A Viper's Nest of Perils:

The Construction and Prioritization of Threats in the Post-Cold War Era and the Evolution of American National Security Policy

Melissa Jane Kronfeld

A Dissertation Submitted to the

Graduate School-Newark

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Global Affairs.

written under the direction of

Dr. Simon Reich, Rutgers University (chair)

_____

and approved by

Dr. Yale Ferguson, Rutgers University

_____

Dr. Gregg Van Ryzin, Rutgers University

_____

Dr. Peter Dombrowski, United States Naval War College

_____

MAY 2018

ABSTRACT

This dissertation asks, given the apparent disconnect between externally defined (or objective) threats and those internally (or subjectively) prioritized by the American government, under what conditions does the U.S. prioritize specific types of threats to its national security? In the case of this research, I seek to understand what are the primary determinates of prioritization in regards to the threat posed to the United States by terrorism, narco-trafficking, climate change and the emerging geopolitics of the Arctic region? At its very essence, this dissertation seeks to explain what Ronnie Lipschultz questioned: "how do *ideas* [*sic*] about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually becomes institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles, and practices?" In this dissertation, I examine two primary explanations and the hypotheses they generate to explain how the U.S. government prioritizes threats to its national security. The first is the role of the international system and the second is the role of political culture. A Realist bias towards the effects of the international system, posits that factors external to the U.S. government's choosing - primarily the changing nature of the international system, evolving power dynamics, and the impact on the character of the threats emerging from it - is the best explanatory variable for threat prioritization. The alternative, a Constructivist-Institutional (i.e. bureaucratic) argument, posits that a bias towards U.S. political culture and its effects on the decision-making processes of national security institutions (factors internal to the character of the U.S. political and institutional perspective) is the primary determinate in threat prioritization. Ultimately, I argue that the latter explanation is better substantiated. I illustrate this through a series of case studies, each which explores a threat representing a different level of prioritization in the schemata of U.S. national security policy. And I present an examination of acquired qualitative and quantitative data, indicating the dominance of subjective factors versus objective measures in ranking threats.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PREFACE

I have never seen anyone die for the ontological argument. – Albert Camus

The defining characteristic of the Jewish people, beyond their revolutionary belief in a single deity, is their endless capacity, indulgent proclivity and sincere desire to deliberate and debate. I have always considered the interminable discussion of dogmatic minutiae over a 5,000-year tradition, as argued by the most learned scholars ever produced, the most endearing, fascinating and inspiring aspects of sharing this set of beliefs with a mere 14 million other individuals, at the time of this writing.

This is because the Jewish faith, like its people – and all people – exist in a world replete with the contradictions, conflicts and inconsistencies that define human existence. Noah, the only man worthy of restoring humanity from wickedness, survives a catastrophic flood to become a drunkard, lost in his family's newly planted vineyard. Miriam sacrifices her entire life to serve as a slave for her brother Moshe so he may free the Jewish people from a 400-year bondage, only to frivolously gossip about his wife once relieved of her Egyptian oppressors. And perhaps, most obviously, when granted eternal bliss in a bountiful garden, Eve defies her Creator at the behest of a serpent (and Adam at the behest of Eve) for a single bite of an apple plucked from the only tree (of an endless choice of trees) she was plainly instructed not to indulge.

These foundational and inherent human incongruities are also expressed by Judaism's most fundamentally existential and pertinent contradiction – whether life is better spent in understanding or in practicing. The *Talmud* teaches us that study of *Torah* (the old testament) is more important than all commandments combined. But the *Pirkei Avot* (the Ethics of the Father) tells us, "it is not the study that is essential, but rather the action." And so, a conundrum is presented: is it our knowledge, or is it our deeds, which define who we are, what we do and the difference we choose to make when given the opportunity?

Confronted with this question, I found myself conflicted between a personal commitment to words – as measured by my academic pursuits – and deeds – as measured by my responsibility to *Tzedakah* and *chesed* – the pursuit of charity and kindness. Unexpectedly, this struggle was most prominent in the Rutgers University classroom where I proudly taught undergraduate Political Science. My approach to inspiring my students demanded I ask them, upon every lesson learned, how this knowledge not only brought them closer to

graduation – but how it provided them with the necessary proficiencies and perspectives to solve the problems we labored over in the classroom (hypothetically and theoretically) once they entered the 'real world.' And in asking this question of them, I was faced with the same critical choice – to continue to speak *at* my students, or to act *for* them, and live by the example I expected them to set. I chose the latter.

This decision had an enormous impact on the research herein. Although I had learned to think critically, I later learned how critical (and restrictive) one's thinking can be. Wherein I had learned the way in which pure analytical practice purports to distill truth, I later learned that analytical eclecticism is far most attuned to truth's practice. And in an attempt to solve the many exigent problems we are now confronting, I found the solutions were extant in listening and empowering the vulnerable, rather than allowing the fear of vulnerability to dictate restraint. Innovation is best served through facilitating the future, rather than forcing its direction. These major themes appear as critical components in this research. Indeed, at the crux of the broader theoretical questions posed herein, are ones which, at some point (and in some form), are asked by all people: how can one live so that values are aligned with actions? Is such a life even feasible – for the individual, the community, a nation, or a community of nations?

In his reflections on the paradoxical experience of our own absurdity – mankind's foolish belief that human reason possesses the capacity to distill the complex ambiguities that define existence – Albert Camus wrote, "but what is happiness except the simple harmony between a man and the life he leads?" Perhaps, therefore, it is more pertinent to ask what results from the incongruous life, lived in the chasm between resolve and reality? Or in the case of the United States, as presented in this research, what is the fate of a revolutionary nation – who lays claim to a unique moral authority through its commitment to a belief that all men they are born free, but which consistently fails to facilitate freedom for all? Perhaps this is why Camus also cautions that, "by definition, a government has no conscience. Sometimes it has a policy, but nothing more" and why he reminds us, "every revolutionary ends up either by becoming an oppressor or a heretic." So, in forging ahead – as an individual or as a nation – we are only left to determine if we are bound by our paths or if we lay siege to its determinism. For as the mindful French-Algerian philosopher once commented, "I *should* like to be able to love my country and still love justice."

In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to dissertation chair Dr. Simon Reich, his partner Dr. Chebel D'Appollonia, committee member Dr. Peter Dombroswki, and committee members Dr. Peter Van Ryzin and Dr. Yale Ferguson, without whom this would not have been possible. This manuscript has been submitted in memory of Eric Norman Kronfeld, z"l.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

We must plot our defense not against a single powerful threat, as during the Cold War, but against a viper's nest of perils. - Madeline K. Albright[1]

AN OBSERVATION

An estimated 350 private American civilians have been killed in terrorist's attacks around the world since 9/11.[2] Although terrorist incidents are on the rise globally, they are also increasingly concentrated, with the majority occurring (by 2017) in Syria Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, and Yemen, all nations where the United States has some form of ongoing military operation.[3] Domestic terrorism tells a similar story.[4] Since 9/11 there have been an estimated 100 (publicly known) Islamist-inspired terrorism attacks launched against the U.S. homeland.[5] Of these 100 attacks, the perpetrators of successful ones were U.S. citizens or American born.[6] And just under 400 people have been charged by the government with the crime of terrorism or terrorism-related activities by the end of 2017.[7] Yet, the Congressional Research Service estimates that in the first decade of the War on Terrorism, over $1 trillion dollars was spent on the War on Terrorism."[8] An in-depth study by Brown University placed this number closer to $3 trillion through fiscal year 2013.[9] The Federation of American

---

[1] Madeline K. Albright *Address to the Milwaukee Business Community.* (Milwaukee, October 2, 1998).

[2] Numbers compiled from the State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* reports (2000-2003); *Country Reports on Terrorism* (2004-2016) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations' annual *Terrorism* report. For a complete listing of reports, visit http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm and http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications. Also see, *Despite fewer attacks in Western world, global terrorism increasing.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013). Accessed December 20, 2013 http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=633.

[3] See Supra Note 2.

[4] For a complete overview of domestic terrorism in the United States see, "Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. Between 1970 and 2012: Data from the Global Terrorism Database." (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, 2013). Accessed January 29, 2014. http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IUSSD_GTDTerroristAttacksinUS_ResearchHighlight_Jan2014.pdf.

[5] Steven Bucci, Jay Carafano, and Jessica Zuckerman. *60 Terrorism Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2013) and John Mueller. *Terrorism Since 9/11* (The CATO Institute: Washington, D.C., 2017).

[6] Kurtis Lee. "Islamist terrorist have struck the U.S. 10 times since 9/11. This is where they were born." *The Washington Post* (February 7, 2017).

[7] *Terrorism in American After 9/11* (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 2017). Accessed September 31, 2017 https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america.

[8] Amy Belasco. *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011).

[9] *Costs of War: Economic Costs.* (Providence: Brown University, 2011). Accessed January 22, 2014. http://costsofwar.org/article/economic-cost-summary. For more information visit http://costsofwar.org.

scientist estimated the number to be $1.5 trillion, or $3.6 billion a month through June 30, 2017.[10] At the same time, domestic agencies – such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as state and local police - have spent an a incalculable amount of federal and state funds preventing an attack on the homeland.[11] In 1997, for example, counterterrorism expenditures across the government totaled $6.7 billion, increasing to approximately $10 billion in 2000.[12] The Department of Justice (DOJ), for example, received just under $1 billion of these funds.[13] In 2013 President Barack H. Obama requested $68.9 billion in homeland defense spending, primarily for anti-terrorism efforts.[14] Obama called for $4 billion to be allocated to the DOJ for anti-terrorism activities and another $35 billion to the DHS, established only in 2002.[15] Similar trends are seen locally. In the first decade of the War on Terrorism, homeland security spending in New York rose from $930 million to over $35 billion; New Jersey from approximately $379 million to almost $5 billion; and California from approximately $2.7 billion to over $45 billion.[16] Even those states less likely to confront terrorism (according to statistical data) saw significant spending increases.[17] For example, Hawaii increased from approximately $178 million to almost $500 million, and Florida increased from approximately $862 million to over $2.1 billion during the same time period.[18]

Terrorism certainty presents some degree of threat to U.S. security. But objectively, in the realist (i.e. material or rationalist sense), terrorism represents a marginal danger in comparison to, for example, the spread of Communism during the Cold War. The centrality of ideological control under the Soviet Union; its possession of nuclear weapons; trained

---

[10] *Cost of War Through June 30, 2017*. (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 2017). Accessed November 1, 2017 https://fas.org/man/eprint/cow/201706.pdf.

[11] The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) states that since 9/11, "the federal government has spent more than half a trillion dollars on homeland security," in order to "detect, deter, protect and respond to terrorists' acts occurring within the United States and its territories." See, *The Proposed Homeland Security Budget for 2013*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2012), p. iii.

[12] Henry L. Hinton, Jr. "Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism." (Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, March 11, 1999). Accessed February 11, 2014 http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/107800.pdf, pp. 1-2.

[13] Hinton, Jr., op. cit., p. 5.

[14] Matt A. Mayer. *An Analysis of Federal, State and Local Homeland Security Budgets*. (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2010), p. iii.

[15] Mayer, op. cit., p. iii.

[16] Mayer, op. cit., pp. 8, 25-26.

[17] *Terrorist Attacks in New York City*. (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013). Accessed February 11, 2014, http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/announcements/2010May01_NYC_Terrorism%20v2.pdf.

[18] Mayer, op. cit., pp. 11 and 13.

military forces; vast natural resources; and control over governments and territory around the world, made the USSR a formidable threat. Furthermore, Islamist terrorism one of many forms of terrorist ideology the U.S. confronts. Although the total number of active terrorists or terrorist cells is difficult to calculate, the Department of State (DOS) has designated 61 different groups as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and four states as sponsors of terrorism.[19] Including state sponsors of terrorism, terrorist organizations originate from a total of 35 different countries across the world, though they have no single, stable state under its control, have no publicly known access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), nor do they possess well trained, armed, and deployable forces in the traditional sense of the state monopoly on the use of force.[20] In general, the average terrorist organization presents a different level of threat to U.S. national security than do states. And although they can be lethal – as evidenced by the 3,000 people killed in the attacks of 9/11, and the many more killed around the world in conflicts everyday – terrorists primarily remain limited in capacity and scope. Terrorism is, despite this, the number two threat to U.S. national security, ranking just below WMDs and just above interstate warfare, as an analysis of threat assessment over the last decade, conducted for the purposes of this research, reveals.[21] As Obama stated in his 2014 national security speech at West Point, "for the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to Americans at home and abroad remains terrorism."[22]

A CONUNDRUM

Despite the more limited nature of the terrorism threat and its similarity to that of child soldiers (both characterized as non-state actors operating as armed sub-state groups), the recruitment and operationalization of children in conflict is largely ignored by the U.S. There is no specific defense-related directive or policy on the matter (beyond its criminalization and general restrictions on aid disbursements to nations employing child soldiers), nor is it

---

[19] The four official state sponsors of terrorism include North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Syria. For a complete list of FTOs visit "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 2012). Accessed December 11, 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

[20] Official designated FTOs originate from, or are headquartered in, the following states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Columbia, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ireland, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Peru, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

[21] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

[22] Barack Obama. *Remarks by the President at the United States Military Commencement Ceremony.* (New York: West Point, May 28, 2014).

addressed in official threat assessments from the last decade.[23] Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich write, "child soldering does not assume centrality on the West's security agenda whose top priorities are terrorism, nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction... [however] child soldering has become intertwined with terrorism, suggesting that the increasing use of child soldiers poses a long-term threat to the health and security of societies."[24] Numerous examples from the War on Terrorism elucidate the similar danger posed by terrorism and by child soldiers to U.S. forces.[25] For example, the first U.S. serviceman killed in the Afghan invasion was shot by a 14-year-old boy.[26] In 2002, U.S. forces arrested three teenagers, aged 13 to 15, on suspicion of aiding and abetting the Taliban, holding them in the Guantanamo Bay prison facility for over a year before being released.[27] Omar Kadr, a 15-year-old Canadian captured that same year, was charged with aiding and abetting the Taliban, and held alongside them.[28] In 2013, an Afghan teenage boy, approximately 16 years old, fatally stabbed an Army

---

[23] In 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law *The Child Soldier Accountability Act* and *The Child Soldiers Prevention Act*, which criminalizes militaries which recruit or use children in conflict. This federal legislation was an act of the Department of State and not the Department of Defense. See, *The Child Soldier Accountability Act*. (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 2008) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135981.pdf and *The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008*. (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 2008) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135981.pdf. The threat assessments used for the purposes of this study include the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2001, 2006, 2010, 2014); *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (2010, 2014); the *National Defense Strategy* (2005, 2008, 2012); the *National Security Strategy* (2002, 2006, 2010); the Central Intelligence Agency *Annual Threat Assessment* statement (2000-2014); and the Defense Intelligence Agency's *Threat Assessments* (2007, 2011, 2012, 2013). See Appendix Two.

[24] Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich. "No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers. *International Security* (2006), p. 130.

[25] The United Nations' *Convention on the Rights of the Child* defines a child soldier as an individual under the age of 15 who is directly engaged in hostilities. See Article 38 of the *Convention of the Rights of the Child*. (New York: United Nations, 1989). The 2002 *Optional Protocol* raised the age to 18 years old. See the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict*. (New York: United Nations, 2002). This definition is consistent with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Article 2) and the International Labor Organization. See *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*. (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008), p. 411. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers defines a child soldier more broadly as, "any person below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group, whether or not an armed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in combat, laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, cooking and domestic labour [*sic*]. Child soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or other forms of sexual abuse." See, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, op. cit., p. 411. The U.S. has not signed nor ratified either the U. N. *Convention* or the *Optional Protocol* but, in 2002, the U.S. military hosted a conference on the implications of child soldiers at the Marine Corp Warfighting Laboratory. The author is not aware of any policy action that resulted from the conference or the publication of the conference's report. See Charles Borchini, Stephanie Lanz and Erin O'Connell. *Child Soldiers: Implications for U.S. Forces*. (Quantico: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2002).

[26] Borchini, Lanz and O'Connell, op. cit., p. 7.

[27] James Astill. "Cuba? It was great say boys freed from US prison camp." *The Guardian* (March 5, 2004) and "Three teens freed from Guantanamo; Boys said to have backed Taliban." *The Washington Times* (January 30, 2004).

[28] *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, op. cit., p. 19.

Sergeant on security detail near the border with Pakistan.[29] A Taliban spokesman announced the boy acted independently but had since joined the group.[30] In January 2014, a nine-year-old girl (the sister of a Taliban commander) was prevented from detonating a suicide vest in Afghanistan.[31] This growing trend of child suicide attackers is seen in Islamist fronts around the world.[32] In Iraq, the UN reports al Qaeda operates a group known as the 'Birds of Paradise' utilizing children under 14 for suicide attacks.[33] Since 2007, al-Shabaab successfully recruited over two-dozen Somali-American teenagers to leave the U.S. and fight in its African insurgency.[34] In Yemen children are frequently abducted for use by terrorists.[35] And by 2017, Boko Haram had forced 115 children to act as suicide bombers.[36]

As Child Soldiers International notes, despite a decrease in child recruitment by national armed forces, the recruitment of children by armed gangs and sub-state groups is rising.[37] Perhaps the most startling development is the growing number of children from the Middle East, Africa and the Caucuses recruited, trained and martyred by the Islamic State (ISIS).[38] The Syrian-Iraqi based, al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization celebrates its child

---

[29] "Afghan Teenager Kills American Soldier." *The Associated Press* (April 1, 2013).

[30] "Afghan Teenager Kills American Soldier," op. cit.

[31] "Suicide vest nine-year-old tells her story. *BBC News* (January 13, 2014).

[32] Achvarina and Reich, op. cit., p. 127. Shakeela Ibrahimkhail. "Child Suicide Bombers A Growing Issue: Officials." *TOLO News* (January 7, 2014). Accessed January 9, 2014 http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/13375-child-suicide-bombers-a-growing-issue-officials and Julie McBride. *The War Crime of Child Soldier Recruitment*. (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2014), p. 12. Also see Bill Roggio. "Taliban rebuild children's suicide camp in South Waziristan." *Long War Journal* (October 6, 2008).

[33] *Report of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict.* (New York: United Nations, 2011), pp. 22-23.

[34] Mia Bloom and John Horgan. "The Rise of the Child Terrorist." *Foreign Affairs* (2015). Also see Allie Conti. "Can the Feds Stop Islamic State Recruiters from Preying on Somali Americans?" *VICE* (February 18, 2015).

[35] McBride, op. cit., pp. 3-4 and *Report of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict* (2011), op. cit., pp. 40 and 46. Also see *Situation Analysis of Children in Yemen 2014*. (Sana'a: UNICEF, 2014).

[36] Authorities in Nigeria called the first two suicide bombings which used underage girls, "an unprecedented step in the insurgency", illustrating the importance of this new tactic in the evolution of their asymmetric war against a government authorities and the Nigerian population. See "Deaths in Nigeria child suicide bombings." Al Jazeera (January 11, 2015); Drew Hinshaw. "Female suicide bomber kills at least 20 in Nigeria." *Wall Street Journal* (July 7, 2015); Adam Nossiter. "In Nigeria, New Boko Haram Suicide Bomber Tactic: 'It's a Little Girl.' *The New York Times* (January 10, 2015) and "Teenage suicide bombers kill at least 12 people in Nigeria and Cameroon." *The Guardian* (November 23, 2015). Also see Philip Obaji Jr. "Children living in fear in northeastern Nigeria." *The Hill* (January 5, 2015). Caleb Weiss. "Boko Haram releases photos showing children in training." *Long War Journal* (January 25, 2015) and Lucy Westcott. "Boko Haram Ramps up use of children in suicide attacks: U.N." *Newsweek.* (April 12, 2017). Villahe militias have begun recruitment child soldiers to combat the terrorist group. See Philip Obaji Jr. "The Child Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram. *The Daily Beats* (March 7, 2015).

[37] "Increase of child soldiers in armed groups in 2014." *Vatican Radio* (February 11, 2015). Accessed February 10, 2015 http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/02/11/increase_of_child_soldiers_in_armed_groups_in_2014/1122791. Also see Bloom and Horgan, op. cit. and Cole Pinheiro. "The Role of Child Soldiers in a Multigenerational Movement." *CTC Sentinel* (February 27, 2015).

[38] The Islamic State or IS, also referred to as the Islamic State in Syria or ISIS, the Islamic State in the Levant or ISIL and *Dawlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq w Belaad al-Sham* or DAESH. On the organization's many names, and why

soldiers, referred to as the 'Caliphate Cubs', 'Generation Caliphate' or '*Ashbal*' (Arabic for 'lion cubs').[39] An estimated 1,100 children under 16 years old have been recruited into its ranks.[40] Equally problematic is the growing number of individuals (many teenagers) being recruited and radicalized through social media platforms, leaving their homes in the U.S. and EU to join the jihadist front overseas.[41] The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence estimates more than 20,000 foreign fighters have joined Islamist terrorist groups, with as many as one-fifth hailing from Western Europe.[42] This makes the war against ISIS the largest mobilization of foreign fighters in a Muslim majority state since 1945, surpassing the 1980s Afghan front.[43] These American and European teenagers are highly dangerous to homeland security due to their ability to travel to and from the West without drawing attention given their native legal status.[44] And although often overlooked as merely brides for Jihadi fighters, the role of Western women traveling to the front lines is problematic.[45] *The Telegraph* reports, these women, "are not just playing the roles of dutiful wives and mothers… While women are prevented from fighting by Sharia law, which Isil [*sic*]

---

they matter, see Zeba Khan. "Words Matter in 'ISIS' war, so use 'Daesh.'" *The Boston Globe* (October 9, 2014) and Jason Silverstein. "Daesh: The word ISI doesn't want you to say – and why politicians are using it more than ever." *The New York Daily News* (November 18, 2015).

[39] Chris Pleasance. "How to raise a jihadi-baby: Horrifying ISIS guide for mothers instructs them to ban TV to 'protect little ears', tell bedtime stories about fighting and give toddlers weapons training with toy guns." *The Daily Mail* (December 31, 2014) and Heather Saul. "The 'cub of Baghdadi': Has this boy become the youngest victim yet of ISIS's use of child soldiers." *The Independent* (October 8, 2014).

[40] Feras Hanoush. "The Islamic State's Molding of Syrian Children." *The Atlantic Council* (November 17, 2015).

[41] For example, see Benedetta Argentieri. "Foreigners fighting Islamic State in Syria: who and why?" *Reuters* (January 5, 2015); J.M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan. *The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2015); Ben Brumfield. "Officials: 3 Denver girls played hooky from school and tried to join ISIS." *CNN.* (October 23, 2014); Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura. "From Studious Teenager to ISIS Recruit." *The New York Times* (February 24, 2105); Fredrik Graesvik, Elin Sorsdahl and Dag Stammes. "Hussein (14) fra Sagene i Oslo kjemper mot IS i Irak." *TV2* (February 1, 2014); "Hashtag Terror: How ISIS Manipulates Social Media." (New York: The Anti-Defamation League, 2014); Trevor Hughes. "Teenage jihad suspect sentenced to four years." *USA Today* (January 23, 2015); Ben Kamisar. "Minnesota man charged with trying to join ISIS." *The Hill* (February 19, 2015); Chris Perez. "Gun-wielding teen girls from Europe join ISIS," *The New York Post* (September 10, 2014); Marc Santora and Nate Schweber. "In Brooklyn, Eager to Joins ISIS, if Only His Mother Would Return his Passport." *The New York Times* (February 26, 2015); Kevin Sullivan. "Three American teens, recruited online, are caught trying to join the Islamic State." *Washington Post* (December 8, 2014) and Susan Zalkind. "How ISIS's 'Attack America' Plain is Working." *The Daily Beats* (June 22, 2015).

[42] Peter R. Neumann. *Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s.* (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2015).

[43] Neumann, op. cit.

[44] Daniel Byman. "The Homecomings: What Happens When Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2015) and Micah Zenko. "Is US Foreign Policy Ignoring Homegrown Terrorists." *Council on Foreign Relations* (May 19, 2015).

[45] Adam Taylor. "The powerful propaganda being spread online by women in the Islamic State." *Washington Post* (March 23, 2015).

adheres to, the female jihadi [*sic*] is now chief recruiter, groomer and propagandist for this murderous cult."[46] One in seven British nationals who left for Syria to join ISIS are female and as many as 600 Western women have joined the organization since its founding.[47]

Speaking to their increasing lethality, ISIS child soldiers have been publicized serving as executioners, positioning and firing missiles into Iraq, and being sacrificed in battle.[48] As one journalist reported, "militants are said to value the so-called martyrdom of children above that of adults."[49] Writing in *Foreign Policy*, Kate Brannen commented, "the Islamic State has put in place a far-reaching and well-organized system for recruiting children, indoctrinating them with the group's extremist beliefs, and then teaching them rudimentary fighting skills. The militants are preparing for a long war against the West, and hope the young warriors being trained today will still be fighting years from now."[50] She adds, "the young fighters of the Islamic State could pose a particularly dangerous long-term threat because they're being kept away from their normal schools and instead inculcated with a steady diet of Islamist propaganda designed to dehumanize others and persuade them of the nobility of fighting and dying for their faith."[51] This "brainwashing," according to Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, makes the current wave of terrorism, "a multigenerational problem."[52]

To ensure the perpetuity of their ranks, organizations like ISIS have created vast networks of training camps for minors, some kidnapped and others enrolled by their families.[53] As the *Daily Mail* reports, "in much the same way as the Nazi Germany preyed on its impressionable young citizens with the creation of the Hitler Youth, ISIS has long groomed children to take part in jihad."[54] Children have become a critical, if not fundamental

---

[46] Javaria Akbar. "British Muslim woman: why can't I make any white friends?" *The Telegraph* (November 14, 2014) and Jayne Huckerby. "When Women Become Terrorists." *The New York Times* (January 21, 2015).

[47] Akbar, op. cit. and Simon Cottee. "The Lost Pilgrims of the Islamic State." *The Atlantic* (July 26, 2015).

[48] John Hall. "Shocking image shows child aged under ten being used to fire rockets from car-mounted missile launcher in Iraq against ISIS targets." *The Daily Mail* (December 20, 2014); Larry McShane. "ISIS teenagers execute group of 25 prisoners in front of crowd at amphitheater." *New York Daily News* (July 4, 2015) and Reid Standish. "Kazakh Child Soldier Executes 'Russian Spies in Islamic State Video." *Foreign Policy* (January 13, 2015).

[49] Hall, op. cit.

[50] Kate Brannen. "The Islamic State is raising an army of child soldiers, and the West could be fighting them for generations to come." *Foreign Policy* (October 24, 2014).

[51] Brannen, op. cit.

[52] Brannen, op. cit.

[53] Mia Bloom. "Cubs of the Caliphate: The Children of ISIS." *Foreign Affairs* (July 21, 2015) and Bloom and Horgan, op. cit.

[54] John Hall. "Chilling images show new ISIS terrorist school in Syria where children soldiers known as 'Caliphate Cubs' are trained to kill." *Daily Mail* (December 8, 2014).

component of the Islamist strategy.[55] The Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) estimates as many as 800 children under 18 years old are members of the organization, many of whom are trained in over a dozen camps exclusively for children and teenagers stretching across the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.[56] Reports from children who have escaped highlight their critical role as porters, guards, patrolmen, sex slaves, as well as frontline fighters and suicide bombers.[57] ISIS has even used mentally challenged children to detonate suicide bombs, a strategy even the most organized and lethal terrorist organizations typically avoid.[58] As the UN reports, "ISIS prioritizes children as a vehicle for ensuring long-term loyalty, adherence to their ideology and a cadre of devoted fighters that will see violence as a way of life."[59] Leila Zerrougui, the UN secretary-general special representative for children and armed conflict adds, "this is not a marginal phenomenon. This is something that is being observed and seems to be part of the strategy of the group."[60]

The indoctrination of the children, the advent of youth training camps, and the use of minors as a tactic of asymmetric war is also a policy of Palestinian terrorist organizations.[61] An estimated 100,000 children have attended Hamas and Islamic Jihad military training camps.[62] And in 2015 Hamas launched the "Vanguards of Liberation" campaign to recruit teenage boys,

---

[55] Chris Pleasance. "Child soldiers are central to ISIS's plans to dominate the Middle East... and breed an entire generation of fanatical fighters, warn terror experts. *Daily Mail* (December 23, 2104).

[56] Bloom, op. cit.; Bloom and Horgan, op. cit.; and *ISIS Kills Childhood: A special report on the Violations committed by ISIS against.* (Edgware: The Syrian Human Rights Committee, August 16, 2014). Accessed January 5, 2014 http://www.shrc.org/en/?p=23838 and Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss. "Jihadists tout training camps for children in Iraq and Syria." *Long War Journal* (November 7, 2014).

[57] Maria Abi-Habib. "The Child Soldiers Who Escaped Islamic State: Boys, Teenagers Tell of Lessons in Beheading, Weaponry at Training Camps." *Wall Street Journal* (December 27, 2014) and Tim Arango. "A Boy in ISIS. A Suicide Vest. A Hope to Live." *New York Times* (December 26, 2014).

[58] Andrew Buncombe. "Isis militants are using mentally challenged children as suicide bombers and crucifying others', says UN body." *The Independent* (February 5, 2015).

[59] The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. *Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria.* (New York, the United Nations, 2014), pp. 10-11.

[60] "Child soldiers become integral part of ISIS' army." *CBS News* (June 23, 2014).

[61] For example, see Khaled Abu Toameh. "Hamas to establish military academy for schoolkids." *Jerusalem Post* (January 1, 2014); Ibrahim Barzak. "3,000 Gaza Teens graduate Hamas terror school." *The Times of Israel.* (January 24, 2013); Evelyn Gordon. "How the World Encourages Hamas to Recruit Child Soldiers." *Commentary Magazine* (January 21, 2015); "In Hezbollah magazine, not fairies but fighters." *Agence France Presse* (December 2, 2014); Phoebe Greenwood. "Hamas teaches Palestinian schoolboys how to fire Kalashnikovs." *The Telegraph* (April 28, 2013); Elhanan Miller. "13,00 teens complete Hamas training camps to emulate 'suicide martyrs.'" *The Times of Israel* (January 15, 2104); and Graham Smith. "Inside the 'theme park' where children are taught the glory of martyrdom." *The Daily Mail* (August 15, 2012).

[62] Paul Alster. "Child Soldier: Shocking video surfaces of purported 4-year-old jihadist in Syria." *Fox News* (February 3, 2014).

as young as 15, from Gaza to form the core of its new "Liberation Army."[63] With swelling populations in the Middle East and Africa, as one military official interviewed for the purpose of this research noted, the predominance of young Muslims as a factor of global demographics cannot be ignored. Speaking of the radical and violent Islamist subset among this religious group, the subject emphasized the "math problem" the U.S. will confront in the next two decades, adding even if these Islamists represent, "only one tenth or one percent of the 1.5 billion [Muslims], that's still that's 150,000 right there alone. So, if you have 150,000 violent dedicated zealots that believe in this, sprinkled across the world [in] certain places, that's very, very dangerous to our country."[64]

These handful of examples only represents a small subset of the broader issue of child soldiering. The Coalition to Stop to the Use of Child Soldiers notes, "when armed conflict breaks out, reignites, or intensifies, children will almost inevitably become involved as soldiers."[65] By 2004, it was estimated that children were involved in almost every major ongoing conflict, fighting on behalf of the state, sub state groups, or both. As a result, they play an important role in perpetuating state failure and regional instability which affects the security of the U.S. and the international system, which America underwrites.[66] By 2008, best estimates placed child soldiers in 86 different state or territories.[67] Over the past fifty years, Simon Reich estimates that children have made up anything between zero percent and 53 percent of combatants in African conflicts, with worldwide estimates ranging from 200,000 to 300,000.[68] As the UN reported in 2017, with 243 million children currently living in war zones, the potential for recruitment is enormous.[69] And evidence suggests that the "new wars" of the post-Cold War era, use child soldiers to the "extreme."[70] Julie McBride writes, "regardless of

[63] Khaled Abu Toameh. "Hamas Forms 'Liberation Army' in Gaza, Thanks to EU Support." (Hudson: Gatestone Institute, 2015). Accessed January 21, 2015 http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5124/hamas-liberation-army.
[64] Interview with Subject 27, op. cit.
[65] *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, op. cit., p. 15.
[66] McBride, op. cit., p. 2.
[67] *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, op. cit., p. 12.
[68] McBride, op. cit., pp. 2-3 Simon Reich. "How Child Soldiers Are Recruited From Refugee Camps." *The Conversation* (September 4, 2011). Accessed January 28, 2014, http://theconversation.com/how-child-soldiers-are-recruited-from-refugee-camps-2938. Also see Achvarina and Reich, op. cit. To understand the difficulties in calculating the number of child soldiers see Barry Ames. "Methodological Problems in the Study of Child Soldiers" in (eds.) Scott Gates and Simon Reich, *Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States.* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2010).
[69] *Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict* (New York: United Nations General, 2017).
[70] Achvarina and Reich, op. cit., p. 128. On "new wars" see Mary Kaldor. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

the disparity in statistics, it is clear that the issue of child recruitment currently shows little sign of abating.[71] This is despite the proliferation of human rights instruments throughout the last twenty years condemning the practice."[72]

Child soldiers have been seen in state and sub state conflicts as diverse as the Maoist opposition movements in Thailand; revolutionary movements in South Sudan, Columbia and Kashmir; extremist Christian and anti-government sub-state groups in Uganda; by Christian and Muslim groups in the Central African Republic (where more than 10,000 children have been recruited from a population of 4.5 million); by transnational criminal organizations in Mexico and Argentina; by pirates in Africa and Asia; and despite their best efforts during demobilization, the practice remains widespread in Myanmar.[73] Child soldiers are made more dangerous and prolific given the advent of light and easily operated weaponry, which do not require the technical skills necessary for explosives, the terrorist's standard weapon of choice.[74] This trend has been widespread in the Iraqi insurgency and on all sides of the sectarian conflict

---

[71] For example, the UN documented as many as 4,000 cases in 2013 alone. See, Edith M. Lederer. "UN: Over 4,000 Child Soldiers in Armed Conflicts." *Associated Press* (July 1, 2014) and *Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General.* (New York: United Nations, 2014).

[72] McBride, op. cit., p. 4.

[73] Adriaan Alsema. "Illegal armed groups recruited more than 100 Colombian child soldiers in 2014." *Colombia Reports* (December 17, 2014); Abhishek Bhalla. "Exclusive: Security forces launch rescue mission to save child soldiers swept up in Maoist 'recruitment drive.'" *Daily Mail* (August 2, 2014); Robert Beckhusen. "How Mexico's Drug Cartels Recruit Child Soldiers as Young as 11." *Wired* (March 28, 2013). Accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/mexico-child-soldiers; *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, op. cit., pp. 23-24; *Children in Maritime Piracy: Our Work in 2013.* (London: Child Soldiers International, 2013). Accessed February 23, 2013, http://www.childsoldiers.org/piracy-report; "Colombia: Child soldiers the new generation of cartel muscle." *Russia Today* (February 19, 2014); Lizzie Dearden. "Hundreds of boys 'kidnapped and forced into becoming child soldiers' in South Sudan. *The Independent* (March 1, 2015); Jo Griffin. "Guns, drugs and banditos: inside the favela too violent for Rio's armed police." *The Guardian* (January 3, 2015); Alexandra Jolly. "Columbia guerilla groups recruited 1400 child soldiers since 2011: Report." *Columbia Reports* (March 13 2014); Hannah McNeish. "South Sudan's next generation in a hurry to fight." *The Guardian* (November 12, 2014); Michelle Nichols. "Central African Republic children forced to commit atrocities: UN." *Reuters* (January 22, 2014); "UN Blacklists Ugandan Group for Using Child Soldiers. *Reuters* (June 30, 2014); "UN secures pledge to free 3,000 South Sudan child soldiers." *Reuters* (January 27, 2015) and Coen Van Wyk. "The continuing dilemma of child soldiers: Central Africa in focus." *Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor* (2014), pp. 48-51. Other examples include, Isma'il Kushkush. "In South Sudan, a Ghost of Wars Past: Child Soldiers." *The New York Times* (June 7, 2014); Judith Victoria Mwandumba. "Children on the Battlefield: A Look Into The Use of Child Soldiers in the DRC Conflict." *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* (2015), pp. 59-71; Arijit Sen. "There Are at Least 500 Child Soldiers Fighting in Northeast India, and the World Hasn't Noticed." *Time* (March 24, 2014) and Michelle Shephard. "The Houmonou siblings: Three tiny orphans and the horror of war." *The Toronto Star* (January 5, 2014).

[74] The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) reports that explosives were used in 45 percent of terrorist attacks around the world between 1970 and 2008. See, *Explosives Used in Most U.S. Terrorist Attacks Overall but Rarely in Recent Attacks.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response To Terrorism, 2010). Accessed February 1, 2014, http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/media/pr/Package_Bombs_Press_Release.pdf. On child soldiers and light weaponry see McBride, op. cit., pp. 5 and 9 and P.W. Singer. "Western militaries confront child soldiers threat." *Jane's Intelligence Review* (January 5, 2005).

in Syria.[75] The UN reports both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and rebel forces using children in combat.[76] Further reports claim state like Russia, recruit children as young as five for military training.[77] This claim that has also been lobbied against Ukraine in its conflict with Russia over Crimea.[78] Child soldiers are even drawn into conflicts from outside direct war zones. Refugee and Internally Displace Persons (IDP) camps provide an endless pool of potential recruits, with children under 18 representing as many as 44 percent of the 50 million refugees and IDPs around the world, who face few options for survival outside of joining armed groups.[79]

Yet, as U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Judith A. Hughes writes, "there is a dearth of published literature on the military's response to the threat of child soldiers, including a lack of literature on troops' pre-deployment training needs and psychological response to encountering and killing children in combat. Despite the awareness of this emerging problem, the majority of the US military has not adopted any official policies or prepared doctrine specific to this issue."[80] She identifies, "the lack of specificity about encountering or killing child soldiers may be a flaw in the medical community's threat-surveillance assessment," and, "being unprepared to encounter child soldiers risks decreasing the effectiveness of U.S. combat forces."[81] Hughes concludes, the U.S. military is, "not been properly prepared to face

---

[75] Alster, op. cit.; Sophie Cousins. "Kurdish child soldiers battle ISIL in Syria." *Al Jazeera* (December 13, 2014); Jessica Elgot. "Iraq, Syria and Gaza Pictures Reveal Grim Reality of Kids At War." *Huffington Post UK* (June 25, 2014); Jonathan Krohn. "Yazidi girls train to take on ISIL from Sinjar." *The National* (December 1, 2014); Rashid Najm. "ISIL recruits children to be soldiers." *Central Asia Online* (July 21, 2014) and David Williams. "Children of war: As rebels force boys to watch and execution, gun-toting youngsters join regime troops." *Daily Mail* (June 16, 2014). Also see Raja Abdulrahim. "In Syria, war is woven into childhood." *Los Angeles Times* (April 24, 2014).
[76] "Children in Syria suffer unspeakable abuses in war." *Agence France Presse* (February 5, 2014). Also see Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. "Fact Sheet: Recruitment and Use of Children." (New York: United Nations, February 11, 2014); David Rhode. "Analysis: Is Syria now a direct threat to the U.S." *Reuters.* (February 7, 2013); "'Maybe We Live and Maybe We Die:' Recruitment and Use of Children by Armed Groups in Syria." (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014) and "Taliban Child Soldiers." *Channel 4* (July 22, 2013). Accessed February 6, 2014, http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/videos/all/taliban-child-fighters-clip-1 and *Under the radar: Ongoing recruitment and use of children by the Myanmar army."* (London: Child Soldiers International, 2015).
[77] "Putin's tiny army: Russian child soldiers trained in battle tactics, weapons and hand-to-hand combat to 'repel any enemy of the Motherland.'" *Daily Mail* (March 24, 2014).
[78] Vitaly Shevchenko. "Ukraine conflict: Child soldiers join the fight." *BBC News* (November 5, 2104).
[79] Achvarina and Reich, op. cit., pp. 138-139; Laura Carlsen. "Treating Child Refugees as National Security Threats." *CounterPunch.org* (April 2, 2015); Khalid Koser. "IDPs, refugees, and violent extremism: From victims to vectors of change." (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2015); McBride, op. cit., p. 6 and Anne Speckhard. "How Dragging Our Feet on Refugees Creates More Terrorists." *New York Times* (September 29, 2015).
[80] Judith A. Hughes. "Child Soldiers: Are US Military Members Prepared to Deal With the Threat?" *Air & Space Power Journal* (2008).
[81] Hughes, op. cit.

the unique threat of child soldiers."[82] Although child soldiers do not present the same threat to the homeland as terrorism, it poses a threat to U.S. forces and civilians in war zones or unstable regions around the world. This is just one example of the way in which the U.S. exhibits a distinct, and at times paradoxical prioritization of threats to its national security.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This generates an important question: given the apparent disconnect between externally defined (or objective) threats and those internally (or subjectively) prioritized by the American government, under what conditions does the U.S. prioritize specific types of threats to its national security?[83] In the case of this research, I seek to understand what are the primary determinates of prioritization in regards to the threat posed to the U.S. by terrorism, narco-trafficking, climate change and the emerging geopolitics of the Arctic region? At its very essence, this dissertation seeks to explain what Ronnie Lipschultz questioned: "how do *ideas* [*sic*] about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually becomes institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles, and practices?"[84]

For the purpose of this research I define threats as an increased level of (probabilistic) hazard, that directly or indirectly inflicts (or is perceived as inflicting) severe injury, or having the potential to significantly degrade or fundamentally disrupt, over a given period of time, the security of a state, individual, or community of individuals. Threats can be divided between external and internal and threats. By external (i.e. independent or objective) threats, I mean threats that are perceived as such from the perspective of independent (and credible) analysis. I define external threats as being imminent or existential in nature, posing a clear and present danger to security. These include direct economic or military threats to the U.S. citizenry or sovereignty at home or overseas.[85] External threats can be measured by such characteristics as historical precedent; high probability of occurrence; high causality rates; and cost of response

---

[82] Hughes, op. cit.

[83] For the purposes of this research, threat prioritization is defined by the discursive emphasis given to a specific threat across official U.S. government threat assessment reports. On the threat assessments used in this study see Appendix Two: Government Documents. On the methodology used to assign a weighted score to the discursive emphasis given to a specific threat, see Chapter Three: Data & Analysis.

[84] Ronnie D. Lipschutz. "On Security" in (ed.) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *On Security*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 1-2.

[85] On this see Barry Buzan *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1983), pp. 75-83.

to the occurrence of the threat. Hans Gunter Brauch writes, "these threats require us to understand the state's vulnerabilities."[86]

By internal (i.e. governmental or subjective), I mean threats that are perceived as such from the perspective of the government responsible for prioritizing them; in the case of this research, the U.S. Internal threats are less tangible, evoking emotional rather than strictly material-based responses. These include threats to the values that define American social, ecological or cultural existence, reflecting the changing notions of security that have emerged in the post-Cold War era.[87] Drawing from the sociological literature on symbolic threat perspective, I posit these types of threats - determined by official threat assessment documents - are conceptualized by their authors (i.e. the government) in the context of intangible American "values" (broadly defined).[88] These threats are perceived as infringing upon U.S. values are therefore more threatening. According to conflict theory, from which symbolic threat perspective derives, those in positions of authority (in the case of this research, government officials), utilize mechanisms of social power (for the purposes of this research discourse and culture) to take actions protecting their status and dominance by identifying threats as threatening in order to exert control over perceptions and, as a result, policy.[89] The context (or discourse) and environment (or culture) therefore become the most important factors in determining internal threats from external one.[90] Internal threats, in essence, are threats to identities or worldviews, while objective threats are 'realistic' threats to the welfare of that which is being threatened.[91] Linda Troop and Ludwin Molina write, "whereas realistic [i.e. external] threats concentrate on conflicts over resources, symbolic [i.e. internal] threats are typically conceptualized in terms of (perceived or actual) differences in values and belief

---

[86] Brauch, op. cit., p. 62.

[87] On this, see Stacy Moak, Shuan Thomas and Jeffrey Walker. "The Influence of Race on Preadjudication Detention: Applying the Symbolic Threat Hypothesis to Disproportionate Minority Contact." *Journal of Juvenile Justice* (2012). Also see Robert J. Sampson and John H. Laub. "Structural variations in juvenile court processing: Inequality, the underclass and social control." *Law and Society Review* (1993), pp. 285-311 and Charles R. Tittle and Debra A. Curan. "Contingencies for dispositional disparities in juvenile justice." *Social Forces* (1988), pp. 23-58.

[88] Moak, Thomas and Walker, op. cit. Also see John Irwin. *The Jail: Managing the underclass in American society.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and Tittle and Curan, op. cit.

[89] Lewis Coser defined conflict as, "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals." See Lewis Coser. *The Functions of Social Conflict.* (New York: Free Press, 1956), p. 8. Also see Celesta Albonetti. "An integration of theories to explain judicial discretion." *Social Problems* (1991), pp. 247-266; Moak, Thomas and Walker, op. cit. and Tittle and Curan, op. cit.

[90] Moak, Thomas and Walker, op. cit.

[91] Richard Crisp. *The Psychology of Social and Cultural Diversity."* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 200.

systems."[92] External and internal threats are furthermore distinguished by the former being an "involuntary risk (in a hazard prone environment)," while the latter is "a voluntary risk (more subjective to control)."[93] Stated differently, Arnold Wolfers writes, "security, in an *objective* [i.e. external] sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a *subjective* [i.e. internal] sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."

I furthermore define security as the means by which one achieves a significantly lessened degree of threat. Security is multi-dimensional, and is best understood through a four-fold typology of human, public, national and global security. For the purpose of this research I will focus on national security, which is defined as a category and discourse of security that takes as given the state (or nation) as its central unit of analysis. National security is defined as the goal of, and means by which, a state preserves its territorial integrity (i.e. sovereignty), as well the political, economic, cultural, social, or environmental freedom of its national institutions, both tangible and intangible.

It is the primary function of U.S. foreign policy to prioritize certain threats in order to create a policy response to them. For the purposes of this research, I define policy as the "legitimate or sanctioned" outcome of the bureaucratic process (i.e. the passing of a law of "some other form of authoritative pronouncement").[94] Employing Harold Laswell and Charles Jones' formulation, this process is characterized by: 1) problem identification (i.e. intelligence, information, recommendation); 2) program development (i.e. prescription and invocation); 3) program implementation; 4) program evaluation and; 5) program termination.[95]

In this dissertation, I will examine two primary explanations and the hypotheses they generate to explain how the U.S. government prioritizes threats to its national security. The first is the role of the international system and the second is the role of political culture. A

---

[92] Linda Tropp and Ludwin Molina. "Intergroup Processes: From Prejudice to Positive Relations Between Groups" in (eds.) Kay Deaux and Mark Snyder, *The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 551.

[93] Brauch, op. cit., p. 90.

[94] Robert T. Nakamua. "The Textbook Public Policy Process." *Policy Studies Review* (1987), p. 145

[95] Harold Laswell's formulation is seven-fold and includes intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal and termination. Charles Jones' take on Laswell's formula is consolidated and includes identification, development, implementation, evaluating and termination. See, Charles O. Jones. *An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy.* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1977); Harold Laswell. *The Decision Process.* (College Park: University of Maryland, 1956) and Harold Laswell. "The decision process: Seven categories of analysis" in (eds.) Nelson Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith, *Politics and Social Life: An introduction to political behavior.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963).

Realist bias towards the effects of the international system, posits that factors external to the U.S. government's choosing - primarily the changing nature of the international system, evolving power dynamics, and the impact on the character of the threats emerging from it - is the best explanatory variable for threat prioritization. The alternative, a Constructivist-Institutional (i.e. bureaucratic) argument, posits that a bias towards U.S. political culture and its effects on the decision-making processes of national security institutions (factors internal to the character of the U.S. political and institutional perspective) is the primary determinate in threat prioritization. Ultimately, I will argue that the latter explanation is better substantiated. I will illustrate this through a series of case studies, each which will explore a threat representing a different level of prioritization in the schemata of U.S. national security policy. And I will present an examination of acquired qualitative and quantitative data, indicating the dominance of subjective factors versus objective measures in ranking threats.

CONTRIBUTION TO SCHOLARSHIP

This research is interesting and important for both theoretical and policymaking reasons.[96] As Jack Holland writes, whereas a "plethora of work that has attempted to understand the framing of foreign policy, the role played by acquiescence in enabling foreign policy remains under-theorized and underexplored."[97] He adds, "asking 'how' seeks to understand the ways in which a particular decision, policy or action was enabled."[98] This research is therefore potentially interesting because it seeks to address what securitization or framing fails to comprehend, mainly the links between threat construction and policy outcomes. Wherein the threat construction or securitization literature examines the moment at which something becomes a threat, it says little about how or why certain threats are prioritized, nor how it leads to government policy. Lipschutz notes that, "this process is the least understood of all."[99] There is much to be learned about the gap between the selection and construction of a threat and the resulting policy to deal with it.

---

[96] Chaim Kaufman makes a similar point in his discussion of threat inflation. See Chaim Kaufmann. "Threat inflation and the failure of the marketplace of ideas: The selling of the Iraq War" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11*. (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 97-116.

[97] Holland, op. cit., p. 38.

[98] Holland, op. cit., p. 30.

[99] Lipschutz, op. cit., p. 2.

This research begins to address a current void in the literature between threat construction and policy outcomes, between words (i.e. discourse) and actions (i.e. behavior). By employing a bifurcated analytic framework discussed in the following chapter, synthesizing Constructivist and Institutional theories of International Relations, this proposed study will, as Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil write, "be able to contend with the complexity of social phenomena that bear on the practical dilemmas and constraints faced by decision makers and other actors in the 'real' world." [100] This research also has potential practical applications. Katzenstein and Sil note, social science research is often more focused on theory than policy, creating a 'chasm' between the 'suppliers' of research and the desires of its 'users.'[101] The literature on the construction of threats is broad and diverse in the European context, but less so in the American one. Research into the construction or 'securitization' of threats suggests that international relations is a historical and social construct and not the consequence of great power politics, as Realists would posit. And threats specifically, are a discursive construction articulated by government officials and sustained, in part, by the co-optation and support of a given audience (as Constructivists would posit).[102]

The securitization literature took on a more prominent role in the post-9/11 era, particularly in regards to constructing the threat of immigration, asylum seekers, and terrorism to Europe in the Twenty-First Century. There exist a few examples of the securitization literature, narrowly defined, or threat construction literature, broadly, being applied in the context the U.S. [103] As is the case with most research traditions, the criticisms of securitization

---

[100] Katzenstein and Sil, op. cit., p. 9.

[101] Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil. *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 1.

[102] For example, see Thierry Balzacq. "A Theory of Securitization" in (ed.) Thierry Balzacq's *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve.* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30; Barry Buzan. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1983); Barry Buzan. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991); Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen. *The Evolution of International Security Studies.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Barry Buzan; Ole Waever; and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) and Ole Waever. "Securitization and Descuritization" in Lipscultz, op. cit., pp. 46-86. Also see Peter Katzenstein. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* (1992), pp. 391-425; and Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[103] In the European context see, for example, Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia and Simon Reich. *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Perspective.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008); Alessandra Buonfino. "Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe." *New Political Science (*2004), pp. 23-49; Aurelie Campana. "Beyond norms: the incomplete de-securitisation of the Russian counterterrorism frame." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2013), pp. 1-16; Michael Collyer. "Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities." *Mediterranean*

studies illustrates the limited nature of its explanatory power in regards to policy outcomes (a central question of this research design), as its focus resides exclusively in the realm of threat construction. Monica Gariup writes, "the mere enunciation of a problem as a security threat is however not sufficient for a successful securitization or the establishment of a dominant security discourse."[104] Matt McDonald concurs, noting that "a broader approach to the construction of security [would] also entail… how particular articulations of security [i.e. threat construction] come to capture the way that community deals with those issues [i.e. policy outcomes]."[105] He adds, "the focus on the designation of threat alone therefore tells a partial story of how security is given meaning, marginalizing inclusive and non-statist definition of 'our values' that tell us how security is understood in particular context."[106] This research,

---

Politics (2006), pp. 255-270; Monica Den Boer. *9/11 and the Europeanization of Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment.* (Paris: Notre Europe, 2003), pp. 1-25; Thomas Faist. "Extension du Domaine de la Lutte: International Migration and Security Before and After September 11th 2001." *International Migration Review* (2002), pp. 7-14; Jef Huysmans. "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration." *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2000), pp. 751-777; Jef Huysmans. *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU.* (London, Routledge, 2006); Matti Jutila. "Desecuritizing Minority Rights: Against Determinism." *Security Dialogue* (2006), pp. 167-185; Anthony M. Messina. *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century (*London, Praeger, 2002); Paul Roe. "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization." *Security Dialogue* (2004), pp. 279-294; Ole Waever; Barry Buzan; Morten Kelstrup; Pierre Lemaitre. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (New York, St Martin's, 1993); Judith Ann Warner. "The Social Construction of the Criminal Alien in Immigration Law, Enforcement Practice and Statistical Enumeration: Consequences for Immigrant Stereotyping." *Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries (*2005-2006), pp. 56-80. In the American context see, for example, For example, see Peter Andreas and Thomas Bierstekler. *The Rebordering of North American: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context,* Routledge, 2003; Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall (eds.) *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Patricia L. Dunmire. "'9/11 changed everything': an intertextual analysis of the Bush Doctrine." *Society and Discourse* (2009); Adam Hodges. *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Bryn Hughes. "Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social Construction of Security." *Global Change, Peace & Security* (2007), pp. 83-102; Jack Holland. *Selling the War on Terror: Foreign policy discourses after 9/11.* (London: Routledge, 2013); Richard Jackson. *Writing the war on terrorism: Language, politics and counter-terrorism.* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Will Jackson. "Securitisation as Depoliticisation: Depolitcisation as Pacification." *Socialist Studies* (2013), pp. 146-166; Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz. "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion and the Road to War in Iraq." *Security Studies* (2007), pp. 409-451; Jennifer Mustapha. "Threat Construction in the Bush Administration's post 9//11 Foreign Policy." *The Pacific Review* (2011), pp. 487-504 and Chengxin Pan. "The 'China Threat' in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of other as Power Politics." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* (2004), pp. 305-331.

[104] Gariup, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

[105] Matt McDonald. "Securitization and the Construction of Security." *European Journal of International Relations* (2008), p. 565.

[106] McDonald, op. cit., p. 579. Although securitization studies have not taken root in the U.S., a field of research of a near identical nature has – framing. We can therefore critique the utility of securitization studies in the U.S. if the more established framing literature proves equally useful for understanding threat construction. Thought like securitization, framing tells us little about policy outcomes, which serves as the point of this research design. Scott D. Watson. "'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2012), p. 281. For examples of this literature also see, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* (1999), pp. 699-732; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* (2000), pp. 611-639; Robert D. Benford and

which seeks to explain the outcomes of threat prioritization as policy, must therefore take a step beyond the securitization research agenda. Finally, it is important to note that much of the research into threat prioritization is either theory driven or policy driven. This research attempts to link these two realms, by providing a framework of possible explanation for threat prioritization, while simultaneously attempting to explore the impact this process of prioritization has on policy.

Lastly, it interesting and important for its practical application to American foreign policy and it speaks tangentially to the greater debate over the future of U.S. power and U.S. decline.[107] Research in the realm of threats (both the prioritization of and policy responses for) is more important now than ever. The U.S strategic community, Christopher Fettweis writes, continues to struggle 25 years after the collapse of the USSR, "to understand this new period, much less chart a logical course forward… [and] as a result, the country has ambled along, rudderless, committing blunders large and small along the way."[108]

RESEARCH DESIGN

In the following chapter, I will outline four potential arguments and their relevant hypotheses, which might explain the primary question posed by this dissertation: being, given the apparent disconnect between externally defined threats and those prioritized by the government, under what conditions does the U.S. prioritize threats to its national security? To answer this question, I will first test for a bias of systemic shifts in the character of threats. I will than contrast this with the alternative explanation, a Cultural-Institutional bias, to discover which is the best explanatory variable for threat prioritization and policy in U.S national security. An extensive literature review for each argument will examine the previously conducted research in respective fields, as well as the merits and drawbacks of each argument. I will than explore

---

David A. Snow. "Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization." *International Social Movement Research* (1988), pp. 197-217; Robert D. Benford; David A. Snow; E Burke Rochford Jr. and Steven K. Worden. "Frame Alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation." *American Sociological Review* (1986), pp. 464-481; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norms Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* (1998) pp. 887-917; Rodger A. Payne. "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction." *European Journal of International Relations* (2007), pp. 37-61 and Sydney Tarrow. *The New Transnational Activism.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[107] On this debate, see, for example, Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment." *International Security* (2012), pp. 7-51 and Barry Posen. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

[108] Christopher J. Fettweis. "Threatlessness and US Grand Strategy." *Survival* (2014), pp. 43-44.

how these potential arguments might be tested in to discover their contribution to fostering explanation.

Chapter Three outlines the relevant methodology applied to this research. This includes first, a Content and Discourse Analysis (CDA); second, a survey administered to elected officials, military personnel, bureaucrats, members of the media, civil society, academia and think tanks (to explore the merit of this dissertation's primary hypothesis); and third, qualitative interviews with elected officials, military personnel, and bureaucrats (for the same purpose). Chapter Three presents the collected data and its implications for the research. Each methodology was selected to serve a distinct role in the research design. The CDA provided a basis upon which to rank threats from most-to-least important as a result of the government's official national security discourse. The survey provides a perspective on the internal (i.e. subjective) opinions of those within the state (including elected officials, bureaucrats and military personnel) regarding the threats identified by the CDA. And it further compares these opinions to the external (i.e. objective) opinions of those outside the state (including the media, civil society and members of academia and think tanks) for comparative analysis. In so doing, the survey expands on the perception of threats by a wider array of actors. Lastly, the interviews provide a greater depth of perspective on the research presented in the case studies. It also further probes the subjective opinions of these actors on the potential explanatory variables (i.e. presidential leadership, economic interests, the international system, political culture and bureaucratic bias) in a manner inaccessible in survey form.

Chapter Four, Five, Six and Seven will present a series of case studies testing the explanations in the context of specific threats while applying the CDA, qualitative interview, survey data, and case-specific literature to better understand how the preferred explanation is superior to the alternative.

Chapter Four, the first case study, will examine the prioritization of terrorism as a major threat to U.S. national security. As an example of what this research defines as a policy of subjugation, or the use of overwhelming force, terrorism presents a compelling example. I will explore how a dominate discourse fosters a singular narrative that tends to dissuade debate, resulting in the narrowing of policy options and the allocation of a disproportionate share of the annual defense and homeland security budgets. I will also explore how this type of narrative emboldens certain agencies to rise in prominence when executing policy and commanding these vast resources. I conclude that a direct correlation exists between this

dominate discourse, the emergence of extreme policy measures, and the allocation of excessive resources to address the threat. I will also illustrate how comparable states facing a comparable threat from terrorism respond more strongly to material factors, and not subjectively defined ones, resulting in counterterrorism policies and budgets more subdued than in the U.S.

Chapter Five will explore the prioritization of narco-trafficking as a secondary, but still critical, threat to U.S. national security. As an example of a policy of mitigation, or the limited use of force, I will explore how dual discourses foster complimentary but competing strategies to address the threat of drug trafficking. I will explore how a dual narrative makes it more difficult for a single agency to rise in prominence to advance or execute a single policy, as is the case with terrorism. Inflated budgets are therefore split between funding supply and demand-centric strategies (albeit the supply side disproportionally so). I conclude that a similar correlation exists between a dual discourse, dual policies, and the resulting budgetary allocations. I will also illustrate how comparable states facing a comparable threat from climate change respond to material factors, resulting in less elevated threat narratives, policies and budgets for narco-trafficking than in the U.S.

Chapter Six, the third case study, will explore the lack of prioritization for climate change as a threat to U.S. national security. As an example of a policy of arbitration, I will explore why, despite objective evidence to the contrary, the U.S. under-prioritizes the threat when compared to its European peers. In this chapter, I illustrate how a low-level priority like climate change results in divisive discourse which can prevent or reverse prioritization. The contradictory narratives prevalent in a low priority threat like climate change leads to policies which waiver between the competing aims of the opposing narratives. I find again that a similar correlation exists, but with different results, due to the lack of discursive cohesion. And I will also illustrate how comparable states facing a comparable threat from climate change respond more strongly to material factors, resulting in threat narratives, policies and budgets for climate change that are far higher than in the U.S.

Chapter Seven will present the fourth and final case study, exploring the lack of prioritization for the emerging geopolitics in the Arctic as a threat to U.S. national security. As an example of a policy of evasion, I will explore the reason why, despite objective evidence to the contrary, the U.S. generally evades prioritizing Arctic geopolitics. In this chapter I illustrate how a minimal-level priority threat like the geopolitics of the Arctic generates little to no discourse. As a result, few national security policy options emerge and there is no urgency to

allocate necessary resources to address them. In turn, the emergence of alternative narratives shapes the narrative around prioritization and policy outside the context of national security. I will illustrate again that comparable states facing a comparable threat from the geopolitics of the Arctic respond more aggressively to material factors, and threat narratives, policies and budgets are higher than in the U.S.

In Chapter Eight I will briefly review the four case studies in the context of the Trump administration in order to further illustrate the applicability of my framework. I will explore how the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis explains the effect of Trump's unique discourse and exaggerated narratives on the prioritization of threats to U.S. national security. I will examine where his administration has, in its first nine months, been consistent with the polices of his predecessors, where they have not, and the reasons which explain why these shifts in policy have occurred.

Chapter Nine will conclude the dissertation and provide a broad overview of the results. I will revisit the evidence presented in the case studies to emphasize how each contributes to validating the expectations generated by this framework. I will explore the lessons learned during the course of this research and how they have incrementally contributed to the research programs outlined in in this chapter (and the next). The final chapter will also present auxiliary questions for investigation as a result of what has, and what remains to be learned from these conclusions.

CHAPTER TWO
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Our greatest threat might be our fear of threats. - Christopher Premble[109]

INTRODUCTION

The following chapter will explore a series of potential explanations that attempt to answer the question, under what conditions does the U.S. prioritize specific threats to it national security? I will explore a series of hypotheses that posit the character of the international system, the nature of executive leadership, the role of special interests and the interaction of elite political culture with U.S. government institutions are (or are not) potential explanatory variables.

SYSTEMIC SHIFTS IN THE CHARACTER OF THREATS

Realist scholars would suggest the simplest explanation for the prioritization of threats is the changing nature of the international system and its impact on the changing character of the threats emerging from it. The revolutionary nature of the current international system - characterized by the end the of bi-polar/superpower era; a rising number of state and non-state actors; and the dissemination of advanced technical capabilities has fostered a profound contemporary unrest, what Ann Swidler calls an, 'unsettled period.'[110] In a post-Cold War, globalized world so-called 'new' threats (including non-state actors and cyberspace, the proliferation of new technologies and WMDs, as well as environmental and sustainable development concerns) appear more dangerous and seem to operate outside the confines of

---

[109] Christopher Premble. *Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security.* (Washington, D.C.: The CATO Institute, October 25, 2013).

[110] Hans Gunter Brauch. "Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risk" in (eds.) Hans Gunter Brauch et. al., *Coping with Environmental Change, Disasters and Security* (Berlin: Springer, 2011), p. 82; Gary Hart. *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Henry Kissinger. "System Structure and American Foreign Policy" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 103-104 and Ann Swidler. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* (1986), pp. 273-286. Also see Jack A. Jarmon. *The New Era in U.S. National Security: An Introduction to Emerging Threats and Challenges.* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); James Kitfield. "The Obama Doctrine: When Does Caution Become Retreat." *Breaking Defense* (March 26, 2014). Accessed March 26, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/the-obama-doctrine-when-does-caution-become-retreat; Adam Quinn. "US decline and systemic constraint," in Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland. *Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 45-60; Sabine Slechow. "An interplay of traditions: The 'return of uncertainty' and its taming in post-9/11 US security thinking" in (eds.) Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hull *Interpreting Global Security.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 46-47 and Jim Talent and Pete Hegseth. "America's Strategic Drift." *National Review* (October 6, 2014).

the traditional security paradigm. As Christopher Fettweis writes, "since those minor threats were more numerous than the singular Soviet Union, the world seemed to have become a more dangerous place."[111]

Realists would anticipate the prioritization of threats occurs because material factors, defining the balance of power, altered America's level of insecurity. This implies that causal powers of structure explain state behavior and variance in prioritizing threats.[112] In adjusting to the evolving international system and defending against 'new' threats, the U.S. must reassess threat prioritization, based on the different material factors present in the Twenty-First Century.[113] But, as Barry Posen writes, since the 1990s, "instead of relying on [its] inherent advantages for its security, the United States has acted with a profound sense of insecurity, adopting an unnecessarily militarized and forward-leaning foreign policy."[114] Given the sudden end of the Cold War, and the typically slow evolution of a nation's paradigmatic worldview, the U.S. confronts Twenty-First Century threats as it has since 1945, by (re)constructing traditional threats as 'new' threats. This was also true after 9/11 when, Monica Gariup writes, "even in the case of an abrupt revolutionary change in external conditions… at the beginning the old dominant discourse generally goes to supplement and not completely substitute the new emerging one: the old discourse is modified in order to integrate the new one."[115] She adds this signifies the existence of a "thick culture," implying there is a strong degree of resistance to change in U.S. political culture.[116] Gariup writes, "as a consequence, national security policies adapt only slowly not only to change in reality per se… but also to new discursive statements that pretend to represent and interpret material changes."[117]

The realist paradigm of international relations has many branches, broadly defined as human nature realism, state-centric realism and system-centric realism. And it includes classical realism; rationalism; security materialism; structural/neo-realism; neoclassical realism;

---

[111] Christopher J. Fettweis "Threatlessness and US Grand Strategy." *Survival* (2014), p. 45. Also see, James Sperling. "United States." in (eds.) James Sperling and Emil J. Kirchner *National Security Cultures: Patterns of global governance.* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 200.

[112] Kenneth Waltz. *Theories of International Politics.* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 121-122.

[113] Also see Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, "Introduction: Understanding threat inflation" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 3-4.

[114] Barry R. Posen. "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* (2012).

[115] Monica Gariup. *European Security Culture: Language, Theory, Policy.* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), p. 62.

[116] Gariup, op. cit., p. 62. Also see Clifford Geertz. *The Interpretation of Cultures.* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[117] Gariup, op. cit., p. 62.

offensive realism; and *Innepolitik*/defensive realism.[118] Michael Doyle characterizes Realism as stemming from Machiavellian fundamentalism, Hobbesian structuralism and Rousseau's constitutionalism.[119] But all forms of Realism, Doyle writes, stem from Thucydides complex realism.[120] Of these branches, I posit neoclassical realism is the most compelling means to answer the research question because it speaks to the politics of threat assessment, including how states make them and who the relevant actors in the process are.[121] As Kenneth Waltz

---

[118] At its most basic level, as Kay writes, Realism is, "a set of assumptions about how and why states behave like they do." See Kay, op. cit., 10. On the typologies of realism, see Stephen Brooks. "Dueling Realism." *International Organization* (1997), pp. 445–77; Liu Feng and Zhang Ruizhuang. "The Typologies of Realism." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* (2006), pp. 109-134 and Gideon Rose. "Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* (1998), pp. 144-172.

[119] Michael W. Doyle. *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism.* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), pp. 41–48. On realism also see Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (eds.). *Realism and Institutionalism in International Relations.* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002); Jack Donnelly. *Realism and International Relations.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Michael Joseph Smith. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1986); Jennifer Sterling-Folker. *Making Sense of International Relations Theory.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 15-16 and Michael C. Williams. *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[120] Doyle, op. cit.

[121] The literature on neoclassical realism is extensive, and includes such works as J. Samuel Barkin. *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Brooks, op. cit. (1997); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Re-Evaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas." *International Security* (2000/1), pp. 5–53; Michael E. Brown, Seth M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security.* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995); Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In." *International Security* (2001), pp. 107-146; Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea." *International Studies Quarterly* (2000), pp. 261–291; Victor D. Cha. "Hawk Engagement and Preventative Defense on the Korean Peninsula." *International Security* (2002), pp. 40-78; Thomas J. Christensen. *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–58.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder. "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity." *International Organization* (1990), pp. 137-166; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder. "Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 919-922; Jason W. Davidson. *The Origins of Revisionist and Status Quo States.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jason W. Davidson, "The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922–39." *Security Studies* (2002), pp. 125–159; Michael W. Doyle. "Politics and Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosencrance and Arthur Stein. *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 22-34; David M. Edelstein. "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers." *Security Studies.* (2002), pp. 1–4; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 923-926; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look." *International Security* (1995), pp. 182-193; Peter D. Feaver, et al. "Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)." *International Security* (2000), pp. 165-193; Feng and Ruizhuang, op. cit.; Aaron L. Friedberg. *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Annette Freyberg-Inan; Ewan Harrison; Patrick James (eds.). *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation.* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009); F. Gregory Gause. "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf. *Security Studies* (2003), pp. 273-305; Jim George. *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations.* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994), p. 111-138; John Glenn. "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration." *International Studies Review* (2009), pp. 523-551; Robert Jervis. "Realism, Neorealism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *International Security* (1999), pp. 42-63; Robert O. Keohane. *Neorealism and its Critics.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Steven E. Lobell. *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Steven Lobell, Norrin

and Robert Gilpin note, neoclassical realists posit that internal domestic and external environmental factors need not be separated when explaining the foreign policy behavior of states.[122]

Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Daniel Markey. "Prestige and the Origins of War: returning to Realism's Roots." *Security Studies* (1999), pp. 126-173; James McAllister. *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954.* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2002); Robert Powell. "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate." *International Organization* (1994), pp. 313–344; Mark Purdon. "Neoclassical realism and international climate change politics: moral imperative and political constraint in international climate finance." *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2014), pp. 301-338; Brian Rathbun. "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism." *Security Studies* (2008), pp. 294–321; Norrin M. Ripsman. *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effects of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements.* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Norrin M. Ripsman, "The Curious Case of German Rearmament: Democracy and Foreign Security Policy." *Security Studies* (2001), pp. 1–47; Rose, op. cit.; Randall L. Schweller. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripoliarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Randall L. Schweller. "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 927-930; Randall L. Schweller. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security* (1994)), pp. 72-107; Randall L. Schweller. "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," in (eds.) Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 311–47; Randall L. Schweller, "The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–39: Why a Concert Didn't Arise," in (eds.) Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 181–212; Randall L. Schweller. *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Glenn H. Snyder. "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security." *International Security* (2002), pp. 149–50; Jack L. Snyder. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Sterling-Folker (2006), op. cit.; Jennifer Sterling-Folker. "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading," *International Studies Review* (2002), pp. 73–97; Jennifer Sterling-Folker. "Realist-Constructivism and Morality." *International Studies Review* (2004), pp. 341–343; Jennifer Sterling-Folker. "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables. *International Studies Quarterly* (1997), pp. 1-25; Jennifer Sterling-Folker. *Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. International Monetary Policy-Making After Bretton Woods.* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. "Security Seeking Under Anarchy." *International Security* (2000/2001), pp. 128-161; Stephen Van Evera. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Waltz (1979), op. cit.; Stephen M. Walt. *The Origins of Alliances.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Stephen M. Walt. "Democracy, Freedom, and Apple Pie Aren't a Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy* (July 1, 2014); Stephen M. Walt. "The Progressive Power of Realism." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 931-935; Kenneth N. Waltz. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in (ed.) Charles W. Kegley Jr., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 67-82; William C. Wohlforth. *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); William C. Wohlforth. "The Stability of the Unipolar World." *International Security* (1999), pp. 5-41; Fareed Zakaria. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Fareed Zakaria. "Realism and Domestic Politics: A review Essay." *International Security* (1992) and David Zarnett. "What Does Realist Foreign Policy Activism Tell Us About Realist Theory?" *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2014).

[122] Neoclassical realists tend to cite Waltz (1979) and Gilpin (1981), as being the progenitors of the movement. But they also accredit classical realists such as Carr, Morgenthau and Wolfers, among others. See Sterling-Folker, op. cit., p. 40. Also see, see John Vasquez. "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review* (1997), p. 902. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro note that Rose coined the terms in the late 1990s. See Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro write, neoclassical realism identifies "elite calculations and perceptions of relative power and domestic constraints as intervening variables between international pressures and states' foreign policies. Relative power sets parameters for how states (or rather, those who act on their behalf) define their interests and pursue particular ends."[123] Liu Feng and Zhang Ruizhuang add, "the fundamental tenets of neo-classical realism are that foreign policy is an outcome of international structure, domestic factors and of a complex interaction between the two" making military ore international economic policy, the evolution of alliances, crisis management and grand strategy, among other factors of primary concern.[124] Jennifer Sterling-Folker writes that neoclassical realists focus on relative power distribution in the international system, shaping foreign policy through elite, "perceptions and calculations of [said] relative power."[125] She notes that neoclassical realism, "explains why different states, or even the same at different times, pursue particular strategies in the international arena."[126] She attributes this to "flesh-and-blood officials" who "misperceived the actual distribution of power or make erroneous estimates about power trends."[127] Gideon Rose writes, this focus on "relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country's foreign policy," but emphasizes the lack of a "perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior."[128] This is because, "systemic pressures and incentives may shape the broad contours and general direction of foreign policy without being strong or precise enough to determine the specific details of state behavior."[129]

Neoclassical realism is distinct from traditional or structural realism in its inclusion of domestic, not exclusively systemic factors; what Brian Rathburn describes as integrating "domestic politics and ideational influences."[130] Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro add, although leaders, "define 'national interest and conduct foreign policy based upon their assessment of relative power and other states intentions," they are, "always subject to domestic

---

[123] Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, op. cit., p. 28.
[124] Feng and Ruizhuang, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
[125] Sterling-Folker, op. cit., p. 38.
[126] Sterling-Folker, op. cit., p. 40.
[127] Rose concurs, writing, "foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so their perception of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources of forces in being." See Rose, op. cit., p. 147 and Sterling-Folker, op. cit., p. 40.
[128] Rose, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
[129] Rose, op. cit., p. 147.
[130] Rathburn, op. cit., p. 295.

constraints."[131] These factors include, John Glenn writes, "the efficiency/inefficiency of the state's bureaucratic apparatus, the perception and misperception of policymakers, interest groups and elite consensus in order to explain the foreign policies of states."[132] He adds neoclassical realism is most relevant when, "threats are clear and policy responses are self-evident" and when "the international environmental provides little in the way of information on the most appropriate response," making domestic factors critical.[133] But when states, Rathburn notes, do not adapt to systemic constraints 'serious consequences' result: "systemic factors push towards particular outcomes, but other factors intrude... domestic politics and ideas are generally to blame when the system's imperatives are not met."[134]

This speaks to another theme of neoclassical realism specifically and realism broadly: strategic studies or theories of grand strategy.[135] The U.S. Army War College Institute of

---

[131] Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

[132] Glenn, op. cit., pp. 529-530.

[133] Glenn, op. cit., pp. 529-530.

[134] Rathburn, op. cit., p. 296 and 312.

[135] Fettweis notes, "although there has never been a universally accepted definition, strategy has traditionally incorporated some conflict, or at least its potential, against a foe." See Fettweis (2014), p. 52. The literature on strategic studies and grand strategy in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries is extensive; some highlights include Lisa Anderson. "Shock and Awe: Interpretations of the Events of September 11." W*orld Politics* (2004). pp. 303-325; Robert J. Art "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War." *International Security* (1991), p. 5-53; Robert J. Art. *A Grand Strategy for America.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Robert J. Art. *America's Grand Strategy and World Politics.* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Robert Art. "The Realm of Grand Strategy." *International Affairs* (1991), pp. 6-7; Stephen D. Biddle. "America's Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment." (Carlisle: Army War College, 2005); Max Boot. "Imperialism!" *The Weekly Standard* (May 7, 2003); Michael J. Boyle. "The war on terror and American grand strategy." *International Affairs* (2008), pp. 191-209; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. "American Primacy in Perspective." *Foreign Affairs* (2002); Zbigniew Brzezinski. *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership.* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.* (New York: Basic Books, 1998); David Calleo. *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance.* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy. *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001); Wesley K. Clark. *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003); Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (eds.). *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004); Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy.* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003); Michael Desch. "The Keys that Lock Up the World: identifying American Interests in the Periphery." *International Security* (1989), pp. 86-121; Daniel Drezner. "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?" *Foreign Affairs* (2011); Colin Dueck. "Ideas and alternatives in American grand strategy, 2000-2004." *Review of International Studies* (2004), pp. 511-535; Colin Dueck, "New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay." *International Security* (2004); Amitai Etzioni. *From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Peter Feaver. "What is grand strategy and why do we need it?" *Foreign Policy* (April 8, 2009); Niall Ferguson. *Colossus: The Price of American Empire.* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 2; Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (ed.) *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Century, 2008); Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (eds.). *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Century, 2012); Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff (eds.) *Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2013); Lawrence Freedman. "Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century." *Defence Studies* (2001), pp. 11-20; Lawrence Freedman. "The Third World War?" *Survival* (2001-02),

pp. 61-88; John Lewis Gaddis. "Grand Strategy in the Second Term." *Foreign Affairs* (2005); David Frum and Richard Perle. *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror.* (New York: Random House, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); John Lewis Gaddis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Stephen Gill. "Grand Strategy and World Order: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective." (New Haven: Yale University, 2003); Avery Goldstein. *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Colin S. Gray. *The Geopolitics of Super Power.* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988); Colin S. Gray. *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History.* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Allen Guelzo. *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President.* (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999); Edward P. Haley "A Defensive Grand Strategy for the United States." *Armed Forces and Society* (2004), pp. 461-481; Basil Henry Liddell Hart. *Strategy.* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967); Hart (2004), op. cit.; James J. Hentz (ed.) *The Obligation of Empire: United States' Grand Strategy for a New Century.* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004); Philip B. Heymann. *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War.* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Frank G. Hoffman. "Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations. *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (2014), pp. 472-485; Michael Howard. "Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century." *Defense Studies* (2001), pp. 1-10; Samuel P. Huntington. "The Renewal of Strategy," in (ed.) Samuel P. Huntington's *The Strategic Imperative: new Policies for American Security.* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1982), pp. 1-52; G. John Ikenberry. "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror." *Survival* (2001-2), pp. 19-34; G. John Ikenberry. "America's Imperial Ambition." *Foreign Affairs* (2002), pp. 44-60; John G. Ikenberry. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); G. John Ikenberry. "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment." *Survival* (2004), pp. 7-22; Bruce Jentleson. "Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy." *The Washington Quarterly* (2014), pp. 115-136; Chalmers Johnson. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company LLC, 2004); Josef Joffe. "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy After Bipolarity." *International Security* (1995), p. 99; Kimberly Kagan. "Hegemony, Not Empire: How the Pax Americana Differs from the Pax Romana." *The Weekly Standard* (2002); Robert Kagan. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.* (New York: Knopf, 2003); Robert Kagan, et al. "One Year After: A Grand Strategy for the West?" *Survival* (2002-03), pp. 135-156; George Kennan. *American Diplomacy 1900-1950.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); Henry Kissinger. *Diplomacy.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Kennedy (1987), op. cit.; Paul Kennedy (ed.). *Grand Strategies in War and Peace.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); John J. Kohout, III, et. al. "Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States." *Comparative Strategy* (1995), pp. 361-420; Charles Kupchan. "Grand Strategy for a Divided America." *Yale Global Online Magazine* (2007); Charles Kupchan. *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century.* (New York: Vintage, 2003); Charles Krauthammer. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited." *National Interest* (2002/03), pp. 5-17; Deepak Lal. *In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Layne (2002), op. cit.; Christopher Layne. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy." *International Security* (1997), pp. 86-124; Christopher Layne. "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century." *World Policy Journal* (1998); Melvyn P. Leffler. "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948." *The American Historical Review* (1984); Robert J. Lieber. "Rethinking America's Grand Strategy." *Chronicle of Higher Education* (June 4, 2004); Edward N. Luttwak. *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Edward N. Luttwak. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third.* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976); Edward N. Luttwak. *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); William C. Martel. "A Roadmap for American Grand Strategy." *The Diplomat* (2013); William C. Martel. "America's Dangerous Drift." *The Diplomat* (2013); William C. Martel. "America's Grand Strategy Disaster." *The Diplomat* (2013); William C. Martel. "For America, Decline is a Choice." *The Diplomat* (2013); Michael Mastanduno. "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *International Security* (1997); Walter Russell Mead. *God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World.* (New York: Random House, 2007); Walter Russell Mead. *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk.* (New York: Knopf, 2004); Mearsheimer (2003), op. cit.; Raymond Millen. "Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy." *Parameters* (2014), pp. 35-47; Paul D. Miller. "Five Pillars of American Grand Strategy." *Survival* (2012), pp. 7-44; John Mueller. "Harbinger or Aberration?" *National Interest* (2002), pp. 45-50; Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.) *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Henry Nau. *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Joseph S. Nye. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. *Makers of Modern*

Strategic Studies defines this research paradigm by its focus on the role of geostrategic national security.[136] Strategic studies addresses conflict and peace to better understand the role of intelligence, diplomacy, economics and military power. Strategy is defined as a plan of action or method for achieving a particular goal over a long period of time. John Kohout, et. al. writes that strategy, "directs and coordinates means to attain ends."[137] In the context of this research, strategy refers to the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war.

Robert Art notes an abundance of definitions for grand strategy, ranging from the expansive to the restrictive.[138] Peter Feaver defines grand strategy as, "the art of reconciling ends and means."[139] Barry Posen notes it is, "a nation-state's theory about how to produce security for itself."[140] William C. Martel adds that grand strategy is, "a broad set of principles,

---

Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Geoffrey Parker. *The Grand Strategy of Philip II.* (Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1998); Barry Posen and Andrew Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." *International Security* (1996), pp. 5-53; Otto Pflanze. *Bismarck and the Development of Germany.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Clyde Prestowitz. *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions.* (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Edward Rhodes. "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda." *Survival* (2003), pp. 131-154; Richard Rosencrance and Arthur Stein. *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Stephen Rosen. "An Empire, If You Can Keep It." *National Interest* (2003), pp. 51-61; Richard Samuels. *Securing Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Sherle R. Schwenninger. "Revamping American Grand Strategy." *World Policy Journal* (2003); Dimitri Simes. "America's Imperial Dilemma." *Foreign Affairs* (2003), pp. 91-103; Walter Slocombe. "Force, Preemption, and Legitimacy." *Survival* (2003), pp. 117-130; Julianne Smith and Jacob Stokes. *Strategy and Statecraft: Am Agenda for the United States in and Era of Compounding Complexity.* (Washington, D.C.: Center For a New American Century, 2014); Tony Smith. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Don M. Snider. *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1995); Nicholas Spykman. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power.* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers); Jonathan Stevenson. *Counterterrorism: Containment and Beyond.* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004); William R. Thompson. "The 1920-1945 Shift in US Foreign Policy Orientation: Theory, Grand Strtaegies, and System Leader Ascents." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2014); Stephen M. Walt. "Alliances, Threats and U.S. Grand Strategy: A reply to Kaufman and Labs." *Security Studies* (1992), pp. 448-482; Stephen M. Walt. "The Case for Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy. *International Security* (1989), pp. 5-49 and Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* (1991), pp. 211-239. These works are all, in some way, rooted in the classic strategic works of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli and Clausewitz. See Niccolo Machiavelli. *The Prince.* (London: Grant Richards, 1903); Sun Tzu. *The Art of War.* (London: Luzac & Co., 1944); Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Stephen Van Evera. "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* (1990), pp. 1-51 and Carl von Clausewitz. *On War.* (London: Kegan Pauk, Trench, Trubner & Cio Ltd., 1908).

136 *About the Strategic Studies Institute.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2014). Accessed July 22, 2014 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/about/strategic-studies-institute.cfm.

137 Kohout III, et. al., op. cit., p. 362.

138 Art, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

139 Feaver (2009), op. cit.

140 Barry Posen. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy.* (2014), p. 1.

beliefs, or ideas that govern the divisions and actions of a nation's policymakers with public support on foreign policy."[141] Characterized by the interests it seeks to protect and the resources allocated to do so, Christopher Layne writes grand strategy is, "the process by which a state matches ends and means in the pursuit of security."[142] Daniel Drezner adds, "the clear articulations of national interests married to a set of operational plans for advancing them."[143] And Ikenberry writes, grand strategies are, "bundles of security, economic and political strategies based on assumptions about how to best advance national security and build international order."[144] For the purposes of this research, I define grand strategy as the use of national instruments of power to achieve political goals through security policy, including internal and external objectives in war and peacetime.

Although grand strategy and foreign policy overlap, the former concerns itself with the military implications of long-term objectives. Posen notes, "grand strategy focuses on military threats, because these are the most dangerous, and military remedies because these are the costliest. Security has traditionally encompassed the preservation of sovereignty, safety, territorial integrity, and power position – the last being the necessary means to the first three."[145] Grand strategy is therefore an essential component of threat prioritization. A failure to define one, Martel writes, is dangerous: "unless the U.S. and its adversaries understand what the nation seeks to achieve, the boundaries to permissible challenges, and the limits to its forbearance – we are asking for a crisis… and America itself may be confused as to what it really values until it struggles during a moment of crisis."[146] When a state does not define what is critical to preserve (in terms of its physical security as well as national, political and socio-cultural identity), threat prioritization is infeasible at best and distorted at worst.[147] Martel writes that without a grand strategy, a state cannot, "understand what threats are inevitable, which ones really matter, and how to deal with them," adding "when specific decisions and

---

[141] Martel, "America's Dangerous Draft," op. cit.
[142] Layne (1998), op. cit., p. 8.
[143] Drezner, op. cit. and Freedman (2001), p. 11.
[144] Ikenberry (2001-02), op. cit., p. 25.
[145] Posen, (2014), op. cit.
[146] Martel, "America's Grand Strategy Disaster," op. cit.
[147] Not all scholars place an emphasis on grand strategy. Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne note, "grand strategy isn't the pursuit of new world orders but simply making the best of bad choices." They add the "grander its foreign-policy visions, the more a state is trapped in the tyranny of its own construct." See Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne. "A New Grand Strategy." *The Atlantic* (2002). Also see Drezner, op. cit.

policies are unguided by bedrock principles of grand strategy, U.S. policies will feel haphazard or random, which is a recipe for ineffective and at times, self-defeating policies."[148]

Grand strategy is about power and power perception, which affects the way in which threats are prioritized.[149] Dueck notes that variations in grand strategy are defined as, among other factors, significant changes in the form and level of threat perception.[150] U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy, prioritizing a preponderance of power and maintaining a broad unilateralist reach, created a belief that it is necessary for the U.S. to police the world and secure the global order.[151] As a result, U.S. values or its core national interests are overly broad, including threats not existential to it security. Drezner attributes this disconnect as a mismatch between the complexity of the global system and the simplicity of American foreign policy rhetoric.[152]

If the changing nature of the international system, and the character of the threats it produces best explains the gap between threat construction (i.e. prioritization) and policy, we would expect, at a minimum, all externally or independently identified threats result in a prioritization and a militarized policy response. But this does not occur. The changing nature of the system does not explain the variance between certain types of internally perceived and externally adjudged threats. This is because material factors (despite some changes) remain heavily static, and continue to favor the U.S. He writes, the tyranny of the status quo prevents radical change not precipitated by catastrophe, noting that grand strategy is a, "constant rather than a variable… even radically imperfect strategies have not fundamentally affected [the U.S.'] rise and fall."[153] Threats are, therefore, not objectively construed based on realist theories of material factors and balance-of-power politics, but subjectively constructed based on inherent cultural and bureaucratic factors. Assuming a constructivist approach, as defined by Alexander Wendt, we see that, "the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and… the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature."[154] Threats are not just about

---

[148] Martel, "America's Dangerous Draft," op. cit.
[149] See Walt (1989), op. cit.
[150] Dueck (2004), op. cit., p. 512.
[151] On this, see Schwarz and Layne, op. cit.
[152] Drezner, op. cit.
[153] Drezner, op. cit.
[154] Wendt (1999), op. cit., p. 1.

material factors, but also ideational ones.[155] If this is true, we would expect variance across threat assessments, even when material factors remain the same.[156]

Wendt writes, "the challenge of 'systemic' theory is not to show that 'structure' has more explanatory power than 'agents', but to show how agents are differently structured by the system to produce different effects.[157] The implication of rejecting this hypothesis is not that the world is more or less dangerous, but that the changing nature of the system and the character of the threats emerging from it are necessary but not sufficient factors in explaining threat prioritization. Zenko and Cohen point out that, "the world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history… The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon."[158] The authors attribute the intensification of threats to fear-mongering and electoral politics, the political-media-societal feedback loop, and bureaucratic interest, all internal or subjective measures of threat prioritization.[159]

For a systemic hypothesis to be true, we would anticipate a convergence between internal (i.e. governmental) and external (i.e. independent) threat assessments in the context of U.S. national security. Following a strict rationalist or realist perspective, I posit only those threats which pose a tangible and measurable hazard to U.S. security would be prioritized because threats are objectively measured by material factors that determine the balance of power. This hypothesis is only substantiated if external or independently ranked threats with the highest scores are prioritized, and that they match the way in which the government internally ranks or prioritizes the threats it perceives as most important.[160] But this is not the case. As Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter write, "change in the international environment is only one of several stimuli to which participants in the foreign policy process are responding

---

[155] David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. "Estimating Threats: The Impact and Interaction of Identity and Power" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 76.

[156] Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, op. cit., p. 76.

[157] Wendt (1999), op. cit., p. 12.

[158] According the 2104 *Global Peace Index,* "we are living in the most peaceful time in human history." See the *Global Peace Index 2014: Measuring Peace and Accessing Country Risk.* (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2104). Also see Ali Wyne. "The World is Much Safer Then 20th-century Historian Would Have You Believe." *The New Republic* (April 1, 2014) and Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen. "Clear and Present Safety." *Foreign Affairs* (2012).

[159] Zenko and Cohen, op. cit.

[160] Using an external measure of threats through a weighted scoring system (as outlined in Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure), I am able to compare against an internal weighted scoring system (as laid out in preceding chapter on methodology) utilized for the purposes of this research.

[though] possibly among the weakest and least important."[161] I conclude that the changing nature of the international system and the character of threats emerging from it, does not satisfactorily explain the prioritization of threats.

LEADERSHIP

A second explanation for why some threats are prioritized while others are not is a micro level explanation, which suggests that individuals, specifically the chief executive, is most responsible for threat prioritization.[162] By examining the philosophy, ideology and beliefs of presidents, these unitary actors become the "decisive element" in national security.[163] John Stoessinger writes, power is an objective fact, but how leaders use power creates subjective (or prejudiced) facts.[164] Unique personality traits can be definitive, he concludes, and who is in power matters.[165]

If this approach best explains the prioritization of threats, we would anticipate significant changes in prioritization and policy across administrations. But this is not the case. Threat perception remains remarkably stable over time. This is due, in part, to the Executive branch being more than just the President, but rather a coalition of many individuals, sometimes with divergent goals.[166] Elected officials formulate policy. But it is misleading and overly parsimonious to ascribe so much power to the individual.[167] An individual level-analysis appears insufficient to explain variance in threat prioritization. I therefore reject this

---

[161] Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter. *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 3. The argument could be made that the nature of the international system has not fundamentally changed since the Peace of Westphalia because it remains characterized by external anarchy (regardless of shifts in the balance of power) and internal hierarchy (leaving states as mostly sovereign entities in the larger anarchic international system). On this see Waltz (1979), op. cit. Also see Henry Kissinger. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy." *Daedalus* (1966), p. 505

[162] The literature on this topic is prolific. For a complete overview see Appendix Four: Chapter Two Literature Review.

[163] John Stoessinger. "Crusaders and Pragmatists: two Types of Foreign Policy Makers" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 448 and Daniel Zoughbie. "Interpreting George W. Bush's foreign policy" in (eds.) Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hull. *Interpreting Global Security.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 53-72.

[164] Stoessinger (1983), p. 448.

[165] Stoessinger (1983), p. 448.

[166] Jerel Rosati. "Explaining SALT from a Bureaucratic Politics Perspective" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 365-366. Also see Doughtry, op. cit., pp. 81-96.

[167] Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 425.

explanation in light of persuasive and compelling data to the contrary and will not be testing this hypothesis in the case studies.[168]

ORGANIZED INTEREST GROUPS

A third explanation posits that the size, strength and relationships of certain special economic interests, relative to others, determine the prioritization of threats. For the purposes of this research, organized interest groups are defined as non-state actors, functioning in society but outside the formal levers of government.[169] They include large lobbyist firms, political party machines, the media, advocacy networks, non-governmental organizations and individual activists.[170] Organized interest groups exert influence through a complex array of power relationships, message transmission and feedback loops that include the mass media, political parties, foreign governments, foreign and domestic interest groups, opinion leaders, elected and appointed officials.[171]

If the interests of an economic elite best explain threat prioritization, we would expect important corporations and powerful individuals to have a measurably large degree of influence on national security, threat prioritization and policy outcomes.[172] And we would expect to find a corporate interest bias in regards to threat prioritization, because particular economic interests benefit from particular forms of policy. Therefore, corporations would use financial power to affect political decisions.[173] Finally, we would expect to find companies use their influence to encourage certain types of policies against certain types of threats which benefit their ability to increase profits.[174] We would anticipate a correlation between, for

---

[168] The complete literature view for the leadership hypothesis appears in Appendix 4.1: Leadership Hypothesis.

[169] McCormick. "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy", op. cit., pp. 13, 16, and 19.

[170] McCormick. "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy", op. cit., pp. 13, 16, and 19.

[171] See chart in Lester Milbrath. "Interests Groups and Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James N. Rosenau, *Domestic Sources in Foreign Policy.* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 234 and in Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter. "The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis." *Annual Review of Political Science* (2008), p. 41. Also see Kay, op. cit., pp. 223-236 and Michael Mastanduno. "The United States Political System and International Leadership: A 'Decidedly Inferior' Form of Government?" in (ed.) G. John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays.* (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), p. 256.

[172] Richard Seymour writes, "in a very general sense, militarization could be seen as an integral part of capitalism." Richard Seymour. "Global military spending an integral part of capitalism." *The Nation* (March 9, 2014).

[173] Halliburton is often cited as an example of the role of special interest in determining threat prioritization, given that Vice President Dick Cheney served as the company's CEO and Halliburton obtained numerous defense contracts while he was serving in office. But there is no evidence that Halliburton as a corporate entity was able to directly influence America's decision to go to war, despite benefiting from the conflict. See Jane Mayer. "Contract Sport: What did the Vice-President do for Halliburton?" *The New Yorker* (February 16, 2004).

[174] Patrick Radden Keefe. "Can Network Theory Thwart Terrorists?" *New York Times* (March 12, 2006).

example, special interest lobbying efforts on behalf of a specific policy and a consistent bias in government for choosing a specific policy.

Although there are examples of organized interest groups affecting foreign policy, there is insufficient evidence that their impact is able to effect policy to the degree of prioritizing certain threats over others.[175] It is not feasible to establish substantial causality as it is difficult to control for the diversity of factors involved. Without a direct revelation by government officials, confessing that they are swayed by economic special interests, it is impossible to prove this is as valid. I therefore reject this explanation due to persuasive and compelling data to the contrary. As a result, I will not be testing this hypothesis in the case studies.[176]

LINKING INSTITUTIONS TO CULTURE

Having reviewed the literature, and finding it insufficient in explanatory power, I therefore posit that the interaction between elite American political culture and institutional structure best explains the prioritization of threats to U.S. national security[177] Balzacq notes, threats are not constructed simply through language, rather they require formal and moral support: "while moral support is generally necessary, alone, it is not enough. Often it is the formal decision by an institution that mandates the government to adopt a specific policy. This support is generally necessary and sufficient."[178] In a series of high profile public threat assessments issued by the government over the last decade, U.S. institutions have clearly specified threats regarded as pivotal to national security.[179] As a result, certain internally ranked threats are prioritized, while other externally ranked threats are not.

I posit that the interaction between America's elite political culture and its national security institutions best explains this variance in prioritization. Political culture sets the tone and delineates a series of subjectively defined (versus objectively defined) values that are prioritized by administrations. This creates a specific elite discourse that lends legitimacy to

---

[175] Cohen, op. cit., pp. 223-224 and 237-239.

[176] The complete literature view for the organized interest group hypothesis appears in Appendix 4.2: Organized Interest Groups Hypothesis.

[177] Samuel P. Huntington "American Ideals Versus American Institutions." *Political Science Quarterly* (1982).

[178] Balzacq, "A theory of securitization", op. cit., p. 8.

[179] These documents include *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2001, 2006, 2010, 2014); *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (2010, 2014); the *National Defense Strategy* (2005, 2008, 2012); the *National Security Strategy* (2002, 2006, 2010); the Central Intelligence Agency *Annual Threat Assessment* statement (2000-2014); and the Defense Intelligence Agency's *Threat Assessments* (2007, 2011, 2012, 2013).

certain values and negates others. It bestows power (broadly defined) to those policy options that fit within the established discursive structure. Institutions are required to work within the confines of these internally delineated options, and the ultimate selection of policies is made available by adhering to the normative values attached to national security by way of elite political discourse. The resulting prioritization of policy, therefore, occurs at the intersection of culture as discourse, and decision-making as institutional (i.e. bureaucratic) procedures. In the following sub-section I shall describe the relationship between them and the forms of policy which result.

THE ROLE OF (ELITE POLITICAL) CULTURE

Anthony Oliver-Smith writes, "vulnerability is a political ecological concept… located at the intersection of nature and culture." [180] And vulnerability, which is "always socially constructed," determines the nature of the threat at the point of divergence between capabilities (to defend against a threat) and intent (the ability of a threat to inflict harm).[181] The resulting (in)security determines the level of crisis, which in turn determines a "crisis discourse," utilized as a means to prioritize threats and frame the parameters for its solution.[182] U.S. political culture creates distinct discursive practices that tend to favor crisis discourse over more practical means of threat construction.[183] One example, is the increasingly frequent declarations by Presidents of "states of emergencies," totaling 52 since the National Emergencies Act was passed into law in 1976, 30 which remain in effect as of 2018.[184] Sperling writes, "Americans require a palpable existential threat to conduct a purposeful security policy; there appear to be no permanent interests independent of the threat posed by a malevolent 'other.'"[185]

A crisis is defined as an unstable or crucial time period, or state of affairs, in which a decisive change is impending, or a time when a difficult or important decision must be made.[186]

---

[180] Anthony Oliver-Smith. "Theorizing Vulnerability in a Globalized World: A Political Ecological Perspective" in (eds.) Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks and Dorothea Hilhorst *Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People* (London: Earthscan, 2003), pp. 10-11.

[181] Sanger, op. cit., p. 94.

[182] Brauch, op. cit., p. 78.

[183] Anna Podvornaia. "The Discursive Battlefield of the 'War on Terror': Enabling strategies for garnering public support in the rhetoric of George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden" in (ed.) Adam Hodges, *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 88.

[184] Gregory Korte. "America's perpetual state of emergency." *USA Today* (October 23, 2014).

[185] Sperling, "United States," op. cit., p. 173.

[186] *Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary* (2013) and the *Oxford Dictionaries* (2013).

Discourse is defined, in its most basic form, as a written or spoken form of communication.[187] In the context of culture, discourse is defined as a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience that is rooted in language and its concrete contexts.[188] Balzacq notes that using discourse, or discursive action is, "compelling power to cause a receiver or the audience to perform a deed."[189] He adds, "through mutual knowledge, discourse shapes social relations and builds their form and content… [and] on the causative sides, as vehicle of ideas, discourse targets and creates the instantiation of a particular communicative action."[190] For the purposes of this research, crisis discourse is defined by the rhetorical practices employed in order to construct threats as clear and present, and requiring immediate action or resolution. In the tradition of frame analysis, advanced by David Snow and Robert Benford, or in the tradition of William Sewell's "schemas" and Swidler's "tool kit", crisis discourse provides the behavioral rules and linguistic structure, as well as the repertoire of social and political practices that enables an agent or actor to act upon structures to manifest transformation.[191] Borrowing from Snow et al. and Goffman, I define a frame as a, "'schemata of interpretation' that enable individuals to 'locate, perceive, identify, and label' occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rending events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action." [192] Robert Entman adds that framing denotes the selection or emphasis on, "some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution."[193] It is therefore necessary for prioritization.

I define crisis discourse as characterized by 1) the identification of a threat as a hazard to the current state of affairs, or existence of a group of individuals (i.e. community, state, or way of life); 2) constructing a threat as the cause, or existing as a critical part, of a given situation in which change is impending and will significantly impact the future course of

---

[187] *Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary* (2013) and the *Oxford Dictionaries* (2013).

[188] *Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary* (2013) and the *Oxford Dictionaries* (2013).

[189] Balzacq, "A theory of securitization," op. cit., p. 23.

[190] Balzacq, "A theory of securitization," op. cit., p. 23.

[191] Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* (2000), pp. 611-639; Berezin, op. cit.; David Snow et. al. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* (1986), p. 464-481; William H. Sewell. "A Theory of structure: duality, agency and transformation." *American Journal of Sociology* (1992), pp. 1-29 and Swidler, op. cit.

[192] Erving Goffman. *Frame Analysis.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 21 and Snow et. al., op. cit., p. 464.

[193] Robert Entman. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 5.

events; and 3) the framing of a solution(s) in response to the threat, as a byproduct of the identification and construction of the threat.[194] This is particularly important when threats are clear or present because, Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon note, hawkish biases are more persuasive where conflict is, or perceived as being, more likely.[195] Crisis discourse is critical because political culture, and its effects on institutional decision making, are best exemplified by the discourse used to frame a threat. As Deva Woodly notes, "communication matters, because changing public discourse, changes power relations, and altered power relations change politics – the principles and policy that are at stake in the struggle over who shall govern and how."[196] She add the "critical battleground" for change is political discourse, where "political issues take on popular meaning and affect the common-sense understanding."[197] Discourse can, "advance particular interests [and] to actually change politics itself, rewriting the common understandings present in the discursive field upon which political possibilities are considered and wherein binding decision are made."[198] As Holland notes, "9/11 generated a discursive void as the events could not be subsumed into existing foreign policy discourse. However, 9/11, in and of itself, was not a crisis. Initially unregulated but discourse, the 'events' did not mean anything for certain. Instead 9/11 became a crisis through a process of discursive construction, which reinstated 'politics' over 'the political.' Crises… are constructed."[199]

I propose this happens in the following way. The level of discourse surrounding a threat occurs on a spectrum ranging from 'crisis' (the highest level), to 'problem', then 'issue', and on the lowest end of the spectrum, 'non-issue.' The higher along the spectrum of discourse a threat is raised, the less policy options are made available to address it. This is because the heightened level of discourse demands both an immediate and exacting response. As a result

[194] Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep write, "language formulates the questions and frames the response… language entwined with power, frames and positions the response." See, Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep. "Introduction" in (eds.) Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep, *Discourse, War and Terrorism*. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2007), p. 3. Kaufmann notes that a "crisis atmosphere" tends to elevate fear and reduce skepticism, making policy options available that might have seemed unlikely prior to the advent of the crisis. See Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 99 and 111. Also see Robert Jervis. "The Confrontation between Iraq and the U.S.: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence." *European Journal of International Relations* (2003), pp. 215-227.
[195] Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon. "Hawkish Biases" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11*. (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 79.
[196] Deva R. Woodly. *The Politics of Common Sense: How Social Movements Use Public Discourse to Change Politics and Win Acceptance*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 1.
[197] Woodly, op. cit., p. 1.
[198] Woodly, op. cit., p. 1.
[199] Holland (2013), op. cit., p. 87.

of the heightened discourse available options are limited because extreme and immediate measures become necessary. This results in fewer agencies capable of executing the demanded policy, thereby commanding more influence. With less policy options, and fewer agencies commanding more influence over these options, the agency/agencies are able to marshal greater resources in executing the policy. As Holland adds, a crisis "is a moment and process of transformation" which was "politically enabling in that it helped render policy conceivable that would previously have been perceived as unthinkable, off-limits or too extreme… this adaptation involved the adoption of exceptional, wartime policies."[200]

An inevitable feedback loop exists wherein perceived institutional vulnerabilities determine threats to the security of the nation, breeding insecurity and crisis, which contributes to the construction of the vulnerability as a threat.[201] Vulnerability is, therefore, largely created by the social order in which it exists. Sabine Slechow writes that the "way a society perceives and deals with uncertainty and the unknown are crucial components in socio-political life… more broadly, how that society understands and deals with the future determines its (political) action in the present."[202] She adds that all approaches to uncertainty are, "culturally specific."[203] This implies that in the context of another country's political culture, a creation of its own unique national environment, vulnerabilities might not be similarly construed. This leads to variance in policy outcomes and indicates the critical role of culture in constructing vulnerability as threat.[204]

Political culture creates a unique framework for threats to be identified and constructed. I define political culture as the values, beliefs and norms about how politics should operate, based on the specific U.S. historical experience and its preferences for liberalism and democracy, equality and self-determination, as well as capitalism and law.[205] Sydney Verba notes, political culture is the embedding of political systems in sets of meanings and purposes, specifically symbols, mythologies, beliefs and values.[206] Lucian Pye adds it is the

---

[200] Holland (2013), op. cit., pp. 89 and 104.

[201] Pietro Pirani argues that elite framing need not be a conscious act. This is important as it emphasizes the overarching role that culture plays in conditioning those tasked with upholding it. See Pietro Pirani. "Elites in Action: Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture." *Political Studies Review* (2014), pp. 1-9.

[202] Sabine, op. cit., p. 42.

[203] Slechow, op. cit., p. 42

[204] Schafer, op. cit., p. 10.

[205] Kegley and Wittkopf, op. cit., p. 171 and McCormick, "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 11.

[206] Sidney Verba. "Comparative Political Culture" in (eds.) Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba. *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

product of collective history of the political systems and the members that comprise it.[207] And America's elite political culture is characterized by the mythos of exceptionalism, messianic purpose, and indispensability, compounded by its decades long post-Cold War unipolar status. This plays a critical role in determining which threats are prioritized (i.e. constructed) and which ones are not.[208] Elite political culture creates an elite national security culture, defined by America's worldview, national identity, instrumental preferences, and interaction preferences.[209] As a result, Mabel Berezin writes, "culture functions as an exogenous variable in institutional and state-oriented studies whose principles purpose is to explain some organization or policy outcome... institutionalism tell[s] plausible stories about how culture constrains and enhances the actions of political actors and organizations."[210] And in the U.S., an elite political culture of national security, specifically, prizes 'total' security above all else. By total security, I mean a situation in which the U.S. achieves (or perceives it has achieved) a stable security environment, culturally defined (in the context of U.S. political values and 'way of life'). This implies that the U.S. faces no direct threat(s) to its national security, or those threat(s) which exist, do not affect the ability of the U.S. to control the domestic and/or international environment in any significant or fundamental way. As David Omand notes security is, "a collective psychological state as well as an objective reality."[211] Total security, as a cultural notion, is therefore achieved through the control over threats or threatening situations through the employment of U.S. military resources to achieve the standards set by elite political culture.[212]

---

[207] Lucian Pye. "Political Culture" in (ed.) David L. Sills, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), p. 218.

[208] Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow. *Goodbye Hegemony.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 134. Also see David Bromwhich. "The Importance of Being Exceptional: From Ancient Greece to Twenty-First Century America." *TomDispatch* (October 23, 2014).

[209] James Sperling writes, "national identity captures the extent to which national elites have retained an 'egoist' definition of the national interest or the extent to which the elites have embedded the national interest in broader, collective 'we' defined against some 'other.' Instrumental preference demarcates those states which retain the traditional reliance upon the 'hard' instruments of statecraft and the coercive use of economic power, as opposed to those states relying on 'soft' instruments... Interaction preference, which refer to the level of cooperation favoured [*sic*] by a state when seeking to ameliorate a security threat, fall along a continuum marked at one end by unilateral action and at the other by at the other by a reflexive multilateralism." See James Sperling. "National security cultures, technologies of public goods supply and security governance" in (eds.) James Sperling and Emil J. Kirchner, *National Security Cultures: Patterns of global governance.* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 11-12.

[210] Berezin, op. cit., 371.

[211] David Omand. "Securing the State: National Security and Secret Intelligence." *PRISM* (2013), p. 20.

[212] Krebs and Lobasz, op. cit. and Philip Wander. "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (1984).

C. Vann Woodward writes that U.S. security has not only been, "remarkably effective, but [also] relatively free."[213] As such, America's elite political culture sets a high standard for security – demanding total security, particularly in the homeland.[214] This is a result of geography, as the U.S. is physically separate from most of the rest of world, including enemies, aggressors and great power rivals. The high standard for security is also a product of history, as the U.S. homeland has remained relatively stable, particularly in comparison to Europe or Asia, over the course of its existence.[215] Holland argues that U.S. political culture, "has long been characterized by illusions of Homeland impenetrability (sheltered by two vast oceans), a zero-death military culture and a hypervaluisation [*sic*] of American life. U.S. foreign policy traditions often share these values and assumptions."[216] Compounded by its hegemonic status over the last century, the concept of security (defined by the near absence, or significantly lessened degree, of threat) in U.S. political culture creates a context in which vulnerability is over-emphasized. This despite the objective strength and stability of the U.S.[217]

The combination of elite political culture and the use of crisis discourse, Podvornaia writes, "exploits the psychological vulnerabilities exhibited by human beings in crisis situations that necessitate immediate action… and involves public acceptance of conflict."[218] Meaning, when threats rise to the level of a crisis (which they frequently do in the U.S.) certain expectations are manifest and certain policy responses are delineated. This is because, Gariup writes, "culture intervenes in the form of a lens that translates and organizes the information received [and] these beliefs influence then the choice of a determinate discursive action or grand strategy by limiting or enlarging the preferences and options available."[219] Our interests and ideals, therefore, are an integral if not the most critical, "part of the cultural assumptions that steer the attitudes towards policy."[220]

American political culture fosters an (informal) sense of empire which has permeated

---

[213] Woodward, op. cit., p. 2.
[214] John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit. (2004) and C. Vann Woodward. "The Age of Reinterpretation." *The American Historical Review* (1960), pp. 1-19.
[215] Holland, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
[216] Holland, op. cit., p. 23.
[217] Christopher J. Fettweis. *The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory and Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 80-81.
[218] Podvornaia, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
[219] Gariup, op. cit., p. 63.
[220] Gariup, op. cit., p. 64.

government and society.[221] Hart writes this "new imperialism" manifests itself as the nationalism of U.S. identity.[222] Like empires before it, the U.S. believes its existence is fundamental to the stability of the international system. This sentiment was echoed by a retired bureaucrat interviewed for the purposes of this research, who stated, "we are the most powerful nation in the world, and where we like it or not we have to be the policeman of the world. Who else can do it? It has to be somebody – we are the most powerful and the most patient that I know of… we are a blessing to the world. We have an obligation also to maintain the order in the world."[223] But this has led to a situation whereby the U.S. is overcommitted through innumerous international obligations, leaving the U.S. more likely to see vulnerability, causing the prioritization of objective and non-objective threats to flourish.[224]

This sentiment is due in part, as Sperling notes, to America's historical tendency to conflate its interest with those of the rest of the world and the "embedded assumption that military instruments are the most efficacious and appropriate."[225] Fettweis attributes this to a 'general rule' of unipolar power: "the greater its power, the harder it is for a state to disconnect vital interests from peripheral. As expansion occurs, new dangers are perceived that seem to require action, leading to further expansion and subsequent identification of new threats." [226] The U.S. is less able to sustain its national security goals except through force, and this contributes to determining which threats are prioritized. But, as Robert Gilpin notes, the cost for a hegemon to further change or expand the system over time increases, and the cost of maintaining the status quo exceeds its capacity to support its defense capabilities.[227] Uneven

---

[221] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write, "the concept of Empire is presented as a global concert under the direction of a single conductor, a unitary power that maintains the social peace and produces its ethical rules. And in order to achieve these ends, the single power is given the necessary force to conduct, when necessary, 'just wars' at the borders against the barbarians and internally against the rebellious… Empire presents its order as permanent, eternal, and necessary." See, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. *Empire*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 10-11.
[222] Hart, op. cit., p. 289.
[223] Interview with Subject 5, op. cit. See Appendix Five: Interview Subject Identification
[224] Niall Ferguson writes, America is "just another empire, rather than (as many Americans still like to regard it) as something quite unique," although he does not discount the distinct, "peculiarities of American imperialism." See Ferguson (2004), p. 2. Also see, for example, Michael Gerson. "Syria, the United States is learning the lessons of inaction." *Washington Post* (March 24, 2014) and Robert Kaplan. "In Defense of Empire." *The Atlantic* (March 19, 2014).
[225] Sperling, "United States," op. cit., pp. 174-175.
[226] Fettweis (2013), op. cit., p. 89.
[227] Robert Gilpin. *War and Change in World Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 10-11. Ferguson notes that hegemony is a simply a "euphemism for empire." See, Ferguson, op. cit., p. 8. Also see Paul Kennedy. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*. (New York: Random House, 1989)

growth and expansion across the system (especially in regards to advancements in transportation, communication, technology and changing economic factors) shifts the international balance of power, creating new equilibria. This results in war, which leads to the creation of new power structures.[228] Paul Kennedy adds that as great powers rise, priorities shift from economic expansion to the maintenance of overseas obligations and hegemonic status, but in a more competitive and less secure environment, relative to the uneven rates of growth taking place in other nations over time.[229]

The unique nature of America's elite political culture of national security is one in which, "the argument is frequently made that American 'leadership' is needed to deal with the world problems."[230] American altruism creates an integral part of the "national mythology" whereby global power is an unanticipated accident of history.[231] The U.S. begrudgingly accepts this role fulfill its mission to spread the values, principles and institutions of democracy for the betterment of society.[232] Patrice Dunmire notes that, "in the history of empire and imperialism, then, the United States has represented a new breed of world power. Rather than seeking territory, wealth, and dominance, it has rightly pursued, according to policymakers and politicians, self-interest that are at one with freedom, peace, and security."[233] This creates a

---

[228] Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 50-105 and 156-230.

[229] Whether or not all empires adopt militaristic policies out of hegemonic necessity, remains open to debate. See Kennedy, op. cit., p. xxiii.

[230] For example, see Andrew Bacevich. "Regional Policies in the post-9/11 World" in (ed.) James Hentz, *The Obligation of Empire: United States' Grand Strategy for a New Century.* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), pp. 197-207. Huntington defines national interest as, "a public good of concern to all or most Americans" wherein a "vital national interest" is one in which a nation is "willing to expend blood and treasure to defend." See Samuel P. Huntington. "The Erosion of American National Interests." *Foreign Affairs* (1997). Colucci expands on this, defining a vital interest as an, "existential interest whose failure to protect could bring about the extinction of that civilization…they tend to be stark, raw and basic… [and] demand the highest priority." On the other hand, Colucci writes that national interests, "cause more debate; there is less consensus because the stakes are lower, albeit incredibly important." They are, "those that a nation defines to achieve national objectives." See Colucci (Volume 1), op. cit., pp. 5-6. Bruce Jentleson's typology of national interest – including power, peace, prosperity and principles – provides one example of how nations might define their national interest versus their vital interests. See Bruce Jentleson. *American Foreign Policy* (Fourth Edition). (W.W. Norton & Co., 2010), pp. 9-17.

[231] Patricia Dunmire. "'Discourses of War and Peace': Narratives of the Future in U.S. Post-Cold War National Security Discourse" in (ed.) Adam Hodges, *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 37.

[232] Dunmire, op. cit., p. 37. Also see Robert Kagan. "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire: What Our Tired Country Still Owes the World." (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 2015) and Kay, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

[233] Micah Zenko disagrees with this premise: "like many foreign policy concepts overwhelmingly endorsed by officials and policymakers, this one has little basis in reality. If you consider everything encompassing global affairs - from state- to-state diplomatic relations, to growing cross-border flows of goods, money, people, and data - there are actually very few activities where America's role is truly indispensable, defined by Webster's as 'absolutely necessary.' Nevertheless, the notion clearly has political salience, and has even become something of a mandatory mantra for current and prospective commanders-in-chief. The problem with allowing this

situation in which the U.S. is unwilling to sacrifice its hegemonic status, despite its apparent detrimental effects.

If political culture explains the prioritization of threats, we would expect to find different results when compared similar countries facing a comparable threat. Alastair Ian Johnson notes, "elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed in similar situations… similar strategic realities will be interpreted differently."[234] A comparative analysis of the U.S. and its Western democratic, capitalist counterpart, the European Union, illustrates this point. Hampton's writes, "for most Americans, existential threats exist because evil continues to lurk in the world. The EU security model that evolved over the last three decades largely ceased to address existential threats because the old belief in fundamental evil no longer obtained."[235] He adds, "for America, going to war for the just cause of combating evil remains an ever-present option. For Europeans in the EU, just war has been increasingly defined in much more restrictive contexts."[236] Hampton concludes that this results from an American belief, "that their nation has played, and continues to play, a special historic and providential role in bringing to light a world darkened by evil-doers," while Europeans believe, "if they have a special role to play in the world, it is through the spread of cosmopolitanism.[237] Hampton cites "Providence" and it connection to "national mission" as the key to diverging threat prioritization.[238]

---

classification of America's global role to persist is that it is so patently false, and thus an illogical basis upon which to base and prescribe U.S. grand strategy." See Micah Zenko. "The Myth of the Indispensable Nation." *Foreign Policy* (November 6, 2014). Robert Borosage goes as far as to say the unrelenting pursuit of monsters is killing democracy and the American Constitution. See Robert Borosage. "Being the 'indispensable nation' is killing American democracy. *Reuters* (October 20, 2014). Also see Dunmire. p. 37.

[234] Johnson defines strategic culture as "an integrated, 'system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long- lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.'" Johnson credits Jack Snyder as coining the term in a 1977 RAND Corporation report on the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons. Snyder defined the term as the, "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy." See Johnson (1995), op. cit., p. 36 and Jack L. Snyder. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1977), p. 9.

[235] Hampton, op. cit., p. 1.

[236] Hampton, op. cit., p. 1.

[237] Hampton, op. cit., p. 1.

[238] Ernest Tuveson makes a similar argument in his book almost fifty years prior to the publication of Hampton's volume. See Hampton, op. cit., pp. 2-5 and Ernest Lee Tuveson. *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Robert Kagan and Ian Manners agree with Hampton, but provide different justification for diverging foreign policy conduct. Kagan attributes the differences to fundamental beliefs regarding traditional forms of power, positing that Europe is turning away from power and

Given, as Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow note, that America's elite political culture of national security is imbued with exceptionalism, messianic purpose, and a sense of indispensability, these factors begin to explain, in part, how threats are perceived.[239] The EU, conversely, Bruce Williams writes, "with access to almost all levers of power, from its birth, has been predominately concerned with the norms of human existence and nation building, rather than crises requiring military response" and this in turn, "has had the effect of promoting a more impartial EU military persona in the settlement of international disputes."[240] This is due to a "diversity of stakeholders" and the, "convoluted environment in which the EU military exists" wherein, "greater levels of compromise, collaboration and critically, levels of ambiguity" avoid "military absolutism" prevalent in the U.S.[241] Rather, "the EU's uniqueness lies in that it does not presume a starting point where any one level of power is dominant… it now assumes modern crises require all instruments of power be woven together from the outset to address them."[242]

For example, Omand notes how the U.S. processed the threat of terrorism has significant impact on its policy: "Bush's national security strategy subsequently stated, America is at war, thus reflecting al Qaeda's own characterization of the external aggression against the U.S. as war. This metaphor has legitimized abnormal 'wartime' measures, first embodied in the Bush 'War on Terror' aimed at identifying and destroying the enemy, al Qaeda."[243] But, Hampton points out, by 2001 EU, "security culture had already come to reject the concept of threat defined in terms of evil and evildoers."[244] She adds, "the antimilitaristic, cosmopolitan, secularist beliefs underpinning emerging European security culture precluded 'othering'

---

towards a "post-historical age" governed by, "laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation." The U.S. "remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depends on the possession and use of military might." Manners concurs that the EU increasingly derives its "normative power" from the rule-based system it helped to establish. He writes that European, "historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution has, in the post-cold war period, accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the centre [*sic*] of its relations with Member states and the world." This normative commitment alters the types of threats the EU prioritizes, Manners argues, not Kagan's power or Hamptons' providence. See, Robert Kagan. "Power and Weakness." *Policy Review* (2002) and Ian Manners. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2002), p. 241.

[239] Reich and Lebow, op. cit.
[240] Bruce Williams. "The Military in a Wicked World: A European Union Military Point of View." *PRISM* (2013), pp. 48-49.
[241] Williams, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
[242] Williams, op. cit., p. 47.
[243] Omand, op. cit., p. 18.
[244] Hampton, op. cit., p. 147.

terrorists as evil."[245] Instead, "terrorism was perceived as a problem in the realm of societal security, where working to relieve the underlying conditions that produced terrorism was also part of the solution."[246] With trade, aid and development as the foundation for conducting its "external" policy, prioritizing terrorism to fight a war overseas was less relevant to EU strategic thinking.[247] Omand writes, "these strategic differences across the Atlantic may seem abstract, but they have practical consequences… the strategic narrative government chooses to tell about what is going on in the world should be based not just on the assessment of the threat, but also the likely effects of the response, direct and indirect."[248]

Critically, how a threat is constructed (i.e. threat discourse) and prioritized sets the parameters for the response (i.e. form and substance of policy) by subjectively defining the level of vulnerability (i.e. the risk or hazard).[249] But some threats cannot be defeated, only diminished, which introduce a dysfunctional gap. This is problematic because, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen writes, "today's considerations of safety are increasingly about managing risk rather the achieving perfect security."[250] Detached from these evolving notions of security (like those endorsed by the EU) – due to the inflexibility of political culture and the traditionally stagnant nature of bureaucracies – the U.S. tends to under or over-prioritize threats considered more or less important, respectively, by comparable states facing a similar threat.[251] This implies that by utilizing crisis discourse to prioritize threats, certain policy responses become acceptable

---

[245] Hampton, op. cit., p. 147.

[246] Hampton, op. cit., p. 147.

[247] This does not discount the role of the individual European states who joined coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor does it discount the role of French and British forces in the Libyan and Malian conflicts, respectively. As individuals states they are still responsible for conducting a certain degree of foreign policy, within the realm of their national interest, but outside the wider European community, as a supranational entity. This example simply illustrates the diminished role of "war" against terrorism (broadly defined) as a general policy option employed by the EU. See Derek E. Mix. *The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013), pp. 17 and 20.

[248] Omand, op. cit., pp. 19 and 26.

[249] On political responsibility and threat constructions, see Gariup, op. cit., p. 69-93.

[250] Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. "'It Sounds Like a Riddle': Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk." *Millennium Journal of International Studies* (2004), p. 388.

[251] In his extensive literature review on security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks, Brauch sees this evolution as being three fold: "The *pre-modern* world where state sovereignty and the ability to rule the whole state territory has ceased to exist in so-called 'failing', or 'failed states', many of them having fallen victim to internal conflicts or civil wars where warlords control part of the country and major resources; the *modern* world where the defence [*sic*] of the Westphalian state and of its population and territory against undue outside intervention and intrusion is a major goal of 'national security' policies; [and] the *postmodern* world where a progressive internal de-borderization (e.g. within the EU) combined with a tightening of external borders has occurred and both integration and globalization processes have reduced the classical *domaine réservé* of the nation state." See Brauch, op. cit., p. 105. 'Over-securitizing' implies employing security measures to a degree that does not, by any objective measure, equate to the level of threat against which these measures are directed.

and others are not. Discourse will affect behavioral outcomes by delimiting options available to institutions.[252] Johnson notes this is the result of the early, formative experiences of the state, influenced by the characteristics of elites creating it, resulting in variance across strategic preferences between states.[253] And Paul Chilton and Christina Schaffner add that, "language is closely bound up in practice with culture, and that culture in turn closely bound up with practice of politics."[254] For example, Holland notes, "constructing 9/11 as a moment of temporal rupture was politically enabling in that it helped to render policy conceivable that would previously have been perceived as unthinkable, off-limits or too extreme. By framing 9/11 as the dawn of a new era, coalition foreign policy discourse ensured that the perceived rules of the games were fundamentally and irrevocably altered."[255] Political culture, thereby, "influences the range between the permissible and the impermissible."[256]

Political culture (a constructivist explanation) and institutions (a bureaucratic-institutional explanation), despite differences, are not mutually exclusive. Katzenstein and Stephen Nelson write, "the rationalist and sociological optics," have more explanatory power together than when studied separately: "it seems unnecessary, even harmful to stipulate that one or the other can be right."[257] Barnett and Finnemore concur.[258] In the tradition of "analytic eclecticism" (defined by Katzenstein and Rudra Sil), integrating a constructivist and institutionalist explanation, "demonstrates the practical relevance of, and substantive connections among, theories and narratives constructed within seemingly discrete and irreconcilable approaches."[259] As a byproduct of its environment, bureaucracies are not

---

[252] H. L. Mencken writes, "the whole aim of practical politics… [is] to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary." See Hodges, op. cit., p. 50; Holland, op. cit., p. 25 and H.L. Mencken. *A Mencken Chrestomathy.* (New York: Knopf, 1949), p. 29.

[253] Johnson (1995), op. cit., p. 33. Also see A. Trevor Thrall. "Framing Iraq: Threat Inflation in the Marketplace of Values" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 179.

[254] Paul A. Chilton and Christina Schaffner. "Theme and principles" in (eds.) Paul A. Chilton and Christina Schaffner, *Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse.* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002), p. 8.

[255] Holland, op. cit., p. 4.

[256] Adrian R. Lewis. *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom.* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 11.

[257] Stephen C. Nelson and Peter J. Katzenstein. "Uncertainty, Risk and the Financial Crisis of 2008." *International Organization* (forthcoming), p. 14.

[258] Barnett and Finnemore, op. cit.

[259] The authors define eclectic as, "any approach that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements – concepts, logics, mechanisms, and interpretations – of theories or narratives that have been developed within spate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive problems that have both scholarly and practical significance." See Katzenstein and Sil, op. cit., pp. 3 and 10.

capable of functioning, or remaining distinct from, the effects of national political culture. Colin S. Gray writes, "no one and no institution can operate 'beyond culture.'"[260] This occurs on both a micro-level (i.e. within the institution) and a macro-level (i.e. within the broader national security structure). As Kissinger notes, "the definition of what constitutes a problem and what criteria are relevant in 'solving' it reflects to a considerable extent the domestic notions of what is just, the pressures produced by the decision-making process, and the experience which forms the leaders in their rise to eminence." [261]

Embedded notions of how the world should be effects our interpretation of the way it is, and as a result, the responses employed to address threats.[262] Gariup writes that language is similar to, "a transmission belt that channels meaning from the realm of ideas to the world of 'things.'"[263] Meaning that rhetoric plays an important role in organizing how we think and how we behave. And crisis discourse structures opportunities for agenda setting while enabling, shaping and constraining responses.[264] Holland notes, "linking foreign policy explicitly to the national identity is a prevalent and powerful political manoeuvre."[265] In prioritizing certain threats, and elevating them to a crisis or high priority status, an immediate and all-encompassing response is expected. And as Hampton's points out, "when threatened, the United States often responds with mighty force" (wherein the EU acts in a "more guarded manner").[266] This leads to, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth write, a situation wherein "military superiority causes [the U.S.] to seek total solutions to security problems… creat[ing] a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake."[267] David Campbell concurs: "justification is embodied in a dramatic narrative from which, in turn, an argument is extracted. That argument claims that a threat imperils the nation, and indeed civilization itself; that the threat emanates from the acts of an identifiable enemy; and that despite a patient search for alternatives, the threat necessitates a forcefully immediate response."[268]

---

[260] Colin S. Gray. *Modern Strategy*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 129.
[261] Kissinger (1966), op. cit., p. 503.
[262] Gariup, op. cit., p. 48.
[263] Gariup, op. cit., p. 48.
[264] On discursive practices see Gariup, op. cit., p. 48 and on crisis discourse see Holland, op. cit., pp. 4 and 87-88.
[265] Holland, op. cit., p. 39.
[266] Hampton, op. cit., p. 1.
[267] Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth (2013), op. cit.
[268] David Campbell. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1998), p. 224.

The prioritization of clear and present threats, as Table 2.1 illustrates, is evidenced by a three-fold measure. This includes the 'weight' given to the threat by official government documents; the allocation of expenditures as a reflection of the annual national budget; and the type of strategy used to achieve the policy outcome (defined by subjugation, mitigation, arbitration or evasion).[269]

Table 2.1: Forms of Policy & Discourse

EVIDENCE OF THREAT PRIORITIZATION		LEVEL OF THREAT & POLICY			
		Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
	Official Government Documents	4.00-3.00	2.99-2.00	1.99-1.00	> 1.00
	Expenditures	High	Medium	Low	Minimal
	Strategy	Overwhelming use of force (i.e. invasion/war)	Limited use of force (i.e. targeted strikes; military aid)	Use of diplomacy, sanctions, or economic aid	None
	Discourse	Crisis	Problem	Issue	Non-Issue

A policy of subjugation is defined as the outcome of a process by which the U.S. seeks to fully dominate, annihilate, repress, or defeat a threat. It results from an estimated threat weight ranging from medium to high (from 4.00 to 3.00 on a four-point scale); a high level budgetary commitment (implying the allocation of annual expenditures of 50 percent or more by the specified agency enacting the policy); and a strategy of overwhelming force (implying military actions such as invasion or war). A policy of mitigation is defined as the outcome of a process by which the U.S. seeks to make less severe, by mollifying or tempering a threat, so as to decrease its level of danger, without fully vanquishing it. It results from an estimated threat weight ranging from medium to low (from 2.99 to 2.00 on a four-point scale); a medium level budgetary commitment (implying the allocation of annual expenditures of 25 percent to less than 50 percent by the specified agency enacting the policy); and a strategy of limited force (implying military actions such as targeted strikes or military aid). A policy of arbitration is defined as the outcome of a process by which the U.S. seeks to achieve a mediated settlement regarding a threat, without resorting to the use of force (be it overwhelming or limited). It results from an estimated a low estimated threat weight (from 1.99 to 1.00 on a four-point

---

[269] On the weighted scoring process see Appendix One: Threat Weights, as well as the Chapter Three: Methodology.

scale); a low level budgetary commitment (implying the allocation of annual expenditures of less than 25 percent by the specified agency enacting the policy); and a strategy of diplomacy in the form of sanctions (i.e. diplomacy as punishment) or economic aid (i.e. diplomacy as encouragement). Finally, a policy of evasion is defined as the outcome of a process by which the U.S. seeks to avoid confronting a threat, by eschewing responsibility (for any number of contextual reasons). It results from when a threat is identified as such, but not addressed by the official documents (implying it is referenced just a few times and has a score of less than 1.00); there is small budgetary commitment; and therefore, a less significant strategy is employed.[270]

The use of fear, Ludlow writes, prevents questioning decisions, "being made for our safety."[271] Because organizations, as Barnett and Finnemore note, cannot be separated from the political culture in which it is embedded, they often, "mirror and reproduce those [cultural] contradictions, which in turn, can lead to contradictory and ultimately dysfunctional behavior."[272] It therefore plays a pivotal role in threat construction and providing the necessary framework for policy formulation. But it is only a necessary, not a sufficient explanatory factor to answer the research question. As Balzacq writes, "language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it."[273] This requires interaction with a second explanatory factor: institutions.

LINKING INSTITUTIONS TO CULTURE

Anthony DiBella writes, "the conduct of national security is more about organization science; it is through the institutions of national security that strategies are ultimately implemented and either succeed or fail."[274] For the purposes of this research, I define institutions in the context of the bureaucratic elements of the state – including its branches of government, array of

---

[270] A strategy of evasion does not imply a complete dismissiveness of policy, but rather a severely limited or restricted one relative to the other policy categorizations. In these case studies, I find the emergence of an alternative narrative which does not conform to the expectations of traditional national security discourse. Rather other forms of security discourse, like human or environmental, which do not situate the nation as the central actor being threatened, result. This will be further explored in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.

[271] Peter Ludlow. "Fifty States of Fear." *New York Times* (January 19, 2014).

[272] Barnett and Finnemore, op. cit., p. 718.

[273] Balzacq, "A theory of securitization," op. cit., p. 12.

[274] Anthony DiBella. "Organization Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions." *Joint Force Quarterly* (2013), p. 14.

departments, agencies and political appointees.[275] Bureaucratic models of politics generally posit that institutions, and the processes that occur within them, determine policy and play a critical role in defining which threats the U.S. prioritizes. Through the U.S. legal system of checks and balances, and the fragmentation of power, the diffusion of control as bottom up rather than top down leads to policy as an outcome of bureaucratic wrangling across the government.[276] Combined with elite political culture, Jack Holland and Michelle Bentley write, institutionalism and dominate discourses are among the factors that best characterize the context of U.S. foreign policy.[277] They write, "this context not only constrains and limits the options and choices of agents, it also enables and shapes those choices. Structure works through and to make possible strategic action as well as to encourage particular choices that might not be pursued in an alternative set of circumstances."[278]

Institutions have two components, and policy is the outcome of these distinct but interrelated processes.[279] One is organizational, implying that the constraints of institutional procedure play a critical role in decision-making. The second is governmental, implying that bureaucratic wrangling within and between agencies plays an equally important role. As Roger Hilsman notes, organizational decisions are rarely decisive or final, the process always less direct and orderly than expected.[280] This leads to an uneasy compromise among a multiplicity of actors and their divergent policy prescriptions and competing goals, specializations, hierarchies, and viewpoints.[281] Bureaucracy is a mutually acceptable course of action and does

[275] Mabel Berezin. "Politics and Culture: A Less Fissured Approach." *Annual Review of Sociology* (1997), pp. 368-369 and Francis Fukuyama. "The Primacy of Culture." *Journal of Democracy* (1995).
[276] Doughtry, op. cit., pp. 50-64; McCormick, "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy," op. cit., pp. 14-15. Examples of the application of the bureaucratic model applied to U.S. foreign policy and national security abound. See D.B. Hicks. "Internal Competition Over Foreign Policy-making: The Case of the U.S. Arms Sales to Iran." *Policy Studies Review* (1990), pp. 471-484; Lauren Holland. "The U.S. Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis. *Armed Forces & Society* (1990), pp. 219-242; Christopher Jones. "Roles, Politics and the Survival of the V-22 Osprey. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (2001), pp. 46-72; Marsh, op. cit., pp. 1-24; Rosati, op. cit., pp. 364-378; Steve Smith. "Policy Preference and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission." *International Affairs* (1985), pp. 9-25 and Qingmen Zhang. "The Bureaucratic Politics of U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* (2006), pp. 231-265.
[277] Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland (eds.). "Conceptualising change and continuity in US foreign policy" in *Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 197.
[278] Bentley and Holland, op. cit.
[279] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* (New York: Longman, 1999). Also see Graham Allison. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The American Political Science Review* (1969), pp. 689-718.
[280] Roger Hilsman. "Policy-Making is Politics" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 251.
[281] Stephen Cohen. "The Impact of Organization on United States' International Economic Policy" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York:

not necessarily result in optimal policy.[282] Government actions are political and not the result of a cost-benefit analysis.[283] Institutions, like political culture, are resistant to swift or widespread change, and any given course of action typically results from slightly modifying existing policy.[284] Kissinger notes this results in, "decisions taken with enormous doubt and perhaps close division becom[ing] practically sacrosanct once adopted."[285] The concept of 'bureaucratic momentum,' furthermore implies that once an issue is 'securitized,' this 'securitization' generally expands in order for the national security bureaucracy to continue maintaining its control over the now 'securitized' problem.[286] This is compounded by a national security bureaucracy which consistently favors, Barnett writes, "instruments of violence" to solve what its frames as a (culturally defined) total security problem, but which might be better suited by, for example, a diplomatic solution.[287] To challenge this assumption, a bureaucracy would undermine its own power and status.[288] As J. David Sanger suggests "the formulation and articulation of an ideological position have their very real applications and, as such, may condition or modify but will not determine… foreign policy; national security is the categorical imperative."[289]

Because of the distinct nature of specific institutions, we would expect to see different types of institutions pursuing different forms of policy, which correspondingly and best allow each to achieve the security goals set out by the discourse established (see Table 2.2). Unsurprisingly we find that defense-related institutions, like the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and DOD tends towards a policy of subjugation, regardless of the level of threat. This policy best satisfies their institutional mandate. And permits them to attempt to achieve a culturally defined goal of total security against clear and present threats (subjectively defined), as established by the elite discourse.

St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 355-356; Hilsman, op. cit., pp. 251-257; Ole Holsti (1989), "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," in (ed.) G. John Ikenberry's *American Foreign Policy: Essays* (Fifth Edition). (New York: Pearson, 2005), p. 25 and Cass R. Sustein and Reid Hastie. "Garbage in, garbage out? Some micro sources of macro errors." *Journal of Institutional Economics* (2014), pp. 1-23.

[282] Cohen (1983), op. cit., pp. 356-357.
[283] Marsh, op. cit., p. 3.
[284] Hilsman, op. cit., p. 252.
[285] Kissinger (1966), op. cit., p. 509.
[286] On this see John Campbell. "Is American Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa Increasingly Militarized?" *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* (2013).
[287] Barnett as cited in Wohlsetter (1968), op. cit.
[288] Barnett as cited in Wohlsetter (1968), op. cit.
[289] Sanger, op. cit.

Table 2.2: Forms of Policy & Institutional Preferences

	Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
Clear & Present Threat	National Intelligence Council Department of Defense	Department of Homeland Security Federal Bureau of Investigation	Department of Energy	N/A
Long Term Threat	Central Intelligence Agency	Department of Health and Human Services	Department of State Department of the Treasury	N/A

Domestic agencies focused on internal security (across the spectrum of threats) – like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services – tend to focus on policies of mitigation. In theory, all institutions would prefer a situation in which total security prevails. But given the latter's institutional status, environmental focus (i.e. operating in a domestic capacity under Federal regulations) and access to resources (less than those afforded to, for example, the CIA or DOD), these agencies can only achieve their goals (established by the parameters of elite political culture) through mitigating, rather than subjugating, threats. Finally, those organizations with a distinct focus on the politics of security, like the State Department, Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy, tend towards a policy of arbitration. This permits them to achieve their goals through political means (i.e. diplomacy, sanctions or aid) since they lack the resources of those institutions preferring a policy of subjugation or mitigation. Finally, it is important to note that no institution tends towards a policy of evasion, though it does occur.

When U.S. institutions attempt to achieve security, one of four policy outcomes result as a response to prioritizing a given threat. Institutions attempt to subjugate, mitigate, arbitrate, or evade the danger they are confronting. This is a result, as Table 2.1 illustrates, of the prioritization of a threat as discourse (defined in terms of official government documents), resources (budgetary allocations), and the dominant security institutions addressing said threat (as outlined by Table 2.2). But, when comparing internally to externally prioritized threats, discrepancies are apparent. Utilizing the threat weights, segmented by the policy options outlined in Table 2.1, a series of interesting dichotomies take shape. Specifically, threats the government selects - defined by the three-fold evidentiary measure of official documents, strategy and budget - differ from those of by an independent and authoritative (external) analysis - defined by a rationalist measure, removing elements of political culture and

bureaucratic institutionalism.[290] These clear and present threats presented appear to the government as if they cannot go ignored even when some are in terms of policy. And they are further characterized as being consistent and palpable threats to U.S. security. On the other hand, long term threats reside at the lower end of the estimated weight spectrum. And although consistent and palpable, or hazardous and tangible, they are more opened-ended, rather than immediate, in their perceived level of danger. As Table 2.3 illustrates, the U.S subjectively (as measured of estimated weight scores, level of expenditures, and strategy employed), prioritizes the threat of terrorism (with an estimated threat score of 3.88; high budgetary commitment; and a policy of subjugation).

Table 2.3: Universe of Cases (Internally Defined)

	Subjugate	**Mitigate**	**Arbitrate**	**Evade**
Clear & Present Threat	Terrorism	Narco-trafficking	Energy Security	Small Arms
Long Term Threat	Attack on the Homeland	Humanitarian Disasters	Climate Change	The Geopolitics of the Arctic

It also prioritizes, but to a lesser degree, the threat of narco-trafficking (with an estimated threat score of 2.07; medium budgetary commitment; and a policy of mitigation). It prioritizes to a lesser degree the threat of energy security (with an estimated threat score of 1.59; low budgetary commitment; and a policy of arbitration). Each of these threats, categorized by their respective policy outcomes, are deemed more important than the general threat posed by, for example, an attack on the homeland (with a 3.11 estimated threat score; high budgetary commitment; and a policy of subjugation), humanitarian disasters (with a 2.01 estimated threat score, medium budgetary commitment; and a policy of mitigation), and climate change (with a 1.21 estimated threat score; low budgetary commitment; and a policy of arbitration).

As for examples of a policy of evasion, both small arms trafficking (in the international, not domestic context) and the geopolitics of the Arctic are identified as minimal level threats. (defined as a less then 1.000 estimated threat weight with no significant budgetary commitment nor strategy). And the does U.S. effectively ignore both in the context of its national security policy. Otherwise, to resolve the danger, U.S. strategy would require a fundamental

---

[290] For example, see Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

reorganization of its bureaucratic mandate and resource allocation, changes institutions are (as illustrated above) and resistant and slow to do.[291] For example, the U.S. prizes small arms as an essential aspect of its national identity., The U.S. is also a leading manufacturer of small arms. To address the issue as a threat to U.S. national security, therefore, would have long-term and costly political consequences.[292] Although the State Department does participate in multilateral efforts to disrupt small arms trafficking abroad, the strategy is undermined by America's continued contribution to the problem, as one of the largest manufacturers and exporter of small arms in the world.[293] And in the Arctic, despite the growing militarization and the lack of U.S. regional hegemony, compounded by a failed strategy to secure the region's vast resources, U.S. Arctic policy is almost entirely lacking. Rather than focusing on the aforementioned emerging threats, the U.S. evades traditional national security discourse in favor an alternative discourse that emphasizes energy and environmental factors in the context of economic and human security, not traditional national security.

When examined independently, drawing on impartial and credible resources not directly related to or stemming from the U.S. government, and employing a diversity of independent measures (including but not limited to those outlined in Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure), we find that the level of threat tends to differ from official estimates.[294] Most of the threats that the U.S. government internally defines as a clear and present threats become, by all independent or external measures, a long-term (i.e. less pressing) threat (see Table 2.4). This is true even when the same measures (i.e. "clear and present" versus "long term") are utilized. But clear and present, as well as long term, threats take on slightly different characteristics through an external lens.

---

[291] As with many threats, no universal definition of small arms exists, but the Small Arms Survey defines them as revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns. See "Small Arms and Light Weapons." (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2014). Accessed March 10, 2014 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html.

[292] Jurgen Brauer. *The US Firearms Industry: Production and Supply.* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2013).

[293] On the U.S. strategy for small arms trafficking see, "Actions by the United States to Stem the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons." (Washington, D.C: Department of State, 2006). Accessed March 9, 2014 http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/67700.htm and "Conventional Weapons Destruction (including MANPADS & Small Arms/Light Weapons" (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2014). Accessed March 9, 2014 http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c3670.htm. On U.S. small arms production see, Same Perlo-Freeman and Pieter D. Wezeman. *The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies, 2012.* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014).

[294] For the complete explanation of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure, see Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

Table 2.4: Universe of Cases (Externally Defined)

	Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
Clear & Present Threat	Attack on the Homeland	Humanitarian Disasters	Climate Change	The Geopolitics of the Arctic
Long Term Threat	Terrorism	Narco-trafficking	Energy Security	Small Arms

Maintaining the same segmentation in regards to estimated threat weights as a measure of policy forms and employing materials outside official government threat assessments (i.e. independent data compiled from a diversity of alternative authoritative sources), we find that different threats fit in the clear and present category, while many of those threats defined as clear and present by the government, become long term, or less pressing, threats.

Policymakers, for example, continue to view and attack on the Homeland through the prism of Islamist terrorism, despite the fact that the only a handful of private American citizens have died in terrorist attacks and very few have occurred in the homeland since 9/11. This, while domestic groups (including American separatists, violent eco-activists and lone, non-ideological gunmen); immediate cross-border threats from transnational criminal organizations and Latin American drug cartels; and a wide range of external threats from state and non-state actors such as, for example, anti-American governments; rogue counterintelligence operatives; and cyber-hackers continue to plague U.S. security. On the other end of the threat spectrum, for example, the categorization of climate change (with a threat weight of 1.21; a low budgetary commitment, and a policy of arbitration) as clear and present threat to national security is standard among most world governments. Yet it does not receive same level of prioritization or resources that, for example, energy security does. An extensive review of the literature on climate change (featured in Chapter Six) illustrates the widely accepted objective nature of the threat.

Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 allow for the selection of a series of interesting case studies to analyze (see Table 2.5).

Table 2.5: Case Studies

	Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
Forms of Threat	Terrorism	Narco-trafficking	Climate Change	The Geopolitics of the Arctic

These represents a cross-section of clear and present threats, divided by their internal (i.e. subjective) versus external (i.e. objective) categorization in U.S. national security and elite political culture. The case studies that will focus on the threat of terrorism and narco-trafficking, are both internally defined by the political culture, and by the institutions that create the resulting policy, as clear and present threats, though the cursory overview of external data illustrates otherwise. The third and fourth case studies, that of climate change and the geopolitics of the Arctic, represent more significantly or increasingly pressing threats to U.S. security, according to alternative, credible, and independent analysis. Yet these receive far less attention from the U.S.

I have chosen to analyze the case studies listed in Table 2.5 for four reasons. First, they represent a cross-section of prioritization, as specified in the threat assessment documents (terrorism is a high-level threat, narco-trafficking is a medium-level, threat, climate is a low-level threat, and the geopolitics of the Arctic is a minimal-level threat).[295] Second, the selected cases represent a cross-section of non-traditional threats and are therefore drawn from a similar policy area. By non-traditional threats I mean threats to state security, which defy conventional conceptions and national security strategies. They are, in this regard, comparable topics for study. Third, these threats reflect differing policy responses, defined by the four policy categories (i.e. subjugate, mitigate, arbitrate, evade). Finally, each case study represents a legitimate, ongoing and identifiable threat to the U.S. and its national security, regardless of its level of prioritization or imminence.

CONCLUSION

For a cultural-institutional hypothesis to be true, we would expect to see an institutional bias in regards to threat prioritization. Crisis discourse, created by the elite political culture of national security, forces a total security paradigm on institutions. As a result, it limits options, skews prioritization and forces over-securitized or objectively unnecessary policies on institutions. These limitations occur for one of two reasons. First, because, government officials employ a crisis discourse to address the immediate nature threats, restricting the policy response so as to require total security. Or second, threat prioritization occurs when U.S. officials use political culture to employ crisis discourse in order to achieve the goal of total

---

[295] For a review of threats and their weighted scores across the selected assessment documents see Appendix One: Threat Weights and Appendix Two: Government Documents.

security, even when it is not necessary nor suitable for the threat being addressed.[296] The reason for employing crisis discourse in a non-crisis situation varies, but generally occurs for organizational reasons, including, for example, control over the resources allocated to combat the threat.

I tested this hypothesis by examining the structure of elite political culture around individual threat case studies and first assessed whether or not a crisis discourse was being employed. The use of a crisis discourse was established by comprehensively illustrating its employment across a range of actors. Second, I examined the range of possible policy outcomes (i.e. subjugation, mitigation, arbitration, evasion) made available by this gradation of crisis discourse (resulting in problem, issue or non-issue discourse) as a measure of official statements, strategy documents or reports issues by government officials and/or bureaucracies. Then I examined the relevant decision making process, defined as how discourse is interpreted and how bureaucracies, as a result, shape policy. In the next chapter, I will review the fieldwork conducted for the purpose of this research. I will examine and analyze the collected data in the context of the two primary hypotheses. An overview of the methodologies, including the CDA (featuring 30 government documents) as well as the survey and interviews (completed by 130 subjects) will be provided, and its relevancy to the research discussed.

---

[296] Friedman, op. cit., p 214. Also see Theodore Lowi. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States.* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979) and Warner Roller Schilling. *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets.* (New York: Columbia, 1962).

**CHAPTER THREE
DATA & ANALYSIS**

*Nothing is intrinsically more dangerous than anything else,
except when interpreted as such. - David Campbell*[297]

INTRODUCTION

Chapter Three will provide a broad review of the data collected during the course of this research study. This data will be examined on its merit and in the context of the hypothesis to determine its application and relevancy in confirming or rejecting systemic shifts or political culture as the most plausible explanatory variable in U.S. national security threat prioritization. To accomplish this, first I will provide a broad overview of the methodological tools used for data collection and the terminology employed to describe it. Second, I will provide a broad overview of the responses from interview and survey subjects. I will focus specifically on how respondents defined threats; how they defined threats in the context of U.S. foreign policy; how they prioritized threats; and finally, their perceptions of prioritization in the context of the explanatory variables. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the respondents' general view of the threats presented in the case studies (with more specific analysis to be featured in the case studies themselves) as well as a review of the data in its entirety.

Three primary methodologies were employed for the purposes of this research. First, a Content and Discourse Analysis (CDA) was conducted featuring 30 official government threat assessment documents spanning 14 years and a range of national security related agencies. Second, a series of personal interviews were conducted with 29 politicians, bureaucrats and military officials. And third, an online survey of 101 politicians, bureaucrats and military officials, as well as members of the media, think tanks, academia and civil society.[298] Each methodology has a specific purpose and illuminates a specific aspect of this research as administered.

The CDA illustrates the government's prioritization of threats by way of its official national security discourse, which allows us to rank order from most-to-least important the vast array of threats the government does (and does not) identify as a concern to the safety of the U.S., its allies and interests.

---

[297] Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1998), p. 183.
[298] For a complete list of interview subjects and interview questions see Appendix Six: Interview Subject Identification and Appendix Seven: Interview Questions.

The survey provides a perspective of the internal (i.e. subjective) opinions of those operating within the structure of the state (including elected officials, bureaucrats and military personnel) regarding the threats identified by the CDA. And it compares these opinions to the external (i.e. objective) opinions of those operating outside the state (including the media, civil society and members of academia and think tanks) for comparative analysis. In so doing, the survey further expands on the perception of threats by a wider array of actors who may or may not have a direct bearing on the creation of the official documentation from which the CDA was drawn.

Finally, the interviews provide an in-depth perspective on the research presented in the case studies. It does so by providing a qualitative form of perception analysis from those who have or had direct bearing on the creation of the official documentation used for the CDA. It further probes the subjective opinions of these actors regarding the potential explanatory variables (i.e. presidential leadership, economic interests, systemic shifts in the character of threats, political culture and bureaucratic bias) in a manner inaccessible in survey form. Because this study employed a purposive and non-probability sample of experts, the analyses that follows focuses on descriptive statistics and does not include formal tests of statistical significance. These research tools were employed in order to further answer the research question: given the apparent disconnect between externally defined (or objective) threats and those internally (or subjectively) prioritized by the American government, under what conditions does the U.S. prioritize specific types of threats to its national security?

DEFINING THE TERMINOLOGY

It is important to note that the sample population was not chosen at random, but rather each subject was a purposeful selection. Survey and interview subjects were specifically selected to represent the viewpoints of politicians, bureaucrats, the military, the media, civil society, think tanks and academics. For the purposes of this research I define a 'politician' as an elected official, active or retired, who is or has served as a member of the Congress or the Senate in one of the fifty states (representatives from U.S. territories were excluded). I define a 'bureaucrat' as a non-elected official, currently working as or retired from a position as an employee of the state or as a political appointee in any official government agency or bureaucracy. I define a 'military' official as any member of the armed forces, who is currently or has served as, an officer in any of the four branches. I define a member of the 'media' as

an individual who is or had been employed by a major media outlet – including television, print and online news organizations. I define a 'civil society' member as a current or former representative of a non-profit or non-governmental organization that focuses on an issue or problem of international concern, or a member of an inter-governmental organization (specifically for the purposes of this research, the United Nations) in a staff role which does not directly support or effect the interests of a member state or the state from which they derive nationality. Finally, I define an 'expert' as a former or current member of the academic community (employed by an American college or university), a think tank, or a research institute focused on issues of national and/or foreign policy.

CONTENT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

In order to determine how the government prioritizes threats, 30 official threat assessments published between 2000 to 2014 were used to compile data on the range of issues the U.S. identifies (or does not identify) as being threatening to its security.[299] The reports analyzed include the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2001, 2006, 2010, 2014); the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (2010, 2014); the *National Defense Strategy* (2005, 2008, 2012); the *National Security Strategy* (2002, 2006, 2010); the Central Intelligence Agency *Annual Threat Assessment* statement (2000-2014) and the Defense Intelligence Agency's *Threat Assessments* (2007, 2011, 2012, 2013). The documents were chosen based on the following criteria: their relevance as a national security threat assessment (i.e. whether the report focuses primarily on current threats confronting the U.S. at the time of publication); the source, in the context of relevancy to threat prioritization (i.e. was the report published by a government agency that has a mandate to focus on foreign policy); classification (i.e. unclassified versus classified material); and consistency of publication over the respective time frame for which this research design was conducted (i.e. are two of more reports available, having been published at consistent or near consistent intervals, from 2001 to 2014). Reports not included in this list (and based on the aforementioned criteria) include the *National Military Strategy* for which two assessments were published, but not at a consistent intervals (although three supplemental reports were published on specific issues, rather than broad or more general threat assessments); Presidential Executive Orders (because not all Executive Orders are declassified at the time of

---

[299] On threat assessment documents and their critical role in producing strategy, see Carol Atkinson. "US strategic preferences in the early twenty-first century." *Defense & Security Analysis* (2015), pp. 35-43.

their issuance); and special strategy documents (like the cyber security or counter terrorism strategy documents of which one of each has been issued by the Executive Office). As a matter of circumstance, the reports utilized for the purposes of this research were selected, in part, due to their availability at the time the CDA was conducted. For this reason, those reports published in 2015 and 2016 (including the *National Security Strategy*, the Central Intelligence Agency's *Annual Threat Assessment* statements and the Defense Intelligence Agency's *Threat Assessment* statements), were excluded because they were only made publically available following the conclusion of data collection for this research. Despite not being featured in the quantitative analysis, these reports were incorporated in the qualitative analysis of the case studies presented in Chapters Four through Eight.

The NVivo software program was utilized in order to conduct a CDA of the threat assessment documents selected for this research design in order to discern a weighted score for each individual threat. Threats have been separated into four categories (High/Medium/Low/Minimal) based on frequency of occurrence. High scores denote a frequency of eight or more references in the threat assessments. Medium scores denote a frequency of five to seven. Low scores denote a frequency of two to four. And a Minimal score, denoting a single reference.[300] Each of these categories was assigned a weight (from one to four), allowing the threats to be scored per report, and as an average across the multiple reports. This resulting average score determined the discursive prioritization level (High/Medium/Low/Minimal) of each threat.

INTERVIEWS AND SURVEY

In addition to the CDA, 29 interviews were conducted with current and former bureaucrats, soldiers, and politicians. An online survey was administered to 101 others, but which also included current and former experts, civil society representatives and members of the media. In tandem, they added another dimension of understanding threat prioritization and policy outcomes. The duration of each interview was between 20 and 60 minutes. All were conducted over the phone. They featured 10 military officials, 10 bureaucrats and nine politicians (of

---

[300] This methodology is informally employed by the news media when determining priorities while reporting on a Presidential speech or a government agency report to determine which issues are considered most important to the individual or organization. For example, see Domenico Montanaro. "By the numbers: Comparing Obama's State of the Union Priorities to those of Bush, Clinton." *PBS* (January 20, 2015). For the complete listing of threats, see Appendix One: Threat Weights.

which five were Democrats, four were Republicans and one was an Independent), comprising of 26 men and three women.[301] Interview subjects were asked a series of 14 questions which gauged their perspective on the following issues: the definition of threats; the threat prioritization process; the actors and factors involved in the process; the nature of threats; and the ability of the U.S. to address threats presented by the four case studies (i.e. terrorism, narco-trafficking, climate change, and the geopolitics of the Arctic).[302] The following figures provide a basic overview of the population characteristics of those individuals who participated in the online survey (see Figures 3.1-3.3).

Figure 3.1: Survey Respondents by Gender

Figure 3.2: Survey Respondents by Age

Figure 3.3: Survey Respondents by Profession

---

[301] Interviewees were not required to provide their age in order to protect their anonymity.
[302] For a complete list of questions, see Appendix Six: Interview Questions.

DEFINING THREATS

When asked to define a threat in the context of U.S. national security, interview subjects provided a range of answers. But the primary response focused on a traditional notion of the definition. An attack on, or the defense of, the homeland was considered the most important defining feature. An important secondary role was afforded to any generalized danger to American citizens at home and overseas (broadly defined); U.S. economic supremacy; and the American 'way of life' (including its 'enduring institutions', the protection of the Constitution and the fundamental freedoms it provides). Subjects characterized threats using many of the same indictors that the definition of this research emphasizes. I define security as an increased level of (probabilistic) hazard which directly or indirectly inflicts (or is perceived as directly or indirectly inflicting) severe injury, or having the potential to significantly degrade or fundamentally disrupt, over a given period of time, the security of a state, individual, or community of individuals. As one interviewee noted of threats, "definitionally [*sic*] it is broad, and I think that is by necessity."[303]

Respondents also placed an emphasis on the situational nature of the threat, highlighting its dependence on those in power. One respondent called threat definitions an, "ad hoc, subjective evaluation."[304] Another interviewee noted that this "cognitive view" of threats is derived from the ideological underpinnings held by those defining it.[305] A retired bureaucrat commented, "facts have no meaning, your interpretation of a threat is what gives it meaning. It's all about your social identity."[306] Speaking to the central thesis of this research, the respondent added, "to have meaning you must interpret [threats]. And this is a very active interpretation by the interpreter. [Threats] are amplified or minimized or ignored according to one's perspective."[307] As another subject noted the 2001 attacks had a critical impact on threat definitions: "I think that changed the whole outlook for the government after 9/11, everything was considered a threat - minor or not."[308] When interviewees were later asked about whether or not terrorism was a priority for the government and why, the primary reason given was the national 'trauma' caused by 9/11. They further defined this trauma as being caused by the

---

[303] Interview with Subject 6, op. cit.
[304] Interview with Subject 25, op. cit.
[305] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[306] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[307] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[308] Interview with Subject 4, op. cit.

number of casualties and the unique state of vulnerability to the homeland that the attack created. As one bureaucrat commented, "terrorist attacks have a tendency to traumatize the country. They also have an inordinate amount of media attention because their shock value. So, terrorism is a high priority for the federal government, the threats might be a little higher than it should be because of its traumatic perception of terrorism."[309]

THREATS IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Interview subjects were also asked if U.S. policy does or does not reflect objective threats to national security in the post-Cold War era. This question was posed because if threats perceived as being hazardous by the U.S. do not reflect the objective threat environment, we can posit that threats are therefore subjectively arrived at through other means.

In general, interview responses were evenly divided between respondents who believed policy does reflect the current threat environment and those who did not. This division was further reflected within the different categories of respondents, with no group expressing a majority opinion one way or the other. Of those interviewed who believed that U.S. policy does reflect the current threat environment, a handful conditionally qualified their statements. Although they agreed that U.S. policy is accurately reflective, they also questioned its effectiveness.[310] And they believed that the U.S. must place a greater emphasis on the long-term threats including, for example, Russia and China as well as corruption and its effects on the rule of law in developing countries.[311]

Of those interviewed who believed that U.S. policy is not reflective of the current threat environment, a variety of reasons were provided. The conflict between Israel and Hamas; an over-emphasis on China; the effects of massive energy consumption (which one politician called, "a significant driver of foreign policy"); and a failing American economic system were among the key issues cited.[312] But the majority focused on domestic political factors including the political landscape; an over-emphasis on the use of military power; the effects of maintaining large defense budgets; a failure of leadership to recognize threats and the failure of bureaucratic institutions to act on them.[313] One retired military official noted that the U.S.

---

[309] Interview with Subject 10, op. cit.
[310] Interviews with Subject 3 and 17, op. cit.
[311] Interviews with Subject 3 and 17, op. cit.
[312] Interviews with Subject 2 and 23 op. cit.
[313] Interviews with Subjects 2, 21, 11, 25, and 27, op. cit.

is no longer equipped to manage threats because, "the preponderance of our nation capability has been military power. I'm not sure that our single focus on military capability is going to be as effective as influence, and we have to adapt and mature our information, cultural, trade, business instruments of power or we are not going to be successful."[314] Another added that U.S. policy suffers from being mostly ad-hoc and reactionary, lacking long-term perspective and adequate debate, due in large measure to the dangerous divisiveness that exists in the current political leadership.[315] And a third military official added the U.S. ignores certain threats that it cannot or does not want to address: "to focus on them, that could be more threatening" because then the U.S. would be forced to act.[316]

When asked to consider those threats to national security that the U.S. should be confronting but is not, the most consistent response was terrorism. One bureaucrat attributed this to the politically theocratic nature of the threat, questioning, "how do you fight an ideology? The way you fight an ideology is to come up with a better idea. You cannot burn books, you cannot bomb buildings, you cannot kill all the people; you have to come up with a better idea. So, one of the reasons the United States has not addressed the ideological threat is because it does not know how to."[317] A retired military official concurred, noting "you can't defeat extremism on the battlefield. You beat extremism by winning the war of ideas. You can't beat an idea with a gun. You have to beat an idea with an idea. And that is where we are woefully short in our tools of statecraft and diplomacy."[318] Emphasizing these sentiments, another military official commented that counterterrorism could be executed by the U.S., "with one hand tied behind our back."[319] This implies, as a third military official pointed out, that terrorism policy is failing because the government is too focused on defense: "everything's about the military, the military, the military, and that's all bullshit… It's the least of the capabilities of national power we should be applying, when we should be applying many other aspect of our national power. But yet we're not."[320] A final military official plainly stated that the real problem is, "we are trying to address everything and we are doing so badly."[321]

---

[314] Interview with Subject 11, op. cit.
[315] Interview with Subject 27, op. cit.
[316] Interview with Subject 20, op. cit.
[317] Interview with Subject 7, op. cit.
[318] Interview with Subject 11, op. cit.
[319] Interview with Subject 27, op. cit.
[320] Interview with Subject 27, op. cit.
[321] Interview with Subject 27, op. cit.

In conclusion, the interview subjects presented an interesting perspective on what a threat is, the current threat environment, and the adequacy of the U.S. response to it. Those interviewed were strongly in favor of a definition of threats as situational in nature, implying that what is and is not threatening is shaped by the context from which it emerges. Threats were further characterized as having elements which are both tangible (in the context of the homeland and/or the citizenry) and intangible (in the context of American values and/or political ideology). In terms of the threat environment, subjects were divided on whether or not prioritization was based on objective or subjective measures, and they provided a diverse array of reasons for believing in one or the other. There was a general agreement that threats could be better prioritized by the government – however the subject defined 'better' in the context of U.S. national security priorities (as they existed at the time this data was collected).[322] And there was a general agreement that resulting strategy could be more coherent – implying the U.S. could be more deliberate and less reactionary. These critical revelations are the foundation upon which subjects based their assessment of the four specific threats examined in this research.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONTENT & DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The CDA revealed interesting insights into the perception and prioritization of threats to U.S. national security (see Table 3.1).[323] WMDs were the only threat which received a weighted high score of 4.0 (the highest possible score) implying that across the range of threats - regardless of agency, institutional bias or the dictates of political culture - WMDs are perceived by the U.S. as being the most dangerous issue in the post-Cold War era. The only other threats that ranked in the high category were Terrorism (with a score of 3.88 out of 4.0) and an Attack on the Homeland (scoring a 3.11 on the same scale).

In the medium category, more traditional threats (including state and non-state actors) dominated the group. Among the threats in this category included Interstate Warfare (2.94); Cyber Warfare (2.59); Security Allies (2.51); Missiles (2.46); Intra-state Warfare (2.44); Pandemics (2.15); Global Financial Crisis and Economic Destabilization (2.08); Disruption of Space Dominance (2.07); Narco-Trafficking (2.07) and Humanitarian Disasters (2.01). State

---

[322] See Appendix One: Threat Weights.
[323] For the complete listing of threats and scores, see Appendix One: Threat Weights.

actors included China (2.69); Afghanistan (2.63); Russia (2.59); Iraq (2.59); Iran (2.13) and Pakistan (2.12).

Table 3.1: Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents)
And Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis)

Threat Weight	Threat Ranked by Content and Discourse Analysis	Threats Ranked by Survey Respondents	Mean Score
4.00	Weapons of Mass Destruction	Cyber Warfare	7.33
3.88	Terrorism	Terrorism	6.36
3.11	Attack on the Homeland	Weapons of Mass Destruction	6.56
2.94	Intra-state war (irregular/insurgent/civil conflict)	Global Financial Crisis & Economic Destabilization	5.95
2.59	Cyber Warfare	Climate Change	5.94
2.51	Security of Allies	Attack on the Homeland	5.91
2.46	Missiles	National Debt	5.84
2.44	Intra-state Warfare	Security of Allies	5.75
2.15	Pandemics	Energy Security	5.73
2.08	Global Financial Crisis & Economic Destabilization	Pandemics	5.38
2.07	Disruption of Space Dominance	Failed States	5.28
2.07	Narco-Trafficking	Disruptive Technologies	5.16
2.01	Humanitarian Disasters	Poverty & Unemployment	5.06
1.59	Energy Security	Attacks of Critical Bases of Operation Overseas	5.03
1.32	Failed States	Intra-state war (irregular/insurgent/civil conflict)	5.02
1.30	Poverty & Unemployment	Water Security	4.89
1.22	Border Control	Humanitarian Disasters	4.81
1.21	Climate Change	Border Control	4.63
1.16	Attacks of Critical Bases of Operation Overseas	Espionage	4.61
1.07	Food Security	Food Security	4.44
0.94	Human Rights Crimes	Disruption of Space Dominance	4.40
0.91	Water Security	Transnational Criminal Organizations	4.35
0.90	Disruptive Technologies	Interstate Warfare	4.20
0.84	Espionage	Freedom of the Global Commons	4.13
0.73	Freedom of the Global Commons	Missiles	4.00
0.61	Illegal Migration	Narco-Trafficking	3.86
0.59	Refugees	Human Trafficking	3.48
0.55	Human Trafficking	Human Rights Crimes	3.32
0.54	The Emerging Geopolitical Situation in the Arctic	Illegal Migration	3.04
0.50	Piracy (on the seas)	The Emerging Geopolitical Situation in the Arctic	3.03
0.48	Small Arms (use and trafficking)	Refugees	2.91
0.27	Transnational Criminal Organizations	Small Arms (use and trafficking)	2.67
0.19	National Debt	Piracy (on the seas)	2.40
0.00	Child Soldiers	Child Soldiers	1.74

Traditional threats also dominated the low category. Most of these threats which might be characterized as multilateral in nature or international in scope, implying they are threats

which require collaboration among the many actors in the international system and necessitate policies and means beyond the traditional use of force. These non-state actor threats include Energy Security (1.59); Failed States (1.32); Poverty and Unemployment (1.30); Border Control (1.22); Climate Change (1.21); Attacks on Critical Bases of Operation Overseas (1.16) and Food Security (1.07). Interestingly North Korea (1.89); Israel, in the context of war with Arab nations, (1.51) and Syria (1.35) ranked as low actor threats. Although each represents a distinct threat, each is also an entrenched conflict to which the U.S. in engaged, but which diplomatic rather than direct military operations are the primary focus (at the time the data was collected in 2014). This is not surprising, recalling the expectations presented in Chapter Two that low level priority threats tend towards a policy of diplomacy, sanctions and economic incentives, not the use of force, as is the case with threat prioritized as high or medium level threats (see Table 2.1).

A diverse range of threats made the minimal threat category, which represented the largest grouping of threats. It included Human Rights Crimes (0.94); Water Security (0.91); Disruptive Technologies (0.90); Espionage (0.84); Freedom of the Global Commons (0.73); Illegal Migration (0.61); Refugees (0.59); Human Trafficking (0.55); the Emerging Geopolitical Situation in the Arctic (0.54); Piracy (0.50); Small Arms (0.48); Transnational Criminal Organizations (0.27); National Debt (0.19) and Child Soldiers (0.00). The state actors included Somalia (0.85); Colombia (0.75); Mexico (0.73); Yemen (0.72); Saudi Arabia (0.64); Libya (0.63); Venezuela (0.61); Sudan/South Sudan (0.59) and Nigeria (0.48). These 'wicked problems' - as labeled by a retired military official – represent ongoing problems, requiring the contributions of many actors, a diverse range of tactics, and do not have a single or simple solution. It is for these reasons, I posit, that these threats are grouped together.[324]

Meanwhile, the threat posed by different regions from across the world only ranked in the Medium or Low category. The greatest threat was posed by Africa (2.44) followed closely behind by Central & Southeast Asia (2.40) East Asia (2.30); The Middle East (2.16); Eastern Europe (1.75); Western Europe (1.75) and Latin America (1.26).

When juxtaposed against threats ranked by the survey respondents, a slightly different hierarchy of threats emerged.[325] Survey respondents were in agreement with six of the top 10

---

[324] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.

[325] For a complete listing of survey and CDA scores displayed side by side from highest to lowest for comparative analysis see, Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) and Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

threats listed by the CDA (see Table 3.1). But survey respondents selected Cyber Warfare (ranked fifth in the CDA) as the most important threat by a wide margin. They ranked WMDs, the most important threat in the CDA, lower at third place. The two threat hierarchies also shared seven of the least important threats, with both lists ranking child soldiers as the least important threat to U.S. national security. The state actor threats ranked by the CDA and survey respondents were more similar (see Table 3.2).

**Table 3.2: State Actor Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents)
and Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis)**

Threat Weight	Threat Ranked by Content and Discourse Analysis	Threats Ranked by Survey Respondents	Mean Score
2.69	China	China	6.63
2.63	Afghanistan	Iran	6.36
2.59	Russia	Russia	6.20
2.59	Iraq	Pakistan	5.89
2.13	Iran	Iraq	5.34
2.12	Pakistan	Syria	5.24
1.89	North Korea	North Korea	5.07
1.51	Israel (in the context of war with Arab nations)	Israel (in the context of war with Arab nations)	5.05
1.35	Syria	Afghanistan	4.95
0.85	Somalia	Yemen	4.29
0.75	Colombia	Saudi Arabia	4.27
0.73	Mexico	Mexico	3.63
0.72	Yemen	Libya	3.14
0.64	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	2.76
0.63	Libya	Nigeria	2.52
0.61	Venezuela	Sudan/South Sudan	2.46
0.59	Sudan/South Sudan	Venezuela	2.43
0.48	Nigeria	Colombia	2.12

China topped both lists as the most important state actor threat, while Iran, Russia and Pakistan, North Korea and Israel (in the context of regional dynamics and war with surrounding Arab nations) appeared in the top 10 of both lists. The largest discrepancy was Afghanistan, ranked as the second most important state actor threat in the CDA but ninth by survey respondents. The second largest discrepancy was Colombia, ranked the least important state actor threat by the survey respondents, but ranked 11 of 18 state actor threats by the CDA.

Similarities were also seen in the ranking of regional threats by survey respondents and the CDA with one large difference. Wherein the CDA ranked Africa as the most threatening region, survey respondents ranked the Middle East as the most threatening (see Table 3.3).

**Table 3.3: Regional Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents)
and Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis)**

Threat Weight	Threat Ranked by Content and Discourse Analysis	Threats Ranked by Survey Respondents	Mean Score
2.44	Africa	The Middle East	6.68
2.40	Central & South East Asia	East Asia	5.17
2.30	East Asia	Central & South East Asia	3.96
2.16	The Middle East	Eastern Europe	3.84
1.75	Eastern Europe	Africa	3.70
1.75	Western Europe	Latin America	3.29
1.26	Latin America	Western Europe	2.22

UNDERSTANDING EXPLANATORY VARIABLES THROUGH THE SURVEY

Interview and survey questions fell into one of two categories. The first are those questions which focused on the potential and hypothesized explanatory variables considered instrumental to the prioritization of threats to U.S. national security. These include, the systemic shifts in the character of threats, political leadership, economic interests and political culture in conjunction with bureaucratic or institutional bias. The second were those questions which focused on the four case studies (terrorism, narco-trafficking, climate change and the geopolitics Arctic). I will now address the interview and survey results in regards to the explanatory variables. And I will further address the interview and survey results concerning the specific case studies in the ensuing chapters.

Survey respondents were asked to rank the four hypotheses presented in Chapter Two on a scale from one to four (with one being most important and four being the least important), in the context of their impact on threat prioritization. Based on the overall mean scores of the six groups surveyed, respondents ranked presidential leadership as the most important variable, followed by political culture (see Table 3.4).

**Table 3.4: Impact on Prioritization of Threats
to National Security (Overall Mean Scores of Factors)**

Factors	Mean Scores
Presidential Leadership	1.96
Political Culture	2.43
Economic (i.e. corporate) Interests	2.73
Systemic Shifts in the Character of Threats	2.88

Survey respondents gave the same general across-group rankings when also asked about their impact on the creation (rather than the prioritization) of national security policy. Respondents

attributed the greatest impact to presidential leadership, followed again by political culture (see Table 3.5).

**Table 3.5: Impact on Creation of National
Security Policy (Overall Mean Scores of Factors)**

Factors	Mean Scores
Presidential Leadership	1.79
Political Culture	2.22
Economic (i.e. corporate) Interests	2.81
Systemic Shifts in the Character of Threats	3.18

Survey respondents consistently believed that the least important factor was the systemic shifts in the character of threats on both the prioritization of threats and the creation of national security policy.

When further broken down by professional category, those outside of government (broadly defined as members of the media, civil society and think tanks/academia) were most likely to rank economic interests as most important, followed by presidential leadership and then political culture (see Table 3.6). Those inside the government also ranked economic interests first, but considered political culture of secondary importance, followed by presidential leadership. Both groups believed that the nature of the systemic shifts in the character of threats was least important.

**Table 3.6: Impact on Prioritization of Threat to National Security
Defined by Professional Category (Overall Mean Scores of Factors)**

	Presidential Leadership	Systemic Shifts in the Character of Threats	Economic (i.e. corporate) Interests	Political Culture
Politician	1.25	2.88	2.63	3.25
Bureaucrat	1.78	3.06	2.61	2.56
Military	2.05	3.10	2.75	2.10
Media	2.00	3.33	2.60	2.07
Civil Society	2.78	2.56	2.22	2.44
Academia/Think Tank	2.00	2.38	1.04	2.52

Politicians most preferred presidential leadership, while members of civil society ranked it least important. Members of think tanks and academia tended to prefer the systemic shifts in the character of threats. This might be attributed to the fact that of all the groups surveyed, these individuals are most focused on national security issues, and frequently sought after for their

advice and council, from both a theoretical and practical standpoint.[326] While the academic/think tank community was also most likely to see economic and corporate interests as being more important than the other professional categories, it was military officials who were least likely to believe economic interests play a primary role. The media, on the other hand, was most likely to choose political culture as the primary factor behind threat prioritization, wherein politicians and bureaucrats were the least likely to consider this so. This might be attributed to the fact that the media is responsible, when reporting on issues of national security, for having an acute understanding of political and cultural trends affecting decision-making. Wherein politicians and bureaucrats – because they are engaged in creating and are forced to react to political and cultural trends – attribute less importance to political culture. Or they may actively choose to disregard its influence in order to avoid admitting any effectual nature on their decision-making processes.

When asked about the impact of these same factors on national security policy, the media was most likely to believe presidential leadership plays a primary role, followed by bureaucrats than politicians, who had nearly identical mean scores (see Table 3.7).

Table 3.7: Impact on Creation of National Security Policy Defined by Professional Category (Overall Mean Scores of Factors)

.	Presidential Leadership	Systemic Shifts in the Character of Threats	Economic (i.e. corporate) Interests	Political Culture
Politician	1.57	2.86	2.86	2.71
Bureaucrat	1.56	3.50	2.56	2.38
Military	1.90	3.10	2.90	2.10
Media	1.07	3.13	2.73	2.13
Civil Society	2.10	3.00	2.50	2.40
Academia/Think Tank	1.65	3.20	3.15	2.00

Interestingly, the mean scores across respondents for political culture has the shortest range, with the lowest score being 2.00 and the highest being 2.71. This implies that all the respondents had a generally similar belief that political culture is significant in providing context for but not determinative in the creation of national security policy.[327] Members of the academia and think tanks, followed closely by the military were the most likely to consider political culture as being the most important while politicians considered it the least important.

---

[326] The potential for bias within the group can also not be ignored, implying that the those surveyed might tend to favor a Realist, over a Liberal or Constructivist perspective of national security.

[327] Note that the lower the mean score, the higher priority survey respondents ranked the variable in terms of its impact on threat prioritization.

UNDERSTANDING EXPLANATORY VARIABLES THROUGH INTERVIEWS

In the following section I will examine the four explanatory variables, including presidential leadership, organized economic interests, political culture, and systemic shifts, in the context of the interview responses. This section represents solely the view of those within the structure of the state, including politicians, bureaucrats and military personnel.

Presidential Leadership & Politics

Although the survey revealed the general importance of the four explanatory variables, the interviews provided a more in-depth understanding of the reasons why some are considered more important than others. Across the three interviewed groups there was an obvious bias for the President, the array of existing bureaucratic agencies, and the interaction that occurs between them as being the most important factors in regards to threat prioritization. As one bureaucrat commented, "fundamentally, it really depends who is on the top" or as a retired politician noted, it is "who is making the most noise."[328] When interviewees were prompted to discuss the specific impact elected officials generally, and the President specifically, the overwhelming response was uncritically in favor of their dominate influence on the threat prioritization process. As one retired military official commented, "it's not just influence, it's their responsibility."[329] Another added, "dealing with the cacophony of all this is one of the things leaders get paid to do."[330] When discussing why and how political leadership is best able to exert its influence over the process, respondents cited control over the budget. They also cited the capacity of political leadership to increase awareness for issues by creating "both logic and pressure for them."[331] Leaders matter, as one retired military official pointed out, using as an example President George W. Bush's identification of AIDS as a threat to the world, which allowed him to establish his "imprint" as an "active participant" on the national security process.[332]

But despite selecting presidential leadership as being an important factor, the majority of those interviewed stressed that there are so many actors involved in 'the presidency' (broadly defined), that no single leader can ultimately determine the outcome of the threat

---

[328] Interview with Subjects 3 and 12, op. cit.
[329] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[330] Interview with Subject 6, op. cit.
[331] Interview with Subjects 6 and 12, op. cit.
[332] Interview with Subject 6, op. cit.

prioritization process. This is due in part to the highly sensitive nature of the decisions being made (as the literature review illustrated).[333] As one former military official noted, "everybody brings their own personality and experience to the table. So, they deal with problems slightly differently. But their interests are all the same and you certainly see there is a significant difference between what is said on the campaign trail and what is actually done once they are getting the morning intelligence updates. And there are lots of different ways to skin the cat, but when you're reading the intelligence, you know, people generally come to similar assessments of what we should do."[334]

At the same time, a retired bureaucrat noted, despite the government's best efforts to be, "careful not to take into account domestic political considerations… when you get to the level of the situation room, and even at even at the higher levels of the NSC, you have to take into account what political actors think in the United States."[335] A military official illuminated this line of reasoning when, discussing his time working in the Bush and Obama administrations, he questioned if, "national security is driving their thinking or was politics driving their thinking?"[336] The subject added that, "there were probably glimpses of national security driving their thinking, but I think that most of the time it was politics dividing their, or shaping their thinking about national security."[337] In a similar fashion, as one retired military commented, "each bureaucracy has a tendency to identify a threat that they can each respond to… it's unusual for someone to identify a threat outside of their lane."[338] An retired politician emphasized this sentiment when noting, "politics doesn't operate in a vacuum, so every interest group, organization… play their role in shaping policy."[339]

Political Culture & Discourse

Because politics does not operate in a vacuum, it is relevant and interesting that survey respondents placed political culture as the second most important factor. Political culture provides the context in which the President and all the aforementioned actors function. When asked if political culture plays a role in the prioritization of threats, the overwhelming response

---

[333] On this, see the overview in Chapter Two and the full review in Appendix Four: Chapter Two Literature Review.
[334] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[335] Interview with Subject 10, op. cit.
[336] Interview with Subject 27, op. cit.
[337] Interview with Subject 27, op. cit.
[338] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.
[339] Interview with Subject 28, op. cit.

from interviewees across all respondent categories was that it does. Subjects defined the political culture in different ways, but the most common definitions included political culture as a form of discourse and political culture as a form of politics. The majority of respondents believed that the effects of political culture on national security threats could best be understood through the expression of 'partisanship' and the 'exaggeration' or 'minimization' of crisis. As one retired bureaucrat noted, "inside the beltway... real threats are ignored and fake ones are magnified. Threats are seen through partisan lenses. If a party is in power, they will latch on to something that is important. And you see this in the flip-flopping all the time."[340] The subject added that this was conditioned by political culture, which can be best understood as perspective: "to have meaning you must interpret [threats]. And this is a very active interpretation by the interpreter. [Threats] are amplified or minimized or ignored according to one's perspective."[341] The subject went on to note that, "culture is created by discussion between people and being a member of community, generates a discourse. It doesn't exist outside these discursive communities. You're not dealing with intellectuals and self-aware thinkers."[342] The interviewee added that, "in general, social identity, discursive communities, this is how we interpret events and realities which itself has no meaning."[343] Many respondents noted that political culture fosters divisiveness and this polarization drives the definition and description of threats, which can often be used in inappropriate ways.[344]

This inappropriateness manifests itself through the discursive techniques of "over exaggeration" (i.e. the use of crisis discourse) or minimization of threats.[345] As one retired politician noted, "sometimes you may want to over-describe [*sic*], sometimes you may want to under-describe [*sic*] it, depending on politics."[346] As an example, the respondent pointed to the terrorist threat stemming from ISIS: "the President, for policy reasons, decided maybe [ISIS] wasn't quite the threat it grew to be. And because it fit in to the political narrative of, that we're out of Iraq, we're going to allow the Iraqis to take this, this is their kind of problem. But I think again with this rebounding the way it has, we're going to air more in the side of over

---

[340] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[341] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[342] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[343] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[344] Interview with Subjects 1, 2, 5, 11, 18, 22, 27, and 28, op. cit.
[345] Interview with Subjects 12 and 22, op. cit. Also see Interview with Subject 12, op. cit.
[346] Interview with Subject 28, op. cit.

exaggerating than under exaggerating [*sic*], problems."[347] Another elected official noted, "sometimes politicians can exaggerate or over state threats and thereby appeal to the sense of fear and frustration and anger that our constituents might be feeling and you've got as a unifying point that enables us to get re-elected. So, in other words, playing into the fears of the lowest instinct of the people."[348]

Respondents pointed to 9/11 as an example of this. One retired military official noted that the U.S. has a tendency to, "build ourselves into a frenzy over these things. We talk about threats as well but sometimes it's just perceived threats... So, I think in some cases our culture since 9/11 hasn't been very pensive."[349] This "frenzy" (which might be likened to this research's definition of 'crisis discourse'), leads to a situation in which, "all of the sudden the people get revved up about the issues and they'll provide support to the policy makers who want to then develop the appropriate policies to respond. But it's ordinarily a response to a threat, to a crisis, or an event rather than thinking about it in advance."[350] This, as one retired military official noted, "can be a catalyst. They can create an impetus for action, they can raise visibility very significantly, they can pressure, they can galvanize, and again just have a catalytic effect. And you know, you have to be very careful about that because you don't want to get into [a] reactive phase."[351]

A retired politician noted that there are situations in which, "a threat may be prescribed to get legislation to order national security. You can stretch it or in some cases delay, depending on a legislatively where you want to go."[352] A bureaucrat affirmed this perspective, stating that political leaders, "often try to define what the situation is whenever they want to exaggerate or minimize a threat. If they want to mobilize a nation, or the various agencies behind them, they do so on the basis of politics, how will it play in next election."[353] In this way, we can see how state actors are able to employ a crisis discourse around a threat in order to achieve certain policy goals, rather than allow the threat to be entirely defined by external factors. These opinions might lend credence to the political culture hypothesis, primarily that threat

---

[347] Interview with Subject 28, op. cit.
[348] Interview with Subject 29, op. cit.
[349] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[350] Interview with Subject 21, op. cit.
[351] Interview with Subject 6, op. cit.
[352] Interview with Subject 29, op. cit.
[353] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.

prioritization is more about subjectivity, or internal perspectives, then objectivity or external perspectives, when considering a threat to national security.

The political culture hypothesis would best explain why these domestic factors play such a critical role in the prioritization process. If the discourse around a threat, conditioned by political culture, affected institutional capacity to execute - let alone choose - policy, we might expect to see a of mismatch between external (i.e. objective) and internal (i.e. subjective) threat prioritization. A retired military official noted with, "the institutional inertia of these modern industrial bureaucracies… What happens is when you start wanting to translate your defenses against those threats into action, you bump up against deep bureaucratic cultures. And these institutional cultures are very resistant to change."[354] The subject continued to note that, "the [defense] organizations are designed to fight a war we are not very likely to fight [i.e. a major ground war with associated air-sea battle components on two fronts, similar to World War II]. So the assessment of threats is very focused and clear, how that is translated into action among all the different departments and these 200-year-old bureaucracies is a significant challenge."[355] The subject added, "I spent the first 30 years of my career learning to fight a war I never fought, and the last 30 years training to fight a different kind of war while I was fighting it."[356] If, in fact, the systemic shift in the character of threats were the explanatory variable, we might expect to see the contrary; that the U.S. would be fighting the types of wars in must, and only when it has to. But this is not the case, lending credence to the political cultural hypothesis.

Of those who denied any role for political culture in the prioritization of threats, only one (a retired bureaucrat) adamantly rejected this idea, stating that it is the President (which survey respondents ranked as most important) who bears primary responsibility: "it is very unusual that political discourse leads towards action.[357]" A retired politician added political culture does not affect threat prioritization at the highest level of the national security debate.[358] A military official concurred, noting that political culture was more influential at the Congressional rather than the Executive level.[359] Using Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama

---

[354] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[355] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[356] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[357] Interview with Subject 16, op. cit.
[358] Interview with Subject 24, op. cit.
[359] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.

as an example, the subject noted that in having worked for all three administrations, "every single one of them took their security responsibilities extremely careful."[360]

Organized Economic Interests & Systemic Shifts

Interviewees also addressed the role of economic (i.e. corporate) interests. The existence of the oft-cited, "military-industrial complex" was not denied by any subject. But when it came to issues of great national concern, the ability of economic interests to sway military officials was mentioned far less than their potential to influence politicians. Indeed, the overall sentiment was that national security always supersedes economic interests at the highest levels of decision-making, although it may be a more important factor at the lower levels of government.[361] As one former bureaucrat commented, "the one thing that Congress still needs to bring home is jobs. So, if they get a defense industry in your district – they are going to fight you. So that also has a potential impact on national security strategy issues."[362] Despite this, bureaucrats and politicians interviewed were more willing than military personnel to concede that organized economic interests play a role in prioritization. As one retired bureaucrat noted, "I don't want to insult the true believers who do this for a living. I look at the budget as a cynical operation. Companies try to sell [politicians] on their own belief. And I know the government really believes that this is the right way, regardless of whether they know contractors are trying to make money."[363] He added that, "contractors have publicity campaigns to not only influence the executive and legislative branches, but jobs in a Congressman's community are essential to national security because that voting congressman wants them in his district."[364]

And when prompted to discuss the specific role of systemic shifts in the character of threats influencing threat prioritization, the response from interviewees was mixed and diffused. But in general, they believed that the nature of the threats emerging as a result of systemic shifts does not play as important a role as other potential causal factors, such as political culture. The diverse array of responses, and potential affecting actors, was so diffuse as to render the general response of an insufficient explanatory power. Of all the groups

---

[360] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[361] Interview with Subjects 14, 15, 20, and 24 op. cit.
[362] Interview with Subject 11, op. cit.
[363] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[364] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.

interviewed, the military were among the strongest believers that that systemic shifts play a critical role while bureaucrats and politicians were more divided on its impact. As one former politician noted these systemic shifts only play a role when the President and elected officials believe it is important enough to require the passage of legislation on the matter.[365] A handful of subjects interviewed noted that its influence is entirely dependent on how it is defined, who is defining it, what actors are included in the relevant definition, and what interests are subject to inclusion in this analysis.[366] Among those that argued systemic shifts in the character of threats has little or no influence at all, a diversity of reasons were provided. But most focused on domestic issues like partisanship, bureaucratic mandates and the interpretation of intelligence.

Alternative Factors Affecting Prioritization

When unprompted in the interview process, respondents also spoke of the importance of other factors influencing the threat prioritization process. Institutionally, the National Security Council, the Armed Services, the Intelligence Community, and the White House (broadly defined) were the most cited bureaucracies. This was followed closely by the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, and Presidential Commissions. Interviewees also found the role of official government documents - including classified and unclassified intelligence reports, national security and risk assessments, and specifically, the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) – as being equally important in the threat prioritization process. This adds a degree of legitimacy to the use of such documents by this research, as well as emphasizing the importance of official discourse, in revealing internal (i.e. subjective) ranking of threats, as presented in the CDA. But, as one former bureaucrat noted, this does not mean these documents actually reflect the real threats to U.S. security, commenting that, "whatever is written on paper is subject to judgment."[367] A second bureaucrat noted that prioritization is not executed according to "pre-established concepts of prejudice" with which reality is analyzed.[368] The subject continued to point out that priorities are made depending on the

---

[365] Interview with Subject 24, op. cit.
[366] Interview with Subjects 7, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 29, op. cit.
[367] Interview with Subject 16, op. cit. For example, see Robert David Steele. "The National Military Strategy: Dishonest Platitudes." *Counter Punch* (July 6, 2015).
[368] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.

situation in Washington, the context in which the threat emerges from and is responded to, as well as how certain individuals can either exaggerate or minimize it.[369] The bureaucrat added that, "can you prioritize based on the worst possible scenario? Yes. But is that a real threat?"[370] There was also a heavy emphasis on the nature of the threat itself, specifically the level of capability and urgency posed by any given threat. Bureaucrats, politicians and military personnel were in agreement that threats are more often than not prioritized by what is least likely. This is because what is least likely is also most likely to cause the greatest and most harmful impact if it occurred. For example, this could include major interstate warfare between great powers; the use of WMDs in the homeland; or a multi-pronged missile attack on major U.S. cities.[371]

Political leadership, particularly those elected to the Congress and the Senate, as well as budgets, were also stressed. But both received less focus than U.S. national security agencies (broadly defined) and the documents produced by them. As one former military official commented the budgetary process does not prove that prioritization is a result of budgets.[372] Rather, it can and does skew the level of threat prioritization when elected officials or any bureaucratic agency has a political reason to pass budgetary measures supporting policies that address the preferred threat.[373] One former politician noted that threats are defined (particularly by Congressmen and Senators) based, on, "the electoral map… the first thing that occurs to a member of Congress is not to sit down in isolation and try to determine what the threats to lives of American or the property of Americans. The first instinct is to think, what will this do to me in the election? What is the best way to arrive at a definition of threat that is consistent with my political best interest?"[374] One former military official agreed, stating that "pre-9/11 we had decided al Qaeda was not a threat as we have a limited number of resources we can allocate to them."[375] The subject added, "you've got competing constituencies trying to pursue those resources. And so, for instance, there was no counter-terrorism constituency

---

[369] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[370] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[371] For example, see Interviews with Subjects 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21 and 26, op. cit.
[372] On the role of politics and the budgetary process, see Aaron Widavsky. *Politics of the Budgetary Process* (New York: Scott Foresman & Co., 1984) and Aaron Widavsky and Naomi Caiden. *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process* (New York: Pearson, 2003).
[373] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.
[374] Interview with Subject 18, op. cit. Later in the interview, when discussing the threat posed by the emerging geopolitics of the Arctic, the subject reiterated this point, noting threats are important when the public perceives them as such, forcing elected officials to respond to the demands of their constituencies.
[375] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.

because the threat also has to have constituencies in the United States that identifies it as a threat and pushes to deal with it. That's the nature of a compromise political system."[376] In this way, security is frequently sacrificed for politics.[377] So-called "world events" and the context in which threats evolve – evidence in support of the systemic shift in the character of threat hypothesis – was mentioned just twice by those interviewed; both subjects were military officials, one active and one retired.[378]

Institutional Bias & Bureaucracies

When asked about the role of institutional bias in the perception and prioritization of national security threats, respondents were in agreement with the vast academic literature on the subject. This implies the general existence of an institutional bias within bureaucracies and government agencies affecting perception and prioritization. This bias, as detailed at length in Chapter Two, is a deeply entrenched organizational culture that make bureaucracy's decision-making processes more predictable and prevents policy instability. But it also thwarts policy innovation as a result. Most subjects agree that bias is directly related to the nature and mission of the institution itself. As one former military official stated, "bureaucracies are created to deal with the threat. Bureaucracies are designed to do one thing and when it doesn't work they do more of it. And that's just the rule of all bureaucracies."[379] One active bureaucrat added that, "institutions do reflect certain biases… they see things through the lens of threat they have been trained to see things through. And that's what you want to have."[380] A retired military official echoed this sentiment: "every organization, whether it's an intelligence organization or business has their own organizational culture… So, are there biases in different institutions? Sure, there are." But the respondent added that one's view of a threat is shaped by responsibilities, concluding that, "where you stand is where you sit."[381]

Many subjects cited the military as an example of prevalent and obvious institutional bias and organizational culture.[382] As one former bureaucrat noted, "it's natural that's what they do. So, things that look like a military threat to the Defense Department are more likely

---

[376] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.
[377] Interview with Subject 2, op. cit.
[378] Interview with Subjects 20 and 27, op. cit.
[379] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.
[380] Interview with Subject 3, op. cit.
[381] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[382] Interview with Subjects 13, 14, 16, 20, and 26, op. cit.

to look like a diplomatic challenge to the State Department. And I wouldn't say that this is an America phenomenon – it's just life."[383] In focusing on the military, many respondents expressed concern over America's reliance on hard power solutions to the detriment of other means (such as economic or diplomatic solutions), labeling the Defense Department the "hammer of choice" for U.S. foreign policy.[384] This is because, as one retired military official stated, "if I drop a bomb you can see what happens right away. Write a policy, it might take years to implement that policy, it might take years to see any result come from that policy. So, people like to call on the fire department or call on the police squad, send some ordinates over there."[385]

Some of the reasons provided for how bias influences the perception and prioritization of threats is simply because it increases funding and thereby benefits the agency.[386] For example, one former military officer noted that within the DOD, the Air Force and the Navy focus on the threat of China and the AirSea Battle concept for war because it serves their interest (particularly in terms of influence and budgets) to do so.[387] Other reasons mentioned include the conservative nature of government institutions, which exhibit a bias towards protecting what they have.[388] Also cited was the bias created by 'CNN effect,' which forces the government to respond to crisis immediately, rather than thoroughly understand an issue before fashioning a policy response.[389] Bias works as an opposing force as well, preventing the prioritization of threats. One active military official cited border control as an example. The subject commented that the U.S. government often does not want to deal with border security because of the range of controversial issues associated with it (including immigration, narco-trafficking and U.S. relations with Mexico and Latin America).[390]

In conclusion, a broad overview of interview subject's perspective on the explanatory variables generates significant insights. Most importantly, subjects placed a stronger emphasis on domestic and political factors over systemic and economic factors when discussing how

---

[383] Interview with Subject 16, op. cit.
[384] Interview with Subjects 14, 20, and 26, op. cit.
[385] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[386] Interview with Subject 1, op. cit.
[387] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit. The AirSea Battle concept is a war doctrine that integrates joint movements by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. Formalized in 2010, the doctrine is a critical component of modern U.S. military strategy.
[388] Interview with Subject 11, op. cit.
[389] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[390] Interview with Subject 1, op. cit.

threats are prioritized. In general subjects rejected economic interests and systemic shifts in favor of presidential leadership (as a factor of politics) and political culture (as a factor of discourse). Subjects did stress the role of institutions, organizational bias and culture, political leadership (at the legislative level) and threat assessments in the broader domestic landscape. And they were generally supportive of prioritization as a result of internal or domestic factors that create stronger subjective (versus objective) measures.

THE CASE STUDIES: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

In the following four chapters, I will examine the two primary hypotheses – systemic shifts in the character of threats and the interplay of political culture and institutions – in the context of four threats to U.S. national security. The case studies will examine the threat posed by terrorism, narco-trafficking, climate change and the geopolitics of the Arctic, in order to answer the question posed by this research. In the following section, I will provide a brief review of the survey and interview data regarding these threats, before examining them individually in the case studies.

In general, interview and survey respondents ranked the threat of terrorism as the most important (i.e. high priority) and the geopolitics of the Arctic as the least important (i.e. minimal priority) of the four threats. Interview respondents were more likely to agree with the results of the CDA, which ranked narco-trafficking as a more important (i.e. medium priority) threat then climate change (i.e. low priority). And wherein survey respondents ranked climate change as slightly more important than narco-trafficking, the scores separating the two threats was minimal (see Table 3.8).

**Table 3.8: Overall Mean Scores of Threats to
American National Security (Rated on a Scale of 1 to 4)**

Factors	Mean Scores
Terrorism	1.59
Climate Change	2.16
Narco-trafficking	2.84
The Geopolitics of the Arctic	3.41

Even when asked to adjudge the level of threat posed by each case study on a scale from zero to 10, in a context isolated from the other threats, the order of the scoring was the same (see Table 3.9).

Table 3.9: Overall Mean Scores of Threats to
American National Security (From Questions 5, 8, 11 & 14)

Threats	Mean Scores
Terrorism	5.78
Climate Change	5.65
Narco-trafficking	4.02
The Geopolitics of the Arctic	3.49

When correlating the case studies across the survey data in regards to the level of threat that respondents perceive each case study poses, it was discovered, in general, those who ranked terrorism as a high-level threat were least likely to believe that climate change was also a threat (see Table 3.10).

Table 3.10: Level of Threat Posed by Case Studies
(Correlated with Questions 5, 8, 11 & 14)

	Terrorism	Narco-Trafficking	Climate Change	The Arctic
Terrorism	1.0000			
Narco-Trafficking	0.2880	1.0000		
Climate Change	0.0497	0.2534	1.0000	
The Arctic	0.2514	0.5599	0.5220	1.0000

The strongest correlation was between survey respondents who believed both narco-trafficking and the geopolitics of the Arctic were a high priority. This was followed by those who ranked climate change and the geopolitics of the Arctic has a high priority threat.

When further broken down by professional category, politicians and members of civil society were most likely to rank terrorism as the most important threat. Conversely, the military was least likely to rank it first (see Table 3.11).

Table 3.11: Question Four Mean Scores of Survey Respondents

	Terrorism	Narco-trafficking	Climate Change	The Arctic
Politician	1.13	2.75	2.75	3.38
Bureaucrat	1.56	3.13	1.88	3.44
Military	1.88	2.53	2.29	3.29
Media	1.67	2.92	2.08	3.33
Civil Society	1.13	3.00	2.00	3.88
Academia/Think Tank	1.71	2.76	2.24	3.29

Politicians and members of civil society were most likely to rank climate change as a higher priority than other professional categories. Although according to the correlated data, in general, those willing to rank terrorism as a high priority threat were unwilling to also rank climate change as a high priority threat. Military officials, although expressing a belief that terrorism is the highest priority of the four presented threats, was more likely to rank narco-

trafficking as the most important threat among the professional categories. Bureaucrats were least likely to rank narco-trafficking a priority.

CONCLUSION

This broad overview of the data leads to some interesting conclusions. It appears to indicate that respondents generally favor political culture over systemic shifts in the character of threats as the preferred hypothesis for the prioritization of threats. Respondents also perceived and identified institutional biases as playing an important role. Survey respondents specifically identified policy biases preferred by different institutions when confronting threats. And interview subjects discussed how this institutional bias exerts influence on the prioritization process as a result of the political culture that exists within these agencies, and the broader political culture which exists around them. As one retired military official noted, "every administration comes with certain biases, with certain components, certain advocates in their party that, or certain cultural pieces."[391] This is because, as another bureaucrat added, "to the victor goes the spoils, so whoever wins the election gets to make the appointments."[392] On the other hand, institutional bias, as identified by a retired bureaucrat, can also be manifested in the form of the government choosing to, "simply not think about certain things until they present themselves," citing the attacks of 2001 as an example.[393]

But when defining threats, interviewees were more divided between a traditional state-centric definition and an alternative definition featuring a more expansive conception of "security." This alternative definition included such factors as the "American way of life" or its "enduring institutions." Military officials generally favored a definition of threat that was more tangible – focusing on issues which directly endanger the U.S. homeland, citizens, interest, and overseas defenses, emphasizing the threat's intentions, capability, capacity and consequences. Meanwhile elected officials and bureaucrats tended to prefer a broader definition – which emphasized politics, personalities, institutional biases, and domestic factors, including, for example, elections, the media, and public sentiment. But both definitions were, as one former bureaucrat noted, "very political." This is because, as a retired military official added, "everyone defines [threats] differently based on their politics."[394]

---

[391] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[392] Interview with Subject 7, op. cit.
[393] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[394] Interview with Subjects 18 and 29, op. cit.

The mismatch between the actual threat environment and the national security priorities of the U.S. were attributed, in part, to the complex mechanisms of government, the polarization of politics, and a "failure of leadership." All of which were concerns cited as frequently as terrorism in the context of threats the U.S. should be, but is not adequately, confronting. One retired politician plainly stated there is simply too much bureaucracy, while a military official pointed to doublespeak, wherein the U.S. is "saying one thing and do[ing] another."[395] Other respondents looked to the agencies in charge, identifying poor diplomacy, a lack of effective ambassadors and an underfunded State Department.[396] An elected official concurred, but framed the issue as a dependency on "formalities" and an overreliance on "hard power." [397] Domestic governmental factors were also attributed importance including the polarization of Congress, a lack of political capital to act and an imbalance of the ends, ways and means equation in policymaking.[398]

The collected data furthermore illustrated a difference in threat perception between those inside and outside the state. This was exhibited most clearly in the ranking of threats from most-to-least important. When the order of threat rankings from the CDA (representing the state) was compared to the survey (representing actors both inside and outside the state), the majority of threats appeared to be generally similar. But there were some clear distinctions. Threats that received a greater emphasis in the combined surveyed group included, for example, Cyber Warfare; the Global Financial Crisis; the National Debt; Energy Security; Transnational Criminal Organizations; Climate Change and the Middle East. A lesser emphasis was places on threats deemed of great importance to the state, including Afghanistan; Missiles; the Security of Allies; as well as Intra- and Interstate Warfare.

Official state documents tend to favor threats that are less likely but which, if occurred, would have the most devastating impact. In contrast survey respondents generally tended to place a greater emphasis on those threats that appear more pressing and immediate. This was expressed many times throughout the interview process, wherein respondents noted that, for example, WMDs are clearly the most destructive threat to the U.S. and its allies, but also the most difficult to execute by the enemy. As one military official noted, "threats are prioritized by what can render the greatest damage, and certainty they are prioritized by those things that

---

[395] Interview with Subjects 17 and 25, op. cit.
[396] Interview with Subject 13, op. cit.
[397] Interview with Subject 29, op. cit.
[398] Interview with Subjects 1 and 9, op. cit.

can have the biggest impact and pose the greatest danger. But when dealing with national security matters, the threats that constitute the biggest danger are usually the most unlikely. I think everybody would agree that nuclear exchange today is very, very unlikely. Yet, it would have such a catastrophic impact you're morally required to plan against that."[399] Echoing this statement, a retired bureaucrat noted that the government does not tend to, 'look at reality,' rather, "they look at the worst possible scenario. So, every scenario on WMD is always argued from the worst possible scenario, regardless that the probability is zero."[400] The subject added that it is primarily a bureaucratic problem, pointing out that the enormous amount of intelligence streaming into the national security structure leads agencies to investigate "nonsense" rather than real threats.[401] They further noted, "you begin to feel the world is very threatening and so you have a skewed view of the world and you think anything is possible."[402] This would appear to lend credence to the hypothesis that political culture – its use or misuse as well as its broader effects on bureaucracies writ large – are the critical factors in threat prioritization.

If systemic shifts in the character of threats were the explanatory variable, we would expect to see more similar alignments in threat prioritization when comparing the perspectives of those functioning inside and outside the structure of the state. This would further suggest that threats are prioritized based on objective measures resulting from the ever-changing international system, and not subjective measure pertaining to political culture or institutions. We would also expect to see those issues that have an immediate and existential nature rise to the top of the national security priorities list and those of a less immediate and chronic nature would be on the lower end. But by all objective measures, and as illustrated in the aforementioned example on WMDs, this is not the case. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there appears to be important differences between the CDA and the survey threat rankings, implying that when external, and arguably objective measures are compared to the exclusive perspective of those representing the state, some critical threats for the U.S. Government are considered objectively less important, while others rise in importance. This will be further explored in each case study with the introduction of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure. The Measure was created for the

---

[399] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[400] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[401] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[402] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.

purposes of this research to provide a (relatively) independent measure of threat level which could be used as a comparable factor against the CDA scores, as well as the survey data. Using a binary scoring methodology and analyzing a range of broad factors, the measure aims to remove (some degree of) subjectivity through quantifying a set of materials factors that are generally taken into account when assessing threats.[403]

Finally, in regards to the case studies, respondents generally agreed with the way in which the threats were prioritized as a separate grouping of case studies, distinct from the larger threat list. There was a strong inclination to agree that terrorism was a major threat requiring a great deal of attention and the use of force to defeat it. And there was also a determined belief that the geopolitics of the Arctic posed a significantly lesser threat with respondents offering vague and non-committal policy options to deal with the growing complexity of the region. This is in line with the premise of the political culture hypothesis in which high level threats (such as terrorism) overwhelmingly demand a singular option (typically the use of force) while low level threats (such as the Arctic) receive less attention regarding potential nation security-related policy solutions. Even more telling was the divisiveness in opinion and wide ranging diversity of policies proffered by interview respondents in regards to narco-trafficking (a medium level threat) and climate change a (low level threat). Particularly, the fact that survey respondents reversed their order of priority, placing a greater emphasis on climate change then narco-trafficking). This is because, as discussed in Chapter Two, medium and low-level threats are characterized by increased level of discourse presenting a wider variety of perspectives and therefore agencies and policies options to solve them. Medium and low level threats are not like high level threats (i.e. constrained by crisis discourse), nor are they like minimal level threats (i.e. lacking a national security-related discourse almost entirely). Meanwhile, narco-trafficking and climate change proved to be far more contentious, with respondents exhibiting a wider diversity of views in regards to the level of threat and the potential policy options available. This is also in line with the premise of the political culture hypothesis, which posits that a wider discourse surrounding threats leads to the potential for a wider array of policy options to be implemented, permitting more institutions to attempt to take on responsibility for executing them.

---

[403] See Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

In the following chapter, I will present the first of four case studies, featuring the threat posed by terrorism. First, I will define the threat in the context of the framework presented by this research and review the expectations generated by it. Second, I will examine terrorism in the context of the modern threat environment, as it pertains to U.S. national security. Third, I will review the qualitative (i.e. interview) and quantitative (i.e. survey) data which specially addresses the threat of terrorism and explore how it pertains to the expectations. Fourth, I will explore the threat in the context of the two hypotheses, employing a s series of four examples which compare American threat prioritization to that of its Western European allies. Finally, I will conclude with an overview the case study, data, and presented evidence to further assess the validity of the alternative hypothesis in explaining the reason why terrorism is highly prioritized in U.S. national security.

CHAPTER FOUR
TERRORISM

In so far as we feel ourselves in any heightened trouble at the
present moment, that feeling is largely of our own making. - George Kennan[404]

INTRODUCTION

In this first case study, I will examine the research question in the context of the threat posed by terrorism under the Bush and Obama administrations. As a measure of subjective threat analysis, according to the Content and Discourse Analysis (as outlined in Chapter Three), terrorism ranks as the second most important threat to the U.S. of 59 potential threats.[405] It has an average weighted score of 3.88 on the CDA's four-point scale, ranking it as a high-level priority (see Table 4.1).[406]

Table 4.1: Forms of Policy & Discourse

EVIDENCE OF THREAT PRIORITIZATION		LEVEL OF THREAT & POLICY			
		Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
	Official Government Documents	4.00-3.00	2.99-2.00	1.99-1.00	> 1.00
	Expenditures	High	Medium	Low	Minimal
	Strategy	Overwhelming use of force (i.e. invasion/war)	Limited use of force (i.e. targeted strikes; military aid)	Use of diplomacy, sanctions, or economic aid	None
	Discourse	Crisis	Problem	Issue	Non-Issue

As such, terrorism is characterized by a series of specific features including: a high-level budgetary commitment; a preference for a policy of subjugation (i.e. a strategy of overwhelming force) to address the threat; and the prevalence of 'crisis discourse' as the defining feature of the threat narrative (all which will be further explored in the sections below). Why terrorism is ranked as a high-level priority, and the reasons for the existence of these defining characteristics, will be the focus of this chapter.

I will attempt to discover under what conditions, given the apparent disconnect between externally defined or objective threats and those internally or subjectively defined by

---

[404] George Kennan. *The Cloud of Danger Current Realities in American Foreign Policy.* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977).
[405] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.
[406] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

the government, does the U.S. prioritize terrorism in the context of its national security. I will first provide an overview of the threat posed by terrorism. Second, I will examine the expectations generated by the framework. Third, I will review the collected data, both quantitative (i.e. survey) and qualitative (i.e. interview), to describe how those inside and outside the state perceive and advocate confronting terrorism. Having reviewed the data, I will examine terrorism in the context of the two hypotheses to determine whether the research question is best explained by systemic shifts in the character of threats or the combined effects of culture and institutions as they pertain to the U.S. I will conclude with an overview of the findings and explore if they conform to the expectations generated by this research's framework

THE UNITED STATES & THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

A review of the literature on terrorism highlights an ongoing and persistent problem in the field of research. Specifically, the excess of definitions, which by some counts totals over a hundred across the political, bureaucratic, academic, and alternative stakeholder spaces.[407] But for the purposes of this research, I adopt the U.S. Department of Defense definition of, "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political."[408] Given the specific time frame selected for the purposes of this research, the threat of terrorism will be examined in the context of radical Islamism.[409] This threat is two-fold, with critical domestic and international national security effects and implications. It is also unique in that generally, Islamist inspired terrorism is directed towards

---

[407] On the many definitions of terrorism, see Alex Schmidt and Albert Jongman. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases.* (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2005). On the difficulties encountered defining terrorism see, Leonard Weinberg; Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. "The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2004), pp. 777-794. On why terrorism does not need a singular definition, see Gilbert Ramsay. "Why terrorism can, but should not be defined." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2015), pp. 211-228.

[408] The lack of definitional consensus on terrorism by the UN highlights the complex politics involved. Although no single definition has been adopted by the international community, I have chosen this definition exclusively for the purposes of this research. See *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014), p. 257 and Appendix 1.5: Definitions of Threats.

[409] This is not meant to discount others forms of domestic terrorism in the U.S. including far right, far left and environmental extremists who launch successful small-scale attacks across the nation that do result in fatalities. In fact, before the 2016 Orlando terrorist attacks, white supremacists had killed two more Americans in the homeland then had Islamist terrorists since 9/11. See, *Deadly Attacks Since 9/11.* (Washington, D.C.: The New America Foundation, 2016). Accessed June 17, 2016 http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html.

a broad enemy labeled 'the West', but the U.S. (referred to as the 'Great Satan') is frequently identified as their specific primary target.[410] This is compounded by America's special relationship with Israel (the 'little Satan'), whom Islamists frequently identify as their secondary target.[411]

But terrorism poses a much broader threat to U.S. foreign policy because it remains a chronic problem in developing nations where rule of law is weak and authoritarianism commonplace.[412] Fragile, failing and failed states are bastions of terrorist activity and exist in every region of the world.[413] This is compounded by increasing cooperation between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations, and specifically narco-cartels across the Latin American continent (which will be further explored in the following chapter).[414] Terrorism emerging from theses ungoverned territories presents a dual problem for the U.S. It is first a matter of dealing with a threat in the most inaccessible or most inhospitable regions of the world. But it is also a matter of dealing with those governments that govern (or fail to govern) these areas. This is compounded by the fact most of these governments frequently prove to be anti-American, state-sponsors of terrorism, duplicitous and corrupt actors or employ practices antithetical to democratic values. The complexity of sovereign inter-state relations is therefore exponentially more complicated when dealing with terrorism in developing nations. The threat of terrorism is further amplified in those rogue nations that provide refuge or safe harbor to terrorist groups, as was the case with al Qaeda under the Taliban in Afghanistan, or Hamas in the Palestinian Territories.

As an ideological phenomenon, radical Islamism poses a distinct threat: it recognizes no borders, nationality, race or gender. And it is compounded by groups (particularly al Qaeda

---

[410] For example, see Interview with Subject 3 op. cit.

[411] For example, see Interview with Subject 14 op. cit.

[412] Micah Zenko. "Terrorism is Booming Almost Everywhere but in The United States." *Foreign Policy* (June 19, 2015).

[413] For example, see Eldad Beck. "Hezbollah's Cocaine Jihad." *Ynet* (December 29, 2012); John Cisar. "Narcoterrorism: How Drug Trafficking and Terrorism Intersect." *Journal of Homeland and National Security Perspectives* (2014); Joel Hernandez. "Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and the Globalization of Supply." *Perspectives on Terrorism* (2013); Russell D. Howard and Colleen Traughber. *The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype.* (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, 2013) and Gus Martin. "Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime" in Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel (eds.) *Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview from Six Continents* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), pp. 163- 192.

[414] It is important to note that narcotics are not the only product Islamists are purchasing from transnational criminal organizations. Allegations of weapons smuggling are also prevalent. For example, the firearms used during the attack by ISIS operatives on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices in Paris are believed to have originated from the Southern Italian Mafia. See Mark Townsend. "Is the Mafia selling assault weapons to Islamists." *The Guardian* (July 23, 2016).

and ISIS) who have launched English-language recruitment strategies through online magazines, social media platforms, chat rooms, messaging services, and video games to access, recruit and radicalize audiences farther removed from traditional Muslim and Arabic speaking communities.[415] These strategies have proven successful, in part, due to the America's tradition of open borders, its commitment to freedom of movement, religion and expression, as well as its legacy of immigrant resettlement. These factors can make tracking, arresting or deterring citizens and non-citizens difficult for authorities, more so than in nations where civil liberties are restricted. This is apparent in the case of terrorists who successfully executed an attack in the U.S. and who were previously on a watch list or had been interviewed by authorities on suspicion of supporting terrorism.[416]

As a domestic issue, terrorism presents a unique set of problems for U.S. national security. Between 2001 and 2017 there have been almost 100 cases of Islamist inspired terrorism in the U.S. (not including U.S. citizens who traveled overseas to commit acts of terrorism, cases of terrorism financing by U.S. citizens, or U.S.-based organizations or entities).[417] Although the vast majority have been unsuccessful, plots continue to be uncovered and a growing number of citizens continue to be inspired to commit these acts, indicating the larger threat confronting the U.S. Indeed, the second deadliest Islamist terrorist attack in the U.S. soil took place 15 years after 9/11, killing 49 people.[418] IN this same time frame, just under 100 Americans have died from acts of terrorism in the homeland – while just approximately 350 have been killed in attacks worldwide (not including servicemen or women deployed in the war on terrorism).[419] The domestic threat is mostly a result of the new terrorist activity in reaction to increased security measures following 9/11. Homegrown radicalization, or the 'lone wolf' phenomenon, is therefore an increasingly frequent occurrence.[420] This

---

[415] For examples of English language Islamists recruitment literature see *Jihadi Recollections*, *Inspire*, or *Dabiq*. Also see Ahmed Al-Rawi. "Video games, terrorism, and ISIS's Jihad 3.0." *Terrorism & Political Violence* (2016) and Julian Droogan. "Reading jihad: Mapping the shifting themes of *Inspire* magazine." *Terrorism & Political Violence* (2016).

[416] This was the case with the 9/11 hijackers, the Fort Hood and Orlando shooters as well as the Boston Bombers.

[417] For a full review of the post-9/11 Islamist inspired terrorism cases see John Mueller. *Terrorism Since 9/11* (The CATO Institute: Washington, D.C., 2016) and *Terror Plots in the United States Since 9/11* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2016). Also see *Case by Case: ISIS Prosecutions in the United States March 1, 2014-June 30, 2016* (New York: Center for National Security, 2016) and Pervaiz Shallwani, Damian Paletta and Devlin Barrett. "Bombs in New York and New Jersey, Stabbing Attacks in Minnesota Stoke Unease." *Wall Street Journal* (September 19, 2016).

[418] Ralph Ellis, et. al. "Orlando shooting" 49 killed, shooter pledged ISIS allegiance." *CNN* (June 13, 2016).

[419] "Deadly Attacks Since 9/11," op. cit. and David Rothkopf. "Scared Stupid." *Foreign Policy* (July 4, 2016).

[420] For example, see Barak Mendelsohn. "ISIS' Lone-Wolf Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* (2016); Peter R. Neumann. *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West.* (London: L.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2016) and Scott Shane, Richard

specific threat is compounded by accessibility to modern technologies as well as the use of traditional weapons (like explosive devices or firearms), non-traditional weapons (like large vehicles) or ordinary ones (like hatchets or knives). It is further compounded by a growing trend towards prison radicalization in the U.S. where skilled criminals convert to Islam while incarcerated and later shroud their resentment and crimes under the guise of their assumed religion.[421]

Although the threat might seem minimal when defined by the number of those radicalized, number of attacks executed (or thwarted), or number of dead and injured when compared to other threats facing the U.S., the cost of fighting terrorism must be also considered. This includes both the tangible and psychological affects terrorism has had on the nation and its standing in the world. Some of these tangible effects, which will be further considered below, include the institutionalization of the war on terrorism as the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and the widespread reorganization of the government (resulting in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and a Director of National Intelligence). The U.S. has also suffered in stature, with its hegemony challenged by a non-state actor. Indeed, the attacks of 9/11, as is the case with terrorism broadly, are not only defined in the context of an objective reality (i.e. an act of extreme violence resulting in a significant fatalities) but also by such open-ended factors like, "way of life", "freedom", and "opportunity." By threatening America's tangible resources (i.e. citizens, economy and infrastructure), and its most cherished values (i.e. "way of life") – factors that define and construct the core U.S. identity – the threat of terrorism became exceptional, even existential.

Still, after confronting the most powerful, well-funded, and technologically advanced military force in human history, Islamist terrorism persists. This does not deny gains made by the U.S. – including killing senior terrorist leadership, toppling pro-terrorist regimes and an enhanced focus on (as well as more robust response to) terrorist financing. But they are negated by alternative gains made by terrorist groups.[422] A decline of al Qaeda 'central' has, for example, has not meant defeat for the broader movement, illustrated by the rise of the

---

Perez-Pena and Aurelien Breeden. "'In-Betweeners' Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists." *New York Times* (September 22, 2016).

[421] For example, see Melissa Jane Kronfeld. *Killing Them With Kindness: A Softer Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Radicalization in the War on Terrorism* (Long beach, First Amendment Studies Institute, 2012).

[422] Audrey Kurth Cronin. "The Evolution of Counterterrorism: Will Tactics Trump Strategy?" *International Affairs* (2010), pp. 846-851.

affiliates overseas which have grown particularly strong in Africa and Yemen. It is also illustrated by the rapid formation and rise of the ISIS, whose territorial gains, adaptive messaging tactics, capacity to recruit Western citizens, and commitment to extremism and violence at a level unparalleled by their peers, cannot be ignored. As Clint Watts writes, "with an unprecedented number of foreign fighters available to terrorist affiliates, al-Qa'ida [*sic*] and the Islamic State seem poised to outpace each other via violence on several continents."[423] Indeed, it is estimated that as many 150 Americans and as 4,000 to 5,000 European nationals have travelled overseas to fight on behalf of jihadists forces.[424] According to the UN Security Council, as many as 30 percent of those who have fought or received training from ISIS returned to their country of origin, exponentially raising the potential for blowback.[425] Furthermore, State Department reports that ISIS, which was operational in seven states when the U.S. began strikes against it in 2014, was operational in 18 states by 2016, with an additional six "aspiring branches" emerging.[426]

When depicting the threat posed by terrorism, a multi-faceted but unified narrative emerges, and a singular logic prevails: terrorism is among the most serious and significant issues confronting the U.S. Jihadist terrorism is an ever-present concern, requiring constant vigilance, as well as offensive and defensive tactics. This creates fertile ground for a state of

---

[423] Clint Watts. "Deciphering Competition Between al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State." *CTC Sentinel* (2016), p. 4.

[424] It estimated over 100 foreign nationals are represented in the ranks of al Qaeda ISIS. See Edith M. Lederer. "UN: More than 25,000 recruits join jihadi groups in 2014." *Haaretz* (April 2, 2015). On European and American fighters, see Kristin Archick, et. al. *European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses. And Issues for the United States.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015); Edwin Bakker & Roel de Bont. "Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012-2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016), pp. 837-857; Rukmini Callimachi. "How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Network of Killers." *New York Times* (August 3, 2016); Cottee, op. cit.; "Jihadi Trails: Circuitous Routes Foreigners Take to Syria and Iraq." *Wall Street Journal* (August 2015); George Joffe. "Global Jihad and Foreign Fighters." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016); Lasse Lindekilde, Preben Bertelsen and Michael Stohl. "Who Goes, Why, and With What Effects: The Problem of Foreign Fighters from Europe." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016), pp. 858-877; Murphy, op. cit.; Arno Tausch. "Estimates on the Global Threat of Islamic State Terrorism in the Face of the 2015 Paris and Copenhagen Attacks." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (2015) and *The Other Foreign Fighters: An Open-Source Investigation into American Volunteers Fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.* (Leicester: bellIngcat, 2015).

[425] William M. Arkin and Robert Windrem. "ISIS Numbers Drop, But Fighters Now Attacking Around the World." *NBC News* (July 13, 2016); Eliot Friedland. *Special Report: The Islamic State.* (Washington, D.C.: The Clarion Project, 2015); Joffe (2016), op. cit.; Jack Moore. "Iraq, Syria has 30,000 extremists ready to return home." *Newsweek* (July 15, 2016) and *Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat* (New York: The United Nations, January 29, 2016).

[426] William Arkin, Robert Windrem and Cynthia McFadden. "New Counterterrorism 'Heat Map' Shows ISIS Branches Spreading Worldwide." *NBC News* (August 3, 2016).

constant war, in terms of policy and psychology, justified by terrorism's imminent and widespread nature.

TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DATA

Having examined the threat of terrorism in the context of U.S. national security, I now turn to the data. In this section I will examine subjective and objective perceptions of the terrorism threat as expressed by survey and interview respondents. Subjects represent views internal to (i.e. politicians, bureaucrats and military officials) and external from (i.e. members of the media, civil society, academics and think tanks) the state. As such, the data presents an overview of how subjective and objective stakeholders perceive the threat of terrorism and the reasons why they hold these views.

A Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism

The CDA provided an average weighted score of 3.88 (on a four-point scale) ranking it a high-level priority.[427] But survey respondents, representing subjective and objective perspectives, ranked terrorism lower. Based on the mean scores of all threats in the survey, terrorism ranked as the fifth of 59 threats, with a mean score of 6.36 out of 10.[428] When asked to rank the level of threat posed by terrorism, the majority of survey respondents placed the threat level at 7.00 (on a scale from zero to 10), although the average score was only 5.78 (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Level of Threat Posed by Terrorism (As a Percentage of Response)

---

[427] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats
[428] See Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked By Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) And Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

When broken down by professional category, those within the state generally ranked the threat level higher than those external to it. Politicians and bureaucrats ranked terrorism significantly higher than their peers at 7.89 and 6.47, respectively (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Mean Scores of the Level of
Threat Regarding the Threat of Terrorism

Professional Category	Mean Score
Politician	7.89
Bureaucrat	6.47
Media	5.80
Civil Society	5.78
Academia/Think Tank	5.14
Military	4.86

When asked to choose which one strategy is best suited to confront terrorism, survey respondents overwhelmingly selected limited force (see Figure 4.2). A near equal number selected overwhelming force or diplomatic engagement as the secondary choice.

Figure 4.2: Best Strategy to Confront Terrorism

When further broken down by professional category we find all respondents preferred the use of limited force to confront terrorism (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Best Strategy to Confront Terrorism Defined
by Professional Category (as a Percentage of Responses)

	Over-whelming Use of Force	Limited Use of Force	Economic Incentives	Diplomatic Engagement	Sanctions	None of the Above
Politician	22.22	55.56	0.00	22.22	0.00	0.00
Bureaucrat	15.79	52.63	5.26	26.32	0.00	0.00
Military	19.05	71.43	0.00	9.52	0.00	0.00
Media	20.00	66.67	6.67	6.67	0.00	0.00
Civil Society	10.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	0.00	0.00
Academia /Think Tank	9.09	72.27	0.00	0.00	4.55	9.09

Those representing the state preferred diplomatic engagement as a secondary option overall, but also expressed support for the use of overwhelming force. Interestingly, the opposite was true in regards to those outside the state whose secondary preference was generally the use of overwhelming force before diplomatic engagement.

When asked which agency was best equipped to handle the threat of terrorism, survey respondents overwhelmingly preferred the Central Intelligence Agency, not the Department of Defense, which ranked alongside the FBI a secondary and tertiary choice, respectively (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle Terrorism

When further broken down by professional category some interesting divisions between groups emerged. Although the CIA was the preferred agency overall, those external to the state expressed a slightly stronger preference for the CIA then those internal to it (see Table 4.4). The opposite is true for the DOD and the FBI (the overall second and third choice, respectively), wherein those representing the state expressed a stronger preference for both agencies.

**Table 4.4: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle
Terrorism Defined by Professional Category (as a Percentage of Responses)**

	DOD	DOS	NIC	DHS	DOT	CIA	FBI	DOE	DHHS	None	Total
Politician	11.11	11.11	0.00	22.22	0.00	55.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**100**
Bureaucrat	31.58	5.26	5.26	5.26	0.00	21.05	26.32	0.00	0.00	5.26	**100**
Military	23.81	0.00	0.00	14.29	0.00	38.10	23.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	**100**
Media	13.13	0.00	6.67	6.67	6.67	46.67	6.67	0.00	0.00	13.33	**100**
Civil Society	0.00	22.22	11.11	11.11	0.00	55.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	**100**
Academia/ Think Tank	13.64	0.00	4.55	9.09	4.55	40.91	22.73	0.00	0.00	4.55	**100**

A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM

The interviews conducted for the purposes of this research provide a more nuanced view, from the perspective of the state, of how terrorism is characterized, as well as why it is highly prioritized.

A General Perspective on the Threat of Terrorism

When asked if terrorism is a national security priority for the U.S., the general assessment of interviewees was in the affirmative. They categorized terrorism as a high-level priority of a pressing and critical nature. As was anticipated, a singular narrative emerged, depicting terrorism as a central preoccupation for the U.S. and its allies, in the homeland and overseas. I will now briefly explore the perspectives of each group as it pertains to the threat posed by terrorism.

The Politicians' Perspective on the Threat of Terrorism

Politicians were united in their perspective that the threat posed by terrorism is a top priority. But distinctions emerged between the four Democrats and five Republicans regarding why it is a threat and what should be done about it. Democrats were more cautious depicting terrorism. Although they agreed ISIS poses a serious threat to the geopolitics of the Middle East, they believed it is less of a threat to the U.S. homeland. Democrats blamed the war in Iraq as the primary cause behind the rise of ISIS but agreed the organization must be eliminated because of the threat is poses to civilization. One Democrat commented that dialogue with the organization should be pursued, adding that 'hard power' prevails because it remains America's preferred strategy of last resort.[429] The subject attributed this dependence on hard power to America's fear, stupidity and ignorance of threats.[430] Democrats were also in agreement that terrorism is a 'popular' national security issue which is used to galvanize support from the public for the government to act with military force.

Republicans also perceived the threat of terrorism as a high priority. But unlike Democrats, their rhetoric was more focused on a necessary role for the military as central to any counterterrorist strategy, specifically, and as a means to strengthen U.S. national defense broadly. This is necessary, Republicans generally believed, in order to sustain the war on

---

[429] Interview with Subject 29, op. cit.
[430] Interview with Subject 29, op. cit.

terrorism over the long term. Republicans cited ISIS as posing a unique threat to Middle Eastern geopolitics, but were also critical of Obama's policies. Republicans expressed a belief that the threat of terrorism had not been adequately identified, that not enough was being done to address it, and that a continued failure of intelligence and statecraft (compounded by a significant degree of poor budgetary decisions) has made terrorism difficult to defeat. Republicans also pointed to the role of discourse in threat assessments. As one politician commented, by avoiding the word 'Islamist,' Obama makes it difficult to discuss the role of ideology and religion in the context of the current threat posed by terrorism.[431] Another noted after 9/11 the threat had been over-exaggerated, but now was being under-exaggerated.[432] The subject attributed the failure to address ISIS to the fact that it did not fit into the narrative of ending the war Iraq under the Obama administration.[433] They added the consequences of American discourse is illustrated by ISIS filling the void of power and leadership left by the U.S. in Iraq.[434]

The interviews generally reflected the sentiments of surveyed politicians. Politicians surveyed had the highest mean score for the threat (see Table 4.2). Concerns about the use of force and a desire for diplomatic engagement emerging in the interviews, were reflected in the survey data. Interestingly, politicians surveyed were less likely to prefer the DOD to handle terrorism then did bureaucrats and military officials, registering an equal preference for diplomatic engagement and overwhelming force, despite selecting limited force as their preferred option (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.4).

A Bureaucrat's Perspective on the Threat of Terrorism

Bureaucrats generally believed terrorism is, and will remain, a top priority. When depicting terrorism, they noted despite diminishing the threat from al Qaeda, ISIS remains a serious issue which was not being adequately addressed. As one bureaucrat remarked, "the policy is not equal to the threat."[435] The subject added that by not prioritizing the threat, the response by the U.S. was 'weak.' Bureaucrats pointed to the underlying social issues across the Middle East and the role of religious extremism in the context of political ideology as being

---

[431] Interview with Subject 25, op. cit.
[432] Interview with Subject 28, op. cit.
[433] Interview with Subject 12, op. cit.
[434] Interview with Subject 12, op. cit.
[435] Interview with Subject 16, op. cit.

the primary factors sustaining terrorism. They further believe these factors are mostly unaddressed by U.S. policy.[436]

Among the groups interviewed, bureaucrats were most likely to discuss the failure of America to win the ideological battle against the terrorists, noting the war on terrorism succeeds when fought in conjunction with a war of ideas. Citing the need for a "competitive ideology," one bureaucrat noted, "the way you fight an ideology is to come up with a better idea. You cannot burn books, you cannot bomb buildings, you cannot kill all the people."[437] Another concurred: "you can't defeat extremism on the battlefield. You beat extremism by winning the war of ideas. You can't beat an idea with a gun. You have to beat an idea with an idea."[438] The respondent added that the U.S. is 'woefully short' in its tools of stagecraft and diplomacy.[439]

It is therefore not surprising that these sentiments were also reflected in the survey data. Bureaucrats surveyed selected more agencies then any professional category when asked which one is best able to handle the threat (see Table 4.4). Although the majority (just one third) preferred the DOD, bureaucrats surveyed also expressed a preference for the inclusion of the FBI, CIA, DOS, NIC, and DHS respectively, reflecting their belief in the need for an interagency response. And although bureaucrats surveyed ranked terrorism higher than the general average for the threat, they also expressed a preference for the use of limited to overwhelming force, illustrating sustained reservations about subjugation as the best strategy (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3).

The Military Perspective on the Threat of Terrorism

Military officials generally believed terrorism is a top priority which requires a long-term commitment of military resources. This might explain why military officials surveyed expressed a preference for the use of limited instead of overwhelming force to confront terrorism, as expected threat duration must be matched by a sustainable strategy. When depicting the terrorist threat, military officials frequently pointed out that although non-state actors impact the system, they are only relevant in the context of ungoverned territories where they find sanctuary; the unstable governments that finance them; or (the most cited reason)

---

[436] Interview with Subjects 3, 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15, op. cit.
[437] Interview with Subject 7, op. cit.
[438] Interview with Subject 11, op. cit.
[439] Interview with Subject 11, op. cit.

the WMDs they might potentially require.[440] The implications of framing the threat this way is particularly interesting. In essence, military officials are framing terrorism in the context of what they are trained to defend against: failing states, unlawful regimes, and CBRN materials. But they are not contextualizing non-state actors as a threat themselves. This might explain why, as one military official expressed, the armed forces have been slow to adapt to the war on terror. The subject noted that, "people are so used to having states being the most significant security threat to the country. And all our systems and things, missions, are designed to support conflict between states. And now, from my perspective, that is not the most significant threat we have. Our problem is now state actors, with access to the means of catastrophic destruction that can affect this country."[441]

Terrorism remains a priority for a number of reasons cited by military officials. This include the "trauma" produced by the events of 9/11; continued land conquests by terrorist organizations across the unstable Middle East and Africa; and the recruitment by terrorist organizations of Western operatives from around the U.S. and Europe.[442] They also cited the rise of ISIS; a sustained focus on the U.S. (and Israel) as a primary target and a constant need for defense against potential acts of terrorism as reasons why the threat has remained high for almost two decades. At the same time, military officials were cautious not to exaggerate the threat. This is also in line with the survey results, wherein military officials ranked the threat of terrorism significantly lower than elected officials and bureaucrats (see Table 4.2). As one military official noted, terrorism is only a problem when something goes wrong.[443] Another commented terrorism is contextual, point out the threat is greater to New York then, for example, it is to Iowa.[444] He further commented that terrorism is nothing new, citing World War I as having ignited following a successful terrorist attack.[445] Others acknowledged the threat, but focused on its status today, versus in the days after 9/11. One pointed to the diminished nature of threat given U.S. operations against al Qaeda.[446] And another noted the government had adequately recognized the threat, dedicated resources to combat it, and created a bureaucracy to monitor and execute strategy, calling terrorism, 'a dull roar' and at

---

[440] For example, see Interview with Subject 20, op. cit.
[441] Interview with Subject 8, op. cit.
[442] On national "trauma," see Interview with Subject 1, op. cit.
[443] Interview with Subject 2, op. cit.
[444] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[445] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[446] Interview with Subject 6, op. cit.

the 'mowing the grass stage.'[447] But despite these views, none conceded terrorism was anything less a critical threat. And despite believing terrorism is more limited in scope then perceived, or that it faces diminished prominence in the threat hierarchy, when asked if it is a top priority for U.S. national security, all military officials agreed that it unequivocally was.

TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HYPOTHESES

Having examined the threat of terrorism as it pertains to the U.S., recognizing the expectations generated, and reviewing the objective and subjective perception of the threat as a measure of the acquired data, I now turn to testing the hypotheses. If systemic shifts in the character of threats best explains threat prioritization, we would expect that countries respond to specific material factors when confronting a threat. In the case of terrorism, these material factors might include (but are not limited to): unrest within a sizeable Muslim native and/or immigrant population; general civil unrest; state instability, fragility or failure; large ungoverned areas within an state's sovereign territory; the existence of established terrorist organizations conducting operations; a high number of attacks or fatalities due to terror operations; government corruption; porous borders; or untrained or undertrained security forces. We would expect to find where these factors threaten the U.S. to a higher degree, there would be a difference in prioritization compared to similar nations. And if systematic shifts were the most critical factor, U.S. prioritization and policy would be generally similar to comparable states facing a comparable threat.

Alternatively, if the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis best explains the level of prioritization, we would anticipate subjective measures of threats to be based not on material factors, but America's distinct political culture. We would expect to find policies do not reflect material factors, but an interpretation of threat, expressed rhetorically, and emerging as a product of bureaucratic bias. This would be illustrated by an American threat discourse diverging in significant ways from an objective narrative. And a preference for policy that also diverges in significant ways from comparable states facing similar threats. Finally, based on the nature of the preferred strategy, we might also expect specific bureaucracies to rise in prominence over others within the government in regards to the execution of policy, regardless of their applicability or capacity to succeed.

---

[447] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.

TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF SYSTEMIC SHIFTS

If systemic shift in the character of threats were a validated, as noted above, we would expect threat assessments to be based on material factors and U.S. policies to address terrorism to converge with comparable states. But according to the survey data reviewed above, there exists significant degrees of variation between the subjective and objective perspective. Convergence between these perspectives is therefore not established. This is also evidenced by the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure (as outlined in Chapter Two).[448] The Measure for terrorism presented in Appendix Eight, scores the threat as a "low to moderate/moderate threat" (with a ranking of 4.5 out of 10).[449] As a result of, I propose that material factors are again, indeterminate. To determine what factors are, I will review U.S. counterterrorism policy and draw comparisons with other nations to emphasize the divergence of influencing factors

Comparing the European Union and United States

When examining the anti-terrorism policies of the EU, despite similar means, systems of governance, and perspectives on threats to global security, the prioritization of terrorism varies from significantly from the U.S.[450] This remains true despite the EU confronting a greater threat from terrorism. The magnitude of the threat confronting Europe is the result of a series of unique factors including proximity to regions where terrorism is endemic (like Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia) and the high volume movement of both people and goods between and within the Union's Schengen Area.[451] Given Europe's colonial legacy, the EU also has a larger Muslim population and the majority of member states have a larger domestic Muslim population (made up predominately of young people) as a percentage of the population size.[452] Over 44 million Muslims (six percent of the global population) live in

---

[448] The External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure was created for the purpose of these research to provide a (relatively) independent measure of threat level which could be used as a comparable factor against the Content and Discourse Analysis scores and survey data. Using a binary scoring methodology and analyzing a range of broad factors, the measure aims to remove (some degree of) subjectivity through quantifying a set of materials factors that are generally taken into account when assessing threats. See Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure and Appendix Eight: Terrorism in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

[449] See Appendix Eight: Terrorism in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

[450] For a review this topic, see Michael Jacobson. *The West at War: U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts Post-September 11.* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006).

[451] Kristin Archick and Paul Belkin. *European Security and Islamist Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016).

[452] *The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030* (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center, 2011). Also see Jamie Tarabay. "To Defeat Future Terrorist, Europe Must Look to the Past." *The Atlantic* (August14, 2016).

Europe, and estimated 19 million (3.8 percent of the global population) live in the EU, with the largest absolute numbers in Germany, France and the UK respectively.[453] The Muslim population is expected to rise to as much as eight percent of the total European population by 2030.[454] The scope of this community and their lack of integration into society has caused acute problems in terms of radicalization. The U.S. Muslim population, by comparison, is just 3.3 million or one percent of the total population and the majority are native born.[455] The community is expected to grow to two percent of the U.S. population (or 8.8 million) by 2050.[456]

Regardless of these specific contributing factors, and despite a growing, restless, and increasingly foreign-born Muslim population, the EU approaches terrorism differently. Gauri Khandekar writes, "from the EU's perspective, terrorism is best treated as an organised [*sic*] crime and counter-terrorism in the EU is structured accordingly. Supremacy is accorded to the rule of law, political, and financial means. For the EU terrorism is primarily a call for global action but not global war."[457] This is true despite a rising fatalities due to attacks since 2013 (see Table 4.5 and Table 4.6).

Table 4.5: Number of Attacks & Fatalities in the European Union (2013-2016)[458]

	2013	2014	2015	2016
Attacks	2	2	17	13
Fatalities	1	4	150	135

Table 4.6: Number of Attacks & Fatalities in the United States (2013-2016)[459]

	2013	2014	2015	2016
Attacks	15	16	6	6
Fatalities	7	16	82	49

---

[453] Conrad Hackett. "5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe." (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, July 19, 2016) and *The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030*, op. cit., p. 121.

[454] *The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030*, op. cit., p. 121.

[455] Besheer Mohamed. "A new estimate of the U.S. Muslim population." (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center, January 6, 2016).

[456] Mohamed, op. cit.

[457] Gauri Khandekar. *The EU as a Global Actor in Counter Terrorism* (Madrid: FRIDE, 2011), p. 5.

[458] *TE-SAT 2013: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2013); *TE-SAT 2014: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2014); *TE-SAT 2015: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2015); *TE-SAT 2016: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2016) and *TE-SAT 2017: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2017).

[459] *2015 Sees Dramatic Spike in Islamic Extremism Arrests.* (New York: Anti-Defamation League, April 27, 2015); Max Blau, Emanuella Grinberg and Shimon Prokupecz. "Investigators believe Ohio State Attacker was inspired by ISIS." *CNN* (November 29, 2016); Scott Calvert. "Philadelphia shooting suspects pledges allegiance to ISIS." *Wall Street Journal* (January 8, 2016); *Global Terrorism Database.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study

Yet, the general European approach to policing and domestic intelligence remains less stringent and invasive then the U.S., particularly when considering the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and its associated counterterrorism and security law (which will be further explored below).[460]

This is not to discount British and French domestic security legislation passed in 2005 and 2015, respectively. But generally, in the context of broader European historical political and religious violence, Islamist inspired violence is mostly considered, "a marginal phenomenon."[461] And despite many European countries participating in the war on terrorism, it is not traditionally the policy of EU governments to launch large scale military operations or employ overwhelming force. This also does not discount instances where governments have launched limited (i.e. targeted) strikes (like France in Syria against ISIS after the 2015 and 2016 Paris attacks) rather than overwhelming strikes (as occurred with the U.S. after 2001). But even as terrorist organizations increase strikes within Europe and continue to threaten European interests abroad, these governments generally do not launch major ground offenses nor tend mobilize the full power of their military forces in those countries where terrorist originate or are trained.[462] This is contrast to the U.S., which prefers the use of overwhelming force as illustrated by the Iraq and Afghan wars, the creation AFRICOM, or the ongoing military-intelligence counterterrorist operations occurring around the world.

---

of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism). Accessed July 31, 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; Nick Corasaniti, Richard Perez-Pena and Lizette Alvarez. "Church Massacre Suspect Held as Charleston Grieves." *New York Times* (June 18, 2015); Richard Fausset, Richard Perez-Pena and Matt Apuzzo. "Slain Troops in Chattanooga Saved Lives Before Giving Their Own." *New York Times* (July 22, 2015); Nicole Hensley and Reuven Blau. "Two gunmen shot dead by cops after opening fire outside controversial 'Prophet Muhammad' art exhibit in Texas." *New York Daily News* (May 4, 2015); "Man who struck Ohio diners with machete was from Guinea, FBI says." *Associated Press* (February 15, 2016); "San Bernardino shooting victims: why they were." *Los Angeles Times* (December 17, 2015); Marc Santora, William K. Rashbaum, Al Baker and Adam Goldman. "Ahmad Khan Rahami is Arrested in Manhattan and New Jersey Bombings." *New York Times* (September 19, 2016); Catherine E. Shoichet, AnneClaire Stapleton and Greg Botelho. "Colorado Planned Parenthood shooting: 3 dead, suspect captured." *CNN* (November 27, 2015); Brandon Stahl, Beatrice Dupuy and Paul Walsh. "Family ID's attacker behind 'potential act of terrorism' in St. Cloud." *Star Tribune* (September 19, 2016); Letitia Stein and Jarrett Renshaw. "Orlando killer expressed support for multiple Islamist groups." *Reuters* (June 12, 2016) and *Terror in Orlando: The Victims.* CNN (2016).

[460] On this see Kristin Archick, et. al. *European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006).

[461] *Terrorism Risk in the Post-9/11 Era: A 10-Year Retrospective.* (Newark: RMS, 2012), p. 5.

[462] Two exceptions that stand out include the role of Britain in the international mission against the Libyan government and the role of France in operations against terrorists in Mali. On the European rejection of a war-based response in favor of a law enforcement approach, see Richard Jackson. "An Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Discourse post-September 11" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2007).

Having briefly outlined the EU's general perspective on the threat posed by terrorism, I will now provide four specific examples that illustrate America's distinct prioritization and policy approach to the threat, from a foreign and domestic security perspective. In the context of foreign policy, I will examine direct military operations against terrorist organizations, and the use of (traditionally) extrajudicial actions (including targeted assassinations and extraordinary rendition). In the context of domestic policy, I will examine the militarization and expansion of law enforcement, and the judicial practices undertaken to prevent and/or combat terrorism.

Terrorism & the Use of the Military

As noted, the EU generally does not engage in the widespread use of overwhelming force against terrorism. This does not discount the active role played by Europeans in the fight against terrorism, as evidenced by the many EU countries which joined the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. But the most glaring difference is attacks in Spain, France, Germany, the UK or even Belgium did not result in any of these countries implementing a policy of subjugation (i.e. the use of overwhelming defined by full-scale invasion and war). Even where a clear correlation was drawn between an attack and a military operation, the European standard is to employ a policy of mitigation (i.e. the use of limited force). This is reflected in their 2005 action plan to combat terrorism. The program defined the EU's role as strengthening national and collective capacity; facilitating cooperation and promoting international partnership through high-level political dialogue; bi- or multilateral agreements; and capacity building assistance – not the use of force.[463]

Yet, there is little doubt that terrorism represents a national security threat which does demand, in certain cases and contexts, a military response. A country repeatedly attacked which did not respond with some degree of military force against the aggressors (at home or overseas) would be considered negligent if not culpable in endangering its citizenry. In the specific case of terrorism, it is expected that force might be employed. But the scope of operations, and their proportionality to the level of threat posed, is what separates the U.S. from the EU. Looking to the example of France (the member state with the highest level of domestic terrorism since 9/11 defined by number of attacks and fatalities in the homeland)

---

[463] *EU Fight Against Terrorism* (Brussels: European Council, 2016). Accessed July 28, 2016 and *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy.* (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2005).

these differences become apparent. Between 2012 and 2016, a series of violent attacks in the France killed 245 people and injured another 726. Although this is far less than the 3,000 who have died in the U.S. from terrorism since 2001 (99 percent which occurred on 9/11), it is a significant number when considering the French population (66 million) is only 20 percent of the U.S. population (318 million). Yet when examining the use of the military by the French as a policy to combat terrorism, the application of a subjugation (i.e. the use overwhelming force) does not rise to the level employed by the U.S. This is true irrespective of terrorist attacks rising in France during the latter half of the Obama administration. Instead, the French government employed a gradual application of limited force, against specific targets tangibly related to domestic security. For example, following an attack by ISIS, the French military launched air strikes against the organization in Iraq and Syria.[464] They did not deploy ground forces, opting only for the use of its Air Force as a primary offensive means.[465] This is in stark contrast to America's full-scale invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq following the attacks of 2001.

Since 2014, when French military forces were deployed, for example, they have preferred narrower missions with high-tech expeditionary forces flexible enough to evolve in rapidly changing situations in countries which directly correlated to the threat at home.[466] With France, this pertains mostly to a limited geographic area comprising of its former colonial holdings across Africa and the Middle East (including Libya, , the Central African Republic, Syria and the countries of the Sahel region).[467] Another feature of the "French way of war" is scale, notes the RAND Corporation's Michael Shurkin.[468] He writes, "whereas the U.S. military tends toward a 'go big or go home' approach to war… the French military embraces 'going' small. They strive for sufficiency and hope to achieve limited goals through the application of the smallest possible measure of force, what they refer to as "*juste mésure*," i.e., just enough to get the job done, and no more."[469] For the French, Shurkin writes, the key is, "substituting quality for quantity, and fighting smart, of making the most of the tools at hand."[470] This is

---

[464] David A. Graham. "What Is France Doing in Syria?" *The Atlantic* (November 15, 2015) and Jean Gene Vilmer and Olivier Schmitt. "Frogs of War: Explaining the New French Military Interventionism." *War On The Rocks* (October 14, 2015).

[465] Alessandra Masi. "France and Britain's Coordinated Counterterrorism Strategy Against ISIS in Iraq and Syria Leaves Unanswered Questions." *International Business Times* (November 23, 2015).

[466] Michael Shurkin. *France's War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army*. (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2014).

[467] Shurkin (2014), op. cit.

[468] Michael Shurkin. "The French Way of War" *Politico* (November 17, 2015).

[469] Shurkin (2015), op. cit.

[470] Shurkin (2015), op. cit.

illustrated, in part, by the French not deploying their military against Islamist terrorist organizations until two years following their first domestic terrorist attack and not joining the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.[471]

France's 'major military operations' in the context of the war on terrorism are also much smaller than by the U.S. This is attributable to the unique French historical experience with colonialism, specifically in regards to Algeria, which left France believing the application of military force is an insufficient policy for dealing with insurgency, revolution and terrorism.[472] France's major post-9/11 counter terrorism operations have included a series of short-lived, targeted strikes in Libya in 2011 and, as previously mentioned, in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2016. It has also included limited ground engagements. Still, the French escalation of force does not, as the *Washington Post* writes, "signal a fundamental change in the country's counterterrorism strategy," rather it reflects a need to "keep pace with evolving terror networks."[473] This included the 2010 Operation Serval in Mali, which lasted just 18 months, ending after having achieved its primary objective of driving out al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[474] Operation Barkhane, launched in 2014, was slightly larger scope, but aimed solely at preventing terrorist safe havens and assisting with limited counterterrorist operations in the broader Sahel region (of Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger), a formal colonial possession of the French Empire.[475] The operation, despite spread across five countries, was comprised of just 3,000 French forces, a quarter of the 12,000 French troops deployed on global counter terrorism missions worldwide.[476] As a comparative measures, at the height of the Afghan and Iraq wars, the U.S. had deployed 100,000 and 144,000 troops, respectively.[477]

---

[471] "France sets ups Islamist force in Africa's Sahel." *BBC News* (July 14, 2014).

[472] As Camilleri writes, Islam has been part of the public political discourse since the 1980s. See Raphaelle Camilleri. *Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report* (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012). Also see Charles Rault. "The French Approach to Counterterrorism." *CTC Sentinel* (January 13, 2010).

[473] Michael Birnbaum. "France Boosts Counterterrorism Force After Deadly Paris Attacks." *Washington Post* (January 21, 2015).

[474] "France sets ups Islamist force in Africa's Sahel," op. cit.

[475] Christopher Griffin. "Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram: Counterterrorism and Military Cooperation in the Sahel. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016), pp. 896-913; Maxime H.A. Larive. "Welcome to France's New War on Terror in Africa: Operation Barkhane." *National Interest* (August 7, 2014); "France sets ups Islamist force in Africa's Sahel," op. cit. and Shurkin (2014), op. cit.

[476] Vilmer and Schmitt, op. cit.

[477]*Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, August 2, 2010); "France sets ups Islamist force in Africa's Sahel," op. cit.; Josh Lederman. "Obama: Longest War in U.S. History is Ending."

Terrorism & Extrajudicial Practices

'Extrajudicial' security measures represent an alternative to the direct use of overwhelming force to fight terrorism. These surreptitious policies include tactics like extraordinary rendition and targeted assassination. Rendition, defined as, "the transfer - without legal process - of a detainee for purposes of criminal prosecution either into the United States or to the custody of a foreign government," was a policy established by the Reagan administration in 1986.[478] It has been used by every President since, but in a significantly limited capacity and with a high degree of oversight.[479] Extraordinary rendition defined as, "the transfer - without legal process - of a detainee to the custody of a foreign government for purposes of detention and interrogation," only emerged in the aftermath of 9/11. It was the result of the wide latitude granted by the Bush administration to the CIA to conduct such types of operations.[480] And Obama did not end this policy upon assuming office. Instead of issuing an Executive Order to cease the practice (which was in his authority to do), the administration only sought only diplomatic assurances prohibiting the torture of detainees by receiving states, post-transfer.[481] It was later revealed, after investigations by news agencies, human right organizations, and law firms representing those illegally detained and tortured, that Obama also kept secret prisons for extraordinary rendition in Afghanistan, Somalia, Nigeria and aboard U.S. Navy vessels on international waters.[482]

But these policies are not pursued by America's European allies. This does not imply these countries rejected a role assisting the U.S., but for the majority, this entailed little or no

---

Associated Press (May 27, 2014) and Luis Martinez. "U.S. Military in Afghanistan by the Numbers." *ABC News* (May 27, 2014).

[478] Amrit Singh. *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition.* (New York: Open Society, 2013), p. 14.

[479] Singh, op. cit., p. 14.

[480] It is important to note the U.S. does not have a legal definition for rendition or extraordinary rendition. See Singh, op. cit., pp. 5 and 11.

[481] Singh, op. cit., p. 7.

[482] Spencer Ackerman. "Commandos Hold Afghan Detainees in Secret Jails." *Wired* (April 8, 2011); "America's Secret Afghan Prisons: Investigation Unearths Torture Site, Abuse Allegations in Afghanistan." *Democracy Now* (February 2, 2010); Nick Bauman. "American Muslim alleges FBI Had a Hand in His Torture." *Mother Jones* (April 17, 2012); Cora Currier. "The Secret Prison." *ProRepublica.* (July 16, 2016); Ken Dilanian. "Terrorism suspect secretly held for two months." *Los Angeles Times* (July 6, 2011); Kimberly Dozier. "New detention network is revealed." *Associated Press* (April 9, 2011); Anad Gopal. "America's Secret Afghan Prisons." *The Nation* (January 28, 2010); Scott Horton. "Obama Secret Afghan Prisons." *Harper's* (January 29, 2010); Eli Lake. "Somalia's Prisons: The War on Terror's Latest Front." *The Daily Beast* (June 27, 2012); Jeremy Scahill. The CIA's Secret Sites in Somalia." *The Nation* (December 10, 2014); Singh, op. cit., pp. 20-21; Eileen Sullivan. "Under Obama 'Black' Sites Swapped for Ships." *Associated Press* (October 8, 2013) and Craig Whitlock. "Renditions continue under Obama despite due process concerns." *Washington Post* (January 1, 2013).

active participation. Extensive research into the use of extraordinary rendition by the Open Society Foundation revealed Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain permitted the CIA to use its airspace and/or its airports to transfer suspects.[483] Austria, Italy, and Sweden allowed their airspace and airports to be used and turned over residents or citizens to the CIA.[484] The UK did the same and provided intelligence for the capture of suspects.[485] Germany provided the most support permitting the aforementioned actions and allowed nationals to be abducted.[486] This in addition to participating in at least one interrogation of a rendered individual.[487] In total, the Open Society estimates at least 54 countries played a role in the CIA's extraordinary rendition program (see Table 4.7).[488] The U.S. has acknowledged 100 renditions, although there is evidence for 136.[489] Of the European states examined, none openly endorsed an extraordinary rendition policy. Noticeably absent is France, where no evidence indicates government support for the program.[490]

Table 4.7: Countries Participating in the CIA's Extraordinary Rendition Program[491]

Middle East	Western & Central Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia	Africa	The Americas
Djibouti	Austria	Albania	Afghanistan	Algeria	Canada
Egypt	Denmark	Belgium	Australia	Ethiopia	
Iran	Finland	Cyprus	Azerbaijan	Gambia	
Jordan	Germany	Croatia	Uzbekistan	Kenya	
Saudi Arabia	Greece	Czech Republic	Hong Kong	Libya	
Somalia	Iceland	Georgia	Indonesia	Malawi	
South Africa	Ireland	Lithuania	Malaysia	Mauritania	
Syria	Italy	Macedonia	Pakistan	Morocco	
Turkey	Portugal	Poland	Sri Lanka	Zimbabwe	
United Arab Emirates	Spain	Romania	Thailand		
Yemen	Sweden	Bosnia-Herzegovina			
	United Kingdom				

[483] Singh, op. cit., pp. 67, 69, 72, 76, 82-85, 102-103 and 108.
[484] Singh, op. cit., pp. 67, 85-87 and 109-110.
[485] Singh, op. cit., pp. 113-117.
[486] Singh, op. cit., pp. 79-81.
[487] Singh, op. cit., pp. 79-81.
[488] Max Fisher. "A staggering map of the 54 countries that reportedly participated in the CIA's rendition program." *Washington Post* (February 5, 2016) and Singh, op. cit., p. 6.
[489] Singh, op. cit., p. 6.
[490] There are unconfirmed reports in the French media making the case that for CIA aircraft landing briefly with a suspect on board, unbeknownst to French authorities. On this see Thierry Oberie and Thierry Vigoureux. "Des avions de la CIA ont fait escale en France." *Le Figaro* (October 16, 2007).
[491] Data compiled from Singh, op. cit.

A second extrajudicial policy illustrating the difference between the U.S. and Europe is the use of "targeted assassination" or "targeted killings." The practice is defined by the UN as "the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour [*sic*] of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator."[492] The use of targeted assassination is justified (as is extraordinary rendition) by the *2001 Authorization on the Use of Military Force*, approved by the U.S. government directly after 9/11. It allows for the, "use of all necessary and appropriate force," to defeat al Qaeda and its associated organizations. The U.S. justifies the action as the right to self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It further finds any U.S. citizens posing an imminent threat, and who is not able to be captured, can be assassinated under applicable and traditional laws of war.[493] Targeted assassinations are typically conducted by drone strikes, or by kill/capture missions by U.S. Special Operation Forces.[494] Like extraordinary rendition, there is historical precedent for targeted assassination within a limited scope and high degree of oversight. But, as like with extraordinary renditions, targeted assassinations were expanded by Bush in 2001 and escalated by Obama in 2009.[495] Under these two administrations there were at least 2,200 successful assassination operations, only 675 which occurred under Bush's two terms (see Table 4.8).[496]

Table 4.8: Number of U.S. Drone Strikes & Fatalities (2002-2016)[497]

	Pakistan	Somalia	Yemen
Strikes	403	36	163
Fatalities	2284-3625	336-403	1031-1294

Comparatively, Europeans have rejected the use of such tactics, specifically prohibiting the targeted assassinations via drones by member states with no exception. In 2014 the European Parliament passed a resolution banning the practice.[498] It further placed drones, and

---

[492] Like rendition and extraordinary rendition, there is no international legal definition for this policy, whose terminology was popularized in the early 2000s after Israel made public their use of targeted assassinations against Palestinian terrorists. Only three states are said to employ this policy: the U.S., Russia and Israel. On this see, Philip Alston. *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.* (New York: United Nations, 2010), p. 3.

[493] Jonathan Masters. *Targeted Killings* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013).

[494] Masters, op. cit.

[495] Masters, op. cit.

[496] Masters, op. cit.

[497] Data compiled from *Drones Strikes*, op. cit.

[498] Jessica Elgot. "Illegal Drone Strikes Condemned in Landslide Vote by European Politicians." *Huffington Post* (February 27, 2014).

their use, under the purview of international disarmaments and arms control regimes.[499] And it demanded a total commitment to international humanitarian law and human rights as the cornerstone of all drone-related actions and policies employed by member states.[500] Unlike the U.S., where support for the policy is framed in the context of preventing ground operations and limiting collateral damage, the Europeans generally reject autonomous armed robotic warfare entirely.[501]

Terrorism & Law Enforcement

Differences between the U.S. and its European counterparts exist in their respective domestic policies to fight terrorism. Annegret Bendiek writes the reason, "why the transatlantic partners differ markedly also in their interpretations of threat situations and their choice of measures in the fight against terrorism" is because, "the United States sees itself at war against al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates, whereas the EU and its member states base their counter-terrorism efforts primarily upon policing measures and intelligence services."[502] In this way, Europeans generally prefer a criminal-centric policy for combatting terrorism domestically. By this I mean, EU members depend upon law enforcement and the judicial system in order to arrest, detain, charge, prosecute and imprison terrorists for ordinary criminal offenses, rather than affording them or their crimes any special status. On a supranational level, the work of combatting terrorism falls to EUROPOL and EUROJUST – the EU's law enforcement and judicial authorities. Both agencies are fairly new; EUROPOL was established in 1992 and EUROJUST in 1999 (although it was not operational until 2001). Having had less time to foster a fully developed bureaucratic culture with entrenched missions and policies, these agencies still have a greater degree of flexibility in mandate and policy, which has allowed them to better evolve alongside the threat terrorism.[503] Both EUROPOL and EUROJUST were established as autonomous organizations from the states they serve,

---

[499] *European Parliament on the use of armed drones 2014/2567(RSP).* (Brussels: European Parliament, February 25, 2014).

[500] *European Parliament on the use of armed drones 2014/2567(RSP),* op. cit.

[501] For example, see Betsy Jose. "Bin Laden's targeted killing and emerging norms." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2016), pp. 1-23 and Douglas A. Johnson, Aliberto Mora and Averell Schmidt. "The Strategic Costs of Culture." *Foreign Affairs* (2006)

[502] Notwithstanding pronouncements by French President Francois Hollande noting his country is at war with the terrorists. See, Annegret Bendiek. *At the Limits of the Rule of Law: EU-US Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2011)

[503] Oldrich Bures. "Eurojust's fledging counterterrorism role." *Journal of Contemporary European Research* (2010), p. 241.

providing an opportunity to work outside certain domestic political constraints and influences.[504] Designating EUROPOL as the centralized agency for the management of information and threats assessments, strategic and operational support, as well as rapid emergency response or on site management of terrorist incidents, provides an opportunity for a higher degree of objective analysis among the more 1,200 person staff comprising of 40 different nationalities.[505] It also serves to encourage the 'harmonization' or 'Europeanization' of terrorism policy to allow for a higher degree of cooperation among member states.[506] For example, adopting standard definitions for terrorism and terrorist crimes helps alleviate potential investigatory or prosecutorial misunderstandings when coordinating between a range of national and supranational agencies and government bureaucracies.[507] Conversely, even within the Federal government, the U.S. has different definitions for terrorism; the CIA, FBI, DHS, and DOD each have a distinct version.

Terrorism only recently rose in priority at EUROPOL; In 2016 the agency lists terrorism as the last of 12 operational activates in its mandate.[508] Furthermore Europol did not launch its Counter Terrorism Centre until 2016, highlighting terrorism as generally lacking priority as well as cohesive strategy.[509] The first terrorism policy the EU established after 9/11, for example, called for enhanced judicial and police cooperation; the use of international legal instruments; the end of terrorism funding; the strengthening of air security and the coordination of global action with members states. Unlike the U.S., there was no endorsement of the use of overwhelming force; rather there was a focus on intelligence and information gathering as the necessary means to address the threat.[510]

Although the European authorities typically leave domestic responsibility for anti-terrorist operations to law enforcement, there is a long-established, historical precedent for

---

[504] Tamara D. Madensen. "Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a Global Perspective." *Justice Quarterly* (2006), p. 349.

[505] *Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre Strengthening the European Union's Response To Terror,* op. cit. and *Our People.* (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2016). Accessed August 1, 2016 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/our-people-19.

[506] Rik Coolsaet. "European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera." *International Affairs* (2010), p. 860 and Madensen, op. cit., pp. 351-352

[507] Coolsaet, op. cit., p. 860 and Madensen, pp. 351-352.

[508] See *Mandate.* (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2016). Accessed August 1, 2016 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/mandate-119.

[509] Oldrich Bures. "Europol's fledging Counter-Terrorism Role." *Terrorism & Political Violence* (2008), pp. 500-501 and *Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre Strengthening the European Union's Response to Terror* (The Hague: Europol, January 25, 2016).

[510] Bures (2008), op. cit., p. 501.

the military to play a direct role in national or domestic affairs across the continent in times of crisis. This is exemplified by actions taken by the French, for example, following the wave of terrorist attacks between 2015 and 2016. In lieu of deploying the majority of its forces to fight terrorists overseas, the French government opts to focus on domestic security in its fight against terrorism.[511] Following the 2016 attack in Nice, the French government deployed over 10,000 French troops across the nation, 6,500 of which were stationed in Paris, representing that nation's largest military deployment since World War II.[512] Although, the Europeans have a tradition of military security as a tool of domestic security, U.S. law prevents this. Under the *Posse Comitatus* Act, the military cannot be deployed in the homeland unless decreed by the President in times of grave national crisis, as was the case following the 2001 attacks. Because of this restriction, the U.S. takes the more extreme approach of militarizing its domestic law enforcement agencies at the local, state and Federal level in order to wield a level of force similar to that of the military. Most police departments across the U.S. are now recipients of significant amounts of military tactical gear and weaponry – including military grade weapons, armored personal carriers, and tanks.[513] Much of the supplies comes from 1033 Program, which permits the DOD to distribute excess materials to local and state law enforcement.[514] Distributions have risen in value from approximately $1 million in 1990 to over $450 million by 2013.[515] Since 1997 it is estimated that the program has dispersed $5.4 billion in supplies.[516] The DHS has surpassed the 1033 Program in its efforts to militarize the police.[517] Between 2002 and 2011, the DHS gave $35 billion in grants to police to build their capacity, tapping

---

[511] Frederic Lert. "French military responds to Paris terror attacks." *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly* (November 16, 2015).

[512] Angelique Chrisafis. "Thousands of troops on Paris streets, but are they France's new Maginot line?" *The Guardian* (April 15, 2016) and Oscar Nikala. "France to Station Counterterrorism Force in Burkina Faso." *Defense News* (March 24, 2015).

[513] Radley Backo. *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2014), pp. xi-xii and *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing.* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2014). Also see Matt Apuzzo. "War Gear Flows to Police Departments." *New York Times* (June 8, 2014); Dexter Filkins. "'Do not resist' and the crisis of police militarization." *The New Yorker* (May 13, 2016) and Dennis Wagner. "Ariz. Sherriff ordered to return military goods." *USA Today* (September 14, 2012).

[514] Backo, op. cit.; "How America's police became so heavily armed." *The Economist* (May 18, 2015) and *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing*, op. cit.

[515] "How America's police became so heavily armed," op. cit.

[516] Tom Jackman. "Trump to restore program sending surplus military weapons, equipment to police." *Washington Post* (August 27, 2017).

[517] Backo, op. cit.; "How America's police became so heavily armed," op. cit. and *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing*, op. cit.

into a $19 billion homeland security market that has grown to meet the demand from, in part, this militarization of domestic law enforcement.[518]

When compared to Britain, for example, this response appears extreme. Following a series of attacks by ISIS supporters across London, the government dispatched armed officers, the majority of British police are unarmed, as part of their response.[519] They also increased their engagement with the Muslim community to work with authorities and avoid further alienating them from society.[520] Furthermore, the primary mission of law enforcement has remained, despite these incidents, focused on the preemption and interception of suspects or the potentially radicalized, deterring terrorism as measure of social engagement, rather than by threat of police force or immigration restrictions.[521] Indeed, following the 2016 attacks in France, the general European sentiment was to strengthen gun laws across the EU.[522] The opposite reaction occurred after terrorist attacks involving firearms in the U.S., where intense debate raged between gun rights activists and advocates for more stringent controls on gun sales.[523] This exemplifies, even on a micro level, that material factors appear not to be the most influential in determining the prioritization of threats or necessary policies to confront them.

Terrorism & The Judicial System

A more aggressive approach to combat terrorism is in the application of the European justice system. The EU wields the force of its judicial authority in arresting, charging and prosecuting terrorists to a much larger extent then the U.S. EUROJUST, for example, lists terrorism first under its "core business" (EUROPOL lists it last).[524] This is also illustrated in the rate of prosecution of domestic terrorists in the EU versus the U.S. (see Table 4.9). It is clear from even a small snapshot that the EU places greater authority and dedicates a greater amount of resources for judicial measures in its fight against terrorism. This data further emphasizes the higher level of threat terrorism poses to the EU.

---

[518] Backo, op. cit., p. 254.

[519] Alexis Flynn. "Mass Stabbing Strikes London as U.K. Steps Up Armed Police Force to Prepare for Possible Terror Attacks." *Wall Street Journal* (August 4, 2016).

[520] Rachel Briggs. "Community Engagement for Counter-Terrorism: Lesson From the United Kingdom." *International Affairs* (2010), pp. 971.

[521] Gary Hindle. "Policing Terrorism in the United Kingdom." *Policing* (2007), pp. 38-39.

[522] Gabirela Baczynska. "EU ministers tighten gun controls in wake of terrorist attacks." *Reuters* (June 10, 2016).

[523] Baczynska, op. cit.

[524] See *Core Business.* (The Hague: EUROJUST, 2016). Accessed August 1, 2016 http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/eurojust-core-business.aspx.

**Table 4.9: Number of Terrorism Prosecutions in
the European Union and the United States (2013-2016)** [525]

	2013	2014	2015	2016
United States	269	212	220	259
European Union	848	1,218	1,077	1002

As previously noted, Europeans prefer addressing terrorism through a framework of crime, not war. Therefore, the application of law and order to deter and punish terrorist offenders is a cornerstone of the European anti-terrorism strategy. The French and British exemplify this. Both nation's judicial systems are premised on the belief that terrorists are criminals who can and should be tried by domestic courts for a range of ordinary criminal offenses.[526] Neither believes in affording terrorists or their crimes "special status" and therefore both avoid creating "exceptional legislation."[527] As Charles Rault writes, the French believe it only serves to elevate terrorists and legitimize their narrative; a critical point in their opposition to the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.[528] Instead human rights and international legal instruments inform judicial proceedings.[529] Conversely, the U.S. basis much of its anti-terrorism strategy on exceptional legislation and extrajudicial action. This is best illustrated by Guantanamo Bay; the use of enhanced interrogation techniques in Afghan detention centers (and beyond); the creation of a 'non-combatant' legal designation for terrorists in order to bypass the Geneva Accords; and the establishment of military tribunals to prosecute terrorists.

A second example of judicial measures to combat terrorism is domestic national security legislation. And again, there exists a significant disparity between America's extreme approach and the European's more proportional one. On a macro level, after 9/11 the U.S. underwent a major legislative overhaul, vastly increasing the capacity of the state to access the resources and information it would require in the intelligence war against al Qaeda and its

---

[525] *2015 Sees Dramatic Spike in Islamic Extremism Arrests.* (New York: Anti-Defamation League, April 27, 2015); *Domestic Terrorism Prosecutions Outnumber International* (Syracuse: TRAC Reports, 2017). Accessed November 17, 2017 http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/481; Ellen Nakashima. "At least 60 people charged with terrorism-linked crimes this year – a record." *Washington Post* (December 25, 2015); *Global Terrorism Database.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism). Accessed July 31, 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; *TE-SAT 2013: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, op. cit.; *TE-SAT 2014: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol, 2014); *TE-SAT 2016: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, op. cit. and *TE-SAT 2017: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,* op. cit.

[526] Susan Hemming. "The practical application of counter-terrorism legislation in England and Wales: A prosecutor's perspective." *International Affairs* (2010), pp. 955 and Rault, op. cit.

[527] Hemming, op. cit., p. 955.

[528] Rault, op. cit. Also see Laura Pitter. "The Dangers of Guantanamo." *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

[529] Hemming, op. cit., p. 955.

affiliates. This included a large increase in the government capacity to obtain the private information of citizens and monitor them, their family members, co-workers, co-religionists, and associates. The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and its associated amendments is indicative of this. And wherein Americans traditionally prize their privacy as a fundamental and inalienable right, they have (as evidenced by the array of classified information revealed by a series of whistleblowers over the past decade) permitted the U.S. government to fundamentally alter the relationship between citizen and state to defend against terrorism.[530]

The same cannot be said of Europe. For example, Europeans have been far more protective of dating sharing in the digital age – even within and among EU members - believing sovereign rights and citizen privacy is a cornerstone of human rights.[531] The best example of this is the passage of the EU Data Protection Reform regulations which emerged in reaction to the 2014 court case by a Spanish citizen against Google.[532] European's complex data protection rules now force companies operating in member states, but who servers are located outside the EU, to still comply with EU regulations on data privacy, breaches and government age restrictions for social media.[533] It also permits individuals the 'right to be forgotten' or the right to erasure of information resulting from search engine queries which are 'inadequate,' 'irrelevant' or 'excessive.'[534] Conversely, the U.S., in the aftermath of 9/11, was quicker to abrogate human rights to defend the population as evidence by the abuses of the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT, revealed in the wake of a series of major intelligence leaks since 2006.[535] And even in Britain, where the mass deployment of surveillance cameras is now the norm, it has not so significantly altered their laws as to permit the widespread abuses seen in the U.S. war on terrorism, at home or overseas. As Susan Hemming writes, the British believe that

---

[530] For example, see Kathleen Hicks. "Keeping America's Principles in the Age of Terrorism." *The Atlantic* (August 17, 2016).

[531] Bures (2010), op. cit., p. 244 and Maiade La Baume and Giulia Paravicini. "Europe's Intelligence 'Black Hole.'" *Politico* (December 8, 2015), p. 244.

[532] *Factsheet on the 'Right to be Forgotten' ruling (C-131/12).* (Brussels: European Commission, 2014); David Gilbert. "Europe's sweeping data privacy reforms put Google, Facebook and Apple in regulatory crosshairs." *International Business Times* (December 16, 2015); *Google Transparency Report: Frequently Asked Questions* (Mountain View: Google, 2014). Accessed October 1, 2016 https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms and Mark Scott. "European tried to reign in Google. It backfired." *New York Times* (April 18, 2016).

[533] *Factsheet on the 'Right to be Forgotten' ruling (C-131/12)*, op. cit.; Gilbert, op. cit.; *Google Transparency Report: Frequently Asked Questions*, op. cit. and Scott, op. cit.

[534] *Factsheet on the 'Right to be Forgotten' ruling (C-131/12)*, op. cit.; Gilbert, op. cit.; *Google Transparency Report: Frequently Asked Questions*, op. cit. and Scott, op. cit.

[535] For example, see Antony Field. "The Dynamics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Domestic Security Dilemma." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2016), pp. 1-14.

"draconian policies" have long term negative ramifications.[536] Looking at the British Terrorism Act of 2006, limitations on these "draconian polices" is evident; even the more far wielding clauses only slightly increase the capacity of the government to prosecute an individual actively planning terrorism or the number of days a suspect can be detained, extending detention from 14 to 28 days. The legislation does not permit extrajudicial practices; non-jurisdictional prison camps; new legal designation for terrorists or their offences; nor the vast intrusion by authorities into the lives of UK citizens.[537] This is also true of the French, who like the British, increased security measures proportionally – providing wider latitude to arrest or prosecute individuals charged with intention to commit a crime, or being associated with a group or individual intending to commit a crime.[538] Efforts were made to increase surveillance and protect counter-terrorism intelligence sources, while providing greater latitude to undercover counter-terrorism agents.[539] But the French maintain a firm commitment to intelligence gathering, information sharing, and education for preemption as well as human, civil and international rights and laws as the cornerstone of the its counter-terrorism strategy.[540]

If systemic shifts in the character of threats were the best hypothesis, terrorism would be differently prioritized. Although terrorism poses a threat to the U.S., it is not existential. Wherein it might damage U.S. prestige, it does not portend its hegemony in the world. And without discounting the death and destruction it causes, and the expense of blood and treasure combatting it, terrorism does not fundamentally undermine the integrity of the U.S. system, its 'enduring institutions' nor its 'way of life.' Having therefore illustrated the lack of explanatory power of systemic shifts, I now turn to the second hypothesis: the prioritization of terrorism is a result of the powerful impact of political culture and bureaucratic institutions.

TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

I will now assess whether the discrepancies presented in the four examples in the previous section are better explained by a Cultural-Institutional hypothesis. I argue that political culture and related institutional biases (in the context of discourse, strategy and expenditures) best explain the prioritization of specific threats to the U.S. As noted in the beginning of this

---

[536] Hemming, op. cit., p. 956.
[537] Hemming, op. cit., p. 965.
[538] Rault, op. cit.
[539] Rault, op. cit.
[540] Rault, op. cit.

chapter, terrorism ranks as a high-level priority. This is characterized by a series of specific features including: a high-level budgetary commitment; a preference for subjugating (i.e. overwhelming force) strategies to confront the threat; and the prevalence of 'crisis discourse' as the defining feature of the official threat narrative (see Table 4.1). Crisis discourse is defined by a dominate narrative and elevated discourse inflates prioritization while bureaucratic bias institutionalizes a narrative in the form of a policy. Endemic over-prioritization perpetuates institutional bias. Policy prejudice feeds back into the elevated threat narrative creating a cycle of inflated prioritization. Alternative narratives are unable to challenge the legitimacy of crisis discourse. A lack of contestation effects policy allowing the dominate narrative to define the threat. Cohesive discourse provides little opportunity for the inclusion of alternative policy in threat assessment debates, constraining policy preferences. The prevalence of a dominate discourse ensures policy preferences are maintained, regardless of failure to achieve desired outcomes. The role of crisis discourses, and its effects on prioritization and policy will be the focus of the next section.

Discourse

A Cultural-Institutional explanation posits threat prioritization can be understood as a measure of the discourse, or how a threat is framed. Political culture is critical in shaping the discourse, which in turn helps shape priorities. Meanwhile bureaucracies (and their inherent biases) play an essential role institutionalizing priorities into policy. For example, Jackson notes that in the case of 9/11, despite "what the 'facts' were (hijacked planes that crashed into prominent buildings which subsequently were destroyed) – it was far from obvious what these events meant or signified."[541] He writes, "the language used to explain these attacks was not a neutral or inevitable interpretation of what happened: rather, it worked to enforce a particular understanding or reading of the political, military, cultural meaning of the attacks." This language, Jackson continues, would "justify and normalize the military response at the heart of the 'war on terrorism.'" [542] He points out, "politically driven narrative," is created to "dominate public interpretation of the events… and give meaning to the events and answer all the questions."[543] Writing of this phenomenon, Chin-Kuei Tsui notes, "the central core of

---

[541] Jackson (2005), op. cit., p. 29.
[542] Jackson (2005), op. cit., p. 29.
[543] Jackson (2005), op. cit., p. 29.

terrorism and counterterrorism discourse is the interpretation of threat, danger and uncertainty. Political elites also emphasize, and frequently claim, that terrorist violence is sudden, dramatic and threatening, thus requiring urgent action."[544] He adds, "some would question whether the threat posed by terrorism really is as dangerous as officials assert. It is argued that the danger and threat stressed by politicians is not actually an objective condition; instead, it is defined, articulated and socially constructed by authorized actors."[545] Tsui concludes, "danger and threat are not things that exist independently; rather, they become 'reality' by the way in which people analyze them and consider them to be urgent and imminent. Our perception of threats, crises and risks is introduced through a series of interpretations, and as a result, is largely a product of social construction.[546]

Expanding line of reasoning, Paul R. Pillar explains social constructions are deeply embedded in the government's conception of non-state actors, representing, "a long-standing American worldview and American habits of conceiving the U.S. role in global affairs than they are characteristic of the threats themselves."[547] He determines, "there is a disconnect between how the threats are usually treated in U.S. debates and how much of a danger they actually pose to the U.S. interests. The disconnect is more often in the direction of threats being overrated."[548] National security officials tend to ignore evidence contrary to their perception of terrorism because, Fettweis points out, it "conflict[s] with their preexisting beliefs about the ubiquity and danger of the threat."[549] He adds the threat posed by terrorism, "is a chronic rather than a life-threatening condition, one that causes problems and needs constant attention but will not prove fatal. Its practitioners can kill people and scare many more, but the localized damage they can cause is incapable of changing the character of Western civilization. Only the people of the West, largely through their own fear and overreaction, can accomplish that."[550] In this way, we see the power of political culture

---

[544] Chin-Kuei Tsui. "Framing the threat of catastrophic terrorism: Genealogy, discourse and President Clinton's counterterrorism approach." *International Politics* (2015), p. 67.

[545] Tsui, op. cit., p. 67.

[546] Tsui, op. cit., p. 67.

[547] Paul R. Pillar. "The American Perception of Substate Threats" in (eds.) Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller, *A Dangerous World: Threat perception And U.S. National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2014), p. 60.

[548] Pillar (2014), op. cit., p. 66. Also see and Annie S. Kennelly. "Terror of the talk: a new framework for countering terrorism within the institutionalization of the terrorism industry." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2014), p. 465; Jessica Stern. "POV: Is the War on Terrorism Really Winnable?" *BU Today* (September 9, 2016) and Greg Toppo. "Expert: Terrorism frightens us 'far out of proportion to actual risk." *USA Today* (September 21, 2016).

[549] Fettweis (2013), op. cit., p. 40.

[550] Fettweis (2013), op. cit., p. 43.

effecting threat prioritization and as a result, policy. This is critical in understanding differences in prioritization and policy between the U.S. and the EU.

This difference in strategy are obvious when examining each nation's counterterrorism policy. The U.S. defines its strategy as "defeat, deny, diminish and defend," while the EU defines its strategy as "prevent, protect, pursue and prepare (respond)."[551] David T. Armitage notes, the US approach to terrorism is about war, external force projection and proactive measures, wherein the EU's is about crime and law enforcement, internal security maintenance and reactive measures.[552] This results, Shapiro notes, because the EU and U.S. "filter the problem of terrorism through very different institutional and historical lenses."[553] These lenses, or frames, are a determining factor in the prioritization of threats to U.S. national security, because they serve as the filter for prioritizing threats in the context of a distinctly American political culture.

Jackson writes, "linking foreign policy explicitly to the national identity is a prevalent and powerful political manoeuvre [*sic*]."[554] Examples in the U.S. context abound. Following the attacks of 9/11, Bush declared, "civilization itself, the civilization we share, is threatened" by terrorism.[555] In a speech before Congress on September 21, 2001, Bush stated targeting the World Trade Center was an attack on, "a symbol of American prosperity."[556] In his 2002 *National Security Strategy*, Bush noted, "the characteristics we most cherish - our freedom, our cities, our systems of movement, and modern life - are vulnerable to terrorism."[557] Widening the discursive parameters of the threat a few months later – creating a context for the execution of U.S. policy on a global scale – Bush declared, "this is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom."[558]

---

[551] David T. Armitage. *US and EU Efforts to Fight Terrorism: Same Ends, Different Means – Or Same Means, Different Ends.* (Montreal: European Union Studies Association Conference, May 17-18, 2007), p. 4.

[552] Armitage, op. cit., pp. 6-11.

[553] Jeremy Shapiro. "Where You Stand Depends on Where You Get Hit: US and European Counterterrorism Strategies." (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005).

[554] Holland (2013), op. cit., p. 39.

[555] George W. Bush. *Address to the United Nations General Assembly.* (New York: United Nations, November 10, 2011).

[556] George W. Bush. *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Capital, September 20, 2001).

[557] *National Security Strategy* (2002), op. cit.

[558] Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,* op. cit.

This type of elevated rhetoric, what this research labels crisis discourse, drives a form of policy resulting in a reliance on the overwhelming use of force. Hamed Mousavi points out the Bush administration employed crisis discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 in order to create, "overwhelming support for measures, to combat terrorism in 'whatever form necessary.'[559] And as Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz write, the war in Iraq was, "made possible by the effective fixing of the meaning of September 11 in terms of the War on Terror" using hegemonic, dominate discourses, or what the authors label, "rhetorical coercion – a strategy that seeks to rhetorically constrain political opponents and maneuver them into public assent to one's preferred team and ideally to one's policy stance."[560] This discursive strategy is successful because, "organizing discourses not only open political possibilities as constructivist often emphasize, but also discipline and repress, narrowing the space for contestation."[561] Examining a spectrum of public opinion data in the aftermath of 9/11, Mousavi finds a statistical correlation between increasing personal anxiety and fear, increasing levels of media consumption and support for what he calls, "hawkish foreign policy interventions in an American public who traditionally had held isolationist views towards foreign policy."[562] This view was also reflected in the interviews conducted for this dissertation. As one bureaucrat commented, terrorism is a priority because of "perception of threat" and the "gaps" that exist between perception and reality.[563] The subject noted, "terrorist attacks have tendency to traumatize the country. They also have an inordinate amount of media attention because their shock values. So, terrorism is a high priority for the federal government, the threats might be a little higher than it should be because of its traumatic perception of terrorism."[564] This is evident in how the government, another bureaucrat noted, has "a habit of lumping everything together."[565] The subject added, "a protest in Nigeria in the name of Boko Haram is seen as a threat to the U.S., but we are not going to end all political violence worldwide. So, the question is how do you define the threat of political violence from non-state actors?"[566]

---

[559] Hamed Mousavi. "American Militarism in the Post 9/11 Era: A New Phenomenon or the Continuation of a Military Tradition." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* (2014), p. 10.
[560] Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz. "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion and the Road to War in Iraq." *Security Studies* (2007), p. 412.
[561] Krebs and Lobasz, op. cit., p. 414.
[562] Mousavi, op. cit., p. 12.
[563] Interview with Subject 10, op. cit.
[564] Interview with Subject 10, op. cit.
[565] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[566] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.

Armitage writes that the combination of "bureaucratic, cultural and tactical differences" - a result of "different histories, legal traditions, perceptions of the cause" - play a critical role in the differing approaches to terrorism.[567] It is this collective European identity, he writes, that "exerts a systematic yet contingent influence on its foreign policy."[568] This is particularly apparent with terrorism wherein the U.S. government has chosen a discourse of war to frame the threat. When employing certain discursive practices designed to raise the level of prioritization a threat poses to U.S. national security, it is often defined in the context of war.[569] When depicting a threat in the context of war, the policy options are narrowed almost exclusively to the use of force. As the Center for a New American Security noted, "policymakers go to great lengths to persuade the American public about the wisdom of proposed uses of force they believe necessary and the folly of others they deem unnecessary."[570] This is certainly the case for terrorism, against which war was first declared by Bush just nine days after the 2001 attack.[571] Even five years later, wartime rhetoric emphasizing the use of force remained strong. In a 2007 State of the Union address, Bush stated, "America is still a nation at war. In the mind of the terrorist, this war began will before September 11, and will not end until their radical vision is September the 11, and will not end until their radical vision is fulfilled."[572] But, French President Hollande, serving as a comparative example, only declared terrorism as an "act of war" for the first time in November 2015, and only after having endured a series of increasingly lethal attacks since 2012. And although France did engage in limited military operations in Africa and the Middle East between 2011 and 2016, these operations occurred gradually and in direct response to the attacks launched by Islamists in the French homeland.

There can be little doubt the French and American discourse has begun to converge, and as a result, so has French and U.S. policy. But distinctions remain: the time frame in which policy emerged and was executed, the extent of operations conducted, and the level of

---

[567] Armitage, op. cit., pp. 1-3.

[568] Kai Hebel and Tobias Lenz. "The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy." *Journal of European Public Policy* (2015), p. 1.

[569] Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker. "U.S. Officials Retool Slogan for Terror War." *New York Times* (July 26, 2005) and Wojtek Mackiewicz Wolf. *Winning the War of Words: Selling the War on Terror From Afghanistan to Iraq.* (Praeger Security International, 2008).

[570] Jim Golby, Kyle Dropp and Peter Feaver. *Listening to the Generals: How Military Advice Affects Public Support for the Use of Force.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security), p. 5.

[571] Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,* op. cit.

[572] George W. Bush. *State of the Union Address to 110th Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Capital, January 23, 2007).

resources allocated. The reaction to terrorism, the development of discourse, and the implementation of policy occurred at a much slower pace in France then the U.S., who launched two major ground offensives in two countries following 9/11. When considering the limited scope of counterterrorist operations pursued by the French, the disparity is apparent. And when considering the French confront a much higher threat from terrorism, I posit these differences are in large measure a result of the distinct narrative that emerge from the U.S. and France, in specific, but also the EU more generally.

For example, when one reviews comments by Prime Minister Tony Blair in the aftermath of the 2005 London Bombings versus those of Bush's to Congress after 9/11 a distinctly different tone emerges.[573] Although the two leaders broach similar thematic points, the overall interpretation of threat, and the manner in which it is portrayed, differs. Using binary terminology like good and evil in the discourse is exemplary of this. When invoking "evil" in terms of the threat posed by terrorism, Bush implies not only is the ideology evil but those embracing it are as well. Blair employed a different narrative, identifying only the ideology of Islamism as evil, absolving those involved from being evil themselves. Blair also maintained a global emphasis when discussing the threat and its root causes, highlighting not the policies of the British people as a source of their victimization, but rather ongoing conflicts (like the status of a Palestinian state) and endemic structural issues (such as poverty, development and authoritarianism). Although Blair did declare that Islamism must be defeated, he neither called for (more) war, nor did he make demands on the terrorists themselves. Conversely, Bush drew direct parallels between the nature of the American democratic system and its way of life as being, to a large degree, the root cause of the 2001 terrorist attack. Bush furthermore used the word "war" in the context of the threat of terrorism almost 10 times in his remarks; Blair made no mention of the word in his. The British approach specifically, and the European approach broadly is a result of is de-emphasis of the types of themes invoked by the U.S. This is in line with the EU's commitment to pursuing "non-emotive" lexicon for discussing the threat of terrorism.[574] This does not imply a total exclusion of such policies by the British, but it does imply that bureaucratic bias, which exists within the structure any government, is not activated in the same way as the U.S. Therefore, prioritization

---

[573] The two speeches examined in the following section include Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107ᵗʰ Congress*, op cit. and Tony Blair. *Speech on the London Bombings at the National Labour Conference.* (London, July 16, 2005).
[574] *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (2005, op. cit.)

and policy preferences are less prone to the dictates of a pre-established political culture. I therefore posit, as Stuart Croft and Cerwyn Moore write, "the 'war on terror' was a deliberate political choice."[575]

The rhetoric of war has other effects on policy. The use of such tactics as targeted assassination, or rendition - despite America's commitment to human rights, the rule of law, and due process - further illustrates the way in which conformity to this dominate narrative effects policy options.[576] Terrorism demands extreme measures and subjugating policies, to confront what is perceived as an existential threat. And sometimes even traditional warfare is perceived as inadequate in the face of an 'existential' crises. Indeed, the "rhetoric of terrorism" has so effectively placed those designated individual or groups, "outside the norms of acceptable social and political behavior," writes Tomis Kapitan, that it creates a set of discursive rules that result in tangible effects.[577] And, "it paves the way for the use of force making it easier for a government to exploit the fears of citizens and ignore objections to the manner in which it responds to terrorist violence."[578] This is best illustrated in the U.S. government creating a of a separate "legal" discourse for terrorists. The invention and application of the term 'unlawful combatants,' for example, was used to create an opportunity to prosecute terrorists by military commission, rather than through the U.S. judicial system, by designating them as 'outside' the law. This, despite the existence of the Geneva Accords (and other international legal instruments governing the rules of war) as well as the strength of U.S. judicial system – both which have proven themselves capable of addressing the detention and prosecution of terrorists.[579]

Under Obama, there appears to have been an attempt to widen potential policy options beyond subjugation (to include a greater emphasis on mitigation and/or arbitration strategies), although at no point has the administration fully retracted or repealed a discourse of war. And despite a stated desire to employ alterative policy solutions, little tangible change has occurred. And in some cases, as Maria Ryan points out, there has been an escalation of policies put in

---

[575] Stuart Croft and Cerwyn Moore. "The evolution of threat narratives in the age of terrorist: understanding terrorist threat in Britain." *International Affairs* (2010), p. 821.

[576] On this see Jared Del Rosso. *Talking About Torture: How Political Discourse Shapes the Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).

[577] Tomis Kapitan. "The Reign of 'Terror.'" *The New York Times* (October 14, 2014).

[578] Kapitan, op. cit.

[579] For example, Ramzi Yousef, the "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman and their terrorist associates were arrested, tried and incarcerated after the first World Trade Center bombing.

place by Bush – like targeted drone strikes.[580] Or how Obama vastly increased the scope of the war's frontlines by sending Special Operations Forces into 150 different countries to pursue terrorists between 2011 and 2014.[581] Despite Obama's general, although not totally exclusive, lack of employing crisis discourse and other heightened rhetorical devices in regards to terrorism (particularly in his avoidance of the term in speeches and other public statements) the perception of terrorism as existential remains nonetheless.[582]

Without discounting these, and a handful of other aberrations, and notwithstanding the perception that the Obama administration attempted to end the war on terrorism rhetorically and strategically, he has upheld much of the same legitimizing discourse established by Bush.[583] As a result, the policies used to confront terrorism have remained largely in place.[584] After a review of the major speeches and statements by Bush and Obama on terrorism, Andrew Pilecki et. al. notes that "despite notable statements to the contrary, President Obama largely maintained the war-on-terrorism discourse that emerged during the Bush administration."[585] They attribute this to both the naturalization of post-9/11 terrorism discourse and the fact "partisan differences in moral discourses are less likely to emerge a priority in presidential rhetoric on policy matters."[586] Holland extends this reasoning and declares Obama a "victim of dominant discourses" due to a "kind of cultural cohesion. With the narrative deck stacked against the possibility of achieving greater change in American foreign and security policy."[587] This is because, as Stephan Walt writes, "the main reason so many people stay afraid is that fear is good for the people who purvey it, and so they work hard to instill fear in the rest of us. Fear is what keeps the United States spending more on

---

[580] Cronin, op. cit., pp. 852-855; Maria Ryan. "'War in countries we are not at war with': The 'war on terror' on the periphery from Bush to Obama." *International Politics* (2011), pp. 364-389 and Charlie Savage. *Power Wars: Inside Obama's Post-9/11 Presidency* (Boston: Little. Brown and Company, 2015).

[581] Nick Turse. "The Golden Age of Black Ops." *TomDispatch.com* (January 20, 2015). Accessed October 13, 2015 http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175945/tomgram:_nick_turse,_a_shadow_war_in_150_countries.

[582] For example, the word terror/terrorism appears 227 times in the two *National Security Strategy* documents released under the Bush administration (84 times in 2002 and 143 times in 2006). It appears just 96 times in the two released by Obama (59 times in 2010 and 37 times in 2015), representing less than half as many mentions as his predecessor.

[583] For an in depth look at what remains the same and what has changed from Bush to Obama see Jessica Stern. "Obama and Terrorism: Like it or Not, the War Goes On." *Foreign Affairs* (2015).

[584] Greg Jaffe. "Hope fades on Obama's vow to bring troops home before presidency ends." *Washington Post* (October 12, 2015) and Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt. "Obama's 'Boots on the Ground': U.S. Special Forces Are Sent to Tackle Global Threats." *New York Times* (December 27, 2015).

[585] Andrew Pilecki, et, al. "Moral Exclusion and the Justification of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Bush, Obama, and the Terrorist Enemy Figure." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology.* (2014), p. 294.

[586] Pilecki, et. al., op. cit., p. 294.

[587] Holland (2014), op. cit., p. 3.

defense than the next dozen states *combined*. Fear is what gets politicians elected, fear is what justifies preventive wars, excessive government secrecy, covert surveillance, and targeted killings."[588] I therefore post the naturalization or institutionalization of a specific discourse, in the case of terrorism this being 'crisis' discourse, lends to the creation subjugating policy. How this policy emerges will be explored in the following section.

Strategy

The U.S. strategy to combat terrorism is reflected in the many aforementioned discursive elements presented above. This implies how a threat is framed by the U.S. has critical implications for prioritization and policy. In the case of terrorism, despite acknowledging that the U.S. would direct every resource at its command (including diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial influence) the consistent focus on employing "weapons of war" remained the dominant discursive theme.[589] A solution (in the form of a prominent military response and the use of overwhelming force) was laid with preparatory statements in the days following the attacks. For example, Bush remarked, "Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen," and he assured them that the Armed Forces are "powerful" and "prepared" and ready "to act" against the threat.[590] As Annita Lazar and Michelle M. Lazar write, "just as the discourse of right is premised upon the legitimate requirement of obedience and conformity to the social order, it invests authority structures with the legitimate right to pursue and punish offenders."[591]

In order to invest authority into these structures, terrorism as a unique or exceptional threat – therefore demands a unique and exceptional response. In the context of bureaucratization, and in the specific case of terrorism, the U.S. undertook a far-reaching overhaul of the national security structure. The result was, as Vice President Richard Cheney noted, "the largest reorganization of the federal government since the Truman years."[592] The appointment of a Director of National intelligence (DNI) to oversee the many intelligence

---

[588] Walt (2015), op. cit.
[589] Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,* op. cit.
[590] Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,* op. cit. and Bush, *Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks*, op. cit.
[591] Annita Lazar and Michelle M. Lazar. "Enforcing justice, justifying force: America's justification of violence in the New World Order" in (eds.) Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep's *Discourse, War and Terrorism* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2007), p. 51.
[592] Richard Cheney. *Remarks at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.* (Beverley Hills: Beverley Hilton Hotel, January 15, 2004).

agencies across the many national security bureaucracies and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security to direct those agencies operating domestically, were the most critical changes. But this attempt to centralize power, responsibility and intelligence only added layers to a pre-existing and complex national security structure inadequately designed and prepared to respond to a non-state actor threat at the scale and scope which terrorism presented itself in 2001. Compared to the French, the U.S. approach appears ad-hoc, excessive and unwieldy. The French bureaucratic structure is highly centralized, and therefore presents less opportunity for rivalry between agencies.[593] Designating a small group of national security directors with near total control over a mostly secretive process frees the group from many external influences.[594] This creates a unique bureaucratic structure where threats are assessed and addressed in an efficient and streamlined manner.[595] The core tenants of centralization and secrecy are unique to the French, as are comparative attributes previously discussed in regards to the U.S. As a result, the French bureaucratic culture creates its own distinct set of norms which have evolved to be mostly not-reliant on the use of overwhelming force to address threats like terrorism. This is informed in part, as previously noted, by their particular historical experience with force in the context of terrorism.

A preference for the use of force at home and abroad is evident in U.S. policies to combat terrorism. While other countries pursue restrained military operations, a focus on domestic law enforcement strategies, and support judicial actions while treating terrorism as an ordinary crime, the U.S. continues to emphasize more extreme strategies. It is therefore interesting to note that although the CIA was the agency of choice for survey respondents, the DOD still plays the primary role in fighting terrorism (see Table 4.3). Not even a major overhaul by the U.S. of its national security bureaucracy affected this preference. In fact, as the survey revealed, the DHS was the fourth overall choice selected by respondents as the agency best equipped to handle terrorism, following more traditional national security agencies, including the CIA, DOD and FBI respectively (see Table 4.3). Survey respondents on average also preferred the use of limited force as their policy preference to combat terrorism (see Figure 4.2). It is therefore consistent with the expectations of bias that survey respondents also indicated a belief that the CIA generally (and outside the context of any

---

[593] Steven Erlanger. "Fighting Terrorism, French-Style." *New York Times* (March 30, 2012) and Rault, op. cit.

[594] Erlanger, op. cit., and Rault, op. cit.

[595] Erlanger, op. cit., and Rault, op. cit.

specific threat) is inclined towards a policy of limited force when executing any given policy. When asked which policy each agency has a preference for, outside the context of any specific threat, survey respondents overwhelmingly selected the use of limited force for the CIA (see Table 4.10).

Table 4.10: Preferred Policy of the Central Intelligence Agency

	Over-whelming Use of Force	Limited Use of Force	Economic Incentives	Diplomatic Engagement	Sanctions	No Policy	Do Not Know	Total
Politician	11.11	77.78	0.00	11.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	**100**
Bureaucrat	0.00	68.42	0.00	21.05	0.00	10.53	0.00	**100**
Military	0.00	70.00	0.00	10.00	0.00	15.00	5.00	**100**
Media	6.67	60.00	6.67	6.67	0.00	6.67	13.33	**100**
Civil Society	11.11	66.67	0.00	22.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	**100**
Academia/ Think Tank	9.09	27.27	0.00	13.64	4.55	18.18	27.27	**100**

Despite expressing a preference for the CIA to combat terrorism through limited force, and a perceived bias within the CIA to use limited force (as expressed by survey respondents in Table 4.10), this is not what results. As will be illustrated again in the case study on the geopolitics of the Arctic, discrepancies can exist between the collected data, which represents an opinion of preference, and the reality of how the threat is actually addressed by the government. I posit this serves to further support the underlying premise of the Cultural-Institutional Hypothesis. By which I mean, despite wanting the CIA to lead the fight, the DOD is still the agency tasked with the primary responsibility of doing so. In the context of high-level threats, the U.S. dependence on force (as an option of first and last resort) undermines alternative agencies and courses of action from rising in prominence (as they have in Europe). The use of subjugating policies by the DOD occurs regardless of its merit in application or its prior failure to achieve U.S. goals.

If political culture drives elevated discourse, and bureaucracy institutionalizes bias as policy, this demonstrates even minimal shifts in strategy are difficult to achieve in the case of high level threats like terrorism. The gap between perception and reality is illustrated by the discrepancy between expressed preferences when compared to the actual implementation. This illustrates how resulting policies solutions are driven by subjective prioritization, and not necessarily objective, material factors. How budgets are therefore allocated to support the execution of these skewed policies, will be the focus of the following section.

Expenditures

As Egan writes, "the fear-industrial complex continues to dominate national priorities," fostering, "huge structural changes in American society, and a lock-hold on the federal budget [which] has grown more outsized and out of proportion to the actual threat."[596] When political culture comes to bear on institutions and threat prioritization is transformed into policy outcomes, budgets provide a tangible measure of priorities and preferences. Budgetary allocations for fighting terrorism are exorbitant. The U.S spends approximately $10 million a day in the war on terrorism while Americans themselves, as Jackson writes, continue to be a people living in a state of 'ontological hysteria' – a nation constantly anticipating the next attack, 'waiting for terror.'"[597] Meanwhile, any number of other threats to the average citizen are far more likely to occur. For example, in 2014 the McKinsey Global Institute reported that obesity or smoking costs as much as fighting terrorism, armed violence and war combined, estimated at approximately $21 trillion annually.[598] But unlike terrorism, threats to the health of Americans remain largely unaddressed by the government (as will be further illustrated in the following case study on narco-trafficking). Americans are far more likely to die from, but spend far less on cures or preventative measures for, skin cancer, heart disease, respiratory diseases, strokes, distracted drivers, Alzheimer's or food borne illnesses.[599] They are also far more likely to die from gun violence then terrorism.[600] Yet according to a 2015 *New York Times/CBS News* poll approximately 60 percent of Americans worry about being a victim of a homeland terrorist attacks while only 23 percent worry about being a victim of a mass shooting.[601] A 2016 Chapman University Survey of American fears reports similar findings. Those surveyed ranked terrorism (41 percent) second of 10 fears, and mass shootings

---

[596] Egan, op. cit.

[597] Similar to the concept of crisis discourse as presented by this research, Jackson attributes this state of being to the "discourse of danger so carefully constructed by the authorities… [it] is the 'reality effect' of the language." See, Gordon Adams. "Pentagon Estimates Cost of Fighting ISIS Up To $10 Million Per Day." *WBUR* (September 29, 2014); Jackson (2005), op. cit., p. 118; Edwin Rios. "Charts: Here's How Much We're Spending on the War Against ISIS." *Mother Jones* (June 14, 2015) and Rebecca Shabad. "US spending $9M a day in ISIS fight." *The Hill.* (June 11, 2015).

[598] *Overcoming obesity: An initial economic analysis* (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2014).

[599] Egan, op. cit. On this also see Peter Ludlow. "Fifty States of Fear." *The New York Times* (2014) and Paul Waldman. "The Islamic State isn't actually much of a threat to the United States." *Washington Post* (March 20, 2015). For an interesting overview of comparative expenditures and number of deaths from threats confronting Americans, see John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart. "Responsible Counterterrorism." *Policy Analysis* (2014).

[600] Philip Bump. "Oregon shooting: Figures reveal that guns kill more Americans then terrorism." *The Independent* (October 2, 2015).

[601] Giovanni Russonello. "Poll Watch: American Fear More Terrorist Attacks but Have Mixed Views on Gun Control." *New York Times* (December 17, 2015).

fourth 38.5 percent).[602] This despite the fact that guns killed 301,797 people between 2005-2015, making a gun-related death 3,210 times more likely than death from a terrorist attack.[603] There is, as Fettweis notes, "a disconnect between that low level of threat and high level of threat perception among leaders and the public alike. A foreign policy pathology is present, one with important, deleterious implications for the decisions made by the United States."[604]

As a final result of the narrow policy options and bureaucratic bias, there is a need for, in the case of terrorism, inflated budgetary commitments to execute policy. Political culture expressed by discourse (in official threat assessments, speeches, interview and other public appearances by elected officials and bureaucrats) sets the level of prioritization, and priorities dictate budgets.[605] The enormous budgetary commitment invested into the war on terrorism, as well as counterterrorist efforts in the homeland, are massive in proportion and have remained at elevated levels for almost two decades. For example, in his 2002 State of the Union address (just six month after the 9/11), Bush noted that the government had spent more than one billion dollars, over $30 million dollars a day, fighting the newly declared war.[606] He stated, "my budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades – because while the price of freedom and security is high – it is never too high.[607] Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay." And despite Obama's promises to decrease spending, budgets remained largely (though no exclusively) in place. For example, in 2015 the government gave out $1.6 billion in federal counterterrorism grants while simultaneously spending an additional $3 billion on offensive measures in the war against ISIS – costing a

---

[602] Those surveyed ranked government corruption (60.6 percent) first and not having enough money (39.9 percent) third. See, *What Do Americans Fear?* (Orange: Chapman University, 2016).

[603] Jenny Anderson. "The psychology of why 94 deaths from terrorism are scarier than 301,797 deaths from guns." *Quartz* (January 31, 2017); Linda Qiu. "Fact-checking a comparison of gun death and terrorism death." *Politifact* (October 5, 2015) and *What is the Threat to the United States Today* (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 2017).

[604] Fettweis (2013), op. cit., p. 51.

[605] Prioritization levels and their relationships to budgets are best reflected in a comment by a senior defense official in a 2015 article in *The Daily Beast:* "the administration thinks the ranking of threats is not the most productive devise a strategy. But we are saying, 'How else do we allocate increasingly limited resources?'" See, Youssef and Schactman, op. cit. Also see Rachel Rizzo. "Congress' Flabby Defense Budgets Aren't Entirely Lawmakers' Fault." *Defense One* (April 26, 2015).

[606] Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,* op. cit.

[606] Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,* op. cit.

[607] Bush, *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,* op. cit.

total of $250 million a month.[608] And while Obama decreased certain spending measures in Bush's terrorism war, he increased funding for emerging terrorist threats in Syria and Africa.

As John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart note, resources dedicated to thwarting terrorism vastly outweigh the damage terrorism causes, even when taking into account the attacks of 9/11.[609] For example, between 2001 and 2012, approximately 25,000 people died from Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide, a far smaller number of fatalities than posed by many common diseases.[610] And despite the number of attacks and fatalities increasing since 2014, Annie S. Kennelly notes, there has been an overall decline in the number of terrorist attacks over the last thirty years. Yet the fear of, and spending on, terrorism is as high as ever.[611] This fear, Kennelly writes, "is therefore not statistically correlated with the frequency of actual terrorist attacks."[612] Research indicates that terrorism is prevalent mostly where interstate or trans-regional conflict is high, and as a trend, represents a very small fraction of overall violent deaths worldwide.[613] Less than one percent of all deaths due to terrorism between 2002 and 2016 occurred in the West.[614] Civil war, particularly in in Middle East, has been the driving force behind much of the current wave of the terrorism, and has remained largely in that region.[615] Considering the fact that the U.S. claims to have thwarted 80 percent to 90 percent of all terrorist attacks attempted in the U.S. homeland, and that in 2013 the director of the NSA noted that authorities had thwarted over 50 attacks since 9/11 (a greater number then successfully executed) it is illustrative that a 2016 *Fox News* poll found as many as 84 percent of Americans believe authorities are unable to stop terrorist attacks.[616]

---

[608] Jennifer Caifas. "$1.6 billion in FEMA grants target terrorism." *USA Today* (July 278, 2015) and Rebecca Shabad. "US has spent more than $3 billion fighting ISIS." *The Hill* (June 27, 2015).

[609] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart. *Terror, Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Also see Ed Lotterman. "Terrorism isn't going away, so how are we going to respond?" *Idaho Statesman* (October 7, 2016).

[610] *Terrorism Risk in the Post-9/11 Era: A 10-Year Retrospective*, op. cit.

[611] Russell Goldman. "How Many Die in a Typical Terror Attack? Fewer Than You Think." *New York Times* (June 20, 2016) and Kennelly, op. cit., p. 457.

[612] According to the 2014 Global Terrorism Index, the number of attacks worldwide rose by 44 percent, though on average, there has been a statistically significant decline in the number of attacks over the last 30 years. See *Global Terrorism Index 2014: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.* (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). Also see Kennelly, op. cit. p. 457.

[613] Uri Friedman. "Is Terrorism Getting Worse? Depends on Your Definition." *Defense One* (July 14, 2016) and Zenko, op. cit., 2015.

[614] *Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.* (Sydney: Institute for Economic & Peace, 2015), p. 2.

[615] Friedman (2016), op. cit.

[616] Dana Blanton. "Fox News Poll: Voters show anxiety about guns, terrorism." *Fox News* (June 29, 2016); John R. Parkinson. "NSA: 'Over 50' Terror Plots Foiled by Data Dragnets." *ABC News* (June 18, 2013) and *Terrorism*

The effects of political culture on institutional bias further illustrate budgetary allocations. Despite respondents overwhelmingly selecting the CIA as the agency best equipped to handle the threat of terrorism, and a policy of mitigation as the best means by which to confront it, a strategy of subjugation employed by the DOD prevails. This is exemplified by, for example, the percentage of the overall counterterrorism budget. The CIA reportedly spends approximately $16 billion a year, or 30 percent of its budget, on counter-terrorist operations.[617] Meanwhile the DOD was allocated a $600 billion budget under Obama – which funded a vast array of counterterrorist operations – in addition to a $50 billion supplemental allocation appropriated for additional anti-terrorist operations in 2016.[618] And the overall DHS budget, of which terrorism is one of five mission priorities, rose from just over $60 billion in 2014 to almost $65 billion in 2016.[619]

The EU prioritizes their counterterrorism spending differently than the U.S. Most tellingly, the EU places a great emphasis on preventative measures.[620] For example, the EU set aside $165 million for their Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and Other Security-Related Risks."[621] An additional $471 million was allocated for educational programs addressing radicalization in 2016.[622] The EU afforded their Radicalisation Awareness Network Center for Excellence almost $30 million in 2015.[623] The EU's direct counterterrorism budget also emphasizes the disparity in prioritization. Although estimates are, by the EU's own admission, difficult to determine because of spending measures occur at the national level, the overall counterterrorism budget was assessed at approximately $110 million in 2015, while the overall EUROPOL budget, of which a significant amount is dedicated to terrorism, was approximately $100 million in 2016 up from just $80 million in

Risk in the Post-9/11 Era: A 10-Year Retrospective, op. cit., p. 22. Also see *By the Numbers: ISIS Cases in the United States.* (New York: Center on National Security at Fordham Law, 2015).

[617] Drew Desilver. *U.S. spends over $16 billion annually on counter-terrorism.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, September 11, 2013) and "The Black Budget." *Washington Post* (August 29, 2013).

[618] Belasco, op. cit.; *DOD Release Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Proposal* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2, 2015); Sam Stein. "From 9/11 To Osama Bin Laden's Death, Congress Spent $1.28 Trillion in War on Terror." *Huffington Post* (May 2, 2011); Pat Towell. *Defense: FY2015 Authorization and Appropriations.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2015) and Austin Wright and Jeremy Herb. "Obama to seek defense boost to battle terrorism." *Politico* (January 27, 2015).

[619] *Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2016* (Washington, D.C., Department of Homeland Security, 2016).

[620] The European budgetary allocations presented in this section have all been adjusted for 2017 dollars.

[621] *Public Expectation and European Union Policies: Fight Against Terrorism* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2016).

[622] *Public Expectation and European Union Policies: Fight Against Terrorism,* op. cit.

[623] *Public Expectation and European Union Policies: Fight Against Terrorism,* op. cit.

2009.[624] The EUROJUST budget, of which terrorism is only one of 10 mission priorities, rose from just $38 million in 2010 to $50 million in 2016.[625] And the Broader 'Security & Citizenship' budget for the entire European Union, under which terrorism is a component, totaled just $4.8 billion in 2016.[626] Comparatively, the DOJ's national security budget – which funds FBI operations and Federal terrorism prosecutions – was over $4 billion in 2015.[627] The FBI's Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Decision Unit (responsible for terrorism investigations) was budgeted $45 million in 2015.[628] And its National Security Division, which ranks terrorism as its highest priority, increased its budget from $92 million to $95 million 2016.[629]

We find similarly stark comparisons, for example, when examining British, French and U.S. expenditures. For example, from 2012 to 2013, the UK spent almost $600 million on counterterrorism policing efforts.[630] During that same period, the entire security and intelligence budget was just over $2 billion.[631] Meanwhile spending by the Ministry of Defense remained mostly stable since 2011, ranging from approximately $51 to $52 billion, roughly equivalent to America's supplemental allocation appropriated for defeating terrorism in 2015.[632] Unsurprisingly, given the rise in domestic attacks since 2013, France's defense spending is slightly higher, at approximately $56 billon dollars. But this still represents just a fraction of overall U.S. defense spending.[633]

---

[624] *Public Expectation and European Union Policies: Fight Against Terrorism,* op. cit. and Tim Wensink, Michael van de Velde, and Lianne Boer. *Estimated costs of counterterrorism measures.* (Luxembourg: Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2011). Also see *Counter-terrorism Funding in the European Union Budget* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2016).

[625] *EUROJUST Annual Report 2015.* (The Hague, EUROJUST, 2016), p. 69.

[626] *Counter-terrorism Funding in the European Union Budget*, op. cit.; "Statement of Revenue and Expenditures of EUROJUST for the Financial Year 2012." *Official Journal of the European Union* (2012); "Statement of Revenue and Expenditures of EUROJUST for the Financial Year 2015." *Official Journal of the European Union* (2015) and "Statement of Revenue and Expenditures of EUROJUST for the Financial Year 2017." *Official Journal of the European Union* (2017).

[627] *FY 2015 Budget Request at A Glance.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2015).

[628] Federal Bureau of Investigation. *FY2016 Authorization and Budget Request to Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2016), pp. 4-10.

[629] *National Security Divisions: FY 2017 Budget Request At A Glance* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2017).

[630] *The UK's response to the terrorist threat.* (London: Home Affairs Committee, 2014). Accessed October 31, 2015 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/231/23107.htm.

[631] *The UK's response to the terrorist threat*, op. cit.

[632] *HMT Public Expenditures Statistical Analyses (PESA).* Accessed December 7, 2017 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-expenditure-statistical-analyses-pesa and *International Defence Expenditure: 2015.* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2015).

[633] Nan Tian, et. al. *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017).

Budgets reveal prioritization in distinct ways. The Cultural-Institutional cycle creates opportunities for the allocation of long-term resource commitments which prove difficult to dismantle. As a result, bureaucracies tend towards adopting threats they are best suited to combat rather than evolving to meet the pressing challenges they should address to ensure these resources are maintained. This is illustrated by a bureaucrat interviewed for the purposes of the research, who commented it is, "hard to say we're overspending with the emergence of ISIS."[634] But as has been illustrated, an argument can be made the U.S. is overspending or misallocating resources, in the fight against terrorism. The subject's comments reflect a mindset in which a perpetual terrorist enemy exists, and the substitution of one (i.e. al Qaeda) for another (i.e. ISIS) ensures the 'war-industrial complex', and resources required to manage it, are continued over the long term. This same sense of elevated perpetuity in the context of terrorism, I posit, is directly correlated to the crisis discourse which prioritizes it to such a high degree that, as a result, subjugating policies re employed to combat it, which appear to exceed the actual danger terrorism poses to the U.S., both domestically and overseas.

CONCLUSION

As a long-time civilian advisor to the Pentagon, Rosa Brooks observes that the U.S. is increasingly accustomed to, "viewing every new threat through the lens of 'war,' thus asking our military to take on an ever-expanding range of nontraditional tasks [and] asking the military to take on more and more new tasks requires higher military budgets, forcing us to look for savings elsewhere, so we freeze or cut spending on civilian diplomacy and development programs."[635] She adds, "as budget cuts cripple civilian agencies, their capabilities dwindle, and we look to the military to pick up the slack, further expanding its role. 'If your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.' The old adage applies here as well. If your only functioning government institution is the military, everything looks like a war, and 'war rules' appear to apply everywhere, displacing peacetime laws and norms."[636] This research has attempted to illustrate such a tendency. In the context of terrorism, a high priority for U.S. national security, Cultural-Institutional factors appear to be the best explanatory factor, not

---

[634] Interview with Subject 16, op. cit.

[635] Rosa Brooks. "How the Pentagon became Walmart." *Foreign Policy* (August 9, 2016). Also see Rosa Brooks. *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).

[636] Brooks, op. cit.

systemic shifts in the character of the threat. This is demonstrated in the distinctly different policy preferences between the U.S. and comparable nations facing a similar threat.

Despite some similar policies enacted by the U.S. and its European counterparts, the general scope, scale and level of force which the U.S. approaches terrorism exceeds that of European peers. Examining the role of discourse, strategy and expenditures, the case study demonstrated how the effects of culture and institutions play a primary role in threat prioritization and its resulting policy options. In the context of terrorism this is exemplified by the dominate discourse present in the political narrative. This exclusionary narrative defines levels of prioritization and guides policy preferences which are narrowed or limited by it. This is also reflected in the budget allocations, wherein terrorism is, by a measure of allocated resources, a far greater priority to the U.S. then in other countries. Indeed, the U.S. spends far more of its terrorism budget on the use of overwhelming force – including defense operations, covert operations or the militarization of domestic security, in lieu of judicial strategies.

In the following chapter, I will present the second case study featuring the threat posed by narco-trafficking. First, I will define the threat in the context of the framework presented by this research and review the expectations generated. Second, I will examine narco-trafficking in the context of the modern threat environment as it pertains to U.S. national security. Third, I will review the qualitative (i.e. interview) and quantitative (i.e. survey) data which specially addresses the threat of narco-trafficking and explore how it pertains to the expectations. Fourth, I will explore the threat in the context of the two hypotheses, employing a series of examples which compare U.S. threat prioritization to that of its Western European allies. Finally, I will conclude with an overview of the case study, the data, and the presented evidence to further assess the validity of the alternative hypothesis in explaining the reason why narco-trafficking is prioritized in U.S. national security.

CHAPTER FIVE
NARCO-TRAFFICKING

*[Security] is not something we can have more or less of,
because it is not a thing at all. - Mariana Valverde[637]*

INTRODUCTION

In this second case study, I will continue my examination of the research question in the context of the threat posed by narco-trafficking. As a measure of subjective threat analysis, according to the Content and Discourse Analysis narco-trafficking ranks as 22 of 59 potential threats to the U.S.[638] It has an average weighted score of 2.07 on the CDA's four-point scale, ranking it as a medium level priority (see Table 5.1).[639]

Table 5.1: Forms of Policy & Discourse

EVIDENCE OF THREAT PRIORITIZATION		LEVEL OF THREAT & POLICY			
		Subjugate	**Mitigate**	**Arbitrate**	**Evade**
	Official Government Documents	4.00-3.00	2.99-2.00	1.99-1.00	> 1.00
	Expenditures	High	Medium	Low	Minimal
	Strategy	Overwhelming use of force (i.e. invasion/war)	Limited use of force (i.e. targeted strikes; military aid)	Use of diplomacy, sanctions, or economic aid	None
	Discourse	Crisis	Problem	Issue	Non-Issue

As such, narco-trafficking is characterized by a series of specific features including: a mid-level budgetary commitment; a preference for mitigating (i.e. limited force) strategies to confront the threat; and the prevalence of 'problem discourse' as the defining feature of the official threat narrative. The focus of this chapter will be to explain why narco-trafficking is ranked as a medium level priority, and the reason for the existence of these defining characteristics.

I will attempt to discover under what conditions - given the apparent disconnect between externally defined or objective threats, and those internally or subjectively defined by the government - does the U.S. prioritize narco-trafficking in the context of its national

---

[637] Mariana Valverde. "Governing Security Governing Through Security" in (eds.) R.J Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach's *The Security of Freedom: Essay on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), p. 85.
[638] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.
[639] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

security. I will first provide an overview of the threat posed by narco-trafficking. Second, I will examine the expectations generated by the framework. Third, I will review the quantitative and qualitative data and describe how individuals, inside and outside the structure of the state, perceive and advocate confronting the threat. Having reviewed the data, I will examine narco-trafficking in the context of the two hypotheses to determine whether the research question is best explained by systemic shifts in the character of threats, or the combined effects of culture and institutions as they pertain specifically to the U.S. I will conclude with an overview of the findings and explore if they conform to the expectations generated by this research's framework.

THE UNITED STATES & THE THREAT OF NARCO-TRAFFICKING

For the purposes of this research, I define narco-trafficking as the, "global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to prohibition laws."[640] The U.S. serves as a source, transit and destination point for the trade of illicit narcotics. Estimates of the retail value for the global drug trade totals $300 billion, of which the U.S. share is approximately a third.[641] For the last decade, on average, Americans spend $100 billion annually on drugs, resulting in the highest rate of consumption in the world.[642]

The threat of narco-trafficking is compounded by the U.S. Southern border.[643] Mexico, ranked as having the third most deadly, ongoing intra-state conflict in the world, produces and distributes $35 billion to $50 billion of the total drug market.[644] And its shared border with the U.S. is the busiest and most crossed land border in the world.[645] Maintaining almost 2,000 miles of border with a fragile state with minimal physical barriers, makes controlling trafficking

---

[640] *Drug trafficking.* (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014).

[641] Barack Obama. *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010).* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2014) and *Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work* (Rio De Janeiro: Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2014).

[642] Obama. *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010)*, op. cit. and United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. *Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, 2012).

[643] Jose Luis Pardo Veiras. "A decade of failure in the War on Drugs." *New York Times* (October 9, 2019).

[644] *Armed Conflict Survey 2015* (Washington: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015); *Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work,* op. cit. and Ted Galen Carpenter. "Mexican Drug Lord Captured – So What?" *The National Interest* (July 18, 2013).

[645] "Mexico: Crimes at the Border." *Frontline* (May 27, 2008).

a complex task.[646] Taking into account Canada and South America, the Americas represent approximately half of the total global drug market.[647] Canada and Columbia are, furthermore, two of the world's four major producer nations for narcotics most commonly consumed by Americans (including methamphetamines, heroin, cannabis and cocaine).[648] With half or more of the total global narcotics market in close geographic proximity to the U.S., the threat of narco-trafficking, as a measure of the volume of trade, is enormous.[649]

America's surrounding oceans compound the threat. Although 90 percent of the cocaine produced in Latin America enters the U.S. through Texas, 70 percent is first transported from Colombia to Central America or Mexico through the Pacific Ocean.[650] And with 40 million square nautical miles surrounding the U.S., it is unsurprising the Coast Guard estimates at least 95 percent of all imported narcotics are smuggled into the U.S by water in both licit and illicit vessels.[651] Drugs are trafficked into the U.S. at such a high rate that large drug shipments frequently wash up on U.S. shores from the large volume of abandoned loads or sunken boats.[652] Managing the problem is made more difficult by the cartel's control over large areas of the Gulf of Mexico.[653]

Finally, the threat of narco-trafficking to the U.S. is made more complex by its relationship to other threats. Narco-trafficking, like terrorism, occurs in tandem with conflict, immigration, border control, human trafficking, refugees and internally displaced person (IDPs), state instability or failure and government corruption. Narco-traffickers foster and exploit state failure, thriving where government fragility and a feeble rule of law is endemic.[654]

---

[646] *Immigration Enforcement Along the U.S. Borders and at Ports of Entry: Federal, State, and Local Efforts.* (Philadelphia: The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015).

[647] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2005), pp. 128-129.

[648] Obama, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010),* op. cit., pp. 74, 82, 87-93 and 94-100.

[649] In 2013, for example, there were 362 million processed passages – both citizens and non-citizens – across all 320 legal entry points into the U.S., of which 242 million, over 65 percent, traveled by land. An additional 102 million arrived by air and 18 million by sea. Furthermore, authorities apprehended another 421,000 individuals attempting to enter the U.S. illegally.. See, *Immigration Enforcement Along the U.S. Borders and at Ports of Entry: Federal, State, and Local Efforts*, op. cit. and Ron Nixon. "As U.S. Watches Mexico, Traffickers Slip in From Canadas." *New York Times* (October 16, 2016).

[650] *Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.* (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016).

[651] "How do cartels get drugs into the U.S." *BBC* (December 3, 2015). Also see *Caribbean Border Counternarcotic Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2015).

[652] Dane Schiller. "Drug traffickers look to the seas to reach Texas." *Houston Chronicle* (June 4, 2012).

[653] June S. Beittel. *Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations* (Washington, D.C.: 2015) and Jeremy Bender, Christopher Woody and Amanda Macias. "Here are the most powerful Mexican drug cartels that operate in the U.S." *Business Insider* (January 31, 2016).

[654] Christian Caryl. "Mob Rule" *Foreign Policy* (July 19, 2013).

This has led to an increase of the 'crime-terror' or 'drug-terror' nexus, demonstrated by a surging collaboration between transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.[655] Narco-trafficking has become a common tactic exploited by a variety of non-state actors, including Islamist movements like al Qaeda, ISIS or Hezbollah.[656] It is estimated 50 percent of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations participate in narco-trafficking.[657]

But the supply of narcotics is only one factor. As such, narco-trafficking is primarily a foreign policy issue. But defining narco-trafficking in the context of demand presents a second and equally compelling narrative. As such, narco-trafficking is a domestic issue with socio-economic and healthcare dimensions. This perspective challenges the dominance of a supply-side narrative. In 2016, overdose deaths peaked at 63,000 making widespread addiction to drugs a significant threat to the nation's well-being.[658] An estimated 24.6 million Americans use or abuse narcotics, representing 10 percent of users worldwide.[659] This has occurred alongside rising potency and declining prices.[660] But narco-trafficking in the context of health and welfare is just one factor of the domestic threat. The effects on the judicial system are also

---

[655] On the drug-terror nexus see Eldad Beck. "Hezbollah's Cocaine Jihad." *Ynet* (December 29, 2012); John Cisar. "Narcoterrorism: How Drug Trafficking and Terrorism Intersect." *Journal of Homeland and National Security Perspectives* (2014); Hernandez, op. cit.; Howard and Traughber; op. cit.; Bill Mandrick. "An Ontological Framework for Understanding the Terror-Crime Nexus" in (eds.) William Mendel and Peter McCabe's *SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime* (Tampa: The Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016), pp. 147-162; Martin (2014), op. cit., pp. 163-192; Caroline May. "GOP Leaders Highlight Threat of Islamic State Infiltrating Southern Border." *Breitbart* (November 27, 2015); Richard Perez-Pena. "Migrants' Attempts to Enter U.S. via Mexico Stoke Fears About Jihadists." *New York Times* (November 19, 2015) and William F. Wechsler. "Combatting Transnational Organized Crime (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, April 26, 2012).

[656] Mary Fran T. Malone and Christine B. Malone-Rowe. "Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America." in Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel (eds.) *Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview from Six Continents* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014); Josh Meyer. "The secret backstory of how Obama let Hezbollah off the hook." *Politico* (December 18, 2017) and Reichel, op. cit.

[657] The rise of the crime-terror nexus is due in large measure to policies employed to fight al Qaeda and its affiliates, which resulted in declining state sponsorship and an increased vigilance by the U.S. and its allies of financial flows to these organizations by private donors. See, Michael Braun. "Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?" (Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute, July 25, 2008). Also see, Musa al-Gharbi. "Mexican drug cartels are worse than ISIL." *Al Jazeera America* (October 20, 2014).

[658] *Data Brief 294. Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999–2016* (Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017). Accessed December 26, 2017 https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294_table.pdf#page=1; *Drug War Statistics.* (Washington, D.C.: Drug Policy Alliance, 2015); Obama, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010),* op. cit., pp. 20-29 and 45-65. *Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work,* op. cit. and Thomas Harrison. *The U.S. Security Homeland Security Role in the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels.* (Washington, D.C.: United States House of Representatives, March 31, 2011).

[659] Obama, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010),* op. cit., pp. 20-29 and 45-65; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. *Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings* (Rockville: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014) and *Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work,* op. cit., p. 12.

[660] Obama, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010),* op. cit., pp. 45-65 and *Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work,* op. cit., p. 12.

critical. Individuals serving sentences for drug related offenses comprise a disproportionate percentage of the U.S. prison population, which is the world's largest.[661]

When depicting the threat posed by narco-trafficking, a dual discourse emerges, where two dominate threat narratives are present (not just as with terrorism). One is framed through a supply-centric and the other a demand-centric threat discourse. These distinct narratives result in two diverging but complimentary sets of policies. This creates the potential for a conflict within the government regarding the level of the threat narco-trafficking poses and the best means to address it.

NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DATA

Having examined the threat of narco-trafficking in the context of U.S. national security I now turn to the data. In this section I will examine both the subjective and objective perceptions of the threat of narco-trafficking expressed by survey respondents and interview respondents. Subjects represent views internal to (i.e. politicians, bureaucrats and military officials) and external from (i.e. members of the media, civil society, academics and think tanks) the state. As such, the data presents an overview of how these stakeholders perceive the threat and the reasons why they hold these views.

A Quantitative Analysis of Narco-Trafficking

Although the CDA provided an average weighted score of 2.07 (on a four-point scale), survey respondents – representing both subjective and objective perspectives – ranked the threat lower.[662] Based on the mean scores of all threats presented in the survey, narco-trafficking ranked 40 of 59 threats, with a score of 3.86 (out of 10), illustrating a disparity in perspectives.[663] When asked to rank the level of threat posed by narco-trafficking, the majority of survey respondents placed the threat level at 3.00 (on scale from zero to 10), although the average score was higher at 4.02 (see Figure 5.1).

---

[661] *Drug War Statistics*, op. cit.; Lauren E. Glaze and Danielle Kaeble. *Correctional Populations in the United States, 2013.* (Washington, D.C., United States Department of Justice, 2014) and Peter Wagner and Bernadette Rabuy. *Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2015* (Northampton: Prison Policy Initiative, December 8, 2015).

[662] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

[663] See Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked By Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) And Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

**Figure 5.1: Level of Threat Posed by
Narco-Trafficking (As a Percentage of Response)**

When broken down by professional category, those within the state generally ranked the threat level of narco-trafficking higher than those external to it. Politicians and bureaucrats tended to rank the threat slightly higher, with mean scores of 4.67 and 4.21 respectively (see Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2: Mean Scores Regarding the
Level of Threat Posed by Narco-Trafficking**

Professional Category	Mean Score
Politician	4.67
Bureaucrat	4.21
Civil Society	4.20
Military	4.14
Academia/Think Tank	3.27
Media	3.07

In general, and in line with the expectations generated by this research, every professional category ranked narco-trafficking lower than terrorism (the reasons for which will be explored below).

When asked to choose which one strategy is best suited to confront narco-trafficking, survey respondents were divided (see Figure 5.2). A majority of respondents, 39 percent, selected limited force. But a comparable percentage, 35 percent, endorsed economic incentives. This divergence in policy preference mirrors the dual discourses (i.e. supply and demand) emerging in the context of mid-level threats like narco-trafficking.

Figure 5.2: Best Strategy to Confront Narco-Trafficking

When further broken down by professional category, those within the state expressed a stronger preference for the use of limited force then those external to it (see Table 5.3). Those external to the state also expressed a greater preference for both economic and diplomatic strategies to counter narco-trafficking.

Table 5.3: Best Strategy to Confront Narco-Trafficking
Defined by Professional Category (as a Percentage of Responses)

	Over-whelming Use of Force	Limited Use of Force	Economic Incentives	Diplomatic Engagement	Sanctions	None of the Above
Politician	0	44.44	33.33	22.22	0	0
Bureaucrat	5.26	42.11	36.84	10.53	0	5.26
Military	0	61.90	23.81	9.52	0	4.76
Media	13.33	33.33	40.00	13.13	0	0
Civil Society	11.11	33.33	33.33	22.22	0	0
Academia /Think Tank	4.76	19.05	42.86	9.52	0	23.81

This is again indicative of the discursive duality that emerges with mid-level threats, as a measure of those diverging policy options (i.e. demand versus supply) that result

When asked which agency was best equipped to handle the threat of narco-trafficking, survey respondents again expressed division (see Table 5.3).

Figure 5.3: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle Narco-Trafficking

A majority, 39 percent, selected the FBI. But 29 percent selected the DHS. I posit this is also illustrative of the duality in policy, wherein the FBI represents a criminal judicial approach and the DHS, a more traditional security-centric model.

When further broken down by professional category, there was a strong preference across all groups for the FBI to be the lead agency for U.S. counter-narcotics efforts (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle
Narco-Trafficking Defined by Professional Category (as a Percentage of Responses)

	DOD	DOS	NIC	DHS	DOT	CIA	FBI	DOE	DHHS	None	Total
Politician	0	11.11	11.11	11.11	0	0	55.56	0	0	11.11	**100**
Bureaucrat	10.53	5.26	0	42.11	5.26	0	31.58	0	5.26	0	**100**
Military	4.76	9.52	0	52.38	0	0	28.57	0	0	4.76	**100**
Media	6.67	13.13	0	6.67	6.67	6.67	46.67	0	0	13.33	**100**
Civil Society	0	11.11	0	11.11	0	11.11	55.56	0	0	11.11	**100**
Academia /Think Tank	0	9.09	4.55	27.27	9.09	0	36.36	0	0	13.64	**100**

Interestingly, the military was the category least likely to prefer the FBI. I posit this might result from bureaucratic bias (further explored below), wherein defense agencies tend to frame a threat in the context of national security policy more aligned with the DHS (established to defend the U.S., primarily, against the threat of terrorism after 9/11), than the FBI's criminal-justice approach.

A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF NARCO-TRAFFICKING

The interviews conducted for the purpose of this research provide a more nuanced view, from the perspective of the state of how narco-trafficking characterized, as well as why narco-trafficking is prioritized as a medium level threat.

A General Perspective on the Threat of Narco-Trafficking

When asked if narco-trafficking is a national security priority for the U.S., the general assessment of interviewees was in the affirmative. They categorized narco-trafficking as a critical priority, but noted that it does not rise to the level of terrorism. Consistent with my expectations, two specific narratives emerged from the interviews. One emphasized narco-trafficking as a foreign policy threat, necessitating an attack on traffickers and supply and an alternative that stressed its root causes and the effects of domestic demand. I will now briefly describe the perspectives of each group as it pertains to the threat posed by narco-trafficking.

The Politicians' Perspective on the Threat of Narco-Trafficking

Politicians were more divided on the threat posed by narco-trafficking. Narcotics were categorized as a problem by politicians, but less so than terrorism. Democrats were less likely to believe narco-trafficking posed a threat. They attributed this to the failure of mitigating policies (i.e. the war on drugs), not because the danger itself had decreased, but because of a narrow-minded focus on supply to the exclusion of alterative domestic, demand-centric strategies. They also cited an increased acceptance of alternative policy options (i.e. legalization and decriminalization), but did not express any clear support for pursing these options in lieu of mitigating strategies (i.e. use of limited force). As one Democrat explained, the government realizes a foreign policy approach does not "have much hope of doing any good."[664] But the government also does not, "see a solution. If they saw a solution – they know how to control terrorism – they don't know how to control narco-trafficking because the demand for the drugs is so great in the U.S. and the conduits [i.e. the supply] so extensive."[665]

Republican were more critical of this perspective, noting that although a growing minority tends to believe alternative strategies are better, this approach will not stop narco-trafficking nor protect the border. Republicans believed that narcotics pose a threat, but not to the degree of terrorism and were more inclined to focus on the external causes and consequences of narcotics (i.e. supply) rather than the domestic causes (i.e. demand). While Democrats were more concerned about addressing the root causes of narcotics (i.e. poverty and a lack of education) and promoting a domestic agenda, Republicans were more concerned with narco-trafficking in the context of violence, erosion of democracy abroad, human trafficking, terrorism, the rise of organized crime and border insecurity.

The interviews tended to reflect the survey results. Politicians surveyed also ranked narco-trafficking central in the threat spectrum, like politicians interviewed, who expressed a belief that narco-trafficking is a threat, but to a lesser degree then terrorism (see Table 5.2). Politicians surveyed were furthermore divided between policy options: the use of force (representing a supply-centric approach) as Republicans expressed, and economic incentives (representing a demand-centric or alternative approach), as Democrats tended to express (see Table 5.4).

---

[664] Interview with Subject 18, op. cit.
[665] Interview with Subject 18, op. cit.

The Bureaucrats' Perspective on the Threat of Narco-Trafficking

Bureaucrats generally believed narco-trafficking is an important priority but agreed it does not rise to the threat level of terrorism. Bureaucrats also believed that narco-trafficking is inadequately addressed. They attributed this to a lack of resources, commitment and prioritization as a national security threat. As one subject noted, "just declaring a war on drugs is not going to work."[666] But bureaucrats interviewed did not discount a continued role for mitigating policies and many believed insufficient force is being used. Bureaucrats were staunch advocates of an increased use of limited force at home.[667] They consistently pointed to the need for complimentary law enforcement and national security measures to be introduced to combat narcotics.

But bureaucrats also advocated for a 'whole-of-government approach' as the only means to address the multi-dimensional nature of the threat at home and overseas. Bureaucrats were most likely to regard narco-trafficking as resulting from the institutional failure in foreign governments (defined by corruption, the erosion of democracy and the lacking rule of law), rather than a failure of U.S. policy. Wherein bureaucrats expressed a concern that domestic demand is insufficiently addressed, this did not change their commitment to use of limited force to combat narco-trafficking overseas.

This is consistent with the survey results, in which bureaucrats, ranking narco-trafficking below terrorism, expressed a preference for including a broader array of agencies in combatting the threat than their political and military peers (see Table 5.2 and Table 5.4). Interestingly, they were also the only state-based professional group surveyed which expressed a slight preference (5.26 percent) for the use of overwhelming, compared to the zero percent registered by politicians and the military (see Table 5.3). They were also the most likely among their peers to endorse a role for the DOD, at 10.53 percent (see Table 5.4).

The Military's Perspective on the Threat of Narco-Trafficking

Military officials were slightly more divided than bureaucrats, but less so than politicians regarding the threat posed by narco-trafficking. In general, military interviewees conveyed a definite sense of threat. But the majority focused on narco-trafficking as an issue that cannot be defeated solely by the use of limited force overseas. As one subject commented,

---

[666] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[667] Interview with Subjects 3 and 7, op. cit.

addressing the "huge network that moves everything from drugs, humans, weapons, everything through the southern approaches and into the U.S…. needs to be a whole-of-government approach."[668] Military officials did not discount the role of limited force, but focused on its use in a domestic context, including border control and interdiction, as the best means to address the threat.

Military officials emphasized "political divisiveness" as a key factor in the failure to combat narco-trafficking.[669] Debating supply versus demand-centric policies creates, as one military official explained, the "political impossibility" of adequately addressing the threat.[670] They generally believed this results in a lack of necessary resources allocated to fight the narco-trade. Required to consider an increasing array of dangers, each measured as a degree of finite resources apportioned to national security, risks can only be addressed when considered proportional to all others. As one military official noted, "resource economics are going to start wagging the dog in many cases."[671] A deficit in resources, military officials believed, has serious ramifications for the prioritization of narco-trafficking.[672] This implies the execution of military policy is hampered by the politics of national security, not the capabilities or capacity of national security agencies. Military personnel believed that the politics of national security – measured by the narrative depicting the threat and the resources dedicated to combatting it – has a critical and determining effect on threat prioritization and policy generally, and narco-trafficking, specifically.

Interestingly, despite interviewed military officials expressing a wider array of policy options were necessary to confront narco-trafficking, they were still the most likely to select the use of limited force when surveyed (see Table 5.3). I posit this might be attributable to the inherent bureaucratic bias to maintain control over the resources allocated to defense agencies to address narco-trafficking. This also might explain why military officials surveyed were least likely to prefer economic or diplomatic policies (see Table 5.3). And why military officials, as I previously posited, selected the DHS to the FBI, the latter which takes a criminal-justice approach to the threat, while the former has a security-centric approach (see Table 5.4).

---

[668] Interview with Subject 1, op. cit.
[669] Interview with Subject 1, op. cit.
[670] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.
[671] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[672] Interview with Subject 1, op. cit.

NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HYPOTHESES

Having examined the data, I now turn to testing the two hypotheses. If systemic shifts in the character of threats best explains prioritization, we would expect that countries respond to specific material factors (as outlined above) when confronting a threat.[673] We would expect to find where these factors threaten the U.S. to a higher degree, there would be a difference in prioritization when compared to similar nations. This implies, if systematic shifts were the most critical factor, prioritization and policy would be generally similar in the U.S. as in comparable states facing a comparable threat.

Alternatively, if the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis best explains the level of prioritization, we would anticipate subjective measures of threats to be based not on material factors, but America's distinct political culture. We would expect to find policies do not reflect material factors, but an interpretation of threat, expressed rhetorically, and emerging as a product of bureaucratic bias. This would be illustrated by an American threat discourse diverging in significant ways from an objective narrative and a preference for policy by the U.S. that also diverges in significant ways from comparable states facing similar threats. Finally, based on the nature of the preferred strategy, we might also expect specific bureaucracies to rise in prominence over others within the government in regards to the execution of policy, regardless of their applicability or capacity to succeed.

NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF SYSTEMIC SHIFTS

If the systemic shift in the character of threats were a validated, we would expect threat assessments to be based on material factors and U.S. policies to combat narco-trafficking would converge with comparable states. This is evidenced by the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure (as outlined in Chapter Two).[674] The Measure for narco-trafficking (which examines threat levels as an objective measure) presented in Appendix Nine, scores narco-trafficking as a "low to moderate/moderate threat" (with a ranking of 4.5 out of 10).[675]

---

[673] Barry Posen. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* (2003).

[674] The External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure was created for the purposes of this research to provide a (relatively) independent measure of threat level which could be used as a comparable factor against the CDA scores and the survey data. Using a binary scoring methodology and analyzing a range of broad factors, the Measure aims to remove (some degree of) subjectivity through quantifying a set of materials factors that are generally taken into account when assessing threats. See Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure and Appendix Nine: Narco-Trafficking in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

[675] See Appendix Nine: Narco-trafficking in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

As a result, I propose material factors are again indeterminate. To determine precisely what factors are, I will review U.S. anti-narcotics policies and draw comparisons with similar nations facing a similar level of threat.

Comparing the European Union and United States

The EU prioritizes narco-trafficking as a major threat to its security.[676] Like the U.S., the EU is a critical source, transit and destination point for the global narcotics market.[677] The EU is the second largest regional market for narcotics, behind the U.S.[678] With a total population about a third larger than the U.S., the EU has approximately the same number of users (26 million) as America (24 million), with seven percent (versus America's 10 percent) of the population addicted to narcotics.[679] But, the EU only has 7,000 to 8,000 overdose deaths a year, remaining stable since 2001, while the U.S. rate continues to rise exponentially (see Table 5.5). Like the U.S., the EU is situated in close proximity to several major drug producer nations (like Afghanistan, China and the West African countries). Every EU member has a vast array of legal and illegal entry points which traffickers can use to move goods.[680] This is compounded by less restriction on movement within EU member states, necessitating a higher degree of inter-state cooperation between law enforcement and justice-related agencies.[681] This, in addition to, the EU's broader asylum and refugee policies, specifically its admittance of people from communities in crisis, where narco-trafficking (or organized crime) is an endemic aspect of conflict.[682]

---

[676] Eva Magdalena Stambol. "Governing Cocaine Supply and Organized Crime from Latin America and the Caribbean: The Changing Security Logic in European Union External Policy." *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research* (2015), pp. 6-7.

[677] For an overview of the current state of affairs, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2017).

[678] *World Drug Report* (2005), op. cit., pp. 128-129.

[679] International Narcotics Control Board. *Report 2015*. (Vienna: The United Nations, 2016); Obama, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010),* op. cit., pp. 20-29 and 45-65; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, op. cit. and *Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work*, op. cit., p. 12.

[680] *EU Approved Border Inspection Posts (BIP).* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016). Accessed: April 24, 2016 http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/vet-border-control/bip/index_en.htm.

[681] Georges Estievenart. "Enlargement of the European Union Regarding the Drug Phenomenon: A Single Market for Illicit Drugs?" in (ed.) Alvaro Camacho Guizado, *Drug Trafficking: Perspectives From Europe, America and the United States.* (Bogota: Universidad de los Andes, 2005), p. 33.

[682] For example, in 2013 the EU estimated 3.4 million peopled legally immigrated into a member state (although more than half moved from one member state to another) while approximately 1.3 million moved legally into the U.S. from another country. Another 400,000 to 600,000 illegal immigrants arrive in the U.S. every year, while low estimates place the number of illegal entries into the EU at 72,000 a year. See, See, Steven A. Camarota. *2.5 Million Join Illegal Population under Obama.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, 2015; Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *Trends In International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision - Migrants By Age And Sex*

Table 5.5: Number of Deaths Due to Overdoes from
Narcotics in the European Union & the United States (2001-2016)[683]

Year	European Union	United States
2001	8,126	19,394
2002	6,830	23,518
2003	6,364	25,785
2004	6,912	27,424
2005	7,368	29,813
2006	7,010	34,425
2007	7,435	36,010
2008	8,044	36,450
2009	7,645	37,004
2010	6,954	38,329
2011	---	41,340
2012	6,100	41,502
2013	---	43,982
2014	7,529	47,055
2015	7,585	52,404
2016	---	63,632

Yet the EU's general approach to narco-trafficking remains demand-driven.[684] In its external policy, the EU pursues 'soft control' or 'security through development' instead of force.[685] Cooperation on anti-trafficking efforts between the EU and states assisted by them (specifically in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America), generally takes precedence over unilateral actions or direct military operations. The EU emphasizes strategies that balance their shared 'principles and values' with security instead of purely security strategies.[686] The EU has led the global shift towards demand-centric policies, reflected in the broad application of decriminalization and legalization across the continent, as well as a commitment to addressing

---

(New York: United Nations, 2013); *Migration and Migrant Population Statistics.* (Brussels: European Commission, 2015); "Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts." *BBC* (March 4, 2016); Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts." *BBC* (March 4, 2016); Randall Monger and James Yankay. *U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2013.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2015) and Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalove. *Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2016).

[683] It is important to note not every member state reports statistics annually and in some cases these totals are incomplete. See *Data Brief 294. Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999–2016*, op. cit.; European *Drug Report: Trends and Developments* (Luxembourg: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2014); *European Drug Report: Trends and Developments* (Luxembourg: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2017); *Overdose Death Rates* (Atlanta: National Center for Health Statistics, 2015); *Table DRD-2. Number of drug-induced deaths recorded in EU according to national definitions: Part (i) Total drug-induced deaths, 1995–2011.* (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats13#display:/stats13/drdtab2a and *Table DRD-2: Overdose deaths. Current Situation. Gender.* (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016) Accessed August 30, 2016 http://ww.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2016#displayTable:DRD-2.

[684] Stambol, op. cit.

[685] Stambol, op. cit., pp. 4 and 16.

[686] Stambol, op. cit., p. 4.

the endemic, root causes leading to the production, distribution and abuse. These policies have resulted in a lower number of narcotics-related arrests, for example, in the EU when compared to U.S. (see Table 5.6).

**Table 5.6: Number of Drug Law Violations in
the European Union & the United States (2001-2016)**[687]

Year	European Union	United States
2001	613,117	1,586,902
2002	657,553	1,538,813
2003	729,849	1,678,192
2004	949,848	1,746,570
2005	804,387	1,846,351
2006	809,603	1,889,810
2007	1,103,422	1,841,182
2008	825,771	1,702,537
2009	919,096	1,663,582
2010	920,759	1,638,84
2011	853,347	1,531,251
2012	874,565	1,552,432
2013	913,923	1,501,043
2014	1,004,818	1,561,231
2015	---	1,488,707
2016	---	1,486,810

Having briefly outlined the EU's general perspective on the threat of narco-trafficking, I will now provide four specific examples that illustrate America's distinct approach to the threat, from both the foreign and domestic security perspective. In the context of foreign policy, I will examine direct military operations and Alternative Development strategies in Latin America.[688] In the context of domestic policy, I will examine border control and healthcare (broadly defined as intervention, rehabilitation and education-related initiatives).

---

[687] It is important to note not every member state reports statistics annually and in some cases these totals are incomplete. Too few states have submitted data to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drugs Addiction to make any estimates for 2015 or 2016. See, *Arrests for Illicit Drugs Annually in the US, by Drug: Type Figures in Percents.* (Lancaster: Common Sense for Drug Policy, 2017). Accessed December 28, 2017 http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Crime#sthash.NtoCBD46.dpuf; *Crime in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Accessed September 1, 2016 https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/main and *Table DLO-01-1. Drug law offences. Number of Offences. Offences.* (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2017). Accessed December 28, 2017 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2016#displayTable:DLO-01-1.

[688] The UN defines Alternative Development as the, "process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs." The UN further notes those, "national strategies may vary, but the specific purpose of Alternative Development in its

Narco-Trafficking & The Use of Military

As noted above, the EU generally promotes military assistance (including training, intelligence and military hardware) over direct EU-led operations. This represents a broader European strategy which encourages states to provide for, and ensure, their own stability – not become reliant on external aide. This is also a reflection of the general European emphasis on addressing the endemic root causes and systemic failures which diminish capacity for sustainable preventative measures.[689] The EU maintains, for example, that stability in Latin America can only be addressed through poverty, social inequality and democratic governance.[690] The EU counter-narcotics strategy in the region ranks supply-centric policies the last of four objectives including, respectively, 1) policy support and coordination between the countries; 2) collecting, consolidating and analyzing data; and 3) addressing demand.[691]

Of all EU members, the UK confronts a narcotics threat most similar to the U.S., as a measure of both supply and demand.[692] The U.K. defense community's anti-narcotics strategy is not devoid of military operations, but they are limited in scope occurring in just two countries (according to declassified information).[693] Comparatively, the U.S. conducts anti-narcotics operations with governments on every continent in the world.[694] In Colombia, for example, the specific nature of British operations and precise budget remain classified, but the UK reports its budget is less than the $2 billion U.S budget.[695] Reports suggest that UK military engagement in Colombia is limited to anti-narcotic law enforcement training as well as military advice, intelligence and hardware.[696] Furthermore, due to environmental concerns

---

present, broader meaning is to contribute to economic development (especially in rural areas) in order to target the underlying factors and root causes of illicit drug economies." See *World Drug Report* (2015), op. cit., p. 77.

[689] Sven Biscop. *Global and Operational: A New Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy.* (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2015).

[690] *A Stronger Partnership Between the European Union and Latin America.* (Brussels: The European Commission, 2004), pp. 8-9.

[691] Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development. *Latin America - COPOLAD - Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies with EU* (Brussels, European Parliament, 2016).

[692] For example, see *United Kingdom country overview: A summary of the national drug situation.* (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016).

[693] David Pallister, Sibylla Brodzinksy and Owen Bowcott. "Secret aid poured into Colombian drug war." *The Guardian* (July 8, 2003) and Daniel Read. "Britain's Secret War in Colombia." *London Progressive Journal* (July 3, 2009). Also see "British military involvement in Colombia." (London: Justice for Colombia, 2016). Accessed May 1, 2016 http://www.justiceforcolombia.org/campaigns/military-aid/photos.php.

[694] "British military involvement in Colombia," op. cit.; Pallister, Brodzinksy and Bowcott, op. cit. and Read, op. cit.

[695] "British military involvement in Colombia," op. cit.; Pallister, Brodzinksy and Bowcott, op. cit. and Read, op. cit.

[696] "British military involvement in Colombia," op. cit.; Pallister, Brodzinksy and Bowcott, op. cit. and Read, op. cit.

(i.e. the use of chemical agents and their effects), the UK tends to reject crop eradication strategies, and always introduces alternative agriculture practices in the those unique cases when eradication is undertaken.[697]

This contrasts with the U.S. preference for broad based partnerships and direct military operations not only in Latin America, but in all the countries where it combats narco-trafficking, illustrating a consistent use of limited force by the U.S. in the war on drugs.[698] Starting with the launch of the war by President Richard Nixon in the late 1960s, there was a noticeable shift in the perception of the threat. Narcotics were defined in the context of a security rather than a societal threat. Nixon launched Operation Intercept as his first mitigating strategy in 1969, wherein the border with Mexico was almost shut down to stem the tide of cannabis into the U.S. In 1989 Bush launched Operation Just Cause, invading Panama to apprehend its de-factor dictator (and international narco-trafficker), Manuel Noriega. Three years later, Clinton sent a paramilitary force to support Colombian efforts in capturing international narco-trafficker Pablo Escobar, who was killed during the operation. In 1996, Clinton launched Plan Colombia which focused on military and law enforcement operations and the sale of hardware to the Colombian military and paramilitary anti-narcotics forces. The program was maintained, and grew under Bush (see Table 5.7).

Table 5.7: Plan Colombia Program Budget (in millions)[699]

Year	Reduce Narcotics & Improve Security	Promote Rule of Law	Promote Social & Economic Justice
2000	817.80	121.10	80.00
2001	232.80	0.90	0.50
2002	395.90	15.80	109.90
2003	607.90	27.00	125.70
2004	617.70	09.00	126.50
2005	585.60	7.30	124.70
2006	587.30	10.50	130.40
2007	591.10	7.80	139.70
2008	423.40	39.40	194.40

---

[697] The same is true in Afghanistan where the British military maintains an exclusive focus on supporting law enforcement, crop substitution and institutional reform to ensure the sustainability of anti-narcotics efforts over the long term. See, Sayaka Fukumi. *Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America: EU and US Policy Responses* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008) and *The UK's work in Afghanistan* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2014).

[698] For a snapshot of the discrepancy between military and non-military aid in Latin America see, Peter J. Meyer and Mark P. Sullivan. *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and Appropriations* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

[699] Pablo F. Gomez. *The War on Drugs Revisited: Old Problems, Old Solutions, Same Results* (Vanderbilt University, September 16, 2009), p. 24; *PLAN COLOMBIA Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance* (Washington, D.C.: Governmental Accountability Office, 2008) and Seelke and Finklea, op. cit., p. 27.

In 2008, the GAO issued a report citing some successes, but assessed that the program had failed to meet its reduction goals.[700] In 2011, Obama launched the Merida Initiative with Mexico to stem the volume of drugs, crime and money laundering between the neighboring nations.[701] Consisting of a $2.5 billion aid package, the program (like its counterpart in Colombia) emphasized mitigating over arbitrating strategies.[702]

Of the Initiative's seven programs, the four with the most funding were military and law enforcement operations (see Table 5.8). Funding was extended through 2017 with a $129 million budget including $80 million to fight traffickers and support law enforcement and only $49 million for development assistance.[703]

Table 5.8: The Merida Initiative Program Budget (in millions)[704]

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Military Programs	46.5	261.9	206.7	160	119.1
Development Assistance	13.7	67.7	58.3	46.8	46.1

When asked to assess the success' of the initiative, the Congressional Research Service noted a response depended on the specific program and definition of success, rather than offering an endorsement of the program in its entirety.[705]

The preference for the use of limited force by the U.S. is illustrated in its consistent use of small-scale combat operations against cartels and their armies; the killing, capture and extradition of senior cartel leadership; the eradication of crops; and providing intelligence or support for security personnel in anti-narcotics efforts. These actions are limited in the sense that they do not amount to large-scale deployment and warfare (as is the case with terrorism, exemplified by U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). Other examples of America's use of limited force, against narco-trafficking abound. For example, a 2008 CIA Inspector's General Report revealed between 1995 and 2001, the CIA shot down 15 planes suspected of smuggling narcotics across Latin America.[706] And General Charles Jacoby, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command, stated in testimony before the Senate in 2012 that the U.S. "decapitation

---

[700] *PLAN COLOMBIA*, op. cit.
[701] Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea. *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016).
[702] Seelke and Finklea, op. cit., p. 27.
[703] Seelke and Finklea, op. cit., p. 8.
[704] Seelke and Finklea, op. cit., p. 27.
[705] Seelke and Finklea, op. cit., p. 18.
[706] "CIA helped shutdown 15 civilian planes." *CBS News* (December 11, 2008).

strategy" has captured or killed 22 or 37 high value traffickers.[707] Furthermore, the U.S. deploys more Predator drones in Latin America, and particularly the U.S.-Mexican border, then it does against terrorism.[708] Although weaponized drones have not yet been deployed in the war on drugs, the Predator was first used in the late 1980s and early 1990s to assist cross border anti-narcotics operations, and remains an integral part of operations against high value narco-traffickers.[709] The CIA and the DEA have furthermore run joint operations, sometimes in conjunction with the U.S. military, in places like Somalia, Bolivia, Honduras, Afghanistan and Colombia.[710] And at any given time, the U.S. has as many as 2,000 troops deployed across Latin America (and upwards to 4,000 when including supporting Navy ships stationed directly off the continents' coast), to execute anti-narcotics efforts.[711] But the extent of covert operations and unofficial paramilitary support for Latin American governments, and beyond, is unknown.[712]

Narco-Trafficking & Alternative Development

When executing anti-drug strategies overseas, the EU relies on close collaboration with the various stakeholders across multi-national platforms while emphasizing education, drug prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and harm reduction policies.[713] It also relies on an strategy of Alternative Development as the best means to "address the underlying drivers of illicit cultivation."[714] The U.S., conversely, views Alternative Development exclusively as a security measure.[715] As Emily Phan-Gruber writes, "the UN and the EU perceive AD [Alternative Development] and drug control programs as development activities aimed at reducing poverty and improving public. The U.S., on the other hand, views AD programs as security measures

---

[707] Robert Beckhusen. "Killing drug cartel bosses isn't working, says top U.S. General." *WIRED* (March 13, 2012) and "Top Mexican drug cartels leaders captured or killed in recent years." *The Associated Press* (February 27, 2015).

[708] William Booth. "More Predator drones fly U.S.-Mexico border." *Washington Post* (December 21, 2011).

[709] Booth, op. cit. and "The Drug War Taught the U.S. Military How to Hunt Terrorists." *War Is Boring* (October 23, 2015).

[710] George A. Crawford. *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare* (Halbert Field: Joint Special Operation University, 2009); Jaime Malamud-Goti. *Soldiers, Peasants, Politics and the War on Drugs.* American University International Law Review (1990) and "Timeline: America's War on Drugs." *NPR* (April 2, 2007).

[711] *Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2015) and "U.S. Military expands its drug war in Latin America." *Associated Press* (February 3, 2013).

[712] Deborah Sontag. "The Secret History of Colombia's Paramilitaries and the U.S. War on Drugs." *The New York Times* (September 10, 2016).

[713] Fukumi, op. cit. and Stambol, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[714] *World Drug Report* (2015), op. cit., p. 81.

[715] Emily Phan-Gruber. "The Role of Alternative Development in the 'War on Drugs': The Case of Bolivia." *The Journal of Civil Society and Social Transformation* (2010).

designed to reduce the coca crop."[716] As a result, the International Crisis Group notes, "in the U.S. drugs are basically still seen and treated as a law enforcement issue. This perception has only grown since 9/11, and the U.S. now includes a narcoterrorism evaluation in its National Security assessments."[717]

In the four primary countries where the UK supports Alternative Development strategies (Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia), the U.S. has ongoing counter-narcotic military operations.[718] The UK has ongoing operations in just two.[719] This lack of social and economic development programming has resulted in, Fukumi writes, a failure by the U.S. to decrease supply to or address the 'real problems' of weak government and inequality.[720] Furthermore, when implementing Alternative Development strategies, the U.S. makes funding conditional on fully executing crop eradication first, something neither the EU (nor the UN) requires of partnering states.[721] Finally, the U.S. tends to take a top-down approach to Alternative Development, forcing policy on states as a condition of development support. This is stark contrast to the EU wherein local community stakeholders are involved in executing policy. The result for the U.S. has been a general distrust and disassociation by states at the local level, leading to less positive outcomes from U.S. Alternative Development strategies when compared the EU (and the UN).[722]

The outcomes of these diverging foreign policies are unsurprisingly different and prove less successful in the U.S. than the EU. The U.S. policy has failed to achieve its goal of lessening supply. Cultivation as a measure of hectares, for example, doubled in Colombia between 2013 and 2015, despite continued efforts to eradicate cocoa crops in that country.[723] Only 6.4 percent less land was used for the production of cocoa in 2015 than in 2001 when

---

[716] Phan-Gruber, op. cit., p. 6.

[717] Phan-Gruber, op. cit., p. 6.

[718] *About the U.S. Military Group.* (La Paz: United States Department of State, 2016); *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2016); *Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength*, op. cit.; Stephen Losey. "The Air Force's quiet war on the Latin American drug cartels." *Air Force Time* (May 29, 2016); George Withers, Lucila Santos and Adam Isacson. *Preach What You Practice: The Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Office on Latin America, 2010);

[719] *About the U.S. Military Group*, op. cit.; *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, op. cit.; *Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength*, op. cit.; Losey, op. cit. and Withers, Santos and Isacson, op. cit.

[720] Fukumi, op. cit.

[721] Phan-Gruber, op. cit., p. 6.

[722] Phan-Gruber, op. cit.

[723] Stephen Gill. "Colombia to deploy 5000 troops and begin crop substitution pilot to curb coca cultivation." *Colombia Reports* (March 17, 2016).

the U.S. launched its Plan Columbia.[724] And arresting cartel leadership has done little to deplete the reserve of individuals prepared to lead these multi-billion dollar enterprises.[725] Extradition and prosecution has further proven costly and time-consuming, undermining the effects of arrest and detainment as a preventative measure. Rather than building the Mexican government's capacity to imprison and prosecute cartel leadership domestically, the U.S. continues to exponentially increase extradition, which reached historic levels in 2012 (see Figure 5.4).[726]

Figure 5.4: Narco-Traffickers Extradited from Mexico to the United States (2000-2014)[727]

---

[724] Gill, op. cit.

[725] For example, see, Charlotte Alfred. "Why the Capture of 'El Chapo' Guzman Won't Stop His Cartel." *Huffington Post* (January 14, 2016); Nicholas Casey. "Drug War Grinds on After Cartel Arrest." *Wall Street Journal* (July 16, 2013); Dolia Estevez. "One Month After Drug Lord El Chap Guzman Arrest, Narcotics Business Continues With No Change." *Forbes* (March 20, 2014); Brian P. Kelly. "5 reasons why arresting drug lords won't solve the world's drug problem." *The Week* (August 6, 2013); Elliot Spagat and Marth Menoza. "Cartel arrests did not curb drug trade." *Associated Press* (December 2, 2010) and Karla Zabludovsky. "Ismael Zambada Garcia next in line to take over the Sinaloa drug cartel after 'El Chapo' Guzman capture." *Newsweek* (February 26, 2014).

[726] Walter Rodriguez. "Mexico's Catch-22: How the Necessary Extradition of Drug Cartel Leaders Undermines Long-Term Criminal Justice Reforms." *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review* (2015), p. 167 and Seelke and Finklea, op. cit., p. 19.

[727] According to media reports, at least 13 high-level extraditions occurred in 2015. A review of data for 2015 and 2016 revealed no official government statistics (or informal statistics from media outlets, relevant think tanks or academic research) for exclusively narco-traffickers extradited from Mexico to the U.S. A review of news releases from the DOJ, State Department and U.S. Marshalls (all responsible for a part of the extradition process) revealed no additional data. See, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (United States Department of State, 2015); *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (United States Department of State, 2017); Seelke and Finklea, op. cit., p. 19 and Dan Slater. "An American Drug Lord Comes Home." *The New Yorker* (October 21, 2015). Also see, United States Drug Enforcement Agency *Major Arrests/Extraditions/Convictions News Releases.* Accessed December 25, 2017, https://www.dea.gov/pr/top-story/MajorArrests.shtml United States Marshalls. *News Releases.* Accessed December 25, 2017, https://www.usmarshals.gov/news/index.html.

The propensity of farmers to replant crops quickly has undermined eradication efforts, making crop substitution polices ineffective.[728] Despite these failures, Obama reaffirmed the U.S. military commitment to Colombia's efforts to combat narco-trafficking in 2016.[729]

The EU, on the other, recognizing the inadequacy of its policies, changed its strategy in 2012. The European Parliament declared at the time Latin American anti-trafficking had failed, noting two decades of cooperation had, "limited impact in terms of reducing drug consumption and production and have not led to better control of the criminal networks involved in the trafficking."[730] As a result, they concluded, a new approach was needed.[731] This recognition of failure is particularly relevant when considering the EU was already on the forefront of alternative anti-narcotics policies at home and abroad since the early 1990s.[732] The EU's current anti-drug policy reflects an even broader application of decriminalization, deregulation and legalization, representing the world's most liberal drug policies. The extent to which states implement this approach is in stark contrast to U.S. policy.

Narco-Trafficking & Border Controls

Domestically, the EU depends almost exclusively on national law enforcement to secure its external borders and to monitor its internal ones.[733] Border control is only one aspect of the EU's 'balanced' approach to addressing supply and demand. Unlike the U.S., it does not take precedence over other policies and does not rise to the same level of institutional importance. This is evidenced, in part, by criticism that FRONTEX – the EU's border management agency – has a 'weak' mandate, little authority to hire necessary personnel and few resources (in terms of operational hardware) to defend the border.[734] The organization does not maintain its own equipment or border guards, nor command over national border agents working with the agency (authority which remains with the government from where

---

[728] Gill, op. cit. and Nick Miroff. "Tracing the U.S. heroin surge back south of the border as Mexican cannabis production falls." *Washington Post* (April 6, 2014).

[729] "Obama Says He Wants to Help Latin America Fight Drug Trade." *Telesurtv.net* (January 24, 2016). Accessed January 28, 2016 http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Obama-Claims-He-Wants-to-Help-Latin-America-Fight-Drug-Trade-20160124-0025.html.

[730] Directorate-General for External Policies. *Europe and Latin America: Combatting Drugs and Trafficking* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2012).

[731] Directorate-General for External Policies, op. cit.

[732] Estievenart, op. cit.

[733] *Drug supply reduction and internal security policies in the European Union: an overview.* (Luxembourg: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2013).

[734] "A Real Border Guard at Last." *The Economist* (December 19, 2015).

the agents are supplied).[735] Border control, as a policy to defend against narco-trafficking within the EU, therefore, remains limited particularly when compared to the U.S. For example, despite having the ability to close their borders for 'exceptional circumstances,' of the 26 EU member states and the four non-EU members of the Schengen Agreement, only six countries have border restrictions in place, and none use or have used the policy to combat narco-trafficking.[736]

In contrast, border control is a central pillar and, the U.S. doubled Border Patrol Agents from between 2001 and 2016; starting (see Figure 5.5).[737]

Figure 5.5: United States Border Patrol Staff (2001-2016)[738]

The largest concentration of these agents is found at the U.S. Southern border (see Table 5.9).[739] The Drug Enforcement Agency has had its budget and bureaucracy rise at a similar

---

[735] It is important to note that since 2015, with the rise of terrorism and the refugee crisis in Europe, a focus on border control has gained a measure of importance. For example, see *EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: mandate extended by one year, two new tasks added.* (Brussels: European Council, June 20, 2016); European Union Committee. *Operation Sophia, the EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean: an impossible challenge.* (London: United Kingdom Parliament, 2016); Chiara Palazzo. "Operation Sophia: EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean deemed an impossible challenge' in House of Lords report." *The Telegraph* (May 13, 2016); "Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained." *BBC* (April 24, 2016) and Thierry Tardy. *Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military measures.* (Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015). On FRONTEX, see *About the Agency.* (Warsaw: FRONTEX, 2016). Accessed August 31, 2016 http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/faq/about-the-agency.

[736] "Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained." *BBC* (April 24, 2016).

[737] *Immigration Enforcement Along the U.S. Borders and at Ports of Entry: Federal, State, and Local Efforts*, op. cit.

[738] *Nationwide Staffing, 1992-2017.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Customs and Border Protection, 2017).

[739] *Immigration Enforcement Along the U.S. Borders and at Ports of Entry: Federal, State, and Local Efforts*, op. cit.

annual rate over the past two decades.[740] As a comparative measure, FRONTEX announced its goal to reach 1000 staff members to secure the border by 2020.[741]

Table 5.9: United States Border
Patrol Staff by Region (2001-2016)[742]

Year	Coastal Border	Northern Border	Southwest Border
2001	148	340	9147
2002	143	492	9239
2003	152	569	9840
2004	160	979	9506
2005	160	988	9891
2006	153	919	11032
2007	172	1098	13297
2008	209	1363	15442
2009	223	1887	17408
2010	246	2263	17535
2011	232	2237	18506
2012	224	2206	18546
2013	213	2156	18611
2014	215	2093	18156
2015	212	2051	17522
2016	211	2059	17026

Narco-Trafficking & Demand Side Strategies

In terms of domestic policy, the EU has been on the forefront of demand-centric measures, including decriminalization, legalization and health-related services. The "European model" emphasizes harm reduction through substitution treatment; needle exchange; controlled consumption and prescription; addiction treatment, disease testing; and vaccination.[743] Approximately one in six people in the EU get access to addiction treatment services (see Table 5.10).[744] Meanwhile the DHHS estimates only 10 percent of U.S. addicts seek and receive treatment.[745] The success of the European' focus on supply side policies are measurable.

Treatment, intervention and education takes precedence over incarceration in the EU. Of the 650,000 people incarcerated across member states, approximately half have narcotics-

---

[740] Conor Friedersdorf. "The War on Drugs Turns 40." *The Atlantic* (June 15, 2011).

[741] *European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders.* (Brussels: European Commission, 2015).

[742] *Nationwide Staffing, 1992-2017*, op. cit.

[743] Estievenart, op. cit., pp. 41-42. Also see "Burn-out and battle fatigue." *The Economist* (March 17, 2012).

[744] *Data and Statistics.* (Lisbon: European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2015). Accessed April 25, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2015. Also see International Narcotics Control Board. *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2010* (Vienna: United Nations, 2011).

[745] *Defining the Addiction Treatment Gap* (Rockville: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2010).

related offenses (see Table 5.11).[746] Comparatively, approximately half of all U.S. prisoners in federal prisons, and approximately 16 percent of those in state facilities, are serving a sentence for narcotics-related offences.[747]

Table 5.10: Number of Deaths Due to Overdoes from Illegal Narcotics in France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom & the United States (2001-2016)[748]

Year	France	The Netherlands	United Kingdom	United States
2001	272	144	3679	19,394
2002	242	103	3461	23,518
2003	231	104	3168	25,785
2004	267	127	3378	27,424
2005	301	122	3305	29,813
2006	305	112	3306	34,425
2007	333	99	3352	36,010
2008	374	129	3754	36,450
2009	365	392	3677	37,004
2010	392	139	3517	38,329
2011	340	---	3499	41,340
2012	264	---	---	41,502
2013	---	144	2499	43,982
2014	---	123	3,346	47,055
2015	---	197	3,674	52,404
2016	---	---	3,744	63,632

This is an increase of over 200 percent and over 60 percent, respectively, since 1990.[749] It is estimated as many as 500,000 Americans are imprisoned for drug-related offenses, almost as many as imprisoned across the entire EU for all offences.[750] Low European prison populations are also due to the widespread decriminalization and legalization policies across the continent.

---

[746] *Prisons and Drugs: prevalence, responses and alternatives to imprisonment.* (Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction, 2015). Accessed May 1, 2016: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/topics/prison.

[747] *Prisons and Drugs: prevalence, responses and alternatives to imprisonment*, op. cit.

[748] *Deaths related to drug poisoning in England and Wales, 2014 registrations* (London: Office for National Statistics, 2015); *Deaths related to drug poisoning in England and Wales, 2016 registrations* (London: Office for National Statistics, 2017); *European Drug Report: Trends and Developments* (2017), op. cit.; *France Country Overview.* (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016); *Overdose Death Rates*, op. cit.; Damien Gayle. "Drug related deaths hit record levels in England and Wales." *The Guardian* (September 9, 2016); *Table DRD-2. Number of drug-induced deaths recorded in EU according to national definitions: Part (i) Total drug-induced deaths, 1995–2011*, op. cit. and *Table DRD-2: Overdose deaths. Current Situation. Gender.*

[749] Ann E. Carson. *Prisoners In 2014* (Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 2015), pp. 16-17; Darrell K. Gilliard and Allan J. Beck. *Prisoners in 1994.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 1995), pp. 10-11. Accessed May 1, 2016 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p04.pdf; Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison and William J. Sabol, *Prisoners in 2010.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2011), pp. 28 and 30. Accessed May 1, 2016 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf; Lauren E. Glaze and Thomas P. Bonczar. *Probation and Parole in the United States, 2010.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2011), pp. 33 and 43 and *Trends in U.S. Corrections* (Washington, The Sentencing Project: 2015), p. 2.

[750] *Trends in U.S. Corrections,* op. cit., p. 3.

The obvious contrast to the U.S. regarding the effects of these policies is the Netherlands, which has a long-established preference for such strategies.

**Table 5.11: Number of Drug Law Violations in in France,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom & the United States (2001-2015)**[751]

Year	France	The Netherlands	United Kingdom	United States
2001	91,618	13,558	---	1,586,902
2002	108,121	15,848	---	1,538,813
2003	125,479	17,087	---	1,678,192
2004	141,297	22,304	122,459	1,746,570
2005	144,561	20,160	118,706	1,846,351
2006	151,487	20,306	124,344	1,889,810
2007	157,008	19,399	135,655	1,841,182
2008	177,964	18,862	149,203	1,702,537
2009	174,870	17,076	147,013	1,663,582
2010	157,341	14,905	152,451	1,638,84
2011	---	17,420	154,212	1,531,251
2012	---	18,200	144,434	1,552,432
2013	---	17,130	139,803	1,501,043
2014	216110	21387	128260	1,561,231
2015	---	20503	---	1,488,707

The Netherlands has slightly less than half the rate of cannabis use and two-thirds less than rate of heroin use.[752] It also spends less on its criminal justice system and maintains a fraction of the prison population in absolute terms when compared to the U.S.[753] The number of drug users also reveals the level of impact these divergent polices have on domestic populations. A review of available data from 2004 to 2016, revealed a much smaller number of drug users in France and the UK, with a population size of approximately 66 million and 64 million respectively, than in the U.S. (see Table 5. 11)[754]

---

[751] *Arrests for Illicit Drugs Annually in the US, by Drug: Type Figures in Percents*, op. cit.; *Crime in the United States*, op. cit.; *France Country Drug Report 2017* (Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction, 2017) and *Table DLO-01-1. Drug law offences. Number of Offences. Offences*, op. cit.

[752] *Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Volume II. Technical Appendices and Selected Prevalence Table*s (Rockville: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2010), p. 99, Table G.2, and p. 101, Table G.4. Accessed April 15, 2016 http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k9NSDUH/2k9ResultsApps.pdf and *The Netherlands Drug Situation 2011: Report to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point.* (Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and Addiction and the Ministry of Security and Justice Research and Documentation Centre, 2012), p. 40, Table 2.1.1.

[753] Frans van Dijk and Jaap de Waard. *Legal infrastructure of the Netherlands in international perspective: Crime control.* (Netherlands: Ministry of Justice, June 2000), p. 9, Table S.13 and Roy Walmsley. *World Prison Population List*, Tenth Edition. (Kings College, London, England: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2013), Table 2, p. 3, and Table 4, p. 5.

[754] *DrugFacts: National Wide Trends* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute on Drug Abuse); *European Drug Report: Trends and Developments* (2014), op. cit.; *GPS 106. Problem drug use. Overall (ex PDU). All years. Geo-Coverage. National* (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016

In contrast, decriminalization and legalization are viewed in America as an expression of failure or defeat, despite the proven success of many of these policies in comparable nations.[755] In a statement to the UN, the U.S. made clear that debating legalization gratifies and misleads traffickers, and the acceptance of "harm reduction" strategies, "connotes a tacit acceptance of drug abuse" and fosters "de facto decriminalization."[756] This perspective is manifest across the government. Attorney General Loretta Lynch, for example, rejected legalization in her confirmation hearing.[757] Michael Botticelli, Obama's director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated before House Committee on Oversight in 2014 that the administration would continue to oppose attempts to legalize marijuana and other drugs, despite state efforts.[758] This view was supported by Former DEA administrator Michele Leonhart, who said in her 2012 testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, "all illegal drugs are bad."[759] Indeed, the Obama administration has consistently maintained the long established anti-narcotics policies of his predecessors (to be further described in the sections below). For example, Obama continued to allow the DEA to raid state medical marijuana providers – institutions that primarily serve terminally ill medical patients – at a rate even higher than the Bush administration.[760] And he reinstated a ban supporting syringe access programs in 2011, despite one-third of all HIV/AIDS cases in the U.S. (or an estimated 354,000 people) resulted from needle sharing and that access to syringes, according to the CDC, can transmission rates by 80 percent.[761]

---

http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2016#displayTable:PDU-Nat; International Narcotics Control Board (2015), op. cit.; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, op. cit. and *Table PDU-1. Estimates of prevalence of problem drug use at national level: summary table, 2006–11, rate per 1 000 aged 15–64, Part (i) Overall problem drug use.* (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats13#display:/stats13/pdutab1a.

[755] Robin Room. "The Rhetoric of International Drug Control." *Substance Use and Misuse* (1999).

[756] Room, op. cit.

[757] Matt Ferner. "Loretta Lynch Says She Doesn't Support Marijuana Legalization or Obama's Views on Pot." *Huffington Post* (January 28, 2016).

[758] Benjamin Goad. "White House: We oppose marijuana legalization." *The Hill* (February 4, 2014).

[759] Michele Leonhart. *Drug Enforcement Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, June 20, 2012), p. 30. After revisiting the issue in 2016, the DEA ruled again that that marijuana would maintain its status as a Schedule I narcotic. See *DEA Will Not Reschedule Marijuana, But May Expand Number of Growers of Research Marijuana* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016).

[760] Friedersdorf, op. cit.; Martha Mendoza. "U.S. drug war has met none of its goals." *Associated Press* (May 31, 2010) and David Remnick. "Going the Distance: On and off the road with Barack Obama." *The New Yorker* (January 27, 2014). For a broad overview of this contradiction in rhetoric and policy see Jacob Sullum. "Bummer: Barack Obama turns out to be just another drug warrior." *Reason* (October 2011).

[761] *Drug War Statistics*, op. cit. and Schrager, op. cit.

The outcomes of these diverging domestic policies are unsurprisingly different and prove less successful in the U.S. than the EU. In 2014, for example, an estimated 74 percent of maritime smuggling – and as much as 80 percent of all narcotics smuggled into the U.S. generally – passed through a legal point of entry, despite increases in border security (see Figure 5.5 and Table 5.9).[762] The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse's examination of U.S. interdiction policy found rising budgets had no impact in reducing demand, nor the costs of trafficking and addition on society and government.[763] Combined with increasingly militarized domestic policies in the U.S., the failure to achieve the desired outcomes is apparent in the increasing rates of abuse and addiction (as explored in the introduction); death and disease (for example, see Table 5.5 and Table 5.10); incarceration and criminalization (for example, see Table 5.6 and Table 5.11); in addition to the increasing accessibility, diversity and lethality of available narcotics.[764] It is estimated, for example, that the U.S. has ten times more hardcore users today than when the drug war was launched.[765]

Federal policies remain in place despite twenty U.S. states having passed decriminalization or legalization legislation, which have reaped certain benefits.[766] In Colorado, for example, the Drug Policy Alliance found a decrease in crime, arrests and traffic fatalities, while gains in tax revenue and savings for law enforcements and the judicial system (from a

---

[762] Ernesto Londono. "Commander of Southern Command tells senators budget cuts mean more narcotics get to U.S." *Washington Post* (March 13, 2014).

[763] National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse. *Shoveling Up II: The Impact of Substance Abuse on State Budgets* (New York: Columbia University, 2009), p. 58.

[764] For an overview of these expanding budgets and rising militarization see, Yulia Vorobyeva. "Drugs as a National Security Threat: Securitization of Drugs in the U.S. Official Discourse." *Miami International Studies Journal* (2012), pp. 72-94.

[765] Michael F. Walther. *Insanity: Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug Strategy* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2012), p. 2.

[766] As of 2017, more than 20 countries outside the U.S. have enacted decriminalization polices. See Eastwood, Fox and Rosmarin, op. cit. Recently Mexico has suggested it might also experiment with the policy. See Rafael Bernal. "Mexican President proposes pot decriminalization." *The Hill* (April 22, 2016) and Ryan Grenoble. "Revenue from Colorado Marijuana Tax Expected to Double in 2015." *Huffington Post* (October 5, 2015). On the success of legalization and decriminalization policies around the world, see Jon Lee Anderson. "Can Colombia Solve Its Drug Problem Through Peace?" *The New Yorker* (May 22, 2015); *Approaches to Decriminalizing Drug Use & Possession.* (New York: The Drug Policy Alliance, 2015); Jose Carlos Campero. *From Repression to Regulation: Proposals for Drug Policy Reform* (Bogota: Regional Security Cooperation Program, 2013); Meaghan Cussen and Walter Block. "Legalize Drugs Now: An Analysis of the Benefits of Legalized Drugs." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (2000), pp. 525-536; Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy. "The War on Drugs: Anatomy of a Failure." *Books and Ideas* (February 11, 2016); *Drug War Statistics*, op cit.; William A Galston and E.J. Dionne Jr. *The New Politics of Marijuana Legalization: Why Opinion is Changing.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013); Jeffrey Miron and Katherine Waldock. *The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition.* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2010); Allison Schrager. "The economic case for the US to legalize all drugs." *Quartz* (June 7, 2013); *Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work,* op. cit. and Colletta A. Youngers and John M. Walsh. "Drug Decriminalization: A Trend Takes Shape." *Americas Quarterly* (Fall 2009).

decreased focus on marijuana possession) has allowed for the state to make major investments in its public school system.[767] It was further estimated by the Insittuto Mexicano para la Competitividad (a well-respected Mexican think tank), that widespread legalization in the U.S. would significantly decrease Mexican production of marijuana, up to 30 percent.[768] As Niamh Eastwood, Edward Fox and Ari Rosmarin note, "the proliferation of decriminalisation policies around the world demonstrates that decriminalisation is a viable and successful policy option for many countries. Decriminalisation has not been the disaster many predicted and continue to predict… a country's drug-enforcement policies appear to have little correlation with levels of drug use."[769]

We might anticipate that if the prioritization of threats to U.S. national security were based on material factors, and policies consistently failed, a shift in approach would occur to adequately reorient strategy. This implies the U.S could justify a war on drugs if significant gains were measurable, or if no other feasible policy options were available. But this is not the case. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan writes, "prohibition has had little impact on the supply of or demand for drugs. When law enforcement succeeds in one area, drug production simply moves to another region or country, drug trafficking moves to another route and drug users switch to a different drug" adding that, "nor has prohibition significantly reduced use. Studies have consistently failed to establish the existence of a link between the harshness of a country's drug laws and its levels of drug use."[770] He concludes, "the widespread criminalization and punishment of people who use drugs, the overcrowded prisons, mean that the war on drugs is, to a significant degree, a war on drug users a war on people.[771]

Despite the availability of alternative strategies, the U.S. government sustains its failed policy. While increased production, distribution, demand and addiction have all led the U.S. to employ an increasingly militarized approach, EU policy has grown more liberalized. This while European narcotics use and abuse, related incarcerations, public and military expenditures as well as the volume of trade of have all declined. U.S. policy has nonetheless

---

[767] Kit O'Connel. "New School, less crime: Colorado benefits of marijuana legalization." *MIT Press News* (August 19, 2015) and *Marijuana Legalization in Colorado After One Year of Retail Sales and Two Years of Decriminalization.* (New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2015).

[768] *Possible impacto del la legalizaciont de la marihuana en Estados Unidos.* (Mexico City: Insittuto Mexicano para la Competitividad, 2012).

[769] Eastwood, Fox and Rosmarin, op. cit., p. 38.

[770] Kofi Annan. "Why I'm Calling to End the War on Drugs." *Huffington Post* (April 19, 2016).

[771] Annan, op. cit.

moved predominately in the opposite direction. It favors increased military spending on overseas operations, increased criminal penalties for offenders and an emphasis on more vigilant border control efforts (on land at sea). Although the U.S. does not exclude the policies favored by the EU, as evidenced above, they do not depend on them as a primary policy means for combatting narco-trafficking.

I now turn to the second hypothesis: the prioritization of narco-trafficking is a result of the powerful impact of political culture and bureaucratic institutions.

NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

I will now assess whether the discrepancies presented in the four examples in the previous section are better explained by a Cultural-Institutional hypothesis. I argue that political culture and related institutional biases (in the context of discourse, strategy and expenditures) best explain the prioritization of specific threats to the U.S. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, narco-trafficking ranks as a medium level priority. This is characterized by a mid-level budgetary commitment; a preference for mitigating (i.e. limited force) strategies; and the prevalence of 'problem discourse' (see Table 5.1). Problem discourse is defined by a dominate narrative, but unlike crisis discourse, this narrative does not exist to the exclusion of others. Alternative narratives work to challenge its legitimacy. Contested discourse effects policy by constraining the dominate narrative's capacity to fully define the threat. The existing tension between, and the lack of cohesion among, discourses creates opportunities for alternative policy options to be included in threat assessment debates, creating potential for expanding policy preferences. But the very existence of a dominate narrative (although weaker when compared the narrative presented by crisis discourse) ensures that policy preferences are maintained, regardless of their failure to achieve their desired outcomes.

Discourse

A Cultural-Institutional explanation posits that threat prioritization can be understood, in part, as a measure of the discourse, or how a threat is framed. The perspective of narco-trafficking as a national security problem is present in the discourse. In his 2003 and 2008 *National Drug Control Strategy*, for example, Bush referenced narcotics as a 'problem' for

America 61 times and 43 times respectively.[772] Comparably, in his 2013 and 2014 *National Drug Control Policy*, Obama defined drugs as a 'problem' 43 times and ten times, respectively.[773]

The U.S. government contextualizes the threat of drugs generally through a military frame. Starting with Nixon in the 1970s, the 'war on drugs' (terminology maintained to this day) provided the foundation of an inherit strategic bias for a strategy of mitigation. When launching the war on drugs, Nixon declared the threat, "public enemy number one," stating that, "in order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive."[774] As Emily Dufton writes, "Nixon launched a drug war that framed drug users not as alienated youths whose addiction was caused by inhabiting a fundamentally inequitable society, but as criminals attacking the moral fiber of the nation, people who deserved only incarceration and punishment."[775] She adds, "the addict doesn't need to be *cured*. Rather, he needs to be *contained* before he can do any additional harm. Launching a war that emphasizes forfeiture and 'no-knock' drug busts over rehabilitation or treatment is the most logical outcome of this reasoning, one that we've endured since 1971."[776] Reagan echoed this sentiment in 1981, declaring the U.S. would win the war on drugs and making anti-drug policy a pillar of his administration by increasing criminal penalties, budgets and overseas military operations.[777]

The second Bush administration maintained this framing mechanism. In his first *National Security Strategy*, Bush referenced the illicit drug trade six times in the context of security and only once in the context of health.[778] In his 2006 strategy, Bush mentioned narco-trafficking again six times but only in the context of security.[779] As Eliot Katz writes, "locked in the language of war, it's impossible to find another way out."[780] And not all threats are as frequently defined in the context of war, and over such an extended period of time. In the

---

[772] George W. Bush. *National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003) and George W. Bush. *National Drug Control Strategy: 2008 Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2008).

[773] Barack Obama. *National Drug Control Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2013) and *2014 National Drug Control Policy*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2015).

[774] Richard Nixon. *Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.* (Washington: The White House, June 17, 1971).

[775] Emily Dufton. "The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime." *The Atlantic* (March 26, 2012).

[776] Dufton, op. cit.

[777] Andrew Glass. "Reagan Declares 'War on Drugs,' October 14 1982." *Politico* (October 14, 2010) and Ronald Reagan. *Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy.* (Maryland: Camp David, October 2, 1982).

[778] *National Security Strategy* (2002), op. cit.

[779] *National Security Strategy* (2006), op. cit.

[780] Eliot Katz. "Unlocking the Language Room of War." *CommonDreams.org* (September 7, 2004).

post-9/11 era the threat discourse depicting narco-trafficking grew, becoming increasingly associated with threat like terrorism, immigration, border control, failed states and insurgency. The widespread militarization of the U.S. following 2001 further expanded America's 'geographic vision' of what war looks like.[781] The U.S.-Mexico borderlands, for example, became a primary focal point, writes Carolyn Gallaher, having "primed the pump for making a direct connection between cartels and insurgency."[782]

Obama attempted to shift the focus and include demand-centric discourse. He called U.S. policy, "unproductive" and "devastating" for families and he indicated his desire to shift the threat narrative from criminality to one depicting a threat to the moral fabric of society.[783] Gil Kerlikowske Obama's former Director if the Office of Drug Control Policy, echoed these sentiments: "in the grand scheme, it has not been successful. Forty years later, the concern about drugs and drug problems, if anything, magnified, intensified."[784] Botticelli concurred: "we can't arrest and incarcerate addiction out of people. Not only do I think it's really inhumane, but it's ineffective and its costs us billions upon billions of dollars to keep doing this."[785] Still, as evidenced in the aforementioned remarks from the Attorney General, the DEA, the U.S. Mission to the UN and Botticelli himself, this has done little to shift the focus of official U.S. policy from a supply to a demand-centric approach. Despite his stated intent to shift discursive emphasis, Obama still filed a statement on the Congressional Record in 2013 noting that narco-trafficking poses, "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and causes an extreme level of violence corruption, and harm in the United States and abroad."[786]

The discourse employed by the U.S. differs substantially from the EU. For example, member nations are bound by their founding treaty to ensure human health is protected as a part of any policy are enacted.[787] And the EU accepted into its supranational framework UN standards (also adopted in the 1970s) which foremost maintain respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, solidarity, the rule of law and human rights in executing any anti-

---

[781] Carolyn Gallaher. "Mexico, the failed state debate and the Merida fix." *The Geographical Journal* (2015), p. 3 and Derek Gregory. "The everywhere war." *The Geographical Journal* (2011), p. 244.

[782] Gallaher, op. cit. p. 244.

[783] "Obama blasts war on drugs: 'It's been very unproductive.'" *The Washington Times* (April 9, 2015).

[784] Martha Mendoza. "U.S. drug war has met none of its goals." *Associated Press* (May 31, 2010).

[785] Scott Pelley. "A New Direction on Drugs." *CBS News* (December 13, 2015).

[786] Barack Obama. *Notice to Congress – Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2014).

[787] *Public Health: Health Programme.* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016

narcotics strategies.[788] As Robin Room notes in his examination of statements made by member states in the UN Commission on Narcotics Drugs, despite a consistent belief that drugs are, "a scourge or menace, against which a war must be waged," not all states articulate militaristic discourse. In particular, Western European countries were distinct in their lack of framing drugs in the context of the war.[789] Rather, the EU depicts narcotics as a 'complex social and health problem' while the U.S. defines it as a threat to the, "safety, security, and financial well-being of Americans."[790] This divergence has critical implications for the prioritization of threats.

Variance is also illustrated by official U.S. and EU anti-drug strategies.[791] On a substantive level, these documents present two distinct frameworks for how to prioritize and implement policies intended to fight narco-trafficking. The EU's focus is first reducing demand, then addressing supply.[792] To achieve these goals the EU pursues coordination with member states; international cooperation with partnering states outside the EU; and the compilation, analysis and application of standardized metrics and data.[793] The use of data (labeled the 'common language' among nations) is considered the central pillar of a successful strategy.[794] As Wolfgang Goltz, director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, noted in a 2015 speech, "fundamentally, it is the investment made by Member States in developing robust national drug information systems that makes European-level monitoring possible and successful."[795] The same cannot be said in the U.S. where different states maintain different standards regarding privacy rights and the use personal information. For example, Missouri refuses to join the prescription pill database monitoring patient use and

---

[788] National Security Council. *Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security.* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2015).

[789] Room, op. cit.

[790] *Drug Control.* (Brussels: European Commission, 2015) Accessed October 1, 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/drug-control/index_en.htm.

[791] *2015 National Drug Control Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2015); "EU Action Plan on Drugs (2013-2016)." *Official Journal of the European Union* (2013) and "EU Drugs Strategy (2013-20)." *Official Journal of the European Union* (2012).

[792] *EU Action Plan on Drugs (2013-2016),* op. cit.

[793] *EU Action Plan on Drugs (2013-2016),* op. cit.

[794] Wolfgang Goltz. *20 years of monitoring and communicating evidence on drugs.* (Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, September 21, 2015), p. 2.

[795] Goltz, op. cit., p. 2.

abuse.[796] U.S. states are also increasingly decriminalizing and legalizing, certain substances, making enforcement increasingly difficult for Federal or state agencies across jurisdictions.

Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to place a greater emphasis on the production and distribution and the use of limited force to combat them.[797] Under Bush, for example, despite a tacit recognition of alternative policies (including rehabilitation and education), the war on drugs rhetoric was ever-present. This is best illustrated in the war on terrorism, where the fight against narcotics resulted in the widespread eradication of poppy fields as a part of the military mission against al Qaeda and the Taliban.[798] And in the years following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration made a significant effort to emphasize the war on terror is funded by narco-trafficking.[799] And despite attempts to shift the discourse away from this framework of war, Obama was unable to reframe the dominate narrative. For example, in 2008 Obama declared the war on drugs had failed; but DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, declared in her 2010 remarks while visiting Mexico that it had not.[800] Attorney General Eric Holder consistently used the term 'war on drugs' during his tenure. And Vice President Joe Biden is a longtime advocate of traditional anti-narcotics policy; his views while serving in the Senate stand in stark opposition to Obama.[801] Starting in 1984, Biden led the passage of legislation to increase police powers against low level drug dealers and penalties for addicts and traffickers.[802]

This rhetorical framing also extends its influence to the second set of policy examples – border control and healthcare. A discourse of war, as noted above, is difficult to escape. As discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two, this is because the labeling of a threat is more than, Monica Gariup writes, "rhetorical practice" but rather has, "deep cognitive implications since it suggests a way to categorize information and consequently act upon it: conceptual classification and framing shapes competence delimitation and the set of rules which should be applied to the specific case (means and ways)."[803] The implication being discourse structure

---

[796] "49 States Combat Opioid Epidemic with Prescription Database." *NPR* (May 10, 2016); Jared Kaufman. "Without database, Missouri pharmacists struggle to detect prescription drug abuse." *Colombia Missouri* (April 5, 2016) and Alan Schwarz. "Missouri Alone in Resisting Prescription Pill Database." *New York Times* (July 20, 2014).

[797] *2015 National Drug Control Policy,* op. cit.

[798] "Drug Money Sustains al Qaeda." *The Washington Times* (December 29, 2003).

[799] "Drug Money Sustains al Qaeda," op. cit.

[800] Rafael Romo. "Napolitano: Mexican drug war 'not a failure.'" *CNN* (February 27, 2012).

[801] Matt Ferner and Nick Wing. "Joe Biden Has a Serious Drug Policy Problem." *Huffington Post* (September 2, 2015).

[802] Ferner and Wing, op. cit.

[803] Monica Gariup. *European Security Culture: Language, Theory, Policy.* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), p. 66.

actions and creates opportunities for specific threat perceptions to emerge, coalesce and evolve into policy by restricting or widening opportunities for engagement. As Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs note, "how political actors articulate collective goals, the array of threats, and the conceivable means has effects on the support of relevant audiences, the formation of coalitions, the marginalization of opponents, the resilience of national mobilization, and the selection of policy instruments."[804] For example, as Sue Pryce points out, the term "drug" is generic; its legality or illegality of it is a subjective measure.[805] Drugs became, "politically and morally loaded" through interpretation and framing by government officials.[806] Drugs are, "an enemy to be identified in all its many guises, feared, fought and defeated to safeguard a nation's citizens and way of life. Governments not only specify which substances are legal/illegal, but enforce these distinctions by imprisoning drug offenders as if they were enemies of the state."[807] This perspective fosters a domestic policy approach similar to the U.S. foreign policy approach, implying a preference for the use of force in strict border control, policing to combat supply and criminalizing demand.

Fukumi notes, the U.S. differs from the EU because it perceives drugs as a "national security threat that needed to be eliminated to defend the homeland."[808] The EU perceives the problem as a, "societal security threat that should be curbed through economic and social politics."[809] The differences is a result of a divergent "understanding of its nature… constructed on their geographical, historical, and cultural backgrounds."[810] This divergence cannot be solely attributed to material factors, as a systemic shift hypothesis suggests. Rather, I posit, it is based on non-material factors, evolving from subjective measures specific to the unique political culture of U.S. national security. And these factors have a determining and consequential effect on the evolution and execution of policy, to be explored in the following section.

---

[804] Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs. "Rhetoric Legitimation, and Grand Strategy." *Security Studies* (2015).
[805] Sue Pryce. "The Politics of Drug Prohibition" in Julia Buxton's (ed.) *The Politics of Narcotic Drugs: A Survey* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 102.
[806] Pryce, op. cit., p. 102.
[807] Pryce, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
[808] Fukumi, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
[809] Fukumi, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
[810] Fukumi, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

Strategy

Discourse upholds specific forms of bureaucratic bias. It provides opportunities for certain agencies to rise in prominence when competing to control the execution of policy and the resources allocated to achieve it. As Donald T. Dickson points out, America took on narco-trafficking as a 'moral crusade' in the 1970s.[811] The ideological commitment to prohibition became more than just policy, but a means for organizational survival and growth, which is still present today.[812] This institutional bias for prohibition – and the continued use of prohibition in the dominate discourse – contributes to sustaining mitigating strategies as the primary policy in the fight against narcotics. In 1989, the government institutionalized this bias when making the DOD the lead agency in the Federal response at the nation's land and sea borders. By amending Title 10 of the Federal Code, legislators upgraded the DOD from playing a support role (defined by the *Posse Comitatus Act*) to being the primary bureaucracy leading the fight against drugs.[813] This followed a 1986 directive that authorized the military to intervene abroad in order to fight narco-trafficking.[814]

This bias is also measurable in the collected data. Survey respondents on average, preferred the use of limited force as their policy preference to combat narco-trafficking (see Figure 5.2). They also expressed a preference for the FBI as the agency best suited to address the threat (see Figure 5.3). It is therefore consistent with expectations of bias that survey respondents indicated a belief that the FBI is generally (and outside the context of any specific threat) inclined towards a policy of limited force when executing any policy. When asked which policy each agency has a preference for, outside the context of any specific threat, survey respondents overwhelmingly selected the use of limited force (see Table 5.12). A preference expressed by survey respondents for the FBI to combat narco-trafficking, and a perceived bias within the FBI to use limited force (as expressed by survey respondents in Table 5.12), might

---

[811] Donald T. Dickson. "Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade" in (ed.) Paul E. Rock's *Drugs and Politics* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1977) and "Thirty Years of America's Drug War." *PBS* (2014). Accessed, January 25, 2016 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron.

[812] Dickson, op. cit.

[813] See *10 U.S. Code § 124 - Detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs: Department of Defense to be lead agency.* Also see Lynn A. Stuart. *The US Marine Corps' Role in the War on Drugs* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1990) and George Withers, Lucila Santos and Adam Isacson. *Preach What You Practice: The Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Office on Latin America, 2010).

[814] Daniela Corti and Ashok Swain. "War on Drugs and War on Terror: Case of Afghanistan." *Peace and Conflict Review* (2009), p. 3.

explain why, despite the availability of other relevant agencies or applicable policies, the FBI was the bureaucracy selected to confront narco-trafficking. Agency preference notwithstanding, a desire to use mitigating strategies to defeat narco-trafficking remains the norm.

Table 5.12: Preferred Policy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

	Over-whelming Use of Force	Limited Use of Force	Economic Incentives	Diplomatic Engagement	Sanctions	No Policy	Do Not Know	Total
Politician	11.11	55.56	0	11.11	0	0	22.22	**100**
Bureaucrat	5.88	52.94	0	23.53	0	5.88	11.76	**100**
Military	0	42.86	0	9.52	19.05	14.29	14.29	**100**
Media	0	66.67	0	6.67	0	6.67	20	**100**
Civil Society	11.11	66.67	0	0	0	11.11	11.11	**100**
Academia /Think Tank	4.55	18.18	0	9.09	4.55	9.09	54.55	**100**

The institutional bias for prohibition is systemic, manifesting as a preference for mitigating (i.e. limited force) policies across the government. Wherein other nations are shifting towards policies addressing the root causes and effects of drug distribution and addiction, the U.S. continues to focus on border militarization and criminalization.

Yet, the use of limited force has a failed strategy. This is not only represented by data, but is also the standard objective perspective of a vast and diverse array of stakeholders, including the Global Drug Commission, the American Public Health Association, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Organization of American States, the UN, the WHO among other groups.[815] Their objective

---

[815] For example, the Global Commission on Drug Policy finds current global drug policy fuels, rather than diminishes, public health hazards and threats to public safety. It undermines human rights and fosters discrimination, resulting in a dramatic expansion of detained populations worldwide (with a disproportionate emphasis on women and minorities). It tends to increase, rather decrease, crime by fostering higher profit margins that motivate new actors to join the production and distribution of narcotics, increasing the costs of enforcing anti-drug policies. The Commission determines that anti-narcotic policies undermines security, fosters corrupt governance through the exploitation of weak institutions and vulnerable populations, and wastes billions of dollars of government revenue. A review of the UNODC annual report on world drug use from its inception in 1997 to 2017 consistently stresses the relevancy and necessity of demand versus supply side policies. See *Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work*, op. cit. and United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2016) and *World Drug Report* (2017), op. cit. Also see *A.P.H.A. Policy Statement 201312: Defining and Implementing a Public Health Response to Drug Use and Misuse.* (Washington, DC: American Public Health Association, 2013); *Americas: Decriminalize Personal Use of Drugs; Reform Policies to Curb Violence, Abuse.* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013); *The Drug Problem in the Americas: Analytical Report* (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 2013); Lasha Goguadze. *International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' Statement to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 55th Session.* (New York, United Nations, March 20, 2012); Jose Miguel Insulza. *The OAS Drug Report: 16 Months of Debates and Consensus* (Guatemala: Organization of American States, 2014); *One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections.* Washington, D.C.: The Pew Center on the States, 2009); *Policy Brief: H.I.V. Prevention, Diagnosis, Treatment and Care for Key Populations: Consolidated Guidelines*

analysis maintains that the use of force to combat narco-trafficking has failed and alternative policies must be pursued. As former Secretary-General Annan writes, "nowhere is this divorce between rhetoric and reality more evident than in the formulation of some notable global drug policies, where too often emotions and ideology rather than evidence have prevailed."[816] Other examples abound. In an extensive study on the topic of international prohibition by The Lancet revealed mitigating policies generate a, "parallel economy run by criminal networks" which "resort to violence to protect their markets."[817] This is compounded by state policy and paramilitary actions against traffickers which increase violence as well as community insecurity and instability. In 2015, a group of 150 former law enforcement officers from across the U.S. launched the Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime & Incarceration, arguing that the current drug prohibition regime was the primary factor in U.S. crime and high imprisonment rates.[818] And a 2011 global study published in the *International Journal of Drug Policy* revealed an increase in law enforcement pressure on illicit narcotics networks tended to increase levels of violence around the world.[819]

As aa result, Latin American are increasingly shifting towards the European model of decriminalization, regulation and "harm reduction." As Otto Perez Molina, the President of Guatemala wrote, "facts are what we need to concentrate on when considering drug policy options. When we analyse drug markets through realistic lenses (not ideological ones as is pretty much customary in most government circles these days), we realise that drug consumption is a public health issue that, awkwardly, has been transformed into a criminal justice problem."[820] He added, "knowing that drugs are bad for human beings is not a compelling reason for advocating their prohibition. Actually, the prohibition paradigm that inspires mainstream global drug policy today is based on a false premise: that the global drug markets can be eradicated?"[821] A 2013 report from the Organization of American States

---

July 2014. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2014) and *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing.* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2014).

[816] Annan, op. cit.

[817] The Lancet Commissions. *Public Health and international Drug Policy* (London: The Lancet, 2016).

[818] Garry McCarty and Ronal Serpas. "Cut incarceration and crime at the same time." *USA Today* (October 21, 2015) and the Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime & Incarceration at http://lawenforcementleaders.org.

[819] Dan Werb et. al. "Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence: Evidence from a Scientific Review." *International Journal of Drug Policy* (2010) and Devon Kristine Zuegel. "Prohibition & Anarchy: How The War on Drugs Helps Violence Flourish." *Stanford Review* (2014).

[820] Otto Perez Molina. "We have to find new solutions to Latin America's drugs nightmare," *The Guardian* (April 7, 2012).

[821] Molina, op. cit.

supported this view, challenging states to consider counternarcotic strategies that decrease criminal penalties for use and legalize or decriminalize cannabis.[822] Since then, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico, have begun relaxing penalties for possession.[823]

Expenditures

William N. Elwood writes that, "war is a potent condensation symbol that connotes heroes and enemies, battles and battlefields, and war sized allocation of resources to guarantee ultimate victory of the enemy."[824] When political culture comes to bear on institutions and threat prioritization is transformed into policy outcomes, budgets provide a tangible measure of priorities and preferences. Budgetary allocations for fighting narco-trafficking are substantial. The U.S spends approximately $40 to $50 billion annually fighting the war on drugs.[825] It is estimated to have spent over $1 trillion since 1969.[826] Over the past forty years, an analysis by the *Associated Press* revealed, the U.S. has spent approximately $20 billion fighting domestic narco-trafficking gangs; $49 billion in law enforcement along the border; $121 billion executing arrests on 37 million nonviolent drug offenders; and an additional $450 billion to incarcerate them in federal prisons.[827] The reflects a clear preference for dedicating resources to supply over demand side policies. Every president since Nixon has spent less on prevention and treatment than law enforcement, and nearly every administration (with the exception of Carter) has worked to widen the gap of this unbalanced funding.[828] The 1973 budget for anti-drug efforts was the 'high-water mark for demand reduction' with 70 percent of total resources being allocated to demand-centric policies.[829] And since the 1980s, according to an analysis from the U.S. Army War College, the spending balance has remained at approximately one-

---

[822] See Alvaro Briones, et. al. (eds.) *The Drug Problem in the Americas* (Washington, D.C: Organization of American States, 2013) and Insulza, op. cit.

[823] Rafael Bernal. "Mexican president proposes pot decriminalization." *The Hill* (April 22, 2016) and Luis Andres Henao. "Latin America rejects old U.S. approach." *Reuters* (January 29, 2010).

[824] Elwood, op. cit., p. 5.

[825] *Drug War Statistics*, op cit.; Miron and Waldock, op. cit. and Schrager, op. cit. For a breakdown of the direct budget (versus the indirect total costs associated with fighting the war on drugs annually), see *National Drug Control Budget* (Washington, D.C.: United States Office of the President of the United States, 2014).

[826] Walther, op. cit., p. 15.

[827] Mendoza, op. cit.

[828] Dufton, op. cit.

[829] Walther, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

third for demand reduction and two-thirds for supply reduction.[830] As Dufton writes, "this division has become the core of our modern war on drugs."[831]

But alternative demand-centric policies, adopted by comparable states in the EU yielded measurable results.[832] This includes a general decline in drug use, spending on military and law-enforcement as well as strain on the judicial system. Examples of these positive outcomes have also been achieved in the growing number of U.S. states implementing alternative polices. California, for example, saved $1 billion in state funds enforcing prohibition in the 10 years following the decriminalization of cannabis, while Colorado collected $70 million in taxes in its first year of decriminalization, almost double from the previous year.[833] Objective analysis estimates that the federal government could save over $40 billion a year by not enforcing prohibition.

Overall, expenditures illustrate a sustained and consistent use of limited force at home and abroad. Approximately 57 percent of the current federal budget is allocated to supply reduction, while approximately 43 percent is allocated to demand reduction.[834] RAND estimates that at least $600 billion (adjusted for inflation) has been spent by the U.S. on drug interdiction and law enforcement while only $200 billion has been spent on treatment and rehabilitation, between 1981 and 2008.[835] The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse estimates that only two cents of every dollar is spent on prevention and treatment.[836] Bush's 2008 federal drug control budget featured $8.3 billion for international interdiction and

---

[830] Walther, op. cit., p. 2. Also see "After 40 years, $1 trillion, US War on Drugs has failed to meet any of it goals." *Associated Press* (May 13, 2010); *National Drug Control Budget*, op. cit. and Sophie Novack and Patrick Reis. "Here's How Obama Plans to Spend $25 Billion on the War on Drugs." *The National Journal* (March 24, 2014).

[831] Dufton, op. cit.

[832] For example, the Global Commission on Drug Policy believes current global drug policy fuels, rather than diminishes, public health hazards and threats to public safety. It undermines human rights and fosters discrimination, resulting in a dramatic expansion of detained populations worldwide (with a disproportionate emphasis on women and minorities). It also tends to increase, rather decrease, crime by fostering higher profit margins that motivate new actors to join the production and distribution of narcotics, increasing the costs of enforcing anti-drug policies. The Commission determines that anti-narcotic policies undermines security, fosters corrupt governance through the exploitation of weak institutions and vulnerable populations, and wastes billions of dollars of government fund. See *Taking Control: Pathways To Drug Policies That Work*, op. cit., p. 13. Also see *One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections.* Washington, D.C.: The Pew Center on the States, 2009) and *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing.* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2014).

[833] Tanya Basu. "Colorado Raise More Tax Revenue From Marijuana Than From Alcohol." *Time* (September 16, 2015) and Niamh Eastwood, Edward Fox and Ari Rosmarin. *A Quiet Revolution: Drug Decriminalization Across the Globe.* (London: Release, 2016).

[834] *FY 2015 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2014), p. 21

[835] Peter Chalk. *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response.* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2011), p. 47.

[836] *Addiction by the Numbers.* (New York: The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2016).

domestic law enforcement and just $4.6 billion for treatment and prevention.[837] Meanwhile Obama's 2015 federal drug control budget allocated $14.6 billion to international interdiction efforts and domestic law enforcement and just $10.6 billion to prevention and treatment.[838] Still 95 percent of spending on demand-centric policies focus on treating addiction, while just two percent is spent on preventative measures addressing addiction.[839]

In his examination of anti-narcotics spending from the 1970s to the present time, Michael F. Walther illustrates continuity of supply over demand side policies.[840] Bush's supply side spending ranged between 55 percent and 67 percent of total funding, while Obama's ranged from 59 percent to 65 percent.[841] Obama's overall anti-narcotics funding rose in every category but prevention - which decreased by 11 percent.[842] As Walther writes, "Obama now presides over a war on drugs that employs a strategy virtually indistinguishable from that of his predecessors. The Obama drug budget is the Bush drug budget, which was the Clinton drug budget. The rhetoric has remained largely unchanged for four decades."[843] He adds, "successive administrations have promised new, balanced approaches while delivering the same failed strategy favoring supply-reduction (which actually did little to reduce supply) over more effective and less expensive demand-reduction strategies.[844] Defense spending has also increased dramatically. Between 2000 and 2003, the DOD spent approximately $890 million to $950 million of its budget fighting drugs.[845] By 2009 this increased to $1.5 billion, peaking at $1.8 billion in 2012 before returning to $1.5 billion by 2014.[846] In general, the U.S. spends nine out of every ten dollars dedicated to fighting drugs in Latin America on law enforcement and military aide, with total expenditures rising 30 percent over the last decade.[847] Domestic

---

[837] George W. Bush *National Drug Control Strategy: 2008 Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2008), p. 8.

[838] *FY 2015 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy*, op. cit., p. 7.

[839] National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[840] Walther, op. cit.

[841] Walther, op. cit., pp. 12-15.

[842] Walther, op. cit., p. 14.

[843] Walther, op. cit., p. 15.

[844] Walther, op. cit., p. 15.

[845] *1999 National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1999) and *National Drug Control Strategy: A Ten-Year Plan* (Office of the President of the United States, 1998), p. 56.

[846] *FY 2012 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2012); *FY 2013 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2013), p. 14; *FY 2014 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2014) and *FY 2015 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy*, op. cit., p. 21.

[847] "U.S. Military expands its drug war in Latin America," op. cit.

bureaucracies also have their own anti-narcotics budgets. The DHS, for example, received approximately $4.3 billion to fight drugs in 2015 and the DOJ received $7.7 billion.[848] Although minimal compared to terrorism budgets, this still represents significant spending when considering the first budget for Nixon's war on drugs in 1971 was $350 million across the government, having been increased from $100 million in 1970.[849]

Other budgetary measures illustrate the sustained commitment to the war on drugs and the use of limited force. For example, since 2011, the DHS issued $34 billion in grants to local law enforcement, funding the militarization of police forces, who cite a need for funds to deal with the narcotics and narcotics-related crime.[850] Obama, for example, re-issued funding for the Byrne Grant and Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program which had begun to be phased out under Bush.[851] The Byrne Grant and COPS allocate billions of dollars a year to support policing programs across the nation, in lieu of funding alternative policies focused on demand (like rehabilitation, treatment or educational programs).[852] Wherein Bush decreased Byrne Grants to $170 million from approximately $500 million, Obama increased funding to $2 billion.[853] In his first year in office, Obama increased COPS funding by 250 percent.[854] And Pentagon transfers of surplus gear to local and federal law enforcement reached a historic peak in 2011.[855]

When compared to all defense related activities, funding for Alternative Development is nominal, illustrating a preference in policy. As a general measure of all the development assistance from members of the Organizations for Economic Co-Operation and Development between 2002 and 2013, Alternative Development was allocated 0.2 percent or $245 million annually.[856] Meanwhile the U.S. only spent $42.5 million of $869 million allocated to fight drugs under Plan Colombia to Alternative Development, including crop substitution, building institutional capacity, tackling corruption, promoting good governance, standardizing

[848] *FY 2015 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy*, op. cit., p. 22.
[849] Mendoza, op. cit. and Nixon, op. cit.
[850] Radley Balko. "7 ways the Obama administration has accelerated police militarization." *Huffington Post* (July 7, 2013); Radley Balko. *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); Andrew Becker and G.W. Schultz. "Local Cops Read for War with Homeland Security-Funded Military Weapons." (New York: Center for Investigative Studies, 2011) and *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing,* op. cit.
[851] Balko, op. cit. and Balko, op. cit.
[852] Balko, op. cit. and Balko, op. cit.
[853] Balko, op. cit. and Balko, op. cit.
[854] Balko, op. cit. and Balko, op. cit.
[855] Balko, op. cit. and Balko, op. cit.
[856] *World Drug Report* (2015), op. cit., p. 84.

farming practices and fostering individual ownership.[857] And 80 percent of resources allocated for the Andean Initiative in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, was dedicated to military and police initiatives.[858]

The preference for the use of force is also illustrated domestically and the budget to a defending the nation's borders is significant. The U.S. Border Patrol budget more than doubled since 2003, but has not decreased narco-trafficking (see Table 5.13).[859]

Table 5.13: Border Patrol Budget (in billions)[860]

Year	Budget
2000	$1.06
2001	$1.15
2002	$1.42
2003	$1.51
2004	$1.42
2005	$1.52
2006	$2.12
2007	$2.29
2008	$2.25
2009	$2.66
2010	$2.96
2011	$3.55
2012	$3.53
2013	$3.47
2014	$3.63
2015	$3.79
2016	$3.64
2017	$3.81

The inflated level of spending is apparent when compared to the EU, which allocated, for example, approximately $37 million between 2003 and 2013 on its border management program with Central Asia, and an additional $9 million on air and sea interdiction efforts.[861] And in 2016, FRONTEX was budgeted just $268 million for its EU-wide operations.[862] Meanwhile the DOJ estimates that the U.S. spends $215 billion annually just on the costs

---

[857] Meza, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[858] *U.S. Policy in Colombia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2016) and Withers, Santos and Isacson, op. cit., p. 19.

[859] Chris Edwards. *Border Control Spending.* (Washington D.C.: The CATO Institute, 2014) and *Immigration Enforcement Along the U.S. Borders and at Ports of Entry: Federal, State, and Local Efforts*, op. cit.

[860] *Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year* (Washington, D.C.: United States Customs and Border Patrol, 2017).

[861] *Drug supply reduction and internal security policies in the European Union: an overview,* op. cit., pp. 8 and 15.

[862] FRONTEX is a civilian border enforcement agency and their budget does not include additional military operations, particularly those conducted by national Navies, in patrolling the waters around the Union. *European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders,* op. cit.

associated with the drug epidemic, including health care related services, lost productivity from addiction, crime and environmental damage caused by cultivation.[863]

CONCLUSION

When answering the research question in the context of narco-trafficking, the conditions under which the U.S. prioritizes threats appear to be Cultural-Institutional. This explanation better approximates those conditions rather than systemic shifts in the character of the threat itself. This is exemplified in the distinctly different preferences for foreign and domestic policy between the U.S. and comparable Western nations facing a similar threat. As illustrated by the four policy examples presented above (including Alternative Development, direct military operations, border control, and healthcare), the U.S. tends to place a greater emphasis on more aggressive, outwardly focused supply-oriented strategies then their European counterparts. And despite the global movement towards alternative policies, the U.S. maintains its failed strategy. This would imply that the material factors have less bearing on threat prioritization and policy than it comparable states, which have shifted policies in response to material factors.

Examining the role of discourse, strategy and expenditures, the case study demonstrated how culture and institutions play an important role in threat prioritization and resulting policy. In the context of narco-trafficking this is exemplified by the dual discourse of a supply and demand, as well as a preference for limited force at home and overseas. It is also illustrated in the budget, where narco-trafficking is a far more important priority to the U.S. than in comparable countries, defined in the context of committed resources. For example, the U.S. spends vastly more of its counter-narcotics budget on military operations, border control and the judicial enforcement of its anti-narcotics laws than promoting economic development, addressing addiction or adjusting the legal structure alongside societal norms regarding the use of certain types of narcotics (like cannabis).

In the following chapter, I will present the third case study featuring the threat posed by climate change. First, I will define the threat in the context of the framework presented by this research and review the expectations generated. Second, I will examine climate change in the context of the modern threat environment as it pertains to U.S. national security. Third, I

---

[863] Mendoza, op. cit. and *The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use on American Society* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2011).

will review the qualitative and quantitative data which specially addresses the threat of climate change and explore how it pertains to the expectations. Fourth, I will explore the threat in the context of the two hypotheses, employing a series of examples which compare U.S. threat prioritization to that of its Western European allies. Finally, I will conclude with an overview of the case study, the data and the presented evidence to further assess the validity of the alternative hypothesis in explaining the reason why climate change is not prioritized in U.S. national security.

CHAPTER SIX
CLIMATE CHANGE

It depends on your world view, and there are two opposing world views, if you will, that both have a compelling narrative... you could call them almost fear and fear not. – U.S. Lieutenant General David L. Goldfein[864]

INTRODUCTION

In this third case study, I will continue my examination of the research question in the context of the threat posed by climate change. As a measure of subjective threat analysis, according to the Content and Discourse Analysis, climate change ranks as 34 of 59 potential threats.[865] It has an average weighted score of 1.21 on the CDA's four-point scale, ranking it as a low-level priority (see Table 6.1).[866]

Table 6.1: Forms of Policy & Discourse

EVIDENCE OF THREAT PRIORITIZATION		LEVEL OF THREAT & POLICY			
		Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
	Official Government Documents	4.00-3.00	2.99-2.00	1.99-1.00	> 1.00
	Expenditures	High	Medium	Low	Minimal
	Strategy	Overwhelming use of force (i.e. invasion/war)	Limited use of force (i.e. targeted strikes; military aid)	Use of diplomacy, sanctions, or economic aid	None
	Discourse	Crisis	Problem	Issue	Non-Issue

As such, climate change is characterized by a series of specific features including a limited budgetary commitment; a preference for a policy of arbitration (i.e. diplomacy, sanctions, economic aid) to address the threat; and the prevalence of 'issue discourse' as the defining feature of the threat narrative. Why climate change is ranked as a low-level priority, and the reason for the existence of these defining characteristics, will be the focus of this chapter.

I will attempt to discover under what conditions – given the apparent disconnect between externally defined or objective threats, and those internally or subjectively defined by the government – does the U.S. minimize or under-prioritize climate change in the context of its national security. I will first provide an overview of the threat posed by narco-trafficking.

---

[864] David L. Goldfein. *Keynote Address: Providing Best Military Advice* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2015).

[865] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats

[866] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

Second, I will examine the expectations generated by the framework. Third, I will review the quantitative and qualitative data and describe how individuals, inside and outside the structure of the state, perceive and advocate confronting the threat. Having reviewed the data, I will examine climate change in the context of the two hypotheses to determine whether the research question is best explained by systemic shifts in the character of threats, or the combined effects of culture and institutions as they pertain specifically to the U.S. I will conclude with an overview of the findings and explore if they conform to the expectations generated by this research's framework.

THE UNITED STATES & THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

For the purposes of this research, I define climate change as, "changes in the physical environment or biota… which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare," caused by "natural variability" and/or human activity over "comparable time periods."[867] Due to the far-reaching nature of the threat, this research confines the definition to its domestic effects within the U.S. or its effects on the U.S. to operate overseas militarily, politically or economically.[868]

A wide-ranging review of U.S national security assessments, special reports and official statements finds that the government perceives climate change as an issue manifested in many forms. These include: drought, flooding, rising sea levels and melting ice; extreme weather and its effects on infrastructure vulnerability; energy, water and food security; access to secure shipping and transportation means; economic growth; resource competition; mass migration; and social, communal, cultural and structural instability resulting in state failure, intrastate conflict or even war.[869] In official reports published across a range of government agencies

---

[867] Rajendra Kumar Pachauri and Andy Reisinger (eds.). *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.* (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) and *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.* (Rio De Janeiro: United Nations, 1992).

[868] See Appendix 1.5: Definitions of Threats.

[869] A growing body of literature has begun to trace the connections between climate change, conflict and war including, Craig A. Anderson. "Heat and Violence." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* (2001); Colleen Devlin, Brittany Franck, and Cullen S. Hendrix. *Trends and Triggers: Climate Change and Interstate Conflict.* (Austin: Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 2013); Flowers, op. cit.; *Global Water Security.* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2012); Peter M. Haas. "Constructing Environmental Conflicts from Resource Scarcity." *Global Environmental Politics* (2002), pp. 1-11; Julia Koos et. al. *Climate Change, Water Conflicts and Human Security: Regional Assessment and Policy Guidelines for the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel.* (Brussels: European Commission, 2013); Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel. "Collective Violence Caused by Climate Change and How It Threatens Health and Human Security." *Health and Human Rights Journal* (2014); Solomon M. Hsiang and Kyle

between from 2000 to 2016, the U.S. acknowledges the implications of climate change but (per the discussion on short versus long terms threats featured in Chapter Two) generally frames the issue in the context of a long-term threat. This does not discount recognition of specific aspects of the immediate or pressing nature of climate change in certain branches of government or among select lawmakers, bureaucrats and military officials. But when examining the range of official national security documents across a variety of agencies the tendency is to consider future challenges rather than present effects. This limits urgency when implementing policies which might reverse or minimize the current consequences of the threat. It also reflects the general view of the U.S. public, of which approximately two-thirds believe climate change will harm future generations, while one-third believes it will personally affect them in their lifetime.[870]

As Michael Reis notes, despite more than three decades of strong scientific consensus, 'a bare majority' of Americans have ever held a significant belief that climate change will affect them.[871] This perspective began to shift around 2015. But the threat remains, in large measure, under-prioritized in the context of national security. For example, according to a 2017 Gallup poll, just two and four percent of Americans consider environmental pollution an important

---

C. Meng "Civil Conflicts are associated with global climate change." *Nature* (2011); *Heat Is On: Climate Change as a Threat to National Security, The.* (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 2014); Solomon M. Hsiang; Marshall Burker and Edward Miguel. "Quantifying the Influence of Climate Change on Human Conflict." *Science Express* (2013); Andrew Linke, J. Terrence Mccabe, John O'Loughlin, Jaroslav Tir and Frank Witmer. "Rainfall Variability and Violence in Rural Kenya: Investigating the Effects of Drought and the Role of Local Institutions with Survey Data." *Global Environmental Change* (2015), pp. 35–47; "Rethinking Climate Change Conflict and Security (Issue 4)." *Geopolitics* (2014); Rafael Reuveny, "Economic Growth, Environmental Scarcity, and Conflict." *Global Environmental Politics* (2002), pp. 83-110; Harold Welzer. *Climate Wars: What People Will be Killed for in the 21st Century.* (Cambridge: Goethe-Institut, 2012). Despite the breadth of research on the effects of climate change on conflict, another growing body of literature contends that causality is indirect, and the multitude of contributing facts so extensive as to the render climate change an inadequate primary driver behind current or future conflict. This community notes that the popularity of climate change as a driver of conflict only came into being around 2010 and does not yet justify a body of recognized and widely accepted, theoretical literature adopted as academic consensus. For example, see, Cameron Harrington. *Water Wars? Think Again.* (Zurich: Center for Security Studies 2014); Francois Gemenne, at. al. "Climate and Security: Evidence, Emerging Risks and a New Agenda." *Climatic Change* (2014); Joshua Goldstein. "Climate Change as a Global Security Issue." *Journal of Global Security Studies* (2016); Samenow (2015), op. cit.; David O. Williams "Conflict Experts Dispute Impact of Global Climate Change on National Security." *Real Vail* (2015). New research purports to provide a middle ground. A review of 126 countries impacted by large floods between 1985 to 2009 revealed that the effects of climate change fuels existing conflict, but does not ignite new ones. On this, see Ramesh Ghimire, Susanna Ferreria and Jeffrey H. Dorfman. "Food Induced Displacement and Civil Conflict." *World Development* (2015), pp. 614-628.

[870] Jonathan Franzen. "Carbon Capture." *The New Yorker* (April 6, 2015).

[871] Michael Reis. "Warmly Argued: A Brief Historical Look at Two Centuries of Climate Change Findings in Public Discourse." *Marine Corps University Journal* (2016), p. 58

issue.[872] Although attempts have been made to re-frame climate change as national security issue, it remains mostly situated in the public health, energy, environmental and human security paradigm. As a result, it generally receives less attention than other arguably more pressing threats.[873] In the last two decades, the climate change debate has divided the U.S. unlike in other countries. Although the counter climate change movement (hereafter the 'counter movement') did not emerge until the end of the Twentieth Century, its strength belies its inchoate nature.[874] The counter movement is as diverse as it is strong. This movement generally expresses the view, at its most extreme, that climate change is not caused by human acvitivity. And at its least extreme, the movement claims it is a natural process, is not a national security threat, and can be managed through investments in science and new technologies.[875] Although not exclusively so, U.S. political preference plays a role determining one's perspective on climate change. For example, a 2016 Pew poll revealed that when asked if climate change was a threat to the U.S., 77 percent of Democrats, 52 percent of Independents and just 26 percent of Republicans agreed.[876]

The immediate and pressing nature of the threat posed by climate change is apparent. Sharma Meena, et. al. estimates 70 percent of natural disasters are climate related, an increase of 50 percent in twenty years.[877] These events affected approximately 2.4 billion people in the

---

[872] *Most Important Problem.* (Washington, D.C.: Gallup Polls, 2017). Accessed June 17, 2017 http://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx.

[873] On this see, Barry Posen. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy.* (2014).

[874] The counter movement emerged in the late 1990s when ExxonMobil funded scientists to examine the available climate change data in an effort to refute widely held and long developed claims by the scientific community in general, and the IPCC in specific, that climate change is driven by human activity. The result was the "Oregon Petition" that collected more than 31,400 signatures as of 2017 from researchers, climate practitioners, and scientists who believe "no convincing scientific evidence" exists proving climate change is driven my human activity (although the credibility of many signatures has been called into question by those who reject the grounds of the petition). The counter movement grew stronger after ExxonMobil shifted away from climate denial in 2006, opening funding from new organizations who sought to support the alternative research. Since then, ExxonMobil has returned to the view that "incumbent weather… may or may not be induced by climate change," and has declared advancements in technology will provide a means to address climate change. On this history of the counter movement, see Sarah Childress. "Timeline: The Politics of Climate Change." *Frontline* (October 23, 2012) and Bill MacKibbon. "How mankind blew the fight against climate change." *Washington Post* (June 9, 2015). Also see the Global Warming Petition Project at http://www.petitionproject.org.

[875] For example, see Mark G. Stewart. "Climate Change and National Security: Balancing the Costs and Benefits" in (eds.) Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller, *A Dangerous World: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2014).

[876] *Public Uncertain, Divided Over America's Place in the World.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2016), p. 6.

[877] Meena Sharma, et. al. "Assessing Global Climate Change: Extent and Effects, Effects *International Journal of Research in Social Sciences* (2016), p. 160. Also see *Findings from Select Federal Reports: The National Security Implications of a Changing Climate.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2015).

past 10 years, an increase from 1.7 billion from the decade prior.[878] And it is estimated that

another 1.2 billion people will experience some sort of political instability from climate change

in the near future.[879] The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reports that that

the Twenty-First Century has had 16 of the 17 hottest years on record.[880] These environmental

shifts can have significant effects on state stability, threatening the favorable regional balances,

interests or allies of the U.S. For example, climate change (in the context of food and water

shortages) is considered a critical factor in the mass protests, riots, and other forms of violence

in Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.[881] Climate change has contributed to the spread

of infectious diseases affecting human, animal and agricultural systems.[882] And it is estimated

that the number of 'climate refugees' or 'climate migrants' will reach as many as 250 million

by 2050.[883] Some have already been forced from their home due to rising sea-levels which has

made micro-islands off of New Zealand inhabitable.[884] Three million Pacific Islanders will

---

[878] Sharma, et. al., op. cit., p. 160.

[879] Tracey Skillington. "Climate Change and Its Security Implications." *Climate Justice and Human Rights* (2016), pp. 123-150.

[880] *Global Analysis – Annual Report* (Asheville: National Centers for Environmental Information, 2015); *Global Analysis – July 2016* (Asheville: National Centers for Environmental Information, 2016); *NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally* (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, January 18, 2017) and Tatiana Schlossberg. "2016 Already Shows Record Global Temperatures." *New York Times* (2016).

[881] Lester R. Brown *Peak Water: What Happens When the Wells Go Dry?* (Washington, D.C.: Earth Policy Institute, 2013); Joshua Busby and Jennifer Hazen. *Climate Change and African Political Stability.* (Austin: Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 2013); Ken Butts and Bryan McDonald. *Environmental Security: Conflict or Cooperation.* (Zurich: The International Relations and Security Network, 2014); Alvaro Calzadilla, et. al. "Climate change impacts on global agriculture." *Climatic Change* (2013); *Climate Change as a Security Threat in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, (2012); Kimberly Flowers. *Food Security, Conflict and Stability.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, 2016), pp. 128-130; Giorgios Kallis and Christos Zografos. "Hydro-climate change, conflict and security." *Climatic Change* (2014), pp. 69-82; Adam Heffez. "How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry." *Foreign Affairs* (2013); Eric Holthaus. "Is climate change destabilizing Iraq?" *Slate* (June 27, 2014); Brad Plumer. "Drought helped cause Syria's war. Will climate change bring more like it?" *Washington Post* (September 20, 2013); Jason Samenow. "Why climate change shouldn't be named the top 'threat' to national security." *Washington Post* (November 17, 2015); Skillington, op. cit.; Anne-Marie Slaughter. "The Arab Spring and Climate Change" (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2012); David W. Titley. "A Military View on Climate Change." *The Conversation* (October 6, 2016) and Joachim Von Braun and Tim Wheeler. "Climate Change Impacts on Global Food Security." *Science* (2013).

[882] Altizer, Sonia et al. "Climate Change and Infectious Diseases: From Evidence to Predicative Framework." *Science* (2013).

[883] Maxine Burkett. "In Search of Refuge: Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced Migration, and the Legal Frontier." *Asia-Pacific Issues* (2011), p. 3. Also see Elizabeth Ferris. *Earth Day: Climate Change and Displacement Cross Borders* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2015); *The Ocean: U.S. National Debate Topic 2014-2015.* (Ipswich: Grey House Publishing, 2014); Jennifer Holdaway. *Environment, Health and Migration: Towards a More Integrated Analysis.* (Geneva: United States Institute for Social Development, 2014); Oscar Williams. "Military Experts Warn Climate Change Will Create An 'Epic' Humanitarian Crisis." *Huffington Post* (January 12, 2016) and Emily Wilkinson, et. al. *Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2016).

[884] Over the last century sea levels have risen over 19 centimeters. See, Cameron Conaway. "Climate Change and Slavery: The Perfect Storm." *The Guardian* (December 13, 2013); *Our planet, our future.* (Brussels: European

likely be forced from their homes within the next 30 to 50 years.[885] And these global trends could have a significant effect on the U.S. foreign policy, requiring its military to respond to humanitarian disasters in allied nations and possibly forcing the U.S. to consider absorbing climate migrants, refugees and displaced person from around the world.[886] This is especially pertinent given that the Caribbean has some of the world's most vulnerable climate refugees.[887]

The U.S. homeland is not immune to these effects. A town of 400 in Alaska will require federal relocation support and services in the coming years due to rising sea ice levels.[888] And tidal flooding in Miami, Norfolk and other coastal towns in the U.S. have become increasingly common, and are no longer only caused by storm damage.[889] Military infrastructure has also been affected. Damage to Homestead Air Force Base in Florida and the Naval Air Stations in Pensacola, for example, caused the former to be temporarily abandoned, and the latter forced to shut down for an entire year.[890] As will be explored in the sections below, even the most minimal damage to sensitive military infrastructure results in multi-million-dollar repair efforts.[891] Climate change also has broader effects on society. The advent of prolonged and drier droughts continues to create significant threats to the U.S. food supply and public health.[892] Intense drought and food shortages have also been cited as a causing increased legal and illegal immigration from Central and South America.[893] Environmental disasters, like the

---

Commission, 2015), p. 10. and Kenneth R. Weiss. "The Making of a Climate Refugee." *Foreign Policy* (January 28, 2015).

[885] Stewart (2014), op. cit. p. 147.

[886] On this see Kate Jastram. "Warm World, Cold Reception: Climate Change, National Security and Force Migration." *Vermont Journal of International Law* (2014).

[887] Ricardo Marto; Lourdes Alvarez and David Suarez. *Background Paper: LAC Small Island Development States* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2014) and Murray Simpson, Daniel Scott and Ulric Trotz. *Climate Change's Impact on the Caribbean's Ability to Sustain Tourism, Natural Asset and Livelihoods.* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2011).

[888] Chris Mooney. "The remote Alaskan village that needs to be relocated due to climate change." *Washington Post* (February 24, 2015).

[889] *U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters (1980-2016).* (Asheville: National Centers for Environmental Information, 2016).

[890] Stewart (2014), op. cit., p. 149.

[891] For example, see John R. Deni (ed.) *New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2014); *National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces.* (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2011) and *Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011).

[892] *Global Analysis – Annual Report*, op. cit.; *Global Analysis – July 2016*, op. cit.; Alexandria Icenhower and Shawn Dhar. *Combating climate change and water scarcity in the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2015) and "The Water Crisis in the West." *New York Times* (June 29, 2014).

[893] Hannah Brock. *Climate Change: Drives of Insecurity and the Global South.* (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, 2012) and Lindsey R. Ross. *Climate Change and Immigration: Warnings for America's Southern Border.* (Washington D.C.: American Security Project, 2010).

earthquakes in Japan, the hurricane in Haiti or the increased flooding across Southeast Asia in recent years can create massive and unexpected fluctuations in immigration rates.[894] The costs of climate change are also apparent. The NOAA estimates that the U.S. has spent as much as $10 billion a year on extreme weather events between 2008 and 2016.[895] The U.S. government estimates that an increase of average temperature could decrease U.S. GDP by $150 billion annually.[896] According to an in-depth study in *Nature* rising temperatures could potentially decrease incomes at least 40 percent in the U.S. and other major developed nations, leading to an estimated 20 percent decline in global economic output over 100 years.[897]

Yet in response to this threat, and when compared to other states, the U.S. prioritizes climate change to a far lesser degree. When depicting the threat of climate change, a divided discourse emerges featuring diametrically opposed narratives, distinctly different from the dominate or dual narratives present in terrorism or narco-trafficking, respectively. On one side, an apocalyptic climate change narrative features alarming rhetoric about the effects and consequence of the threat in both the short and long term, and at times, dilutes valid scientific claims presented by the movement.[898] On the other, the lack of alarmism by the counter movement stifles nuanced debate regarding what can be done by instead exclusively focusing on the threat's origins. With hyperbole and exaggeration in both perspectives, neither policy preference tends to dominate.[899] As a result, policy is stalled, having been thwarted by the efforts of one side or the other, as strategy wavers back and forth from each, making institutionalizing solutions more difficult. We would therefore anticipate that divided discourse creates little opportunity for climate change to be adequately prioritized. As a result, limited policy preference emerges and few resources are allocated. The frustrated process drives both narratives towards their respective extremes, making compromise and

---

[894] Amy Harder and Dion Nissenbaum. "Hagel to Stress Climate Risks with Southeast Asian Military Officials." *Wall Street Journal* (March 31, 2014).

[895] *Global Analysis – July 2016*, op. cit. Also see *The Price Tag of Being Young: Climate Change and Millennials' Economic Future* (New York: Demos, 2016).

[896] *The Cost of Delaying Action to Stem Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2014) and Marshall Shepard. "Weather and climate priorities facing the next president." *Forbes* (October 24, 2016).

[897] Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang and Edward Miguel. "Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production." *Nature* (2015), pp. 235-239; *GPS – Energy Darwinism II* (New York: Citigroup, 2015) and Laura Seaman. *The high cost of climate change.* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2015).

[898] Gemenne, at. al., op. cit., p. 2.

[899] For example, see Oren Cass. "The Problem With Climate Catastrophizing." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

collaboration increasingly difficult over time, leading to a low priority status in the threat matrix.

CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DATA

Having examined the threat of climate in the context of U.S. national security I now turn to the data. In this section I will examine both the subjective and objective perceptions of the climate change threat expressed by survey respondents and interview respondents. Subjects represent views internal to (i.e. politicians, bureaucrats and military officials) and external from (i.e. members of the media, civil society, academics and think tanks) the state. As such, the data presents an overview of how these stakeholders perceive the threat and the reasons why they hold these views.

A Quantitative Analysis of Climate Change

The CDA provided an average weighted score of 1.21 (on a four-point scale), ranking climate change as a low-level priority. But survey respondents, representing subjective and objective perspectives, ranked it much higher.[900] Based on the mean scores of all threats presented in the survey, climate change ranked as ninth of 59 threats and received a score of 5.94 (out of 10).[901]

Figure 6.1: Level of Threat Posed by Climate Change (As a Percentage of Response)

---

[900] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.
[901] See Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) and Appendix One: Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

When asked to rank the level of threat posed by climate change (on scale from zero to 10), the majority of survey respondents placed the threat level at 5.00, although the average score was slightly higher at 5.65 (see Figure 6.1).

Consistent with the expectations generated in the beginning of this chapter, responses to this question were more polarized than the responses in the previous case studies. (see Figure 4.1, Figure 5.1 and Figure 6.1). This serves to support the view that contesting narratives exists in the context of this specific threat category. When further broken down by professional category, those within the state generally ranked the threat higher than those external to it. Bureaucrats and politicians ranked the threat significantly higher than other professional categories (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2: Mean Scores Regarding the Level of Threat Posed by Climate Change

Professional Category	Mean Score
Bureaucrat	7.00
Politician	6.14
Media	5.61
Civil Society	5.30
Military	5.00
Academia/Think Tank	4.91

I posit this might be attributed to climate change being positioned as a 'new' security threat with the potential for new forms of resource allocation or bureaucratic ownership for an agency seeking to increase its influence.

When asked to choose which one strategy is best suited to confront climate change, survey respondents expressed a preference for economic incentives, followed by diplomatic engagement (see Figure 6.2), illustrating a preference for an arbitrating strategy (as indicated in Table 6.1).

Figure 6.2: Best Strategy to Confront Climate Change

When further broken down by professional category, there was a clear and consistent preference for the use of economic incentives and diplomatic engagement (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: Best Strategy to Confront Climate Change Defined by Professional Category (as a Percentage of Responses)

	Over-whelming Use of Force	Limited Use of Force	Economic Incentives	Diplomatic Engagement	Sanctions	None of the Above
Politician	0	0	33.33	33.33	11.11	22.22
Bureaucrat	5.26	5.26	47.37	42.11	0	0
Military	0	0	61.90	19.05	4.76	14.29
Media	6.67	0	53.33	33.33	0	6.67
Civil Society	0	0	80.00	10.00	0	10.00
Academia/ Think Tank	0	0	71.43	19.05	0	9.52

Those external to the state expressed a stronger preference for economic incentives, while those internal to it preferred diplomatic engagement.

When asked which agency was best equipped to handle the threat of climate change, survey respondents were divided between those who believed no agency is equipped, requiring the creation of a new agency (at 36 percent), and a near equal number (at 33 percent) who selected the DOE (see Figure 6.3). A lesser number of respondents selected the State Department (at 19 percent).[902]

Figure 6.3: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle Climate Change

Organizational Abbreviations
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
DOD: Department of Defense
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
NIC: National Intelligence Council
DOS: Department of State
DOT: Department of the Treasury
DOE: Department of Energy
DHHS: Department of Health & Human Services

When further broken down by professional category, we find that those within the state preferred to employ preexisting bureaucratic structures including the DOE and the State

---

[902] It is important to note that the survey question was framed so that the selection of no agency implied that the creation of a new agency is necessary to confront the threat

Department (see Table 6.4). Meanwhile those external to the state strongly preferred the creation of a new agency.

Table 6.4: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle
Climate Change Defined by Professional Category (as a Percentage of Responses)

	DOD	DOS	NIC	DHS	DOT	CIA	FBI	DOE	DHHS	None	Total
Politician	0	33.33	11.11	0	0	0	0	44.44	0	11.11	**100**
Bureaucrat	0	36.84	0	0	0	0	0	26.32	0	36.84	**100**
Military	4.76	14.29	0	0	0	0	0	38.10	0	42.86	**100**
Media	0	13.33	0	13.33	0	0	0	26.67	0	46.67	**100**
Civil Society	0	0	12.50	0	37.50	0	0	37.50	0	50.00	**100**
Academia/ Think Tank	0	14.29	9.52	4.76	33.33	0	0	33.33	0	28.57	**100**

But there was a general agreement across professional categories that the DOE should be the lead agency, albeit to varying degrees. Politicians were most in favor of the DOE across all professional categories but also the least likely to prefer the creation of a new agency.

A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The interviews conducted for the purposes of this research provide a more nuanced view, from the perspective of the state, of how climate change is characterized, as well as why it is not prioritized as a threat to national security.

A General Perspective on the Threat of Climate Change

When asked if climate change is a national security priority for the U.S. government, interview subjects were divided. Each professional category had committed supporters and opponents and within each perspective, there was a range in level of commitment to the preferred perspective. As anticipated, a divided narrative depicting climate change as the most critical, or least critical threat confronting the U.S. I will now briefly explore the perspectives of each group.

A Politician's Perspective on the Threat of Climate Change

Democrats and Republicans espoused distinct climate change threat narratives. Democrats generally perceived climate change as a threat caused by human activity which requires immediate action. Republicans generally rejected climate change as being caused by human activity, although most also recognized it is does require government action, just outside the context of national security.

Interestingly, Democrats were prone to juxtapose their position against that of the Republicans, but Republicans did not do the same. Democrats tended to depict the incalculable costs of climate change to U.S. foreign policy and economic output.[903] One Democrat called climate change a threat to international security and the greatest threat to humanity.[904] But a second noted the difficulty in prioritizing a threat whose most critical effects are not always evident or noticeable, especially when compared to the imminent threat that terrorism is perceived as presenting.[905] Republicans generally believed climate change is not a national security priority, although they did agree it must be addressed. They were less likely to agree with Democrats that climate change is caused, or entirely caused by human activity. And they did not believe that it was a matter for U.S. national security institutions because, as Republicans suggested, the U.S. has more pressing demands. Only one Republican staunchly opposed the categorization of climate change as a threat suggesting the scientific data was 'unsubstantiated' and a 'political tool' to increase taxes and expand regulations.[906]

Responses from interviewees were consistent with the survey results. Politicians surveyed and interviewed were divided between employing economic assistance and diplomacy on the one hand, or endorsing no policy at all (see Table 6.3). The view expressed by politicians interviewed that climate change is best addressed as an energy issue, and not exclusively) a national security threat, was further reflected in the survey results, wherein the DOE was the preferred agency (see Table 6.4).

A Bureaucrat's Perspective on the Threat of Climate Change

Bureaucrats, like politicians, were divided. The majority believed climate change was not a national security but among those who did, a further division existed between perceptions of climate change as a national security threat versus an alternative (i.e. energy, environmental, scientific, etc.) threat. Among those in the latter group, none defined climate change as pressing or immediate. Rather they considered it a long-term issue which needs to be addressed, but which does not rise to the level of terrorism or narco-trafficking. Some

---

[903] Interview with Subject 23, op. cit.
[904] Interview with Subject 29, op. cit.
[905] Interview with Subject 18, op. cit.
[906] Interview with Subject 25, op. cit.

expressed a belief that as climate change rises in prioritization, it would assume a broader national security context.[907]

As one bureaucrat stated, "you have to look at the threat through a political perspective. Facts have no meaning; your interpretation of the threat is what gives it meaning."[908] Rejecting climate change as a national security threat was justified in a variety of ways. One bureaucrat noted, climate change is just "global warming" re-framed.[909] Another noted what was once an "energy problem" had become an "energy-security problem" to increase prioritization, but added that the actual problem of energy needs had not changed in any significant way.[910] In fact, many bureaucrats pointed to the role of discourse, ideology and partisanship in attempting to frame climate change as a security threat.[911] Within this group there was a belief that climate change represents an economic, environmental, scientific, energy or social issue, but not a national security threat. Other reasons cited for why climate change was not a national security threat included: the rise of alternative energy resources (including fracking); the lack of cooperation from major polluters like China, India, Russia (in addition to other medium-sized, less developed nations) prior to the Paris Agreement; the controversial nature of the scientific data; the role of U.S. as an energy exporter in the world; and accusations of profit-generating opportunities as a result of a growing climate change industry.

Bureaucrats generally believed climate change should be addressed through diplomatic means, as illustrated in the interviews and survey data. Bureaucrats, unsurprisingly, expressed the strongest preference for diplomacy among all the professional categories (see Table 6.3). But they were also divided in their choice of which agency was best suited to address the threat, the State Department or a new agency, which I posit could indicate a rejection of current ways and means (see Table 6.4)

A Military Perspective on the Threat of Climate Change

Military officials were divided like their peers. A minority believed that climate change was not a threat to national security, but should be prioritized as one. A majority believed it is a threat,

---

[907] Interview with Subjects 4, 9, 13 and 11, op. cit.
[908] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[909] Interview with Subject 3, op. cit.
[910] Interview with Subject 10, op. cit.
[911] Interview with Subjects 7, 9, 10 and 16, op. cit.

but not to national security. Only two military officials rejected climate change being a threat at all, noting any efforts made to reverse its effects would be negated by the practices of developing countries like India and China. Military officials generally believed climate change presents an economic, energy, food or water security issue with long term consequences for U.S. infrastructure and emergency management, as well as the health and well-being of the planet. Nonetheless, most did not believe it should not be addressed through U.S. national security institutions.

Among those who did perceive climate change as a threat to national security (either in the current or future context), many expressed concerns over the reactive nature of any future policies versus enacting policies at the present time. One military official commented, a better understanding of how much is needed to invest and what would be gained, is critical for the foundation of any climate change policy.[912] While another cited Obama's policies as more dangerous then climate change itself. A third believed climate change is the greatest risk to civilization, citing a stable climate as the foundation for all humanity.[913]

Survey results aligned with the interview data. Military officials were generally in favor of framing the threat as an energy or economic issue (see Table 6.3). This was emphasized by survey respondent's selection of the DOE to address climate change (see Table 6.4). This lack of emphasis on climate change as a national security threat in the survey data was further emphasized by the low mean score surveyed military personnel afforded to it (see Table 6.2).

CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HYPOTHESES

Having examined the data, I now turn to testing the two hypotheses. If systemic shifts in the character of threats best explains prioritization, we would expect that countries respond to specific material factors (as outlined above) when confronting a threat.[914] We would expect to find where these factors threaten the U.S. to a higher degree, there would be a difference in prioritization when compared to similar nations. This implies, if systematic shifts were the most critical factor, prioritization and policy would be generally similar in the U.S. as in comparable states facing a comparable threat.

---

[912] Interview with Subject 14 op. cit.
[913] Interview with Subjects 16 and 26, op. cit.
[914] Barry Posen. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* (2003).

Alternatively, if the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis best explains the level of prioritization, we would anticipate subjective measures of threats to be based not on material factors, but America's distinct political culture. We would expect to find policies do not reflect material factors, but an interpretation of threat, expressed rhetorically, and emerging as a product of bureaucratic bias. This would be illustrated by an American threat discourse diverging in significant ways from an objective narrative and a preference for policy by the U.S. that also diverges in significant ways from comparable states facing similar threats. Finally, based on the nature of the preferred strategy, we might also expect specific bureaucracies to rise in prominence over others within the government in regards to the execution of policy, regardless of their applicability or capacity to succeed.

CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF SYSTEMIC SHIFTS

If systemic shift in the character of threats were validated, as noted above, we would expect threat assessments to be based on material factors and U.S. policies to address climate change to converge with comparable states. But, according to the survey data reviewed above, there exists variations between the subjective and objective perspective, and further divisions within them. No convergence between subjective and objective perspectives is therefore evident. This is also evidenced by External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure (as outlined in Chapter Two).[915] The Measure for climate change, presented in Appendix Ten, scored climate change as a "very high threat" (with a ranking of 8 out of 9).[916] As a result there is present, a consistent and reoccurring pattern of discord between objective and subjective perspectives in regards to the threat posed by climate change to U.S. national security. And this suggests material factors are indeterminate. To determine what factors are, I will review U.S. climate policy and draw comparisons with other like nations to emphasize the divergence in influence factors.

---

[915] The External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure was created for the purposes of this research to provide a (relatively) independent measure of threat level which could be used as a comparable factor against the CDA scores and the survey data. Using a binary scoring methodology and analyzing a range of broad factors, the Measure aims to remove (some degree of) subjectivity through quantifying a set of materials factors that are generally taken into account when assessing threats. See Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure and Appendix Ten: Climate Change in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

[916] See Appendix Ten: Climate Change in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

Comparing the European Union and United States

The prioritization of climate change in the EU varies from significantly from the U.S. The EU believes that climate change is a threat to national security that must transcends politics.[917] According to the European Commission, 90 percent of the EU population perceives climate change as a serious problem.[918] The EU has been on the forefront of environmental conservation, legislation, international negotiation, domestic preparedness, scientific innovation, economic integration and developmental aid to address the diverse effects if climate change. Member states have long been committed to a high energy efficient and low carbon economy across the EU.[919] In 1987, the EU established collective provisions regulating member states' environmental policies including air quality, water, waste and biodiversity.[920] Since then, the EU has adopted its environmental policy through a majority consensus leading to comprehensive legislation and more stable policies over the long term.[921] The EU has integrated climate change policy into the economics of its energy, transportation, industry and regional development policies to ensure a stable regulatory environment.[922] Pursuing cost-effective policies and ensuring adequate technical and economic preparation, the EU has proven successful in a diverse environment with congruent governments, industries, and populations.[923]

The EU emphasizes cohesion and standardization across member states in confronting collective threats like climate change. And this multilateral tradition, evolving from its supranational structure, informs institutional development to security challenges.[924] For example, the EU spent ten years negotiating a carbon and energy tax to govern states.[925] Confronted by failure and unable to reach an agreement, the EU did not abandon the initiative (as the U.S. did when confronted with the same failure) but rather shifted policy and tactics to restarts negotiations and appease the diversity of stakeholders.[926] The EU Emission Trading

---

[917] *A Climate & Resources Security Dialogue for the 21st Century.* (London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, March 22-23, 2012), p. 6.

[918] *Our planet, our future*, op. cit., p. 17.

[919] *Climate change factsheet 2015* (Brussels: European Commission, 2015).

[920] Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis. "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world" in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), p. 10.

[921] Delbeke and Vis, EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 9.

[922] Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis. "Editor's Introduction" in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), p. 3.

[923] Delbeke and Vis, "Editor's Introduction," op. cit., p. 2.

[924] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 9.

[925] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 9.

[926] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 9.

System, established in 2005, is the first and largest international emission trading system in the world.[927] Governing the output of 31 countries – with 500 million people and 1,200 industrial plants, representing half of all EU emissions – the value for of this internal carbon allowance has exceeded expectations since established.[928]

The EU also has the world's most ambitious energy targets for 2020 and even more ambitious ones for 2030 and 2050, when emission levels are expected to be 80 to 90 percent less then 1990 levels.[929] Even when energy consumption peaked in 2005 and 2012, these levels were only one percent above 1990 levels.[930] The EU generates just nine percent of global emissions, down from 14 percent a decade ago, compared to the U.S., which generates 11 percent.[931] It is also the first region to pass binding legislation to ensure climate goals are achieved.[932] For example, the Renewable Energy Directive requires states to increase their use of renewable energy (i.e. biomass, wind, solar, hydro or geothermal power) for transportation-related energy consumption by 10 percent before 2020.[933] The UK has increased the goal to 15 percent across its territories.[934] And the Energy Efficient Directive requires all member state's overall consumption to consist of 27 percent renewable energy by 2030.[935]

The EU model demonstrates ambitious climate policies have significant results.[936] The EU is now the most Greenhouse Gas efficient major economy in the world, having cut emissions in 2015 by 23 percent below 1990 levels while simultaneously growing the economy by 46 percent.[937] In a 2011 report commissioned by the UK government, addressing climate

[927] A. Denny Ellerman, Claudio Marcantonini and Aleksander Zaklan. The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting." *Review of Environmental Economic and Policy* (2015), pp. 89-107; *Climate change factsheet 2015*, op. cit. and "What is the emissions trading scheme and how does it work?" *The Guardian* (June 7, 2011).

[928] Delbeke and Vis., "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., pp. 27-28 and Ellerman, Marcantonini and Zaklan, op. cit., pp. 89-107.

[929] *Climate change factsheet 2015*, op. cit.

[930] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 10.

[931] *Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the European Union* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2009); Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 25 and Meadows, Slingenberg and Zapfl, op. cit., p. 49.

[932] *Climate change factsheet 2015*, op. cit.

[933] *2030 Climate Energy Framework* (Brussels: European Commission, 2017) and *Climate Change Legislation in the EU*. (London: Committee on Climate Change, 2017). On directives in EU climate policy see, Johanna Cludius, Hannah Forster and Verena Graichen. *GHG Mitigation in the EU: An Overview of the Current Policy Landscape* (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2012).

[934] *2030 Climate Energy Framework*, op. cit. and *Climate Change Legislation in the EU*, op. cit.

[935] *2030 Climate Energy Framework*, op. cit. and *Climate Change Legislation in the EU*, op. cit.

[936] *Climate change factsheet 2015*, op. cit.

[937] *Climate change factsheet 2015*, op. cit.

change was seen as driver of economic growth.[938] Green jobs in the EU increased from 2.9 million to 4.3 million between 2000 and 2012, while maintaining a constant rate of economic growth, despite a recession occurring during this time period.[939] By the end of 2012, the U.S., on the other hand, only had 3.4 million green jobs.[940] A number which dropped to 2.5 million by 2016.[941] Meanwhile, the EU's approach to climate change has increased energy security and stimulated new clean energy economies.[942]

Having briefly outlined the EU's general perspective on climate change, I will now provide four specific examples that illustrate its distinctly different approach to the threat, from both the foreign and domestic security perspectives. In the context of foreign policy, I will examine military responses to operational readiness as well as the use of diplomatic engagement and/or economic aid in regards to climate change. In the context of domestic policy, I will examine U.S. preparedness against extreme weather events, and the stability of the domestic energy security.

Climate Change & The Military Response

In terms of foreign policy, the national security threat posed by climate change to the operational capacity and readiness of military forces is significant. This is especially true for countries like the U.S. or the UK, which maintain sizeable defense forces which operate on a continual basis, in a diversity of environments around the world. But when comparing these two countries, the American Security Project ranks the UK as 'highly prepared' to deal with the demands imposed on military readiness but ranks the U.S. as only 'prepared.'[943] The report adds, the U.S. should not only do more, but has the capacity to do so, and actively chooses not to.[944]

---

[938] Richard Black. "Preparing for climate change 'will boost economy.' *BBC* (February 8, 2011).

[939] *Climate change factsheet 2015*, op. cit.

[940] *Fact Sheet: Jobs in Renewable Energy Efficiency.* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 2013).

[941] *Clean Jobs America: A comprehensive analysis of clean energy jobs in America.* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Entrepreneurs, 2016) and *Renewables 2016 Global Status Report:* (Paris: Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, 2016), p. 41.

[942] *Climate change factsheet 2015*, op. cit.

[943] Andrew Holland and Xander Vagg. *The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2013); Andrew Holland and Xander Vagg. *The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change: United Kingdom.* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2013) and Andrew Holland and Xander Vagg. *The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change: United States.* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2013).

[944] Holland and Vagg, *United Kingdom*, op. cit. and Holland and Vagg, *United States,* op. cit.

Richard Youngs notes the EU has, "bought into the climate security agenda" making climate preparedness a critical pillar of its so-called 'smart defense.'[945] Cooperation on climate change policy among EU militaries has proven more successful than collaboration on other matters.[946] The EU has fully incorporated the language and logic of climate security into its agenda.[947] And the British government has specifically instituted aggressive sustainable development strategies as a pillar of its 2011-2030 defense strategy, believing climate change is central to 'comprehensive security' in the Twenty-First century.[948] As U.K. Secretary of Defence John Reid stated in 2009, "environmental security will be at the heart of everything that UK Governments will do for years to come."[949] First recognized as a matter for national security concern its 1998 *Strategic Defence Review*, climate change rose in priority, culminating in the 2007 Integrated Climate Programme (ICP), a collaborative interagency effort to identify climate-related security concerns.[950] This was followed by the 2008 Ministry of Defence *Climate Change Strategy,* (the same year the CIA issued its first *National Intelligence Assessment* on the climate change threat).[951] Among EU nations, Youngs writes, the UK is the most dedicated to incorporating, "climate planning into its defence policy and introduce[ing] a more systematic coverage of climate change into its military staff college."[952]

The UK identifies two primary goals for its military in the context of climate change. First, to adapt and build resiliency against environmental threats and second, to minimize the negative impacts of climate change by incorporating environmental strategies into operational capacity.[953] As a result, the MOD Procurement Framework, for example, adheres to stringent regulations for energy consumption, efficiency and emissions in regards to military vehicles.[954] The U.S. also believes adaption and mitigation are critical to defense readiness, as evidenced

---

[945] Richard Youngs. *Climate Change and European Security.* (London: Routledge: 2014), p. 74

[946] Youngs, op. cit., p. 74.

[947] Youngs, op. cit., pp. 74 and 88.

[948] *Sustainable Development Strategy: A Sub-Strategy of the Strategy for Defence, 2011-2030* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011) and Youngs, op. cit., p. 76.

[949] John Reid. "John Reid on climate change and global security." *Reuters* (December 5, 2009).

[950] Duncan Depledge. *The Impact of Climate Change on Security: Is the UK in Need of a Nationwide Review* (London: RUSI, February 12, 2010).

[951] *Climate Change Strategy* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2008) and Depledge, op. cit.

[952] Youngs, op. cit., p. 74.

[953] *Sustainable Development Strategy: A Sub-Strategy of the Strategy for Defence, 2011-2030,* op. cit. Also see Shirley V. Scott and Shahedul Khan. "The implications of Climate Change for the future military and for conflict prevention, including through peacemaking." *ASPJ Africa & Francophonie* (2016).

[954] Delbecke, Klassen and Vergote, op. cit. p. 65.

by the 2014 DOD *Climate Change Adaption Roadmap*.[955] And even though the document accepts climate change as a threat multiplier (echoed in in the *Quadrennial Defense Review* that same year) the proposed solution to the threat includes three highly non-specific goals including identifying and assessing the threat; integrating these considerations; and collaborating with stakeholders.[956] In fact, it was not until 2007 that legislation was passed requiring the intelligence community to perform a national intelligence estimate in the context of climate change. And, climate change was not identified as national security priority until 2010 when Obama included it his *National Security Strategy*'s list of eight threats confronting the U.S.[957] But that same year, a report from the University of Adelaide ranked the U.S. as the second worst environmental performer in terms of absolute environmental degradation of 179 countries examined.[958]

The U.S. is not only less engaged in terms of preparing for future operational readiness in the context of climate change, in some cases it undermines its ability to be prepared. Marc A. Levy, Deputy Director of the Center for International Earth Science at Columbia University, stated in testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security in 2015 that despite recognizing the need to, "understand and respond to climate-triggered security problems… the White House has not responded. In fact, if one examines publicly accessible information it seems that we are moving backwards in some critical areas."[959] In 2009, for example, the CIA closed its classified research program, Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis (MEDEA), started in the 1990s to examine links between a changing climate and global security.[960] And 2012, the CIA closed its Center on Climate Change and National Security.[961]

---

[955] *2014 Climate Change Adaption Roadmap*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014) and Edward J. Erickson. "Climate Change and the Department of Defense: An Introduction." *Marine Corps University Journal* (2016), p. 13.

[956] *2014 Climate Change Adaption Roadmap*, op. cit.; Edward J. Erickson. "Climate Change and the Department of Defense: An Introduction." *Marine Corps University Journal* (2016), pp. 8 and 13 and *Quadrennial Defense Review* Report, op. cit., (2014).

[957] *National Security Strategy* (2010), op. cit.

[958] Corey J.A. Bradshaw, Xingli Giam and Navjot S. Sohdi. "Evaluating the Relative Environmental Impact of Countries." *PLOS* (2010).

[959] Marc A. Levy. *Examining DHS's Misplaced Focus on Climate Change*. (Washington, D.C.: House Committee on Homeland Security, July 8, 2015).

[960] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 14 and Plautz, op. cit.

[961] "CIA Opens Center on Climate Change and National Security." (Langley: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009); Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 14 and Plautz, op. cit.

Furthermore, as the U.S. remains dependent on traditional energy sources, there will be little impact on defense readiness. For example, writing about his experience fighting the War on Terrorism, veteran Michael Breen, who serves as the Executive Director of the Truman National Security Project, described the critical dependence of fuel convoys for military operations.[962] Taking this into account, he noted that Iraqi insurgents target fuel convoys, forcing infantry troops intro direct battle to defend the fuel at great personal risk.[963] Breen writes, "our enemies recognize a crucial weakness… our dependence on oil for more than 95 percent of our transportation."[964] He adds, "vulnerability is felt at the strategic level as well as on the front lines. Often pumped from nondemocratic regimes, oil flows through extremely vulnerable chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. In return, the cash makes its way into the hands of countries such as Iran, and even to terrorist groups such as al Qaeda."[965] The U.S., Breen implies, funds the very enemies it is fighting.[966] Indeed, the Army found in 2007, the height of the Afghan war, one in eight fuel convoys were attacked and the U.S. experienced one causality for every 24 attacks.[967]

Climate Change & The Use of Diplomacy or Aid

The EU and the U.S. also employ different approaches to diplomacy and economic aid in the context of climate change. As the UK's Department of International Development wrote in 2011, "we cannot have food security, water security, energy security – or any form of national security – without climate security."[968] This is why diplomatic tactics and economic aid are critical tools for the EU. As previously noted, the EU tradition of multilateralism shapes institutional preferences, resulting in a predilection for negotiating international climate change strategy through the UN.[969] They have led efforts for the majority of multilateral climate change agreements and are the earliest adopters of the most restrictive and progressive measures. For example, under the Kyoto agreement, 15 EU members committed to reduce

---

[962] Michael Breen. "Climate change our most serious security threat." *San Francisco Gate* (August 23, 2013).

[963] Breen, op. cit.

[964] Breen, op. cit.

[965] Breen, op. cit.

[966] Breen, op. cit. and Scott and Khan, op. cit., p. 89.

[967] CNA Military Advisory Board. *Advanced Energy & United State National Security.* (Arlington: CNA Corporation, 2017), p. 38.

[968] *UK aid: changing lives, delivering results.* (London: The Department for International Development, 2011), p. 23.

[969] *A Climate & Resources Security Dialogue for the 21ˢᵗ Century,* op. cit., p. 7; Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 9; Peter and Hey, op. cit., pp. 215-216 and *UK aid: changing lives, delivering results*, op. cit., p. 24.

greenhouse gas emissions by eight percent below 1990 levels before 2012.[970] They achieved a reduction of 18.5 percent instead.[971] The Paris Agreement features even more ambitious goals that EU member states are already on target to achieve.

The EU also works to advance the cause of clean energy in developing nations around the world.[972] The European Commission first adopted the concept of 'climate diplomacy' as a pillar of its national security strategy in 2011.[973] The concept was further expanded to include 'energy diplomacy' in 2016.[974] This comprehensive approach encourages engaging a diversity of participants and stakeholders across a broader range of institutions, organizations and platforms.[975] It calls for increased prioritization through a special UN representative, the inclusion of climate change on the Security Council agenda, and a dependence on national strategic guidance or national security assessments of climate change to drive action.[976] It also calls for restructuring existing institutions to, "imbue them with the resilience and capacity to tackle the threat."[977] This diplomatic approach to climate change in the context of national security is unique in its broad commitment to multilateral solutions on the transnational level, underpinned by wide ranging national solutions at the state level. As such, it illustrates a far different approach than the U.S.

Economic aid to combat climate change is equally important to the EU. The 2009 Copenhagen agreement committed developed countries to supporting the efforts of developing countries to implement sustainable development policies at a quicker pace. A promise of $100 billion in climate-related development assistance by 2020 from the EU made it the world's largest contributor to climate financing.[978] In 2014 over 14 billion Euros was spent on economic aid to combat climate change.[979] And member states have since committed to spending 20 percent of their budget on climate aid annually, totaling about $180 billion a

---

[970] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., op. 15 and Werksman, Leferve, and Runge-Metzger, op. cit., p. 94.

[971] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., op. 15.

[972] *UK aid: changing lives, delivering* results, op. cit. and Jacob Werksman, Jurgen Leferve and Artur Runge-Metzger. "The European Union and International Climate Change Policy." *Marine Corps University Journal* (2016), p. 94.

[973] *Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy.* (Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, 2014). Also see *EU Climate Diplomacy for 2015 and beyond: Reflection paper.* (Brussels: European Union, 2013).

[974] *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), p. 49.

[975] *A Climate & Resources Security Dialogue for the 21st Century,* op. cit., pp. 2 and 5.

[976] *A Climate & Resources Security Dialogue for the 21st Century,* op. cit., p. 5.

[977] *A Climate & Resources Security Dialogue for the 21st Century,* op. cit., p. 2.

[978] *Climate change factsheet 2015,* op. cit.

[979] *Climate change factsheet 2015,* op. cit.

year in 2015 and 2016.[980] Comparatively, the U.S. has committed a far smaller share of resources. For example, Obama's initial offer to the Global Climate Fund was just $500 million in 2015, with an estimated commitment of just $3 billion by 2020.[981] The USAID budget is equally small, having allocated just $306 million to support all its climate adaption, clean energy and sustainable landscape projects overseas.[982] It rose to $398 million in 2011 before dropping to $304 million in 2016.[983]

Returning to the British example, climate diplomacy and economic aid is a central pillar of government strategy. British Foreign Secretary William Hague summed up its three-fold goals as requiring first, "an effective response to climate change underpins our security and prosperity;" second, a binding global deal at any cost; and third, the effective deployment of foreign policy assets to 'mobilize political will' in order to shape 'an effective response.'[984] The British government has also spearheaded efforts to securitize climate change as a stand-alone threat, not allowing it to be subsumed under other objectives in its national security hierarchy.[985] The U.S. approach to climate diplomacy differs significantly. As the American Security Project notes, the U.S. is committed to three basic principles (upheld by Republican and Democrats alike) in the context of its climate diplomacy and aid.[986] First, the U.S. discounts the UN as the primary vehicle for negotiation, nor does it believe a grand bargain is necessary.[987] Rather it prefers bilateral or regional initiatives in order to position itself at the center of a network of agreements in its best interest; while the international community takes a secondary role.[988] Second, since the UN can only validate agreements, not enforce them, the U.S. views member states and individual government actions as central to addressing climate

---

[980] *Climate change factsheet 2015,* op. cit. and Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 15.

[981] Alan Neuhauser. "Obama Budget a Gas for Environmental Advocates." *U.S. News & World Report* (February 2, 2015).

[982] *USAID: Global Climate Change Budget* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017). Accessed February 1, 2017 https://www.usaid.gov/climate/strategy/budget.

[983] *USAID: Global Climate Change Budget,* op. cit.

[984] William Hague. *The Diplomacy of Climate Change.* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).

[985] Peter and Hey, op. cit., pp. 213-215.

[986] Andrew Holland and Philip Rossetti. *Climate Diplomacy: A Strategy For American leadership* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2015), p. 3.

[987] Holland and Rossetti, op. cit., p. 3.

[988] Erikson, op. cit., p. 8 and Holland and Rossetti, op. cit., p. 3.

change.[989] And third, the U.S. believes that the global climate change regime should establish and reinforce norms; not impose them by way of broad multilateral agreements.[990]

Climate Change & Domestic Preparedness

In terms of domestic preparedness against extreme weather events, the EU demonstrates a greater commitment than the U.S. in response to material factors. Over the past three decades the EU has seen a significant rise in extreme weather events (see Table 6.5).[991]

Table 6.5: Economic Losses from Weather-Related Catastrophes in Europe (in U.S. Millions)[992]

Type Of Catastrophic Event	Fatalities	Overall Loss 1980s	Overall Loss 1990s	Overall Loss 2000s	Overall Loss 2010
Small-Scale	1-9	0.63	0.91	1.18	>1.33
Moderate	>10	5.08	7.28	9.40	>10.60
Severe	>20	29	42	54	>61
Major	>100	114	164	212	>230
Devastating	>500	305	437	504	636

The Norwegian Meteorological Institute notes, for example, that heatwaves which previously occurred one in every fifty years, are now occurring one in five.[993] Two such heatwaves in 2003 and 2010 caused tens of thousands of deaths, forest fires, crop shortfalls and record high energy consumption.[994] Severe cold spells between 2005 and 2010 – caused significant travel disruptions, death and high energy consumption.[995] In 2002, floods swept across Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria, causing the largest material damage from flooding in European history, costing approximately $21 million dollars and causing 54 fatalities.[996] Two years earlier, floods in Italy, France and Switzerland caused an additional $10 million in damage, causing 37 fatalities.[997] Between 1980 and 2010 there was a 60 percent increase in the cost of damages from extreme weather events across Europe, valued at 415 billion Euros and

---

[989] Holland and Rossetti, op. cit., p. 3.
[990] Holland and Rossetti, op. cit., p. 3.
[991] Paul Kovas. *Severe Weather Impacts & Insurance* (Toronto: Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, 2016).
[992] *Extreme Weather Events in Europe*, op. cit. p. 75.
[993] *Extreme Weather Events in Europe: Preparing for Climate Change Adaption* (Oslo: Norwegian Meteorological Institute, 2013), p. 28.
[994] *Extreme Weather Events in Europe*, op. cit., p. 28.
[995] *Extreme Weather Events in Europe,* op. cit. p. 28.
[996] *Extreme Weather Events in Europe*, op. cit. p. 61.
[997] *Extreme Weather Events in Europe*, op. cit. p. 61.

causing 140,000 causalities.[998] As a result, the EU's domestic preparedness strategy for climate change depends heavily on uniform action at the supranational level.[999] In accordance with their external policy, the EU fully aligns its internal policy, through its Directorate-General for Climate Action, with the multilateral agreements it negotiates, as well as those formal guidelines adopted as standards by international bodies on climate change (like, for example, the 2010 World Health Organization's Parma Declaration on Environment and Health).[1000] Failure to adapt, the EU believes, will have serious implications for collective security.[1001]

The U.S., on the other hand continues to lag behind its European peers at the Federal, state and local level in regards to the institutionalization of national policies for addressing extreme weather caused by climate change. At a 2015 hearing convened on extreme weather, Senator Thomas R. Carper declared that the U.S., "cannot afford to ignore the impacts these weather event is having on Federal spending."[1002] Carper noted that the Comptroller General has made it clear the U.S. is not adequately prepared for the threat of climate change, that the Government is facing a significant financial risk it has not 'properly mitigated,' and that a "wake up call" was necessary.[1003] But by 2016, for example 16 U.S. states had still not issued a Climate Action Plan, despite a directive from Obama to do so.[1004] As Senator Ron Johnson notes, being unprepared results in an overreliance on the declaration of national emergencies and designating disaster zones, creating a dependency on the infusion of emergency funds instead of building resiliency over the long term.[1005] With limited resources, a 'disaster-rebuild-disaster" cycle forces the government to divert supplies from other national security threats.

---

[998] The EU defines 'extreme weather events' as, "rare, with magnitudes in the upper or lower part of the scale of variability… extreme events recur in an irregular fashion, and the timing is unpredictable" adding that, "a characteristic of extremes is that they are understood within a context – and thus seasonal or annual means may be 'extreme' just as an unusual short-term event, such as a daily precipitation accumulation, may be extreme." See, *Extreme Weather Events in Europe*, op. cit. pp. 14 and 21.

[999] *Adapting to Climate Change: Towards A European Framework for Action.* (Brussels: European Commission, 2009), p. 15.

[1000] *Climate Action* (Brussels: European Commission, 2017). Accessed February 28, 2017 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/about-us/mission_en.

[1001] *Adapting to Climate Change: Towards A European Framework for Action*, op. cit., p. 16.

[1002] Thomas R. Carper. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014), p. 3.

[1003] Carper, op. cit., p. 3.

[1004] Mark Gaffigan. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014), p. 17 and *Climate Action Plan* (Arlington: Center for Climate Energy Solutions, 2017). Accessed June 12, 2017, https://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/climate-action-plans.

[1005] Ron Johnson. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014), p. 4.

For example, 14,000 DOD personnel were mobilized to support New York and New Jersey during Superstorm Sandy, while an additional 11,000 personnel were mobilized to support military operations and restore critical infrastructure.[1006]

According to external analysis from the Zurich Insurance Group, the U.S. confronts the world's most significant extreme weather threats.[1007] The annual rate of natural catastrophe is 2.5 times the global average, increasing from 400 events in the 1980s to over 1000 by 2010.[1008] Yet the U.S remains focused on piecemeal rather than comprehensive policies to address the threat over the long term, resulting in an extreme weather resilience gap.[1009] As Jonas Anshelm and Martin Hultman write, climate change remains just "one of several managerial issues relating to the environment and as something to keep an eye on in the future."[1010] This mindset is illustrated by public opinion. Over 50 percent of the U.S. population does not believe it will ever experience a natural disaster and just under 50 percent have developed an emergency plan.[1011] According to a 2015 Pew poll only 45 percent of Americans believe climate change is a serious problem, below the global average of 54 percent.[1012] But insurance claims tell a different story. From the 1970s to the 1990s insurance claims worldwide totaled $10 billion annually worldwide.[1013] In the 1990s claims rose to $30 billion annually, and are expected to grow 10-fold this century.[1014] But in 2015 and 2016, U.S. claims totaled $16 billion and $23.8 billion, respectively.[1015] Yet, nowhere near the equivalent resources are invested in prevention as they are in recovery efforts. This leaves the U.S.

[1006] *National Security Implications of Climate Related Risks & A Changing Climate.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015), p. 4.

[1007] Lindene E. Patton. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014), pp. 26-27.

[1008] Patton, op. cit.

[1009] Patton, op. cit.

[1010] Jonas Anshelm and Martin Hultman. *Discourses of Global Climate Change: Apocalyptic Framing and Political Antagonisms.* (London: Routledge, 2015).

[1011] Unsurprisingly, there exists a direct correlation between believing that extreme weather is a threat and having personally experienced an extreme weather event. On this, see David Konisky Llewelyn Hughes and Charles Kaylor. "Will extreme weather events get American to act on Climate Change." *The Conversation* (2016). Also see, *America's Prepareathon,* op. cit. Also see Peter Howe, et. al. *Yale Climate Opinion Maps – U.S. 2016.* (New Haven: Yale University, 2017).

[1012] Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike and Jill Carle. *Global Concern About Climate Change, Broad Support for Limiting Emissions.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2015).

[1013] Kovas, op. cit.

[1014] Kovas, op. cit.

[1015] *Catastrophes: U.S.* (New York: Insurance Information Institute, 2017).

vulnerable to environmental destabilization which, according to all evidentiary measures, grows worse over time.[1016]

This does not discount some state and regional efforts which have been undertaken, including California's state-led Emission Trading System, the North Eastern Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Western Governors Association Clean and Diversified Energy Initiative. And there have been some limited successes at the federal level – including addressing fuel efficiency and protecting certain wildlife reserves from drilling. But the most important climate change policies passed in the past five years lacked government consensus and were forced through by Obama via Executive Order.[1017] Obama took action on carbon pollution, infrastructure resiliency, coal leasing and water pollution and the protection of federal lands from drilling operations.[1018] But Executive Orders rest on a less stable foundation than bipartisan legislation. This creates a greater risk from the weak institutionalization of policy across the government, or due to the potential of reversal by proceeding administrations (as will be examined in Chapter Eight).

Climate Change & Energy Security

When examining the approach to domestic energy reserves, the EU and the U.S. again diverge. Europe perceives fossil fuels as a national security issues because dependency is strategically undesirable.[1019] EU energy security was a matter of importance long before the prioritization of the climate change threat.[1020] Energy security in the context of domestic national security is central for the EU broadly. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty explicitly outlines EU Energy Policy in Article 194. The policy consists of four principles – including the ensuring a functioning energy market; energy security and supply; efficiency and the development of new

---

[1016] For an in-depth state by state analysis of the many extreme weather threats confronting the U.S., see *States at Risk: America's Preparedness Card* (Princeton: Princeton, 2017).

[1017] David F. Heyman. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014).

[1018] Obama's Executive Order on regulating carbon emissions still left the final decision on reduction and rates as well as the manner by which states will increase renewable energy sources to the discretion of local governments. See Madison Park. "6 Obama Climate Policies That Trump Orders Change." *CNN* (March 28, 2017).

[1019] Youngs, op. cit., p. 83.

[1020] Youngs, op. cit., p. 76.

and renewable energy sources; as well as the promotion of interconnectivity energy networks.[1021]

The security of European energy can be illustrated in many ways. For example, as much as a quarter of EU energy consumption was already from renewable sources by 2009.[1022] The EU increased its share of global renewable energy usage from 8.5 percent in 2005 to 15 percent in 2013 and remains on track for its 2020 global goals.[1023] According to the most recent statistics published by the European Commission, every source of energy (nuclear, solid fuels, natural gas and crude oil) declined between 2005 and 2014, while renewable energy rose exponentially (see Table 6.6). This is critical as Europe is the world's largest energy importer, with 55 percent of its supply – including over 80 percent of its oil more and then 60 percent of its natural gas – being imported.[1024]

Table 6.6: Development of the Production of Primary Energy in the European Union[1025]

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Renewable	105.70	111.30	120.10	128.50	134.60	148.40	145.20	159.60	170.50	173.10
Nuclear	98.90	98.20	92.70	92.90	88.70	90.90	89.90	87.50	86.90	86.90
Solid Fuels	97.20	95.10	92.10	88.20	82.90	81.80	83.10	82.90	77.70	74.50
Natural Gas	93.10	89.10	83.60	84.0	76.60	77.90	69.10	64.90	64.30	57.10
Crude Oil	91.40	83.80	82.20	76.3	71.90	66.30	57.80	52.30	49.20	48.00

In 2013, the EU began increasing levels of natural gas production while expanding energy pipelines and trade within the EU.[1026] Diversification of energy resources has also included expanding investments in resource-rich regions such as Central Asia and North Africa, whose proximity to the European continent makes these areas increasingly desirable over Russia.[1027]

The EU has also expanded energy diversification opportunities following the aggressive actions of Russia in Eastern Europe, illustrating a direct correlation to changing material factors. This has been supported by widespread local level initiatives which have

---

[1021] Jos Delbecke, Ger Klassen and Stefan Vergote. "Climate Change Related Energy Policies." in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), p. 52.

[1022] Delbecke, Klassen and Vergote, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

[1023] Delbecke, Klassen and Vergote, op. cit., p. 75.

[1024] Ratner, et. al., op. cit., p. 5 and Rasmussen (2016), op. cit.

[1025] See *Development of the Production of Primary Energy (by fuel type), EU-28, 20014-14*. (Brussels: European Commission, 2016). Accessed May 1, 2017 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports.

[1026] Ratner, et. al., op. cit., pp. 5-6.

[1027] Some of these projects include the Trans Adriatic, Trans Anatolian Gas, and Nabucco West Pipelines. On European energy diversification in surrounding regions see, Ratner, et. al., op. cit., pp. 14-28. On Russia and diversification across the Union see "Conscious Uncoupling." *The Economist* (April 3, 2014).

generated action, for example, by connecting communities across the EU for 'car free days' in 2,000 cities and 44 countries; establishing a voluntary commitment by 6,000 cities to reduce local emissions; and the creation of climate pact binding European mayors to specific local clean energy policies.[1028] Renewable energy cooperatives have also increased across the continent.[1029] Important domestic policies have also been implemented. By 2020, for example, all new buildings constructed in the EU must adhere to strict eco-designs, operating at zero-energy or energy neutral.[1030] Comparatively, the U.S. only requires, for example, that utility providers use 20 percent renewable energy to meet electricity demand by 2050.[1031] Electrical products sold in the EU at the commercial and retail level are heavily regulated; in the U.S. they are not.[1032] And the EU also has the lowest emission from cars and among the lowest fuel consumption anywhere in the world.[1033] These factors, among others, makes the EU less dependent over all traditional fuels while driving economic growth through new clean energy industries. This in reinforced in the UK, for example, where the government maintains a specific Department of Energy and Climate Change to deal with the interconnected challenges posed by the energy and the environment.[1034]

Yet, the U.S. remains the world's number one consumer of oil, with as much as 80 percent of its energy sourced from oil, coal, and natural gas respectively, and just 10 percent each for nuclear and renewable energy sources.[1035] Whether it is the explosion of the fracking industry or the construction of the Keystone Pipeline, the U.S. maintains a focus on fossil fuel extraction and production to drive U.S. energy. As Joshua W. Busby writes, despite maintaining among the world's most "vibrant and well-resourced environmental advocacy sector," the U.S. government is an "inconsistent leader" when it comes to environmental issues calling the U.S. a laggard on climate change domestically when compared to the rest of the world.[1036]

[1028] Delbeke and Vis, "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world," op. cit., p. 14.

[1029] *Renewables 2016 Global Status Report,* op. cit., p. 136.

[1030] *Our planet, our future*, op. cit., p. 18.

[1031] *Economics of Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Accessed May 1, 2017 https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/economics-climate-change.

[1032] Delbecke, Klassen and Vergote, op. cit., p. 54.

[1033] Delbecke, Klassen and Vergote, op. cit. p. 54.

[1033] Delbecke, Klassen and Vergote, op. cit. p. 55.

[1034] Delbecke, Klassen and Vergote, op. cit. p. 65. Also see Marcus DuBois King and Jay Gulledge. "Climate change and energy security: an analysis of policy research." *Climatic Change* (2014), pp. 57-68.

[1035] *U.S. Energy Facts Explained* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016).

[1036] Joshua W. Busby. *A Green Giant? Inconsistency and American Environmental Diplomacy* in G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng (eds.) *America, China and the Struggle for World Order* (2015), pp. 245.

Since 2015, for example, hydraulic fracking (drilling in shale deposits) has resulted in the largest increase in U.S. oil production and one of the most extreme drop in price at any other time in modern history.[1037] According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, fracking accounted for half of all U.S. crude oil production in 2016, up from less than two percent in 2000. In that time frame, the fracking industry grew from 23,000 wells producing 103,000 barrels a day, to 300,00 wells producing 4.3 million a day.[1038] U.S. fracking production is only exceeded by Saudi Arabia and Russia.[1039] Fracking has reshaped the U.S. approach to domestic energy but has not necessarily improved its level of severity. Fracking is still a fossil fuel based approach to domestic energy security, wherein other countries, prefer investment in clean energy solutions, and stringent regulations to enforce them, as the most secure approach to its energy supply.[1040] This is best evidenced by the ban on fracking in many major European oil producing nations (including Germany, France, the Netherland, Scotland and Bulgaria).[1041] This despite estimates which suggest the EU has more shale gas (approximately nine percent of global supply) than the U.S.[1042] Even in the UK, where fiscal incentives are provided by the government to support fracking projects, little investment from the energy industry has followed.[1043] The general European perspective of fracking is that it remains a relatively a untested process and the environmental effects are too significant.[1044]

They Keystone Pipeline represents another example of how U.S. dependence on fossil fuels has long term negative ramifications for its national security, as well as the environment. Commissioned in 2010, the pipeline was scheduled to be widened to increase capacity. But environmental concerns from ongoing construction (particularly on tribal lands) led to widespread civil protest. Compounded by the increasingly expensive process of extracting oil sands from Canada – which causes soil erosion, water pollution, increased Greenhouse Gas

---

[1037] Matt Egan, "Oil Milestone: Fracking Fuels Half of U.S. Output." *CNN* (March 16, 2016).

[1038] Egan, op. cit.

[1039] Egan, op. cit. and *Hydraulic fracking accounts of about half of crude oil production.* (Washington, D.C., March 15, 2016).

[1040] Arthur Nelson. "The Rise and Fall of Fracking in Europe." *The Guardian* (September 29, 2016).

[1041] Kelly Gilborn and Tara Patel. "Fracking in Europe." *Bloomberg* (November 22, 2016); Nelson, op. cit. and *Shale Gas in Europe: Revolution or Evolution?* (London: Ernst & Young, 2013).

[1042] The one exception is Ukraine, where fracking has been pursed in an effort to decrease the country's dependency on Russian oil imports. See Gilborn and Patel, op. cit.; Nelson, op. cit. and *Shale Gas in Europe: Revolution or Evolution?* (London: Ernst & Young, 2013).

[1043] *Shale Gas in Europe: Revolution or Evolution?*, op. cit.

[1044] Some of these environmental effects include earthquakes, rises Greenhouse Gas emissions as well as water and air pollution. See David Wethe. "Fracking." *Bloomberg* (March 3, 2017).

emissions, arsenic poisoning and the disruption of wildlife – Obama halted the project before leaving office.[1045]

The U.S. may have increased production of oil between 2001 and 2016, but the long-term stability of their approach is called into question by the approach taken by its European counterparts. It is therefore apparent that despite the evident effects of climate change on U.S. security, America does not respond to material factors which would justify the explanatory power of the systemic shifts hypothesis. I will now assess the second hypothesis: that the prioritization of climate change as a threat to national security is a result of the powerful impact of political culture and bureaucratic institutions.

CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

I argue that political culture and related institutional biases (in the context of discourse, strategy and expenditures) best explain the prioritization of specific threats to the U.S. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, climate change ranks as a low-level priority. This is characterized by a series of specific features including a low-level budget; a preference for arbitrating (i.e. diplomacy, economic aid or sanctions) strategies; and the prevalence of 'issue discourse' as the defining feature of the official threat narrative (see Table 6.1). Issue discourse is defined by a divided narrative that posits two distinct discourses against one another. As a result, neither dominates the debate. A divided discourse differs from the dual discourse discussed in the previous case study in one significant way. A dual discourse is defined by two complimentary narratives. This implies an agreement that a threat exists, but a disagreement regarding how to address it. A divided discourse, on the other hand, has two contradictory or opposing narratives. This implies there is a disagreement on how to address the threat and whether a threat exists in the context of national security at all.

Discourse

A Cultural-Institutional explanation posits that threat prioritization can be understood as a measure of discourse, or how a threat is framed. The lack of prioritization in the case of climate change is the result of a deeply divided discourse; specifically, the apocalyptic

---

[1045] Trump reversed Obama's order in 2017. See "Mixed report on safety of eating northern Alberta game." *CBC News* (April 3, 2007) and Parfomak. *Keystone XL Pipeline: Development Issues.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2017).

renderings both narratives employ at its most extreme.[1046] Despite the fact that the scientific evidence favors the argument that climate change is predominately caused by human activity, even those with the scientific high ground still tend towards depicting doomsday scenarios. This discourse features alarming rhetoric about the effects and consequence of climate change in both the short and long term, obfuscating facts which support a belief in the impending threat of climate change.[1047] This rhetoric is matched by an equal commitment to a lack of alarmism from the counter movement, which (at its most extreme) includes a rejection of scientific data, a denial of necessary policy solutions, and no consideration of any prioritizing status.[1048] It is these extremes, I posit, that ensure a low level of prioritization and a disjoined or lacking policy approach. With hyperbole and exaggeration expressed by both perspectives, prioritization is stifled by conflicting narratives. Policy is stagnant as no agreement regarding the nature of the threat is substantiated.[1049] Without a dominate discourse, there is no pathway to drive prioritization or policy.

Advocates for climate action in the context of national security are as diverse as those who reject it, and can be found among politicians, bureaucrats and military personnel. Obama, for example, called climate change a 'severe threat' and 'immediate risk' to national security when addressing the Coast Guard Academy in 2015.[1050] Vice President Joe Biden called climate change the greatest threat to the next generation as a driver of conflict, migration and other forms of dislocation fostering instability.[1051] Tom Ridge, Homeland Security Secretary under Bush, stated that climate change is, "a security challenge that would bring destruction and economic damage," labeling the threat, "a real serious problem."[1052] Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security under the Obama made similar remarks

---

[1046] Gemenne et. al., op. cit., p. 2.

[1047] Stephen Grat et. al. defines this narrative as 'climitization' or the framing of a disastrous event in the context of environmental conditions caused by climate change to obtain a specific goal or to further distract the discussion from any consideration of alternative root causes behind the warming planet. As a result, alternative solutions and policies which might have otherwise been considered are ignored. See Stephen Grat et. al. "Climitization: A Critical Perspective of Framing Disasters as Climate Change Events." *Climate Risk Management* (2015).

[1048] Gemenne et. al., op. cit., p. 2.

[1049] On driving prioritization through heighted rhetoric, see Stephen Jackson. *Seeing Violence in the Weather: The Apocalyptic Rhetoric of Climate-Driven Conflict.* (Oxford: Interdisciplinary Press, 2015).

[1050] Barack Obama. *Remarks by the President at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement.* (New London: Coast Guard Academy, May 20, 2015).

[1051] Charles Spiering. "Joe Biden to College Students: Global Warming is 'Greatest Threat to Your Generation." *Breitbart* (February 12, 2015).

[1052] Paige Lavender. "Former Bush Official Calls Climate Change A 'Real Serious Problem.'" *Huffington Post* (May 21, 2014).

in her 2013 farewell address.[1053] Former CIA Director Jon Brennan noted when his agency examined, "deeper causes of this rising instability, they find nationalistic, sectarian, and technological factors that are eroding the structure of the international system. They also see socioeconomic trends, the impact of climate change, and other elements that are cause for concern."[1054] And General Anthony C. Zinni, the former Commander of the Central Command, wrote, "we will pay for [climate change] one way or another. We will pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions today, and we'll have to take an economic hit of some kind. Or we will pay the price later in military terms. And that will involve human lives."[1055] He added that, "there is no way out of this that does not have real costs attached to it. That has to hit home."[1056]

As a result of these views, and ones similar to them held across the government, the DOD finally adopted climate change in its official lexicon, listing it in Pentagon's official dictionary of terms in 2016. But the definition does not include any attribution for the threat, limiting the explanation to, "variations in average weather conditions that persist over multiple decades or longer that encompass increases and decreases in temperature, shifts in precipitation, and changing risk of certain types of severe weather events."[1057] In contrast, when depicting climate change in 2006, the UK's Ministry of Defense's noted in a strategic trends report: "there is compelling evidence to indicate that climate change is occurring and that the atmosphere will continue to warm at an unprecedented rate throughout the 21st Century. A scientific consensus holds that a large part of this warming is attributable to human activities, primarily through the concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases."[1058]

The oppositional discourse is equally diverse in its justification, use and misuse of evidence, as well as criticism of the scientific consensus. And detractors can also be found among elected officials, bureaucrats and military personnel. For example, the Center for American Progress found elected officials from almost every state serving in the 114th Congress had, while serving in public office, made skeptical remarks regarding climate change

---

[1053] Mike Levine. Outgoing DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano Warns of 'Serious Cyber Attack, Unprecedented Natural Disaster." *ABC* (August 27, 2013).

[1054] John Brennan. *Brennan Delivers Remarks at the Center for Strategic & International Studies Global Security Forum 2015.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 16, 2016).

[1055] *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: The CAN Corporation, 2007), p. 31.

[1056] *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*, op. cit., p. 31.

[1057] *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016), p. 34.

[1058] *The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme: 2007-2036.* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2006), p. 2.

as a national security threat.[1059] At is most extreme are comments like those from Congressman Doug LaMalfa who stated, "the climate of the globe has been fluctuating since God created it."[1060] At its most uninformed are comments like those from Congressman Duncan Hunter who stated, "nobody really knows the cause. The Earth cools, the Earth warms."[1061] He added that, "thousands of people die every year of cold, so if we had global warming it would save lives... We ought to look out for people. The Earth can take care of itself."[1062] Even less extreme politicians, and those who support the view that climate change is predominately driven by mankind, still work to delegitimize attempts to prioritize it in the hierarchy of national security threats specifically. For example, Senator John McCain, who supported climate change action during his 2008 Presidential race later criticized the Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in 2014, questioning, "why should he talk about climate change when we've got 130,000 people in Syria killed."[1063] Republican Senator John Barrasso echoed these sentiments, commenting in 2014 that the military's efforts to combat climate change are, "wasteful and irresponsible at best, especially as our friends and allies struggle with violent, deadly crises that have real implications for our security."[1064] Congressman Ken Buck noted in 2016, "when we distract our military with a radical climate change agenda, we detract from their main purpose of defending America from enemies [like the Islamic State]."[1065] That same year Major General Robert Scales, Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, stated the U.S. military is distracted and personnel at risk because DOD has become, "an unwitting agent for propagandizing the dangers of climate change."[1066]

The power of the alternative discourse presented by the counter movement is illustrated, in part, by shifts in public opinion. According to polls conducted by Pew between 2006 and 2011, when the counter movement was at its height, the number of Americans who

---

[1059] *Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus, The.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2013).

[1060] Jon Levine. "Florida Thinks You Are Literally Crazy If You Mention Climate Change." *PolicyMic* (March 20, 2015).

[1061] Miriam Raftery. "Politics in Paradise: Filner, Hunter Clash on Healthcare, Budget, Climate Change & More." *East County Magazine* (August 2009).

[1062] Raftery, op. cit.

[1063] Harder and Nissenbaum, op. cit.

[1064] Laura Barron-Lopez. "Climate change hits all Pentagon operations, official says." *The Hill* (July 22, 2014).

[1065] W.J. Hennigan. "Climate Change is real: just ask the Pentagon." *Los Angeles Times* (November 11, 2016).

[1066] William S. Becker. "Climate Change: Still a War of Words." *Huffington Post* (April 26, 2016).

believed in the existence of solid evidence for a warming earth as a result of human activity declined (see Table 6.7).[1067]

Table 6.7: American Opinions About the Evidence of
Global Warming (as a Percentage of Responses, 2006-2011)[1068]

Is there Solid Evidence the Earth is Warming?	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Yes	77	77	71	57	59	63
No	17	16	21	33	32	28
Do Not Know	6	7	8	10	9	9

There was also a concurrent rise in those who do not see climate change as a problem (see Table 6.8).[1069] Over this same period, those who identified as Democrat shifted most significantly

Table 6.8: American Opinions the Seriousness of
Global Warming (as a Percentage of Responses, 2006-2011)[1070]

Is there Solid Evidence the Earth is Warming?	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Very Serious	43	45	44	35	32	38
Somewhat Serious	36	32	29	30	31	27
Not Too Serious	11	12	13	15	16	16
Not A Problem	9	8	11	17	18	17
Don't Know	1	3	3	3	3	2

Democrats who believed in the existence of solid evidence for global warming declined from 91 percent to 77 percent.[1071] After a historic drop in 2009, belief in global warming rose to 67 percent in 2012, while its seriousness rose to 39 percent.[1072] In the same time, the number of both Democrats and Republicans who believed in the existence of global warming increased, with Democrats increasing to 85 percent.[1073] A Yale University poll found that by 2016 as much as 70 percent of the U.S. population believed that the available evidence proved the existences of global warming.[1074] And as many as 58 percent of Americans, the same study

---

[1067] *Modest Rise in Number Saying There Is "Solid Evidence" of Global Warming* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, December 1, 2011), p. 1.

[1068] *Modest Rise in Number Saying There Is "Solid Evidence" of Global Warming*, op. cit., p. 1.

[1069] *Modest Rise in Number Saying There Is "Solid Evidence" of Global Warming*, op. cit., p. 1.

[1070] *Modest Rise in Number Saying There Is "Solid Evidence" of Global Warming*, op. cit., p. 1.

[1071] *Modest Rise in Number Saying There Is "Solid Evidence" of Global Warming*, op. cit., p. 2.

[1072] *More Say There Is Solid Evidence of Global Warming* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2012).

[1073] *More Say There Is Solid Evidence of Global Warming*, op. cit.

[1074] Howe, et. al.

reported, are worried about its risks.[1075] A Gallup poll from the same year reported as much as 64 percent of Americans were concerned about the risks associated with global warming.[1076]

Emerging from the interviews conducted for this research, participants espoused a strong belief that ideology, partisanship, discourse and narrative were critical in defining threats. One bureaucrat and one military official specifically pointed to the role of the Obama administration in establishing climate change as a national security priority, similar to how Bush prioritized HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security (as discussed in Chapter Three).[1077] Both noted that due to its "ideological disposition" and particular constituency, climate change is only prioritized when it aligns with alternative political goals or objectives.[1078] Preliminary research into this phenomenon seems to support this view. A 2016 study examining factors which play a determining role in one's perspective on climate change discovered that political affiliation and ideology were critical.[1079] But, the analysis also revealed that even a passionate belief regarding climate change's negative effects did not translate into a willingness to undertake measures – personal or otherwise – to address the issue.[1080] In this way, I posit we can see the effects of divided discourse on the ability of action to adequately emerge at the micro (i.e. personal) level or the macro (i.e. governmental) level.[1081]

Strategy

Discourse reinforces specific forms of bureaucratic bias. In the case of low level threats like climate change, competing discourse empowers competing agencies to develop competing strategies or reject executing their mandate all together. This is illustrated in the qualitative and quantitative data sections wherein preferences for solutions ranged widely from doing nothing to employing non-governmental solutions (i.e. market-based) as well as engaging in public-private partnerships or government regulation to address the current and future effects of

---

[1075] Howe, et. al.

[1076] Lydia Saad and Jeffrey M. Jones. *U.S. Concern About Global Warming at Eight-Year High.* (Washington, D.C.: Gallup, 2016).

[1077] Interview with Subject 16 op. cit. and Interview with Subject 19 op. cit.

[1078] Interview with Subject 16 op. cit. and Interview with Subject 19 op. cit.

[1079] Matthew J. Hornsey, et. al. "Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change." *Nature Climate Change* (2016), pp. 1-5.

[1080] Matthew J. Hornsey, et. al. "Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change." *Nature Climate Change* (2016), pp. 1-5.

[1081] This does not deny the fact that prominent Democrats and Republican exist on both sides of the debate. For example, Republican Vice President Dick Cheney is a vocal advocate for climate change as a threat to national security while Democratic Senators Mary Landrieu and Ben Nelson have been openly skeptical of the climate change agenda in government.

climate change. But consistent with the discussion presented in the previous section, the data also illustrates a distinct U.S. preference for economic incentives. This is in contrast to the European's preference for a broad range of complimentary solutions including diplomacy, economic incentives and sanctions (in the context if of their stringent regulatory regime).

Returning to the examples presented in the sections above, there appears to be consistent failure by the U.S. to pursue an engaged climate-base security strategy. For example, U.S. climate diplomacy is most notable in regards to the consistent criticism, subversion and rejection of multilateral climate change treaties. The Kyoto Accords (rejected by Bush) and the Paris Agreement, which faced staunch opposition from the Congressional Republicans, represent two such examples at the international level. The same holds true for domestic legislation. For example, Obama's proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 failed to pass in the Senate.[1082] And the Climate Stewardship Act (meant to introduce a mandatory cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases) was defeated in 2003, 2005 and 2007.[1083] As a result, Obama enacted his climate initiatives through Executive Order, and was still challenged by local governments in U.S. courts.

A belief in economic incentives as a primary strategy to combat climate change has long been the policy of the U.S. government, illustrating continuity in strategy over time. The U.S. first established a National Climate Program Act in 1978 to address Greenhouse Gas emissions under the mandate of the Department of Commerce. The basis for bureaucratic control was that the regulation of emissions was first and foremost a matter of economic significance. But it was also due in part to the government's belief that regulatory regimes are best served by incentives, or a market-based approach.[1084] This opinion is shared by Americans. The 2016 Yale poll revealed stronger support for policies that fund research into renewable energy sources over strict carbon emission limits.[1085]

This bias for economic strategies is evident in the data. Survey respondents on average preferred the use of economic incentives as their policy preference to combat climate change

[1082] Clare Foran. "The Clash Over the Paris Climate Talks." *The Atlantic* (November 19, 2015).
[1083] Damien Meadows, Yvon Slingenberg and Peter Zapfl. "EU ETS: Pricing carbon to drive cost-effective reductions across Europe" in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), p. 49.
[1084] *Economic Incentives.* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Accessed May 1, 2017 Also see, Richard Belzer and A.L. Nicholas. "Economic Incentives to Encourage Hazardous Waste Minimization and Safe Disposals. (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1988).
[1085] Howe, et. al., op. cit.

(see Figure 6.2). They also expressed a preference for the Department of Energy in terms of which agency is best suited to confront the threat posed by climate change – after the choice of no agency (see Figure 6.3). It is therefore consistent with the expectations of bias that survey respondents also indicated a belief that the DOE is generally (and outside the context of any specific threat) inclined towards a policy of economic incentives when executing any policies (see Table 6.9).

Table 6.9: Preferred Policy of the Department of Energy

	Over-whelming Use of Force	Limited Use of Force	Economic Incentives	Diplomatic Engagement	Sanctions	No Policy	Do Not Know	Total
Politician	0	0	44.44	22.22	0	22.22	11.11	**100**
Bureaucrat	0	5.88	29.41	23.53	11.76	5.88	23.53	**100**
Military	0	4.76	23.81	14.29	19.05	14.29	23.81	**100**
Media	0	6.67	13.33	13.33	6.67	26.67	33.33	**100**
Civil Society	0	0	44.44	11.11	11.11	22.22	11.11	**100**
Academia/ Think Tank	0	0	45.45	4.55	4.55	9.09	36.36	**100**

Some of America's market based policies have been successful, specifically in the development of renewable energy. The U.S. ranks in the top five countries for increasing use of solar and wind power and the U.S. is the global leader in use of bio-power, geothermal power and connecting solar power.[1086] But almost all renewable energy development in the U.S. is fueled by credits and subsidies.[1087] The CNA Military Advisory Board found that where tax credits expire, renewable energy capacity declines steeply.[1088] Historically, the U.S. spends more on subsidizing fossil fuels. For example, between 2002 and 2008, fossil fuel subsidies totaled $72 billion, an average of just over $10 billion annually. In the same period, renewable energy subsidies totaled just $29 billion, an average of just over $4 billion each year.[1089] In 2013 and 2014 national subsidies for fossil fuels totaled $20 billion annually.[1090] This sum notably does not include private investment in the fossil fuel industry, estimated in the trillions of dollars worldwide every year.[1091] Despite indicating his desire to shift policy, the U.S. still

---

[1086] CNA Military Advisory Board (2017), op. cit.

[1087] CNA Military Advisory Board (2017), op. cit.

[1088] CNA Military Advisory Board (2017), op. cit., p. 14 and *Renewables 2106: Global Status Report*, op. cit., p. 107 and 133.

[1089] "Should the U.S. Shift More Energy Subsidies to Renewable Power?" *Scientific American* (August 6, 2012).

[1090] Bast, et. al., op. cit., p. 12. Also see David Coady, Ian Parry and Baoping Shang. "How Large Are Global Fossile Fuel Subsidies?" *World Development* (2017), pp. 11-27.

[1091] John Schwartz. "Investment Funds Worth Trillions Are Dropping Fossil Fuel Stocks." *New York Times* (December 12, 2016) and Elizabeth Bast, et. al. *The Fossil Fuel Bailout: G20 subsidies for oil, gas and coal exploration.* (London: Oil Change International, 2014).

remained the world's number one distributor of fossil fuel subsidies when Obama left office.[1092]

Meanwhile, U.S. investment in renewable energy has grown just $30 billion between 2005 and 2015, rising from $11.9 billion to $44.1 billion (see Table 6.10).

Table 6.10: Global New Investment in Renewable Power & Fuels in the United States (in billions)[1093]

Year	Investment
2005	$11.90
2006	$29.10
2007	$33.20
2008	$35.50
2009	$23.90
2010	$34.70
2011	$49.00
2012	$40.60
2013	$35.30
2014	$37.00
2015	$44.10

And this was neither a consistent nor steady climb, indicating a lack of commitment in prioritization, particularly when compared to funding for other threats over time. By employing incentives over regulation, the U.S. cannot adequately institutionalize renewable energy as a primary source for domestic supply. For example, by 2016, 13.7 percent of generated electricity in the U.S. was from renewable energy while the EU's share was 44 percent, up from 24 percent in 2000.[1094] And although the worldwide use of renewable energy saw its largest increase between 2015 and 2016, U.S. consumption was still just 19.2 percent, with fossil fuels at 78.3 percent and nuclear energy at 2.5 percent.[1095] Meanwhile, other countries continue to outspend U.S. investment in renewable energy.[1096] In 2015, for example, China spent $100 billion on renewable energy, almost three time the U.S. investment that same year.[1097]

The distorting effect of subsidies, taxes and investment in fossil fuels is driven by an over-reliance on market-based policies, not the material factors drive its EU counterparts. For

---

[1092] Elizabeth Bast, et. al. *Empty Promises: G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production* (2015).
[1093] *Renewables 2016 Global Status Report*, op. cit., p. 100.
[1094] *Renewables 2016 Global Status Report*, op. cit., pp. 34-37.
[1095] *Renewables 2016 Global Status Report*, op. cit., pp. 17 and 28.
[1096] CNA Military Advisory Board (2017), op. cit.
[1097] This does not include investments made into large hydropower. See CNA Military Advisory Board (2017), op. cit. The U.S. also ranks second to China in terms of capacity or generation of renewable fuels. See *Renewables 2016 Global Status Report*, op. cit., p. 21.

example, the U.S. consistently rejected cap-and-trade regimes, despite having been the progenitor of the concept, later adopted with great success by the EU.[1098] As a result, Obama was forced to mandate his Clean Power Plan through Executive Order to move the U.S. towards a policy of regulation on carbon emissions.[1099] But opponents immediately denounced the initiative, calling it unconstitutional, demanding non-compliance by local officials and finally filing suit against Obama in U.S. courts.[1100]   Unable to prioritize the threat, nor implement appropriate policy, allocating necessary resources to address climate change is a complex task. How these resources are allocated in light of these complications will be explored in the following section.

Expenditures

As noted in the previous chapters, budgets provide a tangible measure of priorities and preferences. Budgetary allocations for fighting climate change are substantially lower when compared to other threats, and represent just a fraction of the cost reacting to climate change related events. These budgetary commitments are event less significant when compared to the future potential costs of not investing in the necessary policy options at the present time. As Senator Carper noted in regards to climate change, "a little extra planning – combined with prudent, targeted investments – can go a long way in saving both lives and taxpayer's dollars… An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."[1101] Yet, despite an increase of serious flooding from four to 10 times a year over the last half century, the Navy has made only minor investments in protecting its infrastructure, and did not establish a task force on climate change until 2009.[1102] This has significantly hampered capacity in a wide range of cases. The Naval Academy, for example, spent thirteen years and $120 million repairing its facilities from the flood damage caused by Hurricane Isabel in 2003.[1103]

Other branches have also been affected. Hurricane Katrina destroyed 95 percent of Keesler Air Force Base in Missouri and Hurricane Andrew decimated Homestead Air Force

---

[1098] *Economics of Climate Change*, op. cit.

[1099] Will Oremus. "Obama's Climate Plan is Basically Cap and Trade." *Slate* (August 4, 2015).

[1100] The implementation of the Plan was stopped by the Supreme Court in 2016 after 27 states filed suit against the government for overstepping its legal authority. See Oremus, op. cit. and Zoe Schlanger. "Does the Clean Power Plan still stand a chance? Only if the Next President is a Democrat." *Newsweek* (February 10, 2016).

[1101] Carper, op. cit., p. 3.

[1102] Catherine Foley. *Military Basing and Climate Change* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2012), p. 2 and Jason Plautz. "CIA Shuts Down Climate Research Program." *National Journal* (May 21, 2015).

[1103] Josh Hicks. "House Democrats: Naval Academy Climate Forum Lends a Military 'Voice of Credibility.'" *Washington Post* (July 18, 2015).

Base in Florida.[1104] Today, more than 30 U.S. military installations face elevated risks from rising sea levels.[1105] For example, Eglin Air Force Base in Florida (the world's largest) and Norfolk Naval Air station face significant threats to operational capacity in the immediate future due to flooding.[1106] Over $112 million was spent to repair a barrier island which serves to protect Elgin after it was struck by three hurricanes in less than a decade.[1107] And another $60 million was spent repairing the piers at Norfolk from rising tide damage.[1108] A radar base in Alaska was made virtually inaccessible as a result of costal erosions, melting permafrost, disappearing seas ice and rising oceans which have destroyed roads and runways leading to the base.[1109] Severe weather events affecting Fort Benning in Georgia and Fort Polk in Louisiana in 2015 and 2016 respectively caused more than $20 million in damages.[1110] Abroad, the island of Diego Garcia and the floating bases in the Bahrain (both critical for Middle East operations) as well as the base in Guam, (which provides support for East Asian operations, including those involving China), face potential closure.[1111] Securing military bases from the short and long term effects of climate change is further compounded by the diversity of environments in which U.S bases operate. American commands (including Africa, Central, European, Northern, Pacific and Southern) each face their own unique set of climate change related challenges.[1112]

Compounded by a lack of resources dedicated to climate diplomacy and bilateral aid. U.S. climate change policy lags behind the EU. For example, a review of the USAID budget for climate change over two decades reveals two thirds was allocated to technological research and development while just one third was allocated to scientific related activities (i.e. direct assistance) to other countries. According to the GAO the total budget grew less then $10 billion over twenty years, starting at $2.4 billion in 1993 and rising to $11.6 billion by 2014.[1113] In terms of international assistance, the USAID Global Climate Change budget (which invests in adaption, clean energy and sustainable landscapes overseas) was just $306 million in 2010,

---

[1104] Foley, op. cit., p. 2.

[1105] *Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts* (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2014), pp. 12-19.

[1106] Foley, op. cit., p. 2.

[1107] Miguel Llanos. "Military Bases Brace for Slow-Motion War with Climate Change." *NBC News* (June 8, 2014).

[1108] Llanos, op. cit.

[1109] Brian Kahn. "Military Bases Face Hurdles in Climate Change Adaption." *Scientific American* (July 15, 2014).

[1110] Hammack, op. cit.

[1111] Foley, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

[1112] Erikson, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

[1113] *Climate Change Funding and Management.* (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2014).

peaking in 2011 at $398 million, before dropping back down to $304 million by 2016.[1114] Meanwhile, the DOE was allocated $30 billion in discretionary funds just for 2016 alone, $5 billion of which was directed to 'transformational research' into climate change related technologies.[1115] This further emphasizes the results of this research wherein climate change is perceived as an energy issue best addressed by energy-related bureaucracy.

A similar budgetary discord exists in terms of preparedness for extreme weather events and the domestic energy market. Extreme weather affects 45 percent of supply chains and 40 percent of U.S. businesses each year.[1116] It is estimated that extreme weather events will increase federal disaster relief spending from $7 billion to $35 billion annually in the near future.[1117] Unfunded federal disaster assistance costs could total upwards to $1 trillion to $5.7 trillion before the end of the century, with appropriations growing from $1 billion to over $100 billion if preventative actions are not taken.[1118] And the GAO estimates local governments will spend an additional $3 trillion a year on natural catastrophe insurance coverage.[1119] The combination of extreme weather events and increasing government spending on reactionary policy could result in short, medium and long term economic disruption.[1120] As the owner or operator of the country's most significant infrastructure and with stewardship over 30 percent of its lands, forests, and wildlife, investing in public infrastructure is a practical solution to the problem.[1121] The private and public disaster relief sector estimates every dollar spent on resiliency and multi-hazard infrastructure yields a four dollar return on investment in terms of destruction caused by extreme weather events.[1122] This is important, particularly in light of the U.S. government being the major supplier of disaster relief when extreme weather events occur.[1123] For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has stated that

---

[1114] *USAID Global Climate Change Budget.* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2017).

[1115] *DOE FY 2016 Budget Fact Sheet.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2016).

[1116] Patton, op. cit.

[1117] Shaun Donovan. *The Cost of Climate Inaction.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, September 19, 2014); Lori Montgomery. "Forget the national debt. The new budget threat is climate change." *Washington Post* (September 9, 2014) and Katie Valentine. "Denying Climate Change 'Will Cost Us Billions of Dollars,' U.S. Budget Director Warns." (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, September 20, 2014).

[1118] J. David Cummins, Michael Suher and George Zanjami. *Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophic Risk.* (Cambridge: The National bureau of Economic Research, 2007) and Patton, op. cit.

[1119] Patton, op. cit.

[1120] Patton, op. cit.

[1121] Gaffigan, op. cit., p. 13.

[1122] Gaffigan, op. cit., p. 13.

[1123] Gaffigan, op. cit., p. 13.

preparing against extreme weather events is far less costly then recovering from them.[1124] FEMA estimates a failure to prepare cost the U.S. $1.5 trillion in economic loses between 1980 and 2010 and an additional $1 trillion between 2010 and 2015.[1125]

For example, Superstorm Sandy, one of the largest storms to hit the eastern seaboard, cost the government $65 billion in damages alone.[1126] $5 billion of that budget was allocated as a supplement to the Army Corps of Engineers – the equivalent of a five-year projected budget for investments in new projects for the agency.[1127] Yet, the government continues to approach extreme weather events as a measure of defensive rather than an offensive budgetary strategy. In 2012, for example, droughts cost the U.S. $30 billion in damages and was the worst year in the last half century.[1128] This led to an additional $17 billion in agricultural assistance to deal with a lack of water.[1129] As a result, crop insurance exploded, costing the U.S. $900 million a year, on average, in agricultural assistance payments, although in 2014 these payments totaled $2.68 billion.[1130] Wildfires management has also become increasingly costly, tripling since 1999 to a total annual cost of $3 billion a year.[1131]

In regards to the domestic energy market, the UN's IPCC estimates $400 billion a year is spent to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions worldwide, an expenditure which represents just a fraction of the amount the world spends on fossil fuels, and which is less than the average annual budget of ExxonMobil.[1132] Yet the traditional coal and petroleum industry continues to operate unabated, spending upwards to $600 billion to secure future reserves while governments spend an additional $600 billion subsidizing the industry globally.[1133] And although the U.S. estimates each additional ton of carbon dioxide emissions cause an increase in economic damages worth $37 per ton, external research suggests the overall social cost is be closer to $220 per ton.[1134] These projections are relevant because the U.S. is a leader in

---

[1124] *America's Prepareathon* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015).

[1125] *America's Prepareathon,* op. cit.

[1126] Donovan, op. cit.

[1127] Gaffigan, op. cit., p. 18.

[1128] Donovan, op. cit. and Valentine, op. cit.

[1129] Donovan, op. cit. and Valentine, op. cit.

[1130] Donovan, op. cit. and Valentine, op. cit.

[1131] Donovan, op. cit. and Valentine, op. cit.

[1132] An external analysis from the UK-based organization Oil Change International places the number as high as $452 billion. See Bast, et. al., op. cit., and Justin Gilles. "UN Panel Issues Its Starkest Warning Yet on Global Warming." *New York Times* (November 2, 2014).

[1133] *Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report*, op. cit. and Gilles, op. cit.

[1134] Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. *Technical Support Document: - Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis - Under Executive Order 12866* (Washington, D.C.: United States

energy consumption, imports, trade, investment and exploration. This also implies that the U.S. is a leading polluter, and as a result, a slow adaptor of global norms restricting or regulating traditional energy sources, or the multinational corporations which dominate the industry. According to a 2015 report from the British-based Oil Change International, the U.S. provides national and Federal subsidies to fossil fuel producers totaling $20.5 billion and $17.2 billion respectively.[1135] The report notes, "the U.S. is set apart from other G20 countries by the sheer variety of tax exemptions for fossil fuel producers."[1136]

As a result, responding to the effects of climate change on defense readiness strains the budget, representing a far greater share of expenditures then engaging in diplomatic solutions, which have had success in comparable European states. And even though Obama, as *Foreign Policy* notes, "ramped up his rhetoric on the security threat posed by climate change," particularly during his second term, funding did not keep pace.[1137] Admiral Titley concurred noting that, "the President's budget does not reflect the President's rhetoric."[1138] This is because, although cited as the first 'climate president,' Obama generally focused, overall, on future threats, as *The Guardian* asses his two terms in office.[1139] He was therefore unable to generate widespread political support for, or shift n bureaucratic focus to, incorporating climate change into the national security agenda, even though he explicitly instructed 20 federal departments and agencies to do so in an 2016 Executive Memorandum.[1140]

CONCLUSION

The 'Doomsday Clock', maintained by the Science and Security Board at the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, sets a theoretical estimate of time until global disaster as a measure of the current geopolitical climate. Having done so since the launch of the atomic age in 1947, the

---

Government, 2013); Frances Moore and Delavane Diaz. "Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent mitigation policy." *Nature Climate Change* (2015), pp. 127-131 and Ker Than. "Estimated social cost of climate change not accurate, Stanford scientist say." *Stanford News* (January 12, 2015).

[1135] Bast, et. al., op. cit., p. 81.

[1136] Bast, et. al., op. cit., p. 81.

[1137] Keith Johnson. "Obama calls Climate denial, 'dereliction of duty.'" *Foreign Policy* (May 20, 2015).

[1138] Johnson (2015), op. cit.

[1139] Johnson (2015), op. cit. and Oliver Milman, et. al. "Obama's Legacy: The Promises, Shortcomings & Fights to Come." *The Guardian* (January 3, 2017).

[1140] Johnson (2015), op. cit.; Gregory Korte. "Obama orders intelligence agencies to study climate change." *USA Today* (September 21, 2016) and Susan Rice and Brian Deese. "Integrating Climate Change into National Security Planning." *WhiteHouse.gov* (September 21, 2016).

organization finds most threats do not rise to the level of a 'doomsday' scenario.[1141] At no time does terrorism, for example, make the list of threats during the clock's 60 year existence, even after the attacks of 2001.[1142] But the clock was moved to three minutes from midnight in 2015, implying doomsday was almost as likely as during the height of the Cold War.[1143] And the reason given was climate change, which according to the Board, rises to the same level of danger posed by nuclear weapons, making these two threats, in their objective scientific opinion, the most important and imminent threats facing humanity.[1144]

Despite the prevalence of influencing material factors, as illustrated by the examples presented in this case study, when answering the research question in the context of climate change, the conditions under which the U.S. prioritizes threats appear to be Cultural-Institutional. This explanation better approximates those conditions rather than systemic shifts in the character of the threat. This is exemplified in the different preferences in foreign and domestic policy between the U.S. and comparable Western nations. As illustrated by the examples presented above, the U.S. tends to place a greater emphasis on reactive instead of defensive policies, ignoring necessary investments in, and preparations for, extreme weather events or the changing climate in a manner similar to the EU. And despite the global movement towards clean energy, the U.S. generally depends on a higher degree of fossil fuels to secure it energy needs. This would imply that the material factors have less bearing on threat prioritization and policy than it comparable states, which have shifted policies in response to scientific consensus that current weather trends which these comparable states believe is due to human activity.

Examining the role of discourse, strategy and expenditures, the case study demonstrated how culture and institutions play a role in threat prioritization and resulting policy. In the context of climate change this is exemplified by a divided discourse between those who accept climate change as human-driven and the counter climate movement rejecting this view, and the effects this has on ensuring the lack of a committed and cohesive policy at

---

[1141] See "Doomsday Clock: Timeline." *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (2015). Accessed June 29, 2015 http://thebulletin.org/timeline.

[1142] "Doomsday Clock: Timeline," op. cit.

[1143] "Doomsday Clock: Timeline," op. cit.

[1144] Following the 2017 election the clock was moved to two and a half minutes from midnight due to, what the organization perceives as, a dangerous geopolitical landscape compounded by the election of a Trump who promised to thwart progress on combatting climate change and expand strategic dependency on nuclear weapons. See Lawrence M. Krauss and David Titley. "Thanks to Trump, the Doomsday Clock Advances Towards Midnight." *New York Times* (January 26, 2017).

home or abroad. It is also illustrated in the budget, where climate change is allocated far fewer resources then other threats confronting the U.S., who spends vastly more on responding to, rather than preparing for, extreme weather events. The climate change movement has a legitimate narrative, solid evidence, scientific consensus and global support from a wide range of objective actors. There appears no valid reason why the threat is not highly prioritized when considering its immediate and long terms consequences to U.S. national security. I posit that the level of uncertainty which the counter movement casts on the debate is prohibitive, limiting, in some circumstances, even the most benign arbitrating policies.

In the following chapter, I will present the fourth case study featuring the threat posed by the geopolitics of the Arctic. First, I will define the threat in the context of the framework presented by this research and review the expectations generated. Second, I will examine the geopolitics of the Arctic in the context of the modern threat environment as it pertains to U.S. national security. Third, I will review the qualitative and quantitative data which specially addresses the threat from the geopolitics of the Arctic and explore how it pertains to the expectations. Fourth, I will explore the threat in the context of the two hypotheses, employing a series of examples which compare U.S. threat prioritization to that of other Arctic nations. Finally, I will conclude with an overview of the case study, the data and the presented evidence to further assess the validity of the alternative hypothesis in explaining the reason why the Arctic is not prioritized in U.S. national security.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ARCTIC

We need to make tough decisions about which haystacks deserve to be scrutinized
for the needles that can hurt us most [and] there are endless haystacks everywhere. –
Porter Goss[1145]

INTRODUCTION

In this fourth case study, I will continue my examination of the research question in the context of the threat posed by the geopolitics of the Arctic under the Bush and Obama administrations. Due to the nature of this case study (the threat is focused on a geographic region rather than an issue like terrorism, narco-trafficking or climate change), the format will deviate. First, to assess the validity of the hypotheses, four examples will be provided but not divided between foreign and domestic policy. Second, the comparison of discourse, policy and budgets between the U.S. and Western European nations will be replaced with comparisons between the U.S. and relevant Arctic nations. Third, in previous case studies there was an examination of categories of discourses which lead to certain types of narratives. But with the geopolitics of the Arctic, it is the very lack of discourse which will illustrate the threat's priority level. The discourse section will, therefore, vary from previous case studies.

As a measure of subjective threat analysis, according to the Content and Discourse Analysis, Arctic geopolitics ranks as 53 of 59 potential threats.[1146] It has an average weighted score of 0.54 on the CDA's four-point scale, making it as minimal level priority threat (see Table 7.1).[1147]

Table 7.1: Forms of Policy & Discourse

		LEVEL OF THREAT & POLICY			
EVIDENCE OF THREAT PRIORITIZATION		Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
	Official Government Documents	4.00-3.00	2.99-2.00	1.99-1.00	> 1.00
	Expenditures	High	Medium	Low	Minimal
	Strategy	Overwhelming use of force (i.e. invasion/war)	Limited use of force (i.e. targeted strikes; military aid)	Use of diplomacy, sanctions, or economic aid	None
	Discourse	Crisis	Problem	Issue	Non-Issue

[1145] Porter Goss. *Testimony of DCI Goss Before Senate Armed Services Committee.* (Washington, D.C.: Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2005).
[1146] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.
[1147] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

As such, the geopolitics of the Arctic is characterized by a series of specific features including: a severely limited budget; a preference for evasive strategies (i.e. limited national security-related policy) when addressing the threat; and the prevalence of 'non-issue discourse' as the defining feature of the official threat narrative. Understanding why the geopolitics of the Arctic is ranked as a minimal priority threat, and the reason for these defining characteristics, will be the focus of this chapter.

I will attempt to discover why, given the apparent disconnect between objective threats, and those subjectively defined by the government, does the U.S. minimize or under-prioritize the geopolitics of the Arctic in the context of its national security. I will first provide an overview of the threats generated by the geopolitics of the Arctic. Second, I will examine the expectations generated by the framework presented throughout this research. Third, I will review the quantitative (i.e. survey) and qualitative (i.e. interview) data and describe how those inside and outside the government recognize and advocate confronting or not confronting the geopolitical situation in the region. Having reviewed the data, I will examine the Arctic in the context of the two hypotheses to determine whether the research question is best explained by systemic shifts in the character of threats or the combined effects of culture and institutions as they pertain to the U.S. I will conclude with an overview of the findings and how they conform to the expectations generated by this research design.

THE UNITED STATES & THE THREAT OF ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS

For the purposes of this research, I define the Arctic in the context of the emerging geopolitics in the region occurring as a result of increased access to natural resources, heightened military operations as well as territorial claims and issues of sovereignty disputed both among the Arctic and non-Arctic nations. The Arctic is the polar region at the northernmost part of the Earth including the Arctic Ocean and the adjacent seas (see Map 7.1).[1148] The region is just eight million square miles, with ocean covering 5.4 million square miles, representing just six percent of the earth's surface.[1149] The history of the Arctic in the context of national security is relatively recent. The U.S. became an Arctic state with the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. In 1909, Americans were first to reach the North Pole, illustrating their once

---

[1148] See Appendix Eleven: Map of the Arctic Region.
[1149] Roger Howard. *The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources* (London: Continuum UK, 2009).

dominance of the region. Canada and Russia lay claim to certain territories, creating the foundations of the modern-day struggle for resources in 1925 and 1926 respectively. And in 1969, an American commercial vessel first traversed the Arctic's Northern Sea Route, marking a new era in Arctic shipping.[1150]

Map 7.1: The Arctic Region[1151]

The Cold War was the definitive era for Arctic geopolitics. In the interlude between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the USSR, lines were drawn between NATO and Communist forces in the region. Mark Nutall writes, the Arctic, "assumed a strategic importance that did not diminish until the end of the Cold War."[1152] He further notes that it, "became a zone of hostile military confrontation," where both the Eastern Soviet bloc and Western democratic forces stationed, developed and tested their arsenals.[1153] Soviet General Secretary Josef Stalin was first to achieve the long-held dream of the Soviet/Russian empire to develop and control the High North for its future economic and military security.[1154] Between 1950 and 1970, the USSR grew its Northern Fleet (responsible for patrolling the Arctic) to the largest in the Soviet Navy, while vastly increasing

---

[1150] Barry Scott Zellen. *Arctic Doom. Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic.* (Santa Barbara: Prager, 2009).

[1151] *Map of the Arctic Region* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2016)

[1152] Mark Nutall. *Encyclopedia of the Arctic* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 45.

[1153] Nutall, op. cit., p. xxxix and xxxvi.

[1154] Charles Emmerson. *The Future History of the Arctic* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), p. 30.

the number of ballistic missiles stationed in and around the region.[1155] In the 1960s the USSR built a chain of 11 bomber bases stretching across the Arctic, six new naval bases (some with nuclear facilities), five large navy yards for maintenance, a number of smaller bases, as well as a range of early warning systems to enhance their strategic surveillance and air defense capabilities.[1156]

During the 1970s, the Cold War superpowers increased the number of naval exercises and operations leading to the 1980s arms and technology race.[1157] Submarine operations were the focus of many Arctic exercises and operations, and frequently featured nuclear powered or equipped craft, submerged and hidden for weeks in preparation for an impending second strike in the case of land-based nuclear war.[1158] Between 1960 and 1993, the USSR conducted over 4,600 submarine patrols, most of which commenced in the Arctic.[1159] By 1970 the Soviet submarine fleet was larger than the U.S., two-thirds of which were stationed with the Northern Fleet.[1160]

The number of Soviet warheads in the Artic during the Cold War is also revealing. Between 1965 and 1969, the USSR tripled its number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) while expanding its submarine launched ballistic missiles program (SLBMs). In 1967 alone, the Soviet Union doubled ICBMs from 340 to 720.[1161] By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet missile force exceeded that of the U.S. and between 400 and 600 long range Soviet bombers were operational.[1162] The 1970s saw significant advancements by the Soviets in high technology and long range precision conventional weapons.[1163] By the end of the Cold War, the USSR has 18,718 warheads stationed in the Arctic, while the U.S. had just 15,970 (including ICBMs, SLBMs and ballistic missiles).[1164]

[1155] For a detailed overview of the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear, air defense and naval general purpose forces between 1950 and 1990, see Tonne Huitfeldt, Tomas Ries and Gunvald Oyna. *Strategic Interests in the Arctic* (Oslo: Instotuit for Forsvarsstuder, 1992). Also see, Nutall, op. cit., p. 1302.

[1156] Kristian Atland. "Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front." *Contemporary Security Policy* (2011), pp. 270 and Nutall, op. cit., pp. 1303.

[1157] Michael MccGuire. *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 149-150; Nutall, op. cit., pp. 1302-1303 and Nutall, op. cit., p. 1303.

[1158] Atland, op. cit., pp. 270-271.

[1159] Atland, op. cit., p. 272.

[1160] Nutall, op. cit., p. 1300.

[1161] Nutall, op. cit., p. 1300-1303.

[1162] Nutall, op. cit., p. 1303.

[1163] Nutall, op. cit., p. 1303.

[1164] Nutall, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

Ecological concerns were almost entirely absent from Cold War calculations, Nutall writes, and the region's military and scientific potential remained the focus of the Soviet and U.S. strategy.[1165] The Arctic also became a central site for testing nuclear weapons, as well dumping radioactive waste.[1166] The USSR conducted 132 nuclear weapon tests in the Arctic between 1955 and 1990, representing 94 percent of all their nuclear tests.[1167] The U.S. conducted only three nuclear tests because further testing was thwarted by indigenous groups in U.S. courts.[1168] As Mark Nutall and Terry Callaghan note, the Cold War Arctic was reduced to a 'security commodity.'[1169] This changed at the end of the Cold War when an array of bilateral and multilateral agreements evolved to govern the new unilateral world order.[1170] As Kristian Atland writes, until the late 1980s, the Arctic was divided into 'Western' and 'Eastern' sectors, with was little or no interaction. The lack of state-to-state and people-to-people cooperation on the Arctic during the Cold War was largely a product of the nuclear stand-off and the dominance of national security concerns in national perceptions and policies."[1171] He adds, "this changed in the 1990s and 2000s, in the sense that economic interests today play a more prominent role in the formation of national policies, including those of Russia."[1172]

In 1982, for example, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the sovereign rights of the five Arctic nations (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the USSR/Russia, and the U.S.) to control the region.[1173] Coming into force in 1994, each nation had 10 years following ratification to submit claims challenging sovereign delimitation.[1174] The Russian government filed first in 2001. Currently under consideration by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, if recognized the governing body, Russian land claims would amount to one of the greatest wealth transfers in history.[1175] Meanwhile, the U.S. has yet to ratify UNCLOS – the only Arctic nation and one of the few nation's in the world which has not – and therefore remains unable to participate in deliberations for, or make revisions

---

[1165] Mark Nutall and Terry Callaghan. *Arctic: Environment, People, Policy* (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2008).

[1166] Nutall and Callaghan, op. cit., p. 450.

[1167] Nutall, op. cit., p. 1516.

[1168] Nutall, op. cit., pp. 1516-1517.

[1169] Nutall and Callaghan, op. cit., pp. 448 and 450.

[1170] Nutall, op. cit., p. 1332.

[1171] Atland, op. cit., pp. 271.

[1172] Atland, op. cit., pp. 271.

[1173] *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (Montego Bay: United Nations, 1982).

[1174] Nicholas Breyfogle and Jeffery Dunifon. "Russia and the Race for the Arctic." *Origins* (2012) and Ty McCormick. "Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History." *Foreign Policy* (May 7, 2014).

[1175] Eric Hannis. "Russia Arctic Ambitions." *U.S. News & World Report* (March 14, 2017).

to, its Arctic territorial claims.[1176] Further capitalizing on these post-Cold War multilateral initiatives, the Arctic Council was established in 1996. But the body was given no jurisdiction over political or security matters, relegating the Council to a forum for discussion on the environment, fisheries and trade.[1177] As a result, it lacks the capacity to adequately manage issues emerging outside the UNCLOS framework or the growing complexities of the region's geopolitics.

As a result of this history, the modern threat environment in the Arctic is increasingly complex. And there are four primary reasons why the Arctic should be more highly prioritized as a national security threat by the U.S. First, the Arctic serves as a critical military outpost for Russia, Canada, NATO and increasingly Chinese forces. And Arctic geopolitics are growing increasingly militarized, as Russian military supremacy in the region rises (see Data 7.1).

Data 7.1: Russian Military Presence in the Arctic Region in 2017[1178]

Although the U.S. has a larger fleet of submarines as measure of global military superiority, Andrew Holland testified before Congress, nowhere in the world is the U.S. as 'outclassed' like it is in the Arctic.[1179] As Ivo H. Daadler writes, in the Arctic, Russia is, "establishing a position of military dominance in a region where peaceful cooperation among the Arctic

---

[1176] Marina Koren. "Why the U.S. needs an Ambassador to the North Pole." *DefenseOne* (May 5, 2014) and "The Roar of Ice Cracking." *The Economist* (February 2, 2013).

[1177] Hannis, op. cit. and Koren, op. cit.

[1178] Robbie Gramer. "Here's What Russian Military Build Up in the Arctic Looks Like." *Foreign Policy* (January 25, 2017).

[1179] Andrew Holland. *National Security in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: How a lack of attention in the Arctic is harming America's interest.* (Washington, D.C.: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 10, 2014).

powers had become the norm."[1180] As will be detailed, the Russians have invested in advanced ice breaking capabilities, fully equipped missiles cruisers, new Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, deep water sensor technology, and a spectrum of specially trained cold-weather forces.[1181] This is further enhanced by Russia's earlier investment in its outdated Cold War bases (starting around 2007), which already exceeded the number of U.S. Arctic bases.[1182] And Russia's increasingly close economic ties to China has permitted the Asian power an opportunity to grow its military presence in the Arctic and to secure its investments in the region. Alongside NATO and allied troops also operating in the region, the potential for conflict has risen in the past decade, increasing even more rapidly since the Russian invasion of the Ukraine.[1183] This is because, as Daadler writes, "Russia's enhanced military presences has been matched by increase military assertiveness."[1184] Echoing the concerns of all NATO aligned Arctic nations, the chief of Norway's joint military command commented, "after Ukraine we changed our posture."[1185] As Russian aggression grows around the world, and senior Russian leadership increases its hawkish rhetoric and military readiness in the region, the Arctic is a potential flashpoint for great power politics.[1186]

Second, pending legal claims at the UN could fundamentally shift the global balance of power in the near future. This is due in large measure to Russia and Canada's Lawfare strategy to secure its territorial claims in the High North. Both countries, (along with Denmark, Finland and an array of non-Arctic countries) have laid claims to the region through international legal mechanisms that will continue to hamper U.S. efforts to assert its dominance as a measure of military, economic and political influence in the Arctic.

Third, the melting ice is making the region more desirable as a shipping route. The emergence of new shipping routes will dramatically change the global economic order (see Map 7.2).

[1180] Ivo H. Daadler. "Responding to Russia's Resurgence." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

[1181] Daadler, op. cit. and Marlene Laruelle. *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2014).

[1182] Daadler, op. cit. and Laruelle, op. cit.

[1183] Daadler, op. cit.

[1184] Daadler, op. cit.

[1185] Patrick Wintour. "Troubled Waters: Norway Keeps Watch on Russia's Arctic Manoeuvres." *The Guardian* (March 13, 2017).

[1186] Daadler, op. cit.; Koren, op. cit. and Nalin Kumar Mohapatra. "Cooperative or Competitive Geopolitics in Arctic." *The Daily Pioneer* (March 11, 2017).

Map 7.2: Arctic Passageways[1187]

As ice continues to melt across the region, more rapidly than past (and even recent) projections estimated, the emergence of new passageways connecting Asia to Europe and North America will be more accessible, and for longer periods of time. Currently traversable only a few months of the year, both the Northwest Passage (controlled by Canada) and the Northern Sea Route (controlled by Russia) present unparalleled opportunities to decrease the time, cost and danger required by traditional shipping routes, like the Suez Canal or Malacca Straights, which traverse high-conflict areas.

Fourth, the region is resource rich. And due to these vast resources, a struggle for resources is likely to occur over energy reserves and rare earth minerals. But Arctic resources is another area where the U.S. lags far behind its Arctic and non-Arctic peers. Russia began major investment into necessary infrastructure for extracting oil and gas from the Arctic seabed as early as 1992, and since that time private companies have led Russia's expansion in the area.[1188] Even China, who declares itself a 'near-Arctic country,' has invested more in the region to access its resources than the U.S.[1189] As a result Canada, Norway, and Denmark have

---

[1187] *Report on Arctic Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2016), p. 55.

[1188] McCormick, op. cit. and "Russian Nuclear Giant Rosatom on the Front Lines of Moscow's Arctic Expansion." *Sputnik News* (April 2, 2017).

[1189] Gang Chen. "China's emerging Arctic strategy." *The Polar Journal* (2012), pp. 358-371; Nong Hung. "Emerging interests of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic: a Chinese perspective." *The Polar Journal* (2014), pp. 271-286; Mark E. Rosen. "The Arctic is the First Stop in the United States Reset with Russia." *National Interest* (November 15, 2016) and Liz Ruskin. "Russian Aggression Unlikely to Hit Arctic, Say Security Experts." *Alaska Public Media* (October 13, 2016).

increased their military posture in the region to keep pace with the largest military build-up by Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.[1190]

Having not declared a formal Arctic national security strategy until 2009, the U.S. confronts a region where it is outmatched in military strength and economic prowess, while being devoid of a stable legal foundation to secure its interests.[1191] The result is a growing multi-dimensional security risk to U.S. but which consistently lacks prioritization, policy, or resources to address it.

THE ARCTIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DATA

Having examined the threat of Arctic geopolitics in the context of U.S. national security, I now turn to the data. In this section I will examine the subjective and objective perceptions of the threat stemming from Arctic geopolitics as expressed by survey and interview subjects. The subjects represent views internal to (i.e. politicians, bureaucrats and military officials) and external from (i.e. members of the media, civil society, academics and think tanks) the government. As such, it is an overview of how subjective and objective stakeholders perceive the threat of the Arctic to the U.S., and the reasons why they hold these views.

A Quantitative Analysis of the Arctic

The CDA provided an average weighted score of 0.54 (on a four-point) scale ranking the Arctic as a minimal level priority.[1192] But based on the mean scores of all threats presented in the survey, the geopolitics of the Arctic ranked 49 of 59 threats with a score of 3.03 (out of 10).[1193] When asked to rank the level of threat posed by the geopolitics of the Arctic (on scale from zero to 10), the majority of survey respondents placed the threat level at just 1.00, although the average score 3.47 was much higher (see Figure 7.1).


[1190] Breyfogle and Duniform, op. cit.; Hannis, op. cit.; McCormick, op. cit. and Andrew Osburn. "Putin's Russia in Biggest Arctic Military Push Since the Fall of the Soviet Union." *Reuters* (February 1, 2017).

[1191] Rob Huebert. *United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power* (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2009), pp. 3-4 and *National Strategy for the Arctic Region.* (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2009). Also see David M. Slayton and Mark E. Rosen. "Another region where the Russian military threats to dominate the U.S." *CNN* (March 14, 2014).

[1192] See Appendix 11: All Threats.

[1193] See Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) And Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

**Figure 7.1: Level of Threat Posed
by Arctic Geopolitics (As a Percentage of Response)**

When broken down by professional category, those within the state generally ranked the threat posed by Arctic geopolitics as higher than those external to it (see Table 7.2).

**Table 7.2: Mean Scores of Survey Regarding
the Threat Posed by of Arctic Geopolitics**

| Professional Category	Mean Score
Bureaucrat	4.17
Politician	4.00
Academia/Think Tank	3.47
Media	3.31
Military	3.10
Civil Society	2.78

Similar to preceding case studies, bureaucrats and politicians tended to rank the Arctic higher than the other professional categories, with mean scores of 4.17 and 4.00, respectively. And similar to the preceding threats analyzed, the military ranked the threat significantly lower, at 3.10.

When asked to choose which one strategy is best suited to deal with Arctic geopolitics, survey respondents overwhelming selected diplomatic engagement, at 78 percent (see Figure 7.2). This is highest score afforded to any strategy in the context of any of the case studies.[1194] None of the remaining potential strategies to address the Arctic registered more than 10 percent. Despite the geopolitics of the Arctic being categorized by a policy of evasion, as explained in the introduction to these case study, these results of Figure 7.1 (and Table 7.3) are still in line

---

[1194] The preferred strategy for both terrorism and narco-trafficking was limited force at 63 percent and 39 percent, respectively, while the preferred strategy for climate change was economic incentives at 59 percent (see Table 4.2, Table 5.2 and Table 6.2).

with the expectations generated by this research. This is because despite the fact that those surveyed express a clear preference for, or perceive that, diplomacy would be the best strategy to deal with the geopolitics of the Arctic geopolitics, this does not imply a diplomatic strategy is the result.

Figure 7.2: Best Strategy to Confront Arctic Geopolitics

As this research has illustrated, there is an interactive relationship between culture and institutions. The implication being that a lack of policy or strategy is due in part to a lack of discourse defining it. In the case of minimal level threats like Arctic geopolitics, this lack of discourse fails to foster the preferred strategy (i.e. diplomacy). And, as will be illustrated in the examination of interview responses, it is apparent that a widespread ignorance regarding the Arctic exists, which prevented many interview subjects from being willing or able to respond to any questions concerning the level of threat. I posit that this likely had an effect on those responding to the survey as well, who might also have answered the question based on a limited knowledge of the region and the threat posed.

As I will further illustrate, due to the nature of a minimal level threat like Arctic geopolitics, an 'alternative narrative' emerges. This narrative does not focus on the national security threats posed by growing militarization, emerging passageways, resource exploitation, or Lawfare challenges. This alternative narrative ignores more complex aspects of Arctic geopolitics, in favor of a 'new' security narrative (as depicted in Chapter Two) that focuses on energy and environmental factors in the context of economic and human security, restricting (but not entirely eliminating) the traditional national security paradigm. It is also important to note that in answering this question, and the one presented in Figure 7.3 regarding which agency is best suited to handle Arctic geopolitical strategy, respondents are expressing their preference. With higher level threats, like terrorism and narco-trafficking, generally expressed preferences naturally conform more to the actual policies in place because a dominate

discourse(s) exists to shape these preferences. But with under-prioritized threats, the opposite is true because no dominate narrative shapes preferences or policies.

When further broken down by professional category, politicians, bureaucrats and military personnel preferred the use of diplomatic engagement and (to a lesser degree) economic incentives over their peers outside government (see Table 7.3).

Table 7.3: Best Strategy to Confront Arctic Geopolitics
Defined by Professional Category (as a Percentage of Responses)

	Over-whelming Use of Force	Limited Use of Force	Economic Incentives	Diplomatic Engagement	Sanctions	None of the Above	Total
Politician	0	0	22.22	66.67	0	11.11	100
Bureaucrat	0	0	15.79	78.95	0	5.26	100
Military	0	0	4.76	95.24	0	0	100
Media	0	6.67	6.67	80.00	0	6.67	100
Civil Society	0	0	10.00	70.00	0	20	100
Academia /Think Tank	4.55	9.09	4.55	72.73	0	9.09	100

The military was almost unanimous in their support for diplomatic engagement (at 95.25 percent). But politicians and bureaucrats were less inclined to support diplomacy, registering a higher preference (at 22.22 percent and 15.79 percent, respectively) for economic incentives than military officials (at 4.76 percent). Interestingly, those external to the government registered a slight preference for the use of force.

When asked which agency was best equipped to handle the geopolitics of the Arctic, survey respondents overwhelming believed the State Department (at 70 percent) was best suited to handle the threat (see Figure 7.3).

Figure 7.3: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle Arctic Geopolitics

Organizational Abbreviations
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
DOD: Department of Defense
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
NIC: National Intelligence Council
DOS: Department of State
DOT: Department of the Treasury
DOE: Department of Energy
DHHS: Department of Health & Human Services

The DOD, the secondary choice, ranked far behind at just 11 percent. And when further broken down by professional category, there was an equally strong preference across all categories for the State Department to be the lead agency handling the Arctic (see Table 7.4).

Table 7.4: Government Institutions Best Equipped to Handle Arctic Geopolitics Defined by Professional Category (Frequency as a Percentage of Responses)

	DOD	DOS	NIC	DHS	DOT	CIA	FBI	DOE	DHHS	None	Total
Politician	0	55.56	11.11	11.11	0	0	0	11.11	0	11.11	100
Bureaucrat	5.26	73.68	5.26	0	0	0	0	10.53	0	5.26	100
Military	14.29	80.95	0	4.76	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Media	13.33	80.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.67	100
Civil Society	0	55.56	11.11	0	0	11.11	0	11.11	0	11.11	100
Academia/ Think Tank	22.73	59.09	4.55	4.55	4.55	0	0	0	0	4.55	100

This preference was slightly stronger among those within the government compared to those external to it. Interestingly, those external to government expressed a stronger preference overall for the DOD than those internal to it, in line with their registered preference for using force (see Table 7.3).

A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ARCTIC

The interviews conducted for the purposes of this research provide a more nuanced view, from the perspective of the state, of how Arctic geopolitics are characterized, as well as why the threats emanating from it are minimally prioritized.

A General Perspective on the Threat of the Arctic

When asked if Arctic geopolitics poses a national security threat to the U.S., the general assessment was that it does not. But interview subjects did not discount the potential for future conflict over resources or land claims. Three perspectives emerged. First, Arctic geopolitics does pose a threat. Second, it does not pose a threat, and likely never will. And third, it has the potential to pose a threat in the future. But many subjects interviewed admitted to not having enough information or not understanding the issue well enough to respond. When compared to other threats, the frequency with which interview subjects cited a lack of knowledge of the Arctic was pervasive. I will now briefly explore the perspective of each group as it pertains to the perceived lack of threat posed by the Arctic.

A Politician's Perspective on the Threat of the Arctic

Politicians were unanimous that the Arctic does not pose a threat to national security. Only one Republican interviewed believed it posed a threat.[1195] The subject defended the statement by pointing to a lack of resources, investment, and U.S. presence in the region when compared to Russia and other nations with an interest in the region.

A range of other perspectives were presented. Democrats generally framed the threat as economic (i.e. access to resources, the opening of passageways, and the resulting increase in trade opportunities) or environmental (i.e. climate change). All agreed the region could pose a threat to U.S. interests in the future, specifically in the context of an increasingly assertive Russia and China, although two admitted to not having enough information. As one Democrat stated the Arctic is, "not a sexy issue, not something the American public knows about, cares about. It's probably the least impressive issues, the least emotional."[1196] The subject went on to note that as a result, it is the least like to be studied by any government agency, be considered for appropriations, adding that the U.S. has, "a lot more high [*sic*] priority issues to deal with."[1197]

Responses from Republican focused more on the commercial aspects of the region, particularly access to resources and shipping routes, but they did not discount environmental concerns. One Republican did note that "conflict is always possible" and another that the "whole world is a flashpoint," while a third commented that it is in the interest of all states, despite Russian provocation, to respect each other's sovereignty in the region.[1198] Another conceded, "there are so many things going on in the world, it's hard to know what's important."[1199] Similar to Democrats surveyed, two Republicans admitted to not having enough information about the region to respond.

When compared to their peers, the politicians interviewed were less concerned about the threat. This is reflected in the survey data wherein politicians ranked their strategy and agency preference far lower than bureaucrats or military personnel (see Table 7.2 and Table 7.3). This is further emphasized by politicians surveyed who expressed the highest preference for no strategy (11.11 percent) and were mostly likely to believe that no existing agency can

---

[1195] See Interview with Subject 25, op. cit.
[1196] Interview with Subject 18, op. cit.
[1197] Interview with Subject 18, op. cit.
[1198] Interview with Subject 12, op. cit.
[1199] Interview with Subjects 12, 21, and 28 op. cit.

address Arctic threats, implying the need to create a new one, as the question was framed (see Table 7.2 and Table 7.3).

A Bureaucrat's Perspective on the Threat of the Arctic

Bureaucrats were most likely among the professional groups interviewed to perceive the geopolitics of the Arctic as a threat, as reflected in the survey data wherein bureaucrats ranked the mean score highest of all professional categories.[1200] Of those interviewed, three believed that the Arctic is a national security threat, while four believed it could, should or would be in the near future. But bureaucrats generally believed it is a priority which is not being prioritized. Russian aggression and the military buildup was cited as most critical, followed by access to resources and shipping routes. As one subject noted, the Arctic is 'most definitely' an 'important issue' that if left unaddressed would result in Russian dominance in the region.[1201] Another bureaucrat who agreed the Arctic poses a threat, questioned the willingness of the U.S. to address it. The subject noted that without doing so, enforcing any U.S. interests would be impossible.

Those who did not perceive the region as a threat reasoned that the Arctic held no specific appeal to prioritize it among all the threats confronting the U.S. Only one subject denied the geopolitics of the Arctic represents any type of threat. A second admitted to not having enough information about the situation, but did not discount the potential of a threat given the actors involved. As one bureaucrat stated, the Arctic "does not resonate with the electorate."[1202] The subject added, "facts by themselves have no meaning. Meaning is attributed through interpretation by human social identity, through the prism of social identity… right now the Arctic is not, people don't see the salience or relevancy to what they want to do and who they are. National security threats are threats to who you are."[1203]

A Military's Perspective on the Threat of the Arctic

Of all the groups interviewed, military officials were most informed about the Arctic, although less inclined to believe that it is a national security threat. Similar divisions within the group existed; some believe the Arctic is a threat, some believe it could pose a threat and

---

[1200] Bureaucrats ranked the mean score of the threat posed by terrorism at 6.47, narco-trafficking at 4.21 and climate change at 7.00 (see Table 4.2, Table 5.2 and Table 6.2).
[1201] Interview with Subject 5, op. cit.
[1202] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[1203] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.

others rejected the existence of any threat. Among those who believed that the geopolitics of the Arctic posed a threat focused on Russia and its expansive military presence, aggressive diplomacy, pending territorial claims, and as a result, the vast resources Russia might obtain exclusive rights over. As one military official noted, "Russia is not our friend. And they have no interest in being our friend."[1204] Military officials cited a concern over the lack of resources invested (both in the context of economic and military assets); an increasingly complex relationship with Russia; and the multiple assertions of territorial claims by a range of states with competing interests under review by the UN. But as a second military official, who agreed that the Arctic poses a threat questioned, "is it a priority if you're not hearing about it?"[1205]

Those who did not see the Arctic as a threat focused on resource competition. As one military official noted, "it's not a shooting war."[1206] When considering the threat of military aggression from Russia or China, one subject stated that neither country would be willing to fight over the Arctic, calling the former a "fading power."[1207] Two of the subjects interviewed cited the higher probability of China going to war in the South China Seas – considered a more significant strategic resource.[1208]

Military subjects interviewed generally reflected similar sentiments as survey subjects. They were the least likely among their government peers to believe the Arctic poses a threat, ranking its mean score at just 3.10 (see Table 7.2). This is the lowest score the military afforded any threats examined in the case studies.[1209] Like military subjects interviewed, those surveyed focused their strategic preferences on two choices, including diplomacy (66.67 percent) and economic incentives (22.22 percent, see Table 7.3). Their belief that Arctic geopolitics was better served by diplomatic means was reflected in the survey data, with military officials registering the highest preference (80.95 percent) for the Department of State (see Table 7.4).

THE ARCTIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HYPOTHESES

I now turn to testing the two hypotheses: systemic shifts in the character of threats versus Cultural-Institutional factors. If systemic shifts in the character of threats best explains

---

[1204] Interview with Subject 26, op. cit.
[1205] Interview with Subject 14, op. cit.
[1206] Interview with Subject 6, op. cit.
[1207] Interview with Subject 19, op. cit.
[1208] Interview with Subjects 19 and 6, op. cit.
[1209] Military officials ranked the mean score of the threat posed by terrorism at 4.86, narco-trafficking at 4.14 and climate change at 5.00 (see Table 4.2, Table 5.2 and Table 6.2).

prioritization, we would expect that countries respond to specific material factors (as outlined above) when confronting a threat.[1210] We would expect to find where these factors threaten the U.S. to a higher degree, there would be a difference in prioritization when compared to similar nations. This implies, if systematic shifts were the most critical factor, that prioritization and policy would be generally similar in the U.S. as it is in comparable states facing a comparable threat.

Alternatively, if the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis best explains the level of prioritization, we would anticipate subjective measures of threats to be based not on material factors, but America's distinct political culture. We would expect to find policies do not reflect material factors, but an interpretation of threat, expressed rhetorically, and emerging as a product of bureaucratic bias. This would be illustrated by an American threat discourse diverging in significant ways from an objective narrative. And a preference for policy by the U.S. that also diverges in significant ways from comparable states facing similar threats. Finally, based on the nature of the preferred strategy, we might also expect specific bureaucracies to rise in prominence over others within the government in regards to the execution of policy, regardless of their applicability or capacity to succeed.

THE ARCTIC IN THE CONTEXT OF SYSTEMIC SHIFTS

If systemic shifts in the character of threats were validated, we would expect threat assessments to be based on material factors and U.S. Arctic policies to converge with comparable states. But, as was illustrated by both interview and survey data, a lack of urgency or concern is apparent. As a result, few security-related policies are enacted. This is also evidenced by the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure (as outlined in Chapter Two).[1211] The Measure for the geopolitics of the Arctic presented in Appendix Twelve, scored the threat as a "very high threat" to "extreme threat" (with a ranking of 8.5 out of 9).[1212] As a result, I propose that material factors are indeterminate. To determine precisely what factors are, I will review U.S.

[1210] Barry Posen. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* (2003).

[1211] The External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure was created for the purposes of this research to provide a (relatively) independent measure of threat level which could be used as a comparable factor against the CDA and survey data. Using a binary scoring methodology and analyzing a range of broad factors, the measure aims to remove (some degree of) subjectivity through quantifying a set of materials factors that are generally taken into account when assessing threats. See Appendix Three: External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure and Appendix Twelve: The Arctic in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

[1212] See Appendix Twelve: The Arctic in the Context of the External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure.

policy for current and potential threats emanating from the Arctic, drawing comparisons with other nations to emphasize a divergence of influencing factors.

I will now provide four specific examples that illustrate America's lack of prioritization and strategy in regards to the threat. I will first examine the growing militarization in the region. Second, I will examine the application of Lawfare in laying claims of sovereignty in the Arctic. Third, I will examine the exploration and mining of critical resources in the Arctic for the purposes of domestic energy security. And Fourth, I will examine the increasingly accessible and expansive passageways opening new commercial opportunities for trade and economic security.

Arctic Geopolitics & the Threat of Militarization

The geopolitics of the Arctic has created a major national security risk for the U.S as a result of growing military tension in the region, the rapid expansion of bases, and the growth in the number of provocative new exercises.[1213] As Daadler notes, the biggest threat between Russia and the U.S. today is not deliberate war but a war ignited by miscalculation, particularly in response to misunderstood NATO or Russian exercises in sensitive areas, like the Arctic.[1214] But there is also a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, given the proximity of the Arctic to the Western coastal states generally, and Alaska (more immediately) which serves as America's gateway to the polar north. But the geopolitics of the Arctic has remained, predominately, a minimal priority for U.S. national security from the end of the Cold War until 2007 when Russia planted a titanium flag in the Arctic seabed.[1215] As Roger Howard writes, "the Arctic 2007 expedition was all about expressing and symbolizing Russia's claim to the region, as well as its resurgent national confidence, before the watching world."[1216]

[1213] James Bamford. "Today's coldest war is at the top of the world." *Pittsburgh-Gazette* (May 31, 2015); Brian Bennett and W.J. Hennigan. "U.S. build up Arctic spy network as Russia and China increase presence. *Los Angeles Times* (September 7, 2015); Michael E. Miller. "Arctic 'chill' as Russia Cold War are and sea confrontations." *Washington Post* (April 17, 2015) and Karl Ritter. "Cold War-style spy games return to melting Arctic." *Associated Press* (April 1, 2014); Aliya Sternstein. "The Pentagon's Satellite Spies Aiming for the Arctic." *Defense One* (March 9, 2015) and Jake Tapper and Jeremy Diamond. "Russian intelligence ship spotted near American oil vessel." *CNN* (September 7, 2015). Also see Gramer, op. cit. and Osborn, op. cit.

[1214] Daadler, op. cit.

[1215] Daadler points to a noticeable shift in Russian aggression beginning at the 2007 Munich Security Conference where Putin openly criticized NATO expansionism. See Daadler, op. cit.

[1216] Howard, op. cit.; Frederic Lasserre and Pierre Louis Tetu. "Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic: Are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian Security and Sovereignty." *Arctic Yearbook* (2016) and Ritter, op. cit.

A strong Russian presence in the Arctic serves Putin's objective to enhance Russian hegemony around the world, re-consolidate control over former territorial holdings, and increase its influence over world affairs.[1217] As Putin remarked, the region is "tremendously important" for Russian military capabilities.[1218] Russia strategically uses the Arctic to assert supremacy as a military power.[1219] Russian analyst Konstantin Simonov notes, "with the help of the Arctic, Putin can show to people that Russia is still a serious power."[1220] By expanding bases in the High North, Russia has gradually increased defensive tactics, restricting the movement of NATO forces.[1221] And despite the military buildup of its allies in the Arctic as a response to Russia, the U.S. lags behind its peers in dedicating the defense resources to address regional militarization. As a result, the Arctic is not illustrative of U.S. hegemony, Barry Scott Zellin writes, but rather the limitations of its military influence in light of Russian global expansionism.[1222] Since 2007, Russia has invested more than any other Arctic nation in terms of military hardware and infrastructure, operational readiness and specialized Arctic training. Russia has resumed bomber patrols over the region capable of reaching the U.S.[1223] By 2010, Russia had reopened 10 former Soviet bases and in 2012 the government conducted the region's first ever amphibious assault exercise as part of a 20,000-force military drill.[1224] In 2013, Putin announced defense increased efforts in the Arctic, sailing a ten-ship naval armada through Northern Sea Route that year.[1225] In 2014, Putin redoubling government efforts to secure its sovereignty in the region, updating the national security strategy to reflect the Arctic as a key priority.[1226] That same year Russia hosted the largest military drill in the region since

---

[1217] For example, see Konyshev and Sergunin and Osburn, op. cit.

[1218] Atle Staalesen. "Putin: Our future lies in the Arctic." *The Independent Barents Observer* (June 16, 2017).

[1219] McGwin, op. cit.

[1220] David Greene. "Russia Pushes to claim Arctic as its own." *NPR* (August 16, 2011).

[1221] Breygofle and Dunifon, op. cit. and McGwin, op. cit.

[1222] Zellen, op. cit., p. 16. Also see Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit.; Fields, op. cit., p. 67 and Marina Koren. "Russia's Militarization of the North Pole Has U.S. Lawmakers on Edge." *National Journal* (September 11, 2014).

[1223] Tensions were heightened even further the following year when NATO staged exercises in which a fictional state, modeled after Russia, seized an allied oil rig. See Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.; Frederic Lasserre. "What Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic Mean for Canada's Security and Sovereignty." *World Policy* (March 1, 2017) and Osborn, op. cit.

[1224] Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.; Paul R. Josephson. "The Conquest of the Russian Arctic." (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014) and MacDonald, op. cit., p. 20.

[1225] MacDonald, op. cit., p. 20 and "Putin orders strong military presence in Arctic. *Sputnik News* (October 12, 2013).

[1226] Josephson, op. cit.; McCormick, op. cit.; "Russian army beefs up arctic presence over Western threat." *Russia Today* (October 29, 2014) and "Russia revising national security strategy to reflect new threats." *Sputnik News* (May 5, 2015). Also see "Russia Announces Development of Unmanned Arctic Radars." *Sputnik News* (November 29, 2013); "Russia Begins Deployment of Aerospace Defense in Arctic." *Sputnik News* (November 28, 2013) and "Russia sees Arctic as Naval priority in new doctrine." *BBC* (July 27, 2015).

the end of the Cold War, featuring 100,000 troops, a range of hardware and real-time combat missions.[1227] Russia has also held snap exercises, mobilizing troops and aircraft with no warning to its Arctic neighbors.[1228] These increasingly large and complex exercises are meant, Simone T. Wezeman writes, "to underlie Russian assertiveness in region."[1229]

The U.S Government recognizes that the Arctic requires attention, as evidenced by the handful of official reports and threat assessments published by the region. But, as Robert Huebert writes, the U.S. has "failed to make any meaningful progress securing and protecting this part of the nation."[1230] By the end of the Obama administration the Russian government (which had already opened 16 deep water ports and 13 airfields) launched a five-year plan to reopen at least 50 Soviet military outposts in the region and complete its first permanent base by 2018.[1231] Russia increased and modernized their land, air, and sea capacity, cruise missile capability, and radar warning systems.[1232] In addition, it announced the addition of three nuclear icebreakers to their 40 icebreakers fleet, the construction of a billion dollar nuclear

---

[1227] The Russian President cited NATO's encroachment on its Arctic border as the reason for Russian militarization, despite Russia's military strength in the region far outpacing any one of the NATO's Arctic states. See, Daadler, op. cit.; David Axe. "Russia and America prep forces for Arctic War." *Reuters* (October 5, 2015); "Cold War games: Russian military drills in Arctic." *Associated Press* (March 16, 2015); J. Michael Cole. "Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russia Takes the Lead." *The Diplomat* (December 6, 2013); Bruce Jones. "Russia activates new Arctic Join Strategic Command. *HIS Jane's Defence Weekly* (December 2, 2014); Zachary Keck. "Russia to establish Arctic military command." *The Diplomat* (February 2, 2014); MacDonald, op. cit., p. 24; Isabelle Mandraud. "Russia prepares ice Cold War with show of military force in the Arctic." *The Guardian* (October 21, 2014); Roger McDermott. "Vostok 2014 and Russia's Hypothetical Enemies." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (2014); Jess McHugh. "Russia to spend $93 million on Arctic monitoring system." *International Business Times* (August 7, 2015); Roland Oliphant. "Putin eyes Russian strength in Atlantic and Arctic in new naval doctrine." *The Telegraph* (July 27, 2015); Ankit Panda. "Russia to Build 10 Arctic Airfields by 2016. *The Diplomat* (January 15, 2015); "Russia to create multimillion dollar Arctic monitoring system by 20205." *Sputnik News* (July 8, 2015); "Russia tests 100,000 troops in 'Vostok 2014,' biggest-ever post-Soviet drills. *Russia Today* (September 23, 2014) and Damien Sharkov. "Russian sub fires cruise missile in Arctic Barents Sea." *Newsweek* (July 5, 2017).
[1228] Wezeman (2016), op. cit. p. 14.
[1229] Wezeman (2016), op. cit. p. 14.
[1230] Huebert (2012), op. cit.
[1231] Hannis, op. cit. and Osborn, op. cit.
[1232] Robert Beckhusen. "Russia's new Arctic ice breakers have on very special feature: anti-ship missiles and naval guns." *The National Interest* (May 14, 2017); Buxbaum (2017), op. cit.; "Extra Edition: Arctic OCS Development and National Security." *Alaska Business Monthly* (August 12, 2016); Thomas Gibbons-Neff. "Russia Readies Two of its Most Advanced Submarines for Launch in 2017." *Washington Post* (December 29, 2016); Andrew Higgins. "On a tiny Norwegian island, America keeps an eye on Russia." *New York Times* (June 13, 2017); Clark Mindock. "Is Russia Preparing for War? Military, Navy to Keep Aircraft Carrier, Battlecruiser, Anti-Submarine Destroyer in Mediterranean, Arctic. *International Business Times* (January 2, 2017); Osborn, op. cit.; "Russia builds massive Arctic base." *The Telegraph* (October 20, 2015); "Russia rules out Arms race in the Arctic but stands firm on its interests," op. cit.; "Russia to create large drone for scouting Arctic." *Russia Today* (September 10, 2015); "Russia's new Arctic trefoil military base unveiled with virtual tour." *BBC News* (April 18, 2015); Damien Sharkov. "Russia shows off new Arctic air defense systems at victory parade." *Newsweek* (May 10, 2017); Simeon T. Wezeman. *Military Capabilities in the Arctic.* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), pp. 8-9 and Wezeman (2016), op. cit.

sub, and the launch of the first ever Arctic airborne drone.[1233] It increased the number of military flights along the coastlines of several NATO allies and have surfaced Russian submarines in U.S. territorial waters.[1234] The Russian military is the only one in region whose vessels have thick ice breaking capability, giving it an unparalleled access.[1235] And despite U.S. military superiority remaining preeminent, as general measure of global dominance, Russia has a greater capacity to conduct operations in the Arctic.[1236]

Even non-Arctic countries have begun to adopt a policy of militarization in the Arctic. As early as 2010, a Chinese military official was quoted as saying that if China has 20 percent of the global population, they should have 20 percent of the Arctic region.[1237] And in 2015 the Chinese foreign minister declared his nation to be a "major stakeholder" in the Arctic at the region's annual summit.[1238] Beijing has invested heavily in icebreakers, launched extensive exploration operations, and has sailed warships through the Bering Sea.[1239] The Chinese government has invested in a diverse and increasingly large array of economic investments (many of them resource extraction companies) as a means to increase its military presence in order to defend their portfolio.[1240] Mark E. Rosen calls the rising Chinese economic and military presence in the Arctic "worrisome."[1241]

[1233] Beckhusen, op. cit.; Buxbaum (2017), op. cit.; "Extra Edition: Arctic OCS Development and National Security," op. cit.; Gibbons-Neff, op. cit.; Higgins, op. cit.; Mindock, op. cit.; Osborn, op. cit.; "Russia builds massive Arctic base," op. cit.; "Russia rules out Arms race in the Arctic but stands firm on its interests," op. cit.; "Russia to create large drone for scouting Arctic," op. cit. and Sharkov, op. cit.

[1234] Victoria Craw. "Arctic outpost becomes hotbed of Russian military activity." *News.com.au* (June 26, 2017). Accessed July 1, 2017 http://www.news.com.au/world/europe/arctic-outpost-becomes-hotbed-of-russian-military-activity/news-story/25108f508fd511205cac25f6d6371e70; Bert Enge. "Invisible Contest: The Submarine Cat-And-Mouse Game." *Arctic Deeply* (May 6, 2016); "Russia starts nationwide show of force." *Reuters* (May 16, 2015) and Wezeman (2012), op. cit. Also see Atle Staalesen. "More than 300 Russian paratroopers have been on North Pole." *The Independent Barents Observer.* (January 5, 2017).

[1235] Wezeman (2012), op. cit., p. 10 and Wezeman (2016), op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[1236] Axe, op. cit. and Fields, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

[1237] Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit.; Houck, op. cit., p. 23 and Brian Lilley. "Canadian Jets Repel Russian Bombers." *CNews* (July 3, 2010).

[1238] "China's participation in Arctic affairs on basis of respect, cooperation: FM." *Xinhau* (October 16, 2015).

[1239] Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit.; Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.; Bert, op. cit., p. 12; "China's ice breaker to try Arctic rim expedition." *Xinhua* (July 18, 2017); Alice Hill. "Arctic security poses ice chess game with Russia, China." *The Hill* (May 19, 2017); W.J. Hennigan and David S. Cloud. "Pentagon spots Chinese military ships off Alaskan coast." *Los Angeles Times* (September 2, 2015); Marc Lanteigne. "Affirm the Scientific: Chinese Diplomacy in the Arctic." *Arctic Deeply* (December 23, 2015) and Rosen, op. cit.

[1240] Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit.; Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.; Bert, op. cit., p. 12; "China's ice breaker to try Arctic rim expedition," op. cit.; Hill, op. cit.; Hennigan and Cloud, op. cit.; Lanteigne, op. cit. and Rosen, op. cit.

[1241] Nadezhda Filimonova and Svetlana Krivokhizh. "A Russian perspective on China's Arctic role." *The Diplomat* (September 27, 2014); Malte Humpert. *Iceland for sale: Chinese tycoon seeks to purchase 300 km of Wilderness.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011); Linda Jakobsen. *China prepares for an ice-free Arctic.* (Solna:

Yet as Jim Thompson – a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for European and NATO affairs – commented, the Arctic does not fit into U.S. priorities: "within the Pentagon, the Arctic as an issue… is a bit of an orphan."[1242] U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft concurred, starkly noting, "we're not even in the game."[1243] For example, despite having a presence in the Arctic for over a century, the U.S. Navy only began to chart Arctic waters for operational purposes in 2009.[1244] The government did not begin assigning full time analysts across the intelligence agencies until 2014.[1245] And the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency stated its intent to "broaden and accelerate" the creation of maps and charts of the region only in 2015.[1246] As Adam MacDonald writes, the U.S. is the "least active" of the countries in the region having, "largely avoided Arctic specific capability development."[1247] Though he does not discount America air and subsea supremacy which he writes, "provides Washington options in the region," his overall assessment of the U.S. (in light of other Arctic nation's investment in the region) is poor.[1248] For example, a list of military installations North of or near the Arctic Circle is indicative (See Table 7.5).

Table 7.5: Number of Arctic Circle Military Installations in 2014[1249]

Russia has three times as many bases as the U.S. while Norway maintains twice as many, placing America on par with Finland and Canada. America's Alaska Command, with just 16,000 military personnel, is comprised mostly of technical forces, not combat troops, who

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010); Rosen, op. cit. and David M. Slayton and Lawson Brigham. "Strengthen Arctic cooperation between US and China." *Alaska Dispatch News* (June 29, 2016).

[1242] Gramer, op. cit.

[1243] Johnson (2015), op. cit.

[1244] Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.

[1245] Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.

[1246] Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.

[1247] MacDonald, op. cit.

[1248] MacDonald, op. cit.

[1249] Paal Sigurd Hilde. "Armed Forces and Security Challenges in the Arctic" in Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal (eds.) *Geopolitics and security in the Arctic: regional dynamics in a global world* (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 157.

operate in bases leftover from the Cold War used primarily for training, not defense.[1250] As a result, the National Guard's Alaska Stryker Brigade and the U.S. Coast Guard assume a critically important role in the region.[1251] As Wezeman writes, "Arctic security concerns play only a minor role in overall U.S. defense."[1252] The U.S., for example did not increase extreme winter training in the Arctic until 2014, host any major U.S.-led Arctic exercises nor test new Arctic military hardware until 2015.[1253] And only in 2016 did the U.S. launch spy satellites and underwater sensors to monitor the region, as other Arctic nations already had.[1254] But even with greater sea capabilities then any nation in the world, the U.S. fleet of ships and submarines (41 to Russia's 25) are not equipped for Arctic ice operations.[1255] The result, Admiral Zukunft notes, is Russia is "checkmating" the U.S. in the region.[1256]

Arctic Geopolitics & the Threat of Lawfare

The geopolitics of the Arctic also presents a significant national security threat in the context of international law. Specifically, the application of Lawfare as an offensive and defensive tool in the region. Lawfare is defined, in most basic form, as "a strategy of using, or misusing, law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective."[1257] More broadly, it denotes the importance of law in the context of modern conflicts.[1258] Russia and Canada have grown especially proficient at laying claims to sovereignty over land and seas to thwart and defend against the encroachment of other states in the region while expanding its control over it. With the expectation that all final decisions will be settled by UNCLOS sometime after 2020, and with good scientific evidence backing their claims, the expansion of Russia (and to a lesser degree Canada) in the Arctic, will have long term consequences for the U.S.

[1250] Wezeman (2012), op. cit., pp. 11-12; Wezeman (2016), op. cit., pp. 17-19 and Oleg Yegorov. "Out in the cold: Russia and the West's Arctic conundrum." *Russia Beyond the Headlines* (March 12, 2017).

[1251] Wezeman (2016), op. cit., pp. 20-21.

[1252] Wezeman (2012), op. cit., p. 10.

[1253] Axe, op. cit. and Wezeman (2016), pp. 19-20.

[1254] Axe, op. cit. and Wezeman (2016), pp. 19-20.

[1255] Axe, op. cit.; *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016), op. cit., 12; and Wezeman (2012), op. cit., pp. 12-13.

[1256] Yegorov, op. cit.

[1257] The term Lawfare was first popularized by Major Charles Dunlap in a 2001 speech at Harvard University. See Charles Dunlap. "Lawfare Today: A Perspective." *Yale Journal of International Law* (2008) and Michael Scharf and Elizabeth Anderson. "Report of the Cleveland Experts Meeting." *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* (2010), p. 12.

[1258] Scharf and Anderson, op. cit., p. 13.

The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established governance over the Arctic with matters of security relegated to the UN Security Council. UNCLOS, which went into force in 1994, governs coastal state's rights to their surrounding waters (including internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, Exclusive Economic Zones [EEZ], continental shelfs, high seas and archipelagic waters), the resources extracted from them, and the right to control navigation through them. Specifically, the Convention also manages 'ice covered areas' under Article 234, a provision which has additional implications for increased authority by Arctic states.[1259] Russia and Canada, again have developed a strong tradition of employing Article 234 for strategic advantage in the Arctic.[1260] After ratifying UNCLOS, governments have a 10-year period to file claims for sovereign recognition or to resolves boundary disputes.[1261] Having not ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. is unable to file nor settle its claims with Canada in the Beaufort Sea, Russia in the Chukchi Sea or influence control over the Northwest or Northern Sea Passage with either country, respectively.[1262] James W. Houck notes, there exists a "discontinuity between desire for an effective Arctic policy and the interminable and fractious UNCLOS debate."[1263]

Meanwhile, Russia has leveraged UNCLOS to potentially reap the greatest gains of any nation in the region.[1264] As previously noted, Russia ratified the Convention in 1997 and filed its claim in 2001.[1265] These extensive claims will likely be recognized and would result in Russian control over a majority of the Arctic, increasing its territory by almost 500,000 square miles, while providing exclusive rights to billions of tons of oil and gas reserves as well as control over the Northern Sea Route.[1266] This would have a significant impact on the global energy markets, trade, military posture and the geopolitical balance of power.[1267] The situation

---

[1259] Stanley P. Fields. "Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Overlooked Linchpin for the Achieving Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic." *Harvard National Security Journal* (2016).
[1260] Fields, op. cit., p. 59.
[1261] In 2015, the Russians updated their claim to sovereign rights over a vast area of the region based on new scientific research. See Hermann and Raspotnik, op. cit.
[1262] Daniel Cressy. "Geology: The Next Land Rush." *Nature* (January 2, 2008).; Fields, op. cit. and James W. Houck. *The Opportunity Costs of Ignoring the Law of the Sea Convention in the Arctic.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2013), p. 4.
[1263] Houck, op. cit., p. 2.
[1264] Brookman, op. cit.
[1265] Channis, op. cit.
[1266] Channis, op. cit. and Howard, op. cit., p. 4
[1267] Channis, op. cit. Also see Elisabeth Braw. "As Russia makes moves in the Arctic, some Finns fear Red Army from within." *Newsweek* (June 29, 2015).

has recently been compounded by the 'ripple effect', as MacDonald writes, of Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria which have increased Arctic tensions.[1268]

Eric Channis writes that Russian claims have met passive resistance, going unchallenged, uncontested and unregulated politically or practically.[1269] And the U.S., he adds, has no vision for meeting the challenge of Russian Arctic claims over the long term.[1270] Huebert calls American strategy, "reluctant engagement."[1271] As Stanley P. Fields notes, the U.S. would benefit from associating with the authority of UNCLOS, consistent with other Arctic nations, and it would provide the necessary recognition of authority the U.S. requires to ensure its position in the region.[1272] With signatories from almost every nation in the world, the U.S. continues to ignore the same structural factors that drive prioritization and policy among allied and enemy nations alike.

Arctic Geopolitics & the Threat of Emerging Passageways

The geopolitics of the Arctic also presents a significant national security threat in the context of emerging sea routes. Much like with its legal and military strategy, the U.S. has failed to adequately prepare for, or take advantage of, the opening passages in the High North. The Arctic lost almost 500,000 square miles of ice between 1981 and 2010 and what remains is thinner and melting at a quicker rate.[1273] As the next "global energy corridor," the potential for new shipping routes include two primary passages: The Northern (or Northeastern) and Northwestern Sea Routes (see Table 7.6).[1274]

[1268] Adam MacDonald. "Emerging Reality, Exaggeration and Distraction." *Canadian Military Journal* (2015), p. 25. Also see Kristin Bartenstein. "The 'Common Arctic': Legal Analysis of Arctic and Non-Arctic Political Discourses." *Arctic Yearbook* (2015), p. 23; Bookman, op. cit.; Libby Leyden-Sussler. "Canada's Arctic Council Protest: Ripple Effect?" *World Policy Blog* (May 7, 2015). Accessed July 2, 2017 http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/05/07/canadas-arctic-council-protest-ripple-effect and Valery Konyshev, Alexander Sergunin and Sergei Subbotin. "Russia's Arctic strategies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis." *The Polar Journal* (2014).

[1269] Channis, op. cit.

[1270] Channis, op. cit.

[1271] Huebert (2009), op. cit. Also see Fields, op. cit., p. 62.

[1272] Fields, op. cit., p. 106.

[1273] Henry Fountain. "Arctic winter seas ice drops to its lowest recorded levels." *New York Times* (March 22, 2017).

[1274] The Northern Sea Route refers to the route running along the northern coasts of Eurasia and Siberia between the Barents Sea and the Chukchi Sea. The Northwest Passage connects the Baffin Bay and Davis Strait in the Atlantic to the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic and includes all routes along the northern coast of North America through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. See Breyfogle and Duniform, op. cit.; Albert Buixade Farre, et. al. "Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governances, technology and infrastructure." *Polar Geography* (2014); Fields, op. cit., p. 764; Ksenia Gavirlova, Nikolai Vakhtin and Valeria Vasilyeva. "Anthropology of the Northern Sea Route: introducing the topic." *The Polar Journal* (2017) and Houck,

Table 7.6: Number of Vessels Traversing
Northwest and Northern Arctic Sea Routes (2010-2014)[1275]

Year	Northwest	Northern
2007	5	2
2008	8	3
2009	13	5
2010	12	10
2011	14	41
2012	20	46[1276]
2013	21	71[1277]
2014	12[1278]	31
2015	14	18
2016	n/a	19

Both routes provide a unique strategic advantage for global shipping connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans through the Being Straits, decreasing the distance between for shipping Europe and Asia by over 5,000 miles.[1279] They also presents alternatives to conflict-ridden routes through Iran or the South China Seas.[1280] Although seasonal ice limits usage, in 2007 ice levels reached an all-time low, making the Northwestern Passage more accessible than any other time in human history.[1281] The Northern Passage is also increasingly accessible, now traversable approximately four to five months a year.[1282] According to some estimates, the

---

op. cit., p. 2. Also see Malte Humpert. *The Future of Arctic Shipping.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012); Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik. "The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012) and Soroka, op. cit., pp. 365-370.

[1275] Data compiled from R.K. Headland. *Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of the 2015 Navigation Season.* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2015); *Northern Sea Route Shipping Statistics.* (Tromso: The Arctic Council, 2015) and *Transit Statistics.* (Kirekenes: Northern Sea Route Information Office, 2016). Accessed July 24, 2017 http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits. As a comparative measure, more common routes like the Suez Canal have 18,000 passages annually, while the Panama Canal and the Malacca Straights have 15,000 and 6,5000 respectively. See Thompson (2017), op. cit.; Fields, op. cit., p. 63 and McLaughlin, op. cit. Also see "The Melting North." *The Economist* (June 16, 2012).

[1276] In 2012, these 46 vessels were able to carry over a third more tons of cargo then the previous year, making a steep rise in cargo shipments traversing the Arctic. See "The Roar of Ice Cracking," op. cit.

[1277] The Arctic Institute claims that a closer examination of the numbers shows that only 41 vessels actually made the entire length of the route that year. See Malte Humpert. *Arctic Shipping: An Analysis of the 2013 Northern Sea Route* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014), p. 4.

[1278] 2014 marked the first time in history that a ship traversed the Northwest Passage without an icebreaker accompanying it. See Fields, op. cit., p. 63.

[1279] Bert, op. cit., p. 8 and Houck, op. cit., p. 2.

[1280] Borgerson (2008), op. cit.

[1281] The Northwest Passage way has become so accessible in such a short period of time that in 2016, for example, the first ever cruise ship sailed through the Passage during the summer months. See Costas Paris. "Luxury Cruise to Conquer Northwest Passage." *Wall Street Journal* (May 10, 2016); Mark Theissen "Giant luxury cruise ship Crystal Serenity makes historic voyage in melting Arctic. *National Post* (September 12, 2016) and Zellen, op. cit., p. 2. Also see Will Worley. "Ship sets record for earliest crossing of notorious Northwest Passage through Arctic." *The Independent* (July 30, 2017).

[1282] Elizabeth McLaughlin. "The race for the Arctic: As new frontiers open, Russia leaves U.S. in its wake." *CBS News* (May 10, 2017)

Arctic could be entirely ice free by 2060 if current warming trends continue, fundamentally altering the global economic order by rapidly increasing the movement of commercial goods from the world's current largest regional producers (i.e. in Asia) to the world's largest current consumers (i.e. in Europe and the U.S.).[1283]

Canadian and Russian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, respectively, creates specific problems and certain advantages for the U.S.[1284] And control over the passages could generate revenue in the billions of dollars.[1285] Russia has already made a significant investment in building the necessary infrastructure to develop its passage as a global shipping route.[1286] And they made investment a key priority for the Arctic as early as 2011.[1287] As Putin declared, Russia must "fully secure these routes, provide for economic activities and secure our sovereignty over the territories."[1288] Russia also continues to prove the utility and capacity of the Northern Sea as an alternative transport route; U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp labeled their efforts "impressive."[1289] For example, Russia reached a new post-Soviet high traversing 6.9 million tons of shipments across the Northern Sea Route in November 2016, a significant increase from the 1.3 million tons in 2013.[1290] Russia's dominance over the route is problematic, as NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlowe notes: "if the Russians had the ability to militarily hold [the Northern Sea Route] at ransom, that is a big lever over the world economy."[1291] Canada, like Russia, began investing in the necessary infrastructure for commercial shipping in Northwestern Passage as early as 2005, long before its potential was recognized.[1292] And even

---

[1283] Zellen, op. cit., p. 3. Also see Houck, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

[1284] Michael Byers. "North of 60: Negotiate the Northwest Passage, Before It's Too Late." *Arctic Deeply* (October 19, 2016).

[1285] Control over the Suez Canal, for example, generates over $5 billion annually. See, "The Melting North." *The Economist* (June 16, 2012).

[1286] Olesya Astakhova. "Russian tanker forges path for Arctic shipping super highway." *Alaska Dispatch News* (March 30, 2017) and Brian McCandless. "What's at stake with Russia's Arctic military buildup." *CBS News* (July 9, 2017). Also see Andreas Raspotnik and Kathrin Stephen. *The myth of Arctic shipping – why the Northern Sea Route is still of limited geo-economic importance* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013) and Kathrin Stephen. *Evaluation of the Arctic Shipping Season 2013* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

[1287] Klimenko (2014), op. cit., p. 9.

[1288] Staalesen (2017), op. cit.

[1289] Papp, op. cit., p. 10 and Olin Strader. *A Bering Strait Vessel Traffic Service: Critical Infrastructure for an Opening Arctic (Part I).* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012).

[1290] Klimenko writes that over 64 million tons could be traversed through the Northern Sea Route by 2020 and 85 million by 2030. See Klimenko, op. cit., p. 10; "Russian shipments in arctic set record." *Global Trade Magazine* (January 11, 2017) and Josh Thompson and Narine Ohanyan. "Casting a Cool Eye on Russia's Northern Sea Route Ambitions." *Arctic Deeply* (Mat 3, 2017).

[1291] McCandless, op. cit.

[1292] *Canada's Arctic Gateway* (Vilnius: PPM Public Policy Management Limited, 2010).

non-Arctic nations like China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore - whose economies depend heavily on shipping - have paid closer attention to changes in the region which could potentially have a significant effect on their role in international trade.[1293] As early as 2013, for example, China sailed its first cargo ship across the Arctic, after the government announced its intent to increase its use of the Arctic as a shipping route.[1294] China plans on re-routing five to 15 percent of its trade through Arctic passages by 2020.[1295]

Although there is a delicate balance between environmental protection and lucrative navigation, Houck writes, the U.S. lags behind its Arctic peers, preferring the former over the latter.[1296] As a result the U.S has minimal involvement in securing either passage as an international common, investing in the necessary infrastructure or partnerships to allow for greater access, nor has it indicated any long term strategy to shift commercial shipping to Arctic routes, as have other states.[1297] Yet, as Huebert writes, the U.S. is at, "the front door of the new shipping route no matter what Arctic route is used."[1298] In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mead Treadwell of the U.S. Arctic Research Center, voiced concern over lacking U.S. leadership on emerging shipping routes.[1299] Not just to maintain

---

[1293] Mia Bennett. "Arctic LNG: The Energy on East Asia' Doorstep." *RSIS Commentaries* (May 15, 2014); Bert, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Michael Byers. "Asian juggernaut eyes our 'golden' waterways." *The Globe and the Mail* (August 29, 2011); Malte Humpert. "The Future of the Northern Sea Route – A 'Golden Waterway' or Niche Trade Route." (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011); Humpert and Raspotnik, op. cit., pp. 297-299; Marc Lanteigne. "China Loops the Arctic Into Its Belt and Road Vision." *Arctic Deeply* (June 30, 2017); Adam Lejeunesse. "China Prepares to Use the Northwest Passage." *Arctic Deeply* (September 19, 2016); Joseph Chinyong Liow. "Arctic Summer." *Foreign Affairs* (June 21, 2014); Soroka, op. cit., p. 369; Aki Tonami. *Review: Arctic Governance and Japan's Foreign Strategy.* (Washington, D.C. The Arctic Institute, 2013); Stewart Watters and Aki Tonami. "Japan's Arctic Policy" The Sum of Many Parts." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012) and Stewart Watters and Aki Tonami. "Singapore: An Emerging Actor." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012).

[1294] Hill, op. cit.

[1295] *A 10-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region* (Washington, D.C.: The International Council on Clean Transportation, 2015) and Malte Humpert. *The Future of Arctic Shipping: A New Silk Road for China?* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute: 2013).

[1296] This choice is interesting in light of America's less then rigorous commitment to addressing climate change and its effects on the homeland. See Houck, op. cit., p. 4; Andreas Osthagan. *Developing North American Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study – Part 1.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012); Andreas Osthagan. *To drill or not to drill: Arctic Petroleum Development and Environmental Concerns* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012) and Clare Richardson-Barlow. *Risk Factor: Alaskan-Arctic Energy Resources* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012).

[1297] It is important to note that although this research focused on the growing state-based threat to the U.S. from Russia, the opening of passageways presents another national security threat frequently cited by researchers including illegal shipping and fishing, narco trafficking, migrant smuggling, piracy and potentially terrorism. For example, see Elizabeth Chalecki. "Climate Change in the Arctic and its Implication for U.S. National Security." *IDEAS Journal: International Development, Environment and Sustainability* (2007).

[1298] Huebert (2009), op. cit., p. 24.

[1299] Mead Treadwell. *Climate Change and the Arctic: New Frontiers of National Security.* (Washington, D.C.: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2009). Also see, Scott Borgerson. *The United States as an Arctic Nation: Opportunities in the High North* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2014).

U.S. environmental and global safety standards for vessels moving through the region but also to ensure the evolving governance structure over emerging passageways is favorable to the U.S. and all nations with an interest in the region, not just Russia, Canada and China.

Arctic Geopolitics & the Threat of Energy Security

The geopolitics of the Arctic also presents a significant national security threat in the context of energy security. With the region's ice caps melting faster than expected, the rush to exploit the Arctic's resources has accelerated. Bert writes, "the world is growing one step closer to an Arctic economy."[1300] It is estimated that the Arctic contains 22 percent of the world's undiscovered energy resources, including 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its gas.[1301] Over 80 percent of these resources are offshore.[1302] The U.S. share is estimated at 30 billion barrels of oil and 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, in addition to rare earth minerals, and a reservoir of renewable wind, tidal and geothermal energy.[1303] Yet, Bert writes, the U.S. 'willfully' turns away from its, "ability to reap tremendous economic benefits," and significantly, "harms U.S. national security interests."[1304]

Meanwhile Russia relies heavily on the Arctic as a critical component of its economic security.[1305] Economic activity in the Arctic represents 20 percent of Russian GDP and 22 percent of its exports.[1306] Possessing the largest offshore fossil fuel deposits (estimated to be double Saudi Arabian reserves), Russia has the most extensive offshore drilling operations in the region.[1307] Elizabeth Buchanan writes, for Russia, "the Arctic is still a strategic priority - one that many fear Putin will protect by force. A cornerstone of Moscow's vision to reinstate Russia to its rightful international standing - that of a great power - is energy dominance."[1308] She adds, "energy provides a financial backbone for state programs, and energy pipelines are a key tool through which the state coerces its neighbors. And if Russia is to continue finding

---

[1300] Bert, op. cit., p. 7.
[1301] Bert, op. cit., p. 5; *Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle.* (Washington, D.C: United States Geological Survey, 2008) and Robert Gardner. *Arctic Climate and Energy.* (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2012).
[1302] Gardner, op. cit.
[1303] Bert, op. cit., p. 5 and *Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle*, op. cit.
[1304] Bert, op. cit., p. 17.
[1305] Bert, op. cit., p. 7 and Rahbek-Clemmenson (2015), op. cit., pp. 6-7.
[1306] Axe, op. cit.
[1307] Borgerson (2008), op. cit. and McCormick, op. cit.
[1308] Elizabeth Buchanan. "Arctic Thaw: Arctic Cooperation and Rapprochement." *Foreign Affairs* (2016). Also see Stephen Kotkin. "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics." *Foreign Affairs* (2016) and Soroka, op. cit., pp. 360-361.

oil to pump through European pipelines, it must look to the Arctic for further exploration."[1309] Russia's aggressive resource extraction strategy requires increased collaboration with China and Sino-Russian energy projects now dominate the region.[1310] Russia depends on Chinese funding, while China depends on access to resources.[1311]

Meanwhile, the U.S. has yet to pursue any Arctic policy that takes full advantages of its vast and varied Arctic resources. The most developed region for U.S. drilling is Alaska's North Slope, but production levels have been declining since the 1980s.[1312] As Admiral Papp noted, the U.S. is "centuries behind" its Arctic peers, the result of a, "legacy of very limited infrastructure."[1313] A lack of U.S. management in the region, Kathrin Stephen writes, has left a 'vacancy in leadership' that Russia filled.[1314] This leadership vacuum Stephen adds, also allowed non–Arctic countries like China to take advantage of the burgeoning economy in the High North.[1315]

This does not imply that the U.S. is entirely bereft of an energy strategy in the Arctic. Between 2003 and 2010, the U.S. licensed over three million acres of sea for offshore operations.[1316] The Bush administration attempted to increase Arctic drilling, but accomplished little in expanding extraction.[1317] Despite increasing the number of licenses and aggressively supporting drilling for hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals across the region, Bush could not muster the necessary support to advance his agenda nor reverse the ban on drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR).[1318] And by 2011, Obama established the region's most prohibitive environmental regulations for companies pursuing hydrocarbons

---

[1309] Buchanan, op. cit.

[1310] Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit.; Filimonova and Krivokhizh, op. cit.; Ekaterina Klimenko and Camila T.N. Sorensen. *The status of Chinese-Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017); Slayton and Brigham, op. cit.; Josh Thompson. "An Uneasy Alliance: The Limits of the China-Russia Arctic Partnership." *Arctic Deeply* (June 21, 2017) and Li Xing and Rasmus Gjedsso Bertelsen. "The drivers of Chinese Arctic interests: Political stability and energy transportation." *Arctic Yearbook* (2013).

[1311] Ekaterina Klimenko. *Russia's Evolving Arctic* Strategy (Solna: Stockholm, International Peace Research Institute, 2014), pp. 16-22.; Jeremy Maxie and David Slayton. *Russia's Arctic dreams have Chinese characteristics.* (Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016) and Soroka, op. cit., pp. 363 and 373-374.

[1312] Heather A. Conley. *Arctic Economic in 21ˢᵗ Century: The Benefits and Costs of Cold.* (Lanham: Center for Strategic and International Studies), pp. 1-2 and 9.

[1313] Papp, op. cit.

[1314] Kathrin Stephen. *Opening Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic: A Conflict and Risk Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

[1315] Stephen (2013), op. cit.

[1316] Conley, op. cit., p. 3.

[1317] Coral Davenport. "Obama bans drilling parts of the Atlantic and Arctic." *The New York Times* (December 20, 2016).

[1318] Conley, op. cit., pp. 11-12 and Davenport, op. cit. and John Thompson. "U.S. and Canada Announce Sweeping Ban on Offshore Drilling." *Arctic Deeply* (December 21, 2016).

in the region and issuing an Executive Order which indefinitely extended the ban on all ANWR drilling.[1319]

The U.S. has taken a prominent stance against resource extraction in the region. Opting for, "the highest safety and environmental standards," U.S. regulations has prevented the development of 98 percent of federal Arctic waters.[1320] This could have long term consequences for the economy in general, and near-Arctic-dwelling Americans more specifically.[1321] As Alaska Governor Bill Walker criticized, "locking up the Arctic is akin to saying that outside voices are more important than the voices, lives and livelihoods of Arctic residents."[1322] He adds, "efforts to explore in our Arctic are being bogged down by red rape, delays and legal snafus," warning that, "delay in U.S. Arctic development threatens America's emerging positions as a global energy leader. Delay today has huge, negative implications for America's economic future."[1323] Retired Admiral Gary Roughead concurs: "by repeatedly putting the brakes on the development of natural resources in the Arctic, Washington has injected uncertainty into its Arctic policy and threatened the future energy security of U.S. citizens."[1324]

Despite Bush and Obama offering a distinctly different approach to resource development in the High North, the U.S. still has no significant extraction policy for oil, natural gas or rare earth minerals.[1325] As Heather A. Conley writes, it is 'essential' for the U.S. to develop an economic policy for the region.[1326] She notes that only by increasing drilling operations will the U.S. be able to sustain, for example, its oil pipeline from Alaska to the mainland U.S.[1327] America's commitment to preserving the environment ensures upwards to $1 trillion in hydrocarbons remain off limits to extraction.[1328] As Admiral Roughead points

---

[1319] Conley, op. cit., pp. 11-12 and Davenport, op. cit. and Thompson (2016), op. cit.

[1320] Davenport, op. cit. and *United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders' Statement* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, December 20, 2016). Also see John Thompson. "Why North America's Arctic Oil Needs to Stay in the Ground." *Arctic Deeply* (December 23, 2016).

[1321] Davenport, op. cit.; Thompson (2016), op. cit.; and *United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders' Statement*, op. cit.

[1322] Thompson (2016), op. cit.

[1323] Mead Treadwell. "Putin's Arctic Plans Spring Ahead While America Lags Behind." *Roll Call* (November 12, 2014).

[1324] Gary Roughead. *In the Race for Arctic Energy, the U.S. and Russia are Polar Opposites.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2015).

[1325] Andreas Osthagen. *The United States as an Arctic Actor.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011) and Kathrin Stephen. *U.S. Waking Up to Arctic Resources?* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011).

[1326] Conley, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[1327] Conley, op. cit., p. 9.

[1328] Conley, op. cit., pp. 2-3 and Gardner, op. cit.

out, the government is "jeopardizing America's global competitiveness, leadership and influence in the Arctic," by not allowing offshore exploration.[1329] General Joseph W. Ralston, the Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NATO's Supreme Allied Command, concurred calling offshore development critical for American national security.[1330] Yet, Bert writes, "while other Arctic nations take giant steps forward, the U.S. lacks a focused strategy, forestalling its own progress in the region."[1331] It is apparent – despite shifting geopolitics and actions taken by other Arctic nations facing similar pressures in the region – the U.S. is not responding to the same material factors which would justify the systemic shifts hypothesis. I will now review the second hypothesis: that the lack of prioritization of the Arctic as a threat to national security is a result of the powerful impact of political culture and bureaucratic institutions.

THE ARCTIC IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

I will now assess whether the discrepancies presented in the four policy examples in the previous section are better explained by a Cultural-Institutional hypothesis. I will argue that political culture and related institutional biases (in the context of discourse, strategy and expenditures) best explain the prioritization of specific threats to the U.S. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the Arctic ranks as a minimal priority. This is characterized by a series of specific features including a severely limited budgetary commitment; a preference for evasive strategies (i.e. a strategy of limited to no security-related action); and the prevalence of 'non-issue discourse' as the defining feature of the official threat narrative (see Table 7.1).

Non-issue discourse is characterized by a lack of any significant or critical narrative regarding a national security threat. As a result, no dominate national security discourse emerges to frame an issue as a priority or drive policy. This limited national security discourse is distinctly different than the preceding case studies wherein a dominant (i.e. terrorism), dual (i.e. narco-trafficking) or divided (i.e. climate change) security discourse exists. The result is the emergence of an 'alternative narrative'. Alternative narratives, in the context of non-issue discourse, reject a traditional national security discourse in favor of a narrative featuring 'new' types of security (i.e. human, energy or environmental). This does not discount the existence of a national security narrative, as will be illustrated in this section, but it does imply that it

---

[1329] Roughead, op. cit.
[1330] "Extra Edition: Arctic OCS Development and National Security," op. cit.
[1331] Bert, op. cit., p. 16.

significantly limited in the context of those who are employing it. As a result, it lacks a constituency – inside or outside of government – who support or further employ this discourse, and the intended national security policies it anticipates achieving. The role of this alternative narrative (and lack of national security discourse) will be explored in the follow sections.

Discourse

A Cultural-Institutional explanation posits that threat prioritization can be understood, in part, as a measure of the discourse, or how a threat is framed. This is critical in understanding the difference in prioritization and policies of the U.S. when compared to, for example, Russia or Canada where, Rahbek-Clemmenson notes, the "Arctic plays a symbolically important role in the national narratives."[1332] But there is no symbolic national narrative for the Arctic in the U.S., historically or currently.[1333] The lack of prioritization is correlated with a lack of any significant national security narrative driving the Arctic discourse embedded in U.S. political culture. Rather, an alternative narrative emerges, taking different forms under different presidents, but all furthering a lack of discursive cohesiveness as expected with minimal priority threats. During the Bush administration, for example, the narrative had a distinct focus on energy security in the context of economic stability. While the Obama administration focused on environmental sustainability defined by human security.

The Bush narrative on the Arctic emphasized developing energy resources and driving economic growth. This is particularly true in the context of ANWR, which Bush committed to new exploration and drilling operations. As spokesman, Scott McClellan stated in 2005, ANWR access is, "vital to helping us reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy and helping to reduce high energy prices."[1334] But by 2008, Bush failed to increase access to energy resources in federally protected lands and the Outer Continental Arctic Shelf. As he remarked in a 2008 speech, "the American economy will continue to rely largely on oil. And that means we need to increase supply, especially here at home. So, my administration has repeatedly called on Congress to expand domestic oil production. Unfortunately, Democrats on Capitol

---

[1332] Rahbek-Clemmenson (2015), op. cit., p. 11.
[1333] Huebert (2009), op. cit., p. 2.
[1334] Lloyd Vries. "House scraps Arctic drilling plan." *Associated Press* (November 10, 2005).

Hill have rejected virtually every proposal - and now Americans are paying the price at the pump for this obstruction."[1335]

Members of the Bush administration echoed this sentiment. While serving in the Senate, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham had a strong voting record in favor of Arctic drilling and increased access to the AWNR.[1336] After been confirmed in 2001, he praised Alaska senators for introducing legislation to permit drilling in the region.[1337] In his landmark energy speech that year, Abraham stated that increased access to the Arctic should be based on the belief it, "will help increase America's energy security by ensuring a more diverse supply of oil."[1338] His successor, Samuel W. Bodman identified himself as an "energetic advocate" for ANWR drilling.[1339] When discussing opening the region, he noted, "not only could these resources have a meaningful impact on our dependence on imported sources of oil; this means American jobs producing American oil for Americans," emphasizing the energy economics which drove Bush's Arctic agenda.[1340] Mark Maddox, who served as acting Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, concurred, stating that the Arctic was the single most important priority for the future of U.S energy.[1341]

But having consistently failed to open the Arctic to new drilling operations, the Bush administration turned towards an environmental narrative, employing sustainability language during his last year in office.[1342] In his 2009 *National Security Presidential Directive 66* and *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25* (NSPD-66/HSPD-25), Bush advanced his economic-energy narrative while assuring detractors of his intention to secure the fragile eco-system and its indigenous communities. The directive read: "the United States seeks to balance access to, and

---

[1335] George W. Bush. *President Bush Discusses Energy* (Washington, D.C.: White House, June 18, 2008).

[1336] *Timeline of Events: 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017). Accessed October 28, 2017 https://energy.gov/management/office-management/operational-management/history/doe-history-timeline/timeline-events-4.

[1337] *Timeline of Events: 2001*, op. cit.

[1338] Spencer Abraham. *A National Report on America's Energy Crisis.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, March 19, 2001).

[1339] *Timeline of Events: 2005* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017). Accessed October 28, 2017 https://energy.gov/management/timeline-events-2005.

[1340] Samuel W. Bodman. *Bodman Statement on Senate Approval of ANWR Provisions.* (Washington, D.C. Department of Energy, March 16, 2005).

[1341] *Timeline of Events: 2004* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017). Accessed October 28, 2017 https://energy.gov/management/office-management/operational-management/history/doe-history-timeline/timeline-events-7.

[1342] *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25: Arctic Region Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009) and *National Security Presidential Directive 66: Arctic Region Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).

development of, energy and other natural resources with the protection of the Arctic environment," through 'responsible' engagement, cooperative efforts, and commitment to conservation, alongside development projects.[1343] The narrative shifted under Obama, who placed a stronger emphasized environmental and human security over energy security, specifically in the context of fossil fuels. This culminated in his 2015 Alaska speech where Obama framed the region in the context of the 'urgent' and 'growing' threat posed by climate change: "the challenge that will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other" adding that the Arctic is the, "leading indicator of what the entire planet faces."[1344] Obama did not ignore economic diversification in the Arctic, but cited a need to move away from fossil fuel development.[1345] And despite having approved offshore exploration and drilling operations in 2010 (and again in 2015, before his trip to the Arctic), Obama indefinitely extended the ban on drilling in the ANWR before leaving office.[1346]

This environmental and human security discourse extended to Obama administration officials. When discussing Obama's 2012 review of energy exploration in the region, Tommy Beaudreau, the Director of the Ocean Energy Management stated, "within the Arctic, where significant resource potential exists, there are also substantial environmental challenges, and social and ecological concerns that warrant a different and more targeted approach that will focus leasing to offer the greatest resource potential while minimizing possible conflicts with environmentally sensitive areas and the native Alaskan communities that rely on the ocean for subsistence use."[1347] Then Secretary of State John Kerry concurred, noting, "it is imperative that the development we pursue is sensitive to the lifestyle and history that people want to

---

[1343] Bush finally lifted the ban on drilling in 2008 but the act was seen as largely symbolic since the provision requiring Congressional approval remained in place. See, "Bush lifts executive ban on offshore oil drilling." *CNN* (July 14, 2008). Also see, *National Security Presidential Directive 66: Arctic Region Policy*, op. cit. and *Timeline of Events: 2001*, op. cit.

[1344] Barack Obama. *Remarks by the President at the GALCIER Conference.* (Anchorage: Dena'ina Civic and Convention Center, August 31, 2015).

[1345] Tom DiChristopher. "Obama invokes 1953 law to indefinitely block drilling in Arctic and Atlantic oceans." *CNBC* (December 20, 2016). Also see Mary Lynne Corn, et. al. "Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Background and Issues. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003) and Tom Doggert. "Bush budget cuts for Arctic oil drilling in 2010." *Reuters* (February 4, 2008).

[1346] It is important to note that these offshore drilling contracts were approved by the Bush administration but Obama did have the authority to cancel them. See, Suzanne Goldenberg. "Barack Obama reveres campaign promise and approves offshore drilling." *The Guardian* (March 31, 2010) and Eric Holthaus. "Obama is a climate hypocrite. His trip to Alaska proves it." *Slate* (August 31, 2015).

[1347] *Interior Finalizes Plan to Make All Highest-Resource Areas in the U.S. Offshore Available for Oil & Gas Leasing.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, June 28, 2012).

hold on to, and also that it is sustainable."[1348] Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed these sentiments stating it was important to agree on, "the rules of the road in the Arctic so new developments are economically sustainable and environmentally responsible."[1349]

The rise of an alternative narrative, and decline of a national security driven discourse, is evident in official U.S. threat assessments. The Navy's 2009 *Arctic Roadmap*, for example, lists the threats examined in this case study – including military capability and readiness; the emergence of new shipping opportunities; resource extraction; and the "activity and interests of other Arctic nations."[1350] But it also cites the changing environment as important to future national security considerations.[1351] The Navy's 2014 *Arctic Roadmap* places an even greater emphasis on the fragile ecology, international cooperation and long term sustainability.[1352] This shift is in focus, the document portends, is to ensure a, "comprehensive unambiguous understanding of the complex environment... [and] the many challenges its poses for future operations."[1353] But in the 2010 *National Security Strategy,* the Arctic is mentioned just once.[1354] The document cites similar concerns as the Navy, but adds the advancement of scientific research and the protection of indigenous communities to its concerns for the region.[1355] The 2011 *Military Strategy* references the Arctic once as well, but only in the context its partnership with Canada.[1356] And there is no mention of the region in the 2012 *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for Twenty First Century Defense.*[1357] The Coast Guard's *Arctic Strategy* of 2013 and the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* represent the full formation of an alternative narrative superseding a national security narrative, framing the Arctic as threat almost exclusively in the context of climate change, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities.[1358] But both

---

[1348] Carol J. Williams. "U.S. takes helm of Arctic Council, focus on climate change." *Los Angeles Times* (April 24, 2015).

[1349] Arshad Mohammed. "Clinton tours Arctic as nations vie for resources." *The Atlantic* (June 2, 2012). During her campaign for office, then candidate Clinton took a more hardline stance. See, Hillary Clinton (@HillaryClinton) "The Arctic is a unique treasure. Given what we know, it's not worth the risk of drilling. –H." August 18, 2015. 9:21 AM. Tweet.

[1350] *U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Navy, 2009).

[1351] *U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap*, op. cit., p. 5.

[1352] *U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Navy, 2014), pp. 3-19.

[1353] *U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030*, op. cit.

[1354] *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2010).

[1355] *National Security Strategy* (2010), op. cit., p. 50

[1356] *The National Military Strategy for the United States of America* (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), p. 11

[1357] and *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for Twenty First Century Defense.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012).

[1358] *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C: The Department of Defense, 2010), p. 25 and *United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard, 2013).

documents also stress the critical need to depend on Arctic allies due to America's significant resource and capability gap in the region.[1359] It is therefore not surprising that a 2012 and 2014 GAO assessment of the DOD and as well as the federal government, determined the U.S. has failed to adequately execute or resource Arctic policies.[1360]

This does not imply the total elimination of a national security discourse for the Arctic in the current U.S. threat narrative. But it remains significantly restricted and unable to foster the same support for a stronger national security agenda to be established in regards to the geopolitics of the Arctic. Notwithstanding elected officials from Alaska, whom always voiced strong concern over Russian regional presence, only a small group of politicians have expressed apprehension based on national security considerations.[1361] Senator John McCain, for example, wrote the 'immediate threat' in the region is, "a menace that many assumed was relegated to the past: an aggressive, militarily capable Russian state that is ruled by an anti-American autocrat, hostile to our interests, dismissive of our values, and seeking to challenge the international order that U.S. leaders of both parties have maintained for seven decades."[1362] Senator Agnus King joined the Arctic Caucus to raise awareness that the, "strategic significance of the region will only grow more important."[1363] Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner declared, "the time for an unclear and indecisive Arctic policy is over. America

---

[1359] *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, op. cit. and *United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy*, op. cit.

[1360] *Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-term Needs.* (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2012) and *Arctic Issues: Better Direction & Management of Voluntary Recommendations Could Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation.* (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2014).

[1361] Alaskan Senator Dan Sullivan has called the Russian Arctic strategy and operation, "impressive, but disturbing," adding, "that we would even contemplate taking one soldier away from Alaska is lunacy given Putin's recent actions in the Arctic." Alaskan Senator Lisa Murkowski added that defense also requires a robust Coast Guard fleet as being critical to carrying out their mission in the Arctic. Alaskan Congressman Mark Begich complained that when discussing the needs of the Arctic it is like the government "never heard of it," and his counterpart Congressman Don Young called U.S. leadership in the region, "leading from behind." Alaska Governor Bill Walker commented in 2015 that Russian military buildup, compounded by U.S. drawdown, makes Alaskans feel "a little bit uncomfortable." See Bennett and Hennigan, op. cit.; Peter Buxbaum. "One billion dollars for polar icebreaker included in 2017 defense appropriations bill." *Global Trade Magazine* (June 7, 2016); Peter Buxbaum. "The Arctic: A Growing Security and Trade Dilemma." *Global Trade Magazine* (February 1, 2017); Fields, op. cit. pp. 67-68; Koren, "Russia's Militarization of the North Pole Has U.S. Lawmakers on Edge," op. cit. and Kris Osborn. "US Lawmakers: Russia's Military Build Up in Arctic 'Disturbing'" *Military.com* (March 12, 2015). Also see Erica Martinson. "Here's what Alaska's US Senate candidates had to say at the first ever debate in the Arctic." *Alaska Dispatch News* (December 27, 2016) and Randy Showstack. "Diminishing sea ice in the Arctic presents challenges and opportunities." *Eos* (2013), pp. 270-271).

[1362] John McCain. "The Real Arctic Threat." *Wall Street Journal* (September 1, 2015). Also see Jess McHugh. "Russia Arctic Military Expansion: Moscow A 'National Security Issue' McCain Says." *International Business Times* (July 31, 2015).

[1363] Michael Bastasch. "US lawmakers move to counter Putin's Arctic Ambitions." *The Daily Caller* (March 24, 2015)

must recognize that other countries, including China and Russia, have very serious, and possibly adversarial, Arctic ambitions."[1364] And Congressman Rick Larsen commented, "the U.S. can sit by and let other countries run the Arctic show… Just because the Arctic is at a high latitude doesn't mean the U.S. should ignore it."[1365] But outside this group of politicians, few public discussions or pronouncements of concern in the legislature are consistently, if ever, voiced.

Furthermore, only a limited number of military officials have expressed alarm. Ray Mabus, Obama's Secretary of the Navy, noted "as the ice melts in the Arctic our responsibilities go up."[1366] Admiral Bill Gortney, head of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, called the uptick in Russian Arctic operations as 'aggressive,' a sentiment echoed by Admiral Mark Ferguson, Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.[1367] Papp, who served as the Commandant of the Coast Guard (and later the State Department's Special Representative to the Arctic) noted that the issue was not only funding, but prioritization: "the American people are very disconnected from our Arctic. We are both physically and culturally disconnected from the U.S. Arctic, and we need to change that."[1368] He called prioritization a "national imperative."[1369] Yet by the end of the Obama administration, as Admiral James G. Stavridis noted, when compared to Russia, the U.S. had "very, very little capability," in the region.[1370] And he added that strategic competition over resources will likely 'exacerbate' tensions.[1371]

There are also a limited number of examples of the Arctic impacting governmental discourse.[1372] As then Secretary of State Kerry noted in 2015, "our future national security

---

[1364] Jim Sensenbrenner. *Congressman Sensenbrenner Introduces the U.S. Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs Act* (March 16, 2017). Accessed July 3, 2017: https://sensenbrenner.house.gov/2017/3/congressman-sensenbrenner-introduces-the-u-s-ambassador-at-large-for-arctic-affairs-act.

[1365] Rick Larsen. "Congressional Arctic Working Group will help better coordinate and advance U.S. Arctic policy." (August 5, 2014). Accessed July 1, 2017 https://larsen.house.gov/press-release/larsen-and-young-us-cannot-afford-neglect-arctic.

[1366] Osborn, op. cit.

[1367] Lance M. Bacon. "Navy prepares for Arctic operations as ice thins." *Military Times* (February 11, 2015); Ryan Browne. "Coast Guard wants icebreakers as Russia has Arctic push." *CNN* (January 19, 2016) and "US must retain Alaska combat brigade to deter Russia in Arctic – Army chief." *Sputnik News* (February 24, 2016). Also see DJ Summers. "Army officially delays plan to slash Arctic Warrior force level." *Alaska Journal of Commerce* (2016).

[1368] Sean Cockerham. "U.S. lags behind Russia and other nations in the Arctic." *McClatchy* (August 28, 2015).

[1369] "U.S. Readies 'Aggressive' Arctic Council Agenda. *Eos* (2014), pp. 419-20. Also see Victoria Herrmann. *America is not (yet) and Arctic nation* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014).

[1370] Brookman, op. cit.

[1371] Snow (2016), op. cit.

[1372] Buxbaum (2015), op. cit.

strategy is going to be affected also by what's going on in the Arctic. The melting of the polar cap is opening sea lanes that never before existed. The potential there is already there for a global race to exploit the resources of the region."[1373] He added, "economic riches tend to attract military interest as nations seek to ensure their own rights are protected. And we know, because we track it, that these countries – like Russia, China, and others – are active in the Arctic."[1374] Fran Ulmer of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (a government agency advising the president on Arctic affairs) concurred, noting America's Arctic peers are, "better prepared for what is coming in the Arctic," adding that she hoped, "Congress will step up and fund some of the necessary infrastructure."[1375] Guy F. Caruso, the U.S. Energy Information Administration administrator under Bush, highlighted the U.S. lack of preparedness in 2016 when he wrote, "Russia's grandiose claims in the Arctic, combined with their penchant for using energy as a political weapon, underscores the alarming implications of their activity in the north."[1376]

In previous case studies, a dominant discourse forges a singular policy or different national security narratives compete for legitimacy by advancing complimentary or contradictory policies. This is not the case for minimal priority threats like the Arctic. Despite the existence of a narrative which depicts a threat, it lacks strength or influence, creating fragmented messaging and equally fragmented policy. U.S. strategy to address the geopolitics of the Arctic, or the lack thereof, and how it does or does not emerges through this limited discourse will be examined in the following section.

Strategy

Discourse reinforces specific forms of bureaucratic bias. It provides opportunities for certain agencies to rise in prominence when competing to influence the execution of policy. In the case of threats like the geopolitics of the Arctic, limited discourse results in minimal impact driving prioritization or policy formulations. As a result, it does not empower bureaucracies to develop or pursue cohesive policies. Indeed, the U.S. has pursued none of

---

[1373] John Kerry. *Remarks on Climate Change and National Security* (Norfolk: Old Dominion University, November 10, 2015).

[1374] Kerry, op. cit.

[1375] Cockerham, op. cit.

[1376] Guy F. Caruso. "The harsh reality of Russia's influence on Alaska's offshore exploration." *The Washington Examiner* (August 15, 2016).

the potential options as its Arctic peers have.[1377] And during its most recent tenure as Arctic Council chair from 2015 to 2017, as Rosen notes, that the U.S. produced very little benefit for itself or its allies.[1378] Furthermore, the U.S. accomplished very little in terms of building governance structures to deal with emerging issues.[1379] As the 2014 GAO report on Arctic progress assessed, wherein some federal agencies adopted Washington's recommendations for executing Arctic policy, the State Department has no way of tracking or measuring them.[1380] The report furthermore notes these recommendations are so broad that implementation is unfeasible.[1381] Much like U.S. military strategy in the Arctic, the report concludes that the State Department relies too heavily on Alaskan state agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other agencies to execute its mandate, as it lacks its own strategy or resources.[1382]

A Cultural-Institutional hypothesis posits, in the case of a minimal priority threat like the geopolitics of the Arctic, no security-related strategy will emerge. For example, of all the threats presented in this research, U.S. strategy in the Arctic is governed by the least number of official national security orders, directives and policy statements and as a result, the discourse around the threat is limited.[1383] According to Wezeman's assessment on Arctic militarization, the strategic importance of the Arctic experienced a marked decline between 2001 and 2016, when traced through a range of strategy reports (illustrated above).[1384] Unlike with the other threats in this research, U.S. policies in the region does not only diverge from its peers, but as to be expected, it instead lacks any cohesive national security policy all together. Although a threat narrative exists, it does not have a sustaining level of support across the government. Furthermore, framed outside the context of national security – with some government officials emphasizing an economic-energy narrative and others a human-

---

[1377] Franklyn Griffiths. "Environment in the U.S. Discourse on Security: The Case of the Missing Arctic Waters" in Will Ostreng (ed.) *National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic – the Case of the Northern Sea Route* (Berlin: Springer, 1999), p. 193.
[1378] Rosen, op. cit.
[1379] *Arctic Issues*, op. cit.
[1380] *Arctic Issues*, op. cit.
[1381] *Arctic Issues*, op. cit.
[1382] *Arctic Issues*, op. cit. and Justin Sink. "Obama issues order on Arctic climate change." *The Hill* (January 21, 2015).
[1383] For a full review of the formal reports and documents issued by the U.S. Government on the Arctic in the past two decades, see Ronald O'Rouke. *Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional research Service, 2015).
[1384] Wezeman (2012), op. cit., pp. 10-11 and Wezeman (2016), op. cit., p. 17.

environmental one – the U.S. is unable to formulate a dominant discourse to shape a clearly defined security strategy.[1385]

The government has, furthermore, provided little structure or guidance to its military forces operating in the region, and has not undertaken the necessary requirements to prepare the U.S. for a national security emergency in the Arctic.[1386] As the GAO noted in its 2012 assessment on U.S Arctic strategy, "while DOD has undertaken some efforts to assess the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic, it is unclear whether DOD will be in a position to provide needed capabilities in a timely and efficient manner."[1387] Little has changed since then. The 2016 DOD *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region* explicitly states so, noting that "key challenges identified" in 2013, "persist in 2016."[1388] Holland writes, the U.S. has "combined only tentative policies with very little funding and no high-level visibility."[1389] Lacking the necessary infrastructure and resources to adequately operate in the Arctic creates a 'capability gap' and makes U.S. forces overly reliant on leveraging the modernized hardware and new infrastructure of allies like Canada and Norway.[1390]

The U.S. has also not adequately invested in or created opportunities to secure the Arctic's resources.[1391] For example, an estimated $160 billion in oil and gas revenues exist just in the ANWR.[1392] But Bert notes, "businesses considering drilling or any commercial endeavor in the far north see that no deep-water port or infrastructure is in place to support their plans or people."[1393] Stringent regulatory regimes and increased oversight by the Obama administration made drilling in existing leases and new exploration impossible.[1394] A lack of

---

[1385] Huebert, op. cit., p. 2.
[1386] Bert, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
[1387] The report goes on to note, "[DOD] acknowledges that it has some near-term gaps in key capabilities needed to communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. However, DOD has not yet evaluated, selected, or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and addressing near-term Arctic capability needs… Without taking steps to meet near- and long-term Arctic capability needs, DOD risks making premature Arctic investments, being late in obtaining needed capabilities, or missing opportunities to minimize costs." See, *Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-term Needs*, op. cit.
[1388] *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*, op. cit., p. 14.
[1389] Holland, op. cit.
[1390] *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*, op. cit., pp. 11-15.
[1391] Bert, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
[1392] Sean C. Bonyn. *On 50th Anniversary of ANWR, Upton Urges President to Open Vast Reserves.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Congressman Fred Upton, December 6, 2010).
[1393] Bert, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
[1394] Sean Cockerham. "Shell absconds Arctic Ocean drilling efforts amid costs and controversy." *McClatchy* (September 28, 2015) and Sink, op. cit.

resources, policy and support for exploration – compounded by the difficultly of operating in the Arctic – failed to create incentives for long term engagement in the region.[1395] The result, Huebert writes, is a limited Arctic strategy evolving in a, "reactive, piecemeal and rigid" fashion.[1396] He concludes: "U.S. leaders need to recognize that the age of the Arctic is dawning. There is no doubt that other issues, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or the economy will continue to dominate the United States' attention, but it cannot continue to ignore the north."[1397]

Unable to develop a definitive discourse or coherent strategy, allocating resources is neither relevant nor pressing. Michaela David writes U.S. Arctic strategy is, "as elusive as a mirage on the Arctic ice-sheet. The strategy is toothless in the absence of a comprehensive implementation strategy and long-term budgetary plan."[1398] Holland concurs, noting that despite official statements, "neither Administration pushed Congress to actually appropriate the fund necessary to meet these challenges."[1399] How the changing geopolitics of the Arctic is addressed in the context of the budget will be explored in the following section.

Expenditures

Budgets provide a tangible measure of priorities and allocations addressing the threat of Arctic geopolitics are minimal compared to most other threats, and represent just a fraction of investments by other countries. As Holland notes the real danger to the U.S. in the Arctic is not the scramble for resources, but the lack of committing resources to the region.[1400] For example, the U.S. has an estimated $1 trillion dollars in untapped Arctic hydrocarbons.[1401] And even with minimal infrastructure, investment and capacity, Alaska still generates over $1 billion annually in mineral exports.[1402] But in allocating resources to preserve or expand the national and economic security of the Arctic, the U.S. fails to prioritize spending to reflect need.

[1395] For example, Shell spent $7 billion over seven years seeking oil off the Arctic shores before pulling out of the project. See Cockerham, op. cit.

[1396] Huebert (2009), op. cit., p. 2.

[1397] Huebert (2009), op. cit., p.

[1398] Mihaela David. *US National Strategy for the Arctic Region: Strong Foothold or on Thin Ice?"* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

[1399] Holland, op. cit.

[1400] Hollland, op. cit.

[1401] Conley, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[1402] Conley, op. cit., p. 19.

The Coast Guard's budget, for example remains significantly limited (see Table 7.9). Between 2001 and 2008 the Coast Guard budget was under $6 billion annually, growing less than one billion between 2009 and 2012, before rising in 2014 and falling again in 2015.[1403]

Table 7.9: United States Coast Guard Budget in Billions of Dollars (2001-2016)[1404]

The Coast Guard budget, representing just five to six percent of the Navy's overall budget, underwrites the cost of all of its duties, not just those in the Arctic.[1405] State Department funding for the Arctic is even less. When appointed as the first State Department Special Representative to the Arctic, Papp admitted in Congressional testimony that his staff was just four people, supported by less than two dozen others serving across the State Department ranks who have some degree of regional expertise.[1406] The budget for the U.S. staff to the Arctic Council, approximately 10 people, was just $1.4 million in 2015.[1407] As Admiral Zukunft declared, the U.S. is, "depleted of resources. We need to move from being a bantam weight fighter to being a welter weight fighter."[1408] The Alaskan state budget is also revealing. The Alaskan Coast Guard, for example, has an annual budget of approximately $240 million to manage the Army National Guard, Air National Guard and homeland security and emergency services.[1409] This budget also supports Arctic operations, implying that like the Coast Guard, what is spent directly on the Arctic is a fraction of this.[1410]

[1403] *United States Coast Guard: 2016 Budget in Brief* (Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard, 2016) and *U.S. Coast Guard Historic Funding.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2013) Accessed August 1, 2017. https://www.uscg.mil/history/docs/budget/USCG_FundingHistory1922-2012.pdf

[1404] *United States Coast Guard: 2016 Budget in* Brief, op. cit. and *U.S. Coast Guard Historic Funding*, op. cit.

[1405] Meghann Myers. "Bigger budget, more personnel ahead for Coast Guard." *Navy Times* (February 24, 2016).

[1406] Papp, op. cit.

[1407] *Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign operations and Related Programs* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2015).

[1408] Terry McKnight. "Doing the most with the least: The Coast Guard dilemma." *U.S. News & World Report* (March 9, 2017).

[1409] *FY 2017 Budget Overview* (Anchorage: Alaska Department of Military and Veteran Affairs, 2016).

[1410] *FY 2017 Budget Overview*, op. cit.

Meanwhile, investments made by other Arctic nations indicate the importance of the region for national security. Denmark, for example, allocated $18 million of its defense budget to the Arctic in 2016, approximately half of its total defense spending, in response to Russian militarization.[1411] In 2017, Norway increased their military budget to over 5 billion Euros, and have announced their intention to increase spending by an additional one billion a year over the next twenty years.[1412] Canada also invested heavily in its Arctic policy – allocating, for example, $1.5 billion for UAVs designed for the region and an additional $23 billion for six new icebreakers.[1413]

Other examples abound. Between 2007 and 2016, Russian annual military spending doubled, rising to the third largest in the world.[1414] In 2016, Russian military spending was 5.3 percent of GDP, the highest since the collapse of the USSR and the highest of any major economy in the world.[1415] In the Arctic, Russia maintains a modernized fleet of icebreakers with more than three times as many vessels (a total of 40) as the other four countries combined.[1416] But Putin still allocated $40 billion in 2015 to upgrade Arctic forces by 2020.[1417] And in an effort to develop and secure the Northern Sea Route for global trade and shipping, Russia invested $25 million between 2013 and 2014 for search and rescue infrastructure, and another $1.3 billion for a seaport to maintain an array of long term Arctic operations.[1418] Russian investment in developing the region's resources is also considerable; over $40 billion has been invested in one of the world's largest known oil fields in the Barents Sea.[1419] Alaskan Senator Dan Sullivan called the Russian Arctic military build-up, "impressive, but disturbing,"

[1411] Rahbek-Clemmenson (2014), op. cit., p. 349.

[1412] Nilson, op. cit.; O'Dwyer op. cit. and Wintour, op. cit.

[1413] "Construction begins on Canada Navy's first Harry Dewolf-Class AOPS," op. cit.; Fountain, op. cit.; Kamala Kelkar. "Arctic official: 'no imperative' for icebreakers." *Alaska Dispatch News* (September 28, 2016) and Wezeman (2012), op. cit., p. 3.

[1414] Daadler, op. cit.

[1415] Daadler, op. cit.

[1416] Browne, op. cit.; Craw, op. cit.; Gramer, op. cit.; Higgins (2017), op. cit.; Cameron Gordon Judge-Becker. "How Russia Plans to Win the Arctic." *Russia Direct* (August 31, 2015); Jen Judson. "The icebreaker gap." *Politico* (September 1, 2015); Jorbenadze, op. cit.; Magnus Nordenman. "The Russian challenge in the Arctic isn't about icebreakers." *Defense News* (February 24, 2017); Rowan Scarborough. "Ice-cold war: Russian icebreakers outnumber U.S. vessels in vital Arctic." *Washington times* (February 19, 2017); Ritter, op. cit.; "Russia starts nationwide show of force," op. cit. and Shaw, op. cit.

[1417] Jorbenadze, op. cit.; Cameron Gordon Judge-Becker. "How Russia Plans to Win the Arctic." *Russia Direct* (August 31, 2015) and "Russia starts nationwide show of force," op. cit.

[1418] Klimenko (2014), op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[1419] Huebert (2009), op. cit., p. 23.

adding, "that we would even contemplate taking one soldier away from Alaska is lunacy given Putin's recent actions in the Arctic."[1420]

Even non-Arctic countries are making major budgetary commitments to ensure their influence in the region. China invested $10 billion in Russian energy projects, as well as a variety of Arctic resource-based industries in Norway, Canada and the U.S.[1421] In 2012, China's National offshore oil corporation purchased a major Canadian oil company for $1.5 billion to drill in the Canadian Arctic, and one of its largest mining companies bought rights to mine uranium and other rare earth minerals in Greenland's Arctic, importing thousands of workers to support the operation.[1422] Between 2009 and 2013, China's three largest national energy companies became the world's largest purchasers of international energy assets, with several of these purchases geared towards the Arctic Circle.[1423] And in 2016, China invested $300 million for a second icebreaker.[1424] Yet, as Rear Admiral Richard D. West noted in 2017, "for more than 30 years, studies have underscored the need for U.S. icebreakers to maintain presence, sovereignty, leadership and research capacity, but the nation has failed to make the recommended investments, leaving the U.S. ill-equipped to protect its interests, while other nations have mobilized to expand their access to ice-covered regions."[1425] Finally, in 2016, the U.S. approved plans to build its first icebreaker in over 40 years, costing a total of $1 billion.[1426] As a comparative measure, the overall shipbuilding budget of the U.S. Navy is almost $20 billion a year.[1427]

In a 2016 report, the DOD noted that, "addressing needs in step with the rate at which activity in the Arctic increases and balancing potential investments in Arctic-specific capabilities with other national security priorities and fiscal realities will remain as challenges for DOD."[1428] The report adds that only with support from allies, and other government agencies, will the DOD be able address its existing capability and operational gaps.[1429] The

---

[1420] Osborn, op. cit.

[1421] Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit., p. 85; Melas, op. cit., pp. 327-328; Rosen, op. cit. and Roughead, op. cit.

[1422] Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit., p. 85; Melas, op. cit., pp. 327-328; Rosen, op. cit. and Roughead, op. cit.

[1423] Alexeeva and Lasserre, op. cit., p. 85; Melas, op. cit., pp. 327-328; Rosen, op. cit. and Roughead, op. cit.

[1424] Kelkar, op. cit.

[1425] Dan Lamothe. "In a changing Arctic, lone Coast Guard icebreaker maneuver through ice and geopolitics." *Washington Post* (September 4, 2017). Also see *Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation's Needs.* (Washington, D.C.: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017).

[1426] "Construction begins on Canada Navy's first Harry Dewolf-Class AOPS," op. cit.; Kelkar, op. cit. and Pincus, op. cit.

[1427] Robert Hein. *Right-sixing the United States Navy* (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2015).

[1428] *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*, op. cit., p. 14.

[1429] *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*, op. cit., p. 14.

measure of America's long-term investment in the region over the past century, and the growing importance of the Arctic to U.S. national security presently, I posit, would suppose a higher level of investment than currently expended. But as Huebert bluntly contends, the U.S. elects to, "simply ignore the issues facing the Arctic."[1430]

CONCLUSION

When answering the research question In the context of the changing geopolitics of the Arctic, the conditions under which the threats emanating from the region go under-prioritized appear to be Cultural-Institutional. This explanation better approximates those conditions than systemic shifts in the character of threat. This is exemplified in the distinctly different preferences between the U.S. and other Arctic nations facing similar pressures in the region, as well as the lack of a national security discourse or coherent policy to address the region's complex dynamics. And it further emphasized by a distinctive attempt to shift the discourse away from a traditional national security context to a new security context - entailing human and environmental security issues through an alternative narrative. This implies that material factors have less bearing on threat prioritization and policy than in comparable states, which have clearly shifted policies as a response to them.

The qualitative and quantitative data presented in this case study is informative. The geopolitics of the Arctic was the only threat examined in which a number of interview subjects admitted to not knowing or having enough information to respond to questions regarding its level of threat. This likely affected the responses of survey subjects, whom were also asked to rank the level of threat. The geopolitics of the Arctic was afforded the lowest prioritization scores of any case study, in line with the expectations generated by this framework. And in the examination of four critical issues emerging from the region, low prioritization as well as evasive policies were apparent. The U.S. chooses to largely ignore regional issues in the context of national security, while Arctic and even non-Arctic nations pursue economic opportunities and build up military defenses to protect their growing interests in the region. The result for the U.S. is a severely limited policy aligned with a new (i.e. alternative) security narrative and not a traditional national security discourse. As a result, an array of piecemeal environmental and economic policies, and few national security measures, ineffectively address the complex regional dynamics.

[1430] Huebert (2009), op. cit., p. 22.

In the following chapter I will briefly review the four case studies in the context of the Trump administration in order to further illustrate the applicability of my framework. I will explore how the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis explains the effect of Trump's unique discourse and exaggerated narratives on the prioritization of threats to U.S. national security. I will examine where his administration has, in its first nine months, been consistent with the polices of his predecessors, where it has not, and the reasons which explain why these shifts occurred.

CHAPTER EIGHT
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

We are going to do something terrible to you…
we are going to deprive you of an enemy. - Georgi Arbatov[1431]

INTRODUCTION

In this supplemental case study, I will examine the research question in the context of the first nine months of the Donald J. Trump presidency. I will explore the threats presented in the cases studies, and how they are now prioritized to further assess the validity of my argument. I will attempt to illustrate that Cultural-Institutional factors still best explain the apparent disconnect between objectively and subjectively defined threats, as well as how Trump prioritizes them. Returning to the forms of policy and discourse outlined in this research, I have attempted to illustrate that a unique political culture exists in the U.S., which impacts its discourse and institutions (see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1: Forms of Policy & Discourse

		LEVEL OF THREAT & POLICY			
		Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
EVIDENCE OF THREAT PRIORITIZATION	Official Government Documents	4.00-3.00	2.99-2.00	1.99-1.00	> 1.00
	Expenditures	High	Medium	Low	Minimal
	Strategy	Overwhelming use of force (i.e. invasion/war)	Limited use of force (i.e. targeted strikes; military aid)	Use of diplomacy, sanctions, or economic aid	None
	Discourse	Crisis	Problem	Issue	Non-Issue

This is most apparent in national security, where U.S. rhetoric consistently shapes priorities and polices that appear to reject objective, material factors in favor of a distinctly, subjective 'American way.'

This approach to threats is exclusive to the U.S., but not to a specific administration, as the Bush and Obama examples illustrated. This implies, despite changes in administrations or specific commitments made by presidents, certain types of narratives tend to exist in the context of certain national security threats; and once entrenched, tend to endure across

---

[1431] As quoted in Charles E. Nathanson. "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politics of Representation." *Alternatives* (1988), p. 443.

administrations. These narratives also effect the prioritization of threats, as well as policies and budgets. For example, Bush increased drilling licenses in the Arctic, but was unable to increase fossil fuel production or open the ANWR drilling. Obama signed an Executive Order closing Guantanamo Bay but expanded the use of extrajudicial actions, including targeted assassinations. When shaping a narrative, presidents can structure prioritization. But America's unique political culture and bureaucratic bias (in which they must operate) has distinct characteristics ensuring threat prioritization and policy are generally maintained over time.

This does not imply that shifts in culture and institutions never occur. Events perceived as catastrophic, like 9/11, create dramatic shifts in discourse. But without developing a narrative that prioritizes a threat, activates a bureaucratic bias; and spurs the government to allocate resources, national security generally remains stable over time. And presidents mostly conform to what Obama termed, the 'Washington Playbook.'[1432] As he told *The Atlantic*, "there's a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow. It's a playbook that comes out of the foreign-policy establishment. And the playbook prescribes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be militarized responses. Where America is directly threatened, the playbook works."[1433] In essence, Obama describes the prevailing political culture in the U.S. which dictates (as this framework posits) certain types of narratives resulting in certain policy solutions. But as Trump has illustrated, a dramatic shift away from this 'Washington Playbook' can affect narratives, and in turn, the institutions executing U.S. policy.

The Trump Playbook, what this research defines as the Trump narrative, is a populist rhetoric.[1434] Nicole Hemmer describes it as "poll-driven populism, word play and a politics of nihilism."[1435] His plain and direct style is, Derek Thompson writes, obscure and ambiguous, particularly when issued through social media.[1436] In this way, Michael Lindenberger notes, it is shrewd and manipulative.[1437] Bella DePaulo expands on this, writing, "by telling so many lies, and so many that are mean-spirited, Trump is violating some of the most fundamental

---

[1432] Jeffrey Goldberg. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic* (April 2016).

[1433] Goldberg (2016), op. cit.

[1434] Derek Thompson. "The Donald Trump Playbook." *The Atlantic* (November 15, 2016).

[1435] Nicole Hemmer. "Newt's Legitimate Heir." *U.S. News & World* (May 24, 2016).

[1436] Robert Hutton. "EU tweaks Trump playbook as Brexit Negotiators Tweet." *Bloomberg* (September 13, 2017).

[1437] Michael Lindenberger. "In Kentucky, the Trump Playbook Is Already Familiar." *The New Republic* (March 2, 2017). Also see Bill Trott. "Trump rewrote political playbook in successful White House bid." *Reuters* (November 9, 2016).

norms of human social interaction."[1438] Ruth Ben-Ghiat describes the President's narrative as provocative, "with a penchant for aggression and for serial untruths."[1439] It is focused on discrediting enemies and targeting the judiciary, "since it stands in the way of their 'reforms' that often veer into extra-legality."[1440] She describes his strategy as based on, "loyalty to him as a person rather than to a party or set of principles" and a refusal, "to submit to shared customs and norm."[1441] Gloria Goodale concurs, writing that Trump's discourse is driven by conflict and extremism, with the President casting himself as a hero among many villains.[1442] She adds that he gives the appearance of authenticity by creating an artificial environment effective for his new rules.[1443]

Trumps' rhetoric is at times inconsistent with the 'Washington Playbook,' particularly in his framing of threats. As such, he attempts to shift the status quo, closing the institutional gap between discourse and policy. He does this by addressing threats directly as he perceives them, while plainly articulating policy options he believes necessary to address them. But the result is a general continuity of threat perception, prioritization and policy. This is due, in part, to the institutional overlap (of which bureaucratic bias is a factor of), which ensures U.S. policy remains mostly stable regardless of external factors (like changes in leadership or shifts in public opinion). But Trump's rhetoric has created an impetus for some institutional change by employing an amplified narrative in order to shift political culture and effect policy in the context of certain threats. This change takes two forms: Trump amplifies a threat, which has the effect of intensifying pre-existing policy or changing it entirely, or the minimization of a threat, which has the effect of diminishing policy or reversing it completely.

Recalling the discussion on threat prioritization featured in Chapter Three, interview subjects frequently cited the exaggeration or minimization of threats by elected officials to drive specific policies or agendas. As one politician noted, "sometimes you may want to over-

---

[1438] Bella DePaulo. "I study liars. I've never seen one like President Trump." *Washington Post* (December 8, 2017). Also see Greg Weiner. "The Scoundrel Theory of American Politics." *New York Times* (December 8, 2017).

[1439] Ruth Ben-Ghiat. "Trump is following the authoritarian playbook." *CNN* (January 17, 2017).

[1440] Ben-Ghiat, op. cit. Also see Peter Baker. "Trump's attack on Russia inquiry is from familiar playbook: The Clintons." *New York Times* (July 22, 2017) and E.J. Dionne. "Trump is faithfully following the autocrat's playbook." *The Washington Post* (November 1, 2017).

[1441] Ben-Ghiat, op. cit.

[1442] The *New York Times* reported, "Mr. Trump told top aides to think of each presidential day as an episode in a television show in which he vanquishes rivals." See, Gloria Goodale. "Trump's reality TV playbook: seven way it changed the 2016 elections." *Christian Science Monitor* (April 12, 2016) and Maggie Haberman, Glenn Thrush and Peter Baker. "inside Trump's hour-by-hour battle for self-preservation." *New York Times* (December 9, 2017).

[1443] Goodale, op. cit.

describe, sometimes you may want to under-describe it, depending on politics."[1444] Another commented, "politicians can exaggerate or overstate threats, thereby appealing to the sense of fear and frustration and anger that our constituents might be feeling and you've got as a unifying point that enables us to get re-elected."[1445] And a bureaucrat added this is conditioned by political culture, which is best understood as perspective: "to have meaning you must interpret [threats]. And this is a very active interpretation by the interpreter. [Threats] are amplified or minimized or ignored according to one's perspective."[1446] This discursive strategy helps explain the Trump narrative in the context of threats to U.S. national security, and supports the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis.

To further assess this argument, I will examine where and when significant shifts in the Trump administration's discourse occurs. We would expect to find that under Trump, significant deviations from the Washington Playbook would result in measurable changes in policies, bureaucratic bias and expenditures. Having illustrated the U.S. does not respond to systemic shifts in the character of threats, I will examine only the second hypotheses. First, I will provide an overview of the initial nine months of the Trump administration. Second I will examine the Trump administration in the context of the four threats to assess continuity or change in threat prioritization, and the reasons why. I will conclude with an analysis of the Trump narrative's effects on U.S. national security since assuming office.

THE UNITED STATES & THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

In 2017, Donald J. Trump became the 45th President of the United States. His discursive style has forced into the national consciousness an overt awareness of the impact narratives have on prioritization and policy. But despite his discursive style, Trump's policies thus far have conformed to the categories of discourse presented in this research. This is because, as Michelle Bentley, Clara Eroukhmanoff and Ursula Hackett write, despite his unpredictability, "the President still engages with pre-existing norms, systems of meaning and institutional constraints."[1447]

[1444] Interview with Subject 28, op. cit.
[1445] Interview with Subject 29, op. cit.
[1446] Interview with Subject 9, op. cit.
[1447] Michelle Bentley, Clara Eroukhmanoff and Ursula Hackett. "Trumps' 100 days: foreign policy and security implications – introduction." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017), p. 2.

Walter Russell Mead argues Trump's threat prioritization and policies are not unique; rather they are deeply rooted in the Jacksonian tradition of American political thought.[1448] Jacksonian political culture shapes priorities and policies through a populist narrative focused on the nation.[1449] It emphasizes U.S. exceptionalism as a commitment to the equality and dignity of its citizenry, not its capacity to transform the world.[1450] Mead writes, "identity and culture have historically played a major role in American politics, and 2016 was no exception. Jacksonian America felt itself to be under siege, with its values under attack and its future under threat."[1451] He writes that despite his flaws, the U.S. electorate perceived Trump as willing to fight for their survival.[1452] Elliot Abrams echoes Mead's view, writing there is nothing 'revolutionary' about the Trump administration.[1453] Rather, "the broad lines of its policy fit easily within those of the last few decades."[1454] And as Stephen Werthein notes, "Trump never promised to retract the United States' global power. To the contrary, he vowed to build up the military, go after Islamist terrorism, and counter Chinese aggression. An isolationist he is not."[1455] He adds, the President may have, "denounced nation-building and demanded that U.S. allies pay more for protection, but so have many of his predecessors."[1456] Indeed, as former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich notes Trump is, "a pragmatist, not an ideologue."[1457]

Holland and Ben Fermor write, the President's blunt style allows him to craft a powerful and resonant narrative that taps into foundational myths of U.S. greatness, populism, exceptionalism and the construction of numerous 'threatening others.'[1458] And as this research emphasizes, the power of emotional narratives is an important factor driving prioritization and policy.[1459] Sam Leith writes, "simple language reaches the widest possible audience and it tends… to connote honesty. The plain style – short words, simple syntax and a folksy

---

[1448] Walter Russell Mead. "The Jacksonian Revolt." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

[1449] Mead (2017), op. cit.

[1450] Mead (2017), op. cit.

[1451] Mead (2017), op. cit.

[1452] Mead (2017), op. cit.

[1453] Elliott Abrams. "Trump and the Traditionalist: A Surprisingly Standard Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

[1454] Abrams, op. cit.

[1455] Stephen Wertheim. "Trump and American Exceptionalism." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

[1456] Wertheim, op. cit. Also see Doug Bandow. "Ripped Off: What Donald Trump Gets Right About U.S. Alliances." *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

[1457] Newt Gingrich. *Understanding Trump.* (New York: Hachette Book group, Inc., 2017).

[1458] Jack Holland and Ben Fermor. "Trump's rhetoric at 100 days: contradictions within effective emotional narratives." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017).

[1459] Holland and Fermor, op. cit.

approach – has long been a winner for Presidents."[1460] He adds, "simple (or absent) grammatical structures leave the audience with nothing so taxing as a train of thought: rather, a random collage of emotive terms, repeated for emphasis. You come away from a Trump speech with a feeling, not an argument."[1461] Noa Tishby defines this as, "emotional truth."[1462] By employing his distinct discursive amplification and minimization of threats, Trump has, in some cases, shifted (or begun to shift) the political culture. As a result, certain policy changes are noticeable. The reasons for these changes will be explored in the following sections.

Trump's social media posts as discourse illustrate his prioritization of threats. His remarks on Twitter from January 20 to October 20 reveal a hierarchy identical to Table 8.1 (see Table 8.2). Trump has given most attention to terrorism, followed by narco-trafficking. He made one mention of climate change, in the context of a news story about his withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord.[1463] And he has made no mention of the Arctic.

Table 8.2: Tweets from President Donald J. Trump Regarding Case Study Threats[1464]

Threat	Number of Tweets
Terrorism	47
Narco-Trafficking	7
Climate Change	1
The Geopolitics of the Arctic	0

His Executive Orders reveal a slightly different level of prioritization (see Table 8.3).

Table 8.3: Trump Administration Executive Orders Regarding Case Study Threats[1465]

Threat	Executive Orders
Narco-Trafficking	5
Terrorism	4
Climate Change	4
The Geopolitics of the Arctic	1

[1460] Sam Leith. "Trumps' rhetoric: a triumph of inarticulacy." *The Guardian* (January 13, 2017).

[1461] Leith, op. cit.

[1462] Noa Tishby. "What can we learn from the Nazi sympathizer in the White House" *Jewish Journal* (August 20, 2017).

[1463] Donald J. Trump (@realDonalTrump). "RT @foxandfriends: Wall Street hits record highs after Trump pulls out of Climate pact https://t.co/PDMwj13Lus." June 2, 2017. 5:08 AM. Tweet.

[1464] Statistics compiled from the *Trump Twitter Archive*. Accessed: August 22, 2017 http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com.

[1465] Compiled from *Executive Orders*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017). Accessed October 21, 2017 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/executive-orders?term_node_tid_depth=51&page=1.

From January 20 to October 20, Trump signed 43 publicly-known Executive Orders. Examining Trump's Executive Orders reveals an emphasis on narco-trafficking followed by an equal focus on terrorism and climate change. The least prioritized threat is Arctic geopolitics. It is further important to note that the Executive Orders issued on climate change are unique in that they do not establish new policy, but reverse, stall, or thwart previously adopted ones.

It is not just Trump's discourse (i.e. tweets) or policy (i.e. Executive Orders), but also in his budget where threat prioritization is demonstrated. Trump has called for an increase in defense spending, a decrease in diplomatic and foreign aid, and new funding for energy development at the expense of the environment. As Mick Mulvaney, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, indicated Trump's rhetoric is critical in driving resources: "I can point you to speeches that the President gave during the campaign that said exactly [what Americans wanted]. In fact, that's how we wrote the budget… turned his words, his policies into numbers."[1466] In essence, he points to what this research sets out to understand: how discourse drives prioritization and policy.

But political culture is just one factor perpetuating threat prioritization. As this research has illustrated, when political culture is filtered through institutions, bureaucratic bias ensures prioritization and policy is embedded in the national security structure, sustaining it over time and across administrations. What Trump has labeled an insidious or undemocratic 'Deep State,' as John D. Michaels writes, is simply 'the State' as presented in this research, characterized by large, complex and deeply entrenched bureaucratic entities that work to maintain a generally stable national security agenda over the long term.[1467] But, as Abrams argues, this is also a problem of Trump's own making.[1468] The administration is slow to fill cabinet and subcabinet posts, and the majority of Trump's senior bureaucratic advisors are not political appointees but civil servants from 'the permanent government' or 'deep state.'[1469] According to data compiled by *The Washington Post* and the Partnership for Public Service, in his first nine months Trump has less confirmations, more non-confirmed candidates, more

---

[1466] Mark Moote. "American got 'exactly' what they voted for with Trump budget cuts: Mulvaney." *New York Post* (March 16, 2017).
[1467] John D. Michaels. "Trump and the 'Deep State.'" *Foreign Affairs* (2017).
[1468] Abrams, op. cit.
[1469] Abrams, op. cit.

failed nominees and longer confirmation times then Bush and Obama.[1470] But in institutions where Trump has installed political appointees, his narrative is being adopted as policy and measurable shifts in resources have followed, examples of which will be a critical focus of this chapter.[1471]

It is also important to note a second phenomenon contributing to his success: an unparalleled number of government officials who resigned since Trump took office. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics the government has decreased its workforce by 10,700 employees in Trump's first six months in office.[1472] During the same time Bush increased the workforce by 36,400 and Obama by 60,300.[1473] Wherein bureaucrats traditionally play a role in maintaining institutional bias and ensuring strategy through changing administrations, departures under Trump have left a deficit of continuity and leadership. Furthermore, the termination or reappointment of personnel, the reorganization of departments or the dismissal of external advisory boards has served to purposefully diminish institutional bias in order to shift policy (as will be explored below).[1474] Compounded by the appointment of political allies, proponents of the Trump narrative, the interplay between culture and institutions in prioritizing threats and shaping policy become more apparent.

I now turn to the Trump administration in the context of the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis. I will examine Trump's discourse, strategy, and proposed budget in the context of the threat posed by terrorism, narco-trafficking, climate change, and the geopolitics of the Arctic from January 20 to October 20, 2017. In so doing, I will assess the continued validity of my argument by illustrating how the administration prioritizes threats in the context of political culture and institutional bias.

[1470] This does not take into account the Senate returned all Bush nominees before the August recess his first year. See "Tracking how many key positions Trump has filled so far." *Washington Post* (December 3, 2016). Accessed November 7, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-administration-appointee-tracker/database.

[1471] Philip Bump. "We're seeing institutions start to waver as constraints Trump's impulses." *Washington Post* (January 5, 2018).

[1472] Eric Katz. "Trump administration, reversing trend, sheds 11,000 Federal employees in six months." *Government Executive* (August 4, 2017). Also see Lisa Rein and Andrew Ba Tran. "How the Trump era is changing the federal bureaucracy." *Washington post* (December 20, 2017).

[1473] Katz, op. cit.

[1474] Jenna McLaughlin. "A crisis of leadership at the Military Intelligence Agency's Watchdog Office." *Foreign Policy* (December 20, 2017).

TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF TRUMP CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

As I explained in Chapter Four, terrorism is defined as, "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political."[1475] For the purpose of this research, the focus is on specifically Islamist terrorism. Four examples were provided to illustrate America's distinct approach to the threat including the role of military operations and extrajudicial measures against terrorists; the militarization of law enforcement; and the role of judicial procedure in preventing and/or combatting terrorism in the U.S. In none of the examples did I discover the U.S. responds to the same material factors as its peers facing the same threat. Extending these examples to the Trump administration, and recalling Table 8.1, I find the prevalence of crisis discourse, high level prioritization, subjugating policies, and broad budgetary commitments similar to those of the past two presidents. But, in some regards, Trump has amplified the pre-existing crisis discourse. As a result, so have some of the policies he is employing to address terrorism. Trump's unique discursive amplification, and its effect on policy and budgets, will be the focus of the following section.

Discourse

When employing crisis discourse to frame the threat of terrorism, Trump has consistently engaged in the amplified, fear-mongering rhetoric necessary for high level prioritization, as depicted in Chapter Four. Crisis discourse plays on American fears of threats to its values and principles. Morgan Marietta, et. al. argues Trump has been successful at, "melding threat and absolutism into the absolutist threat" by grounding rhetoric in the context of threats to personal safety.[1476] And linking foreign policy to national identity, as explored in the Chapter Two, is a powerful rhetorical tool and critical framing mechanism. Oz Hassan writes, Trump securitized Islam through Islamophobia and Orientalism, making Muslims an existential threat.[1477] Like his predecessors, Micah Zenko writes, Trump has succeeded in depicting terrorism as a 'monolithic enemy.'[1478]

[1475] *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* op. cit., p. 257.

[1476] Morgan Marietta et. al. "The Rhetorical Psychology of Trumpism: Threat, Absolutism and the Absolutist Threat." *The Forum* (2017), p. 313.

[1477] Oz Hassan. "Trump, Islamophobia, and US-Middle East relations." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017), p. 1.

[1478] Micah Zenko. "Bush and Obama Fought a Failed 'War on Terror.' It's Trump Turn." *New York Times* (August 25, 2017).

Trump has described terrorism, as "a tremendous threat, far greater than people in our country understand."[1479] In his inaugural address, the President declared, "we will unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth."[1480] Trump has stated he would 'demolish' and 'destroy' ISIS and vowed to 'eradicate' the threat of 'radical Islamic terrorism.'[1481] And following the August attacks in Spain, Trump declared terrorism must be stopped "by any means necessary."[1482] But this further illustrates continuity across administrations. As Zenko notes, Bush, Obama and Trump have all suggested, "tough-sounding but implausible objectives."[1483] But Trump's discourse tends to differ is in the amplification of certain elements of the threat. For example, the administration frequently employs the term 'radical Islamist terrorism,' and he has referred to terrorists as 'lawless savages', 'savage killers' and 'horrible enemies.'[1484]

Administration officials are equally committed to prioritizing terrorism and matching this amplified discourse. CIA Director Mike Pompeo and DNI Director Dan Coats frequently employ the terminology "radical Islamist terrorism" as a framing mechanism, with the former calling it "real and continuing" and the latter calling its homegrown manifestation the "most frequent and unpredictable threat."[1485] John Kelly, as Secretary of Homeland Security, stated

---

[1479] Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump at MCCA Winter Conference* (Washington, D.C.: J.W. Marriott, February 8, 2017).

[1480] Trump, *Inaugural Address*, op. cit.

[1481] Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by the President and First Lady on the 70th Anniversary of the U.S. Air Force* (Camp Springs: Joint Base Andrews, September 15, 2017) and Donald J. Trump. *Statement by President Trump on Syria* (Mar-a-Lago: The Office of the Press Secretary, April 6, 2017). Also See *Presidential Memorandum Plan to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, January 28, 2017).

[1482] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump). "Radical Islamic Terrorism must be stopped by whatever means necessary! The courts must give us back our protective rights. Have to be tough!" August 18, 2017, 6:06 AM. Tweet and "Trump: stop terrorism by 'whatever means' necessary." *BBC News* (August 18, 2017).

[1483] Zenko, "Bush and Obama Fought a Failed 'War on Terror.' It's Trump Turn," op. cit.

[1484] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump). "Another attack in London by a loser terrorist.These [*sic*] are sick and demented people who were in the sights of Scotland Yard. Must be proactive!" September 15, 2017, 6:42 AM. Tweet; Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump at the 9/11 Memorial Observance* (Arlington: The Pentagon, September, 2017); Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, February 28, 2017); Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia* (Arlington: Fort Myer, August 21, 2017) and Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly* (New York: United Nations, September 19, 2017). Also see Kumar Ramakrishna. *The rise of Trump and its global implications 'Radical Islamic Terrorism': What's in a name?* (Singapore: RSIS Commentary, 2017).

[1485] *A Discussion on National Security with CIA Director Mike Pompeo.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 2017); Meera Jagannathan. "Terror threat is 'not going away,' DNI Dan Coats warns after Manchester bombing." *Daily News* (May 23, 2017) and Courtney Kube. "Intelligence Director Nominee Dan Coats Puts Cyber Threat at Top of List." *NBC News* (February 28, 2017).

that Americans would "never leave the house" if they saw classified intelligence reports.[1486] He described terrorism as "everywhere," "constant" and capable of happening at "almost anytime."[1487] Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned terrorists, "we will find you and bring you to justice" stating the U.S. would, "attack terrorist wherever they live."[1488] And Secretary of Defense James Mattis defined U.S. strategy against ISIS as "annihilation tactics."[1489] I will now explore the impact of this amplified discourse on U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

Strategy

Trump's crisis discourse has led to the adoption of subjugating policy prescriptions similar to his predecessors, including the use of overwhelming force overseas and punitive measures at home. But there has also been a rise in the severity of some of his policies. In terms of foreign policy, Trump has increased counterterrorism operations and issued an Executive Order increasing the defense agencies capacity to operate against ISIS.[1490] According to Zenko, the administration launched at least 100 missions between January and August, averaging almost one a day, compared to Obama's 21 mission in his last six months in office.[1491] Trump's has also increased targeted assassination of ISIS operatives.[1492] As a result, over 60 percent of civilian deaths from coalition strikes during the U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS in Syria and Iraq have occurred during his first three months in office.[1493] Launched in 2014, the DOD reported 199 civilian deaths between August 2014 and the beginning of February 2017.[1494] But from February to April, there were 484 reported civilian

---

[1486] Stephen Dinan. "DHS secretary says world facing most terrorist 'foot soldiers' ever." *The Washington Times* (June 6, 2017) and Tim Marcin. "Terrorism in America: If you knew what I knew, you'd never leave the house DHS's Kelly says." *Newsweek* (May 26, 2017).

[1487] Marcin, op. cit.

[1488] Amber Athey. "Tillerson to Terrorists: 'We Will Find You,'" *The Daily Caller* (August 17, 2017) and Joel Gehrke. "Rex Tillerson puts Pakistan 'on notice' for sheltering terrorists." *The Washington Examiner* (August 22, 2017).

[1489] Idrees Ali. "'We don't scare,' U.S. defense secretary Mattis says after London." *Reuters* (June 4, 2017) and Todd Shepherd. "James Mattis: Military using 'annihilation tactics' against ISIS." *Washington Examiner* (May 28, 2011).

[1490] *Presidential Memorandum Plan to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*, op. cit.

[1491] Micah Zenko. "Trump is pushing America's special forces past the breaking point." *Foreign Policy* (August 1, 2017).

[1492] Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris. "Trump Broadens CIA Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes." *Wall Street Journal* (March 13, 2017) and Paul D. Shinkman. "Report: Trump Gives CIA Authority for Drone Strikes." *U.S. News & World Report* (March 14, 2017). Also see Abrams, op. cit.

[1493] Julian Borger. "Civilian deaths from US led strikes on ISIS surge under Trump administration." *The Guardian* (June 6, 2017) and Jaffer, op. cit.

[1494] Borger, op. cit.

deaths.[1495] By September, Trump further relaxed restrictions on drone strikes and raids.[1496] During this time, the Air Force reported a 50 percent increase in U.S. attacks on Taliban and ISIS-related forces in Afghanistan, representing the highest level of attacks in that country since 2010.[1497] And, as Holland and Fermor write, releasing the 'Mother Of All Bombs' (the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used in combat) in Afghanistan and launching 59 Tomahawk missiles in response to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons has lowered the threshold for the acceptable use of force.[1498]

In other regards, Trump's counterterrorism strategy generally conforms to his predecessors. The Trump administration's Afghan war strategy, for example, adopts the same subjugating policies as Obama and Bush.[1499] And although Trump expanded the authority of and eased restrictions on the rules of engagement for U.S. forces to target terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan like Bush, he also adopted Obama's policy of employing the U.S. judicial system to prosecute terrorist operatives captured overseas.[1500] This despite Trump's hard line stance on terrorism, torture and detention during his campaign and his promise to suspend detainee transfers from Guantanamo Bay.[1501] But since taking office, the administration has yet to halt the process.[1502] Furthermore, in July, Trump transferred a terrorist captured overseas to the U.S. for a criminal trial, instead of a military tribunal.[1503]

[1495] Human rights groups cite civilian causalities as high as 4,000 since the operation commenced. See, Borger, op. cit.
[1496] Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt. "Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and Commando Raids." *New York Times* (September 21, 2017).
[1497] *Airpower Summary* (Washington, D.C.: United States Air Force Central Command, September 30, 2017). Accessed November 11, 2017 http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Airpower%20Summary%20-%20September%202017.pdf?ver=2017-10-06-082818-797 and Stephen Losey. "Afghanistan airstrikes hit highest point in years." *Military Times* (October 9, 2017).
[1498] Michelle Bentley. "Instability and incoherence: Trump, Syria, and chemical weapons." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017); Hassan, op. cit.; Holland and Fermor, op. cit. and Jeff Mason. "Trump says chemical attack in Syria went 'beyond a red line.'" *Reuters* (April 5, 2017).
[1499] Trump. *Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia*, op. cit.
[1500] Trump. *Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia*, op. cit.
[1501] William Finnegan. "President Trumps Guantanamo Delusion." *The Observer* (March 9, 2017); Kheel, op. cit. and Rebecca R. Ruiz, Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo. "Terror Suspect Brought to U.S. For Trial, Breaking From Trump Rhetoric." *New York Times* (July 21, 2017).
[1502] Finnegan, op. cit.; Rebecca Kheel. "Trump officials signal intent to begin refilling Guantanamo." *The Hill* (July 8, 2017) and Charlie Savage. "Draft Trump Order on ISIS Detainees and Guantanamo." *New York Times* (February 8, 2017).
[1503] He also did not transfer the terrorists who attacked New York in October or December. See Finnegan, op. cit.; Emanuella Grinberg and Sarah Jorgensen. "New York terror attack suspects pleads not guilty." *CNN* (November 28, 2017); Philip Rucker. "After first saying 'send him to Gitmo,' Trump changes his mind about N.Y. terrorism suspect." *Washington Post* (November 2, 2017); and Ruiz, Goldman and Apuzzo, op. cit. Also see Kenneth Roth. "The Wrong Way to Combat Terrorism." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (2017).

Domestically, Trump has also taken extreme measures. He relaunched the controversial 1033 Program (discussed in Chapter Four) providing unused military tactical gear and weapons to local, state and Federal law enforcement.[1504] And in an effort to protect the homeland, Trump's Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, proposed a 90 day ban on immigration and 120-day suspension on refugee intake from eight predominately Muslim countries including Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen as well as North Korea and Venezuela.[1505] Trump's amplified discourse and policies, are matched by his proposed budget, to be explored in the following section.

Expenditures

Budgets are a tangible measure of prioritization and policy and certain narratives drive resource allocation in specific ways. Trump's amplified crisis discourse and subjugating polices, have resulted in similar budgetary patterns. For example, the administration passed a $700 billion defense policy bill with a base budget of $640 and an additional $60 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations.[1506] Trump proposed a three percent increase of $244 million, for the FBI's Counterterrorism, Counter Intelligence and Law Enforcement budget, of which $61 million is allocated to counterterrorism and cyber security.[1507] And the proposed DHS budget would increase by $2.8 billion.[1508]

The administration's focus on funding subjugating policies is also apparent in its budget for the Department of State.[1509] Trump proposes cuts of up to 31 percent of the agency budget, or more than $10 billion.[1510] And wherein the budget increases DOS funding for efforts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, the overall budgetary decline has significant implications

---

[1504] Sadie Gurman. "Trump prepares to lift limits on military gear." *Associated Press* (August 27, 2017); Jackman, op. cit. and Alex S. Vitale. "Trump is trying to militarize the police. It won't make us any safer." *Fortune* (August 29, 2017). Also see Luke Hartig. "Is Trump's recusal from military tactics inviting catastrophe?" *Newsweek* (August 31, 2017) and Alfred Regnery. "Police need military equipment to combat rising crime rates and police deaths." *USA Today* (August 31, 2017).

[1505] Hassan, op. cit., p. 2. Also see *Executive Order 13769: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 27, 2017); *Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, March 6, 2017) and Joshua Woods and C. Damien Arthur. *Debating Immigration in the Age of Terrorism, Polarization and Trump.* (London: Lexington Books, 2017).

[1506] "Senate passes $700 billion defense policy bill, backing Trump call for steep increase in military spending." *CNBC* (September 18, 2017). Also see, *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017), pp. 17-18.

[1507] *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2018* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017), p. 29.

[1508] Morgan Chalfant. "Homeland Security sees power grow under Trump." *The Hill* (October 19, 2017).

[1509] *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2018*, op cit., p. 33.

[1510] *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2018*, op cit., pp. 33-34.

for employing non-military measures in the war on terrorism.[1511] Former Ambassadors Nicholas Burns and Ryan Crocker write, "while we count on our military ultimately to defend the country, our diplomats are with it on front lines and in dangerous places around the world."[1512] They note Tillerson's decision to downsize the Foreign Service by eight percent is, "particularly dangerous."[1513] The authors conclude, "neglect of the State Department will harm our country at an already dangerous time. The Foreign Service is a jewel of the American national security establishment, with the deepest and most effective diplomatic corps in the world. All that is now at risk."[1514] DOS political officer Elizabeth Shackelford concurs, writing in her resignation letter, the agency has "diminished, as we have ceded to the Pentagon our authority to drive U.S. foreign policy, at the behest of the White House but to our detriment as a nation."[1515]

Trump & Terrorism: Continuity or Change?

A general overview of the threat posed by terrorism reveals continuity in prioritization, but in some cases, there is an obvious escalation of policy. I posit this occurs, in part, due to unique cultural and institutional factors. Trump's use of simple and direct discourse in the context of who poses the threat (i.e. radical Islamist terrorists) and solutions to the problems (including eradicating and demolishing terrorists) is one factor. That many of his senior staff members, both inside and outside the White House, have a military background, is another. These respective cultural (i.e. discourse) and bureaucratic (i.e. military bias among senior staff) factors, explain aspects of continuity in policy. Increasing the use of targeted assassinations notwithstanding (a policy employed by both his predecessors), Trump has mostly maintained the war on terrorism policies already in place. This is attributable to institutional overlap. The post-9/11 national security structure, built around the war on terrorism, is deeply entrenched in terms of resources and strategy. Many of the aforementioned senior staff members from the military played critical roles in developing and executing war strategy and have a vested interest in, and natural bias, for subjugating policies, given their role in government.

[1511] *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2018*, op cit., p. 33.
[1512] Nicholas Burns and Ryan C. Crocker. "Dismantling the Foreign Service." *New York Times* (November 27, 2017).
[1513] Burns and Crocker, op. cit.
[1514] Burns and Crocker, op. cit.
[1515] Dan de Luce and Robbie Gramer. "U.S. Diplomat's Resignation Signals Wider Exodus from State Department." *Foreign Policy* (December 9, 2017).

But the interplay of discourse and bureaucratic bias has created opportunities for shifts in policy. By amplifying the crisis discourse, elevating the perceived threat level, and institutionalizing a higher degree of military bias, Trump succeeded in pushing for more stringent subjugating policies. This includes, for example, expanding the rules of engagement for extrajudicial operations against terrorists. The President's amplification of populist rhetoric and nativist appeals – particularly in the context of banning refugees, illegal migrants, and asylum seekers being terrorists – has increased notions of otherness, as depicted in the beginning of the section. This despite the fact, as noted in Chapter Four, that the majority of successful terrorist attacks in the U.S. were committed by native-born Americans or immigrants who legally obtained citizenship/residency status.

NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

As I explained in Chapter Five, narco-trafficking is defined as, "the global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to prohibition laws."[1516] Again, four examples were used to illustrate the distinct U.S. approach to the threat, including military operations; Alternative Development policies to thwart production; border security; and healthcare to combat use. I discovered the U.S. does not respond to the same material factors as similar nations facing a similar threat. Extending these examples to the Trump administration, I find the prevalence of problem discourse, medium level prioritization, mitigating policies, and medium budgetary commitments similar to his predecessors (see Table 8.1). But Trump has, in some regards, amplified the pre-existing problem discourse. As a result, so have some of the policies his administration employs to address narco-trafficking. Trump's discursive amplification, and its effect on policy and budgets, will be the focus of this section.

Discourse

In terms of employing problem discourse to frame the threat posed by narco-trafficking, Trump has engaged in the discursive amplification necessary for mid-level prioritization, as depicted in Chapter Five. Trump has framed narco-trafficking as an all-encompassing danger corroding the national fabric.[1517] HIS amplified narratives emphasize

---

[1516] "Drug trafficking," op. cit.

[1517] Ames C. Grawert and Natasha Camhi. *Criminal Justice in President Trump's First 100 Days* (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2017).

failed border security, illegal immigration, lax enforcement of the law, and a 'war on police' as driving crime, addiction and narcotics-related death.[1518]

The 'false narrative' of 'American carnage' speaks to this belief, and is a critical factor in Trump's law-and-order discourse.[1519] The President declared, "crime and gangs and drugs… have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized potential."[1520] He compared U.S. cities to 'war zones', 'blood stained killing fields' and 'drug infested dens.'[1521] He speaks of, "gangs terrorizing our citizens" adding that, "so many of the problems are caused by gang members, many of whom are not even legally in our country."[1522] He instructed law enforcement not to "be too nice" when arresting criminals, stating that laws were written to protect officers, not criminals.[1523] The administration's nativist appeals portraying immigration and narco-trafficking as taking advantage of an insecure border and fueling violence in the U.S. is fundamental to its supply-centric approach. When meeting with families victimized by illegal immigrant crime, Trump commented, "you lost the people that you love because our government refused to enforce our nation's immigration laws and that's including the existing immigration laws."[1524] He later referred to narco-trafficking gangs as 'animals.'[1525] And he has committed to "dismantle, decimate and eradicate" criminal gangs.[1526]

The administration also employs a demand-side narrative when framing the threat of narco-trafficking, wherein addiction (as was the case with his predecessors) is the central factor. Although it is important to note it is not as amplified as the supply-side one, depicted above. In 2017, over two million Americans were abusing prescription drugs, primarily opioids, fueling a heroin epidemic more extreme than the height of the Vietnam War.[1527] By

---

[1518] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 4.

[1519] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 4.

[1520] Trump, *Inaugural Address*, op. cit.

[1521] Greg Miller, Julie Vitkovskaya and Reuben Fischer-Baum. "'This deal will make me look terrible': Transcripts of Trumps' calls with Mexico and Australia." *Washington Post* (August 3, 2017); Ray Villeda and Marc Santia. "Trump pledges to 'destroy' violent MS-13 street gang." *NBC News* (July 28, 2017) and "Transcript: ABC News anchor David Muir interviews President Trump." *ABC News* (January 25, 2017).

[1522] Trump, *Remarks by President Trump at MCCA Winter Conference*, op. cit.

[1523] Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump to Law Enforcement Officials on MS-13.* (Ronkonkoma: Van Nostrand Theatre, July 28, 2017).

[1524] S.A. Miller. "Trump joins with families of illegal-immigrant crime to urge Congress to act." *Washington Times* (June 28, 2017) and Ali Vitali. "Trump highlights crimes by undocumented workers." *NBC News* (June 28, 2017).

[1525] Villeda and Santia, op. cit.

[1526] Villeda and Santia, op. cit.

[1527] James Reinl. "Trump administration and the opioid epidemic." *The Lancet* (2017).

2016, there were as many as 30,000 U.S. deaths annually from opioids and heroin combined.[1528] But, when revealing his plan to deal with the crisis, Trump declared the solution was as simple as, "if they don't start, they won't have a problem."[1529] In essence, as Aaron Rupar writes, Trump is perpetuating a long established belief in a 'just say no' approach to combating narco-trafficking.[1530] John Rosenthal, co-founder of the Police Assisted Addiction and Recovery Initiative, concurred: "his message was 'just say no, talk to your kids and go after drug dealers.' That doesn't work. We need to deal with demand."[1531] At the same time Trump has also declared the opioid crisis a national emergency. This amplifying device intends to elevate the prioritization of the threat. But as James Oliphant notes, "national emergencies are typically declared for short-term crises…It is unclear what Trump's declaration will mean for a complex, long-term public health problem."[1532]

Amplified rhetoric is also apparent among administration officials. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who called traffickers 'filth', is the most ardent supporter.[1533] Sessions has talked of the 'scourge' of heroin and opioid abuse, linking it to a "rising tide of violent crime" and "transnational cartels that bring drugs and violence into our neighborhoods."[1534] He depicts an America where criminal organizations, "turn cities and suburbs into war zones, that rape and kill innocent civilians, and who profit by smuggling poison and other human beings across our borders. Depravity and violence are their calling cards."[1535] When issuing a new DOJ memo mandating a "sweeping criminal charging policy," Sessions declared, "we are returning to the enforcement of the laws as passed by Congress, plain and simple… If you are a drug trafficker, we will not look the other way, we will not be willfully blind to your misconduct."[1536]

[1528] For a full overview of the opioids epidemic, see Chapter Five. Also see, Dan Nolan. "How bad is the opioid epidemic?" *PBS* (February 23, 2016) and *Opioid Addiction 2016 Fact & Figures* (Rockville, American Society of Addiction Medicine, 2017).

[1529] Aaron Rupar. *Trump trots out tired 'just say no' strategy as his plan for the opioid crisis.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress Fund, 2017).

[1530] Rupar, op. cit.

[1531] Christian M. Wade. "Trump's opioid's crisis declaration draws optimism, concerns." *The Richmond Register* (August 18, 2017).

[1532] Julia Lurie. "This is Trump's plan to stop the opioid epidemic. It's… underwhelming." *Mother Jones Magazine* (March 28, 2017); James Oliphant. "Trump declares national emergency on opioid abuse." *Reuters* (August 10, 2017) and Miriam Valverde. "Donald Trump declares public health emergency over opioid crisis. Here's what that means. *Politifact* (October 30, 2017).

[1533] Mallory Shelbourne. "Sessions pushes for crackdown on illegal immigrants who commit crimes." *The Hill* (April 11, 2017).

[1534] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 10 and Jeffrey B. Sessions. *Attorney General Jeff Session Delivers remarks on Efforts to Combat Violent Crime in St. Louis* (St. Louis: Department of Justice, March 31, 2017).

[1535] Shelbourne, op. cit.

[1536] Horowitz and Zapotosky, op. cit. Also see Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 2, 8-10, and 12.

As the Brennan Center for Justice points out, there is a danger, "federal prosecutors may interpret his rhetoric as a directive to aggressively increase drug and other criminal enforcement and prosecute these crimes to the maximum extent allowable by law."[1537] The report notes that some already have.[1538] As Nicole Miller writes, "with every dramatic assertion, Session is stoking American's fears about crime and safety to advance a political agenda of 'law and order.'"[1539] Yet, Sessions persists in framing the problem as "a matter of life and death."[1540] The impact this amplified discourse has on counter narcotics strategy will be examined in the next section.

Strategy

As Marc Arcas-Salvador writes, Trump's strategy is twofold. First, "to fight the entrance of drugs into the U.S. by increasing border security, building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico, ending the so-called sanctuary cities, 'aggressively' prosecuting traffickers and deporting illegal immigrant cartels and traffickers."[1541] And second, "to get drug addicts 'the help they need' by expanding access to treatment and lifting the cap on the number of patients that doctors can treat with recovery medications.'[1542] This represents a general continuity in approach to supply and demand-centric strategies to combat narco-trafficking. But, there has also been a noticeable increase in the severity of some policies, specifically in the context law enforcement and judicial procedure.

The administration, for example, promised to increase border security and address immigration while decreasing illegal border crossings, enforcing deportations, and using vast judicial powers to arrest and detain individuals for narcotics-related offenses. And he has acted swiftly on these promises. Of the five Executive Orders Trump issued pertaining to narco-trafficking, four were signed in his first month.[1543] With these orders Trump has attempted to increase border surveillance; arrest, detain, and deport more illegal immigrants; prevent illegal immigration with 'extreme vetting' procedures; protect law enforcement from violent crime

---

[1537] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 13.

[1538] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 13.

[1539] Miller, op. cit.

[1540] Rebecca Ruiz. "Justice Dept. to work with 12 cities to fight violent crime." *New York Times* (June 20, 2017).

[1541] Marc Arcas-Salvador. "U.S. DEA Report Indicates Tripling Consumption Over Seven Years." *Chicago Policy Review* (2017).

[1542] Arcas-Salvador, op. cit.

[1543] For a discussion on the *Executive Orders*, see Stephanie Liebergen. "President Donald Trump signs three Executive Orders targeting drugs, crime." *AOL News* (February 9, 2017) and Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

by increasing penalties; support public safety initiatives; address the opioid epidemic; and deal with narcotics generally.[1544] He has also committed to building a wall along the Southern border and increasing the number of personnel at the Border Patrol Agency (BPA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) by 5,000 and 10,000 respectively.[1545] But, as noted in Chapter Five, both policies were employed by his predecessors and Trump has yet to succeed in achieving either. In fact, BPA agents have increased every year since 1992 (see Figure 5.5), as has its budget since 2001 (see Table 5.13), illustrating his approach is neither novel nor new.[1546]

Trump also appointed hardline anti-drug advocates to senior positions, particularly in the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the DOJ.[1547] It is therefore unsurprising that the DOJ is where Trump's strategy has shifted most. Attorney General Sessions, for example, has stated that prevention should be minimized, citing too much tolerance for narcotics use.[1548] He has reversed many of his predecessor's policies by expanding private prisons and reinstating mandatory minimum sentences for narcotics offenses.[1549] And he has done so despite sentencing reform decreasing incarceration rates by 9.5 percent between 2007 and 2016.[1550] And even though Trump sought to increase prosecutions for narcotics-related offenses, there was an overall decline in his first nine months.[1551] The administration decreased oversight and increased local law enforcement authority to implement new enforcement

---

[1544] *Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 25, 2017); *Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 25, 2017); *Presidential Executive Order Establishing the President's Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, March 29, 2017); *Presidential Executive Order on a Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, February 9, 2017) and *Presidential Executive Order on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, February 9, 2017).

[1545] Jeremy Diamond. "Trump again raises specter of shutdown over wall." *CNN* (August 28, 2017); Aidan Quigley. "Trump administration to send thousands of ICE agents to target sanctuary cities." *Newsweek* (July 19, 2017); Joel Rose. "Fact Check: What has President Trump done to fight illegal immigration?" *NPR* (August 22, 2017); Lyn Stephen. "Mexico, Immigration and Trump: Towards Transborder Thinking." *Konturen* (2017) and Joseph Tanfani. "In January, President Trump vowed to hire 5,000 new Border Patrol agents. It never happened." *Los Angeles Times* (August 18, 2017).

[1546] *Nationwide Staffing (1992-2015)*, op. cit.

[1547] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 8-9 and Stimson, op. cit.

[1548] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 11 and Cameron Joseph. "Jeff Sessions calls for return to 'just say no' policies, slams marijuana use." *New York Daily News* (March 15, 2017).

[1549] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 8 and 13 and Horowitz and Zapotosky, op. cit.

[1550] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 8.

[1551] Kathryn Watson. "Despite tough talk, drug prosecutions drop under Trump, Sessions." *USA Today* (August 31, 2017).

guidelines.[1552] And during his first week in office, Trump authorized the DHS to deputize police to enforce Federal immigration laws locally.[1553] As a result, illegal immigrant arrests steeply increased, rising 43 percent during Trump's first nine months.[1554] Yet, at its current rate, the administration will still deport 10,000 less people than Obama in 2016.[1555]

The administration has also signaled its intent to address demand. But, a report issued by a Trump convened commission on the opioid crisis was identical to a report issued by a similar commission convened by Obama in November 2016.[1556] The actions proposed by Trump's commission also included creating and funding programs identical to one's already in place.[1557] For example, the commission suggested an additional $500 million in spending for the DHHS to fund treatment and prevention; but a similar program was implemented by Obama in December 2016.[1558] Dr. Barbara Madras, former Deputy Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, criticized the plan, noting that by ignoring addiction, "we'll just be increasing the number of people who are entering the pipeline for treatment, and that could bankrupt the country's health care system."[1559] As the *New York Times* points out, prevention has consistently proven more cost-effective than treatment, yet only two of the commission's 56 recommendations focus on demand, including an awareness campaign and a conversation with a medical professional.[1560] Despite a desire to address narcotics with demand-centric policies, Trump has done little to achieve this goal. Trump's focus on supply, while mostly ignoring demand, is in line with his predecessor's policies. Where Trump's policies differ, specifically where they are amplified, is in his broad application of judicial force and law enforcement. This is also apparent in his narco-trafficking budget, which will be examined in the following section.

[1552] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 3-5 and 12-16.

[1553] Tim Craig. "Tough talking sheriffs raise their voice in Trump era." *Washington Post* (November 12, 2017) and *Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States*, op. cit.

[1554] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 13-16; *President Donald J. Trump Taking Action Against Illegal Immigration* (Office of the Press Secretary, June 28, 2017) and Tanfani, op. cit.

[1555] Tanfani, op. cit.

[1556] Lurie, op. cit.

[1557] Lurie, op. cit. and Reinl, op. cit.

[1558] Margaret Talbot. "Chris Christie's opioid commission and the future of the ACA." *The New Yorker* (June 21, 2017).

[1559] Venezuela criticized Trump's policy, issuing a statement reading, "far from using efforts to judge and punish other sovereign countries that are damaged by drug demand, the United States should review its internal policies to ensure the fall of consumption, which is the actual root of the problem." See, "Venezuela condemns USA for using drug issue as political weapon." *Prensa Latina* (September 15, 2017) and Wade, op. cit.

[1560] Austin Frakt. "Where is the prevention in the president's opioid report." *New York Times* (November 27, 2017). Also see *Benefit-Cost Results.* (Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2017).

Expenditures

As Trump remarked, drugs are cheaper than candy.[1561] Although this comment exaggerates the cost of narcotics in the U.S. today, it does illustrate availability and accessibility.[1562] Yet, his budget fails to adequately address demand, relying on similar supply-side policies as his predecessors. For example, he decreased the Office of National Drug Control Policy's by five percent, leaving just $369 million for the 2018 budget.[1563] This includes a $3 million decrease in spending for demand-side strategies like the communities programs and a $2 million decrease in operational funding.[1564] Another $400 million was cut from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.[1565] And Trump has proposed cuts of over $1.4 trillion to Medicaid over a decade (a total of $610 billion in 2018 alone), which significantly affects treatment options, which Medicaid is a critical source of.[1566]

In line with the Trump narrative explored above, the President allocated an additional $103 million for prosecutions to fight narco-trafficking, employing the new mandatory sentencing guidelines outlined in Sessions' charging memo.[1567] To achieve this goal, the administration proposed $26 million for 300 new federal prosecutors.[1568] Trump has increased the DHS budget by $2.88 billion, 6.8 percent, allocating over $44 billion to strengthen borders and enforce immigration.[1569] Trump's perception of immigration as critical to narco-trafficking is reflected in his threat to end funding for 'Sanctuary Cities' (i.e. local governments refusing to comply with Federal immigration laws by protecting resident illegal immigrants from decoration).[1570] Furthermore, the administration's focus on arrests, detainment and deportation is evidenced by a $71 million budget to upgrade private prisons, rather than construct new Federal facilities to house the increasing number of detained illegal immigrants.[1571] Trump's amplified narrative presenting a lack of border security as contributing to rising addiction is reflected in the allocation of over $2.6 billion for border infrastructure

---

[1561] Christopher Ingraham. "Trump is right – drugs are often cheaper then candy bars." *Washington Post* (February 16, 2017).

[1562] Ingraham, op. cit.

[1563] Dani Diamond. "White House dials back cuts to drug control office." *Washington Post* (May 23, 2017).

[1564] Diamond, op. cit.

[1565] Diamond, op. cit.

[1566] Diamond, op. cit. and Reinl, op. cit.

[1567] *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018*, op. cit. p. 18.

[1568] Ruiz, op. cit.

[1569] *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2018*, op cit., p. 23.

[1570] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 15-16 and Maya Rhodan. "President Trump Calls on Congress to Pass Bills Aimed at Undocumented Immigrants." *Time* (June 28, 2017).

[1571] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

and over $300 million for yet-to-be hired BPA and ICE personnel.[1572] And in a DHS report, it was revealed that estimated costs for the border wall were $21 billion, far higher than $12 to $15 billion first cited by the administration.[1573] But only $1.6 billion was requested for its construction.[1574]

In conclusion, Trump's proposed budget, like its discourse and policies, illustrate a consistent dependence on mitigating strategies (i.e. limited force) and spending on supply-side strategies.[1575] This is especially true in regards to judicial strategy, defined by prosecution and incarceration. Yet, and as illustrated in Chapter Five, these policies (initiated by Nixon in the 1970s) have failed, through a succession of Presidents, with agendas on both the left and the right.

Trump & Narco-trafficking: Continuity or Change?

The general overview of the threat posed by narco-trafficking reveals continuity in prioritization. Despite his discursive amplification, Trump's rhetoric conforms to what Conrad Black calls America's traditional approach of, "hypocrisy, selective permissiveness and in-built failure."[1576] This is because he emphasizes a demand-centric discourse which leads to conforming with long-standing, institutionalized and well-proven discursive fallacies, resulting in equally failed policies. For example, his assertion that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than citizens as well as his belief that Mexican immigrants are more violent or prone to narco-trafficking then other immigrant groups has been proven untrue.[1577] A 2015 report from the American Immigration Council found that, "for more than a century, innumerable studies have confirmed two simple yet powerful truths about the relationship between immigration and crime: immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind bars than the

---

[1572] *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018*, op. cit. p. 18 and *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2018*, op cit., p. 23.

[1573] Julia Edwards Ainsley. "Exclusive – Trump border 'wall' to cost $21.6 billion, take 3.5 years to build: internal report." *Reuters* (February 9, 2017).

[1574] Damian Paletta. "Trump pulls back threat to shut down government over the wall – for now." *Washington Post* (September 1, 2017).

[1575] Mark A. R. Kleiman. "High Stakes: The Future of U.S. Drug Policy" *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

[1576] Conrad Black. "Trump: Overpromising on Drugs." *National Review* (February 28, 2017) and Oliphant, op. cit.

[1577] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 5; Gersh Kuntzman. "Donald Trump's policies, not Mexicans, are the real immigration problem in America." *Daily News* (February 13, 2017); Nicole Miller. "Attorney General Jeff Session's claim that a crime wave is sweeping the nation." *Washington Post* (September 1, 2017); Philip M. Stimson. "Crime stats should inform public. Trump is misusing them to scare us instead." *Washington Post* (February 10, 2017) and Michelle Ye Hee Lee. "Donald Trump's false comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime." *Washington Post* (July 8, 2015).

native-born, and high rates of immigration are associated with lower rates of violent crime and property crime."[1578] Yet, the report notes that, "immigration policy is frequently shaped more by fear and stereotype than by empirical evidence. As a result, immigrants have the stigma of 'criminality' ascribed to them by an ever-evolving assortment of laws and immigration-enforcement mechanisms… immigrants are being defined more and more as threats."[1579] Also untrue is Trump's statement that Mexican illegal immigration was increasing before he took office.[1580] A 2016 analysis by the Pew Research Center found that illegal immigration from Mexico peaked in 2007 and steadily declined between 2009 and 2014.[1581] In the same time period, between 870,000 and one million Mexicans and their families (including U.S.-born children) returned to Mexico.[1582]

Trump's assertion that border control is critical to stemming the tide of narcotics is also flawed. Tony Payan writes, "drugs have their own logic, well beyond the border. They originate far from it; they go deep into the heart of America."[1583] This implies that the source and destination, not just transits routes, are critical to narco-trafficking.[1584] Payan notes there is no correlation between increased surveillance and decreasing narco-trafficking.[1585] And Lyn Stephen illustrates the majority of narcotics enter the U.S. through legal points of entry.[1586] As Payan writes, despite the rise of a 'new security environment' fostering, "the largest security-oriented bureaucracy the United States has ever seen, with more expansive powers and seemingly unending resources," the threat has not diminished.[1587] Instead drugs are increasingly inexpensive and accessible.[1588] Despite this, the Brennan Center for Justice reports, during his first 100 days in office, "Trump has repeatedly cited misleading statistics to

---

[1578] Walter A. Ewing, Daniel E. Martinez and Ruben G. Rumbaut. *The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: American Immigration Council, 2015).
[1579] Ewing, Martinez and Rumbaut, op. cit., p. 1.
[1580] Michelle Ye Hee Lee. "President Trump's claims that illegal immigration went up under past administrations." *Washington Post* (August 1, 2017).
[1581] Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn. *Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2016).
[1582] Ana Gonzalez-Barrera. *More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, November 19, 2015).
[1583] Tony Payan. *The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security.* (Praeger: Santa Barbara, 2016), pp. xiii-xv.
[1584] Payan, op. cit., pp. xiii-xv.
[1585] Payan, op. cit., p. xiv.
[1586] Stephen, op. cit. Also see Ron Nixon. "Heroin in Soups and Lollipops: How Drug Cartels Evade Border Security." *New York Times* (December 2, 2017).
[1587] Payan, op. cit., pp. xiv-xv.
[1588] Payan, op. cit., p. xiv.

push a false narrative about rising crime and call for urgent, drastic action. This focus on fear over fact, unprecedented for a modern president, helps justify the administration's most controversial policies."[1589] And these beliefs guide his use of mitigating tactics to combat narcotics.[1590]

David Green writes Trump's analysis is "biased towards rhetoric rather than evidence."[1591] This bias helps to shape his controversial policies, including the expansion of law enforcement and the judiciary. Trump's amplified threat narrative regarding narco-trafficking directly correlates gangs, crime and addiction. His hardline, law-and-order stance therefore requires an equivalent response. And Trump empowered his most committed ally, Attorney General Sessions, to lead this effort. As the *Washington Post* notes, "from his crackdown on illegal immigration to his reversal of Obama administration policies on criminal justice and policing, Sessions is methodically reshaping the Justice Department to reflect his nationalist ideology and hard-line [*sic*] views" adding, "supporters and critics say the attorney general has been among the most effective of the Cabinet secretaries – implementing Trump's conservative policy agenda."[1592] By expanding the scope of local law enforcement and increasing arrests, prosecutions and penalties for narcotics-related crimes, there appears to be a clear correlation between discourse, policies and proposed budgetary commitments.

CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

In Chapter Six, I define climate change as, "changes in the physical environment or biota… which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare," caused by "natural variability" and/or human activity over "comparable time periods."[1593] Four examples were provided to illustrate the distinct U.S. approach to the threat. I examined military responses to operational readiness in a changing climate; the use of diplomatic engagement and economic aid; U.S. preparedness against extreme weather events;

[1589] Grawert and Camhi, op. cit., p. 1.

[1590] Ye Hee Lee, op. cit.

[1591] David Green. "The Trump Hypothesis: Testing Immigrant Populations as a Determinant of Violence." *Social Science Quarterly* (2016).

[1592] Matt Zapotosky and Sari Horwitz. "While eyes are on Russia, Sessions dramatically reshapes the Justice Department." *Washington Post* (November 24, 2017).

[1593] Rajendra Kumar Pachauri and Andy Reisinger (eds.). *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.* (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) and *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.* (Rio De Janeiro: United Nations, 1992).

and the stability of U.S. domestic energy security. Again, I find the U.S. does not respond to the same material factors as its peers. Extending these examples to the Trump administration, I find the prevalence of issue discourse, low level prioritization, arbitrating policies, and low budgetary commitments (see Table 8.1). This continuity occurred despite significant changes in policy Trump has made. This is because issue discourse is characterized by divided narratives. And Trump has significantly amplified the Bush administration's narrative (i.e. the counter movement narrative depicted in Chapter Six) to minimize the Obama administration's narrative.[1594] Changes to policy, resulting in shifts in priority, are in reality a return to (or a continuation of) an alternative set of policy options once in place. The dual nature of this continuity and change regarding the threat of climate change, mirroring to divisive nature of issue discourse present in minimal level threats, will be the focus of the following sections

Discourse

As mentioned above, minimal level threats are categorized by issue discourse. Issue discourse is divisive because it is characterized by two dominate narratives – one which expands and another which minimizes the level of prioritization afforded to a threat. In the case of climate change, one narrative depicts human activity as the critical factor in the changing environment and an alternative (or counter) narrative rejects this view. Each narrative creates the foundation for significantly different policies solutions – one demands government action and the other rejects government regulation in favor, for example, free market solutions. This is important in understanding conformity and change in prioritization and policy across administrations, specifically with minimal level threats like climate change, where diverging and divisive narratives are employed. Because, in the context of climate change, Trump does conform to a traditionally American approach, despite the obvious shifts in policy. As Tugba Agacayak, Sarah Louis Nash, Umit Sahin write, "this is not the first time that a change in administration in the United States has led to a U-turn in its climate policy."[1595]

[1594] President Ronald Reagan campaigned on a similar environmental platform as Bush and Trump, indicating further continuity across administrations. See, Robert V. Percival. "Environmental Law in the Trump Administration. *Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review* (2017) and Kari De Pryck and Francois Gemenne. "The Denier-in-Chief: Climate Change, Science and the Election of Donald J. Trump." *Law Critique* (2017).

[1595] Tugba Agacayak, Sarah Louis Nash and Umit Sahin. *The Trump effect on climate change policy: hard times for global climate action* (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, 2017), p. 8.

Trump has made far fewer statements about climate change since taking office than before becoming President. It is therefore important to briefly examine his views prior to 2017. Between 2009 and 2016 the President was an outspoken critic of climate change– discussing his disbelief in interviews with print, television and radio outlets; on his reality television show; and in campaign appearances in North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, and West Virginia, among others.[1596] Between 2011 and inauguration day, Trump issued 33 disparaging tweets on climate change and 106 on global warming.[1597] Before assuming office he stated, "I'm not a believer in manmade climate change."[1598] He claimed climate change is, "just a very, very expensive form of tax."[1599] And he called climate change a 'hoax' manifested by the Chinese to make the U.S. less competitive.[1600] In his campaign speech on energy policy, Trump called Obama's policies, "death by a thousand cuts" and "draconian," describing the EPA as "totalitarian."[1601] As President-elect, he stated "nobody really knows" if climate change is real.[1602] He added, "we'll be fine with the environment. We can leave a little bit, but you can't destroy businesses."[1603] It is important to note that when discussing climate change Trump frequently employs the term 'global warming.' This is critical because research illustrates Americans tend to believe less in global warming than climate change.[1604] As President, Trump has made no significant comments or statements about his views, although Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders stated his beliefs have not changed.[1605] The one statement Trump made on climate change was announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord. In his speech he called the it, "a tremendous disadvantage," "debilitating," a

---

[1596] Heather Haddon. "Donald Trump: 'I don't believe in climate change.'" *Wall Street Journal* (September 24, 2015); Hugh Hewitt. "Transcript: Donald Trump Returns." *HughHewitt.com* (September 21, 2015). Accessed: September 1, 2017 http://www.hughhewitt.com/donald-trump-returns; Tim Marcin. "What has Trump said about global warming? Eight quotes on climate change as he announces Paris agreements decision." *Newsweek* (June 1, 2017) and Jeremy Schulman. "Every insane thing Donald Trump has said about global warming." *Mother Jones Magazine* (December 5, 2016).

[1597] Four of these tweets featured both terms in the same post. See, *Trump Twitter Archive*, op. cit.

[1598] Haddon, op. cit. and Hewitt, op. cit.

[1599] "Donald Trump slams Iran." *Fox News* (January 18, 2016).

[1600] Chris Cillizza. "Donald Trump doesn't think much of climate change, in 20 quotes." *CNN* (August 8, 2017).

[1601] Donald J. Trump. *America First Energy Policy Address* (Bismarck: Bismarck Event Center, May 26, 2016).

[1602] Juliet Eilperin. "Trump says 'nobody really knows' if climate change is real." *Washington Post* (December 11, 2016).

[1603] John W. Schoen. "Regulation buster Trump takes aim at the EPA." *CNBC* (November 10, 2016).

[1604] Jonathon P. Schuldt, Peter K. Enns and Victoria Cavaliere. "Does the label really matter? Evidence that the US public continues to doubt 'global warming' more than 'climate change.'" *Climatic Change* (2017), pp. 271-280.

[1605] Alana Abramson. "No, Trump still hasn't changed his mind about climate change after Hurricane Irma and Harvey." *Time* (September 11, 2017) and Dan Merica. "Trump dismisses climate change question by contradicting himself on hurricanes." *CNN* (September 14, 2017).

"handicap" and "unfair."[1606] This despite the Accord having no enforcement mechanism, given that its commitments are voluntary.

This counter-narrative persists in his administration. Scott Pruitt, the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator, stated that, "measuring with precision human activity on the climate is something very challenging to do, and there's tremendous disagreement about the degree of impact. So, no, I would not agree that it's a primary contributor to the global warming that we see."[1607] In his confirmation hearing he declared, "the ability to measure and pursue the degree and the extent of that impact and what to do about it are subject to continuing debate and dialogue."[1608] EPA appointee John Konkus, responsible for awarding research grants, ceased funding projects using the terminology climate change.[1609] Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, former Governor of Texas, rejected carbon dioxide as the primary driver of rising temperatures.[1610]

As Simon Robinson writes, if no challenge is mounted to this narrative, "our public discourse, how we think and speak about our shared life comes under threat. Good discourse connects and challenges people to share and create reality. This is why Trump's withdrawal [from the Paris Climate Accord] feels so unreal. The words he uses reflect the reality of a different experience."[1611] Trump's commitment to the counter-narrative has begun to effect policy, and possibly the climate itself in the immediate future. University of Vermont researchers estimate that his policies could increase GHG emissions by more than five million metric tons before 2019.[1612] In the following section, I will examine the effects of Trump's discourse on the climate change policies he has pursued in his first nine months.

[1606] Donald J. Trump. *Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 1, 2017).
[1607] Nathalie Baptise. "Trumps EPA Chief Just Contracted Decades of Science." *Mother Jones* (March 9, 2017) and Tom DiChristopher. "EPA chief Scott Pruitt says carbon dioxide is not a primary contributor to global warming." *CNBC* (March 9, 2017).
[1608] Rebecca Leber. "Scott Pruitt vs. Science." *Mother Jones Magazine* (January 18, 2017).
[1609] Graham Lanktree. "Under Trump the EPA is more about politics than science." *Newsweek* (September 5, 2017). Also see Evan Halper. "Civil servants charge Trump is sidelining workers with expertise on climate change, environment." *Los Angeles Times* (September 26, 2017).
[1610] *Petroleum & Other Liquids* (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). Accessed September 1, 2017 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm.
[1611] Simon Robinson. "Editorial: denying responsibility." *Journal of Global Responsibility* (2017), p. 148.
[1612] Sam Bliss et. al. "President Trump's Proposed Budget Changes Would Increase Greenhouse Gas Emissions by More than 5 Million Metric Tons CO₂e." *Social Science Research Network* (2017). Accessed: September 1, 2017 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2970185.

Strategy

Trump's adoption of the climate change counter-narrative has had an effect.[1613] His minimization of the threat has fostered change defined by the reversal of policies and a return to, or continuation of, the policies in place (or the lack thereof) under Bush. Trump's minimization of climate change as a threat has, for example, changed how climate change is assessed, who assesses it, the way assessments are addressed, and the definition of what is and is not acceptable energy solutions.

Among his first acts, for example, was the removal of the White House climate change website, replacing it with a blank page.[1614] The Department of the Interior and Transportation as well as the EPA and Federal Highway Administration also removed climate change materials from its websites.[1615] The administration's annual policy memo outlining its science priorities makes no mention of climate change or the environment.[1616] Trump also committed to revisiting fuel standards to weaken carbon pollution standards.[1617] And he promised to, "put coal miners back to work," despite industry leaders, some Trump supporters, advising him

---

[1613] Elizabeth Bromberg. "Environmental politics in the Trump era: an early assessment." *Environmental Politics* (2017).

[1614] Alyssa S. Rosen notes that in anticipation of Trump assuming office scientists worked to safeguard federal government climate change data: "many academics and librarians share the concern that federal .gov climate data and information, for example from the EPA and NOAA websites, will be lost or become unavailable with the transition to the new administration." This is due to the fact that, "a large percentage of information on federal government servers, including digital federal records, reports, and research, is not protected by any law or agency mandate, and can vanish within days of the arrival of a new president." See Emily Atkin. "The EPA's Science Office removed 'science' from its mission statement." *The New Republic* (March 7, 2017); Michael Greshko, Laura Parker and Brian Clark Howard. "A running list of how Trump is changing the environment." *National Geographic* (August 23, 2017) and Alyssa S. Rosen. "Scientists & Librarians Turn to 'End Presidential Term' Web Archive to Safeguard Climate Change Data." *Law Lines* (2017). Also see, Rebecca Leber. "Donald Trump just replaces the White House climate website with… this." *Mother Jones Magazine* (January 20, 2017) and Schulman, op. cit.

[1615] *Changes to Language on the Environmental Protection Agency's SmartWay Program Website* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Data & Governance Initiative, 2017); Sarah Emerson. "The interior Department Just Quietly Scrubbed Its Climate Change Page." *Motherboard* (April 27, 2017). Accessed: September 1, 2017 https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/kbvkp3/the-interior-department-scrubbed-its-climate-change-page-doi-zinke; *EPA Kicks Off Website Updates* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, April 28, 2017). Accessed September 1, 2017 https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-kicks-website-updates; Miranda Green. "Trump administration swaps 'climate change' for 'resilience.'" *CNN* (September 30, 2017); Greshko, Parker and Howard, op. cit. and Rene Marsh. "EPA removes climate change information from website." *CNN* (April 29, 2017).

[1616] Tanya Lewis. "Trump administrations science priorities: better then feared." *Scientific American* (August 18, 2017).

[1617] Rebecca Leber. "Auto executives will be pleased with Trump's latest gift to the industry." *Mother Jones Magazine* (March 15, 2017).

this was not feasible.[1618] Due in part to the rise of clean energy, coal production is also affected by automation, making production safer and more competitive.[1619]

Trump has also issued a series of Executive Orders effecting U.S. climate change policy. One focused on developing U.S. offshore energy and another decreased environmental reviews for major infrastructure projects.[1620] A third rescinded almost all Obama era climate policies, including the Clean Power Plan; the moratorium on new coal leases in public lands; enhanced methane regulations; and the EPA's mandatory calculation of carbon pollution.[1621] Trump also approved the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline.[1622] And in the days before Hurricane Harvey (which devastated large parts of Texas), Trump reversed his predecessors' flood insurance protections.[1623] He also disbanded the National Climate Assessment, responsible for supporting efforts by policymakers and the private-sector in incorporating climate change policies into long-term planning.[1624] But his most dramatic act was his withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord.[1625] This decision was controversial because it was the first international climate agreement to which the world's largest polluters (like China and

---

[1618] Tim Marcin. "Trump can't bring back mining jobs, coal CEO warns." *Newsweek* (March 27, 2017); Dominic Rush. "Top US boss Robert Murray: Trump can't bring back mining jobs." *The Guardian* (March 27, 2012); Shulman, op. cit. and Hiroko Tabuchi. "Coal mining jobs Trump would bring back no longer exist." *New York Times* (March 29, 2017).

[1619] Marcin, op. cit., Shulman, op. cit. and Tabuchi, op. cit.

[1620] *Executive Order Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals For High Priority Infrastructure Projects* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 24, 2017) and *Presidential Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 24, 2017).

[1621] Clifford Krauss and Michael Corkery. "A Bleak Outlook for Trump's Promises to Coal Miners." *New York Times* (November 19, 2016); Rebecca Leber. "Trump just released his plan to gut Obama's climate policies. It's worse than you think." *Mother Jones Magazine* (March 28, 2017) and Milman, op. cit. Also see *Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, March 28, 2017).

[1622] Greshko, Parker and Howard, op. cit. and Kentish and Shugerman, op. cit.

[1623] Ben Kentish and Emily Shugerman. "Donald Trump scrapped Barack Obama's flood protection standards days before Hurricane Harvey." *The Independent* (August 29, 2017).

[1624] Juliet Eilperin. "The Trump administration just disbanded a federal advisory committee on climate change." *Washington Post* (August 20, 2017) and Andrew Rosenberg. "The most important Trump decision no one is talking about." *Fortune* (August 22, 2017).

[1625] Under the rules of the agreement, the first legal opportunity the administration will have to withdrawal is in 2019. See, *Communication Regarding Intent to Withdrawal From Paris Agreement.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, August 4, 2017); Jane A. Leggert. "Paris agreement in Climate Change: US letter to UN." (Washington, D.C.: Congressional research Service, 2017); Jane A. Leggett and Richard K. Lattanzio. *Climate Change" Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris Agreement* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017); Stephen P. Milligan. *Withdrawal from International Agreements Legal Framework Agreements and the Iran Nuclear Agreement* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017) and Robert N. Stavins. "Why Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Accord." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

India) – who have proven difficult to co-opt into international environmental frameworks – had agreed to.

Trump has also appointed a series of officials to senior positions who share his views on climate change. Secretary of Energy Perry believes the science is 'unsettled.'[1626] EPA administrator Pruitt questions climate science and replaced dozens of members on the agency's scientific review boards.[1627] Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke announced a review of more than 200 advisory boards to ensure compliance with new climate policies.[1628] Secretary of State Tillerson, who served as the CEO of ExxonMobil, eliminated the agency's climate change envoy and staff, integrating them in to the Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs.[1629] Secretary of Department of Housing and Urban Development Ben Carson, CIA director Mike Pompeo, Attorney General Sessions, NASA's Jim Bridenstine, and former DHHS Secretary Tom Price all expressed skepticism of climate change science and government regulations.[1630] Yet, a 2017 U.S. Global Change Research Program Science Special Report, issued by 13 federal agencies, stated it is, "extremely likely that more than half of the global mean temperature increase since 1951 was caused by human influence on climate."[1631]

As would be expected with a minimal level threat, where two dominate narratives present two diverging policies, Trump's policies have encountered institutional resistance.[1632] For example, a coalition of business leaders, Fortune 500 companies, investors, universities, and politicians joined together to comply with the Paris Climate Accord in their respective community, corporation or institution.[1633] And Secretary of State Tillerson signed the Fairbank

[1626] Oliver Milman. "Trump aides abruptly postpone meeting on whether to stay in Paris climate deal." *The Guardian* (April 18, 2017).

[1627] Eilperin, op. cit.; Rebecca Leber. "Here are all the climate deniers and oil flacks who love Trump's EPA pick." *Mother Jones Magazine* (January 9, 2017) and Milman, op. cit.

[1628] Eilperin, op. cit. and Juliet Eilperin and Brady Dennis. "EPA dismisses half of key boards' scientific advisors; Interior suspends more than 200 advisory panels." *Washington Post* (May 8, 2017).

[1629] Cathleen Kelly. *Rex Tillerson's Big Oil Ties Endanger the Climate and National Security.* (Washington, D.C.: Center For American Progress, 2017) and Elise Labott, Nicole Gaouette, and Jeremy Herb. "Tillerson moves to ditch envoys." *CNN* (August 29, 2017).

[1630] Mazin Sidahmed. "Climate change denial in the Trump cabinet: where do his nominees stand?" *The Guardian* (December 15, 2016) and Linda Stasi. "After a devastating hurricane, Trump still picks climate change denier to head NASA." *New York Daily News* (September 2, 2017).

[1631] Lisa Freidman. "Scientists fear Trump will dismiss blunt climate report." *The New York Times* (August 7, 2017).

[1632] Agacayak, Nash and Sahin, op. cit. and Yong-Xiang Zhang et. al. "The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and its impact on global climate change governance." *Advances in Climate Change Research* (2017).

[1633] See, *We Are Still In.* Accessed: September 1, 2017 http://wearestillin.com. Also see Michele M. Betsill. "Trump's Paris withdrawal and reconfiguration of global climate governance." *Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment* (2017) and Jean Chermnick. "States are picking up Trump's slack on climate change." *Scientific American* (September 22, 2017).

Declaration in May stressing the threat posed by climate change to the Arctic and reaffirming the Paris Climate Accord.[1634] This opposition partially illustrates the institutional constraints ensuring elements of national security policy over time. As a result, these divergent framing mechanisms (defined by those who accept current trends are manmade and those who do not) employ incongruous discourses and prioritize threats differently, leading to opposing strategies and contrasting budgets. Shifts in the latter is the focus of the next section.

Expenditures

The most dramatic cuts in Trump's proposed budget are climate change related.[1635] He eliminates payments to UN climate change agreements or agencies.[1636] His budget decreases NASA's earth science research by almost nine percent.[1637] And it makes major cuts to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, a critical climate science agency, by 16 percent (over $900 million).[1638] The DOE's Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy program budget decreases by $1.4 billion, leaving just $636 million.[1639] And the EPA's budget decreases by 25 percent (almost $8 billion).[1640] This in addition to $2 million in grants for climate change research already cut by the agency.[1641] In discussing the budget, Mulvaney remarked, "the President was fairly straightforward - we're not spending money on [climate change] anymore; we consider that a waste of your money."[1642]

The administration's enforcement of environmental regulations, measured by civil penalties, also illustrates climate change as a minimal level priority.[1643] Civil penalties for violating environmental regulations declined 60 percent under Trump.[1644] From January to July

---

[1634] Laura Koran. "Tillerson signs declaration stressing climate change threat." *CNN* (May 12, 2017).

[1635] Justin Worland. "President Trump's Proposed Budget is a Blow to Fighting Climate Change. And It's Not Just the EPA." *Time* (March 16, 2017).

[1636] *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2018*, op cit., p. 33.

[1637] Doyle Rice and Ledyard King. "Trump's budget proposal 'savages' climate research, scientists say." *USA Today* (May 23, 2017) and Schulman, op. cit.

[1638] *Trump Budget Cuts NOAA by 16%, Slashes Research Funding Even Deeper.* (Washington, D.C.: American Institute of Physics, 2017).

[1639] *Department of Energy FY 2018 Congressional Budget Request: Budget in Brief* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017), p. 3.

[1640] Timothy Cama. "Trump's EPA Budget Cuts Hit Strong Opposition at House Panel." *The Hill* (June 15, 2017); Michael Greshko. "What you need to know about Trump's proposed climate cuts." *National Geographic* (March 10, 2017) and Schulman, op. cit.

[1641] Lanktree, op. cit.

[1642] Mick Mulvaney. *Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer, 3/16/2017, #25.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 16, 2017).

[1643] *Civil penalties against polluters drop 60 percent so far under Trump* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Integrity Project, 2017).

[1644] *Civil penalties against polluters drop 60 percent so far under Trump*, op. cit.

the government filed 26 lawsuits, collecting $12 million in civil penalties.[1645] In the same time period, during his first term, Obama collected $36 million from 34 cases, and Bush (in the same time period) collected $30 million from 31 lawsuits.[1646] This combination of spending cuts and decreased fines will significantly affect the capacity of agencies to execute climate change policies. It also effects the implementation of preventive measures over the long term.[1647] For example, as noted above, Trump decreased flood insurance protections. Taking into account his request for $14.5 billion in Hurricane Harvey relief, and recalling from Chapter Six that every dollar spent on preventive measures saves four dollars in reconstruction costs, Trump's cuts could severely hamper environmental stability.[1648] It is important to note that Trump has faced opposition to many of these changes.[1649] The Senate Appropriations Committee, for example, allocated $10 million to fund the UN body overseeing the Paris Climate Accord.[1650] But, as a measure of priorities, Trump's budget indicates the minimal level of prioritization placed on the threat.

Trump & Climate Change: Change or Continuity?

A general overview of the climate change threat, in the context of continuity and change under the Trump is unique. The minimization of the threat is a significant change but is also a form of continuity. This is because Trump returned to policies in place (or the lack thereof) in the pre-Obama administration era. The causal chain from discourse to priority, and its effects on policy and budgets, is apparent. In framing the threat through the counter-narrative and questioning climate science (the foundation for prioritizing the threat), Trump decreased the priority level. This shift is exemplified in removing "climate change" terminology across the government. By framing energy in the context of acceptable sources (including coal or fossil fuels), he created opportunities to advance a different agenda (i.e. offshore drilling in Federal lands or approving the pipeline). Trump also introduced institutional bias by appointing officials at critical agencies who share his beliefs. The EPA, DOE and the Department of the Interior are the best examples. At these agencies, significant

---

[1645] *Civil penalties against polluters drop 60 percent so far under Trump*, op. cit.

[1646] *Civil penalties against polluters drop 60 percent so far under Trump*, op. cit.

[1647] Zhang et. al., op. cit.

[1648] Glenn Thrush. "White House to ask for $14.5 billion down payment for Harvey Relief." *New York Times* (September 1, 2017). Also see Gaffigan, op. cit., p. 13.

[1649] Cama, op. cit.

[1650] Valerie Volcovici. "Defying Trump, Senate panel approves funding for U.N. climate body." *Reuters* (September 8, 2017).

shifts in assessing climate change, and who assesses data, diminished an emphasis on measuring pollution. By altering the capacity to measure damage to, or changes in, the environment, the administration negates compliance with regulations (like fuel standards or carbon pollution) fostering less environmentally sustainable policies (like opening ANWR). This diminishing of the threat is also apparent in the budget, where cuts are expected to hamper the execution of climate change mandates.

Consistent with a minimal level threat, characterized by competing and contradictory narratives, institutional inertia is working to maintain elements of U.S. climate policy. This includes continued Senate funding of UN climate change agencies; the Secretary of State signing a declaration recognizing the Paris Climate Accord; and a commitment by politicians to maintain carbon pollution standards in their communities. These examples of institutional overlap are critical in understanding continuity in strategy over time. Conclusively, a broad overview of the climate change threat under Trump reveals that manipulating the political culture through discourse, and institutionalizing a bureaucratic bias with political appointees, Trump has shifted prioritization and policy.

ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE & INSTITUTIONS

In Chapter Seven, I defined the threat posed by the Arctic region in the context of its emerging geopolitics, resulting from increased access to natural resources, heightened military operations as well as territorial claims and issues of sovereignty in dispute among Arctic and non-Arctic nations. Four examples were used to illustrate America's distinct approach to the threat. I examined the growing militarization; the application of Lawfare in laying claims to sovereignty; the exploration and mining of critical resources for domestic energy security; and increasingly accessible and expansive passageways opening new commercial opportunities. Extending these examples to the Trump administration, I find the prevalence of non-issue discourse (including the adoption of an alternative narrative as explored in Chapter Seven) as well as minimal level prioritization, evasive policies and minimal budgetary commitments (see Table 8.1). Trump's diminishing of the threat in the context of national security has shifted its relevance to an alternative framing mechanism. Under Trump, like with climate change, discourse and policy tend towards the Bush administration at the expense of the Obama administration. This shift back to the Bush era in the context of discourse, policy and budgets will be the focus of the following section.

Discourse

In terms of employing non-issue discourse to frame the geopolitics of the Arctic, Trump (like his predecessors) has minimized the threat to national security and instead employed an alternative narrative, characteristic of a minimal level priority (explored in Chapter Seven). Trump has made very few statements on the Arctic, emphasizing continuity as a minimal level priority. His one formal statement on the region was made when signing an Executive Order reversing Obama's ban on drilling in Arctic waters. He made no specific reference to the region but stated, "renewed offshore energy production will reduce the cost of energy, create countless new jobs, and make America more secure and far more energy independent."[1651] This emphasizes the lack of focus on the region as a national security threat in lieu of an alternative (i.e. energy-related) narrative.

Interior Secretary Zinke, for example, declared, "there's a consequence when you put 94 percent of our offshore off limits. There's a consequence of not harvesting trees. There's a consequence of not using some of our public lands for creation of wealth and jobs."[1652] When addressing drilling, Vincent DeVito, the Interior Department's counselor for energy policy, stated, "our country has a massive energy economy, and we should absolutely wear it on our sleeves, rather than keep energy resources in the ground. This work will encourage responsible energy exploration and production, in order to advance the United States' position as a global energy force and foster security for the benefit of the American citizenry."[1653] Yet the administration has made no mention of the complex legal issues, emerging passageways, growing militarization or the threat from Russia and China. When visiting the region, Secretary of State Tillerson made no mention of any threats during his meeting with Alaskan elected officials.[1654] At the Arctic Council, he made no mention of any of the threats examined herein, beyond "risks inherent in the increased human activity."[1655]

This does not discount the existence of a national security narrative. As illustrated in Chapter Seven, there exists a small group of advocates in favor of shifting Arctic prioritization

[1651] Nathan Rott. "Trump signs Executive Order on offshore drilling and marine sanctuaries." *NPER* (April 27, 2017).
[1652] Matthew Daly and Josh Boak. "Trump plan could expand oil drilling Arctic and Atlantic." *Associated Press* (June 29, 2017).
[1653] Darryl Fears. "Trump says the Atlantic, Arctic could be open to drilling." *The Washington Post* (June 29, 2017).
[1654] Rex W. Tillerson. *Remarks at the Arctic Council's 20th Anniversary Welcome Reception.* (Fairbanks: The Morris Thompson Cultural and Visitors Center, May 10, 2017).
[1655] Rex W. Tillerson. *Remarks at the Arctic Council's Ministerial Meeting."* (Fairbanks: The Morris Thompson Cultural and Visitors Center, May 11, 2017).

towards a national security context. When asked about the threat from Russia in the Arctic at his 2017 confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated it is, "not to our advantage to leave any part of the world" to others.[1656] Calling the region "active," he committed to not allowing expansionism by other nations in regards to the region's international commons or any infringement upon Alaskan sovereignty.[1657] In written testimony, Mattis noted, "the Arctic is key strategic terrain," pointing to Russia's, "aggressive steps to increase its presence there" and promising to, "prioritize the development of an integrated strategy for the Arctic."[1658] Coast Guard Admiral Paul Zukunft painted a starker picture when he presented the regional threats to Congress in May, including sovereign interests; Chinese military and economic encroachment; the non-ratification of UNCLOS; and Russian militarization.[1659] But Zukunft and Mattis' views (as well as those presented in Chapter Seven) do not represent a dominate narrative and they have not been able to shift prioritization. This lack of a dominate national security discourse leads to the emergence of an alternative narrative. Under Trump, like with Bush, the focus is therefore shifted towards energy and economic-related matters. How these concerns are formulated into policy will be the focus of the following section.

Strategy

Trump's non-issue discourse has led to the same evasive policies as his predecessors. Like with climate change, he amplified certain aspects of an alternative narrative resulting in a return to policies similar to those under the Bush administration. Specifically, Trump's primary goal is to open offshore and Federal holdings to new energy operations. To achieve this, he signed an Executive Order expanding licenses and exploration and approved exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea.[1660] But because the U.S. lags behind other nations operating in the region, efforts will likely not reassert its hegemony in the region. This is due to Russian military and energy dominance in the Arctic, which has steadily increased over the past decade.

[1656] James N. Mattis. *Confirmation Hearing Testimony* (Washington, D.C.: The Capital, January 12, 2017).
[1657] Mattis, op. cit.
[1658] Mattis, op. cit. Also see Dan Sullivan. *To establish United States policy for the Arctic region for the next 10 years, and for other purposes.* (Washington, D.C: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, June 26, 2017).
[1659] Paul F. Zukunft. *Coast Guard Requirements, Priorities, and Future Acquisition Plans.* (Washington, D.C.: The Capital, May 18, 2017).
[1660] Timothy Cama. "Trump admin approves oil company's Arctic drilling." *The Hill* (July 13, 2017); Lisa Freidman. "Trump administration moves to open Arctic refuge to drilling studies." *New York Times* (September 16, 2017) and *Presidential Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy*, op. cit.

Increasing operations would require the U.S. to make significant long term investments in the region which it has consistently proven unwilling to allocate.

But Trump has not addressed the growing military or legal issues in the region. Nor has he addressed long term the emerging passageways or the resource extraction of the region's other natural resources (i.e. rare earth minerals and renewable energy sources). Even Trump's admiration for Russia and its President, striking a markedly different tone than his predecessors, has nonetheless produced the same strategy employed by Bush and Obama.[1661] Trump, like his predecessors, ignores growing Russian aggression and militarization in the Arctic, continuing a policy of inaction or evasion, in favor of focusing on alternative regional issues. Notwithstanding Trump's more aggressive energy strategy in, his ability to achieve his goals remain to be realized in light of mounting opposition to his plans, as with climate change, both inside and outside of government. Trump's investment in, and commitment to, his Arctic strategy as a measure of allocated resources, will be examined in the following section.

Expenditures

Trump's amplification of the alternative energy narrative is evident is the administration's projected revenues. The budget includes $2 billion from new drilling operations in ANWR, although the CBO estimates $1.1 billion over ten years.[1662] But the projected revenue does not take into account mounting opposition to Trump's plan, which might delay operations. Nor does it take into account the potential costs of emergency operations if natural or manmade catastrophes occur. Admiral Zukunft noted in July that the U.S. is not equipped to handle an oil spill in the region.[1663] Rear Admiral Jonathan White, the former chief oceanographer of the Navy and head of its climate change task force, compared the difficulty of an Arctic emergency to operating on the moon.[1664]

Trump's proposed increase in defense spending provides little funding to address Russian or Chinese aggression in the Arctic. This despite Russia updating its Arctic strategy in

---

[1661] Greg Miller, Greg Jaffe and Philip Rucker. "Doubting the intelligence, Trump pursues Putin and leaves a Russian threat unchecked." *The Washington Post* (December 14, 2017).
[1662] Matt Egan. "Trump wants to drill for oil in Alaska's fragile wildlife refuge." *CNN* (May 25, 2017) and Lisa Freidman. "Conservationists face once-remote prospect in Arctic drilling: defeat." *New York Times* (November 29, 2017).
[1663] Scott Waldman. "The U.S. is not ready to clean up and Arctic oil spill." *Scientific American* (July 19, 2017).
[1664] Waldman, op. cit.

July to reflect the region's continued importance to its economic and national security.[1665]
Trump's budget further undermines national security, proposing a decrease in Coast Guard
funding by almost $2 billion.[1666] As explored in Chapter Seven, this will have critical impact
for the Coast Guard to operate in the region. In testimony before Congress in May, Admiral
Zukunft noted that, the Coast Guard and Navy had recently signed a *Cooperative Strategy for the
21st Century*, reporting that, "the Navy says, Coast Guard, you've got the Arctic. So, as we look
at who has the sole responsibility for exercising sovereignty in the Arctic region, it's the United
States Coast Guard."[1667] Compounded by growing tensions between the U.S. and its NATO
allies (due to the President's aggressive and critical style), depleting resources and diminishing
budgets, Trump (like his predecessors) mostly ignores the complexity of the region's
geopolitics as well as its importance to national security.[1668] Under Trump, as a result, the U.S.
remains strategically stagnant in the Arctic, as it has over the past two decades.

Trump & the Geopolitics of the Arctic: Change or Continuity?

An overview of the threat posed by the geopolitics of the Arctic reveals an approach
similar to climate change. Specifically, continuity results from a return to Bush administration
policies at the expense of Obama administration policies. As Lisa Friedman writes, "at the
heart of the debate… is a clash of values. What is more important: the environment or
economic development?"[1669] More generally, continuity is illustrated in the lack of focus on
national security, an evasive policy maintained by all three presidents despite the increasingly
complex geopolitics.

Trump's amplification of an alternative narrative (framing the threat in the context of
energy and the economy) has resulted in reinstating fossil fuel extraction. But there is no
concurrent action indicating the investment necessary for operating in the region will be
undertaken. Furthermore, this focus on economic and energy occurs at the expense of
diplomatic and security resources, as a measure of the presented bureaucratic and budgetary

---

[1665] Atle Staalesen. "What Russia's new Navy Strategy says about the Arctic." *The Independent Barents Observer*
(August 3, 2017).
[1666] Jueun Choi. "U.S. Coast Guard objects to Trump's funding cut." *USA Today* (March 16, 2017).
[1667] Zukunft (2017), op. cit.
[1668] "Report to Congress raises spectre of American ships challenging Canadian Arctic claims." *National Post*
(March 14, 2017) and Rob Huebert. "Canadian defense review depicts Russia as Arctic adversary." *Arctic Deeply*
(July 4, 2017).
[1669] Friedman, op. cit.

measures. But in general, the prioritization of, and policies employed to address, threats emanating from the Arctic are defined by continuity under Trump.

CONCLUSION

Leith writes, "public oratory has been at the centre [*sic*] of the American project from the time of its founders... Every presidency is punctuated with set-piece speeches, and its historical turning points have been marked by historic speeches. In Donald J. Trump, though, we have a presidential communicator who is quite unlike the other ducks."[1670] Similar to how shifts in institutions are made possible through monumental events rupturing the foundations of their mandate, change under the Trump appears possible through monumental shifts in political cultural manifested through his discourse. This generally takes the form of amplifying an existing threat and increasing the severity of its policies, or minimizing a threat and rescinding policies in place. But Trump has institutionalized this amplification or minimization in the form of bureaucratic bias, defined by political appointees at critical agencies who share his perspective and execute policy based on it. Yet Trump's first nine months in office – defined in the context of discourse, prioritization, policy, and budgets – mostly conforms to his predecessors. As I have attempted to illustrate, this is due in part to the impact of America's unique political culture and institutions, which sustain national security policy over the long term. In his 2017 annual threat assessment, for example, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats presented a ranking of the most important threats to U.S. security. The hierarchy mirrors Table 8.1. Terrorism (third of nine threats), ranks higher then narco-trafficking (seventh of nine threats).[1671] And both are listed higher than "economic and natural resources" (ranked eighth of nine threats), where threats like climate change and the geopolitics of the Arctic would be categorized.[1672]

Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski write, "beyond the noise generated by and about Trump, much the same (albeit employing different language) was said about Obama. This doesn't mean - as some critics contend - that the alternative is chaos, purely reactive tactics, a transactional approach; or - more analytically - that there is no underlying logic to American

---

[1670] Leith, op. cit.

[1671] Daniel R. Coats. *Director of National Intelligence World Wide Threat Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017).

[1672] Coats, op. cit.

strategic behavior." [1673] They add, "Obama and Bush faced many of the same problems and - despite their professed differences - each responded to a variety of foreign policy challenges in markedly *similar* ways."[1674] The same is true of Trump. Wherein his discourse has created shifts in policy, an overview of his first nine months reveals a general conformity to the categories of prioritization and discourse existing in U.S. national security (see Table 8.1). I posit despite the specific desires of the Trump administration his agenda must still generally conform to pre-established national security norms. This is because Trump, as is the case with all presidents, must operate in the context U.S. political culture and institutions.

Continuity in prioritization is illustrated in every threat. In the context of terrorism, Trump perpetuates fear-based rhetoric, subjugating policies and elevated budgets. This is exemplified in maintaining the Afghan war policy and the use of targeted assassinations. The same is true for narco-trafficking where Trump sustains mitigating polices and supply-centric spending evident in U.S. policy over the past 60 years. This is exemplified in his focus on border security and crime. In the context of climate change, Trump supports the counter narrative, one of two dominate discourses. This also represents continuity, in its similarity to Bush's minimal prioritization and lack of arbitrating policies. It is also exemplified in his reversal of Obama's climate change policies. Finally, Trump's approach to the geopolitics of the Arctic also exhibits continuity, adopting a similar alternative narrative as Bush, focused on economics and energy (i.e. drilling) instead of environmental sustainability and indigenous communities (as was the case under Obama). This is only one element of continuity in Arctic strategy. Like his predecessors, Trump generally evades addressing the region in the context of a threat to U.S. national security. But some changes are also noticeable, even if they have yet to yield Trump's desired results. Most prominent is his hardline law and order stance, which has allowed for changes in judicial policy. This includes increasing arrests, prosecutions, penalties and deportations for narcotics and immigration related crimes. He has also significantly decreased spending on demand-centric policies to address rising narcotics addiction and death, while increasing budgets for supply-centric measures (i.e. mitigating policies). And Trump is the first President to so openly and critically question climate science, lending a degree of credibility to a national counter-movement seeking to undermine government regulations protecting the environment.

[1673] Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich. "Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy," *International Affairs* (2017).
[1674] Dombrowski and Reich, op. cit.

Abrams writes, "every administration's policies are a combination of the old and the new. In Trump's case, the expectation was that the mix would change: a great deal more of the new and a broad rejection of the foreign policies of Trump's recent predecessors. That was certainly the impression left by Trump's rhetoric."[1675] He concludes, Trump's actions thus far tend towards, "a mostly conventional direction."[1676] This conformity results from the institutional overlap in government, which is less static than political culture, especially in the context of foreign policy. With high and medium level priority threats, like terrorism and narco-trafficking, there is greater investment of strategy and resources and shifting prioritization or policy is more difficult. Conversely, low and minimal level priorities are easier to shift in terms of policy because there are multiple discourses (i.e. climate change) or a lack of discourse entirely, allowing for alternative (non-security related) narratives to emerge (i.e. the geopolitics of the Arctic). With diverse (or lacking) narratives, opportunities to change threat frames exists and discourse is more malleable. With less investment in resources, shifts in policy are also more feasible. The minimization of threat is, like its amplification, is easier than the reorganization of strategy to address it. I therefore conclude that Trump – despite obvious changes in prioritization and policy – still generally conforms to the expectations presented by this research for the reasons provided above. By adhering to the categories of prioritization and discourse, as well as policy and budgets, that exist in the U.S. national security structure (presented in Table 8.1), even the Trump presidency – despite its unique nature – maintains America's distinct prioritization of threats.

The following chapter will conclude the dissertation and provide a broad overview of the results. I will revisit the evidence presented in the case studies to emphasize how each demonstrates the validity of the expectations generated by this framework. I will explore the lessons learned during the course of this research and how they have incrementally contributed to the research programs outlined in Chapters One and Two. The final chapter will also present auxiliary questions for investigation as a result of what has, and what remains to be learned from these conclusions.

[1675] Abrams, op. cit.
[1676] Abrams, op. cit.

CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION

We can never know what truth really is. The best we can do is approximate...
Truth can never be definitively captured or described. – Werner Herzog[1677]

INTRODUCTION

This research began with an observation: the U.S. perception of terrorism exceeds the level of threat it poses. Terrorism presents a significant danger, but the resources America expends on combatting it objectively outweigh its effects. As I explored in Chapter One, while the U.S. wages a global war against Islamists, approximately 350 private U.S. citizens have been killed in attacks worldwide since 9/11. As of 2018, less than 100 were killed in domestic attacks. Yet, it is estimated this war already cost trillions of dollars, and still terrorism ranks among the highest national security priorities. This presents a conundrum: the threat of child soldiers is similar, but no formal U.S. policy exists in the context of military operations. U.S. forces are not trained nor educated on the risks associated with child soldiers. And the threat is not addressed in high-level defense assessments nor are there prescribed rules of engagement.

This generates an important research question addressed in this dissertation: given the apparent disconnect between externally defined (or objective) threats and those internally (or subjectively) prioritized by the government, under what conditions does the U.S. prioritize specific threats to its national security? My research posited two primary hypotheses: systemic shifts in the character of threats and the interplay of Cultural and Institutional factors. If systemic shifts in the character of threats explains prioritization, we would expect that countries respond to specific material factors stemming from the international system. Where these factors threaten the U.S. to a higher degree, there would be a difference in prioritization compared to similar nations. Otherwise, prioritization and policy would converge.

Alternatively, if the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis explains prioritization, we would anticipate threats to not be based on material factors, but on America's distinct political culture. We would expect policies to reflect a rhetorical interpretation of threat, emerging as a product of bureaucratic bias. This would be illustrated by a threat discourse diverging from an objective narrative and a preference for policy diverging from comparable states facing similar

---

[1677] Werner Herzog. *A Guide for the Perplexed: Conversations with Paul Cronin.* (London: Faber & Faber, 2014).

threats. Finally, based on the preferred strategy, we might expect specific bureaucracies to rise in prominence when executing of policy, regardless of their applicability.

FINDINGS

In answering the question, I discerned four primary findings. First, threats are a social construct. Adam Hodges writes, "events and happenings do not intrinsically contain their own meanings. Rather, we use narrative to imbue events with meaning. Through narrative, we name protagonists, ascribe motivations, and produce explanations."[1678] Fear, therefore, is a potent political tool for agenda-setting. As Jack Holland notes, 9/11 was not a crisis but, "became a crisis through a process of discursive construction."[1679] In so doing, fear fostered a broad approach to combatting terrorism through war; extrajudicial actions; restricting civil liberties; homeland surveillance; and excessive security spending.

Second, the construction of threats through fear can be illustrated by political culture as characterized by discourse. This implies that the types of narratives, and the gradation of fear employed in constructing them, influence threat prioritization. When a threat is presented, for example, by discourse depicting a danger of immeasurable consequences, it is perceived as a priority due the impending hazard its existence imposes, regardless of its objective nature. This further implies a threat may not be existential, nor imminent, but the capacity to establish it as such is feasible when discourse is effectively wielded. But this also implies that by not wielding a prioritizing discourse (i.e. fear-based rhetoric) nor by having conflicting prioritizing/minimizing discourses (depicting different aspects of the danger or arguing none exists, respectively) prioritization can be minimized.

Third, in the process of rendering prioritization into strategy, the intervening institutional factor of bureaucratic bias, reinforces any threat perception as policy. This results in conflating the government's desired policy (subjectively defined) and an appropriate policy (objectively defined). This does not imply that desired and appropriate policy never converge. But when the prioritization of a threat does not reflect the (objective) danger it poses, this distortion establishes an inadequate foundation for action. The result is grossly exaggerating, dangerously minimizing or needlessly redundant and superfluous policies when addressing a threat.

[1678] Adam Hodges. *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 50.
[1679] Jack Holland. *Selling the War on Terror: Foreign policy discourses after 9/11.* (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 87.

Fourth, given the interplay between political culture as discourse and institutions as bureaucratic bias, national security remains remarkably stable over time. This does not imply that shifts in prioritization and policy never occur. Rather, culture and institutions tend to be static, notwithstanding externally imposed catastrophes (like 9/11) or significant cognitive shifts in the perception of values.[1680] As a result, individual-level explanations (like presidents and organized economic interests) as well as systemic factors (like the structure of the international system) appear less impactful on threat prioritization. What emerges is a case for domestic cultural and institutional factors being better explanatory factors.

SUPPLEMENTAL CASES

Having reviewed the findings, I will now extend the Cultural-Institutional hypothesis to four additional threats to further illustrate the validity of my argument. Returning to the CDA, I will examine under what conditions does the U.S. prioritize (or fail to prioritize) the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cyber Warfare, North Korea and Human Trafficking (see Table 9.1).[1681] Each threat will be cursorily examined in the context of the Bush, Obama and the Trump administrations and defined by relevant discursive, strategic and budgetary factors.

Table 9.1: Forms of Policy & Discourse

		LEVEL OF THREAT & POLICY			
EVIDENCE OF THREAT PRIORITIZATION		Subjugate	Mitigate	Arbitrate	Evade
	Official Government Documents	4.00-3.00	2.99-2.00	1.99-1.00	> 1.00
	Expenditures	High	Medium	Low	Minimal
	Strategy	Overwhelming use of force (i.e. invasion/war)	Limited use of force (i.e. targeted strikes; military aid)	Use of diplomacy, sanctions, or economic aid	None
	Discourse	Crisis	Problem	Issue	Non-Issue
	Case Study	Weapons of Mass Destruction	Cyber Warfare	North Korea	Human Trafficking

---

[1680] Values as defined by the 'American way of life' per the discussion in Chapter Two. Examples of shifts have been depicted throughout this research. For example, following 9/11, Americans were more willing to sacrifice privacy for security. Or although the U.S. prohibited cannabis a century ago, a significant cultural shift in perception regarding its medical and recreational usage has begun to take effect on policy at the state level.
[1681] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

I define WMDs as a weapon (of any size or type) that disperses or attempts to disburse, a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agent as defined under international law.[1682] The CDA ranks WMDs as the first of 59 potential threats, with an average weighted score of 4.00 on its four-point scale, making it a high-level priority.[1683] As such, it is characterized by high budgets, subjugating policies and crisis discourse. But according to survey data (including subjective and objective perspectives), WMDs rank as third of 59 threats, with a mean score of just 6.56 out of 10 (see Table 9.2).[1684]

**Table 9.2: Forms of Policy & Discourse for
the Threat of Nuclear Weapons (2001-2018)**[1686]

	BUSH	**OBAMA**	**TRUMP**
DISCOURSE	"The smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."	"As more people & nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold."	"If countries are going to have nukes, we're going to be at the top of the pack."
STRATEGY	Sustain & modernize arsenal; disarm rogue regimes; strengthen U.S. deterrence.	Decrease & modernize arsenal; global non-proliferation; strengthen regional deterrence.	Increase & modernize arsenal; threat of first strike or use in war; increase deterrence.
EXPENDITURES[1685]	$52 billion for NNSA research, development & maintenance from 2002-2009 (~ $7.2 billion a year).	$69 billion for NNSA research, development & maintenance from 2010-2017 (~ $8.6 billion a year).	FY 2018 budget request of $10.2 billion for NNSA research, development & maintenance.

The threat of WMDs is unique in its indiscriminate capacity for destruction; the limited number of actors possessing them; and their potential proliferation among rogue regimes and

---

[1682] See Appendix 1.5: Definitions of Threats.

[1683] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

[1684] Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) and Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

[1685] Reflects allocations to the National Nuclear Security Administration research, development and maintenance programs. The U.S. government maintains there is no adequate way to track all nuclear or other WMD spending across all government agencies given the nature of the programs. According to current estimates, the U.S. will spend over $1 trillion just on modernizing its nuclear weapons over the next thirty years. See Kingston Reif. *U.S. Nuclear Modernization Program.* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 2017).

[1686] For a full list of source materials, see Appendix 12.1 through Appendix 12.3 in Appendix Twelve: Forms of Discourse & Policy Source Material for Supplemental Case Studies.

non-state actors.[1687] As of 2018, the U.S. has not experienced a significant WMD attack.[1688] And according to expert analysis, the likelihood of a state using a WMD – or a terrorist organization acquiring one – remains minimal.[1689] Yet elevated rhetoric, high budgets and the use or threat of subjugating policies is consistent across the three past administrations. As illustrated in Chapter Eight, perceived shifts in discourse and policy can occur, and Obama's approach to nuclear weapons exemplifies this. Still, his overall strategy maintained the key elements of U.S. policy (i.e. the nuclear Triad, weapon modernization and new infrastructure construction) even while decreasing stockpiles. Analysis by the Federation of American Scientists found Obama decreased stockpiles less than any president since the end of the Cold War.[1690]

WMDs pose a threat and defending against them is critical. But the U.S. approach diverges from the majority of the world. Iran and North Korea notwithstanding, there is an international consensus supporting WMD eradication. Yet the threat level, discourse and resources allocated for WMDs remain stable over time.[1691] Kingston Reif notes, "the U.S.

[1687] Margaret Besheer. "UN: Terrorists Using 'Dark Web' in Pursuit of WMDs." *Voice of America* (June 28, 2017); Andrew Blum, Victor Asal and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. "Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction." *International Studies Review* (2005), pp. 133-170; Steve Bowman. *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2002); Kathy Gilsinan. "Why Moldova may be the Scariest Country on Earth." *The Atlantic* (October 8, 2015); Stephen Hummel. "The Islamic State and WMD: Assessing the Future Threat." *CTC Sentinel* (2016); Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. *Al Qaeda: Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype of Reality?* (Cambridge: Belfer Center, 2010); Laura Reed. *Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Hamilton College, 2017); Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell. "Does intent equal capability? Al Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction." *Nonproliferation Review* (2005); Kim Sengupta. "Isis nuclear attack in Europe is a real threat, say experts." *The Independent* (June 7, 2016); Jessica Stern. *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) and "Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden lashes out against the West." *Time* (1999).

[1688] The 2001 Anthrax attacks, resulting in minimal fatalities, was likely perpetrated by a U.S. citizen with no terrorism ties. See "Timeline: How the Anthrax Terror Unfolded." *NPR* (February 15, 2011).

[1689] For example, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, finds the likelihood of terrorists using a WMD is two percent or less, although researchers admit some organizations might be more likely to try to pursue WMDs than others. Later research conducted found hybrid Pakistani terrorist-criminal organizations might be more likely to try to smuggle WMD materials given their capacity and access. See, Gary Ackerman, et. al. *Terrorist Groups and Weapons of Mass Destruction.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2008) and Gary Ackerman and Amy Pate. *The threat of Pakistani Criminal Organizations: Assessing the potential for involvement in Radiological/Nuclear smuggling, collaboration with terrorist groups and the potential destabilization of the Pakistani state.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2012). Also see *Nuclear Post Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010).

[1690] The Arms Control Association notes Obama's proposed spending levels, "exceeded what the administration originally advertised." And in 2016, Obama set in motion $1.2 trillion of spending on nuclear weapons modernization over thirty years. See, Hans M. Kristensen. *How Presidents Arm and Disarm.* (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists (2014) and Reif, op. cit.

[1691] Susan D. Moeller. *Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (College Park: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2004) and Susan Moeller. "Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Media: Anatomy of Failure." *Yale Global* (April 14, 2004).

arsenal is no more powerful than it was when Trump took office and the president's first budget request largely continues Obama's approach."[1692]

Cyber Warfare

I define cyber warfare as, "an armed conflict conducted in whole or part by cyber means [and] military operations conducted to deny an opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems and weapons in a conflict."[1693] The CDA ranks cyber warfare as seventh of 59 potential threats, with an average weighted score of 2.59 on its four-point scale, making it a medium level priority.[1694] As such, it is characterized by mid-level budgets, mitigating policies and problem discourse. But according to survey data, cyber warfare ranks as the most important threat, with a mean score of 7.33 out of 10.[1695]

Cyber warfare emerged as 'new form of weaponry' in the 1990s.[1696] Cyber-attacks include a range of electronic threats from a variety of actors seeking to undermine U.S. economic and political strength.[1697] This is evidenced by growing Federal breaches, increased publication of classified information and the theft of government employee and citizen data.[1698] Government cyber-attacks increased from 5,500 to 77,000 between 2006 and 2015.[1699] Meanwhile, the most significant and sophisticated attacks in cyber history occurred in 2016

[1692] Gould, op. cit. Also see Nafeesa Syeed. "Trump's Nuclear Weapon's Arsenal Isn't Any Different Than Obama's." *Bloomberg News* (August 9, 2017).

[1693] Cyber warfare includes cyber-attack, cyber defense and cyber enabling actions. Cyber space is furthermore defined as the, "domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures." See Appendix 1.5: Definitions of Threats.

[1694] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

[1695] Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) and Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

[1696] Reagan was first to address the threat with the Computer Security Act of 1987. See, "Cyberwar: Frequently Asked Questions." *PBS* (April 24, 2003). Accessed December 16, 2017; Bradley Graham. "Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare." *Washington Post* (February 7, 2003); Fred Kaplan. *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016) and James A. Lewis. *Assessing the risks of cyber terrorism, cyber war and other cyber threats* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002).

[1697] Neal Ungerleider. "Barack Obama is the first cyber war president, but a president can't win a cyber war." *Fast Company* (February 11, 2013).

[1698] Chris Frates and Curt Devine. "Government hacks and security breaches skyrocket." *CNN* (December 19, 2014) and Riley Walters. *Continued Federal Cyber Breaches in 2015.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2015).

[1699] Between 1995 and 1999, attacks increased from four to 1,905. See, Zachary Coile. "Bush names advisor on cyber-terrorism/New approach to protecting info systems." *San Francisco Gate* (October 10, 2001); *INFORMATION SECURITY: Agencies need to improve controls over selected high-impact systems* (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2016) and Richard Wolf. "Bush calls for tighter cybersecurity." *ABC News* (March 14, 2008).

and 2017.[1700] This is evidenced, for example, by the Intelligence Community's assessment of Russian influence in the 2016 elections.[1701] Furthermore, the cost of cybercrime, estimated at $100 billion in 2013, rose to $500 billion in 2016.[1702] By 2017, there were an estimated 1.5 million cyber-attacks on governments and businesses worldwide each year.[1703] China and Russia present the most significant cyber threat but North Korea and Iran's cyberwarfare program have recently increased in sophistication.[1704] Again, I find that problem discourse, mid-level budgets and offensive as well as defensive mitigating policies to combat cyber threats are consistent across the past three administrations (see Table 9.3). Like with other medium level priorities, dual discourses are present. Wherein an agreement exists that cyber warfare poses a threat, different narratives prescribe diverse but complimentary policies. Like with narco-trafficking (featuring a supply and demand-centric discourse), cyber warfare has a 'government' and 'civilian security' narrative. As Obama noted cybersecurity is, "a matter of

---

[1700] *2017 Internet Security Threat Report* (Mountain View: Symantec, 2017); Ryan Grenoble. "2017 was the year of hacks. 208 Probably Won't Be Better." *Huffington Post* (December 20, 2017) and Lily Hay Newman. "The biggest cybersecurity disasters of 2017." *Wired* (July 1, 2017).

[1701] *Background to Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution*, op. cit.

[1702] This number is expected to exceed $2 trillion by 2019 and $6 trillion by 2021. See Steve Morgan. *2017 Cybercrime Report* (Menlo Park: Cybersecurity Investments, 2017) and Steve Morgan. "Cybercrime costs projected to reach $2 trillion by 2019." *Forbes* (January 17, 2016) Also see Siobhan Gorman. "Annual U.S. cybercrime costs estimated $100 billion." *Wall Street Journal* (July 22, 2013) and Luke Graham. "Cybercrime costs the global economy $450: CEO." *CNBC* (February 7, 2017).

[1703] *2018 Global State of Insecurity Survey* (New York: IDG, 2017); Graham, op. cit.; James Griffiths. "Cybercrime costs the average US Firms $15 million a year." *CNN* (October 8, 2015) and "These cybercrime statistics will make you think twice about your password." *CBS* (March 3, 2015).

[1704] Scott Applegate. "Cybermilitias and political hackers: use of irregular forces and cyberwarfare." *IEEE Security & Privacy* (2011); Owen Bowcott. "Dispute along cold war lines led to collapse of UN cyberwarfare talks." *The Guardian* (August 23, 2017); Chris Buckley. "China military paper urges steps against U.S. cyber war threat." *Reuters* (June 16, 2011); Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler. *Russia's Approach to Cyber Warfare.* (Arlington: CNA, 2017); Dorothy Denning. "Cyberwar: How China hackers became a major threat to the U.S." *Newsweek* (October 5, 2017); Dorothy Denning. "Iran's cyber warfare program is now a major threat to the United States." *Newsweek* (December 12, 2017); Dorothy Denning. "Russian Cyberthreat." *Scientific American* (August 18, 2017); *Final Report on the Task Force on Cyber Deterrence* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017); Franz-Stefan Gady. "Russia Tops China as Principal Cyber Threat to the US." *The Diplomat* (March 3, 2015); Magnus Hjortdal. "China's use of cyber warfare: espionage meets strategic deterrence." *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2011); Patrick Marshall. "Cyberwarfare Threat." *CQ Press* (October 6, 2017); Thom Patterson. "Chinese cyber spies may be watching you, experts warn." *CNN* (August 28, 2016); John W. Schoen. "Russia has 'upped its game' in cyberwarfare and the threat isn't going away, US intel officials say." *CNBC* (May 11, 2017) and "U.S. blames North Korea for 'WannaCry' cyber attack." *Reuters* (December 18, 2017).

America's economic competiveness… [and] is also a matter of public safety and national security."[1705]

**Table 9.3: Forms of Policy & Discourse for
the Threat of Cyber Warfare (2001-2018)**[1707]

	BUSH	**OBAMA**	**TRUMP**
DISCOURSE	"A devastating attack in cyberspace would be a massive blow to our economy and way of life."	"The very technologies that empower us to create and to build also empower those who would disrupt & destroy."	"To meet new forms of aggression [like cyber warfare] we must adapt… to compete effectively in new ways & on all new battlefields."
STRATEGY	Established cyber security strategy & infrastructure; engaged in cyber warfare & espionage.	Redesigned & elevated cyber security strategy & established penalties for state & non-state actors for cyber war/crimes.	Elevated & enhanced cyber warfare strategy & infrastructure; expanded government's power to respond to cyber-attacks.
EXPENDITURES	FY 2008 cyber security funding of $7.3 billion.	FY 2017 cyber security funding of $19 billion.	FY 2018 cyber security budget requests: DHS $971 million; State Department $200 million; DOJ $41.5 million.[1706]

But, given the nature of the threat and the range of policy solutions, as Howard Schmidt – Obama's Cyber-Security Coordinator – noted, the line between cyber war and crime is blurred, and an appropriate response is complicated (as was the case with narco-trafficking).[1708] This in part, explains America's continued vulnerability to cyber-related threats at home and overseas.

North Korea

The CDA ranks North Korea 24 of 59 potential threats, with an average weighted score of 1.89 on its four-point scale, making it a low-level priority.[1709] As such, it is characterized by low-level budgets, arbitrating policies and issue discourse. But according to the survey data, North Korea ranks slightly higher (21 of 59 threats), with a mean score of

---

[1705] Eric Talkbot Jensen. "Cyber Warfare and precautions against the effects of attacks." *Texas Law Review* (2009-2010) and Barack H. Obama. *Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 29, 2009).

[1706] Reflects examples of allocations made public by the Trump administration but is not representative of overall cyber security spending across the government in 2018. See *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).

[1707] For a full list of source materials, see Appendix 12.4 through Appendix 12.6 in Appendix Twelve: Forms of Discourse & Policy Source Material for Supplemental Case Studies.

[1708] Ungerleider, op. cit.

[1709] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

5.07 out of 10.[1710] Given the nature of the threat – geographic rather than functional – it is multi-faceted and extends beyond the production and sale of WMDs.[1711] First, the regime is a systemic abuser of human rights.[1712] Second, the U.S. remains in a state of latent conflict with North Korea, having over 37,500 troops stationed in South Korea.[1713] Finally, the potential destabilization of the peninsula or region, as a result of the U.S. having to defend itself or it allies against North Korean aggression, in response to a first strike or from regime collapse, has significant implications for U.S. national security, similar to the threat posed by other rogue regimes wherein a paucity of policy options are available. As was the case with climate change, objective data places a higher level of prioritization on the threat.

But in line with the expectations, issue discourse, lower-level budgets and arbitrating polices (i.e. sanctions and negotiations) have been maintained (see Table 9.4). This is because, although Trump has threatened to use military force, most experts agree there is no tangible change in policy.[1714] As the Heritage Foundation's Bruce Klinger notes, Trump pursues identical leverage points as his predecessors – including negotiations and pressure on regional allies including China; unilateral and UN sanctions; continued military readiness; missile defense upgrades; and offers to directly negotiate with the North Korea regime.[1715] And wherein it can be generally argued that Trump abandoned Obama's policy of "strategic patience," he has not yet resorted to any form of subjugating or mitigating policies (i.e. the use of overwhelming or limited military force) it its place, despite the rotation of naval resources in the region.[1716]

[1710] Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) and Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

[1711] Warrick, op. cit.

[1712] For example, see Anna Fifield. "UN committee condemns North Korea, citing crimes against humanity." *Washington Post* (November 18, 2014); Lulu Garcia-Navarro. "North Korea's prisons 'as terrible even worse' than Nazi camps." *NPR* (December 17, 2017) and *Mapping Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea* (Seoul: Transitional Justice Working Group, 2017).

[1713] At the end of Korean War, an armistice and not a truce, was advanced to cease hostilities. It remains it effect today. See, Corky Siemaszko. "Meet the Americans on the front line if North Korea goes to war." *NBC News* (April 15, 2017).

[1714] Elisabeth Dias. "President Trump blames Obama for North Korea, but he's following Obama's strategy." *Time* (October 27, 2017).

[1715] Kelsey Davenport concurs, noting that Trump's approach consists of the same combination of arbitrating policies as his predecessors. See, Jacqueline Klimas. "Trump's North Korea Strategy: A Lot Like Obama's." *Politico* (August 8, 2017).

[1716] Despite Trump's claims to be amassing an Armada off the coast of North Korea in April, the only additional ships operating in the region at that time were actually headed to participate in pre-planned military exercises with the Australian navy. The purported Armada assembled during his two-week visit to the region near the end of 2017, was actually the convergence of three aircraft carriers that Navy officials reported as sailing together towards the peninsula in mostly a "symbolic" gesture of the President's arrival in China. It was furthermore

Table 9.4: Forms of Policy & Discourse for the Threat of North Korea (2001-2018)[1717]

	BUSH	**OBAMA**	**TRUMP**
DISCOURSE	"We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable & irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program."	"We will not be cowed by threats… North Korea's refusal to meet its international obligations will lead only to less security, not more."	"North Korea best not make any more threats… They will be met with fire, fury & frankly power the likes of which the world has never seen before."
STRATEGY	Multilateral negotiations; aid; sanctions; removed sponsor of terrorism designation.	Bilateral negotiations; aid; sanctions.	Offer of bilateral; sanctions; designated sponsor or terrorism; threat of first strike.
EXPENDITURES[1718]	FY 2008 $592 million in funding to maintain U.S. forces in South Korea.	FY 2016 $1.8 billion in funding to maintain U.S. forces in South Korea.	FY 2018 $1.91 billion in funding to maintain U.S. forces in South Korea.

Harry J. Kazianis, at the Center for the National Interest, points out, Trump's approach is a diplomatic 'bluff' as evidenced by the lack of change in the strategic posture of U.S. forces.[1719] It is also evidenced by consistent statements from key national security figures, like CIA Director Mike Pompeo, National Security Advisor General H.R. McMaster, and Chief of Staff John Kelly who continue to purport that a diplomatic policy remains the focus of overall U.S. strategy.[1720] Indeed, Despite Trump's bellicose rhetoric, the only significant shift has been his diplomatic policy.[1721] Wherein Obama and Bush preconditioned discussions with North Korea on its willingness to end its nuclear weapons program, Secretary of State Tillerson remarked

---

revealed that two of the ships were pre-scheduled (months prior to any provocative actions by North Korea) for a standard rotation wherein commands can briefly overlap during an exchange of duties. This also implies that only one aircraft carrier was diverted to the region, and only for the duration of the President's visit. See Aaron Blake. "The White House's misleading statements about Trump's 'armada' heading to North Korea." *Washington Post* (April 18, 2017); Harry J. Kazianis. "Trump's entire North Korea strategy could be a giant bluff." *The Hill* (December 26, 2017); Alex Lockie. "It looks like a U.S. navy armada will return to waters near North Korea." *Business Insider* (October 13, 2017); Amy Davidson Sorkin. "Donald Trump, North Korea, and the Case of the Phantom Armada." *The New Yorker* (April 19, 2017) and Geoff Ziezulewicz and David B. Larter. "Trump's armada: Navy assembles 3 carriers in Asai for the president visit." *Navy Times* (October 27, 2017).

[1717] For a full list of source materials, see Appendix 12.7 through Appendix 12.9 in Appendix Twelve: Forms of Discourse & Policy Source Material for Supplemental Case Studies.

[1718] Reflects allocations for non-personnel costs to maintain U.S. forces in South Korea and does not include the entire U.S. defense spending on South Korea which also includes arms transfers, base construction, personnel costs and the contributions made by South Korea to offset these costs (estimated to be approximately 40 percent of the shared U.S.-ROK defense budget). The terms of this arrangement are currently under negotiation for 2019. See, "South Korea to contribute $867 million for U.S. military forces in 2014." *Reuters* (January 11, 2014).

[1719] Kazianis, op. cit.

[1720] Noah Bierman. "Chief of Staff John Kelly contradicts Trump on North Korea: 'Let's hope diplomacy works.'" *Los Angeles Times* (October 12, 2017) and Uri Friedman. "The contradictions at the core of Trump's North Korea strategy." *The Atlantic* (October 19, 2017) and Klimas, op. cit.

[1721] Klimas, op. cit.

the administration was ready to talk without preconditions.[1722] Trump also indicated his willingness to talk directly with the regime in 2018.[1723]

As with climate change, the threat of North Korea maintains diverging discourses positing divergent policies – diplomacy or war. This is why the U.S. traditionally has eschewed heightened rhetoric. The implication is not that North Korea in unthreatening, but avoiding elevated discourse intends to avoid escalating tensions and allows for maintaining a diplomatic over a wartime policy.[1724] Recognizing the impact of discourse, explains why many are troubled by Trump's rhetorical escalation. But, this also explains why North Korea remains a low-level priority over time: the general, existing threat discourse (despite Trumps' occasional confrontational comments), consistently results in arbitrating policies, even when added rhetorical pressure is brought to bear. This is because mitigating and subjugating policies, as Michael Fuchs writes, bear an unacceptable cost: "there are no acceptable U.S. military options involving a first strike, given the inevitable retaliation and mass casualties that would follow, and North Korea is not handing over its nuclear weapons… keeping the peace will ultimately mean making diplomacy work."[1725]

Human Trafficking

I define human trafficking as a form of modern slavery, characterized by a situation in which someone obtains or holds a person for involuntary service, compelling them by force, fraud or coercion to commercial sexual exploitation or forced labor.[1726] The CDA ranks human trafficking 52 of 59 potential threats, with an average weighted score of 0.55 on its four-point scale, making it as a minimal-level priority.[1727] As such, it is characterized by minimal budgets, evasive policies and non-issue discourse, resulting in the emergence of alternative (non-

---

[1722] Rachel Ansley. *Tillerson's Takes on US Foreign Policy: A Year in Review* (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, December 13, 2017) and Klimas, op. cit.

[1723] "Donald Trump says he is ready to talk to Kim Jong-un by phone." *Reuters* (January 6, 2018).

[1724] A similar example featuring Obama and Iran is presented in Appendix 4.1: Leadership Hypothesis.

[1725] Michael Fuchs. "The North Korea Deal." *Foreign Affairs* (December 21, 2017).

[1726] Definition adopted from the UN and State Department. See Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Person. See, "Definitions and Methodology" in the *Trafficking in Persons Report.* (Washington, D.C: Department of State, 2013), pp. 29-34 and United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and The Protocols Thereto.* (Palermo: United Nations, 2000). Also see Appendix 1.5: Definitions of Threats.

[1727] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

security related) narratives. But according to the survey, human trafficking ranks higher (44 of 59 threats), with a mean score of 3.48 out of 10.[1728]

Human trafficking has important domestic and foreign implications for U.S. security. An estimated 40 million people are categorized as trafficked or enslaved.[1729] Human trafficking, specifically, is unique in its relationship to other threats including narco and arms-trafficking; terrorism; state instability and conflict; refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; as well as illegal migration.[1730] Human trafficking is the fastest growing criminal enterprise and second largest global black market.[1731] In 2001, human trafficking generated annual profits of $19 to $31 billion, by 2014 it exceeded $150 billion.[1732]

But human trafficking receives less attention as a national security than a human security threat.[1733] This is substantiated by minimal national security rhetoric, minimal-level budgets and evasive national security policies, resulting alternative narratives and policies (see Table 9.5). This does not imply a complete exclusion of a national security narrative.[1734] Like with Arctic geopolitics, wherein, for example, General James Mattis declared his intent to make the region a priority, there are key national security bureaucrats and legislators seeking to prioritize human trafficking as a national security threat. State Department Ambassador for human trafficking Luis CdeBaca represents one such voice.[1735] This has begun to take shape in in the domestic context through the advent of a criminal-justice strategy (i.e. prevention, protection, prosecution).[1736]

[1728] Appendix Seven: All Threats Ranked by Mean Scores (Survey Respondents) and Weight Scores (Content & Discourse Analysis).

[1729] *Global Slavery Index* (Nedlands: Walk Free Foundation, 2017) and Melissa Jane Kronfeld (ed.) *#EndSlaveryNow! A Discussion with Activists, Survivors, Influencers & Visionaries in the Modern Anti-Slavery* Movement, Third Edition (Washington, D.C.: NEXUS Global Summit, 2017).

[1730] Human trafficking is therefore particularly pertinent in the Twenty-First century, which is witnessing the largest mass migration since World War II. See, *Global Trends: Force Displacement in 2015* (New York: Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015) and Rora Pati. "Human Trafficking: An Issues of Human and National Security." *University of Miami National Security and Armed Conflict Law Review* (2014).

[1731] *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994) and Pati, op. cit.

[1732] Pati, op. cit. and *Profits and Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labor.* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2014).

[1733] Arthur Rizer and Sheri R. Glaser. "Breach: The National Security Implications of Human Trafficking." *Widener Law Review* (2011). Also see, *Human Development Report 1994*, op. cit.

[1734] Rizer and Glaser, op. cit.; Hyun Soo Suh. "Human trafficking 'a national security issue' Obama task force told." *CNN* (March 15, 2011) and Shannon A. Welch. "Human Trafficking and Terrorism: Utilizing National Security Resources to Prevent Human Trafficking in the Islamic State." *Duke Journal of Gender and Law Studies* (2017).

[1735] For example, see E. Benjamin Skinner. "Obama's abolitionist." *The Huffington Post* (March 25, 2009) and "Letter from Ambassador Luis CdeBaca," in *Trafficking in Persons Report* (2011), op. cit.

[1736] Rizer and Glaser, op. cit.

**Table 9.5: Forms of Policy & Discourse for
the Threat of Human Trafficking (2001-2018)**[1737]

	BUSH	**OBAMA**	**TRUMP**
DISCOURSE	"It takes a special kind of depravity to exploit & hurt the most vulnerable members of society."	[Modern slavery] "ought to concern every person, because it is a debasement of our common humanity."	"Human trafficking is a modern form of the oldest & most barbaric type of exploitation. It has no place in our world."
STRATEGY	Enhanced domestic training; prosecution; legislation; cooperation & civil society funding; designed NATO anti-trafficking strategy.	Enhanced domestic training, prosecution; legislation & cooperation; developed State Department capacity & funding for civil society overseas.	Enhanced authority to detain & deport immigrant victims trafficked into U.S.; increased sanctions for international human traffickers.
EXPENDITURES[1738]	~ $215.9 million for State Department TIP Office ($26.99 million a year, 2002-2009).	~ $309.73 million for State Department TIP Office ($38.71 million a year, 2010-2017).	FY 2018 $17 million budget request.

But the success of this strategy has not yet translated to foreign policy, where in the approach remains mostly focused on providing minimal aide to civil society groups overseas or declaring zero tolerance policies those engaged human trafficking.[1739]

The lack of national security prioritization is best exemplified by the inability of human trafficking to be institutionalized as a national security threat over the long term. Despite some actors in the government wielding a prioritizing discourse and advocating for national security policy (as was the case, in a limited fashion, under Obama), without a strong governmental constituency to maintain threat prioritization within the security hierarchy, a threat's stature is easily diminished. Such is the case under Trump, who has de-emphasized the level of priority advanced during the Obama administration, both in his actions and his budget (See Table 9.5).

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH PROGRAMS

As noted in Chapter One, my research is potentially interesting and important for theoretical and policymaking reasons. Wherein the securitization literature is prolific in the European context, as I explored, it is less so in the context of the U.S. Furthermore, wherein this literature tends to focus on framing mechanisms, it often occurs to the exclusion of its tangible

---

[1737] For a full list of source materials, see Appendix 12.10 through Appendix 12.12 in Appendix Twelve: Forms of Discourse & Policy Source Material for Supplemental Case Studies.
[1738] Reflects allocations to the Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons and not the total anti-trafficking related funding across other agencies and departments.
[1739] Rizer and Glaser, op. cit.

effects on policy outcomes. Ronald Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson write, "politics is typically marked by rhetorical competition, but our theoretical frameworks are generally hard-pressed to make sense of its dynamics and outcomes."[1740] As such, this research has sought to, as noted in Chapter One, pursue a path of 'analytic eclecticism' by synthesizing theories of International Relations in the context of Constructivism and Institutionalism to answer the question posed by this research

Recalling the discussion from Chapter Two, this research rejects neoclassical realist theories, which posit that systemic shifts best explain threat prioritization. This is because initial evidence illustrates that the international structure does not always constrain or influence states to act in a similarly rational matter. In fact, this research has demonstrated that even similar states – with similar governance structures and political philosophies – when confronted with a similar threat, divergence in prioritization and policy does occur, and states (in this case the U.S.) do not always act rationally. Rather, the evidence illustrates a greater causality from Constructivist notions of preferences, as historically and socially formed. As noted in Chapter Two, America's sense of exceptionalism, messianic purpose and indispensability establishes a unique normative framework for the interpretation of danger, which tends to react more strongly to how a threat endangers the American 'way of life' (i.e. values) rather than more tangible measures of this 'life' itself. But Constructivism does not answer the question of action, or how the framing of threats, creates policy. Institutionalism posits that outcomes are a product of an actor's preference interacting with institutional regimes or rules. I have attempted to illustrate that unique U.S. bureaucratic regimes, defined by their biases, tend to seize on preferences and cement them as policy. This creates a foundation for explaining non-rational behavior in national security strategy. And it also creates the initial groundwork for extending the process of securitization into policy, or more simply, how words become action.

Finally, this research has begun to illustrate there are limits to Neoclassical Realism as well as Constructivist and Institutional paradigms. But it also demonstrates how, by integrating research traditions, new insights into the most important matters of the International Relations – including power, security and the relationship between the two – are expanded to include a

---

[1740] Ronald Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric." *The European Journal of International Relations* (2007), p. 36.

more critical role for domestic factors specifically, and socially (or historically) constructed ones more broadly.

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

If the U.S. does not respond to the same material factors as comparable nations facing a similar threat, this research asked, what does shape its conceptions of danger? And how do these explanatory factors – political cultural and institutions – affect national security decision-making, subsequent policy and the allocation of resources? The preliminarily conclusions drawn from this research explored these questions. But in so doing, additional questions are generated.

For example, understanding the critical role of discourse, how can those in government employ narratives to effectively prioritize threats in relation to its objective value? And understanding the effects of discourse on institutions, how may discourse be better employed to wield bureaucratic bias effectively and address only necessary threats in the most efficient manner? This is critical to explore, if the effects of fear-based discourse on policy (and budgets) are to be counteracted for the sake of guiding a sounder national security policy more aligned with the actual objectives and needs of the U.S. in the Twenty-First Century.

Furthermore, by expanding the historical perspective of this research, and exploring threat prioritization across more administrations, what else can be learned about continuity and change in U.S. national security over time? In uncovering relevant characteristics of the political culture and institutions which existed in other pertinent periods of U.S. history, we might further reveal how shifts in the U.S. perception of itself as reflection of the values it upholds, affects is policies at home and overseas.

How can we also measure the degree to which alternative factors (such as presidential leadership, organized economic interests or the media) - which may be influential but not fully explanatory - contribute to reinforcing political culture and/or institutional bias? And how might these auxiliary factors play a role when there are significant shifts in political culture and institutions? Although my research suggests that political and institutions are the best explanatory factors, it does not imply these factors occur to the total exclusion of others. For example, the Trump administration illustrates that who leaders are can matter, adding relevancy to an examination of presidential personalities in the prioritization of threats. And given the Trump family's background in business there is also and added relevancy in

examining the role of organized economic interests. But the current administration also reveals the importance of the media in defining a narrative, as Trump is frequently forced to explain his discourse in opposition to how it is present by the press.

Finally, how might this research framework be employed to better understand the prioritization of threats in other countries, with both similar and different types of governance? In learning how political culture and institutions affects foreign government's threat perception might serve to support enhanced cooperation or the de-escalation of tensions in the short and long term.

CONCLUSION

On December 18, 2017, Trump released his *National Security Strategy.* The document begins describing, "an extraordinarily dangerous world, filled with a wide range of threats that have intensified in recent years."[1741] It lists these threats as rogue regimes, WMDs, terrorism, China, Russia, and other resurgent or rising power rivalries, narco-trafficking and criminal cartels, economics and the need to strengthen global alliances.[1742] The strategy for confronting this 'extraordinarily dangerous' world is to protect the American people, the homeland, and it's way of life; promote prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and advance U.S. influence.[1743] As such, Trump's approach is, in its most basic form, a continuation of his predecessors depictions, categories of prioritization and policy solutions.[1744]

As Leon Panetta reminds us, "words matter."[1745] And as this research has begun to explore, the impact of discourse, and the narratives it constructs, can affect the prioritization of threats. If accepted as true, a critical reality must be confronted: the societies in which we live, the governments we permit to administer them, and our perceptions of what potentially threatens the stability of both are, in large measure, a product of our own making. The responsibility for securing societies and governments, therefore, does not only extend to outward threats, but also the danger of allowing these societies and governments to rule by fear. This research has begun to explore how, by applying gradations of fear in defining threats, the capacity to defend against them in the name of national security is frequently undermined.

[1741] Trump, *National Security Strategy*, op. cit.

[1742] Trump, *National Security Strategy*, op. cit.

[1743] Trump, *National Security Strategy*, op. cit.

[1744] Vivian Salama. "Trump's new national security strategy close to its predecessors." *NBC News* (December 18, 2017).

[1745] Interview with Leon Panetta and Wolf Blitzer on *CNN* (August 11, 2017).

Whether through the expansion of government power or the preponderance of the use of force, or by way of conflicting, uncompromising and evasive policies, the U.S. tends to challenge its own notions of liberty and its commitment to those inalienable rights it had originally intended to protect and defend. This observation presents a conundrum: what, if anything, can be done to secure the U.S. against its own insecurities? And, more critically, what are the consequences for the U.S. and its allies, if it cannot?

Fear is the dragon every President must slay.

– Walter Emerson[1746]

[1746] *Deterrence*. Rod Lurie. Paramount, 1999. Drama.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX ONE: THREAT WEIGHTS APPENDIX ONE: THREAT WEIGHTS

Appendix 1.1: All Threats

HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	MINIMAL
Weapons of Mass Destruction (4)	Interstate Warfare (2.94)	North Korea (1.89)	Human Rights Crimes (0.94)
Terrorism (3.88)	China (2.69)	Eastern Europe (1.75)	Water Security (0.91)
Attack on the Homeland (3.11)	Afghanistan (2.63)	Western Europe (1.75)	Disruptive Technologies (0.90)
	Russia (2.59)	Energy Security (1.59)	Somalia (0.85)
	Iraq (2.59)	Israel (1.51)	Espionage (0.84)
	Cyber Warfare (2.59)	Syria (1.35)	Colombia (0.75)
	Security of Allies (2.51)	Failed States (1.32)	Mexico (0.73)
	Missiles (2.46)	Poverty & Unemployment (1.30)	Freedom of the Global Commons (0.73)
	Africa (2.44)	Latin America (1.26)	Yemen (0.72)
	Intra-state Warfare (2.44)	Border Control (1.22)	Saudi Arabia (0.64)
	Central & Southeast Asia (2.40)	Climate Change (1.21)	Libya (0.63)
	East Asia (2.30)	Attacks on Critical Bases of Operation Overseas (1.16)	Venezuela (0.61)
	The Middle East (2.16)	Food Security (1.07)	Illegal Migration (0.61)
	Pandemics (2.15)		Sudan/ South Sudan (0.59)
	Iran (2.13)		Refugees (0.59)
	Pakistan (2.12)		Human Trafficking (0.55)
	Global Financial Crisis & Economic Destabilization (2.08)		The Geopolitics of the Arctic (0.54)
	Disruption of Space Dominance (2.07)		Piracy (0.50)
	Narco Trafficking (2.07)		Nigeria (0.48)
	Humanitarian Disasters (2.01)		Small Arms (0.48)
			Transnational Criminal Organizations (0.27)
			National Debt (0.19)
			Child Soldiers (0.00)

Appendix 1.2: Threats (excluding state actors and regions)

HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	MINIMAL
Weapons of Mass Destruction (4)	Interstate Warfare (2.94)	Energy Security (1.59)	Human Rights Crimes (0.94)
Terrorism (3.88)	Cyber Warfare (2.59)	Failed States (1.32)	Water Security (0.91)
Attack on the Homeland (3.11)	Security Allies (2.51)	Poverty & Unemployment (1.30)	Disruptive Technologies (0.90)
	Missiles (2.46)	Border Control (1.22)	Espionage (0.84)
	Intra-state Warfare (2.44)	Climate Change (1.21)	Freedom of the Global Commons (0.73)
	Pandemics (2.15)	Attacks on Critical Bases of Operation Overseas (1.16)	Illegal Migration (0.61)
	Global Financial Crisis & Economic Destabilization (2.08)	Food Security (1.07)	Refugees (0.59)
	Disruption of Space Dominance (2.07)		Human Trafficking (0.55)
	Narco Trafficking (2.07)		The Geopolitics of the Arctic (0.54)
	Humanitarian Disasters (2.01)		Piracy (0.50)
			Small Arms (0.48)
			Transnational Criminal Organizations (0.27)
			National Debt (0.19)
			Child Soldiers (0.00)

Appendix 1.3: State Actor Threats

HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	MINIMAL
N/A	China (2.69)	North Korea (1.89)	Somalia (0.85)
	Afghanistan (2.63)	Israel (1.51)	Colombia (0.75)
	Russia (2.59)	Syria (1.35)	Mexico (0.73)
	Iraq (2.59)		Yemen (0.72)
	Iran (2.13)		Saudi Arabia (0.64)
	Pakistan (2.12)		Libya (0.63)
			Venezuela (0.61)
			Sudan/South Sudan (0.59)
			Nigeria (0.48)

Appendix 1.4: Regional Threats

HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	MINIMAL
N/A	Africa (2.44)	Eastern Europe (1.75)	N/A
	Central & Southeast Asia (2.40)	Western Europe (1.75)	
	East Asia (2.30)	Latin America (1.26)	
	The Middle East (2.16)		

Appendix 1.5: Definitions of Threats

Arctic, The defined as the emerging geopolitics in the region occurring as a result of increased access to natural resources, heightened military operations, territorial claims and issues of sovereignty disputed among the Arctic nations.

Attack on the Homeland defined as an attack on the continental territory of the United States or any of its dependent or unincorporated territories (excluding bases of operation and embassies overseas).

Attacks on Critical Bases of Operation Overseas defined as attacks on United States military or diplomatic bases of operation overseas.

Border Control defined as U.S. control over its borders between Canada and Mexico, as well as its ability to protect it from a range of illicit and illegal activity. For the purposes of this research border control is defined strictly in the domestic sense.

Child Soldiers defined as, "any person below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group, whether or not an armed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in combat, laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, cooking and domestic labour [*sic*]. Child soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or other forms of sexual abuse."[1747]

Climate Change defined as "changes in the physical environment or biota… which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare," caused by "natural variability" and/or human activity over "comparable time periods."[1748] For the purposes of this research climate change is defined in regards to domestic effects within the United States or its effect on the ability of the U.S. to operate overseas as a military, political or economic force.

[1747] See, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, op. cit., p. 411.
[1748] Pachauri and Reisinger, op. cit., and *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, op. cit.

Cyber Warfare defined as, "an armed conflict conducted in whole or part by cyber means. Military operations conducted to deny an opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems and weapons in a conflict. It includes cyber-attack, cyber defense, and cyber enabling actions." Cyber space is furthermore defined as the, "domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures." In earlier threat assessment reports, cyberwarfare is sometimes referred to as "information warfare."[1749]

Disruptive Technologies defined as low-cost, easily obtained technologies that provide state and non-state actors with an asymmetric advantage over tradition technologies (including electromagnetic pulse devices, improvised explosive devises, electronic jamming equipment, etc.). Disruptive technologies are separate and distinct from any form of weapons of mass destruction (defined as those weapons possessing a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear [CBRN] element) and do not include conventional explosives.

Energy Security defined as America's ability to secure and/or maintain both domestic and international sources for energy (including petroleum, natural gas, etc.). For the purposes of this research energy security is defined strictly in the domestic sense.

Espionage defined as the practice of spying or the use of spies to obtain sensitive military or political information about another state of sub-state group. For the purposes of this research espionage is defined strictly in the domestic sense (i.e. the use of espionage by external agents against the United States).

Failed States defined as characterized by the following attributes, "the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services; the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community."[1750]

Food Security defined as, "including both physical and economic access to food that meets people's dietary needs as well as their food preferences."[1751] The World Health Organization recognizes food security as being built on three pillars, "food availability: sufficient quantities of food available on a consistent basis; food access: having sufficient resources to obtain appropriate foods for a nutritious diet; food use: appropriate use based on knowledge of basic nutrition and care, as well as adequate water and sanitation."[1752]

Freedom of the Global Commons defined as the ability of America and its ally's ability to freely and safely operate in areas governed by international law, including oceans, deep space, the atmosphere, the polar regions and the Antarctic (excluding cyberspace).

Global Financial Crisis/Economic Destabilization defined as grave economic instability or collapse at the local, regional or international level due any number of intentional or

---

[1749] *Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), pp. 7-8

[1750] On failed states and their definition, see the Fund for Peace's annual *State Fragility Index* (formerly the *Failed State Index*). *What does state fragility mean?* (Washington, D.C: The Fund for Peace, 2014).

[1751] *Food Security.* (Geneva: The World Health Organization, 2014).

[1752] "Food Security," op. cit.

unintentional factors (including government corruption and mismanagement, sustained conflict, failure of banking industry, failed investment strategies, debt or default).

Human Rights Crimes defined as the widespread and systemic abuse of human rights by state and sub-state groups in the context of those rights outlined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent relevant international law specifically governing war crimes and crimes against humanity.[1753]

Human Trafficking defined is a form of modern slavery and is characterized by a situation in which someone obtains or holds a person (including children, women, and men) for involuntary service, compelling them by force, fraud, or coercion to commercial sexual exploitation or forced labor.[1754]

Humanitarian Disasters defined as those disasters of a natural and/or human-made origin, and due to a natural alteration in the earth's eco system and/or the direct and purposeful actions of a government or a sub state group to effects radical changes in the environment and, as a result, the ability of human beings to subsist in a specified area.

Illegal Migration defined as any form of illegal entry (i.e. by way of trespassing, fraud, etc.) into the United States as an illegitimate national (man, woman or child) of another country for any reason (i.e. labor, criminality, etc.). For the purposes of this research illegal migration is defined strictly in the domestic sense.

Interstate Warfare defined as the conduct of sustained hostilities between the military forces of two sovereign countries.

Intra-state Warfare defined as the conduct of hostilities confined within a single state and conducted by rival groups including both state and non-state actors (i.e. civil war, insurgency, ethnic/religious/tribal conflict).

Missiles defined as any self-propelled guided weapons systems carrying a conventional or unconventional (i.e. CBRN) explosive. For the purposes of this research missiles are defined strictly in the context of potential attacks on the United States (at home or against critical bases of operations overseas), its allies or interests.

Narco-Trafficking defined as the, "global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to prohibition laws."[1755]

[1753] *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (The Hague: International Criminal Court, 1998); *The Geneva Conventions.* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949) and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (Paris: United Nations, 1949).

[1754] Definition compiled from the United Nations and the U.S. State Department. See Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Person. See, "Definitions and Methodology" in the *Trafficking In Persons Report.* (Washington, D.C: Department of State, 2013), pp. 29-34 and United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and The Protocols Thereto.* (Palermo: United Nations, 2000).

[1755] Definition from the United Nations. See, "Drug trafficking." United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014.

National Debt defined as the amount of debt owed by the United States government. For the purposes of this research national debt is defined strictly in the domestic sense.

Pandemics defined as an epidemic resulting from the spread of infectious diseases among a population at the local, regional or international level.

Piracy as defined by the Law of the Sea as, "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described [above]."[1756]

Poverty defined as a, "reflection of the inability of individuals, households, families, or entire communities to attain a minimum and socially accepted standard of living measured in terms of basic consumption needs or income required to satisfy those needs."[1757] The United Nations adds it, "has various manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterized by a lack of participation in decision-making, and in civil, social and cultural life."[1758] *Also see Unemployment.*

Refugees defined as those individuals who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."[1759]

Security of Allies, The defined as the level of safety and security of American allies as a factor of its relationship to, and dependence on, the United States as a military, political, or economic partner.

Small Arms defined as, "any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive… [small arms] are defined for individual use. They include, inter

---

[1756] *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.* (Montego Bay: United Nations, 1982), Article 101.

[1757] Zitha Mokomane. *Types of good practices focusing on family poverty reduction and social exclusion."* Paper presented at United Nations Expert Group Meeting on "Good Practices in Family Policy Making: Family Policy Development, Monitoring and Implementation: Lessons Learnt." (United Nations: New York, May 15-17, 2012), p. 1.

[1758] *World Summit for Social Development Programme of Action* (Copenhagen: United Nations, 1995), paragraph 19.

[1759] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.* (Geneva: United Nations, 1951).

alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns."[1760]

Space Dominance defined as the disruption of America's dominance of space, space exploration, space-based resources, and space-based military or infrastructure technologies. For the purposes of this research the dominance of space is defined strictly in the domestic sense.

Terrorism defined as, according to the U.S Department of Defense, "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political."[1761]

Transnational Criminal Organizations defined as, according to the U.S. Government, "those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/ or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms."[1762] TCOs have no single structure nor are they confined to a single realm of criminal activity, rather, they take many forms and commit a diversity of illegal acts. The U.S. *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* notes that, "transnational organized criminals act conspiratorially in their criminal activities and possess certain characteristics which may include, but are not limited to: in at least part of their activities they commit violence or other acts which are likely to intimidate, or make actual or implicit threats to do so; they exploit differences between countries to further their objectives, enriching their organization, expanding its power, and/or avoiding detection/apprehension; they attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through corrupt as well as legitimate means; they have economic gain as their primary goal, not only from patently illegal activities but also from investment in legitimate businesses; and they attempt to insulate both their leadership and membership from detection, sanction, and/ or prosecution through their organizational structure."[1763]

Unemployment defined as the state of being without a job, but actively seeking one. *Also see Poverty.*

Water Security defined as the security of water resources to meet basic human needs, ensure quality of life, and the production of necessary resources in the United States and overseas; the depletion of which is defined as a result of both environmental and/or manmade factors.

[1760] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. *Small Arms and Light Weapons: Selected United Nations Documents.* (New York: United Nations, 2008), p. 19

[1761] The lack of definitional consensus regarding terrorism by the UN highlights the complex politics involved in doing so. Although no single definition of terrorism has been widely adopted by the international community, I have chosen this definition exclusively for the purposes of this research. See *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* op. cit., p. 257.

[1762] *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2011), p. iii.

[1763] *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security*, op. cit., p. iii.

Weapons of Mass Destruction defined as a weapon (of any size or type) that disperses or attempts to disburse, a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agent as defined under international law.

APPENDIX TWO: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Quadrennial Defense Review (2001, 2006, 2010, 2014)

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (2010, 2014)

The *National Defense Strategy* (2005, 2008, 2012)

The *National Security Strategy* (2002, 2006, 2010)

The Central Intelligence Agency *Annual Threat Assessment* statement (2000-2014)

The Defense Intelligence Agency's *Threat Assessments* (2007, 2011, 2012, 2013)

APPENDIX THREE: EXTERNAL SYSTEMIC THREAT ASSESSMENT MEASURE

The External Systemic Threat Assessment Measure was created for the purpose of these research to provide a (relatively) independent measure of threat level which could be used as a comparable factor against the Content and Discourse Analysis scores and survey data. Using a binary scoring methodology and analyzing a range of broad factors, the measure aims to remove (some degree of) subjectivity through quantifying a set of materials factors that are generally taken into account when assessing threats.

1. Select a threat from the Threat Weight List[1764]

2. Determine the threat environment is for the given threat by examining the following criteria. In order to be considered a threat, it must fulfill at least three of the following criteria (for the first response score 1; for the second response score 0; if it fulfills both score 1).

a. Is it an existential threat (Yes/No)?
b. What type of threat does it pose (National/Global)
c. Type of threat (State/Non-State)
d. Spatial dimension of threat (Domestic/Foreign)
e. Objective of threat (Political/Military or Economic/Social)
f. Target of threat (Domestic/Foreign)
g. Range of threat tactics (Symmetric/Asymmetric)
h. Capabilities (High/Low)

3. Having established there is a threat, and with an understanding of the threat environment, the weight of the threat can then be determined by scoring/weighing the threat(s) level on a 10-point scale (see threat scale explanation below) based on the following weighted criteria:

a. Existence (i.e. there a demonstrable/present threat to cause extreme destruction or existential harm to the U.S.)
1 – Yes
0 – No

b. Capability (i.e. adversary has demonstrated ability to pose a threat or attack, or the adversary has been assessed as being capable of posing a threat or attacking)
1 – Yes
0 – No

c. Intent (i.e. adversary has stated or it has been assessed that adversary will pose a threat or attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

d. History (i.e. adversary has demonstrated threatening behavior or has attacked the in the past)

[1764] See Appendix 1.1: All Threats.

1 – Yes
0 – No

e. Targeting (i.e. there is an indication that adversary is preparing to pose a threat or to attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

f. Probability (i.e. there is a greater prospect than not that the adversary will pose a threat or launch an attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

g. Temporal (i.e. time span until attack)
1 – Short term/imminent
0.5 – Intermediate
0 – Long term/non-imminent

h. Consequences (i.e. effect of attack)
1 – Extreme
0.5 – Moderate
0 – Low

i. Security environment (i.e. is the U.S. making preparations against the adversary and/or for the possible attack)
1 – No
(-1) – Yes

The objective level of threat is then calculated based on the follow scale:

0 – no threat (i.e. threat-free environment)
1 – negligible threat
2 – very low threat
3 – low threat
4 – low to moderate threat
5 – moderate threat
6 – moderate to high threat
7 – high threat
8 – very high threat
9 – extreme threat (i.e. under attack/engaged in war)

APPENDIX FOUR: CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

Appendix 4.1: Leadership Hypothesis

A second explanation for why the prioritization of threats is a micro level explanation, suggesting that individuals, specifically the chief executive, is most responsible for the prioritization of threats.[1765] Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones write, "no other single actor can focus attention as clearly, or change the motivations of such a great number of other

---

[1765] The literature on this topic is prolific. Examples include, George Alexander. *Presidential Decision making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); James E. Anderson *Public Policy and Politics in America.* North Scituate: Duxbury: Pacific Grove, 1978); James David Barber. *Politics by Humans: Research on American Leadership.* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988); James David Barber. *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* (New York: Pearson's Education, Inc., 2008); Andrew Bennett. "Who Rules the Roost? Congressional-Executive Relations on Foreign Policy After the Cold War" in (ed.) Robert Lieber, *Eagle Rules: Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century.* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), pp. 47-69; Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleischer. *The President in the Legislative Arena.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder. *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Jeffrey E. Cohen. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda." *American Journal of Political Science* (1995), pp. 87–107; Lamont Colucci. *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape Our Present and Future* (Volume 1 and 2). (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012); Kevin Doughtry. *Military Decision-Making Processes: Case Studies Involving the Preparation, Commitment, Application and Withdrawal of Force.* (Jefferson: McFarland & Inc., Publishers, 2014), pp. 97-114; George C. Edwards, III. *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); George C. Edwards, III and Andrew Barrett. "Presidential Agenda-Setting in Congress" in (eds.). Jon R. Bond, and Richard Fleischer, *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era.* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2000); George C. Edwards, III, and B. Dan Wood. "Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media." *The American Political Science Review* (1999), pp. 327–44; Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Jeffrey S. Peake. "Presidential Influence Over the Systemic Agenda." *Congress and the Presidency* (2004), pp. 181–201; Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Jeffrey S. Peak. "Presidents and the Economic Agenda." *Political Research Quarterly* (2005), pp. 127–138; Roy B. Flemming, B. Dan Wood, and John Bohte. "Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macro-Dynamics of American Policy Agendas." *The Journal of Politics* (1999), pp. 76–108; James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock. "Psychology and International Relations Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* (2001); Bryan Groves. "To Escalate or Not to Escalate." *Medium.* (April 20, 2014); Margaret G. Hermann. *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders.* (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Margaret G. Hermann. "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders." *International Studies Quarterly* (1980), pp. 7-46; Ole Holsti. *The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems.* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1977); Alex Roberto Hybel. *US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Response to International Challenges.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); John W. Kingdon. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1995); Paul C. Light. *The President's Agenda.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Richard E. Neustadt. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Regan.* (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Joseph S. Nye. *Presidential leadership and the creation of the American era.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Jeffrey S. Peake. "Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy." *Political Research Quarterly* (2001), pp. 69–86; Jeffrey S. Peake and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha. "The Agenda-Setting Impact of Major Presidential Addresses." *Political Communication* (2008), pp. 113–37; David J. Rothkopf. *National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2014); Andrew Rudalevige. *Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Paul E. Rutledge and Heather A. Larsen Prince. "The President as Agenda-Setter-in-Chief: The Dynamics of Congressional and Presidential Agenda Setting." *The Policy Studies Journal* (2014), pp. 443-463; John E. Stoessinger. *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy.* (New York: Norton, 1979) and B. Dan Wood and Jeffrey S. Peake. "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting." *The American Political Science Review* (1998), pp. 173–184.

actors, as the president."[1766] Michael Nelson notes there is the power of the presidential office (an institutional explanation) but also the power of the president himself (an individual level explanation).[1767] Such reasoning dictates personal characteristics, exercised in a particular historical context and bureaucratic environment determines threat prioritization.[1768] This explanation posits that by examining the philosophy; ideology; beliefs; and worldview of presidents, these unitary actors become the "decisive element" in regards to prioritization and policy.[1769] As John Stoessinger writes, power is an objective fact, but how leaders use it creates subjective (or prejudiced) facts.[1770] He adds, unique personality traits can be definitive and who is in power, therefore, matters.[1771]

In his research on presidential personalities, James David Barber posits that the individual has an enormous impact on foreign policy. He writes, "the degree and quality of a president's emotional involvement in an issue are powerful influences on how he defines the issue, how much attention he pays to it, which facts and persons he sees as relevant to its resolution, and finally, what principles and purposes he associates with the issues."[1772] Barber adds, "every story of Presidential decision-making is really two stories: an outer one in which a rational man calculates and an inner one in which an emotional man feels. The two are forever connected." [1773] Barber posits presidents define foreign policy by performing political roles (i.e. rhetoric, personal relations and understanding of the issues); in worldviews (i.e. relevant beliefs and conceptions of morality, human nature, social causality); as a measure of

---

[1766] Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 241.

[1767] Michael Nelson. "Person and Office: Presidents, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), pp. 180-188. Also see Snider, op. cit., p. 19.

[1768] James M. McCormick. "Decision-Makers and Their Policymaking Positions" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), p. 320; James M. McCormick. "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), p. 16 and Martin Zapfe. "People decide, parameters shape: US foreign policy under Barack Obama" in Oliver Thranert and Martin Zape (eds.) *Strategic Trend 2014: Key Developments in Global Affairs*. (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2014), pp. 83-101.

[1769] John Stoessinger. "Crusaders and Pragmatists: two Types of Foreign Policy Makers" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 448. For example, see Daniel Zoughbie. "Interpreting George W. Bush's foreign policy" in (eds.) Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hull, *Interpreting Global Security*. (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 53-72.

[1770] Stoessinger (1983), p. 448.

[1771] Stoessinger (1983), p. 448.

[1772] Barber, op. cit., p. 4.

[1773] Barber, op. cit., p. 4.

character (i.e. personal orientation); and in the context of power dynamics as well as the "climate of expectations" in which decisions are made.[1774]

Presidents determining threat prioritization is best illustrated by unilateral declaration. President William J. Clinton and President George W. Bush, for example, declared HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security like President Richard Nixon did with narcotics. Others have unilaterally identified and constructed threats, bypassing Congressional approval, and employing the War Powers Resolution to launch military operations.[1775] As Martin Kalb suggests, "words have consequence. Spoken by a president, they can often become American policy, with or without congressional approval... In matters of national security, his powers have become awesome – his word decisive."[1776] For example, Clinton declared the massacre of Bosnians and Kosovars as a justifiable threat to U.S. security, requiring missiles strikes, as Yugoslavia dissolved. Bush justified the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by employing the terrorist threat, WMDs and regional instability.[1777] And Obama launched strikes against Libya, declaring civilian protection within the U.S. national interest.[1778] Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Christopher Linebarger note, "it is the president's actions that encapsulate U.S. foreign policy, and moreover, presidential rhetoric is a primary indication of an administration's foreign policy positions [and his] management of foreign policy bureaucracy."[1779]

A president's perception, Robert Jervis notes, is as important as his 'misperception,' emphasizing the potent role of the individual in determining foreign policy outcomes. He writes, "in determining how he will behave, an actor must try to predict how others will act and how their actions will affect his values. The actor must therefore develop an image of others and of their intentions. This image may, however, turn out to be an inaccurate one; the

---

[1774] Barber, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

[1775] Ryan C. Hendrickson notes that Presidents have authorized the use of force over 300 times. Congress has declared war only five times. See Ryan C. Hendrickson. *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress and War Powers.* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), p. 1. Also see, Joseph G. Dawson. *Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars.* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993); Louis Fisher. "Presidents Who Initiate Wars" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), pp. 189-208 and Elizabeth N. Saunders. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[1776] Martin Kalb. *The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed.* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2013), p. 7

[1777] For example, see Gaddis (2006), p. 84.

[1778] Barack Obama. *Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya.* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, March 28, 2011).

[1779] Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Christopher Linebarger. "Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2013), p. 1.

actor may, for a number of reasons, misperceive both others' actions and their intentions."[1780] In practice, Jervis adds, "when we say that a decision-maker 'dislikes' another state this usually means that he believes that that other state has policies conflicting with those of his nation, reasoning and experience indicate to the decision-maker that the 'disliked' state is apt to harm his state's interests."[1781] Perception is, therefore, a highly imperfect measure of potential outcomes.[1782]

Threats the president identifies, moreover, tend to be prioritized. For example, the evolution of Africa as a central preoccupation in U.S national security has increased the level of prioritization regarding health as tenant of U.S. foreign policy. In 2003, following his predecessor, Bush embraced HIV/AIDS as a threat to the U.S., committing $15 billion to defeating the global pandemic. Making it a central pillar of his administration's foreign policy, he allocated more funds to defeat it than any other head of state before or since.[1783] Obama continued the U.S. commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, announcing his Global Health Initiative (GHI) and calling for increased preventative, treatment, care and training measures for practitioners and patients across the world.[1784] Sandra Joireman notes this response, "reflects the way in which Africa fits into the US national security agenda… the African security concerns of greatest interest to US policy is terrorism and state failure [and] a state cannot stand when great numbers of its people are decimated by disease."[1785]

But the president does not always identify prioritized threats as such. A president might avoid identifying an issue as a threat or frame a threat more favorably than the objective, or externally perceived, reality to eschew inflaming rhetoric, heightened provocation, or out of an increased fear of the threat itself. In 2013, for example, Obama indicated his acceptance of moderate overtones and gestures of accommodation from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (who replaced the antagonistic Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). Obama relaxed goodwill exchanges and humanitarian sanctions on Iran, commencing new discussions on the Iran's nuclear energy development and weapons program, despite not having official diplomatic

---

[1780] Robert Jervis. "Hypothesis on Misperception." *World Politics* (1968), p. 454.
[1781] Jervis (1968), op. cit., p. 454.
[1782] Jervis (1968), op. cit., pp. 456-457.
[1783] George W. Bush. *The State of the Union.* (Washington, D.C.: The Capital, 2003).
[1784] Alexandra E. Kendall. *U.S. Response to the Global Threat of HIV/AIDS: Basic Facts.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), p. 9.
[1785] Joireman, op. cit., p. 147.

relations for over thirty years.[1786] This occurred notwithstanding U.S. policy towards, or ongoing military and covert actions against, the Iranian regime, its proxy states and nefarious associates (like Hezbollah) across the Middle East. The same can be said of Russia, which according to defense and intelligence agencies, is an existential threat to U.S. security (in regards to its actions in Eastern Europe, the Artic and cyberspace as well its increasing defense spending and new technology development).[1787]

For a leadership hypothesis to be true, we would expect to see a leadership bias in threat prioritization. We would expect to find different administrations constructing different issues as threats, a result of an individual presidents' personal convictions, policy perspectives and political goals. We would expect to find that post-Cold War Democratic administrations (i.e. Clinton and Obama) would differ from Republican administrations (i.e. Bush and Bush). To test this proposition, I would use a similar methodology outlined by this research proposal. I used the CDA to determine a weighted score for each threat, but examining threat prioritization as segmented by the times periods of different post-Cold War presidents, including the Bush administration (1989-1993); the Clinton administration (1993-2001); the Bush administration (2001-2009); and the Obama administration (2009-2014). For this hypothesis to be substantiated we would expect to discover a significant degree of variance in threat prioritization between administrations. And we would expect to see a significant degree of variance in the strategy used to defeat certain threats, and not the level of prioritization, because presidents (not operating in a vacuum), must sometimes escalate or deescalate strategies, without necessarily changing its level of prioritization.

If this methodological approach best explains the prioritization of threats, we would therefore anticipate significant changes in policies between administrations. But this is not the case. Threat perception remains remarkably stable over time, as indicated by a review of U.S. assessments during the Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations.[1788] For example, Clinton, Bush and Obama all prioritized terrorism, though Clinton tended towards a strategy

---

[1786] Rick Gladstone. "U.S. Eases Sanctions to Allow Good-Will Exchanges with Iran." *New York Times* (September 10, 2013) and Patrick Zengerle and Arshad Mohammed. "Iran nuclear deal 'not perfect' but buys time: U.S. official." *Reuters* (February 4, 2013).

[1787] Nancy Youssef and Noah Shachtman. "Pentagon: Team Obama is 'Too Timid' on Putin." *The Daily Beast* (August 6, 2015).

[1788] In his review of threats to U.S. security across these four administrations, James Sperling writes, "there has been a remarkable degree of continuity in the definition and agents of threat between 1990-2009, despite marked differences in ideological orientation or presidential attitude towards the nature of America's engagement in the outside world." See Sperling, "United States," op. cit., pp. 176-177.

of limited force (i.e. mitigation), while Bush and Obama, given the failure of Clinton's strategy to succeed in creating a 'total security' situation, both employed a policy of traditional force (i.e. subjugation). Still, the level of prioritization across the three administrations remained high. Mustapha writes, "the substantive aspects of Obama's foreign policy and counter-terrorism agenda are not remarkably different from Bush's War on Terrorism. That is to say, there is an observable continuity in American policies, 'on the ground.'"[1789] Despite promising to decrease subjugating policies employed against Islamist terrorism during his campaign, Obama continued most Bush-era policies, leaving open the Guantanamo Bay terrorist detainment facility; increasing drone strikes and targeted assassinations; and continuing the use of rendition and foreign prisons (i.e. "black sites") to defeat al Qaeda and its allies.[1790] In some cases he has expanded Bush's policies. [1791] Engelhardt adds,

> What does it mean when the most military-obsessed administration in our history, which, year after year, submitted ever more bloated Pentagon budgets to Congress, is succeeded by one headed by a president who ran, at least partially, on an antiwar program, and who then submitted an even larger Pentagon budget. What does this tell you about the viability of non-militarized alternatives to the path George W. Bush took? What does it mean when the new administration, surveying nearly eight tears and two wars worth of disasters, decides to expand the U.S. Armed Forces rather than shrink the U.S. global mission?"[1792]

The implication being leadership explanations do not explain threat prioritization. This is because alternative explanatory variables (like political culture and institutions), have a more significant impact. Regardless of their desires, presidents are far more bound by the discourse of national security and the institutions which implement policies then this hypothesis could justify.

[1789] Mustapha, op. cit., p. 501.

[1790] Jack Holland writes, "for a President elected upon an apparent platform of change, the foreign policy of the forty-fourth president has demonstrated a surprising degree of continuity with that of his predecessor." He attributes this, in part, to the president being, "structurally limited in the change that was possible." See Jack Holland. "Understanding continuity in Barack Obama's foreign policy" in (eds.) Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland *Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1-2. Also see *Covert Drone War.* (London, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2014; Anand Gopal. "Obama's Secret Prisons: Night Raids, Hidden Detentions Centers, the 'Black Jail,' and the Dogs of War in Afghanistan." *The Huffington Post.* (January, 28, 2010); Karen Greenberg. "From Guantanamo to Limitless War, Obama's Failure to Live Up to His Own Five Commandments." *Mother Jones.* (February 28, 2014) and Donna G. Starr-Deelen. *Presidential Policies on Terrorism: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[1791] Conor Friedersdorf. "3 Ways Obama Expanded War Powers Well Beyond George W. Bush." *The Atlantic* (November 7, 2014).

[1792] Englehardt, Tom. *The American Way of War: How Bush's Wars Became Obama's.* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010), p. 3.

Mary Hampton writes, "observers expected a deep culture shift upon [Obama's] election; they were wrong."[1793] This is because, McCormick notes, "the positions and the processes rather than the characteristics of the people who decide influence the behavior and choices of those responsible for making and executing the nation's foreign policy."[1794] He adds, changes in policy have more to do with changes in the conception of the role, not who fills it, implying an institutional approach has better explanatory power.[1795] This is illustrated by the U.S. approach to terrorism, which displayed remarkable continuity under Bush and Obama (despite Obama's assertions he would end his predecessor's practices).[1796] As Albert Hunt suggests, the 'overreach' of the Bush administration became the 'new normal' under Obama.[1797] And Mustapha adds, "the substantive aspects of Obama's foreign policy and counter-terrorism agenda are not remarkably different from Bush's War on Terrorism. That is to say, there is an observable continuity in American policies, 'on the ground.'"[1798]

The Executive branch, in reality, is more than just the president. It consists of many individuals and groups with divergent goals and objectives, lending credence the rejection of an explanation focusing on the preferences of individual presidents.[1799] Kevin Marsh writes, "while the president is objectively the single most important and powerful actor in the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process, to claim U.S. foreign policy-making process is effectively dominated by the president effectively dismisses substantial evidence to the

---

[1793] Mary N. Hampton. *A Thorn in Transatlantic Relations: American and European Perceptions of Threat and Security.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 155.

[1794] McCormick, "Decision-Makers and Their Policymaking Positions," op. cit., p. 320.

[1795] McCormick, "Decision-Makers and Their Policymaking Positions," op. cit., p. 320.

[1796] For example, in 2007 Obama issued a campaign promise to close Guantanamo Bay. Despite signing legislation in 2009, directly following his inauguration, the detainee camp remained as of 2018. Furthermore, Obama promised to increase the transparency of government, yet his time in office has been plagued by allegations and revelations of increasing classification of information; the overreach of U.S. domestic and international spying program; the expansion of targeted assassinations; and the expansion of the War on Terrorism (specifically in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula). See, Jo Becker and Scott Shane. "Secret Kill Lists Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will." *New York Times* (May 29, 2012); Anne Broache. "Obama: No warrantless wiretaps if you elect me." *CNET* (January 8, 2008); Charles Ornstein and Hagit Limor. "Where's the transparency that Obama promised?" *Washington Post* (March 31, 2011); Paul Thacker. "Where the Sun Don't Shine." *Slate* (March 15, 2011); Nick Turse. "Obama's Scramble for Africa." *TomDispatch* (July 12, 2012) and David Wagner. "Obama's Failed Campaign Promise to Close Gitmo: A Timeline." *The Atlantic Wire* (January 28, 2013).

[1797] Albert Hunt. "Bush's Terror Overreach Becomes 'New Normal' Under Obama." *Bloomberg* (May 27, 2012).

[1798] Mustapha, op. cit., p. 501.

[1799] Jerel Rosati. "Explaining SALT from a Bureaucratic Politics Perspective" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 365-366. Also see Doughtry, op. cit., pp. 81-96.

contrary."[1800] He adds, "the president does not simply issue foreign policy *diktas* that are then faithfully implemented by the foreign policy community."[1801] Wherein the President might have slightly more power, or as Stephen Krasner points out, opportunity to choose the players of the game. He remains only marginally more influential among an array of competing influences.[1802] Decisions are thereby politically resultant and are often continued between a 'final' decision and its implementation, as it interacts with an entirely new array of actors and interests.[1803] As Ikenberry, Brooks and Wohlforth write, "the details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on a policy of deep engagement in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted."[1804] Indeed, Colucci's research goes as far as identifying nine central themes common to all presidential doctrines since George Washington to Obama, suggesting a greater focus on the critical role of political culture rather than that of just individual leadership.[1805]

Those in power, and specifically, elected officials like the president, formulate policy. But it would be both misleading and overly parsimonious to ascribe so much power to the individual.[1806] Kissinger notes, "issues are too complex and relevant facts too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition."[1807] Scholars generally overstate the power of the president to frame and persuade, leading Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz to label the executive more of a 'facilitator' then 'director,' and only influential when advocating on behalf of an already popular position.[1808] Destler adds, "there is no way for reason alone to overcome the diversity of goals and means that are inevitable among participates in foreign policy-

[1800] Kevin Marsh. "Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decisions to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2013), p. 5.

[1801] Marsh, op. cit., p. 5.

[1802] Stephen D. Krasner. "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland). *Foreign Policy* (1972) and Rosati, op. cit., pp. 365-366. Also see John Lovett, Shuan Bevan and Frank R. Baumgartner. "Popular Presidents Can Affect Congressional Attention, For A Little While." *Policy Studies Journal* (2015), pp. 22-43.

[1803] Rosati, op. cit., pp. 365-366.

[1804] Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Lean Forward." *Foreign Affairs* (2013).

[1805] Colucci, op. cit., pp. 11-17.

[1806] Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 425.

[1807] Kissinger (1966), op. cit., p. 507.

[1808] Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz. "The Sound of Silence: Rhetorical Coercion, Democratic Acquiescence and the Iraq War" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 119.

making."[1809] This does not deny the president's impact, but rather to address the question of under what conditions their specific qualities have the most impact.[1810] An individual level-analysis, therefore, appears too parsimonious and insufficient to explain variance in threat prioritization. I therefore reject the explanation in light of the persuasive and compelling data to the contrary.

Appendix 4.2: Organized Interest Groups Explanation

A third explanation posits that the size, strength and relationships of certain special economic interests relative to others determine the prioritization of threats. Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page write, many scholars "emphasize the decisive influence of organized interest groups on foreign policy. The assumption is that foreign policy is a function of shifting coalitions of multiple and competing political and societal actors."[1811] For the purposes of this research, organized interest groups are defined as non-state actors, functioning in society but outside the formal levers of government.[1812] They run the gamut from large lobbyist firms, political party machines, and the media, to advocacy networks, non-governmental organizations and individual activists.[1813] This range of actors, James M. McCormick notes, results America's from evolving notions of security, which have expanded to include economic, environmental and social issues.[1814] Furthermore, the number of groups attempting to exert their influence and achieve their agenda through the policymaking process has risen exponentially.[1815] As one bureaucrat interviewed for the purposes of this research noted, "at the highest level of national security, the White House tends to take into consideration how

---

[1809] I.M. Destler. *Presidents. Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 56.

[1810] Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf, op. cit., p. 425.

[1811] Jacobs and Page cite Keohane as an example. See Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page. "Business Versus Public Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy" in (ed.) G. John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays.* (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), p. 358 and Robert Keohane. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[1812] McCormick. "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy", op. cit., pp. 13, 16 and 19.

[1813] McCormick. "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy", op. cit., pp. 13, 16 and 19.

[1814] James M. McCormick. "Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James M. McCormick. *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), p. 68.

[1815] McCormick, "Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 68. For a modern example of this phenomenon, see Tom Hamburger and Alexander Becker. "At fast-growing Brookings, donors may have an impact on research agenda." *Washington Post* (October 30, 2014).

strongly certain groups of Americans feel about an issue and it's also part of the threat definition."[1816]

Organized interest groups are able to exert influence through a complex array of power relationships, message transmission and feedback loops that includes the mass media, political parties, foreign governments, foreign and domestic interest groups, opinion leaders, civil society, elected officials, appointed officials and bureaucratic processes.[1817] Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall write, "once a threat has been established, wrongly or rightly, there is an incentive for interest groups, corporations, government agencies, and politicians to continue to inflate the threat in order to achieve material, policy, and electoral goals."[1818] Claims about the effects of organized interest groups on foreign policy are ripe with historical examples. Jeff Friedan notes, following the end of the Civil War through to the early 1900s, it was the individual investments and businesses of the industrial and financial sectors of the U.S. market that drove U.S. involvement in global affairs.[1819] He writes that the post-World War I era, "saw the construction of formal and informal institutions and networks that have ever since been at the center of the American foreign policy establishment."[1820] Increasingly, financiers, bankers and other private individuals came to serve on consultative policy boards or as advisors to the president and organizations like the Council on Foreign Relation or the Foreign Policy Association which, "brought scholars, bankers, journalists, politicians, and government officials together in the pursuit of internationalism."[1821] The effects of organized interest groups, some academics suggest, remains today, albeit on a far larger scale. According to one estimate there are as many as 11,000 firms and lobbies employing approximately 17,000 people, and spending more than $3.5 billion annually in an attempt to exert influence on U.S.

[1816] Interview with Subject 10, op. cit. and See Appendix Five: Interview Subject Identification

[1817] See chart in Lester Milbrath. "Interests Groups and Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James N. Rosenau, *Domestic Sources in Foreign Policy.* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 234 and in Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter. "The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis." *Annual Review of Political Science* (2008), p. 41. Also see Kay, op. cit., pp. 223-236 and Michael Mastanduno. "The United States Political System and International Leadership: A 'Decidedly Inferior' Form of Government?" in (ed.) G. John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays.* (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), p. 256.

[1818] Cramer and Thrall, op. cit., p. 7.

[1819] Jeff Frieden. "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940." *International Organization* (1988). Also see William Appleman Williams. *The Roots of The Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society.* (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 4-5.

[1820] Frieden, op. cit., p. 73. For example, see Gary Winslett. "Differential Threat Perceptions: How Transnational Groups Influence Bilateral Security Relations." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2015).

[1821] Frieden, op. cit., p. 73.

foreign policy and potentially the prioritization of threats to U.S. security.[1822] In the wake of 9/11, Cramer and Thrall point out, "interest groups and companies sought to sell themselves as critical to the war on terror, giving them an organizational incentive to make sure that the American public stayed focused on and afraid of the terrorist threat."[1823]

Research conducted by Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson illustrates political systems tends to favor the interests of the powerful and wealthy.[1824] In America, this is defined as the top 0.1 percent or 0.01 percent of the true wealth holders (approximately 15,000 families across the continental U.S.).[1825] The ability of organized interest groups to mobilize and tap into the resources of this wealth turns, "politics into organized combat" – a situation in which those with the organizational capabilities to marshal the most resources can exert the most influence on the policymaking process.[1826] This makes big business (as well as political parties) especially powerful in terms of defining the discourse and setting the agenda.[1827]

If the interests of an economic elite best explains the way in which threats are prioritized, we would expect to see that important corporations and the powerful individuals behind them would have a measurably large degree of influence on U.S. national security threat prioritization and policy outcomes.[1828] As C. Wright Mills wrote in 1956, this so-called, "Power Elite" (who Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf refer to as "the Establishment" or who Janine R. Wedel suggests today has evolved into a "Shadow Elite") would therefore be the determining factor in the prioritization of threats.[1829] This is because, as Wedel posits, the U.S. government has become so dependent on non-state actors, including contracting firms, and other private sector entities, that the distinction between government and non-

---

[1822] Further estimates place the number of NGOs as high as 100,000 groups worldwide, further blurring the line between foreign and domestic policy. See, McCormick. "Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 69. Also see Francis Fukuyama. "America in Decay: The Sources of Political Dysfunction." *Foreign Affairs* (2014), p. 16.

[1823] The authors add that the same is true for federal agencies, bureaucrats, politicians and aspirants. See Cramer and Thrall, op. cit., p. 7.

[1824] Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson. *Winner Takes All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer – and Turned its Back on the Middle Class.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), pp. 110-111. Also see Larry M. Bartels. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) and Martin Gilens. "Inequality and Democracy Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* (2005), pp. 778-796.

[1825] Hacker and Pierson, op. cit., p. 16.

[1826] Hacker and Pierson, op. cit., pp. 104-105, 107-110, 167-172 and 113

[1827] Hacker and Pierson, op. cit., pp. 118-121, 143 and 172 and Jacobs and Page, op. cit., pp. 358-359.

[1828] Richard Seymour writes, "in a very general sense, militarization could be seen as an integral part of capitalism." Richard Seymour. "Global military spending an integral part of capitalism." *The Nation* (March 9, 2014).

[1829] Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf, op. cit., p. 170; C. Wright Mills. *The Power Elite.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956) and Jane R. Wedel. *Shadow Elite: How's the World's New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government and the Free Market.* (New York: Basic Books, 2009).

governmental agencies operating across the spectrum of governance has blurred, creating a nexus of official and private power in which policy is coopted and created to serve agendas that excludes the general public from exerting greater influence. [1830] In this way, for example, private industry is able to, "drive policy, rather than the other way around. Or they draft rules that benefit themselves."[1831] By supplanting the state, personalizing and privatizing bureaucracy and information, creating new governance structures and institutional arrangements in order to change the rules of the game, the "Shadow Elite" are able to use critical post-Cold War transformational developments to exert undue levels of influence on the prioritization of certain threats.[1832] Sandra Halperin alleges as much in her description of the political economy of American wars: "the pursuit of profit-making opportunities on behalf of increasingly integrated defense and oil industries has been a defining factor in shaping US… foreign policy."[1833] Jack Jarmon concurs, noting that the interdependency between private interests and the government, "has become even more permanent as the revolution in military affairs and the rise of the surveillance society entwines both spheres in a shared threat and a mutual reliance upon technology."[1834] He adds that, "the manpower and skill sets each control and contribute are essential for national security. The relationship is more inextricable tan before and even more complex. The privatization of security and defense functions has created

---

[1830] Wedel, op. cit., pp. 7, 74-78 and 193. Also see Matthew M. Aid *Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terrorism.* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012); Rupert Cornwell. "The Blackwater trial: A shameful case exposes a murky world." *The Independent* (October 26, 2014); Molly Dunigan. *Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies Military Effectiveness.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Matthias Fahn and Tahimna Sadat Hadjer. "How Blackwater Takes Uncle Same for a Ride - and Why He Likes It: A Model of Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment." (Munich: University of Munich, 2014); Sean McFate. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); John J. Pitney and John-Clark Levin. *Private Anti-Piracy Navies: How Warships for Hire are Changing Maritime Security* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013); Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson. *Contractors and War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2102); Martha Lizabeth Phelps. "Doppelgangers of the State: Private Security and Transferable Legitimacy." *Politics and Policy* (2014); Lou Pingeot and David Torres Pascual. "Privatizing Security." *OpenDemocracy.com.* (November 5, 2014). Accessed November 22, 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/lou-pingeot-david-torres-pascual/privatizing-security-talking-with-lou-pingeot; Priest and Arkin, op. cit.; P.W. Singer *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); David T. Smith. "From the military-industrial complex to the national security state." *Australian Journal Political Science* (2015) and Warren Strobel and Phil Stewart. "As U.S. troops return to Iraq, more private contractors follow." *Reuters* (December 24, 2014).

[1831] Wedel, op. cit., p. 89.

[1832] Wedel, op. cit., pp. 15-19, 27-45, 126-129 and 133-138. Also see Ronald W. Cox. "The Military-Industrial Complex and U.S. Military Spending After 9/11." *Class, Race and Corporate Power* (2014), pp. 1-20.

[1833] Sandra Halperin, "The Political Economy of Anglo-American War: The case of Iraq." *International Politics* (2011) p. 216.

[1834] Jarmon, op. cit., p. 30.

a more multi-layered connection… the role of the private sector has grown considerably."[1835] So much, Jarmon points out, that half of the annual defense budgets goes to defense contractors.[1836] Even Christine Fox, the former acting Deputy Secretary of Defense, criticized the Pentagon's "deference to private industry."[1837] And despite the fact, as Nana de Gaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn point out that, "while the U.S. state apparatus is thus partly managed by members of America's corporate elite, this does not make the state beholden to narrow corporate interests (even if sometimes this might play a role in individual cases)."[1838] We can still accept the basic premise that, "their world view is likely share to a very large extent by their social position as (former) members of affiliates of a class conscious corporate elite."[1839]

But the initial evidence points to the contrary. As Milbrath points out, it is far more difficult for organized interest groups to determine threat prioritization, then, for example, economic policy, for three reasons. First, security decisions are often not open to group influences given their sensitive nature; second, security issues often receive more attention from the media and therefore garner more public scrutiny making them less susceptible to special interests; and, third, the more important the issue, the less likely that collective decision-making will be employed.[1840] Bernard Cohen and William Appleman Williams concur, noting that the impact of special interest groups are limited by the issue, the context, the group's ability to form alliances and transmit its message as well as the general centralization of power and authority inherent in government.[1841] As Norrin M. Ripsman writes, "it is only under a very restricted set of circumstances that domestic interests can determine the definition of the national interests that states pursue."[1842] Although there are examples of organized interest groups affecting foreign policy, there is insufficient evidence that the impact of these groups

---

[1835] Jarmon, op. cit., p. 31.

[1836] Jarmon, op. cit., p. 31.

[1837] Tony Capaccio. "Pentagon Must Stop Deferring to Contractors, Fox Says." *Bloomberg News* (October 2, 2014).

[1838] Nana de Gaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. *America's Post-Cold War Grand Strategy-Makers and the Policy Planning Network.* (San Francisco: Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, April 3, 2103).

[1839] de Gaff and van Apeldoorn, op. cit.

[1840] Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 248-57. Also see Williams (1969), op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[1841] Bernard Cohen. "The Influence of Special Interest Groups and Mass Media on Security Policy in the United States" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) and Williams (1969), op. cit., p. 4.

[1842] Norrin M. Ripsman. "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups" in (eds.) Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 191.

– or, as Cohen writes, the 'military-industrial' complex writ large – is able to effect policy to the degree of prioritizing certain threats over others.[1843]

For example, according to the UN, human trafficking costs the international community approximately $31.6 billion every year, diverting profits from an array of U.S. economic interests in global competition with corporations operating in a lax regulatory environment, not paying a fair labor wage, or who are able to export services to countries permitting low–cost wage or slave labor.[1844] Despite the efforts of numerous U.S. labor organizations, 'big' industries, non-governmental organization and lobbying firms, there is little prioritization by the defense agencies of this threat. On the other hand, pirates, as previously discussed, cost the international community less then $12 billion a year, and yet, the defense community's response is larger in scale.[1845] Given the greater economic impact of human trafficking, its higher level of prioritization in the examined threat assessment reports, and the diversity of special interest groups involved, we would expect that human trafficking would result in a higher degree of prioritization.[1846] This, however, is not the case. Frieden points out that the effect of organized interest groups has far more to do with the institutional setting than any other factor, lending credence to an institutional approach to U.S. national security.[1847] He writes, "underlying socioeconomic interests are mediated through a set of political institutions that can alter their relative influence," meaning that the institutions, and the political culture in which they exist, has more to do with the outcome of policy then individuals exerting influence on the institutions themselves.[1848] For as, Williams writes, there is, "no elite or other scapegoat to blame… there are only ourselves."[1849]

For an organized interest groups hypothesis to be true, we would expect to see a corporate interest bias in regards to threat prioritization, positing that because particular economic interests benefit from particular forms of policy, corporations would use their financial power to affect political decisions.[1850] For an organized interest group explanation to

---

[1843] Cohen, op. cit., pp. 223-224 and 237-239.
[1844] *An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Action (*New York: United Nations, 2008), p. 96.
[1845] Christopher M. Blanchard, et al. *Piracy off the Horn of Africa.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), pp. 17-18.
[1846] On levels of prioritization, and their respective weighted scores, see Appendix One: Threat Weights.
[1847] Frieden, op. cit., p. 89.
[1848] Frieden, op. cit., p. 89.
[1849] Williams (1969), op. cit., p. 46.
[1850] Jane Mayer. "Contract Sport: What did the Vice-President do for Halliburton?" *The New Yorker* (February 16, 2004).

illustrate variance in threat prioritization, we would expect to find these companies use their influence to encourage certain types of policies against certain types of threats that best benefit their ability to increase profits.[1851] We would anticipate a correlation between, for example, the lobbying efforts of these special interests on behalf of a specific policy and a consistent bias in the government choosing this policy. Richard Seymour writes, "the more deeply companies are intertwined with national states, the more they rely on those states to fight their competitive battles on a global stage. Maintaining a military advantage is arguably an intrinsic part of this."[1852] To test this proposition, I could use questions from my interviews and surveys that would probe policymakers, politicians, military officials, journalists, academics and employees of large defense contractors on the role of corporate interests in affecting threat-related policies. For this hypothesis to be substantiated, we would expect to discover a consistent bias in the belief or knowledge that corporate bias has undue influence on threat prioritization and policy outcomes. But the likelihood of revealing such a widely accepted evidentiary bias is minimal at best.

Despite this methodological approach, it is infeasible to establish any substantial causality, but rather correlation or circumstantial evidence. This is because it would be difficult to control for the diversity of factors involved. Even if other factors could be held constant, it is impossible to draw direct causality between profit margins, lobbying efforts and threat prioritization or policy outcomes given then 'uncertain' nature of international relations and the complexity of the policy process. Without a direct revelation by government officials confessing that they permit prioritization and policy decisions to be swayed by economic special interests, it would be impossible to prove, that in fact, this is the case. The lack of related data is problematic, and although there is a conjecture that such situations can and do occur, an organized interest groups approach also falls short of being the best explanation for variance in threat prioritization. These include, for example, the limited number of individuals involved in security decisions of a sensitive nature; the public scrutiny these issues receive from the media making them less susceptible to special interests; the relative (versus total) ability of special interests to form alliances and transmit messages; and the centralization of

---

[1851] Patrick Radden Keefe. "Can Network Theory Thwart Terrorists?" *New York Times* (March 12, 2006).
[1852] Seymour, op. cit.

power and authority in government.[1853] There is, as a result, both a persuasive and compelling reason to not further pursue this explanation.

[1853] Cohen, op. cit.; Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 248-257 and Williams (1969), op. cit., pp. 4-5.

APPENDIX FIVE: INTERVIEW SUBJECT IDENTIFICATION

Subject Identification	Date of Interview	Professional Category
1	August 7, 2014	Military
2	August 13, 2014	Military
3	August 18, 2014	Bureaucrat
4	August 19, 2014	Bureaucrat
5	August 20, 2014	Bureaucrat
6	August 21, 2014	Military
7	August 24, 2014	Bureaucrat
8	August 25, 2014	Military
9	August 28, 2014	Bureaucrat
10	August 29, 2014	Bureaucrat
11	September 1, 2014	Bureaucrat
12	September 2, 2014	Politician
13	September 3, 2014	Bureaucrat
14	September 3, 2014	Military
15	September 5, 2014	Bureaucrat
16	September 8, 2014	Bureaucrat
17	September 11, 2014	Military
18	September 15, 2014	Politician
19	September 15, 2014	Military
20	September 16, 2014	Military
21	September 18, 2014	Politician
22	September 23, 2014	Politician
23	September 23, 2014	Politician
24	September 24, 2014	Politician
25	September 25, 2014	Politician
26	September 26, 2014	Military
27	September 28, 2014	Military
28	September 29, 2014	Politician
29	October 1, 2014	Politician

APPENDIX SIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Q1: The notion of a threat to national security can mean many things. Based on your perspective, how does the government define a threat to national security?

Q2: Can you discuss, in your opinion, how threats to national security are prioritized? Are there any actors, inside or outside the government, that have the most influence?

Q2(A): What about National leaders/the President?

Q2(B): What about Organized (economic) interests (i.e. special or corporate interests)?

Q2(C): What about the international system (external state and non-state actors)?

Q2(D): What about American political culture (defined by elite political discourse)?

Q3: What do you think are the most important factors that government institutions and political leaders take into account when prioritizing threats to American national security?

Q4: Do you think government institutions tend to be biased in how they perceive or prioritize national security threats? Can you give me some examples?

Q5: In general, would you say American policy does or does not reflect the real threats to national security the U.S. faces in the post-Cold War era?

Q6: Do you believe there any threats to national security that the US should be confronting, but is not? Why do you think this/these threats are neglected or not prioritized?

Q7: I am going to list a few potential threats to American security. For each one, I would like you to tell me how much of a priority it is for the U.S. government, and why it is (or is not) seen as a priority

Q7(A): Do you see Terrorism as a priority? Why or why not?

Q7(B): Do you see Narco-trafficking as a priority? Why or why not?

Q7(C): Do you see Climate change as a priority? Why or why not?

Q7(D): Do you see the emerging geopolitical situation occurring as a result of the changing Arctic region as a priority? Why or why not?

APPENDIX SEVEN: ALL THREATS RANKED BY MEAN SCORES (SURVEY RESPONDENTS) AND WEIGHT SCORES (CONTENT & DISCOURSE ANALYSIS)[1854]

Threat Weight	Threat Ranked by Content and Discourse Analysis	Threats Ranked by Survey Respondents	Mean Score
4.00	Weapons of Mass Destruction	Cyber Warfare	7.33
3.88	Terrorism	The Middle East	6.68
3.11	Attack on the Homeland	China	6.63
2.94	Interstate Warfare	Weapons of Mass Destruction	6.56
2.69	China	Iran	6.36
2.63	Afghanistan	Terrorism	6.36
2.59	Russia	Russia	6.20
2.59	Iraq	Global Financial Crisis & Economic Destabilization	5.95
2.59	Cyber Warfare		
		Climate Change	5.94
2.51	Security of Allies	Attack on the Homeland	5.91
2.46	Missiles	Pakistan	5.89
2.44	Africa	The National Debt	5.84
2.44	Intra-state Warfare (irregular/insurgent/civil conflict)	Security of Allies	5.75
2.40	Central & South East Asia	Energy Security	5.73
2.30	East Asia	Pandemics	5.38
2.16	The Middle East	Iraq	5.34
2.15	Pandemics	Failed States	5.28
2.13	Iran	Syria	5.24
2.12	Pakistan	East Asia	5.17
2.08	Global Financial Crisis & Economic Destabilization	Disruptive Technologies	5.16
2.07	Disruption of Space Dominance	North Korea	5.07
2.07	Narco-Trafficking	Poverty & Unemployment	5.06
2.01	Humanitarian Disasters	Israel (in the context of war with Arab nations)	5.05
1.89	North Korea	Attacks on Critical Bases of Operation Overseas	5.03
1.75	Eastern Europe	Intra-state Warfare (irregular/insurgent/civil conflict)	5.02
1.75	Western Europe	Afghanistan	4.95
1.59	Energy Security	Water Security	4.89
1.51	Israel (in the context of war with Arab nations)	Humanitarian Disasters	4.81
1.35	Syria	Border Control	4.63
1.32	Failed States	Espionage	4.61
1.30	Poverty & Unemployment	Food Security	4.44
1.26	Latin America	Disruption of Space Dominance	4.40
1.22	Border Control	Transnational Criminal Organizations	4.35
1.21	Climate Change	Yemen	4.29
1.16	Attacks on Critical Bases of Operation Overseas	Saudi Arabia	4.27
1.07	Food Security	Interstate War	4.20

[1854] Note that the Content and Discourse scores range from 0 to 4 while the mean scores are ranked 1 to 10.

0.94	Human Rights Crimes	Freedom of the Global Commons	4.13
0.91	Water Security	Missiles	4.00
0.90	Disruptive Technologies	Central & South East Asia	3.96
0.85	Somalia	Narco-Trafficking	3.86
0.84	Espionage	Eastern Europe	3.84
0.75	Colombia	Africa	3.70
0.73	Mexico	Mexico	3.63
0.73	Freedom of the Global Commons	Human Trafficking	3.48
0.72	Yemen	Human Rights Crimes	3.32
0.64	Saudi Arabia	Latin America	3.29
0.63	Libya	Libya	3.14
0.61	Illegal Migration	Illegal Migration	3.04
0.61	Venezuela	The Emerging Geopolitical Situation in the Arctic	3.03
0.59	Sudan/South Sudan	Refugees	2.91
0.59	Refugees	Somalia	2.76
0.55	Human Trafficking	Small Arms (use and trafficking)	2.67
0.54	The Emerging Geopolitical Situation in the Arctic	Nigeria	2.52
0.50	Piracy (on the seas)	Sudan/South Sudan	2.46
0.48	Nigeria	Venezuela	2.43
0.48	Small Arms (use and trafficking)	Piracy (on the seas)	2.40
0.27	Transnational Criminal Organizations	Western Europe	2.22
0.19	National Debt	Colombia	2.12
0.00	Child Soldiers	Child Soldiers	1.74

APPENDIX EIGHT: TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EXTERNAL SYSTEMIC THREAT ASSESSMENT MEASURE

1. Select a threat from the Threat Weight List: **Terrorism**

2. Determine the threat environment is for the given threat by examining the following criteria. In order to be considered a threat, it must fulfill at least three of the following criteria (for the first response score 1; for the second response score 0; if it fulfills both score 1).

a. Is it an existential threat (Yes/No)?   **No, Score = 0**
b. What type of threat does it pose (National/Global)   **Both, Score = 1**
c. Type of threat (State/Non State)   **Non State, Score = 0**
d. Spatial dimension of threat (Domestic/Foreign)   **Both, Score = 1**
e. Objective of threat (Political/Military or Economic/Social)   **Both, Score = 1**
f. Target of threat (Domestic/Foreign)   **Both, Score = 1**
g. Range of threat tactics (Symmetric/Asymmetric)   **Asymmetric, Score = 0**
h. Capabilities (High/Low)   **Low, Score = 0**

Terrorism fulfills the criteria of a threat with a Total Score of 4.

3. Having established there is a threat, and with an understanding of the threat environment, the weight of the threat can then be determined by scoring/weighing the threat(s) level on a 10-point scale (see threat scale explanation below) based on the following weighted criteria:

a. Existence (i.e. there a demonstrable/present threat to cause extreme destruction or existential harm to the U.S.)
1 – Yes
0 – No

b. Capability (i.e. adversary has demonstrated ability to pose a threat or attack, or the adversary has been assessed as being capable of posing a threat or attacking)
1 – Yes
0 – No

c. Intent (i.e. adversary has stated or it has been assessed that adversary will pose a threat or attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

d. History (i.e. adversary has demonstrated threatening behavior or has attacked the in the past)
1 – Yes
0 – No

e. Targeting (i.e. there is an indication that adversary is preparing to pose a threat or to attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

f. Probability (i.e. there is a greater prospect than not that the adversary will pose a threat or launch an attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

g. Temporal (i.e. time span until attack)
1 – Short term/imminent
0.5 – Intermediate
0 – Long term/non-imminent

h. Consequences (i.e. effect of attack)
1 – Extreme
0.5 – Moderate
0 – Low

i. Security environment (i.e. is the U.S. making preparations against the adversary and/or for the possible attack)
1 – No
(-1) – Yes

The total score for terrorism in the context of the external systemic threat assessment measure is a 4.5, making it a low to moderate or moderate threat.

The objective level of threat is then calculated based on the follow scale:

0 – no threat (i.e. threat-free environment)
1 – negligible threat
2 – very low threat
3 – low threat
4 – low to moderate threat
5 – moderate threat
6 – moderate to high threat
7 – high threat
8 – very high threat
9 – extreme threat (i.e. under attack/engaged in war)

APPENDIX NINE: NARCO-TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EXTERNAL SYSTEMIC THREAT ASSESSMENT MEASURE

1. Select a threat from the Threat Weight List: **Narco-trafficking**

2. Determine the threat environment is for the given threat by examining the following criteria. In order to be considered a threat, it must fulfill at least three of the following criteria (for the first response score 1; for the second response score 0; if it fulfills both score 1).

a. Is it an existential threat (Yes/No)?	**No, Score = 0**
b. What type of threat does it pose (National/Global)	**Both, Score = 1**
c. Type of threat (State/Non State)	**Non State, Score = 0**
d. Spatial dimension of threat (Domestic/Foreign)	**Both, Score = 1**
e. Objective of threat (Political/Military or Economic/Social)	**Both, Score = 1**
f. Target of threat (Domestic/Foreign)	**Both, Score = 1**
g. Range of threat tactics (Symmetric/Asymmetric)	**Asymmetric, Score = 0**
h. Capabilities (High/Low)	**Low, Score = 0**

Narco-trafficking fulfills the criteria of a threat with a Total Score of 4.

3. Having established there is a threat, and with an understanding of the threat environment, the weight of the threat can then be determined by scoring/weighing the threat(s) level on a 10-point scale (see threat scale explanation below) based on the following weighted criteria:

a. Existence (i.e. there a demonstrable/present threat to cause extreme destruction or existential harm to the U.S.)
1 – Yes
0 – No

b. Capability (i.e. adversary has demonstrated ability to pose a threat or attack, or the adversary has been assessed as being capable of posing a threat or attacking)
1 – Yes
0 – No

c. Intent (i.e. adversary has stated or it has been assessed that adversary will pose a threat or attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

d. History (i.e. adversary has demonstrated threatening behavior or has attacked the in the past)
1 – Yes
0 – No

e. Targeting (i.e. there is an indication that adversary is preparing to pose a threat or to attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

f. Probability (i.e. there is a greater prospect than not that the adversary will pose a threat or launch an attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

g. Temporal (i.e. time span until attack)
1 – Short term/imminent
0.5 – Intermediate
0 – Long term/non-imminent

h. Consequences (i.e. effect of attack)
1 – Extreme
0.5 – Moderate
0 – Low

i. Security environment (i.e. is the U.S. making preparations against the adversary and/or for the possible attack)
1 – No
(-1) – Yes

The total score for terrorism in the context of the external systemic threat assessment measure is 4.5, making it a low to moderate or moderate threat.

The objective level of threat is then calculated based on the follow scale:

0 – no threat (i.e. threat-free environment)
1 – negligible threat
2 – very low threat
3 – low threat
4 – low to moderate threat
5 – moderate threat
6 – moderate to high threat
7 – high threat
8 – very high threat
9 – extreme threat (i.e. under attack/engaged in war)

**APPENDIX TEN: CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
EXTERNAL SYSTEMIC THREAT ASSESSMENT MEASURE**

1. Select a threat from the Threat Weight List: **Climate Change**

2. Determine the threat environment is for the given threat by examining the following criteria. In order to be considered a threat, it must fulfill at least three of the following criteria (for the first response score 1; for the second response score 0; if it fulfills both score 1).

a. Is it an existential threat (Yes/No)?	**Yes, Score = 1**
b. What type of threat does it pose (National/Global)	**Both, Score = 1**
c. Type of threat (State/Non-State)	**Both, Score = 1**
d. Spatial dimension of threat (Domestic/Foreign)	**Both, Score = 1**
e. Objective of threat (Political/Military or Economic/Social)	**Both, Score = 1**
f. Target of threat (Domestic/Foreign)	**Both, Score = 1**
g. Range of threat tactics (Symmetric/Asymmetric)	**Asymmetric, Score = 0**
h. Capabilities (High/Low)	**High, Score = 1**

Climate change fulfills the criteria of a threat with a Total Score of 7.

3. Having established there is a threat, and with an understanding of the threat environment, the weight of the threat can then be determined by scoring/weighing the threat(s) level on a 10-point scale (see threat scale explanation below) based on the following weighted criteria:

a. Existence (i.e. there a demonstrable/present threat to cause extreme destruction or existential harm to the U.S.)
1 – Yes
0 – No

b. Capability (i.e. adversary has demonstrated ability to pose a threat or attack, or the adversary has been assessed as being capable of posing a threat or attacking)
1 – Yes
0 – No

c. Intent (i.e. adversary has stated or it has been assessed that adversary will pose a threat or attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

d. History (i.e. adversary has demonstrated threatening behavior or has attacked the in the past)
1 – Yes
0 – No

e. Targeting (i.e. there is an indication that adversary is preparing to pose a threat or to attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

f. Probability (i.e. there is a greater prospect than not that the adversary will pose a threat or launch an attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

g. Temporal (i.e. time span until attack)
1 – Short term/imminent
0.5 – Intermediate
0 – Long term/non-imminent

h. Consequences (i.e. effect of attack)
1 – Extreme
0.5 – Moderate
0 – Low

i. Security environment (i.e. is the U.S. making preparations against the adversary and/or for the possible attack)
1 – No
(-1) – Yes

The total score for climate change in the context of the external systemic threat assessment measure is 8, making it a very high threat.

The objective level of threat is then calculated based on the follow scale:

0 – no threat (i.e. threat-free environment)
1 – negligible threat
2 – very low threat
3 – low threat
4 – low to moderate threat
5 – moderate threat
6 – moderate to high threat
7 – high threat
8 – very high threat
9 – extreme threat (i.e. under attack/engaged in war)

APPENDIX ELEVEN: THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ARCTIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EXTERNAL SYSTEMIC THREAT ASSESSMENT MEASURE

1. Select a threat from the Threat Weight List: **The Geopolitics of the Arctic**

2. Determine the threat environment is for the given threat by examining the following criteria. In order to be considered a threat, it must fulfill at least three of the following criteria (for the first response score 1; for the second response score 0; if it fulfills both score 1).

a. Is it an existential threat (Yes/No)?	**Yes, Score = 1**
b. What type of threat does it pose (National/Global)	**Both, Score = 1**
c. Type of threat (State/Non-State)	**Both, Score = 1**
d. Spatial dimension of threat (Domestic/Foreign)	**Both, Score = 1**
e. Objective of threat (Political/Military or Economic/Social)	**Both, Score = 1**
f. Target of threat (Domestic/Foreign)	**Both, Score = 1**
g. Range of threat tactics (Symmetric/Asymmetric)	**Both, Score = 1**
h. Capabilities (High/Low)	**High, Score = 1**

The Geopolitics of the Arctic fulfills the criteria of a threat with a Total Score of 8.

3. Having established there is a threat, and with an understanding of the threat environment, the weight of the threat can then be determined by scoring/weighing the threat(s) level on a 10-point scale (see threat scale explanation below) based on the following weighted criteria:

a. Existence (i.e. there a demonstrable/present threat to cause extreme destruction or existential harm to the U.S.)
1 – Yes
0 – No

b. Capability (i.e. adversary has demonstrated ability to pose a threat or attack, or the adversary has been assessed as being capable of posing a threat or attacking)
1 – Yes
0 – No

c. Intent (i.e. adversary has stated or it has been assessed that adversary will pose a threat or attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

d. History (i.e. adversary has demonstrated threatening behavior or has attacked the in the past)
1 – Yes
0 – No

e. Targeting (i.e. there is an indication that adversary is preparing to pose a threat or to attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

f. Probability (i.e. there is a greater prospect than not that the adversary will pose a threat or launch an attack)
1 – Yes
0 – No

g. Temporal (i.e. time span until attack)
1 – Short term/imminent
0.5 – Intermediate
0 – Long term/non-imminent

h. Consequences (i.e. effect of attack)
1 – Extreme
0.5 – Moderate
0 – Low

i. Security environment (i.e. is the U.S. making preparations against the adversary and/or for the possible attack)
1 – No
(-1) – Yes

The total score for the Geopolitics of the Arctic in the context of the external systemic threat assessment measure is 8.5, making it a very high threat to extreme threat.

The objective level of threat is then calculated based on the follow scale:

0 – no threat (i.e. threat-free environment)
1 – negligible threat
2 – very low threat
3 – low threat
4 – low to moderate threat
5 – moderate threat
6 – moderate to high threat
7 – high threat
8 – very high threat
9 – extreme threat (i.e. under attack/engaged in war)

APPENDIX TWELVE: FORMS OF DISCOURSE & POLICY SOURCE MATERIAL FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CASE STUDIES

Appendix 12.1: The Bush Administration & Weapons of Mass Destruction

- "Bush: Don't wait for mushroom cloud." *CNN* (October 8, 2002) and Bush makes historic speech aboard warship." *CNN* (May 1, 2003).
- *Excerpts from Classified Nuclear Posture Review* (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense, 2002)
- Robert McNamara. "Apocalypse Soon." *Foreign Policy* (October 21, 2009).
- *Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2008).
- Christopher E. Paine. *Weaponeers of Waste.* (Washington, D.C.: National Resources Defense Council, 2004)
- *President Bush requests $25 billion for U.S. Department of Energy FY 2009 budget.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2008).
- Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey. *Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2008).
- Stephen Young and Lisbeth Gonlund. *A Review of the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review* (Cambridge: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2002).

Appendix 12.2: The Obama Administration & Weapons of Mass Destruction

- Philip Ewing. "Obama's nuclear paradox: Pushing for cuts, agreeing to upgrades." *NPR* (May 25, 2016).
- Katie Howell, et. al. "Obama budget increases funding for energy research and nuclear power." *Scientific American* (February 2, 2010).
- Barack H. Obama. *Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered* (Prague: Hradcany Square, 2009).
- *Nuclear Post Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010).
- Christopher E. Paine. *Weaponeers of Waste.* (Washington, D.C.: National Resources Defense Council, 2004).
- Kingston Reif. *U.S. Nuclear Modernization Program.* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 2017).
- Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey. *Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2008).
- David Welna. "Obama opens final nuclear security summit in Washington, D.C." *NPR* (March 31, 2016).
- Amy F. Woolf. *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017).

Appendix 12.3: The Trump Administration & Weapons of Mass Destruction

- Aaron Blake. "Trump's loose talk on nuclear weapons suddenly becomes very real." *The Washington Post* (October 11, 2017).
- Julian Borger. "Trump team drawing up fresh plans to bolster US nuclear arsenal." *The Guardian* (October 29, 2017).
- *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).
- *Department of Energy: FY 2018 Budget Request Fact Sheet* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017).
- Joe Gould. "Fact-checking Trump's tweet on the US nuclear arsenal." *Defense News* (August 9, 2017).
- Jeet Heer. "The real danger of Trump's nuclear policy isn't Armageddon." *New Republic* (October 24, 2017).

- Steve Holland. "Trump wants to make sure U.S. nuclear arsenal at 'top of the pack." *Reuters* (February 23, 2017).
- Courtney Kube, et. al. "Trump wanted tenfold increase in nuclear arsenal, surprising military." *NBC News* (October 11, 2017).
- Jonathan Landay and David Rhode. "Exclusive: In call with Putin, Trump denounced Obama-era nuclear arms treaty – source." *Reuters* (February 9, 2017).
- Patrick Malone; R. Jeffrey Smith. *Trump budget: an extra billion dollars for nuclear weapons* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Public Integrity, 2017).
- Robert Soofer. *HASC-SF Hearing on the President's Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense Activities* (Washington, D.C.: The Capital, May 25, 2017).
- Donald Trump (@realDonalTrump) "My first order as President was to renovate and modernize our nuclear arsenal. It is now far stronger and more powerful than ever before…." August 9, 2016. 7:56 AM. Tweet.
- Donald Trump (@realDonalTrump) "The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes." December 22, 2016. 11:50 AM. Tweet.

Appendix 12.4: The Bush Administration & Cyber Warfare

- George W. Bush. *President Bush Commemorates Fifth Anniversary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security.* (Washington, D.C.: Constitution Hall, March 6, 2008).
- George W. Bush. *President Bush Signs Homeland Security Act* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, November 25, 2002).
- George W. Bush. *Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Senator Wayne Allard and Governor Bill Owens in Denver, Colorado* (August 14, 2001).
- *The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).
- *Fact Sheet: President Bush Has Kept America Safe* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).
- Bradley Graham. "Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare." *Washington Post* (February 7, 2003).
- Ralph Langner. "Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon." *IEEE Security & Privacy* (2011).
- Ellen Nakashima. "Stuxnet was work of U.S. and Israeli experts, officials say." *Washington Post* (June 2, 2012).
- Paul J. Springer. *Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare.* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2017).
- Richard Wolf. "Bush calls for tighter cybersecurity." *ABC News* (March 14, 2008).

Appendix 12.5: The Obama Administration & Cyber Warfare

- *The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).
- *Executive Order 13694: Blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, April 1, 2015).
- David Nakamura. "Obama: I didn't underestimate the threats from Vladimir Putin." *Washington Post* (January 8, 2017).
- Barack H. Obama. *Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 29, 2009).
- Matt Spetalnick and Michael Martina. "Obama announces 'understanding' with China's Xi on cyber theft but remains wary." *Reuters* (September 25, 2015).
- Paul J. Springer. *Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare.* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2017).

Appendix 12.6: The Trump Administration & Cyber Warfare

- *Background to Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017).

- *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).
- Chris Bing. "Here's what the newly signed NDAA means for cybersecurity." *Cyberscoop* (December 12, 2017).
- Matthew Braga. "Trump makes cyberwarfare and official priority for new White House." *CBC News* (January 20, 2017).
- Julie Hirschfeld Davis. "Trump Says Putin 'Means It' About Not Meddling." *New York Times* (November 11, 2017).
- Joseph Marks. "Here's how the Trump budget treats cyber." *Nextgov* (May 23, 2017).
- *National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2018*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, June 7, 2017).
- Mike Orcutt. "Sizing Up Trump's Cyberwar Strategy." *MIT Technology Review* (March 24, 2017).
- Donald J. Trump. *Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, May 11, 2017).
- Donald J. Trump. *Remarks at the APEC CEO Summit in Da Nang, Vietnam*. (Da Nang: Ariyana Convention Centre, November 10, 2017).
- Donald J. Trump. *Remarks in Warsaw*. (Warsaw: Krasiński Square, July 6, 2017).
- Donald J. Trump. *Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Elevation of Cyber Command*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, August 18, 2017).

Appendix 12.7: The Bush Administration & North Korea

- *Appropriations for FY2003: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003).
- "Bush: U.S. to life key North Korea sanction." *Associated Press* (June 26, 2008).
- George W. Bush. *Presidential News Conference*. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 28, 2003).
- George W. Bush. *Remarks Prior to Discussions With President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and an Exchange With Reporters*. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 7, 2001).
- George W. Bush. *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Capital, September 20, 2001).
- George W. Bush. *The President's News Conference With President Jiang Zemin of China in Beijing*. (Beijing: The Great Hall of the People, February 21, 2002).
- George W. Bush. T*he President's News Conference With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan in Crawford, Texas* (Crawford: Bush Family Ranch, May 23, 2003).
- Helene Cooper. "U.S. declares North Korea off terror list." *New York Times* (October 12, 2008).
- Kelsey Davenport. *Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy*. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 2017).
- *Inquiry into U.S. costs and allied contributions to support the U.S. military presence overseas*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2013).
- Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin. *U.S. Assistance to North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008).
- Won Gon Park. *A Challenge for the ROK-US Alliance: Defense Cost Sharing*. (Seoul: The East Asia Institute, 2013).

Appendix 12.8: The Obama Administration & North Korea

- David S. Cloud. "How much do allies pay for U.S. troops? A lot more than Donald Trump says." *Los Angeles Times* (October 1, 2016).
- Kelsey Davenport. *Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy*. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 2017).
- *Inquiry into U.S. costs and allied contributions to support the U.S. military presence overseas*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2013).
- Charles Lee. "The future of U.S.-ROK defense cost sharing." *The Diplomat* (January 21, 2017).

- Mark E. Manyin, et. al. *U.S.-South Korea Relations.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017).
- Barack Obama. *Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall.* (Tokyo: Suntory Hall, November 14, 2009).
- Won Gon Park. *A Challenge for the ROK-US Alliance: Defense Cost Sharing.* (Seoul: The East Asia Institute, 2013).
- *President Obama and President Lee of South Korea Hold a Joint Press Conference* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 13, 2011).
- Lori Robinson. *Foreign Military Support* (Philadelphia: The Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2016).

Appendix 12.9: The Trump Administration & North Korea

- Rachel Ansley. *Tillerson's Takes on US Foreign Policy: A Year in Review* (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, December 13, 2017).
- *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).
- Kelsey Davenport. *Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 2017).
- Pamela Falk. "Nikki Haley says North Korean regime "will be utterly destroyed" if war comes." *CBS News* (November 29, 2017).
- Jeremy Herb, Joshua Berlinger and Taehoon Lee. "Haley: Kim Jon Un 'begging for war.'" *CNN* (September 4, 2017).
- Jack Kim and Ju Min Park. "South Korea says Trump pledged commitment to its defense." *Reuters* (November 9, 2016).
- Gregory Korte and David Jackson. "With North Korean threat looming, Trump seeks $5.9 billion for military." *USA Today* (November 6, 2017).
- Charles Lee. "The future of U.S.-ROK defense cost sharing." *The Diplomat* (January 21, 2017).
- Alec Macfarlane and Taehoon Lee. "U.S. to South Korea: We'll pay for your missile defense system (for now)." *CNN* (May 1, 2017).
- Carol Morella, Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Emily Rauhala. "U.N. agrees to toughest-ever sanctions against North Korea." *Washington Post* (September 11, 2017).
- *Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Estimates.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017).
- Jacob Pramuk. "Trump warns North Korea threats 'will be met with fire and fury.'" *NBC News* (August 8, 2017).
- Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger. "Trump returns North Korea to list of state sponsors of terrorism." *New York Times* (November 20, 2017).
- "South Korea to contribute $867 million for U.S. military forces in 2014." *Reuters* (January 11, 2014).
- Donald J. Trump. *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2017).
- Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.* (New York: United Nations, September 19, 2017).
- Tracy Wilkinson. "Proposed budget would deeply cut State Department and its programs." *Los Angeles Times* (May 23, 2017).

Appendix 12.10: The Bush Administration & Human Trafficking

- *2001 Trafficking in Persons Report.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2001).
- "Bush announces new spending to counter human trafficking." *VOA News* (July 16, 2004).
- George W. Bush. *President Announces Initiatives to Combat Human Trafficking.* (Tampa: Tampa Marriott Waterside Hotel, July 16, 2004).
- George W. Bush. *President Signs H.R. 972, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 10, 2006).

- *Human Trafficking: A New Form of Slavery* (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2006).
- *Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Anti-Trafficking Efforts Abroad.* (Washington, D.C. Government Accountability Office, 2006).
- Clare Ribando Seelke and Alison Siskin. *Trafficking In Persons: United States Policy and Issues for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008).
- *United States Government Anti-Trafficking in Persons Obligated Project Funding.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2009).

Appendix 12.11: The Obama Administration & Human Trafficking

- *Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2016).
- *Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2017).
- Susan Coppedge and Amy Pope. "How the Obama administration fought human trafficking." *CNN* (January 18, 2017).
- *Executive Order 13627: Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal Contracts* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2012).
- *HHS FY 2017 Budget in Brief - ACF - Discretionary.* (Department of Health and Human Services, 2016)
- *Fact Sheet: the Obama Administration announces efforts to combat human trafficking at home and abroad.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 25, 2012).
- *Fact Sheet: President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 5, 2016).
- Barack Obama. *End Human Trafficking.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).
- Barack Obama. *Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global Initiative* (New York: Sheraton New York Hotel and Towers, September 25, 2012).
- Colleen Owens. *Funding services for human trafficking victims is imperative for policing the crime* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, June 14, 2013).
- Liana Rosen. *Trafficking In Persons: United States Policy and Issues for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014).
- *United States Government Anti-Trafficking in Persons Obligated Project Funding.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2009).
- Liana Sun Wyler. *Trafficking In Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).

Appendix 12.12: The Trump Administration & Human Trafficking

- *Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).
- *Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2018).
- *Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Assistance Supplementary Tables Fiscal Year 2018.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2017).
- Daniella Diaz. "Trump says human trafficking is 'worse now than it ever was.'" *CNN* (July 28, 2017).
- *Executive Order Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, December 21, 2017).
- Maurice I. Middleberg. "Trump administration's talk on human trafficking must be matched by deeds." *CNN* (July 1, 2017).
- Jay Shooster. "Trump isn't fighting human trafficking, he's facilitating it." *Just Security* (May 2, 2017).
- Donald J. Trump. *President Donald J. Trump Proclaims January 2018 as National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 29, 2017).

- Donald J. Trump. *Remarks by President Trump at Listening Session on Domestic and International Human Trafficking* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 23, 2017).

REFERENCES

"7% of Americans think we are winning the war on drugs." *Rasmussen Reports* (November 13, 2012).

9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).

"25 Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S. History Fast Facts." *CNN.* (September 2, 2014).

"49 States Combat Opioid Epidemic with Prescription Database." *NPR* (May 10, 2016).

2001 Trafficking in Persons Report. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2001).

2004 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2004).

2005 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2005).

2008 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2008).

2009 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2009).

2011 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2011).

2011 Report on Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: The National Counterterrorism Center, 2012).

2012 Report on Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: The National Counterterrorism Center, 2013).

2013 Report on Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2014).

2014 Climate Change Adaption Roadmap. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2014).

2014 Report on Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2015).

2015 National Drug Control Policy. (Washington, D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2015).

2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2015).

2015 Sees Dramatic Spike in Islamic Extremism Arrests. (New York: Anti-Defamation League, April 27, 2015).

2017 Internet Security Threat Report (Mountain View: Symantec, 2017).

2018 Global State of Insecurity Survey (New York: IDG, 2017).

2030 Climate Energy Framework (Brussels: European Commission, 2017).

A 10-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region (Washington, D.C.: The International Council on Clean Transportation, 2015).

A Discussion on National Security with CIA Director Mike Pompeo. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 2017).

"A Real Border Guard at Last." *The Economist* (December 19, 2015).

Abbott, Chris. *An Uncertain Future: law enforcement, national security and climate change.* (Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2007).

Abdulrahim, Raja. "In Syria, war is woven into childhood." *Los Angeles Times* (April 24, 2014).

Abi-Habib, Maria. "The Child Soldiers Who Escaped Islamic State: Boys, Teenagers Tell of Lessons in Beheading, Weaponry at Training Camps." *Wall Street Journal* (December 27, 2014).

About the Agency. (Warsaw: FRONTEX, 2016). Accessed August 31, 2016 http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/faq/about-the-agency.

About the Command (Stuttgart: Department of Defense, 2017). Accessed January 22, 2017 http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command.

About the Strategic Studies Institute. (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2014). Accessed July 22, 2014 http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/about/strategic-studies-institute.cfm.

About Us. (London: Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2016).

About the U.S. Military Group. (La Paz: U.S. Department of State, 2016).

Abraham, Spencer. *A National Report on America's Energy Crisis.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, March 19, 2001).

Abrams, Elliott. "Trump and the Traditionalist: A Surprisingly Standard Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Abramson, Alana. "No, Trump still hasn't changed his mind about climate change after Hurricane Irma and Harvey." *Time* (September 11, 2017).

Abu Toameh, Khaled. *Hamas Forms 'Liberation Army' in Gaza, Thanks to EU Support.* (Hudson: Gatestone Institute, 2015). Accessed January 21, 2015 https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5124/hamas-liberation-army

Abu Toameh, Khaled. "Hamas to establish military academy for schoolkids." *Jerusalem Post* (January 1, 2014).

Achvarina, Vera and Reich, Simon. "No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers. *International Security* (2006), pp. 127-164.

Ackerman, Gary et. al. *Terrorist Groups and Weapons of Mass Destruction.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2008).

Ackerman, Gary and Pate, Amy. *The threat of Pakistani Criminal Organizations: Assessing the potential for involvement in Radiological/Nuclear smuggling, collaboration with terrorist groups and the potential to destabilize the Pakistani state.* (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2012).

Ackerman, Spencer. "Commandos Hold Afghan Detainees in Secret Jails." *Wired* (April 8, 2011).

Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the Nation's Needs. (Washington, D.C.: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017).

Actions by the United States to Stem the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. (Washington, D.C: Department of State, 2006). Accessed March 9, 2014 http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/67700.htm.

Adams, Gordon. "Pentagon Estimates Cost of Fighting ISIS Up To $10 Million Per Day." *WBUR* (September 29, 2014).

Adams, Gordon and Williams, Cindy. *Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home.* (New York: Routledge Press, 2010).

Adapting to Climate Change: Towards A European Framework for Action. (Brussels: European Commission, 2009).

"Added Forces Strengthen Horn of Africa Task Force." *American Forces Press Service* (June 13, 2003). Accessed December 4, 2013 http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=28873.

Addiction by the Numbers. (New York: The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016 http://www.centeronaddiction.org.

Adomaitis, Nerijus and Doyle, Alister. "Norway offers record number of blocs for Arctic oil exploration." *Reuters* (June 21, 2017).

Advancing the Cause of Social Justice in the Western Hemisphere. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2007). Accessed August 12, 2013: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2007/81542.htm

"Afghan Teenager Kills American Soldier.*" The Associated Press* (April 1, 2013).

"Afghanistan opium production hits records despite billions spent to combat trade." *NBC News.* (November 13, 2013).

Afghanistan: World Report 2013. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013). Accessed: March 10, 2014 http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/afghanistan.

Africa Multi-Country AIDS Program 2000-2006: Results of the World Bank's Response to a Development Crisis, The. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007).

African Water Development Report. (Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa, 2006).

"After 40 years, $1 trillion, US War on Drugs has failed to meet any of it goals." *Associated Press* (May 13, 2010).

Agacayak, Tugba; Nash, Sarah Louis; Sahin, Umit. *The Trump effect on climate change policy: hard times for global climate action* (Istanbul: Instanbul Policy Center, 2017).

Ahmed, Abdalle and Whiting, Alex. "Patients, workers, agencies shocked at MSF Somalia Pullout." *Reuters* (August 22, 2103).

Aid, Matthew M. *Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terrorism.* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012).

Ainsley, Julia Edwards. "Exclusive – Trump border 'wall' to cost $21.6 billion, take 3.5 years to build: internal report." *Reuters* (February 9, 2017).

Airpower Summary (Washington, D.C.: United States Air Force Central Command, September 30, 2017). Accessed November 11, 2017 http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Airpower%20Summary%20-%20September%202017.pdf?ver=2017-10-06-082818-797

Akbar, Javaria. "British Muslim woman: why can't I make any white friends?" *The Telegraph* (November 14, 2014).

Akhter, Majed; Mustafa, Daanish; and Nasralla, Natalie. *Understanding Pakistan's Water-Security Nexus.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2013).

Al-Gharbi, Musa. "Mexican drug cartels are worse than ISIL." *Al Jazeera America* (October 20, 2014).

Al-Rawi, Ahmed. "Video games, terrorism, and ISIS's Jihad 3.0." *Terrorism & Political Violence* (2016).

Albertson, Bethany and Busby, Joshua. "Persuading Americans to Act on Climate Change." *Washington Post* (April 8, 2015).

Albonetti, Celesta. "An integration of theories to explain judicial discretion." *Social Problems* (1991), pp. 247-266

Albright, Madeline K. *Address to the Milwaukee Business Community.* (Milwaukee, October 2, 1998).

Alexander, George. *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

Alexeeva, Olga and Lasserre, Frederic. "China and the Arctic." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012).

Alfred, Charlotte. "Why the Capture of 'El Chapo' Guzman Won't Stop His Cartel." *Huffington Post* (January 14, 2016).

Ali, Idrees. "'We don't sacre,' U.S. defense secretary Mattis says after London." *Reuters* (June 4, 2017).

Allen, Henry. "U.S. Intervention in Syria: War for Virtue." *Washington Post* (September 1, 2013).

Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The American Political Science Review* (1969), pp. 689-718.

Allison, Graham and Halperin, Morton H. "Bureaucratic Politics: Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." *World Politics* (1972), pp. 40-79.

Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* (New York: Longman, 1999).

Almasy, Steve. "John Kerry: Climate change as big a threat as terrorism, poverty, WMDs." *CNN.* (February 17, 2014).

Alsema, Adriaan. "Illegal armed groups recruited more than 100 Colombian child soldiers in 2014." *Colombia Reports* (December 17, 2014).

Alster, Paul. "Child Soldier: Shocking video surfaces of purported 4-year-old jihadist in Syria." *Fox News.* (February 3, 2014).

Alston, Philip. *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.* (New York: United Nations, 2010).

Altizer, Sonia et al. "Climate Change and Infectious Diseases: From Evidence to Predicative Framework." *Science* (2013).

"America's Secret Afghan Prisons": Investigation Unearths Torture Site, Abuse Allegations in Afghanistan." *Democracy Now* (February 2, 2010).

Americas: Decriminalize Personal Use of Drugs; Reform Policies to Curb Violence, Abuse. (New York: HumanRights Watch, 2013).

Ames, Barry. "Methodological Problems in the Study of Child Soldiers" in (eds.) Scott Gates and Simon Reich *Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States.* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2010).

An Ounce of Prevention: Preparing for the Impact of a Changing Climate on US Humanitarian and Disaster Response. (Boston: Oxfam America, 2011).

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

Anderson, Craig A. "Heat and Violence." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* (2001).

Anderson, Jack. "The Obama administration has been quietly rewriting the US Arctic policy." *Business Insider* (November 9, 2016).

Anderson, James E. *Public Policy and Politics in America.* (Pacific Grove: Duxbury, 1978).

Anderson, Jenny. "The psychology of why 94 deaths from terrorism are scarier than 301,797 deaths from guns." *Quartz* (January 31, 2017).

Anderson, Jon Lee. "Can Colombia Solve Its Drug Problem Through Peace?" *The New Yorker* (May 22, 2015).

Anderson, Lisa. "Shock and Awe: Interpretations of the Events of September 11." *World Politics* (2004). pp. 303-325.

Andreas, Peter and Bierstekler, Thomas . *The Rebordering of North American: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context.* (London: Routledge, 2003).

Andrew, Robbie. *Socio-Economic Drivers of Change in the Arctic.* (Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2014).

Annon, Kofi. "Why I'm Calling to End the War on Drugs." *Huffington Post* (April 19, 2016).

Anshelm, Jonas and Hultman, Martin. *Discourses of Global Climate Change: Apocalyptic Framing and Political Antagonisms.* (London: Routledge, 2015).

Ansley, Rachel. *Tillerson's Takes on US Foreign Policy: A Year in Review* (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, December 13, 2017).

Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus, The. (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2013).

A.P.H.A. Policy Statement 201312: Defining and Implementing a Public Health Response to Drug Use and Misuse. (Washington, DC: American Public Health Association, 2013).

Applegate, Scott. "Cybermilitias and political hackers: use of irregular forces and cyberwarfare." *IEEE Security & Privacy* (2011).

Approaches to Decriminalizing Drug Use & Possession. (New York: The Drug Policy Alliance, 2015).

Appropriations for FY2003: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003).

Apuzzo, Matt. "War Gear Flows to Police Departments." *New York Times* (June 8, 2014).

Arabshani, Ida and Raines, Chase. *Defense, National Security & Climate Change: Building Resilience and Identifying Opportunities Related to Water, Energy and Extreme Events.* (Washington, D.C.: The Association of Climate Change Officers, 2012).

Arango, Tim. "A Boy in ISIS. A Suicide Vest. A Hope to Live. *New York Times* (December 26, 2014).

Arcas-Salvador, Marc. "U.S. DEA Report Indicates Tripling Consumption Over Seven Years." *Chicago Policy Review* (2017).

Archick, Kristin et. al. *European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.* (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2006).

Archick, Kristin, et. al. *European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses. And Issues for the United States.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).

Archick, Kristin and Belkin, Paul. *European Security and Islamist Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016).

Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-term Needs. (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office 2012).

Arctic Issues: Better Direction and Management of Voluntary Recommendations Could Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation. (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2014).

Arctic Strategy. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2013).

Are We Prepared? Four WMD Crises That Could Transform U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2009).

Argentieri, Benedetta. "Foreigners fighting Islamic State in Syria: who and why?" *Reuters* (January 5, 2015).

Aristotle. *Politics A Treatise on Government.* (London: JM Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1912).

Arkin, William and Windrem, Robert. "ISIS Numbers Drop, But Fighters Now Attacking Around the World." *NBC News* (July 13, 2016).

Arkin, William; Windrem, Robert; and McFadden, Cynthia. "New Counterterrorism 'Heat Map' Shows ISIS Branches Spreading Worldwide." *NBC News* (August 3, 2016).

Armed Conflict Survey 2015 (Washington: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015).

Armige, David T. *US and EU Efforts to Fight Terrorism: Same Ends, Different Means – Or Same Means, Different Ends.* (Montreal: European Union Studies Association Conference, May 17-18, 2007).

Armstrong, Terence. *The Northern Sea Route: Soviet Exploitation of the North East Passage.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).

Arrests for Illicit Drugs Annually in the US, by Drug: Type Figures in Percents. (Lancaster: Common Sense for Drug Policy, 2017). Accessed December 28, 2017 http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Crime#sthash.NtoCBD46.dpuf.

Art, Robert J. "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War." *International Security* (1991), p. 5-53.

Art, Robert J. *A Grand Strategy for America.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

Art, Robert J. *America's Grand Strategy and World Politics.* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

Art, Robert J. "Selective Engagement After Bush" in Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (eds.) *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Century, 2008), pp. 25-41.

Art, Robert. "The Realm of Grand Strategy." *International Affairs* (1991), pp. 5-53.

Art, Robert J. and Waltz Kenneth N. *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics* (Sixth Edition). (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004).

Ashcroft, John. *Remarks for the US Mayors Conference.* (Washington, D.C.: Capitol Hill Hilton, October 25, 2001).

Asian Water Development Outlook 2013: Measuring Water Security in Asia and the Pacific
(Mandaluyoung City: Asia-Pacific Water Forum, 2013).

Astakhova, Olesya. "Russian tanker forges path for Arctic shipping super highway." *Alaska Dispatch News* (March 30, 2017).

Astill, James. "Cuba? It was great say boys freed from US prison camp." *The Guardian* (March 5, 2004).

Astill, James. "The Melting North: Special Report, the Arctic." *The Economist* (June 16, 2012).

Athey, Amber. "Tillerson to Terrorists: 'We Will Find You,'" *The Daily Caller* (August 17, 2017).

Atkin, Emily. "The EPA's Science Office removed 'science' from its mission statement." *The New Republic* (March 7, 2017).

Atkinson, Carol. "US strategic preferences in the early twenty-first century." *Defense & Security Analysis* (2015), pp. 35-43.

Atland, Kristian. "Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front." *Contemporary Security Policy* (2011).

Austin, Henry and Gubash, Charlene. "Syria's American-Born Rebels Pose National Security 'Nightmare.'" *NBC News* (February 15, 2013).

Austin, Lloyd. *Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III, Commander U.S. Command Before the House Armed Services Committee on The Future of U.S. Central Command.* (Washington, D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, March 5, 2014).

Axe, David. "Russia and America prep forces for Arctic War." *Reuters* (October 5, 2015).

Bacevich, Andrew. *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

Bacevich, Andrew. *Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country.* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2013).

Bacevich, Andrew. "Regional Policies in the post-9/11 World" in (ed.) James Hentz, *The Obligation of Empire: United States' Grand Strategy for a New Century.* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), pp. 197-207.

Bacevich, Andrew. *The Long War: A New History of U.S. Nation Security Policy since World War II.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

Bacevich, Andrew. *The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by war.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Bacevich, Andrew. *Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War.* (New York: Macmillan, 2008).

Bacevich, Andrew. "Wilsonians under arms," in *Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security and Theory*, in (eds.) Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby. (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 117-130.

Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017).

Backo, Radley. *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2014).

Backus, George; Baker, Arnold; and Romig Jr., A.D. *A Deeper Look at Climate Change and National Security.* (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2010).

Backus, George and Strickland, James. *Climate-Derived Tensions in Arctic Security.* (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratory, 2008).

Bacon, Lance M. "Navy prepares for Arctic operations as ice thins." *Military Times* (February 11, 2015).

Baczynska, Gabirela. "EU ministers tighten gun controls in wake of terrorist attacks." *Reuters* (June 10, 2016).

Baev, Pavel K. "Russia's Arctic Illusions." (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2015).

Bailes, Alyson. "The Arctic's nearest neighbor: An evaluation of the United Kingdom's 2013 Arctic Policy Document." *Arctic Yearbook* (2014).

Bailes, Alyson J.K. "Understanding the Arctic Council: A 'Sub-Regional' Perspective." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* (2013), pp. 31-49.

Baines, Paul R. "Al-Qaeda messaging evolution and positioning, 1998-2008: Propaganda analysis revisited." *Public Relations Inquiry* (2014), pp. 163-191.

Baines, Paul R., et. al. "The dark side of political marketing: Islamist propaganda, Reversal Theory and British Muslims." *European Journal of Marketing* (2010), pp. 478-495.

Baker, James and McElroy, Michael. *Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National Security.* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2012).

Baker, Peter. "Obama Signals More Active Response to Piracy." *The New York Times* (April 13, 2009).

Baker, Peter. "Trump's attack on Russia inquiry is from familiar playbook: The Clintons." *New York Times* (July 22, 2017).

Baker, Peter; Cooper, Helene; and Sanger, David E. "Obama Sends Special Operations Forces to Help Fight ISIS in Syria." *New York Times* (October 30, 2015).

Bakker, Edwin and de Bont, Roel. "Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012-2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016), pp. 837-857.

Baldwin, David A. "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War." *World Politics* (1995), pp. 117-141.

Baldwin, David S. *AIDS and National Security.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2003). Accessed October 23, 2013 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA413446.

Balko, Radley. "7 ways the Obama administration has accelerated police militarization." *Huffington Post* (July 7, 2013).

Balko, Radley. *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).

Balzacq, Thierry. "A Theory of Securitization" in (ed.) Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve.* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30.

Bamford, James." Today's coldest war is at the top of the world." *Pittsburgh-Gazette* (May 31, 2015).

Bandow, Doug. "Ripped Off: What Donald Trump Gets Right About U.S. Alliances." *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

Banks, Jonathan. *Obama Says He Ended the War on Drugs. Don't Believe Him.* (Washington, D.C.: CATO, 2014)

Banks, John and Dews, Fred. *Governing A Changing Arctic.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, April 11, 2014).

Baptise, Nathalie. "Trumps EPA Chief Just Contracted Decades of Science." *Mother Jones* (March 9, 2017).

Barakaeva, Irina; Natali Batugina; and Gavrilov, Vladimir. "State Support of Delivery of Fuel & Energy Resources to the Subarctic Zone of the Russian North-East" *Arctic Yearbook* (2015).

Barber, James David. *Politics by Humans: Research on American Leadership.* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988).

Barber, James David. *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* (New York: Pearson's Education, Inc., 2008).

Barkin, J. Samuel. *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Barnet, Richard J. *Who Wants Disarmament?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).

Barnett, John. *Security and Climate Change.* (Norwich: Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 2001).

Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha. "The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* (1999).

Barnett, Thomas P.M. *Rethinking America's Military Strategy.* (Monterey: TED, 2005). Accessed February 1, 2014 http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace.html.

Barron-Lopez, Laura. "Climate change hits all Pentagon operations, official says." *The Hill* (July 22, 2014).

Bartels, Larry M. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Bartenstein, Kristin. "The 'Common Arctic': Legal Analysis of Arctic and Non-Arctic Political Discourses." *Arctic Yearbook* (2015).

Barzak, Ibrahim. "3,000 Gaza Teens graduate Hamas terror school." *The Times of Israel.* (January 24, 2013).

Base Structure Report - Fiscal Year 2015 Baseline: A Summary of the Real Property Inventory, The. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015).

Bast, Elizabeth et. al. *Empty Promises: G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production* (London: Oil Change International, 2015).

Bastasch, Michael. "US lawmakers move to counter Putin's Arctic Ambitions." *The Daily Caller* (March 24, 2015).

Basu, Tanya. "Colorado Raise More Tax Revenue from Marijuana Than From Alcohol." *Time* (September 16, 2015).

Baum, Matthew A. and Potter, Philip B.K. "The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis." *Annual Review of Political Science* (2008), pp. 39-65.

Bauman, Nick. "American Muslim alleges FBI Had a Hand in His Torture." *Mother Jones* (April 17, 2012).

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jones, Bryan D. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

Beck, Eldad. "Hezbollah's Cocaine Jihad." *Ynet* (December 29, 2012).

Becker, Andrew and Schultz, G.W. "Local Cops Read for War With Homeland Security-Funded Military Weapons." (New York: Center for Investigative Studies, 2011).

Becker, Jo and Shane, Scott. "Secret Kill Lists Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will." *New York Times* (May 29, 2012).

Becker, William S. "Climate Change: Still a War of Words." *Huffington Post* (April 26, 2016).

Beckhusen, Robert. "How Mexico's Drug Cartels Recruit Child Soldiers as Young as 11." *Wired* (March 28, 2013). Accessed January 20, 2014 http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/mexico-child-soldiers.

Beckhusen, Robert. "Russia's new Arctic ice breakers have on very special feature: anti-ship missiles and naval guns." *The National Interest* (May 14, 2017).

Beckhusen, Robert. "The greatest threat to the U.S. Military: Chemical and Biological Weapons?" *The National Interest* (October 17, 2015).

Beittel, June S. *Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).

Belasco, Amy. *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011).

Belzer, Richard and Nicholas, A.L. *Economic Incentives to Encourage Hazardous Waste Minimization and Safe Disposals.* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1988).

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth. "Trump is following the authoritarian playbook." *CNN* (January 17, 2017).

Bender, Jeremy; Woody, Christopher; and Macias, Amanda. "Here are the most powerful Mexican drug cartels that operate in the U.S." *Business Insider* (January 31, 2016).

Bendiek, Annegret. *At the Limits of the Rule of 3Law: EU-US Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2011).

Benefit-Cost Results. (Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2017).

Benford, Robert D. and Snow, David A. "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* (2000), pp. 611-639.

Benford, Robert D. and Snow, David A. "Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization." *International Social Movement Research* (1988), pp. 197-217.

Bennett, Andrew. "Who Rules the Roost? Congressional-Executive Relations on Foreign Policy After the Cold War" in (ed.) Robert Lieber, *Eagle Rules: Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century.* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), pp. 47-69.

Bennett, Brian and Hennigan, W.J. "U.S. build up Arctic spy network as Russia and China increase presence. *Los Angeles Times* (September 7, 2015).

Bennett, Brit. "White Terrorism Is as Old as America." *New York Times* (June 19, 2015).

Bennett, John T. "US Intel Officials Duffer With Obama in View of al-Qaida." *Defense News* (February 11, 2014).

Bennett, Mia. "Arctic LNG: The Energy on East Asia's Doorstep." *RSIS Commentaries* (May 15, 2014).

Bennett, William J. and John P. Walters. "Bring Back The War On Drugs." *Boston Globe* (September 8, 2015).

Bentley, Michelle. "Instability and incoherence: Trump, Syria, and chemical weapons." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017).

Bentley, Michelle; Eroukhmanoff, Clara; and Hackett, Ursula. "Trumps' 100 days: foreign policy and security implications – introduction." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017).

Bentley, Michelle and Holland, Jack. *Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror.* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Berezin, Mabel. "Politics and Culture: A Less Fissured Approach." *Annual Review of Sociology* (1997), pp. 361-383.

Berger, J.M. *The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social Media* (Washington: Brookings, 2014).

Berger, J.M. and Morgan, Jonathan. *The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2015).

Bergh, Kristofer. *The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United States: Domestic Motives and International Context* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012).

Berkman, Paul Arthur and Axworthy, Lloyd. "Escalating Tensions Challenge U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic." *Huffington Post* (April 6, 2015).

Berlatsky, Noah. "The Moral Argument For American Restraint In Iraq and Beyond." *The Atlantic* (2014).

Bernal, Rafael. "Mexican President proposes pot decriminalization." *The Hill* (April 22, 2016).

Bert, Melissa. "The Arctic Is Now: Economic and National Security in the Last Frontier." *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.* (2012).

Bertelsen, Rasmus Gjedsso. "The drivers of Chinese Arctic interests: Political stability and energy transportation." *Arctic Yearbook* (2013).

Bertram, Stewart and Ellison, Keith. "Sub Saharan African Terrorist Groups' Use of the Internet." *Journal of Terrorism Research* (2010).

Besheer, Margaret. "UN: Terrorists Using 'Dark Web' in Pursuit of WMDs." *Voice of America* (June 28, 2017).

Betsill, Michele M. "Trump's Paris withdrawal and reconfiguration of global climate governance." *Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment* (2017).

Bevir, Mark; Daddow, Oliver; and Hull, Ian. "Interpreting Global Security" in (eds.) Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow, and Ian Hull, *Interpreting Global Security.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1-16.

Bhalla, Abhishek. "Exclusive: Security forces launch rescue mission to save child soldiers swept up in Maoist 'recruitment drive.'" *Daily Mail* (August 2, 2014).

Bhatiya, Neil. *Presidential Perspective on Climate Change and Security.* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Climate and Security, 2016).

Biddle, Stephen D. *America's Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment.* (Carlisle: Army War College, 2005).

Biden, Joseph. *Remarks by the Vice President at the John F. Kennedy Forum* (Boston: Harvard University, October 3, 2014).

Bierman, Noah. "Chief of Staff John Kelly contradicts Trump on North Korea: 'Let's hope diplomacy works.'" *Los Angeles Times* (October 12, 2017).

Biette, David N. and Parlow, Anita. "The Pressing need to define US Arctic interests." *The National Interest* (January 30, 2015).

Bigo, Didier. "The Emergence of Consensus: Global Terrorism, Global Insecurity, and Global Security" in (eds.) Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia and Simon Reich, *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Perspective.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), pp. 67-94.

Birnbaum, Michael. "France Boosts Counterterrorism Force After Deadly Paris Attacks." *Washington Post* (January 21, 2015).

Bing, Chris. "Here's what the newly signed NDAA means for cybersecurity." *Cyberscoop* (December 12, 2017).

Bisaro, Anna. "Is a warming Arctic a national security threat." *Navy Times* (May 1, 2014).

Biscop, Sven. *Global and Operational: A New Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy.* (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2015).

Bittner, Jochen. "East vs. West in the Arctic Circle." *New York Times* (April 28, 2016).

Bjelopera, Jerome P. *Public Mass Shootings in the United States: Implications for Federal Public Health and Safety Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013).

"Black Budget, The." *Washington Post* (August 29, 2013).

Black, Richard. "Preparing for climate change 'will boost economy.' *BBC* (February 8, 2011).

Blair, Tony. *Speech on the London Bombings at the National Labour Conference.* (London, July 16, 2005).

Blake, Aaron. "The White House's misleading statements about Trump's 'armada' heading to North Korea." *Washington Post* (April 18, 2017).

Blake, Aaron. "Trump's loose talk on nuclear weapons suddenly becomes very real." *The Washington Post* (October 11, 2017).

Blanchard Christopher M., et al. *Piracy off the Horn of Africa.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011).

Blank, Stephen. "Fueling Russia's Arctic Obsession." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (November 1, 2016).

Blanton, Dana. "Fox News Poll: Voters show anxiety about guns, terrorism." *Fox News* (June 29, 2016).

Blau, Max; Grinberg, Emanuella; and Prokupecz, Shimon. "Investigators believe Ohio State Attacker was inspired by ISIS." *CNN* (November 29, 2016).

Blechman, Barry and Kaplan, Stephen. "United States Military Forces as a Political Instrument Since WWII" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Bliss, Sam, et. al. "President Trump's Proposed Budget Changes Would Increase Greenhouse Gas Emissions by More than 5 Million Metric Tons CO_2e." *Social Science Research Network* (2017).

Bloom, Evan T. "Establishment of the Arctic Council." *The American Journal of International Law* (1999), pp. 712-722.

Bloom, Mia and Horgan, John. "The Rise of the Child Terrorist." *Foreign Affairs* (2015).

Blum, Andrew; Asal, Victor; and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. "Nonstate Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction." *International Studies Review* (2005), pp. 133-170.

Blunden, Margaret. "The New Problem of Arctic Stability." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (2009).

Boccaletti, Giulio. "Water Security in an Unpredictable World." *Live Science* (February 25, 2014).

Bodman, Samuel W. *Bodman Statement on Senate Approval of ANWR Provisions.* (Washington, D.C. Department of Energy, March 16, 2005).

Bond, Jon R., and Fleischer, Richard. *The President in the Legislative Arena.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

Bonhomme, Brian. *Russian Exploration, from Siberia to Space: A History* (Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 2012).

Bonyn, Sean C. *On 50th Anniversary of ANWR, Upton Urges President to Open Vast Reserves.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Congressman Fred Upton, December 6, 2010).

Boot, Max. "Imperialism!" *The Weekly Standard* (May 7, 2003).

Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

Boot, Max. "Without U.S. troops, Afghanistan, like Iraq, could descend into chaos." *Los Angeles Times* (April 20, 2014).

Booth, William. "More Predator drones fly U.S.-Mexico border." *Washington Post* (December 21, 2011).

Borchini, Charles; Lanz; Stephanie and O'Connell, Erin. *Child Soldiers: Implications for U.S. Forces.* (Quantico: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2002).

Borger, Julian. "Civilian deaths from US led strikes on ISIS surge under Trump administration." *The Guardian* (June 6, 2017).

Borger, Julian. "Trump team drawing up fresh plans to bolster US nuclear arsenal." *The Guardian* (October 29, 2017).

Borgerson, Scott G. "Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming." *Foreign Affairs* (2008).

Borgerson, Scott G. *The United States as an Arctic Nation: Opportunities in the High North* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2014).

Borgerson, Scott G. and Byers, Michael. "The Arctic Front in the Battle to Contain Russia." *Wall Street Journal* (March 8, 2016).

Borosage, Robert. "Being the 'indispensable nation' is killing American democracy." *Reuters* (October 20, 2014).

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Language and Symbolic Power.* (Malden: Polity Press, 1983).

Bowcott, Owen. "Dispute along cold war lines led to collapse of UN cyberwarfare talks." *The Guardian* (August 23, 2017).

Bowman, Steve. *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2002).

Boyle, Michael J. "The war on terror and American grand strategy." *International Affairs* (2008), pp. 191-209.

Brachman, Jarret. "High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda's Use of New Technology." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* (2006).

Brachman, Jarret M. and Levine, Alix N. "You Too Can Be Awlaki!" *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* (2011).

Bradshaw, Corey J.A.; Giam, Xingli; and Sohdi, Navjot S. "Evaluating the Relative Envionrmetnal Impact of Countries." *PLOS* (2010).

Braga, Matthew. "Trump makes cyberwarfare and official priority for new White House." *CBC News* (January 20, 2017).

Brands, Hal. *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2014).

Brannen, Kate. "The Islamic State is raising an army of child soldiers, and the West could be fighting them for generations to come," *Foreign Policy* (October 24, 2014).

Branson, Richard. "War on drugs a trillion-dollar failure." *CNN* (December 7, 2012).

Brauch, Hans Gunter. "Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risk" in (eds.) Hans Gunter Brauch et. al., *Coping With Environmental Change, Disasters and Security* (Berlin: Springer, 2011), pp. 61-106.

Brauer, Jurgen. *The US Firearms Industry: Production and Supply.* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2013).

Brauer, Jurgen and Gissy, William (eds.) *The Economics of Conflict and Peace.* (Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997).

Braun, Michael. *Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?* (Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute, July 25, 2008).

Brecher, Michael and Harvey, Frank P. (eds.). *Realism and Institutionalism in International Relations.* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).

Breen, Michael. "Climate change our most serious security threat." *San Francisco Gate.* (August 23, 2013).

Brennan, John. *Brennan Delivers Remarks at the Center for Strategic & International Studies Global Security Forum 2015.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies**,** November 16, 2016).

Breyfogle, Nicholas and Dunifon, Jeffery. "Russia and the Race for the Arctic." *Origins* (2012).

Brienen, Marten W. and Rosen, Jonathan D. (eds.). *New Approaches to Drug Policies: A Time For Change* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

Briggs, Rachel. "Community Engagement for Counter-Terrorism: Lesson From the United Kingdom." *International Affairs* (2010).

Brigham, Lawson W. *Environmental and Economic Security Challenges in a Changing U.S. Maritime Arctic* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2014).

Brigham, Lawson W. (ed). *The Soviet Maritime Arctic* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

Briones, Alvaro et. al. (eds.) *The Drug Problem in the Americas* (Washington, D.C: Organization of American States, 2013).

British military involvement in Colombia. (London: Justice For Colombia, 2016). Accessed May 1, 2016 http://www.justiceforcolombia.org/campaigns/military-aid/photos.php.

Broache, Anne. "Obama: No warrantless wiretaps if you elect me." *CNET* (January 8, 2008). Accessed September 25, 2013: http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9845595-7.html.

Brock, Hannah. *Climate Change: Drives of Insecurity and the Global South.* (Oxford: Oxford Research   Group, 2012).

Broder, John. "Climate Change Seen as Threat to U.S. Security." *New York Times* (2009).

Bromberg, Elizabeth. "Environmental politics in the Trump era: an early assessment." *Environmental Politics* (2017).

Bromwhich, David. "The Importance of Being Exceptional: From Ancient Greece to Twenty-First Century America." *TomDispatch* (October 23, 2014).

Brookes, Peter. *Putin pushes envelope in Arctic.* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2015).

Brookman, Alex. "How Russia Advances in the Arctic are Leaving NATO Behind." *CBC News* (January 8, 2017).

Brooks, Rosa. *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).

Brooks, Rosa. "How the Pentagon became Walmart." *Foreign Policy* (August 9, 2016).

Brooks, Stephen G. "Dueling Realism." *International Organization* (1997), pp. 445–77.

Brooks, Stephen G.; Ikenberry, G. John and Wohlforth, William C. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment." *International Security* (2012): pp. 7-51.

Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, John G. and Wohlforth, William C. "Lean Forward." *Foreign Affairs* (2013), pp. 130-142.

Brooks, Stephen G. and Wohlforth, William C. "American Primacy in Perspective." *Foreign Affairs* (2002).

Brooks, Stephen G. and Wohlforth, William C. "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Re-Evaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas." *International Security* (2000/1), pp. 5–53.

Brooks, Stephen G. and Wohlforth, William C. *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Brown, Hayes. "U.S. Approves Military Aid for Countries With Child Soldiers." *ThinkProgress* (October 1, 2013). Accessed March 10, 2014 http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/10/01/2704611/child-soldier-waivers.

Brown, Lester R. *Peak Water: What Happens When the Wells Go Dry?* (Washington, D.C.: Earth Policy Institute, 2013).

Brown, Michael E. et al. *America's Strategic Choices.* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

Brown, Michael E.; Lynn-Jones, Seth M.; and Miller, Steven E. *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security.* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995).

Brown, Michelle. "Mapping discursive closings in the war on drugs." *Crime Media Culture* (2007).

Browne, Ryan. "Coast Guard wants icebreakers as Russia has Arctic push." *CNN* (January 19, 2016).

Brumfield, Ben. "Officials: 3 Denver girls played hooky from school and tried to join ISIS." *CNN*. (October 23, 2014).

Brumfield, Ben and Walsh, Nick Paton. "French jets bomb ISIS stronghold of Raqqa, Syria; few may have been killed." *CNN* (November 16, 2015).

Brunn, Johanne M. and Medby, Ingrid A. "Theorising the Thaw: Geopolitics in a Changing Arctic." *Geography Compass* (2014).

Brusentsev, Vera and Vroman, Wayne. *Disasters in the United States: Frequency, Costs & Compensation.* (Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2017).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "America's New Geostrategy." *Foreign Affairs* (1987-1988).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Second Chance: Three President and the Crisis of American Superpower.* (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership.* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.* (New York: Basic Books, 1998).

Bucci, Steven; Carafano, Jay; and Zuckerman, Jessica. *60 Terrorism Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2013).

Buchanan, Mark. "Climate Change Could Be a Tougher Test Than War." *Bloomberg* (September 23, 2016).

Buchanan, Elizabeth. "Arctic Thaw: Arctic Cooperation and Rapprochement." *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

Buckley, Chris. "China military paper urges steps against U.S. cyber war threat." *Reuters* (June 16, 2011)

Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2015 (Washington, D.C., Department of Homeland Security, 2015).

Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2016 (Washington, D.C., Department of Homeland Security, 2016).

Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 2018. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).

Bump, Philip. "Oregon shooting: Figures reveal that guns kill more Americans than terrorism." *The Independent* (October 2, 2015).

Bump, Philip. "We're seeing institutions start to waver as constraints Trump's impulses." *Washington Post* (January 5, 2018).

Buncombe, Andrew. "Isis militants are using mentally challenged children as suicide bombers and crucifying others', says UN body." *The Independent* (February 5, 2015).

Buonfino, Alessandra. "Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe." *New Political Science* (2004), pp. 23-49.

Bures, Oldrich. *EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger* (London: Rutledge, 2011).

Bures, Oldrich. "Eurojust's fledging counterterrorism role." *Journal of Contemporary European Research* (2010).

Bures, Oldrich. "Europol's fledging Counter-Terrorism Role." *Terrorism & Political Violence* (2008).

"Burial set for American killed fighting Islamic state." *Associated Press* (June 14, 2015).

Burke, Marshall; Hsiang, Solomon M. and Miguel, Edward. "Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production." *Nature* (2015), pp. 235-239.

Burkett, Maxine. "In Search of Refuge: Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced Migration, and the Legal Frontier." *Asia-Pacific Issues* (2011).

Burns, Nicholas and Crocker, Ryan C. "Dismantling the Foreign Service." *New York Times* (November 27, 2017).

Busby, Joshua W. *A Green Giant? Inconsistency and American Environmental Diplomacy* in G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng (eds.) *America, China and the Struggle For World Order* (2015), pp. 245-274.

Busby, Joshua. *Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action.* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).

Busby, Joshua. "Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and U.S. National Security." *Security Studies* (2008).

Busby, Joshua and Hazen, Jennifer. *Climate Change and African Political Stability.* (Austin: Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 2013).

"Bush announces new spending to counter human trafficking." *VOA News* (July 16, 2004).

"Bush: Don't wait for mushroom cloud." *CNN* (October 8, 2002).

Bush, George H.W. *Address to the National on the National Drug Control Policy.* (Washington, D.C., White House, September 5, 1989).

Bush, George W. *Address at the Citadel.* (Charleston: The Citadel, December 11, 2001).

Bush, George W. *Address on the Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 6, 2006).

Bush, George W. *Address to an International Conference on Democracy and Security in Prague.* (Prague: Czernin Palace, June 5, 2007).

Bush, George W. *Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Capital, September 20, 2001).

Bush, George W. *Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 7, 2001).

Bush, George W. *Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 11, 2001).

Bush, George W. *Address to the United Nations General Assembly.* (New York: United Nations, November 10, 2011).

Bush, George W. *National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003).

Bush, George W. *National Drug Control Strategy: 2008 Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2008).

Bush, George W. *President Announces Initiatives to Combat Human Trafficking.* (Tampa: Tampa Marriott Waterside Hotel, July 16, 2004).

Bush, George W. *President Bush Commemorates Fifth Anniversary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: Constitution Hall, March 6, 2008).

Bush, George W. *President Bush Discusses Energy* (Washington, D.C.: White House, June 18, 2008).

Bush, George W. *President Bush Signs Homeland Security Act* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, November 25, 2002).

Bush, George W. *President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 6, 2006).

Bush, George W. *Presidential News Conference.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 28, 2003)

Bush, George W. *President Signs H.R. 972, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 10, 2006).

Bush, George W. *Promoting Compassionate Conservatism* (San Jose: Parkside Hall, April 30, 2002).

Bush, George W. *Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Senator Wayne Allard and Governor Bill Owens in Denver, Colorado* (August 14, 2001).

Bush, George W. *Remarks on the Global War on Terror: The Enemy in Their Own Words* (Washington, D.C.: Capital Hilton Hotel, September 5, 2006).

Bush, George W. *Remarks Prior to Discussions With President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and an Exchange With Reporters.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 7, 2001)

Bush, George W. *State of the Union Address to 107th Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Capital, January 29, 2002).

Bush, George W. *The President's News Conference With President Jiang Zemin of China in Beijing.* (Beijing: The Great Hall of the People, February 21, 2002).

Bush, George W. T*he President's News Conference With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan in Crawford, Texas* (Crawford: Bush Family Ranch, May 23, 2003).

Bush, George W. *The State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Capital, 2003).

Bush, George W. *State of the Union Address to 110th Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Capital, January 23, 2007).

"Bush, Kim discuss North Korean nuclear crisis." *Voice of America* (October 26, 2009).

"Bush lifts executive ban on offshore oil drilling." *CNN* (July 14, 2008).

"Bush makes historic speech aboard warship." *CNN* (May 1, 2003).

"Bush: U.S. to life key North Korea sanction." *Associated Press* (June 26, 2008).

Butler, Colin D. (ed). *Climate Change and Global Health.* (Oxfordshire: CABI: 2016).

Butts, Kent Hughes and Bankus, Brent. *China's Pursuit of Africa's Natural Resources.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2009).

Butts, Ken and McDonald, Bryan. *Environmental Security: Conflict or Cooperation.* (Zurich: The International Relations and Security Network, 2014).

Buxbaum, Peter "Arctic Summit is about more than Climate Change." *Global Trade Magazine* (September 15, 2015).

Buxbaum, Peter. "DOD Releases Arctic Strategy." *Global Trade* (February 2017).

Buxbaum, Peter. "One billion dollars for polar icebreaker included in 2017 defense appropriations bill." *Global Trade Magazine* (June 7, 2016).

Buxbaum, Peter. "Shipping and Exploration Opportunities Open With Arctic Sea Changes." *Global Trade* (April 5, 2016).

Buxbaum, Peter. "The Arctic: A Growing Security and Trade Dilemma." *Global Trade Magazine* (February 1, 2017).

Buxbaum, Peter. "US at risk of losing heavy polar icebreaker capability." *Global Trade Magazine* (July 31, 2017).

Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991).

Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1983).

Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene. *The Evolution of International Security Studies.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole; and de Wilde, Jaap. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

By The Numbers: ISIS Cases in the United States. (New York: Center on National Security at Fordham Law, 2015).

Byers, Michael. "Asian juggernaut eyes our 'golden' waterways." *The Globe and the Mail* (August 29, 2011).

Byers, Michael. *Circumpolar Challenges: An Ambitious Agenda for the Arctic Council.* (Ottawa: Rideau Institute, 2012).

Byers, Michael. "North of 60: Negotiate the Northwest Passage, Before It's Too Late." *Arctic Deeply* (October 19, 2016).

Byman, Daniel. "The Homecomings: What Happens When Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2015).

Byman, Daniel L. and Pollack, Kenneth M. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In." *International Security* (2001), pp. 107-146.

Byman, Daniel and Shapiro, Jeremy. "Bridging the Transatlantic Counterterrorism Gap." *The Washington Quarterly* (2006).

Caifas, Jennifer. "$1.6 billion in FEMA grants target terrorism." *USA Today* (July 27, 2015).

Calabresi, Massimo. "Why Terrorism Works: Jihadi John And the Fear Premium." *Time* (February 27, 2015).

Calleo, David. *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance.* (New York: BasicBooks, 1987).

Callimachi, Rukmini "How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Network of Killers." *New York Times* (August 3, 2016).

Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. *Water and the Future of Humanity: Revisiting Water Security.* (New York: Springer, 2014).

Calvert, Scott. "Philadelphia shooting suspects pledges allegiance to ISIS." *Wall Street Journal* (January 8, 2016).

Calzadilla, Alvaro et. al. "Climate change impacts on global agriculture." *Climatic Change* (2013).

Cama, Timothy. "Trump admin approves oil company's Arctic drilling." *The Hill* (July 13, 2017).

Cama, Timothy. "Trump's EPA Budget Cuts Hit Strong Opposition at House Panel." *The Hill* (June 15, 2017).

Camarota, Steven A. *2.5 Million Join Illegal Population under Obama.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, 2015).

Camilleri, Raphaelle. *Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report* (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012).

Campaign To Stop Killer Robots http://www.stopkillerrobots.org.

Campana, Aurelie. "Beyond norms: the incomplete de-securitisation of the Russian counterterrorism frame." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2013), pp. 1-16.

Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1998).

Campbell, John. "Is American Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa Increasingly Militarized?" *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* (2013).

Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs. *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words.* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008).

Campbell, Kurt M. (ed.) *Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implication of Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2008).

Campbell, Kurt M., et. al. *The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of   Global Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2007).

Campbell, Kurt M. and Flournoy, Michele A. *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001).

Campero, Jose Carlos. *From Repression to Regulation: Proposals for Drug Policy Reform* (Bogata: Regional Security Cooperation Program, 2013).

Canada as an Arctic Power: Preparing for the Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2013-2015. (Toronto: Munk School of Global Affairs, 2012).

Canada's Arctic Gateway (Vilnius: PPM Public Policy Management Limited, 2010).

"Canada to spend $9B on F-35 fighter jets." *CBC News* (July 16, 2010).

Cane, Mark; Hsiang, Solomon M. and Meng, Kyle C. "Civil Conflicts are associated with global   climate change." *Nature* (2011).

Canuel, Edward T. "The Four Arctic Law Pillars: A Legal Framework." *Georgetown Journal of International Law* (2015).

Capaccio, Tony. "Pentagon Must Stop Deferring to Contractors, Fox Says." *Bloomberg News* (October 2, 2014).

Carafano, James. *Improving Federal Response to Catastrophe: The Next Steps* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation).

Carafano, James Jay. "Welcome to Obama's War on Weather." *The National Interest* (June 5, 2014).

Carden, Michael J. "National Debt Poses Security Threat." *American Forces Press Service* (August 27, 2010).

Cardenas, Jose R. and Noriega, Roger F. *To secure southern border, US must lead international effort to stabilize Central America* (Washington, D.C.: New American Enterprise Institute, 2014).

Caribbean Border Counternarcotic Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2015).

Carle, Jill. *Climate Change Seen As Top Global Threat: Americans, Europeans, Middle Easterners Focus on ISIS as Greatest Danger.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2015).

Carlsen, Laura. "Treating Child Refugees as National Security Threats." *CounterPunch.org* (April 2, 2015).

Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Mexican Drug Lord Captured – So What?" *The National Interest* (July 18, 2013).

Carper, Thomas R. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014).

Carson, Ann E. *Prisoners In 2014* (Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 2015), pp. 16-17.

Carter, Ashton B. *Testimony on the President's Request for Authorization to Use Military Force Against ISIS.* (Washington, D.C.: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 11, 2015).

Carter, Ashton B. "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism." *International Security* (2001-2002).

Carter, Sara. "Former CIA and DIA Directors Operatives Warn of Another 9/11 Attack." *U.S. News & World Report* (September 11, 2015).

Carter, Susan B. *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Accessed January 1, 2014. http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/toc/showTable.do?id=Ed146-195.

Caruso, Guy F. "The harsh reality of Russia's influence on Alaska's offshore exploration." *The Washington Examiner* (August 15, 2016).

Caryl, Christian. "Mob Rule" *Foreign Policy* (July 19, 2013).

Case by Case: ISIS Prosecutions in the United States March 1, 2014- June 30, 2016 (New York: Center For National Security, 2016).

Casey, Kevin. *Greenland's New Frontier: Oil and Gas Licenses Issued Through Development Likely Years Off* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014).

Cavendish, Julius. "In Afghanistan war, government corruption bigger threat than Taliban." *Christian Science Monitor* (April 12, 2010).

Cedar, Oded. "The Arctic Council: Gatekeeper or Doormat to the World's Next Major Resource Battle?" *Sustainable Development Law and Policy* (2011).

Central Asia. (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). Accessed: March 10, 2014 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html.

Ceronie, Lauren. "US not ready for WMD attack, report says." *The Hill* (June 23, 2011).

Cha, Victor D. "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea." *International Studies Quarterly* (2000), pp. 261–291.

Cha, Victor D. "Hawk Engagement and Preventative Defense on the Korean Peninsula." *International Security* (2002), pp. 40-78.

Chalecki, Elizabeth. "Climate Change in the Arctic and its Implications for U.S. National Security." *IDEAS Journal: International Development, Environment and Sustainability* (2007).

Chalecki Elizabeth. "He Who Would Rule: Climate Change in the Arctic and its Implications for U.S. National Security." (Chicago: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, February 28, 2007).

Chalfant, Morgan. "Frustrated senators demand cyber war strategy from Trump." *The Hill* (October 19, 2017).

Chalfant, Morgan. "Homeland Security sees power grow under Trump." *The Hill* (October 19, 2017).

Chalk, Peter. "AIDS Can Threaten National Security." *United Press International* (September 24, 2002).

Chalk, Peter. *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response.* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2011).

Changes to Language on the Environmental Protection Agency's SmartWay Program Website (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Data & Governance Initiative, 2017).

Charbonneau, Louis and Torbati, Yeganeh. "U.S. says talks intense, serious after Iran hints at atomic concessions." *Reuters* (October 16, 2013).

Charron, Andrea. "Canada and the Arctic Council." *International Journal* (2012), pp. 775- 783.

Charron, Andrea. "Canada, the Arctic, and NORAD: Status Quo or New Ball Game?" *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis.* (March 15, 2015).

Chebel d'Appollonia, Ariane and Reich, Simon. *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Perspective.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

Chen, Gang. "China's emerging Arctic strategy." *The Polar Journal* (2012), pp. 358-371.

Cheney, Richard. "Remarks at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council." (Beverley Hills: Beverley Hilton Hotel, January 15, 2004).

Chertoff, Michael. *Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on DHS Accomplishments and Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, December 20, 2005).

Chretien, Jean-Paul. "US Military Global Health Engagement since 9/11: Seeking Stability through Health." *Global Health Governance* (2011).

Chen, Michelle. "European Countries Closing Their Borders to Refugees Is Collective Punishment." *The Nation* (November 18, 2015).

Cheney, Stephen A. and Cunningham, Nick. "Strategic bases vulnerable to climate change." *Stars and Stripes* (November 1, 2012).

Chermnick, Jean. "States are picking up Trump's slack on climate change." *Scientific American* (September 22, 2017).

Chibber, Kabbir. "How Norway lost control of its $500 million Arctic sub base to the Russians." *Defense One* (April 5, 2015).

Chibber, Kabbir. "There's a new country claiming ownership of the North Pole." *Quartz* (December 15, 2014).

Child Soldier Accountability Act, The. (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 2008).

"Child soldiers become integral part of ISIS' army." *CBS News* (June 23, 2014).

Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, The. (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 2008).

Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008. (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008).

Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General. (New York: United Nations, 2014).

Children in Maritime Piracy: Our Work in 2013. (London: Child Soldiers International, 2013). Accessed February 23, 2013 http://www.childsoldiers.org/piracy-report.

"Children in Syria suffer unspeakable abuses in war." *Agence France Presse* (February 5, 2014).

Childress, Sarah. "Timeline: The Politics of Climate Change." *Frontline* (October 23, 2012).

Chilton, Paul A. and Schaffner, Christina. *Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse.* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002).

Chilton, Paul A. and Schaffner, Christina. "Theme and principles" in (eds.) Paul A. Chilton and Christina Schaffner, *Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse.* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002), pp. 1-41.

"China's participation in Arctic affairs on basis of respect, cooperation: FM." *Xinhau* (October 16, 2015).

Choi, Jueun. "U.S. Coast Guard objects to Trump's funding cut." *USA Today* (March 16, 2017).

Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud. "The War On Drugs: Anatomy of a Failure." *Books and Ideas* (February 11, 2016).

Chrisafis, Angelique. "Thousands of troop on Paris streets, but are they France's new Maginot line?" *The Guardian* (April 15, 2016).

Christensen, Thomas J. *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–58.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Christensen, Thomas J. and Snyder, Jack. "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity." *International Organization* (1990), pp. 137-166.

Christensen, Thomas J. and Snyder, Jack. "Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 919-922.

Churchill, Winston. *The Price of Greatness.* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1943).

"CIA helped shutdown 15 civilian planes." *CBS News* (December 11, 2008).

"CIA Opens Center on Climate Change and National Security." (Langley: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).

Cillizza, Chris. "Donald Trump doesn't think much of climate change, in 20 quotes." *CNN* (August 8, 2017).

Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. (Washington, D.C: United States Geological Survey, 2008).

Cisar, John. "Narcoterrorism: How Drug Trafficking and Terrorism Intersect." *Journal of Homeland and National Security Perspectives* (2014);

Civil penalties against polluters drop 60 percent so far under Trump (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Integrity Project, 2017).

Claes, Dag Harald and Moe, Arild. "Arctic petroleum resources in a regional and global perspective," in Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal (eds.) *Geopolitics and security in the Arctic: regional dynamics in a global world* (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 97-120.

Clark, Wesley K. *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003).

Clavell, Janice and Noakes, Jeff. *Acts of Occupation: Canada and Arctic Sovereignty, 1918-1925* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).

Clean Jobs America: A comprehensive analysis of clean energy jobs in America. (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Entrepreneurs, 2016).

Climate & Resources Security Dialogue for the 21st Century, A. (London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, March 22-23, 2012).

Climate Action (Brussels: European Commission, 2017). Accessed February 28, 2017 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/about-us/mission_en.

Climate Action Plan (Arlington: Center For Climate Energy Solutions, 2017). Accessed June 12, 2017, https://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/climate-action-plans.

Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptations, and Vulnerability. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014).

Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report (Geneva: International Panel on Climate Change, 2014).

Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2014).

Climate Change and the Arctic: New Frontiers of National Security (Washington, D.C.: House Committee   on Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2009).

Climate Change as a Security Threat: Sub Saharan Africa. (Zurich: The International Relations and Security Network, 2012).

Climate Change Funding and Management. (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2014).

Climate Change Legislation in the EU. (London: Committee on Climate Change, 2017).

Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the European Union (Washington, D.C.: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2009).

Clinton, Hillary (@HillaryClinton) "The Arctic is a unique treasure. Given what we know, it's not worth the risk of drilling. –H." August 18, 2015. 9:21 AM. Tweet.

Clinton, Hillary. *Hillary Clinton on National Security and the Islamic State.* (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, November 19, 2015).

Clinton, William. *On the Eve of the Millennium* (San Francisco: Grand Hyatt Hotel, February 26, 1999).

Cloud, David S. "How much do allies pay for U.S. troops? A lot more than Donald Trump says." *Los Angeles Times* (October 1, 2016).

Cludius, Johanna; Forster, Hannah and Graichen, Verena. *GHG Mitigation in the EU: An Overview of the Current Policy Landscape* (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2012).

CNA Military Advisory Board. *Advanced Energy & United State National Security.* (Arlington: CNA Corporation, 2017).

CNA Military Advisory Board. *National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change.* (Alexandria: CNA Corporation, 2014).

Coats, Daniel R. *Director of National Intelligence World Wide Threat Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017).

Cobb, Roger W., and Elder, Charles D. *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).

Cockerham, Sean. "Shell absconds Arctic Ocean drilling efforts amid costs and controversy." *McClatchy* (September 28, 2015).

Cockerham, Sean. "U.S. lags behind Russia and other nations in the Arctic." *McClatchy* (August 28, 2015).

Cody, Michael. "U.S. 4th Fleet Hosts Planners for Continuing Promise." (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2012). Accessed August 12, 2013

Coffey, Luke. *Arctic Security: Five Principles That Should Guide U.S. Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2012).

Cohen, Bernard. "The Influence of Special Interest Groups and Mass Media on Security Policy in the United States" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Cohen, Eliot A. "America is not ready for war in North Korea." *The Atlantic* (August 9, 2017).

Cohen, Jeffrey E. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda." *American Journal of Political Science* (1995), pp. 87–107.

Cohen, Michael A. "Are threats to US bigger than ever? No." *Washington Post* (January 31, 2015).

Cohen, Stephen. "The Impact of Organization on United States' International Economic Policy" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Coile, Zachary. "Bush names advisor on cyber-terrorism / New approach to protecting info systems." *San Francisco Gate* (October 10, 2001)

"'Cold' War games: Russian military drills in Arctic." *Associate Press* (March 16, 2015).

Cole, J. Michael. "Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russia Takes the Lead." *The Diplomat* (December 6, 2013).

Collins, James F. et. al. "How America can step up its leadership role in the Arctic." *The National Interest* (April 21, 2015).

Collinson, Jim. "Arctic sovereignty more urgent." *Winnipeg Free Press* (June 12, 2017).

Collinson, Stephen. "Trump confronts perilous North Korea test." *CNN* (November 30, 2014).

Collyer, Michael. "Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities." *Mediterranean Politics* (2006), pp. 255-270.

Colucci, Lamont. *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape Our Present and Future* (Volume 1 and 2*). (*Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012).

"Colombia: Child soldiers the new generation of cartel muscle." *RT: Russia Today* (February 19, 2014).

Combes, M.L. de Raismes. "Who's *not* afraid of ISIS?" *Critical Studies on Security* (2017).

Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

Communication Regarding Intent to Withdrawal From Paris Agreement. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, August 4, 2017).

Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, The. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).

Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2016).

Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2017).

Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2018).

Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Assistance Supplementary Tables Fiscal Year 2018. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2017).

Conley, Heather A. *Arctic Economic in 21ˢᵗ Century: The Benefits and Costs of Cold.* (Lanham: Center for Strategic and International Studies).

Conley, Heather. *The New U.S. Foreign Policy Frontier: U.S. Interests and Actors in the Arctic.* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013).

Conley, Heather. "Through the Arctic Looking Glass and What U.S. Russian Relationship Found There" in (ed.) David Reed, *In Pursuit of Prosperity: U.S. Foreign Policy in an Era of Natural Resources Scarcity.* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).

Connell, Michael and Vogler, Sarah. *Russia's Approach to Cyber Warfare.* (Arlington: CNA, 2017).

"Conscious Uncoupling." *The Economist* (April 3, 2014).

Conti, Allie. "Can the Feds Stop Islamic State Recruiters from Preying on Somali Americans?" *VICE* (February 18, 2015).

Continuing Promise Information. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2013).

Construction begins on Canada Navy's first Harry Dewolf-Class AOPS." *Naval-Technology.com* (June 14, 2016). Accessed July 13, 2017 http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsconstruction-begins-on-canadian-navys-first-harry-dewolf-class-aops-4921350.

Convention of the Rights of the Child. (New York: United Nations, 1989).

Conventional Weapons Destruction (including MANPADS & Small Arms/Light Weapons. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2014). Accessed March 9, 2014 http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c3670.htm.

Conway, John. *Hurricane Risk to Air Force Bases May Be Broader Than Previously Thought.* (Montgomery: The Air Force University, 2008).

Cook, David and Spottir, Lara Johann. "Discourse Analysis of the 2013-2016 Arctic Circle Assembly Programmes." *Polar Record* (2017).

Coolsaet, Rik. "European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera." *International Affairs* (2010).

Cooper, Helene. "U.S. declares North Korea off terror list." *New York Times* (October 12, 2008).

Coppedge, Susan and Pope, Amy. "How the Obama administration fought human trafficking." *CNN* (January 18, 2017).

Corasaniti, Nick; Perez-Pena, Richard; and Alvarez, Lizette. "Church Massacre Suspect Held as Charleston Grieves." *New York Times* (June 18, 2015).

Corcoran, Emily, et al. *Sick Water: The central role of wastewater management in sustainable development.* (Spelefjellveien: United Nations Environmental Programme, 2010).

Corn, Mary Lynne, et. al. *Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Background and Issues*. (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003).

Cornwell, Rupert. "The Blackwater trial: A shameful case exposes a murky world." *The Independent* (October 26, 2014).

Corporate Report: Single Departmental Plan 2015-2020 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2006).

Corti, Daniela and Swain, Ashok. "War on Drugs and War on Terror: Case of Afghanistan." *Peace and Conflict Review* (2009).

Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends." (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).

Coser, Lewis. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. (New York: Free Press, 1956).

"Cost of corruption in Afghanistan nearly $4 billion – UN survey." *UN News Centre* (February 7, 2013).

Cost of Delaying Action to Stem Climate Change, The. (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2014).

Costs of War: Economic Costs. (Providence: Brown University, 2011). Accessed January 22, 2014 http://costsofwar.org/article/economic-cost-summary.

Cost of War Through June 30, 2017. (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 2017). Accessed November 1, 2017 https://fas.org/man/eprint/cow/201706.pdf.

Cottee, Simon. "The Lost Pilgrims of the Islamic State." *The Atlantic* (July 26, 2015).

Corcoran, Kieran; Evans, Sophie Jane; Klasner, Alexandra; and Martokso, David. "Armed and radicalized: Ranting 'self-proclaimed convert; New York hatchet attacker was a 'terrorist,' say police." *Daily Mail* (October 24, 2014).

Core Business. (The Hague: EUROJUST, 2016). Accessed August 1, 2016 http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/eurojust-core-business.aspx.

Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy. (Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, 2014).

Counter-terrorism Funding in the European Union Budget (Brussels: European Parliament, 2016).

Country Reports on Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State) http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm.

Cousins, Sophie. "Kurdish child soldiers battle ISIL in Syria." *Al Jazeera* (December 13, 2014).

"Covert Drone War." (London, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2014). Accessed March 1, 2014 http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones.

Cowan, David. "How a Trump presidency will erode cyber security." *Forbes* (November 30, 2016).

Cox, Ronald W. "The Military-Industrial Complex and U.S. Military Spending After 9/11." *Class, Race and Corporate Power* (2014), pp. 1-20.

Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role and Future.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1982).

Craig, Tim. "Tough talking sheriffs raise their voice in Trump era." *Washington Post* (November 12, 2017).

Cramer, Jane and Thrall, A. Trevor (eds.). *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

Cramer, Jane K. and Thrall, A. Trevor "Introduction: Understanding threat inflation" in Trevor (eds.) Jane Cramer and Trevor A. Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 1-15.

Crane, Jonathan Kadane and Kadane, Joseph Born. "Seeing Things: The Internet, The Talmud and Anais Nin." *Review of Rabbinic Judaism* (2008), p. 342-345.

Craw, Victoria. "Arctic outpost becomes hotbed of Russian military activity." *News.com.au* (June 26, 2017). Accessed July 1, 2017 http://www.news.com.au/world/europe/arctic-outpost-becomes-hotbed-of-russian-military-activity/news- story/25108f508fd511205cac25f6d6371e70

Crawford, George A. *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare* (Halbert Field: Joint Special Operation University, 2009).

Crawford, Jamie. "Syria a 'top' concern for homeland security chief." *CNN.* (February 26, 2014).

Cressy, Daniel. "Geology: The Next Land Rush." *Nature* (January 2, 2008).

Crick, Emily. "Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs." *International Journal of Drug Policy* (2011).

Crime in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Accessed September 1, 2016 https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/main.

Crisp, Richard. *The Psychology of Social and Cultural Diversity.* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 200.

Croft, Stuart and Moore, Cerwyn. "The evolution of threat narratives in the age of terrorist: understanding terrorist threat in Britain." *International Affairs* (2010), pp. 821-835.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "The Evolution of Counterterrorism: Will Tactics Trump Strategy?" *International Affairs* (2010), pp. 837-856.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth and Ludes, James M. (eds.). *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004).

Cummins, J. David; Suher, Michael; and Zanjami, George *Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophic Risk*. (Cambridge: The National bureau of Economic Research, 2007).

"Cuomo Says Threat of Terrorism Is Worse Than It Was in 2001." *The Associated Press* (September 11, 2015).

Cussen, Meaghan and Block, Walter. "Legalize Drugs Now: An Analysis of the Benefits of Legalized Drugs." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (2000), pp. 525-536.

Cyberwar: Frequently Asked Questions. *PBS* (April 24, 2003). Accessed December 16, 2017 https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/etc/faqs.html.

Daadler, Ivo H. "Responding to Russia's Resurgence." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Daalder, Ivo H. and Lindsay, James M. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003).

Dabelko, Geoffrey D. *Inside U.S. Climate Security Policy*. *(*Zurich: The International Relations and Security Network, August 10, 2012).

Daggett, Stephen. *Cost of Major U.S. War*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

Dalby, Simon. "Challenging cartographies of enmity: Empire, war and culture in contemporary militarization" in (eds.) Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby*, Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security and Theory*, (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 33-44.

Dale, Catherine and Towell, Pat. *In Brief: Assessing DoD's New Strategic Guidance*. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

Dallek, Matthew. "When the U.S. freaks out about enemies, things get weird." *The Washington Post* (December 10, 2015).

Daly, Matthew and Boak, Josh. "Trump plan could expand oil drilling Arctic and Atlantic." *Associated Press* (June 29, 2017).

Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: A Review of Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

*Data and Statistics. (*Lisbon: European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2015). Accessed April 25, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2015.

Davenport, Kelsey. *Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 2017).

David, Maxine. "Eclipsed by Russia: Trump's First 100 Days." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017).

David, Mihaela. *US National Strategy for the Arctic Region: Strong Foothold or on Thin Ice?"* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Davidson, Janine and Flournoy, Michele. "Obama's New Global Posture: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Deployments." *Foreign Affairs* (2012).

Davidson, Jason W. "The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922–39." *Security Studies* (2002), pp. 125–159.

Davidson, Jason W. *The Origins of Revisionist and Status Quo States.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)

Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. "Trump Says Putin 'Means It' About Not Meddling." *New York Times* (November 11, 2017).

Davis, Julie Hirschfeld and Haberman, Maggie. "Trump pardons Joe Arpaio, who became face of crackdown on illegal immigration." *New York Times* (August 25, 2017).

Davis, Lois M. *Combating Terrorism: How Prepared are State and Local Response Organizations?* (Santa Barbara: The RAND Corporation 2006).

Davenport, Coral. "E.P.A. warns of high cost of Climate Change." *New York Times* (June 22, 2015).

Davenport, Coral. "Obama bans drilling parts of the Atlantic and Arctic." *The New York Times* (December 20, 2016).

Davenport, Coral and Connelly, Marjorie. "Most Republican Say They Back Climate Action, Poll Finds." *The New York Times* (January 30, 2015).

Dawson, Joseph G. *Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars.* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993).

DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme: 2007-2036, The. (London: Ministry of Defence, 2006).

De Freytas-Tamura, Kimiko. "From Studious Teenager to ISIS Recruit." *The New York Times* (February 24, 2105).

De Luce, Dan. "Is the U.S. Ready for an Endless War Against the Islamic State." *Foreign Policy* (August 27, 2015).

De Luce, Dan and Gramer, Robbie. "U.S. Diplomat's Resignation Signals Wider Exodus from State Department." *Foreign Policy* (December 9, 2017).

De Pryck, Kari and Gemenne, Francois. "The Denier-in-Chief: Climate Change, Science and the Election of Donald J. Trump." *Law Critique* (2017).

De Waal, Alex. "HIV/AIDS and the challenges of security and conflict." *The Lancet* (2010).

De Waal, Alex et al. *HIV/AIDS, Security and Conflict: New Realties, New Response.* (New York: United Nations Join Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2009).

DEA Will Not Reschedule Marijuana, But May Expand Number of Growers of Research Marijuana (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016).

Deadly Attacks Since 9/11. (Washington, D.C.: The New America Foundation, 2016). Accessed June 17, 2016 http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html.

Dearden, Lizzie. "Hundreds of boys 'kidnapped and forced into becoming child soldiers' in South Sudan. *The Independent* (March 1, 2015).

"Deaths in Nigeria child suicide bombings." *Al* Jazeera (January 11, 2015).

Deaths related to drug poisoning in England and Wales, 2014 registrations (London: Office for National Statistics, 2015).

Deaths related to drug poisoning in England and Wales, 2016 registrations (London: Office for National Statistics, 2017).

DeBoer, Sally. "Arctic Security and Legal Issues in the 21st Century." *The Maritime Executive* (March 1, 2017).

DeChaine, Robert (ed.) *Border Rhetorics: Citizenship and Identity on the US-Mexico Frontier* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2012).

Decker, Scott H. and David C. Pyrooz. *The Handbook of Gangs* (Malden: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015).

Defining the Addiction Treatment Gap (Rockville: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2010), p. 1.

Del Rosso, Jared. *Talking About Torture: How Political Discourse Shapes the Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).

Delbecke, Jos; Klassen, Ger; and Vergote, Stefan. "Climate Change Related Energy Policies." in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and   Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016).

Delbeke, Jos and Vis, Peter. "EU's climate leadership in a rapidly changing world" in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016).

Delbeke, Jos and Vis, Peter. "Editor's Introduction" in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016).

Den Boer, Monica. *9/11 and the Europeanization of Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment.* (Paris: Notre Europe, 2003), pp. 1-25.

Deni, John R. (ed.). *New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2014).

"Denmark unveils new Arctic strategy." *Copenhagen Post* (November 1, 2016).

Denning, Dorothy. "Cyberwar: How China hackers became a major threat to the U.S." *Newsweek* (October 5, 2017).

Denning, Dorothy. "Iran's cyber warfare program is now a major threat to the United States." *Newsweek* (December 12, 2017).

Denning, Dorothy. "Russian Cyberthreat." *Scientific American* (August 18, 2017).

Dennis, Bradly and Mufson, Steven. "On its way out, Obama administration moves to slam the door shut on Arctic drilling." *New York Times* (November 18, 2016).

Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program [DHAPP]: 2011 Annual Report. (Washington,   D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011).

DePaulo, Bella. "I study liars. I've never seen one like President Trump." *Washington Post* (December 8, 2017).

Dempsey, Martin. "From the Chairman: Risky Business." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (2013).

Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *Trends In International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision - Migrants By Age And Sex* (New York: United Nations, 2013).

Department of Energy FY 2018 Congressional Budget Request: Budget in Brief (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017).

Depledge, Duncan. "Could the Arctic be the next Crimea?" *Quartz* (March 23, 2015).

Depledge, Duncan. "The United Kingdom and the Arctic in the 21ˢᵗ Century." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012).

Desilver, Drew. *U.S. spends over $16 billion annually on counter-terrorism.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, September 11, 2013).

Despite fewer attacks in Western world, global terrorism increasing. (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013). Accessed December 20, 2013 http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=633.

Desch, Michael. "The Keys that Lock Up the World: identifying American Interests in the Periphery." *International Security* (1989), pp. 86-121.

Deshayes, Pierre-Henry. "Russian ships in old Arctic NATO base sets alarm bells ringing." *Yahoo News* (April 3, 2015).

Destler, I.M. *Presidents. Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

Deterrence. Rod Lurie. Paramount, 1999. Drama.

Detraz, Nicole and Betsil, Michele. "Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts." *International Studies Perspectives* (2009), pp. 202-320.

Dettmer, Jamie. "Al Qaeda Headquarters in Libya. *The Daily Beast* (May 6, 2013). Accessed August 1, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/06/the-al-qaeda-headquarters-in-libya.html.

Deutch, Michael. "America's Illiberal Illusion: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy." *International Security* (2007), pp. 7-43.

Development of the Production of Primary Energy (by fuel type), EU-28, 20014-14. (Brussels: European Commission, 2016). Accessed May 1, 2017 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports.

Devlin, Colleen; Franck, Brittany and Hendrix, Cullen S. *Trends and Triggers: Climate Change and Interstate Conflict.* (Austin: Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 2013).

DeYoung, Karen. "Is it a 'war'? An armed conflict? Why words matter in the U.S. fight vs. the Islamic State." *The Washington Post* (October 7, 2014).

Diamond, Jeremy. "Trump again raises specter of shutdown over wall." *CNN* (August 28, 2017).

Diamond, Dani. "White House dials back cuts to drug control office." *Washington Post* (May 23, 2017).

Dias, Elisabeth. "President Trump blames Obama for North Korea, but he's following Obama's strategy." *Time* (October 27, 2017).

Diaz, Daniella. "Trump says human trafficking is 'worse now than it ever was.'" *CNN* (July 28, 2017).

DiBella, Anthony. "Organization Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions." *Joint Force Quarterly* (2013), pp. 13-19.

DiChristopher, Tom. "EPA chief Scott Pruitt says carbon dioxide is not a primary contributor to global warming." *CNBC* (March 9, 2017).

DiChristopher, Tom. "Energy Secretary Rick Perry says CO2 is not the main driver of climate change." *CNBC* (June 19, 2017).

DiChristopher, Tom. "Obama invokes 1953 law to indefinitely block drilling in Arctic and Atlantic oceans." *CNBC* (December 20, 2016).

Dickson, Donald T. "Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade" in (ed.) Paul E. Rock's *Drugs and Politics* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1977).

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014).

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016).

Dilanian, Ken. "Terrorism suspect secretly held for two months." *Los Angeles* (July 6, 2011).

Dinan, Stephen. "2.5 illegals cross border under Obama, less than Bush." *Washington Times* (July 20, 2015).

Dinan, Stephen. "DHS secretary says world facing most terrorist 'foot soldiers' ever." *The Washington Times* (June 6, 2017).

Dingman, Erica. *Security Matters: States, Security and Climate Change in the Arctic.* (New York: World Policy Institute, 2011).

Dionne, E.J. "Trump is faithfully following the autocrats playbook." *The Washington Post* (November 1, 2017).

Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Agency 2015).

Directorate-General for External Policies. *Europe and Latin America: Combatting Drugs and Trafficking* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2012).

Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development. *Latin America - COPOLAD - Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies with EU* (Brussels, European Parliament, 2016). Accessed May 17, 2016 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/latin-america/copolad-cooperation-programme-between-latin-america-and-european-union-drugs_en**.**

DiStaso, Jon. "Graham, 'brother' McCain warn of another terrorist attack on U.S. homeland. *WMUR* (September 11, 2015).

Ditrych, Ondrej. *Tracing the discourses of terrorism: identity, genealogy and the state.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Dittmer, Lowell. "Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." *World Politics* (1977), pp. 552-583.

DOD Directive 4715.21: Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 2016).

DOD Release Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Proposal (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2, 2015).

DOE FY 2016 Budget Fact Sheet. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2016).

Doggert, Tom. "Bush budget cuts for Arctic oil drilling in 2010." *Reuters* (February 4, 2008).

Dombrowski, Peter and Reich, Simon. "Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy," *International Affairs* (2017).

Domestic Terrorism Prosecutions Outnumber International (Syracuse: TRAC Reports, 2017). Accessed November 17, 2017 http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/481.

"Donald Trump slams Iran." *Fox News* (January 18, 2016).

"Donald Trump says he is ready to talk to Kim Jong-un by phone." *Reuters* (January 6, 2018).

Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relations.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Donovan, Shaun. *The Cost of Climate Inaction.* (Washington, D.C.: Center For American Progress, September 19, 2014).

"Doomsday Clock: Timeline." *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (2015). Accessed June 29, 2015 http://thebulletin.org/timeline.

Doughtry, Kevin. *Military Decision-Making Processes: Case Studies Involving the Preparation, Commitment, Application and Withdrawal of Force.* (Jefferson: McFarland & Inc., Publishers, 2014).

Doughtry, Kevin. *The United States Military in Limited War: Case Studies in Success and Failure, 1945-1999.* (Jefferson: McFarland & Inc., Publishers, 2012).

Doyle, Alister. "Arctic thaw to cause up to $90 trillion in damage to roads and buildings." *The Independent* (April 25, 2017).

Doyle, Michael W. "Politics and Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosencrance and Arthur Stein. *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 22-34.

Doyle, Michael W. *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism.* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997).

Dozier, Kimberly. "New detention network is revealed." Associated Press (April 9, 2011).

Dozier, Kimberly. "Officials: Al-Qaida Plots Come back in Afghanistan." *Associated Press* (February, 28, 2014).

Drezner, Daniel W. "Does Obama Have A Grand Strategy?" *Foreign Affairs* (2011).

Drezner, Daniel W. "These crazy IR kids today, with their wacky threat assessments…." *Foreign Policy* (December 22, 2011).

Droogan, Julian. "Reading jihad: Mapping the shifting themes of *Inspire* magazine." *Terrorism & Political Violence* (2016).

Drone Strikes. (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 2016). Accessed August 1, 2016 http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen-analysis.html.

Drug Control. (Brussels: European Commission, 2015) Accessed October 1, 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/drug-control/index_en.htm.

DrugFacts: National Wide Trends (Washington, D.C.: National Institute on Drug Abuse).

"Drug Money Sustains al Qaeda." *The Washington Times* (December 29, 2003).

Drug Problem in the Americas: Analytical Report, The (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 2013).

Drug Schedules. (Washington, D.C.: Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015). Accessed August 17, 2015 https://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml.

Drug supply reduction and internal security policies in the European Union: an overview. (Luxembourg: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2013).

Drug trafficking. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014. Accessed August 1, 2014 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking.

Drug War Statistics. (Washington, D.C.: Drug Policy Alliance, 2015). Accessed August 15, 2015 http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics.

"Drug War Taught the U.S. Military How to Hunt Terrorists, The." *War Is Boring* (October 23, 2015).

Drumbl, Mark. *Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Druzin, Heath. "Afghanistan again at bottom of corruption index." *Stars and Stripes* (December 3, 2013).

Dueck, Colin. "Ideas and alternatives in American grand strategy, 2000-2004." *Review of International Studies* (2004), pp. 511-535.

Dueck, Colin. "New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay." *International Security* (2004).

Dufton, Emily. "The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime." *The Atlantic* (March 26, 2012).

Dumain, Emma. "Armed Service Chairman Calls for Strategy to Combat ISIS." *Roll Call* (August 27, 2014).

Dunigan, Molly. *Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies Military Effectiveness.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

Dunlap, Charles. "Lawfare Today: A Perspective." *Yale Journal of International Law* (2008)

Dunlap, Riley E. and Brulle, Robert J. *Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Dunmire, Patricia L. "'9/11 changed everything': an intertextual analysis of the Bush Doctrine." *Society and Discourse* (2009).

Dunmire, Patricia. "'Discourses of War and Peace': Narratives of the Future in U.S. Post-Cold War National Security Discourse" in (ed.) Adam Hodges *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 23-46.

Durán-Martínez, Angélica. "Drugs Around the Corner: Domestic Drug Markets and Violence in Colombia and Mexico." *Latin American Politics and Society* (2015).

Eastwood, Niamh; Fox, Edward and Rosmarin, Ari. *A Quiet Revolution: Drug Decriminalization Across the Globe.* (London: Release, 2016).

Ebinger, Charles; Banks, John and Schackmann, Alisa. *Offshore Oil and Gas Governance in the Arctic: A Leadership Role for the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2014)

Ebinger, Charles and Zambetakis, Evie. "The geopolitics of Arctic melt." *International Affairs* (2009).

Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use on American Society, The (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2011).

Economic Incentives. (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Accessed May 1, 2017 https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/economic-incentives.

Economics of Climate Change. (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Accessed May 1, 2017 https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/economics-climate-change.

Edelstein, David M. "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers." *Security Studies.* (2002), pp. 1–4.

Editorial Board, The. "Who Threatens America Most?" *The New York Times* (August 12, 2015).

Edwards, Chris. *Border Control Spending.* (Washington D.C.: The CATO Institute, 2014).

Edwards, George C. III. *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

Edwards, George C. III, and Barrett, Andrew. "Presidential Agenda-Setting in Congress" in (eds). Jon R. Bond, and Richard Fleischer, *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era.* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2000).

Edwards, George C. III, and Wood, B. Dan. "Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media." *The American Political Science Review* (1999), pp. 327–44.

Edwards, Julia and Hosenball, Mark. "FBI says it thwarted Islamic State-inspired July 4 attacks." *Reuters* (July 9, 2015).

Egan, Matt. "Trump wants to drill for oil in Alaska's fragile wildlife refuge." *CNN* (May 25, 2017).

Egan, Matt. "Oil Milestone: Fracking Fuels Half of U.S. Output." *CNN* (March 16, 2016).

Egan, Timothy. "What To Be Afraid Of." *The New York Times* (June 5, 2015).

EIA Report: Subsidies Continue to Roll in for Wind and Solar. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Energy Research, 2015).

Eichenberg, Richard. "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the use of military force, 1981-2005." *International Security* (2005).

Eikenberry, Karl W. "The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy." *American Foreign Policy Interests* (2013), pp. 11-8.

Eilperin, Juliet. "The Trump administration just disbanded a federal advisory committee on climate change." *Washington Post* (August 20, 2017).

Eilperin, Juliet. "Trump says 'nobody really knows' if climate change is real." *Washington Post* (December 11, 2016).

Eilperin, Juliet and Dennis, Brady. "EPA dismisses half of key boards' scientific advisors; Interior suspends more than 200 advisory panels." *Washington Post* (May 8, 2017).

Eilperin, Juliet and Hsu, Spencer S. "White House Directive Guides Policy on Arctic." *Washington Post* (January 19, 2009).

Eligon, John and Cooper, Michael. "Blasts at Boston Marathon Kill 3 and Injure 100." *New York Times* (April 15, 2013).

Eklund, Niklas and van der Watt, Lize-Marie. "Refracting (geo)political choice in the Arctic." *The Polar Journal* (2016).

Elgot, Jessica. "Illegal Drone Strikes Condemned in Landslide Vote by European Politicians." *Huffington Post* (February 27, 2014).

Elgot, Jessica. "Iraq, Syria and Gaza Pictures Reveal Grim Reality of Kids At War." *Huffington Post UK* (June 25, 2014).

Elliott, Dan. "EPA says it can't pay economic damages from mine spill." *Associated Press* (January 13, 2017).

Ellis, Ralph et. Al. "Orlando shooting: 49 killed, shooter pledged ISIS allegiance." *CNN* (June 13, 2016).

Ellerman, Denny A.; Marcantonini, Claudio and Zaklan, Aleksander. "The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting." *Review of Environmental Economic and Policy* (2015).

Elman, Colin and Fendius Elman, Miriam. "Correspondence: History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look." *International Security* (1995), pp. 182-193.

Elman, Colin and Elman, Miriam Fendius. "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 923-926.

Elver, Hilal. "Climate Change and the food security dimension." *Al Jazeera* (April 25, 2104).

Elwood, William N. *Rhetoric in the War on Drugs: The Triumphs and Tragedies of Public Relations* (Westport: Praeger, 1994).

Emerging Arctic, The. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). Accessed March 31, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/polar-regions/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/?cid=otr_marketing_use-arctic_Infoguide#!.

Emmerson, Charles. *The Future History of the Arctic* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).

Emmerson, Charles and Lahn, Glada. *Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North* (Lloyd's and Chatham House, 2012)

Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year (Washington, D.C.: United States Customs and Border Patrol, 2015). Accessed June 15, 2016 https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Budget%20History%201990- 2015.pdf.

Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year (Washington, D.C.: United States Customs and Border Patrol, 2017). Accessed December 26, 2017. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Dec/BP%20Budget%20History%201990-2017.pdf

Ending the Drugs War (London: London School of Economics, 2014).

Energy Security in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2012).

Enge, Bert. "Invisible Contest: The Submarine Cat-And-Mouse Game." *Arctic Deeply* (May 6, 2016).

Engelhardt, Tom. "Is Climate Change A Crime Against Humanity." *TomDispatch* (May 22, 2014).

Englehardt, Tom. *The American Way of War: How Bush's Wars Became Obama's.* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010).

English, John. *Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples and the Arctic Council.* (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013).

Entman, Robert. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

Eoyang, Mike and Freeman, Benjamin. "The Debt Ceiling Debacle is a National Security Threat." *U.S. News & World Report* (October 16, 2013).

EPA Kicks Off Website Updates (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, April 28, 2017). Accessed September 1, 2017 https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-kicks-website-updates.

Erickson, Edward J. "Climate Change and the Department of Defense: An Introduction." *Marine Corps University Journal* (2016).

Erlanger, Steven. "Fighting Terrorism, French-Style." *New York Times* (March 30, 2012).

Ervas, Francesca; Gola, Elisabeth; and Rossi, Maria Grazia (eds.) *Metaphor in Communication, Science and Education* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017).

Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew and Linebarger, Christopher. "Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2013), p. 1.

Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew and Peake, Jeffrey S. "Presidential Influence Over the Systemic Agenda." *Congress and the Presidency* (2004), pp. 181–201.

Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew and Peak, Jeffrey S. "Presidents and the Economic Agenda." *Political Research Quarterly* (2005), pp. 127–138

Estievenart, Georges. "Enlargement of the European Union Regarding the Drug Phenomenon: A Single Market for Illicit Drugs?" in (ed.) Alvaro Camacho Guizado, *Drug Trafficking: Perspectives From Europe, America and the United States.* (Bogota: Universidad de los Andes, 2005).

Estimating public expenditure on drug-law offenders in prison in Europe (Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2014).

Estevez, Dolia. "One Month After Drug Lord El Chapo Guzamn's Arrest, Cartel Business Continues With No Change." *Forbes* (20, 2014)

Etzioni, Amitai. *From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

"EU Action Plan on Drugs (2013-2016)." *Official Journal of the European Union* (2013).

"EU Approved Border Inspection Posts (BIP)." European Commission (2016). Accessed: April 24, 2016 http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/vet-border-control/bip/index_en.htm.

EU Climate Diplomacy for 2015 and beyond: Reflection paper. (Brussels: European Union, 2013).

"EU Drugs Strategy (2013-20)." *Official Journal of the European Union* (2012).

EU Fight Against Terrorism (Brussels: European Council, 2016). Accessed July 28, 2016 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism.

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: mandate extended by one year, two new tasks added. (Brussels: European Council, June 20, 2016).

EUROJUST Annual Report 2015. (The Hague, EUROJUST, 2016).

European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders. (Strasbourg: European Commission, 2015).

European Drug Report: Trends and Developments (Luxembourg: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2014).

European Drug Report: Trends and Developments (Luxembourg: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2015).

European Drug Report: Trends and Developments (Luxembourg: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2016).

European Parliament on the use of armed drones 2014/2567(RSP). (Brussels: European Parliament, February 25, 2014).

European Union Committee. *Operation Sophia, the EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean: an impossible challenge.* (London: United Kingdom Parliament, 2016)

European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, The. (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2005).

Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre Strengthening the European Union's Response To Terror (The Hague: Europol, January 25, 2016).

Ewing, Philip. "Obama's nuclear paradox: Pushing for cuts, agreeing to upgrades." *NPR* (May 25, 2016).

Ewing, Walter A.; Martinez, Daniel E.; and Rumbaut, Ruben G. *The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: American Immigration Council, 2015).

Executive Order 13536: Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia. (April 12, 2010).

Executive Order 13627: Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal Contracts (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2012).

Executive Order 13694: Blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, April 1, 2015).

Executive Order 13769: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 27, 2017).

Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, March 6, 2017).

Executive Order Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, December 21, 2017).

Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 25, 2017).

Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 25, 2017).

Executive Order: Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals For High Priority Infrastructure Projects (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 24, 2017).

"Extra Edition: Arctic OCS Development and National Security." *Alaska Business Monthly* (August 12, 2016).

Extreme Weather Events in Europe: Preparing for Climate Change Adaption (Oslo: Norwegian Meteorological Institute, 2013)

Fact Sheet: Jobs in Renewable Energy Efficiency. (Washington, D.C.: Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 2013).

Fact Sheet: President Bush Has Kept America Safe (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).

Fact Sheet: President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 5, 2016)

Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Investments to Enhance Safety and Security in the Changing Arctic. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, 2015).

Fact Sheet: Justice Department Counter-Terrorism Efforts Since 9/11. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2008).

Fact Sheet: the Obama Administration announces efforts to combat human trafficking at home and abroad. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 25, 2012).

Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, August 2, 2010).

Factsheet on the 'Right to be Forgotten" ruling (C-131/12). (Brussels: European Commission, 2014)

Fahn, Matthias and Hadjer, Tahimna Sadat. "How Blackwater Takes Uncle Same for a Ride - and Why He Likes It: A Model of Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment." (Munich: University of Munich, 2014).

Faist, Thomas. "Extension du Domaine de la Lutte: International Migration and Security Before and After September 11th 2001." *International Migration Review (*2002), pp. 7-14.

Falk, Pamela. "Nikki Haley says North Korean regime "will be utterly destroyed" if war comes." *CBS News* (November 29, 2017);

Farish, Matthew. "The Conquest of the Russian Arctic." *Cold War Studies* (2015).

Farooq, Umar. "Mission Creep: The Scope of Obama's Drone Wars. *Foreign Policy* (July 2, 2013). Accessed September 7, 2013 http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/02/mission_creep_the_scope_of_o bamas_drone_war.

Farre, Albert Buixade et. al. "Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governances, technology and infrastructure." *Polar Geography* (2014).

Fausset, Richard; Perez-Pena, Richard; and Apuzzo, Matt. "Slain Troops in Chattanooga Saved Lives Before Giving Their Own." *New York Times* (July 22, 2015).

Fears, Darryl. "Trump says the Atlantic, Arctic could be open to drilling." *The Washington Post* (June 29, 2017).

Feaver, Peter D. et al. "Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)." *International Security* (2000), pp. 165-193.

Feaver, Peter. "What is grand strategy and why do we need it?" *Foreign Policy* (April 8, 2009).

Fechtelkotter, Sara. "International Arctic Petroleum Cooperation: Barents Sea Scenarios." *The Polar Journal* (2017).

Federal Action On Climate Change and Clean Energy. (Arlington: Center for Climate and Energy Policy, 2013).

Federal Bureau of Investigation. *FY2016 Authorization and Budget Request To Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2016), p. 4-10.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. *Terrorism 2000/2001.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2001).

Feng, Liu and Ruizhuang, Zhang. "The Typologies of Realism." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* (2006), pp. 109-134.

Fenge, Terry. "Canada and the Arctic Council: Our Turn to Conduct the Arctic Orchestra." *Policy Options* (2012), pp. 63-67.

Fenge, Terry. "The Arctic Council: Past, Present and Future Prospects with Canada in the Chair from 2013 to 2015." *Northern Review* (2013), pp. 7-35.

Ferguson, Niall. *Civilization: The West and the Rest.* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011).

Ferguson, Niall. *Colossus: The Price of American Empire.* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).

Fernandez, Steve and Wilbanks, Tom. *Climate Change and Infrastructure, Urban Systems and Vulnerabilities.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2012).

Ferner, Matt. "Loretta Lynch Says She Doesn't Support Marijuana Legalization or Obama's Views on Pot." *Huffington Post* (January 28, 2016).

Ferner, Matt and Wing, Nick. "Joe Biden Has A Serious Drug Policy Problem." *Huffington Post* (September 2, 2015).

Ferris, Elizabeth. *Earth Day: Climate Change and Displacement Cross Borders* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2015).

Fettweis, Christopher J. *The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory and Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Fettweis, Christopher J. "Threatlessness and US Grand Strategy." *Survival* (2014), pp. 43-44.

Field, Antony. "The Dynamics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Domestic Security Dilemma." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2016), pp. 1-14.

Fields, Stanley P. "Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Overlooked Linchpin for the Achieving Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic." *Harvard National Security Journal* (2016).

Fifield, Anna. "UN committee condemns North Korea, citing crimes against humanity." *Washington Post* (November 18, 2014).

Filimonova, Nadezhda and Krivokhizh, Svetlana. "A Russian perspective on China's Arctic role." *The Diplomat* (September 27, 2014).

Filkins, Dexter. "'Do not resist' and the crisis of police militarization." *The New Yorker* (May 13, 2016).

Final Report on the Task Force on Cyber Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017).

Findings from Select Federal Reports: The National Security Implications of a Changing Climate. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2015).

Fingar, Thomas. "National Intelligence Estimates: A Discussion of Process, Analytics, and Structures." (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 2008). Accessed July 30, 2013, http://www.newamerica.net/events/2008/national_intelligence_estimates.

Finnegan, William. "President Trumps Guantanamo Delusion." *The Observer* (March 9, 2017).

Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn. "International Norms Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* (1998) pp. 887-917.

Fischer, Hannah. *A Guide to U.S. Military Causality Statistics: Operation Freedoms' Sentinel, Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).

Fisher, Kathryn. "Terrorist threat construction and the transition to permanent British counterterrorism law." *Journal of Terrorism Research* (2011).

Fisher, Louis. "Presidents Who Initiate Wars" in *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* in (ed.) James M. McCormick. (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), pp. 189-208.

Fisher, Max. "A staggering map of the 54 countries that reportedly participated in the CIA's rendition program." *Washington Post* (February 5, 2016).

Flake, Lincoln E. "Forecasting in the Arctic: The Historical Context of Russia's Security Implications." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* (2015), pp. 72-98.

Flake, Lincoln E. "Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, by Marlene Laruelle." *Strategic Analysis* (2014), pp. 602-604.

Flemming, Roy B., Wood, B. Dan, and Bohte, John. "Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macro-Dynamics of American Policy Agendas." *The Journal of Politics* (1999), pp. 76–108.

Flournoy, Michele A. and Brimley, Shawn (ed.) *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Century, 2008).

Flowers, Kimberly. *Food Security, Conflict and Stability.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, 2016).

Floyd, Rita. "Global climate security governance: case of institutional and ideational fragmentation." *Conflict, Security & Development* (2015).

Flynn, Alexis. "Mass Stabbing Strikes London as U.K. Steps Up Armed Police Force to Prepare for Possible Terror Attacks." *Wall Street Journal* (August 4, 2016).

FOKUS 2017: The Norwegian Intelligence Service's assessment of current security challenges (Oslo: The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2017).

Foley, Catherine. *Military Basing and Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2012).

Fonesca, Brian and Rosen, Jonathan D. *The New US Security Agenda: Trends and Emerging Threats* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 17-57.

Fontaine, Richard and Lord, Kristin M. (eds.). *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration.* (Washington, D.C.: Center For a New American Century, 2012).

Food and Agriculture Organization. *Climate change, water, and food security.* (Rome: United Nations, 2008).

Food and Agriculture Organization. *Coping with water scarcity in the 21ˢᵗ Century.* (Rome: United Nations, 2007)

Food Security. (Geneva: The World Health Organization, 2014). Accessed August 2, 2014 http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en.

Foot, Richard and Boswell, Randy. "Russians spark territorial row by planting flag in Arctic depths." *Calgary Herald* (August 3, 2007).

Foran, Clare. "The Clash Over the Paris Climate Talks." *The Atlantic* (November 19, 2015).

Ford, Gerald. *Statement on Actions To Combat Drug Abuse.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 26, 1975).

Foreign Terrorist Organizations. (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 2012). Accessed January 23, 2014 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

"Former President George W. Bush on ISIS: 'Evil is Real.'" *Real Clear Politics* (February 13, 2015).

Forster, Larissa. "The Soft Power Currencies US Navy Hospital Ship Missions." *International Studies Perspectives* (2013), pp. 1-21.

Forsvarsministeriets fremtidige opgaveløsning i Arktis (Copenhagen: Ministry of Defence, 2016).

Fountain, Henry. "Arctic winter seas ice drops to its lowest recorded levels." *New York Times* (March 22, 2017).

Fountain, Henry. "With more ships in the Arctic, fears of disaster rise." *New York Times* (July 23, 2017).

Fournier, Philippe. "The neoliberal/neurotic citizen and security as discourse." *Critical Studies on Security* (2014).

Frakt, Austin. "Where is the prevention in the president's opioid report." *New York Times* (November 27, 2017).

France Country Drug Report 2017 (Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drugs Addiction, 2017).

France Country Overview. (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016).

"France sets ups Islamist force in Africa's Sahel." *BBC News* (July 14, 2014).

Franke, Volker C. and Dorff, Robert H. (eds.) *Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2013).

Franzen, Jonathan. "Carbon Capture." *The New Yorker* (April 6, 2015).

Frates, Chris and Devine, Curt. "Government hacks and security breaches skyrocket." *CNN* (December 19, 2014).

Freedberg, Sydney J., Jr. "Philippine Typhoon Showcases US Strategic Edge Over China." *Defense One* (November 11, 2013).

Freedman, Lawrence. "Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century." *Defence Studies* (2001).

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs.* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

Freeman, Charles W. and Lu Boynton, Xiaoqing. *China's Emerging Global Health and Foreign Aid Engagement in Africa.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011).

Freyberg-Inan, Annette; Harrison, Ewan; James, Patrick (eds.). *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation.* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009).

Frieden, Jeff. "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940." *International Organization* (1988).

Friedberg, Aaron L. *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Friedersdorf, Conor. "3 Ways Obama Expanded War Powers Well Beyond George W. Bush." *The Atlantic* (November 7, 2014).

Friedersdorf, Connor. "The Perils of Obama's Latest Undeclared War." *The Atlantic* (November 2, 2015).

Friedersdorf, Conor. "The War on Drugs Turns 40." *The Atlantic* (June 15, 2011).

Friedland, Eliot. *Special Report: The Islamic State.* (Washington, D.C.: The Clarion Project, 2015).

Friedman, Benjamin H. "Perception and Power in Counterterrorism: Assessing the American Response to al-Qaeda Before September 11" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall   *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 210-211.

Freidman, Lisa. "Conservationists face once-remote prospect in Arctic drilling: defeat." *New York Times* (November 29, 2017).

Freidman, Lisa. "Scientists fear Trump will dismiss blunt climate report." *The New York Times* (August 7, 2017).

Freidman, Lisa. "Trump administration moves to open Arctic refuge to drilling studies." *New York Times* (September 16, 2017).

Friedman, Uri. "Is Terrorism Getting Worse? Depends on Your Definition." *Defense One* (July 14, 2016).

Friedman, Uri. "The contradictions at the core of Trump's North Korea strategy." *The Atlantic* (October 19, 2017).

Freedman, Lawrence. "The Third World War?" *Survival* (2001-02), pp. 61-88.

From Barracks to the Battlefield: Energy Innovation and America's Armed Forces. (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Project on National Security, Energy and Climate, 2011).

Frum, David and Perle, Richard. *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror.* (New York: Random House, 2003).

Fryer-Biggs, Zachary. "Poll: Cyberwarfare is Top Threat Facing US." *Defense News* (January 5, 2014).

Fuchs, Michael. "The North Korea Deal." *Foreign Affairs* (December 21, 2017).

Fukumi, Sayaka. *Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America: EU and US Policy Responses* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008).

Fukuyama, Francis. "America in Decay: The Sources of Political Dysfunction." *Foreign Affairs* (2014).

Fukuyama, Francis. "The Primacy of Culture." *Journal of Democracy* (1995).

Funk, McKenzie. "Arctic Landgrab." *National Geographic* (May 2009), pp. 104-121.

Future of the Arctic Region, The: Cooperation of Confrontation (The Hague: Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2014).

Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030, The (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center, 2011).

FY 2012 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2012).

FY 2013 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2013).

FY 2014 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2014).

FY 2015 Budget and Performance Summary: Companion to the National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2014).

FY 2015 Budget Request At A Glance. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2015).

FY 2017 Budget Overview (Anchorage: Alaska Department of Military and Veteran Affairs, 2016).

Gabrielson, Teena. "Obstacles and Opportunities: Factors That Constrain Elected Officials' Ability to Frame Political Issues" in (eds.) Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell's *Framing American Politics* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005).

Gaddis, John Lewis. "Grand Strategy in the Second Term." *Foreign Affairs* (2005).

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

Gady, Franz-Stefan. "Russia Tops China as Principal Cyber Threat to the US." *The Diplomat* (March 3, 2015).

Gaff, Nana de and Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. *America's Post-Cold War Grand Strategy-Makers and the Policy Planning Network.* (San Francisco: Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, April 3, 2103).

Gaffigan, Mark. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014).

Gallagher, Carolyn. "Mexico, the failed state debate and the Merida fix." *The Geographical Journal* (2015).

Gallagher, Carolyn. "What does the Trump administration mean for the MERIDA agreement." *Journal of Latin American Geography* (2017).

Galston, William A. and Dionne Jr., E.J. *The New Politics of Marijuana Legalization: Why Opinion is Changing.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013).

Gamble, Jesse. "Arctic Landgrab." *Scientific American Earth* (2009), pp. 58-63.

Garcia-Navarro, Lulu. "North Korea's prisons 'as terrible even worse' than Nazi camps." *NPR* (December 17, 2017).

Gardner, Robert. *Arctic Climate and Energy.* (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2012).

Gardner, Timothy. "U.S. nuclear power plants vulnerable to 9//-style attacks: report." *Reuters* (August 15, 2013).

Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Skaperdas, Stergios. *Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Gariup, Monica. *European Security Culture: Language, Theory, Policy.* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009).

Gaufman, Elizaveta. "Identify Threat Narratives" in (ed.) Elizaveta Gaufman's *Security Threats and Public Perception* (Berlin: Springer Link, 2016).

Gause, F. Gregory. "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf." *Security Studies* (2003), pp. 273-305.

Gavirlova, Ksenia; Vakhtin, Nikolai; and Vasilyeva, Valeria. "Anthropology of the Northern Sea Route: introducing the topic." *The Polar Journal* (2017).

Gayle, Damien. "Drug related deaths hit record levels in England and Wales." *The Guardian* (September 9, 2016).

Gearan, Anne. "Trump sets out national security strategy of 'principled realism' and global competition." *Washington Post* (December 18, 2017).

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures.* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

Gehrke, Joel. "Rex Tillerson puts Pakistan 'on notice' for sheltering terrorists." *The Washington Examiner* (August 22, 2017).

Geiling, Natasha. *Shell's Drilling Plans Expose Just How Unprepared the U.S. is for a Melting Arctic.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2015).

Gemenne, Francois at. al. "Climate and Security: Evidence, Emerging Risks and a New Agenda." *Climatic Change* (2014), pp. 1-9.

Geneva Conventions, The. (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949).

Gensler, Jon. "How Climate Change Affects Terrorism." *Defense One* (May 9, 2014).

Gentile, Carmen. "What happen when the U.S. leaves Afghanistan." *USA Today* (September 19, 2012).

George, Jim. *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations.* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994).

German, Michael. "Our Overreaction To Terrorist Attacks Like Paris Is Only Making Things Worse." *Defense One* (January 27, 2015).

Gerson, Michael. "Syria, the United States is learning the lessons of inaction." *Washington Post* (March 24, 2014).

Gertz, Bill. "FBI National Domestic Threat Assessment Omits Islamist Terrorism." *Free Beacon* (August 29, 2014).

Ghimire, Ramesh; Ferreria, Susanna; and Dorfman, Jeffrey H. "Food Induced Displacement and Civil Conflict." *World Development* (2015), pp. 614-628.

Gholz, Eugene; Press, Daryl; and Sapolsky, Harvey. "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation." *International Security* (1997), pp. 5-48.

Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. "Russia Readies Two of its Most Advanced Submarines for Launch in 2017." *Washington Post* (December 29, 2016).

Gilbert, David. "Europe's sweeping data privacy reforms put Google, Facebook and Apple in regulatory crosshairs." *International Business Times* (December 16, 2015).

Gilbert, Emily. "The Militarization of Climate Change." *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* (2012), pp. 1-14.

Gilboa, Eytan. "Public Opinion and Obama's foreign policy," in (eds.) Efram Inbar and Jonathan Rynhold's *US Foreign Policy and Global Standing in the 21st Century: Realities and perceptions* (London: Routledge, 2016).

Gilborn, Kelly and Patel, Tara. "Fracking in Europe." *Bloomberg* (November 22, 2016).

Gilens, Martin. "Inequality and Democracy Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* (2005), pp. 778-796.

Gill, Stephen. "Colombia to deploy 5000 troops and begin crop substitution pilot to curb coca cultivation. *Colombia Reports* (March 17, 2016).

Gill, Stephen. "Grand Strategy and World Order: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective." (New Haven: Yale University, 2003).

Gilliard, Darrell K. and Beck, Allan, J . *Prisoners in 1994*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 1995), pp. 10-11. Accessed May 1, 2016 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p04.pdf.

Gillis, Justin. "Cooling Language About a Warming Earth," *New York Times* (February 7, 2017).

Gillis, Justin. "UN Panel Issues Its Starkest Warning Yet on Global Warming." *New York Times* (November 2, 2014).

Gillis, Justin. "U.S. Climate Has Already Changed, Study Finds, Citing Heat and Floods." *New York Times* (May 6, 2014).

Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Gilsinan, Kathy. "Why Moldova may be the Scariest Country on Earth." *The Atlantic* (October 8, 2015).

Gingrich, Newt. *Understanding Trump* (New York: Hachette Book group, Inc., 2017).

Gladstone, Rick. "U.S. Eases Sanctions to Allow Good-Will Exchanges with Iran." *New York Times* (September 10, 2013).

Glass, Andrew. "Reagan Declares 'War on Drugs,' October 14 1982." *Politico* (October 14, 2010).

Glaze, Lauren E. and Bonczar, Thomas P. *Probation and Parole in the United States, 2010.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2011).

Glaze, Lauren E. and Kaeble, Danielle. "Correctional Populations in the United States, 2013. (Washington, D.C., United States Department of Justice, 2014).

Gleick, Peter. "Climate change, exponential curves, water resources and unprecedented threats to humanity." *Climatic Change* (2010).

Gleick, Peter. "The implications of global climatic changes for international security." *Climatic Change* (1989).

Glenn, John. "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration." *International Studies Review* (2009), pp. 523-551.

Global Analysis – Annual Report (Asheville: National Centers for Environmental Information, 2015).

Global Analysis – July 2016 (Asheville: National Centers for Environmental Information, 2016).

Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization. (Stockholm: Global Challenges Foundation, 2015).

Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States, The. (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 2000). Accessed October 19, 2013 http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nie99-17.htm.

"Global Partnership 2013" (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2013). Accessed March 1, 2014 http://www.state.gov/t/isn/gp2013.

Global Peace Index 2014: Measuring Peace and Accessing Country Risk. (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2104).

Global Risks (Eighth Edition). (Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2013).

Global Terrorism Index 2014: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. (Sydney: Institute For Economics and Peace, 2014).

Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. (Sydney: Institute for Economic & Peace, 2015).

Global Terrorism Database. (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism). Accessed July 31, 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

Global Trends: Force Displacement in 2015 (New York: Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015).

Global Water Security. (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2012).

Goad, Benjamin. "White House: We oppose marijuana legalization." *The Hill* (February 4, 2014).

Goddard, Stacie E. and Krebs, Ronald R. "Rhetoric Legitimation, and Grand Strategy." *Security Studies* (2015).

Godoy, Eric S. and Jaffe, Aaron. "We don't need a war on climate change, we need a revolution." *New York Times* (October 31, 2016).

Goffman, Erving. *Frame Analysis.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

Goguadze, Lasha. *International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' Statement to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 55th Session.* (New York, United Nations, March 20, 2012).

Golby, Jim; Dropp, Kyle; and Feaver, Peter. *Listening to the Generals: How Military Advice Affects Public Support for the Use of Force.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security).

Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Hillary Clinton: 'Failure' to Help Syrian Rebels Led to the Rise of ISIS." *The Atlantic* (August 10, 2014).

Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic* (2016).

Goldenberg, Suzanne. "Barack Obama reveres campaign promise and approves offshore drilling." *The Guardian* (March 31, 2010).

Goldgeier, James M. and Tetlock, Philip E.. "Psychology and International Relations Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* (2001).

Goldman, Russell. "How Many Die in a Typical Terror Attack? Fewer Than You Think." *New York Times* (June 20, 2016).

Goldstein, Avery. *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

Goldstein, Joshua. "Climate Change as a Global Security Issue." *Journal of Global Security Studies* (2016).

Goltz, Wolfgang. *20 years of monitoring and communicating evidence on drugs.* (Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, September 21, 2015).

Gomez, Pablo F. *The War on Drugs Revisited: Old Problems, Old Solutions, Same Results* (Vanderbilt University, September 16, 2009).

Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana. *More Mexicans leaving Than Coming to the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, November 19, 2015).

Goodale, Gloria. "Trump's reality TV playbook: seven way it changed the 2016 elections." *Christian Science Monitor* (April 12, 2016).

Google Transparency Report: Frequently Asked Questions (Mountain View: Google, 2014). Accessed October 1, 2016 https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms.

"GOP candidates use the Trump playbook." *Wall Street Journal* (August 31, 2017).

Gopal, Anand. "Obama's Secret Prisons: Night Raids, Hidden Detentions Centers, the 'Black Jail,' and the Dogs of War in Afghanistan." *The Huffington Post* (January 28, 2010).

Gopnik, Adam. "Images and Interests at War." *The New Yorker* (October 9, 2014).

Gordon, Evelyn. "How the World Encourages Hamas to Recruit Child Soldiers." *Commentary Magazine* (January 21, 2015).

Gorman, Siobhan. "Annual U.S. cybercrime costs estimated $100 billion." *Wall Street Journal* (July 22, 2013).

Goss, Porter. *Testimony of DCI Goss Before Senate Armed Services Committee.* (Washington, D.C.: Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2005).

Gould, Joe. "Fact-checking Trump's tweet on the US nuclear arsenal." *Defense News* (August 9, 2017).

Gould, Joe. "Lawmakers Press Top Officers For Arctic Plans." *Defense News* (March 20, 2015).

Gouliamos, Kostas and Kassimeris, Christos. *The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism.* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

Goure, Daniel. *The Measure of a Superpower: A Two Major Regional Contingency Military for the 21ˢᵗ Century.* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2013).

GPS 106. Problem drug use. Overall (ex PDU). All years. Geo-Coverage. National (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2016#displayTable:PDU-Nat.

GPS – Energy Darwinism II (New York: Citigroup, 2015).

Graczyk, Piotr. "Poland and the Arctic: Between Science and Diplomacy." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012).

Graesvik, Fredrik; Sorsdahl, Elin and Stammes, Dag. "Hussein (14) fra Sagene i Oslo kjemper mot   IS i Irak." *TV2* (February 1, 2014).

Graham, Bob and Talent, Jim. *World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, D.C.: The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2008).

Graham, Bradley. "Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare." *Washington Post* (February 7, 2003).

Graham, David A. "'America First': Donald Trump's Populist Inaugural Address." *The Atlantic* (January 20, 2017).

Graham, David A. "What Is France Doing in Syria?" *The Atlantic* (November 15, 2015).

Graham, Luke. "Cybercrime costs the global economy $450: CEO." *CNBC* (February 7, 2017).

Gramer, Robbie. "Here's What Russian Military Build Up in the Arctic Looks Like." *Foreign Policy* (January 25, 2017).

Gramer, Robbie. "U.S. coast Guard Chief warns of Russia checkmate in Arctic." *Foreign Policy* (May 3, 2017).

Grat et. al., Stephen. "Climitization: A Critical Perspective of Framing Disasters as Climate Change Events." *Climate Risk Management* (2015), pp. 27-34.

Grawert, Ames C. and Camhi, Natasha. *Criminal Justice in President Trump's First 100 Days* (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2017).

Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Gray, Colin S. *The Geopolitics of Super Power.* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988).

Gray, Colin S. *The Sherriff: America's defense of the new world order.* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 2004).

Gray, Colin S. *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History.* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

Green, David. "The Trump Hypothesis: Testing Immigrant Populations as a Determinant of Violence." *Social Science Quarterly* (2016).

Green, Miranda. "Trump administration swaps 'climate change' for 'resilience.'" *CNN* (September 30, 2017).

Greenberg, Andy. "Hacker Lexicon: What is the Dark Web." *Wired* (November 19, 2014).

Greenberg, Karen. "From Guantanamo to Limitless War, Obama's Failure to Live Up to His Own Five Commandments." *Mother Jones* (February 28, 2014).

Greene, David. "Russia Pushes to claim Arctic as its own." *NPR* (August 16, 2011).

Greenwood, Phoebe. "Hamas teaches Palestinian schoolboys how to fire Kalashnikovs." *The Telegraph* (April 28, 2013).

Gregory, Derek. "The everywhere war." *The Geographical Journal* (2011).

Grenoble, Ryan. "2017 was the year of hacks. 208 Probably Won't Be Better." *Huffington Post* (December 20, 2017).

Grenoble, Ryan. "Revenue from Colorado Marijuana Tax Expected to Double in 2015." *Huffington Post* (October 5, 2015).

Griffin, Christopher. "Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram: Counterterrorism and Military Cooperation in the Sahel." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016), pp. 896-913.

Griffin, Jo. "Guns, drugs and bandidos: inside the favela too violent for Rio's armed police." *The Guardian* (January 3, 2015).

Griffiths, Franklyn. "Environment in the U.S. Discourse on Security: The Case of the Missing Arctic Waters" in (ed.) Willy Ostreng, *National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the   Arctic — the Case of the Northern Sea Route* (New York: 1999), pp. 179-203.

Griffiths, Franklyn. "Environment in the U.S. Discourse on Security: The Case of the Missing Arctic Waters" in Will Ostreng (ed.) *National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the   Arctic – the Case of the Northern Sea Route* (Berlin: Springer, 1999).

Griffiths, Franklyn. *Towards A Canadian Arctic Strategy.* (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009).

Griffiths, James. "Cybercrime costs the average US Firms $15 million a year." *CNN* (October 8, 2015).

Grim, Ryan and Cherkis, Jason. "Paul Ryan's Commitment to 'Regular Order' Collides With Major Heroin Legislation." *Huffington Post* (March 22, 2016).

Grinberg, Emanuella and Jorgensen, Sarah. "New York terror attack suspects pleads not guilty." *CNN* (November 28, 2017).

Greshko, Michael. "What you need to know about Trump's proposed climate cuts." *National Geographic* (March 10, 2017).

Greshko, Michael; Parker, Laura; and Howard, Brian Clark. "A running list of how Trump is changing the environment." *National Geographic* (August 23, 2017).

Grove, Bryan. "To Escalate or Not to Escalate." *Medium.* (April 20, 2014).

Groves, David; Fischbach, Jordan; and Bloom, Evan. "High and Dry? From the Rockies to the Sierra, Water Mangers Gauge Implications of Climate Change." *RAND Review* (2014), pp. 18-24.

Groves, Steven. *True North: Economic Freedom and Sovereignty Must be at the Heart of U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2015).

Guelzo, Allen. *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President.* (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999).

Guerino, Paul; Harrison, Paige M.; and Sabol, William J. *Prisoners in 2010.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2011), pp. 28 and 30. Accessed May 1, 2016 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.

Gurman, Sadie. "Trump prepares to lift limits on military gear." *Associated Press* (August 27, 2017).

Gyarmati, Istvan and Winkler, Theodor (ed.) *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States.* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002).

Haas, Peter M. "Constructing Environmental Conflicts from Resource Scarcity." *Global Environmental Politics* (2002), pp. 1-11.

Haberman, Maggie; Thrush, Glenn and Baker, Peter. "inside Trump's hour-by-hour battle for self-preservation." *New York Times* (December 9, 2017).

Hacker, Jacob and Pierson, Paul. *Winner Takes All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer – and Turned its Back on the Middle Class.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

Hackett, Conrad. "5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe." (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, July 19, 2016).

Haddon, Heather. "Donald Trump: 'I don't believe in climate change.'" *Wall Street Journal* (September 24, 2015).

Hagel, Chuck. "Climate Change is a National Security Problem." *Time* (December 1, 2015).

Hague, William. *The Diplomacy of Climate Change.* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).

Haley, Edward P. "A Defensive Grand Strategy for the United States." *Armed Forces and Society* (2004), pp. 461-481.

Hall, John. "Chilling images show new ISIS terrorist school in Syria where children soldiers known as 'Caliphate Cubs' are trained to kill." *Daily Mail* (December 8, 2014).

Hall, John. "Shocking image shows child aged under ten being used to fire rockets from car-mounted missile launcher in Iraq against ISIS targets." *The Daily Mail* (December 20, 2014).

Halper, Daniel. "Obama: 'The World Must Never Cease in Seeking to Defeat [Al Qaeda's] Evil Ideology.'" *The Weekly Standard* (December 6, 2014).

Halper, Evan. "Civil servants charge Trump is sidelining workers with expertise on climate change, environment." *Los Angeles Times* (September 26, 2017).

Halperin, Morton H. and Kanter, Arnold. *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).

Halperin, Sandra. "The Political Economy of Anglo-American War: The Case of Iraq." *International Politics* (2011), p. 207-228.

Hamburger, Tom and Becker, Alexander. "At fast-growing Brookings, donors may have an impact on research agenda." *Washington Post* (October 30, 2014).

Hampton, Mary N. *A Thorn in Transatlantic Relations: American and European Perceptions of Threat and Security.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Hannerz, Ulf. *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Hanoush, Feras. "The Islamic State's Molding of Syrian Children." *The Atlantic Council* (November 17, 2015).

Harder, Amy and Nissenbaum, Dion. "Hagel to stress climate risks with south east Asian military officials." *Wall Street Journal* (May 31, 2014).

Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio. *Empire.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

Harper, John Lamberton. *The Cold War.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Harrison, Lawrence E. and Huntington, Samuel P. *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress.* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

Harrington, Cameron. *Water Wars? Think Again.* (Zurich: Center For Security Studies 2014).

Harris, Richard. "Trying To Unravel The Mysteries of Arctic warming." *NPR* (August 20, 2011).

Hart, Basil Henry Liddell. *Strategy.* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967).

Hart, Gary. *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Hart, Louis. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolutions.* (San Diego: Harvest/HBJ Book, 1955).

Hartig, Luke. "Is Trump's recusal from military tactics inviting catastrophe?" *Newsweek* (August 31, 2017).

Hartley, Thomas and Russett, Bruce. "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?" *The American Political Science Review* (1992), pp. 905-915.

Hartung, William D. *An Unstoppable Arms Trade.* (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 2008).

Hartung, William D. "Who's Going to Get Rich Fighting the Islamic State?" *Foreign Policy* (October 27, 2014).

Hashtag Terror: How ISIS Manipulates Social Media. (New York: The Anti-Defamation League, 2014).

Hassan, Oz. "Trump, Islamophobia, and US-Middle East relations." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017).

Hattem, Julian. "Spy head: 'Lone wolves' bigger threat than al Qaeda." *The Hill* (July 28, 2015).

Hawdon, James E. "The role of presidential rhetoric in the creation of moral panic: Reagan, Bush and the war on drugs." *Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal* (2001).

Hayes, Jarrod and Knox-Hayes, Janelle. "Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy." *Global Environmental Politics* (2014).

Headland, R.K. *Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of the 2015 Navigation Season.* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2015).

Heat Is On: Climate Change as a Threat to National Security, The. (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 2014).

Hebel, Kai and Lenz, Tobias. "The identity/policy nexus in European foreign policy." *Journal of European Public Policy* (2015).

Heer, Jeet. "The real danger of Trump's nuclear policy isn't Armageddon." *New Republic* (October 24, 2017).

Heffez, Adam. "How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry." *Foreign Affairs* (2013).

Hegghammer, Thomas and Nesser, Petter. "Assessing the Islamic States' Commitment to Attacking the West." *Perspectives on Terrorism* (2015).

Hein, Robert. *Right-sixing the United States Navy* (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2015).

Heininen, Lassi (ed.) *Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).

Helmrich, Lars. "US National Security and Environmental Change in the Arctic." (Maxwell: Air War College, 2010).

Hemmer, Nicole. "Newt's Legitimate Heir." *U.S. News & World* (May 24, 2016).

Hemming, Susan. "The practical application of counter-terrorism legislation in England and Wales: A prosecutor's perspective." *International Affairs* (2010), pp. 955.

Hendrickson, Ryan C. *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress and War Powers.* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002).

Hennigan, W.J. "Climate Change is real: just ask the Pentagon." *Los Angeles Times* (November 11, 2016).

Henrichson, Christian and Delany, Ruth. *The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers* (New York: The Vera Institute of Justice, 2012).

Hensley, Nicole and Blau, Reuven. "Two gunmen shot dead by cops after opening fire outside controversial 'Prophet Muhammad' art exhibit in Texas." *New York Daily News* (May 4, 2015).

Hentz, James J. (ed.) *The Obligation of Empire: United States' Grand Strategy for a New Century.* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004).

Herb, Jeremy; Berlinger, Joshua and Lee, Taehoon. "Haley: Kim Jon Un 'begging for war.'" *CNN* (September 4, 2017).

Hermann, Margaret G. *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders.* (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

Hermann, Margaret G. "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders." *International Studies Quarterly* (1980), pp. 7-46

Herrmann, Victoria. *America is not (yet) and Arctic nation* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014).

Herrmann, Victoria. *An Arctic Council in Transition.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2017).

Herrmann, Victoria and Raspotnik, Andreas. *A Quick Start Guide to the Arctic and UNCLOS.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2016).

Hernandez, Joel. "Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and the Globalization of Supply." *Perspectives on Terrorism* (2013).

Herzog, Werner. *A Guide for the Perplexed: Conversations with Paul Cronin.* (London: Faber & Faber, 2014).

Hewitt, Hugh. "Transcript: Donald Trump Returns." *HughHewitt.com* (September 21, 2015). Accessed: September 1, 2017 http://www.hughhewitt.com/donald-trump-returns.

Heyman, David F. *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014).

Heymann, Philip B. *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War.* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

HHS FY 2017 Budget in Brief - ACF - Discretionary. (Department of Health and Human Services, 2016).

Hicks, D.B. "Internal Competition Over Foreign Policy-making: The Case of the U.S. Arms Sales to Iran." *Policy Studies Review* (1990), pp. 471-484.

Hicks, Josh. "House Democrats: Naval Academy Climate Forum Lends a Military 'Voice of Credibility.'" *Washington Post* (July 18, 2015).

Hicks, Kathleen. "Keeping America's Principles In the Age of Terrorism." *The Atlantic* (August 17, 2016).

Higgins, Andrew. "A Rare Arctic Land Sale Stirs Concerns in Norway." *The New York Times* (September 27, 2014).

Higgins, Andrew. "On a tiny Norwegian island, America keeps an eye on Russia." *New York Times* (June 13, 2017).

Hilde, Paal Sigurd. "Armed Forces and Security Challenges in the Arctic" in Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal (eds.) *Geopolitics and security in the Arctic: regional dynamics in a global world* (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 147-165.

Hilsman, Roger. "Policy-Making is Politics" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 250-259.

Hindle, Gary. "Policing Terrorism in the United Kingdom." *Policing* (2007).

Hinshaw, Drew. "Female suicide bomber kills at least 20 in Nigeria." *Wall Street Journal* (July 7, 2015).

Hinton, Jr., Henry L. *Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism.* (Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, March 11, 1999).

Hironaka, Ann. *Never Ending Wars: The International Community; Weak States and the Perpetuation of Civil War.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

Historical Budget of the United States: Fiscal Year 1996. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Management and Budget, 1996). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=BUDGET&browsePath=Fiscal+Year+1996&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=31

Historical Budget of the United States: Fiscal Year 2012. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Management and Budget, 2012). Accessed January 1, 2014 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/hist.pdf

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue. (Washington, D.C.: International Crisis Group, 2001).

Hjortdal, Magnus. "China's use of cyber warfare: espionage meets strategic deterrence." *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2011).

HMT Public Expenditures Statistical Analyses (PESA). Accessed December 7, 2017 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-expenditure-statistical-analyses-pesa.

Hodges, Adam. *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Hodges, Adam. "The Generic U.S. Presidential War Narrative: Justifying Military Force and Imagining the Nation," in (ed.) Adam Hodges', *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 47-68.

Hodges, Adam. *The 'War on Terror' Narrative: Discourse and Intertexuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Hodges, Adam and Nilep, Chad. "Introduction" in (eds.) Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep, *Discourse, War and Terrorism.* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2007).

Hoffman, Frank G. "Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations. *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (2014), pp. 472-485.

Hoffman, Stanley. *Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy.* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

Holdaway, Jennifer. *Environment, Health and Migration: Towards a More Integrated Analysis.* (Geneva: United States Institute for Social Development, 2014).

Holder, Eric. *Remarks at Northwestern University of Law.* (Evanston: Northwestern University, March 5, 2012).

Holland, Andrew. *America's Energy Choices.* (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2009).

Holland, Andrew. *America's Role in the Arctic: Opportunity and Security in the High North* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project).

Holland, Andrew. *National Security in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: How a lack of attention in the Arctic is harming America's interest.* (Washington, D.C.: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 10, 2014).

Holland, Andrew and Vagg, Xander. *The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2013).

Holland, Andrew and Vagg, Xander. *The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change: United Kingdom.* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2013).

Holland, Andrew and Vagg, Xander. *The Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change: United States.* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2013).

Holland, Jack. *Selling the War on Terror: Foreign policy discourses after 9/11.* (London: Routledge, 2013).

Holland, Jack. "Understanding continuity in Barack Obama's foreign policy" in (eds.) Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland *Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror.* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 1-16.

Holland, Jack and Fermor, Ben. "Trump's rhetoric at 100 days: contradictions within effective emotional narratives." *Critical Studies on Security* (2017).

Holland, Lauren. "The U.S. Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis. *Armed Forces & Society* (1990), pp. 219-242.

Holland, Steve. "Trump wants to make sure U.S. nuclear arsenal at 'top of the pack." *Reuters* (February 23, 2017).

Holsti, Ole. "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy," in (ed.) G. John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays.* (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005),

Holsti, Ole R. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

Holsti, Ole. *The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems.* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1977).

Holthaus, Eric. "Hot Zone: Is climate change destabilizing Iraq?" *Slate* (June 27, 2014).

Holthaus, Eric. "Obama is a climate hypocrite. His trip to Alaska proves it." *Slate* (August 31, 2015).

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25: Arctic Region Policy. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." *International Security* (1994), pp. 5-40.

Honneland, Geir. *Arctic Euphoria and International High North Politics* (Berlin: SpringerLink, 2017).

Hornsey, Matthew J. et. al. "Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change." *Nature Climate Change* (2016), pp. 1-5.

Horowitz, Michael. *The diffusion of military power - causes and consequences for international politics.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Horowitz, Sari and Zapotosky, Matt. "Sessions issues sweeping new criminal charging policy." *Washington Post* (May 12, 2017).

Houck, Caroline. "The Arctic could be the next South China Sea, says Coast Guard Commandant." *Defense One* (August 1, 2017).

Houck, James W. *The Opportunity Costs of Ignoring the Law of the Sea Convention in the Arctic.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2013), pp. 11-21.

"How America's police became so heavily armed." *The Economist* (May 18, 2015).

"How do cartels get drugs into the U.S." *BBC* (December 3, 2015).

"How do illegal immigrants get into the European Union." *CNN* (October 30, 2013).

"How the Arctic Council Sets the Tone for International cooperation. *World Policy Blog* (April 12, 2017). Accessed July 13, 2017 http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/12/how-arctic-council-sets-tone-international-cooperation.

Howard, Michael "Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century." *Defense Studies* (2001), pp. 1-10.

Howard, Roger. *The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources* (London: Continuum UK, 2009).

Howard, Russell D. and Traughber, Colleen. *The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype.* (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, 2013).

Howe, Peter et. al. *Yale Climate Opinion Maps – U.S. 2016.* (New Haven: Yale University, 2017).

Howell, Katie et. al. "Obama budget increases funding for energy research and nuclear power." *Scientific American* (February 2, 2010).

Howlett, Darryl. "Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature." *Strategic Insights* (2005).

Hsiang, Solomon M.; Burker, Marshall; and Miguel, Edward. "Quantifying the Influence of Climate Change on Human Conflict." *Science Express* (2013).

Huber, Daniela. *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-Western Democracies* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

Huckerby, Jayne. "When Women Become Terrorists." *The New York Times* (January 21, 2015).

Huebert, Rob. "Canadian defense review depicts Russia as Arctic adversary." *Arctic Deeply* (July 4, 2017).

Huebert, Rob. "New Directions in Circumpolar Co-operation: Canada, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council." *Canadian Foreign Policy* (1998), pp. 37-57.

Huebert, Rob. *United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power* (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2009).

Huebert, Rob et. al. *Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether.* (Arlington: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012).

Huebert, Rob and Yeager, Brooks B. *A New Sea: The Need For A Regional Agreement on Management and Conservation of the Arctic Marine Environment* (Oslo: World Wildlife Fund, 2008).

Hughes, Seamus. "To Stop ISIS Recruitment, Focus Offline." Lawfare (August 7, 2016).

Hughes, Trevor. "Teenage jihad suspect sentenced to four years." *USA Today* (January 23, 2015).

Hughes, Bryn. "Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social Construction of Security." *Global Change, Peace & Security* (2007), pp. 83-102.

Hughes, Judith A. "Child Soldiers: Are US Military Members Prepared to Deal With the Threat?" *Air & Space Power Journal* (2008).

Huitfeldt, Tonne; Ries, Tomas; and Oyna, Gunvald. *Strategic Interests in the Arctic* (Oslo: Instotuit for Forsvarsstuder, 1992).

Human Development Report 1994 (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

Human Trafficking: A New Form of Slavery (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2006).

Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Anti-Trafficking Efforts Abroad. (Washington, D.C. Government Accountability Office, 2006).

Hummel, Stephen. "The Islamic State and WMD: Assessing the Future Threat." *CTC Sentinel* (2016).

Humpert, Malte. *Arctic Shipping: An Analysis of the 2013 Northern Sea Route* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014).

Humpert, Malte. *Canada's National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: New Capabilities for Arctic.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011).

Humpert, Malte. *Iceland for sale: Chinese tycoon seeks to purchase 300 km of Wilderness.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011).

Humpert, Malte. *The Future of Arctic Shipping: A New Silk Road for China?* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute: 2013).

Humpert, Malte. *The Future of the Northern Sea Route – A 'Golden Waterway' or Niche Trade Route.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011).

Humpert, Malte and Raspotnik, Andreas. "China in the 'Great White North'" *European Geostrategy* (2012). Accessed August 2, 2017 http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2012/08/china-great-white-north.

Humpert, Malte and Raspotnik, Andreas. *Norway's Energy Resource Policy and The Future of Bilateral Cooperation the Barents Sea* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute 2012).

Humpert, Malte and Raspotnik, Andreas. "The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012).

Hung, Nong. "Emerging interests of non-Arctic countries in the Arctic: a Chinese perspective." *The   Polar Journal* (2014), pp. 271-286.

Hunt, Albert. "Bush's Terror Overreach Becomes 'New Normal' Under Obama." *Bloomberg* (May 27, 2012).

Hunter, Duncan. *Statement from Hearing on Coast Guard Arctic Implementation Capabilities.* (Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, July 12, 2016).

Hunter, Melanie. "Dem Congressman: 'Forces That Will Rise If ISIS Is Destroyed Are Nearly as Evil as ISIS.'" *CSNNews.com* (September 9, 2014). Accessed September 15, 2015 http://cnsnews.com/news/article/melanie-hunter/dem-congressman-forces-will-rise-if-isis- destroyed-are-nearly-evil-isis.

Huntington, Samuel P. "American Ideals Versus American Institutions." *Political Science Quarterly* (1982).

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Erosion of American National Interests." *Foreign Affairs* (1997).

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Renewal of Strategy," in (ed.) Samuel P. Huntington's *The Strategic Imperative: new Policies for American Security.* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1982), pp. 1-52.

Hussain, Rashad. *Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorist Recruiting in the Digital Age.* (Abu Dhabi: Hedayah CVE Expo, December 9, 2014).

Huttner, Paul and Miller, Keri. "How climate change affects global poverty." *Minnesota Public Radio* (August 15, 2013).

Hutton, Robert. "EU tweaks Trump playbook as Brexit Negotiators Tweet." *Bloomberg* (September 13, 2017).

Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration." *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2000), pp. 751-777.

Huysmans, Jef. *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU.* (London, Routledge, 2006).

Hybel, Alex Roberto. *US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Kennedy to Obama: Response to International Challenges.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Hydraulic fracking accounts of about half of crude oil production. (Washington, D.C., March 15, 2016).

Hyman, Randall. "The Big Chill: Norway and Russia's Icy Rift." *Arctic Deeply* (April 3, 2017).

Ibrahimkhail, Shakeela "Child Suicide Bombers a Growing Issue: Officials." *TOLO News* (January 7, 2014). Accessed January 9, 2014 http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/13375-child-suicide-bombers-a-growing-issue-officials.

Icenhower, Alexandria and Dhar, Shawn. *Combating climate change and water scarcity in the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2015).

Ikenberry, John G. *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (Fifth Edition). (New York: Pearson, 2005), pp. 14-34.

Ikenberry, G. John. "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror." *Survival* (2001-2), pp. 19-34.

Ikenberry, G. John. "America's Imperial Ambition." *Foreign Affairs* (2002), pp. 44-60.

Ikenberry, G. John. "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment." *Survival* (2004), pp. 7-22.

Ikenberry, John G. (ed.) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays.* (New York: Pearson, 2005).

Ikenberry, John G. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

Immigration Enforcement Along the U.S. Borders and at Ports of Entry: Federal, State, and Local Efforts. (Philadelphia: The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015).

Implementation Plan for the National Strategy foe the Arctic Region. Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2014).

"In Hezbollah magazine, not fairies but fighters." *Agence France Presse* (December 2, 2014).

"Increase of child soldiers in armed groups in 2014." *Vatican Radio* (February 11, 2015).

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, The. *Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria.* (New York, the United Nations, 2014), pp. 10-11.

INFORMATION SECURITY: Agencies need to improve controls over selected high-impact systems (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2016).

Inglehart, Ronald. "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review* (1988), pp. 1203-1230.

Ingraham, Christopher. "Trump is right – drugs are often cheaper then candy bars." *Washington Post* (February 16, 2017).

Inquiry into U.S. costs and allied contributions to support the U.S. military presence overseas. (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2013).

Insulza, Jose Miguel. *The OAS Drug Report: 16 Months of Debates and Consensus* (Guatemala: Organization of American States, 2014).

Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. *Technical Support Document: - Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis - Under Executive Order 12866* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 2013).

Interior Finalizes Plan to Make All Highest-Resource Areas in the U.S. Offshore Available for Oil & Gas Leasing. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, June 28, 2012).

International defence expenditure: 2015. (London: Ministry of Defence, 2015).

International Narcotics Control Board. *Report 2015.* (Vienna: The United Nations, 2016).

International Narcotics Control Board. *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2010* (Vienna: The United Nations, 2011).

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (United States Department of State, 2015).

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (United States Department of State, 2017).

"Interview: Warning Sounded Over 'Vibrant' Drug Trafficking in Afghanistan. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (March 13, 2014).

Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Action, An. (New York: United Nations, 2008).

Irwin, John. *The Jail: Managing the underclass in American society.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)

"IS Will 'Soon' Pose a Threat To the United States: Top General." *Agence France Presse* (August 25, 2014).

ISIS Kills Childhood: A special report on the Violations committed by ISIS against. (Edgware: The Syrian Human Rights Committee, August 16, 2014). Accessed January 5, 2014 http://www.shrc.org/en/?p=23838.

Jackman, Tom. "Trump to restore program sending surplus military weapons, equipment to police."*Washington Post* (August 27, 2017).

Jackson, Liz. "Where are British troops deployed overseas?" *BBC News* (December 1, 2015).

Jackson, Richard. *Writing the war on terrorism: Language, politics and counter-terrorism.* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

Jackson, Stephen. *Seeing Violence in the Weather: The Apocalyptic Rhetoric of Climate-Driven Conflict.* (Oxford: Interdisciplinary Press, 2015).

Jackson, Susan T. "The National Security Exception, the Global Political Economy and Militarization" in (eds.) Kostas Gouliamos and Christos Kassimeris, *The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism.* (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 214-235.

Jackson, Susan T. "The National Security Exception, the Global Political Economy and Militarization" in (eds.) Kostas Gouliamos and Christos Kassimeris, *The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism.* (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 214-235.

Jackson, Will. "Securitisation as Depoliticisation: Depolitcisation as Pacification." *Socialist Studies* (2013), pp. 146-166.

Jacobs, Laurence R. and Page, Benjamin I. "Business Versus Public Influences in U.S. Foreign Policy" in (ed.) John G. Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays.* (New York: Pearson, 2005): pp. 357-383

Jacobsen, Marc. "The Power of Collective Identity Narrations: Greenland's Way to A More Autonomous Foreign Policy." *Arctic Yearbook* (2015).

Jacobson, Michael. *The West At War: U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts Post-September 11.* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006).

Jaffe, Greg. "After vowing to end two wars, Obama may leave three behind." *Washington Post* (October 31, 2015).

Jaffe, Greg. "Hope fades on Obama's vow to bring troops home before presidency ends." *Washington Post* (October 12, 2015).

Jaffer, Jameel. "How the US justified drones strikes: targeted killing, secrecy and the law." *The Guardian* (November 15, 2016).

Jagannathan, Meera. "Terror threat is 'not going away,' DNI Dan Coats warns after Manchester bombing." *Daily News* (May 23, 2017).

Jahner, Kyle. "Climate change is a major threat to readiness, expert says." *Army Times* (September 23, 2015).

Jakobsen, Linda. *China prepares for an ice-free Arctic.* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010).

Jang, S. Mo and Hart, P. Sol. "Polarized frames on 'climate change' and 'global warming' across countries and states: Evidence from Twitter big data." *Global Environmental Change* (2015), pp. 11-17.

Jarmon, Jack A. *The New Era in U.S. National Security: An introduction to Emerging Threats and Challenges.* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

Jastram, Kate. "Warm World, Cold Reception: Climate Change, National Security and Force Migration." *Vermont Journal of International Law* (2014).

Javeline, Debra. "The Most Important Topic Political Scientists Are Not Studying: Adapting to Climate Change." *Perspectives on Politics* (2014), pp. 1-14.

Jegorova, Natalja. "Regionalism and Globalisation: The Case of the Arctic." *Arctic Yearbook* (2013).

Jensen, Eric Talkbot. "Cyber Warfare and precautions against the effects of attacks." *Texas Law Review* (2009-2010).

Jensen, Leif Christian. *Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic.* (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).

Jentleson, Bruce. *American Foreign Policy* (Fourth Edition). (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010).

Jentleson, Bruce. "Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly* (1992), pp. 49-73.

Jentleson, Bruce. "Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy." *The Washington Quarterly* (2014), pp. 115-136.

Jervis, Robert. "Hypothesis on Misperception." *World Politics* (1968), p. 454.

Jervis, Robert. "Realism, Neorealism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *International Security* (1999), pp. 42-63.

Jervis, Robert. "The Confrontation between Iraq and the U.S.: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence." *European Journal of International Relations* (2003), pp. 215-227.
Jervis, Robert. "Understanding the Bush Doctrine." *American Foreign Policy in a New Era.* (New York, Routledge, 2005), pp. 79-102.

Jetter, Michael. *Terrorism and the Media.* (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2014).

"Jihadi Trails: Circuitous Routes Foreigners Take to Syria and Iraq." *Wall Street Journal* (August 2015).

Joffe, George. "Global Jihad and Foreign Fighters." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016).

Joffe, Josef. "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy After Bipolarity." *International Security* (1995), pp. 94-117.

Johnson, Alastair Ian. "Thinking About Strategic Culture." *International Security* (1995), pp. 32-64.

Johnson, Chalmers. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company LLC, 2004).

Johnson, Chalmers. *Dismantling the Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2010).

Johnson, Chalmers. *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2006).

Johnson, Chalmers. *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2004).

Johnson, Douglas A.; Mora, Aliberto; and Schmidt, Averell. "The Strategic Costs of Culture." *Foreign Affairs* (2006).

Johnson, Keith. "A Clear and Present Danger." *Foreign Policy* (May 6, 2014).

Johnson, Keith. "Obama calls Climate denial, 'dereliction of duty.'" *Foreign Policy* (May 20, 2015).

Johnson, Keith. "Searching for Leads in the Opening Arctic." *Foreign Policy* (September 14, 2015).

Johnson, Kevin. "Comey: Feds have roughly 900 domestic probes about Islamic State operatives." *USA Today* (October 23, 2015).

Johnson, Robert H. *Improbable dangers: US Conceptions of threat in the Cold War and after.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

Johnson, Robert H. *Improbable dangers: US Conceptions of threat in the Cold War and after.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

Johnson, Ron *Extreme Weather Events: The Costs of Not Being Prepared.* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 12, 2014).

Johnston, David. "U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, but With More Oversight." *New York Times* (August 24, 2009).

Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010).

Joireman, Sandra F. "HIV/AIDS in Africa" in (eds.) Donald Rothschild and Edmond J. Keller, *Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 157-165.

Jolly, Alexandra. Columbia guerilla groups recruited 1400 child soldiers since 2011: Report." *Columbia Reports.* (March 13 2014).

Jones, Bruce. "Russia activates new Arctic Join Strategic Command." *HIS Jane's Defence Weekly* (December 2, 2014).

Jones, Charles. *An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy.* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1977).

Jones, Christopher. "Roles, Politics and the Survival of the V-22 Osprey." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (2001), pp. 46-72.

Jones, Merion and Watts, Susan. "Wikileaks cables show race to carve up Arctic." *BBC* (May 12, 2011).

Jorbenadze, Luka. *Russia holds the key to the future of Arctic Exceptionalism.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2017).

Jose, Betsy. "Bin Laden's targeted killing and emerging norms." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2016), pp. 1-23.

Joseph, Cameron. "Jeff Sessions calls for return to 'just say no' policies, slams marijuana use." *New York Daily News* (March 15, 2017).

Josephson, Paul R. "The Conquest of the Russian Arctic." (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

Jost, John T. "Resistance to Change: A Social Psychological Perspective." *Social Research* (2015), pp. 607-636.

"Journey To Planet Earth: Extreme Realities." *PBS* (2014). Accessed October 20, 2016

Judge-Becker, Cameron Gordon. "How Russia Plans to Win the Arctic." *Russia Direct* (August 31, 2015).

Judson, Jen. "The icebreaker gap." *Politico* (September 1, 2015).

Kafanov, Lucy. "Russia's military buildup in Arctic has US watching closely." *CNBC* (May 1, 2017).

Kagan, Kimberly. "Hegemony, Not Empire: How the Pax Americana Differs From the Pax Romana." *The Weekly Standard* (2002).

Kagan, Robert. "Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline." *The New Republic* (January 11, 2012).

Kagan, Robert. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

Kagan, Robert. "One Year After: A Grand Strategy for the West." *Survival* (2002-03), pp. 135-156.

Kagan, Robert. "Power and Weakness." *Policy Review* (2002).

Kagan, Robert. "Superpowers Don't Get to Retire: What Our Tired Country Still Owes The World." (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 2015).

Kagan, Robert. *The World America Made.* (New York: Knopf, 2012).

Kagan, Robert. "United States can't pivot away from Middle East." *Washington Post* (November 20, 2012).

Kagan, Robert et al. "One Year After: A Grand Strategy for the West?" *Survival* (2002-03), pp. 135-156.

Kahn, Brian. "Military Bases Face Hurdles in Climate Change Adaption." *Scientific American* (July 15, 2014).

Kahneman, Daniel and Renshon, Jonathan. "Hawkish Biases" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 79-96.

Kapitan, Tomis. "The Reign of 'Terror.'" *The New York Times* (October 14, 2014).

Kaplan, Fred. *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).

Kakonen, Jyrki. *Green Security of Militarized Environment.* (Hanover: Dartmouth, 1994).

Kalb, Martin. *The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed.* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2013).

Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

Kallis, Giorgios and Zografos, Christos. "Hydro-climate change, conflict and security." *Climatic Change* (2014), pp. 69-82.

Kamisar, Ben. "Minnesota man charged with trying to join ISIS." *The Hill* (February 19, 2015).

Kandiyoti, Rafael. "Pipeline politics caused the war in Georgia." *The Telegraph* (August 20, 2008).

Kao, Shih-Ming; Pearre, Nathaniel S.; and Firestone, Jeremy. "Adoption of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement: A Shift of the Arctic Regime Toward a Hard Law Basis?" *Marine Policy* (2012), pp. 832-838.

Kapyla, Juha and Mikkola, Harri. *The Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, the United States and the European Union.* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013).

Karl, Thomas R.; Melillo, Jerry M.; and Peterson, Thomas C. (eds.). *Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Karlsson, Michael. *9/11 and the Design of Counterterrorism Institutions* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012).

Katz, Eliot. "Unlocking the Language Room of War." *CommonDreams.org* (September 7, 2004).

Katz, Eric. "Trump administration, reversing trend, sheds 11,000 Federal employees in six months." *Government Executive* (August 4, 2017).

Katz, Mark N. *Leaving Without Losing: The War on Terror After Iraq and Afghanistan.* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

Katzenstein, Peter. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Katzenstein, Peter and Sil, Rudra. *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

Kaufmann, Chaim. "Threat inflation and the failure of the marketplace of ideas: The selling of the Iraq War" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 97-116.

Kaufman, Jared. "Without database, Missouri pharmacists struggle to detect prescription drug abuse." *Colombia Missouri* (April 5, 2016).

Kay, Sean. *America's Search for Security: The triumph of idealism and the return of realism.* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

Kazianis, Harry J. "Trump's entire North Korea strategy could be a giant bluff." *The Hill* (December 26, 2017).

Keck, Zachary. "Russia to establish Arctic military command." *The Diplomat* (February 2, 2014).

Keefe, Patrick Radden. "Can Network Theory Thwart Terrorists?" *New York Times* (March 12, 2006).

Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Wittkopf, Eugene R. (eds.) *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. "Individuals as Sources of American Foreign Policy" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Kelkar, Kamala. "Arctic official: 'no imperative' for icebreakers." *Alaska Dispatch News* (September 28, 2016).

Kelly, Cathleen. *Rex Tillerson's Big Oil Ties Endanger the Climate and National Security.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2017).

Kelly, Cathleen and Peterson, Miranda. *Safeguarding the Arctic: Why the U.S. Must Lead in the High North.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2015).

Kelly, Cathleen and Marano, Howard. *The Big Melt: Curbing Arctic Climate Change Aligns with U.S. Economic and National Security Goals.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2017).

Kendall, Alexandra E. *U.S. Response to the Global Threat of HIV/AIDS: Basic Facts.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

Kennan, George. *American Diplomacy 1900-1950.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951).

Kennan, George. *The Cloud Of Danger Current Realities in American Foreign Policy.* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977).

Kennedy, Paul (ed.). *Grand Strategies in War and Peace.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000.* (New York: Random House, 1989).

Kennedy, Peter. "The Arctic and Antarctica: Differing currents of change." *New Zealand International Review* (2015).

Kennedy, Robert F. *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis.* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968).

Kennedy, Ross. A. "Woodrow Wilson, World War I and an American Conception of National Security." *Diplomatic History* (2001), pp. 1-31.

Kennelly, Annie S. "Terror of the talk: a new framework for countering terrorism within the institutionalization of the terrorism industry." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2014).

Kentish, Ben and Shugerman, Emily. "Donald Trump scrapped Barack Obama's flood protection standards days before Hurricane Harvey." *The Independent* August 29, 2017).

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Keohane, Robert O. *Neorealism and its Critics.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

Kerbel, Josh. "The U.S. Intelligence Community's Kodak Moment." *The National Interest* (May 15, 2014).

Kerry, John. *Remarks on Climate Change and National Security* (Norfolk: Old Dominion University, November 10, 2015).

Khan, Rameez. "Global initiatives: Counter-messaging strategies key to fighting terror, say experts." *International New York Times* (April 11, 2015).

Khan, Zeba. "Words Matter in 'ISIS' war, so use 'Daesh.'" *The Boston Globe* (October 9, 2014).

Khandekar, Gauri. *The EU as a Global Actor in Counter Terrorism* (Madrid: FRIDE, 2011).

Kheel, Rebecca. "Trump officials signal intent to begin refilling Guantanamo." *The Hill* (July 8, 2017).

Kilgore, Ed. "North Korea and Iran are footnotes in Trump's national security speech." *New York Magazine* (December 18, 2017).

Kim, Jack and Park, Ju Min. "South Korea says Trump pledged commitment to its defense." *Reuters* (November 9, 2016).

King, W. Chris. "Environmental security revived: A global security threat." *Reviews in Engineering Geology* (2014).

King, David et. al. *Climate Change: A Risk Assessment.* (Cambridge: Centre for Science and Policy, 2015).

King, Kay. *Congress and National Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).

King, Marcus. *Meeting Global Environmental Security Challenges: Water Scarcity, Migration and Extremism.* (Zurich: The International Relations and Security Network, 2014).

King, Marcus DuBois and Gulledge, Jay. "Climate change and energy security: an analysis of policy   research." *Climatic Change* (2014), pp. 57-68.

Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for The Arctic, 2011-2020 (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Kingdon, John W. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1995).

Kinsella, David. "The global arms trade and the diffusion of militarism" in *Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security and Theory*, (eds.) Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby. (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 104-116.

Kinsey, Christopher and Patterson, Malcolm Hugh. *Contractors and War: The Transformation of USExpeditionary Operations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2102).

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Kissinger, Henry. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy." *Daedalus* (1966).

Kissinger, Henry. *Opening Statement By Dr. Henry Kissinger Before The United States Senate Committee On Armed Services At A Hearing Convened To Discuss Global Challenges And U.S. National Security Strategy.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 29, 2015).

Kissinger, Henry. "System Structure and American Foreign Policy" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 103-118.

Kitfield, James. "The Obama Doctrine: When Does Caution Become Retreat." *Breaking Defense* (March 26, 2014). Accessed March 26, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/the-obama-doctrine-when-does-caution-become-retreat.

Kjuka, Deana. "When Terrorist Take to Social Media." *The Atlantic* (February 20, 2013).

Klare, Michael T. and Volman, Daniel. "Africa's Oil and American National Security." *Current History* (2004), pp. 226-231.

Klausen, Jytte. "Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2015), pp. 1-22.

Klimas, Jacqueline. "Trump's North Korea Strategy: A Lot Like Obama's." *Politico* (August 8, 2017).

Kleiman, Mark A. R. "High Stakes: The Future of U.S. Drug Policy" *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Klimenko, Ekaterina. *Russia's Evolving Arctic* Strategy (Solna: Stockholm, International Peace Research Institute, 2014).

Klimenko, Ekaterina. "Russia's military buildup in the Arctic: Political rhetoric vs. reality." *WorldPolicy Blog* (October 14, 2015). Accessed August 2, 2017 http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2015/10/14/russia's-military-buildup-arctic-political-rhetoric-vs-reality.

Klimenko, Ekaterina. *US leadership in the Arctic Council: what choice does the USA have?* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015).

Klimenko, Ekaterina and Sorensen, Camila T.N. *The status of Chinese-Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017).

Knecht, Sebastian. *US-Russian Arctic Strategies: Specializing Governance and Governing Space.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012)

Knecht, Sebastian and Kell, Kathrin. "Arctic geopolitics revisited: spatialising governance in the circumpolar North." *The Polar Journal* (2013), pp. 178-203.

Knodt, Michele and Princen, Sebastian. *Understanding the European Union's External Relations.* (London: Routledge, 2003).

Kochis, Daniel. "Where's the site of Russia's next land grab? Hint: It's in the Arctic." *Fox News* (November 5, 2014).

Kohout, III, John J., et. al. "Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States." *Comparative Strategy* (1995), pp. 361-420.

Koivurova, Timo. "Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance." *Polar Record* (2010), pp. 145-156.

Koivurova, Timo and Heinamaki, Leena "The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic." *Polar Record* (2006), pp. 101-109.

Koivurova, Timo and Molenaar, Erik J. *International Governance and the Regulation of the Marine Arctic: Overview and Gap Analysis.* (Oslo: World Wildlife Fund, 2009).

Koivurova, Timo and Vanderzwaag, David L. "The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects." *UBC Law Review* (2006), pp. 121-194.

Kolata, Gina and Cohen, Sarah. "Drug Overdoes Propel Rise in Mortality Rates of Young Whites." *New York Times* (January 16, 2016).

Kolga, Marcus. "Defending Canada's Borders by Securing NATO." *The Toronto Star* (July 4, 2016).

Kona, Swapna. *Child Soldiers in Afghanistan.* (New Delhi: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2007).

Konisky, David; Hughes, Llewelyn; and Kaylor, Charles. "Will extreme weather events get American to act on Climate Change." *The Conversation* (2016).

Konyshev, Valery and Sergunin, Alexander. "Is Russia a Revisionist Military Power in the Arctic?" *Defense and Security Analysis* (2014).

Konyshev, Valery; Sergunin, Alexander; and Subbotin, Sergei. "Russia's Arctic strategies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis." *The Polar Journal* (2014).

Kopra, Sanna. "China's Arctic Interests." *Arctic Yearbook* (2013).

Koran, Laura. "Tillerson signs declaration stressing climate change threat." *CNN* (May 12, 2017).

Koren, Marina. "Is the U.S. Ready to Patrol the Arctic." *Defense One* (July 13, 2014).

Koren, Marina. "Why the U.S. Needs an Ambassador to the North Pole." *Defense One* (May 5, 2014).

Koren, Marina. "Russia's Militarization of the North Pole Has U.S. Lawmakers on Edge." *National Journal* (September 11, 2014).

Korte, Gregory. "Trump's meeting with Egyptian leader to push human rights to the background." *USA Today* (April 3, 2017).

Korte, Gregory and Jackson, David. "With North Korean threat looming, Trump seeks $5.9 billion for military." *USA Today* (November 6, 2017).

Koos, Julia et. al. *Climate Change, Water Conflicts and Human Security" Regional Assessment and Policy Guidelines for the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel.* (Brussels: European Commission, 2013).

Koser, Khalid. "IDPs, refugees, and violent extremism: From victims to vectors of change." (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2015).

Korte, Gregory. "America's perpetual state of emergency." *US Today* (October 23, 2014).

Korte, Gregory. "Obama orders intelligence agencies to study climate change." *USA Today* (September 21, 2016).

Korten, Tristram. "In Florida Officials Ban Term 'Climate Change.' *WLRN* (March 15, 2015).

Kotkin, Stephen. "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics." *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

Kovas, Paul. *Severe Weather Impacts & Insurance* (Toronto: Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, 2016).

Kraft, Michael E. "U.S. Environmental Policy and Politics: From the 1960s to the 1990s." *Journal of Policy History* (2000), pp. 17-42.

Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C. "From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies" in (eds.) Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 33-59.

Krauss, Clifford and Corkery, Michael. "A Bleak Outlook for Trump's Promises to Coal Miners." *New York Times* (November 19, 2016).

Krauss, Lawrence M. and Titley, David. "Thanks to Trump, the Doomsday Clock Advances Towards Midnight." *New York Times* (January 26, 2017).

Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* (1990), pp. 23-33.

Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited." *National Interest* (2002/03).

Krasner, Stephen D. "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)." *Foreign Policy* (1972).

Kratochvil, Petr. *The Balance of Threat Reconsidered: Construction of Threat in Contemporary Russia.* (Netherlands: Fifth Pan-European Conference, 2004).

Kristol, William. "Congressional Leadership and National Security." Interview with Jon Kyl and William Kristol. Washington, D.C., November 27, 2012. Accessed January 1, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/congressional-leadership-and-national-security#Video

Krebs, Ronald and Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric." *The European Journal of International Relations* (2007), p. 35-66.

Krebs, Ronald and Lobasz, Jennifer. "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion and the Road to War in Iraq." *Security Studies* (2007), pp. 409-451.

Krebs, Ronald and Lobasz, Jennifer. "The Sound of Silence: Rhetorical Coercion, Democratic Acquiescence and the Iraq War" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 117-134.

Krebs, Valdis E. "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells." *Connections* (2002), pp. 43-52.

Kristensen, Hans M. *How Presidents Arm and Disarm.* (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists (2014).

Krohn, Jonathan. "Yazidi girls train to take on ISIL from Sinjar." *The National* (December 1, 2014)

Kronfeld, Melissa Jane (ed.) *#EndSlaveryNow! A Discussion with Activists, Survivors, Influencers & Visionaries in the Modern Anti-Slavery Movement*, Third Edition (Washington, D.C.: NEXUS Global Summit, 2017).

Kronfeld, Melissa Jane. *Killing Them With Kindness: A Softer Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Radicalization in the War on Terrorism* (Long beach, First Amendment Studies Institute, 2012).

Kube, Courtney. "Intelligence Director Nominee Dan Coats Puts Cyber Threat at Top of List." *NBC News* (February 28, 2017).

Kube, Courtney et. al. "Trump wanted tenfold increase in nuclear arsenal, surprising military." *NBC News* (October 11, 2017).

Kuersten, Andreas. "Icebreakers and U.S. Power: Separating Fact From Fiction." *War On The Rocks* (October 11, 2016).

Kuersten, Andreas. "The Arctic Race That Wasn't." *Foreign Affairs* (August 20, 2015).

Kuersten, Andreas. "The Battle For The Arctic." *National Interest* (November 3, 2016).

Kunkle, Joseph. "Social Media and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat." *The Policy Chief* (2014).

Kuntzman, Gersh. "Donald Trump's policies, not Mexicans, are the real immigration problem in America." *Daily News* (February 13, 2017).

Kupchan, Charles. "Grand Strategy for a Divided America." *Yale Global Online Magazine* (2007).

Kupchan, Charles. *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Kupchan, Charles. *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century.* (New York: Vintage, 2003).

Kushkush, Isma'il. "In South Sudan, a Ghost of Wars Past: Child Soldiers." *The New York Times* (June 7, 2014).

La Baume, Maiade and Paravicini, Giulia. "Europe's Intelligence 'Black Hole.'" *Politico* (December 8, 2015).

Labott, Elise; Gaouette, Nicole; and Herb, Jeremy. "Tillerson moves to ditch envoys." *CNN* (August 29, 2017).

Lachicotte, George P. *U.S. Mexican Border: Official U.S. Army Strategy Against Transnational Criminal Organizations & the New Presidential Order.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 2017).

"Lack of stable supplies may lead to future oil price hikes and regional unrest." (Bath: Maplecroft, 2011).

Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. *From Polar Race To Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World.* (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009).

Lacy, Mark J. *Security and Climate Change: International relations and the limits of Realism.* (London: Routledge, 2005).

LaFeber, Walter. "The Post September 11 Debate Over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation." *Political Science Quarterly* (2002), pp. 1-17.

Laitin, David. *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

Laitin, David and Wildavsky, Aaron. "Political Culture and Political Preferences." *American Political Science Review* (1988), pp. 589-597.

Lake, Eli. "Somalia's Prisons: The War On Terror's Latest Front." *The Daily Beast* (June 27, 2012).

Lal, Deepak. *In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Lalonde, Suzanne and McDorman, Ted L. *International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2015).

Lamothe, Dan. "In a changing Arctic, lone Coast Guard icebreaker maneuver through ice and geopolitics." *Washington Post* (September 4, 2017).

Lancet Commissions, The. *Public Health and international Drug Policy* (London: The Lancet, 2016).

Landay, Jonathan and Rhode, David. "Exclusive: In call with Putin, Trump denounced Obama-era nuclear arms treaty – source." *Reuters* (February 9, 2017).

Langhorne, Richard. *The Essentials of Global Politics.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Langston, Kate. "Crumbling Bases 'could affect operational readiness." *Yorkshire Post* (November 15, 2016).

Lanktree, Graham. "Under Trump the EPA is more about politics than science." *Newsweek* (September 5, 2017).

Lanteigne, Marc. "Affirm the Scientific: Chinese Diplomacy in the Arctic." *Arctic Deeply* (December 23, 2015).

Lanteigne, Marc. "China and Norway: Cold Shoulder No More, Following Diplomatic Thaw." *Arctic Deeply* (January 3, 2017).

Lanteigne, Marc. "China Loops the Arctic Into Its Belt and Road Vision." *Arctic Deeply* (June 30, 2017).

Lanteigne, Marc. *China's Emerging Arctic Strategies: Economics and Institutions* (Reykjavík: Institute of International Affairs, 2014).

Lanteigne, Marc. "Keeping the gunpowder dry." *Arctic Deeply* (March 6, 2017).

Lanteigne, Marc. "U.S. Wary of Russia's Arctic Military Buildup." *Arctic Deeply* (February 13, 2017).

Langner, Ralph. "Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon." *IEEE Security & Privacy* (2011).

Lantis, Jeffrey S. "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism." *Strategic Insights* (2005).

Larive, Maxime H.A. "Welcome to France's New War on Terror in Africa: Operation Barkhane." *National Interest* (August 7, 2014).

Larsen, Henrik. "Concepts of Security in the European Union After the Cold War." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (2000).

Larsen, Rick. "Congressional Arctic Working Group will help better coordinate and advance U.S. Arctic policy." (August 5, 2014). Accessed July 1, 2017 https://larsen.house.gov/press-release/larsen-and-young-us-cannot-afford-neglect-arctic.

Laruelle, Marlene. *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2014).

Laruelle, Marlene. "Resource, state reassertion and international recognition: locating the drivers of Russia's Arctic policy." *The Polar Journal* (2014), pp. 253-270.

Lasserre, Frederic. "What Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic Mean for Canada's Security and Sovereignty." *World Policy* (March 1, 2017).

Lasserre, Frederic and Tetu, Pierre Louis. "Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic: Are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian Security and Sovereignty." *Arctic Yearbook* (2016).

Laswell, Harold. *The Decision Process.* (College Park: University of Maryland, 1956).

Laswell, Harold. "The decision process: Seven categories of analysis" in Nelson Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life: An introduction to political behavior.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963).

Lattanzio, Richard K. *The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI): Budget Authority and Request, FY2010-FY2016.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).

Lavender, Paige. "Former Bush Official Calls Climate Change A 'Real Serious Problem.' *Huffington Post* (May 21, 2014).

Layne, Christopher. "A New Grand Strategy." *The Atlantic Monthly* (2002).

Layne, Christopher. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy." *International Security* (1997), pp. 86-124.

Layne, Christopher. "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century." *World Policy Journal* (1998).

Lazar, Annita and Lazar, Michelle M. "Enforcing justice, justifying force: America's justification of violence in the New World Order" in Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep's *Discourse, war and terrorism* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2007).

Leber, Rebecca. "Auto executives will be pleased with Trump's latest gift to the industry." *Mother Jones Magazine* (March 15, 2017).

Leber, Rebecca. "Donald Trump just replaces the White House climate website with… this." *Mother Jones Magazine* (January 20, 2017).

Leber, Rebecca. "Here are all the climate deniers and oil flacks who love Trump's EPA pick." *Mother Jones Magazine* (January 9, 2017).

Leber, Rebecca. "Scott Pruitt vs. Science." *Mother Jones Magazine* (January 18, 2017).

Leber, Rebecca. "Trump just released his plan to gut Obama's climate policies. It's worse than you think." *Mother Jones Magazine* (March 28, 2017).

Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross. *We All Lost the Cold War.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Lederer, Edith M. "UN: Over 4,000 Child Soldiers in Armed Conflicts." *Associated Press* (July 1, 2014).
Lederer, Edith M. "UN: More than 25,000 recruits join jihadi groups in 2014." *Haaretz* (April 2, 2015).

Lederman, Josh. "Obama: Longest War in U.S. History is Ending." *Associated Press* (May 27, 2014).

Lee, Charles. "The future of U.S.-ROK defense cost sharing." *The Diplomat* (January 21, 2017).

Lee, Kurtis. "Islamist terrorist have struck the U.S. 10 times since 9/11. This is where they were born." *The Washington Post* (February 7, 2017).

Lee, Michelle Ye Hee. "Donald Trump's false comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime." *Washington Post* (July 8, 2015).

Lee, Michelle Ye Hee. "President Trump's claims that illegal immigration went up under past administrations." *Washington Post* (August 1, 2017).

Leetaru, Kalev. "Tracking the Islamic State – With Words." *Foreign Policy* (June 19, 2015).

Leffler, Melvyn P. "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948." *The American Historical Review* (1984), p. 346-381.

Leggert, Jane A. "Paris agreement in Climate Change: US letter to UN." (Washington, D.C.: Congressional research Service, 2017).

Leggett, Jane A. and Lattanzio, Richard K. *Climate Change" Frequently Asked Questions About the 2015 Paris Agreement* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017).

Legro, Jeffrey and Moravcsik, Andrew. "Is Anybody Still A Realist?" *International Security* (1999), pp. 5-55.

Leibovich, Mark. "Fear Factoring." *Washington Post* (May 1, 2003).

Lejeunesse, Adam. "China Prepares to Use the Northwest Passage." *Arctic Deeply* (September 19, 2016).

Leland, Anne and Oboroceanu, Mari-Jana. *American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics.* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010).

Leonhart, Michele. *Drug Enforcement Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, June 20, 2012),.

Lepore, Jill. "The Force: How much military is enough." *The New Yorker* (January 28, 2013).

Lert, Frederic. "French military responds to Paris terror attacks." *HIS Jane's Defense Weekly* (November 16, 2015).

Lester Milbrath. "Interests Groups and Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James N. Rosenau, *Domestic Sources in Foreign Policy.* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 231-251.

Levin, Dan. "Synthetic Drug Manufacturing is an Open Secret in China." *New York Times* (June 23, 2015).

Levine, Jon. "Florida Thinks You Are Literally Crazy If You Mention Climate Change." *PolicyMic* (March 20, 2015).

Levine, Mike. Outgoing DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano Warns of 'Serious Cyber Attack, Unprecedented Natural Disaster." *ABC* (August 27, 2013).

Levy, Barry S. and Sidel, Victor W. "Collective Violence Caused by Climate Change and How It Threatens Health and Human Security." *Health and Human Rights Journal* (2014).

Levy, Marc A. *Examining DHS's Misplaced Focus on Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: House Committee on Homeland Security, July 8, 2015).

Lewis, Adrian R. *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom.* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

Lewis, Brooke. "By the numbers: Kayla Mueller becomes the fourth American killed by ISIS." *The Toledo Blade* (February 11, 2015).

Lewis, James A. *Assessing the risks of cyber terrorism, cyber war and other cyber threats* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002).

Lewis, Tanya. "Trump administrations science priorities: better then feared." *Scientific American* (August 18, 2017).

Leyden-Sussler, Libby. "Canada's Arctic Council Protest: Ripple Effect?" *World Policy Blog* (May 7, 2015). Accessed July 2, 2017 http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/05/07/canadas-arctic-council-protest-ripple-effect.

Lieber, Robert J. "Rethinking America's Grand Strategy." *Chronicle of Higher Education* (June 4, 2004).

Liebergen, Stephanie. "President Donald Trump signs three Executive Orders targeting drugs, crime." *AOL News* (February 9, 2017).

Light, Paul C. *The President's Agenda.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

Lindekilde, Lasse; Bertelsen, Preben; and Stohl, Michael. "Who Goes, Why, and With What Effects: The problem of Foreign Fighters from Europe." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (2016), pp. 858-877.

Lindenberger, Michael. "In Kentucky, the Trump Playbook Is Already Familiar." *The New Republic* (March 2, 2017).

Lindsay, James. "George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and the Future of U.S. Global Leadership." *International Affairs* (2011), pp. 765-779.

Lindsay-Poland, John. "Supplying the World's Third Most Deadly War." *Huffington Post* (September 24, 2014).

Linker, Damon. "America's foreign policy God complex." *The Week* (November 25, 2015).

Liow, Joseph Chinyong. "Arctic Summer." *Foreign Affairs* (June 21, 2014).

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. "On Security" in (ed.) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *On Security.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 1-2.

Lissner, Rebecca Friedman. "Strategy is not strategy." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Litman, Gary V. "The Arctic Comes In From the Cold." *Real Clear Politics* (April 4, 2015).

Litwer, Lach. "Global Climate Change Is Worsening Instability and Making It Harder to Keep the Peace." *Huffington Post* (June 12, 2014).

Lizza, Ryan. "The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama's Foreign Policy." *The New Yorker* (May 2, 2011).

Llanos, Miguel. "Military Bases Brace for Slow-Motion War With Climate Change." *NBC News* (June 6, 2014).

Lobell, Steven E. *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

Lobell, Steven; Ripsman, Norrin and Taliaferro, Jeffrey. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Lockie, Alex. "It looks like a U.S. navy armada will return to waters near North Korea." *Business Insider* (October 13, 2017).

Lofflmann, Georg. "Hollywood, the Pentagon, and the cinematic production of national security." *Critical Security Studies* (2013), pp. 280-294.

Londono, Ernesto. "Commander of Southern Command tells senators budget cuts mean more narcotics get to U.S." *Washington Post* (March 13, 2014).

Londono, Ernesto. "U.S. commander in Afghanistan warns that full withdrawal will allow al-Qaeda to regroup." *Washington Post* (March 12, 2014).

Long, Austin. "The Management of Savagery: Policy Options for Confronting Substate Threats" in (eds.) Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller, *A Dangerous World: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2014).

Losey, Stephen. "Afghanistan airstrikes hit highest point in years." *Military Times* (October 9, 2017).

Losey, Stephen. "The Air Force's quiet war on the Latin American drug cartels." *Air Force Time* (May 29, 2016).

Lotterman, Ed. "Terrorism isn't going away, so how are we going to respond?" *Idaho Statesman* (October 7, 2016).

Lovett, John; Bevan, Shuan; and Baumgartner, Frank R. "Popular Presidents Can Affect Congressional Attention, For A Little While." *Policy Studies Journal* (2015), pp. 22-43.

Lowi, Theodore. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States.* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979).

Lowry, Rich. "The Return of Evil." *National Review* (February 6, 2015).

Lubold, Gordon and Harris, Shane. "Trump Broadens CIA Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes." *Wall Street Journal* (March 13, 2017).

Luckham, Robin. "Armament Culture." *Alternatives: Global, Local Political* (1984), pp. 1-44.

Ludlow, Peter. "Fifty States of Fear." *New York Times* (January 19, 2014).

Lundestad, Ingrid and Tunsjo, Oystein. "The United States and China in the Arctic." *Polar Record* (2014), pp. 1-12.

Lurie, Julia. "This is Trump's plan to stop the opioid epidemic. It's… underwhelming." *Mother Jones* (March 28, 2017).

Luttwak, Edward N. *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Luttwak, Edward N. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third.* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976).

Luttwak, Edward N. *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Mabey, Nick. *Delivering Climate Security: International Security Response to a Climate Changed World.* (London: Third Generation Environmentalism Ltd., 2008).

Mabey, Nick; Gulledge, Jay, Finel, Bernard; and Silverthorne, Katherine. *Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security.* (London: Third Generation Environmentalism Ltd., 2011).

MacDonald, Adam. "Emerging Reality, Exaggeration and Distraction." *Canadian Military Journal* (2015).

MacDonald, Adam. "Deep freeze or warm peace? Canada's Arctic strategy in a changing regional regime." *Canadian Naval Review* (2012).

Macfarlane, Alec and Lee, Taehoon. "U.S. to South Korea: We'll pay for your missile defense system (for now)." *CNN* (May 1, 2017).

Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince.* (London: Grant Richards, 1903).

MacKibbon, Bill. "How mankind blew the fight against climate change." *Washington Post* (June 9, 2015).

MacQuarroe, Brian. "In Afghan's war's twilight, two farewells in Mass." *Boston Globe* (February 17, 2014).

Madensen, Tamara D. "Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a Global Perspective." *Justice Quarterly* (2006).

Madwar, Samia. "Ice Cracks and Tensions and Tensions Rise at North Pole Camp." *Arctic Deeply* (July 14, 2016).

Malamud-Goti, Jaime. "Soldiers, Peasants, Politics and the War on Drugs." *American University International Law Review* (1990).

Malone, Mary Fran T. and Malone-Rowe, Christine B. "Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America." in Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel (eds.) *Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview from Six Continents* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), pp. 57-74.

Malone, Patrick and Smith, R. Jeffrey. *Trump budget: an extra billion dollars for nuclear weapons* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Public Integrity, 2017).

"Man who struck Ohio diners with machete was from Guinea, FBI says." *Associated Press* (February 15, 2016).

Mandate. (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2016). Accessed August 1, 2016 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/mandate-119.

Mandraud, Isabelle. "Russia prepares ice Cold War with show of military force in the Arctic." *The Guardian* (October 21, 2014).

Mandrick, Bill. "An Ontological Framework for Understanding the Terror-Crime Nexus" in (eds.) William Mendel and Peter McCabe's *SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime* (Tampa: The Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016), pp. 147-162.

Manicom, James and Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. East *Asian States, The Arctic Council and International Relations in the Arctic.* (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013).

Mann, Michael. *Incoherent Empire.* (London: Verso, 2003).

Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2002), pp. 235-58.

Mark E. Manyin, et. al. *U.S.-South Korea Relations.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017).

Manyin, Mark E. and Nikitin, Mary Beth. *U.S. Assistance to North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008).

Map of the Arctic Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2016). Accessed March 1, 2017 https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair/258202.htm.

Mapping Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea (Seoul: Transitional Justice Working Group, 2017).

Marcin, Tim. "Terrorism in America: If you knew what I knew, you'd never leave the house DHS's Kelly says." *Newsweek* (May 26, 2017).

Marcin, Tim. "Trump can't bring back mining jobs, coal CEO warns." *Newsweek* (March 27, 2017).

Marcin, Tim. "What has Trump said about global warming? Eight quotes on climate change as he announces Paris agreements decision." *Newsweek* (June 1, 2017).

Marietta et. al., Morgan "The Rhetorical Psychology of Trumpism: Threat, Absolutism and the Absolutist Threat." *The Forum* (2017).

Marijuana Legalization in Colorado After One Year of Retail Sales and Two Years of Decriminalization. (New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2015).

Markey, Daniel. "Prestige and the Origins of War: returning to Realism's Roots." *Security Studies* (1999), pp. 126-173.

Markusen, Ann. "Dismantling the Cold War Economy." *World Policy Journal* (1992), pp. 389-399.

Marks, Joseph. "Here's how the Trump budgte treats cyber." *Nextgov* (May 23, 2017).

Marks, Joseph. "Trumps Cybersecurity Advisers Resign In 'Moral' Protest." *Defense One* (August 25, 2017).

Marsh, Kevin. "Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decisions to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2013), pp. 1-24.

Marsh, Rene. "EPA removes climate change information from website." *CNN* (April 29, 2017).

Martel, William C. "A Roadmap for American Grand Strategy." *The Diplomat* (2013).

Martel, William C. "America's Dangerous Drift." *The Diplomat* (2013).

Martel, William C. "America's Grand Strategy Disaster." *The National Interest* (June 9, 2014).

Martel, William C. "For America, Decline is a Choice." *The Diplomat* (2013).

Martin, Gus. "Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime" in Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel (eds.) *Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview from Six Continents* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014),   pp. 163- 192.

Martin, James. *Drugs on the Dark Net: How Cryptomarkets Are Transforming in the Global Trade of Illicit Drugs* (New York: Palgrave, 2014).

Martin, Jonathan. "Avoiding Trump but adopting his divisive playbook: will it work in Virginia." *New York Times* (November 5, 2017).

Martinez, Luis. "U.S. Military in Afghanistan by the Numbers." *ABC News* (May 27, 2014).

Martinson, Erica. "Here's what Alaska's US Senate candidates had to say at the firs ever debate in the Arctic." *Alaska Dispatch News* (December 27, 2016).

Marto, Ricardo; Alvarez, Lourdes and Suarez, David. *Background Paper: LAC Small Island Development States* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2014).

Marshall, Patrick. "Cyberwarfare Threat." *CQ Press* (October 6, 2017)

Masi, Alessandra. "France and Britain's Coordinated Counterterrorism Strategy Against ISIS in Iraq and Syria Leaves Unanswered Questions." *International Business Times* (November 23, 2015).

Mason, Jeff. "Trump says chemical attack in Syria went 'beyond a red line.'" *Reuters* (April 5, 2017).

Mastanduno, Michael. "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *International Security* (1997).

Mastanduno, Michael. "The United States Political System and International Leadership: A 'Decidedly Inferior' Form of Government?" in (ed.) G. John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays.* (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), pp. 248-268.

Masters, Jonathan. *Targeted Killings* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013).

Masters, Jonathan. *The Arctic is Integral to U.S. National Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013).

Mathiesen, Karl. "Climate Change Has Left the US Exposed in the Arctic, Say Military Experts."*Mother Jones* (June 11, 2015).

Mathieu, Hans and Guarnizo, Catalina Nino (eds.) *Repression to Regulation: Proposal for Drug Policy Reform.* (Bogata: Friedrich-Ebert-Stifung, 2013).

Matthew, Richard. "Beyond The 'Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus." (Zurich: The International Relations and Security Network, 2014).

Matthew, Richard. "The Environment as a National Security Issue." *Journal of Policy History* (2000).

Matthews, Dylan. "Defense Spending in the U.S. in Four Charts." *Washington Post* (August 28, 2012).

Matti, Jutila. "Desecuritizing Minority Rights: Against Determinism." *Security Dialogue* (2006), pp. 167-185.

Mattis, James N. *Confirmation Hearing Testimony* (Washington, D.C.: The Capital, January 12, 2017).

Mauroni, Al. "Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?" *Homeland Security Affairs* (2012).

May, Caroline. "GOP Leaders Highlight Threat of Islamic State Infiltrating Southern Border." *Breitbart* (November 27, 2015).

"'Maybe We Live and Maybe We Die:' Recruitment and Use of Children by Armed Groups in Syria." (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Mayer, Jane. "Contract Sport: What did the Vice-President do for Halliburton?" *The New Yorker* (February 16, 2004).

Mayer, Matt A. *An Analysis of Federal, State and Local Homeland Security Budgets.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2010).

Mayoral, Amanda. "Climate Change as a Conflict Multiplier." (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2012).

Maxie, Jeremy and Slayton, David. *Russia's Arctic dreams have Chinese characteristics.* (Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016).

Mazarr, Michael (ed.) *Military Technical Revolution.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993).

Mazzetti, Mark and Cooper, Helene. "U.S. Officials and Experts at Odds on Threat Posed by ISIS." *The New York Times* (August 22, 2014).

Mazzetti, Mark and Gordon, Michael R. "ISIS is Winning the Social Media War, U.S. Concludes." *The New York Times* (June 12, 2015).

Mazzetti, Mark and Schmit, Eric. "Obama's 'Boots on the Ground': U.S. Special Forces Are Sent to Tackle Global Threats." *New York Times* (December 27, 2015).

McAllister, James. *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954.* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2002).

McBratney, Alex B. and Jarrett, Lorna E. "Securitsation" in (eds.) Damien J. Field, Cristine L.S. Morgan and Alex B. McBratney's *Global Soil Secuity* (Berlin, Springer, 2016), pp. 437-441.

McBride, Julie. *The War Crime of Child Soldier Recruitment.* (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2014)

McCain, John. *Opening Statement at Hearing on Nomination of General Joseph Dunford to Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.* (Washington, D.C.: Senate Armed Service Committee, July 9, 2015).

McCain, John. "The Real Arctic Threat." *Wall Street Journal* (September 1, 2015).

McCandless, Brian. "What's at stake with Russia's Arctic military buildup." *CBS News* (July 9, 2017).

McCannon, John. *Red Arctic: Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 1932-1939.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

McCarthy, Garry and Serpas, Ronal. "Cut incarceration and crime at the same time." *USAToday* (October 21, 2015).

McCarthy, James; Chen, Chery; Lopez-Carr, David and Walker, Barbara Louise Endemano. "Socio-cultural dimensions of climate change: charting the terrain." *GeoJournal* (2014).

McCarthy, Tom. "John McCain mocks Obama for calling climate change a threat as Isis advances." *The Guardian* (May 24, 2015).

MccGuire, Michael. *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

McCormick, James M. "Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), pp. 67-87.

McCormick, James M. "Decision-Makers and Their Policymaking Positions" in *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, (ed.) James M. McCormick. (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), p. 319-332.

McCormick, James M. "Introduction: The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), p. 1-18.

McCormick, Ty. "Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History." *Foreign Policy* (May 7, 2014).

McDermott, Roger. "Vostok 2014 and Russia's Hypothetical Enemies." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (2014).

McDonagh, Kenneth. 'Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk': Understanding the EU's Security Identity." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* (2015).

McDonald, Matt. "Securitization and the Construction of Security." *European Journal of International Relations* (2008), pp. 564-587

McFate, Sean. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean For World Order.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

McGwin, Kevin. "Norwegian Intel: Arctic Important to Russia but not top priority." *Global Trade Magazine* (February 10, 2017).

McHugh, Jess. "Russia Arctic Military Expansion: Moscow A 'National Security Issue' McCain Says." *International Business Times* (July 31, 2015).

McHugh, Jess. "Russia to spend $93 million on Arctic monitoring system." *International Business Times* (August 7, 2015).

McInerney, Thomas. "The coming struggle for the Arctic." *Washington Times* (May 6, 2015).

McIver, Jennifer. "Environmental Protection, Indigenous Rights and the Arctic Council: Rock, Paper, Scissors on the Ice?" *Geographical International Environmental Law Review* (1997), pp. 147-168.

McKay, Tom. "Top Military Commanders Have Declared Our Biggest Threat, and It's One We're All Ignoring." *PolicyMic.* (April 22, 2014). Accessed May 2, 2014, http://www.policymic.com/articles/88089/top-military-commanders-have-declared-our-biggest-threat-and-it-s-one-we-re-all-ignoring.

McLaughlin, Elizabeth. "The race for the Arctic: As new frontiers open, Russia leaves U.S. in its wake." *CBS News* (May 10, 2017).

McLaughlin, Jenna. "A crisis of leadership at the Military Intelligence Agency's Watchdog Office." *Foreign Policy* (December 20, 2017).

McLeary, Paul. "Defense Secretary 'Absolutely Prepared' For More U.S. Ground Combat in Iraq." *Foreign Policy* (October 23, 2015).

McLeary, Paul. "New Obama Strategy for Fighting the Islamic State Involves More Boots on the Ground." *Foreign Policy* (October 27, 2015).

McLeary, Paul. "Remember the Iraq War? More U.S. Combat Troops Are Heading Back to the Fight." *Foreign Policy* (December 1, 2015).

McMorris, Bill. "Zinke: Obama Foreign Policy 'Provides Fuel for Terrorism.'" *Free Beacon* (January 9, 2015).

McNamara, Robert. "Apocalypse Soon." *Foreign Policy* (October 21, 2009).

McNeil, Taylor. "Hotbed in the Arctic: Will Warmer Temperatures Thaw Diplomatic Relations." *Tufts Now* (2014).

McNeish, Hannah. "South Sudan's next generation in a hurry to fight." *The Guardian* (November 12, 2014).

McPherson, Stephanie Sammartino. *Arctic Thaw: Climate Change and the Global Race for Energy Resources.* (Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing Group, Inc.: 2015).

McShane, Larry. "ISIS teenagers execute group of 25 prisoners in front of crowd at amphitheater." *New York Daily News* (July 4, 2015).

Mead, Walter Russell. *God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World.* (New York: Random House, 2007).

Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk.* (New York: Knopf, 2004).

Meadowcroft, James and Weibust, Inger (eds.). *Multilevel Environmental Governance: Managing Water and Climate Change in Europe and North America.* (Cheltenham: Edward Elger Publishing Limited, 2014).

Meadows, Damien; Slingenberg, Yvon; and Zapfel, Peter. "EU ETS: Pricing carbon to drive cost-effective reductions across Europe" in (eds.) Jos Delbeke and Peter Vis' *EU Climate Policy Explained* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016).

Mearsheimer, John and Walt, Stephen. "The Israel Lobby" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), pp. 89-103.

Medby, Ingrid A. "Big fish in a small (Arctic) pond: Regime adherence as status and Arctic identity in Norway." *Arctic Yearbook* (2015).

Medby, Ingrid. *From Black Gold to a Blue Economy.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2015).

Melas, Matthaios. "The Arctic as a geopolitical bond among the EU, Norway and Russia." *Arctic Yearbook* (2016).

Meloy, J. Reid, et. al. "The Concept of Identification in Threat Assessment." *Behavioral Science and the Law* (2015).

"Melting North, The." *The Economist* (June 16, 2012).

Mencken, H.L. *A Mencken Chrestomathy.* (New York: Knopf, 1949).

Mendel, Charles. "NATO to consider Climate Change impact and military build up in Arctic states." *National Observer* (July 7, 2016).

Mendelbaum, Michael. "David's Friend Goliath." *Foreign Policy* (January 4, 2006).

Mendelbaum, Michael. *The Case for Goliath: How America acts as the world's government in the Twenty-First Century.* (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 2005)

Mendelbaum, Michael. *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).

Mendelbaum, Michael. *The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in Cash-Strapped Era.* (New York: Perseus Books, 2010).

Mendelsohn, Barak. "ISIS' Lone-Wolf Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

Mendelsohn, Barak. "Threat Analysis and the UN's 1267 Sanctions Committee." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2015), pp. 609-627.

Mendoza, Martha. "U.S. drug war has met none of its goals." *Associated Press* (May 31, 2010).

Merica, Dan. "Trump dismisses climate change question by contradicting himself on hurricanes." *CNN* (September 14, 2017).

Messina, Anthony M. *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century.* (London, Praeger, 2002).

Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016). Accessed June 1, 2016 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/mexico-central-america-and-the-caribbean.html.

"Mexico: Crimes at the Border." *Frontline* (May 27, 2008).

Meyer, Christoph O. and Miskimmon, Alister. "Perceptions and response to threats: introduction." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2009).

Meyer, Josh. "The secret backstory of how Obama let Hezbollah off the hook." *Politico* (December 18, 2017).

Meyer, Peter J. and Sullivan, Mark P. *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and Appropriations* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

Meyer, Robinson. "Can Trump Reverse Obama's Arctic Drilling Ban." *The Atlantic* (December 21, 2016).

Meza, Ricardo Vargas. *USAID's Alternative Development policy in Colombia* (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2011).

Michaels, John D. "Trump and the 'Deep State.'" *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Michaels, Jeffrey H. "The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge." (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Middleberg, Maurice I. "Trump administration's talk on human trafficking must be matched by deeds." *CNN* (July 1, 2017).

"Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts." *BBC* (March 4, 2016).

"Migration and Migrant Population Statistics." (Brussels: European Commission, 2015). Accessed: April 24, 2016 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics.

Milbank, Dana. "With al-Qaeda, what's in a name?" *The Washington Post* (2014).

Milbrath, Lester. "Interests Groups and Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James N. Rosenau, *Domestic Sources in Foreign Policy.* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 231-251.

"Military Deaths in ISIS Operations." *New York Times* (June 16, 2015).

Military Health Support for Stability Operations. (Washington, D.C: Department of Defense, 2010). Accessed August 13, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/600016p.pdf.

Millen, Raymond. "Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy." *Parameters* (2014), pp. 35-47.

Miller, Elhanan. "13,00 teens complete Hamas training camps to emulate 'suicide martyrs.'" *The Times of Israel* (January 15, 2104).

Miller, Greg; Jaffe, Greg; and Rucker, Philip. "Doubting the intelligence, Trump pursues Putin and leaves a Russian threat unchecked." *The Washington Post* (December 14, 2017).

Miller, Greg; Vitkovskaya, Julie; and Fischer-Baum, Reuben. "'This deal will make me look terrible': Transcripts of Trumps' calls with Mexico and Australia." *Washington Post* (August 3, 2017).

Miller, Michael E. "Arctic 'chill' as Russia Cold War are and sea confrontations." *Washington Post* (April 17, 2015).

Miller, Nicole. "Attorney General Jeff Session's claim that a crime wave is sweeping the nation." *Washington Post* (September 1, 2017).

Miller, Paul D. "National Insecurity: Just How Safe is the United States?" *Foreign Affairs* (2012).

Miller, Paul D. "Five Pillars of American Grand Strategy." *Survival* (2012), pp. 7-44.

Miller, S.A. "Trump joins with families of illegal-immigrant crime to urge Congress to act." *Washington Times* (June 28, 2017).

Milligan, Stephen P. *Withdrawal from International Agreements Legal Framework Agreements and the Iran Nuclear Agreement* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017.

Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956).

Milman, Oliver. "Trump aides abruptly postpone meeting on whether to stay in Paris climate deal." *The Guardian* (April 18, 2017).

Milman, Oliver et. al. "Obama's Legacy: The Promises, Shortcomings & Fights to Come." *The Guardian* (January 3, 2017).

Milne, Richard. "Norway opens up record 93 blocks for Arctic oil exploration." *Financial Times* (June 21, 2017).

Mindock, Clark. "Is Russia Preparing For War? Military, Navy to Keep Aircraft Carrier, Battlecruiser, Anti-Submarine Destroyer in Mediterranean, Arctic." *International Business Times* (January 2, 2017).

Miroff, Nick. "Tracing the U.S. heroin surge back south of the border as Mexican cannabis production falls." *Washington Post* (April 6, 2014).

Miron, Jeffrey and Waldock, Katherine. *The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition.* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2010).

Mix, Derek E. *The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013).

"Mixed report on safety of eating northern Alberta game." *CBC News* (April 3, 2007).

Moak, Stacy; Thomas, Shuan; and Walker, Jeffrey. "The Influence of Race on Preadjudication Detention: Applying the Symbolic Threat Hypothesis to Disproportionate Minority Contact." *Journal of Juvenile Justice* (2012).

Modest Rise in Number Saying There Is "Solid Evidence" of Global Warming (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, December 1, 2011).

Moeller, Susan D. *Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (College Park: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2004).

Moeller, Susan. "Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Media: Anatomy of Failure." *Yale Global* (April 14, 2004).

Mohamed, Besheer. *A new estimate of the U.S. Muslim population.* (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center, January 6, 2016).

Mohammed, Arshad. "Clinton tours Arctic as nations vie for resources." *The Atlantic* (June 2, 2012).

Mohapatra, Nalin Kumar. "Cooperative or Competitive Geopolitics in Arctic." *The Daily Pioneer* (March 11, 2017).

Mokomane, Zitha. *Types of good practices focusing on family poverty reduction and social exclusion."* Paper presented at United Nations Expert Group Meeting on "Good Practices in Family Policy   Making: Family Policy Development, Monitoring and Implementation: Lessons Learnt." (United Nations: New York, May 15-17, 2012).

Moller, Stig. "Climate Change: Politics versus Economics." *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook* (2007).

Monger, Randall and Yankay, James. *U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2013.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2015).

Montanaro, Domenico. "By the numbers: Comparing Obama's State of the Union Priorities to those of Bush, Clinton." *PBS* (January 20, 2015).

Montanaro, Domenico. "U.S. Political Reaction To Paris Attacks Split Along Party Lines." *NPR* (November 14, 2015).

Montgomery, Lori. "Forget the national debt. The new budget threat is climate change." *Washington Post* (September 9, 2014).

Montgomery, Lori. "Is the Pentagon Hyping Climate Change? Here, Take A Look." *Washington Post* (January 30, 2015).

Moodie, Michael and Schneider, Mark. *The Destabilizing Impacts of HIV/AIDS: First Wave Hits Eastern and Southern Africa; Second Wave Threatens India, China, Russia, Ethiopia, Nigeria.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002).

Moon Cronk, Terri. "USNS Comfort Complete Humanitarian Mission." *Armed Forces Press Service* (September 2, 2011).

Mooney, Chris. "The remote Alaskan village that needs to be relocated due to climate change." *Washington Post* (February 24, 2015).

Moore, Frances and Diaz, Delavane. "Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent mitigation policy." *Nature Climate Change* (2015), pp. 127-131.

Moore, Jack. "Iraq, Syria has 30,000 extremists ready to return home." *Newsweek* (July 15, 2016).

Moore, Scott. "Obama's Climate Change Diplomacy." *The Diplomat* (January 28, 2015).

Moore, Scott. "Why India is Now the Greatest Barrier to Global Climate Agreement." *Foreign Affairs* (November 20, 2014).

Moote, Mark. "American got 'exactly' what they voted for with Trump budget cuts: Mulvaney." *New York Post* (March 16, 2017).

Morgenthau, Hans J. *A New Foreign Policy for the United States."* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

Morgenthau, Hans. "Six Principles of Political Realism" in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* (New York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 4-15.

More Say There Is Solid Evidence of Global Warming (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2012).

"More Than 50 Bases to Go In MOD Estate Sell Off." *Forces* (November 7, 2016).

Morella, Carol; Lee, Michelle Ye Hee and Rauhala, Emily. "U.N. agrees to toughest-ever sanctions against North Korea." *Washington Post* (September 11, 2017)

Morgan, Steve. *2017 Cybercrime Report* (Menlo Park: Cybersecurity Investments, 2017).

Morgan, Steve. "Cybercrime costs projected to reach $2 trillion by 2019." *Forbes* (January 17, 2016).

Most Important Problem. (Washington, D.C.: Gallup Polls, 2017). Accessed June 17, 2017 http://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx.

Mousavi, Hamed. "American Militarism in the Post 9/11 Era: A new Phenomenon or the Continuation of a Military Tradition." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* (2014), pp. 8-16.

Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. *Al Qaeda: Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype of Reality?* (Cambridge: Belfer Center, 2010).

Mshvidobadze, Khatuna. "Commentary: New Russian Security Strategy." *Defense News* (2016).

Mueller, John. "Harbinger or Aberration?" *National Interest* (2002), pp. 45-50.

Mueller, John. *Terrorism Since 9/11* (The CATO Institute: Washington, D.C., 2017).

Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. "Responsible Counterterrorism." *Policy Analysis* (2014).

Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. *Terror, Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. "Terrorism and counterterrorism in the US: the questions of responsible policymaking." *The International Journal of Human Rights* (2014), pp. 228-240.

Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. "Terrorism poses no existential threat to America. We must stop pretending otherwise." *The Guardian* (February 24, 2015).

Muhlhausen, David B. and McNeill, Jena Baker. *Terror Trends: 40 Years; Data on International and Domestic Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2011).

Mulrine, Anna. "Resurgent Afghanistan drug trade threatening US goals, Pentagon warns." *Christian Science Monitor* (January 20, 2014).

Mullen, Jethro. "'France is at war,' President Francois Hollande says after ISIS attack." *CNN* (November 16, 2015).

Mulvaney, Mick. *Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer, 3/16/2017, #25.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 16, 2017).

Mungin, Lateef. "Benghazi siege: The ambassador's last minutes." *CNN* (December 19, 2012). Accessed August 1, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/19/us/benghazi-what-happened.

Murphy, Cian C. *EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law.* (Oxford: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), pp. 23-24.

Murray, Robert W. "Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges and consequences." *The Polar Journal* (2012).

Murray, Shoon Kathleen and Spinosa, Christopher. "The Post-9/11 Shift in Public Opinion" in (eds.) James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2004).

Murray, Williamson; Knox, MacGregor; and Bernstein, Alvin (eds.) *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Murray, Williamson and Grimsley, Mark. "Introduction: On Strategy" in (eds.) Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Mustapha, Jennifer. "Threat Construction in the Bush Administration's post 9/11 Foreign Policy." *The Pacific Review* (2011), pp. 487-504.

Mwandumba, Judith Victoria. "Children on the Battlefield: A Look Into The Use of Child Soldiers in the DRC Conflict." *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* (2015), pp. 59-71.

Myers, Meghann. "Bigger budget, more personnel ahead for Coast Guard." *Navy Times* (February 24, 2016).

Myers, Steven Lee. "Arctic Council Meeting Starts Amid Russia Tensions." *New York Times* (April 24, 2015).

Myers, Steven Lee. "U.S. is playing catch-up with Russia in scramble for the Arctic." *New York Times* (August 29, 2015).

Nagourney, Adam; Lovett; Ian and Perez-Pena, Richard. "San Bernardino Shooting Kills at Least 14; Two Suspects Are Dead." *New York Times* (December 2, 2015).

Naim, Moses. "The Five Wars of Globalization." *Foreign Policy* (2003).

Najm, Rashid. "ISIL recruits' children to be soldiers." *Central Asia Online* (July 21, 2014).

Nakamura, David. "Obama: I didn't underestimate the threats from Vladimir Putin." *Washington Post* (January 8, 2017)

Nakamua, Robert T. "The Textbook Public Policy Process." *Policy Studies Review* (1987), pp. 142-154.

Nakashima, Ellen. "At least 60 people charged with terrorism-linked crimes this year – a record." *Washington Post* (December 25, 2015).

Nakashima, Ellen. "Stuxnet was work of U.S. and Israeli experts, officials say." *Washington Post* (June 2, 2012).

NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, January 18, 2017).

Nathanson, Charles E. "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politics of Representation." *Alternatives* (1988), pp. 443-483.

National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse. *Shoveling Up II: The Impact of Substance Abuse on State Budgets* (New York: Columbia University, 2009).

National Climate Assessment. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2014).

National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2018. (Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, June 7, 2017).

National Drug Control Budget (Washington, D.C.: United States Office of the President of the United States, 2014).

National Drug Control Strategy: A Ten Year Plan (Office of the President of the United States, 1998).

National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012).

National Military Strategy for the United States of America, The (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).

National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. (Washington, D.C.: The CAN Corporation, 2007).

National Security Council. *Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security.* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2015). Accessed October 1, 2015 https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat.

National Security Divisions: FY 2017 Budget Request at A Glance (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 2017).

National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces. (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2011).

National Security Implications of Climate Related Risks & A Changing Climate. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015).

National Security Presidential Directive 66: Arctic Region Policy. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2009).

National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002).
National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006).

National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2010).

National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2015).

National Strategy for the Arctic Region. (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2009).

National Strategy for the Arctic Region. (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2013).

National Survey on Global Warming. (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2009). Accessed August 2, 2013,

Nationwide Staffing, 1992-2015. (Washington, D.C.: United States Customs and Border Protection, 2015).

Nationwide Staffing, 1992-2017. (Washington, D.C.: United States Customs and Border Protection, 2017).

Nau, Henry. *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

Navy Task Force on Climate Change. *U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030.* (Washington, D.C: Department of Defense, 2014)

Negroponte, John. *Statement by the Director of National Intelligence.* (Washington, D.C.: Senate Armed Services Committee, February 28, 2006).

Neill, Peter. "Russia, the Arctic and the Consequence of Failure." *Huffington Post* (July18, 2017).

Nelson, Arthur. "The Rise and Fall of Fracking in Europe." *The Guardian* (September 29, 2016).

Nelson, Michael. "Person and Office: Presidents, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy" in (ed.) James M. McCormick, *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), pp. 179-188.

Nelson, Stephen C. and Katzenstein, Peter J. "Uncertainty, Risk and the Financial Crisis of 2008." *International Organization* (2013).

Netherlands Country Overview, The. (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/countries/netherlands#pdu.

"Netherlands Drug Situation 2011: Report to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point, The." (Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and Addiction and the Ministry of Security and Justice Research and Documentation Centre, 2012), p. 40, Table 2.1.1.

Neubauer, Chuck. "U.S. gives military aid to nations with child soldiers." *Washington Times.* (August 8, 2012).

Neuhauser, Alan. "Obama Budget a Gas for Environmental Advocates." *U.S. News & World Report* (February 2, 2015).

Neumann, Peter R. "Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s." (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2015).

Neumann, Peter R. *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West.* (London: L.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2016)

Neustadt, Richard E. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Regan.* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

Newman, Lily Hay. "The biggest cybersecurity disasters of 2017." *Wired* (July 1, 2017).

Nichols, Michelle. "Central African Republic children forced to commit atrocities: UN." *Reuters* (January 22, 2014).

"Nigeria: Climate Change, Biological Weapons May Worsen Nigeria's Secret Crisis." *AllAfrica* (June 18, 2014). Accessed June 18, 2014 http://allafrica.com/stories/201406190045.html.

Nikala, Oscar. "France to Station Counterterrorism Force in Burkina Faso." *Defense News* (March 24, 2015).

Nilson, Thomas. "Norway Hikes 2017 Defense Budget." *The Independent Barents Observer* (November 8, 2016).

Nin, Anais. *Seduction of the Minotaur* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1961).

Nixon, Richard. *Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.* (Washington: The White House, June 17, 1971).

Nixon, Ron. "As U.S. Watches Mexico, Traffickers Slip in From Canadas." *New York Times* (October 16, 2016).

Nixon, Ron. "Heroin in Soups and Lollipops: How Drug Cartels Evade Border Security." *New York Times* (December 2, 2017).

Nolan, Dan. "How bad is the opioid epidemic?" *PBS* (February 23, 2016).

Nordas, Ragnhild and Gleditsch, Nils Petter. "Climate Change and Conflict." in Susanne Hartard and Wolfgang Liebert (eds.) *Competition and Conflicts on Resource Use* (Berlin: Springer Link, 2015), pp. 21-38.

Nordenman, Magnus. "The Russian challenge in the Arctic isn't about icebreakers." *Defense News* (February 24, 2017).

Nordhaus, Ted; Trembath, Alex; and Lovering, Jessica. "Climate Policy in the Age of Trump." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Northern Sea Route Shipping Statistics. (Tromso: The Arctic Council, 2015).

Norwegian Government's High North Strategy, The. (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

Nossiter, Adam. "In Nigeria, New Boko Haram Suicide Bomber Tactic: 'It's a Little Girl.' *The New York Times* (January 10, 2015).

Novack, Sophie and Reis, Patrick. "Here's How Obama Plans to Spend $25 Billion on the War on Drugs." *The National Journal* (March 24, 2014).

Nuclear Post Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010).

Nutall, Mark. *Encyclopedia of the Arctic* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

Nuttall, Mark and Callaghan, Terry (eds.). *The Arctic: Environment, People, Policy. (*The Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000).

Nye, Joseph S. *Presidential leadership and the creation of the American era.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

Nye, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

Nye, Joseph S. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

O'Connel, Kit. "New School, less crime: Colorado benefits of marijuana legalization." *MIT Press News* (August 19, 2015).

O'Dwyer, Gerald. "Eyeing Russia, Norway pumps prior savings into its defense budget." *Defense News* (February 3, 2017).

O'Hanlon, Michael E. *Defense Cuts, Big and Small.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, December 28, 2012).

O'Rourke, Ronald. *Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).
Obaji Jr., Philip. "Children living in fear in northeastern Nigeria." *The Hill* (January 5, 2015).

Obaji Jr., Philip. "The Child Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram. *The Daily Beat* (March 7, 2015).

Obama, Barack. *National Drug Control Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2014).

Obama, Barack. *End Human Trafficking.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2017).

Obama, Barack. *National Drug Control Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2013).

Obama, Barack. *Notice to Congress – Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2014).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global Initiative* (New York: Sheraton New York Hotel and Towers, September 25, 2012).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by the President at the GALCIER Conference.* (Anchorage: Dena'ina Civic and Convention Center, August 31, 2015).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.* (Washington, D.C.: Fort McNair, May 23, 2013).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by the President at the United States Military Commencement Ceremony.* (New York: West Point, May 28, 2014).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by the President at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement.* (New London: Coast Guard Academy, May 20, 2015).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya.* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, March 28, 2011).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall.* (Tokyo: Suntory Hall, November 14, 2009).

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered* (Prague: Hradcany Square, 2009)

Obama, Barack. *Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 29, 2009).

Obama, Barack. *The President's News Conference with President Nicolas Sarkozy of France in Strasbourg, France.* (Strasbourg: Palais de la musique et des congress, April 3, 2009).

Obama, Barack. *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (2000-2010).* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2014).

"Obama blasts war on drugs: 'It's been very unproductive.'" *The Washington Times* (April 9, 2015).

"Obama condemns 'cowardly, evil' Paris attack, offers US help to pursue terrorists." *Fox News* (January 7, 2015).

"Obama sanctions on North Korea are also aimed at China." *Christian Science Monitor* (August 31, 2010).

"Obama Says He Wants to Help Latin America Fight Drug Trade." *Telesurtv.net* (January 24, 2016). Accessed January 28, 2016 http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Obama-Claims-He-Wants-to-Help-Latin-America-Fight-Drug-Trade-20160124-0025.html.

Obeidallah, Dean. "The Real Muslim American Threat? It's Against Us." *The Daily Beast* (August 27, 2015).

Oberg, PerOla; Lundin, Martin; Thelander, Jonas. "Political Power and Policy Design: Why Are Policy Alternatives Constrained?" *Policy Studies Journal* (2015).

Oberie, Thierry and Vigoureux, Thierry. "Des avions de la CIA ont fait escale en France." *Le Figaro* (October 16, 2007).

Observers (Tromso: The Arctic Council, 2017). Accessed March 1, 2017 http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers.

Ocean: U.S. National Debate Topic 2014-2015, The. (Ipswich: Grey House Publishing, 2014).

Ochmanek, David, et. al. *America's Security Deficit: Addressing the Imbalance Between Strategy and Resources in a Turbulent World.* (Washington, D.C., The RAND Corporation, 2015).

Odeku, Kola. "Climate Induced Poverty: Impediment to Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* (2014).

Offerdal, Kristine. "Arctic energy in EU policy: Arbitrary interest in the Norwegian high North." *Arctic Journal* (2010).

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. *Fact Sheet: Recruitment and Use of Children.* (New York: United Nations, February 11, 2014).

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Person. "Definitions and Methodology" in the *Trafficking In Persons Report.* (Washington, D.C: Department of State, 2013).

Ogden, Pete. "Beyond Copenhagen: How Washington can Bolster a Stronger Climate Deal." *Foreign Affairs* (August 4, 2014).
Oliphant, James. "Trump declares national emergency on opioid abuse." *Reuters* (August 10, 2017).

Oliphant, Roland. "Putin eyes Russian strength in Atlantic and Arctic in new naval doctrine." *The Telegraph* (July 27, 2015).

Oliphant, Roland. "Russia claims resources rich swatch of Arctic territory." *The Telegraph* (August 4, 2015).

Oliver-Smith, Anthony. "Theorizing Vulnerability in a Globalized World: A Political Ecological Perspective" in (eds.) Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks and Dorothea Hilhorst, *Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People* (London: Earthscan, 2003), pp. 10-24.

Olsen, Inuuteq Holm and Shadian, Jessica. "Greenland and the Arctic Council: Subnational Regions in and Time of Arctic Westphalianisation." *Arctic Yearbook* (2016).

Omand, David. "Securing the State: National Security and Secret Intelligence." *PRISM* (2013), pp. 15-27.

"Omar Khadr to be moved to Alberta medium-security prison, lawyer says." *The Canadian Press* (January 17, 2014).

One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections. (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Center on the States, 2009).

Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Estimates. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017).

Opioid Addiction 2016 Fact & Figures (Rockville: American Society of Addiction Medicine, 2017).

Orcutt, Mike. "Sizing Up Trump's Cyberwar Strategy." *MIT Technology Review* (March 24, 2017)

Oremus, Will. "Obama's Climate Plan is Basically Cap and Trade." *Slate* (August 4, 2015).

Oremus, Will. "We Haven't Been This Close to the Apocalypse Since 1984." *Mother Jones* (January 23, 2015).

Ornstein, Charles and Limor, Hagit. "Where's the transparency that Obama promised?" *Washington Post* (March 31, 2011).

Osborn, Kris. "US Lawmakers: Russia's Military Build Up in Arctic 'Disturbing'" *Military.com* (March 12, 2015).

Osburn, Andrew. "Putin's Russia in Biggest Arctic Military Push Since the Fall of the Soviet Union." *Reuters* (February 1, 2017).
Osherenko, Gail and Young, Oran R. *The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Ostergrad, Robert L. *HIV/AIDS and the Threat to National and International Security.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Osthagan, Andreas. *Arctic Oil and Gas: The Role of Regions."* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Arctic Security: Hype, Nuances and Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2015).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Canada and the Arctic: An Ambiguous Relationship.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Coast Guards in the Arctic – Troubles Ahead?* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014).

Osthagan, Andreas. *Developing North American Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas: A Comparative Study – Part 1.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Dimensions of Oil and Gas Development in Greenland* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Hedging Bets: Oil and Gas in the Canadian Arctic.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Late to the Party of Premature Investments: The Debate on U.S. Arctic Capabilities.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011).

Osthagen, Andreas. *The United States as an Arctic Actor.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties of Reconciliation* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014).

Osthagen, Andreas. *Why we aren't ready for an active Arctic.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Other Foreign Fighters: An Open-Source Investigation into American Volunteers Fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, The. (Leicester: bellIngcat, 2015).

Otto, Richard A. "Countering Terrorist Recruitment Through Agile, Targeted Public Diplomacy." (Carlisle: Army War College, 2013).

Oueslati, Salah. "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Complex Factors in the Decision Making Process." *Society* (2014).

Oughton, Edward J. et. al. "Quantifying the daily economic impact of extreme space weather due to failure in electivity transmission infrastructure. *Space Weather* (2017).

Our People. (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2016). Accessed August 1, 2016 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/our-people-19.

Our planet, our future. (Brussels: European Commission, 2015).

Overcoming obesity: An initial economic analysis (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2014).

Overdose Death Rates (Atlanta: National Center for Health Statistics, 2015). Accessed August 30, 2016 https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates.

Owens, Colleen. *Funding services for human trafficking victims is imperative for policing the crime* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, June 14, 2013)

Pachauri, Rajendra Kumar and Reisinger, Andy (eds.). *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.* (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007).

Padrtova, Barbara. "Russian military buildup in the Arctic: Strategic shift in the balance of power or bellicose rhetoric only?" *Arctic Yearbook* (2014).

Paine, Christopher E. *Weaponeers of Waste.* (Washington, D.C.: National Resources Defense Council, 2004).

Palazzo, Chiara. "Operation Sophia: EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean deemed an impossible challenge' in House of Lords report." *The Telegraph* (May 13, 2016).

Paletta, Damian. "Trump pulls back threat to shut down government over the wall – for now." *Washington Post* (September 1, 2017).

Pallister, David; Brodzinksy, Sibylla; and Bowcott, Owen. "Secret aid poured into Colombian drug war." *The Guardian* (July 8, 2003).

Pan, Chengxin. "The 'China Threat' in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of other as Power Politics." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* (2004), pp. 305-331.

Panda, Ankit. "Russia to Build 10 Arctic Airfields by 2016." *The Diplomat* (January 15, 2015).

Papp, Robert Jr. *The United States as an Arctic Nation: Opportunities in the High North* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2014).

Paqin, Jonathan and James, Patrick (eds.). *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014).

Paret, Peter; Craig, Gordon A.; and Gilbert, Felix. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Paris, Costas. "Luxury Cruise to Conquer Northwest Passage." *Wall Street Journal* (May 10, 2016).

Park, Madison. "6 Obama Climate Policies That Trump Orders Change." *CNN* (March 28, 2017).

Park, Won Gon. *A Challenge for the ROK-US Alliance: Defense Cost Sharing.* (Seoul: The East Asia Institute, 2016).

"Paris attacks: 'France will destroy IS' – Hollande." *BBC* (November 16, 2015).

Parfitt, Tom. "Russia plants flag on North Pole seabed." *The Guardian* (August 2, 2007).

Parfomak, Paul W. *Keystone XL Pipeline: Development Issues.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2017).

Parker, Geoffrey. *The Grand Strategy of Philip II.* (Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1998)

Parkinson, John R. "NSA: 'Over 50' Terror Plots Foiled By Data Dragnets." *ABC News* (June 18, 2013).

Part One: Climate Change and Security. (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 20012).

Part Two: Climate Change and the Homeland. (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2012).

Part Three: Climate Change and Global Security. (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2012), pp. 438-441.

Partner Military HIV/AIDS Program: U.S. Africa Command Fact Sheet. (Stuttgart: United States Africa Command Public Affairs, 2012). Accessed August 9, 2013, http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Document/8929.

Passel, Jeffrey S. and Cohn, D'Vera. *Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2016).

Pati, Rora. "Human Trafficking: An Issues of Human and National Security." *University of Miami National Security and Armed Conflict Law Review* (2014).

Patterns of Global Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State) http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm.

Patterson, Thom. "Chinese cyber spies may be watching you, experts warn." *CNN* (August 28, 2016).

Payne, Rodger A. "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction." *European Journal of International Relations* (2007), pp. 37-61.

Payne, Rodger A. *Trump and American Foreign Policy; A Threat to Peace and Prosperity?* (Baltimore: Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 22-25, 2017).

Peake, Jeffrey S. "Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy." *Political Research Quarterly* (2001), pp. 69–86.

Peake, Jeffrey S. and Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew. "The Agenda-Setting Impact of Major Presidential Addresses." *Political Communication* (2008), pp. 113–37

Pedersen, Torbjorn. "Debates Over the Role of the Arctic Council." *Ocean Development and International Law* (2012), pp. 146-156.

Pelley, Scott. "A New Direction On Drugs." *CBS News* (December 13, 2015).

Pen, Jingchao and Wegge, Njord. "China and the law of the sea: implications for Arctic governance." *The Polar Journal* (2013), pp. 287-305.

Percival, Robert V. "Environmental Law in the Trump Administration. *Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review* (2017).

Perez, Chris. "Gun-wielding teen girls from Europe join ISIS," *The New York Post* (September 10, 2014).

Perez-Pena, Richard. "Migrants' Attempts to Enter U.S. via Mexico Stoke Fears About Jihadists." *New York Times* (November 19, 2015).

Perez-Rivas, Manuel. "Bush vows to rid the world of 'evil-doers'". *CNN* (September 16, 2001).

Perez, Evan. "FBI: Mass shooting incidents occurring more frequently." *CNN* (September 24, 2014).

Perle, Richard. "The Case for War: In Defense of Freedom." *PBS*, April 17, 2007. Accessed November 22, 2012 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WSIZLse6S4.

Perlez, Janea. "China Increases Aid to Philippines." *New York Times* (November 14, 2013).

Perliger, Arie. *Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America's Violent Far-Right* (West Point: Combatting Terrorism Center, 2012).

Perlo-Freeman, Sam. "Military Expenditure and the Global Culture of Militarism" in (eds.) Kostas Gouliamos and Christos Kassimeris, *The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism.* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 189-123.

Perry, Charles and Andersen, Bobby. *New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration.* (Cambridge: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2012)

Peters, Katie and Hey, Leigh May. "The Securitization of Climate Change: A developmental Perspective," in Stephen Brown and Jon Gavin Ghlot (eds.) *The Securitization of Foreign Aid.* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.).

Peterson, Susan. "Epidemic Disease and National Security." *Security Studies* (2002/2003), pp. 43-81

Petroleum & Other Liquids (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). Accessed September 1, 2017 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm.

Petterson, Trude. "Cargo transport through Norther Sea Route will tenfold." *The Barents Observer* (November 19, 2010).

Pezard, Stepahnie, et. al. *Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning for Regional Change in the Far North* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017).

Pflanze, Ottoy. *Bismarck and the Development of Germany.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

Phan-Gruber, Emily. "The Role of Alternative Development in the 'War on Drugs': The Case of Bolivia." *The Journal of Civil Society and Social Transformation* (2010).

Phelps, Martha Lizabeth. "Doppelgangers of the State: Private Security and Transferable Legitimacy." *Politics and Policy* (2014).

Phillips, Amber. "'They're rapists.' President Trump's campaign launch speech two years later, annotated." *Washington Post* (June 16, 2017).

Picarelli, John T. "Osama bin Corelone? Vito the Jackal? Framing Threat Convergence Through an Examination of Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2012), pp. 180-198.

Pietschman, Thomas et. al. *Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting From Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime.* (Vienna: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2011).

Pilecki, Andrew et, al. "Moral Exclusion and the Justification of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Bush, Obama, and the Terrorist Enemy Figure." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* (2014).

Pillar, Paul R. "The American Perception of Substate Threats" in (eds.) Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller, *A Dangerous World: Threat perception And U.S. National Security.* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2014), pp. 59-73.

Pincus, Rebecca. "No one wants a new Cold War in the Arctic." *Arctic Deeply* (January 15, 2016).

Pincus, Rebecca. "'The US is an Arctic Nation': policy, implementation and US icebreaking capabilities in a changed Arctic." *The Polar Record* (2012), pp. 149-162.

Pinheiro, Cole. "The Role of Child Soldiers in a Multigenerational Movement." *CTC Sentinel* (February 27, 2015).

Pingeot, Lou and Pascual, David Torres. "Privatizing Security." *OpenDemocracy.com.* Accessed November 22, 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/lou-pingeot-david-torres-pascual/privatizing-security-talking-with-lou-pingeot.

Pirani, Pietro. "Elites in Action: Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture." *Political Studies Review* (2014), pp. 1-9.

Pitney, John J. and Levin, John-Clark. *Private Anti-Piracy Navies" How Warships for Hire are Changing Maritime Security* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013).

Pitter, Laura. "The Dangers of Guantanamo." *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

Plague Upon Plague: AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 8 2001). Accessed October 20, 2013 http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/plague_cib.pdf.

PLAN COLOMBIA Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Governmental Accountability Office, 2008).

Plautz, Jason. "CIA Shuts Down Climate Research Program." *National Journal* (May 21, 2015).

Pleasance, Chris. "Child soldiers are central to ISIS's plans to dominate the Middle East... and breed an entire generation of fanatical fighters, warn terror experts." *Daily Mail* (December 23, 2104).

Pleasance, Chris. "How to raise a jihadi-baby: Horrifying ISIS guide for mothers instructs them to ban TV to 'protect little ears', tell bedtime stories about fighting and give toddlers weapons training with toy guns." *The Daily Mail* (December 31, 2014).

Plouffe, Joel. *Stephan Harper's Arctic Paradox* (Calgary: Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2014).

Plumer, Brad. "America's staggering defense budgets in chart." *Washington Post* (January 7, 2013).

Plumer, Brad. "Drought helped cause Syria's war. Will climate change bring more life it?" *Washington Post* (September 10, 2013).

Podvornaia, Anna. "The Discursive Battlefield of the 'War on Terror': Enabling strategies for garnering public support in the rhetoric of George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden" in (ed.) Adam Hodges, *Discourse of War and Peace.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Policy Brief: H.I.V. Prevention, Diagnosis, Treatment and Care for Key Populations: Consolidated Guidelines July 2014. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2014).

Pollack, Joel. B. "Why aren't we at war yet over climate change?" *Breitbart* (August 18, 2015).

Posen, Barry. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* (2003)

Posen, Barry R. "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* (2012).

Posen, Barry. *Restraint: A New Foundation For U.S. Grand Strategy.* (2014).

Posen, Barry R. "The Case for Doing Nothing in Iraq." *Politico Magazine* (June 16, 2012).

Posen, Barry R. "The Case for Restraint." *American Interest* (2007).

Posible impacto del la legalizaciont de la marihuana en Estados Unidos. (Mexico City: Insittuto Mexicano para la Competitividad, 2012).

Powell, Colin. *Secretary Of State Colin L. Powell At Open Forum Conference on The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in the Global Fight Against HIV/AIDS.* (Washington, D.C., June 24, 2002).

Powell, Robert. "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate." *International Organization* (1994), pp. 313–344.

Pramuk, Jacob. "Trump warns North Korea threats 'will be met with fire and fury.'" *NBC News* (August 8, 2017).

Preble, Christopher Mueller John (eds.) *Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security.* (Washington, D.C.: The CATO Institute, 2014).

President Bush requests $25 billion for U.S. Department of Energy FY 2009 budget. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2008).

President Donald J. Trump Taking Action Against Illegal Immigration (Office of the Press Secretary, June 28, 2017).

President Obama and President Lee of South Korea Hold a Joint Press Conference (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 13, 2011).

"President Obama asks Congress to declare war against ISIL." *Associated Press* (February 11, 2015).

Presidential Executive Order Establishing the President's Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, March 29, 2017)

Presidential Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, January 24, 2017).

Presidential Executive Order on a Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, February 9, 2017).

Presidential Executive Order on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, February 9, 2017).

Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, March 28, 2017).

Presidential Memorandum Plan to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, January 28, 2017).

Prestowitz, Clyde. *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions.* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

Price Tag of Being Young: Climate Change and Millennials' Economic Future, The. (New York: Demos, 2016).

Price-Smith, Andrew and Daly, John L. *Downward Spiral: HIV/AIDS, State Capacity, and Political Conflict in Zimbabwe.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2004).

Priest, Dana and Arkin, William. *Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State.* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011).

Prisoners in 2013. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 2014).

Profits and Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labor. (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2014).

Proposed Homeland Security Budget for 2013, The. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2012).

Pryce, Sue. "The Politics of Drug Prohibition" in Julia Buxton's (ed.) *The Politics of Narcotic Drugs: A Survey* (London: Routledge, 2011).

Public Health: Health Programme. (Brussels: European Commission, 2016). Accessed July 5, 2016: http://ec.europa.eu/health/programme/policy/index_en.htm.

Pugh, Tony. "Obama seeks $1.1 billion to fight heroin and opioid addiction." *McClatchy DC* (February 2, 2016).

Pugliese, David. "Polar Challenge: Extreme Conditions Put High Cost on Arctic Operations." *Defense News* (June 10, 2014).

Pumphrey, Carolyn. *Global Climate Change: National Security Implications.* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).

Purdon, Mark. "Neoclassical realism and international climate change politics: moral imperative and political constraint in international climate finance." *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2014), pp. 301-338.

"Putin orders strong military presence in Arctic." *Sputnik News* (October 12, 2013).

"Putin's tiny army: Russian child soldiers trained in battle tactics, weapons and hand-to-hand combat to 'repel any enemy of the Motherland.'" *Daily Mail* (March 24, 2014).

Putin, Vladimir. "Meeting on the Security Council on state policy in the Arctic." (Moscow: The Kremlin, April 22, 2014). Accessed May 1, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/7065.

Pye, Lucian. "Political Culture" in (ed.) David L. Sills, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968).

Qiu, Linda. "Fact-checking a comparison of gun death and terrorism death." *Politfact* (October 5, 2015).

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C: The Department of Defense, 2001).

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C: The Department of Defense, 2006).

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C: The Department of Defense, 2010).

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C: The Department of Defense, 2014).

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, The (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2014).

Quigley, Aidan. "Trump administration to send thousands of ICE agents to target sanctuary cities." *Newsweek* (July 19, 2017).

Quinn, Adam. "US decline and systemic constraint," in Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland. *Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 45-60.

Quinn, John; Zeleny, Tomas; and Bencko, Vladimir. "Food Security: The Nexus of Heath Security in Fragile and Failed States." *Food and Nutrition Sciences* (2014).

Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon. "An Arctic Great Power: Recent Developments in Danish Arctic Policy." *Arctic Yearbook* (2016), pp. 346-347.

Rahbek-Clemmenson, Jon. "'Arctic-vism' in Practice: The Challenges Facing Denmark's Political-Military Strategy in the High North." *Arctic Yearbook* (2014).

Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon. *Arctic Security: Global Dynamics Upset Stable Regional Order.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2014).

Rahbek-Clemmenson, Jon. "Carving up the Arctic: The Continental Shelf Process Between International Law and Geopolitics." *Arctic Yearbook* (2015).

Raftery, Miriam. "Politics in Paradise: Filner, Hunter Clash on Healthcare, Budget, Climate Change & More." *East County Magazine* (August 2009).

Ramsay, Gilbert. "Why terrorism can, but should not be defined." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2015), pp. 211-228.

Raphael, T.J. "Is climate change a bigger threat to our national security than terrorism." *Public Radio International* (May 8, 2014);

Rasmussen, Anders Fogh. "Energy Security in Europe: An Individuals Approach to a Collective Problem." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (April 26, 2016).

Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. "'It Sounds Like a Riddle': Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk." *Millennium Journal of International Studies* (2004), pp. 381-396.

Raspotnik, Andreas. *No race for the Arctic Hydrocarbon Resources? A possible scenario for an unclear development* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012).

Raspotnik, Andreas and Stephen, Kathrin. *The myth of Arctic shipping – why the Northern Sea Route is still of limited geo-economic importance* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Rathbun, Brian. "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism." *Security Studies* (2008), pp. 294–321.

Ratner, Michael, et. al. *Europe's Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013).

Rault, Charles. "The French Approach to Counterterrorism." *CTC Sentinel* (January 13, 2010).

Read, Daniel. "Britain's Secret War in Colombia." *London Progressive Journal* (July 3, 2009).

Reid, Paula and Condon, Stephanie. "DEA chief says smoking marijuana as medicine 'is a joke.'" *CBS News* (November 4, 2015).

Reagan, Ronald. *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 1987).

Reagan, Ronald. "Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy. *(Maryland: Camp David,* October 2, 1982).

Reagan, Ronald. *Remarks at a White House Meeting for the United States Ambassador.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, November 13, 1986).

Record, Jeffrey. "The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (2005).

Reed, Laura. *Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Hamilton College, 2017).

Reich, Simon. "How Child Soldiers Are Recruited From Refugee Camps." *The Conversation* (September 4, 2011). Accessed January 28, 2014 http://theconversation.com/how-child-soldiers-are-recruited-from-refugee-camps-2938.

Reich, Simon and Lebow, Richard Ned. *Goodbye Hegemony.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

Reid, John. "John Reid on climate change and global security." *Reuters* (December 5, 2009).

Rein, Lisa and Tran, Andrew Ba. "How the Trump era is changing the federal bureaucracy." *Washington Post* (December 20, 2017).

Reinl, James. "Trump administration and the opioid epidemic." *The Lancet* (2017).

Reis, Michael. "Warmly Argued: A Brief Historical Look at Two Centuries of Climate Change Findings in Public Discourse." *Marine Corps University Journal* (2016).

Regnery, Alfred. "Police need military equipment to combat rising crime rates and police deaths." *USA Today* (August 31, 2017).

Remnick, David. "Going the Distance: On and off the road with Barack Obama." *The New Yorker* (January 27, 2014).

Renewables 2016 Global Status Report: (Paris: Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, 2016).

Renshon, Stanley A. and Suedfeld, Peters. *Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism.* (New York: Rutledge, 2007).

"Report: DOJ Not Full Prepared for WMD Attack." *Associated Press* (June 2, 2010).

Report on Arctic Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2016).

Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 2013).

Report of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict. (New York: United Nations, 2011).

Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (New York: The United Nations, January 29, 2016).

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (New York: United Nations General, 2017).

Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016).

"Report to Congress raises spectre of American ships challenging Canadian Arctic claims." *National Post* (March 14, 2017).

*Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Volume II. Technical Appendices and Selected Prevalence Table*s (Rockville: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2010), p. 99, Table G.2, and p. 101, Table G.4.

"Rethinking Climate Change Conflict and Security (Issue 4)." *Geopolitics* (2014).

Rethinking the Top of the World: The Arctic Council. (Toronto: Canada Centre for Global Security Studies, 2011).

Reveron, Derek. *When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call the Pentagon.* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2013).

Reuveny, Rafael. "Economic Growth, Environmental Scarcity, and Conflict." *Global Environmental Politics* (2002), pp. 83-110.

Rhodan, Maya. "President Trump Calls on Congress to Pass Bills Aimed at Undocumented Immigrants." *Time* (June 28, 2017).

Rhode, David. "Analysis: Is Syria now a direct threat to the U.S." *Reuters* (February 7, 2013).

Rhodes, Edward. "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda." *Survival* (2003), pp. 131-154.

Rice, Condoleezza. Interview With Wolf Blitzer. *CNN* (September 8, 2002).

Rice, Doyle and King, Ledyard. "Trump's budget proposal 'savages' climate research, scientists say." *USA Today* (May 23, 2017)

Rice, Susan and Deese, Brian. "Integrating Climate Change into National Security Planning." *WhiteHouse.gov* (September 21, 2016).

Richardson-Barlow, Clare. *Risk Factor: Alaskan-Arctic Energy Resources* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012).

Richey, Warren. "Terror on twitter: How Islamic State uses social media to draw recruits." *Christian Science Monitor* (June 3, 2015),

Ricoeur, Paul. *Hermeneutics and the human sciences: Essays on language, action and interpretation.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Riffkin, Rebecca. "Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low." (Washington, D.C.: Gallup, 2014).

Rios, Edwin. "Charts: Here's How Much We're Spending on the War Against ISIS." *Mother Jones* (June 14, 2015).

Ripsman, Norrin M. "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups*"* in (eds.) Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 170-193.

Ripsman, Norrin M. *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effects of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements.* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).

Ripsman Norrin M. "The Curious Case of German Rearmament: Democracy and Foreign Security Policy." *Security Studies* (2001), pp. 1–47.

"Rising Temps and Emerging Threats: The Intersection of Climate Change and National Security in the 21st Century." *Vermont Journal of Environmental Law* (2014).

Ritter, Karl. "Cold War-style spy games return to melting Arctic." *The Associated Press* (June 11, 2014).

Rizer, Arthur and Glaser, Sheri R. "Breach: The National Security Implications of Human Trafficking." *Widener Law Review* (2011).

Rizzo, Rachel. "Congress' Flabby Defense Budgets Aren't Entirely Lawmakers' Fault." *Defense One* (April 26, 2015).

"Roar of Ice Cracking, The." *The Economist* (February 2, 2013).

Robinson, Lori. *Foreign Military Support* (Philadelphia: The Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2016).

Robinson, Simon. "Editorial: denying responsibility." *Journal of Global Responsibility* (2017).

Rodrigues, Thiago and Labate, Beatriz Caiuby. "Prohibition and the War on Drugs in the Americas: An Analytical Approach" in (eds.) Beatriz Caiuby Labate, Clancy Cavner and Thiago Rodrigues, *Drug Policies and the Politics of Drugs in the Americas* (New York: Springer, 2016).

Rodrigues de Brito, Rafaela. *Securitizing Climate Change: Expectations and Concerns.* (Organization for Economic Co-operation, 2012).

Rodriguez, Walter. "Mexico's Catch-22: How the Necessary Extradition of Drug Cartel Leaders Undermines Long-Term Criminal Justice Reforms." *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review* (2015).

Roe, Paul. "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization." *Security Dialogue* (2004), pp. 279-294.

Roemer, Tim. "The Threats We Forget." *Foreign Policy* (October 25, 2014).

Rogers, Paul. "Climate Change and Security." (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, 2010).

Rogers, Paul. *Responding to Climate Disruption – Developing the Agenda.* (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, 2014).

Roggio, Bill. "Taliban rebuild children's suicide camp in South Waziristan." *Long War Journal* (October 6, 2008).

Roggio, Bill and Weiss, Caleb. "Jihadists tout training camps for children in Iraq and Syria." *Long War Journal* (November 7, 2014).

Rohde, David. "How fear of al Qaeda hurts U.S. more than al Qaeda." *Chicago Tribune* (October 25, 2013).

Rollins, John and Wyler, Liana Sun. *Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013).

Romaniuk, Scott Nicholas. *Global Arctic: Sovereignty and the Future of the North.* (East Sussex: Berkshire Academic Press, 2013).

Romo, Rafael. "Napolitano: Mexican drug war 'not a failure.'" *CNN* (February 27, 2012).

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: International Criminal Court, 1998).

Ronson, Alison. "Political Climate Change: The Evolving Role of the Arctic Council." *NorthernReview* (2011), pp. 95-111.

Room, Robin. "The Rhetoric of International Drug Control." *Substance Use and Misuse* (1999).

Rosati, Jerel. "Explaining SALT From a Bureaucratic Politics Perspective" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 364-378.

Rose, Gideon. "Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* (1998).

Rose, Joel. "Fact Check: What has President Trump done to fight illegal immigration?" *NPR* (August 22, 2017).

Rosen, Alyssa S. "Scientists & Librarians Turn to 'End Presidential Term' Web Archive to Safeguard Climate Change Data." *Law Lines* (2017).

Rosen, Liana. *Trafficking In Persons: United States Policy and Issues for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014).

Rosen, Mark E. "The Arctic is the First Stop in the United States Reset with Russia." *National* Interest (November 15, 2016).

Rosen, Stephen. "An Empire, If You Can Keep It." *National Interest* (2003), pp. 51-61.

Rosencrance, Richard and Stein, Arthur. *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Rosenberg, Andrew. "The most important Trump decision no one is talking about." *Fortune* (August 22, 2017).

Rosenberg, Matthew. "Obama is Rethinking Pullout in Afghanistan, Officials Say." *New York Times* (October 14, 2015).

Rosenberg, Elizabeth; Titley, David; and Wiker, Alexander. *Arctic 2015 and Beyond: A Strategy for U.S. Leadership in the High North* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2014).

Roughead, Gary. *In the Race for Arctic Energy, the U.S. and Russia are Polar Opposites.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2015).

Roulo, Claudette. "U.S. Military Medical System 'Unique', Official Says." *American Forces Press Service* (April 25, 2013).

Rousseau, David L. and Gracia-Retamero, Rocio. "Estimating Threats: The Impact and Interaction of Identity and Power" in (eds.) Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 54-78.

Ross, Jannell. "Mexico Ambassador Arturop Sarukhan Say's U.S. Guns Fuel Violence, Denies Mexico is Infringing Upon Gun Rights." *Huffington Post* (June 1, 2012).

Ross, Lindsey. *Climate Change and Immigration: Warnings for America's Southern Border.* (Washington, D.C., American Security Project, 2010).

Roth, Kenneth. "The Wrong Way to Combat Terrorism." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (2017).

Rothkopf, David J. *National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2014).

Rothkopf, David. "Our Reaction to Terrorism Is More Dangerous Than the Terrorists." *Foreign Policy* (November 25, 2015).

Rott, Nathan. "Trump signs Executive Order on offshore drilling and marine sanctuaries." *NPER* (April 27, 2017).

Rubin, Jennifer. "Foreign policy lesson learned for the post-Obama era." *The Washington Post* (September 30, 2015).

Rubin, Josh and Smith, Matt. "'I am the shooter,' Nidal Hassan tells Fort Hood court-martial." *CNN.* (August 6, 2013).

Rubin, Michael. *The Danger of Climate Diplomacy."* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2016).

Rucker, Philip. "After first saying 'send him to Gitmo,' Trump changes his mind about N.Y. terrorism suspect." *Washington Post* (November 2, 2017).

Rudalevige, Andrew. *Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Ruiz, Rebecca. "Justice Dept. to work with 12 cities to fight violent crime." *New York Times* (June 20, 2017).

Ruiz, Rebecca R.; Goldman, Adam; and Apuzzo, Matt. "Terror Suspect Brought to U.S. For Trial, Breaking from Trump Rhetoric." *New York Times* (July 21, 2017).

Rumsfeld, Donald. *Memorial service in remembrance of those lost on September 11th.* (Arlington: The Pentagon, 2001).

Rumsfeld, Donald. *Pentagon Briefing on Military Response to Terrorist Attacks.* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 18, 2001).

Rupar, Aaron. *Trump trots out tired 'just say no' strategy as his plan for the opioid crisis.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress Fund, 2017).

Rush, Dominic. "Top US boss Robert Murray: Trump can't bring back mining jobs." *The Guardian* (March 27, 2012).

Ruskin, Liz. "Arctic is Top Priority for Homeland Security – But One of Many." *Alaska Public Media* (March 12, 2014).

Ruskin, Liz. "Russian Aggression Unlikely to Hit Arctic, Say Security Experts." *Alaska Public Media* (October 13, 2016).

"Russia Announces Development of Unmanned Arctic Radars." *Sputnik News* (November 29, 2013).

"Russia Begins Deployment of Aerospace Defense in arctic." *Sputnik News* (November 28, 2013).

"Russia builds massive Arctic base." *The Telegraph* (October 20, 2015)

"Russia plants flag under North Pole." *BBC News* (August 2, 2007).

"Russia Returns to Arctic." *BBC News* (April 27, 2003).

"Russia revising national security strategy to reflect new threats." *Sputnik News* (May 5, 2015).

"Russia rules out Arms race in the Arctic but stands firm on its interests." *Sputnik News* (September 4, 2017).

"Russia sees Arctic as Naval priority in new doctrine." *BBC News* (July 27, 2015).

"Russia starts nationwide show of force." *Reuters* (May 16, 2015).

"Russia tests 100,000 troops in 'Vostok 2014,' biggest-ever post-Soviet drills." *Russia Today* (September 23, 2014).

"Russia to create multimillion dollar Arctic monitoring system by 20205." *Sputnik News* (July 8, 2015).

"Russia's new Arctic trefoil military base unveiled with virtual tour." *BBC News* (April 18, 2015).

"Russian army beefs up arctic presence over Western threat." *Russia Today* (October 29, 2014).

"Russian Nuclear Giant Rosatom on the Front Lines of Moscow's Arctic Expansion." *Sputnik News* (April 2, 2017).

"Russian shipments in arctic set record." *Global Trade Magazine* (January 11, 2017).

Russonello, Giovanni. "Poll Watch: American Fear More Terrorist Attacks but Have Mixed Views on Gun Control." *New York Times* (December 17, 2015).

Rutledge, Paul E. and Prince, Heather A. Larsen. "The President as Agenda-Setter-in-Chief: The Dynamics of Congressional and Presidential Agenda Setting." *The Policy Studies Journal* (2014), pp. 443-463.

Ryan, Maria. "'War in countries we are not at war with': The 'war on terror' on the periphery from Bush to Obama." *International Politics* (2011), pp. 364-389.

Rydell, C. Peter. *Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs.* (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1994).

Saad, Lydia and Jones, Jeffrey M. *U.S. Concern About Global Warming at Eight-Year High.* (Washington, D.C.: Gallup, 2016).

Sacco, Lisa N. *Drug Enforcement in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014).

Salama, Vivian. "Trump to Mexico: Take care of 'bad hombres' or US might." *Associated Press* ` (February 2, 2017).

Salama, Vivian. "Trump's new national security strategy close to its predecessors." *NBC News* (December 18, 2017).

Salama, Sammy and Hansell, Lydia. "Does intent equal capability? Al Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction." *Nonproliferation Review* (2005).

Sale, Richard and Potapov, Eugene. *The Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North* (London: Frances Lincoln Limited Publishers, 2010).

Samenow, Jason. "Why climate change shouldn't be named the top 'threat' to national security." *Washington Post* (November 17, 2015).

Sampson, Robert J. and Laub, John H. "Structural variations in juvenile court processing: Inequality, the underclass and social control." *Law and Society Review* (1993), pp. 285-311.

Samuels, Richard. *Securing Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

"San Bernardino shooting victims: why they were." *Los Angeles* (December 17, 2015).

Sanger, J. David. "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1958).

Santora, Marc; Rashbaum, William K.; Baker, Al and Goldman, Adam. "Ahmad Khan Rahami is Arrested in Manhattan and New Jersey Bombings." *New York Times* (September 19, 2016).

Santora, Marc and Schweber, Nate. "In Brooklyn, Eager to Joins ISIS, if Only His Mother Would Return his Passport." *The New York Times* (February 26, 2015).

Saunders, Elizabeth N. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

Savage, Charlie. "Draft Trump Order on ISIS Detainees and Guantanamo." *New York Times* (February 8, 2017).

Savage, Charlie. *Power Wars: Inside Obama's Post-9/11 Presidency* (Boston: Little. Brown and Company, 2015).

Savage, Charlie. "Trump is rapidly reshaping the judiciary. Here's how." *New York Times* (November 11, 2017).

Savage, Charlie and Schmitt, Eric. "Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and Commando Raids." *New York Times* (September 21, 2017).

Scahill, Jeremy. "The CIA's Secret Sites in Somalia." *The Nation* (December 10, 2014).

Scarborough, Rowan. "Ice-cold war: Russian icebreakers outnumber U.S. vessels in vital Arctic." *Washington times* (February 19, 2017).

Schafer, Philip Jan. *Human and Water Security in Israel and Jordan.* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013).

Schaller, Benjamin. "Confidence- & Security-Building Measures in the Arctic: The Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe as a Role Model for the Area?" *Arctic Yearbook* (2014).

Schaller, Benjamin. "The unpredictable Russian bear flexes its muscles." *Arctic Deeply* (August 15, 2016).

Scharf, Michael and Anderson, Elizabeth. "Report of the Cleveland Experts Meeting." *CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law* (2010).

"Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained." *BBC* (April 24, 2016).

Schiller, Dane. "Drug traffickers look to the seas to reach Texas." *Houston Chronicle* (June 4, 2012).

Schilling, Warner Roller. *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets.* (New York: Columbia, 1962).

Schlanger, Zoe. "Does the Clean Power Plan still stand a chance? Only if the Next President is a Democrat." *Newsweek* (February 10, 2016).

Schlossberg, Tatiana. "2016 Already Shows Record Global Temperatures." *New York Times* (2016).

Schmid, Alex P. "Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2004).

Schmid, Alex and Jongman, Albert. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases.* (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2005).

Schmitt, Eric. "ISIS or al Qaeda? American officials split over tope terror threat." *New York Times* (August 4, 2015).

Schmitt, Eric and Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Officials Retool Slogan for Terror War." *New York Times* (July 26, 2005).

Schneps, Kyle Benjamin. *The U.S.-China 'cold war.'* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, August 21, 2013). Accessed August 21, 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-us-   china-cold-war-in-africa.

Schoen, John W. "Regulation buster Trump takes aim at the EPA." *CNBC* (November 10, 2016).

Schoen, John W. "Russia has 'upped its game' in cyberwarfare and the threat isn't going away, US intel officials say." *CNBC* (May 11, 2017).

Schrager, Allison. "The economic case for the US to legalize all drugs." *Quartz* (June 7, 2013).

Schuldt, Jonathon P.; Enns, Peter K. and Cavaliere, Victoria. "Does the label really matter? Evidence that the US public continues to doubt 'global warming' more than 'climate change.'" *Climatic Change* (2017).

Schulman, Jeremy. "Every insane thing Donald Trump has said about global warming." *Mother Jones Magazine* (December 5, 2016).

Schwartz, Mattathias. "A Mission Gone Wrong." *The New Yorker* (January 6, 2014).

Schwartz, Mattathias. "'We're at Greater Risk': Q&A With General Keith Alexander." *The New Yorkers* (May 15, 2014).

Schwartz, Moshe and Church, Jennifer. *Department of Defense' Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013).

Schwarz, Alan. "Missouri Alone in Resisting Prescription Pill Database." *New York Times* (July 20, 2014).

Schwarz, Benjamin. "Permanent Interests, Endless Threats: Cold War Continuities and NATO Enlargement." *World Policy Journal* (1997), pp. 24-30.

Schwarz, Benjamin and Layne, Christopher. "A New Grand Strategy." *The Atlantic* (2002).

Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security* (1994)), pp. 72-107.

Schweller, Randall L. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripoliarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

Schweller, Randall L. "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 927-930.

Schweller, Randall L. "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," in (eds.) Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 311–47.

Schweller, Randall L. "The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–39: Why a Concert Didn't Arise," in (eds.) Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 181-212.

Schweller, Randall L. *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

Schwenninger, Sherle R. "Revamping American Grand Strategy." *World Policy Journal* (2003).

Scopelliti, Maria and Perez, Elena Conde. "Defining security in a changing Arctic: helping to prevent an Arctic security dilemma." *Polar Record* (2016), pp. 672-679.

Scott, Mark "European tried to reign in Google. It backfired." *New York Times* (April 18, 2016).

Scott, Shirley V. and Khan, Shahedul. "The implications of Climate Change for the future military and for conflict prevention, including through peacemaking." *ASPJ Africa & Francophonie* (2016).

Scrivener, David. "From Ottawa to Iqaluit: Towards Sustainable Arctic Co-Operation?" *Environmental Politics* (1998), pp. 136-141.

Seaman, Laura. *The high cost of climate change.* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2015).

Seelke, Clare Ribando and Finklea, Kristin. *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016).

Seelke, Clare Ribando and Siskin, Alison. *Trafficking In Persons: United States Policy and Issues for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008).

Seib, Gerald F. "In Mideast Obama finds he has limited leverage." *Wall Street Journal* (July 20, 2013).

Sen, Arijit. "There Are at Least 500 Child Soldiers Fighting in Northeast India, and the World Hasn't Noticed." *Time* (March 24, 2014).

Sengupta, Kim. "Cameron admits Taliban just waiting for troops to leave." *The Independent* (July 20, 2012).

Sengupta, Kim. "Isis nuclear attack in Europe is a real threat, say experts." *The Independent* (June 7, 2016).

Sergunin, Alexander "Russia in search of its Arctic policy: between hard and soft power?" *The Polar Journal* (2014), pp. 69-87.

Sessions, Jeffrey B. *Attorney General Jeff Session Delivers remarks on Efforts to Combat Violent Crime in St. Louis* (St. Louis: Department of Justice, March 31, 2017).

Sewell, William H. "A Theory of structure: duality, agency and transformation." *American Journal of Sociology* (1992), pp. 1-29.

Seymour, Richard. "Global military spending an integral part of capitalism." *The Nation* (March 9, 2014).

Shabad, Rebecca. "Ex-CIA chief: 'I wouldn't underestimate' ISIS." *The Hill* (August 25, 2014).

Shabad, Rebecca. "US has spent more than $3 billion fighting ISIS." *The Hill* (June 27, 2015).

Shabad, Rebecca. "US spending $9M a day in ISIS fight." *The Hill.* (June 11, 2015).

Shakarian, Paulo; Shakatian, Jana; and Ruef, Andrew. *Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach.* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013).

Shalal, Andrea and Rascoe, Ayesha. "U.S. needs to invest in Arctic ships, technology to prepare for calamite change: envoy." *Reuters* (October 21, 2014).

Shale Gas in Europe: Revolution or Evolution? (London: Ernst & Young, 2013).

Shallwani, Pervaiz; Paletta, Damian; and Barrett, Devlin. "Bombs in New York and New Jersey, Stabbing Attacks in Minnesota Stoke Unease." *Wall Street Journal* (September 19, 2016).

Shane, Scott; Perez-Pena, Richard; and Breeden, Aurelien. "'In-Betweeners' Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists." *New York Times* (September 22, 2016).

Shanker Thom. "U.S. Arms Sales Make Up Most of Global Market." *New York Times* (August 12, 2012).

Shapiro, Jeremy. *Where You Stand Depends on Where You Get Hit: US and European Counterterrorism Strategies.* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005).

Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy (Brussels: European Commission, 2016).

Sharkov, Damien. "Russia shows off new Arctic air defense systems at victory parade." *Newsweek* (May 10, 2017).

Sharkov, Damien. "Russian sub fires cruise missile in Arctic Barents Sea." *Newsweek* (July 5, 2017).

Shaw, Jonathan. "The Water Tamer" *Harvard Magazine* (January/February 2012).

Shear, Michael D. and Sanger, David E. "Trump returns North Korea to list of state sponsors of terrorism." *New York Times* (November 20, 2017).

Shelbourne, Mallory. "Sessions pushes for crackdown on illegal immigrants who commit crimes." *The Hill* (April 11, 2017).

Shepard, Laura J. (ed.) *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to theories and methods.* (London: Routledge, 2013).

Shepard, Marshall. "Weather and climate priorities facing the next president." *Forbes* (October 24, 2016).

Shephard, Michelle. "The Houmonou siblings: Three tiny orphans and the horror of war." *The Toronto Star* (January 5, 2014).

Sheppard, Kate. "House Directs Pentagon To Ignore Climate Change." *Huffington Post* (May 5, 2014).

Shepherd, Todd. "James Mattis: Military using 'annihilation tactics' against ISIS." *Washington Examiner* (May 28, 2011).

Sheridan, Mary Beth. "Obama waiver allows U.S. aid to 4 countries using child soldiers." *Washington Post* (October 27, 2010).

Sherlock, Roth. "America and Russia locked in race to control the Arctic Circle." *The Telegraph* (September 2, 2015).

Shevchenko, Vitaly. "Ukraine conflict: Child soldiers join the fight." *BBC News* (November 5, 2104).

Shinkman, Paul D. "Report: Trump Gives CIA Authority for Drone Strikes." *U.S. News & World Report* (March 14, 2017).

Shirky, Clay. "The Political Power of Social Media." *Foreign Affairs* (2011).

Shoichet, Catherine and Pearson, Michael. "Garland, Texas, shooting suspect linked himself to ISIS in tweets." *CNN* (May 4, 2015).

Shoichet, Catherine E.; Stapleton, AnneClaire; and Botelho, Greg. "Colorado Planned Parenthood shooting: 3 dead, suspect captured." *CNN* (November 27, 2015)

Shooster, Jay. "Trump isn't fighting human trafficking, he's facilitating it." *Just Security* (May 2, 2017).

Shorrock, Tim. "Exclusive: New documents details America's war machine – and secret mass of contractors in Afghanistan." *Salon* (May 28, 2014).

"Should the U.S. Shift More Energy Subsidies to Renewable Power?" *Scientific American* (August 6, 2012).

Shoumatoff, Alex. "The Arctic Oil Rush." *Vanity Fair* (2008).

Showstack, Randy. "Diminishing Sea Ice in the Arctic Presents Challenge and Opportunities." *Eos* (2013), pp. 27-271.

Shurkin, Michael. *France's War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army.* (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2014).

Shurkin, Michael. "The French Way of War" *Politico* (November 17, 2015).

Sick Water: The central role of wastewater management in sustainable development. (Spelefjellveien: United Nations Environmental Programme, 2010).

Sidahmed, Mazin. "Climate change denial in the Trump cabinet: where do his nominees stand?" *The Guardian* (December 15, 2016).

Siegel, Jacob. "The Real Winner of the Afghan War Is This Shady Military Contractor." *The Daily Beast* (April 24, 2014).

Siemaszko, Corky. "Meet the Americans on the front line if North Korea goes to war." *NBC News* (April 15, 2017).

Silverstein, Jason. "Daesh: The word ISI doesn't want you to say – and why politicians are using it more than ever." *The New York Daily News* (November 18, 2015).

Simes, Dimitri. "America's Imperial Dilemma." *Foreign Affairs* (2003), pp. 91-103.

Simpson, Murray; Scott, Daniel and Trotz, Ulric. *Climate Change's impact on the Caribbean's Ability to Sustain Tourism, Natural Asset and Livelihoods.* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2011).

Samuel, Justin Sincalir and Daniel Antonius (eds.). *The Political Psychology of Terrorism Fears.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Singer, P.W. "AIDS and International Security." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (2002), pp. 145-158.
Singer, P.W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

Singer, Peter W. *Wired For War: The Robotics Revolutions and Conflict in the 21st Century.* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).

Singer, P.W. "Western militaries confront child soldiers threat." *Jane's Intelligence Review* (January 5,2005).

Singh, Amrit. *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition.* (New York: Open Society, 2013).

Sink, Justin. "Obama issues order on Arctic climate change." *The Hill* (January 21, 2015).

Simeone, Nick. "Panetta: Environment Emerges as National Security Concerns." *Armed Forces Press* (2012).

Situation Analysis of Children in Yemen 2014. (Sana'a: UNICEF, 2014).

Sjostedt, Roxanna. "Ideas, identities and internalization: Explaining securitizing moves." *Cooperation and Conflict* (2013), pp. 1-22.

Skillington, Tracey. "Climate Change and Its Security Implications." *Climate Justice and Human Rights* (2016), pp. 123-150.

Skinner, Danielle. "International Military HIV/AIDS Conference Opens in Tanzania." (Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command, 2010).

Skinner, E. Benjamin. "Obama's abolitionist." *The Huffington Post* (March 25, 2009)

Slater, Dan. "An American Drug Lord Comes Home." *The New Yorker* (October 21, 2015).

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. *The Arab Spring and Climate Change.* (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2012).

Slayton, David M. and Brigham, Lawson. "Russia and US must maintain Arctic relations in an interconnected world." *Alaska Dispatch News* (July 7, 2016).

Slayton, David M. and Brigham, Lawson. "Strengthen Arctic cooperation between US and China." *Alaska Dispatch News* (June 29, 2016).

Slayton, David M. and Rosen, Mark E. "Another region where the Russian military threats to dominate the U.S." *CNN* (March 14, 2014).

Slayton, David M. and Zysk, Kararzyna. "Why US must keep a close eye on Russia's plan for the Arctic." *Fox News* (August 28, 2015).

Slechow, Sabine. "An interplay of traditions: The 'return of uncertainty' and its taming in post-9/11 US security thinking" in (eds.) Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hull, *Interpreting Global Security.* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Slocombe, Walter. "Force, Preemption, and Legitimacy." *Survival* (2003), pp. 117-130.

Smale, Alison. "Germany proposes tougher measures to combat terrorism. *New York Times* (August 11, 2016).

Small Arms and Light Weapons. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2014).

Smith, Adam B. "2016 A Historic Year for Billion Dollar Weather Climate Disasters in the U.S." *Climate.gov* (January 9, 2017).

Smith, David. "Donald Trump defends controversial pardon of 'patriot' Joe Arpaio." *The Guardian* (August 28, 2017).

Smith, David T. "From the military-industrial complex to the national security state." *Australian Journal Political Science* (2015).

Smith, Graham. "Inside the 'theme park' where children are taught the glory of martyrdom." *The Daily Mail* (August 15, 2012).

Smith, Julianne and Stokes, Jacob. *Strategy and Statecraft: Am Agenda for the United States in an Era of Compounding Complexity.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Century, 2014).

Smith, Kevin. *Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster.* (London: Routledge, 2001).

Smith, Michael Joseph. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1986).

Smith, Steve. "Policy Preference and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission." *International Affairs* (1985), pp. 9-25.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Snider, Don M. *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision.* (Carlisle: U.S. Army WarCollege, 1995).

Snow, David et. al. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* (1986), pp. 464-481.

Snow, Shawn. "Retired 4-star: US Military ill-prepared for Arctic confrontation." *Military Times* (December 27, 2016).

Snyder, Glenn H. "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security." *International Security* (2002), pp. 149–50.

Synder, Jack L. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

Snyder, Jack L. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options.* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1977).

Soldatkin, Vladimir. "Russia's Roseneft finds first oilfield offshore eastern Arctic." *Reuters* (June 18, 2017).

Somers, Margaret R. "What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept Formation." *Sociological Theory* (1995), pp. 113-144.

Sonne, Paul. "Russia's Military Sophistication in the Arctic Sends Echoes of the Cold War." *Wall Street Journal* (October 4, 2016).

Sontag, Deborah. "The Secret History of Colombia's Paramilitaries and the U.S. War on Drugs." *The New York Times* (September 10, 2016).

Soofer, Robert. *HASC-SF Hearing on the President's Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense Activities* (Washington, D.C.: The Capital, May 25, 2017).

Sopko, John F. *Future U.S, Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan.* (Washington, D.C.: Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, January 15, 2014).

Sorensen, Camila T.N "Changing geo-political realities in the Arctic region." *Newsletter for Center for Polar and Oceanic Studies* (2014)

Sorkin, Amy Davidson. "Donald Trump, North Korea, and the Case of the Phantom Armada." *The New Yorker* (April 19, 2017).

Soroka, George. "Political Economy of a Russia's Reimagined Arctic." *Arctic Yearbook* (2016).

"South Korea to contribute $867 million for U.S. military forces in 2014." *Reuters* (January 11, 2014).

Speckhard, Anne. "How Dragging Our Feet on Refugees Creates More Terrorists." *New York Times* (September 29, 2015).

Speier, Jackie. "Earth Day: Treat Climate Change as a Security Threat." *Huffington Post* (April 22, 2014).

Sperling, James. "National security cultures, technologies of public goods supply and security governance" in James Sperling and Emil J. Kirchner (eds.) *National Security Cultures: Patterns of global governance.* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 1-18.

Sperling, James. "United States." in James Sperling and Emil J. Kirchner (eds.) *National Security Cultures: Patterns of global governance.* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 172-209.

Spetalnick, Matt and Martina, Michael. "Obama announces 'understanding' with China's Xi on cyber theft but remains wary." *Reuters* (September 25, 2015).

Spiering, Charles. "Joe Biden to College Students: Global Warming is 'Greatest Threat to Your Generation." *Breitbart* (February 12, 2015).

Springer, Paul J. *Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare.* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2017).

Spykman, Nicholas. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power.* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers).

Srubar, Brian. "Breaking Bad Policy: Shifting U.S. Counter-Drug Policy, Eliminating Safe Havens, and Facilitating International Cooperation." *Houston Journal of International Law* (2014).

Staalesen, Atle. "More than 300 Russian paratroopers have been on North Pole." *The Independent Barents Observer.* (January 5, 2017).

Staalesen, Atle. "Putin: Our future lies in the Arctic." *The Independent Barents Observer* (June 16, 2017).

Staalesen, Atle. "What Russia's new Navy Strategy says about the Arctic." *The Independent Barents Observer* (August 3, 2017).

Stahl, Brandon; Dupuy, Beatrice and Walsh, Paul. "Family ID's attacker behind 'potential act of terrorism' in St. Cloud." *Star Tribune* (September 19, 2016).

Stambol, Eva Magdalena. "Governing Cocaine Supply and Organized Crime from Latin America and the Caribbean: The Changing Security Logic in European Union External Policy." *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research* (2015).

Standish, Reid. "Kazakh Child Soldier Executes 'Russian Spies in Islamic State Video." *Foreign Policy* (January 13, 2015).

Stano, Madeline. "Fighting for Home in the Melting Arctic." *Vermont Journal Of Environmental Law* (2014).

Starkey, Jerome. "Drugs for guns: how the Afghan heroin trade is fueling the Taliban insurgency." *The Independent.* (April 29, 2008).

Starr-Deelen, Donna G. *Presidential Policies on Terrorism: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama.* (NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Stasi, Linda. "After a devastating hurricane, Trump still picks climate change denier to head NASA." *New York Daily News* (September 2, 2017).

Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promising Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2010).

States At Risk: America's Preparedness Card (Princeton: Princeton, 2017).

Stavins, Robert N. "Why Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Accord." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Stavrianakis, Anna and Selby, Jan. "Militarism and international relations in the twenty-first century" in (eds.) Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, *Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security and Theory.* (London: Routledge, 2013).

Steele, Robert David. "The National Military Strategy: Dishonest Platitudes." *Counter Punch* (July 6, 2015).

Stein, Jeff. "What is Russia up to in the Arctic?" *Newsweek* (February 24, 2015).

Stein, Letitia and Renshaw, Jarrett. "Orlando killer expressed support for multiple Islamist groups." *Reuters* (June 12, 2016).

Stein, Sam. "From 9/11 To Osama Bin Laden's Death, Congress Spent $1.28 Trillion in War on Terror." *Huffington Post* (May 2, 2011).

Steinhausler, Frederich. *Gap Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Research Initiatives.* (Erice: Erice International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies, 45th Session: The Role of Science in the Third Millennium, August 19-25, 2012).

Stephen, Kathrin. *Canada in the Arctic – Arctic Oil and Gas: Reserves, Activities, and Disputes* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Stephen, Kathrin. *Evaluation of the Arctic Shipping Season 2013* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Stephen, Kathrin. *Moving Mosaic: The Arctic Governance Debate* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Stephen, Kathrin. *Opening Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic: A Conflict and Risk Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Stephen, Kathrin. *The Arctic: Hot or Not* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2017).

Stephen, Kathrin. *The Questionable Arctic Bonanza – Exaggerated Hopes and False Images of the Arctic as 'Prime Real Estate.'"* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Stephen, Kathrin. *U.S. Waking Up to Arctic Resources?* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2011).

Stephen, Lyn. "Mexico, Immigration and Trump: Towards Transborder Thinking." *Konturen* (2017).

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. *Making Sense of International Relations Theory.* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading," *International Studies Review* (2002), pp. 73–97.

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. "Realist-Constructivism and Morality." *International Studies Review* (2004), pp. 341–343.

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables. *International Studies Quarterly* (1997), pp. 1-25.

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. *Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. International Monetary Policy-Making After Bretton Woods.* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).

Stern, Jessica. "Obama and Terrorism: Like it or Not, the War Goes On." *Foreign Affairs* (2015).

Stern, Jessica. "POV: Is the War on Terrorism Really Winnable?" *BU Today* (September 9, 2016).

Stern, Jessica. *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

Sternstein, Aliya. "The Pentagon's Satellite Spies Aiming for the Arctic." *Defense One* (March 9, 2015).

Stevenson, Jonathan. *Counterterrorism: Containment and Beyond.* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004).

Stewart, Mark G. "Climate Change and National Security: Balancing the Costs and Benefits" in (eds.) Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller, *A Dangerous World: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2014).

Stenlund, Peter. "Lessons in Regional Co-operation from the Arctic." *Oceans and Coastal Management* (2002), pp. 835-839.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Bilmes, Linda J. "The true cost of the Iraq war: $3 trillion and beyond." *Washington Post* (September 5, 2010).

Stimson, Philip M. "Crime stats should inform public. Trump is misusing them to scare us instead." *Washington Post* (February 10, 2017).

Stoessinger, John E. *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy.* (New York: Norton, 1979).

Stoessinger, John. "Crusaders and Pragmatist: two Types of Foreign Policy Makers" in (eds.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 448-465.

Stokes, Bruce; Wike, Richard; and Carle, Jill. *Global Concern About Climate Change, Broad Support for Limiting Emissions.* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2015).

Stokke, Olav Schram. "A Legal Regime for the Arctic?: Interplay with the Law of the Sea Convention." *Marine Policy* (2007), pp. 402-408.

Stokke, Olav Schram. "Arctic Stakes and Arctic Governance." *Strategic Analysis* (2014).

Stokke, Olav Schram. "Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions" in Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Honneland (eds.) *International Co-operation and Arctic Governance* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 13-26.

Strader, Olin. *A Bering Strait Vessel Traffic Service: Critical Infrastructure for an Opening Arctic (Part I).* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2012).

Strader, Olin. *An Arctic Council Security Agreement: Preventing Militarization and Ensuring Stability and Security of the Arctic (Part I).* (Washington, D.C., The Arctic Institute, 2012).

Strader, Olin. *An Arctic Council Security Agreement: Preventing Militarization and Ensuring Stability and Security of the Arctic (Part II).* (Washington, D.C., The Arctic Institute, 2012).

Strasser, Max. "As the World Warms, Navy Strategists Plan for an Arctic Rush. *Newsweek* (April 30, 2014).

Stoller, Heidee et. al. "The Costs of Post-9/11 National security Strategy." *Yale Law & Policy Review* (2004).

Strategic Persistence of Bioterrorism Threat (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Preparedness, Response and Communication, April 22, 2015).

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, 2011).

Strobel, Warren and Stewart, Phil. "As U.S. troops return to Iraq, more private contractors follow." *Reuters* (December 24, 2014).

Strohm, Chris. "FBI Chief Warns 'Terrorist Diaspora' Will Come to the West." *Bloomberg News* (July 28, 2016).

Stuart, Lynn A. *The US Marine Corps' Role in the War on Drugs* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1990).

Stuhltrager, James. "Global Climate Change and National Security." *Natural Resources & Environment* (2008).

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. *Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings* (Rockville: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014).

Suh, Hyun Soo. "Human trafficking 'a national security issue' Obama task force told." *CNN* (March 15, 2011).

"Suicide vest nine-year-old tells her story. *BBC News* (January 13, 2014).

Sullivan, Eileen. "Under Obama 'Black' Sites Swapped for Ships." *Associated Press* (October 8, 2013).

Sullivan, Dan. *To establish United States policy for the Arctic region for the next 10 years, and for other purposes.* (Washington, D.C: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, June 26, 2017).

Sullivan, Kevin. "Three American teens, recruited online, are caught trying to join the Islamic State." *Washington Post* (December 8, 2014).

Sullum, Jacob. "Bummer: Barack Obama turns out to be just another drug warrior." *Reason* (October 2011).

Sunar, Lutfi. "The long history of Islam as a collective "Other" of the West and the rise of Islamophobia in the U.S. after Trump." *Insight Turkey* (2017).

Sustainable Development Strategy: A Sub-Strategy of the Strategy for Defence, 2011-2030 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011).

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for Twenty First Century Defense. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012).

Sustein, Cass R. and Hastie, Reid. "Garbage in, garbage out? Some micro sources of macro errors." *Journal of Institutional Economics* (2014), pp. 1-23.

Swidler, Ann. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* (1986), pp. 273-286.

Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Syeed, Nafeesa. "Trump's Nuclear Weapon's Arsenal Isn't Any Different Than Obama's." *Bloomberg News* (August 9, 2017).

Table DLO-01-1. Drug law offences. Number of Offences. Offences. (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2017). Accessed December 28, 2017 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2016#displayTable:DLO-01-1.

Table DRD-2. Number of drug-induced deaths recorded in EU according to national definitions: Part (i) Total drug-induced deaths, 1995–2011. (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats13#display:/stats13/drdtab2a.

Table DRD-2: Overdose deaths. Current Situation. Gender. (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016) Accessed August 30, 2016 http://ww.emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2016#displayTable:DRD-2.

Table PDU-1. Estimates of prevalence of problem drug use at national level: summary table, 2006–11, rate per 1 000 aged 15–64, Part (i) Overall problem drug use. (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016). Accessed August 30, 2016 http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats13#display:/stats13/pdutab1a.

Tabuchi, Hiroko. "Coal mining jobs Trump would bring back no longer exist." *New York Times* (March 29, 2017).

Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work (Rio De Janeiro: Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2014).

Talbot, Margaret. "Chris Christie's opioid commission and the future of the ACA." *The New Yorker* (June 21, 2017).

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. "Security Seeking Under Anarchy." *International Security* (2000/2001), pp. 128-161.

"Taliban Child Soldiers." *Channel 4.* (July 22, 2013). Accessed February 6, 2014, http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/videos/all/taliban-child-fighters-clip-1.

Talent, Jim and Hegseth, Pete. "America's Strategic Drift." *National Review* (October 6, 2014).

Tama, Jason; Greenley, Heather and Barata, David. *Is the United States positioned to lead in the Arctic?* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2015).

Tammes. Rolf and Offerdal, Kristine. *Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional dynamics in a global world.* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Tanfani, Joseph. "In January, President Trump vowed to hire 5,000 new Border Patrol agents. It never happened." *Los Angeles Times* (August 18, 2017).

Tang, Shiping. "Taking Stock of Neoclassical Realism." *International Studies Review* (2009), pp. 799-803.

Tanter, Raymond. *Classifying Evil: Bush Administration Rhetoric and Policy Towards Rogue Regimes.* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, 2003).

Tapper, Jake and Diamond, Jeremy. "Russian intelligence ship spotted near American oil vessel." *CNN* (September 7, 2015).

Tarabay, Jamie. "To Defeat Future Terrorist, Europe Must Look to the Past." *The Atlantic* (August14, 2016).

Tardy, Thierry. *Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military measures.* (Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015).

Tarrow, Sydney. *The New Transnational Activism.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Tausch, Arno. "Estimates on the Global Threat of Islamic State Terrorism in the Face of the 2015 Paris and Copenhagen Attacks." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (2015).

Taylor, Adam. "The powerful propaganda being spread online by women in the Islamic State." *Washington Post* (March 23, 2015).

Taylor, Guy. "Exclusive: Confidential U.S. Assessments Show Afghanistan Not Ready to Govern On Own." *Washington Times* (April 15, 2014).

TE-SAT 2013: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: Europol, 2013).

TE-SAT 2014: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: Europol, 2014).

TE-SAT 2015 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: Europol, 2015).

TE-SAT 2016: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: Europol, 2016).

TE-SAT 2017: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: Europol, 2017).

"Teenage suicide bombers kill at least 12 people in Nigeria and Cameroon." *The Guardian* (November 23, 2015).

Tenant, George. *Challenges in a Changing Global Context.* (Washington, D.C.: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 24, 2004).

Tenant, George. *Converging Dangers in a Post-9/11 World.* (Washington, D.C.: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 6, 2002).

Tenant, George. *Evolving Dangers in a Complex World.* (Washington, D.C.: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003).

Tennberg, Monica. *Arctic Environmental Co-operation: A Study in Governmentality.* (New York: Ashgate, 2000).

"Terror in Orlando: The Victims." *CNN* (2016).

Terror Plots in the United States Since 9/11 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2016).

Terrorism in American After 9/11 (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 2017). Accessed September 31, 2017 https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america.

Terrorism Risk in the Post-9/11 Era: A 10-Year Retrospective. (Newark: RMS, 2012).

Terrorist Attacks in New York City. (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013). Accessed February 11, 2014 http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/announcements/2010May01_NYC_Terrorism%20v2.pdf.

Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. Between 1970 and 2012: Data from the Global Terrorism Database. (College Park: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, 2013).

Teslik, Lee. "Who Owns the Arctic?" *Slate* (October 24, 2007).

Thacker, Paul. "Where the Sun Don't Shine." *Slate* (March 15, 2011). Accessed September 25, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/03/barack_obama_promised_transparency_the_white_house_is_as_opaque_secretive.html.

Than, Ker. "Estimated social cost of climate change not accurate, Stanford scientist say." *Stanford News* (January 12, 2015).

"Thawing Ice and Chilly Diplomacy in the Arctic." *The New York Times* (April 27, 2015).

"These cybercrime statistics will make you think twice about your password." *CBS* (March 3, 2015).

Thiessen, Marc A. "Obama's disturbing pattern of playing down Islamic terror." *Washington Post* (July 20, 2015).

"Thirty Years of America's Drug War." *PBS* (2014). Accessed, January 25, 2016 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron.

Thomas, Pierre and Levine, Mike. "Why Attorney General Says ISIS is More of a Threat Than al Qaeda." *ABC News* (July 26, 2015).

Thompson, Derek. "The Donald Trump Playbook." *The Atlantic* (November 15, 2016).

Thompson, Ginger. "Trafficking in Terror." *The New Yorker* (December 14, 2015).

Thompson, John. "U.S. and Canada Announce Sweeping Ban on Offshore Drilling." *Arctic Deeply* (December 21, 2016).

Thompson, Josh. "An Uneasy Alliance: The Limits of the China-Russia Arctic Partnership." *Arctic Deeply* (June 21, 2017).

Thompson, Josh and Ohanyan, Narine. "Casting a Cool Eye on Russia's Northern Sea Route Ambitions." *Arctic Deeply* (May 3, 2017).

Thompson, Michael; Verweji, Marco; and Ellis, Richard J. "Why and How Culture Matters," in Robert E. Goodwin and Charles Tilly (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 319-340.

"Three teens freed from Guantanamo; Boys said to have backed Taliban." *The Washington Times* (January 30, 2004).

Thrall, A. Trevor. "Framing Iraq: Threat Inflation in the Marketplace of Values" in Jane Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall (eds.). *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 174-191.

Thrush, Glenn. "White House to ask for $14.5 billion down payment for Harvey Relief." *New York Times* (September 1, 2017).

Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Thompson, William R. "The 1920-1945 Shift in US Foreign Policy Orientation: Theory, Grand Strategies, and System Leader Ascents." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2014).

Tian, Nan et. al. *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017).

Tierney, Dominic. H*ow We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War.* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2010).

Tillerson, Rex W. *Remarks at the Arctic Council's 20th Anniversary Welcome Reception.* (Fairbanks: The Morris Thompson Cultural and Visitors Center, May 10, 2017).

Tillerson, Rex W. *Remarks at the Arctic Council's Ministerial Meeting.* (Fairbanks: The Morris Thompson Cultural and Visitors Center, May 11, 2017).

"Timeline: America's War on Drugs." *NPR* (April 2, 2007).

"Timeline: How the Anthrax Terror Unfolded." *NPR* (February 15, 2011).

Timeline of Events: 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017). Accessed October 28, 2017 https://energy.gov/management/office-management/operational-management/history/doe-history-timeline/timeline-events-4

Timeline of Events: 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017). Accessed October 28, 2017 https://energy.gov/management/office-management/operational-management/history/doe-history-timeline/timeline-events-7

Tipson, Frederick S. "Natural Disasters as Threats to Peace." (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2013).

Tishby, Noa. "What can we learn from the Nazi sympathizer in the White House" *Jewish Journal* (August 20, 2017).

Titley, David W. "A Military View on Climate Change." *The Conversation* (October 6, 2016).

Titley, David W. "Arctic Security Considerations and the Navy's Roadmap for the Arctic." *Naval War College Review* (2010).

Titley, David W. "As the Arctic melts, the US needs to pay attention." *The Conversation* (January 9, 2015).

Titley, David W. *Security Considerations and the U.S. Roadmap for the Arctic.* (Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2010).

Titley, David W. *Signals, Noise & Swans in a Changing Arctic Environment.* (Pennsylvania: Penn State University, October 20, 2015)

Tittle, Charles R. and Curan, Debra A. "Contingencies for dispositional disparities in juvenile justice." *Social Forces* (1988), pp. 23-58.

Tjalve, Vibeke Schou and Williams, Michael. "Reviving the Rhetoric of Realism: Politics and Responsibility in Grand Strategy." *Security Studies* (2015), pp. 37-60.

Tololyan, Khachig. "Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist." *Journal of Strategic Studies* (1987), pp. 217-233.

Tomasi, John. "Former FBI director Mueller warns of ongoing terrorism threat, plays down threats to privacy." *Colorado Statesman* (September 19, 2015).

Tonami, Aki. *Review: Arctic Governance and Japan's Foreign Strategy.* (Washington, D.C. The Arctic Institute, 2013).

"Top Mexican drug cartels leaders captured or killed in recent years." *The Associated Press* (February 27, 2015).

Toppo, Greg. "Expert: Terrorism frightens us 'far out of proportion to actual risk." *USA Today* (September 21, 2016).

Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015).

Towell, Pat. *Defense: FY2015 Authorization and Appropriations.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2015).

Townsend, Mark. "Is the Mafia selling assault weapons to Islamists." *The Guardian* (July 24, 2016).

"Tracking how many key positions Trump has filled so far." *Washington Post* (December 3, 2016). Accessed November 7, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-administration-appointee-tracker/database.

"Transcript: ABC News anchor David Muir interviews President Trump." *ABC News* (January 25, 2017)

"Transcript: The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer." *CNN* (May 23, 2017).

Transit Statistics. (Kirekenes: Northern Sea Route Information Office, 2016). Accessed July 24, 2017 http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits

Treadwell, Mead. *Climate Change and the Arctic: New Frontiers of National Security.* (Washington, D.C.: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2009).

Treadwell, Mead. "Putin's Arctic Plans Spring Ahead While America Lags Behind." *Roll Call* (November 12, 2014).

Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011).

Trends in U.S. Corrections (Washington, D.C: The Sentencing Project, 2015).

Trenin, Dmitri. "The Revival of the Russian Military," *Foreign Affairs* (2016).

Tropp, Linda and Molina, Ludwin. "Intergroup Processes: From Prejudice to Positive Relations Between Groups" in (eds.) Kay Deaux and Mark Snyder, *The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Trott, Bill. "Trump rewrote political playbook in successful White House bid." *Reuters* (November 9, 2016).

"Trump: stop terrorism by 'whatever means' necessary." *BBC News* (August 18, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. (@realDonaldTrump). "America is proud to stand should-to-shoulder with Poland in the fight to eradicate the evils of terrorism and extremism." July 6, 2017. 8:44 AM. Tweet.

Trump, Donald J. (@realDonaldTrump). "Another attack in London by a loser terrorist.These are sick and demented people who were in the sights of Scotland Yard. Must be proactive!" September 15, 2017, 6:42 AM. Tweet.

Trump, Donald J. (@realDonalTrump) "My first order as President was to renovate and modernize our nuclear arsenal. It is now far stronger and more powerful than ever before…." August 9, 2016. 7:56 AM. Tweet.

Trump, Donald J. (@realDonaldTrump). "Radical Islamic Terrorism must be stopped by whatever means necessary! The courts must give us back our protective rights. Have to be tough!" August 18, 2017, 6:06 AM. Tweet.

Trump, Donald J. (@realDonalTrump). "RT @foxandfriends: Wall Street hits record highs after Trump pulls out of Climate pact https://t.co/PDMwj13Lus." June 2, 2017. 5:08 AM. Tweet.

Trump, Donald J. (@realDonalTrump) "The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes." December 22, 2016. 11:50 AM. Tweet.

Trump, Donald J. *America First Energy Policy Address* (Bismarck: Bismarck Event Center, May 26, 2016).

Trump, Donald J. *Inaugural Address.* (Washington, D.C., The National Mall, January 20, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The Office of the President of the United States, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *President Donald J. Trump Proclaims January 2018 as National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 29, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks at the APEC CEO Summit in Da Nang, Vietnam.* (Da Nang: Ariyana Convention Centre, November 10, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.* (New York: United Nations, September 19, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump at Listening Session on Domestic and International Human Trafficking* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 23, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump at MCCA Winter Conference* (Washington, D.C.: J.W. Marriott, February 8, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump at the 9/11 Memorial Observance* (Arlington: The Pentagon, September, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, February 28, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Elevation of Cyber Command.* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President of the United States, August 18, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Statement by President Trump on Syria* (Mar-a-Lago: The Office of the Press Secretary, April 6, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord.* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 1, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump on the Administration's National Security Strategy.* (Washington, D.C.: Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, December 18, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia* (Arlington: Fort Myer, August 21, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump to Law Enforcement Officials on MS-13.* (Ronkonkoma: Van Nostrand Theatre, July 28, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly* (New York: United Nations, September 19, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks by the President and First Lady on the 70th Anniversary of the U.S. Air Force* (Camp Springs: Joint Base Andrews, September 15, 2017).

Trump, Donald J. *Remarks in Warsaw.* (Warsaw: Krasiński Square, July 6, 2017).

Tsui, Chin-Kuei. "Framing the threat of catastrophic terrorism: Genealogy, discourse and President Clinton's counterterrorism approach." *International Politics* (2015).

Tufro, Manuel and Litvachy, Paula. "Has Argentina entered the 'war on drugs'?" *Open Democracy* (March 18, 2016).

Turse, Nick. "America's Empire of AFRICOM Bases." *TomDispatch* (November 17, 2015).

Turse, Nick. "Obama's Scramble for Africa." *TomDispatch* (July 12, 2012).

Turse, Nick. "The Golden Age of Black Ops." *TomDispatch* (January 20, 2015).

Turse, Nick. "The New Obama Doctrine: A Six Point Plan for Global War." *Salon.* (June 14, 2012).

Tuveson, Ernest Lee. *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War.* (London: Luzac & Co., 1944).

"UN Blacklists Ugandan Group for Using Child Soldiers." *Reuters* (June 30, 2014);

"UN secures pledge to free 3,000 South Sudan child soldiers." *Reuters* (January 27, 2015).

UK aid: changing lives, delivering results. (London: The Department for International Development, 2011).

UK Climate Risk Assessment 2017 (London: Her Majesty's Government, 2017).

UK's response to the terrorist threat, The. (London: Home Affairs Committee, 2014).

UK's work in Afghanistan, The. (London: Ministry of Defence, 2014).

Under the radar: Ongoing recruitment and use of children by the Myanmar army. (London: Child Soldiers International, 2015).

Unger, David. *The Emergency State: America's Pursuit of Absolute Security at All Costs* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012).

Ungerleider, Neal. "Barack Obama is the first cyber war president, but a president can't win a cyber war." *Fast Company* (February 11, 2013).

United Kingdom country overview: A summary of the national drug situation. (Brussels: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs & Drug Addiction, 2016).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Montego Bay: United Nations, 1982).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (Rio De Janeiro: United Nations, 1992).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.* (Geneva: United Nations, 1951).

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. *Small Arms and Light Weapons: Selected United Nations Documents.* (New York: United Nations, 2008).

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and theProtocols Thereto.* (Palermo: United Nations, 2000).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2005),

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2011).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2014).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2015).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2016).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2017).

United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders' Statement (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, December 20, 2016).

United States Coast Guard: 2016 Budget in Brief (Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard, 2016).

United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. (Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard, 2013).

United States Government Anti-Trafficking in Persons Obligated Project Funding. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 2009).

United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. *Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs.* (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, 2012).

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris: United Nations, 1949).

"US Army boss: Afghan pullout talk may encourage Taliban." *BBC News.* (February 26, 2014)

U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters (1980-2016). (Asheville: National Centers for Environmental Information, 2016)

"U.S. blames North Korea for 'WannaCry' cyber attack." *Reuters* (December 18, 2017).

U.S. Coast Guard Historic Funding. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2013). Accessed August 1, 2017. https://www.uscg.mil/history/docs/budget/USCG_FundingHistory1922-2012.pdf.

"U.S. Congressional Sanctions Carry Consequences Beyond Russia." *Stratfor* (July 25, 2017).

"US: Don't Finance Child Soldiers." (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011).

U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2016).

U.S. Energy Facts Explained (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016).

U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change an Extreme Weather. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2013).

"US exit from Afghanistan could bolster Qaeda: commander." *Agence France Presse.* (February 27, 2014).

"U.S. Military expands its drug war in Latin America." *Associated Press* (February 3, 2013).

"US must retain Alaska combat brigade to deter Russia in Arctic – Army chief." *Sputnik News* (February 24, 2016).

U.S. Navy Arctic Strategy Roadmap. (Washington, D.C.: United States Navy, 2009).

U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030. (Washington, D.C.: United States Navy, 2014).

"U.S. Readies 'Aggressive' Arctic Council Agenda." *Eos* (2014), pp. 419-20.

USAID Climate Action Review: 2010-2016 (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2016).

USAID Global Climate Change Budget. (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2017).

Vagg, Zander. *American Security: The Impact of Climate Change.* (Washington, D.C.: American Security Project, 2009).

Valencia, Mark J. "The inherent dangers of the U.S. proposal to legalize interdiction of North Korean ships." *The Diplomat* (September 12, 2017).

Valentine, Katie. *Denying Climate Change 'Will Cost Us Billions of Dollars,' U.S. Budget Director Warns.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, September 20, 2014).

Valkova, Irena. "Claiming the Arctic: on the legal geography of the northernmost sovereignty dispute." *The Polar Journal* (2016), pp. 143-164.

Valuation of Energy Security for the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 2017).

Valverde, Miriam. "Donald Trump declares public health emergency over opioid crisis. Here's what that means." *Politifact* (October 30, 2017).

Valverde, Mariana. "Governing Security Governing Through Security" in (eds.) RJ Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach's *The Security of Freedom: Essay on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), p. 85.

Van Dijk, Frans and de Waard, Jaap. "Legal infrastructure of the Netherlands in international perspective: Crime control" (Netherlands: Ministry of Justice, June 2000), p. 9, Table S.13.

Van Dijk, Jan and Spapens, Toine. "Transnational Organized Crime: Networks Across the World" in Jay Albanese and Philip Reichel (eds.) *Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview from Six Continents* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), pp. 7-27.

Van Evera, Stephen. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

Van Evera, Stephen. "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* (1990), pp. 1-51.

Van Wyk, Coen. "The continuing dilemma of child soldiers: Central Africa in focus." *Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor* (2014), pp. 48-51.

Varadarajan, Uday and Zuckerman, Julia. *Energy, the U.S. Budget, and Climate Change.* (San Francisco: Climate Policy Initiative, 2012.

Vasquez, John. "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review* (1997), pp. 899-912.

Veiras, Jose Luis Pardo. "A decade of failure in the War on Drugs." *New York Times* (October 9, 2019).

"Venezuela condemns USA for using drug issue as political weapon." *Prensa Latina* (September 15, 2017).

Verba, Sidney. "Comparative Political Culture" in (eds.) Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

Victor, David. G. "Diplomacy's Meltdown: Developing Countries Are Note Holding Back Climate Agreements." *Scientific American* (January 1, 2011).

Vigeland Rottem, Svein. "The Arctic Council and the Search and Rescue Agreement: The Case of Norway." *Polar Record* (2013), pp. 284-292.

Villeda, Ray and Santia, Marc. "Trump pledges to 'destroy' violent MS-13 street gang." *NBC News* (July 28, 2017).

Vilmer, Jean Gene and Schmitt, Olivier. "Frogs of War: Explaining the New French Military Interventionism." *War on The Rocks* (October 14, 2015)

Virtanen, Vera. *The Arctic in World Politics: The United States, Russia and China in the Arctic – implications for Finland.* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2013).

Vitali, Ali. "Trump highlights crimes by undocumented workers." *NBC News* (June 28, 2017).

Vitale, Alex S. "Trump is trying to militarize the police. It won't make us any safer." *Fortune* (August 29, 2017).

"Vladimir Putin visits Arctic to reaffirm Russia's claim." *Associated Press* (March 29, 2017).

Volcovici, Valerie. "Defying Trump, Senate panel approves funding for U.N. climate body." *Reuters* (September 8, 2017).

Volynets, Steven. "Oil-Hungry Russia Claims the Arctic." *PC Magazine* (August 2, 2007).

Von Braun, Joachim and Wheeler, Tim. "Climate Change Impacts on Global Food Security." *Science* (2013).

Von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. (London: Kegan Pauk, Trench, Trubner & Cio. Ltd., 1908).

Volz, Dustin and Freifeld, Karen. "U.S. issues first government guide on responding to cyber-attacks." *Reuters* (July 26, 2016).

Vorobyeva, Yulia. "Drugs as a National Security Threat: Securitization of Drugs in the U.S. Official Discourse." *Miami International Studies Journal* (2012), pp. 72-94.

Vries, Lloyd. "House scraps Arctic drilling plan." *Associated Press* (November 10, 2005).

Waever, Ole. "Securitization and Descuritization" in (ed.) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *On Security*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.

Waever, Ole; Buzan, Barry; Kelstrup, Morten; Lemaitre, Pierre. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (New York, St Martin's, 1993).

Wade, Christian M. "Trump's opioid's crisis declaration draws optimism, concerns." *The Richmond Register* (August 18, 2017).

Wagner, David. "Obama's Failed Campaign Promise to Close Gitmo: A Timeline." *The Atlantic Wire* (January 28, 2013). Accessed September 24, 2013

Wagner, Dennis. "Ariz. Sherriff ordered to return military goods." *USA Today* (September 14, 2012).

Wagner, Peter and Rabuy, Bernadette. *Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2015* (Northampton: Prison Policy Initiative, December 8, 2015).

Waldman, Paul. "The Islamic State isn't actually much of a threat to the United States." *Washington Post* (March 20, 2015).

Waldman, Scott. "The U.S. is not ready to clean up and Arctic oil spill." *Scientific American* (July 19, 2017).

Walker, Dinah. *Trends in U.S. Military Spending*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, August 23, 2012).

Walker, R.B.J. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Walmsley, Roy. *World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition)*. (Kings College, London, England: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2013), Table 2, p. 3, and Table 4, p. 5.

Walsh, Nick Paton. "A new Cold War: Wintry war games reassure Norway over Russia threat." *CNN* (December 1, 2016).

Walt, Stephen M. "Alliances, Threats and U.S. Grand Strategy: A reply to Kaufman and Labs." *Security Studies* (1992), pp. 448-482.

Walt, Stephen M. "Chill Out, America." *Foreign Policy* (May 29, 2015).

Walt, Stephen M. "Democracy, Freedom, and Apple Pie Aren't a Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy* (July 1, 2014).

Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

Walt, Stephen M. "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy." *International Security* (1989), pp. 5-49.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Progressive Power of Realism." *American Political Science Review* (1997).

Walt, Stephen M. "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* (1991).

Walters, John P. "Legalized Drugs: Dumber Thank You Think." *The Weekly Standard* (May 7, 2012).

Walters, Riley. *Continued Federal Cyber Breaches in 2015.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2015).

Walther, Michael F. *Insanity: Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug Strategy* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2012), pp. 9-10.

Waltz. Kenneth. *Man, the State and War" A Theoretical Analysis.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in (ed.) Charles W. Kegley Jr., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 67-82.

Waltz, Kenneth. *Theories of International Politics.* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

Wander, Philip. "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy. *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (1984).

War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing. (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2014).

War on Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. (Rio de Janeiro: Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011).

War and Poverty: The Themes. (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2004).

Ward, Bud. "Climate Change as Catalyst of Conflict." *YaleClimateConnections.org* (September 22, 2014).

Warner, Judith Ann. "The Social Construction of the 3 Alien in Immigration Law, Enforcement   Practice and Statistical Enumeration: Consequences for Immigrant Stereotyping." *Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries (*2005-2006), pp. 56-80.

Warner, Koko et. al., *Changing Climate, Moving People: Framing Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation.* (Bonn: United Nations University, 2013).

Warrick, Joby. "Microbes by the ton: Officials see weapons through North Korea gains biotech expertise." *Washington Post* (December 10, 2017).

Water. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014). Accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water

Water: A Shared Responsibility. (New York: United Nations, 2006).

*Water and Food Security. (*New York: United Nations, 2013).

Water and Climate Change: Understanding the Risk and Making Climate-Smart Investment Decisions. (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2009).

Water and Poverty: The Themes. (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2004).

Water Crisis in the West, The. New York Times (June 29, 2014).

Water Security and Conflict Prevention Summit (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, September 10, 2013).

Water Security & the Global Water Agenda: A UN-Water Analytical Brief." (Ontario: United Nations University, 2013).

Water Security for Better Lives. (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013).

Water Security Risk Index 2010. (Bath: Maplecroft, 2011).

Watson, Kathryn. "Despite tough talk, drug prosecutions drop under Trump, Sessions." *USA Today* (August 31, 2017).

Watson, Paul. "A Melting Arctic Could Spark a New Cold War." *Time* (May 12, 2017).

Watson, Scott D. "'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2012), pp. 279-301.

Watters, Stewart and Tonami, Aki. "Japan's Arctic Policy" The Sum of Many Parts." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012).

Watters, Stewart and Tonami, Aki. "Singapore: An Emerging Actor." *Arctic Yearbook* (2012).

Watts, Clint. "Deciphering Competition Between al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State." *CTC Sentinel* (2016).

Webber, Mark et. al. "The governance of European Security." *Review of International Studies* (2004), pp. 3-26.

Webersik, Christian. *Climate Change and Security.* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010).

Wechsler, William F. *Combatting Transnational Organized* Crime (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, April 26, 2012).

Wedeen, Lisa. "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science." *American Political Science Review* (2002), pp. 713-728.

Wedel, Jane R. *Shadow Elite: How's the World's New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government and the Free Market.* (New York: Basic Books, 2009).

Weibust, Ingur and Meadowcroft, James. *Multilevel Environmental Governance: Managing Water and Climate Change in Europe and North America.* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2014).

Weigley, Russell Frank. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973)

Weinberg, Leonard; Pedahzur, Ami; and Hirsch-Hoefler; Sivan. "The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2004), pp. 777-794.

Weiner, Greg. "The Scoundrel Theory of American Politics." *New York Times* (December 8, 2017).

Weiss, Caleb. "Boko Haram releases photos showing children in training." *Long War Journal* (January 25, 2015).

Weiss, Daniel J.; Weidman, Jackie and Bronson, Mackenzie. *Heavy Weather: How Climate Destruction Harms Middle – and Lower-Income Americans.* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2012).

Weiss, Kenneth R. "The Making of a Climate Refugee." *Foreign Policy* (January 28, 2015).

Welch, Shannon A. "Human Trafficking and Terrorism: utilizing National Security Resources to Prevent Human Trafficking in the Islamic State." *Duke Journal of Gender and Law Studies* (2017).

Welna, David. "Obama opens final nuclear security summit in Washington, D.C." *NPR* (March 31, 2016).

Welzer, Harold. *Climate Wars: What People Will be Killed for in the 21ˢᵗ Century.* (Cambridge: Goethe-Institut, 2012).

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* (1992), pp. 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,   1999).

Wensink, Wim; van de Velde, Michael; and Boer, Lianne. *Estimated costs of counterterrorism measures.* (Luxembourg: Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2011).

Werb, Dan et. al. "Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence: Evidence from a Scientific Review." *International Journal of Drug Policy* (2010).

Werksman, Jacob; Leferve, Jurgen; and Runge-Metzger, Artur. "The European Union and International Climate Change Policy." *Marine Corps University Journal* (2016).

Wertheim, Stephen. "Trump and American Exceptionalism." *Foreign Affairs* (2017).

Westcott, Lucy. "Boko Haram Ramps up use of children in suicide attacks: U.N." *Newsweek.* (April 12, 2017).

Westermeyer, William and Shusterich, Kurt. *United States Arctic Interests* (New York: Springer, 1984).

Wethe, David. "Fracking." *Bloomberg* (March 3, 2017).

Wezeman, Simeon T. *Military Capabilities in the Arctic.* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012).

Wezeman, Simeon T. *Military Capabilities in the Arctic: A New Cold War in the High North* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2016).

What Do Americans Fear? (Orange: Chapman University, 2016).

What does state fragility mean? (Washington, D.C: The Fund for Peace, 2014). Accessed August 3, 2014 http://ffp.statesindex.org/faq-06-state-fragility.

"What is the emissions trading scheme and how does it work?" *The Guardian* (June 7, 2011).

What is the Threat to the United States Today (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 2017).

White, Daniel et. al. "Food and water security in a changing arctic climate." *Environmental Research Letters* (2007).

Whitford, Andrew B. and Yates, Jeff. *Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda: Constructing the War on Drugs.* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009).

"'Where's Our Dedication to Stopping Evil?': McCain Slams Obama on ISIS." *Fox News* (May 22, 2015).

Widavsky, Aaron. *Politics of the Budgetary Process* (New York: Scott Foresman & Co., 1984).

Widavsky, Aaron and Caiden, Naomi. *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process* (New York: Pearson, 2003).

Widmaier, Wesley W. *Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama: Constructing Crisis, fast and slow* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

Wilkinson, Emily et. al. *Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2016).

Wilkinson, Tracy. "Proposed budget would deeply cut State Department and its programs." *Los Angeles Times* (May 23, 2017).

Williams, Bruce. "The Military in a Wicked World: A European Union Military Point of View." *PRISM* (2013), pp. 47-59.

Williams, Carol J. "U.S. takes helm of Arctic Council, focus on climate change." *Los Angeles Times* (April 24, 2015).

Williams, David. "Children of war: As rebel force boys to watch and execution, gun-toting youngsters join regime troops." *Daily Mail* (June 16, 2014).

Williams, Glyn. *Arctic Labyrinth: The Quest for the Northwest Passage* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009).

Williams, Michael C. *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Williams, Oscar. "Military Experts Warn Climate Change Will Create An 'Epic' Humanitarian Crisis." *Huffington Post* (January 12, 2016).

Williams, William Appleman. *The Roots of The Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society.* (New York: Random House, 1969).

Willis, Matthew. *Reelections on Canada's Vision for the Arctic Council.* (Washington, D.C.: The Arctic Institute, 2013).

Wills, Michael et. al. "Polar Pursuits Asia Engages the Arctic." *Asia Policy* (2014).

Wilson, Richard W. "Review: The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches." *World Politics* (200), pp. 246-273.

Winkler, Carol K. "The rhetorical origins of the US war on terror" in (ed.) Daniela Pisoiu's *Arguing Counterterrorism: new perspectives."* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 27-55.

Wintour, Patrick. "Troubled Waters: Norway Keeps Watch on Russia's Arctic Manoeuvres." *The Guardian* (March 13, 2017).

Winton, Douglas. "Economic Statecraft: China in Africa." *Parameters* (2013), pp. 99-110.

Winn, Patrick. "Why Somalia is not the real piracy threat." *The Toronto Star* (March 27, 2014).

Winslett, Gary. "Differential Threat Perceptions: How Transnational Groups Influence Bilateral Security Relations." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2015)

Wintour, Patrick. "Troubled Waters: Norway Keeps Watch on Russia's Arctic Maneuvers." *The Guardian* (March 13, 2017).

Wirth, Timothy. "Foreword" in (eds.) K.A. Hamilton and C.A. Ducker's *Global HIV/AIDS: A Strategy for U.S. Leadership: A Consensus Report of the CSIS Working Group on Global HIV/AIVDS (Panel Report).* (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994).

Withers, George; Santos, Lucila; and Isacson, Adam. *Preach What You Practice: The Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Office on Latin America, 2010).

Wohlforth, William C. *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Wohlforth, William C. "The Stability of the Unipolar World." *International Security* (1999), pp. 5-41.

Wohlsetter, Albert. "On Vietnam and Bureaucracy." Paper presented at the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, Chicago, June 3-6, 1968. Accessed April 21, 2013,

Wolf, Richard. "Bush calls for tighter cybersecurity." *ABC News* (March 14, 2008).

Wolf, Sonja. "Gangs, drugs, and the state: violence and survival at the margins of Latin America." *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* (January 29, 2016), pp. 114-125.

Wolf, Wojtek Mackiewicz. *Winning the War of Words: Selling the War on Terror From Afghanistan to Iraq.* (Praeger Security International, 2008).

Wolfowitz, Paul. Interview with Greta Van Susteren. *Fox News* (July 9, 2002).

Wong, Kristina "Could US handle biological attack?" *The Hill* (October 21, 2014).

Wood, B. Dan and Peake, Jeffrey S. "The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting." *The American Political Science Review* (1998), pp. 173–184.

Woodly. Deva R. *The Politics of Common Sense: How Social Movements Use Public Discourse to Change Politics and Win Acceptance.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

Woods, Joshua and Arthur, C. Damien. *Debating Immigration in the Age of Terrorism, Polarization and Trump.* (London: Lexington Books, 2017).

Woodward, C. Vann. "The Age of Reinterpretation." *The American Historical Review* (1960), pp. 1-19.

Woolf, Amy F. *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2017).

Worland, Justin. "President Obama issues permeant Arctic drilling ban before leaving office." *Time* (December 20, 2016).

Worland, Justin. "President Trump's Proposed Budget is a Blow to Fighting Climate Change. And It's Not Just the EPA." *Time* (March 16, 2017).

World Economic Forum. *Water Security: The Food-Energy-Climate Nexus.* (Washington: Island Press, 2011).

World Summit for Social Development Programme of Action (Copenhagen: United Nations, 1995), paragraph 19.

Worley, Will. "Ship sets record for earliest crossing of notorious Northwest Passage through Arctic." *The Independent* (July 30, 2017).

Wozniak, Antal; Wessler, Hartmut; and Luck, Julia. "9Who Prevails in the Visual Framing Contest About the United Nations Climate Change Conferences." *Journalism Studies* (2016), pp. 1-20.

"Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden lashes out against the West." *Time* (1999)

Wright, Austin and Herb, Jeremy. "Obama to seek defense boost to battle terrorism." *Politico* (January 27, 2015).

Wright, Julia E. and Bachmann, Michael. "Inciting Criminal Violence: An Examination of Al Qaida's Persuasive Devices in the Digital World." *Journal of Terrorism Research* (2015).

Wyler, Liana Sun *Trafficking In Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy for Congress.* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).

Wyne, Ali. "The World is Much Safer Then 20th-century Historian Would Have You Believe." *The New Republic* (April 1, 2014).

Xing, Li and Bertelsen, Rasmus Gjedsso. "The drivers of Chinese Arctic interests: Political stability and energy transportation." *Arctic Yearbook* (2013).

Yegorov, Oleg. "Out in the cold: Russia and the West's Arctic conundrum." *Russia Beyond The Headlines* (March 12, 2017). Accessed March 13, 2017.

Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977).

Yin, Beibei. "Reality check casts doubts on Chinese health aid to Africa." *The Guardian* (June 10, 2013).

Young, Oran R. "Building an International Regime Complex for the Arctic: Current Status and Next Steps." *Polar Journal* (2012), pp. 291-407.

Young, Oran. "Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Co-operation." *GlobalGovernance* (2005), pp. 9-15.

Young, Oran. "The Age of the Arctic." *Foreign Policy* (1985), pp. 160-179.

Young, Oran. "The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change." *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* (2009), pp. 423-443.

Young, Oran. "The shifting landscape of Arctic politics: implications for international cooperation." *The Polar Journal* (2016), pp. 209-223.

Young, Oran. "Whither the Arctic? Conflict of Co-operation in the Circumpolar North." *Polar Record* (2009), pp. 73-82.

Young, Stephen and Gonlund, Lisbeth. *A Review of the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review* (Cambridge: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2002).

Youngers, Colletta A. and Walsh, John M. "Drug Decriminalization: A Trend Takes Shape." *Americas Quarterly* (Fall 2009).

Youngs, Richard. *Climate Change and European Security.* (London: Routledge: 2014), p. 74

Yourish, Karen; Watkins, Derek; and Giratikanon, Tom. "Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired Attacks Around the World." *New York Times* (July 1, 2015)

Youssef, Nancy and Shachtman, Noah. "Pentagon: Team Obama is 'Too Timid' on Putin." *The Daily Beast* (August 6, 2015).

Yusufzai, Ashfaq. "Taliban Waiting to Take Over from U.S." *Inter Press Service* (October 27, 2013).

Zabludovsky, Karla. "Ismael Zambada Garcia next in line to take over the Sinaloa drug cartel after 'El Chapo' Guzman capture." *Newsweek* (February 26, 2014).

Zahedzadeh, Giti; Barraza, Jorde A.; Zak, Paul J. "Persuasive Narratives and Costly Actions." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2015), pp. 1-13.

Zakaria, Fareed. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

Zakaria, Fareed. "Realism and Domestic Politics: A review Essay." *International Security* (1992).

Zald, Mayer N. "Culture, ideology, and strategic framing" in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) *Comparative Perspective on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 261-274.

Zalkind, Susan. "How ISIS's 'Attack America' Plain is Working." *The Daily Beast* (June 22, 2015).

Zapfe, Martin. "People decide, parameters shape: US foreign policy under Barack Obama" in Oliver Thranert and Martin Zape (eds.) *Strategic Trend 2014: Key Developments in Global Affairs.* (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2014), pp. 83-101.

Zapotosky, Matt and Horwitz, Sari. "While eyes are on Russia, Sessions dramatically reshapes the Justice Department." *Washington Post* (November 24, 2017).

Zarnett, David. "What Does Realist Foreign Policy Activism Tell Us About Realist Theory?" *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2014).

Zelizer, Julian E. *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – from World War II to the War on Terrorism.* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

Zellen, Barry Scott. "Arctic Doom. Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic." (Santa Barbara: Prager, 2009).

Zellen, Bary Scott. *The Fast Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for A Warmer World.* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2013).

Zenko, Micah. "Bush and Obama Fought a Failed 'War on Terror.' It's Trump Turn." *New York Times* (August 25, 2017).

Zenko, Micah. "Is US Foreign Policy Ignoring Homegrown Terrorists." *Council on Foreign Relations* (May 19, 2015).

Zenko, Micah. "Terrorism is Booming Almost Everywhere but in The United States." *Foreign Policy* (June 19, 2015).

Zenko, Micah. "The Existential Angst of America's Top Generals." *Foreign Policy* (August 4, 2015).

Zenko, Micah. "The Myth of the Indispensable Nation." *Foreign Policy* (November 6, 2014).

Zenko, Micah. "Trump is pushing America's special forces past the breaking point." *Foreign Policy* (August 1, 2017).

Zenko, Micah and Cohen, Michael A. "Clear and Present Safety." *Foreign Affairs* (2012).

Zhang, Qingmen. "The Bureaucratic Politics of U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* (2006), pp. 231-265.

Zhang, Yong-Xiang et. al. "The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and its impact on global climate change governance." *Advances in Climate Change Research* (2017).

Zheng, Haicui. "Classification and Ideology – A Critical Discourse Analysis of Bush's Two Speeches on 911 Attack." *World Journal of English Language* (2015), pp. 48-55.

Ziezulewicz, Geoff and Larter, David B. "Trump's armada: Navy assembles 3 carriers in Asia forthe president visit." *Navy Times* (October 27, 2017).

Zimmerman, Katherine. "A New Definition for al-Qaeda." *The Washington Post* (January 31, 2014).

Zirnite, Peter. *Reluctant Recruits the US Military and the War on Drugs.* (Washington D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1997)

Zong, Jie and Batalove, Jeanne. *Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2016).

Zoughbie, Daniel. "Interpreting George W. Bush's foreign policy" in Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hull (eds.) *Interpreting Global Security.* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 53-72.

Zuegel, Devon Kristine. "Prohibition & Anarchy: How the War on Drugs Helps Violence Flourish." *Stanford Review* (2014).

Zukunft, Paul F. *Coast Guard Requirements, Priorities, and Future Acquisition Plans.* (Washington, D.C.: The Capital, May 18, 2017).