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theses

In the recent years, we have witnessed a heated debate on China’s rise, peaceful or not, in both media and academia. Xiang, Primiano, and Huang (2015) show sharply growing news in the New York Times and various studies on the rise of China in academic journals. Although without a general agreement in the debate, scholars (e.g., Mearsheimer, 2001; Johnston, 2003; Wang, 2011; Xiang, Primiano, and Huang, 2015) have provided plenty of analyses on how China will rise as a great power in the security dimension after economic reform. For instance, Mearsheimer (2001) argues that great powers will use force to alter the balance of power and thus are “primed for offense”(pp.2-3). This way, “[t]he result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them”(p. 4). In contrast, Johnston (2003) disagrees with Mearsheimer and concludes that “the PRC has become more integrated into and more cooperative within international institutions than ever before”(p.49) while comparing China’s behaviors as a status quo player. However, he exempts his conclusion from two issues: domestic social unrest and issues regarding Taiwan. Put differently, it is still a question of whether China rises peacefully and also depending on the direction of discussions. As Putnam (1988) noted, the political consideration of domestic factors is an indispensable condition to explain foreign politics. Quek and Johnston’s (2018) on the domestic public opinion and the development of external disputes China involved is an instance. Following this direction, I will introduce the domestic politics to explain puzzles on China’s foreign policy and the reaction of neighbors to the rise of China. These puzzles can be better answered by including considering domestic politics. Furthermore, three research questions from different directions applying considerations of domestic politics to foreign policies will be asked respectively in the following chapters in order to fully address countries’ interactions in East Asia with the rise of China. The first cut is to examine the diversionary theory to China’s external conflicts. What is the mechanism for China to post aggressive behaviors on its neighbors? Next, I will examine how China’s neighbor signals its true intention to China: Taiwan military expenditure as a signal to Mainland China. Last but not least, I will turn to explain China’s rationale for using non-conflict – economic sanctions – behaviors in with its neighbor, including South Korea and Taiwan.

ETD_8965

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

by Wei-Hao Huang

doi:10.7282/T31V5JB1

ETD doctoral

The author owns the copyright to this work.