsibilities and functions. Noting that the instructions of revolutionaries like Mao Zedong and Ernesto “Che” Guevara encouraged rebels to do so to demonstrate their revolutionary legitimacy—and that many 20th Century rebel groups took these instructions seriously—Mampilly argues that rebels stand to make enormous gains by establishing their own independent system of governance. There may also be more banal reasons for their protostates. Indeed, Mancur Olsen argues that even roving groups of bandits who become “stationary” may have reason to act as rulers. Olsen argues that where “bandits” expect to remain in power for a long time, the desire to reap gains from one’s realm leads such

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2 Ibid. 1-4
4 One assumes that Olson’s use of this term inspired the title of Mampilly’s dissertation.
“bandits” to invest in public goods.\textsuperscript{5} This allows rebel leaders to rationalize their “banditry” as actions in the best interest of their would-be citizens, but it also provides ample incentive for rebels to divert resources away from the war effort and toward ruling the populations within their territory.

**Mampillian Modalities**

Mampilly develops a framework of rebel governance which differentiates between different governing functions. The first function is policing and justice.\textsuperscript{6} Establishing civil security and justice is one of the great postwar challenges as it demands not just manpower, but functioning institutions and individuals trained in non-military paradigms of force application.\textsuperscript{7} It is interesting that this happens at all given that it requires three things that one expects to be quite rare in the midst of a civil war: 1) a rebel group or side has the personnel to dedicate to policing, 2) that this personnel can do the distinctly un-military job of policing and 3) that the rebel group or side can establish a working justice institutional mechanism. All three of these things are predictably difficult,\textsuperscript{8} and yet this is only the first of three elements of rebel governance.

Concern over the provision of goods is somewhat curious in the context of a civil war, at least notionally. However, this whole business of rebel governance is a little curious, so that should not stop us from taking a closer look thereat. Mampilly posits that the provision of goods—specifically education and healthcare\textsuperscript{9}—can be used as an

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\textsuperscript{5} Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” *American Political Science Review* 87, No. 3 (1993), 567-576

\textsuperscript{6} They are treated as a single element in Mampilly’s dissertation and will be treated similarly here, although he separates them in his book.


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid. 704-706

\textsuperscript{9} He also mentions that in some circumstances, this concept also includes feeding the population.
incentive for a population to cooperate with its rebel rulers. This can be viewed cynically as a transaction; rebels may provide certain goods to prevent its subjects from complaining, as in a rentier state. However, even in such a case, the rebels are acting as a properly reactive government would—making policy to address the needs of its subjects.

The final element concerns the reactivity (if not the representativeness) of the institutions of rebel governance, as well as their provision of a means by which a population may interact with its rebel rulers. While rebel governance is a relatively novel concept within the literature, there is some precedent to this concern with ruler-populace political interaction in the midst of conflict. For instance, Courtney Young, Elen Lusk-Okar, and Ian Shapiro note that one of the lessons to be gleaned from the South African democratic transition is the importance of legitimacy. They argue that popular support and a feeling of investment in the process is far more important even than the particular terms of an agreement. While they do not speak at length about rebel governance as such, it is not a great conceptual leap to suggest that these feedback mechanisms could serve as a powerfully legitimating force for rebel governors.

**Democracy from Rebel Governance: Two Theories**

The first two functions contribute not only to how well a rebel group can administer its controlled territory, but may also contribute to those functions in the
postwar state. The literature aimed at statebuilding practitioners has long lamented the fact that many of these practitioners ignore local competencies. Moreover, some have argued that these competencies are essential to aid in the development of postwar democratization. One could argue then that these functions could contribute to postwar democratization.

This is known as the statebuilding hypothesis. By constructing a protostate during a conflict, rebels make the postwar transition period less difficult. While the explicit connection to democratization is somewhat nebulous, the connection between state competency and functional democracy is a common topic of study. However, there are some sound theoretical reasons why this hypothesis is flawed. For one, states may be exceptionally well-administered without bothering with democracy—indeed, Mampilly notes that feedback mechanisms are unnecessary for a well-administered rebel-controlled protostate.

On the other hand, the last function—feedback mechanisms—may represent something different entirely. Some rebel groups appear to invest resources into their capacity to not only mobilize but react to (and perhaps empower) the civilians in rebel-controlled territory. This can help cultivate a political consciousness among a

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20 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 89-91
population. By incorporating the population into the governing enterprise, it becomes easier for that population to be mindful not only of how policies affect them, but how they can in turn affect policies.

By cultivating this sort of mindfulness, rebels can prime civilians to expect that they should have some sort of role in the state. Almond and Verba described this phenomenon as the development of a “civic culture.” They argue that the development of a “participant” civic culture—one in which civilians are aware of the impact of policies upon themselves and their potential role in changing that state of affairs—is one that goes hand in hand with democracy. One could argue that the transition here is subtler. It may not be that civilians in non-participant civic cultures are unaware that they could have a role in governing, but rather that they simply do not consider this as a reasonable possibility. By providing some means by which this possibility could be made manifest, rebel governors can cultivate this sort of civic culture, making civilians cognizant of this possibility.

This is not necessarily a selfless act on the part of rebel governors. By cultivating this sort of consciousness the rebel group may also be cultivating a loyal base of support. The revolutionary theories which informed the ideology of many 20th Century rebel groups made this connection explicitly. As such, rebel leaders may have viewed these sorts of governor-governed relationships as essential to victory.

22 Ibid. 14-26
23 Ibid. 161-163
24 or “Civic Culture,” to borrow Almond and Verba’s term
This sort of support can also serve to incentivize rebels to assent to democratization after the war ends. A base of support makes pursuing an agenda by non-violent means more feasible. It also helps to build up a pool of potential officials for both government offices and for party leadership. This is especially important given the fact that not all soldiers make good politicians—and the same goes for generals.

**Alternative Hypothesis: Civilian Aid**

Reyko Huang argues that the statebuilding hypothesis is not supported by empirical fact. She demonstrates that the presence of institutions does not correlate with postwar democratization, but she only measures their presence and absence. Advocates of the statebuilding hypothesis might argue that examining functions is more important than merely noting the presence or absence of that which is supposed to perform the function in question. In addition to the literature aimed at statebuilders, one could argue that Tilly’s discussion of war as a statebuilding enterprise supports this notion as well.²⁶

Specifically, one could argue that the organizational residue wars produce could at least be a development which permits democracy to emerge, even if it does not cause it. One issue with the statebuilding hypothesis is that it does not address the fact that administrative savvy does not need to be applied to democratic purposes. One could easily imagine a circumstance where an autocrat justifies his or her position and power by administering the state efficiently and effectively (at least as far as the autocrat’s agenda is concerned, anyway). While undoubtedly critical to consolidating a fledgling democracy,²⁷ statebuilding’s impact on democratization is less clear.

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²⁷ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 3-15
Huang’s argument bears more commonality with the consciousness-building hypothesis but she takes a different approach than the one pursued here. She posits that it is the degree to which rebels rely upon civilians that determines whether democratization takes place in the wake of the civil war. She argues that Olsonian “stationary bandits” can help to mobilize a population in support of democratization by relying upon this population. Because these stationary bandits must justify their position, the rebels are incented to meet the needs of a population.

She also counts proto-democratic institutions as being a manifestation of state capacity and less important than civilian aid when predicting or explaining democratization. This suggests that Huang’s theory of democratization is one which rests upon a relationship the rebels cultivate with civilians to a greater degree even than the one argued here.

Huang’s civil mobilization theory argues that it is the relationship itself that contributes to democratization. The consciousness-building hypothesis argues that this relationship must take a certain shape if it is to contribute to postwar transition.

Testing the Theory

This theory is tested quantitatively and qualitatively. The former uses the novel dataset in a series of regressions and proportional hazard models. The dataset uses

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30 Huang, 60-61
Caroline Hartzell’s dataset\textsuperscript{31} from her piece on integrating rebels into postwar militaries\textsuperscript{32} as its source for civil wars. The set is extremely fine-grained in terms of differentiating cases. This is ideal from a methodological perspective as it makes for a larger sample size.\textsuperscript{33} However, one might argue that some of the separate cases in the set should be treated as a single conflict. As such, one robustness check for these statistical analyses will involve requiring a minimum period of peace before recidivism will be treated as starting a new civil war.

The regression models will incorporate the ordinal scale of rebel governance outputs for each of the three modalities of rebel governance examined for this project. It will also incorporate Reyko Huang’s dichotomous civilian aid variable.\textsuperscript{34} It signifies whether there were significant transfers of money, supplies, or materiel between civilians and rebel groups during the civil war in question. This is a key addition which should help determine which of these related theories better explains postwar transitions. Hazard models will also include Huang’s variable, but will have far fewer other variables in them due to the nature of proportional hazard models.\textsuperscript{35}

The qualitative analysis will examine more closely the mechanistic action of the Mampillian modalities of rebel governance during the conflict as well as the transition


\textsuperscript{33} This is particularly helpful for the proportional hazards models.

\textsuperscript{34} Huang, Wartime Origins of Democratization, 1-16

\textsuperscript{35} Peter C. Austin and Ewout W. Steyerberg, “The number of subjects per variable required in linear regression analyses,” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 68 (2015), 627-636
period. The cases were selected on the variables in the consciousness-building theory—specifically the presence of feedback mechanisms and postwar democratization. The cases—El Salvador (feedback mechanisms + democratization), Sudan (feedback mechanisms + no democratization), Angola (no feedback mechanisms + no democratization) and Mozambique (no feedback mechanisms + democratization). El Salvador is useful to demonstrate how the theory works under ideal circumstances, but Sudan and Mozambique make ideal deviant cases to examine as well. Sudan’s rebels were successful rebel governors and Mozambique’s were largely uninterested in governing their controlled territory. Even Angola’s rebels were largely successful rebel governors outside of feedback mechanisms.

The Layout of this Dissertation

Chapter two will examine some of the literature regarding rebel governance as well as the literature upon which the notion of rebel governance is built. It will also present two new theories of democratization from rebel governance based upon the altered version of Mampilly’s framework I develop for this project. The first is an updated version of the statebuilding hypothesis in which the independent variable is the provision of functions rather than the presence of an institution. The second is the consciousness-building theory introduced here in which feedback mechanisms change popular expectations regarding what role civilians should play in their own governance.

Chapter three will clarify the three functions or modes of rebel governance which I have introduced here. It will also discuss the dataset I have constructed and the ordinal scale of provision I have developed for the measurement of rebel governance. Although
complete case notes are available in the appendix, this chapter will also contain a list of the cases and their governance scores, as well as some descriptive statistics.

Chapter four will feature several statistical analyses to determine the general relationship between these manifestations of governance and postwar democratization. It will feature regression analyses and proportional hazard models as means to describe this relationship. It will also apply a variety of different interpretations of the polity data to ensure the robustness of these findings. It will also incorporate an additional dataset with a dichotomous variable for democracy as an additional robustness check.

Chapter five will trace the impacts of those manifestations, with particular emphasis on their relationship to the mechanisms discussed in chapter two. The civil wars in El Salvador, Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique will receive this treatment. The degree of success in rebel governance will be noted in greater detail than in the general case notes and special attention will be paid to the impact of this rebel governance on the postwar state’s transition or lack thereof.

Finally, chapter six will offer concluding remarks which will summarize the findings and arguments of this project. It will also situate them within the developing literature on rebel governance. These remarks will be accompanied by an exploration of avenues for extension as well as implications for policymakers. This conclusion will also note some of the shortcomings of this project, both as caution to those who would generalize from this research and as a means of exploring avenues for extension.
Chapter 2: Democratization from Rebel Governance

El Salvador’s transition to democracy—and the FMLN’s transition from rebel group to political party—was greeted in political science as a great clarion call. Few events could have had such far-reaching implications for the discipline, and political scientists reacted accordingly, both in its immediate aftermath and in the decades that followed. Some wrote of the titanic struggles related to holding the FMLN—already something of a tenuous coalition in wartime—together as it forswore violent political action.\(^\text{36}\) Others focused on the importance of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Chapultepec Accords.\(^\text{37}\) Still others focused on the impact of public memories of violence on elections themselves.\(^\text{38}\) Some even argued that the transition to democracy was not really a democratization at all and that its then newly formed pseudo-democracy was destined for failure.\(^\text{39}\)

Fewer scholars paid attention to the rebellion’s impact on the civilian population. Thankfully, there were some who did. For instance, Elisabeth Wood noted that the FMLN had taken pains to develop and support “novel insurgent institutions” both as a means of encouraging *campesinos* to provide military intelligence and as a means of challenging the Salvadoran government’s legitimacy.\(^\text{40}\) This sort of attention is becoming more common, though, as more political scientists examine the emergence of these sorts

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of state-like functions among civil war belligerents. Surprisingly, many belligerents are successful in establishing states-within-states even as a civil war rages around them.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Rebel Governance}

The fact that some rebel groups bother administering their controlled territory is far from obvious. This makes Mancur Olson’s notion of the “stationary bandit” all the more critical. Olson notes that under conditions of anarchy, the shadow of the future is short enough that a civil war belligerent (a “roving bandit,” if you will) will only seek control over a population to extract as much revenue as possible, as an insecure dictator would.\textsuperscript{42} However, if a rebel group’s shadow of the future were longer—say, if its control of certain territory were more secure—then the group would be incented to provide goods and services to maintain their relationship with their subjects (and make sure that those subjects did not themselves feel the need to overthrow their governors).

This does not answer the question of when exactly a civil war belligerent would feel secure enough to settle down, as it were. Indeed, a non-incumbent belligerent would likely feel intensely insecure until such time as its incumbent adversary is defeated (and perhaps even afterward). However, Mampilly notes that the domestic hegemony which political scientists have assigned to the ideal state may not necessarily be a prerequisite to administration. Instead, he argues that governance may emerge under more contested circumstances.

\textsuperscript{42} Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” \textit{The American Political Science Review} 87, No. 3 (1993), 567-576
Mampilly’s first point is to note that a non-hegemonic internal state system may not be as anarchic as one might think. Indeed, he notes that Thomas Hobbes’ does not argue that investing power in a leviathan is a way to escape anarchy, but rather as a means to escape contested authority.43 Second, the historical record is littered with cases of rebel governance under conditions where the rebels in question were not likely to survive the course of the civil war.44 These two points call into question Olson’s preconditions for a stationary bandit. A rebel group may well establish something approximating state infrastructure and administration under profoundly insecure circumstances, even if the end goal of extracting resources remains the same.

Reyko Huang argued that this sort of acquisitiveness may produce the bonds between governor and governed necessary for a democratization moment.45 Huang found that when a given rebel group’s funding comes primarily from revenues garnered from the locals, the state was more likely to democratize after the conflict came to a close. The thinking goes that rebels who secure funding from a civilian population are more likely to act as one of Olsen’s “stationary bandits,” taking pains to rationalize their rule by way of providing public and political goods to their subject population.46 However, rebel groups which are primarily supported by foreign parties or by natural resource extraction have little incentive to cultivate such a relationship with a given population. This connection stands to reason—rebels who depend on a population for support would be more likely to

44 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 16-19
46 Olsen, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” 567-576
maintain some sort of ongoing relationship with that population than rebels who do not need to do so.

**Statebuilding**

Huang also tests the alternative theory that postwar democratization is a product of wartime statebuilding. She tests this by using the proxy of the presence of certain institutions. The thinking behind what she calls “rebel statebuilding theory” is that rebels who survive the war (both literally and in terms of being a going political concern) have incentives to build on their wartime institutional achievements toward “social contractual” forms of state-civilian relationships. This idea has deep roots. The connection between social and institutional developments and democracy has been the subject of near-constant study by 20th Century political scientists. The 21st Century has seen these same notions applied to civil war developments—for instance, Cliffe and Manning wrote of the immense institutional needs for postwar statebuilding, especially when that project has democratization as its aim. It makes sense then, that rebels who begin building their states before the war ends should be more successful afterward.

However, Huang finds this hypothesis wanting, especially when drawn out into the cold light of statistical analysis. She suggests that there may even be a connection

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47 Huang, *Wartime Origins of Democratization*, 60-61; These include: “(1) an executive, (2) a legislature or regional councils, (3) a court or a legal system, (4) a civilian tax system, (5) a mandatory boycott of state taxes, (6) a police force, (7) an education system, (8) a health care system, (9) humanitarian relief, (10) media or propaganda, and (11) foreign affairs.”
48 Olsen, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” 567-576
between exceptionally well-institutionalized rebels and postwar autocratization. Her conclusion posits that all may not be lost for institutionalists, though—she suggests that there may be a connection between well-institutionalized rebels and long-lived peaces.\(^{52}\) Regardless, she finds little evidence that institutional capital is a predictor of postwar democratization.

The presence of rebel-constructed institutions suggests that rebels may desire to produce the sorts of outputs which Mampilly examines (or at least signal to other parties that they are willing to try), but there is no guarantee that rebels’ governance strategies will be successful—or even that the rebels in question care one way or another. The Mozambican rebel group RENAMO was one such group.\(^{53}\) Although the group’s leadership made pronouncements (and appointments) suggesting that they had an ambitious agenda of producing parallel governance within their controlled territories, the group only began dedicating substantial resources to such enterprises late in the war. This dissonance between rhetoric and action—more so than the group’s failure to secure productive outputs—suggests that the group was uninterested in actually governing.

Additionally, rebel governance may be hamstrung due to issues beyond the rebels’ control. Mampilly argues that one such problem is the degree to which the incumbent state has been able to administer its territory, which he calls “state penetration.”\(^{54}\) The thinking here goes that statebuilding rebels take cues from their incumbent adversaries, even as they wish to defeat them; if their adversaries constructed a well-administered state, then the rebels are likely to try and do the same. However,

\(^{52}\) Ibid. 176-177
\(^{53}\) Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 103-104
\(^{54}\) Ibid. 75-83
rebels fighting incumbents who are poor administrators may themselves be ill-suited to
the job. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Movement for the Liberation
of Congo made sincere efforts to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with DRC’s
population. However, in spite of their self-sufficiency (in part due to taxes collected
within controlled territory) and an attempt at representative governance (in the form of
some impressive-seeming institutions), the MLC was largely unsuccessful. Mampilly
argues that this came about in part due to DRC’s low level of state penetration.55

Finally, funding from civilians is far from a guarantor of postwar
democratization—or even that the groups in question are concerned with contingencies
beyond the near term. The Communist Party of Burma’s program of taxation was by far
its most successful endeavor into the realm of governing.56 Although one could argue that
dwindling funds from their Chinese patrons led them to try governing their controlled
territories, the “institutions” that the CPB constructed remind one of RENAMO’s
pronouncements—very little substance accompanies their lofty ostensible purposes. In
Olsonian terms, many of these rebel groups engaged in civil taxation are acting as
“roving bandits” instead of stationary ones. Given this, an alternative to the statebuilding
and civil taxation theses is warranted.

Political Consciousness

Wood’s fieldwork in El Salvador points to such an alternative.57 In the face of
crushing poverty and the normatively charged repression of labor rights, radical priests
and proto rebel groups introduced the possibility of, to borrow Wood’s terminology,

55 Ibid. 101
56 Ibid. 100
57 Wood, Insurgent Collective Action, 1-30
participation (as in actorship), defiance (as in rejecting the condescending elite interpretation of Salvadoran economic realities), and the “pleasure of agency,” a sense of actualization of one’s ability to play a part (however small) in a larger historical development, not to mention the development of one’s own destiny. These developments primed Salvadorans for their role an electorate in postwar El Salvador.

According to Wood’s field research, Salvadoran rebels could be said to be conscious of the realities which drove them to violence. In defiance of the existing order, they recognized both that the source of their suffering was not the immutable will of God and, in doing so, recognized their own agency in altering their state of affairs. This sort of consciousness-raising should strike scholars and practitioners from disparate subfields as familiar, even outside the context of mechanized violence. For instance, the National Organization of Women dedicated substantial resources to organizing and supporting activities that raised consciousness of the subtle ways women face particular struggles in the United States. 

This also shows up in the comparative politics canon. Dankwart Rustow’s single prerequisite for democratization allows for enterprising rebels to provide an alternative conception of a population’s identity. Rustow’s theory only requires that a people group have “national unity” to precipitate a democratization event, even though this trait is insufficient to sustain the newly created democracy. Regardless of its potential

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58 Ibid. 232-237
59 For one example, see: NOW Guidelines for Feminist Consciousness-Raising, National Organization of Women, 1982, 2-7.
60 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, No. 3 (1970), 337-363
ephemerality, it is possible that a rebel group might begin acting as a government in order to encourage Rustowian national unity.

This would mean that the most important role of rebel governance in democratization is not in building institutional capacity, per se. Instead, the purpose of governing would be to establish connections between the populace and its would-be governors. Once these connections are established and healthy, a democratic political culture may emerge, facilitating postwar democratization. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba write of the powerful impact of having a “participant” political culture as opposed to a “subject” or “parochial” one. In particular, they write that participant political culture is cognizant of policy inputs and outputs, as well as their own (potentially active) role in the political system.

Almond and Verba’s civic culture in particular bears more than a passing connection to consciousness-raising. Their categories are not permanent, and the transition between them—at least from parochial to subject to participant—reflects a change in consciousness. While there may be more dimensions to this transformation than how much consciousness one has, the transition to participant reflects a greater awareness of one’s potential role in the politics of one’s home. The normative associations with these terms can make this a thorny issue, but at least where Almond and Verba are concerned this sort of notion can be defined with some degree of clarity. The participant culture represents a truer consciousness than either of the other categories

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61 This may not necessarily be the case, though. Linz and Stepan write that a democracy’s consolidation relies on developments which are not, strictly speaking, institutional (see: Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3-15).
63 Erich Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man* (New York: Continuum, 2003), 18-21
because it is aware not only of the impact of policy on their own lives, but the role that the population has (and could have) in its creation.64

**War as a Chance to Burn, Build, or Sow**

It may seem odd to think of war as an opportunity for building states or popular consciousness, but its role as a laboratory is well documented. For example, Edward Luttwak argued that the post-Cold War efforts to end wars “prematurely” is causing more trouble than if these conflicts had been left alone.65 In particular, he argued that leaving wars unresolved leaves open the possibility for recidivism. Therefore, if wars are allowed to reach their logical conclusion, they are less likely to recur. This is hardly a new idea now (and was not then).66 For instance, Harvey Waterman echoes the sentiment that the prosecution of a war provides necessary information for striking a deal to secure its end, whatever that may be.67 Moreover, Waterman notes that absent the information a war provides, a resilient deal to end the conflict may not be possible.

War can help construct more than a long peace, though. Charles Tilly argues not only that states were made by war-making, but that the violence of the state in defense of a political order is not entirely distinct from the violence employed to make war (or enforce a protection racket).68 More to the point, war making relies substantially on the state apparatus; Tilly notes that where populations are not large enough to easily satisfy demands of a given war making project, that project leads to enormous “organizational

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64 Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 14-26  
65 Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, No. 4 (1999), 36-44  
residue.” For example, a large standing army in a country with a small population and
few resources is likely to produce an enormous (and unwieldy) bureaucracy, almost out
of necessity.\(^6^9\) Thus, those who wish to make war effectively should expect to perform a
measure of governing in the service of this goal.

Tilly’s work on democracy (and democratization in particular) also supports the
idea that wars present opportunities for remaking the state. Specifically, he notes that the
destruction of “segregated trust networks” creates an opportunity for more inclusive ones
to emerge.\(^7^0\) A war could, in overwhelming these trust networks, undermine the
relationships between rulers and those to whom the rulers feel accountable (a group of
people who in an autocracy would be quite small). On a related note, the categorical
inequalities of an undemocratic state must evaporate along with these segregated trust
networks for a democracy to emerge. The categories that correspond to political status
must lose this particular bit of content in order for a democratization to take place.

These two points mean that previously disenfranchised sectors of a population
must develop political actorship as well as consciousness (if it was absent previously).
Thus, politically isolated segments of a population must take on a distinctly political (and
not merely violent) character over the course of a war if that war is to culminate in a
democratization moment. After all, Tilly notes that democratization depends on changes
within three “arenas”: trust networks, categorical inequalities, and public politics.\(^7^1\)

\(^6^9\) He is not alone in this assertion (see: Jeremy Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and International
Intervention in Comparative Perspective,” *Center For Global Development*, Working Paper 57 (April,
2005), 11-13)
\(^7^0\) Charles Tilly, *Democracy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72-79
\(^7^1\) Ibid. 72-79
This last arena means that there must be a positive element alongside the dissolution (or mitigation) of segregated trust networks and categorical inequalities. Wars are quite good at destroying something that existed previously, but less useful in terms of replacing what came before with something better. As such, it is the changes in this last category which represent the biggest challenges for would-be democrats in the midst of a war.

**Civil Wars as a post-WWII Laboratory**

Tilly’s war-making as state-making hypothesis has its share of skeptics—including Tilly himself. One of the issues its critics have is that in the post-WWII world, interstate conflict has become increasingly rare. This means that most pressures on weak states come from within, which critics have noted do not necessarily produce sorts of opportunities to remake the state as do external ones. Conquest has become relatively uncommon, but civil wars have become quite common in their place. Tilly argues that the repressive instruments left behind by ex-colonial masters, an international community all too happy to intervene in civil wars, and the apparent resilience of national borders all combine to profoundly stunt the state-making residue of war-making.

This may not prevent it entirely, though. First, from a theoretical perspective, a lack of conquest does not necessarily preclude profound reorganizations within states. One can argue that the post-WWII resilience of borders is a result of treating wars of conquest as criminal. Michael Walzer explores this paradigm and endeavors to flesh it

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out, arguing that aggression constitutes the crime of attempted conquest. This does not apply in a similar way in civil wars. To summarize Walzer’s argument, a rebel group has a right to self-determination if they can get it themselves. Intervention makes this more complicated but it does not change the fact that the possibility remains for a civil war to remake the state.

The possibility appears more realistic when one examines Tilly’s examples of civil wars. He mentions El Salvador, Mozambique, Guatemala, and Nicaragua (among several others) as wars in which the state-making process may be stunted by foreign intervention. However, each of these countries experience postwar democratization. El Salvador’s democratization saw a profound reform of civil society from a religiously reinforced paternalistic oligarchy into a participatory democracy. Mozambique’s journey from colony to democracy produced similarly substantial changes, most of which took place amidst conflict. This suggests that even if this theory is not as applicable in the post-WWII world, it may still help to explain some of the transformations which civil wars appear to facilitate.

**Movements and Consciousness**

Tilly’s work on democratization suggests that this consciousness argument can be made with his language of social movements and democracy. As movement producing and movement sustaining devices, feedback mechanisms promote democracy (on Tilly’s
terms) by mobilizing excluded citizens and giving them a means of relating with a group of (insurgent) political actors. Moreover, these mechanisms are judged by how well they provide a means of relation and (crucially) consultation with the governed, two elements which Tilly notes are essential to democracy.

This still does not explain how the effect of consciousness-building can survive a defeat in a civil war, though. Indeed, one could argue that a victorious incumbent might frame these developments as anathema to whatever state in which the war took place in as a means of justifying reprisals. The literature paints a similarly bleak picture. Peter Clark and James Wilson’s typology of organizations suggests that fledgling organizations driven primarily by ideology (purposive, in their language) require an “angel” to provide resources if they are to survive. The “angel” could very well be an insurgent army, as some means of defense against a hostile incumbent may well be as important a resource as any in the midst of a civil war, but this defense would be compromised should the army in question be defeated in the field.

As it happens, Wilson provides part of the answer to how consciousness might persist in the face of defeat. While he deals primarily with American examples, he notes that the episodic emergence of movements is driven by the belief in the value of the “purposive incentives” among its adherents. He observes that these incentives have power among adherents to a movement during periods of weakness not because of the group’s likelihood of success, but because of the value of the goal itself. In addition to

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83 Ibid. 195-211
the direct parallels one can draw between this notion and Wood’s interviews,\(^6\) this suggests that it might be possible that a newly conscious populace might continue to agitate for political standing—even in the face of postwar repression—if that population views the goal of officially sanctioned political standing and activity as worth the trouble.\(^5\)

**Why Cultivate Consciousness?**

Rebel groups have reasons to develop legitimacy during a war. Olsen argues that by administering territory, rebels can justify collecting taxes.\(^6\) Mampilly argues that rebels were also receptive to the prescriptions which emerged from revolutionary ideology.\(^7\) This does not necessarily explain why political consciousness would be so important in and of itself. After all, one can administer territory without encouraging any sense of consciousness beyond a cognizance of who is keeping one safe and well-fed.\(^8\)

Huang’s justification for linking rebels securing funding from civilians to democratization points to a solution. She argues that stationary bandits who must rely on rents from governing instead of natural resources or external aid develop a relationship with their subjects.\(^9\) One can see some evidence of just this sort of development in Wood’s research, as FMLN rebels often received support beyond what they required from local populations.\(^10\) There is a problem with linking this sort of activity by itself to

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\(^5\) One might even imagine postwar reprisals as encouraging these sort of movements, as their perceived unjustness could become a motivating force (see: Manus Midlarsky, *Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 29-31).
\(^6\) Olsen, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” 567-576
\(^7\) Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers*, 10-11
\(^9\) Huang, *Wartime Origins of Democratization*, 1-16, 25-49
democratization though. One could argue that this is largely just a population expressing its gratitude for being kept safe and well fed.

In context, however, campesino contributions to the FMLN war effort represent something more complicated.\textsuperscript{91} The Poder Popular Locales which the rebels established were opportunities for participant populations to govern themselves, not merely a means of marshaling support for the rebels’ cause.\textsuperscript{92} The insurgent cooperatives which replaced them gave those who participated in them even more latitude, even as the rebels supported the collectives and coordinated with them.\textsuperscript{93} The support the rebels were cultivating was not merely a means to justify taxes. It was also a means of producing supportive political actors.

The FMLN’s political project evolved over the course of the conflict, but by the time the belligerent parties signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords, the rebels had already begun to transform into a political party which could exist within a pluralist political landscape. The rebels lobbied the Salvadoran government for legalization in 1989 so that they may participate in elections.\textsuperscript{94} This suggests that they were reasonably confident that even if they could not win legislative majorities or secure the presidency, they would be able to constitute a minority large enough to materially impact the country’s politics. The FMLN’s willing transformation points to a confidence that they were politically sophisticated enough to compete politically, not just militarily, with their incumbent adversaries. This suggests that consciousness can not only encourage wartime support,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Also, the FMLN were not always successful at (or directly responsible for) safeguarding and feeding local populations.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Molly Todd, Beyond Displacement: Campesinos, Refugees, and Collective Action in the Salvadoran Civil War, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 81
\item \textsuperscript{93} Wood, Insurgent Collective Action, 174-192
\item \textsuperscript{94} Christine Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN,” From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War, ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 37-41
\end{itemize}
but it can also help plant the seeds for a base of popular support (not to mention a pool from which a transition party may recruit officers).

This gives rebel groups the means to pursue an agenda by non-violent means, but it also contributes to democratization full stop. Salvadoran rebels encouraged activity on the part of the local populations whose profoundly constrained agency had been justified by landowners and oligarchs as the will of God. The FMLN also encouraged these same populations to participate in organizing and governing themselves, albeit along the lines of their revolutionary ideology. Tilly argues that each of these processes encourage democratization in as yet undemocratic states. The FMLN’s activities encouraged additional participants in the governing process and insulated these new participants from societal inequalities where the emerging public sphere was concerned.

This is the fundamental difference between the theory presented here and Huang’s. Huang’s theory suggests that the Olsonian stationary bandit without access to other resources encourages mobilization and ultimately democratization by naturally because being receptive to a population is necessary to maintain these resources. The theory behind this project argues that democratization follows from more explicit attempts to treat a population as a valid political actor or set of actors. In doing so, the rebel groups cultivate an expectation that civilians ought to have a say in their own destinies, even if the rebels themselves restrict the range of possible outcomes. Thus,

95 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 41-45, 76-81
97 Tilly, *Social Movements*, 131-136
98 The degree to which the FMLN equalized resources and connections among their subjects is up for debate, and one could argue that the rebels did not incorporate existing trust networks into the public sphere so much as try to cultivate new ones in line with their revolutionary ideology.
99 Huang, *Wartime Origins of Democratization*, 30-31
while the theories bear some resemblance to one another, the things which rebel pre-
democrats do to cause postwar democracy are different.

**What About Outcomes?**

A casual observer can deduce that certain outcomes would diminish the impact of rebel statebuilding after the war’s conclusion. If the rebels are militarily defeated in a civil war, it would be foolish to assume that their governing structures would be incorporated into the postwar state. Indeed, Toft notes that victorious incumbents are more apt to punish their rebellious subjects than to take seriously their suggestions as to how they should be governed.100 Thus, it would make sense that any developments which occur in the wake of a civil war where the rebels engaged in the statebuilding project do not survive would not have come about due to taking advantage of that statebuilding.

The less prominently tangible trappings of a rebel group may be more difficult to root out. For instance, the whatever impact the group had on the population is likely to linger on, even if the rebel group itself has been liquidated.101 Even the rebel group itself can be difficult to snuff out.102 Whether because of geography, skill on the part of the rebels, or exhaustion on the part of the “victors,” rebel groups can be notoriously difficult to completely destroy, even if they have been defeated in the field.

Even the nature of memory contributes to this. The fact that the feelings brought about by negative stimuli are felt more poignantly and over longer periods of time than positive stimuli is well documented. This apparently inborn sensitivity to negative

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100 Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 48
101 While raising the political consciousness of a population is one of these potential impacts, this category also includes the scars of mistreatment.
outcomes can end up justifying atrocities in the minds of those who commit them,\textsuperscript{103} but it can also make the apparently defeated extremely resilient.\textsuperscript{104} One could even argue that if one were able to completely defeat the rebels in question \textit{and} eliminate their political presence, if the group was successful in encouraging political activity, one might expect that the participants might continue to agitate for an officially sanctioned method to impact their political destinies. Should a rebel group \textit{not} be completely liquidated in this fashion, one almost expects that they would continue to pursue their agenda, hoping to eventually rebuild their constituency.\textsuperscript{105} This suggests that, given enough time, the impact of consciousness may not depend on a particular outcome in the civil war to manifest itself in the postwar context.

\textbf{Limited Democratization}

In contrast to the relatively ineffable notion of “consciousness,” the conception of democracy used here is decidedly more conventional. Robert Dahl’s notion of polyarchy, while admittedly not the newest conception of democracy, remains extremely useful here (to say nothing of its continued relevance to the discipline).\textsuperscript{106} Not only are participation and contestation effective and concise proxies for democracy, but Dahl’s insistence that even regimes which seem to embody these traits do so to varying degrees gives conceptual support to an implicit assumption behind the ordinal measurement of

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\textsuperscript{105}Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” \textit{World Politics} 44, No. 1 (1991), 7-48; Kuran argues that depending on the willingness of portions of a population to revolt, one need only reach a relatively small threshold of resistance to produce a potentially revolutionary moment.
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incomplete democratization is a phenomenon whose contrast to hegemonic regimes (to use Dahl’s verbiage) is worth noting. Even better where measurement is concerned, Arend Lijphart has remarked that the Polity Project’s data does a reasonably good job of approximating most of Dahl’s conditions for polyarchy. 107

This conception is particularly useful given the sorts of democratization which many scholars argue are possible in the wake of wars. Leonard Wantchekon’s suggested pathway to postwar democratization has as its ideal outcome a sort of democracy which is decidedly procedural and limited, particularly in its contestation. 108 Moreover, while Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie have argued with Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder regarding the relative utility of power sharing 109 and power dividing, 110 both pairs of authors seem to agree that these sorts of limited forms of democracy are useful in the wake of wars.

They are not alone. Joseph Schumpeter’s minimalist depiction of democracy may not have been intended as a blueprint for the goal of democratization, but it has had substantial influence upon the literature. Schumpeter’s conception is premised on the notion that what sets democratic regimes apart from nondemocratic regimes is its

procedure, not its philosophy. The idea that democratic regimes necessarily serve or reflect the common interest, he writes, are demonstrably false. As such, he defines democracy as a procedure. The only necessary component for a regime to qualify as democratic (according to Schumpeter) is the election.

The election is absolutely and utterly critical in Schumpeter, even if the election is not used to select every (or even the most important) office. There are, functionally, two standards to Schumpeter’s procedural democracy’s elections. The first is that that election be genuinely competitive. The second is that the elected officials have primary authorship of state policy. If the election is, by its design, uncompetitive or impotent (by virtue of not deciding state policy authorship), then the election becomes a meaningless exercise. However, so long as the election meets these standards, then Schumpeter believes that the regime in the state which holds them is democratic.

This definition is noteworthy for its profound minimalism. Schumpeter’s definition omits many of the alternatives’ trappings. For instance, he makes no mention of necessary laws, impacts on the governed (i.e. welfare), or even the processes outside of (or even around) the elections themselves. Even alternative procedural definitions are less shallow than Schumpeter’s—Freedom House’s concern regarding electoral fraud is based on its subversion of popular will. Schumpeter has no such concerns.

Schumpeter’s definition is not entirely unconcerned with popular will, though. According to his definition, a democracy is a democracy because of the popular creation

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112 Ibid. 273-283; one reason that he points this out is that, to his knowledge, the only state which did directly elect its highest officer was the United States at the time of his publication.
113 Charles Tilly, *Democracy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6-9; Tilly identifies these as being hallmarks of constitutional, substantive, and process-oriented approaches to defining democracy.
of a government.\textsuperscript{114} Schumpeter’s public is also instrumental in evicting that government, though. This can mean regular elections, but it is not necessarily the case. This may mean that the period between elections has some flexibility but will not be suspended indefinitely,\textsuperscript{115} but it may also mean that some other mechanism may exist for removing a government. Even with this addendum, though, Schumpeterian democracy is conceptually shallower than its alternatives.

In spite of this minimalism, this model of democracy has been enormously influential in democratization literature, in no small part due to the fact that its standards are, compared to many other democracy theorists, quite lax.\textsuperscript{116} Wantchekon’s ‘Warlord’ democratization is model which explicitly rests on this limitation.\textsuperscript{117} In order for elites of the different sides to actually prefer to democratize, they themselves must perceive some sort of incentive on their part relative to their other choices. Those incentives come from the particular limitations on contestation.

Wantchekon’s model requires the belligerent parties reach a stalemate at some point. At this stalemate, the parties must select one of three options.\textsuperscript{118} The first is maintaining the status quo. If breaking the stalemate is feasible, then this option becomes attractive to belligerents, but both belligerents and the remaining population are worse off. The second option is to “invite leviathan,” or in other words adopt authoritarian governance with no guarantee of which faction would be allowed to participate in governing. Unless absolutely necessary to stave off extermination, no belligerent party

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\textsuperscript{114} Schumpeter, \textit{Democracy}, 272, 284-285
\textsuperscript{115} As is the case in the United Kingdom
\textsuperscript{116} One example can be found in the aforementioned Linz and Stepan.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. 18-22
\end{flushright}
will select this choice. As such, it is impossible that all belligerents would agree to do so. The third option is to make peace and democratize.

Assuming that both sides agree to democratize,\textsuperscript{119} then that democratization is, by Wantchekon’s estimation, necessarily Schumpeterian.\textsuperscript{120} This comes from the fact that the singular goal of establishing and changing governments without requisite bloodshed is the primary goal of the arrangement. However, this is, to some extent, predicated on the notion that elections serve as a proxy for measuring one’s power and how it compares to one’s would-be adversaries. There may be another reason for belligerent parties to accept sub-optimal electoral outcomes.

By limiting the degree of contestation, Wantchekon’s warlords-cum-governors may be able to maintain a certain degree of control over their own political destiny.\textsuperscript{121} A number of authors have argued that power-sharing agreements can help to provide this “floor,” preventing electoral catastrophe for any of the major players. One example in the literature is Hartzell and Hoddie’s defense of power-sharing arrangements, which posits a mode of democratization where contestation is intentionally limited to this very end.\textsuperscript{122} By allowing the factions a measure of autonomy or control over certain policy issues, the agreement can assuage belligerent fears of marginalization and domination. While this is important at the best of times, it is absolutely necessary in the context of a state emerging from a civil war.

\textsuperscript{119} If one side refuses to democratize then the status quo is maintained.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. 27-28
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. 17-33
Many of these concerns also inform Lijphart’s defense of consociational democracy.\textsuperscript{123} Lijphart defends the mode of democracy as a means of providing some degree of stability to democracies in deeply fragmented societies.\textsuperscript{124} While this development is distinct from creating an entirely new democratic regime, several of the elements in Lijphart’s defense resemble Hartzell and Hoddie’s description. For instance, one of the most critical elements necessary for consociationalism is that elites recognize the dangers of the system’s collapse. Wantchekon appears to paraphrase the idea behind this in his description of the game warlords play in assenting to democratization: they see settling and coexisting with one’s adversaries as preferable to either surrendering to that adversary or continuing to prosecute the war.

This is not to say that the fit is ideal, though. Hartzell and Hoddie emphasize the importance of securing elite cooperation by assuaging their fears, but these fears are not quite the same as those discussed in Lijphart. The elites in Lijphart’s conception are not (necessarily operating under conditions of potential (or actual) civil war, for one. Lijphart argues that in the absence of cross-cutting cleavages within a society’s masses, the society’s elites must make pains to cooperate—especially with rival groups.\textsuperscript{125} This is an especially difficult task if one assumes that elites may not be prepared to take such pains, as are likely the case under conditions of a civil war. Regardless, that society’s elites must find ways to cooperate across rival groups or else the system is in danger of collapse.

\textsuperscript{123} In part because the critics of power-sharing cite similar issues as did critics of consociational democracy.  
\textsuperscript{124} Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” \textit{World Politics} 21, No. 2 (1969), 211-222  
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. 216
This is far easier said than done. Although Lijphart argues that deeply divided societies have a fighting chance to maintain democracies under consociational auspices,\textsuperscript{126} it is difficult to imagine Lijphartian elites\textsuperscript{127} holding a crumbling consociational democracy such as, say, Lebanon together.\textsuperscript{128} In the Lebanese case, elites were incented to maintain the status quo by the distribution of offices, but this distribution was the subject of fierce debate in the face of changing demographics.\textsuperscript{129} This was exacerbated by the lack of accountability of the presidency, the office reserved for the Maronites. To make matters worse, deep economic inequalities had emerged by the time of Lebanon’s civil war\textsuperscript{130} which the power sharing agreement was ill-equipped to deal with.\textsuperscript{131}

Lijphart and others have proposed means by which consociational democracy may be made less tenuous by way of including elements of federalism. Lijphart notes that consociationalism and federalism are by no means mutually exclusive—indeed, he identifies multiple examples of countries that fit all the criteria for both designations.\textsuperscript{132} This can manifest itself in one of two ways. The first is that the plurality within a society


\textsuperscript{127}His conception of elites’ impulse to manage (if not resolve) conflict within a plural society stems from their preference for peace over war (see: Arend Lijphart, “Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration,” \textit{Canadian Journal of Political Science} 4, No. 1 (1971), 13-14). This is by no means a forgone conclusion in Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{128}Proportional representation appears to correlate with increased inter-ethnic cooperation, but a history of conflict appears to be a more powerful factor. See: Nils-Christian Bormann, “Conditional Consociationalism: Electoral Systems and Grand Coalitions,” \textit{ECPR Joint Workshop}, April 12-17, \url{https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/7f510e36-df77-4f1f-a192-cb1a4bd7ab94.pdf} (accessed July 22, 2016), 1-43


\textsuperscript{130}Edgar O’Ballance, \textit{Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92}, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 7, 14-16; the Shiite minority was particularly impoverished.

\textsuperscript{131}Krayem, “Taif Agreement.”

can be along geographical lines, making a federal system with regional autonomy (but collective governing responsibility) possible. The second is that federalism may be corporate instead of geographic.

This does not address the development of economic cleavages that can run parallel to those of a consociational arrangement’s vested groups. Asymmetric economic growth can be met with internal transfers of funds, although this can produce tensions even as it assuages others. This can be seen plainly in the persistent (albeit non-violent) tensions between the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium.\(^\text{133}\) This can be even more difficult in the wake of a civil war. While a war’s end should ideally produce a “peace dividend,” ensuring equal access to it is easier said than done.\(^\text{134}\)

These developments can frustrate a postwar peace and prevent a consociational arrangement’s instruments from properly functioning, as Imad Salamey argues happened in Lebanon.\(^\text{135}\) Specifically, he argues that Lebanon’s consociational system allowed the inequalities—political, economic, and otherwise—between the groups to ossify and allowed confessional resentments to boil over into violence, even in the wake of the Ta’ef agreement. He highlights the agreement’s call for a bicameral legislature (with a non-sectarian house and a sectarian senate) as an example, though this organizational plan was ultimately abandoned in the face of elite opposition. He goes further though, suggesting the incorporation of list proportional representation in electing legislators and


\(^{135}\) Imad Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options,” \textit{International Journal of Peace Studies} 14, No. 2 (2009), 83-105
employing voluntary secular and confessional voter designations. These prescriptions do not make consociationalism a panacea for conflict within plural societies. Even if integrative and federal elements could have assuaged Lebanese conflict, it bears noting that elite opposition prevented those elements present in the Ta-ef agreement from being applied.

Rothchild and Roeder’s criticism of power-sharing follows a somewhat similar tack. They argue because power sharing in the consociational mold substantially limits contestation, elites must be both powerful and willing to accommodate each other—a difficult ask if ever there was one. While Hartzell and Hoddie do not explicitly engage with Lijphart’s potential criticism, they do engage with Rothchild and Roeder’s, arguing (and then demonstrating) that elite cooperation can be bought with certain concessions that limit the contestedness of the political arena. Moreover, they argue that the concessions are not merely for elites—they can also assuage the fears of the masses. Finally, they note that these concessions do not remove the political arena’s contestedness entirely.

With the exception of Roeder’s power-dividing alternative to power-sharing, these modes of partial democratization do not include broad protections of civil liberties. While more limited conceptions of partial democratization may be more palatable to elites, this concession is not without its costs. Should a state not protect civil liberties, political theorists from Locke to Gramsci suggest that the relationship

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136 Which resemble some of the prescriptions in Roeder, “Power Dividing as an Alternative,” 51-82
137 Rothchild, and Roeder, “Power Sharing as an Impediment,” 29-50
138 There were several others, but they are not as directly related to the question at hand.
139 Hartzell and Hoddie, “Art of the Possible,” 37-71
140 Roeder, “Power Dividing as an Alternative,” 51-53, 8
141 Hartzell and Hoddie, “Art of the Possible,” 47-49
between citizen and state will be strained. Even if calls for the protection of civil liberties are ultimately heeded, this change may provoke resistance on the part of elites who might lose power from it.

Even aside from constrained civil liberties, limited democratization is a dangerous proposition. For one, partial democratization is not a terribly stable state of affairs. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue that competitive authoritarian regimes tend to complete the transition to democracy or slide into authoritarianism. Even assuming that the transitioning country does not backslide, the elongated transition period may create a similarly long period in which this instability may translate into war. Would-be democratizers may not have much of a choice in the matter though, no matter how much rebels achieve during the conflict in question.

**Hypotheses**

The statebuilding hypothesis maintains that the work that rebels do in establishing state-like competencies represents an important head start towards establishing a well-administered state, something which some have argued aids the transition to democracy. The supposition that the first two modes of governance (policing and justice, public good provision) are important in determining a state’s postwar destiny should make for an appropriate proxy for this hypothesis. The “goods of governance” framework makes re-

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144 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5-7, 37
145 That is, electoral regimes which lack one of “(1) free elections, (2) protections of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably even playing field” (see: Ibid.)
146 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *The American Political Science Review* 97, No. 1 (2003), 85; the authors find that both new states and states in the midst of political instability are more likely to engage in civil war.
examining the hypothesis worthwhile as it takes into account the fact that the institutions in question need to function to some degree in order to have an impact.

With that said, even if the statebuilding hypothesis is valid, one expects it to be mediated by the civil war’s outcome. Specifically, prevailing (to use Huang’s term) is a necessary but insufficient condition in this version of the statebuilding hypothesis. If the rebels are defeated, one expects that the victors would have little incentive to salvage the competencies of the rebel’s infrastructure, such as it was. These functions would undermine an incumbent’s authority, as they represent the claim that the rebel group in question can provide for a population better than could the antebellum government.

**Hypothesis 1:** The rebel provision of policing and justice aids the transition to democracy after civil wars.

**Corollary 1:** In order for the impact of policing and justice to manifest itself, the civil war in question must end in a negotiated settlement or rebel victory.

**Hypothesis 2:** The rebel provision of public goods aids the transition to democracy after civil wars.

**Corollary 1:** In order for the impact of public good provision to manifest itself, the civil war in question must end in a negotiated settlement or rebel victory.

**Corollary 2:** Public good provision’s impact does not depend upon the civil war’s outcome.

Public good provision, much like policing and justice, is primarily a proxy for the statebuilding hypothesis. One could make an argument that it also encourages the
development of what Almond and Verba call a “subject” civic culture, this only entails that a population is cognizant of how policies impact their lives, not what they could do to change them.\(^{147}\) As such, its impact on postwar political developments will be treated as a manifestation of statebuilding’s impact.

*Hypothesis 3: The rebel provision of reactive governing institutions aids the transition to democracy after civil wars.*

*Corollary 1: In order for the impact of feedback mechanisms to manifest itself, the civil war in question must end in a negotiated settlement or rebel victory.*

*Corollary 2: Feedback mechanisms’ impact does not depend upon the civil war’s outcome.*

Although one could expect that the particular manifestations of feedback mechanisms could represent a foundation that the postwar state might build upon (see H3, C1), this mode’s role in the consciousness-building hypothesis is far more important. The theory here supposes that it is more important that a population becomes conscious of its potential role in its country’s politics and, more importantly, that it begins to expect to play that role.\(^{148}\) As such, feedback mechanisms or reactive governing institutions will be used as a proxy for the cultivation of political consciousness.

**Testing the Hypotheses**

This project will use a mixed methods approach to determine the particulars of these relationships, but in order to do this, a dataset will be constructed. In the next chapter, I will discuss this dataset’s construction. In the following chapter, I will conduct


\(^{148}\) Almond and Verba describe this sort of civic culture as “participant.”
statistical analyses to sketch the general trends associated with those relationships.

Finally, in the chapter after that one I will trace the path of statebuilding and consciousness-raising as well as how these phenomena impact the postwar environment in El Salvador, Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique.
Chapter 3: Measuring Rebel Governance

Over the past ten years or so, scholars have spent more and more time examining the ways in which rebels govern the territory they control in the midst of conflict. While many such examinations have involved intense ethnographic research focused on that which is unique to each individual case, some have endeavored to compare common traits across cases. Expanding on this work, I have created a novel dataset of rebel governance during the 79 civil wars which ended between 1980 and 2006. The dataset attaches an ordinal value to each of three modes of governance adapted from Zachariah Cherian Mampilly’s work on the subject: policing and justice, public good provision, and feedback mechanisms.¹⁴⁹

In addition to contributing to the growing literature on the subject by facilitating large-N comparative analyses, it complements some of the existing large-N analysis on the subject. Moreover, it privileges outcomes over institutions. As such, it offers a few rough measures of the fruits of rebel governors’ efforts rather than taking note of institutions which are often non-functional. Finally, the dataset’s agnosticism toward the method of a good’s provision should allow it to account for the unique (or at the very least non-Western) modes of provision which some rebels adopt.

This project is deeply indebted to Mampilly’s work on the subject. He develops a framework for examining a rebel group’s governance during a conflict. In addition to other contextual factors, Mampilly focuses the provision of legal services, public goods,

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and feedback mechanisms.\textsuperscript{150} He then applies this framework in predicting the effectiveness of rebel governance during the war.\textsuperscript{151} Huang’s theory builds on these notions, arguing that the institutional manifestations of governance matter far less than the degree to which the rebels rely upon the population.\textsuperscript{152} She argues that the former is primarily window-dressing with little postwar impact. The latter, on the other hand, reflects the degree to which the Olsenian “stationary bandits” have an incentive to govern. She then develops a theory of rebel governance which relies upon revenue collection as an impressively parsimonious proxy for it.

**A New(ish) Framework: The Case for Outputs**

The framework of this project differs from that of both authors, even as it is deeply indebted to them. As in Huang, the cases are arranged with an eye toward examining postwar developments. Mampilly is concerned with wartime developments for their own sake, as he examines the steps rebels take to build ersatz states within states while prosecuting a war effort. This framework adopts the same categories (policing and justice, public good provision, and feedback mechanisms) for the postwar period—albeit with altered conceptions of each.

Another difference is an emphasis on the degree of success of rebel governance structures in their ostensible purpose. Huang examines the wartime presence of rebel governing institutions to test the hypothesis that rebel statebuilding contributes to postwar

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} He argues that legal services and public goods are critical to effective governance, while feedback mechanisms are not.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Reyko Huang, *The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 65-74
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
democratization.\textsuperscript{153} Ultimately, she finds that rebel institutions are unrelated to
democratization, that the “statebuilding thesis” is falsified. However, the mere presence
of a wartime institution may not adequately capture their impact.

A sympathetic interpretation of Huang’s repudiation of the statebuilding thesis
would suggest that it may not be that wartime institutions do not matter, but rather that
their function is more important than their mere presence. Indeed, the latter may be
nothing more than an attempt to garner international support, similar to the ways in which
competitive authoritarian regimes maintain the appearance of democracy to reduce
international pressure to fully democratize.\textsuperscript{154} Olson’s stationary bandits are instructive
here as well—stationary bandits do not appear to administer their territory, they actually
do so, providing goods and services to ensure that their tax base remains content in
providing revenues.\textsuperscript{155} On the other hand, Mampilly notes that his dichotomy between
secure and insecure bandits may rest on dubious assumptions. It may be possible to
mitigate the problems with these by not treating rebel governors as ideal-type sovereigns
nor their territories as ideal-type states.

That democracies often germinate in non-state or proto-state contexts is
noteworthy on its own, but the statement carries subtext which should be clearly stated:
the germination process may not necessarily resemble developments within an extant
state. Much has been written about these developments, but those which do not conform

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 60-61, 176-177; These include: “(1) an executive, (2) a legislature or regional councils, (3) a court
or a legal system, (4) a civilian tax system, (5) a mandatory boycott of state taxes, (6) a police force, (7) an
education system, (8) a health care system, (9) humanitarian relief, (10) media or propaganda, and (11)
foreign affairs.”

\textsuperscript{154} Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, \textit{Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold
War}, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3-36

\textsuperscript{155} Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” The American Political Science Review
87, No. 3 (1993), 567-576
to the modes of an extant state are generally unexamined. This has caused no shortage of umbrage in a discipline supposedly dominated by neorealism over the previous decades and statism for an even longer period.

For instance, Cliffe and Manning’s aforementioned discussion of the common practitioner assumption of *Terra Nullius* is hardly unique. Rebecca Richards notes that state building enterprises have tended to emphasize institution-building, particularly liberal ones that resemble Western ones, at the expense of extant ones which do not fit this paradigm.156 She argues that this rejection of unfamiliar (or, to use her term, “deviant”) forms of governance betrays a certain ignorance of political realities in the states where they exist. It is possible that these forms emerged from the particular needs of a particular people or state—needs that might not be met by Western-style liberal political institutions.157 In spite of this, non-Western, nonliberal modes of governance are generally not taken seriously by the international community.

Séverine Autesserre mirrors Cliffe and Manning’s point that intervening parties need to rely on local resources.158 However, she notes that intervening parties tend to rely on universalist (or at least general or generalizable) strategies, marginalizing particularist concerns. A part of this comes from the nature of foreign actors’ expertise. It makes sense that they would have more general competencies than local actors, but this has become troubling as these differences manifest as landmarks for an emerged hierarchy between

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157 For an example of non-Western, non-liberal institutionalization, see: Richards, *Understanting Statebuilding*, 124-151 in which Richards describes how the traditional (and surprisingly non-hierarchical) clan system has been institutionalized in Somaliland.

local and foreign actors; Autesserre argues that interveners tend to marginalize the input of local actors not only because they are unfamiliar with the particulars of local expertise, but because they do not take these actors seriously. Because the states where these locals reside have endured some degree of collapse, foreign actors feel justified in disregarding the contributions of local actors, as they have “proven” to be inadequate to deal with the circumstances. This contributes not only to interveners not using local resources, but also their feeling that their ignorance of local resources is justified. After all, if what they (the subject of the intervention) already had sufficient state resources, they would not be in the mess they are in, the intervener thinks.

Steven Sampson’s work reflects this outlook as well. He notes that foreign actors are unreasonably trusting of their ostensibly universal models for rebuilding civil society.159 This manifests as the actors crediting their successes to their models and their failures to problems native to the particular state itself. This is intensely problematic, as it prevents foreign actors from accurately evaluating their models or adapting them to idiosyncratic circumstances.

This preference for the “universal” at the expense of the “particular” reflects, in part, a not uncommon privileging of states over non-states amongst international relations scholars, particularly realists. John Mearsheimer, for instance, is famously dubious of the role of non-state actors, arguing that some of them are merely outside the realm of that

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which realism can explain and that some are not worth examining in the first place. This privileging of states has resulted in substantial critiques, and even some realists argue that statism is intensely problematic.

Considering these critiques, perhaps one should search for outputs as evidence of institutions rather than the other way around. Examining outputs requires substantially more information than determining the mere presence of an institution, and even then will rely upon the reliability of those who have examined the individual cases more closely. However, in using a modified version of Mampilly’s typology, one can still look for particular hallmarks of state functions in non-state contexts. Indeed, some elements of institutional analysis at the state level can be instructive here. This should allow me to test for a connection between rebel government and administration and postwar political developments. Moreover, it would allow me to differentiate between rebel groups which achieve meaningful success in their governance projects and those which make only token efforts to replicate state functions (as well as those who do not even bother to pretend to govern).

Measuring governance

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160 “Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer,” *International Relations* 20 No. 2 (2006), 231-243
164 Many schools of institutionalism are predominantly concerned with these outcomes, and some of the newer iterations are examining the complex interactions between different sorts of institutions (such as rules and norms) and actors (see: Fiona Mackay, Meryl Kenny and Louise Chappell, “New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism?” *International Political Science Review* 31, No. 5 (2010), 573-588).
Mampilly’s project involves searching for these functions for the purpose of judging rebel groups’ success or failure in administering the territory they control. However, he describes the success and failure of providing particular modes of governance as a dichotomy—rebel groups either provide the mode in question or they do not. I have endeavored to provide a more complete picture of rebel provision of these modes of governance, measuring them ordinally. Each mode of governance measured in this dataset is assigned an ordinal value between “0” and “3” based largely upon the degree to which the mode is brought about by a rebel group or rebel groups. The “0” value represents an absence of the mode in question. A “1” represents a geographically inconsistent or incomplete provision of the mode, while a “2” represents a more consolidated or comprehensive provision. The difference between these categories comes down to consistency, which often (but not always) entails institutionalization. The efforts of providing a mode at the “2” level are not isolated or geographically determined, nor are they largely by way of outside forces with the support or consent of rebels.

Finally, there is an additional category for especially well-consolidated governance. The “3” category is reserved for a manifestation of a governance mode which effectively emulates that of a well-administered state. This means that a rebel group must have geographically consistent, comprehensive provision of the good in question. The rebel group must also have centralized or regulated this provision; this mode of governance cannot be ad-hoc in any way to achieve this category. As it happens, there is only one example of a governance mode during a civil war achieves this level, which is perhaps unsurprising given the added challenges associated with providing

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165 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 89-96
wartime governance, even for a state. The particulars of the three modes are discussed in the following sections

**Policing and Justice**

The first of Mampilly’s governance modes is legal services. In practice, this includes not just policing and justice, but also domestic security. The ability to keep residents safe from, say, the perils of warfighting is beyond the scope of this dataset. However, the ability to keep residents safe from a rebel group’s own cohort is not. As such, Mampilly’s “security” mode is clearly related to policing and justice, even if manifestations of the security mode do not directly reference policing or justice.

Security is more than discipline among a rebel group’s ranks. Effective policing and justice require that a resident have access to a means of settling disputes, both between a rebel and a citizen and among citizens. As the saying goes, though, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure—the rebel group must also either dedicate personnel for preventing abuses, conscript residents to do the task for them, or support the establishment of popular cohorts for this purpose. As such, the mode of policing and justice overlaps with that of Mampilly but does not involve the actual prosecution of the war itself.

One example can be found in the lengthy civil war in the Philippines. Neither the MNLF nor its more extreme MILF were successful in consolidating Moro support. Making matters worse, organization was lacking even within the groups and after the conflict had ended. At the same time, the group achieved an intermediate value in

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166 Ibid. 233-235
167 Rosalie Arcala Hall, “From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine Policy of Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front Combatants into the Armed Forces,” *New Armies from Old:*
policing and justice. This happened because of the establishment of independent courts which caused many Moro to abandon the official courts as an option for settling disputes.168

This contrasts with the efforts of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), whose policing and justice functions were better consolidated than any other manifestation of rebel governance in the dataset.169 These policing and justice functions established during the final iteration of the Sri Lankan civil war (1990-2002) were aided by the fact that the rebels took pains to retain and replicate the government’s mechanisms for providing these goods to great effect.170 Although the Sri Lankan government was complicit with the efforts to administer Tamil Tiger territory, the rebels adapted the system to their own purposes—for instance, the penal code came to resemble that of the British colonial system from the country’s pre-independence past.171 The end result was a unique and complex system of law with a sizable cadre of officers dedicated to its enforcement.

Public Goods

This mode of governance is borrowed almost in its entirety from Mampilly’s term. The two principal public goods from Mampilly’s conception are healthcare and education.172 Mampilly also includes the provision of food, although he admits this is not

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169 This was the lone “3” in any case in the dataset.
170 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 112-128
171 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 178-182
172 Ibid. 90-95
always applicable. What is more noteworthy than this are the effectiveness and consistency with which healthcare and education are provided.

Measuring the provision of public goods is made easier by the fact that there are two goods to consider. Where both are provided in rebel-controlled territory, this good is considered to be provided at a high level. Where one is provided and the other is absent, then public good provision is considered to be present but uneven. Unfortunately, many cases are more complex than this, as it is not always clear who is responsible for the provision of certain services.

Several civil wars feature the provision of public goods under the guise of rebel administration. However, under some circumstances this is misleading. Effective provision, even if it is not directly caused by the rebel group in question, may still be significant if the group in question is at least indirectly responsible for it. For instance, if a rebel group devotes material support to education even if it does not oversee or administer it, then that group could be said to be contributing to the project. However, even if education is broadly and effectively provided by some other entity with the support and approval of the rebel group, this does not qualify as consistent effective provision by the group in question.

A good example of this can be found in the Sudanese Civil War. The SPLM/A produced a myriad of impressive-seeming institutions, but its public good provision was substantially less impressive where outcomes are concerned. Not only did service provision vary greatly depending on which area of SPLM/A territory one examined, but the group’s responsibility for healthcare and education also varied. While the group was

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173 Ibid. 141-148
engaged in supporting education efforts and had assigned personnel to help craft policy, healthcare was largely provided by NGO’s with the consent (and little else) of the SPLM/A. This makes service provision by the SPLM/A an excellent example of a mode of governance which manifests itself to an intermediate degree, coded as a 1.

On the other hand, The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was more successful in providing public goods during its war against the Derg in Ethiopia. Although political education took precedence over formal education during resource shortages, both were provided through the local organizations known as *baitos*.\(^\text{174}\) These organizations also served as clinics for villages and towns.\(^\text{175}\) Moreover, in spite of how compartmentalized the *baito* system was, the TPLF diverted substantial resources towards their operation, even as the particulars of each individual *baito* were determined by the locals themselves.\(^\text{176}\)

This still leaves the question of how to weigh the destruction of existing capabilities by rebel groups. All other things being equal, it makes sense to discount rebel provision if the rebels are also diminishing the educational and healthcare-related capabilities of the state, such as they are. However, some diminishing of these capabilities should be expected—the state-within-a-state that rebel groups carve out for themselves normally lead to diminished services, whether or not the rebels want them to continue. As such, it is considered a “tiebreaker” of sorts; if a good is apparently between categories, the degree to which rebel groups actively attack pre-existing capabilities will

\(^{176}\) Young, “Peasants and Revolution,” 204-205, 273-274
be factored into their category. This is also the case with the provision of food—although not common enough to constitute its own category, where applicable the provision of food will also constitute something of a “tiebreaker.”

**Feedback Mechanisms**

Feedback mechanisms are a means by which the rebels and “residents” interact. The clearest signs of this manifest themselves as proto-representative government, with local elections selecting provisional leadership. However, feedback mechanisms do not necessarily need to be representative or democratic in nature. Including would-be citizens in policymaking, holding referenda, and allowing or encouraging the development of popular organizations which can interact with the rebels also count as feedback mechanisms. The most important element is that the residents (or some representative thereof) have input in their administration.

For instance, the final iteration of the Sri Lankan civil war demonstrates a profoundly non-democratic manifestation of feedback mechanisms. In addition to efforts to energize the public, some of those members of the public were incorporated into that LTTE policy-making infrastructure. Although the civilian input does indeed matter, its impact was strictly mediated by rebel leadership. Moreover, the sorts of interaction which were allowed between rebel and resident were also strictly limited. This serves as a good example of a marginal case of non-democratic feedback mechanisms and was coded as 1.

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178 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 174-182
El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels were more successful in providing such mechanisms. The Poder Popular Locales (PPL) had been successful in enticing political action among populations in FMLN territory. The PPLs consisted of five individuals selected by each village to take charge of production, legal affairs, education, health, and popular militias. Although the PPLs clearly furthered FMLN’s war aims, they also represented an exercise in agency and self-government for the villages themselves, even as this self-government was deeply bounded by FMLN’s ideology. This agency would manifest itself independently as the 1980’s drew to a close.

The rebels supported the establishment and maintenance of these community councils, especially in the districts of Morazán and Chalatenango. While they ultimately collapsed, Salvadoran campesinos had already begun to craft its replacement. The insurgent cooperatives were more independent than the PPL’s which preceded them, but they were often overtly aligned with the rebels, often coordinating with them. While the PPL’s successor was as much (if not more) due to the efforts of Salvadoran peasants as the rebels, the rebels’ provision of the PPL’s and support of the cooperatives led to its feedback mechanism score of “2.”

What makes a War Civil?

181 Diana Villiers Negroponte, *Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 34-37; the PPL’s were also known as Community Councils
The Correlates of War data\textsuperscript{185} is generally appropriate for this project, but the way in which the data is presented is not. The COW data has achieved broad acceptance within political science, and many contemporary alternatives use similar coding rules when determining what qualifies as a civil war.\textsuperscript{186} However, the COW data treats each individual conflict dyad as a particular civil war.\textsuperscript{187} This can be enormously helpful analytically, but not for my purposes; one side collapsing in an otherwise ongoing civil war is not the sort of circumstance that I am describing when I speak of the post-civil war context. Even though COW data has an outcome variable, a dataset purpose-built to examine civil war \textit{termination} may be more useful.

Thankfully, Caroline Hartzell has developed just such a civil war termination dataset.\textsuperscript{188} She has adapted COW coding rules for a dataset which treats the conflicts (and their terminations) as the unit of analysis. Indeed, she relies on the four principal criteria the COW project uses for civil wars to code for her own: 1,000 or more battle deaths, the state government is one of the sides in the conflict, there is mutual resistance between the combatants, and the conflict takes place within one single particular state (or parallel unit).\textsuperscript{189} Using this definition, Hartzell identifies 127 civil wars that take place between 1946 and 2006. However, I have imposed additional limits in case selection.

\textsuperscript{186} Nicholas Sambanis, “What is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” \textit{The Journal of Conflict Resolution} 48, No. 6 (2004), 816-821; Sambanis notes that many deviations from COW’s coding rules are questions of magnitude, not category.
\textsuperscript{187} Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, \textit{Resort to War: 1816 – 2007}, CQ Press, 2010
I have restricted the case selection to those civil wars which have ended during or after 1980. There are multiple reasons for this decision. First, coding cases, even from documentary sources is a time-intensive process. Second, there are concerns that the quality of data may degrade the further into the past the civil war in question took place. These concerns come about in part because of the relative newness of the topic’s interest to political scientists and in part due to the state-centric chauvinism exhibited by then-contemporary practitioners. Hartzell and Hoddie did something similar when examining power-sharing agreements out of a similar concern for finding good information. Mampilly also limited his case selection for similar reasons.

Even given this restriction, there are 79 valid cases, which should be sufficient for many statistical analyses, including the ones attached to this project. Moreover, even as many civil wars which took place during the Cold War are excluded from this analysis, several Cold War era civil wars are still included. This should allow for some comparison of Cold War and post-Cold War civil wars. Outside of some superficial observations, little work has been done on this topic.

**Descriptive Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War Governance (1980-2006)</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>P/J</th>
<th>PG</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>Sum of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.443</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.354</td>
<td>1.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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190 For an examination of this, see Richards, *Understanding Statebuilding*, 19-38
192 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 11-12
193 One example is the fact that negotiated settlements as a means of terminating a civil war became substantially more common after the Cold War ended (see: Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 5-9)
Basic descriptive statistics reveal a number of trends. First, the 1990s saw the conclusion of civil wars at a dramatically higher rate than during the rest of the time examined, Second, the 1980s saw few civil wars come to an end. Along similar lines, it appears that civil wars ended at a lower rate in the 2000s than in the 1990s in spite of the fact that only seven years in the 2000s are included in the scope of the dataset. Finally, rebel governance seems to be increasingly more common during civil wars as time goes on.

Hartzell’s dataset is quite fine-grained, particularly where the endings to civil wars are concerned. As such, the set includes some conflicts which resume quite quickly after a would-be conclusion. To examine the relationship between short postwar peace and governance’s effect on postwar developments, I have introduced minimum peace time thresholds of 6, 12, and 18 months. Aside from indulging my curiosity, these thresholds serve three purposes. First, they help to control for the possibility that a conflict in the dataset might be coded as completed erroneously. For instance, if a brief ceasefire expires and a conflict resumes, some might not consider the conflict to have meaningfully ended at all. At the same time, limiting the thresholds to 18 months means that this analysis does not need to wade into discussions of creating lasting peace. While this is certainly a worthwhile topic of study with a rich literature of its own, this is not the topic of this analysis. At the same time, even if one assumes that postwar democrats build

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
<th>6 Months</th>
<th>12 Months</th>
<th>18 Months</th>
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<td>48</td>
<td>.313</td>
<td>.396</td>
<td>.354</td>
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<td>.500</td>
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<td>6 Months</td>
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<td>.413</td>
<td>.387</td>
<td>.360</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Months</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>.370</td>
<td>1.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Months</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>1.201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
these institutions extremely quickly, *some* period of relative calm must be allowed for them to do so.

These wars will be treated as single cases so long as the recidivist conflict is between the same combatants as the previous war. For instance, Ethiopia experienced three civil wars which overlapped for substantial periods of time. However, these cases remain separate, as one was a conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrean secessionists, one was a center-seeking conflict between Ethiopian rebels (especially the Tigray People’s Liberation Front), and one was a secessionist civil war fought by ethnic Somali Ethiopians in the Ogaden region with the aid of Somalian forces. While one might be tempted to treat the conflicts as one war, this would be problematic. Not only are the conflicts distinct (the combatants eventually united against the ruling Derg, after several years), but two of the three conflicts featured rebel groups which were quite successful in establishing unique systems of rebel governance. Making this distinction even more important is the fact that the impact that governance had on postwar developments (at least as far as this project is concerned) depends on what country counts as the postbellum state. Eritrea and Ethiopia went in substantially different directions after the Derg were defeated as far as their polity scores are concerned. This may not impact the use of this dataset outside of this project, but it will for this one.

Discussion

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This set’s value will be first demonstrated by my use of it to explore the potential relationship between rebel governance and postwar democratization. Hopefully, measuring the different modes separately will allow me to disaggregate the impact of each individual mode. Moreover, this dataset should allow me to examine the role that outcomes play in this prospective relationship, as well as the timing of the would-be transition.

Over the long-term, this dataset could be improved by expanding it. Although this sort of data on the civil wars in question becomes difficult to obtain as one travels further back in time, it is worth noting that some of the civil wars in the dataset extend quite far back in time themselves. With this in mind, the first extension of the dataset is likely to be the examination of civil wars which end between 1970 and 1980. Doing so would add 21 cases, bringing the dataset’s size to an even 100 cases. In addition to the value added by making the dataset more comprehensive in general, this would also facilitate further comparison of civil wars during and after the Cold War. These cases are likely to be more difficult to code given the comparative lack of interest in the subject to then-contemporary scholars, but this means the task is likely to be difficult, not necessarily impossible.

Going forward poses a bit more of a challenge. While Hartzell’s data sticks to COW guidelines, there are some elements which are unique to it that I am not equipped to provide. The good news is that including newer civil wars is a less pressing issue than including older ones. The dependent variable of this project is postwar developments with regard to democracy. As of this writing, the newest civil war in this dataset is ten years old. While some postwar democratization events take place fairly quickly, this is
still not a particularly long time. For the sake of the dataset, including newer civil wars would be helpful. For the sake of this project’s theory, this would not necessarily be the case.

Another means of broadening the dataset’s utility would be to include measures other scholars have used as representations for rebel governance. For instance, Huang’s variables representing the resource base and statebuilding hypotheses would make welcome additions to this dataset.¹⁹⁸ This is easier said than done, however. Huang relies on Doyle and Sambanis’s coding rules¹⁹⁹ for the civil wars in her dataset which differ from COW selection rules. Although the differences are marginal, they impact the inclusion and exclusion of cases. Fortunately, this should only make the process more difficult, not impossible.

¹⁹⁸ Huang, Wartime Origins, 65-74, 188-189
## Dataset and Scores

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wars</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>P/J</th>
<th>PG</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>Apr-92</td>
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<td>PDPA, Najibullah, mujaheddin</td>
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<td>Afghanistan2</td>
<td>Apr-92</td>
<td>Sep-96</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Taliban v. Rabbani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan3</td>
<td>Sep-96</td>
<td>Dec-01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>United Front/Coalition v Taliban</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Jan-92</td>
<td>Sep-05</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>GIA, AQIM, FIS, AIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2/21/1975</td>
<td>6/22/1989</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>FNLA, MPLA, UNITA</td>
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<td>8/22/1989</td>
<td>5/31/1991</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>MPLA, UNITA</td>
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<td>11/15/1994</td>
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Chapter 4: Statistical Analyses

Constructing the dataset of 79 cases allows me to perform several statistical analyses without too much concern that the results would be tainted by the vagaries of small samples. This is especially important given the idiosyncrasies of different rebel movements and the ways that they endeavor to administer their territory. If one is ever going to make sense of rebel governance as a phenomenon and especially as a contributor to democratization, one must put oneself in a position to generalize inasmuch as it is possible. While this brings with it many of its own risks the following analyses should help to clarify the relationship between different modes of governance and postwar democratization.

These analyses’ validity depends on an effective definition of democracy and a workable measure thereof. Measuring democracy is a conceptual minefield. While this project does not solve each of the issues related to democracy’s measurement, the path it takes is as safe as one can reasonably expect at this point. The fact that this path is perhaps not even terribly useful as a model for other scholars is beside the point, as is the fact that it is likely that the discipline will produce a more effective way of measuring democracy and the transition to it.

The Things We Mean When We Say “Democracy” and “Democratization”

Although their definition is the source of no small amount of disagreement, democracy and democratization must be defined for this project to have any meaning whatsoever, even if the definition here will do little to determine the debate’s outcome. The definition of the former will follow Robert Dahl’s lead, emphasizing contestation

200 Which will be mitigated by the lengthier case studies conducted in chapter 5
and participation.\textsuperscript{201} This is hardly a unique emphasis; Carles Boix, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato do the same in constructing their own dataset of democratic regimes.\textsuperscript{202} They code regimes dichotomously as democratic or undemocratic based on their relatively straightforward measures. A regime meets their threshold for contestation if the executive is: 1) popularly elected in direct or indirect elections and is responsible to the legislature or electorate and 2) popular elections for the executive and legislature are free and fair. Their definition of participation is even simpler: a majority of adult men must have the right to vote.\textsuperscript{203}

So long as one has an idea of democracy, one could be forgiven for expecting democratization to be relatively simple to define. Using Boix, et al’s conception as a model, democratization could be defined simply as the regime going from non-democratic to democratic. While this simplicity can be useful, many of the models I use here require a more fine-grained depiction of a regime.

In light of this, I have used the venerable polity IV score as the basis for many of my quantitative models’ measure of regime.\textsuperscript{204} The scale allows one to discern more subtle changes, both in terms of movement along the -10 to 10 numerical scale and in terms of the additional categories the scale offers. One can therefore discern both numerical change over time and the transition from one category to another, even if that


transition were to fall short of the “democracy” category. Polity’s use of the scale and multiple categories allows one to capture partial transitions. This is not only important for the sake of precision, but also because several scholars have debated the merits of power-sharing or power-dividing arrangements which may not immediately lead to full democratization.

This is not to say that Boix et al’s dichotomous measure is without utility here. The authors note that their measure coincides with an important threshold on the polity IV scale. If the authors code a regime as democratic, it is also overwhelmingly likely to be coded as a 5 or higher on the Polity IV scale, noteworthy as 6 is the threshold for the category “democracy.” Similarly, Boix et al’s measure is an excellent predictor of a Freedom House Freedom in the World score of 3.5 or better. While 3.5 is still considered “partly free,” it approaches the threshold for the “free” designation (2.5), especially remarkable given the substantial disagreement among democracy measures in the middle figures.

While the polity scale has achieved ubiquity in the discipline, it is not without its critics. One particularly damaging (and pertinent) criticism comes from James Vreeland. In deconstructing the many pieces of the scale, he notes that its utility in analyses which deal with civil wars is particularly compromised as some of the scale’s elements deal

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205 For instance, a change to 2 from -2 leaves an anocracy still as an anocracy, but in terms of polity categories a potentially meaningful transition from “closed anocracy” to “open anocracy” has taken place.
208 Boix, Miller, and Rosato, “Complete Dataset,” 1536-1538
209 Matthijs Bogaards, “Measures of Democracy: From Degree to Type to War,” Political Research Quarterly 63, No. 2 (2010), 475-488
explicitly with political violence (and implicitly with civil war).\textsuperscript{210} Specifically, both the competitiveness and regulation of political participation contain references to such, meaning that the results are compromised even if the polity scale variable is lagged. Thankfully, Vreeland constructs an alternate scale free from these issues.

Vreeland’s x-polity scale is essentially nothing more than the original polity scale without these problematic elements. This scale consists entirely of executive attributes: the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the chief executive. What remains is a scale that goes from -6 to 7, 2/3 of the range of the original one.\textsuperscript{211} In spite of this, the seriousness of the conceptual and methodological issues unleashed by the original are such that such a truncation is necessary.\textsuperscript{212} As such, the x-polity scale will be used instead of the polity IV scale. While this may undermine the importance of competitiveness and openness of the would-be democracy that could emerge in the wake of the civil war in question, Boix et al.’s dichotomous variable does not suffer from the same conceptual foibles and is coded solely on the basis of participation and openness.

Vreeland’s “fix” is not without its costs. Few would criticize the polity scale for being too comprehensive, yet the x-polity alteration further narrows the polity scale’s conceptual depth. Absent a perfect option easily at hand, I instead use the Polity IV scale, the x-polity scale, and BMR’s dichotomous measure together, bearing in mind that none of the three perfectly encapsulate democracy. In order to further ensure the results’

\textsuperscript{211} 14 values as compared to 21.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. 401-425
robustness, I also apply a variety of imputation techniques for missing values in the polity and x-polity scales.

The first imputation technique for the polity score comes from the polity IV scale itself. The polity2 measure imputes values for two of three categories of instances lacking face validity. Interregnum or anarchic periods without cogent central authority (or its approximation) are recoded as “0.” Periods of transition are given prorated and rounded values between the last and next known value, assuming a linear transition between the former and the latter. Given that transitional period occasionally coincide with periods of anarchy, the order of operations becomes significant. Interregnum periods are coded before transitional ones, which means that the anarchic “0” counts as a known value where the prorated values are concerned.

Thomas Plumber and Eric Neumayer propose an alternative means of imputation. In order to avoid scenarios where it appears that a state makes short-lived progress towards democracy (or experiences a short-lived bout of that which approaches autocracy), they propose three different coding rules. Two of them are quite simple—recode all interregnum and transition periods as the higher of the last or next polity value. The third is only marginally more complex. The authors posit that the prorating strategy applied to transitional periods should be applied to interregnum and transition periods together to avoid confusion. While this method is itself far from perfect, it has its use as a robustness check at the very least.

214 Instead of -.77
215 Instead of -.88, -.66 remains without face validity.
216 Thomas Plümber and Eric Neumayer, “The level of democracy during interregnum periods: recoding the polity2 score,” *Political Analysis* 18, No. 2 (2010), 206-226
While this may adequately approximate the statistical representation of democracy, doing the same with democratization will prove more challenging. Rather than relying on a single method, I will be relying on a combination of several methods to capture the phenomenon. The first measure will be an unaltered reading of x-polity levels at the years leading up to (and including) the civil war’s ignition as compared to the levels at the war’s end and immediate aftermath. Positive movement along the scale will be treated as movement toward democratization (if not democratization as such).

As a number of scholars have argued, definitional minutiae can meaningfully impact what cases are considered within a dataset. For instance, the 1,000 battle death threshold approaches universal use, even as alternatives are readily available. Depending on what threshold one uses, the number of cases one considers valid can vary to a substantial degree. The large-N analyses conducted herein will employ Small and Singer’s criteria made famous in the Correlates of War data for determining a civil war’s occurrence.

I considered using Freedom House’s data as well, but the data appears to be more than a little problematic. Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index could be useful to this end, although the scale also brings with it its own host of potential issues. For instance, Illiya Harik accuses the scale’s authors of biasing their figures when examining Arab majority countries. More troubling is the relative lack of clarity in the

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217 An exception will be granted for wars which take place in only one year. Under these circumstances, democracy during the year of the war’s beginning but not previously will constitute democratization.
measurement of cases. While some have criticized the use of the polity scale and the implications of how its authors have interpolated missing data, these seem minor in comparison, particularly as a careful political scientist can avoid the pratfalls associated therewith.

**Regression Design**

Applying each of these measures and interpretations requires several regression analyses, the results of which can be found below. For each of these regressions, the dependent variable is an operationalization of the shift in relative level of democracy from prewar to postwar era. This is captured by taking the difference between two mean polity2 scores. The first figure covers the year the war ended and the five years following it, and the second covers the year the war ended and the five years leading up to it. In other words, the dependent variable is a measure of postwar governance minus prewar governance. The postwar periods from which this prewar figure is subtracted are as follows: the year the war ends out to five years afterward, the sixth year after the war’s end to the tenth, the 11th to the 15th, and the 16th to the 20th. This is done to minimize the likelihood of missing figures and to take as full advantage of the polity data as possible. The first set of regressions will include ordinal measures of each of the three modes of governance, as well as dummy variables for the two outcomes which represent prevailing—negotiated settlement and rebel victory. The second set of regressions tests for the impact of interacted modes of governance. A dummy variable for whether or not the rebels in a civil war prevail has been created and included. More importantly, the

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interacted values for prevailing and the various modes of governance are also included. These sets of regressions are replicated for each of the two other interpretations of the polity data. The first is for Vreeland’s “fix” for the polity score and the second is for Neumeyer and Plümber’s fix for interpolating missing data in polity.

Each set of regressions has a similar battery of controls. Many of these controls take their inspiration from Fortna’s scale constructed to measure the relative difficulty of a prospective peacekeeping mission. I have selected several additional controls already present in Hartzell’s dataset. These controls include variables accounting for life expectancy, intensity, war duration, and GDP/pc. Additionally, a dummy variable is included for whether the civil war in question ended after the Cold War. The reason for this is that the post-Cold War era saw a spike in negotiated settlement as a means of ending a civil war. This, combined with the several theories tying civil wars’ outcomes to postwar developments constitutes a compelling case for including the variable in the battery of controls. Each regression will also control for outcomes. The uninteracted regressions will include separate controls for rebel victory and negotiated settlement and the interacted ones will include a control for prevailing.

One final control is included for Reyko Huang’s civilaid variable. The variable is the critical one for her theory linking rebel reliance upon civilian funds, resources, and

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224 Vreeland, “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War,” 403-407
226 Caroline A. Hartzell, Data Set for Hartzell’s “Mixed Motives: Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End.” In New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by Roy Licklider. April, 2014, https://www.carolinehartzell.com/uploads/4/0/3/7/40375771/licklider_military_integration_project_4.dta (accessed February 3, 2016); This is another reason why Hartzell’s data is ideal for this project. In pursuit of the answer to a very different question, she has compiled an extensive list of variables which have proved useful for this project.
materiel to postwar democratization. Both Huang and Hartzell adopt the COW’s coding guidelines when determining a conflict as a civil war, there are several inconsistencies. This presents an issue for adopting a variable from Huang’s data and using it with Hartzell’s. In order to escape this issue, I adopted a handful of coding rules. Conflicts which Hartzell codes as multiple conflicts but Huang counts as a single conflict are both coded similarly as the single conflict from Huang’s data. Discrepancies between when the conflicts end or begin are overlooked so long as it can be confirmed that the conflict is in fact the same outside of the starting or ending dates.227 The cases which appear in Hartzell’s dataset but which are absent from Huang’s are coded as missing.

Regression Results

Figure 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>End to 5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Polity2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.525)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/J</td>
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<td>-4.089***</td>
<td>-3.788**</td>
<td>-4.825***</td>
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<td>FM</td>
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<td>2.947***</td>
<td>3.907**</td>
<td>4.154**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1.197)</td>
<td>(1.368)</td>
<td>(1.795)</td>
<td>(1.971)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

227 Huang’s notes attached to the replication data was instrumental here (see: Reyko Huang, Rebel Governance Dataset Coding Notes, June 2016, http://www.reykohuang.com/uploads/7/7/5/9/77594542/rgd.zip (February 25, 2018)).
The first sets of regressions produce fascinating results. The impact of feedback mechanisms is uncertain in the immediate aftermath of the civil wars in the data. However, there is a clear connection between the presence of these mechanisms and the persistent development of more democratic governance. Civilian aid may have a positive impact, but it is uncertain due to the insignificance the model assigns it. Moreover, it appears that Civilian aid’s impact attenuates over time.

On the other hand, policing and justice functions have a clear and persistent impact on governance which manifests itself as soon as the war has ended, albeit not in the direction one would expect. Policing and justice functions correlate with autocratic governance. These results may seem counterintuitive, but Christian Davenport’s work on state repression has highlighted the costs associated with enacting repressive policies, particularly as they pertain to the state’s policing capabilities. Put simply, a state with well-developed policing competencies has some of the tools necessary to effectively enact repressive policies while absorbing their costs. As useful as these functions may be for a democracy, Davenport notes that they are also extremely useful to nondemocratic governments as well. Additionally, when taken alongside the negligible impact of public aid.

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good provision, these results confound the first two hypotheses in this design. This adds to the evidence suggesting that the statebuilding hypothesis is insufficient to describe the relationship between rebel governance and democratization. Also, these results support the third hypothesis, which rests upon the consciousness-building impact of feedback mechanisms.

*Figure 2*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>End to 5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Polity2</strong></td>
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<td>(1.684)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-.391</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>FM*Preval</td>
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<td>(1.111)</td>
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<td>(1.364)</td>
<td>(1.479)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civaid*Preval</td>
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<td>.554</td>
<td>1.632</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(1.307)</td>
<td>(1.517)</td>
<td>(1.778)</td>
<td>(2.134)</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; *a: p < .15
The set of regressions which treats the outcome as an intervening variable produces results that are similar in shape to the regressions which do not. However, these results tell a different story in terms of these governance modes’ magnitude and significance. The impact of feedback mechanisms and policing and justice is muted as compared to the first round of regressions and the significance of those impacts which in the first round is also absent. Moreover, these results do not change when applying the x-polity fix. The civilian aid results are also uncertain. It appears that there is an impact early in the postwar period, but it diminishes over time. Also, it does not appear in the regressions which use alternative interpretations of the polity data.

If the statebuilding hypothesis were valid, then one would expect that the impact of the various modes of governance examined here would remain significant and substantive here. Policing and justice functions correlate with some degree of autocratization here, but it appears to dissipate after some time. Moreover, the impact of the other two modes of governance as well as that of civilian aid is smaller here than in the regressions with uninteracted independent variables. These results suggest that the relationship between rebel governance and postwar political developments is not mediated by outcomes, or at least not in the way one would expect.

The fact that interacting the governance variables with outcomes diminishes the predictive power of those governance variables suggest that the outcome of the civil war may not matter (which would appear to confirm the second set of corollaries and

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229 One example of this is that of the Polisario Front in what is considered Morocco. The rebels were extremely reactive to their base and took pains to demonstrate their political sophistication. In spite of the interminable debates regarding the ultimate destiny of Western Sahara, two things have become fairly clear. First, Morocco has become less profoundly autocratic, even if only marginally so. Second, it appears that so long as it remains a part of Morocco proper, the Moroccan government would consent to some degree of autonomy for Western Sahara (see: Teresa K. Smith de Cherif, “Western Sahara: A Moroccan-Style Election?” Review of African Political Economy, No. 58 (1993), 99-105).
confound the first set). This would suggest that the postwar governors do not build upon wartime developments—or, if they do, they do not use them to aid democratization. Although this does not necessarily support the notion that wartime governance supports democratization by way of raising a population’s political consciousness, it does confound one of this notion’s alternatives.

**Hazard Design**

These regressions demonstrate that consciousness-building governance can encourage democratization, but the question of timing remains. As such, I construct Cox proportional hazards models to determine whether or not the forms of governance I have developed bring about democratization more quickly. I constructed models to correspond with each of the regression analyses with the “democratization” value being a shift in polity score from five or below to six or higher.\(^{230}\) This is then replicated for the shift to open anocracy, noting a shift from zero or below to 1 or above. I also construct a final hazard model using Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s dichotomous scale, with democratization being a shift from zero to one.\(^{231}\) Ideally, I would reuse the controls from the regression analyses but this is not advisable here.

Although there is some variance in the number of “failure” events—that is transitions—the range of outcomes greatly restricts the number of variables I can use per model.\(^{232}\) While the classic “one in ten” rule has been called into question, this is in part due to the fact that there is no pronounced drop in bias when one limits the variables to

\(^{230}\) Or, for x-polity, a score of three or below to four or higher.

\(^{231}\) Note that BMR’s data is only current up to 2010 not 2016.

\(^{232}\) Peter C. Austin and Ewout W. Steyerberg, “The number of subjects per variable required in linear regression analyses,” *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology* 68 (2015), 627-636; note that this is not nearly as serious an issue with multiple regression.
ten per observation. As such, the models will only include the three modes of governance developed for this project, a variable for civilian aid, and a dummy variable for negotiated settlement.

**Hazard Results**

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratization (polity2)</th>
<th>Open Anocracy (polity2)</th>
<th>Dem (inter)</th>
<th>O. An. (inter)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policing and Justice</strong></td>
<td>.374** (.162)</td>
<td>.477* (.207)</td>
<td>.702 (.300)</td>
<td>.406* (.200)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Public Goods</strong></td>
<td>.882 (.401)</td>
<td>.552 (.268)</td>
<td>.634 (.294)</td>
<td>.699 (.355)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Feedback Mechanisms</strong></td>
<td>3.349*** (1.334)</td>
<td>1.901ª (.771)</td>
<td>2.021* (.782)</td>
<td>1.516 (.667)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Aid</strong></td>
<td>1.133 (.450)</td>
<td>1.777 (.714)</td>
<td>1.201 (.470)</td>
<td>1.704 (.710)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiated Settlement?</strong></td>
<td>3.230*** (1.324)</td>
<td>3.047*** (1.239)</td>
<td>3.210*** (1.305)</td>
<td>2.199* (.923)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*: p &lt; .1; **: p &lt; .05; ***: p &lt; .01; ª: p &lt; .15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results are far less definitive. Depending upon which data one uses—and the transition threshold one adopts—one can come to one of several different

---

233 Eric Vittinghoff and Charles E. McCulloch, “Relaxing the Rule of Ten Events per Variable in Logistic and Cox Regression” *American Journal of Epidemiology* 165, No. 6 (2006), 710-718

234 This makes the ratio of observations to variables vary between 5:1 (x-polity democratization) and 6.6:1 (polity2 democratization, interpolated polity democratization). The negotiated settlement dummy was selected as the lone control because of its correlation with high polity scores (see regression tables).
conclusions. It appears that both feedback mechanisms and civilian aid may make transitions take place sooner, but the answer to which one of these is a greater accelerator depends upon which data one uses. Feedback mechanisms appear to have no effect whatsoever on democratization according to the BMR data or anocratization according to interpolated polity. Meanwhile polity2 and interpolated polity data are skeptical that civilian aid has any impact at all. The impact of policing and justice functions are similarly uncertain. While these functions do appear to make the transition to anocracy more distant, the impact on democratization only shows up in the polity2 data.

**Thresholds and Reiterations**

Hartzell’s data is extremely fine-grained in its case selection. Some cases devolve into recidivism in a mere matter of months. This could mean that some might consider the war in question not to have ended at all. Treating multiple cases as being the same war might influence the results, just as treating a single war as multiple ones might. As such, additional regressions and hazard functions are conducted here with cases considered not to have ended until 6, 12, or 18 months have passed with some caveats.

Civil wars will not be combined if the conflict is not between a largely similar group of belligerents. Specifically, wholesale change in the rebel or incumbent contingent will constitute a new civil war, even if rebels and incumbents simply switch places. Similarly, a civil war fought by the same incumbents against entirely different rebel groups will constitute a new civil war. However, in the case of a multiparty civil war, a civil war can be combined if a rebel contingent defects and allies with the incumbents.

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235 Three or more belligerent groups
Combining cases like this requires that some changes be made with regards to the variables. For the governance data, the highest figures will be used. In practice, this normally means taking the values from the latest iteration of the conflict, but there are some exceptions. Given the fact that this project’s consciousness-building theory does not necessitate that the governance structures survive into the postwar context, this is not necessarily an issue. Other variables are not quite as simple to adapt.

The control for the duration and intensity of the conflict are adapted similarly—the figures from the conflicts which are to be combined are added together as they appear in Hartzell’s data. One could make the argument that this process could produce inaccuracies; after all, the length of the conflict would be something other than the time from the war’s beginning to its end. However, this process treats the time in between the conflicts as being something of a break between the conflicts. The values for the rest of the variables come from the final later iteration of the conflict. For instance, the end of the war as far as the GDP/pc is concerned is the end of the latest of the conflicts condensed into a single case. The same is the case for the war’s outcome. This is particularly appropriate; a civil war termination that results in recidivism so quickly that the war cannot truly be said to have ended, then the event is not really much of a termination at all.

**Minimum Peace Regression Results**

*Figure 3*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity2</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>End to 5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
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<td>6 Months</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/J</td>
<td>-3.169**</td>
<td>-4.404***</td>
<td>-4.493**</td>
<td>-4.836***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.281)</td>
<td>(1.404)</td>
<td>(1.694)</td>
<td>(1.788)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>1.462</td>
<td>.628</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>1.304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.167)</td>
<td>(1.280)</td>
<td>(1.493)</td>
<td>(1.575)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These regressions only reinforce the conclusions which emerge from the previous rounds of regressions. Feedback mechanisms correlate with movement toward democratization over time while policing and justice functions do so with movement toward autocratization over time. These results also reveal an emergent positive relationship between public good provision and movement toward democracy, but there are reasons to discount this even aside from the fact that it is not statistically significant. This effect only manifests itself between 16 and 20 years after the war’s end. The length of time between the effect and the war’s end combined with the fact that it only shows up after this extended period suggests that even were it closer to statistical significance it is likely not worth further examination.

Minimum Peace Hazard Results
### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6 Months</th>
<th>Democratization (polity2)</th>
<th>Open Anocracy (polity2)</th>
<th>Dem (BMR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policing and Justice</strong></td>
<td>.378** (.165)</td>
<td>.472* (.214)</td>
<td>.869 (.402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Goods</strong></td>
<td>.812 (.398)</td>
<td>.514 (.277)</td>
<td>.570 (.294)</td>
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<td><strong>Feedback</strong></td>
<td>3.393*** (1.389)</td>
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<td>1.530 (.709)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.255 (.553)</td>
<td>1.582 (.675)</td>
<td>2.528* (1.219)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.844** (1.192)</td>
<td>2.721** (1.220)</td>
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; a: p < .15

### Table 5

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<th>Dem (BMR)</th>
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<td><strong>Policing and Justice</strong></td>
<td>.374** (.167)</td>
<td>.468a (.225)</td>
<td>.954 (.486)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Public Goods</strong></td>
<td>.798 (.391)</td>
<td>.441a (.245)</td>
<td>.581 (.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feedback</strong></td>
<td>3.457*** (1.475)</td>
<td>2.363* (1.101)</td>
<td>1.458 (.702)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Aid</strong></td>
<td>1.319 (.572)</td>
<td>2.031a (.888)</td>
<td>1.954 (.917)</td>
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<td>3.022*** (1.259)</td>
<td>3.099*** (1.319)</td>
<td>2.777** (1.242)</td>
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; a: p < .15

### Table 6

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<th>Dem (BMR)</th>
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<td>.468a (.223)</td>
<td>.974 (.490)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Public Goods</strong></td>
<td>.864 (.449)</td>
<td>.491 (.282)</td>
<td>.625 (.348)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Feedback</strong></td>
<td>3.138*** (1.386)</td>
<td>2.294* (1.085)</td>
<td>1.338 (.654)</td>
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<td><strong>Civilian Aid</strong></td>
<td>1.251</td>
<td>1.786</td>
<td>1.879</td>
</tr>
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; a: p < .15
The minimum peace threshold hazard models supports some of the results from the previous models. Policing and justice functions make democratization more distant, but less so with anocracy. Feedback mechanisms appear to still make democratization happen more quickly, but with the minimum peace thresholds it appears that this is also the case with anocracy. Both of these relationships drop out in the BMR data though. Critically, so does the impact of civilian aid, albeit only for the models which require 12 and 18 month peace periods for a war to have ended.

**Discussion**

Feedback mechanisms clearly correlate with higher polity scores across different interpretations of the polity data and with minimum periods of peace. While the impact is less certain in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, it appears that the impact is one which grows to be substantial and resilient. The hazard results are less conclusive. It appears that they accelerate democratization but do less to accelerate anocracy. Moreover, the BMR data suggests that there is no impact at all. On the other hand, the civilian aid variable’s impact is best seen in the hazard models. It appears that they can also accelerate a transition event. Requiring a minimum period of peace of at least a year causes this impact to drop out though. Moreover, the regression results suggest that this impact is more fleeting than that of feedback mechanisms.

Policing and justice functions appear to correlate with autocratization and seem to make democratization more distant. This is a good reminder that one cannot assume that...
skilled administrators will necessarily use that skill to encourage democratic governance. This appears to evidence Davenport’s points regarding these proficiencies. Specifically, while these functions can be useful to democratic governments, they can be especially useful to repressive regimes. On the other hand, public goods provision does not appear to have any impact on the postwar regime or the speed at which it changes.

One can take away several conclusions from these results. First, the statebuilding hypothesis does not fare well here. This does not necessarily mean that the scholars who recommend that postwar governors take advantage of what competencies exist already outside the realm of officially sanctioned institutions are incorrect. For example, rebels in El Salvador were successful in establishing policing and justice functions and the RAND Corporation suggested that these competencies may be useful in the conflict’s aftermath to re-establish order in the country. This suggestion was not heeded, which reflects an unfortunately common outlook regarding local resources in postwar theaters. As such, even though statebuilding forms of governance do not appear to translate into postwar developments, it may be that postwar statebuilders deserve some of the blame.

This notion is not entirely novel. Autesserre’s scathing analysis of peacebuilding efforts in DRC and elsewhere suggest at the very least that statebuilding by external interveners is both fraught with pitfalls, both due to how challenging the projects so often are and the apparent unwillingness to account for the additional challenges that

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237 Toft, Securing the Peace, 86-87; in fairness, this was only one of the means that RAND suggested would be useful in pacifying postwar El Salvador.
240 Autesserre, Peaceland, 60-95.
intervening itself poses. Richards takes this even further, suggesting that paternalism on the part of the international community blinds them to deviant forms of provision which could cause rebel modes of governance to be ignored or worse.

The second take away is that while rebel governance as a whole may not contribute to postwar democratization, certain manifestations of it might. The first set of results suggest that feedback mechanisms contribute to eventual democratization in the wake of a civil war, for instance. The fact that this relationship drops out when interacted with the “prevail” variable suggests that this relationship does not require that the physical manifestations of rebel governance survive into the postwar era. This in turn suggests that rebel governance can contribute to postwar democratization when it has an effect on the population similar to that which Wood observed. Rebels can cultivate a participant civic culture (to borrow Almond and Verba’s term) even when the extant regime assumes a parochial or subject one. This leads to a population which is more comfortable making demands for political agency. This is an exciting possibility. Thus far, though, it appears that the value of rebel governance with regards to postwar democratization appears to be limited to the degree to which rebel “governments” treat their would-be citizens as citizens in a democratic sense. That is, the population of a rebel group’s controlled territory is not only the source of a government’s ability to govern, but that the population must begin to govern itself if one hopes to see a transition to democratization after the war.

While Huang’s alternative hypothesis fares less well than the consciousness-building hypothesis, one should limit the degree one discounts it from these results. It

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appears that there is some independent impact of civilian aid at work here. Moreover, there is some theoretical overlap as well. The theory argues that relying on civilian aid causes those civilians to consider their political actorship\textsuperscript{242} which is also an important element of the consciousness-building theory. Additionally, the application of the theory here is only a part of Huang’s theory. Civilian aid may be the most essential part of the theory, but it interacts with foreign aid and the presence of natural resources. The reason civilian aid is so important is that, according to Huang’s theory, it forces rebels to be accountable to civilians. If rebels have other sources of funds and materiel, then this effect is muted.

Regardless, these analyses confirm the consciousness-building theory and refute the statbuilding theory. The consciousness theory involves more than just the presence of feedback mechanisms, though. These mechanisms should cultivate political consciousness among rebel governors’ charges. As such, confirming this theory requires a more thorough investigation into the process behind this theory’s mechanism. The statebuilding hypothesis requires a similar examination if for no other reason than to determine why exactly the theory does not bear fruit empirically. The case studies in the next chapter will do this very thing.

**Regression Tables**

*Table 7*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity2</th>
<th>End to 5 years</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Justice</td>
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<td>-3.784***</td>
<td>-3.649**</td>
<td>-4.512**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(1.395)</td>
<td>(1.657)</td>
<td>(1.703)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
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<td>.979</td>
<td>.679</td>
<td>1.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goods</strong></td>
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<td>(1.282)</td>
<td>(1.490)</td>
<td>(1.525)</td>
</tr>
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\textsuperscript{242} Reyko Huang, *The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 8-10
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<td>4.452***</td>
<td>4.502**</td>
<td>5.534***</td>
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; *: p < .15

Table 8

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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; ª: p < .15

## Table 10

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<td>.349</td>
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<td>(.630)</td>
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; ª: p < .15
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<th>.0005a</th>
<th>.0002</th>
<th>.0001</th>
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<td>(0.0003)</td>
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; a: p < .15

### Table 11

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<th>16-20</th>
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<td>1.893</td>
<td>1.138</td>
<td>.773</td>
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<td>(1.536)</td>
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<td>(2.309)</td>
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; a: p < .15

### Table 12

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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; ª: p < .15

### Table 13

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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; ª: p < .15

### Table 14

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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; a: p < .15

Table 15
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*: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01; <sup>a</sup>: p < .15
Chapter 5: Culture, Consciousness, and Democratization in Four Case Studies

While many of statistical analysis’s flaws can be addressed with a sound research design, there are questions which large-N studies are not particularly well-equipped to answer (at least not on their own). This dissertation’s theory is one of them. In particular, I have selected four cases from the dataset to examine in greater detail based upon the consciousness hypothesis’s critical independent (feedback mechanisms) and dependent (democratization) variables. The four cases are El Salvador (feedback mechanisms, democratization), Sudan (feedback mechanisms, no democratization), Mozambique (no feedback mechanisms, democratization), and Angola (no feedback mechanisms, no democratization).

Each of these cases present opportunities to examine feedback mechanisms’ mechanistic activity in greater detail. How, for instance, do feedback mechanisms in the Salvadoran case incubate a participant political culture that is absent in SPLM/A-controlled territory? Why did Mozambique democratize after its civil war when RENAMO showed so little interest in cultivating a political citizenry? UNITA was generally successful at administering its territory, scoring well in both non-feedback mechanism measure of rebel governance, and yet Angola did not democratize post-civil war.

Why Trace the Process?

Given that this project’s governance data is entirely novel and comes with descriptions of each case, one could argue that more detailed case studies would be redundant. While these case studies will indeed perform a similar task as the case
entries, it will perform other tasks as well. The first is to examine the relationships between the modes of governance (policing/justice, public good provision, feedback mechanisms) and the mechanisms of the two competing hypotheses (consciousness, statebuilding). In so doing, these cases should help to draw connections between governance activities during the conflict and the mechanisms which could create lingering effects for the postwar regime and describe these effects in more detail than the net polity score change would.

In the wake of the series of statistical analyses in chapter 4, King, Keohane, and Verba’s argument that process tracing can be useful to increase the N in a qualitative analysis is less important here. On the other hand, the arguments that qualitative analyses—and specifically process tracing—can effectively complement statistical analyses are especially pertinent in this case. While not as useful for establishing generalizability, process tracing can illuminate the mechanisms which underpin quantitative findings, bolstering the findings’ validity.

This can be extremely useful as a non-statistical robustness check as well. By illuminating a quantitative analysis’s mechanisms, a researcher can root out spuriousness, which can creep in to an otherwise reasonably constructed large-N design. Along the same lines, process tracing can be quite helpful in testing alternative hypotheses, as will

243 Which is important, given that the appendix which contain the entries does not contain these four cases.
246 A good example of this can be found in Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 19-31, 213-229.
247 Jack A. Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions” Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, eds. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47-51
be done here. By examining the process by which the variables relate to one another, I will compare the consciousness-building and statebuilding hypotheses.

Since these case studies are to be conducted via process tracing and given the complimentary statistical analyses, the cases have been selected based on the values of their variables. While the consciousness-raising hypothesis is not explicitly a necessary or sufficient condition, testing it as if it were can be extremely useful for determining its applicability. Using Andrew Bennett’s (and, by association, Stephen Van Evera’s) typologies for the different forms and uses of process tracing, the case studies shall consist of one of two different types based upon the value of the dependent variable (democratization). Each case will consist of a “hoop test”—that is, a test which eliminates a hypothesis should it fail—for the consciousness hypothesis. Cases of democratization need to demonstrate the cultivation of consciousness by way of feedback mechanisms. Moreover, cases without democratization should absolutely not demonstrate the cultivation of political consciousness. By forcing the consciousness hypothesis to jump through these hoops the process tracing in this chapter exposes it to refutation and marginalization.

Meanwhile, the statebuilding hypothesis is also tested in these cases, but in a different manner. Having already cast doubt on the hypothesis in the previous chapter, these cases should act as something of an altered “smoking gun” test. If the hypothesis

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251 Ibid. 207-219
is not confirmed, even though this evidences its weakness, that has already happened to a certain extent. However, if the statebuilding hypothesis is confirmed by these cases, then it reintroduces the possibility that it is valid and suggests that the problem lies with the design.

The actual case studies consist of extended versions of the entries which can be found in the appendix for each civil war. In addition to examining each rebel group’s governing structures in greater detail, these cases also include examinations of the mechanisms behind the consciousness and statebuilding hypotheses. In particular, the cultivation of political consciousness and how the proto-state structures are used in the transition period are explored. The cases then conclude with a brief statement regarding the aftermath of the conflict and transition period.

**Case Selection**

As previously mentioned, the cases have been selected based upon the presence or absence of the dependent variable (democratization) and the independent variable of the consciousness hypothesis (feedback mechanisms). This should illuminate the connection between wartime feedback mechanisms and the cultivation of political consciousness, especially in El Salvador’s case. It should also help to explain the outcomes in the deviant cases (Mozambique and Sudan).

There are other reasons that these cases are especially useful. For instance, Sudan’s SPLM/A rebels and Angola’s UNITA rebels were successful in providing impressive levels of wartime governance without democratizing afterward. This could help to serve as a test of the statebuilding hypothesis, as well as a reminder that democratic rhetoric does not a democrat make. The degree of wartime governance these
would-be governors achieved also help to isolate the impact of feedback mechanisms and the consciousness they can produce, as neither of these non-democratizing rebellions are without any sort of governance at all.

Moreover, Mozambique’s postwar democratization appears to have been undertaken *despite*, not because, of RENAMO governance. This in particular is a puzzle, although an examination of the conflict which came just before the country’s independence may help explain Mozambique’s curious postwar course. It may also serve to add texture to the notion of consciousness. Postwar leadership can harness political consciousness or cast it aside. This means that on some level, consciousness is not by itself sufficient to produce postwar democratization.


**Policing and Justice: 2; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 2**

El Salvador’s civil war began in 1980, but its roots lay much further in the past.\(^{252}\) 1932 saw the establishment of a new, uniquely repressive paradigm of interaction between labor and management. In response to a labor-driven rebellion and feeling the pressure of plummeting commodity prices, El Salvador’s government began a campaign of flamboyant retribution. This bloody campaign consolidated El Salvador’s authoritarian government and the subservient status of workers.\(^{253}\)


The particular nexus of actors in 1932 appears to have also solidified a relationship between elites within the regime and economic elites. Rather than rely on market forces to regulate the labor supply, economic elites relied on “extra-economic coercion” to maintain its discipline. This necessitates cooperation by the regime—especially on the part of the military. This meant that not only was the vast majority of economically viable real estate in the hands of a small number of landlords, but that the options open to laborers were institutionally limited.

It is in this context that rebellion began to emerge. In 1970, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was formed. The FMLN would ultimately come to consist of something like a coalition of leftist and left-leaning groups operating in opposition to the Salvadoran government. Meanwhile, catechists, priests, and nuns began teaching liberation theology in the countryside in the 1960’s. This development was especially important, as it decoupled the suffering of the landless and land-poor campesinos from the will of God. It is the landlords, not God, who decided to repress you, the thinking went. The brutal response on the part of the government drew these two forces together.

FMLN Governance

In spite of the war’s profound violence, the FMLN rebels provided a remarkable level of wartime governance to its controlled territories. The FMLN was especially successful in El Salvador’s underdeveloped backwater departments. This makes their

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256 Molly Todd, *Beyond Displacement: Campesinos, Refugees, and Collective Action in the Salvadoran Civil War*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 41-45
achievements all the more impressive; in spite of chronic poverty in these departments (and the profound violence brought to bear to by the government to subdue them) the rebels had been able to provide a certain level of civil organization to its controlled territory. The principal instrument of direct wartime civil organization was (at least for a time) the Poder Popular Locales (PPL’s) or, as they were also known, community councils.

It appears that there were three purposes for the PPL’s. The first is ideological—the FMLN believed that such an organizational mode would allow even poorly institutionalized areas to adopt specifically socialist modes of production and society. The second is as a means of furthering the war effort. The councils mandated support for the war effort both politically and militarily. The third purpose is more interesting for my purposes than either of the first two, though—the PPL’s were also engaged in the project of dealing with day-to-day issues within the localities as a government would.

The local population played a substantial role in providing policing and justice functions. Although the FMLN diverted some personnel and materiel to the project of keeping peace, it was often the campesinos themselves who were involved in the enforcement of law and order, especially where deterring opportunistic looting was concerned. Each PPL had a member chosen from a village’s number to organize a local militia, but this was not solely for policing functions. Additionally, while

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261 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 76-78
262 Alvarez, “Transition Before the Transition,” 86-89
commanders would often settle disputes between citizens, rebel commanders would also have villages elect adjudicators to handle disputes, rather than serving as arbiters themselves. While law and order were hard to come by given the circumstances, the presence of an individual in the PPL in charge of legal affairs helped to at least encourage the illusion of this.

Each PPL also had one member each in charge of production, education, and healthcare. Although each member was clearly an instrument of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement, they were also (at least ostensibly) to provide for the basic needs of the considerable masses living in controlled territories. For example, the council member in charge of production was in charge of overturning bourgeois production modes and providing food for the army, but this individual was also in charge of making sure that the population was able to subsist on its efforts as well. Similarly, the task of education in zones of control clearly had a dual-purpose. The public good of education was clearly a part of the educational agenda, but so was removing bourgeois influences and de-emphasizing competition.

This may be a product of the FMLN’s political program, but residents in FMLN controlled areas appear to be more pleased with the provision of public goods, but Wood notes that this opinion does not correlate with their effective provision. The PPL’s were indeed effective in Chalatenango, but the government’s siege of the countryside

265 Alvarez, “Transition Before the Transition,” 86-89
266 Ibid. 86-89
greatly diminished the capacity of these organizations. Even aside from direct attacks, the PPL’s varied substantially in their effectiveness across different areas. This was due in part to the FMLN’s own internal diversity.\textsuperscript{269} The group was a coalition of generally like-minded rebels and interacted with local populations in a variety of different ways. This helped to maintain popular support for the group, but it also led to inconsistency where public goods are concerned, especially education.\textsuperscript{270}

The PPLs were a vital source of strength for the FMLN,\textsuperscript{271} but they also provided a means of self-government\textsuperscript{272} for the villages under rebel control, even as its auspices were inextricable from FMLN ideology.\textsuperscript{273} The impact of these developments would be seen as government offensives led to the PPLs’ destruction. As government forces targeted the more overtly FMLN-created PPLs, Salvadoran campesinos began organizing insurgent cooperatives.\textsuperscript{274} These cooperatives were similarly somewhat inconsistent, as the members themselves took more responsibility for them, but they were similarly successful.\textsuperscript{275} More importantly, they also represented an extension of the PPLs’ exercise in self-governance.

While the insurgent cooperatives were not controlled by the FMLN (and some were not even particularly sympathetic to the group), they were wildly successful. By the

\textsuperscript{269} Wood, \textit{Forging Democracy from Below}, 47-50
\textsuperscript{270} Leigh Binford, “Grassroots Development in Conflict Zones of Northeastern El Salvador,” \textit{Latin American Perspectives} 24, No. 2 (1997), 61-64
\textsuperscript{271} Diana Villiers Negroponte, \textit{Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War}, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 34-37; the PPL’s were also known as Community Councils
\textsuperscript{272} Todd, \textit{Beyond Displacement}, 81
\textsuperscript{273} Department of Social Sciences, “Correlation of Forces in El Salvador,” 430-432
\textsuperscript{274} Wood, \textit{Insurgent Collective Action}, 174-192; The cooperatives were also not free from governmental interference or attacks.
\textsuperscript{275} Hammond, \textit{Fighting to Learn}, 110-119; Education seems to have been better-provided under these auspices.
war’s end, 18.5% of El Salvador’s farmland was controlled by these cooperatives.\textsuperscript{276} One reason for this success was the formation of \textit{campesino} political organizations such as the CONFRAS (the National Confederation of Federations of the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform), COMUS, (United Communities of Usultán), and FENACOA (the National Federation of Agrarian Cooperatives). None of these organizations were FMLN appendages, but CONFRAS covertly supported the rebels and coordinated their activities with them. Additionally, FENACOA’s leadership had several individuals who were members of the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP), an organization within the FMLN.

\textbf{Consciousness}

While all of these rebel organizations were connected to the rebels in some way, shape, or form, they represented the wartime flowering of civil society.\textsuperscript{277} These organizations allowed Salvadorans to politically organize and gave them standing to bargain.\textsuperscript{278} This impact was felt keenly by the insurgents themselves, as Wood’s interviews demonstrate. In the face of crushing poverty and normatively charged repression of labor rights, radical priests and proto-rebel groups introduced the possibility of, to borrow Wood’s terminology, participation (as in actorship), defiance (as in rejecting the condescending elite interpretation of Salvadoran economic realities), and the “pleasure in agency” (as in playing a role in contributing to history).\textsuperscript{279}

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\textsuperscript{276} Wood, \textit{Insurgent Collective Action}, 84-86, 160-177
\textsuperscript{278} Wood, \textit{Insurgent Collective Action}, 167-168
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid. 232-237
\end{flushright}
These reasons for rebelling are distinct, but closely related to one another.280 The opportunity to do something in response to the indignities of prewar Salvadoran society and responding in turn to the repression the Salvadoran government brought to bear in response to that activity constitute the first two categories. The last relies somewhat on the possibility of success, but not solely. Pleasure in agency is the feeling of having some sort of say in one’s destiny, even if the individual contribution is “vanishingly small.”281 These reasons each reflect a growing consciousness of one’s potential as a political actor, but also appear to have been sufficient to encourage participation in the rebellion.

The involvement in the rebellion itself appears to support this. Even though some involvement was involuntary (providing water and tortillas to soldiers, providing “war taxes” if you were a rich land-owner),282 it was largely the participants themselves who were deciding to undertake the responsibilities of participation as well as to what degree they would participate.283 Although direction from rebel leadership was more pronounced in some areas (Tenancingo, for instance), the rebels (especially post-PPL) encouraged supporters to determine what policies to adopt in insurgent cooperatives themselves. The degree to which this was successful suggests that the PPL’s had, in spite of their decimation, achieved the stated goal of encouraging the development of political consciousness.284 This suggests not only that the FMLN had established Mampillian feedback mechanisms, but that they were remarkably organic and radically representative, particularly given the FMLN’s Marxist (and Leninist) ideology.

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280 Ibid. 231-241
281 Ibid. 236
282 Wood notes that some FMLN supporters suggested that some landowners granted substantial support in this form voluntarily. It bears mentioning that Wood was understandably—albeit privately—incredulous.
283 Ibid. 234-241
284 Universidad de El Salvador, “Correlation of Forces in El Salvador,” 430-432, 439-441
This conclusion is supported by other depictions of the rebel group turned political party. For instance, Christine Wade argues that the FMLN was surprisingly enthusiastic in its role as a political actor, even if its competencies were somewhat lacking. She notes that the FMLN offered to halt operations for six months in advance of the 1989 elections if they would be allowed to participate.\textsuperscript{285} This took place in spite of the early dominance of the Communist Party within the FMLN in postwar El Salvador. The Communist Party was the only group that had any experience as a political party as such, so on one hand this makes sense. However, the group was the smallest of the FMLN’s constituent pieces.

**Statebuilding**

Wood notes that the guerilla factions—especially once united under the FMLN’s auspices—established themselves as parallel sovereigns in controlled areas.\textsuperscript{286} Critically, she mentions that in some areas, “state authority had been effectively replaced by novel insurgent institutions.”\textsuperscript{287} In spite of the fact that a substantial portion of this political capacity was leveraged in direct support of rebel combatants, she points out that “local political capacity constituted a significant part of the FMLN’s military capacity.”\textsuperscript{288} With that said, little remained of rebel infrastructure after the conflict ended.

A part of this is due to the effective replacement of direct forms of social organization with ones controlled (at least in part) by actors other than the FMLN or its constituent organizations. The cooperative organizations which emerged during the war

\textsuperscript{285} Christine Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN,” *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War*, ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 37-41; their offer was not accepted.
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid. 121-131
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid. 121
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid. 124
continued to be important civil society actors after the war, but FMLN’s institutional presence was scant after 1986. This is not to say that the group did not participate in the emergent civil society as the war came to a close. For instance, the FMLN supported the legalization of the de facto transfers of property which took place during the conflict. Although they were not entirely successful, they were able to leverage both their military control of certain areas and the desire of landlords to get some sort of recompense for their lands as a means of making interim agreements with the government. While this can appear as hardly more than brute coercion, the fact that the FMLN was concerned about the legal face of the transfers suggests that they were operating as more than just an instrument for popular retribution.

There was some institutional residue after the conflict had ended, as well. Campesinos took to meeting in ERP headquarters to make plans for the transition. Additionally, the ERP “coordinated the founding of ‘public security commissions’” two months after the conflict had actually ended. This was to protect and keep the peace in occupied territories. While some might call this activity recalcitrance, the RAND corporation suggested that these sorts of local resources could be used to ensure that the transition period is as peaceful as possible. Unfortunately, this particular piece of advice went unheeded in favor of creating entirely new organizations for the job.

Aftermath

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289 Foley, “Laying the Groundwork,” 67-104
290 Wood, Insurgent Collective Action, 166-177; the growth of insurgent, self-governing collectives was encouraged by FMLN factions, but they were often the target of violent reprisals by government forces.
291 Ibid, 178-189; This was also a means of encouraging landlord support for a cessation of hostilities.
292 Ibid. 178-189
293 Ibid. 188
294 Toft, Securing the Peace, 81-90; This process took place over an incredibly short period of time, but there is a suggestion that indigenous capacity was used in the few weeks after the Accord came into being.
Although there was some doubt that what emerged from Chapultapec was indeed a democracy,\textsuperscript{295} El Salvador has democratized. The FMLN quickly organized itself as a political party after the war, although the group struggled with internal divisions and the emergence of other alternatives to the left of the government.	extsuperscript{296} However, in spite of this and its early electoral defeats, by 1997 it had established itself as by far the largest source of political opposition to the ARENA government. The post-rebellion FMLN was especially successful in local elections, though, securing a number of mayoral positions. The FMLN was unable to achieve the presidency until 2009,\textsuperscript{297} though, and its internal divisions and emphasis on global economic issues have made the party less of a galvanizing force than its wartime supporters likely imagined. FMLN’s struggles as a political party do not obscure El Salvador’s transformation though. In spite of persistent issues with crime, El Salvador is touted as a rousing success in post-civil war democratization.\textsuperscript{298}

**Sudan (1983-2005): Feedback Mechanisms + No Democratization**

**Policing and Justice: 2; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 1**

Sudan has faced near-constant civil war since its independence in 1956.\textsuperscript{299} Since independence, the government based in Khartoum has fought against rebels in the country’s southern regions.\textsuperscript{300} The conflict went into hiatus in 1972 with the Addis Ababa


\textsuperscript{296} Manning, *Making of Democrats*, 116-120, 134-137


\textsuperscript{298} Wade, “El Salvador,” 48-51


\textsuperscript{300} Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 116-129
Agreement. The peace was not to last, though, as non-Muslims chafed at Khartoum’s push to apply Sharia law throughout the country. In the face of this as well as profound economic inequalities, it is perhaps unsurprising that the conflict resumed.

The largest rebel actor during this chapter of the conflict was the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A), which began as a group of southern soldiers from the 105th Battalion who refused to disarm and relocate northward. One of their number—John Garang—quickly assumed leadership and the group began performing raids on the recently opened southern oil fields. The SPLM/A was able to hold territory and effectively repulse Sudanese incursions, even as the group itself suffered from fragmentation (predominantly along ethnic Dinka and Nuer lines). By 1989, the group had incorporated many similarly anti-government factions and controlled roughly two thirds of southern Sudan thanks to the substantial victories it had scored over governmental forces. The conflict was formally ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

SPLM/A Governance

The SPLM/A began as a group of soldiers. This has colored the group’s activities into the present day. However, the group began to concern itself with administering its controlled territory in 1989. It was then that the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation

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301 While the country’s northern regions had long been majority Muslim, the rise of conservative and political Islam was a novel development (see: Richard Cockett, *Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 67-83).
303 These ethnic divisions would continue to cause South Sudan problems after the conflict.
305 John Young, “Sudan: The Incomplete Transition from SPLA to SPLM,” *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War*, ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 157
306 Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers*, 144-148
Association (SRRA) was established to provide services in the absence of rebel provision. The SRRA’s relationship with the SPLM/A was supposed to be complementary but this did not come about. One reason is that the relationship was exploitative as well as cooperative. Another is that the SPLM/A endeavored to produce their own administration.

The SPLM/A was able to develop successful policing and justice functions. Pains were taken to establish new sets of laws and courts in SPLM/A controlled territory. As early as 1984, the group was developing a parallel legal authority, beginning with a military penal code. By 1985, the rebels had established their own courts.307 The penal code enforced strict discipline and meted out harsh punishments for mistreatment of civilians. Mampilly notes that this caused no small amount of dissension within the ranks, but it also limited abuses of the civilian population.308 This is particularly important given the domination of SPLM/A wartime administration by the military—even after substantial reforms in 1994—as there may have been temptation to allow rank-and-file solders to take advantage of the military’s status within southern Sudan. The reforms in 1994 brought with them substantial reforms of policing and justice functions, including allowed some villages to select their own chief to settle disputes between civilians. They continued to consolidate this system over the remainder of the conflict by cooperating with (or coopting) traditional sources of authority.309 This was critical as the SPLM/A was riven by ethnic resentments. It was also by far the most successful element of

307 Cherry Leonardi, *Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State*, (Rochester: James Currey, 2013), 175
309 Leonardi, *Dealing with Government*, 171-180
SPLM/A governance. The other modes, on the other hand, were fraught with shortcomings.

Public good provision was largely due to the efforts of NGOs such as the SRRA. While they operated within SPLM/A-controlled territory, the relationship was not simply a complementary one. The SPLM/A often directed the application of NGO efforts and the distribution of its funds, which often entailed enriching the rebels in addition to providing services. By 1994, the Civil Administration of New Sudan (CANS) was formalized and, in so doing, ostensibly removed the military from questions of civil administration. This did not lead to independence on the part of the NGOs engaged in providing services, though. CANS’s independence from the military was also nominal, not functional. As such, even though these reforms promoted improved service provision, the relationship between the SPLM/A and NGOs remained roughly the same as it had been previously.

Public good provision was uneven at best, especially with regards to education. This was hampered by the SPLA’s reliance upon child soldiers, furthering a reputation of being generally hostile to education. Making matters even more difficult, the SPLM/A (and the assisting NGOs) were effectively starting from nothing where schools and teachers were concerned. Even before the conflict, education in Southern Sudan was quite poor. CANS’s formalization helped to remedy this to a certain extent, although there remained vast disparities in provision within southern Sudan. While this was one element of administration that CANS actually contributed to, the teachers themselves were volunteers and the curricula were borrowed from those of neighboring countries.

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310 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 125, 132-137
311 Ibid. 141-145
Healthcare provision was also inconsistent—not to mention largely due to the efforts of NGOs. This, too was an artifact of Khartoum’s neglect of the territory SPLM/A would come to control.\(^\text{312}\) The rebels would staff many of the health centers which were established during wartime, but the funding would come entirely from NGOs. Indeed, Mampilly suggests that the decision to staff the medical centers has as much to do with controlling them as with providing health services. If anything, healthcare provision had less to do with the rebels than did education.

SPLM/A’s feedback mechanisms were impressive on paper. Their controlled territory had a four-tiered system of legislative councils, with popular elections and quotas to ensure the representativeness of the bodies.\(^\text{313}\) However, many SPLM/A figures saw these institutions as existing primarily on paper. Mampilly notes that candidates required executive approval by the SPLM/A, the legislative bodies only met sporadically. Mampilly suggests that these institutions existed purely so that the international community could see them. Given the degree to which the SPLM/A relied on foreign aid to buttress their civil administrative efforts, this is hardly surprising.

In practice, the aforementioned elected chiefs were the most important means of interacting with rebel leadership.\(^\text{314}\) However, even though the chiefs were elected, this process was not one with a great deal of contestation. Candidates were still judged on the basis of their hereditary claim to the position or by the internal politics among chiefs. In addition to the local chiefs, toward the end of the conflict local administrative government became an important means of participating for would-be South Sudanese.

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\(^\text{312}\) Ibid. 141-145
\(^\text{313}\) Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 92, 132
\(^\text{314}\) Leonardi, *Dealing with Government*, 158-163, 176-177, 184-185
By offering to serve in the fledgling local bureaucracies, southern Sudanese could help shape the emerging state’s regulatory environment.

**Consciousness**

The SPLM/A’s 1994 reforms were significant not just for what they accomplished but for how they accomplished it.\(^{315}\) In addition to establishing a political wing and civil administration, the reforms took place at the first SPLM/A National Convention. This allowed Garang to announce something of a political project and to begin to erode his image as an authoritarian. For instance, although it is unsurprising that he won his party’s leadership election handily, the convention also saw several votes for resolutions, suggesting that some degree of consultation was taking place at this convention, even if in actuality the SPLM/A remained effectively the projector of Garang’s ambitions.

Garang lacked the doctrinaire revolutionary philosophy which typifies other rebel leaders. John Young argues that this is unsurprising, noting that the would-be South Sudanese people were relatively difficult to politically mobilize.\(^ {316}\) The fiercely independent pastoralists had little use for a political project, and so the SPLM/A was under little pressure to provide one. This speaks to the limited degree to which the group attempted to cultivate a political culture during the conflict, as well as the lack of new developments after the war’s end. Reversing the direction of reforms form the 1994 reorganization, pre-independence reforms consolidated power in the national government and in its executive branch.\(^ {317}\) The presidency was strengthened at the expense of the

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316 Young, “Sudan: Incomplete Transition,” 162-163
317 LeRiche and Arnold, *South Sudan*, 152-157
legislative assembly. Specifically, the president was allowed to name new delegates thereto and suspend its activities in the event of a national emergency.

These developments become less shocking the closer one looks into the group’s feedback mechanisms. For instance, while chiefs were indeed elected, the SPLM/A often influenced their selection.318 Failing that, many chiefs were coopted after election by rebel leadership—not a difficult task given that chiefs began to collect salary in 1989.319 This combined with the aforementioned limitations on the chief selection process’s contestation suggest that this process was not meant to cultivate an active and participatory population.

Local administration was little better.320 Although some consultation took place in the late-developing local bureaucracies, they were also a haven for shielding illegal behavior and securing rents for activities. Leonardi notes that the chiefs were more useful interlocutors with rebel leadership.

Statebuilding

The SPLM/A may not have been entirely successful in every aspect, but it was successful in taking advantage of the governance structures which emerged during the conflict. Indeed, their wartime administration relied upon resources which were already present.321 While this speaks to the group’s efficiency with regards to resources, it may also speak to an unwillingness or inability to improve on the deeply flawed governance structures it produced during the conflict.

318 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 140-141
319 Leonardi, Dealing with Government, 184-185
320 Ibid. 158-159, 176-177
321 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 138-139
In spite of the inconsistent provision of public goods during the conflict, the wartime educational developments in Sudan had a substantial impact on postwar education in the country.\textsuperscript{322} One could argue that this is not necessarily a positive development—education provision was particularly inconsistent and heavily reliant upon foreign aid. As such, a pessimist might see this as the result of laziness or incompetence. The South Sudanese government did not develop new educational policies and instruments not because of how well the wartime ones performed, but because they were unable or unwilling to replace them.

Similarly, elements of the representative structures which emerged during the conflict carried over into the postwar context. While deeply flawed, LeRiche and Arnold note that the country’s debates regarding new democratic governmental institutions revealed that some believed that the feedback mechanisms within the SPLM/A may have been sufficient for their purposes.\textsuperscript{323} While this may suggest that the assemblies carried a certain symbolic importance for Sudanese democrats, it may also suggest that substantive democracy was not considered to be terribly important given the ineffectual nature of these assemblies.

\textbf{Aftermath}

South Sudan’s successful incorporation of wartime competencies has not isolated the SPLM from criticism in the postwar context. Indeed, it appears that popular support for the group—already not especially well-consolidated—began to buckle in the face of a transition administration dominated by military figures.\textsuperscript{324} While Garang might have had

\textsuperscript{322} LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}, 144-145
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid. 32-33, 113-116
\textsuperscript{324} Young, “Sudan: Incomplete Transition,” 172-173
the political capital to democratize South Sudanese administration if he had wanted to do so, his successor Salva Kiir appears to not. Instead, he has continued to empower the stronger military wing at the expense of the political one.

This failure may be due to a desire to maintain power, but it also might be driven by the tenuousness of his position. Kiir maintenance of undemocratic administration may be due to an unwillingness to challenge the SPLM’s military elite. This has not been entirely successful, although this is also due to the ethnic tensions that have simmered since the group’s genesis.\textsuperscript{325} In spite of efforts to defuse these tensions, the ostensibly non-ethnic SPLM/A was dominated by the Dinka people and continues to be so.\textsuperscript{326} These tensions combined with persistent economically-driven resentment catalyzed a new civil war in 2013 between the Dinka and non-Dinka (especially the Nuer).\textsuperscript{327}

It is fairly clear that by any appreciable measure, South Sudan did not emerge from its civil war a democracy.\textsuperscript{328} However, the democratic rhetoric of John Garang meant there was little controversy within South Sudan regarding whether or not to attempt to democratize.\textsuperscript{329} These were abortive attempts, though. Moreover, ethnic tensions continued to simmer between the Dinka and Nuer. These tensions—along with the continued dominance of the military wing of the SPLM/A over the political one—

\textsuperscript{325} Lere Amusan, “Germinating Seeds of Future Conflicts in South Sudan,” \textit{African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review} 4, No. 1 (2014), 120-133
\textsuperscript{326} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 139-141
\textsuperscript{327} Khalid Mustafa Medani, “‘Open for Business’: The Political Economy of Inter-Communal Conflict in South Sudan,” \textit{Middle East Report}, No. 269 (2013), 26-29
\textsuperscript{329} LeRiche and Arnold, \textit{South Sudan}, 32-33, 113-116
would ultimately produce a new civil war in 2013.\textsuperscript{330} With this new conflict, it seems that the new country has followed in its predecessor’s bloody footsteps.\textsuperscript{331}


\textbf{1975-1989: Policing and Justice: 2; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

\textbf{1989-1991: Policing and Justice: 2; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

\textbf{1992-1994: Policing and Justice: 1; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

\textbf{1998-2002: Policing and Justice: 1; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

The Angolan Civil War was fitfully fought over nearly three decades, predominantly between the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In spite of their shared adversary in their ex-colonial masters, Portugal, these groups (as well as the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA)) fought each other as well as colonial forces during Angola’s 14-year war for independence.\textsuperscript{332} The ascendant MPLA fashioned itself as a Leninist vanguard party after scoring major victories against both of its domestic opponents with the aid of their Cuban (and later, Soviet) patrons.\textsuperscript{333} UNITA and the FNLA had patrons themselves (South Africa (and later, the US) and Zaire, respectively), but these relationships could not bring the former victory nor could it save the latter from defeat.

\textsuperscript{330} Clemence Pinaud, “South Sudan: Civil War, Predation, and the making of a Military Aristocracy,” \textit{African Affairs} 113, No. 451 (2014), 192-193


\textsuperscript{332} Tony Hodges, \textit{Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, 2nd Ed.} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 6-9

Save a two-month hiccup in 1989 thanks to the Gbadolite declaration’s ceasefire,\textsuperscript{334} the first of several of the civil war’s “endings” took place in May of 1991, when the MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Accords.\textsuperscript{335} This agreement was supposed to facilitate Angola’s democratization, and while elections were indeed held in 1992, neither democracy nor peace emerged in their wake.\textsuperscript{336} UNITA accused the MPLA of rigging the vote—which showed the incumbents to be the victors. Because UNITA’s fighters were largely still armed and because the executive election was winner-take-all, it is perhaps unsurprising that Jonas Savimbi (UNITA’s leader and presidential candidate) rejected the results; absent a power-sharing agreement, one could argue he had little to gain by accepting them.\textsuperscript{337}

The renewed conflict was short-lived. With the Lusaka Protocol signed in 1994, the war was technically over, even as UNITA maintained control over a substantial portion of its previously-held territory.\textsuperscript{338} Interestingly, it was the MPLA that reinitiated hostilities in 1998 in response to (among other things) the rebels’ recalcitrance and the international community’s inability to effectively encourage compliance. The war came to its final close in 2002 after Savimbi’s death, although the manner of the war’s ending is a matter of some disagreement. Hartzell codes the case as a negotiated settlement,\textsuperscript{339} while Monica Toft codes it as a truce.\textsuperscript{340} To make matters even less clear, Tony Hodges

\textsuperscript{335} Hodges, \textit{Anatomy of an Oil State}, 11-14
\textsuperscript{336} Karl Maier, \textit{Angola: Promises and Lies}, (Rivonia: William Waterman Publications, 1996), 74-78
\textsuperscript{338} Hodges, \textit{Anatomy of an Oil State}, 14-18
\textsuperscript{339} Hartzell, “Mixed Motives”
\textsuperscript{340} Toft, \textit{Securing the Peace}, 170
asserts that the settlement was negotiated because UNITA had suffered “virtual military
defeat.”

UNITA Governance

UNITA’s rebel governance is a success story in many ways, even as the conflict itself was notoriously brutal. The group was able to create and administer a de facto state within a state in the areas it controlled. UNITA rebels were able to effectively enforce a monopoly on the use of force within their controlled territories which extended to the residents in these territories. In addition to the domestic security UNITA offered, discipline among the ranks in these territories was taken seriously. Indeed, the security UNITA was to be seen to provide was a key element of Savimbi’s strategy in attracting domestic support.

The policing and justice functions themselves were fairly well organized, although their application could border on arbitrary. Savimbi was known to personally order UNITA elements to take brutal punitive measures against individuals within the group who he suspected of disloyalty. Even absent Savimbi’s paranoid and vengeful whims, UNITA justice erred on the side of brutality, especially when UNITA was losing territory to MPLA advances during the 1990s.

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341 Hodges, *Anatomy of an Oil State*, 18
342 Terrence Lyons, *Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 42-43
345 Pearce, *Political Identity and Conflict*, 114-115, 146-147
The provision of public goods was similarly successful. Education was arguably even more essential to UNITA’s self-depiction than security. The group’s leadership saw political education as critical to establish their narrative as provider and protector in the minds of the population. The practical training that was most readily available in UNITA’s schools was similarly oriented to benefit the rebels themselves. It takes little imagination to consider the benefits UNITA could glean from providing training in medicine, agriculture, and engineering.

Medicine was similarly forthcoming. As was the case with education, medicine (and food, for that matter) was provided free of charge in UNITA-controlled areas. UNITA hospitals were not staffed or supplied up to modern standards, with anesthesia in especially short supply, but most controlled areas had some sort of UNITA-run health facility. The rebels did require that residents contribute to the war effort (which included the provision of these services), but UNITA also took pains to place themselves at the center of this system. It might rely upon contributions from the local population, but UNITA made sure that population saw the rebels as responsible for these services.

The same cannot be said for the group’s feedback mechanisms. Savimbi claimed to support democratization, but his actions suggest that this was more a means of attracting support from the US in its opposition to the Soviet Union and communism in

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347 Pearce, *Political Identity and Conflict*, 103-111
349 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 100
350 Pearce, “Control, Politics, and Identity,” 457-459
general. UNITA’s leader may have sold himself as a democrat, but his actions and the organization of his group paint him as a populist autocrat. Moreover, the administration of the liberated areas suggest that he was more interested in taking care of his supporters needs so that they would not need to provide feedback. After all, why bother registering dissent if one has no problems with one’s government? There were, however, some individuals who were recruited and tasked with improving the administration and provision within controlled territories, similar to what emerged in Sri Lanka. However, this was primarily instrumental. They would identify someone as having a certain proficiency and put that person to work, often without the consent of that person.

The party congresses are a different matter. Although nominally impressive, the wartime party congresses did little besides reaffirm the group’s commitment to negotiating an end to the conflict (in the presence of foreign observers, no less). The national party congresses sent representatives from the villages, suggesting that UNITA’s rhetoric supporting democracy holds a bit of water. However, the impact of these conferences suggest that they were more for Savimbi’s aggrandizement than encouraging interaction. For instance, the fourth conference saw debate calling for latitude for subordinates to criticize military commanders’ decisions. However, once decisions

355 Pearce, *Political Identity*, 103-106, 111
356 Ibid. 60-61, 100-103, 146-147
359 Bridgland, *Key to Africa*, 249-254
were made, those further down the chain of command—be they soldier or civilian—would be bound by them.\textsuperscript{360} Functionally, this meant that not only was civil society extremely constrained, but dissent—or the suggestion of dissent—was sufficient to merit punishment.\textsuperscript{361} The dissent need not be

Justin Pearce’s interviews were particularly illuminating here, and not just with regards to the party’s actions. One interview with a priest who lived in UNITA-controlled Jamba revealed that not only were atrocities committed by soldiers hand-waved away as being the inevitable result of war, but that “freedom of opinion in war is a utopia.”\textsuperscript{362} This suggests that for all its trappings of proto-democracy, UNITA cared very little for the input of its would-be citizens. This seems to reflect accounts of Savimbi’s behavior. UNITA’s longtime leader conducted frequent purges against rivals, real and imagined,\textsuperscript{363} in order to root out dissent and reinforce his power.\textsuperscript{364}

**Consciousness**

While UNITA clearly sought to have the population in its territory rely upon them, that appears to have been the extent of their concern for developing a politically active base of domestic support.\textsuperscript{365} This appears to have been their purported basis for legitimacy—UNITA framed itself as an instrument of provision (as did the MPLA-controlled state).\textsuperscript{366} A population does not need political consciousness to recognize a

\textsuperscript{360} James, *Political History*, 100-101
\textsuperscript{361} Pearce, *Political Identity*, 112-117
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid. 112-113
\textsuperscript{363} Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena, *Mexico is not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenges of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 168-170
\textsuperscript{365} Pearce, *Political Identity*, 111
\textsuperscript{366} Pearce, “Control, Politics and Identity,” 443
protector and provider, whether or not that protector/provider sprinkles democracy into its rhetoric. Indeed, Savimbi appealed to his authenticity as an exponent of Angolan national interests. He may have promulgated his image as a democrat, but it figured into the defense of his leadership as an image only. The more substantial elements were based on authentic Angolan-ness and his ability to protect and provide for his people.\footnote{Ibid. 457-459}

Although some may point to the enormous turnout of the 1992 elections (over 90\%\footnote{Steve Kibble and Alex Vines, “Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?” Review of African Political Economy 28, No. 90 (2001), 544} as evidence of consciousness-building on the part of the rebels, this is somewhat suspect. For instance, Savimbi’s loss in the first round of the presidential election was rejected by UNITA out of hand, in spite of the UN’s pronouncement that they were relatively free and fair.\footnote{Marina Ottaway, “Angola’s Failed Elections,” Postconflict Elections, Democratization & International Assistance, ed. Krishna Kumar, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 138-143} To be fair, this may have been instrumental. After all, Savimbi had resisted any efforts to establish a power-sharing agreement with the MPLA. Additionally, the results themselves were a bit of a surprise,\footnote{Susan H. Broadhead, Historical Dictionary of Angola, 2nd Ed. (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 1992), 180-181} so perhaps the assertion that they must be tainted might ring less hollow at least among UNITA’s leadership. However, Savimbi and UNITA’s decision to reject the election results speaks not only to an authoritarian streak\footnote{Alex Vines, “Beyond Savimbi,” The World Today 58, No. 4 (2002), 14-15} but also to a deeper disinterest in empowering the would-be citizens under its charge.

The group may have taken pains to educate these would-be citizens in UNITA’s purported political project,\footnote{Pearce, Political Identity and Conflict, 103-106} the actual civil society that emerged in its controlled
territory was extremely constricted.\textsuperscript{373} Even the suggestion of dissent was dealt with harshly, and Savimbi’s efforts to cultivate something of a society within his controlled territory seems to be entirely oriented toward the twin goals of supporting the war effort and convincing his would-be citizens that political activity (beyond supporting UNITA) is unnecessary. This sort of paternalistic relationship reflects the traditional notion of the distinctly non-democratic “Hunter King” which Savimbi appears to have deliberately sought to embody. This entity appears to be a sort of Hobbesian leviathan, justified in using whatever violent means necessary in a crisis to restore order.\textsuperscript{374} This is further highlighted by the group’s stubborn refusal to transform into a peacetime political party until Savimbi’s death.\textsuperscript{375}

It is possible to argue that the democratic rhetoric reflected similar ambitions during the first iteration of the conflict. After all, the party conferences represented something of a forum, at least early in the conflict and for those chosen to attend, to air grievances.\textsuperscript{376} The lack of manifestations beyond this apparently ineffectual demonstration suggests otherwise,\textsuperscript{377} and the group’s organization and hierarchy further suggests that the only “feedback” Savimbi was interested in was support for him and his leadership.\textsuperscript{378} Even if UNITA was engaged in the consciousness-building project, these

\textsuperscript{373} Kibble and Vines, “Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?” 539-544
\textsuperscript{374} Jutta Bakonyi and Kristi Stuvøy, “Violence & Social Order beyond the State: Somalia & Angola,” \textit{Review of African Political Economy} 32, No. 104/105 (2005), 368-372; The authors also mention the notion of the more democratic “Blacksmith King” and note that both notions would be culturally salient in post-colonial Angola.
\textsuperscript{375} Terrence, \textit{Demilitarizing Politics}, 103-104, 130-131
\textsuperscript{376} Bridgland, \textit{Key to Africa}, 249-254
\textsuperscript{377} Pearce, \textit{Political Identity and Conflict}, 93-106
\textsuperscript{378} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 100
ambitions evaporated as the conflict went on, and Savimbi’s vicious treatment of would-be rivals suggests that there was not anything there to begin with.

Statebuilding

Although UNITA’s administrative project was remarkable in many ways, it had been liquidated by the final end of the conflict in 2002. In fact, many highlight that the administration had effectively collapsed by the beginning of the war’s final phase in 1998 and some even note that it had begun to falter during the post-election fighting. Unsurprisingly, the collapse seems to have been driven by the MPLA’s successful campaigns on UNITA positions, with service provision failing shortly before UNITA vacates its controlled territory.

From the perspective of the statebuilding hypothesis, this is especially unfortunate as UNITA had achieved parity with the MPLA government in terms of administering its territory. As such, Angola would have been a golden opportunity to see if functioning administration could be built atop rebel governance structures. This is especially unfortunate given that in the run up to the war’s final chapter, a substantial portion of UNITA’s administrative project remained functional. Alas, by the time Savimbi was killed, little remained of his ambitious statebuilding project.

Aftermath

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380 Paul, Clarke, and Serena, *Mexico is not Colombia*, 168-170
381 Bakonyi and Stuvey, “Violence & Social Order,” 369-370
382 Maier, *Promises and Lies*, 194-201
One could be forgiven for believing that Savimbi’s death in 2002 gave way to a steady march toward democracy. Angola’s polity scores would certainly point in that direction.\textsuperscript{385} There are some developments which give this credence. However, neither Vreeland’s x-polity interpretation of the polity data\textsuperscript{386} nor Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s dichotomous measure agree.\textsuperscript{387} The former might be able to be explained as an artifact of Vreeland’s alterations (namely, they remove polity’s ability to measure legislative institutions). The latter should be more concerning.

It seems that while elections did indeed take place, there were a number of issues therewith. In addition to some irregularities regarding voter rolls,\textsuperscript{388} the MPLA was able to effectively constrain debate in the years following the conflict. The MPLA was able to do so using its control of state media.\textsuperscript{389} Not only did this crowd out dissenting voices (and make campaigning excruciatingly difficult for opposition parties), but it also allowed the group to frame itself as the sole provider of Angola’s substantial peace dividend. As such, the group has been able to maintain not only control of the presidency, but also uninterrupted control of Angola’s legislature.\textsuperscript{390}


\textsuperscript{389} Pearce, *Political Identity*, 159-173.

\textsuperscript{390} The most recent elections were held in August of 2017 and elicited new complaints of foul play by opposition parties (see: “Angola elections: Ruling MPLA wins parliamentary vote,” *Al Jazeera*, 25 Aug 2017 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/170825124719728.html (accessed February 9, 2018)).
Policing and Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

While Mozambique remains deeply troubled politically, its civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO presaged a remarkable democratization. And yet, RENAMO appeared profoundly inept in rebel governance and not especially interested in changing. Upon examination, though, Mozambique’s democratization does not run as directly in opposition to the theory’s mechanisms as it first appears.

War with Portugal

Hartzell’s dataset, following COW’s coding strictures, states that a civil war was fought between FRELIMO and RENAMO between 1982 and 1992. However, this took place shortly after Mozambique won its independence from its Portuguese colonial masters. The war resembled the Salvadoran Civil War in some ways, but differed on two important counts. First, the Salvadoran Civil War was a civil war, and FRELIMO’s war with Portugal was a colonial one. Second, the catalysts of the conflicts were different; where Salvadoran mobilization began with parish priests teaching a gospel of political liberation, Mozambican anti-colonialism stemmed from expatriates and politically engaged students.

The similarities are more meaningful, though. For some time after anti-colonialism coalesced into the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), their efforts were limited to geographically remote areas and were less than effective. It was not

391 Mozambique remains at a sub-democracy Polity IV score and observers have noted problems with procedures and institutions. However, Boix et al’s measure lists it as a democracy as of 1994.
393 Margaret Hall, and Tom Young, Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997), 11-23
until the Portuguese authorities opted to enact a policy of scorched earth\textsuperscript{394} that much of the population began to support FRELIMO’s efforts. By the 1970’s, the tide had turned and FRELIMO was operating near the country’s geographic (and economic) center. Allen and Barbara Isaacman note that the rebels, due to increased popular support and access to Soviet and Chinese provided arms, had consolidated their control of northern Mozambique and had begun to operate in the southern regions as early as 1972. Margaret Hall and Tom Young further note that by this time, Portugal’s considerable forces were nearly entirely deployed in defensive positions, suggesting that they knew the war would ultimately end in defeat.\textsuperscript{395}

Even if this was the Portuguese position (and, at least among the military and intelligence communities, it was), the swiftness with which the end came was surprising, even given the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship.\textsuperscript{396} In the wake of the Carnation Revolution in April of 1974, FRELIMO and the remaining colonialist forces escalated their engagements with one another.\textsuperscript{397} The rebels expected a pitched battle against remnants of the regime as they believed that the collapse of Estado Novo would not meaningfully impact the situation in Mozambique (at least not immediately).\textsuperscript{398} In spite of this momentary ramping up of hostilities, plummeting morale and increasing Portuguese domestic opposition to colonial wars ultimately led to their willingness to grant independence.

\textsuperscript{394} Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, \textit{Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982}, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 100, 105-107
\textsuperscript{395} Hall and Young, \textit{Confronting Leviathan}, 23-25
\textsuperscript{396} Ibid. 35
\textsuperscript{397} Hanlon, \textit{Revolution Under Fire}, 43-45
\textsuperscript{398} Isaacman and Isaacman, \textit{Colonialism to Revolution}, 106-107
The auspices of independence were contested, though. In spite of its central role in the war itself, FRELIMO was not the only group vying for the right to represent post-colonial Mozambique. The Armed Forces Movement which had precipitated the revolution in Portugal proposed a role both for post-colonialist Portugal and anti-FRELIMO political forces, both of which FRELIMO rejected out of hand. Indeed, the protests from anti-FRELIMO forces, especially the radical, racially white group Frente Independente Convergência Ocidental (FICO, or “I stay” in Portuguese) only galvanized FRELIMO’s insistence that Portugal hand control of the country over to it explicitly.

RENAMO’s Genesis

The transition was not an easy one. FICO in particular was demonstrative, even violent in their protest of FRELIMO’s ascension to power. Their “Dragoons of Death” instigated a brief revolt in reaction to September’s Lusaka Agreement (which ended the war and set June 25, 1975 as the date when the state would be handed to FRELIMO). This, in turn, stoked racial tensions, leading to massive (and deadly) protests and riots, only brought to a halt by a concerted cooperative effort on the part of Portuguese forces and FRELIMO. FRELIMO’s leadership attempted to assuage racial tensions by appealing to class-oriented cleavages recalling exploitation, but by the time that Mozambique was officially independent, over half of the white population had fled.

Not all who fled at the prospect of FRELIMO’s impending reign were disaffected white workers, though. Many had been paratroops (GEP’s), anti-guerilla commandos, or

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399 Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, 36-43
400 Isaacman and Isaacman, *Colonialism to Revolution*, 106-107
402 Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, 43-49
403 Hanlon, *Revolution Under Fire*, 45
404 Ibid. 219-220
members of Pide (the colonial secret police). Using the weapons they had on hand, many forced their way across the border to what was then Rhodesia. Upon FRELIMO’s decision to employ economic sanctions against the country, the then Mozambican National Resistance Movement (MNR) began raiding areas close to the border in Mozambique at the behest of their Rhodesian patrons. This suggests that the armed conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO (which became the MNR’s new name in 1983) actually began before Hartzell—and thus COW—codes the civil war as having properly begun.

The first evidence of such comes from the fact that these early incursions happened in March of 1976, less than a year after Mozambican independence. While these operations likely represent sub-war violence, they are substantial enough that other datasets code the civil war as beginning in 1976. Toft codes the war as having begun then for the purposes of her large-N study, as does Mampilly for his analysis. Indeed FRELIMO and the MNR had clashed several times prior to 1982, with FRELIMO forces succeeding in killing its leader André Matsangaissa in 1979 and capturing major bases in 1980.

Between 1979 and 1982, the MNR relied on South Africa for critical support. Indeed, once Rhodesia withdrew its support at the end of the 1970’s, it appeared that the group might dissolve. However, FRELIMO had little control in Mozambique’s southern

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407 Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 9-10, Appendix 1; this is especially interesting, as she adopts the COW threshold for battle deaths in her definition of a civil war.
408 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 74, 103-104
409 The Uppsala Conflict Database lists 1978 as the first engagement with substantial casualties.
410 Hanlon, *Revolution Under Fire*, 221-228
regions, even by then.\textsuperscript{411} This allowed South Africa to resuscitate the group to the point where it could carry out raids and economic sabotage within Mozambican borders.\textsuperscript{412} Eventually, the MNR was able to hold substantial territory within the country.

**RENAMO Governance (or, “RENAMO Governance?”)**

At its height, RENAMO claimed to control between 80 and 85\% of Mozambique. Moreover, American journalists had been taken to RENAMO’s liberated zones to demonstrate the rebels’ success in administering their territory.\textsuperscript{413} It was reported that the standard of living was so high that FRELIMO had urged civilians to take advantage of RENAMO’s schools and clinics. It appears that this was nothing more than a ruse. Multiple sources refer to the 80\% figure as nonsensical,\textsuperscript{414} and outsiders found little evidence outside of these carefully curated visits that RENAMO’s administration brought with it any tangible benefits to the population in these “liberated zones.”\textsuperscript{415}

Governance in RENAMO née MNR territory was sparse at best. This, in part, stems from the fact that the group possessed little political sophistication and similarly little desire to improve on this point.\textsuperscript{416} They have been described as an apolitical force, which would explain this apathy. Their interest was primarily (at least during the war) in controlling territory and extracting goods necessary to the war effort.\textsuperscript{417}

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\textsuperscript{411} Isaacman and Isaacman, *Colonialism to Revolution*, 106-107
\textsuperscript{412} Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, 121-130; South African leadership, well-aware of how important it was economically to Mozambique, wished to coerce them into recognizing the South African state officially. As South Africa enforced policies of Apartheid, this was, unsurprisingly, impossible.
\textsuperscript{413} Alex Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 75-76
\textsuperscript{415} Vines, *RENAMO*, 74-77
\textsuperscript{417} Finnegan, *Complicated War*, 66-67
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This acquisitiveness lead to the development of something approximating a system of taxation, but only as a means of extraction. Areas which were of little strategic import were subject to this taxation, but the population itself received nothing but the absence of violence on the part of the rebels in return.\footnote{Vines, \textit{RENA MO}, 91-96} Other areas were not so lucky. Areas designated for “control” saw the impressing of populations as a source of unpaid labor.\footnote{Hilary Anderson, \textit{Mozambique: A War Against the People}, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 62-65} There was also a third category of administration known as “destruction,” but as the name suggests, RENAMO’s activities in these areas consisted of killing as many people as possible and taking the rest to work in control areas. Beyond this, it appears that they had little interest in governing.

What little interest RENAMO did have in governing—rather than simply ruling or controlling—manifested as support for traditional forms of law and authority.\footnote{Juan Obarrio, \textit{The Spirit of the Laws in Mozambique}, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 48} FRELIMO’s revolutionary agenda sought to marginalize (or indeed, eliminate) traditional sources of authority. Whether RENAMO’s support for these stems from genuine support for traditional sources of authority or as a means to coopt resistance to FRELIMO policies, Mampilly notes that RENAMO offered little input beyond their support.\footnote{Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 103-104}

This preference for traditional authority was not reflected by the “party’s” supposed ideology. Its “Manifest and Programme” from 1982 calls for free and fair multi-party elections, equal protection under the law, respect for international norms and organizations, and free enterprise.\footnote{Vines, \textit{RENA MO}, 76-80} While these declarations appear purpose-built to
attract American support (particularly in opposition to FRELIMO who remained committed to Leninist scientific socialism\textsuperscript{423}, this support was not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{424}

Healthcare and education policies were similarly hard to come by, as were feedback mechanisms.\textsuperscript{425} Their provision was limited to rhetoric until international pressure forced RENAMO to employ superficial measures. Even when they did, rather than enlisting labor to provide these goods, labor was impressed.\textsuperscript{426} This did little to make RENAMO effective rebel rulers. Indeed, it barely prepared them to be a political party. However, there were some benefits to this political consolidation.\textsuperscript{427} While precious few actual outcomes were secured by RENAMO’s “civil service,” their enlarged political class allowed the few teachers that existed within the organization to try and return to teaching. With that said, it would be disingenuous to describe RENAMO’s public good provision as effective.

Feedback mechanisms were entirely absent, as was—for most of the conflict—anything resembling a political project. That said, after 1986, RENAMO began to spend resources formalizing its political project, albeit to little effect. Between 1986 and 1989, the rebel group invested resources trying to develop a political wing that had, up until that point, existed in name only.\textsuperscript{428} 1989 saw the first RENAMO party conference, in which the political structure which had been coalescing was formalized. Interestingly, the rhetorical content that emerged from the congress was unchanged from the party’s

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\textsuperscript{423} Chris Alden, \textit{Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State}, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 8-9
\textsuperscript{424} Anderson, \textit{War against the People}, 46-47
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid. 103-104
\textsuperscript{427} Ibid. 95-99
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid. 91-97
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manifesto from 1981, reflecting (if anything) the party’s lassitude in terms of political
development. It is noteworthy that this development was not terribly organic, but at least
personnel resources were being attracted to join rather than kidnapped and impressed.

**Consciousness**

RENAMO may have developed a political program by the end of the conflict, but
it did not contribute to the political actorship of the people living in its controlled
territory. A part of this was due to the group’s general lack of political sophistication\(^\text{429}\) and relative lack of political cadres\(^\text{430}\). Where FRELIMO had cultivated a substantial
political class, RENAMO relied on a very small group even years after the conflict’s end
(which would ultimately sow dissension between RENAMO’s representatives and its
leadership). During the conflict, the relationship between fighters and civilians was one
of adversaries. RENAMO fighters may have stayed where they fought but they rarely
fought where they were from. The rebel group sought to encourage loyalty within the
ranks by discouraging connections with the populace in this way\(^\text{431}\). This meant that even
as some RENAMO political cadres had developed by the end of the conflict, the fighters
themselves felt little kinship with the civilians around them—and vice versa. This apathy
toward relations between governor and governed extended to the traditional authorities
they claimed to support. RENAMO fighters and commanders would undermine the


traditional sources of authority they had resuscitated as a means of undermining
FRELIMO if they had any reason to do so.\textsuperscript{432}

This contrasts with the group’s rhetoric, but Jeremy Weinstein argues that there is
a very clear logic to it.\textsuperscript{433} He argues that RENAMO pushed for democracy at the national
level, not on the local level. Indeed, the traditional sources of authority the group
supported were not necessarily democratic to begin with. This suggests that democracy
for the group was a far-off ideal, perhaps to attract international support, not something
which would inform their activities as rebels.

\textbf{Statebuilding}

Although they did eventually begin trying to provide some health and educational
services in 1988,\textsuperscript{434} the group had so little tangible infrastructure involved with
governance to begin with that RENAMO’s contribution to postwar statebuilding could
hardly be anything but negligible. Moreover, although RENAMO fighters lived where
they fought, they were separate from civilians to further emphasize the difference
between the two groups.\textsuperscript{435} Thus, the best-case scenario for many living in RENAMO-
controlled territory was neglect. The worst-case scenario was destroying what was there
to begin with.\textsuperscript{436}

This makes some degree of sense. The Mozambican state was fragile to begin
with,\textsuperscript{437} and RENAMO was a war-fighting organization before it was a popular one. The
notion of actually doing anything beyond fighting FRELIMO in the field and extracting

\textsuperscript{432} Weinstein, \textit{Inside Rebellion}, 182-186
\textsuperscript{433} Ibid. 182-184
University Press, 2007), 186
\textsuperscript{435} Daly, \textit{Organized Violence}, 240-243
\textsuperscript{436} Anderson, \textit{A War Against the People}, 62-65
\textsuperscript{437} Hall, “Destruction of an African Country,” 60-61
resources and personnel from the population came about several years after the fighting had begun. While most rebel governance structures do not survive into the postwar era, one could argue that RENAMO did not have any to begin with.

**Alternative Explanation: FRELIMO as a rebel group?**

Although the case that FRELIMO during its war for independence should be treated as a rebel group has not been made up until this point, they nevertheless were able to achieve a substantial level of governance within their controlled territories (especially in the north) during their war with Portugal. This is somewhat surprising given how much effort FRELIMO had to expend on feeding the populace of their controlled territories from the beginning. In the wake of Portuguese scorched earth tactics, many Mozambican peasants had fled in search of FRELIMO, meaning that organizing peasant production in rebel-controlled territories took precedence over governance.

With that said, Mampillian modalities of governance emerged relatively quickly. Law and order in controlled territories is difficult to prove from the historical record, as histories of the conflict emphasize defensive measures against colonialist forces. This is understandable, as a substantial portion of what FRELIMO considered its territory still had a noteworthy colonialist presence, meaning that defending against colonialists took precedence over matters of justice and law enforcement. With that said, FRELIMO emphasized discipline of its personnel in relation to their charges. From where the authority to actually apply this discipline came is something of an open question. While authority was technically in the hands of FRELIMO and their agents, many traditional

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439 Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, 32
chiefs retained their prewar positions so long as they paid lip service to their rebel caretakers.\footnote{Isaacman and Isaacman, \textit{Colonialism to Revolution}, 89-91}

There is much more evidence that FRELIMO was successful in providing public goods. Hall and Young point out that the rebel group established schools and regional hospitals by the end of the conflict.\footnote{Hall and Young, \textit{Confronting Leviathan}, 32-34} While health provision was ultimately relatively advanced, with centers staffed by graduates of FRELIMO-established nursing schools, this grew out of a peculiar practice that began when FRELIMO began to try to provide for Mozambicans fleeing colonial reprisals. The earliest FRELIMO “health service” was little more than combat medics giving check-ups.\footnote{Hanlon, \textit{Revolution Under Fire}, 29-31}

Most importantly, FRELIMO’s struggle against Portugal saw the development of impressive feedback mechanisms. While postwar FRELIMO became increasingly illiberal, uncreative, and unrepresentative, wartime FRELIMO was substantially more tolerant of participation. Indeed, FRELIMO commanders organized weekly meetings in controlled territories in order to elect regional new village leadership, set policies regarding sanctioned behavior, and organize production.\footnote{Isaacman and Isaacman, \textit{Colonialism to Revolution}, 91-95} While there was substantial opposition to FRELIMO’s experiments with collectivization that was ultimately ignored, it appears that the commanders assented to most of the decisions that came from these meetings.

There is some question as to whether or not FRELIMO should be considered as rebel governors, though. Although FRELIMO and RENAMO engaged in some form or fashion as early as March of 1976, it is difficult to argue that the casualties from these
engagements are sufficient to depict their pre-1982 conflict as a civil war.\textsuperscript{445} Moreover, the difference between colonial and civil wars is not incidental—in spite of certain similarities, there are good reasons that people who research civil wars treat them as separate phenomena. Finally, in spite of FRELIMO’s governance, independent Mozambique was a largely illiberal place. This calls into question whether post-colonial FRELIMO can be said to have contributed to feedback mechanisms in Mozambique—indeed, it might be more accurate to say that the party undermined their effectiveness.

FRELIMO’s third party conference in 1977 formalized their place as a Leninist vanguard party, at the expense of their wartime popular democracy.\textsuperscript{446} The party’s leadership saw their role not merely as a catalyst to consciousness, but also as a mediator of that consciousness. This meant that it would be the party, not the population, which would determine the course of independent Mozambique’s development. Regional and local assemblies continued to operate at some level thereafter, but it would be on the party’s terms.\textsuperscript{447} Opposition and dissent was met with calls for re-education instead of debate, and ultimately large sectors of the population harbored hostilities to their new leaders.

While this Leninist turn may have been borne out of a desire among leadership to consolidate its domestic position to deter the international threat from Rhodesia,\textsuperscript{448} FRELIMO appears to have neglected an opportunity to democratize. In doing so, it undermined the feedback mechanisms which had functioned during wartime. Although

\textsuperscript{445} Hanlon, \textit{Revolution Under Fire}, 232-233; FRELIMO did not appear to consider RENAMO as anything more than bandits at this point.
\textsuperscript{446} Ibid. 121-140
\textsuperscript{447} Manning, \textit{Politics of Peace}, 50-55
\textsuperscript{448} Isaacman and Isaacman, \textit{Colonialism to Revolution}, 146
the other functions carried over into post-independence Mozambique as well, they remained quite flimsy, ultimately contributing to the decision by the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO to make peace with the country’s religious communities as a means of inspiring unity.\textsuperscript{449}

This was just the tip of the iceberg. FRELIMO’s leader Joaquim Alberto Chissano had been pushing for a reversal of the Leninist turn as soon as he became the group’s leader in 1986.\textsuperscript{450} This culminated in the summer of 1989, when the 5\textsuperscript{th} party congress saw the removal of all references to Marxism, Leninism, and the Soviet Union. The season also saw the announcement that all Soviet advisors would leave the country within two years. This turn also coincided with the overtures that would ultimately lead the conflict’s end. Although FRELIMO did not entirely do away with its bureaucratic, unrepresentative character, this was an important development to its postwar transformation.

This turn may have been strategic, but it was also meant to diminish (or at the very least fundamentally change) the party’s domination of Mozambican government.\textsuperscript{451} In addition to softening the party’s doctrinaire economic stances, the period between 1986 and 1989 were devoted to rejuvenating political education and encouraging debate and criticism within party ranks. The legal system was also, to use Hall and Young’s terminology, “civilianized,” leading to the Revolutionary Military Tribunal’s abolition and concomitant release of some 1,000 individuals held because of its operation.\textsuperscript{452} The transition also appeared to open the possibility that FRELIMO would transition from The

\textsuperscript{449} Hall, “Destruction of an African Country,” 60-61
\textsuperscript{450} Hall and Young, \textit{Confronting Leviathan}, 199-203
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid. 200-205
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid. 203
Party to a party, although this may have been due in part to the clear advantage the party held over its RENAMO adversaries in terms of political sophistication.

While one who hoped that FRELIMO would transform into a center-left political party would be disappointed by this incomplete transition, it is important to note that this turn is in many ways a return to pre-independence politics. FRELIMO was not originally so averse to consultation and debate, even once it had begun to develop a Marxist-Leninist character. That debate was intended to take place within the party’s auspices, however, highlighting some of the contradictions in the party’s early aspirations. Hillary Anderson sums up these contradictions when she notes that President Samora Machel wanted to “have his cake and eat it: he wanted to stir the people’s emotions, excite their hopes, awaken their hatreds to incite them to revolution, but at the same time to keep them in line.” Ultimately, keeping people in line took precedence, but the mobilizing project may have laid the groundwork for FRELIMO’s partial transition.

Aftermath

The postwar elections were held in 1994, which secured legislative and presidential victories for the incumbent FRELIMO, albeit not to the degree which the party’s hardline had expected. RENAMO’s leadership cried foul as well, although they did so throughout the process. They also announced that they would not participate in the elections on the eve of the elections themselves. After the UN Secretary General and the presidents of South Africa and Zimbabwe attempted to cajole Dhlakama, the elections

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453 Anderson, War Against the People, 26-45
454 Ibid. 27
went ahead anyway. Dhlakama, displeased with the results, claimed the results were fraudulent.\footnote{\citenum{55} J. Michael Turner, Sue Nelson, and Kimberley Mahling-Clark, \textit{“Mozambique’s Vote for Democratic Governance,”} \textit{Postconflict Elections, Democratization, & International Assistance}, ed. Krishna Kumar, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 158-163}

The aforementioned rift between RENAMO’s leadership and its legislators emerged in part due to the amount of consensus that emerged within the legislature. Making matters worse, their attempts at decentralizing authority appear to have not been effective in empowering local, popularly accountable actors.\footnote{\citenum{56} Ibid. 163-169} It is likely that there would be bitter resentment within the fledgling political party whatever emerged from the early legislative sessions, though. The group struggled mightily to act as a political party,\footnote{\citenum{57} Manning, \textit{Politics of Peace}, 103-107} meaning that a member outside of the political class might view a RENAMO legislator as an outsider. This lack of political sophistication was picked up on by FRELIMO as well. Before the elections, the incumbents argued that RENAMO was not a proper political party.\footnote{\citenum{58} Manning, \textit{“RENAMO’s Electoral Success,”} 60-64}

Regardless of these struggles, Mozambique has made the transition to something resembling democracy. However, in spite of RENAMO’s gradual growth as a competent political party,\footnote{\citenum{59} Manning, \textit{The Making of Democrats}, 63-71} FRELIMO has dominated electoral politics since the war’s end, particularly since 2004.\footnote{\citenum{60} Yonatan L. Morse, \textit{“From Single-Party to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Institutional Origins of Competitiveness in Post-Cold War Africa,”} \textit{Comparative Politics} 48, No. 1 (2015), 126-143} One would likely need to see this long-dominant party cede control in the face of election losses for one to say that a complete transition to democracy has taken place.

Discussion
The consciousness hypothesis finds confirmation and the statebuilding hypothesis finds none in these cases. Cases of democratization are accompanied by the cultivation of political consciousness by way of feedback mechanisms, even if not necessarily at the hands of the rebels in question. This, along with the statistical analyses, suggests that a critical element to producing postwar democracy emerges during the conflict. Specifically, rebels can encourage democratization by cultivating a participant political culture in which citizens are aware not merely of the impact of policies upon them, but of their potential role in shaping their own political destiny.\footnote{Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, \textit{The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations}, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 14-26}

The FMLN did this directly, by encouraging political action in general. In spite of the war aims which it served, their program appeared to encourage political activity through the collectives regardless of whether or not they supported the rebellion itself. UNITA achieved an impressive degree of governance, especially early in the conflict, but failed to cultivate a political project among its population. SPLM/A’s project was similarly impressive, as they were able to take advantage of local resources as well as the structures they built up during the conflict. However, their political project was largely window-dressing and was unable to stave off a civil war in the new South Sudan. RENAMO’s political project was entirely illusory, but because of FRELIMO’s pre-independence project, the belated return thereto, and RENAMO’s transition efforts, Mozambique saw the cultivation of something of a political consciousness in spite of FRELIMO’s wartime Leninism and RENAMO’s wartime nihilism.

The results for this last case do suggest that consciousness-raising took place and contributed to democratization, but it also introduced potentially troubling caveats. For
instance, even assuming that the foundations FRELIMO laid during its war with Portugal contributed to the transition almost two decades afterward, this means that this political consciousness can be buried just as easily as it can be cultivated. Consciousness’s ability to impact postwar developments appear to be contingent on whether or not the victors (or remaining parties in the case of a negotiated end to hostilities) take advantage of it. This suggests that the theory is one which relies upon elite activity, even as it involved empowering non-elites.

This may seem counterintuitive, but the fact that rebel governance depends upon rebels taking some sort of initiative should not come as a surprise. The theory here is that rebels intentionally cultivate a politically active citizenry using feedback mechanisms. It is not that much of a leap to say that the consciousness these mechanisms cultivate must be harnessed in order for a regime to change substantially.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Civil wars produce suffering at least as profound as the destruction they wreak. They are also devilishly difficult to end and have a nasty habit of restarting after they come to an end. The notion that such a setting might make a workable laboratory for democracy should beggar belief. It seems that this is the case, but only under certain circumstances. The best predictor of whether anything emerges from this laboratory is rebel commitment to incorporating civilians in the project of governing. The provision of feedback mechanisms cultivates an expectation among civilians that they should have some sort of role in governing themselves, even if the particulars of that role are carefully constrained. Even with these constraints, it seems that this makes democratization after civil wars a more salable proposition, both for civilians and rebel governors.

Summary of Findings

The findings from the previous two chapters point to feedback mechanisms as an important contributor to postwar democratic transition. It seems that these explicit efforts to incorporate a population into the enterprise of wartime governance helps to cultivate a political consciousness which prepares an electorate-to-be and makes democratic competition salable amongst rebels. It also appears that this effect is not entirely contingent upon civil war outcomes. Some states may witness a transition to more democratic forms of governance in the wake of a ceasefire or the defeat of reactive rebels.

The statebuilding hypothesis fares poorly here. Neither public good provision nor policing and justice functions correlate with democratization. Policing and justice functions seem to correlate with autocratization and makes transitions to democracy or
even partial democracy more distant. This is an important finding, as it highlights the fact that while these functions are critical in a democracy, there is nothing inherently democratic about them. Moreover, they can be even more useful to a repressive regime.\textsuperscript{462}

The civilian aid hypothesis also fares badly, although not nearly as badly as the statebuilding hypothesis. It appears that civilian aid has some impact on postwar democratization, but less than that of feedback mechanisms. Moreover, the impact is inconsistent across different interpretations of the polity data. This is not to say that Huang’s hypothesis is obsolete, though. There is a fair amount of overlap conceptually between the consciousness-raising hypothesis furthered and supported here and the one she develops. More importantly, civilian aid is coded as a dichotomous variable. If the variable were recoded as a scale, then perhaps that more precise version of the variable would fare better. Additionally, the civilian aid variable was included as it appeared in Huang’s dataset. If it were recoded to incorporate whether or not there was also foreign aid or natural resources available, then perhaps the hypothesis would fare better in this analysis.

Finally, the results from the hazard models were inconclusive. As such, even though feedback mechanisms correlate with more democratic governance in the wake of a civil war, this does not necessarily translate into democratization. It may be that the changes brought on by feedback mechanisms are more marginal, and so would not cross the thresholds between regime categories in the polity set. It is also possible that were

those thresholds altered, then a different picture would emerge. Lastly, proportional hazards models are especially sensitive to overfitting with small datasets. As such, one would likely need to replicate the models with a larger dataset to come to definitive conclusions regarding the findings.

**Significance of this Study**

One of the most important contributions of this study is the dataset. It provides a means of systematically studying the impact of successes and failures in rebel governance for their own sake and in connection with other phenomena. This could facilitate further analysis of rebel governance, contributing to the emergent field’s literature, even without expanding the dataset’s size or scope.

For instance, Mampilly’s original analysis sought to clarify the relationship between rebel governance and how well the rebels administered their territory. One could replicate Mampilly’s analysis using the dataset with substantially less effort than it would have taken otherwise. Mampilly’s hypothesis was that the first two modes of governance—policing and justice functions, public good provision—correlated with well-administered territory. One could use this project’s dataset as the explanatory variable without altering it in any meaningful way.

The emphasis on outcomes provides a framework in which idiosyncratic modes of governance can be studied. This is important for a variety of reasons. First, even though the statebuilding hypothesis does not fare well here, it highlights the fact that civil war combatants can provide important proficiencies which outside interveners might

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464 Indeed, a casual glance at the case notes reveals a plethora of idiosyncratic governance strategies.
overlook.\textsuperscript{465} In doing so, this study encourages these outside interveners to treat unfamiliar forms of governance by their performance, not their resemblance to more familiar forms.\textsuperscript{466} Moreover, this study demonstrates that it is possible to generalize about these unconventional modes.

Relying upon outputs rather than the mere presence or absence of institutions makes this sort of study especially difficult to conduct without visiting the warzones themselves. As such, this project would not be possible but for the brilliant field work done by other researchers. While the value of this research goes far beyond its utility here, it certainly serves as a reminder of the value of ethnographic research, even as this project is not an ethnography.

\textbf{Theoretical Implications}

These findings suggest that the connection between development and democracy is not necessarily a causal one. While democratic states may experience higher levels of development,\textsuperscript{467} the existence of one does not necessarily lead to the other. This is not to say that democracies are not strengthened by development. It may well be that consolidating a democracy requires a great deal of this.\textsuperscript{468} Similarly, the findings here seem to diminish the value of education in cultivating political consciousness. While undoubtedly useful to a democratic state, it appears that even if education provides an

\textsuperscript{466} Rebecca Richards, \textit{Understanding Statebuilding: Traditional Governance and the Modern State in Somaliland}, (Burlington: Ashgate Press, 2014), 22-36
opportunity to do so, there are no guarantees that rebel governors will take advantage of it.

One can also argue that these findings point to the value of institutionalizing self-government. The comparative strength of feedback mechanisms relative to civilian aid in predicting more democratic forms of postwar governance suggests that establishing a relationship between ruler and ruled is not sufficient to encourage democratization. Rather, it seems that this relationship must be regular. Institutionalizing the interactions in this relationship may be what helps bring this about.

Moreover, the fact that this relationship does not necessarily correspond with liberal democratic norms suggests that this analysis has touched on something fundamental. The FMLN’s feedback mechanisms were illiberal (or anti-liberal), particularly early in the conflict. And yet, Wood’s interviews lead her to believe that FMLN activity was critical to the development of an active, engaged populace. This sort of engagement bears more than a passing resemblance to Tocquevillian ideals.

Avenues for Extension

As mentioned in chapter 3, one avenue for extending this analysis is to extend the dataset. Hartzell’s dataset goes back to the end of the Second World War, but even going back to 1970 adds 21 potential cases. This would bring the grand total to 100. Extending

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the dataset forward might be more difficult, given that it would mean adding cases to
Hartzell’s dataset. Regardless, extending the dataset in either direction and replicating the
quantitative analyses should give a clearer picture of the relationship between
consciousness-building enterprises and postwar democratization. This would be
particularly helpful for improving the hazard models, as increasing the sample size and
the number of transitions would help to ensure that the models are not biased or overfit.
Another avenue for extending this analysis is to follow King, Keohane, and Verba’s
advice and increase the number of cases examined by the same means as in the fifth
chapter. Deviant cases still remain, meriting further examination. For instance,
Ethiopia hosted two rebel movements which did not produce postwar democratization
(although one group got closer than the other). Another means of extending this analysis
might be to examine more colonial conflicts, such as the one FRELIMO won against
Portugal. It may be Mozambique’s experience is more common than this analysis
suggests.

While the quantitative analysis compares the efficacy of the Mampillian modes of
governance with Huang’s Civilian Aid variable, the case studies do not. In addition to
considering some of the other deviant cases, expanding the scope of the case study
analyses might also present an opportunity to compare the theory argued in this project
with Huang’s more closely. This would help to better determine the relative validity of
the consciousness-building hypothesis and Huang’s civil mobilization hypothesis. It may

\[474\] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 208-229; it bears mentioning that this
is not the only advice the authors have when constructing qualitative designs. For a defense of their
suggestions in the face of criticism, see: Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, “The Importance
of Research Design,” Rethinking Social Inquiry, 2nd Edition, eds. Henry E. Brady and David Collier,
Rowman and Littlefield, 2010, 111-122
also be worthwhile to examine the interaction between civilian aid, foreign aid, and feedback mechanisms. It is possible that the presence of civilian aid and feedback mechanisms coupled with the absence of foreign aid may be an even more effective predictor of postwar democratization.

The interaction between modes of governance and outcomes may be worth re-examining. This may also be the case with the modes themselves—it may be that the modes of governance interact in a meaningful but contingent manner. Ange-Marie Hancock has developed a paradigm intersectionality approach which states that certain memberships may only matter under certain circumstances. Hancock argues that certain demographic traits may not appear as interaction terms under normal circumstances, but for certain values these traits may have a meaningful interactive power. Given the fact that outcomes and each mode of governance is already separated out, it might be easier to examine the interaction terms in this manner than it was for Hancock to develop this methodological innovation. This makes this avenue especially promising.

It is also possible that the mediating impact of outcomes (or lack thereof) is an artifact of the data. Hartzell’s dataset is ideal in many ways for this study. However, its inclusion of each formal cessation of violence and the long period of time over which this project examines democratic governance may produce red herrings in which non-prevail outcomes (incumbent victory or negotiated truce) appear to correlate with democratization. This would require revisiting the regression analysis design.

Policy Implications

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The failure of the statebuilding hypothesis to explain or predict post-civil war democratization has several implications for statebuilding practitioners. First, practitioners should not assume that rebels who made effective wartime administrators will necessarily make good postwar democrats. A well-ordered rebellion may well give way to a well-ordered autocracy.476 This is especially the case with policing and justice functions, as it appears that they can prevent or stunt democratization in the wake of a civil war. This is not to say that statebuilders should not try to establish transition facsimiles for state functions or that these statebuilders should ignore native competencies and resources. These can be important to stave off suffering and may even help aid a fledgling democracy to consolidate itself.477 However, practitioners should be aware that these are not likely to produce or support a democratization itself.

The apparent success of the consciousness hypothesis has some clear implications as well. Policymakers should expect that rebel groups who elicit input from civilians should be better prepared to transition from belligerent group to political party. Moreover, policymakers should encourage rebels to move beyond declarations of intent to democratize and incorporate civilians into their decision-making apparatus, particularly where administering their controlled territories are concerned. The hazard models should be especially noteworthy to policymakers on this note, as the models suggest that feedback mechanisms cause democratic transition to happen more rapidly.

The lack of interaction between outcomes and governance modes suggests that outsiders need not encourage a particular outcome to a civil war in order to encourage

476 Terrence Lyons, “The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian Politics,” *Comparative Politics* 48, No. 2 (2016), 172-176
477 Linz and Stepan, *Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 3-15
democratization. While technically true, this is misleading. Feedback mechanisms can have a democratizing impact on a nondemocracy, but so can ending a civil war by way of a negotiated settlement. Each of the regressions which included a control for negotiated settlements pointed to this mode of termination having a substantial impact on the postwar political environment. While not necessary to bring about a democratization, negotiated settlements are clearly useful to this end, in spite of how difficult it can be to craft one well.478

Although one could argue that this should be apparent absent this analysis, policymakers should be skeptical of rebel claims to support democratization. Rebels have the opportunity to provide concrete evidence of their commitment to democracy in their controlled territory, so failing to do so should raise red flags. Judging the success of this may be easier said than done. RENAMO’s nonsensical wartime claims highlight the fact that rebel groups stand to gain from overstating their successes.479 Moreover, rebel groups may attract outside support more for their opposition to something a supporter views as particularly loathsome rather than what those rebel groups actually represent.480 In light of this, there may be less incentive to accurately judge the ability and willingness of would-be democrats to democratize. It may still have some use inasmuch as democratization remains a goal of statebuilders, though.

478 For a discussion of this, see: Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 27-30
Lastly, these recommendations should be seen as applicable in the event of a civil war, not as a justification for starting one. Inducing a civil war should not be seen as a viable means of encouraging democratization, especially if it is an outside party who considers such an avenue. Whatever good things come from democratization, civil wars produce destruction on a far greater scale. Civil war belligerent parties should take seriously the opportunity to engage politically with would-be citizens just as foreign interveners should take seriously rebel attempts to govern. However, any suggestion that the democracy to which such actions can contribute makes the war worthwhile is guilty of relegating the welfare of those would-be citizens to abstraction.
Appendix: Rebel Governance Case Notes

Afghanistan (1978-1992)

Rebels / Incumbents: Several (Sunni and Shia Mujahedeen parties and militias)\textsuperscript{481} / Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan)

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The first of Afghanistan’s civil wars to fall within the timeline of the dataset began in April of 1978 with a bloody coup d’état perpetrated by USSR-backed Afghan Communists against president Mohammed Daoud Khan, who had been a vocal proponent of reducing Soviet influence in the country and returning it to genuine non-aligned status.\textsuperscript{482} The resultant Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) would be dissolved at war’s end, but the disparate nature of the resistance to the new regime (among other things) made large-scale governance projects remarkably difficult.

For both incumbent and rebel, there was a profound lack of unity, both along ethnic and religious lines.\textsuperscript{483} In spite of this, regional powers asserted some degree of control after the Soviet withdrawal. Outside the capital Kabul (one of the few areas where Mohammad Najibullah’s incumbent government maintained control), five warlords maintained territory throughout the countryside. In spite of this, no governance outcomes could emerge; what paper institutions did emerge provided no benefits and were popularly disregarded and those were few and far between, in spite of efforts to

\textsuperscript{481} Although many sources note the ideological differences along the axes of religion and perceived degree of fundamentalist devotion thereto, Fotini Christia lists them according to their principal ethnic groups. (Fotini Christia, \textit{Alliance Formation and Civil Wars}, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 57-60

\textsuperscript{482} Amalendu Misra, \textit{Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence}, (Boston: Polity Press, 2004), 20-26

\textsuperscript{483} Ibid. 48-60
encourage political development within the militias themselves on the part of the
government.  

**Afghanistan (1992-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Taliban and various allied parties and militias / Islamic State of
Afghanistan and various allied parties and militias

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Following the fall of the Najibullah government, the UN-negotiated Peshawar
Accord attempted to bring many of the erstwhile independent groups and what remained
of the collapsed state’s infrastructure and personnel under a common banner—The
Islamic State of Afghanistan. This proved predictably difficult, with Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, leader of the fundamentalist Sunni Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami, rejecting the post
of Prime Minister, preferring to play the role of “total spoiler” until the full extent of his
agenda is achieved or granted (although also motivated by a deep and resentful rivalry
with the leader of the Tajik group Jamiat-i-Islami, Ahmad Shah Massoud).  

Hekmatyar’s spoiling behavior contributed to the eventual downfall of the already
tenuous tenure of President Burhanuddin Rabbani at the hands of the ascendant Taliban.

In spite of their grand pronouncements regarding the restoration of law and order,
the Taliban were exceptionally poor governors, even after the war.  

There is little
evidence of any efforts to build up the state’s capacity in Mampillian terms. Moreover,
Taliban leadership did not view such goals as important—military conquest was viewed

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486 Christia, *Alliance Formation*, 61-63

as far more critical to their agenda. The only governance project at which the Taliban tried their hand was policing, but observers take pains to differentiate this from the establishment of law and order. Instead, the group employed extraordinary violence and cruelty to secure obedience from subject populations. Fear of a grizzly fate ensured order in their controlled territories, not the rule of law. Lastly, manifestations of non-policing governance goods were enthusiastically attacked.

There is an argument that Mohammed Ismail Khan’s relative success in governing the Western city of Herat could constitute some small measure of rebel governance.\(^{488}\) He had been able to provide some degree of policing, justice, and public good provision, but he was also affiliated with Jamiat-i-Islami, a group represented prominently within the government. As such, even though he operated with a large degree of autonomy, it is perhaps misleading to call this rebel governance. Although he was able to return to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban’s government, he fled into exile in 1995 as the Taliban began to assert their control over large swaths of the country.

**Afghanistan (1996-2001)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Former elements of The Islamic State of Afghanistan / The Emirate of Afghanistan (The Taliban)

**Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

With the ascendance of the Taliban, The remnants of the Islamic State of Afghanistan retreated northward. In spite of the incorporation of Hekmatyar into ISA’s government as prime minister in 1996,\(^{489}\) these remnants were beaten back to the

\(^{488}\) Neal A. Englehart, “A Tale of Two Afghanistans: Comparative Governance and Insurgency in the North and South,” *Asian Survey* 50, No. 4 (2010), 738-741

\(^{489}\) Giustozzi, “Afghanistan,” 180-181
northeastern corner of the country at their nadir in 1998. Until American involvement in the conflict after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Islamic State and Emirate traded off gains and losses, with some towns captured, lost, and recaptured in relatively short order.

It can be argued that Abdul Rashid Dostum, a one-time Communist officer turned militia leader, had been successful in creating a pocket of governance in Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Shiberghan. Similarly to Ismail Khan, Dostum was able to use what infrastructure remained from the Communist era to provide some semblance of governance. Dostum, like Ismail Khan, was aligned with the Islamic State of Afghanistan, so it would not be accurate to describe him as a rebel (in spite of the difficulties differentiating between the groups amid constant alliance portfolio shuffling) until 1996. Thereafter, in spite of his notorious cruelty, regions under his control enjoyed a measure of domestic security and institutionalized education. He was able to maintain some measure of control until 1998, when (aided by a mutinous lieutenant) the Taliban were able to defeat his considerable forces and chase Dostum into exile.

The same cannot be said about Dostum’s rival, Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose Panjsher Valley enclave was held in some form or fashion until American intervention. Beyond providing a modicum of security from Taliban forces, little is known about Massoud’s record as a governor in these intervening years. However, it is known that he was even more successful at rebuffing Taliban offensives than he was at doing so against

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490 Christia, *Alliance Formation*, 75-83
492 Englehart, “Tale of Two Afghanshans,” 741-743
494 Ibid. 743-746
Soviet forces in the 1980’s, leading to limited (and largely theoretical) recognition of the Northern Alliance as an opposition group on the part of the Taliban. 495

Algeria (1992-2005)

Rebels / Incumbents: Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Armed Islamic Group (GIA) / Algeria

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The Algerian Civil War came in the wake of a military coup which prevented the victorious FIS from taking power. 496 In the wake of the coup, Islamist militias took up arms to challenge the state. While FIS-aligned fighters initially fought to secure the fruits of their electoral victory, the GIA fought to destabilize the state. The profound violence that the groups employed (especially the GIA) made holding the groups together difficult, to say nothing of their attempts to govern. 497

The GIA fought to overturn the state and was ideologically opposed to any compromise of that goal. 498 This ideology was a powerful recruitment tool, but desertion quickly became an issue as the group exercised extreme cruelty when dealing with civilians (many of whom were Muslim themselves). This ideology—in particular its forsaking of dialogue—led to an interesting development. 499 While the coup is generally seen as the cause de guerre, the GIA were uninterested in becoming a legal political party (The FIS lost legal status in the wake of the coup). The Islamist’s group’s

495 Adam Tarock, “The Politics of the Pipeline: The Iran and Afghanistan Conflict,” Third World Quarterly 20, No. 4 (1999), 815
496 Martin Evans and John Filipps, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 177-214
498 Ibid. 215-251
single-minder pursuit of the liquidation of the state above left little room for governance
(although it did apparently give support to the hardline military position on the matter).500

Angola (1975-1989)
Rebels / Incumbents: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),
National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) / Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA)

Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Rebels / Incumbents: UNITA / MPLA

Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Rebels / Incumbents: UNITA / MPLA

Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Rebels / Incumbents: UNITA / MPLA

Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

See Case Study in Chapter 5

Rebels / Incumbents: Nagorno-Karabakh / Azerbaijan

Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 1

One could be forgiven for thinking that the civil war in Azerbaijan was, in fact, an
interstate one. After all, Azerbaijani and Armenian forces clashed during the conflict.

However, the war was one of secession for the Armenian majority in the Azerbaijani district of Nagorno-Karabakh. In part due to support from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh secessionists were able to achieve a certain degree of governance during the war in addition to holding its declared territories.

Although some have argued that this was spurred by international pressure, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians did hold elections for their newly created parliament beginning in 1992, although direct presidential elections did not take place until after the war’s end. In spite of these elections (and its de-facto control and administration of its territory), formal recognition has not been forthcoming. Feedback mechanisms also manifested themselves as secessionists conducted a much ballyhooed independence referendum in late 1991. The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of secession, although it is worth noting that Azerbaijanis boycotted the referendum. Further diminishing these wartime achievements is the fact that the first elements of NKR’s parallel government manifested themselves well before the war commenced, meaning that the NKR was a rebel government before it was, technically, a rebellious organization.

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Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians also maintained a police force which was clearly distinct from its military.\textsuperscript{507} However, the military enjoyed pride of place which allowed for occasional improprieties—and not simply because of the war. Armenian assistance meant that the army was perhaps the best organized element of the emerging secessionist republic.\textsuperscript{508}

**Bosnia (1992-1995)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Republika Srpska / Bosnia-Herzegovina

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The Bosnian War was not so much a civil war as it was a series of civil wars. One such conflict was that which manifested itself in the newly independent Bosnia and its secessionist (and perhaps annexation-minded) Serbian minority. With the aid of also-independent Serbia and what remained of the Yugoslav infrastructure, Bosnia’s secessionist Serbs were in a position to make substantial gains quickly from early on in the conflict.\textsuperscript{509}

While the territorial gains did not quite match this advantageous position,\textsuperscript{510} it is still somewhat surprising that the secessionist state did not establish itself as a state during the conflict. Policing functions were particularly desultory, even in the wake of the conflict.\textsuperscript{511} Similarly, Republika Srpska did not conduct any free elections during the

\textsuperscript{507} Dov Lynch, “Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” *International Affairs* 78, No. 4 (2002), 836-837

\textsuperscript{508} Kolstø and Blakkisrud, “Living with Non-Recognition,” 488-490


\textsuperscript{510} Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*, 153-165; Bosnian Serb forces were better able to consolidate their gains after tensions between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks became inflamed.

conflict, in spite of its claims to represent the interests of Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{512} While Bosniak authorities made some efforts to make education reforms,\textsuperscript{513} little evidence exists that Republika Srpska was interested in producing public goods.

**Burma/Myanmar (1948-1989)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Communist Party of Burma (CPB) / Union of Burma (until 1962); Burma (thereafter)

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The CPB began operations in the country as soon as Burma secured its independence from Great Britain.\textsuperscript{514} This presented the fledgling country with a profound challenge, particularly given the ethnic resentments which also began to manifest itself at independence.\textsuperscript{515} CPB’s “invasion” of Burma did not formally begin until some years after Ne Win’s coup established a military dictatorship in the country, though.

The CPB relied heavily on Chinese patronage, but it had a relatively well-articulated ideology and ultimate agenda.\textsuperscript{516} At independence, they adopted a distinctly Leninist footing—their goal was to lead a popular revolution to destroy the Burmese state so it could be remade in the CPB’s image. To support this end, the organization developed an impressive array of mass mobilization organizations and a more or less

\textsuperscript{513} These were mostly related to advocating for religious education (see: Anto Knežević, “Alija Izetbegovic’s ‘Islamic Declaration’: Its Substance and its Western Reception,” *Islamic Studies* 36, No. 2/3 (1997), 483-521)
\textsuperscript{515} Violence from national liberation fronts would constitute their own civil war beginning in 1960, but their development began during the British period.
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid. 102-109
functional taxation system.\textsuperscript{517} Unfortunately, its mobilization efforts produced little effect beyond impressive membership lists. Indeed, once Chinese patronage faltered, the group’s non-revenue collection political functions ceased to operate in any meaningful fashion.

In spite of the group’s size and (at least nominal) support,\textsuperscript{518} the group privileged military gains over political developments in their controlled territories.\textsuperscript{519} The group faltered militarily after China withdrew its support, especially as the Burmese military stepped up anti-insurgent operations in the wake of the 8888 campaign. After a string of defeats, the CPB collapsed in 1989. Interestingly, the CPB’s acquisitiveness reveals itself in the groups that sprang up from the group’s dissolution, as these groups focused increasingly on profiting from the drug trade.\textsuperscript{520}

**Burma (1960-1995)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Ethnic insurgent movements (Some include the Karen National Union (KNU), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and Shan State Army (SSA)) / Union of Burma (until 1962); Burma (thereafter)

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 1**

The second of Myanmar’s civil wars in the dataset has its roots around the time that the CPB began fighting, as ethnic resentments precluded the national unity promised by the 1947 constitution.\textsuperscript{521} These resentments led to the conflict’s reignition as the


\textsuperscript{520} Fink, *Living Silence*, 80-81

Union of Burma began to falter in 1960. Perhaps because of the Burmese state’s inability to administer its hinterlands, several rebel movements were able to develop and thrive over course of the 20th Century’s remainder. Unlike the CPB, some of these groups were successful in providing some of the goods of governance at various times during the conflict.

Terrain and strategy made governance a bit easier for ethnic rebel groups in Burma. While the state waged campaigns against them, the groups themselves were more concerned with ridding their territory of Tatmadaw forces. This concern with their own affairs at the expense of seeking the destabilization of Ne Win’s regime allowed many of these groups to establish schools and clinics. The efficacy of public good provision in rebel-controlled territory leaves something to be desired (especially in healthcare) but their establishment bears mentioning all the same. Unfortunately, it also led to conflict amongst themselves and the CPB at various points in time.

This concern with controlled territory meant that the 8888 uprising was largely a civil society phenomenon; ethnically defined rebel groups largely did not participate. One could more easily argue for the role of ethnic rebels in the 1990 elections, though. Burma’s intelligentsia went underground in the wake of the 8888 uprising, eventually leading to the establishment of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). The group had

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522 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 80-83
523 Fink, Living Silence, 48-49
524 Monique Skidmore, “Contemporary medical pluralism in Burma,” Dictatorship, Disorder, and Decline in Myanmar, eds. Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, (Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), 200-203; access to proper materials seems to have been especially difficult, even after the war. Thankfully, educational efforts appear to have had more of a carryover effect (see: Jasmin Lorch, “The (re)-emergence of civil society in areas of state weakness: the case of education in Burma/Myanmar,” Dictatorship, Disorder, and Decline in Myanmar, eds. Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, (Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), 168-169
525 Smith, Burma, 322-354
526 Fink, Living Silence, 61-63
527 Smith, Burma, 385-388, 412-419
a military wing—the National Democratic Front (NDF)—which was made up of 11 ethnically defined groups formed much earlier. This is important to note because of the peculiarities of the 1990 elections. Even DAB leadership assumed that the results would be falsified by the incumbent regime. What happened was even more bizarre; the results—a landslide victory for DAB—were released, but not honored.

Finding evidence of policing and justice in rebel-controlled Burma is a harder task. While it is clear that by 1990 the Burmese state had, to a certain degree, accepted rebel control of certain regions, little evidence exists that points to the operation of policing or justice within controlled territories. One could suppose that civil society actors may take on such responsibilities, but it appears that the rebels may not have.

**Burundi (1988)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Hutu militias / Burundi and Tutsi militias

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

This brief civil war took place shortly after Pierre Buyoya’s coup d’état, albeit not immediately so. Buyoya had intended (or claimed to have intended) to repair relations between the majority Hutu population and that of the Tutsi, who had ruled the country for decades. Unsatisfied by the regime’s progress, Hutus began to lash out at the Tutsi

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528 Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” *Perspectives on Politics* 10, No. 2 (2012), 249


minority,\textsuperscript{531} leading to a brief conflict followed by brutal reprisals on behalf of the very regime which had promised to work toward interethnic peace.\textsuperscript{532}

The war’s brevity made rebel governance highly unlikely. Even so, there were governance developments contemporary with the conflict. For instance, Burundi’s education system was in the midst of ambitious expansion in 1988.\textsuperscript{533} However, this was not done at the behest of those who participated in the uprising. Political developments would also emerge in the years that followed, but these are not examples of rebel governance, but merely developments coincidental with a brief civil war.


Rebels / Incumbents: Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD/CNDD), National Liberation Front (FROLINA), and National Forces of Liberation (FNL/PALIPEHUTU) / Burundian Armed Forces, Political Parties of the Opposition (PPO), Tutsi militias

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Shortly after adopting a new constitution in 1992, Burundi held elections in 1993. These elections ousted Pierre Buyoya in favor of Melchior Ndadaye by a wide margin. Not only was Ndadaye a Hutu, but he was a civilian; both of these traits alienated the ascendant Ndadaye from Burundi’s Tutsi military leadership. Following his assassination in October of 1993, Hutus committed massacres against Tutsi, which then led to military

reprisals against Hutus. Hutus from Ndadaye’s party thus left the government to wage a war, ostensibly to restore democracy.534

Burundi’s rebels were not terribly effective governors, save for one aspect: collecting taxes.535 In part due to the war’s mobile nature and the difficulties holding territory for extended periods, rebel organizations did not provide health, educational, or even legal apparatuses for their would-be subjects. What they did do was regularly collect taxes. As Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Philip Verwimp point out, though, there were some benefits to the taxed. Although the rebels could not spare the effort to create institutions, they could provide additional domestic security or muscle in enforcing the collection of personal debts.

In spite of the elections that preceded the conflict, feedback mechanisms were scarce.536 A part of this may have been the flight of some of the Hutu political leadership, but regardless of the explanation, the emergent democracy had, for all intents and purposes, ceased to function at the beginning of the conflict. With that said, the negotiations which brought brief respite to the belligerents (and especially to the brutalized population) emphasized the need to restore the democratic institutions which had begun to bear fruit in the early 1990’s.


Rebels / Incumbents: CNDD, CNDD-FDD, new CNDD-FDD, PALIPEHUTU-FNL / Burundi, Tutsi militias

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The second chapter of the conflict began shortly after the first one ended, as the carefully crafted power-sharing agreement collapsed under the strain of factions within factions being left out of the negotiations, either because they were not invited or because they refused to participate.\(^{537}\) The government then attempted to negotiate cease fires with the different factions within CNDD individually, recognizing that the organization had become, for all intents and purposes, divided into three. Once these peace agreements had been signed, the country held elections once again, where the tenuously unified CNDD-FDD performed well, ostensibly because of its promises of change from the status quo ante and for “delivering” on the promise to incorporate more Hutus into security and defense forces at the war’s end.

The fractured CNDD factions were not particularly good governors, continuing the trend from the conflict’s previous iteration.\(^{538}\) Perhaps because of the poor performance of state institutions or perhaps because of the conflict’s mobile nature, the rebel groups did not seem terribly concerned with acting as good governors. This was in spite of the fact that they did have political ambitions which were made manifest after the conflict ended in 2003, when the CNDD and Burundian armed forces collaborated to combat FNL.\(^{539}\)

**Burundi (2004-2006)**

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\(^{537}\) Ibid. 107-109
\(^{538}\) Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp, “Extortion with Protection,” 1-19
\(^{539}\) Samii, “Military Integration in Burundi,” 218-220
Rebels / Incumbents: PALIPEHUTU-FNL / CNDD factions, Burundi, Tutsi militias

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The final chapter in the conflict took place as the CNDD and Burundian armed forces collaborated against the last remaining rebel group: the FNL.\textsuperscript{540} After brutal offensives further victimized the country’s civilian population, the Burundian government signed a peace agreement with the FNL in 2006.\textsuperscript{541} This gave the CNDD a head start in transforming itself into a political party, as it was able to participate in the country’s elections in 2005.

The FNL’s isolation did not make it an effective vehicle for governance. Service provision in general was not strong in the country, to be sure. For instance, access to education during the conflict was especially poor and uneven.\textsuperscript{542} However, the FNL did little to change this, in spite of its long-term control over rural Bujumbura and Bubanza for much of the conflict.\textsuperscript{543}

Cambodia (1978-1991)

Rebels / Incumbents: Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (until 1979), People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK thereafter) Vietnam / Khmer Rouge (until 1982), Party of Democratic Kampuchea (1982 and thereafter, also known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK)), Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), FUNCINPEC party. After 1979, the polarity of incumbents and rebels inverts, with the unrecognized coalition government playing the part of the rebels.

\textsuperscript{540} Ibid. 213-225
\textsuperscript{541} Nindorera, “Burundi,” 108-109
\textsuperscript{543} Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp, “Extortion with Protection,” 1-19
Identifying incumbents and rebels in the case of the Cambodian civil war is especially difficult. One reason for this is that the most powerful group in the conflict was a foreign state. Another is the fact that de jure control over the Cambodian state changed hands over the conflict’s course. The Khmer Rouge regime began the conflict as incumbents, but it was the victim of its own xenophobia. Concerned more by its saber-rattling along its shared border than by its abominable treatment of its populace, Vietnam invaded the country in 1978, overtaking Phnom Penh in 1979. Eventually, the routed remnants of DK were able to reform as a coalition government, incorporating two other parties to strengthen their claim to the Cambodian state. This claim would go generally unrecognized.

This was, in part, due to Vietnam’s de facto control of Cambodia. The invaders were able to empower a remarkably resilient puppet regime, allowing it to consolidate itself while Vietnamese forces hunted remnants of the old regime. Beginning in 1984, Khmer Rouge insurgents were able to secure a stalemate, maintaining control over the Northwest regions of the country. In spite of this, the government-in-exile was not able to provide the goods of governance within its controlled territories.

Although members of the coalition attempted to reach out to the population in Cambodia, they were not terribly successful in governing, in part due to the more

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546 Brown and Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds*, 24-30
pressing problem of the Vietnam-backed government in Phnom Penh.\textsuperscript{547} Even their outreach programs ran into issues due to the unpopularity of the Khmer Rouge—while alliance with the old guard helped balance against the hostile forces in the capital, Cambodian memories of the old regime meant that the government-in-exile had enormous difficulties securing support. There is evidence that schools and clinics existed, but none that the groups themselves ran them.\textsuperscript{548}

**Chad (1980-1988)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Liberation Front of Chad (FRONILAT), Armed Forces of the North (FAN) (until 1982); Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) (1982 and following) / GUNT (until 1982); FAN (1982 and following)

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Many of the civil wars listed here played out as hybrid conflicts, involving both domestic forces and foreigners. Sometimes these foreign states are patrons, as is the case with Libya in this particular conflict, coming on the heels of another civil war which had effectively broken the state. Because of this, identifying rebels and incumbents is exceptionally difficult, to the point that such distinctions may not be useful or even valid in this case. It is most accurate to say that the status of incumbent changes over the conflict. Goukouni Oueddei’s GUNT had established control over the country in the waning days of the previous civil war, but was only able to maintain control of what remained of the Chadian state until 1982. GUNT did not dissolve at this point—rather it

\textsuperscript{547} Abdulgaffar Peang-Meth, “A Study of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 12, No. 3 (1990), 172-185

\textsuperscript{548} Frederick Z. Brown and Laura McGrew, “Cambodia: The Royal Government on Trial,” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, (1995), 129-130; another issue arises when trying to determine exactly when these facilities were open.
became a rebel group. At this point, Hissène Habré’s Armed Forces of the North (FAN) became the incumbent, as it controlled the capital and was the de facto governing authority.549

Prior to seizing power, FAN did little in the way of rebel governance.550 Similarly, GUNT’s attempts to administer its territory as an incumbent in the terms of this study were unsuccessful. On the other hand, GUNT (as well as several southern militias) made more concerted attempts to administer the territory they occupied and controlled. GUNT’s ability to operate and linger on, even considering its Libyan patrons, is almost unique—GUNT had been ousted from power, but yet it was able to retreat and reconstitute itself as a center-seeking “shadow government.”551

Success in this enterprise was not forthcoming, though. Even though GUNT was able to linger due to FAN’s profoundly sub-Weberian control of Chad,552 GUNT’s position was hardly stable.553 In part, this was due to its status as a coalition, relying upon the loyalty of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT), the People’s Armed Forces (FAP), and the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR) in order to survive. This coalition proved to be exceptionally tenuous in the aftermath of GUNT’s defeat. To make matters worse, French and American support of Habré’s forces left GUNT in dire straits, eventually

549 “Chad,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 17/03/29) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/#country/483, Uppsala University
552 This lack of control is not unique in Chadian government. Aside from local strong-men, control was not forthcoming, leading to a profound inversion of the role of violence in the state (see: Marielle Debo, “Living By the Gun in Chad: armed violence as a practical occupation,” Journal of Modern African Affairs 49, No. 3 (2011), 409-428).
553 Ali, S. Amjad, “War-Torn Chad—Cockpit of International Rivalry,” Pakistan Horizon 37, No. 3 (1984), 33-34
precluding the group’s ability to hold territory.\textsuperscript{554} Lastly, GUNT’s failures to govern during its time in government were not remedied when it “governed” in exile—itits aim in operating away from the center was to defeat FAN militarily, something which it failed to achieve.

\textbf{Chad (1990-1998)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Several. Movement for Democracy and Development (anti-Habré: MDD; pro-Habré: MDD-fant), Comité de Sursaut National pour la Paix et la Démocratie (CSNPD), National Liberation Front of Chad (FRONILAT), National Council of Chadian Recovery (CNR), Action Forces for the Republic (FFAR) / Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS)

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

The second violent chapter depicted herein begins with the deposing of Habré and the ascension of a new president: Idriss Déby. With the aid of his MPS, he was able to quickly establish de jure control of the Chadian state. However, conflict re-emerged as he retained his predecessor’s inability to control the length and breadth of the state. Indeed, Mario Acevedo argues that the degree of stability he was able to secure rested on his decision to not attempt to monopolize deadly force.\textsuperscript{555}

Rebel governance in this second chapter was just as desultory as in the first. Many groups claimed—in accordance with their names—democratic purposes, but their predatory behavior betrays their acquisitive agendas.\textsuperscript{556} However, such claims were perhaps more useful, if not accurate, in this chapter of the conflict. After all, President

\textsuperscript{554} Nolutshungu, \textit{Limits of Anarchy}, 186-193
\textsuperscript{555} Acevedo, \textit{Roots of Violence}, 134-136
Déby, unlike his predecessor, claimed to be a democrat. As such, criticism for his failing to provide consolidated democracy is far more persuasive than in the previous case\textsuperscript{557}; Habré never claimed to be so, even as he noted that such developments could come about in a future interrupted by his ouster.\textsuperscript{558} Still, these critiques ring hollow given the inability or unwillingness to provide some sort of parallel legal basis of security,\textsuperscript{559} even as Déby’s forces showed a similar lack of discipline.\textsuperscript{560}

This is not to say that Chad was entirely undemocratic. Due in large part to deals that Déby cut with many of the rebel groups, something vaguely resembling democracy was able to emerge in Chad during the mid-1990’s.\textsuperscript{561} Even though many of these “elections” are better described as exercises in elite bargaining than in securing public mandate to rule, Déby’s regime was able to survive the conflict by building coalitions with opposition rebel-groups-turned-political-parties. With that said, this represents rebel groups buying into the incumbent’s scheme for governing the state, not rebel governance manifesting itself as parallel to that state.

Public goods were as hard to come by as other manifestations of governance. Other than a semi-regular means of extracting “taxes,” most of the rebel groups were unsuccessful in this venture.\textsuperscript{562} Although some independent schools were able to operate sporadically, the primary “good” which rebel groups purported to provide was security.

\textbf{Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (1993-1994)}

\textsuperscript{557} It is noteworthy that such a task is still next to impossible given the inability to control Chad in its totality.
\textsuperscript{558} Nolutshungu, \textit{Limits of Anarchy}, 290-291
\textsuperscript{559} Miles, “Tragic Tradeoffs,” 57-58
\textsuperscript{560} Nolutshungu, \textit{Limits of Anarchy}, 251-253
\textsuperscript{562} Debos, “Living by the Gun,” 420-422
Rebels / Incumbents: Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT), The Mouvement Congolais pour le Developpement et la Democratie Integrale (MCDDI) / The Union Panafricaine pour la Democratie Sociale (UPADS)

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The first Congolese civil war in the dataset took place over less than a year, during which time three militias clashed over control of the central African state. The catalyst of this conflict were the results of legislative elections which had President Pascal Lissouba’s UPADS party making significant gains. The PCT and MCDDI opposition parties rejected the results, leading to riots and clashes between each party’s militia.

The conflict itself was a manifestation of how fragile Congo’s erstwhile democratization was at the time. President Lissouba and his UPADS party had just acceded to power after decades of PCT rule when, in the wake of a crumbling coalition he dissolved parliament. These actions would have rattled the stability of a consolidated state; they started a war in Congo. The war itself was brief, bloody, and surprisingly multilateral. Each militia quickly began operating in the interest of establishing not political dominance, but ethnic dominance. The ethnic cleansing experienced in the conflict was exacerbated by foreign intervention which sought to patronize one of the groups rather than mediate the conflict.

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565 Pierre Englebert and James Ron, “Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville’s Ambivalent Resource Curse,” Comparative Politics 37, No. 1 (2004), 61-66
Unsurprisingly, there was little in the way of governance developed over the war’s months. Indeed, the politicians at the head of the militias provided scant recompense save for a narrative of grievance. The most notable governance development during the conflict was the chaos the militias caused from a law enforcement perspective. It is noteworthy, though, that the parties were able to use the extant political structures which remained to negotiate an end to the conflict. While not necessarily indicative of rebel governance, it is nevertheless impressive that parliamentarians and military officers from different sides of the conflict helped to secure a cease fire, even in the wake of an especially brutal neighborhood bombardment. It is also noteworthy that the efforts of Congolese actors succeeded where foreign mediation had failed.

Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (1997)

Rebels / Incumbents: PCT militias led by Denis Sassou Nguesso / UPADS militias led by Pascal Lissouba

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Nguesso, who had been president of Congo from 1979 until Lissouba took over in 1992, returned from self-imposed exile in 1997 to declare a return to electoral politics.

This also signaled a return to militia warfare, though, and his Cobra militia began fighting

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566 There was some activity from civil society groups who were not aligned with the combatants (see: Patrice Yengo, “Brazzaville's Marché Total Women's Alliances during the Civil War in Congo,” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 46, No. 182 (2006), 341-344)
570 Englebert and Ron, “Congo’s Ambivalent Resource Curse,” 66
in the capital of Brazzaville in May of 1997. Had it not been for the support of Angolan soldiers in October of the same year, Nguesso would have been defeated. As it was, he assumed the presidency again that same month.

Nguesso’s seizure of the presidency did not come by way of electoral prowess—indeed, he suspended Congo’s democracy upon the military defeat of his adversaries and has yet to fully resuscitate it. Nguesso’s political activity during the conflict was secondary to his military activity—although he campaigned briefly, following the arrest of some of his associates in May, he was determined to take Brazzaville by force of arms. In the absence of successful mediation, his campaign was successful. Although he resuscitated his flagging PCT party, the only developments on his part were military—Nguesso was only a ruler once he was no longer a rebel.

Interestingly, Nguesso’s Cobras used a form of control even more punitive than the previous conflict had seen. In the war’s first manifestation, ethnic cleansing was enforced by the use of roadblocks, with militia fighters checking identification papers to ensure that the “wrong” ethnicities did not have access to the neighborhoods they controlled. The Cobras used the roadblocks to identify and victimize anyone who they perceived as benefiting from the democratic system.

Traditional sources of order were not terribly effective either. In the wake of the conflict’s first chapter, militia fighters in need of a paycheck were recruited into the

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571 Clark, “Democratic Experiment,” 175-176
572 Clark, “Foreign Intervention,” 32-35
573 Bazenguissa-Ganga, “Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville,” 44-47
army and police forces. That these organs contributed to the banditry and general chaos of the conflict is not a surprise given this fact.

**Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (1998-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Southern militias (Ninjas, Cocoyes, Nstiloulous) / Congo (Nguesso), Cobra militia

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The post-ascension peace was short-lived in Congo, as conflict renewed away from the capital less than a year after Nguesso took power. Even with the aid of Angolan troops, the fighting eventually reached Brazzaville. Ultimately, Nguesso was forced to negotiate with the rebels, offering amnesty to all rebel commanders save Lissouba and Kolelas (who were political rivals from Congo’s brief democratic era).

This conflict, in spite of taking place largely outside of the capital, was even more brutal than its direct predecessor. One reason for the extraordinary brutality was the support from Congo-Brazzaville’s oil extraction sector. Nguesso retained his European contacts from his lengthy pre-democratic rule, meaning his leadership had lucrative implications for Elf Congo (an exploration and extraction firm). Fittingly, it was economic factors which ended the war. As the economy for many Congolese never recovered from the first conflict, the promise of employment was sufficient to coax militias to stop fighting (for the moment).

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575 Englebert and Ron, “Congo’s Ambivalent Resource Curse,” 66-67
576 Bruce A. Magnussen and John F. Clark, “Understanding Democratic Survival and Democratic Failure in Africa: Insights from Divergent Democratic Experiments in Benin and Congo (Brazzaville),” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47, No. 3 (2005), 558
Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (2002-2003)

Rebels / Incumbents: Southern militias (Nstiloulous, Ninjas) / Congo

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

In spite of 1999’s agreement, the conflict had one final chapter. All told, though, this one is not terribly noteworthy. In spite of its temporal proximity to the 2002 elections, Patrice Yengo remarks with palpable weariness that the conflict itself brought with it new versions of the elements found in previous conflicts: “new military campaign, new peace agreement signed 17 March 2003, new violations.”\(^\text{579}\) The conflict’s lack of noteworthiness extends to the degree of violence—there is reason to believe that it does not cross the fatality threshold.\(^\text{580}\)

There is not even evidence that the militias actually held territory in this brief chapter of the conflict. However, it is worth noting that the peace agreement hints at Congo’s fragility—the insurgency in the Pool Department continued for years afterward in spite of the peace agreement.\(^\text{581}\) The rebels did not appear to have been able to hold territory at any time during the conflict, though.

Croatia (1991-1992)

Rebels / Incumbents: Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) / Croatia

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 1

After asserting its independence as Yugoslavia began to implode, Croatia faced the possibility that it may face secession within its own territory just as it seceded.

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\(^{580}\) “Congo,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 17/03/28) *UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/#country/484*, Uppsala University

Shortly after making its presence known by way of declaration, the RSK did so by attempting to eliminate or drive out Croats and Croatian administration.\textsuperscript{582} Thus, in addition to threats to Bosnian Croats, Croatia had to deal with internal conflict as well.

The RSK was not especially well-equipped to provide services in its controlled territory.\textsuperscript{583} One reason for this was its emphasis on eliminating any vestige of Croatian-ness from its territory. This included the native Croats as well as any vestige of the fledgling Croatian state. Thus, not only was the capacity of the would-be state hamstrung, but its resources (especially its “police force”) were dedicated to projects not related to governance.

The RSK took pains to appear representative, arranging an independence referendum shortly before the civil war began.\textsuperscript{584} In addition to this, the would-be state held elections over the course of its brief existence.\textsuperscript{585} As such, there was evidence of feedback mechanisms in the form of a representational apparatus emerging. However, this was one which institutionally barred non-Serbs from participation. Moreover, Serbian leadership (especially Slobodan Milosevic) was deeply involved in RSK’s process of selecting leadership,\textsuperscript{586} so the feedback mechanisms were not reflective of the will of RSK’s population, even if one only counts the Serbian population among that number.

\textbf{Croatia (1995)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) / Croatia

\textsuperscript{582} Burg and Shoup, \textit{War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 81-92
\textsuperscript{583} Ibid. 81-82
\textsuperscript{584} Ibid. 81-82
\textsuperscript{585} John R. Cencich, \textit{The Devil’s Garden: A War Crimes Investigator’s Story}, (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2013), 109-121
Croatia, having established its de facto independence in the wake of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, set out to consolidate its declared territory by conquering the Republic of Serbian Krajina’s territory in Eastern Slavonia. While the August offensives (Operations Flash and Storm) recaptured much of this territory within the month’s first week, the conflict was not formally ended until the year’s end. With December 1995’s signing of the Basic Agreement, an orderly transition to de jure control over Eastern Slavonia to match the de facto control enjoyed by Croatia was given the force of law.

The RSK was intended to be a semi-autonomous satellite of Serbia, but it did provide some measure of feedback mechanisms for its ethnically defined population. Indeed, the RSK held elections a month before the conflict began, which led to the ascendance of a new Prime Minister. The impact of this development is somewhat limited, though—by the end of August, most of RSK’s political leadership had fled abroad in the wake of losing its territory. It was further hamstrung by the fact that Belgrade was deeply involved in the selection of RSK’s leadership.

Other manifestations of governance are wanting here, though. The police force was, for all intents and purposes, a paramilitary organization designed to achieve the fledgling would-be state’s goals of ethnic cleansing and to enrich itself by way of

587 Marcus Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War*, 3rd Ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 332
588 Ibid. 305
590 Cencich, *Devil’s Garden*, 118
591 Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 510
criminal enterprise. In spite of controlling substantial territory within the country, the RSK appears to have actively disrupted the function of public good provision.


Rebels / Incumbents: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) / Mobutist Zaire

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The first war in the DRC was one in which disparate elements aligned against Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime sought to replace the authoritarian regime. With substantial aid from foreign patrons (especially Rwanda), Mobutu’s Zaire was toppled and Laurent Kabila was installed as his replacement. In part because of the war’s brevity, the AFDL had been marginally (at best) successful in establishing some modicum of governance during the conflict.

To some extent, AFDL governance was a victim of their good fortune—their victory was too rapid to allow for carefully planned governance structures. It is perhaps unsurprising then, that the AFDL’s program of political education was extremely hastily produced, churning out ideologically literate supporters as fast as they can. Beyond this, though, the AFDL appears to not have been overly concerned with providing education (or healthcare, for that matter).

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592 Ibid. 109-121
593 Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 81-84
594 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 209-211
The group did arrange for referenda to be conducted, but the purpose was not to represent popular interests in lawmaking.\textsuperscript{597} The reason for these was to identify corrupt officials and remove them from their posts. This could be done with little political cost as most officials had no ties to the AFDL by design. The downside to this arrangement, though, is that the group had little institutional competency outside of the military. Any praise for success must be further tempered by the fact that the AFDL committed scores of human rights violations on their way to victory, though.\textsuperscript{598} Aside from attacks on refugees, it is also clear that the policing and justice functions that the AFDL pursued had more to do with quashing dissent than enforcing the rule of law.\textsuperscript{599} While the war’s brevity may have precluded the possibility of good governance, it appears that the AFDL was also not entirely committed to the project in the first place.

\textbf{Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) (1998-1999)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) (Later RCD-Goma, others), The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) / Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

The second war in DRC saw the ascendant rebels from the previous conflict playing the part of the incumbents. Similarly, the role of the AFDL was taken up by the RCD. RCD governance strategy is one which should strike observers as familiar—indeed, their AFDL predecessors used one quite similar.\textsuperscript{600} Instead of building

\textsuperscript{597} Ibid. 165-170
\textsuperscript{598} Nigel Eltringham, \textit{Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda}, (Chicago: Pluto Press, 2004), 124-131
\textsuperscript{600} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 220-235
institutions from scratch, the RCD attempted to coopt what little state competency remained in controlled territory. Even where this was found wanting, the RCD tried to invigorate atrophied institutions to at least produce the illusion that they, like their predecessors, were a “government in waiting.”

Unfortunately, RCD ambitions were more impressive than the outcomes the group was able to produce. Their cadres were undisciplined and several human rights violations were committed against their subject populations. In spite of this, the RCD appeared to play a role in creating a multi-ethnic conflict resolution organ: the Council of Elders.601 The group’s efforts at establishing policing and judicial functions seems to be more as a means of collecting revenue than establishing law and order, though. Indeed, they considered security to be a “private matter,” which can help explain the profound insecurity experienced during the conflict among the civilian population.602

The group (and later its factions) appeared to be interested in establishing public good provision at the war’s outset.603 This enthusiasm evaporated quickly, though. In spite of RCD’s efforts to produce the trappings of a state (ministries, stationary, etc.), its efforts at providing goods themselves were barely extant.604 The extent of their support for education amounts to not getting in the way of civil society actors’ provision of the good. Healthcare, such as it was, came entirely from NGO’s—even during the peace between the two conflicts.605 Similarly, in spite of numerous claims from the group itself

603 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 235-241
604 Tull, “Reconfiguration of Political Order?” 433-436
to the contrary, there was little concrete evidence that attempts to establish anything like a rule of law—or even cadre discipline—by any manifestation of the RCD and its constituent, splinter, and rival groups bore fruit.606

The RCD’s struggles were mirrored by those of the MLC, who like the RCD were supported from abroad but maintained ambitions of ruling the state.607 Also like the RCD, their ambitions outstripped their results. They were a popular group, however, and in spite of Ugandan support,608 were as successful at collecting revenues and taking advantage of the natural resources in their controlled territories as the RCD.609 This was the extent of their successes, however. The lack of accountability measures meant that the group’s forces abused civilians with impunity.

One could argue that the group was more successful than the RCD in producing feedback mechanisms, but those of the MLC had roughly the same impact. Taken as a whole, it is more accurate to describe the conflict as lacking them. The group’s founder, Jean-Pierre Bemba saw to it that his version of a “government in waiting” was staffed by people from each of DRC’s districts, but this is the extent of these measures.610 This did not stop the Kabila government from coopting the MLC in the Lusaka Accords, but the point stands.


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606 Tull, “Reconfiguration of Political Order?” 433-436
607 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 101
Rebels / Incumbents: RCD-Goma, MLC / DRC

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The peace at the end of the second chapter of the civil war was short-lived. By 2001, the Lusaka agreement was shattered by the assassination of President Joseph Kabila (who was replaced by his son). Although the conflict’s final chapter was mercifully brief, it nevertheless left DRC’s already desperate population in truly dire straits.\(^{611}\)

The third and final chapter of DRC’s civil war proceeded much like the second from a governance standpoint.\(^{612}\) Independent (and predominantly religious) civil society actors provided most of what little education there was to be had in DRC (and the state complimented these efforts with its own, although they were less effective). Healthcare provision was similarly provided by independent actors, although in this case by NGO’s. Although the group took pains to mobilize popular support, it does not appear that the group succeeded in establishing feedback mechanisms.

The one place where governance appeared seems to have been almost incidental.\(^{613}\) The courts that RCD-G ran were, for the most part, used as a source of revenue and a convenient means of disposing of opposition, but their operation bears noting. Much like the state that came before, though, the operation of institutional trappings of law enforcement signified nothing as far as law and order were concerned.\(^{614}\)

\(^{611}\) Séverine Autessere reports that a year after the war’s conclusion, 1,000 Congolese civilians died daily from disease and malnutrition, which speaks to the degree to which the state and rebel groups failed to provide these goods of governance (see: Séverine Autessere, “D. R. Congo: Explaining Peace Building Failures, 2003-2006,” *Review of African Political Economy* 34, No. 113 (2007), 423-424).

\(^{612}\) Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 220-241

\(^{613}\) Ibid. 233-236

Even if one argues that the courts operated as intended, the population did not view them as a source of order.\footnote{Tull, \textit{The Reconfiguration of Political Order}, 213-217}

In spite of having been brought into the government at the end of the conflict’s second chapter, the MLC was also at war with Kabila’s government.\footnote{Carayannis, “The Complex Wars of Congo,” 244-249} While some saw the group as one which could have a positive impact on the country before this stage,\footnote{ICG, \textit{Scramble for the Congo}, 36-37} the group’s activities during this stage were viewed in a much less positive light.\footnote{Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 101} The lack of accountability manifested itself in notorious atrocities committed by MLC forces.\footnote{Collins, “Congo,” 607-615; atrocities were also committed by RCD forces.} The most infamous of these became known as Effacer le Tableau ("Erase the Blackboard"), a campaign by MLC and RCD splinter groups to brutalize and exterminate the pygmy population.\footnote{Michael Deibert, \textit{The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair}, (New York: Zed Books, 2013), 97-99}

\textbf{Djibouti (1991-1994)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) / Djibouti

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

The civil war in Djibouti was waged between the predominantly Afar FRUD (itself a coalition of other dissident groups) and President Hassan Gouled Aptidon’s authoritarian regime in Djibouti.\footnote{Mohamed Kadamy, “Djibouti: Between War and Peace,” \textit{Review of African Political Economy} 23, No. 70 (1996), 515-517} Discontent at the president’s powers and what Afars perceived as an institutionalized and systematic preference for Issa over Afar were sufficient to constitute a raison de guerre, but as the Front’s name suggests, FRUD was
also dedicated to producing a democracy—either by overthrowing the current government or by forcing Gouled to consent to such. Unfortunately, FRUD did little to administer the territories which it controlled.

FRUD’s leadership had not planned on serving as rulers—at least not until the government was toppled, anyway. It was only after the group had made substantial territorial gains that the group’s military leaders even broached the subject. While the group transitioned into a political party after the conflict ended, there is little evidence that any effort was made to begin to administer their territory. Worse, the transition from military force to political party did not lead to Djiboutians enjoying the goods of good governance after the conflict, either. For example, education provision is particularly pitiful—but by no means unique.

El Salvador (1979-1992)
Rebels / Incumbents: FMLN/Salvadoran Government

Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 2

See Case Study in Chapter 5

Rebels / Incumbents: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) / The Derg

Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 2

Two of Ethiopia’s concomitant civil wars began with the ousting (and eventual coup d’état) of Emperor Haile Selassie by the emergent Derg, even as their causes exist

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independent of this cataclysm. In this case, the cause was Eritrean Independence—something which Ethiopia’s new rulers were in no mood to entertain. Although Selassie had also taken steps to undermine Eritrean autonomy, it was clear that the “confederal” relationship that had existed from 1950 into the 1960’s was not to be had under the Derg.624

The EPLF was not the only Eritrean group fighting the Derg; indeed, it was not even the first. The Eritrean Liberation Front differed dramatically from its similarly named counterpart in ideology: the ELF was conservative and Islamic; the latter was Marxist-Leninist and uninterested in religion.625 By 1980, the EPLF was, for all intents and purposes, uncontested in its claim to represent Eritrean independence as an interest.626

In spite of a lack of outside inputs, the EPLF was generally successful in its aim to provide public goods.627 Their success on the front of healthcare was especially noteworthy given the lack of resources, but substantial gains were made regardless. The EPLF dispatched workers to remote locations to help treat maladies, but their primary aim was educational—they taught midwives as well as preventative and curative medicine in remote villages. In a country where substantial portions of the population may not have access to hospitals, this was a major landmark.

626 Prunier, “Eritrean Question,” 244-248; the ELF was liquidated the year after.
627 Connell, “Inside the EPLF,” 345-364
The EPLF was also deeply invested in the project of popular education, and aimed to provide it for as large a portion of its controlled territory as possible.\textsuperscript{628} This manifested itself in the provision of primary education for Eritreans,\textsuperscript{629} but it was not limited thereto. The group invested substantial resources into doctrinal education as well.\textsuperscript{630} In order to ensure that the population understood and accepted their political agenda, they trained scores of political organizers at cadre schools.

It is perhaps unsurprising given how EPLF education manifested itself, but the rebel group relied heavily on its supporters, even as it demanded complete and absolute obedience to their cause.\textsuperscript{631} On one hand, there was a great deal of interactivity between the average Eritrean and their wartime government, such as it was, including regular village elections.\textsuperscript{632} The degree to which the EPLF stressed popular democracy\textsuperscript{633} contrasts with the way in which dissent was treated. Considering themselves to be the Eritreans’ vanguard, the EPLF dealt with dissent in any and all forms quickly and brutally.\textsuperscript{634}

The elections themselves were arranged around local organizations known as \textit{baitos}.\textsuperscript{635} These organizations also served as the point where the EPLF interacted with the population of its controlled territory. This included the enforcement of EPLF law.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{628} Les Gottesman, \textit{To Fight and Learn: The Praxis and Promise of Literacy in Eritrea’s Independence War}, (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1998), 111-121
\item \textsuperscript{629} Kjetil Tronvoll, “The Process of Nation-Building in Post-War Eritrea: Created from below or Directed from above?” \textit{The Journal of Modern African Studies} 36, No. 3 (1998), 474, 480-481
\item \textsuperscript{630} Connell “Inside the EPLF,” 353-355
\item \textsuperscript{631} Prunier, “Eritrean Question,” 246-247
\item \textsuperscript{632} Connell, “Inside the EPLF,” 355
\item \textsuperscript{634} Prunier, “Eritrean Question,” 247
\item \textsuperscript{635} Tronvoll, “The Process of Nation-Building in Post-War Eritrea,” 465-470
\end{itemize}
Administrators—who themselves were accountable to both party and populace—could adjudicate disputes and assign punishments in a similar way as a judge might.


Rebels / Incumbents: Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) / The Derg

**Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 2**

The TPLF was born of anti-Derg sentiment in 1974. While initially of little concern, it emerged as both a potent fighting force and as effective governors as the war progressed. The TPLF was never as ideologically homogenous as its EPLF counterparts, but a philosophy of cooperative engagement informed the group’s activities as rebel rulers.

The primary means of delivering the goods of governance were local organizations known as *baitos*. These organizations helped to provide a level of domestic security—no mean feat given the Derg campaigns in Tigray. The localized organs served as a mechanism for confronting grievances as well as adjudicating cases within TPLF controlled territory.

The TPLF was largely successful in providing public goods. Like the EPLF, they took pains to teach the rural population their ideology. Indeed, formal education of children would take a backseat to political education or training when material shortages forced baito members to choose between the two, even as both were provided for absent

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638 Young, “Peasants and Revolution,” 273-274; the first baito appeared in 1980.

639 Segers et al, “Be Like the Bees,” 95-96
resource shortages.\textsuperscript{640} Similarly, the TPLF was successful in providing healthcare in its controlled territory.\textsuperscript{641} Just as with the rest of TPLF governance outputs, healthcare was administered from the local baitos.\textsuperscript{642}

Like the EPLF, the TPLF emphasized popular democracy at the village level, employing locally elected councils in the baitos.\textsuperscript{643} These councils produced policies that held sway within the localities, even as they differed from village to village. As can be gathered from this fact (and unlike the EPLF), the TPLF appeared to be somewhat tolerant of a degree of ideological dissent.

**Ethiopia (1977-1985)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) / The Derg

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Unlike its two more successful counterparts in Eritrea and Tigray, the Western Somali Liberation Front relied extensively on the intervention of foreign patrons. Once these Somali patrons had been routed in 1978, the group ceased to be a going concern.\textsuperscript{644} Although it lingered on in one form or another until 1985, the WSLF (and its splinter groups) posed little threat to the incumbent Derg after their 1978 defeat. The reason for this was the group’s ties and reliance upon their patron, the Somali state. Once defeated in the field, both rebels and patron suffered a rapid slide to obscurity and an agonizingly slow death.\textsuperscript{645}

\textsuperscript{640} Young, “Peasants and Revolution,” 204-205
\textsuperscript{641} Segers et al, “Be Like the Bees,” 95-96
\textsuperscript{642} Young, “Peasants and Revolution,” 204-205
\textsuperscript{643} Segers et al, “Be Like the Bees,” 95-96
Although better organized and more popular than their ideological cousins, the Somali-Abo Liberation Fron (SALF), neither group had anything more than the appearance of autonomy from their Somali patrons.\textsuperscript{646} Both in terms of their materiel and their organization, the two rebel groups were utterly dependent upon Somalia. In part because of this, the group’s part to play in the larger Ethiopian conflict was largely as a guerilla nuisance, lingering on just long enough after Somalia’s defeat to merit a concerted (and ultimately successful) campaign to snuff them out in 1985.\textsuperscript{647} Other than attempts to undermine Derg administration, these groups did not interact with issues of governance.


**Rebels / Incumbents:** Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia / Georgia

**Police/Justice:** 0; **Public Goods:** 0; **Feedback Mechanisms:** 1

Abkhazia’s war to secure its independence from Georgia began in response to the restoration of Georgia’s 1921 constitution (which stripped the region of its autonomy).\textsuperscript{648} Abkhazia was able to secure a cease-fire with the state in late 1993 and end the war entirely by the following spring, consolidating its military victory in the process. Interestingly, in spite of its de facto control of the its eponymous territory, it remains de jure a part of Georgia.

Abkhazia’s military victory obscures the fact that the would-be state did not establish control over its territory even afterward. For instance, Emzar Kvitsiani


\textsuperscript{647} Ibid. 663

\textsuperscript{648} Kolstø and Blakkisrud, “Living with Non-Recognition,” 485-486
maintained a Svan enclave during and after the conflict in the Kodori Gorge region.\textsuperscript{649} Even within its controlled territory, though, little in the way of infrastructure survived the conflict—what institutions and competencies exist in Abkhazia have, for the most part, been developed in the time since the war’s end.\textsuperscript{650} For instance, the Republic of Abkhazia has made some strides in rebuilding its educational infrastructure, but these strides took place after the war.\textsuperscript{651} During the war, most educational facilities in the would-be state were destroyed.

Although feedback mechanisms existed in the form of an Abkhazian parliament (in which the different ethnic groups were guaranteed a certain number of seats), wartime developments of this parliament were scarce. Its formation preceded the beginning of the conflict and its ratification of the fledgling proto-state’s constitution came after the war’s end—each by a matter of months.\textsuperscript{652} In addition to the relative lack of developments during the war, the would-be state’s parliament is quite weak institutionally, with little ability to check the postwar-created presidency’s allotted powers.\textsuperscript{653}

\textbf{Georgia – South Ossetia (1991-1992)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Republic of South Ossetia / Georgia

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 1}

The secessionist conflict in South Ossetia began just as the Soviet Union collapsed, but tensions between Georgia and the former Oblast had been rising for some

\textsuperscript{649} Ibid. 488-489
\textsuperscript{650} Tom Trier, Hedvig Lohm, and David Szakonyi, \textit{Under Siege: Inter-Ethnic Relations in Abkhazia}, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 7
\textsuperscript{651} Ibid. 58-66
\textsuperscript{653} Trier et al, \textit{Under Siege}, 87-88, 94
time. When Georgia declared its independence, it also revoked South Ossetia’s status as being an autonomous oblast. This appears to have been the raison de guerre.

The appearance of feedback mechanisms took place just prior to the war, with the newly formed South Ossetian Parliament coming into being nearly concomitantly with the war’s initiation. While this still technically falls outside the bounds of the war itself, the decision of that parliament to adopt a declaration of independence as its founding document weeks before the war’s conclusion counts as a substantial wartime development. In spite of this (and the development of three distinct political parties), South Ossetian civil society struggled to develop under conditions of near-anarchy. However, a referendum was held in January of 1992 to determine whether South Ossetia should join Russia. South Ossetians voted overwhelmingly to leave Georgia (Georgians did not participate in the referendum). Another such referendum was held in the months following the cessation of the conflict, and South Ossetia has maintained de facto independence since.

Other forms of governance have been a bit scarcer. There was only enough time to organize paramilitary fighters during the conflict, and South Ossetia has continued to lack effective, formal law enforcement organs. Several attempts have been made by foreign groups to produce law and order within the region, with dispiriting results.

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656 Kolstø and Blakkisrud, “Living with Non-Recognition,” 504-505
659 König, “Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict,” 238-244
President Saakashvili attempted to use the provision of healthcare as an olive branch some ten years after the conflict’s ending, but provision before then appears to have been quite poor. Even outside of the breakaway republics, Georgian healthcare provision was in the midst of collapse. Moreover, in spite of the existence of nominally independent representative organs, education in South Ossetia was allowed to decay over the course of the conflict, reflecting the state of South Ossetian medical care.

Guatemala (1963-1996)

Rebels / Incumbents: Several; Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), Guatemalan Party of Labor (PGT), united as Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) since 1982 / Paramilitary groups, Guatemala

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The Guatemalan civil war began as rebel groups composed of reformist military personnel and land-poor Guatemalans (many of whom were victims of land grabs by wealthier individuals) took up arms against the state’s military government. The various rebel movements were hamstrung by their own lack of coordination and the willingness of the military establishment to employ extraordinary brutality in its counterinsurgent efforts. Even after the rebel groups united in 1982, Guatemala’s rebels were on the ropes. Although they regrouped by the end of the decade, Guatemala’s military (and military-aligned militias) were better equipped and organized than the

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661 Kolstø and Blakkisrud, “Living with Non-Recognition,” 497-498
guerillas, placing them at a distinct disadvantage. Even had URNG adopted a strategy of taking and holding territory, they would likely have been unsuccessful.

In spite of the rebels’ reliance on sympathetic civilians for food, the URNG (and its constituent groups) did not adopt a strategy of holding territory, in part due to its strategic disadvantages. This made rebel governance especially difficult. It did not help matters that URNG was a coalition. Although the group took pains to enumerate something like a unified political agenda, the disparate ideologies which composed it made this difficult. This was also reflected in the lack of success the group had in leveraging its newfound solvency in the 1990’s, as they failed to secure a place in the postwar order beyond legalization as a political party. The group was further hamstrung by an apparent lack of sophistication, causing it to lean heavily upon moderators in the negotiations themselves.

**Guinea-Bissau (1998)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Ansumane Mane and allied portion of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces / Guinea-Bissau

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

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664 Daniel Wilkinson, *Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 217-251; Wilkinson’s interviews demonstrate the degree to which Guatemala’s military exercised de jure and de facto control of territory, even where guerillas were operating.


Ansumane Mane, on the verge of being implicated in a scandal related to the sale of arms to Senegal, organized sympathetic elements of the armed forces to attempt a coup d’état.668 Between the somewhat dubious accusations leveled against him and public dissatisfaction with governmental corruption and a generally low standard of living, Mane had little trouble attracting followers. The coup quickly became a war, as the brief war became extraordinarily bloody.

Mane retained a substantial portion of power after the peace agreement was signed. Nevertheless, the promised elections were held on schedule.669 However, very little took place during the fighting other than the fighting itself.670 Mane, a military commander himself, busied himself with the business of the war, trusting that the postwar process would revitalize the democratic institutions that already existed. Other than the organizing of the belligerents, no rebel governance manifested itself during this brief conflict.

India (1984-1993)

Rebels / Incumbents: Khalistan Separatists / India

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Although the civil war had technically begun already, Operation Bluestar marked the largest confrontation between Sikh separatists aiming at establishing an independent Khalistan and Indian forces.671 Although the operation successfully ejected the separatist militants from their fortified position inside Marmandir Sahib, the operation also left

670 Henrik Vigh, “Confictual Motion and Political Inertia: On Rebellions and Revolutions in Bissau and Beyond,” African Studies Review 52, No. 2 (2009), 143-164
Punjab’s Sikhs deeply alienated, in no small part due to the places symbolism in India’s founding. This alienation likely played a role in the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards. Ghandi’s popularity outside of Punjab then fueled brutal reprisals in the form of deadly riots.

Although the separatists were rumored to have established their own civil administration within their pockets of controlled territory, instruments of limited Sikh autonomy already existed at the time of the conflict’s beginning. Indeed, elections to the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC)—an organ which handles religious questions and administers Sikh places of worship—are (and were) conducted by the state. However, over the course of the conflict, some extra-state institutions emerged. For instance, the independent Panthic Committee was created by militants in 1986. However, this and other institutional actions (disbanding the SGPC, appointing a jathedar outside of SGPC auspices) were themselves subversions of elected Sikh officials. Regardless of their popularity, these actions do not qualify as additional feedback mechanisms.

This appears to be the extent of Khalistani institutional development, as the groups pushing for independence suffered a myriad of obstacles. In spite of assistance from mass organizations in Punjab beginning before the conflict, Khalistan separatism became increasingly unpopular as allegations of rape and murder on the part of militants spread throughout the state. Inconsistent support from Pakistan also made consolidation

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672 It is near the site of a 1919 peaceful protest which was itself ended violently when British troops fired upon the crowd, killing upwards of 400 people.
673 Ibid. 592-594
675 Peter A. Kiss, Winning Wars Amongst the People: Case Studies in Asymmetric Conflict, (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2014), 89
difficult, as it meant that the material disadvantage suffered by the militants was unlikely to be remedied. Thirdly, beginning in 1988, factional rivalries left the movement deeply divided, preventing the consolidation of their meagre resources. Finally, the Indian government instituted a brutal campaign to stamp out militancy in Punjab, overwhelming what remained of militant forces.

Indonesia (1975-1999)

Rebels / Incumbents: Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor Leste (Fretilin, or as their armed win is referred, Falintil) and National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) / Indonesia

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 1

East Timor (or Timor Leste) emerged from Portuguese colonialism into an even more dire circumstance with Indonesian occupation. Considering East Timor to be a part of Indonesia proper, Suharto’s Indonesia consistently employed extraordinary brutality in dealing with Timor Leste independence movements, regardless of their own violence. In the face of genocidal violence by the incumbents, East Timor’s rebels were able to make extremely limited progress in the realm of rebel governance.

Fretilin took advantage of the mountainous territory away from the would-be state’s coast as a base of operations. In spite of this, their ambitious governance

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677 Van Dyke, “The Khalistan Movement,” 990-994
679 Peter Carey, “Secede and We Destroy You,” The World Today 55, No. 10 (1999), 4-5
682 Ibid. 179
agenda, formed before the conflict began, pressed forward. From their isolated enclaves, they attempted to establish programs of education and literacy. Unfortunately, the majority of the population remained in Indonesian controlled territory, which was itself subject to a substantial education program aimed at socializing new generations of complacent Indonesian citizens. Beyond these programs, though, there is little evidence of rebel governance as Fretilin clung to life for the first decade of the conflict.

Beginning in the late 1980’s and continuing until the conflict’s close in 1999, other groups (including the CNRT and the increasingly independent Falintil) began to more directly and actively participate in the effort to secure Timorese independence. Interestingly, this coincided with the development of a more concrete system of parallel governance in East Timor. This “Clandestine System” supported resistance fighters and aided communication within the movement. More importantly, this parallel system of governance was meant to recruit support among the population with the aid of leaders selected from among their number by their number (even though not by way of formal elections).

Indonesia (1990-1991)

Rebels / Incumbents: Free Aceh Movement / Indonesia

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

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Concomitantly with the then ongoing conflict in East Timor, separatists in the Free Aceh Movement were engaged in a struggle to liberate their small, eponymous corner of Sumatra. Although the movement originated in the 1970’s, emerging from some elements which had survived the Darul Islam rebellion, its impact was marginal for quite some time. Indonesia authorities had effectively eliminated GAM’s presence from the country in 1979, devoting counter-insurgency resources in spite of its still marginal size. By 1989, though, the movement had recovered, sporting hundreds of foreign-trained fighters in the place of the marginal presence it had previously. This led to the Jaring Mereh operation—“Red Net” in English.

The movement had established something of a government shortly after its formation. However, this existed more in theory than in practice; beyond a promise of popular choice of regime, there was nothing resembling a feedback mechanism in place here, even as the movement relied heavily upon popular support. The impact of Aceh governance is further diminished by the brutality and completeness of its defeat in 1991—although many elements of the movement were able to flee into exile, its active presence in Aceh was effectively ended (for a time).

**Indonesia (1999-2002)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Free Aceh Movement / Indonesia

**Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 1**

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689 Ibid. 11

690 Ibid. 5
The Free Aceh Movement spotted an opportunity to reconstitute itself after Suharto’s departure from power. This second chapter also saw more opportunities to develop manifestations of rebel governance. For instance, the movement was successful in establishing a parallel legal system. Still, in spite of the appearance of institutions suggesting as much, law and order was not forthcoming. Neither Indonesian nor GAM forces were terribly well-disciplined and human rights abuses were common. Moreover, the “law” in law and order was subject to substantial variance—because of the latitude GAM gave to its commanders, some areas were subject to morality policing in the Islamist mold. Others were not, though, as the particular role of Islam in GAM was open to a great deal of interpretation.

Public goods are another matter. Public good provision on behalf of the state continued in GAM-controlled territory, it did not do so without interruption. Dozens of teachers were killed between 1998 and 2002, and hundreds more assaulted. Indonesian security forces are to blame for a substantial portion of these, but so are the GAM—they believe that the state education system has been an important tool of marginalizing the Aceh people’s uniqueness. Kirsten Schulze suspects that the GAM may have been motivated by the fact that many of the alternatives to state education were GAM-controlled. As such, even though the GAM was participating in destroying the state’s capacity to provide public goods, they were also engaged in the practice—at least where education was concerned.

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691 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 102
692 Schulze, Free Aceh Movement, 7-8
694 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 102
695 Schulze, Free Aceh Movement, 36-37
Health care is more difficult to discern. On one hand, Mampilly notes that GAM was content to allow the extant health care structure to operate. On the other, Damien Kingsbury notes that in addition to most of the education in the region, GAM had taken on a majority of the region’s health care responsibilities. These statements, taken together are somewhat problematic. They are further clouded by the fact that as a political party after the war, the movement called for free education and health care as major planks of its platform. This leads one to a few conclusions. First, it seems that GAM did administer public good provision to some degree, even if this administration involved some degree of cooption. This is clearer for education than for healthcare, but the point stands. Second, they did not administer the sum total of public good provision within Aceh, in spite of their dominance of the region. This means that the Indonesian government maintained some control over its provision. At the same time, the destruction of facilities and calls from the Aceh Party (PA) to establish greater access to public services suggests that their provision was not as robust as it might be, a conclusion supported by government-reported statistics.

The presence of feedback mechanisms within GAM is also somewhat contested. After the demise of Suharto’s New Order Government, GAM instituted traditional

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696 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 102
697 Kingsbury, 171
699 Schulze, Free Aceh Movement, 35; this is supported by interviews with GAM officials from 2002, which note that Indonesian civil servants were allowed to operate much like they had previously because of their expertise.
700 Ibid. 2; by 2003, GAM controlled between 70 and 80 percent of Aceh.
These structures privileged local input and included an elected eight member council of elders for each village. This suggests that these feedback mechanisms were quite strong. In practice, however, the positions on the council were often passed down hereditarily.

**Indonesia (2003-2005)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Free Aceh Movement / Indonesia

**Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 1**

The final chapter saw a natural disaster and the abandonment of independence as an ultimate aim, but little in the way of new rebel governance outcomes. Policing and justice saw some development, albeit largely in the form of acceptance by the population. The courts had gained considerable legitimacy in the eyes of the Acehnese people by this final stage of the conflict. This was in part due to the fact that rebel-run courts were more likely to be functional at the time, but the point stands, with the help of religious leaders, GAM was able to provide an approximation of a judiciary during this final chapter of the armed conflict.

Where public goods are concerned, the calls for health care and education suggested that provision was far from perfect. However, in this final chapter, the relationships between the GAM and local religious leaders bore substantial fruit in this realm. While originally skeptical of their independence project (or at the very least

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Kingsbury, 172-174
Schulze, *Free Aceh Movement*, 34-35
Stange and Patock, “Rebels to Rulers,” 113-114; Fan, “Protecting Land Rights,” 161
skeptical that they should become involved), their cooperation aided GAM’s governance project, both in terms of shoring up its legitimacy with local populations and in terms of supporting their efficacy. Although this contributed to the operation of the courts, this was clearest in the case of religious schools from this time period, which relied heavily on the resources of local ulama.707

In spite of GAM’s developments as a political actor, some observers remained skeptical of their efficacy as such an actor, even after the conflict ended.708 This did not stop them from trying during the conflict, however. Although their capabilities were hamstrung by Indonesian military successes and the capture of civilian leaders, GAM attempted to consolidate their status as competent and legitimate civilian leaders.709 Much of it had collapsed by the time the tsunami hit, though, leaving the movement without much of its local civilian political capital.

Iran (1979-1984)

Rebels / Incumbents: Kurdish Separatists / Islamic Republic of Iran

Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 1

Iran’s Kurds had been vocal proponents of removing the Shah during the Iranian Revolution. However, Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology left little room for Kurdish autonomy.710 While Kurdish community in Iran was riven with ideological fault lines, those who wished for autonomy took umbrage at Khomeini’s assertion that the

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708 Jeroen De Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements,” From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War, ed. Jeroen De Zeeuw, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 2
710 Nader Entessar, “The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary Iraq and Iran,” Third World Quarterly 6, No. 4 (1984), 923-927
(specifically Shi’ite) Muslim identity of Iranians would transcend all other signifiers in the new regime. Not only were most Iranian Kurds Sunni, but many (especially Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini) believed Iran’s budding theocracy to be a substantial threat to the Kurds’ cultural and ethnic separateness.

In the wake of the revolution (and perhaps anticipating issues with the ascendant revolutionary government), Iran’s Kurds began asserting their autonomy, holding local elections and reviving old political organizations.\footnote{Ibid. 924-925} This political activity was not restricted to extra-state manifestations, though—although many Kurds participated in the boycott of the Islamic Republic referendum, Kurdish candidates stood for election in the resultant parliament.\footnote{Hashem Ahmadzadeh and Gareth Stansfield, “The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran,” \textit{Middle East Journal} 64, No. 1 (2010), 17-21} The degree of political organization among Kurdish officials (particularly the Kurdish Democratic Party) and its control of Iranian Kurdistan meant that the famously recalcitrant Islamic Republic negotiated with Kurdish leadership on occasion. This is particularly impressive given the number of different factions within Iran’s Kurdish community.

This was hardly window-dressing—the KDP maintained a remarkable level of parallel administration until its territory was conquered in 1983.\footnote{Martin van Bruinessen, “The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq,” \textit{MERIP Middle East Report}, No. 141 (1986), 20-22} In addition to arranging local elections, KDP administration produced schools and hospitals for Iranian Kurdistan, as well as “a court of law with an experienced and professional judge.”\footnote{Ibid. 22} Interestingly, the KDP was willing to exist as an autonomous region \textit{within} Iran, in spite
of this parallel administration (at least in the wake of the revolution).\textsuperscript{715} This mattered little in the end, though; independent Kurdistan was effectively liquidated in Iran by 1984.

**Iraq (1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Various Dissident Factions (South) and Kurdistan (North) / Iraq

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, fresh off being routed in Kuwait, faced an uprising beginning in March of 1991—although it may be more accurate to describe the civil war as consisting of two distinct uprisings. Southern towns, beginning with Basra, fell to a largely spontaneous and unorganized uprising of dissidents who noticed the flagging state power’s vulnerability.\textsuperscript{716} In spite of early successes, by late March the Ba’athists had regained control of its Southern territories, aided by the lack of any sort of organization to the uprising.

The Kurdish involvement in the uprising was more organized than its southern counterpart, but the outcome was similar.\textsuperscript{717} Fueled by horrors of living in Saddam’s Iraq, Kurdish attacks on Iraqi state organs were brutal. Little in the way of new organs of governance replaced the smoldering ruins of the Ba’athist administration, though. As Kurdistan fell, much of the organizational capital that did exist was put to use organizing large-scale evacuations to avoid chemical weapons attacks.\textsuperscript{718}


\textsuperscript{716} Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 45-49

\textsuperscript{717} Ibid, 45-50

In neither case was there substantial governance efforts on the part of the rebels. In spite of the state’s inability to meet the populations’ need of public goods in the wake of the war, the rebels generally failed to fill the gap with one exception.\textsuperscript{719} When one notes that the uprisings barely survived into April, this becomes easy to understand; the southern rebels hardly had time to be “stationary” bandits. With that said, Kurdish rebels had established a means by which they could take advantage of the not insignificant number of trained medical personnel.\textsuperscript{720}

**Ivory Coast (2002-2005)**

Rebels / Incumbents: New Forces (FN), Patriotic Movement of the Ivory Coast (MPCI) / Ivory Coast, government-aligned militias

**Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 1**

Ivory Coast’s civil war began as motive merged with opportunity for the largely Muslim northern region of the country. Amidst the chaos surrounding a power transition in the country and a failed coup the Forces Nouvelles (“New Forces” in English) quickly gained control of the northern, inland region of the West African state.\textsuperscript{721} Their raison de guerre appears to have been a policy of exclusion of the northern, largely Muslim population, brought on as ethnic tensions emerged in the wake of a struggling economy.\textsuperscript{722} In spite of the economic struggles that had gripped the country, the FN was successful in providing the goods of governance to the population in its controlled

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\textsuperscript{719} Abbas Alnawrawi, “Iraq: Economic Consequences of the 1991 Gulf War and Future Outlook,” *Third World Quarterly* 13, No. 2 (1992), 344-345

\textsuperscript{720} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 103

\textsuperscript{721} Peter Custers, “Globalisation and War in Ivory Coast,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 41, No. 19, (2006), 1844-1846

\textsuperscript{722} Lorenzo Rocco, and Zié Ballo, “Provoking a Civil War,” *Public Choice* 134, No. 3/4 (2008), 347-349
territory, especially after the creation of La Centrale in 2004, an organization which provided a comprehensive framework for administering FN territory.\(^\text{723}\)

In addition to an elaborate apparatus of taxation and regulation, FN produced functioning policing and justice functions in the northern regions of the state.\(^\text{724}\) Its functions had been coopted by acquisitive rebels by 2007, but these functions were nevertheless present over the course of the conflict. This is particularly the case in the wake of 2004’s reorganization, in which military, political, financial elements of the movement were given their own semi-autonomous wings. Even aside from cooption, the function of policing and justice under FN was not perfect.\(^\text{725}\) Although they excelled at maintaining internal domestic security, they were far less successful performing adjudicative functions. Their attempts at doing so took a few forms, but ultimately adjudicative functions were ceded to civil society actors who established such functions under FN supervision.

Similarly, although schools and hospitals were already present in spite of the Ivorian state’s lack of reach in the country’s Northeast region, the FN did oversee the construction of additional education and healthcare facilities.\(^\text{726}\) This is important as many Ivorians had been resentful at the degree to which these projects relied on volunteer organizations.\(^\text{727}\) With that said, the availability of education and (especially) medicine

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\(^\text{726}\) Ibid. 230-231

was limited in rebel-controlled areas.\textsuperscript{728} This was especially disappointing to Ivorians who had seen the dispensation of medical treatment in the wake of rebel victories by said rebel medics.\textsuperscript{729}

The FN struggled to engender lasting popular support for their movement in spite of these functions, though. Although in part due to the governance functions being coopted for the enrichment of rebels\textsuperscript{730} and the perception among the Lobi people that the FN was taxing them especially heavily, the ineffectuality of feedback mechanisms did not help matters. Indeed, the FN actively undermined what feedback mechanisms existed as a part of the previous regime.\textsuperscript{731} However, the FN did contain an organ intended to mobilize popular support and register discontent known as the Délégant General.\textsuperscript{732} Additionally, this organization was intended to make decisions regarding the dedication of resources to provide public goods (as well as coordinating relationships with NGOs for similar purposes). However, FN’s attempts at feedback mechanisms were not terribly successful. For instance, the function of public meetings to register dissent was diminished by the fact that even politicians felt intimidated into acquiescence. By conflict’s end, popular sentiment was strong enough that dissent against its rule was registered, but response to it was underwhelming; the FN did not begin ceding autonomy to local civil society actors until well after this chapter of the conflict had ended.\textsuperscript{733}

\textbf{Kosovo (1998-1999)}

\textsuperscript{728} Camelia Minoiu and Olga Shemyakina, “Child Health and Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire,” \textit{The American Economic Review} 102, No. 3 (2012), 294-299
\textsuperscript{730} Speight, “Rebel Organisation,” 227-228
\textsuperscript{731} Speight, “Warlord undone?” 230-236
\textsuperscript{732} Speight, “‘Big-Men’ Coalitions,” 117-123
\textsuperscript{733} Speight, “Warlord Undone?” 230-236
Rebels: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) / Serbia

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Displeased with the outcomes of the various civil wars that emerged from Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the KLA staged a brief insurgency at the end of the 1990’s. While some have argued that the KLA should have been treated as a terrorist organization, others point to the continued repression experienced by the non-Serbian population at the hands of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as reason enough for the KLA’s resort to violence. The KLA’s success rested to a large extent on its ability to convince others to intervene on its behalf, but it took pains to cultivate genuine popular support.

In part due to Milosevic’s use of ethnic cleansing and recruitment of criminal elements to help contain the insurgency, the KLA had few opportunities to establish parallel governance structures. They did try to leverage their continued existence and resistance to provide ethnic Albanians with the Woodian “pleasure of agency,” demonstrating to the put-upon population that resistance was indeed possible. The KLA appeared to willingly surrender some of its autonomy in 1999, though, as international involvement became more likely in the wake of the Racak Massacre. This was, after all, a major goal of the insurgency—attract foreign intervention so that Serbian military might could be effectively countered.

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734 Henry H. Perritt Jr., Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of An Insurgency, (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 8-12
736 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 48-56, 62-64
The postwar period is particularly instructive. The KLA, conquering heroes of Kosovar Albanians, became a growing political problem, as mayhem committed by young “fighters” claiming to be KLA veterans became more than just a public nuisance.\footnote{Perritt, 152-158} This became one of the factors driving Kosovo’s elections—in order to prevent rule by insurgent fighters, Kosovo’s population must have the opportunity to vote for someone else. This is significant as it demonstrates the relative lack of a political project during the conflict. The sum total of the KLA’s political project was secession by force of arms, hopefully supported by foreign intervention. Beyond this, there appears to have been no attempts at rebel governance.

**Lebanon (1975-1990)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Muslim militias,\footnote{This depiction of the various alliances somewhat simplistic as Sunni and Shiite Muslims were technically competing over representation as the consociational arrangement of the country, even though broadly speaking, Shiite and Sunni militias allied with each other to fight Maronite ones. Indeed, some of the fiercest inter-Muslim violence took place when Hezbollah and Amal (both Shiite) clashed towards the conflict’s end. This is hardly the exception, though, as most of the combatants found themselves fighting most other combatants, regardless of religious or political affiliation, at some point in the conflict (see: Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, trans. John Richardson, (Beirut: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993), x-xi)} Syria, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) / Lebanon, Christian militias, Israel

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The Lebanese Civil War is extraordinarily complicated. In addition to the scores of “sides” which participate, the coalitions collapse and reform several times over the war’s 15 years. Making matters still more complicated, the war has three distinct stages. The initial conflict burns out quickly, lasting only from 1975 to 1976.\footnote{Edgar O’Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 14-16} Syria intervened in 1976 (although not on the side of the Muslim Lebanese National Movement (LNM)),...
in part out of fear of what might happen should the conflict continue to rage on but in part out of fear of what might happen should the LNM’s PLO allies come to dominate the alliance.\textsuperscript{741} Between 1976 and 1982, the Lebanese government (under the watchful eye of Syria) attempted to work out an agreement between the warring sides.\textsuperscript{742}

This simmering conflict transformed back into all out war shattered when Israel invaded in 1982, allying itself with the Christian Lebanese Front (LF).\textsuperscript{743} Amal and the Progressive Social Party (PSP) composed the largest Muslim coalition at this point, with both parties emerging from the dilapidating LNM-PLO alliance. While the LF, PSP, and Amal hammered out the terms of the Taif Agreement which would ultimately serve as the instrument by which the war was ended, Hezbollah began to emerge in 1988, largely as a result of Iranian patronage and direction.\textsuperscript{744}

In spite of the large number of combatants in the conflict, rebel governance was hard to come by. The constant rearrangement of alliances\textsuperscript{745} contributed to this, as did the nominal functioning of the state and state services, even as their actual provision collapsed. The most culpable appears to have been the groups themselves, who often endeavored to secure some sort of concessions instead of territory.\textsuperscript{746} This undoubtedly reduced the costs of such campaigns—it is far easier to inflict pain than to establish some means of administering territory and people.

\textsuperscript{742} Marius Deeb, \textit{The Lebanese Civil War}, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1980), 52-56
\textsuperscript{744} Harris, \textit{New Face}, 180-188
\textsuperscript{745} There were far too many shifts in alliances to list their entire number here.
\textsuperscript{746} Hanf, \textit{Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon}, 357-360
This was not always the case, though. Early in the conflict, Christian militias coordinated to try and secure a contiguous Christian enclave.\textsuperscript{747} Interestingly, though, the only evidence of rebel governance came at the hands of the PLO, who had relocated much of their infrastructure from Jordan to Lebanon before the war began.\textsuperscript{748} This infrastructure included the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), which operated clinics and hospitals within Lebanon (albeit not exclusively for their benefit).\textsuperscript{749} The organization also runs a teacher’s union, but this appears to have been incorporated within the larger infrastructure of Lebanese education, not as a parallel institution within controlled territory.\textsuperscript{750} Additionally, although the PLO sports a complex system of consensus governance, this system operates outside of territorial bounds—indeed, the largest delegation within the central committee as of 1982 was in Jordan. However, it appears that this manifestation was some form of rebel governance—indeed, Edouard Ghurra, Lebanon’s delegate to the UN, described the PLO as operating a “state within a state” as a means of establishing the group’s nefarious intentions.\textsuperscript{751} Israel’s invasion in 1982 spelled the end of the PLO\textsuperscript{752} as it had operated previously,\textsuperscript{753} but these attempts at governance are noteworthy all the same.

**Liberia (1989-1993)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) / Liberia (later ULIMO)

\textsuperscript{747} A.J. Abraham, *The Lebanon War*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1996), 88-100
\textsuperscript{748} Zeev Moaz, *Defending the Holy Land*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 175-176
\textsuperscript{749} Cheryl A. Rubenberg, “The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Analysis of the PLO in Lebanon Until June 1982,” *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 12, No. 3 (1983), 54-78
\textsuperscript{750} It appears that the PRCS did some of this as well, although its direct connection to the PLO, a party to the conflict, makes this less conceptually problematic.
\textsuperscript{751} Abraham, *The Lebanon War*, 93
\textsuperscript{753} Helen Cobban, “The Dilemma of the PLO,” *MERIP Reports*, No. 119 (1983), 3-6
Liberia’s first civil war brought with it a rapid descent into pandemonium. President Samuel Doe suffered a distressing deficit of legitimacy stemming from allegations that his 1985 election had been determined by way of electoral fraud.\textsuperscript{754} Worse, even though rebel forces controlled the vast majority of the country outside of the capital Monrovia, NPFL leader Charles Taylor seemed singularly disinterested in governing, even when it came to disciplining his own forces.\textsuperscript{755}

In these early stages, the closest thing to policing came in the form of brutal reprisals against starving looters on the part of what passed for the standing armies in the conflict.\textsuperscript{756} The general lack of discipline on the part of the rebels and the lack of interest in policing their newfound territory meant that the NPFL were contributing to the war’s chaos rather than causing it to abate. This diminished somewhat after the war’s first spasms of brutality, although it was hardly due to Taylor’s (or his lieutenants’) direct efforts.\textsuperscript{757} He encouraged traditional sources of localized authority to operate as they had previously but did nothing to directly aid in their administration of justice.\textsuperscript{758}

Health provision was also especially poor. The country’s hospitals ceased functioning almost as soon as the war began, leaving patients in desperately squalid conditions.\textsuperscript{759} Lack of funds, staff, and even electricity meant that the sick or injured were

\textsuperscript{756} Jaye, \textit{Issues of Sovereignty}, 121-130; the would-be police officers would then steal the belongings that had been looted for themselves.
\textsuperscript{757} Felix Gerdes, \textit{Civil War and State Formation: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Liberia}, (Frankfurt-on-Main: Campus, 2013), 64-73
\textsuperscript{758} RENAMO adopted this strategy as well
\textsuperscript{759} Jaye, \textit{Issues of Sovereignty}, 127, 134
better off fending for themselves than going to a hospital. Schools suffered similar neglect—mass education was not a priority in the midst of the conflict, and so its provision dwindled.  

Although one could be forgiven for believing that feedback mechanisms had either formed or functioned over the conflict’s course, this is not the case. Originally, elections had been scheduled for October, 1991. These elections were never held. There was an election held for an interim president in 1990, won by Amos Sawyer. However, this was not a popular election; Sawyer was selected by a group of delegates at The Banjul Conference. While elections were held after the war’s close, little development of feedback mechanisms appear during the conflict.

**Liberia (1994-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: NPFL / ULIMO

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Much that can be said about the Liberian civil war’s first chapter can be said about its second. Taylor’s NPFL did little to further the provision of policing, justice, or public goods from 1994 to 1996. This was especially detrimental as civil society actors were often unable or unwilling to fill the gap. Liberia’s population, Emmanuel Dolo argues, had been conditioned to expect disappointing outcomes from political leaders. This was exacerbated by the fact that public service was viewed as a means of extracting rents rather than of providing effective administration.

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762 Jaye, *Issues of Sovereignty*, 147-149

While the interim government remained in some form until the end of the conflict, its activity as a feedback mechanism did not manifest itself until the July, 1997 elections.\footnote{Waugh, \textit{Charles Taylor}, 174-178, 228-236} In spite of the apparent legitimacy of those elections,\footnote{This has come under scrutiny since the initially positive evaluation.} governance outcomes were uninspiring even after Taylor’s electoral victory, to say nothing of their status beforehand.\footnote{Gerdes, \textit{Civil War and State Formation}, 132-140} It appears that the statebuilding efforts that took place after this chapter’s close were working with very little native resources on the part of the rebels.

\textbf{Liberia (1999-2003)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) / Liberia

\textbf{Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 1}

Charles Taylor’s postwar peace was quite brief, as simmering discontent with his regime (from both opponents and would-be clients) paired with his inability to establish a monopoly of force within the state meant recidivism was hardly surprising, albeit with Taylor playing the part of the incumbent in this chapter.\footnote{Ibid. 154-168} This combined with Taylor’s difficulties securing revenue meant that his defeat should also come as little surprise.\footnote{This was in part an administrative failure, but it was also in part due to UN sanctions applied in May of 2001, (see: Jaye, \textit{Issues of Sovereignty}, 208).} What is somewhat surprising was that a) Taylor had the opportunity to resign and flee into exile without much protest from the victorious rebels and that b) he actually took it.

The LURD rebels (many of whom were late of ULIMO) took pains to make themselves seem legitimate, both to the outside world and to their fellow Liberians.\footnote{Gerdes, \textit{Civil War and State Formation}, 168-172} In addition to rigorous discipline within their ranks (especially with regards to the treatment...
of civilians), LURD established a separate and (to a certain extent) effective civil administrative apparatus. In particular, they were concerned with providing domestic security and with refilling civil administrative positions within controlled territories (the new occupants of these offices often came from the populations themselves). Although the particulars of the larger structure of this administration are difficult to determine, there is a degree of local representation in the group’s political wing, as well as ministries for the provision of public goods.\textsuperscript{770} Although discipline within their ranks was extremely inconsistent in spite of its emphasis on the part of the commanders, this was diminished by the impressing of refugees into a fact-finding mission to examine civilian-rebel interactions. Moreover, as a part of its effort to increase discipline, the group established “forums for hearing local grievances” against rebel fighters.\textsuperscript{771} While LURD’s legitimacy-seeking behavior bore some fruit, they were hardly model governors and by no means free of deliberate attacks on civilian populations.

Their targeted attacks on civilian areas are especially problematic from a governance standpoint. In addition to effectively emptying Ganta—once a regional hub—of its civilian population, the town’s education and healthcare infrastructure had been obliterated by the conflict, with little (if anything) appearing in its place.\textsuperscript{772} Additionally, in spite of attempts at reining in disorderly soldiers, LURD’s fighters regularly preyed upon the populations in their controlled territories.\textsuperscript{773} Moreover, LURD units would

\textsuperscript{772} Waugh, \textit{Charles Taylor}, 264-268
\textsuperscript{773} Lidow, “Rebel Governance,” 18-19
routinely execute prisoners of war who do not show remorse and some reports point to particular brutality in the treatment of those POW’s who did not wish to join the cause.\textsuperscript{774}

MODEL was less successful, although their ambitions were similar in kind, if not magnitude, to those of LURD.\textsuperscript{775} MODEL’s commanders took pains to instill some degree of discipline among their numbers (albeit with limited success). Although there was a much ballyhooed instance of MODEL soldiers repairing damaged streetlights after taking a town, the extent of MODEL’s governance could be charitably described as “benign neglect.”

\textbf{Mali (1990-1995)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Several. Some include MPA (Azawad People's Movement) FIAA (Islamic Arab Front), MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), FPLA (Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA), which became ARLA (Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad) a few months later / Mali

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

Mali’s civil war technically dragged on for five years, but the actual incidence of conflict was far more sporadic than other conflicts of similar length.\textsuperscript{776} There was little cohesion among the various Tuareg rebel groups. Dissolution, absorption, and reformation was common. Indeed, one of the primary reasons the conflict dragged on for as long as it did was the fact that Mali’s army did such a poor job discriminating between rebel and civilian, leading many of the latter category to support the former.\textsuperscript{777}

\textsuperscript{774} Brabazon, “LURD,” 8
\textsuperscript{775} Gerdes, Civil War and State Formation, 172
\textsuperscript{776} Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96,” Journal of Peace Research 34, No. 3 (1997), 351
\textsuperscript{777} Baz Lecocq and Georg Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali,” International Journal 68, No. 3 (2013), 426-428
The chaos among the rebel groups was not conducive to the production of the goods of governance. One of the Tuareg rebels’ raisons de guerre was a lack of access to services—particularly health and education—and this was not changed by the end of the conflict. Moreover, while the Malian government has held elections (including one during the conflict) and incorporated Tuareg into the armed forces and police, there is little evidence of the rebels providing these things for themselves during the conflict.

Moldova (1991-1992)

Rebels / Incumbents: Transnistra Separatists / Moldova

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The civil war in Moldova pitted newly independent Moldova against its secessionist, ostensibly pro-Russian region to the east of the Dniester River. Although the war began with a Transnistran referendum result which appears to support independence, this may not necessarily be the case. First, the referendum calls for independence under the auspices of the Soviet Union—something of a contradiction in terms. Second, the referendum was conducted under less than free and fair circumstances. Igor Smirnov’s supporters intimidated and killed critics of independence in the region and portrayed non-independence as tantamount to annexation by Romania.

781 Ibid. 128; Smirnov became the president as a result of the referendum.
Additionally, much of the parallel state’s functions’ development took place after the war had come to a close.\textsuperscript{782}

Instead, after securing an ostensible mandate to rule the would-be state, Igor Smirnov and his supporters threw their efforts into recruiting support for the war effort. This came in the form of volunteers from Transnistria, naturally, but also included calls for support from Russia.\textsuperscript{783} Russian intervention was crucial to securing a negotiated end (or pause) to the conflict, but efforts to incorporate Transnistran interests into Moldova’s governance structure have been met with hostility on the part of the separatists. Instead, the separatists have busied themselves trying to establish a facsimile of a functional state, with mixed results at best.\textsuperscript{784}

Morocco (1976-1991)

Rebels / Incumbents: Polisario Front / Morocco

Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 2

The Polisario Front was formed in 1973, before Morocco had a claim to Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{785} At the time, the region was still a Spanish colonial holding. By 1975, the UN was convinced that Western Sahara should become an independent state. However, Morocco, who had argued unsuccessfullly that it should be allowed to annex the region in 1956, invaded, quickly securing de facto control. Shortly thereafter, Spain relinquished


\textsuperscript{783} Charles King, “Moldova and the New Bessarabian Questions,” \textit{The World Today} 49, No. 7 (1993), 135-139


its claim on Western Sahara. The Polisario front, still determined to secure independence, began a decades-long military and political campaign against Moroccan rule.

The Polisario Front have supported their cause internationally by seeking (and acquiring) membership into the Organization of African Unity in 1982 for their Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Although this led to chaos within the organization, its accession was not without reason; since the conflict’s outset, The Polisario Front has taken pains to establish a parallel state with all of the requisite institutional trappings. While SADR was by no means a consolidated state, it was able to provide some of the goods of governance to its subject population.

The most impressive of these trappings was SADR’s electoral basis. From early on in the conflict, the proto-state had a complex political authority structure that relied on popular elections. Although popular decision-making has roots in Sharawi culture, this is impressive nonetheless. Another element of rebel governance which manifested itself based in part on its place in Sahrawi culture is education. One of the first elements of governance the Polisario Front used against their former colonial masters was a series of schools for women which also served as a means of recruitment. While not as robust as its educational system, SADR also boasted a number of health clinics.

One of the reasons that SADR has been more successful in providing education than medicine is the problem of materials, but it also bears mentioning that education is also better incorporated into SADR’s micro-level political organization.

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787 Anne Lippert, “Sahrawi Women in the Liberation Struggle of the Sahrawi People,” *Signs* 17, No. 3 (1992), 639, 643-646
789 Raoul Weexstein, “Fighters in the Desert,” *MERIP Reports*, No. 45 (1976), 4
education as well as policing, justice, and food distribution are handled at this level, health is not\textsuperscript{790} (likely a reflection of the difficulties providing medicine in non-village camps). With that said, observers marveled at the degree to which these organizational implements functioned as designed in spite of the ongoing struggle against the Moroccan state.

\textbf{Mozambique (1982-1992)}

Rebels / Incumbents: RENAMO / FRELIMO

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

See Case Study in Chapter 5

\textbf{Nepal (1996-2006)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Communist Party of Nepal / Nepal

\textbf{Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 2}

Nepal’s Maoist insurgency was driven by a myriad of factors.\textsuperscript{791} Extreme poverty, official corruption, and the lack of meaningful change from democratization seem to have been especially effective, although this is hardly an exhaustive list. Regardless, the hills of mid-western Nepal (especially the Rolpa district) served as an incubator for a decade-long civil war which would see the end of a centuries-old monarchy.\textsuperscript{792}

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{790} Randa Farah, “Refugee Camps in the Palestinian and Sahrawi National Liberation Movements: A Comparative Perspective,” \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies}, 38, No. 2 (2009), 82-84; education is viewed as being especially critical to SADR’s ultimate success, as it provides a means of removing kinship barriers from its agenda of national liberation. This is doubly impressive when one considers the fact that the Polisario Front did not see itself as a vanguard, dictating emancipatory ideology to a captive audience (see: Stephen Zunes, “Nationalism and Non-Alignment: The Non-Ideology of the Polisario,” \textit{Africa Today} 34, No. 3 (1987), 39-40).
    \item \textsuperscript{791} Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, \textit{A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004}, (Chicago: Zed Books, 2004), 51-81
\end{itemize}
Nepal’s Maoists had a clear political agenda which from the beginning they took pains to establish. One of the first manifestations of this was the institution of “People’s Courts.” Corruption in state courts and pressure from insurgents ensured that there were always plenty of grievances that these ad-hoc courts could hear and adjudicate. Another early manifestation of Maoist governance was the collection of taxes, although some of the taxed would likely protest at these contributions being described as such. For instance, Nishchal Nath Pandey describes some of the contributions from banks as little more than robberies.

Between 1998 and 2001, the Communist Party of Nepal began to establish a more comprehensive “people’s government” as a parallel to the state. This allowed the party to set up a bounded matrix within which their subject populations could interact with the party and (more importantly) a means by which that population could participate in their own administration. People’s committees were filled originally by members selected during mass meetings, but soon after elections for positions were held. The administration also took over the provision of education, which was specifically anti-Sanskrit, as the institutions associated with religion in Nepal were seen as responsible for popular repression.

Nicaragua (1981-1989)

Rebels / Incumbents: Contras (Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), Misura) / Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

793 Ibid. 85-103
794 Nishchal Nath Pandey, Nepal’s Maoist Movement and Implications for India and China, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), 104-106
795 Thapa, Kingdom Under Siege, 106-109
The Sandinista rebels made quick work of Somoza’s repressive regime in Nicaragua, but their victory would be short-lived. Right wing militias formed in the wake of the revolution began to violently contest Sandinista control of the country. The FDN, operating in the north of the country, was by far the largest and most dangerous of the militias, taking advantage both of popular support and American patronage.

In spite of their successes, the contras were not effective rulers. They, unlike their adversaries, lacked a unified, coherent political agenda, in part due to a lack of unity among the militias. For instance, Misura ostensibly fought for regional autonomy, not to seize the commanding heights of governmental power. Regardless, contra militias (especially the FDN) enjoyed some degree of territorial control, but did little to administer it. The extent of their administration was to organize networks of informants. After all, contra forces lacked the wherewithal to defeat Sandinista forces, but they did not lack the ability to inflict pain.


Rebels / Incumbents: Yan Tatsine / Nigeria

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The early 1980’s saw the rise of a peculiar brand of Islamic Fundamentalism driven by a self-proclaimed prophet who went by the nickname “Maitatsine.” His Yan

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797 Ibid. 248-251
Tatsine group participated in violent riots in the early 1980’s which ultimately cost the group’s leader his life in 1980. In spite of the relatively crude means of pursuing them, their goals were relatively well-articulated; Yan Tatsine wanted the liquidation of the Nigerian state and to replace it with an Islamic theocracy which would embody both religious and social tenets of Maitatsine’s interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{801}

The group was able to attract a fair number of followers, particularly in the more devoutly Muslim northern regions of the country.\textsuperscript{802} However, many who supported the movement were attracted primarily by its call for redistributory policies as Nigeria’s poor tended to live in fairly stark deprivation.\textsuperscript{803} This is exacerbated by Nigeria’s oil wealth, which enriched a small number of Nigerians.\textsuperscript{804} Yan Tatsine does not appear to have done very much to remedy this, however; the movement is far more notable for its profound bloodlust and sadistic treatment of captives than for its economically equitable policies.

Indeed, it is not clear that Yan Tatsine had policies beyond fanatical discipline within its “ranks.”\textsuperscript{805} It is more accurate to describe the movement as a manifestation of profound discontent at the selective prosperity brought about by Nigeria’s oil boom than to describe it as an organized rebel group. It operated sporadically, only manifesting itself in kidnappings and violent riots targeting symbols of the Nigerian state.

\textbf{Pakistan (2004-2006)}

\textsuperscript{803} Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram,” 102-106
Rebels / Incumbents: Remnants of the Taliban and sympathetic warlords / Pakistan

Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Pakistan faced violent uprisings in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) between 2004 and 2006. Between Pakistan’s neglect of these regions and the resentment this neglect caused, it stands to reason that the Taliban would seek a foothold in Northwest Pakistan. The government’s primary mode of response was to offer bilateral peace agreements, in spite of the threat that these groups posed to the Pakistani state. Indeed, this threat would manifest itself again in 2009 when the Swat valley would come under siege.

In spite of the near complete lack of state presence in the region, it appears that the Taliban and the warlords aligned with it were either ill-prepared to serve as rulers or were unwilling to undertake the project (at least until after it liquidated the state). The warlord population appears to have been even less concerned with governing—their primary interest appears to have been squeezing the state for as many resources as could be had in exchange for something resembling acquiescence to de jure state control. In this regard, what popular support there was for Taliban control makes some degree of sense; although thoroughly unregulated and spectacularly brutal, Taliban control brought with it some form of criminal justice.


Rebels / Incumbents: Bougainville Revolutionary Army / Papua New Guinea

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806 Nasreen Gufran, “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan,” *Asian Survey* 49, No. 6 (2009), 1106-1107
807 Omar Farooq Zain, “NWFP and the Scourge of Talibanization,” *Pakistan Horizon* 62, No. 4 (2009), 33-34
The civil war in Papua New Guinea centered around the secessionist movement of Bougainville, one of PNG’s several constituent islands. Secessionist forces in the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) were quickly able to overtake incumbent forces, and by March of 1990, PNG forces (and officials) retreated from the islands. Thereafter, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) declared the island a new independent state. In spite of its rapid victory, little of PNG’s administrative apparatus remained, leaving BIG scrambling to administer its territory.

Early failures in providing basic security led to dissention among the populace, as BRA cadres tasked with maintaining domestic security used their mandate as a means of acquiring wealth and settling scores. Eventually, some cadres were employed by certain localities as effective domestic security, but it appears to have been done independently of the aloof BIG. In fact, by 1992 the PNG government began to covertly supply the BRA cadres which took on these security responsibilities. Unsurprisingly, this led to a shift in hostilities from BRA vs. PNG forces to BRA vs. repurposed BRA cadres.

While order was clearly not forthcoming, law was another matter. While not entirely successful, BIG empowered local chiefs with substantial powers by creating a Council of Chiefs. In addition to granting administrative powers, the council gave chiefs the responsibility to act as adjudicators in disputes. While the application of this

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809 Kristian Lassett, State Crime on the Margins of Empire: Rio Tinto, the War on Bougainville and Resistance to Mining, (London: Pluto Press, 2014), 141-142
810 John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth, Peter Reddy and Leah Dunn, Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville, (Canberra: ANU Press, 2010), 29-31
811 Some titles these groups fought under include Bougainville Resistance Group (and later, Force) and Buka Liberation Front.
812 Lassett, State Crime, 165-166
ambitious project was wildly inconsistent due to predatory BRA cadres, it represents the most profound of BIG’s wartime administrative successes, such as they are.

The dismantling of Bougainville’s administrative apparatus was intentional—even if BIG administered the islands, if it could not provide healthcare or education, popular support for independence would wither, so the thinking went. BIG focused more of its efforts on producing domestic security (which it failed to accomplish) so it is perhaps unsurprising that PNG’s boycott of goods and services successfully crippled their provision in Bougainville. Schools and hospitals were not merely neglected—most of them had been destroyed.

While BIG intended on ultimately holding elections, these were not forthcoming during the conflict. Clashes between former comrades gave PNG forces a window of opportunity to return to the island and begin fighting the BRA directly. Elections did eventually come about, but not until well after the conflict. Other than input from chiefs, BIG had no feedback mechanisms to speak of.

Peru (1980-1997)

Rebels / Incumbents: Sendero Luminoso (SL; Shining Path) / Peru

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 2

SL began its civil war against the Peruvian state just as that state had begun to institute land reforms similar to those which El Salvador’s FMLN had supported.

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813 Ibid. 146-147
815 Lassett, State Crime, 165
817 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 186-187
Whether because of the lack of impact the reforms had in the regions from which SL had sprung or because SL’s founders sensed weakness in the state is immaterial. What matters is that the civil war which followed was profoundly brutal and long. During the course of the conflict, SL had established fairly extensive zones of control which it administered enthusiastically (and bloodily).

In spite of its profound brutality and the damage this brutality did to its popularity, SL took pains to establish instruments of rebel governance, especially education. Indeed, one of the first manifestations of SL as a political entity was educational. Although that education was ideological, the provision of basic education was part and parcel to SL’s agenda. SL also established a clearly defined political role for subject populations in governing themselves—the group established Open People’s Committees composed entirely of civilians to administer towns and villages. There is evidence that civilian committees participated in crafting party strategy. Although this utopian arrangement fractured in the face of the violence of the civil war, these instruments of governance were surprisingly effective.

SL’s governance was not entirely successful, though. For instance, aside from targeted assassinations, there does not appear to have been any instrument of policing or justice. Additionally, SL did not provide substantial instruments of healthcare. This was perhaps unsurprising given the state of healthcare in Peru, but is noteworthy nonetheless.

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818 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 104-105
819 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 188-192, 275-277
820 Ibid. 89-90
821 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 104-105
822 Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 215-216
Philippines (1972-1996)

Rebels / Incumbents: Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) / Philippines

Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

As the predominantly Christian Philippine government consolidated its position, previously self-governing groups found themselves to be suddenly subordinate in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In response to this loss of sovereignty, the enforcement of a new set of laws, and what was seen as inequitable application of those laws the MNLF began a decades-long civil war against the Philippine state in 1972.\textsuperscript{823} In spite of the tradition of self-government, the MNLF did little to provide the goods of governance to its controlled territories.

To a certain extent, this came about because of organizational deficiencies.\textsuperscript{824} Never a terribly well-organized resistance movement, the group struggled to formalize its relationship with the population of its controlled territories, in spite of that population’s enthusiastic support. This deficiency could be seen in the MNLF’s struggles to govern itself after the conflict.\textsuperscript{825} There were concerted efforts to re-establish independent legal authority, although their impact was somewhat limited.\textsuperscript{826} Although independent courts were established, their authority was undercut by inconsistent reliance upon them by the

\textsuperscript{823} Lela Garner Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” \textit{Pacific Affairs} 49, No. 3 (1976), 405-412
\textsuperscript{824} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 105-106
\textsuperscript{826} Thomas M. McKenna, \textit{Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines}, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 226-231
population. Additionally, the continued participation of Muslims in Philippine politics undercut the demand for governing institutions.

**Romania (1989)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Anti-Governmental Factions (eventually represented as National Salvation Front) / Socialist Republic of Romania

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Nicolai Ceausescu’s grip on Romania had dwindled to a substantial extent by December of 1989, but few could have imagined that the dictator’s regime, built largely on a cult of personality, would be toppled in a matter of days. One reason for the rapidity of Communist Romania’s downfall was the fact that shortly after the uprising began in Timisoara in mid-December, substantial portions of Romania’s army and communist party joined in.\(^{827}\)

Unsurprisingly, the extraordinarily brief civil war ended before the opposition could begin to organize itself as a government. Although the Ceausescus were tried before they were killed, it was hardly representative of a state applying force according to some notion of rule of law. Indeed, some observers noted that it bore much of the excesses and deficits of the Stalinist regime which it opposed.\(^{828}\) Even several years after the revolution had ended, the transition to democracy remained incomplete; the revolution could almost not help the fact that it experienced no real development of governance over its course.

**Russia (1994-1996)**

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\(^{827}\) Ioan Marginean, “Indicators of Democratization in Romania,” *Social Indicators Research* 42, No. 3 (1997), 358-361

Rebels / Incumbents: Chechen Separatists / Russia

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The ongoing Chechen conflict’s first act was a humiliating defeat for the Russian incumbents. The Chechen separatists were able to make and defend their claim to independence and began the process of constructing a parallel state structure to administer their homeland. One would expect then, that one would find ample evidence of wartime rebel governance developments. This is not the case.

First, the independent Chechen state established its popular legitimacy in 1991 with elections in October and a declaration of independence the following month. It similarly cannot be argued that the parliament and presidencies role as a feedback mechanism was novel enough in 1994 to be counted as a novel wartime development. Additionally, most new developments in governance had more to do with its collapse than its progression.

The provision of public goods appears to have been particularly hard hit. Education ceased altogether save for those which could either be a) paid for by parents or b) the teachers continued working without receiving payment. Healthcare provision was even more desultory, although not for lack of the effort on the part of doctors and nurses. In addition to harrowing accounts of overstretched staff trying to wade through a sea of the dead and dying, Chechen medical personnel had to deal with an almost

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830 It can be argued that elections held proximally to the beginning of a conflict could be counted as such.
832 Ibid. 150-151
unfathomably high infant mortality (10%), which some observers suggest was exacerbated by the alleged use of chemical weapons on the part of the Russians.\textsuperscript{833}

In part due to their skill in fighting the Russians, Islamists in Chechnya were able to secure a substantial concession which presaged their prominent position in contemporary Chechen politics. Beginning in April, 1995, courts purpose-built to apply sharia law operated parallel to secular ones, eventually replacing secular courts entirely after the war’s end. Although this is an important development in governance during the war, it does not represent a substantially novel proficiency of the state, as courts already existed within the separatist would-be state.

\textbf{Rwanda (1990-1993)}

Rebels / Incumbents: Rwandan Patriotic Front / Rwanda

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

Although ostensibly representing Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, Tutsi refugees formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front to fight for the rights of the members of the put-upon ethnic community.\textsuperscript{834} In spite of French assistance, the RPF made substantial gains within Rwanda. Ultimately, the RPF was able to secure a negotiated end to this chapter of the conflict. The short-lived agreement provided instruments of power-sharing and promised elections.

The RPF’s record as wartime governors is most charitably described as incomplete. The state’s ability to administer itself collapsed during the conflict, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{833} Wood, \textit{Chechnya}, 84
\item \textsuperscript{834} Idean Salehyan, \textit{Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics}, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 146-149; one source of resentment between Tutsi and Hutu communities was the racial hierarchy applied by their Belgian former colonial masters—Tutsi were deemed superior to Hutu, according to Belgium’s pseudoscientific ordering.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
RPF’s leadership appeared to be ill-suited to creating an administration ex nihilo. The legal system, already hamstrung by a lack of public confidence, ceased to function altogether during the conflict. The RPF was in a poor position to replace it—its number were largely not Rwandan, but Ugandan. Its public support came almost entirely from the brutal reprisals against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu.

A more stringent evaluation of RPF governance would be quite poor, though. The RPF did very little to support or even engage with the local population. Wiliam Cyrus Reed remarks that, while many guerilla operations seek to politicize the peasant population within their controlled territory, the RPF made no such attempts. Instead, they preferred to leave displaced peasants up to the government, placing additional strain on an administration which was also poorly-suited to the job.

**Rwanda (1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Rwandan Patriotic Front / Rwanda, Interahamwe militias

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

Hutu resentment of the power-sharing agreement signed in Arusha was palpable in 1994. In spite of constituting a fifth of the population, the agreement called for Tutsis to constitute 40% of the country’s armed forces (for instance). These resentments reached fever pitch when President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, killing him. Following a genocidal series of reprisals, the RPF began a brief campaign in April of 1994, defeating Rwanda’s armed forces in a matter of months.

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837 Salehyan, *Rebels Without Borders*, 147-149
The RPF’s performance in the conflict’s second chapter proceeded much like the first. For example, Rwanda’s health service was devastated during the conflict. What healthcare could be had was provided by foreign parties.\textsuperscript{838} The RPF appears to have been largely uninvolved in these efforts. Although it is unlikely that even concentrated efforts to establish instruments of governance could bear fruits in such a brief conflict, there is little evidence that the RPF would have bothered even had the conflict dragged on much longer.

**Sierra Leone (1991-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Revolutionary United Front (RUF) / Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes (1995 and forward)

**Police/Justice: 1; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The RUF, a collection of fighters from Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and Liberian partisans of Charles Taylor, invaded eastern Sierra Leone in March of 1991.\textsuperscript{839} The early days of the conflict were especially difficult for the incumbents, as many Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) soldiers spent at least some of their time supporting the rebels. To make matters worse, the central government was unable to provide medical treatment for their wounded or even salaries, leading to a protest in the capital. Sierra Leonean president Joseph Saidu Momoh believed the protest was, in fact, a coup and fled the country. A military regime—the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)—filled the power vacuum, appointing Captain Valentine Strasser as its leader.

\textsuperscript{838} John Pearn, “History, Horror, and Healing: The Historical Background and Aftermath to the Rwandan Civil War of 1994,” *Health and History* 1, No. 2/3 (1999), 205-207

In spite of their territorial conquests, securing popular support was difficult.\textsuperscript{840} One reason for this is their brutal treatment of their would-be subjects. In spite of this, RUF had, by war’s end, engaged in some efforts to organize and administer its controlled territories.\textsuperscript{841} To the extent that RUF was interested in revolution, they emphasized a return to communitarian, agrarian society which mixed private agriculture with community farming projects to feed soldiers (there is some disagreement over whether and to what extent RUF soldiers engaged in agriculture themselves\textsuperscript{842}). In spite of the fairly limited political or ideological scope of their struggle, the RUF did engage in rebel governance.

This included to the provision of education and healthcare.\textsuperscript{843} This is especially noteworthy given the desultory state of the government’s provision of both.\textsuperscript{844} RUF provision of public goods was often interrupted due to lack of supplies (or loss of territory), though. Moreover, provision appears to have been of questionable quality even under the best circumstances. Regardless, beginning in 1994, the group appeared to have made arrangements to provide healthcare and education, something that the government struggled to achieve at the time.

The RUF also provided mechanisms for policing and justice, although their performance and purpose were both limited.\textsuperscript{845} RUF policing included mechanisms for

\begin{itemize}
\item Hazen, \textit{What Rebels Want}, 75-78
\item Krijn Peters, \textit{War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone}, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 106-111
\item Hazen, \textit{What Rebels Want}, 82-84; Peters points to interviews that state that they did, but Hazen is deeply skeptical that RUF forces engaged in resource collection beyond looting and forcing civilians to farm or mine.
\item Peters, \textit{War and the Crisis of Youth}, 119-124
\item Lansana Gberie, \textit{A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone}, (London: Hurst & Co. 2005), 6, 36; both before and after the conflict Sierra Leonean provision of healthcare and education was quite poor.
\item Peters, \textit{War and the Crisis of Youth}, 131-137
\end{itemize}
enforcing their brand of retributive justice between soldiers and from soldiers to civilians, but not between civilians. Furthermore, one of the more common punishments for bad behavior among the soldiers was to be sent to the front line, where predatory behavior could not be as easily monitored or curtailed. This, Krijn Peters argues, is one reason for the degree to which the RUF was guilty of monstrous abuses of the Sierra Leonean people. Additionally, as much as their adjudicative system was impressively transparent and functional, there was an important limit to punishments—the RUF was always short of manpower. Therefore, if an infraction was not serious enough to kill the perpetrator, then this perpetrator would remain in RUF’s forces.

The input from civilians was quite limited, in spite of their democratizing rhetoric. Civilians were far more likely to be targeted as suspected supporters of the Sierra Leonean government than to be asked for input in policymaking. The exception appears to have been the recruitment of interlocutors between civilian and military actors. Occasionally, civilians would be asked to name fighters who would make good “G5” officers, an element of RUF policing which specifically dealt with grievances between soldiers and civilians.

**Sierra Leone (1997-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: RUF, AFRC / Sierra Leone, ECOMOG

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

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847 This rhetoric is undermined by the atrocities committed to interrupt postwar elections (see: Yusuf Bangura, *Development, Democracy, & Cohesion: Critical Essays with Insights on Sierra Leone and wider Africa Contexts*, (Freetown: Sierra Leonean Writers Series, 2015), 184-188)

848 Peters, *War and the Crisis of Youth*, 135, 138-140
Sierra Leone’s first and second civil wars happened in quick succession. Dissatisfied SLA officers executed a coup, establishing the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in May of 1997.\textsuperscript{849} Originally incorporating the RUF into the fold, the AFRC sought to overturn the elected civilian government. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces intervened on their behalf, eventually leading to the AFRC’s defeat in the capital of Freetown in 1998.\textsuperscript{850}

This second chapter of the conflict saw the limited policing and justice mechanisms effectively collapse.\textsuperscript{851} Even though G5 agents maintained their positions, responsibilities, and de jure authority, soldiers who had already committed atrocities against civilians began threatening officers who tried to enforce RUF discipline. Thus, even though the institutions remained, their function all but evaporated by the end of the conflict.

The same could not be said for public good provision. If anything, RUF territory saw much improved health and education provision, at least at the start of the second conflict.\textsuperscript{852} This diminished towards the conflict’s end, though; as RUF saw its non-looting sources of funding dry up and its controlled territory shrink, the provision of healthcare and education suffered, especially outside of the Kailahun district. This lack of resources was especially problematic for healthcare provision. By the end of the conflict, RUF healthcare had all but disappeared.

Once again, while the rebels acted as rulers, they did little to elicit input from their subjects. While atrocities were much rarer deep into RUF territory—where

\textsuperscript{849} Hazen, \textit{What Rebels Want}, 80-82
\textsuperscript{850} David Harris, \textit{Sierra Leone: A Political History}, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 105-111
\textsuperscript{851} Peters, \textit{War and the Crisis of Youth}, 134-142
\textsuperscript{852} Ibid. 119-124
monitoring was still possible—there were no formal auspices under which civilians could impact policy decisions. The most one could hope for in these territories would be forming a relationship with members of RUF who could ensure one’s safety deep in RUF territory.

**Sierra Leone (2000-2001)**

Rebels / Incumbents: RUF / Sierra Leone

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The third and final chapter of the Sierra Leonean civil war in this dataset comes shortly after the end of the previous one with the collapse of the Lomé Accord. With the support of Liberian President Charles Taylor, RUF resumed its war against Sierra Leone, having used the brief peace to recover. This time, however, the war ended relatively quickly, as RUF’s prospects for survival dwindled, a negotiated end to hostilities became the only tenable option.

RUF’s governance rested on the willingness of its leadership to commit to its supposed political objectives. By the third chapter of the conflict, this had evaporated. While the group had previously set up means of providing services similar to that of a functioning state, the third chapter of the conflict saw provision replaced by predation. For instance, as resources dwindled, civilians were increasingly pressed into service as diamond miners. This reflects the apparent loss of anything resembling a coherent

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853 Ibid. 168-171
854 Bangura, *Development, Democracy, & Cohesion*, 296-301
855 Hirsch, *Sierra Leone*, 109-110
856 Hazen, *What Rebels Want*, 99-104
857 Gberie, *Dirty War*, 188-190
ideology among the rank and file soldiers, particularly those who were recent recruits at this stage.858

Little remained of RUF’s efforts to establish a parallel society by the time this third chapter had begun. There were still some who attempted to maintain previous levels of service provision, resource scarcity made this extremely difficult.859 By conflict’s end, RUF was little more than a predatory group of bandits, securing what rents could be had by fighting on.

**South Africa (1983-1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: African National Congress / South Africa Defense Force (SADF), South Africa

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

The South African civil war was a conflict brought on by discontent at the profound discrimination brought on by Apartheid policies. In response to the willingness to resort to violence on the part of the ANC, SADF engaged in open warfare.860 In addition, SADF personnel were granted broad immunity from prosecution for their behaviors as a result of the Defense Act, which granted absolution for many of the more grisly practices undertaken in the name of counterinsurgency.861

While the postwar transition has received ample coverage, the course of the war itself, particularly from a political standpoint, is another matter entirely. What is known is

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858 Peters, *War and the Crisis of Youth*, 111-119, 141-142
859 Ibid. 123-124
that the ANC engaged in an ambitious governance strategy beginning in the 1980’s. It was during this time that the ANC established a small number of relatively self-sufficient camps in which children and young adults could pursue some degree of education. In addition to sending a small number of college-aged students abroad by way of scholarships, basic education was provided alongside ideological training.\(^{862}\) This project was broadly hamstrung by the inability to withstand conventional clashes with the SADF, though.\(^{863}\)

The ANC struggled from the perspective of popular mobilization, though. This is surprising given the degree to which South African civil society had already organized in protest of Apartheid by the time the war had begun.\(^{864}\) By the time the party was legalized in 1990, though, much of its political structure had been crippled. While the party was able to reconstitute itself between then and 1994 (in part due to Nelson Mandela’s immense popularity), its political function was hamstrung by SADF’s military response to the ANC—including the political education of its cadres.\(^{865}\)

**Sri Lanka (1983-1987)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) / Sri Lankan Government (GoSL)

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

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Although 1983’s “Black July” pogroms against Sri Lankan Tamils in response to a deadly attack on Sri Lankan soldiers\textsuperscript{866} marked the war’s beginning, the LTTE had been engaging in low-level anti-state activity since the mid-1970’s.\textsuperscript{867} Aside from these activities, the LTTE was primarily focused on consolidating public support for their cause and eliminating any competing pro-Tamil organizations. In part due to this single-mindedness, the group did very little to establish competing manifestations of governance.

LTTE did have a political office, but it fell beneath the military office in the group’s strictly enforced hierarchy.\textsuperscript{868} Indeed, Mampilly writes that GoSL remained in charge of administering justice and enforcing the law in LTTE territory throughout this phase of the war. Although this changed as the war’s next phase began, the transition was not to LTTE governance. Instead, the shift was external: their Indian patrons became the administrators of the territory in which the LTTE operated under the auspices of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF).\textsuperscript{869}

\textbf{Sri Lanka (1987-1989)}

Rebels / Incumbents: LTTE / GoSL

\textbf{Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0}

The second phase of the conflict proceeded much like the first, only with the IPKF taking part as an external intervening party. Although the ostensible auspices of a civilian administration came into being in 1987, but until 1990, its list of

\textsuperscript{866} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 163-164
\textsuperscript{868} Mampilly, \textit{Rebel Rulers}, 108-109
\textsuperscript{869} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 164-165
accomplishments included negotiating with GoSL and the Indian Government in 1987 and little else.\textsuperscript{870}

This second phase came to a close when the LTTE and GoSL perceived a common enemy in the IPKF.\textsuperscript{871} A short-lived alliance was struck, in part due to the extreme heavy-handedness of the Peacekeepers’ tactics and the accompanying violations of human rights. Ethnic Sinhalese resentment also played a major role in GoSL’s decision to arm the LTTE.\textsuperscript{872} At this point, the war ceased to be civil, at least briefly.

**Sri Lanka (1990-2002)**

Rebels / Incumbents: LTTE / GoSL

Police/Justice: 3; Public Goods: 2; Feedback Mechanisms: 1

In the wake of the IPKF withdrawal, the LTTE wasted little time in establishing control of Sri Lanka’s northeastern provinces.\textsuperscript{873} It was at this point that the LTTE also began acting as governors as well as rebels, even as hostilities quickly resumed between the group and GoSL. In spite of their lack of success of until this point, LTTE administration achieved a remarkable level of competence relatively quickly.

One of the secret’s to LTTE success in this realm is related one of Mampilly’s hypotheses: well-administered states tend to produce rebels who themselves are well-equipped to administer their territory.\textsuperscript{874} Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of Tamil administration during the war’s third chapter. Rather than dismantle GoSL’s structures of governance in an attempt to institutionalize their revolutionary agenda, LTTE essentially

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{870} Ibid. 170-171
  \item \textsuperscript{871} Smith, “Sri Lanka,” 208-209
  \item \textsuperscript{872} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 165-166
  \item \textsuperscript{873} Smith, “Sri Lanka,” 209
  \item \textsuperscript{874} Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 75-83
\end{itemize}
replicated GoSL’s structures to remarkable effect. While they largely replaced their territories’ domestic security forces, their cooption of Sri Lankan judicial institutions required much less turnover, at least institutionally. Although some of the legal system’s particulars were changed to fit their needs (for instance, land courts were established to determine land values so the rebels could more easily collect taxes), the penal code in Tamil Eelam resembled colonial British Law as much as did that of GoSL. These modes of governance replicated the application and enforcement of law and order in a well-administered state and the rebels enjoyed a noteworthy degree of legitimacy because of it.

The provision of public goods was less successful. Providing healthcare within LTTE-controlled territories was especially difficult, due to a lack of pre-existing facilities in these territories, a GoSL embargo which greatly restricted supplies, and a hesitance among qualified Tamils to work in a warzone. Interestingly, the GoSL appeared to be more invested in healthcare provision in LTTE-controlled areas than even the LTTE.

Education is another story. The LTTE was proactive in supporting education within its controlled territories, creating the Tamil Eelam Education Council (TEEC) to administer it. Although the war naturally made this more difficult, the success (and remarkable continuity) of educational provision in controlled areas is evident in the high

875 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 112-128
876 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 178-182
877 Ibid. 182-184
878 This also appears to be the case with regard to providing food and encouraging economic development to depressed areas (see: Saman Kelegama, “Transforming a Conflict Using an Economic Dividend: The Sri Lankan Experience,” Federalism and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka, eds. V.R. Raghavan, and Volker Bauer, (New Delhi: Centre for Security Analysis/Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006), 64-66).
879 Ibid. 184-186
levels of schooling and (relatively) low dropout levels achieved at war’s end (15%) in spite of two decades of nearly uninterrupted bloodshed.

Although feedback mechanisms existed, the forms of feedback which were supported were closely curated by LTTE leadership. The LTTE was as dedicated to authoritarian governance as it was to being the sole instrument of Tamil liberation.  

Similarly, although the LTTE had developed its political wing by 2002, it was subordinate to the group’s military wing and effectively did not exist as an autonomous actor until just before the conflict’s respite, even as its activities increased dramatically during the 1990’s. As such, in spite of the LTTE’s incorporation of non-military figures in civil administration, the provision of feedback mechanisms is marginal in this case.

**Sudan (1983-2005)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) / Government of Sudan (GoS)

**Police/Justice:** 2; **Public Goods:** 1; **Feedback Mechanisms:** 1

See Case Study in Chapter 5

**Tajikistan (1992-1997)**

Rebels / Incumbents: United Tajik Opposition (UTO) / Tajikistan

**Police/Justice:** 0; **Public Goods:** 0; **Feedback Mechanisms:** 0

Shortly after securing independence, Tajikistan was gripped by a civil war waged by various groups (predominantly Islamists and pro-democracy reformists) against the country’s post-Soviet government. These groups coalesced relatively quickly, forming

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880 Smith, “Sri Lanka,” 205-223
881 Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits,” 174-176
the UTO after the initial victory of pro-government forces in December 1992. In spite of the ostensible pro-democracy stance of the UTO, very little in the way of governance developed over the course of the conflict.

Although the war itself is remarkably lightly covered, some things are known. First, both the government and the UTO lacked traditional standing armies. Because of this, militias and criminal elements did much of the actual fighting in the war’s early proceedings. The relationship between civilian and combatant was, according to those accounts which do exist, purely exploitative. Those who were physically able to fight were conscripted into the first “army” that could find them and civilian material support to the combatants was given in the face of the (sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit) threat of violence.

**Turkey (1984-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) / Turkey

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

The PKK fought a 15 year guerilla campaign against the Turkish state as the 20th Century drew to a close. Their activities were aimed at securing secession, so they were focused on Turkey’s southeast, where Turkish Kurdistan borders with its Iraqi counterpart. These activities included attacking police and military targets, but Kurds who collaborated with the state were also targeted. The PKK were able to make substantial gains, exerting some degree of control over several towns in the early

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884 Shirin Akiner, *Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation*, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 37-44
PKK influence wilted in the face of sustained military resistance, though. By decade’s end, the insurgency was effectively ended.

While the PKK’s political efforts took shape in the early 20th Century, it does not appear that the group engaged in much ruling during the conflict. This appears to have come about for one central reason; the PKK’s “controlled territory” never resembled that of other rebel groups. Turkish forces possessed both superior capability and a mandate to use it with profound cruelty. Once Turkish control of Southeastern villages came into question, they were evacuated, leaving the PKK with no one to rule. To make matters worse, Turkish forces employed scorched earth tactics in reconquered territories. This left the “conquering” PKK with nothing when they won and even less when they lost.

**Uganda (1981-1986)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A), Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), remnants of Idi Amin’s disbanded army / United National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A)

**Police/Justice: 2; Public Goods: 1; Feedback Mechanisms: 2**

Milton Obote’s regime, still catching its breath after the ouster of Idi Amin, faced an existential crisis in the first of Uganda’s civil wars in the dataset. The NRM, livid at the results of what they perceived to be a rigged election, began its war with the UNLF’s Uganda in earnest. In spite of some early successes, the NRA appeared to be on the

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888 Yildiz, *Kurds in Turkey*, 15-19
ropes in the wake of a 1983 offensive, but had recovered by 1985. Yoweri Museveni was installed as Uganda’s president in January of the next year.

Museveni’s (and the NRM’s) democratizing rhetoric bore fruit quickly, as the ascendant party wasted no time installing democratic institutions and practices. However, the NRM’s governance project began during the conflict itself. The group established Resistance Councils in towns and villages which the NRA controlled. These councils were populated by members of the localities themselves elected by that same locality, mirroring the effective micro-level democratization seen in several other cases. The RC’s function went beyond representation, though. In addition to mobilizing support and providing the NRM with information pertinent to the war effort, they also began to be deployed in the service of law and order beginning in 1982. Their effectiveness can be seen in their mandate—the NRA used the RC’s to enforce a strict code of conduct for its rank-and-file soldiers.

Wartime public good provision is another matter entirely. Although the Museveni regime has undertaken ambitious projects in health and education provision since the war’s conclusion, the state of both was desultory when he took office. One of the

890 Ibid. 109-111
892 Giovanni Carbone, No-Party Democracy?: Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective, (Boulder: Lynne-Reinner, 2008), 19-20
893 Juma Okuku, Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 22-23, 26; Ironically, these councils appeared to have ceased to operate as instruments of representative government after the war, quickly becoming a means of control for the Museveni regime.
894 Carbone, No-Party Democracy?, 31-32, 42-43
896 Carbone, No-Party Democracy?, 57-58
few exceptions were independent women’s organizations, who organized local schools and clinics (among many other functions) where they were able. The women in these organizations fiercely defended their independence and struggled (ultimately unsuccessfully) to maintain their autonomy after the war had come to a close. As such, even though Museveni courted their support as he was consolidating his presidency, these organizations had no formal relationship with the NRM.

There is evidence of some efforts taken to remedy this during wartime, though. For instance, while generalized healthcare efforts were at best qualified successes due to insecurity, the NRA was able to tackle some particular health problems, such as the spread of malaria by way of NRA-organized clinics. Similarly, the NRA attempted to provide educational services, although their success was similarly limited due to insecurity.

Uganda (1986-2006)

Rebels / Incumbents: Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda People’s Democratic Army (until 1989), Holy Spirit Movement (until 1987) / NRM

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

Shortly after Obote’s ouster, the remnants of his defeated army began an insurgency under the guidance of Joseph Kony, terrorizing northern Uganda for two decades. In spite of its resiliency, the conflict is known more for its profound violence and Kony’s bizarre tendencies than any rebel governance project.

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899 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 175-180
900 Toft, Securing the Peace, 108-109
of child soldiers is well-reported, but the horrors visited upon Ugandans (and others—the army operated in neighboring countries as well) are staggering even when weighed against many of the cases described herein. Between Kony’s sadism and his unpredictable behavior, it is perhaps unsurprising that they did not participate in any sort of governance project.

Nominally, there was a Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), but the connection between it and the LRA was unclear. It is unclear, for example, whether attempts to negotiate with this LRM, had they been successful, could have led to a cessation of violence as it was unclear that the ostensible political wing had any effect on the LRA or (most importantly) Kony. Towards the end of the conflict, Kony began to articulate a more coherent political vision, arguing that his was a fight for Ugandan democracy. Additionally, he paused operations in 1996, claiming that it was important to give Ugandans a chance to vote against Museveni. However, it was clear that if there was a broader political project, it was unknown to the rank-and-file soldiers. Many scholars have put themselves into a similar camp, arguing that if there was a political agenda, it was based on the whims of the LRA’s leader, not on a coherent idea.

**Yemen (North) (1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Democratic Republic of Yemen (Southern Separatists) / Republic of Yemen

**Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0**

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902 Ibid. 107
903 Ibid. 23
904 Surama, *Advancing the Ugandan Economy*, 25
905 Carbone, *No-Party Democracy*, 73-74
The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen had unified in May of 1990, but unification was problematic for a number of reasons. First, North Yemen (YAR) was substantially more prosperous, not to mention “sturdier.” Secondly, continuing lack of development and disappointing electoral outcomes of Southern Yemen candidates left the region’s population with a simmering resentment. Thirdly, the armed forces remained largely unintegrated, save for moving some Northern brigades south and some Southern brigades north. This led to periodic skirmishes between the groups, ultimately escalating to a civil war in early 1994.

Ali Salem al-Bidh, the de facto leader of South Yemen’s old guard, was vice-president to northerner Ali Abdullah Saleh, but this did not stop the former from rebelling against the latter. The secessionists were defeated in short order, with Southern Yemen only independent from May to July. Because of the war’s brevity and the lack of consensus support for independence, even among Southerners, there was little opportunity for al-Bidh to establish governance during the conflict. The southern secessionists had barely time to organize itself politically before being forced into exile.

Yemen (South) (1986)

Rebels / Incumbents: Fmr. President Abd al-Fattah Ismail and his supporters / President Ali Nasir Muhammed and his supporters

Police/Justice: 0; Public Goods: 0; Feedback Mechanisms: 0

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South Yemen faced something of a war of succession in early 1986. President Ali Nasir Muhammed, reacting to rising opposition from the country’s politburo—and the resurgent former president Abd al-Fattah Ismail (at the behest of his supporters in Moscow)—sent his bodyguards to sit in for him at a politburo meeting. The bodyguards opened fire on the assembled members, sparking a brief but remarkably violent civil war. The war itself hinged on the allegiances of various elements of Yemen’s armed forces, with the Ismail-aligned tank corps ultimately deciding the conflict.

There is no evidence that any constructive political developments took place during the conflict. Accounts from the time describe unorganized spasms of violence. Although it is noteworthy that Ali Nasir’s decision to reach out to North Yemen may have contributed to the country’s eventual unification, this eventuality may have also been produced by the loss of much of its political leadership. Ali Nasir was forced to flee the country, as was Ismail. The latter perished under somewhat suspicious circumstances, but even though the former survived, South Yemen’s political class was crippled by the war.

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911 Clark, *Yemen*, 127-129
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