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RISE OF THE DEMAGOGUES: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN IMPERIAL ATHENS

AFTER THE REFORMS OF EPHIALTES

By

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A dissertation submitted to the

School of Graduate Studies

Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Classics

Written under the direction of

Thomas Figueira

And approved by

New Brunswick, New Jersey

May, 2018

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This dissertation explores the phenomenon of ‘demagogues’ in Classical Athens both through the Greek term *dēmagōgos* (and its cognates) and through scholarly theories about the evolution of political leadership during the Athenian democracy. An analysis of the usage of *dēmagōgos* by ancient sources reveals that it initially lacked the pejorative sense of the modern ‘demagogue’, instead serving as a neutral descriptive term to indicate a citizen whose political activity consists (at least in part) in providing policy advice to the assembly of voting citizens in its capacity as the ultimate decision-making body in the democracy. By its etymology and its function *dēmagōgos* affirmed the power of the mass of citizens in the democracy (and thence democracy itself), as well as highlighting the removal of the privilege of state leadership from the private preserve of a limited, self-defining group of established elite families. The members of this group, and later more broadly the ideological opponents of democracy, appropriated *dēmagōgos* to use as a pejorative term for a bad leader, colored by an implicit or explicit belief that the *dēmos*, the mass of citizens, were unworthy of the role of decision-making and incapable of fulfilling that role competently. Modern scholarship, drawing on the antagonistic

assimilation of demagogues to the mass of non-elite citizens given a greater political voice in democracy and influenced by an overly literal and generalizing reading of the abuse of certain demagogues in the plays of Old Comedy, has posited that demagogues were men of self-made wealth who used (or misused) rhetorical training and the promise of their financial competence to influence citizens in the assembly and courts without undergoing the traditional steps for building a political career. This dissertation endeavors to promote a nascent reaction to that line of thought, demonstrating that we lack evidence for demagogues making appeals to the citizen body in any capacity on the basis of financial expertise, and that there is no reason to conclude that the process of building a political career at Athens was substantively less involved at the end of the fifth century than at its beginning. The Old Comic depiction of demagogues is also analyzed in detail, with the findings pointing toward the existence of a generic set of areas or characteristics with respect to which a politician might be mocked; these characteristics were not based on a ‘right-wing’ bias in Old Comedy or a desire to reveal the ‘reality’ about targeted politicians, but rather they exploited the prejudices and anxieties of the audience of Athenian citizens more generally. Through Old Comedy it may be possible to discern Athenian preoccupations about contemporary demagogues, but care should be taken in assimilating those preoccupations to a rounded portrait of political leadership based in reality.

Acknowledgements

As I reach the end of this project, it is truly a pleasure to have the opportunity to acknowledge all of the necessary assistance I have received along the way. First I must thank my family: my father Frank and mother Missy, who have supported me in every way conceivable; my brother David, who has been my best friend for as long as my memory stretches; and my grandmother Charlotte, whose sage advice led me to academia in the first place. My advisor, Thomas Figueira, has been an exemplary mentor and teacher to me, and has consistently opened doors to exciting opportunities; the same is true of my undergraduate mentor Judith Hallett, who provided me the opportunity (and guidance necessary) to give my first conference paper. The rest of my dissertation committee, James McGlew and Tim Power, and especially my outside readers Loren J. Samons II and Angelos Chaniotis, have gone above and beyond the call of duty not only in aiding me with the dissertation, but in providing all the assistance to which one could ever aspire while navigating graduate school and the beginning of one's professional career in academia. I will be forever grateful to Professor Samons for his frequent encouragement as I took my first tentative steps in writing on the history of the Athenian *arkhē*, to Professor Chaniotis for providing similar encouragement and guidance in the realm of Greek epigraphy, and to both for their friendship. I must also thank the other members of the Classics Department at Rutgers University, faculty and graduate students alike, both past and present, from whom and with whom I have had the very great pleasure of learning about Classics and how to be a professional classicist. Especial thanks are due to Serena Connolly, who has selflessly spent far too much of her time answering my questions, preparing me, and giving me feedback before and after classes,

presentations, interviews, and the like. Funding support, without which this project would not have been possible, has been generously provided by the School of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers University as a whole, and the Fulbright Foundation, and the project was much improved by the resources of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, and by conversations with the student members and scholars there during my time in residence in 2014-15 and 2016.

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Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer a simple question: who and what is a demagogue in the context of Classical Athens? The *OED* provides two definitions for *demagogue*: “1. In ancient times, a leader of the people; a popular leader or orator who espoused the cause of the people against any other party in the state.” and “2. In bad sense: A leader of a popular faction, or of the mob; a political agitator who appeals to the passions and prejudices of the mob in order to obtain power or further his own interests; an unprincipled or factious popular orator.” Several important connotations and connections of ‘demagogy’ are well brought out by these definitions. The first is the clear connection to ‘the people’, a linkage easily drawn in Greek from the word’s δημός (*dēmos*) etymological root. It is, however, unclear whether the relationship between demagogue and people is one of leadership/support or of exploitation, and this is the notable difference between the first, ‘neutral’ definition and the second, ‘negative’ definition. The other two salient aspects of the ‘negative’ definition appear in the repeated words ‘mob’ and ‘faction/factious’. The former word, a pejorative term for ‘the people’ derived from Claudian’s phrase *mōbile vulgus* (the fickle crowd), harkens back to Polybius’ distinction between the ‘good’ government of democracy and the ‘bad’ government of mob-rule.¹ The terms ‘faction’ and ‘factious’ accentuate the thought that any state wherein a leader is “espous[ing] the cause of the people against any other party” is heading towards or already in a condition of στάσις (*stasis*).² The important corollary, then, is that there are two differences between the ‘neutral’ definition and the ‘negative’ definition: the meaningful distinction lies in whose interest the demagogue is leading the

¹ *Histories* 6.2-10.

² For the connection between demagogues and *stasis*, see also Finley 1962.

people, while the more insidious difference is the absence or presence of pejorative terminology for ‘the people’ and for ‘party’ government.

The need for this study is nowhere more apparent than in the staggering imprecision with which even eminent scholars use the term ‘demagogue’ when discussing fifth-century Athenian politics. Every scholar, it seems, has a slightly different connotation for the term, and most never concern themselves to set forth explicitly whatever definition they have settled upon or even limit its application to persons whom our sources actually call demagogues. For some, like W.E. Thompson, ‘demagogue’ seems to refer to post-Periklean politicians, especially Kleon and those similar to him.³ Antony Andrewes considers Kleon in Thucydides’ Mytilenean debate to be “the portrait of the demagogue in action,” and his summary of that portrait points to a definition of demagogue similar to the second definition from the *OED* above: “a political agitator who appeals to the passions and prejudices of the mob.”⁴ For others, as in the influential 1924 article of A.B. West on “Pericles’ Political Heirs”, the definition can shift even over the course of a single article: at first West appears to conflate demagogues with politicians in favor of radicalizing⁵ the Athenian democracy, but he then goes on to note that “to many, including Aristotle, Pericles was a demagogue and a radical. To others he

³ Thompson 1981.

⁴ Andrewes 1962.

⁵ West sees three distinct constitutional views as dominant at the time of Perikles’ death and Kleon’s rise: “first, that of the reactionary oligarchs who were beginning to talk of the good old days before the constitution of the Fathers had been corrupted, whose platform was revolution, not reform of the democracy, secondly, that of the conservatively minded democrats who were content with the constitution as it stood, the ‘Finality Jacks’ of fifth-century Athens, and finally, that of the radicals who wanted more far-reaching reforms,” (126). West repeatedly couples the term “demagogue” with the third view described above, in opposition to the “conservatism” represented for him in the first two views.

was a demagogue without being a radical.”⁶ This quote from West betrays the confusion in the classical texts that underlies the inconsistency in modern scholarship.

Even those scholars who set out to provide an explicit definition for ‘demagogues’ generally fail both to explain sufficiently the variances in ancient usage and to reconcile their own views with those of previous scholars (or sometimes even with their own scholarly views as elsewhere stated). To continue with a previously utilized example, Andrewes, after making Kleon the poster-boy for a group of politicians whose defining characteristic seems to be exploiting the passions of the popular assembly, goes on to recriminate against Thucydides and Aristophanes for unnecessary bias in their depictions of Kleon and to theorize that Kleon and those like him were distinguished by their financial expertise. At no point, however, does Andrewes directly address which of these definitions for a ‘demagogue’ (preying on the passions of the people or providing vital financial expertise) is likely to be more historically accurate or significant, or which is even more accurate with reference to the ancient notion of ‘demagogy’.

M. I. Finley’s article on “The Athenian Demagogues” presents almost identical problems to those of Andrewes. After baldly disavowing an interest in “the lexicography of demagogy,” Finley boils the term ‘demagogue’ down to “the simplest way of identifying the bad type” of leadership.⁷ He then ties this issue of good versus bad leadership back to the question of whether a given politician is advising the people in their best interest, or his own. However, later in the same work Finley attacks the use of ‘demagogue’ as a pejorative term for a leader who deliberately misleads the people (*e.g.*, by promising the people something without the intent or ability to deliver on that

⁶ West 1924, 161.

⁷ Finley 1962, 5.

promise), noting that such behavior appears in our histories not among “the so-called demagogues,” but rather the oligarchic partisans of 411.⁸ Finley concludes by saying that “demagogues — I use the word in a neutral sense — were a structural element in the Athenian political system. By this I mean, first, that the system could not function at all without them; secondly, that the term is equally applicable to all leaders, regardless of class or point of view; and thirdly, that within rather broad limits they are to be judged individually not by their manners or their methods, but by their performance.”⁹ It seems impossible to believe that Finley in this final analysis still means by ‘demagogues’ politicians who lead in their own interest (for one thing, how would that constitute a neutral sense of the word?). The reader is left wishing that Finley had indeed undertaken the lexicography of demagogy that he initially eschewed, because, following him, we seem to have ended rather far from the contexts in which this terminology is actually applied.

Even W.R. Connor, whose *New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* has an entire section devoted to new political terminology developing in the fifth century, treats the term ‘demagogue’ with relative neglect: far more thought and detail is lavished on the term προστάτης τοῦ δήμου (*prostatēs tou dēmou* – champion of the people), and even the word ῥήτωρ (*rhētōr* – speaker) is given more analysis. One rationale behind his preferential treatment of *prostatēs tou dēmou* would be to note its greater use during the fifth century. Yet to apply such reasoning would ignore the fact that much of our information about fifth-century politics and politicians comes from far later sources, for whom δημαγωγός (*dēmagōgos*) is clearly the more important (and meaningful) word.

⁸ Finley 1962, 17-18.

⁹ Finley 1962, 19.

The definition for ‘demagogue’ that Connor does give makes the good point of linking the variably negative or neutral connotations of the term to similar variability in the root word *dēmos* during the fifth century. Unfortunately, Connor fails to address most of the issues raised by Finley or Andrewes, such as characterizing as demagogic decisions elicited on the basis of strong emotion, or those suspected to be predicated on the interests of their proposer, rather than of the entire city/polity.

In contrast, the purpose of this study is twofold: first, it provides a systematic analysis of the usage, connotations, and valences of the term ‘demagogue’ throughout antiquity, and especially in our sources for Classical Athenian history and politics. Second, it will reconsider the prevailing theory about Athenian politicians from the rise of Perikles through the fall of the fifth-century ἀρχή (*arkhē*). The careers of these politicians are inextricably tied up with the issues associated with the term demagogue: issues of class, profession, oratorical ability and style, quality of leadership, and moral character. This analysis seeks to provide answers to our guiding question: what (Chapter One, ‘The lexicographer of demagogy’) and who (Chapter Two, ‘The Athenian demagogues’) is a demagogue in Classical Athens? In these two chapters I conclude that a demagogue is a descriptive term for any Athenian citizen who advises the Athenian people in their capacity as the deliberative body for Athenian policy; nearly any Athenian politician active during the period of the independent Athenian democracy, stretching from its legendary foundation under Theseus to its diminution and reorganization under Demetrios of Phaleron, could be called a demagogue, but the term was especially reserved for prominent politicians associated with the expansion of or support for popular sovereignty. In Chapter Three, ‘New political techniques and reactions’, we apply those

answers to several of the most critical works of recent scholarship pertaining to demagogues and demagogy: Connor's *New Politicians*, M. Ostwald's *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, L.B. Carter's *The Quiet Athenian*, and C. Mann's *Die Demagogen und das Volk*.¹⁰ Finally, in Chapter Four, 'Demagogues in Old Comedy', we focus in greater depth on the evidence of Old Comedy, a genre whose testimony has greatly influenced subsequent appreciations of demagogy and political leadership generally at Athens.

¹⁰ Connor 1971, Ostwald 1986, Carter 1986, Mann 2007.

1. The Lexicography of Demagogy

Almost all attempts to discuss the changes in political leadership that occurred in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries, including those conducted in antiquity and indeed nearly contemporaneously with the events in question, have been freighted with qualitative and moral evaluations of those changes. Given the negative connotation of ‘demagogy’ in modern languages, one might assume that the word *dēmagōgos* and its derivatives embody this diachronic contamination of analysis with judgment, but upon closer examination it becomes clear that *dēmagōg*- terms were employed in antiquity by a great variety of authors with a surprisingly broad range of connotations, sometimes clearly pejorative, sometimes partisan without a necessarily negative valence, often neutrally as a descriptive term without inherent positive or negative meaning. As I pointed out in the introduction, modern scholarship mirrors this variety of meaning and connotation, and, if such mirroring in some ways can bring scholarship closer to its objects of study, unexamined usage has great potential to confuse and mislead. This is not to say that disentangling the qualitative or moral evaluation from analysis in ancient sources would be desirable or even necessarily possible: for example, Aristotle’s understanding of the political system at Athens is inextricably tied to his moral evaluation of that system. However, when dealing with a subject that must be approached through millennia of ancient and modern biases, it is essential to attempt at least to distinguish the various points of view, so as not to generalize where similarity may not be warranted. Although the two most recent monographs on the subject of evolving Athenian political leadership have taken very different approaches to *dēmagōg*- terminology,¹¹ neither has

¹¹ Connor 1971 deliberately avoids the terms, stating in his preface (xi) that “‘demagogy’ and all its cognates seemed to me, despite their ancient origin and inoffensive etymology, to have become hopelessly

incorporated a systematic evaluation of the use of that terminology in antiquity. In fact, encompassing evaluation of the ancient lexicography is nearly entirely absent from Anglophone scholarship, and investigation has mostly been carried out in a relatively piecemeal fashion.¹²

In this chapter I shall conduct a comprehensive analysis of the use of *dēmagōg*-terminology in antiquity in an effort to better understand and characterize how the usage and connotation of the terms varies across different times, authors, and subjects. The starting point will be our extant fifth-century appearances of *dēmagōg*-terms in Aristophanes and Thucydides; with my conclusions from considering those five instances, I shall revise the definitions of Athenian demagogues and demagogy offered by Moses Finley and his predecessors Eduard Meyer and Max Weber. This new definition, which sees demagogues as citizens advising the *dēmos* in its capacity as decision-making body for the πόλις (*polis*) outside of any magistracy or official position,

emotional. I have tried to avoid them by entitling my draft ‘The New Politicians in Ancient Athens’ only to find that the phrase ‘New Politicians’ rapidly became more emotional than the words I had intended.” Mann 2007 takes nearly the opposite tack: not only does he use *dēmagōg*-terminology in his title (*Die Demagogen und das Volk*), it appears well over 300 times in the volume. Mann specifies that for him ‘demagogue’ will essentially be equivalent to ‘politician’, and neither will be associated with evaluations of morality or social status: “Deshalb werden im Folgenden mit der Bezeichnung ‚Demagoge‘ oder ‚Politiker‘ keine Aussagen über den sozialen Status, geschweige denn eine moralische Wertung verbunden; der Begriff wird neutral und allein politisch gebraucht werden” (29). As D.M. Lewis’ review of Connor 1971 pointed out, most of the influential work on the subject of Athenian politicians to that point had been carried out in articles, and such has continued to be the case.

¹² Connor 1971 devotes only two pages (109-110) to *dēmagōgos*. Finley 1962, after brushing off lexicography, claims that “Greek political vocabulary was normally vague and imprecise, apart from formal titles for individual offices or bodies (and often enough not even then)” (5), connects the word ‘demagogue’ to *dēmos*, which for him means the ‘the lower classes’ in literary texts, and concludes that “[w]ith respect to Athens and its democracy, the word ‘demagogue’ understandably became the simplest way of identifying the bad type, and it does not matter in the least whether the word appears in any given text or not” (5). As will (I hope) become clear from my examination, Finley’s conclusions are not in fact supported by the ancient evidence. The investigations into *dēmagōg*-terminology in recent scholarship are Lossau 1969, Zoepffel 1974, Canfora 1993, and Deininger 2002. Of these, Canfora and Deininger devote significant attention to the afterlife of “demagogue” terminology in modern language literature and scholarship, and even Connor spends a noticeable portion of his section on “*Demagogos*” speaking about the word’s adoption into English. Although here I shall restrict myself to the ancient uses and connotations of “demagogy”, a thorough and consolidated examination of the use of the terms in modern literature and scholarship with an eye to the cross-contamination that this can cause between modern and ancient events and prejudices is much to be desired.

will then be applied to and tested against the other fourth-century uses of *dēmagōg*-terminology; it will be shown that while Xenophon more or less matches the usage of Thucydides and the orators the usage of Aristophanes, Aristotle brings a new, decidedly anti-democratic theoretical construction to bear on demagogy. I conclude with a brief examination of the afterlife of Aristotle's new meaning for *dēmagōg*-terminology, which is found to have had a greater influence on modern thought than ancient, and with some discussion of Plutarch, who not only frequently uses *dēmagōg*-terms but actively defines demagogy as the use of reason to persuade the people.

1.1. Fifth-Century Usage

The fifth-century sources provide our earliest evidence for *dēmagōg*-terminology, and they present in microcosm many of the issues of interpretation that become more fully visible in later authors. There are four lemmata into which *dēmagōg*-terminology is divided: the noun *δημαγωγός* (*dēmagōgos*), the abstract noun *δημαγωγία* (*dēmagōgia*), the verb *δημαγωγεῖν* (*dēmagōgein*), and the adjective *δημαγωγικός* (*dēmagōgikos*). Incredibly, the five surviving fifth-century appearances of *dēmagōg*-terminology cover all four lemmata, a fact that ensures us that none is a later formation and gives us some confidence in the prevalence of the terms at the time. Our first instance is Aristophanes' use of *dēmagōgia* and *dēmagōgika* in the *Knights* of 424 BCE.¹³ In the *Knights*, two

¹³ Here and in Table 1 I have located both the *Knights* and the *Frogs* of Aristophanes chronologically prior to Thucydides. With respect to the *Knights* this should be relatively uncontroversial, as it was performed in 424 BCE and the events regarding which Thucydides employs *dēmagōg*-terminology occur in 425 BCE (4.21) and 411 (8.65). The *Frogs*, on the other hand, was performed in 405 BCE, and so invites some discussion of the vexed question of the unity and composition of Thucydides' *Histories*. To be as brief as possible, the problem facing scholars is that, while Thucydides' clearly shows a knowledge (*e.g.*, in 2.65) of the end of the Peloponnesian War, his narrative breaks off in the middle of 411 BCE, suggesting that we are, in one way or another, dealing with an unfinished work. The question, then, is whether we should attempt to date individual pieces of the *Histories* to different chronological periods, whether on grounds of style or content, or work with it as a unified text. For a recent review of the issue, see Samons 2016, 173-177 (although I do not agree with his conclusions vis-à-vis the differences between Perikles and Kleon). In

downtrodden slaves of one Demos work together with the chorus of *hippeis* to overthrow the slave Paphlagon, who is currently dominating the household.¹⁴ They accomplish this by raising up an even worse slave, a Sausage-Seller to Paphlagon's tanner, to challenge and replace him. The two *dēmagōg*- terms appear within the same scene of the *Knights* (188-193, 211-219), as the first slave attempts to convince the Sausage-Seller to fulfill his destiny:

SAUSAGE SELLER

Look, mister, I'm uneducated except for reading and writing, and I'm damn poor even at those.

FIRST SLAVE

The only thing that hurts you there is that you're only damn poor. No, **political leadership's** no longer a job for a man of education and good character, but for the ignorant and disgusting.

...

SAUSAGE SELLER

The prophecies are flattering, but it's an amazing idea, me being fit to supervise the people.

FIRST SLAVE

Nothing's easier. Just keep doing what you're doing: make a hash of all their affairs and turn it into baloney, and always keep the people on your side by sweetening them with gourmet bons mots. You've got everything else a

this particular instance my conclusions are not affected by rearranging the chronological priority of Thucydides and Aristophanes, and so I will leave the issue there.

¹⁴ Paphlagon is firmly identified with Kleon. On Kleon, Aristophanes, and the *Knights*, see Ehrenberg 1951, Dorey 1956, Edmunds 1987, Lind 1990, Rosenbloom 2002, and Sidwell 2009. The two slave protagonists were firmly identified with the στρατηγοί (*stratēgoi*) Nikias and Demosthenes in antiquity: see ΣAristoph. *Kn.* Arg 3, 1c, 1d; the characters are listed among the *dramatis personae* as Δημοσθένης and Νικίας; indeed, as Henderson 2003b notes, the manuscripts "in fact ignore their nominal status and identify them respectively as Demosthenes and Nikias" (63). Modern scholarship, however, has been less sanguine about this identification. Henderson sums up the controversy nicely: "[t]hough these ancient identifications may be correct, they are hardly authoritative: the hypothesis and scholia to the play show that they do not derive from Aristophanes himself but are inferences drawn (probably first in Alexandria) by aligning allusions in the text with historical information external to it. Such instances are sometimes plausible, sometimes not...and so must be judged solely on their scholarly merits. This was first pointed out by Dindorf in his edition of 1835, and his skepticism was acted upon editorially by Weise in 1842, who in his text identified the slaves only by their dramatic identifications, Οἰκέτης A and Οἰκέτης B. But the slaves' identification is still controversial: while Weise has been followed by most subsequent editors, Green, Merry, Hall/Geldert, Zacher, Rogers, and Sommerstein follow the manuscripts" (Henderson 2003b, 63). The debate about the merits of the identification centers on references to Pylos as well as a variety of comments thought to evoke the recognizable persona of Nikias; for a fuller treatment see Henderson 2003b, with extensive bibliography at 63 n. 3.

demagogue needs: a repulsive voice, low birth, marketplace morals—you’ve got all the ingredients for a political career.¹⁵

As Canfora has recognized, the key to understanding both *dēmagōg-* terms here lies with the first in line 191: here we can see clearly that it is not *dēmagōgia* itself that is bad, but the change that it has undergone.¹⁶ Where once *dēmagōgia* was associated with a man who is μουσικός (*mousikos* - elegant, scholarly) or χρηστός (*khrestos* – literally ‘useful’, but language with a host of social status implications that will be discussed further below) now it is for the ἀμαθής (*amathēs* - unlearned) and βδελυρός (*bdelyros* - loathsome). The οὐ... ἔτ’¹⁷ assures us that what is operating here is the contrast between the ‘good old days’ and the current state of decline, a trope that is common nearly to the point of cliché not only in comedy but in Greek literature generally.¹⁸ The contrast between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ *dēmagōgoi* or *dēmagōgia* will be a recurring theme in this chapter, because it is often the most immediate indicator that the *dēmagōg-* term(s) themselves can be of neutral moral value. Here *dēmagōgia* itself is simply an activity that can (in theory) be practiced by ‘good’ or ‘bad’ people alike,¹⁹ and the implication of the

¹⁵ Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. Greek texts are those in the *TLG*. Trans. here Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 188-193, 211-219: ΑΛ. ἀλλ’, ὦγάθ’, οὐδὲ μουσικὴν ἐπίσταμαι | πλὴν γραμμάτων, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι κακὰ κακῶς. | Α. τουτί σε μόνον ἔβλαπεν, ὅτι καὶ κακὰ κακῶς. | ἡ **δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ** | **ἔτ’ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς** οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους, | ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀμαθὴ καὶ βδελυρόν. | ... | ΑΛ. τὰ μὲν λόγι’ αἰκάλλει με· θαυμάζω δ’ ὅπως | τὸν δῆμον οἶός τ’ ἐπιτροπεύειν εἴμ’ ἐγώ. | Α. φαυλότατον ἔργον· ταῦθ’ ἄπερ ποιεῖς ποιεῖ | τάραττε καὶ χόρδεν’ ὁμοῦ τὰ πράγματα | ἅπαντα, καὶ τὸν δῆμον αἰεὶ προσποιοῦ | ὑπογλυκαίνων ῥηματίοις μαγειρικοῖς. | **τὰ δ’ ἄλλα σοι πρόσεστι δημαγωγικά**, | φωνὴ μιὰ, γέγονας κακῶς, ἀγόραιοις εἰ | ἔχεις ἅπαντα πρὸς πολιτείαν ἃ δεῖ.

¹⁶ Canfora 1993, 10-12.

¹⁷ Lossau 1969, 88 n. 38 either misinterprets the meaning of οὐ...ἔτ’ or fails to recognize that the existence (or even predominance) of ‘bad’ *dēmagōgia* or *dēmagōgoi* in the present does not guarantee a negative connotation for the terms themselves. The phrase “kids these days”, often uttered in exasperation and rarely in admiration, does not make of ‘kids’ a pejorative term.

¹⁸ At the dénouement of the *Knights* the Sausage-Seller returns Demos to his ‘former glory’: “He’s as he was when his messmates were Aristeides and Miltiades. You’ll soon see for yourselves: that’s the sound of the Propylaea being opened. Now raise a cheer for the reappearance of the Athens of old, wonderful and celebrated in so many songs, home of the renowned Demos!” (*Knights* 1325-8). On the *topos* of a diminished present as compared to a glorious past, cf. briefly Hesiod *Works and Days* 109-201 (the ‘Ages of Man’), Hom. *Il.* 1.259-272 (Nestor on the greatness of earlier generations).

¹⁹ “Qui c’è dunque una identificazione tra *demagogia* e *attività politica*” Canfora 1993, 11.

scene should surely be that it is preposterous that the *dēmagōgia* is for ‘bad’ rather than ‘good’ nowadays. We shall return below to further consider the aspects that here (and elsewhere) differentiate ‘good’ and ‘bad’ *dēmagōgoi* and *dēmagōgia*.²⁰

The use of *dēmagōgia* in line 191 not only acts as the key for properly interpreting *dēmagōgika* at line 217, it also allows the latter passage to serve as a critical example of the danger of placing too much emphasis upon a single instance of *dēmagōg-*terminology, even potentially one with more than fragmentary context. Knowing the plot of the *Knights* and looking at ll. 211-219 without the benefit of ll. 188-193, we would be nearly compelled to conclude that *dēmagōgika* has a decidedly negative valence. The ‘*dēmagōgikos* things’ are a *phōnē miara* (repulsive voice), *gegonas kakōs* (poor birth), and being *agoraios* (a market-dweller/worker): *miara*, *kakōs*, and *agoraios* all have built-in negative value judgments (although such judgment is less pronounced for *agoraios*), and the natural conclusion, even for a comedic passage, would be that *dēmagōgika* should likewise be understood to have a negative moral value. Without 188-193 we would only be saved from such a faulty conclusion by line 219: ἔχεις ἅπαντα πρὸς πολιτείαν ὃ δεῖ. By the same logic with which we attributed a negative valence to *dēmagōgika* we would have to attribute a negative valence to *politeian*, and as far as I am aware no one has attempted to argue that *polit-* terms could be negative in a specific author or work. We must, therefore, always take great care when examining a passage to identify other Greek terms equated with *dēmagōg-*terminology, and we must generally be wary of assigning a ‘usual’ valence for *dēmagōg-*terminology to an author or work on the basis of an individual passage.

²⁰ On ‘good’ demagogues see pp. 52-57 below, and on ‘bad’ demagogues see section 1.5 on Aristotle’s *Politics*.

The final Aristophanic passage is *Frogs* 416-421:

Chorus: So what say we get together | and ridicule Arkhedemos? | At seven he still hadn't cut his kinsdom teeth, | but now **he's a leading politician** | among the stiffes above, | And holds the local record for rascality.²¹

The nominal protagonist of the *Frogs* is Dionysus, who, with some help from Heracles and his slave Xanthias, makes his way to the underworld to retrieve his favorite tragedian, Euripides, who has recently died. While there he is roped in to judging a contest between Aeschylus and Euripides for the underworld “Chair of Tragedy”, and, after deciding in favor of Aeschylus, is permitted to return to Athens with the great tragedian. Our passage is spoken by a chorus of initiates shortly after Dionysus has arrived in the underworld, and, as is not infrequently the case with Aristophanic choral odes, it directly comments upon contemporary political leaders (in this case Arkhedemos, one of the prosecutors from the Arginousai trial: Xen. *Hell.* 1.7). Although one could argue for a negative connotation for *dēmagōgei* here based upon the assertion in line 421 that Arkhedemos is ‘tops in wickedness’ (κάστιν τὰ πρῶτα τῆς ἐκεῖ μοχθηρίας), it is more likely that *dēmagōgei* is meant to highlight the contrast between Arkhedemos’ childhood, wherein he was not fit even to join the *dēmos* by virtue of his illegitimacy or foreignness,²² and the present, where he has not only joined but leads the *dēmos*. This is supported by the νυνὶ δὲ of line 419, which indicates a direct opposition between lines 418 (ὅς ἐπτέτης ὦν οὐκ ἔφυσσε φράτερας) and 419 (νυνὶ δὲ δημαγωγεῖ). As *Suda* s.v.

²¹ Trans. Henderson Vol. 4. Aristoph. *Frogs* 416-421: βούλεσθε δῆτα κοινῇ | σκώψωμεν Ἀρχέδημον; | ὅς ἐπτέτης ὦν οὐκ ἔφυσσε φράτερας, | νυνὶ δὲ δημαγωγεῖ | ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσι, | κάστιν τὰ πρῶτα τῆς ἐκεῖ μοχθηρίας.

²² The charge cast at Arkhedemos in *Frogs* 418 is that he was illegitimate or a foreigner, as is explained in Tzetzes’ commentary *ad loc.* and in *Suda* φ 692. Tzetzes notes that “Arkhedemos being a foreigner would not have been enrolled as a citizen in Athens” (Ἀρχέδημος ξένος ὦν οὐδὲ κἂν ἐπολιτογραφήθη ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις) and the *Suda* entry s.v. Φραστήρες explains that Aristophanes “is saying that [Arkhedemos] grew up without having been able to be enrolled into the citizen-body” (λέγει οὖν, ὅτι χρονίσας ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις οὐκ ἠδυνήθη ἀναγραφῆναι εἰς τοὺς πολίτας). Cf. Dover 1993’s comment *ad loc.* (p. 248). For the aspect of foreignness in the abuse of demagogues in Old Comedy, see section 4.1 below, and especially pp. 211-212.

Φραστῆρες points out, the μοχθηρίας (“wickedness”) at the end of the line stands where, from the previous lines, one might expect πολιτείας ἢ δημαγωγίας (“politics or demagoguery”). The situation here, then, is nearly identical to that in *Knights*: in the present (νυνὶ) an obviously unworthy person ‘acts as a demagogue’ (δημαγωγεῖ) and does terrible things (τὰ πρῶτα τῆς μοχθηρίας).²³ Arkhedemos is ‘bad’, but it is precisely this badness that makes it *ridiculous* that he *dēmagōgei*. Furthermore, in the *Suda* entry we have either a confirmation that *politeian* and *dēmagōgia* should be identified or that a late reader picked up on the identity established at *Knights* 219 and applied it here.

Of the three appearances of *dēmagōg-* terminology in Aristophanes, none clearly has a negative meaning. In fact, it is possible to go even a step further and suggest that a positive expected valence to the terminology is what sharpens Aristophanes’ jokes: the *dēmagōgia* *should be* for the *mousikos* and *khrestos* man; it is preposterous that the *dēmagōgikos* necessities should include a *phōnē miara* and *gegonas kakōs*, or that a vile non-citizen should *dēmagōgei* in Athens (echoed by the topsy-turvy-ness of the ‘corpses above’ – τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσι²⁴). Ironically, although Lossau suggests just such a

²³ The introduction to the *Frogs* in Henderson vol. 4 notes that “*Frogs* embraces two transcendent issues, the decline of Athens as a great power and the decline of tragedy as a great form of art, and connects them by portraying tragic poets as both exemplifying and shaping the moral and civic character of their times” (5). That the juxtaposition of the ‘good old days’ and the ‘diminished present’ is again a major theme here is not a surprise (cf. n. 18 above), but it does lend support to my interpretation of νυνὶ δὲ δημαγωγεῖ.

²⁴ The phrase δημαγωγεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσι can be interpreted in several ways, and indeed has been in the various commentaries on the *Frogs*. Both Stanford 1958 (111) and Dover 1993 (248), probably understanding ‘among the corpses above’ to broadly indicate ‘the living’ or perhaps ‘the living Athenians’, see the kind of humorous reversal of perspective which I have deemed ‘topsy-turvy-ness’: the dead think of the living as corpses just as the living think of the dead thus. Radermacher 1967 (rev. Kraus) notes that such a reversal would be “kein Kompliment für die Lebenden” (204); for him, then, *nekroisi* represents a more pointed comment but is still aimed rather generally at ‘the living’. Sommerstein 1996b picks up Radermacher’s interpretation, suggesting that “*nekroi* ‘dead men, corpses’ could be used to mean ‘stupid clods’, as Strepsiades in *Clouds* 1202-3 calls those without the advantage of a sophistic education ‘stones’, ‘sheep’ and ‘a heap of earthenware jars’” (194). Although I certainly would not rule out that *nekroi* was meant to indicate stupidity among the living, Sommerstein misses the point that Strepsiades is neither a stone, nor a sheep, nor a heap of earthenware jars: it is important to bear in mind that the chorus of initiates who speak the phrase ‘ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσι’ live in the underworld, and are thus *nekroi* themselves, which should almost certainly be considered central to the joke here. In the case that we do interpret *nekroi* as

juxtaposition of positive expectation and negative present reality informs the instances of *prostatēs* in Aristophanes, he concludes that the lack of positive expectations explains the relative scarcity of *dēmagōgos* in comparison.²⁵ Of course, *dēmagōgos* only seems significantly scarcer than *prostatēs* when one ignores the other *dēmagōg*- derivatives: with those included we have three *dēmagōg*- terms to five instances of *prostatēs*.²⁶ To be fair to Lossau, if there is a disparity that calls out for explanation, it is not between *dēmagōg*- terminology and *prostat*- terminology, but between *dēmagōgos* and *prostatēs*.²⁷ However, I would argue that it is more interesting and revealing that five of the seven *prostat*- terms that appear in Aristophanes are appearances of the simple word *prostatēs* while none of the three *dēmagōg*- terms are *dēmagōgos*. Although this speaks partly to the greater historical depth of *prostatēs*, especially in the fifth century, it also exemplifies the advantage in flexibility that *dēmagōg*- terminology presents: the latter can convey the full weight of the phrase *prostatēs tou dēmou* within a single word,

indicating stupidity, it is worth considering the possibility that ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσι refers to the group *with whom* Arkhedemos ‘demagogues’, *i.e.*, that we should construe it more narrowly as pointing not to all of the living, or all of the Athenians, but the current group of Athenian democratic politicians. To my mind the major thrust of the joke should be the chorus of corpses in the underworld calling the living ‘*nekroi* above’, perhaps while winkingly breaking the fourth wall (to use a modern term); a subtext of criticism towards current democratic politicians, however, would not be amiss, nor, for our purposes, would it indicate that the act of *dēmagōgein* itself was a ‘bad’ thing.

²⁵ Lossau 1969, 85: “Frei von solchen oder ähnlichen Assoziationen, musste der Ausdruck δημαγωγός von vornherein auf das Negative festlegen, wie der Gebrauch der freilich weniger verbindlichen Derivata andeutet.”

²⁶ This latter number increases to seven if we include the broader scope of *prostat*- terminology (see n. 27 immediately below), but even so the difference can hardly support the weight of Lossau’s argument.

²⁷ It is more difficult to clearly delimit *prostat*- terminology than *dēmagōg*- terminology, because the former is based in particular uses and meanings of the general-use verb ποίιστημι. To keep the present inquiry within manageable boundaries, *prostat*- terminology is here defined as the lemmata προστάτης, προστατεία, προστασία, προστατεῖν, προστατεύειν, and προστατικός, as well as appearances of the verb ποίιστημι in conjunction with the noun δημός.

permitting retention of meaning more easily across transformations from noun to verb, adjective, or abstract noun.²⁸

As we turn to the other fifth-century author to use *dēmagōg*-terminology, Thucydides, it is worth taking a moment to discuss one of the important differences between the works of Thucydides and of Aristophanes. The difference I want to emphasize is that between ‘public’ and ‘private’ works set out best by Dover:

The first and most obvious distinction to be made is between (a) what is composed for public delivery, eliciting immediate praise or blame from an audience not of the author’s choosing, and (b) what is meant to be read at leisure by such individuals as may be interested, is most likely to be read by those who are (in the broadest sense) in sympathy with the author, and can be put aside at any moment by a reader who does not like it. History, philosophy, science and essays belong to the latter class, oratory and drama to the former. The significance of this differentiation may be illustrated by the fact that Xenophon can refer (*Hell.* vii.3.4) to the opposing sides in civil strife at Sikyon as ‘the best men’ and ‘the people’; that contrast is inconceivable in a speech addressed to a democratic assembly or jury in Xenophon’s own day, but Xenophon’s standpoint is close to that of the oligarch Theramenes, whom he represents as contrasting (*Hell.* ii.3.39) ‘opposition to the people’ with ‘opposition to good men’. Similarly, Thucydides on one occasion (viii.64.5) describes the forcible replacement of democracy by oligarchy as an attainment of ‘sensible government’.²⁹

This distinction will be important to keep in mind not only for our consideration of Thucydides and Aristophanes, but as we progress into the fourth century and beyond. Although ‘public’ and ‘private’ sources may certainly present the same valences for our *dēmagōg*-terminology, we should be less surprised to find differences across the categories than within them (and, conversely, we should be particularly sensitive to differences within the categories). Furthermore, we should bear in mind that, of the two categories, the ‘public’ category is far more likely to give us some insight into the usage

²⁸ Although only in one of the five instances in Aristophanes does *prostatēs* appear as part of the full phrase *prostatēs tou dēmou*, that this phrase lurks behind the naked term *prostatēs* draws support from Thucydides, for whom all six instances of *prostatēs* occur as part of *prostatēs tou dēmou*.

²⁹ Dover 1974, 5.

and connotations of *dēmagōg-* (or any other) terminology within the almost-entirely-lost realm of ‘popular speech’ than the ‘private’ category. Oratory and drama (for us comedy, since surviving tragedy eschews *dēmagōg-* terminology) provide the best information about what a word would mean if spoken to a general audience of Athenians with immediate stakes riding on the successfulness of the communication (*i.e.*, both oratory and drama took place within agonistic, competitive contexts).

Dēmagōg- terminology appears twice in Thucydides, at 4.21 and 8.65, the former of which is the first surviving instance of the noun *dēmagōgos*:

Such were the words of the Lakedaimonians, their idea being that the Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, thought that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to make it, and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage them in this policy was Kleon, son of Kleainetos, a **popular leader** of the time and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to answer as follows: First, the men in the island must surrender themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens. Next; the Lakedaimonians must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Akhaia, all places acquired not by arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded by Athens herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more necessary to her than at present. This done they might take back their men, and make a truce for as long as both parties might agree.³⁰

Only a slight basis exists both in 4.21 and in 8.65 for making a determination about the connotation(s) of the *dēmagōg-* terms employed by Thucydides. Here for example we are told only that Kleon is ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὃν καὶ τῷ πλήθει

³⁰ Trans. *Landmark*. Thuc. 4.21: Οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοσαῦτα εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιουμένων κωλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένους δέξεσθαι τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδώσειν. οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ἤδη σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον ἐτοίμους εἶναι, ὅποταν βούλωνται ποιῆσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὠρέγοντο. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνήγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὃν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος· καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς χρή τὰ μὲν ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ παραδόντας πρῶτον κομισθῆναι Ἀθήναζε, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἀποδόντας Λακεδαιμονίους Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγάς καὶ Τροιζήνα καὶ Ἀχαΐαν, ἃ οὐ πολέμῳ ἔλαβον, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας συμβάσεως Ἀθηναίων συγχωρησάντων κατὰ ζυμφορὰς καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε δεομένων τι μᾶλλον σπονδῶν, κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ὅποσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον ἀμφοτέροις.

πιθανώτατος. As has often been pointed out in scholarship, Thucydides has a very clearly negative opinion of Kleon.³¹ For Lossau, this negative opinion, along with the greater context of the passage, the scarcity of the term in Thucydides, and the collocation *anēr dēmagōgos* combine to provide proof of the negative valence of *dēmagōgos*.³² The first step in evaluating the valence of *dēmagōgos* in this passage, then, will be clearing the ground of Lossau's conclusion (some of which work has already been undertaken by Canfora).

We can set aside Thucydides' opinion of Kleon and the larger context of the passage as Lossau interprets it: it is clear enough that Thucydides approves neither of Kleon nor of his advice against making peace, but such a conclusion does not guarantee that a reference to Kleon as an *anēr dēmagōgos* is inherently negative.³³ If we follow the

³¹ Most famously expressed by Woodhead 1960; for a more recent discussion cf. Spence 1995.

³² Lossau 1969, 87: "Es sind vier Indizien, die, jedes für sich betrachtet, gewiss zu schwach wären, in ihrer Summe und einander ergänzend aber δημαγωγός als pejoratives Wort erkennen lassen: Die Singularität, der Kontext, Thukydides' allgemein unfreundliche Haltung gegen Kleon und das geprägte Syntagma ἀνὴρ δημαγωγός."

³³ Lossau's argument that Thucydides lays the blame for rejecting the Spartan peace offer on Kleon instead of the Athenians is unconvincing ("Mit dem derart insinuierten Unrecht eigentlich belastet ist allein Kleon. Die Athener lehnen ab, aber nur deshalb, weil jener dazu treibt, der nicht einfach nur τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος ist, sondern dazu Demagoge genannt wird," 87). Samons 2016 has made a compelling argument for belligerence and ambition as defining traits of the Athenian people; traits which, if Athenian leaders did make use of them, they did not create or bear sole responsibility for. Our passage fits this interpretation perfectly: Thucydides never suggests that the Spartans are correct in their assumption that the Athenians were eager to make peace (νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν); to the contrary, his οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς... ἤδη σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον ἐτοίμους εἶναι, ὁπόταν βούλωνται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὥρεγοντο shows that the Athenians themselves saw the situation as disadvantageous for them to make peace. That such an assessment of the situation was in fact correct draws support from the Spartans' own speech in favor of the treaty (4.19.2: νομιζομέν τε τὰς μεγάλας ἔχθρας μάλιστ' ἂν διαλύεσθαι βεβαίως, οὐκ ἦν ἀνταμυνόμενός τις καὶ ἐπικρατήσας τὰ πλείω τοῦ πολέμου κατ' ἀνάγκην ὅρκους ἐγκαταλαμβάνων μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ζυμβῇ, ἀλλ' ἦν παρὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι πρὸς τὸ ἐπικεκός καὶ ἀρετῇ αὐτὸν νικήσας παρὰ ἃ προσεδέχετο μετρίως ζυναλλαγῇ. Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings, conquers his rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate conditions than he expected. Trans. *Landmark*.) Kleon may have urged on the Athenians in their opinion (ἐνῆγε), but he did not create it. The phrase καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι ὥς should mean that everything following was the official response to the Spartan embassy suggested, moved, or formulated by Kleon, but *confirmed by the Athenian dēmos*. After all, at 4.22 Kleon reacts violently to the Spartan suggestion that negotiations *not* be carried out in the assembly. The Athenians bear every bit as

pattern established in Aristophanes, Kleon could be a ‘bad’, ‘modern’ demagogue, but we lack the comparison to earlier ‘good’ demagogues/demagogy that would confirm such an interpretation.³⁴ Arguments from the rarity of the word *dēmagōgos* also carry little weight. First and foremost, we can only speculate about the reason why an author uses or avoids a particular term, and the speculation here is circular: Thucydides avoids the term *dēmagōgos* because only Kleon was vile enough to merit it,³⁵ and in turn *dēmagōgos* is pejorative because Thucydides avoids it. We are left simply with the connection of *dēmagōgos* to Kleon again. Second, both Plato and Aristotle are actively hostile to many democratic politicians, and *dēmagōg*-terminology appears 39 times in the *Politics* alone, but *never* in the Platonic corpus; if two related authors with similar positions on the field of reference within which *dēmagōg*-terminology operates can take such diametrically opposed approaches to the actual deployment of that terminology, it is surely risky in the extreme to assume Thucydides’ opinion about that terminology from his modest usage of it.³⁶

much blame as Kleon for their refusal to make peace, although Kleon’s subsequent success on Pylos would seem to vindicate both parties. In a forthcoming publication T. Figueira (Forthcoming A) highlights the difficulty of assessing Athenian decisions about peace in the 420s: the choice not to make peace either in 425 or after the capture of the Spartiates in Pylos makes sense insofar as the Spartans could offer very little in the context of a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, while the Athenians had as important bargaining chips both the Spartiate prisoners and the staging areas for raiding in Pylos, Kythera, and Malea. Subsequent losses at Delion and Amphipolis meant that a return to the *status quo ante bellum* with the Peace of Nikias appeared, in hindsight, inferior to a decision to make such a peace in 424 would have been, but these losses do not necessarily indicate that the decision was wrong when it was made: had the Athenians made different tactical choices and been victorious at Delion and Amphipolis, constant *lēisteia* (raiding) might well have worn the Spartans down and led to quite a different conclusion to the Archidamian War.

³⁴ Recall, however, that we would be in exactly such a situation for *Knights* 211-219 without *Knights* 188-193.

³⁵ Lossau 1969, 87: “Kleon bleibt der Einzige, den Thukydides des ‚Titels‘ δημαγωγός würdig hält.”

³⁶ As was the case with Aristophanes, the ‘scarcity’ of *dēmagōg*-terminology has been exaggerated. Thucydides has two instances, as compared to twelve of *prostatēs* terminology (for the definition of which in the present study see n. 27 above): compared to most other authors before Diodorus Siculus (with the obvious exception of Aristotle), this is a fairly normal proportion of usage. The ratio of *dēmagōg*-terms to *prostat*-terms for Isocrates is 8/9; Xenophon 3/45; Lysias 2/5; Plato 0/16; Demosthenes 2/10; Aeschines 3/3; Hypereides 2/4; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 7/10; Aristotle 42/9; Theopompus 8/5; Dinarchus 5/2;

As for the phrase *anēr dēmagōgos*, both Lossau and Canfora suggest *anēr stratēgos* as an apt comparison: “[i]nducono a pensarlo sia l’indicazione di tempo (“in quel periodo”) sia il nesso (*anēr demagogòs*) equivalente per esempio ad *anēr strategòs* (Tucidide, I, 74, 1) che significa ‘persona in carica come stratego’.”³⁷ This equivalency is, however, unnecessary. Thucydides frequently uses *anēr* in apposition to a named (and often recently introduced) figure to provide more information about that figure.³⁸ Although this information often comes in the more grammatically comfortable form of an adjectival clause describing *anēr*,³⁹ it is not unusual for Thucydides to add yet another noun to the appositional chain. Working only with the nominative *anēr*, both to keep the parallel as close as possible and for the sake of expediency, this phenomenon occurs three times with the noun *Spartiatēs* and once with *politēs*.⁴⁰ The phrase *anēr stratēgos* in all cases appears only twice in Thucydides (1.74 and 8.98), fewer times than *anēr Spartiatēs* in the nominative alone, much less in all cases (eleven appearances); in classical authors forms of *anēr stratēgos* appear only twelve times in total, five of which are in Xenophon, suggesting that he may have had a special affinity for the phrase.⁴¹ It is thus unlikely that the phrase *anēr dēmagōgos* in Thucydides was meant to bring the phrase *anēr stratēgos* to mind for the reader, and thence indicate a juxtaposition with Kleon’s later failure at Amphipolis. There is also no reason to think that *anēr dēmagōgos* is particularly

Theophrastus 1/3; Polybius 4/59. Clearly if there are authors particularly worthy of remark, they are Plato, Xenophon, and Polybius: not Thucydides and Aristophanes.

³⁷ Canfora 1993, 10; cf. Lossau 1969, 86-87. Canfora, however, (rightly) rejects Lossau’s notion that ἀνὴρ δημαγωγός is an ironic coinage alluding to a non-existent office: “è probabilmente una sovrainterpretazione testuale suggerire che il sintagma *anēr demagogòs* sia un conio ironico su *anēr strategòs* in quanto allusivo ‘ad una carica inesistente’” (10).

³⁸ For the nominative (ἀνὴρ) alone 17 of the 28 instances in Thucydides fit this pattern.

³⁹ E.g., Thuc. 1.79.2: Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνεπὶς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων. (Arkhidamos their king, a man seeming to be both wise and moderate.)

⁴⁰ *Spartiatēs*: 2.25.2, 8.61.1, 8.99.1; *politēs*: 6.54.2.

⁴¹ Aesch. Ag. 1627; Thuc. 1.74, 8.98; Hdt. 5.111; Andoc. 3.34; Xen. *Anab.* 2.1.9, 3.1.34, 3.2.2, 6.5.9, *Ages.* 3.5.7; Lys. 13.79; Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 229.

indicative of a ‘formal role’.⁴² Rather, *anēr* alerts the reader to expect new details about the preceding person, and those details can take the form of an adjective,⁴³ a noun,⁴⁴ an entire clause, or some combination thereof.⁴⁵ The phrase Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον should not be considered more unusual for the inclusion of the noun *dēmagōgos* than the phrase Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων (Perikles son of Xanthippos, a man foremost of the Athenians at that time) is for glossing its subject as *prōtos Athēnaiōn* rather than *dēmagōgos*.⁴⁶

So what can we ultimately conclude about the valence of *dēmagōgos* in 4.21? Not very much, I think. It is not enough that the term is applied to a person about whom the author holds a negative opinion: we have seen with Aristophanes and will see frequently in later authors that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people (or practices) alike can be described with *dēmagōg*-terminology. That Kleon is also described in the same phrase as being τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος (most persuasive to the many) provides two potential hints. First, the use of τῷ πλήθει suggests that Thucydides may be thinking of the narrow, partisan⁴⁷ sense of *dēmos* as the ‘commoners’ when he utilizes the related term *dēmagōgos*.⁴⁸ Second, πιθανώτατος may also be suggestive of partisan connotations to our passage. The

⁴² Cf. Canfora 1993, 10: “L’espressione adoperata (‘Cleone che in quel periodo era *anēr demagogos*’) fa quasi pensare ad un ruolo formale.”

⁴³ E.g., 3.29.2: Τευτίαπλος ἀνὴρ Ἡλεῖος. (Teutiaplos, an Eleian man.)

⁴⁴ Cf. n.40 above.

⁴⁵ E.g., 8.90.1: Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ. (Aristarkhos, a man among them especially and to the greatest extent opposed to the *dēmos*.)

⁴⁶ Thuc. 1.139.4. Note the identical time indicator κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον in both phrases.

⁴⁷ The term ‘partisan’ is potentially problematic given its previous use in scholarship to describe politics at Athens as adhering to a sort of party structure (for Connor on this issue, see pp. 165-167 below). By ‘partisan’ I do not mean to suggest that there were coherent, persistent oligarchic and democratic parties at Athens; rather, by it I indicate that the use of the *dēmagōg*-term involves societal polemic, such as that against the *plēthos* at Athens or the plebs at Rome. That is to say, a ‘partisan’ use of *dēmagōg*-terms defines and demarcates separate groups within Athens, aligning the ‘demagogue’ with one particular group.

⁴⁸ On the relationship between *dēmos* and *dēmagōgos* see Connor 109-110 n.4, as well as my n. 12 above and section 1.2 below.

adjective *πιθανός*, -ή, -όν appears only three times in Thucydides, always in the superlative. Twice it is applied to Kleon: once here and once upon his introduction at 3.36, where he is referred to as *τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος* (and [he was] at that time extremely persuasive with the *dēmos*). In its other appearance it is applied to Athenagoras of Syracuse, who is described as *δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς* (a *prostatēs tou demou* and at that time very persuasive towards the many).⁴⁹ In Thucydides, then, *πιθανώτατος* is associated with two staunchly democratic politicians, and is twice coupled with a literal term for the ‘many’ (*τῷ πλήθει* in 4.21 and *τοῖς πολλοῖς* in 6.35), which suggests that the *τῷ δήμῳ* at 3.36 should be interpreted in the partisan sense parallel to the other instances. Without a particularly positive or negative valence for *dēmagōgos* in 4.21,⁵⁰ let us simply settle for a partisan usage (*i.e.*, one in which *dēmagōg-* terminology would automatically align the figure to which it is applied with views popular with the mass of citizens in a democracy).

The second appearance of a *dēmagōg-* term in Thucydides comes at 8.65:

Peisander and his colleagues on their voyage along shore abolished, as had been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some heavy infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to Athens. Here they found most of the

⁴⁹ Trans. *Landmark*. Thuc. 6.35. The speech preceded by this description includes potent praise of democracy and polemics against oligarchy, and has (clearly deliberate) resonances with speeches by Kleon and Perikles. Cf. *CT* vol. 3, 405: “This section has features in common with earlier, important speeches. (a) Its attention to internal political matters of little obvious relevance to the topic in hand may remind us of the extended opening salvo which Kleon, now speaking ‘right out of context’ (Andrewes, vol. I of this comm. p. 424), fires at the Athenians at 3.38, the Mytilene Debate. (b) The praise of democracy recalls, but is more elaborate and less guarded than, that of Perikles in the Funeral Oration at 2.37 and other passages (in particular 6.39.1, the many are best able to judge, κρίναι, a policy, brings to mind the admittedly difficult words at 2.40.2, καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα).”

⁵⁰ As will become clear, I side with Gomme, *HCT* vol. 3, 461, (“δημαγωγός was of course a respectable term at this time”) and Dover 1993, 69 n. 1 (“[t]he English ‘demagogue’ is derogatory, but that is not true of δημαγωγός”) on the connotation of *dēmagōgos* in the fifth century. *Pace CT* vol. 2, 178 (“against Dover’s view that the word was not derogatory see Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 7”) a single negative instance of *dēmagōgos* (which I in fact dispute below at pp. 51-52) from Xenophon does not outweigh the evidence of Lysias and Aristophanes presented by Dover.

work already done by their associates. Some of the younger men had banded together, and secretly assassinated one Androkles, the chief leader of the commons, and mainly responsible for banishing Alkibiades; Androkles being singled out both because he was a **popular leader**, and because they sought by his death to recommend themselves to Alkibiades, who was, as they supposed, to be recalled, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. There were also some other obnoxious persons whom they secretly did away with in the same manner. Meanwhile their cry in public was that no pay should be given except to persons serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand should share in the government, and those such as were most able to serve the state in person and in purse.⁵¹

This time instead of *dēmagōgos* we have the abstract noun *dēmagōgia* (a form that also appeared in Aristophanes *Knights* 191). As far as the valence of *dēmagōgia*, much less has been said about this passage in scholarship. Lossau mentions it briefly in the context of discussing Thucydides' portrayal of Perikles at 2.65,⁵² the *HCT* twice refers to Androkles as a 'demagogue' but does not discuss the impact of *dēmagōgia*,⁵³ Hornblower

⁵¹ Thuc. 8.65: Οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον παραπλέοντες τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυον, καὶ ἅμα ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν χωρίων καὶ ὀπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσις αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἐταίροις προειργασμένα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀνδροκλέα τέ τινα τοῦ δήμου μάλιστα προεστῶτα ξυστάντες τινὲς τῶν νεωτέρων κρύφα ἀποκτείνουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐξήλασε, καὶ αὐτὸν κατ' ἀμφοτέρα, **τῆς τε δημαγωγίας ἔνεκα** καὶ οἰόμενοι τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ὡς κατιόντι καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρην φίλον ποιήσοντι χαριεῖσθαι, μᾶλλον τι διέφθειραν· καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀνεπιτηδεῖους τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ κρύφα ἀνήλωσαν. λόγος τε ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ προεῖργαστο αὐτοῖς ὡς οὔτε μισθοφορητέον εἶη ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατευομένους οὔτε μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων πλέοσιν ἢ πεντακισχίλοις, καὶ τούτοις οἱ ἂν μάλιστα τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὠφελεῖν οἰοί τε ὦσιν.

⁵² Lossau 1969, 87 argues that Thucydides uses the term *prostasia* at 2.65.11 to describe the same situation to which he applies *dēmagōgia* in 8.65.2, and that he deliberately avoids *dēmagōgia* in 2.65 so that the word will not taint Perikles: "In einem Vorausblick auf die innenpolitischen Verhältnisse während der sizilischen Expedition ist 2,65,11 die Rede vom Ränkespiel Einzelner *περὶ τῆς δήμου προστασίας*. Was 8,65,2 im Bericht unter dem Sommer des Jahres 411, also zwei Jahre nach dem Ausgang eben jener Expedition, *δημαγωγία* genannt werden kann, heisst hier *Prostasia*. Verständlich, nachdem wenige Zeilen zuvor von der Herrschaft des Ersten Mannes gesprochen war und – sei es nur durch eine übereilte Assoziation, die das andere Wort etwa auslöste – auch nicht der Schatten der Demagogie auf Perikles fallen darf." This argument seems odd to me in the extreme. The entire thrust of 2.65.10-12 is to display the inferiority of the politicians who followed Perikles (see pp. 102-109 below); are we to believe that Thucydides weakened his criticism of these later politicians by eschewing the use of a particularly negative word in *dēmagōgia* out of fear that the word would creep out of its immediate context and latch on to Perikles? Additionally, it is unwise to base an argument on Thucydides' choice *not* to use *dēmagōgia* or *prostasia* in a particular passage: *dēmagōgia* appears only once and *prostasia* twice in the *Histories* (cf. n. 36 above).

⁵³ *HCT* vol. 5, 161-162. This section, written by Andrewes, makes no reference to Gomme's assessment of *dēmagōgos* at 4.21.

simply refers the reader to his discussion of 4.21,⁵⁴ and Canfora aligns *dēmagōgia* here with Aristophanes' use at *Knights* 191 as both meaning 'political leadership of the city'.⁵⁵ All that we have to go on in this passage is that a group of youths prepare the way for an oligarchic coup at Athens by targeted political killings, and that one of their victims is Androkles, whom they kill 'on account of the/his *dēmagōgia*' and because he is an opponent of Alkibiades.⁵⁶ It seems to me that there are three possible ways in which *dēmagōgia* could be functioning in this situation: (1) it has a negative moral connotation, *i.e.*, that the youths are killing Androkles because of his 'political wickedness'; (2) it has a neutral/positive connotation in that it simply indicates significant power in the *polis*, and the youths would be killing Androkles because he is a potential rival; (3) its major connotation is partisan, in that it positions Androkles as a supporter of democracy and a leader of the *dēmos*-qua-plebs, all of which would automatically align him opposite the youths and explain the motive for the murder. The first interpretation is problematic on several counts. For one thing, we have seen no indication that *dēmagōgia* meant anything like 'political wickedness' in the fifth century. For another, the other motivation for the killing (οἰόμενοι τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ... χαριεῖσθαι) is pragmatic, not idealistic, and indeed the Athenians on the whole are generally depicted as acting out of pragmatism (even if sometimes misguided pragmatism) in Thucydides.⁵⁷ The strongest argument in favor of

⁵⁴ *CT* vol. 3, 944 (cf. n. 50 above).

⁵⁵ Canfora 1993, 9: "Sia in un caso che nell'altro il termine indica semplicemente la guida politica della città, ovvero il far politica in un ruolo in vista."

⁵⁶ Andrewes in the *HCT* thinks that μᾶλλον τι must be distinguishing between the motives for the murder: "the murder is not a matter of degree, and these words must make a distinction among their reasons; he rated assassination in any case as a demagogue, but his enmity to Alkibiades was a further and stronger motive" (vol. 5, 162).

⁵⁷ Cf. n. 33 above on the Athenian response to the Spartan peace embassy or the speeches of Kleon and Diodotos in the Mytilenean debate (Thuc. 3.37-48). This is not to say that no Athenian was motivated by idealism, but rather that Thucydides prefers to impute intellectual and pragmatic motives to the actors in his *Histories*.

the second interpretation is that, even before his use of the term *dēmagōgia*, Thucydides introduces Androkles as *τινα τοῦ δήμου μάλιστα προεστῶτα*. This description suggests two conclusions for us: first, that *prostasia* and *dēmagōgia* are roughly equivalent for Thucydides;⁵⁸ and second, that Thucydides' primary conception of Androkles was as a leading conventional democratic politician.⁵⁹ The third interpretation also works well, both as an explanatory note and in conjunction with the partisan orientation of the group of youths and their slogans in 8.65; it also fits well with our conclusions about Thuc. 4.21.

For Thucydides in general, then, we have insufficient evidence to establish a moral valence for *dēmagōg*-terminology, whether negative, positive, or neutral, but we can say with some confidence that that terminology had partisan connotations for him that were not detectable in Aristophanes. These partisan connotations could take two possible forms. Either the *dēmagōgos* was a politician who represented the interests of a specific portion of the state, the *dēmos*-qua-commoners, or the *dēmagōgos* was a politician in a democracy who accepted the validity of democracy. In an important way these two forms are merely perceptions of the same phenomenon from differing viewpoints: for a believer in aristocracy, the *aristoi* in an aristocratic state would of course govern in their own best interest, but in doing so would also be making the best decisions possible for the *polis*; similarly, for a believer in democracy a politician could govern in the interest of the *dēmos* and that *dēmos* could represent both the mass of non-elite citizens and the *polis* as a whole without any contradiction. Thucydides' approval of

⁵⁸ This further undermines Lossau's argument about the deliberate use of *prostasia* at Thucydides 2.65.11, on which see n. 52 above.

⁵⁹ Given the nature of Athenian society and politics, anyone as intently engaged in political life as the youths in question must have known Androkles' stance towards the constitutional changes under discussion.

the government of the 5000 at 8.97⁶⁰ may show some reservations about the war-time democracy in its prior form. Do these potential reservations clash with his positive appraisal of Perikles at 2.65? One factor in considering an answer to this question is whether the supremacy of Perikles was somehow a conditioning or reduction of democracy in the eyes of Thucydides. Yet certainly Thucydides could not have been totally without sympathy for a system that produced a Perikles, and after all, Thucydides was himself an active politician in the democracy. Perhaps in the end a cautious agnosticism about Thucydides' view of democracy and thence *dēmagōgia* is the best course.

1.2. Defining *Dēmagōg*- Terminology

Despite the extensive consideration of *dēmagōg*- terms in the fifth century conducted above,⁶¹ I have so far refrained from positing an actual definition of that terminology. However, with our conclusions from the Aristophanic and Thucydidean material in hand, it is worth constructing such a definition to which we can compare later

⁶⁰ Thuc. 8.97: τοῖς πεντακισχίλοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι (εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν ὅποσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται) καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν μηδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ: εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τὰλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες: μετρία γὰρ ἢ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ζυγκρασίς ἐγένετο καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνῆνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. ([They] voted to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of which body all who furnished a suit of armor were to be members, decreeing also that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any office, or if he did should be held accursed. Many other assemblies were held afterwards, in which law-makers were elected and all other measures taken to form a constitution. It was during the first period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time. For the fusion of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head after her manifold disasters. Trans. *Landmark*.)

⁶¹ Three more fifth-century authors are worthy of some mention: Herodotus, Stesimbrotos of Thasos, and the so-called Old Oligarch (henceforth [Xenophon]). Although all three touch upon Athenian politics to some degree, no instances of *dēmagōg*- terminology survive in their respective *corpora* (an absence which is more meaningful for Herodotus and [Xenophon], whose relevant works survive in a state of relative completion, than for Stesimbrotos, for whom we have only very fragmentary evidence). It is not, to my mind, a particularly productive enterprise to speculate about the possible reasons behind the absence of *dēmagōg*- terminology in a given author. It is difficult enough to draw conclusions about an author's opinion of these terms when multiple examples with full context survive that I remain skeptical of the validity of any conclusions based upon a complete lack of evidence. Zoepffel 1974, 75-77 notes the risk in arguments from silence before making a few tentative suggestions about the authors in question.

uses of the terminology. The constituent parts of *dēmagōgos* make it fairly obvious what the most basic, literal meaning of the word ought to be: to ἄγειν (*agein* – lead) the *dēmos*. Aelius Aristeides, responding in the second century CE to a tradition headed by Thucydides 2.65 that would see *dēmagōgoi* as allowing the people to lead them,⁶² enunciates exactly this derivation and adduces the parallel formation of *paidagōgos*: “And therefore they have got this name from them, like any other token, as an evidence of their power, I mean that of demagogues, not because they are led by the peoples, O you who make all things topsy-turvy, but because they lead the peoples; just as, to be sure, we call men pedagogues, not because they are subservient to children, but because they lead them.”⁶³ But ‘leader of the *dēmos*’ is relatively vague; to what specific aspect(s) of leadership should we understand *dēmagōgos* as referring, why did the word develop when and where it did,⁶⁴ and what caused it to have such potentially different meanings in different authors and contexts?

The above observation from Aelius Aristeides raises an important question for the development of *dēmagōg*- terminology: was that terminology formed specifically by analogy to *paidagōg*- terms? If so, we might see *dēmagōgos* as indicating a childlike quality to the *dēmos*, requiring educated guidance and stewardship. It is, of course, generally impossible to answer such etymological questions with certainty, but it seems to me unlikely that the relationship between the two words was so direct. In the *LSJ* I

⁶² Cf. Thuc. 2.65.8: καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἤγε (“[Perikles was enabled...] to lead them instead of being led by them”). For a more extensive discussion of this aspect to Thuc. 2.65 see pp. 107-109 below.

⁶³ Trans. Behr 1981. Ael. Ar. *Orat.* 45 (Jebb 44): καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν διὰ τοῦτο εἰλήφασιν παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀντ’ ἄλλου συμβόλου μαρτύριον τῆς ἐξουσίας, λέγω τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν, οὐκ ἐπειδήπερ ὑπὸ τῶν δήμων ἄγονται, ὥ πάντ’ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποιῶν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τοὺς δήμους ἄγουσιν· ὥσπερ γε δὴ καὶ τοὺς παιδαγωγούς, οἶμαι, καλοῦμεν, οὐκ ἐπειδήπερ ὑποπεπτόκασι τοῖς παισιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἡγοῦνται.

⁶⁴ Zoepfel 1974 notes the *communis opinio* that *dēmagōgos* was coined in the later fifth century; cf. his p. 75 and especially n. 23 (with extensive bibliography).

have counted at least sixty-three different compound words formed with *-agōg-* terms (variously verbs, adjectives, nouns, or combinations thereof).⁶⁵ Of these sixty-three terms, thirty are attested in the third century BCE or earlier, and fourteen of those appear in literary texts in the fifth century or earlier. These fourteen early examples can be divided into two categories based upon the meaning of *agein* being stressed: to lead, or to carry. In the latter category we see adjectives like ἵππαγωγός (horse-carrying, especially in the sense of cavalry transport ships), κοπραγωγός (dung-carrying, a favorite word of Old Comedy), and οἶναγωγός (wine-carrying, another favorite of Old Comedy), as well as others in the same vein. More relevant for our purposes is the former category, in which we find not only *dēmagōgos* and *paidagōgos*, but also ψυχαγωγός (*psukhagōgos*), νυμφαγωγός (*nymphagōgos*), μυσταγωγός (*mustagōgos*), and γερονταγωγέω (*gerontagōgeō*). *Paidagōgos*, *psukhagōgos*, and *gerontagōgeō* all appear at the same time as, or earlier than, the first appearance of *dēmagōg-* terminology in the *Knights* of 424. Variants of *paidagōgos*, *psukhagōgos*, *dēmagōgos*, and *mustagōgos* all appear at least 1,300 times in Greek literature, and although *paidagōg-* terms appear most often (2903 times), *mustagōg-* terms are not far behind (2373). There is simply insufficient evidence to conclude that (a) the *Knights* is the first appearance of *dēmagōg-* terminology, (b) *dēmagōg-* terms were coined on the basis of a specific *-agōg-* compound, rather than

⁶⁵ In the following list, words attested in the third century or earlier are bolded, and those attested in the fifth century are bolded and italicized: ἀγκαλιδαγωγός, αίμαγωγός, ἀρχισυνάγωγος, ἀχυραγωγός, βρονταγωγός, ξεναγωγός, δειγματοκαταγωγός, **δημαγωγός**, δικασταγωγός, δουλαγωγός, **δραπεταγωγός**, ἐλεφανταγωγός, φαλλαγωγία, φλεγμαγωγός, **φορταγωγός**, φυγαγωγός, φυταγωγέω, **φωταγωγός**, **γερονταγωγέω**, **γλευκαγωγός**, γραμματοεισαγωγέας, Ἰακχαγωγός, **ἱεραγωγός**, **ἵππαγωγός**, ἰχθυαγωγός, κλειδαγωγία, **κοπραγωγός**, **κυφαγωγός**, **κυναγωγός**, **λαφυραγωγός**, **λαρκαγωγός**, λιθαγωγός, **μειαγωγός**, **μυριαγωγός**, **μυσταγωγός**, νεκραγωγός, νεκυαγωγός, **νυμφαγωγός**, νωταγωγός, ὀδονταγωγόν, **οἶναγωγός**, **ὄπλιταγωγός**, οὐραγωγός, **ὄχλαγωγός**, **παιδαγωγός**, πομπαγωγία, θεαγωγέω, σιδηραγωγός, **σιταγωγός**, **σκευαγωγός**, **σκληραγωγία**, σκυμναγωγέω, σπονδαγωγός, στολαγωγός, συλαγωγέω, ὕδραγωγός, ὕλαγωγός, ὕμναγωγός, **χαλιναγωγός**, **χειραγωγός**, χολαγωγός, χρεαγωγός, χρηματαγωγός, **ψυχαγωγός**.

simply by applying the *-agōg-* suffix as appears to have been common, and (c) *paidagōgos* was the specific *-agōg-* term upon which *dēmagōgos* was based.

Moving on from what we can say about the creation and early development of *dēmagōg-* terminology, we find an excellent starting point for understanding the terminology's complicated nexus of meanings and its relationship to leadership with Finley's conclusion that "demagogues – I use the word in a neutral sense – were a structural element in the Athenian political system. By this I mean, first, that the system could not function at all without them; second, that the term is equally applicable to all leaders, regardless of class or point of view; and third, that within rather broad limits they are to be judged individually not by their manners or their methods, but by their performance."⁶⁶ Deininger traces this notion of demagogues as a structurally necessary component of democracy from Eduard Meyer to Max Weber, and it is likely that their views influenced those of Finley.⁶⁷ Clearly a formulation like Meyer's "(Es) zeigt sich, dass die attische Demokratie tatsächlich auf eine institution zugeschnitten ist, von der die geschriebene Verfassung nichts weiss: auf die Leitung des Staats durch den vom Vertrauen des Volks auf unbegrenzte Zeit an seine Spitze berufenen Demagogen"⁶⁸ appears to underlie Finley, but the latter makes an important adjustment from this notion of a singular demagogue appointed 'to the head of the state' to the much broader group comprising "everyone, aristocrat or commoner, altruist or self-seeker, able or incompetent, who, in George Grote's phrase, 'stood forward prominently to advise' the Athenians."⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Finley 1962, 19.

⁶⁷ Deininger 2002, 101-103.

⁶⁸ Meyer 1901, 3.579.

⁶⁹ Finley 1962, 16.

This alteration by Finley, from a single persistent personality, lending consistency of policy to the *dēmos*, to a much broader group of those standing forward to give advice may seem small, but it is a critical and potentially overlooked difference. Meyer very explicitly states the necessity of a *single* leading personality:

die vielköpfige Masse wohl über eine ihr vorgelegte Frage durch Stimmenmehrheit die definitive Entscheidung geben kann, aber gänzlich ausserstande ist, aus eigener Initiative zu handeln. Überall bedarf sie des Eingreifens einzelner Persönlichkeiten, um auch nur ihres Willens sich bewusst zu werden...; soll das Staatsschiff nicht ziellos hin- und herschwanken und schliesslich scheitern, soll eine folgerichtige Politik eingehalten werden, so muss die leitende Persönlichkeit dieselbe bleiben.⁷⁰

Although from a modern point of view efficiency is considered a major advantage in smaller circles of control, there is little evidence that the Athenians held such a view. Two examples will serve to demonstrate this disconnect. First we can think of the long held assumption, thoroughly dismantled by Fornara,⁷¹ that there had to be a ‘commander-in-chief’ of the Athenian college of *stratēgoi*. As Fornara shows, despite the modern “*a priori* assumption that no army can be led effectively without a commander-in-chief” (17), the evidence does not support this conclusion, and critically “[u]nity of command in Athens on the highest level, that of continuity of policy, was tightly held in the fist of the *demos*” (18). Second we can turn to the Persian constitutional debate at Herodotus 3.80-83, which, without entering into the vexed subject of how appropriate it might be for its geographical and chronological context, is certainly comprehensible for and aptly fitted to fifth-century Greek politics. Neither Megabyzos, the speaker in favor of oligarchy, nor Darius in favor of monarchy, suggest that a smaller ruling group is necessary because large numbers of people render the decision-making process ungainly. Instead both resort

⁷⁰ Meyer 1901, 3.345.

⁷¹ Fornara 1971.

to class-based language, emphasizing the inherent inferiority of ‘the many’. Megabyzos calls them ἀχρηΐος (*akhrēios* - useless), ἀσύνητος (*asynetos* - witless), and ἀκόλαστος (*akolastos* - undisciplined), and asks “how could someone who has never been educated, who has never seen anything good or decent, be knowledgeable about anything?”⁷² He concludes flatly that “the best men are most likely to make the best decisions.”⁷³ Darius, although slightly more mild, likewise uses simplistic good/bad language: “then again, when the people rule, baseness will always and inevitably be the result.”⁷⁴ To sum up, proponents of democracy, far from being concerned about lack of efficiency created by having minimal persistent leaders, appear to have seen this lack as a feature that prevented the (more dangerous) concentration of power into the hands of an individual; opponents of democracy, meanwhile, were less concerned about organizational efficiency and more concerned about power moving outside of the circle of the societally-approved ‘best people’.

I would like to build on Finley’s conclusions by suggesting that the term *dēmagōgos* was developed to indicate an individual who helped formulate policy and make decisions for the state, although this was not a position that the Athenians had any initial interest in making official. In fact, such a position would run counter to the

⁷² Trans. Godley 1921. Hdt. 3.81: κῶς γὰρ ἂν γινώσκοι δὲ οὗτ’ ἐδιδάχθη οὔτε εἶδε καλὸν οὐδὲν [οὐδ’] οἰκίον. It could be argued that the end of this clause, ‘and it rushes into matters without sense, like a river in winter flood’ (ὥθέει τε ἔμπεσὼν τὰ πρήγματα ἄνευ νόου, χειμάρρῳ ποταμῷ ἕκελος), indicates the recognition of the increased efficiency of smaller groups, inasmuch the *dēmos* is said to be without *noos*, which would thus be an aspect of a political man, and not a political body. However, at both Polybius 6.16.5 and DS 19.101.3 the term *noos* is indeed applied to a body rather than an individual, and in the Diodorus passage it is applied specifically to the *dēmos* itself: ‘And the *dēmos*, with matters progressing according to its intent (*noos*), sent a colony to the island called Pontia’ (ὁ δὲ δῆμος, κατὰ νοὺν τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῷ προχωροῦντων, ἀποικίαν ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον τὴν Ποντίαν καλουμένην). Megabyzus certainly thinks that the *dēmos* acts without proper consideration, but it is in no way clear that this is a result of their numbers rather than their lack of education and inherent excellence.

⁷³ Trans. Godley 1921. Hdt. 3.81: ἀρίστων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἰκὸς ἄριστα βουλευόμενα γίνεσθαι.

⁷⁴ Trans. Godley 1921. Hdt. 3.82: δήμου τε αὖ ἄρχοντος ἀδύνατα μὴ οὐ κακότητα ἐγγίνεσθαι.

strongly held democratic values of the polis.⁷⁵ Thus, the *dēmagōgos* was distinguished by the very absence of any position. It is not, as Weber and Meyer suggested, a position that is ‘illegitimate’ or ‘illegal’ or ‘outside the written constitution’⁷⁶ – for one thing, Athens was not governed by a written constitution in our modern sense,⁷⁷ but more importantly, *dēmagōgos* is not, in fact, a position at all: it is a descriptive term. It is the word for a person who, outside of any deputized or official position, is helping to guide a group’s policy. I do not think it a coincidence that the term seems to have developed specifically within a democracy, or specifically in Athens in the second half of the fifth century. Here Mann, who stresses a newfound disconnect between the aristocratic social order and decision-making processes in the *polis*, has surely gotten it right:⁷⁸ such a descriptive term is unnecessary in a more traditional *polis*, where the *aristoi*, by their very nature, expect and are expected to fulfill such a role.⁷⁹ The *dēmagōgoi* are the *aristoi*, the *chrēstoi*, the *beltistoi*: the latter’s existence as a group is predicated upon attempting to guide both their own, narrow group as well as the larger *polis*. When the group of

⁷⁵ Cf. Fornara 1971, 18: “[t]he Demos had learnt from Marathon, where Miltiades, though the legal subordinate of the polemarch Callimachus, deserved the title of author of victory, that collaboration among equals, and moral leadership rather than legal, were no less effective means of winning battles and imposing unity than pyramidal chain of command. The democratic trend of the Demos, moreover, rendered it antagonistic to a perpetuation of the latter system.”

⁷⁶ Weber 2000, 66 = MWG 1/22-5, 219-220 (“nicht nur nicht legitim, sondern nicht einmal legal”); cf. Meyer 1901, 3.579 at pp. 29-30 above.

⁷⁷ Thus Aristotle at *Pol.* 1319b can refer to the ‘unwritten and written laws’ (νόμους, καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους) to be enacted for the preservation of a constitution, and can speak at 1291b of a deleterious state of affairs in which ‘the decrees of the assembly are master, and not the laws’ (τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος). Pp. 66-72 below present an in-depth discussion of the latter passage.

⁷⁸ Mann 2007, 10-11: “Denn die soziale Ordnung an sich blieb zwar erhalten, nicht aber ihre politische Bedeutung. Während in archaischer Zeit die soziale Ordnung und die Entscheidungsprozesse in der Polis aufs engste miteinander verzahnt waren, wurde, beginnend mit den Reformen des Kleisthenes 508/07, eine eigenständige, von der sozialen Ordnung abstrahierte politische Ordnung geschaffen, in welcher die Volksversammlung das Zentrum der Macht bildete und personale Bindungsverhältnisse vertikaler und horizontaler Natur zumindest auf der institutionellen Oberfläche von der Willensbildung ausgeschlossen waren.”

⁷⁹ This is the argument made by Megabyzus at Hdt. 3.81.

‘guides’ or ‘advisors’ becomes disjoined from the group of ‘*aristoi*’, a term is needed to indicate that advisory position.⁸⁰

We can also, I think, refine Connor’s discussion of the link between the *dēmos* and the *dēmagōgos*:

Demos, as has been pointed out above, is ambiguous. It can be the equivalent of either *populus* or *plebs*. In the mouth of a *chrestos*, then, the word could be used in an adverse sense, ‘the leader of the plebs,’ but the reaction provoked by the word would depend on already existing attitudes toward the *demos*. Thus the ambiguity of the component *demos* makes it difficult to use the word as a ‘smear word,’ except among those who were already ill-disposed to the *demos*. As the century goes on and *demos* comes more and more frequently to be used in the narrower sense, it becomes easier to represent the *demagogos* as a factional leader. (On the development of the word *demos* note the comparative rarity of the sense ‘plebs’ in literature before the late fifth century, and the change that can be detected in Herodotus 1.196.5 and pseudo-Xenophon, *Constitution of Athens* 1.2 et alibi. By the late fifth or early fourth century the word is quite frequently used for the poorer citizenry, e.g. Xenophon’s report of Socrates’ conversation with Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* 4.2.37, or Thucydides 2.65.2.)⁸¹

If I am right about *dēmagōgos* acting specifically as a term to indicate a guide to the *polis* separately from the older terminology tied inextricably to a particular class (*aristoi*, *chrēstoi*, *beltistoi*), the very existence of the term indicates a new political status-quo that is disruptive to, and tends to diminish, that previously-governing class. This would go a long way towards explaining the confusion we see in sources about whether the problem is the very existence of *dēmagōgoi*, or the people who are now filling that position. Anti-democratic theorists like Aristotle and Plato both do and do not have a problem with *dēmagōgoi*: nothing that the *dēmagōgoi* do is any different from the previous interactions

⁸⁰ Mann 2007 connects this splitting off of political power from social order to the Kleisthenic reforms of 508/7, while Zoepffel 1974 (79) places it (or at least has it come to the surface) after the death of Perikles. I discuss ‘break-points’ in Athenian political leadership (and especially the death of Perikles) at greater length in section 2.2 and chapter 3 below; for now the question is not of great importance, and given that we cannot pinpoint the emergence of *dēmagōg*-terminology a more specific connection is out of the question anyway.

⁸¹ Connor 1971, 109-110 n. 34.

within the group of the *khrestoi*⁸² or between the *khrestoi* and the *dēmos*,⁸³ but the very fact that *dēmagōgoi* are not synonymous with the *khrestoi* evokes both the diminished power of the *khrestoi* and the increased power of the *dēmos*, whose ability to choose their leaders (always present, even in an aristocracy, by virtue of the Assembly) is highlighted by the increased pool of leaders from which to choose.

To bring things back around to our fifth-century texts, in Aristophanes we see the ‘popular’ sense of *dēmagōg*-terminology functioning. Theoretically *dēmagōgoi* can be good or bad leaders, and can come from the *khrestoi* or from outside of that group. Either Aristophanes specifically, or more likely Old Comedy generally, is ‘conservative’ enough to evince a distaste for contemporary politicians and a preference for ‘the good old days’, but not anti-democratic enough to suggest that the very existence of *dēmagōgoi* is an unacceptable state of affairs. In Aristophanes we should probably see the *dēmos* of *dēmagōgos* as referring not to οἱ πολλοί, but to the entire citizen body, as it functions in Athenian decrees.⁸⁴ Thucydides may differ in precisely this respect. It is not clear that for him a *dēmagōgos* is a bad thing *per se*, but there is a distinct possibility that he sees the *dēmos* of the term as referring primarily to representation not of the entire *polis* but of the majority of its citizens. This could be an indication of a negative evaluation of *dēmagōgoi* on a moral level, inasmuch as they might engender or accompany *stasis*, but

⁸² Cf. Aristotle *Pol.* 1305b on the dynamics within the Four Hundred or the Thirty.

⁸³ Think, *e.g.*, of Kleisthenes, who probably lost out to Isagoras in the competition for the archontate of 508/7 before “bringing the people into his faction” and initiating his famous reforms without the benefit of any particular magistracy. Hdt. 5.69: ὥς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον πρότερον ἀπωσμένον πάντων τότε πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μοῖραν προσεθήκατο, τὰς φυλάς μετωνόμασε καὶ ἐποίησε πλέονας ἔξ ἑλασσόνων: δέκα τε δὴ φυλάρχους ἀντὶ τεσσέρων ἐποίησε, δέκαχα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένειμε ἐς τὰς φυλάς: ἦν τε τὸν δῆμον προσθήμενος πολλῶ κατῴπερθε τῶν ἀντιστασιωτέων. (When he had drawn into his own party the Athenian people, which was then debarred from all rights, he gave the tribes new names and increased their number, making ten tribe-wardens in place of four, and assigning ten districts to each tribe. When he had won over the people, he was stronger by far than the rival faction. Trans. Godley 1922.)

⁸⁴ As in the ever-present introductory formula ἔδοχεν τῇ βολῇ καὶ τῷ δέμῳ (it was resolved by the council and the people).

[Xenophon]’s *Athenaion Politeia* is clear evidence that contemporary Greeks could condemn aspects of democracy on a moral basis while simultaneously appreciating those (or other) aspects on a more pragmatic level.⁸⁵

1.3. Table of *Dēmagōg*- Usage

With our provisional understanding of the usage and meaning of *dēmagōg*-terminology rooted in its fifth-century origins, it is time to turn to the fourth century and beyond. Including our fifth-century examples, there are 1529 appearances of *dēmagōg*-terminology in Greek: 814 of *dēmagōgos*, 149 of *dēmagōgia*, 533 of *dēmagōgein*, and 33 of *dēmagōgikos*. This is obviously an overwhelming amount of data to consider, and so I have made some restrictions. The latest figure I shall discuss in detail here is Plutarch, and for authors later than the fourth century BCE I shall restrict myself to presenting some conclusions and examining the most critical passages. Table 1, which precedes the following discussion for ease of reference, stops around the end of the second century CE with Athenaeus, who is important for his frequent citation of earlier sources; I have, however, included all appearances in the *Suda* for the same reason. After much deliberation I have decided not to include a systematic evaluation of the 131 appearances of *dēmagōg*-terminology in the scholia to Aeschines, Aristophanes, Demosthenes, Euripides, Hermogenes, Lucian, Plato, and Thucydides. Such a study is much to be desired, but is particularly involved because the scholia are chronologically and authorially varied and so require particular attention to details of manuscript tradition and palaeography; even with this attention, nearly every scholion will have to be treated individually. As a result, such a study is beyond the scope of the current project.

⁸⁵ Cf. Mann 2007, 39-41, esp. “Pseudo-Xenophon hingegen billigt der Demokratie trotz ihrer ästhetisch-moralischen Minderwertigkeit eine hohe Funktionalität zu” (41).

Table 1 lists the instances of *dēmagōg-* terminology, including author, locus, which lemmata appear, any politician(s) to whom the terminology is applied in the passage, and my own assessment of the valence of the terminology in the passage. When multiple terms appear within close proximity in a passage I have often grouped them for convenience; hence, for example, in Aristotle *Pol.* 1305b-1306a *dēmagōgos* occurs once, *dēmagōgia* once, and *dēmagōgein* five times. I have made divisions where a new sense grouping occurs with a different valence for the *dēmagōg-* terminology, as happens within Aristotle *Pol.* 1305a. There are five different evaluations that can appear individually or in combination: Unclear (U), Negative (Ng), Neutral (Nu), Partisan (P), and Military (M). Unclear indicates that there is insufficient information to determine whether the *dēmagōg-* terminology carries a particular moral/aesthetic valence; Negative indicates that the term carries a negative moral/aesthetic valence; Neutral indicates that the term carries a neutral (or positive)⁸⁶ moral/aesthetic valence; Partisan indicates that the term is aligned with a particular faction, namely the many (the *dēmos*, the plebs), and generally against the *aristoi*;⁸⁷ finally Military indicates that the term is used specifically of the interaction between a commander and his troops.⁸⁸ I have also indicated when the *dēmagōg-* terminology appears within direct or indirect (but clear) speech by placing the evaluation within square brackets. For example, when at *Anabasis* 7.6 Xenophon ‘says’

⁸⁶ I have not separately indicated ‘positive’ valence, because it is rare for terms indicating a position of power in Greek to make clear their ‘positive’ valence: it is self-evident. Besides, given the long-standing assumption of the pejorative nature of *dēmagōg-* terminology, it will suffice for now to prove that most instances are *not* negative.

⁸⁷ Partisan never appears by itself: I always indicate whether the context suggests that this partisan usage includes a negative or neutral valence.

⁸⁸ When ‘Military’ is indicated, this almost always has a negative connotation of being an improper way to interact with soldiers. There are, of course, occasional exceptions to this, but they are very much the exception rather than the rule.

that he himself ‘demagogued’ his troops, it is important to know that the term does not simply appear in narrative, but is spoken by the Spartans.

Table 1: Instances and Usage of Demagogue Terminology							
Author	Locus	Dēmagōgos (δημαγωγός)	Dēmagōgikos (δημαγωγικός)	Dēmagōgein (δημαγωγεῖν)	Dēmagōgia (δημαγωγία)	Assessment ⁸⁹	Politician(s)
Aristophanes	<i>Kn.</i> 188-194	0	0	0	1	[Nu]	
Aristophanes	<i>Kn.</i> 211-222	0	1	0	0	[Nu]	
Aristophanes	<i>Frogs</i> 416-430	0	0	1	0	[Nu]	Arkhedemos
Thucydides	4.21	1	0	0	0	U/P	Kleon
Thucydides	8.65	0	0	0	1	U/P	Androkles
Isocrates	10.35-37	1	0	0	0	Nu	Theseus
Isocrates	2.15-16	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Isocrates	8.121-133	4	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
Isocrates	15.232-234	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
Isocrates	12.145-148	1	0	0	0	U	Peisistratos
[Andocides]	4.26-27	1	0	0	0	Nu	Alkibiades
Xenophon	<i>Hell.</i> 2.3.24-28	1	0	0	0	[U/P]	
Xenophon	<i>Hell.</i> 5.2.7	1	0	0	0	U/P	
Xenophon	<i>Anab.</i> 7.6.2-6	0	0	1	0	[M]	Xenophon
Lysias	25.7-10	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Lysias	27.10	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Androtion	<i>BNJ</i> 324 F 6	1	0	0	0	U	Peisistratos
Demosthenes	8.33-34	0	0	1	0	Ng	
Demosthenes	26.3-4	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Aeschines	3.77-78	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Aeschines	3.134-135	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Aeschines	3.226-227	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Hypereides	5.4	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Hypereides	5.5	1	0	0	0	Nu	
[Aristot.] <i>Ath.</i>	22	1	0	0	0	Nu	Peisistratos

⁸⁹ Abbreviations used here are as follows: U = ‘Unclear’; Ng = ‘Negative’; Nu = ‘Neutral’; P = ‘Partisan’; M = ‘Military’.

<i>Pol.</i>							
[Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i>	26	0	0	1	0	Nu	
[Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i>	27	0	0	2	0	Nu	Pericles
[Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i>	28	0	0	1	1	Nu	Pericles, Kleophon
[Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i>	41	1	0	0	0	U	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1270b	0	0	1	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1274a	2	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1291b-1292a	5	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1304b-1305a	5	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1305a	3	0	2	0	Ng/P	Peisistratos, Theagenes, Dionysius
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1305b-1306a	1	0	5	1	Ng	Kharikles, Phrynikhos
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1307b-1308a	2	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1310a-b	2	0	0	1	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1312b	0	0	1	0	Ng	Thrasyboulos brother of Hiero
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1313b	2	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1315a-b	1	0	2	0	Ng/P	Kypselos, Kleisthenes (Sicyon)
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1319b	1	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Pol.</i> 1320a-b	2	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Aristotle	<i>Rhet.</i> 1393b-1394a	2	0	0	0	U	
Aristotle	<i>cat.8 treatise 44 fr. 461 Rose</i>	1	0	0	0	Ng/P	
Theopompos ⁹⁰	<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 92	1	0	0	0	U	Kleon
Theopompos	<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 95	1	0	0	0	U	
Theopompos	<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 96c	0	0	1	2	U	Hyperbolos, Kleon
Theopompos	<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 97	1	0	0	0	U	Kallistratos
Theopompos	<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 99	1	0	0	0	U	Euboulos
Theopompos	<i>FGrH</i> 115 F 404	1	0	0	0	U	Krobylos
Phaenias	Fr 15 Wehrli	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Philoxenos the Solenist
Dinarchus	1.1-2	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Dinarchus	1.10	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Dinarchus	1.31	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Dinarchus	1.53-54	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Dinarchus	1.99	1	0	0	0	Nu	

⁹⁰ For Theopompos I have only listed those fragments which seem to indicate (or at least suggest) that Theopompos himself used the word *dēmagōgos*, rather than the framing author. Besides those listed here, F 100, 164, and 166 include the word *dēmagōgos*, and in every case the use is neutral as far as can be determined.

Theophrastus	<i>Char.</i> 26	1	0	0	0	[Ng]	Theseus
Duris	<i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller	1	0	0	0	Nu	8 figures
Idomeneus	<i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller	1	0	0	0	Nu	8 figures
Hegesander	<i>FHG</i> 4 fr 9 Müller	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Polybius	2.21	0	0	0	1	Ng	Gaius Flaminius
Polybius	3.79-80	1	0	0	0	Ng	Gaius Flaminius
Polybius	15.21	0	1	0	0	Ng	Molpagorus of Kios
Polybius	38.11	0	0	0	1	Ng	Kritolaos
Satyrus	<i>Vita Euripidis</i> 39.iii	1	0	0	0	[U]	
Satyrus	<i>Vita Euripidis</i> 39.x	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon
Septuaginta	Esdras I.5.63-71 Rahlfs	0	0	0	1	Ng	
Posidonius	<i>FGrH</i> 87 F 18	0	0	1	0	Ng	Lovernius the Celt
Posidonius	<i>FGrH</i> 87 F 112	0	0	0	1	Ng	
Agatharchides	<i>De mari Erythraeo</i> 18	1	0	0	0	U	
Diodorus Siculus	9.4	0	0	1	0	Ng	Peisistratos
Diodorus Siculus	11.77	1	0	0	0	Ng	Ephialtes
Diodorus Siculus	11.87	1	0	0	0	Ng	
Diodorus Siculus	12.9	1	0	0	0	Ng	Telys (Sybarite)
Diodorus Siculus	12.55	1	0	0	0	Ng	Kleon
Diodorus Siculus	12.57	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	
Diodorus Siculus	12.63	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon
Diodorus Siculus	12.73	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon
Diodorus Siculus	12.80.1-3	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	
Diodorus Siculus	13.5	1	0	0	0	Ng	
Diodorus Siculus	13.19	1	0	0	0	Nu	Diokles (Syracuse)
Diodorus Siculus	13.34.4-6	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Diodorus Siculus	13.53	1	0	0	0	Ng	Kleophon
Diodorus Siculus	13.102	1	0	0	0	Ng	
Diodorus	15.38	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kallistratos

Siculus							
Diodorus Siculus	15.58	5	0	0	0	Ng	
Diodorus Siculus	17.3	0	0	1	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Diodorus Siculus	18.61.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Eumenes
Diodorus Siculus	19.1.1-8	0	0	0	1	Ng	
Diodorus Siculus	19.5.4-6	0	0	1	0	Ng	Agathocles (Syracuse)
Diodorus Siculus	19.8.6-19.9.7	0	0	1	0	Nu	Agathocles (Syracuse)
Diodorus Siculus	19.31	0	0	0	1	Nu	Eumenes
Diodorus Siculus	20.24	0	0	1	0	Nu	Eumenes
Diodorus Siculus	20.27	0	0	1	0	Nu	Ptolemy I Soter
Diodorus Siculus	20.79	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Diodorus Siculus	34/35.33	0	0	0	1	Ng	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 4.8	0	0	1	0	Ng	Servius Tullius
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 4.47	1	0	0	0	[U]	Turnus Herdonius
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 4.85	0	0	1	0	Nu	Lucius Junius Brutus (I)
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 5.75	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.18	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.16	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Lucius Junius Brutus (II)
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.19	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.23-24	2	0	0	0	[Nu/P]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.28-29	2	0	0	0	[Nu/P]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.31	1	0	0	0	[Nu/P]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.33	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Gaius Sicinius Bellutus
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.36	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Lucius Junius Brutus (II)
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 7.64	0	0	0	1	Ng	Gaius Marcius Coriolanus
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 8.31	1	0	0	0	[Ng]	Marcus Decius, Spurius [L]icinius
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 8.71	0	0	2	0	Nu/P	Spurius Cassius Viscellinus

Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 8.76	0	0	0	1	Ng	Spurius Cassius Viscellinus
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 8.82.4-6	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.29	0	0	1	0	[Ng]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.32	1	0	1	0	[Ng]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.38	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Gnaeus Genucius
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 10.18	0	0	0	1	[Nu/P]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 10.33	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Lucius Icilius
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 11.6	0	0	1	0	[Ng]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 12.1-3	0	0	0	1	Ng	Spurius Maelius Felix
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Ant. Rom.</i> 19.7	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Isoc.</i> 8	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Dem.</i> 17.1-16	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Dem.</i> 21	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Th.</i> 17-18	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles, Kleon
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Th.</i> 45	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
Dionysius Hal.	<i>Pomp.</i> 6.1-4	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Didymus	<i>In Demosth.</i> 8.55-9.1	2	0	0	0	Nu	Aristophon
Didymus	<i>In Demosth.</i> 14.47-15.10	1	0	0	0	Nu	Philokrates
Nikolaos	FGrH 90 F 57	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Kypselos
Philo Judaeus	<i>De ebrietate</i> 37	0	0	1	0	Ng	Jothor
Philo Judaeus	<i>De ebrietate</i> 68-70	1	0	0	0	U	
Philo Judaeus	<i>De somniis</i> 2.78-84	0	0	0	1	U	
Strabo	1.2.7	0	0	1	0	Nu	Homer
Strabo	1.2.9	0	0	1	0	Nu	Homer
Strabo	14.2.24	1	0	0	0	Nu	Euthydemus, Hybreas (Mylasa)
Strabo	14.5.4	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Athenaios (Seleucia?)
Chion	<i>Epist.</i> 15.2.2-3	0	0	1	0	Ng	
Josephus	<i>AJ</i> 7.194-196	0	0	1	0	Nu	Absalom
Josephus	<i>AJ</i> 8.274-281	0	0	0	1	[Nu]	Abijah
Josephus	<i>AJ</i> 13.330-333	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Demainetos
Josephus	<i>AJ</i> 16.58-65	0	0	1	0	Nu	Herod
Josephus	<i>Vit.</i> 36-42	0	0	1	0	Ng	Justus son of Pistus
Plutarch	<i>Thes.</i> 14	0	0	1	0	Nu	Theseus
Plutarch	<i>Thes.</i> 32	0	0	1	0	Ng	Menestheus
Plutarch	<i>Rom.</i> 27.1-4	0	0	1	0	Nu	Romulus
Plutarch	<i>Comp. Thes. Rom.</i> 2	1	0	0	0	Ng	Romulus
Plutarch	<i>Lyc.</i> 2	0	0	1	0	Ng	Eurypon
Plutarch	<i>Num.</i> 8.1-3	0	0	1	0	Nu	Numa
Plutarch	<i>Publ.</i> 7.4-5	0	0	1	0	Nu	Appius Claudius Caecus
Plutarch	<i>Publ.</i> 22.1	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Them.</i> 2.5-6	1	0	0	0	Nu	

Plutarch	<i>Them.</i> 6	1	0	0	0	Nu	Epikydes son of Euphemides
Plutarch	<i>Them.</i> 10.1-2	0	0	1	0	Nu	Themistocles
Plutarch	<i>Cam.</i> 9	0	0	1	0	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Cam.</i> 31.1-2	0	0	0	1	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Cam.</i> 36	0	0	2	0	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Per.</i> 3.2-4	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
Plutarch	<i>Per.</i> 4	0	0	0	1	Nu	Pericles
Plutarch	<i>Per.</i> 10	2	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles, Ephialtes
Plutarch	<i>Per.</i> 15	0	0	0	1	Nu	Pericles
Plutarch	<i>Per.</i> 33.3-7	0	0	0	1	Nu	Kleon
Plutarch	<i>Per.</i> 39.4-5	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
Plutarch	<i>Fab.</i> 5.4-6	0	0	1	0	M	Marcus Minucius Rufus
Plutarch	<i>Fab.</i> 26.1-2	0	0	1	0	[Ng]	Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus
Plutarch	<i>Alc.</i> 6	1	0	0	0	Nu	Alkibiades
Plutarch	<i>Alc.</i> 13	1	0	0	0	Nu	Alkibiades, Phaiax, Nikias
Plutarch	<i>Alc.</i> 19.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Androkles
Plutarch	<i>Alc.</i> 23.3-6	0	0	1	0	Nu	Alkibiades
Plutarch	<i>Alc.</i> 34.5-6	0	0	1	0	Nu	Alkibiades
Plutarch	<i>Cor.</i> 12-13	5	0	0	0	Nu/P	Gaius Sicinius Bellutus, Lucius Junius Brutus (II)
Plutarch	<i>Cor.</i> 16	1	0	0	0	[Ng]	
Plutarch	<i>Cor.</i> 19	1	0	0	0	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Cor.</i> 39.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Comp. Alc. Cor.</i> 1	0	0	2	0	Nu/P	Alkibiades
Plutarch	<i>Tim.</i> 37.1-2	1	0	0	0	Nu	Laphystios, Demainetos
Plutarch	<i>Aem.</i> 3.6	0	0	1	0	M	
Plutarch	<i>Aem.</i> 31	0	0	1	0	M	
Plutarch	<i>Aem.</i> 38	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Arist.</i> 24.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Cat. Ma.</i> 12.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Cat. Ma.</i> 16.2-6	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Comp. Aristid. Cat.</i> 1	2	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Phil.</i> 17.1-2	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 13.2-4	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 14.2-7	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Pyrrh.</i> 23.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pyrrhus
Plutarch	<i>Mar.</i> 4	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Gaius Marius
Plutarch	<i>Mar.</i> 7.6	0	0	1	0	M	Gaius Marius
Plutarch	<i>Mar.</i> 28	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Gaius Marius

Plutarch	<i>Mar.</i> 34.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Lys.</i> 14.5	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleomenes (Athens)
Plutarch	<i>Sull.</i> 12.6-9	0	0	1	0	M	Gaius Marius, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, Lucius Cornelius Cinna, Gaius Fabius Fimbria
Plutarch	<i>Comp. Lys. Sull.</i> 4.4-5	2	0	0	0	Nu	Philokles
Plutarch	<i>Cim.</i> 10.5-9	0	0	0	1	[Ng]	Kimon
Plutarch	<i>Cim.</i> 19	1	0	0	0	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 5	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Lucius Quinctius
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 7.1-2	0	0	1	0	M	Gaius Fabius Fimbria
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 20.3-5	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 23.1-4	0	0	1	0	Nu	Lucius Licinius Lucullus
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 24.1-5	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 33.3-6	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 34.1-5	0	0	1	0	M	
Plutarch	<i>Luc.</i> 35.7	1	0	0	0	Nu	Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus
Plutarch	<i>Nic.</i> 2.1-3.2	0	0	3	0	Nu	Pericles, Nikias
Plutarch	<i>Nic.</i> 4.1-3	0	0	0	1	Nu	Nikias
Plutarch	<i>Nic.</i> 9.1-2	1	0	0	0	Nu	Alkibiades, Kleon
Plutarch	<i>Nic.</i> 12.3-4	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demostratos
Plutarch	<i>Nic.</i> 28.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Eurykles (Syracuse)
Plutarch	<i>Crass.</i> 7.5-9	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Eum.</i> 13.4-6	0	0	1	0	M	
Plutarch	<i>Eum.</i> 15.3	0	0	1	0	M	
Plutarch	<i>Sert.</i> 14.1-3	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Ages.</i> 5.1-2	0	0	1	0	Nu	Agesilaus II (Sparta)
Plutarch	<i>Ages.</i> 15	2	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Pomp.</i> 6.1-2	1	0	0	0	[Ng]	
Plutarch	<i>Pomp.</i> 10.5-7	1	0	0	0	Nu	Sthenis (Himera)
Plutarch	<i>Caes.</i> 20.1-2	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Caes.</i> 35.2-4	0	0	1	0	[Nu]	
Plutarch	<i>Phoc.</i> 8	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Phoc.</i> 32.1-2	1	0	0	0	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Cat. Mi.</i> 19.3-5	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Publius Clodius Pulcher
Plutarch	<i>Cat. Mi.</i> 31	1	0	1	0	Nu/P	Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, Publius Clodius Pulcher
Plutarch	<i>Cat. Mi.</i> 45	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Publius Clodius Pulcher

Plutarch	<i>Agis</i> 1-2	2	0	0	0	Nu	Agis IV, Kleomenes III
Plutarch	<i>TG.</i> 14.1	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus
Plutarch	<i>CG.</i> 1	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Gaius Sempronius Gracchus
Plutarch	<i>CG.</i> 2.2-3	0	0	0	1	Nu/P	Gaius Sempronius Gracchus
Plutarch	<i>CG.</i> 5	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Gaius Sempronius Gracchus
Plutarch	<i>CG.</i> 9	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Marcus Livius Drusus
Plutarch	<i>CG.</i> 11	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Dem.</i> 8	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pytheas
Plutarch	<i>Dem.</i> 12.3-4	0	0	1	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Plutarch	<i>Dem.</i> 17.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Krobylos
Plutarch	<i>Dem.</i> 23.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes, Polyeuktos, Ephialtes, Lykourgos, Moirokles, Demon, Kallisthenes, Kharidemos
Plutarch	<i>Dem.</i> 25.1-3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Plutarch	<i>Cic.</i> 12.1-3	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Cic.</i> 25	0	0	1	0	[Nu]	Marcus Licinius Crassus
Plutarch	<i>Demetr.</i> 34.3-5	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Ant.</i> 2	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Publius Clodius Pulcher
Plutarch	<i>Ant.</i> 4.1-3	0	0	1	0	Nu	Marcus Antonius
Plutarch	<i>Ant.</i> 10	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Publius Clodius Pulcher
Plutarch	<i>Ant.</i> 16.1-3	0	0	1	0	Nu	Octavian Augustus
Plutarch	<i>Dio</i> 32	0	0	1	0	Ng	Herakleides (Syracuse)
Plutarch	<i>Dio</i> 37.3-38.4	2	0	0	0	Nu	Hippo (Syracuse)
Plutarch	<i>Dio</i> 39.1-2	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Dio</i> 44	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Dio</i> 47	1	0	0	0	Nu	Herakleides, Theodotes
Plutarch	<i>Dio</i> 48	0	0	1	0	M	Herakleides
Plutarch	<i>Brut.</i> 20.1-4	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Publius Clodius Pulcher
Plutarch	<i>Brut.</i> 22	0	0	0	1	Nu	Octavian Augustus
Plutarch	<i>Brut.</i> 30.1-2	0	0	1	0	M	Marcus Junius Brutus
Plutarch	<i>Brut.</i> 30.3-8	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Arat.</i> 2	1	0	0	0	Ng	

Plutarch	<i>Arat.</i> 14	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Arat.</i> 49	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Galb.</i> 11	0	0	0	1	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Galb.</i> 20	0	0	1	0	M	Otho
Plutarch	<i>Oth.</i> 4.1-3	0	0	1	0	Nu	Otho
Plutarch	<i>Adolescens</i> 26b-d	0	0	1	0	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Adulator</i> 52e-f	1	0	1	0	Ng	Alkibiades
Plutarch	<i>Adulator</i> 71d-e	0	0	1	0	Ng	
Plutarch	<i>Regum</i> 177d-e (Philip)	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Regum</i> 184f-185c (Themistocles)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Epikydes
Plutarch	<i>Regum</i> 203c-d (Cn. Pompey)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Sthenius
Plutarch	<i>Apoph.</i> 211a (Agesilaus)	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Apoph.</i> 211b (Agesilaus)	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Mulier.</i> 261d-262a (Xenocrita)	0	0	1	0	Ng	Aristodemos of Cumae
Plutarch	<i>Quaes. Rom.</i> 275f- 276a	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Quaes. Rom.</i> 276c-d	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	
Plutarch	<i>Quaes. Rom.</i> 279c-d	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Quaes. Gr.</i> 295c-d	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De Alex.</i> 327c-e	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De Alex.</i> 330a-e	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De Frat.</i> 482d-f	0	0	2	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De Frat.</i> 486c-d	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De Cup.</i> 525b-d	0	0	1	0	Nu	Demades
Plutarch	<i>De Vitioso</i> 534e-535b	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De laude ipsius</i> 542d- 543a	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De laude ipsius</i> 545b	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>De Lib.</i> 11d-12a	0	0	0	1	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Quaes. Conv.</i> 621b-c	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Quaes. Conv.</i> 633b-e	1	0	0	0	Nu	Arkhippos
Plutarch	<i>Quaes. Conv.</i> 726a-b	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>An Seni</i> 784a-c	0	0	0	1	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>An Seni</i> 784f-785a	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>An Seni</i> 788c-e	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>An Seni</i> 790d-e	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>An Seni</i> 794d	0	0	0	1	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Praecepta</i> 800c-801c	2	0	0	0	Nu	
Plutarch	<i>Praecepta</i> 802b-e	0	0	1	1	Nu	

Plutarch	<i>Praecepta</i> 813a-c	1	0	0	0	Nu	Onomademos (Chios)
Plutarch	<i>Vit. Dec.</i> 840a-c	0	0	1	0	Nu	Euboulos
Plutarch	<i>Vit. Dec.</i> 847e-848a	2	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes
Plutarch	<i>De Herod.</i> 855c-d	1	0	0	0	Nu	Hyperbolos
Plutarch	<i>Non Posse</i> 1089d-1090a	0	0	1	0	U	
Appian	<i>Sam.</i> 7.1-2	1	0	0	0	Nu	Philocharis (Tarentum)
Appian	<i>Pun.</i> 20 (<i>Libyca</i> 631-632)	0	0	1	0	Nu	Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus
Appian	<i>BC</i> 1.13.114	0	0	1	0	Nu	Marcus Perpenna Vento
Appian	<i>BC</i> 3.3.24	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Appian	<i>BC</i> 4.4.19	1	0	0	0	Nu	Marcus Tullius Cicero
Appian	<i>BC</i> 4.9.66	0	0	1	0	Ng	Alexander, Mnaseas (Rhodes)
Appian	<i>BC</i> 5.5.39	0	0	1	0	[Nu]	
Appian	<i>BC</i> 5.6.53	0	0	1	0	Nu	
D.Chrysostom	2.22	1	0	0	0	Nu	
D.Chrysostom	3.48-49	1	0	0	0	Nu	
D.Chrysostom	4.105-108	1	0	0	0	Nu	
D.Chrysostom	4.129-132	2	0	0	0	U	
D.Chrysostom	22	1	0	0	0	Nu	Peisistratos
D.Chrysostom	25.1-4	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	
D.Chrysostom	34.34-38	2	0	0	0	Nu	
D.Chrysostom	38.1-2	0	0	1	0	Ng	
D.Chrysostom	50.1-2	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Hyperbolos, Kleon
D.Chrysostom	56.9-10	1	0	0	0	[Nu/P]	
D.Chrysostom	66.12	1	0	0	0	Ng	
D.Chrysostom	77/78.26-27	1	0	0	0	Ng	
D.Chrysostom	80.13-14	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Harpokration	s.v. Ἀγύρριος (α 23 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Agyrrhios
Harpokration	s.v. Ἀσπασία (α 250 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Lysikles
Harpokration	s.v. Ἐπικράτης (ε 101 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Epikrates
Harpokration	s.v. Εὐβουλος (ε 153 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Euboulos
Harpokration	s.v. Θεωρικά (θ 19 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Agyrrhios
Harpokration	s.v. Ἰππαρχος (ι 15 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Peisistratos
Harpokration	s.v. Κέφαλος (κ 46 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kephalos

Harpokration	s.v. Ὑπέρβολος (v 5 Dindorf)	1	0	0	0	Nu	Hyperbolos
Lucian	<i>Icar.</i> 19	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Lucian	<i>Nec.</i> 19-20	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Lucian	<i>Laps.</i> 3	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 13 Jebb 195-196	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 14 Jebb 209-210	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 38 Jebb 487-488	0	0	1	0	Ng	Philip II of Macedon
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 42 Jebb 529-530	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 45 Jebb 44	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 46 Jebb 119	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 46 Jebb 250	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
Aelius Aristeides	<i>Orat.</i> 53 Jebb 10	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Artemidorus	<i>Onirocriticon</i> 1.17	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Artemidorus	<i>Onirocriticon</i> 1.77.54-64	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Artemidorus	<i>Onirocriticon</i> 1.79.16-24	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Artemidorus	<i>Onirocriticon</i> 3.16	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Artemidorus	<i>Onirocriticon</i> 3.42	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Maximus	4.3	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Maximus	6.5	1	0	0	0	Ng	
Maximus	7.4	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon, Hyperbolos, Alkibiades
Maximus	11.7	0	0	1	0	U	
Maximus	14.7.15-29	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Pericles, Nikias
Maximus	15.4	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon
Maximus	17.3	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Maximus	20.3	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Maximus	22.4	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	
Maximus	26.4	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Maximus	27.6	1	0	0	0	Nu/P	Alkibiades, Kleon
Maximus	33.6	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Maximus	34.4	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon
Maximus	36.6.1-21	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Maximus	41.5	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Polyaenus	1.48.3	1	0	0	0	Nu	

Polyaenus	4.2.19	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Polyaenus	4.8.3	0	0	1	0	Ng	
Chariton	<i>Callirhoe</i> 1.1.11-14	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Chariton	<i>Callirhoe</i> 4.1.9-12	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Chariton	<i>Callirhoe</i> 5.1.6-8	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Chariton	<i>Callirhoe</i> 8.7.1-2	0	0	1	0	Nu	
Athenaeus	2.22	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	Demosthenes, Demades
Athenaeus	3.40	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	Philoxenos
Athenaeus	4.37	0	0	1	0	[Ng]	Lovernius the Celt
Athenaeus	4.61	3	0	0	0	[Nu]	Euboulos, Kallikratos
Athenaeus	5.63	1	0	0	0	Nu	
Athenaeus	6.57	0	0	1	0	[Nu]	
Athenaeus	11.87	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> α 385	1	0	0	0	Nu	Agyrrhios
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> α 2191	1	0	0	0	Nu	Androtion son of Andron
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> α 2703	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demosthenes, Hypereides, Himeraios
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 411	0	0	3	0	Nu/P	
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 412	0	2	0	1	[U/Ng]	Molpagoras
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 413	3	0	0	0	[Nu/P]	Gaius Flaminius
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 414	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demades
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 416	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demades
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 421	0	0	1	0	Nu/P	Gaius Sicinius Bellutus, Lucius Junius Brutus (II)
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 429	1	0	0	0	Nu	Demetrios of Phaleron
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> δ 455	0	0	1	0	Nu	Demosthenes
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> ε 2416	1	0	0	0	Nu	Epikrates
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> ε 2417	1	0	0	0	Nu	Epikrates
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> ε 3385	1	0	0	0	Nu	Euboulos
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> η 214	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleon
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> ι 523	1	0	0	0	Nu	Peisistratos
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> θ 124	1	0	0	0	Nu	Themistocles
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> κ 1040	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	Kallixenos
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> κ 1452	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kephalos
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> ν 444	1	0	0	0	Nu	
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> ο 1057	1	0	0	0	[Nu]	Gaius Flaminius
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> π 144	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pamphilos
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> π 433	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pamphilos
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> π 1180	1	0	0	0	Nu	Pericles
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> π 2066	1	0	0	0	Nu	
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> π 2150	1	0	0	0	Nu	Epikrates

<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> σ 776	1	0	0	0	Nu	Solon
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> τ 750	1	0	0	0	Nu	
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> τ 998	1	0	0	0	Nu	
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> υ 249	1	0	0	0	Nu	Hyperbolos
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> υ 295	1	0	0	0	Nu	Hypereides
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> φ 433	1	0	0	0	Nu	Kleophon
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> φ 517	1	0	0	0	Nu	Gaius Flaminius
<i>Suda</i>	<i>Lexicon</i> φ 692	0	0	1	1	Nu	Arkhedemos

Before turning to fourth-century usage of *dēmagōg*- terminology, it is worth characterizing in broad strokes the data from the table; some conclusions about the changes in connotation over time will be addressed below, after we consider Aristotle.⁹¹ Of the 478 uses of *dēmagōg*- terminology catalogued here, 431 are employed directly by the author, and 47 appear in speech. By far the most frequent moral coloring was neutral, with 262 such instances, and another 67 neutral but with partisan connotations; for comparison, 75 instances were negative, and another 32 negative and partisan.⁹² The noun form *dēmagōgos* and the verb form *dēmagōgein* made up over 90% of uses, at 296 and 143 respectively, while the adjective *dēmagōgikos* appeared only 4 times. The authors who most frequently used *dēmagōg*- terms were Plutarch (173), Aristotle (42, or 49 if including the 7 appearances in the *Athenaion Politeia*), the *Suda* (30), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (35), and Diodorus Siculus (30); the scholia to Aristophanes, excluded for reasons just mentioned,⁹³ would otherwise come in behind only Plutarch with 90 uses. Nor are these numbers simply the result of large surviving corpora: the same group of six ‘authors’ dominate the *TLG*’s lists of relative distribution by author for *dēmagōgos*,

⁹¹ P. 76 below.

⁹² For reasons mentioned above at n. 86, passages where the *dēmagōg*- term(s) had a positive connotation were subsumed into the neutral category.

⁹³ P. 35 above.

dēmagōgein, and *dēmagōgia*.⁹⁴ Of these major authors, only Aristotle's uses are dominated by negative connotations (40 negative uses); Diodorus Siculus has 14 neutral uses to 16 negative, Dionysius of Halicarnassus 25 neutral to 9 negative, the *Suda* 8 neutral to 3 negative, and Plutarch 138 neutral to 22 negative. A retabulation of this information focused on the Athenian politicians identified in the final column is presented in section 2.1 in Tables 2 and 3.

1.4. Fourth-century Usage

Of the fourth-century authors we shall begin by examining Xenophon, both because he is relatively early in the century and because we shall examine the orators as a group. There is little enough to say about *Anabasis* 7.6.2-6, which was mentioned above as an example of the 'military' use of *dēmagōgein*:

When the Lakedaimonians asked what sort of a man Xenophon was, [Herakleides] replied that he was not a bad fellow on the whole, but he was a friend of the soldiers, and on that account things went the worse for him. And they said: "He **plays the demagogue**, you mean, with the men?" "Exactly that," said Herakleides.⁹⁵

The Lakedaimonians are specifically concerned about the possibility of Xenophon opposing their acquisition of the mercenary force, but it is difficult to settle on a particular valence here. It seems a bit odd to imagine that Xenophon means to suggest that his own comportment in command was improper; it is perhaps more likely that a difference in leadership philosophy is intended, contrasting the notoriously strict Spartans and monarchic Persians with the more egalitarian Athenians.⁹⁶ Although many later

⁹⁴ *Dēmagōgikos* appears 34 times total in the *TLG* corpus, so that statistical analysis of expected usage is pointless.

⁹⁵ Trans. Brownson 1922. Xen. *Anab.* 7.6.2-6: ἐρωτῶντων δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τίς ἀνὴρ εἴη Ξενοφῶν ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εἴη οὐ κακός, φιλοστρατιώτης δέ: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χειρόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ εἶπον: ἀλλ' ἦ **δημαγωγεῖ** ὁ ἀνὴρ τοὺς ἄνδρας; καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλείδης, πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

⁹⁶ Even if we conclude that *dēmagōgein* here is intended in a derogatory sense, the context muddies interpretation significantly. The speakers who use the term are Spartans, a people not known for their

military instances of *dēmagōgein* are quite explicit about the inappropriateness of the behavior described, the next such use does not appear until Plutarch, and so this passage should in all likelihood be considered on its own. In any case, Lendle makes no comment on the use of *dēmagōgein*, and Stronk simply translates it as ‘playing the demagogue’ without any discussion of the meaning of such a phrase.⁹⁷

The first occurrence in the *Hellenika* works in much the same vein as Thuc. 8.65. At *Hellenika* 2.3.27 Kritias, speaking about Theramenes, complains that the latter has of late opposed the Thirty Tyrants when they “wish to put some **demagogue** out of the way,”⁹⁸ purely out of a self-interested attempt to jump ship now that the people are turning on the Thirty. In this instance *dēmagōgos* could conceivably refer to a generically powerful advisor of the *polis*, whom the Thirty would be eliminating because of his opposition to their rule.⁹⁹ It could also refer specifically to a supporter of the *dēmos*-qua-many and democracy, in which case it would be self-evident why the Thirty would try to put such a person ‘out of the way’. Although it is possible that *dēmagōgos* is meant to have a negative moral/aesthetic connotation, and certainly the Thirty were no friends to democrats, there is actually no indication in this passage that such a connotation exists beyond the partisan. Such is also the case for *Hellenika* 5.2.7, where the dioecism of Mantinea is said to be pleasing to the property-holders in no small part because they

particular love of democracy; we know little of the contemporary political situation in Maroneia, the *polis* of Herakleides, but Herakleides himself cuts quite a villainous figure in the *Anabasis*. When Xenophon the author has a group of Spartan commanders use the term *dēmagōgein* in conversation with Herakleides, a man who exemplifies corrupt self-interest, to denigrate the actions and military leadership of Xenophon the general, one may perhaps be permitted some reservations about the expected reaction of a Greek reader.

⁹⁷ Lendle 1995, 458; Stronk 1995, 258-259.

⁹⁸ Trans. Brownson 1918. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.27: ὅταν τινὰ ἐκποδὼν βουλόμεθα ποιήσασθαι τῶν δημαγωγῶν.

⁹⁹ This notion draws some support from Kritias’ earlier statement that “if we find anyone opposed to the oligarchy, so far as we have the power we put him out of the way” (ἐάν τινα αἰσθανώμεθα ἐναντίον τῇ �λιγαρχίᾳ, ὅσον δυνάμεθα ἐκποδὼν ποιούμεθα). Note that the exact same phrase is used here for the elimination of rivals (ἐκποδὼν ποιούμεθα/ποιήσασθαι) as in our passage.

subsequently “enjoyed an aristocratic government and were rid of **the troublesome demagogues**.”¹⁰⁰ There is again little doubt about the partisan nature of *dēmagōgōn* in this passage, since Xenophon stresses through the mentions of aristocracy and property the elite nature of the group who find the *dēmagōgoi* to be ‘troublesome’ (βαρείς - *bareis*). It is, however, unclear whether that adjective should be taken to indicate that, for the property-holders at least, *dēmagōgoi* were by nature a bad thing: it is an equally possible interpretation that the problem is that these *dēmagōgoi* are *bareis*, rather than that all *dēmagōgoi* are by nature *bareis*.¹⁰¹ Any politician with a commitment to democracy would be objectionable to these observers. Unless one adopts their attitude that democracy is necessarily a bad thing, there seems little sense in generalizing from these instances.

If Xenophon falls in line with Thucydides, the orators (Lysias, Aeschines, Hypereides, Dinarchus, Demosthenes, and Isocrates)¹⁰² very much fall in line with Aristophanes; given our distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ sources, this makes sense.¹⁰³ We shall begin with Lysias 27.10, because it is straightforward and informs our other Lysias passage, 25.9. At 27.10 Lysias, speaking of his opponents, accuses them of having gotten wealthy by impoverishing the jurors (and by extension the *dēmos* -qua-citizen-body). He then remarks, “surely it is the duty of true **leaders of the people** not to

¹⁰⁰ Trans. Brownson 1921. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7: ἀριστοκρατία δ’ ἐχρῶντο, ἀπηλλαγμένοι δ’ ἦσαν τῶν βαρέων δημαγωγῶν.

¹⁰¹ Underhill 1906 has no comment on our word in either passage. Canfora 1993, 14 sees *Hellenika* 2.3.27 as possessing a sharply pejorative sense, while 5.2.7 simply means the equivalent of *prostatēs tou dēmou*: “Senofonte l’adopera in senso nettamente deterioro nell’ambito di un discorso di Crizia (*Elleniche*, II, 3,27) ma come semplice equivalente di *prostatēs tou dēmou* in un altro passo della stessa opera (V, 2,7).” As was mentioned above at n. 50, Hornblower (*CT* vol. 2) comes down strongly on the opposite side, citing 5.2.7 as evidence for why *dēmagōgos* must have a negative connotation at Thuc. 4.21. As I hope is clear from the above, I agree with neither.

¹⁰² Since the authorship of Andocides’ *In Alcibiadem* is disputed, I shall not spend much time on it, other than to note that it fits our orator-pattern of neutral valence for *dēmagōg*- terms.

¹⁰³ See pp. 16-17 above.

take your property in the stress of your misfortunes, but to give their own property to you.”¹⁰⁴ Here for the first time we are seeing explicitly the idea not just of ‘good’ people being demagogues, but of ‘good demagogues’ (ἀγαθῶν δημαγωγῶν). We should keep in mind this morally neutral valence to *dēmagōgos* for 25.9. There Lysias claims that people are not naturally democrats or oligarchs, but support whatever constitution will benefit them, and as an example he adduces how “Phrynikhos, Peisander and **their fellow demagogues**, when they had committed many offences against you, proceeded, in fear of the requital that they deserved, to establish the first oligarchy.”¹⁰⁵ Although an argument could be made for a partisan meaning here which contrasts the status of those around Phrynikhos and Peisander as ‘demagogues’ with their establishment of oligarchy,¹⁰⁶ that conclusion is I think unwarranted. Phrynikhos, Peisander, and their coterie would be ‘switching sides’ by founding an oligarchy as leading advisors in a democracy, regardless of whether they were partisan in the sense of supporting the *dēmos*-qua-many against the *khrēstoi*.¹⁰⁷ As we established above, for our purposes the fact that *dēmagōg*-terminology is natively more suited to democracy than to oligarchy does not make particular instances of it partisan if it is not deployed to indicate politicians advising in the interests of one particular portion of the citizen population. In Lysias, then, *dēmagōgos* is entirely neutral, and a particular *dēmagōgos* could be expected to live up to certain standards of good behavior (or chastised for failing to meet those standards).

¹⁰⁴ Trans. Lamb 1930. Lysias 27.10: καίτοι οὐ ταῦτα ἀγαθῶν δημαγωγῶν ἐστὶ, τὰ ὑμέτερα ἐν ταῖς ὑμετέραις συμφοραῖς λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ὑμῖν διδόναι.

¹⁰⁵ Trans. Lamb 1930. Lysias 25.9: Φρύνιχος μὲν καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ οἱ μετ’ ἐκείνων δημαγωγοί, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐξήμαρτον, τὰς περὶ τούτων δέισαντες τιμωρίας τὴν προτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατέστησαν.

¹⁰⁶ This is the position of Zoepffel 1974: “Immerhin bedeutet Demagoge hier noch so viel wie Demokrat im Gegensatz zum Oligarchen” (80).

¹⁰⁷ Thus Dover 1993, 69 n. 1 says “it should be noted that Lys. xxv. 9 designates the oligarchic conspirators Phrynichos and Peisandros δημαγωγοί, i.e. men of exceptional influence in the assembly.”

Aeschines and Hypereides very much fit the model established in Lysias 27.10. Both are attacking Demosthenes: Aeschines in his lawsuit against Ktesiphon over the award of a crown to Demosthenes, and Hypereides in the trial of Demosthenes for bribery in the context of the Harpalus incident.¹⁰⁸ At 3.77-78 Aeschines condemns Demosthenes for celebrating the death of Philip before the mourning period for his own daughter had ended, concluding that “the man who hates his child and is a bad father could never become a **safe guide to the people**.”¹⁰⁹ As in Lysias 27.10 we see an adjective normally reserved for the *aristoi*¹¹⁰ (*khrestos* in this case) being applied directly to *dēmagōgos*, and a standard of behavior being set for *dēmagōgoi*. At 3.134-135 Aeschines provides the flip side to this notion of ‘good/useful’ demagogues, when he cites Hesiod’s warning against choosing ‘bad’ demagogues.¹¹¹ Without context one might assume that a partisan meaning is lurking here, since *πονηρός* (*ponēros*) is often used by the *aristoi* to refer to the many; however, both the use of *khrestos* at 3.77-78 in a clearly moral, but not partisan, sense and the respective backgrounds of Aeschines and Demosthenes (who is clearly the target of Aeschines’ jibe) argue against such an interpretation.¹¹² At 3.226-227 Aeschines marvels that Demosthenes has not asked himself “what kind of a **statesman** he would be who, having the power to cajole the people, should sell the opportunities for saving the city, and by his calumnies prevent

¹⁰⁸ For a full consideration of this affair see Badian 1961.

¹⁰⁹ Trans. Adams 1919. Aeschin. 3.77-78: Ὁ γὰρ μισότεκνος καὶ πατὴρ πονηρὸς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο **δημαγωγὸς χρηστός**.

¹¹⁰ I use this term here and elsewhere as distinct from the English ‘elite’, which can indicate high status vis-à-vis wealth *or* birth, to specifically indicate those of high status by birth (or accepted among that group as worthy members).

¹¹¹ Aeschin. 3.134-135: λέγει γὰρ πού, παιδεύων τὰ πλήθη καὶ συμβουλεύων ταῖς πόλεσι **τοὺς πονηροὺς τῶν δημαγωγῶν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι**.

¹¹² For more on the backgrounds of Aeschines and Demosthenes, see Harris 1995, 21-40.

patriots from giving advice?”¹¹³ Clearly the answer is ‘a bad one’, as we saw from 3.77-78 and 3.134-135: again, a *dēmagōgos* is not a bad thing, but Demosthenes is failing to live up to his responsibilities as a *dēmagōgos*, and so is a bad *dēmagōgos*.

Hypereides has to be handled with more care than Aeschines because the speech in question is fragmentary; conclusions drawn, and especially those drawn from sections of text that are reconstructed in part or in whole, must obviously bear less weight than evidence from texts that survive whole. At 5.16 Hypereides asserts that “a **popular leader** worthy of the name should be his country’s savior.”¹¹⁴ Commenting on this passage Whitehead mentions the “originally value-free connotations of the word *dēmagōgos*”,¹¹⁵ and perhaps given his translation and the use of the word δίκαιον (*dikaion*), which can mean ‘fitting’, ‘right’, or even ‘genuine’, we should see a positive connotation here, inasmuch as an appropriate *dēmagōgos* would be the savior of his city. The instance of *dēmagōgos* at 5.22 is even more fragmentary:

You used, (?)at the... to be ashamed before those Greeks who were in court when you voted to condemn certain persons, if ... that sort of **popular leaders** and generals and guardians of affairs...¹¹⁶

Although there is less here to indicate the precise meaning of *dēmagōgos*, its use in parallel with στρατηγοὺς and φύλακας τῶν πραγμάτων suggests at least a neutral valence, if not the kind of positive valence we would associate with the other two terms.

Dinarchus’ speech against Demosthenes, although it survives in its entirety, is less straightforward in its uses of *dēmagōg-* terminology than those of Aeschines and

¹¹³ Trans. Adams 1919. Aeschin. 3.226-227: τίς ἂν εἴη δημαγωγὸς τοιοῦτος ὅστις τὸν μὲν δῆμον θωπεῦσαι δύναιτο, τοὺς δὲ καιροὺς, ἐν οἷς ἦν σφάζεσθαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀποδοίτο, τοὺς δ’ εὖ φρονούντας κωλύοι διαβάλλων συμβουλεύειν.

¹¹⁴ Trans. Whitehead 2000. Hyp. 5.16: δεῖ δὲ τὸν δίκαιον δημαγωγὸν [σω]τήρα τῆς [ἐαυτοῦ πατρίδος εἶναι].

¹¹⁵ Whitehead 2000, 410.

¹¹⁶ Trans. Whitehead 2000. Hypereides 5.22: ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς | μὲν ἡσχύνεσθε ἐ-|πὶ τῆςν | τ]οὺς περιεστηκότας | τῶ]ν Ἑλλήνων, ὅτε | τινῶ]ν κατεχειρο-|τον]εῖτε, εἰ τοιοῦτο[υς | καὶ] δημαγωγούς κα[ὶ] | στρ]ατηγοὺς καὶ φύλα-|κα]ς τῶν πραγμ[άτων].

Hypereides. At the very outset of the speech (1.1-2) and again at 1.53-54 Dinarchus calls Demosthenes “this popular leader of yours” (ὁ δημαγωγὸς ὑμῖν).¹¹⁷ This is clearly done for rhetorical effect, which makes Dinarchus’ uses more complicated to analyze than most of the others we have previously considered. It seems to me that there are two major possibilities to consider. First, that *dēmagōgos* has the meaning that we assign it in modernity, so that Dinarchus is repeatedly lashing out at Demosthenes in anger: we might replace the word ‘demagogue’ with ‘malefactor’ for illustration in this case.¹¹⁸ Second, that *dēmagōgos* has the meaning that we have more often seen in our own analysis of its use in ancient texts, *i.e.*, leader of the public, with the same understanding that we saw from Hypereides 5.16 that a *dēmagōgos* ought to be looking out for the best interests of the city. In this case Dinarchus’ use of the term would be a sort of sneering sarcasm. Dinarchus would not be saying, “of course Demosthenes took bribes and looked out for his own best interests, he’s a *dēmagōgos*!” Rather, he would be saying “Demosthenes, supposedly a *dēmagōgos*, instead took bribes and betrayed his city and Greece out of personal greed.” That this latter interpretation is correct draws support from the usage of *dēmagōgos* at 1.99. There Dinarchus exclaims “how shall we agree upon the interests of the state when our leaders and **demagogues** take bribes and betray their country’s interests?”¹¹⁹ First, *dēmagōgoi* is placed in parallel to ἡγεμόνες (*hēgemones*), which

¹¹⁷ At 1.10 Demosthenes is referred to as τοῦτον τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ; this use, clearly operating in the same rhetorical manner as 1.1-2 and 1.53-54 should be subject to the same conclusions we may draw about those instances. 1.10 provides no additional information about how we should interpret *dēmagōgos*.

¹¹⁸ Whitehead 2000, 410-411 appears to take this approach: “Deinarchos repeatedly uses the word, of Demosthenes, with derogatory intent: see Dein. 1. 1, 10, 31, 53, the first and last of which have the biting ὁ δημαγωγὸς ὑμῖν (‘this people’s leader of yours’).”

¹¹⁹ Trans. Burt 1954. Din. 1.99: πῶς ὁμονήσομεν ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων, ὅταν οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ χρήματα λαμβάνοντες προίωνται τὰ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντα.

argues against a negative meaning for *dēmagōgoi*.¹²⁰ Second, that the leaders and demagogues are taking bribes and betraying their fatherland is quite clearly an object of perplexity, indicating that the natural state of affairs should be the opposite. Thus in 1.1-2, 1.10, 1.31, and 1.53-54 we should understand Dinarchus to be hammering home the point that Demosthenes is a failure as a *dēmagōgos*, not that he is a *dēmagōgos* full stop: in this way Dinarchus is making the same attack on Demosthenes as Aeschines and Hypereides.¹²¹

Demosthenes does not fit as comfortably with the picture we have found in the other orators. There are only two instances of *dēmagōg*-terminology in his oeuvre: 8.33-34 and 26.3-4. The latter appearance is straightforward: Demosthenes explains a law of Solon that penalties should act slowly against private citizens but swiftly against ‘magistrates and political leaders’ (ταῖς δ’ ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς) on the basis of how much more damage the latter can cause.¹²² Given that the ‘popular’ definition of *dēmagōgos* that I laid out above does not exclude any group from advising the *polis*,¹²³ including the *aristoi* or even a tyrant, I would not consider this usage to be an

¹²⁰ At 1.40 Dinarchus says of Athenian leaders of old (Aristeides, Themistokles, Kephalos) “they were counsellors, Athenians, they were leaders such as yourselves and the state deserve” (ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄξιοι σύμβουλοι καὶ ἡγεμόνες ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ δήμου). Here *hēgemones* and *symboloi* (σύμβουλοι) are clearly neutral/positive, and we should carry that meaning over to the parallel construction at 1.99.

¹²¹ I share this interpretation with Zoepffel 1974: “Da Deinarchos dann wieder von ‚Anführern und Demagogen‘ als einem selbstverständlichen, wenn auch nicht ungefährlichen Phänomen spricht, glaube ich nicht, dass sein Angriff sich gegen den Volksführer an sich richtet, sondern speziell gegen Demosthenes, der dieser Stellung nicht gerecht wird. Wenn Demosthenes als schlechter Demagoge abgestempelt wird, so könnte hier auch der Vorwurf damit verbunden sein, er sei kein wahrer Demokrat, was ihm hauptsächlich Deinarchos, aber auch Aischines vorhält. Aber dieses ist im Grunde nichts Besonderes; denn immer wieder wird dem jeweiligen Gegner in der Volksversammlung vorgeworfen, er tue nur so, als sei er dem Demos wohlgesonnen, in Wirklichkeit aber verfolge er nur die eigenen Interessen.” (81-82).

¹²² There is, of course, no guarantee that this is a genuinely Solonic law. At the end of the fifth century and beginning of the fourth the Athenians empaneled *syngrapheis*, *anagrapheis*, and *nomothetai* to review and publish the laws of Solon and Draco, the *patrioi nomoi*; as a result of the work of these panels and of the general tendency to ascribe any laws that fit the *patrios politeia* to the hand of a traditional law-giver, laws in the fourth century were often called Solonic even if they were, in fact, much more recent. Cf. Ostwald 1986, 414-420, 509-524.

¹²³ Section 1.2 above.

anachronism: clearly Solon himself would not have used the term *dēmagōgos*, but that does not mean that the concept cannot aptly be applied to his time. Regardless, there is nothing negative or partisan detectable in Demosthenes' use of the word here: when paired with ταῖς ἀρχαῖς it should denote that Solon's intent was to cover both those in and out of office who had a substantial influence over Athenian decision-making.¹²⁴ 8.33-34 is our thorny passage. There Demosthenes asserts that politicians (πολιτευόμενοι) *should* have taught the Athenians to be mild in the Assembly and warlike against enemies and rivals, but instead,

by persuasive arts and caresses they have brought you to such a frame of mind that in your assemblies you are elated by their flattery and have no ear but for compliments, while in your policy and your practice you are at this moment running the gravest risks.¹²⁵

It is difficult to consider this instance of *dēmagōg*- terminology anything but negative: the actions of δημαγωγοῦντες and χαριζόμενοι are equated with κολακεύεσθαι (*kolakeuesthai* - flattery), and are clearly bad leadership that is corrupting the people into making dangerous decisions. We shall see with the upcoming material that one of the most negative valences of *dēmagōg*- terminology occurs when this terminology is combined with *kolak*- terms to indicate that 'leading the people' is equivalent to 'flattering the people', or telling them only what they want to hear. It is somewhat surprising to see such a different usage here than in 26.3-4 and the other instances of the terminology within the orators, but there is insufficient evidence to draw any

¹²⁴ Cf. also Zoepffel 1974, 80: "Der Demagoge ist eben derjenige, der, ohne ein Amt innezuhaben, durch Anträge oder Verteidiger in den grossen Prozessen die Politik der Stadt aktiv beeinflusst."

¹²⁵ Trans. Vince 1930. Dem. 8.33-34: δημαγωγοῦντες ὑμᾶς καὶ χαριζόμενοι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν οὕτω διατεθήκασιν, ὥστ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τρυφᾶν καὶ κολακεύεσθαι πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκούοντας, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἤδη κινδυνεύειν.

conclusions.¹²⁶ It is, of course, possible that we are seeing here demagoguery that is bad for its style and results, and not demagoguery being bad *per se*; in this case we might consider the phrase δημαγωγούντες ὑμᾶς to serve as a frame or context for the following material, explaining that the corruption of the *dēmos* into policy mistakes is the result of advice rhetorically given outside the strictures of magistracy.

Dēmagōg- terminology appears to a significant degree in Isocrates: seven instances across five speeches. On the whole he fits within the ‘popular’ pattern of usage familiar from Aristophanes and the orators – better, in fact, than does Demosthenes. At 2.15-16 Isocrates advises Nikokles, the successor to the throne of Cypriot Salamis, to serve the people (τὸ πλῆθος θεραπεύωσιν), and that he will be leading the people well (καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγήσεις) if he “does not allow the multitude either to do or to suffer outrage.”¹²⁷ Clearly *dēmagōgein* here has no negative, and perhaps even a positive, valence, or Isocrates would not use it to describe the desired outcome for his advisee. Perhaps more interestingly, this passage suggests that, for Isocrates at least, *dēmagōgein* was an activity suited not only to democracies, but to oligarchies and monarchies as well, and in fact described a state of good governance in those constitutions. *Dēmagōgos* appears three times in *De Pace* (8.121-133).¹²⁸ At 8.122 Isocrates rebukes the Athenians for preferring as *dēmagōgoi* the new leaders who have destroyed Athenian power to the

¹²⁶ Cf. Zoepffel 1974, 81: “Dies ist einer der grundsätzlichen Vorwürfe, die Aristophanes dem Demagogen gemacht hatte, und sicher gebraucht Demosthenes den Begriff an dieser Stelle nicht zufällig.” Leaving aside the odd observation that Demosthenes probably did not use δημαγωγούντες by accident here, I disagree with Zoepffel’s use of Aristophanes as a fit comparison. As we have seen at pp. 11-12 above, Aristophanes faults those currently associated with *dēmagōgia* with being uneducated and disgusting (*Knights* 188-194), common or mercantile (*Knights* 211-222), or illegitimate citizens and wicked (*Frogs* 419): nowhere does he explicitly associate *dēmagōgia* with flattery, only even coming close at *Knights* 215-216 when one of the servants recommends that the Sausage-Seller ‘sweeten’ (ὑπογλυκαίνων) the people. For a more thorough examination of the abuse directed at demagogues in Aristophanes and Old Comedy more generally, see section 4.1 below.

¹²⁷ Isoc. 2.15-16: μήθ’ ὑβρίζειν τὸν ὄχλον ἐὰς μήθ’ ὑβριζόμενον περιορᾶς.

¹²⁸ For more on Isoc. *De Pace* 8.122-127, see pp. 109-110 below.

sort of leaders who gained it;¹²⁹ here we have the familiar situation that *dēmagōgos* itself is neutral and good (*khrestoi*) *dēmagōgoi* are to be preferred to bad (*ponēroi*) ones. This train of thought continues in 8.126, where Perikles is given as an example of the kind of ‘good’ *dēmagōgos* that Athens used to have,¹³⁰ and 8.129 where Isocrates bemoans the current bad orators and *dēmagōgoi* as the factor in the state most inimical to the people.¹³¹ At 15.234 Isocrates calls Perikles “a good leader of the people and an excellent orator”¹³² which only further reinforces the usage we have seen in the *De Pace*.

The two final instances of *dēmagōg*-terminology in Isocrates are more complex and stray a bit from the generally neutral-positive connotations we have seen thus far. At 10.37, Isocrates says of Theseus that he “passed his life beloved of his people and not the object of their plots, not preserving his sovereignty by means of alien military force, but protected, as by a bodyguard, by the goodwill of the citizens, ruling as a king by virtue of his authority, **but by his benefactions as a popular leader.**”¹³³ Isocrates’ appraisal of Theseus in this speech is highly positive, and so there is little reason to see the description of him as ‘being a popular leader by good deeds’ as anything other than

¹²⁹ Isoc. 8.122: Ἄ καὶ πάντων μάλιστ’ ἄν τις θαυμάσειεν ὅτι προχειρίζεσθε δημαγωγούς οὐ τοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχοντας τοῖς μεγάλῃν τὴν πόλιν ποιήσασιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὅμοια καὶ λέγοντας καὶ πράττοντας τοῖς ἀπολέσασιν αὐτήν.

¹³⁰ Isoc. 8.126: Περικλῆς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τοιούτων δημαγωγὸς καταστάς.

¹³¹ Isoc. 8.129: θαυμάζω δ’ εἰ μὴ δύνασθε συνιδεῖν ὅτι γένος οὐδέν ἐστι κακονούστερον τῷ πλήθει **πονηρῶν ῥητόρων καὶ δημαγωγῶν**. The comments of Laistner 1927 do not add much to our understanding of Isocrates’ use of *dēmagōg*-terms. He simply mentions that προχειρίζεσθε should mean ‘prefer’ or ‘choose’ and not ‘elect’, since the latter “suggests appointment to an office, which of course was not necessarily the case with demagogues” (119); we have taken this concept one step further by theorizing that *dēmagōg*-terminology was important precisely because it allowed for the indication of influence within the *polis* outside of the system of magistracies. Of the usage at 126, Laistner notes that “Isocrates uses the word very loosely”, (120) on the basis of his application of it to Peisistratos at *Panath.* 148 (cf. pp. 61–62 below).

¹³² Trans. Norlin 1929. Isoc. 15.234: δημαγωγὸς ὦν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος. Lee Too 2008 appears to completely ignore the word *dēmagōgos*, focusing entirely on the importance of Perikles’ rhetorical ability to Isocrates. It is unclear whether he is thus interpreting *dēmagōgos* as also referring to a specifically rhetorical aspect of politics.

¹³³ Trans. Van Hook 1945. Isoc. 10.37: διετέλεσε τὸν βίον οὐκ ἐπιβουλευόμενος ἀλλ’ ἀγαπώμενος, οὐδ’ ἐπακτῷ δυνάμει τὴν ἀρχὴν διαφυλάττων, ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐνοίᾳ δορυφορούμενος, τῇ μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυραννῶν, ταῖς δ’ εὐεργεσίαις δημαγωγῶν.

positive.¹³⁴ There is an interesting back-and-forth described before this, wherein Theseus hands the government over to the people and they return it to him as sole-ruler.¹³⁵ It is in this context, I believe, that we should see the admixture of popular/constitution and single/tyrannical rule described by τῇ μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυραννῶν, ταῖς δ' εὐεργεσίαις δημαγωγῶν.¹³⁶ Zoepffel sees in this passage evidence, 'if only in a playful form', of writers considering the past from the angle of present experience,¹³⁷ but it seems to me impossible for them ever to have considered the past from any other angle. Finally, at *Panathenaicus* 148 Isocrates describes the tyranny of Peisistratos thus: "after he had placed himself at **the head of the people** and done much harm to the city and driven out the best of her citizens as being partisans of oligarchy, [he] brought an end to the rule of

¹³⁴ Zajonz 2002, 209 notes the (at least) neutral valence of the word in Isocrates: "Analog zum Substantiv δημαγωγός (8,126 u. 15,234 von Perikles; abfällig hingegen 12,148) hat auch das Verb δημαγωγεῖν bei Isokrates nicht notwendig einen pejorativen Beiklang, sondern bezeichnet neutral die politische Lenkung des Volkes (vgl. 2,16)."

¹³⁵ On the sometimes neutral valence of τυραννεῖν in Isocrates as 'single rule', cf. Zajonz 2002, 200: "Hier, wie nicht selten bei Isokrates (vgl. noch 3,11; 6,45; 9,27.28.64.71; 10,37; ep. 6,11), im neutralen Sinne von ‚allein herrschen‘ (vgl. dazu auch Eucken 220 mit Anm. 31); dagegen mit eindeutig negativem Beiklang 8,91 οὐκ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τυραννεῖν ἐπεθύμησαν (vgl. auch 5,154 βασιλικῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τυραννικῶς)."

¹³⁶ The combination of sole-rule and democracy depicted by Isocrates here may well come from the *Supplices* of Euripides. At 349-57 of that play, Theseus, speaking about his plan to compel Thebes to return the bodies of the slain Argives, says (trans. Kovacs 1998) "I want the city too to ratify this decision, and ratify it they will since that is what I wish. But if I add my reasons I will have more of the people's good will. And in fact I have made the people sovereign by freeing this city and giving them equal votes. I shall take Adrastus along as the proof of what I am saying and appear before the citizen assembly. When I have won them over on this point, I shall gather a picked band of Athenian youth and return here" (δόξαι δὲ χρήζω καὶ πόλει πάσῃ τόδε, | δόξει δ' ἐμοῦ θέλοντος· ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου | προσδοῖς ἔχοιμ' ἂν δῆμον εὐμενέστερον. | καὶ γὰρ κατέστησ' αὐτὸν ἐς μοναρχίαν | ἐλευθερώσας τήνδ' ἰσόνηφον πόλιν. | λαβὼν δ' Ἄδραστον δεῖγμα τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων | ἐς πλῆθος ἀστῶν εἶμι· καὶ πείσας τάδε, | λεκτοὺς ἀθροίσας δεῦρ' Ἀθηναίων κόρους | ἥξω·). Theseus' concern for the δῆμον εὐμενέστερον in Euripides matches up well with his preservation by τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐνοίᾳ in Isocrates, and although Theseus specifically rejects tyranny in the *Supplices* (cf. 429-455), he is certainly confident at l. 350 in his ability to carry the day essentially through his ἐξουσίᾳ. Although it is dangerous to draw parallels too closely between dramatic figures and historical personages, we could perhaps see in the Theseus of the *Supplices* an echo of how some Athenians (Thucydides, for example) felt about the government of the city during the lives of particularly influential statesmen like Perikles.

¹³⁷ Zoepffel 1974, 85: "Auf jeden Fall zeigt die Stelle aber, dass man schon früh im 4. Jahrhundert, wenn zuerst vielleicht auch nur in spielerischer Form, daran ging, die Vergangenheit unter dem Blickwinkel dieser Gegenwartserfahrung zu betrachten."

the people and set himself up as their master.”¹³⁸ That Peisistratos began his path to tyranny as a *dēmagōgos* does not necessitate a negative valence for that term, but his action in driving out the *beltistoi* and oligarchs suggest a potentially partisan usage (*i.e.*, that Peisistratos turned to the *dēmos* in his intra-elite struggle, as Herodotus had described Kleisthenes doing at 5.69). These passages, then, although they are more complicated, ultimately do not contradict the neutral valence we have seen in Isocrates to this point.

Before we close out the fourth century with Aristotle, some discussion of Theopompos is necessary. A digression within his *Philippika* became split off at some point in antiquity and was labeled Περὶ δημαγωγῶν (*Peri dēmagōgōn*) – ‘On the Demagogues’. We shall leave aside the title itself, since there is no evidence that Theopompos employed it. W.R. Connor has devoted an excellent monograph to analysis and commentary on the relevant fragments, and so I shall not go into depth on every surviving passage.¹³⁹ Connor concludes, based upon the fact that no figure receives a particularly favorable report in the surviving fragments, that Theopompos was wholly opposed to democracy and the politicians who espoused and enabled it: for Theopompos, “[a] succession of demagogues, beginning with Themistocles and extending down to late in the century, had progressively corrupted the state and had developed more and more ingenious ways of satisfying their own appetites for wealth and power.”¹⁴⁰ I am not certain that we should assume because Theopompos disliked the *dēmagōgoi* he discussed that he considered a *dēmagōgos* as an inherently bad thing.¹⁴¹ It could equally have been

¹³⁸ Trans. Norlin 1929. Isoc. 12.148: *δημαγωγὸς γενόμενος καὶ πολλὰ τὴν πόλιν λυμηνάμενος καὶ τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν πολιτῶν ὡς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς ὄντας ἐκβαλὼν, τελευτῶν τὸν τε δῆμον κατέλυσεν καὶ τύραννον αὐτὸν κατέστησεν.*

¹³⁹ Connor 1968.

¹⁴⁰ Connor 1968, 74.

¹⁴¹ It is also unclear whether Connor himself would hold this: at 144 n. 23 he remarks that “[t]he word ‘demagogue’ is used in this study as a literal rendering of the Greek, although the pejorative connotations

the most apt term to describe the variety of political figures that he wanted to discuss, some of whom were primarily known as magistrates, some generals, and some orators. And, as we have seen in Isocrates, *dēmagōg-* terminology could by this point easily be applied to non-democratic figures. It is worth examining one particular passage, Fragment 96c (a scholion to Aristophanes *Peace* 681),¹⁴² both because it shows some of the conventional ‘good or bad people can be demagogues’ line of thought and because it introduces a version of *dēmagōgia* which we have yet to discuss:

Hyperbolos was the son of Khremes and the brother of Kharon, a lamp seller, vile in his character. **This man succeeded Kleon in the leadership (*dēmagōgian*) over the people.** Starting with him, the Athenians began to hand over the city and the leadership of the people to vile men, whereas before entirely outstanding men had been leaders of the people. But the people chose men of such a sort because they distrusted the esteemed citizens on account of the war against the Lakedaimonians, lest they might destroy the democracy.¹⁴³

First we can observe the transition from “outstanding men” (πάνυ λαμπρῶν πολιτῶν) and “esteemed citizens” (τοῖς ἐνδόξοις) to “vile men” (φαύλοις) in the political leadership. This juxtaposition may indicate to us that it was the people who filled the position of *dēmagōgos*, and not the position itself, that was objectionable to Theopompos. Second, we have the phrase οὗτος μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Κλέωνος δυναστείαν διεδέξατο τὴν δημαγωγίαν. As Connor notes, the wording here “suggests that its source spoke of the position of the demagogue almost as a formal office, held continuously over a considerable period

of the English word are not always present in the Greek”, and at 71 he concludes that the politicians described by Theopompos “were demagogues in both the ancient sense and the modern.” Even the combination of these statements does not make clear whether Theopompos should be included among those for whom ‘demagogue’ did not have a pejorative connotation in the Greek.

¹⁴² Theopompos F 96c is discussed at more length in pp. 112-114 below.

¹⁴³ Text and trans. *BNJ*. Theopomp. F 96c *BNJ*: Ὑπέρβολος VLh Χρέμητος υἱὸς ἦν VTLh Ὑπέρβολος, Γ ἀδελφὸς δὲ Χάρωνος, λυχνοπώλης, φαῦλος τοὺς τρόπους. οὗτος μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Κλέωνος δυναστείαν διεδέξατο τὴν δημαγωγίαν. ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ πρώτου ἤρξαντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φαύλοις παραδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δημαγωγίαν πρότερον δημαγωγούντων πάνυ λαμπρῶν πολιτῶν. προεῖλετο δὲ τοὺς τοιοῦτους ὁ δῆμος ἀπιστῶν διὰ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους τοῖς ἐνδόξοις τῶν πολιτῶν, μὴ τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταλύσαιεν.

during which the demagogue was dominant in the state.”¹⁴⁴ We will see this view of the *dēmagōgia* as a pseudo-office to be held by a single person again in Aristotle and then in Plutarch. It is, I think, a later development that aims at simplifying a political landscape for which many of the details had become hazy at best, and it had the additional benefit of adapting Athenian democratic history to fit into the same conceptual framework as king or archon lists.¹⁴⁵ Nor does this particular meaning make much headway: it seems to mainly be restricted to *dēmagōgia* of the *dēmagōg-* terms, and more often than not even later authors will indicate the presence of multiple *dēmagōgoi* or contestants for the *dēmagōgia*.

Although I have no intention of entering here into the vexed question of the authorship of the *Athenaion Politeia* (*Ath. Pol.*) ascribed to Aristotle,¹⁴⁶ I shall briefly address the appearances of *dēmagōg-* terminology in that work separately from the comprehensive analysis of Aristotle’s *Politics*. The reader may then decide to what extent she or he believes that the usage in the two documents differs; in any case, we see only seven *dēmagōg-* terms in the *Ath. Pol.*, and they are not critical for our understanding of the *Politics* (although applying the conclusions from the 39 appearances in the *Politics* to the *Ath. Pol.* would have a greater impact).¹⁴⁷ *Ath. Pol.* 22.3 mentions merely that

¹⁴⁴ Connor 1968, 64.

¹⁴⁵ Another possibility is that this conception of *dēmagōgia* represents a deliberate anti-democratic effort to reduce the Athenian *politeia* to government by the single most powerful person, a step which would both remove the truly democratic aspects of the *politeia* and conceptually bind it more closely to tyranny (we will see the connection between democracy and tyranny in the eyes of anti-democratic theorists again in Aristotle: see p. 73 below). Either way, if we accept Thucydides’ view that the primacy of Perikles was unique then we shall have to reject any historicity to this conception of *dēmagōgia*.

¹⁴⁶ For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Rhodes 1992, 58-63, who ultimately sides against Aristotelian authorship. Moore 1983, 143-144, comes to the opposite conclusion. I shall refer to the author of this work as [Aristotle] for the sake of ease and to distinguish between definitely Aristotelian and possibly Aristotelian material.

¹⁴⁷ This is, more or less, the approach taken by Zoepffel 1974; cf. esp. 75.

Peisistratos was a *dēmagōgos* and a *stratēgos* before becoming tyrant.¹⁴⁸ Rhodes sees here and elsewhere in the *Ath. Pol.* “hostile undertones”,¹⁴⁹ but it seems more likely to me that *dēmagōgos* is simply complementing *stratēgos* by adding the fact of significant political influence, perhaps through rhetorical or partisan activity. After all, the passage is discussing the implementation of ostracism because of a distrust of those in power/influence,¹⁵⁰ and simply being one of the generals was less of a qualification for ostracism than having great influence in the state.¹⁵¹ The other six appearances of *dēmagōg*-terms in the *Ath. Pol.* all pertain more or less directly to the decline of political leadership at Athens. *Ath. Pol.* 26.1 and 41.2 both refer to the *dēmagōgoi* causing problems for the state in the period after the reforms of Ephialtes, at 26.1 by loosening the constitution (ἀνίεσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν) and at 41.2 by causing the state to ‘make many mistakes’.¹⁵² At *Ath. Pol.* 27.1 Perikles is said to advance to influence in the state,¹⁵³ and at 27.3 he institutes jury-pay as a popular counter-move to the wealth of Kimon.¹⁵⁴ Although the latter act could appear negative, it is important to note that [Aristotle] deliberately distances himself from such a judgment: “the result of which according to some critics was their deterioration.”¹⁵⁵ [Aristotle] is more than capable of making indicative statements if he himself believes them to be true. Furthermore, shortly

¹⁴⁸ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.3: Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὢν τύραννος κατέστη.

¹⁴⁹ Rhodes 1992, 271.

¹⁵⁰ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.3: τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν.

¹⁵¹ We will see below that in the *Politics* Aristotle expands upon the potential importance of generalship for tyranny, since he observed both a warlike-demeanor and popularity with the people to be helpful for maintaining a tyranny. Here, however, the presentation of Peisistratos is less partisan even than in Isocrates (cf. pp. 61-62 above).

¹⁵² [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 41.2: συνέβη τὴν πόλιν διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν διὰ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχήν. This latter passage has a distinct connection to *Politics* 1274a in the attribution of the decline at Athens to naval *arkhē*.

¹⁵³ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.1: πρὸς τὸ δημαγωγεῖν ἐλθόντος Περικλέους.

¹⁵⁴ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3: ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ μισθοφόρα τὰ δικαστήρια Περικλῆς πρῶτος, ἀντιδημαγωγῶν πρὸς τὴν Κίμωνος εὐπορίαν.

¹⁵⁵ Trans. Rackham 1935. [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3: ἀφ’ ὧν αἰτιῶνται τινες χεῖρω γενέσθαι.

thereafter at 28.1 [Aristotle] explicitly says that the state was better run with Perikles at its head,¹⁵⁶ and indeed that in former times only the reputable (*epieikeis*) were *dēmagōgoi*.¹⁵⁷ Finally, at 28.4 we see a full description of ‘bad people’ holding ‘the demagogy’ after Kleophon: those willing to be bold and to curry favor with the many looking only to the present.¹⁵⁸ There is nothing in the *Ath. Pol.* that is inconsistent with our definition of *dēmagōgos* as a figure with important influence over the *dēmos*-qua-state.¹⁵⁹ There is, in fact, no evidence that a *dēmagōgos* represented only a part of the state (*i.e.*, the *dēmos*-qua-plebs). There are better *dēmagōgoi* and worse *dēmagōgoi*, and both leaders of the people (*prostatēs tou dēmou*) and leaders of the *aristoi* (called γνωρίμων in this instance) fall under this general heading.

1.5. Aristotle’s *Politics*

The usage of *dēmagōg*-terminology in Aristotle’s *Politics* can more or less be divided into five categories: the disconnect between the *aristoi* (*epieikeis*) in a *polis* and the leadership of that *polis*; flattery of the *dēmos*; turning to the *dēmos* for support; the movement from *dēmagōgos* to *tyrannos*; and the generic application of influence. We shall begin with the first category because it is the most central to Aristotle’s thinking and, I believe, provides some of the best evidence in support of our working definition of *dēmagōg*-terminology. At the heart of this discussion is *Pol.* 1292a:

¹⁵⁶ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.1: ἕως μὲν οὖν Περικλῆς προειστῆκει τοῦ δήμου, βελτίω τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἦν.

¹⁵⁷ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.1: ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις αἰεὶ διετέλουν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς δημαγωγοῦντες.

¹⁵⁸ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.4: ἀπὸ δὲ Κλεοφώντος ἤδη διεδέχοντο συνεχῶς τὴν δημαγωγίαν οἱ μάλιστα βουλόμενοι θρασύνεσθαι καὶ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς τὸ παραυτίκα βλέποντες. On this passage and the contrast of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ leadership in fifth-century Athens, see section 2.2 below and especially pp. 110-112.

¹⁵⁹ Canfora 1993, 12 also sees the *Ath. Pol.* as falling in line with the ‘popular’ definition of *dēmagōgos* which we have seen in (*e.g.*) Aristophanes: “Termine neutro, dunque, che si riempie di tratti negativi per il modo in cui i nuovi politici, provenienti dai ceti bassi, praticano la *demagogia*. Limpida riprova di ciò la testimonianza di Aristotele nella *Costituzione di Atene*: ‘In principio erano le persone perbene che facevano i demagoghi’ (28, 2).”

Another form of democracy is that in which all of the citizens who are not liable to scrutiny participate, but *nomos* rules; and another form of democracy is when there is a share of the magistracies for everyone, provided that he is a citizen, but *nomos* rules; and another form of democracy is that the other things are the same, but the multitude is master and not *nomos*. And this comes to be when the decrees are master [*i.e.*, dispositive] but not *nomos*; **and this happens on account of the *dēmagōgoi*. For in cities governed by democracies under *nomos* a *dēmagōgos* does not come into being**, but the ‘better’ (*beltistoi*) of the citizens are in a position of priority [literally: seated in the front row]; **but wherever the *nomoi* are not master, there *dēmagōgoi* come to be**. For the *dēmos* comes to be a monarch, a composite one out of many; for the many are master not individually but all together.¹⁶⁰

There are two seeming contradictions in this passage. The first is the direction of the contingent relationship between anomic democracy and *dēmagōgoi*. On this issue Mann follows Zoepffel in concluding that the apparent contradiction between demagogues causing the sovereignty of the multitude and only arising in that condition is the result of Aristotle modifying his theoretical schema on the basis of historical judgments.¹⁶¹ Although it is possible that Aristotle has, in the space of a single sentence, reversed his judgment in such a way as to leave a clear contradiction, it is perhaps more likely that the generality of the term *sumbainei* makes the sequence almost penetrate subliminally without the reader pondering its implicit contradiction. In point of fact, history defuses this contradiction: there is no reason to assume that this degenerate form of democracy has to emerge exclusively from a democracy in which the laws held previously a privileged status. Such demagogic democracies could well emerge out of non-

¹⁶⁰ Aristot. *Pol.* 1292a: ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ παντὶ μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔαν μόνον ἢ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὰλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, κύριον δ’ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος· **συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ’ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ’ οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσὶ κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί.** μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες.

¹⁶¹ Mann 2007, 18; Zoepffel 1974, 73: “Hat sich bisher ergeben, dass Aristoteles sein theoretisches Schema – den Demagogen gibt es nur dort, wo das Gesetz nicht herrscht (1292 a 10f.) – auf Grund historischer Urteile modifiziert – es sind gerade Demagogen, die einen Zustand der Gesetzlosigkeit herbeiführen (1292 a 23ff.) –, so lässt sich andererseits meiner Ansicht nach auch zeigen, dass er historische Urteile auf Grund seines Schemas fällte.”

democracies. In light of these observations, we should stop attempting to impose a rigid contingency on 1292a, and recognize it as describing two states: either *nomos* prevails, or it does not. This ‘lawlessness’ can occur in any constitution.¹⁶² In a democracy, this state of ‘lawlessness’ entails two things: first, the *dēmos* and its decrees are supreme (κύριον δ’ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον... τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος... μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται); second, and this is where my own definition appears, the state is guided by *dēmagōgoi* rather than the *beltistoi*.

The second contradiction in *Politics* 1292a is the distinction between the rule of νόμος (*nomos*) and the rule of ψήφισμα (*psēphisma* - decree). The notion that a *psēphisma*, that is, a decision taken by the citizen body of a democratic city-state, could be anomic in the strict, legal sense is a contradiction in terms. The idea of the sovereignty of law is an intriguing idea, but in practice people will always possess the power to regulate law, whether by insisting on the continuance of existing law or by changing it. The ongoing accumulation of *psēphismata* is capable of altering the *nomoi*, at least over time and sometimes quickly. However, an important, and indeed perhaps the oldest, definition of *nomos* means ‘custom’ or ‘tradition’ more than ‘law of the *polis*’. Martin Ostwald postulates that Cleisthenes deliberately associated the term *nomos* with statutes of the *polis* during his reforms,¹⁶³ and that over the course of the fifth century there was an evolution from the archaic *nomos*, immutable and absolute, to the sophistic

¹⁶² Cf. Zoepffel 1974, 71: “Denn den beiden Extremformen der zwei ‚Abeichungen‘ Oligarchie und Demokratie ordet Aristoteles nun die dritte ‚Abweichung‘, die Tyrannis, als Ganzes zu, wobei er sie als Extremform der Monarchie auffasst. Das System ist zugunsten des gemeinsamen Nenners ‚Gesetzlosigkeit‘ abgewandelt.”

¹⁶³ Ostwald 1986, 27: “Cleisthenes may have been responsible for the adoption of *nomos* as the official term for ‘statute’ to replace the older term, *thesmos*, in order to stress the democratic aspect of his reforms: namely, that no enactment was to be enforced unless its validity were first ratified by the people as a whole, regardless of social or economic status.” Note that *nomos* became not simply a term for statute, but for specifically *democratic* statute.

understanding of *nomos* as man-made, relative, and very rooted within a temporal and geographical context.¹⁶⁴ From this Athenian historical point of view, the crisis of *psēphisma* and *nomos* really comes to a head only in the last fifteen years of the fifth century,¹⁶⁵ as democratic and oligarchic politicians alike successfully manipulate the *boulē* and *ekklēsia* into taking actions that clearly conflict with accepted and longstanding judicial and procedural rules.¹⁶⁶ The Athenians confronted this crisis by formally establishing as a coherent written body the *nomoi* of the polis (a process that was begun under the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, but continued during the resumed democracy and after the rule of the Thirty), and by passing several measures over the course of the fourth century that took direct control over the laws away from the *ekklēsia*, entrusting that control to other, democratically formed bodies (the *nomothetai* and the *boulē*) and mandating a more deliberate and involved process of review and enactment.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ See Ostwald 1986, 85-89.

¹⁶⁵ That the Ephialtic reforms did not intend to disempower the traditional body of law prevailing under the Kleisthenic constitution can be seen by their formulation as stripping away from the Areopagus powers that had improperly accreted to it. Cf. [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 25.2: ἔπειτα τῆς βουλῆς ἐπὶ Κόνωνος ἄρχοντος **ἅπαντα περιεῖλε τὰ ἐπίθετα** δι' ὧν ἦν ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, τὰ δὲ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀπέδωκεν (Then in the archonship of Konon **he stripped the Council of all its added powers** which made it the safeguard of the constitution, and assigned some of them to the Five Hundred and others to the People and to the jury-courts. Trans. Rackham 1935.).

¹⁶⁶ The execution of six Athenian generals after the battle of Arginousai in 406 has long been recognized as technically illegal; Ostwald 1986, 436-441 provides a comprehensive overview of the event, which he sees as the high-water-mark of popular sovereignty (and the event that signaled its failure as constituted). In Xenophon's account the many (*plēthos*) overrule an attempt to stop the conviction of the generals on the grounds of its illegality, protesting that "it is shocking not to let the people do whatever they wish" (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.12: δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μὴ τις ἐάσει δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται. Trans. Brownson 1918.). On the oligarchic side, both the regimes of the Four Hundred and the Thirty began as temporary grants of plenipotentiary power by the *ekklēsia* to a small body. On the Four Hundred, cf. Thuc. 8.65-70; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 29. On the Thirty, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.1-2, 11-14; [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 33-34.

¹⁶⁷ Andocides 1.17 and Thucydides 8.67.2 do indicate an awareness by the 410s of the concept of an illegal (*paranomic*) proposal; unfortunately, we lack the evidence to draw any certain conclusions about what constituted *nomos*, or whether *nomos* in this sense excluded *psēphismata* as opposed to simply (potentially) being broader than just *psēphismata*. What we are seeing in this case is not a simple superiority of *nomos* to *psēphisma*, but a procedure for addressing on an *ad hoc* basis concerns that a given *psēphisma* might contextually tamper with *nomos* without attention to consistency or to accepted principles. Indeed, the exact legislative action of the oligarchs in 411 (a *psēphisma* forbidding the review of *psēphismata* for *paranomia*) would be incomprehensible if there were not an accepted notion among the Athenians that *psēphismata* could overrule or rewrite *nomos*. See Ostwald 1986, 509-524; on the changes to *nomothesia*

For Aristotle, however, the conflict between *nomos* and *psēphisma* is not the same as for the Athenian democracy, and the steps taken by the latter to address that conflict are irrelevant.¹⁶⁸ In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle makes quite clear that the point of *nomos* is to guide citizens to virtue and that, while the decent may respond to reason and incitements to virtue by appeal to nobility, the base require punishment. Aristotle further directly equates the many with the base who must be guided by punishments.¹⁶⁹ While human beings supplying such punishment for ‘improper’ desires are resented, *nomos* is

during the last decade of the fifth century, see Harrison 1955; on these and further changes over the fourth century, see MacDowell 1975.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1274a: ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσχυσεν, ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν: καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, **καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὐξῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν**. φαίνεται δ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἷτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη καὶ δημαγωγὸς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἐπεικῶν). (For as the law-court grew strong, men courted favor with the people as with a tyrant, and so brought the constitution to the present democracy; and Ephialtes and Perikles docked the power of the Council on the Areopagus, while Perikles instituted payment for serving in the law-courts, and in this manner finally **the successive leaders of the people led them on by growing stages to the present democracy**. But this does not seem to have come about in accordance with the intention of Solon, but rather as a result of accident [for **the common people** having been the cause of the naval victories at the time of the Persian invasion **became proud and adopted bad men as popular leaders** when the respectable classes opposed their policy]. Trans. Rackham 1932.) Note that the trajectory of Athenian democracy down to Aristotle's time (εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν) is portrayed as entirely negative and characterized throughout by demagogic leadership.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1179b6-13, 1180a4-12: νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμήσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἥθός τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας....οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἴονται τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυστέροις οὓσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπεικὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσῃ, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. (But as it is, we see that although theories have power to stimulate and encourage generous youths, and, given an inborn nobility of character and a genuine love of what is noble, can make them susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to stimulate the mass of mankind to moral nobility. For it is the nature of the many to be amenable to fear but not to a sense of honor, and to abstain from evil not because of its baseness but because of the penalties it entails...for the many are more amenable to compulsion and punishment than to reason and to moral ideals. Hence some persons hold, that while it is proper for the lawgiver to encourage and exhort men to virtue on moral grounds, in the expectation that those who have had a virtuous moral upbringing will respond, yet he is bound to impose chastisement and penalties on the disobedient and ill-conditioned, and to banish the incorrigible out of the state altogether. For [they argue] although the virtuous man, who guides his life by moral ideals, will be obedient to reason, the base, whose desires are fixed on pleasure, must be chastised by pain, like a beast of burden. Trans. Rackham 1926.)

seen as less oppressive.¹⁷⁰ Additionally, Aristotle considers the fundamental principle of democracy to be, as Richard Bodéüs notes,

freedom—which is understood by many as the license afforded everyone to act as they please.... Aristotle judges this democratic freedom severely, in direct proportion as it encourages in its citizens a refusal to be governed by anyone. A regime of laws is therefore more important there than anywhere else, on account of the dangers that this regime brings on itself. ‘To live with a view to the regime should not be supposed to be slavery, but preservation,’ Aristotle protests.¹⁷¹

If the *πλῆθος* (*plēthos* – the many) can only be guided to virtue by punishments enshrined in *nomos*, and a *psēphisma* is by definition an enactment of the *plēthos*, we can begin to see why, for Aristotle, a *psēphisma* can never be a *nomos*, and why a polis where *psēphismata* and not *nomoi* are dispositive is not a *politeia* at all.¹⁷² We can also understand why Aristotle in the *Politics* does not so much as acknowledge the changes to *nomothesia* at Athens in the fourth century: shifting the responsibility for law-making from one democratic organ of the *plēthos* to another while retaining the power of the

¹⁷⁰ Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1180a22-24: καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, καὶ ὁρῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς τάττων τὸ ἐπικέκ. (Men are hated when they thwart people's inclinations, even though they do so rightly, whereas law can enjoin virtuous conduct without being invidious. Trans. Rackham 1926.)

¹⁷¹ Bodéüs 1991, 246-247. Three footnotes *ad loc.* provide citations of relevant passages from the *Politics*: before the ellipsis: “Cf. *Pol.* 1290b1ff., 1291b34ff., 1310a28ff., 1317a40ff.”; first sentence after the ellipsis: “*Pol.* 1317b14-15”; third sentence after the ellipsis: “*Ibid.* 1310a34-36”.

¹⁷² Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1292a23-33: αἵτιοι δὲ εἰσι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους οὗτοι, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλους διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δῆμον πάντων εἶναι κύριον, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δήμου δόξης τούτους· πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις. ἔτι δ’ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν, ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται πάσαι αἱ ἀρχαί. εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων <τῶν καθόλου>, τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ ταύτην πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστ’ εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερόν ὥς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ἣ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου. (And these men cause the resolutions of the assembly to be supreme and not the laws, by referring all things to the people; for they owe their rise to greatness to the fact that the people is sovereign over all things while they are sovereign over the opinion of the people, for the multitude believes them. Moreover those who bring charges against the magistrates say that the people ought to judge the suits, and the people receive the invitation gladly, so that all the magistracies are put down. And it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that such a democracy is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not govern there is no constitution, as the law ought to govern all things while the magistrates control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be constitutional government; if then democracy really is one of the forms of constitution, it is manifest that an organization of this kind, in which all things are administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the proper sense, for it is impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal rule. Trans. Rackham 1932.)

dikastēria over the magistracies does not necessarily obviate the problems that Aristotle has with government by *psēphismata*.¹⁷³ The comment that *nomos* will naturally advance ‘*beltistoi*’ to the foremost position is yet more evidence of Aristotle’s teleological conception of *nomos* and his prejudice about ‘the many’. In some ways, then, the definition of *dēmagōgos* is unchanged in Aristotle: it is still a politician who accepts the validity of democracy as a political system, including the validity of *psēphismata* passed by the *ekklēsia* and scrutiny of magistrates by the *dikastēria*. However, for Aristotle such a politician is flattering the *dēmos* by accepting/asserting such rights as belonging to it, and must be doing so because they stand to benefit from the *dēmos* retaining its (excessive) power.

¹⁷³ [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.8-9 seems to begin from Aristotle’s premises vis-à-vis the nexus of ‘good’ citizens, the many, law, punishment, and freedom, but [Xenophon] explicitly acknowledges that in “good government” the ‘most clever’ (*dexiōtatoi*) make *nomoi* in their own best interest: ὁ γὰρ δῆμος βούλεται οὐκ εὐνομουμένης τῆς πόλεως αὐτὸς δουλεύειν, ἀλλ’ ἐλεύθερος εἶναι καὶ ἄρχειν, τῆς δὲ κακονομίας αὐτῷ ὀλίγον μέλει· ὁ γὰρ σὺ νομίζεις οὐκ εὐνομεῖσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τούτου ἰσχύει ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν. εἰ δ’ εὐνομίαν ζητεῖς, πρῶτα μὲν ὄψει τοὺς δεξιωτάτους αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους τιθέντας (For the people do not want a good government under which they themselves are slaves; they want to be free and to rule. Bad government is of little concern to them. What you consider bad government is the very source of the people’s strength and freedom. If it is good government you seek, you will first observe the cleverest men establishing the laws in their own interest. Trans. Marchant 1925.). As a result, *eunomia* is indeed the *khrēstoi* punishing the *ponēroi*, but for that reason it is anathema to the continued existence of democracy: ἔπειτα κολάσουσιν οἱ χρηστοὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ βουλεύσουσιν οἱ χρηστοὶ περὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ οὐκ ἐάσουσι μαινομένους ἀνθρώπους βουλεύειν οὐδὲ λέγειν οὐδὲ ἐκκλησιάζειν. ἀπὸ τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τάχιστ’ ἂν ὁ δῆμος εἰς δουλείαν καταπέσοι (Then the good men will punish the bad; they will make policy for the city and not allow madmen to participate or to speak their minds or to meet in assembly. As a result of these excellent measures the people would swiftly fall into slavery. Trans. Marchant 1925.). Thus the critical differences between [Xenophon] and Aristotle are (1) that [Xenophon] has no notion that democracy ‘should’ be eunomic in Aristotle’s sense (rather, [Xenophon] believes that the stability of democracy is best served by it *not* being eunomic), and (2) that [Xenophon] is less veiled about the partisan orientation of ideas like *eunomia*. Additionally, on the notion of punishment as an important form of socialization and education, one of the key features of the Athenian democracy singled out by [Xenophon] (1.10) is the inability for citizens to hit or discipline slaves and metics: τῶν δούλων δ’ αὐ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία, καὶ οὔτε πατάξαι ἔξεστιν αὐτόθι οὔτε ὑπεκστήσεται σοι ὁ δοῦλος (Now among the slaves and metics at Athens there is the greatest uncontrolled wantonness; you can’t hit them there, and a slave will not stand aside for you. Trans. Marchant 1925.). Again, in contrast to Aristotle, [Xenophon] (1.11) approves (not morally, but pragmatically) of this suspension of punishment not only for the *plēthos* but even for non-citizens as useful for preserving the democracy: εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο θαυμάζει, ὅτι ἐῶσι τοὺς δούλους τρυφᾶν αὐτόθι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς διατᾶσθαι ἐνίοις, καὶ τοῦτο γνώμη φανεῖεν ἂν ποιοῦντες (If anyone is also startled by the fact that they let the slaves live luxuriously there and some of them sumptuously, it would be clear that even this they do for a reason. Trans. Marchant 1925.).

This *schema* explains three of our four other categories of Aristotelian usage of *dēmagōg-* terminology. At *Politics* 1292a and even more clearly at 1313b *dēmagōgoi* are labeled the ‘flatterers of the people’.¹⁷⁴ Since tyrants and the *dēmos* alike are both elevated above their true civic station, anyone who enables or views as appropriately-positioned the tyrant in a tyranny or the *dēmos* in a ‘modern’ democracy is, by necessity, a flatterer: *i.e.*, someone saying an untruth for their own benefit. There is a recurring theme in the *Politics* of the connection between *dēmagōgoi*/democracy and tyranny on the basis of the mistreatment of the *nomoi* and *beltistoi*.¹⁷⁵ At 1305b Aristotle lays out the pattern, which we have seen before in Isocrates and [Aristotle], of tyrants emerging from *dēmagōgoi*. This impulse to tyranny among *dēmagōgoi* (and use of the position of *dēmagōgos* to achieve tyranny) is repeated at 1308a and 1310b and illustrated with examples at 1310b¹⁷⁶ and 1315b.¹⁷⁷ In a similar vein to that of the would-be tyrant, *dēmagōg-* terminology can be used to refer to any instance of a leader appealing to the *dēmos* for support: thus the Spartan kings could be said to *dēmagōgein* to compete with the Ephors for influence, and by doing so turn the state from aristocracy to democracy.¹⁷⁸ Oligarchs can likewise cause a shift in constitution by appealing to the *dēmos*: “oligarchies are overthrown from within themselves when from motives of rivalry they

¹⁷⁴ Aristot. *Pol.* 1313b: ἔστι γὰρ ὁ δημαγωγὸς τοῦ δήμου κόλαξ.

¹⁷⁵ Aristotle complains at 1292a that ‘modern’ democracy is like tyranny because “both exercise despotic control over the better classes” (ἄμφω δεσποτικά τῶν βελτιόνων), and at 1313b and 1319b democracy, like tyranny, is associated with the “dominance of women in the homes...and lack of discipline among the slaves” (1313b: γυναικοκρατία τε περὶ τὰς οἰκίας... καὶ δούλων ἄνεσις διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν; 1319b: ἀναρχία τε δούλων...καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων).

¹⁷⁶ Aristot. *Pol.* 1310b: Παναίτιος δ’ ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθήνησι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις καὶ ἕτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ **δημαγωγίας**.

¹⁷⁷ Aristot. *Pol.* 1315b: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος **δημαγωγὸς** ἦν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν διετέλεσεν ἀδορυφόρητος.

¹⁷⁸ Aristot. *Pol.* 1270b: **δημαγωγεῖν** αὐτοὺς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτη συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν: δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας συνέβαινε.

play the demagogue... as the ‘civic guards’ (*politophylakes*) at Larisa **courted popularity** with the mob because it elected them.”¹⁷⁹

The final type of ‘demagogy’ that appears in the *Politics* does not fit with any of the established uses, and should be considered as distinct. There are two such instances: at 1305b when a sort of ‘demagogy’ *within* a small group of oligarchs is discussed, and at 1312b where a single individual is said to *dēmagōgein* another individual. In the first instance, Aristotle notes that one way in which ‘demagogy’ can occur in an oligarchy is “among the oligarchs themselves, for a **demagogue** can arise among them even when they are a very small body—as for instance in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of Kharikles rose to power by **currying popularity** with the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred the party of Phrynikhos rose in the same way.”¹⁸⁰ Zoepffel, at something of a loss for how to interpret this unusual usage, suggests that Aristotle intended to attribute the extremes of the Thirty and the Four Hundred (convictions of innocent citizens and confiscation of their property) to Kharikles and Phrynikhos, because they ‘demagogued’ the others and these are the acts associated with ‘democratic demagogues’.¹⁸¹ These abuses would then cause the downfall of the oligarchy. Zoepffel’s interpretation reads a fantastic amount into Aristotle: Aristotle does not explain what he means when he says that the ‘demagogy’ of Kharikles and Phrynikhos caused their

¹⁷⁹ Trans. Rackham 1932. Aristot. *Pol.* 1306a: κινούνται δ’ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ φιλονεικίαν **δημαγωγούντων**... οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς **τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγωγῶν**.

¹⁸⁰ Trans. Rackham 1932. Aristot. *Pol.* 1305b: ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις—ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ **δημαγωγὸς** καὶ πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὧσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς Τριάκοντα **δημαγωγούντες**, καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

¹⁸¹ Zoepffel 1974, 74: “Aristoteles muss die Ansicht vertreten, dass es Charikles mit seinen engsten Freunden war, der die übrigen ‘Tyrrannen’ zu jenen gesetzwidrigen Handlungen – Verurteilungen unschuldiger Bürger und Konfiszierungen ihrer Vermögen: sonst bekannt als typisch für das Treiben ‘demokratischer Demagogen’ – verleitete, die schliesslich zum Sturz der Oligarchie führten. Dabei muss er die Vorstellung gehabt haben, es sei zu diesen Exzessen nur gekommen, weil die Gruppe um Charikles sich dadurch die Führung innerhalb der Oligarchie verschaffen wollte.”

respective oligarchies to κινουῦνται; nor does he mention the ‘excesses’ of the regime(s). Zoepffel’s interpretation also overlooks the fact that Aristotle does not, in fact, categorize this occurrence of ‘regime-change’ (if that is what we should understand κινουῦνται to mean here) with those that occur when the oligarchs mistreat the multitude (ἕνα μὲν ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι τὸ πλῆθος): it is specifically in the other group, of those ‘changed’ from within. I think it more likely that we are seeing one of two things here: either a reversion to a more generic usage of *dēmagōgein* or a translation of Aristotle’s usage to a foreign context. As to the first, it is worth remembering that Aristotle was not operating in a vacuum or immune to the original meanings of words he redefined: here ‘demagoguing’ could simply be ‘providing influential guidance outside the strictures of office’. As to the latter, Aristotle’s definition includes the valences of using flattery to advance one’s ends and (re-)shaping the constitution in one’s own interest and the interest of those with whom one is in a *dēmagōgos* relationship. These valences can easily be mapped on to the situation in 1305b. Both of these possibilities also apply to 1312b. There Aristotle notes how the tyranny of Gelon’s family was destroyed “when Thrasyboulos, the brother of Hiero, **paid court** (*dēmagōgountos*) to the son of Gelon and urged him into indulgences in order that he himself might rule.”¹⁸² Here too Thrasyboulos could be ‘influencing’ or ‘advising’ the son of Gelon, or he could be flattering him and rearranging the balance of power: both interpretations fit the (admittedly scanty) evidence Aristotle provides.¹⁸³

¹⁸² Trans. Rackham 1932. Aristot. *Pol.* 1312b: Θρασυβούλου τοῦ Ἱέρωνος ἀδελφοῦ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Γέλωνος **δημαγωγούντος** καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ὀρμῶντος, ἵν’ αὐτὸς ἄρχῃ.

¹⁸³ We know nothing more of this incident, which prevents Zoepffel from offering any further historical interpretation (Zoepffel 1974, 74).

1.6. Later Usage in Antiquity

In Table 1 I have marked most of the appearances of *dēmagōg*-terminology in the *Politics* as negative based upon the understanding of Aristotle's usage that I have here laid out. Speaking of the historical reality of democratic political leadership, Mann says that "[d]ie Ausführungen des Aristoteles haben einen grossen Einfluss auf das Verständnis der athenischen Demokratie und der Demagogen gehabt, worin meines Erachtens eine Ursache für gravierende Fehleinschätzungen liegt."¹⁸⁴ This overreliance on the conclusions and opinions of Aristotle holds true in the realm of *dēmagōg*-terminology as well. Canfora, for example, sees the negative meaning of the term generally imposing itself, with Polybius as an example.¹⁸⁵ However, Aristotle's usage, as we have understood it, is extremely embedded within the theoretical context of the *Politics*; even for his own *Rhetoric* or the potentially Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.* such a particular valence fits uncomfortably at best. Furthermore, most later authors are writing at a significant remove from the experience of the 'modern' Athenian democracy that so bothers Aristotle, and many are trying to describe both Roman and Greek society. My impression, as should be clear from Table 1, is that most authors from Diodorus Siculus forward use *dēmagōgos* variously to indicate (1) a 'politician', in the same way as the orators we have examined, (2) a partisan leader, of the *dēmos*-qua-plebs or, at Rome, literally the plebs, or (3) a 'bad' politician who leads through flattery or emotional manipulation. As time progresses, the third meaning becomes rarer and the first meaning

¹⁸⁴ Mann 2007, 19.

¹⁸⁵ Canfora 1993, 15: In Polibio ormai i termini "demagogo", "demagogia", "demagogico" (II, 21, 8; III, 80, 3; XV, 21, I) hanno unicamente significato deteriore: si tratta di persone e metodi che cercano, per fini perversi, di catturare il favore delle masse adulandole. Via via che si impone questa nozione deteriore, si fa chiaro che il veicolo privilegiato della demagogia è la parola." Although *dēmagōg*-terminology does have negative connotations in its four appearances in Polybius, by Diodorus Siculus connotations are already more mixed.

increasingly appears standard. Of the remaining authors, I will only discuss here Plutarch, who not only provides much of our evidence for fifth and fourth century Athenian political history, but also uses *dēmagōg-* terminology 173 times in his corpora.

We have already spent a significant amount of time combing through narrative passages to determine the valence of *dēmagōg-* terminology. Thus out of the unexamined uses of such terminology I will cite here only *Cat. Ma.* 16.2-6. There Plutarch notes that “so truly great was the Roman people, and so **worthy of great leaders**, that they did not fear Cato's rigour and haughty independence, but rejected rather those agreeable candidates who, it was believed, would do every thing to please them, and elected Flaccus to the office along with Cato.”¹⁸⁶ That a ‘great people’ (μέγας... δῆμος) could demonstrate that it was ‘worthy of great *dēmagōgoi*’ (μεγάλων ἄξιος δημαγωγῶν) by rejecting flatterers (πρὸς χάριν ἅπαντα ποιήσιν) should put it beyond contestation that in Plutarch *dēmagōgoi* could not be assumed to have a negative valence. However, like Aristotle Plutarch on several occasions speaks directly about *dēmagōgia*, and it is these passages that are particularly worthy of consideration.

There are three passages particularly of note: the *Comparison of Theseus and Romulus* 2, the *Comparison of Alcibiades and Coriolanus* 1, and *Praecepta* 802b-e. All three passages, but especially the first two, show that for Plutarch *dēmagōg-* terminology was a bundle of conflicting meanings and connotations. In the *Comparison of Theseus and Romulus*, Plutarch concludes that Theseus and Romulus both erred and moved away

¹⁸⁶ Trans. Perrin vol. 2. Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 16.2-6: οὕτω δ’ ἄρα μέγας ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ μεγάλων ἄξιος δημαγωγῶν ὁ Ῥωμαίων δῆμος, ὥστε μὴ φοβηθῆναι τὴν ἀνάτασιν καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡδεῖς ἐκείνους καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἅπαντα ποιήσιν δοκοῦντας ἀπορρίψας ἐλέσθαι μετὰ τοῦ Κάτωνος τὸν Φλάκκον.

from appropriate kingliness (Theseus towards ‘demagogy’ and Romulus towards tyranny):

But he who remits or extends his authority is no longer a king or a ruler; he becomes either a **demagogue** or a despot, and implants hatred or contempt in the hearts of his subjects. However, the first error seems to arise from kindness and humanity; the second from selfishness and severity.¹⁸⁷

This passage at first appears negative and even Aristotelian, positing a ‘change’ or decline away from kingship (οὐ μένει βασιλεὺς οὐδ’ ἄρχων) and suggesting that a *dēmagōgos* engenders hatred or contempt in those being ruled (ἐμποιεῖ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ καταφρονεῖν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις).¹⁸⁸ However, where Aristotle repeatedly joined tyranny and demagogy, Plutarch deliberately distinguished between the two, associating the *dēmagōgos* with ‘goodness’ (*epieikeias*, from the same word that Aristotle repeatedly contrasts with *dēmagōgoi*) and ‘benevolence’ (φιλανθρωπίας), but tyranny with ‘self-love’ (φιλαυτίας) and ‘harshness’ (χαλεπότητος). One is left with a vision of *dēmagōgia* as a mistake of perhaps too much goodness or innocence, and it is far harder to reproach someone for such a mistake than for selfishness (which Aristotle associates with *dēmagōgoi*, but Plutarch only with tyranny).

¹⁸⁷ Trans. Perrin vol. 1. Plut. *Comp. Thes. Rom.*: ὁ δ’ ἐνδιδοὺς ἢ ἐπιτείνων οὐ μένει βασιλεὺς οὐδ’ ἄρχων, ἀλλ’ ἢ **δημαγωγὸς** ἢ **δεσπότης γιγνόμενος**, ἐμποιεῖ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ καταφρονεῖν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἐπιεικείας δοκεῖ καὶ φιλανθρωπίας εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ φιλαυτίας ἀμάρτημα καὶ χαλεπότητος.

¹⁸⁸ Whether we should see the *dēmagōgos* as engendering hatred (τὸ μισεῖν) or contempt (καταφρονεῖν) depends upon whether we interpret the syntactic relationship between the phrases ἢ δημαγωγὸς ἢ δεσπότης γιγνόμενος and ἐμποιεῖ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ καταφρονεῖν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις as chiasmic or interlocking. If we see the *dēmagōgos* as engendering hatred, that hatred should in all likelihood be factional: that is to say, in accordance with the patterns we have already seen the *dēmagōgos* would engender in the *dēmos* hatred of the *aristoi*, and would potentially engender in the *aristoi* a hatred of the *dēmos* and, by extension, himself. If it is the despot who engenders hatred, such hatred would doubtless be directed at the despot himself as a result of his harshness (χαλεπότητος). Contempt would, in either case, presumably be directed by the ruled at the ruler: in the case of the *dēmagōgos* because of his softness (at least by comparison to despotic or kingly rule), and in the case of the despot because of his selfishness (φιλαυτία).

The *Comparison of Alcibiades and Coriolanus* extends this contrast between *dēmagōgia* and tyranny to include oligarchy, and yet again *dēmagōgia* is found to be the lesser evil:

As statesmen, if the exceeding wantonness of Alcibiades, and the stain of dissoluteness and vulgarity upon all his efforts to win the favour of the multitude, won the loathing of sober-minded citizens, it was equally true that the utter ungraciousness of Marcius, together with his pride and oligarchical demeanour, won the hatred of the Roman people. Neither course, then, is to be approved; although the man who **seeks to win the people** by his favors is less blameworthy than those who heap insults on the multitude, in order to avoid the appearance of **trying to win them**. For it is a disgrace to flatter the people for the sake of power; but to get power by acts of terror, violence, and oppression, is not only a disgrace, it is also an injustice.¹⁸⁹

Plutarch concludes that we should praise neither the popular flattery of Alcibiades that caused loathing among the reasonable (ἐν τῷ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ σόφρονες ἐβδελύττοντο) nor the pride and oligarchic leaning of Coriolanus which drew the hatred of the Roman *dēmos* (τὴν δὲ Μαρκίου παντάπασιν ἄχαριν καὶ ὑπερήφανον καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν γενομένην ἐμίσησεν ὁ Ῥωμαίων δῆμος). Once again, Plutarch softens the blow against *dēmagōgia* while emphasizing the worse quality of oligarchy: even the bad side of *dēmagōgia*, flattering the people (χαριζόμενος... τὸ κολακεύειν δῆμον), is simply ‘shameful’ (αἰσχρὸν) if used to get power. Oligarchy is associated instead with gaining power “by acts of terror, violence, and oppression”, and is both ‘shameful’ and ‘unjust’ (ἄδικόν). This suggests that *dēmagōgia* even explicitly including flattery was, while distasteful, not unjust.

¹⁸⁹ Trans. Perrin vol. 4. Plut. *Comp. Alc. Cor.*: πολιτείαν δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τὴν ἄγαν λαμυρὰν καὶ τὸ μὴ καθαρεῖον ἀναγωγίας καὶ βωμολοχίας ἐν τῷ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ σόφρονες ἐβδελύττοντο, τὴν δὲ Μαρκίου παντάπασιν ἄχαριν καὶ ὑπερήφανον καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν γενομένην ἐμίσησεν ὁ Ῥωμαίων δῆμος. οὐδετέραν μὲν οὖν ἐπαινετέον· ὁ δὲ **δημαγωγῶν καὶ χαριζόμενος τῶν ὧπως οὐ δόξουσι δημαγωγεῖν προπηλακίζόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀμεμπτότερος**· αἰσχρὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ κολακεύειν δῆμον ἐπὶ τῷ δύνασθαι, τὸ δ’ ἰσχύειν ἐκ τοῦ φοβερὸν εἶναι καὶ κακοῦν καὶ πιέζειν πρὸς τῷ αἰσchrῷ καὶ ἄδικόν ἐστιν.

Finally, at *Praecepta* 802b-e Plutarch goes even a step further and provides a definition of *dēmagōgia* that would seem to preclude flattery and emotional appeal.

Plutarch is comparing Perikles to Nikias, and finds the latter wanting in his mildness and inability to restrain the *dēmos*. About the interactions of politicians with the *dēmos* he concludes:

They say, that a wolf is not to be held by the ears; but a people and city are chiefly to be drawn by the ears, and not as some do who, being unpractised in eloquence, seek other absurd and unartificial ways of taking them, and either draw them by the belly, making them feasts and banquets, or by the purse, bestowing on them gifts and largesses, or by the eye, exhibiting to them masks and prizes or public shows of dancers and fencers,—by which they do not so much **lead** as cunningly catch **the people**. For **to lead a people** is to persuade them by reason and eloquence; but such allurements of the multitude nothing differ from the baits laid for the taking of irrational animals.¹⁹⁰

The most important aspect of this passage is the distinction between ‘leading the people’ (δημαγωγούσι) and ‘ensnaring the people’ (δημοκοποῦσι). The latter is accomplished by appealing to the wallets or stomachs of the people; conversely, for Aristotle *dēmagōgia* consisted precisely of appealing to the people through distribution of money.¹⁹¹ Here, however, δημαγωγία γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου πειθομένων ἐστίν: *dēmagōgia* is persuading by reason, by speech. We are far indeed from *dēmagōgos* as simply a ‘flatterer of the people’.

In modern English ‘demagogue’ and its derivatives are almost exclusively pejorative, but such was not the case in antiquity. There is significant evidence in the fifth and fourth centuries for an original, neutral meaning of *dēmagōg-* terminology as

¹⁹⁰ Trans. Plutarch 1909 (S. White). Plut. *Praecepta* 802b-e: τὸν μὲν οὖν λύκον οὗ φασι τῶν ὧτων κρατεῖν, δῆμον δὲ καὶ πόλιν ἐκ τῶν ὧτων ἄγειν δεῖ μάλιστα, μή, καθάπερ ἔνιοι τῶν ἀγυμνάστων περὶ λόγον λαβὰς ἀμούσους καὶ ἀτέχνους ζητοῦντες ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῆς γαστρὸς ἔλκουσιν εὐωχοῦντες ἢ τοῦ βαλλαντίου διδόντες, ἢ πυρρίχας τινὰς ἢ μονομάχων θεάματα παρασκευάζοντες αἰεὶ **δημαγωγούσι, μᾶλλον δὲ δημοκοποῦσι**. **δημαγωγία** γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου πειθομένων ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται τιθασεῦσεις τῶν ὄχλων οὐδὲν ἀλόγων ζώων ἄγρας καὶ βουκολήσεως διαφέρουσιν.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1315a-b.

indicating an advisor of the *polis* removed from the more traditional contexts of office-holding and elite status groups. For members of that elite group or traditionalists *dēmagōg-* terms thus represented everything that was wrong with democracy: the primacy of the *dēmos* over the *beltistoi*, the disconnect from traditional customs, and the explicit political representation of the interests of a particular segment of the *polis*. These concerns are occasionally detectable in writers like Thucydides and Xenophon, but are not fully developed and promulgated until Aristotle's *Politics*. The heavily prejudiced Aristotelian interpretation of *dēmagōg-* terminology had some immediate influence which is detectable in Polybius and Diodorus Siculus, but by the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch that terminology had come to encompass a wide range of connotations, of which Aristotle's was just one small aspect. The most prominent later meaning, in fact, is nearly a reversion to the original 'public' meaning of 'influential politician'. It is surely thus that the term should be taken when it appears as an identifier in Harpokration or the *Suda*.

We have seen throughout our texts a differentiation between current, 'bad' leaders and former 'good' leaders. That distinction is sometimes tied to whether a leader is identified as a *dēmagōgos*, but more often former 'good' and later 'bad' politicians alike are *dēmagōgoi*. I have argued that *dēmagōg-* terminology represents a development in political discourse more so than a strictly political development, *i.e.*, that ways of thinking and talking about leadership were changing in the second half of the fifth century. This change probably reflected one or more developments in politics and leadership proper, and we know that several such developments occurred over the course of the late sixth century and throughout the fifth century. In the next chapter we shall

examine our evidence for which Athenian politicians were labeled *dēmagōgoi* in antiquity before delving into one of the most frequently discussed break-points in ancient and modern commentators alike: the death of Perikles.

2. The Athenian Demagogues

In the previous chapter, we examined the meanings and connotations in antiquity of the terms central to ‘demagogy’: *dēmagōgos*, *dēmagōgia*, *dēmagōgein*, and *dēmagōgikos*. Now we shall turn to a related question: who were the Athenian demagogues? We shall approach this question in three stages. First, we shall examine which figures, legendary, historical, or fictional,¹⁹² were labeled as ‘demagogues’ by ancient sources. However, as we shall see, such an approach ends up including such a large proportion of the Athenian politicians known to us that it has proved dissatisfying for modern scholars, a fact which leads us to our second stage: considering the death of Perikles in 429 BCE, an event which stands as the most frequently cited break-point between ‘demagogic’ and non-‘demagogic’ politicians in both ancient and modern

¹⁹² There are two legendary Athenian figures who are called demagogues in our sources: Theseus and Menestheus. Although the historicity of various aspects of Solon’s life and career can be, and has been, challenged, the historicity of Solon himself is not in question: for a recent appraisal of the life, laws, and poetry of Solon see Blok and Lardinois 2006; on Plutarch’s *Life of Solon*, see Manfredini and Piccirilli 1977. In their introduction, Blok and Lardinois note that “[i]f the authenticity and date of the laws traditionally ascribed to Solon have repeatedly been a matter of dispute, until recently Solon’s poems elicited far more confidence.... In recent years, our understanding of archaic Greek poetry has undergone a radical change, since scholars have started to situate the poetry in the context of oral composition, oral performance and oral transmission.... The poems of Solon known in the fourth century BC, when the present corpus seems to have been more or less consolidated, need not all be composed by the historical Solon, and, if so, they probably underwent significant transformations over time” (2-3). In addition to Theseus and Menestheus, we have one potentially fictitious figure: Kallikles, the host and interlocutor of Plato’s *Gorgias*, who is called a demagogue in Olympiodorus’ commentary on the *Gorgias*. As E.R. Dodds (1959, 12) observes, “[o]f Callicles we know absolutely nothing beyond what Plato tells us in the *Gorgias*.” Scholars have variously denied the historicity of Kallikles and suggested that he was a ‘mask’ for another, known fifth-century personage. Dodds rejects these approaches, pointing out that neither possibility occurs elsewhere in Plato, and that the weight of detail supplied by Plato points against a fictitious character; he sees Kallikles as a historical figure. See Dodds 1959, 12-15 for his complete argument with further bibliography. Douglas MacDowell, in his commentary on Andocides’ *On the Mysteries*, builds on Dodds to suggest an identification of the Kallikles of the *Gorgias* with the Καλλίδης of *On the Mysteries* 127 and the Καλλιᾶδης of Lysias 30.14 (MacDowell 1962, 153-154). Of the four reviewers of MacDowell’s work, only Umberto Albinì accepted MacDowell’s assertion that the identification stood ‘beyond reasonable doubt’; see Albinì 1964, and cf. Urdahl 1963, Hudson-Williams 1964, Redfield 1964. For our purposes here, leaving aside MacDowell (the correctness of whose theory does not materially affect our discussion), we shall follow Dodds and treat Kallikles as a historical figure.

sources.¹⁹³ This exploration will cover Thucydides 2.65 (the passage that was, in all likelihood, formative for the later ancient focus on the death of Perikles) as well as later ancient sources and modern theories centered on that same moment. It will become clear that Thucydides 2.65 itself merely emphasizes the exceptional greatness of Perikles by comparison with the politicians who immediately followed him: a more comprehensive break in Athenian politicians between early, ‘better’ politicians and later, ‘worse’ politicians does not appear until the fourth century sources whom Thucydides influenced. We shall conclude by directing our attention to one particular modern theory, which, despite the lack of evidence to support it, has tenaciously clung to the discussion of ‘demagogues’ and changing Athenian politics: the idea that politicians after Perikles based their appeals to the *dēmos* in large part on financial expertise. By examining the ancient passages that discuss Kleon in connection to money as well as the various pieces of financial or administrative legislation that modern scholars have attributed to him (or his influence), we shall show that the only relationship between Kleon and finance supported by the evidence is based not in expertise, but in corruption.

2.1. Demagogues According to Ancient Sources

Let us turn back to our starting point, then: a simple investigation, hopefully unbiased by modern notions of ‘demagogy’, of what figures were labeled as *dēmagōgoi* by ancient sources. Tables 2 and 3 below present the comprehensive list of Athenian ‘demagogues’ in chronological and alphabetical order, respectively. Included with each figure is a list of every passage referring to that figure as a demagogue. In these tables I

¹⁹³ Although I shall touch briefly on other posited break-points, such as the reforms of Kleisthenes and Ephialtes, the rise to prominence of Alkibiades, the surrender of Athens in 404, and a few even more minor possibilities, a full consideration of every watershed moment in the development of Athenian politicians is beyond this scope of this (or any other) dissertation.

have followed the same procedure as I did in Table 1: any application of a *dēmagōg-* term to a figure qualifies as an assertion of that figure's status as a 'demagogue'. Thus, for our purposes here, we are assuming that anyone who carries out the action *dēmagōgein*, holds or applies *dēmagōgia*, or is labeled as *dēmagōgikos* is to be considered a *dēmagōgos*. Neither our own analysis in the previous chapter nor any of the other scholarly appraisals of *dēmagōg-* terminology¹⁹⁴ has detected an appreciable difference in meaning between *dēmagōg-* terms, a finding which supports the viability of the current approach. In cases where figures are homonymous either with others in the table (*e.g.*, the two Ephialtes) or with famous figures external to the table (*e.g.*, Thoukydides son of Melesias and Thucydides son of Oloros), I have provided distinguishing information: patronymic where available, distinct chronological or geographical identifier otherwise. I have included references to Kirchner *PA*, Davies *APF*, and Develin *AO* in footnotes where available.¹⁹⁵

Table 2: Chronological List of Athenian Demagogues	
Historical Figure	Source(s)
Theseus	Isoc. 10.35-37; Theophrastus <i>Char.</i> 26; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 14
Menestheus	Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 32
Solon ¹⁹⁶	Suda s.v. Σόλων
Peisistratos ¹⁹⁷	Isoc. 12.145-148; Androtion <i>BNJ</i> 324 F 6; [Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i> 22; Aristot. <i>Pol.</i> 1305a; DS 9.4; D.Chr. 22; Harp. s.v. Ἰππαρχος; Suda s.v. Ἰππαρχος
Miltiades ¹⁹⁸	Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; ΣPlat. <i>Gorgias</i> 503c
Epikydes ¹⁹⁹	Plut. <i>Them.</i> 6; <i>Regum</i> 184f-185c
Themistokles ²⁰⁰	Plut. <i>Them.</i> 10.1-2; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; ΣPlat. <i>Gorgias</i>

¹⁹⁴ For bibliography cf. n. 11 above.

¹⁹⁵ These references are by entry number, not page number.

¹⁹⁶ *PA* #12806, *APF* #8792, *AO* #2752.

¹⁹⁷ *PA* #11793, *APF* #11793, *AO* #2286.

¹⁹⁸ *PA* #10212, *APF* #8429 VIII-X, *AO* #2003.

¹⁹⁹ *PA* #4920.

²⁰⁰ *PA* #6669, *APF* #6669, *AO* #2901.

	503c; Suda s.v. Θεμιστοκλῆς
Kimón ²⁰¹	Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; Σ <i>Plat. Gorgias</i> 503c
Ephialtes (son of Sophonides) ²⁰²	DS 11.77; <i>Plut. Per.</i> 10; <i>Gnom. Vat.</i> 285; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.4
Periklēs ²⁰³	Isoc. 8.121-133, 15.232-234; [Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i> 26-28; Aristot. <i>Pol.</i> 1274a; <i>DH Th.</i> 17-18, 45; <i>Plut. Per.</i> 3.2-4, 4, 10, 15, 39.4-6, <i>Nic.</i> 2.1-3.2; <i>Ael. Ar. Orat.</i> 46 Jebb 119, 250; Maximus 14.7.15-29; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.4; Σ <i>Plat. Gorgias</i> 503c; Σ <i>Aristoph. Cl. Recc.</i> 213c, 859c; Suda s.v. Περικλῆς
Thoukydides (son of Melesias) ²⁰⁴	<i>Marc. Vita Thucydidis</i> 28
Kleon ²⁰⁵	<i>Thuc.</i> 4.21; Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 92, F 96c; <i>Satyrus Vita Euripidis</i> fr. 39.10; DS 12.55, 12.63, 12.73; <i>DH Th.</i> 17-18; <i>Plut. Per.</i> 33.3-7, <i>Nic.</i> 9.1-2; <i>D.Chr.</i> 50.1-2; <i>Luc. Laps.</i> 3; Maximus 7.4, 14.7.15-29, 15.4, 27.6, 34.4; <i>Vita Aristophanis</i> 11-19; <i>Vita Tzetziana Aristophanis</i> 2.1-15; Σ <i>Aeschin.</i> 1.25; Σ <i>Aristoph. Kn. Arg.</i> , 255, 497, 877; Σ <i>Eur. Orestes</i> 903; Σ <i>Lucian.</i> 25.30.22-55; Suda s.v. Ἡλιασταί
Nikias ²⁰⁶	<i>Plut. Alc.</i> 13, <i>Nic.</i> 2.1-3.2, 4.1-3; Maximus 14.7.15-29
Lysikles ²⁰⁷	<i>Harp. s.v.</i> Ἀσπασία
Androkles ²⁰⁸	<i>Thuc.</i> 8.65; <i>Plut. Alc.</i> 19.1-3
Hyperbolos ²⁰⁹	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 96c; <i>Plut. De Herod.</i> 855c-d; <i>D.Chr.</i> 50.1-2; <i>Harp. s.v.</i> Ὑπέρβολος; Maximus 7.4; Σ <i>Aristoph. Kn.</i> 739; Suda s.v. Ὑπέρβορος
Phaiax (son of Eresistratos) ²¹⁰	<i>Plut. Alc.</i> 13
Alkibiades ²¹¹	<i>Andoc.</i> [4.26-7]; <i>Plut. Alc.</i> 6, 13, 23.3-6, 34.5-6, <i>Comp. Alc. Cor.</i> 1, <i>Nic.</i> 9.1-2, <i>Adulator</i> 52e-f; Maximus 7.4, 27.6; <i>Olympiadorus Comm. in Plat. Alc.</i> 35.3-5
Peisander (of Acharnai) ²¹²	Σ <i>Aeschin.</i> 2.176
Kharikles (son of Apollodorus) ²¹³	<i>Aristot. Pol.</i> 1304b-1306a

²⁰¹ PA #8429, APF #8429, AO #1437.

²⁰² PA #6157, AO #1011.

²⁰³ PA #11811, APF #11793 III-VII, AO #2293.

²⁰⁴ PA #7268, APF #7268, AO #3012.

²⁰⁵ PA #8674, APF #8674, AO #1437.

²⁰⁶ PA #10808, APF #10808, AO #2116.

²⁰⁷ PA #9417, AO #1856.

²⁰⁸ PA #870, AO #150.

²⁰⁹ PA #13910, APF #13910, AO #1436.

²¹⁰ PA #13921, APF #13921, AO #2297.

²¹¹ PA #600, APF #600, AO #84.

²¹² PA #11770, AO #2281.

²¹³ PA #15407, APF #13479, AO #644.

Demostratos ²¹⁴	Plut. <i>Nic.</i> 12.3-4
Kallikles ²¹⁵	Olympiadorus <i>Comm. in Plat. Gorg.</i> 35.3-5
Phrynikhos (politician) ²¹⁶	Aristot. <i>Pol.</i> 1304b-1306a;
Kleophon ²¹⁷	[Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i> 26-28; DS 13.53; ΣAeschin. 3.150; ΣAristoph. <i>Frogs</i> 679; ΣEur. <i>Orestes</i> 903; Suda s.v. Φιλοτιμότεραι Κλεοφῶντος
Kleigenes ²¹⁸	ΣAristoph. <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Frogs</i> 706a, 709
Kallixenos ²¹⁹	Suda s.v. Κατηγορίας ἔχω
Philokles (fifth c.) ²²⁰	Plut. <i>Comp. Lys. Sull.</i> 4.4-5
Arkhedemos ²²¹	Aristoph. <i>Frogs</i> 416-430; ΣAristoph. <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Frogs</i> 419, 420a; Suda s.v. Φραστήρες
Lykon (prosecutor of Socrates) ²²²	D. L. 2.38
Kleomenes (of Athens) ²²³	Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 14.5
Epikrates (late fifth / early fourth c.) ²²⁴	Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης; Etym. Mag. Kallierges s.v. Ἐπικράτης; ΣAristoph. <i>Eccl.</i> 71; Suda s.v. Ἐπικράτης (ε 2416 and 2417 Adler), s.v. Πώγων
Kephalos (late fifth / early fourth c.) ²²⁵	Harp. s.v. Κέφαλος; ΣAristoph. <i>Eccl.</i> 248; Suda s.v. Κέφαλος
Simon (politician) ²²⁶	ΣAristoph. <i>Cl.</i> 351d
Eukleides (politician) ²²⁷	ΣAristoph. <i>Pl.</i> 1146, <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Plut</i> 1146
Pamphilos (of Athens) ²²⁸	Michael Apostolius <i>Collect. paroem.</i> 14.4; ΣAristoph. <i>Pl.</i> 174, <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Plut</i> 174; Suda s.v. Πάμφιλος, s.v. Παράσιτος
Agryrhios ²²⁹	Harp. s.v. Ἀγύρριος, Θεωρικά; Suda s.v. Ἀγύρριος
Kallistratos ²³⁰	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 97; DS 15.38; ΣAeschin. 2.124

²¹⁴ PA #3611, APF #3276, AO #797.

²¹⁵ PA #7927.

²¹⁶ PA #15011, AO #2519.

²¹⁷ PA #8638, AO #1672.

²¹⁸ PA #8488, AO #1634.

²¹⁹ PA #8042, AO #1573.

²²⁰ PA #14517, AO #2417.

²²¹ PA #2326, AO #300.

²²² PA #9271.

²²³ PA #8590.

²²⁴ PA #4859, APF #4859, AO #1042.

²²⁵ PA #8277, AO #1581.

²²⁶ PA #12686.

²²⁷ PA #5674, AO #1136.

²²⁸ PA #11545, APF #9667, AO #2239.

²²⁹ PA #179, APF #8157 II, AO #44.

Androtion ²³¹	Suda s.v. Ἀνδροτίων
Aristophon (fourth c.) ²³²	Didymus <i>In Demosth.</i> 8.55-9.1; ΣAeschin. 3.139
Demosthenes ²³³	Aeschin. 3.77-78, 226-227; Hyp. 5.4; Din. 1.1-2, 10, 31, 53-54; Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller; DS 17.3; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 12.3-4, 23.1-3, 25.1-3, <i>Vit. Dec.</i> 847e-848a; Ath. 2.22; [Lucian] <i>Demosth. encom.</i> 33; D.L. 6.34; Suda s.v. Ἀντίπατρος, s.v. Δημοσθένης
Euboulos ²³⁴	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 99; Plut. <i>Vit. Dec.</i> 840a-c; Harp. s.v. Εὐβουλος; Ath. 4.61; ΣAeschin. 2.8; ΣDem. 1.1f28-41; Suda s.v. Εὐβουλος
Krobylos	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 404; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 17.1-3
Philokrates (son of Pythodoros) ²³⁵	Didymus <i>In Demosth.</i> 14.47-15.10
Pytheas (of Athens) ²³⁶	Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 8
Polyeuktos (son of Sostratos) ²³⁷	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Lykourgos (son of Lykophron) ²³⁸	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Moirokles ²³⁹	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Kharidemos (from Oreos) ²⁴⁰	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Ephialtes (fourth c.) ²⁴¹	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Demon (II, son of Demomeles) ²⁴²	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Kallisthenes ²⁴³	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Hypereides ²⁴⁴	Suda s.v. Ἀντίπατρος, s.v. Ὑπερίδης
Himeraios ²⁴⁵	Suda s.v. Ἀντίπατρος
Demades ²⁴⁶	Plut. <i>De Cup.</i> 525b-d; Ath. 2.22; Suda s.v. Δημάδης (δ 414 and 416

²³⁰ PA #8130=8157, APF #8157, AO #1564.

²³¹ PA #913=915, APF #913, AO #159.

²³² PA #2108, APF #2108, AO #462.

²³³ PA #3597, APF #3597, AO #795.

²³⁴ PA #5369, AO #1113.

²³⁵ PA #14599=14576, AO #2434.

²³⁶ PA #12342, AO #2655.

²³⁷ PA #11950=11925=11934, AO #2563.

²³⁸ PA #9251, APF #9251, AO #1437.

²³⁹ PA #10400=10401, AO #2048.

²⁴⁰ PA #15380, APF #15380, AO #637.

²⁴¹ PA #6156, AO #1010.

²⁴² PA #3736, APF #3597 IV, AO #768.

²⁴³ PA #8090, AO #1554.

²⁴⁴ PA #13912, APF #13912, AO #1437.

²⁴⁵ PA #7578, APF #3455, AO #1406.

²⁴⁶ PA #3263, APF #3263, AO #717.

	Adler)
Demetrios (of Phaleron) ²⁴⁷	Suda s.v. Δημήτριος
Arkhippos (Dates uncertain) ²⁴⁸	Plut. <i>Quaes. Conv.</i> 633b-e
Polykharmos (Dates uncertain) ²⁴⁹	Plut. <i>Quaes. Conv.</i> 726a-b

Table 3: Alphabetical List of Athenian Demagogues	
Historical Figure	Source(s)
Agyrrhios	Harp. s.v. Ἀγύρριος, Θεωρικά; Suda s.v. Ἀγύρριος
Alkibiades	Andoc. [4.26-7]; Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 6, 13, 23.3-6, 34.5-6, <i>Comp. Alc. Cor.</i> 1, <i>Nic.</i> 9.1-2, <i>Adulator</i> 52e-f; Maximus 7.4, 27.6; Olympiadorus <i>Comm. in Plat. Alc.</i> 35.3-5
Androkles	Thuc. 8.65; Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 19.1-3
Androtion	Suda s.v. Ἀνδροτίων
Aristophon (fourth c.)	Didymus <i>In Demosth.</i> 8.55-9.1; ΣAeschin. 3.139
Arkhedemos	Aristoph. <i>Frogs</i> 416-430; ΣAristoph. <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Frogs</i> 419, 420a; Suda s.v. Φραστήρες
Arkhippos (Dates uncertain)	Plut. <i>Quaes. Conv.</i> 633b-e
Demades	Plut. <i>De Cup.</i> 525b-d; Ath. 2.22; Suda s.v. Δημάδης (δ 414 and 416 Adler)
Demetrios (of Phaleron)	Suda s.v. Δημήτριος
Demon (II, son of Demomeles)	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Demosthenes	Aeschin. 3.77-78, 226-227; Hyp. 5.4; Din. 1.1-2, 10, 31, 53-54; Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller; DS 17.3; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 12.3-4, 23.1-3, 25.1-3, <i>Vit. Dec.</i> 847e-848a; Ath. 2.22; [Lucian] <i>Demosth. encom.</i> 33; D.L. 6.34; Suda s.v. Ἀντίπατρος, s.v. Δημοσθένης
Demostratos	Plut. <i>Nic.</i> 12.3-4
Ephialtes (son of Sophonides)	DS 11.77; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 10; Gnom. Vat. 285; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.4
Ephialtes (fourth c.)	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Epikrates (late	Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης; Etym. Mag. Kallierges s.v. Ἐπικράτης;

²⁴⁷ PA #3455, APF #3455, AO #740.

²⁴⁸ PA #2545.

²⁴⁹ PA #12105, AO #2552.

fifth / early fourth c.)	ΣAristoph. <i>Eccl.</i> 71; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Ἐπικράτης (ε 2416 and 2417 Adler), s.v. Πόγων
Epikydes	Plut. <i>Them.</i> 6; <i>Regum</i> 184f-185c
Euboulos	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 99; Plut. <i>Vit. Dec.</i> 840a-c; Harp. s.v. Εὐβουλος; Ath. 4.61; ΣAeschin. 2.8; ΣDem. 1.1f28-41; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Εὐβουλος
Eukleides (politician)	ΣAristoph. <i>Pl.</i> 1146, <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Plut</i> 1146
Himeraios	<i>Suda</i> s.v. Ἀντίπατρος
Hyperbolos	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 96c; Plut. <i>De Herod.</i> 855c-d; D.Chr. 50.1-2; Harp. s.v. Ὑπέρβολος; Maximus 7.4; ΣAristoph. <i>Kn.</i> 739; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Ὑπέρβορος
Hypereides	<i>Suda</i> s.v. Ἀντίπατρος, s.v. Ὑπερίδης
Kallikles	Olympiadorus <i>Comm. in Plat. Gorg.</i> 35.3-5
Kallisthenes	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Kallistratos	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 97; DS 15.38; ΣAeschin. 2.124
Kallixenos	<i>Suda</i> s.v. Κατηγορίας ἔχων
Kephalos (late fifth / early fourth c.)	Harp. s.v. Κέφαλος; ΣAristoph. <i>Eccl.</i> 248; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Κέφαλος
Kharidemos (from Oreos)	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Kharikles (son of Apollodorus)	Aristot. <i>Pol.</i> 1304b-1306a
Kimon	Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; ΣPlat. <i>Gorgias</i> 503c
Kleigenes	ΣAristoph. <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Frogs</i> 706a, 709
Kleomenes (of Athens)	Plut. <i>Lys.</i> 14.5
Kleon	Thuc. 4.21; Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 92, F 96c; Satyrus <i>Vita Euripidis</i> fr. 39.10; DS 12.55, 12.63, 12.73; DH <i>Th.</i> 17-18; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 33.3-7, <i>Nic.</i> 9.1-2; D.Chr. 50.1-2; Luc. <i>Laps.</i> 3; Maximus 7.4, 14.7.15-29, 15.4, 27.6, 34.4; Vita Aristophanis 11-19; Vita Tzetziana Aristophanis 2.1-15; ΣAeschin. 1.25; ΣAristoph. <i>Kn. Arg.</i> , 255, 497, 877; ΣEur. <i>Orestes</i> 903; ΣLucian. 25.30.22-55; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Ἡλιασταί
Kleophon	[Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i> 26-28; DS 13.53; ΣAeschin. 3.150; ΣAristoph. <i>Frogs</i> 679; ΣEur. <i>Orestes</i> 903; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Φιλοτιμότεραι Κλεοφώντος
Krobylos	Theopompos <i>FGrH</i> 115 F 404; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 17.1-3
Lykon (prosecutor of Socrates)	D. L. 2.38
Lykourgos (son of Lykophron)	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Lysikles	Harp. s.v. Ἀσπασία
Menestheus	Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 32

Miltiades	Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; ΣPlat. <i>Gorgias</i> 503c
Moirokles	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Nikias	Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 13, <i>Nic.</i> 2.1-3.2, 4.1-3; Maximus 14.7.15-29
Pamphilos (of Athens)	Michael Apostolius <i>Collect. paroem.</i> 14.4; ΣAristoph. <i>Pl.</i> 174, <i>Comm. Tzetz. in Plut</i> 174; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Πάμφιλος, s.v. Παράσιτος
Peisander (of Acharnai)	ΣAeschin. 2.176
Peisistratos	Isoc. 12.145-148; Androtion <i>BNJ</i> 324 F 6; [Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i> 22; Aristot. <i>Pol.</i> 1305a; DS 9.4; D.Chr. 22; Harp. s.v. Ἰππαρχος; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Ἰππαρχος
Perikles	Isoc. 8.121-133, 15.232-234; [Aristot.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i> 26-28; Aristot. <i>Pol.</i> 1274a; DH <i>Th.</i> 17-18, 45; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 3.2-4, 4, 10, 15, 39.4-6, <i>Nic.</i> 2.1-3.2; Ael. Ar. <i>Orat.</i> 46 Jebb 119, 250; Maximus 14.7.15-29; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.4; ΣPlat. <i>Gorgias</i> 503c; ΣAristoph. <i>Cl. Recc.</i> 213c, 859c; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Περικλῆς
Phaiax (son of Eresistratos)	Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 13
Philokles (fifth c.)	Plut. <i>Comp. Lys. Sull.</i> 4.4-5
Philokrates (son of Pythodoros)	Didymus <i>In Demosth.</i> 14.47-15.10
Phrynikhos (politician)	Aristot. <i>Pol.</i> 1304b-1306a;
Polyeuktos (son of Sostratos)	Duris <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 9 Müller; Idomeneus <i>FHG</i> 2 fr. 16 Müller
Polykharmos (Dates uncertain)	Plut. <i>Quaes. Conv.</i> 726a-b
Pytheas (of Athens)	Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 8
Simon (politician)	ΣAristoph. <i>Cl.</i> 351d
Solon	<i>Suda</i> s.v. Σόλων
Themistokles	Plut. <i>Them.</i> 10.1-2; Bessarion <i>In calumn. Plat.</i> 4.8.1; ΣPlat. <i>Gorgias</i> 503c; <i>Suda</i> s.v. Θεμιστοκλῆς
Theseus	Isoc. 10.35-37; Theophrastus <i>Char.</i> 26; Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 14
Thoukydides (son of Melesias)	Marc. <i>Vita Thucydidis</i> 28

These lists threaten to overwhelm, so that some initial comments and efforts at characterizing the information they present are wanted. Obviously, our final conclusions will depend upon the reasoned winnowing of this list, but let us first allow the full range

of diction to impregnate our analysis. Fifty-seven distinct Athenians are labeled as ‘demagogues’ by surviving ancient sources, of whom three, as we mentioned above, are of questionable historicity.²⁵⁰ In terms of chronology we have at one extreme Theseus, rooted firmly in the legendary period from a modern point of view but classified as the agent for a legitimate stage of Athenian constitutional development in antiquity,²⁵¹ and at the other Demetrios of Phaleron, the oligarchic statesman who ruled Athens from 317 to 307 at the behest of Kassandros. The term ‘demagogue’ is not restricted to the politicians we would consider to be pro-democratic: besides Demetrios, Theseus and Menestheus can properly be regarded as ‘democratic’ kings, Peisistratos built his tyranny on a popular base of support, and Peisander, Kharikles, and Phrynikhos all eventually took part in oligarchic coups. On a more subtle note, we might compare our list to the series of ‘leaders of the people’²⁵² and ‘leaders of the nobles’²⁵³ juxtaposed by [Aristotle] in the *Ath. Pol.*: it lists Solon, Peisistratos, Kleisthenes, Xanthippos, Themistokles, Ephialtes, Perikles, Kleon, and Kleophon as ‘leaders of the people’, and Isagoras, Miltiades, Aristeides, Kimon, Thoukydides son of Melesias, Nikias, and Theramenes as ‘leaders of the nobles’.²⁵⁴ First, although seven of the nine ‘leaders of the people’ from [Aristotle] appear on our list, neither Kleisthenes nor Xanthippos are called ‘demagogues’ in surviving works, and Solon only once in the *Suda* entry headed by his name.²⁵⁵ Then, of

²⁵⁰ See n. 192 above.

²⁵¹ In the list of Athenian constitutional stages at [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 41 the constitution under Theseus is the second after that established by Ion.

²⁵² [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.2: προστάτης τοῦ δήμου.

²⁵³ The opposition ‘party’ to the ‘leaders of the people’ are variously referred to as γνώριμοι (‘well-known’), εὖποροι (‘prosperous’), ἐπιφανείς (‘notable’), and on several occasions simply ἕτεροι (‘the others’) in contrast to the δήμου (‘people’).

²⁵⁴ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.

²⁵⁵ There may be a chronological element at play here. Solon, Kleisthenes, and Xanthippos are all relatively early politicians, meaning that (1) there are almost no sources contemporary with their lives, (2) the sources that do survive are further removed from these figures than, *e.g.*, from Perikles, and (3) they are more

the seven leaders of the opposition, four *are* called ‘demagogues’. As a result, at first blush it would seem that, despite its etymological roots in *dēmos*, *dēmagōgos* did not in antiquity map cleanly onto those politicians who were specifically aligned with the interests of the *dēmos*.

So what happens if we try to narrow down the number of ‘demagogues’ by applying more selective criteria to our sources? Two obvious candidates are the robustness (*i.e.*, requiring that a certain minimum number of sources label a figure a demagogue for that figure to qualify) and the chronology of the source evidence (prioritizing or exclusively using earlier evidence under the theory that it will provide a more accurate picture of which Athenians were generally considered ‘demagogues’). In terms of robustness, of our fifty-seven ‘demagogues’, thirty-three are so labeled in only a single author or passage, and another seven in only two authors or passages. That leaves us with seventeen figures who are attested in at least three different authors and passages: Theseus, Peisistratos, Themistokles, Ephialtes, Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Alkibiades, Kleophon, Arkhedemos, Epikrates, Kephalos, Pamphilos, Kallistratos, Demosthenes, Euboulos, and Demades.²⁵⁶ In terms of chronology, if we insist on only utilizing sources that are contemporary with the period under consideration (*i.e.*, nothing after the period of Demetrios of Phaleron, a period which can for convenience be set at 300),²⁵⁷ we are

chronologically distant from the coining of the *dēmagōg*- terms, assuming that these terms did originate in the second half of the fifth century. There is also the question of dramatic changes, or break-points, in the character or quality of politicians to be considered: on this see section 2.2 and chapter 3.

²⁵⁶ There is no particular aspect or aspects uniting the less famous members of this group (Arkhedemos, Epikrates, Kephalos, and Pamphilos). However, Arkhedemos is said to *dēmagōgein* in Aristophanes, and the other three all first have *dēmagōg*- term(s) applied to them in scholia to Aristophanes, before being picked up by later lexicography. This pattern may suggest the presence of Attidographic intermediaries compiling lists of political figures at Athens based upon their appearance in Aristophanes.

²⁵⁷ For our purposes here we will include fragments of earlier authors preserved in later works. We will not, however, include scholia, even those of the *vetera* traditions, some of which may admittedly date to the third century or earlier.

left with twenty-one qualifying ‘demagogues’, seven of whom appear only in a single passage of Plutarch which he attributes to Douris and Idomeneus.²⁵⁸ These seven comprise a list of ‘demagogues’ whose extradition was demanded by Alexander the Great. They are Polyeuktos (son of Sostratos), Lykourgos (son of Lykophron), Moirokles, Kharidemios (from Oreos), Ephialtes (fourth c.), Demon (II, son of Demomeles), and Kallisthenes.²⁵⁹ The fourteen others are Theseus, Peisistratos, Perikles, Kleon, Androkles, Hyperbolos, Kharikles, Phrynikhos, Kleophon, Arkhedemos,

²⁵⁸ It is worth considering the use of the term *dēmagōgōn* in this particular passage (Plut. *Dem.* 23.1-3): “And Alexander, sending to Athens, immediately began to demand *dēmagōgoi*: ten of them, as Idomeneus and Douris have said; the following eight, according to the most numerous and trustworthy authors: Demosthenes, Polyeuktos, Ephialtes, Lykourgos, Moirokles, Demon, Kallisthenes, and Kharidemios” (Εὐθὺς δ’ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐξήτει πέμπων τῶν δημαγωγῶν δέκα μὲν, ὡς Ἰδομενεὺς καὶ Δοῦρις εἰρήκασιν, ὀκτὼ δ’, ὡς οἱ πλείστοι καὶ δοκιμώτατοι τῶν συγγραφέων τούσδε, Δημοσθένην, Πολύευκτον, Ἐφιάλτην, Λυκούργον, Μοιροκλέα, Δήμωνα, Καλλισθένην, Χαρίδημον). The major questions here are which source (or sources) of Plutarch were responsible for calling these figures *dēmagōgoi*, and what (if anything) that information tells us about the uses of *dēmagōg-* terminology. It is possible that Plutarch introduced the term *dēmagōgoi* to this context without finding it in his sources; if such is the case, we can draw few conclusions: as we saw above at pp. 77-80 Plutarch’s use of *dēmagōg-* terminology varies slightly and is not in general characterized by negative connotations or an overriding conceptual disdain for democracy. Matters are somewhat different if we assume that Plutarch picked up the description of these figures as *dēmagōgoi* from Idomeneus or Douris. Idomeneus stands in a tradition descending from Theopompos and thence Isocrates, so that a negative connotation to the term is possible, but cannot be assumed (on Isocrates see pp. 59-62 above, and on Theopompos pp. 62-64). If the description of these politicians as *dēmagōgoi* originated with Douris, the term was more probably negative in its connotation. Between his political position as tyrant of Samos (cf. *FGrH* [BNJ] 76 T 2, and see also Barron 1962), his hostility towards Athens as a result of their cleruchy on Samos and exile of the Samians in the mid-fourth century (cf. Shipley 1987, 181), and his possible participation as a student in the Lyceum under Theophrastos (on which see Dalby 1991, who summarizes the arguments for and against a peripatetic background for Douris, ultimately concluding that the evidence for it is weak), a distaste for Athenian democracy and democratic politicians is a reasonable assumption. Perhaps the most attractive possibility is that Idomeneus, Douris, and Plutarch, as well as the other unnamed sources in Plutarch, base their wording upon the original Macedonian demand; the chronology of Idomeneus and Douris alike would make access to such information easy enough. The Macedonians would have had several compelling reasons to use such terminology. First, it allows them to excuse the Athenian *dēmos* for its decision to involve Athens in the Theban revolt by placing responsibility on those who lead the *dēmos*. Second, it appeals to potential support at Athens on the basis of a common distaste for democratic leadership and leaders; that such opinions existed at Athens is, of course, quite clear, and has been explored at length in the previous chapter (see section 1.2 above). Finally, it avoids grouping these figures with reference either to their civic affiliation (e.g., “Send these ten Athenians”) or to their opposition to Macedon: the latter was undoubtedly the common factor among the politicians in question, but the Macedonians will have wanted to avoid making the issue an “Athens-versus-Macedon” referendum. For an analysis of this list in Plutarch as well as parallel lists of the politicians demanded by Alexander which exist at Arrian 1.10.4, Suda s.v. Ἀντίπατρος, and Plut. *Phoc.* 17.2, see Bosworth 1980, 93-95, who concludes that of the various lists “Plutarch’s list in the *Demosthenes* is correct” (95).

²⁵⁹ Demosthenes is also named in this list, but he is labeled a ‘demagogue’ in many other sources.

Kallistratos, Demosthenes, Euboulos, and Krobylos. If we applied *both* our robustness and chronological filtering, we would be left with ten ‘demagogues’: Theseus, Peisistratos, Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Kleophon, Arkhedemos, Kallistratos, Demosthenes, and Euboulos.

What effect, then, do these selection criteria have on the characteristics of the set of ‘demagogues’? There is no noteworthy effect on the chronological boundaries of the set: Theseus remains by both of our criteria, and Euboulos, Krobylos, and Demades, although not quite as late as Demetrios of Phaleron, nevertheless stretch our period down to the 330s or 320s. We are, in fact, left with a relative balance of early (Theseus, Peisistratos), mid-to-late-fifth-century (Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Kleophon, Arkhedemos) and fourth-century (Kallistratos, Demosthenes, Euboulos) figures. The ratios here are roughly proportional to that of the fuller list: if we break our list down into periods before, during, and after the *arkhē* (the existence of which had an immense impact on politics and politicians at Athens), defining Themistokles as our last pre-*arkhē* politician²⁶⁰ and Kallistratos as our first post-*arkhē* politician (see Table 2 for the full list of which politicians thus fall into each period), our fuller list has 12.7% early figures, 52.7% middle figures, and 34.5% late figures.²⁶¹ When filtering by the robustness criterion the proportions are 17.6% early, 58.8% middle, and 23.5% late; by chronological filtering 14.3% early, 57.1% middle, and 28.6% late; and by both 20% early, 50% middle, and 30% late. These numbers should be taken only with a grain of salt, because the totals in each case are small enough that changing the break points

²⁶⁰ The grounding for Themistokles’ career as a politician and most of that career came before the foundation of the Delian League.

²⁶¹ Eight early, twenty-eight middle, nineteen late, all out of a total of fifty-five: two Athenians who are labeled as demagogues, Arkhippos and Polykharmos, have no indication of their date, and so have been left out of this consideration.

slightly can result in significant differences; nevertheless, the similarities are striking and suggest that, chronologically at least, what we see with these filtering criteria is the same picture with, so to speak, merely the loss of resolution that would be expected from decreasing our data points.

When we turn to the question of exact political position, however, our winnowing of the data begins to make more of an impact on our conclusions. Theseus and Peisistratos remain in all three selective groups, but when we filter by robustness we lose Demetrios of Phaleron as well as the oligarchs: Peisander, Kharikles, and Phrynikhos. Demetrios and Peisander are also eliminated by the chronological criterion, but Kharikles and Phrynikhos make the cut. More fully undermined is the presence of members of what we might call the ‘aristocratic’ party at Athens: not exactly oligarchs, but the sort of politicians classified by [Aristotle] as leaders of the ‘others’ as opposed to the *dēmos*. The four members of this group who appear on the full list, Miltiades, Kimon, Thoukydides son of Melesias, and Nikias, are all removed by both the robustness and the chronology criteria. Of the ‘leaders of the people’, on the other hand, only Solon is removed by both criteria, and Themistokles and Ephialtes are excluded on chronology but not robustness. As a result, in all three selective groups the fifth-century names become much more dominated by the ‘democratic’ stalwarts, the politicians often characterized as demagogues (or at least partially demagogic) by modern scholars: Ephialtes, Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Alkibiades, Androkles, Kleophon, Arkhedemos. Our experiment with selection criteria thus shows us that there *is* something to be said for the connection between *dēmagōgos* and *dēmos*, particularly when we filter for robustness. This accords well with our observation in the previous chapter that the notion of a *dēmagōgos* was

intimately tied up with democracy, for the position and power of the *dēmos* was undoubtedly the central aspect of democracy.

At the end of the day, however, it is important to recognize that every figure on the list was said in antiquity to be a demagogue in one way or another. Furthermore, given how poorly preserved our source material is, especially for periods beyond late-fifth-century Athens, we should rather assume that many more politicians were labeled as demagogues, some indeed many times by many authors, than that our surviving sources give an overly broad view of who the Athenian demagogues were. Our filtering for robustness gives us an idea not of who the ‘real’ demagogues were, but of which figures were most commonly thought of in antiquity specifically as demagogues (the answer is, by a fairly wide margin, Perikles, Kleon, and Demosthenes). That Perikles and Demosthenes, both of whom are widely regarded both in antiquity and modernity as ‘good’ leaders (*i.e.*, not ‘corruptors’ of the people), are two of the three politicians most frequently labeled as demagogues suggests that a figure’s infamy was less at issue in the number of ‘demagogue’ sources than (1) their notoriety and (2) the application of the term ‘demagogue’ to the person by an early and influential source.²⁶² Our chronological filtering may tell us more about which figures were labeled as demagogues by their contemporaries, but we should bear in mind that authors like Plutarch, the scholiasts, and the lexicographers were drawing their information and often their terminology from earlier sources. While it is often difficult in the extreme to ascertain whether Plutarch or a scholion to Aristophanes are drawing directly on fifth- or fourth-century source material when they refer to a particular figure as a *dēmagōgos*, it is quite certain that they were far

²⁶² So, for example, Perikles is referred to as a demagogue in Isocrates, [Aristotle] and Aristotle, Kleon in Thucydides, and Demosthenes in the works of the various contemporary orators.

more immersed in that source material than is possible for us today, so that their application of *dēmagōg*-terminology should carry nearly the same weight as fifth- or fourth-century sources.

Let us, then, return to our original list of fifty-seven names, and specifically to the chronological boundaries within which those names fall.²⁶³ The list covers the entire period of the independent Athenian ‘democracy’, insomuch as that democracy was retrojected to a legendary foundation under Theseus²⁶⁴ (with whom Menestheus then competed²⁶⁵) and was assimilated to the constitution of Solon,²⁶⁶ and Peisistratos was considered to have derived his support from a popular base before ‘converting’ the constitution to a tyranny.²⁶⁷ It seems safe to assume that, since many Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries conceived of their *polis* as having a single, democratic constitution, with some admitted changes,²⁶⁸ stretching all the way back to their

²⁶³ Although I am speaking here about the entire list, it is worth recalling that, as we saw above (pp. 94-95) the chronological range for the narrowed selections is almost identical to that for the entire list.

²⁶⁴ For further bibliography on the connection between Theseus and the foundation of Athenian democracy, see Hershkowitz 2016, 170-171 and esp. n. 6.

²⁶⁵ In Plutarch’s *Life of Theseus*, which clearly casts the eponymous Athenian hero as the founder of democracy, Menestheus enters politics as a *dēmagōgos* (after Theseus disappears on his *katabasis*), gains the loyalty of the people and the nobility alike, and resolves the conflict with Sparta that had begun with Theseus’ abduction of Helen (Plut. *Thes.* 32). For more on Menestheus in the *Theseus*, see Cantarelli 1974; Ampolo and Manfredini 1988, 253-254; Hershkowitz 2016, 180-181, 227-228, 236-244.

²⁶⁶ On the idea of Solon as the genesis of the democratic constitution of Athens, see *HAC* 2-8; Rhodes 1992, 118-120.

²⁶⁷ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* presents Peisistratos as largely keeping the Athenian constitution intact: διώκει δ’ ὁ Πεισίστρατος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν μετρίως καὶ μᾶλλον πολιτικῶς ἢ τυραννικῶς (16.2: Peisistratos, as has been said, managed the affairs concerning the *polis* moderately and more politically than tyrannically); ἐβούλετο πάντα διοικεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους (16.8: he was willing to manage everything according to the laws). On Peisistratos’ main supporters as the poor who had been insufficiently helped by Solon’s reforms, see Rhodes 1992, 184-188. *N.b.* that neither of the truly hated tyrants, his sons, Hippias or Hipparkhos — both of whom were also dynastic, rather than needing popular support — are ever called ‘demagogues’.

²⁶⁸ The number and degree of these changes varied from author to author. Without entering fully into the vexed question of the Athenian ‘*patrios politeia*’, there was political and propagandistic value to the perceived stability of a *polis*’ constitution; as a result of this preference for stability and conservatism, supporters of a state’s current constitution were incentivized to portray it as essentially unchanged going back to a legendary or semi-legendary founder or law-giver, while those calling for some kind of alteration preferred to depict the current constitution as fallen or debased and their change as a reversion to a more original constitution. On the *patrios politeia*, see Cecchin 1970, Finley 1971, Mossé 1978.

legendary kings, both they and later ancient commentators were comfortable applying *dēmagōg*- terms to Athenians who functioned across the length of that democratic constitution. The next fifty politicians on the list are relatively unproblematic, as even those who were involved in oligarchic coups certainly acted as politicians in the democracy before, and sometimes after, such oligarchic partisanship. The most fascinating aspect of the list is that it terminates with Demetrios of Phaleron.²⁶⁹ A modern commentator might naturally be inclined to bound their area of consideration with the death of Alexander in 323; after all, (1) this moment is frequently used to separate the Classical from the Hellenistic periods of Greek history,²⁷⁰ (2) after Alexander's death both Athens' constitutional form and its role in external Mediterranean politics changed dramatically, meaning that later politicians must be judged by very different standards,²⁷¹ and finally (3) the amount of surviving source material, especially contemporary, about politics at Athens in Hellenistic and subsequent periods is far less than for the fifth and

²⁶⁹ The dates for two of the Athenians labeled 'demagogues' are unknown: Arkhippos and Polykharmos (cf. n. 261 above); both appear only in Plut. *Quaes. Conv.* (633b-e and 726a-b respectively). *AO* lists the latter as a speaker in the assembly in his appendix to Section IX (336/5 to 322/1), although Develin admits that the date is uncertain. All that we can say of Arkhippos is that he is mocked by a 'Melanthios'. There are several figures named Melanthios who might have made the quip: the *stratēgos* of 411, the tragedian and elegist of the late fifth century, and the fourth-century Attidographer. Unfortunately, since this covers the entirety of the late fifth and fourth centuries, it does not provide any further certainty about Arkhippos' time. There is, however, no indication that either of these figures should be placed chronologically subsequent to Demetrios, which is what matters most for our purposes here.

²⁷⁰ *CAH* is a perfect example of this epochal distinction: vol. VI², although entitled 'The Fourth Century', brings mainland Greece down only to the death of Alexander, which is precisely where vol. VII² ('The Hellenistic World') picks up (on p. xi Walbank and Astin point to this moment as "a more realistic beginning to the new Hellenistic age than the battle of Ipsus in 301").

²⁷¹ In *CAH* vol. VI², Rhodes notes that "[f]ormally, Athens had the same constitution from the tribal reorganization of Cleisthenes in 508/7, or at any rate from the reform of the Areopagus by Ephialtes in 462/1, until the suppression of the democracy by Antipater at the end of 322/1" (565) and that "[b]efore Chaeronea the Greeks of the mainland and the Aegean (but not those of Asia Minor) had never had to acknowledge a non-Greek master, and the larger cities, particularly Sparta and Athens, had sought not only to be free from subjection to others but to make others subject to them; but within a few years all the Greeks except those of the western colonies were subjected, to a king who was not quite Greek, and thereafter until power passed to Rome they were to live under the shadow of his successors. Athens and Sparta lost for ever the absolute freedom which they had once enjoyed" (589).

fourth centuries (and even, in some cases, the sixth century).²⁷² Demetrios in a very real way marks this epochal turning-point: he almost certainly functioned as a normal Athenian politician before the death of Alexander, and subsequently served as Kassandros' local representative in Athens as well as overseeing a number of anti-democratic alterations to the constitution of Athens.²⁷³

That no Athenian later than Demetrios is named a 'demagogue' by an ancient source may suggest that ancient observers, like their modern counterparts, saw the government and politicians of Athens as fundamentally different after the city's subjugation first by Macedon and then by Rome.²⁷⁴ Such an interpretation dovetails well with the meanings of *dēmagōg*-terminology that we saw in the previous chapter: if a *dēmagōgos* is an Athenian democratic politician, then regardless of how your view of democracy informs the connotations of that term an Athenian politician outside of the context of the Athenian democracy would not qualify. In other words, if the *dēmos* is not the meaningful decision-making body in the *polis* because that position is held, *e.g.*, by a

²⁷² *CAH* vol. VII², 1 is illustrative: "From the hundred years following Alexander's death the work of no single contemporary historian has survived other than fragmentarily. Yet the period had been fully covered both in universal histories and in specialized works dealing with particular kings, peoples or regions. In the latter category there are forty-six authors known to have written about the Hellenistic period: all are lost."

²⁷³ Cf. Strabo 9.1.20 C397-398.

²⁷⁴ But note the Strabo passage cited in the previous note, which forcefully insists that Athens continued as a democracy until Roman conquest, and even thereafter the Athenians were autonomous and free until the Mithridatic war: ἐφύλαξαν δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν μέχρι τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπικρατείας. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι μικρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδονικῶν βασιλέων παρελπήθησαν ὥσθ' ὑπακούειν αὐτῶν ἀναγκασθῆναι, τὸν γε ὅλοσχερῇ τύπον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν διετήρουν... Ῥωμαῖοι δ' οὖν παραλαβόντες αὐτοὺς δημοκρατουμένους ἐφύλαξαν τὴν αὐτονομίαν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. ἐπιπεσὼν δ' ὁ Μιθριδατικὸς πόλεμος τυράννους αὐτοῖς κατέστησεν οὐδ' ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐβούλετο ([They] preserved the democracy until the Roman conquest. For even though they were molested for a short time by the Macedonian kings, and were even forced to obey them, they at least kept the general type of their government the same... Be that as it may, the Romans, seeing that the Athenians had a democratic government when they took them over, preserved their autonomy and liberty. But when the Mithridatic War came on, tyrants were placed over them, whomever the king wished. Trans. Jones 1927.). The degree of polemic in this passage suggests that it is likely responding to an alternative tradition which viewed Athenian democracy as stopping either with the Macedonian or, more likely, Roman conquest, but the very existence of the passage makes abundantly clear that some in antiquity viewed Athens' constitutional form as persevering into the Hellenistic and even Roman period.

monarch, an advisor to the *polis* is no longer truly a *dēmagōgos*. This interpretation does admit of several objections. First, as we observed above, the source material for the Hellenistic period is much scantier than that for the Classical period. This absence of material is not only troubling in itself, it also suggests the possibility that later readers, copiers, and compilers in antiquity and thereafter were less interested in the historical events and figures of Hellenistic and Roman Greece than they were in those of Legendary, Archaic, and Classical Greece. Such a lack of interest could explain why we see no trace of later Athenian ‘demagogues’ in sources like Harpokration and the *Suda*. Scholia, of course, rarely survive for works that are lost (except for papyri), and even though they themselves are chronologically Hellenistic or later, they rarely discuss events or figures significantly subsequent to the material on which they are commenting.

Second, we know from inscriptions that the Athenian *dēmos* continued to consider itself a decision-making body. In modern scholarship we might label this as a polite fiction or a formality, but it is an important formality: through it the Athenians themselves claim a continuity for their *polis* and their constitution. Still, this particular objection cuts both ways since we might expect a similar (formal) continuity of the *dēmagōg*- terms, the absence of which leads us back to our initial question. Ultimately we can say that the chronological boundaries of the Athenians who were labeled ‘demagogues’ in antiquity match up with modern epochal divisions in a way convenient for scholarly analysis, and that that overlap may reinforce definitions of *dēmagōg*- terminology as denoting any politicians from the period of Athens’ existence as an independent, democratic *polis*.

P.J. Rhodes, in his exploration of “Demagogues and *Demos* in Athens”, notes that the early trend in modern scholarship was to combine the pejorative meaning of the term

in modern use with the political tastes of Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Aristotle, leaving a much more select group of ‘demagogues’:

In the first and second editions of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* Pericles and the leading Athenians contemporary with or earlier than him were regularly described as ‘statesmen’ (with the exception of Thucydides son of Melesias, whose opposition to Pericles was perhaps ipso facto a sign of inferiority), whereas Cleon and Cleophon (and that Thucydides) were ‘politicians’, and Hyperbolus (regarded as exceptionally contemptible, for reasons which are not explained, by Thuc. 8.73.3, Ar. *Eq.* 1304, etc.) was a ‘demagogue’ – but Alcibiades as a relative of Pericles was allowed to be a ‘statesman’.²⁷⁵

From here he summarizes the changes made to this picture primarily by Finley and Connor, many of which have already been discussed in the previous chapters. Critical for Connor, of course, and for his conception of demagogues is the notion of ‘new politicians’. For Connor demagogues were intimately tied up with a change in Athenian politics initiated in many ways by Perikles but truly exemplified by those who succeeded him.²⁷⁶ Importantly, Rhodes admits in a footnote that this theory of ‘new politicians’ after Perikles itself has more recently come under challenge, although he ultimately stands with the old guard: “while I agree that Thucydides exaggerated the difference between Pericles and the politicians who followed him, I believe that there were some significant respects in which the politicians after Pericles were of a different kind.”²⁷⁷

2.2. Thucydides 2.65 and the Death of Perikles

We have so far seen little evidence from a lexicographical point of view or from the ancient sources themselves for a fifth-century political split dividing ‘statesmen’ from ‘demagogues’, but such a split has clearly dominated modern scholarship, so we shall

²⁷⁵ Rhodes 2016, 244.

²⁷⁶ Cf. Rhodes 2016, 246: “Connor builds up the picture which by now is familiar, of the new politicians as demagogues and orators, dominating the assembly but not necessarily holding offices, still rich (because a political career at the highest level was a full-time occupation) but from a new background and a new generation.” See section 3.1 below for more discussion, and for the full argument see Connor 1971.

²⁷⁷ Rhodes 2016, 245 n. 9.

now turn to look at the passage that has undoubtedly had a greater influence on the reception of fifth-century Athenian politics than any other: Thucydides 2.65.²⁷⁸ Because of the passage's central importance and Thucydides' well-known ability to pack a great deal of meaning into relatively few words, an extensive quotation is warranted:

For [Perikles] said that by remaining reactive and taking care of the fleet and neither extending the *arkhē* in the war nor endangering the city they would survive; but they both did the opposite of all these things and for private ambitions and private profits they handled politically other matters seeming to be extraneous to the war badly for both themselves and the allies, and had those other matters turned out well honor and aid would have accrued to private citizens, while going wrong the harm fell on the *polis* in the war. And responsible for this was the fact that Perikles, being powerful both in reputation and in judgment and being manifestly the most incorruptible, freely restrained the multitude, and he was not led by it but rather he himself led, because he did not, pursuing power by improprieties, say anything to humor them, but had the capacity on the basis of his reputation even to contradict them into anger. Indeed whenever he perceived that they were emboldened beyond measure into insolence, speaking he struck them down into fear, and again whenever they were irrationally fearful he restored them to boldness. It was proving to be democracy in word, but in fact government by the first man.²⁷⁹ But those later, being more equal to each other and each grasping at being first, changed so as to even hand over affairs to the *dēmos* in accordance with whatever was pleasing.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ As I have mentioned previously at n. 13, this chapter of Thucydides shows a clear awareness of the end of the Peloponnesian War, and thus betrays the unfinished state of the *Histories* (which cut off in 411). For a good summary of this issue see Samons 2016, 173–177, and for scholarly trends on approaching it see especially 173 n. 55. It is likely that Thucydides wrote 2.65 well after much of the narrative/speech portion of books 1 and 2, and importantly (see n. 281 below for Gomme on the subject), after his description of the Sicilian expedition. The potential for a difference in perspective on the part of Thucydides is key to bear in mind when considering inconsistencies in his depictions of Perikles and his successors.

²⁷⁹ The tense of the main verb in this sentence, ἐγίγνετό, has drawn considerable interest. The debate has mainly centered on whether and how much to emphasize the imperfect tense, which allows a more ingressive/inchoative construal; for a recent, fairly comprehensive consideration see *CT* vol. 1, 346. Although Hornblower ultimately leans away from giving the verb the incompleteness its tense often indicates, I have chosen in the translation here to follow the suggested translation of Gomme at *HCT* vol. 2, 193 and use a more ingressive aspect.

²⁸⁰ Thuc. 2.65.7–10: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοῦναντίον ἐπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μάλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο. αἴτιον δ' ἦν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μάλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὗ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν τι ἀντειπεῖν. ὁπότε γοῦν αἰσθητοῖς τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη

Although this passage does discuss differences between politicians, that discussion is in service (αἴτιον δ' ἦν) to the main point Thucydides is here making: that Perikles knew how to win the Peloponnesian War, that he gave that knowledge to the Athenians (ὁ μὲν γὰρ... ἔφη περιέσεσθαι), and that they lost the war by doing the opposite of his recommendations (οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοῦναντίον ἔπραξαν). Much scholarly ink has been spilled on debating the validity of this central assertion of 2.65,²⁸¹ but we are interested in the explanation Thucydides expounds for the Athenian failure to follow Perikles' advice.

Thucydides has often been interpreted as drawing a distinction in Athenian politics with the death of Perikles. We saw above that Rhodes maintains a difference

πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι.

²⁸¹ There are several layers to this debate, but the most important one for our purpose centers on the observation that Thucydides' contrast of Periklean plan and subsequent Athenian action works far better after the Peace of Nikias than before it. The significant depletion of Athenian resources during the Archidamian War and the financial measures enacted to address these shortcomings have often been used to call into question the soundness of Perikles' estimation of Athenian power (see *CT* vol. 1, 341-342; Andrewes 1972, 161). A cornerstone of this argument is the association of the afore-mentioned financial measures (the *eisphora* and the increased tribute levels) with the successors of Perikles, presumably against his intentions (*CT* vol. 1, 341: "There are good grounds for associating these necessary increases with the successors of Pericles in general and Kleon in particular"; Hornblower at *CT* vol. 1, 228-229 and 342 also assumes that Perikles statement at Thuc. 1.141.5, αἱ δὲ περιουσίαι τοὺς πολέμους μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ βίαιοι ἐσφοραὶ ἀνέχουσιν, indicates an opposition to enacting an *eisphora*, but this is reading too much into Perikles' statement about the relative values for income and surplus for extended wars). However, as we shall see below, the association of these financial measures with Kleon in scholarship is not supported by the ancient evidence, and that the politicians after Perikles' death were responsible for enacting the measures (after Perikles' death) is chronologically necessary but does not indicate any difference of opinion with Perikles, who likely based his 'financial optimism' on the awareness that much scope existed for tribute increases. Furthermore, Mann 2007, 75-87 has compellingly argued that the military activities of Athens during the Archidamian War largely followed the instructions of Perikles laid down in Thuc. 2.65. Finally, the terms of the Peace of Nikias make clear, as Lewis says at *CAH*² 432, that "Athens had won the [Archidamian] war." Thus, we are left with the slightly uncomfortable conclusion suggested by Gomme at *HCT* vol. 2, 196 that "there is little in the narrative of iii, iv, and v.1-24 to justify this statement [that the Athenians 'did the opposite of all these things']; and, in fact, Thucydides is there, as I said, surely thinking of the Sicilian expedition as the great example of effort at variance with the strategic plan of Perikles. That passage too was written after 404, when the events of the years after 413 had made so deep an impression on Thucydides' mind, as on most men of the time, that the course of the ten years' war had been almost forgotten and he has telescoped events in his judgement." Mann 2007, 78-79 argues that Thucydides means to distinguish specifically between Perikles and the politicians of the Archidamian war, and that such a distinction cannot be borne. On the different financial and military policies and actions of Perikles versus those of his successors see also Samons 2016, 172-179.

between Perikles and subsequent politicians in the context of this Thucydidean passage,²⁸² and Hornblower twice designates this passage as the basis for the ‘new politicians’ theory of Connor and the ‘financial expertise’ theory of Andrewes.²⁸³ Hornblower responds to these theories by finding fault with Thucydides’ distinction between Perikles and his successors, and thus making an argument for continuity rather than difference.²⁸⁴ This is not entirely fair to either Connor or Andrewes, both of whom actually argue that there was comparatively less difference between Perikles and his successors than there was between Perikles and earlier Athenian politicians.²⁸⁵ For Andrewes lineage represented a critical difference between the politicians influential after Perikles’ death and those before it (including Perikles himself): he specifically calls Perikles ‘upper class’, and notes that aristocratic “traditional habits of life and education were not geared to these new needs, and the inevitable influx of new men doubtless

²⁸² See p. 101 above.

²⁸³ *CT* vol. 1, 346: “This highly controversial claim, that Pericles’ successors were on an altogether lower level than he was and indulged the people as he had not needed to, is the foundation of modern theories about the ‘new politicians’ of the Archidamian War period”. See also the following note.

²⁸⁴ Cf. *CT* vol. 1, 340, “[Thucydides] here implies, surely wrongly, that there was a radical difference between the style and methods of Pericles and those of his successors. The issue has been much discussed, particularly in the aftermath of Connor’s important 1971 book on the ‘New Politicians’ of fifth-century Athens, i.e. the successors of Pericles” and *CT* vol. 1, 346-347 (see n. 283 above and p. 106 below).

²⁸⁵ Andrewes 1962 calls Perikles “a clear case” (83) of administrative talent found in the upper classes, and Connor repeatedly refers to Perikles as foreshadowing Kleon in important ways, especially in the context of financial expertise (“Pericles’ claim to the title is indisputable”, 126) but also in respects more central to his own conception of ‘new politics’, such as the limited interaction with friends (“Though it is not a repudiation of the traditional politics of friendships, though Pericles continues to use friends, discreetly, for his political goals, it does affirm his willingness to follow wider interests than those of his own *philoí*. Thus it anticipates developments which in a few years’ time were to give a dramatically different tone to the politics of Athens”, 128). Mann 2007, 104-123, in his argument against a dramatic change in Athenian politicians after Perikles’ death (cf. section 3.4 below), suggests that Perikles should be seen *precisely* as repudiating his friends, and that such a repudiation was in fact traditional in Athenian democratic politics. Samons 2016, 206 more or less reaffirms the position of Connor: “A man with very few close personal friends or ties on a one-to-one level, Pericles rather built a strong bond with the Athenians as a group. This would be a technique that later demagogues like Cleon would develop into a cynical ‘renouncing of friends,’ in which the politician would claim that only members of the Athenian demos had the status of his personal friends.” The main project of Mann 2007 is the exploration of the ‘*imago*’ of Athenian politicians, or how they presented themselves in their democratic context; his argument for the repudiation of friends as a democratic *imago*-tradition stretching back long before even the Kleon/Perikles divide is compelling. It does, however, run counter to the commentary and judgment of many of our ancient sources, which will undoubtedly result in the issue remaining a contested one.

came, as the comic poets allege, from business families.”²⁸⁶ Not only does Thucydides avoid any mention of lineage or social status in 2.65, he avoids it entirely in his discussion of political leaders in the *Histories*. Connor focuses on membership in political groups, the deployment of friendships, time-consuming advancement through military and civil offices, and the use of wealth as ‘traditional’ politics to be contrasted with the actions of the ‘new’ politicians; Thucydides does not speak of any of these aspects here, either. We shall return to consider Andrewes’ theory in more depth, but for now let it suffice us to note that Thucydides 2.65 can only be said to be the ‘foundation’ of the theories of Andrewes and Connor inasmuch as the dividing line sketched by Thucydides between Perikles and his successors, regardless of its meaning within Thucydides, grew into a broad ancient (and thence modern) conception of a ‘change’ in politicians located at the moment of Perikles’ death.

An important but underappreciated point about 2.65, then, is that Thucydides is *not* drawing a distinction between politicians before and after the death of Perikles at all. Rather, he is specifically comparing *Perikles* with the politicians who conducted Athenian affairs immediately after him. He says nothing at all about politicians contemporary with or earlier than Perikles and so assuming that Thucydides is pointing out a larger change in political leadership rather than emphasizing Periklean exceptionalism is not supported by the text. Perikles, Thucydides says, was knowledgeable, respected, politically established and dominant, and manifestly incorruptible. As a result he was able to pursue a relatively independent relationship with the *dēmos*, and he could afford to anger them rather than placating them (πρὸς ὀργήν τι

²⁸⁶ Andrewes 1962, 83.

ἀντειπεῖν rather than πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν). Gomme has hit the nail on the head in interpreting the difference Thucydides sees between Perikles and his successors:

it is important to keep in mind exactly what Thucydides here says—not that the policy of Kleon, Nikias, or Alkibiades was necessarily wrong, or contrary to that of Perikles (ταῦτα πάντα ἐς τοῦναντίον ἔπραξαν, § 7 n.), but that no one of them possessed enough influence with the *ekklesia*, to conceive and carry out a consistent policy; ‘the conduct of affairs too was offered to the whims of the people’, and policy varied from year to year, every politician vying for the popular favour.²⁸⁷

It was, in other words, Thucydides’ view that after Perikles’ death none of the remaining politicians in Athens was so much more influential than the others as to be truly pre-eminent; in such a situation we can say that the *dēmos* will appear to have more power because, when choosing between options proposed by relatively equal spokesmen, they will be more likely to make their decision based upon their interpretation of the situation as it stands than upon the reputation of one spokesman as opposed to another.

Hornblower is thus missing the point to a certain degree when he says that “in most respects it is hard to see what was so ‘new’ or different about Pericles’ successors, especially if they are compared not with Pericles the senior statesman but with Pericles the pushing politician of the 460s and 450s.”²⁸⁸ Thucydides emphasizes three aspects of Perikles that set him apart from his successors: his reputation (ἀξίωμα - *axiōma*), his judgment (γνώμη - *gnomē*), and his obvious (διαφανὴς - *diaphanōs*) incorruptibility (ἀδωρότατος - *adōrotatos*). That these aspects are highlighted because of their effect on Perikles’ interaction with the *dēmos* allows us to collapse all three aspects under the heading of the first (*axiōma*), because Perikles’ intellect only mattered for influencing the *dēmos* insofar as they were aware of that intellect, and his incorruptibility mattered

²⁸⁷ *HCT* vol. 2, 194-195.

²⁸⁸ *CT* vol. 1, 346-347.

because it was well-known: *i.e.*, both intellectual capability and resistance to financial corruption were crucial aspects of Perikles' reputation. Reputation, whether for *gnomē*, being *adōrotatos*, or indeed nearly anything else, is established over time. Nothing that Thucydides says in 2.65 would lead us to conclude that he believed the Perikles of 463, for example, fresh off of one of his earlier political acts in the prosecution of Kimon and still nearly a decade out from his first known *stratēgia*,²⁸⁹ would have been significantly more capable of successfully guiding the Athenians through the Peloponnesian War than Kleon, Nikias, Alkibiades, or the rest.

Thucydides suggests two significant failings in politics at Athens after the death of Perikles: first, that affairs were handled to benefit private rather than public ambitions and coffers (κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν), and second, that the politicians let the *dēmos* lead them, instead of vice versa. As Hornblower points out, it is unclear who precisely should be seen as the subject of the verb ἐπολίτευσαν, but the most technically correct assumption would be that of Classen/Steup – “generally ‘the Athenians after his death’”, as opposed to Gomme’s assumption that it was “a slightly more precise and loaded reference to the *politicians* after [Perikles’] death”.²⁹⁰ Two further complicating factors are that it is unclear what events driven by private greed Thucydides is thinking of here,²⁹¹ and that the accusation of governing from impure motivations is as clichéd as it is unprovable in antiquity. Samons interprets Thucydides’ argument as that “Pericles’ vision and political honesty separated him from those who followed, even if they seemed on the surface to

²⁸⁹ On Perikles’ early career, see Samons 2016, 53-76.

²⁹⁰ *CT* vol. 1, 342. Italics are Hornblower’s. Classen/Steup translated by Hornblower.

²⁹¹ For some speculation, see *CT* vol. 1, 343-344.

advocate similar policies.”²⁹² However, even if we accept that Thucydides meant exactly this (and I am inclined to do so), we lack the material external to Thucydides to test the hypothesis. It is an extremely acute differentiation of politicians which is based on their character while advocating virtually the same policies. Old Comedy is quintessentially a medium that sharpens our dilemma by its distortions and personal attacks. The issue of leading the people versus being led by the people is another version of the same conundrum. When a politician makes a proposal which is enthusiastically embraced by the *dēmos*, how is one to tell whether he made that proposal because he knew it would be popular with the *dēmos* and wanted to ‘ride the wave’ of their desires, or because he *honestly* believed that proposal was the best course of action for Athens, and the *dēmos* agreed with him?

After the death of Perikles, then, Thucydides would have us see a group of politicians who were more equal among themselves, with none possessing the individual renown of Perikles (unsurprising given the nearly incredible degree of influence possessed by the latter), and who potentially lacked Perikles’ vision, honesty, and convictions. The greater equality of politicians after Perikles is not in question. Neither Nikias nor Kleon had significant political or military careers of any length before Perikles’ death, and it took Perikles himself between ten and twenty years to develop his grip on Athenian politics. However, it is neither uncommon nor unique to classical Athens for a power vacuum filled with squabbling would-be successors to form upon the death of a powerful and long-tenured political leader, and there is no indication in our sources that what defined the Athenian demagogues was their inability to quickly and aptly pick up Perikles’ mantle. The lack of vision, honesty, and conviction, is open to two

²⁹² Samons 2016, 177.

objections, both of which I have already raised: first, that it is difficult, if even possible, to prove, and second, that, given Thucydides' silence here about Athenian leaders contemporary with or prior to Perikles, it would indicate Periklean exceptionalism more than a watershed moment in Athenian politics.²⁹³

Thucydides was, of course, highly influential, and thus we are not surprised to see the idea of Perikles' death as a critical moment in Athenian politics recur in subsequent authors. The first work in which we can detect such an influence is the *De Pace* of Isocrates, published in 356.²⁹⁴ Isocrates, although some twenty-five years Thucydides' junior, may, to judge by his heritage, circle of friends, and political leanings, have moved in some of the same circles as the historian.²⁹⁵ Indeed *De Pace* 122-127 adheres quite closely to Thucydides 2.65, changing it mostly through chronological generalization:

...you prefer as *dēmagōgoi* not those having the same disposition as those who made the city great, but those both speaking and acting the same as those who destroyed it... Perikles having become demagogue before this sort of folk, taking control of the city which was, on the one hand, less sane than before it had the *arkhē*, but still tolerably governed, was not eager for personal gain, but left his estate smaller than he had received it from his father, and he brought eight thousand talents above and beyond the sacred monies up to the acropolis. But these men are so different from him that they dare to say that they are unable to attend to their personal affairs on account of their concern for public ones, although it is clear that these neglected affairs have garnered such an increase as they would never have thought to beg of the gods previously, while our populace,

²⁹³ Thucydides also lavishes praise on Themistokles when narrating the end of his life at 1.138, and there again the case appears to be one of exceptionalism rather than any kind of epochal change. Where Perikles was most remarkable for his reputation, intellect, and manifest resistance to corruption (δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος), Themistokles was distinguished by his superlative capacity to react extemporaneously to exigencies (κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο). Both are credited with extraordinary foresight: Themistokles with respect to Athenian naval dominance (Thuc. 1.93), and Perikles with respect to the Peloponnesian War.

²⁹⁴ Laistner 1927, 17.

²⁹⁵ Thucydides, of course, was in exile from Athens in 423 after his part in the loss of Amphipolis to Brasidas (Thuc. 5.26), but even if Thucydides and Isocrates did not much interact during the war there is no reason to assume that they could not have done so afterwards. On the biography of Isocrates, cf. Laistner 1927, 11-15.

for whom they say they care, are in such a state that no citizen can live happily or easily, but the city is full of lamentations.²⁹⁶

The contrast between Perikles and those after him in this passage is much the same as it was in Thucydides 2.65: highlighted are *gnomē*, the salvation of the city (or failure thereof – τοῖς ἀπολέσασιν αὐτήν), and the distinction between public and private focus and interests. Isocrates, however, has extended the ‘bad’ leaders down from the death of Perikles to his own time, tying Thucydides’ appraisal of Perikles and his successors into the trope of ‘present evils versus past greatness’ that we saw exemplified in Aristophanes in the previous chapter.²⁹⁷ He also suggests a generalization of Perikles’ good leadership to other pre-Kleonian leaders, laying out a model of ‘best’ Athenian government pre-*arkhē*, tolerable government under Perikles (with Perikles as perhaps exceptionally good himself), and then bad government after Perikles. As we shall see, this model is picked up and amplified in the Peripatetic *Athenaion Politeia*.

After Isocrates we have two other fourth-century accounts which display noteworthy similarity both to those of *De Pace* and to each other. The first is [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28, the section which lays out lists of ‘leaders of the people’ and ‘leaders of the others’.²⁹⁸ Just as we saw in Isocrates, it is clear in *Ath. Pol.* 28.1 that a broader break is intended between Perikles and all those politicians operating prior to his death and Kleon and those later: “as long as Perikles was the leader of the *dēmos*, matters regarding

²⁹⁶ Isoc. 8.122-127: προχειρίζεσθε δημαγωγούς οὐ τοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχοντας τοῖς μεγάλῃ τὴν πόλιν ποιήσασιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὅμοια καὶ λέγοντας καὶ πράττοντας τοῖς ἀπολέσασιν αὐτήν ... Περικλῆς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τοιούτων δημαγωγὸς καταστάς, παραλαβὼν τὴν πόλιν χειρὶν μὲν φρονούσαν ἢ πρὶν κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἔτι δ’ ἀνεκτῶς πολιτευομένην, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸν ἴδιον χρηματισμὸν ὥρμησεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν οἶκον ἐλάττω τὸν αὐτοῦ κατέλιπεν ἢ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβεν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀνήνεγκεν ὀκτακισχίλια τάλαντα χωρὶς τῶν ἱερῶν. Οὗτοι δὲ τοσοῦτον ἐκείνου διενηνόχασιν, ὥστε λέγειν μὲν τολμῶσιν ὡς διὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν οὐ δύνανται τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίῳι προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀμελοῦμενα τοσαύτην εὐληφότητα τὴν ἐπίδοσιν ὅσῃ οὐδ’ ἂν εὖζασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς πρότερον ἡξίωσαν, τὸ δὲ πλήθος ἡμῶν, οὐ κήδεσθαι φασιν, οὕτω διακεῖμενον ὥστε μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡδέως ζῆν μηδὲ ῥαθύμως, ἀλλ’ ὀδυρμῶν μεστὴν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.

²⁹⁷ See p. 11 above.

²⁹⁸ See pp. 64-66 and 90-96 above.

governance were better, but when he died, much worse. For then for the first time the *dēmos* chose a leader not in good repute with the sound citizens (*epieikeis*); in earlier times the sound citizens had always been the ones serving as *dēmagōgoi*.”²⁹⁹ We can see here the emphasis on what we might call philosophical or ideological judgments (possibly based on ‘class’ relations) which was so markedly absent in Thucydides;³⁰⁰ the issue is phrased in two slightly different ways,³⁰¹ but it is always a question of the relationship between the *dēmos*, its leader(s), and the *epieikeis*.³⁰² [Aristotle] does pick up some of the judgments issued by Thucydides at 2.65, but he places them in a slightly different chronological context: “but from Kleophon onward those desiring to embolden the many and win their favor, looking to the present, took up the *dēmagōgia* in constant succession.”³⁰³ The idea of a lack of foresight (πρὸς τὸ παραντίκα βλέποντες), although not specifically mentioned by Thucydides, could map onto his praise for Periklean (and Themistoklean) *gnomē* and the fact that only Perikles is given a coherent plan in 2.65; flattery of the many has an obvious parallel in the repeated terminology of *hēdonē* (ἡδονή) of 2.65, and we could consider ‘emboldening’ (θρασύνεσθαι - *thrasunesthai*) as referring also to the ‘empowering’ of the *dēmos* by leaders after Perikles, although that particular verb has closer ties to Perikles’ control of the *dēmos* than his successors’

²⁹⁹ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.1: “Ἔως μὲν οὖν Περικλῆς προειστήκει τοῦ δήμου, βελτίω τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἦν, τελευτήσαντος δὲ Περικλέους πολὺ χεῖρω. πρῶτον γὰρ τότε προστάτην ἔλαβεν ὁ δῆμος οὐκ εὐδοκιμοῦντα παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ἀεὶ διετέλουν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς δημαγωγοῦντες.

³⁰⁰ See pp. 103-105 above.

³⁰¹ It is first posed as a question of whether the leaders of the *dēmos* were ‘in good repute with the *epieikeis*’ (εὐδοκιμοῦντα παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν), then subsequently as whether the leaders *were* the *epieikeis* (ἀεὶ διετέλουν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς δημαγωγοῦντες). The central question is whether someone who was not himself *epieikēs* could be ‘in good repute with the *epieikeis*’: if not, then we are simply looking at an instance of stylistic *variatio*. If so, then there is some remaining confusion about whether this was the first time a non-*epieikēs* leader of the *dēmos* was chosen, or merely the first time that a non-*epieikēs* leader of the *dēmos* did not also have the blessing of the *epieikeis*.

³⁰² The import of this relationship in the context of *dēmagōgoi* is discussed at length in sections 1.2 and 1.5 above.

³⁰³ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.4: ἀπὸ δὲ Κλεοφῶντος ἤδη διεδέχοντο συνεχῶς τὴν δημαγωγίαν οἱ μάλιστα βουλόμενοι θρασύνεσθαι καὶ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς τὸ παραντίκα βλέποντες.

actions.³⁰⁴ In this section [Aristotle], likely drawing on the political tendency illustrated by Isocrates' generalizing version of Thucydides 2.65, emphasizes the death of Perikles as a watershed moment, but for reasons entirely different than Thucydides (and Isocrates) did; at the same time, he adapts some of the reasoning familiar from Thucydides and Isocrates to a group of politicians (Kleophon and those thereafter) who are virtually entirely subsequent to Thucydides' narrative. Hence there is implicitly a transition period before the emergence of Kleophon.

The other fourth-century passage of interest in this context comes from Theopompos, one of Isocrates' most famous students.³⁰⁵ In his 'On the Demagogues',³⁰⁶ Theopompos "investigated the domestic politics of Athenians in both the fourth and fifth centuries B.C."³⁰⁷ A scholion on Aristophanes' *Peace* 681 (BNJ 115 F 96c) can be attributed to this work,³⁰⁸ and it clearly fits the discussion occurring in Thucydides, Isocrates, and [Aristotle]:

Hyperbolos administered the state after Kleon. Hyperbolos was the son of Khremes, and the brother of Kharon, a lamp-seller, common in his ways. This man took up in turn the *dēmagōgia* after the *dunasteia* [dominion] of Kleon. From him first the Athenians began to hand over the city and the *dēmagōgia* to common men, since formerly only illustrious citizens acted as *dēmagōgoi*. And the *dēmos* preferred these sorts of people because it had lost faith in the notable citizens on

³⁰⁴ The closely related verb *θαρσύνειν* appears twice in 2.65, both to describe the state of inappropriate boldness of the *dēmos* before being checked by Perikles and his actions in restoring their boldness when they are overly fearful. Given the negative context, there are several possibilities for how to interpret *thrasunesthai*: it might be that 'empowering' the *dēmos* is in itself negative, or that building the *dēmos* up without reining them in represented a critical distortion of Perikles' successful political approach; alternatively, we could consider *thrasunesthai* to bear a connotation of inculcating impulsivity, and so be inherently negative here.

³⁰⁵ *FGrH* [BNJ] 115 T 5a, 6b.

³⁰⁶ Cf. p. 62 above.

³⁰⁷ Connor 1968, 6. Connor suggests that this digression should be located "not earlier than the late 340's" (5), and so almost certainly after Isocrates' *De Pace* and perhaps roughly contemporary with [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.*

³⁰⁸ On this passage see also pp. 63–64 above. Although Theopompos is not named in the scholion, the details about Khremes being Hyperbolos' father and Hyperbolos' body being stuffed into a sack match accounts that are specifically attributed to him (BNJ 115 F 95, 96a, 96b).

account of the war against the Lakedaimonians, fearing that they would put down the democracy.³⁰⁹

This passage shares a great deal with [Aristotle] in terms of its evolution of the Thucydidean theme: here too *ethos* or class (φαῦλος, λαμπρός, ἔνδοξος) is central and it is possible that the breakpoint between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ politicians has again been postponed beyond the death of Perikles.³¹⁰ In addition to attributing the change in Athenian leadership to a ‘class’ conflict at Athens, Theopompos provides an explanation for this ‘class’ conflict in fear among the commoners, arising from the Peloponnesian War, that the politicians of noble lineage might become oligarchic conspirators. That these various sources posit the main break in Athenian leadership as coming after Kleon almost certainly indicates the persistence of a tradition in which Athens is recognized to have won (or at the least held its own in) the Archidamian War;³¹¹ the notion of a change in the quality of leadership is usually used to explain Athens’ failure in the Peloponnesian War, and such failure was far more pronounced in the Sicilian Expedition, the Dekelean War, and the Ionian War. The introduction here of fear about oligarchy and tyranny (ἀπιστῶν... μὴ τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταλύσαιεν) also clearly points to the departure of the

³⁰⁹ Theopompos *FGrH* (BNJ) 115 F 96c: μετὰ τὸν Κλέωνα Ὑπέρβολος ἐπολιτεύσατο. Χρέμητος υἱὸς ἦν Ὑπέρβολος, ἀδελφὸς δὲ Χάρωνος, λυγροπόλης, φαῦλος τοὺς τρόπους. οὗτος μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Κλέωνος δυναστείαν διεδέξατο τὴν δημαγωγίαν. ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ πρώτου ἤρξαντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φαύλοις παραδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δημαγωγίαν πρότερον δημαγωγούντων πάνυ λαμπρῶν πολιτῶν. προεῖλετο δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους ὁ δῆμος ἀπιστῶν διὰ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους τοῖς ἐνδόξοις τῶν πολιτῶν, μὴ τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταλύσαιεν.

³¹⁰ That ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ πρώτου refers to Hyperbolos and not to Kleon is both the most obvious interpretation of the Greek and is additionally indicated by the reasoning Theopompos asserts for the *dēmos*’ change in the selection of its leaders: given that Kleon must have been involved, albeit perhaps briefly, in the leadership of the *polis* before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and that he became the city’s leader very early indeed in that war, it seems unlikely that a fear of aristocratic betrayal of the city as a result of the Peloponnesian War could be said to have driven Kleon’s rise to the *dēmagōgia*. If, however, αὐτοῦ should be taken to refer to Kleon, then this passage matches more closely with Thucydides and Isocrates. Intriguingly, in none of the fragments of ‘On the Demagogues’ is Kleon described as lower-class; this omission could be a result of the fragmentary nature of our evidence, or it might indicate that Theopompos did not see a lower-class station as one of Kleon’s flaws.

³¹¹ For more on this see n. 281 above.

Sicilian expedition and the first flight of Alkibiades.³¹² Perhaps most importantly, however, just as in Isocrates and [Aristotle] a concrete and generalized (πρότερον δημαγωγούντων πάνυ) division in Athenian politics and politicians is envisioned.

Intriguingly, after the fourth century the pattern of a major shift in Athenian politicians after the death of Perikles (whether pinpointed at this particular death, as in Isocrates, the death of Kleon, as in Theopompos, or the ascension of Kleophon, as in [Aristotle]) largely disappears. The end of Plutarch's *Life of Perikles* is perhaps the locus in which we would most expect to find such a passage, but what we see there fits far better with what we have seen is the actual message of Thucydides 2.65 than the generalizing versions of the fourth-century:

Matters engendered a swift appreciation and clear yearning for Perikles in the Athenians. For those oppressed by his power as obscuring them during his life, making trial of the other orators and *dēmagōgoi* as soon he was out of the way, came to understand that a character more measured in dignity and more august in gentleness did not exist. But that invidious strength of his, formerly called monarchy and tyranny, appeared then to be the guard and salvation of the constitution: so great was the destruction and so manifold the evil pressing on the affairs of state, which Perikles was hiding from sight, making it weak and submissive, and was preventing from becoming irremediable in power.³¹³

There is no sign, either here or elsewhere in the *Life of Perikles*, that Plutarch sees Perikles as the last in a line of politicians of a particular sort as distinguished from his successors. Instead we see the Periklean exceptionalism familiar from Thucydides 2.65: Perikles was great in particular, and was especially distinguished by his exceptional

³¹² Cf. Thuc. 6.53, 60-61. See also Mann 2007, 199-262.

³¹³ Plut. *Per.* 39.4-5: Τοῦ δὲ Περικλέους ταχέϊαν αἴσθησιν καὶ σαφὴ πόθον Ἀθηναίοις ἐνεργάζετο τὰ πράγματα. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ζῶντος βαρυνόμενοι τὴν δύναμιν ὡς ἀμαυροῦσαν αὐτούς, εὐθὺς ἐκποδὼν γενομένου πειρώμενοι ῥητόρων καὶ δημαγωγῶν ἑτέρων, ἀνωμολογοῦντο μετριώτερον ἐν ὄγκῳ καὶ σεμνότερον ἐν πραότητι μὴ φθίνειν τρόπον. ἢ δ' ἐπίφθορος ἰσχὺς ἐκείνη, μοναρχία λεγομένη καὶ τυραννὶς πρότερον, ἐφάνη τότε σωτήριον ἔρυμα τῆς πολιτείας γενομένη· τοσαύτη φορὰ καὶ πλῆθος ἐπέκειτο κακίας τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἀσθενὴ καὶ ταπεινὴν ποιῶν ἀπέκρυπτε καὶ κατεκώλυεν ἀνήκεστον ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ γενέσθαι.

power (ἡ ἐπίφθορος ἰσχὺς ἐκείνη, μοναρχία λεγομένη καὶ τυραννίς).³¹⁴ Although his successors lacked this power, there is no chronological generalizing among Perikles and his predecessors or among the politicians after him broadly, nor do we have any indication of the sorts of qualitative differences which we saw in the fourth-century sources: there is no mention here of class or greed.

Plutarch's *Life of Nicias* provides further evidence that Plutarch did not see the death of Perikles as a watershed moment. At 2.1, Plutarch directly quotes [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.5, where [Aristotle] calls Nikias, Thoukydides son of Melesias, and Theramenes the son of Hagnon 'the best of the Athenian politicians after the early ones'.³¹⁵ However, Plutarch completely omits the previous assertion in [Aristotle] that Perikles' death was a turning point between 'good' and 'bad' governance of the state, rather simply setting Thoukydides son of Melesias as an opponent of Perikles and Nikias as a younger but independently respected leader.³¹⁶ Then, at 3.1-2, Perikles is said to lead the city 'from his genuine excellence and power of speech',³¹⁷ while Nikias for want of such inherent ability used his wealth,³¹⁸ and Kleon used unscrupulousness and coarseness.³¹⁹ As one might expect of an attentive biographer, Plutarch has recognized the different traits and characters assigned to Perikles, his successors, and indeed to Athenian politicians generally, but he has resisted the temptation to take up from some of the earlier sources

³¹⁴ Plut. *Per.* 15 is entirely devoted to hymning the greatness of Perikles, and Plutarch makes it very clear that he sees Perikles alone (μόνος at 15.4) as the peak of Athenian political leadership.

³¹⁵ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.5: δοκοῦσι δὲ βέλτιστοι γεγονέναι τῶν Ἀθήνησι πολιτευσαμένων μετὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους Νικίας καὶ Θουκυδίδης καὶ Θηραμένης.

³¹⁶ Plut. *Nic.* 2.2: ὁ Θουκυδίδης...πολλὰ καὶ Περικλεῖ δημαγωγοῦντι τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν προϊστάμενος ἀντεπολιτεύσατο, νεώτερος δὲ Νικίας γενόμενος ἦν μὲν ἐν τινι λόγῳ καὶ Περικλέους ζώντος, ὥστε κάκινω συστρατηγῆσαι καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ἄρξαι πολλάκις.

³¹⁷ Plut. *Nic.* 3.1: ἀπὸ τε ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς καὶ λόγου δυνάμεως.

³¹⁸ Plut. *Nic.* 3.1: Νικίας δὲ τούτοις μὲν λειπόμενος, οὐσία δὲ προέχων.

³¹⁹ Plut. *Nic.* 3.2: τῇ Κλέωνος εὐχερεία καὶ βωμολοχία.

with which he was surely working the idea that some more general difference separated Perikles and early Athenian politicians from Kleon or Nikias and those who followed.

Dio Chrysostom and Maximus, finally, apply Athenian politics and politicians allegorically within philosophical discussions. In so doing, they show awareness of the line drawn between Perikles and his successors, but are noncommittal about whether that difference is personal, as we saw with Thucydides and Plutarch, or generalized, as we saw with Isocrates, Theopompos, and [Aristotle]. Dio, comparing *dēmagōgoi* to the guiding spirits within men, notes that “thereafter in like manner some other people became *daimones* of the Athenians, such as Alkibiades the son of Kleinias and Nikias and Kleon and Hyperbolos, some perhaps fitting (*epieikeis*), but most base (*ponērous*) and grievous.”³²⁰ Given the use of terms such as *epieikēs* and *ponēros* it is hard not to see a class-based distinction being made here, similar to that which we saw in the fourth-century sources. And yet, although Perikles is named earlier in the passage, only Themistokles is spoken of, and no real comparison is made between Perikles and these later figures: we know only that most of the later figures were ‘base and difficult’. Maximus, meanwhile, comparing the importance of the body to the soul, juxtaposes the ‘bodily’ sickness of Athens when struck by invasion and plague at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War but kept strong by Perikles, the soul, so-to-speak, with the ‘bodily’ might of Athens after his death frittered away by the ‘sickness’ of its leaders.³²¹ The

³²⁰ D.Chr. 25.4: μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους τινὰς ἴσως φήσεις δαίμονας γεγονέναι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, οἷον Ἀλκιβιάδην τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Νικίαν καὶ Κλέωνα καὶ Ὑπέρβολον, τοὺς μὲν τινὰς ἐπικεῖς τυχόν, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ πονηροὺς τε καὶ χαλεπούς.

³²¹ Maximus 7.4: δηουμένης δὲ τῆς γῆς καὶ φθειρομένης τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἀναλίσκομένων τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μαραινομένης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπαγορευόντος τῇ πόλει τοῦ σώματος, εἰς ἀνὴρ οἷον ψυχὴ πόλεως, ὁ Περικλῆς ἐκεῖνος, ἄνοσος καὶ ὑγιὲς μένων, ἐξώρθου τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνίστη καὶ ἀνεξωπύρει καὶ ἀντετάττετο τῷ λοιμῷ καὶ τῷ πολέμῳ. θέασαι δὴ καὶ τὴν δευτέραν εἰκόνα· ὅτε μὲν ὁ λοιμὸς ἐπέπαυτο καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἔρρωτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἤκμαζεν, τότε δὴ τὸ ἀρχικὸν μέρος τῆς πόλεως ἐνόσει νόσον δεινὴν καὶ ἐγγύτατα μανία, <ἥ> καὶ κατελάμβανεν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν δῆμον συννοσεῖν προσηνάγκαζεν. ἡ γὰρ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ

people are said to fall victim to the ‘madness’ (συνεμαίνετο), ‘sickness’ (συνενόσει), and ‘infatuation’ (συνεφλέγετο) of Kleon, Hyperbolos, and Alkibiades. No mention is made of leaders beyond these, nor before Perikles: Maximus stays very much within the boundaries of Thucydides 2.65, suggesting that both the *dēmagōgoi* and the *dēmos* fell prey to a sort of mental or spiritual disease or mania in the time immediately after Perikles, and that this led to Athens’ destruction. This point cannot be overemphasized: whatever else Thucydides 2.65 says, whatever its influences and evolutions may be, it inextricably unites *all* of the politicians after Perikles in culpability for Athens’ loss in that war, and, while Perikles might have been blamed for starting the war while his strategy for winning it could be questioned, his death in 429 made it difficult to blame him for Amphipolis, the Sicilian Expedition, or Aigospotamoi.

2.3. Indispensable Expertise and Kleon

Modern scholarship, in positing a general break in Athenian politicians after the death of Perikles, and in locating the difference between ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ politicians in aspects such as lineage, honesty, and selfishness, is thus inspired less by Thucydides than by the fourth-century sources which generalized from him. In attempts to buttress the notion of an important change in the type or character of politicians after Perikles, recourse has frequently been made to Old Comedy and to epigraphy as some of the few contemporary sources which might give insight into the lineage and the *modus operandi* of these politicians. Such recourse has especially been made in the case of the ‘financial

δῆμος καὶ Κλέωνι συνεμαίνετο καὶ Ὑπερβόλῳ συνενόσει καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ συνεφλέγετο, καὶ τελευτῶν τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς συνετήκετο καὶ συνεσφάλλετο καὶ συναπωλλύετο....

expertise' theory, to which I shall now turn.³²² Andrewes, who originated this theory, puts it thus:

The Athenian empire was not just a moral problem about aggression—Thucydides' obsession with this aspect has imposed itself to an unreasonable extent—but a large administrative problem too. Athens needed, in numbers large relative to her size, a regular supply of reasonably competent hellenotamiai, archontes, episkopoi, and the rest... and the inevitable influx of new men doubtless came, as the comic poets allege, from business families. Kleon and his like were not simply the people's leaders on the comparatively narrow political front which Thucydides examines: a large part of the point is their mastery of finance and administration.³²³

Connor incorporated the 'financial expertise' theory into his own notion of 'new' politicians in post-Periklean Athens who eschewed the traditional political course of friendships, alliances, and office-holding by appealing directly to the *dēmos* for support. For him, 'financial expertise' became a selling-point for these ambitious politicians, born and raised in the world of the *arkhē*: "The growing need for specialization, I believe, provided the politicians with a new way of appealing for support. They could represent themselves as the masters of the complexities of public affairs. That Cleon did this is perhaps suggested by Aristophanes, *Knights* 75, and Eupolis frs. 290-292, which perhaps echo Cleon's oratory".³²⁴

One name has recurred in these two formulations of the theory of 'financial expertise': Kleon. This prominence rests on several factors that make him critical to the validity of the entire theory. He is the first politician to hold significant power at Athens

³²² There has begun to be pushback against the notion of Perikles' death as a major political turning-point; see p. 101 above, and, emphatically, S. Hornblower: "[t]here was surely nothing very new about these more professional-looking politicians," (Hornblower 2011, 149; in his note on this sentence, however, Hornblower merely points to Connor 1971). However, to my knowledge no one has yet taken the time and care to reject fully and finally the 'financial expertise' theory, and ideas of finance, administration, specialization, and expertise have thus continued to appear in descriptions of post-Periklean politicians (and occasionally Perikles himself).

³²³ Andrewes 1962, 83. I have removed the footnotes to the text here.

³²⁴ Connor 1971, 126 n. 68.

after Perikles,³²⁵ and he is the first known, and almost certainly the most successful, politician from outside of the established group of *aristoi* in the fifth century.³²⁶ He is also, as we shall see below, often connected by ancient sources to money. If, for all this, he shows no signs of having evinced and traded upon his capacity for expert financial manipulation in service of the *polis*,³²⁷ all that remains of the ‘financial expertise’ theory is that various Athenian politicians — some early, some late, some of elite background and some whose fortune was more recent — showed capability with finance and administration, and that some extent of their influence with the *dēmos* was rooted in the perception and appreciation of that capability. This, however, is not so much a theory of political change as it is a truism of governance in an environment of popular politics.

³²⁵ This can be seen both in Thucydides’ description of him at the time of the Mytilenean debate (see pp. 17-22 above) as well as the various lists of demagogues or *prostatai* in Athens (see p. 91 above).

³²⁶ For the details of his family, see pp. 154-156 and 209-210 below and the prosopographic sources listed in n. 205 above. It is possible that Ephialtes could be said to have had a greater impact, or even a dominant period of similar length, but we simply lack any evidence to support such a view; Swoboda s.v. Ephialtes (4), *RE* 5.2.2850 asserts that Ephialtes came from a distinguished house (“Eher wird man daran denken dass er aus vornehmem Hause war, wie alle demokratischen Politiker vor Kleon”), reaffirming Kleon as the first exception to this rule, but as Mann points out we lack any indication for Ephialtes’ lineage: “Über die familiäre Herkunft des Ephialtes ist ausser dem Namen des Vaters nichts bekannt...Zwar sollte man hier kein allzu grosses Vertrauen an den Tag legen – wie schon mehrfach betont wurde, sit für eine politische Karriere eine gewisser ökonomischer Wohlstand Voraussetzung – doch für eine Herkunft aus der grundbesitzenden Aristokratie fehlt jedes Indiz” (Mann 2007, 135). Although Nikias has a long career, he is eclipsed first by Kleon, then potentially by Hyperbolos, and finally by Alkibiades. Furthermore, in sources both ancient and modern he is associated with foreign policy and the military, not administrative or financial expertise; he is, of course, also treated very differently by Old Comedy generally than most of the other leaders at Athens, including Perikles (cf. pp. 227-228 below). On Hyperbolos’ potentially six years of power in Athens, see Theopompos *FGrH* (BNJ) 115 F 96c (= ΣAristoph. *Peace* 681) above, 63 and 113, and Connor 1968, 59-64. Alkibiades cannot in any way be considered a non-elite politician.

³²⁷ Although Thucydides at 3.36 already presents Kleon as the most influential politician on the eve of the Mytilenean debate in 427, most modern scholars associate his ascendancy with his success at Pylos in 425: see pp. 149-153 below; McGregor 1935, 161; Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 394; ML 196; *AE* 326; Meritt 1981, 92-3. As far as we can tell from our evidence, this complex of events leading to Kleon’s supremacy had nothing to do with finance. It began with Kleon criticizing the generals, and especially Nikias, for incompetence in failing to capture or kill the Spartans on Sphakteria (Thuc. 4.27.3-5); Nikias then resigned his commission to Kleon, who vowed to complete the task within 20 days, and leaned upon the general Demosthenes in planning his approach to the operation (Thuc. 4.28-9); finally, through some combination of skill and luck Kleon and Demosthenes succeeded in defeating the Spartans on Pylos (Thuc. 4.30-8). All of this is political maneuvering and military success, and the only office we know Kleon to have capitalized on his popularity to gain was the *stratēgia* in the three following years.

The certainty about Kleon's role in the financial administration of Athens is of long tenure in scholarship. Already in 1924 West could confidently proclaim that "it is no exaggeration to say that Cleon, by common consent, soon took over Pericles' position as the director of finances of the state".³²⁸ West essentially makes Kleon the bagman for what he sees as a 'radical war party' at Athens, and connects him to the institution of the *eisphora*, as well as to assessment and collection of tribute.³²⁹ Gomme responded to West by pointing out that the notion of a 'position as the director of finances of the state' "misunderstands the nature of Athenian administration", and, as we shall see below, this scholar repeatedly expressed caution about the grounding in the sources for the connections between Kleon and Athenian financial administration.³³⁰ In subsequent scholarship, however, Kleon has been viewed as at least a party to, and often the driving force behind, nearly every financial maneuver made by Athens during the period between Perikles' death and his own. Thus, it is necessary to consider the evidence for Kleon's involvement with the three major innovations in financial policy during that period: the already mentioned *eisphora*, the Kleonimos decree of 426/5,³³¹ and the Thoudippos decree of 425/4. As part of this effort we shall consider the other evidence for Kleon and finance (much of which survives in the contemporary or nearly contemporary work of Aristophanes) and attempt to paint a coherent picture of how Kleon presented himself as interacting with matters of finance, and how such interactions were perceived by the Athenian *dēmos*.

³²⁸ West 1924, 139.

³²⁹ West 1924, 139-40.

³³⁰ *HCT* vol. 2, 278, and pp. 156-157 below.

³³¹ Samons 2000 slightly unmoors the Kleonimos decree from 426/5 by removing the necessity that it originate during Kleonimos' tenure as *bouleutēs*, but he ultimately concludes that "the year 426/5 remains a possible, perhaps even likely date for the measure, while other years in the early to mid-420s should not be excluded" (189). Since any date within this range works for our discussion and 426/5 is a likely date, I shall henceforth simply refer to the decree as belonging in 426/5.

Our knowledge about the institution of the *eisphora*, a property tax, comes from Thuc. 3.19.1 (summer 428 BCE): “The Athenians, requiring money for the siege, even though they themselves had payed then for the first time an *eisphora* of two hundred talents, also sent out to the allies twelve money-levying ships and five generals including Lysikles.”³³² Gomme notes that “Kleon, who may have been a member of the *boule* in this year, 428-427 (Ar. *Eq.* 774; Busolt, iii. 998, I), is generally held to have been responsible for this special tax on the well-to-do”,³³³ and Blamire 2001 (110) reiterates this judgment. Let us deal first with Busolt and the question of Kleon as a *bouleutēs* or *hellēnotamias*. Leaving aside the association with the *eisphora* levied in 428/7 to avoid circular argument, the case for Kleon serving on the *boulē* in 428/7 is so weak that Develin does not even mention it: “Ar. *Knights* 774 suggests [Kleon] was [*bouleutēs*] before 425/4; does *Acharn.* 379-81 suggest 427/6? There may be some connexion with the *eisphora* of 428 (Thuc. 3.19.1), but what is suggested in *Acharnians* could be in the wake of that rather than exactly at that time.”³³⁴ *Knights* 774 is strong evidence that Kleon served as *bouleutēs* before its production in 424, but (1) cannot be used to specify a more exact year and (2) suggests not the introduction of an innovative and successful financial maneuver but the kind of frequent and ruthless recourse to the courtroom for which he was otherwise famous:

Paphlagon: Just how could there be a citizen who cherishes you more than I do, Demos? First of all, when I was a Councillor, I showed record profits in the

³³² Thuc. 3.19.1: Προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε πρῶτον ἐσφορὰν διακόσια τάλαντα, ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς δώδεκα καὶ Λυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν. The debate about the precise meaning of τότε πρῶτον and the history of *eisphorai* at Athens does not concern us here, but for a good summary with literature see Blamire 2001, 110.

³³³ *HCT* vol. 2, 278.

³³⁴ *AO* p. 195.

public accounts by putting men on the rack, or throttling them or demanding a cut, without regard for anyone's personal situation, so long as I could gratify you.³³⁵

Aristophanes is mocking Kleon here for constantly harping on his service to the *dēmos*, so that the concern, frequently discussed in attempts to use Aristophanes to establish chronology, about comedy requiring a recent enough target for it to draw a response from the audience is not applicable here: Kleon could easily have continued to brag about his 'successful' time as a *bouleutēs* for many years after so serving, and, given the tendency in Athenian oratory to recall offices held and services rendered to the *polis*, it would almost be more surprising had he not done so.³³⁶ Furthermore, the actions that he undertakes to 'fill the public coffers' (σοι χρήματα πλείστ' ἀπέδειξα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ) are brutal acts of enforcement and extortion (στρεβλῶν... ἄγχων... μεταιτῶν); while these actions could be standing in hyperbolically for instituting the *eisphora*, it is equally if not

³³⁵ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 773-776: Πα. καὶ πῶς ἂν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον σε φιλῶν, ὦ Δῆμε, γένοιτο πολίτης; | ὃς πρῶτα μὲν ἡνίκ' ἐβούλευόν σοι χρήματα πλείστ' ἀπέδειξα | ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοὺς μὲν στρεβλῶν, τοὺς δ' ἄγχων, τοὺς δὲ μεταιτῶν, | οὐ φροντίζων τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδενός, εἰ σοὶ χαριόμην.

³³⁶ Ostwald 1986, 204-206 argues that Kleon served two terms as *bouleutēs*: first in 428/7, during which he was responsible for initiating the *eisphora* and for attacking the *hippeis*' state funding, the *katastasis*, and second in 425, when he was instrumental in the rejection of a Spartan peace offer. Although we have no evidence for or against the possibility of serving twice in the *boulē* at this time (for a more complete consideration of the question, see Rhodes 1972, 3-6; Rhodes 1980), the theory that Kleon did so is not convincing. We have just discussed the weakness of the case for Kleon as *bouleutēs* in 428/7. The case for 427/6 is not much stronger: Rhodes 1972, 4 notes that "after the production of the *Babylonians* [in 427/6] Cleon denounced Aristophanes in the bouleuterium", but his note *ad loc.* (n. 3) admits that "it is not certain that Cleon did this as a bouleutes." Ostwald (1986, 205 n. 23) connects Kleon's attack on the cavalry, mentioned in Aristoph. *Ach.* 6-7 and explicated in a scholion *ad loc.* (on which see also p. 144 and n. 429 below), with his membership in the *boulē*, but Edwin Carawan (1990, 142-143) has suggested that instead of an action as *bouleutēs* at the *hippeis*' *dokimasia*, the subject of the scholion should be understood to be a legal action brought by Kleon against the *hippeis* (which would not require membership in the *boulē*). Finally, on council membership in 425, Ostwald 1986, 206-207 claims that "[s]ince this demand [by Kleon that the Spartans cede Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia to Athens] cannot have been made in the Assembly, and since it was the Council's function to receive foreign ambassadors, Cleon is likely to have made his point as a member of the Council." Ostwald is quite right that Thucydides' narrative at 4.22.2 rules out the possibility of this discussion occurring in the *ekklēsia*, but the *boulē* was not the only destination for foreign ambassadors: it is every bit as possible that these discussions occurred in the house of a Spartan *proxenos* at Athens as that they occurred formally within the *boulē*. Kleon, as a major force in Athenian politics at the time whose support was, if not absolutely necessary, highly desirable, would almost certainly have been invited to an exploratory meeting. Thus, as we have no compelling evidence for two different years in the 420s in which Kleon was a *bouleutēs*, and indeed no confirmed instances of any Athenian serving as *bouleutēs* twice in the fifth century, the most reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that Kleon served once in the *boulē* at some point before 424.

more probable that they refer to the solicitousness with which he carried out the many responsibilities of review and examination reserved to the *boulē*.³³⁷

For West Kleon's financial career was indicated and epitomized by his tenure of office as a *hellēnotamias*: "as Cleon became Hellenotamias in 427, it is very probable that he worked his way up to this position by the attention he gave to imperial affairs."³³⁸ Busolt, on whom this *hellēnotamia* depends,³³⁹ uses it to justify dating Kleon's year in the *boulē* to 428/7: "Er begann aber in der That als Ratsherr sich amtlich mit Staatsangelegenheiten zu befassen, denn er muss schon 428/7 im Rate gesessen haben, sowohl aus andern Gründen, als auch deshalb, weil er im J. 427/6 aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach Hellenotamias war."³⁴⁰ However, the subsequent redating of the inscription (*IG* I³ 371) which Busolt had restored for evidence of this *hellēnotamia* has removed all evidence for it,³⁴¹ and with it Busolt's dating of Kleon as *bouleutēs* and the pinnacle of West's vision of Kleon as 'director of finance'. Rudi Thomsen, in his monograph on the *Eisphora*, considers in addition to *Knights* 774 also *Knights* 923-926, *Wasps* 31-41, and Eupolis F 300 K. – A., and concludes that "[n]one of these passages in Aristophanes, however, prove that Kleon was the originator of the motion on levying eisphora in 428/7. The first two passages [*Knights* 923-926 and *Wasps* 31-41] only show Kleon's eagerness regarding the collection of the tax. Even less convincing is the last passage [*Knights* 774], which does not refer to the eisphora at all."³⁴² About the fragment of Eupolis, he concludes that even its attachment to Kleon "is mere guesswork, based on

³³⁷ See [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 45-49. If there is any sense at all to the hyperbole about his savagery, he may have particularly pursued allied defendants, who lacked all the protections of Athenian citizens.

³³⁸ West 1924, 139.

³³⁹ Busolt 1890, 640.

³⁴⁰ *GG* 3.998.

³⁴¹ Cf. *APF* p. 319: "Busolt's identification of him as Hellenotamias in 427/6 (*Hermes*, 25 (1890), 604f.) did not survive Bannier's re-dating of i.² 297 to 414/3".

³⁴² Thomsen 1964, 169.

the unproved assumption that he was responsible for the introduction of the *eisphora*”.³⁴³

Thomsen ultimately finds neither direct nor circumstantial evidence for Kleon’s instituting the *eisphora* in 428/7 compelling, and concludes that Lysikles³⁴⁴ or another, unknown figure could just as easily be responsible.

Before we move on from the *eisphora*, *Knights* 923-926 and its context are worth briefly considering for their resemblance to *Knights* 774 and because, as we shall see, they fit the emerging picture of Kleon’s involvement with finance:

Paphlagon: I’ll put you in command of a trireme at your own expense, an ancient hulk that you’ll never stop pouring money into and refitting, and I’ll fix it so you get rotten sails!... You’ll pay me a fine penalty for this, when I crush you with tax bills; because I’ll fix it so you’re registered among the rich!³⁴⁵

Paphlagon, Aristophanes’ stand-in for Kleon, is threatening that, to get revenge on his personal opponent, the Sausage-Seller, he will misuse his position (1) to assign him a trierarchy, (2) to ensure that the trireme to which he is assigned is in the worst possible condition, and (3) to enroll him among the rich for the purposes of the *eisphora* (which has nothing to do with initiating the *eisphora*). It would be a stretch in the extreme to interpret any of this as financial wizardry on behalf of the state treasury: it is vindictive pettiness on the part of one politician abusing the tools at hand to ruin a competitor for the favor of the *dēmos*.³⁴⁶ Kleon is not an expert here, he is simply corrupt. We shall return to the Sausage-Seller’s riposte, which provides important evidence for the nature of Kleon’s involvement with the tribute of the allies. First, however, Kleon’s putative

³⁴³ Thomsen 1964, 170.

³⁴⁴ Thomsen, like West, functions with a party-based conception of Athenian politics, and sees Lysikles as the head of the ‘war party’ at Athens between Perikles’ death and his own death: Thomsen 1964, 170.

³⁴⁵ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 923-926: Πᾶ. ἐγὼ σε ποιήσω τρη-|ραρχεῖν, ἀναλίσκοντα τῶν | σαυτοῦ, παλαιὰν ναὺν ἔχοντ’, | εἰς ἣν ἀναλῶν οὐκ ἐφέ-|ξεις οὐδὲ ναυπηγούμενος | διαμηχανήσομαί θ’ ὅπως | ἂν ἰστίον σαπρὸν λάβῃς. | ... | δώσεις ἐμοὶ καλὴν δίκην, | ἱπόμενος ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς. | ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους | σπεύσω σ’ ὅπως ἂν ἐγγραφῇς.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Thompson 1981, 156-157, who reaches similar conclusions about Kleon’s role with respect to the *eisphora*.

involvement with the Kleonymos and Thoudippos decrees needs to be reviewed and addressed.

The decree of Kleonymos will be considered first, both because it continues our chronological movement through Kleon's career (*eisphora* in 428/7, Kleonymos decree in 426/5, Thoudippos decree in 425/4), because there is far less evidence and scholarship tying it to Kleon, and because much of this work is either the same as that for the Thoudippos decree or relies on a narrative including both decrees. For these reasons, careful analysis could contribute to a reinterpretation of Kleon as administrator that better reflects the textual evidence. There are six central aspects to the Kleonymos decree:³⁴⁷ (1) each of the allied cities are to choose collectors (*eklogeis*) of the tribute to ensure its collection, and those collectors are possibly to be liable to scrutiny;³⁴⁸ (2) lists of which cities have fully paid their tribute, which have partially paid, and which have defaulted are to be compiled and published;³⁴⁹ (3) five men are to be sent to each city still owing tribute to collect on the debt;³⁵⁰ (4) an amendment stipulates hastily bringing the proposal before the people to aid the war effort;³⁵¹ (5) the generals are to be involved in dealings

³⁴⁷ IG I³ 68 (= ML 68).

³⁴⁸ IG I³ 68 ll. 5-9: ... *χοπόσ]αι πόλεις φόρο-*
ν φέροσ[ι Ἀθ]ενα[ίοις χαιρέσθον] ἐν ἐκάσται τε-
[ι] πόλει [φόρο ἐγλογέας ἡόπος ἄν] ἡεκασταχόθε-
[ν Ἀθε]ν[αίοις σύμπας ἐγλέγεται] ἡο [φόρος] ἔ ἡυπ-
[εὐθυνοὶ ὄντον ἡοὶ ἐγλογῆς — — — — — — — — — —]

³⁴⁹ IG I³ 68 ll. 14-16: *ἐς δὲ κοί]νὸν ἀ[ποφαινόσθον ἡαι πό]λες χαίτ-*
[ινες ἄν ἀπο]δοσι τ[ὸν φόρον καὶ αἴτιν]ες μὲ ἀπο-
[δοσιν καὶ ἡ]αἴτιν[ες ἄν κατὰ μέρε·

³⁵⁰ IG I³ 68 ll. 16-18: *ἐ]πὶ δὲ τὰς ὁφ-*
[ελόσας πέ]μπεν πέ[ντε ἄνδρας ἡίνα] ἐσπράχσον-
[ται τὸν φ]όρον·

³⁵¹ IG I³ 68 ll. 26-30: Π-
[...]κριτος εἶπε· τ[ὴ] μὲν ἄλ]λα καθάπερ Κλεόνυμ-
[ος· ἡ]όπος δὲ ἄρι[στα καὶ ῥῥᾱ]ιστα οἷσοσι Ἀθενα-
[ίοι τ]ὸν πόλεμ[ον γνόμεν ἐς] τὸν δέμον ἐχφέρειν
[ἐκκλε]σίαγ [ποέσαντας ἡε]οθινέν,

with those cities which are in debt;³⁵² (6) anyone contravening the decree is to be prosecuted, and procedures for this prosecution are indicated.³⁵³ Kleon shows up nowhere in the decree itself, nor is he explicitly connected to it by any ancient source, so what evidence has led modern scholarship to support his involvement?

Meiggs and Lewis, in their commentary on this inscription, note that “Kleonymos is one of Aristophanes’ favourite targets, a coward, a glutton, and liar (for references see PA 8680, i. 580). His politics were probably those of Cleon (see especially *Wasps*, 592 f.)”.³⁵⁴ In the *Athenian Empire*, Meiggs reiterates that Kleon “was supported by Cleonymus, Hyperbolus, and probably Thudippus”,³⁵⁵ in defense of this ‘party-lite’ view of Athenian politics he asserts that “[i]t would be naïve to believe that Cleon had no associates, and that the views he expressed in the Assembly were not shared by associates.”³⁵⁶ Be this as it may, a similarity of views and even the possibility of mutual support in the *ekklēsia* are not evidence for Kleon as the driving force behind the Kleonymos decree, nor does the passage from *Wasps* really support a notable association between Kleonymos and Kleon (592-597):

Then Euathlos and Toadyonimos here, the weighty shield-shedder, swear that they’ll never betray us, that they’ll fight for the masses. And no one ever carries a motion before the People unless he’s proposed to adjourn the courts after the very

³⁵² *IG* I³ 68 ll. 41-43: τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡ[ένα τάττεν παρέ]ζεσθα-
ι ἡόταν περὶ τινος τὸν [πόλεον δίκη δικάζεται]-

³⁵³ *IG* I³ 68 ll. 43-47: ἐὰν δέ τις κακοτεχνῇ [ἡόπος μὲ κύριον ἔστα]-
ι τὸ φσέφισμα τὸ τῷ φόρῳ [ἔῃ ἡόπος μὲ ἀπαχθέσεται]-
αι ἡο φόρος Ἀθέναιζε γρά[φεσθαι προδοσίας αὐ]-
τὸν τὸν ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πό[λεως τὸν βολόμενον π]-
ρὸς τὸς ἐπιμελετάς

³⁵⁴ ML 188.

³⁵⁵ AE 317.

³⁵⁶ AE 318.

first case tried. And even Kleon, the scream champion, takes no bites out of us!
No, he puts his arm around us and swats away the flies.³⁵⁷

All that we see here is Kleonymos, Euathlos, and Kleon acting as prosecutors and swearing their allegiance to the people of Athens. There is not even any policy connection suggested by Aristophanes between the figures. Note, however, the further connection between Kleon and prosecutorial zeal.

Nevertheless, Ostwald (and Meiggs) both push the connection between Kleon and the Kleonymos decree further: “there are indications that Cleon was behind two decrees that tried to squeeze the last drop of tribute from the allies.... That Cleonymos and Thudippus acted as friends and agents of Cleon can be inferred from the severe and impatient tone of their decrees, and especially of Thudippus’s”.³⁵⁸ Thus, for Ostwald, Kleon and Kleonymos have moved beyond ‘associates’ who had similar beliefs and/or goals with respect to policy; now we have Kleon ‘behind’ the decree(s), and Kleonymos acting as an ‘agent’ of Kleon. In a note presumably supporting the association of Kleon and Kleonymos, Ostwald cites only Meiggs and Lewis, p. 188 and Meiggs, *AE* 317, both of which we have seen above provide little reason to think of the relationship as one in which Kleon dominated and gave direction. The notion of ‘tone’ is, as Ostwald states, even more prominent in scholarship on the Thoudippos decree, but before we turn to that decree it is worth quoting at length from Meiggs, who provides a perfect example of the ‘narrative’ into which Kleon, Kleonymos, Thoudippos, and the decrees concerning tribute have often been placed:

³⁵⁷ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 592-597: εἴτ’ Εὐαθλος χὼ μέγας οὔτος Κολακόννυμος ἀσπίδαποβλής | οὐχὶ προδώσειν ἡμᾶς φασιν, περὶ τοῦ πλήθους δὲ μαχεῖσθαι. | κὰν τῷ δήμῳ γνώμην οὐδεὶς πώποτ’ ἐνίκησεν, ἐὰν μὴ | εἴπῃ τὰ δικαστήρι’ ἀφείναι πρότιστα μίαν δικάσαντας | αὐτὸς δὲ Κλέων ὁ κεκραξιδάμας μόνον ἡμᾶς οὐ περιτρώγει, | ἀλλὰ φυλάττει διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων καὶ τὰς μυίας ἀπαμύνει.

³⁵⁸ Ostwald 1986, 205-206.

It is tempting to believe that the associates of Cleon had wished to raise the tribute again but had been successfully opposed by Nicias and his group who consistently followed a more moderate policy towards the empire. A decree standing in the name of Cleonymus may represent something of a compromise.... The new radicals, having perhaps failed to secure a new assessment, were at least determined to see that the current assessment was actually realized, and the pinning of responsibility on collectors, who would naturally be selected from the rich, is typical of their methods.... It was some advance to improve the machinery of collection in the cities, but, if we are right, Cleon and Cleonymus would have preferred a new assessment. This they were not able to secure in the Assembly in 426, for the opposition of the moderates was too strong. Twelve months later they had their opportunity and seized it.³⁵⁹

Meiggs is slightly more cagey about the relationship between Kleon and Kleonymos than is Ostwald, but he clearly connects Kleon with both the Kleonymos decree and the Thoudippos decree. For him, both decrees represent a partisan struggle at Athens in which ‘new radicals’ who support the war with Sparta attempt to extract funds for the war effort from the allies over the opposition of a ‘moderate’ party headed by Nicias. Meiggs infers this partisan clash from “the polemical tone” *specifically of the Thoudippos decree*.³⁶⁰ I add this emphasis because, to the best of my knowledge, Ostwald is the only scholar to associate severity of tone with the Kleonymos decree, as opposed to the Thoudippos decree. We shall address the severity of the Thoudippos decree momentarily, but for now it is worth noting that the Kleonymos decree lacks most of the penalties from which the severity of the Thoudippos decree has been inferred.

Let us turn, then, to the Thoudippos decree, and let us begin with the ‘tone’ of the inscription before moving to other arguments for connecting it to Kleon. Because the tone of the decree is so central to the narrative visible in Ostwald and Meiggs, among others, we shall provide the entirety of the decree (excluding the attached list of tribute figures, for which see *IG I³ 71*).

³⁵⁹ *AE* 322-323.

³⁶⁰ *AE* 322.

θ[εοί]³⁶¹.

τά[χσι]ς [φ]ό[ρο]·

ἔδοχσεν τῇι βολῇ καὶ τῷ δέμοι· Λεοντίς]³⁶² ἐπρ[υτάνευε, ...]³⁶³ον ἐγρα[μμάτευε,

...7... ἔπε]-

στάτε, Θόδι[ππος εἶπε· πέμφσαι κέρυκας] ἐκ τῆν[...8... ἡδὺς]³⁶⁴ ἂν χερο[τονέσει ἡε βολὲ

ἐς τὰ]-

5 ς πόλεις δύο [μὲν ἐπ' Ἰονίαν καὶ Καρίαν] δύο δὲ ἐπὶ Θράικεν δύο δ' ἐπὶ Ν[έσος

δύο δὲ ἐφ' Ἑλλάσπ]-

οντον· ἡοῦτ[οι δὲ ἀνειπόντον ἐν τῷ] κοινῷ ἡ[εκάστες τῆς πόλ]εος πα[ρῆναι πρέσβες τῷ

Μαι]-

μακτεριῶν[ος μενός· κυαμεῦσαι δὲ ἐ]σαγογέα[ς τριάκοντα³⁶⁵· τοῦ]τος³⁶⁶ δὲ [ἡελέσθαι καὶ

γραμμα]-

τέα καὶ χσυ[γγραμματαέα ἐχ σφὸν αὐτ]ῶν³⁶⁷ ἡε δὲ β[ολὲ τάκτας ἐχσελέ]σθῃ [αὐτίκα μάλα

³⁶¹ The base Greek text here is that of *IG I*³ 71 as accessed through the Packard Humanities Institute.

³⁶² ML 69.3 prints “. . . ντίς] ἐπρ[υτάνευε”, and Samons 2000, 176 n. 41 observes that “[t]he tribes mentioned here and in line 34 are not securely restored.” The question of precisely which tribe held the prytany in lines 3, 34, and 55 is important for the dating of the decree within the Attic year of 425/4; for a review of the arguments and bibliography, see pp. 149-152 below, and especially nn. 445 and 447.

³⁶³ Publications of this inscription indicate that this space holds a single line, slanting from left to right, of the same height as the omicron to its right. Autoptic confirmation is to be desired.

³⁶⁴ I have elected, with *HCT* vol. 3, 502 n. 1 and ML 192, to accept neither the *ATL* vol. 2 reading here of μισθοτῶν (despite the defense of that supplement by McGregor 1958, 420-421) nor the reading of βολευτῶν from *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950. Cogent objections to both readings, including the unusual (but not unprecedented) appearance of τῶν where we would expect τῶμ before μισθοτῶν, can be found in *HCT*, with some additional reasoning in ML. Meritt 1971, 113 n. 19, recognizing that “[n]either of these restorations [μισθοτῶν or βολευτῶν] has found favor”, suggested instead κλετέρον, under the theory that the duty of the κλητῆρες “was to issue summons and those to the cities of the empire may be considered especially within the competence of their professional activity.”

³⁶⁵ ML 69.7 prints “.....11.....ἐ]σαγογέα[ς.....9.....”. The text as printed here is from *ATL* vol. 2; *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 restore “ἡε δὲ βολὲ καὶ ἐ]σαγογέα[ς κλεροσάτο”.

³⁶⁶ In Samons 2000 (which reproduces the text of *IG I*³) and the PHI text online this word is rendered τοῦ]τος. In Meritt and West 1934 and *ATL* vol. 2 it is instead τού]τος. The photograph of the inscription in Meritt and West 1934 would appear to confirm the latter as the correct reading from the stone, but autopsy is a desiderandum. It is not clear how the change originated.

³⁶⁷ ML 69.8 prints “χσυ[γγραμματαέα.....9.....]ον”. The text printed here is from Béquignon and Will 1950. *ATL* vol. 1 and 2 print “χσυ[γγραμματαέα ἐχς ἡαπάντ]ον”.

δέκα ἄνδ]-

ρας³⁶⁸ *χοῦτοι* [δὲ τὰς πόλεις πέντε ἑμερ]ὼν ἄφ' ἑς ἃ[ν *ἡαιρεθῶσι* ὁμομοκότες

ἀναγραφσάντων ἔτ]-³⁶⁹

10 ἔς ἑμέρας *ἡ*[εκάστες χιλίας δραχμὰς] *ἡέκαστ[ος ἀποτεισάτο· τὸς δὲ τάκτας*

ἡορκοσάντων ἡ]-

οι *ἡορκοτα[ῖ τῇ αὐτῇ ἑμέραι ἐπειδὰν]* *τυγχ[άνουσιν ἡαιρεθέντες ἔ* ὀφελέτο *ἡέκαστος τὲ]-*

ν αὐτὴν ζεμ[ίαν· τὼν δὲ διαδικασίων ἡοι] ἔσ[α]γ[ογῆς ἐπ]ιμ[ε]λεθέντων τῷ φόρῳ καθάπερ

ἂν φσε]³⁷⁰ -

φίσεται *ἡο* [δῆμος· ἐσαγογέον δὲ *ἡο* λα]χὼν κα[ὶ *ἡ*]ο πολέμαρχος ἀνακρινάντων τὰς δίκας

ἐν τ]³⁷¹ -

εἰ ἐλίσσεται [καθάπερ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἄλλ]ας τῶ[ν ἐ]λίσσων· ἐ[ὰν δὲ ἡοι τάκται μὲ τάττοσι

τῇσι]³⁷²

15 πόλεις[ι] κατ[ὰ τὰς δ]ια[δικασίας εὐθυ]νέσθω μ[υ]ρίασι δραχμῇσι κατὰ τὸν νόμον

ἡέκαστος αὖ]-

τὼν· *ἡοι* δὲ [νομο]θέτα[ι]³⁷³ δικαστέριον] νέον κα[θ]ιστάντων χ[ιλίος δικαστάς· τὸ δὲ

³⁶⁸ ML 69.8-9 prints “*ἡε δὲ β[ολέ.....12.....]σθο [.....10.....δέκα ἄνδ]-/ρας*”. *ATL* prints “*ἡε δὲ β[ολέ τὸν φόρον ἡελέ]σθο [ἡοὶ τάχσοσι δέκα ἄνδ]-/ρας*”.

³⁶⁹ ML 69.9 prints “*ἄφ' ἑς ἃ[ν.....32.....ἔτ]*”. Text here from *ATL* vol. 2. *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 print “*ἄφ' ἑς ἃ[ν ἡαιρεθέντες τυγχάνουσι ἐγγραφσάντων ἔτ]*”.

³⁷⁰ ML 69.12, following *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950, prints “*ἐσ[α]γ[ογῆς ἐπ]ιμ[ε]λ[όσθων περὶ τῷ φόρῳ ἐπειδὰμ φσε]*”. Text here follows *ATL* vol. 2. Samons 2000, 177 n. 43 comments that “[r]estorations and readings of this line are most uncertain”.

³⁷¹ Text here matches ML 69.13, on which the authors note “[t]he restoration in the text is an improvement in *ATL* iv, p. ix, on a suggestion by BW.” *ATL* vol. 1 prints “*ἐπ'ἀνάγκης δὲ ἡο ἄρ]χὼν κα[ὶ *ἡ*]ο πολέμαρχος χσυνδέσθων τὰς δίκας*”. *ATL* vol. 2 prints “*χοῦτοι δὲ καὶ ἡο ἄρ]χὼν κα[ὶ *ἡ*]ο πολέμαρχος ἀνακρινάντων τὰς δίκας*”.

³⁷² ML 69.14 prints “*ἐ[ὰν δὲ.....18.....τῇσι]*”. Text here from *ATL* vol. 2. *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 print “*ἐ[ὰν δὲ μὲ εὐθὺς χρεματίζουσι τῇσι]*”.

³⁷³ ML 69.16 prints “*δὲ [. . .]θέτα[ι]*”, and comments that “[νομο]θέτα[ι] neatly fills the space, but the responsibility of establishing a new court does not seem appropriate to νομοθέται (nor is the office otherwise known at Athens until the last years of the century). We should expect thesmothetai to have been appointed. Perhaps they were, and the mason left a letter out, ?θε<σ>μο]θέτα[ι.” A now unparalleled administrative arrangement may well have been initiated here.

φόρο, ἐπειδ]-

ἐ ὀλέζον ἐγ[ένε]το, τὰς [νῦν τάχσες χσ]ὺν τῇ [βο]λῇ χσυντα[χσάντον]³⁷⁴ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς

τελευτ]-

αίας ἀρχῆς [πρὸς] μέρο[ς] *ἡ*πάσας τῷ Π[οσιδε[ιῶ]νος μενός· χ[ρ]εματιζόντων δὲ καὶ

*ἡ*οσεμέραι]³⁷⁵

[ἀ]πὸ νομενί[ας κα]τὰ τ[αὐτὰ] *ἡ*ίνα ταχθ[έ]ι[ι] *ἡ*ο φό[ρ]ος ἐν τῷ Π[οσιδε]ιδόνι μενί· *ἡ*ε δὲ

βολὲ πλέθος]-

20 [α] χρεματι[ζέτο κ]αὶ χ[συνεχ]ές³⁷⁶ *ἡ*ίνα τ[ά]χ[σ]ες γ[έ]νονται ἐὰμ [μέ τι ἄλλο

φσεφίζεται *ἡ*ο δέμο]ς· τ-

[ὀ]ν δὲ φόρο[ν ὀλέζ]ο μὲ π[ό]λει νῦν ταχσάντ]ον μ[ε]δεμῖαι ἔ *ἡ*ο[πόσον] πρὸ τῷ ἐτύγχανον

ἀπάγ]οντ-

[ες] ἐὰμ μέ τ[ις φαίν]ετα[ι ἀπορία] *ἡ*όστε ὅς]ες τ[έ]ς χώρας ἀδυ[νάτο] μὲ πλείο ἀπάγεν·

τένδε] δὲ τ[έ]-

[ν γ]νόμεν [καὶ τὸ φσέ]φ[ισμα] τόδε καὶ τὸμ φ[ό]ρο[ν] *ἡ*ὸς ἂν ταχθ[έ]ι τῇ πόλει *ἡ*εκάσται

ἀνα]γρά[φσ]-

[ας] *ἡ*ο γρ[αμματεὺς] τῆς βολῆς ἐν δυοῖν στ[έ]λα[ι]ν λιθίναιν [καταθέτο] τὲμ μὲν ἐν τῷ

βο]λευ[τε]-

25 [ρ]ίοι τῇ δὲ ἐμ πόλει· ἀπομισθοσάντων δὲ] *ἡ*ο[ι] πολεταί, τ[ὸ δὲ ἀργύριον

παρασχόντων] *ἡ*οι κ[ο]-

λακρέτ[αι· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἀποφαίνεν] τῇσι π[ό]λ[ε]σι³⁷⁷ περὶ τῷ φ[ό]ρο πρὸ³⁷⁸ τῷμ

³⁷⁴ Text here from *ATL*; Béquignon and Will 1950 print “χσυντά[χσασθαι]”.

³⁷⁵ *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 print “φθίνοντος τῷ Π[οσιδε]ιδόνι μενός· χ[ρ]εματιζεν δὲ δὲ περὶ τὸ φόρο εὐθὺς”.

³⁷⁶ *ML* 69.20 prints “χ[συνεχ]ός”.

³⁷⁷ Text here matches *ATL*; Hiller (*IG* I²) prints “ὄντων δὲ *ἡ*αι τάχσες *ἡ*αι τῇσι π[ό]λ[ε]σι”.

³⁷⁸ Text here matches *ATL*; Hiller prints “[ἀπὸ]”, Raubitschek (*SEG* X) prints “[ἐπὶ]?”.

Παναθηναίον τ]ὸμ με[γ]-

άλον· ἐσ[άγεν δὲ τὲμ πρυτανείαν *ἡτίς* ἄν] τυ[γ]χάνει πρυτ[ανεύουσα τὰς τάχσες κατὰ

Π]αναθ[έ]-

ναία.³⁷⁹ [ἐὰν δὲ *ῥοι* πρυτάνες μὲ τότε ἐσάγο]σι ἐ[ς] τὸν δέμον κ[αὶ μὲ φσεφίζονται

δικαστ]έριον³⁸⁰

περὶ τῷ [φόρο καὶ μὲ τότε χρεματίζουσι³⁸¹ ἐ]πὶ σ[φ]ὸν αὐτὸν ὀφ[έλεν *ἑκατὸν δραχμὰς*

*ἡε]*ρᾶς τῆ-

30 [ἰ Ἀ]θενα[ΐαι *ἑκάστον* τὸμ πρ[υ]τάνεον³⁸² κ]αὶ τὸ[ι] δεμοσίοι *ἡ*[εκατὸν καὶ

εὐθύνεσθαι *χιλί]ασι*

[δρα]χμῆ[σι *ἑκάστον* τὸμ πρ]υτ[ά]νεον, κα]ὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος δι[δῶι φσεφον³⁸³ τῆ]σι [πόλεσι

μ]ὲ ἔναι τ-

[ᾶς] τάχσ[ες κατὰ Π]α[ναθέναι]α τὰ μ[εγάλα] ἐπὶ τῆς πρυτανεί[ας *ἡτίς* ἄν πρ]ότε

[πρυτα]νεύει ᾗτ-

[ι]μος ἔσ[το καὶ] τὰ χ[ρέματα] αὐτὸ δ[ε]μόσι]α ἔσ[τ]ο καὶ τῆς θεῶ [τὸ ἐπιδέκατ]ον·

ἐχ[σενε]γκέτο δὲ τ-

αὐτα ἐς [τὸν] δέμον [*ἡε* Οἶνε]ις³⁸⁴ π[ρ]υτα[νεί]α ἐπάναγκες ἐπει[δὴν *ἡέκει ἡε*] στρα[τιὰ]

ἐς τρίτεν ἐ-

35 μέραν [πρὸτ]ον μετ[ὰ τὰ *ἡε]*ρά· ἐ[ὰν] δὲ [μὲ δ]ιαπ[ρ]αχθῇ ἐν ταύ[τει χρεματί]ζεν

³⁷⁹ Text here matches *ATL*; Hiller prints “ἐχ[σενεγκέτο δὲ *ἡε* πρυτανεία, *ἡε* ἄν] τυ[γ]χάνει κτλ. ἐς τὰ Π]αναθ[έ]ναία”. On the reading of a sigma rather than a chi here, see Meritt and West 1934, 4.

³⁸⁰ ML 69.28 prints “κ[αὶ τὲμ βολὲν καὶ τὸ δικαστ]έριον” as in Hiller, *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950. Text here matches *ATL* vol. 2.

³⁸¹ Text here matches *ATL* vol. 2; Hiller prints “περὶ τῷ[ν νέον φόρον ἐ μὲ χρεματίζουσι”, and Meritt and West 1934 print “περὶ τῷ [φόρο μεδὲ εὐθὺς χρεματίζουσι”.

³⁸² Text here matches ML 69.30. *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 print “Ἀ]θενα[ΐαι τῇ Νίκει τὸν γ]ρ[αμματέα”.

³⁸³ Text here matches *ATL*; Hiller prints “κα]ὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος δι[αχειροτονέσε]ι [ἔ]ειπαι μ]ὲ”; Lewis 1974, 85 suggests “δι[δῶι γωόμεν” without complete confidence.

³⁸⁴ See n. 362 above.

πε[ρ]ὶ τούτο προ[τ]-
 ον τῇ [ἡ]σ[τε]ραία[ι] χ[σ]υνε[χ]ὸς [ἡ]έ[ος] [ἂν] δ[ια]π[ρ]αχθῇ ἐπὶ τῇ[ς] εἰρεμένε[ς] πρυτανείας.³⁸⁵
 ἐὰν δ[ὲ] μ]-
 ἐ ἔχσε[ν]έγ[κο]σι ἐς [τὸν] δέμ[ον] ἔ[μ]ε[ν] δι[α]πρά[χ]σ[ο]σι ἐπὶ σφῶν α[ὐ]τῶν εὐθυ[ν]έσθο
 μυρίασι δρ[α]χμῇ]-
 σιν ἡέ[καστ]ος τῶμ [πρυτάν]εον [φ]ό[ρο]ν [ἡ]ος[ς] διακολύον ἐπιδ[ό]ναι ἐς τὰ[ς] στρα[τι]άς.³⁸⁶
 τὸς δ[ὲ] κέρυ]-
 κας πρ[ο]σκε[κ]λεμέ[ν]ος ἀχθ[ῇ]να[ι]³⁸⁷ ἡ[υ]π[ὸ] τῶν] δεμοσίων κλετέ[ρον] ἡίνα ἡ[ε] βολ[ῇ]
 δικά[σ]ει αὐτὸς ἐ]-
 40 ἄμ με ὁ[ρ]θὸς] δοκῶσ[ι] διακο[ν]ε[ν]· τὰ[ς] δ[ὲ] πορ[εί]ας τοῖς κέρυχ[σι] τοῖς ἰῶσι
 χσυγγράφσαι κατὰ τ]-
 ὦν ἡόρ[κ]ον τὸ[ς] τάκ[τας] ἡέ[ος] τ[ὸ] πο[ρ]ε[υ]θέσ[ον]τα[ι] ἡίνα με αὐ[τοῖ] ἀτακτοὶ ἴοσι· ἡοι δὲ
 κέρυκες]³⁸⁸
 τὰς τά[χ]σ[ε]ς τέσι π[ό]λεσι ἐπ[α]ναγ[κα]σθέντ[ο]ν [ἡ]ό[πο] ἀν δοκῇ[ι] τοῖς ἄρχοσι ἀνειπῆν· ἡό
 τι δὲ πε]-³⁸⁹
 ρὶ τῶν [τ]άχσεων κα[ὶ] τῷ φσεφίσμα[τι] το[ς] τέσι] π[ό]λεσι χρὲ λέγ[ε]σθαι περὶ τούτο τὸν
 δέμον φσε[φ]-
 ἵξεσθ[α] καὶ ἐάν τ[ι] ἄλλο ἐσάγοσι] ἡ[οι] πρυτάνες περὶ τῷ δ[έ]οντος· ἡόπος δὲ ἂν τὸμ
 φόρον] ἀπά-

³⁸⁵ The phrase τῇ[ς] εἰρεμένε[ς] πρυτανείας (or alternative restorations thereof) plays a part in reconstructing the timing of this decree; see n. 445 below. Text here matches *ATL*; ML print “ἐπὶ τῇ[ς] Λεοντίδο[ς]”, and Meritt 1971, 112 suggests “ἐπὶ τῇ[ς] καθ’ ἑαυτὸ[ς]”.

³⁸⁶ Text here matches *ATL*; Béquignon and Will 1950 print “τὸν ἐ[ς] στρα[τι]άς”.

³⁸⁷ ML 69.38-39, following *ATL* vol. 1, and Béquignon and Will 1950, print “τὸς δ[ὲ] ἐς δί]-/κας πρ[ο]σκε[κ]λεμέ[ν]ος ἀχθ[ῇ]να[ι]”. The text here matches *ATL* vol. 2.

³⁸⁸ ML 69.41 prints “αὐ[τοῖ]ς14.....ἡοι δὲ κέρυκες]”. *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 print “αὐ[τοτε]λ[ε]ς ἀπ[ὸ]σι· ἡοι δὲ κέρυκες]”. Text here matches *ATL* vol. 2.

³⁸⁹ ML 69.42 prints “δοκῇ[ι]17..... ἡό τι δὲ πε]-”. *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 print “δοκῇ[ι] τῷ δέμοι ἀποφαίνεν· ἡό τι δὲ πε]-”. Text here matches *ATL* vol. 2.

- 45 [γ]οσιν [h]αι πόλες [ἐπιμελόσθον hοι στρατηγοὶ³⁹⁰ εὐθὺς] *hότ[αν χσυντάχσει he*
βολὲ τ]ἐν τάχσι-
 [v τὸ] φό[ρ]ο *hίνα* *ἔι* [τὸι δέμοι ἀργύριον *hικανὸν ἐς τὸμ] πὸλ[εμον· τὸς δὲ στρατεγὸς]*
χρῆσθαι π-
 [εὐρὶ τὸ φ]όρο κατα[σκέφσει καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐχσεται] *ἀ[σαντας κατὰ γέν κα]ῖ*
θάλατταν πρ-
 [ὅτον πόσ]α δεῖ *ἔ* *ἐς* τὰς στρ]α[τιάς *ἔ* *ἐς* ἄλλο τι ἀναλίσκεν· ἐν δὲ τῇ *hέδραι τ]ῆς βολῆς*
τῇ πρό-
 [τει περὶ] τ[ο]ῦτο ἀ[ῖε] δίκ]ας [ἐσαγόντον ἄνευ τῆς ἐλίας καὶ τ]ὸν ἄλλον δικαστερίον
ἐὰμ μ-
- 50 [ἐ δικαστὸν] πρὸ[τον δικα]σά[ντον ἐσάγεν φσεφίζεται hο] δέμ[ος]· τοῖς δὲ
κέρυχσι τοῖς ἰῶσι τ-
 [ὀμ μισθὸν] ἀποδ[όντον hο]ι κ[ολακρέται9.... εἶπ]ε· τὰ με[v] ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ
βολῇ· τὰς
 [δὲ τάχσες] *hόσαι* [ἂν κατ]ὰ π[όλιν διαδικάζονται τὸς πρ]υτάνε[ς]³⁹¹ *hοὶ ἂν τότε*
τυγχάνοσι πρυτ-
 [ανεύοντ]ες καὶ τὸ[v γρα]μμ[ατέα τῆς βολῆς δελῶσαι ἐς τ]ὸ³⁹² δικαστέριον *hόταν περὶ τὸν*
τάχσ-
 [εον *ἔ* *h*]όπος ἂν ἀ[ὐτὰς ἀ]νθ[ομολογῶνται hοι δικαστα]ί *ἔ* *ἔδοχσ[εν] τῇ βολῇ καὶ τῷ*
δέμοι· Α-

³⁹⁰ Text here matches *ATL*; Béquignon and Will 1950 print “[ἐπίσκοποι]”.

³⁹¹ Text here matches *ATL* vol. 2; *ATL* vol. 1 prints “*hόσαι* [ἂν κατ]ὰ π[όλιν χσυντάττονται τὸς πρ]υτάνε[ς]”, and ML 69.52 prints “*hόσαι* [ἂν κατ]ὰ π[όλιν.....13.....τὸς πρ]υτάνε[ς]”.

³⁹² ML 69.53 prints “καὶ τὸ[v γρα]μμ[ατέα τῆς βολῆς ἐφίεναι ἐς τ]ὸ”, on which restoration ML comments, “but this is the language of appeal. ἐσφέν would be more appropriate.” The text here matches *ATL* vol. 2.

55 [ἰγεῖς ἐ]πρυτάνευ[ε, Φίλ]ιπ[πος ἐγραμμάτευε, ...7...]ορος ἐπεσ[τάτε], Θόδιππος
εἶπε· ἡοπόσ-

[εσι πό]λεσι φόρος [ἐτάχ]θ[ε ἐπὶ τ]ῆς [βολῆς ἡεῖ Πλειστί]ας πρῶτος [ἐγ]ρα[μμάτευε ἐπὶ
Στρατοκ-

[λέος] ἄρχοντος βῶ[ν καὶ παν]θοπ[λ[ίαν ἀπά]γεν ἐς Παναθ[έναια τὰ με[γάλα] ἡαπάσας·
πεμπόντον

δ[ὲ ἐν] τῇ πομπῇ [καθάπερ ἄπο]ι[κ[οι ^{vvv}
G[ods]

Ass[essme]nt of [tr]ibu[te]

It was decreed by th[e *boulē* and the people; Leontis] was in the *pr[ytany]*,³⁹³ ...] ? was the
sec[retary, ...7... pre]-

sided, Thoudi[ppos proposed; send heralds] from the [? whom the *boulē*] will se]lect [to
th]-

5 e cities, two [to Ionia and Karia] and two t[o Thrace and tw]o to the Is[lands and
two to the Hellesp]-

ont; [and] the[se shall proclaim pub]licly i[n each ci]ty [that ambassadors are to c]ome [in
the month of Mai]-

makterio[n³⁹⁴; and choose by lot thirty] *eisagōgei[s*³⁹⁵; the]se [are to choose both a

³⁹³ Each civic month, one tribal contingent of the *boulē* took its turn presiding over that body, and this position of presidency was called the *prytany*. For more on the *prytanies* in the fifth and fourth centuries, see Rhodes 1992, 518-522.

³⁹⁴ Maimakterion is the fifth month in the Attic ‘festival calendar’, a lunar calendar that began with “the first sighting of the new moon’s crescent following the summer solstice” (Hannah 2005, 43). Thus Maimakterion would usually occur in mid- to late-November. In 425/4, Maimakterion began around November 24. On the synchronisms between the ‘festival’ and ‘conciliar’ calendars and their importance for the interpretation of the Thoudippos decree, see nn. 445 and 447 below.

³⁹⁵ At the time of this inscription, these officials were likely responsible for introducing cases to court, perhaps specifically those involving the allies. For more on the *eisagōgeis*, see Harrison 1971, 21-23; Rhodes 1992, 582-586.

secreta]-

ry and a sub-[secretary from their own num]ber; and let the *b[oulē]* pick] out

[immediately ten men as *tak*]-

*tai*³⁹⁶; and these, [within five da]ys from when th[ey were selected, having given their oath, shall record the cities or]

10 for e[ach] day [let] eac[h pay 1000 drachmas; and let the *taktai* be administered their oaths by t]-

he *horkōta*[i³⁹⁷ on the same day when] they ha[ppen to be chosen or let each owe th]-
e same fi[ne; let the] *eis[a]g[ogeis]* see [to the *diadikasiai*³⁹⁸ of the *phoros*³⁹⁹ just as it is decreed]

by the [*dēmos*⁴⁰⁰; one of the *eisagōgeis* chosen by l]ot an[d t]he polemar[ch⁴⁰¹ shall preliminarily examine the cases in t]-

he *hēliaia*⁴⁰² [just as for the ot]her [cases] o[f the *h]ēliasts*⁴⁰³; bu[t if the *taktai* do not assess the]

15 citie[s] accordi[ng to the *d]ia[dikasai* let each of th]em[be subject at their *euth]yna*⁴⁰⁴ to a fine of t[en] thousand drachmas according to the law;

³⁹⁶ *I.e.*, assessors, magistrates responsible for the assessment of tribute; their duties are described in the inscription.

³⁹⁷ The officer who administers an oath. Cf. Antiphon 6.14.

³⁹⁸ These were cases aimed at deciding between two parties (often financial, *e.g.*, claims to an estate or a wardship, or to exemption from a liturgy), rather than determining the guilt of a defendant; see Harrison 1971, 79-80.

³⁹⁹ This was the term for the monetary contributions paid to Athens by the allies in lieu of the contribution of ships or soldiers, conventionally translated into English as 'tribute'. Cf. Thuc. 1.96.

⁴⁰⁰ Or, if we prefer the reading of *ATL* vol. 1 and Béquignon and Will 1950 (ἐπειδὴ μὲν for καθάπερ), 'let the *eisagōgeis* of the *diadikasiai* see to the *phoros* whenever it is so decreed by the *dēmos*'.

⁴⁰¹ Literally the 'war archon', but by the early fifth century the direct military responsibilities of this office had been redirected, largely to the *stratēgoi*. For the competencies remaining to this office, see Harrison 1971, 9-11; Rhodes 1992, 652-657.

⁴⁰² The term for the citizen body of Athens in its judicial capacity. For an overview and a brief discussion of some of the aspects of the *hēliaia* as yet controversial in scholarship, see Ostwald 1986, 9-12.

⁴⁰³ Citizens sitting as jurors in the *hēliaia*.

and the [*nomo*]*theta*[i]⁴⁰⁵ are to es[t]ablish a new [*dikasterion*]⁴⁰⁶ of o[ne thousand
dikasts⁴⁰⁷; and of the tribute, sinc]-

e it has be[com]e less, the [current assessments wi]th the [*bou*]*lē* let them reas[ess]
together [just as for the la]-

st office [with respect] to [every p]art in the month [of P]oside[i]o[n]⁴⁰⁸; a[nd they shall
deliberate daily]

[f]rom the first of the [month with rega]rd to th[ese matters so that] the *pho*[r]os [may be
asses[sed] in the [month] of Po[sideion; and let the full *boul*]-

20 [ē] deliber[ate a]lso co[n]tinuously so that a[ss]essme[nts] may [ha]ppen unl[ess the
dēmo]s [votes otherwise;] a-

[n]d [they shall not now asse]ss [les]s tribu[te] for a[n]y c[ity] than how[ever much it
happened to p]ay [before th]-

[is] unless [there shou]ld ap[pear] s[ome insufficiency so that beca]use of a wea[kness o]f
resources [it cannot pay more; and thi]s

m]otion [and this *psē*]ph[isma]⁴⁰⁹ and the ph]oro[s, however much is asses[sed for each

⁴⁰⁴ The process, after a magistrate had laid down his office for most magistracies (or at any point during the tenure of the office for the *stratēgia*) through which a magistrate was liable to charges of malpractice with respect to his actions while in office. See Harrison 1971, 14-15; Ostwald 1986, 12-13.

⁴⁰⁵ What word is to be restored here is the subject of some scholarly dispute: see n. 373 above. The foremost possibilities are [νομο]θέτα[ι, as printed here, and θε<σ>μο]θέτα[ι. On the *thesmothetai*, six ‘lesser’ archons in charge of a variety of legal and religious procedures at Athens, see Harrison 1971, 12-17. On the office of the *nomothetai*, presumably (from the evidence and the name) magistrates tasked with implementing or creating laws, and the scarce evidence for its persistent existence in the fifth century, see Ostwald 1986, 405-407. Epigraphic considerations point to *nomothetai*, while the current state of our knowledge about the Athenian legal system points to *thesmothetai*.

⁴⁰⁶ A *dikastērion* was a jury court constituted from Athenian citizens over the age of 30 who were not in any sense *atimos* (on which condition see n. 413 below). On the *dikasteric* courts, see Harrison 1971, 43-49.

⁴⁰⁷ Citizens sitting as jurors in a *dikastērion*.

⁴⁰⁸ Posideion is the sixth month in the Attic ‘festival calendar’, directly following Maimakterion (on which see n. 394 above). On the synchronisms between the ‘festival’ and ‘conciliar’ calendars and their importance for the interpretation of the Thoudippos decree, see nn. 445 and 447 below.

⁴⁰⁹ A *psēphisma* is a binding vote on a subject by the Athenian *ekklēsia*, that is, the assembly. Usually, at least in Athens, the *psēphisma* was formulated by the *boulē* before being presented to the *ekklēsia* for

city, having be]en wr[itten

[up] by the se[cretary of the *boulē* on two] stone [st]el[a]i [is to be set up one in the

bou]leu[tē]-

25 [r]ion⁴¹⁰ [and] th[e other on the Akropolis;] th[e] *pōlētai*⁴¹¹ [shall let the contract,

and] th[e silver shall be provided by] the *k[ō]-*

lakret[ai];⁴¹² and for the future let it be declared to the c[it[i]es about the tr[ibute before

the Panathenaia, t]he gr[e]-

at one; [and the *prytany* – whoever] ha[p]pens to hold [the *prytany* –] shall [introduce the

assessments every P]anath[e]-

naia; [and if the *prytaneis* do not at that time introdu]ce (them) t[o] the *dēmos* a[nd they

do not vote a *dikast]ērion*

about the [*phoros* and they do not at that time deliberate am]ong th[emsel]ves they sh[all

owe one hundred drachmas sac]red t-

30 [o A]then[a, each of the p]r[ytaneis, a]nd on[e hundred] to th[e] public treasury

[and at their *euthyna* for one th]ousand

[dra]chm[as each of the p]r[ytaneis] shall be liable, an[d if anyone else should [propose a

resolution for t]he [cities th]at there [n]ot be t-

[he] assessme[nts each] G[reat P]a[nathena]ia in the *prytany* – whoever fi]rst holds the

pr]ytany –, let hi[m be] *at-*

[i]mos⁴¹³ and let his m[oney] bel[on]g to [the state] and [a tent]h to the goddess; and these

modification and approval or rejection; such is the case with the *psēphisma* at hand. On the difference between *psēphisma* and *nomos* in ancient conceptions of law, see pp. 68-72 above.

⁴¹⁰ The meeting-place of the *boulē*. See Rhodes 1972, 30-35.

⁴¹¹ The *pōlētai* were officials with financial responsibilities including the selling of public contracts and of confiscated property: cf. Harpokration s.v. πωληταὶ καὶ πωλητήριον and Suda s.v. πωληταὶ.

⁴¹² The *kōlakretai* were another board of financial officials, on whom see Samons 2000, 57-59.

things shall [be refe]-
 rred to [the] *dēmos* by [the] *p[r]yta[ny]* of Oine]is compulsorily when[ever the]
 exped[ition has come] on the third d-
 35 ay [first] thing aft[er the religio]us matters; and i[f (these things) are not
 c]on[c]luded on that [day they shall delibe]rate abo[u]t this firs[t]
 thing on the [fol]lowin[g (day) continu]ally [un]til [they are c]omp[l]eted in th[e
 aforement]ed *prytany*; and if the[y do]
 not re[fe]r (this) to [the *dēm*]os or [they do not] co[mpl]e[t]e it among thems[elves they
 shall be liable] at their *euthyna* for ten thousand dr[achma]-
 s, e[ac]h of the [*prytan*]eis (because of) the [*pho*]ro[s, that they prevented it be[ing given
 to th]e exped[iti]ons; the [her]-
 alds ha[v]ing be[en summ]oned (to court) are to be] led i[n b]y [the] public *klētēres*⁴¹⁴ so
 that t]he *boul[ē]* may jud]g[e them i]-
 40 f they do not co[rrectly] see[m to have attende]d to mat[ters; and the cour]ses for
 the heral[ds going out shall be drawn up according to t]-
 he oa[th by th]e *tak[tai]*, t]o what po[int they] are [to] pro[cee]d, so that th[ey] do not [go
 out in a disorderly fashion; and the heralds]
 [sha]ll [be] co[mpel]le[d to announce] the asse[ssme]nts for the c[ities wher]ever seems
 be[st to the archons; what con]-
 cerning the [as]sessments an[d the *psēphis*]m[a for the] c[ities] it is necessary to [say,

⁴¹³ *Atimia* was a category of penalty at Athens carrying a variety of potential meanings, from that of ‘outlawry’ to something approaching more closely a recission of citizen rights. See in depth Harrison 1971, 169-176.

⁴¹⁴ The *klētēres* were witnesses sent to summon a person or group of people to court. The sort of public *klētēres* involved in matters pertaining to tribute seen here also appear at *IG* I³ 68.48-49, the Kleononymous decree. On the more general function of the *klētēres* in Athens, see Harrison 1971, 85-86.

about this the *dēmos* shall v]o-
 t[e], and if a[nything else is introduced] by t[he *prytaneis* ab]out what is n[ecessary; and
 how the *phoros*] should be pa-
 45 [i]d by [t]he cities [shall be the care of the *stratēgoi* immediate]ly whene[ver the
boulē has joined in t]he assessme-
 [nt of] *pho[r]os* so that there may be [for the *dēmos* silver sufficient for the] w[ar; and the
stratēgoi] shall take a-
 [bout the *ph*]oros consi[deration each year exami]n[ing by land an]d sea fi-
 [rst how muc]h is necessary [to spend] either fo[r the ar]m[y or something else; and in
 the] fi[rst sitting of] the *boulē*
 [regarding] t[h]is ca[ses shall alw]ays [be introduced without the *hēliaia* and t]he other
dikastēria unles-
 50 [s the] *dēm[os* votes for them to be introduced with the dikasts havi]ng j[udged
 them fi]rst;] and to the heralds going out t-
 [he pay] shall be p[rovided by th]e *k[ōlakretai* ...9... propos]ed; all [e]lse just as the
boulē suggested; [but] the
 [assessments,] however many [are adjudicated city-]by-c[ity, the *pr*]ytanei[s] – whoever
 happen to be serving
 [as the *prytan*]eis – and th[e sec]re[tary of the *boulē* shall disclose to th]e *dikastērion*
 whenever [it is] about the assess-
 [ments so th]at t[hey ma]y b[e assented to by the dikast]s v it was decre[ed] by the
boulē and the people; A-
 55 [igeis he]ld the *prytan*[y, Phil]ip[os was secretary, ...7...]oros pres[ided],

Thoudippos proposed; however
 [many ci]ties [have b]ee[n assessed] *phoros* [in t]he [*boulē* for which Pleisti]as was the
 first [secr]etary while Stratok-
 [les] was archon [shall] all [contribute] an o[x and panop]]y to the Gr[eat Panath]enaia;
 they shall take part
 [in] the procession [just like colon]i[sts . . .

So, what do scholars say about the tone of this decree? Meiggs gives the fullest statement of the camp who associate the decree with Cleon, and he is echoed by Ostwald and Meiggs and Lewis:

More important is the language of the decree, which displays the violence associated with Cleon and his associates. Penalties are threatened at every turn, and in the clause insisting on regular assessments in the years of the Great Panathenaea there is a strong suggestion of polemic. The general tone is reminiscent of the decrees of the early forties, which also threatened the executive with penalties on a liberal scale, and the two periods have something in common. In both there were sharp divisions of opinion and sharp feelings.⁴¹⁵

The focus is on penalties⁴¹⁶ and required regular assessments, which are connected to ‘the violence associated with Cleon and his associates’ and ‘the bullying tone that gives Aristophanes so much scope in the *Knights*’. Looking back to Meiggs’ earlier narrative of

⁴¹⁵ AE 326. Ostwald 1986, 206: “deadlines were peremptorily laid down for all officials involved in assessments and collection (ML, no. 69.9, 11, 20, 33-36); harsh fines and penalties, including loss of civic rights and confiscation of property, were imposed for noncompliance at every stage (9-10, 11-12, 15, 28-31, 31-33, 35-38).” ML 196-7: “The association with the followers of Cleon may also be reflected in the tone of the decree, for this is perhaps the strongest decree that has survived from the fifth century. The executive is threatened with penalties at every turn, in a manner reminiscent of, but more intensive than, the Coinage decree (No. 45) and the decree of Kleinias (No. 46). The polemical tone of most of the clauses presupposes opposition, and a strong determination to override it. This is the bullying tone that gives Aristophanes so much scope in the *Knights*.”

⁴¹⁶ Notably almost all of these penalties are aimed at Athenian officials allotted from the *dēmos* and not aimed at the allies; the same is true for the Coinage Decree, on which see Figueira 1998, 319-423. Most scholars have noted the inward direction of these punitive clauses, which have served as the foundation for theories about partisan strife at Athens on the subject of tribute reassessment: see pp. 127-128 and n. 415 above.

the back-and-forth over war and tribute in the 420s, we can see Kleon as pro-war aligning with a pro-war funding decree. And the Thoudippos decree is certainly clear that it aims to support the army (ll. 37-38; cf. Kleonymos decree 27-30) by requiring a swift reassessment (8-12, 18-20, 33-38) which will increase the amount of the tribute (16-22). However, the decree also directs considerable space to reorganizing the system of tribute assessment so as to regularize it and place it more firmly under the control and oversight of the *dēmos*. The clause insisting on regular, Great Panathenaic assessments (31-33) fits better here than it does in the context of immediate war-time funding concerns, and we see in addition the *taktai* being required to assess in accordance with tribute adjudications in the *hēliaia* (13-16), the establishment of a *dikasteric* court to review assessments along with the *boulē* (16-18), direct and explicit rules about how tribute is to be assessed and under what circumstances tribute decreases are permissible (19-20), the prytanies being required to introduce the question of assessment to the *ekklēsia* every Panathenaia, as well as carrying out other requisite actions related to tribute assessment (27-31), and the routes and proclamations of the heralds being strictly controlled (40-44). Samons has astutely pointed out that these concerns are a common theme running through Athenian financial decrees in the 420s: “Developments in the bureaucracy of tribute-collection and the hike in tribute assessments of 425/4 obviously presented motives and opportunities for fraud in the system. So much is clear from the decrees of Kleonymos, Thoudippos and Kleinias.”⁴¹⁷ It is easy to associate Kleon with the pro-war position, since Thucydides 4.22 makes clear his opinion of peace around this time; is it so easy to determine how public control and oversight about tribute related to him?

⁴¹⁷ Samons 2000, 193.

To answer this question, let us look at our ancient sources and see exactly what kind of behavior Kleon is associated with when it comes to tribute. Meiggs and Lewis mentions the *Knights*, and so we can start there. At line 78, Paphlagon's hand is said to be among the Aitolians.⁴¹⁸ Paphlagon's entrance onstage occurs as he is being beaten, an act which the chorus of knights cheers on: "rightly so, since you gobble public funds before you're allotted an office; and like a fig picker you squeeze magistrates under review, looking to see which of them is raw, which ripe and unripe; yes, and what's more, you scan the citizenry for anyone who's an innocent lamb, rich and innocuous and afraid of litigation."⁴¹⁹ A little later he is described as "watching the tribute from up above on the rocks like a tunny-fisher".⁴²⁰ At 438 the Sausage-Seller accuses Paphlagon of getting ten talents from Poteidaia, and then promises to charge him over a thousand times for theft (κλοπή).⁴²¹ In a further confrontation, the Sausage-Seller claims at 802-804 that Paphlagon is stealing and taking bribes from the allies while hoodwinking Demos,⁴²² and at 823-835 that he "breaks the choicest stalks off the audits of outgoing officials and gulps them down, and with both hands sops the gravy from the people's treasury....[and] took a bribe from Mytilene of over forty minas!"⁴²³ Then we come back around to the Sausage-Seller's riposte to Paphlagon's threats about trierarchies and the *eisphora* which

⁴¹⁸ Aristoph. *Kn.* 78: τὸ χεῖρ' ἐν Αἰτωλοῖς.

⁴¹⁹ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 258-265: ἐν δίκη γ', ἐπεὶ τὰ κοινὰ πρὶν λαχεῖν κατεσθείεις, | κάποσुकάζεις πιέζων τοὺς ὑπευθύνους, σκοπῶν | ὅστις αὐτῶν ὠμός ἐστιν ἢ πέπων ἢ ἢ μὴ πέπων. | καὶ σκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, | πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα.

⁴²⁰ Aristoph. *Kn.* 313: κάπὸ τῶν πετρῶν ἄνωθεν τοὺς φόρους θυννοσκοπῶν.

⁴²¹ Aristoph. *Kn.* 438: σὲ δ' ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἔχοντ' εὖ οἶδα δέκα τάλαντα. Charges of theft: 445.

⁴²² Aristoph. *Kn.* 802-804: σὺ μὲν ἀρπάζης καὶ δωροδοκῆς παρὰ τῶν πόλεων, ὃ δὲ δῆμος | ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς ὀμίχλης ἃ πανουργεῖς μὴ καθορᾷ σου, | ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἅμα καὶ χρείας καὶ μισθοῦ πρὸς σε κεχρήνη.

⁴²³ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 824-827, 834-835: καὶ τοὺς καυλοὺς | τῶν εὐθυνῶν ἐκκαυλίζων | καταβροχθίζει, κάμφοιν χειροῖν | μυστιλᾷται τῶν δημοσίων... | δωροδοκήσαντ' ἐκ Μυτιλήνης | πλεῖν ἢ μνᾶς τετταράκοντα.

we mentioned above:⁴²⁴ “I wish you this: your squid is sizzling in the pan when you’re scheduled to make a motion about the Milesians that’ll net you a talent if you get it passed, and you’re hurrying to stuff yourself with the squid in time to get to the Assembly, and before you can eat it a man comes to fetch you, and you’re so eager to get the talent that you choke on your meal!”⁴²⁵ At 992-996 the chorus jokes that as a youth Kleon was expelled from music classes for a propensity for bribe-taking.⁴²⁶ In the *Clouds*, the chorus advises the Athenians to “convict that vulture Kleon of bribery and theft, then clamp his neck in the pillory.”⁴²⁷ Critias, meanwhile, is reported to have claimed that “Kleon had not even the property of a free man before coming to public affairs, but subsequently left behind an estate worth fifty talents.”⁴²⁸ A scholiast’s note on *Acharnians* 6 attributes to Theopompos the information that “Kleon took five talents from the islanders, in order that he might persuade the Athenians to lighten their *eisphorai*.”⁴²⁹

⁴²⁴ See p. 124 above.

⁴²⁵ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 928-940: εὐχομαι δέ σοι ταδί· | τὸ μὲν τάγηνον τευθίδων | ἐφεστάναι σίζον, σὲ δὲ | γνώμην ἐρεῖν μέλλοντα περὶ | Μιλησίων καὶ κερδανεῖν | τάλαντον, ἣν κατεργάσῃ, | σπεύδειν ὅπως τῶν τευθίδων | ἐμπλήμενος φθάις ἔτ’ εἰς | ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθῶν· ἔπει-|τα πρὶν φαγεῖν ἀνὴρ μεθή- | κοι, καὶ σὺ τὸ τάλαντον λαβεῖν | βουλόμενος ἐσθίων ἐπαποπνιγείης.

⁴²⁶ Aristoph. *Kn.* 992-996: κᾶτα τὸν κιθαριστὴν | ὀργισθέντ’ ἀπάγειν κελεύ-|ειν, “ὥς ἀρμονίαν ὁ παῖς | οὗτος οὐ δύναται μαθεῖν | ἣν μὴ Δωροδοκιστί”.

⁴²⁷ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Cl.* 591-592: ἦν Κλέωνα τὸν λάρων δώρων ἐλόντες καὶ κλοπῆς | εἶτα φιμώσητε τούτου τῷ ξύλῳ τὸν ἀνχένα.

⁴²⁸ DK 88 [81] B 45 = Ael. *VH* x. 17: Κλέωνα πρὸ τοῦ παρελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ μηδὲν τῶν οἰκείων ἐλεύθερον εἶναι· μετὰ δὲ πεντήκοντα τάλαντων τὸν οἶκον ἀπέλιπε.

⁴²⁹ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F 94 = ΣAristoph. *Ach.* 6: παρὰ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἔλαβε πέντε τάλαντα ὁ Κλέων, ἵνα πείσῃ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κουφίσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς εἰσφορᾶς. There are several possibilities for explaining the use of the term *eisphora* in this scholion. Connor 1968, 158 n. 16 presents perhaps the most straightforward explanation, namely that the scholiast was using *eisphora* to refer to tribute (the usual term was *phoros*) instead of the normal technical meaning of *eisphora* as a property tax in a *polis* (cf. pp. 121-124 above). Samons 2000, 182 and especially n. 60 suggests that the use of *eisphora* instead of *phoros* here, when combined with the specific stipulations about *khōra* in lines 21-22 of the Thoudippos decree, should be taken to indicate that many (perhaps most?) allied states used *eisphorai* to raise the money for their tribute. There are two major issues with this theory. First, it requires discounting the evidence of Plut. *Arist.* 24 that Aristeides took into account both χώραν τε καὶ προσόδους in his initial assessment of the Delian League *poleis*. Samons’ argument (182 n. 62) that the impetus for assessment being located with the allies in this passage renders the passage tendentious and unreliable is not entirely compelling: while highlighting

The clear pattern that emerges from these passages is the same as the one we saw in our consideration of the *eisphora*. It is not of Kleon as a master financial manipulator concerned with maximizing Athenian revenues, but of Kleon as just another corrupt politician, pledging allegiance to the *dēmos* and bragging about his accomplishments in office like any other politician while simultaneously lining his own pockets at the expense of Athenian interests. As Lowell Edmunds has observed, “Aristophanes’ principal explicit charge against Cleon [in the *Knights*] is that he steals the city’s money.”⁴³⁰ That Aristophanes saw Kleon not as anything unique, but as one of a type that was widespread at Athens is apparent from both the *Knights* and the *Wasps*. Thus Bdelykleon in the *Wasps* speaks of “the ‘I won’t betray the Athenian rabble and I’ll fight for the masses’ bunch” who “extort fifty talent bribes from the allied cities by terrifying them with threats like this: ‘You’ll hand over the tribute, or I’ll upend your city with my

the complicity of the allies at the outset of the Delian League can easily be interpreted as an Athenian *apologia*, the note that the Athenians considered both *khōra* and *prosodoi* for assessment serves no such easily detectable purpose, nor is it at all clear why a later author would insert or fabricate such a detail. Andreades 1933, 308 is to be preferred in his rejection of the Athenians taking over the Persian *dasmos*, and Figueira 2016, 32 suggests that “Aristeides and his collaborators carefully reviewed and compared revenues from the existing indirect taxes (like harbor duties) of the allied states and calculated assessments that seemed equitable in cross comparison”. This suggestion leads me to the second problem with Samons’ theory: his restrictive understanding of *khōra*. Samons claims that “[t]he clause in our decree describing possible *aporia* in the *chora* (line 22) looks specifically to the agricultural condition of the polis.” It should be obvious, however, that a city’s *khōra* could be prosperous or impoverished in many ways beyond simply the agricultural: one could think of the silver-vein at Laureion, or the wealth of Thasos from marble, copper, silver, and gold, or the discussion of timber for ship-building at Plat. *Laws* 705c, which includes specific (and repeated) use of the term *khōra*. The *khōra* encompassed all of a *polis*’ resources, so that incapacity in the *khōra* would legitimately impact a *polis*’ economic output regardless of whether that *polis* was capitalizing on the *khōra* by direct or indirect taxation. Surely the reference at IG I³ 71.22 to *aporia* in the *khōra* was meant not to distinguish between ‘legitimate’ appeals based in agricultural infertility and ‘illegitimate’ appeals based on (e.g.) an important mineral vein being depleted, but between ‘legitimate’ appeals based on inability to pay an assessed level of tribute and ‘illegitimate’ appeals worked through *proxenia* or rhetorical prowess where no real inability existed. To return to the question of *eisphora* and *phoros* in Theopompos fr. 94, there is one further possibility. Previous interpretations have assumed that τῶν νησιωτῶν are non-Athenians, so that their paying *eisphora* to Athens (or having that *eisphora* reduced) would be out of the question. If, however, the *nēsiōtai* are construed as Athenian colonists/cleruchs living on the islands, the interpretation of our fragment would be quite straightforward. That there are references in the Khalkis decree (IG I³ 40.52-54) and the Hestiaia decree (IG I³ 41.38) to Athenian tax-payers and *eisphorai*, respectively, may potentially provide some support for such an interpretation.

⁴³⁰ Edmunds 1987, 16.

thundering!’ while you [the Athenian *dēmos*] are content to gnaw the rinds of your own empire.”⁴³¹ The entire plot of the *Knights* is an exercise in competitive corruption, as the Sausage-Seller overthrows Paphlagon by beating him at his own game; Edmunds comments on the ‘cheerful nihilism’ of the chorus of knights in supporting the Sausage-Seller: “Cleon’s enemies were the σόφρονες ‘sensible men’, and chief among them was Nicias (Thuc. 4.27.5). The Knights exhort the Sausage-seller to prove, in defeating Cleon, that τὸ σωφρόνως τραφῆναι ‘the education of a sensible man’ is now meaningless in public life (334, cf. 191-2).”⁴³² When the Sausage-Seller warns Demos to beware of Paphlagon who is always requesting revenue-collecting ships, he ends by pledging to pay the soldiers on those ships in a hyperbolic promise comparable to Kleon’s own about Pylos.⁴³³ Finally, Demos vaunts that he selects a thieving *prostatēs* to fatten up and then swats that leader down,⁴³⁴ and that he monitors such leaders (plural!), pretending not to see their theft until he extracts the money in court.⁴³⁵

Several of the passages we have discussed are particularly meaningful in the context of the Thoudippos decree. The fragment of Theopompos provides one likely example of Kleon taking (or extorting) money from allied cities to lower their tribute, but similar situations also probably underlie the references to Kleon accepting bribes from the allies at *Knights* 78, 438, 802, 834, and 930-933, and this kind of personal enrichment is the best background for the image of Kleon as the fisher lurking in wait for the allied

⁴³¹ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 666-667, 669-672: τούτους τοὺς “οὐχὶ προδώσω τὸν Ἀθηναίων κολοσυρτόν, | ἀλλὰ μαχοῦμαι περὶ τοῦ πλήθους αἰεί.”... | καὶ οὔτοι μὲν δωροδοκοῦσιν κατὰ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα | ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἐπαπειλοῦντες τοιαυτὶ κάναφοβοῦντες, | “δώσετε τὸν φόρον, ἢ βροντήσας τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν ἀνατρέψω.” | σὺ δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀγαπᾷς τῆς σῆς τοὺς ἀργελόφους περιτρώγων.

⁴³² Edmunds 1987, 19-20.

⁴³³ Aristoph. *Kn.* 1070-1079.

⁴³⁴ Aristoph. *Kn.* 1125-1130: αὐτός τε γὰρ ἥδομαι | βρύλλων τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν, | κλέπτοντά τε βούλομαι | τρέφειν ἕνα προστάτην· | τοῦτον δ’, ὅταν ᾖ πλέως, | ἄρας ἐπάταξα.

⁴³⁵ Aristoph. *Kn.* 1145-1150: τηρῶ γὰρ ἐκάστοτ’ αὐ-|τούς, οὐδὲ δοκῶν ὀρᾶν, | κλέπτοντας· ἔπειτ’ ἀναγ-|κάζω πάλιν ἐξεμεῖν | ἅττ’ ἂν κεκλόφωσί μου, | κημὸν καταμηλῶν.

tribute at 313. Our evidence, then, actually suggests that Kleon was exactly the sort of politician *against whom* many of the stipulations of the Thoudippos decree were designed to protect. Furthermore, the idea that a career military man like Nikias would have attempted to undermine the war effort by disrupting necessary funding for the Athenian army is not so obvious as Meiggs makes it out to be. Nikias was *stratēgos* six times between 428/7 and 421/0, after all, and would have been acutely aware of the need for augmented funds to secure military success. He displays this awareness twice in the course of the Sicilian expedition when, *despite being embroiled in an effort he opposed*, he recommends a large, well-funded initial expedition (Thuc. 6.21-23), and requests reinforcements and significantly more financial support after the venture has bogged down (Thuc. 7.13-15). The only real association between Nikias and lower tribute is the backing down from 425/4 levels that occurs after the death of Kleon,⁴³⁶ but such a change can as easily be explained as a reasonable response to the lower financial demands of peacetime as by a long-standing policy of moderation with respect to allied tribute.⁴³⁷

Besides, the ‘backing down’ of tribute during the Peace of Nikias was not terribly

⁴³⁶ *ATL* vol. 3, 353: “But although the hope and expectation of lowered tribute assessments were in everyone’s mind at the Dionysia of 421, it was, after all, the date of tax collection and the old rates were still in force. Indeed, the old rates were undoubtedly reaffirmed at the Panathenaia of 422 when Kleon was still the guiding spirit of the Athenian democracy. Talk of lower rates came only after his death, and the death of Brasidas, and the progress of negotiations for peace.” Even this connection between Nikias and lower tribute has been significantly undermined by the more recent scholarly *communis opinio*: the *ATL* arrived at their conclusion about the identical assessments of 425/4 and 422/1 by dating *IG I³ 77* to 421, largely to match and support the narrative laid out in the quotation above. Subsequently *IG I³ 77* has been redated to 422/1 (cf. Meritt and McGregor 1967, *AE* 340-343), so that the total assessment was already decreasing ‘when Kleon was still the guiding spirit of the Athenian democracy’ and, in fact, did not much change under Nikias (see nn. 437-439 immediately below).

⁴³⁷ I hope that I am showing here that it was not so much Kleon’s policies vis-à-vis tribute *per se* that caused it to be high during the late 420s and to return to “moderate” (on the high nature of these ‘moderate’ levels, cf. nn. 438 and 439 below) levels after his death, but that it was his policy (adopted from Perikles) of refusing any concessions to the Peloponnesians that in turn necessitated greater funding, to which even Athenians in favor of peace with Sparta would not necessarily object. Even after Kleon’s death and Nikias’ ascension, as Blamire 2001 points out, “[t]here could clearly be no question of any return to pre-war levels of assessment until the debt to the sacred treasuries had been repaid” (112).

significant: the assessment of 422/1, made before the Peace, likely decreased the total assessment from its high of 1460+ T in 425/4 to something closer to 1200 T,⁴³⁸ and there is no indication that the assessment of 418 provided further decreases.⁴³⁹ We should consider the possibility that the strong language mandating expediency in the Thoudippos decree was a reaction to the urgent necessities of the wartime situation, rather than being reflective of an underlying attempt to undercut the Athenian war effort, and that the attempts at regulation and oversight were actually aimed at ensuring that politicians like Kleon were not becoming rich at the expense of the Athenian military. In evaluating this possibility we must consider two further possible connections between Kleon and the Thoudippos decree: the timing of the decree, and a putative marriage between Thoudippos and the daughter of Kleon.

⁴³⁸ Both Andocides (a contemporary source) and Aeschines claim that the annual *phoros* during the Peace of Nikias was 1200 talents, and that this level of tribute allowed the Athenians to restore their reserves on the Acropolis. Andoc. 3.8-9: οἶμαι δ' ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας εἰδέναι τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην ἑπτακισχίλια μὲν τάλαντα νομίματος εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀνηγέκαμεν, ναὺς δὲ πλείους ἢ τετρακοσίας ἐκτησάμεθα, καὶ φόρος προσήει κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν πλέον ἢ διακόσια καὶ χίλια τάλαντα (As you are all aware, I imagine, this peace enabled us to deposit seven thousand talents of coined silver on the Acropolis and to acquire over three hundred ships: an annual tribute of more than twelve hundred talents was coming in... Trans. Maidment 1941); Aeschin. 2.175: καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἑπτακισχίλια τάλαντα ἀνηγέκαμεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην ταύτην, τριήρεις δ' ἐκτησάμεθα πλωίμους καὶ ἐντελεῖς οὐκ ἐλάττους ἢ τριακοσίας, φόρος δ' ἡμῖν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν προσήει πλέον ἢ χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα (In the period that followed we again deposited treasure in the Acropolis, seven thousand talents, thanks to this peace, and we acquired triremes, seaworthy and fully equipped, no fewer than three hundred in number; a yearly tribute of more than twelve hundred talents came in to us... Trans. Adams 1919). The total for the Hellespontine district in *IG* I³ 71.III.121-124 is somewhere between 250 and 300 T, and *AE* 342 argues compellingly that the Hellespontine total in 422/1 (*IG* I³ 77.IV.11-13) should be about 196 T. If the Hellespontine total in 425/4 is closer to 250 T, that means it decreases by about 20% in 422/1; a similar decrease in overall tribute would bring it from ~1500 T to ~1200 T, matching our evidence from Andocides and Aeschines.

⁴³⁹ Cf. Blamire 2001, 113: “[a] new assessment of tribute was due at the Great Panathenaia of 418, and five fragments survive of what is now agreed to be the quota list for 418/17 (*ATL* list 33 = *IG* I³ 287). Extrapolation from the three preserved figures in the Hellespontine panel (col. II, lines 9-11) seems to establish that the level of tribute set in 422 had been broadly maintained after the Peace of Nikias, so that a return of 1,200T a year (Andoc. 3.9) is by no means impossible if taken to refer to overseas income as a whole.” Here and at his p. 111 Blamire seems to prefer a figure of 1000 T for the post-422/1 total tribute assessment. Such a number would make sense if the Hellespontine district’s total in 425/4 was much closer to 300 T than 250 T, but also requires distorting Andoc. 3.8-9 and Aeschin. 2.175, which clearly state that the *tribute* (φόρος) during the Peace of Nikias was 1200 T, into meaning instead ‘overseas income as a whole’. As best I can make out, there is no advantage to such an interpretation, as opposed to simply accepting a total tribute assessment of ~1200 T post-422/1.

Much has been made of the close chronological proximity between the Thoudippos decree and the surprising and momentous success of Kleon at Pylos. The precise details of this hypothesis have evolved over time, centering largely on the mention of the returning army at lines 33-35, the appropriate restoration and understanding of the various *prytaneis* named in the decree, and Thucydides' timeline of Kleon's Pylos campaign. Initially, Wade-Gery and Meritt argued that the prytany dating the principle decree (line 3, must be entirely restored) should be the third prytany, and that the one in line 34 (partially restored) should be the second prytany.⁴⁴⁰ On the basis of the stipulation that this second prytany was to bring the matter to the *dēmos* and even stretch the *ekklēsia* meeting to a second day if necessary to conclude discussion, it was argued that the *probouleuma* was formulated towards the end of this second prytany. This would be around mid-September, which would match up well with Wade-Gery and Meritt's interpretation of the narrative of Thucydides as locating the Spartan surrender at Pylos around September fifth.⁴⁴¹ In light of this extremely close timing, Wade-Gery and Meritt proposed a scenario in which "Thoudippos, knowing Kleon's plans and policies, drafted the probouleuma of *I.G.*, I², 63 and had it ratified in the council as soon as the news of Kleon's success had reached him. Still, he wanted Kleon in Athens when the decree was brought into the *ekklesia* and so inserted in the probouleuma the clause calling for an extraordinary session two days after Kleon's return."⁴⁴² However, Gomme proposed a different chronology, arguing that "the second week of August seems to be

⁴⁴⁰ Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 390.

⁴⁴¹ Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 378-384, and especially Table 1 on page 383.

⁴⁴² Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 391-2.

the latest date possible for the finish of the campaign.”⁴⁴³ Meiggs and Lewis objected to Wade-Gery and Meritt’s reconstruction on this basis, and by noting that, “[i]f this reconstruction is right, a stele was set up on the Acropolis which said that the members of the [Oineis] prytany would be very heavily fined if they did not do what it was already known they had not done (ll. 34-8).”⁴⁴⁴ Ultimately, and without convincingly resolving some of the epigraphic points of Wade-Gery and Meritt, Meiggs and Lewis agree with McGregor, who had suggested that the ‘army returning’ in the Thoudippos decree referred to Nikias’ campaign in Corinthia subsequent to Kleon’s return from Pylos.⁴⁴⁵ In 1971, based upon further discoveries and developments in his understanding of the calendar of 425/4, Meritt conceded that “the first decree was passed...in the fifth prytany, Leontis (line 3),”⁴⁴⁶ and thence in 1981 that “the decree was passed only after the return of the troops from the Korinthia”.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴³ *HCT* vol. 3, 478. Wade-Gery and Meritt’s proposed chronology is based upon a somewhat questionable interpretation of Thucydides’ positioning of the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica with respect to the growth of the grain crop (Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 379-380), which is rejected by Meiggs and Lewis in favor of Gomme’s interpretation.

⁴⁴⁴ *ML* 195.

⁴⁴⁵ On the epigraphic issues, *ML* 195: “If in the two places (3 and 34) different tribes are indeed mentioned, then it is possible that the tribe of l. 3 is Leontis Pryt. II, followed by Oineis Pryt. III in l. 34, and that the decree was passed on the last day of Leontis when it was known that Oineis was to follow. This, however, though formally possible, perhaps relies too much on coincidence. An alternative is to believe that in l. 34 the mason wrote ἔ Λεοντίς, though the aspirate is not dropped elsewhere in this inscription. This possibility, however, is strengthened if in l. 36 we restore, instead of ἐπὶ τῇ[ς εἰρεμένε]ς πρυτανείας, which we do not think can mean ‘the said prytany’, ἐπὶ τῇ[ς Λεοντίδο]ς πρυτανείας, the more normal formulation.” Meritt 1971, 110-113 rejects both conjectures: the former (Leontis l. 3 Prytany II, Oineis l. 34 Prytany III) because it violates Ferguson’s law of sortition (“no prytany knew the name of its successor until its own term came to its close,” 112) and because giving the task to a newly beginning prytany would clash with the urgency in lines 35-38 that the prytaneis conclude the business ideally in a single day, or at worst by continuously working from that day forward, with penalties imposed if the task is not finished within their prytany; the latter (lines 34 and 36 refer to Leontis, rather than Oineis) on epigraphic grounds (“[t]he daseia is never omitted from the definite article in this inscription, which is a veritable model of careful and consistent stonemasonry,” 111). On the expedition, *ML* 196: “we believe that the expedition referred to in the main decree is more probably that of Nikias than that of Cleon”. Cf. McGregor 1935, 156-161.

⁴⁴⁶ Meritt 1971, 111.

⁴⁴⁷ Meritt 1981, 89 and 92. Meritt 1971 and 1981 move Oineis, formerly his second prytany, to the fourth prytany on the basis of its appearance in the *Logistai* inscription (*IG* I³ 369.19), and make Leontis, the prytany in which the (first) decree was passed, the fifth prytany. He thus sustains over Meiggs and Lewis’

Ultimately, despite the disagreements about the exact timing of the Thoudippos decree, most scholars have agreed that the decree was made possible by, and indeed indicates, the supremacy of Kleon. Meritt, even after backing off about regarding the decree “as the *immediate* consequence of that victory”,⁴⁴⁸ still thought that it “came so close after Kleon’s spectacular triumph at Pylos that his prestige was high and any elective position that he wished could have been open to him...the assessment of 425 B.C. belonged to Kleon.”⁴⁴⁹ Meiggs and Lewis come to a similar conclusion, noting that “the date is still sufficiently near to Cleon’s spectacular triumph to justify the belief that his political followers were primarily responsible for it.”⁴⁵⁰ The situation is slightly different for McGregor, who attempts to take more fully into account the timing of the decree during/after Nikias’ campaign in the Corinthia:

The decree was not passed on the wave of enthusiasm which followed Kleon’s victory at Pylos. On the contrary, it was preceded by the failure of Nikias to

objections the idea of Oineis’ “failure” vis-à-vis lines 33-38 of the Thoudippos decree as “a dead letter” published on the stele, and evidence of “a surprising lack of official interest in the archival accuracy of the record” (90). However, a timeline placing the passage of the decree in the fifth prytany runs afoul of questions raised by Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 384-385 about the feasibility of heralds dispatched in the fifth prytany summoning allied ambassadors to arrive in Athens by Maimakterion. In 425/4 Prytany V began around Maimakterion 4, and, as Meritt notes, the *probouleuma* will not have been ratified on the first day of the prytany: after the return of the army “there were to be still two more days before the business of the decree came before the Demos, and then one day at least of deliberation, possibly two days or more” (1971, 112). Meritt (if I understand him correctly) appears to resolve this issue by having the heralds sent out by the *probouleuma* rather than the decree, speculating that “[t]he probouleuma must have been drafted late in Pyanopsion with the prospect in view of sending the heralds out immediately. They were enjoined by the probouleuma late in Prytany IV to travel to the cities of the empire” (1971, 112). The procedure of sending heralds out through a *probouleuma* not yet approved by the *dēmos* is unusual at best, and is actively counter-indicated by lines 42-44 of the decree, which stipulate that the *dēmos* shall vote on the very wording that the heralds are to use. Ultimately, no interpretation is unproblematic. Meritt’s theory, although epigraphically sound, leaves a decree which is inscribed with ‘dead letter’ stipulations and which leaves about three weeks for heralds to reach the corners of the empire and for allied embassies to return. Meiggs and Lewis’ theory creates several epigraphic irregularities and possibly does violence to the meaning of lines 35-38, but leaves plenty of time for heralds to be sent and embassies to return, and removes the problem of Meritt’s ‘dead letter’ fine for the Oineis prytany.

⁴⁴⁸ Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 394; italics from original publication.

⁴⁴⁹ Meritt 1981, 92-93. Meritt even notes that “[i]t is very probable that he was one of the assessors.” (92). There is obviously no positive evidence to support this assertion, but beyond that, given the restrictions placed on these assessors and the degree of oversight stipulated it is questionable whether Kleon would even have wanted such a position.

⁴⁵⁰ ML 196.

accomplish in the Korinthia what Kleon had done on the west coast of the Peloponnese. Kleon's party had been ascendant since his triumph at Sphakteria, and his influence was undoubtedly enhanced by Nikias' futile attempt to counterbalance his rival's recently acquired prestige. Nikias' influence, then, might well have been insufficient to prevent the imposition of new burdens upon the allies.⁴⁵¹

Kleon was undoubtedly popular at the time when the Thoudippos decree was passed, but can we assume from that popularity that he (or 'his political followers') were responsible for it? For one thing, we should take care in accepting McGregor's judgment about Athenian feelings regarding the Corinthian campaign of Nikias. McGregor calls the expedition a "failure" and a "futile attempt" to match Kleon's achievement, but the narrative in Thucydides 4.42-45 does not support such an assertion: the Athenians solidly defeat the Corinthians in battle,⁴⁵² withdraw in good order when further forces arrive,⁴⁵³ ravage the territory of the Corinthians,⁴⁵⁴ and fortify Methana to be used as a base for future raiding.⁴⁵⁵ Although the result was not as spectacular as was Kleon's success at

⁴⁵¹ McGregor 1935, 161.

⁴⁵² Thuc. 4.44.6: ἀπέθανον δὲ Κορινθίων μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγω ἐλάσσους πεντήκοντα (Two hundred and twelve Corinthians died in the battle, and a few less than fifty Athenians).

⁴⁵³ Thuc. 4.44.5-6: ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύμπαντας αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας καὶ νομίσαντες τῶν ἐγγὺς ἀστυγείτων Πειλοποννησίων βοήθειαν ἐπιέναι, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἔχοντες τὰ σκυλεύματα καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς πλὴν δυοῖν, οὓς ἐγκατέλιπον οὐ δυνάμενοι εὑρεῖν. καὶ ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπεραιώθησαν ἐς τὰς ἐπικειμένας νήσους, ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν ἐπικηρυκευσάμενοι τοὺς νεκροὺς οὓς ἐγκατέλιπον ὑποσπόνδους ἀνείλοντο (The Athenians, seeing all of these attackers and thinking that there was a rescue party of neighboring Peloponnesians falling upon them, swiftly withdrew onto the ships, bringing the spoils and their own dead excepting two whom they left behind, not being able to find them. And embarking on the ships they crossed to the islands off the coast, and sending a herald from these they retrieved under treaty the bodies which they had left behind).

⁴⁵⁴ Thuc. 4.45.1: Ἄραντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν νήσων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπλευσαν αὐθημερὸν ἐς Κρομμυῶνα τῆς Κορινθίας· ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίους. καὶ καθορμισάμενοι τὴν τε γῆν ἐδήωσαν καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἠύλίσαντο (The Athenians getting under sail from the islands went on the same day to Krommyon of the Korinthia, which is about one hundred and twenty stades from the city. And coming to harbor there they ravaged the land and passed the night).

⁴⁵⁵ Thuc. 4.45.2: τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ παραπλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν πρῶτον καὶ ἀπόβασιν τινα ποιησάμενοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Μέθανα τὴν μεταξὺ Ἐπιδάουρου καὶ Τροιζήνος, καὶ ἀπολαβόντες τὸν τῆς χερσονήσου ἰσθμὸν ἐτείχισαν, [ἐν ᾧ ἡ Μεθώνη ἐστί,] καὶ φρούριον καταστησάμενοι ἐλήστευον τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὴν τε Τροιζηνίαν γῆν καὶ Ἀλιάδα καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίαν (On the following day, having sailed along the coast first to the Epidauria and made a landing of sorts, they came to Methana between Epidauros and Troezen, and disembarking they walled up the isthmus of the peninsula [in which Methana is], and after

Pylos, there is no indication that the Athenians were displeased with the results of Nikias' Corinthian campaign. Nikias was in fact elected as *stratēgos* again in 424/3 and 423/2.⁴⁵⁶

Furthermore, popularity with the Athenian people in no way guaranteed that a politician would have his way on any particular matter. After being introduced to the *Histories* in 3.36 as 'by far the most influential with the *dēmos* at the time', Kleon is immediately overruled on the question of how to deal with the rebellious Mytilenians.⁴⁵⁷ The entire concept of the ostracism revolved around expelling a leader at or near the height of their popularity. Perhaps most importantly, however, the timing of the decree may actually argue against a narrative in which Kleon as leader of those supporting the war effort jammed through the Thoudippos decree at a moment of strength for himself and weakness for Nikias, his opponent and leader of a 'moderate' party. If the scholarly consensus is correct about the timing of the decree's passage, then the prytaneis of Oeneis are required to hold off on introducing the decree to the *ekklēsia* until *after Nikias has returned with his troops*. If Kleon was in Athens (and we have no reason to think that he was not), and the Thoudippos decree was a piece of legislation that he had been blocked in passing by the efforts of Nikias, why would he wait until Nikias returned to Athens to bring the *probouleuma* before the *dēmos*? Such a stipulation makes far more sense if Nikias was expected to support its passage.⁴⁵⁸

There is one final piece of circumstantial evidence frequently adduced to support Kleon's involvement with the Thoudippos decree: a prosopographical connection

establishing a garrison they frequently raided the territories of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus in the time thereafter).

⁴⁵⁶ See Fornara 1971, 59-61.

⁴⁵⁷ Thuc. 3.36: τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος. Cf. also the description of Kleon at Thuc. 4.21, p. 17 above.

⁴⁵⁸ McGregor 1935, despite his acceptance of the theory of Nikias as head of a 'moderate' party, nevertheless admits that "the assessment decree itself contains nothing to which Nikias and the moderates could have objected" (161).

between the politician and the proposer of the decree. In a footnote to the article of Wade-Gery and Meritt that we have been discussing, the authors suggest that the Thoudippos of *IG I³ 71* should be identified with a Thoudippos, father of a Kleon in Isaeus 9 (*On the Estate of Astyphilos*):

Astyphilos πρῶτον μὲν ἐστρατεύσατο εἰς Κόρινθον not later than 394BC (§ 14); so his father's death when he was still quite a small child (§§ 20, 27-28) happened hardly later than 410 BC, and perhaps a few years earlier. Thoudippos, the alleged assaulter, may thus be the Thoudippos of *I.G.*, I², 63. The name is otherwise unknown, and it is noteworthy that his son's name was Kleon. Put most concretely, was Thoudippos the son-in-law of the great demagogue? And did his second son take the maternal grandfather's name?⁴⁵⁹

Meiggs and Lewis called the suggestion 'attractive',⁴⁶⁰ and Davies expanded upon it in his entry on Θούδιππος (I) Ἀραφίνιος in *APF*: "The first suggestion [that Thoudippos (I) should be identified with the proposer of the reassessment decree of 425/4] is as good as certain; the second [that he should be regarded, because of the name of his son, as the son-in-law of Kleon (I) of Kydathenaion] fits as well chronologically as it does politically, and is very probably correct as well."⁴⁶¹ However, this association has been strongly challenged by F. Bourriot in his 1982 article on "La famille et le milieu social de Cléon".

Bourriot attacks the proposed marriage connection on nearly every front. He begins by providing an important caution against reconciling simple homonymies, using as an example the Astyphilos of Araphen from Isaeus 9, a rare name and a man who, by chronology, one might be tempted without further information to associate with an Astyphilos proposing a decree admitting Methymna to the Second Athenian

⁴⁵⁹ Wade-Gery and Meritt 1936, 392 n. 36.

⁴⁶⁰ ML 197.

⁴⁶¹ *APF* p. 228.

Confederacy.⁴⁶² In the case of Astyphilos we have the necessary information to rule out such an identification, but the warning is well worth keeping in mind for the case of Thoudippos. Bourriot then examines Isaeus 9 for support for the identification of Thoudippos of Araphen and the proposer of *IG I³ 71*, concluding that “[n]ous ne l’avons pas décelée.”⁴⁶³ The political connection is also questionable. As Bourriot notes, the two are from different worlds: Kleon a nouveau-riche politician from the city deme of Kydathenaion, and Thoudippos from “une famille de ce genre qui évoque plutôt le milieu campagnard d’Aristophane”.⁴⁶⁴ This rural background also means that “on imagine mal Thoudippos, un paysan de la côte orientale venant à l’Ecclesia proposer une loi capitale sur le tribut des alliés qui exige des connaissances dépassant de loin l’horizon d’Araphen.”⁴⁶⁵ (It is worth noting here that Nikias seems to have aligned far better with the ‘milieu d’Aristophane’ than did Kleon, given the notable restraint shown towards the former in his plays.) Finally, not even the chronology lines up as well as Wade-Gery and Meritt suggest: for Thoudippos to propose a decree in 425 he would have to be at least thirty years old at that point, and so would be between forty-five and fifty years old (and a prominent politician for some fifteen years) when he killed his brother in an argument over inheritance.⁴⁶⁶ Not impossible, but certainly incongruous. Ultimately, then, all that supports the identification of Thoudippos of Araphen and the proposer of *IG I³ 71* is two pieces of homonymy stacked atop each other: Thoudippos and Kleon. Furthermore, even if we lean towards identifying Thoudippos of Araphen and the proposer of *IG I³ 71* on the basis of the rarity of the name Thoudippos, the same argument cannot be made for Kleon:

⁴⁶² Bourriot 1982, 414-415.

⁴⁶³ Bourriot 1982, 416.

⁴⁶⁴ Bourriot 1982, 417.

⁴⁶⁵ Bourriot 1982, 417.

⁴⁶⁶ Bourriot 1982, 417-418.

as J.S. Traill points out, “the name is known in at least 25 other demes and has about 75 Attic occurrences.”⁴⁶⁷ Traill also endorses Bourriot’s conclusions about Thoudippos, although he is not persuaded by Bourriot’s rearrangement of the *bouleutai* list *Agora* XV, no. 10: “the cautions concerning the identification of Thoudippos, the simplified stemma for the descendants, and even the proposed Kleon of Paiania... are still relevant, perhaps more so, without the encumbrance of the forced and unconvincing argument from the prytany list.”⁴⁶⁸

We have seen that arguments for attributing the Thoudippos decree of 425/4 to the impetus of Kleon on the basis of tone, timing, and prosopography are all unconvincing. Our study of the evidence for Kleon’s interactions with tribute have revealed not a man with a financial bent who was dead set on squeezing the allies to provide more money for the war effort with Sparta, but a politician with a reputation for making money at the expense of the city coffers, precisely the kind of behavior that decrees like the Thoudippos decree and, if we accept Samons and Fornara’s redating,⁴⁶⁹ the Kleinias decree were designed to prevent. The timing of the Thoudippos decree and the stipulation therein that the *prytaneis* wait for Nikias’ return from campaign before presenting it to the *dēmos* is also poorly suited to the argument for a Kleonian initiative. Finally, as we have just seen, the putative family connection between Kleon and Thoudippos is extremely weak, especially without the added support of a previously assumed association between Kleon and the decree which Thoudippos proposed. Thus, it is necessary to agree with Gomme, against the general trend in scholarship, that “the common assumption...that Kleon was specially responsible for [the Thoudippos decree],

⁴⁶⁷ Traill 1986, 41.

⁴⁶⁸ Traill 1986, 41.

⁴⁶⁹ Fornara and Samons 1991, 180-181. Cf. also Samons 2000 192-194.

is wrong”.⁴⁷⁰ Such a conclusion may draw some support from Aristophanes’ complete silence about any connection between Kleon and the decree, a silence which made

Meiggs nervous:

The view that Thudippus was the mouthpiece of Cleon’s group has, however, to admit one objection. Aristophanes’ *Knights*, produced at the Lenaea of 424, is primarily concerned with attacking Cleon, but the play has no clear reference to the assessment decreed only a few months earlier. It is difficult, in view of its temper, to believe that the decree was non-controversial, and Aristophanes’ attitude to the allies elsewhere makes it unlikely that he would have approved the sharp increase now made. Did he perhaps remember the *Babylonians* and feel that anything which could be construed as an attack on the new policy, especially when the final list had not yet been approved, might lead to another prosecution?⁴⁷¹

Our new appreciation for the Thoudippos decree resolves this difficulty in two ways.

First, if Kleon was not associated with the decree, there is no particular reason for Aristophanes to incorporate the decree among his attacks on Kleon in the *Knights*.

Second, if the decree was designed to primarily accomplish two goals, (1) to provide funding to continue the war effort, and (2) to cut down on the corruption among politicians with respect to the tribute system, Aristophanes may well have been conflicted about how to react to it. He expresses strong yearnings for peace in many plays of the 420s, but he spends even more time attacking politicians for their corruption, and so he

⁴⁷⁰ *HCT* vol. 3, 501-502.

⁴⁷¹ *AE* 326. Meiggs’ assertion that Aristophanes would have disapproved of the sharp increase in tribute is questionable at best. In the *Wasps*, produced at the Lenaea of 422 (and thus while the tribute was, according to the *ATL*’s assessment, still at its high, 425-level), Aristophanes has Bdelykleon exult about the high tribute levels as a good undermined only by the rapacity of the politicians who steal the money for themselves, joking that the thousand cities paying tribute could each support twenty men, enabling twenty-thousand Athenians to comfortable lives “as befits their country and their trophy at Marathon” (*Wasps* 706-711; trans. Henderson vol. 2.). Thus, even a character named for hatred towards Kleon argues that the Athenians deserve the proceeds of their empire, and specifically the (high) tribute.

may have decided to take a wait-and-see approach on whether to decry or vaunt about the decree.⁴⁷²

Thus, what evidence we have for how Kleon was viewed by his contemporaries does not suggest a man who gained the support of the *dēmos* by possessing, and trading on, ‘financial expertise’ or mastery of the mass of details of imperial administration that was beyond the reach of the common man.⁴⁷³ Instead it suggests a forceful, opinionated man willing to take drastic steps to get what he wants, who gained the support of the Athenian *dēmos* by operating with the aggressiveness and πολυπραγμοσύνη (*polypragmosunē* - hyperactivity) that characterized the Athenian ethos.⁴⁷⁴ This is the same image of Kleon that has been discovered by close analyses of his speeches in the Mytilenean Debate in Thucydides, such as those of James Andrews, who notes Kleon’s appeals to a very traditional concept of *arētē* to persuade the Athenians to adopt his position.⁴⁷⁵ As we mentioned above, this strikes a serious blow to the ‘financial/indispensable experts’ theory:⁴⁷⁶ if Perikles is a perfectly serviceable example of a politician who used financial knowledge as part of his appeal to the *dēmos* for support,⁴⁷⁷ while Kleon shows no signs of similar capability or reputation with financial matters, surely it is perverse to suggest that only upon the former’s death and the latter’s

⁴⁷² Cf. Ehrenberg 1951, 48: “[t]he real aim of Aristophanes is always to fight corruption, not to hamper Athenian might.”

⁴⁷³ See Andrewes 1962 and p. 118 above. Pritchard 2015 has challenged this assumption about the Athenian *dēmos*, although his own argument for the level of financial interest and discussion in Classical Athens may go too far.

⁴⁷⁴ Samons has recognized better than most the importance of this national character and its long tenure at Athens; see, *e.g.*, Samons 2010, Samons 2016, 9-31. See also Thuc. 1.70.

⁴⁷⁵ See Andrews 1994 and Andrews 2000.

⁴⁷⁶ See pp. 118-119 above.

⁴⁷⁷ For example, at Thuc. 2.13 Perikles goes over the Athenian finances in painstaking detail to help them mentally prepare on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.

ascension did financial expertise begin to serve as a critical aspect of a political career at Athens.

An additional point against the ‘indispensable expertise’ theory is worth making. Andrewes suggests that Athens’ need for a large supply of competent magistrates compared to its size was filled by men ‘from business families’. In one way, this is almost certainly true. Although we lack the figures for total magistrates in other *poleis* that would allow us to assess statistically whether Athens employed more magistrates per citizen capita than was the classical Greek ‘norm’, both the numbers we have for Athenian office-holders (let us make a conservative estimate of 1000 total magistracies at home and abroad)⁴⁷⁸ and the size of the non-citizen population over which Athens was attempting to exert leadership or control (*i.e.*, the allies) strongly argue that Athens must have had an unusually high number of officials for its citizen population. Furthermore, neither Andrewes nor our figures for officials from [Aristotle] appear to include the *boulē*, whose five hundred members, chosen by lot from the citizen body and permitted to hold the office no more than twice, probably served as the state’s main organ of financial supervision and policy formulation.⁴⁷⁹ Now, to the extent that these magistracies proliferated during the *arkhē* while the number of citizens inside the group of Athenian

⁴⁷⁸ According to [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3, there were around seven hundred Athenians holding office within the city, and possibly another seven hundred abroad (ἀρχαὶ δ’ ἐνδημοὶ μὲν εἰς ἑπτακοσίους ἄνδρας, ὑπερόριοι δ’ εἰς ἑπτακοσίους); this second figure, however, is highly suspect and may be the result of a scribal error: see Rhodes 1992, 305. Presumably a great number of these magistracies abroad, and perhaps many of those in the city as well, were a result of Athens’ position at the head of its *arkhē*; such is certainly the impression given not only by this passage of the Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.*, but by works such as Aristophanes’ *Birds*. Andrewes 1962 specifically refers to “hellenotamiai, archontes, episkopoi, and the rest” (83), who should surely fall within the group to which [Aristotle] is referring.

⁴⁷⁹ Rhodes 1972, 104-105 observes that “the boule’s control of finance depended on its supervision of a large number of financial boards. It watched over the activities of the sacred treasurers, of the poletae, and of the apodectae; in the fifth century it controlled the colacretae...each of these officials or boards was involved only at one point in the state’s finances: the boule was involved at every point, and it alone could see the whole picture”; Pritchard 2015, 19-20 echoes this point: “[t]he Athenian *dēmos* may have controlled public spending, but the day-to-day oversight of it fell to their council of five hundred.”

aristoi remained generally stable they must have been occupied in increasing proportion by those outside of the traditional office-holding elite. So-called ‘business families’ (or, to be more precise, more recently affluent Athenian families) in particular would have become involved in increasing numbers with the prominent financial offices such as *tamiai*⁴⁸⁰: these offices mandated a high wealth level⁴⁸¹ and so would devolve to *pentakosiomedimnoi* of non-elite birth rather than well-born or well-connected citizens of the next lower census class, *i.e.*, the *hippeis*.

There is, however, a serious disconnect between a numbers game that puts more non-elite citizens (or at least more citizens who were not *aristoi*) into financial magistracies and the notion that a newfound respect among the *dēmos* for the financial acumen of men from business families led to the latter’s elevation to the group of leading voices in the *ekklēsia*. As we saw in the previous chapter with Kleon, there is no evidence in the ancient texts for a commercial mastery of finance driving political influence, as opposed to a general requirement that all politicians be versed in financial matters.⁴⁸² It is possible to imagine that the increased number of magistracies gave a greater opportunity for non-*aristoi* citizens to distinguish themselves, eventually coupling with an increasing

⁴⁸⁰ The number of *tamiai* was trebled during the fifth century by the addition of the *hellenotamiai* at the formation of the Delian League and then the *tamiai* of the ‘other gods’ in 434/3: see AO p. 8. It is not entirely clear when the *logistai* or *taktai* were introduced or whether there was a census-class requirement for tenure of those offices.

⁴⁸¹ [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 8.1 notes the longevity of the law that treasurers come from the highest wealth class: σημείον δ’ ὅτι κληρωτὰς ἐποίησεν ἐκ τῶν τιμημάτων ὁ περὶ τῶν ταμιῶν νόμος, ᾧ χρώμενοι δια[τελ]οῦσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν· κελεύει γὰρ κληροῦν τοὺς ταμίας ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμων (And a proof that [Solon] made the offices elective by lot according to assessments is the law in regard to the Treasurers that remains in force even at the present day; for it orders the Treasurers to be elected by lot from the Five-hundred-measure men. Trans. Rackham 1935.). Cf. also [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 4.2 and 47.1. Rhodes 1992, 147-149 provides some scattered commentary, including that the *tamiai* here are probably those of Athena. HAC p. 224 would extend this property restriction also to the *hellenotamiai*, and notes that “[d]emocratic principles were here overruled by expediency; the chief financial offices were left in the hands of the rich because their wealth provided the state with the necessary guarantees against speculation.”

⁴⁸² For discussions of the importance of financial knowledge for political or even military careers at Athens, see Aristot. *Rh.* 1.4, Xen. *Mem.* 3.4 and 3.6.

appreciation at Athens of the importance of finance to culminate in a breakthrough of these non-*aristoi* politicians onto the grandest public stage at Athens, but such a transformation would have happened mostly beneath the view of our sources, and anyway does not entirely explain the exact timing and seeming suddenness of the shift from leadership nearly exclusively by *aristoi* to leadership largely from outside of that group. Thus, although we should reject the notion that ‘a large part of the point’ of the prominence of Kleon and the other non-*aristoi* politicians is ‘their mastery of finance and administration’, we should keep the growth of such forces in mind as a backdrop, and perhaps motivator, to the shifts in political leadership in the fifth century.

In this chapter, we have explored the question of which Athenian politicians should appropriately be called ‘demagogues’, both from ancient and modern perspectives. We found that in antiquity the term was broadly applied, being used occasionally for ‘aristocratically’- and more frequently for ‘democratically’-inclined politicians, but that it was never used to describe a politician at Athens after Demetrios of Phaleron. We then closely examined Thucydides 2.65, which has been the basis both in the fourth century BCE and in modern scholarship for systematizing theories of a major change in politicians and political dynamics after the death of Perikles. Instead, we saw that Thucydides himself appears only to have made a distinction on the basis of the degree to which Perikles had established and entrenched his power, which was unmatched by the politicians who followed him (none of whose careers were anywhere approaching the same length). This Thucydidean insight was picked up in a variety of ancient commentators after the fourth century, but the quite different interpretations of Isocrates, [Aristotle], and Theopompos seeped through into modernity, underlying

several scholarly theories about major political changes upon Perikles' death. One of these theories, formulated by Andrewes and adopted by Connor, argues that many politicians after Perikles were raised in 'business' families, and that this upbringing gave them a level of indispensable expertise through which they could appeal to the *dēmos* for support. Our investigation of Kleon, the most famous of the post-Periklean nouveau-riche politicians *and* the one with the most associations with money in the ancient sources, has however revealed that to our knowledge he neither posed himself as a financial expert nor was he appreciated as such. It is true that some demagogues at Athens were capable with finance, but any connection between this truism and the death of Perikles or the rise of 'new politicians' finds no support in the evidence.

3. New Political Techniques and Reactions

Although it has prevailed in Anglophone scholarship, the ‘indispensable expertise’ theory, against which we have just spent some time arguing, is only one of a variety of scholarly attempts to characterize and understand the way(s) that politics and political leadership at Athens changed over the course of the fifth century. It is, in fact, a fairly elegant theory: it takes two somewhat troubling but apparently unrelated aspects of fifth-century history — the growing administrative overhead of the Athenian *arkhē*⁴⁸³ and the sudden appearance on the political scene of major leaders from outside the traditional elite⁴⁸⁴ — and uses the first to explain the second. In this chapter, I shall survey and discuss four of the other most noteworthy theories of political leadership at Athens in the fifth century: Connor’s ‘new politicians’, Ostwald’s adduction of a sophistic generational gap, L.B. Carter’s activists/passivists dichotomy (from *The Quiet Athenian*), and Mann’s hypothesis regarding democratic *imagines*. Connor provides an adept replacement for the ‘party’ approach to political organization at Athens with his polycentric model of demagogues and *philoī*, while Ostwald and Carter focus on analyzing and categorizing the response of the *aristoi* to increased participation in politics from outside of their group. With Mann, we shall question Connor’s conclusion of new political *tekhnai* and career paths developing in the late fifth century, but in place of Mann’s nearly exclusive focus on the *ekklēsia* we shall preserve Connor’s vision of political career-building through magistracies and personal connections, and indeed stretch that model all the way down to the end of the fifth century.

⁴⁸³ Cf. n. 478 above.

⁴⁸⁴ See pp. 118-119 and n. 326 above. Mann 2007, 129-137 argues that a variety of well-known politicians from earlier in the sixth and fifth centuries were also from outside of the circle of elite families; for more on Mann’s view of the changing political landscape of fifth-century Athens, see section 3.4 below.

3.1. Connor's *New Politicians*

In *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, W.R. Connor presents three important and innovative models for fifth-century politics and the changes therein: he first revises the standard conception of political careers and group dynamics (or 'party politics') in Athens, then suggests a critical change in this political framework beginning with Kleon, before finally speculating about the effects of the change on the Athenian *aristoi*, the class most involved in traditional politics. Connor's discussion of political careers and group dynamics essentially centers on the Greek term φίλος, which, although difficult to render fully or easily in English, refers to the people (friends, family, in-laws) closely connected to an individual by ties of blood, law, or feeling. Connor notes that the desire to help one's *philo*i was one of, if not the, most consistent motivations for an Athenian citizen to pursue influence and power in the *polis*. The importance of having access to a *philos* in a position of power also meant that families were compelled to encourage their young scions to become politically active and subsequently to support those aspiring politicians in their careers. Beyond being the major motivation for starting a political career, Connor sees the bonds of *philia* as the means for achieving success in politics. Prior to Kleon, at least, he envisions a political career as requiring an extensive period of pseudo-apprenticeship and the careful building of reputation and connections. Support could be expected from one's family, especially within one of the old and elite *genē*, for whom politics and the holding of power would have long since become a tradition and an expectation. An aspiring politician would also join one or more *hetaireiai*, groups of wealthy individuals who gathered to entertain themselves and thence

became *philoï* who would mutually support each other.⁴⁸⁵ Then he would hold a variety of military and civic offices, and in discharging his duties he would build a reputation for competence and intelligence, while continuing to make more alliances and *philoï*. If he became well enough regarded he might hold the *stratēgia*,⁴⁸⁶ which would both serve as a badge of his ability and influence and would give him continuing access to the *boulē*. Such access was important, since the *boulē* was responsible for guiding Athenian policy, but citizens could only serve as *bouleutēs* a maximum of two, non-consecutive terms, and the position was filled by lot: thus, a politician needed either to have a large pool of friends and allies who might sit on the *boulē* and provide him access, or to serve as a *stratēgos*, since the *stratēgoi* had access to the *boulē* whenever they were in Athens. Ultimately, a politician aimed to reach a position where he could marshal a significant number of votes in the *ekklēsia*, have consistent access to the *boulē*, and have allies for dealing with the court cases that almost invariably came with prominent position in the Athenian state.

This new conception of the career of an Athenian politician as based largely on personal connections leads Connor to his re-evaluation of group dynamics in Athenian politics. The model of Athenian politics that Connor is seeking to replace is one that we have confronted previously in our consideration of Kleon: the idea of ‘party’ politics. This model evolved over the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although no historian suggested that ‘parties’ in Athens would have had formal organization (members,

⁴⁸⁵ The exact function and evolution of the *hetaireiai* has been the subject of much scholarly attention; see Calhoun 1913, Sartori 1957, Aurenche 1974, Gehrke 1985, Ostwald 1986 (354-358), Welwei 1992, and Lehmann 1997.

⁴⁸⁶ The archonship, while also important, continually declined in prestige over the fifth century, first because of the switch from election to sortition, and then when the reforms of Ephialtes stripped power away from the Areopagus, the body of former archons. Certainly by the 450s and probably even by the victories of 480-479 the *stratēgia* was the more desirable and powerful office.

candidates, slates, whips, etc.) like modern parties, there was a movement from an initial model where the term ‘party’ was used to represent persistent groups among the Athenian citizenry with a coherent social make-up and/or policy position (*aristoi*, oligarchs, war/peace party, radical democrats) to a later model where ‘party’ was used more as a term of convenience to represent a temporary constellation of Athenian politicians and citizens working for a particular goal at a particular time (*e.g.*, a ‘peace party around Nikias’ in the late 420s, or an anti-Macedonian party around Demosthenes in the 340s). Connor acknowledges that even by the 1920s many historians working with party terminology included disclaimers about the potential unsuitability of that terminology as a point of comparison between modern and ancient politics, and that no one working within the field would be unaware of that unsuitability, but he maintains that using and thinking within those terms necessarily influences the historian’s conception of Athenian politics. Even after the term ‘party’ began to disappear from scholarship, however, no concerted attempt was made to provide an alternate model. Connor suggests “a quite literally *polycentric* system, with many politicians each the center of a group of *philoï*.”⁴⁸⁷ It is easy to see how this conception grows out of Connor’s understanding of Athenian political careers, and how several groups operating in concert towards or against a particular goal could appear as ‘party’ politics, especially when viewed through the simplifying lens of Greek historiography, which often exaggerated leading figures and events while in essence erasing less important figures and events. And, of course, no one in fifth-century Athens felt it necessary to record and preserve the minutes of an *ekklēsia* meeting, much less the various ‘backroom’ discussions, negotiations, and dealings that laid the way for a decision made across several such meetings, so that

⁴⁸⁷ Connor 1971, 68 (italics Connor’s).

explicit evidence for the system Connor conjectures does not survive. Connor's system does, however, fit both the historical and the epigraphical evidence (which reveals a great number of relatively unknown high magistrates, proposers of decrees, and even generals) better than does the party model.

After outlining this new model of Athenian politics, Connor turns to his eponymous subject: the so-called 'new politicians' who, in his view, emerged in the second half of the fifth century. Connor specifies Kleon as the first of these 'new politicians', accepting the evidence from Thucydides and subsequent ancient literature that we examined (and rejected) in the previous chapter.⁴⁸⁸ Drawing in large part on the testimony of Old Comedy, but also on surviving historiography, Connor concludes that these politicians, so reviled in comparison to earlier figures like Perikles and Kimon, must have differed in some substantive way to attract this negative opinion. He considers and rejects the possibility that the difference lay in the realms of policy or even, to a certain extent, social background: certainly more men from outside of the *khrēstoi* appear among the post-Periklean politicians, but he finds that all are from wealthy backgrounds and some, in fact, were more connected to the *aristoi* than our literary sources credit. He concludes that the change occurred on two levels: first, the stylistic, a fact which he bases on various passages such as [Aristot.] *Ath. Pol.* 28.3 that attribute dramatic innovations in speaking style to Kleon and his successors, and second (and far more importantly), the systemic, inasmuch as he sees Kleon and other post-Periklean politicians as rejecting the traditional political career that he had outlined at the beginning of his work. Building upon what he observes as a sudden rise in prominence of verbal compounds highlighting the city (*polis*) or people (*dēmos*), as well as plays (both comic and tragic) applying a

⁴⁸⁸ See section 2.2 above.

newfound focus to the question of *philia* loyalties as opposed to civic loyalties, Connor concludes that “[t]he new terminology brought with it a new style and a new technique. It made possible, as we have seen, a rapid rise to power based on the power of hitherto ill-organized segments of the citizenry. A new pattern of politics came into being, in which the allegiance of large numbers of citizens came to be as important, even more important, than alliances with narrow circles of influential men.”⁴⁸⁹ The ‘new’, post-Periklean politicians, in other words, used rhetorical prowess to win over the non-elite members of the *dēmos*, and by so doing both (1) attained to positions of which the traditional elite felt them unworthy, and (2) advanced to heights of influence in the state far faster than the traditional political career had permitted.

Connor closes by considering the reactions to these ‘new politicians’ among the traditional Athenian elite, this time drawing not only on comedy but also to a significant extent on the dialogues of Plato and the *Athenaion Politeia* of pseudo-Xenophon. He concludes that, although responses among the ‘*khrestoi*’ varied greatly, one that was particularly noteworthy was the withdrawal from Athenian political life. This deliberate withdrawal (into *apragmosynē*) was, he thinks, the flipside of the notion that the Athenian *dēmos* was no longer choosing the *khrestoi* for its leaders: the *khrestoi* were no longer offering their services in the same numbers. Withdrawal could come in the form of a general refusal to involve oneself fully in the politics of the *ekklēsia*; a deliberate, but peaceful, turn to literature or philosophy; or, most dangerously, involvement with other disenchanted elites for the purpose of putting down the Athenian democracy. Thus, although Connor generally sees the ‘new politicians’ as a positive, and even necessary,

⁴⁸⁹ Connor 1971, 118.

development in Athenian government,⁴⁹⁰ he also concludes that their new mode of political activity and the responses to it created the first rifts within the Athenian citizenry that eventually burst into bloody *stasis* in the years after 412. We shall see this theory of withdrawal recur in both Ostwald's *Popular Sovereignty* and Carter's *Quiet Athenian*.

There are some notable weaknesses in Connor's argumentation, some of which will be discussed further in the context of the subsequent theories below, but some of which are worth taking the time to tease out here. One such weakness is Connor's assertion that Kleon was the first of the 'new politicians' differentiated from prior politicians at Athens by their eschewal of the politics of *philia* in favor of direct appeal to the people (especially in the form of the *ekklēsia*). Mann has shown conclusively that the renunciation of friendship attributed to Kleon and focused upon by Connor is actually detectable in most Athenian politicians of the fifth century, including Aristides and Perikles.⁴⁹¹ Mann's theory that the renunciation of friendship was more a performed act than a real removal from all *philia* ties fits best with our knowledge of Athenian society as well as our other evidence for Kleon. *Philo*i, especially those bound by blood or marriage, were not so easy to disavow as the anecdote in Plutarch (*Praecepta* 806f) would suggest, and indeed Plutarch goes on to compare the friends that Kleon drove away with the "hundred heads of wailing flatterers" of Aristophanes *Peace* 756.⁴⁹² A less

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. Connor 1971, 106: "These developments of language mark the emergence of a new hierarchy of values in the Greek city, one that emphasizes civic virtues and devotion to the well-being of the whole city. They form both the natural culmination of a progression toward popular rule, and the essential preconditions for a successfully functioning democratic system."

⁴⁹¹ See Mann 2007, 104-108, and below, pp. 187-188.

⁴⁹² Plut. *Praecepta* 806f-807a: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλέων, ὅτε πρῶτον ἔγνω τῆς πολιτείας ἄπτεσθαι, τοὺς φίλους συναγαγὼν εἰς ταῦτο διελύσατο τὴν φιλίαν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥς πολλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας προαιρέσεως μαλάσσουσιν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ παράγουσιν· ἄμεινον δ' ἂν ἐποίησε τὴν φιλοπλουτίαν ἐκβαλὼν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν φιλονεικίαν καὶ φθόνου καὶ κακοηθείας καθήρας αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀφίλων αἱ πόλεις ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀνεταίρων ἀλλὰ χρηστῶν καὶ σωφρόνων δέονται· νυνὶ δὲ τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἀπῆλασεν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύκλῳ κεφαλαὶ κολάκων οἰμωζομένων ἐλιχμῶντο περὶ αὐτόν, ὥς οἱ κωμικοὶ λέγουσι' (For Kleon, when he first

adversarial view might see these ‘flatterers’ precisely as political *philoï*. Furthermore, if Ostwald is correct that Kleon exerted much of his influence through the *boulē*, he will have needed *philoï* to provide access to that body during the years when he was neither *bouleutēs* nor *stratēgos*.⁴⁹³ Given the direct, personal, and adversarial nature of both Athenian politics and court proceedings, it would be extremely surprising if Kleon’s well-known activity in the latter arena did not indebt important men to him, and indeed if he would have had any perceptible degree of success in the courts without *philoï* to draw upon for grievance-holders, witnesses, supporting speakers, and the like. Finally, if one accepts the view of Kleon promulgated by Meritt, Meiggs, Lewis, and Ostwald,⁴⁹⁴ Kleon was quite active in using his friends to carry out his interests, with the Kleonymos and Thoudippos decrees as outstanding examples.⁴⁹⁵

Beyond Kleon specifically, Connor’s notion that ‘new politicians’ could, by their use of the *ekklēsia* in place of *philia* politics, more quickly advance their career than those traditional *philia* politics permitted is not supported particularly well by the evidence. There is no indication that either Kleon or Nikias came to political prominence at a particularly early age: as Davies (*APF* p. 319) notes, “from the probable ages of his children Kleon is unlikely to have been born after 470”, and on the basis of Plato *Laches* 186c we know that Nikias was older than Socrates, and so born before 469. Both were

knew that he was to take on him the government, assembling his friends together, brake off friendship with them, as that which often disables the mind, and withdraws it from its just and upright intention in managing the affairs of the state. But he would have done better, if he had cast out of his soul avarice and contention, and cleansed himself from envy and malice. For cities want not men that are friendless and unaccompanied, but such as are good and temperate. Now he indeed drove away his friends; but a hundred heads of fawning flatterers were, as the comedian speaks, licking about him. Trans. Fowler 1936.).

⁴⁹³ On Ostwald’s contention see below pp. 173-174, and for the importance of access to the *boulē* see above p. 165.

⁴⁹⁴ Cf. pp. 126-128 above.

⁴⁹⁵ I have argued against such a view, but not on the basis of the conceptual implausibility of Kleon executing a legislative agenda through friends serving in the *boulē*.

thus in their 40s by the time that they vied for primacy in the *polis*, and Kleon had already been a *bouleutēs*, Nicias probably a *stratēgos*.⁴⁹⁶ Although we have some indications from Old Comedy that Hyperbolos began his political career at a relatively young age,⁴⁹⁷ we know so little about that career that it would be irresponsible to argue on the basis of Old Comedy alone that appealing to the people for power granted Hyperbolos an unusually swift rise to the top.⁴⁹⁸ The meteoric rise of Alkibiades, meanwhile, is no more impressive than that of Themistokles, for whom the evidence suggests that his eponymous archonship occurred when he was thirty, *i.e.*, at the earliest legal age.⁴⁹⁹ Similarly, Kimon was likely not much older than thirty when he served as ambassador and general in 480/79.⁵⁰⁰ Furthermore, the notion that these politicians could somehow avoid an Attic '*cursus honorum*' by virtue of their rhetorical success in the assembly or courts is misleading in several respects. We have no evidence for a particular *cursus honorum* in Athens to parallel that in Rome, and indeed the lottery system used for most offices up to and including the eponymous archonship would render such a pattern of office-holding difficult if even possible. The *stratēgia*, which overtook the archonship in importance precisely because of its elected basis, could be held as many times as a person was elected; this fact, combined with the probable restriction of any given tribe at Athens to a relatively small number of generals,⁵⁰¹ meant that it would have been unreasonable to expect every burgeoning Athenian politician to compete for the office.

⁴⁹⁶ According to Plut. *Nic.* 2.2 Nicias at least held independent command, and perhaps should be considered to have been a general in his own right. Fornara 1971, 50-51 is non-committal.

⁴⁹⁷ For the treatment of Hyperbolos in Old Comedy, see pp. 211-213 below.

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. ΣLucian *Timon* 30: Κρατῖνος δὲ ἐν Ὁραῖς ὡς παρελθόντος νέου τῷ βήματι μέμνηται καὶ παρ' ἡλικίαν καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης Σφηξὶ καὶ Εὐπολὶς Πόλεσι (Cratinus in *Seasons* [F 283] mentions that he <Hyperbolos> came to speak at the *bema* at an unusually early age, also Aristophanes in *Wasps* [1007] and Eupolis in *Cities*. Trans. Storey vol. 2.).

⁴⁹⁹ *APF* pp. 214-215.

⁵⁰⁰ *APF* p. 302.

⁵⁰¹ On the tribal election of generals in the fifth century, see Fornara 1971, 1-10 and 19-27.

Finally, even with the lacunose state of our evidence we know that politicians after Perikles (like Kleon, Nikias, and Alkibiades) continued to hold a variety of offices as they established their position in the state. Connor's theory of 'new politicians' short-cutting the traditional political process at Athens simply does not hold water.

3.2. Ostwald's *Popular Sovereignty*

With respect to Martin Ostwald, one section in particular of his 1986 *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* addresses issues raised here: "Opposition to Popular Sovereignty." Ostwald begins this section by considering the reported attempts at abolishing the democracy⁵⁰² prior to Perikles, and concluding that these incidents were not partisan efforts carried out on an ideological basis. That is, although conspirators may have been attempting to overthrow the government, they were not doing so because of discontent with the democratic system itself: rather, they were motivated by other policy concerns (*e.g.*, foreign relations with Persia or Sparta) or self-interest (*e.g.*, landowners concerned that Athenian movement towards sea-power would endanger their holdings). In the period of Perikles' ascendancy, Ostwald sketches out three loci of internal division at Athens: resistance to the "excessive influence Pericles acquired by catering to the masses" (represented for Ostwald by Thoukydides son of Melesias as the representative of upper class citizens concerned about Perikles' tyrannical potential);⁵⁰³ aristocratic resentment that the mode of exercise of popular power provides social and economic

⁵⁰² Ostwald mentions the phrase *κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου* in this context, but cautions that the expression itself cannot, in his view, predate the reforms of Ephialtes. See Ostwald 1986, 177 and n. 9.

⁵⁰³ Ostwald 1986, 188. It should be noted that this concern was not anti-democratic. In a way it was in fact pro-democratic, in that it represented concern from the citizens around Thoukydides son of Melesias that Perikles intended to subvert the democracy, or was building up his power to the point that the democracy was less functional. The reaction of Thoukydides and his like to Perikles was only anti-democratic insofar as Perikles, by virtue of his introduction of 'democratic' measures such as pay for public service and the citizenship law (by some interpretations), was assimilated to a 'democratic' party at Athens, and any opposition to him would thus be 'anti-democratic'. This misapprehension is a good example of the problems of thinking in 'party' language noted by Connor: see pp. 167-169 above.

benefit to ‘the wrong people’ (this position is exemplified by [Xenophon]’s *Ath. Pol.*); and discomfort by the traditional religious majority with new ideas appearing at Athens in the 430s, often associated with Perikles and the Athenian intelligentsia (the trials of Pheidias, Perikles, Aspasia, and Anaxagoras at the hands of prosecutors such as Kleon, Simmias, Lacratidas, Dracontides, and Diopeithes constitute Ostwald’s evidence for such a religious reaction to Perikles).⁵⁰⁴ In other words, Ostwald sees opposition specifically to popular sovereignty at Athens growing only slowly, and he, like Connor, sees Perikles as an important figure in the development of political sovereignty at Athens.

Ostwald’s interpretation of Kleon and the change in Athenian politics after the death of Perikles is also clearly influenced by Connor, and indeed is generally traditional. Ostwald accepts the idea of a movement away from traditional office-holding among politicians labelled as demagogues; he rejects the notion of the demagogues as lower-class, but accepts that they came from more recently wealthy families rather than the traditional agricultural elite; unfortunately, he also buys into the financial expertise theory as an important distinction between these ‘industrialist’ demagogues and their predecessors. Ostwald offers some important tweaks to previous theories, however: his book, which has a recurring interest in the courts at Athens, their transformations over the course of the democracy, and especially in *euthynai* and *eisangeliai*, gives more weight to the role of the courts in the rise of ‘demagogic’ politicians than previous scholars. Ostwald at one point goes so far as to claim that Kleon “accomplished most of his purposes in the Council or at the *euthynai* of outgoing officials”.⁵⁰⁵ He does stop short of

⁵⁰⁴ Samons 2016, 182-209 pushes back against the commonly held notion of Perikles as particularly involved with the emerging intellectual trends of rationalism and sophism as opposed to traditional piety.

⁵⁰⁵ Ostwald 1986, 299.

fully assimilating the demagogues and the so-called ‘sycophants’,⁵⁰⁶ but in his view it was the use of the courts to defeat, discourage, dispossess, or extort upper-class Athenian citizens that gave rise to much of the discontent about demagogues visible especially in comedy. Thus, while for Connor the courts appeared more as a means for politicians like Kleon to attract the support of lower-class Athenians so that those politicians could deploy that support in the assembly, for Ostwald the demagogues worked in large part through the courts and the *boulē* as functional elements of the Athenian government, and the application of rhetoric in the assembly, although increasingly important, was not really a revolutionary jump in political technique made by the demagogues.

Where Ostwald’s analysis really comes into its own, however, is the identification of a second wave of ‘new politicians’ following the demagogues of the 420s. Because these second-wave Athenian politicians were reacting *to* the demagogues, their opposition provides us with more insight into the demagogues themselves. As has been noted, for Connor and Ostwald the demagogues differed from Perikles and their other predecessors in their use of the popular organs of the Athenian government to create their power base and in their background from manufacturing families rather than the long-tenured landed elite. Despite those differences, Ostwald still sees the demagogues as generally being committed to democracy and to the state (rather than being obviously self-interested or in service to some part of the population): for example, he says that Kleon “seems to have been genuinely concerned to implement a policy he regarded as good for his city.”⁵⁰⁷ In other words, although Kleon did “rally the masses to his support in the Assembly and in the jury courts”, he did so both out of a desire to guide the city

⁵⁰⁶ This term was used to describe citizens carrying out malicious prosecutions to enrich themselves and settle personal scores; Ostwald 1986, 209-210. On sycophancy, see Osborne 1990, Harvey 1990.

⁵⁰⁷ Ostwald 1986, 298.

beneficially and a legitimate belief in the sustainability and effectiveness of a democratic Athens. That this sort of belief existed even among those of an aristocratic bent in Athens prior to the 420s is confirmed by the *Ath. Pol.* of [Xenophon], which abhors the Athenian system of government on moral grounds while admiring it on a pragmatic level. Ostwald locates the key difference between the demagogues and the political reaction to them in this very patriotism and belief. Largely on the basis of an extended consideration of the evolution of the *physis-nomos* opposition in Athenian political thought over the last quarter of the fifth century,⁵⁰⁸ Ostwald concludes that a youth movement evolved among the intellectual class at Athens in response to the calcification of an establishment mindset with respect to both politics and religion. In this way Kleon, Nikias, and others like them are transformed into senior representatives of the democratic status-quo, generally approving of the *nomoi* of the *polis* and suspicious or outright hostile towards new thought. This new thought was embodied by the philosophers like Anaxagoras and the sophists like Gorgias who passed through Athens and who educated many of the wealthiest youths in the city: an education that focused on the pragmatic value of rhetoric to achieve one's ends without necessarily addressing the ethical or moral goals to which such power ought to be directed.⁵⁰⁹ Ostwald focuses particularly on Alkibiades and Kallikles in this context. The latter, the lack of available information about whom we touched on above,⁵¹⁰ is used to provide the philosophical mindset and lack of morality or patriotism that was a potential result of sophistic training; the former disdained the theoretical equality among citizens that was a core tenet of the democratic ethos at

⁵⁰⁸ Ostwald 1986, 250-290.

⁵⁰⁹ Ostwald's conception of the sophists is almost entirely derived from Plato. For responses to the Platonic position on the sophists, see Kerferd 1981, Wallace 1998 and 2007, Tell 2011.

⁵¹⁰ See n. 192 above.

Athens, clearly visible in the speeches of Perikles and Kleon alike in Thucydides, and used the assembly as a tool to further his personal goals and satisfy his pride. It was these disaffected younger men, raised by the sophists to a morality that undercut the foundational values that had largely stabilized the growing rift between upper and lower class at Athens, who, although sometimes ‘staunch’ democrats early in their careers, subsequently formed the *hetaireiai* that were responsible for the mutilation of the herms and the profanation of the mysteries (certainly perceived as an assault on the democracy, regardless of whether such assault was intended) and the oligarchic machinations in 411.⁵¹¹

By providing compelling evidence for a second shift among politicians at Athens after the death of Perikles, Ostwald helps to undermine the narrative we have seen in both Connor and Andrewes. Connor’s theory of ‘new politicians’ already struggled to explain Perikles, leading to Connor’s awkward conclusion that Perikles was a sort of forerunner of political technologies that Kleon perfected and later demagogues copied. If we acknowledge that the *hetaireiai* at Athens never functioned in earlier Athenian history as they appear to have during the period from the Peace of Nikias through the end of the fifth century, then we are compelled to admit that politicians like Alkibiades, Peisander,

⁵¹¹ Ostwald’s connection of the mutilation of the herms and the profanation of the mysteries, although it follows in the footsteps of the contemporaneous Athenian reaction (cf. Thuc. 6.28.1), is problematic. Even if the Athenian *dēmos* concluded that the incidents were connected, we are not compelled to do so, and indeed such a conclusion hardly seems warranted. The profanation of the mysteries, if it was even a profanation (cf. Murray 1990), was private, of relatively small scale, and peaceful; the mutilation of the herms was public on an impressive scale and was clearly designed to create terror. The case that Ostwald builds to support his view of Alkibiades as anti-democratic, with the matters of the herms and mysteries as one aspect, is not compelling. Alkibiades’ review of democracy among the Spartans (Thuc. 6.89) is far too often used to indicate a native hostility to democracy, when it should more probably be read as an instance of his ultimate chameleonic character (Plut. *Alc.* 23.3-6). The notion that Alkibiades surrounded himself with a young “band of cronies” at the assembly meeting regarding the expedition to Sicily is based on several dubious inferences. Alkibiades’ aristocratic bearing and lack of respect for ‘equality’ do not necessarily mean that he opposed the Athenian democratic system of government, especially given the degree of success that he found under that system. For a more nuanced reading of the incidents of the herms and mysteries in 415, see Mann 2007, 244-262, with bibliography.

and Antiphon equally represent a 'new politics'. Ostwald's conclusions do, however, require a bit of nuancing to be fruitfully applied to our consideration of demagogues. Although he acknowledges that Kleon and his fellows came from (often several generations of) wealth and office, and must therefore be considered 'upper class' if not of the traditional elite, in his discussion of the sophist-trained youth movement versus the older democratic establishment he often slides simply into mentioning a group as 'upper class'. Similarly, although he incorporates the question of foreign policy vis-à-vis a preference for war or peace into his descriptions of various political figures, this just serves to illustrate how the 'old', the 'young', the 'upper class', the 'demagogues', the 'democratic stalwarts', can all be split on individual issues like foreign policy: Nikias and Kleon are both older, both members and supporters of the democratic establishment, and both upper class (but not both elite in the same sense), and yet only one is considered a demagogue; the two split dramatically on their policy positions, and indeed they spent much of the 420s diametrically opposed in Athenian politics. Likewise, Alkibiades is younger, of a pedigree beyond simply upper class, is a demagogue, and although he is to Ostwald's mind not a supporter of the democratic establishment, he nevertheless falls quite in line with Kleon as concerns Athenian foreign policy. Although these inconsistencies appear in Ostwald he does not highlight or truly acknowledge them, and although they may ultimately be irreconcilable with an elegant theory of political change, they demand a reckoning that Ostwald does not undertake.

3.3. Carter's *Quiet Athenian*

L.B. Carter's *The Quiet Athenian*, published in the same year (1986) as Ostwald's *Popular Sovereignty*, focuses on the concept of *apragmosynē* at Athens. This

examination is especially important because both Connor and Ostwald do not conduct it, although their own discussions are intrinsically linked to the reaction to and withdrawal from Athenian politics in the 420s by a particular subset of Athenian citizens. As I pointed out above in the context of Ostwald's work, to understand whatever changes in Athenian politics are to be associated with 'demagogues', we need to study not only those demagogues but their negative, so to speak: the people, policies, and techniques which were (or felt that they were) being replaced by those demagogues. Carter's study helpfully breaks *apragmosynē* down into several very different aspects practiced by different groups of Athenians: noble youths, peasant farmers, and rich quietists.⁵¹² Carter's analysis is, on the whole, not as detailed as that of Ostwald, and it mostly leaves aside the question of sophistic moral relativism that largely defines Ostwald's picture of the 'youth reaction' to demagogues, or perhaps better, entrenched democratic norms;⁵¹³ however, Carter does a much better job than Ostwald of demonstrating the divide within social groups at Athens in their responses to the changing face of Athenian political life.

The 'young nobles' are a perfect example of this sensitivity. Carter distinguishes two groups that Ostwald's analysis often elides: the young, undoubtedly wealthy, and often *aristoi* students of the sophists who advocated moral relativism and who potentially disdained democratic notions of equality, and the young, undoubtedly wealthy, and often

⁵¹² Carter also explores at some length the philosophical *bios theoretikōs*, considering the historical precedents for a principled withdrawal from public life in the Presocratics before ultimately concluding that the phenomenon was a creation of Plato, inspired perhaps by his disappointment with oligarchic (cf. 411 and 404) and democratic (*i.e.*, the execution of Socrates) politics alike. Although this conclusion is in some ways the capstone of Carter's study, it is outside of our own area of inquiry because (1) it occurs after the period most commonly associated in antiquity and modernity alike with demagoguery, and (2) even Carter admits that it was a profoundly minority, and perhaps nearly unique, point of view (cf. Carter 1986, 174).

⁵¹³ Carter (1986, 16) does importantly note that the "cynical, modern...relativist doctrine, asserting individuality and denying any universally understood, universally held, values...is in reality only restating the traditional one, which stretches back to Homer. It is that of the heroic individual, for whom civilized society as the fifth century understood it does not yet exist."

aristoi members of the *hetaireiai* who, like Euripides' Hippolytus or Ion, advocated a withdrawal from political life, and who were probably the instigators of the oligarchic uprisings in 411 and 404. Although there was undoubtedly some overlap between these two groups, and they were likely united in a shared distaste for the 'commoners' who had, in their view, risen to a prominence far above their station and usurped the control of the city from their betters, the two reactions to such a situation are markedly different. Those who turned to the sophists to better learn how to protect themselves (or, indeed, attack others) in the democratic courts and gain influence in the assembly were simply continuing to follow the political urge outlined already by Connor, albeit in a way fitted to new political circumstances. Those, however, like Kharmides, Kritias, Antiphon, and (to name a fictitious example) Bdelykleon of the *Wasps*, "had seldom, if ever, been before the people. Their generation had either despaired of, or despised, an appeal to the people, and at length resorted to extreme lengths to turn the national purpose" (Carter 1986, 70). These latter used terms like *sōphrosynē* and *hēsykhiotēs* for an appropriate and tasteful restraint in political matters: "Charmides had given a second definition of *sōphrosynē*, afterwards attributed to Critias... *sōphrosynē* is 'to mind your own business'" (Carter 1986, 73). In other words, the *apragmosynē* of 'young nobles', which need not be identified with all young nobles, consisted of a hesitance to enter democratic politics out of a combination of fear and distaste, and would culminate in violent attempts to remove the 'lower class rabble' from power and return politics in Athens to the stewardship of the rich and wellborn.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹⁴ Carter struggles to explain satisfactorily this transition from withdrawal to violence; Mann's explanation, that the aristocratic youths were spurred to action by the success of Alkibiades' non-conformist aristocratic *imago*, probably lends far too much importance to the impact of Alkibiades, but is on the right track. What we are seeing here is more a social phenomenon than a political one: young men of

Perhaps the most interesting of Carter's manifestations of *apragmosynē*, albeit the one least relevant to our own purposes, is the *apragmosynē* of peasant farmers. Carter observes that

the oligarchic theorists had a special place in their hearts for the peasant...the *autourgos* performs a double role for them: on the one hand he is the 'sturdy yeoman', modestly prosperous, independent, capable of supplying his own arms, the backbone of the nation; on the other, he is the poor farmer living far from Athens, coming only rarely to the assembly, bowed with toil, and respectful of his betters. The latter type was the peasant the oligarchs were able to overawe in 411, but it was the former who figured in their theoretical programmes, and who legitimated their coup.⁵¹⁵

Aside from the potentially problematic interpretation of the coup of 411,⁵¹⁶ Carter provides an apt assessment of the *apragmosynē* that could be said to be practiced by an *autourgos* peasant farmer. This *apragmosynē* was driven by three important components: the physical difficulty of participation in government, the preference for local social groups and activity, and the respect for a more class-based system of government. The first of these aspects is a simple fact: a farmer anywhere near the subsistence level who

incredible privilege presuming that the rules of society do not apply to them. In some cases this manifested rather harmlessly, as with Alkibiades' self-presentation or potentially the profanation of the mysteries; in others, particularly when stressors were applied, it manifested with violence, as in the mutilation of the herms or the political terrorism of 411. Such a social explanation for the unrest associated with aristocratic youth in the last quarter of the fifth century deserves further attention, but is beyond the scope of the current project.

⁵¹⁵ Carter 1986, 189. In the same place, however, Carter essentially admits that the latter image (a poor farmer coming only rarely to the assembly, bowed with toil, and respectful of his betters) is as much a product of literary craft as is the 'yeoman backbone of the nation' glowingly depicted by oligarchic theorists and perhaps cynically exploited in popular agitation. In his chapter on the "Peasant Farmer" (1986, 76-98) Carter draws extensively on Aristophanes and Euripides, and at 189 he notes that "[t]he portraits of the peasant in Euripides and Aristophanes are complementary. The latter's reflects his maker's temperament; he is high-spirited, fiercely independent, lusty and vigorous, proud of his country ways, his traditions, and festivals, hating the city; the former is more sober, responsible, serious, hard-working; both are pillars of traditional values and contrast with the supposed corruption of city life." We must be wary about crafting a real, coherent class of citizens at Athens by tempering Old Comedic stock characters and emplotment with Euripidean nostalgia.

⁵¹⁶ Carter claims that "in 411, with the navy in Samos, the oligarchs were able to overawe the predominantly country population again in Athens and to set up briefly an oligarchy dedicated to concluding a quick peace with Sparta" (97). That it was an unusually 'country' population in Athens that allowed the oligarchs their victory is a dubious conclusion at best: 411 was certainly not the only occasion on which the navy was mobilized in large numbers, and Thucydides' account in 8.65-69 speaks not of a different composition of the people or the assembly, but of terror caused by informers and extra-judicial murders effectively paralyzing the urban population.

lived in Attica would have had little time or opportunity to travel to Athens and participate in the *ekklēsia* or hold a magistracy. The latter two aspects are tied more closely to the conservative, traditional point of view associated with the rural population of Attica. Thucydides 2.16 notes the reticence of the Athenians to move into Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War: “[d]eep was their trouble and discontent at abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient state, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city.”⁵¹⁷ The peasant farmers of Athens are also depicted in literature (although it is impossible to know how close this depiction comes to real life) as preserving the internalized and performed respect toward wealthier and better-born members of society in a way that had ceased to be the case in the city. These *autourgoi*, even if of moderate station and hoplite wealth, are certainly not the sort (like Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles) who had previously supplied the leaders of the state before withdrawing into *apragmosynē* in reaction to the democracy. Indeed, their *apragmosynē* could be said to be timeless in a way not true for the other groups Carter analyzes.

There is, however, an important caveat to Carter’s conception of the Athenian *autourgos* that goes unaddressed in his work: namely, it is unlikely that the political experience of an *autourgos*, whether truly impoverished or solidly “middle class”,⁵¹⁸ would have persisted unchanged through the second half of the fifth century. These men, who would previously have been accustomed to a life spent mostly a reasonable distance from Athens, were pulled inside the city and away from the support of their farms for

⁵¹⁷ Trans. *Landmark*. Thuc. 2.16: ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερὰ ἃ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας πάτρια δίαίταν τε μέλλοντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος.

⁵¹⁸ On this distinction of two sorts of *autourgoi* see n. 515 above.

about five years by the Periklean war strategy.⁵¹⁹ During this period many will have supported themselves either by military or public service, and thus will have worked and lived side-by-side with the urban population; the Peloponnesian invasions forced many less political or apolitical Athenians into closer proximity with the organs of government and especially the meetings of the *ekklēsia*. Many will have been introduced to new politicians and new ideas, and all will have watched their lives become less autarkic and correspondingly more political. As such, given that the experience and political orientation of an *autourgos* at Athens almost certainly varied dramatically from 438 to 428 to 418 to 408, it may not be valid to construct a single image of this group.

Carter breaks down the *apragmosynē* of his so-called ‘rich quietists’ into three further subdivisions: the advocacy for a quietist Athenian foreign policy, the complete avoidance of political life, and the limited or partial engagement in political life. The third category is Carter’s least successful. The argument goes that “some generals were just soldiers and no more, not interested in using their position for political advancement; that there existed a tradition of public service and that they were in other respects *apragmōn* private citizens.”⁵²⁰ Carter takes as the prime example of this sort of *apragmosynē* Lamakhos and Lakhes, and argues that their characterization in Aristophanes,⁵²¹ the lack of evidence for their further involvement in Athenian politics, and Lakhes’ participation with Nikias in the effort toward making peace with Sparta

⁵¹⁹ Although the Archidamian War lasted closer to a decade, the Spartans ceased to invade Attica itself after the capture of their men at Pylos in 425, which would presumably have allowed most Athenian *autourgoi* to return to their land and remain there until the disastrous conclusion of the Sicilian expedition and the occupation of Dekeleia by the Spartans.

⁵²⁰ Carter 1986, 129-130

⁵²¹ Lamakhos in the *Acharnians* lacks means, political weight, and the impudence and self-confidence of the demagogues in Aristophanes; Lakhes in the *Wasps* “is contrasted with Cleon, the very soul of *polypragmosyne*; it is stressed that he is away at sea serving the people, not sitting at home stirring up *pragmata*” (Carter 1986, 118).

argue for their *apragmōn* status. It seems to me to go too far with the evidence we have to take an Athenian who was politically active enough to be elected general and draw the attention (for better or worse) of Aristophanes and conclude that they were *apragmōn* because they were not Kleon: such efforts will at some point drain a term like *apragmōn* of its meaning. Furthermore, given just how little evidence for comprehensive biography survives, we should be alert to the strong possibility that figures such as Lamakhos or Lakhes were involved in magistracies or assembly debates either at the *polis* or deme level. Meanwhile, the notion of an *apragmosynē* consisting in the support of a peace policy is particularly Thucydidean, inasmuch as that historian regarded cities as being the aggregate of their citizens and was accustomed to apply terms normally reserved for individuals to cities themselves; in other words, we are thinking not of Thucydides son of Melesias or of Nikias as an *apragmōn* themselves (for clearly they were deeply involved in Athenian politics), but as advocating for *Athens* to be *apragmōn*. This group too is of less interest to us in our consideration of political change at Athens, since they are clearly a continual presence in Athens throughout the fifth and even the fourth centuries.

Finally, we have the true rich quietists: the wealthy Athenians who “were in an *apragmōn* state, of non-participation, so far as was possible in the public life of Athens.”⁵²² Carter infers the existence of a significant number of such quietists from the openings to fourth-century speeches, where protestations of *apragmosynē* became commonplace.⁵²³ Another important distinction from Ostwald appears here, in that Carter

⁵²² Carter 1986, 129.

⁵²³ These protestations were undoubtedly both defensive and formulaic in nature, but, as Carter (1986, 110) notes, “[t]o say that it is a speech-writer’s tool, a topos, is to miss the point. Why do speech-writers employ it? Presumably because it was effective, and if it was effective it must have had some basis in fact.” This

clearly stresses wealth (the ‘rich quietists’) rather than birth or other social markers as being the important element at play. According to Carter we are seeing not aristocrats or oligarchs scared away by demagogues (and this is the important distinction between this group and the ‘young nobles’), but any wealthy Athenian dissuaded from public life. Carter concludes that the most important element behind this dissuasion was litigation: the movement of most of the judicial system at Athens from smaller, aristocratic court bodies to the democratic *dikastēria* (and critically the institution of pay for jury service) meant that the wealthy were being judged by the urban *dēmos*, the elderly, and the infirm to a much greater degree than had previously been the case. Furthermore, both the rewards for successfully prosecuting a trial and the potential for bribery to escape prosecution led to the institution of sycophancy (either in reality or in the perception of the wealthy, and the difference is immaterial in this context). Finally, a new generation of Athenians who were perceived to lack the appropriate respect for age, who questioned traditional values, who deployed new concepts and techniques for debate, were frightening in an entirely new way for those with prospective interests in politics. Thus, according to Carter, the group of Athenians who were of the appropriate wealth and class to participate in and even lead the politics of the state chose to do so in increasingly smaller numbers over the second half of the fifth century.⁵²⁴

last conclusion, that the *topos* of the *apragmōn* defendant must have had some basis in fact for it to be effective is not so self-evident as Carter suggests, but he buttresses it with the observation that *apragmones* were notoriously the targets of malicious prosecution at Athens (cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.14, Aristoph. *Birds* 1422-1429, Aristoph. *Kn.* 261-264).

⁵²⁴ This conclusion is questionable, as it is founded upon an increase in noteworthy non-*aristos* politicians combined with evidence almost entirely from Plato for some young *aristoi* disdaining politics and the *topos* of the *apragmosynē* defense used in court. None of these pieces are particularly compelling. The advancement of a few politicians from outside of the traditional elite would not necessarily lead that elite to withdraw from politics; young *aristoi* must always have chosen lives other than political, whether musical, athletic, philosophical, or the like; nor can Plato be trusted to any significant degree in this context, given his demonstrable political biases; finally, that some wealthy Athenians claimed *apragmosynē* to gain the

As I have said above, some aspects of *The Quiet Athenian* are preferable to Ostwald's analysis in *Popular Sovereignty*: Carter has a tendency to break groups and phenomena down into their smallest identifiable parts and to preserve the difficult, variegated nature of Athenian social and political life. When Ostwald identifies a critical phenomenon in Athenian politics of the late 420s, *i.e.*, the reaction of some wealthy young Athenians to traditional democratic leaders, techniques, and values, the aspects of that phenomenon ('young', 'upper class', 'intellectual') are not only left broad, they are used to make the phenomenon as all-encompassing as possible, to the point that figures who only dubiously fit the circumstances are included. Carter's solution to a central problem laid out in *The Quiet Athenian*, a problem held over from Connor and Ostwald, is only partially successful. The problem is the why of the situation: "what was the incentive to *apragmosynē* for a wealthy Athenian?"⁵²⁵ Early on, Carter suggests that the answer may lie in a lack of compensation for work and danger: to borrow a Homeric image, in democratic Athens the spoils were no longer being shared in accordance with personal toil. There was *timē*, honor, standing, reputation, to be gained from political involvement, but no longer the material rewards that once existed. This theory is not satisfactorily proven by Carter, who relies on trials of generals and other magistrates for malversation without clearly showing revenue streams from office that existed prior to the democracy and were cut off by it. Later, and especially with reference to the young nobles, it is suggested (in contradiction to this earlier portion) that the respect and *timē* accorded to leaders in the state had decreased or disappeared. The theory of wealthy men's fear of litigation in a new judicial situation is perhaps most satisfactory in itself,

favor of jury courts neither indicates an increase in such behavior nor says anything about status as opposed to wealth.

⁵²⁵ Carter 1986, 49.

but it does not answer the pressing question of the causation of a sudden political shift away from established elite families around 430. On this point Carter says only that

The *apragmōn* is first attested in 431 BC, in circumstances not easy to clarify. Euripides' Odysseus [in the fragmentary *Philoctetes* of 431 (*test. ii*); Carter cites ff. 787-9 and D.Chr. *Oration* 59.1-2] seemed to be growing weary of the life of a *chrēstos*: the career of a leader of men, a general perhaps, seemed to offer no rewards other than fame and honour (which, in the speech, are in fact sufficient). Yet if Odysseus reaps no material reward in the execution of his duty, others, generals perhaps among them, were certainly prospering from the Empire at this time. The problem is plagued by lack of evidence, but the explanation may lie in a culture gap—Thucydides tells how after Pericles died a different breed of politicians arose, of lesser stature, pandering to the crowd. None of these, so far as we know, drew their wealth from land, but from various kinds of quasi-industrial enterprises. It seems possible that at this moment, 431, there was taking place a transition—a new generation was arising, and that at the outbreak of the war attitudes had polarized. A new kind of rich man emerged who, not feeling constrained by traditional loyalties and values, could see more clearly the immense possibilities the empire afforded.⁵²⁶

Much of this is standard fare concerning the 'demagogues' without the depth we have already sought to bring to the subject, and we are left not with an explanation but with a description. Perhaps we *are* seeing a new generation polarized by the outbreak of war and unconstrained by traditional loyalties and values (this latter fits to a certain extent with Connor, but is opposed by the conclusions of Ostwald), but what we want to know is *why* some traditional families specifically withdrew from politics, if withdraw they did, to leave the state in the hands of the 'new kind of rich men', and Carter provides only a fitful answer to that question.

3.4. Mann's *Demagogen und das Volk*

The most recent, and most comprehensive, rethinking of Athenian democratic politics from the perspective of the phenomenon of the demagogue is Christian Mann's 2007 monograph *Die Demagogen und das Volk: Zur politischen Kommunikation im*

⁵²⁶ Carter 1986, 187-188.

Athen des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Mann responds both to the dominant scholarly conception of fifth-century political change drawn from and embodied by Connor and to the works like those of Ostwald and Carter which focus on what I have termed a second wave of negative political change. In other words, all three aspects of the *New Politicians* outlined above (revision of the standard conception of political careers and group dynamics in Athens, postulation of a critical change in this political framework beginning with Kleon, and speculation about the effects of the change on the Athenian *aristoi*) are addressed by Mann. Mann's refutation of the first two aspects is intertwined: he generally approves of Connor's theory of Athenian politics in the period during and after the Archidamian War, and indeed his argument is that it holds as well for the period before Perikles' death as after it.

In terms of the building of a political career, Mann diverges from Connor and sees the *ekklēsia* as preeminent well before 430; indeed, he emphasizes that the power of final decision-making, as far as we can tell, resided there from the beginning of the democracy (which he is unwilling to set specifically, except to reject forcefully the reforms of Ephialtes and to prefer a sixth-century date). Politicians had always appealed to the *ekklēsia* directly for power, and they did so by utilizing certain trust-building techniques such as the disavowal of friendships and the praise of the people or the *polis*. This latter conception represents perhaps Mann's most important contribution to the study of Athenian democratic politics: his emphasis on a politician's *imago*, or the public persona he crafts and projects to create a rapport and inspire trust with the Athenian people. Mann shows that aspects of this direct appeal to the people, familiar from Connor's description of Kleon, can in fact be detected for nearly every prominent Athenian politician of the

fifth century, including Aristeides, Kimon, and Perikles. He uses the phrases and images found on *ostraka* to suggest that failure to adhere to a democratic *imago* (e.g., placing *philoï* before *polis*, or emphasizing personal or aristocratic excellence or superiority) often resulted in extreme punishments from the *dēmos*. Mann also accepts the conclusions of Bourriot, Roussel, and Jones in rejecting a significant influence of the structural units of Athens (phratries, *genē*, phylai, demes) and other social associations on political decision-making.⁵²⁷ Indeed Mann envisions the political system at Athens as nearly entirely abstracted from the social system(s), and views the collapse of 411 as “einen Einbruch des Sozialsystems in die Politik.”⁵²⁸ Mann most stringently disagrees with Connor on the notions of friendship, wherein Connor sees political friendship as essential for understanding Athenian democracy, and Mann places the performed rejection of political friendship in its place, and on the balance of responsibility to *philoï* versus responsibility to *polis*, which Connor sees as an active and unresolved question during the fifth century, and which is seen by Mann as demonstrably resolved in favor of not only loyalty/responsibility to the *polis*, but also of public proclamation of that state of mind.

In addition to dismantling the theorized break between Perikles and Kleon on Connor’s basis of ‘systematic’ differences, Mann also attacks the notion of a change in the class of politicians upon the death of Perikles. After carefully differentiating between ‘elite’ (or ‘upper class’) as a division of the populace based upon wealth (a division which he accepts as separating those with economic freedom to pursue political power from those without that freedom) and ‘elite’ (or ‘upper class’) as “die Abstammung aus

⁵²⁷ Cf. Bourriot 1976, Roussel 1976, Jones 1999.

⁵²⁸ Mann 2007, 292.

einer der alten grundbesitzenden Familien Athens, die entweder zu den vorsolonischen Eupatriden gehört hatten oder im 6. Jahrhundert in die höchste soziale Gruppe aufgestiegen waren,”⁵²⁹ Mann uses the examples of Themistokles, Aristeides, and Ephialtes to undermine the popular notion that politicians at Athens before the death of Perikles represented the latter group of ‘elites’, while those after his death were ‘new elites’ who fit the former, but not the latter, category. This argument is, in my judgment, a mixed success. He has underestimated the background of Themistokles.⁵³⁰ Although neither of the other two may have possessed quite the lineage of a Kimon, Perikles, or Alkibiades, we in fact know quite little about their family background, far too little for

⁵²⁹ Mann 2007, 128.

⁵³⁰ Although Mann is right to note (as he does at his p. 129) that circular logic has at times been employed to prove the ‘elite’ ancestry of early politicians (politicians before Perikles come from elite families, and these are politicians before Perikles, therefore they must come from elite families), removing that argument for their ancestry does not prove the opposite, and in the case of Themistokles there are further compelling pieces of evidence. Mann summarizes his discussion of Themistokles thus (2007, 133): “Themistokles gehörte mit Sicherheit zu den Pentakosiomedimnoi oder den Hippeis. Dies wird durch sein Archontat belegt, und auch die Heiratsverbindung seines Vaters über die Grenzen der Polis hinaus setzt eine Mobilität voraus, die bei einem Zeugiten oder gar Theten kaum zu erwarten wäre. Darüber hinaus stand er in enger, vielleicht verwandtschaftlicher Verbindung zu den Lykomiden. Auf der anderen Seite erwähnen die Quellen nicht, dass sein Vater oder ältere Vorfahren irgendwelche Verdienste für die Polis Athen erbracht hätten oder öffentlich in Erscheinung getreten seien. Der familiäre Hintergrund vermag folglich nicht zu erklären, dass Themistokles zum grossen Organisator und Strategen beim athenischen und griechischen Kampf gegen die persische Invasion wurde und auf der panhellenischen Bühne Ehren erwarb, wie sie keinem Athener vor ihm zuteil geworden waren.” Leaving aside the issues of Themistokles’ archonship and mother, which can, as Mann points out, go more to his census class than his lineage, Mann is overly influenced by the conclusions of Bourriot 1976 about the Lykomidai. Membership in this family, even as a member of the cadet branch, would have put Themistokles among the top echelon of Athenians with respect to lineage; furthermore, the notion that in 480/79, after not only having been *the* major force in Athenian politics for over a decade (as *ostraka* and magistracies demonstrate) but being the hero of Salamis, Themistokles would rebuild the cultic center of the Lykomidai in Phlya to increase his own prestige by connection to that family is surely putting the shoe on the wrong foot. At that time and in several respects the Lykomidai had more need for Themistokles than he had for them. Nor is the lack of information about the father or ancestors of Themistokles surprising: Themistokles was probably born around 524 (see *APF* pp. 214-215), so that his father’s political career would mostly have taken place during the Peisistratid tyranny. Thus, in addition to the general lack of information about the sixth century, we must deal with the possibility that Themistokles’ family was out of favor with the tyrants, and so was either in exile or excluded from holding major office or making major dedications. Finally, Mann is quite right that lineage cannot explain Themistokles’ rise to greatness; however, that lineage is no guarantor of greatness does not mean that it has no importance in giving a potentially great man his initial opportunity. After all, no one doubts the importance of Perikles’ lineage, despite his elder brother Ariphron’s near complete lack of a political career (cf. *APF* pp. 456-457).

anything approaching a confident conclusion. Furthermore, Mann's response to, *e.g.*,

Eupolis F 384 K. – A.⁵³¹ is not convincing:

Doch die üblichen Probleme von Komödienfragmenten verhindern auch hier eine präzise Interpretation: Zum einen ist nicht bekannt, wer diese Verse in der Komödie ausgesprochen hat; zum anderen ist der Kontext unbekannt, so dass es schwierig ist, die Position des Dichters selbst zu diesen Versen zu bestimmen, ob sie seine eigene Meinung widerspiegeln oder vielmehr die sprechende Person karikieren sollen. Die Eupolisstelle zeigt deshalb vor allem an, dass der *Topos* einer guten alten Zeit, in der edle Männer den höchsten Einfluss gehabt hätten, existierte. Über die politische Dimension des *Topos* gibt sie keinen Aufschluss.⁵³²

Although he is certainly right to urge caution in approaching a comic fragment, where

speaker and context are entirely unknown, it is hard to imagine the content of that

fragment being directly mocked or undermined. Moreover, concerns specifically about

fragmentary context are irrelevant for Aristophanes' *Frogs* 718-737, which expresses

much the same sentiments.⁵³³ We may argue that this *topos* of a sort of earlier golden age

⁵³¹ Eupolis F 384 K. – A.: οὕτω σφόδρ' ἀλγῶ τὴν πολιτείαν ὁρῶν παρ' ἡμῖν. | ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐχ οὕτω τέως ᾤκοῦμεν οἱ γέροντες, | ἀλλ' ἦσαν ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει πρῶτον μὲν οἱ στρατηγοὶ | ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων οἰκῶν, πλούτῳ γένει τε πρῶτοι, | οἷς ὥσπερ εἰ θεοῖσιν ἠυχόμεσθα· καὶ γὰρ ἦσαν· | ὥστ' ἀσφαλῶς ἐπράττομεν· νυνὶ δ', ὅταν τύχωμεν, | στρατευόμεσθ' αἰρούμενοι καθάρματα στρατηγοῦς. (I am so upset when I look at our state of government. This is not how we old men used to live. Our city had generals from the greatest families, leaders in wealth and birth, to whom we prayed as if they were gods—and gods they were to us. And so we lived in security. But now we take the field in haphazard fashion, electing as our generals the scum of the earth. Trans. Storey vol. 2.)

⁵³² Mann 2007, 139.

⁵³³ Aristoph. *Frogs* 718-737 (Spoken by the chorus leader): πολλάκις γ' ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν ἡ πόλις πεπονθέναι | ταῦτόν εἰς τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς καλοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς | εἰς τε τὰρχαῖον νόμισμα καὶ τὸ καινὸν χρυσῖον. | οὐτε γὰρ τοῦτοισιν, οὐδὲ οὐ κεκιβδηλευμένοις | ἀλλὰ καλλίστοις ἀπάντων, ὥς δοκεῖ, νομισμάτων | καὶ μόνοις ὀρθῶς κοπεῖσι καὶ κεκωδωνισμένοις | ἔν τε τοῖς Ἑλλήσι καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροισι πανταχοῦ, | χρώμεθ' οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτοις τοῖς πονηροῖς χαλκίοις, | χθές τε καὶ πρόην κοπεῖσι, τῷ κακίστῳ κόμματι. | τῶν πολιτῶν θ' οὐδ' ἔμην ἴσμεν εὐγενεῖς καὶ σώφρονες | ἄνδρας ὄντας καὶ δικαίους καὶ καλοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς | καὶ τραφέντας ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ χοροῖς καὶ μουσικῇ, | προυνελοῦμεν, τοῖς δὲ χαλκοῖς καὶ ξένοις καὶ πυρρίαις | καὶ πονηροῖς καὶ πονηρῶν εἰς ἅπαντα χρώμεθα, | ὑστάτοις ἀφιγμένοισιν, οἷσιν ἡ πόλις πρὸ τοῦ | οὐδὲ φαρμακοῖσιν εἰκὴ ῥαδίως ἐχρήσατ' ἄν. | ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν, ὧν ὀνέτοι, μεταβαλόντες τοὺς τρόπους | χρῆσθε τοῖς χρηστοῖσιν αὖθις· καὶ κατορθώσασιν γὰρ | εὖλογον, κἂν τι σφαλῇτ', ἐξ ἄξιου γοῦν τοῦ ξύλου, | ἣν τι καὶ πάσχετε, πάσχειν τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκῆσετε (It's often struck us that the city deals with its fine upstanding citizens just as with the old coinage and the new gold. Though both of these are unalloyed, indeed considered the finest of all coins, the only ones minted true and tested everywhere among Greeks and barbarians alike, we make no use of them; instead we use these crummy coppers, struck just yesterday or the day before with a stamp of the lowest quality. Just so with our citizens: the ones we acknowledge to be well-born, well-behaved, just, fine, and outstanding men, men brought up in wrestling schools, choruses, and the arts, we treat them shabbily, while for all purposes we choose the coppers, the aliens, the redheads, bad people with bad ancestors, the latest arrivals, whom formerly the city wouldn't readily have used even

(often specifically of the *Marathonomachai* ‘Marathonian combatants’) was mythologizing the previous democratic leadership at Athens, but we should take care in assuming that, without evidence specifically to the contrary, the Athenians were incorrect in their memory of the previous generation’s leaders. In other words, although Mann is correct in questioning the foundations of the broad assumption in scholarly literature that Athenian politicians before Kleon were of ‘elite’ ancestry while Kleon and many of his successors were not, he goes too far in asserting that the opposite was true, and that the ancestry of political leaders at Athens did not change over the fifth century.

Much of *Die Demagogen und das Volk* argues for a continuity of democratic leadership in fifth-century Athens, but where Mann does see a major change is the figure of Alkibiades:

Alkibiades‘ Gefährlichkeit für die demokratische Ordnung bestand folglich nicht darin, dass er innerhalb der Institutionen eine Sonderstellung einnahm oder institutionelle Veränderungen anstrebte. Eine Erschütterung der bestehenden Ordnung bewirkte er auf eine andere Weise. Er überredete die Athener zum folgenschweren Sizilienfeldzug, vor allem aber kündigte er die eingefahrenen Muster der politischen Kommunikation zwischen Demos und Demagogos an zwei zentralen Punkten auf: Erstens brach er mit dem allgemein akzeptierten Grundsatz, dass es keine Politik gegen die Volksversammlung oder an ihr vorbei geben könne, und zweitens politisierte er seinen sozialen Status, indem er ihn massiv als Argument im Kampf um die Macht in Athen einsetzte.⁵³⁴

The deficiency in Mann’s argument derives from another of the very important points that he himself makes earlier in his book: in discussing the use of Old Comedy to differentiate politicians before and after the death of Perikles, Mann points out that

[f]ür Kleons Zeit liegen mehrere vollständig überlieferte Komödien vor, aus der früheren Zeit haben sich dagegen nur Fragmente erhalten, welche durch das Fehlen des Kontextes deutlich schwieriger auszuwerten sind. Da auch Thukydides

as scapegoats. But even at this late hour, you fools, do change your ways and once again choose the good people. You’ll be congratulated for it if you’re successful, and if you take a fall, at least the intelligent will say that if something does happen to you, you’re hanging from a worthy tree. Trans. Henderson vol. 4.).

⁵³⁴ Mann 2007, 227.

die Ereignisse des Archidamischen Krieges sehr viel Ausführlicher beschreibt als die Pentekontaëtie, stellt sich die Frage, ob es sich bei den ‘new politicians’ nicht viel eher um ein Phänomen von ‘new sources’ handelt.⁵³⁵

Thus, when Mann bases the ‘revolutionary’ character of Alkibiades and his manner of interacting with the *dēmos* on the narrative of Thucydides and a comparison to the speeches of Kleon and Perikles (also in Thucydides), one might justifiably wonder whether Alkibiades represents a new sort of democratic political communication⁵³⁶ or rather the first politician of his type for whom evidence like the speeches and narrative of Thucydides, full comedies, and even some court speeches survives. Would Thucydides son of Melesias or Kimon appear to be entirely different from Alkibiades if we possessed a fuller description of their political activities and interactions with the *dēmos*? Mann’s argument that it was the exceptionally social basis of Alkibiades’ claims to leadership and the temporary success of those claims, in combination with a sudden decrease in faith in democratic decision-making processes in the wake of the Sicilian disaster, that led to the coup in 411 thus rests on extremely shaky ground. It is, however, somewhat necessary for Mann, since, if there was no change in political leadership in the second half of the fifth century, there could hardly be a movement reacting to that change, as Connor, Ostwald, and Carter theorized. In fact, Mann deals only to a shockingly small degree with the background to Alkibiades’ beliefs and affectations presented by Ostwald.

3.5. A New Path Forward

There is, I think, a better conclusion that can be drawn in light of the theories that have been laid out here and the evidence that I have presented in the previous chapters. Mann fails to address one of the central questions of Connor’s *New Politicians*: how did a

⁵³⁵ Mann 2007, 24.

⁵³⁶ Although he acknowledges that this communication is essentially a revival of archaic aristocratic political communication, Mann still characterizes it as new in the Athenian democratic context.

citizen at Athens build a political career? Although Mann argues compellingly that prominent politicians (*aristoi* or not) were not in complete control of democratic Athens (*i.e.*, the *ekklēsia* had the final say on matters, and the leading politicians never seem to have united to present only a single option to the *ekklēsia*, with the exception of during the coup in 411), this argument misses Connor's point. As far as our evidence shows, a citizen did not jump up at age thirty, speak persuasively in an open meeting of the *ekklēsia*, and immediately become an influential politician. It is important to keep in mind that we simply do not know what an *ekklēsia* meeting looked like *in toto*, on the surface much less in any sort of depth. In a meaningful way Mann is sidestepping Connor's notion of political circles when he views the *dēmos* as some kind of abstract whole; in arguing for a political system removed from the social system Mann is, usually in an unspoken way, imagining every Athenian citizen as making *ekklēsiastic* decisions as an individual in a social vacuum, affected by his conception of a politician's *imago* (this is his 'political communication') and, presumably, by the matter at hand, but not by other various social ties. It is true that no clientage system existed in Athens parallel to that in Rome, but Athenian citizens were members of a sizeable number of social networks, and would almost certainly have discussed political matters and formulated opinions about topics and politicians within those networks. Indeed, where Mann wants to apply the political system of Connor's 'new politicians' to the entire period of the Athenian democracy, it would be preferable to conclude that both of Connor's political systems were active at the same time: the highest level of Athenian *dēmagōgia* consisted of regularly speaking about, and often carrying the day on, the major *polis*-level issues discussed in the *ekklēsia*, but before one could become influential at the level of

thousands of Athenians, one had to become influential with the smaller group of one's social connections, and probably had to also gain the support, or at least respect, of other such 'local' *dēmagōgoi*.

Connor is likely correct that political terminology was shifting, and even that the open consideration of devotion to one's *philoī* versus devotion to one's city was a new and extremely potent force.⁵³⁷ Connor is also right that this change is intimately tied up with democracy/popular rule: only in a democracy is it particularly meaningful to express loyalty/devotion to the *dēmos*, as opposed to the narrow group of rulers in a tyranny/oligarchy, and there should be no doubt that in the latter systems conflict did arise between duties to *philoī* and duties to the tyrant/oligarchs as the case of Harmodios and Aristogeiton shows. These types of conflicts of loyalties are visible all the way back in the *Iliad*, where Achilles attempts to balance his devotion to himself and his *philoī* with his duty/devotion to the larger communities and structures of authority to which he belongs, the Achaean *laos* before Ilium. I would argue that pledging loyalty to the *polis* is democratic at heart precisely because it separates *polis* from people: it is the same as using *dēmagōgos* to refer to a leader instead of *aristos/khrēstos*.⁵³⁸ Mann, however, is in turn almost certainly correct in rejecting Connor's notion of a change in political technology around the death of Perikles. All of the above is terminological, not technological, and Mann shows clearly that the political technologies of Kleon were practiced by nearly every fifth-century successful Athenian politician of whom we are aware.

⁵³⁷ Bearing in mind Mann's caution on the subject we might alter the newness of this crisis of loyalty to extend back to the beginning of the fifth century.

⁵³⁸ Cf. pp. 31-34 above.

Nevertheless, significant indications of a change in Athenian politics appear in the second half of the fifth century. Although Mann is correct in pointing out the lack of complete comedies to provide evidence for pre-Kleonian politicians, the comedies that we do have do more than make positive assertions about politicians (*e.g.*, Kleon is an uneducated tanner): they explicitly compare current politicians to previous politicians and note changes. Later systematizing authors such as [Aristotle] and the *atthidographers* believed that a change occurred in Athenian politics at some point after death of Perikles, even if they could not exactly place the moment of the change.⁵³⁹ Additionally, authors like Ostwald and Carter have correctly noted the existence in the literary evidence of conservative and progressive (or perhaps sophistic) reactions to the changing face of Athenian politics. Mann asks (and answers) some critical questions about the ostracism of Hyperbolos in 416,⁵⁴⁰ but he does not discuss the degree to which the use of ostracism slowed after 461 (or indeed the potential for a significant gap between the ostracism of Thukydides son of Melesias and Hyperbolos), a fact which in itself raises some questions about the continuity of political techniques and communication during the fifth century. As I have indicated previously, I am not convinced that positions of the greatest influence in democratic Athens were open to anyone with the wealth for leisure and the intellect or charisma for leadership: the democracy did not spring into being, fully formed and adhering to the supposed ideals of the Periklean funeral oration, in the late sixth century. An established group who aspired to hold leadership positions (and to control and vet any aspiring new members of their group) existed; we have precious little evidence in either direction, but it seems to me more incredible that the *dēmos* would

⁵³⁹ Cf. pp. 109-114 above.

⁵⁴⁰ Mann 2007, 240-243. The question of the exact date has been well-trodden in scholarship; see Mann 2007, 234-237, Heftner 2000, and Rhodes 1995, all of which review earlier scholarship in some detail.

have immediately and fully grasped its prerogative to treat as a leader any and every one whom it preferred than that it grew into such confidence over time, during which period men from outside the established group of political leaders were both becoming enriched by the *arkhē* in increasing numbers and were participating in the consistently growing administration of the *polis* and its constituent parts, giving them a taste for deliberative leadership and some of the connections with which a political career was launched. As such men were increasingly represented at the upper echelons of *polis* leadership, in part no doubt catalyzed by the increased democratization of the courts and the *ekklēsia* that resulted from the reforms of Ephialtes and the system of salaried public service instituted by Perikles, it was only natural that, in the same way as is visible in the Theognidean corpus, some members of the formerly dominant group would become proportionately frustrated, resulting in the various reactions of competition, withdrawal, and sedition observed by Ostwald and Carter.

Both Connor's 'new politicians' and the 'indispensable expertise' theory draw in no small part on the evidence of Old Comedy, and specifically on its descriptions (and abuse) of politicians in the last quarter of the fifth century. Indeed, such evidence has been so influential that Mann felt it necessary to caution against its use in drawing conclusions about a moment of political change at Athens with Perikles' death. We must bear in mind, as he says, that Perikles' death as a breakpoint lines up uncomfortably well with the breakpoint of well-preserved versus extremely fragmentary Old Comedy: perhaps we are seeing an accident in survival and not a change in leaders. Our next chapter makes Old Comedy the subject of its investigation, and considers what sort of abuse 'demagogic' politicians were subjected to (as well as what sort of abuse

supposedly 'non-demagogic' politicians were subjected to), whether there was a 'right-wing' bias to Old Comedy, and what the societal and comedic function of the genre was with respect to Athenian political life.

4. Demagogues in Old Comedy

To this point we have engaged somewhat tangentially with Old Comedy, addressing individual passages without applying sustained and systematic focus. However, Old Comedy is the driving force behind the very concept of a ‘demagogic’ class of fifth-century Athenian politicians, and as such it demands greater attention. In this chapter, I shall begin by exploring the depiction in Old Comedy of several of our best-known Peloponnesian-War era *dēmagōgoi*: Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Alkibiades, Androkles, Peisander, and Kleophon.⁵⁴¹ What we shall see from these “character” studies is that the depiction of ‘demagogues’ in Old Comedy fits poorly with the concept of demagogy that has been built upon those depictions, and indeed in some cases destabilizes the critical distinctions inherent in the modern notion of demagogy. At the heart of these distinctions between demagogue and non-demagogue is a major, ongoing debate in Aristophanic (and Old Comedic) studies about the place of Old Comedy in Athenian politics. Building upon the conclusions from our ‘demagogues in comedy’ case study, I shall argue against those scholars who would construe the surface meaning of various plays to position Aristophanes (and, to a lesser extent owing to their fragmentary survival, the other authors of Old Comedy) as an active participant within an ideological struggle during the Peloponnesian War between ‘conservative’ or ‘right-wing’ politicians/citizens and ‘radical’ or ‘leftist’ politicians/citizens. Instead, in a vein similar

⁵⁴¹ This list is mostly drawn from Table 2, after chronological and robustness filtering. That list was Theseus, Peisistratos, Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Kleophon, Arkhedemos, Kallistratos, Demosthenes, and Euboulos. Theseus, Peisistratos, Demosthenes, and Euboulos have been excluded for falling before or after our period of focus, while Kallistratos and Arkhedemos are mentioned once and three times respectively in Old Comedy. Alkibiades, Androkles, and Peisander have been added: the first qualifies for the robustness threshold (but not chronological), and the second for the chronological threshold (but not robustness). Peisander is called a demagogue in one, relatively late source only, but appears in 10 separate passages of Old Comedy, and thus serves as an interesting point of comparison.

to the work of David Konstan and James McGlew,⁵⁴² I shall suggest that the attack of Aristophanes and the other Old Comedians against Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos and the like are less about persuading the audience to turn against that specific politician, and more about reaffirming communal ideals about politicians and political participation generally.

4.1. Case Studies

For the sake of simplicity, let us proceed chronologically, beginning with Perikles. Perikles is a complicated figure in this analysis for two major reasons: first, as we saw in our discussions of financial expertise and elite lineage, there is considerable dispute over whether Perikles should be included *with* the ‘demagogues’, or opposed to them;⁵⁴³ second, Perikles died before the production of any of our surviving plays (and indeed generally before Aristophanes’ period of activity), so that he can only be approached through fragments or retrospective. Although Aristophanes never in truth becomes friendly towards Kleon, our perception of their relationship would be drastically altered if *Peace* or especially *Birds* were the first play of his to survive. Regardless, it will be necessary to bear in mind the potential difference(s) between Perikles (and Peisander) and the other figures whom we are examining. How, then, is Perikles treated by comedy? He is frequently faulted as being responsible for the Peloponnesian War, and usually from deeply personal, potentially even lust-driven motives. The hypothesis to Cratinus’ *Dionysalexandros* from P. Oxy. 663 (Cratinus *Dionysalexandros* testimonia i. K. – A.) concludes by stating that “in the play Pericles is very persuasively made fun of through

⁵⁴² Konstan 1995, McGlew 2002.

⁵⁴³ See sections 2.2, 3.1, and 3.4 above.

innuendo [ἔμφρασις] for having brought the war on the Athenians.”⁵⁴⁴ Although some disagreement exists over just how much of *Dionysalexandros* consisted of allegorical/allusive satire of Perikles, as opposed to mythological burlesque, at the very least a comment along the lines of the statement above was made, and it is hard to imagine such a comment not forming the backdrop for a play about a monarchical politician who starts a war out of lust before hiding and refusing to fight.⁵⁴⁵

Indeed, warmongering, tyranny, personal interest, overactive sexuality, and cowardice all recur in Old Comedy’s treatment of Perikles. Cratinus F 73 K. – A. refers to Perikles as Zeus and implies that he has been hiding from, or at least laying low to avoid, ostracism: “Here comes Perikles, the onion-headed Zeus, with the Odeion on his head, now that the *ostrakon* has gone away.”⁵⁴⁶ As is the case in this fragment, Perikles’ tyrannical leanings are often associated with a noteworthy physical abnormality: his large head. Thus Eupolis can archly refer to him as “the head of the dead”,⁵⁴⁷ and Teleclides can paint an image wherein Perikles, “confounded by events, sat on the Acropolis with heavy head, and alone he caused a great uproar to spring from a head that could fit eleven couches.”⁵⁴⁸ Teleclides, Eupolis, and Callias all hit upon the theme of Perikles’ lack of sexual self-control as well as his unorthodox, social- and gender-norm-breaking relationship with Aspasia: Teleclides mentions Perikles’ love for ‘Khrysilla of Corinth,

⁵⁴⁴ Trans. Storey vol. 1. Hypothesis to Cratinus’ *Dionysalexandros* (P. Oxy. 663): κωμωιδεῖται δ’ ἐν τῷ δράματι Περικλῆς μάλα πιθανῶς δι’ ἐμφάσεως ὡς ἐπαγοχὸς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸν πόλεμον.

⁵⁴⁵ For a moderate, if somewhat pessimistic assessment of the degree of allegory in *Dionysalexandros*, see Storey’s introduction to the play at Storey vol. 2, 284-287. Bakola 2010, 181-208 argues against interpreting *Dionysalexandros* as a primarily political play. Vickers 1997 and McGlew 2002 both argue for allegorical mockery of, and opposition to, Perikles as a critical, and even central, aspect of the play.

⁵⁴⁶ Trans. Storey vol. 1. Cratinus F 73 K. – A.: ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς ὅδε προσέρχεται | < ὁ > Περικλῆς, τῷδεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανίου | ἔχων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦστρακὸν παροίχεται.

⁵⁴⁷ Eupolis F 115 K. – A.: κεφάλαιον τῶν κάτωθεν...

⁵⁴⁸ Trans. Storey vol. 3. Teleclides F 47 K. – A.: Τηλεκλειδῆς δὲ “ποτὲ μὲν” ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡπορημένον καθῆσθαι φησιν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει “καρηβαροῦντα, ποτὲ δὲ μόνον ἐκ κεφαλῆς ἑνδεκακλίνου θόρυβον πολὺν ἐξαντέλλειν”.

daughter of Teleas’;⁵⁴⁹ Eupolis in his *Demes* has Perikles refer to one of his own sons as a bastard, and his interlocutor refer to the child’s mother as a whore.⁵⁵⁰ Callias claimed that Aspasia had taught Perikles how to speak in public.⁵⁵¹ The notion that Perikles’ famous rhetorical power was tied to foreign, potentially sophistic teachers recurs in Platon⁵⁵², where instead of Aspasia Damon is Perikles’ Chiron-like instructor.⁵⁵³ In fact, every reference to Perikles’ fearsome rhetoric is twisted in one way or another. Besides the examples we have already seen, at Eupolis F 102 K. – A. he is said to ἐκῆλει⁵⁵⁴ (‘bewitch’) and τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε (‘leave a sting in’) his audience; an *adespota* fragment has him ‘wielding a terrible thunderbolt on his tongue’,⁵⁵⁵ a description that calls to mind both his own tyrannical associations with Zeus and the force-of-nature descriptions of Kleon’s oratory.⁵⁵⁶ Aristophanes (*Clouds* 858-9) has Strepsiades cheekily transfer Perikles’ famous financial obfuscation ‘I’ve expended them as required’ from talents to shoes.⁵⁵⁷ Hermippus and Aristophanes mock Perikles’ rhetoric within a context very familiar from the *Dionysalexandros*. In explaining the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Dikaiopolis relates how

⁵⁴⁹ Teleclides F 18 K. – A.: Βάτων δ’ ὁ Σινωπεὺς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Ἰωνος τοῦ ποιητοῦ φιλοπότην φησὶ γενέσθαι καὶ ἐρωτικώτατον τὸν Ἴωνα· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ἑλεγείοις ἐρᾶν μὲν ὁμολογεῖ Χρυσίλλης τῆς Κορινθίας, Τελέου δὲ θυγατρὸς, ἧς καὶ Περικλέα τὸν Ὀλύμπιον ἐρᾶν φησὶ Τηλεκλείδης ἐν Ἡσιόδοις.

⁵⁵⁰ Eupolis F 110 K. – A.: ΠΕΡΙΚΛ. ὁ νόθος δέ μοι ζῆ; | ΜΥΡΩΝΙΔ. καὶ πάλαι γ’ ἂν ἦν ἀνὴρ, | εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς πόρνης ὑπωρρώδει κακόν.

⁵⁵¹ Callias F 21 K. – A.: ἐπεγῆματο δὲ μετὰ τὸν Περικλέους θάνατον Λυσικλεί τῷ προβατοκαπήλῳ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔσχεν υἱὸν ὀνόματι Ποριστίν, καὶ τὸν Λυσικλέα ῥήτορα δεινότατον κατεσκευάσατο, καθάπερ καὶ Περικλέα δημηγορεῖν παρεσκεύασεν, ὥς Αἰσχίνης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ἐν διαλόγῳ †Καλλία καὶ Πλάτων† ὁμοίως Πεδήταις.

⁵⁵² I shall refer thus to the author often called ‘Plato Comicus’; both conventions are simply ways of distinguishing him from the more famous philosopher.

⁵⁵³ Platon F 207 K. – A.: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μοι λέξον, ἀντιβολῶ· σὺ γάρ, | ὥς φασιν, [ὦ] Χίρων ἐξέθρεψας Περικλέα. This fragment is preserved at Plut. *Per.* 4.1, which provides the reference to Damon.

⁵⁵⁴ This verb connotes the activity of an Orpheus, of a magician, and could often be accomplished through bribery.

⁵⁵⁵ *Comic Adespota* F 701 K. – A.: δεινὸν δὲ κεραυνὸν ἐν γλώσσει φέρειν.

⁵⁵⁶ See p. 206 and especially n. 580 below.

⁵⁵⁷ Aristoph. *Cl.* 858-9: Φε. τὰς δ’ ἐμβάδας ποῖ τέτροφας, ὧνόητε σύ; | Στ. ὥσπερ Περικλῆς εἰς τὸ δέον ἀπόλεσα.

the Megarians, garlic-stung by their distress, in retaliation stole a couple of Aspasia's whores, and from that the onset of war broke forth upon all the Greeks: from three sluts! And then in wrath Perikles, that Olympian, did lighten and thunder and stir up Greece, and started making laws worded like drinking songs, that Megarians should abide neither on land nor in market nor on sea nor on shore.⁵⁵⁸

Hermippus, focusing instead on Perikles' passive strategy in the war, ponders, "King of the satyrs, why are you so unwilling to wield the spear? You do deliver fearsome speeches about the war, but inside lurks the heart of a Teles. At the sound of a dagger being sharpened on a hard whetstone you grind your teeth, bitten by fierce Kleon."⁵⁵⁹ Finally,⁵⁶⁰ Aristophanes (*Peace* 606-611) takes up again the theme of Periklean responsibility for the Peloponnesian War, this time characterizing it as an attempt on his part to avoid prosecution for corruption (a conceit that Aristophanes had previously used against Kleon-cum-Paphlagon at *Knights* 801-809)⁵⁶¹: "Then Perikles got frightened that he'd share Pheidias' bad luck, dreading your inherently mordant behavior, so before he had to face anything terrible himself, he torched the city by tossing in a small spark of a

⁵⁵⁸ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Ach.* 526-534: κᾶθ' οἱ Μεγαρῆς ὁδύναις πεφυσιγγωμένοι | ἀντεξέκλεψαν Ἀσπασίας πόρνα δύο· | κἀντεῦθεν ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου κατερράγη | Ἑλλήσι πᾶσιν ἐκ τριῶν λαικαστριῶν. | ἐντεῦθεν ὀργὴ Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος | ἥστραπτ', ἐβρόντα, ξυνεκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, | ἐτίθει νόμους ὥσπερ σκόλια γεγραμμένους, | ὥς χρὴ Μεγαρέας μῆτε γῆ μῆτ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ | μῆτ' ἐν θαλάττῃ μῆτ' ἐν ἡπείρῳ μένειν.

⁵⁵⁹ Trans. Storey vol. 2. Hermippus F 47 K. – A.: βασιλεῦ Σατύρων, τί ποτ' οὐκ ἐθέλεις | δόρυ βαστάζειν, ἀλλὰ λόγους μὲν | περὶ τοῦ πολέμου δεινούς παρέχει, | ψυχὴν δὲ Τέλητος ὑπέστης; κἀγχειριδίου δ' ἀκόνῃ σκληρᾷ | παραθηγομένης βρύχεις κοπίδος, | δηχθεὶς αἰθῶνι Κλέωνι.

⁵⁶⁰ Perikles is also mentioned at *Clouds* 213-214, Eupolis F 104 K. – A., and Teleclides F 45 K. – A., but none of those passages give much indication of Old Comedy's response to (or opinion of) Perikles.

⁵⁶¹ Aristoph. *Kn.* 801-809: οὐχ ἵνα γ' ἄρξῃ μὰ Δί' Ἀρκαδίας προνοούμενος, ἀλλ' ἵνα μάλλον | σὺ μὲν ἀρπάξης καὶ δωροδοκῆς παρὰ τῶν πόλεων, ὁ δὲ δῆμος | ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς ὀμίχλης ἂ πανουργεῖς μὴ καθορᾷ σου, | ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἅμα καὶ χρεῖας καὶ μισθοῦ πρὸς σε κεχήνῃ. | εἰ δέ ποτ' εἰς ἀγρὸν οὗτος ἀπελθὼν εἰρηναιὸς διατρίψῃ, | καὶ χῖδρα φαγὼν ἀναθαρρήσῃ καὶ στεμφύλῳ εἰς λόγον ἔλθῃ, | γνώσεται οἶων ἀγαθῶν αὐτὸν τῇ μισθοφορᾷ παρεκόπτου· | εἰθ' ἥξει σοι δριμύς ἄγροικος, κατὰ σοῦ τὴν ψῆφον ἰχνεύων. | ἂ σὺ γινώσκων τόνδ' ἐξαπατᾷς καὶ ὄνειροπολεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ. (You certainly aren't figuring how he can rule Arkadia, but how you can steal and take bribes from the allied cities, and how Demos can be made blind to your crimes amid the fog of war, while mooning at you from necessity, deprivation, and jury pay. But if Demos ever returns to his peaceful life on the farm, and regains his spirit by eating porridge and chewing the fat with some pressed olives, he'll realize how many benefits you beat him out of with your state pay; then he'll come after you with a farmer's vengeful temper, tracking down a ballot to use against you. You're aware of this, so you keep fooling him and rigging up dreams about yourself. Trans. Henderson vol. 1.)

Megarian decree, and blew up so great a war that the smoke brought tears to the eyes of all Greeks, here and elsewhere.”⁵⁶²

Not all is bad, it is true: Aristophanes (*Knights* 282-283) seems to imply that Perikles is a good standard of worthiness to dine in the Prytaneion,⁵⁶³ and in Eupolis’ *Demes* Perikles is one of the four ‘great leaders of the past’ resurrected to help Athens with the exigencies of the prolonged war. Nor is rhetorical prowess necessarily a negative attribute, although, as I have pointed out, the Old Comedians seem usually to give it some kind of negative coloring. These positive aspects notwithstanding, the Perikles we see in Old Comedy is hardly the incorruptible, wise, selfless leader of Thucydides’ narrative. Rather, he is a tyrannical man of seductive oratory, a literally big-headed man whose sexual desires lead him to produce bastard children and to associate with prostitutes for whom he embroils Athens in at least one war, a general who was only too happy to crush Euboea and Megara, but who hid from the Spartans. McGlew has proposed the intriguing notion that the previously discussed *Dionysalexandros* was in fact designed to counter Periklean ideology of “a radical disjunction of private desire and public virtue” by exposing the personal desires behind his political image.⁵⁶⁴ I am, I admit, a bit leery of extrapolating an *imago* or ideology to Perikles’ entire career from one second-hand speech, but there seems little doubt that acting in one’s self interest was as discouraged among Athenian politicians by the *dēmos* as it was expected;⁵⁶⁵ this seeming paradox is

⁵⁶² Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Peace* 606-611: εἴτα Περικλῆς φοβηθεὶς μὴ μετὰσχοι τῆς τύχης, | τὰς φύσεις ὑμῶν δεδοικῶς καὶ τὸν αὐτοδᾶξ τρόπον, | πρὶν παθεῖν τι δεινὸν αὐτός, ἐξέφλεξε τὴν πόλιν, | ἐμβαλὼν σπινθήρα μικρὸν Μεγαρικοῦ ψηφίσματος· | κάζεφύσησεν τοσοῦτον πόλεμον ὥστε τῷ καπνῷ | πάντας Ἕλληνας δακρῦσαι, τοὺς τ’ ἐκεῖ τοὺς τ’ ἐνθάδε.

⁵⁶³ Aristoph. *Kn.* 282-283: νῆ Δί’, ἐξάγων γε τὰ πόρρηθ’, ἅμ’ ἄρτον καὶ κρέας | καὶ τέμαχος, οὗ Περικλῆς οὐκ ἤξιώθη πώποτε.

⁵⁶⁴ McGlew 2002, 25-56; quote from p. 54.

⁵⁶⁵ On the societal, political, and sometimes judicial restraints imposed on the activities of politicians by the *dēmos* at Athens, see Mann 2007.

almost certainly larger than Perikles, and should probably be viewed in light of the evolving conceptions of democracy, aristocracy, and leadership that we discussed in a previous chapter.⁵⁶⁶

The next ‘demagogue’ on our list is Kleon. While it is possible that Cratinus devoted a now-fragmentary play to satirizing Perikles, there is no question that the quite-whole *Knights* presents even-less-cloaked mockery of Kleon. A full consideration of Aristophanes’ treatment of Kleon in the *Knights* would take far more space than is available here, and has already been carried out in several scholarly monographs.⁵⁶⁷ Indeed, not including the *Knights* or compound onomastics like Bdelykleon and Philokleon, Kleon is mentioned by name in at least twenty-six passages of Old Comedy, and is alluded to by demotic or comic aspect (leather, Cerberus) in at least another seven. As such, rather than going through all of these passages, I shall discuss the ways in which Kleon is mocked in comedy, listing relevant passages and providing an illustrative example or two for each.

Many of the bases for mockery that we saw applied to Perikles recur in the treatment of Kleon. We have already covered in detail the allegations of financial impropriety, bribery, and theft, and these allegations operate along similar lines to Perikles’ concern that he might share Pheidias’ fate, or his quip about spending money as necessary.⁵⁶⁸ The broader category of personal/private interests and motivations into which such financial improprieties fall also very much recurs in Kleon’s case. The character of Paphlagon in the *Knights* is in fact defined (and defeated) by his greed and

⁵⁶⁶ See section 1.2 above.

⁵⁶⁷ Cf. Lind 1990, Edmunds 1987.

⁵⁶⁸ On Kleon’s financial improprieties, see pp. 124, 143-147 above. On the abuse of Perikles for questionable financial activities, see pp. 201-203 above. Besides *Knights*, accusations of bribery, theft, etc. occur at *Ach.* 5-8, *Kn.* 985-996, *Clouds* 591-594, and *Wasps* 756-759.

selfishness, as is the ‘Dog of Kydathenaion’ in *Wasps* 894-930. We have also already discussed the related notion that Kleon prolonged the war to cover his own misdeeds and thievery, much as Aristophanes alleged that Perikles started the war to cover *his* misdeeds.⁵⁶⁹ Those passages bring us to the depiction of the targeted figure as a warmonger, and again Kleon is painted with the same brush as Perikles,⁵⁷⁰ especially in the *Peace* where it is feared that Kleon, although dead, will break up the attempt to retrieve peace: “well, the thing is, the Athenians have lost their pestle: the leather seller who used to churn up Greece....Now beware of that Cerberus below ground; he might start spluttering and bellowing, as he did when he was up here, and become an obstacle to our excavating the goddess [Peace].”⁵⁷¹

Kleon also shares with Perikles abuse for perceived (or alleged) tyrannous behavior, deviant sexuality, dangerous rhetorical power, and physical abnormality. Kleon’s tyranny is most apparent in the way Paphlagon in the *Knights* lords his position over his fellow slaves;⁵⁷² the chorus then promises that same degree of absolute power to the Sausage-Seller to entice him to oppose Paphlagon: “You’re going to be top dog of them all, of the market, the harbors, and the Pnyx! You’ll trample the Council, dock the generals, put people in chains and lock them up, suck cocks in the Prytaneum!”⁵⁷³ This last ‘benefit’ leads nicely to the connection between tyranny and deviant, or at least

⁵⁶⁹ Aristoph. *Kn.* 801-809 and *Peace* 606-611 respectively. See pp. 201-203 above.

⁵⁷⁰ Cf. also Hermippus F 47 K. – A., where Perikles has become cowardly and is deliberately opposed to the αἰθῶνι (*aithōni* - fiery) Kleon. Kleon himself is in one passage (*Ach.* 659-664) described as δειλός, which can have the meaning of ‘cowardly’ but can also indicate moral or social inferiority.

⁵⁷¹ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Peace* 268-9, 313-315: τὸ δεῖνα γάρ, | ἀπόλωλ’ Ἀθηναίοισιν ἀλετρίβανος, | ὁ βυρσοπώλης, ὃς ἐκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα. | ... | εὐλαβεῖσθέ νυν ἐκείνον τὸν κάτωθεν Κέρβερον, | μὴ παφλάζων καὶ κεκραγώς, ὥσπερ ἦνικ’ ἐνθάδ’ ἦν, | ἐμποδὼν ἡμῖν γένηται τὴν θεὸν μὴ ἔλκύσαι.

⁵⁷² At *Knights* 75 Kleon is said to ἐφορᾷ ... πάντα (oversee everything); similarly Eupolis F 316 K. – A. addresses Athens as ὦ καλλίστη πόλι πασῶν, ὅσας Κλέων ἐφορᾷ (fairest city of all that Kleon oversees).

⁵⁷³ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 164-167: τούτων ἀπάντων αὐτὸς ἀρχέλας ἔσει, | καὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῶν λιμένων καὶ τῆς Πυκνός· | βουλὴν πατήσεις καὶ στρατηγοὺς κλαστάσεις, | δήσεις, φυλάξεις, ἐν πρυτανείῳ λαικάσει.

uncontrolled, sexuality. Although this uncontrolled deviant sexuality applies to both Perikles and Kleon, it does so quite differently in each case: Perikles is presented as a hyper heterosexual, albeit one who fails to meet gender norms by allowing Aspasia to instruct him in rhetoric and to control his political decisions,⁵⁷⁴ while Kleon is presented more as participant in pederasty or a male prostitute (the line between these two states being thin but critical for Athenian citizens). Thus Kleon is a “super-lech”⁵⁷⁵ with the asshole of a camel⁵⁷⁶ who shamelessly eats loose shit,⁵⁷⁷ and Paphlagon’s “arsehole’s smack dab over Buggerland.”⁵⁷⁸ I shall treat the theme of homoerotic relationships among Athenian politicians in more detail shortly,⁵⁷⁹ but for now it will suffice to note that the theme will recur frequently in our remaining ‘demagogue’ depictions. Turning to the theme of rhetorical power, Kleon is associated in comedy with the sort of violent persuasiveness that is his calling card in Thucydides: he roars like the Kykloboros,⁵⁸⁰ he is the ‘scream champion’,⁵⁸¹ “he had the voice of a death dealing torrent,”⁵⁸² a scholion even suggests that the name Paphlagon comes from the verb παφλάζω, ‘to bluster’.⁵⁸³ The persuasive effect of this forceful speech is apparent in the hold that Kleon or his Paphlagonian alter ego are said to have over the *dēmos*. Just as Perikles’ abnormality in his large head was used to symbolize his tyrannical pretensions, the descriptions of the

⁵⁷⁴ See above pp. 200-201.

⁵⁷⁵ Aristoph. *Ach.* 664: λακαταπύγων.

⁵⁷⁶ Aristoph. *Wasps* 1035, *Peace* 758: πρωκτὸν δὲ καμήλου.

⁵⁷⁷ Aristoph. *Peace* 49: ἀναιδέως τὴν σπατὺλιν ἐσθίει.

⁵⁷⁸ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 78: ὁ πρωκτός ἐστιν αὐτόχρημ’ ἐν Χάοσιν.

⁵⁷⁹ See n. 624 below.

⁵⁸⁰ Aristoph. *Ach.* 381, *Kn.* 137. The scholia to *Knights* 137 explain the reference, e.g., ΣAristoph. *Kn.* 137c: ποταμὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς χειμάρρους ὁ Κυκλωβόρος. τὴν κακοφωνίαν οὖν τοῦ Κλέωνος εἵκασε τῷ ἥχῳ τοῦ ποταμοῦ (The Kykloboros is a torrential river in Attica, so he likens Kleon’s cacophony to the noise of the river).

⁵⁸¹ Aristoph. *Wasps* 596: κεκραξιδάμας.

⁵⁸² Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 1034, *Peace* 757: φωνὴν δ’ εἶχεν χαράδρας ὄλεθρον τετοκυίας.

⁵⁸³ Eupolis F 192.135-6 K. – A.; see n. 596 below.

dangerous power of Kleon's speech may indicate a physical abnormality of his own: his voice. Besides a death dealing torrent such as the Kykloboros, his voice is also described as that of a 'scalded pig',⁵⁸⁴ and Kleon is frequently represented by dog-like characters including Cerberus.⁵⁸⁵

There are a number of respects in which the depiction of Kleon in Old Comedy departs from that of Perikles: specifically, his affinity for slander and litigation, his alleged vocational connections, his foreignness, and his status as a slave. As was the case with financial malfeasance, some of the passages associating Kleon with abuse and litigiousness have already been discussed above, but there are a great many examples. Kleon hauls Aristophanes before the council, slanders him, and tongue-lashes him with lies;⁵⁸⁶ he is the patron saint of the chorus of waspish jurors in the *Wasps*;⁵⁸⁷ when a prosecutor is needed for the dog trial in the *Wasps*, the pup for the job just happens to be from Kleon's deme of Kydathenaion;⁵⁸⁸ he is "a bigmouth and a frame-up artist and an agitator and a troublemaker";⁵⁸⁹ when Dionysus has wronged several denizens of the underworld in the *Frogs*, they turn to Kleon as their champion, proclaiming, "I'm off to get Kleon; he'll summons this guy today and wind the stuffing out of him!"⁵⁹⁰ The profession, foreignness, and slave status of Kleon all form a single nexus, and are particularly important for modern theories about Athenian 'demagogues'. The *Knights* is again the main source of our information; indeed, the only references to Kleon as foreign

⁵⁸⁴ Aristoph. *Wasps* 36: ἔχουσα φωνὴν ἐμπεπρημένης ὕος.

⁵⁸⁵ Cf. Platon F 236 K. – A., *Peace* 313, and the scene of the 'Dog of Kydathenaion' at *Wasps* 894-930.

⁵⁸⁶ Aristoph. *Ach.* 379-381: εἰσελκύσας γάρ μ' εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον | διέβαλλε καὶ ψευδῇ κατεγλώττιζέ μου...

⁵⁸⁷ Cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 197, 240-244, 408-414, 596-597.

⁵⁸⁸ Aristoph. *Wasps* 894-930.

⁵⁸⁹ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Peace* 653-654: λάλος καὶ συκοφάντης | καὶ κύκηθρον καὶ τάρακτρον...

⁵⁹⁰ Trans. Henderson vol. 4. Aristoph. *Frogs* 577-578: ἀλλ' εἴμ' ἐπὶ τὸν Κλέων', ὃς αὐτοῦ τήμερον | ἐκπηνιέται ταῦτα προσκαλούμενος.

or a slave are not even really directed at Kleon, but at Paphlagon.⁵⁹¹ The occupation of Paphlagon in the *Knights*, however, or at least his association with leather, stretches beyond that play: in *Acharnians* Aristophanes announces his intention “to cut [Kleon] up as shoe leather for the Knights,”⁵⁹² the dragon with the voice of a scalded pig in *Wasps* 31-41 is said to “reek horribly of rotten hides,”⁵⁹³ Kleon is twice referred to only as βυρσοπώλης (leather seller) in the *Peace*,⁵⁹⁴ and an *adespota* fragment refers to Kleon as standing behind the incomprehensible but leather-related epithet βυρσόκαππον.⁵⁹⁵ It is worth mentioning that this last instance of unknown provenience is the only attachment of leather or leather-working to Kleon outside of Aristophanes.⁵⁹⁶

Modern commentators have accepted at more-or-less face value the narrative from the *Knights* that Athens was led by a series of πωληταί (*pōlētai*),⁵⁹⁷ and indeed have used it to underpin the theory of a shift in the social class of leadership at Athens after Perikles. While such a shift may well have been taking place, we should take care in placing too much weight on the evidence of a burlesque of Athenian politics in the garb of household slaves, and there are some counter-indications to a reading of Kleon as lower class elsewhere within Aristophanes’ oeuvre. For instance, at *Knights* 985-996,

⁵⁹¹ If a variant reading at *Wasps* 1221 is accepted Kleon would also be referred to as a foreigner there, as Henderson vol. 2, 379 n. 81 explains: “With the variant [Ἀκέστορος for Ἀκέστορος] read ‘and another foreigner next to you, Acestor’s son’ (not mentioned elsewhere), implying that Cleon is a foreigner, as in *Knights*.” By the primary reading, Acestor, “a tragic dramatist ridiculed in comedy as a parasite with the nickname ‘Sacac’ (implying Asian ancestry)” (Henderson vol. 2) would be the ‘first’ foreigner.

⁵⁹² Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Ach.* 299-302: μεμίσσηκά σε Κλέωνος ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὃν ἐ- | γὼ τεμῶ τοῖσιν ἱπεῦσι καττόματα.

⁵⁹³ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 38: ὄζει κάκιστον τοῦνύπνιον βύρσης σαπρᾶς.

⁵⁹⁴ Aristoph. *Peace* 269 and 648.

⁵⁹⁵ *Comic Adespota* 297 K. – A.

⁵⁹⁶ An argument could be made for the appearance of this trope in Eupolis’ *Marikas*, where lines 54-58 of F 192 K. – A. refer to “**Scraps**...of hides...cut up...people...glued”; however, the argument would either be circular (there is no mention of Kleon) or, if lines 135-136 (“Kleon <is called> “Paphlagon” <from the verb> “to splutter” [*paphlazein*]”) are adduced, would suggest a direct reference to the *Knights* rather than a separate instance of the leather-working motif.

⁵⁹⁷ To my knowledge no one has yet remarked upon the near-homophony of πωλητής/πολίτης and πώλης/πόλις, which should surely be part of the fun of the parade of ‘sellers’.

although the joke is that Kleon is extremely open to bribery, the frame places him in class with a κιθαριστής (*kitharistēs*) learning the lyre: undoubtedly an upper-class milieu, if not outright aristocratic. Another such situation occurs in *Wasps* 1219-1242, when Bdelykleon runs Philokleon through an imaginary symposium attended by Kleon, among others, who is depicted as quite well versed in symposiastic culture. On the historical side, Kleon's father has been identified with the "Kleainetos of Pandionis who was victorious as choregos for Pandionis in men's dithyramb at the Dionysia in 460/59 (ii.² 2318, line 34)",⁵⁹⁸ and although the evidence of ΣAristoph. *Knights* 44 that Kleon's father owned an *ergasterion* of leather-working slaves may well be correct, it bears mentioning that the scholion incorrectly gives the name of Kleon's father not as Kleainetos but Kleonymos.⁵⁹⁹ Additionally, Jeffrey Henderson notes that Kleon "seems to have been related by marriage to one of Harmodius' descendants."⁶⁰⁰ Very little is known about the other *pōlētai*; the 'hemp-seller' is identified in the scholia as Eukrates, while the 'sheep-seller' is said to be either Lysikles or Kallias. We know very little either way about the heritage of Eukrates or Lysikles, but both names do appear in aristocratic circles in the fifth century: a brother of Nikias named Eukrates marries a sister of Kallias of Pandionis, while a Lysikles was brother to Lysimakhe, the long-tenured priestess of Athena, and thus was a member of the cadet branch of the Eteoboutadai. The name Lysikles also appears in the family of a (H)abronikhos who commanded a *triakonter* in 480 and received votes for ostracism in the 480s.⁶⁰¹ There are of course many men named

⁵⁹⁸ *APF* p. 318.

⁵⁹⁹ ΣAristoph. *Kn.* 44: <βυρσοδέψην>: ἐπειδὴ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Κλεώνυμος ἐργαστήριον | εἶχε δούλων βυρσοδεψῶν.

⁶⁰⁰ Henderson vol. 1, 325 n. 60.

⁶⁰¹ Cf. Davies *APF* #20: "Abironikhos Lysikleous Lamptreus: Commander, and presumably trierarch, of a *triakonter* stationed off Thermopylai in 480 (Hdt. viii. 21), and ambassador to Sparta in 479/8 (Thuc. i. 91. 3). The ostraca that show him to have been a candidate for ostracism in the 480s also give his demotic".

Kallias, but the most likely candidate is the member of the Kerykes and son of Hipponikos active in the period under discussion;⁶⁰² his eupatrid *bona fides* needs no comment.

A final⁶⁰³ aspect of Kleon in comedy that is worth briefly treating is his self-representation as the protector of the Athenian people. This self-representation is, of course, mostly visible through Aristophanes' mockery of it, but it is nevertheless a major and recognizable facet of Aristophanes' Kleon. Paphlagon's constant refrain in his battle with the Sausage-Seller for the affection of Demos⁶⁰⁴ is that he fights on behalf of Demos and keeps him safe; the 'Dog of Kydathenaion' in *Wasps* repeats much the same notion in his prosecution of Labes the cheese-stealing dog: "tell me, who will be able to give you a square deal unless a scrap or two gets thrown to me, your watchdog? ... Under the circumstances you must punish him — as they say, one copse can't support two robbers — so all my barking won't have been for nothing. Otherwise I won't bark next time."⁶⁰⁵ It has been suggested that the nickname of Cerberus for Kleon was either coined by the politician, or was a reference to this very sort of 'guard dog of the *dēmos*' language used by Kleon himself. Kleon is also the protector and patron of the chorus of old jurors in the *Wasps*, just as he is the *prostatēs* of the underworld innkeeper in the *Frogs*. Indeed, even some of Kleon's attacks on Aristophanes are obliquely admitted to have been made not

⁶⁰² Cf. *APF* #7826. Note the possibility raised by Davies that Hipponikos may have increased his already substantial wealth through mining interests; if true, this fact would further connect Kallias to the 'working politicians' of the 420s while simultaneously throwing into question whether a 'working politician' necessarily meant a non-aristocratic one.

⁶⁰³ The following passages referring to Kleon by name have not appeared in our discussion: Aristoph. *Cl.* 549-550, *Wasps* 58-63, *Wasps* 1284-1291, *Comic Adespota* F 461 K. – A., Cratinus F 228 K. – A., Eupolis F 211 K. – A., Eupolis F 331 K. – A., Platon F 115 K. – A.

⁶⁰⁴ Often literally affection, as Paphlagon and the Sausage-Seller appropriate the *erastēs* language of Perikles' funeral oration.

⁶⁰⁵ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 915-916, 927-930: καίτοι τίς ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν δυνήσεται, | ἢν μή τι κάμοι τις προβάλλῃ, τῷ Κυνί; | ... | πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦτον κολάσας — οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε | τρέφειν δύναιτ' ἄν μία λόχμη κλέπτα δύο — | ἵνα μὴ κεκλάγγω διὰ κενῆς ἄλλως ἐγώ· | ἐὰν δὲ μή, τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ κεκλάγγομαι.

because of slanders directed at Kleon, but for “speaking ill of the city in the presence of foreigners.”⁶⁰⁶

By this point the categories into which our demagogue-descriptive passages fall will begin to look familiar. Hyperbolos is most thoroughly mocked for his alleged profession, foreign origin, warmongering, and litigiousness. Where Kleon was accused of being a πώλης of leather, Hyperbolus is associated with lamps. Aristophanes (*Knights* 1314-1315) has a group of personified triremes suggest that “if [Hyperbolos] wants to go sailing, let him launch those trays where he used to display his lamps for sale, and sail off all by himself to hell!”⁶⁰⁷ At *Clouds* 1065-1066 Hyperbolos is “the man from the lamp market [who] has made a vast amount of money by being a rascal,”⁶⁰⁸ and in *Peace* the joke is that Hyperbolos has improved the deliberations of the *dēmos* by lighting their way: “he happens to be a lamp maker. So, whereas previously we groped in the dark at our problems, now we’ll be planning everything by lamplight!”⁶⁰⁹ Cratinus also used the profession itself for a joke, suggesting that Hyperbolos should be extinguished among his lamps.⁶¹⁰ The connected topics of foreignness and slave status are also applied to him: Platon calls him “a nasty foreign person, not yet a free citizen,”⁶¹¹ and jokes that his ostracism suited his character, but not his στιγμαίων (brand-marks applied to slaves);⁶¹² a scholion to Lucian’s *Timon*, meanwhile, notes that “Polyzelos in his *Demo-Tyndareus*,

⁶⁰⁶ Aristoph. *Ach.* 503: ξένων παρόντων τὴν πόλιν κακῶς λέγω.

⁶⁰⁷ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 1314-1315: ἀλλὰ πλείτω χωρὶς αὐτὸς ἐς κόρακας, εἰ βούλεται, | τὰς σκάφας, ἐν αἷς ἐπώλει τοὺς λύχνους, καθελκυσας.

⁶⁰⁸ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Cl.* 1065-1066: Ὑπέρβολος δ’ οὐκ τῶν λύχνων πλεῖν ἢ τάλαντα πολλὰ | εἵληφε διὰ πονηρίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μὰ Δί’ οὐ μάχαιραν.

⁶⁰⁹ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Peace* 690-692: ὅτι τυγχάνει λυχοποιὸς ὢν. πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὖν | ἐψηλαφῶμεν ἐν σκοτῶ τὰ πράγματα, | νυνὶ δ’ ἅπαντα πρὸς λύχνον βουλευόμεν.

⁶¹⁰ Cratinus F 209 K. – A.: Ὑπέρβολον δ’ ἀποσβέσας ἐν τοῖς λύχνοις γράψον.

⁶¹¹ Trans. Storey vol. 3. Platon F 182 K. – A.: A. ὅτι πονηρῶ καὶ ξένῳ | ἐπέλαχες ἀνδρί, οὐδέπω γὰρ ἐλευθέρῳ. | * * * * | B. ἄπερρ’ ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα δὴ φράσω· | Ὑπερβόλῳ βουλῆς γάρ, ἄνδρες, ἐπέλαχον.

⁶¹² Platon F 203 K. – A.: καίτοι πέπραγε τῶν τρόπων μὲν ἄξια, | αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν στιγμαίων ἀνάξια· | οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων εἶνεκ’ ὄστραχ’ εὐρέθη.

joking at [Hyperbolos'] foreign nature, says that he is a Phrygian. Platon the comic poet in *Hyperbolos* says that he is 'a Lydian, of the race of Midas,' and others say otherwise."⁶¹³ Platon F 183 K. – A. ("O dear Fates, the man just couldn't speak Attic Greek") also mocks Hyperbolos' speech,⁶¹⁴ but Stephen Colvin has argued that "[i]t seems more likely that Hyperbolus' substandard is a 'low urban' rather than a rural variety of Attic: perhaps the nascent 'international' Attic of the city."⁶¹⁵ Note, however, that Aristophanes (*Clouds* 876) characterizes Hyperbolos as having successfully learned the sophistic speaking techniques of the Thinkery at the price of a talent.⁶¹⁶ Such an anecdote runs directly counter to characterizations of Hyperbolos as a poor lamp-maker, or a slave, or as rhetorically inept.

Like Kleon and Perikles before him, Hyperbolos is also depicted as a warmonger, or at the least as an obstacle to peace: at *Knights* 1303-1304 he requisitions one hundred triremes for an expedition against Carthage,⁶¹⁷ and the repeated mentions of him in *Peace* suggest that his presence and the return of the goddess Peace are mutually exclusive.⁶¹⁸ Also like Kleon Hyperbolos is frequently associated with lawsuits, jurors, and lies: in the *Acharnians* the chorus praises Dikaiopolis' peace-treaty as allowing him to avoid Hyperbolos 'infecting' him with lawsuits,⁶¹⁹ the rejuvenated Demos at the end of *Knights* promises to throw a speaker who threatens to withhold grain unless a conviction is

⁶¹³ Trans. Storey vol. 3. Platon F 185 K. – A.: Πολύζηλος δὲ ἐν Δημοτυνδάρει Φρύγα αὐτὸν εἶναί φησιν εἰς τὸ βάρβαρον σκώπτων. Πλάτων δὲ ὁ κωμικὸς ἐν Ὑπερβόλῳ Λυδὸν αὐτὸν φησιν εἶναι Μίδα γένος, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλως.

⁶¹⁴ Trans Storey vol. 3. Platon F 183 K. – A.: ὁ δ' οὐ γὰρ ἡττίκιζεν, ὦ Μοῖραι φίλαι, | ἀλλ' ὅποτε μὲν χρεῖη 'δητῶμην' λέγειν, | ἔφασκε 'δητῶμην', ὅποτε δ' εἰπεῖν δεοί | 'ὀλίγον', 'ὀλίον' ἔλεγεν.

⁶¹⁵ Colvin 2000, 290.

⁶¹⁶ Aristoph. *Cl.* 876: καίτοι ταλάντου τοῦτ' ἔμαθεν Ὑπέρβολος.

⁶¹⁷ Aristoph. *Kn.* 1303-1304: φασὶν αἰτεῖσθαι τιν' ἡμῶν ἑκατὸν εἰς Καρχηδόνα, | ἄνδρα μοχθηρὸν πολίτην, ὁξύνην Ὑπέρβολον.

⁶¹⁸ Aristoph. *Peace* 918-921, 1316-1328.

⁶¹⁹ Aristoph. *Ach.* 846-847: κοῦ ξυντυχὼν σ' Ὑπέρβολος | δικῶν ἀναπλήσει.

delivered “into the death pit with Hyperbolos hung around his throat”;⁶²⁰ Bdelykleon promises Philokleon that, now that he is no longer participating in jury service, “no longer will Hyperbolos make a fool of you with his lies”;⁶²¹ in the underworld of the *Frogs*, Hyperbolos is twin *prostatēs* to Kleon as both are called upon to secure legal punishments for Dionysus.⁶²² Hyperbolos was, however, mocked in at least one way not visible in the comedians’ treatment of Perikles and Kleon: at least Cratinus and perhaps also Eupolis commented upon Hyperbolos’ youth when he entered politics.⁶²³ There is one further fragment that may provide insight into the comic treatment of Hyperbolos, a papyrus fragment of Eupolis’ *Demes*; the identification of the mocked figure as Hyperbolos, however, is disputed, and as several other politicians including Alkibiades are alternative possibilities for the κωμωδούμενος (*kōmōdoumenos* – person mocked in comedy), I shall leave that fragment out of our consideration here.⁶²⁴

⁶²⁰ Trans. Henderson vol. 1. Aristoph. *Kn.* 1358-1363: Αλ. εἴαν τις εἴπῃ βομολόχος ξυνήγορος, | “οὐκ ἔστιν ὑμῖν τοῖς δικασταῖς ἄλφιστα, | εἰ μὴ καταγνώσεσθε ταύτην τὴν δίκην,” | τοῦτον τί δράσεις, εἰπέ, τὸν ξυνήγορον; | Δημ. ἄρας μετέωρον εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλῶ, | ἐκ τοῦ λάρυγγος ἐκκρεμάσας Ὑπέρβολον.

⁶²¹ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 1007: κοῦκ ἐγχανεῖται σ’ ἐξαπατῶν Ὑπέρβολος.

⁶²² Aristoph. *Frogs* 568-578.

⁶²³ The same scholion to Lucian mentioned above at pp. 211-212 claims that “Cratinus in *Seasons* mentions that [Hyperbolos] came to speak at the *bema* at an unusually early age, also Aristophanes in *Wasps* and Eupolis in *Cities*” (Κρατίνος δὲ ἐν Ὠραῖς ὡς παρελθόντος νέου τῷ βήματι μέμνηται καὶ παρ’ ἡλικίαν καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης Σφηξὶ καὶ Εὐπολὶς Πόλεσι). The difficulty with accepting this scholion at face value is that Aristophanes mentions Hyperbolos only once in the *Knights* (cf. p. 211 and n. 607 above), and makes no comment there on his age.

⁶²⁴ In said fragment, the *kōmōdoumenos* is mocked on several fronts: first, the (un)worthiness of the figure in question to address the people, based upon a denial of his membership in a phratry, the accusation that his current Attic speech covers another, shameful sort of speech, and the allegation of sexual impropriety (that his friends, perhaps the members of his *hetaireia*, are *apragmōn* male prostitutes and he himself belongs in a brothel); second comes a somewhat unclear comment about creeping secretly upon the generalships and comic poets; the final, and most specific, portion of the fragment is a reference to a time when the subject threatened to put into the stocks by force the generals who were not permitting the Athenians to take the field at Mantinea. Davidson 1998, 250-277, discusses at length the practice of shutting down a speaker by attacking him on the basis of improper citizenship (*e.g.*, the issues here with phratries and possibly foreign speech) and prostitution: “The threat of conspiracy, then, must also be added to the list of dangers presented by the pleasures of the flesh. Men are bonded together in banquets and symposia. This is where political alliances are formed, creating factions to work against the state.... Politicians are often referred to in Athenian literature as if they were all *katapugones* and *pornoi*.... Sex and gender are being used to caricature political intimacies. Politicians are ‘getting in bed together’, forming dangerous collusions. There is something fundamentally undemocratic about politicians having

Speaking of Alkibiades, his characterization is impressively dominated by sexual incontinence, an aspect of abuse that had been entirely missing with Hyperbolos.

Alkibiades appears in ten passages or fragments of Old Comedy, and in six his sexuality is targeted. The mockery seems to combine Perikles' hyper-heterosexuality and Kleon's pederasty/male prostitution: in Aristophanes he is εὐρύπρωκτος⁶²⁵ (wide-assed) and Κυσολάκων (a pederast),⁶²⁶ while Eupolis on several occasions alludes (in not-entirely-comprehensible fragments) to Alkibiades' heterosexual exploits⁶²⁷ and adultery,⁶²⁸ charges repeated by Pherecrates, who refers to Alkibiades as “a man for all women though not yet a man,”⁶²⁹ and a comic *adespota* calls him “pretty boy Alkibiades whom Sparta lusts to have as her adulterous lover.”⁶³⁰ With this sexual profligacy goes his association with the aristocratic lifestyle of excess and excellence, and especially the symposium. Such prodigiousness is reflected in the opinions of Euripides and Aeschylus in the *Frogs*: Euripides describes Alkibiades with the language of self-interest,⁶³¹ while

friends.... We should not be too keen to draw a distinction, then, between *hetaireiai*, the dining societies and political clubs that undermined the fair workings of democracy through assistance in law-suits, and *hetairesis*, sexual companionship.... What is happening is a problematization of political friendship in sexual terms.” While the abuse related to the ἀπραγμόνων πόρνων, κινητήρι[ον, ἐταιρίας, sneaking around generalships and comic poets, and Mantinea all fit better with Alkibiades than any other known politician of the time, such an identification would require assuming that the comment about phratry is a total comic fiction, or that some question about Alkibiades' personal pedigree, entirely unknown to us, existed. For comprehensive discussion of the passage and of the possibilities for the *kōmōdoumenos*, see Storey 2003, 149-160, Telò 2007, 397-401. References to Hyperbolos in Old Comedy not discussed here: Aristoph. *Cl.* 551-559, *Thes.* 839-845, Leucon F 1 K. – A..

⁶²⁵ Aristoph. *Ach.* 716: εὐρύπρωκτος καὶ λάλος χὼ Κλεινίου.

⁶²⁶ Aristophanes F 358 K. – A.: Κυσολάκων ὁ Κλεινίου

⁶²⁷ Eupolis F 385 K. – A.: **ΑΛΚΙΒ.** μισῶ λακωνίζειν, ταγηνίζειν δὲ κἂν πριαίμην. | **B.** πολλὰς δ' .. οἶμαι νῦν βεβηῆσθαι

⁶²⁸ Eupolis F 171 K. – A.: **A.** Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξίτω. **B.** τί ληρεῖς; | οὐκ οἶκαδ' ἐλθὼν τὴν σεαυτοῦ γυμνάσεις δάμαρτα;

⁶²⁹ Trans. Storey vol. 2. Pherecrates F 164 K. – A.: οὐκ ὦν ἀνὴρ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὥς δοκεῖ, | ἀνὴρ ἀπασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν ἐστι νῦν.

⁶³⁰ Trans. Storey vol. 3 (slightly modified). *Comic Adespota* 123 K. – A.: Ἀλκιβιάδην τὸν ἀβρόν, ὃ γῆ καὶ θεοί, | ὃν ἡ Λακεδαίμων μοιχὸν ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν.

⁶³¹ Aristoph. *Frogs* 1427-1429: μισῶ πολίτην, ὅστις ὠφελεῖν πάτραν | βραδὺς πέφανται, μεγάλα δὲ βλάπτειν ταχύς, | καὶ πόριμον αὐτῷ, τῇ πόλει δ' ἀμήχανον.

Aeschylus more menacingly marshals terminology of tyranny.⁶³² Both of these aspects were prominent in comic treatments of Perikles and Kleon, but not (to our knowledge) of Hyperbolos. In the somewhat-less-threatening realm of aristocratic conviviality, Eupolis F 385 K. – A. (which includes one of the already mentioned sexual references) has Alkibiades claim to invent early morning drinking as well as vomiting mid-party.⁶³³

At Aristophanes F 205 Henderson, an interlocutor's negative response to an Alkibiadean piece of rhetoric elicits the complaint, "why do you insinuate against and slander gentlemen for cultivating fine-and-dandyhood [καλοκαγαθεῖν]?"⁶³⁴ This passage also brings out a close similarity in the treatment of Alkibiades and Hyperbolos with respect to rhetoric. Here *kalokagathia* is associated with a learned, sophistic style of speaking and verbiage, a style that Alkibiades has come to represent despite his well-known lisp, parodied at *Wasps* 42-45 and called τραυλίσας. Hyperbolos, as we have seen, was also accused of speaking Attic poorly or unusually, and in the *Clouds* was related by Socrates as a success story in sophistic training and thus as a model for Pheidippides. What is more, right before mentioning Hyperbolos Socrates refers to Pheidippides' own speech defect, which only ten lines earlier Strepsiades had described with the term τραυλίσαντι.⁶³⁵ Pheidippides, of course, is characterized in the *Clouds* as having aristocratic lineage and pursuits similar to Alkibiades. We seem to have stumbled upon a nexus of comic *kalokagathia*, speech defects, and sophistic training, and it is particularly

⁶³² Aristoph. *Frogs* 1430-1432: οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν· | μάλιστα μὲν λέοντα μὴ 'ν πόλει τρέφειν· (1431b) | ἦν δ' ἐκτραφῆ τις, τοῖς τρόποις ὑπηρετεῖν.

⁶³³ Eupolis F 385 K. – A.: A. δὲ δὲ πρῶτος ἐξεῦρεν τὸ πρῶτον πίνειν; | B. πολλήν γε λακκοπρωκτίαν ἡμῖν ἐπίστασ' εὐρών. | A. εἶεν. τίς εἶπεν ἁμίδα παῖ' πρῶτος μεταξὺ πίνων; | B. Παλαμηδικόν γε τοῦτο τοῦξεύρημα καὶ σοφόν σου.

⁶³⁴ Trans. Henderson vol. 5. Aristophanes F 205 Henderson: B. Παρ' Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦτο τὰποβύσεται. | A. Τί ὑποτεκμαίρει καὶ κακῶς ἄνδρας λέγεις | καλοκαγαθεῖν ἀσκοῦντας;

⁶³⁵ Aristoph. *Cl.* 861-862...872-873: Στ. καγὼ τοί ποτε, | οἶδ', ἐξέτει σοι τραυλίσαντι πιθόμενος· | ... | Σω. ἰδοὺ κρέμαι' ὥς ἡλίθιον ἐφθέξατο | καὶ τοῖσι χεῖλεσιν διερρηγκόσιν.

interesting that Hyperbolos would be included in that discussion. Rhetoric is also, of course, connected to litigiousness, and Alkibiades' first mention, in the *Acharnians*, presents him as the designated ζυνήγορος (*sunēgoros* - prosecutor) for the youth of Athens. In Aristophanes F 205, our passage for verbiage and *kalokagathia*, he is again mentioned in the context of *sunēgoroi* and *rhētores*.

Let us turn to Androkles, the next politician on our list. Androkles is most famous for being the politician assassinated by the *hetaireiai* in the lead-up to the oligarchic coup of 411 "on account of his *dēmagōgia*".⁶³⁶ He is mentioned by the authors of Old Comedy eight times, mostly in contexts familiar from our previous 'demagogues' but with some new twists. Thus at Aristophanes *Wasps* 1186-1187, Bdelykleon suggests that in order to fit in at symposia, Philokleon should tell impressive stories, "such as how you went on an official embassy with Androkles and Kleisthenes."⁶³⁷ This reference seems innocuous on its face, and it may be, but Kleisthenes certainly does not come off well in Aristophanes in general, and Alan Sommerstein has observed that the ambassador was statistically the position most vulnerable to satire in all comedy, perhaps because they seemed to be well paid to carry out a job that was relatively safe and easy.⁶³⁸ A scholion to these lines from

⁶³⁶ On this passage in detail see pp. 22-25 above.

⁶³⁷ Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 1186-1187: Φι. ποίους τινὰς δὲ χρὴ λέγειν; Βδ. μεγαλοπρεπεῖς, | ὥς ζυνεθεώρεις Ἀνδροκλεῖ καὶ Κλεισθένει.

⁶³⁸ Sommerstein 1996a, 328 (italics his): "A more surprising finding is that the most satirizable position (leaving aside that of *proboulos*, which only existed for two years) was not that of general or *rhetor* but that of ambassador: of thirty-six known ambassadors of the Peloponnesian War period, twenty-two or 61% are mentioned in comedy. To some extent this disproportion is due to a passage in the *Acharnians* (594-617) which expresses resentment at those who allegedly avoid the dangers of military service by getting themselves elected to serve on safe and well-paid embassies, and names or clearly identifies no less than eight individuals; but then this passage itself would hardly have been written unless there was some public feeling against ambassadors as such. What, after all, did an ambassador *do*? A general led armies or fleets, risked his own life, and bore responsibility for the lives of those under him and often for the future of the entire *polis*. A *rhetor* staked his reputation on the advice he gave to Assembly meetings, and if that advice led to bad results prosecution and personal ruin were not unlikely consequences. An ambassador will have seemed to many little but a glorified messenger-boy, handsomely paid at public expense for doing what any

the *Wasps* mentions that Cratinus called Androkles a ἡταιρηκότα, a man who associates with *hetairai*;⁶³⁹ it also notes that Teleclides and Ecphantides call Androkles a cut-purse. Accusations of theft and sexual profligacy are nothing new, nor is an *adespota* fragment (278) that refers to Androkles as being ἀπ’ αἰγείρων (‘from the poplars’), an apparent reference to the location where the sycophants hung their notices and thus to Androkles’ litigiousness.⁶⁴⁰ Another *adespota* fragment (951) jokes that “in times of dissension even Androkles can take command,”⁶⁴¹ a denigration of military capability that may find a parallel in the unwillingness of the personified triremes of *Knights* 1300-1315 to accept Hyperbolos as their commander.

Cratinus F 281 K. – A. is a bit inscrutable, mentioning an Ἀνδροκολωνοκλῆς; Storey comments that “[t]he lexicographer tells us that Cratinus uses this compound to mean ‘stupid Androcles,’ but it is not immediately obvious why Colonus, a village just outside Athens, should denote stupidity.”⁶⁴² Cratinus F 223 K. – A. is quite clear, but gives a new direction to the familiar trope of politician-as-slave: “[t]hen you will come to the Sabae and the Sidonians and the Erempi, and to the City of Slaves, nasty nouveaux riches, disgusting men, like Androkles, Dionysokourones.”⁶⁴³ Here πόλιν δούλων is essentially glossed, and it is revealed that these men are not literal slaves but

Tom, Dick or Harry could do as well. It may be significant that several characters in contemporary Euripidean tragedies express a strong hostility to the glorified messenger-boy of heroic saga, the herald.”

⁶³⁹ Perhaps we should think here too of the connections between *hetairai*, male prostitution, and *hetaireiai* discussed above with reference to Davidson 1998 (see n. 624 above).

⁶⁴⁰ From Hesychius α 5716: ἀπ’ αἰγείρων· “Ἀνδροκλέα τὸν ἀπ’ αἰγείρων” ἀντὶ τοῦ συκοφάντην, ἐπειδὴ [δὲ] ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ αἰγείρου τὰ πινάκια ἐξήπτον, τοιούτων ἐξήρτων, οἱ ἔσχατοι.

⁶⁴¹ Trans. Storey vol. 3. *Comic Adespota* 951 K. – A.: Ἐν δὲ διχοστασίῃ καὶ Ἀνδροκλέης πολεμαρχεῖ.

⁶⁴² Storey vol. 1, p. 399 n. 1. Perhaps the *kolōnos* is simply a ‘hill’ or ‘mound’, however, rather than a reference to a particular place; an English rendering might thus be ‘Andro-clod-es’.

⁶⁴³ Trans. Storey vol. 1. Cratinus F 223 K. – A.: εἴτα Σάκας ἀφικνεῖ καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἐρεμβούς, ἔς | τε πόλιν δούλων, ἀνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονήρων, | αἰσχυρῶν, Ἀνδροκλέων, Διονυσοκουρώνων.

νεοπλουτοπονήρων, newly wealthy *ponēroi*,⁶⁴⁴ shameful creatures (αἰσχρῶν). This comic neologism is another of the pieces of evidence that have been heavily leaned upon to produce the theory of a new social class of politicians to which the poets of Old Comedy objected. It seems to me to be dangerous to draw such a generalizing conclusion from a fragment given our lack of knowledge about important pieces of context such as the speaker; for example, this very fragment is in dactylic hexameter, more suited to epic or tragedy than to comedy, which should raise serious questions about who was using the term νεοπλουτοπονήρων, how, and for what purpose.

Our next ‘demagogue’, Peisander, presents an interesting case precisely because his identification as a demagogue is so tenuous in the ancient sources: he receives the appellation only once, in a scholion to Aeschines.⁶⁴⁵ And yet, his depiction in comedy seems to differ very little from the other figures whom we have examined. His defining characteristic is supposedly cowardice, which is mocked at *Birds* 1553-1558,⁶⁴⁶ Eupolis F 35 K. – A.,⁶⁴⁷ and Phrynichus F 21 K. – A.,⁶⁴⁸ but he appears in the *Peace* as another of the warmongering opponents to returning the eponymous goddess of the play,⁶⁴⁹ and similarly in *Lysistrata* he is accused of constantly stirring up trouble to cover his theft

⁶⁴⁴ This term, which appears with some frequency in passages discussed to this point, can have social or moral connotations, or occasionally a combination of both.

⁶⁴⁵ ΣAeschin. 2.176. See also Table 2.

⁶⁴⁶ Aristoph. *Birds* 1553-1558: πρὸς δὲ τοῖς Σκιάποσιν λί- | μνη τις ἔστ’, ἄλουτος οὐ̐ | ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης· | ἔνθα καὶ Πείσανδρος ἦλθε | δεόμενος ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν ἢ | ζῶντ’ ἐκεῖνον προὔλιπε.

⁶⁴⁷ Eupolis F 35 K. – A.: Πείσανδρος εἰς Πακτωλὸν ἐστρατεύετο, | κἀνταῦθα τῆς στρατιᾶς κάκιστος ἦν ἀνὴρ.

⁶⁴⁸ Phrynichus F 21 K. – A.: A. μεγάλους πιθήκους οἶδ’ ἐτέρους τινὰς λέγειν, | Λυκέαν, Τελέαν, Πείσανδρον, Ἐξηκεστίδην. | B. ἀνωμάλους εἶπας πιθήκους ... | ὁ μὲν γε δειλός, ὁ δὲ κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ νόθος....

⁶⁴⁹ Aristoph. *Peace* 390-399: †μὴ γένη παλίγκοτος | ἀντιβολοῦσιν ἡμῖν,† | ὥστε τήνδε μὴ λαβεῖν· | ἀλλὰ χάρις’, ὦ φίλαν- | θρωπότατε καὶ μεγαλο- | δωρότατε δαιμόνων, | εἴ τι Πείσανδρου βδελύττει τοὺς λόφους καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς, | καὶ σε θυσίαισιν ἱε- | ραῖσι προσόδοις τε μεγά- | λαισι διὰ παντός, ὦ | δέσποτ’, ἀγαλοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀεὶ. (Don’t be so hostile to our entreaties as to prevent our getting her; but be gracious, most philanthropic of divinities and most bountiful, if you feel any loathing for Peisander’s crests and brows, and we will always, Lord, pay you homage continually with holy sacrifices and great processions. Trans. Henderson vol. 2.)

while in office.⁶⁵⁰ According to an *adespota* fragment, unnamed comic poets attacked Peisander for gluttony,⁶⁵¹ and Eupolis F 99.1-3 K. – A. indicates gluttony, greed, and sexual incontinence.⁶⁵²

It seems fair to say that, from an Old Comic point of view at least, Peisander was a run of the mill ‘demagogue’ for much of the 420s and 410s, and as some support for this view we can adduce Andocides *On the Mysteries* 27 and 43, where Peisander is shown zealously defending the *dēmos* in the investigation about the profanation of the mysteries and desecration of the herms. That he is seldom labeled a *dēmagōgos* in subsequent ancient literature is no doubt a result of the end of his political career at Athens, and should serve as a caution for us against assuming that an Athenian politician was not contemporaneously perceived as a ‘demagogue’ solely on the basis of that term’s relative absence from descriptions of the politician. In the case of Peisander, after Thucydides recorded that “[t]he man who moved this resolution [creating the 400] was Peisander, who was throughout the chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy”⁶⁵³ and indeed mentioned Peisander exclusively in the context of the oligarchic conspiracy and coup, it became nearly impossible to depict him as a democratic politician. Thus the *New Pauly* article on Peisander has gotten matters quite backwards when it claims that “[a]fter the failure of the oligarchs [Peisander] fled to the Spartans in Decelea [and] subsequently became a frequent target of mockery in comedy (Aristoph. *Lys.* 490f.) and his ‘cowardice’ became proverbial (Suda s.v. Πεισάνδρου

⁶⁵⁰ Aristoph. *Lys.* 489-492: Πρ. διὰ τὰργύριον πολεμοῦμεν γάρ; Λυ. καὶ τᾶλλα γε πάντ’ ἐκυκλήθη. | ἵνα γὰρ Πείσανδρος ἔχοι κλέπτειν χοῖ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπέχοντες | αἰεὶ τινα κορκορυγὴν ἐκύκων.

⁶⁵¹ *Comic Adespota* 119 K. – A.: Ἀρχίλοχος δ’ ἐν Τετραμέτροις Χαρίλαν εἰς τὰ ὅμοια διαβέβληκεν (fr. 79 B), ὡς οἱ κωμωδιοποιοὶ Κλεώνυμον καὶ Πείσανδρον.

⁶⁵² Eupolis F 99.1-3 K. – A.: καὶ δὴ δὲ Πείσανδρ[ο]ν διε- | στράφθαι χθὲς ἀριστῶντά φα | σ’, ἐπεὶ ξένον τιν’ ὄντ’ ἄσι- | τον οὐκ ἔφασκε θρέψειν.

⁶⁵³ Trans. *Landmark*. Thuc. 8.68.1: ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς προθυμώτατα ζυγκαταλύσας τὸν δῆμον...

δειλότερος, ‘more cowardly than P.’).” Our evidence suggests that Peisander was only the target of mockery in comedy *before* the oligarchic coup, and that the cowardice for which he was a byword had nothing to do with his flight to Dekeleia and everything to do with somewhat generic abuse applied to him during his time as a *dēmagōgos*.

Kleophon returns us to the more traditional group of ‘demagogues’, and his treatment in Old Comedy matches the patterns that we have established to this point. He is mocked on three occasions for an alleged foreign origin: twice for ‘Thracian’ speech⁶⁵⁴ and once for more generic foreignness.⁶⁵⁵ Two of these passages, both from Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, also associate Kleophon with litigiousness (674-685) and with warmongering (1528-1533). A scholion to the first of these passages refers to Kleophon as ‘the lyre-maker’ (Κλεοφῶν ὁ λυροποιός), a possible instance of comic abuse by marketplace profession as we saw for Kleon and Hyperbolos, although this time without the -πώλης compound to (a) focus attention on commerce and (b) pun with citizenship. Fragments from Platon’s *Kleophon* that may well describe the eponymous politician characterize him as “a most thieving fellow”⁶⁵⁶ and indicate sexual incontinence during his youth.⁶⁵⁷ Finally, at *Thesmophoriazousai* 801-805⁶⁵⁸ and *Frogs* 1500-1514⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁴ Aristoph. *Frogs* 674-685: Μοῦσα, χορῶν ἱερῶν ἐπίβηθι καὶ | ἔλθ’ ἐπὶ τέρψιν αἰοιδᾶς ἐμᾶς, | τὸν πολὺν ὀψομένη λαῶν ὄχλον, οὗ σοφαί | μυρία κάθηνται | φιλοτιμότεραι Κλεοφῶντος, ἐφ’ οὗ | δὴ χεῖλεσιν ἀμφιβάλλεις | δεινὸν ἐπιβρέμεται | Θρηκία χελιδὼν | ἐπὶ βάρβαρον ἐζομένη πέταλον, τρύ- | ζει δ’ ἐπὶ κλαυτὸν ἀηδόνιον | νόμον, ὡς ἀπολεῖται, | καὶ ἴσαι γένωνται. (Embark, Muse, on the sacred dance, and come to inspire joy in my song, beholding the great multitude of people, where thousands of wits are in session more high-reaching than Kleophon, on whose bilingual lips some Thracian swallow roars terribly, perched on an alien petal, and bellows the nightingale’s weepy song, that he’s done for, even if the jury’s hung. Trans. Henderson vol. 4.) Platon F 61 K. – A.: Πλάτων ἐν Κλεοφῶντι δρᾶματι βαρβαρίζουσιν πρὸς αὐτὸν πεποίηκε τὴν μητέρα. καὶ αὐτὴ δὲ Θρᾶσσα ἐλέγετο. (Platon in his play *Kleophon* depicts his mother talking to him in a foreign tongue. She was said to be a Thracian. Trans. Storey vol. 3.)

⁶⁵⁵ Aristoph. *Frogs* 1532-1533: ἀργαλέων τ’ ἐν ὅπλοις ξυνόδων. Κλεοφῶν δὲ μαχέσθω | καὶ ἄλλος ὁ βουλόμενος τούτων πατρίοις ἐν ἀρούραις. (Let Kleophon do the fighting, and any of those others who wants to fight on his own native soil! Trans. Henderson vol. 4.)

⁶⁵⁶ Platon F 58 K. – A.: “Ἴν’ ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἀνδρὸς ἀρπαγιστάτου.

⁶⁵⁷ Platon F 60 K. – A.: ἐψάθαλλε λεῖος ὢν.

Kleophon is more generally abused as a ‘bad person’: in *Thesmophoriazousai* he “is of course worse in every way than Salabakkho,” a well-known courtesan, and in the *Frogs* Pluto tasks Aeschylus with bringing to Kleophon the message that he should report directly to the underworld. The former passage may be meant to allude to sexual incontinence on Kleophon’s part by the comparison specifically with a *hetaira*, but if so it is a rather subtle jibe compared to many in Old Comedy.

Let us recapitulate what we have seen in our consideration of Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Alkibiades, Androkles, Peisander, and Kleophon. Although each politician ends up as a somewhat distinct character in his representation in Old Comedy, these characters are formed out of a common set of building blocks of abuse, so to speak. Making up those building blocks are the following different activities or traits which comic playwrights picked out for public reproach: tyranny, warmongering, seeking personal interests, sexual incontinence, cowardice, dangerous rhetorical power, corruption, litigiousness, mercantile profession, foreignness, servile status, aristocratic excess (participation in symposia/*hetaireiai*), speech deficiencies, youth, sophistic training, and new wealth. Given these sixteen different major aspects and seven ‘demagogue’ figures, a table is here provided for ease of comparison.

⁶⁵⁸ Aristoph. *Thes.* 801-805: βάσανον δῶμεν πότεροι χείρους. ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ φαμεν ὑμᾶς, | ὑμεῖς δ’ ἡμᾶς. σκεψόμεθα δὲ κἀντιτιθόμεν πρὸς ἕκαστον, | παραβάλλουσαι τῆς τε γυναικὸς καὶ τᾶνδρὸς τοῦνομ’ ἐκάστου. | Ναυσιμάχης μὲν <γ> ἥττων ἐστὶν Χαρμῖνος· δῆλα δὲ τᾶργα. | καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Κλεοφῶν χείρων πάντως δήπου Σαλαβακχοῦς. (Let’s take a test to see which sex is worse. We say it’s you and you say it’s us. Let’s examine the issue by pairing the names of each man and each woman one on one. Take Kharminos: he’s worse than Nausimakhe, as the record makes clear. And then Kleophon is of course worse in every way than Salabakkho. Trans. Henderson vol. 3.)

⁶⁵⁹ Aristoph. *Frogs* 1500-1514: ἄγε δὴ χαίρων, Αἰσχύλε, χῶρει, | καὶ σῶζε πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν | γνώμαις ἀγαθαῖς, καὶ παιδεύσον | τοὺς ἀνοήτους· πολλοὶ δ’ εἰσὶν· | καὶ δὸς τουτὶ Κλεοφῶντι φέρων | καὶ τουτουσὶ τοῖσι πορισταῖς, | Μύρμηκί θ’ ὁμοῦ καὶ Νικομάχῳ | τόδε δ’ Ἀρχενόμῳ· καὶ φράζ’ αὐτοῖς | ταχέως ἥκειν ὥς ἐμὲ δευρὶ | καὶ μὴ μέλλειν.

Table 4: Notable Demagogues and Old Comic Abuse							
	Perikles	Kleon	Hyperbolos	Alkibiades	Androkles	Peisander	Kleophon
Tyranny	X	X		X			
Warmongering	X	X	X	X		X	X
Personal Interest	X	X		X			
Sexual Incontinence	X	X		X	X	X	X
Cowardice	X					X	
Dangerous Rhetoric	X	X					
Corruption	X	X			X	X	X
Litigiousness		X	X		X		X
Marketplace Profession		X	X				X
Foreignness		X	X				X
Slave Status		X			X		
Aristocratic Excess		X		X			
Speech Deficiency			X	X			
Youth			X				
Sophistic Training			X	X			
New Wealth					X		

4.2. The Bias and Influence of Old Comedy

At this point many readers have, I suspect, the same question: if this is how demagogues are treated by Old Comedy, how are non-demagogues treated? That question is made immensely more difficult to answer by the fact that, as we saw in previous chapters, *there is no agreed upon definition of who is or is not a demagogue*. In my analysis above I included two politicians in Perikles and Peisander regarding whom I

suspect many scholars would object to their being classed among the demagogues. Is there, then, a line detectable anywhere in Old Comedy's treatment of Athenian politicians? Two of the most prominent living scholars of Old Comedy, Alan Sommerstein and Jeffrey Henderson, certainly think so, both concluding essentially that "Old Comedy had a right-wing bias", to quote Sommerstein.⁶⁶⁰

So how do these scholars support this conclusion? Let us begin with Henderson, who claims that

In Aristophanes' case we must reckon with the presence of a consistent and systematic pattern of bias. There is hostility toward populist leaders in the mold of Pericles and Cleon and any of their policies that threatened the wealth and power of the elite classes. Men like Nicias, Laches, Alcibiades, those implicated in the scandals of 415, and the oligarchs disenfranchised after the coup d'état of 411—potential targets at least as obvious as Pericles and Cleon—are entirely spared and occasionally even defended.⁶⁶¹

Before engaging with the individual pieces of Henderson's argument, it is worth noting that the theories on the ideological affiliation of Aristophanes are necessarily extractions with several removes of the comments in his plays; as such, the following discussion proceeds under the caveat that no external evidence about Aristophanes' political tendencies survives to anchor speculation. With respect to hostility towards Perikles and Kleon, such a pattern certainly fits with what we have seen in our analysis, but I find distinguishing them as populist leaders to be a bit odd: there is no complaint in Aristophanes about 'populist' measures such as jury service payment, and indeed in the *Wasps* the suggestion is that the problem with Athenian politicians is that they give *too little* to the average Athenian citizen. Furthermore, we have no particular indication that "men like Nicias, Laches, [or] Alcibiades" were particularly opposed to the populist

⁶⁶⁰ Sommerstein 1996a, 336.

⁶⁶¹ Henderson 2003a, 157-158.

aspects of the advocacy of Perikles or Kleon. As far as Henderson's other grouping, however, those "entirely spared and even occasionally defended," it does not hold up in the least. With regard to class distinction by birth or wealth, we know nothing to separate Nikias or Lakhes from Kleon, and Alkibiades is patently of the same degree of birth and wealth as Perikles. Nikias is treated relatively well in Old Comedy, although even he is mocked at *Birds* 638-640 for his tendency to paralysis in critical situations and in Teleclides F 44 K. – A. for paying off an informer with good reason. Lakhes is neither spared nor defended: in the *Wasps* he is first referenced by name as having "stuffed his hive with money",⁶⁶² and then is the allusive subject of the mock household prosecution in the form of the dog 'Labes'.⁶⁶³ Although Labes is presented somewhat sympathetically by its advocate, Bdelykleon, it is worth noting that Labes is clearly guilty of the corruption (cheese stealing and hoarding) of which he is accused and only gets acquitted when Bdelykleon literally rigs the vote. I hope that no one will see fit to defend me that way in a play. As we have spent a significant amount of time above exploring the abuse of Alkibiades in comedy, that assertion needs little rebuttal, and Peisander stands as a similar response to "the oligarchs disenfranchised after the coup d'état of 411," at least in their capacity as Athenian politicians before the coup.

As far as the time after the expulsion of the oligarchs and the restoration of the democracy, it is first worth noting that Sommerstein is making an argument from silence. The *Lysistrata* and *Thesmophoriazousai* were both produced in 411, before the coup itself much less the restoration. Besides the potential unsuitability of joking about

⁶⁶² Trans. Henderson vol. 2. Aristoph. *Wasps* 240-244: ἀλλ' ἐγκονῶμεν, ὦνδρες, ὥς ἔσται Λάχητι νυνί· | σίμβλον δέ φασι χρημάτων ἔχειν ἅπαντες αὐτόν. | χθὲς οὖν Κλέων ὁ κηδεμὼν ἡμῖν ἐφείτ' ἐν ὥρᾳ | ἥκειν ἔχοντας ἡμερῶν ὀργὴν τριῶν πονηρὰν | ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὥς κολωμένους ὦν ἠδίκησεν.

⁶⁶³ Aristoph. *Wasps* 835-998.

Athenian internal weakness,⁶⁶⁴ the gendered content and reconciliatory elements make the kind of commentary that one might look for about oligarchic politicians unfitting for the *Lysistrata*; the *Thesmophoriazousai* not only has the same gendered aspect but is broadly artistic and social in its content. The next surviving play of Aristophanes, the *Frogs*, was not produced until 405, and with the war in dire straits calls for a pragmatic reconciliation of citizens and exiles. It is an open question, which cannot now be answered in credible arguments, the degree to which an Athenian audience at that time was receptive to ridicule about the subset of participants in the revolution of 411 who were marked as culpable. This question is further complicated by the fact that many people, equally responsible based on our surviving evidence, suffered no legal retribution. That there were subjects too sensitive to receive comic ridicule perhaps derives some support from the plague: although it was a major factor of life every bit as much as the war, we have no evidence for its mention in plays of the 420s. Indeed, during that time the word νόσος (*nosos* – illness or plague) appears in Aristophanes only in obviously preposterous (and non-life-threatening) situations, such as the νόσος ἱππική that is said to afflict Strepsiades in the *Clouds*, or the malady of jury-obsession in the *Wasps*. The word is entirely absent from *Acharnians* and *Knights*.

If Henderson's distinctions fail to hold up, how do Sommerstein's fare?

Sommerstein's arguments offer more details, although they run along similar lines to those of Henderson. After conducting a survey of politicians mocked in comedy similar, but broader and shallower in scope, to the one that I have carried out above, he detects two particularly important groups: those Athenians mentioned favorably in comedy, and those satirized throughout all or most of a play. In the former group he places

⁶⁶⁴ See pp. 230-232 below.

Arkheptolemos, Nikias, Oulios son of Kimon, Sophokles, and Thoukydides son of Melesias; in the latter group, Hyperbolos, Kleon, Kleophon, Peisander, Perikles, and Teisamenos. Ultimately, he concludes that “while run-of-the-mill comic satire selected its victims fairly impartially, the few political figures singled out for vilification on the grand scale were all on what may be called the Left, and the few singled out for favourable mention were all among their opponents.”⁶⁶⁵

Of the figures supposedly well treated in comedy, Sommerstein sets aside Sophokles, assuming that he “got this treatment because he and his work were so universally admired”;⁶⁶⁶ Sophokles was, of course, also notably active in Athenian politics, holding a generalship in the 440s and serving as a *proboulos* after the failure of the Sicilian expedition, but we know so little about his political views that it is probably wise to leave him out of consideration.⁶⁶⁷ Of the remaining figures, it is hard to accept Arkheptolemos or Oulios as being particularly well-treated by Comedy, and even harder to make solid statements about their political views. Arkheptolemos appears twice in the *Knights*, once described by the aristocratic chorus as looking on and weeping as

⁶⁶⁵ Sommerstein 1996a, 335.

⁶⁶⁶ Sommerstein 1996a, 334.

⁶⁶⁷ Samons 2016, 195-198 discusses at some length the politics of Sophokles; while I find his conclusions about Sophokles’ religious conservatism compelling, I am less convinced by the evidence bearing on Sophokles’ positions vis-à-vis domestic policy and constitutional arrangement. Aside from detecting a general alignment between Sophokles and Kimon and a light antagonism between Sophokles and Perikles, much depends on an anecdote in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (1419a) in which Sophokles is charged as a *proboulos* with having approved the 400, and acknowledges having done *ponēra* things “for there were no better alternatives” (οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω). This anecdote is open to two objections. First, that the man questioning Sophokles is introduced simply as Peisander, and so should likely be the Peisander who was the driving force in establishing the 400, and who fled to the Spartans at Dekeleia after the failure of that government (Thuc. 8.98); it is hard to imagine the situation in which Peisander would accuse Sophokles of doing *ponēra* things by approving the 400. Second, although οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω may be interpreted to mean that there were no better political alternatives to the 400, it could just as well refer to the lack of plausible alternative to approving the 400: i.e., Sophokles was just as powerless in the face of the oligarchic conspirators as the rest of the Athenian *dēmos*. This interpretation might explain why, as Samons notes, Sophokles appears to have suffered no ill effects from his involvement with the foundation of the 400. All of this having been said, I have no intention of arguing that Sophokles was ‘radical’ in his politics: my position is simply that we lack the evidence to make any conclusions about his opinions specifically on the increasing democratization of the political process at Athens.

Paphlagon ‘plucks fruitful foreigners’,⁶⁶⁸ and once recalled as having brought a peace treaty that Paphlagon tore up.⁶⁶⁹ While this is not exactly brutal abuse, it is far from effusive praise, and leaves the audience rather with an impression of Arkheptolemos as powerless. Oulios, meanwhile, appears only once, when the chorus leader of the *Knights* predicts that Oulios will rejoice if Paphlagon suffers a setback.⁶⁷⁰ Outside of their putative opposition to Kleon, which means relatively little in the agonistic world of Athenian politics except that they are not Kleon, we can say relatively little about either Oulios’ or Arkheptolemos’ politics. *Knights* 794-796 may suggest that Arkheptolemos joined Nikias in favoring peace over war with Sparta; the pseudo-Plutarchan *Lives of the Ten Orators* indicates that Arkheptolemos was a member of the 400 and was convicted and executed upon their overthrow, but as we have seen with Peisander membership in the 400 was no guarantee that a politician had always displayed anti-democratic leanings. Sommerstein is straining when he makes Oulios a noteworthy opponent of ‘Leftist’ politics at Athens by virtue of his father’s opposition to Perikles. Indeed, his brother Lakedaimonios seems to have been a collaborator of Perikles, and was sent to Corcyra with the fleet in 433.⁶⁷¹ The most likely referent for this comment is that Oulios had some kind of dispute with Kleon, or they were opponents of each other without any ideological grounding. If we set aside Sophokles, Oulios, and Arkheptolemos, we are left with only Nikias and Thoukydides son of Melesias. I have noted above that Nikias’ treatment in Comedy is not without its sharp edges, although it is undeniable that he was subjected to

⁶⁶⁸ Aristoph. *Kn.* 324-327.

⁶⁶⁹ Aristoph. *Kn.* 794-796.

⁶⁷⁰ It is tempting, given Oulios’ relative lack of impact in Athenian politics, to believe that his appearance was simply a way for Aristophanes to make another ‘good old days’ reference via Kimon to the generation that fought the Persians: if Oulios has contempt for Paphlagon/Kleon, how much more would a great Athenian like Kimon have had!

⁶⁷¹ Thuc. 1.45.

significantly less abuse than the various politicians examined above. Thoukydides is an odd choice, however, as he is almost entirely politically irrelevant during the period for which Old Comedy survives in whole plays or fragments. When he does appear on stage, as at *Acharnians* 703-712⁶⁷² and *Wasps* 946-948,⁶⁷³ his powerlessness is emphasized, just as it was with Arkheptolemos. If any irregularity is worth noting in comedy's treatment of Athenian politicians, it is less a pattern of ideological bias than an unexplained fondness specifically for Nikias. And Nikias was hardly an outlier in the Athenian political spectrum.

Sommerstein's dichotomy of those well-treated by comedy and those singled out for large-scale vilification further collapses upon the realization that the "well-treated" figures are, with the exception of Nikias and Sophokles, also unimportant in the period for which we have evidence, while the "heavily vilified" figures are the most prominent politicians of the time. Indeed, although Sommerstein has chosen to exclude Alkibiades from this list of Athenians targeted with most or all of a play, such a decision is by no means uncontroversial: the bulk of the *testimonia* for Eupolis' *Baptai* indicates that Alkibiades was a, if not the, major target of the play. It seems to me that the most correct conclusion from the evidence is that the authors of Old Comedy targeted the politicians

⁶⁷² Aristoph. *Ach.* 703-712: τῷ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄνδρα κυφόν, ἡλίκον Θουκυδίδην, | ἐξολέσθαι συμπλακέντα τῇ Σκυθῶν ἐρημίᾳ, | τῷδε τῷ Κηφισοδήμῳ, τῷ λάλῳ ξυνηγόρῳ; | ὅστ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἠλέησα κάπεμορξάμην ἰδὼν | ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς τοξότου κυκώμενον· | ὃς μὰ τὴν Δήμητρ', ἐκεῖνος ἦνικ' ἦν Θουκυδίδης, | οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὴν τὴν Ἀχαιὴν ῥαδίως ἠνέσχετ' ἄν, | ἀλλὰ κατεπάλαισε μέντ' ἄν πρῶτον Εὐάθλους δέκα, | κατεβόησε δ' ἂν κεκραγὼς τοξότας τρισχίλους, | ὑπερετόξευσεν δ' ἂν αὐτοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς τοὺς | ξυγγενεῖς. (Yes, how can it be fair that a stooped man of Thoukydides' age should be destroyed in the grip of that Scythian wilderness, this man here, Kephisodemos' son, the prattling advocate? I for one felt pity and wiped away a tear at the sight of an old gentleman being confounded by a bowman. By Demeter, when Thoukydides was himself, he wouldn't lightly have brooked Artakhaes himself, but would have first outwrestled ten Euathloses, outshouted with a roar three thousand bowmen, and shot circles round the kinsmen of the advocate's father. Trans. Henderson vol. 1.)

⁶⁷³ Aristoph. *Wasps* 946-948: οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό μοι δοκεῖ πεπονθέναι, | ὅπερ ποτὲ φεύγων ἔπαθε καὶ Θουκυδίδης· | ἀπόπληκτος ἐξαίφνης ἐγένετο τὰς γνάθους. (No, I think the same thing's happened to him that once happened to Thoukydides when he was on trial: his jaws suddenly got paralyzed. Trans. Henderson vol. 2.)

of the Athenian democracy for abuse, and that with a very few exceptions the degree, consistency, and often the variety of that abuse was directly proportional to a politician's prominence. Once we reject the notion of Old Comedy as being 'pro-aristocratic' or 'rightist', we no longer need the sort of mental gymnastics that have been deployed to explain why a popular form of literature espoused views undercutting the viability of popular sovereignty.⁶⁷⁴ Naturally, it is always popular to attack politicians and to point out their corruption, self-centeredness, and personal failings.

Moving away from a model that sees Old Comedy as operating with an aristocratic bias (and I am far from the only scholar to advocate for such a move) does not, however, answer the question of what Old Comedy's intended effect was. Should we look, for example, at the *Knights*, and conclude that Aristophanes was attacking Kleon in the hopes that he might unmask the man's corruption and convince the *dēmos* to throw him over for a new *prostatēs*?⁶⁷⁵ And if so, how do we reconcile that interpretation with the fact that the audience voted a first prize to the *Knights* and elected Kleon general just a few months later? Arguments that Old Comedy was intended to be primarily aesthetic

⁶⁷⁴ Sommerstein 1996a, 336 n. 73, building on the theory of Edwards 1993 that Old Comedy began as a demotic form of entertainment before being appropriated by poets from the *aristoi* and used against the people's leaders, argues that the "process of appropriation may have been inadvertently facilitated by changes in the composition of the theatre audience due to pressure on seating space and a probable increase in admission charges"; in other words, "the theatre audience and the electoral assembly differed significantly in their social composition." With Henderson I find it "implausible that at the dramatic festivals, the city's most spectacular and expensive annual events, members of the host demos were significantly outnumbered by elite minorities" (2003a, 158), not least given the elite preoccupation with political participation and the popular disinterest in regular assembly meetings that led first to their being literally roped in (as we see at *Acharnians* 17-22) and eventually to pay being offered. However, Henderson's subsequent conclusion, "that the comic poets' political agenda still had some persuasive power, as indeed was still the case in actual politics", is not much better: certainly there were aspects of Aristophanes' plays that must have found un-ironic appreciation and even political support among the audience/*dēmos*, such as perhaps the support for a peace policy, but there is no evidence that removing democratic leaders and handing control of affairs over to some nebulous group of 'better people' was anything but a dead letter, except perhaps among oligarchic terrorists.

⁶⁷⁵ Note that the hoped-for result of the *Knights* is not a return to aristocratic control of the city, but a rejuvenation of the *dēmos* at the hands of a thoroughly demagogic politician (depicted as similar to Kleon/Paphlagon in extraction as well as tactics) who simply turns out to be a good person and citizen; cf. McGlew 2002, 104-111.

falter against the evidence of *Acharnians* (377-382, 502-503, and 630-631) and *Wasps* (1284-1291) for Kleon's legal action(s) against Aristophanes, as well as the likely existence of laws passed around 440 and 415 restricting the right of comedy to satirize. However, these instances all have the common thread of preventing comic satire from undermining the status and unity of the Athenian *dēmos*: they do not indicate a perceived need to protect individuals from potential damaging effects of comic abuse, and scholarly attempts to prove this latter concern are unconvincing. It is not in the least surprising that many members of the audience of the *Knights* thought it salutary that Kleon be taken down a peg or two, especially along with warnings about the impropriety of self-aggrandizement, and that many of the same people still thought that electing Kleon as general would provide a necessary stimulus to that office.

Sommerstein provides a convenient overview of the “fifth- and early fourth-century evidence that some Athenians at least did regard comedy as a significant element in influencing public opinion in particular directions”: the already-mentioned laws of 440-437 and 415 and attacks on Aristophanes by Kleon, the restaging of the *Frogs* “just about the same time as the successful attempt by anti-democratic circles to engineer the death of one of the play's principal satirical targets, Kleophon”,⁶⁷⁶ the culpability of the *Clouds* in “the creation of ... an erroneous public perception of Socrates”, and the ostracism and eventual assassination of Hyperbolos following “a whole series of comedies containing vicious satire on” the politician.⁶⁷⁷ Regarding the conflict between Kleon and Aristophanes, Sommerstein accepts Atkinson's conclusions that “[t]here is no suggestion in the scholium [to *Ach.* 377-382] that Cleon was looking for protection of his

⁶⁷⁶ Sommerstein 1993, 461-469 provides a much fuller overview of his position.

⁶⁷⁷ Sommerstein 1996a, 321-323.

good name as a private citizen”⁶⁷⁸ and that the conflict “provides the most plausible context for the celebrated remarks by the so-called Old Oligarch on how the Athenians do not allow themselves to be spoken ill of as a *people* in comedy, but do allow and encourage vilification of prominent (and therefore normally wealthy) *individuals*.”⁶⁷⁹ (The number of times that Old Comic authors mock the *dēmos* makes abundantly clear the tendentiousness of the Old Oligarch’s comment, but I will argue that there may still be a sound distinction lurking within it.)

Of the law restricting comic speech from 440-437 essentially all that we know are the dates of passage and repeal, but Stephen Halliwell has argued compellingly against seeing it as a general ban on abusing Athenians by name and in favor of connecting it to “the immediate political sensitivities aroused by the Samian war,” potentially in the form of banning reference to the Samian war or Athenian imperial affairs when the allies were present at the Greater Dionysia.⁶⁸⁰ This interpretation is formed in part by analogy to the Kleon-Aristophanes conflict, and as such it would be circular to use it as positive support for *polis*/alliance unity as an area where the effects of comedic abuse were particularly concerning; it will suffice to note that such an explanation fits the circumstances of the 440-437 law, has extensive pedigree in scholarship,⁶⁸¹ and is in no way counter-indicated by the facts we do have about the law. For the so-called Syrakosios decree of 415 Atkinson has made a convincing argument that “Syracosius’ bill was one of the measures taken to protect those who had been falsely accused of involvement in the mutilation of the Herms,” going on to note that “[a]s in the aftermath of similar political crises, there

⁶⁷⁸ Atkinson 1992, 58.

⁶⁷⁹ Sommerstein 1996a, 332. The argument is worked out in detail at Atkinson 1992, 58-61.

⁶⁸⁰ Halliwell 1991, 57-59 (quote from 59).

⁶⁸¹ For extended bibliography on the Samian war and Perikles as motivating factors for the 440-437 law, see Halliwell 1991, 58 n. 43.

may well have been a ban on malicious references to the past - in this case to alleged involvement in blasphemous acts, and as the mutilation of the Herms had been seen as part of a broader plot to undermine democracy, closure of debate on the extent of involvement in the plot was a critical political issue.”⁶⁸² McGlew has argued at length that a detectable ideological goal of comedy is to exalt the average Athenian citizen and promote equality and unity among citizens by bringing to the fore the common desires of all citizens, great and small.⁶⁸³ If this is correct, and it seems so to me, then the laws and legal actions discussed above may represent an awareness of this function of Old Comedy on the part of the *dēmos* and its leadership and an effort to steer that function at particularly politically charged moments: care was to be taken in representing the relationship between Athens and its allies at the height of the Samian war or the Peloponnesian War, and in dealing with the unity of the citizen body following an episode of *stasis* or near-*stasis*.

With this conception of Old Comedy in mind, let us see how Sommerstein’s other examples (Kleophon and the *Frogs*, Socrates and the *Clouds*, and Hyperbolos and the world) fare. For Kleophon, the question centers on the believability and interpretation of the comment in the hypothesis to the *Frogs*, attributed to Dikaiarkhos, that the *parabasis* (686-705) was so wondered at that the play was performed a second time.⁶⁸⁴ It should be noted that the hypothesis/fragment provides *no indication* of the year of reperformance; that datum must be assumed based on one’s interpretation of the larger situation.⁶⁸⁵ Thus

⁶⁸² Atkinson 1992, 62.

⁶⁸³ McGlew 2002.

⁶⁸⁴ Dikaiarkhos F 84 Wehrli: οὕτω δὲ ἐθαυμάσθη διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ παράβασιν, <καθ’ ἣν διαλλάττει τοὺς ἐντίμους τοῖς ἀτίμοις καὶ τοὺς πολίτας τοῖς φυγάσιν>, ὥστε καὶ ἀνεδιδάχθη, ὥς φησι Δικαίαρχος.

⁶⁸⁵ Sommerstein 1993, 465-466 argues in favor of the Lenaia of 404, but his arguments against 403/2 or 406/5 are not entirely compelling.

Sommerstein can claim that the “restaging of the play...strangely enough took place just about the same time as the successful attempt by anti-democratic circles to engineer the death of one of the play’s principal satirical targets,”⁶⁸⁶ while Malcolm Heath can claim (based on the same evidence) that the reperformance “was probably not until after the democratic restoration of 403.”⁶⁸⁷ McGlew tentatively sides with Heath’s interpretation, theorizing that “if [the reperformance] did happen, it may have been because the parabasis points to a resolution that would restore the Athenian citizen body (in a time when no resources could be ignored) without threatening the Athenian democracy.”⁶⁸⁸ It is unclear whether McGlew has a particular time in mind, but such an explanation could hold equally well before Athens’ surrender or after the fall of the Thirty.⁶⁸⁹ McGlew’s interpretation is attractive in how well it would make the reperformance of *Frogs* fit with our previous conclusions, but regardless of whether we accept such a conclusion it is clear that evidence is completely lacking to support a version of events wherein a group of pro-oligarchic friends of Aristophanes use the reperformance to accomplish or celebrate the judicial murder of Kleophon.

The connection of the *Clouds* to the execution of Socrates is explored at length by Heath, who proceeds by focusing on two texts: Plato’s *Apology* (18-19) and his *Symposium*. It is to the *Apology* that Sommerstein refers when he suggests that Aristophanes and the *Clouds* were significantly responsible for creating an “erroneous

⁶⁸⁶ Sommerstein 1996a, 332.

⁶⁸⁷ Heath 1987, 20 n. 34.

⁶⁸⁸ McGlew 2002, 169.

⁶⁸⁹ When discussing the amnesty, Andocides (1.81) specifically mentions as motivation the paramount importance of Athens’ safety: ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐπανήλθετε ἐκ Πειραιῶς, γενόμενον ἐφ’ ὑμῖν τιμωρεῖσθαι ἔγνωτε ἂν τὰ γεγενημένα, καὶ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσασθε σφῶζειν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τὰς ἰδίας τιμωρίας, καὶ ἔδοξε μὴ μνησικακεῖν ἀλλήλοις τῶν γεγενημένων. (After your return from Peiraeus you resolved to let bygones be bygones, in spite of the opportunity for revenge. You considered the safety of Athens of more importance than the settlement of private scores; so both sides, you decided, were to forget the past. Trans. Maidment 1941.)

public perception of Socrates”. This is, I would argue, a misinterpretation of the *Apology*. It is true that Plato has Socrates say that Anytus and the other accusers are less dangerous than those who have for a long time accused him of being “a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger.”⁶⁹⁰ These men are more dangerous, he says, because (a) “those who hear them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods,” (b) “these accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth, most of you in childhood),” (c) “the case they prosecuted went utterly by default, since nobody appeared in defence,” and (d) “it is not even possible to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies.”⁶⁹¹ When Socrates later tries to put a finger on the statements made to arouse prejudice against him, he concludes that he

must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: ‘Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these same things.’ Something of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes’ comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little.⁶⁹²

⁶⁹⁰ Trans. Fowler 1904. Plato *Apology* 18b-c: ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασιν πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάσαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὧς ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὥς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν μου κατήγοροι...

⁶⁹¹ Trans. Fowler 1904. Plato *Apology* 18c-d: οὗτοι, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν μου κατήγοροι: οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὢν.

⁶⁹² Trans. Fowler 1904. Plato *Apology* 19c-d: ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν: ‘Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν

What we should understand from these passages is not that Aristophanes and the *Clouds* were particularly responsible for spreading misinformation and prejudice about Socrates; rather, Aristophanes was the single nameable person for Socrates among an enormous sea of invisible Athenians spreading misinformation to their children. Socrates is not especially afraid of a relatively unpopular play from over two decades prior, nor does he paint the *Clouds* as some kind of fount of the slander spread against him: if anything, he brings it up because it gives him someone and something solid to respond to and defend himself against.

To all of this Heath adds the intriguing possibility that,

by insinuating that the charges against Socrates at his trial were based on a lot of nonsense out of comedy (19b1-2 ἡ δὲ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην), Plato's intention was to discredit the prosecution's case... If that were Plato's intention, it would mean that he felt able to count on a general acceptance that comic portrayals were untrue and should not influence opinion outside the theatre.⁶⁹³

Given the ridiculous, overblown comic portrayals we have seen above, it does not seem at all outlandish to me that Socrates-Plato might utilize such a tactic: after all, despite Aristophanes' frequent descriptions of Kleon as criminal in virtually every way possible, he was to our knowledge never brought to court, let alone convicted of anything. Heath supports this argument opposing the attribution of hostile intent against Socrates to Aristophanes (and perhaps even against the ascription of significant damage *tout court*) with evidence from the *Symposium*. He points out that in the *Symposium* Aristophanes is depicted as a friend of Socrates and even a member of the Socratic circle, and was

καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων.' τοιαύτη τις ἐστίν: ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω.

⁶⁹³ Heath 1987, 9-10.

characterized by Cratinus as a “tiresome over-subtle intellectual, like Euripides and their common mentor Socrates”; thus,

[i]f the poet of *Clouds* was indeed on amicable terms with Socrates and sympathetic to the intellectual interests of his circle, then we cannot safely infer, here or elsewhere, from gross distortions in a comic portrayal to the poet’s ignorance of or indifference to the truth about the individual portrayed, nor from extreme abuse and even violence on the comic stage to the poet’s hostility towards or disapproval of the victim outside the theatre.⁶⁹⁴

In other words, we are on very shaky ground indeed if our best evidence for serious personal harm to a *kōmōdoumenos* as a result of comedy’s abuse shaping popular opinion is Socrates’ execution decades after being targeted in one poorly-received play.

Attributing an important role to the comic dramatists in the murder of Hyperbolos is an innovation of Sommerstein’s, and it fails to convince. Sommerstein first points to the ostracism of Hyperbolos in 417 or 416, asking whether it was “coincidental that shortly after Aristophanes (in the revised parabasis of *Clouds*) had commented on this trend, two leading politicians with their careers at stake guessed that Hyperbolos would be (next to themselves) the likeliest winner of a national unpopularity contest, and that they guessed right”.⁶⁹⁵ It is obtuse in the extreme to suggest that Nikias and Alkibiades were unaware of the relative popularity and primacy of their fellow Athenian politicians, and rather had to rely on comedy to point out to them who their target for ostracism should be. However did politicians in the 480s survive without ‘demagogue comedies’ to show them the way? Surely a more reasonable conclusion is that the “series of comedies containing vicious satire” were aimed at Hyperbolos precisely because he was the most powerful politician in Athens at the time, much as Kleon had drawn the lion’s share of abuse during his primacy and Perikles before him. Comedy did not create Hyperbolos as

⁶⁹⁴ Heath 1987, 11.

⁶⁹⁵ Sommerstein 1996a, 333.

a target for ostracism; rather, it reflected his status in that regard, in much the same way that Nikias and Alkibiades responded to his status by choosing to focus their joint efforts on him during the ostracism. Sommerstein, through a similar train of thought to his analysis of the ostracism, also theorizes that the Athenian oligarch's motive for assassinating Hyperbolos on Samos in 411 was his reputation as a symbol of "the 'shameful wickedness' (Thucydides' words) of the regime they detested." Given that he had not been practicing politics since his ostracism, this reputation would have simply carried over from its creation by the comic poets.⁶⁹⁶ This theory is especially difficult to believe because Sommerstein postulates immediately beforehand the motivation that almost certainly actually under laid the assassination: "[i]t may be that they feared he might be able, with his known ability as a popular orator, to stir up opposition to them among the crews of the fleet based at the island."⁶⁹⁷ Indeed, Thucydides' editorializing commentary about Hyperbolos' lack of influence notwithstanding,⁶⁹⁸ there should be little doubt that, if the *hetaireiai* in Athens paved the way for their coup through the assassination of *dēmagōgoi* such as Androkles, then the Athenian and Samian oligarchs were quite justified in beginning their attempt to cow the local democrats by assassinating a *dēmagōgos* so prominent that he had been ostracized.⁶⁹⁹ Sommerstein's theory that Aristophanes' comments on Hyperbolos served as a trigger or solicitation to

⁶⁹⁶ Sommerstein 1996a, 333.

⁶⁹⁷ Sommerstein 1996a, 333.

⁶⁹⁸ Thuc. 8.73: καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τε τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. (Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolos, an Athenian, a pestilent fellow that had been ostracised, not from fear of his influence or position, but because he was a rascal and a disgrace to the city. Trans. *Landmark*.) This sounds more like comedy or oligarchic propaganda than history (note the avalanche of moral/class value terms: μοχθηρὸν...πονηρίαν...αἰσχύνην. Thucydides was, of course, in exile from Athens for the entirety of Hyperbolos' ascendancy, and may have received his information from fellow exiles with an anti-democratic bias.

⁶⁹⁹ There is also, of course, a strong possibility that some of those engineering the assassination had personal motives which they cloaked under a convenient *realpolitical* rationale.

assassinate him therefore seems a very strange motivation in the context of Samos in 411.⁷⁰⁰

4.3. Old Comedy and Societal *Mores*

So if there is little evidence that the virulent attacks of Old Comedy against individual politicians did lasting damage to the careers of those politicians in isolation from or more predominantly than other aspects of public opinion, and indeed rather more evidence that politicians like Perikles, Kleon, and Hyperbolos maintained or even increased their power and prominence during and after comedic abuse, what are we to make of the function of that abuse? As I have previously indicated, I find claims for Old Comedy possessing primarily an aesthetic function (like those of Heath) to falter in the face of the concerns displayed by Kleon and the laws of 440-437 and 415 about the effect of Comedy on the city; I am also unpersuaded by the theories that Aristophanes opposed popular sovereignty, directing his plays either to an aristocratic audience or an audience significantly divided on the issue. Instead, I think that McGlew's *Citizens on Stage* points the way, and I hope that I can follow in its footsteps with respect to *onomasti kōmōdein*. I wish to suggest (briefly here and more extensively, I hope, in the future) that the point of the abuse directed at politicians in Aristophanes is not to suggest truths about individual politicians, politicians generally at that time, or even the Athenian *dēmos*' opinion (and distrust) of politicians; rather, their point is to reinforce societal *mores* more generally.

To take an example from the figures we have analyzed, Hyperbolos or Kleophon are accused of being foreign, and the audience laughs: the point is not to convince the

⁷⁰⁰ People may have been disinhibited from killing Hyperbolos because he had been dehumanized by ridicule, but that is not the same thing as a triggering commentary, nor does it indicate that such a result lay within the intentions of Aristophanes. Furthermore, a great many Athenian politicians were the target of extensive ridicule in Old Comedy, foremost among them Kleon and Perikles, and the overwhelming majority suffered no attempts against their lives on that basis.

audience that Hyperbolos or Kleophon are foreign in actuality, or that ‘politicians nowadays’ turn out to be foreign, nor does the audience’s laughter indicate that they suspected their politicians of being foreign; rather, it reaffirms between comedian, chorus, actors, and audience, in essence the *dēmos* writ large, that foreignness was an unacceptable quality in a citizen, let alone an official or politician. The audience did not go home eager to bring a case against Hyperbolos for improper citizenship, but they may well have gone home thinking about the importance of maintaining the purity of the citizen rolls, and assuming that anyone who could laugh with them in the audience at the theater shared the belief in that importance and must therefore also have been a citizen: exclusion binds. They may also have pondered whether there was in fact something outside Attic tradition in the policies and comportment of Hyperbolos. Or again: Kleon is accused of accepting bribes, and the audience laughs; are we really to believe that they sincerely suspected that Kleon was accepting enormous bribes and yet took no direct action? Rather, we should see this as a group affirmation, presumably with most politicians watching and participating, of the wrongness of accepting bribes. After all, although we may, from a modern standpoint, see bribery as inherently evil and indefensible, from the standpoint of an archaic gift-giving culture (kept partially alive among the aristocracy, and thus in imitation by other wealthy elements of Athenian society) a ‘bribe’ might simply be part of keeping up an important relationship of reciprocal benefit (and possibly also benefit to the city). Here, then, we might see Mann’s notion of the *dēmos* asserting its morality, and indeed reminding politicians of that morality.⁷⁰¹ The point of comic abuse is not so much about which people are accused of

⁷⁰¹ Mann 2007, 184-190.

bad things as about which bad things are selected to serve as abuse for those politically active.

A good modern parallel for the goal of comedy that I am here suggesting is the attempt at removing terms such as ‘retarded’ and ‘gay’ from the American lexicon of abuse. This step is taken not only, and indeed not primarily, because of a concern that such a term might be ‘accurately’ applied to the target; indeed, ‘gay’ can be used unproblematically as a neutral term. The reason for removing these terms *as abuse* is that such use is an affirmation by the party intending abuse, the party taking umbrage (if there is one), and any audience that these terms indicate a negative, undesirable aspect to a person or thing. That is to say, by continuing the use of ‘gay’ to describe even non-human things or circumstances which we might dislike, we are societally reaffirming the negativity of homosexuality. This parallel brings us to an important point about the politics of Old Comedy. Although comedy was certainly a popular medium, the playwrights were not simply reflecting audience beliefs back at them to be thoughtlessly confirmed; the comedians could not only choose which aspects of identity to focus on in a particular play (and here we might think of Atkinson’s interpretation of the Syrakosios decree as prohibiting the mockery of acquitted individuals on the basis of their participation in the affairs of the mysteries and herms), but could choose to problematize a certain aspect of abuse beyond the ability of the audience to simply laugh away. In terms of this latter point the issue of rhetoric is a perfect example: the speech of figures like Perikles and Kleon is frequently picked out for mockery, but always with an eye to its powerful, seductive quality. Areas of abuse are built upon exclusion (x is good or acceptable, and y is not), and so they overlay a dual anxiety: most basically the anxiety of

being excluded, the appropriate target of ridicule, but also the anxiety about the validity of the exclusion/definition in the first place. Thus, depending upon how it is marshaled, comic abuse has the potential to unite the audience by excluding the other, divide the audience by constructing or affirming internal exclusions, or undermine a societal definition itself. It behooved the Athenian *dēmos* for comedy to restrict itself as much as possible to the first of these modes, although only the second seems to have been appreciated as particularly dangerous, and then only to be interdicted in times of particular danger to the *polis*. It also served the public interest for the rehearsal of *mores* to be attached to those with the most power, and thus the most potential (a) to transgress those *mores* and (b) to think themselves above those *mores*: the aristocracy and, after its disjunction from political power, the ‘demagogues’.

This chapter began with a systematic assessment of the treatment of ‘demagogues’ in Old Comedy, restricted for the sake of space to Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Alkibiades, Androkles, Peisander, and Kleophon. We discovered that the abuse of these politicians fit into several categories, and that these categories usually applied to at least two (and sometimes to many) of the ‘demagogues’. We also showed that figures like Perikles, Alkibiades, and Peisander, whom modern scholars (and in the last case, ancient sources) have been hesitant to classify as ‘demagogues’, fit unexceptionally into the patterns and categories of abuse detectable with the other figures examined. We then considered and ultimately dismissed arguments that Old Comedy had an appreciable ‘right-wing’, aristocratic, or anti-democratic bias, and argued that no programmatic distinction was detectable between ‘mocked’ and ‘non-mocked’ politicians. Finally, we rejected the theory that Old Comedy had the capacity by its abuse

of individual political figures to reduce or destroy the prominence or popularity of that figure with the *dēmos*/audience, or was successful in so doing. In its place, we suggested a political vitality of Old Comedy and its abuse within the realm of ideology and definition, where the importance of abuse was shifted from the figure targeted (except inasmuch as their presence warned them to avoid the transgressions imputed to them) to the avenues and exact deployment of the abuse itself.

Conclusion

This investigation into the phenomenon of demagogy in Classical Athens began with a thorough lexicographical analysis of the Greek *dēmagōg-* terms: *dēmagōgos*, *dēmagōgia*, *dēmagōgein*, and *dēmagōgikos*. The most obvious meaning for these terms comes from their constituent parts: *dēmos*, ‘the people’, and *agein*, ‘to lead’: to lead the people. Although it might be tempting to assume that *dēmagōgos* was formed by analogy with *paidagōgos*, and thence indicated the childishness of the *dēmos*, an extensive examination revealed little positive evidence for such a formation. After considering the evolution of various definitions of ‘demagogue’ in scholars such as E. Meyer, M. Weber, and M. I. Finley, I proposed that ‘demagogue’ was coined to indicate any person who advised the *dēmos* in its capacity as the decision-making body in the state with respect to matters of policy. Importantly, this was a descriptive term, and not indicative of a formal position or office: any citizen could, theoretically, act as a *dēmagōgos* on a given matter, regardless of their specific policy position or previous political prominence.

‘Demagogue’ by its very existence displaced the role of leadership within the state from the *aristoi* who had traditionally held that role onto the members of the citizen body generally; it also, by its constituent parts, indicated that the position of highest influence that an individual could aspire to in the state was merely leadership or guidance (*agein*, unlike many magistracies which derive from verbal stems like *arkhein*, to rule), while the final, ruling power in the state was reserved to the *dēmos*. In these senses, *dēmagōg-* terms were always partisan: they upheld the validity of popular sovereignty and represented the consequent stripping of authority from the traditional elite. However, they were partisan in that they acknowledged the non-elite citizens in the *polis* as a part of the

decision-making *dēmos*, not in a prizing or representation of the interests of the non-elites *against* the interests of the elites or *aristoi*. It was, furthermore, a subsequent development that writers who either disapproved of democracy and popular sovereignty *tout court*, or who at least found themselves consistently disapproving of the leaders chosen by the democracy, appropriated the word for use in a derogatory sense to mean a bad, self-interested, or corrupt leader.

The effort to provide a new and comprehensive definition for *dēmagōg*- terms in Classical Athens went side by side with an exploration of the use of those terms in ancient sources. In Aristophanes, we saw repeatedly a comparison of ‘good’ aspects to demagogues and demagogy in an idealized past with ‘bad’ modern demagogues and demagogy; this comparison indicated the moral neutrality of the terms themselves. Thucydides’ usage was more difficult to assess with respect to moral connotations, and it seemed possible that beneath the terms lurked a partisan, even adversarial relationship between the *dēmos* as non-elites and the *aristoi*. These two fifth-century authors stood at the head of respective traditions of understanding demagogy, traditions that we broke down on the basis of K. J. Dover’s distinction between public works, *i.e.*, those intended for mass consumption, and private works, *i.e.*, those intended for a narrow, like-minded (usually reading) audience. Similar to Aristophanes were the fourth-century orators: they too largely used *dēmagōg*- terms in a morally neutral sense, and even sometimes suggested that good, selfless behavior was expected of demagogues. The Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*, if taken on its own without Aristotle’s *Politics*, fits the same pattern: the leaders in an idealized past were better than present leaders, but figures as far back as Peisistratos could be called demagogues, and a major decline in those ‘holding the

demagogy' only occurred with Kleophon. Xenophon seemed to follow Thucydides fairly closely in meaning, although his usage may edge closer to negative moral connotations. He also presented the only early example of *dēmagōg-* terms used to describe the activity of a *philostratiōtēs* military commander (perhaps, 'comradely commander' or 'soldiers' favorite').

Aristotle certainly fell into the private category, but although his use of *dēmagōg-* terminology followed more closely that of Thucydides and Xenophon than Aristophanes and the orators, the extent of his theoretical construction around the terms in the *Politics* made him *sui generis*. We found this theoretical construct to be rooted in a conflict between *nomos* and *psēphisma*, insomuch as he claimed that demagogues enabled a degenerate form of democracy wherein *psēphisma* was dispositive over *nomos*, and that they only came to exist in such a state. Leaving aside the causative paradox in this statement, we found both a historical sense and an Aristotelian sense in which *psēphisma* could problematically be dispositive over *nomos*. From a historical standpoint, *nomos* was the body of rules approved by social memory; *psēphismata* could be *nomoi* in this sense, but were not necessarily, nor did a *nomos* necessarily require a *psēphisma* to be recognized and cogent. Concern about the conflict between *psēphisma* and *nomos* grew over the fifth century, undoubtedly a side-effect both of constitutional changes (*i.e.*, instances where *nomos* was overruled) and the proliferation of the *stēlai* bearing legislation that served as reminders (and symbols) of the binding force of *psēphismata*. In the late fifth century there were several prominent instances, such as the oligarchic coup in 411 and the (lack of a) trial of the generals at Arginousai, of the transgression of *nomos* either by *psēphisma* (411) or by aberrant executive action of the *ekklēsia* (Arginousai).

These incidents, combined with a general push from many constituencies along the Athenian political spectrum for the revision, codification, and publication of the accepted historical and valid *nomoi* of the city, led to a new distinction in the fourth century between the processes and bodies associated with creating *psēphismata*, and those with creating *nomoi*. Although this historical material provided the backdrop for Aristotle's work, the changes made by the Athenian democracy did not obviate his complaints, because his complaints were fundamentally anti-democratic. For him, the purpose of *nomos* was to guide the *ponēros plēthos* to virtue; as a result, *psēphismata* being operative over *nomos* is intolerable because *psēphismata* are enactments of the *ponēros plēthos*, who will thus act outside of control. Anyone supporting such an immoral state of affairs could not be acting in the best interest of the *polis*, and so must be acting in his own best interest, and thus be a flatterer. Tyrants were similarly inappropriate rulers, making them akin to the *dēmos* and to demagogues, and the self-interest inherent in demagoguery would make of any demagogue a proto-tyrant. Furthermore, by extension anyone, even a monarch or demagogue, who appealed to the *dēmos* for support in political power struggles was acting as a demagogue, and ran the risk of turning over control to the *dēmos* and thus giving rise to a democracy.

Although Aristotle has undoubtedly had a strong influence on the meaning of demagogue-related terms in modern languages, he was less influential in that respect in antiquity. We saw lingering negative uses of *dēmagōg*-terms in Diodorus Siculus and Polybius, but nearly all subsequent authors had more mixed usage of the terms, most frequently applying the neutral moral sense familiar from Aristophanes and the orators. Of the later authors we focused only on Plutarch, because of the frequent appearance of

dēmagōg- terminology in his oeuvre. In separate passages Plutarch specifically compared demagogy to tyranny and to oligarchy, and in both cases he found that, although demagogy was not inherently good, it was nevertheless a far lesser evil than the other sort of rule or personality in question. Furthermore, on the one occasion that Plutarch defined demagogy itself, he distinguished it from a similar word, *dēmokopein*, ‘to catch the people’, saying that while the latter meant to take the people by their stomachs or purses, *dēmagōgein* meant to take the people by their ears with reason. With this remark we returned to the original, advisory term for leadership in a democratic situation, far from the disapproval for that situation and the activity of demagogy that had permeated Aristotle.

In our second chapter, we turned from the ‘what’ of demagogy to the ‘who’: that is, which Athenians were called demagogues by our ancient sources. The initial list comprised fifty-seven names, stretching chronologically from Theseus to Demetrios of Phaleron and ideologically from the traditionally understood demagogues (so-called ‘radical’ democratic politicians) to kings, tyrants, participants in oligarchic coups, and traditional ‘leaders of the nobles’ like Miltiades, Kimon, Thoukydides son of Melesias, and even Nikias. When restricted to only those figures named by fifth- or fourth-century sources, our list dropped from fifty-seven to twenty-one names, and when limited to those named on three or more occasions, from fifty-seven to seventeen. When both criteria were applied, we were left with ten ‘demagogues’: Theseus, Peisistratos, Perikles, Hyperbolos, Kleophon, Arkhedemos, Kleon, Kallistratos, Demosthenes, and Euboulos. This list (more or less) maintained the chronological range from the full list of fifty-seven figures, but the oligarchic partisans and ‘leaders of the nobles’ have all disappeared,

lending some confirmation to the conclusion of our lexicographical exploration that demagogues were intimately tied up with support for (and encouragement of) popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, caution was recommended in dismissing members of the larger list entirely from consideration as demagogues: after all, our evidence is lacunose at best, and it would be odd indeed to assume that we have seen every application of *dēmagōg*-terminology rather than to surmise further examples existed that are now lost. Regardless of the exact scope one might choose to employ in approaching the list, the chronological boundaries present a particularly interesting coincidence. They stretch nearly exactly over the scope of the ‘independent’ Athenian democracy, given that the Athenians considered Theseus the founder of that democracy and that the death of Alexander and the constitutional reforms of Demetrios of Phaleron have often been taken in antiquity and modernity alike as its end point. That Demetrios is the latest Athenian labeled a demagogue thus provides further confirmation for the connection between demagogy and democracy.

From this broad (chronologically and ideologically) list of demagogues we segued to a moment that has often been singled out in modern scholarship as the beginning of demagogic politics at Athens: the death of Perikles. Although A. Andrewes and W.R. Connor explicitly express uncertainty about whether to class Perikles as a demagogue (or, in Connor’s parlance, a ‘new politician’), they tend to lean against doing so, and S. Hornblower has pointed to Thucydides’ eulogy of Perikles (2.65) as the source for their division of Athenian politics. Our analysis of that passage revealed that Thucydides was indicating not a larger breakpoint in Athenian politics, but Periklean exceptionalism specifically: he mentioned no pre-Periklean politicians, and the difference between

Perikles and his successors was located in Perikles' superior reputation and influence. Thucydides made no reference to aspects like Andrewes' financial expertise and social status or Connor's change in political *tekhnē*. Here and elsewhere in Books 1 and 2 of the *Histories* Thucydides stressed the 'vision and honesty' of Perikles as opposed to subsequent politicians, but it is difficult to assess the validity of this judgment: we simply lack any confirmatory evidence, and it is hard to imagine how one could distinguish between a politician presenting a proposal that he believed in and that was popular with the *dēmos* and a politician presenting a proposal simply because he thought that it would be popular.

It turned out that the breakpoint in political leadership at Athens that has loomed large in modern scholarship derives not from Thucydides, but from the fourth-century writers whom he influenced. Isocrates' *De Pace* 122-127, for example, adhered closely to Thuc. 2.65 but generalized 'good' politicians to those before Perikles' death and stretched 'bad' politicians all the way down to the mid-fourth-century publication of the speech. The Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* not only chronologically generalized the break in leadership, but added terminology like *epieikeis* that holds not only moral but also social (or perhaps 'class') connotations, matching up with theories like those of Andrewes and Connor. Interestingly, [Aristotle] selected not Kleon for the beginning of the decline in leadership, but Kleophon; this selection suggested that success or failure in the war effort was a critical aspect in the appreciation of the quality of leadership at Athens (after all, to some ancient observers the Athenians had won the Archidamian War). Theopompos followed [Aristotle] in the chronological generalization, the application of moral/class terminology, and the transfer of the breakpoint away from the death of Perikles: for him

leadership began to decline with Hyperbolos, and his attribution of that decline to fear that the *aristoi* might put down the democracy further points to thinking influenced by the events leading up to the Sicilian Expedition, rather than at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

The chapter concluded with an in-depth examination of the theory of ‘financial expertise’, pioneered by Andrewes and taken up by Connor. Andrewes theorized that the Athenian *arkhē* required men capable with details of administration and finance, and that these men came from business families because aristocratic education and habits of life were unsuitable to produce the necessary expertise. Connor in turn suggested that, as rhetoric and the *ekklēsia* took on increased importance in guiding the state, men who were elite in money but not birth could use their own or their family’s background in business or trade to gain the trust and respect of the *dēmos*. At the center of both theories we found one man, Kleon, and so our analysis focused on determining the extent and manner of Kleon’s involvement with finance. This involvement was predicated largely upon the evidence of Old Comedy, but upon further examination that evidence suggested not a scrupulous businessman or financial wizard, but a litigious and corrupt politician. His involvement with money almost always came down to extortion, whether of the rich in court or the allies in diplomacy, self-enrichment by bribery and graft, or a combination thereof.

Furthermore, the connections to actual financial measures that scholars have proposed for Kleon were found to stand on very weak bases. The only evidence for his institution of the *eisphora* tax came from comedy, and indicated not his creation or imposition of the tax but rather his zeal in applying it, often in his own political self-

interest. Scholars connected him to the Kleonymos Decree only by the fact of its dealing with tribute collection and occasional references to Kleonymos and Kleon with a similar tenor in Aristophanes. Although more detailed arguments had been made tying Kleon to the Thoudippos decree, these too turned out to be illusory. The contents of the decree could indeed be characterized by some scholars as ‘harsh’, but these provisions were aimed not at the allies or at opponents of the war with Sparta, but at Athenian corruption (of the very character with which Aristophanes associates Kleon). The timing of the decree did fall shortly after Kleon’s great success at Pylos, but the decree itself stipulates waiting for the return of the army with Nikias, the man usually cast as Kleon’s opponent in the passage of the decree. Finally, a putative family connection between Kleon and Thoudippos was previously shown by F. Bourriot to be questionable at best, and likely unfounded. In all, we found no evidence that the first (and most likely) of our ‘financial experts’ ever marshaled such an argument on his own behalf, nor indeed that he was viewed by his contemporaries as particularly involved with aiding the finance or administration of the *arkhē*. Moving beyond Kleon, we noted that, although the growth of said *arkhē* certainly led to an increased number of magistracies and thence to a higher proportion of non-aristocratic officials, officials were not *dēmagōgoi*. The tenure of a magistracy may have given these aspiring, non-aristocratic politicians greater opportunity to distinguish themselves and begin working towards a prominent role advising the *dēmos*, but such a slow, traditional process would run directly counter to Connor’s theory of the new politicians and would scarcely indicate a necessary reliance on financial expertise when approaching the *ekklēsia*.

Chapter three picked up the thread of Connor's 'new politicians' by beginning with an in-depth consideration of that theory. We saw that Connor rejected the notion of 'party' politics at Athens or even using 'party' terminology to describe Athenian politics, suggesting in its place a 'polycentric' system of many groups bound together not by policy issues but by personal connections to a central 'demagogue'. Against the backdrop of this polycentric system Connor envisioned a change in political technology detectable with Perikles but really coming to the fore with Kleon and subsequent leaders: where earlier politicians underwent a time-consuming process of building *philia*-bonds, holding magistracies, and excelling in military service, these 'new politicians' skipped this career-building by using rhetoric to appeal directly to the *dēmos* in the *ekklēsia*. The traditional Athenian aristocracy would then have reacted to this change by withdrawing from political life, whether in the form of simple refusal to participate or in active anti-democratic machination. We did, however, note several problems with this theory. First, that Kleon did not function well as a first 'new politician', given the indications of a noteworthy career in the courts, which would have required *philoī* as well as the lack of evidence for financial expertise or innovative appeal to the *dēmos*. Second, there was little indication that 'new politicians' actually rose more quickly to prominence than previous leaders: both Kleon and Nikias were older and relatively experienced on their rise to prominence in the 420s, while (*e.g.*) Themistokles and Kimon were quite young during their rise to prominence early in the fifth century. Finally, there was no *cursus honorum* of the Roman type at Athens in terms of a course of magistracies aspiring politicians were expected to hold, so that 'skipping magistracies' would be difficult to gauge even if it were a relevant characteristic.

From Connor's 'new politicians' we moved to M. Ostwald's 'opposition to popular sovereignty'. Ostwald's major contribution here was detecting a second wave of 'new politicians' reacting to Connor's 'demagogues': while those 'demagogues' were committed to democracy and were patriotic, the reactionaries, a youth movement rooted in intellectualism and sophism, were trained in rhetorical power without ethical or moral guidelines, and were thus motivated mostly by self-interest. In pushing back against what had become a calcified establishment mindset in the pro-democratic 'demagogues', they eventually became the members of the *hetaireiai* and anti-democratic partisans who would cause significant upheaval in the state in the 410s and 400s. Unfortunately, Ostwald showed a tendency to create multiple, broad groupings of political figures (young versus old, pacifist versus pro-war, aristocratic versus 'common', wealthy versus poor, self-interested versus patriotic, etc.), which resulted in a difficulty for his classification of politicians in really detecting coherent movements as opposed to temporary constellations (outlined in Connor's polycentric system).

L.B. Carter's *The Quiet Athenian* improved on Ostwald's approach in large part by addressing these very discrepancies within Athenian reactions to a 'new politics' after Perikles, which reactions Carter classified under the term *apragmosynē*. He distinguished three particular groupings: the noble youths, wealthy *aristoi* who either used sophistic teachings to engage in democratic politics or, overwhelmed by disgust at those politics and particularly the non-aristocratic leaders chosen by the *dēmos*, withdrew first into non-participation and eventually into sedition against democracy itself; the *autourgoi* peasant farmers who were either (or both) unable to participate in politics because of the demands of farm life outside of the city or unwilling to usurp the aristocratic privilege of political

leadership; and the rich quietists, comprising (a) wealthy men frightened away from politics by the possibility of sycophantic prosecutions against them, (b) men who were themselves active in politics but wanted Athens to be more *apragmōn* in its dealings with the Greek world, and (c) men who engaged only to a limited extent in the political life of the *polis* (perhaps militarily but not demagogically). Of these three groupings, we found it difficult to accept aspects associated with the second and third groups. With respect to peasant farmers, the radical changes in life circumstances pressed upon that group by the Periklean war strategy made the assumption of any coherence to their political participation questionable, even if one could endorse how the portrait of this class is created from the plays of Aristophanes and Euripides. For the rich quietists, the idea of politically withdrawn generals was a non-starter, politically active men in favor of a more reactive Athenian foreign policy were unrelated to our interest in Athenian political participation, and wealthy men frightened away by the possibility for lawsuits may draw overly much on the *topos* of non-participation within judicial speeches.

With C. Mann's *Die Demagogen und das Volk* we found important critiques of several aspects of the previous theories. Mann approved Connor's theory of direct rhetorical appeals to the *dēmos* vis-à-vis the *ekklēsia* during the Archidamian War, but argued that such communication was just as valid all the way back to the beginning of the Athenian democracy. He also claimed that the techniques of self-presentation that Connor attached to the 'new politicians', such as a staged rejection of *philia* ties, were equally valid for the entire length of the democracy, and that, for example, comments written or drawn on *ostraka* showed that failure to meet the expected style of life and politics could be and were punished harshly by the *dēmos*. For Mann there were two important groups

of elites: those elite by birth, and those elite by wealth, and he rejected the idea commonly held by Connor, Ostwald, and Carter that politicians who were not elite by birth first began appearing on the largest stage at Athens after Perikles' death. In supporting his position, he pointed to Themistokles, Aristides, and Ephialtes as potentially non-aristocratic politicians from earlier in the fifth century, but with mixed persuasiveness: pushing back against the notion of a strict absence of non-aristocratic politicians before Kleon is quite worthwhile, but Mann arguably went too far in making a confident claim for any of these specific politicians. We know too little (other than about Themistokles, connected with a prestigious *genos*) to declare them aristocratic, but just the same we know too little to declare them non-aristocratic. Mann's bid to replace Ostwald and Carter's vision of a wealthy or aristocratic reaction to a 'new politics' at Athens was similarly of mixed success, although it was a necessary argument given his rejection of the concept of a 'new politics'. Alkibiades as a major turning point in the *imago*-construction of Athenian politicians leading to a destabilization of democratic norms is a tempting theory, but is hobbled by the same lack of evidence for earlier, possibly similar politicians that Mann uses to caution against the 'new politicians' theory itself.

In closing the chapter, we concluded that it was preferable to see both forms of Connor's politics (old, *philia*-based career building and new, rhetorical guidance of the *ekklēsia*) as active at the same time, rather than taking Mann's course of simply preferring the 'new' politics as the dominant mode of Athenian democratic political life. Most of our evidence for Athenian politics comes at the highest levels, and indeed is focused more on results or actions than on process; as such, and given that we lack any

real indication of the discontinuation of Connor's 'early' political career-building, it seems odd to assume that the process of building a political *imago* and official career would have been substantively different for a non-aristocratic politician than for an aristocratic one (although the status of individual *philo*i would of course have differed). The changes in terminology through which Connor detected a change in political technique should instead be understood simply as changes in terminology, reasonable in light of the arrival and development of sophistic and philosophical thought at Athens over the course of the fifth century. The increase in non-aristocratic participation in politics was an understandable result of the *arkhē*, both through its enrichment of many non-aristocratic Athenians and through the scope it gave for such Athenians to distinguish themselves in offices military and civic alike. It should not surprise us that to our eyes such politicians 'appear suddenly' after Perikles: first because our source material becomes orders of magnitude more complete at that point, and second because Perikles' greatness had a tendency to obscure any lesser politicians (for a period of nearly twenty years), as Plutarch himself observes at *Pericles* 39.4.⁷⁰²

Our fourth and final chapter focused on Old Comedy and its treatment of 'demagogues' at Athens. We began with a comprehensive examination of the abuse directed at seven particular 'demagogues': Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos, Alkibiades, Peisander, Androkles, and Kleophon. The abuse quickly fell into recognizable categories, leading us to create a list of 'building blocks of abuse': tyranny, warmongering, pursuit of

⁷⁰² Plut. *Per.* 39.4: καὶ γὰρ οἱ ζῶντος βαρυνόμενοι τὴν δύναμιν ὡς ἀμαυροῦσαν αὐτούς, εὐθὺς ἐκποδὼν γενομένου πειρώμενοι ῥητόρων καὶ δημαγωγῶν ἑτέρων, ἀνωμολογοῦντο μετριώτερον ἐν ὄγκῳ καὶ σεμνότερον ἐν πραότητι μὴ φῶναι τρόπον (For those who, while he lived, were oppressed by a sense of his power and felt that it kept them in obscurity, straightway on his removal made trial of other orators and popular leaders, only to be led to the confession that a character more moderate than his in its solemn dignity, and more august in its gentleness, had not been created. Trans. Perrin vol. 3.).

personal interest, sexual incontinence, cowardice, dangerous rhetorical power, corruption, litigiousness, mercantile profession, foreignness or servile status, aristocratic excess, speech deficiency, youth, sophistic training, and new wealth. There was little perceptible difference in how Perikles, who falls before the ostensible ‘demagogues’ proper in a variety of modern theories, Alkibiades, whose social class and self-presentation differ from many of his contemporaries, or Peisander, who eventually assumed a leadership role in the oligarchic coup of 411, were treated as compared to the other, more traditionally demagogic figures on our list. Warmongering was a particularly common thread, and, given Aristophanes’ general preference for peace in his plays and the relatively mild treatment of Nikias, who is associated with opposition to adventurism during the Peloponnesian War, may have been an issue by which politicians were selected for abuse. However, sexual incontinence was equally common, raising the question of whether (a) Aristophanes was prudish, (b) the politicians mocked in Old Comedy were really sexually deviant and were selected on that basis, or (c) Aristophanes was simply appealing to a general prejudice about affluent or elite behavior within his audience for comic effect. The third of these options seems most likely to me, and may indicate that the issue of war and peace was similarly used either for comic effect or for emplotment (to position with emphasis a character as sympathetic or villainous).

From the treatment of individual ‘demagogues’ we moved to the position held by J. Henderson, A. Sommerstein, and others that Aristophanes and Old Comedy operated from a conservative or ‘right-wing’ point of view. Henderson argued that hostility was normally shown towards populist leaders like Kleon and Perikles, while their opponents (Nikias, Lakhes, Alkibiades, those implicated in the scandals of 415 or the coup of 411)

were spared or defended. Our previous examination had shown that Alkibiades was not particularly well treated, nor was Peisander, who was involved in the coup of 411; a look at Lakhes in comedy revealed that his treatment was not much better, if at all.

Furthermore, J.E. Atkinson has made a compelling argument that the Syrakosios decree of 415 restricted Old Comedy specifically from attacking for their involvement in the scandals of 415 those who had been vindicated. And I further suggested that Athenian audiences would find little comedy or entertainment in bringing up those executed, disenfranchised, or exiled for their politico-religious terrorism in 415 or 411. Some topics were too close to home, as for example the plague is never joked about in the surviving plays of Aristophanes.

Sommerstein compared two groups of politicians: those mentioned favorably in comedy (Arkheptolemos, Nikias, Oulios, Sophokles, Thoukydides son of Melesias) and those who were satirized in entire plays (Hyperbolos, Kleon, Kleophon, Peisander, Perikles, Teisamenos), concluding that the ‘right-wing’ orientation of the former and the populist orientation of the latter spoke to Old Comedy’s bias. However, we saw little surviving evidence for the political orientation of Arkheptolemos or Oulios (as a father’s politics do not guarantee his son’s), and their treatment in comedy turned out to be more as powerless figures than favorable ones. Thoukydides, long past his relevance in Athenian politics, was treated similarly in comedy. Along with Sommerstein himself, we left Sophokles aside (being a *proboulos* did not indicate that a figure was ‘right-wing’, but that he was established, senior, and respected by the *dēmos*; Hagnon, the only other known *proboulos*, was certainly not ‘right-wing’). This left only Nikias as a relevant and influential politician treated particularly well in comedy. The ‘populists’, meanwhile,

were more readily identifiable as the most prominent politicians of their respective eras aside from Nikias (Sommerstein left out Alkibiades, but we noted that the *Baptai* may have extensively satirized him). In other words, generally the figures not subjected to abuse were unimportant in Athenian politics — and hence potentially useful counter-exemplars — while those subjected to particular abuse were the most important: this was the axis of delineation, not populist policy position or opposition thereto. Removing the ‘ring-wing’ label from our lexicon on Old Comedy fits more comfortably with the popular nature of the form. Previously, we had been left with the unpalatable options either that the audience was representative of the decision-making *dēmos* and enjoyed (for Aristophanes at least was very popular) repeatedly being told that their choices of leaders were wrong, or that the audience was not representative of the decision-making *dēmos*, but somehow slanted toward the *aristoi*, and enjoyed repeatedly being told that the choices of leaders by the *dēmos* were wrong.

We also considered the question of whether Old Comedy had a significant effect in influencing public opinion. We sided with Halliwell in concluding that the laws restricting the freedom of abuse granted to Old Comedy were concerned not with potential damage to *kōmōdoumenoi*, but with promoting the unity and harmony of the *dēmos* and the Athenian alliance more generally (the discussion of the Syrakosios decree above falls within this heading). The claim that a reperformance of Aristophanes’ *Frogs* was carried out to encourage or celebrate the judicial murder of Kleophon, one of a gamut of politicians abused in that play, was found to be unpersuasive. Building on the realization of M. Heath that the *Symposium* of Plato depicts Aristophanes as a friend of Socrates and even a member of his intellectual circle, we suggested that Socrates in the

Apology pointed to the misrepresentation of his activities in the *Clouds* not because he thought the play particularly damaging to him, but because Aristophanes was the only identifiable voice to which he could respond and against which he could defend himself in an otherwise invisible sea of Athenians. A relatively unsuccessful play produced over two decades before his trial was not a major contributor to his eventual condemnation. Finally, we completely rejected Sommerstein's theory that Nikias and Alkibiades turned their joint efforts against Hyperbolos in an ostracism because of the depictions of him in Old Comedy (rather, his ostracism and the abuse in Old Comedy should both indicate that Hyperbolos was extremely influential at the time), and that the oligarchs who later assassinated him in Samos did so influenced by his representation in comedy. In actuality there was a *realpolitical* motivation for the action in that he was potentially a powerful leader for the democratic forces and Athenian crews on Samos, as well as there existing possible personal motivations for the Athenian exiles involved in his murder.

We concluded that Old Comedy focused on the reinforcing or problematizing of social *mores* through its abuse of those prominent political figures who were most likely to (visibly and dangerously) transgress those *mores*. The point was not to rail against democracy, nor to unveil the sordid corruption of Athenian politicians, nor did Aristophanes win his popularity by consistently telling the people in earnest that their choices of leaders were terrible. Rather, the abuse was democratic, in that it attacked those who sought to stand out above the people, while, as [Xenophon] complains, sparing the people themselves. This fact may explain why Nikias was less targeted than most of

his contemporaries: Plutarch tells us that a (and perhaps the) major cause of Nikias' popularity was the respect and fear that he showed to the people.⁷⁰³

As is so often the case, the act of answering questions (who and what were the demagogues of Classical Athens) has led to further questions that must remain beyond the scope of the current work. In the future I intend to do further work on surviving scholia to assess their evidence on the usage of *dēmagōg*-terminology in antiquity. There is also a separate diction belonging to military command that deserves its own treatment. The Romans never felt the need to transliterate the Greek diction on demagogy into Latin. Naturally, the frequency with and patterns by which Greek biographers and historiographers applied this terminology to Roman leaders does not relate to the analyses conducted in this work. Yet a treatment of such discourse stands as a manifest scholarly desideratum.

My other major research project involves the epigraphy and statistical analysis of the Athenian tribute lists. This work has been supported by several grants. With my interlocutors, I am striving to realign our understanding of Athenian democracy away from the public trajectories of specific leaders and towards an exploration of dynamics of administrative processes, including issues such as inertia and efficiency. In considering

⁷⁰³ Plut. *Nic.* 2.3-4: καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἦν αὐστηρὸν οὐδ' ἐπαχθὲς ἄγαν αὐτοῦ τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' εὐλαβεῖα τινὲ μεμειγμένον, αὐτῷ τῷ δεδιέναι δοκοῦντι τοὺς πολλοὺς δημαγωγοῦν. τῇ φύσει γὰρ ὢν ἀθαρσὴς καὶ δύσελπις, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀπέκρυπτεν εὐτυχίαν τὴν δειλίαν· κατάρθου γὰρ ὁμαλῶς στρατηγῶν· τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ψοφοδεὲς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συκοφάντας εὐθροῦβητον αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτικὸν ἐδόκει καὶ δύναμιν οὐ μικρὰν ἀπ' εὐνοίας τοῦ δήμου παρέχειν τῷ δεδιέναι τοὺς θαρροῦντας, αὔξειν δὲ τοὺς δεδιότας. τοῖς γὰρ πολλοῖς τιμὴ μεγίστη παρὰ τῶν μειζόνων τὸ μὴ καταφρονεῖσθαι (The dignity of Nikias was not of the harsh, offensive sort, but was blended with much circumspection, and won control of the people from the very fact that he was thought to be afraid of them. Timid as he was by nature, and distrustful of success, in war he managed to succeed in hiding his cowardice under a cloak of good fortune, for he was uniformly successful as a general; while in political life his nervousness, and the ease with which he could be put to confusion by accusers, actually tended to make him popular, and gave him in high degree that power which comes from the favor of the people, because they fear men who scorn them, but exalt men who fear them. The multitude can have no greater honor shown them by their superiors than not to be despised. Trans. Perrin vol. 3.).

the history of finance and administration in Classical Athens in Chapter Two, there were strong temptations to introduce discussions from these investigations which needed in the main to be suppressed in the interest of focus on my central inquiries. As my work on the tribute matures and appears, I look forward to melding its results with my appreciations of the demagogues as bureaucrats or financial gurus.

It is nearly impossible to imagine the word ‘demagogue’ being used in modern English parlance to indicate simply that a person is ‘a leader in a popular state’,⁷⁰⁴ although in the *Oxford English Dictionary* one can trace such a meaning coexisting with the pejorative sense through the 19th century. Such a situation is not *prima facie* unacceptable: language and meaning do evolve, after all. However, this study serves as a critical corrective for any assumption that the pejorative sense that we have settled on for ‘demagogue’ was the original, or even the dominant, sense of the Greek *dēmagōgos*. Given the wide variety of meanings, connotations, and ideological underpinnings that I have clearly demonstrated to have attended on ‘demagogue’ terminology in antiquity, this work should serve as a needed caution against Anglophone scholars employing our word ‘demagogue’ in discussions of ancient politicians without a careful definition and discussion of their usage of that term. Indeed, it may be hoped that the conclusions here will have ramifications beyond academia, encouraging those of us living in (and ostensibly supporting) democratic states to confront the conflicted feelings about democracy betrayed by our use of words like ‘demagogue’.

⁷⁰⁴ As Swift glossed it in his 1719 *Letter to Young Gentlemen* (with reference to Demosthenes and Cicero!).

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Abbreviations

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 AO: Develin, R. *Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C.* Cambridge 1989.
 APF: Davies, J.K. *Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C.* Oxford 1971.
 ATL: Meritt, B. D, H.T. Wade-Gery, and M.F.McGregor. *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (4 vols.). Cambridge, MA and Princeton 1939-1953.
 BNJ: Brill New Jacoby.
 CAH: Cambridge Ancient History.
 Classen/Steup: *Thukydides erklärt* von J. Clasen, bearbeitet von J. Steup, 3rd to 5th edns. Berlin 1900-1922.
 CT: Hornblower, S. *A Commentary on Thucydides*. 3 vols. Oxford 1991-2008.
 FGfH: Jacoby, F. *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Berlin and Leiden 1922- .
 GG: Busolt, G. *Griechische Geschichte*². 3 vols. Gotha 1893-1904.
 HAC: Hignett, C. *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford 1952.
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 IG: *Inscriptiones Graecae*.
 K. – A.: Kassel, R. and C. Austin. *Poetae Comici Graeci*. 8 vols. Berlin 1983-2001.
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 LSJ: Liddell, H.G. and R. Scott. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Rev. and aug. H.S. Jones and R. McKenzie. Oxford 1940.
 ML: Meiggs, R. and D. Lewis eds. *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century B.C.*² Oxford 1988.
 MWG: *Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. 1: Schriften und Reden, Bd. 22: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. Teilband 5: Die Stadt, ed. W. Nippel. Tübingen 1999.
 OED: *The Oxford English Dictionary*.
 P.Oxy.: *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*.
 PA: Kirchner, J. *Prosopographia Attica*. 2 vols. Berlin 1901-1903.
 Perrin: Perrin, B. *Plutarch: Lives*. 11 vols. Cambridge, MA 1914-1926.
 PHI: Packard Humanities Institute, searchable database of Greek inscriptions.
 RE: *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*.
 SEG: *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.
 Storey: Storey, I.C. *Fragments of Old Comedy*. 3 vols. Cambridge, MA 2011.
 TLG: *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.

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